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# United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit

No. 12-1010
J A M E S R E Y N O L D S , Plaintiff-Appellant,

v

.

D A N I E L M. T A N G H E R L I N I , * Admini strat or

, Uni ted S tate s General Ser vic es Admini strat i on, Defen dant-Appellee.

A p p e a l f r o m t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s D i s t r i c t C o u r t f o r t h e N o r t h e r n D i s t r i c t o f I l l i n o i s , E a s t e r n D i v i s i o n

. N o

. 0 8 C 5 8 3 7

— W i l l i a m T

. H a r t , J u d g e

.

A R G U E D S E P T E M B E R 18, 2012

— D E C I D E D D E C E M B E R 12, 2013

Before F L A U M , S Y K E S , and T I N D E R , Cir cui t Judges

.

P u r s u a n t t o F e d e r a l R u l e o f A p p e l l a t e P r o c e d u r e 4 3 ( c ) , w e h a v e s u b s t i

- *
t u t e d D a n i e l M

. T a n g h e r l i n i f o r M a r t h a N

. J o h n s o n a s t h e n a m e d d e f e n d a n t

- a p p e l l e e

.2 No. 12-1010

S Y K E S , Cir cui t Judge

. James Reyno lds w as 62 y ears old when hi s employ er

, the U.S. General Ser vic es Admini strat i on (“GSA”), pass ed hi m ov er for a promo tion i n fav or of a 32-y ear -old employ ee. Reyno lds sued the GSA Admini strat or allegin g that the agency di scri minated again st hi m on the basi s of age i n violati on of the “federal sector” prov i si on of the Age Di scri minati on i n Employment Act (“ADEA”) , 29 U.S.C. § 633a. He also brought clai ms under Ti tle VII of the Ci vil Ri ghts Act of 1964 (“Ti tle VII”), 42 U.S.C . § 2000e-16, alleg i ng di scri minati on on the basi s of race and se x , and clai ms for ret ali ation in violati on of both t he ADEA and Ti tle VII.
The di stric t court di sposed of t he ret ali ation clai ms on
sum mar y j udg ment for fai lure to exhaust admini strat i v e remedies, and Reyno lds dropped hi s clai ms of raci al and sex di scri minati on. Then after a three -day bench tr i al , t he di stric t court rej ected the age-di scri minati on c lai m for lac k of evidentiary supp or t and refused to allow Reyno lds to amend hi s complaint to add new c lai ms. Reynolds appeals

. The most i mport ant i ssu e i n thi s case i s one of fi rst i mpressi on in thi s ci rcui t: D oes the AD EA’s federal-sector provisi on, 29 U.S.C. § 633a(a), require the plai nti ff to pro v e that ag e w as the but-for caus e of the challen ged personnel acti on? Reyno lds arg ues that i t does not, and hi s reading of § 633a(a) has supp or t from a deci si on of the D.C. Ci rcui t that i nterpr ets the statute as authorizing “mi xed motiv es” clai ms. See Ford v

. Mab us , 629 F .3d 198 (D.C. Ci r

. 2010). The Supreme Court ’s deci si ons i n Unive rsity of T

exas Southwestern Medical Center v

. Nassar , 133 S. Ct. 2517 (2013), and Gross v

. FBL Fin ancial Servic es, Inc. , 557 U.S. 167 (2009), giv e us reason to questi on that ho lding. The GSANo. 12-1010 3

Admini strat or has si destepped the i ssu e, arg uing i nstead that the di stric t court’s findings defeat the age-di scri minati on clai m reg ardless of whether a but-for requirement or a more leni ent “mi xed motiv es” standard appli es. W e agr ee, and so w e leav e the caus ation questi on fo r a nother case when the legal standard makes a di fference and has been more co m p l e te l y bri efed. The judgment i s affi rmed.

I. Background Reyno lds, a 6 2 -y ear -old whi te male wi th more than 30 y ears’ ex perienc e wi th GSA, w as pas sed ov er for a promo
tion i n May 2005. Then a Bui lding Man a g e me nt Speci ali st, Reyno lds appli ed fo r a posi tion as a Bui lding Manager

. But A nt oin e Bell, a 32-y ear -old black employ ee, got the nod ov er Reyno lds and three other candi dates, all of whom w ere o lder than 40. Kennet h Kipn i s, the Superv i sory Proper ty Manager , made the deci si on. Kipn i s did n ot interv i ew any of the candi

dates before dec i di ng who w ould get t he promot i on. Instead, he relied o n his k no wledge of and exper i ence wi th the fi v e candi dates, tog ether wi th a rev i ew of their résumés, educati on, and spec i ali zed exper i ence and ab i li ties

. After losi ng the promo tion, Reyno l d s met wi th a couns elor 1 i n the GSA’s equal employment oppor tuni ty (“EEO”) offi ce

Tw o m o n t h s l a t e r, i n J u l y 2 0 0 5 , R e y n o l d s u n s u c c e s s f u l l y s o u g h t a n o t h e r 1
p r o m o t i o n

— t o a C o n t r a c t S p e c i a l i s t p o s i t i o n

— a n d h i s l a w s u i t i n i t i a l l y

e n c o m p a s s e d t h i s d e c i s i o n a s w e l l

. T h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t g r a n t e d s u m m a r y j u d g m e n t f o r t h e G S A A d m i n i s t r a t o r o n t h i s c l a i m , a n d R e y n o l d s h a s n o t

c h a l l e n g e d t h a t d e t e r m i n a t i o n o n a p p e a l

.4 No. 12-1010

and there aft e r fi led a handw ritten admini strat i v e complaint asserti ng m ulti ple clai ms of employment di scri minati on. One of hi s clai ms w as that he had been harassed fo r uns peci fi ed “whi stleblowing” acti viti es. He als o ge nerally alleg ed that an “environment [of ] harassmen t” exis ted at the agency

. The EEO offi ce i nformed Reyno lds that i t w ould only i nv esti gate clai ms that the GSA had di scri minated or ret ali ated aga ins t hi m on the basi s of race, color

, sex, or age. In res p on s e Re yn ol d s u rg ed Lav eda Jarret t, GSA’s Regional EEO Manager

, to rev i ew hi s clai m of “harassmen t.” He noted that hi s i ni tial complaint had i ncorpor ated by refer ence an
a r bi tr ation hearin g and hi s EEO couns elor ’s notes, evidenc e that he beli ev ed w ould prov i de Jarret t wi th the factual basi s for hi s clai ms. But he di d not giv e her anythin g more speci fi c about the arbi tr ation—s uch as a tr ansc ript of the hearin g—and Jarret t i nformed Reyno lds that hi s relianc e on t he EEO counselor’s notes w as i nsu ffic ie nt becau se they lacked the factual detail n ecess ary to per mi t the EEO offi ce to inv esti gate

. Jarret t speci fi cally i nvited Reyno lds to prov i de her wi th factual supp or t for the alleged harassmen t, but the recor d does not i ndi cate that R e y no l d s ev er di d so. Instead, he v aguely cl a imed that at an uns peci fi ed tim e i n the past, GSA offi ci als who w ere serving as offi cers at a Chi cago cr e d it uni on “undermin[ed]” the labor uni on for whi ch Reyno lds serv ed as
a n offi cer

. He also clai med that other GSA offi ci als w e r e responsible for creat i ng a “culture fostering harassmen t,” b ut again he prov i ded no factual speci fi cs ot her than the name of

one of the offi ci als. Based on the lack of factual detai l and t he apparent absenc e of any conn e c ti on to cogni zable employmentNo. 12-1010 5

di scri minati on, the EEO offi ce di d not i nv e st i gate Reyno lds’s gener ali zed clai m of “harassm ent.”
The rest of Reyno lds’s admini strat i v e complaint concerned hi s allegations of di scri minati on based on age and race. Th e EEO offi ce di sposed o f t hese clai ms sum mari ly , and on admini strat i v e appeal the Equal Employ me nt Oppor tuni ty Commi ssi on (“EEOC”) affi rmed. Reyno lds then sued the GSA Administr ator allegin g (1) di scri minati on and hosti le w or k environment based on hi s age i n violati on of the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 633a; (2) di scri mination and hosti le w or k environment based on hi s race and sex i n violati on of Ti tle VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16; and (3) ret ali ation for eng agin g in

acti vity p ro tected by the ADEA and Ti tle VII. The GSA Admini strat or mov ed for sum mary judgment,

a r g uing that Reyno lds had not exhausted admini strat ive remedies wi th respect to hi s ret ali a t io n claim s and that the remain i ng clai ms fai led for lack of ev ide nt i ary supp or t. Reyno lds responded that what he presently w as calling hi s “ret ali ation” clai ms he had refer red to as “harassmen t” duri ng the admini strat i v e process. The di stric t co ur t agr eed wi th the GSA Admini strat or that Reyno lds fai led t o e x haust hi s ret ali ation clai ms and decline d to consi der them further , and deni ed the balance of the motion. Reyno lds then abandoned all but hi s age-di scri minati on clai m, whi ch w as tr i ed to the court. Pri or to closing arg ument, Reyno lds m ov ed to amend hi s compl ai nt under Rule 15(b) (2) of the Feder al Rules of Ci vil Procedure to add a new ret ali ation clai m under the Rehabi li tation Act, see 29 U.S.C. § 7 9 4, whi ch i ncorpor ates certain prov i si ons of the Americ ans wi th Di sabi li

-6 No. 12-1010

ties Act (“ADA ” ), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq. The motion w as premi sed on Ki pni s’s testi mony durin g the bench trial. Kipn i s testifi ed that one of the factors that contribu ted to hi s deci si on not to promo te Reyno lds w as a negativ e e xper i

ence he had wi th hi m ov er an i ssu e of ADA compli ance. At the tim e of the i nci dent, Rey no l d s w or ked for a GSA offi ce that

w as responsi

ble for i nspec tin g leased loc a t io ns. The offi ce conduc ted tw o types of i nspec tions : i ni tial- acceptanc e i nspec
tions, whi ch ensured that bui ldings compli ed wi th the government’s speci fi cati ons before a lease w as accepted; and periodi c i nspec tions, whi ch ensured ongo i ng com p l i a n c e w i th the terms of exis tin g leases. Rey nolds had conduc ted a periodi c ins pection on a bui lding that the government w as leasing i n Chi cago and for whi ch Kipn i s w as responsible. Reyno lds had i denti fi ed what he thou ght w ere ADA acces si bi li ty defi ci enci es i n the restr ooms, and he t hought the landlord should be or dered to

corr ect the defi ci enci es immedi ately

. Kipn i s di sagreed. The defi ci enci es w ere minor (“toler ance defi ci enci es,” he called them), and the cost to corr ect them ulti mately w ould be borne by t he government under the ter ms of the exis tin g lease. Becaus e no d i sabled employ ees w or ked at that locati on at the tim e and the tenant agen cy w as not complaining, Kipn i s deci ded to si mply notify t he l a ndlo rd about the defi ci enci es and the need to remedy th e m in t he future. Reyno lds w as
unc ooper ativ e and seemed unw i lling to accept the deci si on, whi ch w as Kipn i s’s to make

. K ipn i s testifi ed that he too k Reyno lds’s resi stence i nto accoun t when ev aluat ing hi s i nterper sonal ski lls i n connecti on wi th the promo tion deci si on.No. 12-1010 7 Reyno lds arg ued that Kipni s’s testim ony supp or ted a new clai m that he w as deni ed the promo tion becau se he engaged i n acti vity prot ected by the ADA. He also sought to add a clai m pursuant to Rule 15(b) (1) for violati on of the Whi stleblow er Prot ecti on Ac t, 5 U.S.C. § 1221, based on (as far as w e can tell)

uns peci fi ed complaints he made i n October 2000 atte mpti ng to draw atte nti on to what he percei v ed as w aste and mi sman agement at t he GS A i n connecti on wi th a purchas e of proper ty

. The di stric t court deni ed both motions to amend.
Follo wing tr i al, the di stric t court enter ed wri tte n fin di ngs of fact and conclu si ons of law rej ecti ng the age-di scri minati on clai m for lack of evidenti ary supp or t. Reyno lds then renew ed hi s mot i on to add a Rehabi li tation Act r e t ali ation clai m t o hi s complaint and mov ed for a new tr i al on that clai m. The di stric t

co urt deni ed the motion and enter ed final judgment. Thi s appeal follow ed.

II. Disc uss ion Reyno lds challen ges the di stric t court’s refusal to consi der hi s ret ali ation cl a i m s b a s e d on fai lure to exhaust admini strat i v e remedies

. He also attacks the court’s findings of fact and conclu si ons of law followi ng the bench tr i al on hi s age-di scri mi nati on clai m, arg uing prim arily t hat the court appli ed the wrong causati on standard. Finally , he contends that t he court should h av e permitted hi m t o amend hi s compl ai nt pursuant to Rule 15(b) (1) and (2) to add a ret ali ation clai m under t he Rehabi li tation Act and a clai m und er the Whi stleblow er Prot ecti on Act.8 No. 12-1010

A. Retali ation Clai ms/Administ rative Exhausti on The di stric t court enter ed sum mary judgment for the GSA Admini strat or on Reyno lds’s ret ali a t io n clai ms based on hi s fai lure to exhaust admini strat i v e remedies

. Reyno lds arg ues 2 that thi s w as err or

. Our rev i ew is d e no v o. See Boha c v

. W est, 85 F .3d 306, 308–09 (7th Ci r

. 1996); see also Ajayi v

. Aramark Bus. Servs., Inc. , 336 F .3d 520, 526–27 (7th Ci r

. 2 0 0 3 ). B ecaus e Reyno lds alleged tw o clai ms of ret ali ation, one under Ti tle VII

a nd another under the ADEA, w e consi der each statute in turn. 3

I n r u l i n g o n t h e A d m i n i s t r a t o r ’ s m o t i o n f o r s u m m a r y j u d g m e n t , t h e 2 d i s t r i c t c o u r t h e l d t h a t R e y n o l d s f a i l e d t o e x h a u s t h i s T i t l e V I I a n d A D E A

r e t a l i a t i o n c l a i m s a n d s i m p l y d e c l i n e d t o c o n s i d e r t h e m f u r t h e r

. W e t r e a t t h i s d i s p o s i t i o n a s t h e e n t r y o f p a r t i a l s u m m a r y j u d g m e n t

. S e e F E D

. R

. C I V

. P

. 1 2 ( d ) ; S m i t h v. P o t t e r , 4 4 5 F

. 3 d 1 0 0 0 , 1 0 0 6 n

. 1 4 ( 7 t h C i r

. 2 0 0 6 )

.

T h e S u p r e m e C o u r t h a s h e l d t h a t t h e s o
- c a l l e d “ f e d e r a l s e c t o r ” p r o v i s i o n 3

o f t h e A D E A “ p r o h i b i t s r e t a l i a t i o n a g a i n s t a f e d e r a l e m p l o y e e w h o

c o m p l a i n s o f a g e d i s c r i m i n a t i o n

. ” G o m e z

- P e r e z v. P o t t e r , 5 5 3 U

. S

. 4 7 4 , 4 9 1 ( 2 0 0 8 )

. W e p r e v i o u s l y h a v e a s s u m e d t h a t t h e f e d e r a l

- s e c t o r p r o v i s i o n o f T i t l e V I I , 4 2 U

. S

. C

. § 2 0 0 0 e
- 1 6 , l i k e w i s e e n c o m p a s s e s a c l a i m f o r r e t a l i a t i o n

. S e e H a l e v. M a r s h , 8 0 8 F

. 2 d 6 1 6 , 6 1 9 ( 7 t h C i r

. 1 9 8 6 ) ( n o t i n g t h a t t h e N i n t h C i r c u i t a d o p t e d t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n a n d t h a t t h e p a r t i e s d i d n ’ t o b j e c t t o i t ) ;

s e e a l s o , e

. g

. , C o l e m a n v. D o n a h o e , 6 6 7 F

. 3 d 8 3 5 , 8 5 9

– 6 2 ( 7 t h C i r

. 2 0 1 2 ) ( a n a l y z i n g a r e t a l i a t i o n c l a i m b r o u g h t a g a i n s t t h e P o s t m a s t e r G e n e r a l

w i t h o u t d i s c u s s i n g w h e t h e r r e t a l i a t i o n i s c o v e r e d b y t h e f e d e r a l

- s e c t o r p r o v i s i o n ) ; M l y n c z a k v. B o d m a n , 4 4 2 F

. 3 d 1 0 5 0 , 1 0 6 0

– 6 1 ( 7 t h C i r. 2 0 0 6 ) ( c i t i n g t h e p r i v a t e
- s e c t o r p r o v i s i o n f o r t h e p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t

“ c o r r e c t l y a c k n o w l e d g e d t h a t T i t l e V I I p r o h i b i t s ” r e t a l i a t i o n ) ; R e n n i e v. G a r r e t t , 8 9 6 F

. 2 d 1 0 5 7 ( 7 t h C i r. 1 9 9 0 ) ( p e r m i t t i n g a r e t a l i a t i o n c l a i m t o g o f o r w a r d w i t h o u t d i s c u s s i n g w h e t h e r s u c h a c l a i m i s a v a i l a b l e u n d e r ( c o n t i n u e d

. . . )No. 12-1010 9

1. T itleVII Retaliation
Before filing sui t under Ti tle VII, a federal employ ee must exhaust hi s admini strat i v e remedies

. See Hill v

. Pott er, 352 F .3d 1142, 1145 (7 t h Ci r

. 2003) (“Ti tle VII does not authorize the fi li ng of sui t unti l the plainti ff has exhausted hi s admini strat i v e remedies

... .” (ci tin g 42 U.S.C. § 2 0 00e-16(c )))

. “Exhaust” i n thi s context means that the clai mant mus t compl y wit h the relev ant precondi tions to bri ngi ng a laws ui t, inclu di ng fi li ng a tim ely complaint wi th the agency after co nt acti ng an EEO

couns elor

. See generally 29 C

. F

. R. § 1614; see also Brown v

. Gen. Servs. Admin. , 425 U.S. 820, 832 (1976) (desc rib i ng a p r ior

v ersi on of § 2000e-16(c ) as prov i ding certain “pr e co ndi tions ” for fi li ng a ci vil acti on and sum mari zi ng those precondi tions ); Hill , 352 F .3d at 1145 (explai ning that prior to fi li ng sui t, a Ti tle VII plainti ff mus t receiv e a right-to-sue let t e r indic atin g that he wi ll not be afforded admini st rat i v e relief ). These precondi tions do not require a clai mant to pursue an admini str ativ e appeal of the deci si on render ed by hi s employ er’s EEO offi ce, nor do they require that a clai mant w ai t for a lagging agency— one that keeps the clai mant w ai tin g for more than 180 days—to make a deci si on before fi ling su it. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c ) (prov i di ng that federal employ ees may fi le a ci vil acti o n i n federal court wi thi n 90 days of receiving a notic e of final acti on by ei ther an agency i n the fi rst inst a nc e or by the EEOC on admini strat i v e appeal, or after 180 days of i ni tiating

(

. . . c o n t i n u e d ) 3
T i t l e V I I ’ s f e d e r a l

- s e c t o r p r o v i s i o n )

. F o r p u r p o s e s o f t h i s a n a l y s i s , w e a l s o

a s s u m e t h a t t h e f e d e r a l

- s e c t o r p r o v i s i o n o f T i t l e V I I p r o h i b i t s r e t a l i a t i o n

. S e e G o m e z

- P e r e z , 5 5 3 U

. S

. a t 4 8 8 n

. 4 ( d e c l i n i n g t o a d d r e s s t h e q u e s t i o n )

.10 No. 12-1010

ei ther a charg e wi th the ag ency or an appeal wi th the EEOC); 29 C.F .R. § 1614.407 (same)

. In Ti tle VII cases, the scope of the complaint brought before the adm i ni strat i v e agency li mi ts the scope of sub sequent ci vil proceedings in federal court; i n other w or ds, plainti ffs may pursue only those clai ms that could reasonably be expected to gr ow out of the admini strat i v e charges. See D e ar v

. Shin seki, 578 F .3d 605, 609 (7th C i r

. 2009); Ajayi, 336 F .3d at 527; Rush v

. McDonald's Corp. , 966 F .2d 1104, 1110 (7th Ci r

. 1992). The scope of an admini strat i v e charge br ought again st a priv ate-sector employ er i s deter mined by exam ining the clai ms that w ere “brought to [the EEOC’s] atte nti on,” not by whether the EEOC actually consi dered or di sposed of a giv en clai m. Rush , 966 F .2d at 1112. Thi s pri nci ple also appli es t o clai ms b ro ught under Ti tle VII’s federal-sector prov i si on. Cf. Pacheco v

. Mineta , 448 F .3d 783, 788 n.6 (5th Ci r

. 2006) (“ B ecaus e the presently relev ant sc o p e o f the exhausti on requirement i s the same for both federal and p r iv a t e employ ees, w e freely ci te to both federal and priv ate-sector employm e nt -di scri minati on cases here.”). Here, Reyno lds fai led to bri ng hi s Ti tle VII ret ali ation clai m to the atte nti on of the GSA’s EEO offi ce i n a manner suffi ci ent to preserve hi s clai m. Although he atte mpted to i nclu d e a clai m of “harassmen t” as part of the complaint he fi led wi th the EEO offi ce, he di d not prov i de enough details to allow an EEO offi cer to i nv esti gate

. He infor med Jarret t, the Regional EEO Manager , that he t hought he had a v ali d “harassmen t” clai m, but he nev er accepted Jarret t’s multi ple i nvitati ons to prov i de factual speci fi cs. The most he sai d w a s t hat when he w as anNo. 12-1010 11

offi cer of a uni on at some uns peci fi ed tim e, GSA management had i nterfer ed wi th the uni on’s financi al recor ds. He also told Jarret t that he w ould prov i de her wi th the t r a ns cr i pt of an arbi tr ation hearin g that he sai d w ould contai n relev ant details, but there i s no indi cati on tha t he ev er di d so. Reyno lds also clai med that he di scu ssed these “harassmen t” allegations wi th hi s EEO couns elor

, but Jarret t’s rev i ew of the couns elor ’s notes di d no t rev eal factual speci fi cs suffi ci ent to permi t the EEO offi ce to inv esti gate a Ti tle VII r etaliati on clai m. W e hav e held that “whi le techni cali ties a r e particu larly i nappropr i ate i n a statuto ry sch eme li ke Ti t l e VI I in whi ch laymen, unas si sted by tr ai ned lawy ers, i ni tiate the process, the requirement of some speci fi ci ty i n an EEOC charge i s not a
mere techni cali ty

.” Cheek v

. W

. & S. Life In s

. Co. , 31 F .3d 497, 501 (7th Ci r

. 1 9 9 4 ) (brackets and i nternal quotat i on marks omi tte d); see also Hill , 352 F .3d at 1146 (holding that a fai lure to coop e r a te wi th the EEOC consti tutes fai lure to exhaust admini stra t ive remedies ). Here, Reyno lds fai led to prov i de mini mally adequate factual speci fi ci ty to allow the EEO offi ce to co nd uct an i nv esti gation, and what he di d prov i de had

no t hing whatsoev er to do wi th prot ected acti vity under Ti tle VII. He cannot haul the GSA i nto court to defend again st

a clai m that i t di dn’t hav e a suffi cie nt ba si s to i nv esti gate or address. Reyno lds arg ues t ha t ev en i f he fai led to bri ng hi s ret ali ation clai m to the EEO offi ce’s atte nti on, the clai m i s nonetheless si mi lar enough to the di scri minati on clai ms that the EEO offi ce did i nv esti gate that the distr i ct court should not hav e refused to address i t. I t is tr ue that i n deter mining whether federal-12 No. 12-1010

court allegations fall wi t hin t he scope of an admini strat i v e charge, “w e look to whether the allegations are li ke or reasonably relat ed to” the charges that w ere actually brought before the agency

. Ezell v

. Pott er, 400 F .3d 1041, 1046 (7th Ci r

. 2005); see also S i ta r v

. In d. Dep’t of T ransp. , 344 F .3d 720, 726 (7th Ci r

. 2003). But to be “li ke or reasonably relat ed to” an admini strat ive charge, the relev ant clai m and the admini strat i v e char g e
mus t, at mini mum, “ ‘describe the same conduc t and i mpli cate the same i ndi vidu als.’ ” Dear, 578 F .3d at 609 (quoti ng Ezell , 400 F .3d at 1046).
Our b e s t d e c i p h e rin g of Re yn ol d s ’s a l l e gati ons of ret ali ation i s that the alleged ret ali ator y conduc t co ns isted of a hosti le

w or k environment that sprang from hi s acti vity as a union offi cer and occurred long before the a d ver se promo tion deci si on pert ai ning to the Bui lding Ma na g er posi tion. Again, these allegations hav e nothin g to do wi th the di scrimin ation clai ms t hat w ere actually brought before the EEO offi ce, nor
are they cogni zable as ret ali ation for acti vity prot ected by Ti tle VII. The di stric t court cor rectly held that the Ti tle VII ret ali ation clai m could not go forw ard based on the fai lure to exhaust admini strat i v e remedies

.

2. ADEA Re taliation
The ADEA offers federal employ e e s tw o independent

ro utes to court: They may fi le a complaint wi th the EEOC and comply wi th the EEOC’ s complaint procedures (an admini strat i v e-e xhausti on ro ute akin to Ti tle VII’s), or they may go di rectly to court after prov i di ng the EEOC wi th “notNo. 12-1010 13

less than thi rt y days’ notic e of an i ntent t o fil e ” a clai m. 4 29 U.S.C. § 633a(d); see also Stevens v

. Dep’t of T reasury, 500 U.S. 1, 5 (1991) (desc rib i ng the tw o meth o ds by whi ch a federal employ ee can reach a di stric t court wi th an ADE A cl a im). B e c a u s e t h e a p p l i c a b l e r e g u l a t i o n s g o v e r n i n g t h e
a d m in i strat i v e-exhausti on ro ute require the aggr i ev e d p a rty to

W e h a v e h e l d t h a t f i l i n g a c o m p l a i n t w i t h t h e E E O o f f i c e o f t h e a g e n c y t h a t 4

a l l e g e d l y e n g a g e d i n t h e d i s c r i m i n a t o r y c o n d u c t i s e q u i v a l e n t t o f i l i n g a

c o m p l a i n t w i t h t h e E E O C f o r p u r p o s e s o f 2 9 U

. S

. C

. § 6 3 3 a ( d )

. S e e B o h a c v. We s t , 8 5 F

. 3 d 3 0 6 , 3 0 9

– 1 0 ( 7 t h C i r

. 1 9 9 6 )

. T h u s , a n e m p l o y e e w h o f i l e s a

c o m p l a i n t w i t h t h e f e d e r a l a g e n c y ’ s E E O o f f i c e a n d c o m p l i e s w i t h t h e

r e l e v a n t r e g u l a t i o n s t h e r e a f t e r n e e d n o t f i l e a n a d m i n i s t r a t i v e a p p e a l o r a

s e p a r a t e c o m p l a i n t o r n o t i c e o f i n t e n t t o s u e w i t h t h e E E O C t o b r i n g s u i t i n f e d e r a l c o u r t

. T o t h e e x t e n t t h a t R a n n v. C h a o , 3 4 6 F

. 3 d 1 9 2 , 1 9 8 ( D

. C

. C i r

. 2 0 0 3 ) , e x p r e s s e s d i s a g r e e m e n t w i t h o u r d e c i s i o n , w e r e s p e c t f u l l y s u g g e s t t h a t R a n n m i s r e a d s B o h a c

. W e h a v e n e v e r d i s p u t e d t h e R a n n c o u r t ’ s

s t a t e m e n t t h a t a p l a i n t i f f w h o w a n t s t o s a t i s f y § 6 3 3 a ( d ) b y t h e a l t e r n a t i v e

m e t h o d o f f i l i n g a n o t i c e o f i n t e n t t o s u e w i t h t h e E E O C “ m u s t t r a n s m i t h i s i n t e n t

- t o
- s u e n o t i c e t o t h e E E O C i t s e l f

. ” I d

. O u r h o l d i n g i n B o h a c w a s s i m p l y t h a t w h e n a p l a i n t i f f c h o o s e s i n s t e a d t o s a t i s f y § 6 3 3 a ( d ) b y p u r s u i n g

a d m i n i s t r a t i v e r e m e d i e s , f i l i n g a c o m p l a i n t w i t h t h e e m p l o y i n g a g e n c y ’ s E E O o f f i c e r a t h e r t h a n w i t h t h e E E O C i t s e l f s a t i s f i e s t h e s t a t u t o r y c o n d i t i o n t h a t t h e p l a i n t i f f “ f i l e [ ] a c o m p l a i n t c o n c e r n i n g a g e d i s c r i m i n a t i o n w i t h t h e C o m m i s s i o n , ” 2 9 U

. S

. C

. § 6 3 3 a ( d ) , b e c a u s e t h e r e i s a “ s i g n i f i c a n t s h a r i n g o f

r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s b e t w e e n t h e E E O C a n d t h e a g e n c i e s u n d e r t h e r e g u l a t o r y

s c h e m e , ” B o h a c , 8 5 F

. 3 d a t 3 1 0

. T h i s i s c o n s i s t e n t w i t h R a n n , s e e 3 4 6 F

. 3 d a t 1 9 5 ( s t a t i n g t h a t p l a i n t i f f s o t h e r t h a n t h o s e w h o p r o v i d e n o t i c e t o t h e E E O C

“ m u s t h a v e ‘ f i l e d ’ a n a p p r o p r i a t e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e c o m p l a i n t ” i n o r d e r t o b r i n g s u i t i n f e d e r a l c o u r t a n d c i t i n g t h e r e g u l a t i o n r e q u i r i n g t h a t t h e

c o m p l a i n t b e f i l e d w i t h t h e c o m p l a i n a n t ’ s a g e n c y ) , c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e

a p p l i c a b l e r e g u l a t i o n s , s e e 2 9 C

. F

. R

. § § 1 6 1 4

. 1 0 6 ( a ) , . 2 0 1 ( c ) ( 2 ) , a n d a l s o

c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e o p i n i o n s o f o t h e r c o u r t s t h a t h a v e c o n s i d e r e d t h e i s s u e , s e e , e

. g

. , S h e l l e y v. G e r e n , 6 6 6 F

. 3 d 5 9 9 , 6 0 5 & n

. 1 ( 9 t h C i r

. 2 0 1 2 )

.14 No. 12-1010

meet w i th an EEO offi ce couns elor prior to fi li ng a complaint,

w e hav e explain ed that the p ur pose underlyin g both alter nativ es i s to allow the E E O offi ce or the EEOC “to atte mpt conci li ation.” Boha c, 85 F .3d at 3 10 (internal quotat i on marks omi tte d).
W i th respe ct to the admini strat i v e-exhausti on ro ute, the ADEA requi res the EEOC to “prov i de for the acceptanc e and processing of complaints of di scri minati on i n Feder al employment on account of age.” 29 U.S.C. § 633a(b) (3). The EEOC’s procedural reg ulat i on s for AD E A charges are, i n turn, the same
as those governing Ti tle VII charges. See 29 C.F .R. §§ 1614.103, .201, .407. The appli cable statuto ry prov i si ons and reg ulati ons do not address the permi ssi ble scope of a ci vil acti on i n federal

co ur t after bri ngi ng an admini strat i v e charge. But there i s no relev ant di ffer e nc e betw een the ADEA and Ti tle VII in thi s reg ard, so w e wi ll a p p ly the same rule: A plainti ff bri ngi ng a ci vil acti on under the ADEA again st a federal emplo y er may bri ng clai ms actually charged i n the admini strat i v e proceeding and also clai ms that are “li ke o r r e a so nably relat ed to” the admini strat i v e charges. See Shell ey v

. Ge ren , 666 F .3d 599, 606 (9th Ci r

. 2012) (applying the “li k e o r reasonably relat ed to” standard to clai ms brought under the federal-sector prov i si on of the ADEA). Reyno lds appears to p re mi se hi s ADEA ret ali ation clai m on the same alleg a t ions that form the basi s for hi s Ti tle VII ret ali ation clai m. The only di fference i s the statu te i nv oke d. For the reasons w e hav e already explain ed, Reyno lds cannot

suc ceed i n using the ADEA’s admini strat i v e-exhausti on ro ute to feder al court.No. 12-1010 15

That lea v es only the ADEA-sp eci fi c method of prov i di ng the EEO C wit h notic e of intent to sue at least 30 days i n adv ance of bri ngi ng a laws ui t. Here, although Reyno lds

no tifi ed Jarret t via emai l that he w anted the EEO offi ce to consi der hi s “harassmen t” clai ms, and although he sai d he

w ould “bri ng the case to the E E O C ” if “har assm ent” w as not i nclu ded i n the final complaint i nv esti gation, he does not clai m to ha ve p r o v ided notic e to the EEOC of hi s i ntent to sue. He there fore fai led t o sati sfy § 633a(d), and the di stric t court proper ly refused to consi der the ADEA ret ali ation clai m based on fai lure to exhaust admini strat i v e remedies

.

B. Federal-Sec tor Age-Discri minati on Claim
W e turn now to the s ub s tan c e of Reynolds’s age-di scri mination clai m. The ADEA prov i si on appli cable to employment wi thi n the federal government prov i des as fo l l o ws: “All personnel acti ons affec tin g employ ees or appli cants for employment who are at l e a st 4 0 y ears of age

... [in v arious federal government posts] shall be made free from any di scri minati on based on age.” 29 U.S.C. § 633a(a). This so
called “federal sector” p ro vis i on appli es to many federal agenci es and departments, i nclu di ng the GSA and other executiv e agenci es. See id. § 633a (a ); 5 U.S.C. § 105 (defining “executiv e agenci es”). Reyno lds ha d the burden of prov i ng that Kipn i s’s deci si on not to promo te hi m to Bui lding Manager violated § 633a(a). The di strict court conclu ded after a bench tr i al that he had fai led to carry hi s bur d e n a nd enter ed judgment for the GSA Admini strat or

. Reyno lds contends that th e court applied the w ro ng standard of causati on.16 No. 12-1010

In Gross the Supreme Cour t held that 29 U.S.C. § 623, the ADEA secti on appli cable to priv ate-sector employ ers, requires proo f that age w as the but-for caus e of the challen ged employment acti on; “mi xed motiv es” clai ms are not a ut horized. 557 U

. S

. at 177 (“[U]n der § 623(a)( 1), the plainti ff ret ai ns the burden of persuasi on to establi sh that a g e w as the ‘but-for’

caus e of the employ er’s adv erse acti on.”). Section 623 prov i des as follows : It shall be unl awfu l for an employ er— (1) to fai l or refuse to hir e or to di scharge any i ndi vidu al or other wi se di scri minate again st any i ndi vidu al wi th resp ect to hi s compens ation, ter ms, co n d i

tions, or privi leges of employment, becau se of su ch indi vidu al’s age ... .
29 U.S.C. § 623(a). Thi s secti on appli e s t o p r i v ate employ ers, empl o y me nt agenci es, and labor or gani zations, and also to state and loca l governments. See id. § 623(a)–( c) (prohib i tin g any “employ er

,” “employment agency ,” or “labor or gani zation” fr o m di scri minati ng again st employ ees or appli cants becau se of age); id. § 630(b) (defining “emplo yer” to i nclu de, among other things, most priv ate bus i ness es and state or local governments or agenci es).
The Supreme Court’s dec i si on in Gross rests large ly on the statute’s use of the phrase “becau se of age,” whi ch i n or di nary parlance means that “age w as the ‘reason’ that the employ er deci ded to act.” 557 U.S. at 176. The Court di stanced i tself from the judi ci ally i mpli ed “mi xed motiv es” theor y of employment di scri minati on under Ti tle VI I a nnounc ed i n Price W ater houseNo. 12-1010 17

v

. Hopkins , 490 U.S. 228, 244–47 (1989). Gros s , 5 57 U.S. at 174. The burden-s hi fti ng, mi xed-motiv es framew or k of Price W ater house w as later codi fi ed—but only i n part—in t he Ci vil Ri ghts Act of 1991. Id. ; see also Nassar , 133 S. Ct. at 2525–26. Becaus e Congr ess di d not also amend t he ADEA to inc lude a mi xed-motiv es framew or k, the Court confined i ts i nqui ry to the tex t of § 623(a) and conclu ded that i t di d not authoriz e mi xed-motiv es a g e -di scri minati on clai ms. Gross , 557 U.S. at 175. Instead, a plainti ff proceeding under § 623(a) “mus t prove by a preponder ance of the evidenc e

... that age w as t he ‘butfor’ cau se of the challenged employ er deci si on.” Id. at 177–78. Reyno lds a r g ues that becau se § 633a, the federal-sector prov i si on of the ADEA, i s phrased di fferently than § 623(a), i ts priv ate- se ct or counterpar t, Gross i s i napposi te and a more leni ent standard of caus at i on appli es. Thi s arg ument finds supp or t i n Fo r d v

. Mab us , i n whi ch a di vided panel of the D.C. Ci rcui t held that a plainti ff proceeding under § 633a need only pr ov e that ag e w as “ a factor in the ch allenged personnel acti on,” not the but-for caus e of i t. 629 F .3d at 206. The panel major i ty i n Ford focus ed on the di fferen t p hr asing of the federal-sector prov i si on—“[a]ll personnel acti ons affec tin g [federal employ ees]

... shall be made free from any di scri minatio n based on age”—and conclu ded that a looser standard of

caus ation appli es. 29 U.S.C. § 633a(a); Ford, 629 F .3d at 205–06. Th e court held that the “sw eepi ng language” of the feder a l

sector prov i si on requires that age mus t not “bleed i nto particu

lar personnel deci si ons” at all becau se “ any amount of di scri mi

na t i on tain tin g a personnel acti on, ev en i f not sub stanti al,

means that the acti on w as not ‘free from any di scri minati on18 No. 12-1010

based on age.’ ” Ford, 629 F .3d at 2 0 6 (emphas i s added). “ ‘Any ,’ after all, means any

.“ Id. Judge Henderson di sagreed and wrot e separately , unw i lli ng to endorse the panel major i ty’ s holding that § 633a requires “a lesser quantum of proo f t ha n does secti on 623.” Id. at 208 (Henderson, J., concu rr ing). She doubt e d that “Congr ess i ntended, si mply by di nt of secti on 633a’s di fferent p hr a sing, to set up a l e g al framew or k for the federal government so tot ally at odd s wi th that for a priv ate employ er .” Id. In her view the major i ty’ s i nterpr etat i on w as all the more doubtful i n li ght of the Supreme Court ’s “flat declar a t ion” i n Gross that “the mi xed-motiv es theor y ‘i s nev er proper in an ADEA case,’ ” as w ell as the Court ’s “cri tic i sm [in Gross ] of the burden-s hi fti ng fra mew or k set fort h i n Price W ater house. ” Id. (quoti ng Gross , 557 U.S. at 170).
The D.C. Ci rcui t i s the only one of our si ster ci rcui ts to hav e undert a ken an in-depth analysi s of the caus ation standard i n § 633a. The Ni nth Cir cu it has held that but-for caus ation i s
re q uired for federal-sector ADEA clai ms, but di d not engage di rectly wi th the statuto ry language. See Shell ey, 666 F .3d at 607 (holding that a federal-sector plainti ff “mus t prove at tr i al that age w as the ‘but-for’ caus e of the employ er’s adv erse acti on”). The First and Fifth Ci rcui ts have noted the i ssu e but not resolv ed i t. See V

e l az quez-Ortiz v

. V

ilsack , 657 F .3d 64, 74 (1st Ci r

. 2011); Leal v

. McHugh , 731 F .3d 405, 411–12 (5th Ci r

. 2013).
We hav e not ha d o ccas i on to address the caus ation standard applicable to federal-sector ADEA clai ms under § 633a. Left wi thout clear gui dance fr o m thi s court, the di stric t court hedged, applyi ng both a but-for caus al st a ndar d and a moreNo. 12-1010 19

leni ent “motiv atin g factor” standar d a nd conclu di ng that Reyno lds fai led to establi sh caus ation under either standa r d. The GSA Admini strat or t a kes no posi tion on the proper standard of caus ation and si mply urges us to affi rm the judgment based on the dis tr i ct court’s alter nati v e findings. W e acknowledge the need for an authoritativ e deci si on on thi s i ssu e i n our ci rcui t, but w e hesi tate to w ei gh i n wi thout the benefi t of the government’s view s on the matter

. There is no questi on that § 633a i s phrased di fferently than § 623(a), the priv ate-sector prov i sio n o f the ADEA at i ssu e i n Gross

. Whether the d iffer ence i n statuto ry language i s enough to di sti ngui sh Gross i s a close and di fficult questi on, as the spli t deci si on in t he D.C. Circui t atte sts. W e hav e prev i ously giv en Gross a broad reading, construi ng i t as a turnin g poin t for deter mining the caus ation standard in federal anti di scri mination laws in gener al. See Serwatka v

. Rockwell Automat ion, Inc. , 591 F .3d 957, 961 (7th Ci r . 2010).
The Supreme Court ’s recent deci si on i n Nassar , 133 S. Ct. at 2525–30, suggests that w e hav e been right to read Gross broadly

. In Nassar the Court held that ret ali ation clai ms under Ti tle VII require tr adi tional but-for caus ation, not a lesser “motiv atin g factor” standard of caus ation. Id. at 25 3 4

. Th e C o urt reiterat ed that “[c] ausati on i n fact— i.e. , proo f that the defendant’s conduc t di d i n fact caus e the plainti ff’s i njury —i s a standard requirement of any to rtclai m ... ,” id. at 2524, and th is st andard “requires the plainti ff to show that the harm

w ould no t have occurred i n the absenc e of—that i s, but for

— t he defendant’s conduc t,” id. at 2525 (internal quotat i on marks omi tte d). Thi s i s the “backgro und again st whi ch20 No. 12-1010 Congr ess legisl ated i n enacting Ti tle VII,” id. , and t he same is certainly t r ue of the ADEA. As i t had i n Gr oss , the Court

c a u ti one d a ga in s t d i s p l a c in g the tradi tional requirement of b u tfor caus ation unless explic i t statuto ry language speci fi es a more lenient standard. Id. at 2528–29.
Accordi ngly

, there may be goo d reason to questi on the D.C. Ci rcui t’s i nterpr etat i on of § 633a in Ford

. But w e need not decide t he matter here. The di stric t court made alter nati v e findings that R e y no lds’s age w as nei ther the but-for caus e of Kipn i s’s promo tion deci si on no r “ a mo tiv atin g factor” i n the deci si on. W

e agr ee wi th the GSA A d min istrato r that these findings are amply supported by t he recor d.

C. The Dist rict

Court’s Findi ngs Fin di ngs of fact enter ed after a bench tr i al are rev i ew ed for clear err or

. W

infor ge, Inc. v

. Coachmen Indus. , 691 F .3d 856, 868 (7th C ir

. 2012). The same standard appli es to the court’s appli cati on o f the law to the facts. Id. Under the clear -erro r standard, w e wi ll not rev erse unles s, after r e v ie win g all the evidenc e, w e are left wi th “ ‘t he d e fin i te and fi rm convic tion that a mi stake has been commi tte d

. ’ ” Anderson v

. City of Bessemer City

, N.C. , 470 U

. S

. 5 64, 573 (1985) (quoti ng United States v

. U.S. Gypsum Co. , 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)) . As long as the di stric t court’s conclu si ons are “plaus ibl e in li ght of the

recor d view ed i n i ts entirety ,” w e wi ll not di sturb them. Fyrn etics (Hong Kong) Ltd. v

. Quantum Grp., Inc. , 293 F .3d 1023, 1028 (7th Ci r . 2002).No. 12-1010 21

The di stric t judge found that Reyno lds “di d not prove that he w ould hav e been promo ted i f ev ery thi ng else w ere the same except that he w as y ounger than age 40 or that hi s age w as a
mo t iv atin g factor in denyi ng hi s promo tion.” These findings
are not clearly err one o us

. A lthough Bell w as the y oungest of the fi v e candi dates and Reyno l d s t hus had more exper i ence, t he di stric t court credi ted Kipn i s’s testim ony that exper i en ce
w as not the sole factor he consi dered i n maki ng the promo tion deci si on. Speci fi cally

, the court credi ted Kip n i s ’s te s tim ony that the n ew Bui lding Manager needed s tr ong interpersonal skills becau se t he bui lding i n questi on w as underg oin g a tr ansi tion i n occupan cy

. The new manager needed to w or k w ell wi th the tr ansi tion team that had been assembled to effectuate the tr ansi tion. Bell w as alr eady a member of that team and had a tr ack recor d of w or kin g w ell wi th ot her te am memb ers. Mor eov er

, the Bui lding Manager w ould be the fi rst poin t of contact for agency personnel i n the bui lding a nd t herefor e
w ould need to int eract ext ensi v ely wi th bui lding tenants and agency repr esentativ es. The B u i l d in g Man a ge r w a s re s p onsible for the basi c maintenance, admini strat i on, and oper ation of the buil d ing, but also w as t asked wi th “i mprov i ng cus tomer and cli ent agency sati sfa cti on wi th bui lding services .” Kipn i s testifi ed that Bell had better i nterper sonal ski lls than Reyno lds and w as the best fi t for the Bui lding Manager posi tion. The di stric t court as finder of fact w as entitled to cre d it that testim ony

. Reyno lds arg ues t ha t Kipn i s’s fai lure to i nterv i ew hi m i s evidenc e that the promo tion deci si on w as motiv ated by age di scri minati on. Reyno lds w as not tr eated any di fferently from22 No. 12-1010

t he other candi dates i n thi s reg ard; i n fact no one w as i nter

view ed. Kipn i s’s deci si on not to i nterv iew any of the candi

dates w as consi sten t wit h the relev ant prov i si on of the collecti v e-bargain i ng agr eement governing the selecti on process, whi ch prov i ded that i f “one candi date i s i nterv i ew ed, all candi dates in that catego ry mus t be i nterv i ew ed.” Reyno lds arg ues that becau se Kipn i s w or ked closely wi th Bell, he effecti v ely co nducted “the equi v alent of many i nterv i ews” wi th hi m and there fore violated t he collecti v e-bargain i ng agr eement by not i nterv ie wing Reyno lds and the other candi dates. Thi s i s a stret ch. Ev en i f accepted, thi s strained view of the facts w ould show only that Kipn i s violated the collecti v e-bargain i ng agr eement, not tha t he commi tte d age di scri minati on. There i s no e v ide nce to supp or t an i nference that the collecti v e-bargaini ng agr eement w a s be ing used as a pret extto j usti fy age dis cri minati on. 5

D. Rul e 15(b) Moti ons Fin ally , Reyno lds challe n ge s the di stric t court’s deni al of hi s motion to amend the pleadings duri ng tr i al and hi s motion for

a new tr i al. Our r e v iew i s for abus e of di screti on. Aldridge v

.

R e y n o l d s a l s o a r g u e s f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e o n a p p e a l t h a t t h e f a i l u r e t o 5
i n t e r v i e w h i m i s i t s e l

f a d i s c r i m i n a t o r y p e r s o n n e l a c t i o n i n v i o l a t i o n o f t h e A D E A

. I n c i v i l c a s e s “ [ a ] r g u m e n t s n o t r a i s e d i n t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t a r e

c o n s i d e r e d w a i v e d o n a p p e a l ” u n l e s s e x c e p t i o n a l c i r c u m s t a n c e s j u s t i f y

a p p l i c a t i o n o f t h e p l a i n
- e r r o r d o c t r i n e

. B r o w n v. A u t o

. C o m p o n e n t s H o l d i n g s , L L C , 6 2 2 F

. 3 d 6 8 5 , 6 9 1 ( 7 t h C i r

. 2 0 1 1 ) ; s e e a l s o M o o r e e x r e l

. E s t a t e o f G r a d y v. T u l e j a , 5 4 6 F

. 3 d 4 2 3 , 4 3 0 ( 7 t h C i r

. 2 0 0 8 ) ( e x p l a i n i n g t h a t p l a i n
- e r r o r r e v i e w i s r a r e l y a p p l i e d i n c i v i l c a s e s )

. T h e r e a r e n o e x c e p t i o n a l c i r c u m s t a n c e s h e r e

.No. 12-1010 23

Forest River

, Inc. , 635 F .3d 870, 875 (7th Cir

. 2 0 11) (ci tin g T rustmark Ins. Co. v

. Gen. & Cologne Life Re of Am. , 424 F .3d 542, 553 (7th Ci r

. 2005)) (moti on to amend the pleadings); Whitehead

v

. Bond, 680 F .3 d 9 1 9 , 9 27 (7th Ci r

. 2012) (moti on for a new tr i al).
Rule 15(b)(2 ) p r ov i des that i ssu es “tr i ed by the parties’ expr ess or i mpli ed consent” must be t reat ed i n all respe cts as i f rais ed i n the pleadings, and a party may mov e “at any tim e,
ev en after judgment,” to a mend the pleadings to conform to the evidenc e. F E D

. R. C I V

. P

. 15(b) (2). The standard for a motion under Rule 15(b) (2) i s “ ‘whether the opposi ng party had a fai r oppor tuni ty to defend and whether he could hav e presented addi tional evidenc e had he known sooner the sub stance of the amendmen t.’ ” Aldridge, 635 F .3d at 875 (quoti ng In re Rivin ius, Inc. , 977 F .2d 1171, 1175 (7th Ci r .1992)). A di stric t court i s “w ell wi thi n i ts di screti on” to deny a motion seeki ng to add a ne w theor y of li abi li ty i f the defendant has not consented to i t. Id. at 875–76. Reyno lds sought to amend hi s complaint to add a ret ali ation clai m under the Rehabi li tation Act. Nothing in the recor d suggests that the GSA Admini strat or consented t o t ry thi s clai m. Indeed, before closing arg ument, Reyno lds had nev er before mentioned thi s theory of li abi li ty

. Reyno lds arg ues that Kipn i s’s testim ony about the ADA

re s tr oo m-c ompli ance di spute cons ti tu te s i m p l i e d c on s e nt to try the new clai m. Not so. First, a court wi ll not i mply a party ’s consent to tr y an unpleaded clai m “merely becau se evidenc e relev ant t o a proper ly pleaded i ssu e i nci dentally tends to establi sh an unpleaded clai m.” Ippolito v

. WNS, Inc. , 864 F .2d24 No. 12-1010
440, 456 (7th Ci r

. 1988) (in t e rnal quotat i on marks omi tte d). Mor e fun d a ment ally

, Kipn i s’s testim ony cannot remot ely be construed as consen t by the GSA Admini strat or to tr y a completely new clai m under the Rehabi li tatio n A ct or as evidenc e tending to establi sh such a clai m. The poin t of Kipni s’s testim ony about the restr oom
- c om p l i an c e d i s p u te w a s to explain hi s concern about Reyno lds’s i nterper sonal sk i lls, not to meet a newfang l e d ret ali ation clai m that ev ery one understood w as lurking beneath the surfac e. The di stric t court proper ly deni ed Reyno lds’s Rule 15(b) (2) motion to amend. The motion for a new tr i al w as a ret read of that motion and for the same reason w as correctly deni ed.
Sim i larly , the tr i al court w as w el l wit hin i ts di screti on i n denyi ng Reyno lds’s Rule 15(b) (1) motion to amend hi s complaint to add a clai m und er t he Whi stleblow er Pro tection Act. When a defendant objects that evidenc e presented by the plainti ff at tr i al i s not wi thi n the scope of an i ssu e rais ed i n the complaint, Rule 15(b) (1) prov i des that the court should “freely permi t” the complaint to be amended to co nf o r m to the evidenc e presented, but only when doin g so “wi ll ai d i n presentin g the merits” of the case and “the objecting party fai ls to sati sfy the court that the evidenc e w oul d prej udi ce that party ’s ... defens e on the mer i ts.” F E D

. R. C I V

. P

. 15(b) (1).
Her e , R eynolds atte mpted to testif y about complaints he allegedly made about the GSA’s effort to purchas e a pi ece of proper ty many y ears before t he deci si on about the Bui lding Manager promo tion, testim ony that he apparently thought

w oul d fo r m the basi s of a clai m under the Whi stleblow er Prot ecti on Act. The GS A A d mini strat or objecte d that thi sNo. 12-1010 25

testim ony w a s outsi de the scope of the i ssu es rais ed by the pleading s. R e y nolds later sought to add a clai m under the Whi stleblow er Prot ecti on Act, but the di stric t court w as r i ght to rej ect thi s prej udi ci al atte mpt to add a wholly unrelated new
caus e of acti on to the sui t.

A F F I R M E D

.