NORTH KOREA’S STRATEGIC INTENTIONS

Andrew Scobell

July 2005

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iii

FOREWORD

 North Korea poses a key challenge to the global community of 

states. Sometimes viewed as primarily a nuclear or proliferation 

challenge, Pyongyang actually presents the United States and other 

countries with multiple problems. As the 2005 National Defense 

Strategy of the United States notes, these challenges include “traditional, 

irregular, and catastrophic.” While each dimension of these threat 

capabilities are fairly clear and, with the exception of the third, 

readily documented, North Korea’s intentions are a much more 

controversial subject upon which specialists reach widely disparate 

conclusions. 

 In this monograph, Dr. Andrew Scobell examines the topic of 

Pyongyang’s strategic intentions. He first identifies a broad spectrum 

of expert views and distills this wisdom into three “packages” of 

possible strategic intentions. He then sets out to test which package 

appears to reflect actual North Korean policy. While he opines that 

one is more likely than the others, he concludes that it is impossible to 

say with certainty which package most closely resembles reality. As 

a result, he suggests that further probing of Pyongyang’s intentions 

is advisable.

 As General Richard B. Myers stated before the House Armed 

Services Committee in February 2005, “The United States remains 

committed to maintaining peace and stability on the Korean 

Peninsula.” To this end, it is important to ensure that decisionmakers 

receive timely information and authoritative analysis on all aspects 

of North Korea. To meet this need, the Strategic Studies Institute is 

pleased to publish this monograph. Subsequent works will examine 

related topics, including North Korea’s political system, economy, 

armed forces, and foreign relations.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director

Strategic Studies Institute 
iv

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

ANDREW SCOBELL is an Associate Research Professor at the 

Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, and Adjunct 

Professor of Political Science at Dickinson College. Born and raised 

in Hong Kong, he joined the Strategic Studies Institute in 1999 

and is the Institute’s specialist on Asia-Pacific security. Prior to his 

current position, he taught at the University of Louisville, Kentucky, 

and Rutgers University, New Jersey. Dr. Scobell is the author of 

China’s Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March

(Cambridge University Press, 2003), 10 monographs and reports, and 

some 20 articles in such journals as Armed Forces and Society, Asian 

Survey, China Quarterly, Comparative Politics, Current History, and 

Political Science Quarterly. He has also written a dozen book chapters 

and edited or co-edited four conference volumes. Dr. Scobell holds a 

Ph.D. in Political Science from Columbia University.
v

SUMMARY

 North Korea is probably the most mysterious and inaccessible 

country in the world today. Officially known as the Democratic 

People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), the Pyongyang regime is 

headed by perhaps the most mercurial and enigmatic political leader 

alive. The regime Kim leads is generally considered to be one of the 

most repressive in existence, with a vast gulag, a massive security 

apparatus, and an extensive system of controls. Despite the facade of 

a powerful party-state possessing an enormous military, the North 

Korean economy is in shambles, hundreds of thousands of people are 

living either as refugees in China or as displaced persons inside their 

own country, and millions have died from starvation and related 

diseases.

 Topping the U.S. list of concerns about North Korea is its 

nuclear program; Washington is extremely alarmed not only that 

Pyongyang is developing a nuclear capability for its own use, but also 

proliferating nuclear material and technology. But the United States 

and other countries are also concerned about other weapons of mass 

destruction (WMD) North Korea possesses, as well as its ballistic 

missile program. Moreover, North Korea’s conventional military 

forces are sizeable, with significant capabilities, and confront the 

armed forces of the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the United States 

across the Demilitarized Zone.

 This monograph analyzes North Korea’s strategic intentions 

and motivations. First, the views of leading analysts of North 

Korea regarding Pyongyang’s strategic intentions are surveyed and 

examined.All of the analysts concur on a number of conclusions: (1) 

that the North Korean regime is not irrational; (2) this rationality leaves 

North Korea’s leadership with a heightened sense of insecurity; (3) 

North Korea’s rulers―or at least some of them―appear to be acutely 

aware of the reform dilemma they face.

 This third conclusion is particularly significant. Because North 

Korea’s leaders fear that they would be undermining their positions 

if the regime adopts comprehensive reforms, they are reluctant 

to move down this slippery slope. However, without significant 

reform, North Korea’s leaders realize they are probably condemning 

their regime to the ash heap of history. Pyongyang is probably more 
vi

fearful of initiating change that it fears will spiral out of control than 

it is of doing little or nothing. 

 Three alternative packages of Korean strategic intentions are 

identified: (1) the modest aim of regime survival; (2) a driving desire 

to maintain a strong, independent, and autonomous North Korea; (3) 

an ambitious and extremely aggressive goal―unification on North 

Korea’s terms. 

 Three kinds of observable manifestations would indicate which 

of the three sets of strategic intentions North Korea is pursuing: 

propaganda, policy, and planning. An analysis of North Korean 

ideology and rhetoric does not give a clear indication of which package 

(#1, #2, or #3) would be selected. One point does seem very clear: 

an unrelenting focus on maintaining a robust conventional national 

defense capability and building a nuclear capacity. Examining 

past and present policies reveals consistent national priorities of 

focusing on maintaining military power, centrally planned economic 

development, and initiatives promoting national unification. At the 

same time, North Korea has depended for decades on substantial 

external assistance in the form of food, fuel, and technology to 

compensate for the serious inadequacies of its Stalinist economy.

 An examination of North Korean planning indicators suggests 

that the regime continues to think about and prepare for the 

future. While little evidence suggests that new thinking pervades 

Pyongyang’s approach to security or unification matters, there are 

significant indications that North Korea is contemplating further 

economic reforms. However, what is under consideration appears 

far removed from systemic transformation and complete opening.

 A careful analysis of propaganda, policy, and planning leads to 

a high degree of skepticism that North Korea is focused on mere 

survival. Pyongyang appears to have far more ambitious intentions, 

and nothing indicates desperation on the part of North Korean 

leaders. A conceivable possibility is that Pyongyang’s intentions are 

focused on arms control, a policy of economic reform and opening, 

and pursuing some form of peaceful confederation with Seoul. 

However, actual Pyongyang policies and planning do not seem to 

bear this out. Evidence from planning is unclear so the data remain 

inconclusive.

 A real possibility is that North Korea’s key strategic goals are to 

build up its WMD programs, engage in parasitic extortionism, and 
vii

pursue unification by force or coercion. According to Pyongyang’s 

propaganda, maintaining its military strength is the regime’s 

foremost priority. This is born out by examinations of implemented 

policy, planning, and ruminations about the future. 

 The limited evidence available does not suggest a policy of 

thoroughgoing reform. North Korea’s history of central planning and 

the absence of any obvious blue print for how to proceed indicate that 

systemic reform is unlikely. Pyongyang appears likely to continue to 

hope that ad hoc changes, coupled with continued foreign aid and 

income generated from arms sales, tourism, and criminal activity, 

will be adequate to meet the country’s needs. As for unification, 

although propaganda stresses using peaceful means, it also urges 

a united front between North and South Korea against the United 

States. An examination of the record of unification policy suggests 

that Pyongyang believes that South Korea’s government enjoys no 

real popular support and is merely a U.S. puppet. With the United 

States out of the picture, North Korea thinks it could relatively easily 

bring about the collapse of the South Korean regime and unification 

under the auspices of Pyongyang through limited military acts. 

 It is unlikely that North Korea’s current leaders, at least the 

highest echelon, have lost all hope and have fatalistically accepted 

that the end of the DPRK looms on the horizon. North Korea’s rulers 

are influenced by history, ideology, and notions of nationalism that 

produce what social scientists like to term a “bounded rationality.” 

The author’s conclusion is that North Korea’s senior leaders are 

determined and confident that they will not only survive but that 

they will be able to restore and revitalize their regime. 

 However, in the final analysis, insufficient data exist to say with 

absolute certainty what North Korea’s strategic intentions are. Any 

one of these three “packages” outlined is plausible. Intentions could 

conceivably also fluctuate among the three, depending on how the 

regime assesses the situation at a particular point. The United States 

needs to probe and prod the Pyongyang regime to learn for sure; to 

keep an open mind and continually monitor what North Korea says, 

does, and prepares for. The United States should look for consistencies 

and inconsistencies. The distrust and suspicion are such that some 

intermediate confidence-building measures are necessary.

1

NORTH KOREA’S STRATEGIC INTENTIONS

 North Korea is probably the most mysterious and inaccessible 

country in the world today. Officially known as the Democratic 

People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), the Pyongyang regime is headed 

by perhaps the most mercurial and enigmatic political leader alive. No 

prominent figure of the early 21st century has been more reviled by 

Americans or considered more dangerous to the United States―with 

the possible exception of Saddam Hussein and Osama Bin Laden―

than Kim Jong Il.1

 The regime Kim leads is generally considered to be 

one of the most repressive in existence, with a vast gulag, a massive 

security apparatus, and an extensive system of controls. Despite the 

facade of a powerful party-state possessing an enormous military, 

the North Korean economy is in shambles, hundreds of thousands 

of its people are living either as refugees in China or as displaced 

persons inside their own country, and as many as three and a half 

million people have died from starvation and related diseases.2

 Pyongyang is one of only two surviving members of the exclusive 

Axis of Evil club identified by President George W. Bush in January 

2002. Topping the U.S. list of concerns about North Korea is its 

nuclear program―Washington is extremely alarmed not only that 

Pyongyang is developing a nuclear capability for its own use, but 

also proliferating nuclear material and technology. But the United 

States and other countries are also concerned about other weapons 

of mass destruction (WMD) that North Korea possesses, as well as 

its ballistic missile program. Moreover, North Korea’s conventional 

military forces are sizeable with significant capabilities and confront 

the armed forces of the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the United 

States across the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ).

APPROACH

 This monograph analyzes the North Korean regime’s strategic 

intentions and motivations. I use the term “North Korean regime” to 

refer to the highest echelon of the power structure in Pyongyang―

Kim Jong Il and his senior associates.3

 Subsequent monographs will 
2

examine North Korea’s political and economic systems, its foreign 

relations, and its conventional military and WMD capabilities.

 To begin, I survey and examine the views of six leading analysts 

of North Korea regarding Pyongyang’s strategic intentions.4 I have 

selected these analysts (in one case a two-person team)―Stephen 

Bradner, Victor Cha, Bruce Cumings, Selig Harrison, Kongdan 

Oh and Ralph Hassig, and David Kang―based on their significant 

records of substantial research and major publications on North 

Korean security issues and/or distinguished professional careers 

focused on North Korean security affairs.5

 Moreover, I have identified 

the six because they represent the wide spectrum of thinking about 

Pyongyang―indeed the assumptions and findings of these analysts 

vary considerably. 

 Analysts often are labeled in ideological terms as “liberal” or 

“conservative” in their views on North Korea. This is a legitimate 

distinction because it is important to recognize the possible biases 

experts may bring to their analyses and blinders they might have. 

However, such differentiation is of limited utility because some 

significant and surprising overlaps and commonalities exist, as 

well as contrasts in analyses of Pyongyang and policy prescriptions 

for Washington that do not seem to fit neatly into either a “left” or 

“right” position. For example, most analysts contend that North 

Korea is fearful of U.S. military capabilities, and most agree that 

Pyongyang is a morally repugnant and highly repressive totalitarian 

dictatorship.6 Meanwhile they differ on the significance of ideology to 

North Korea―whether it makes Pyongyang more rigid or flexible in 

policymaking and decisionmaking. Some, such as Stephen Bradner, 

argue that North Korea’s leaders are trapped in a kind of ideological 

straightjacket that tends to preclude certain policy options. Others 

assume that a significant number of North Korea’s leaders are 

actually pragmatists, and the key barrier to major policy changes lies 

with the dogmatism of some entrenched “ideologues” in the elite.7

 I use the terms “hardline” and “softline” broadly to classify an 

analyst’s assessment of North Korean strategic intentions. But even 

within the hardline and softline “camps,” one can find a diversity 

of assessments. This diversity can prove valuable in discerning the 

main points of controversy and identifying key common themes in 
3

strategic assessments of North Korea. Furthermore, this approach 

will identify the fundamental assumptions that each analyst makes 

in his/her treatment of North Korea. 

THE SPECTRUM OF EXPERT VIEWS 

OF NORTH KOREA’S INTENTIONS

 Perhaps the most significant difference among the six analysts is 

in their assessments of the likelihood that the regime will moderate 

its policies. By moderate, I mean pursue economic reforms, reduce 

defense spending, and improve relations with perceived adversaries, 

notably the United States. Assessments range from a belief that 

Pyongyang is already in the process of moderating at one extreme 

to the belief that Pyongyang will never moderate at the other. The 

key variable is motivation―what drives the regime? Motivation, 

however, is a difficult dimension to identify and gauge.

Soft(line) Hard(line)

Selig

Harrison

Regime is

Moderating

David

Kang

Regime will

Moderate

Bruce

Cummings

Regime likely

to Moderate

Victor

Cha

Regime might

Moderate

Oh &

Hassig

Regime

unlikely to

Moderate

Stephen

Bradner

Regime

will not

Moderate

Selected Expert Assessments

of North Korea's Strategic Disposition

Figure 1.

Selig Harrison: Regime Is Moderating.

 Selig Harrison is a long time observer and writer on the subject of 

North Korea who has visited the country at least six times (1972, 1987, 

1992, 1994, 1996, and 2005). Of the six analysts under review, he is the 
4

most benign in his assessment of North Korean intentions. He argues 

that a “fundamental change in the North Korean worldview during 

the past three decades” has occurred. While Harrison admits that 

Pyongyang continues to possess a “siege mentality,” he nevertheless 

asserts the regime has undertaken a “steady liberalization of 

economic life.” He contends that Kim Jong Il is pursuing “reform by 

stealth” because the pace and scope of economic change depends on 

a struggle between an “Old Guard” faction and “reformers” in the 

North Korean leadership.8

 Harrison argues it is crucial that the United States support the 

reformers by pursuing more accomodationist policies toward North 

Korea. Since Pyongyang has a heightened threat sensitivity to 

Washington, if the United States moderates its approach, this will 

strengthen the hands of the moderates and hence provide greater 

impetus for further reform and opening. North Korea, in Harrison’s 

view, has also sought arms control agreements and has periodically 

made proposals for troop reductions.9

 Harrison asserts that it is very difficult for North Korea’s leaders 

to renounce publicly the goal of full Korean unification because this 

is a key legitimacy issue for the Pyongyang regime.10 He argues that 

North Korea’s leaders are actually seeking confederation between 

the two Koreas, and this has been a consistent theme put forward 

by Pyongyang since 1972. Harrison contends that North Korea 

is fearful of the United States, and this is the reason for building 

a large military. Pyongyang, he claims, only developed its nuclear 

program when a “severe deterioration” in the “military readiness” 

of its conventional forces occurred.11

David Kang: Regime Will Moderate. 

 David Kang, a scholar at Dartmouth College, specializes in North 

Korean security issues. He argues that Pyongyang has tenaciously 

gone about ensuring “regime survival” the most logical way a 

small, weak and vulnerable state can―by winning a reputation for 

acting in a dangerous and unpredictable manner―a strategy Kang 

dubs “deterrence through danger.”12 Kang stresses that the reason 

North Korea is so highly militarized and has pursued a nuclear 

program is because it believes it is facing a massive security threat 
5

from overwhelming U.S. might. The purpose of its sizeable military 

machine is “deterrence and defense” against the United States.13

Kang insists that the regime wants to moderate and will do so 

under the proper conditions. These conditions are predicated on the 

United States taking a less hostile and threatening approach to North 

Korea.14

 Kang argues that for 4 decades following the Korean War, North 

Korea remained in a “holding pattern” with “minor changes” 

in foreign policy and no reform.15 But in recent years the regime 

has pursued a “cautious and tentative” opening in economic and 

diplomatic spheres.16 If the perceived threat from the United States 

diminishes, then Pyongyang will more vigorously pursue economic 

reforms. Kang argues that it is “highly unlikely that North Korea 

currently retains such aggressive intentions [i.e., plans to invade 

South Korea] in any serious way.”17

Bruce Cumings: Regime Likely to Moderate. 

Bruce Cummings is the most renowned historian of modern 

Korea, and his prolific publications include a two-volume history 

on the origins of the Korean War. While he is routinely considered 

pro-Pyongyang in his views, this characterization is inaccurate. 

Although Cumings does tend to be somewhat sympathetic to North 

Korea, he is certainly no apologist for the regime. Indeed, Cumings 

is clear-eyed about the horrors of the system, openly critical of it, and 

not sanguine in his assessments of the current situation. He contends 

that Pyongyang is “neither muddling through . . . nor is it seriously 

reforming like China and Vietnam.” He laments that, during the 

past decade, the system was beset by “paralysis and immobilism.”18

North Korea, he says, is “the most astounding garrison state in the 

world” and “deeply insecure, threatened by the world around it.” 

Precisely because of this insecurity, Cumings―like David Kang―

argues that the regime “projects a fearsome image.”19 Nevertheless, 

he seems to believe that the regime would likely moderate if the 

United States eased its hawkish approach. Cumings appears to 

suggest that Pyongyang has given up on unification and desires 

“peaceful coexistence with the South.”20
6

Victor Cha: Regime Might Moderate. 

Victor Cha, a professor at Georgetown University until he joined 

the staff of the National Security Council in late 2004, is a leading 

scholar of contemporary East Asian security. In recent years, he has 

focused on North Korea and tends to be viewed as hawkish. Indeed, 

he has advocated a policy approach for the United States dubbed 

“hawk engagement.” In fact, he is less harsh than his reputation 

would lead one to believe. 

 Cha argues, while the United States must be tough on North 

Korea, that does not mean Washington should refuse to engage 

Pyongyang. He contends that North Korea feels threatened by the 

United States. Cha suggests it is possible that North Korea might 

be willing to moderate, and the United States should pursue this 

possibility but with caution and willingness to employ a stick 

when necessary. He does believe that Pyongyang has given up on 

unification on its terms, and hence it is conceivable that the regime 

might be willing to moderate its policies.

 Nevertheless, while North Korea has lowered its expectations, 

Cha believes that “Pyongyang’s endgame . . . [now boils down] 

to basic survival, avoiding collapse, and avoiding domination by 

Seoul.”21 North Korea’s leadership recognizes that it is weaker than 

South Korea and has concluded that time is not on its side. Cha 

fears that Pyongyang “could perceive some use of limited force as a 

rational and optimal choice, even when there is little or no hope of 

victory.”22 He dubs this concern “lashing out.” In short, Cha worries 

that North Korea might be getting more desperate and hence more 

prone to act violently.

Kongdan Oh/Ralph Hassig: Regime Unlikely to Moderate. 

Kongdan Oh and Ralph Hassig are long-time analysts of North 

Korea―Oh is a researcher at the Institute for Defense Analyses, and 

Hassig is a professor of psychology. They believe that the regime is 

unlikely to moderate because this will likely undermine its position. 

Most, if not all, measures adopted during the past few years which 

have been characterized as reforms actually appear to be ad hoc 

adjustments (or “modifications”) to ensure the survivability of 
7

the regime rather than part of any thoroughgoing reform effort.23

Moreover, Pyongyang almost certainly will not agree to give up 

completely its nuclear program or negotiate away other WMD or 

missile programs because “military strength” is seen as vital to 

ensuring the survival of the regime.24 The regime, Oh and Hassig 

argue, has not given up on attaining unification on its terms and, 

under certain circumstances, could possibly launch an attack across 

the DMZ.

25

Stephen Bradner: Regime Will Not Moderate. 

Stephen Bradner is a veteran analyst of North Korean security 

affairs who has served for many years as special advisor to the 

Commander of U.S. Forces in Korea. The most hawkish of the 

analysts reviewed here, he argues that the likelihood of North Korea 

moderating is virtually nil. Bradner asserts that Pyongyang is tightly 

and brutally controlled by one kinship group―what he calls the Kim 

Family Regime. This regime is single-minded in its determination to 

unify the Korea Peninsula on its own terms. 

 Despite the severe economic difficulties North Korea has faced 

over the past decade and a half, Bradner contends that the regime has 

not scaled back its goals nor curbed its ambitious plans. Pyongyang 

is focused single-mindedly on maintaining a powerful military to 

the detriment of all else (“maximizing its military power”).26 North 

Korea’s leaders will never give up their WMD or missile programs.27

“They will not reform,” although the regime “may cautiously hazard 

some limited experimentation.”28 Instead Pyongyang’s leaders will 

likely continue to pursue an “aid-based strategy” of accepting or 

extorting handouts from foreign governments and nongovernment 

organizations (NGOs), pending the achievement of their ultimate 

goal.29 North Korea’s leadership believes the road to its unification 

goal leads through military preparedness and defeating the enemy.

 According to Bradner, Pyongyang recognizes that the troops of 

the United States and ROK Combined Forces Command constitute a 

formidable and determined foe. Its strategy is to weaken its adversary 

through undermining and eventually breaking the alliance.30 The 

goal is to bring about the withdrawal from South Korea of U.S. 
8

forces. Since Pyongyang views Seoul as a puppet regime that cannot 

stand without U.S. backing, once this withdrawal has occurred, 

North Korea believes the South will be ripe for the taking. Bradner 

argues that Pyongyang “will not reconcile with the South” but rather 

is intent on overthrowing the Seoul government.31

Observations and Analysis.

 All of the analysts surveyed concur on a number of conclusions. 

While they may seem basic and even obvious, they bear stipulating. 

First, each assumes that the North Korean regime is not irrational, 

and there is an internal logic to its words and deeds. Of course, the 

experts tend to differ on what this internal logic is. While there never 

cease to be those in the media who are eager to proclaim that North 

Korea’s leaders are crazy, all serious observers of the Pyongyang 

regime tend to insist that, quite to the contrary, they can detect a 

perverse logic and clear pattern of behavior from North Korea. Cha 

and Kang assert North Korea is “neither irrational nor undeterrable.”32

Kang argues that Pyongyang deliberately depicts itself as dangerous 

to deter the enemy. Oh and Hassig also argue that North Korean 

leaders consciously have cultivated an image of irrationality to serve 

as a deterrent effect.33 This is not to say that even veteran analysts 

have not at times betrayed a sense of frustration in seeking to make 

sense of the Pyongyang regime.34

 Second, in the consensus view of assembled experts, this 

rationality leaves North Korea’s leadership with a heightened sense 

of insecurity. While leaders of communist countries tend to be prone 

to paranoia in the first place, the Pyongyang regime also believes 

that it faces a very real threat from the armed forces of the United 

States and ROK. They appear truly afraid of possible attack. This fear 

may have heightened in the spring of 2003 when U.S. and coalition 

forces toppled the regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq because North 

Korea feared that it might be the next object of an American military 

operation.35

 At a minimum, the North Korean leadership probably believes 

that in any major force-on-force conflict with the United States the 

Korean People’s Army would be defeated, leading to the collapse 
9

or overthrow of the regime. The clearest indication of this fear and 

the existence of this logic in the north is that, for more than half a 

century, Pyongyang has not launched an attack southward across the 

DMZ. In other words, the presence of U.S. Forces in Korea (USFK) 

immediately below the DMZ appears to have deterred North Korea. 

Pyongyang’s leaders know that from the very start of any attack 

on South Korea, they would be battling U.S. military forces and be 

at war with the United States.36 In short, deterrence seems to have 

worked.

 Third, North Korea’s rulers―or at least some of them―appear 

to be acutely aware of the dilemma they face. On the one hand, 

they seem to recognize that, on the surface of it, the most logical 

way to rescue their economy is to adopt thoroughgoing reforms. 

On the other, they seem to realize that pursuing such a course is 

likely to mean that they would be undermining their positions in 

the process―threatening their own power and control. Such reforms 

might be so successful that after gathering momentum, the regime 

would eventually find itself reformed out of existence. Because North 

Korea’s leaders fear this would be the outcome, they are reluctant 

to move down what they view as the slippery slope of reform.37

Of course, the alternative―to undertake little or no reform―is just 

as problematic. Without significant reform, North Korea’s leaders 

realize they are probably condemning their regime to the ash heap 

of history. In short, they are damned if they do and damned if they 

don’t. Pyongyang is probably more fearful of initiating change that 

it fears will spiral out of control than it is of doing little or nothing. 

STRATEGIC INTENTIONS

 After surveying the range of expert views about North Korean 

thinking, what can one now say about the strategic intentions of 

Pyongyang’s leaders? In the absence of access to internal documents 

and interviews with key North Korean policymakers, one cannot say 

with certainty. Yet on the basis of the assessments of North Korea 

reviewed above, it seems prudent to narrow the range of possibilities 

to three alternatives for the thrust of North Korean strategic intentions: 

modest/security, ambitious/benevolent, or ambitious/malevolent 

(see Figure 2).
10

National Strategy Intentions Goals

Ambitious

Benevolent

Peaceful/defensive

Modest

Security

Survival/defensive

Ambitious

Malevolent

Violent/offensive

Regime

Perpetuation

Secure

defenses

Economic

recovery

Peaceful 

coexistence

Arms control

Reform and

opening

Peaceful

confederation

Build up

WMD

Parasitic

extortionism

Unification

by force

Figure 2. Pyongyang’s National Strategy, Intentions, 

Goals, Circa 2004-05.

Modest/Security.

 The first possible set of Pyongyang’s strategic intentions comes 

down to a single overriding modest aim: the survival of the North 

Korea regime. The paramount goal is to ensure that North Korea 

is adequately protected. Pyongyang would be willing to negotiate 

but reluctant to agree to give up its nuclear or missile programs. 

The siege mentality would be alleviated if North Korea could be 

reassured adequately that the United States and South Korea do 

not threaten it. Then it might be possible for Pyongyang to develop 

a more conciliatory relationship with Seoul―a policy of peaceful 

coexistence. Harrison, Kang, and Cumings believe Pyongyang 

subscribes to this set of intentions.
11

Ambitious/Benevolent.

 The second package of intentions is a driving desire to maintain 

a strong, independent, and autonomous North Korea. Pyongyang 

would still need to conquer its siege mentality, but confidencebuilding measures might increase trust. This alternative would 

entail Pyongyang making peace with its long time adversaries in 

Seoul and Washington. North Korea would also desire to undertake 

thoroughgoing economic reforms and become an integral part of 

the global economic system. It would be prepared cautiously but 

purposefully to reduce―but probably not give up―its massive 

military through arms control efforts―conventional, WMD, missiles, 

and personnel―while seeking ways to guarantee North Korea’s 

security. This represents an extremely ambitious but peaceful and 

defensive strategy. Harrison and Kang would certainly concur with 

most elements of this set of intentions, and Cumings, Cha, and Oh 

and Hassig would likely be prepared to entertain this possibility. 

Ambitious/Malevolent.

 The third possible set of North Korean strategic intentions is 

ambitious but extremely aggressive. In this option, Pyongyang has 

not given up on the conquest of South Korea through violence and/

or deceit: unification on North Korea’s terms. In this scenario, North 

Korean leaders would not be seeking merely to protect themselves 

and deter a possible attack by the United States and/or ROK. 

Rather, Pyongyang would desire to possess the conventional and 

unconventional capabilities to topple Seoul by force and deception. 

For this set of intentions, nuclear weapons and other WMD are 

essential offensive or at least coercive weapons, and North Korea 

will never give them up. Pyongyang would not see an urgent need to 

repair its deplorable economy, because it views the current priority 

as maintaining a military capable of attacking the forces of the United 

States and South Korea. In other words, North Korea has a wartime 

economy and rather than be diverted from its consuming focus of 

military preparedness, Pyongyang intends to sustain itself in the 

interim by extorting aid and revenue by whatever means necessary 
12

(including criminal activities). Bradner clearly believes this set of 

goals most accurately reflects North Korean intentions.

 So, what are the intentions of the North Korean regime? Is it 

package #1, #2, or #3? Often analysts argue that Pyongyang’s priority 

is simply “regime survival.” As Bradner writes, “It has . . . become 

fashionable to describe North Korea’s objective as survival.”38 But 

this probably does not capture its intent accurately. Kim Jong Il and 

his associates do not simply want to survive, they want to perpetuate 

and sustain their system. Fighting merely to survive would be 

implicitly to accept ultimate defeat, inevitable decline, and/or the 

DPRK’s inferiority vis-à-vis the ROK. It is unlikely that North Korea’s 

current leaders, at least the highest echelon, have lost all hope and 

have fatalistically accepted that the end of the DPRK looms on the 

horizon. But one must consider the possibility that this may be so. 

Cha argues this and outlines a worrisome mindset imbued with logic 

that might lead North Korea to “lash out” militarily to assure “basic 

survival.”39

 What all of the above analysts assume (rightly in my view) is 

that North Korea’s rulers are rational. However, a tendency exists 

to succumb to the presumtion of clear-eyed and absolute rationality. 

Most analysts surveyed here have refrained from assuming perfect 

logic and recognize Pyongyang’s leaders’ reasoning is likely 

constrained or limited by the view from where they sit gazing 

out on the world. North Korea’s rulers are influenced by history, 

ideology, and notions of nationalism that produce what social 

scientists term a “bounded rationality.”40 Nevertheless, some 

analysts appear to presume North Korea’s leaders are capable of 

rationally calculating their options and in possession of a complete 

and accurate picture of the situation on the Korean peninsula. Cha 

and Kang, for example, fundamentally assume that Pyongyang’s 

rulers have weighed all the statistics and, after comparing North and 

South Korea by the numbers, have determined that Seoul’s system 

is superior. According to Cha and Kang, the only conclusion that 

Pyongyang can logically draw is that there is no conceivable way 

the regime can possibly emerge victorious under current conditions, 

and urgent action is needed. Cha argues that the regime is desperate 

and preoccupied with avoiding collapse and absorption by South 
13

Korea.41 Kang argues that “the flurry of North Korean diplomatic 

and economic activities in the past few years show that the North 

Korean leadership is actively pursuing a strategy they hope will ease 

their domestic problems.” While Kang argues that there is “little 

evidence that North Korea is backed into a corner” and the regime 

has “not given up hope,” Pyongyang, nevertheless, does appear to 

believe that urgent measures are necessary according to Kang.42

 But what if North Korea’s rulers do not have all the facts? And 

what, even if they have “all the facts” or at least most of them, 

they remain convinced of the superiority of their own system and 

confident in their ultimate victory? My own conclusion is that North 

Korea’s senior leaders are determined and confident that they will 

not only survive, but that they will be able to restore and revitalize 

their regime. While most agree that they possess a siege mentality, 

they are not defeatists and retain a high degree of self-confidence, 

if not outright arrogance. Kim and other leaders are not crazy or 

irrational but they are almost certainly extremely ambitious. Kang 

argues “the North Korean leadership―far from having lost all hope 

and going into a bunker mentality―has been actively pursuing a 

number of options through which it can survive into the future.”43

Madeleine Albright remarked that when she met with Kim Jong Il in 

Pyongyang in November 2000, he “seemed confident”; he certainly 

“didn’t seem a desperate or even worried man.”44 If this reasoning is 

correct, it rules out option #1. But beyond the likely strong desire to 

persevere and reenergize the DPRK, what can one say about North 

Korean intentions with a high degree of confidence? To address this 

question one needs to look closely at observable manifestations.

PROPAGANDA, POLICY, AND PLANNING

 What are the observable manifestations that would indicate which 

of the three sets of strategic intentions North Korea is pursuing?There 

are three kinds of manifestations: (1) propaganda, (2) policy, and (3) 

planning. Each will be examined with regard to four areas: general 

intentions, security intentions, economic intentions, and intentions 

regarding unification.
14

Propaganda.

 Propaganda is all pervasive―evident in virtually all official 

documents and public pronouncements. There are two aspects of 

propaganda: ideology and rhetoric. Ideology, or “basic principles,” 

many analysts argue, is critical to understanding the North Korea 

regime.45 First, we will examine what experts say about Pyongyang’s 

ideology, and then we will look at the regime’s own rhetoric.

Ideology. Officially, ideology remains central for Pyongyang, and 

hence some dogmatic justification or rationale must be forthcoming 

on virtually any issue. The key element of the ideology is the Cult of 

Kim Il Sung as manifest in the concept of Juche (also written Chuch’e). 

According to North Korean propaganda, citizens of the country owe 

everything to the “Great Leader.” His brilliance and superhuman 

efforts have made the DPRK what it is today. And Kim Il Sung is 

credited with having “invented” Juche in the 1930s.46 The ideology 

is portrayed as being uniquely Korean. In fact, the “idea of chuch’e

is . . . firmly rooted in the experience of the North Korean people 

and Kim Il Sung.”47 The concept highlights the role of a supreme 

leader―suryong―and stresses the importance of unity and loyalty.48

 Although Juche is normally translated as “self-reliance,” it is 

perhaps more accurate to translate it as “Korea first.” Putting Korea 

first is the opposite of accepting a subservient role for the country. 

In this sense, Juche can been seen as the opposite of tributary status. 

According to propaganda, North Korea today stands on its own 

proudly and bows to no one. It is no longer the supplicant to China 

it was in dynastic times. In a dramatic reversal, today dignitaries 

from other countries come to North Korea bearing gifts. 

 For Juche to be perpetuated, it must be continually validated in 

the eyes of North Korean people, which occurs in at least three ways. 

First, foreigners travel to Pyongyang. Most important are foreign 

leaders and dignitaries who come and pay their respects to Kim Il 

Sung by visiting his mausoleum. They also meet with other leaders, 

including Kim Jong Il. These visits are prominently shown on North 

Korean television and reported in the print media which depicts 

them as pilgrimages. Second, North Korea receives aid from abroad 

which is portrayed as tribute or gifts from around the world.49 Both 
15

the flow of people and gifts are used by the regime to demonstrate 

that North Korea is a powerful and respected country. Of course 

there is a paradox: on the one hand, veneration and tribute from 

foreigners is seen as positive, but at the same time, Juche represents 

a “xenophobic nationalism” that teaches North Koreans to be wary 

and suspicious of foreigners.50

 Third, for Juche to be validated, the regime must be seen to keep 

the country strong and continue to make at least token efforts toward 

unification. This requires staunch political “independence” (or chaju), 

“self-defense” (or chawi), and economic “self-sustenance” (or charip).51

Kim Jong Il’s primary theme has become kangsongtaeguk.52 This 

slogan translates as “strong development, powerful country.” How 

does the regime ensure a strong and powerful country? Unifying the 

peninsula would seem to be the strongest guarantee. How can the 

regime justify the continued sacrifices it asks of its citizens? These 

are rationalized as only temporary. The implicit logic is North Korea 

must maintain a strong military while enduring temporary economic 

hardships, pending unification of the Koreas. The stress on achieving 

“a unified, self-reliant, independent state free of foreign interference” 

is traceable back to pre-Korean War speeches given by Kim Il Sung.53

Pyongyang believes that realization of unification will ensure a 

powerful independent country with a revitalized economy.

Rhetoric. Although the words in public pronouncements, official 

documents, and news releases are invariably propaganda, they can 

reflect actual thinking, reveal key trends, and indicate significant 

changes. While bluster, threat, and hyperbole are staples of North 

Korean documents and pronouncements, if examined methodically, 

they can provide insights or at least hints of regime intentions. 

These include the various versions of the DPRK’s constitution, party 

documents, major editorials in the most prominent publications, and 

the text of public statements by senior officials. For the purposes of 

this analysis, I will limit my examination to four key items: the 1998 

state constitution, the 2000 Inter-Korean summit news release, the 

five most recent New Year’s editorials (2001-05) jointly published in 

the three leading newspapers (Nodong Sinmun, Josoninmingun, and 

Chongnyonjonwi), the statements made following each of the three 

rounds of Six Party Talks held in Beijing in 2003 and 2004 (April 

23-25, 2003; August 27-29, 2003; and February 25-28, 2004), and the 
16

Foreign Ministry statement of February 10, 2005. I consider four 

areas: the general situation, security, the economy, and unification. 

General Situation. The current state constitution, amended in 1998, 

appears more Kim Il Sung-centric and nativist than earlier versions. 

First, this constitution contains a brand new preamble which is 

essentially a “eulogy” to the late North Korean leader.54 Second, the 

post of state president was abolished, and deceased leader Kim Il 

Sung is designated “eternal president.” There are no mentions of 

Marxism-Leninism, and only vague references to “socialism”―all 

overshadowed by constant harping on Juche. This is the guiding 

theoretical principle for North Korea and is attributed to the genius 

of Kim Il Sung.

 According to Article 11 of the Constitution, “all activities” of the 

state should be conducted “under the leadership” of the Korean 

Workers’ Party (KWP). Despite this assertion, repeated emphasis 

on the centrality of the armed forces, in such places as the highly 

authoritative annual New Year’s joint editorials, call into question 

the leadership role of the KWP. The January 1, 2005, editorial, for 

example, urges the people to give “priority to military affairs” and 

“unite as one . . . [to] demonstrate the might of Songun [military 

first]!”55 The editorial also insists: “The People’s Army is the mainstay 

and main force of the Songun revolution.” While this contrasts with 

an emphasis on a leading role for the “Party’s leadership” in the 

January 2004 editorial, the 2005 editorial was consistent with the 

exhortations of the previous 2 years’ editorials (2002 and 2003) to 

advance under the “Army-Based” banner. 

Security. The defense portion of the 1998 amended constitution 

remains unchanged over the previous version. National defense 

continues to be the “supreme duty and honor of citizens. Citizens 

shall defend the country and serve in the army as required by law 

(article 86).” The January 2005 New Year’s editorial exhorts the 

people to “actively learn from the People’s Army’s fighting spirit, 

work style and traits.” 

 Both the January 1, 2005, editorial and February 10, 2005, Foreign 

Ministry statement insist that the United States should end its 

“hostile policy” towards North Korea.56 The 2004 editorial also noted 

the “extremely hostile policy” of the United States. The editorial calls 

upon “All Koreans . . . [to] stage a powerful struggle . . . to drive the 
17

U.S. troops out of south Korea [and thereby] remove the very source 

of a nuclear war.” The January 2004 editorial pledged Pyongyang’s 

commitment “to seek a negotiated peaceful solution to the nuclear 

issue between the DPRK and the U.S.” This statement underscored 

the statement of a DPRK Foreign Ministry spokesman 4 months 

earlier on August 30, 2003, following the conclusion of the second 

round of the Six Party Talks. He said: “The DPRK made clear its 

consistent stand on the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.” 

The DPRK spokesman ridiculed the U.S. insistence on “complete, 

verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement” of Pyongyang’s nuclear 

program. If Washington would only take positive steps to improve 

relations after North Korea had disarmed:

This means that the U.S. is asking the DPRK to drop its gun first, saying 

it would not open fire, when both side[s] are leveling guns at each other. 

How can the DPRK trust the U.S. and drop its gun? Even a child would 

not be taken in by such a trick. What we want is for both side[s] to drop 

guns at the same time and co-exist peacefully. 

The spokesman then went on to state that as a result of the U.S. position, 

Pyongyang had concluded: ”that there is no other option for us but 

to further increase the nuclear deterrent force as a self-defensive 

measure to protect our sovereignty.” The same February 10, 2005, 

Foreign Ministry statement announcing an “indefinite” suspension 

of North Korea’s participation in the Six Party Talks also declared 

that Pyongyang possessed “manufactured nuclear weapons.” The 

statement concluded by insisting that North Korea, nevertheless, 

remained committed to “the ultimate goal of denuclearizing the 

Korean Peninsula.”

 The 2003 and 2002 New Year’s editorials were somewhat more 

strident, emphasizing North Korea’s “military-based policy” and 

echoing the language of the 2001 New Year’s editorial. The January 

2001 joint editorial was very clear: “The policy of giving priority to 

the army is the permanent strategic objective in the present-time.” 

The 2004 editorial notes that the SPA “strengthened” the political 

system by enhancing the “exceptionally high . . . authority” of the 

National Defense Commission “to meet the requirements of the

Songun era.” 
18

Economy. According to article 34 in the DPRK Constitution, the 

“national economy of the DPRK is a planned economy.” In terms 

of planning, the top priority continues to be national defense, and 

therefore it is no surprise that the 2005 editorial insists that “The 

defense industry is the foundation of the nation’s military and 

economic potentials.” The editorial states emphatically: “It is 

imperative to supply everything necessary for the defense industry 

on a preferential basis, pursuant to the Party’s line of economic 

construction in the Songun era.”

 Despite the emphasis on national defense, the civilian sector does 

get attention in the constitution as well as in each New Year’s editorial 

over the past 5 years. Article 37 of the amended constitution of 1998 

includes the following new sentence: “The state shall encourage 

institutions, enterprises, or associations of the DPRK to establish 

and operate equity and contractual joint venture enterprises with 

corporations or individuals of foreign countries within a special 

economic zone.” Furthermore a new phrase is inserted in article 33: 

“The state shall introduce a cost accounting system in the economic 

management . . . and utilize such economic levers as prime costs, 

prices, and profits.” The 2003, 2004 and 2005 New Year’s editorials 

all stress the necessity of improving “economic management.” The 

2003 editorial states: “We should manage and operate the economy 

in such a way as to ensure the largest profitability while firmly 

adhering to . . . socialist principles.”

 Regularly singled out in January 1 editorials as “the most 

important front[s] in socialist economic reconstruction” (2001 

editorial) or as “a main link on efforts to revitalize the national 

economy” (2003 editorial) are: “power, coal mining, metal industries, 

and railway transportation.” In January 2005, however, agriculture 

was declared “the main front of socialist economic construction.” 

Increased attention to consumer goods is also stressed (2004 and 

2005 editorials). Efforts are also urged to increase energy output and 

push forward with modern “science and technology” (2002, 2003, 

2004, and 2005 editorials).

Unification. Unification figures prominently in all of the items 

under review. The preface to the current DPRK constitution states: 

“Kim Il Sung set reunification of the country as the nation’s supreme 

task. . . .” And reunification is mentioned five times in the preface. 
19

But the most prominent item is the “North-South Joint Declaration” 

issued by ROK President Kim Dae Jung and Kim Jong Il on June 15, 

2000, at the conclusion of their summit in Pyongyang. The document 

highlights the common aspiration of both Pyongyang and Seoul as 

“peaceful unification.” The declaration notes that proposals put 

forward by both sides for reunification “have elements in common.” 

The final sentence of the joint declaration states that President Kim 

invited his North Korean counterpart to visit Seoul, and Kim Jong Il 

“agreed to visit . . . at an appropriate time in the future.” 

 All five of the most recent joint New Year’s Day editorials 

stress the continued significance of the “June 15 North-South Joint 

Declaration.” The January 2005 editorial states: “This year is a 

significant year which marks the 5th anniversaries of the historic 

Pyongyang meeting [between Kim Dae Jung and Kim Jong Il].” The 

editorial gives the slogan for the year: “Let’s advance holding high 

the flag of cooperation for national independence, cooperation for 

peace . . . and cooperation for reunification and patriotism!” It further 

opines: “It is unbearable shame on the nation that the sovereignty 

has been infringed upon for more than 100 years in . . . half of the 

country due to the 60-year-long presence of . . . U.S. troops in the 

wake of the Japanese imperialists’ colonial rule that lasted for over 

100 years.”

 The main barrier to unification is routinely identified as the 

United States. According to the 2003 editorial: “It can be said that 

there exists on the Korean Peninsula at present only confrontation 

between the Koreans in the north and south and the United States.” 

The editorial urges Washington to “. . . stop its provocative military 

pressure and withdraw their aggression forces from South Korea 

without delay.” According to the 2005 editorial: “All Koreans should 

stage a powerful struggle for peace against war in order to drive the 

U.S. troops out of South Korea, remove the very source of nuclear 

war, and defend the peace and security on the Korean Peninsula.”

 An analysis of North Korean ideology and rhetoric doesn’t give 

a clear indication of which package (#1, #2, or #3) would be selected. 

One point does seem very clear: an unrelenting focus on maintaining 

a robust conventional national defense capability and building a 

nuclear capacity. 
20

Policy.

 Examining past and present policies reveals consistent national 

priorities of focusing on maintaining military power, centrally 

planned economic development, and initiatives promoting national 

unification. At the same time North Korea has depended for decades 

on substantial external assistance in the form of food, fuel, and 

technology to compensate for the serious inadequacies of its Stalinist 

economy.

General Situation. The history of Pyongyang’s policies reflects 

the guerrilla origins of the regime. This experience has produced a 

record of policies that are extremely ambitious, do not deviate even 

in the face of great adversity, and approach domestic affairs and 

statecraft as perpetual warfare to be overcome through militarystyle campaigns.57 This guerrilla experience also underscores the 

militant nature of the regime―the “military first” policy. Conceiving 

of policy implementation as constant struggle and preoccupied 

with threats―old, potential, and newly emerging (both internal 

and external)―leads Pyongyang to adopt a siege mentality. In its 

diplomatic relations, North Korea has tended to be rather hostile or 

belligerent. This has changed since the collapse of the Soviet bloc, 

and is especially evident in the past 5 years or so, as Pyongyang 

made efforts to be far more conciliatory and reached out to Seoul, 

Washington, Tokyo, and other capitals. 

Security. As noted above, defense has long been Pyongyang’s 

highest national priority. The priority has only seemed to increase 

over time. Particularly since the 1960s, when North Korea’s relations 

with both the Soviets and Chinese soured, Pyongyang undertook a 

massive defense build up, increasing its defense production output 

and substantially expanding the number of uniformed personnel. 

 North Korea has also long been obsessed with nuclear, biological, 

and chemical weapons. These subjects will be dealt with in greater 

detail in a subsequent monograph. For the purposes of this analysis, 

it is important to note that research and development in these areas 

have been ongoing for a considerable period. This should be neither 

surprising nor shocking, since Pyongyang believes it has been the 

victim of both actual use of WMD during the Korean War and 
21

constant subjection to nuclear blackmail for decades.58 North Korea 

has had a nuclear program since the 1950s, although reportedly 

efforts at weaponization did not get underway until the late 1970s.59

North Korea has also had a vigorous cruise and ballistic missile 

program for decades, producing both for deployment at home and 

sale abroad. Evidence strongly suggests that Pyongyang also has 

exported nuclear technology and material, with the primary impetus 

being entrepreneurial. Most recently, in February 2005 there were 

claims that North Korea provided processed uranium to Libya.60

Economy. North Korea has a long history of heavy-handed 

central control of the economy. Since 1954 Pyongyang has pursued 

economic development through multiyear state plans―of 3, 5, 6, 

and 7-year durations.61 This policy proclivity has eased only slightly 

in recent years and is unlikely to undergo dramatic reform any 

time soon. While the constitution was amended in 1998 to allow 

for consideration of “profit” and the establishment of “special 

economic zones,” remarkably little actual policy follow through has 

occurred. One example is that, while a law on foreign investment 

was passed in 1984, for over a decade there was very little actual 

foreign investment or even serious attempts to attract foreign 

investment. Still, in recent years Pyongyang has stepped up efforts 

to attract foreign investment and capital in special zones but with 

modest and disappointing results. The first attempt was the RajinSonbong Zone in the northeast of the country in the Tumen River 

border region.62 The second effort was the establishment of a foreign 

investment zone at Kaesong on the western edge of the DMZ, and 

the third effort was the Mount Kumgang Tourist venture located east 

of Pyongyang near the eastern end of the DMZ. Neither investment 

zone has attracted the volume of investment hoped for, but at least 

the latter has had limited success, while the former appears to be 

languishing.63 However, the Mount Kumgang tourist project has 

been the most lucrative of all. Under the terms of the agreement, 

Hyundai guaranteed North Korea US$940 million in exchange for 

permitting South Korean tourists to visit the scenic mountain. Since 

1998 hundreds of thousands of tourists have visited the locale.64

Domestic economic reforms have been jerky and uncoordinated, 

with limited and sometimes contradictory results. In recent years the 

authorities have permitted farmers’ markets to operate, and in July 
22

2002 released price controls on food. These policies have appeared 

to make food more available, but freeing prices has caused serious 

inflation. While salaries were increased also, they do not seem to have 

kept pace with the food costs. Serious reform of the way agriculture 

is organized and planned does not appear to have occurred. As a 

result, there has been no dramatic improvement in the food situation 

in the country. Most recently, in January 2005, Pyongyang announced 

that the cereal allocation per person had been reduced by 50 grams 

to 250 grams―half of the minimum daily amount recommended by 

the World Food Program.65

 In fact, rather than pursuing structural reforms in agriculture (or 

industry for that matter), North Korea’s policy preference seems to be 

to continue to rely on foreign aid to alleviate food shortages and keep 

famine at bay. Foreign governments, including the United States, 

China, and South Korea, provide such humanitarian assistance. In 

early 2005, for example, Pyongyang asked Seoul for half a million 

tons of chemical fertilizer―the largest amount it had ever requested.66

This is a continuation of an ongoing policy to survive economically, 

whereby Pyongyang has received aid from governments and 

nongovernment organizations. This aid-seeking policy spills over 

into North Korea’s foreign relations, where Pyongyang exacts 

payments for coming to the diplomatic table. North Korea agreed 

to host the 2000 Inter-Korea summit after receiving at least US$500 

million for its troubles.67 Similarly, Pyongyang appears to have been 

promised significant amounts of Chinese assistance as incentive for 

sending a delegation to the Six Party Talks in Beijing.68

 Other entrepreneurial efforts aimed at earning foreign currency 

include what are widely considered to be activities more befitting 

organized crime than a government: smuggling, narco-trafficking, 

counterfeiting, and gambling.69

Unification. Policy strands of both peaceful consensual confederation AND coercive unification are evident. Formal efforts by 

Pyongyang to pursue confederation go back at least to the joint 

declaration signed by representatives of the North and South in 1972. 

North Korea repeatedly has stated this policy and regularly refers to 

this agreement. Can this policy initiative be taken at face value? The 

answer apparently is no. We have learned this from the transcript 

of a discussion held in July 1972 between DPRK Ambassador to 
23

the German Democratic Republic (GDR) Lee Chang Su and GDR 

officials. According to documents discovered in the archives of the 

now defunct East German regime, Lee told East German leaders that 

the declaration was actually a tactical ploy.70

 This ruse is consistent with other information we know about 

North Korean diplomatic initiatives. Admiral C. Turner Joy, chief 

negotiator for the United Nations (UN) Command at the truce 

talks at Panmunjom, noted the efforts of Pyongyang officials to use 

every ruse possible to promote their overarching goals. Negotiating, 

in short, is not seen as a substitute for military options, but rather 

another arena of battle.71

 Advocating confederation did not preclude North Korea from 

pursuing nearly simultaneous violent and subversive efforts against 

South Korea. These initiatives include assassination attempts 

against the ROK’s most senior leaders in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s; 

elaborate tunnels dug under the DMZ; and acts of terrorism. North 

Korean special forces infiltrated Seoul and came close to penetrating 

the Blue House (the residence of South Korea’s president) perimeter 

in January 1968 before they were detected and defeated. In August 

1974 another attempt to assassinate President Park Chung Hee 

failed, but the would-be assassin did kill South Korea’s first lady. In 

October 1983, a bombing in Rangoon, Burma, killed 17 South Korean 

government officials, including 4 cabinet ministers. But perhaps the 

most horrifying act of terrorism carried out by North Korea was the 

bombing of Korean Air Lines Flight 858 in November 1987 that killed 

all 115 passengers and crew on board. The infiltration of special 

operations forces into South Korea continued into the 1990s, as the 

discovery of North Korean submarines and commandos attest.

 As noted earlier, Pyongyang’s more recent high profile claim 

to be pursuing a policy of peaceful unification was made at the 

2000 Inter-Korean summit. The summit and related North Korean 

diplomatic charm offensive reflect that Pyongyang has become 

savvier and more adept at utilizing diplomacy over the decades. 

Since the early 1990s, North Korea has engaged in unprecedented 

waves of diplomatic activity: establishing diplomatic relations with 

a cluster of states, joining the UN, and participating in a variety of 

multilateral fora, including the Six Party Talks with South Korea, 

China, Russia, Japan, and the United States in Beijing. However, in 
24

February 2005, Pyongyang announced that it was suspending its 

participation in the Beijing talks indefinitely.

 An analysis of North Korean policies reveals efforts at piecemeal 

economic reform, continued preoccupation with military matters, 

and greater initiatives to engage with Seoul and other capitals. 

Planning.

 What evidence is there of preparation and coordination by 

the regime for the future? The data to be examined include what 

senior leaders say both in formal statements and in discussions with 

foreign officials and reporters. Revisions or additions made in major 

documents, such as the constitution, and new laws passed can also 

be important indicators. Moreover, foreign study tours and training 

programs conducted overseas for regime officials provide useful 

evidence of planning.

General Situation. In terms of aspirational policies, what is 

the regime thinking? If one is to go by the words of Kim Jong Il, 

Pyongyang is not interested in wholesale opening to the outside 

world and thoroughgoing reforms. According to Secretary of State 

Madeleine Albright, who visited North Korea in November 2000, 

Kim is rather cautious on this front. When Albright asked him about 

economic opening, he responded: “What do you mean by ‘opening’? 

We will have to define the term first, because opening means different 

things to different countries. We do not accept the Western version 

of opening. Opening should not harm our traditions.”72

 Which countries does the regime look to as models? In terms of the 

number of foreign study tours and volume of personnel dispatched 

in recent years, China is by far above the rest. Yet, if one is to go 

by the words of Kim, Pyongyang is not interested in imitating the 

Chinese model of combining free markets and socialism. According 

to Albright, Kim is far more enthusiatic about Swedish socialism 

and Thailand’s experience. “Thailand,” Kim noted approvingly, 

“maintains a strong traditional royal system and has preserved its 

independence through a long turbulent history and yet has a market 

economy.”73

Security. No tangible evidence beyond rhetoric suggests North 

Korea’s willingness to give up its nuclear capability. Nor is there 
25

any evident willingness to downsize the massive military. The KPA 

continues to maintain cordial, if rather superficial and symbolic, 

relations with the militaries of China, Russia, Vietnam, and Cuba.

North Korean officers continue to take specially tailored short 

courses at Chinese institutions of professional military education but 

are isolated from Chinese and other foreign students.74

Economics. Economics is the one major area under review 

where considerable evidence suggests that North Korea is actively 

contemplating experimentation and innovation. Nevertheless, there 

is no evidence of plans for radical reform of the central planning 

system. The highest levels seem reluctant to make such a dramatic 

break. The regime fears it will lose control. This concern is probably 

strongest among the economic planning bureaucracy which fears 

that major steps in this direction would threaten its own power and 

influence.

 Ongoing foreign study tours and training programs for officials 

provide perhaps the best indicators that the regime is seriously 

contemplating significant changes in economic policy. According 

to Kang, in 2001 alone “more than 480 [officials] visited China, 

Australia, Italy, and Sweden.”75 Field trips of note since then have 

included China, Vietnam, and Russia, and training programs on 

economic related subjects for DPRK personnel at universities in 

China, Australia, and the United States.76

 Other evidence consists of efforts to open new special economic 

zones. In 2002 North Korea sought to establish a new zone at Sinuiju 

on the northwest border with China. In an unprecedented move, 

Pyongyang appointed a Dutch-Chinese entrepreneur, Yang Bin, to 

direct the zone. Little indicates that the initiative was well-conceived 

or planned. Soon after, Yang was arrested in China, charged with 

various crimes, and sentenced to 18 years in prison.77 The zone has 

since failed to make significant progress. 

 Further evidence suggests that North Korea’s leaders are very 

keen on pursuing high tech projects, especially in the field of 

information technology (IT). Pyongyang apparently has a small but 

vigorous IT sector. In the late 1990s, it reportedly developed an award 

winning computer game, and in 2002 embarked on its first Internet 

joint venture with a South Korean firm.78 These are very small steps, 
26

and nothing indicates that Pyongyang is preparing to overcome the 

major impediments to pursuing IT.

Unification. On unification, there is no sense of urgency, let alone 

any indication of planning―e.g., detailed proposals―by Pyongyang 

to move on the nuts and bolts of unification or confederation. At 

the very least, one might expect some discussion of or proposals for 

Kim Jong Il to visit Seoul in the near future to make good on the 

joint statement that he and Kim Dae Jung issued in June 2000. Thus 

far, there has been none. While some hyping of road and rail links 

across the DMZ has occurred, none have been completed, much less 

becoming operational.79

 An examination of the key indicators of North Korean planning 

suggests that the regime continues to think about and prepare for 

the future. While there is little evidence that new thinking pervades 

Pyongyang’s approach to security or unification matters, significant 

indications suggest that North Korea is contemplating further 

economic reforms. However, what is under consideration appears 

far removed from systemic transformation and opening.

CONCLUSIONS

 Which package of intentions is Pyongyang pursuing? It remains 

difficult to say with certainty. Nevertheless, the above analyses 

provide considerable insight and strong hints.

Modest Security: Wishful Thinking?

 A careful analysis of propaganda, policy, and planning leads to 

a high degree of skepticism about the possibility that North Korea 

is focused on mere survival: simply maintaining a self-defense 

capability, engineering a modest economic recovery, and coexisting 

peacefully with South Korea. Pyongyang appears to have far more 

ambitious intentions, and nothing indicates absolute desperation on 

the part of North Korean leaders. As David Kang notes: the leaders 

of “countries [that are] falling to pieces do not engage in long-term 

planning.”80 The indications are that Pyongyang envisions a bright 

future―significant economic changes are under consideration, and 

foreign models are being examined. 
27

Ambitious Benevolence: Cautious Optimism?

 A careful analysis of propaganda makes it a conceivable possibility 

that Pyongyang’s intentions are focused in the direction of arms 

control, a policy of economic reform and opening, and pursuing some 

form of peaceful confederation with Seoul. Pyongyang propaganda 

insists that North Korea seeks a peaceful negotiated settlement of 

the nuclear issue and is committed to the denuclearization of the 

peninsula.81 However, actual Pyongyang policies and planning 

do not seem to bear this out. When one remembers that the most 

consistent strand of North Korea’s propaganda continues to be the 

essential need for military strength and the “military first” policy, 

then a healthy dose of skepticism emerges. Moreover, evidence from 

planning is unclear, so overall the data remain inconclusive.

Ambitious Malevolence: Reluctant Pessimism.

 There is a real possibility that North Korea’s key strategic goals are 

to build up its WMD programs, engage in parasitic extortionism, and 

pursue unification by force or coercion. According to Pyongyang’s 

propaganda, maintaining its military strength is the regime’s foremost 

priority. This is born out by examinations of implemented policy, 

planning, and ruminations about the future. As for the economy, 

while propaganda has made vague claims about redoubling efforts 

to improve economic performance, very limited evidence suggests 

policies of thoroughgoing reform. North Korea’s history of central 

planning and the absence of any obvious blue print for how to proceed 

suggest that systemic reform is unlikely. Pyongyang appears likely 

to continue to hope that ad hoc changes, coupled with continued 

foreign aid and income generated from arms sales, tourism, and 

criminal activity, will be adequate to meet the country’s needs. As 

for unification, propaganda, although it stresses using peaceful 

means to unification, also urges a united front between North and 

South Korea against the United States. Statements continue to call 

for the withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Korea. An examination 

of the record of unification policy suggests that Pyongyang believes 

that South Korea’s government enjoys no real popular support and 
28

is merely a U.S. puppet. With the United States out of the picture, 

North Korea thinks it could relatively easily bring about the collapse 

of the South Korean regime and unification under the auspices of 

Pyongyang through limited military acts. North Korea has yet to put 

forward a clear blue print for peaceful unification and then follow 

through on it.

 In the final analysis, there are insufficient data to say with 

absolute certainty what North Korea’s strategic intentions are. Any 

one of these three “packages” outlined is plausible, or intentions 

could conceivably fluctuate among the three, depending on how 

the regime assesses the situation at any particular point. We need 

to probe and prod the Pyongyang regime to learn for sure. We need 

to keep an open mind and continually monitor what North Korea 

says, does, and prepares for. We should look for consistencies and 

inconsistencies. While not entirely discounting propaganda, we 

should pay closest attention to what the regime is actually doing 

and planning for, and give less credence to what it says. We do not 

want to reward and reinforce bad behavior, but at the same time 

it is important to provide incentives for good behavior. Complete, 

verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement (CVID) of North Korea’s 

nuclear program is a laudable goal. However, the level of mutual 

distrust and suspicion is such that some intermediate confidencebuilding measures are necessary to develop trust on both sides. 

ENDNOTES

1. President George W. Bush is quoted as saying, “I loathe Kim Jong Il!” See Bob 

Woodward, Bush at War, New York: Simon and Schuster, 2002, p. 340.

 2. See the discussion in Marcus Noland, Famine in North Korea: Causes and Cures, 

Working Paper 99-2, Washington, DC: International Institute for Economics, 1999. 

For two studies, see Andrew Natsios, The Great North Korean Famine: Famine, Politics, 

and Foreign Policy, Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2001; Meridith 

Woo-Cumings, The Political Ecology of Famine: The North Korean Catastrophe and Its 

Lessons, Tokyo: Asian Development Bank, 2001.

 3. There are considerable differences of opinion about the nature of the power 

structure and policy process in North Korea. Most analysts view the regime as 

totalitarian, but some scholars, including Selig Harrison, appear ambivalent about 

that, referring to the system variously as “totalitarian” and “corporatist.” Selig 

Harrison, Korean Endgame, Princeton University Press, 2001. A detailed analysis of 

the North Korean political system will be the focus of a second monograph to be 

published by SSI later this year.
29

 4. This manuscript has benefited from careful readings by some very 

knowledgeable people, including Guy Arrigoni, Don Boose, Ralph Hassig, Jiyul 

Kim, Katy Oh, and Dwight Raymond. It should be noted these individuals do not 

necessarily agree with all of the analysis or findings presented herein. Moreover, any 

errors or leaps are logic are solely the responsibility of the author.

 5. However, the list of experts should not be considered exhaustive and does 

not include everyone researching and writing on North Korea. Moreover the sample 

does not include specialists primarily focused on the North Korean economy (e.g., 

Nicholas Eberstadt), military (e.g., Joseph Bermudez), foreign relations (Samuel 

Kim), or history (Charles Armstrong).

 6. All the analysts listed in the text appear hold both the former and the latter 

views. The distaste for the repressive Pyongyang regime is also evident in the 

writings from analysts often considered sympathetic to the North Korea system. 

Bruce Cumings, for example, calls the regime an “abhorrent family dictatorship” 

and places blame for the “truly inexcusable . . . suffering of the North Korea people” 

squarely on its shoulders. See Bruce Cumings, North Korea: Another Country, New 

York: The New Press, 2004, pp. 207, 189. David Kang says “the regime’s actions are 

abhorrent and morally indefensible.” See Victor Cha and David Kang, Nuclear North 

Korea: A Debate About Engagement Strategies, New York: Columbia University, 2003, 

p. 46. 

 7. Harrison, Korean Endgame, p. 25.

 8. These quotes come from Ibid., pp. xxi, 6, and 26, respectively. 

 9. Ibid., pp. 139-140.

 10. Ibid., pp 75-78.

 11. Ibid., p. xxi.

 12. David Kang, “North Korea: Deterrence Through Danger,” in Muthiah 

Alagappa, ed., Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideational Influences, Stanford, CA: 

Stanford University Press, 1998, p. 263. 

 13. Kang in Victor Cha and David Kang, Nuclear North Korea, p. 43. 

 14. Ibid., p. 119.

 15. Kang, “North Korea,” p. 240.

 16. Kang in Cha and Kang, Nuclear North Korea, p. 114.

 17. Kang, “North Korea,” p. 236.

 18. Cumings, North Korea, p. 184.

 19. Ibid., pp. 1, 151.

 20. Cumings quotes with apparent approval the conclusions of Anthony 

Namkung. Ibid., p. 61.

 21. Cha in Cha and Kang, Nuclear North Korea, p. 21.

 22. Ibid., p. 18.
30

 23. Kongdan Oh and Ralph C. Hassig, North Korea Through the Looking Glass, 

Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 2000, p. 63.

 24. Ibid., p. 192.

 25. Ibid., pp. 110-111.

 26. Stephen Bradner, “North Korea’s Strategy,” in Henry D. Sokoloski, ed., 

Planning for a Peaceful Korea, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic 

Studies Institute, 2001, p. 40. 

 27. Ibid., p. 39.

 28. Ibid., pp. 28-30.

 29. Ibid., pp. 32-38

 30. Ibid., p. 37.

 31. Ibid., p. 28.

 32. Cha and Kang, Nuclear North Korea, p. 4.

 33. Ibid., p. 110.

 34. Kim Il Sung biographer Dae-suk Suh writes that “at times [North Korea seems 

to adopt a] completely irrational attitude toward others.” Kim Il Sung: The North 

Korean Leader, second edition with a new preface, New York: Columbia University 

Press, 1995, p. 305.

 35. Kang in Cha and Kang, Nuclear North Korea, p. 67; Cha in ibid., pp. 84-85. The 

former highlights Pyongyang’s alarm, while the latter downplays it. 

 36. Ibid., p. 54. Kang argues that deterrence has worked both in preventing a 

North Korean attack against South Korea and vice versa.

 37. Cha in Cha and Kang, Nuclear North Korea, p. 85; Harrison, Korean Endgame, 

p. 64; Oh and Hassig, North Korea, p. 77.

 38. Bradner, “North Korea’s Strategy,” p. 33.

 39. Cha in Cha and Kang, Nuclear North Korea, pp. 18, 21. 

 40. Herbert Simon is credited with the concept. The term is explicitly discussed 

by at least one set of analysts under review. See Oh and Hassig, North Korea, p. 192.

 41. Cha in Cha and Kang, Nuclear North Korea, p. 21.

 42. The quotes are from Kang in Cha and Kang, Nuclear North Korea, pp. 102, 103, 

104.

 43. Ibid., p. 104.

 44. Madeleine Albright with Bill Woodward, Madam Secretary, New York: 

Miramax Books, 2003, p. 467.

 45. Bradner, “North Korea’s Strategy”; Charles K. Armstrong, “Inter-Korean 

Relations: A North Korean Perspective,” in Samuel S. Kim, ed., Inter-Korean Relations: 

Problems and Prospects, New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004, pp. 38-56. 
31

 46. Suh, Kim Il Sung, p. 305.

 47. Ibid., p. 305.

 48. Ibid., p. 304.

 49. Nicholas Eberstadt, The End of North Korea, Washington, DC: American 

Enterprise Institute, 1999, p. 19, and chapter 5.

 50. Suh, Kim Il Sung, p. 313.

 51. Ibid., p. 302.

 52. See for example, Armstrong, “Inter-Korean Relations,” p. 46. 

 53. See August 1947 speech quoted by Bruce Cumings, “The Corporate State in 

North Korea,” in Hagen Koo, ed., State and Society in Contemporary Korea, Ithaca, NY: 

Cornell University Press, 1993, p. 215.

 54. Inter-University Associates, Inc., “Introductory and Comparative Notes,” 

in Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Gisbert H. Flanz, ed., Constitutions of the 

Countries of the World, Vol. X: Release 99-7 Issued November 1999, Dobbs Ferry, NY: 

Oceana Publications Inc., 1999, p. v.

 55. The New Year’s joint editorials were accessed in the archives of Pyongyang’s 

Korean Central News Agency located at www.kcna.co.jp. The 2005 editorial is at 

www.kcna.co.jp/item/2005/20050. The editorial for 2004 can be found at www.kcna.

co.jp/item/2004/200401/news01/01.htm; the 2003 at www.kcna.co.jp/item/2003/200301/

news01/01.htm; a summary of the 2002 editorial is available at www.kcna.co.jp/

item/2002/200201/news01/01.htm, while the full text was accessed via the Foreign 

Broadcast Information System (FBIS), and the 2001 at www.kcna.co.jp/item/2001200101/

news01/01.htm.

 56. Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Foreign Ministry Statement (in 

Korean) carried by Pyongyang Central Broadcasting Station, February 10, 2005 and 

translated by FBIS. 

 57. Adrian Buzo, Guerilla Dynasty: Politics and Leadership in North Korea, Boulder, 

CO: Westview Press, 1999.

 58. For example, North Korea appears convinced that the United States used 

biological weapons in the Korean War. Although Washington certainly considered 

the use of such weapons, all the evidence to date indicates that it refrained from 

doing so. Nevertheless, the belief that the United States did remains strong. The 

belief is perpetuated by slap dash Western scholars who assert myth as fact. See, 

for example, Harrison, Korean Endgame, pp. 9-10. For a noble effort to set the record 

straight, see Conrad C. Crane, “Chemical and Biological Warfare During the Korean 

War: Rhetoric and Reality,” Asian Perspective, Vol. 25, No. 3, 2001, pp. 61-84.

 59. Alexandre Y. Mansurov, “The Origins, Evolution, and Current Politics of the 

North Korean Nuclear Program,” The Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 2, No. 23, SpringSummer 1995, pp. 25-26.

 60. David E. Sanger and William J. Broad, “Test Said to Tie Deal on Uranium to 

North Korea,” New York Times, February 2, 2005; Glenn Kessler, “North Korea may 

Have Sent Libya Nuclear Material, US Tells Allies,” Washington Post, February 2, 
32

2005; David E. Sanger and William J. Broad, “Using Clues from Libya To Study a 

Nuclear Mystery,” New York Times, March 13, 2005.

 61. For a list of these plans and their basic emphases, see Noland, Avoiding the 

Apocalypse, pp. 66-67, Table 3-1. 

 62. Ibid., pp. 133-139.

 63. On the Rajin Sonbong Zone, see Oh and Hassig, North Korea, p. 64. On 

the Kaesong Zone, see Norimitsu Onishi, “2 Koreas Forge Economic Ties to Ease 

Tensions,” New York Times, February 8, 2005.

 64. Oh and Hassig, North Korea, p. 181; and Noland, Avoiding the Apocalypse, pp. 

139-140.

 65. “North Korea Slashes Food Rations” British Broadcasting Corporation report, 

January 24, 2005, accessed at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/4200861.stm

on March 1, 2005.

 66. “N. Korea Asks for a Record Amount of Fertilizer,” Chosun Ilbo, February 6, 

2005, accessed on http://English.chosun.com/w21data/html/news/200502/200502060017/

html on March 1, 2005.

 67. Gordon Fairclough, “South Korean Officials Paid North Before 2000 Summit, 

Panel Says,” Wall Street Journal, June 26, 2003.

 68. On speculation, see, for example, Mark Magnier, “‘Unofficial Visit’ Includes 

Pledge of Patience, Peking Duck and a Tour,” Los Angeles Times, April 22, 2004.

 69. See, for example, Bradner, “North Korea’s Strategy,” p. 24; and Noland, 

Avoiding the Apocalypse, pp. 119-121. Gambling comes from a casino operated by a 

Hong Kong company in the Ranjin Sonbong Zone and from the pachinko industry 

in Japan operated by ethnic Koreans who remit earnings to North Korea. The casino 

is reportedly being closed down because of Chinese pressure. See Michael Rank, 

“China cashes N. Korean casino chips,” AsiaTimes, February 24, 2005, cited at http//:

www.AsiaTimes.com, accessed on March 1, 2005. 

 70. The DPRK ambassador called the joint statement a “tactical measure.” Cited 

in Bernd Schafer, “Weathering the Sino-Soviet Conflict: The GDR and North Korea, 

1949-1989,” Cold War History Project Bulletin, Issue 14/15, Winter 2003/Spring 2004, 

p. 32. This comment is also cited by Cha in Cha and Kang, Nuclear North Korea, p. 

84. 

 71. See, for example, C. Turner Joy, with a foreword by Matthew B. Ridgeway, 

How Communists Negotiate, New York: Macmillan, 1955.

 72. Madeleine Albright with Bill Woodward, Madam Secretary, New York: 

Miramax Books, 2003, p. 466.

 73. Ibid., p. 466.

 74. Author’s conversations with civilian and military analysts in China in May 

2002, September 2003, and June 2004.

 75. Kang in Cha and Kang, Nuclear North Korea, p. 110.
33

 76. Author conversations with analysts in China and Vietnam in November 

2004; Kang in Cha and Kang, Nuclear North Korea, p. 116.

 77. Andrew Scobell, China and North Korea: From Comrades-in-Arms to Allies 

at Arm’s Length, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War, College Strategic Studies 

Institute, March 2004, p. 8. 

 78. Nina Hachigan, “The Internet and Power in One-Party Asian States,” 

Washington Quarterly, No. 25, Summer 2002, pp. 44-45; Sonni Efron, “Computer 

Chips Stacked to Master Japanese Chess,”Los Angeles Times, August 19, 1999; and 

“North Korean Launches High-Tech Venture,” ibid., April 1, 2002.

 79. See, for example, “Seoul to Finish S-N Railroad by December,” Korea Times, 

February 24, 2005.

 80. Kang in Cha and Kang, Nuclear North Korea, p. 116.

 81. North Korean Foreign Ministry statement of February 10, 2005.