Supreme Court of Louisiana 

FOR IMMEDIATE NEWS RELEASE NEWS RELEASE #057

FROM: CLERK OF SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA

The Opinions handed down on the 19th day of October, 2016, are as follows:

PER CURIAM:

2016-B -0967 IN RE: ARTHUR GILMORE, JR. 

Upon review of the findings and recommendations of the hearing 

committee and disciplinary board, and considering the record, 

briefs, and oral argument, it is ordered that Arthur Gilmore, 

Jr., Louisiana Bar Roll number 1059, be and he hereby is 

disbarred, retroactive to June 9, 2013, the date of his most 

recent interim suspension. Respondent shall also be given credit 

for the time he served on interim suspension during the period of 

June 19, 2011 to September 21, 2011 and during the period of May 

2, 2012 to April 3, 2013. Respondent’s name shall be stricken 

from the roll of attorneys and his license to practice law in the 

State of Louisiana shall be revoked. All costs and expenses in 

the matter are assessed against respondent in accordance with 

Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest to commence 

thirty days from the date of finality of this court’s judgment 

until paid. 

HUGHES, J., dissents and would impose a lesser sanction.
10/19/16

SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA

NO. 2016-B-0967

IN RE: ARTHUR GILMORE, JR.

ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDING

PER CURIAM

This disciplinary matter arises from formal charges filed by the Office of 

Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) against respondent, Arthur Gilmore, Jr., an attorney 

licensed to practice law in Louisiana but currently on interim suspension based 

upon his conviction of a serious crime. In re: Gilmore, 13-1284 (La. 6/19/13), 117

So. 3d 500.

UNDERLYING FACTS

In 2010, a federal grand jury in the Western District of Louisiana returned an 

indictment against respondent, a member of the Monroe City Council. The 

indictment charged respondent with engaging in a racketeering enterprise whereby 

he used his office and position as an elected city councilman to extract bribes in the 

form of cash and other things of value from individuals and organizations having 

business before the council, in exchange for which respondent took actions 

favorable to these individuals and organizations. 

The matter first proceeded to trial in April 2011. On May 10, 2011, a jury 

found respondent guilty of violating the RICO Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), and the 

Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951, which prohibits actual or attempted extortion 

affecting interstate or foreign commerce. Following respondent’s conviction, we
2

placed him on interim suspension in In re: Gilmore, 11-1401 (La. 7/19/11), 65 So. 

3d 1289. 

Thereafter, the federal district court granted respondent’s motion for new 

trial in the criminal case and vacated his conviction. In light of this order, the 

ODC filed a motion to dissolve respondent’s interim suspension. We granted the 

motion and dissolved respondent’s interim suspension on September 21, 2011. In 

re: Gilmore, 11-1401 (La. 9/21/11), 72 So. 3d 342. 

In October 2011, the government filed a motion for reconsideration of the 

ruling on the motion for new trial. Following a hearing, the federal district court 

granted the motion for reconsideration and reinstated respondent’s May 2011 

convictions of racketeering and extortion. On May 2, 2012, we again placed 

respondent on interim suspension based upon his conviction of a serious crime. In 

re: Gilmore, 12-0852 (La. 5/2/12), 88 So. 3d 441.

In March 2013, the federal district court granted a second motion for new 

trial in respondent’s criminal case, prompting him to seek the dissolution of his 

interim suspension. We granted respondent’s motion and dissolved his interim 

suspension on April 3, 2013. In re: Gilmore, 12-0852 (La. 4/3/13), 110 So. 3d 

130. 

On May 13, 2013, respondent was retried before a jury in federal district 

court. During the trial, a local real estate developer testified that in 2007 he had 

regularly given respondent cash contributions and in-kind donations in exchange 

for favorable assistance with certain zoning variances he sought. In late 2007 or 

early 2008, the developer became an FBI informant. In 2008, the developer 

recorded a conversation with respondent. After respondent brought up the 

developer’s pending zoning application and other business before the city, the 

conversation turned to respondent’s recently concluded re-election campaign. 

Respondent then said that he was “still taking campaign contributions,” and the 
3

developer gave him $1,000, saying, “and all I ask for is a fair shake and you do 

something for me.” Respondent replied, “No problem.”1

Approximately eighteen months later, in 2009, the developer recorded a 

second conversation with respondent. Respondent began the conversation by 

updating the developer on a proposal pending in the city council to ratify an 

amendment to a contract between one of the developer’s companies and the city. 

Respondent then requested $207 from the developer on behalf of a constituent 

whose utilities were about to be disconnected. The same evening, the city council 

approved the contract amendment, and the developer gave the $207 to respondent a 

couple of days later.

On May 16, 2013, respondent was found guilty of racketeering but not guilty 

of extortion. Following respondent’s conviction, we placed him on interim 

suspension for a third time. In re: Gilmore, 13-1284 (La. 6/19/13), 117 So. 3d 500.

On September 26, 2013, respondent was sentenced to serve twenty-four 

months in federal prison. This sentence was below the sentencing guidelines 

range, and the judge gave the following reasons for the downward departure: 

In this case, the Government’s main witness engaged in 

an ongoing program of planned enticement to provoke 

[respondent] into agreeing to bribes in exchange for 

perceived favors from [respondent’s] position with the 

Monroe City Council. Because of that, the Guidelines, in 

my opinion, may overstate the relative seriousness of 

[respondent’s] actions and the application of an equitable 

sentence.

So I find there exists a mitigating circumstance of a kind 

not adequately taken into consideration by the Guidelines 

and that in order to advance the objective set forth under 

the Guidelines, the sentence will be different from that 

described.

 1 The $1,000 payment was not reported as a campaign contribution on respondent’s campaign 

finance reports. 
4

On November 13, 2014, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth 

Circuit affirmed respondent’s racketeering conviction.2

 United States v. Gilmore, 

No. 13-31064 (5th Cir. 2014) (not designated for publication).

DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

In July 2015, the ODC filed one count of formal charges against respondent, 

alleging that he violated Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 19 (lawyers convicted of a 

crime). Respondent, through counsel, answered the formal charges, essentially 

admitting to his misconduct and asking for a sanction “other than disbarment.” In 

mitigation, respondent offered that his conviction was based on only two 

violations, those being a $1,000 campaign contribution and a $207 payment for a 

constituent’s electric bill. The matter then proceeded to a formal hearing before 

the hearing committee.

Formal Hearing

The hearing committee conducted the formal hearing in December 2015. 

Both respondent and the ODC introduced documentary evidence for the 

committee’s consideration. Respondent called several character witnesses to 

testify before the committee. He also testified on his own behalf and on crossexamination by the ODC.

 2 In its unpublished opinion, the Court of Appeals framed the issue before it as follows:

In May 2013, a jury found Arthur Gilmore, Jr., a former Monroe, 

Louisiana city councilman, guilty of violating the Racketeering 

Influence and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”). In this direct 

appeal, we are asked two questions: (1) was Gilmore entitled to a 

jury instruction on entrapment, and (2) was there sufficient 

evidence to support his conviction under RICO?

We answer “no” to the first, “yes” to the second, and AFFIRM 

Gilmore’s conviction.
5

Hearing Committee Report

Following the hearing, the hearing committee determined that respondent 

committed a “serious crime” under Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 19. The 

committee further determined that respondent violated the following provisions of 

the Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules 8.4(b) (commission of a criminal act that 

reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer), 

8.4(c) (engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or 

misrepresentation), 8.4(d) (engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of 

justice), and 8.4(e) (stating or implying an ability to influence improperly a judge, 

judicial officer, government agency or official or to achieve results by means that 

violate the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law). In making these 

determinations, the committee considered both the evidence and testimony 

presented at the hearing, summarizing the testimony as follows:

Judge Robert Johnson of the Fourth Judicial District Court for the Parish of 

Ouachita testified that respondent is smart, compassionate, and wants to help 

people. He also described respondent as a good and decent man, a man of 

integrity, and a generous man who cared for his constituents and the people of his 

community. He indicated respondent was a family man who kept his promises, 

and he did not believe respondent should be disbarred. Valerie Rowley, 

respondent’s long-time neighbor, testified that respondent is caring, honest, 

generous, and trustworthy. She also indicated he is a deacon in his church and is

particularly helpful to the elderly. Ellen Hill, a committee member of the Monroe 

Planning and Zoning Commission and an employee of Louisiana Delta 

Community College, described respondent as professional, concerned, and 

committed. Reverend Sam Moore described respondent as principled, honest, 

compassionate, generous, and trustworthy. Jamie Mayo, the Mayor of Monroe, 

testified that he served on the Monroe City Council with respondent. Mr. Mayo 
6

indicated respondent was concerned and cared about his constituents, is a man of 

the highest integrity, and has a strong work ethic. He further described respondent 

as dependable, helpful, generous, trustworthy, and religious. David Creed, who is 

the Executive Director of North Delta Planning and Development, testified that 

respondent was a member of North Delta’s board and a Vice President. He 

indicated respondent upheld his duties, and he rated respondent highly for honesty. 

Reverend James Earl Jackson testified that he has known respondent since 1966. 

He indicated respondent was a deacon at his church, had a love of God, and was a 

generous giver to the church. He also described respondent as having a strong 

work ethic and concern for the community as well as being honest, trustworthy, 

and non-materialistic. Ibra January, the Executive Director of the Ouachita MultiPurposes Community Action Program, indicated respondent served on the 

program’s board with him. He testified that respondent tries to help people in need 

in Ouachita Parish and has a passion for the poor. He also described respondent as 

trustworthy, honest, and committed to his church.3

Respondent testified that he was elected to the Monroe City Council in 1996 

and re-elected three consecutive times thereafter, the last time being in 2008. He 

also indicated that he worked as an assistant district attorney in the child support 

section from 1995 to 2010. He stated he returned to Monroe after law school 

because he wanted to get into politics there in order to help the elderly and the poor 

of his hometown. Respondent also testified that he is a Christian, a generous giver, 

a church deacon, chairman of the board of deacons, and superintendent of 

education in his church’s Sunday school. He further indicated his belief in giving 

of his money, time, and talent to the church. He has also advised AfricanAmerican men through an African-American fraternity, working with them in 

 3 The ODC and respondent stipulated that four other character witnesses would testify similarly 

to the witnesses who appeared before the committee. 
7

doing manual labor in various Monroe communities. He testified that honesty is 

important to him and that he has used his personal money to help his constituents. 

Regarding his conviction, he stated he feels remorse for putting his family 

“through this” and for having used “bad judgment.” Despite his conviction, he 

believes he has a good reputation in his community. 

Based on the evidence presented, and noting respondent admitted to his 

conviction, the committee determined the ODC proved by clear and convincing 

evidence that respondent was convicted of a serious crime. The committee further 

determined respondent knowingly and intentionally accepted money to use his 

official position on the Monroe City Council to influence the outcome and to affect 

certain zoning issues before the Council. Respondent violated duties owed to the 

public, the legal system, and the legal profession, causing harm to the public trust 

and the legal profession. Citing the ABA’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer 

Sanctions, the committee determined the baseline sanction is disbarment.

In aggravation, the committee found a prior disciplinary record (a 1992 

admonition for failing to promptly remove his suspended law partner’s name from 

the law office’s newspaper advertisement), a dishonest or selfish motive, and 

substantial experience in the practice of law (admitted 1983). In mitigation, the 

committee found full and free disclosure to the disciplinary board and a 

cooperative attitude toward the proceedings, character or reputation, imposition of 

other penalties or sanctions, and remoteness of the prior disciplinary offense.

Although the committee considered respondent’s misconduct in light of the 

permanent disbarment guidelines, it ultimately decided permanent disbarment was 

not warranted. In rejecting permanent disbarment as the appropriate sanction, the 

committee was compelled by respondent’s character witnesses, who all believed 

that he had been punished enough and that permanent disbarment should be 

reserved for a more egregious offense than respondent’s. The committee also cited 
8

the mitigating factors present as well as the judge’s reasons for imposing a more 

lenient sentence upon respondent than the sentencing guidelines presented.

Based on this reasoning, the committee recommended respondent be 

disbarred, but not permanently. The committee further recommended respondent 

be given credit for the time he has served on interim suspension.

The ODC filed an objection to the committee’s report and recommendation, 

arguing that permanent disbarment should be imposed.

Disciplinary Board Recommendation

After review, the disciplinary board determined the hearing committee 

correctly applied the Rules of Professional Conduct by finding respondent in 

violation of Rules 8.4(b), 8.4(c), 8.4(d), and 8.4(e). Although the ODC did not 

charge respondent with any of these rule violations, the substance of the formal 

charges gave him adequate notice of his misconduct, namely his criminal 

conviction, and the facts underlying his conviction clearly implicate these rules.

The board then determined respondent intentionally violated duties owed to 

the public by engaging in a criminal act while acting in his capacity as an elected 

official. His misconduct harmed the public, especially his constituents, by 

depriving them of a fair governmental process and harmed the public’s perception 

of the legal profession. The board agreed with the committee that the baseline 

sanction is disbarment.

The board adopted the aggravating and mitigating factors found by the 

committee. Additionally, the board recognized respondent’s illegal conduct as an 

aggravating factor and respondent’s remorse as a mitigating factor.

Considering respondent’s misconduct in light of the permanent disbarment 

guidelines and the prior jurisprudence of this court, the board recommended he be 

permanently disbarred.
9

Respondent filed an objection to the board’s recommendation. Accordingly, 

the case was docketed for oral argument pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 

11(G)(1)(b).

DISCUSSION

Bar disciplinary matters come within the original jurisdiction of this court. 

La. Const. art. V, § 5(B). When the disciplinary proceedings involve an attorney 

who has been convicted of a crime, the conviction is conclusive evidence of guilt 

and the sole issue presented is whether respondent’s crimes warrant discipline, and 

if so, the extent thereof. Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 19(E); In re: Boudreau, 02-

0007 (La. 4/12/02), 815 So. 2d 76; Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Wilkinson, 562 So. 

2d 902 (La. 1990). The discipline to be imposed in a given case depends upon the 

seriousness of the offense, the circumstances of the offense, and the extent of the 

aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Perez, 550 

So. 2d 188 (La. 1989).

Here, respondent stands convicted of racketeering by accepting bribes in 

exchange for taking favorable actions on behalf of individuals and organizations 

having business before the Monroe City Council, of which respondent was an 

elected member. This crime is a felony under federal law and clearly warrants 

serious discipline. The record supports the rule violations found by the hearing 

committee and the disciplinary board.4

Respondent knowingly and intentionally violated duties owed to the public

and to the legal system by engaging in a criminal act while acting in his capacity as 

an elected official, causing actual harm. The baseline sanction for this type of 

misconduct is disbarment.

 4 We agree with the board that although the ODC did not charge respondent with specific

violations of Rule 8.4, the substance of the formal charges gave him adequate notice of his 

misconduct, namely his criminal conviction. See In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544 (1968).
10

Aggravating factors present include a prior disciplinary record, a dishonest 

or selfish motive, substantial experience in the practice of law, and illegal conduct. 

The mitigating factors present are full and free disclosure to the disciplinary board 

and a cooperative attitude toward the proceedings, character or reputation, 

imposition of other penalties or sanctions, remorse, and remoteness of the prior 

disciplinary offense.

In concluding that permanent disbarment is not an appropriate sanction in 

this matter, the hearing committee gave great weight to the testimony of the 

character witnesses, the applicable mitigating factors, and the reasons given by the 

federal district judge for imposing a more lenient sentence upon respondent than 

called for by the sentencing guidelines. We agree that all of these factors are 

compelling, and accordingly, we find that it is not necessary to impose permanent 

disbarment in this case.

Accordingly, we will reject the disciplinary board’s recommendation and 

disbar respondent, retroactive to June 9, 2013, the date of his most recent interim 

suspension. We further order that respondent be given credit for the time he served 

on interim suspension during the period of June 19, 2011 to September 21, 2011 

and during the period of May 2, 2012 to April 3, 2013.

DECREE

Upon review of the findings and recommendations of the hearing committee 

and disciplinary board, and considering the record, briefs, and oral argument, it is 

ordered that Arthur Gilmore, Jr., Louisiana Bar Roll number 1059, be and he 

hereby is disbarred, retroactive to June 9, 2013, the date of his most recent interim 

suspension. Respondent shall also be given credit for the time he served on interim 

suspension during the period of June 19, 2011 to September 21, 2011 and during 

the period of May 2, 2012 to April 3, 2013. Respondent’s name shall be stricken 
11

from the roll of attorneys and his license to practice law in the State of Louisiana 

shall be revoked. All costs and expenses in the matter are assessed against 

respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest 

to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this court’s judgment until 

paid.
1

10/19/16

SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA

No. 2016-B-0967

IN RE: ARTHUR GILMORE, JR. 

ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDING

Hughes, J., dissents.

I respectfully dissent and would impose a lesser sanction.