LANDPOWER AND CRISES:

ARMY ROLES AND MISSIONS IN 

SMALLER-SCALE CONTINGENCIES 

DURING THE 1990s

Conrad C. Crane

January 2001
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ISBN 1-58487-043-5

ii
FOREWORD

 Though the end of the Cold War brought a decrease in the likelihood of global war 

and significant reductions in U.S. military force levels, demands placed on remaining 

American military forces increased rather than subsided. Over the past decade, American 

political leaders have used military forces much more frequently to achieve national policy 

objectives. Most of the post-Cold War deployments fall under the general heading of 

smaller-scale contingencies (SSCs), but their cumulative effect has placed considerable 

burdens on the Army, in particular.

In this study, Dr. Conrad Crane analyzes the role of landpower in the 170 SSCs 

conducted during the last decade. He disaggregates such contingencies into engagement, 

enhanced deterrence, hostility, and stabilization phases, and discusses the military’s role in 

each one. Though cruise missiles and aircraft have been the primary policy tool for actual 

hostilities, the Army has been the predominant service in the other phases, especially for 

stabilization. He points out that no major foreign policy objectives have been achieved from 

major theater deployments during the last decade without some form of significant longterm Army involvement in the region after the crisis has been resolved.

Nonetheless, there have been many flaws in the Army's performance during the 

stabilization phase of these SSCs. Using historical examples and unit after-action reports, Dr. 

Crane points out recurring problems in planning, execution, and force structure for such 

missions. He concludes that despite the desires of American leaders to limit the nationbuilding involvement of the troops they deploy, the capability mismatch between military 

and civilian organizations, combined with the require-ments of peace operations and 

character of American soldiers, makes such a result unavoidable. He argues that the Army 

iii
especially needs to accept some degree of nation-building as its mission, and adapt its force 

structure, training, and planning accordingly. He also presents some other recommendations 

to enhance further the Army's ability to meet the full spectrum of future challenges it will 

face.

There is much in this study to support the current program for Army Transformation, as well as to present a case for a larger active force structure, especially for combat 

support and combat service support. Dr. Crane's analysis and recommendations also merit 

examination as part of the Quadrennial Defense Review process. Statistical analysis of the 

period since America became the world's lone superpower suggests that its armed forces will 

face an increasing number of SSCs. The services will have to find a way to accomplish these 

most-likely missions while still retaining full ability to win those major wars that remain the 

most dangerous threat to national security. 

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director

Strategic Studies Institute 

iv
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

CONRAD C. CRANE joined the Strategic Studies Institute in September 2000 after 26 

years of military service that concluded with 9 years as Professor of History at the U.S. 

Military Academy. He has written or edited books on the Civil War, World War I, World 

War II, and Korea, and published articles on military issues in such journals as The Journal of 

Strategic Studies, The Journal of Military History, The Historian, and Aerospace Historian, as well as in 

a number of collections and reference books. He holds a B.S. from the U.S. Military 

Academy along with an M.A. and Ph.D. from Stanford University. He is also a graduate of 

the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College and the U.S. Army War College.

v
vi
LANDPOWER AND CRISES:

ARMY ROLES AND MISSIONS 

IN SMALLER-SCALE CONTINGENCIES

DURING THE 1990s

You may fly over a land forever; you may bomb it, atomize it, pulverize it and wipe it 

clean of life--but if you desire to defend it, protect it, and keep it for civilization, you 

must do it on the ground, the way the Roman legions did, by putting your young men 

into the mud.

T.R. Fehrenbach1

Introduction.

Prior to World War II, the majority of instances where American armed forces were 

used abroad involved Marine or Navy actions to protect U.S. citizens or promote national 

interests. The use of American military forces (especially the Army) expanded considerably 

with the advent of the Cold War and America's ascension to superpower status.2 Since the 

end of the Cold War, there has been another significant increase in the use of military forces 

(with special emphasis again on the Army) by American political leaders to achieve policy 

objectives. Except for the major theater war of Operation DESERT STORM, these 

deployments have fallen under the broad heading of smaller-scale contingencies (SSCs). 

While this overall increase in theater military operations began in the aftermath of Operation 

DESERT STORM, it stabilized at a high level during the first full year of the Clinton 

administration. Since mid-1993, American military forces have engaged in 170 separate SSCs, 

ranging from humanitarian assistance to peacekeeping, averaging between 20 and 30 a 

month. 3 (See Figure 1.) During this same time frame, the administration implemented a 

National Security Strategy that involved the military heavily in peacetime engagement 

1
ß January 1990 to January 1993 -- increasing number of opera

ß January 1993 to October 1993 -- transition period

ß October 1993 to October 2000--number of operations fluctua

of increase stabilizes (slower rate of increase)

Figure 1. SSC Operations – January 1990 to September 2000

5

0

35

30

25

20

15

10

Jan-90

May-90

Sep-90

Jan-91

May-91

Sep-91

Jan-92

May-92

Sep-92

Jan-93

May-93

Sep-93

Jan-94

May-94

Sep-94

Jan-95

May-95

Sep-95

Jan-96

May-96

Sep-96

Jan-97

May-97

Sep-97

Jan-98

May-98

S

98

Number of Operations

2
activities to shape the environment to preclude the advent of a crisis that could require even 

more forces. The purpose of this monograph is to look at the typical roles of Army forces 

during the life cycle of these SSCs, beginning with normal activities and progressing to the 

stabilization phase after force deployment and possible hostilities. Its findings support the 

assertion of the oft-quoted opening passage that the long-term achievement of a nation's 

security objectives--even for SSCs--depends primarily on the capabilities and sacrifices of its 

ground forces.

The U.S. Commission on National Security--21st Century has produced a "strategic 

spectrum" that displays the progress of a crisis that escalates to hostilities. They disaggregate 

the process into phases that move from Peace to Crisis to Conflict to Post-Conflict and then 

return to Peace.4 This depiction of the life cycle of a crisis can be misleading, however, if it is 

interpreted to mean that the end state is just a return to the status quo, or that all crises 

inevitably lead to conflict. A more representative construct for analysis of the missions and 

capabilities required from contemporary military forces in SSCs is to define the operational 

phases by the primary functions being performed. During periods of normalcy, the 

geographic combatant commander, known colloquially as the Commander-in-Chief (CINC), 

will use his assets to shape his strategic environment primarily through engagement. 

However, once a crisis begins that threatens to escalate to armed conflict, additional military 

forces are usually deployed to enhance deterrence through a show of force. (If the crisis is 

more humanitarian in nature, forces may be built up to facilitate possible response.) 

Hostilities may or may not occur, but the aftermath of any crisis will normally require 

significant military involvement to stabilize the situation and maintain policy gains. This last 

phase can take a very long time, but without it the conditions that led to the crisis in the first 

place will usually return. Currently CINCs coordinate their peacetime activities with Theater 

3
Engagement Plans, and respond to crises with contingency plans and Crisis Action Planning 

that lead to the operations plans executed in a conflict. Historically, however, because of an 

operational focus concerned primarily with the conflict phase of SSCs, American military 

forces have not done as well with post-hostility planning and execution. 

While the Clinton administration showed a preference to rely on cruise missiles and 

air strikes in the hostility phase of SSCs, the Army was still the predominant service in the 

engagement, enhanced deterrence, and stabilization phases. The Army's involvement in 

stabilization phase operations has been particularly demanding and has pushed the service to 

perform numerous unwanted nation-building tasks. As the demands have grown for ground 

forces in overlapping post-hostility or post-crisis operations, they have highlighted some 

shortfalls in Army attitudes, resourcing, and force structure that will require changes if the 

service is going to be able to meet its considerable similar responsibilities for the future. The 

key finding of this study for the U.S. Army is that it must be trained and structured to 

execute some degree of nation-building during the stabilization phase of SSCs. The character 

and capabilities of its soldiers, combined with persistent security requirements and the 

inadequacies of civilian organizations, insure that the Army will not be able to avoid such 

missions in a future that will be filled with contingencies requiring its unique ability to 

protect an area while restoring it to civilization. 

Operational Phases and Service Roles.

Almost all SSCs are joint operations, though some missions are tailored primarily for 

one component. Maritime operations are carried out mainly by the Navy, and "no fly" zones 

are enforced by air forces. During the last 7 years, cruise missiles or aircraft alone carried out 

strike missions in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Iraq, Sudan, and Yugoslavia. But the Army had an 

4
important role in the vast majority of the recorded contingencies, especially in peacekeeping 

or show-of-force missions and cases of domestic support or humanitarian assistance, and 

usually bore the brunt of major operational requirements.5

While the SSCs discussed in this monograph vary greatly in kind and scope, general 

patterns can be derived for missions, capabilities, and service employment in different phases 

of the operational life cycle in the theater. Before a crisis occurs, a CINC's military forces 

will be involved in normal shaping missions. Shaping is accomplished through deterrence 

and engagement, and the current National Security Strategy places heavy emphasis on the 

latter.6 The Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) requires CINCs to develop Theater 

Engagement Plans (TEPs) to link regional activities with national strategic objectives. 

Essential mission categories addressed in the TEP include operations, combined exercises, 

security assistance, combined training and education, military contacts, humanitarian 

assistance, and monitoring treaty obligations.7 A significant shortcoming in the uniformity of 

the CINCs' abilities to shape their theaters effectively with the TEPs is that they are just 

individually reviewed rather than integrated or assessed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff (CJCS). Priorities among plans are not established and forces are not allocated 

accordingly, meaning that a CINC's engagement capabilities are largely a function of his 

forces on hand, not his requirements.8 The Army provides over 60 percent of America's 

forces committed to engagement through its 150,000 forward stationed and deployed 

forces.9 While much of this activity falls into the classification of stability operations or 

support operations, offensive and defensive capabilities are exercised through operations and 

exercises that also enhance deterrence. 

This warfighting capability becomes even more important once a crisis erupts, 

providing CINCs with a key ingredient in the flexible deterrent options they develop for 

their theaters. These usually combine diplomatic, economic, and military elements tailored to 

5
stop or control the escalation of a crisis. They may be as simple as enhancements for existing 

forces, such as increasing the alert posture or manning levels for units already in place. 

Sometimes theater assets will have to be augmented with new projected forces.10

Normally some show of military force is made to intimidate potential aggressors and 

show U.S. interest and resolve. Effective military deterrence has three requirements: the 

development of objectives intended to be accomplished or defended by force, the 

acquisition and deployment of capabilities to back up that intent, and the communication of 

that intent to a potential threat.

11 A primary rationale for maintaining a conventional force 

capable of fighting two major theater wars (MTW) is to ensure that no matter what other 

military operation America is involved in, there is still roughly an MTW worth of capability 

in reserve waiting to deal with a threat that tries to catch the nation off guard. One of the 

paradoxes of conventional deterrence is that the stronger U.S. military forces are, the less 

likely we are to have to use them. As force levels and capabilities decrease, risks of a 

challenge to them increase. Another paradox of deterrence also makes maintaining such 

strong forces difficult in times of peace or budgetary constraints: while it is easy to tell when 

deterrence fails, such as with Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, it is more problematic to prove that 

it is working. 

Army units are the preferred forces to form the core of the joint force required for 

the type of enhanced conventional deterrence that can compel an aggressor to back down 

and defuse a crisis. Not only do Army forces possess significant capability, the deployment 

of heavy units also is the strongest possible signal of American intent. The effort that goes 

into their movement and relative permanence of their placement shows the maximum 

national commitment to defend U.S. interests. Lighter Army units also clearly signal 

6
commitment intent and usually serve as the spearhead for American ground involvement in 

any crisis.

The effectiveness of the Army's deterrent is based on its proven and perceived ability 

to exercise offensive and defensive operations. In 1988, President Reagan deployed elements 

of the 7th Infantry and 82d Airborne Divisions to Honduras to counter Nicaraguan 

incursions. Though labeled a "joint training exercise," the operation featured fully armed 

troops and the Sandinistas withdrew. 12 They no doubt remembered the performance of 

similar American forces in Operation URGENT FURY in Grenada. Similarly, the deterrent 

value of the deployment of elements of the 24th Mechanized Infantry Division back to 

Kuwait in 1994 for Operation VIGILANT WARRIOR was enhanced by Iraqi memories of 

DESERT STORM, and they quickly withdrew from threatening positions along the Kuwaiti 

border. Further deployments of ground forces to Kuwait in 1996 and 1998 succeeded in 

modifying Iraqi behavior again, and have had an obvious dampening effect on overt 

aggressive behavior over time.13 These shows of force had the desired impact. No aggressor 

since the Vietnam War has risked attacking where deployed American ground forces blocked 

the way.

The effectiveness of this ground deterrence, plus a predilection to rely on airpower to 

reduce the risk of friendly casualties, has reduced the role of the Army in combat during the 

last decade in relation to the other services. However, the Army's Wartime Executive Agency 

Requirements delineated in Department of Defense (DoD) Directives, CINC operation 

plans (Oplans), Inter-Service Support Agreements, and Title X, U.S. Code insure that it will 

remain heavily involved at least in support of any combat operation. Its responsibilities for 

all services in a theater cover more than 30 different functions including Class I and III 

support; overland petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL) distribution; prisoners of war 

(POWs) and detainees; civil affairs; graves registration; and nuclear, biological, and chemical 

7
(NBC) protection and decontamination. In addition, Army agencies must provide supply 

support for United Nations (U.N.) peacekeeping forces if they are deployed, as well as all 

inland logistical support for the Marines.14

However, the Army makes perhaps its greatest contribution towards accomplishing 

national policy objectives in the stabilization phase of SSCs after most air and naval forces 

have gone home. During the Clinton administration, the Army was the primary tool to 

achieve any lasting impact from major military deployments. The record shows that when 

ground troops leave, as in Haiti or Somalia, the situation soon reverts to the conditions that 

sparked the crisis in the first place. Only when they remain behind, as in Bosnia or Kosovo, 

is any stability or meaningful change possible. 

While Army forces help keep the peace through the deterrent effect of their offensive 

and defensive abilities, the primary roles they perform in this final phase are in support 

operations and stability operations. And as time goes on, the need for combat capabilities 

continues to decline, while requirements for rebuilding infrastructure and restoring normal 

life increase. Generally the Army has planned poorly for the stabilization phase after crisis 

resolution, and is not properly resourced or structured to handle the growing number of 

such overlapping commitments accruing to it. This monograph addresses these issues in 

more detail later. Neither budgets nor forces have been designed to take into account the 

sober fact that during the last decade any major deployment of military force to resolve a 

crisis in a theater has ended by creating new long-term force requirements there to keep the 

situation stabilized and to maintain progress towards American foreign policy goals.

Figures 2, 3, and 4 graphically depict the general course and greatest emphasis in the 

participation of the various service components in resolving a crisis during the last decade. 

Figure 2 illustrates the employment of Army forces. They are the most heavily involved of 

8
Level of 

TimeDeployment/use

Engagement

And Shaping

Enhanced

Deterrence

Hostility

Does not always

occur

Figure 2. Pattern for Landpower in SSCs in the 1990s.

9
any service in engagement activities. As the crisis heats up, they are also the preferred 

instrument to enhance deterrence, as long as land areas are available for their deployment. 

Force levels build up in preparation for possible hostilities, and even if not engaged in them 

the Army has the extensive support responsibilities listed above. Then the service picks up 

almost all the missions in the final stabilization phase of the SSC, which can take a very long 

time. The Korean example, where an American division is still in place 50 years after the 

crisis, might be a portent of things to come in the Balkans. Army peacekeepers have been in 

Egypt as part of Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) Sinai for 18 years, and in 

Honduras as part of Joint Task Force (JTF) Bravo for 16 years. Additionally, the longer that 

hostilities go on with the destructive power of modern weapons, the more extensive 

rebuilding and clean-up efforts will be.

Figure 3 generally depicts the mission flow of Navy and Marine forces. They are also 

heavily engaged in shaping activities, especially for CINCs with wide ocean expanses such as 

CINCPAC. Naval battle groups are an important instrument for flexible deterrent options 

such as a show of force or enforcement of a blockade in support of sanctions, and the 

Marines from an Amphibious Readiness Group may provide important landpower 

reinforcements to affect a crisis. Sealift gets Army forces to the theater, especially heavy 

units, though there are limited organic U.S. Navy assets for these missions. Naval aircraft 

and cruise missiles were primary tools of the Clinton administration for strikes and combat 

operations, a trend that will probably continue with future administrations intent on 

minimizing casualties in crisis resolution, especially when public support for the commitment 

of American military power is weak or fragile. However, most Navy and Marine forces 

remain distant or leave once the crisis is resolved, unless there are some lingering sanctions 

to be enforced at sea, or a Marine force is left behind as a precaution. 

As for airpower, Eliot Cohen has described it as "an unusually seductive form of 

10
Level of 

TimeDeployment/Use

Engagement

And Shaping

Enhanced

Deterrence

Hostility

Does not always

occur

Figure 3. Pattern for Seapower in SSCs in the 1990s

11
military strength because, like modern courtship, it appears to offer the pleasure of 

gratification without the burdens of commitment."15 During the last decade the main role for 

air forces in conventional SSCs has been for airlift and combat strikes. (See Figure 4.) They 

are involved only marginally in engagement, and while one may argue that strategic bombers 

in Kansas add to conventional deterrence because of their range and power, they do not 

have the ability to send a strong signal of intent until they are actually used. A show of force 

with airpower almost always involves combat actions that escalate a crisis into a phase of 

hostilities. While land forces can be deployed for a long-term presence along borders and 

naval forces off coasts, the utility for air forces in the enhanced deterrence phase of an SSC 

has been more limited. Flyovers of another nation can be viewed as a violation of 

sovereignty or act of war, might not be seen, and are ephemeral. The commitment that 

Cohen mentioned provides the signal for national intent that is such a key ingredient for 

effective deterrence. The U.S. Air Force (USAF) development of Aerospace Expeditionary 

Forces might make airpower a better conventional deterrent tool, but that remains to be 

seen.16 And when the shooting stops, most air combat forces usually go home. However, 

airlift requirements, which are also critical to build up Army forces for deterrence and 

hostilities, as well as to execute most humanitarian relief missions and noncombatant 

evacuations, remain important in the stabilization phase. 

Air combat forces do retain a significant role in the stabilization phase for the 

enforcement of no-fly zones. These come infrequently and generally do not require a large 

number of aircraft, but can last for a long time and are expensive. Northern Watch and 

Southern Watch against Iraq have gone on for more than 9 years, becoming quite a drain on 

USAF resources and personnel. This kind of stabilization is less entangling for the nation, 

but also much less effective than using ground forces. Despite retaliatory air attacks that the 

Iraqis claim have killed or wounded over a thousand people since December 1998, there is 

12
Level of 

TimeDeployment/Use

Engagement

And Shaping

Enhanced

Deterrence

Hostility

Does not always

occur

Figure 4. Pattern for Airpower in SSCs in the 19

13
little evidence that American and British air patrols have shielded southern Iraqis from 

persecution. 17 Their efforts have been more successful in the north, but Kurds living in "a 

Middle East version of Brigadoon" know that the future remains uncertain. 18 Also, air forces 

can not rebuild infrastructure or restore law and order as ground forces do. Like naval 

forces, however, they can be very useful in maintaining sanctions.

The importance of the Army role in recent peace operations can be deduced from an 

examination of DoD expenditures on such missions. (See Figure 5.) From 1994 to 1998, the 

Army paid 53 percent of the department's incremental costs for such operations, far more 

than any other service. Second was the Air Force, averaging about 35 percent.19

Some Historical Examples.

Recent history provides a number of useful examples to illustrate these trends in the 

employment of American military forces in SSCs. They also highlight many of the special 

difficulties that appear in the stabilization phase of such operations.

Panama. Operations in Panama leading to the overthrow of the Noriega regime 

arguably provide the best warfighting model for the employment of American military forces 

in a crisis that escalates into a full conflict, at least through the hostility phase.20 The crisis 

period was exceptionally long, beginning with public revelations about General Manuel 

Noriega's nefarious activities in June 1987 and culminating with the execution of Operation 

JUST CAUSE in December 1989. Planning for military intervention began as early as 

February 1988.21 When Noriega annulled the election of May 1989, sent his paramilitary 

hugs to assault opposition candidates, and increased his harassment of Americans, the 

United States executed Operation NIMROD DANCER as a show of force primarily with 

landpower. Army units deployed included a brigade headquarters, a light infantry 

14
15
battalion, a mechanized infantry battalion, and a battery of field artillery. They were 

augmented with a company of Marines. The U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) used 

these additional forces to conduct exercises designed to show further American resolve and 

hopefully to force Noriega to modify his behavior. When this failed to occur, the National 

Command Authority directed the execution of Operation JUST CAUSE. A textbook 

example of the quality of the new armed forces and doctrine developed in the United States, 

it encompassed the simultaneous assault of 27 targets at night. Though all service 

components participated, the Army furnished 79 percent of the forces.22

Due to a focus on conducting a decisive operation and not the complete campaign, 

the aftermath of this SSC did not go as smoothly, however. Planning for the stabilization 

phase, Operation PROMOTE LIBERTY, was far from complete when hostilities began. 

Missions and responsibilities were vague, and planners failed to adequately appreciate the 

effects of combat operations and overthrowing the regime.23 Though guidance from 

SOUTHCOM on post-hostility missions was clear, tactically oriented planners at the 18th 

Airborne Corps in charge of JTF South gave it short shrift. For instance, the planners 

assigned the lone military police (MP) battalion the responsibility for running a detention 

facility, conducting all convoy security, and providing security of key facilities, as well as for 

being prepared to restore law and order.24 With the elimination of the Panamanian Defense 

Force, looting and vandalism spread throughout the country. Chaos reigned as American 

forces scrambled to restore some semblance of order.25 MPs trained in law and order 

missions did not perform well in unfamiliar combat operations, and were inadequate in 

numbers to deal with the problems they faced in the aftermath. 26 They also could not handle 

all the POWs and refugees for which they were now responsible. There were not enough 

civil affairs personnel or engineers for the rebuilding effort, either, and deficiencies were 

16
exacerbated by slow and disorganized Reserve call-ups relying on volunteers. Politicalmilitary interagency cooperation was also poor, as many agencies were excluded from DoD 

planning and the embassy was severely understaffed.

27

Senior commanders admitted afterwards that they had done poorly in planning for 

the stabilization phase and hoped the Army would remedy that situation in the future.28 The 

U.S. Military Support Group that had been activated in January 1990 to support the growth 

of independent Panamanian institutions was finally deactivated exactly 1 year later in a much 

more stable country, though whether it or Panamanian leaders deserved most credit for 

progress was unclear to observers.29 American ground forces remained in the country until 

late 1999, when they were withdrawn in accordance with treaty agreements.

Somalia. This SSC illustrates the importance for peacekeepers also to be capable of 

warfighting, and that task forces configured primarily for humanitarian missions might not 

be able simultaneously to conduct effective peace enforcement. The two basic problems 

involved in relieving the widespread suffering in Somalia were delivering adequate food, 

water, and medicine throughout that troubled nation while insuring supplies were not stolen 

by bandits, clans, or warring factions.30 The Army's unique transportation capabilities with 

trucks and helicopters insure it will always be critical in delivering relief to isolated or 

undeveloped regions of the world, and its ability to provide ground security for any SSC is 

the most important ingredient for achieving success. 

Operation PROVIDE RELIEF from August to December 1992 consisted primarily 

of airlifts of supplies, but the deteriorating security situation caused the United Nations to 

expand its mandate to include restoring order. The nucleus for the JTF in Operation 

RESTORE HOPE that resulted was a Marine Expeditionary Force, but Army organizations 

comprised 44 percent of the total force deployed in the theater, including much of the 10th 

17
Mountain Division and many support units. After 5 months the first peacekeeping operation 

directed by the U.N. under the auspices of Chapter VII of its charter replaced the initial 

force. While the actual combat power of the new force was reduced, its mission was actually 

expanded to include disarming Somali clans. Most of the 4,500 Americans serving in the 

U.N. operation were Army support personnel, but the 10th Mountain Division provided 

over a thousand combat soldiers for a Quick Reaction Force. This is a case where the 

Marines also kept a marine expeditionary unit (MEU) offshore. The Army eventually 

reinforced its contingent with Task Force Ranger as well. There was a poor transition from 

one force to another, and a lack of appreciation for the increasing security problems and 

capabilities of the armed threats in the country. One problem with short rotations is the loss 

of institutional knowledge that results. The failure to properly coordinate humanitarian, 

military, and diplomatic requirements, and the jumble of nation-building tasks added by the 

newest U.N. mandate, meant that determinants of mission success were vague at best. 

Campaign planning is very difficult without a clear end state. There were critical shortfalls in 

communications units in a complex multinational environment, intelligence personnel and 

procedures, and liaison between military and civilian agencies.31

Resistance to nation-building contributed to "mission creep" as those tasks were 

forced upon unprepared American units or fell to them by default. Forces were not 

structured or resourced to accomplish all their required missions, and this culminated in the 

debacle in Mogadishu in October 1993. President Clinton withdrew all American forces 5 

months later, and, without a U.S. ground presence, the relief effort in Somalia foundered. 

The country reverted into "a madhouse of violence and corruption" with a wretched 

population. Exhausted by a decade of debilitating strife, only recently have the Somalis 

responded to fresh initiatives from their neighbor, Djibouti, and begun to reestablish a 

functioning state.32 From 1992-95 the United States spent more than two billion dollars for 

18
operations in Somalia, and about three-quarters of that was expended through DoD. These 

costs included considerable logistics support for U.N. forces and the rebuilding of much of 

the nation's basic infrastructure, missions falling primarily under Army purview. 33

Haiti. Like Panama, this was another SSC in response to a long-festering crisis. It

began with the military overthrow of President Jean-Bertrande Aristide by Lieutenant 

General Raoul Cedras in September 1991. The JCS sent the first alert order to 

CINCUSACOM to begin planning for contingency operations in Haiti on April 1, 1993. 

Because it was an island nation and the Dominican Republic would not allow American 

military forces to deploy on its territory, Coast Guard and Navy vessels provided enhanced 

deterrence by intercepting refugees, enforcing sanctions, and steaming off the shores as 

shows of force. Tens of thousands of Haitian refugees fleeing their impoverished island 

taxed humanitarian relief agencies and facilities throughout the Caribbean. Planning for 

active intervention intensified in October after armed protesters in Port Au Prince turned 

away a ship loaded with U.N. peacekeepers. During the next year, international pressure on 

the military leaders of Haiti increased, and was intensified even further by obvious American 

preparations for an invasion. The decision of the Haitian government in September 1994 to 

return President Aristide to power was to a large extent because they knew Army helicopters 

and 10th Mountain Division soldiers aboard the USS Eisenhower, along with elements of the 

82nd Airborne Division deployed from Fort Bragg, were heading for Haiti.34 In fact, 

General Cedras did not begin to negotiate seriously with the American diplomatic delegation 

until he had confirmed that the 82nd Airborne detachment was in the air. The overwhelming 

force deployed in the initial occupation and that force's professional and disciplined conduct 

and appearance in continuing operations did much to deter and control the actions of 

potential troublemakers.35

19
The long lead-time between the beginning of the crisis and actual military 

intervention combined with lessons learned from operations like those in Panama and 

Somalia greatly facilitated planning for Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY.36 The U.S. 

Atlantic Command (USACOM) prepared Oplans for both forced and unopposed entry, 

while DoD conducted extensive interagency coordination. 37 Its Haiti Planning Group, with 

the assistance of other government agencies, prepared a detailed "Interagency Checklist for 

Restoration of Essential Services." The lead agency for all major functional areas was the 

U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), with DoD support, mostly from 

Army units, in reestablishing public administration, conducting elections, restoring 

information services, assisting the Department of Justice with setting up and training a police 

force, disaster preparedness and response, running airports, and caring for refugees. Military 

units did have primary responsibility for security measures such as explosive ordnance 

disposal (EOD), protecting foreign residents, and demobilizing paramilitary groups. Again, 

these were mostly Army functions, and the service provided 96 percent of deployed military 

forces.38

These plans and their execution were obviously affected by the desire of military 

leaders to avoid getting involved with "nation-building" missions such as those that had led 

to so much grief in Somalia. Army lawyers wrestled with interpreting humanitarian requests 

for reconstruction to classify them as mission related and allowed versus nation-building and 

prohibited.39 Medical units were told to focus on supporting the JTF and not humanitarian 

assistance, as they were cautioned not to replace the medical facilities of the host nation. 40

This stand-off approach had its most regrettable result on September 20, 1994, when 

American forces stood by and watched Haitian police kill two demonstrators. The next day 

American officials expanded the rules of engagement to allow more military involvement in 

restoring and maintaining law and order.41

20
Similar expansion of Army roles and missions happened in most other areas of the 

restoration efforts.42 The attorneys eventually rationalized that any action that made 

Americans look good would lessen security risks, and approved more projects.43 Other 

governmental agencies were slow to arrive or build up resources, so the military picked up 

the slack. Generally, the other departments had not done the detailed planning that DoD 

had, and often wanted more support than DoD expected to provide.44 A typical example 

was when the Ambassador to Haiti asked for military advisers to help new government 

ministries get established until efforts from USAID and the State Department could be 

established. The result was a ministerial advisor team from the 358th Civil Affairs (CA) 

Brigade, "the first large scale implementation of a civil administration effort since World War 

II."45 The scope and pace of CA missions increased so rapidly that they threatened to get out 

of control, and raised fears that such actions would only heighten Haitian expectations that 

U.S. forces could fix all the nation's problems, and thus set the people up for great 

disappointment later.46

These expanded missions caused many other problems. Engineer planning, 

equipment, and personnel were inadequate for their required civil affairs and reconstruction 

projects. Soldiers had to develop new policies and procedures to help set up internal security 

forces and expend funds. This often required "working around" Title 10, U.S. Code, 

restrictions. They assumed expanded roles in maintaining law and order, including manning 

and operating detention facilities and developing new crowd control techniques. Items like 

latrines and police uniforms were in short supply. Doctrine and personnel were not available 

to establish proper liaison with the myriad civilian organizations working in the country. As 

in previous SSCs, intelligence assets were severely taxed, and the force in Haiti had to rely 

heavily on theater and national intelligence assets to make up for deficiencies.47

21
However, the military in general, and the Army in particular, has received much 

praise for its performance in Haiti. Nonetheless, since the last American troops left the 

island in April 1996, the situation there has deteriorated to conditions approaching those 

early in the 1990s. Without long-term military involvement, most U.S. policy goals have been 

frustrated. The civilian agencies that replaced military forces have not had the same 

resources available, and persistent flaws in the Haitian economy, judicial system, and political 

leadership have obstructed reform. American officials have decried the results of recent 

elections, and admitted the failure of their policies. Even the Secretary General of the U.N. 

has recommended against renewing the current mission there.48 Between 1992 and 1995, the 

United States spent over 1.6 billion dollars for operations in Haiti. Over $950 million of that 

was expended through DoD, and mostly for Army operations, to include the administration 

of large refugee camps.49

The Balkans. The combat actions in the Balkans reflect the trend to use aircraft and 

cruise missiles for hostilities, though the threat of the Croat Army had important influence 

on the negotiations that led to the Dayton Accords for Bosnia, just as the growing potential 

for a NATO ground campaign helped resolve the situation in Kosovo. The deployment of a 

relatively small ground contingent, including 350 American soldiers, in the U.N. Preventive 

Deployment Force in Macedonia had significant impact both for peacekeeping there and as 

a show of force to deter potentially aggressive neighbors, preventing any "conflict 

spillover."50 The U.S. Army has picked up its usual predominant load of stabilization phase 

tasks requiring more than 10,000 troops in Bosnia and Kosovo, and seems resigned to a 

long-term commitment in the region. Rotational schedules have been prepared through 

2005, and there are discussions in Washington about establishing a "permanent presence" 

there.51

Current American operations in the Balkans reveal how force and mission 

22
requirements change during the stabilization phase. Eighteen months after the signing of the 

agreement between NATO and the Yugoslav Army over Kosovo, U.S. Army troops there 

are still engaged in "peacekeeping with an iron fist." They are primarily focused on 

establishing a safe and secure environment under the rule of law, with patrols backed by 

armored vehicles and detention centers to control troublemakers. The U.N.-NATO justice 

system has been heavily criticized, and a Judge Advocate General Legal Assessment Team 

recently found the U.N. mission in Kosovo so severely short of facilities and personnel to 

establish the rule of law that it recommended teams of 15 Army Reserve Component (RC) 

lawyers be rotated through the country to reinforce the U.N. effort.52

Efforts in Bosnia are more advanced, and the environment more secure and peaceful. 

Deployed Army task forces have become lighter with every rotation, and have moved from 

immediate security concerns towards enhancing long-term stability. By late 1997 it became 

apparent to stabilization forces (SFOR) that a large disparity existed between the ability of 

military forces to achieve their initially assigned tasks of the General Framework Agreement 

for Peace (GFAP) and that of their less-capable civilian counterparts to meet their own 

implementation requirements. SFOR realized it could not disengage with such a large 

"GFAP Gap" remaining, and expanded its mission to "assist international organizations to 

set the conditions for civilian implementation of the GFAP in order to transition the area of 

operations to a stable environment." U.S. military leaders on the scene recognized they were 

moving into the area of nation-building, but saw no alternative if SFOR was ever going to be 

able to withdraw or significantly reduce its commitment without risking the peace.53

As the nature of the stability operations and support operations in Bosnia evolved, so 

did the requirements of the peacekeeping force. It needed fewer combat troops and more 

engineers, military police, and civil affairs personnel. Intelligence requirements changed and 

23
expanded. After-action reports highlighted many shortfalls in the current force structure and 

peacekeeping policies, many of them common to previous SSCs. Army lawyers again proved 

adept at "thinking outside traditional fiscal rules and applications" to support operational 

requirements.54 The roles of military policemen expanded to include performing as 

maneuver battalion task forces and working with international law enforcement agencies.55

Difficulties with tactical MPs trying to perform law and order missions reappeared.56

There were problems with shortages and recall procedures for RC engineer, military 

intelligence, and civil affairs augmentation. 57 The massive engineering requirements for 

Operations JOINT ENDEAVOR and JOINT GUARD especially highlighted branch 

deficiencies with command and control, construction unit allocations, and bridging.58 A 

split-based logistics system trying to meet requirements in the Balkans and back in the 

Central Region of Europe required considerable augmentation and still strained combat 

support/combat service support (CS/CSS) assets considerably.59 Liaison officers were in 

great demand, not just as Joint Commission Observers with the Entity Armed Forces, but 

also to coordinate with the myriad non-governmental organizations and other agencies.60

There were shortages of linguists throughout the theater, which especially exacerbated 

problems with intelligence. Military intelligence (MI) doctrine was completely inadequate for 

supporting peace operations, and understaffed intelligence units had to adapt as best they 

could for the complex "multi-service, multi-agency, and multi-national" situation further 

complicated by a host of treaty requirements.61

A Defense Science Board study concluded that Balkan operations revealed many 

shortcomings in psychological operations (PSYOPS) as well, especially in planning and 

resources to support engagement and stabilization phase activities for all the geographic 

CINCs.62 Even with all these problems, Army units in Bosnia have continued to compile a 

24
superlative record of accomplishments. However, the "GFAP Gap" remains, with recurring 

U.N. problems coordinating and directing civilian agencies while recent elections were 

dominated by continuing political divisiveness.63

Stabilization Shortfalls.

By the time Germany surrendered in May 1945, Allied planning for the post-conflict 

phase of operations in that nation had been ongoing for 2 years. All staff sections at SHAEF 

and Army Group headquarters invested considerable resources in developing what became 

Operation ECLIPSE. The plan correctly predicted most of the tasks required of the units 

occupying the defeated country. Within 3 months they had disarmed and demobilized 

German armed forces, cared for and repatriated four million POWs and refugees, restored 

basic services to many devastated cities, discovered and quashed a potential revolt, created 

working local governments, and reestablished police and the courts.64 In contrast, Lieutenant 

General John Yeosock, commander of Third Army in Operation DESERT STORM, could 

get no useful staff support to assess and plan for post-conflict issues like hospital beds, 

prisoners, and refugees, complaining later that he was handed a "dripping bag of manure" 

that no one else wanted to deal with. 65 Neither the Army nor DoD had an adequate plan for 

post-war operations to rebuild Kuwait, and civilian agencies were even more unprepared. 

The situation was only salvaged by the adept improvisations of Army engineers and civil 

affairs personnel, and the dedicated efforts of Kuwaiti volunteers and the Saudi Arabian 

government.66

Some of the deficiencies in post-war planning for Desert Storm can be attributed to 

the fact that Third Army was the first American field army in combat since the Korean War. 

Stabilization phase planning historically has been a function of headquarters at echelons 

25
above corps, and continuing problems with more recent operations are at least partly 

attributable to the generally small scale of American interventions. It also is a result of the 

fact that for most of the 20th century, U.S. Army leaders and planners have focused almost 

exclusively on winning major wars, not keeping the peace. The disappointing experience in 

Vietnam shaped and reinforced institutional attitudes that nation-building missions are to be 

avoided, a predilection reinforced by legal constraints. Joint Publication 1-02, the DOD 

Dictionary, does not even mention the term, instead offering this more limited definition of 

"nation assistance":

Civil and/or military assistance rendered to a nation by foreign forces within that nation's 

territory during peacetime, crises, or emergencies, or war based on agreements mutually 

concluded between nations. Nation assistance programs include, but are not limited to, 

security assistance, foreign internal defense, other US Code Title X (DOD) programs, and 

activities performed on a reimbursable basis by Federal agencies or international 

organizations.67

Semantics aside, the Army must be better prepared to plan and execute a broad range 

of stabilization phase tasks for the long term. Other regional actors rarely understand 

American military reluctance to engage in such missions. Africans viewed the American 

multi-million dollar effort to aid Rwanda as grudging and token because the commander 

insisted his mission was going to be limited and short in duration. Though U.S. European 

Command (USEUCOM) viewed the completed operation as a model of efficiency, Africans 

were still complaining about unpaid bills a year later, and the experience reinforced their 

perceptions that America was a fickle and disinterested partner in their region. 68

Some CINCs have begun placing special emphasis on the development and execution 

of stabilization phase tasks, though their efforts are still in the early stages. A recent 

ARCENT exercise aimed to identify the key mission requirements for "post-decisive" 

26
operations in its theater. It determined that Army forces would initially have to stabilize the 

country with actions like preventing violence, restoring the power system, repairing the 

transportation infrastructure, and facilitating the ability of local authorities and 

nongovernment organizations/international organizations (NGOs/IOs) to provide water, 

food, and medical support. Another important mission will involve the internment and 

resettlement of enemy POWs and displaced civilians. Information operations will include 

PSYOPS against remaining hostile elements as well as public information to the civilian 

populace. Army personnel will take the lead in clearing mines and unexploded ordnance that 

hinder mission accomplishment, and in securing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) 

production and delivery sites. While providing security for the region from outside threats, 

the Army will also have to facilitate the organization of a regime to replace the one it helped 

destroy. This will necessitate reshaping a new local military force and assisting the new 

regime to reenter the international arena. Before redeploying along with allied contingents, 

Army forces will have to help reconstitute them while moving to transfer responsibility for 

the region back to IOs.69

Improving Army performance in the stabilization phase of SSCs will require more 

than just better planning and education, however. Recent operations have highlighted a 

number of organizational deficiencies. SSCs strain force structure in a number of special 

ways. Traditional counts of units deployed in the theater underestimate the total personnel 

involved in the operation. The number of CS/CSS personnel supporting the mission in 

Somalia outnumbered soldiers actually serving in the theater by up to four times or more. 

(See Figure 6.) Cross leveling of personnel to fill units to wartime strength or for unique 

requirements can have a considerable ripple effect on readiness. The ten companies of MPs 

that deployed to Somalia required augmentation from 62 different units.70 SSCs are 

particularly hard on certain active duty "high demand/low density" units in the 

27
28
quartermaster and transportation branches, such as general supply companies and water 

purification units. Somalia required all of the Army's active air movement control teams and

three quarters of the active petroleum supply companies.71 The Army has already acted to 

increase its supply of active and reserve Civil Affairs personnel to meet shortages revealed by 

recent deployments, but that strain will not be reduced until FY 2003.72 The extension of the 

Bosnia mission has highlighted additional inadequacies in the total available number of a 

variety of other CS/CSS units that are distributed between active and reserve components.73

Excessive deployments for SSCs have a negative effect on retention of active soldiers, 

but are having even more significant impact on Reserve and National Guard units not 

accustomed to such use. Considerable portions of the Army's CS and CSS are currently in 

the Reserve Component, including 66 percent of the CS and 72 percent of the CSS in 

Echelons above Division units that are often so critical for stabilization phase tasks in 

SSCs.74 When General Creighton Abrams moved more of the Army's CS/CSS structure out 

of the active component, at least partly to ensure the president would not be able to deploy 

forces to another Vietnam without obtaining Congressional support for mobilization, the 

Army Chief of Staff did not foresee the future course or tempo of service missions.75 In 

Fiscal Year 1986, Reserve Components contributed 900,000 man-days of service; by Fiscal 

Year 1999 that figure had skyrocketed to 12.5 million man-days. Increased deployments also 

require more training time and are causing more problems with concerned employers. 

Additionally, using reserve forces for peacekeeping missions significantly raises Army costs 

for personnel, transportation, and training, while heightening awareness of key military 

occupational specialty (MOS) shortages in some reserve organizations.76 This pace of 

deployments threatens to change the traditional part-time nature of reserve duty. By the time 

29
soldiers from the 49th Division returned from Bosnia, some of them had served more than 

380 days of active duty within 2 years. Twenty-six reportedly filed labor complaints before 

deploying to keep from losing their civilian jobs.77 There has been plenty of media coverage 

about the problems faced by guardsmen and reservists sent overseas on unexpectedly long 

or repetitive deployments, and the situation is especially acute for those high demand/low 

density CS/CSS units mentioned above.78

SSC requirements also have a major potential impact on the Army's ability to fight 

two MTWs. The CBO has noted that the Service's rather ad hoc approach to forming task 

forces for peace operations would significantly detract from its ability to garner enough 

forces for two MTWs.79 USEUCOM has already developed a Balkan Disengagement Plan to 

redeploy its units to other major contingencies that might arise, but American political 

leadership might not be willing to risk losing gains in the region that such an abandonment 

might bring.80 Analyses of the Army's ability to conduct two nearly simultaneous MTWs 

have already revealed many force shortfalls for that particular scenario. The Army National 

Guard (ARNG) Division Redesign Study recommended the conversion of up to 12 ARNG 

combat brigades into CS/CSS units to help make up for a shortfall of 124,800 personnel in 

those specialties identified by Total Army Analysis 2003 in order to carry out the national 

military strategy. Initial units for conversion have been designated, but the whole process, if 

carried out to its full course, will not be completed until FY 2009 and does not currently 

address all the shortcomings that have been mentioned in SSC after-action reports.81

Possible Solutions for Stabilization Shortfalls.

A number of possible structural solutions are available to the Army to improve its 

performance in SSCs, especially for the stability operations and support operations required 

30
in the last phase. These range from internal reorganizations to relying more on civilian 

agencies.

Forming Specialized Peacekeeping Units. Some commentators have recommended that the 

Army establish constabulary units focused exclusively on peacekeeping duties. While this has 

certain training and organizational efficiencies, it is a bad idea for a number of reasons. At 

the beginning of the stabilization phase, strong warfighting skills are essential, and no 

progress is possible without peace and security. The overall conventional deterrent value of 

today's relatively small Army will be significantly reduced if some units are perceived as 

having more limited capability for offensive and defensive operations, unless these 

constabulary units are an addition to the existing force structure. They will also be of only 

marginal utility in meeting the requirements of the current national military strategy with 

acceptable risk. Whether created as new organizations or from modifications of existing 

ones, these specialized units would probably be inadequate to meet future demands for their 

skills, anyway, since Center for Army Analysis (CAA) projections based on data from the last 

decade predict the United States will face 25 to 30 ongoing SSCs every month. 82 One 

alternative to deal with this approach would be to structure Reserve and National Guard 

units to perform stabilization phase functions. After active combat units have had time to 

provide a secure environment, deployment of such specialized RC/NG forces might be 

appropriate. Their performance in the Balkans has drawn rave reviews from many civilian 

administrators who like the different attitudes those units bring to stabilization phase 

operations. But there would need to be many of these units to prevent excessive 

deployments, and these same attitudes that please civilian observers will draw the Army even 

more into nation-building tasks.

Creating More Multi-Purpose Units. This option makes more sense, considering the 

realities the Army will face. General Eric Shinseki's transformation initiatives are very 

31
relevant for this solution. The new medium brigades will retain some armored punch with 

more infantry. They will have augmented intelligence capabilities. They will be more mobile 

and versatile. The Army would need to invest in multi-purpose technologies, such as 

platforms equally suitable for mounting lethal weaponry for combat or carrying relief 

supplies for humanitarian missions. Another approach might be to employ combat engineers 

with armored personnel carriers for peacekeeping, relying on their secondary mission as 

infantry while retaining their building skills, or to use military policemen equipped with 

armored security vehicles (ASVs). This solution will require more than just new 

organizations or technology, however. There will have to be a recognition and acceptance 

throughout the Army that SSCs are the most likely missions to be performed, and that they 

require a different mindset and training than fighting a major war. Army schools at all levels 

will have to prepare soldiers better to meet this challenge, and units will have to adjust 

METLs accordingly.

Increase Active Component CS/CSS Force Structure. A common theme in mission afteraction reports, observations from civilian administrators, and exercise analyses is that the 

Army has serious shortfalls in providing the required CS/CSS support for the operational

stabilization phase. Some of these shortfalls are the result of having theater-level elements in 

the reserve component that might be a late follow-on in a major war but are needed much 

more quickly in an SSC. This is the case with some engineer organizations. Some deficiencies 

are the result of elements that are almost exclusively in the reserves and have just become 

overextended by the unaccustomed demands of recurring SSCs. In other cases, the force 

does not exist anywhere, sometimes because of the lack of reliable historical experience or 

planning data to determine requirements. This is a factor in the shortfalls in military police 

assets to conduct internment and resettlement functions with POWs and refugees. The 

32
complicated multi-national and multi-agency environment of SSCs has also created a host of 

new requirements not foreseen by planners used to combat operations. 

Some deficiencies can be handled by training and equipping CS/CSS units to be more 

versatile, but most fixes to this problem are not that easy. To effectively increase its CS/CSS 

personnel and assets available for SSCs, the Army will have to invest in that force structure, 

particularly providing more active component assets for theater or echelon above corps 

tasks. Utilizing scenarios included in the DoD Fiscal Years 2000-2005 Defense Planning 

Guidance, the Reserve Component Employment Study 2005 determined that the Army 

needed 230 new CS/CSS units to be able to conduct SSCs for 60 days without RC 

augmentation.83 The list covers many of the shortages revealed by recent AARs, and would 

be a good place to start to determine expanded requirements. 

Strengthen Civilian Agencies. Though this is not something the Army can do directly, it is 

often a solution presented by those who believe the service should not be involved in any 

nation-building, as well as by departmental secretaries and officials advocating the roles of 

their organizations. In some form this solution needs to be adopted anyway, though there is 

an obvious threat that reductions might be made accordingly in the DoD budget. Ideally, the 

course of military involvement in a contingency should go according to Figure 7 that 

illustrates the handoff to civilian and indigenous agencies, but that process can take a very 

long time and rarely reduces or eliminates all military requirements. One of the objectives of 

the recent Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 56 on "Managing Complex Contingency 

Operations" is to facilitate this process and "reduce pressure on the military to expand its 

involvement in unplanned ways,"84 but the interagency process still has far to go in order to 

achieve PDD 56's lofty goals. A distinguished and disparate group of participants at a recent 

Post Conflict Strategic Requirements Workshop conducted by the Army War College's 

33
34
Center for Strategic Leadership (CSL) agreed wholeheartedly on the importance of 

extended military involvement in the operational stabilization phase. The list of tasks they 

developed generally agreed with those mentioned above from ARCENT, though the CSL 

conferees put more emphasis on law and order roles and were less optimistic about any kind 

of timely military withdrawal.85 They emphasized that nothing could be accomplished 

without establishment of the secure environment on the ground that only the Army could 

maintain. Recent killings in West Timor of staff members of the U.N. High Commissioner 

for Refugees have highlighted the essential role military forces perform in all relief efforts.86

Attendees also agreed that the lack of quick response capability of civilian agencies 

and problems coordinating them would insure that the military would bear the brunt of all 

essential tasks in rebuilding and reorganizing a failed or war-torn state for a long time. For 

instance, a representative from the Justice Department specializing in setting up police forces 

stated that even with proper funding and commitment, it takes at least 9 months to have a 

viable force, and recent experiences show that to be an optimistic estimate.87 The good news 

from this conclusion for DoD is that there is widespread consensus about its essential role in 

such operations and its budget is probably secure. However, the implication for the Army is 

that there is no foreseeable future reduction in the nation-building or nation assistance roles 

that SSCs demand from it. Some relief from this burden could result from practices that 

have developed to contract services to companies like Brown and Root, but these activities 

have recently come under fire from the General Accounting Office (GAO) for their 

costliness and inefficiency, and suffer from the same limitations as operations by other 

civilian agencies.88

Recommendations and Conclusions.

Primary Recommendation: The Army must be trained and structured to execute some degree of 

35
nation-building during the stabilization phase of SSCs. Recently the Undersecretary of Defense for 

Personnel and Readiness told a group of defense correspondents that in order to prevent 

future wars the U.S. military is in the nation-building business to stay, and its leaders need to 

accept the fact that the soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines so engaged believe it is an 

important mission. 89 His assertion is supported by anecdotes from the field. For example, 

soldiers interviewed in Nova Brdo, Kosovo, emphatically expressed their support for nationbuilding. One of them announced, "With every plate of glass we replace in a window, with 

every door we install, we're helping these people get back on their feet." He also described 

the importance of patching a child's broken arm and giving a mother blankets to keep her 

children warm. He concluded, "With every town that we help, we're helping the nation get 

stronger."90 While military leaders and security advisers for the incoming Bush 

administration have often expressed resistance to employing the U.S. Army in nationbuilding, recent history demonstrates it will occur anyway. Being prepared to conduct such 

operations will avoid a sense of "mission creep" when they inevitably have to be performed.

Dag Hammerskold once said, "Peacekeeping is not a job for soldiers, but only a 

soldier can do it."91 The same might be true for nation-building, especially during the earliest 

stages of the stabilization phase before a safe and secure environment has been established 

and civilian agencies have been able to build up their resources. Accepting nation-building or 

increased nation assistance as a mission has major implications for military involvement in 

SSCs, especially in the engagement and stabilization phases, but it would also bring service 

attitudes, doctrine, force structure, and training into line with the reality of what is happening 

in the field. This adjustment also probably will require congressional action to carefully alter 

legal and fiscal constraints about such military activities. A national strategy relying heavily 

on engagement will also benefit from better prioritization of those activities between regions, 

36
a process that could be facilitated by a more thorough and definitive TEP review process.

Secondary Recommendations. A future of continuous and cumulative SSCs has significant 

implications for the Army, and the following recommendations should better prepare it to 

successfully accomplish its missions:

1. Create truly multi-capable units structured, trained, and committed to both winning 

MTWs and handling SSCs.

2. Increase the ability of units at all levels to train for, plan, and execute stabilization 

phase tasks.

3. Increase the Army's overall CS/CSS force structure to fix those recurring shortfalls 

that appear in executing SSCs.

4. Realign CS/CSS force structure between active and reserve components to better 

meet the demands of SSCs.

5. Ensure adequate focus is placed on the planning and execution of stabilization 

phase tasks at the Command and General Staff College and the Army War College.

6. Develop planning metrics for determining stabilization phase requirements for 

issues like POWs and refugees. 

At a recent strategy conference, Admiral (Retired) William Owens remarked that the 

Army remains "the most relevant service" for today's American security needs.92 With some 

of the adjustments suggested here, it should be able to maintain that relevance and perform 

its missions even better. Though T.R Fehrenbach's quote that opens this monograph was 

inspired by the war in Korea 50 years ago, it is also relevant to the peacekeeping role of the 

Army in Kosovo and Bosnia today. Soldiers are there to protect the inhabitants and facilitate 

their return to the civilized world. No other American organization can perform both those 

roles.

37
ENDNOTES

1. T.R. Fehrenbach, This Kind of War: A Study in Unpreparedness, New York: Pocket Books, 1964, p. 

454. Relevance of this quote brought to my attention by Colonel Dennis Murphy, Center for Strategic 

Leadership, USAWC.

2. Richard F. Grimmett, Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-1999, Washington, 

DC: Congressional Research Service, May 1999.

3. Center for Army Analysis, "Stochastic Analysis of Resources for Deployments and Excursions: A 

Historical Perspective," December 2000.

4. Dr. Pat Pentland and F.G. Hoffman, U.S. Commision on National Security/21st Century, "A 

Forward Looking Examination of U.S. National Security," Mahan Scholars Presentation, October 20, 2000.

5. "Stochastic Analysis," U.S. Army Program Analysis and Evaluation Directorate, America's Army . . . 

into the 21st Century, Washington, DC: HQDA, 1997, p. 5.

6. See the 1997 National Military Strategy, Shape, Respond, Prepare Now--A Military Strategy for a New 

Era, and the 1999 National Security Strategy, A National Security Strategy for a New Century.

7. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 3113.01A, Theater Engagement Planning, May 31, 2000.

8. Thomas M. Jordan, Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr., and Thomas-Durell Young, "Shaping" the World 

Through "Engagement": Assessing the Department of Defense's Theater Engagement Planning Process, Carlisle, PA: 

Strategic Studies Institute, April 2000, pp. 17-27.

9. Institute of Land Warfare, AUSA, The Research, Development and Acquisition "Death Spiral": Future 

Readiness at Risk, Washington, DC: AUSA, October 2000, p. 5.

10. First Draft of FM 3-50, Decisive Force: The Army in Theater Operations, Washington, DC: HQDA, 

July 2000, pp. 4-5.

11. Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice, 

New York: Columbia University Press, 1974, p. 64.

38
12. "Operation Golden Pheasant, Honduras, 1988," on the 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment 

webpage, http://www.bragg.army.mil/AFVC-A/hondopanamahistory.htm; "Operation Golden Pheasant" on FAS 

Military Analysis Network webpage, http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/ops/golden_pheasant.htm. 

13. W. Eric Herr, Operation Vigilant Warrior, School of Advanced Airpower Studies: Maxwell AFB, 

AL, June 1996; Third Army Pamphlet, "The Role of Coalition Task Force-Kuwait: The U.N.-Iraq Crisis of 

1997-1998," furnished to the author by Colonel John Bonin, U.S. Army War College.

14. "Army Wartime Executive Agency Requirements (WEAR)," from CENTCOM Theater Support 

Command Briefing, September 2000, furnished by Lieutenant Colonel Gregg Gross, CENTCOM J-4, 

MacDill AFB, FL; "Army Inter-Service Logistics Support Requirements," briefing provided on December 12, 

2000, by Mr. David Pearsall, CALIBRE Systems, currently working under contract for HQDA, ODCSOPS. 

These WEAR can be a heavy drain on Army resources. Total Army Analysis 05 concluded that in a 2 MTW 

scenario, over 57,000 Army CS/CSS soldiers would be needed to provide logistics support to other services. 

The bulk of the burden falls on chemical, quartermaster, and transportation units. The full WEAR list 

includes: Inland Class I Support; Class III Bulk and Package; Operation of Common User Ocean Terminals; 

Intermodal Container Management; Common User Land Transportation in Theater; Military Customs 

Inspection Program; Military Troop Construction; Airdrop Equipment and Supplies; Power Generation 

Equipment and Systems; Land Based Water Resources; Overland POL Support (Distribution); Military Postal 

Service; DOD Enemy POW and Detainee Program; Military Veterinary Support; Medical Evacuation on the 

Battlefield; Mortuary Services/Graves Registration; Single Manager for Conventional Ammunition; Chemical 

Munitions; Chemical Protective Clothing and Equipment; NBC Decontamination, Reconnaissance, and 

Detection; Disposal of Waste Explosives and Munitions; Medical Treatment for POWs and Civilians; 

Communications Liaison Teams; Civil Affairs Support; Locomotive and Rail Management; Traffic Regulation 

on Designated Routes; Contracting Support; Single Item Manager for Class VIII Support; Water Support for 

POWs, Refugees, and Displaced Persons; Medical Support for Noncombatant Evacuations; Civilian 

Personnel Program; Optical Fabrication and Repair. Besides the additional responsibilities for U.N. 

peacekeepers and the Marines mentioned in the text, the Army also handles blood supplies for the Air Force.

15. Quoted by Ernest Blazar, "Inside The Ring," Washington Times, December 18, 1998, p. 7.

39
16. United States General Accounting Office, Air Force Structure: Air Force Expeditionary Concept Offers 

Benefits but Effects Should Be Assessed, GAO/NSIAD-00-201, August 2000. The report criticizes USAF for not 

having quantifiable goals and systematic data collection and analysis to determine the real effect of the 

reorganization, and also notes that any major conflict will necessitate crisis action planning to pool assets 

from all AEFs.

17. "The Zapping of Iraq," Economist, August 19-25, 2000; "Iraq: Allied Bombing," The New York 

Times, August 29, 2000.

18. Warren P. Strobel, "Freed From Saddam's Grip," U.S. News & World Report, September 11, 2000. 

Recent Iraqi incursions into the exclusion zone and more displaced Kurds fleeing there from other areas in 

Northern Iraq have raised further questions about the effectiveness of the no-fly zone. "Saddam Is Out Of 

His Box," Charleston Post and Courier, December 18, 2000.

19. Congressional Budget Office, Making Peace While Staying Ready for War: The Challenges of U.S. 

Military Participation in Peace Operations, December 1999, Chapter II, pp. 1-2. Many of these costs of 

contingency operations are funded in supplemental appropriations, but "raids" on operating funds are often 

needed to cover expenses until subsequent funding is provided. This has an adverse impact on operations and 

maintenance accounts, causing additional service strains.

20. Operations were conducted superbly and quickly in a complex situation with difficult terrain, 

many civilians, and restrained rules of engagement, that required intricate joint planning and execution. 

21. John T. Fishel, The Fog of Peace: Planning and Executing the Restoration of Panama, Carlisle, PA: 

Strategic Studies Institute, April 1992, p. 7.

22. Thomas Donnelly, Margaret Roth, and Caleb Baker, Operation Just Cause: The Storming of Panama, 

New York: Lexington Books, 1991; America's Army . . . into the 21st Century, p. 5.

23. Fishel, pp. 29-63.

24. U.S. Army War College, American War Plans Special Text-2001, Carlisle Barracks, PA: USAWC, 

November 2000, pp. 233-306.

25. Lieutenant Colonel John Fishel and Major Richard Downie, "Taking Responsibility for Our 

Actions? Establishing Order and Stability in Panama," Military Review, April 1992, No. 66, pp. 69-70.

40
26. Fishel and Downie, pp. 70-75; Oral History Interview JCIT 097Z of Lieutenant General Carmen 

Cavezza by Dr. Larry Yates, Dr. Robert Wright, and Mr. Joe Huddleston, "Joint Task Force South in 

Operation Just Cause," conducted at Fort Lewis, WA, April 30, 1992, available on the U.S. Army Center of 

Military History website, http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/documents/panama/jcit/JCIT97Z.htm. 

27. Cavezza Interview; Fishel, pp. 38, 58-59.

28. Cavezza Interview. Lieutenant General Cavezza expressed doubt, however, that he could have 

trained his unit adequately for the METL required by the complexities of the stability operations he faced.

29. Fishel, p. 63.

30. Kenneth Allard, Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned, Washington, DC: National Defense University 

Press, 1995, p. 14.

31. Ibid., pp. 21-85; America's Army . . . into the 21st Century, p. 5. 

32. Richard C. Hottelot, "A New Somalia?" Christian Science Monitor, August 23, 2000, p. 8.

33. U.S. General Accounting Office, Peace Operations: U.S. Costs in Support of Haiti, Former Yugoslavia, 

Somalia, and Rwanda, GAO/NSIAD-96-38, March 1996.

34. CINCUSACOM CD-ROM, Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY: U.S. Forces in Haiti, 1997, 

executive level AAR pamphlet, pp. 1-13.

35. Joint Universal Lessons Learned System entries 10451-37950 and 10754-92362, USACOM CDROM.

36. David Bentley and Robert Oakley, "Peace Operations: A Comparison of Somalia and Haiti," 

National Defense University Strategic Forum No. 30, May 1995, available on NDU website at 

http://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/forum30.html. 

37. AAR, pp. 2-9, USACOM CD-ROM.

38. Haiti Planning Group, "Draft Interagency Checklist for Restoration of Essential Services," 

furnished to author by Colonel Mike Fitzgerald, CENTCOM J-5; America's Army . . . into the 21st Century, p. 5.

41
39. Interview of Lieutenant Colonel Karl Warner by Colonel Dennis Mroczkowski, JTF-190 

Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY AAR, 266-267, USACOM CD-ROM.

40. Interview of Colonel Gerald Palmer by Major Christopher Clark, JTF-190 Operation UPHOLD 

DEMOCRACY AAR, 269, USACOM CD-ROM.

41. Chronology, Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, USACOM CD-ROM.

42. This expansion of missions is evident from the Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY Logistics 

Support Operations briefing from the USACOM CD-ROM.

43. Warner Interview, p. 267.

44. JULLS entry 10829-67459, USACOM CD-ROM.

45. Memorandum, From 358th Civil Affairs Brigade to Commanding General, U.S. Army Civil 

Affairs and Psychological Operations Command, SUBJECT: After Action Report, USACOM Operation 

Uphold/Maintain Democracy, May 26, 1995, p. 3, USACOM CD-ROM. 

46. JULLS entry 11566-55234, USACOM CD-ROM.

47. JULLS entries 00676-58398, 00969-70100, 01040-06216, 02656-20553, 10355-63106, 10447-

74360, 10758-27517, 11558-362234, 11640-05029, 11640-61460, 50257-20594, 50258-39326, 92638-89373, 

USACOM CD-ROM.

48. U.S. General Accounting Office, Foreign Assistance: Any Further Aid to Haitian Justice System Should be 

Linked to Performance-Related Conditions, GAO-01-24, October 2000; "Haiti is Nightmare for U.S.," Charleston 

Post and Courier, October 5, 2000; "Haiti's Disappearing Democracy," The New York Times, November 28, 

2000; Ben Barber, "U.S. Officials See Failed Haiti Policy," Washington Times, November 29, 2000; "Annan 

Urges End to U.N. Mission in Haiti," The New York Times, November 29, 2000.

49. USGAO, Peace Operations: U.S. Costs in Support of Haiti, Former Yugoslavia, Somalia, and Rwanda, pp. 

6-7.

50. Steven R. Bowman, Bosnia & Macedonia: U.S. Military Operations, Washington, DC: Congressional 

Research Service, June 1995, p. 12; Julie Kim, Macedonia: Conflict Spillover Prevention, Washington, DC: 

Congressional Research Service, July 1998.

42
51. "Army Has Begun Reviewing Options For Long-Term Balkan Presence," Inside the Pentagon, 

October 26, 2000; Steven Lee Myers, "Army Will Give National Guard The Entire U.S. Role In Bosnia," The 

New York Times, December 5, 2000.

52. Gregory Piatt, "A Good Bit Of Progress . . . A Long Way To Go," European Stars and Stripes, 

September 17, 2000, p. 2; "UN-NATO Court Setup In Kosovo Faulted," The New York Times, October 20, 

2000; Donald G. McNeil, Jr., The New York Times, November 22, 2000; Emily Kelly, "Peacekeeping With An 

Iron Fist," Stars and Stripes Omnimedia, November 29, 2000; Major General Donald Campbell, Memorandum 

for Record, SUBJECT: Trip Report for Reserve Component (RC), Judge Advocate General (JAG) Legal 

Assessment Team for Kosovo deployed between May 26 and June 5, 2000, June 9, 2000, copy furnished to 

author by Lieutenant Colonel Peter Menk.

53. Headquarters, U.S. Army Europe, After Action Report: Operation Joint Guard, November 1998, pp. 

3-2, 3-21 to 3-23.

54. Ibid., p. 9-26.

55. Ibid., p. 9-36.

56. Headquarters, U.S. Army Europe, Operation Joint Endeavor: After Action Report, May 1997, p. 235.

57. Operation Joint Guard, pp. 4-5, 5-18. Problems were so acute that the AAR asked for both the 

Reserves and National Guard to realign their units and specialties for peacekeeping missions.

58. Colonel David A. Kingston, Towards a More Relevant Engineer Command, Carlisle Barracks, PA: 

USAWC, 2000; Operation Joint Endeavor, pp. 206, 210.

59 Operation Joint Endeavor, pp. 130-131.

60. Center for Army Lessons Learned, Joint Military Commissions: Lessons Learned From Operation Joint 

Endeavor, May 1996. The large requirement for military liaison with the myriad agencies involved in such 

contingencies was a key point of discussion at a recent Post Conflict Strategic Requirements Workshop 

conducted by the Center for Strategic Leadership at the USAWC from November 28-30, 2000.

43
61. Operation Joint Endeavor, pp. 78-94; Lieutenant Colonel Melissa E. Patrick, Intelligence in Support 

Operations: The Story of Task Force Eagle and Operation Joint Endeavor, Carlisle Barracks, PA: USAWC, 2000.

62. "Outdated Equipment, Organizational Issues Hamper Effective PSYOPS," Inside the Pentagon, 

September 28, 2000, p. 1.

63. ADM (Ret) Leighton W. Smith, "NATO's IFOR in Action: Lessons from the Bosnian Peace 

Support Operations," National Defense University Strategic Forum No. 154, January 1999, available on the 

NDU website at http://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/forum154.html; R. Jeffrey Smith, "Ethnic Hatred Permeates 

Bosnia's Bitter Peace," The Washington Post, November 10, 2000, p. 30; Paul Watson, "Bosnian Vote Seen As 

A Setback," Los Angeles Times, November 14, 2000, p. 9.

64. Major Kenneth O. McCreedy, Planning the Peace: Operation Eclipse and the Occupation of Germany, Fort 

Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, 1995.

65. John J. Yeosock, remarks in "What We Should Have Done Differently," Part II of In the Wake of 

the Storm: Gulf War Commanders Discuss Desert Storm, Wheaton, IL: Cantigny First Division Foundation, 2000, p. 

25.

66. Ibid, p. 29; Janet A. McDonnell, After Desert Storm: The U.S. Army and the Reconstruction of Kuwait, 

Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1999.

67. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and 

Associated Terms, September 1, 2000, p. 312.

68. Richard G. Catoire, "A CINC for Sub-Saharan Africa? Rethinking the Unified Command Plan," 

Parameters, Vol. XXX, No. 4, Winter 2000-01, p. 117, n. 56.

69. Interview by author of Colonel Mike Fitzgerald, CENTCOM J-5, MacDill AFB, FL, October 11, 

2000; Colonel John Bonin, Notes on ARCENT Exercise Internal Look, November 21, 2000, copy provided 

to author by Colonel Bonin, USAWC.

70 Stephen J. Hosmer, et al., Bettering the Balance: Large Wars and Small Contingencies, RAND Arroyo 

Center, 1997, p. 2, available on the RAND website at http://www.rand.org/publications/IP/IP167/.

71. Making Peace While Staying Ready for War, Chap. II, p. 5.

44
72. USGAO, Contingency Operations: Providing Critical Capabilities Poses Challenges, GAO/NSIAD-00-164, 

July 2000, p. 5.

73. USGAO, Bosnia: Military Services Providing Needed Capabilities but a Few Challenges Emerging, 

GAO/NSIAD-98-160, April 1998, pp. 7-9. These units include Broadcast Public Affairs Detachments, 

Replacement Battalion Headquarters, Rear Tactical Operations Centers, Target Acquisition Detachments,

Movement Control Battalion Headquarters, Centralized Movement Control Teams, Air Terminal Movement 

Control Teams, Public Affairs Detachments, Engineering Fire Fighter Detachments, Military History 

Detachments, and Medical Distribution Units.

74. America's Army . . . into the 21st Century, p. 9. These numbers are often misrepresented. For 

instance, Congressional Budget Office reports cite statistics that show 68 percent of Army "support forces" 

are in the RC, but they do not break down larger units into CS, CSS, or combat arms components. 

Congressional Budget Office, Structuring the Active and Reserve Army for the 21st Century, Washington, DC: CBO, 

December 1997, Summary, pp. 4, 8. Sources that state 70 percent of the Army's CS/CSS are in the RC are 

misleading since they do not properly factor in divisional CS/CSS elements.

75. Colonel Harry G. Summers, Jr., "The Army After Vietnam," in Kenneth J. Hagan and William B. 

Roberts, eds., Against All Enemies, New York: Greenwood Press, 1986, p. 363.

76. Reserve Forces Policy Board, Reserve Component Programs, Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary 

of Defense, March 2000, p. xxvii; USGAO, Force Structure: Army Is Integrating Active and Reserve Combat Forces, 

but Challenges Remain, GAO/NSIAD-00-162, July 2000.

77. David T. Fautua, "Army Citizen-Soldiers: Active, Guard, And Reserve Leaders Remain Silent 

About Overuse Of Reserve Components," Armed Forces Journal International, September 2000, pp. 72-74.

78. Steven Lee Myers, "Military Reserves Are Falling Short in Finding Recruits," The New York Times, 

August 28, 2000, p. 1; Marsha Low, "Military Reserves Fall Short," Detroit Free Press, September 11, 2000; 

Myers, "Fallout in Texas From Bosnia Duty," The New York Times, September 15, 2000; David Foster, "More 

Missions For Part-Time Soldiers Strain Lives At Home," Boston Globe, September 23, 2000, p. 4; Deborah 

Martinez, "Reserve Ranks Dwindle As Number of Deployments Increases," Corpus Christi Caller-Times, 

September 24, 2000; "U.S. Leans Too Heavily on Guard, Reserves," Austin American-Statesman, October 11, 

2000, p. 10.

45
79. Making Peace While Staying Ready for War, Summary, p. 7. 

80. "Pentagon Crafts 'Balkan Disengagement Plan' In Event Of Major War," Inside The Pentagon, 

September 7, 2000, p. 1.

81. Major General William A. Navas, Jr., Army National Guard Fiscal Year 1999 Posture Statement, 

Arlington, VA: ANG Office of Policy and Communication, 1999, p. 7-8; Army National Guard Bureau, 

"Army National Guard Division Redesign Study Phase I Update," briefing, October 13, 1999.

82. "Stochastic Analysis."

83. Reserve Component Employment Study Group, Reserve Component Employment Study 2005 Study 

Report, Washington, DC: DoD, 1999, pp. 1, 12-13, Annex E. The Study Group recommended against these 

changes mainly because of the cost to develop new force structure and because giving the AC this capacity to 

conduct SSCs independent of the RC would take away the Army's "political check and balance" to prevent 

the Executive Branch from committing substantial troops to an SSC without a debate in Congress on 

mobilization. The latter rationale seems a questionable usurping of the President's prerogative and could have 

the result of limiting Army utility and increasing response time. The policy has also contributed to the RC 

strains mentioned in this study, and has not produced much Congressional discussion about the large 

numbers of reservists and National Guardsmen deploying to the Balkans. It can therefore be criticized for its 

effectiveness as well as its legality.

84. White Paper, "Managing Complex Contingency Operations," May 1997, available on The White 

House website, http://www.whitehouse.gov/WH/EOP/NSC/html/documents/NSCDoc2.html. 

85. The workshop was conducted from November 28-30, 2000, and included many former 

ambassadors and civilian administrators familiar with stabilization phase operations in Europe and Africa.

86. Christopher S. Wren, "Where Troops Fear To Tread, Aid Workers Are At Risk," The New York 

Times, November 19, 2000. For a thorough evaluation of the challenges of providing security for international 

relief operations, see Michael J. Dziedzic, "Protection for Humanitarian Relief Operations," National Defense 

University Strategic Forum No. 168, December 1999, available on NDU website at 

http://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/forum168.html. 

46
87. It took almost a year and a half for U.N. Civilian Police and Italian Carabinieri to relieve 

American troops of some of their law enforcement duties in Kosovo, and a local police force is still being 

formed. Bosnia has a working indigenous force, but six U.N. policemen frustrated with its corruption recently 

had to resign after "exceeding their authority" and acting on their own to liberate women forced into 

prostitution. Gregory Piatt, "KFOR Soldiers' Roles Changing In Kososvo," European Stars and Stripes, 

November 27, 2000, p. 3; Colum Lynch, "Six U.N. Officers In Bosnia Resign After Unauthorized Raid," The 

Washington Post, November 30, 2000, p. 20. A recent GAO study examining the lack of progress in reforming 

the Bosnian law enforcement and judicial systems has concluded, "Senior Bosnian officials have not 

demonstrated the will to address the problem of crime and corruption and work toward a society based on 

the rule of law." USGAO, Bosnia Peace Operations: Crime and Corruption Threaten Successful Implementation of the 

Dayton Peace Agreement, GAO/NSIAD-00-156, July 2000.

88. USGAO, Contingency Operations: Army Should Do More to Control Contract Cost in the Balkans, 

GAO/NSIAD-00-225, September 2000.

89. Dale Eisman, "Top Defense Official Defends U.S. Military's Role As Peacekeeper," Norfolk 

Virginian-Pilot, November 15, 2000.

90. Emily Kelley, "GIs Reluctant To Leave Kosovo Town," Stars and Stripes Omnimedia, November 

28, 2000.

91. Quoted in Army Field Manual 100-23, Peace Operations, Washington, DC: HQDA, December 

1994, p. 1.

92. Remarks by Admiral (Ret.) William Owens on Panel 6 of IFPA-Fletcher Conference 2000, 

"National Strategies and Capabilities for a Changing World," Arlington, VA, November 16, 2000.

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48
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Robert R. Ivany

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Earl H. Tilford, Jr.

Author

Dr. Conrad C. Crane

Director of Publications and Production

Ms. Marianne P. Cowling

Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Mrs. Christine A. Williams

Cover Artist

Mr. James E. Kistler