U.S.-UKRAINE MILITARY RELATIONS

AND THE VALUE OF INTEROPERABILITY

Leonid I. Polyakov

December 2004

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ii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

 I am grateful to many people who supported this monograph with their knowledge 

and advice. First of all, I thank the authors of interviews for sharing their knowledge and 

experiences: U.S. Army retired Major General Nicholas Krawciw, U.S. Army retired Colonel 

Harry Simmeth, Ukrainian Army retired Colonel Dmitri Shkurko, Ukrainian Army Colonel 

Sergiy Poliakov, U.S. Army Colonel Timothy Shea, U.S. Air Force Lieutenant Colonel John 

Cappello, and California Army National Guard Major Joel Ostrom. This report would not 

be possible without friendly revision, skillful insight, and all possible support from my 

friends, Colonel Harry Simmeth and Mr. James Greene. Special thanks to my 1995 U.S. 

Army War College classmate, Colonel Harry Simmeth, for his expert opinion on the early 

days of U.S.-Ukraine military engagement. This came from his unique perspective of having 

been the principal U.S. architect of that engagement while serving as a U.S. Army colonel 

on the U.S. Joint Staff in the Pentagon. Important additions to the report were made due to 

the timely recommendations by U.S. Army Colonel Mark Easton and U.S. Army Lieutenant 

Colonel Leigh Gabel. I am grateful to the U.S. Army Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), in 

particular to the Director, Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr., who encouraged me to write 

the monograph, and to Dr. Stephen Blank, for ”piloting” it through the SSI publication 

process. I should also like to thank the Razumkov Centre’s intern, Stefan Sokolowski, whose 

invaluable help in preparing the text is greatly appreciated.

NOTICES

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 This manuscript was funded by the U.S. Army War College External Research 

Associates Program. Information on this program is available on our website, http://www.

carlisle.army.mil/ssi/, at the Publishing button.

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the U.S. Government. This report is cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.

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ISBN 1-58487-170-9
iii

CONTENTS

Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Part I. Strategic Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Part II. The Cooperation Mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Part III. Practical Peacetime Engagement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

Part IV. Accomplishing Missions Together . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

Part V. Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65

Endnotes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71

Appendix. Key Interviews . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79

About the Author . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115

v

FOREWORD

 Ukraine has been a pivotal actor in Eurasia since its independence 

in 1991. Ukraine’s destiny is critical to the security of the entire postSoviet zone, and both it and the United States always have acted on 

that assumption. The stated goal of Ukrainian defense policy long 

has been to integrate with Euro-Atlantic structures like the North 

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and this goal has been one 

of the chief objectives of the United States, as well. However, to 

move from rhetoric to implementation is particularly difficult where 

the defense reform of a post-Soviet state has been concerned, and 

Ukraine is no exception. Nevertheless, in the past few years Ukraine 

has begun to make remarkable progress towards its self-professed 

goal of defense integration with Western structures.

 Mr. Leonid Polyakov’s detailed study of Ukrainian-U.S. defense 

relations and of Ukraine’s defense reforms provides a comprehensive 

account of these two intertwined processes with focus on the last 

5 years. His analysis clearly points out both the obstacles and the 

successes that Ukraine has encountered in its defense reform and 

outlines the challenges ahead for both partners. Given that Ukraine is 

a major contributor to the stabilization forces in Iraq and a key player 

in any European and Eurasian security order, this monograph is of 

more than academic interest. It has great policy relevance, especially 

as the United States seeks to work with its allies and partners in other 

post-Soviet states to foster their defense and political integration 

with the West. This monograph deserves careful consideration, and 

the Strategic Studies Institute offers it to foster better understanding 

of Ukraine’s pivotal role.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director

Strategic Studies Institute 
1

INTRODUCTION

 From the earliest times of its post-Soviet independence, Ukraine 

has been open to security cooperation with the United States. In the 

beginning, there were significant differences in political, security 

and even bureaucratic cultures between the two countries, which 

formed some obstacles to building bridges quickly. Many of these 

obstacles remain, especially in the political dimension of relations 

between the two countries. But in the absence of their former 

ideological differences and united by common interests in preserving 

international peace and fighting terrorism, Ukraine and the United 

States have established constructive and mutually beneficial military 

cooperation.

 The United States has been interested in engaging post-Soviet 

Ukraine in security cooperation and clearly articulated what it 

wanted to achieve from this cooperation. It was in U.S. interests to 

have a strong, independent, stable, and democratic Ukraine as a 

partner in Eastern Europe. Guided by such a vision, the United States 

consistently has demonstrated initiative in supporting Ukraine in 

building its national military by engaging it in peacetime militaryto-military contacts. The Ukrainian government unhesitatingly 

accepted U.S. leadership in bilateral military cooperation, which has 

provided it with an opportunity to learn useful approaches to defense 

reform, raised Ukraine’s international prestige, and strengthened 

the country’s position vis-à-vis the pressure for regional influence 

exerted by its neighbor (and regional dominant power), Russia. 

 Bilateral programs of military contacts with the United States have 

become the largest among Ukraine’s many international military 

cooperation programs. Since 1992 bilateral military cooperation has 

improved in terms of quality and substance, and set the stage for 

preparation, execution, and support of actual U.S.-Ukraine combined 

operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, and now Iraq. These combined 

deployments have demonstrated that the years of cooperation were 

not in vain; Ukrainians have proven their ability to be a reliable and 

capable peacekeeping combat force. 

However, as this monograph suggests, despite steady improvement in bilateral cooperation, developing full interoperability 

between the Ukrainian and U.S. militaries beyond joint peacekeeping 
2

is not yet a realistic possibility. At a time when full combat 

interoperability is beyond reach for even the closest U.S. allies, the 

experience of previous U.S.-Ukraine partnership shows that the most 

logical and realistic option is to promote and further improve tactical 

interoperability for low intensity conflict: peacekeeping, peacebuilding, and humanitarian assistance. More ambitious goals are far 

beyond Ukraine’s current financial capabilities, and are restrained 

by the country’s inability to qualify politically and economically for 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) membership soon. 

 This monograph consists of four parts. Part I presents a strategic 

context for U.S.-Ukrainian military cooperation and provides general 

data on the history and current state of security relations between 

Ukraine and the United States. Part II focuses on the development 

and improvement of cooperative mechanisms for bilateral military 

contacts. Part III provides data and analysis of peacetime military 

engagement and discusses important lessons learned. Part IV 

examines Ukraine’s practical cooperation with the U.S. military 

in operations in Kosovo and Iraq―operations where cooperation 

continues today.

 In sum, U.S.-Ukrainian military cooperation has created a 

reasonable foundation for limited joint and combined action, with

the United States helping Ukraine to build a noticeable cooperative 

capability. This capability currently is being adjusted in Iraq and 

other places. The potential remains for even greater cooperation, if 

necessary improvements are made.

 The United States should not be expected to carry the burden of 

the future international peace and security agenda alone. In exercising 

its leadership, the United States will have to rely on ad hoc coalitions 

as often as it will rely on its closest allies. Ukrainian troops, though 

not among the closest U.S. allies, are a likely partner of the U.S. 

military in future contingencies. Thus the success of U.S. future 

engagements could depend on how the two countries act today to 

build their interoperability. 

 The history and lessons of U.S.-Ukrainian military cooperation 

may be of interest to scholars in post-Cold War East European 

security affairs, and to operational planners and practitioners who 

are creating and/or participating in a coalition force including the 

United States, Ukraine, and/or other post-Soviet or post-totalitarian 

states.
3

PART I

STRATEGIC CONTEXT

We are like long-distance cousins; where you grew up and you really did 

not know your cousin, and now for some reason you have both moved to 

the same city, and now you have the opportunity to see one another. And 

now, as you get to know each other, certain things are very important 

and demand attention right now, and then later on, there are still items 

to work on, you just have to spend the time to get to know each other 

better. And with time, eventually, you will fall in love with each other. So 

maybe it is not long-distance cousins. Maybe it is long-distance lovers. 

Joel Ostrom

Interview, November 12, 2003

 In terms of territory, Ukraine is the largest European nation. It is 

strategically located at a European crossroads between the eastern 

borders of enlarged NATO and the European Union (EU) and the 

western border of Russia, with Belarus to the north and the Black Sea 

to the south. Ukraine’s border with Russia is 2,063 kilometers (km) 

long; with Belarus, 975 km; with Poland, 542.5 km; with Slovakia, 

98 km; with Hungary, 135 km; with Romania, 608 km; and with 

Moldova, 1,194 km.

 Ukraine’s population is approximately 48 million―down by 4 

million from what it was in 1991, when it became independent after 

the dissolution of the former Soviet Union. 

 Ukraine is famous for its fertile black soils and, consequently, for 

its agricultural sector (“bread basket”); Ukraine produces millions of 

tons of such commodities as grain, sugar, sunflower oil, and meat. 

Ukraine is also blessed with a wealth of natural resources such as 

iron ore, manganese, coal, nickel, and uranium. Except for oil and 

gas, Ukraine is basically self-sufficient. It is both agricultural and 

industrial, producing a wide range of products including spacecraft, 

tanks, radars, ships, transport aircraft, and many other state-of-theart products. Its workforce generally has earned a good reputation 

in Europe for being industrious, educated, and skilled.

 Ukraine also could become a notable sea power. Among the Black 

Sea littoral nations, Ukraine holds first place in terms of its coastline’s 
4

length―1,720 km (Russia, 920 km; Turkey, 1,320 km; Georgia, 290 

km; Bulgaria, 260 km; Romania, 240 km). The country has 18 seaports 

and 8 shipyards, as well as its own system of educating maritime 

specialists.1

 Politically, Ukraine is a unitary state and presidentialparliamentary republic. According to its constitution, Ukraine is 

a democratic, social, and law-based state. All the formal signs of a 

democratic state exist: political parties, an elected Parliament, and an 

elected president. But in reality, Ukraine is still struggling to become 

a real democracy. Contemporary political life too often becomes a 

battleground between dominant oligarchic and opposing leftist and 

national-democratic forces, with major democratic values very often 

declared rather than enforced.

 Yet, as a forward step, Ukraine announced its intention to 

integrate into NATO and the European Union in May 2002.

Historical Background.

 Given its crossroads position between Europe and Asia, and 

its natural wealth, it is no wonder that this land historically was a 

battleground for legions of conquerors and for its natives, who lived 

through centuries of glorious victories, humiliating defeats, heights 

of national spirit, and darkness of subjugation and oppression. 

 On the territory currently occupied by Ukraine, the first Eastern 

Slavic State, Kievan Rus, emerged in the early 9th century, with 

its capital in Kiev. The state’s first rulers traced their roots to the 

Varangians (Vikings), who came to Kiev from the north. The history 

of this medieval state is largely a consecutive series of war stories 

about fighting invaders and internal rivals, conquering neighboring 

tribes, and threatening Byzantium across the Black Sea. In the 10th 

century Kievan Rus formally adopted Eastern Orthodox Christianity 

as the state religion.

 The state existed until the 13th century when it became a common 

heritage for Ukrainians and Russians. In 1240 Kiev was destroyed by 

the Mongols/Tartars, who dominated this land for about a century 

until they were pushed away by the Grand Principality of Lithuania, 

and later by the Rzech Pospolita (a Polish-Lithuanian medieval 

state). The northern territories of Kyivan Rus around Moscow were 
5

separated, and for almost another 200 years they were dominated by 

Tartars, later becoming the Principality of Moscow, and later still―

”Great” Russia.

 In the Ukrainian part of the Polish state, the introduction of 

serfdom in the 16th century led to the emergence of a phenomenon 

called Cossacks. These were former peasants who could not tolerate 

serfdom and chose to escape to the southeastern steppes on the lower 

River Dnipro (Dnepr), where they established a stronghold called 

the Zaporozhian Sich. 

 With time, the Roman Catholic Polish state accepted the existence 

of the Sich and often used its free peasant-soldiers in its wars. But 

later, the Orthodox Zaporozhian Sich gained strength as a political 

power and pursued an independent policy of shifting alliances with 

powers other than Poland. This became intolerable for the latter 

and provoked attempts at suppression. The subsequent Cossacks’ 

rebellion in the middle of the 17th century under the leadership 

of Bohdan Khmelnytsky was victorious, but the Cossacks failed 

to secure an independent state, choosing instead in 1654 to join 

Moscow’s Orthodox Tsar, on the condition that they preserve a 

confederate status and internal self-rule. 

 Moscow later reneged on this arrangement and imposed its power 

on Kiev, liquidating Ukraine’s autonomy and proclaiming itself 

the ruler of Ukraine. In 1775 the Zaporozhian Sich was destroyed. 

“Muscovites” became “great Russians,” or simply “Russians,” and 

Ukrainians became “little Russians” and lived under Russian and 

later Soviet rule.

 While relations between ordinary people of the two nations 

throughout 3 centuries have been generally tolerant, Russia’s 

imperial rulers were always on alert for the stirrings of Ukrainian 

nationalism and tolerated no hints of Ukraine’s escaping their 

political control. The Ukrainian language was once banned in the 

19th century, and signs of national independence were always 

persecuted severely. In the 20th century’s Soviet period, this took the 

form of the destruction of Ukraine’s attempts to become independent 

during the civil war of 1917-20; the imposition of an artificial famine 

in 1932-33 after Ukrainians showed that they were unwilling to 

submit to collectivization (some seven million Ukrainians perished 
6

from hunger); and the severe persecution of Ukrainian nationalist 

resistance after World War II.2

 In 1991, after the infamous coup in Moscow, Ukraine’s Parliament 

(Verkhovna Rada) adopted an Act of Ukraine’s independence on 

August 24, and a national referendum on independence in December 

showed that 91 percent of the population supported independence. 

Thus the modern state of Ukraine appeared on the world map, 

although the prospects for its independent development were not 

rosy. 

 Ukraine inherited from its Soviet past the aftermath of the 1986 

Chernobyl nuclear disaster; a large, but “heavy” energy-inefficient 

industrial base, with some 80 percent of it dependent on Russianmade components and energy supplies; an almost total lack of 

national-level management; and a weak civil society. Ukraine also 

inherited Soviet bureaucratic traditions and an uneasy relationship 

with Russia, which, despite the official proclamations of friendship 

and strategic partnership, at times could be characterized as uneasy 

cooperation―a “cold peace.” 

Ukraine as a Military Power.

 In terms of military power, newly independent Ukraine 

inherited a great deal from the Soviet Union.3

 Forces located on 

Ukrainian territory were part of the second strategic echelon of the 

Soviet western theatre of operation. In pure numbers, the country 

inherited the world’s third largest nuclear arsenal; about 40 percent 

of the former Soviet Union’s armed forces personnel and equipment; 

and huge stocks of Soviet strategic reserves of arms, supplies, and 

ammunition.

 As for ground forces, in 1991 Ukraine hosted on its terrain 5 armies, 

1 army corps, 18 divisions (12 motorized rifle, 4 tank, and 2 airborne), 

3 airborne brigades, and 3 artillery divisions. The Air Force had four 

air armies, while Air Defense had one air defense army and three 

corps. Also, a Black Sea Fleet, not initially under Ukraine’s control, 

was divided between Ukraine and Russia in 1997. There was one 

rocket army of nuclear-capable Strategic Missile Forces and many 

support units. Soviet military educational facilities on Ukrainian 
7

territory consisted of 34 military colleges and 78 military faculties at 

civilian universities to provide military education and training. 

 In terms of numbers, there were 6,500 battle tanks; more than 7,000 

armored combat vehicles; 1,500 combat aircraft; 270 attack helicopters; 

350 combat ships and support vessels; and millions of small arms 

pieces and millions of tons of ammunition. Ukraine inherited a large 

nuclear arsenal, with 220 strategic weapon carriers, including 176 

land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) (130 SS-19 and 

46 SS-24 missiles) and 44 strategic bombers (19 Tu-160 and 25 Tu-95). 

The overall nuclear potential of the strategic force was estimated at 

1,944 strategic nuclear warheads, in addition to 2,500 tactical nuclear 

weapons. The ICBMs were targeted at the United States and armed 

with multiple independent reentry vehicle (MIRV) warheads, and 

every bomber carried long-range cruise missiles. In the military were 

some 800,000 troops in total.4

 Ukraine also possessed one-third of the 

Soviet defense industry―1,840 enterprises and research centers that 

employed 2.7 million people. Some facilities had unique capabilities 

such as shipbuilding and missile production.

 However, it was not a coherent national defense sector per se, 

but a fragmented collection of what used to be the mammoth Soviet 

military-industrial complex, which had to be transformed into the 

national defense sector of Ukraine. Despite Ukraine’s becoming 

the world’s third largest armed power immediately after gaining 

independence (taking into account all inherited conventional and 

nuclear capabilities), it did not have much time to enjoy this status. 

The extremely high “inheritance tax” on this Cold War legacy became 

obvious very soon. In fact, the legacy brought more debts to be paid 

than wealth for prosperity.

 It was obvious from the beginning that Ukraine needed a smaller 

force for its defense and one that it could afford. But in the absence of 

sound experience and appropriate intellectual capacity to produce 

a meaningful reform plan, Ukraine initially tried to recreate a 

Soviet-model system. These efforts, however, took place against a 

background of rapid economic decline. Due to poor governance and 

the virtual absence of effective economic reforms, the promising 

economic potential of Ukraine rapidly disappeared: from 1991-95, 

Gross Domestic Product (GDP) dropped by almost 50 percent. It 
8

bottomed out in 1999 with an estimated 60 percent reduction, if 

compared with the last preindependence year of 1990. Thus in the 

1990s defense reform basically was confined to cutbacks of the most 

obsolete and expensive parts of the Armed Forces (for numbers, see 

Table 1). 

 

 1991-2002

Total 2006

1991 1996 2002 Reduction Plan

Battle tanks 6,500 4,080 2,467 3,033 1,800

Armored combat vehicles 7,000 5,050 4,103 2,897 3,500

Combat Ships 9 12 17 +8 18

Combat aircraft 1,648 1,090 392 1,236 225

Attack Helicopters 271 230 133 138 120

Total military personnel 800 400 290 510 160

(Army personnel), thousand (300) (190) (170) (130) (106)

Table 1. Dynamics of Reduction of Weapons, 

Military Equipment, and Personnel in Ukraine.

 By the turn of the millennium, however, the situation qualitatively 

changed. All nuclear weapons were removed or dismantled. 

Economic decline was also reversed in 2000, and since then Ukraine’s 

economy has grown by some 5-8 percent per year. Necessary defense 

reform experience also was acquired and applied to reach more 

reasonable decisions. Though the military equipment remaining 

in service has become 13 years older (with poor maintenance and 

scarce modernization), more attention and resources are coming 

to some priority areas, providing hope for the positive outcome of 

reform efforts. Constant attempts to reform the military generally 

have resulted in certain structural changes and in the threefold 

reduction of the numerical strength of the military―from almost 

800,000 military servicemen in 1991 to 250,000 in 2003. However, the 

country is unable to sustain even this number, and further reductions 

by almost half are imminent. On the positive side, a certain degree of 

experience has accumulated, and there have been modest successes 

in some rather low-tech/low-cost areas (international peacekeeping; 

combat engineering; chemical, biological, and radiological [CBR] 

protection; military education; and transport aviation).
9

 In addition, recent encouraging decisions point Ukraine’s military 

towards the creation of a Joint Rapid Reaction Force (RRF)5 and to 

the transition to all-volunteer manning instead of the current mixed 

conscript/contract model. Defense budgeting has shown modest 

signs of improvement, which has made it possible to channel resources 

to funding some priority requirements, such as, for instance, military 

intelligence and RRF unit training. 

To a significant extent, Ukraine’s limited achievements in 

the defense sector are due to the country’s active participation in 

international peacekeeping and military-to-military cooperation, 

both under the NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) program and 

under programs of bilateral military cooperation. After the terrorist 

attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, Ukraine became 

a member of the antiterrorist coalition.

 Beginning with 400 peacekeepers sent to the former Yugoslavia 

in 1992, in 2004 Ukraine had well over 3,000 peacekeepers around the 

world participating in 11 missions in such places as Iraq, Lebanon, 

Liberia, Sierra Leone, Kosovo, Georgia, and others. Having gained a 

reputation as a reliable peacekeeping force, the military of Ukraine 

is in constant demand from the United Nations (UN) and other 

security organizations, thus significantly contributing to Ukraine’s 

international image. Ukrainian transport aviation is working hard 

under contracts from the UN and from individual NATO countries 

(including the United States) to sustain operations in Africa, 

Afghanistan, Iraq, and other places. 

With regard to cooperation with NATO, Ukraine became the 

first of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries 

to join the NATO PfP Program in February 1994. In 1995, UkraineNATO cooperation started in a real peacekeeping operation, with 

the deployment to Bosnia of the Implementation Force (IFOR). It 

continues―beginning with the follow-on Stabilization Force (SFOR), 

and later with the Kosovo Force (KFOR), in which Ukraine has almost 

250 personnel, mainly within a joint Ukrainian-Polish mechanized 

battalion.

 On July 9, 1997, in Madrid, Spain, Ukraine and NATO signed the 

“Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between the North Atlantic 

Treaty Organization and Ukraine.” This event paved the way for the 

creation of a Joint Working Group on Defense Reform and a Joint 
10

Group on Civil Emergency Planning. Soon after signing the charter, 

NATO opened its Information and Documentation Center in Kiev 

(its first on the territory of the former Soviet Union), and established 

a NATO liaison office in Ukraine’s Ministry of Defense, which has 

been headed by a retired U.S. military officer since January 2004.

 In 2000 Ukraine ratified the PfP Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) 

and in 2002, the Exchange of Classified Information Agreement, and 

offered its large Yavoriv Training Center in Western Ukraine for the 

purposes of PfP training and exercises. Ukraine’s NATO partners 

render important assistance in personnel training and developing 

interoperability. Ukrainian representatives are regularly invited 

to attend NATO training courses abroad and participate in joint 

exercises. Many hundreds of Ukrainians already have graduated 

from colleges and courses abroad. 

 Since 1995 Ukraine has participated in the NATO interoperabilitybuilding vehicle commonly known as the Planning and Review 

Process (PARP). It started by accomplishing only one interoperability 

objective out of 14 the country voluntarily took upon itself to achieve 

in the first cycle of PARP (1995-97), and somewhat improved during 

the second cycle―11 accomplished out of 27 selected. Currently 

Ukraine is in its third PARP cycle program, and is trying to integrate 

PARP, previously limited to the interoperability of PfP-designated 

units only, into the overall process of reforming Ukraine’s military. 

To this end, Ukraine has coordinated with NATO, through the Joint 

Working Group on Defense Reform, to develop a list of 51 PARP 

partnership goals, prioritizing language training, command and 

control, and logistics. The most illustrative practical examples of 

these efforts are the creation of a multinational staff officers course,6

increased emphasis on English language proficiency for certain 

categories of officers’ positions, and creation of the first all-volunteer 

units within RRF. 

 Overall, Ukraine’s partnership with NATO has developed into 

an extensive, mutually beneficial, and promising cooperation. Taken 

together with such major factors as the historical military tradition 

of Ukrainians, the growing contribution of the Ukrainian military 

to international peacekeeping, and recent positive developments 

in Ukraine’s defense reform, it creates a favorable background for 
11

building U.S.-Ukrainian military cooperation and the particular 

issue of improving interoperability.

Political-Military Framework.

 It probably would not be an exaggeration to say that, before 

independence, Ukraine, for a majority of educated Americans, 

basically was known―if at all―only as the one-time “bread basket” 

of Europe and as a part of the former Soviet Union (Russia). This 

knowledge reflected only Ukraine’s agricultural potential―a 

historical image created by largely Russophile-dominated American 

East European studies. 

 For a few, Ukrainians also were known for their original culture 

and many centuries of continuous but largely unsuccessful struggle 

for self-government and independence. In the course of this struggle, 

Ukrainians sometimes were very ruthless to their perceived 

oppressors―be it Poles, Russians, Germans, Jews, or Turks―and these 

stories helped to inflate a false, stereotyped image of Ukrainians as 

“stubborn and ungrateful” or “greedy and selfish” nationalists. In 

addition, as part of the Soviet Union/Russia, Ukraine was known 

as a territory harboring a large part of the Soviet nuclear potential, 

which was targeted at the United States, and as such, represented a 

vital threat to U.S. security (which was correct).

 Given that Ukrainians themselves had a rather limited ability to 

present their historical arguments, their influence on U.S. foreign 

policy prior to becoming independent was also limited, being 

realized only through émigré circles. The above-mentioned dominant 

perceptions of Ukrainians as “unpredictable and dangerous 

nationalists” were very likely behind the logic of the famous speech 

in August 1991 by U.S. President George Bush to the Supreme Soviet 

(Parliament) of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic just weeks 

before the infamous Moscow coup and Ukraine’s declaration of 

independence, in which he warned Ukrainians that ”. . . freedom 

is not the same as independence . . . [Americans] will not aid those 

who promote a suicidal nationalism based on ethnic hatred.”7

 Such 

warning naturally surprised Ukrainians and ignited protests and 

demonstrations from the Ukrainian Diaspora in the United States.
12

 Thus the beginning of the political relationship between the two 

countries was rather rocky.8 Despite Ukraine’s earlier adoption of 

the Declaration of State Sovereignty in July 1990, which declared 

that “Ukraine would not acquire or produce nuclear weapons,” it 

took some time for U.S. foreign policy towards Ukraine to change its 

main focus from pressuring Ukraine to denuclearize. 

 The difference in political, security, and even bureaucratic 

cultures was also a noticeable obstacle to building bridges fast 

enough,9 but several major developments contributed to a positive 

change in the relationship, which generally took shape by 1995. 

First, Ukrainian authorities appeared to be cooperative on the issue 

of nuclear disarmament. They did not always seem eager to satisfy 

their U.S. partners, since they did not consider it appropriate for 

Ukraine to bear the entire burden of dismantling and disposing of 

nuclear arms. After all, it was not Kiev’s decision to deploy these 

arms on Ukrainian territory. However, the successful conclusion of 

the denuclearization agreement with the United States and Russia 

(the so-called Trilateral Accord) and ratification of the Strategic 

Arms Reduction (START) I Treaty and the Lisbon Protocol in early 

1994, soon followed by Ukraine’s accession to the Non-Proliferation 

Treaty, effectively made the country a non-nuclear state and defused 

all nuclear-related concerns.

 Second, Ukraine appeared to be open to security cooperation 

with the West, specifically with NATO and the United States. In 

fact, the exchange of visits, invitation of military students, and other 

cooperative events between Ukrainian and U.S. militaries started 

immediately after Ukraine became independent and well before the 

signing on July 27, 1993, of the first background document for military 

cooperation between the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine and the 

Department of Defense (DoD) of the United States―”Memorandum 

of Understanding on Defense and Military Contacts.”

 Third, despite all the political and economic turmoil of the first 

years of independence, Ukraine managed to avoid the internal 

discord and even bloodshed common to many other CIS states such 

as Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, and Russia. Ukraine also set the 

first and very important real example for the rest of the CIS countries 

by managing the peaceful transition of presidential power in July 
13

1994 from Leonid Kravchuk to Leonid Kuchma.

 The new, much more positive spirit of cooperation was reflected 

in high-level U.S. policy documents. If one looks into the U.S. National 

Security Strategy for 1995 (subtitled “A National Security Strategy of 

Engagement and Enlargement,” February 1995), one cannot help but 

notice how often the state of Ukraine is mentioned in this 27-page 

document―over 20 times. The Strategy also introduced a policy 

of distinguishing Ukraine, in parallel to Russia, from other newly 

independent states when talking in general terms about the countries 

of the former Soviet Union.

 Thus an initial period of suspicion and cautious rapprochement 

lasted for the first half of the 1990s but paved the way to a following 

period of much broader political and security engagement and 

cooperation, which continued through the second half of the 

decade. During that period the United States and Ukraine achieved 

significant progress in the political and security dimensions of their 

bilateral relationship. The main institutional structure overseeing 

this progress was the U.S.-Ukraine Binational Commission created 

in September 1996 and led by President Kuchma and Vice President 

Gore. In the corresponding declaration on the establishment of this 

Commission, the term “strategic partnership” was used for the first 

time.

 In fact, throughout the 1990s the United States became the major 

global lobbyist for Ukraine.10 In 1996-97 Ukraine even became the 

third largest recipient of U.S. assistance in the world (after Israel and 

Egypt), and the number one recipient in the former Soviet Union. But 

this did not continue for long due to the U.S. Congress’ disappointment 

in Ukraine’s failure to resolve specific disputes involving U.S. firms, 

and the country’s general inability to provide favorable conditions 

for U.S. business development and investment.

 By the year 2000, what had become the ritual practice of 

mentioning of Ukraine in parallel to Russia in official speeches 

and communiqué had faded away. There appeared to be a sense 

of growing disappointment by Washington in Ukraine’s overall 

progress. In the U.S. view of that time, Ukraine: 

. . . has not moved from independence and nuclear disarmament to 

economic and political reform . . . has not escaped the predation and 
14

corruption of the transfer of power and property from state to private 

hands . . . its leaders have spoken confidently of a European future for 

Ukraine, but they have done little to prevent Ukraine from slipping into 

a near Third World country, which for the old, weak and marginal is a 

decline from the Soviet past.11

The unfolding Ukrainian political crisis was precipitated by the 

murder of opposition journalist Georgiy Gongadze in the fall 

of 2000. Seeing no progress in the resolution of the case and a 

deepening political crisis for more than a year, by 2002, America’s 

new administration began to show signs of frustration with and 

loss of interest in Ukraine. The U.S.-Ukraine Binational Commission 

ceased to function, and the previous cordiality of political relations 

was clearly evaporating. 

 Other problems followed. The United States had misgivings 

over Ukrainian supplies of heavy armaments in 2001 to the Former 

Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia during the internal ethnic strife 

there. (The weapons sales were legal and above-board, but the 

United States viewed them as potentially destabilizing). But the real 

“bombshell” was the announced authentication by U.S. authorities 

in 2002 of a recording in which President Kuchma allegedly 

approved the proposed transfer of the Ukrainian “Kolchuga” air 

defense system to Iraq. This created a full-fledged political scandal. 

The U.S. Government responded by delaying the appropriation 

of Freedom Support Act funds, while NATO allies downgraded 

Ukraine’s participation in the NATO-Ukraine Commission meeting 

at the November 2002 NATO Summit in Prague from the head of 

state to ministerial level. In the latest National Security Strategy of the 

United States (September 2002) prepared by the Bush administration, 

Ukraine is not mentioned at all, in noticeable contrast to the National 

Security Strategies of the Clinton era. Ukrainian authorities, for their 

part, denied all weapons sales accusations and, in turn, showed 

displeasure towards Western philanthropic organizations allegedly 

funding the Ukrainian political opposition.

 Fortunately for the two countries’ partnership, converging 

interests prevailed over these differences. By the start of 2003, political 

decisions on both sides were made that these setbacks should not 

prevent a mutually beneficial U.S.-Ukrainian relationship.12 Ukraine 

agreed to deploy its CBR-protection unit to Kuwait in March-
15

April 2003 during the campaign in Iraq, and later contributed a 

peacekeeping brigade to the stabilization efforts of the coalition 

force there. This was not easy for Ukraine for a number of reasons, 

mainly due to negative public attitudes towards the war in Iraq and 

the strong opposition of Russia. 

 The U.S. leadership responded by agreeing to stop ignoring 

Ukraine’s leadership and to meet briefly with Ukrainian President 

Kuchma, whose international image suffered seriously as a result of 

Gongadze- and “Kolchuga”- related scandals, and with Ukrainian 

Prime Minister Yanukovych during visits to the United States in 2003. 

U.S. officials also expressed cautious support for Ukraine’s hopes of 

becoming a NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP) participant in 

the near future. However, they made clear that the success of future 

bilateral relations would be judged by the progress of Ukraine’s 

democratic development.13

 Thus, in the middle of the third 5-year period of their relationship, 

in the political dimension the United States and Ukraine appeared to 

be adopting the policy of small practical steps towards each other, 

rather than attempting to revive the inflated expectations of “strategic 

partnership.” In light of their recent experience, both sides are very 

careful to keep the door of cooperation open in spite of possible 

disagreements.

Security Cooperation.

 While political relations between the two countries have had a 

great many high and low points, sometimes resembling a foreign 

policy “roller coaster,” their security cooperation somehow managed 

to remain rather stable and has been progressively improving. This 

cooperation has developed along three main axes: dismantling 

Ukraine’s Soviet nuclear legacy, improving the national security of 

Ukraine, and cooperation in fighting terrorism and peacekeeping.

 As far as cooperation on dismantling of the Soviet nuclear legacy is 

concerned, it started immediately after Ukraine became independent. 

Even the issue of Ukraine’s diplomatic recognition was conditioned 

by U.S. concerns about nuclear weapons on Ukrainian soil, which 

were addressed during the meeting between U.S. Secretary of State 
16

James Baker and Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk on December 

18, 1991, prior to President Bush’s announcement on December 25, 

1991, of the formal U.S. diplomatic recognition of an independent 

Ukraine.

It took 3 years (1992-94) of relentless negotiations for the United 

States and Ukraine to bring the latter firmly to non-nuclear status 

and frame the generally successful nuclear disarmament process. In 

June 1996 the last nuclear warhead left Ukrainian soil, in October 

2001 the last Ukrainian ICBM silo was destroyed, and the same year 

the last of the Ukrainian Tu-160 Blackjack and Tu-95 Bear strategic 

bombers were destroyed, along with hundreds of air launched cruise 

missiles (ALCMs) or converted to nonmilitary use. In August 2002 

the 43rd Rocket Army of the former Soviet Strategic Missile Forces 

was finally disbanded. Thirty-eight nuclear capable Tu-22M Backfire

bombers were also destroyed, while the remaining 19 Tu-22Ms were 

scheduled to be eliminated by September 2004. The most visible 

remaining issue is the U.S. possible support for the destruction of 

rocket engines, which is anticipated to be concluded in 2007.

 Overall, by the start of 2004 the United States will have spent 

almost $700 million to eliminate strategic nuclear delivery systems 

in Ukraine within the framework of the well-known Cooperative 

Threat Reduction (CTR) Program (also known as the “Nunn-Lugar” 

program after its U.S. congressional sponsors). According to former 

Ambassador of the United States to Ukraine Carlos Pascual, “It is 

almost easier to predict where this country will be in 25 years than 

in 3 years.” That, he added, is precisely why the United States must 

keep supporting Ukraine’s efforts to eliminate its weapons of mass 

destruction. “It is the best security money we have ever spent.”14

 U.S. support for Ukraine in improving its national security is 

another dimension of cooperation that is 13 years old and continues to 

develop progressively. Its major component is defense cooperation, 

but also includes export control and nonproliferation and other areas 

such as border control, emergency management, and civil-military 

cooperation. 

 In the second half of the 1990s, bilateral programs of military 

cooperation grew to more than 120 events every year, which made 

the U.S.-Ukraine programs of that time almost twice as large 

as Ukraine’s second largest bilateral program (with the United 
17

Kingdom) and almost three times larger than Russia’s program of 

military cooperation with Ukraine.

 A large proportion of the bilateral cooperative events were 

funded within the scope of the CTR Program as well―through 

targeted CTR monies promoting “Defense and Military Contacts 

Programs” focused on promoting defense reform and developing 

trust and interoperability. However, after September 11, 2001, the 

number of yearly events funded this way within Ukraine’s armed 

forces has been cut approximately in half. This reduction reportedly 

occurred “due to postponements caused by the new priorities under 

the Global War on Terrorism and deliberate efforts by the U.S. and 

Ukraine sides to focus on quality rather than quantity.”15

But this reduction did not occur in other funding sources and 

programs, some of which even increased and thus partly compensated 

for the reduction in the major traditional source. For instance, in 2002,

each U.S. regional Combatant Command (U.S. European Command 

[EUCOM], for example) has a source of U.S. DoD funding known as 

“Traditional CINC (commander-in-chief) Activity”16 (TCA) funds, 

often utilized for cooperative activity with partner military forces. 

TCA, for example, funded two exchange visits between the U.S. 

Army Europe’s (USAEUR) Southern European Task Force Brigade 

and the Ukrainian 95th Separate Airmobile Brigade, the main 

ground forces component of Ukraine’s rapid reaction force. These 

exchanges established the groundwork for a partnership between 

the brigades to be further developed through the 2003 PfP exercise 

“Peace Shield.”17

 The U.S. International Military Education and Training (IMET) 

Program has provided over U.S.$16 million since its establishment 

in Ukraine in 1992 to educate about 500 Ukrainian officers and 

noncommissioned officers (NCOs) and over 100 civilians in U.S. 

military establishments (See Table 2). IMET training supported efforts 

to improve interoperability between the Ukrainian and U.S. and 

NATO militaries, and to promote transformation and restructuring 

within the Ukrainian Armed Forces, by providing opportunities 

for select Ukrainian officials to attend U.S. military and educational 

institutions. In addition, the expanded IMET (E-IMET) Program 

provided training for Ukrainian military and civilian officials, 
18

including personnel from nondefense ministries and the legislative

branch, on defense budget management, creating an effective military 

justice system and moving to civilian control of the military. 

 Training Number of

 Fiscal Expenses Students In that,

 Year $Thousand Total Civilians 

1992 0,075 3 0

1993 0,413 13 0

1994 0,600 8 1

1995 0,707 40 23

1996 1,020 33 9

1997 1,015 37 9

1998 1,250 46 16

1999 1,250 48 4

2000 1,338 43 2

2001 1,443 49 5

2002 1,675 53 10

2003 1,692 48 13

2004 1,700 77 19

2005 1,800 TBD TBD

Total (by end of 2004) 15,978 498 111

Table 2. The U.S. IMET Program for Ukraine: General 

Indicators.

18

 In the Ukrainian case, the IMET Program has achieved qualified 

success. It might be judged as less successful if compared with 

participants from Ukraine’s neighbors in Central Europe, but 

it is certainly more successful if compared with Russia. Several 

Ukrainian graduates of the IMET program have achieved prominent 

official positions such as Minister of Foreign Affairs Kostiantyn 

Hryshchenko (Naval Post Graduate School), former Head of the 

Analytical Service of the National Security and Defense Council 

of Ukraine Anatoliy Grytsenko (Air War College), and a few 

ambassadors, deputy ministers, and parliamentarians. Others have 
19

attained the rank of general officer such as Sergiy Mokrenets (Army 

War College), Oleg Taran (National War College), Leonid Holopatiuk 

(Naval Post Graduate School), and several more.

Ukraine’s interoperability with U.S./NATO in peacekeeping 

and humanitarian operations, (for instance, Ukrainian involvement 

in KFOR) has been supported through programs such as the U.S. 

Department of State―Foreign Military Financing (FMF) Program and 

U.S. Department of State―Peacekeeping Operations. In particular, 

this support is made available to Ukrainian participation in the 

Ukrainian-Polish Battalion (UKRPOLBAT) peacekeeping support 

operations within the U.S. sector of Kosovo. This funding is not only 

helping to solve NATO manpower needs, but provides Ukrainian 

troops experience in interoperability with Western forces and 

exposure to NATO professional standards and practices.

 Every year some $1-3 million is allocated by the U.S. Departments 

of State and Defense to Ukraine’s participation in PfP Program 

through the so-called “Warsaw Initiative,” founded by the United 

States in July 1994. Among other important purposes, the initiative 

helps to promote the ability of the Ukraine’s armed forces to cooperate 

with NATO allies and NATO partners, as well as to prepare for 

joining NATO. 

 In terms of security cooperation, the United States also has 

provided significant technical support in nonproliferation efforts 

and strengthening Ukraine’s export control system. It supported 

the strengthening of Ukraine’s borders against illegal migration 

and cross-border crime, as well as in many other projects. Recently, 

the United States approved a $30 million multiyear comprehensive 

CTR weapons of mass destruction (WMD) Proliferation Prevention 

Initiative of equipment, training, and technical assistance for the 

State Border Guard Service and the State Customs Service. Rather 

than individual parts, the Border Guard Service was asked to 

develop a complete concept including land, maritime, and riverine 

control. Once the concept is developed, the equipment needed will 

be provided as an integrated solution beginning in 2004.

 Through the California-Ukraine partnership, training is underway 

at the California Highway Patrol and Border Guard Academy at 

the city of Khmelnytskyi. Other exchanges and expert visits are 

planned for 2004 to address contraband cargo inspection measures 
20

and rapid response unit operating models. An interagency team of 

California law enforcement agencies support these and other needs, 

including criminal intelligence sharing tools from the Western States 

Information Network, officer safety from the California Department 

of Justice, and harbor security from the San Francisco Police 

Department.

This tremendous amount of U.S. security support to Ukraine paid 

off on a number of occasions. This included Ukraine’s agreement 

in 1998 to terminate its participation in the Russian-Iranian contract 

on the construction of a nuclear plant in Bushehr, Iran; Ukraine’s 

contribution to the antiterrorist coalition through granting overflight 

rights and sharing intelligence information; and, of course, the 

contribution of peacekeepers to Bosnia, Kosovo, and Iraq.

These examples demonstrate that the 13 years of Ukraine’s 

bilateral military cooperation with the United States and other NATO 

countries were not in vain; they created at least a minimal foundation 

for combined action. The Ukraine-U.S. and Ukraine-NATO 

programs proved their value, which could have been greater, if not 

for certain political and administrative problems on the Ukrainian 

side. Prominent East European security affairs expert British scholar 

James Sherr, speaking about Iraq, noted, “Like the United States, 

Ukraine has shown nerve. Very few others have shown it. If it can 

keep its nerve and defend its interests on other fronts, it will not only 

earn the support of the ‘new Europe’, it will earn its right to be part 

of it.”19
21

PART II

THE COOPERATION MECHANISM

To categorize it as “good or bad” overall, however, I would have to 

say “good,” but I am disturbed at aspects of the “negative side” of 

the equation. There exists still a tendency in the Ukrainian Defense 

bureaucracy to over-centralize planning and decisionmaking. In any 

system this inevitably leads to various inefficiencies and frustrations. 

Harry Simmeth

Interview, December 11, 2003

 From the beginning, the initiative in bilateral military contacts 

was clearly on the U.S. side. Several obvious factors prompted this 

situation, such as the much heavier political and military “weight” 

of the United States vis-à-vis Ukraine, more substantial U.S. 

experience in building cooperative relations with other countries, 

a U.S. commitment to finance the bulk of expenditures related to 

cooperative events, and so on. 

 Most importantly, the U.S. side had a conscious interest in 

engaging Ukraine and a rather clear understanding of what it wanted 

to achieve from this cooperation. It also had systemic strategic 

guidance documents that framed “engagement” with emerging 

states as a key policy and that provided the “glue” to create and hold 

together an appropriate cooperation mechanism. The U.S. National 

Military Strategy, in particular, fleshed out the basis for military-tomilitary engagement programs in support of the national strategy. 

 On its part, Ukraine simply accepted U.S. leadership in planning 

and coordination of the bilateral military cooperation, although 

without any correspondingly well-coordinated strategy documents 

or guidance. It seemed to be enough that Ukraine was now an 

independent democratic state and no longer had any ideological 

differences with the United States. Moreover, a comfortable 

relationship with the U.S. military represented at least a symbolic 

counterweight to Russian influence or bullying. On a practical 

level, military cooperation with the United States would provide an 

opportunity to learn useful approaches to defense reform, which for 
22

many also meant the very attractive opportunity to travel abroad, 

including to the United States. 

 In fact, the Ukrainians were cooperative from the very beginning 

and still are. But due to the continuous instability inside the Ukrainian 

military, precipitated by lack of clear political guidance as well as 

by permanent reorganizations and reductions, the military was 

very slow in building effective military cooperation structures and 

procedures. These structures and procedures still require significant 

improvement.

Strategic Guidance.

 When the issue of U.S.-Ukrainian military cooperation first 

appeared on the agenda in 1992, the U.S. side already had a hierarchy 

of strategic guidance documents and certain institutional instruments 

to translate the guidance into mutually-negotiated plans for real 

cooperative events such as the IMET and FMF programs, as well as 

military-to-military contact visits and even combined exercises. At 

that time, the global strategic equation had just changed from bipolar 

confrontation to an uncertain and ambiguous global environment. 

In the wake of the end of the Cold War and disintegration of the 

Soviet Union, the immediate U.S. security interests in Eastern 

Europe were very clear: reduce the threat of nuclear war, constrain 

the proliferation of WMD, preclude any reemergence of the “evil 

empire,” and support regional stability. The subsequent shift from 

previous strategies of containment of communism and nuclear 

deterrence naturally required a new policy of flexible engagement.

Thus the existing U.S. institutional and intellectual capability to 

formulate and articulate U.S. national interests helped to start the 

cooperation with Ukraine and other so-called newly independent 

states of the former Communist bloc. It also augmented the 

mechanism of foreign military relations with several high profile 

overarching security programs such as CTR and PfP, as well as 

additional targeted military-to-military cooperation programs,

including the U.S. European Command Joint Contact Team Program 

(JCTP)20 launched in 1992 (formally it got to Ukraine in 1998) and 

Army National Guard State Partnership Program (SPP)21 which 

started in 1993.
23

 However, when Ukraine became independent, it had no 

mechanisms for strategic planning and planning to protect national 

interests by military means. Ukraine had no National Security 

Council, no Ministry of Defense, and no General Staff of the 

Armed Forces. Capabilities of the previously existing Ministry of 

Foreign Affairs of Ukraine were rather limited, given its small staff, 

republican subordination within the former Soviet Union, and the 

routine practice of the outflow of the best specialists to Moscow.

 The first Ukrainian strategic level documents were soon drafted 

and approved by the Parliament, but their value was very limited 

because of their largely declarative nature. This was further 

exacerbated by the complexities of the nation-building processes 

in the 1990s, which took the form of long internal political battles 

for redistribution of powers between Ukrainian legislature and the 

executive branch.

 Ukrainian national security strategy level documents like “The 

Foundations of Ukraine’s Foreign Policy” (1993) and “Concept of the 

National Security of Ukraine” (1997) were rather good as the first 

national exercise in drafting strategic level conceptual documents. 

However, the correct, albeit “very general in tone,” provisions 

reflected “the continuing ambiguities present in defining Ukraine’s 

security interests, threats, and policy objectives.”22 More to the point, 

the virtual absence of an enforceable implementation system to force 

executive structures to follow these documents, plus continuous 

internal political rivalry in the country, precipitated the big gap 

between the documents’ theses and real practices in security area.23

 At least these documents defined the strategic basics to include 

the non-nuclear, nonaligned status of the country and its general 

interest in European integration and building cooperative relations 

with the United States. But they certainly were too unspecific to 

provide clear strategic guidance for Ukrainian planners on policy 

priorities and allocation of resources.

 As far as the U.S. National Military Strategy is concerned, in 

terms of its continuity from the U.S. National Security Strategy, the 

first post-Cold War document of 1995 displayed a clear example 

of how to translate the National Security Strategy requirement of 

“engagement and enlargement” into specific subordinate military 

strategy guidance:
24

Military-to-military contact programs are . . . effective instruments . . . 

to forge new and more cooperative relationships both with former 

adversaries and with formerly non-aligned nations. . . . success . . . hinges 

on mutual trust, effective communications . . . interoperability, and 

doctrinal familiarity . . . The militaries of Central and Eastern Europe are 

a particular priority.24

 In comparison, the main Ukrainian military security level 

documents of the 1990s―”Military Doctrine of Ukraine” (1993) and 

“State Program for the Building and Development of the Ukrainian 

Armed Forces for the Year 2005” (1996)―provided less clear guidance, 

especially on the goals of military cooperation with any other 

countries. They generally reflected the euphoria and inexperience of 

the first years of independence. 

 Instead of providing specific direction, the 1993 military doctrine 

only contained general tasks and a long list of good intentions, with 

priorities unsupported by resources. It stated very ambiguously that 

Ukraine “builds its relations with other countries regardless of their 

social-political system and military-political orientation on the basis 

of recognition of all issues of national security of two sides.”

 The State Program (1996) was developed by the military itself, 

approved by the president, and was classified “secret.” Its main 

tenets, which were made public, did not go very far. They included 

adoption of specific legislative acts, preparation for all-around 

unilateral defense of the country, and set general goals of force 

modernization and numerical reductions to the level of Conventional 

Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty limitations. 

 However, the turn of the decade brought new tendencies on both 

sides. In the United States, the new Republican Bush administration 

came to office. It suggested a new strategic vision, which, while 

generally continuing the “engagement and enlargement” approach, 

appeared to be shifting from inclusive multilateralism to “coalitions 

of the willing.” Of course, the entire focus of U.S. strategy was 

affected tremendously by the events of September 11, 2001, and by 

the U.S. response. While reemphasizing common values, the National 

Security Strategy (2002) also puts special attention on accountability 

of the receivers of foreign aid: “Nations that seek international aid 

must govern themselves wisely, so the aid is well spent. For freedom 

to strive, accountability must be expected and required.”25
25

 In Ukraine, the experience of reforming the military, based in 

no small part on the useful examples of other countries including 

the United States plus changes in the global and regional security 

environment, brought about new national strategic guidance as 

well as a new national military strategy. The new “State Program 

for Reform and Development of Armed Forces of Ukraine,” adopted 

in 2000, made significant steps in defining the priorities of defense 

reform to include creation of a Joint Rapid Reaction Force, gradual 

abolition of conscription and a turn to manning on a contract basis, 

and improving the Reserve structure. 

 Furthermore, in May 2002 the National Security and Defense 

Council of Ukraine took a strategic decision to join NATO in the 

future and in July 2002 the Ukrainian President approved the 

Strategy of Integration to NATO. After this decision was made, 

Ukraine developed and agreed on an Individual Action Plan with 

NATO. Ukraine also tried (thus far, unsuccessfully) to be admitted 

to NATO MAP participation.

 Given the negative influence of the remaining problems of the 

country’s democratic and economic development on the progress 

of defense transformation, these latest positive developments in 

Ukraine’s strategic security guidance should not be overestimated. 

However, they are leading in the right direction and provide more 

clear guidance for military cooperation. 

Planning for Military Cooperation.

 In 1992 the United States began military cooperation by forming 

contacts with high-level Ukrainian military officials. Invitations to 

Ukrainian officers to study at U.S. military colleges under the longexisting IMET program followed. In 1992 the first two Ukrainian 

colonels went to the U.S. Army War College at Carlisle Barracks, 

Pennsylvania, and the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College 

at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Issues of future military cooperation 

were discussed when then-Ukrainian Minister of Defense General 

Kostiantyn Morozov visited Washington, DC, in April 1992, at the 

invitation of then-Defense Secretary Richard Cheney.

 On both sides, specific structures overseeing new military 

cooperation issues were created. The United States assigned this task 
26

to the newly created “Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia (RUE)” Division 

in the J-5 Directorate of the Joint Staff. This newly formed staff 

division consisted of five officers―about half the size of the typical J5 division. The Ukrainians created the Foreign Relations Directorate 

(FRD) within their General Staff of the Armed Forces, where the 

mission of coordinating cooperation with the United States (and 

Canada) was assigned to a corresponding group of five people. 

 The bulk of the first contacts in the early years of military 

cooperation was related to the issue of Ukrainian nuclear arsenal 

dismantlement and primarily coordinated through Ukraine’s 

Ministry of Foreign Affairs. However, the first high-level political 

and military contacts also secured the first bilateral military 

cooperation agreements, which enabled the planning and conduct of 

the first specific military-to-military cooperative events between the 

Ukrainian Ministry of Defense and the U.S. DoD. A Memorandum 

of Understanding (1993) provided for semiannual meetings of a 

“Bilateral Working Group on Defense and Military Contacts” and 

annual talks between the U.S. Joint Staff and Ukraine’s General 

Staff.

 During the period of 1993-95, the initial yearly plans of military 

contacts were worked primarily through countries’ defense attaché 

offices, and the number of bilateral cooperative events slowly grew 

from some 20 in 1993 to around 50 in 1995. In fact, despite the high 

interest on both sides in large expansion of military cooperation, the 

agenda of Ukraine’s nuclear disarmament naturally overshadowed 

the agenda of bilateral military-to-military contacts. This issue 

remained until the United States and Ukraine worked out all the 

major problems of Ukraine’s nuclear weapons by the end of 1994. 

Then, in spring 1995, Defense Secretary William Perry visited 

Ukraine and suggested moving past issues of nuclear disarmament 

to questions of social protection, security, and military and economic 

cooperation. 

 Colonel Harry Simmeth,26 the U.S. officer who became responsible 

for the execution of this policy guidance, found the task rather difficult, 

given that he reported to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

(CJCS). Under U.S. law the CJCS does not command military assets; 

primarily he is the chief military advisor to the President and the 

Secretary of Defense. Normally, one of the regional U.S. Combatant 
27

Commands would assume the job of military cooperation with a 

country in its area of operations. In Ukraine’s case, this role is held 

by the USEUCOM. However, during the Cold War, the entire Soviet 

Union (including Ukraine) was never assigned to a U.S. Combatant 

Command, a situation that continued until 1998. This meant that 

CJCS had at his immediate disposal few resources with which to 

execute military contact programs, and could not simply order the 

regional Combatant Commands to assist. (Another effect was that, 

while a Combatant Command would normally have a sizeable staff 

section coordinating military cooperation, CJCS basically only had 

Colonel Simmeth. It also meant that some of the most mundane and 

routine matters, rather than being handled by “experts” at lower 

levels, immediately rose to the attention of the highest levels.

 Essentially, CJCS―meaning, in this case, Colonel Simmeth―had to 

“ask” the Combatant Commands and other U.S. agencies to support 

proposed programs and events with the necessary resources. This 

vastly complicated his ability to construct and execute a plan. He was 

largely reduced to proposing events to these agencies and soliciting 

their ideas. His one advantage was the availability of the additional 

funding sources noted earlier, which at least heightened the “spirit of 

cooperation” shown by the commands and agencies solicited. What 

almost necessarily emerged initially from this process was largely 

a “buffet” of proposed activities, rather than a set of coordinated 

activities within a coherent plan. Colonel Simmeth observed: 

There were no formal lower-level planning mechanisms beyond the 

BWG (bilateral working groups) and Joint Staff Talks through which 

to develop coherent programs. But, since there were those mechanisms 

at the strategic level (BWG and Joint Staff Talks), the higher leadership 

had agreed in general to conduct activities. In turn, there was pressure 

to elaborate this into actual cooperative events. This created pressure 

for results. Planners were expected to devise various events whether 

there was a coherent plan or not. Worse (from a planning perspective) 

the pressure for such tangible “deliverables” was not tied to any rational 

planning schedule, but primarily to the date of the next high-level 

meeting.27

 However, despite the fact that the Ukrainian side participated 

enthusiastically in developing this first formal agreement on military 
28

cooperation (negotiated by Colonel Simmeth and a Ukrainian 

counterpart in 1995 for implementation in 1996), it was by far 

primarily the U.S. side that suggested the majority of cooperative 

events contained in the document. Although it was referred to as 

the “U.S.-Ukraine Plan for Military Cooperation for 1996,” it was (as 

noted) more properly a list of events based on the guidance available 

in U.S. national security documents, concepts, and ideas generated by 

J-5 RUE’s counterpart staff section in the U.S. Office of the Secretary 

of Defense (OSD), CJCS’ intent, and the “volunteered” services of 

U.S. various commands and agencies. 

 This said, it nevertheless must be noted that the “plan” was far 

from being totally disjointed, because of relatively clear guidance 

provided by U.S. strategic level documentation. This guidance 

specified the goals of “encouraging military reform,” “civilian 

control of the military,” “fostering greater regional cooperation,” 

and “facilitating Ukraine’s participation in PfP.” It was assumed in 

this documentation that military contact events could support these 

goals by focusing on their substance while developing “mutual trust, 

effective communications, interoperability, and familiarity with each 

other’s doctrines.” Another goal, “imparting democratic values,” 

in the process would happen primarily by familiarizing Ukraine’s 

military with the democratic processes in which the U.S. military is 

required to work, and by personal interaction among commanders, 

staffs, and troops during cooperative activity.

 Additionally, there was some further rationalization of the Plan 

during Joint Staff-General Staff negotiations. For example, the effort 

was made to link certain events (as when a visit to the United States 

by an Ukrainian IL-76 Candid transport plane for training with the 

U.S. Air Force brought along a Ukrainian Army Regimental staff 

for an exercise with the U.S. Army). An attempt also was made to 

identify activities that suggested follow-on events for the next year’s 

list, in the hope of creating logical progression (for instance, the 

exercise “Peace Shield” 96 would be a U.S.-Ukraine sponsored event 

geared to help prepare Ukraine to host a larger and more complicated 

NATO exercise in following years). 

 When the plan was developed, the Ukrainian side agreed with 

all of the U.S. proposals; this surprised the United States, which 
29

doubted Ukraine would be able to handle such an ambitious 

schedule of activity (this turned out to be true, with about 15 percent 

of the events being cancelled or postponed). But the larger surprise―

and eventually, disappointment―was the realization by the United 

States that the Ukrainian side was not particularly strong in defining 

its own goals for bilateral cooperation with the United States, even 

when asked and “coached.”

 Given the Ukrainian lack of clarity regarding priorities, the 

United States mounted a much more serious effort over the next 

several years to help them focus on meeting both U.S. and Ukrainian 

objectives and producing a “programmatic” approach, resulting 

in a more integrated and coherent cooperation plan. This led to 

the creation of a working-level direct contact arrangement among 

military planning experts called the “Colonel’s Conference.” This 

conference was co-chaired by representatives of the U.S. Joint Staff 

and the Ukrainian General Staff, and comprised delegates from 

each side’s military services, commands, and appropriate agencies, 

to include a prominent role for USEUCOM. This model helped to 

produce contact plans that were much better focused, and, despite 

the general expansion of the plans, to reduce pressure for “numerical 

success.” The list of events was now backed by the first coherent 

sub-programs, such as plans for the continued long-term conduct 

of the “Peace Shield” series of peacekeeping exercises, the “Sea 

Breeze” naval exercise series, and a highly comprehensive project 

to help create a Ukrainian NCO corps. California and Kansas were 

designated as PfP state partners for Ukraine; their state National 

Guard organizations cooperated in creating a series of coordinated 

events focused on civil-military affairs, disaster relief, and search and 

rescue, as well as peacekeeping and contingency operations. In 1998, 

an important change took place in the U.S. command and planning 

arrangements―Ukraine finally became assigned to USEUCOM 

(along with Ukraine’s neighbors, Belarus and Moldova, plus the 

Caucasus region). This had a significant impact in that both sides had 

to adapt to new cooperative mechanisms. The Colonels’ Conference 

was replaced by the Military Liaison Team (MLT)―an arrangement 

successfully tested by USEUCOM in Central Europe.28 The idea was 

for a team of U.S. officers to work in Kiev with Ukrainian officers, as 

well as with the USEUCOM Staff, 
30

to create plans, identify resources available to fulfill activities, and to 

submit timely requests to other agencies. Regularly established channels 

would be available for efficient funds administration. From the U.S. 

perspective, this would be a much more efficient, continuous, and 

coherent way to operate.29

 In general, however, because of the U.S. friendly but somewhat 

dominating attitude to Ukraine in the 1990s, plus Ukraine’s lack 

of clear focus on what it wanted from U.S.-Ukrainian military-tomilitary cooperation, the initial plans developed under the MLT 

concept concentrated on familiarization events to the detriment of 

events tied to specific goals and objectives. To some extent, the MLT 

program seems to have arrived with the notion that the parties were 

“starting anew” despite the record of cooperation already logged. 

On a larger scale, however, the NCO development project continued 

to be successful, and there was a further rationalization of exercise 

goals and schedules. 

 To be completely fair to the U.S. MLT concept, the cooperative 

attitudes of the Ukrainians were dealt a blow by the reorganizing of 

FRD into the Department of International Cooperation of Ukraine’s 

Ministry of Defense (DICMOD). DICMOD replaced the FRD as the 

agency interfacing with the MLT. The U.S. concept had been to align 

the MLT with the Ministry of Defense/General Staff for direct liaison, 

the model used in East Central Europe. Ukraine instead imposed 

the DICMOD, which initially seemed more concerned with building 

its own “empire.” This included stressing its own “importance” by 

demanding that all contact, even routine correspondence, be routed 

through its own very inefficient bureaucracy. Inevitable delays and 

frustrations developed, as did the quality of planning overall. In 

an environment of generous U.S. funding, coupled with Ukraine’s 

inability to prioritize and (eventually) DICMOD’s bumbling, bilateral 

military cooperation frequently witnessed inflated expectations on 

the Ukrainian side and produced frustration for the United States. 

Even strong U.S. supporters of the military cooperation program were 

often at least irritated by what often appeared to be the Ukrainians’ 

overestimation of costs and efforts to “squeeze” one project to fund 

additional activity. (For example, to accommodate a U.S. ship visit, a 

request was made that the United States provide funds to refurbish 

the pier at which the ship was to dock). Former Army attaché in Kiev 
31

Colonel Timothy Shea has skeptically concluded about that period 

of cooperation that: 

The amount of money thrown at peacetime military engagement 

has convinced senior Ukrainian leadership that the United States 

has unlimited resources and that the decreasing incentives represent 

Washington’s indifference. What is needed is less lecturing, greater 

humility, more thoughtful organizing, rewarding positive change, and 

discouraging inappropriate action.30

 A legacy of Soviet-style behavior to this day remains among many 

Ukrainian top military leaders and some remaining Soviet KGBstyle security regulations, as well as a legacy of Soviet centralizing 

bureaucracy. This has furthered U.S. frustration. As Colonel Shea 

observed, 

Designed to be collocated with counterparts on the general staff, MLT in 

Ukraine’s case was forced to accept residency on the opposite side of Kiev 

from Ministry of Defense. Instead of directly coordinating with planners, 

the team relies on DICMOD apparatchiks to administer the program . . . 

The legacy of the Soviet armed forces and KGB remains deeply imbedded 

in the psyche of most senior officers.31

To make the situation worse, the unfolding severe economic crisis 

in Ukraine in the 1990s made it impossible to achieve any Ukrainian 

defense reform objective beyond reduction of structures, personnel, 

and equipment. The humiliating social conditions of Ukrainian 

officers provoked a noticeable outflow of qualified personnel 

from the military in general, and in particular from structures 

coordinating military contacts, where personnel had comparatively 

high marketing value due to the knowledge of foreign languages 

and possession of valuable experiences. There was also a problem 

of so-called “military tourism”―distorted criteria for selection of 

participants in cooperative events would frequently occur, such 

as when an appropriate “expert” would be passed over in favor of 

someone in a position to “bump” him. This was especially true in 

case of trips from Ukraine to other countries, which at that time also 

meant at least per diem pay―an important addition to a Ukrainian 

officer’s monthly pay of lower than U.S.$100, even for colonels. 

 However, the turn of the decade brought better strategic guidance 

on the Ukrainian side and a slightly different, more pragmatic 
32

strategic focus on the U.S. side, which, along with experience gained, 

helped to improve the planning and management of cooperative 

events on both the U.S. and Ukrainian sides.

 To cure the problem of exaggerated cost estimates, for example, 

the United States, since FY 2000, moved from direct reimbursement of 

goods and services provided by the Ukrainian side during combined 

exercise, to hiring contractors and providing contracts based on 

competitive bidding. 

 To provide for better coordination on its side, the United States 

brought together the previously separate MLT (responsible for JCTP 

and SPP) and the Security Assistance Office (responsible for IMET 

and FMF), and in 2001 created in Ukraine a joint structure―the 

Office of Defense Cooperation (ODC), which also incorporated the 

Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Office. 

 To provide for a better quality rather than a greater quantity of 

cooperative events, the number of planned events was reduced twice 

from over 120 at the end of the 1990s to some 60-70 “high quality” 

events per year starting in 2001. Plans themselves were drafted with 

more discretion and have been more closely tied to defense reform 

priorities under a new Ukrainian State Program (2000).32 New issues 

of cooperation of a rather technical nature appeared on the rise since 

Ukrainian participation in the Kosovo (from July 1999) and in the 

Iraq (from August 2003) campaigns, for which the United States 

provided partial financial compensation and technical assistance.

 To facilitate the Ukrainian military’s force development and 

acquisition prioritization planning, in 2001 during Defense Secretary 

Donald Rumsfeld’s visit to Kiev, the United States suggested 

conducting a defense analysis of the Ukrainian Armed Forces 

by a team of USEUCOM experts. The focus was Ukraine’s RRF. 

The analysis, accomplished by October 2002, provided valuable 

background both for Ukraine’s defense reform planning and for 

planning of bilateral military contacts. According to the Head of 

Bilateral Affairs Office (the new name for MLT after being moved 

under ODC) Major Joel Ostrom,

For 2004, our planned focus is on the Rapid Reaction Force that was 

agreed to by the U.S. and Ukrainian leadership at the last joint staff talks. 
33

The reason for that is to ensure that the effort, the financial resources, are 

going to be used to further professionalism of the Ukrainian military, 

which will last beyond its restructuring and the downsizing of the 

Ukrainian military.33

 On the Ukrainian side, qualitatively positive actions could be 

found in development of the system of military contacts coordinating 

structures and somewhat better personnel management. In addition 

to the central bilateral cooperation body of Ukraine’s MOD (now 

the DICMOD), each service now has its own division of military 

cooperation. In the General Staff a separate Directorate of EuroAtlantic integration was created with the specific mission to 

coordinate Ukraine’s military NATO- and EU-related activities, as 

well as to participate in peacekeeping missions. A top official at the 

level of Deputy Defense Minister was designated to address foreign 

military cooperation issues.

 The detrimental Ukrainian tendency to attempt to obtain as 

much money from the United States as possible has been tempered. 

It is true that the United States is more attuned to the issues and 

provides better oversight. But the Ukrainian military seems to have 

somewhat changed its attitude as to the “unlimited” nature of U.S. 

resources. During the conference in Warsaw in May 2003 to discuss 

contributions to the Iraqi Stabilization Force, Ukrainian generals 

announced the intent to contribute a brigade, but afterwards they 

were less eloquent (in notable contrast to some other contributing 

nations) in asking for either assistance or reimbursement of the 

brigade’s deployment costs. 

 Unfortunately, other damaging factors on Ukrainian side remain, 

such as the tendency towards over-centralized decisionmaking, 

inefficient and irritating bureaucracy, and over-restrictive security 

regulations. But at least these problems have been identified, and 

discussion of them gains momentum; and with it, the chances for 

correction grow. 

However, in this case, it should be pointed out that success will

be difficult to achieve, if efforts to repair the culture of bureaucracy 

and secretiveness is limited to the Ukrainian military establishment 

only. To a significant extent, success of the military’s democratizing 

remains hostage to success in wider democratic governance reform 

in the country. 
34

 In general though, despite all the remaining problems, the 

planning mechanism is improved, and now the two sides’ 

cooperation encompasses not only peacetime military engagement, 

but preparation, execution, and support of actual combined 

deployments and operations. It is unlikely that the U.S.-Ukraine 

combined operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, and now Iraq would have 

been possible without the stage having been set by years of peacetime 

military engagement, whatever its imperfections. 
35

PART III

PRACTICAL PEACETIME ENGAGEMENT

There are a few aspects of interoperability that we must address when we 

discuss the bilateral U.S.-Ukrainian relationship. Technical issues can be 

addressed by making a commitment to procure interoperable systems. 

But physically obtaining western equipment does not solve the problem. 

Training and accepting doctrine are as, if not more, important. There 

needs to be a focus on western standards. This is where there seems to be 

the biggest gap.

John Cappello

Interview, December 30, 2003

 Ideally, in order to be successful, practical military cooperation 

should be well-planned, well-supported, and well-executed in 

accordance with sound strategic guidance. According to U.S. Joint 

Vision 2020 (JV2020):

Although we must retain the capability to act unilaterally, we prefer 

to act in concert with our friends and allies. Laying a solid foundation 

for interoperability with our alliance and potential coalition partners is 

fundamental to effective combined operations. We remain committed 

to doctrinal and technological development with our key allies 

and to combined training events and exercises that contribute to 

interoperability.

 Apparently the guiding principles of JV2020 for jointness 

ultimately will guide the interoperability agenda as well: 

A fully joint force requires joint operational concepts, doctrine, tactics, 

techniques, and procedures―as well as institutional, organizational, 

intellectual, and system interoperability―so that all U.S. forces and 

systems operate coherently at the strategic, operational, or tactical levels. 

Joint effectiveness does not mean that individual pieces of equipment or 

systems are identical, but rather that commanders are not constrained 

by technical or doctrinal barriers among the components of the joint 

force, and that the joint force’s capability is dramatically enhanced by the 

blending of complementary Service capabilities.
36

 As far as any Ukrainian documents’ provisions on interoperability 

are concerned, this issue is related almost exclusively to the UkraineNATO agenda. For instance, the NATO-Ukraine Action Plan (2002) 

states among the “Principles of Defense and Security Sector Reform” 

that: 

Cooperation in defense-related areas promotes interoperability with 

NATO and increases Ukraine’s overall ability to be a key player in regional 

security. Reform efforts and military cooperation also support Ukraine’s 

strategic goal of Euro-Atlantic integration by gradually adopting NATO 

standards and practices, and enhancing interoperability between the 

armed forces of Ukraine and NATO forces, in particular through the 

implementation of Partnership Goals and participation in NATO-led 

crisis response operations.

 To this end, several objectives are formulated, such as:

Develop the full interoperability, sustainability and mission effectiveness 

of the Armed Forces through effective implementation of Partnership 

Goals; maintain the readiness of Rapid Reaction Force units for 

participation in joint operations with NATO, and training of these units 

to meet NATO standards; achieve a required level of compatibility for 

the actual and future armaments and military equipment and doctrine of 

the Armed Forces of Ukraine, which allows minimum interoperability in 

order to conduct, on a case-by-case basis, tasks of common interest with 

NATO, and adapt/adjust acquisition and related practices to those of 

NATO Allies; and develop interoperability between Ukraine and NATO 

communication and information systems.

 Provided that the two sides have enough trust in each 

other to contemplate fighting side by side, success in achieving 

interoperability between their militaries in an actual mission will be 

enhanced through practical peacetime cooperation. The actual level 

of interoperability thus becomes a derived category of the level of 

achieved common standards in language, training, doctrine, and 

technical systems during their practical peacetime engagement.34

Language.

 From the very beginning, there was a clear understanding 

on both sides that truly interoperable allies should use the same 
37

working language and the same terminology; in other words, that 

use of English is critical to enhance interoperability. (Although both 

English and French are the official operating languages of NATO, 

English predominates by far. As it is unlikely that NATO will adopt 

Ukrainian as an official language any time soon, the importance of 

English, therefore, is obvious).

 When the first Ukrainian IMET students went to the United States 

in 1992, it was already clear that an in-country system of preliminary 

English language training was needed by Ukraine. The intention 

was to train Ukrainian instructors at the U.S. Defense Language 

Institute and supply language laboratories to Ukraine, where trained 

instructors could bring Ukrainian IMET candidates and other related 

personnel to required proficiency levels before they went abroad for 

further study. 

 In 1993 the first two instructors went to the Defense Language 

Institute (Lackland Air Force Base, San Antonio, Texas). Ten years 

later, there were 32 U.S.-trained English language instructors, and 

several dozens trained in Canada and the UK. A number of foreign 

instructors―5 from the United States and 14 from the UK―came 

to the country through this period to teach English for Ukraine’s 

military.35

 During the first years of cooperation, the focus was on training 

candidates for the IMET program. But Ukraine’s participation 

in peacekeeping operations soon broadened this focus. By 1995 

two U.S.-supplied language laboratories were operational in the 

Odessa Army Institute and the Kiev Military Institute of National 

Shevchenko University, while the Kiev Army Institute offered 20 

hours of language training for officers selected for peacekeeping 

operations. In 1997 one more U.S.-supplied laboratory was opened 

in the Sevastopol Naval Institute to support the exclusive needs of 

Ukraine’s Navy. Since 1994 Canada and the UK have invited some 

30-40 Ukrainian officers and MOD civilian employees every year to 

their language training centers as well. 

 In addition to IMET and other foreign programs, in the new 

context of Ukraine’s commitments to an interoperability agenda 

under NATO’s PARP, the Ukrainian military decided gradually to 

increase efforts to produce a sufficient number of qualified Englishspeaking personnel.
38

 While more in-country language laboratories were needed 

and the United States planned to provide these, there was also an 

understanding that military colleges (in Ukraine they are termed 

military institutes) could and should provide better background 

training for cadets, which was to be further upgraded at language 

laboratories and specialized language courses when required. In 

1998, Ukraine’s Minister of Defense ordered the number of language 

training hours for cadets increased by 100 hours, and compulsory 

examination at the end of the last year was introduced.

 By 2001, seven U.S.-supplied language laboratories were 

operational in Ukraine’s military, along with several courses offered 

by the UK (the latter trained both active and retired personnel). 

However, even this number was enough only for training IMET 

candidates, while increased Ukrainian commitments to peacekeeping 

operations still suffered from a lack of language proficient personnel.36

According to former Deputy Army Commander Lieutenant General 

Victor Hudym: 

[In 2001] English language as a common language for Army officers so far 

failed to become the focus of officers’ education and training. Today we 

feel great demand for English speaking officers, especially for missions 

abroad and participation in PfP events. Unfortunately, in regular units 

the conditions for and organization of studying English cannot permit 

quality and timely accomplishment of joint missions and resolution of 

common problems.37

 Indeed, as many Ukrainian and foreign experts observed, for 

Ukrainian staff officers it appeared much easier either to enroll in 

the IMET program or to attend language courses usually located in 

large urban areas, where the major Ukrainian military headquarters 

are located as well. But for units’ commanding and logistical staff at 

bases in more remote areas, especially in the case of those having a 

large number of subordinate personnel requiring constant attention, 

it was nearly impossible to find the opportunity for language 

training.

 Further, by the middle of 2002, after Ukraine declared its 

intention to become a NATO member, attention to English language 

interoperability assumed greater criticality. New actions followed. 

A system of language curriculums at educational institutions was 
39

supplemented by study courses streamlined into an “evening” 

(without interruption of service assignment), “day,” and “foreign” 

system of courses. 

 Also in 2002, by the order of the Minister of Defense, a list of 

specific positions requiring knowledge of foreign languages was 

approved. This list contains over 2,500 positions. Provisions to make 

it easier for these selected personnel to attend courses also were 

developed and established. New incentives for those successfully 

mastering language were instituted to retain qualified personnel, 

since once an officer learned to speak English, his skill becomes 

highly marketable. However, “real life” conditions of unit officer 

assignment obligations often continued to be a stronger priority than 

declared requirements and incentives for language training. 

 The latest move came at the end of 2003, when the Minister of 

Defense approved the “Program for the strengthening of the language 

training of the Armed Forces of Ukraine personnel for 2004-2005.” 

Under the program, the network of foreign-language courses is to 

provide places for 205 students in 2004. It will function based at 10 

military higher education institutions of the Ministry of Defense and 

several selected training centers.

 By the end of 2005, the network capacity is to be expanded 

and new foreign-language courses are to be created, including at 

locations where Ukrainian peacekeeping contingents are deployed. 

The overall network of language training is planned to have places 

for up to 320 students, thanks to these measures. Eight additional 

language laboratories, provided by the United States under the FMF 

Program will be established in military education institutions. There 

are also plans to introduce new ways of teaching classes without 

removing personnel from service. As a new development, not only 

officers will undergo language training, but other personnel also will 

participate, including selected soldiers, sergeants, and civilians. 

In general, as of 2004, the highest and rather acceptable level 

of English language proficiency is being displayed by Ukrainian 

staff officers, many of whom accumulated experience through 

IMET education, local and foreign language courses, multinational 

exercises, and peacekeeping missions. Commanding and logistical 

staff officers coming from units generally have uneven levels of 

English due to time constraints not favorable to combining education 
40

with performing assigned unit-level duties. The poorest state of 

language proficiency is on the soldier-NCO level, where training is 

not organized properly as yet.

 After 13 years of cooperation, the Ukrainian Armed Forces 

have made noteworthy progress in English language proficiency. 

Primarily, this is due to the continuous efforts on both sides, and a 

significant amount of U.S. financial and technical support. However, 

because of the lack of serious planning attention during the first 

years of cooperation and a lack of focus until very recently, language 

interoperability still requires significant improvement. 

Training.

 Since 1995, when the first joint tactical peacekeeping exercise, 

“Peace Shield,” was conducted at Ukraine’s Yavoriv Training 

Center, Ukrainian and U.S. Army units have been regularly involved 

in various kinds of training exercises. As a rule, these exercises are 

conducted “In the spirit of PfP,” when Ukrainians and Americans 

play the key role in planning, financing, and conducting exercises, 

while inviting many other NATO partner nations to participate.38

Not only U.S. and Ukrainian Army units have trained together, 

but also naval forces and marines/naval infantry (“Sea Breeze, 

“Eloquent Nugget”). Ukrainian and U.S. Air Force units additionally 

have conducted some low-level but productive combined training, 

especially in cross-familiarization with each other’s transport aircraft 

and procedures. In addition, there is a number of now-traditional 

series of multinational exercises under the NATO PfP program, 

where Ukrainians cooperate with U.S. and other NATO militaries, 

contributing to U.S.-Ukrainian interoperability on different subjects to 

include maritime logistic support systems (“Cooperative Support”), 

communication system interoperability (“Combined Endeavor”), 

interoperability in peacekeeping and humanitarian relief tactics 

(“Cooperative Osprey” and “Cooperative Nugget”), and many 

others.

 In relation to training exercises, it is important to note the unique 

role of the “Peace Shield” series, which became traditional. The 

overall number of participants ranges from 800 to 1,200, representing 

the armed forces of 20-26 countries. The cost of the exercise so far 
41

has been covered largely by the United States and constitutes some 

U.S.$400,000-700,000 per exercise. 

 With time, the scenario and equipment underwent changes 

and improvements. In 2000, the establishment of a satellite system 

of teleconference communication made it possible to keep certain 

participating units’ headquarters outside the borders of Ukraine 

and locate them in Estonia and Bulgaria, from which locations they 

participated on a “virtual” level. In 2001, a transatlantic flight by 

three U.S. Air Force C-17 aircraft after three refuelings in midair 

ended with a joint Ukrainian-U.S. parachute drop on the Yavoriv 

Training Center by 180 paratroopers of the U.S. 82nd Airborne 

Division, 120 paratroopers of the 1st Ukrainian Airmobile Division, 

and 9 pieces of Ukrainian combat airborne fighting vehicles. The 

same year the exercise scenario changed from a traditionally abstract 

one to a concrete situation modeled on Kosovo and set in the zone 

of responsibility of the Multinational Brigade “East” under U.S. 

command, in which Ukraine participates.39 The latter was truly an 

example of the progression to utilizing exercises to anticipate and 

solve practical issues of interoperability.

 “Peace Shield” also was raised from the battalion to the brigade 

level and transformed from a live-training tactical-level event to 

both a live-training and virtual-training tactical/operational level 

event. This involved the introduction of computer-assisted stafflevel exercise simulations with corresponding involvement of a 

small number of troops from the participating armed forces in live 

tactical play. Despite some continuing organizational deficiencies, 

these exercises provided valuable lessons learned for both the U.S. 

and Ukrainian sides. As noted in 1998 by U.S. Major General (Ret.) 

Nicholas Krawciw in after-action comments: 

For the future, it would be beneficial for NATO and Ukraine to conduct 

a series of computer assisted staff exercises designed to involve, over 

time, as many Ukrainian military headquarters as possible in various 

peacekeeping staff functions. Exercises “Peace Shield 97” and “98” 

provide a U.S.-Ukrainian model for useful future computer assisted 

training.40

 The experience received during “Peace Shield” and NATO PfP 

exercises along with practical lessons from peacekeeping missions 
42

has allowed Ukrainians to produce several rudimentary tactical 

manuals for training their personnel to perform future peacekeeping 

together with other countries.

 It also allowed, with support from the United States and NATO, 

the conduct of large-scale exercises like “Cooperative Adventure 

Exchange” in October 2002, when some 3,000 military personnel 

from 12 NATO nations (Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, 

Germany, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, Norway, Poland, Turkey, the 

United Kingdom, and the United States) and from six partner nations 

(Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Moldova, Macedonia, and Ukraine) 

struggled to improve the interoperability of Allied Command 

Europe Mobile Forces, LAND with other headquarters and units 

from NATO and partner nations. At the same time these exercises 

promoted common understanding of deployment, organization, 

employment, and redeployment of a multinational formation in a 

fictitious UN-mandated NATO-led peace support operation.

 The Ukrainians gained many good lessons from these combined 

exercises: peacekeeping techniques, standard operating procedures 

(SOP), the role and use of simulations, communication equipment, 

and leadership. At the same time, these exercises generally have 

shown that, while intellectually and physically Ukrainian servicemen 

were not much inferior to American, the Ukrainian combat training 

system, doctrine, and ethos of leadership needed significant 

improvement.

 In fact, Ukrainian [post-Soviet] manuals provide a solid base of 

methods, procedures, and techniques for attaining necessary combat 

skills through rigorous training. This is one of the major reasons 

why the former Soviet military was considered to be very good in 

“generating raw combat power.” As proven many times by the U.S. 

Army’s Opposing Force (OPFOR) Regiment at the U.S. National 

Training Center (Fort Irwin, California), these techniques and skills, 

if mastered and applied properly, appear not at all to be inferior to 

those adopted in U.S. field manuals, and permit the OPFOR to fight 

and typically win tactical engagements with other U.S. Army units 

in training.

 However, most people would agree that the average Ukrainian 

unit noticeably would be less combat capable than a U.S. one, even 

if given the same equipment. There is an obvious problem on the 
43

Ukrainian side, which is a lack of necessary resources for training. 

In addition, conscript manning and less consistent leadership 

qualities could be counted as negative factors. But to a significant 

extent, the average Ukrainian unit would be weaker mainly because 

of the inferior training system currently in place. In essence, there 

is a big gap between what is written in manuals and what kind of 

real practice Ukraine inherited along with good combat manuals. 

On paper, units should master skills in accordance with the specifics 

of their assigned mission, geographical specifics of the territory 

where the mission is to be performed, and with different approaches 

to day/night conditions. In fact, this is hampered by a number of 

negative factors: significant amount of time consumed by repeating 

cycles of basic training for rotating conscripts; a very weak NCO 

corps and, consequently, Ukrainian officers being too busy with 

other than training business; little opportunity to train more than 

at company level―very basic but important things. And to top it all, 

Ukrainian units have no such things as developed Mission Essential 

Task Lists (METLs) to guide their training; in the U.S. military, each 

unit’s METL helps to prioritize and assist in organizing training on 

the most essential tasks for that unit, which in turn helps to tailor 

and rationalize the current U.S. system of combat training.

 In Ukraine, there is still a Soviet-style conscript-oriented system 

of “periods of training”―two half-year periods per year, based on the 

curriculum provided by “Program of Army combat training” and 

similar programs for other services. The system is driven in large 

part by the need to bring new conscripts “up to speed” every halfyear. Thus, in reality, Ukrainian soldiers routinely master the same 

basic skills every period to pass the “control inspection” at the end, 

but very rarely is there an opportunity to be trained as a coherent 

unit in anything resembling advanced tactical operations. Ukrainian 

officers, faced with this simplistic non-innovative approach to 

combat training―especially when added to the very low quality of 

life provided by the current system of social support (pay, housing, 

retirement benefits, etc.)―often lose the incentive to try to train their 

units to any higher standards.

 On a low level of joint peacekeeping, these differences are not a 

big problem yet, though it is a growing issue in terms of efficiency 
44

of the way Ukrainians man and train their higher-than-company 

peacekeeping contingents. This will be true especially in view 

of Ukrainian plans to have a fully professional RRF soon, as well 

a standing peacekeeping brigade of up to 3,000 strong and the 

deployment of a relatively large Ukrainian force in Iraq.

 The necessity of improving the system of Ukrainian combat 

training was recognized by a U.S. team of experts, conducting the 

“Defense Analysis of the Armed Forces of Ukraine” in 2002. In 

the final report of this analysis, which was primarily focused on 

Ukraine’s RRF, the team explicitly recommended to begin with 

developing METL and a new set of standards, and suggested using 

the U.S. Army set of manuals/evaluations “that may be useful as a 

model for a similar system for the Ukraine Armed Forces.”41

 As far as multinational headquarters staff training is concerned, 

the progress already is past the stage of familiarization. Growing 

participation of Ukrainian officers in peacekeeping deployments 

abroad has prompted the opening in 2000 of special courses for the 

officers of multinational staffs within the National Defense Academy 

of Ukraine. These courses train officers who are selected for the 

positions in international peacekeeping or similar multinational staffs. 

For each rotation, up to 40 officers study the theoretical foundations 

of peacekeeping for 2 weeks, as well as practical Ukrainian and 

international experience in working on a multinational basis. The 

curriculum is based on programs from NATO schools. 

 In 2003, the courses provided training for a group of Ukrainian 

officers who were to be appointed to various positions in Iraq, where 11 

Ukrainian officers served in Joint Coalition Headquarters in Baghdad 

and 24 Ukrainian officers and one senior NCO in the multinational 

“Center-South” division headquarters in Babylon. Instruction was 

carried out exclusively in English, and the curriculum itself was 

adopted with consideration of actual operational experience in Iraq. 

Instructors from the United States, Canada, and France helped to 

teach the course, along with Ukrainian instructors.42 There is a plan, 

with the support of NATO, to transform the courses for the officers 

of multinational staffs into a (international) center for training the 

officers for peacekeeping operations. 

 The United States supplied the courses with the bulk of supporting 

computers, local network equipment, software, and literature, as 
45

well as providing some visiting lecturers to supplement permanent 

NATO instructors from Canada and France. They also contributed to 

Ukraine’s National Defense Academy program called “International 

Weeks,” during which U.S. and NATO speakers lecture Ukrainian 

student-officers and their instructors on various security and defense 

topics. 

 In addition, on June 17, 2004, Ukraine Defense Minister Yevgen 

Marchuck and U.S. Ambassador John Herbst inaugurated the U.S. 

sponsored Simulation Center in the National Defense Academy, the 

first of several such centers supplied by the United States to Ukrainian 

military for the purpose of more efficient officer training for joint 

and peacekeeping operations. The overall cost of the U.S. supplied 

hardware, software, and training package is U.S.$5.4 million. 

 While Ukrainians go to the United States and some other NATO 

countries under training and exchange programs, Americans study 

in Ukraine, too. In 1997 two U.S. Army officers attended a 4-month 

course at Ukraine’s Army Institute in Kiev (now in Odessa). This 

experience found its further application when U.S. officers and cadets 

from time to time have come to Ukraine to spend several months in a 

Ukrainian military unit or institute.43

 Overall, in regard to training as part of the interoperability 

development process between the U.S. and Ukrainian militaries, past 

experience has proved that many problems of Ukraine’s military 

training could be corrected. Decisions have been made to emphasize 

command and control interoperability: to introduce a Joint “Jstructure” for Ukrainian headquarters and adopt NATO standards. 

Ukrainian officers, in fact, have two sets of standards―the old Soviet 

ones for combat and new NATO ones for peacekeeping.

 In terms of the specific training of Ukrainian units, a broader 

use of training simulators is envisioned. But removing the negative 

impact on the training process of such factors as Ukrainian conscript 

manning, very limited resources, and virtual absence of professional 

NCO corps will require more time. If current positive trends continue, 

it will still take at least 5-10 years for the Ukrainian military to become 

qualified at a satisfactory NATO level.
46

Doctrine.

 The problem of bringing Ukrainian military doctrines closer to the 

American ones was a need primarily emphasized by the U.S. side. At 

the turn of the decade, there was a feeling of some disappointment 

because of the alleged lack of enthusiasm on the Ukrainian side to 

utilize Western doctrine. With regard to the period of cooperation 

up to 2000, Colonel Simmeth summarized: 

Familiarity with each other’s doctrines [is] partly successful. Ukraine’s 

military is now more familiar with U.S. and Western doctrine through 

exercises, exchanges, and cooperation in the Balkans. The reverse is also 

true. But the hope in the West was that Ukraine would find Western 

doctrine useful in pursuit of military reform. It does not seem that this is 

the case.44

 Colonel Simmeth’s assessment was founded in the U.S. concept 

that doctrine tells a force what it needs to be able to do and to what 

standards. Thus from that, it may derive other conclusions such as 

what resource allocations, training programs, etc., rationally are 

necessary. In this sense, doctrine can serve as an “engine of change” 

for reform, particularly at the operational level and above. That 

Ukraine’s limited reform progress up to 2000 was perceived at least 

in part to be hampered by a failure to reform doctrine thoroughly is 

not surprising. 

 Such a conclusion is natural as well for the United States in the 

area of interoperability, given its perception of the great importance of 

doctrinal compatibility for effective combined operations. U.S. Major 

General Krawciw noted, for example: “Doctrinal interoperability in 

joint and combined operations may well constitute the difference 

between ensuring the well-being and success of those sent into 

combat, or risking failure and loss of lives because of inadequate 

procedures and tactics.”45 Then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff General John Shalikashvili emphasized this idea to a visiting 

Ukrainian General Officer delegation in 1996 when the latter 

expressed the desire to obtain more U.S.-made military equipment 

“for the sake of interoperability.” The Chairman explained his belief 

that we: 
47

do not all have to buy the same equipment to be interoperable . . . but 

our doctrine and techniques for employing that equipment should be 

compatible. This means having the same or similar operational doctrine, 

and understanding where that doctrine differs and why, as well as having 

compatible equipment standards.46

 Overall, many Americans, after gaining experience in cooperating 

with Ukrainian troops, acknowledge their “fundamental” competence at individual and tactical levels plus good discipline. But at 

the same time, there is probably a consensus on the U.S. side about 

the weakness of Ukrainians in the areas of operational level doctrine 

and doubts about the operational competence of at least some of the 

mid-top leadership.

 However, since the year 2000, and even during the prior period 

of bilateral military cooperation, the U.S. doctrinal influence on 

Ukrainian military was quite significant. Though Ukrainians 

always have attempted to base their system of developing major 

doctrinal documents primarily on their own intellectual resources, 

there was no doubt that experience received through military-tomilitary contacts played a very important role in this process. This 

experience came through many familiarization cooperative events, 

as well as through joint training exercises, the open sharing of U.S. 

doctrinal publications, and, of course, through graduates of the IMET 

Program.47

 The U.S. experience undoubtedly has influenced the adoption 

of Ukrainian key doctrinal concepts like creation of the RRF and of 

the Active Reserve (State Program, 2000) and the 2002 decision on 

turning to all-volunteer manning by 2015. Occasional U.S. and other 

NATO countries’48 doctrinal recommendations play an ever more 

influential role in many specific areas of Ukrainian defense reform.

 For instance, EUCOM’s Defense Analysis Report on the RRF 

has made a significant impact on the development of the Ukrainian 

manual, “Fundamentals of preparation and application of the Joint 

Rapid Reaction Force.” Another good example, according to Ukraine’s 

Minister of Defense Yevghen Marchuk, “The U.S. program DRMM 

(Defense Resource Management Model) is utilized in development 

of a well-balanced prospective force structure for the Armed Forces 

of Ukraine 2015 in terms of determining realistic resource allocations 

needed for this.”49
48

 Other individual NATO countries such as Canada, Germany, 

Poland, and the UK provide important support to Ukraine’s doctrinal 

development in the form of general military reform analysis, training, 

and education of military personnel, personnel management systems, 

etc. 

 Starting from 2001, NATO teams of experts in cooperation 

with Ukrainians launched several pilot projects to develop 

recommendations for some specific areas like Ukraine’s Naval 

force structure reform, reintegration of retired military personnel, 

and disposal of ammunition and small arms. In doctrinal terms, 

the most promising results and prospects are shown within a naval 

pilot project, where a NATO team in concert with U.S. experts has 

passed the stage of recommendation development and is helping 

Ukrainians to implement a new force structure in the Ukrainian 

Navy, establish a naval combat information center, adopt NATO 

standards for Naval headquarters, and improve the Navy’s system 

of logistic support.50 And, Western experience in general clearly was 

taken into account in the recently adopted new version of Ukraine’s 

operational-strategic doctrine, “Fundamentals of preparation and 

application of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.”

 There are many recent indications of genuine progress by the 

Ukrainians on the operational doctrine level of interoperability. 

However, the issue of leadership remains for U.S. counterparts an 

area of some disappointment. The lower level leadership problem―

reinforced by the weakness of the Ukrainian NCO Corps―was 

recognized by both sides long ago, and consequent priority attention 

was given to this, bringing visible improvements. The solution at 

higher levels is a bit more problematic. 

 Perhaps foremost, the decisionmaking style adopted by the senior 

Ukrainian leadership seems to frustrate the United States. It is a familiar 

thing to complain of the “Ukrainian tendency to over-centralize both 

decisionmaking and execution,” which is in vivid contrast to the U.S. 

military doctrinal standard of “centralized planning and direction 

and decentralized execution.” Some Americans recognize that this 

is not simply a case of bad leaders with poor leadership ability, but 

rather a cultural and organizational tendency, reinforced by a legacy 

of Soviet over-centralization. But it remains frustrating to most, who 
49

view it as an impediment to efficient planning and reform progress 

overall.

 Another point of discontent, which has to do with adoption of the 

U.S. doctrinal experience, is the currently rather slow development 

of a Ukrainian system of “lessons learned.” It took a long time for 

Ukrainians to recognize how important it is to have an effective 

multilevel system of lessons learned. While this problem finally was 

recognized, it is still unclear as to when Ukrainians will be able to fill 

the current gap between regular units’ experiences and the ability 

of the central military research institutions to gather and distribute 

these experiences along with suggested “best practices.” This 

problem is characteristic for both operational experiences and the 

way Ukrainians manage their resources. Prominent NATO experts 

on Ukraine Christopher Donnelly and James Greene have stated, 

with regard to the Ukrainian resource management problem which 

is of the same nature as “lessons learned” problem, that: 

More important than Rapid Reaction Forces or moving to contract 

service is the issue of managing resources . . . The system also needs to 

evaluate program results . . . For such system to work, it must be able 

to accurately measure and predict costs, both for current force structure 

and programs, and for alternatives. This is difficult in any armed forces; 

in a post-communist system the challenge is huge; intensive foreign 

assistance will be needed.51

 Ukraine needs to adopt an effective system of reporting, analyzing, 

summarizing, and disseminating important lessons learned, as well 

as a methodology by which to compare these lessons to doctrine and 

thereby identify any doctrinal gaps or errors. U.S. experts suggest 

capitalizing much more on its experience in order to reduce waste of 

resources, prevent repeating the same mistakes, and disseminating 

innovative solutions and practices. 

 Overall, while Ukrainians actually adopted a lot of positive 

U.S. experiences for their Navy, military education system, and 

peacekeeping doctrine; the remaining problems with resources and 

bureaucratic shortsightedness noticeably slowed wider application 

of doctrinal lessons. It is important to remember, however, that 

there are natural limits to doctrinal aspects of interoperability, since 

in practical terms, it is still a bit early to talk about U.S.-Ukrainian 
50

military cooperation beyond peacekeeping, and Ukraine is not 

a member of NATO yet. According to many well-known expert 

estimates, even some U.S. NATO allies and other European partners 

often are considered not to be fully combat interoperable with the 

United States, and sometimes even not fully trusted.

 In general, in terms of doctrinal interoperability, the two sides 

already are beyond the familiarization stage. Ukrainians started a 

number of important changes to adopt their force structure, staff 

procedures, peacekeeping operations, and logistical system to U.S. 

and NATO standards. However, problems remain with the full 

adoption of Western combat doctrines and with the leadership/

decisionmaking style. When a specific joint mission is envisioned, 

Ukrainians simply adapt personnel to this mission’s Rules of 

Engagement (ROE) and multinational staff procedures. The core 

of Ukrainian combat doctrine is considered to be not radically 

different or deficient to that of the United States. The comprehensive 

adaptation of manuals, headquarters’ techniques, and leadership 

styles to U.S. and NATO models is not seriously on the agenda yet. 

And to ensure effective implementation of doctrinal change, there 

likely will need to be a longer-term deeper “cultural” change (and 

possibly a generational change) in the Ukrainian military and in the 

minds and styles of its members. Any more sudden radical “change 

of minds and styles” of the senior Ukrainian military leadership―

especially when this is not strongly encouraged by their political 

masters―appears highly unlikely.

Technical Systems.

 Given the scarcity of resources that the Ukrainian authorities 

are willing to allocate for the country’s military armaments and 

equipment needs, the issue of technical systems interoperability has 

not been solved, not even by adoption of the “compatible equipment 

standards” noted by General Shalikashvili. The “solution” basically 

was left to the good will of the United States in donating or helping to 

fund the purchase of military equipment under its FMF program, the 

“Warsaw initiative,” and other programs. In addition to Ukrainian 

financial limitations, it took a long time for the two countries 

to negotiate and sign the necessary background agreements on 
51

military-technical cooperation, which also blocked the development 

of more intensive contacts in this area. There is also a history of the 

United States buying small batches of Ukrainian weapons and other 

products for military use, but these amounts never exceeded several 

million dollars per year.

 Still, in terms of cooperation in peacekeeping, the United States 

has provided quite a lot of equipment to make Ukrainian units 

technically interoperable. This concerns primarily Ukrainian military 

contingents in Kosovo and Iraq. For instance, under FMF, in FY 

2000 Ukraine purchased HUMVEEs with tactical radios and other 

communication equipment. In FY 2001 Ukraine purchased additional 

HUMVEEs with tactical radios, other four-wheel-drive vehicles, 

and night-vision goggles.52 In FY 2002 Ukraine used FMF funds to 

purchase, among other things, automation and simulation equipment 

and additional military tactical radios and communications systems, 

as well as to help develop a simulation center to support peacekeeper 

training.53 This pattern continued in FY 2003. A certain number 

of radios and data-transmission equipment also were supplied 

to Ukrainian peacekeeping units from funds provided under the 

“Warsaw initiative.” 

 This kind of support naturally helped to cover only the immediate 

needs of Ukrainian units to be interoperable with their U.S., Polish, 

and other partners in Kosovo and in Iraq. However, ambitions to 

join NATO pushed the Ukrainian military to declare its intention 

to equip all units with interoperable communication equipment, 

for which purpose the plans for international tender in 2004 were 

announced. Among the bidders Ukrainians expected to see wellestablished producers, such as Siemens, Motorola, Tadiran, and 

others.54

 Ukrainians supplied some of their equipment to the United 

States as well, but these supplies were of a different nature. First, 

Ukrainians were selling, not donating, or helping anyone to fund 

their equipment. While the list of this equipment includes some 

Ukrainian tanks, combat vehicles, missiles, artillery systems, and even 

training aircraft, these sales have nothing to do with interoperability 

and were evidently purchased for different purposes. At a minimum 

these sales bring some initial experience of military-technical 

cooperation, which could possibly become helpful in the future, if 
52

Ukraine continues to plan for acquisition of western interoperable 

equipment beyond communication systems. 

 Ukraine also provides the United States and other NATO nations 

with a significant amount of airlift, especially in cases of very large 

and very heavy cargo. It possesses a sizable fleet of Antonov-124 

(Ruslan) and Iliushyn-76 Candid cargo aircraft, as well as the biggest 

plane in the world, the Antonov-225 (Mriya), capable of carrying a 

240-tons maximum load. These aircraft were used in 2003 to deliver 

U.S. equipment to Kuwait and Iraq.

 In fact, theoretical opportunities exist for future close military 

technical connections, given some of Ukraine’s unique technological 

capabilities in the fields of space, transport aircraft, shipbuilding, 

missile, radar, and other production. But for this to become true, 

Ukraine will need to become a real “strategic partner.” Beyond 

today’s rather declarative political rhetoric, this is likely to occur only 

in the more distant future. This is the reason why, despite genuine 

interest on both sides to expedite military technical cooperation 

and despite available technological potential, the issue of technical 

systems interoperability probably lags behind most other main issues 

of interoperability. 

 Overall, the results of U.S.-Ukraine peacetime military 

engagement could be termed effective but not efficient. On the one 

hand, bilateral cooperative mechanisms have allowed for the conduct 

of a great number of useful familiarizing and training events and 

for the running several important joint projects. These events and 

projects have created the necessary conditions for the overall positive 

development of bilateral military cooperation and established a 

foundation for cooperation in practical deployments. On the other 

hand, so far the effect of these cooperative events on the progress 

of Ukraine’s defense reforms has been mixed, and the process of 

strengthening Ukraine’s military interoperability with U.S. and 

NATO militaries has proceeded at a rather slow pace. This reflects 

remaining shortcomings on the Ukrainian side in terms of improving 

language and doctrinal interoperability, as well as the rather 

insignificant efforts to improve technical systems interoperability. 

Most important, the Ukrainian side corrects problems only very 

slowly because its own internal system of the lessons learned still is 

very underdeveloped.
53

PART IV

ACCOMPLISHING MISSIONS TOGETHER

Actual operational experience provides the greatest learning environment. 

Therefore, continuing Ukrainian participation in peace operations . . . 

should be considered as very important.

Nicholas Krawciw55

 Ukraine’s participation in many UN and Organization for Security 

and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) peacekeeping operations and in 

stabilization operations in Iraq makes it possible for the Ukrainian 

military to gain new experiences from working with the armed 

forces of other countries. Most importantly, this participation has 

tested the value of peacetime engagement and allowed Ukraine to 

improve interoperability with the United States and NATO partners, 

thus building the foundation for possible cooperation in future low 

intensity conflicts. The United States and Ukraine have cooperated 

most closely in accomplishing peacekeeping and combat missions 

together in Kosovo and Iraq. These experiences so far represent the 

most important instances of interoperability development, though 

many other operations could also suggest plenty of lessons from 

working together. 

Kosovo.

 At first, the Ukrainian KFOR contingent, consisting of the 14th 

Helicopter Company and the 37th Maintenance Company (replaced 

by a mechanized company in July 2000), was deployed to Macedonia, 

where it remained from July until December 1999. This time 

primarily was used to prepare for further deployment to Kosovo, 

to train troops for future missions, and to learn NATO standards 

and ROE. In December the Ukrainians moved to Kosovo, where they 

were based at Camp Bondsteell with the MNB “East” under U.S. 

command.

 Among the many examples of joint actions between Ukraine 

and the United States in Kosovo, two are particularly interesting for 
54

study of interoperability. The first case involved the protection of 

the first democratic elections in Kosovo in October 2000. For KFOR’s 

operational reserve, consisting of British and Greek infantry troops 

mounted on seven helicopters (three Ukrainian and four American), 

the mission was to move a multinational force anywhere throughout 

Kosovo quickly to provide extra security and additional forces for the 

municipal elections. To demonstrate the resolve of KFOR to secure 

peace and order prior to the election day of October 28, the strength 

demonstration, codenamed “Air Insertion Exercise,” was conducted 

in an open field close to the town of Gnjilane.

 The period of intense preparation was meant to demonstrate the 

readiness of KFOR’s operational reserve to protect and secure the 

first free, democratic political elections in Kosovo. According to an 

observer’s report:

Coming in formations of three and three, the helicopters touched down 

in turn to drop off heavily equipped British and Greek infantry soldiers 

who ran bowed into their positions, waiting for the soldier deployment 

to be fulfilled. This joint helicopter force consisted of three American UH60 Black Hawks and three Ukrainian Mi-8 Hips, all very well-coordinated 

and obviously familiar with this type of assignment. As soon as the last 

helicopter, an American CH-47 Chinook, touched the ground, the first 

formation of three helicopters took off again, immediately followed by 

the second formation. Shortly afterwards, the Chinook was also emptied 

and back in the air, chasing the six helicopters ahead. Left in the field 

were seven groups of soldiers.56

 The scenario of the exercise was rather simple―it envisioned a 

demonstration of the unopposed deployment of the multinational 

KFOR Operational Reserve into a small field near the town. However, 

the message was powerful: “There should be no doubt that the 

Kosovo Force is ready to deal with any problems that might occur in 

connection with Kosovo’s first municipal elections.”57 Judging by the 

conduct of the elections, it worked well.

 According to Ukrainian peacekeeping experts, this episode in 

KFOR’s mission marked a noticeable improvement in coordinated 

actions between Ukrainian and U.S. and NATO forces, compared to 

their previous deployments to Bosnia and Eastern Slavonia (Croatia) 

in the 1990s.
55

 Another illustrative story which involved the Ukrainian and 

U.S. infantry took place in Kosovo on February 13, 2001. Ukrainian 

peacekeepers escorted a convoy of Serbian civilians through the 

mountains to the municipal center of Strpce. A sniper (allegedly 

Albanian) opened fire, apparently aiming at one of the bus drivers, 

but shot an elderly Serb instead. Ukrainian peacekeepers deployed 

immediately and searched the nearby slopes, where they found 

several Albanian males and detained them. Later in the evening 

a Serbian crowd of over 500 gathered around the local UN police 

station as a “spontaneous protest against the killing of the elderly 

Serb.” The situation became tense as Ukrainian peacekeepers formed 

a circle around the station with the UN police contingent (including 

U.S. military police) inside while the crowd attempted to break in. At 

some point, the UN police station chief started firing in the air and 

aiming his gun at the crowd. This move ignited the mob―Molotov 

cocktails were thrown at the station, stones were hurled at Ukrainian 

peacekeepers, and five police cars were burned or destroyed.

 The crowd was growing when Ukrainian company commander 

Captain Brezgounov entered the station with four soldiers and 

suggested the policemen evacuate. They hesitated when they 

learned that the Ukrainians were in small numbers. When the 

policemen were finally in Ukrainian vehicles, the crowd blocked 

their movement. Then support suddenly came from outside―U.S. 

HUMMVees rammed through the hastily-erected Serbian barricades 

on the outskirts of Strpce and raced to the aid of the Ukrainians. 

The senior U.S. officer present, Colonel Kamena, decided to address 

the crowd. As he approached, the crowd seized him, but Ukrainian 

peacekeepers led by the same Captain Brezgounov broke into the 

crowd and pulled the U.S. officer out of it. Within 24 hours, MNB 

“East” commander U.S. Brigadier General Quinlan awarded Captain 

Brezgounov with a NATO medal for outstanding performance.

 This episode showed evident reluctance on the part of the UN 

police to cooperate with the Ukrainian KFOR troops. There was 

also some evidence of lack of coordination between the U.S. and 

Ukrainian troops once the action began. This could be attributed to 

a lack of proper advanced planning, but there was no doubt about 

the trust and support between the Americans and the Ukrainians. 
56

Ukrainian veterans still gratefully recall that, immediately after this 

action, the U.S. troops supplied them with better antiriot equipment, 

which the Ukrainians initially lacked. 

 However, the two sides’ military newspapers reported the 

incident quite differently. While the Ukrainian Narodna Armiya58 did 

not hesitate to describe broadly and praise the role of both Ukraine 

and the United States, the U.S. Stars and Stripes,

59 in describing the 

incident, wrote a story about the role of the Americans, but said 

nothing about the role of Ukrainian peacekeepers that day, merely 

mentioning someone’s proposal to assign U.S. troops as convoy 

escorts instead of unnamed “KFOR troops.” 

 This difference in coverage might have to do with U.S. political 

leadership not wishing to publicize a danger to their troops, even 

though the U.S. forces on the scene recognized the action for what it 

was. This could be an example of trying to avoid the “CNN factor”―

the story of U.S. soldiers being surrounded and having to be rescued 

by anyone could have produced public or political backlash. But this 

lack of publicity was perceived by some Ukrainians as reluctance to 

note their important role. 

 Since then, both the composition and the mission of Ukrainian 

contingent have changed. In 2001, Ukrainian helicopters were 

withdrawn, and Ukrainian troops were represented by two 

companies of the Ukrainian-Polish joint peacekeeping battalion, 

UKRPOLBAT, and the staff element. By the start of 2004, they are 

still serving within the U.S.-led MNB “East,” patrolling the area near 

the Kosovo border with Macedonia along with the United States. 

The situation has become more peaceful, and the troops devote a 

great deal of time to training together. As observed by UKRPOLBAT 

Deputy Commander Ukrainian Army Major Serhij Heraimovich, 

Our soldiers participate in all MNB(E) training offered at Camp 

Bondsteel. Especially our medics are training on a regular basis with their 

American counterparts. There are also many professional development 

and language skills programs for our sergeants in the United States prior 

to being sent on this mission.60

 This training and these bonds naturally help during joint 

actions:
57

Since arriving in the theater, the Ukrainian and American soldiers have 

conducted joint patrols. According to [Ukrainian] Senior Sergeant Andrej 

Chernata, these patrols have been very interesting: “Especially during 

joint patrols, we have the opportunity to share knowledge and our shared 

goals of security.”61

Iraq.

 The story of Ukraine-U.S. cooperation in Iraq begins with the 

deployment of the Ukrainian CBR-protection battalion to Kuwait 

during the active hostilities period of March-April 2003. The battalion 

was deployed by Ukrainian air transport to Kuwait 2 weeks after 

hostilities began.

 This first deployment to the zone of hostilities near the Iraqi border 

proved several things. The problem of the individual equipment 

of Ukrainian personnel remained, as was the case in Kosovo, and 

the United States again provided support on the spot with some 

basic equipment including uniforms, protection gear, and footwear. 

But there was no doubt about the professionalism of Ukrainian 

personnel and the readiness of their combat equipment. In addition,

the Ukrainians were located at the same base as the Americans, 

which added once again to their knowledge and appreciation of 

each other.

 Though Ukrainian 19th CBR-protection battalion did not take 

part in active combat action, in August the third “special” battalion 

of Ukraine’s 5th Separate Mechanized Brigade was formed from 

elements of this battalion. As far as follow-up deployment of the 

Ukrainian 5th Mechanized Brigade and higher staff elements to 

Iraq is concerned, the announcement was made in May 2003 during 

the conference in Warsaw on foreign troops’ contribution to the 

stabilization operation. Though the news about the U.S. proposal 

to deploy a brigade headquarters and two battalions to Iraq (made 

to Ukraine earlier that month) was known previously, Ukraine’s 

agreement still came as a surprise for many. When the Ukrainian 

proposal officially was made, according to witnesses, there was at 

first a moment of silence evidently caused by this surprise. Then 

some of those present started to ask their neighbors again to confirm 

whether they had understood the Ukrainian offer correctly. When 
58

it was confirmed by Ukrainian Deputy Chief of the General Staff 

Major General Oleg Sivushenko, the U.S. Marine officer present at 

the conference, who had just arrived from Iraq, could not hide his 

pleasure―”My people will go home!”62

 After 3 months of intense preparations, in which U.S., Canadian, 

and British instructors took part, the Ukrainian contingent was 

fully deployed to Iraq in accordance with the schedule by August 

17, 2003. Not everything went smoothly, and the heads of the 

Ukrainian MOD’s armaments and logistic headquarters paid for this 

with their positions, as did several other high-ranking Ukrainian 

officers. Nonetheless, overall, after the previous deployment to 

Kuwait, this next deployment to Iraq once again proved the ability 

of the Ukrainians to deploy in time, relying primarily on their own 

airlift capability while partly using foreign sealift when necessary. 

The Americans, who pledged to compensate the Ukrainians for 

the transportation cost of both deployments―to Kuwait and Iraq―

praised this ability.

 The Ukrainian brigade was to replace the 3rd Marine Battalion at 

al-Kut, the capital of Wasit province in Iraq, southeast of Baghdad on 

a 140-km long sector of Iraqi border with Iran. The substitution was 

planned to be finished in 2 weeks. The first week, both the Ukraine 

and the United States had to accomplish missions together. During 

the second week, only instructors remained on the U.S. side to help 

Ukrainian personnel adjust. From early September, the Ukrainians 

assumed full responsibility for Wasit province’s peace and order.

 According to Ukrainian participant accounts,63 as soon as the 

first elements of the 5th Brigade stepped onto Kuwaiti and then Iraqi 

soil, U.S. military personnel gave them comprehensive support. The 

United States helped in the organization of transportation, security, 

rations, deployment of personnel, and supply of the equipment 

for the Ukrainian military contingent. At briefings, as well as in 

everyday communication, the experienced U.S. troops continuously 

gave practical advice on how to operate in a hot climate, what to be 

careful of, what to do if someone gets sunstroke, how to maintain 

communications and orient oneself in an unfamiliar environment, 

how to act when under attack, etc. 

 At the Kut airfield, the command of the U.S. Marine battalion, 

which was to transfer control to the Ukrainian brigade, did everything 
59

to ensure that its comrades-in-arms would not be starting from 

scratch. Almost every day U.S. personnel met with personnel of the 

Ukrainian peacekeeping contingent and transferred their experience 

in performing their duties. Specifically, the 19th Separate Special 

Battalion, which was slotted to take over the defense of the Kut 

airfield, was given complete information about the most dangerous 

sectors of the perimeter of this large installation. The Marines told 

the Ukrainians about various incidents that had occurred over the 5 

months since the operation began. They also shared their observations 

of the behavior of the residents of the city. 

 The specialists of the marine engineer unit were just as concerned 

with the health and lives of the Ukrainians. They collected and 

displayed a huge exhibit of the explosive devices that had been found 

on the former military airfield. The U.S. sappers fully characterized 

each mine, device, and grenade and recounted the story of an 

unfortunate incident involving two of their soldiers. At some points, 

Ukrainian and U.S. sappers had to work together to demine the 

territory of the airfield, which they did with understanding and trust 

in each other.

 The company of the U.S. military police proved particularly helpful 

to the military police platoon of the Ukrainian brigade. The specific 

nature of assignments involving the patrol of the unknown city of Kut 

and the detention of law-breakers demanded special knowledge and 

practices. Thanks to the efforts of U.S. Captain Terry Dorn, Ukrainian 

peacekeepers were able to master the service quickly. Almost every 

night in the U.S. or Ukrainian headquarters, one could witness the 

examination and analysis of the joint operations in the city by this 

young woman. According to Ukrainian accounts, “Captain Dorn 

was concerned for the Ukrainians as if for her brothers. She wanted 

everything to turn out as it should and to avoid human losses.”64

 The joint cooperation of the Ukrainian and U.S. military, which 

began with transmission of operational experience, continued after 

the marines’ departure, when the task of training an Iraqi territorial 

self-defense battalion was carried out jointly. The Ukrainians were 

responsible for selection and medical examination of Iraqi personnel, 

while training was organized together with U.S. instructors. 

 An interesting moment was recalled by a Ukrainian CIMIC 

officer. When head of the brigade’s CIMIC section Lieutenant 
60

Colonel Veleriy Kuzmin first approached local contractors, he was 

stunned by the previous practice. His U.S. predecessors allegedly 

were providing payments for orders without attempting to verify 

the local price for specific jobs and without any competitive bidding. 

This led to locals extracting large sums of money for rather simple 

and inexpensive orders. Therefore, in order to reduce waste, he 

had to exert strong efforts and experience conflicts to break the 

habits of many local contractors spoiled by U.S. generosity.65 This 

is an interesting “role reversal” for the United States and Ukraine, 

considering the complaints by Americans that the Ukrainians made 

the same errors and encouraged “price-gouging” in the early days 

of U.S.-Ukraine military contacts (see Part II). It appears that the 

Ukrainians had paid attention to the “lessons learned” from that 

earlier military cooperation, and as a result may actually have had 

more experience and knowledge on this subject than the U.S. units 

involved in this particular operation.

 Another example, which might have something in common with 

the internal U.S. debate about the “tough” Army versus “liberal” 

Marine approaches to local population in the occupied territories,66

was observed in the Iraqi town of Suwayrah by a Los Angeles Times

correspondent: 

. . . Some residents are happy that the Ukrainians have taken over from 

the Americans, who they complained insulted residents and showed 

disrespect to Iraqi women when raiding homes or conducting body 

searches. “The Ukrainians treat us in a very nice way, completely different 

from the Americans,” said Adnan Hamid Abbas, a lawyer. “They never 

shout at us.” But others said the Ukrainians’ easygoing nature meant 

they were not as aggressive as the Americans in eradicating supporters 

of Saddam Hussein or resistance fighters who were staging attacks in the 

area. “The Ukrainians are cowards, while the Americans are tough,” said 

Ghasan Ali Izzi, a television shopkeeper. “I prefer the Americans.”67

Whatever the pros and cons, perhaps an analysis of the more “liberal” 

Ukrainian approach may yield lessons applicable to the internal U.S. 

debate.

 Outside the Ukrainian 5th Brigade, the officers of the Ukrainian 

staff element at the higher “Center-South” division headquarters 

and at the Coalition headquarters, who were working together with 
61

Americans, Poles, Spaniards, and other allies, on many occasions 

recognized the valuable experience they received during joint 

peacetime training, joint peacekeeping missions, and at the courses 

for multinational staff officers in Kiev. This experience allowed them 

to be interoperable with their U.S. partners and other nationals in 

Iraq.

 Regarding the preliminary analysis of the first rotation of the 

Ukrainian brigade to Iraq, the United States appeared basically 

satisfied, based on the overall ability of Ukrainians to deploy to the 

theater of operation and perform the assigned mission. However, 

honest feedback from Polish partners―who have had the opportunity 

to cooperate closely with the Ukrainian brigade on an everyday basis 

within a joint formation―has been more specific and more critical, 

particularly concerning the low level of English proficiency among 

Ukrainian officers in Iraq and the slow pace of forming and training 

the brigade to the required standard.68

 During the second rotation of Ukrainian troops in Iraq, when 

6th Brigade was substituted for the 5th Brigade in February-March 

2004, the events in Wasit province, as everywhere in Iraq, took more 

dramatic turn. In addition to routine instances of cooperation of 

the U.S. and Ukrainian sappers, medics, logisticians, etc., several 

combat engagements took place. At the start of clashes with the 

militia of Shiite cleric Muqtada-al-Sadr, on April 6-7, two Ukrainian 

mechanized platoons for 2 days defended the Coalition Provisional 

Authority (CPA) building at the capital of Wasit province, the city 

of Kut, and another Ukrainian mechanized platoon defended the 

bridge over the Tigris River. They withstood a 4-hour long attack 

by overwhelming numbers of Sadr militia and further attempts to 

blow the CPA administrative building, as well as continuous mortar 

and RPG attacks. They suffered one dead and five wounded, while 

killing over a hundred attackers. Two U.S. F-16s and later two Apache

helicopters came and left without firing a shot or launching a missile 

apparently because of problems with target identification and lack 

of coordination with Ukrainians.

 The Ukrainian detachment managed to evacuate safely 37 U.S. 

and 6 Polish civilian personnel under their protection from the siege. 

According to Ukrainian official sources, this was done at the request 
62

of U.S. civilian CPA personnel. Two U.S. Apache helicopters covered 

the retreat. 

 Unfortunately, many U.S. newspapers reported the incident in 

slightingly negative tones, as if Ukrainian troops simply abandoned 

the city of Kut (some 250,000 inhabitants!) to the Sadr militia. In fact, 

it never was a mission of the lightly armed Ukrainian detachment 

to hold the city. Their mission was to do exactly what they had 

done―to provide for security of civilian administration―which they 

accomplished with tactical brilliance. Law and order at Kut were 

restored soon after by the U.S. combat brigade, so in the aftermath, 

it is perfectly clear that, opposite hasty media accusations, there was 

no need for the Ukrainian company to replicate another Stalingrad 

and risk the lives of civilians and their own.

 U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell thanked Ukrainian allies in 

his letter dated April 9 to Ukrainian Foreign Minister Kostiantyn 

Hryshchenko. Powell highly praised the courage and bravery 

shown by the Ukrainian troops, particularly during the events in the 

city of Kut. During retaking control of Kut, the Ukrainian battalion 

stationed near the city performed a supporting role and later renewed 

patrolling the city and conducting searches. For instance, during the 

first day, they detained three militiamen pretending to be fire-fighters 

and discovered a large weapons cache. The other two Ukrainian 

battalions from the 6th Brigade were not engaged in serious combat: 

one was doing border guard duty defending the 80 miles long border 

with Iran (they also had seizures of large amounts of weapons), and 

the third battalion was busy with de-mining, patrolling, and CIVIC 

missions. Associated Press reported the events: 

U.S. troops drove into Kut before dawn Friday, pushing out members 

of the militia headed by radical Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr that had 

seized the southern textile and farming center this week after Ukrainian 

troops abandoned the city under heavy attack. . . . Brigadier General 

Mark Kimmitt said he expected the operation to retake Kut from alSadr’s al-Mahdi Army militia would be finished by Saturday morning. . . . 

Kimmitt told CNN he believed there were 300-400 al-Sadr militants in 

Kut on Thursday night who had been trying “to intimidate the people” 

in the city of about 250,000. The Kut operation represented a major foray 

by the American military in a region where U.S. allies have struggled to 

deal with the uprising.69
63

 However, the attacks on Ukrainian troops in Wasit province 

continued, and on April 19, a Ukrainian patrol on three armored 

personnel carriers was attacked by a large group of terrorists, which 

detonated two roadside bombes and opened fire from RPG and 

small arms. The Ukrainians returned fire, killing five and wounding 

seven. In another similar ambush on April 28, 2004, the Ukrainian 

patrol was less fortunate, when two Ukrainians died and five were 

wounded. 

 But in the latter case, as in other similar cases, U.S. MEDEVAC 

helicopters and U.S. medical personnel did everything possible 

to save wounded Ukrainians. U.S. attack helicopters always were 

ready to provide fire support. However, certain problems of 

coordination between Ukrainian and U.S. troops became evident, 

so in the aftermath of the April-May events in Wasit province, U.S. 

CENTCOM supplied the Ukrainian brigade with an additional 

number of U.S. radios, which Ukrainians had in limited quantity.

 At home, Ukrainian leftists immediately accelerated campaigning 

on the withdrawal of Ukrainian troops from Iraq. This campaign, 

along with absence of a balanced and positive coverage in foreign 

press, made it more difficult for Ukrainian authorities to explain to 

the public why Ukrainians are dying in Iraq. 

 Again, as in the case of events in Kosovo in February 2001, the 

lack of appreciation by the U.S. media was perceived by Ukrainians 

as reluctance to note their important role in dramatic April-May 2004 

events in Iraq. Overall, Ukrainian participation in the stabilization 

operation in Iraq, as previously in Kosovo, has provided a new 

opportunity to gain real-life experience, to learn from each other, and 

to test the value of peacetime engagement. These ultimate tests of 

doctrine, training, and equipment generally have shown that, while 

Ukraine is capable of consistently producing ad hoc successes, a more 

systemic approach is needed to develop a stable, long-term capability 

for deploying interoperable units. The repetition of previously 

recognized problems strongly suggests that interoperability issues 

should be included in a system of regular review of operations, 

training, and doctrine―that is, a mandatory part within a more 

specific and effective Ukrainian “lessons learned” system.

65

PART V

CONCLUSIONS

 The principal U.S. approach to cooperation with Ukraine, a postSoviet nation with long and complex history, has consistently been 

to help in building a stable, prosperous democracy that can become a 

viable economic and security partner to the West. An important role 

in these efforts belongs to military cooperation: within the bilateral 

military-to-military contacts programs, within NATO partnership 

events, and through the practical accomplishment of peacekeeping 

and humanitarian missions. 

 In the course of 13 years of cooperation, Ukraine and the United 

States have gone through periods of cautious rapprochement, inflated 

expectations of “strategic partnership,” and sober reevaluation. 

Ukraine’s recent ambitious declaration of intent to become a NATO 

member was welcomed by the United States, although cautiously, 

given that Ukraine has not been very successful in building a firm 

democratic foundation and conducting defense reform. 

 Although the search for the most appropriate political modus 

vivendi for bilateral relations still continues, the military dimension 

of the relations between two countries has always remained 

cooperative. Most important is that in the military sphere there are 

no insurmountable ideological, geopolitical, or cultural differences 

between Ukraine and the United States. The history of military 

cooperation has proven that, despite Ukraine’s many political and 

economic problems, as well as those of a cultural and military nature 

(bureaucracy and over-centralization, Soviet legacy of equipment 

and doctrine), certain core interests provide firm ground on which 

to continue mutually advantageous military cooperation. These 

core interests are, at their most basic, U.S. willingness to support the 

preservation of Ukraine’s independence as a key to regional security 

and Ukrainian willingness to cooperate with the United States in 

fighting terrorism and preserving international peace.

 The two countries have developed elaborate cooperative 

mechanisms, which permit rather effective implementation of joint 

events. The Ukrainian military appears genuinely to be interested in 
66

this cooperation, is generally technically and intellectually capable, 

but is still a rather long way from compatibility with U.S. cultural 

and doctrinal standards. But if we consider the starting point, the 

results are impressive.

 At the start of their cooperation, there was practically no ground 

to talk about interoperability in the traditional sense between U.S. 

and Ukrainian (post-Soviet) militaries.70 But 13 years of military 

cooperation have allowed for achieving certain limited progress 

in major interoperability areas between the U.S. and Ukrainian 

militaries. As a result, the relationship has grown from simple 

peacetime engagement to conducting successful combined peacekeeping operations. 

 As has happened so far, it is exactly in the area of peacekeeping 

where the United States has needed―and will continue to need―the 

Ukrainian military the most. Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq 

have shown that the United States is capable of winning regional wars 

without decisive support from its allies. But these campaigns also 

have proved that the United States has significant limits in providing 

for post-conflict resolution (peacekeeping and peace-building) 

without support from allies, even those as distant as Ukraine. This 

is very important, since no war can be considered victorious if the 

post-war situation deviates too far from prewar objectives. 

 For the United States, the experience of military cooperation 

with Ukraine has proved that U.S. military contact programs and 

peacetime engagement are a good way to understand the people with 

whom you are engaging, and evaluating whether they are “really on 

your side.” Quite likely, this experience also proved for the United 

States an already known classical virtue of coalitions: they allow 

smaller nations to feel important, while they allow stronger nations 

to consider that others share the burden. 

 For Ukraine, military cooperation with the United States has 

provided many opportunities for expediting reforms in the security 

sector. Unfortunately, Ukraine has not been very successful in using 

these opportunities. In particular, this is the result of the lack of 

strong political direction and sufficient funding, compounded by 

the failure of Ukraine’s military to introduce a system to process the 

lessons learned effectively. To alleviate partly the impact of Ukrainian 
67

problems, the country could have done better in developing its own 

“U.S. specialists” to take some of the burden off the United States; 

that is, to train enough “plug and play” liaison officers. 

 If, for the sake of comparison, a third party―for example, new 

NATO member and Ukraine’s neighbor, Poland―is used as an 

indicator, the general conclusion would be that Ukrainians, as a 

fighting force, are not more deficient than Poles. Rather, Ukrainians 

are less interoperable in terms of language, doctrine, and equipment. 

However, Ukraine has some unique capabilities it can provide, such 

as airlift, missile/space, radars, tanks, CBR-testing and protection 

equipment, and other high-tech possibilities.

 Ukraine, indeed, has a lot of assets potentially to contribute to 

combined operations with the United States, but the challenge 

still remains how better to make them interoperable. In answer, 

the results of this study generally point to the need for a twotier approach to interoperability: the first tier being continued 

efforts to develop compatible capabilities for the low intensity 

conflict (peacekeeping); the second tier being the identification 

and improvement of complementary―rather than comparable―

capabilities for high intensity conflict.

At this moment, however, because of the number of political and 

security reasons indicated above, in practical terms it is relevant to 

speak primarily about the value of interoperability in the low intensity 

conflict. To ensure continued success, more systemic approach to 

U.S.-Ukraine military relations should be recommended.

 First, given the total domination of the Army agenda in bilateral 

military programs, consider shifting from the current practice 

of appointing the U.S. Defense Attaché in Kiev from the U.S. Air 

Force to more relevant and logical representation―from the U.S. 

Army. For the same reason, Army program events should become 

undisputed priorities of the Program of Bilateral U.S.-Ukraine 

Military Cooperation.

 Second, in order to develop a stable, long-term capability for 

deploying interoperable Ukrainian units, a lot has already been done 

and is currently planned to be done. But additional efforts are still 

needed. These are:
68

 • Developing effective Ukrainian “lessons learned” systems, in 

which interoperability issues should be included in regular 

review of operations, training, and doctrine.

 • Initiating the comprehensive and systemic adaptation of 

Ukrainian manuals, headquarters’ techniques, and leadership 

styles to U.S. and NATO models. 

 • Supporting Ukrainians in adapting wargaming techniques 

to provide for interoperability at the strategic-operational 

levels.

 • Providing more focused support to the Ukrainian side in 

training operational officers capable of pursuing interoperability issues. To this end, establish the permanent placement of the U.S. instructors at the special courses for the 

officers of multinational staffs within the National Defense 

Academy of Ukraine.

 • Selecting and training Ukrainian instructors for Ukraine’s 

National Academy of Defense and other relevant training facilities in view of their contribution to building interoperability. 

 • Helping transition from the current Ukrainian practice of 

creating ad hoc units for missions abroad to deploying regular 

units, first of all, from Rapid Reaction Forces. 

 • Providing targeted support in equipping Ukrainian Rapid 

Reaction Forces with interoperable command, control, and 

communication equipment.

 • Focusing joint training exercises on actual units, which will 

deploy out of country. 

 Third, recognizing that success of Ukraine’s efforts in reforming 

its military, particularly in increased interoperability, depends to a 

significant extent on success of wider governance reform. Ukraine 

should consider more targeted efforts in training Ukrainian defense 

experts from the staffs of the Parliament, the Cabinet of Ministers, 

Administration of the President, National Security and Defense 

Council, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Finance, etc. 
69

 As proved by the experience of practical missions together in 

peacekeeping, human and intellectual factors (an understanding 

of each others’ national and military cultures, common language) 

are more important than technical systems. Thus for low intensity 

conflict, “operational interoperability” (similar doctrines, planning 

methods, training, and basic doctrinal/cultural understandings) 

appears to be more important than “technical interoperability.” 

 But by deploying a brigade to Iraq, Ukraine has raised the 

level of its cooperation to a new height, which will, in turn, be a 

new test to the value of peacetime military cooperation. If, despite 

all conceivable political and military problems, this new level of 

cooperation is successful, it might open the door for partnership 

beyond peacekeeping.

 Thus, there are grounds to think that options for greater 

interoperability for higher-intensity operations should be considered 

as well. This analysis proves that the opportunities are there―but for 

these to materialize, both countries’ militaries will need to continue 

efforts to further strengthen the common capabilities and bonds that 

U.S.-Ukraine military cooperation has already helped to build.

 Overall, U.S.-Ukrainian military cooperation has developed more 

slowly and less efficiently than most U.S. participants have expected. 

But given the magnitude of the nation-building challenge for Ukraine, 

it could be assessed as a qualified success. This cooperation has 

brought tangible results for both sides, as well as valuable lessons 

for modern relations between the United States and post-totalitarian 

states.

71

ENDNOTES

 1. For more details, see Vladimir Bezkorovainy, “Navy and Maritime Policy 

of Ukraine,” Defense Express―Arms Export and Defense Industrial Complex of Ukraine: 

News and Analysis, No. 11, 2003, p. 8.

 2. “It was intellectually decapitated as a matter of deliberate policy during 

the Stalin years and beyond so that the most able and energetic Ukrainians were 

either killed or magnetically attracted to Moscow and Russified.” Zbigniew 

Brzezinski, “Ukraine and Europe,” Fulfilling the Promise: Building an Enduring 

Security Partnership Between Ukraine and NATO, Ashton B. Carter, Steven E. Miller, 

and Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall, eds., The Stanford-Harward Preventive Defense 

Project, 1999, pp. 33-34.

 3. For a comprehensive account of the Soviet military legacy in Ukraine, see 

Oleksiy Melnyk, “Ukraine’s Cold War Legacy 12 Years On: A Burden from the 

Past, a Problem for the Future,” in Alyson J. K. Bailes, Oleksiy Melnyk and Ian 

Anthony, Relics of Cold War (Europe’s Challenge, Ukraine’s Experience), SIPRI Policy 

Paper No. 6, November 2003.

 4. Besides those in the armed forces, Ukraine had a large number of troops in 

other military formations: 130,000 troops under the Ministry of Internal Affairs, 

Border Troops, etc. Some 12,000 officers and NCOs of non-Ukrainian origin left 

Ukraine, while 33,000 came back to Ukraine from other former Soviet republics. 

For more details, see Andreas Heinemann-Gruder, “Becoming an Ex-military man: 

Demobilization and Reintegration of Military Professionals in Eastern Europe,” 

BICC Brief 26, August 2002, p. 18. 

 5. Future Ukrainian Joint Rapid Reaction Forces are expected to include land 

component (three airmobile brigades and various supporting units), air component 

(three squadrons of MIG-29 Fulcrum, SU-25 Frogfoot, and IL-76 Candid each), and 

Naval component (three ships: command ship, frigate, and a large landing ship). 

Its total strength is expected to number around 30,000.

 6. The course employs instructors from NATO nations and is open to NATO 

partners.

 7. “Remarks by the President in Address to the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian 

Soviet Socialist Republic,” The White House: Office of the Press Secretary, August 

1, 1991. Cited from Sherman Garnett, Keystone in the Arch: Ukraine in the Emerging 

Security Environment of Central and Eastern Europe, Washington DC: Carnegie 

Endowment for International Peace, 1997, p. 4.

 8. Roman Popadiuk, American-Ukrainian Nuclear Relations, McNair Paper 55, 

October 1996, Washington, DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National 

Defense University, p. 60. 

One also cannot dismiss the cultural influences that Washington had 

to deal with. Having been a submerged nation for centuries, there 

was limited appreciation in Washington of the historical and cultural 
72

motivations in Kiev. There was a learning process for Washington 

policymakers, whereby outside the words of recognizing Ukraine as an 

independent state, they had to come around to dealing with and treating 

it as an independent state, and this meant respecting its positions and 

negotiating rather than dictating or expecting automatic action. 

 9. Sherman Garnett, “Ukraine’s Regional Security Challenges,” National 

Security & Defence, No. 7, 2000, p. 19. 

. . . during the negotiations with Ukraine on nuclear issues, one of 

the biggest problems on my side was assuming that the Ukrainian 

bureaucracy was like us. . . . I would go to U.S. Government meetings 

on Ukrainian nuclear weapons, and there could be 75 people. These are 

policy questions, big decisions. The U.S. President made those decisions 

himself, but there were 75 people who wrote papers and participated 

in this process. There were not that many people on the Ukrainian side. 

There is a difference in bureaucratic structure, culture and outlook. 

 10. “We will sustain our effort to help integrate Ukraine more fully into 

international institutions and structures. . . . an independent, unitary, secure, 

democratic, prosperous, self-confident, integrated Ukraine is a keystone in the 

architecture of this new Europe.” Strobe Talbott, “The New Ukraine in the New 

Europe,” Fulfilling the Promise: Building an Enduring Security Partnership Between 

Ukraine and NATO, p. 22.

 11. Sherman Garnett, “Ukraine: Strategic Partner or Strategic Problem?”―

Towards a New Ukraine III, Geopolitical Imperatives of Ukraine: Regional Context, 

Theofil Kis, Irena Makaryk, Natalie Mychajlyszyn, eds., with Irena Bell, Ottawa, 

Canada: Chair of Ukrainian Studies, University of Ottawa, 2001, p. 165.

 12. On February 3, 2003, President Kuchma in his address to the diplomatic 

corps in Kiev underlines, “In its relations with the United States, Ukraine remains 

loyal to the ideals of strategic partnership in spite of the existing problems. I want 

to stress with all confidence that we have never intended and do not intend to 

revise our policy toward the United States.” See Embassy of Ukraine in the United 

States, www.ukremb.com.

 13. Ambassador Herbst, Speech on Democracy in Ukraine, Institute of 

International Relations, Taras Shevchenko National University, Kiev, December 

23, 2003, http://kiev.usembassy.gov/files/031223_herbst-iir-remarks_eng.html.

As Americans, we would like to see democracy flower here for two 

reasons. First of all, the U.S. and Ukraine share many common interests. 

We would like to establish a deep, long-term friendship and more, 

but that can only happen if Ukraine is a true democracy. Secondly, we 

would like to see long-term stability in Ukraine and history teaches that 

democracy, well grounded in the ethos of an open society, is the best way 

to ensure both enduring stability and felicity. That in turn will contribute 

to European security and stability.
73

 14. Peter Eisler, “U.S. helps Ex-Soviet states scrap weapons,” United States 

TODAY, January 31, 2003, http://www.United Statestoday.com/news/world/2003-01-

30-ukraine-United Statest_x.htm.

 15. U.S. Government Assistance to and Cooperative Activities with Eurasia, 

FY 2002, Ukraine. Released by the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, 

January 2003, http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rpt/23629.htm.

 16. “CINC” is an abbreviation that once denoted a regional U.S. “Commander 

in Chief”; a U.S. regional military commander is no longer referred to by this term, 

but simply as a “Combatant Commander,” or “Commander, USEUCOM” for 

example.

 17. Ibid. 

 18. According to the Office of Defense Cooperation of the U.S. Embassy in 

Ukraine.

 19. James Sherr, “Iraq and the impermissibility of failure,” Dzerkalo 

Tyzhnia, October 25-31, 2003.

 20. The Joint Contact Team Program (JCTP) was established by General Colin 

Powell in 1992 in an effort to promote regional stability in the newly emerging 

democracies of Central/Eastern Europe by presenting them with the U.S. example 

of how a civilian-controlled military works in a democratic free-market orientated 

society. Today, the JCTP is a pillar of USEUCOM’s security cooperation activities 

in Central/Eastern Europe and the Trans-Caucasus region. Through orienting host 

nation militaries to DoD-wide organizations, programs, activities, and standards, 

the program supports USEUCOM theater objectives of stability, democratization, 

military professionalism, closer relationships with NATO, and, for the new NATO 

members, preparing for NATO integration. 

 21. The National Guard State Partnership Program was established in 1993 

in response to the radically changed political-military situation following the 

collapse of Communism and the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Today 39 U.S. 

states, 2 territories, and the District of Columbia are partnered with 44 countries 

around the world. SPP is also an added dimension of JCTP. The SPP encourages 

the development of long-term institutional and personal relationships and allows 

more Americans to become directly involved in assisting these countries as they 

transition to a democratic society. Reserve components conduct approximately 25 

percent of JCTP events.

 22. Stephen D. Olynyk, “Ukraine as a Post-Cold War Military Power,” Joint 

Force Quarterly, Spring 1997, p. 88.

 23. For a good analysis of Ukrainian problems with strategic guidance 

documents and other key issues of current Ukrainian security and defense reform, 

see James Greene and Christopher Donnelly, “The Basic Principles of Structuring 

Modern Armies―in the Context of Ukrainian Security & Defense Reform,” National 

Security & Defence, No. 7, 2003, pp. 54-61.
74

 24. See the National Military Strategy of the United States of America, 1995.

 25. See the National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 

2002.

 26. Colonel (U.S. Army retired) Harry Simmeth authored the most complete 

account of the 1995-99 period of the U.S.-Ukrainian military cooperation in his 

article, “U.S.-Ukraine Military Cooperation and Strategic Partnership,” National 

Security & Defence, No. 12, 2000, pp. 74-80.

 27. Ibid., p. 76.

 28 “. . . The Military Liaison Team is a comparatively inexpensive project, 

costing the U.S Defense Department around $400,000 annually for office upkeep, 

travel, and staff salaries. It is a price the U.S. and NATO are willing to pay in 

return for the Ukrainian military’s help in maintaining peace.” See Katya Cengel, 

Kyiv Post Staff Writer, “State wants to take a bite out of military might,” http://

www.calguard.ca.gov/ia/Military/UMOD%20-%20further%20downsizing.htm.

 29. Harry Simmeth, “U.S.-Ukraine Military Cooperation and ‘Strategic 

Partnership’,” p. 78.

 30. Timothy Shea, “Shaping on NATO’s Doorstep: U.S.-Ukraine Relations,” 

Joint Force Quarterly, Autumn/Winter 2001-02, p. 64. 

 31. Ibid., pp. 62-63. For more of critical insight to the problems of U.S.-

Ukrainian military cooperation, see Timothy Shea, “Post-Soviet Maskirovka, Cold 

War Nostalgia, and Peacetime Engagement,” Military Review, May-June 2002.

32. See Jim Garamone, “U.S., Ukraine Sign Annual Plan of Cooperation,” 

American Forces Press Service, Brussels, Belgium, December 6, 2000.

 33. Author’s interview with Major Ostrom on November 19, 2003.

 34. In addition to these major areas, many other important factors influence 

the level of interoperability such as force structures, recruitment, security 

arrangements, and cultural traditions (casualties sensitivity, food, religion, and 

social status). 

 35. Ukrainian MOD statistics.

 36. In early 2001 NATO and Ukraine took stock with the “Language Training 

Pilot Project.” According to the project report recommendations, Ukraine did 

“need to direct military cooperation programs not just toward providing language 

training, but also toward improving the capabilities of Ukraine’s own structures to 

plan, conduct, and manage language training programs.”

 37. Victor Hudym, “Ukraine’s experience of participation in KFOR peacekeeping operation and in PfP program,” Peacekeeping activity of Ukraine: cooperation 

with NATO and other European security structures, Joint Publication of the National 

Institute for Strategic Studies (Ukraine) and the Royal Institute of International 

Affairs (the UK), Kiev, 2002, p. 82.

 38. “In the spirit of PfP” is a term typically applied to an exercise or event 

not sponsored by NATO but in which the participants generally follow NATO 
75

guidance and procedures. It is intended to go somewhat beyond familiarizing the 

participants with each other’s methodologies to the level of working together in a 

NATO-like environment.

 39. Data from the press release of the briefing of the Army of Ukraine 

Commander-in-Chief Colonel General Petro Shuliak, May 26, 2003, http://www.

mil.gov.ua/index.php?part=news&sub=read&id=2239.

 40. Major General Nicholas Krawciw, U.S. Army, Ret., “Peacekeeping and 

Joint Military Operations: Lessons Learned and Next Steps,” Fulfilling the Promise: 

Building an Enduring Security Partnership Between Ukraine and NATO, p. 50.

 41. Defense Analysis Report on the Armed Forces of Ukraine, prepared by The 

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy and 

The United States European Command, October 24, 2002, p. 23.

42. See “Complete “Internationalisation,” Narodna Armiya, December 2, 2003.

43. For details, see “A group of cadets from the U.S. Military Acedemy West 

Point Study in Odessa Army Institute,” Press release of Ukraine’s MOD, March 

18, 2003, http://www.mil.gov.ua/ukr/index.cgi?read_news.htm&Uk&1992; “As Part 

of the Ukrainian-U.S. Program of Military Contacts, American Officer Served in 

Airmobile Unit of the Armed Forces of Ukraine,” Press release of Ukraine’s MOD, 

January 21, 2003, http://www.mil.gov.ua/ukr/index.cgi?read_news.htm&Uk&1784. 

 44. Harry Simmeth, “U.S.-Ukraine Military Cooperation and ‘Strategic 

Partnership’,” p. 80.

 45. Krawciw, p. 53.

 46. Quote supplied by COL Simmeth from record of a meeting with a Ukrainian 

delegation at the Pentagon in 1996.

 47. The author of the monograph, as a graduate of the U.S. Army War College 

and participant of many bilateral cooperative events, has utilized and popularized 

his knowledge of U.S. doctrine in a number of publications on the issues of 

personnel management, leadership, reserve component, urban warfare, civilmilitary relations, peacekeeping, and transition to an all-volunteer force. Many 

other Ukrainian IMET Program graduates utilized their knowledge of the U.S. 

doctrine in their respective publications and in practice of their assigned duties.

 48. In practical terms, the most significant influence on Ukraine’s doctrinal 

development, beyond the United States, was exerted by Canada, Germany, and 

the UK.

 49. “Military Cooperation between Ukraine and the USA remain one of the 

key directions of Ukraine’s Armed Forces international activity,” Press release of 

Ukraine’s MOD, December 3, 2003, http://www.mil.gov.ua.

 50. “Issues of organizing Ukraine’s Navy command and control and logistical 

support in accordance with NATO standards will be discussed during the visit 

of the delegation of NATO Supreme Allied Command Atlantic,” Press release 

of Ukraine’s MOD, July 21, 2003, http://www.mil.gov.ua/ukr/index.cgi?read_news.

htm&Uk&2425.
76

 51. James Greene and Christopher Donnelly, “The Basic Principles of 

Structuring Modern Armies―in the Context of Ukrainian Security & Defense 

Reform,” National Security & Defence, No. 7, 2003, pp. 54-61.

 52. U.S. Government Assistance to and Cooperative Activities with Eurasia, 

FY 2001, Ukraine, released by the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, March 

2002, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/17714.pdf.

 53. U.S. Government Assistance to and Cooperative Activities with Eurasia, 

FY 2002, Ukraine, released by the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, 

January 2003, http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rpt/23629.htm.

 54. “In the near future, Ukraine intends to resolve the problem of secure 

communication of its NBC-protection battalion in Iraq,” Defense-Express, 

December 23, 2003, www.defense-ua.com.

 55 . Krawciw, p. 50.

56. Monika Blikеs, “KFOR Secures Kosovo Elections,” KFOR Chronicle, October 

28, 2000, http://www.nato.int/kfor/chronicle/2000/nr_001028.htm.

 57. Ibid.

 58. Dmitri Shkurko, “The war in Kosovo has flared up. This Time It Affected 

Ukrainian Peacekeepers in Serbian Enclave,” Narodna Armiya, February 23, 2001.

 59. Kevin Dougherty, “In Wake of Bus Bombing, American’s Efforts Have 

Earned Them Serb’s Trust,” Stars and Stripes, February 21, 2001. 

 60. Veronica Saffo, “Ukrainian Patrol,” KFOR Chronicle, April 18, 2003, http://

www.nato.int/kfor/chronicle/2003/chronicle_04/18.htm.

 61. Ibid.

 62. From interview with Warsaw conference participant, who preferred not to 

be identified.

 63. Andriy Lysenko, “Common Goal United All Militaries,” Armiya Ukrainy, 

December 4, 2003.

 64. Ibid.

 65. Andriy Lysenko, “’CIMIC’―a New Page of Post-War Diplomacy in Iraq,” 

Narodna Armiya, January 6, 2004.

 66. For details, see Thomas E. Ricks, “Marines to Offer New Tactics in Iraq; 

Reduced Use of Force Planned After Takeover From Army,” The Washington Post, 

January 7, 2004.

 67. Richard C. Paddock, “Wounding of Ukrainians Could Give Other Nations 

Pause,” The Los Angeles Times, October 31, 2003.

 68. Lessons-learned Conference, Polish Embassy, Kiev, December 2003.

 69. “U.S. Forces Retake Most of Key Iraqi City,” The Associated Press, April 9, 

2004.
77

 70. Ralph Peters, Letter to the author, October 24, 2003. 

The [U.S. and Soviet prior to 1991] systems were so profoundly different 

that the only interoperability basis is simply that all are soldiers, with 

some shared general knowledge and purpose, subject to discipline, etc. 

But the functional systems and approaches to leadership and personnel 

management are profoundly different. . . . I just do not see any doctrinal 

common ground, whatsoever. . . as regards the present situation. 

I expect a great many lessons have been learned, on both sides, from 

interoperability requirements in the former Yugoslavia and elsewhere. 

79

APPENDIX

KEY INTERVIEWS

Major General (U.S. Army Ret.) Nicolas Krawciw,

Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Military-To-Military Relations 

between USA and Ukraine

 The principal American interest in Ukraine, for obvious regional 

security and economic reasons, is in enhancing its independence and 

democratic institutions. I believe that, for similar reasons, Ukraine’s 

best interests are to become part of Europe.

 Our current status of military cooperation with Ukraine became 

somewhat stalled following the “Kolchuga” disclosures, but is 

reviving as Ukraine, with its brigade in Iraq, is providing valuable 

professional assistance. We are working with NATO HQ and with 

other NATO countries to assist in Ukraine’s preparation for the 

MAP process. Senior American government officials are concerned 

that some nasty aspects of Ukrainian election year power politics 

may negatively influence NATO allies in their deliberations in 

preparation for the Istanbul NATO Summit concerning the issuance 

of an invitation to Ukraine to join NATO.

 Not much has been achieved in technical military cooperation. 

After long delays, the classified information agreement between 

the United States and Ukraine has been signed last year. In time, if 

relations remain on course, this may bear fruit in some meaningful 

technical and technological cooperation.

 Concerning cultural aspects of interoperability between our 

militaries, I believe much has been achieved. We understand and 

appreciate each other better. The intrinsic value of our exchanges 

I describe in the second part of this message. I would like to add 

that even the high level visits and exchanges have contributed to 

our mutual understanding of our respective capabilities, methods, 

politics, etc. Changes in senior Ukrainian military leadership 

mindsets concerning threat definition, management, leadership, 

military reform, and care of people have been progressive, visible, 

and contribute to “cultural interoperability.” The best examples that 

I can think of are these:

 a. When we first started the training exercises in Yavoriv and in 
80

the Black Sea, Ukrainian units were focused not so much on training 

to achieve the training objectives of the exercise but to look good 

in various demonstration vignettes at the “Opening Day,” or “VIP 

Day,” or “Closing Day” when various high level visitors were 

expected to attend. By 2000, this began to be changed to a focus on 

exercise training objectives and visitors were shown what is actually 

being achieved.

 b. Similarly, discussions of defense reform over the last few years 

turned from showcase briefings to discussions of what is feasible, 

possible, and achievable based on available budgetary funding.

 Events of this year [2004] will determine the future course of 

our cooperation. In any case, we on the U.S. side will continue our 

assistance to meaningful Ukrainian defense reform for as many years 

as is necessary and is desired by Ukraine.

 I would also provide comments on the main differences between 

the U.S. and Ukrainian militaries. During the late 1970s, the U.S. 

Army began a serious analysis of Soviet how-to-fight doctrine. We 

learned that Soviet highest level commanders had a significant 

amount of freedom of action at the strategic-operational level, but 

less at the operational-tactical level, and very little at the tactical 

level. We also knew of the impressive Soviet artillery and combat 

engineer capabilities. Our post-Vietnam reform became oriented on 

improvement of these two capabilities to try to match those of the 

Soviet Union. However, at the operational tactical level, we felt that 

we had the advantage in the way that our lower level commanders 

(division down to battalion) planned and executed operations. The 

system that evolved in Vietnam gave these commanders areas of 

operation and general missions but would let them develop and 

coordinate plans and actions within the assigned areas. That was 

extended down to company level. Needless to say, that approach 

stimulated individual initiative and contributed to leadership 

development in the post-Vietnam period.

 When we began our Partnership for Peace and other bilateral 

exchanges with the Ukrainian Armed Forces in 1994, it became clear 

that many of the Soviet practices and organizational concepts that 

still existed, while possibly useful for a major continental land war, 

were not suited to small regional conflicts or to peacekeeping. There 

were no planning staffs at regimental or battalion levels. Everything 
81

was being directed from the top. Colonels, lieutenant colonels, and 

majors had very little leeway to change training schedules or to 

influence organizational requirements. Equipment looked good, but 

there were no funds to exercise or maintain it. We were told that, due 

to a general lack of funding, force modernization apparently stopped 

in the early 1980s. There was no real NCO corps; officers were 

performing tasks of seargeants. Inspections by higher commanders 

or by the Inspector General were dreaded and not really systemic. 

On the other hand, Ukrainian officers were highly educated; many 

showed a genuine interest in different ways of doing things.

 Beginning in the summer of 1995, our “Peace Shield” exercises 

in Yavoriv were designed to share our tactical and operational 

methodologies with the Ukrainian Ground Forces (Ukrainian Army) 

and with other participants. Similarly, the “Sea Breeze” Exercises in 

1997 and 1998 were intended to assist the Ukrainian Navy to develop 

its sea and shore based staffs. Most importantly, Ukrainian officers 

trained in the United States (IMET) and in other NATO countries 

were bringing back to Ukraine better examples of various military 

methodologies.

 In my estimation, over the years, IMET, similar education in other 

countries, actual peacekeeping operations, and various combined 

field or staff exercises, provided the Ukrainian Armed Forces with 

various models of operational/tactical techniques more suited to 

current real world situations and exposed Ukrainian participants to 

the more open ways of conducting military affairs that exist in the 

West. By the summer of 2000, we could see that certain directorates of 

the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense began to develop methodologies 

for defense reform. In some cases, particularly in military education, 

reforms started taking place. Plans were drawn up to develop an 

all-volunteer enlisted force, with an NCO Corps at its core. As of the 

end of last year, while budget and legislation dependent, the reforms 

that are taking place; and those that are contemplated, particularly 

the drawdown to much lower force levels and the restructuring to 

brigade organizations, seem to be on the right track if Ukraine really 

desires eventual NATO coalition security. We are now poised to assist 

the Ukrainian Armed Forces in their preparation for participation 

in NATO’s MAP once Ukraine receives NATO’s invitation for 

membership.
82

 Higher morale, esprit de corps, lower level leadership, and 

initiative will develop as the economy continues to improve, 

as military personnel get better pay, and as political turbulence 

diminishes. The ethical grounding of most Ukrainian officers is 

solid and will surface when the right political and senior military 

leadership is in place. Examples of individual integrity at the highest 

levels will assist in the grooming of better leadership at all levels of 

command.
83

Colonel (U.S. Army Ret.) Harry Simmeth,

former Branch and Division Chief, Joint Staff J-5 Strategy, Plans and Policy; and 

former Commander, USA Opposing Force (OPFOR) Regiment, U.S. National 

Training Center, Fort Irwin, CA.

 It is difficult to pass a summary judgment on the overall value 

of this cooperation, as it is subject to analysis on a number of levels. 

For example, it clearly can be said to have paid large dividends in 

the sense of preparing U.S. and Ukrainian forces to work together in 

real-world contingency operations, e.g., Bosnia, Kosovo, and now 

Iraq. However, part of the U.S. (and NATO) rationale in conducting 

this cooperation was to encourage greater reform in the Ukrainian 

armed forces. The latter effect, it seems to me, has been minimal 

overall. If you want me to categorize it as “good or bad” overall, 

however, I would have to say “good,” but I am disturbed at aspects 

of the “negative side” of the equation. 

 For example, there still exists a tendency in the Ukrainian Defense 

bureaucracy to overcentralize planning and decisionmaking. In 

any system, this inevitably leads to various inefficiencies and 

frustrations. 

 There was a period of time―I would estimate about 1997-

99―during which I sensed a serious effort on the part of certain 

Ukrainian military leaders to correct this situation. One of the more 

positive outcomes of this tendency was the creation of the U.S.-

Ukraine “Colonels’ Conference,” a mechanism through which joint 

and Service Colonel-level and below planners from each country 

met regularly to set objectives and priorities and formulate proposed 

schedules of events and programs. A true test of this mechanism arose 

in 1998, when the Colonels’ Conference recommended significant 

modification of a new program proposed jointly by the Ukrainian 

Defense Minister and a U.S. Deputy Undersecretary of Defense. The 

Colonels collectively felt that the funds involved could be better 

utilized on a similar existing program rather than creating a new, 

duplicative one. To the U.S. Colonels, this was considered “advice” 

to be either heeded or overruled; the Ukrainian Colonels, although 

in complete accord, seemed to feel the Conference was engaging in 

an act of overt rebellion. I recall that Colonel General Sobkov, then 

Ground Force Commander and “lead agent” for Ukraine’s military 
84

engagement programs, felt compelled to address the Conference 

on this issue in a meeting in Kiev. He began by asking, “So I am 

supposed to go to the Defense Minister and tell him I do not approve 

of his idea, on the advice of this Conference?” The Ukrainian Colonels 

visibly cringed. But the next thing out of the General’s mouth was, 

“Well, I will. This is good advice, because I can demonstrate that what 

he wants accomplished is being done by this other program. This 

recommendation shows you are making excellent progress in sorting 

out our priorities.” I recall to this day how completely vindicated 

and energized my Ukrainian counterparts felt at this development, 

and how they redoubled their efforts at our work in response. It was 

as if they could spy military reform around the corner.

 Despite this small victory, it eventually became clear to me that 

the sad truth must nevertheless consist of one or a combination of the 

following factors: (1) the General Sobkovs of Ukraine were in very 

short supply; (2) they were seriously constrained in how far they 

could actually go; and/or (3) they were undergoing a “counterattack” 

from “reactionary forces.” I tend to believe it is a combination of the 

above at work.

 Based on the Colonels’ Conference’s initiatives, direct liaison via 

mail, phone, e-mail, etc., between and among U.S. and Ukrainian 

joint and Service counterparts began to proliferate. The relationship 

between the U.S. Joint Staff and the Ukrainian General Staff began 

to grow to the extent that the 3-star U.S. Joint Staff Director for 

Strategy, Plans, and Policy (J-5) was corresponding directly with his 

counterpart in Kiev, and vice-versa, regarding military engagement. 

Perhaps more importantly, their subordinates were exchanging email to coordinate and troubleshoot as required. 

 Somewhere along the line, a new entity inserted itself into this state 

of affairs. The Ukrainian Department of International Cooperation 

(DICMOD) was created to coordinate all military engagement 

programs. This was to some extent welcomed at first by the United 

States, as it seemed logical to have a single “clearinghouse” for 

administrative coordination. However, the DICMOD soon appeared 

to us to be not an “administrative hub” but a new “filter” through 

which we had to work. The result was a disruption in direct U.S.-

Ukraine military liaison on a routine basis. 
85

 Having said all that, it has become clear to me that the power 

structures in Ukraine’s military apparatus (as well as in many respects 

its political apparatus overall) are purposefully fragmented so that 

no one individual or agency can possibly impose his or its vision of 

the way ahead. In the case of the United States, this fragmentation 

is institutionalized, and there are rules for building and reaching 

an overall consensus. In Ukraine, the power structure appears to be 

diffuse and somewhat shifting, with no clear rules in application. 

This leads (among other things) to serious frustration at the midlevel leadership in Ukraine’s military and to a deeper frustration 

among Ukraine’s western military counterparts. 

 From a TECHNICAL point of view: Much is made, of course, of the 

potential difficulties of cooperation between a “high tech” and “lowor mid-tech” force. To some extent, this is a concern even in regards 

to U.S. cooperation with many of its NATO allies. In my opinion, this 

is a greater problem in the context of a mobile, fluid high-intensity 

conflict than in a low-intensity situation such as a peacekeeping 

operation. Nevertheless, the problem exists. Setting aside the 

question of equipment in general, probably the greatest potential 

discrepancy is in the area of information gathering, processing, and 

dissemination. As U.S. forces become more capable in this area, it 

becomes more critical for a coalition commander to be provided 

with or to devise means to determine critical information exchange 

requirements among force components and national contingents, 

and make available the means to ensure that exchange takes place in 

an accurate and timely manner. Ideally, this would best be enhanced 

by sharing common C4ISR (command, control, communications, 

intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) equipment and systems 

across the force. For various reasons, however, this is unlikely to be 

the case in a multinational coalition force. For that reason, it becomes 

more important to share common technical standards across varying 

equipment platforms. Sharing common fundamental understandings 

of doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures is an operational 

element that further compensates for the aforementioned technical 

disparities. Finally, a simple understanding of common practices is 

generally insufficient―particularly at the tactical level―without the 

ability to train the forces together. 
86

 From a CULTURAL point of view: I have mentioned a Ukrainian 

tendency to overcentralize decisionmaking. I also pointed out that 

this becomes a “two-edged sword” in a sense, since even though 

many routine decisions have to be made at a high level, the decision 

authority at that high level itself seems to be diffused and (to me 

at least) sometimes confusing. Finally, once decisions are made, the 

higher authority often intervenes in or micromanages the execution of 

that decision. By contrast, in the U.S. military, the doctrinal standard 

is “centralized planning and direction and decentralized execution.” 

U.S. doctrine calls for careful identification and understanding of the 

chain of command and the locus of authority for various decisions. 

This carries over into our day-to-day operations and mentality such 

that we would simply feel more comfortable working directly (as 

much as possible) with our counterparts on foreign planning staffs, 

for example, rather than to have to be routed through a rigid filter 

such as the DICMOD for even routine correspondence. 

 Also, since the U.S. military is an all-professional force and the 

Ukrainian military still relies on conscripts, this creates certain cultural 

differences. The simple fact of reduced turnover alone simplifies and 

enhances the ability to produce a very well collectively trained force in 

an all-volunteer military. Another consideration is that when troops 

are professional, they expect to be treated as professionals. This does 

not entail coddling or “going easy” on people by any means. But it 

does entail providing for adequate pay, shelter, and so on, as well as 

elimination of petty and unnecessary practices, for example “hazing” 

routines that are clearly unrelated to any meaningful training. 

 Of course to take maximum advantage of professionalization, we 

completely revamped our training processes, both on the individual 

and collective levels. In fact, we tried very hard to look at the various 

factors impacting on military efficiency―doctrine, organization, 

training, materiel, leadership, personnel, and facilities―and to make 

changes simultaneously or at least in a coordinated fashion. That 

remains the U.S. practice. It is very hard and does not always work 

as well as it should, but it is an ideal methodology that generally 

produces good results. A difference in Ukraine is that it often seems 

that while reforms may be planned or attempted in one area, they 

are not coordinated with the others. From my own experience, I can 
87

repeat that this is hard to do―even more so when a military force is 

suffering from lack of funding and resources. But it must be attempted, 

or at least considered so as to avoid unintended consequences in one 

area as the result of change somewhere else. 

 While at Exercise “Peace Shield” 96 at Yavoriv Training Center 

with U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Shalikashvili, 

I had the chance to talk to a U.S. Sergeant. He told me that he had 

been on the (much smaller) “Peace Shield” 95, and he had thought 

the Ukrainians were “very difficult to work with.” However, he 

added, “They are much better this time! These boys learn fast.” 

 I had the privilege of escorting Deputy Chief of the General Staff 

Lieutenant General Mykola Palchuk on a visit to the Pentagon and 

various military facilities in the U.S. in early 1999. I recall that he 

gave an absolutely superb briefing on Ukraine’s National military 

strategy to our Director for Strategy, Plans and Policy (J-5), a threestar General. I found Palchuk to be an intelligent and engaging 

officer, with a true sense of how to proceed on many aspects of 

military reform in Ukraine. Our J-5 shared my assessment, and 

corresponded directly with Palchuk on a number of accessions 

about aspects of reform and our military engagement program. In 

the long run, however, we were disappointed. Not because Palchuk 

was any less capable or well-intentioned than our estimation, but 

because―it seems clear to me―of the decisionmaking environment 

back in Kyiv and the lack of both resources and the political will for 

comprehensive military reform. 

 As part of the military engagement program, the United States 

provided several briefings on our system and arranged for General 

Sobkov and a number of his staff to visit U.S. NCO training facilities. 

We eventually crafted a program under the auspices of the U.S. 

Army Sergeants’ Major Academy and the U.S. Army Training and 

Doctrine Command that largely implemented Sobkov’s vision. The 

basic concept was to identify an initial cadre of Ukrainian enlisted 

men through extensive competition, teach them English so they 

could attend training in the United States, send them to a basic 

orientation course on the U.S. military, and have them attend a U.S. 

Army Basic NCO Course (BNCOC). They also attended a shortened 

version of the Advanced NCO Course (ANCOC). Upon graduation, 
88

they would join an active U.S. Army Division and be assigned to 

Sergeants’ duties for 60-90 days. The ultimate goal was to create a 

pool of professional Ukrainian NCOs who would eventually form 

the faculty of Ukraine’s own NCO School, tentatively to be located 

at the Desna Training Center. Colonel Shevtsov was designated the 

Ukrainian manager for the overall effort. The United States appointed 

a senior Sergeant Major to oversee its participation and to mentor 

the Ukrainian NCO candidates. 

 After the newly-minted Sergeants returned to Ukraine and had 

served for a time in Ukrainian units, the U.S. Sergeant Major and 

I visited Kiev to meet with several of them in Colonel Shevtsov’s 

office. They reported that they had received excellent training and 

mentoring in the United States. They also reported that they had 

been well received in their new Ukrainian units. They said they had 

been given considerable authority, and that their training had made 

them valuable and trusted members of their units. 

 The U.S. Sergeant Major arranged to take the Ukrainian Sergeants 

out to dinner “with no officers around” so they would feel freer to 

talk. Interestingly, the reports were very much the same in this venue 

as well. However, some additional insights emerged: They were 

of the opinion that in a “regular unit” vice one of the more “elite” 

peacekeeping battalions, they might not feel as welcomed and wellutilized because the officers would “not know what we are.” The 

Ukrainian Sergeants felt that they (along with everyone else in the 

Army) were “not very well taken care of”―primarily in the area of 

housing and other care for families. Furthermore, in teaching them 

English, we had provided them a rather highly marketable skill in 

Ukraine, so they now had the option of leaving service to become 

interpreters for much higher pay. I do not know that any of them 

did, but you can see in this example an effect of not considering―

or not being able to influence―all the factors impacting on military 

efficiency―doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, 

personnel, and facilities―and to make changes simultaneously 

or at least in a coordinated fashion. In this case particularly, the 

introduction of Sergeants probably calls for a review of leadership 

education as well, for example, and an overall effort at cultural 

change in the Ukrainian military. Better care for personnel (and 

families) and attention to facilities (housing, medical care) may be 
89

required to retain NCOs with marketable skills. But again this is 

hard without resources and political will for a much more ambitious 

reform effort. 

 As long as I am reminiscing, I would like to note the contributions 

of Major General Olexandr Ivashchenko of the General Staff, who 

was a Colonel and my counterpart in co-chairing the Colonels’ 

Council, and did so much to try to make our military engagement 

meaningful and useful to both countries. I recall what he said to me 

in confidence as he departed the airport for his flight back to Ukraine: 

“I was skeptical about this whole thing when I arrived here. I did not 

trust you or the United States. Now I see that you want to help us. In 

return you may get a potential coalition partner that you might just 

need one day. Together, we can make this work.”

91

Colonel (Ukrainian Army Ret.) Dmitri Shkurko, 

former Head of Media Operations at KFOR Press Information Center 

 There were quite a lot of incidents and provocations in Kosovo; 

it was very clear there in what manner the Americans manage 

similar kinds of incidents, first of all, from a tactical point of view; 

and second, from a purely informational point of view. By the way, 

one must give them their due; when it comes to information, they 

give significant attention to any military operation. This is perhaps 

already even a systematic approach. For example, in the case of the 

firing on the Kosovo village of Krivenik from Macedonian territory 

(in 2001), where Albanians were killed.

 First, the forces were being concentrated. Second, intelligence 

efforts, including aviation reconnaissance, were being increased too. 

Our helicopters did not participate because the Americans had a lot 

of their own helicopters. But from a tactical point of view, it was very 

clear how the powerful American machinery operates.

 Our people did not take part in this particular episode, but 

in similar, related actions. Joint reconnaissance was conducted 

continuously. Our area of responsibility was shared with the 

Americans, and we organized joint orientation groups consisting of 

Ukrainians, Poles, and Americans. This was done in order to control 

the region. The area under our control was right on the border with 

Macedonia, and it was very unstable from the point of view of 

penetration by criminal/terrorist elements, as well as from the point 

of view of the transit of arms and sometimes even food. But in order 

to forestall these things, raids were carried out. There were wellknown paths which they used. It was impossible to control them all 

since this was in the mountains, but in the most cases we succeeded; 

some of the caravans were intercepted, and Ukrainians intercepted 

some. There were cases when weapons were used as well. 

 At the same time, one cannot say that there in Kosovo everyone 

acts in accordance with American rules. Everyone acts in accordance 

with common rules. And this is necessitated by the conditions 

because otherwise, if during the carrying out of a tactical mission 

a unit begins to think in various different ways rather than act, this 

demonstrates an inability to resolve the simplest situations, and 

serious situations often occur there. 
92

 In the situation surrounding the events in Strpce, when 

disturbances broke out after the killing of a Serb by Albanians after a 

sniper attack on a convoy, the Americans played a positive role. But 

why did they play a positive role? Because, in contrast to our troops, 

they already had experience in dealing with similar situations. 

When this turmoil began, our troops proved to be poorly protected 

from the crowd. Flak jackets and submachine guns are not the best 

equipment for use against a crowd. Moreover, the emotions of these 

people were understandable, but at the same time, the fact remains―

our troops came under attack, and weapons had to be used against 

the Serbs, probably for the first time. And the Americans gave our 

troops protective equipment right after the events: face shields, 

protective shields, and other similar gear. This may seem elementary, 

but without this equipment, it was difficult to communicate with the 

crowds. And after that, of course, it was not a case of mistrust, because 

overall our people were controlling the situation fairly well. But there 

were, for example, the mobile patrols of the Americans (they were 

constantly traveling on the roads). This showed that the Americans 

trusted us, but they were still monitoring our performance. In other 

words, they kept the situation under control by themselves, and in 

addition to this they took advantage of our abilities. 

 If we take daily communication, then here one can say that there 

was a great deal of trust and a definite kind of cooperation, especially 

at the level of interpersonal relations. Here it was a great deal simpler 

than at any official level. They knew that we were all working on the 

same team. They had no conception of, “You are a Ukrainian, you 

are a Pole, you are an Austrian,” and so on. This kind of complex 

often arises in NATO partner nations, which sometimes like to 

demonstrate their importance, and the Americans have nothing like 

this. They are ready to work on equal terms, if, of course, they see 

sincere attitude towards work. If they see no sincere desire to work, 

or if some kinds of “misunderstandings” begin of the type where an 

officer who comes to a briefing cannot speak English, then in this 

case, one cannot count on tolerance or a respectful attitude. There 

were not too many cases like that, but these things did happen. It 

is true that our troops learn very quickly. One must give them their 

due; after one such incident, the same thing never occurred again. 
93

 Another point is worth mentioning. I had a large number of 

acquaintances among the American servicemen, and I felt very keenly 

what is called the feeling of military camaraderie. The American 

uniform then became my own in a way, which as an officer with past 

Soviet experience I could never even have imagined earlier, since 

earlier this uniform was associated with the enemy. 

 In theory, if one were to assess language training, our officers 

receive satisfactory language training when they go there. Of course, 

it is more complicated at the level of the soldiers, but at the level 

of everyday phrases everyone knows enough to say “hello,” “goodbye,” “good luck,” and so on, and they do not need more than that. 

This is because if the platoon sergeant knows English at least at the 

command level, to the degree that he can understand commands, 

then this is already sufficient for those conditions.

 Once again, we are talking not about a war, but about a 

peacekeeping operation, since in this case one can accept more 

flexibility, but in the context of the military operation that is taking 

place right now in Iraq, this level of communication is already 

insufficient. This is because under these war conditions, the factor 

of individuality plays a role in addition to the team factor. Every 

individual should be self-sufficient on the battlefield. This is a 

Western concept, which is somewhat alien to us. In our tradition, 

since the times of tank attacks and breakthroughs everything was 

taken with cannon fodder, which was thrown at the embrasures 

and enemy fortifications. In the West, I would say that there is a 

completely different, Anglo-Saxon school of thought. According to 

this school of thought, the soldier on the battlefield must be selfsufficient, and the greatest conflict between the Americans and us 

with regard to cooperation is precisely the inadequate perception 

of this principle―the role of the soldier on the battlefield. This is 

because for some of our old-fashioned, stiff generals, it is impossible 

to conceive that they will sit and have lunch at the same table as an 

ordinary soldier; although for the Americans, this is quite natural. 

But if one accepts the principle of military comradeship, then if the 

general and the soldier both equally risk their lives, there is no basis 

for inequality in daily life. We can learn something from this point of 

view. 
94

 When we cooperate with the United States, we should respect 

their ways of doing things. And we should expect them to respect 

our views in return. But they will only respect our views in the event 

that we begin to share the burden more equally, instead of constantly 

expecting American support. 
95

Colonel (Ukrainian Army) Sergiy Poliakov,

Head of the Division of International Military Cooperation of the Western 

Operational Command of the Army of Ukraine, former Ukrainian contingent 

commander at KFOR

 We have not done many of the things our western neighbors 

have done, and they also started their new existence almost from 

scratch. We acted with a false confidence that was not based on 

clearly formulated objectives derived from a critical reassessment of 

“what we were and what we had.” But our childhood years ended, 

and our more mature period had not yet begun. We continued to 

wait, wondering when someone would tell us what to do and how 

to do it in all areas. Somehow we expected our life to progressively 

improve. Even now, with relation to the declarations on accession to 

NATO, we continue attempts to make our “own” policy with other 

people’s money, and money has become one of the major arguments 

for participation in peacekeeping.

 For 10 years, we in fact wasted the experience of our participation 

in multinational operations; negligence was common at all institutional levels. We formed battalions for a 1-year mission, and after the 

rotation, they were disbanded, leaving behind no impact from this 

so-called experience. Every time another contingent was formed, it 

began its preparation almost from scratch. 

 There is some interest in the military sphere in instituting ties with 

NATO member states. However, it appears to be driven more by a 

desire to receive than to contribute. Nothing more than a symbolic 

budget is allocated to NATO cooperation, and so-called EuroAtlantic integration is for the moment little more than the training of 

peacekeeping contingents. We do not fund cooperation events with 

our own money, and current efforts to attain the Partnership Goals, 

interoperability, and other similar aims often do not go beyond mere 

declarations.

 The Ukrainian generals are not very interested in and do not 

strongly support the declared course of Euro-Atlantic integration. 

Even if they did support it, barely any of the generals or colonels 

commanding a division, brigade, or regiment can speak English. 

Those few high-level military leaders (no more than a dozen) 

who have already learned the language have either never been 
96

commanding officers, or have not held a command position for a 

long time. Overall, language training is a unique indicator of how 

words correspond to deeds.

 The United States cannot continue to spend such large sums and 

so much time on the Armed Forces of Ukraine, as was done in the 

mid-1990s. This is because American problems have become more 

real―terrorism―and the partner (the Armed Forces of Ukraine) have 

already made the critical decision (entry into NATO). However, 

there is still an interest in supporting engagement with Ukrainians. 

In the case of the deployment of Ukrainian contingents to Kosovo 

and Iraq, the costs of training, supply, and insurance payments for 

the Americans in case of injury or death would be much higher if the 

Ukrainians were not there.

 In this context, it is pertinent to recall the article of Timothy Shea 

who criticized the state of American-Ukrainian military relations a 

few years ago. These relations appeared to be based more on the 

quantity rather than the quality of cooperative events. Officers who 

studied in U.S. military colleges and took various language courses 

later left the army because there was no demand for their skills, or 

they shifted to less demanding positions in the military. I know many 

officers for whom study in a college of strategic or defense studies 

became a ticket to many years of administrative work in the field 

of cooperation or to long foreign assignments, and not to practical 

work in and for the military. Language training had not yet reached 

the level of platoons, companies and battalions.

 I would characterize the current state of U.S.-Ukrainian military 

relations as transitional. We need a year or a year-and-a-half to define 

the direction of cooperation on the strategic level and, hopefully after 

the process called “reform of the army,” its leadership will at least 

be consistent, and in the best case, it will begin to work in earnest 

for Euro-Atlantic integration. There are a lot of problems here that 

need correction. New requirements for the education and training 

of officers will drive the reform of the entire system of education 

and the organizational structure of staffs. The true implementation 

of the concept of a professional NCO corps will be a blow to the 

current personnel system, and the adoption of all those thousands 

of STANAGs will bring with it an increase in the budget. It will be 

necessary to do many other things to be able to look confidently into 
97

the eyes of our partners of the next stage of Planning and Review 

Process.

 Measures at the strategic and operational levels have to be 

coordinated with measures at the tactical level. Since it is already 

understood what kind of decisions must be made, then instead of 

waiting for decisions to be made at the top, a lot could be done at 

the bottom. During their training before deploying to Iraq, the Poles 

were not hesitant to invite American sergeants and captains to train 

their units at the platoon level, and if one compares the actions when 

on convoy escort of our platoons with the Polish ones, the results are 

not to our credit.

 Our chance now lies in our ability to clearly identify our own 

interests. Having identified these interests, we should build our

relations with America on the basis of our own priorities, and 

not think about how to better implement the plans created by the 

Americans. A more adult attitude towards these issues has been 

expected of us for a long time.

99

Lieutenant Colonel (U.S. Air Force) John Cappello, 

former Operations Officer for the Joint Contact Team Program 

in Kiev, Ukraine

 Overall, military-to-military cooperation has been quite positive. 

U.S. Theater Security Cooperation goals and objectives are furthered 

by continued engagement. There are, of course, very important 

mutual benefits as well. Two of the most important results of this 

cooperation are increased transparency and increased familiarization 

with western procedures, equipment, and doctrine. For example, 

the Joint Contact Team Program (JCTP) provided a very important 

avenue for providing familiarization on a wide range of subject 

matter. The program provides familiarization on a large scope of 

topics, but shallow depth. This is probably the biggest critique of the 

mil-to-mil relationship: the set of security cooperation tools available 

are to a certain extent passed. The relationship has progressed 

beyond these tools that have been implemented in the early 1990s. 

These programs include JCTP, Partnership for Peace (PfP), In Spirit 

Of PfP (ISO PfP), and State Partnership Program (SPP). Not all of 

these programs are applicable. They must continue to evolve as the 

relationship matures and evolves. For example, the training value to 

the United States is rather limited as the focus is on familiarization. 

Many of these programs do not focus on the actual development of 

capabilities, which, in many instances, is what the Ukrainian military 

needs at this point. Enough familiarization has already transpired, 

it is time to train, equip, and develop concrete capabilities. In 

general, the tools that we now use do not focus on these outcomes 

sufficiently. The program which I was involved with during my 

time in Kiev was the JCTP. It provided familiarization in areas such 

as: Airspace Medicine, Meteorology, Logistics Support, Patrol Boat 

and Search and Rescue Ops, Demining, Civil-Military Legal Issues, 

Military Police Topics, Peace Support Operations, Military Chaplains 

Program, English Language Program, and Combat Communications, 

just to name a few. As mentioned, these week-long familiarization 

programs provided an excellent point of departure upon which we 

should be building other more robust events that focus on training 

and capabilities development. This is not an overly critical view of 
100

the mil-to-mil relationship, the main idea in providing this critique 

is to suggest that the relationship is developing and the tools we use 

must develop as well. It is imperative that both sides monitor these 

changes and take an active role in ensuring the proper resources are 

being used to address the proper objectives. 

 Technical aspects of interoperability are not only serious issues 

when we look at the interoperability of Ukraine and the other exWarsaw Pact nations, but are also discussions within NATO itself. It 

is a very important issue that must be resolved among those that wish 

to operate with one another. It is a particularly timely issue now as 

coalitions continue evolve, deploy, and operate in the war on terror. 

No one country can fight this battle alone, and, while the United 

States may bear the brunt of some deployments at the moment, all 

coalition allies that volunteer to deploy forces must first and foremost 

be interoperable. As deployments against still unforeseen threats 

occur, as they surely will, the interoperability question will continue 

to be one that must be addressed for the success of the mission. 

 Basically, one of the biggest differences I have seen between 

Ukrainian/Soviet standards and the western standards is in the 

way we exercise and train. Scenarios are used as guidance, not to 

script exact actions and maneuver. More emphasis is placed on 

problem solving at the lower levels. The way we overcome this gap 

is continued exposure to each other’s way of operating. Training 

together provides exposure to the western standards. Educational 

opportunities also expose Ukrainian leaders to the western thought 

process. The International Military Education and Training (IMET) 

program sends individuals to many different military education 

courses in the United States. The George C. Marshall Center in 

Garmisch, Germany, also provides training and education for many 

east European leaders. 

 There are a few aspects of interoperability that we must address 

when we discuss the bilateral U.S.-Ukrainian relationship. There 

are, of course, technical issues. These can be addressed by making 

a commitment to procure interoperable systems. Foreign Military 

Funding (FMF) is one program that focuses on just this. It allows the 

recipient nation to purchase American equipment. Past FMF money 

has been used to purchase computer equipment for the Modeling and 

Simulation Center at the Ukrainian National Defense Academy. But 
101

physically obtaining western equipment does not solve the problem. 

Training and accepting doctrine are as, if not more, important. There 

needs to be a focus on western standards. This is where there seems 

to be the biggest gap. Training through IMET is one way to address 

this shortcoming.

 I am an optimist when looking at the future of U.S.-UKR military 

cooperation. There is no doubt a lot of work to do, but my experience 

is what reinforces my optimism. While serving in Kiev as the 

Operations Officer for the JCTP, I had the opportunity to work with 

a large number of Ukrainian military officers. And to a person, my 

contemporaries are extremely motivated, intelligent, and capable. 

But they need the tools to perform to their potential. The cultural 

mindset of the Ukrainian leadership must continue to evolve 

to allow for critical thinking and decentralization. Lieutenants, 

Captains, Majors, and Lieutenant Colonels must be empowered to 

make appropriate decisions. Education helps to provide a western 

reference, but the process cannot end with the students’ graduation 

from a western school, course, or training program. The individuals 

must be allowed, they must be encouraged; they must be empowered 

to put what they have learned into practice. Senior leadership is often 

criticized for being too set in their ways, for being too inflexible and 

unwilling to change. This is a problem that is certainly not unique 

to the Ukrainian military, nor to the ex-Warsaw Pact. “Turf” wars, 

parochial competition is found in many bureaucratic systems that 

rely on limited resources. The U.S. military is not immune to this 

type of competition. The system must be flexible enough to allow for 

competition and evolution. Rewards for innovation and flexibility. 

Critical thinking and analysis is a must. These are not traits that have 

been historically valued in the Ukrainian military. Certainly resources 

are necessary for the future development and modernization of 

the UKR military. Limits on resources, on money, and educated 

manpower severely limit the ability of leadership to implement the 

reforms they state in the strategic defense review documents. But 

a lack of resources does not mean that all is lost. It is imperative 

that the capabilities of the younger officers, their motivation, and 

intelligence be harnessed to fill the gap where able.

103

Major (California Army National Guard) Joel Ostrom

Bilateral Affairs Officer, Office of Defense Cooperation, U.S. Embassy, 

Kiev, Ukraine

 Under the Joint Contact Team Program, the major pillars 

of our program are to support democracy, stability, military 

professionalism, and a closer relationship with NATO. So what we 

try to do is work with the Ukrainian military to develop proposals 

to conduct military contacts, which support those overarching 

goals. Of course, interoperability is a part of that effort because that 

contributes to a closer relationship with NATO and greater readiness 

for the Ukrainian military. We also want to make sure that we are 

focusing on structures that will be around after the reductions.

 Our whole effort is to try to help Ukraine achieve its own goals. Of 

course, these are goals which are shared with the United States. Once 

Ukraine declared its intention to join NATO, that certainly gave us 

both a very tangible goal to work towards. And so now we are trying 

to focus events that would address a particular problem and to try 

and facilitate a solution. But, to be honest, from my experience, the 

issues that halt us from maximizing our progress are not the types 

of events that are called for or the duration or the composition of the 

teams or anything like that. It is really, I think, still a matter of the 

decisions that hold the whole process back.

 The political leadership from Ukraine has said, “We want to go 

towards NATO.” But this has not been felt throughout the armed 

forces. You still have officers who are very reluctant to move towards 

that objective. I am not an expert, but is it a result of those officers 

in the system, who have not fully bought in or agree with that goal, 

and perhaps they are reluctant? Or is it because they personally do 

not feel that it is the right decision? Or, is it a result of the leadership 

saying one thing and yet doing another? 

 I guess I have a couple of thoughts on the prospects for U.S.-

Ukraine military interoperability. One is about the capabilities 

which rest here already, and then the categorization or the difference 

between peacekeeping operations and combat operations and the 

forces, which are brought to bear on those two areas. I think, first 

of all, there is a difference between the United States and Ukraine 
104

in how we perceive, and therefore prepare, forces for peacekeeping 

operations as opposed to combat operations. In the United States, we 

train soldiers for their combat mission. So our units are structured for 

combat, they are trained for combat operations―to fight and win the 

nation’s wars. That is our mission. Now, if there is a peacekeeping 

mission, we still use those same forces which are trained for combat. 

The difference is that those forces are tailored, in other words, we 

may (from this brigade or another division) extract parts, take away 

pieces, and then add pieces to it to make a unique structure, which 

is appropriate to the situation. For instance, in a peacekeeping 

situation, perhaps we would add more military police, we would 

add more security forces. Perhaps we would take away artillery. 

We are very used to that, because in combat operations, we do the 

same thing. We may add more infantry troops; or armor based on 

METT-T―based on the mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and the time 

available. So that is kind of how I think the U.S. military approaches 

peacekeeping operations. And, of course, there is additional training 

that they receive to ensure that they know the rules on the use of 

force, for instance, and to ensure that they understand the situation 

that they are going into and that they understand the other coalition 

forces which are participating. But it is my impression, and I may be 

misinformed, that Ukraine has this idea that we train specific forces 

specifically for peacekeeping and for those types of missions, and 

therefore those units would not be used, necessarily, in a combat 

situation, but would reserved specifically for a peacekeeping mission. 

So I think there is a difference there. The United States always trains 

for the highest global conflict, and the theory is that, if you can go 

to combat, go to war, then you have all the skills required of you in 

any kind of given situation, in a peacekeeping situation. Because, of 

course, if something went wrong . . .

 Since you cannot deploy draftees immediately, Ukraine creates 

new units specifically for peacekeeping missions, but I think that is a 

very big challenge. And a new unit, at least in our experience, is not 

combat effective until they have trained for a considerable amount of 

time, until they learn the processes and develop their own sustained 

operational procedures.

 I think that is a challenge of the transition from a contract to a 

professional army. If you have a professional army, then the army 
105

purposefully changes, molds, and adapts itself to the requirements 

of the mission. So, if our mission is to have ready and trained forces 

available for worldwide deployment, then our soldiers who are 

trained to provide that capability must be mobile, they must be able 

to be reassigned and ready to work within a new unit, both during 

combat, as well as peacetime.

 I also think it is important for us to develop more of our military 

language capabilities. We have looked at many ways to achieve 

that―through contractors, or some kind of machine where you type 

it in, and it translates―but I think our experience in contingency 

operations shows that we need a soldier on the ground who 

understands military operations as well as the language.

 The Ukrainian military are making efforts to achieve that goal. Of 

course, there is always room for improvement. But, establishing rules 

which tie that goal to individual advancement rather than simply 

saying “our goal is to achieve X percentage,” I think is where you 

will find success and progress. Everyone is interested in advancing 

and growing to that next rank. So if you say, “Look. If you are going 

to be a major, you have to speak at least one NATO language at a 

certain level. Or if you are going to be a senior NCO, you have to 

have this capability.” . . . Well, it seems as though there is a core 

group of people, and some of them have studied here in Ukraine 

through a foreign language school or through their own efforts. And 

as a result of that, when it came time to send someone to the West 

for school, leaders looked for someone who had some educational 

basis for learning in English. Those were the soldiers who were 

chosen to go, and then, of course, once they went to the school, their 

English dramatically improved, and they truly became the subjectmatter experts and people who were marked: “You are an English 

speaker, so you will coordinate activities with NATO, you will be the 

interpreter, you will do all these things.” But the problem is that that 

base is not very broad, especially in units that will be deployed. Here 

in Kiev, it seems that there are sufficient numbers of people who 

speak English to coordinate with, but when you go to a contingency 

operation, we are severely lacking. 

 In terms of interoperability of various areas, like staff procedures 

and ammunition or the difference between using a Kalashnikov and 

an M-16, I do not think we could say that those are not important, 
106

but I think it is a matter of priorities. We can operate using two 

different sources of ammunition. We can have supplies coming from 

two different locations, merging to that same operational point. 

But the other issues, which are very important, which you cannot 

necessarily do without, are things like command and control. You 

have to know and have a mutual understanding of command and 

control to be an effective force. And that is true in every military 

organization. So when you bring it together to be one organization, 

you have to operate within those same understandings. And I think 

that is sometimes difficult, but that will come along. But there are 

cultural differences that are reflected in a different approach to our 

command and control. For example, in the U.S. system, we place high 

importance on delegating decisionmaking authority to the lowest 

level that can possibly make that decision. So our junior NCOs, when 

they are out there, are making decisions on the spot. And there is 

no fear for them to make that decision, because the institution itself 

not only encourages them to make decisions but demands that they 

make those decisions. Now the evaluation of that person is not a 

matter of whether they made that decision or not, it is a matter of 

how well they made that decision. Here in Ukraine, our experience 

has been much different. The decisionmaking authority does not 

really come until you reach the grade of colonel. That does not mean 

that people are not working―junior people are working, but they are 

generally working preparing documents to be submitted to a higher 

level, the decision is made by the colonel or general, and the decision 

is transmitted back down the chain of command. This is a cultural 

difference, but it is difficult. For instance, in the headquarters, you 

may have a junior enlisted soldier in the U.S. military sitting side 

by side with a Ukrainian major or a captain and essentially doing 

the same work. That is a cultural difference, but it is a difference 

which hampers interoperability. In the Ukrainian military, you have 

technical experts who are senior in grade, and technical experts in our 

military are junior in grade (junior NCOs or enlisted soldiers). And 

whether it is the operator of a piece of machinery or communications 

gear, the rank difference makes it very difficult. 

 Routine staff decisions as well are elevated all the way up to the 

Minister of Defense himself, or the Chief of the General Staff; things 

that, as a major on the U.S. side, I typically make. I am charged to 
107

work with the Ukrainian military, to meet them, and develop a 

program of events. So we get together at a conference, both Ukrainian 

military representatives as well as U.S., and we collectively decide 

what events we think we would like to conduct for the next year. Of 

course in the process of doing that, we use the guidance from our 

leadership such as a focus on Rapid Reaction Force or military interoperability, closer relationship with NATO, stability, democracy . . .

All those kinds of things. 

 We have the political guidance; the United States wants to 

have a cooperative relationship, a beneficial relationship with 

Ukraine. We actively seek Ukraine’s participation in the Western 

community of nations. Those are the kinds of high political goals, 

which are developed by the President, the National Security Strategy. 

The ambassador amplifies that locally. And, of course, our higher 

military headquarters looks at that as well, and then U.S. European 

Command takes that political guidance and distills it down to 

military goals and objectives, and then it comes down to us. And 

now it is our job to take those goals and objectives and then develop 

a program which supports all of that. But getting back to this point 

about decisionmaking authority, once this program is developed, 

we, of course, submit it for approval and funding. So it comes back 

approved. At that point, our leadership says, “Okay, execute.” 

Essentially it gives us the mission, they say, conduct these events. So 

what I do at that point is, I turn these events into a schedule, and we 

assign those dates, and we go about executing it. Now if there is a 

date change or a schedule change, I approve that at my level. On the 

Ukrainian side, it still requires an official letter be sent, despite the 

fact that they have already approved the event set. So that is a very 

tangible sign, really, that we have different staff procedures, and 

that we have differences in the way that we delegate authority. And 

as we move and help Ukraine come closer to NATO, those kinds of 

things, I think, have to change, because NATO just does not work 

that way. You have to be more flexible, you have to be faster, and 

you have to be more efficient.

 And we can look to businesses as an example, businesses would 

never tolerate such bureaucracy, because it takes too much time 

for senior people to review, to make all those decisions. Senior 

leaders have to preserve their time and apply it to more important 

decisions. 
108

 Well, the biggest success story of course, is the brigade-plus that is 

deployed to Iraq. Despite the fact that it is not a good thing that we had 

to deploy to Iraq, but it does also provide many opportunities, both to 

demonstrate our capabilities to work together currently, to learn from 

those, conducting honest after-action reports, looking objectively at 

how we are deploying, how we are operating, how we conduct all the 

various actions that we take. And then working to solve those kinds 

of challenges. So there are a lot of opportunities, assets that Ukraine 

has, of course, starting with Ukrainian cargo capabilities. Ukraine has 

a huge airlift potential to contribute towards operations, regardless 

of whether it is peacekeeping, combat, or whatever. So there are a lot 

of assets that Ukraine is able to contribute to NATO as well as other 

organizations’ efforts. It seems to me that the opportunities to work 

together are really unlimited. I mean, you can look at every aspect 

of operations and say, “As long as you have a trained force, there is 

opportunity to work together.” But the challenges that are associated 

with those opportunities are those which we have already identified, 

and that is, primarily, interoperability. Interoperability in technical, 

interoperability in the ammunition that we use, the vehicles, the 

fuel that we use, as well as procedurally, the command and control 

systems that we talk about, staff procedures, the way that we conduct 

mission analysis, the military decisionmaking process, etc. Those all 

benefit from NATO standards, and at every level, not just a couple 

of units, not just a couple of people who speak English, but all units 

have to adopt this method that NATO uses, so that regardless of 

what emergency comes up, that Ukraine will also have the ability 

to task organize and to tailor its forces they are going to contribute. 

And that force, however it is created or built, will already have those 

capabilities inherent in the people that make up that unit, and they 

will already be interoperable by their training. And then it is just a 

matter of working internally to make that task-organized unit work 

together as a cohesive unit. And then when it deploys alongside 

coalition forces, NATO forces, they will be able to essentially plugand-play. 

 The most glaring difference is evident when we try to work 

directly together, to simply coordinate events which have already 

been approved. I cannot just call and say, “I’d like to come over for 
109

half an hour or an hour. Can you meet today?” Even though we 

may have a good relationship, he is obliged to say, “No, I’m sorry, 

you have to write a letter requesting this meeting.” And then he has 

to submit it to his chain of command to get a decision, and it has to 

come back down. And then, even if it is approved, we cannot meet at 

his office. There are only designated places where we can meet. I can 

meet him at the officers’ club, I can meet him at the NATO Liaison 

Office, I can meet him at the Multinational Staff Officers’ Course. But 

that rule assumes that we are not partners, it assumes that we are 

not working together. If we assume that we are going to work as a 

NATO ally, to come closer, then staff officers should have the ability 

to really work together. 

 The impression left is that either they do not trust the person that 

is asking for this meeting, that they feel that there is some information 

that they have to protect. So now my parents, the U.S. Army, have 

said, “Go talk to the Ukrainians. Work with them. Help them become 

closer with NATO. Help with stability. Help with democracy. Help 

with military professionalism. Help with interoperability.” So I am 

here, my door is open, I am happy to work with anyone who comes 

by. But, on the other hand, my good neighbor still has to go ask his 

mother for the opportunity to talk to me.

 I am fearful that we will waste these opportunities. The Joint 

Contact Team Program (JCTP), for instance, that has a robust 

program has been providing information to Ukraine for about 5 

years now, providing both familiarization visits, bringing Ukrainians 

to Western Europe or the United States, showing them any kind 

of subject material or organization. We also bring U.S. experts to 

Ukraine to provide briefings on a variety of topics to Ukrainians. But 

this program will not last forever. We have already been told that the 

JCTP will decline―nothing lasts forever; we need to make sure that 

reform happens concurrently with these programs. If we wait and 

reform does not occur until later, this program will not be around 

when it is needed. Only then will people want to implement change, 

when they need the information. We are providing the information 

now, but if the bureaucracy is not willing to implement it, then it is 

wasted. And the worst part is, when you need the information later, 

when the bureaucracy is willing to accept it, the funding will no 

longer be there, and it will be even harder to convince our Congress 
110

to provide the money. The response will be, “We already did that, 

and we did it for 5 years already. Why should we fund this again?” 

But that is the moment of truth, when Ukraine is actually ready to 

make reform a reality. I just hope we still have the money to help 

make reform possible. We are working hard, but to maximize the 

effort Ukraine needs to take full advantage of the opportunities that 

are available now.
111

Colonel (U.S. Army) Timothy Shea, 

Some Thoughts on U.S.-Ukraine Interoperability 

Common Interests and Background for Cooperation.

 As part of the 3D Infantry Division (3ID) staff, I was assigned as 

the project officer for designing the first “Peace Shield” exercise with 

Ukraine in 1994-95. We had just executed “Peacekeeper 94” with 

the Russians in October 1994, when we were tasked to meet with 

MOD in Kyiv to plan a peacekeeping exercise with the Ukrainian 

MOD. Cooperation was excellent, and both sides were enthusiastic. 

3ID was autonomous and self-sufficient in planning with little help 

or interference from higher headquarters (I was a Eurasian Foreign 

Area Officer with planning/exercise design experience―the division 

maintained this billet and expertise for years). Brigadier General 

David Grange, Assistant Division Commander, led most planning 

events. On the U.S. side, the Commanding General took personal 

interest in all activities.

 When I arrived in Ukraine as the Army Attaché in 1998, I was 

surprised to see that the “Peace Shield” exercise had not evolved 

much from the initial event. Division of labor was such that the 

Ukrainian side focused on welcome ceremony/reception and 

portions of the field exercise. Staff interaction was minimal. On both 

sides the event became routine, with less senior leader involvement, 

especially on the Ukrainian side. Major General Grange, now the 

Division Commander, retained a personal interest, but operational 

matters took away opportunities to focus. Increasingly fragmented 

portions of U.S. units were used as participants in later exercises 

such as the California National Guard, Illinois National Guard, and 

SETAF. It became harder to understand who was in charge, and I 

found it necessary as the Army Attaché to take an increasingly active 

role. Problems dealing with the Western Operational Command also 

moved the focus of exercises away from interoperability and toward 

a “Pokazukha” circus-like show for Ukrainian Minister of Defense. 

Computer exercises were increasingly organized by U.S.-sponsored 

contractors. Interoperability became secondary to other concerns 

such as funding issues, U.S. operational distractions in the Balkans, 
112

introduction of new units, organizations, and leaders unfamiliar 

with Ukraine. I felt things were going backwards and set out to make 

improvements with “Peace Shield 2000.” Ground Forces Command 

(Ukraine) was not interested in integrating the Ukrainian-Polish 

Peacekeeping Battalion into “Peace Shield,” even though the two 

parts of the unit were almost colocated near Yavoriv Training Area. 

Breaking the Mold. Although I was unsuccessful in getting an 

“airborne” exercise approved, I convinced both EUCOM and Colonel 

Yakubets (Chief of Airborne, Ground Forces) to conduct an airborne 

exercise inside “Peace Shield 2000.” This event was the best example I 

have seen demonstrating U.S.-Ukraine interoperability. The U.S. 82d 

Airborne Division and Ukrainian Airmobile forces were enthusiastic 

planners as were their air force counterparts. Discussions on drop 

zone assembly procedures and aerial link up considerations over 

Poland were very impressive and substantially different from the 

typically tired approach used for the stagnating “Peace Shield” 

series exercises of late 1990s. Unfortunately, for unknown reasons, 

this type of exercise was discontinued.

 In the fall of 1999, I assisted the Ukrainian General Staff in 

deploying to the Balkans as part of KFOR. There were several legal 

and administrative problems in staffing a Memorandum with U.S. 

Army Europe for Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement for 

goods and services, and with the Transfer of Authority (TOA) placing 

Ukrainian forces within the NATO/U.S. chain of command. For 

weeks the whereabouts of TOA was unknown, resulting in Ukrainian 

forces being denied permission to conduct PKO. Later I organized 

a leader’s recon to Camp Bondsteel to support the deployment of 

the Ukrainian-Polish Battalion―it was evident that coordination 

and interoperability inside the Ministry of Defense between Ground 

Forces Command and the General Staff was deplorable, resulting in 

miscommunications and poor coordination of activities.

 In the summer of 2000 as I was reassigned from Ukraine to 

the Joint Staff, I noted that tactical-operational cooperation was 

generally outstanding, but the United States and Ukraine were miles 

apart at senior levels (General Officer). The Joint Staff and Ukrainian 

General Staff conducted POTOMAC DNIPRO in May 2002, which 

was considered the first step in achieving military interoperability at 

the strategic level. The game players discussed and examined each 
113

side’s capabilities for combined response to crisis situations, such as 

a noncombatant evacuation operation (NEO) and possible long-term 

missions for humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping missions. 

Each delegation was led by a General Officer, with functional staff 

representatives on each side for operations, planning, logistics, 

intelligence, communications, and legal counsel. The Ukrainian 

Military representative from the United Nations and the Political 

Officer from the U.S. Embassy Kyiv were players, as well as Defense 

Attaches from both countries. Game players made significant 

progress in understanding each other’s decisionmaking processes 

and command structures. The process of planning and designing 

the game provided greater understanding of Joint Staff and General 

Staff coordination procedures. The Ukrainian side considered this 

game to be instrumental in facilitating the Ukrainian deployment in 

support of Iraqi Freedom.

Current Progress.

 A follow-on POTOMAC DNIPRO wargame was conducted in 

the Fall 2004 to capitalize on lessons learned in Iraq and to build on 

interoperability. Use of Marshall Center courses and IMET slots are 

improving but still need attention.

 The exercise regime of “Peace Shield” and “Sea Breeze” continue, 

but seem to have little more than symbolic value. The U.S. side uses 

the National Guard, and the Ukrainians recently used cadets instead 

of actual soldiers. There is still no tie in with Mission Rehearsal 

Exercises (MRE) for Ukrainian units deploying to Iraq for next 

rotation.

 Soviet-era structure DICMOD is alive and well. An unnecessary 

bureaucracy that over centralizes interaction, discourages direct 

contact, steals IMET/Marshall Center slots, and is an obstacle to 

genuine interoperability.

Challenges of Cooperation and Lessons Learned. 

 • A casual and complacent attitude regarding exercises at 

Yavoriv Training Area has become entrenched. Other locations 

and units should be considered.
114

 • Ukrainian units deploying abroad are provisional and break 

up upon return. This loss of unit integrity and experience is 

a tremendous waste. Ukraine must colocate families that are 

part of these units so that the officers and soldiers continue to 

serve in high ready units (Rapid Reaction Forces).

 • Exercises should focus on actual units (U.S. and Ukraine) that 

will deploy out of country. Using third tier units and cadets 

from Western Operational Command and U.S. National 

Guard units contributes little to real interoperability.

 • War games and combined staff events provide real 

opportunities to develop interoperability at the strategicoperational levels.

 • Too much of “interoperability” and security cooperation is 

based on personalities that are passionate about initiating 

new events (very small density). Responsibility on both sides 

needs to be broadened so that a larger pool of officers is 

able to initiate new ideas and understand counterparts. The 

Ukrainian side has an extremely small density of operational 

officers capable of pursuing interoperability issues.

 • NCO Corps. Until the officer corps understands how to use 

NCOs effectively (without feeling threatened), it is useless to 

expend resources on developing such a capability.

 • National Academy of Defense―U.S. institutional partnership. 

Perhaps exchanging professors with George C. Marshall 

Center (or other institution) might permit some much needed 

changes to curriculm/topics in Ukraine. A Ukrainian colonel 

assigned to Garmisch for a year, to teach afterwards at the 

National Academy of Defense, would help interoperability.
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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

LEONID I. POLYAKOV (Colonel, Army of Ukraine, retired) is 

director of Military Programs at Ukrainian Centre for Economic 

and Political Studies named after Olexander Razumkov (Razumkov 

Centre) in Kyiv, Ukraine. His last position on active duty was as a 

State Expert (senior advisor) on the Analytical Service of the National 

Security and Defense Council Staff, Ukraine. His military service also 

includes a combat tour as Company Commander in Afghanistan, 

Group Chief for U.S./Ukraine military contacts, Senior Research 

Fellow on the General Staff of Ukraine’s Armed Forces, and various 

other military command and staff officer positions. As NATO Fellow 

1999-2001, Mr. Polyakov worked on The Russian Factor in Ukraine’s 

Relations with NATO: Possible Outcomes and Policy Implications for 

Ukraine and NATO. He guided the development of Razumkov 

Centre’s analytical reports: Military Reform in Ukraine: Start, or Another 

False Start?; Democratic Civilian Control over the Military in Ukraine: On 

the Path from Form to Substance; Ukraine’s Relations with NATO within 

the Context of European Security, and Transfer to Professional Armed 

Forces in Ukraine: Problems and Prospects. His numerous publications 

touch the broad range of Ukrainian and regional security issues, and 

include Ukrainian-NATO Relations and New Prospects for Peacekeeping

(United Kingdom: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2003); 

Ukraine’s Security between Russia and the West [Die Siecherheitspolitic 

der Ukraine zwischen Russland und dem Westen], Austria: Mittler, 

Jahrbuch fur internationale Sicherheitspolitic 2002; “Military Reforms 

in Russia” in Toward an Understanding of Russia. New European 

Perspectives (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2002); and 

“American Defense Transformation: A View from Ukraine” in 

Transforming Defense (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. 

Army War College, December 2001). Mr. Polykov is a graduate of 

Frunze Military Academy in Moscow, the U.S. Army War College 

(1995), and the George C. Marshall Center for European Security 

(Senior Executive Course, 2001).