In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 15-2359

DANIIAR SANTASHBEKOVICH SANTASHBEKOV,

Petitioner,

v.

LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General of the United States,

Respondent.

____________________

Petition for Review of an Order of

the Board of Immigration Appeals

No. A205-800-334

____________________

ARGUED APRIL 6, 2016 — DECIDED AUGUST 24, 2016

____________________

Before FLAUM, RIPPLE, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.

HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. Daniiar Santashbekov petitions 

for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals 

denying his application for asylum. The immigration judge 

found that Santashbekov’s claims of political persecution

were not credible, and the Board affirmed. We deny Santashbekov’s petition because substantial evidence supports the 

judge’s and Board’s credibility findings.
2 No. 15-2359

I. Factual and Procedural Background

In early 2013, Daniiar Santashbekov filed an application 

for asylum claiming that he faced persecution for his political 

activism as a member of the youth wing of the Ata Meken 

party in his native Kyrgyzstan. His asylum application was 

denied, and he was served with a Notice to Appear for removal proceedings on April 24, 2013. Santashbekov admitted 

his removability but renewed his application for asylum.

The Attorney General or Secretary of Homeland Security 

may grant asylum to an immigrant who has “a well-founded 

fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, 

membership in a particular social group, or political opinion” 

in his home country. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42), 1158(b)(1)(A). 

The applicant for asylum has the burden of proof, which may 

be satisfied by the applicant’s own testimony if it is credible. 

8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(1)(B), 1231(b)(3)(C). A trier of fact may 

base a credibility determination on a wide variety of factors, 

“using whatever combination of considerations seems best in 

the situation at hand.” Mitondo v. Mukasey, 523 F.3d 784, 789 

(7th Cir. 2008); see 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). The trier of fact 

may base an adverse credibility decision on inconsistencies, 

inaccuracies, or falsehood, and there is no longer any requirement that an “inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to 

the heart of the applicant’s claim....” 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). 

Santashbekov’s application stems from political unrest in 

Kyrgyzstan. In April 2010, opposition parties protested and 

ousted the then-president. Ata Meken was one of the opposition parties, and it became part of a new coalition government. After the 2010 revolution, according to the U.S. State 
No. 15-2359 3

Department, Kyrgyzstan continued to face instability and human rights problems, including arbitrary arrests and torture 

by law enforcement and security forces.

The immigration judge characterized Santashbekov’s testimony about his own situation as “vague” and “extremely 

confusing.” In essence, Santashbekov testified that he had 

joined the youth wing of the Ata Meken party at his university 

in Bishkek in October 2010. After he gave a political speech at 

his university in December 2010, he began experiencing persecution by a man named Kurmanov, who Santashbekov believes is a member of an opposing political party and a police 

or government official. Santashbekov testified that Kurmanov 

and his associates asked him to repudiate the Ata Meken 

party and detained and beat him several times in 2011. He testified that after the beatings, he was afraid to leave his home 

and changed his address in Bishkek. Santashbekov also 

changed his name, which was formerly Sultanhodzhaev. Santashbekov testified that his supervisor at the Ata Meken party, 

Zhoomart Saparbaev, recommended that he flee the country 

and helped him. 

Santashbekov also submitted documentary evidence to 

the immigration judge. He submitted hospital paperwork that 

confirms that he received medical treatment in Kyrgyzstan 

corresponding to the beatings he described. He submitted 

criminal court documents showing that Kurmanov was prosecuted and that Santashbekov was named as a “plaintiff” in 

the proceeding. And Santashbekov submitted a document 

confirming that he legally changed his name in December 

2011. Finally, he submitted a letter from Saparbaev saying that 

Santashbekov had “helped us working with young people in 

various activities.” The letter does not mention the Ata Meken 
4 No. 15-2359

party or detail Santashbekov’s political involvement, but it is 

on letterhead from the Jogorku Kenesh, Kyrgyzstan’s national 

legislature.

The immigration judge did not believe Santashbekov’s testimony. He made an adverse credibility determination based 

on the vague and sometimes contradictory nature of Santashbekov’s testimony. The judge also found that Santashbekov’s 

documentary evidence was insufficient to support his claims 

of political activity or persecution. The judge concluded that 

Santashbekov did not carry his burden of proof and denied 

the application for asylum. The Board affirmed the immigration judge’s denial, also noting inconsistencies in Santashbekov’s testimony.1

II. Analysis

Where the Board affirms the immigration judge’s decision 

and adds its own analysis, as it did here, we review the immigration judge’s decision and the Board’s additional reasoning. 

Darinchuluun v. Lynch, 804 F.3d 1208, 1214 (7th Cir. 2015). Our 

review is deferential. We review administrative findings of 

fact, including credibility determinations, for substantial evidence. Tawuo v. Lynch, 799 F.3d 725, 727 (7th Cir. 2015). Under 

 1

Santashbekov also applied for withholding of removal and protection under the United Nations Convention Against Torture. He has not 

argued for withholding of removal in his petition for judicial review, and 

he did not raise the torture claim before the Board or on judicial review. 

An unauthorized immigrant who does not meet burden of proof for an

asylum claim necessarily fails to meet the more stringent requirements for 

withholding of removal and relief under the Convention Against Torture. 

Shmyhelskyy v. Gonzales, 477 F.3d 474, 481–82 (7th Cir. 2007).
No. 15-2359 5

that standard, we must uphold factual determinations “supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on 

the record considered as a whole.” Balogun v. Ashcroft, 374 

F.3d 492, 498 (7th Cir. 2004). We may not reverse an administrative finding of fact “unless any reasonable adjudicator 

would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1252(b)(4)(B). An immigration judge’s credibility findings 

should be overturned only under “extraordinary circumstances.” Balogun, 374 F.3d at 498, citing Pop v. INS, 270 F.3d 

527, 531 (7th Cir. 2001). Still, an adverse credibility finding 

must be supported by specific and cogent reasons, and the 

judge must consider explanations offered for gaps and inconsistencies. See Lishou Wang v. Lynch, 804 F.3d 855, 858 (7th Cir. 

2015) (granting relief); Tawuo v. Lynch, 799 F.3d at 726 (denying relief). 

Here, substantial evidence supports the Board’s and the 

immigration judge’s finding that Santashbekov’s testimony 

was not credible. The Board and the judge noted that Santashbekov testified vaguely about Kurmanov’s identity. He could 

not identify the political party to which Kurmanov belonged 

or the part of the government in which he worked. Similarly, 

as the Board and the judge noted, despite being prompted by 

the immigration judge, Santashbekov did not explain why 

Kurmanov would travel the 400 kilometers from Bishkek to 

Karakol to persecute him, as Santashbekov had claimed he 

had. Immigration authorities may discredit testimony for lack 

of “inherent plausibility.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). Santashbekov’s vagueness and his failure to clarify the parts of 

his story the judge found implausible provided sufficient 

grounds to support an adverse credibility finding. See 

Shmyhelskyy v. Gonzales, 477 F.3d 474, 479 (7th Cir. 2007) (affirming adverse credibility determination where, among 
6 No. 15-2359

other things, testimony about fear of persecution was “vague 

and unconvincing”).

There are also inconsistencies in Santashbekov’s story. Despite a request for clarification at the hearing, Santashbekov 

did not explain to the judge why his new name appeared on 

a criminal court document dated August 2011, though he testified that he began using his new name in December 2011 

and a name-change document showed the same date. Santashbekov also gave different years for when he joined the Ata 

Meken party in his asylum application and in his testimony 

before the immigration judge. He testified that he joined the 

Ata Meken party in October 2010, but his asylum application 

said he joined in October 2009.

An inconsistency need not go to the heart of an applicant’s 

claims to justify an adverse credibility determination, but “the 

inconsistencies spotted by the [judge] should not be trivial.” 

Tawuo, 799 F.3d at 727, 728 (inconsistencies in story not “earthshaking,” but provided substantial evidence for credibility 

determination nonetheless); see also Chun Sui Yuan v. Lynch, 

No. 15-2834, — F.3d —, —, 2016 WL 3536667, at *7 (7th Cir. 

June 28, 2016) (granting petition; inconsistencies identified by 

Board were “either so easily explained or so trivial as to call 

into doubt the Board’s decision”); Shmyhelskyy, 477 F.3d at 480 

(“We have not hesitated to reverse an [immigration judge’s] 

credibility assessment when grounded in trivial details or easily explained discrepancies.”). Here, Santashbekov’s mistakes 

regarding important dates and his vague testimony support 

the adverse credibility determination.
No. 15-2359 7

While Santashbekov’s documentary evidence may corroborate some aspects of his testimony, it does not undermine the 

judge’s credibility finding. As the Board noted, the letter from 

Saparbaev does not mention any of the particulars of Santashbekov’s claimed political activity or persecution (although a 

letter from a member of the national legislature may suggest 

that Santashbekov was somehow involved in politics). As the 

judge noted, Santashbekov did not submit other evidence 

from any other party members verifying his political activities. And as the Board noted, the medical evidence corroborates that Santashbekov was injured at the relevant times, but 

it does not independently establish that political persecution 

was the cause. The judge did not err by giving the medical 

records limited weight because of the vague testimony about 

how they were obtained. See Tawuo, 799 F.3d at 729 (it was 

asylum applicant’s burden to authenticate documents; no error in refusing to let applicant submit more documents to corroborate testimony after immigration judge found initial 

round of documents “wanting”).

Some aspects of the Board’s and judge’s decisions, however, are troubling. For example, the judge wrote that Santashbekov’s parents and sibling in Kyrgyzstan remain “well 

and intact.” But in his asylum application and in the hearing 

before the judge, Santashbekov said the same people who persecuted him had also beaten his brother and broken his 

brother’s leg. Santashbekov submitted a medical document 

corroborating his brother’s injury (although, as noted above, 

the judge did not err by giving medical records limited 

weight).

Similarly, the Board and immigration judge found that 

Santashbekov’s testimony that he was not involved in the 
8 No. 15-2359

April 2010 protests, and that nothing bad happened to him as 

a result of the protests, was inconsistent with his asylum application. The application indicated that his political persecution was due “to the incidents related to the April 7, 2010 protests and the following chaos” (emphasis added). We are mindful of our deference to the Board and immigration judge in 

the area of credibility, but Santashbekov’s asylum application 

did not claim he was involved directly in the April 2010 protests. His asylum application made clear that his persecution 

was due to the chaos related to and following the April 2010 

protests that led to the then-president’s ouster. We do not see 

a basis for discrediting Santashbekov here.

We are also troubled by the Board’s and immigration 

judge’s concern that Santashbekov’s asylum application did

not include many of the details in his testimony before the 

judge, such as his December 2010 political speech. Material 

omissions may certainly support an adverse credibility finding. Shmyhelskyy, 477 F.3d at 480 (we may uphold adverse 

credibility findings when petitioner is “unable to explain a 

significant discrepancy between her hearing testimony and 

her asylum application”), citing Korniejew v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 

377, 386 (7th Cir. 2004). However, the I-589 asylum application 

form provides small boxes to detail an applicant’s experiences, containing space for about ten lines of text. We caution 

against drawing adverse credibility conclusions from an applicant providing differing levels of detail in such different 

contexts. The limited space on the I-589 form provides a readily apparent reason why Santashbekov was able to provide a 

more detailed account of his alleged persecution at the hearing than on the application. Cf. Shmyhelskyy, 477 F.3d at 481 

(applicant “provided no reason for his failure to allege this 
No. 15-2359 9

beating in his asylum application”). The Board’s and the immigration judge’s decisions were thus not flawless, but both 

considered Santashbekov’s claims and evidence, made reasoned decisions, and supported their decisions with substantial evidence.

Finally, Santashbekov argues that the Board and immigration judge violated his due process rights by dismissing his 

arguments “with no analysis” and failing to “give fair and 

proper weight to the evidence at hand ... .” See Reno v. Flores, 

507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993) (Fifth Amendment entitles aliens to 

due process of law in deportation proceedings). This argument is wide of the mark. The Board and the judge provided 

ample analysis to justify their decisions. Santashbekov’s argument that the Board and judge incorrectly weighed the evidence “is indistinguishable from a straightforward claim that 

[their decisions were] not supported by substantial evidence 

on the record.” Albu v. Holder, 761 F.3d 817, 822 (7th Cir. 2014). 

That argument fails both as a due process claim and on the 

merits. 

Accordingly, Santashbekov failed to carry his burden of 

proof to establish his eligibility for asylum. 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(i). The petition for review of the Board’s decision is DENIED.