Study

Report

2006-04

Evaluating the Contributions of Virtual

Simulations to Combat Effectiveness

Phillip N. Jones and Thomas Mastaglio

MYMIC LLC

United States Army Research Institute

for the Behavioral and Social Sciences

March 2006

20060601032

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Kathleen A. Quinkert, U.S. Army Research Institute

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Evaluating the Contributions of Virtual Simulations to Combat W74V8H-04-C-0010

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14. ABSTRACT

The problem under investigation was the evaluation of virtual simulations to combat effectiveness for two

separate populations: US Army, heavy combat units returning from Operation Iraqi Freedom and US Army

National Guard heavy combat units. The research used opinion data collected via questionnaires delivered to

battalion through platoon leadership. Questionnaires were delivered via physical interviews and written survey

and also through web delivered surveys. Individual opinions were aggregated based upon duty position and

other demographic factors to develop collective opinions, which allowed analysts to make supported

observations. Results are reported separately for Iraqi Freedom units and National Guard units. Significant

findings include: virtual simulations are effective but are seen as a substitute to live training; users would

prefer higher operational area modeling in virtual trainers so they can use them more as theaterfmission

rehearsal tools; and integration of virtual simulations into unit training strategies is a learned skill and requires

more attention. Finally, this research demonstrates the viability of using web-based collection methods in

further investigations.

15. SUBJECT TERMS

Close Combat Tactical Trainer

18. $1CURITY CLASSIFICATION OF 17. LIMITATION 18. NUMBER 19. RESPONSIBLE PERSON

OF ABSTRACT OF PAGES Ellen Kinzner

a. REPORT b.ABSTRACT c. THIS PAGE Technical Publication

Unclassified Unclassified Unclassified Unlimited 90 Specialist

(703) 602-8047
Study Report 2006-04

Evaluating the Contributions of Virtual Simulations

to Combat Effectiveness

Phillip N. Jones

Thomas Mastaglio

MYMIC LLC

Simulator Systems Research Unit

Stephen.L. Goldberg, Chief

U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences

2511 Jefferson Davis Highway, Arlington 22202-3926

March 2006

665803D730 Personnel and Training

Analysis Activities

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

iii
FOREWORD

The U.S. Army has made significant investments in virtual simulations for training its

mechanized forces. The Close Combat Tactical Trainer (CCTT) has been fielded across the

Active Army and a mobile version is available for National Guard armor and mechanized

infantry units. The original virtual simulation, Simulation Networking (SIMNET) is still being

used by National Guard units. An earlier research project summarized in a report entitled

"Assessing the Effectiveness of the Close Combat Tactical Trainer," ARI Research Report 1820,

January, 2004, obtained leaders' opinions about the contribution CCTT was making to their

overall training strategy. The report also, presented anecdotal information about unilue training

applications of CCTT.

This report summarizes two studies.conducted to determine the contribution virtual

simulations made toward preparing Active Component and National Guard units for deployment.

The studies used many of the que'stionnaire items and survey methods developed in the earlier

CCTT assessment project. The first study surveyed Active units upon their return from the early

phases of Operation Iraqi Freedom regarding the role CCTT played in preparing them for combat

operations. The second study focused on obtaining National Guard leaders' opinions regarding

their use of virtual simulation (CCTT, Mobile CCTT, and SIMNET) as part of their preparation

for deployment.

Both studies were part of the ARI studies program.. Both topics were generated by the U.S.

Army Training and Doctrine Command's Program Integration Office, Virtual Simulation (TPIO,

Virtual). During the period when the studies were conducted TPIO, Virtual was directed by

COL Mark Vinson and COL James Shufelt. The TPIO, Virtual representative who monitored

progress of the work was Mr. Daniel Miller. TPIO, Virtual was briefed on the results of the

studies on 22 September 2005 at Ft. Leavenworth, KS.

MICHELLE SAMS

Technical Director,

v
Acknowledgements

The authors of this report would like to thank Mr. Travis Cherry, whose time and expertise were

essential in this work.

The authors would also like to thank Mr. Dan Miller and Mr. Randy Krug, whose assistance

made the research possible.

Finally, the authors would especially like to thank the US Army professionals, those officers and

noncommissioned officers who provided their honest and insightful opinions. It was a rewarding

experience to work with them. The defense of the nation remains in good hands.

vi
EVALUATING THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF VIRTUAL SIMULATIONS TO COMBAT

EFFECTIVENESS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Research Requirement:

The primary intent of this investigation was twofold. One portion of the investigation was

designed to determine what role virtual simulations, which were developed to train collective

task proficiency, played in preparing €1ose combat units for operations in a combat theater,

specifically Iraq. The other portion of the investigation examined the use of virtual simulations,

as implemented in virtual maneuver trainers (e.g., Simulation Network (SIMNET) and Close

Combat Tactical Trainer (CCTT), by Army National Guard (ARNG) units.

Procedure:

The method sampled the attitudes and opinions of the training devices user populations. This

approach is based upon techniques and principles commonly used in the commercial world as the

basis for customer relationship management strategies. User input, in juxtaposition with

analyses of reported training system usage, was evaluated to address a set of investigation

objectives from which we derived a primary set of investigation issues and sub-issues. A finding

for each sub-issue was arrived at through an analysis of questions presented to specific categories

of the user populations (e.g., Commanders, Company level leaders, Operations Officers, etc.).

Issue findings are the aggregation of sub-issue findings determined through an analytic review

process that begins with determining consensus responses for each question. Data was collected

through written surveys, interviews with key leadership personnel, and web hosted

questionnaires.

Findings:

A primary result of the first investigation effort was a finding that units used virtual simulations

as a secondary training environment once they were alerted for deployment. Collective and

individual training in live environments, using ranges, maneuver areas and mock MOUT sites,

was given priority. Virtual training environments were used as an additional context for

preparing units for deployment; they were primarily used for and by company level leaders as

time permitted. Another factor contributing to the secondary role of CCTT was command

emphasis on insuring individual Soldier skills (e.g., marksmanship, first aid, etc) were at peak

levels of expertise and that family/personal matters were in order before deployment. An

exception was a centralized approach used in USAREUR where each platoon being deployed

was required to successfully complete a command prescribed set of scenarios in CCTT designed

to exercise the tasks anticipated during combat operations. This CCTT exercise was part of a

comprehensive tune-up for deployment that emphasized individual and platoon level proficiency.

The reason for this approach being adopted in USAREUR was lack of suitable dessert-like

terrain within that theater and the command's decision to insure that all of its units were prepared

for combat at a minimal acceptable level of competency. Unit leaders in general perceive a key

role in their collective training for the use of virtual simulations and those who have redeployed

vii
from an operational theater would integrate CCTT into their preparations for future deployments

given sufficient time. However, they strongly suggest that to do that they need CCTT to be

directly relevant to any specific theater to which they might deploy; it should have appropriate

terrain databases of that theater and Semi Automated Forces able to emulate tactics of possible

enemies. Units are satisfied with the support provided by CCTT sites. They chose to train

offensive scenarios and tasks at the company/troop and platoon levels relying heavily on the after

action review (AAR) capability of the system and AAR process to reinforce learning and insure

training objectives are met.

The second investigation found that, within the ARNG, training using virtual simulations is

almost exclusively platoon level; this includes training at fixed sites, where available, as well as

platoon configurations in the mobile trainers. ARNG unit leadership does not yet fully

understand how to integrate virtual simulations into their overall training strategy, although they

do appreciate the potential of virtual maneuver trainer (VMT's). Published usage guidance is

almost non existent, a finding consistent with previous investigations of CCTT usage in the

active force. Because many ARNG close combat units are either scheduled or expect to be

scheduled for deployment to the Iraq Theater they have attitudes similar to their active

counterparts about the relevance of currently available virtual environments. Unit leaders would

like relevant terrain databases and semi-automated forces (SAF) in their VMT's in order to better

prepare for the conditions and missions they expect to encounter. Access to VMT's is not an

issue and ARNG appear satisfied with the current strategy of a higher level organization

establishing a prescribed schedule for mobile trainers around which they plan their training.

Although unit leaders would like to train at higher than platoon level in virtual simulations they

are not sure that the technology can support them because the systems to which they are

primarily exposed are platoon level (mobile) trainers. ARNG leaders hold opinions similar to

the active component in regards to the fidelity of virtual simulations available to close combat

forces; they perceive it as adequate with the exception of theater relevant capabilities. The

highest priority for system enhancements is terrain and simulator realism, but not at the cost of

reduced access to the system.

In general, these two efforts, in combination with a previous investigation of CCTT, point to a

gradual cultural change within close combat heavy units to incorporate and depend on virtual

simulations. This process is not as mature in the ARNG because they have not had access to

virtual simulations for as long as active units and their training cycles stretch over longer periods

of time because they are not full time Soldiers. We have termed this trend "cultural absorption"

and although it continues, current operational conditions may be slowing its pace because of the

emphasis on counter insurgency vice high intensity conflict. Junior leaders of today may have to

be reindoctrinated at some future point in their professional training on the importance of

maneuver warfare so the Army does not loose 'the capability to conduct such operations. Virtual

simulations can play a key role in that process if employed and managed properly.

viii
Utilization and Dissemination of Findings:

The findings of this report are useful to both training developers and training managers.

Developers will discover specific recommendations from their user base for improving the

effectiveness of their training devices, CCTT and SIMNET in particular and all training devices

in general. Training developers can learn how users are, or are not, integrating virtual

simulations into their training programs. Managers can take from this report targets for the

commitment of resources to improve training programs and for educating leaders.

ix
'C
EVALUATING THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF VIRTUAL SIMULATIONS TO

COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS

CONTENTS

Page

B A C K G R O U N D ................................................................................................................ 1

M E T H O D ........................................................................................................................... 5

Preparatory phase ...................................................................................................... . 5

Data Collection Phase ............................................................................................... 8

Data Analysis Phase ................................................................................................ 9

MACRO LEVEL ANALYSIS (MALA) ..................................................................... 10

FINDINGS & DISCUSSIONS ..................................................................................... 11

O IF STU D Y : ................................................................................................................... 12

Findings : ....... ........ .................................................................................... 12

USAREUR Study .................................................................................................. 27

Macro Level Analysis Results .............................................................................. 29

D iscussion : ............................................................................................................... 30

A R N G STUDY: .......................................................................................................... 32

F indin gs: ................................................................................................................... 33

Macro Level Analysis Results .............................................................................. 65

D iscu ssion : ................................................................................................................ 66

OBSERVATIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS ......................................................... 69

R EFER EN C ES ............................................................................................................. 75

APPENDIX A: USAREUR QUESTIONS AND CONSENSUS ANSWERS ...... A-1

APPENDIX B:. WEB COLLECTION ANALYSIS .................................................. B-1

APPENDIX C: ACRONYM LIST ........................................................................... C-1

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1. OIF Investigation Physical Collection Results .............................................. 12

Table 2. OIF Investigation Web Collection Results ........................................................ 12

Table 3. ARNG Investigation Total Respondents ....................................................... 32

Table 4. ARNG Investigation Physical Data Respondents .......................................... 32

Table 5. ARNG Investigation Web Collected Data Respondents ................................ 32

Table 6. CCTT Use by Month for Sample of ARNG Units .......................................... 66

Table 7. List of Recommendations .............................................................................. 69

Table 8. Study Finding Cross-Comparison ................................................................... 72

xi
CONTENTS (continued)

Page

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1. Investigation goal disaggregating .................................................................... 5

Figure 2. OIF investigation unit sample ........................................................................ 6

Figure 3. ARNG investigation unit sample .................................................................... 6

Figure 4. Investigation findings aggregation ................................................................. 9

Figure 5. CCTT usage hours, Jan 02-Feb 04 ............................................................... 29

Figure 6. AVG MUTA investment by mobility ............................ 57

Figure 7. AVG MUTA investment by system ............................................................ 58

Figure 8. ARNG CCTT usage, Jun 02 - Feb 04 ................................................. 65

xii
Background

In April 2002, the Army Research Institute (ARI) and the Training and Doctrine

Command (TRADOC) Program Integration Office-Virtual (TPIO-V) commissioned an

investigation assessing the effectiveness of the Close Combat Tactical Trainer (CCTT)

(Mastaglio, Peterson, Williams 2004). This investigation assessed general effectiveness

of CCTT via a process of interviewing and surveying users, then consolidating their

opinions to develop general user findings. This investigation sampled attitudes of

battalion and below level leadership from four US Army battalions and two CCTT sites.

Some of the investigation's findings Were:

* CCTT fixed site facilities are being operated in accordance with established PMCATT policies and prescribed procedures.

e Users assess CCTT aq having a direct, positive impact on their combat readiness.

Units consistently include CCTT training in their preparation for live training

events and believe its use directly improves mission essential task list (METL)

performance levels. Opinions vary by unit and grade as to whether key staff and

chain of command oversight of the preparation for and execution of CCTT

training exercises is sufficient.

CCTT is being integrated into unit training strategies and plans as a key event, but

is not given the same emphasis or as closely managed as field training. CCTT

exercises are scheduled and planned well in advance. Either 9both in some cases)

unit METL requirements or events they will encounter during upcoming live

training are the basis fro selecting scenarios and exercise objectives. CCTT is

used more in preparation for future events than as a context for remediation of

deficiencies identified during live or other training.

e Company grade officers and NCOs are the prime users of CCTT, both because

that is the way it is generally managed at the battalion level and because they have

easy access to the site for their unit's use. CCTT exercises are primarily planned,

conducted, and reviewed at company level. There are units that have active

involvement of battalion staff and leaders, but these are the exception.

9 Close combat unit leaders believe CCTT directly contributes to unit readiness and

potentially reduces resource consumption. However, it is not feasible to develop

specific metrics for value or cost effectiveness.

* All members of the chain of command rated the AAR capabilities in CCTT as

critical to effective training.

* CCTT is being used at the company and platoon level extensively to prepare units

for live fire table ranges.

9 Users are satisfied with the fidelity of CCTT.
" Users desired the Army to procure more simulators to allow task force level

training and to procure high mobility multi-wheeled vehicles (HMMWV)

simulators to support scout training.

" There is no published training guidance at any level establishing usage levels or

event-driven use of CCTT.

"* Most company grade leaders use the outcomes of CCTT to plan future training.

The process provided sufficient insight for continued investigation, specifically.

evaluating the contribution of virtual simulations to units preparing for Operation Iraqi

Freedom (OIF) and assessing training and leader development using mobile CCTT in the

U.S. Army National Guard (ARNG).

The goals of this OIF investigation were:

"* To determine if virtual training impacts combat effectiveness,

"• To evaluate if changes should be made to the CCTT simulation or sites to better

meet pre-deployment training needs.

The ARNG trains using a variety of simulators, including fixed and mobile CCTT and

fixed and mobile SIMNET. Collectively these are call Virtual Maneuver Trainers

(VMTs) and the investigation looked at these VMTs used by the ARNG.

The goals of the ARNG investigation were:

"• Determine the training and leader development benefits of VMT used at ARNG

home stations (pre-mobilization).

"* Determine the generalization of skills learned in Virtual Close Combat simulators

to combat systems and tasks that will be encountered in theater.

"* Determine the functionality of Virtual Close Combat simulators, training

approaches, and hardware configurations.

"* Recommend changes in the way virtual close combat simulators are scheduled

and utilized to potentially increase their efficiency and effectiveness.

As conducted, this investigation was actually comprised of two independent data

collection and analyses:

1. The OIF investigation of the effectiveness of CCTT in helping prepare notified

units for deployment.

2. The ARNG investigation of the effectiveness of VMTs during premobilization

training.

2
This report addresses the two investigations separately.

The OIF investigation sample consisted of eight units who had returned from OIF. Some

common characteristics about these units follow.

Upon receiving a deployment warning order, each of the units were in a different point of

their training plan. One was preparing for the National Training Center. However, all

would consider themselves trained and ready for Mission Essential Task List (METL)

operations. During pre-deployment, these units anticipated offensive, METL-supported

operations, as opposed to the stability and reconstruction operations (SARO)* they later

found themselves performing in-theater.

There are two implications for the investigation. It was found that much of the training

focus of these units shifted away from collective tasks, on which they considered

themselves proficient, toward individual tasks, which they thought were important to

Soldier survival, and on Soldier and family support tasks, anticipating the effects of

deployment. These subtle changes impacted unit attitudes toward the use of CCTT after

re-deployment.

The other implication is that, due to an operational level shift from offense to SARO, and

resultant impacts on tactical tasks and order of battle, including switching from

mechanized to motorized/dismounted operations, the tasks they trained in CCTT were

frequently dc-emphasized during OIF. This had obvious impact on the perceived

effectiveness of CCTT in preparing these Soldiers for their operations in Iraq. Proving

their professionalism, leaders who were interviewed and surveyed looked beyond this

potential problem.

The ARNG sample consisted of battalions located within the United States. The National

Guard Bureau (NGB) nominated battalions for the study. All sample battalions were in

varying places in their training programs. However, they all shared common ARNG

training conditions.

ARNG training is divided into pre- and postmobilization training. This investigation

addressed exclusively premobilization training. The objective for ARNG units is "to

identify achievable, sustainable training requirements, this provides the focus for

effective premobilization unit training." The ARNG has established required

premobilization training proficiencies, to include (FORSCOM/ARNG/USAR Regulation

350-2, 1999):

* Individual Soldier proficiency: Duty-Military Occupational Qualification

(DMOSQ) and professional development at 85% of assigned strength,

* Note, on 14 June 2005, the US Army published a new version of FM 1 that changed the basic types of

operations from offense, defense, stability, and support to offense, defense, stability and reconstruction, and

civil support. As this change occurred during the final analysis and preparation of this report, readers will

find both the old term stability and support operations (SASO) and the new stability and reconstruction

operations (SARO).
"* Maneuver (collective) proficiency: Infantry/Armor/Cavalry-platoon level,

"* Crew/weapon system qualification/technical skills proficiency,

"• Command and staff proficiency at level organized.

ARNG combat units are to focus on platoon maneuver and gunnery. In fact, platoon

level proficiency is a gate, which must be reached before performing company level

training. The decision of Whether the gate has been reached lies with the brigade

commander. Additionally, the ARNG as a whole has a requirement to annually conduct

280 platoon/company and 21 battalion virtual training cycles (FORSCOM/ARNG/USAR

Regulation 350-2, 1999). However, there is no further requirement imposed on lower

level units to conduct a specific number of these training events.

These conditions set specific VMT use guidance for the Guard and outline training

management conditions for ARNG units: focus should be on individual skills,

crew/weapon system qualification, command and staff proficiency, and maneuver up to

platoon level.

4
Method

The OIF and ARNG investigations were each conducted in three phases:

* A preparatory phase involving the writing of a plan and the identification of

available data, the development of the survey instruments, and the coordination

with the investigation sites and units.

* A data collection phase during which a team visited sample units and delivered

questionnaires through interviews and written surveys.

e A data analysis phase that compiled and studied the data collected in Phase 2 to

generate appropriate findings, observations, and recommendations.

Preparatory Phase

For each investigation a formal research plan was developed and delivered to the

government for review and approval.

Study goals were disaggregated through two levels. From investigation goals, the team

developed specific investigation issues. Each of these issues was further separated into

sub-issues, from which questions were developed.

Study Study Sub- Question

Goal I Issue I Issue 1.1 . I..

Study - Study S Question Goafl2 u Sub- ]

G Issue 2 Issue_1.2 1.1.2

Study Stud Sub- Question

Goal 3 Issue 3 Issue 1.3 1.1.3

Figure 1. Investigation goal disaggregating

Simultaneously, the team identified a desired unit sample and the population of

respondents from whom data would be collected using questionnaires and interviews.

The unit sample was built in order to collect input from a variety of unit types and

locations. The desired sample was delivered to the Government for populating. In both

investigations, current unit Operations Tempo (OPTEMPO) and other factors prevented

accessing an ideal population sample but nevertheless the sample did include sufficient

depth to assure analytic insights would be representative of the Army as a whole.

For the OIF investigation, the intention was to include U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR)

units in the sample. However, these units were not available and, instead, the team

collected data from USAREUR training sites; this spawned a small sub-investigation

effort which will be described separately in this report.

5
Figures 2 and 3 show geographically the population from which data was collected fbr

each investigation:

(,AV i" 134 AR

3:3 GAV 11-16IN

Figure 2. OIF investigation unit sample

I f AI ' l IN;• ! * ''

1A. • ] "FF1CA (X;1 f40 ."

I I 11AA3

Figure 3. ARNG Investig•ition i init Sample

For each invcstigation, a standard list of respondents by unit position was created. These

were personnel who would likely have the knowledge being sought. both officer and

NCO small unit leaders, firom platoon to battalion level.

l-or the ('elF investig ation. it was decided to match the same list of respondents with the

one used in the previous CCTT investigation: Battalion Commanders, Battalion

Command Sergeant Majors (CSMs), Battalion Executive Officers (XOs), Battalion

Operations Officcrs (S3s), ('ompany Commanders. Platoon Leaders, and Platoon

Sergeants. The only exception to the earlier respondent list is that Site Staffimemnbers

were not included.

6
For the ARNG investigation, it was decided, after consultation with NGB to reduce the

number of unit respondents. We did not collect input from Battalion XOs and

interviewed Battalion Master Gunners in lieu of CSMs. In addition, in order to obtain a

variety of opinions, the team decided to make an effort to collect input from members of

the NGB's Distributed Battle Simulation Program, i.e. Training Aids, Devices,

Simulators, and Simulations (TADSS) Facilitators and Commander's Operations

Training Assistants (COTAs). The team also included active componentsAC Advisors to

the ARNG and site staff supporting NGB training in the investigation population.

In the OIF investigation, there was one identified respondent demographic factor: duty

position. In order to allow greater comparative analysis, the ARNG investigation

included §even demographic factors:

"* Duty Position

"* Months in position

* Primary VMT

* Level ofVMT experience

* Home State

* OIF Veteran

* Under orders for OIF

Questions were cross-referenced to the class of respondents who would reasonably have

insight on the topic. Physical questionnaires were then prepared for each respondent

within each sample unit.

Both investigations included web-collection of data as an additional or alternative means

of acquiring input from the user community. This web-based approach was conducted as

a test of the efficacy of using the web as a primary method for data collection in these

types of investigations. The web-collection consisted of questionnaires delivered via a

web site. Respondents were asked via the Army Knowledge On Line (AKO) web page

and emails to visit a web site where they could complete the questionnaire. The OIF

investigation web-collection was designed to serve as a proof of principle. The primary

goals were to determine how to disseminate such an investigation, determine whether the

target audience would voluntarily respond and whether their responses would suffice to

provide sufficient data to conduct an analysis that answered the government's

investigation goals. Maximizing web questionnaire response was emphasized. Thus,

neither questionnaires nor respondents by position were explicitly matched between the

physical and web-collections for the OIF investigation. The web-collection approach

proved successful as an approach to soliciting input from a significant number of users.

Building on the success of the web effort for OIF in obtaining user input, we decided to

make the ARNG web-collection effort mirror the physical collection effort by matching

both the sample of respondents and questions posed using either approach. The only

difference between physical and web-collection was that the web-collection effort asked

for respondents who had served in the appropriate positions anytime in the last two years,

whereas the physical collection could only collect data in actual units from respondents

currently serving in the designated positions. For purposes of efficiency, only the web7
collection method was used to collect data from AC advisors, site staff, COTAs and

TADSS facilitators.

Respondents on the web went through an informal, multi-level vetting process. The

manner of announcement, via AKO home page announcement and targeted email, served

as the first level of screening. At the'next level respondent were forced to perform a selfscreening. They first had to decide that they fit the announced survey criteria and go to

the survey site. Once on the site, they had to complete a short demographic

questionnaire. They were then given'questionnaires targeted to their duty position.

Anyone who responded, even if they did not pass the vetting process and qualify as part

of our target population, was asked to complete an "other respondent" questionnaire.

This is a recommended technique in Order to avoid discouraging these particular

volunteers from agreeing to participate in the future.

The final screening step was completed by a MYMIC Subject Matter Expert (SME)

analyzing the data. The Analyst reviewed each answer to determine its validity to the

question. Answers that did not follow from the question were not included in the

analysis. When this occurred, the SME would also review that individual's entire

questionnaire. Some questionnaires were obviously not submitted as serious responses so

they were selectively removed from the database.

For each investigation, MySQL databases were developed for use as a repository for the

results of all questionnaires. These databases are being delivered with the final report to

the Government for use in future investigations or analysis's. In addition, Data Analysis

Interface (DAI) tools were developed to assist MYMIC analyze the large amount of data

collected via the web. The DAI toolset is also being delivered in the form of code to the

Government for potential future use. This was not a formal deliverable and the scope of

this investigation did not allow the development of complete documentation of the DAI.

MYMIC intends to further develop this toolset for future corporate use.

Data Collection Phase

Teams visited each unit within the sample population. The team provided an in-briefing

to battalion leadership. They then conducted interviews of available battalion level

leaders and surveyed available company and platoon level leaders. The interviews

consisted of prepared questionnaires, but included the opportunity for follow-up

questions and discussion. Often the follow-up provided observations as useful as the

formal questionnaire. These observations will be discussed at the end of this report.

An issue with the OIF physical collection effort was the turn-over of personnel within the

targeted duty positions. Units were replacing key personnel almost immediately upon

return from Iraq, before our team could visit. In the case of one battalion, the unit was

literally unloading duffle bags from shipping containers during the visit, and even that

unit had personnel turnover. Fortunately, in some cases, Majors who served as S3s

during OIF had moved up to the XO position, in which case they were interviewed using

the S3 questionnaire.

8
Web-collection occurred concurrently with unit visits to complete the physical collection.

It will be noted that for some respondent categories, there is a relatively small sample size

compared to respondent populations. The research is not intended to determine the

opinions of the various populations. Rather, the research uses consensus opinions that

provide relative insight into the effectiveness of virtual simulations.

Data Analysis Phase

The final phase consisted of aggregating the data in a reversal of the earlier

disaggregating process in Figure 1. As shown in Figure 4, within each investigation,

OIF and ARNG, individual answers were combined into consensus answers for each

question, by-position. These by-position consensus answers were then used to determine

by-position, sub-issue findings. By-position, sub-issue findings were combined into

general, sub-issue findings. Finally, general, sub-issue findings were used to derive issue

findings.

Study Sub- "nsenus

Study j~~ýJb ] , SUb- 11-A2~ :Consensus 4isu q Issue I Issue 1.2 4AnsweA r

Study Sub Consensu Answer,

IssueI3 ssue 1.3 Answer

Figure 4. Investigation findings aggregation

In the OIF investigation, due to the asymmetry between physical and web-collection, the

web collected data was aggregated to the by-position sub-issue finding level, but was not

used to determine general sub-issue findings. Instead, the web results were analyzed

separately to evaluate the viability of using the web to conduct similar investigation

efforts in the future.

In the ARNG investigation, however, there was symmetry between the web physical and

web-collections. Further, the web-collection effort was more successful and more

informative than expected. Therefore, in order to provide the best investigation results,

the web and physical collection efforts were combined at the by-position, sub-issue

finding level to form general sub-issue findings.

The ARNG effort analysis consisted of two types of analysis. For quantitative questions,

there was a statistical analysis. However, many of the questions were qualitative

requiring short answers. These questions were reviewed by a MYMIC SME, who first

screened the answers, then grouped them into categories in order to obtain a weighting of

9
respondent opinion. These weighting were then used to derive consensus answers. As an

example, a question might ask, "What is the most significant limitation to using a VMT?"

Within a respondent position, some individuals might have skipped the question

completely. Other individuals might have provided an answer that did not relate directly

to the question. Of the remaining individuals, some might have provided a single

limitation. Others might have listed multiple limitations, with no indication as to which

they believed to be the most significant.

Their answers were grouped and thent added. Continuing with this example, there might

have been sixteen answers referring to distance/location, eight referring to time.

availability, four referring to scheduling, etc. Our analysis process then determines that

the user population believes distance/location is the most significant limitation to VMT

use, followed by time availability etc. Further, one can compare the responses to see

their relative strengths, i.e. in this example distance/location is not only the stronger

answer but is cited twice as often as the next answer, sixteen references versus eight,

inferring it is two times more important to the respondents as a sample of the population.

For select questions, additional relative analysis was conducted to determine differences

between Fixed and Mobile VMT user opinions and differences between CCTT and

SIMNET user opinions.

Macro Level Analysis (MALA) I

Concurrent with data collection, the investigation team reviewed CCTT and SIMNET

usage data provided by the government through their support contractor (Madison

Research) for monitoring Contractor Logistics Support (CLS) at these sites. Our goal

was to determine if any insights on preparation for deployment to Iraq or general ARNG

usage could be inferred from a review of that reported data (e.g., did sites at installations

deploying significant numbers of units to theater have an increase or decrease in usage

between unit notifications and their deployment). Results of the two macro-level analysis

(MALA) are listed in the section covering the findings specific to each of the two

investigations.

10
Findings & Discussions

This section of the report provides the overall findings by research issue for each

investigation: OIF and ARNG.

The section is divided into sections that present first OIF investigation findings and then

the ARNG investigation findings. For each investigation, each issue and its related

finding are shown, followed by sub-issues and overall sub-issue findings. For readers

who want to see the input used to develop the overall sub-issue findings, Annex A and B

list for each sub-issue;. the same overall finding as contained in this section and the byposition, findings from which the overall finding was derived.

Each investigation had a physical and web-collection. In the OIF investigation, the webcollection data was developed to evaluate the practicality and validity of a web collection

approach. Due to differences between the two approaches in terms of both questions and

respondents, the web data was not specifically reviewed during the data analysis. In the

ARNG investigation, however, the web-collection mirrored the physical and webcollected data. Therefore the web data set was considered during data analysis. That is,

for each position, web and physical sub-issue findings were combined to generate

general, sub-issue findings. In the ARNG annex, the by-position, sub-issue table shows

first the finding from the physical collection effort and then the finding from the web

collection effort. Consensus answers by position are delivered in electronic form in Parts

II (OIF) and III (ARNG) of this report as word documents. This same data is also

available in the MySQL database also delivered with this report. Electronic files of these

products are being delivered due to their size, 250 pages.

After the findings for each effort, there is a general discussion, including observations

made during data collection but outside of the formal issue-analysis-finding process.

11
0IF Study.

The purpose of the OIF investigation was to evaluate the contribution of virtual

simulations to combat effectiveness. Data was collected using physical interviews and

surveys of targeted units that were representative of the population of active duty units

which deployed to and fought in Operation Iraqi Freedom. Additional data was collected

via the web as a test of the potential for use of this approach in the future. Interviews and

surveys were conducted between August and November, 2004. Below is the number of

respondents for both the physical and web collection efforts:

Table 1. OIF Investigation Physical Collection Results

BN BN BN CO PLT PLT

Unit CDR CSM XO BN S3 CDR LDR SGT Total

2-8 IN 1 1 2 3 11 9 27

1-22 IN 1 1 1 3 3 9

3-66 AR 1I 1 1 1 3 4 7 18

1-67 AR 1 1 1 1 2 6

1/3 CAV 1 1 3 10 12 27

3/3 CAV 1 1 1 1 4 11 11 30

1-16 IN 1 1 2 4 6 6 20

1-34 AR 1 1 1 1 2 6 8 20

Total 8 6 5 8 20 52 58 157

Table 2. OIF Investigation Web Collection Results

CO PLT PLT

CDR LDR SGT Total

102 114 31 247

Findings:

ISSUE 1: Do units alerted for deployment view virtual simulation-based training as a

critical part of their preparation?

FINDING: Units alerted for deployment did consider virtual simulation-based training as

a component of their training strategy, but not as a critical part of preparation for combat.

They preferred to execute predeployment training in live environments. Virtual

environment training was not explicitly included in predeployment training plans but

when selected and used it was because of bottom-up decisions; CCTT training to prepare

for war was predominantly scheduled, planned, and executed by company and platoon

level leaders.

12
SUBISSUE 1.1: How was CCTT generally used in unit training prior to deployment

notification?

FINDING: Pre-notification, CCTT training frequency varied from weekly to annually

among unit. Tasks selected for training were predominantly offensive and defensive,

rather than stability or support operations. CCTT training typically occurred at the

company and platoon echelon. Training is METL-based because units believe CCTT

enhances METL proficiency.

Position Sub Issue Finding

Battalion Commander Pre-notification CCTT followed no Army-wide pattern. There was no common

frequency of use. 75% of battalion commanders trained typically CO/TRP echelon.

Tasks trained included: attack, movement-to-contact, and defend. All the battalion

commanders believed CCTT enhanced METL proficiency.

Battalion CSM CSMs indicated no cross unit patterns in using CCTT. CCTT was used at the

platoon and company level with no CSMs reporting battalion level training. Types of

tasks varied from unit to unit. Frequency of training varied by battalion. All CSMs

stated CCTT enhanced unit level METL.

Battalion XO Use of CCTT varied widely by unit both in frequency, task, and echelon. Generally,

units used CCTT for lower echelon, platoon and company training and trained both

maneuver and gunnery tasks. All XOs believed CCTT was highly effective in

enhancing unit METL proficiency.

S3 CCTT training varied by unit. Two S3s stated it was done quarterly and one

monthly. 66% of S3s stated they typically conducted platoon echelon training and

33% stated company echelon training was typical. No S3 reported battalion level

training. All S3s reported that CCTT enhanced unit METL proficiency.

Company Commander Units varied greatly in frequency of CCTT use prior to notification, from monthly to

annually. 86% of commanders believed CCTT enhanced METL proficiency.

Platoon Leader CCTT frequency varied by unit, 32% stated quarterly, 28% reporting monthly. 87%

of platoon leaders stated CCTT enhanced unit proficiency.

Platoon Sergeant CCTT training frequency varied by unit. 34% reported quarterly use. 20% reported

annual use and 17% each reported semi-annual and weekly. 73% of platoon

sergeants stated CCTT enhanced METL proficiency.

SUBISSUE 1.2: Did unit develop a focused or specific training strategy as part of

preparation for deployment?

FINDING: Most units developed a pre-deployment training strategy. This strategy was

focused at lower echelon units and individual skills. Units selected mostly offensive

tasks, especially movement to contact. Most units included gunnery training.

Position Sub Issue Finding

Battalion Commander 80% of battalion commanders reported executing a deployment specific training

strategy. These strategies focused on lower echelon skills: platoon and some

company. 50% focused on collective skills and 50% on individual skills. 50% of the

battalions included gunnery training, including one battalion that used CCTT as part

of gunnery. All the battalions reported company and platoon leadership requesting

CCTT time as part of deployment training. All the battalions reported successfully

complying with their training strategy.

13
Battalion CSM 83% of CSMs reported their units developing a pre-deployment specific training

strategy. This strategy was focused at the lowest levels: individual and platoon

collective tasks. 67% of CSMs reported that junior leadership, platoon leaders, and

__ company commanders personally requested CCTT training time.

Battalion XO 50% of units developed a pre-deployment specific training strategy. This consisted

of offensive and defensive operations. Company level leadership requested CCTT

as part of this training strategy.

S3 67% of units developed a pre-deployment specific training strategy. This strategy

. consisted of maneuver and gunnery tasks trained at the platoon and crew level.

Company commanders and platoon leaders requested CCTT access as part of this

strategy. All S3s reported that their unit was able to comply with their strategy.

Company Commander 67% of company commanders stated their units developed a pre-deployment

specific training strategy. Most units trained at the lowest echelon, individual and

small units. Tasks were mostly offensive with some SASO and defensive. Many

units trained gunnery or small arms. All responding commanders stated they were

able to comply with their strategy, with some difficulties.

Platoon Leader 74% of platoon leaders reported that their unit followed a pre-deployment training

strategy.

SUBISSUE 1.3: What live training was conducted to prepare for combat operations?

FINDING: Pre-deployment training consisted mostly (>50%) of live training-primarily

on offensive tasks. Most live training was conducted at platoon level. Units used a variety

of live-training venues: field training areas, ranges, sand tables, and formal and ad hoc

MOUT sites.

Position Sub Issue Finding

Battalion Commander All battalions included live training in their deployment training plan. 100% of

battalions trained offensive tasks and 66% trained defensive tasks. Only one

battalion trained SASO tasks. Live training was multi-echelon focused on lower

echelons: crew, platoon and company. Only one battalion conducted battalion level

training. Battalions used a variety of training environments, including training areas,

ranges, sand tables, and even abandoned buildings.

Battalion CSM The majority of CSMs reported that live training consisted of over 30% of predeployment preparation with two reporting the total to be over 50%. 50% stated

they typically trained at platoon level with 37% stating they trained at company and

13% reporting crew level training. Reported resources included MOUT sites and

gunnery ranges.

Battalion XO All XOs reported over 50% of their pre-deployment training being conducted in the

live environment. This training was done at the company/troop level and consisted

of a variety of tasks, with emphasis on gunnery.

S3 Over 50% of pre-deployment training was conducted in a live environment. This

training was conducted at a variety of echelons but typically at platoon level. Units

trained C2, maneuver, and gunnery tasks. Resources used included sand tables,

maneuver areas and ranges.

Company Commander 86% of company commanders stated their unit included live training as a

component of pre-deployment training. Over 50% of combat training was conducted

in the live environment. Live training consisted of lower echelon units, company and

platoon, conducting a variety of tasks, including maneuver, gunnery, and C2 tasks

on ranges and in training areas.

Platoon Leader 96% of platoon leaders reported that live training was part of their pre-deployment

training. This training included gunnery and offensive maneuver tasks. Only one

respondent indicated a stability task. Units trained in maneuver areas and on

ranges, with a few using sand tables.

14
Platoon Sergeant 87% of platoon sergeants reported doing live training as part of pre-deployment

training. Gunnery was a predominant task, followed by maneuver training. Units

used ranges, field sites, sand tables and a few units used MOUT sights.

SUBISSUE 1.4: Were virtual training events scheduled to prepare units for combat

operations?

FINDING: Units conducted CCTT training during pre-deployment, but it was not a

formal or mandatory part of a training strategy. Units used CCTT to train at the platoon

echelon on combat tasks. Less than 10% of pre-deployment training occurred in CCTT.

60-70% of units used CCTT after their vehicles were shipped. (NOTE: See discussion on

USAREUR for the exception to this finding)

Position Sub Issue Finding

Battalion Commander All battalions conducted CCTT events as part of pre-deployment training. No

battalion incorporated CCTT within their training strategy nor prescribed a minimum

of CCTT use. Half of the battalions reported CCTT as consisting of less than 30%

of training while the other half reported it being less than 10%. 80-100% of tasks

trained were combat versus SASO tasks. 60% of the battalion used CCTT to train

_following vehicle shipping.

Battalion CSM 83% of CSMs reported using CCTT as part of pre-deployment training. CSMs

reported training echelon was typically platoon or company level, with no reports of

crew or battalion. All CSMs reported that offensive and defensive tasks consisted of

over 60% of pre-deployment training with 40% reporting over 80%. There was no

consistent answer on how much of these tasks were conducted in CCTT, with

answers varying from 10 to greater that 50%. 67% of CSMs reported using CCTT

after vehicles were shipped. Only one CSM said his HQ required CCTT training as

part of pre-deployment training.

Battalion XO All units reported using CCTT as part of their pre-deployment training. CCTT was

used equally at the platoon and company levels. 75% of XOs reported using CCTT

after their vehicles were shipped. No HQ required a minimal CCTT use.

S3 40-60% of pre-deployment training was conducted on offensive and defensive

tasks. However, only half of units integrated CCTT into their strategy and CCTT

comprised less than 10% of this training. No HO prescribed CCTT training. Only

half of units used CCTT after their vehicles were. shipped.

Company Commander 57% of commanders stated CCTT was part of their pre-deployment training. 45% of

company commanders stated they typically conducted platoon echelon training and

38% stated they conducted company echelon training. 60-80% of tasks were

combat related but less than 10% of training was conducted in CCTT. There was

no effort at battalion to develop CCTT-specific training nor did the chain of

command require a minimum, CCTT usage.

Platoon Leader 77% of platoon leaders reported using CCTT as part of their pre-deployment

training strategy while just 58% reported using it after their vehicles were shipped.

Platoon Sergeant 52% of platoon sergeants reported using CCTT as part of pre-deployment training.

39% reported using CCTT after their vehicles were shipped.

ISSUE 2: As currently configured and managed, did CCTT sites adequately meet the

needs of deploying units?

FINDING: CCTT site configuration and management more than adequately met the

needs of deploying units. CCTT was available when needed by deploying units. Users

15
felt CCTT training was highly effective in training collective tasks; not as effective in

training individual tasks. CCTT sites made changes to their operating procedures to better

accommodate deploying units.

SUBISSUE 2. 1: Was CCTT available when deploying units needed it?

FINDING: CCTT was available to support pre-deployment training. Less than 10%

reported training lost due to non-availability. CCTT was not considered important to

completion of unit training strategy.

Position Sub Issue Finding

Battalion Commander All battalions reported CCTT being available to support their training requirements.

One reported difficulty scheduling it. One battalion reported CCTT availability as

being important compared to other training resources.

Battalion CSM CSMs reported CCTT was available when required. 33% reporting difficultly

scheduling it. Only one CSM stated his unit had to cancel training due to CCTT

non-availability.

Battalion XO Only one XO reported CCTT not being available when needed, this due to

scheduling conflicts. No unit had to cancel training due to non-availability.

S3 83% of S3s stated CCTT was available when needed. When it was not available it

was due to scheduling conflicts. On a scale of one to five, S3s stated CCTT

availability importance averaged 2.6. No S3 giving it a five.

Company Commander CCTT was available when deploying units required it, leading to no inability to train.

CCTT availability was only moderately important compared to other resources, a

2.2 on a one to five scale.

Platoon Leader 91% of platoon leaders reported CCTT was available when needed to support their

pre-deployment training. 9% of platoon leaders reported training lost due to

availability.

SUBISSUE 2.2: Were any changes to site operations made to accommodate needs of

deploying units?

FINDING: CCTT sites made changes to support pre-deployment training. CCTT was

available to support pre-deployment training.

Position Sub Issue Finding

Battalion Commander 80% of battalion commanders reported CCTT sites made changes to accommodate

pre-deployment training requirements. All commanders reported CCTT was

available as needed to support training requirements. 60% of commanders reported

participating in this training.

Battalion CSM All CSMs stated CCTT availability supported preparation for deployment. 67% of

CSMs participated in CCTT training during pre-deployment. This participation

varied from mentoring more junior NCOs to participating in a squadron level

exercise.

Battalion XO All XOs reported that CCTT availability supported their preparation for deployment.

75% of XOs participated in CCTT training to improve crew level skills.

S3 67% of S3s reported changes made at CCTT sites to accommodate predeployment training. This includes a site making space available for bn level

elements. All S3s report CCTT availability supported preparation for deployment.

Half of S3s participated in CCTT training.

16
Company Commander 67% of company commanders reported changes made to site operations to support

pre-deployment training. 76% reported that CCTT availability supported unit

_ preparation.

Platoon Leader 83% of platoon leaders reported that CCUT availability supported their preparation

for deployment.

Platoon Sergeant 61% of platoon sergeants stated that CCTT availability supported their preparation

for deployment.'

SUBISSUE 2.3: CCTT Training Effectiveness

FINDING: All respondents felt CCTT had a strong, positive impact training collective

tasks, i.e. crew and unit level. Only platoon sergeants felt it had a positive impact on

individual training. No position felt they would consider their unit "trained" based solely

on CCTT results. CCTT is not considered a substitute for live training, due to CCTT's

relative inability to model the difficulties of combat conditions.

Position Sub Issue Finding

Battalion Commander All battalion commnanders reported CCTT being extremely effective, a five on a

scale of one to five, effective at training collective tasks, i.e. crews and units. 60%

reported it being effective training individuals. No battalion commander would

consider being trained to standard based solely on CCTT. They believed CCTT

was not able to adequately replicate combat conditions, as opposed to live training.

All battalion commanders felt there was an established set of tasks for which CCTT

could train units.

S3 No S3 has ever considered a unit trained to standard bases solely on CCTT due to

the inability of CCTT to sufficiently replicate combat conditions. S3s felt that CCTT

very positively impacts training proficiency for crews and units but believed there is

very little impact on individuals. No S3 experienced negative training from CCTT.

All S3s had an established set of tasks which are trainable on CCTT.

Company Commander Company commanders would not consider their unit trained based solely upon

CCTT due to the level of difference between CCTT and combat conditions. No

commander felt CCTT caused negative training at the crew or unit level; 5% felt it

caused negative training at the individual level. 90% of commanders felt CCTT had

positive impact on crew training, with the majority saying it had extremely positive

impact. 95% of commanders said CCTT had positive impact on unit proficiency, but

there was no majority saying it had an extremely positive impact. Only 80% of

commanders stated CCTT had a positive impact on individual training, but the

majority of these gave it the highest positive impact rating. 71% stated they had

seen no negative impact from CCTT on unit readiness. 90% of company

commanders said there was an established set of tasks which CCTT can train.

Platoon Leader 83% of platoon leaders have never considered their unit trained based exclusively

on CCTT training, due to the inability of CCTT to replicate combat conditions. 17%

did feel there were tasks on which they could train their units to standard

exclusively in CCTT. Platoon leaders overwhelmingly believed CCTT had a positive

impact on individual, crew, and unit proficiency. No platoon leaders felt CCTT had a

negative training impact on crews or units though 4% felt it had a negative impact

on individuals. 83% stated there was an established set of tasks which CCTT can

train.

17
Platoon Sergeant 82% of platoon sergeants stated they would not consider their unit trained based

solely on CCTT results. CCTT realism cannot match combat conditions. 5% of

platoon sergeants felt that CCTT had some negative impact on individuals, though

no platoon sergeant felt it had any negative impact on crew or unit proficiency.

Platoon sergeants felt CCTT had a positive or extremely positive impact on

individual (67%), crew (79%), and unit (75%). 21% of platoon sergeants stated they

have experienced some negative impact from CCTT. 85% of platoon sergeants

reported that there was an established set of tasks for CCTT.

ISSUE 3: What type of predeployment training was conducted in CCTT?

FINDING: Units used CCTT to train offensive tasks from their METL. Training

occurred 'at the company/troop echelon with significant platoon echelon training.

Company commanders primarily managed training. AARs were critical to successful

training. Study respondents reported their AARs being facilitated at the level of the

echelon being trained, i.e. platoons facilitated platoon AARs, companies facilitated

company AARs.. Site staff provided OPFOR. CCTT SAF tactics did not match Iraqi

tactics, techniques, and procedures.

SUBISSUE 3.1: How was CCTT training constructed?

FINDING: Units trained critical tasks, chosen primarily from their METL, but in some

cases selected from command guidance or OPLANs. Units trained mostly offensive

tasks. Units used CCTT to train both maneuver and gunnery skills. Use of TSPs varied

by unit.

Position Sub Issue Finding

Battalion Commander All tasks trained were METL tasks. Half of battalion commanders stated METL was the starting point for CCon planning, while 25% said commander's guidance and

OPLANs. There was no consensus on how tasks or scenarios were selected.

Battalion CSM There was no CSM consensus on how CCTT training was constructed. Units varied

between gunnery and maneuver and between TSPs, in-house scenarios, and NTC

scenarios.

Battalion XO Units used CCTT to train a variety of tasks, including offensive tasks and gunnery.

S3 The starting point for CCTT training was unit METL. Units selected tasks they

thought would support anticipated theater operations. Tasks included offensive

tasks, and gunnery. Tasks were selected to create complex and challenging

training. Half of units used TSPs.

Company Commander CCTT strategy varied widely between units. Task selection and scenarios came

from METL, command guidance, and OPLANs. Most tasks were offensive tasks,

with movement to contact being somewhat common. Units also trained defensive

tasks but not stability or support tasks. 71% of company commanders reported

using TSPs to develop pre-deployment CCTT training.

Platoon Leader Platoon leaders reported that command guidance was generally the start of

exercise preparation, with some reporting METL or orders. Units varied greatly on

the types of scenarios but most reported offensive scenarios, specifically movement

to contact and gunnery. Only one platoon leader reported using a scenario

generated by CCTT.

Platoon Sergeant Platoon sergeants reported that their units trained collective, offensive tasks, mostly

movement-to-contact. Almost exclusively, units generated their own scenarios.

18
SUBISSUE 3.2: What levels of exercises were conducted in CCTT?

FINDING: In similarity to units' overall pre-deployment training strategies, CCTT

training occurred primarily at the Company/Troop level, with less but still significant

platoon level training. Only a few respondents reported battalion level training.

Position Sub Issue Finding

Battalion Commander Battalion commanders reported CO/TRP training in CCTT.

S3 Units conducted'training at platoon, company and battalion echelon. Tasks were

offensive tasks such as deliberate attack, movement to contact, and .react to

contact. Tasks also included gunnery.

Company Commander Typical echelon of training varied by unit, with company/troop being the most

common, while several units reported platoon training being typical and a few

reporting battalion level. Most units trained offensive tasks and gunnery. Some

trained defensive tasks. Only one commander reported training SASO.

Platoon Leader Platoon leaders reported the echelon of training evenly divided between company

and platoon. Platoon trained maneuver, gunner and C2. Almost all platoon leaders

reported performing offensive tasks, specifically movement-to-contact.

Platoon Sergeant Platoon sergeants divided evenly between training typically platoon and company

level tasks. The mnajority of platoon sergeants trained maneuver tasks, with

approximately half of platoon sergeants training gunnery tasks and less than half

training command and control tasks.

SUBISSUE 3.3: Who in the chain of command served as the on-site trainer during

exercises?

FINDING: The primary facilitator of CCTT training were company commanders, with

support from battalion. This was especially true for platoon level training.

Position Sub Issue Finding

Battalion Commander Battalion commanders stated that company commanders were the on-site trainers

during CCTT exercises, with company commanders planning and supervising

training.

S3 The S3 planned company level training. The S3 planned platoon level training with

,company commander input in some units.

Company Commander Platoon level training was typically facilitated by company commanders with

support from battalion. Company level facilitation was evenly divided between

_company and battalion.

SUBISSUE 3.4: After Action Reviews

FINDING: All respondents believed that AARs are critical or extremely critical to

CCTT training success. Respondents varied greatly on who facilitated AARs, with

respondents from the three echelons, battalion, company, and platoon, stating they

facilitated platoon and, especially, company AARs.

19
Position Sub Issue Finding

Battalion Commander AARs are extremely, five on a scale of one to five, critical to a successful CCTT

exercise. Half of battalion commanders stated they facilitated company level AARs

with the other half saying company commanders or company trainers facilitated

them. Only one battalion commander claimed he facilitated platoon level AARs

while the majority of commanders stated company commanders facilitated them.

Battalion CSM All CSMs reported that AARs were extremely critical to CCTT effectiveness.

Battalioýi XO XOs considered the AAR capability to be very critical to CCTT effectiveness.

S3 S3s reported that AARs were critical to a successful CCTT exercise. Company

commanders facilitated AARs at the company and platoon level with some units

using battalion level leadership to facilitate company and platoon AARs and one

unit using platoon leadership to facilitate platoon AARs.

Company (ommander Company commanders believed AARs were extremely critical to CCTT success. The vast majority of company commanders stated they facilitated their own AARs,

with a small minority stating battalion facilitated them. One-fourth of commanders

reported platoon leadership facilitating platoon AARs. The remaining commanders

stated they facilitated those AARs, with a small number reporting some battalion

assistance.

Platoon Leader Platoon leaders believed the AAR is very critical to a successful CCTT exercise.

Platoon AARs are typically facilitated by platoon leadership. 40% of platoon leaders

stated company leadership facilitated all or some AARs and 14% stated site staff

were facilitators.

Platoon Sergeant 48% of sergeants felt that AARs were extremely critical (5) and 27% felt they were

critical (4).

SUBIýSUE 3.5: How was the OPFOR played during exercises?

FINDING: Site staff played the OPFOR. Respondents were consistent in stating that

CCTT OPFOR tactics did not match OPFOR tactics in Iraq.

Position Sub Issue Finding

Battalion Commander All battalion commanders stated that the site staff played the OPFOR.

S3 Site staff played OPFOR in all units.

Company Commander. Site staff played the OPFOR. Commanders reported that the ROE used in CCTT

was dissimilar to that used in Iraq (average of 2 on a 1-5 scale).

Platoon Leader Site staff played the OPFOR. Only 7% of platoon leaders found the CCTT ROE to

be similar to what they experienced in Iraq.

Platoon Sergeant Platoon sergeants reported that the site staff played OPFOR. Platoon sergeants

stated that the CCTT ROE was not similar to the ROE in Iraq.

ISSUE 4: How does training in CCTT environment compare with actual combat?

FINDING: Generally, the CCTT training environment is sufficient to provide adequate

training, but improvements are desired to better model current theater conditions and

improve focused training support to deploying units. Units would like to have a capability

that is short of mission rehearsal, but more specific to the theater than the CCTT Terrain

Databases and SAF capabilities provided at the time they were preparing to deploy. The

lower the echelon, the less satisfaction there was with current models of terrain, vehicle

systems, weapons, and OPFOR tactics. Users especially desire a better OPFOR. Users

also desire improved models of environmental conditions, such as theater specific MOUT

20
terrain and civilians-on-the-battlefield (COBs). There were no tasks that users felt could

only be trained in CCTT. CCTT's strength, however, is its ability to replicate task

conditions in support of multiple training iterations.

SUBISSUE 4.1: Did the CCTT Terrain Databases provide a context that was sufficient

to practice under combat conditions?,

FINDING: Users believed CCTT terrain realism was sufficient to support training. The

lower the echelon (battalion-company-platoon), the less the respondent felt that the

CCTT database modeled actual conditions sufficiently to support theater-specific

training. Users wanted to see more th'eater-specific terrain modeling, in the case of OIF

this included urban terrain and deserts. Users also recommended non-terrain

improvements, specifically adding civilians to the environment and more accurate enemy

TTPs.

Position Sub Issue Finding

Battalion Commander All -battalion commanders reported that the CCTT terrain databases were realistic

enough to support training requirements.

S3 All S3s felt that CCTT databases were realistic enough to meet training

requirements and adequately prepare units for OIF.

Company Commander 76% of company commanders felt that the CCTT terrain databases adequately

modeled conditions in Iraq and prepared them for combat operations. Commanders

recommended better modeling the terrain for theater conditions, specifically desert

and urban environments. Commanders would like to see more civilians, ambush

sites, religious sites, walls, villages, palm groves, and enemy lED tactics.

Platoon Leader 64% of platoon leaders felt the CCTT terrain database adequately prepared them

for Iraq. 57% felt the CCTT terrain was sufficiently realistic to support training,

though 81% felt the training databases were realistic enough to meet training

needs. Platoon leaders recommended improving urban terrain and civilian

presence.

Platoon Sergeant 74% of platoon sergeants stated CCTT databases supported training. Half felt that

the CCTr terrain database was neither adequate for training nor replicated terrain

in Iraq. Platoon sergeants wanted more complex terrain, especially urban terrain,

though there were also mentions of desert, rivers, roads, and bridges.

SUBISSUE 4.2: Was the CCTT OPFOR comparable to enemy fighting units

encountered in theater?

FINDING: Battalion respondents (commanders and S3s) believed CCTT OPFOR was

comparable to Iraqi OPFOR. Company and below respondents stated CCTT did not

adequately model the Iraqi insurgent enemy and its tactics. Respondents want CCTT to

model the specific OPFOR tactics they would face in-theater. In the case of OIF,. these

included such tactics as IEDs, VBIEDs, snipers, mortars, hit & run tactics, low density

attacks, 360 degree engagements, and mixing with civilians. Again, respondents mention

civilians on the battlefield, including such implications as traffic.

Position Sub Issue Finding

Battalion Commander All battalion commanders believed that CCTT OPFOR was comparable to Iraqi

fighting units, though one commander recommended adding insurgents to the

OPFOR.

21
S3 All S3s felt the CCTT OPFOR was comparable to units encountered in Iraq.

Company Commander Company commanders would modify CCTT to better replicate insurgent tactics.

Only half of commanders thought CCTT adequately modeled their opponents in

Iraq. Their actual opponents used insurgent tactics versus conventional.

Commanders would like to see smaller unit engagements on non-contiguous

battlefields. They want to see dismounts using RPGs, IEDs, civilians, and

I insurgents in civilian attire.

Platoon Leader Platoon leaders divided almost exactly in half over whether CCTT OPFOR was

comparable to actual OPFOR. Platoon leaders said Iraqi OPFOR used insurgent

tactics such as ambushes, IEDs, and snipers. Iraqi OPFOR was mixed-in with

civilians and used trucks and other POVs. The Iraqis were much less accurate in

* direct fire attacks. They recommended more urban environments, more insurgent

OPFOR, and multi-directional enemy attacks.

Platoon Sergeant Almost all platoon sergeants stated the CCTT OPFOR did not adequately model

the insurgents they faced in Iraq, in such areas as lack of organizational structure,

lack of uniforms, dismounted tactics, and hit and run tactics. Just over half of

platoon sergeants felt the differences between CCTT and Iraq were significant

enough to state that CCTT did not adequately model OPFOR. The sergeants

recommended building dismounted insurgents and insurgent tactics into CCTT.

This included IEDs, suicide bombers, mortars, and mines. Platoon sergeants also

focused on including civilians and civilian vehicles.

SUBISSUE 4.3: Were CCTT models of simulator characteristics comparable to actual

combat performance?

FINDING: Majorities of all users felt CCTT adequately modeled weapon system combat

performance. Some users said actual weapons performed better in combat than modeled

in CCTT. Additionally, some report enemy weapon systems, specifically RPGs, operated

better in CCTT than in combat. Users had several recommendations for improvement.

Some include improving the MIAI's loader position to allow M240 engagements and to

better model main gun loading. Users want better dismounted capability. Users also want

HMMWV simulators. Users wanted CCTT to input vehicle degradation, either due to

maintenance or weapon breakdowns or degradation to communications due to terrain

(urban) masking.

Position Sub Issue Finding

Battalion Commander Battalion commanders believed that CCTT adequately modeled actual weapon

systems both in operation, weapon effects, and movement. One commander felt

CCTT did not adequately model weapon effects in an urban environment.

Commanders jumped out of the physical modeling area to propose changes to

environment modeling. These changes all involved making CCTT experience more

aligned with Current Operational Environment (COE) conditions, including Enemy,

Terrain, and Civilians from the METT-TC. Commanders wanted additional systems

modeled, specifically gun mounted HMMWVs. One commander wanted a system

that expanded the virtual environment to allow off-vehicle actions.

Battalion XO One XO felt that communications capabilities within CCTT were better than realized

in combat.

S3 All S3s felt that CCTT accurately and sufficiently modeled actual equipment

performance. S3s had many recommendations for improvements. These include

improvements in terrain databases: MOUT, higher fidelity, COBs. These also

include better SAF. OPFOR SAF should better replicate actual OPFOR TTP,

including IEDs. Friendly SAF should improve tethered vehicles and tethered

dismounts.

22
Company Commander Company commanders felt CCTT modeled well actual weapon, maneuver,

configuration, communication and other operational combat performance. Areas

commanders said were different was that CCTT had more limited visibility and that

CCTT did not replicate communication troubles caused by breakdown or terrain

(urban) masking. Conimanders recommended more vehicle modeling, including

civilian vehicles and HMMWVs. Commanders also recommended modeling wind

effects and insurgent hide positions

Platoon Leader Platoon leaders felt CCTT adequately modeled actual weapon (81%), movement

(72%), and configuration (79%) effects. Platoon leaders recommended several

changes, including: allowing the crew to fire from outside hatches (including the

tank's loader's machine gun), creating more noise including bullet and RPG hits,

modeling breach recoil, turret traverse in relationship to the hull, and.loading and/or

un-jamming weapons. Platoon leaders said they could travel in reverse in combat

much faster than in CCTT. They said urban terrain and noise degraded

communications in combat. Platoon leaders wanted to see more distracters, such

as civilians, mosques, and cars.

Platoon Sergeant Majorities of platoon sergeants believed CCTT adequately modeled actual combat

performance, including weapon effects (80%), movement (60%), operational characteristics (67%), and communications (73%). Differences include: RPGs were

more effective in CCTT, CCTT required too many MRS updates, CCUT had to have

better tank loader station modeling including using the M240 and loading main gun

rounds, CCTT weapons were too accurate, HEAT and AP round effects were less

in CCTT, the M2/3 handled better in combat, vehicles were much hotter in combat,

and CCTT fields of view were too restrictive. Several platoon sergeants reported

that combat communications were better than CCTT communications, though two

reported the opposite. However, only a few platoon sergeants made

recommendations to change equipment representations. These included

recommendation to improve the communications within CCTT and two

recommendations to a~dd a loader's M240. Rather than changing equipment

modeling, most platoon sergeants took the opportunity to recommend changes to

OPFOR/civilian modeling. These included introduction of aggressive theaterinsurgent tactics (IEDs, VBIEDs, snipers, mortars, mines, shooting from civilian

crowds, and close-in engagements of 300-600 meters). Platoon sergeants also

recommended more urban terrain, civilians and civilian vehicles including civilian

interaction, HMMWVs and AT-4s.

SUBISSUE 4.4: What were the most significant unexpected conditions encountered in

combat for which training had not prepared units?

FINDING: All respondents overwhelmingly identified OPFOR tactics as the most

unexpected condition faced in Iraq. Users wanted CCTT to better model theater insurgent

tactics. Company grade respondents also mentioned unexpected terrain conditions.

Battalion level respondents did not. S3s had the most specific comments, including

comments referencing operational conditions such as rapid task organizing, non-linear

fights, crowd control, and including training combat support and service-support

Soldiers.

Position Sub Issue Finding

Battalion Commander Commanders stated the most significant unexpected condition encountered was

insurgent TTP. Commanders also wanted better theater specific replication,

including terrain (MOUT), civilians, non-linear engagements (360 degree

battlefield). Commanders recommended dynamic terrain ...terrain that changed due

to unit actions, such as collapsed buildings.

23
Battalion CSM CSMs desired a more accurate replication of operational conditions, including

terrain (MOUT and COBs) and OPFOR TTP. Other suggestions included better

dismounted operations, air-ground operations, checkpoint and road block

operations, and integrating individual MILES into CCTT to allow individual crew

casualties.

Battalion XO XOs felt that the most unexpected conditions in combat dealt with insurgent tactics,

including IEDs, mortars, and small arms engagements within MOUT conditions.

XOs recommended adding IEDs to CCTT, more incoming mortar events, especially

on stationary units, and MOUT databases including civilians.

S3 Soldiers were initially hesitant to pull their triggers. Units were not prepared to

recognize IEDs, crowd control and reacting to fire from crowds. Quick task

organizing. S3s recommended training for IEDs, training in a three dimensional

environment, more theater specific scenarios, and the ability to train CS and CSS

,_ _ troops in combat operations.

Company Commander Company Commanders identified several unexpected conditions. In the area of

environment, these included the level of urbanization, restrictive terrain, city noises,

civilians and civilian traffic. In the area of tactics: insurgent tactics including IEDs,

hit and run attacks, no organized resistance. Commanders also did not expect to

task organize from mechanized to motorized formations and to conduct SASO.

Platoon Leader Unexpected conditions platoon leaders found included dismounted operations,

MOUT, fighting unconventional tactics including IEDs, RPG ambushes and mines,

and dealing with civilians.

Platoon Sergeant Platoon sergeants again discussed unexpected insurgent tactics, including IEDs,

VBIEDs, mines, mortars and snipers. They also reported unexpected environmental

conditions, including urban terrain, civilians, restricted roads, and rough terrain.

They recommended more dismounted operations, more checkpoint operations, and

CASEVAC training.

SUBISSUE 4.5: Did CCTT prepare units for blue-on-blue encounters?

FINDING: All units reported some though few fratricide incidents. All incidents arose

from difficult situational awareness in tactically and environmentally complex conditions,

specifically engagements between units not fully aware of each other's presence or

operations. Respondents stated CCTT helped in preventing more fratricide incidents.

However, they recommended more joint, interagency, and multi-national (JIM) cross

training in realistically complex situations.

Position Sub Issue Finding

Battalion Commander CCTT prepared units to avoid fratricide incidents. Commanders recommended

depicting a greater variety of friendly vehicles to better prepare units to avoid

fratricide.

S3 . S3s reported two blue-on-blue events, one in which Iraqi police were mistaken for

insurgents and one in which their unit traversed another unit's area and reacted to

an attack on the other unit without proper coordination. S3s recommended being

able to train dismounts in MOUT environments. They also recommended great

scenario clutter.

24
Company Commander Company commanders reported more friendly incidents than battalion respondents.

These were mostly incidents caused by misidentifying targets, by poor coordination

between flanking or co-located units, and by lack of situational awareness. Twothirds of commanders stated CCTT prepared their unit for friendly fire incidents.

Commanders recomniended putting actual operational terrain into CCTT, allowing

familiarization training. Commanders reiterated recommendations to make

environment more complex with urban terrain, mosques, and civilians.

Commanders recommended graphics good enough to allow friend-or-foe

identification.

Platoon Leader 21% of platoon leaders reported a friendly fire incident. These consisted mostly of

misidentification.' Three-fourths of platoon leaders felt CCTT prepared their units for

these situations., Platoon leaders said training with sister services (marines) and

increased MOUT training would help prevent fratricide.

Platoon Sergeant Only about one-fourth of platoon sergeants reported a blue-on-blue incident in Iraq.

These were all from misidentification, either at night or in the day due to stress or

enemy action. Two-thirds of platoon sergeants stated CCTT adequately prepared

them for these events. A minority of platoon sergeants provided recommendations

for improvement. These include more urban settings; more friendly dismounts

including observation posts, patrols, checkpoints, and road blocks; SAF friendly

units; and joint training (with marines). Some recommended putting vehicle

markings on CCTT vehicles.

SUBISSUE 4.6: Were combined arms or joint operations conditions encountered in

combat different than as represented in CCTT?

FINDING: Most units did not conduct combined arms training in CCTT during predeployment. The combined arms training conducted was limited to armor-infantry

cooperation. No unit conducted joint training. Recommendations for improving

combined arms and joint training capability include adding dismounted capability,

improving CAS modeling, adding additional vehicles including foreign and sister service

vehicles and HMMWVs.

Position Sub Issue Finding

Battalion Commander According to battalion commanders, combined arms training did not seem

important as an objective of their pre-deployment training. The majority reported

conducting combined arms training, but it was limited to armor-infantry. Only one

reported using CCTT to train air-ground coordination by platoon leaders. No

battalion commander-used CCTT to train joint operations. To better support

combined arms training, commanders recommended increasing the variety of

weapon and vehicle systems and improving dismounted operations modeling.

Commanders recommended adding a Ground, Forward Air Controller (GFAC) to

support joint operations and building in a method to train inter-agency coordination.

S3 Only one-third of S3s were able to conduct combined arms training in CCTT as part

of pre-deployment training, due to time constraints. The one S3 whose unit did train

combined arms stated CCTT was very adequate. S3s recommended several ways

to make CCTT more effective. Several recommended being able to task organize

down to vehicle level. One S3 recommended adding aviation simulators. No S3

trained joint operations but they recommended improving CAS modeling and

,building Marine vehicles and Air Force observation capabilities into CCTT.

25
Company Commander Company commanders reported participating in combined arms operations of

various compositions, including armor, infantry, engineer, and EOD. A small

number of commanders reported training combined arms operations in CCTT.

Many commanders reported conducting both joint and multi-national operations,

though none reported training in joint operations in CCTT. Commanders

recommended more Air Force participation and modeling coalition forces. 40% of

commanders experienced some negative impact on unit readiness from training in

CCTT.

Platoon Leader 45% of platoon leaders felt their unit experienced a negative impact due to CCTT.

Platoon Sergeant Only one-fourth of platoon sergeants reported any negatiye impact on unit

readiness from CCTT.

SUBISSUE 4.7: Were there specific battlefield events that virtual training only provided

preparation?

FINDING: Respondents did not believe there were tasks which only CCTT, vice other

environment or devices, could train. Several discussed the ability of CCTT to replicate

specific, theater, environmental conditions, such as specific terrain or terrain types

(rivers) or friendly, enemy, or neutral Order of Battle (large convoys, insurgents,

civilians).

Position Sub Issue Finding

Battalion Commander No battalion commander felt that there were battlefield events that only CCTT could

prepare their units for. However, one commander identified that CCTT could not

prepare his unit for MEDEVAC or recovery operations. The commanders expressed

desire for better modeling of COE conditions. This included more vehicle types,

better modeling of actual OPFOR TTP, modeling of COBs, weapon effects on

terrain, and JIM representation.

Battalion XO XOs recommended a theater specific database. They recommended improved airground integration capability. They recommended adding the capability of

generating a 5-20 truck convoy (SAF) for convoy training.

S3 The only CCTT-only event mentioned was a situation where the unit was separated

from OPFOR by a river. S3s recommended several improvements to CCTT.

System improvements included improving dismounts and adding resolution to

create individual enemy insurgents. Administrative improvements included creating

ROE scenarios, MOUT scenarios, and making it one-stop training.

Company Commander Commanders felt CCTT cannot train units on reaction to ambush, joint raids, sniper

tactics, IEDs, building clearing, CASEVAC, vehicle and personnel searches, and

dismounted operations. Commanders felt only CCTT could provide training in large

scale engagements, with large maneuver and firing, circular battlefields, and

fratricide potential. Commanders appreciated CCTT's ability to allow multiple

repetitions under identical conditions. Commanders recommended CCTT be

improved via degradable communications, theater specific databases, civilians,

commercial vehicles, more urban terrain, some ability to interact with civilians, and

better insurgent tactics.

Platoon Leader Platoon leaders believed that CCTT is unable to replicate close fighting;

dismounted operations including cordon & search, Combat Search and Rescue

(CSAR); and civil-military operations including negotiations and riot control. Platoon

leaders felt only CCTT could replicate long-range engagements and large scale

engagements. Platoon leaders were appreciative of CCTT's ability to repeat a

scenario under identical conditions. Platoon leaders recommended more MOUT

capability, more OPFOR conducting insurgent tactics including RPG attacks, IEDs,

and ambushes. Platoon leaders would like to see more background noise, vehicle

breakdowns, motion, and accurate environmental conditions (heat). Platoon leaders

would like the ability to fight their vehicles out of their various hatches.

26
Platoon Sergeant Platoon sergeants recommended making the CCTT environment more COE

specific, focusing on insurgent tactics and urban terrain. Platoon sergeants wanted

more dismount capability, a better loader's station, better communications and

HMMWV operations. Two sergeants wanted more CCUT time and one

recommended random terrain generation.

USAREUR Study

The investigation initially included USAREUR units in the desired sample in order to

more accurately reflect the population. USAREUR units were not available for physical

collection, but interest in visiting USAREUR continued because Europe was the only

location with reported prescriptive CCTT training practices. In February 2005, the

investigation team visited the USAREUR CCTT Site at Seventh Army Training

Command (7ATC) in Grafenwoehr for interviews. This visit was requested because

during predeployment, units being sent to Iraq were required to train in CCTT. The

investigation team wanted to learn first hand the basis for this required training and how

it was conducted. The team, using a separately developed protocol, interviewed ten

personnel including government civil servants and contractors supporting 7ATC CCTT

and combat maneuver training center (CMTC) training sites. Those questions and the

consensus answers developed from an analysis of the responses is shown in Appendix C.

The team also conducted a telephone interview with BG Tucker, currently Assistant

Division Commander for 1st Armor Division (AD); he was the Commander of the I"

Brigade during the above events and during its subsequently operation's in Iraq.

BG Tucker indicated that the prescriptive training strategy followed by his unit was a

comprehensive train-up for deployment of which CCTT was one portion. The goal Of

this directed training was to insure all platoons in the Brigade demonstrated training

proficiency to a minimal level (gate) prior to deployment and to re new qualifications that

would expire prior to or shortly after deployment (e.g., gunnery table qualifications). The

primary factor in focusing this training at platoon level was time available prior to

deployment. BG Tucker believes the entire training regime used - dubbed the Two

Minute Drill (2MD) - was a successful approach and contributed to the ability of the unit

to execute its missions in the combat theater.

The following findings were derived from reviewing data collected resulted from the

separate portion of this investigation conducted in USAREUR:

USAREUR, specifically 1 st AD, used CCTT to insure all Armor and Mechanized

Infantry Platoons had achieved a minimal level of training proficiency on select

close combat tasks anticipated for operations in Iraq.

o Training was prescriptive

o Dedicated and experienced CMTC Observer/Controllers managed the

CCTT training

o Scenario content was custom designed by 7th ATC

o A standard task set and conditions were established by higher echelon

headquarters

27
"* Units and Soldiers that went through the 2MD in CCTT were highly cooperative,

enthusiastic, and accepted the need for structured training.

"* CCTT scenarios were part of a command-wide strategy (Two Minute Drill) to

hone gunnery and maneuver skill sets

" Positive Aspects

"o Units could train on Terrain similar to where they would fight

"o Scenarios could be repeated as many times as each platoon required

"o Observer/Controllers insured consistent conduct of scenarios

"o Higher level command and staff could concentrate on other deployment

duties

o Negative aspects

"o The "doctrinally" designated trainer did not have responsibility or control

of the training

"o Units with high readiness levels did not get to use the training time to

further enhance skills

"o Approach required contractor site augmentation to support 24/7 operations

"o Non deploying units lost scheduled training time and access to virtual

simulation

"o Other training venues (e.g. CMTC) operations were reduced in order to

provide O/C staff at CCTT

The USAREUR experience validates the potential for prescriptive, structured training in

virtual simulations, but a specific approach to executing such a strategy needs further

investigation. The 2MD was more aki n to a certification than training: certification' at

the Division and higher level than at the small unit level central to this investigation.

Tasks were approved by Division but selected by CMTC, an Army level asset, based

upon their assessment of OIF tactical requirements. Current platoon training levels and

anticipated roles of platoons within Company and Battalion maneuver schemes were not

a factor in the 2MD. Doctrinal platoon trainers, the battalion leadership, neither directly

participate in the preparation, execution nor assessment. There was some company

leadership presence, but the only reported leader regularly involved was the Division

Commander. Training results, other than a "pass," did not appear to have been captured

nor was there follow-up to insure retention of skills, though this could very likely have

happened in theater. The 7ATC after-action report (Russel, 2003) mentions CCTT in the

description of the total effort, but does not list it as an accomplishment.

This was a successful certification event, well planned and executed. Platoons were

required to demonstrate required proficiency on the centrally selected tasks and the event

took advantage of the ability of CCTT to replicate the same exercise, reiterating a

scenario until a platoon demonstrated competency. Platoons not demonstrating

competency received excellent coaching from the Observer/Controllers. Only the

28
controlled, prescriptive execution of the 2MD would have allowed the number of

platoons to pass through the CCTT facility in the limited time available and coordinate

that event with the others occurring at 7ATC. The impact though was a lack of flexibility

in tasks. Given CCTT's flexibility and skill of 7ATC personnel, units might have

presented a menu from which small unit leaders could have selected tasks that were most

appropriate to their unit needs.

USAREUR's successes do not necessarily shed light on the concept of prescriptive

CCTT use. Prescription creates efficiencies in operation and alleviates the weaknesses of

subordinate leaders. On the other hand, prescription can limit initiative and innovation,

preventing junior leaders from developing new and unique solutions.

In general these findings are not directly incorporated into the overall investigation

findings unless relevanrt but are included here for both sake of completeness and potential

use as further insight by the government.

Macro Level Analysis Results

The below chart shows CCTT usage man-hours by echelon for the period January 2002

to February 2004 for units that deployed to OIF during that time frame. Some insights

from this chart include:

2 5 0 0 0 ........... . ... ............. ........................ .............................. ...... . ........... .... .... ............ ... ............. ................ . .. .. .. .... .................. ........... ...................... ....... ..... ......................... .

20000

15000

0EOTHER

IOBN

10000n

5000

0-

Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb

02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 04 04

Figure 5. CCTT usage hours, Jan 02-Feb 04

* Training usage appears to be cyclical.

29
* Before OIF, there was a near equilibrium between platoon and company

echelon training. Significant battalion training occurred approximately

every third month.

There was a downward trend beginning in April 2003, when the majority

of units deployed. The data shows a gradual increase in usage towards the

end of the time frame.

This gradual increase 'consisted almost exclusively of platoon echelon

training, indicative of battalions beginning a re-training regimen to

develop their high intensity conflict skills (all the battalion usage hours in

December 2003 and January 2004 are all attributable to one unit, 3-7

CAV).

Discussion:

Users see CCTT as a critical and effective training tool. However, it is seen as an

addition to live training; and most often used as a substitute when resources to support

live training are unavailable. Upon deployment notification, units received priority

access to the resources needed to perform live training. Therefore, live training was

given priority over virtual training. Units considered themselves, in general, trained in

the collective tasks supported by CCTT. Therefore, the training focus shifted toward

individual tasks, collective tasks not supported by CCTT (such as dismounted MOUT

operations), and certification. The overall impact of these factors is that deploying units

did not consider CCTT essential to pre-deployment training and it was not included in

training plans.

Nevertheless, users want to train in CCTT. Interviewees demonstrated a keen interest in

CCTT. But their interest translated into modifying CCTT into a means to place units into

anticipated environments using virtual simulations, i.e. theater-specific training scenarios

or mission rehearsals.

A key observation from the OIF investigation is that the conditions for using CCTT have

changed dramatically since the inception of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. The advent

of SARO operations in Iraq in combination with the knowledge of eventual deployment

to conduct those operations is causing the traditional CCTT user audience to seek training

tools that allow them to focus on conditions and tasks they will face in-theater. Users

want CCTT to evolve from a general, collective task trainer toward a mission rehearsal

tool. This means simulating the complex battlespace they will face in theater, for Iraq

this includes system capabilities such as dynamic urban terrain, an ever-present and

interactive civil population, and actual threat TTPs. In general terms, users desire the

ability to rapidly modify CCTT training conditions to emulate expected conditions they

will encounter in theater.

Finally, the investigation revealed that users are very personal and hands-on in designing

CCTT training. Users prefer creating their own training events, in lieu of using TSPs.

30
Setting up CCTT training is dependent upon face-to-face interaction between the site

staff and the unit leadership.

31
ARNG Study:

The purpose of the ARNG investigation was to assess training and leader development

using VMTs in the ARNG. Data was collected using physical interviews and written

surveys and from web surveys. Physical interviews and written surveys were conducted

between March and June, 2005. Data was collected via the web between March and

May, 2005. Table 3 shows the total number of respondents from which data was

collected and analyzed, while Table 4 and 5 the number of respondents from the physical

and web collection efforts respectively.

Table 3. ARNG Investigation Total Respondents

BN CO ,PLT PLT AC Site TADSS

CDR BN S3 BN MGI CDR V LDR SGT Advisori Staff Fac Total

85 114 37 228 280 536 24 17 20 1341

Table 4. ARNG Investigation Physical Data Respondents

BN BN CO PLT PLT

Unit CDR BN S3 MG CDR LDR SGT Total

1-118 IN I 1 1 2 3 5 13

2-136 IN 1 1I 1 3 6 6 18

3-144 IN 1 1 1 2 1 1 7

2-185 AR 1 1 3 1 3 9

5-117 CAV 1 1 1 3

1-262 AR 1 1 1 3 8 6 20

1-167 CAV 1 1 3 5 9 19

1-167 IN 1 1 2 4 5 13

4-112"A R ..... ...... I I

Total 8 8 5 18 28 35 103

Table 5. ARNG Investigation Web Collected Data Respondents

BN BN CO PLT PLT AC Site TADSS

CDR BN S3 MG CDR LDR SGT Advisors Staff Fac Total

77 106 32 210 252 501 24 17 20 1239

32
Findings:

ISSUE 1: What strategies are used by ARNG for training with VMTs

FINDING: The ARNG is using VMTs to train platoon level maneuver tasks. ARNG

units perceive value in VMTs, but VMTs are not seen as integral to training. Rather, the

ARNG sees VMTs as add-ons to training. Commanders have not published specific use

guidance.

SUBISSUE 1.1: Does the unique conditions/missions of the ARNG lead to VMT

strategies different from the Active Component?

SUBISSUE 1.1 FINDING: ARNG conditions, but not missions, cause VMT use

differing from the Active Component. ARNG unique missions, including state level

missions and mobilization, are not leading factors in determining a VMT strategy. The

ARNG generally does not see a relationship between VMTs and state missions, other

than some transference of individual and leader skills. Rather, the unique conditions of

the ARNG IDT/AT scheduling and the geographical dispersion of their units are the

driving factors in how they use VMTs. Therefore, the determining factor when it comes

to integrating VMTs into an over all training strategy is not training management, but

logistics, including system availability, training time available, and transportation to

training sites.

Position Sub-Issue Finding by Position: ,' Physical =- Web

N CDR ARNG conditions, not missions, cause ARNG VMT strategies to differ from the Active

Component. Battalion Commanders state the prime factors impacting VMT use is time

available (4 references) followed by scheduling (2), and unit location/dispersion (2). State

missions are fourth on the list. No Commander believed VMT training supported readiness

for state missions. VMT scheduling is decided based upon preserving AT for live training,

system availability, staff recommendation, company schedules, and to execute concurrent

training at IDTs.

ARNG missions do not lead to VMT strategies different from the Active Component.

Battalion commanders do not see VMTs as supporting training for unique, state missions,

though some see transference of individual and leader skills. ARNG conditions do lead to

different VMT strategies. Unit dispersion, IDT/AT scheduling requirements, VMT

@r. availability, deployments, state missions, and MOS/TO&E changes, in order, are all ARNG

conditions mentioned as having the greatest impact on use of VMTs. The impact is

logistical considerations, including VMT availability and preserving AT for live training, are

the two most mentioned factors in a VMT strategy. A training management factor, using

VMT to prepare for a major training event, is third.

BN S3 ARNG conditions, but not missions, lead to VMT strategies differing from the Active

Component. S3s report the primary factor impacting use of VMTs is time availability (3

references). S3s generally believe VMTs do not support state mission (4 out of 6). Where

SS3s see transference is in basic military discipline and teaching leader skills. Factors

impacting integrating VMTs into training schedules include time availability, system

availability, availability of other resources, and preserving AT for live training.

ARNG conditions, but not missions, lead to VMT strategies different from the Active

Component. IDT/AT schedule requirements (24 references), unit location/dispersion (18),

IF and scheduling conflicts with AC units (13) are the leading Guard conditions impacting

VMT use. Mobilizations/deployments and state missions are seventh and eighth on the list.

S3s (37 respondents) do not see VMTs as supporting state missions. A few saw a

transference of leader skills (8), team building (3).

33
BN MG ARNG conditions, but not missions, lead to VMT strategies differing from the Active

Component. According to Master Gunners, the leading factor impacting use of VMTs is

• time availability (2 references) followed by location/dispersion, crew turbulence, MOS

changes, and scheduling. No Master Gunner believed VMTs supported state missions. The

leading factor in integrating VMTs'into training strategies is time availability (2 references)

followed by preserving AT for live training and scheduling VMTs to prepare for live training.

According to master gunners, ARNG conditions lead to VMT strategies different from the

Active Components, missions do not. Unit dispersion/location (10 references), IDTIAT

scheduling (8), time availability (5), system availability (3), and Soldier availability (2) are all

conditions impacting on VMT strategy. Mobilization/deployment is fourth on the list (3

references) and state missions are not mentioned. Master gunners feel VMTs provide little

to no support for state missions (14 references). The predominant factor on VMT

scheduling is system availability (5 references) followed by integration into a train-up (4),

travel time (4) and scheduling around other planned training (3).

C0 CDR ARNG conditions more than missions lead to VMT strategies differing from the Active

Component. Company Commanders report the leading factors impacting VMT use are

dispersion/location and IDT/AT scheduling (6 references each). State missions are third

.• tied with scheduling (2 references). Commanders generally do not believe VMTs support b state missions (11 references), though some see bleed over with such things as team

building, dealing with stress, confidence building and familiarization. Commanders report

battalion decides how VMTs are integrated into training schedules (8 references). Other

factors are time availability, system availability, and transportation availability.

ARNG conditions, not missions, cause VMT strategies to differ from the Active Component.

Of those ARNG circumstances that impact ARNG use of VMTs, missions are eighth and

ninth on the list (7 and 5 references, respectively). Leading the list is dispersion/location

(39), IDT/AT scheduling (26), time availability (18), scheduling (15), funding (12), system

availability (9) and MOS/MTO&E changes (7). Company commanders do not believe VMTs

* support state mission or civil support (53 references). For those commanders who see a

connection, that connection is generally some transference in individual and leader skills

and in appreciating conditions, including allowing new scenarios (6), training leader tasks

(5), and building unit cohesion (4). Company commanders report that the predominant

factor in scheduling VMT training is system availability (22 references), followed by

preserving AT for live training (13), executing a train-up for a critical training event (8), and

time availability (7).

PLT LDR ARNG conditions, not missions, cause VMT strategies differing from the Active

Component. Factors listed by Platoon Leaders that impact use of VMTs are ARNG

conditions, not missions. The lead factor is IDT/AT scheduling (9 references) followed by

general scheduling and system availability (2). Platoon Leaders generally do not believe

VMTs support training for state missions (8 references) though a minority list some training

bleed over, including: improves general readiness, training individual and leader skills, and

builds teamwork and confidence. The factor that most impacts integration of VMTs into

training plans is time availability (3 references) followed by system availability and

preparing for a key training event (ramp strategy) (2).

The unique conditions of the ARNG, but not the missions, lead to VMT strategies different

from the Active Component. According to platoon leaders, state missions are fourth on the

list of ARNG conditions impacting VMT usage (11 references). The lead condition is

IDT/AT scheduling (41), followed by location/dispersion (21), and availability (12).

Mobilizations/deployments are ninth on the list (6 references). The majority of platoon

n,* leaders do not believe VMTs support state missions (64 references). Some platoon leaders

see skill cross-over, including cohesiveness (11), general training benefit (5), and

situational awareness development (5). Platoon leaders reported higher echelons drive

scheduling of VMTs (34 references). Other factors in scheduling VMTs are system

availability (10) and time availability (9). A training management factor, using them to train

to a key event, is fourth on the list (7 references).

34
PLT SGT ARNG conditions, not missions, lead to VMT strategies differing from the Active

Component. According to Platoon Sergeants, the leading factor impacting use of VMTs is

IDT/AT scheduling (12 references) followed by dispersion/location and MOS changes (5

? each), MOS changes (5) and time availability (4). ARNG specific missions, mobilize/deploy

o and state missions, are sixth and eighth on the list. Generally, Platoon Sergeants report

that VMTs do not support readiness for state missions (11 references) while a few

Sergeants see some general bleed over including improving general skills and providing

familiarization.

Accordingto platoon sergeants, the unique missions of the ARNG have little impact while

ARNG conditions have great impact on the use of VMTs. ARNG mission specific

conditions: state missions and mobilization/deployments, are listed eighth and ninth (23

and 12 references, respectively) on the list of conditions impacting VMT use. Platoon

sergeants overwhelmingly (132 respondents) see no connection between VMTs and state

level missions. Those mentioning a connection mention individual, leader, or other

secondary cross-over benefit, including teamwork, familiarization, command and control

*NI., skills, andSoldier skills, in order. Leading ARNG conditions impactingVMT use strategies

include: ADT/AT scheduling (81 references), MOS changes (35), scheduling (28), time

availability (27), availability of systems (26), unit dispersion (25), and training site

location/distance (24), in order. Platoon sergeants stated the number one determinant on

when to integrate VMTs into training, during IDTs or during ATs, is system availability (32

references). A-training management related determinant, ramping up to a training event, is

next (12 references). Other deciders include: availability of time (11), support for other

training events (9), preserving AT for live training (7), and availability of Soldiers (3).

C ADV AC Advisors describe conditions, not missions, as causing ARNG VMT strategies differing

from the Active Component. AC advisors state IDT/AT scheduling (5 references) and

_mj dispersion/location (3 references) are leading factors impacting ARNG usage strategy.

They state integrating VMTs into training is based first on preparing for AT (2 references)

and then on availability (1).

'ADSS ARNG conditions and missions cause the ARNG to follow a VMT strategy different from the

Facilitators Active Component. The factors of unit location/dispersion and state missions have the

COTA leading impact on use of VMTs (4 references each), followed by IDT/AT scheduling (3) and

Wpv MOS/TO&E changes (2). TADDS facilitators and COTAs believe VMTs do not support

state missions (three references), though some see a bleed over in leadership and convoy

training. TADDS facilitators and COTAs report the leading factors in scheduling VMTs are

preparation for a live training event and system availability (3 references each).

SUBISSUE 1.2: Is platoon echelon training the right level of usage for mobile trainers

during IDT?

SUBISSUE 1.2 FINDING: Platoon echelon training is the right level of usage for VMTs.

However, comparing current platoon to company training ratios to desired, users want

company. level training to increase relative to platoon level training. CCTT users are

slightly more likely than SIMNET users to desire less platoon and more company level

training.

ZIl I--Highlights top two training ratios.

Position Sub-Issue Finding by Position: ," Physical w Web

BN CDR PLT/CO Training Ratio

100/0 75/25 50/50 25/75 0/100

• All Training 62.50% 37.50% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%

Current VMT Training 87.50% 12.50% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%

Desired VMT Training 0.00% 50.00% 50.00% 0.00% 0.00%

35
PLT/CO Training Ratio

100/0 75/25 50/50 25/75 0/100

W All Training 23.73% 57.63% 18.64% 0.00% 0.00%

Current VMT Training 44.64% 26.79% 19.64% 7.14% 1.79%

Desired VMT Training 11.54% 50.00% 26.92% 11.54% 0.00%

N S3 PLT/CO Training Ratio

100/0 75/25 50/50 25/75 0/100

[All Training 14.29% 85.71% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%

Current VMT Training 42.86% 28.57% 28.57% 0.00% 0.00%

Desired VMT Training 0.00% 57.14% 42.86% 0.100%. 0.00%

PLT/CO Training Ratio

100/0 75/25 50/50 25/75 0/100

lp.ý All Training 14.29% 63.49% 12.70% 7.94% 1.59%

Current VMT Training 35.59% 47.46% 8.47% 6.78% 1.69%

Desired VMT Training 9.84% 40.98% 37.70% 9.84% 1.64%]

BN MG PLT/CO Training Ratio

100/0 75/25 50/50 25/75 0/100

4 All Training 16.67% 66.67% 0.00% 16.67% 0.00%

Current VMT Training 66.67% 33.33% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%

Desired VMT Training 0.00% 50.00% 50.00% 0.00% 0.00%

PLT/CO Training Ratio

'100/0 75/25 50/50 25/75 0/100

Lok. All Training 16.67% 41.67% 25.00% 16.67% 0.00%

Current VMT Training 34.78% 34.78% 17.39% 8.70% 4.35%

Desired VMT Training 30.43% 34.78% 30.43% 0.00% 4.35%

O CDR PLT/CO Training Ratio

100/0 75/25 50/50 25/75 0/100

All Training 17.65% 70.59% 5.88% 5.88% 0.00%

Current VMT Training 47.06% 29.41% 11.76% 11.76% 0.00%

Desired VMT Training 5.88% 64.71% 29.41% 0.00% 0.00%

PLT/CO Training Ratio

100/0 75/25 50/50 25/75 0/100

*• All Training 21.10% 57.80%, 12.84% 6.42% I 1.83%

Current VMT Training 39.60% 40.59% 9.90% 3.96% 5.94%

Desired VMT Training 5.10% 50.00% 41.84% 3.06%j 0.00%

PLT LDR PLT/CO Training Ratio

100/0 75/25 50/50 25/75 0/100

All Training 4.00% 52.00% 36.00% 8.00% 0.00%

Current VMT Training 16.00% 32.00% 40.00%I 12.00% 0.00%

Desired VMT Training 4.17% 29.17% 62.50% 4.17% 0.00%

PLT/CO Training Ratio

100/0 75/25 50/50 25/75 0/100

L, All Training 11.72% 57.03% 17.97% 12.50% 0.78%

Current VMT Training 36.75% 30.77% 16.24% 8.55% 7.69%

Desired VMT Training 5.08% 49.15% 40.68% 4.24% 0.85%

36
PLT SGT PLT/CO Training Ratio

100/0 75/25 50/50 25/75 0/100

, All Training 16.67% 63.33% 13.33% 6.67% 0.00%

Current VMT Training 27.59% 24.14% 27.59% 17.24% 3.45%

Desired VMT Training 3.33% 46.67% 46.67% 3.33% 0.00%

PLT/CO Training Ratio

100/0 75/25 50/50 25/75 0/100

.i, All Training 8.67% 52.33% 22.33% 14.00% 2.67%

Current VMT Training 23.33% 29.63% 22.59% 12.22% 12.22%

Desired VMT Training 8.08% 41.54% 43.85% 4.62% 1.92%

C ADV PLT/CO Training Ratio

100/0 75/25 50/50 25/75 0/100

*I All Training 9.09% 54.55% 27.27% 0.00% 9.09%

Current VMT Training 27.27% 36.36% 18.18% 9.09% 9.09%

Desired VMT Training 18.18% 27.27% 36.36% 18.18% 0.00%

TADSS PLT/CO Training Ratio

Facilitatorsi 100/0 75/25 50/50 25/75 0/100 3OTA 100 7/5 5/0J2/5I /0 COT All Training 0.00% 53.85%j 38.46% 7.69% 0.00%

Current VMT Training 30.77% 46.15% 15.38% 7.69% 0.00%

Desired VMT Training 6.67% 60.00% 26.67% 6.67% 0.00%

Site Staff PLT/CO Training Ratio

U._ {, 100/0 75/25 50/50 25/75 0/100

FDesired VMT Training 0.00% 66.67% 33.33% 0.00% 0.00%

CCTT PLT/CO Training Ratio

Users * ( 100/0 75/25 1 50/50 125/75 10/100

Desired VMT Training 7.51% 44.55% 41.89% 5.08% 0.97%

IMNET [7PLT/CO Training Ratio

Users == ', 100/0 75/25 1 50/50 1 25/75 0/100

__ Desired VMT Training 11.22% 45.37% 35.61% 4.88%1 2.93%

SUBISSUE 1.3: What are the ARNG unit VMT strategies? How do they differ by region

or command?

SUBISSUE 1.3 FINDING: .ARNG units use VMTs to train platoon level, maneuver

tasks. Gunnery and leader training are other significant uses. There is no top-down

usage guidance. When there is guidance, it is non-specific, such as "maximize use" or

"use when available." ARNG units use VMTs to prepare for live events. VMT results

are not significant in executing training plans. Strategies did not differ by region or

command.

37
Position Sub-Issue Finding by Position: o• Physical " Web

ýN CDR Battalion Commanders report the primary purpose of VMTs is platoon collective training (2

references) followed by command and control, preparing for live training, gunnery,

situational awareness, validate leaders, and crew coordination. Battalion Commanders

receiving little Sreport or no usage guidance from higher HQs. The few that reported

guidance received nonspecific guidance, including maximized use and use is encouraged.

38% report tracking VMT usage. 50% report modifying training strategies based upon VMT

results. 62% report using VMTs to prepare for live training.

Battalion commanders integrate VMTs into their training strategies in a wide number of

ways, the predominant being as preparation for other events, leader validation, and

collective maneuver task training, in order. 80% of battalion commanders report using

W, VMTs to prepare for live events. Battalion commanders have generally received little of no

usage guidance. Guidance they have received has generally been non-specific. 49% of

battalion commanders report their units tracking VMT usage. 46% report modifying training

strategy based on VMT results.

BN S3 S3s report the primary role of VMTs is to train gunnery (4 of 7 S3s). They also mention

training collective maneuver tasks and a replacement for live training. S3s have received

• no usage guidance (6 of 7). One S3 reported nonspecific guidance: usage was

a. encouraged. 57% of S3s report their unit tracks VMT use. 29% report their unit has

modified it training strategy based upon VMT results. 86% report using VMTs to prepare for

live training.

The predominant way S3s report VMTs being integrated into their training strategies is as

leader trainers (10 references). Other ways include: preparation for key training event (9),

small unit task training (9), a replacement for live training (6), and gunnery training (6). S3s

have generally received no or little VMT usage guidance (23 references). Those reporting

guidance report non-specific guidance, including: maximize use (8), encourage use (4) and

use when available (2). Five S3s reported being told to execute a minimum number of

hours per year and one S3 received guidance specific to echelon (platoon) and

management (rehearsal). 51% of S3s report tracking VMT usage. 54% report modifying

their training strategy based upon VMT results. 82% report using VMTs to prepare for live

training.

N MG Master Gunners report the primary roles of VMTs are training platoon collective maneuver

tasks and leaders training (2 references each). Three Master Gunners report receiving no

SVMT usage guidance from higher HQ while three report non-specific guidance including:

a use if possible (2) and maximize use. 50% report their units track VMT use. 67% report

they have modified their training strategy based on VMT results. 83% report they use VMTs

to prepare for live training.

Master gunners report their units predominantly integrate VMTs into their training strategies

as collective maneuver task trainers (9 references) and gunnery trainers (7). Other uses

include leader trainers (4), SOP development tools (3), and familiarization tools (2). Master

gunners report they have generally received little or no usage guidance from higher Has (9

M_ references). Some Master Gunners report guidance specified down to length of exercise,

iterations, and echelon per year (3 references) but other reported guidance is non-specific:

use as much as possible (2), use as available (1) or use during AT (1). 76% of Master

Gunners report tracking VMT usage. 67% report modifying training strategy based upon

VMT results. 86% report using VMTs to prepare for live training.

38
CO CDR Company Commanders state the primary role of VMTs is maneuver training (4 references)

followed by gunnery (3) and sustainment training, command and control training and unit

coordination (2 each). Generally, Commanders have not received any VMT usage

Sguidance from higher commands. Those that report guidance report non-specific guidance,

including use it for mounted trainihg and use it as much as possible (2 each). 62% of

Commanders report their units track VMT usage. 38% report their unit has modified its

training strategy or plan based on VMT results. 65% report their units use VMTs to prepare

for live training.

Company commanders report that the primary use of VMTs is to train platoon collective

maneuver tasks (24 references) followed by leader/staff training (13), team building (8),

crew training (7), and gunnery training, low-cost training altemative, and prepare for major

training events (6 each). Ten commanders reported VMT had no role in their units' training strategies. Company commanders have not received VMT usage guidance from their

@ higher HQs (40 references). Of the commanders who reported some guidance, there were

twelve references to specific minimum use and three references to guidance on number of

crews per time period and specified tasks. Other guidance was nonspecific, including

maximize use (9), use when possible (6), and use encouraged (2). 46% report their unit

tracks VMT usage..37% report they have modified their training strategy based on VMT

results. 75% report they use'VMTs to prepare for live training.

PLT LDR Platoon Leaders have generally not received any VMT usage guidance from their higher

commands. Of those reporting guidance, two reported directed use while the rest reported Snon-specific guidance such as: use for mounted training, use for crew training, use when

available, and use rarely. 71% of Platoon Leaders state their unit tracks VMT use. 33%

state their unit has modified its training plan based on VMT results. 75% report using VMTs

to prepare for live training.

The majority of platoon leaders, forty, report receiving no or little VMT usage guidance.

Some platoon leaders report receiving unspecific guidance, including: use as much as

W* possible (7 references), a scenario as guidance (7), date/location/uniform (5) and if

available, use it (4). 62% of platoon leaders report their unit tracks VMT usage. 34% of

platoon leaders report their unit has modified its training strategy based upon VMT results.

77% of platoon leaders state their units use VMTs to prepare for live training.

PLT SGT Platoon Sergeants generally say they have received no VMT usage guidance. The few that

report guidance report it as non-specific, such as reporting availability and encouraging Suse. 61% of Sergeants report their unit tracks VMT use. 57% report their unit has modified

its training plan based on VMT results. 80% state their units use VMTs to prepare for live

training.

142 platoon sergeants report that they have received little or no VMT usage guidance from

higher commands. One platoon sergeant reported a specified minimum use. Three

reported directions to use it as a gate for gunnery or maneuver. Others reported guidance

such as use it as much as possible (14 references), use if available (8), use only with

gunnery (3), and maintain a level of realism (2). 39% of platoon sergeant respondents

reported their units tracked VMT usage. 28% reported their units modified training strategy

based upon VMT results. 60% reported using VMTs to prepare for training in a live

environment.

AC ADV AC advisors report that the primary role of VMTs in ARNG units is maneuver trainer (4

references) followed by communication trainer (2). Two stated VMTs had no role. AC

I advisors state their units have received no usage guidance except for one advisor who

provided a nonspecific guidance, "use as often as possible." 30% of advisors stated their

units tracked VMT usage. 40% stated their units modified their training strategy based on

VMT results. 50% stated their units used VMTs to prepare for live training.

'ADSS TADSS facilitators and COTAs report the primary role of VMTs is to prepare for a key Facilitators) training event (ramp strategy) and to train leaders (3 references each). The next leading

COTA W, role is to validate SOPs (2). 80% report tracking VMT usage rates. 64% report units modify

training strategies based upon VMT results. 93% report units use VMTs to prepare for live

training.

39
SUBISSUE 1.4: How: critical are VMTs to METL proficiency?

SUBISSUE 1.4 FINDING: ARNG units do not view VMTs as critical to METL

proficiency, but believe there is great value in VMT training. Less than one-third of

respondents reported raising or sustaining a METL task assessment based solely on VMT

results. Slightly more SIMNET users than CCTT users report raising a METL task

assessment based solely on VMT results, 46% versus 33%. Respondents are using

VMTs to train platoon' collective tasks, gunnery, and platoon drills. Units are unable to

train logistical/sustainment tasks. Company leadership reported that SARO tasks are not

adequately supported by VMTs.

Battalion'level respondents equate the value of access to a VMT as equivalent to 2-4 field

exercises (STX or FTX) and I gunnery. Company level respondents perceive more

gunnery value, equating VMTs to 2-4 field exercises and 1-3 gunneries.

Other objectivesfor VMT exercises include unit cohesion, familiarization, and

coordination. Respondents indicate VMT exercises are modified when necessary during

execution to achieve specific training objectives, but not to the extent that their overall

objectives or goals for the event are compromised.

Position Sub-Issue Finding by Position: . Physical "i Web

N CDR Battalion Commanders report using VMTs to train movement to contact, defend, and

gunnery (3 references each) followed by screen (2), attack, attack by fire and route

recon. Battalion Commanders report that they are not able to train mobilize/deploy (4

references) followed by SASO, and security operations. One Commander stated there

were no missions he could not train. 38% stated they had sustained or raised a METL

assessment based only on performance in VMTs. Battalion Commanders stated their

SVMTs provided the equivalent training of 1-3 PLT STX lanes and 1 gunnery.

* Commanders reported that normal training objectives were to exercise/validate SOPs or

obtain a "p" or "t" on an assigned task (2 references each). Other reported objectives

were: conduct a specific collective task, execute until the company commander is

satisfied, execute multiple iterations, or increase crew proficiency. 38% of Commanders

report these objectives are usually achieved and 38% report they are often achieved.

50% of Commanders say VMT training events are never modified to reach training

objectives while 25% state they are usually modified.

Battalion commanders report training.offensive and defensive tasks in VMT as opposed

to stability and reconstruction or civil support tasks. Most mentioned tasks include

attack, defend, and movement to contact, in order. Battalion commanders mentioned

sustain, mobilize/deploy, and conduct joint fires as the three leading tasks they could not

perform in a VMT, though most commanders felt there were no tasks they could not

train. 32% of battalion commanders reported raising or sustaining a METL training

assessment based solely on performance in a VMT. Commanders believed their units

would require a gunnery, a combined arms live fire exercise, 3-6 field training exercises,

l@1 and a command post exercise to replace their VMT training, though many stated VMTs

can not replace live training. The most commonly reported VMT training objective was a

specified training level in a specified tasks (19 references), though other objectives cited

were non-specific, including improve command, control and communications (9

references); execute Troop Leading Procedures (3 references); and improve gunnery

skills (3 references). Commanders reported achieving these objectives usually (32%) or

often (30%) with 10% reporting never and 5% reporting always. Commanders report

modifying a VMT exercise during execution to reach training objectives sometimes

(53%) while 16% report never and 5% reporting always.

40
BN S3 S3s report using VMTs to train defend (3 references), movement to contact, attack, and

command and control (2 references each). S3s state they are unable to train

mobilize/deploy (4 references) and logistics/sustainment (2). 29% report sustaining or

raising a METL task training assessment based solely on performance in a VMT. S3s

report VMTs provide them the eqtiivalent training of 1-4 STX lanes and 1 gunnery. S3s

the normal Sreport training objective for a VMT exercise is to conduct tactical movement

(4 references) followed by reporting and command and control (2), mounted navigation,

crew coordination, proper use of weapons, unit cohesion, and Soldier participation. 33%

of S3s report training objects are achieved often and 33% report they are achieved

usually. 50% report VMT training objectives are modified to reach training objectives

sometimes.

S3s do not see VMTs as critical to METL proficiency. S3s report using VMTs to train

defend (20 references), attack (16), movement to contact (10), and gunnery (5). S3s

report they cannot use VMTs to train logistics/sustainment (7 references), mobilize (6),

deploy (5), dismounted tasks (4), and force protection (3). 32% of S3s have sustained or

raised a METL training assessment.based only on performance in a VMT. S3s report

they would require between one and three FTXs and an additional gunnery each year to

replace the training they receive from VMTs, though they emphasize VMTs cannot

_, replace live training. S3s report the typical training objective for a VMT exercise is to

train to a specific proficiency for a specific task (12 references). Other objectives are less

specific, including: train leader/staff skills (9), validate/rehearse tasks prior to live training

(5), familiarity (3), and enhance coordination (2). 40% of S3s report these objectives are

usually obtained while 26% state they are sometimes and 24% state they are often

obtained. 57% of S3s state VMT training events are sometimes modified to reach

training objectives, while 23% state they are often modified and 14% state they are

never modified.

BN MG Master Gunners report their VMT training is equivalent to 2-6 platoon STX lanes. Normal

training objectives for a VMT exercise include execution of battle drills, making marked

• improvement, and specific platoorn maneuver task training. 67% of Master Gunners state

objectives are usually achieved. 50% state VMT training events are sometimes modified

to reach training objectives and 33% state they are often modified.

Master Gunners believe their units would require between 1 and 4 field training

exercises plus a gunnery to replace the training value of their VMTs. However, they fell

strongly that VMTs cannot replace live training. Master Gunners report normal training

objectives are basic task proficiency (i.e. drills/formation) (7 references), leaders training

I (5), familiarity (2), and none (2). Only four reported establishing proficiency in specified

tasks as a training objective. 40% of Master Gunners report objectives are usually

achieved with 35% reporting often and 20% reporting sometimes. 60% report VMT

exercises are modified sometimes to achieve objectives, while 20% report usually, 15%

report often, and 5% report never.

41
CO CDR Company Commanders report they train movement to contact (6 references), defend

(5), attack and actions on contact (3 each), movement techniques and gunnery (2 each).

They are unable to train SASO and mobilize/deploy (2 references each). 44% report

sustaining or raising a METL assessment based only on performance in a VMT.

Company Commanders report VMTs provide them the equivalent of one week of

maneuver training per year. The normal training objective for a VMT exercise is to train

a collective maneuver task (7 references) followed by gunnery training, increasing unit

coordination, and training command and control (2 each). 37% of commanders report

these objectives are usually obtained and 31% state they are often obtained. 53% of

Commanders say VMT exercises are sometimes modified during execution to obtain

training objectives and 41% state they are often modified.

Company Commanders report using VMTs to train attack (21 references), movement to

contact (20), defend (18), actions on contact (11), gunnery (8) and tactical movement

(7). Commanders are unable to train SASO (9 references), all (5), MOUT (5), assembly

area procedures (3), and mobilize/deploy (3). Nine commanders reported there were no

tasks theycould not train on their VMT. 27% of commanders report that they have

sustained or raised a METL training assessment based only on unit performance in a

VMT. Commanders believed their VMTs provided the training equivalent of 2-4 field

training exercises, 1 gunnery, and a CALFEX. Commanders strongly believed that

La VMTs are not a substitute for live training. Normal VMT training objective is platoon

collective task to proficiency (15), followed by platoon drills/movement techniques (9),

command'and control tasks (8), crew tasks trained to proficiency (5), skill improvement

(4), and individual tasks trained to proficiency (3). Four commanders reported that VMT

exercises normally have no objectives. 35% of commanders report training objectives

are achieved usually while 23% report objectives are obtained often and 23% report

they are obtained sometimes. 55% of commanders report VMT training is modified to

reach training objectives sometimes, while 15% report it is modified often and 13%

report it is never modified.

LT LDR Platoon Leaders report that VMTs provide the equivalent of 1 to 2 field training

exercises. The report that the normal objective of a VMT exercise is to train a collective

Smaneuver task (7 references) followed by training gunnery (5), familiarization (4), and

command and.control training (2). 38% state objectives are obtained usually while 29%

report they are often obtained. 36% report VMT events are sometimes modified during

execution to obtain training objectives while 20% report they are never modified.

Platoon leaders report they would require between 1 and 6 FTXs and between 1 and 3

gunneries to replace their VMT training. Platoon leaders report generally unspecific VMT

exercise training objectives, including train to proficiency (22 references) followed by

basic skills (15), crew or individual familiarization (11), prepare for future training events

IF, (8) and team building (4). 37% of platoon leaders report their objectives are usually

obtained, while 35% state they are often achieved and 22% state they are sometimes

achieved. 46% of platoon leaders stated VMT training events are sometimes modified to

reach training objectives. 21% say they are often modified and 14% state they are never

modified.

42
PLT SGT Platoon Sergeants believe VMTs provide the equivalent training of 2-3 training events

per year. They state the normal training objective of a VMT exercise is collective

• maneuver task (11 references) followed by gunnery training (4) and team building (3).

36% of Sergeants state training objectives are sometimes obtained while 32% state they

are often obtained. 62% state VMT events are sometimes modified during execution to

reach training objectives.

VMT exercise training objectives reported by platoon sergeants include: training on

collective platoon or squad tasks (46 references), train on gunnery skills (27), none (22),

familiarization (9), prepare for live training (8), crew or individual proficiency (6), and

leader training (5). Note platoon sergeants did not describe training specific tasks to

specific training levels (i.e. P or T). 30% of sergeants report these objectives usually

being achieved. 29% report them being sometimes achieved and 23% report them being L often achieved. 49% of platoon sergeant report VMT training events sometimes being

modified to reach training objectives. 25% report VMT training being never modified and

13% report it being often modified. Platoon. sergeants believe to replace VMTs with live

training and maintain METL proficiency would require one to six gunneries and two to

six field training exercises. There was strong opinion that VMTs cannot replace live

training.

C ADV AC advisors reported their units used VMTs to train movement to contact (3 references),

defend (2) and attack and attack by fire. They state there units were unable to train

some individual crew tasks. Advisors stated normal VMT exercise objectives included

@I, training maneuver tasks, training leader tasks, building unit cohesion, establishing SOPs

and familiarization. 33% of advisors stated these objectives are sometimes achieved

and another 33% stated these are often achieved. 60% stated VMT exercises are

sometimes modified during execution to achieve objectives.

ADSS TADSS facilitators and COTAs believe that VMTs provide the equivalent of 2 FTXs, 1-3

Facilitators, gunneries, and 1 CALFEX. They say the typical training objective of a VMT exercise is

OTA _• to conduct a tactical task (4 references) followed by leaders training (3). 50% state

training objectives are often achieved while 33% state they are usually achieved. 50%

state VMT exercises are sometimes modified to reach training objectives.

Site Staff Site staff reports that the typical VMT exercise objective is to execute platoon tactical

Lot missions (2 references) followed by leader validation, preparation for live training,

training proficiency, and familiarization (1 each). 33% say these objectives are often

achieved, with 27% saying they are usually achieved.

CCTT _i.ý 33% of CCTT users have sustained or raised a METL training assessment based only

Users on performance in a VMT.

IMNET M, 46% of SIMNET users have sustained or raised a METL training assessment based only

Users on performance in a VMT.

SUBISSUE 1.5: Are there significantly different usage levels between units by

command, geographic region or technology available?

SUBISSUE 1.5 FINDING: Macro Level Analysis and data collection observations show

no discemable differences in usage levels between units due to commands, regions or

technology.

SUBISSUE 1.6: In a VMT Exercise, where does training occur?

SUBISSUE 1.6 FINDING: In a VMT exercise, just under half of training occurs during

execution. One-third of training occurs during AARs. AARs are critical to VMT

efficiency. Users and AC Advisors report that AARs are somewhat effective. Site Staff

and COTAs/TADSS Facilitators have a higher opinion of AARs, rating them as

"extremely" effective. Better facilitation and audio/video recording (down to crew level)

will make the AARs more effective. Battalion level leaders receive their preparation to

43
facilitate AARs first from experience then on professional education. This was reversed

for company commanders and platoon leaders whose preparation to facilitate AARs

comes from professional schooling followed by experience. Platoon sergeants were

evenly divided between experience and education.

Position Sub-Issue Finding by Position: . "Physical 01 Web

N CDR Battalion Commanders believe in a VMT exercise, 41% of the training comes from AARs,

32% comes from execution, and 27% comes from preparation. Commanders believe AARs

are extremely critical to VMT effectiveness (4.63 on a 5 scale). They feel AARs are

Seffective (4.13 on a 5 scale). To improve AARs, Commanders recommend more

participation, improved video feedback, more site staff participation, more standardized

AARs, and an ability to show unit trends. The primary training to facilitate AARs reportedby

Commanders is OES (3 references) followed by local classes and Training Support

Battalion/AC Advisor classes (2 each).

Commanders report that training comes primarily form execution (40%) while 29% comes

from preparation and 31% from the AAR. Commanders reported AARs as being very

critical (4.26% on a scale of 5) but somewhat effective (3.86% on a scale of 5).

N& Commanders received most of their training to conduct AARs from experience (14

references) followed by OC training (4 references) and OES (3 references). Five

commanders reported no formal AAR training. Better trained facilitators and more time for

the AAR were the two most mentioned ways to improve AARs.

BN S3 In a VMT exercise, S3s believe 38% of learning occurs in execution, 32% occurs in AARs

Sand 30% occurs in preparation. S3s believe AARs are extremely critical (4.57 on a 5 scale).

They believe AARs are effective (3.86 on a 5 scale). S3s list OES, local training, and

experience as preparing them to conduct AARs (2 references each).

S3s report that training comes primarily from execution (43%) while 31% comes from

preparation and 26% comes from the AAR. S3s believe AARs are critical to the

effectiveness of VMTs (4.08 on a 5 scale). They believe AARs are somewhat effective

(3.72 on a 5 scale). S3s believe better trained facilitators will make AARs more effective

(10 references), followed by better/more video playback (7), more time for AARs (2), and

more AARs (2). Seven S3s stated they had no or little training to facilitate AARs.

Preparation for facilitating AARs reported by S3s included experience (11 references),

OES/NCOES (7), and local classes including ODP (7).

N MG Master Gunners believe 39% of training comes from execution, 34% from AARs and 27%

from preparation. Master Gunners state AARs are critical to the effectiveness of VMTs (4.5

on a 5 scale). They believe AARs are effective (3.83 on a 5 scale). They say methods to

• make them more effective include better facilitation, more time for AARs, and shorter

AARs. Master Gunners report their primary preparation to facilitate AARs is NCOES (3

references), and experience (2). Two Master Gunners report no preparation/training to

facilitate AARs.

Master Gunners report that 44% of learning comes from execution, 31% from preparation,

and 25% from AARs. Master gunners believe AARs are extremely critical to the

effectiveness of VMT exercises (4.63 on a 5 scale). They believe AARs are effective (4.25).

W. They recommend more participation and better facilitators (3 references each) to make

AARs more effective. Four Master Gunner respondents reported no or little training to

facilitate AARs. Six reported experience as training them for AARs. There were two

references each to the Master Gunners course and to NCOES.

44
O CDR Company Commanders believe that 49% of the training occurs during execution, 25%

during AARs, and 23% during preparation. They believe AARs are critical to VMT

effectiveness (4.19 on a 5 scale) and are effective (4). To improve AARs they would have

• better facilitation, provide examples of success, provide crew level audio/video, and get

more participation. Commanders 'report that primarily OES has prepared them to facilitate

AARs (4 references) followed by experience (1). Two Company Commanders stated they

had no preparation/training to facilitate AARs.

Company commanders believe 48% of learning comes from execution while 27% comes

from the AAR and 25% from preparation. Commanders report that AARs are critical to VMTI

effectiveness (4.16 on a 5 scale). They state that AARs are somewhat effective (3.79 on a

5 scale). In order to make AARs more effective, commanders would like to see first better

Lai facilitation (14 references) followed by better video/audio support/playback (6), more time

(5), better participation (5), and better post-AAR implementation of lessons learned (4).

Commanders report that their preparation to facilitate AARs comes primarily from OES (22

references) followed by experience (12), local classes/OPDs (12) OC certification (5) and

doctrinal manuals (3). Six commanders reported they had no preparation to conduct AARs.

PLT LDR Platoon Leaders believe that 48% of the training occurs during execution while 32% occurs

during preparation'and 28%. during AARs. Platoon Leaders believe that AARs are critical to

VMT effectiveness (4.13 on a 5 scale) and are somewhat effective (3.92). To make AARs

., more effective, Platoon Leaders recommend better facilitation, more time for AARs, digital

take home video/packets, more video replay, and more mission focus. Three Platoon

Leaders state they have received no training to facilitate AARs. Other Platoon Leaders

state their training/preparation to facilitate AARs included local class/OPDs (3 references)

and experience and OES (2 each).

Platoon leaders state that 48% of training occurs during execution, 26% in the AAR, and

26% in preparation. Platoon leaders believe AARs are critical to the effectiveness of VMTs

(4.1 on a 5 scale). They believe A.Rs are somewhat effective (3.79 on a 5 scale). Platoon

leaders believe better facilitation would make AARs more effective (7 references) followed

* by more video (6), more time for AARs (5), allowing immediaterepeats of the exercise (5), L more participation (5), better electronic take home packages (4), less time for AARs (4),

more criticism in the AAR (4) and less criticism in AARs (2). Platoon leaders state their

training to facilitate AARs comes from OES (33 references), followed by experience (22)

and local classes/OPDs (16). Fifteen platoon leaders stated they had no training to

facilitate AARs.

PLT SGT Platoon Sergeants believe that in a VMT exercise, 52% of the training comes from

execution while 26% comes from AARs and 22% comes from preparation. They believe

AARs are critical to VMT exercises (4.26 on a 5 scale) and are effective (4.21). To make

, them more effective they recommend more audio/video feedback, more participation, and

allowing more time for exercise interactions (2 references each). Sergeants state their

preparation/training to facilitate AARs comes from NCOES (5 references) followed by

experience (3). Two Platoon Sergeants stated they had no preparation/training to facilitate

AARs.

Platoon sergeants reported that in a VMT exercise, 23% of the training occurs during

preparation, 50% during execution, and 27% during the AAR process. Platoon sergeants

believe AARs are critical to the effectiveness of VMTs (4.14 on a five scale). Platoon

Sergeants believe AARs are somewhat effective (3.83 of a five scale). Recommendations

to make AARs more effective include: better training/more experienced facilitators (21

references), more discussion in AARs (20), more video playback (15), more time for AARs

(8), showing individual vehicle views (6), and better follow through after AARs (5). Thirty

five platoon sergeants reported they had little or no preparation or training to facilitate

AARs. Of those reporting preparation or training, this included experience (55 references),

NCOES (50), local class room training including NCODP (32) and OC training (8).

C ADV AC Advisors believe in a VMT exercise, 42% of the learning occurs in execution, 31% in

AAR, and 27% in preparation. They believe AARs are critical to the effectiveness of VMTs

p. (4.1 on a 5 scale). They believe AARs are marginally effective (3.8 on a 5 scale). Methods

to improve AARs include better facilitation, mandatory AARs, better training management,

more time for AARs, time to repeat the exercise, and better video playback capability.

45
ADSS TADSS. facilitators and COTAs believe that in a VMT exercise, 42% of the training occurs

Facilitators in the AAR, 40% in execution, and 18% in preparation. They believe that AARs are

COTA extremely critical (4.82 on a 5 scale) and they are effective (4.18). To improve AARs, they recommend better facilitation (2 references).

Site Staff Site staff believes that in a VMT exercise, 40% of training comes from execution, 34%

comes from preparation, and 26% from AARs. Site staff believes AARs are extremely

critical to the effectiveness of VMTs (4.73 on a 5 scale). Staff reports that AARs are

effective (4.36). To improve AARs, staff recommends better trained facilitators, more video

playback, linking audio to video, digital take home packages, and limiting AARs to 20

minutes.

ISSUE 2: How does training in VMTs prepare units for operational environments?

FINDING: Training in VMTs does not prepare units for the operational environment.

There is not a linkage between VMTs and the current operational environment. ARNG

units are adapting their training with unique ways to use VMTs. However, systems and

scenarios available are not sufficient to leverage current VMT capabilities to prepare

units for OIF.

SUBISSUE 2.1: Are units using standard TSPs or have unique scenarios been created by

unit, by CLS contractor, or by higher commands?

SUBISSUE 2.1 FINDING: Units are not using standard TSPs. Approximately half of

respondents are not familiar with the term "TSPs." This included AC Advisors, TADDS

Facilitators and site staff. The only position that was familiar with the term was Battalion

Master Gunner. One-third of respondents report using TSPs. These TSPs come from a

variety of sources. The lower echelon respondents reported that TSPs come from

battalion. CCTT site staff is the leading single source of TSPs though respondents obtain

TSPs more from other sources combined: AKO/digital library, AC Advisors, and

doctrinal manuals; than from the CCTT site staff. Predominantly, battalion staffs are the

source of VMT scenarios, followed by company commanders and site staff. Site staff is

most often cited as the primary resource for assisting units with preparation for training.

Position Sub-Issue Finding by Position: . Physical W Web

BN CDR 620/% of Battalion Commanders report using TSPs to develop VMT training. 12.5% were not

aware of the term "TSPs" even after some coaching. The source of TSPs they use is site

staff (2 references) followed by doctrinal manuals, unit records, and Training Support

Battalions. They report the S3 staff and Master Gunners develop their VMT scenarios (3

references each).

43% of battalion commanders are not familiar with the term "TSPs." 38% of battalion

commanders use TSPs. Commanders report getting TSPs from AC advisors and doctrinal

manuals, in order. No commander reported getting TSPs from VMT staff; however eight

commanders reported site staff developing or assisting with developing training scenarios.

Predominantly, battalion staff develops training scenarios followed by battalion

commanders, VMT site staff, company commanders, and AC advisors.

46
BN S3 43% of S3.s report using TSPs to develop VMT training. 29% were not familiar with the term

"TSPs" even after coaching. The source of TSPs are site staff (2 references) followed by

Support Battalions, STraining the S3, and doctrinal manuals. S3s report they develop VMT

scenarios (3 references) followed by battalion staff (2), Training Support Battalions and

company commanders.

44% of S3s are not familiar with the term "TSPs." Of those familiar with the term, 37% state

- they use TSPs. Sources of TSPs include: site staff (5 references), doctrinal manuals (3),

and training support battalions/AC Advisors (2). S3s report battalion staffs develop VMT

training scenarios (23 references) followed by site staffs (9) and company staffs (4).

BN MG 67% of Master Gunners use TSPs to develop VMT training. The source of these TSPs is

, site staff (2 references) followed by doctrinal manuals and battalion staff. Master Gunners

report that S3s develop training scenarios (3 references) followed by site staff, and

battalion commanders (2 each).

10% of Master Gunners were not familiar with the term "TSPs." 75% reported they used

TSPs. Master Gunners predominantly get them from doctrinal publications (2 references),

AC Advisors (2), Center for Army Lessons Learned, institutional schools, and AKO/digital

library. One Master Gunner stated he gets TSPs from site staff. Master Gunners report that

VMT scenarios are developed by S3s predominantly (8 references) followed by Master

Gunners (6), company commanders/staff (4), and higher HQ (2).

CO CDR 50% of Company Commanders were not familiar with the term "TSPs." 38% stated they did

Snot use TSPs to develop VMT training. Those that used TSPs stated the TSPs came from

Ssite staff and battalion staff. Commanders stated that battalion staff developed VMT

scenarios (9 references) followed by company commander/staff and site staff (5 each).

50% of company commanders are not familiar with the term 'TSPs." 28% report using

TSPs to develop VMT training. The primary source of these TSPs is site staff (6

references) followed by AKO/digital library (5), higher HQs (3) and Center for Army

Lessons Learned and AC Advisors (2 each). Commanders report that company

commanders/staff develop their VMT scenarios (29 references), followed by battalion staff

(26), and site staff (23).

PLT LDR 68% of Platoon Leaders are not familiar with the term "TSPs." 12% report using TSPs to

, develop VMT training. Sources of TSPs are doctrinal manuals, battalion staff, OCs, and

site staff. Battalion staff (7 references) develops VMT scenarios followed by company staff

(4), ICs and site staff (3 each).

53% of platoon leaders were not familiar with the term "TSPs." 25% of platoon leaders said

they used TSPs to develop VMT training. The source of these TSPs were company

commander/staff and doctrinal manuals (6 references each), followed by battalion staff (4),

AKO/digital library (3), other units (2) and site staff (2). Platoon leaders stated the battalion

staff predominantly developed VMT scenarios (31 references) followed by company

commander/staff (27), site staff (19), and platoon leaders (10).

PLT SGT 40% of Platoon Sergeants were not familiar with the term "TSPs." 37% stated they used

TSPs to develop VMT training. The source of these TSPs is battalion staff (3 references)

t followed by site staff (2). Sergeants state VMT scenarios are developed by company

master gunners (7 references) followed by company commanders/staff and battalion

master gunners (6 each) and site staff (4).

29% of platoon sergeants reported using TSPs. 52% of were not familiar with "TSPs."

Sources for TSPs included: manuals or SOPs (22 references), higher HQ guidance (11),

Army schools/centers (9), AKO or digital libraries (5), and Training Support units/AC

U Advisors (3). Only one platoon sergeant reported getting TSPs for site staff. Sergeants

reported that scenarios are developed by battalion command and staff (63 references).

Other developers include: company command and staff (42), site staff (22), platoon

leadership (16), brigade or higher staff (9), and instructors (7).

47
C ADV 50% of AC Advisors were not familiar with the term "TSPs." 30% stated their units use

TSPs to develop VMT training. The sources of these TSPs are doctrinal m:ntuals, schools,

and higher HQ. AC Advisors stated battalions staffs develop VMT scenarios (5 references)

followed by company staffs (3) and Training Support Battalions/Brigades/AC Advisors (2).

ADSS 50% of TADSS facilitators and COTAs say they use TSPs to develop VMT training. 36%

Facilitators) are not familiar with the term "TSP." They say the sources of their TSPs are schools (2

OTA k" references), Training Support Battalions/AC Advisors and doctrinal manuals. They say site

staff (4 references) develops VMT scenarios followed by battalion staff (4), and Training

Support Battalions/AC Advisors (2).

ite Staff 50% of site staff are not familiar with the term "TSPs." 43% use TSPs to develop VMT

training. Staff report the source of TSPs includes Force XXI Training Program, unit SOPs,

qi doctrinal manuals, institutional schools, Army standards, and site staff (1 reference each).

Site staff report that unit trainers develop VMT scenarios (3 references) followed by site

staff (2).

SUBISSUE 2.2: What skill sets supported by VMTs are critical to success in theater?

Which critical tasks are not supported?

SUBISSUE 2.2 FINDING: VMT supported skill sets have not been critical to success in

theater. Less than half of ARNG units have received or created an OIF specific task list.

Approximately 60% have created an OIF specific training strategy. One-third of OIF

veterans report that OIF training prior to deployment matched their experiences in Iraq.

Battalion level leaders state useful pre-deployment VMT training included convoy

operations and leader skills. Company and platoon level leaders state useful training

included maneuver and leaders training. High-intensity conflict (HIC) tasks trained in

VMTs were not useful in Iraq. A small percentage of respondents reported that time spent

training high-intensity tasks was detrimental, due to it taking time away from other, more

relevant training. However, the vast majority of respondents stated that VMTs have no

detrimental impact or cause negative training.

Note: No respondent from the physical collection had been to nor had orders for Iraq.

Position Sub-Issue Finding by Position: Physical S Web

N CDR • 25% of Battalion Commanders report receiving an OIF specific task list and 38% report

developing or modifying an 0IF specific task list.

50% of battalion commanders report receiving an OIF specific task list. 46% report

developing or modifying an 0IF specific task list. 64% report preparing an OlF specific

training strategy. Twenty four commanders reported their units going to or on orders to

deploy to OIF. 38% of these reported that 0IF specific tasks trained on prior to deployment

matched what they experienced. Critical training in VMTs included leader tasks and convoy

iU1 operations. Four commanders reported that no task trained in VMTs was critical to

success. High intensity combat, non-urban terrain, and main gun engagements were tasks

reported as trained in VMT which had no relationship to their OF experience. Two

commanders reported VMT training had no relationship. Commanders did not perceive

negative training from VMT; though one reported loss of training time to VMTs had a

negative impact on OIF performance.

48
BN S3 - 14% of.S3 report their unit has received an OIF specific task list. 43% report developing or

modifying an OIF task list. 14% report their units have prepared an OIF training strategy.

45% of S3s report receiving an OIF task list. 42% report developing or modifying an OIF

task list. 60% report preparing an OIF specific training strategy. 49% of OIF experienced

S3s report that OIF specific tasks trained on prior to deployment matched what they

experienced in Iraq. Training conducted in VMTs that was critical to success in Iraq include:

Lot convoy operations (4 references) and command and control/planning/troop leading

procedures (2). Two S3s reported that none of the training received in VMTs was critical to

unit success. Training that had no relationship to OIF included: high intensity conflict tactics

(4) and gunnery (2). Four S3s reported that none of their VMT training had no relationship.

S3s reported that no training in VMTs had a detrimental or negative effect (14 references).

One S3 stated that the HIC focus was detrimental.

BN MG 17% of Master Gunners report receiving an OIF specific task list from a higher command.

• 67% report their unit has developed or modified an OIF specific task list. 67% report their

unit has prepared an OIF training strategy.

39% of Master Gunners report their units have received an OIF specific task list. 35%

report developing or modifying an OIF task list. 59% report their units have developed an

OIF training strategy. 35% of Master Gunners with OIF experience report that OIF tasks

trained on prior to deployment matched what they experienced in Iraq. Most Master

Gunners (5 references) reported that no VMT training was critical to OIF success. Master

Gunners report that convoy operations (3 references) and collective maneuver training (2)

in VMTs was critical to unit success. Master Gunners reported that tank/Bradley tasks and

high intensity conflict tasks were not critical to OIF success (3 references each) while most

(6) reported no training had no relationship. Master Gunners reported that no VMT training

had negative impact.

C0 CDR 35% of company commanders with OIF experience report that OIF tasks trained on prior to

deployment matched what they experienced in iraq. Thirteen commanders reported that no

VMT training was critical to their success in Iraq. VMT training that was critical included

leader skills (7 references), gunnery (4), crew training (4), actions on contact (3), and unit

W, cohesion (2). VMT training that had no relationship to OIE included high intensity conflict

and armor tasks (14 references), all (13), gunnery (3) and company and higher training (2).

Five commanders reported that all training had a relationship. Commanders reported that

there was not any VMT training which was detrimental or OIF success, though one

commander stated that loss of training time was detrimental.

PLT LDR 35% of platoon leaders with OIF experience report that OIF specific tasks trained on prior

to deployment matched what they experienced in Iraq. They stated maneuver training (7

references), command, control, and communications training (5), convoy operations

training (3) and situational awareness training (2) was critical to their unit success. Twenty

Lo six platoon leaders stated no training in VMTs was critical to unit success. VMT training not

critical to unit success included all and high intensity conflict training (15 references each),

gunnery (4), and defensive operations (3). Platoon leaders stated VMT had no detrimental

or negative training impact, other than four platoon leaders who stated time spent in VMTs

limited time for other training.

PLT SGT 33% of platoon sergeants reported that OIF specific tasks trained on prior to deployment

matched their experience in Iraq. VMT training reported as critical included: none (51

references), convoy operations (15), maneuver tasks (9), and MOUT operations (7). Many

of the sergeants who state no VMT training was critical trained as an armored or

uIF mechanized unit and then operated as a motorized unit. VMT training that had no relation

to OIF included: none (32 references), all (14), high intensity operations (10), armor

operations (5), scenarios (4), and defend (2). Negative or detrimental training reported

included: none (75 references), focus on high intensity conflict versus current operating

environment (11), and vehicle models different than used in OIF (6).

AC ADV 60% of AC Advisors report their units received an OIF specific task list. 44% report their

@ units developed or modified an OIF task list. 50% reported their units prepared an OIF

training strategy.

rADSS 45% of TADSS Facilitators and COTAs have received an OIF task list, have developed or

Facilitators - modified an OIF task list, and/or prepared an OIF specific training strategy.

.OTA

49
ite Staff 23% of site staff report receiving an OIF specific task list. 58% report developing or

modifying an OIF task list. 40% report that OIF training matched conditions experienced in

HP Iraq. Staff report fire control and ROE training was critical to unit success in Iraq. They

report that no training had no relationship (1 answer) and no training was detrimental (1

answer).

SUBISSUE 2.3: Are there innovative training approaches being employed by CLS,

units, or higher commands that can be promulgated?

SUBISSUE 2.3 FINDING: The ARNG is using VMTs in many unique ways, most of

which expand the training horizon. This is done through linking VMTs to other live and

constructive training, through using the tether function of VMTs, or by training nontraditional training audience. To better use VMTs to train for OIF, respondents

recommend matching tasks and conditions as much as possible to the Current Operational

Environment. A task specifically cited was training convoy operations. Conditions cited

include mirroring threat tactics, techniques, and procedures and making the virtual

environment match the anticipated operational environment.

Position Sub-Issue Finding by Position: , Physical O Web

N CDR , Battalion Commanders report the following unique ways to use VMTs: -Using them to

, validate company and platoon leaders -Using them to conduct convoy operations training.

Unique uses for CCTT mentioned include: Using CCTT for gunnery -.Integrating mortars

and medics into training (3 references) . Transitioning from armor to light infantry • Integrate Air Cavalry assets • Joint training with USMC • Officer/leader validation (2

references) ° Combined Arms operations • Convoy training o Convoy scenario with civilian

vehicles and VBIED. o Scenario where convoy runs over child - Training drivers from

Support Platoon ° Linking CCTT to JANUS (2 references) . BN 'King of the Hill" competition

lpý, Recommended uses for CCTT to prepare units for OIF include: VMTs need to be the same

equipment that will be used in OIF. • Use of COE in the VMT environment. * Junior officer

and NCO decision making • Need to integrate more motorized tasks and small arms

training with shoot/don't shoot situations. Especially with Blue forces using SUVs on mnain

roads. More Blue on Blue units firing on Coalition forces using SUVs. * VMT must be

adapted to the OIF environment: Urban, IEDs, VBIEDs, snipers/RPG, and civilian

interaction.

N S3 • S3s report the following unique uses of VMTs: -Conducting convoy security operations. -

' Train support platoons on convoy operations.

Some of the more unique ways S3s have seen VMTs used include: -Battalion maneuver in

CCTT using the TOC, company commanders, and tethered platoons. -Using VMTs to train

1W newly assigned Soldiers and leaders. -Injecting MSELs into VMT training. -Training junior

leaders to perform two levels up. Ways S3s would use VMT to prepare units for OIF

include: more convoy operations (6 references), more dismounted training (4), and more

complex urban terrain environment training (3).

BN MG • Master Gunners report the following unique VMT usage: -Modifying target array to simulate

a tank ranges and tables.

Master Gunners report the following innovative uses of VMTs: -Execute a

HMMWV/motorized scenario using Bradley simulators. New ways Master Gunners would

use VMTs to prepare for OIF include convoy operations training (4 references) followed by

urban terrain training (2).

50
CO CDR 0 Company:Commanders report seeing one unique use of VMTs: training non-tankers in

, VMTs to develop leader confidence and build teams.

Company commanders report the following unique VMT usages: -Company level leader

training with platoon leaders and commanders in tanks and platoon sergeants running

tethered platoons from god screens. -Using CCTT to practice mounted land navigation in

urban areas. -Participated in a brigade FTX in which one battalion was maneuvering in the

field and another was in CCTT maneuvering on adjacent terrain. Commanders the

following uses of VMTs for units deploying to OIF: train convoy operations (7 references),

use realistic threat TTP (7), do MOUT training (6), train leader/staff skills (6), train HMMWV

operations (5), and use realist scenarios/missions (5).

PLT LDR , The only unique use of VMTs reported by Platoon Leaders was its use to evaluate leaders.

Platoon leaders have seen the following unique ways to use VMTs: -Wargaming possible

outcomes -Drivers training Platoon leaders with OIF experience recommend the following

ways to use VMTs to prepare for OIF: more realistic scenarios (19 references), tailoring

training to. actual AOR (9), and more realistic threat (9).

PLT SGT , The only unique use of VMTs reported by Platoon Sergeants is the use of them during AT

, down time.

Some innovative VMT training approaches reported by platoon sergeants include: •

Scenarios based on upcoming lanes training • Used during gunnery tables to maintain crew

skills • Cross training of junior Soldiers (dismounts/loaders/drivers) (six separate reports) . MOUT training (two separate reports) • Pitting platoons against each other instead of a

SAF • Recruiting -Used to support senior leaders training (platoon execute plan and then

view in AAR) - Creating tank-Brad hunter killer teams - Doing call for fire ° Convoy

operations (including non-combat arms units) x2 * Threat vehicle ID - Cross training other

MOSs • Train non-mechanized units on how mechanized units operate -Land navigation

Recommended uses to prepare units for OIF include: make more available (17 references),

use for MOUT training (16), use OIF specific scenarios (14), use for IDENBIED training

(14), use for dismounted operations (7), put in more civilians (6), and use for convoy

operations training (6).

C ADV m No AC Advisor reports observing an unique use of VMTs.

ADSS TADSS Facilitators and COTAs have reported linking VMTs with tabletop trainers to create

Facilitators) convoy operations training. They recommend using VMTs for ROE training.

COTA

Site Staff Site staff reported a unique way of using VMTs was to combine them with live or virtual

111i training. Site staff recommended using VMTs to prepare units for OIF by reinforcing ROE,

training fire control, and training on identifying IEDs and ambush sites.

ISSUE 3: Do current policies and operating schedules for VMTs adequately support user

needs?

FINDING: Current policies and operating schedules for VMTs adequately support user

needs. The number and location of VMTs are limiting factors in their use. However,

VMT schedules provide access when needed. Disruptions to training plans/schedules are

moderate.

SUBISSUE 3.1: Are systems fully utilized?

SUBISSUE 3.1 FINDING: See Macro-Level Analysis below.

SUBISSUE 3.2: Do units have adequate access?

51
SUBISSUE 3.2 FINDING: Less than one-third of respondents feel there are sufficient

VMTs to meet training needs. These numbers are lower at the company and platoon

levels. The biggest limiting factor is the long distances to training sites, followed by the

number of systems available.

Position Sub-Issue Finding by Position: i .Physical V. Web

BN CDR 62% of Battalion Commanders report there are sufficient VMTs available to meet training

' needs. The most significant factor limiting VMT availability is location and scheduling

conflicts with other units (3 references each).

37% of battalion commanders report sufficient VMTs are available to meet their training

0, needs. The most reported limiting factors was system availability, location of or distance to

systems, funds, time availability, scheduling, and conflicts with higher priority units.

BN S3 86% of S3s report sufficient VMTs are available to meet training needs. S3s report the

Smost significant factor limiting VMT availability is location/distance (2 references) followed

by system availability, mobilizations, and scheduling conflicts with other units.

28% of S3s report there are'sufficient VMTs available to meet training needs. The most

INS significant factor that limits VMT availability is location/distance (15 references) followed by

scheduling (including conflicts with other units) (10), time availability (6), funding (4), and

number of systems (4).

N MG 33% of Master Gunners report sufficient VMTs are available to meet training needs. The

Sprimary factor in limiting VMT availability is scheduling (4 references) followed by location,

• system availability, maintenance, and funding. One Master Gunner reported there are no

tasks they cannot train.

35% of Master Gunners report there are sufficient VMTs available to meet training needs.

1N The most significant factor that limits VMT availability is distance/location and system

availability (3 references each), followed by time availability (2), and scheduling (2).

0 CDR 56% of Company Commanders report there are sufficient VMTs to meet training needs.

A& They say the most significant factor limiting VMT availability is location/distance (7

references) followed by time availability (5) and scheduling conflicts with other units (2).

29% of company commanders report there are sufficient VMTs to meet their training.

needs. The most significant factor that limits VMT availability is location/distance (25

references), followed by time availability (15), schedule conflicts (13), system availability

(11) and funding (9).

PLT LDR 50% of Platoon Leaders report that there are sufficient VMTs available to meet training

"• needs. The most significant factor limiting VMT availability is time availability (10

references) followed by system availability and location/distance (5 each) and funding (3).

20% of platoon leaders report there are sufficient VMTs available to meet training needs.

Platoon leaders report the most significant factor limiting VMT availability is

location/distance (25 references), followed by funding (24), time availability (22), system

availability (17), maintenance (7), and trained operators (6).

PLT SGT 37% of Platoon Sergeants report that there are sufficient VMTs available to meet training

° needs. They report the most significant factor limiting VMT availability is distance/location

(14 references) followed by time availability (8) and other missions (4).

26% of platoon sergeants report that there are sufficient VMTs to meet training needs.

Significant factors that limit VMT availability include: number of systems available (47

.. references), location/distance (44), time availability (44), scheduling conflicts (including

conflicts with other units) (24), funding (21) leaders' attitudes (8), system maintenance (8),

and number of trained operators (7).

C ADV 40% of AC Advisors report there are sufficient VMTs to meet training needs. They report

LE the most significant factors limiting VMT availability are systems available, time availability,

and funding (3 references each).

52
'ADSS 27% of.TADSS Facilitators and COTAs believe there are sufficient VMTs to meet training

Facilitators) 10.& needs. The most significant factors limiting VMT availability are staff and number of

COTA systems (2 references each).

Site Staff Site staff report that the most significant factors limiting VMT availability are system

@ ý` availability, unit knowledge of system, units not requesting system, trained operators,

scheduling conflicts, and unit time available.

SUBISSUE 3.3: Do VMT schedules drive unit training strategies and plans or do plans

determine VMT scheduling?

SUBISSUE 3.3 FINDING: VMTs schedules impact unit training strategies and plans but

that impact is not large. Two-thirds of respondents state VMTs provide access when

needed. Slightly more mobile VMT users than fixed users report VMTs provide access

when needed (62% versus 59%). VMT location or proximity has a negative impact on

training. Mobile users report a slightly less negative impact than fixed users (2.75 versus

2.69 on a scale of 5). One-third report having had to change a training schedule to take

advantage of unplanned VMT availability. One-quarter to one-half of respondents report

having to cancel a VMT exercise due to a change in VMT scheduling.

Position Sub-Issue Finding by Position: * "Physical 0, Web

N CDR 88% of Battalion Commanders report that VMT scheduling provides access when

needed to support training schedules. 86% report that their unit has taken advantage of

unexpected VMT availability. 25% report that their unit has been required to change its

training schedule to take advantage of unexpected VMT availability. 50% report that a

A change in the VMT schedule has caused their unit to cancel a VMT exercise. They state

the biggest challenge to training in a VMT is time availability (4 references) followed by

location/distance (3). Commanders report that battalion staff coordinates VMT use (4

references) followed by Master Gunners/Operations SGMs. Commanders report that

location or proximity of VMTs has a negative impact on their training (2.88 on a 5 scale).

63% of battalion commanders report VMT scheduling provides access to support unit

training schedules. 64% have taken advantage of unexpected VMT availability. 41%

have been required to change a training schedule to take advantage of unexpected VMT

. availability. 42% report having to cancel a VMT exercise due to a change in VMT

scheduling. System availability, distance/location, time conflicts, scheduling, and

preparation are reported as the biggest challenges to VMT training, in order.

Commanders reported BN S3s, master gunners, staff primarily schedule VMTs. Distance

to a VMT adversely affects training (2.55 on a 5 scale).

53
BN S3 All S3s report VMT scheduling provides access when needed to support training

schedules. 86% have taken advantage of unexpected VMT availability. 29% report their

unit has been required to change its training schedule to take advantage of unexpected

VMT availability. No S3 reported that a change in VMT schedule caused their unit to

Al cancel a VMT exercise. S3s report the biggest challenge to train in a VMT is time

availability (3 references) followed by system availability, system familiarization, and

getting used to virtual environment. S3s report that battalion training officers (3

references) followed by S3 staff coordinate VMT use. VMT location/proximity has a

positive impact on VMT training.

66% of S3s state VMT scheduling provides access when needed to support their training

schedule. 53% report their unit taking advantage of unexpected VMT availability. 39%

report being required to change their training schedule to take advantage of unexpected

VMT availability. 33% report canceling a VMT exercise due to a change in VMT

I, scheduling. The biggest challenge to train in a VMT is travel/location (7 references)

followed by availability (6), pre-exercise preparation (4), and time availability (4). S3s

report they coordinate VMT use (14 references), followed by battalion master gunners or

operations NCOs (12) and other battalion staff (11); Distance'to a VMT adversely affects

training (2.61 on a 5 scale).

BN MG 67% of Master Gunners report that VMT scheduling provides access when needed to

support training schedules. 83% report their unit has taken advantage of unexpected

VMT availability. 33% report their unit has been required to change training to take

advantage of unexpected VMT availability. 17% report their unit has been required to

a. cancel a VMT exercise due to a VMT schedule change. They report the biggest'

challenges to train in a VMT are transportation, system availability, time availability,

system maintenance, and crew turbulence. Master Gunners report they primarily

coordinate VMT use (3 references) followed by battalion staff. They say that the

location/proximity of VMTs has a positive impact on training (3.67 on a 5 scale).

67% of Master Gunners report that VMT scheduling provides access when needed to

support training schedules. 56% report their units have taken advantage of unexpected

VMT availability. 44% report their units have been required to change their training

schedule to take advantage of unexpected VMT availability. 37% report that a change in

LE VMT schedule has caused them to cancel a VMT exercise. The biggest challenge to

train in a VMT is time availability (5 references) followed by distance/location/logistics (3)

system familiarization (3) and personnel availability (2). Master Gunners report that they

coordinate VMT use (8 references) followed by BN S3 staff (7), and S3s (2). Proximity

has a negative impact on VMT use (2.75 on a 5 scale).

CO CDR 62% of Company Commanders state VMT scheduling provides access when needed to

support training schedules. 59% report their unit had taken advantage of unexpected

VMT availability. 53% report their unit had been required to change its training schedule

to take advantage of unexpected VMT availability. 44% report canceling a VMT exercise

.• due to a change in VMT scheduling. The biggest challenge to training in a VMT is

distance/location/travel (5 references) followed by preparation (3) and terrain

association/navigation, conflicting requirements, and scheduling (2 each). Commanders

report that battalion staff coordinates VMT use (6 references) followed by the battalion

S3 (5) and company staff (3). Commanders state that the location/proximity of VMTs has

a negative impact on their use (2.18 on a 5 scale).

56% of company commanders report that VMT scheduling provided access when

needed to support training objectives. 68% report their units taking advantage of

unexpected VMT availability. 53% report their unit was required to change its training

schedule to take advantage of unexpected VMT availability. 36% of commanders report

W canceling a VMT exercise due to a change in VMT scheduling. The biggest challenge to

train in a VMT is distance/location (5 references) followed by exercise preparation (3),

navigation within the exercise (2) conflicting requirements (2), and scheduling (2).

Commanders report that battalion staff coordinate VMT use (34 references) followed by

company commander/staff (23). The proximity of VMTs has a negative impact on VMT

use (2.41 on a 5 scale).

54
PLT LDR 61% of Platoon Leaders state VMT scheduling provides access when needed to support

training schedules. 65% report their units taking advantage of unexpected VMT

availability. 52% report their units being required to change its training schedule due to

j unexpected VMT availability. 26% report that a change to VMT schedule has caused

a their unit to cancel a VMT exercise. Platoon Leaders report the biggest challenge to train

in a VMT is time availability (8 references) followed by system availability (4) and

personnel availability (2). Platoon Leaders state that the location/proximity of VMTs has

no impact on training (3 on a 5 scale).

50% of platoon leaders report VMTs provide access when needed. 59% report their unit

has taken advantage of unexpected VMT availability. 36% report that their unit has been

required to change its training schedule to take advantage of unexpected VMT

LE availability. 29% report that a change to the VMT schedule has forced them to cancel a

VMT exercise. Platoon leaders report the biggest challenge to train in a .VMT is

availability of systems (20 references) followed by availability of time (11), getting used to

a virtual simulator (9) and location/distance (9). Platoon leaders report that proximity or

distance has a negative impact on VMT use (2.64 on a 5 scale).

AC ADV 40% of AC Advisors report VMTs provide access when needed to support training

schedules. 40% report their units have taken advantage of unexpected VMT availability.

30% report their units have been required to change their training schedules to take

advantage of unexpected VMT availability. 22% reported a change in the VMT schedule

has required them to cancel a VMT exercise. The biggest challenge to train in a VMT is

knowing/learning the system (5 references) followed by time availability (4). AC Advisors

report battalion staffs and company staffs coordinate VMT use (4 references each). They

say VMT location/proximity has a negative impact on VMT use (2.5 on a 5 scale).

TADSS 67% of TADSS Facilitators and COTAs believe VMT scheduling provides access when

Facilitators) needed to support training schedules. 78% have seen units take advantage of

COTA unexpected VMT availability. 30% have seen units required to change their training

schedules to take advantage of unexpected VMT availability. 40% have seen units

cancel a VMT exercise due to VMT schedule changes. They say the biggest challenge to

train in a VMT is scheduling. They say brigade or higher coordinate VMT use (4

references) followed by battalions (3) and companies (2). They say that location or

proximity has a slightly positive impact on VMT use (3.67 on a 5 scale).

Site Staff All (100%) of site staff report VMT scheduling provides access when needed to support

training schedules. 67% of staff report that units have take advantage of unexpected

VMT availability. 30% report units have been forced to change their training schedules to

LWL take advantage of VMT availability. Site Staff report the following challenges to train in a

VMT: units trying to do too many things at the same time, lack of unit preparation,

system breakdowns, communicating time available, and motivation. Site Staff report that

VMT proximity has a positive impact on training (3.5 on a 5 scale).

Mobile l 62% of mobile VMT users report VMTs provide access when needed to support training

VMT Users schedules. The proximity of VMTs has a negative impact on VMT use (2.75 on a 5

scale).

Fixed VMT *. 60% of fixed VMT users report VMTs provide access when needed to support training

Users schedules. The proximity of VMTs has a negative impact on VMT use (2.69 on a 5

scale).

ISSUE 4: Do the capabilities of VMTs meet user training requirements?

FINDING: Users are satisfied overall with the capabilities of their VMTs. They would

like more availability, but not at the expense of realism. Users believe their VMTs are

good at training individual through platoon level, but best at training crews. Although,

wanting to keep a primary platoon focus to their VMT training, they would want the

ability to also train at the company level. This implies a desire for a system-level VMT

capability to train at the company level.

55
SUBISSUE 4.1: At what echelons are VMTs used and why?

SUBISSUE 4.1 FINDING: VMTs are being used primarily at platoon level but also to

train at crew and company level. Unit leaders believe VMTs provide the best training for

crews followed by individuals. The only exception are Battalion Master Gunners, who

believe VMTs are best at training platoons followed by crews. Respondents do not

believe VMTs are good trainers of companies and battalions.

Position Sub-Issue Finding by Position: ' Physical U- Web

BN CDR All Battalion Commanders report that they have seen platoon training on VMTs..75% report

Sseeing crew training while 25% report company and 12% report battalion training.

Commanders believe VMTs best train crews followed by individuals and platoons. They

believe VMTs do not well train companies and poorly train battalions.

Battalion commanders have seen primarily crew (82%), platoon (77%) and company (64%)

training occur in VMTs. Commanders believe VMTs best train crews (3.81 on a 5 scale)

and then individuals (3.54) and platoons (3.41). Commanders rate poorly VMT training for

companies (2.76) and battalions (2.3).

N S3 100% of S3s have seen VMTs used to train crews and platoons. 71% have seen them train

I companies and 14% have seen them train battalions. S3s believe VMTs best train crews

(4.29 on a 5 scale) followed by individuals (3.86), and platoons (3.71). They believe VMTs

do not train companies (2.29) nor battalions (1.29) well.

82% of S3s have seen crew training conducted on VMTs, while 79% have seen platoon,

L 71% have seen company, and 39% have seen battalion training conducted. S3s believe

VMTs best train crews (3.82 on a 5 scale) followed by individuals (3.53) and platoons

(3.45). S3s believe VMTs are less suitable to companies (2.68) and battalions (2.29).

BN MG All Master Gunners have seen crew and platoon training in VMTs. 67% have seen

. company training and 17% have seen battalion training. They believe VMTs best train

platoons (4.17 on a 5 scale) followed by crews (3.5) and individuals (3). The train less well

companies (2.5) and battalions (1.83).

94% of Master Gunners have reported platoon echelon training conducted in VMTs. 75%

reported crew, 56% report company, and 19% report battalion level training in VMTs:

W. Master Gunners believe VMTs best train platoons (4.06 on a 5 scale) followed by crews

(4), and individuals (3.69). Master Gunners believe VMTs do not train companies or

battalions well (2.5 and 1.88 respectively).

O CDR 76% of Company Commanders have observed platoon training in VMTs. 65% have seen

crew training while 41% have seen company and 12% have seen battalion. Commanders

' believe VMTs best train crews (4.24 on a 5 scale) followed by platoons (3.59), and

individuals (3.53). Commanders believe VMTs are less well at training companies (2.12)

and battalions (1.29).

84% of company commanders have seen platoons train in VMTs. 80% have seen crews,

S68% have seen companies and 24% have seen battalions. Commanders believe VMTs

best train crews, followed by platoons and individuals. Commanders believe VMTs are less

efficient at training companies and battalions.

PLT LDR 60% of Platoon Leaders have seen VMTs do crew level training. 56% have seen platoon

level training, 28% have seen company, and 24% have seen battalion level training.

Platoon Leaders believe that VMTs train crews best (4.08 on a 5 scale) followed by

individuals (3.67) and platoons (3.54). Platoon Leaders believe VMTs are less well at

training companies (2.67) and battalions (2.33).

75% of platoon leaders have seen platoon training in VMTs. 71% have seen crew training,

52% company training, and 18% battalion training. Platoon leaders believe VMTs train

crews well (3.81 on a 5 scale) followed by platoons and individuals. Platoon leaders do not

think VMTs train companies (2.76) nor battalions (2.13) well.

56
C ADV 70% of.AC Advisors have seen crew and platoon level training on VMTs. 60% have seen

* company level and 30% have seen battalion level. AC Advisors believe that VMTs best

train platoons (3.33 on a 5 scale) but do not train well crews (2.33), individuals and __ _ companies (2.22 each), and battalions (1.67).

TADSS 90% of TADSS Facilitators and COTAs have seen VMTs train platoons. 70% have seen

Facilitatorsi them train crews. 60% have seen them train companies and 10% have seen them train

COTA battalions. They say VMTs are best at training platoons, followed by crews, and individuals.

They say that VMTs do not well train companies followed by battalions.

SUBISSUE 4.2: Would more company and battalion level training be conducted if

technology could support it?

SUBISSUE 4.2 FINDING: ARNG leaders prefer using VMTs to train platoons and

crews. Guard units would conduct more company, but not more battalion level training.

If given additional resources, respondents would first train platoons then crews and

finally companies. This is true for both CCTT and SIMNET users, though CCTT users

placed more emphasis on using their VMT for individual training than did SIMNET

users. Guard leaders would invest limited training time (MUTAs) first in platoon and

then crew level training. Overall, Guard units would train gunnery tasks followed closely

by maneuver tasks. However, CCTT users would train maneuver tasks followed closely

by gunnery tasks.

The bglow charts compare the investment in MUTAs mobile users would make versus

fixed users and CCTT users would make versus SIMNET users. One MUTA is a half-day

assembly/training period for one Soldier. Guard units normally have 48 MUTAs per

Soldier per year, which they allocate to weekend IDTs.

8 .0 0 . .. ..... ....... . .... . .. .. ......... ......... ... .... .-........... . ... ... ......... ........ ......

7.00

6.00

5.00

E3 Fixed VMTs I

4.00 .m~~ Mbile W V

3.00

2.00

1.00

0.00

Ind Crew PLT CO BN

Figure 6. AVG MUTA investment by mobility

57
8 .0 0 . . . . . . . . . . . . .

7.00

6.00

5.00

4.00---

4.00 __ _ ___-- C1

m SIMET

3.00

2.00

1.00

0.00

Ind Crew R.T CO BN

Figure 7. AVG MUTA investment by system

Investment of training time is an indicator of the relative importance users place in

differing systems. Figure 6 compares fixed VMT users to mobile VMT users. The figure

shows that both fixed and mobile users place most importance in platoon training,

followed by crew. The figure also shows that fixed VMT users would invest more

training in higher echelons, companies and battalions, than mobile users. Figure 7

compares CCTT and SIMNET users. Again, both CCTT and SIMNET users would

invest more time training platoon tasks, followed by crew. The figure also shows that

CCTT users would invest more training time in higher echelons than SIMNET users.

Position Sub-Issue Finding by Position: Physical 0- Web

BN CDR If given additional access to VMTs, Commanders would first train crews and platoons,

followed by companies, individuals, and battalions. They would train gunnery and

S0 maneuver followed by fire control, command and control, SOPs and communications.

Commanders would invest time (MUTAs) first in platoon training (5) followed by crews

(3.25), companies (3.13), individuals (2.25) and battalions (1.38).

If given more access to VMTs, battalion commanders would first train platoons, then

crews, individuals, companies and battalions, in order. Commanders would train

LOL, gunnery first, maneuver, command and control, call for fire, communications, and SOPs,

in order. Commanders wouldcommit most training time (MUTAs) to platoons (5.22),

crews (4.81), companies (3.89), individuals (3.28), and battalions (2.83), in order.

BN S3 If given additional access, S3s would first train platoons, followed by crews, companies,

,4 individuals and battalions. They would first train gunnery, followed by maneuver, fire

* control and command and control. They would invest time (MUTAs) first to train platoons

(10.14), crews (9.86), individuals (6.29), companies (5.86), and battalions (5.57).

If S3s were given more resources, they would first train platoons followed by crews,

companies, individuals, and battalions (3.78). They would train command and control

LN tasks followed by maneuver, gunnery, fire control, SOPs and communications, in order.

They would commit most training time (MUTAs) to platoon training (10.14) followed by

crews (9.86), individuals (6.29), companies (5.86) and battalions (5.57).

58
BN MG If given additional VMT access, Master Gunners would train first platoons, followed by

crews, companies, individuals, and battalions. They would train gunnery, followed by

maneuver, fire control and communications, command and control, and SOPs. Master

Gunners would commit time (MUTAs) most to platoons (12.5) then companies (5.33),

crews (5.17), individuals (2.33) and battalions (2.17).

If given additional resources, Master Gunners would first want to train platoons, followed

by crews, individuals, companies and battalions. They would train maneuver tasks,

• followed by gunnery, command and control, SOPs, fire control, and communications.

They would invest training time (MUTAs) most in platoons (12.5), then companies

(5.33), crews (5.17), individuals (2.33) and battalions (2.17).

O CDR If given additional access to VMTs, Company Commanders would first train platoons,

followed by crews, companies, individuals and battalions. They would first train fire

j control followed by command and control, maneuver, communications, and gunnery and

SOPs. Commanders would invest most time (MUTAs) into training platoons (5) followed

by individuals (4.14), crews (3.86), companies (3.29) and battalions (2.43).

If given additional resources, company commanders would use them first to train

platoons, followed by crews, companies, individuals, and battalions, in order.

Commanders would train maneuver tasks, followed by gunnery, command and control,

. communications and fire control, and SOPs. Commanders would invest time (MUTAs)

first training platoons (7.87), crews (5.6), companies (4.96), individuals (3.03), and

_battalions (2.66), in order.

PLT LDR If given additional access to VMTs, Platoon Leaders would first train platoons, followed

' by crews, individuals, companies, and battalions. They would train gunnery followed by

command and control, fire control, maneuver tasks, and SOPs and communications.

If given more access to VMTs, platoon leaders would like first to train platoons followed

! by crews, companies, individuals, and battalions. Platoon leaders would use additional

access to train first gunnery followed by maneuver, command and control, SOPs, fire

control, and communications.

PLT SGT If given additional access to VMTs, Platoon Sergeants would first train platoons,

, followed by crews, companies, individuals, and battalions. They would first train

Smaneuver followed by gunnery, communications, command and control, fire control, and

SOPs.

If given more access to VMTs, platoon sergeants would place most priority on crew

1 training, followed by platoon, individual, company, and battalion. Platoon sergeants

would most like to train maneuver, gunnery, fire control, command and control,

communications, and SOPs, in order.

AC ADV If given additional access to VMTs, AC Advisors would first train crews and platoons,

followed by individuals, companies, and battalions. They would train communications

T,_ followed by command and control, gunnery, fire control, maneuver, and SOPs. They

would invest time (MUTAs) first in crews (4.4), platoons (4.1), companies (2.7),

individuals (2.2) and battalions (1.6).

"FADSS If given additional access to VMTs, TADSS Facilitators would first train platoons,

Facilitators) followed by crews, companies, individuals, and battalions. They would first train

,OTA LE maneuver followed by gunner and command and control, fire control and

communications, and then SOPs.

:ixed VMT Fixed VMT users would invest most time (MUTAs) into training crews (7.40) followed by

Jsers platoons (7.38), companies (5.15), individuals (5.12), and battalions (3.04).

Vlobile :Mobile VMT users would invest most time (MUTAs) into training platoons (7.48) followed

IMT Users - by crews (6.52), companies (5.31), individuals (4.26), and battalions (3.68).

CTT If given additional resources, CCTT users would use them first to train platoons, followed

Users by crews, individuals, companies, and battalions, in order. CCTT users would train

*maneuver tasks, followed by gunnery, command and control, SOPs, communications,

and fire control. CCTT users would invest most time (MUTAs) into training platoons

(7.24) followed by crews (6.66), companies (5.43), individuals (4.14), and battalions

(2.43).

59
IMNET If given additional resources, SIMNET users would use them first to train platoons,

Users followed by crews, companies, individuals, and battalions, in order. SIMNET users would

tI1 train gunnery tasks, followed by maneuver, command and control, communications, fire

control, and SOPs. SIMNET users would invest most time (MUTAs) into training

platoons (7.28) followed by crews (6.96), individuals (4.84), companies (4.83) and

battalions (3.01).

SUBISSUE 4.3: Do the differences between the capabilities afforded by the available

VMTs impact how they are used?

SUBISSUE 4.3 FINDING: Battalion level leadership and platoon sergeants believe that

VMTs improve their confidence in their training proficiency, followed by confidence in

their units. Company Commanders and Platoon Leaders believe VMTs best improve

confidence in themselves, followed by confidence in their training proficiency. CCTT is

better than SIMNET in improving users' confidence in themselves.

Respondents would not accept an improvement in realism if it meant less availability nor

would they accept an increase in availability if it meant a decrease in realism. The desire

to maintain realism is stronger than the desire to maintain availability. CCTT and

SIMNET users share the same level of desire to accept no increase in realism if it meant

less availability. CCTT users were significantly less likely to accept any decrease in

availability if it meant an increase in realism (51% versus 45%).

Position Sub-Issue Finding by Position: . Physical 8- Web

BN CDR Battalion Commanders believe VMT training best improves confidence in their training (4

on a 5 scale) and then in their units (3.75), themselves (3.63), and their equipment

(2.63). 50% of Commanders would not accept a less realistic VMT for any increase in its

availability while 38% would accept a less realistic VMT for a medium increase in it

Savailability. 62% would not accept a decrease in VMT availability for any increase in its

realism while 25% would accept a decrease in availability for a slight increase in realism.

Commanders report the capabilities of their VMTs do not allow them to train CASEVAC,

maintenance, CAS, convoy operations, MOUT, and dismounted tasks.

Battalion commanders believe VMTs most improve their confidence in their training (3.6

on a 5 scale) followed by their unit, self, and equipment (2.66). 47% of commanders

would not accept a less realistic VMT for more access.*25% would settle for a less

Srealistic VMT for a major increase in availability. 58% of battalion commanders would not

accept a decrease in availability for an increase in realism. 25% would settle for less

availability for a major increase in realism. Commanders report they are unable to train

logistics/sustainment, gunnery, and MOUT due to VMT limitations. Most commanders,

however, said there were no tasks they could not train due to VMT limitations.

60
BN S3 S3s believe VMTs best improve confidence in their training followed by themselves, their

units, and their equipment. 43% of S3s would not accept a less realistic VMT for any

increase in availability. 28.5% would accept a less realistic VMT for a slight increase and

28.5 would accept for a medium increase in availability. 28.5% of S3s would not accept

a decrease in VMT availability of bny increase in realism. The same percent would

accept a decrease in availability for a major increase in realism. S3s report they are

unable to train dismounted tasks 92 references), logistics/sustainment, company level

tasks, and weapons system maintenance tasks due to the capabilities of their VMT. One

reported there are no tasks that he cannot train.

S3s believe VMTs most improve their confidence in their training (3.88 on a 5 scale)

followed by their unit (3.72), themselves (3.53), and their equipment (2.78). 50% of S3s

would not accept a less realistic VMT for any increase in its availability. 33% woild settle

_• for a less realistic VMT for a medium and 8% would settle for a major increase in

availability. 47% of S3s would not settle for a decrease in availability for any increase in

its realism. 33% would settle for a decrease in availability for a major increase in its

realism.

BN MG Master Gunners believe VMTs most improve their confidence in their units and training

(3.83 each on a 5 scale), then themselves (3.33) and their equipment (2.5). 67% of

Master Gunners would not settle for a less realist VMT for any increase in its availability

• while 33% would settle for a major increase. 67% would not settle for a decrease in VMT

availability for any increase in realism. Master Gunners say the capabilities of their VMTs

prevent them from training loader tasks (2 references) followed by dismounted

operations, deliberate defense, company tasks, and pre-combat inspections and checks.

Master Gunners report that training in VMTs best improves their confidence in their

training (3.89) followed by their units (3.81), themselves (3.63), and their equipment

(2.74). 60% of Master Gunners report they would not accept a less realistic VMT for any

improvement in availability, while 20% report they would accept one for a medium

W_- increase in availability and 13% would accept one for a slight increase. 53% of Master

Gunners report they would accept no decrease in availability for any increase in realism,

while 33% state they would accept a decrease for a major increase in realism. Master

Gunners report that the tasks they are unable to train due to the capabilities of their

systems include none.(3 references) and dismounted operations (2).

CO CDR Company Commanders believed that VMTs best improve their confidence in themselves

(3.95 on a 5 scale) followed by their training (3.71), their units (3.59), and their

equipment (3.12). 47% of Commanders would not accept a less realistic VMT for any

increase in availability. 24% would accept a less realist VMT for a medium increase in

o availability. 41% of Commanders would not accept a decrease in availability for any

increase in realism. 24% would accept a decrease in availability for a major and 24%

would accept a decrease for a slight increase in availability. Commanders report that

due .to the capabilities or their VMTs, they are not able to train logistics/sustainment (3

references) followed by dismounted operations and tank/Bradley crew gunnery skills (2

each).

Company commanders report that VMTs most improve their confidence in themselves

(3.76 on a 5 scale) followed by their training (3.73), their units (3.68), and their

equipment (2.69). 60% of company commanders would not settle for a less realistic VMT

for any increase in its availability. 16% would settle for a less realistic VMT for a medium - increase in availability. 51% of company commanders would not accept a decrease in

-• availability for any increase in realism. 25% would accept a decrease in availability for a

major increase in its realism. Commanders report the tasks they cannot do due to the

capabilities of their VMT include: SASO tasks (6 references), company and above

echelon tasks (6), none (5), gunnery (3), dismounted operations (3), and

logistics/sustainment (3).

61
PLT LDR Platoon Leaders believe training in VMTs best improves their confidence in their training

(3.88 on a 5 scale) followed by themselves (3.68), their units (3.48) and their equipment

(2.6). 32% of Platoon Leaders would not accept a less realistic VMT for any increase in

, its availability and 32% would accept a less realistic VMT for a medium increase in

availability. 48% of Platoon Leaders would not accept a decrease in VMT availability for

any increase in realism. Platoon Leaders state that the capabilities of their VMTs do not

allow them to train logistics/sustainment and loader's tasks. The majority of Platoon

Leaders state there are no tasks that they cannot train (5 references).

Platoon leaders believe VMTs best improve confidence in themselves (3.93 on a 5

scale), followed by their training, their unit, and their equipment. 48% of platoon leaders

would not accept a less realistic VMT for any increase in its availability. 22% would

accept a less realistic VMT for a medium increase in availability. 52% of platoon leaders

IQ would not accept a decrease in availability for any increase in realism. 26%.would

accept a decrease for a major increase in realism. Platoon leaders report that the

capabilities of their VMTs do not allow them to train company and higher tasks (10

references), MOUT (8), loaders tasks (80, and logistics including breakdowns (7). Ten

platoon leaders reported there were no tasks they could not train on.

PLT SGT Platoon Sergeant believe that training in VMTs best improves their confidence in their

units (3.87 on a 5 scale) followed by their training 3.83), themselves (3.7), and their

equipment (3). 34% would not accept a less realistic VMT for any increase in availability.

28% would accept a less realist VMT for a medium increase in availability. 45% would

Snot accept a decrease in availability for any increase in realism. 31% would accept a

decrease for a major increase in realism. Platoon Sergeants report that the capabilities

of their VMTs prevent them from training dismounted operations, and

logistics/sustainment (2 references each). Two Sergeants reported there are no tasks

they cannot train.

Platoon sergeants believe VMTs most improve their confidence in their training (3.59 on

a 5 scale), then themselves (3.56), their unit (3.42), and their equipment (2.93). 57% of

sergeants would not accept a less realistic VMT for any improvement in availability. 19%

would accept a less realist VMT for a major increase in availability. 51% would not

IF accept a decrease in availability for any increase in realism. 26% would accept a

decrease in availability for a major increase in realism. The top task that platoon

sergeants report they cannot train on due to their VMT capabilities is company and

higher echelon tasks (22 references) followed by dismounted operations (21), and

gunnery (21). Fifteen platoon sergeants reported there were no tasks they could not

perform.

AC ADV AC Advisors believe that VMTs best improve confidence in the individual then in training,

the unit, and finally equipment. 40% of Advisors would not settle for a less realistic VMT

for any increase in its availability. 30% would accept a decrease in realism for a medium

increase in availability. 30% of AC Advisors would not accept a decrease in VMT

availability for any increase in realism while 30% would accept a decrease for a major

increase in realism. AC Advisors report that the capabilities of their VMTs do not allow

them to train presence patrol, react to IEDs, convoy operations, gunnery, and

dismounted tasks.

ADSS 33% of TADSS Facilitators and COTAs would not accept a less realistic VMT for any

Facilitators increase in availability. Those will to accept a less realist VMT for an increase in

OTA availability were divided evenly between accepting a slight, medium, or major increase.

Io 67% of TADSS Facilitators and COTAs would not settle for a decrease in VMT

availability for any increase in realism. 22% would accept a decrease for a medium

increase in availability. TADSS Facilitators and COTAs say the capabilities of their VMTs

do not allow them to train gunnery tasks (4 references) followed by dismounted tasks,

company or higher echelon tasks, command and control, and civil-military operations.

Site Staff Site staff report that the capabilities of their VMTs prevent training on the following:

_! logistics/sustainment, HMMWV tasks, and dismounted tasks. Three reported that there

are no tasks which their VMT cannot support.

62
CTT CCTT users report that training in VMTs best improves their confidence in their training

Users and themselves (3.62) followed by their units (3.37), and their equipment (2.57). 56% of

CCTT users report they would not accept a less realistic VMT for any improvement in

I availability, while 14% report they would accept one for a major increase in availability,

19% for a medium and 10% would accept one for a slight increase. 51% CCTT users

report they would accept no decrease in availability for any increase in realism, while

26% state they would accept a decrease for a major increase in realism.

SIMNET SIMNET users report that training in VMTs best improves their confidence in their

Users training (3.83) followed by themselves (3.56), their units (3.41), and their equipment (2.75). 55% of SIMNET users report they would not accept a less realistic VMT for any

LE improvement in availability, while 18% report they would accept one for a major increase

in availability, 17% for a medium, and 9% would accept one for a slight increase. 45% of

SIMNET users report they Would accept no decrease in availability for any increase in

realism, while 26% state they would accept a decrease for a major increase in realism.

SUBISSUE 4.4: What do users recommend for future investment of training

development budget for VMT, systems?

SUBISSUE 4.4 FINDING: Users placed the highest priority for improvements to VMTs

on terrain and simulator realism. When asked to provide a specific recommendation, they

responded predominantly that they wanted improvements in threat depiction, followed by

improvements in terrain. It is not clear from our analysis why the leading prioritized

recommendation is for improvements in terrain realism while the leading specific

recommendation cited was for improvements in threat depiction.

Position Sub-Issue Finding by Position: T Physical *Uý Web

BN CDR 50% of commanders would like to see improvements in terrain realism while 38% would

• like to see more realistic simulators and OPFOR. 12% would like to see improvements in

TSPs and site staff. Commanders would like to SAF crew members for when crews are

short personnel, motion, and better communications modeling.

Commanders would most like to see resources invested in improving system realism,

followed by terrain realism, support staff, TSPs and SAF. The most recommended

improvement was more realistic OPFOR followed by more realistic terrain, dismounted

capability, improved scenarios, urban terrain, and improved battle damage, in order.

N S3 86% of S3s would like to see resources placed into better terrain realism. 29% would like to

Ssee more realist simulations. 14% would like to see improvements in TSPs, support staff,

* and HMMWV models, each. S3s would like most to see better visual weapon effects (2

references).

S3s would most like to see resources invested in improving simulator realism (54%)

followed by better support staff, better SAF/OPFOR, and better terrain realism, in order.

i, One S3 recommended addition of coalition forces. S3s reported they would most like to

see improvements made in terrain realism (8) followed by vehicle realism (4) and weapon

system realism (4).

N MG 50% of Master Gunners would invest resources into improving TSPs and terrain realism.

• They would improve VMTs by improving the loader's station (2 references) followed by

OPFOR realism, dismounted modeling, and adding more systems.

67% of Master Gunners would like to see resources invested in more realistic simulators

while 27% would like to see better terrain realism and 20% would like to see betters TSPs - and SAF/OPFOR. The improvements most referenced by Master Gunners is a more realist

threat and urban terrain (3 references each) followed by better weapon system realism (2).

63
O CDR 65% of Company Commanders would like to see resources committed to improving

,q, simulator realism. 41% would like to see better terrain realism. Commanders recommend

improvements in first in weapon system realism (4 references) followed by OPFOR realism

(3) and terrain, graphics and vehicle realism (2 each).

Company commanders most want to see resources invested in simulator realism (55%),

followed by OPFOR (33%), terrain realism (28%), support staff (20%), and TSPs (9%). The

predominant improvement commanders want to see is OPFOR realism (20 references),

followed by weapon system realism (10), terrain realism (8), and vehicle realism (7).

PLT LDR 77% of Platoon Leaders would like to see more realistic simulators. 36% would like to see

, improvements in terrain realism. Platoon Leaders recommend more realistic scenarios,

better vehicle realism, and better OPFOR realism (3 references each).

52% of platoon leaders would invest resources in more realistic simulators while 36%

would invest in terrain realism, 31% in OPFOR realism, and 14% in site staff. Platoon

i leaders would like to see improvements made first in OPFOR realism (28 references),

terrain rearlism (19), vehicle realism (including vehicle breakdowns and HMMWV

simulators) (17) and weapon system realism (11).

PLT SGT 55% of Platoon Sergeants would like to see resources committed to better terrain realism.

, 52% would like to see more realistic simulators. Platoon Sergeants recommend

* improvements to terrain realism (8 references) followed by vehicle realism (5) and OPFOR

realism (3).

Platoon sergeants would most like to see resources invested in improving simulator realism

followed by terrain realism and SAF realism. Other recommendations include buying more

_ systems, sustaining site staff, and buying repair parts. Sergeants would like to see

OPFOR/SAF realism improvements (42 references) followed by terrain/weather realism

improvements (19), weapon accuracy improvement (18), vehicle realism (14), realistic

_ _ scenarios (9) and better graphics (8).

AC ADV 70% of AC Advisors would like to see resources committed to improving simulator realism

LE while 50% would like to see improvements in site staff and 40% would like to see better

OPFOR. Advisors recommend better OPFOR TTP, better weapon systems realism, more

realistic terrain (3 references each) and the ability to train loader's tasks (2).

TADSS 50% of TADSS Facilitators and COTAs would like to see resources invested in improving

Facilitators OPFOR realism and more realistic simulators. 30% would like to see improvements in

COTA q;. support staff and terrain realism, while 10% would like to see improved TSPs. Specific

improvements include OPFOR realism (2 references), MOUT.terrain, integration of

HMMWV simulators, COBs, different regional databases, and more availability.

ite Staff 66% of site staff would like to see more realistic simulators. 44% would like to see more

realistic OPFOR. Site staff would recommend better graphics.

64
Macro Level Analysis Results

5000 - - -- -- ~ -

4500

4000

3500

3000 J

0 ",e

2500 _OBattalion

20Company

03PIatoon

2000

1500

1000

500 -----

0 n

Jun- Jul- Aug- Sep- Oct- Nov- Dec- Jan- Feb- Mar- Apr- May- Jun- Jul- Aug- Sep- Oct- Nov- Dec- Jan- Feb02 02 02 02 02 02 02 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 04 04

Figure 8. ARNG CCTT usage, Jun 02 - Feb 04.,

The below chart shows reported ARNG CCTT usage by man-hours by echelon for the

period June 2002 to February 2004. Some insights from this chart include:

"* ARNG CCTT training does not occur on a regular pattern.

" ARNG CCTT use is primarily platoon level. There are two anomalies on the

chart. The first is the battalion level training conducted in February 2003. This

was movement to contact training attributed to the 10 8'h CAV, the most

prodigious CCTT user during this period. The second anomaly is the "other"

trainin/g occurring in May 2003. This was crew and section training attributed to

2-263r AR.

The below table shows the number of reported CCTT exercises by unit by month.

65
Table 6. CCTT Use by Month for Sample of ARNG Units

00 -,' 9 C9 (Ch 9 9C? 0 C0 0 0 C? T 0 9 0 4? 0 ? 9 0 z L~ 4~ '4 ( 0 z a n LA.

108 CAV 1 1 2 2

1-101 CAV I

1.103 CAV "

1-112 AR 1 2

1.127 AR 1 3 1

1-147 AR I 1 I

1-194 1

1-263 AR 2

127 1

1-94 AR 3 2 1

2-112 AR 2

2-142 AR __2 2 __

2-185 AR 1

2-278 C"V 5

4-112 AR1

Some insights from this table include:

The units in this sample, on average, used CCTT one month per year. However,

there are wide differences between unit use frequencies. 40% of the units in this

sample conducted CCTT more than one month per year. These heavy-use units

conducted CCTT training an average of 1.6 months per year. Low-use units in

the sample conducted CCTT training an average of one month every two years.

CCTT use generally occurred in clusters over four to five months.

Discussion:

ARNG units face an extreme challenge dealing with the conditions confronting RC units.

Today's NGB units are trying to maintain a level of training readiness under severe time

constraints. They are doing this when OIF, Transformation, and other requirements

impact their ability to make long-term plans. Also, they are maintaining readiness while

losing individuals, platoons and companies deploying to Iraq and southeast Europe.

It is under these conditions that they are trying to integrate a somewhat new and

revolutionary training capability, VMTs, into their programs. Of the battalion

commanders interviewed, only one articulated a concept where VMTs are integrated into

an overall training plan, and he, being relatively new, had not yet implemented the plan,

66
nor promulgated it down to his subordinates. One battalion commander admitted that he

did not know how to integrate VMTs into training. A few web respondents admitted the

same. These Guardsmen are not receiving sufficient assistance. VMT usage guidance

appears to be virtually non-existent. What guidance was reported is non-specific and of

limited assistance in developing specific plans, strategies or schedules. NGB units are

being left to develop their own approach to using VMTs. This is not necessarily a

problem except that they have had minimal experience that helps them decide how to use

available virtual simulations and no command or Army level assistance.

Despite these issues, leaders of ARNG units do appreciate the potential of virtual

simulation and are seeking ways to use VMTs to better support training. Guard leaders

reflect the same attitudes as found in their AC peers: a desire to see the virtual

environments of their VMTs better emulate the current operational environment (COE).

This includes complex, dynamic terrain and a civil populace; scenarios that support the

offensive, defensive, and stability and reconstruction missions found in active theaters;

and fully supporting training in the modes in which units must operate today:

mechanized, motorized, and dismounted.

There are negative feelings towards training for high intensity conflict (HIC), especially

from junior leaders. Junior leaders do not share their senior leaders' experiences

preparing to fight Soviet tank armies. One cited negative aspect of VMT usage is a

perception that HIC training takes time from "useful" training. As junior leaders advance

in position and authority, VMTs will have, to transform their training focus or they will be

viewed as non-relevant. On a higher level, the Army will have to deal with a force that

has a low intensity conflict (LIC) focus, similar to the post-Vietnam force.

The data shows a dichotomy between reports that VMTs provide access when needed and

conflicting reports of a lack of VMT availability. Users recognize VMT effectiveness

and therefore they want more availability. However, this "need" may be a perception

based not on strict training management analysis, but rather on low expectations for VMT

availability. If users start increasing their expectation of availability and building VMTs

into their training plans based upon strict analysis, it is reasonable to believe "need" will

rise and satisfaction with access might decrease.

An additional dichotomy in the data is the low regard of users towards VMT ability to

train companies but their desire for an increase in company level VMT training relative to

platoon level training. This is harder to explain, especially given regulatory guidance for

the ARNG directing a focus on platoon level training during premobilization. It is

possible that users have a general desire for more company level training to improve

overall unit readiness. However, they have not had much experience in conducting

company level training, especially when their primary experience base is VMTs

comprised of four vehicle simulators suites. This limitation of the VMTs to which they

have had access may cloud their perceptions of how well the technology is able support

company and battalion exercises/training. These higher level exercises are hard to

envision using platoon sets. With more experience, access to fixed sites, and assistance in

planning to use VMTs to support company training this perception would likely change.

67
NGB units are also having difficulty integrating VMTs at the Soldier level. Units report

significant personnel turbulence such that, in almost every VMT exercise, the crews and

platoons are "new." A large portion of the limited time the units have to use a VMT site

is consumed by orientation and administrative train-up. This impacts the time available

for scenario iterations and AARs. Personnel turbulence also makes it difficult to field

full crews and it is not easy for dispersed units, already challenged in forming and

maintaining cohesive units, to move individuals around to support collective training.

68
Observations & Recommendations

Table 7. List of Recommendations

" CCTT and SIMNET Army-level managers should have access to

current intelligence information that will allow them to rapidly

identify and, perhaps, predict operational conditions.

" CCTT and SIMNET preparation training should occur using

distance learning technology prior to arriving at the training

location.

"* Army-level managers should develop leadership guides on how to

integrate virtual simulations into unit training programs.

"* Virtual systems should include an artificial crew member

capability that permits training by units short on personnel.

" Take home packets should be improved with greater audio and

video feedback.

"* Army-level managers should work on procedures and technology

to link virtual training with live and constructive training.

The research effort within these investigations focused on assessing the effectiveness of

virtual simulations to combat effectiveness. The research looked at two populations of

simulation users: heavy, close-combat battalions recently returned from OIF and heavy,

close-combat battalions within the ARNG. The research consisted of canvassing sample

user communities using a developed survey and interview method to determine the

answers to identified issues.

A synopsis of key findings is below:

CCTT use is driven from bottom-up. Generally, there is little or no guidance from

more senior headquarters. This maximizes the flexibility for subordinate leaders and

their opportunity for initiative. However, some subordinate' leaders are not well

versed in integrating virtual simulations within their training program and they might

benefit from instruction.

9 Users are identifying CCTT as a gunnery training tool.

0 Training in a virtual environment is not seen as a substitute for live training. When

resources become available, units will opt for live training.

* Users recognize CCTT's support to training collective tasks but do not recognize

support to individual tasks.

69
"* AARs are critical to training success, though the majority of training comes during

execution, as opposed to preparation or AARs. Leaders develop their AAR

facilitation skills through experience.

" Users believe CCTT is adequately realistic to support training for the COE. Users

would like to see more theater-specific modeling in order to use CCTT for more

theater oriented training. Modeling includes theater-specific environment, missions,

and threat forces.

"* Users believe CCTT adequately models the Abrams tank and Bradley fighting

vehicle. Users would like to see the Abrams loader station better modeled, especially

the modeling of the loader's M240 machine gun. Users would also like to see

realistic vehicle breakdowns to support learning to fight vehicles under less than

optimum conditions.

* ARNG leaders equate their annual VMT training to 2-4 field exercises and 1-3

gunnery rotations. ARNG use of VMTs is limited by logistics, including the number

of systems and transportation to VMT sites. ARNG unit leaders would like to

conduct more VMT training and increase company level training.

In the process of the research, the team formulated personal and collective perceptions

relative to the effectiveness and value of CCTT and SIMNET. We believe it is important

to make our observations and recommendations explicit.

CCTT and SIMNET Army-level managers should have access to current intelligence

information that will allow them to rapidly identify and, perhaps, predict operational

conditions. This will allow Army-level managers to emulate such conditions, through

software and hardware, in their system's virtual environment. Managers could also

distribute information to site managers to improve scenario/exercise development. This

will improve the quality of the training available to users and improve the relevance of

whatever virtual trainer they use. Information available to sites should include the terrain

of a likely battlespace, anticipated enemy, and potential missions. The goal would be to

provide units the capability to become familiar with their area of operations (AO) and

conduct missions under conditions which they might expect to encounter before

deploying to that AO in a virtual environment.

CCTT and SIMNET preparation training should occur using distance learning technology

prior to arriving at the training location. This would be especially beneficial for the

Reserve Component. The several hours of orientation they require prior to a training

event could be done before the CCTT or SIMNET training day during an earlier IDT or

between IDTs. This would preserve valuable time for training, allowing more in-depth

exercises and improving return on the logistical investment of co-locating virtual trainers

and Soldiers.

Army-level managers should develop leadership guides on how to integrate virtual

simulations into unit training programs. Multiple guides should be targeted at different

leadership echelon audiences: platoon, company, battalion, and higher. As increased

70
weapons system capability combine with diminishing live training resources and venues,

virtual training will take greater priority. Virtual system managers should help educate

users and potential users on how to maximize the benefit of virtual training and how to

transition from performing in a virtual (yet artificial) environment to performing in a live

environment.

Virtual systems should include an artificial crew member capability that permits training

by units short on personnel. Personnel turbulence is creating situations where units do

not have full crews. Reassigning crewmembers to fill open seats even temporarily is

detrimental to training. Also, due to the distances between NGB units, it may not be

possible. In these situations, units should have the ability to replicate a loader or other

crew mermber via software.

Take home packets should be improved with greater audio and video feedback. Leaders

should be able to replay scenarios using these packets between exercises to reiterate

learning points. Further, these packets should be placed in a "Lessons Learned"

repository where other units can review them to learn from prior successes and failures.

Army-level managers should work on proceduresand technology to link virtual training

with live and constructive training. Several NGB respondents reported already doing

this. Their efforts should be reviewed and improved upon. This will allow more

complex training and support training of higher level commanders and staffs.

This report represents two investigations of CCTT effectiveness; they are companions to

a previous investigation completed in 2003 and publicly reported in January 2004

(Mastaglio, 2004). These three investigations are similar in that they used the same data

collection and analysis approach, addressed the same core basic issue - how well, from a

user's perspective is CCTT meeting the training requirements of close combat heavy

units, and at the overall investigation level investigated several similar issues. Therefore,

we are including here a limited cross comparison of these three investigations in the

interest of identifying common and consistent findings. This analysis was not performed

at a detailed (question or sub-issue) level but in terms of overall findings. Table 7 below

compares similar or related findings between the three investigations. Some general

observations we made from this comparative analysis:

"* Fixed sites schedules are more stable and less likely to change and cause users

to have to modify their plans.

"• Virtual simulation is used as an important step (gate) in many units in their

preparation for major live training events (e.g., NTC rotation) but it is not

viewed equivalently as a key step in prep for actual combat.

"* Primary focus of CCTT training is company, then platoon, level exercises at

fixed sites; platoon level for mobile sites.

* AARs are viewed as a critical component of effective training in virtual

collective training simulations.

"* Fidelity of CCTT is acceptable to users.

"* A major enhancement to both fixed and mobile CCTT desired by users is more

HMMWV simulators.

71
* In general, there is not higher level command guidance or published directives

prescribing use of CCTT at any specific level on a calendar-basis or to train any

specific tasks or events.

Table 8. Study Finding Cross-Comparison

CCTT Study OIF Study ARNG Study

CCTT sites are being operated Sites were 'operated to support Scheduling supports training needs.

in accordance with established unique predeployment Sites are available to support

policies, and users find them requiremeilts. Changes were made training plans, but this could be due

conducive to achieving as necessary. to lower user expectations.

effective training Scheduling turbulence sufficient to

change training plans was reported

by one-third of users.

Users assess CCTT as having a Users found CCTT useful during Users report VMTs are valuable.

direct positive impact on their predeployment. However, due to However, due to system noncombat'readiness. Units predeployment specific training availability, logistics/transportation

consistently include CCTT focuses and availability of live issues, and unfamiliarity with

training in their preparation for training, CCTT was neither VMTs, users have not integrated

live training events and believe essential to training nor written them into their training strategies.

its use directly improves into training plans.

METL performance levels.

Opnions vary by unit and

grade as to whether key staff

and chain-of-command

oversight of the preparation for

and execution of CCTT

training exercises is sufficient

CCTT is being integrated into CCTT was not integrated into Units consider VMTs to be add-ons

unit training strategies and predeployment training strategies. to training strategy, often to prepare

plans as a key event, but is not There was no prescriptive use of for live training. Battalions,.

given the same emphasis or as CCTT for training. USAREUR companies, and platoons have

closely managed as field did prescribe CCTT received no usage guidance.

training, training/certification. This was

done at the division as opposed to

battalion or brigade.

Company grade officers and Company grade users were VMT training is done primarily at

NCOs are the prime users of generally the sole users of CCTT. platoon level but is planned at

CCTT, both because that is the battalion level.

way it is generally managed at

the battalion level and because

they have easy access to the

site for their unit's use.

Close Combat unit leaders Leaders believed CCTT Leaders state VMTs contribute to

believe CCTT directly contributed to training. They unit training. However, they

contributes to unit readiness believed CCTT must better model require additional

and potentially reduces COE conditions, friendly task education/experience to be able to

resource consumption. organization, and missions. fully integrate them into training

However, it is not feasible to programs. They believed VMTs

develop specific metrics for must better model COE conditions,

value or cost effectiveness friendly task organization, and

missions.

72
All members of the chain-of- Leaders state AARs are critical to Leaders state AARs are critical to

command rated the AAR CCTT effectiveness. VMT effectiveness. AARs provide

capabilities in CCTT as critical about one-third of total VMT

to effective training. training. Users and AC Advisors

state AARs are somewhat effective,

while administrators report higher

effectiveness. Better trained

facilitation is key to improving

AARs.

CCTT is being used at the CCTT was used at the company VMTs are used mostly at the

company and platoon level and platoon level, platoon level. Users want to see

extensively to prepare units for increase in proportion of company

live fire table ranges. level training. VMTs are used

primarily for maneuver training but

also gunnery and leaders training.

Company and platoon level leaders

see more gunnery value in VMTs

than battalion level leaders.

Users are satisfied W~ith the Users are satisfied with the fidelity Users are satisfied with the fidelity

fidelity of CCTT of CCTT. They would like to see of VMTs. They would like to see

better modeling of COE. better modeling of COE.

Users noted or recommended Users believe CCTT must better Users believe VMTs must better

system level improvements to model COE conditions, friendly model COE conditions, friendly

CCTT in two major areas: task organization, and missions, task organization, and missions.

more simulators at each site Users want HMMWV models to Users want more simulators and

and HMMWV models support motorized operations. HMMWV models to support

motorized operations.

Users rate CCTT as able to Same Same

provide positive transfer to

improved performance in both

combat and during field

exercises.

There is no published training Same Same

guidance at any level

establishing usage levels or

event-driven use of CCTT.

The Commanders Integrated NA Leaders are not familiar with TSPs.

Training Tool (CITT) was Scenarios are developed by units

developed to assist junior with site staff support.

leaders plan and execute

CCTT training. CITT is

available at fixed sites, but

most company grade officers

are not aware of it.

CCTT provides small unit NA Users have not fully integrated

leaders not only a training VMTs into training strategies, due

context to prepare for specific most likely to lack of system

upcoming events and an availability and inexperience with

environment in which to VMTs. Leaders are designating

execute and train to standard training objectives but these are

on their unit METL but also an often unspecific and training is not

assessment environment in being modified to reach objectives.

which they can determine what VMTs are not being used to assess

unit missions, tasks, METL or training not training proficiency.

skills need remediation.

73
74
References

Mastaglio, T.W., Peterson, P., & Williams, S. (2004). Assessing the Effectiveness of the

Close Combat Tactical Trainer (Research Report 1820). Alexandria, VA: US

Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences.

Russel, T.J, Seventh Army Training Command, After Action Review (AAR),

Headquarters (2003). Two-Minute Drill (2MD).

Schonlau, M.., Fricker, R.D., Jr., & Elliott, M.N. (2002) Conducting Research Surveys

Via E-Mail and the Web: Rand.

United States Army Forces Command. (1999). FORSCOM/ARNG/USAR Regulation,

350-352.

75
Appendix A: USAREUR Questions and Consensus Answers

QUESTION CONSENSUS ANSWER

1. Prior to notification, how did units USAREUR units used the Training Resource Management System to

schedule CCTT? schedule CCTT Training. The level at which the scheduling is done varies by

unit

2. Describe a typical, non-2MD USAREUR units typically use CCTT for one day training exercises, primarily

CCTT training event? at platoon level with some company events. Multiple iterations of the same

or several different scenarios are completed with AAR after each mission.

Company commanders are the primary trainer using the system

3. What was the relationship CCTT is used in USAREUR normal training as a preparatory event for CMTC

between CCTT and live training? rotation.

4. What was the relationship The tasks trained in the CCTT 2MD were generic and identical for all units.

between the 2MD and a unit's METL?

5. What was the strategy/objectives Final training of crews and platoons prior to going into combat. Insure all

of pre-deployment training/certification? units met a minimal level of proficiency

6. What role did live training have There was no live maneuver training in 2MD except for range tables. It

in this strategy? primarily was gunnery and virtual collective training

7. What role did the 2MD have in 2MD was the overall strategy, CCTT portion was designed to exercise C2

this strategy? and maneuver at platoon level.

8. Did units use CCTT outside of Some units used CCTT to prepare for deployment prior to it being dedicated

the 2MD and, if so, how did they use it? to 2MD structured training.

9. How did the 2MD impact non- Non deploying units were not able to use the site during 2MD training period.

deploying units, especially in

scheduling? No access.

10. Was sufficient time available to Yes, approach to organizing 2MD training allowed units sufficient time to

conduct the 2MD, AARs, and re-do's, if achieve training objectives.

necessary?

11.. Did prescriptive training create Yes, better use was made of the facility and it was used more efficiently --

economies of use? enhanced throughput.

12. What changes to site operations Site operated 24/7 with 12 hour shifts during 2MD, augmentation staff came

were made to accommodate the 2MD? from US.

Significantly increased cost.

13. How did BN/CO CDRs perceive Commanders at Co and Battalion levels were appreciative and supportive of

the impact of prescriptive training on 2MD CCTT Training. No negative responses to a prescriptive approach.

their training management/success?

14. Was the 2MD a test of a training The 2MD was primarily viewed as a training event that units had to complete

event? Training event, successfully to insure readiness for combat operations.

15. How did units perceive the 2MD? Soldiers viewed the 2MD positively with minimal complaints.

Did they view it as a test or an aide?

Did their perception change once

training was complete?

16. How did the 2MD impact other The CCTT portion of the 2MD was not interdependent upon any other

Pre-Deployment training? training events.

17. Did the 2MD include the option Units were required to re do scenarios which they did not complete

of a "do-over?" Who made that successfully based on the assessment of the CMTC Observer/Controller

decision? What remedial training managing the training.

opportunity was there prior to the "doover?"

18. Why was the use of 2MD 2MD was a one-time event to prepare 1st AD for combat because of limited

stopped as a (prescriptive) pre- time to get ready.

deployment event?

19. What tasks were part of the 2MD CCTT portion of 2MD trained collective tasks select by the command to

and how were they selected? support expected mounted combat operations in Iraq.

Collective? Leader? Individual?

20. How were task-conditions- The Observer/Controllers established the standard to which platoons had to

standards selected and was this more perform the selected tasks

efficient/effective than decentralized

selection? Why?

21. What linkages were there There were no linkages between live training events, essentially ranges, that

between the 2MD and live training? were also part of 2MD.

Were 2MD results/observations built

into live training?

22. Did the 2MD incorporate Leader,

Individual, and

A-]
23. What was the impact of 2MD on Not able to determine from responses.

unit "Directed Mission" METL

development?

24. What echelon conducted the PLATOON

2MD?

25. What was the role of the two Co and Battalion Commanders and Staff observed training on an individual

higher echelons? discretionary level but did not play a role in the training event per se.

26. How were AARs conducted? The Qbserver/Controllers conducted the After Action Reviews using a

Who facilitated them? common template generally after a mission was completed successfully

27. How was the OPFOR OPFOR was templated by CMTC S2 based on info about Iraqi Army and

depicted/played? controlled by Site Staff during execution of scenarios.

28. How was the terrain database NTC

used in the 2MD?

29. What feedback on There was not any cross talk between training events comprising the 2MD

accuracy/effectiveness was received (e.g., between live ranges and CCTT or vice versa)

from live-training venue? OPFOR?

Conditions? Tasks/Missions?

30. What feedback on None

accuracy/effectiveness was received

from live-training venue? OPFOR?

Conditions? Tasks/Missions?

31. What changes to CCTT None.

operations have been made due to

2MD? Administration? SAF? Training

Management? AARs? TSPs?

32. What changes to CCTT CCTT has added a Baghdad database and lED models for inclusion in

operations have been made due to OIF scenarios -- no new TSPs.

feedback? Administration? SAF?

Training Management? AARs? TSPs?

33. Was fratricide-prevention built There were opportunities for training audience to deal with fratricide but not a

into 2MD and, if so, how? specific scripted fratricide event

34. Were combined arms and/or joint Beyond integrating fires and calling for them within a scenario there was no

operations built into the 2MD and, if so, integration of combined arms or joint operations in 2MD CCTT scenarios.

how?

35. Were there any events built into The ability to train on a virtual dessert landscape was critical for USAREUR

the 2MD or other CCTT training units who have no training areas similar to it.

because they could only be replicated in

virtual simulation?

A-2
Appendix B: Web Collection Analysis

One of the goals through this series of investigations on CCTT effectiveness has been to

establish the efficacy of using a web-based approach for collecting data from the user

community to support analysis and subsequent findings. The web collection process is

outlined in the Method section above. This appendix analyzes the efficacy of web

collection.

The original concept for the approach to effectiveness assessment was based on

principles and techniques applied in Customer Relationship Management (CRM)

approaches used in the commercial sector. In this case, the product is CCTT and the

customers are its targeted user community-close combat heavy units. One method

recommended to organizations who want to implement a CRM approach is to leverage

the availability of the wveb to gauge users' attitudes while allowing users to be

anonymous. This approach has application to assessing the effectiveness of training

systems (or other military products).

For the OIF Study, MYMIC offered to evaluate the potential for using the web as a data

acquisition source. This was intended to be a proof of principle that would answer

questions regarding how to set up the questionnaire process on the web, what methods to

use to notify potential respondents, whether a significant number of targeted respondents

would complete the questionnaire, and would the data be sufficient to support an analytic

effort.,

In order to address these issues, MYMIC created a companion survey related to the OIF

investigation issues but not identical to the questions posed on the physical

questionnaires. In retrospect, we should have selected a subset of the actual question

used in physical data collection. Nevertheless, the web data collection test demonstrated

the efficacy and potential of this as a primary tool for training effectiveness

investigations. In fact, the number of respondents (see Table 2) and the quality of their

input exceeded our expectations and led to a decision to better develop our webcollection toolset and use it as a key process in the subsequent ARNG investigation.

The ARNG investigation web collection leveraged our assessment in the OIF

investigation that valid data from sufficient respondents could be collected via the web.

The ARNG investigation shifted the emphasis of the web collection from maximizing

response to maximizing value of data received; value defined by support to investigation

goals and minimizing survey error.

Supporting investigation goals was insured. During the preparatory phase, as sub-issues

were disaggregated down to specific questions, the questions were prepared in a form that

could be delivered in by means of a web-based questionnaire. Questions were written to

be as simple as possible while also providing the respondent an opportunity for initiative

in answering them. These required a mixture of open (text) and closed questions,

sometimes supporting the same sub-issue. It also required a level of situational

awareness of ARNG conditions, in order to write questions understandable to Guard

respondents. The team presented questions to the NGB for their input. The NGB also

B-I
assisted the team by having three individuals, an officer, a senior NCO, and a civilian,

take beta questionnaires and provide feedback.

Dealing with survey error was more problematic. The experience with the OIF web

collection allowed a much more rigorous web survey creation process, designed to

minimize or respond to the four sources survey error. (Schonlau, Elliot, 2002):

"* Coverage error occurs when some part of the population of interest cannot

become part of the sample.

"* Sampling error arises when only a subset of the target population is surveyed yet

inference is made about the whole population.

"* Nonresponse error occurs when individual respondents do not participate in any

part of the survey or respondents don not answer individual questions.

"• Measurement error arises when the respondents provide false or incomplete

answers.

To limit coverage error, the team used a hybrid sampling approach, combining both

convenience and probability sampling. The convenience sampling occurred by placing

survey announcements onto the AKO homepage, publishing them to the survey

population and beyond. Probability sampling occurred via e-mail announcements to

ARNG armor and infantry leaders of appropriate rank. An unexpected and, probably,

unpreventable source of coverage error derives from the inability of ARNG respondents

deployed to Iraq to participate in the survey. The survey was announced to a large

population of Guardsmen, a good number of them had OIF experience. The team

received emails from some deployed Guardsmen stating they did not have time to

complete the questionnaire.

Sampling error is limited by the breadth of the response. The investigation used a wide

variety of respondents covering multiple. echelons (battalion, company, and platooni,

perspectives (TO&E units, advisors, administration), and various types of experience.

Respondents came from a fifty-five states and territories. Sampling error could be better

limited by including more questions to screen and define individual respondents.

Despite not being the focus of the collection, nonresponse error was aggressively

attacked. Announcements were worded to highlight the importance of each individual's

participation. Several announcements were published over the life of the collection

effort. Questionnaires were constructed to encourage completion. Finally, the most

critical questions were front loaded. Web survey response rates vary from 7 to 44%

(Schonlau, 2002). It is difficult to identify the potential web sample of the ARNG

investigation. However, AKO sent out approximately 15,600 ernails. With 2359 webquestionnaires collected, the response rate was just over 15%.

Measurement error was limited by several means. The self-selecting nature of the

investigation, combined with the general professionalism of population, helped limit

sham respondents. Assurances of anonymity and affirmative questions encourage honest

responses. A SME was used to screen out answers that did not follow from questions and

B-2
sham respondents. Finally, the number of respondents and the commonality of their

responses provided assurance that measurement error was acceptable.

Error reductions efforts were successful and both quantity and quality of responses were

higher than expected. Therefore, the team was able to place great trust in the web data,

using it for analysis in combination with the physical data, each given equal credibility.

In future web based surveys, the following steps are recommended based on our

experience with these two investigations.

" Develop questions that can be presented via the web as well as used in physical

questionnaires and interview protocols.

" Enter questions into a common database that can also be used to capture

responses and 'Support analysis

" Create an interface that presents (extracting them from the database) appropriate

questions to each respondent visiting the webpage based upon an up-front vetting

process that demographically categorizes each respondent.

"* Make the website available for a specific period of time

"• Advertise the availability of the web questionnaire on appropriate websites and

via directed emails

" As respondents answer each question, have their responses automatically entered

into the common database. (Data collected physically should be manually entered

into this same database)

" Use the database as the single source for the analysis process.

The following are lessons learned:

* Web collection is an effective means for obtaining data from users.

* Collection from each source (web and physical) can occur concurrently. However

there may be rationale for doing first one then the other - e.g., collecting and

reviewing web data first could help target interview protocols

* Screening criteria (vetting process) is critical to improving the quality of web

input data. This should be carefully designed in consultation with investigation

user.

* Database design is critical and must take into account how it will support the

entire research process.

* Using a single database facilitates development of tools (DAI as developed for

this research) that will allow analysis of large amounts of textual data. Automatic

generation of statistical data can easily be incorporated into those tools.

B-3
Appendix C: Acronym List

AAR After Action Review

AC Active Component

AD Armored Division

ADC Assistant Division Commander

AKO Army Knowledge Online

AO Area of Operations

AR Armor

ARI Army Research Institute

ARNG Army National Guard

AT Annual Training

ATC Army Training Command

BG Brigadier General

BN Battalion

BT Bradley Table

C2 Command and Control

CALFEX Combined Arms Live Fire Exercise

CAS Close Air Support

CASEVAC Casualty Evacuation

CAV Cavalry

CCTT Close Combat Tactical Trainer

CDR Commander

CO Company

COB Civilians on the Battlefield

COE Current Operational Environment

COTA Commander's Operations Training Assistant

CPX Command Post Exercise

CSAR Combat Search and Rescue

CSM Command Sergeant Major

DAI Data Analysis Interface

DMOSQ Duty Military Occupational Specialty Qualification

EOD Explosive Ordinance Disposal

FM Field Manual

FORSCOM Forces Command

FTX Field Training Exercise

GFAC Ground Forward Air Controller

HIC High Intensity Conflict

HMMWV High Mobility Multi-Wheeled Vehicle

HQ Headquarters

IC Instructor/Controller

ID Identify

IDT Inactive Duty Training

IED Improvised Explosive Device

C-I
IN infantry

JIM Joint, Inter-Agency, Multinational

LDR Leader

LIC Low Intensity Conflict

MALA Macro-Level Analysis

MDMP Military Decision Making Process

MEDEVAC Medical Evacuation

METL Mission Essential Task List

METT-TC Mission, Enemy. Terrain, Troops-Time, Civilians

MG Master Gunner

MOS Military Occupational Specialty

MOUT Military Operations in Urban Terrain

MUTA Modified Unit Training Assembly

NCO Non-Commissioned Officer

NCODP Non-Commissioned Officer Development Program

NCOES Non-Commissioned Officers Education System

OC Observer/Controller

OES Officer Education System

OIF Operation IRAQI FREEDOM

OPFOR Opposing Forces

OPLAN Operations Plan

OPTEMPO Operation Tempo

PLT Platoon

POV Privately Owned Vehicle

RC Reserve Coinponent

ROE Rules of Engagement

RPG Rocket Propelled Grenade

S3 Operations Officer

SAF Semi-Automated Force

SARO Stability and Reconstruction Operations

SASO Stability and Support Operations

SGT Sergeant

SIMNET Simulation Network

SME Subject Matter Expert

SOP Standard Operating Procedure

STX Situational Training Exercise

SUV Sports Utility Vehicle

TADSS Training Aides, Devices, Simulators, and Simulations

TLP Troop Leading Procedures

TO&E Table of Organization and Equipment

TPIO-Virtual TRADOC Program Integration Office-Virtual

TRADOC Training and Doctrine Command

TRP Troop

TSP Training Support Package

TT Tank Table

C-2