Establishing the Secretary’s Role

Special Study 2

Jeffrey A. Larsen and Robert M. Shelala II

Historical Office

Office of the Secretary of Defense

FEBRUARY 2012

Louis Johnson, George Marshall,

and Robert Lovett

1949-1952

Rearming at the

Dawn of the Cold War
Cold War Foreign Policy Series • Special Study 2 Establishing the Secretary’s Role

Cover Photos: Louis Johnson is sworn in as Secretary of Defense, March 28, 1949; 

President Harry Truman meets in the Oval Office with Secretary of Defense George 

Marshall and Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Lovett, 1951.

Source: U.S. Army/ Truman Presidential Library, used with permission.

Cover Design: OSD Graphics, Pentagon.

Rearming at the

Dawn of the Cold War

Louis Johnson, George Marshall,

and Robert Lovett

1949-1952
ii iii

Cold War Foreign Policy Series • Special Study 2 Establishing the Secretary’s Role

Louis Johnson, George Marshall,

and Robert Lovett

1949-1952

Rearming at the

Dawn of the Cold War

Published for the Historical Office

Office of the Secretary of Defense

by National Defense University Press

February 2012

Series Editors

Erin R. Mahan, Ph.D.

Chief Historian, Office of the Secretary of Defense

Jeffrey A. Larsen, Ph.D.

President, Larsen Consulting Group

Special Study 2

Jeffrey A. Larsen and Robert M. Shelala II
Rearming at the Dawn of the Cold War

iv v

Cold War Foreign Policy Series • Special Study 2

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied 

within are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the 

views of the Department of Defense, the Historical Office of the Office of 

the Secretary of Defense, Larsen Consulting Group, or any other agency 

of the Federal Government. 

Cleared for public release; distribution unlimited.

Portions of this work may be quoted or reprinted without permission, 

provided that a standard source credit line is included. The Office of the 

Historian to the Secretary of Defense would appreciate a courtesy copy 

of reprints or reviews.

Contents

Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii

Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix

Louis Johnson in Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

NATO and the Military Assistance Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

New Threats: The Soviet Atomic Test and 

China’s Communist Revolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

NSC 68 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Implementing NSC 68: 

The Korean War and German Rearmament . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

The Changing of the Guard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

The Marshall-Lovett Legacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

About the Authors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Cold War Foreign Policy Series • Special Study 2 Rearming at the Dawn of the Cold War

vi vii

Foreword

This is the second special study in a series by the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense (OSD) Historical Office that emphasizes 

the Secretary’s role in the U.S. foreign policy making process and 

how the position evolved between 1947 and the early 1990s. The 

study presented here examines the last 4 years of the Harry S. 

Truman administration and a succession of Secretaries of Defense 

who served during the Korean War: Louis Johnson, George 

Marshall, and Robert Lovett. These three Secretaries took divergent 

approaches to meeting their mandate from President Truman in an 

era of increasing foreign policy and national security challenges. 

The study is not meant to be a comprehensive or detailed look 

at the Secretary’s involvement in foreign affairs. But as a member 

of the President’s Cabinet and the National Security Council and 

the person charged with managing the largest and most complex 

department in the government, the Secretary of Defense routinely 

participates in a variety of actions that affect the substance and 

conduct of U.S. affairs abroad. More influential at some times 

than at others, the Secretary of Defense has consistently been a key 

figure among the President’s senior advisors. 

Concern with foreign affairs goes to the very essence of defense 

and military policy. That foreign policy consumes a large portion 

of the Secretary of Defense’s time is not surprising. Without some 

notion of foreign threats and challenges, the Secretary and his 

staff would operate virtually in the dark when considering such 

crucial and contentious matters as the scale and scope of research 

and development for new weapons, the procurement of equipment 

and supplies, the allocation of resources among the Services, and 

the general size and readiness of the Armed Forces. Although the 

foreign affairs aspect of defense policy and management did not 
Cold War Foreign Policy Series • Special Study 2 Rearming at the Dawn of the Cold War

viii ix

typically receive much public attention in the early years of the 

Department of Defense, it has certainly become an omnipresent 

factor. 

This series of special studies by the Historical Office is part of an 

ongoing effort to highlight various aspects of the Secretary’s mission 

and achievements. This is the second study in a nine-part series on 

the role of the Secretary of Defense in U.S. foreign policy making 

during the Cold War. This series began as a book manuscript by 

Dr. Steven Rearden, author of The Formative Years, 1947–1950, 

in our Secretaries of Defense Historical Series. I wish to thank Dr. 

Jeffrey Larsen for his efforts in serializing Dr. Rearden’s previously 

unpublished manuscript. I also wish to thank Dr. Alfred Goldberg, 

former OSD Chief Historian, and Dr. Lawrence Kaplan for their 

critique and helpful suggestions. Thanks also to OSD Graphics, 

especially Kathleen Jones, for designing the cover and formatting 

the special studies series, and to the editorial team at National 

Defense University Press, particularly Lisa M. Yambrick, for their 

support.

We anticipate that future study series will cover a variety of defense 

topics. We invite you to peruse our other publications at <http://

history.defense.gov/>. 

Erin R. Mahan

Chief Historian

Office of the Secretary of Defense

Executive Summary

As the first U.S. Secretary of Defense, James Forrestal did not have 

the opportunity to lead the Pentagon under the expanded powers 

of the National Security Act as amended in 1949. His successor, 

Louis Johnson, committed much time and effort to advance 

President Harry S. Truman’s goals of integrating the National 

Military Establishment into a single, cohesive executive entity, 

as well as of economizing national security. Benefiting from the 

National Security Act amendments, Johnson enlarged the Office 

of the Secretary of Defense, cut personnel in the Armed Forces, 

stopped the Navy flush-deck supercarrier procurement effort, and 

favored strategic nuclear forces over more costly conventional 

forces.

At the same time Johnson sought to establish the power of the 

Secretary of Defense, he also was driving a wedge between the 

Defense and State Departments as tensions grew between himself 

and Secretary of State Dean Acheson over the crafting of foreign 

policy. To gain an edge over Acheson, Johnson attempted to 

influence policy in the National Security Council and limited 

Defense-State communications. While not an enthusiast of the 

treaty that created it, Johnson would play an important role in 

orchestrating the establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty 

Organization, providing member states with the logistical and 

material support necessary to create a strong alliance.

The 1949 Soviet nuclear weapons test and the Communist 

revolution in China triggered a recalibration in the U.S. threat 

perception of the Soviet Union and China. These events would 

push two issues to the top of the national security agenda for the 

Truman administration: the development of the hydrogen bomb, 

and the reevaluation of U.S. grand strategy. Johnson became a 
Cold War Foreign Policy Series • Special Study 2 Rearming at the Dawn of the Cold War

x xi

strong advocate of the hydrogen bomb, a weapon that would help 

ensure a qualitative edge over the Soviet nuclear arsenal. The 

Defense Department’s isolation from the State Department and 

Johnson’s own reluctance to participate in joint policy planning 

led to the State Department taking the lead in shaping the grand 

strategy published in the report known as National Security 

Council 68 (NSC 68).

The requirements for containment delineated in NSC 68, coupled 

with the demand for an American response to the invasion of 

South Korea, served as the catalyst for a shift from economy to 

rearmament. This shift, along with the sharp antagonism between 

Johnson and Acheson, eventually brought an end to Johnson’s 

tenure as the second Secretary of Defense.

In September 1950, in the midst of the Korean War, President 

Truman selected former Secretary of State George Marshall 

to succeed Johnson. An experienced diplomat and military 

administrator, Marshall quickly created good relations with the 

State Department in general and with Acheson in particular. 

Defense spending began to increase substantially in response to the 

demands of the war and the requirements of deterring the Soviet 

Union under NSC 68. Marshall’s Deputy Secretary of Defense, 

Robert Lovett, succeeded him as Secretary in September 1951.

Marshall appears to have reached an understanding with Truman 

that Lovett would take over as Secretary of Defense after a year, and 

the seamless handoff of responsibilities in 1951 was planned from 

the onset of Marshall’s tenure. The tenures of the two Secretaries 

can be considered as essentially one continuous term of office, 

given their similar views and perspectives on budgeting, security 

issues, and the role of the Secretary of Defense.

While Johnson had sought aggressively to rival the influence of the 

Secretary of State on foreign policy, Marshall and Lovett succeeded 

in making the Secretary of Defense a key actor in foreign policy 

making while fostering a positive relationship with the State 

Department. The more amicable environment between Defense 

and State as well as the greater salience of security issues in foreign 

policy set the stage for the empowerment of the Secretary of 

Defense in the policy realm that Forrestal had sought and Johnson 

had fought to obtain. However, the challenges of safeguarding 

the defense budget and handling the administration of such a vast 

organization complicated the role of the Secretary of Defense, 

as did the requirement of pursuing a budget that balanced fiscal 

prudence with meeting national security demands. Johnson’s 

tenure would serve as a caution that tilting too far toward the lower 

end of the budgetary spectrum could be detrimental to national 

security. Marshall and Lovett learned that lesson and strengthened 

the Office of the Secretary of Defense in the process.
Cold War Foreign Policy Series • Special Study 2 Rearming at the Dawn of the Cold War

xii1

he efforts made by James Forrestal as the first Secretary of 

Defense to guide national security policy proved impossible 

without the consent of the President—consent that was not 

forthcoming. No Secretary of Defense would ever be in a position 

to challenge the President’s authority; no President could permit it. 

Forrestal became painfully aware of this during his confrontation 

with President Harry S. Truman over the fiscal year (FY) 1950 

military budget. With his influence thus diminished and with 

increasing signs that he was on the verge of a nervous breakdown, 

Forrestal’s remaining tenure as Secretary appeared likely to be short. 

Any lingering doubt was removed when, in March 1949, President 

Truman announced that he was appointing Louis A. Johnson, 

his 1948 campaign fundraiser, as the new Secretary of Defense. 

For Forrestal, who had come to devote himself wholeheartedly to 

public service, it was an ignominious yet unavoidable exit.

1

Louis Johnson in Command

Johnson took up his duties at the Pentagon in late March 1949 with 

a clear mandate from Truman to enforce discipline in the Services, 

exercise strict economy, and make Service unification more of a 

day-to-day working reality than it had been under Forrestal. 

Savvy, hard-driving, and ambitious, Johnson had been a highly 

successful attorney in private life. Prior to World War II, he had 

spent several years (1937–1940) in President Franklin Roosevelt’s 

administration as Assistant Secretary of War, locked in controversy 

much of the time with his immediate superior, Secretary of War 

Harry H. Woodring. Johnson’s appointment as Secretary of 

Defense suggested a payoff for helping to secure Truman’s election 

the previous November. But it was also obvious that after Forrestal, 

Truman wanted a “doer,” not a “thinker,” heading the Pentagon. 

Johnson seemed like just the person. T
Cold War Foreign Policy Series • Special Study 2 Rearming at the Dawn of the Cold War

2 3

had espoused, actually made little difference in the policy process 

since the Secretary continued to serve on the National Security 

Council (NSC). Congress dropped the Service Secretaries from 

NSC membership, thus implicitly reaffirming the Secretary of 

Defense’s paramount advisory role, and it added the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff (JCS) as statutory advisors to the council, thereby assuring 

the uniformed heads of the Services access to and inclusion in highlevel decisionmaking.4

Even before the 1949 amendments became law, Johnson was well 

on his way toward consolidating authority over the Pentagon. 

Through flawed judgment or exaggerated expectations, he brought 

many of the difficulties and much of the resistance he eventually 

encountered on himself. But other problems—intense interService competition for funds, debate over rival weapons systems, 

and resistance to unification by the military Services, especially the 

Navy—he inherited from Forrestal. His tough leadership style on 

budget issues reflected to a considerable degree his determination 

to maintain order. Meanwhile, Truman was more determined 

than ever to hold down military expenditures. Fearing a business 

recession in the spring of 1949 that would eat into Federal revenues 

and leave the government in the red, the President lowered the 

ceiling on the military budget for FY51 from $15 billion to $13 

billion. Johnson, eager to do his part, launched a relentless—

Ironically, the qualities that Truman initially valued in Johnson—his 

determination, no-nonsense attitude toward Service sensitivities, 

and zealous pursuit of economies and budget-cutting—would 

eventually prove to be serious liabilities. So, too, would Johnson’s 

lack of knowledge and experience in foreign affairs, which 

increasingly required his attention. In sharp contrast to Forrestal, 

Johnson placed foreign policy matters low on his list of priorities, 

only to discover that his presence and advice as Secretary of Defense 

were often in demand, not only in Washington, but in London, 

Paris, and elsewhere overseas as well. Indeed, as the United States 

became more deeply involved in the Cold War through the North 

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Mutual Defense 

Assistance Program (MDAP), and other American initiatives with 

military implications, his responsibilities as Secretary of Defense 

acquired truly global proportions, though not always in ways that 

Johnson found comfortable or consonant with policies he was 

trying to pursue.2

Johnson’s arrival at the Pentagon occurred at roughly the same 

time that Congress was holding final hearings on amendments to 

the 1947 National Security Act. These amendments, originally 

proposed by Forrestal, became law in August 1949 and replaced the 

National Military Establishment created by the original act with a 

Department of Defense that functioned as a full-fledged executive 

department in which the Secretary of Defense possessed clearer 

direction, authority, and control. At the same time, however, the 

new law stripped the Secretary of his title as “principal assistant 

to the President in all matters relating to the national security.” 

Truman had never liked this provision, feeling that it gave the 

Secretary of Defense too much latitude and license to intervene in 

the affairs of other agencies and departments.3

 When Congress 

undertook to amend the law, Truman made sure that this provision 

was dropped for a somewhat narrower—but more accurate—

description of the Secretary’s function as the President’s principal 

assistant “in all matters relating to the Department of Defense.” 

This change, while intended as a departure from the ideas Forrestal 

President Truman signs 

the Amendment to the 

National Security Act 

of 1947 as Secretary 

of Defense Johnson (to 

Truman’s left) and other 

Cabinet members look 

on, August 10, 1949.

(Abbie Rowe/Truman 

Presidential Library, used 

with permission) 
Cold War Foreign Policy Series • Special Study 2 Rearming at the Dawn of the Cold War

4 5

some thought ruthless and excessive—economy drive to meet the 

President’s target. Indicating that strategic airpower and nuclear 

weapons would now bear the major burden of the country’s defense, 

Johnson set off a firestorm by canceling the Navy’s much-prized 

new flush-deck supercarriers. As a further moneysaving move, he 

reduced Active-duty military personnel strength by 100,000.5

No less controversial than Johnson’s budget cuts were his stormy 

relationship with Secretary of State Dean Acheson, George 

Marshall’s successor, and the unprecedented prohibitions Johnson 

imposed on exchanges between the State and Defense Departments. 

Johnson tried to draw a distinction between military policy, which 

he saw as the province of the Defense Department, and political 

affairs, which he left to State. Such distinctions had become 

increasingly artificial and outdated, but they were useful to Johnson 

nonetheless as a means of protecting his turf and reinforcing his 

authority. Breaking with Forrestal’s practice, Johnson no longer 

invited such senior State Department specialists as George Kennan 

and Charles Bohlen to the Pentagon to give background briefings.6

Instead, wherever possible, Johnson sought to narrow StateDefense contacts and, as a matter of policy, required all Defense 

Department officials to conduct any business they might have 

with State through his immediate office.7 He also insisted that all 

members of his staff, the Service Secretaries, and the Joint Chiefs 

furnish him with copies of “every communication” they sent to 

or received from the State Department.8

 Efforts by Acheson to 

persuade Johnson to loosen his restrictions on contacts proved 

unsuccessful and helped fuel press speculation of an AchesonJohnson feud. So frustrated did Acheson eventually become that 

he suspected that there was something emotionally wrong with 

Johnson and that he must have been “mentally ill.” “His conduct,” 

Acheson claimed in his memoirs, “became too outrageous to be 

explained by mere cussedness. It did not surprise me when some 

years later he underwent a brain operation.”9

Though heavily criticized by Acheson and others, Johnson’s 

approach to political-military affairs did not differ much in 

substance from Forrestal’s. Concentrating responsibility around 

the Secretary of Defense, from Johnson’s standpoint, represented a 

logical mechanism for coping with the burgeoning volume of work 

and at the same time protecting the integrity of his own position 

within the policymaking system. Like Forrestal, Johnson regarded 

the NSC as the focal point of policymaking and sought to conduct 

business accordingly. Acheson, on the other hand, found the NSC 

a cumbersome impediment and at times an unwelcome barrier 

between him and the President. He preferred a less formal, more 

fluid environment and liked whenever possible to conduct business 

with Truman in private one-on-one meetings. He also insisted 

that he should have direct, unchecked access to the Joint Chiefs, 

something Johnson viewed as not only an unwarranted intrusion 

into his domain but also a blatant attempt by Acheson to lay claim 

to the entire national security apparatus.10

Paradoxically, despite the contentious environment, this period was 

also one of the more creative and productive in American foreign 

and defense policy. Between the beginning of Truman’s term in 

January 1949 and the outbreak of the Korean War a year and a half 

later, the United States effectively completed the transition, begun 

with the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, and NATO, from 

hesitant opponent of Soviet expansion to active interventionist in 

the Cold War arena. By no means an easy process, this affirmation 

confirmed, for better or worse, that military power—particularly 

strategic airpower, atomic weapons, and the eventual development 

of hydrogen weapons—was a growing and integral part of U.S. 

Cold War foreign policy.11 It set in motion the development of 

a peacetime defense establishment specifically designed to fulfill 

that role, a defense establishment far larger in size and different 

in character from any the United States had previously known in 

peacetime.
Cold War Foreign Policy Series • Special Study 2 Rearming at the Dawn of the Cold War

6 7

NATO and the Military Assistance Program

Nowhere was the interaction between defense and foreign affairs 

more plainly visible than in the growth of U.S. defense commitments 

abroad, starting with the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in 

April 1949. The treaty’s central purpose was to provide collective 

security against the potential danger of a Soviet invasion of Western 

Europe, but its practical application extended well beyond promises 

of mutual support in the event of trouble. Marking the end of an 

American tradition of not joining “entangling alliances,” the treaty 

set in motion a chain of events that, over time, recast the entire 

range of political, military, economic, and even cultural relations 

between the United States and Western Europe. Henceforth, as 

long as the Soviet threat persisted, Western Europe and the United 

States would share a common destiny.12

Despite the treaty’s momentous implications, Johnson remained 

skeptical that the United States would, or should, become overly 

involved in European affairs. In 1948, while addressing the 

Daughters of the American Revolution, he dismissed foreign 

alliances as “not in the tradition of the United States.”13 Although 

he quickly disavowed these sentiments after becoming Secretary of 

Defense, he was forever concerned that the Alliance would prove to 

be a drain on limited American resources. He inclined, therefore, 

to hedge American participation in Western Europe’s defense, 

limiting it to a minimal contribution. For budgetary and strategic 

reasons, he considered a direct commitment of American combat 

forces out of the question and never envisioned the involvement of 

U.S. military assets other than naval forces to secure the sealanes 

and strategic air already earmarked for bombardment of the Soviet 

Union.14

Johnson’s uneasiness over NATO also grew out of other concerns—

one of which was its close identification with Acheson. During the 

final negotiations leading up to the creation of the Alliance, it was 

Acheson who was in the forefront of the discussions of the treaty’s 

terms; it was Acheson who repeatedly over the ensuing months 

handled the delicate diplomacy of forging the Alliance’s original 12 

disparate members into a working coalition. Johnson’s role in all 

this was, appropriately, secondary to Acheson’s. As a member of 

the North Atlantic Defense Committee, comprised of the NATO 

defense ministers who met at regular intervals, the Secretary of 

Defense was ostensibly a key figure in shaping high-level strategy 

and policy. Johnson’s actual participation in NATO decisions, 

however, wound up being confined for the most part to arranging 

coordination between the various NATO planning bodies and 

the U.S. Joint Chiefs and to providing advice as needed on such 

matters as supply and logistics, MDAP allocations, finance, and 

other related issues—all important subjects, to be sure, but not 

ones that captured newspaper headlines or enhanced Johnson’s 

public stature.15

Johnson found a further source of irritation in the MDAP, a 

worldwide military assistance effort in which help to NATO 

accounted for two-thirds of the funds initially budgeted. Even 

though MDAP was a separate program supported by its own 

appropriations, Johnson considered it a competitor of the 

Pentagon’s own budget requests. Money allocated for military 

assistance meant less funds available to the Defense Department 

at a time when Johnson was doing everything he could to save and 

stretch dollars. All the same, the decisions having been made well 

before he took office, Johnson accepted MDAP as a fait accompli 

and adjusted accordingly. 16

NATO and MDAP were unavoidable responsibilities, both for 

Johnson personally and for members of his staff. While the State 

Department exercised overall policy responsibility for MDAP, 

the day-to-day management and administration rested with the 

Pentagon. To deal with these and related matters, in August 1949, 

Johnson recalled from retirement his former War Department aide, 

Major General James H. Burns, USA (Ret.),17 to serve as his special 

consultant on political-military affairs, taking over the embryonic 
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8 9

international security organization that Special Assistant John H. 

Ohly had started in 1947.18 Affable, open-minded, and widely 

respected, Burns was an ideal counterweight to his hard-charging, 

opinionated boss. Because of frail health, however, Burns rarely 

spent more than half-days at his desk and relied heavily on two 

principal assistants—Major General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, USA, 

who served as coordinator for military aid, and Najeeb E. Halaby, 

who handled the remainder of foreign military affairs.19

The increased tempo of activity occasioned by the advent of NATO 

and MDAP made it exceedingly difficult for responsible officials 

like Lemnitzer and Halaby to abide by Johnson’s restrictions on 

contacts with the Department of State. Much of the time, as a 

matter of expediency, they had no choice but to ignore Johnson’s 

prohibitions and risk the consequences.20 From all accounts, 

Johnson could be rude and unfeeling toward subordinates, but he 

was never known to be so vindictive as to relieve someone of his 

job without good reason. Johnson had the perspicacity to realize—

despite whatever reservations Acheson may have had about his 

mental state—that his true concerns had little to do with the 

behavior of the Pentagon bureaucracy. Rather, what he considered 

to be Acheson’s meddling in defense policy was what bothered him 

most of all. From the fall of 1949 on, this constituted an almost 

constant source of friction in State-Defense relations.

New Threats: The Soviet Atomic Test and 

China’s Communist Revolution

Two international events in 1949 intensified the perceived threat 

posed by communism to U.S. security interests. First came the 

discovery in early September 1949 that the Soviet Union had 

recently detonated an atomic device, thus ending the American 

nuclear monopoly at least a year sooner than was expected. U.S. 

intelligence later pinpointed the test as having taken place on 

August 29, 1949, and estimated its yield as similar to the American 

bomb dropped on Nagasaki (about 20 kilotons). Although the 

United States appeared in no immediate danger, it seemed only 

a matter of time—possibly as early as mid-1953—before the 

Soviet Union would have enough bombs and long-range planes to 

threaten serious damage.21 From that point on, should war break 

out, the continental United States could find itself thrust onto the 

front line of combat.

The other trauma came from the virtual disintegration of 

all remaining resistance by the Chinese Nationalists and the 

proclamation on October 1, 1949, of the People’s Republic of 

China (PRC) headed by Mao Zedong. While not unexpected, the 

Nationalists’ defeat was so swift and thorough as to suggest the 

imminent possibility of a “red tide” sweeping across the Far East. 

More than a diplomatic setback, the Communist victory persuaded 

many Americans, especially those who made up the right wing of 

the Republican Party, that U.S. policy in Asia had been inherently 

flawed, perhaps even sabotaged, and that the “loss” of China might 

somehow have been avoidable.22

Not surprisingly, the Soviet atomic test and the fall of China 

were bound to produce major policy repercussions. Indeed, even 

though the American public, by and large, took these events in 

stride, they sent a shock wave through Washington unlike any felt 

since the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. The consensus saw them 

as the most ominous intensification to date of the ongoing Cold 

War, possibly even a prelude to global war or, no less unsettling, a 

possible shift in the global balance of power in favor of the Soviet 

Union. Dissenters from this view were few and far between and 

did not receive much of a hearing.23

The closed-door debates that followed represented some of the 

most intense in American history. Though in agreement on the 

gravity of the situation, Acheson and Johnson differed considerably 

on how to address it. Since the United States could do nothing 

to stop the Soviet Union from further development of nuclear 

weapons, short of an exceedingly risky preemptive strike against 
Cold War Foreign Policy Series • Special Study 2 Rearming at the Dawn of the Cold War

10 11

the Soviet atomic energy complex in Central Asia, something else 

would have to be done to offset the impact of its atomic bomb 

capability. The course that received the most attention called for 

forging ahead with U.S. development of a much stronger weapon, 

a thermonuclear or hydrogen bomb (H-bomb). With the U.S. 

defense posture tilting increasingly toward strategic airpower and 

nuclear weapons, Johnson, supported by the Joint Chiefs and key 

congressional figures, unhesitatingly endorsed the H-bomb as a 

necessary addition to the U.S. arsenal. Not only would it reassert 

America’s lead in the atomic energy field and reassure U.S. allies, 

advocates of the hydrogen bomb argued, but it also seemed like 

the logical step to take in view of the possibility that the Soviet 

Union might have initiated work on a hydrogen bomb of its own. 

Opponents, led by the chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, 

David E. Lilienthal, countered that the hydrogen bomb, because 

of its extraordinary potential power, was morally reprehensible, 

would only further fuel an East-West nuclear arms race, and would 

contribute little to American security. President Truman, seeing 

logic on both sides, delayed an immediate decision by turning the 

matter over in November 1949 to a special committee of the NSC 

comprised of Johnson, Acheson, and Lilienthal. Given the strong, 

prevailing differences of opinion, an early recommendation seemed 

unlikely.24

With the H-bomb question relegated to further study, attention 

turned to the deteriorating situation in the Far East. Again, as 

with the Soviet atomic bomb, American options were limited. 

Anticipating the worst, Acheson had sought to cushion the blow 

by releasing a detailed official history arguing that the United States 

had done all it could over the past few years to avert a Communist 

takeover. The China White Paper published in the summer of 

1949, however, failed to assuage critics, Johnson among them. Like 

Forrestal, Johnson tended to favor more vigorous American actions 

in China, if not to prop up the faltering Nationalists, then at least 

to preserve some semblance of U.S. influence through support 

of non-Communist, pro-Western pockets of resistance. But the 

sudden and total nature of the Communist victory took nearly 

everyone, including Johnson, by surprise and effectively preempted 

any last-ditch efforts to salvage the remnants of Chiang Kai-shek’s 

beleaguered regime on the mainland. The survivors, led by Chiang 

himself, fled by the thousands to Taiwan (Formosa), where they 

dug in for what loomed as the final battle.25

Despite the Nationalists’ desperate situation, Johnson continued to 

talk as if a rescue operation might yet be possible. Such optimism 

on Johnson’s part amounted to little more than political posturing, 

but it readily appealed to Chiang’s supporters in the United States 

and helped to boost the Secretary’s credibility and popularity with 

the China bloc in Congress at a time when Acheson and the State 

Department looked increasingly embarrassed and ineffectual. 

Earlier, in June 1949, Johnson had also asked the NSC to conduct 

a complete review of U.S. policy in Asia. However, the State 

Department’s Far East experts, suspecting hidden motives, resented 

Johnson’s intrusion and stalled as long as they could. When a draft 

report (NSC 48/1) was finally ready for discussion in December, 

the Nationalists’ prospects looked bleaker than ever.26

Johnson had no illusions that it might yet be possible to save 

Chiang and his followers from disaster without large-scale U.S. 

military intervention. He did, however, hope to convince Truman 

that in light of the strong criticism of U.S. policy, it would be ill 

advised for the United States to be seen abandoning a former close 

ally. Johnson wanted to use some of the money appropriated for 

MDAP—specifically, part of a $75-million slush fund set aside by 

Congress for aid to “the general area of China”—as a gesture of 

American support and continuing concern. As it turned out, it 

was a futile endeavor. Heeding Acheson’s advice instead, Truman 

feared that even the limited aid Johnson proposed would lead to 

unforeseen complications and drag the United States into the fray. 

“The President did not disagree with the military considerations,” 

Johnson recalled. “I was told, without quoting him directly, that 
Cold War Foreign Policy Series • Special Study 2 Rearming at the Dawn of the Cold War

12 13

he wasn’t going to argue with me about the military considerations 

but that on political grounds he would decide with the State 

Department.”27

The policy adopted in NSC 48/2 over Johnson’s objections had two 

main goals: to extricate the United States from the messy situation 

brought on by the Chinese civil war, and to prepare the way for the 

eventual normalization of relations between the United States and 

the PRC. Acheson elaborated to a National Press Club audience in 

January 1950 that American security interests in the Far East would 

henceforth follow a line running south from the Aleutians, through 

Japan and the Ryukyu Islands, to the Philippines. This placement of 

Taiwan and Korea—both known trouble spots—outside the sphere 

of U.S. responsibility would later come back to haunt Acheson 

as having invited the North Korean aggression of June 1950. Yet 

at the time, the omission of Taiwan and Korea seemed less an act 

of negligence or oversight than a reflection of official American 

thinking on the insoluble nature of East Asia’s problems. Johnson, 

though he may have privately disagreed with Acheson’s statement, 

had no reason to go public with dissent. If, despite the American 

hands-off policy, Taiwan managed to survive, so much the better; if 

not, the opprobrium would be Acheson’s to bear.28

In the long run, however, whatever happened to Taiwan was not 

nearly as likely to affect American security as how the United States 

handled the H-bomb question. Having extended its deliberations 

over several months, the NSC special committee neared a 

recommendation in January 1950. Although Lilienthal remained 

apprehensive about the H-bomb, he warmed to a suggestion from 

Acheson that would link a decision on stepping up research to a 

special in-depth review of U.S. foreign and defense policy. This 

last proviso struck Johnson as extraneous, since the NSC staff had 

already scheduled a comprehensive policy roundup.29 Yet it was the 

price he realized he would have to pay if he wanted a unanimous 

recommendation favoring development of the hydrogen bomb. On 

January 31, 1950, the special committee met briefly with Truman, 

who quickly approved both the hydrogen bomb and the proposed 

special study, a two-part decision that would move the United States 

inexorably closer to military containment of the Soviet Union.30

NSC 68

The fragile consensus between Johnson and Acheson that had 

paved the way for the hydrogen bomb decision dissipated quickly. 

Although Johnson agreed to the special State-Defense study, he did 

so reluctantly and treated it from the beginning as an unwarranted 

imposition on his time and an encroachment on his terrain. With 

the H-bomb project finally under way, and with the U.S. strategic 

nuclear air arm growing stronger, Johnson saw no reason to press the 

inquiry into such areas as the adequacy or soundness of America’s 

defense posture. Remaining personally aloof from the whole 

project, he looked to Burns and the Joint Chiefs to handle the 

details and to arrange coordination with State through an ad hoc 

review group. But he did not encourage them to be forthcoming 

with sensitive information.31 While the ultimate purpose of the 

study remained unclear at this stage, Johnson felt almost certain 

that it would have no significant impact on defense or national 

security policy. He believed Truman to be totally committed to 

holding the Defense budget to its current level of $13 billion or 

less, and he saw nothing on the horizon that could conceivably 

make the President budge from that position. On the whole, this 

realistic and ostensibly safe set of assumptions probably would have 

held up save for the crisis that soon unfolded in Korea.32 

Acheson, in contrast, had high hopes for the study from the start. 

Not only did he expect it to yield fresh insights into the West’s 

security problems, he saw it also as providing a useful vehicle for 

reordering national priorities, beginning with the military budget. 

By 1950, in the aftermath of the China debacle and with the growing 

demands of NATO, Acheson considered Johnson’s military strategy 

of relying on nuclear weapons wholly impractical. Although the 

hydrogen bomb might buy the United States a little more time, 
Cold War Foreign Policy Series • Special Study 2 Rearming at the Dawn of the Cold War

14 15

Acheson considered it a temporary advantage at best in view of 

the Soviet Union’s demonstrated ability to match U.S. nuclear 

technology, as shown by its earlier than expected test of an atomic 

bomb. Slowly but surely, he thought, the margin of U.S. nuclear 

superiority would become less important. The result, Acheson 

feared, would be “a trend against us which, if allowed to continue, 

would lead to a considerable deterioration in our position.”33

The alternative defense strategy that Acheson favored entailed 

building “situations of strength”—strong points around the 

globe—through which the United States could project its power 

and influence to contain Soviet expansion.34 To give such a strategy 

credibility, he considered it necessary, first, to lessen American 

dependence on an all-or-nothing response with nuclear weapons; 

and second, to create a defense posture resting in the first instance 

on general purpose forces. U.S. and Soviet nuclear weapons, he 

thought, would eventually cancel one another out. Although 

Acheson did not reject the possibility of a full-scale East-West 

confrontation, he considered it far more likely that future conflicts 

would take the form of low-intensity regional wars. The outcomes 

of these wars would be determined not by the side possessing the 

greater nuclear capabilities, but by the side that could bring to bear 

superior conventional military power.35

Like Johnson, Acheson relied on subordinates to do the spade 

work of assembling information for the study and drafting 

recommendations. To head the State Department contingent he 

picked Paul H. Nitze, George Kennan’s successor as Director of 

Policy Planning. Young, ambitious, and forceful, Nitze found the 

Defense representatives at first reluctant to discuss any measures 

that might result in a significant change in the U.S. defense posture 

or boost military spending. But as time went on, their resistance 

weakened, causing Nitze to conclude that there was a revolt brewing 

against Johnson at the Pentagon. According to Nitze:

Louis Johnson had so drummed into their heads the need 

for holding the military budget to thirteen billion dollars 

that they found it hard even to contemplate a proposal that 

might result in a military budget increased by more than 

five billion dollars per year. Initially, they wanted a few 

more air groups, a couple of additional divisions, and a 

few more ships, but that was about all. It was not until we 

had had a week or two of discussions that General [Truman 

H.] Landon [the senior Joint Chiefs of Staff representative] 

accepted the idea that we were engaged not in a mere horsetrading budget exercise, but in a fundamental reassessment 

of the requirements of our national security policy, as the 

President had directed. From that point on, things progressed 

smoothly as we wrote our report with growing consensus on 

what the thrust of it should be.36

While Nitze may have overestimated the extent of the military’s 

willingness to challenge Johnson’s defense policies, he was basically 

correct in sensing their mood and using it to Acheson’s advantage. 

The resulting report—designated NSC 68 in mid-April 1950—

reflected a variety of complaints, but none more clearly than 

Acheson’s. He believed that given the expected growth in Soviet 

military power, the United States needed to reduce its dependence 

on nuclear weapons and increase the size and flexibility of its Armed 

Forces in order to contain Soviet expansionism. In addition, NSC 

68 urged a revived military role for West Germany and Japan; sizable 

increases in foreign propaganda, covert operations, intelligencegathering, and analysis; and stepped-up military aid to U.S. friends 

and allies.37 Although the report offered few concrete indications 

of how large the buildup ought to be or what it might cost, Nitze 

and others on the State-Defense review group speculated that it 

might push the Defense budget alone to upwards of $40 billion per 

year, with $10 billion to $15 billion more needed to cover increases 

in other national security programs.38
Cold War Foreign Policy Series • Special Study 2 Rearming at the Dawn of the Cold War

16 17

These daunting figures, more than enough to inspire caution on 

Truman’s part, no doubt further strengthened Johnson’s conviction 

that the entire exercise would ultimately prove a waste of time and 

energy. Although he joined Acheson in recommending the report 

for the President’s consideration, he did so on the condition that 

any future action on its approval and implementation be handled 

through the NSC.39 On April 12, 1950, Truman accepted Johnson’s 

advice and agreed to take the report under advisement; meantime, 

he wanted the Bureau of the Budget and other economic advisors to 

give it a thorough going-over. These studies, along with a JCS review 

of military requirements, were still in progress when the Korean War 

erupted on June 25, 1950. Confronted with the sudden outbreak 

of hostilities and fearing an escalation of communist aggression 

elsewhere, Truman ordered U.S. combat troops into Korea and 

notified Congress that he would need supplemental appropriations 

for defense and military assistance. Finally, in late September 1950, 

he signed a memorandum (NSC 68/1) approving NSC 68 “as a 

statement of policy to be followed over the next four or five years.”40

Implementing NSC 68: 

The Korean War and German Rearmament

While Johnson had worked relentlessly toward the goal of unifying 

the Armed Forces during his time as Secretary, his initial response 

to the North Korean invasion was to gain perspectives from the 

Services and allow those perspectives to be articulated to the 

Commander-in-Chief. By fostering communication between 

the Service Secretaries and senior policymakers, the Services had 

the chance to influence the U.S. response to the invasion. At a 

meeting with President Truman and senior staff at Blair House 

on June 25, Johnson encouraged the Service Secretaries to each 

present a response to the emergency. Moreover, while Johnson 

had championed the economization of the Pentagon prior to the 

invasion, he now had to take steps toward rearmament to support 

the war effort. Developments in Korea demanded that the military 

establishment abandon the isolation from the Department of State 

in policy development that Johnson had worked to create and to 

instead establish solid links with both State and Treasury. Two 

of the tenets of the Johnson Pentagon, centralization of power 

and economy, were beginning to lose standing as the Korean War 

commenced.41

Whether Truman would have approved NSC 68 had the Korean 

War not intervened cannot be known; the available historical studies 

and sources suggest no clear evidence. The most solid indication 

that he was favorably disposed toward the report, but not overly so, 

comes from a conversation he had in late May 1950 with Director 

of the Bureau of the Budget Frederick J. Lawton. According to 

Lawton’s notes of their meeting: “The President indicated that we 

[the Bureau of the Budget] were to continue to raise questions that 

we had on this program [the modernization called for in NSC 68] 

and that it definitely was not as large in scope as some of the people 

seem to think.”42 This suggests that while the President was willing 

to entertain changes here and there, he did not regard NSC 68 (as 

some did, then and later) as the blueprint for a major departure of 

policy toward a peacetime rearmament program of unprecedented 

proportions. Judging from subsequent events, the emergency in Korea 

Secretary of Defense 

Johnson, General of 

the Army Douglas 

MacArthur, 

Commander, United 

Nations Command 

in the Far East, and 

General Omar Bradley, 

Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff, on 

reviewing stand during 

Johnson’s visit to Tokyo, 

June 19, 1950. 

(U.S. Army/Truman 

Presidential Library, used 

with permission)
Cold War Foreign Policy Series • Special Study 2 Rearming at the Dawn of the Cold War

18 19

and its various spinoffs, rather than NSC 68, hastened the buildup 

of military forces and increased the reliance on military options that 

came to typify American foreign policy in the 1950s and 1960s.43

As much as anything, NSC 68 provided a convenient and durable 

rationale for comprehensive planning, the prototype for the allinclusive, annual basic national security papers that became standard 

procedure until the John F. Kennedy administration discarded the 

practice in the early 1960s. But its contents—broadly worded and 

vague about costs and ultimate objectives—were open to a variety 

of interpretations. Little wonder, then, that Acheson saw the report 

as less a call to action than a lever for manipulating policy, defense 

policy in particular. “The purpose of NSC–68,” he insisted in his 

memoirs, “was to so bludgeon the mass mind of ‘top government’ 

that not only could the President make a decision but that the 

decision could be carried out.”44

While Acheson expected others to fall in line behind NSC 68, both 

he and Johnson chose to treat its recommendations selectively. A 

case in point was the rearmament of West Germany, which Johnson 

and the Joint Chiefs favored in order to help overcome NATO’s 

manpower shortages and to counter the ongoing buildup of a 

Soviet-supplied East German defense force; Acheson opposed it as 

diplomatically ill timed, if not ill advised. Despite the absence in 

NSC 68 of any specific endorsement of West German rearmament, 

it was clear that the authors were sympathetic to taking steps in that 

direction. Seizing on this apparent breakthrough, the JCS asked 

Acheson to raise the question of West German rearmament, starting 

with a token force of 5,000, at the May 1950 meeting of the North 

Atlantic Council. Acheson, while acknowledging the potential 

benefits of a German contribution, declined to do so, citing the 

likelihood of French objections and the damage that might be done 

to Allied relations. With the outbreak of the Korean War, however, 

Johnson’s continued prodding soon brought Truman’s intercession 

and a reversal of policy. The upshot—the so-called package plan, 

which provided for West German rearmament, a strengthened 

American military presence in Europe, and appointment of a 

NATO Supreme Allied Commander—was laid before the other 

Allies in September 1950. But as Acheson had expected, stiff 

French resistance to a rearmed Germany effectively blocked any 

immediate decision. The Pleven Plan, the French alternative calling 

for creation of a composite European Defense Force, was the subject 

of protracted argument for the next several years.45

As it turned out, the West German rearmament question was 

the last significant foreign policy matter in which Louis Johnson 

participated. Amid the early setbacks the United States suffered in 

Korea, Johnson’s cost-cutting policies had to be reversed, while his 

well-publicized quarrels with Acheson conveyed the impression of 

disorganization and indecision in the upper echelons of government. 

With the administration now gearing up for a war in Asia and a 

military buildup in Europe, Johnson had become a liability to the 

President. By July 1950, Truman began to explore the appointment 

of retired General of the Army and former Secretary of State George 

C. Marshall as the third Secretary of Defense. By early September, 

Marshall and Truman had agreed to a short tenure for Marshall as 

Secretary, setting the stage for Johnson’s departure. While Johnson 

largely succeeded in implementing Truman’s defense austerity 

programs, his political position on Taiwan and the clashes with 

Acheson that complicated the making of foreign policy no doubt 

helped precipitate the end of his career in September 1950.46

The Changing of the Guard

From outward appearances, Johnson’s departure may have seemed 

a turning point in the institutional development of U.S. national 

security policy. With the Korean War to validate Acheson’s 

prediction of the serious danger posed by the Soviet Union, and 

with NSC 68 to provide timely guidance on how to respond, the 

Secretary of State was in a remarkably strong position to establish 

himself as the overall manager of foreign and defense affairs—much 

the same role that Forrestal had tried to play.47 The notion that the 
Cold War Foreign Policy Series • Special Study 2 Rearming at the Dawn of the Cold War

20 21

emerging institutional setup seemed headed in the same direction 

that Forrestal had once envisioned—toward concentrating national 

security responsibilities and authority in a single member of the 

Cabinet—remained just that: a notion.

Such a system failed to develop partly because when faced with 

the crisis in Korea, Truman turned to the most respected figure he 

could find to restore the Pentagon’s credibility: George Marshall, 

whom Truman had once described in a Kansas City Star interview 

as “the greatest living American.”48 Such veneration, which 

Truman apparently never lost, all but guaranteed Marshall a 

close association with the President. Acheson, also an admirer of 

Marshall, had little inclination to challenge the new Secretary of 

Defense’s advice. In contrast to the tension that characterized the 

relationship between Johnson and Acheson, the new Secretary of 

Defense enjoyed excellent relations with the Secretary of State, and 

the two consistently worked together and took steps to foster closer 

Defense-State links.49

Besides enjoying the President’s confidence, Marshall had two 

additional assets that gave him a leg up on his new job. One, of 

course, was his celebrated capacity for objectivity and nonpartisan 

detachment in analyzing problems, reinforced by his broad 

experience in and personal familiarity with foreign and defense 

matters. Not only had Marshall emerged during his tenure as 

Secretary of State (1947–1949) as an accomplished diplomat, 

but he also was the country’s “First Soldier”—the “organizer of 

victory” in World War II who, as Chief of Staff, had planned and 

orchestrated the War Department’s role in victory over the Axis. No 

other individual at the time—in or out of government—possessed 

this combination of such admirable qualities.

Another of Marshall’s remarkable attributes was his ability to 

surround himself with able and effective aides, advisors, and 

deputies, a skill honed during his many years of overseeing Army 

staff work. Marshall’s choice of Robert A. Lovett to serve as his 

Deputy Secretary of Defense was especially important, for it 

gave the department a discreet backstage manager, one devoid 

of personal ambition and committed to the same high sense of 

integrity and professional standards as his superior. A New York 

investment banker in private life, as Forrestal had been, Lovett was 

a practiced hand in the defense business and foreign affairs as well, 

having served as Assistant Secretary of War for Air in World War 

II and, afterward, as Marshall’s Undersecretary of State. The aging 

Marshall appears to have reached an understanding with Truman 

that Lovett would take over as Secretary of Defense after a year, and 

the seamless handoff of responsibilities in 1951 was planned from 

the onset of Marshall’s term.50 The tenures of the two Secretaries 

can be considered as essentially one continuous term of office, 

given their similar views and perspectives on budgeting, security 

issues, and the role of the Secretary of Defense.

In stark contrast to the confrontational tone of Johnson’s tenure, 

Marshall and Lovett both stressed the need for sound working 

relations between State and Defense—what Lovett termed 

“constant, close and sympathetic cooperation” between the two 

departments.51 This included not only increased contacts at the 

uppermost levels of policymaking but also direct consultations on 

a regular basis involving State’s regional Assistant Secretaries, the 

Policy Planning Staff, and the Joint Chiefs, something that Johnson 

had strictly forbidden. As Acheson summarized the new situation:

Secretary of State Dean 

Acheson, President 

Truman, and Secretary 

of Defense Marshall 

in Washington, DC, 

December 26, 1950. 

 (Truman Presidential 

Library, used with 

permission) 
Cold War Foreign Policy Series • Special Study 2 Rearming at the Dawn of the Cold War

22 23

For the first time and, perhaps, though I am not sure, the last, 

the Secretaries of State and Defense, with their top advisers, 

met with the Chiefs of Staff in their map room and discussed 

common problems together. At one of these meetings General 

[Omar] Bradley [Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff] and 

I made a treaty, thereafter scrupulously observed. The phrases 

“from a military point of view” and “from a political point 

of view” were excluded from our talks. No such dichotomy 

existed. Each of us had our tactical and strategic problems, 

but they were interconnected, not separate.52

At the same time, in a move that further strengthened the policy 

process, Truman began paying closer attention to the National 

Security Council. Obviously worried that the war in Korea could 

have far-reaching repercussions, Truman ordered in July 1950 

that the NSC meet every Thursday and that it streamline its 

operations to provide more timely and systematic advice. One of 

the innovations he approved was the creation of a senior NSC staff, 

composed of council members’ deputies (usually at the Assistant 

Secretary level), to expedite the coordination of staff-level work and 

to handle the expected increase in NSC business. Though still 

leery of the NSC, Truman was growing to appreciate its usefulness, 

and in the current emergency he seemed to feel that he would need 

all the help he could get.53

Indeed, as the war intensified, the United States sought to expand 

its network of military commitments both to thwart the North 

Korean aggression and to shore up anticommunist defenses 

elsewhere. Events appeared to bear out NSC 68’s ominous 

prediction of increasingly militant Soviet behavior. In response, 

military spending surged, from $13.5 billion in new obligational 

authority in FY50 to $48 billion in FY51 and $60 billion in FY52, 

dropping to $44 billion in FY53. Foreign military assistance, 

atomic energy, intelligence-gathering and analysis, and other areas 

of the national security budget registered similar sharp rises.54

With these increases in defense and national security spending, 

Acheson and the State Department felt more confident and 

comfortable teaming with Defense in pursuit of a more active 

foreign policy and making promises of American aid and other 

support that would have been unheard of a few years earlier. Some 

of the obligations the United States took on, such as the acquisition 

of overseas bomber bases around the periphery of the PRC and 

the Soviet Union, stemmed directly from the high priority that 

U.S. war plans attached to strategic airpower.55 Others—the 

assignment of U.S. combat troops to Europe in 1951, the creation 

of a multinational NATO high command, the welcoming of Greece 

and Turkey into NATO, and the signing of mutual security treaties 

with Japan, Australia, and New Zealand—went well beyond 

previous U.S. commitments.

The most important national security issues during Marshall’s 

tenure were the recall of General Douglas MacArthur and the 

“Great Debate” over the stationing of U.S. forces in Western 

Europe in support of NATO. Though isolationists and others 

objected during the “Great Debate” in 1950–1951 to sending U.S. 

divisions to West Germany, Congress and the American public 

were, on the whole, remarkably acquiescent. Marshall’s testimony 

in February 1951 in support of the President’s NATO policy 

before joint Congressional committees helped persuade Congress 

to act favorably on the issue. Truman’s relief of MacArthur as 

Commander of the United Nations forces in Korea in April 1951 

occasioned a passionate and bitter national debate that culminated 

in Senate joint committee hearings. For much of the long and 

tiring week of May 7–14, 1951, Marshall testified at great length 

before the committee, enduring harsh, unfriendly personal attacks 

from Republican Senators. Once again, as in the “Great Debate” 

hearings, Marshall’s measured, thoughtful, compelling testimony 

affirming the President’s decision helped greatly to carry the day, 

gaining the support of a large majority of the joint committee.56
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24 25

During this hectic and trying period in 1951, Marshall and Lovett 

maintained their focus on ensuring effective and efficient staff 

support in handling foreign affairs. A larger Defense establishment 

with greatly enhanced responsibilities meant, of course, increased 

work for the Secretary of Defense, particularly in the handling of 

foreign affairs. In fact, the Secretary now found himself as often as 

the Secretary of State at the forefront of representing U.S. interests 

abroad. Effective and efficient staff support thus became all the 

more important, not only to guarantee the smooth administration 

of burgeoning programs but to provide 

timely policy advice and coordination as 

well.57 Like Forrestal and Johnson before 

them, Marshall and Lovett attached such 

high importance to these matters that they 

kept them as close as possible at a high 

institutional level. Given the new title of 

Assistant for International Security Affairs 

(ISA) in January 1951, Burns remained in 

charge of what was quickly becoming the 

Pentagon’s most far-flung operation, with 

worldwide interests and responsibilities.58

But as a part-timer, he recognized that his 

usefulness was nearing an end. Forced for 

health reasons to step down that summer, he yielded the position 

to Frank C. Nash, one of the many Forrestal protégés still around 

the Pentagon.59

Under Nash, a lawyer by training and a civil servant most of his 

life, the Office of International Security Affairs (OISA) confirmed 

its status as a pivotal organization in the Office of the Secretary of 

Defense (OSD).60 Though small by comparison with other OSD 

offices, it operated under a broad charter that gave the Assistant 

for ISA responsibility to develop and recommend positions to the 

Secretary and authority to coordinate “all activities” within the 

Defense Department relating to international security affairs.61

OISA, organized along functional lines, had four major units by 

1952: the Office of Foreign Military Affairs, which focused on 

policy and long-range plans; the Office of North Atlantic Treaty 

Affairs, which handled liaison with NATO; the Office of Foreign 

Economic Defense Affairs; and the Office of Military Assistance, 

which coordinated and processed military aid requests. In 

addition, smaller, separate offices dealt with NSC Affairs, European 

Mutual Security Affairs, and Psychological Policy Affairs.62 The 

last provided support and assistance to the Deputy Secretary in 

his capacity as the Defense member of the Psychological Strategy 

Board, a policy-advisory body established in April 1951 to assist 

the NSC in mounting anti-Soviet propaganda.63

Nash involved himself intimately in practically every detail of 

OISA’s operations, serving as a key aide to Marshall and Lovett in 

policymaking. The Assistant for ISA, one of the Pentagon’s most 

high-profile jobs, required a judicious mix of administrative and 

diplomatic skills that continuously underscored the increasingly 

close relationship between military affairs and foreign policy.64

The Marshall-Lovett Legacy

From 1950 on, with the Korean War providing most of the 

impetus, the Secretary of Defense came to exercise influence over 

Cabinet and staff 

members greet 

President Truman 

upon his return from 

the conference on 

Wake Island with 

General Douglas 

MacArthur, October 

18, 1950. Left to right: 

Special Assistant to 

the President Averell 

Harriman, Secretary 

of Defense George 

Marshall, President 

Truman, Secretary of 

State Dean Acheson, 

Secretary of the Treasury 

John Snyder, Secretary 

of the Army Frank Pace, 

and Chairman of the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff 

General Omar Bradley.

(Abbie Rowe/Truman 

Presidential Library, used 

with permission) 
Cold War Foreign Policy Series • Special Study 2 Rearming at the Dawn of the Cold War

26 27

diplomatic, political, and fiscal policy to a degree much exceeding 

that of the first two Secretaries. This was true not only in such areas 

as NATO matters and military assistance, where one would expect 

the Secretary to play a prominent role, but also in other aspects 

of foreign policy with less obvious political-military dimensions, 

such as helping to formulate the American mediating position 

in the Anglo-Iranian oil dispute. Even though the Middle East 

oil situation had attracted the attention of U.S. military planners 

for years, Defense officials had largely stayed out of the complex 

economic diplomacy of that region until 1951–1952, when events 

in Iran persuaded Lovett that a communist takeover there might 

be imminent. Lovett thought that U.S. intervention, in one form 

or another, “tantamount to the extension of the Truman Doctrine 

to Iran,” would eventually be unavoidable.65 Yet it was carving 

a path through the American antitrust laws and helping effect a 

reconciliation between Tehran and London rather than refining 

plans for U.S. military involvement that claimed his attention. 

Although the oil industry was being targeted over antitrust 

issues, Lovett saw the participation of these companies as crucial 

to providing the oil-driven economic growth that would help 

prevent the emergence of communism in Iran. As the Iran episode 

suggests, the Defense Department’s interests abroad had widened 

beyond military issues, making it increasingly difficult to draw a 

line between the Department of State’s responsibilities on the one 

hand and those of the Pentagon on the other.66

Despite the enlarged role in foreign policy making while Marshall 

and Lovett were in office, the Secretary of Defense never replaced 

the Secretary of State as the President’s principal foreign policy 

advisor. Nor did he become, as Forrestal had unrealistically 

envisioned, the chief coordinator of national security affairs.67

The heightened visibility of their job notwithstanding, Marshall 

and Lovett always considered themselves facilitators rather than 

operators in the international arena, even though their involvement 

in policymaking was greater than Forrestal’s or Johnson’s had ever 

been. They viewed their main job as providing the material means, 

at the right time and place, to achieve the foreign policy objectives 

set by Acheson and President Truman. They viewed themselves as 

supporting actors rather than as the lead performers.

There were several reasons for this behavior. One explanation 

suggested by scholars is that it was part of a conscious effort by 

Marshall and Lovett to preserve and reinforce the principle of civilian 

control of the military.68 As Lovett once characterized it, “The military 

professionals should be contributors to, and not makers of, national 

political policies,” including foreign policy.69 Consequently, while 

Lovett strongly endorsed military involvement at the staff level in 

developing policy, he deplored giving the military a larger voice in the 

final decision. This had the practical effect of not only strengthening 

a longstanding American tradition but at the same time reaffirming 

the Secretary of Defense’s direction, authority, and control over the 

Services. By deferring to Acheson’s lead, Marshall and Lovett were 

sending a message to the military chiefs that their job was to carry out 

policy, not originate it, and that they should look to the Secretary of 

Defense to represent their views and interests.70

As important as maintaining civilian control may have been, 

however, it does not fully explain why Marshall and Lovett did 

not exercise greater power and influence in international affairs. 

The simplest and most obvious explanation is that they had their 

hands full with other problems that limited the time they could 

devote to foreign affairs. Because of the Korean emergency and 

the ensuing military buildup, their first priority often tended to be 

routine housekeeping business. Their days (Lovett’s especially) were 

taken up with reviewing the details of budget requests, establishing 

priorities for the allocation of resources, fixing production and 

procurement problems, and similar routine yet essential and 

exacting tasks. Keeping abreast of these problems was probably as 

much as they could feasibly do.71
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28 29

The complexity of dealing with issues of foreign affairs and national 

security, as well as the onerous nature of a Defense Secretary’s 

other responsibilities, made Marshall’s and Lovett’s jobs all the 

more difficult. The idea of what constituted American “national 

security” underwent a steady transformation after 1945.72 Starting 

as a fairly narrow idea, with military affairs the primary component, 

it evolved into something probably broader than even Forrestal had 

imagined. Under the conceptual framework suggested in NSC 

68, it acquired an almost all-inclusive quality in which military, 

economic, and foreign affairs coexisted, sometimes uneasily, with 

new ventures in psychological warfare, foreign propaganda, covert 

operations, and other unconventional extensions of American 

power and influence abroad. With no guiding precedent in 

developing and managing policy for such a wide range of activities, 

many of them unfamiliar, the Truman administration had to learn 

from experience. By 1953, there had emerged a sort of triumvirate 

for national security composed of Acheson, Lovett, and White 

House special assistant W. Averell Harriman, a former Ambassador 

to the Soviet Union who had also been instrumental in setting up 

and running the European Recovery Program. Although it had 

its awkward moments, the triumvirate approach proved, for the 

most part, a workable and satisfactory arrangement for all involved. 

“During this period,” one aide recalled, “the three men—Lovett, 

Acheson, and Harriman—were very close to each other, knew how 

each other’s mind worked, and had great respect for each other.”73 

Obviously an uncommon but nonetheless healthy arrangement, it 

would not occur often. Yet it served a highly useful and productive 

purpose at the time.74

Finally, even if Marshall and Lovett had wanted to play a larger 

role in foreign affairs, it is doubtful that they could have convinced 

themselves that it would be in the Defense Department’s interest 

to do so. Quite apart from any philosophic qualms they may have 

had, they found it hard to imagine that Congress or the American 

people would ever tolerate a large peacetime defense establishment, 

not only because of the supposed threat it might pose to American 

liberties, but also because of the foreign entanglements that 

might ensue. Marshall remembered well the isolationism and 

miniscule defense budgets of the interwar years and the posthaste 

demobilization that followed World War II. He felt certain that 

the high level of defense spending occasioned by the Korean War 

would never last and that deep cuts, probably accompanied by a 

revival of isolationism, were virtually inevitable upon the return of 

more normal peacetime conditions.75 As Secretary of Defense, he 

saw his job as achieving what some termed a “sustainable” level of 

defense in the sense that it would enjoy long-term popular backing 

and not become a crippling drain on the Nation’s economy. 

Marshall confronted the challenge of adopting the strategic posture 

of arming the republic that had been advocated in NSC 68 and 

winning the war in Korea with approaches that emphasized political 

and economic feasibility. With Lovett pushing for organizational 

coordination and fiscal responsibility, the department was able 

to take measures attempting to control its budgeting. While 

Marshall understood the monumental importance of building up 

the defenses of the United States at the time, he sought a prudent 

military buildup that would allow long-term stability rather than a 

huge development of the military oriented toward the short term.76

Lovett’s reasoning, while somewhat different, basically led to the 

same conclusion. As a private citizen serving in spring 1950 as 

a consultant to the policy review group that had drafted NSC 

President Truman and 

Secretary of Defense 

Lovett confer in the 

Oval Office, ca. 1952.

(Truman Presidential 

Library, used with 

permission) 
Cold War Foreign Policy Series • Special Study 2 Rearming at the Dawn of the Cold War

30 31

68, Lovett had strongly endorsed the notion of an all-around 

strengthening of the American defense posture to combat the 

growing Soviet threat. “Anything we do short of an all-out effort,” 

he said, suggesting no allowance for possible exaggeration, “is 

inexcusable.”77 But as Marshall’s deputy and later as Secretary 

of Defense, he found himself facing a difficult dilemma. “What 

we needed,” he acknowledged, “was a stable Army, Navy, and Air 

Force.”78 Perhaps more than Marshall, Lovett could well imagine 

the military and, by extension, the Secretary of Defense playing 

a larger and more active part in American foreign policy. Yet he 

candidly acknowledged the constraints as a Secretary that fiscal 

limitations and the budget process imposed.

Conclusion

The Korean buildup, rather than making the Secretary’s role 

in foreign affairs clearer and more focused, left it in some ways 

less distinct than before. Obviously, with the growth of U.S. 

commitments abroad, the Secretary’s role took on an added 

dimension that required him to devote more attention to problems 

overseas. Even so, Marshall and Lovett had trouble conceiving 

their job as one in which foreign affairs might become their central 

concern. They operated, as had Johnson (but for different reasons), 

within a fairly restricted, self-imposed sphere. Johnson’s main 

purpose was to protect what he saw as the department’s interests, 

though as a member of the NSC and as an advisor to the President, 

he also regarded himself operating as Acheson’s equal. Marshall and 

Lovett aimed to encourage a working partnership between State 

and Defense, in support and furtherance of U.S. foreign policy to 

the extent of available resources. Either way, it was a role vastly 

different but probably no less demanding than the coordinator’s 

job that Forrestal had expected the Secretary to play. 

Nonetheless, the institutional and global environment in which 

the Secretary of Defense functioned was changing rapidly. With 

the intensification of the Cold War from 1950 on, the military 

component was fast becoming one of the most crucial elements 

of U.S. foreign policy, chiefly because to many policymakers, it 

seemed the only expression of U.S. power likely to command 

respect in Moscow and thereby affect Soviet thinking and 

behavior. This perception of the nature of the Soviet threat and 

the corresponding importance of military power in shaping 

American responses effectively rendered obsolete any lingering 

belief in a sharp distinction between defense policy and foreign 

policy. No longer could military affairs be treated as a monopoly 

of the military or foreign policy as a monopoly of the diplomats. 

What was emerging was a more complex pattern of organization 

and conduct of national security policy in which the Department 

of Defense would necessarily continue to play a vital part. 
Cold War Foreign Policy Series • Special Study 2 Rearming at the Dawn of the Cold War

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Notes

1 Keith D. McFarland and David L. Roll, Louis Johnson and the 

Arming of America: The Roosevelt and Truman Years (Bloomington: Indiana 

University Press, 2005). Chapter nine provides a detailed synopsis of 

Louis Johnson’s role as a fundraiser for the Truman campaign, the downfall 

of James Forrestal, and the subsequent ascent of Johnson as the second 

Secretary of Defense. 2 Ibid. Johnson’s uneasiness about a transatlantic security 

agreement is mentioned in terms of his 1948 speech to the Daughters of 

the American Revolution, in which he spoke out against U.S. participation 

in an alliance (236–237). This work also argues that Johnson risked 

“military preparedness,” a concept he had embraced throughout his career, 

for the sake of maintaining a positive relationship with President Truman. 

This concept was put at risk through the decreases in defense expenditure 

advanced by both Johnson and Truman (359–360). 3 Arthur B. Darling, “The Central Intelligence Agency: An 

Instrument of Government, to 1950,” 2 vols., sanitized version; manuscript, 

Historical Staff, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), December 1953, 19. 4 Roger T. Trask and Alfred Goldberg, The Department of Defense, 

1947–1997: Organization and Leaders (Washington, DC: Historical 

Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense [OSD], 1997), 14–16. 5 Steven L. Rearden, History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, 

volume I, The Formative Years, 1947–1950 (Washington, DC: Historical 

Office, OSD, 1984), 369–384, 410–413. On the anxieties that Johnson’s 

advent generated, especially in the Navy, see Jeffrey G. Barlow, Revolt 

of the Admirals: The Fight for Naval Aviation, 1945–1950 (Washington, 

DC: Naval Historical Center, 1994). Also see McFarland and Roll, who 

discuss the infringements Johnson made upon the autonomy of the Service 

branches, including suspending Service Days and seeking the cancellation 

of the Navy’s supercarrier. The Navy in particular perceived that its 

back was against the wall due to the supercarrier debacle and Johnson’s 

pursuit of a B–36 procurement for the Air Force, which was perceived 

to strengthen the Air Force vis-à-vis the Navy. Both of these moves by 

Johnson were vehemently opposed by the Navy (see chapter 10).
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34 35

6 Exactly why Johnson dropped this practice is unclear, but it may 

have had as much to do with a personnel shakeup at the State Department 

as with Johnson’s disinclination to continue the briefings. Bohlen was 

reassigned as Ambassador to France in late 1949 and was thereafter 

unavailable for consultations. Kennan, meanwhile, found himself 

increasingly at odds with prevailing policy decisions following Acheson’s 

appointment as Secretary of State. Eventually, Acheson nudged him out 

of the Policy Planning Staff and promoted him to the post of Counselor 

(Bohlen’s former job) as of January 1, 1950, where he no longer exercised 

any direct influence over policy.

7 Memo, Johnson for Secretary of the Army et al., August 31, 

1949 (subject: State-Defense Liaison), International Security Affairs (ISA) 

Notebook, OSD Historian’s files. Also see Walter Millis with Harvey C. 

Mansfield and Harold Stein, Arms and the State: Civil-Military Elements 

in National Policy (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1958), 234–236; 

and Charles A. Stevenson, SECDEF: The Nearly Impossible Job of the 

Secretary of Defense (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2006). Secretary 

Johnson’s limitations on communications between the Departments of 

Defense and State are mentioned as a means by Johnson to protect the 

position of the former in influencing policy, 11.

8 Memo, Johnson for Secretary of the Army et al., July 14, 1949 

(subject: Communications with the Department of State), OSD Directives 

Book, Doc. No. I–G–9, OSD Historian’s files.

9 Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation (New York: W.W. Norton, 

1969), 374.

10 McFarland and Roll, 224–231. The authors mention the tension 

between Johnson and Acheson when it came to the National Security 

Council (NSC), specifically in the context of the drafting of NSC 68. 

They highlight that Johnson took substantial measures to safeguard the 

Defense Department from the State Department. These tensions were 

visible in a March 22, 1950, meeting at the State Department, in which 

Johnson’s isolation from the NSC 68 drafting process led him to make clear 

his disappointment with the State Department and Secretary Acheson in 

controlling the drafting process. Melvyn P. Leffler, A Preponderance of 

Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War

(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992), 358.

11 McFarland and Roll, 205–233. They describe the U.S. military 

development that began in 1948 and grew as a result of the 1949 Soviet 

nuclear test, particularly in terms of strategic bombing capabilities, 

investment in nuclear weapons, and the development of hydrogen 

weapons in addition to more conventional military capabilities. 

12 One of the best overall accounts of the Alliance is Lawrence 

S. Kaplan, NATO and the United States: The Enduring Alliance, rev. ed. 

(Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1994). Also see Richard W. Barnet, The 

Alliance: America, Europe, Japan—Makers of the Postwar World (New 

York: Simon and Schuster, 1983); and A.W. DePorte, Europe Between the 

Superpowers (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979).

13 See Johnson’s testimony in North Atlantic Treaty, Hearings Before 

the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 81st Congress, 1st sess., 

April 28, 1949 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office 

[GPO], 1949), 146; and Rearden, Formative Years, 474–475.

14 McFarland and Roll, 236–238. The authors point out that 

Johnson did not look favorably upon the North Atlantic Treaty initially. 

Even outside of the scope of the Daughters of the American Revolution 

speech, Johnson is described as being troubled by the prospect of the 

Alliance during a briefing prior to becoming Secretary. However, Johnson 

later defended the treaty in his congressional testimony, insisting that the 

treaty would not make it possible for Europe or any other country to 

commit the United States to war.

15 McFarland and Roll, 245–249.

16 Lawrence S. Kaplan, A Community of Interests: NATO and the 

Military Assistance Program, 1948–1951 (Washington, DC: Historical 

Office, OSD, 1980), 41.

17 Burns served as an aide when Johnson was Assistant Secretary of 

War from 1937–1940.

18 Memo, Johnson for Secretary of the Army et al., August 3, 1949 

(subject: Organization for Handling Politico-Military Matters in the NME 

[National Military Establishment]), ISA Notebook, OSD Historian’s files.

19 Rearden, Formative Years, 70–71.

20 Ibid.

21 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), “Estimate of the Effects of the 

Soviet Possession of the Atomic Bomb Upon the Security of the United 

States and Upon the Probabilities of Direct Soviet Military Action,” 

ORE 91–49, April 6, 1950, Intelligence File, President’s Secretary’s File, 

Truman Papers. See Enclosure A, in which the CIA estimates that by 

1954, the Soviet Union could have the nuclear capabilities to deliver the 

200 weapons estimated to be required to have a greatly deleterious impact 

on U.S. security.

22 See, for example, David Halberstam, The Coldest Winter (New 

York: Hyperion Books, 2007).
Cold War Foreign Policy Series • Special Study 2 Rearming at the Dawn of the Cold War

36 37

23 See draft memo by Kennan, February 17, 1950, in Foreign Relations 

of the United States [hereafter FRUS] 1950, vol. I, National Security Affairs; 

Foreign Economic Policy (Washington, DC: GPO, 1977), 160–167.

24 The best accounts of the H-bomb controversy are McGeorge 

Bundy, Danger and Survival: Choices About the Bomb in the First Fifty Years

(New York: Random House, 1988), 197–235; Richard G. Hewlett and 

Francis Duncan, A History of the United States Atomic Energy Commission, 

vol. II, Atomic Shield, 1947–1952 (Washington, DC: Atomic Energy 

Commission, 1972), 362–409; Herbert F. York, The Advisors: Oppenheimer, 

Teller, and the Superbomb, rev. ed. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 

1989); Warner R. Schilling, “The H-Bomb Decision: How to Decide 

Without Actually Choosing,” Political Science Quarterly 76 (March 1961), 

24–46; McFarland and Roll, 219–224; and Richard Rhodes, Dark Sun: 

The Making of the Hydrogen Bomb (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995).

25 Doris M. Condit, History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, 

vol. II, The Test of War: 1950–1953 (Washington, DC: Historical Office, 

OSD, 1988), 173–174. 

26 Leffler, 333–337; McFarland and Roll, 253–264.

27 Johnson testimony, Joint Hearings: Military Situation in the Far 

East and the Facts Surrounding the Relief of General of the Army Douglas 

MacArthur From His Assignments in that Area, Senate Committees on 

Armed Services and Foreign Relations, 82d

 Congress, 1st sess., June 14, 

1951 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1951), 2578.

28 McFarland and Roll, 261–264, and Condit, 173–174. Both 

claim that Acheson’s National Press Club speech may have set the stage 

for the North Korean invasion and highlight the fact that while Acheson 

and Truman were backing the policy toward Formosa, several Members of 

Congress were not behind the policy.

29 NSC Action no. 270, January 2, 1950, Office of the Secretary of 

Defense Record Group (RG) 218, Combined Chiefs of Staff 334 (9–25–

47), sec. 2.

30 Condit, 455–482.

31 Memo, Johnson for Joint Chiefs of Staff, February 3, 1950 

(subject: Re-examination of Strategic Objectives and Plans), RG 330, CD 

16–1–17.

32 Meeting, Armed Forces Policy Council, February 21, 1950 

(subject: 1952 Budget), John H. Ohly Collection, Historical Office, 

OSD.

33 Acheson, memorandum of conversation, March 24, 1950, in 

FRUS 1950, vol. I, 207. Also see Steven L. Rearden, “Frustrating the 

Kremlin Design: Acheson and NSC 68,” in Dean Acheson and the Making 

of U.S. Foreign Policy, ed. Douglas Brinkley (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 

1993), 159–175.

34 See, for example, Dean Acheson, “‘Total Diplomacy’ to 

Strengthen U.S. Leadership for Human Freedom,” Department of State 

Bulletin 22, March 20, 1950.

35 Ibid.

36 Paul H. Nitze with Ann M. Smith and Steven L. Rearden, From 

Hiroshima to Glasnost: At the Center of Decision—A Memoir (New York: 

Grove, Weidenfeld, 1989), 94.

37 See NSC 68, “U.S. Objectives and Programs for National 

Security,” April 14, 1950, in Containment: Documents on American Policy 

and Strategy, 1945–1950, ed. Thomas H. Etzold and John Lewis Gaddis 

(New York: Columbia University Press, 1978), 385–442.

38 Nitze, From Hiroshima to Glasnost, 98; Paul Y. Hammond, 

“NSC–68: Prologue to Rearmament,” in Warner R. Schilling, Paul Y. 

Hammond, and Glenn H. Snyder, Strategy, Politics, and Defense Budgets

(New York: Columbia University Press, 1962), 321.

39 Memo, Johnson for Truman, April 11, 1950 (subject: Re-Exam. 

of U.S. Objectives and Strategic Plans), RG 330, CD 16–1–17.

40 Minutes, 68th Meeting of the NSC, September 29, 1950, NSC 

Meetings File, 1945–1953, Box 181, President’s Secretary’s Files, Truman 

Papers.

41 Condit, 31–32; McFarland and Roll, 278–281. 

42 Memo for the Record, May 23, 1950 (subject: Meeting with the 

President), Frederick J. Lawton Papers, box 6, Truman Library.

43 For a more thorough discussion, see Samuel R. Williamson, Jr., 

and Steven L. Rearden, The Origins of U.S. Nuclear Strategy, 1945–1953

(New York: St. Martin’s, 1993), 131–159.

44 Acheson, Present at the Creation, 374. 

45 Thomas Alan Schwartz, America’s Germany: John J. McCloy and 

the Federal Republic of Germany (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 

1991), 116–155. Also see Laurence W. Martin, “The American Decision 

to Rearm Germany,” in Harold Stein, ed., American Civil-Military 

Decisions: A Book of Case Studies (Birmingham: University of Alabama 

Press, 1963), 645–663.
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46 McFarland and Roll, 339–340, 350, 359–363. While discussing 

the end of Johnson’s career, the authors offer several likely explanations 

for Truman replacing Johnson, among which are the differences between 

Johnson and Acheson, his position on Formosa, and the difficulties 

encountered in the Korea campaign.

47 Benjamin O. Fordham, Building the Cold War Consensus: The 

Political Economy of U.S. National Security Policy, 1949–51 (Ann Arbor: 

The University of Michigan Press, 1998), 69–70. Acheson met with 

Representative Christian Herter in 1950, at which time he stated that 

he believed the Soviet Union would provoke a conflict. This statement 

was made in the context of the Truman administration’s push for military 

buildup as per NSC 68.

48 Quoted in Alexander De Conde, “George C. Marshall, 1947–

1949,” in An Uncertain Tradition: American Secretaries of State in the 

Twentieth Century, ed. Norman A. Graebner (New York: McGraw-Hill, 

1961), 247.

49 Leffler, 363–364.

50 McFarland and Roll, 340, and Stevenson, 12, posit that Lovett 

had been “groomed” to become Secretary after Marshall. See also Condit, 

36–39. While it is not explicitly stated that there was a quid pro quo 

with Marshall becoming Secretary of Defense that involved Lovett, it is 

stated that Lovett was an essential component to Marshall’s leadership as 

Secretary. Upon leaving the Pentagon, Marshall is said to have told Lovett 

that he must assume leadership of the Defense Department.

51 Quoted in Henry M. Jackson, ed., The National Security Council: 

Jackson Subcommittee Papers on Policy-Making at the Presidential Level

(New York: Praeger, 1965), 82.

52 Acheson, Present at the Creation, 441.

53 Letter, Truman to Acheson, July 19, 1950, FRUS 1950, vol. 

I, 348–349; James S. Lay, Jr., and Robert H. Johnson, Organizational 

History of the National Security Council during the Truman and Eisenhower 

Administrations (Washington, DC: National Security Council, n.d.), 16–

17; Nelson, “Truman and the NSC,” 373–378.

54 Condit, 241, 259, 283.

55 Williamson and Rearden, 161–174.

56 Condit, 97–104.

57 Ibid., 514–515.

58 Memo, Marshall for Service Secretaries et al., January 11, 1951 

(subject: Organization for International Security Affairs [OISA]), ISA 

Notebook, OSD Historian’s files.

59 Letter, Burns to Truman, July 11, 1951, ISA Notebook, OSD 

Historian’s files.

60 In 1949, the Secretary of Defense created the position of Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. The position 

changed in 1953 to Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security 

Affairs) based on Reorganization Plan No. 6, June 30, 1953, authorizing 

six new Assistant Secretaries of Defense.

61 Memo from Lovett for Service Secretaries et al., November 3, 

1951 (subject: Office of Asst. to SecDef for ISA); Department of Defense 

(DOD) Directive No. 5132.1 (formerly 20.08–1), November 3, 1951, 

“Assistant to SecDef, ISA.”

62 Memo, Nash for OISA Directors, June 24, 1952 (subject: 

Directive to Directors), ISA Notebook, OSD Historian’s files.

63 DOD Directive 5105.6, April 21, 1952 (subject: Organization, 

Office of Psychological Policy), ISA Notebook, OSD Historian’s files; Lay 

and Johnson, NSC Organizational History, 21–22.

64 DOD Directive 5105.6, April 21, 1952 (subject: Organization, 

Office of Psychological Policy), ISA Notebook, OSD Historian’s files.

65 Letter, Lovett to Acheson, October 24, 1952, RG 330, OISA 

files, box 2, Iran folder. Also see FRUS 1952–1954, vol. X, 510n.

66 Leffler, 424, 479, 482–484.

67 Ibid., 447–448. Military and security affairs were a critical part 

of foreign policy at this time, and the Department of Defense was the 

engine behind military and security policy. However, the leadership of 

Defense and State enjoyed extremely close ties during this time relative to 

Johnson’s time as Secretary of Defense. 

68 See Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory 

and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1957); 

James M. Roherty, Decisions of Robert S. McNamara: A Study of the Role of 

the Secretary of Defense (Coral Gables: University of Miami Press, 1970); 

and Gene M. Lyons, “The New Civil-Military Relations,” American 

Political Science Review 55 (1961), 53–63.

69 Quoted in Jackson, 80.
Cold War Foreign Policy Series • Special Study 2 Rearming at the Dawn of the Cold War

40 41

About the Authors

Jeffrey A. Larsen is president of Larsen Consulting Group and a senior 

scientist with a major U.S. defense contractor. He also serves as an 

adjunct professor at Denver, Northwestern, and Texas A&M universities. 

Widely published, Dr. Larsen holds an MA in national security affairs 

from the Naval Postgraduate School and an MA and Ph.D. in politics 

from Princeton University.

Robert M. Shelala II is a researcher with Larsen Consulting Group. He 

previously worked as a contractor in support of a foreign military sales 

program and as an administrator for the Denver Council on Foreign 

Relations. Shelala holds an MA in International Security from the Josef 

Korbel School of International Studies at the University of Denver and is 

a Harold W. Rosenthal Fellow in International Relations.

70 Condit, 514–515, states that Marshall and Lovett would not 

always adopt policy positions aligned with the military leadership, and in 

the instance of the peace treaty with Japan, Marshall’s position was more 

in tune with the State Department than the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

71 Condit, 515, suggests that the Secretaries of Defense following 

Forrestal spent a great deal of time dealing with congressional issues, 

particularly with regard to the budget.

72 See Christopher C. Shoemaker, The NSC Staff: Counseling the 

President (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991).

73 Theodore Tannenwald, Jr., quoted in Francis H. Heller, ed., The 

Truman White House: The Administration of the Presidency, 1945–1953

(Lawrence: Regents Press of Kansas, 1980), 155.

74 Stevenson, 161–162. A more contemporary example of such a 

relationship playing out between the Secretary of Defense and another 

senior member of government can be found in the relationship between 

Donald Rumsfeld and Richard Cheney. Stevenson sheds light on 

aspects of this relationship, such as when Rumsfeld, as leader of the 

Office of Economic Opportunity, took Cheney aboard under the Nixon 

administration. Later, while White House Chief of Staff under President 

Gerald Ford, Rumsfeld picked Cheney to serve as Deputy Chief of Staff. 

Cheney would soon become Chief of Staff himself. Stevenson credits 

Cheney with helping influence Rumsfeld to accept the position of 

Secretary of Defense under President Ford. This is indicative of a level 

of respect and rapport between the two men similar to that seen among 

Lovett, Acheson, and Harriman. 

75 See Doris Condit interview with Lovett, June 7, 1976, OSD 

Oral History Collection, 6; and memo, Nitze for Acheson, July 31, 1951 

(subject: Issues in NSC 114), FRUS 1951, vol. I, 111.

76 Condit, 223–273.

77 “Record of Meeting of State-Defense Policy Review Group, 

March 16, 1950,” FRUS 1950, vol. I, 198.

78 Condit interview with Lovett, 6.
Cold War Foreign Policy Series • Special Study 2

42

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Office of the Secretary of Defense

Washington, DC

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