a

GAO

United States Government Accountability Office

Report to Congressional Requesters

January 2006 DEFENSE 

MANAGEMENT

Fully Developed 

Management 

Framework Needed to 

Guide Air Force 

Future Total Force 

Efforts

GAO-06-232
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

January 2006

DEFENSE MANAGEMENT 

Fully Developed Management Framework 

Needed to Guide Air Force Future Total 

Force Efforts 

Highlights of GAO-06-232, a report to 

congressional requesters 

The Air Force is in the process of 

transforming its force to meet

today’s new and emerging threats.

Its “Future Total Force” concept is 

intended to maximize future

capabilities by integrating its 

active, National Guard, and reserve

components to a greater degree. 

While the Air Force was making 

force structure decisions and 

developing its 20-year plan, the Air 

National Guard embarked on its 

own “Vanguard” transformation 

initiative to ensure its role and 

relevance in the new Air Force. 

This report discusses (1) the 

processes and events that

surrounded the Air Force’s

development of its 20-year force 

structure plan, including the

involvement of key stakeholders 

and the development of the Guard’s 

Vanguard initiative, and (2) the

extent to which the Air Force is 

utilizing key results-oriented 

management tools to guide its 

effort to identify new missions for 

the Air National Guard and 

integrate active and Guard forces

as part of its Future Total Force 

effort. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that the 

Secretary of the Air Force take

steps to fully develop a

management framework,

accelerate its approval, and

establish an evaluation plan to 

assess its test initiatives. DOD 

agreed with the recommendations 

in this report and has begun

implementing them. 

The Air Force used an iterative process to develop its 20-year force structure 

plan with periodic review and oversight by senior-level Department of 

Defense (DOD) and Air Force officials; however, stakeholders have different 

views on the extent to which the Air Force sought and addressed input from 

process participants. The plan included a reduction in the legacy fighter 

fleet—residing largely within the Air National Guard—and the acquisition of

new aircraft such as the F/A-22 and the Joint Strike Fighter. In late 2004, a 

departmentwide shift in funding priorities reduced the number of F/A-22 

aircraft to be acquired and resulted in changes to the Air Force’s plan. 

Perspectives on how well this process worked vary depending on the role 

and level of involvement of each organization. For example, Air Force Air 

Staff officials viewed the process as fully participatory and noted that the Air 

National Guard Bureau and the Air Force’s major commands had direct 

representation on the force structure development team. In contrast, Air 

National Guard officials expressed concerns about their ability to influence 

decisions and 7 of the 10 adjutants general whom GAO contacted believed 

that they did not have sufficient opportunity to influence the decisions. 

Because documentation of the proceedings of key meetings was limited, 

GAO was unable to evaluate the extent to which stakeholders influenced the 

process. During the same period, the Air National Guard began a separate 

effort—the Vanguard Engagement Strategy—to solicit input from the states 

on future roles and missions for the Guard and to prepare its units to 

respond to anticipated force structure reductions. 

The Air Force has taken steps to identify new missions for the Air National 

Guard and test ways to integrate the active, Guard, and reserve components 

as part of its Future Total Force transformation, but it has not fully 

developed a management framework to guide its efforts or a plan to evaluate

its progress. In December 2004, the Air Force announced initiatives for six 

states to test its transformation concepts. In March 2005, the Air Force 

established a new directorate to guide implementation of the Future Total 

Force concept. The new directorate has taken steps to identify new 

missions and implement new constructs to integrate components. As GAO 

has previously reported, organizations undergoing transformation increase 

their likelihood of success if they adopt a results-oriented management 

framework to guide their efforts. Although the directorate has drafted a 

strategic plan that directorate officials said includes such tools, as of 

November 2005, the plan had not been approved and there is no requirement 

that it be used to guide implementation efforts. Moreover, while the Air 

Force has some metrics to use in evaluating its test initiatives, it has not 

developed a comprehensive evaluation plan to measure results. By moving 

ahead to implement the Future Total Force concept without such a 

framework and evaluation plan, the Air Force may be unable to successfully 

transform its culture, evaluate initiatives and program results, determine the 

most cost effective mix of active and reserve forces, and ensure

transparency of the implementation process. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-232.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Janet St. 

Laurent at 202-512-4402 or

stlaurentj@gao.gov. 
Contents 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 3

Background 6

Stakeholder Views on Extent of Input and Transparency of Force 

Structure Development Process Differ 7 

Air Force Proceeding with Future Total Force Implementation

without a Fully Developed Management Framework 18 

Conclusion 26

Recommendations for Executive Action 27 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 27 

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 29 

Appendix II Comments from the Department of Defense 31 

Appendix III GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 34 

Tables 

Table 1: Key Events and Stakeholder Participation in The Force 

Structure Development Process 9 

Table 2: Future Total Force Initiatives Announced by the Air Force 

in December 2004 20 

Table 3: Key Results-Oriented Management Tools 23 

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

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other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to 

reproduce this material separately. 

Page i GAO-06-232 Defense Management
United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

January 31, 2006 

The Honorable Tom Davis 

Chairman 

Committee on Government Reform 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Christopher Shays 

Chairman 

Subcommittee on National Security,

Emerging Threats and International Relations 

Committee on Government Reform 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Christopher Shays 

Chairman 

Subcommittee on National Security,

Emerging Threats and International Relations 

Committee on Government Reform 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Frank LoBiondo 

House of Representatives 

The Air Force has developed a 20-year force structure plan that will 

require billions of dollars to recapitalize, modernize, and upgrade its 

inventory of aging aircraft. This force structure plan could potentially 

result in a significant reduction in the number of existing fighter aircraft—

replaced by fewer aircraft that are intended to be more capable and 

reliable—along with changes in the roles and missions of the Air National 

Guard, and further integration of the active, Guard, and reserve flying

units. The Air Force intends to transform its force to meet new and 

emerging threats—while supporting military operations at home and 

abroad and preparing to implement changes resulting from the 2005 base 

closure and realignment process. Recognizing that future capabilities to 

meet these challenges will require a combination of new, more capable 

aircraft that will cost billions of dollars, including $63.8 billion currently 

estimated for the F/A-22, the Air Force has embarked on developing what 

it calls the “Future Total Force” which is intended to integrate the active

and reserve components to a greater degree by using new organizational 

constructs and realigning missions. 

The Air Force has developed a 20-year force structure plan that will 

require billions of dollars to recapitalize, modernize, and upgrade its 

inventory of aging aircraft. This force structure plan could potentially 

result in a significant reduction in the number of existing fighter aircraft—

replaced by fewer aircraft that are intended to be more capable and 

reliable—along with changes in the roles and missions of the Air National 

Guard, and further integration of the active, Guard, and reserve flying

units. The Air Force intends to transform its force to meet new and 

emerging threats—while supporting military operations at home and 

abroad and preparing to implement changes resulting from the 2005 base 

closure and realignment process. Recognizing that future capabilities to 

meet these challenges will require a combination of new, more capable 

aircraft that will cost billions of dollars, including $63.8 billion currently 

estimated for the F/A-22, the Air Force has embarked on developing what 

it calls the “Future Total Force” which is intended to integrate the active

and reserve components to a greater degree by using new organizational 

constructs and realigning missions. 

As the Air Force begins to adjust and reduce its current force structure, 

the Air National Guard has also recognized that it must be proactive in

helping the Air Force identify new roles and missions best suited for the 

Guard so that it can remain a ready, reliable, and relevant component of 

the Future Total Force. To prepare for the future, the Air National Guard 

embarked on its own transformational effort—called the Vanguard 

As the Air Force begins to adjust and reduce its current force structure, 

the Air National Guard has also recognized that it must be proactive in

helping the Air Force identify new roles and missions best suited for the 

Guard so that it can remain a ready, reliable, and relevant component of 

the Future Total Force. To prepare for the future, the Air National Guard 

embarked on its own transformational effort—called the Vanguard 

Page 1 GAO-06-232 Defense Management
Engagement Strategy—to ensure that it would continue its role as a key 

participant in the Air Force’s expeditionary force and defense of the 

homeland, as well as in emerging mission areas. 

Because of the significant impact that the Air Force’s transformational 

efforts could have on the future force structure and basing of the Air 

National Guard, you asked us to examine the processes through which the 

Air Force developed its force structure plans, its progress in identifying 

new missions and organizational constructs for the Air Guard, and the 

level of stakeholder involvement in the force structure development 

process. Additionally, you expressed interest in the Air National Guard’s 

Vanguard transformation initiative. This report discusses (1) the processes 

and events that surrounded the Air Force’s development of its 20-year 

force structure plan, including the involvement of key stakeholders and 

the development of the Guard’s Vanguard initiative, and (2) the extent to

which the Air Force is using key results-oriented management tools to 

guide its effort to identify new missions for the Air National Guard and 

integrate active and Guard forces as part of its Future Total Force effort. 

To describe the processes and events surrounding the Air Force’s 

development of its 20-year force structure plan, we reviewed Air Force 

guidance, directives, and instructions and interviewed current and former 

officials of the Air Force Strategic Planning Directorate who led the force

structure development. We also interviewed key stakeholders involved in

this process including the Air National Guard Director and officials of two 

major Air Force commands. We discussed the process with 10 adjutants 

general1

 to obtain their perspectives on the process. To guide our selection 

of adjutants general to include in our review, we developed criteria—

including a mix of large and small states, a geographic mix of states, and 

states with differing views on the Air Force’s force structure plans and the 

Guard’s Vanguard program—and evaluated each state and territory against 

these criteria. We also interviewed Air Force Studies and Analyses Agency

officials to discuss modeling and analyses they performed to evaluate

various force structure options. We reviewed the Air National Guard’s 

Vanguard Engagement Strategy and held discussions with senior Air 

Guard officials, including several adjutants general, to determine how the 

strategy was related to the Air Force’s force structure development 

process. We did not evaluate the Air Force’s base closure and realignment

 1

 We interviewed the adjutants general of 10 states—Colorado, Connecticut, Maryland, 

Nebraska, New York, North Dakota, Texas, Utah, Vermont, and Virginia. 

Page 2 GAO-06-232 Defense Management
assessment and recommendations process as part of this report, but did 

separately report on the overall Department of Defense (DOD) base 

closure and realignment process in July 2005.2

 To assess the extent to 

which the Air Force is using key management tools in developing new 

missions for the Air National Guard and integrating the active and reserve

component forces, we reviewed key documents and our prior work on the 

management tools consistently found in successful organizations. We also

discussed these tools with senior directorate officials to obtain their 

perspectives and discussed their efforts to develop a strategic plan. We did

not evaluate the process the Air Force is using to identify and validate new 

missions for the Guard. Although much of the information on the force 

structure development process was testimonial from participants in the 

process, we assessed this information by comparing it to supporting 

documentation, when available, and corroborated it through additional 

interviews to determine consistency and reasonableness. On the basis of 

these efforts, we believe the information we obtained is sufficiently 

reliable for the purposes of this report. Additional information on our 

scope and methodology appears in appendix I. 

We conducted our review from September 2004 through November 2005 in

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

The Air Force used an iterative process to develop its 20-year force 

structure plan with periodic review and oversight by senior-level DOD and 

Air Force officials, and a complex process of modeling and analysis; 

however, stakeholders have different views on the transparency of the

process and the extent to which the Air Force sought and addressed input 

from process participants. Moreover, the adjutants general were not 

directly involved because the Air Force relied on the Air National Guard to

represent the states’ perspectives. The force structure plan developed by 

the Air Force included a reduction in the legacy fighter fleet—which 

resides largely within the Air National Guard—and the acquisition of new 

aircraft such as the F/A-22 and the Joint Strike Fighter. In late 2004, 

following completion of the Air Force’s process to develop the 20-year 

force structure plan, a departmentwide shift in funding priorities by the 

Secretary of Defense reduced the number of F/A-22 aircraft to be acquired. 

This decision resulted in changes to the Air Force’s 20-year force structure 

Results in Brief 

 2

 GAO, Military Bases: Analysis of DOD’s 2005 Selection Process and Recommendations 

for Base Closures and Realignments, GAO-05-785 (Washington, D.C.: July 1, 2005). 

Page 3 GAO-06-232 Defense Management
plan as the Air Force delayed retirement plans for some of its F-16 aircraft 

to accommodate F/A-22 reductions. This revised force structure plan was 

provided to the Air Force’s base closure team and was used to develop

base realignment and closure recommendations. Significant modifications 

to those recommendations were subsequently made by the congressionally 

chartered Base Closure and Realignment Commission, which issued its 

own recommendations to the President on September 8, 2005. However, 

the Quadrennial Defense Review, expected to be completed in February 

2006, may require further changes to the Air Force’s force structure plan. 

Perspectives on how well the Air Force’s force structure development 

process worked vary depending on the role and level of involvement of 

each organization. For example, Air Force officials viewed the process as

participatory and noted that the Air National Guard Bureau and the Air 

Force’s major commands had direct representation on the force structure 

development team. In contrast, Air National Guard officials and officials 

from one major Air Force command expressed concerns about their 

ability to influence decisions and 7 of the 10 adjutants general that we 

contacted believed that they did not have sufficient opportunity to 

influence the force structure decisions. Because documentation of the 

proceedings and issues discussed at key meetings attended by the Air 

Force, the Air National Guard, and the adjutants general was limited, we 

were unable to evaluate the extent to which stakeholders were able to

influence the force structure development process. To prepare Air 

National Guard units in each state to respond to anticipated force 

structure reductions, the Air National Guard began a separate effort, 

referred to as the Vanguard Engagement Strategy, to begin transforming 

the Guard and solicit input from the states on future roles and missions for 

the Guard to keep it relevant and ready to support future Air Force 

requirements. The Vanguard Strategy remains the framework through 

which the Air Guard develops and refines its input to the Air Force’s 

transformation efforts. 

The Air Force has taken steps to identify some new missions for the Air 

National Guard and test new ways of integrating active, Guard, and 

reserve units as part of its Future Total Force transformational effort, but

lacks a fully developed management framework to guide the process and

evaluate the results. The Air Force has taken two important steps in 

implementing its Future Total Force concept. First, in December 2004, the 

Chief of Staff of the Air Force announced test initiatives in six states to 

test new Air Guard missions and new ways to integrate the active and

reserve components. The Air Force has continued to evaluate and 

prioritize additional initiatives over the past several months. Second, in

March 2005, the Air Force established the Future Total Force Directorate,

Page 4 GAO-06-232 Defense Management
with a 2-year term, to guide the implementation of the Future Total Force 

concept. Driven by recent force structure and base closure decisions, this 

new directorate has focused largely on identifying new missions and 

implementing new constructs to integrate active, Guard, and reserve 

forces. Our prior work and the work of others show that organizations 

undertaking complex transformations can increase their likelihood of 

success by adopting a results-oriented management framework, which 

includes key management practices and a strategy that includes resultsoriented management tools, to guide implementation efforts and achieve 

desired program outcomes.3

 Although the Future Total Force Directorate 

has drafted a strategic plan that according to directorate officials would 

address many of these results-oriented management tools, the plan is not 

yet approved. Consequently, until the strategic plan is approved, there is 

no requirement that those involved in implementing the Future Total 

Force concept—including the Air Staff, Air Combat Command, and Air 

National Guard—use the plan to guide their efforts. The directorate has 

also established some steps to evaluate the six test initiatives, but these 

steps do not provide a comprehensive, methodical, and readily evident 

approach to evaluate the success of the new organizational constructs 

being tested so that the Air Force can determine the most cost effective 

ways to organize active and reserve forces to carry out the National 

Defense Strategy. By moving ahead with its efforts to implement the 

Future Total Force concept without a comprehensive results-oriented 

management framework, the Air Force may not be able to efficiently and

effectively achieve the transformation to the Future Total Force, adjust to

the many uncertainties surrounding transformation, or fully evaluate its 

test initiatives and overall program results. 

We are recommending that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary

of the Air Force to strengthen the recently established Future Total Force 

Directorate’s management efforts by completing a strategic plan that fully

reflects results-oriented management principles, setting specific time 

frames to accelerate the plan’s approval, and developing an evaluation 

plan for assessing the success or failure of its initiatives designed to test 

new organizational constructs. In written comments on a draft of this 

report, DOD agreed with our recommendations and provided information 

on the actions it plans to take to address them. The Air Force completed

 3

 GAO, Military Transformation: Clear Leadership, Accountability, and Management

Tools Are Needed to Enhance DOD’s Efforts to Transform Military Capabilities, 

GAO-05-70 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 17, 2004).

Page 5 GAO-06-232 Defense Management
and approved the Future Total Force strategic plan and stated that it is 

aggressively working toward its goal of having a clear and comprehensive 

plan for evaluating Future Total Force alternatives. 

The Air Force’s aircraft fleet is currently the oldest in the service’s history. 

The average age of the service’s aircraft is 23 years, and many tankers and 

bombers are more than 40 years old. The service has stated that the 

biggest challenge it faces over the next two decades is replacing its aging

aircraft. Accordingly, the Air Force plans to retire some of its older 

fighters such as the F-16 and has begun purchasing new aircraft such as 

the F/A-22, currently being fielded, and the F-35 Joint Strike fighter, which 

is currently under development. At the same time it modernizes and 

recapitalizes, the Air Force anticipates facing changing and harder to 

define adversaries; an increased demand for support to combat 

operations; and affordability challenges. 

Background 

The Air National Guard is a reserve component of the United States Air 

Force. It performs both federal and state missions, consists of about 

107,000 members, and makes up about 20 percent of the total Air Force.

The Air National Guard plays a key role in the Air Force’s Aerospace 

Expeditionary Force,4

 including providing 100 percent of the air 

sovereignty missions, 49 percent of theater airlifts, and 45 percent of 

tanker missions. Since September 11, 2001, Air National Guard pilots and 

aircraft have played a key role in worldwide Air Force operations, 

participating in Operation Noble Eagle defending the skies over the United

States; Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan; and Operation Iraqi 

Freedom in Iraq. In their state role, Air National Guard units report to the 

governor of their respective state, territory (Puerto Rico, Guam, Virgin 

Islands), or the commanding general of the District of Columbia National 

Guard and participate in emergency relief support during natural disasters 

such as floods, earthquakes, and forest fires; search and rescue operations; 

support to civil authorities; maintenance of vital public services; and 

counter-drug operations. Most recently, the Air National Guard was 

involved in the relief effort following Hurricane Katrina in September 2005. 

 4

 The Air Force Aerospace Expeditionary Force (also referred to as the Air and Space

Expeditionary Force) combines the active, reserve, and Guard into one component that

trains, deploys, and operates together. This force is comprised of fighters, bombers, 

tankers, and tactical air lifters. 

Page 6 GAO-06-232 Defense Management
The Air Force, its major commands, and the National Guard Bureau each

have a role in the management of the Air National Guard. The Air Force 

and its major commands play a key role in determining the Air National 

Guard’s force structure, approving new missions, and equipping the Guard 

to perform its missions. In addition, the Air National Guard largely relies 

on the Air Force to provide its funding through the Planning,

Programming, Budgeting, and Execution process. The National Guard 

Bureau administers the federal functions of the Air National Guard and 

works with the Air Force Air Staff to develop and coordinate programs 

that directly affect the Guard. The Bureau also formulates and administers 

programs for training, development, and maintenance of Air National 

Guard units. In accordance with Title 10 of the United States Code, the 

National Guard Bureau also acts as the channel of communication 

between the Air Force and the 54 states and territories where National 

Guard units are located.5

Additionally, National Guard units in each of the 54 states and territories 

are commanded by an Air Force or Army officer known as the adjutant

general. The adjutants general are, for the most part, state or territory 

employees and work for the governor. The adjutants general are 

responsible for overseeing Guard units’ federal and state missions and may 

also serve as state emergency management directors. The adjutants 

general are advocates for the views of their state and work closely with 

the National Guard Bureau, Air Force, and Army to ensure the National 

Guard is ready to respond to the nation’s needs both overseas and 

domestically. 

From November 2002 through September 2004, the Air Force developed a 

20-year force structure plan through a multistep, iterative process that 

included periodic review and oversight by senior-level Air Force, Air 

National Guard, and DOD officials and a complex process of modeling and 

analysis; however, stakeholders have different views on the transparency

of the process and the extent to which the Air Force sought and addressed 

input from process participants. Moreover, the adjutants general were not 

directly involved because the Air Force relied on the Air National Guard to

represent the states’ perspectives. A wide range of perspectives exist on 

how well this process worked, depending on the role and level of 

involvement of each organization. Limited documentation exists to show 

Stakeholder Views on 

Extent of Input and 

Transparency of 

Force Structure 

Development Process 

Differ 

 5

 10 U.S.C. §10501. 

Page 7 GAO-06-232 Defense Management
the various organizations represented at planning meetings and briefings,

but the documentation does not indicate what issues were discussed or 

whether input was sought from all participants. Therefore, we were unable 

to evaluate the extent to which stakeholder interests influenced the Air 

Force’s proposed force structure, which was referred to as the Beacon

Force. To prepare the Air National Guard units in each state for the 

anticipated force structure reductions, the Director, Air National Guard, 

began a separate effort known as the Vanguard Engagement Strategy to

solicit input from the states on future roles and missions for the Air 

National Guard to support future Air Force requirements within whatever 

force structure emerged from the force structure planning process. 

Although this effort also met with some resistance from participants, it 

continues to be the framework through which the Air National Guard 

provides input to the Air Force’s Future Total Force initiative.

Force Structure Planning 

Process Included Iterative 

Analysis and Periodic 

Oversight 

The Air Force used a multistep, iterative process to develop its 20-year 

force structure plan—also referred to as the 2025 force structure plan. The 

Air Force began to develop its long-term plan in response to a provision in

the Base Closure and Realignment Act, as amended through 2003, which 

required the Secretary of Defense to submit to the Congress a 20-year 

force structure plan beginning with fiscal year 2005.6

 According to current 

and former Air Force officials, as the service began projecting its existing 

force structure plans over the 20-year period, it believed that the existing 

plan it had in place would be unaffordable in the longer term and took 

several steps to develop a more affordable plan that would still provide 

required capabilities. 

The Air Force’s Strategic Planning Directorate led this 2-year effort—from 

November 2002 through September 2004—to develop a more affordable 

long-term force structure plan with the intention of using the 2025 force 

structure plan as the basis for both base realignment and closure decisions 

 6

 Pub. L. No. 107-107, section 2912(a) (1) (A) required DOD to develop a 20-year force 

structure plan as the basis for its base closure and realignment analysis. The plan was to

begin with fiscal year 2005 and be based on an assessment of the (1) probable threats to

U.S. national security during the 20-year period, (2) the probable end-strength levels and

major force units needed to meet the threats, and (3) the anticipated level of funding 

available for national defense.

Page 8 GAO-06-232 Defense Management
and the 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review.

7

 Table 1 provides a chronology 

of the key events surrounding the force structure development and 

summarizes stakeholder participation in the process. 

Table 1: Key Events and Stakeholder Participation in The Force Structure Development Process

Time frame Key events 

Stakeholders participating and

providing input 

November 2002– 

April 2003 

• Air Force Strategic Planning Directorate began planning for 

development of affordable 20-year force structure plan to meet Base 

Closure and Realignment Act requirements 

• Initial meetings held to solicit stakeholder input on current and future 

force structure plans 

• CORONAa and Chief of Staff briefed on the current plan/broad options 

• Chief of Staff of the Air Force 

• Air Force four-star generals 

• Director, Air National Guard 

• Chief, Air Force Reserve 

• Major commands 

• Air Force Studies and Analyses 

Agency 

May 2003 • Stakeholders asked to provide current, future unconstrained, and future 

constrained force structure plans 

• Strategic Planning Directorate determined that an integrated long-term 

force structure plan does not exist and, projected over the long-term, 

current major command plans are unaffordable 

• Chief of Staff briefed on results 

• Chief of Staff of the Air Force 

• Major commands 

• Air Force Studies and Analyses 

Agency 

• Air National Guard 

• Air Force Reserve Command 

June 2003 • CORONA members briefed on current, constrained, and “strawman” 

force structure based on initial plans from major commands 

• CORONA members approved follow-on briefings to major commands 

• Air Force four-star generals 

• Director, Air National Guard 

• Chief, Air Force Reserve 

July – August 2003 • “Strawman” force structure briefed to major commands, Air National 

Guard, and Air Force Reserve Command to inform and obtain input 

• Developed consolidated long-term force structure plan to balance 

competing priorities of all major commands 

• Major commands 

• Air Force Studies and Analyses 

Agency 

• Air National Guard 

• Air Force Reserve Command 

September 2003 • Chief of Staff and Air Force Secretary briefed on long-term force 

structure plan 

• Four-star generals and Air National Guard Director briefed on force 

structure plan; including specific reductions to legacy fleet and need to 

consolidate active and reserve components 

• Force structure plan submitted to Joint Staff as initial submission for 

base realignment and closure process 

• Secretary of the Air Force 

• Chief of Staff of the Air Force 

• Air Force four-star generals 

• Director, Air National Guard 

 7

 The congressionally mandated 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review, scheduled for 

publication in February 2006, is a DOD-wide, comprehensive review intended to provide a

basic strategy for addressing critical issues such as budget and acquisition priorities, 

emerging threats, force modernization, and the force structure required for the next 20

years. 

Page 9 GAO-06-232 Defense Management
Time frame Key events 

Stakeholders participating and

providing input 

November 2003 • CORONA members briefed on force structure plan; questions arose on 

“optimum” force structure option 

• Air Force four-star generals 

• Director, Air National Guard 

• Chief, Air Force Reserve 

January – February 

2004 

• Air Force “Tiger Team” formed to address CORONA concerns and 

validate long-term force structure plan; efforts focused on the combat 

air force (i.e., fighters, bombers) and verifying capabilities provided 

• Air Force Studies and Analyses Agency evaluated options to optimize 

combat force capabilities within anticipated funding levels 

• Periodic briefings provided to stakeholders including major commands 

and Air National Guard 

• Air Force “optimal” option became known as the Beacon Force 

• Detailed plans developed for fiscal year 2006 budget submission based 

on Beacon Force 

• Air Staff 

• Air Force Studies and Analyses 

Agency 

• Major commands 

• Air National Guard 

May 2004 • Air Force Secretary and Chief of Staff and then CORONA members 

briefed on the Beacon Force 

• Beacon Force approved as Air Force 2025 force structure plan 

• Secretary of the Air Force 

• Chief of Staff of the Air Force 

• Air Force four-star generals 

• Director, Air National Guard 

• Chief, Air Force Reserve 

June 2004 • 2025 force structure plan briefed to Deputy Secretary of Defense • Deputy Secretary of Defense

• Secretary of the Air Force 

• Chief of Staff of the Air Force 

• Air Staff 

July 2004 • 2025 force structure plan briefed to adjutants general conference • Secretary of the Air Force 

• Chief of Staff of the Air Force 

• Air Staff 

• Director, Air National Guard 

• Adjutants general 

September 2004 • The Secretary of Defense and senior leadership briefed on the 2025 

force structure plan 

• Secretary of Defense approved the Air Force’s proposed 2025 force 

structure plan 

• Secretary of Defense 

• Senior Leadership Review 

Group 

• Air Force Senior Leadership 

December 2004 • Office of the Secretary of Defense issued Program Budget Decision 

753 which reduced funding for the F/A-22 and ended procurement in 

2008 rather than 2011 

• Air Force adjusted its approved force structure plan to slow retirement 

of F-16 aircraft to compensate for F/A-22 reduction 

• Secretary of Defense 

• Air Staff 

March 2005 • In accordance with the Base Closure and Realignment Act, the 

Secretary of Defense submitted the Air Force’s revised 20-year force 

structure plan to the Congress as part of DOD’s submission 

• Secretary of Defense 

Source: GAO’s analysis of Air Force information. 

a

CORONA is a term the Air Force uses for meetings of its four-star generals and senior leadership 

held three times a year to discuss servicewide issues. 

Page 10 GAO-06-232 Defense Management
As shown in table 1, between November 2002 and April 2003, the 

directorate held a series of meetings with subject matter experts from

across the service, including representatives from the Air Staff, major 

commands (e.g., Air Combat Command), Air National Guard, Air Force 

Reserve Command, and Air Force Studies and Analyses Agency, to identify 

the existing long-term force structure plan and solicit input on the future 

plan. The directorate determined that while episodic attempts had been 

made at establishing a long-term plan in the past, an integrated, 

comprehensive, and fiscally realistic plan simply did not exist.

8

As the directorate developed the 2025 force structure plan, the major 

commands, the Air National Guard, and Air Force Reserve Command were 

asked to provide input to the process, according to Air Force officials. The 

directorate provided periodic briefings to the senior leadership of the Air 

Force, the major commands, the Air National Guard, and the Air Force 

Reserve Command throughout the force structure development process. 

According to the former Deputy Director of the Strategic Planning 

Directorate who led the development effort, the directorate adjusted the

force structure plan several times based on input from stakeholders and 

guidance from senior Air Force leadership, before reaching agreement on 

a consolidated long-term force structure plan that balanced the competing

priorities of all of the major commands across the Air Force. He further 

noted that when the Air Force four-star generals and the Air National 

Guard Director were briefed on and approved the consolidated force 

structure plan in September 2003, the participants recognized that the

smaller force structure would require the Air Force to integrate its active

and reserve components to a greater extent. This consolidated 20-year 

force structure plan served as the Air Force’s initial submission to the 

Joint Staff as part of the base realignment and closure process in late 

September 2003. 

In November 2003, during a subsequent briefing to senior Air Force 

leaders—in a meeting known as CORONA—questions arose about 

whether the force structure plan submitted to the Joint Staff in September 

was the “best possible” force structure option.9

 The senior leadership was 

particularly concerned about the adequacy of the combat air force 

 8

 Previous Air Force efforts had focused primarily on the 6-year defense plan used in the 

Defense Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution process. 

9

 CORONA is a term the Air Force uses for meetings of its four-star generals and senior

leadership held three times a year to discuss servicewide issues.

Page 11 GAO-06-232 Defense Management
included in the proposed plan. To address these questions, the Air Staff 

formed a “Tiger Team” to evaluate the proposed force structure plan. The 

team worked with the Air Force Studies and Analyses Agency10 to evaluate

the proposed force structure plan against other possible options. The Air 

Force Studies and Analyses Agency used modeling and analyses to 

evaluate the September 2003 submission to the Joint Staff against 17 other 

options to identify the option that would, in their words, “optimize” 

capabilities required to meet the National Defense Strategy11 within 

anticipated budget levels.12 According to senior Studies and Analyses 

Agency officials, at the direction of the Tiger Team, their analysis focused 

on the combat air force—in other words, fighter and bomber aircraft—and 

on determining the number of those aircraft required to provide desired 

capabilities.13 Studies and Analyses Agency officials also stated that the 

analysis did not consider whether the aircraft would be flown by the active 

or reserve component force. Further, they stated that the methodology 

included first setting aside the number of aircraft required to meet the U.S.

Northern Command’s existing homeland defense requirements14 and then 

distributing the remainder of the aircraft to meet the other requirements of 

the National Defense Strategy. Upon completion of the analysis, the 

Studies and Analyses Agency determined that the force structure plan 

submitted to the Joint Staff in September 2003 was, in fact, the best option. 

 10 The Air Force Studies and Analyses Agency reports directly to the Vice Chief of Staff of

the Air Force and provides analysis to the Chief of Staff and Secretary that is intended to

enhance the quality of defense reviews, force structure and resource allocation processes,

and air expeditionary force actions. 

11 As set out in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review, the National Defense Strategy 

provides strategic-level guidance for developing force structure. The strategy calls for 

defending the United States while serving as a deterrent in four critical regions and swiftly 

defeating adversaries in two overlapping major conflicts with the capability of winning 

decisively in one of them for an enduring result. At the same time, the capability should 

exist to conduct a limited number of smaller-scale contingency operations. This is 

commonly referred to as “1-4-2-1.” 

12 The Air Force Studies and Analyses Agency used its Combat Force Assessment Model to 

compare the Strategic Planning Directorate’s 20-year force structure plan to 17 alternative 

options to measure the effect that increases or decreases in the availability of particular 

weapon systems would have on both effectiveness and cost.

13 According to Studies and Analyses Agency officials, for this analysis the mobility air 

force—those aircraft that provide airlift and refueling capability—was only considered in 

terms of how the refueling capabilities might affect the capabilities of the combat air force. 

14 The U.S. Northern Command is responsible for executing homeland defense activities

and supporting civilian authorities when requested. 

Page 12 GAO-06-232 Defense Management
The Air Staff formally briefed the plan—now known as the Beacon 

Force—to the adjutants general for the first time in July 2004. Prior to that 

time, the Air Force had primarily relied on the Air National Guard to 

represent the adjutants generals’ views in the force structure development 

process.15 The plan included the acquisition of new aircraft, such as the 

F/A-22 and the Joint Strike Fighter, and a steep reduction in the F-16 fleet, 

which comprises a significant portion of the Air National Guard fighter 

fleet, and it was expected that some Air National Guard units would lose 

their aircraft and associated flying missions as a result. Both Air National 

Guard and Air Combat Command officials told us that they had concerns 

about the Beacon Force plan and its effect on their ability to perform the 

homeland defense mission while meeting Air Expeditionary Force 

commitments. To address their respective concerns, Air Combat 

Command and Air National Guard officials worked together to develop an

alternative proposal that would allow the Air Force to retain a larger 

portion of the F-16 fleet. Representatives of the Air Guard and Air Combat 

Command presented their proposal to the Air Staff in October 2004, but 

according to Command and Guard officials, they were told the proposal 

could not be considered because the Beacon Force plan had already been

approved by the Secretary of the Air Force and the Secretary of Defense. 

In December 2004, 3 months after approving the Air Force’s Beacon Force 

plan, the Office of the Secretary of Defense issued Program Budget 

Decision 753, which reduced the Air Force budget and shifted funds to the 

Army.16 This budget reduction drove the Air Force to alter its 20-year force 

structure plan. The budget decision reduced funding for the F/A-22 by 

$10.5 billion and cut 96 aircraft from the planned procurement quantity,

leaving a total of 178 aircraft to be procured.17 To adjust to this reduction 

in the number of F/A-22s to be purchased, the Air Force adopted an 

alternative force structure plan—1 of the 17 previously evaluated by the 

 15 Air Force officials cited the Title 10 authority (10 U.S.C. §10501) of the National Guard 

Bureau to act as the channel of communication between the Department of the Air Force

and the states. 

16 Program Budget Decision 753 was DOD’s reaction to an Office of Management and 

Budget mandate to cut $55 billion from its Fiscal Years 2006–2011 Future Years Defense 

Program and, at the same time, add $25 billion to the fiscal years 2007–2011 Army budget to

cover the cost of the ongoing reorganization known as Army Modularity. The net result was

a reduction of $30 billion in DOD’s budget over a 6-year period. 

17 Program Budget Decision 753 nominally reduced the procurement quantity to 179

aircraft. Subsequently, the Air Force transferred one production aircraft to be dedicated to

testing, thus reducing the procurement quantity to 178. 

Page 13 GAO-06-232 Defense Management
Air Force Studies and Analyses Agency—that slowed the retirement of its 

F-16 fleet. According to Air National Guard and Air Combat Command 

officials, the revised force structure plan alleviated some of their concerns

because it slowed the reduction of the F-16 fleet and allowed the Guard to

retain a greater number of flying units in the near term. 

The revised 20-year force structure plan was submitted to the Congress in 

March 2005. The plan was also used by the Air Force’s base closure and 

realignment team to reorganize the fleet by determining where the planned 

force structure (i.e., aircraft) would be located and who would operate it 

(i.e., the active or reserve components). We did not evaluate the Air 

Force’s base closure and realignment assessment and recommendations 

process for this report. However, we separately reported on the overall

DOD base closure and realignment process in July 2005.18 The 

congressionally chartered Base Closure and Realignment Commission 

made significant modifications to DOD’s recommendations—particularly 

with respect to Air National Guard units—in its recommendations to the 

President on September 8, 2005. 

The force structure plan may continue to evolve as a result of the 2005 

Quadrennial Defense Review. This review is an ongoing, congressionally 

mandated study conducted by DOD that is expected to result in new 

guidance on strategy, forces, and risks derived from extensive 

deliberations and consultation. The purpose of the Quadrennial Defense 

Review is to provide a basic strategy for addressing critical issues such as 

budget and acquisition priorities, emerging threats, types and levels of 

force structure, and capabilities, for the next 20 years. Results of the 

review are scheduled for publication in February 2006 and may result in 

changes to the Air Force’s 20-year force structure plan. 

Stakeholder Participation 

and Perceptions of the 

Force Structure 

Development Process Vary 

As shown in table 1, many key stakeholders participated directly in the 

force structure development process, including representatives of the Air 

Staff, the major commands, the Air Force Studies and Analyses Agency, 

the Air National Guard, and the Air Force Reserve Command. The force

structure development team also provided numerous briefings throughout 

the process to audiences that included the Secretary and Deputy Secretary 

of Defense, senior Air Force leadership, major commands, Air Force 

 18 GAO, Military Bases: Analysis of DOD’s 2005 Selection Process and Recommendations 

for Base Closures and Realignments, GAO-05-785 (Washington, D.C.: July 1, 2005). 

Page 14 GAO-06-232 Defense Management
Reserve Command, Air National Guard, and state adjutants general. 

Although periodically briefed by the Air Staff and the Guard Bureau on the 

Air Force’s overall plans to adjust the force structure, the adjutants 

general did not participate directly in the process. 

Through our discussions with Air Force Air staff, major command, and Air 

National Guard officials, as well as 10 adjutants general, we found that key 

stakeholders included in and affected by the force structure development 

process have varying, and sometimes disparate, perceptions of the process 

depending on their role and involvement. We requested minutes or other 

documentation of key meetings, but Air Force and Air National Guard 

officials told us that this documentation did not exist. Therefore, we were 

unable to assess the exact nature and extent of stakeholder involvement 

or evaluate the perceptions and views of key participants. The following 

summaries describe the perspectives provided by the Air Staff, Major 

Commands, Air National Guard, and adjutants general officials we 

interviewed. 

Air Staff. The Air Staff officials we spoke with told us that they used a 

process based on the Air Force Corporate Structure, which formalizes 

review and decision making by bringing together representatives from 

across the Air Force to discuss issues and develop recommended courses 

of action. Air Staff officials noted that key stakeholders, including the Air 

National Guard and major commands, were invited to attend and were 

present at many of the meetings and briefings over the 2-year period 

during which the force structure was being developed. During these 

meetings, it was the Air Staff’s expectation that Air National Guard 

participants would (1) raise concerns about the force structure plan and 

(2) represent the views of the adjutants general in the discussions in 

accordance with Title 10 of the United States Code, which establishes the 

National Guard Bureau as the channel of communication between the Air 

Force and the states. According to the Director, Future Total Force 

Directorate, these meetings provided the opportunity for all involved to

raise concerns and have them openly discussed. However, in the opinion 

of this official, this opportunity is dependent upon the representative to 

make and defend the position of his or her organization. In the absence of 

objections, the group as a whole assumes that all are in agreement. With 

respect to the adjutants general, the former Deputy Director of the Air 

Force Strategic Planning Directorate told us that in addition to the formal 

briefings, the directorate staff provided several briefings to individual 

adjutants general throughout the force structure development process. 

However, available documentation we obtained did not indicate how many 

briefings were given or to whom. Directorate staff viewed these meetings 

Page 15 GAO-06-232 Defense Management
as opportunities for the adjutants general to share their views, provide 

direct input, and influence the force structure development process. 

Major Commands. Air Combat Command and Air Mobility Command 

officials told us that they were consulted about force structure options and 

that they had several opportunities to provide input into the process. 

However, Air Combat Command officials noted that while they were 

included in the process through various briefings and meetings, they often 

did not know how their input was used. Further, Air Combat Command 

officials noted that when they submitted an alternative proposal to the 

force structure plan in October 2004, prepared in conjunction with the Air 

National Guard, it was met with resistance from Air Staff officials because 

the Air Force’s force structure plan had already been approved by the 

Secretary of the Air Force and the Secretary of Defense. 

Air National Guard. Air National Guard officials told us that while they 

participated in numerous meetings and briefings held by the Air Staff, they 

did not believe that their views, opinions, and input were being sought. Air 

Guard officials often viewed these meetings as informational in nature 

because the Air Staff described overall anticipated force structure cuts 

without details on where the cuts would be made and how the reductions

would affect the Air National Guard. The Air National Guard officials 

whom we talked with noted that the Guard representatives were 

frequently outranked at these meetings and, as a result, did not feel that

the environment was conducive to raising their concerns and consequently 

remained silent. Several Guard officials told us that on the occasions when 

they raised concerns or objections, their input was met with negative 

reactions from the Air Staff and on at least one occasion they were told 

that the decision had already been approved by the Air Force senior 

leadership and their input was too late. Overall, as previously discussed, 

the Air National Guard believed that the Beacon Force plan would reduce 

its F-16 fleet too quickly and that the Guard would absorb a 

disproportionately high portion of the cuts. DOD’s December 2004 budget

decision that limited the F-A/22 acquisition and slowed the retirement of 

the F-16 fleet resolved these concerns to some extent. 

Adjutants general. For the most part, the adjutants general we 

interviewed (7 of 10) were in agreement in their belief that they did not 

have sufficient opportunity to provide input or to influence the force 

structure development process. Three of the 10 adjutants general that we 

interviewed told us that they viewed the briefings and information they 

received on the force structure development process to be “big picture” 

options under consideration, with few specific details. Half of the 

Page 16 GAO-06-232 Defense Management
adjutants general noted that despite their efforts to engage the Air Force in 

discussion about specific force structure issues, in their opinion, the Air 

Staff was not receptive to their input. Six of the adjutants general we met 

with specifically noted their belief that the Air Force did not adequately 

consider the Guard’s responsibility for homeland security or the Guard’s 

requirements to participate in other state missions in making its force 

structure decisions. For example, three adjutants general expressed 

concern that if some or all of the aircraft in their states were retired, they

would also lose associated personnel whose state role is to perform 

security or firefighting missions. 

Air National Guard 

Vanguard Strategy Initiated 

to Identify Future Roles 

and Missions 

During the same period that the force structure plan was being developed,

the Air National Guard developed its Vanguard Engagement Strategy to

establish a forum to ensure that the Guard remains ready, reliable, and 

relevant as the Air Force adjusts its current force structure, by providing 

input into the Air Force’s decision-making processes. The strategy 

encouraged the state adjutants general and units to begin identifying new

roles and missions that they could support in the future. Although under 

way at the same time as the force structure was being developed, the 

Guard’s Vanguard strategy was not formally linked to the force structure 

development process, according to Air Force and Air National Guard 

officials. 

As noted previously, the Air National Guard used its Vanguard strategy as 

a means of involving the adjutants general in thinking about and planning 

for the future. Over the period from December 2002 through late 2004, Air 

National Guard officials engaged in a variety of efforts to encourage state 

Guard officials to begin thinking about the future of their units and 

identifying possible new missions that would be appropriate for their 

state. Outreach efforts by senior Air National Guard leaders included 

presentations to the Adjutants General Association of the United States 

and senior leadership conferences. During these meetings, Air National 

Guard and on some occasions senior Air Force leaders discussed the 

overall force structure planning process and expected results.

Additionally, one senior Air National Guard official told us that he made 

personal contact with the adjutants general of most of the 54 states and 

territories to discuss potential force structure reductions and the 

Vanguard initiative. During these individual meetings, the official 

discussed the overall force structure plan, specific changes that could 

affect each state, and possible ideas for new missions. 

Page 17 GAO-06-232 Defense Management
According to Air National Guard officials, the Vanguard Strategy was met 

with a variety of reactions from the adjutants general. Many state 

organizations responded to the Air National Guard’s request for new 

mission proposals by offering ideas and proposals of their own. As of 

November 2005, 46 of the 54 states and territories—about 85 percent—had 

submitted proposals through the Vanguard process. Additionally, 

according to Air National Guard officials, some states submitted proposals 

for new missions directly to the Air Staff, rather than through the 

Vanguard process, and some states organizations chose not to submit any 

new mission ideas for their state at all. 

According to senior Air National Guard officials, the Vanguard

Engagement Strategy remains the framework through which the Air 

National Guard develops and refines its input to the Air Force’s Future 

Total Force transformation effort. In addition, Future Total Force 

Directorate officials told us that all proposals from state organizations 

must now be funneled through the Air National Guard process and that 

they no longer accept proposals directly from state organizations. 

The Air Force is proceeding with implementation of its Future Total Force

transformation concept—which is centered on new ways of using and 

organizing the active, Guard, and reserve components—without a fully 

developed management framework to guide its efforts and facilitate 

evaluation of the new organizational constructs currently being tested. As

the Air Force developed its 20-year force structure plan and prepared its 

base closure and realignment recommendations, it concluded that new 

ways of operating would be required in the future and embarked on 

implementing its Future Total Force concept. Specifically, the Air Force 

announced initiatives to begin testing some new organizational constructs

for integrating active, reserve, and Guard units, and also established a 

temporary office to initiate and manage implementation of these efforts. 

Implementing organizational changes, such as those the Air Force is 

attempting, are difficult and require concentrated effort and a management 

framework that sets forth a clear strategy that includes results-oriented 

management tools—such as long-term goals, strategies and performance 

measures—to guide implementation efforts and evaluate new concepts. 

However, the directorate is still in the process of developing a strategic 

plan to guide the Future Total Force transformation effort, and specific 

time frames have not been set for approving the plan. Without a 

management framework that includes a strategic plan and a 

comprehensive plan for evaluating its test initiatives, the Air Force’s ability 

to implement the Future Total Force effort efficiently and effectively may 

Air Force Proceeding 

with Future Total 

Force Implementation 

without a Fully 

Developed 

Management 

Framework 

Page 18 GAO-06-232 Defense Management
be limited, and the overall progress and success of its efforts will be more 

difficult for DOD managers and the Congress to assess. 

Air Force Has Taken Initial 

Steps to Implement Future 

Total Force Concept 

The Air Force is facing significant challenges that could ultimately affect 

its combat capabilities: an aging fleet of aircraft that needs to be replaced 

or modernized, adversaries that are increasingly hard to define, and 

affordability challenges. These challenges combined with anticipated 

reductions in its force structure have driven the Air Force to embark on an

effort to transform its force to better integrate active and reserve forces. 

The resultant Future Total Force concept, if fully implemented, could have

a substantial impact on the way the Air Force and its reserve components 

operate and are organized. The Future Total Force concept consists of two 

components: (1) creating a long-term plan for a smaller, more capable and 

affordable force structure that is capable of addressing future threats and 

(2) using new organizational arrangements that allow the Air Force to 

better use the personnel in all its components by integrating its active and 

reserve component forces into mixed units. For example, the Air Force 

asserts that its new aircraft, such as the F/A-22 fighter, will be more 

capable and more reliable than current aircraft, thus providing an 

opportunity to use a higher number of crews per aircraft to take advantage 

of the aircraft’s capabilities. The Air Force plans to increase the number of 

crew members available by combining active and reserve component 

forces into co-located active, Guard, and reserve units that share aircraft. 

In addition, the service plans to meet increasing demand for certain new 

and emerging missions, such as operating unmanned aerial vehicles and 

analyzing intelligence, by assigning more of those missions to Guard and 

reserve units. According to Air Force officials, these efforts will also allow 

the Air Force to respond to changes brought about by base closure and 

realignment decisions, including 18 Air National Guard units that will lose 

their aircraft and flying missions. 

Over the last year, the Air Force has taken two important steps toward 

implementing the Future Total Force concept. First, in December 2004, the 

Secretary of the Air Force announced six test initiatives—four focused on

integrating active, Guard, and reserve units through the use of new 

organizational constructs and two that assigned emerging missions to 

Guard and reserve units. The initiatives included the first Air National 

Guard units that will operate Predator unmanned aerial vehicles, the first 

“community-based” unit where the Air Force will station active duty 

Page 19 GAO-06-232 Defense Management
personnel at a Guard unit, and the first active duty and Guard units to fly 

the F/A-22 fighter aircraft as integrated “associate” units.19 Table 2 lists the 

Future Total Force test initiatives and provides a brief description of each. 

Table 2: Future Total Force Initiatives Announced by the Air Force in December 2004 

Initiative Description 

Richmond to Langley Integration The Virginia Air National Guard’s Richmond-based 192nd Fighter Wing will join the 1st Fighter 

Wing at Langley Air Force Base in an associate unit to operate the F/A-22 fighter aircraft. 

Guard pilots and maintenance personnel have begun training for the new mission. 

Vermont Community Basing The Air Force will station active duty personnel at Vermont Air National Guard’s 158th

Fighter Wing in an associate unit to use experienced Guard personnel to train 

inexperienced active duty personnel and to test whether the personnel services normally

provided on an active Air Force base can be obtained from the local community. The first of 

12 active duty personnel reported for duty in Vermont in June 2005. 

Arizona and Texas Predator Missions Arizona and Texas Air National Guard members will operate Predator unmanned aerial 

vehicles in their respective states. Six crews were in training as of October 2005. Air Force 

analysis to determine appropriate unit size and location is under way. 

New York Distributed Ground Station Initially, the Air Force planned for the New York Air National Guard to process global 

intelligence information; however, subsequent increased demand for unmanned aerial 

vehicles caused the Air Force, after discussions with state officials, to change the proposed 

new mission from the Ground Station to a Predator mission. Plans for establishing the 

Predator unit are under development. 

Nevada Air Warfare Center The Air Force plans to integrate Nevada Air National Guard personnel into Predator 

operations and Air Force Reserve personnel into most missions at the Air Warfare Center. 

Hill Air Force Base, Utah Integration The Air Force Reserve’s 419th Fighter Wing will integrate with the active duty’s 388th Fighter 

Wing in an associate unit, both units currently operate F-16 fighters at Hill Air Force base. 

Agreements on how the units will operate were being coordinated as of October 2005. 

Source: GAO, developed from Air Force data.

At the time of our review, the initiatives were in varying stages of 

development. For example, some of the initiatives including the Richmond 

to Langley integration and the Vermont Community Basing had been under 

development prior to the announcement and formalized implementation 

plans have been finalized and agreed to by the Air Combat Command, the 

Air National Guard, and the state adjutants general. As shown in table 2,

training of those involved in these integration initiatives has already 

begun. In other cases, such as the Texas Predator and New York 

 19 Associate units combine active and reserve component units in an integrated work 

environment to share aircraft and perform support, maintenance, instruction, and day-today missions. The Air Force has used the associate unit organizational construct in the past

in the mobility community where active and Air Force Reserve Command units frequently 

share mobility aircraft, such as the C-130 and KC-135. 

Page 20 GAO-06-232 Defense Management
Distributed Ground Station initiatives, little planning was done in advance 

and, in fact, according to state officials, little notice was provided to the 

affected states prior to the public announcement. For several of the 

initiatives, much planning remains to be done before implementation can 

be completed. In addition, as discussed later, the Air Force has identified 

several hundred other potential initiatives, which it has prioritized for 

future implementation. 

The second step taken by the Air Force to implement the Future Total 

Force concept was to establish a new directorate in March 2005 to provide 

a focal point for managing the transformational initiatives that promote 

the Future Total Force concept; the new directorate also assumed 

responsibility for overseeing implementation of the test initiatives.20 The 

Air Force established the directorate on a 2-year temporary basis, with the 

intention of incorporating the Future Total Force concept into usual Air 

Force practices and thus ultimately eliminating the need for an office 

dedicated to promoting and managing these ideas. The directorate is 

staffed with representatives from stakeholder organizations including the 

Air Staff, Air National Guard, Air Force Reserve Command, and several 

states. In addition, the Air Force has established two working groups to 

provide support and guidance to the directorate. These working groups 

also involve representatives from the Air Staff, major commands, reserve 

components, and adjutants general. Several stakeholders we interviewed 

told us that their inclusion in the Future Total Force Directorate and its 

working groups has improved communication between the Air Force and 

the Air Guard and that they have recently had more opportunity to provide 

input to key decisions. 

Since its inception, the Future Total Force Directorate has continued to 

oversee development of the Future Total Force test initiatives, but has 

largely focused its efforts on identifying additional new missions and 

integration opportunities for Guard and reserve units, particularly those 

affected by the base closure and realignment decisions. First, the 

directorate evaluated the impact of base closure recommendations and 

other planned actions on active, Guard, and reserve units. Second, the 

directorate, working with key stakeholder organizations, identified and 

prioritized a list of about 300 potential new missions and integration 

 20 Although the Future Total Force concept has been in development for several years,

previous efforts had been carried out at a lower organizational level within the Air Force’s 

Strategic Planning Directorate. The new directorate was established in order to devote the

full-time effort believed necessary to fully implement the concept. 

Page 21 GAO-06-232 Defense Management
opportunities into four categories ranging from highest to lowest priority, 

at times combining new missions with integration opportunities—such as 

an associate Predator unit operated by an integrated active and Guard 

unit.21 Third, the directorate plans to use this list to evaluate and match 

potential missions with 18 units affected by 2005 base closure decisions. 

Once missions have been determined for these units, the directorate plans 

to begin assigning the remaining missions to other units. The Air Force 

indicates that it plans to complete implementation of about 60 percent of

the highest priority initiatives by fiscal year 2007 and about 87 percent of

all initiatives by fiscal year 2009. 

The Air Force Has Not 

Fully Developed a 

Management Framework 

Needed to Guide 

Implementation Efforts 

and Fully Test Initiatives 

Implementing significant transformational changes, such as those the Air 

Force is attempting under the Future Total Force concept, are difficult and

require concentrated effort to accomplish established goals. Our prior 

work and the work of others show that organizations undertaking 

complex transformations can increase their likelihood of success by 

adopting a results-oriented management framework, which includes key 

management practices and a strategy that includes results-oriented 

management tools, to guide implementation efforts and achieve desired 

program outcomes.22 Key management practices include leadership that 

defines and articulates a compelling reason for change; sets the direction, 

pace, and tone for transforming; assigns accountability for results; and is 

supported by a dedicated implementation team, which, in turn, can 

provide the focused, day-to-day direction needed for success.23 The Air 

Force has taken steps that address several of these key management 

practices and provide certain aspects of a framework to guide its overall 

Future Total Force effort. For example, the Air Force has developed the 

 21 With input from the major commands, Air National Guard, and Air Force Reserve 

Command, the directorate prioritized the missions list by grouping missions into one of 

four bands: Band 1, the highest priority, contains those the Air Force “must do” to satisfy 

congressional mandates, existing laws, etc.; Band 2 missions are considered “mission 

critical” to the Air Force achieving its objectives; Band 3 missions are “mission significant,” 

meaning that failing to perform the tasks could negatively affect overall effectiveness; and 

Band 4 missions are “mission enhancing,” meaning that they would be nice to do if 

resources are available. In addition, some missions were not included in the bands because 

they were added to the list after the prioritization process was complete. 

22 GAO, Military Transformation: Clear Leadership, Accountability, and Management

Tools Are Needed to Enhance DOD’s Efforts to Transform Military Capabilities, 

GAO-05-70 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 17, 2004).

23 GAO, Results-Oriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist Mergers and

Organizational Transformations, GAO-03-669 (Washington, D.C.: July 2, 2003). 

Page 22 GAO-06-232 Defense Management
Future Total Force concept over a period of several years and has 

described the needs and reasons for change in its policies and guidance to

subordinate organizations. The Air Force, as previously discussed, has 

also recently established the Future Total Force Directorate to provide 

day-to-day management, accountability, and an increased emphasis on this 

transformation effort. 

An effective management framework also includes a clear strategy that

articulates a mission and vision and incorporates the use of specific 

results-oriented management tools, such as those embodied by the 

Government Performance and Results Act of 1993,

24 to provide 

organizations with a way to effectively implement and manage

transformation efforts. This framework can shift the focus of organizations

from measuring activities and processes to identifying and measuring 

desired results. Table 3 lists and describes the results-oriented 

management tools used in our analysis. 

Table 3: Key Results-Oriented Management Tools

Long-term goals Long-term goals identify overall expected results and when to expect 

such results. 

Strategies to be

used 

General methods the agency plans to use to effectively and 

efficiently accomplish long-term goals. 

Performance 

goals 

Derived from long-term goals, should establish intended performance 

and focus on results required.

Performance 

measures 

Specific, objective indicators used to measure progress toward 

achieving goals. 

Evaluation and

corrective action 

plans 

An evaluation plan is an objective and formal assessment of the 

results of a major effort; a corrective action plan describes how 

evaluation findings will be used to improve performance or revise 

unmet goals. 

Source: GAO guidelines. 

Long–term goals should explain what results are expected, should be 

results-oriented, and should be expressed in a way that allows them to be 

assessed in terms of achievement. Goals can help an organization 

communicate what it intends to accomplish. Performance measures 

should be objective and results oriented with specific target levels to meet 

performance goals. Measuring performance allows organizations to track

 24 Pub. L. No. 103-62 (1993). 

Page 23 GAO-06-232 Defense Management
progress toward goals and provides crucial information on which to base 

organizational and management decisions. Organizations use evaluation 

and corrective action plans to examine the success of a program and to 

improve performance by identifying appropriate strategies to meet those 

goals that were not met. An evaluation plan is a particularly important 

management tool for implementing the Future Total Force concept 

because of the new organizational constructs that will be required and the 

complex challenges that they present. For example, integrating active and 

Guard units may require changes to how those forces are employed, their 

organizational structures and cultures, personnel policies and career 

progression, how they are trained, and the unit command structure. 

At the time of our review, the Air Force had not yet fully developed these 

elements. The Future Total Force Directorate was developing a strategic 

plan that directorate officials said would address many of the resultsoriented management tools we described above. In addition, the officials 

said that the plan would include the directorate’s organizational vision and 

mission; lay out its strategic goals and objectives, and identify specific 

steps to achieve them; and provide for an annual review using specific 

performance measures to gauge success in achieving each goal. As of 

November 2005, however, the strategic plan was still in draft form and had 

not yet been approved, nor had specific time frames been set for 

approving the plan. Furthermore, directorate officials said that approval of 

their strategic plan is dependent upon approval of the Air Force Deputy 

Chief of Staff for Plans and Programs’ (their parent organization) strategic 

plan, which is not expected to be finalized until early 2006. 

Also, as of November 2005, the Air Force had developed implementation 

plans for two of the Air Force initiatives designed to test new 

organizational constructs that will integrate active, Guard and reserve 

units, which are the foundation of the Future Total Force concept. 

However, these two implementation plans lacked comprehensive methods 

to evaluate and assess the results of the initiatives. For example, the 

approved implementation plan for the Vermont initiative describes to a 

limited extent some metrics that will be used to evaluate both mission and 

non-mission-related activities such as the skill progression of active duty 

maintenance personnel as a result of training with more experienced Air 

National Guard personnel and the satisfaction of active duty personnel in

obtaining support from the local community. The Virginia initiative 

implementation plan describes metrics for crew ratios and utilization rates 

that the Air Force intends to use to measure the effectiveness of that 

initiative, but does not address other metrics. Also, the Director of the 

Future Total Force Directorate told us that other steps will be taken to 

Page 24 GAO-06-232 Defense Management
evaluate the test initiatives, including (1) the test units will be 

continuously monitored so that implementation issues may be addressed 

as they arise, (2) implementation obstacles and lessons learned are 

discussed at monthly meetings of the Future Total Force working groups,

and (3) the directorate’s strategic plan, once approved, will set out several 

other indicators that can suggest whether the Future Total Force concept 

is producing the desired results. According to directorate officials, these 

indicators will include 

• traditional Air Force measurements of unit effectiveness such as 

readiness, crew ratios and utilization rates, and sortie generation rates; 

• reserve component volunteerism compared to involuntary mobilization; 

• trends in the number of deployable active, Guard, and reserve personnel 

for the Air Expeditionary Force; and 

• progress toward implementing the 20-year force structure plan. 

Taken as a whole, the compilation of metrics contained in the approved

implementation plans for two of the test initiatives and the other measures 

that Future Total Force Directorate officials have described as being 

contained in the draft strategic plan are good first steps, but do not 

provide a comprehensive, methodical, and readily evident approach to 

evaluating the success of the new organizational constructs being tested.

As we have previously reported, such a formal study process can provide a 

rigorous framework for data evaluation, development of lessons learned,

and increase the visibility of the process to outside organizations. For 

example, best practices by other governmental organizations and the 

private sector rely on detailed study plans, or data collection and analysis 

plans, to guide the development of studies and experiments and the 

collection and analysis of data, and to provide a feedback loop that links

the outcomes of the study or event and subsequent analysis to the original

goals and objectives of the test.25

When we discussed the benefits of such an evaluation plan with 

directorate officials, they stated their concern that a lengthy evaluation of

the test initiatives could delay implementation of the new organizational 

constructs beyond the time frames in which they will be needed to support 

Future Total Force goals and objectives. We agree that the evaluation 

should not be drawn out to the point that the Air Force’s goals for 

 25 GAO, Military Readiness: Navy’s Fleet Response Plan Would Benefit from a

Comprehensive Management Approach and Rigorous Testing, GAO-06-84 (Washington,

D.C.: Nov. 22, 2005). 

Page 25 GAO-06-232 Defense Management
implementing the Future Total Force are not achieved. However, the 

absence of a comprehensive and readily evident plan to evaluate the 

initiatives can itself create an environment in which delays may occur. 

Further, without a sound evaluation plan, the Air Force will not have a 

good basis for determining the extent to which the new organizational 

constructs should be applied, a basis for identifying and applying lessons 

learned, or a method for gaining acceptance of the conclusions reached, 

and increasing the transparency of the process for decision makers and 

outside organizations. 

The Air Force has developed a force structure plan for the next 20 years 

with a vision of a smaller, but more agile and capable force. This plan calls

for billions of dollars to be invested in new aircraft while some legacy 

aircraft are retired, new roles and missions, and the physical and 

operational integration of more active, Guard, and reserve units to form 

the “Future Total Force.” The changes that will be required to achieve 

these objectives present significant challenges to the Air Force, such as 

the need to develop new doctrine, training, personnel policies, and 

command structures for the integrated units, which will require the 

support of all affected organizations to develop effective solutions and 

achieve success. While the Air Force has recognized these challenges and

has taken several steps to address them, it has not yet completed 

development of a management framework that fully reflects resultsoriented management principles and no specific time frame has been 

established for putting such a framework in place. Until the framework is 

completely developed and approved, no requirement exists for those 

responsible for implementing the Future Total Force concept to use the 

draft strategy and the management tools it contains to guide the 

transformation and provide visibility over its results. Similarly, the Air 

Force has not fully developed a clear and comprehensive plan to evaluate

the test initiatives announced in December 2004 and expand these new 

constructs as appropriate. Without an approved comprehensive evaluation

plan that includes metrics and milestones for assessing results, the Air 

Force may be unable to fully evaluate the new organizational constructs 

and determine the most cost effective way to organize active and reserve 

forces to carry out the defense strategy. Moreover, without a 

comprehensive management framework that includes an approved 

strategic plan and a clear plan to evaluate the test initiatives, the Air Force 

may be limited in its ability to adjust to the many uncertainties 

surrounding this transformation process, measure the success of its 

efforts, and receive the full support of all the affected organizations, 

including the state adjutants general and the Congress. 

Conclusion 

Page 26 GAO-06-232 Defense Management
To establish a results-oriented management framework that can be used to

guide the implementation of the Future Total Force transformation 

process, measure effectiveness and overall results, and clearly 

communicate plans for implementing and evaluating the concept to all key 

stakeholders and decision makers within the Air Force and DOD, we 

recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Air 

Force to take the following two actions: 

• Require the Future Total Force Directorate to fully develop a 

comprehensive, results-oriented management framework to guide the 

Future Total Force transformation effort and measure overall results. 

Specifically, the management framework should include a strategic plan 

that contains, but is not limited to 

• long-term goals and objectives, 

• strategies to be used to accomplish goals, 

• performance goals, 

• performance criteria for measuring progress, and 

• evaluation and corrective action plans. 

• Set a specific time frame to accelerate the approval of the Future Total 

Force Directorate’s strategic plan. 

Further, to establish a clear understanding of the approach and 

mechanisms to be used to evaluate the Future Total Force initiatives to 

test new organizational constructs, we recommend that the Secretary of 

Defense direct the Secretary of the Air Force to take the following action:

• Establish a stand-alone, comprehensive, and clearly articulated plan for 

evaluating the Future Total Force test initiatives to measure results, 

identify and apply lessons learned, and build on current efforts to increase

the transparency of the process for Air Force and DOD decision makers 

and outside organizations. 

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD agreed with our 

recommendations and provided information on the actions it plans to take

to address them. The Air Force completed and approved the Future Total

Force strategic plan and stated that it is aggressively working toward its 

goal of having a clear and comprehensive plan for evaluating Future Total

Force alternatives. Although we have not fully evaluated the recently

approved strategic plan, our initial review indicates that it contains many 

of the elements that we believe are important to guide a transformation 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 

Page 27 GAO-06-232 Defense Management
effort of this magnitude. Specifically, the plan describes the organizational 

vision, mission, strategic goals and objectives, key initiatives, and some 

general performance measures for the initial implementation of the Future

Total Force concept. However, as the department noted in its comments, 

the strategic plan is a “living document” that should be reviewed and 

improved over time to reflect progress toward achieving the goals and 

objectives it describes. The department also agreed that a stand-alone, 

comprehensive, and clearly articulated plan for evaluating the Future 

Total Force test initiatives is needed and noted that it is working to 

develop such a plan, including working to identify new metrics specifically 

for evaluating its integration initiatives. Once this evaluation plan is 

completed and approved, and if it provides a comprehensive and readily 

evident plan to evaluate the test initiatives, we believe that the Air Force

actions would be responsive to our recommendation. DOD’s comments 

are reprinted in appendix II. 

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense; the 

Secretary of the Air Force; the Chief, National Guard Bureau; the Director, 

Air National Guard; and the Director, Office of Management and Budget. 

We will also provide copies to others upon request. In addition, this report 

will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me 

at (202) 512-4402 or stlaurentj@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of 

Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page 

of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are 

listed in appendix III. 

Janet A. St. Laurent 

Director 

Defense Capabilities and Management 

Page 28 GAO-06-232 Defense Management
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

To determine the processes and events that surrounded the Air Force’s 

development of its 20-year force structure plan, we interviewed officials 

and obtained briefings and other pertinent documentation from current 

and former officials of the Department of the Air Force Headquarters, Air 

Combat Command, Air Mobility Command, Air Force Studies and 

Analyses Agency, and Air National Guard. We reviewed the Office of the

Secretary of Defense Program Budget Decision 753 that reduced the Air 

Force procurement budget for fiscal year 2006 and discussed with Air 

Force officials the subsequent adjustments made to the force structure. 

Although much of the information on the force structure development 

process was testimonial from participants in the process, we assessed this 

information by comparing it to supporting documentation, when available,

and corroborated it through additional interviews to determine 

consistency and reasonableness. On the basis of these efforts, we believe

the information we obtained is sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this 

report. We also reviewed DOD’s draft Strategy for Homeland Defense and

Civil Support and discussed the strategy with officials from the Office of 

the Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense. We also interviewed 

officials at the U.S. Northern Command and the North American 

Aerospace Defense Command to understand the Air National Guard’s role 

in homeland defense missions. During the same period in which the Air 

Force was developing its force structure plan, the Air National Guard 

implemented its Vanguard Engagement Strategy. To describe the Air 

National Guard’s Vanguard Engagement strategy and its relationship to the 

Air Force’s force structure development process, we reviewed the strategy

and interviewed and obtained briefings and documentation from Air 

National Guard and Department of the Air Force officials. 

To determine the level of involvement of key stakeholders in the force 

structure development process, we interviewed officials and obtained 

documentation from officials of the Department of the Air Force 

Headquarters, Air Combat Command, Air Mobility Command, and the Air 

National Guard. Also, to determine the level of stakeholder involvement in

the Guard’s Vanguard initiative, we interviewed officials from the 

Department of the Air Force Headquarters and the Air National Guard and 

obtained documentation from Air National Guard officials. To gauge the 

involvement of the 54 adjutants general, we interviewed a non-probability 

sample of 10 adjutants general. To guide our selection of this sample, we 

developed a list of six criteria and evaluated each state and territory 

against these criteria. The state selection criteria included (1) a mix of 

large and small states, with states containing three or more flying units 

being considered large; (2) a geographic mix of states; (3) states with 

differing views on the proposed force structure plan or Vanguard changes;

Page 29 GAO-06-232 Defense Management
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

(4) states with adjutants general who were active in leadership positions in 

the Adjutants General Association of the United States; (5) states with 

adjutants generals serving on an Air Force General Officer Steering 

Committee; and (6) states with Vanguard or Future Total Force initiatives. 

We conducted open-ended interviews with the adjutants general of 

Colorado, Connecticut, Maryland, Nebraska, New York, North Dakota, 

Texas, Utah, Vermont, and Virginia to gain their perspectives on the force 

structure development process and the Vanguard engagement strategy and 

their level of involvement in the development and implementation of each.

In 6 of the 10 states, we also interviewed members of the adjutants 

generals’ command staff. 

To evaluate the extent to which the Air Force is utilizing key management 

tools to develop new missions for the Air National Guard and to integrate 

active duty and reserve component forces, we identified key management 

tools consistently found in successful organizations through a review of 

key documents and our prior work. We reviewed and analyzed key 

documents related to the Air Force’s efforts to implement its Future Total

Force concept and held discussions with the Director and other officials of 

the newly formed Air Force Future Total Force Directorate to obtain their

perspectives and discuss their efforts to develop a strategic plan 

incorporating the key management tools to guide implementation of the 

concept. In addition, we interviewed directorate and Air Combat 

Command officials to determine what actions they had taken to develop a

plan to implement and evaluate the six Chief of Staff test initiatives. We 

also interviewed the adjutants general for four of the states slated to 

participate in the test initiatives to determine their involvement and 

discuss their plans for implementing and measuring the success of these 

initiatives. We did not evaluate the process the Air Force is using to 

identify and validate new missions for the Guard. 

We conducted our review from September 2004 through November 2005 in

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Page 30 GAO-06-232 Defense Management
Appendix II: Comments from the Department Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense 

of Defense 

Page 31 GAO-06-232 Defense Management
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 32 GAO-06-232 Defense Management
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 33 GAO-06-232 Defense Management
Appendix III: GAO

A

 Contact and Staff 

cknowledgments 

Page 34 GAO-06-232

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

Janet St. Laurent (202) 512-4402 or stlaurentj@gao.gov

In addition to the contact named above, Robert Repasky, Assistant 

Director; Hugh Brady; John Clary; Alissa Czyz; George Delgado; Nicole 

Harms; Penney Harwell; Kenneth Patton; Terry Richardson; and Travis 

Thomson also made key contributions to this report. 

Defense Management

GAO Contact 

Acknowledgments 

(350583) 
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