IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

No. 20–1551

Submitted January 19, 2023—Filed April 21, 2023

STATE OF IOWA,

Appellee,

vs.

PATRICK HENRY BOOKER JR.,

Appellant.

On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals.

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Dubuque County, Monica L. Zrinyi 

Wittig, Judge.

The defendant seeks further review of the court of appeals opinion 

affirming his conviction for sexual abuse in the third degree and his life sentence, 

challenging the denial of his Batson claim. DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS 

AFFIRMED IN PART AND VACATED IN PART; DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT 

OF CONVICTION AFFIRMED, SENTENCE VACATED IN PART, AND 

REMANDED.

Oxley, J., delivered the opinion of the court in which all participating 

justices joined. Mansfield, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Christensen, 

C.J., and McDermott, J., joined. May, J., took no part in the consideration or 

decision of the case.
2

Martha J. Lucey (argued), State Appellate Defender, and Stephan J. 

Japuntich (until withdrawal), for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Sheryl Soich (argued), Assistant 

Attorney General, for appellee.
3

OXLEY, Justice.

We are asked to decide whether the prosecutor engaged in purposeful 

discrimination during jury selection in Patrick Booker’s trial for sexual abuse in 

the third degree when he used a peremptory strike to remove a Black venire 

member. Upon our review of the record, we conclude the strike was not motivated 

in substantial part by discriminatory intent—the relevant standard under federal 

law. The strike at issue here was justified by a valid nonracial basis. The stricken 

juror expressed his opinion that “both parties” were to blame in describing the 

sexual assault that landed his cousin in prison for fifty years in a scenario 

factually similar to the case about to be tried. A prosecutor could have logically 

been concerned the juror would form a similar opinion about the victim when 

presented with the facts of this case. The prosecutor’s stated concern about the 

juror’s opinion was, at least in this context, a valid, nonracial basis for the 

peremptory strike.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

The defendant, Patrick Henry Booker Jr. (who is Black), was charged by 

criminal complaint on May 30, 2019, with first-degree kidnapping and thirddegree sexual abuse as a second or subsequent offender.

The charges were based on an incident that occurred at the Dubuque 

home of C.H. in the late-night to early-morning hours of April 14–15, 2018. C.H. 

invited (among others) Booker and Andy Cheeks to her home to attend a “tattoo 

party.” As C.H. described, this is an event where “people c[a]me to [her] house to 

get tattoos or piercings.” Booker performed piercings at the party. C.H. planned 
4

to have group sex with Booker and Cheeks after the party. When the party ended, 

Booker began to insist that C.H. have sex with his brother as well; she became 

uncomfortable and attempted to leave the group. Booker then slammed C.H.’s 

head against a wall and made her stand by an open window, letting in cold air 

“for approximately 5 1/2 hours.” When C.H. finally got permission from Booker 

to leave her spot in front of the window she headed back into the bedroom to lie

down, but Booker followed her again, tearing off her clothes and, according to 

C.H., forcing her to have intercourse. Fearing retribution from Booker, C.H. 

waited several days after the incident before reporting it to the police.

Trial began on September 15, 2020. The jury found Booker not guilty of 

first-degree kidnapping but guilty of third-degree sexual abuse. The jury also 

found that Booker had committed a prior sexual offense, which enhanced the 

penalty for his conviction. See Iowa Code § 902.14 (2018) (making a second or 

subsequent offense for certain sexual abuse convictions a class “A” felony). On 

November 23, Booker was sentenced to a mandatory term of life imprisonment. 

Booker appealed, and we transferred the case to the court of appeals to 

address his appellate challenges, including, inter alia: (1) neither the conviction 

nor the sentencing enhancement was supported by sufficient evidence; (2) the 

court erroneously overruled a Batson challenge1 to one of the State’s peremptory 

strikes; (3) the court erroneously granted the State’s for-cause challenge to 

another juror; and (4) the court lacked jurisdiction to enter a nunc pro tunc order 

1See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
5

amending Booker’s sentence after he filed his notice of appeal. The court of 

appeals rejected all of Booker’s arguments except his challenge to the court’s 

jurisdiction to enter the nunc pro tunc order, and it remanded for the district 

court to correct Booker’s sentence (by adding the Iowa Code section 903B.1 

special sentence to the written disposition) as it had attempted to do through the 

belated nunc pro tunc order in the first instance.

We granted further review to consider Booker’s Batson challenge.

II. Analysis.

“When we grant further review, we may exercise our discretion to let the 

court of appeals decision stand as the final decision on particular issues.” 

Farnsworth v. State, 982 N.W.2d 128, 135 (Iowa 2022) (quoting State v. Fogg, 

936 N.W.2d 664, 667 n.1 (Iowa 2019)); see State v. Jonas, 904 N.W.2d 566, 568 

(Iowa 2017). We do so here with respect to all of Booker’s challenges except the 

two involving the jury selection process and his challenge to the sufficiency of 

the evidence for his sentencing enhancement, which the court of appeals found 

was not preserved and therefore did not review. We start with the sentencing 

enhancement and then address the Batson and for-cause challenges related to 

the jury selection process.

A. Sentencing Enhancement Evidence. We review the sufficiency of the 

evidence supporting Booker’s sentencing enhancement for correction of errors at 

law. See State v. Reed, 875 N.W.2d 693, 704–05 (Iowa 2016). “[W]e view the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the State, including all ‘legitimate 

inferences and presumptions that may fairly and reasonably be deduced from 
6

the record evidence.’ ” State v. Crawford, 972 N.W.2d 189, 202 (Iowa 2022)

(quoting State v. Tipton, 897 N.W.2d 653, 692 (Iowa 2017)).

Booker’s trial was conducted in two phases. In the first phase, the jury 

found Booker guilty of third-degree sexual abuse under Iowa Code 

section 709.4(1)(a). Immediately following that verdict, the trial proceeded to a 

second phase where the State sought to prove this was Booker’s second 

conviction for an act of sexual abuse in order to enhance his sentence under 

Iowa Code section 902.14(1). See Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.19(9). To support the 

enhancement, the State introduced a Cook County, Illinois record of conviction 

for one “Patrick Booker” and offered the testimony of Andy Cheeks. The jury 

found Booker had previously been convicted of an act of sexual abuse.

Booker challenges the State’s use of the record of conviction from Cook 

County, arguing that since the record only identifies a “Patrick Booker,” rather 

than his full name, “Patrick Henry Booker Jr.,” the State did not present 

sufficient evidence to prove that the “Patrick Booker” convicted in Cook County 

was actually him. The court of appeals did not address the merits of Booker’s 

sufficiency claim because he failed to move for a judgment of acquittal. 

The court of appeals opinion was filed nearly one month to the day before 

this court’s opinion in State v. Crawford, where we held that filing a motion for 

judgment of acquittal is not necessary to preserve sufficiency-of-the-evidence 

challenges for appellate review. 972 N.W.2d at 200–02. Whether Booker filed a 

separate motion for judgment of acquittal prior to submission to the jury of the 

enhancement issue is therefore irrelevant, and we reach the merits of his claim.
7

That said, we hold that Booker’s sufficiency claim fails. To supplement the 

Cook County record of conviction, the State called Andy Cheeks to testify. Cheeks

explained that he was a codefendant with Booker in the Cook County case and 

identified Booker as the same “Patrick Booker” from that case. If the State offered 

only the Cook County record, Booker’s argument that his surname is common 

enough to question whether the prior record belonged to someone else might 

have more sway. But here, Cheeks’s testimony, if believed, provided the 

necessary link. See id. at 202 (drawing all inferences in favor of jury’s verdict). 

The State presented sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that Booker 

was previously convicted of an act of sexual abuse for purposes of the sentencing 

enhancement, and imposition of the enhancement is affirmed.

B. Batson Challenge. Booker’s first issue with the jury selection process 

involves the State’s use of a peremptory strike to remove Juror 38 from the

venire. Booker contends this strike was improperly motivated by racial 

discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clauses of the United States 

and Iowa Constitutions. U.S. Const. amend. XIV; Iowa Const. art. I, § 6; see

Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).

When a party challenges a peremptory strike as racially discriminatory, 

Batson’s burden-shifting framework resolves the challenge through a three-step 

inquiry: (1) the challenging party (here, Booker) must establish a prima facie case 

of purposeful racial discrimination in the peremptory strike (i.e., the State’s 

strike of Juror 38); (2) the striking party (here, the State) must proffer a 

race-neutral explanation for the strike; and finally, (3) the challenging party 
8

must carry the ultimate burden of proving purposeful discrimination.2 See 

State v. Veal, 930 N.W.2d 319, 332 (Iowa 2019); see also Batson, 476 U.S. at 96–

98. We conduct a de novo review of the record when making this inquiry, but at 

step three, “we give ‘a great deal of deference to the district court’s evaluation of 

credibility when determining the true motives of the attorney’ ” who made the 

strike. Veal, 930 N.W.2d at 327 (quoting State v. Mootz, 808 N.W.2d 207, 214 

(Iowa 2012)).

On the first day of voir dire3 (when Juror 38 was not present), the 

prosecutor alluded to the Black Lives Matter movement, asking whether any of 

the jurors had “attended, spoke at, or otherwise supported a demonstration in 

support of Black Lives Matter.” Two jurors gave affirmative responses, but the 

prosecutor did not follow up with them on this line of questioning, instead 

transitioning to whether any juror got “the majority of their news from Facebook 

or social media.” Black Lives Matter was not raised again after the first day of 

jury selection.

Juror 38 was questioned during the second day of voir dire. In response 

to the prosecutor’s first line of questioning about whether anyone ever “deserves 

2Despite some discussion during oral argument about whether the Batson framework 

should be discarded or modified under the Iowa Constitution, these arguments were not 

advanced in the appellate briefs or at trial. We therefore analyze Booker’s Batson challenge under 

the traditional three-part framework outlined by the United States Supreme Court in Batson v. 

Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79. Cf. State v. Warren, 955 N.W.2d 848, 859 (Iowa 2021) (declining, but not 

foreclosing, a separate analysis of whether to depart from the Fourth Amendment framework 

under article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution where the defendant suggested the Iowa 

Constitution should provide greater protection but did not actually ask us to depart from the 

federal framework or separately brief and analyze the state constitutional argument). 

3Booker’s trial was held under our modified COVID-19 pandemic measures, one of which 

required limiting the number of people in a courtroom, which in turn necessitated splitting voir 

dire into smaller, separate groups.
9

to be raped,” Juror 38 echoed the sentiments of Juror 39 that no one does, but 

volunteered, “There’s always two sides to a story.”

When the prosecutor then asked whether Juror 38 believes “it’s common 

for women to claim that they’ve been sexually assaulted without necessarily 

having said no or something like that,” Juror 38 posited a scenario in which a 

woman said she did not want to have sex but, while intoxicated, did have sex, 

then after becoming sober, felt bad about the experience because she had 

cheated on her boyfriend. In response to the prosecutor’s follow-up question of 

whether Juror 38 believes “that happens at all,” Juror 38 explained that his 

cousin was serving a fifty-year prison sentence from an incident arising “under 

the same thing. They had a party, and like four or five guys had sex with a girl, 

that was at the party.” Although he indicated his only knowledge of the incident 

came from his cousin, when asked “who [he] blame[s] more in that situation”—

the woman “for being put in that situation,” or his cousin “for being one of the 

guys who partook”—Juror 38 indicated he believed “both parties” were to blame.

Later, during defense counsel’s questioning, Juror 38 indicated that he 

was running on very little sleep that morning because he worked a third-shift 

(overnight) job. The court clarified that “if [he was] chosen to sit on this panel, 

[the court could] provide [him] with a notice to [his] employer. [He would] not 

have to work tonight.”

At the end of voir dire, the State used one of its peremptory strikes to 

excuse Juror 38, and defense counsel lodged a Batson challenge. In response, 

the prosecutor cited Juror 38’s third-shift job obligations and, “[m]ore 
10

concerning” to the State, Juror 38’s discussion about his cousin’s fifty-year 

sentence for a sex abuse conviction and his apparent views that his cousin and 

the victim were both to blame.

The district court initially indicated it would uphold Booker’s challenge. 

The court observed that Juror 38 followed and answered questions from the 

attorneys, was not as emotional as some of the jurors from the first day who 

“would have probably been too emotionally vested in their own circumstances to 

be able to separate that out from what was going on here in this courtroom,” and 

“would be capable of following the Court’s instructions,” leading the court to 

conclude the State had not met its burden to support the strike. But after taking 

a brief recess to review caselaw on the issue, the court changed its mind and 

overruled Booker’s Batson challenge. In revisiting the issue, the court explained 

it had reviewed its notes and could not say the State was engaged in a pattern 

of racial discrimination in making its strikes given the treatment of other 

individuals who had also expressed varying degrees of experience with sexual 

assault allegations. Ultimately, the court concluded the State provided a 

race-neutral basis and allowed the strike to stand.4

Turning to our analysis of the Batson claim—because the prosecutor 

offered and the court considered race-neutral justifications for the strike, “the 

4It appears the district court initially applied a for-cause standard, considering whether 

Juror 38 had been rehabilitated concerning his remarks about both the accused and the victim 

being at fault in a sexual assault case. But, as the district court seemed to recognize after the 

recess, “[t]he prosecutor’s explanation [for a peremptory strike] ‘need not rise to the level 

justifying exercise of a challenge for cause.’ ” State v. Griffin, 564 N.W.2d 370, 375 (Iowa 1997) 

(quoting Batson, 476 U.S. at 97).
11

preliminary issue of whether [Booker] ha[s] made a prima facie showing [is] 

moot.” Mootz, 808 N.W.2d at 218 (quoting Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 

359 (1991)). That said, we briefly address the court of appeals’ conclusion that 

“striking the sole Black juror on a panel is not itself sufficient to generate an 

inference of purposeful racial discrimination” at the first Batson step. Batson 

necessarily requires a heavily context-specific inquiry, so although striking the 

sole Black juror does not, in a vacuum, establish a prima facie case, that fact in 

itself is relevant to the analysis and may be sufficient when viewed in context. 

Cf. Batson, 476 U.S. at 93–97 (“We have confidence that trial judges, experienced 

in supervising voir dire, will be able to decide if the circumstances concerning 

the prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges creates a prima facie case of 

discrimination against black jurors.”); cf. also Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 

239 (2005) (“[W]e accordingly held [in Batson] that a defendant c[an] make out a 

prima facie case of discriminatory jury selection by ‘the totality of the relevant 

facts’ about a prosecutor’s conduct during the defendant’s own trial.” (quoting 

Batson, 476 U.S. at 94)).

At step two, the State must proffer a racially-neutral justification for its 

strike. “At this step of the inquiry, the issue is the facial validity of the [attorney’s] 

explanation. Unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the [attorney’s] 

explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race neutral.” Mootz, 808 N.W.2d 

at 218 (alterations in original) (quoting Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 360). A 

prosecutor’s justifications “ ‘need not rise to the level justifying exercise of a 

challenge for cause’ but must be race-neutral and ‘related to the particular case 
12

to be tried.’ ” Veal, 930 N.W.2d at 334 (quoting State v. Griffin, 564 N.W.2d 370, 

375 (Iowa 1997)). At this stage, the reasons given need not be “persuasive, or 

even plausible.” Mootz, 808 N.W.2d at 218 (quoting Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 

765, 768 (1995) (per curiam)). “It is not until step three ‘that the persuasiveness 

of the justification becomes relevant.’ ” Id. (quoting Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768).

In this case the State offered two justifications for its strike: (1) Juror 38’s 

third-shift work obligations; and (2) Juror 38’s views about his cousin’s 

imprisonment for a similar crime—specifically “[t]he lesson he drew from his 

cousin[’s] [experience] was that there were two sides to every story, and that the 

victim and his cousin were probably equally to blame.” For brevity’s sake, we will 

refer to this justification as the “cousin narrative.” Both of these are facially 

race-neutral reasons. 

First, the effect of Juror 38’s third-shift job on his ability to focus during 

trial is not a characteristic peculiar to his race. Cf. Purkett, 514 U.S. at 769 (“The 

wearing of beards is not a characteristic that is peculiar to any race.” (quoting 

EEOC v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 635 F.2d 188, 190 n.3 (3d Cir. 1980))). We agree 

with the court of appeals’ recent conclusion that this is a facially neutral 

justification for a strike. See State v. Price, No. 19–1692, 2021 WL 4593228, at

*4–5 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 6, 2021) (deferring to district court’s determination that 

juror’s work obligation, which “allows her very little time to sleep,” was a valid, 

race-neutral justification for a peremptory strike); State v. Malone, No. 19–1680, 

2021 WL 1400709, at *5–6 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 14, 2021) (“The prosecutor also 
13

noted S.M.’s late-night work shift, which appeared to leave her less than alert in 

the court room. These are race-neutral reasons.”).

Second, in regard to the cousin narrative, we “have repeatedly noted that 

a juror’s interactions with law enforcement and the legal system are . . . valid, 

race-neutral reason[s] for a peremptory challenge.” Veal, 930 N.W.2d at 334 

(quoting Mootz, 808 N.W.2d at 219). Booker claims that this justification is at 

least implicitly race-based because African-Americans are more likely to have 

negative interactions with law enforcement, leading to more experience with the 

criminal justice system than the general population and, as a result, a greater 

likelihood that African-Americans will be excluded from juries. But that is not 

what happened here. Rather than relying on some tangential negative encounter 

with law enforcement to say that Juror 38 might be biased against police or the 

State generally, the State’s justification focused on how Juror 38’s familiarity 

with and perspective of a very similar set of circumstances might shape his 

perspective of this particular case. Under the circumstances, we cannot say this 

justification inherently violates equal protection. See Mootz, 808 N.W.2d at 218 

(“The reason given must, in and of itself, violate equal protection” for a challenge 

to succeed at step two of the Batson analysis).

Finally, proceeding to step-three of the Batson inquiry, we must “decide 

whether to believe the [attorney’s] explanation for the peremptory challenges,” or 

whether the reasons given are merely pretext for racial discrimination. Id. at 219 

(alteration in original) (quoting State v. Veal, 564 N.W.2d 797, 807 (Iowa 1997), 

overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Hallum, 585 N.W.2d 249 (Iowa 
14

1998), vacated, 527 U.S. 1001 (1999)). At this stage, “[b]ecause the trial judge’s 

finding whether purposeful discrimination exists will largely turn on evaluation 

of credibility, a reviewing court ordinarily should give those findings great 

deference.” State v. Knox, 464 N.W.2d 445, 448 (Iowa 1990); see also Veal, 930 

N.W.2d at 327 (noting that although review is de novo, “we give ‘a great deal of 

deference to the district court’s evaluation of credibility when determining the 

true motives of the attorney when making strikes’ ” (quoting Mootz, 808 N.W.2d 

at 214)). The ultimate inquiry is whether, under the totality of the circumstances, 

the strike was “motivated in substantial part by discriminatory intent.” 

Flowers v. Mississippi, 139 S. Ct. 2228, 2244 (2019) (quoting Foster v. Chatman, 

578 U.S. 488, 513 (2016)). 

Booker challenges whether Juror 38’s third-shift work schedule really 

motivated the prosecutor’s strike, pointing to the district court’s statement it 

would clear his absence with his employer, and the lack of record support for 

the prosecutor’s belief that Juror 38 would nonetheless continue working during 

the trial. See Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 485 (2008); Miller-El, 545 U.S. 

at 252 (noting that “[i]f the stated reason [for a strike] does not hold up” it has 

“pretextual significance” that “does not fade because a trial judge, or an appeals 

court, can imagine a reason that might not have been shown up as false”). We 

need not decide whether the prosecutor offered the third-shift concern as a 

pretext to hide his real motive because we conclude that Juror 38’s cousin 

narrative justified the prosecutor’s strike on nonracial grounds.
15

In determining whether the prosecutor’s proffered justification for a 

peremptory strike is pretextual, courts may consider “a variety of evidence,” 

including whether the prosecutor struck or kept similarly situated jurors and 

whether his explanation for the strike is consistent with the record. Flowers, 

139 S. Ct. at 2243 (listing evidence a Batson challenger may present to support 

his claim, including “side-by-side comparisons of black prospective jurors who 

were struck and white prospective jurors who were not struck in the case; [and] 

a prosecutor’s misrepresentations of the record when defending the strikes 

during the Batson hearing”). Here, it is true that the prosecutor misstated the 

record (whether intentionally or not) in defending against the Batson challenge 

when he claimed Juror 38 “expressed very clearly that his opinion was, his 

cousin was wrongfully accused.” At the very least, that premise is belied by 

Juror 38’s statement that “both parties” were to blame in his cousin’s case—i.e., 

both the victim and his cousin.

Nonetheless, Juror 38’s cousin narrative raised legitimate concerns given 

its similarity to the facts of the case at hand. The prosecutor sought to identify 

jurors who might be unsympathetic to the victim, asking the jury whether C.H. 

“br[ought] [the rape] upon herself” by inviting Booker to her apartment and 

initially agreeing to have sex with him and Andy Cheeks. As the prosecutor 

discussed extensively during closing arguments, the specific facts of the case did 

not paint C.H. in a sympathetic light, which might have made jurors skeptical of 
16

her claim.5 But C.H. was the linchpin of the State’s case.6 Given Juror 38’s 

perspective of his cousin’s experience, it is no mystery why the prosecutor felt 

he could have a more difficult time persuading Juror 38 to believe C.H. and view 

the case from the State’s perspective. It would be fair for the prosecutor to have 

concerns that when asked, “Did [C.H.] bring it upon herself,” Juror 38 would be 

more receptive than others to the notion that she did.

Importantly, the prosecutor did not limit his concerns about potential 

“victim blaming” solely to Juror 38. Juror 24 indicated prior experience with 

instances affirmatively involving false accusations of sexual abuse, and the State 

successfully challenged her for cause. Jurors 4 and 18 also indicated they knew 

someone accused of sexual assault, and although it is not clear from the record 

which party struck them, neither served on the petit jury. We therefore find—as 

did the district court, to whom we give “a great deal of deference,” Veal, 

930 N.W.2d at 327 (quoting Mootz, 808 N.W.2d at 214)—that the prosecutor’s 

stated motivation to strike Juror 38 based on the cousin narrative was sincere.

A final note on the prosecutor’s reference to the Black Lives Matter 

movement. Although the question may have needlessly inserted race into this 

case, it was not asked in Juror 38’s presence (or in the presence of any minority

5“I mean, she’s a little pitiful, you know. . . . She’s not a classy individual, right?”

6The prosecutor concluded his closing argument as follows: 

If you’re going to find reasonable doubt in this case, it has to come from her. It 

has to give you a reason to think that she is telling a lie about what happened. 

And if that reason is, I can’t relate to her, I don’t trust her, she’s obviously a rough 

customer, if that reason is, she has made bad life choices, then maybe she did 

deserve to get raped.
17

A final note on the prosecutor’s reference to the Black Lives Matter 

movement. Although the question may have needlessly inserted race into this 

case, it was not asked in Juror 38’s presence (or in the presence of any minority 

juror, as far as we can tell from the record) and the prosecutor did not follow up 

on it after two jurors gave affirmative responses. So, unless we were to say the 

question so clearly reflected the prosecutor’s racial biases that his asserted 

motives in striking Juror 38 are unbelievable at step three, it does not alter our 

Batson analysis.

Viewing the totality of the circumstances, we cannot say that the 

prosecutor’s strike of Juror 38 was substantially motivated by discriminatory 

intent. The fact that a prosecutor unnecessarily proffers weak justifications (like 

the work conflict justification here) when the primary reason for the strike could 

easily have stood alone may itself be viewed as evidence of pretext.7 Nevertheless, 

any discriminatory inference that may be deduced from that evidence does not 

rise to the substantial level necessary to successfully challenge a strike under 

Batson when considered under the totality of the circumstances of this case. See 

Flowers, 139 S. Ct. at 2244.

For the foregoing reasons, we hold the district court did not err in 

overruling Booker’s Batson challenge.

7The inference is, in essence, that “[t]he [prosecutor] doth protest too much.” William 

Shakespeare, Hamlet act 3, sc. 2, l. 220.
18

C. For-Cause Challenge. Booker’s next jury selection challenge charges 

the district court with error in sustaining the prosecutor’s for-cause strike of 

Juror 24. District courts are “vested with broad discretion in” ruling on for-cause 

challenges to potential jurors; we accordingly review for abuse of that discretion. 

Jonas, 904 N.W.2d at 570–71.

Booker’s first argument on this point takes issue with the State’s failure 

to specify the basis for its challenge as required under Iowa Rule of Criminal 

Procedure 2.18(5). True, Juror 24 indicated facts about herself that implicated 

multiple potential bases for a strike for-cause, including that she may have 

known the defense attorney through “mutual acquaintances” and “Facebook 

interaction,” see id. r. 2.18(5)(d); and that she had trouble hearing out of one ear, 

see id. r. 2.18(5)(c). But based on the discussion held in chambers, both the 

court and defense counsel were well aware of why the State was raising a forcause challenge. When the district court separated Juror 24 from the rest of the 

venire for individual questioning on the State’s for-cause challenge, both defense 

counsel (who questioned Juror 24 first during this session) and the court 

focused almost exclusively on Juror 24’s personal knowledge about other 

incidents of sex abuse. Juror 24 stated she knew “several [people who were] 

falsely accused” of sexual assault in Dubuque in cases where the accusers 

“admitted that they lied,” making her “more hesitant than most people” to judge 

the case on its own merits. See id. r. 2.18(5)(k). Booker’s argument is well-taken 

that the prosecutor was required to “distinctly specify the facts constituting the 
19

cause[]” for his challenge, id. r. 2.18(5) , but we do not believe any violation in 

this case constituted reversible error.

When pressed on whether her experiences would cause her to hold the 

State to a higher burden than it was required to carry, Juror 24 wavered between 

indicating that she “wouldn’t hold anybody to a higher standard of proving 

anything,” and that she did not “want to have any doubt” because she has “seen 

too many false accusations.” Emphasizing her former statements, Booker also 

challenges the for-cause strike by arguing that despite any biases Juror 24 may 

have expressed against the State or alleged victims generally, she had been 

rehabilitated, thus negating the State’s grounds for the strike. The court of 

appeals declined to reach the merits of this issue, agreeing with the State that 

even if it was error to strike Juror 24, Booker failed to show prejudice. See 

Summy v. City of Des Moines, 708 N.W.2d 333, 339–40 (Iowa 2006) (“Prejudice 

from the erroneous exclusion of a juror will not be presumed.”), overruled on 

other grounds by Alcala v. Marriott Int’l Inc., 880 N.W.2d 699 (Iowa 2016).

We agree with the court of appeals. Although we have recently eased the 

burden on a party seeking to establish prejudice from an erroneous denial of a 

for-cause challenge, see Jonas, 904 N.W.2d at 570–71, it has been long-settled 

in Iowa (and across the country generally) that in order to establish prejudice 

from the erroneous grant of a for-cause challenge a party must show that “the 

resulting jury was not impartial and competent,” Summy, 708 N.W.2d at 339–

40. See Johnson v. City of Waterloo, 119 N.W. 70, 71 (Iowa 1909) (collecting cases 

for support of the proposition that “though a qualified juror be excused, another 
20

equally competent and fair minded will be selected in his stead, and, if a 

competent and impartial jury is finally secured before whom the cause is tried, 

neither party is in a situation to complain”); see also N. Pac. R. Co. v. Herbert, 

116 U.S. 642, 646 (1886) (“[I]f we regard the challenge as for cause, its allowance 

did not prejudice the company. A competent and unbiased juror was selected 

and sworn, and the company had, therefore, a trial by an impartial jury, which 

was all it could demand.”); United States v. Cornell, 25 F. Cas. 650, 656 (D.R.I. 

1820) (Story, J.) (“Even if a juror had been set aside by the court, for an 

insufficient cause, I do not know that it is matter of error, if the trial has been 

by a jury duly sworn and impaneled, and above all exceptions. Neither the 

prisoner nor the government in such a case have suffered any injury.”).

Booker does not attempt to show that his petit jury was partial or 

incompetent. Rather, his prejudice argument maintains that if the court erred in 

allowing the strike, then it effectively granted the prosecutor an additional 

peremptory strike by sparing him from using one to remove Juror 24. In essence, 

Booker argues for a per se prejudice rule: once the district court is determined 

to have erred as a legal matter, then the legally erroneous for-cause strike is 

automatically treated as a peremptory strike. This argument has been 

considered and rejected by other courts. See United States v. Mills, 987 F.2d 

1311, 1314 (8th Cir. 1993) (“Mills contends that the [district court’s grant of the 

prosecutor’s for-cause] strikes ‘effectively awarded the prosecution two 

additional peremptory challenges.’ We disagree.”); Jones v. State, 982 S.W.2d 

386, 393–94 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (en banc) (rejecting as flawed “the statement 
21

that the effect of [a district court’s] erroneous exclusion [of a juror for cause] ‘is 

the same as if the State had been given an extra peremptory challenge’ ” (quoting 

Payton v. State, 572 S.W.2d 677, 680 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (en banc), overruled 

by Jones, 982 S.W.2d at 386)); State v. Mendoza, 596 N.W.2d 736, 747 (Wis. 

1999). We agree with their reasoning and therefore reject Booker’s argument that 

it was enough to show he was prejudiced because the State effectively received 

an extra strike.

To summarize those courts’ analysis, Booker’s position is flawed because 

for-cause and peremptory strikes are inherently different mechanisms for 

removing prospective jurors from a venire. The absence of one does not establish 

the presence of the other. See NLRB v. Noel Canning, 573 U.S. 513, 589 (2014) 

(Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (“To assume otherwise . . . is to commit 

the fallacy of the inverse (otherwise known as denying the antecedent): the 

incorrect assumption that if P implies Q, then not-P implies not-Q.”). True, the 

effects of both may for all practical purposes be the same since a juror is removed 

either way. But the rigor of the for-cause challenge process distinguishes even 

an erroneously granted for-cause strike from an “extra” peremptory strike. The 

challenging party must justify the basis for the for-cause challenge and that 

challenge is scrutinized by the court. That the court makes the wrong call in that 

party’s favor does not change that process. Conversely, it is precisely the absence 

of that rigor—the lack of scrutiny into the reasons for the strike (aside from a 

Batson challenge) and the absence of a need for any reason at all—that makes a 

peremptory strike. See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 147–48 
22

(1994) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“[T]he essential nature of the peremptory 

challenge is that it is one exercised without a reason stated, without inquiry and 

without being subject to the court’s control.” (quoting Swain v. Alabama, 380

U.S. 202, 220 (1965), overruled by Batson, 476 U.S. 79)); United States v. Elliott, 

89 F.3d 1360, 1365 (8th Cir. 1996) (“There is simply no legal basis for this 

argument, which fails to recognize that peremptory strikes, for which no reasons 

need be given (absent a Batson challenge), are different from challenges for 

cause, which by definition require a showing of cause.”); Mootz, 808 N.W.2d at 

215 (noting that, aside from the Batson context, “a peremptory challenge is, by 

its very nature, a capricious and arbitrary statutory right”). In other words, “[t]he 

erroneous dismissal of a prospective juror constitutes an error by the court; it 

does not compute as a peremptory challenge by a party.” Mendoza, 596 N.W.2d 

at 747.

We therefore hold that any error in the district court’s decision to excuse 

Juror 24 for cause did not prejudice Booker absent evidence that the seated petit 

jury was partial or incompetent. Accordingly, reversal is not warranted on this 

ground.

III. Conclusion.

For the reasons stated above, we affirm the district court’s denial of 

Booker’s challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his sentencing 

enhancement and to the jury selection process. As to Booker’s other challenges, 

the decision of the court of appeals stands unmodified.
23

DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS AFFIRMED IN PART AND 

VACATED IN PART; DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION 

AFFIRMED, SENTENCE VACATED IN PART, AND REMANDED.

All justices concur except May, J., who takes no part. Mansfield, J., files a 

concurring opinion, in which Christensen, C.J., and McDermott, J., join.
24

#20–1551, State v. Booker

MANSFIELD, Justice (concurring).

I join the court’s well-reasoned opinion, but I write separately to take issue 

with the prosecutor’s voir dire questioning of prospective jurors about Black 

Lives Matter. In the context of this case, I believe such questioning was 

inappropriate. This case didn’t involve any issue of alleged police misconduct or 

even police credibility; it simply involved a Black defendant. Thus, I view the 

questioning as an improper attempt to identify prospective jurors who might be 

concerned about the overall status of Black Americans in our society. And just 

as we don’t allow prosecutors to reflexively strike Black Americans from juries, 

we shouldn’t allow prosecutors to reflexively strike whites who might be 

sympathetic to Black Americans.

Voir dire took place on September 15, 2020, less than four months after 

the murder of George Floyd at the hands of Minneapolis police that rocked the 

nation. During voir dire of the panel, which was at that time apparently all-white, 

the prosecutor asked,

Is there anyone here who has either attended, spoke at, or otherwise 

supported a demonstration in support of Black Lives Matter? Is 

there anyone who’s done that? Show of hands?

Two jurors raised their hands. A third juror later volunteered that they did 

not attend a rally but provided a donation for Black Lives Matter. It appears that 

two of these three jurors were ultimately stricken with peremptory challenges, 

but the record does not indicate which side struck them.
25

This case involved a Black defendant, but it wasn’t a case with racial 

overtones, and it wasn’t a case about police conduct. It was about a rape, 

convincingly described in detail by C.H. 

Skilled attorneys typically ask two kinds of voir dire questions in addition 

to the customary, routine questions. One type of questioning involves “preselling” 

the case. For example, this prosecutor asked the panel, “Who deserves to be 

raped?” Surely the prosecutor didn’t expect anyone to answer that somebody 

deserves to be raped. He was preselling his case.

The other type of questioning involves asking a simple factual question 

where a prospective juror can be expected to give an honest answer in order to 

get at the prospective juror’s underlying outlook and beliefs. That’s what I believe 

the prosecutor was doing here. He was asking prospective white jurors whether 

they had attended or supported a Black Lives Matter rally as a way of getting at 

their views on race. To put the matter in perspective, as of July 3, 2020, two 

months before this trial, it was estimated that fifteen to twenty-six million people 

had already participated in demonstrations over the death of George Floyd and 

others. Larry Buchanan, Quoctrung Bui & Jugal K. Patel, Black Lives Matter May 

Be the Largest Movement in U.S. History, N.Y. Times (July 3, 2020), 

https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/07/03/us/george-floyd-protestscrowd-size.html.

Many questions of the second type are unobjectionable. For example, it is 

perfectly fine to ask a prospective juror whether they use a shopping list at the 

supermarket or just walk the aisles. The lawyer doesn’t really care about how 
26

the juror shops but is trying to get at whether the juror is likely to take a 

systematic or an intuitive approach to the case. But not all second-type 

questions are so innocuous. One good way of testing the legitimacy of a secondtype question is to consider how we would feel if the lawyer asked the direct 

version of the question, instead of the proxy version. For example, could the 

prosecutor have asked here, “Are you concerned about the status of Black 

Americans in this country?” I would find that quite troubling.

I echo the views of the Nevada Supreme Court in Cooper v. State where it 

criticized the state’s use of a Black Lives Matter question during voir dire and 

specifically voiced concern about “questioning a veniremember’s support for 

social justice movements with indisputable racial undertones.” 432 P.3d 202, 

206 (Nev. 2018). As the court put it,

The question had, at best, minimal relevance to the circumstances 

of this case. The question did not examine an issue apparent in this 

case, and the State fails to credibly explain how this question helped

expose whether a prospective juror could “consider and decide the 

facts impartially and conscientiously apply the law as charged by 

the court.” 

Id. (footnote omitted) (citation omitted) (quoting Johnson v. State, 148 P.3d 767,

774 (Nev. 2006) (en banc)).

The defendant here received a fair trial, and his trial counsel did not object 

at the time to the Black Lives Matter voir dire inquiry. But I do not believe this 

inquiry was proper. Again, this case had nothing to do with police conduct. 

What’s next? In a case with a Mexican-American defendant, will the prosecutor 

be able to ask whether a prospective white juror supports higher levels of 
27

immigration on our southern border? Our country is polarized enough without 

a voir dire process threatening to make it more so.

Christensen, C.J., and McDermott, J., join this concurrence.