The slip opinion is the first version of an opinion released by the Chief Clerk of the Supreme Court. Once an opinion is selected for publication by the Court, it is assigned a vendor

- neutral citation by the Chief Clerk for compliance with Rule 23

- 112 NMRA , authenticated and formally published . The slip opinion may contain deviations from the formal authenticated opinion. IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 1
Opinion Number: 2

F iling Date: March 13, 2023 3
NO. S

- 1

- SC

- 38713 4 STATE OF NEW MEXICO, 5
Plaintiff

- Petitioner, 6

v. 7 ANTHONY C. SENA, 8
Defendant

- Respondent. 9
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING ON CERTIORARI 10 Fred Van Soelen, District Judge 11
Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General 12 Charles J. Gutierrez, Assistant Attorney General 13 Santa Fe, NM 14
for Petitioner 15
Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender 16 Charles Agoos, Assistant Appellate Defender 17 Santa Fe, NM 18
for Respondent 191 OPINION 1
THOMSON , Justice. 2

{1} Given our C onstitution ’s limited timetable for considering and passing 3 legislation , i t is no surprise that two bills relating to the same issue may pass and be 4 signed into law during the same legislative session

. See N.M. Const. art. IV, § 5 (A) 5 ( “ Every regular session of the legislature convening during an odd

- numbered year 6 shall remain in session not to exceed sixty days, and every regular sessio n of the 7 legislature convening during an even

- numbered year shall remain in session not to 8 exceed thirty days. ”). W hen this happens , this Court may be tasked with deciding 9
whether th ose two laws can be reconciled. 10

{2} In 2007 , two bills addressing the monitoring and parole of convicted sex 11
offenders passed within days of each other and were signed into law on the same 12 day

. Defendant Anthony Sena, who ple a d ed no contest to the offense of child 13 solicitation by electronic communication device , asks us to hold these laws 14
irreconcilable

. 1 Consequently , he seeks application of the preexisting standard 15 parole term to his sentence and not the extended parole term enacted in the 2007 16 legislation

. We disagree that these bills are irreconcilabl e and conclude that the 17

1 Four other cases concerning the same issue have been held in abeyance pending the outcome of this case.2 extended parole term applies to those convicted of this crime

. In this opinion , we 1
reaffirm that our role is to read statutes harmoniously if possible and that the proper 2
test for a c ourt to apply when reconciling legislation and discerning legislative intent 3
in these circumstances is that of State v. Smith , 2004

- NMSC

- 032 , 136 N.M. 372, 98 4
P.3d 1022 . For these reasons , we revers e the Court of Appeals opinion and affirm 5
the district court’s imposition of the extended parole term on D efendant’s crime. See 6
State v. Sena , 2021

- NMCA

- 047, ¶¶ 24, 33, 495 P.3d 1163. 7
I. B ACKGROUND 8

{3} Defendant entered a conditional plea to “ child solicitation by electronic 9
communication device , ” contrary to NMSA 1978, S ection 30

- 37

- 3.2( C) (2007) 10 ( CES ) , having been accused of luring via a website an undercover officer posing as 11

a young teenage girl into meeting at a house for a sexual encounter in October 2015. 12
The district court s entenced Defendant to three years in the Department of 13
Corrections

. Because CES is included in the current sex offender parole statute, 14 NMSA 1978, § 31

- 21

- 10.1 (I)(6) (2007), the court imposed on Defendant a five

- to 15
twenty

- year indeterminate period of sex offender parole and not the standard parole 16

term applicable to other criminal offenders. Compare § 31

- 21

- 10.1 (A)(1) , (I)(6) , 17
with NMSA 1978, § 31

- 21

- 10(D) (2009) (mandating a two

- year period of parole for 18
an inmate who is convicted of a third

- degree felony)

. 193 {4} The parole term that applies to Defendant turns on w hether two bills passed 1
in the 2007 legislative session

— Senate Bill 735 (S.B. 735, 48 th Leg., 1 st Sess. (N .M. 2 2007) ) 2 (SB 735) and Senate Bill 528 (S.B. 528, 48 th Leg., 1 st Sess. (N.M. 2007 ) ) 3 3 (SB 528)

— can be reconciled insofar as they apply to the crime of CES. The Court 4 of Appeals concluded that the se bills could not be reconciled and felt bound by its 5 previous decision in State v. Ho , 2014

- NMCA

- 038, ¶ 13, 321 P.3d 147. Sena , 2021

- 6
NMCA

- 047, ¶¶ 23

- 24

. The Court of Appeals reversed the district court and ordered 7 the district court to impose the standard parole term. Id. ¶ ¶ 33, 34. B ecause the 8 analysis in Ho , 2014

- NMCA

- 038, ¶¶ 13

- 14, focused solely on sex offender 9 registration provisions

— not the parole statute

— we determine its application to this 10 case inappropriate. In doing so , we remind the courts below that when confronted 11 with reconciling t w o pieces of legislation passed in the same session, the well

12
established test in Smith , 2004

- NMSC

- 032, ¶ ¶ 7, 13 , 25, is the more appropriate way 13 to discern legislative intent

. We begin by discussing the legislative history of SB 735 14
and SB 528 and the Court of Appeals decision in this case. 15

2 Available at https://www.nmlegis.gov/ Sessions/07%20Regular/final/ SB0735.pdf (last visited Mar. 3, 2023).
3 Available at https://www.nmlegis.gov/ Sessions/07%20Regular/final/ SB0528.pdf (last visited Mar. 3, 2023).4 A. Legislative History of SB 735 and SB 528 1

{5} The offense of CES was created with the enactment of SB 735. See 2007 N.M. 2
Laws , ch. 68, §§ 1

- 5. The title of the SB 735 enactment stated its purpose : 3 Relating to sex off enders; creating a new criminal offense known as 4 child solicitation by electronic communication device; adding the 5 offense of child solicitation by electronic communication device to sex 6 offender registration requirements; providing an extended period of 7 parole for the offense of child solicitation by electronic communication 8 device. 9
Id. ( e mphasis added)

. 10

{6} The SB 735 enactment focused on three main legislative policy directives: ( 1) 11 creating the offense of CES under NMSA 1978, Section 30

- 37

- 3.2 , ( 2) adding CES 12

to the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act ( SORNA ) under NMSA 1978, 13
Section 29

- 11A

- 3(E)(11) ( 2007, amended 2013 ) and NMSA 1978, Section 29

- 11A

14 5(E)(8) ( 2007 ) , 4 and ( 3) requiring those convicted of CES to serve a mandat ed five

15
to twenty

- year period of sex offender parole under Section 31

- 21

- 10.1(A)

. 16

{7} From the same session came the enactment of SB 528 , whose title read s : 17

4 SORNA is part of New Mexico ’ s Law Enforcement Code and is not part of the Crimi nal Procedure Code. See NMSA 1978, §§ 29

- 11A

- 1 to

- 10 (1995, as amended through 2013). The express purpose of SORNA is to protect communities by requiring resident sex offenders “to register with the county sheriff,” “requiring the establishment of a centr al registry for sex offenders,” and “providing public access to information regarding certain registered sex offenders.” Section 29

- 11A

2(B)(1), (3), (4).5 Relating to sex offenders; creating a new crime of aggravated criminal 1 sexual penetration; increasing pen alties for sex offenses against minors; 2 responding to Jessica’s Law; imposing lifetime parole supervision for 3 certain sex offenders; clarifying standard of proof; clarifying 4 definitions; increas ing period of parole for criminal sexual contact of a 5 minor in the fourth degree. 6
S ee 2007 N.M. Laws , ch

. 69, §§ 1

- 9. 7

{8} T he SB 528 enactment focused on differen t polic y objectives than those of 8
the SB 735 enactment , including ( 1) creating the new offense of aggravated criminal 9 sexual penetration under NMSA 1978, Sectio n 30

- 9

- 11(C) (2007, amended 2009) , 10 ( 2) adding the offense of aggravated criminal sexual penetration to SORNA under 11
Sections 29

- 11A

- 3(E)(1) (2007) and 29

- 11A

- 5(D)(1) , and ( 3) amending the sex 12 offender parole statute by ( a) mandating sex offender parole for those convicted of 13
that new offense under Section 31

- 21

- 10.1(A) , ( b) creating a two

- tiered structure for 14 sex offender parole, allowing a potential period of lifetime parole for the most severe 15
sex offenses under Section 31

- 21

- 10.1(A)(2) , and ( c) requiring GPS monitoring for 16 offenders on sex offender parole under Section 31

- 21

- 10.1(E)

. Importantly, SB 528 17

ma de no mention of CES or the extended parole requirements for this crime

. 18

{9} As introduced, each bill restated the exist ing law in full , a s required by our 19
Constitution

. See N.M. Const. a rt. IV, § 18 (“ No law shall be revised or amended, 20 or the provisions thereof extended by reference to its title only; but each section 21 thereof as revised, amended or extended shall be set o ut in full. ” ). SB 735 and SB 226 528 passed the Senate within two days of each other and passed the H ouse on the 1 same day, and the G overnor signed them into law on the same day. See SB 735 2 Legislation Actions ; 5 SB 528 Legislation Actions

. 6 3

{10} When multiple amendments to the same statutory section are enacted during 4 the same legislative session, as in this case, our statutes set forth the procedure for 5 constructing and compiling them into law. NMSA 1978, § 12

- 1

- 8 (2019). I n 6
accordance with the v ersion of th is statute that was in effect at the time of the two 7

enactments , § 12

- 1

- 8 (A) (1977) , 7 t he New Mexico Compilation Commission 8 compiled the last

- signed bill , SB 528, into NMSA 1978 in the statute that govern s 9 sex offender parole and included the text of the SB 735 enactment and notation s of 10

5 Available at https://www.nmlegis.gov/Legislation/Legislation?Chamber= S&LegType=B&LegNo=735&year=07 (last visited Mar. 3, 2023).
6 Available at https://www.nmlegis.gov/Legislation/Legislation?Chamber= S&LegType=B&LegNo=528&year=07 (last visited Mar. 3, 2023).
7 The language of Section 12

- 1

- 8(A) (1977) reads in full: [I]f two or more acts are enacted during the same session of the legislature amending the same section of the NMSA, regardless of the effective date of the acts, the act last signed by the governor shall be presumed to be the law and shall be compiled in the NMSA. The history following the amended section shall set forth the section, chapter and year of all acts amending the section. A compiler’s note shall be included in the annotations setting forth the nature of the difference between the acts or sections.7 its passage in the annotations

. See § 31

- 21

- 10.1 (compiler annotations, “2007 1
amendments” ) ( noting that the SB 735 enactment defined “sex offender” to include 2
someone convi cted of CES whereas the SB 528 enactment defined “sex offender” 3 to include someone convicted of aggravated criminal sexual penetration, and 4 explaining that the parole statute was set out as amended by the SB 528 enactment 5
because SB 528 was the last

- signed bill). The Compilation Commission followed 6 the same procedure when compiling the two bills into SORNA. See § 29

- 11A

- 3 7 ( 2007 ) (compiler annotations, “2007 amendments” )

. 8

{11} Then, i n 2013, the Legislature passed a comprehensive amendment exclusive 9
to SORNA

. The title of the act read s , 10 Relating to sex offenders; requiring additional registration information; 11 requiring sex offenders to register and update information within five 12 business days; providing for verification of registration; providing for 13 electroni c updates; including additional offenders on the sex offender 14 internet web site; requiring that certain crimes be committed with 15 sexual intent before they are deemed a sex offense; providing for 16 information to be available on the sex offender internet web site; 17 reiterating state preemption of the field of sex offender registration by 18 prohibiting law enforcement from requiring additional registration or 19 from imposing other restrictions; providing definitions; reconciling 20 multiple amendments to the same secti ons of law in Laws 2007

. 21
2013 N.M . Laws, ch. 152, §§ 1

- 6 (2013 SORNA Amendment) (emphasis added)

. 22
T his amendment reconciled portions of the SB 735 and SB 528 enactments that 23
involve sex offender registration

. See Ho , 2014

- NMCA

- 038, ¶ 13. Relevant to th e 248 Court of Appeals holding in Ho , the amendment add ed CES as a registrable offense 1
under SORNA effective July 1, 2013

. Ho , 2014

- NMCA

- 038 , ¶¶ 13

- 14; 2013 2
SORNA Amendment , § 1

. As a result, the current version of SORNA li sts CES as a 3 registrable offense for those convicted on or after July 1, 2013

. Section 29

- 11 A

4 3(I)(11)

. Significantly, while the 2013 SORNA A mendment comprehensively 5
altered SORNA in the manner described , it did not modify the sex offender parole 6

statute or the parole requirements for CES

. 7

{12} I n t hat same year , the Legislature also amended the compilation statute , 8 provi di ng that 9
i f the New Mexico compilation commission, after consultation with the 10 legislative council service, determines that the p rovi sions of one or 11 more of the earlier sign ed acts can be reconciled with the act that is to 12 be compiled, those provisio ns shall be incorporated in the last

- signed 13 act and compiled in the NMSA. 14 2013 N.M. Laws, ch. 176, § 1 ; § 12

- 1

- 8(A) (2013)

. T he amendment allowed the 15
C ompilation C ommission to not only compile recently enacted legislation but also 16
to revisit law s passed be fore the effective date of the new compilation process to 17
determine if th ose laws can be reconcile d with the compiled act

. 2013 N.M. Laws, 18 ch. 176, § 2 ( “ M ultiple amendments to the same section of law that were enacted 19
before the effective date of this act may be reconciled and compiled in accordance 20 with the provisions of Section 1 of this act. ” (appearing in compiler annotations 219 under “Tem porary provisions” of the 2013 statute but not in the text of the statute ) )

. 1
T h is, as the Court of Appeals correctly noted , granted the C ompilation C ommission 2 authority to reconcile and compile statutes in accordance with this Court ’ s opinion 3
in Smith

. See Sena , 2021

- NMCA

- 047, ¶ ¶ 17

- 18 ( recognizing that expansion of the 4 Compilation Commission’s authority in 2013 “ put into statute the ruling of the New 5 Mexico Supreme Court in [ Smith ] ” ( internal quotation marks and citation omitted) ) ; 6 § 12

- 1

- 8(A) (2013)

. I n 2016 , in consultation with the legislative council servic e, t he 7 Compilation Commission reconciled and compiled the SB 735 and SB 528 8

enactments into the sex offender parole statute. See 2007 N.M. Laws , ch. 68 , § 4 ; 9
2007 N.M. Laws , ch. 69 , § 4

. C ompare § 31

- 21

- 10.1 (I) ( 2007 H istorical NMSA 10
1978 ) , with § 31

- 21

- 10.1 (I) (2016 H istorical NMSA 1978 ) ( adding a person guilty 11
of CES as a “ ‘ sex offender ’ ” to the 2007 statutory text ). As a result, t he current sex 12 offender parole statute defines those convicted of CES as sex offenders, based on 13 the undisturbed legislative enactment of SB 735 passed in 2007. See § 31

- 21

- 14 10.1(I)(6) (compiler annotations , “2007 Multiple Amendments”)

. With this 15 legislativ e history in mind, we turn to an examination of the Court of Appeals 16
decision. 1710 B. The Court of Appeals Decision 1

{13} In a split decision, the Court of Appeals reversed the d istrict c ourt ’s 2 application of the extended parole term instead of the standard parole term

. Sena , 3
2021

- NMCA

- 04 7, ¶¶ 33

- 34

. The majority relied heavily on its earlier decision in 4
Ho , which concluded that the SB 528 and SB 735 enactments are irreconcilable as 5 they applied to the SORNA registration requirement

. Sena , 2021

- NMCA

- 047, ¶¶ 23, 6
24 ; see Ho , 2014

- NMCA

- 038, ¶¶ 1, 13

. Treating the analysis of the registration 7 requirement as analogous to the parole requirement , the Court of Appeals summarily 8
concluded that there “is no principled reason why the Legislature would view SB 9 735 and SB 528 as irreconcilable for the purpose of SORNA [in 2013 , as held by 10
Ho , 2014

- NMCA

- 038, ¶ 13 ] but reconcilable for the purpose of sex offender parole.” 11
Sena , 2021

- NMCA

- 047, ¶¶ 23

- 24 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)

. 12 The majority also focused on provisions in SB 528 that did not exist in SB 735 to 13
reach the decision that the bills are irreconcilable. Sena , 2021

- NMCA

- 047, ¶ 25 14 (“We cannot presume that the Legislatur e, in establishing such expansive revisions 15 to sex offender supervision, did not additionally consider the number and nature of 16
offenses to which such heightened requirements and resources must be applied, 17 arriving at the list of covered offenses set forth in SB 528 and not SB 735.”). T he 18 majority ultimately concluded that “ SB 735 was ineffective in amending the sex 1911 offender parole statute to include the crime of [ CES ].” Sena , 2021

- NMCA

- 047, ¶¶ 1 1, 33. 2

{14} The dissent disagreed with the application of Ho and determined that the better 3 analysis is contained in Smith

. Sena , 2021

- NMCA

- 047, ¶¶ 37, 41 (Yohalem, J., 4 dissenting)

. The dissent did not view Ho as dispos itive of legislative intent as to sex 5 offender parole in 2007 because Ho ’s reasoning turned on intent derived from the 6
2013 SORNA

- exclusive amendment , not the sex offender parole statute. Sena , 2021

- 7
NMCA

- 047, ¶¶ 36, 40 (Yohalem, J., dissenting)

. In additio n, the dissent properly 8
took issue with interpret ing the intent of the Legislature in 2013 as address ing 9 legislative intent of sex offender parole legislation passed six years earlier. See i d

. ¶ 10
36. The dissent concluded, and we agree, that the 2007 statute which is the current 11 version of the sex offender parole statute , § 31

- 21

- 10.1, correctly state s the 12 legislative intent behind the 2007 amendments to the sex offender parole statute , 13 which is to apply the extended parole term to those conv icted of CES

. See Sena , 14
2021

- NMCA

- 047 , ¶ 41 (Yohalem, J., dissenting)

. 15
II. DISCUSSION 16
A. Standard of Review 17

{15} We review “questions of statutory construction” de novo. Tran v. Bennett , 18
2018

- NMSC

- 009, ¶ 16, 411 P.3d 345 (citing Chatterjee v. King , 2012

- NMSC

- 019, 1912 ¶ 11 , 280 P.3d 283 ). The main purpose of statutory interpretation is to give effect to 1
the intent of the L egislature. N .M. Bd. of Veterinary Med. v. Riegger , 2007

- NMSC

2 044, ¶ 11, 142 N.M. 248, 164 P.3d 947 (citing Cobb v. State Canvassing Bd. , 2006

- 3
NMSC

- 034, ¶ 3 4 , 140 N.M. 77, 140 P.3d 498); State ex rel. Klineline v. Blackhurst , 4
1988

- NMSC

- 015, ¶ 12, 106 N.M. 732, 749 P.2d 1111. To glean legislative intent, 5

r eviewing courts should look only to the plain language of the statute unless the 6 meaning of the language is ambiguous. Riegger , 2007

- NMSC

- 044, ¶ 11

. We must 7

“‘ construe the entire statute as a whole so that all the provisions will be considered 8
in relation to one another.’” Id. (quoting Cobb , 2006

- NMSC

- 034, ¶ 3 4 ). 9

{16} We begin by reorient ing the statutory reconciliation analysis away from Ho 10
and toward our holding in Smith

. 11
B. Smith Is the Controlling Analysis 12

{17} We adopt the view of the dissent in Sena that “this case is governed by [this 13 Court’s] decision in Smith , 2004

- NMSC

- 032 [ , which] requires our courts to construe 14 amendments to the same statutory section enacted in a single legislative session to 15 give effect to each, if at all possible.” Sena , 2021

- NMC A

- 047, ¶ 37 (Yohalem, J., 16 dissenting); Smith , 2004

- NMSC

- 032, ¶ 13 (citing State v. Rue , 1963

- NMSC

- 090, ¶ 17 15, 72 N.M. 212, 382 P.2d 697 ; State v. Herrera , 1974

- NMSC

- 037, ¶¶ 9

- 10, 86 18 N.M. 224, 522 P.2d 76; NMSA 1978 , § 12

- 2A

- 10 (A) (1997) )

. In Smith , t his Court 1913 overturned a split decision of the Court of Appeals that held successive amendments 1
to a D W I statute as irreconcilable. 2004

- NMSC

- 032, ¶ ¶ 1, 7. Smith established that 2 when a court approaches questions of legislative intent, it should not begin wi th the 3 premise that statutes are irreconcilable. See i d

. ¶ 13 ( “ A t the outset, we believe the 4 [lower court ’ s] majority relies on a faulty premise, namely, that the three 5
amendments to the DWI statute are irreconcilable

. ” )

. T he Smith C ourt urged against 6 a mechanical analysis and adopted the requirement “ to look to see what the 7 Legislature was trying to accomplish in its passage of the three bills at issue.” Id . ¶ ¶ 8
7 , 25 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)

. Moreover, the Smit h Court 9
established that if statutes have distinct purposes that may be read harmoniously , 10

courts must give effect to each

. See id. ¶ 13. T his is especially true because, 11 [g] iven the dynamic and sometimes frenzied way in which bills are 12 introduced, passed , and signed into law during a single legislative 13 session, we [must not] place an impractical burden on both the 14 legislature and the governor, [by requiring] them to reconcile all bills 15 in advance of their passage or signature

. . . . 16
Id. ¶ 20. 17

{18} In Smith , the Court hel d that even though the three amendments involved the 18 DWI statute, each had a distinct purpose

. I d

. ¶ ¶ 13 , 17 . T h ese separate purposes w ere 19
clear from the titles ( namely, one amendment regarding felony sentencing, another 20 regarding inter governmental agreements, and the last addressing lowering the legal 2114 blood alcohol levels for commercial drivers ) , and each served the general purpose 1 of strengthening the DWI statute. See id. ¶¶ 14

- 1 7 (looking at the title of each bill 2 and determining that each bill served both a distinct purpose and the common 3

purpose “ to ma k e specific, independent improvements to the DWI statute”)

. 4 Reliance on the title of a statute to aid in the analysis is appropriate because a title 5 may be considered part of the act if the title is necessary to the statute’s construction. 6
Tri

- State Generation & Transmission Ass’n, Inc. v. D’Antonio , 2012

- NMSC

- 039, ¶ 7
18 , 289 P.3d 1232 ; 1A Norman J. Singer & J.D. Shambie Singer , Sutherland Statutes 8

a nd Statutory Cons tr

. , § 18:7 , at 78

- 79 (7th ed. 2 009) (stating that “ the title of a 9 statute may be used as an aid to construe the statute even though it is not dispositiv e 10 on the issue of legislative intent ” ); State ex rel. Sedillo v. Sargent , 1918

- NMSC

- 042, 11 ¶ 10, 24 N.M. 333, 171 P. 790 ( “ The title of the act plainly shows the legislative 12 intent, and , reading the act in connection with the title, [the intent] is clearly 13
apparent .” ). Using Smith as the proper guide, we analyze the question whether the 14
SB 735 and SB 528 enactments serve distinct purposes as they relate to sex offender 15 parole. 16
C. Reconciling the SB 735 and SB 528 Enactments 17

{19} Like Smith, this case involves multiple amendments with distinct purposes 18 that each serve to strengthen the statute at issue. The SB 735 enactment made CES

— 1915 and thus Defendant’s acts

— illegal and subject to an extended parol e requirement

. 1
See 2007 N.M. Laws, ch. 68 ( contain ing , in the title of the act , “Creating a n ew 2

c riminal o ffense k nown as c hild s olicitation by e lectronic c ommunication d evice ; 3

. . . p roviding an e xtended p eriod of p arole for the o ffense of c hild s olicitation by 4

e lectronic c ommunication d evice ”). The SB 528 enactment focused on goals 5 unrelated to the specific charge of CES, namely creat ing the offense of aggravated 6 criminal sexual penetration, includ ing a second tier of sex offender parole that 7 impo ses lifetime parole for the most serious sex offenses, requir ing electronic 8 monitoring, and increas ing parole requirements for criminal sexual contact of a 9 minor in the fourth degree. See 2007 N.M. Laws, ch. 69 ( contain ing , in the title of 10
the act , “Creating a n ew c rime of a ggravated c riminal s exual p enetration; i ncreasing 11

p enalties for s ex o ffenses a gainst m inors;

. . . i mposing l ifetime p arole s upervision 12
for c ertain s ex o ffenders;

. . . i ncreasing p eriod of p arole for c riminal s exual c ontact 13
of a m inor in the f ourth d egree ”). The fact that the two bills as enacted add ress ed 14 parole requirements for sex offenders does not demonstrate conflicting intentions of 15 the Legislature because each bill’s purpose is distinct in its effor t s to make specific 16 independent improvements to the sex offender parole statute. See Smith , 2004

- 17
NMSC

- 032, ¶ 17 ; 2007 N.M. Laws, ch. 68 ; 2007 N.M. Laws, ch. 69

. Therefore, for 18
this rea son alone, we conclude that the SB 735 and SB 528 enactments are 1916 reconcilable , and we give effect to the extended parole requirements provided in the 1
SB 735 enactment

. 2

{20} Next , we reject any suggestion that Ho or the 2013 SORNA Amendment that 3
forms the basis of its analysis changes the outcome of this case. See Sena , 2021

- 4
NMCA

- 047, ¶ ¶ 23

- 24. W e strongly caution against the continued application of Ho 5

to determine whether these two bills are reconcilable. First, the holding in Ho is 6 limited in its scope in that it involves only sex offender registration requirements for 7
those convicted of CES and does not implicate parole

. See 2014

- NMCA

- 038, ¶ 14. 8 Second, by applying Ho as broadly as the Court of Appeals does in this case , one 9
must conclude that in 2013 the Legislature impliedly repealed the 2007 enactment 10
of the extended parole requirement for CES , making the passage and signing of SB 11
735 an absolute nullity, something we decline to do. 12

{21} In Ho , t he Court of Appeals held t hat a convicted sex offender who pleaded 13 guilty to CES in 2012 was not required to abide by SORNA registration 14 requirements imposed by the 2013 SORNA Amendment

. 2014

- NMCA

- 038, ¶¶ 1, 3, 15
14. The Ho Court began by faithfully app lying the test for discerning l egislative 16 intent pronounced in Smith , concluding initially that the SB 528 and SB 735 17

enactments are likely reconcilable. Id. ¶¶ 11

- 12 ( “ A bsent the 2013 amendment, we 18
would apply Smith and conclude that SB 735 and SB 528 are reconcilable because 1917 they have different purposes and the substantive changes they made

. . . are not at 1
odds

. . . , [ and ] we would conclude further that the Legislature intended both SB 2
528 and SB 735 to be valid

. ” ). L ater , however, the Ho Court lost its bearings by 3 focusing not on what was contained in the SB 735 and SB 528 enactments but on a 4 portion of the 2013 SORNA Amendment’s title, “reconciling multiple amendments 5
to the sa me sections of law in Laws 2007,” and on the effective date for the 6 registration requirement

. Ho , 2014

- NMCA

- 038 , ¶¶ 6, 11, 13

- 14 (internal quotation 7 marks and citation omitted) (“ But we cannot ignore the import of the 2013 8
amendment to Section 29

- 11A

- 3(I), the existence of whic h req uires a different 9 outcome.”) ; 2013 N.M . Laws, ch. 152 (title)

. The Ho Court concluded that the 2013 10 SORNA Amendment evidenced the Legislature’s recognition that the SB 528 and 11
SB 735 enactments were irreconcilable as to making CES a registrable offense for 12
convictions that occurred before 2013

. See 2014

- NMCA

- 038, ¶ 13

. 13

{22} T he Court of Appeals decision to simply carry forward Ho ’s holding 14 regarding registration and render the SB 735 enactment’s parole requirements 15
ineffective was error
. See Sena , 202 1

- NMCA

- 047, ¶¶ 23

- 24. To begi n, the Court of 16 Appeals gives too much weight to the broad statement in Ho that the Legislature 17
“viewed the 2007 amendments as irreconcilable.” Ho , 2014

- NMCA

- 038, ¶ 13; see 18
Sena , 2021

- NMCA

- 047, ¶ ¶ 23

- 24 . T he use of “ reconciling ” in the 2013 SORNA 1918 Amendment title does not imply that the Legislature vie w s the SB 735 and SB 528 1

enactments as irreconcilable . In fact, t he wording in the amendment can be read 2 reasonably to simply express the desire of the Legislature to rec oncile those portions 3
of two statutes that can be reconciled . More importantly, t here is nothing in SORNA , 4 and specifically in the 2013 SORNA A mendment , that address es the extended parole 5 requirements for CES , and we refuse to add such an amendment through the 6 expansion of Ho

. When a statute’s terms have a plain meaning, the court’s analysis 7
is at its end. See Bostock v. Clayton Cnty. , 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1743 (2020); see also 8 Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill , 437 U.S. 153, 185 (1978) (“It is not for us to speculate, 9 much less act, on whether Congress would have altered its stance had the specific 10 events of this case been anticipated.”). T he 2013 SORNA Amendment’s plain 11 wording reveals no effect on the parole statute and has no role in the outcome of this 12

ca se. 13

{23} We take specific issue with t he conclusion of the Court of Appeals majority 14
that “ [ t ] here is no principled reason why the Legislature would view SB 735 and SB 15 528 as irreconcilable for the purpose of SORNA [in 2013 , as held by Ho ] but 16
reconcilable for the purpose of sex offender parole

. ” Sena , 2021

- NMCA

- 047, ¶ 24 17 ( first alteration in original ) (internal quotation marks omitted)

. T he principled reason 18

to hold the two enactments reconcilable for the purpose of parole is that the parole 1919 requirements are not only a distinct aspect of the SB 735 enactment but , in many 1

ways, are the core of the legislation

. We presume that if the Legislature chose to alter 2 this distinct aspect of the SB 735 enactment , it would have done so expressly

. S ee 3
Kin g v. Burwell , 576 U.S. 473, 497 (2015) ( hold ing that because the creation of the 4
tax credit was a fundamental purpose of the Affordable Care Act, if Congress 5 intended to limit the provision of tax credits it would have done so expressly). 6

{24} The United States Supreme Court described the importance of understanding 7 the core policy of legislative enactments as it reviewed an agency decision that 8 loosened filing requirements for new competitors under the common carrier section 9
of the Federal Communications Act

. M CI Telecomm. Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. , 10
512 U.S. 218, 221 (1994) . The Court held that the agency exceeded agency authority , 11
conclud ing that the rate

- filing requirements were “the heart” of the act and that if 12 Congress had intended such an allowance , it would have said so expressly. See id

. 13
at 229

- 30 , 234 ( “ For the body of a law, as for the body of a person, whether a change 14 is minor or major depends to some extent upon the importance of the item changed 15

to the whole. Loss of an entire toenail is insignificant; loss of an entire arm tragic. 16
The tariff

- filing requirement is, to pursue this analogy, the heart of the common

17
carrier section of the Communications Act. ” ) . The Court reasoned that the filing 18 requirem ents were “ Congress’ s chosen means of preventing unreasonableness” in 1920 rate charges, so it was unlikely, given the importance of rate monitoring to the 1 purposes of the act, that Congress would have delegated the authority to subtly 2 change the requirements. Id. at 230

- 31

. 3

{25} Similarly, the parole requirements in the SB 735 enactment are at the heart of 4 the purpose of the amendment which , as outlined in its title , is threefold: to create 5
the offense of CES , to amend registration requirements, and to outline parol e 6 requirements for the offense. See 2007 N.M. Laws, ch. 68, §§ 1

- 5 (title). The parole 7 requirements outlined in SB 735 were the Legislature’s chosen method of dealing 8
with those who commit CES

. See id. § 4. Given the importance of the parole 9 requirements in the 2007 enactment , it is unlikely that the Legislature would revoke 10
the m through the 2013 SORNA Amendment , a statute that nowhere reference s sex 11
offender parole terms

. Therefore, because we presume that the Legislature deal s with 12 major aspects of statutes expressly, we do not construe the 2013 SORNA 13
Amendment to have rendered the parole requirements of the SB 735 enactment 14
ineffective by implication

. Smith , 2004

- NMSC

- 032, ¶ 22; Rodriguez v. United 15
States , 480 U.S. 522, 524 (1 987) (citing Hill , 437 U.S. at 189) ( “[R] epeal s by 16 implication are not favored .” ). We emphasize that legislative intent to repeal a prior 17

statute “‘ must be clear and manifest. ’ ” United States v. Borden Co. , 308 U.S. 188, 18 198 (1939) ( quoting Red Rock v. Hen ry , 106 U.S. 596, 601

- 02 (1883)). Because 1921 there is no express intent by the Legislature to alter much less repeal the extended 1 parole requirement in Section 31

- 21

- 10.1 as it was created in 2007, we disagree with 2 the Court of Appeals analysis concluding that the requirement was implicitly 3 repealed .” 8 4

{26} Finally, sanctioning a n interpretation that the SB 528 enactment 5 comprehensively amended the SB 735 enactment rendering it ineffecti ve is rebutted 6 by the procedural history of the legislation : SB 528 and SB 735 were introduced in 7
the Senate within a week of each other and were passed by the Senate within two 8 days of each other

. See SB 735 Legislation Actions; SB 528 Legislation Actions

. 9
B oth SB 735 and SB 528 were passed by the House on the same d ay and were signed 10 into law by the Governor on the same day

. See SB 735 Legislation Actions ; SB 528 11 Legislation Actions. An interpretation that the L egislature intended the SB 528 12

enactment to sup ersede the SB 735 enactment assumes that the L egislature acted 13

8 Because the SB 735 enactment w as published in the compiler annotations to Section 31

- 21

- 10.1 upon its passage in 2007 , whereupon the Compilation Commission accordingly recompiled it into statutory text in 2016, CES has required an extended sex offender parole term since 2007. Due proce ss notice requirements were met, and the statute was in effect at the time Defendant committed the crime, and thus Defendant’s argument on this point fails. See Smith , 2004

- NMSC

- 032, ¶¶ 31

- 32 (concluding that due process notice requirements were met becaus e the increased penalty provisions in one amendment to the DWI statute were “in force at the time Defendants committed their repeat DWI offenses” and because “all three amendments to [the DWI statute] were noted and printed in the compilation”).22 superfluously in enacting SB 735

. Given the improbability of the Legislature 1 undertaking the legislative process to pass a bill and render it ineffective two days 2
later and the lack of any express legislative intent to support this contention , we 3
conclude that the SB 528 enactment did not comprehensively amend the SB 735 4
enactment, and we give effect to both amendments. 5
III. CONCLUSION 6

{27} Applying Smith , we conclude that the SB 735 and SB 528 enactments are 7
reconcilable , and we give effect to the parole re quirements provided in the SB 735 8

enactment . The 2013 SORNA Amendment and Ho play no role in our analysis

. 9
Pursuant to Smith , the SB 735 and SB 528 enactments m ust be read harmoniously 10
because each has distinct purposes, and accordingly , the Court of Appea ls should 11 have given effect to both . Therefore, we reverse the Court of A ppeals and affirm the 12

sentence of the district court. 13

{28} IT IS SO ORDERED. 14

15 DAVID K. THOMSON , Justice 1623 WE CONCUR: 1

2 C. SHANNON BACON, Chief Justice 3

4 MICHAEL E. VIGIL , Justice 5

6 BRIANA H. ZAMORA , Justice 7