THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Court of Appeals 

The Estate of Delila Parrott, Respondent, 

v. 

Sandpiper Independent and Assisted Living-Delaware, 

LLC, Appellant. 

Appellate Case No. 2020-001643 

Appeal From Charleston County 

Bentley Price, Circuit Court Judge 

Opinion No. 6067 

Heard March 12, 2024 – Filed June 26, 2024 

REVERSED 

Stephen Lynwood Brown, Russell Grainger Hines, 

Matthew Oliver Riddle, Donald Jay Davis, Jr., and James 

Edward Scott, IV, all of Clement Rivers, LLP, of 

Charleston, for Appellant. 

Todd Richard Lyle, of Lyle Law Firm LLC, and Paul L. 

Reeves, of Reeves Law Firm, LLC, both of Columbia; 

and John G. Boswell, of Raleigh, North Carolina, all for 

Respondent. 

GEATHERS, J.: In this wrongful death and survival action, Sandpiper Independent 

& Assisted Living-Delaware, LLC (Sandpiper) challenges the circuit court's order 

following a bench trial finding Sandpiper liable for the death and conscious pain and 

suffering of Delila Parrott and awarding $1,000,000 to Parrott's estate (Respondent). 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Sandpiper argues that the circuit erred in finding that (1) Sandpiper owed Parrott a 

duty, (2) Sandpiper's breach of that duty proximately caused Parrott's death, and (3) 

Sandpiper failed to establish comparative negligence as a defense. Sandpiper also 

contests the circuit court's calculation of damages, arguing the award was wholly 

undue and speculative or excessive. We reverse. 

FACTS 

Tragically, Delila Parrott, who was eighty years old, fell from a rocking chair 

she was standing on to hang curtains in her apartment at Sandpiper's independent 

living community. Though the exact timeline is disputed, Parrott could have fallen 

as early as the evening of Tuesday, June 3, 2014. The fall caused comminuted 

fracturing of Parrott's hip, resulting in complete immobility as she laid until the 

evening of June 6, when Sandpiper's staff entered Parrott's apartment and called 

emergency services. 

Parrott spent four days in the hospital to treat her broken hip and other 

conditions related to her fall before being discharged and sent to a rehabilitation 

facility owned by Sandpiper. From rehab, she was moved into an assisted living 

community. Having never returned to an independent living community, she was 

hospitalized in January 2015 for mental health reasons, entered hospice care on 

January 31, 2015, and died on February 9, 2015—eight months after the fall. Her 

death certificate listed her causes of death as "failure to thrive" and "chronic 

schizophrenia," among other things. Respondent contended at the bench trial that 

Parrott's death was the result of a "long lie"—a medical condition that occurs when 

an elderly person is left immobile after a fall for an extended period as they await 

rescue—as opposed to her broken hip from the fall.1 See 4 Attorneys Medical 

Advisor § 33:123 (Monique Leahy ed., 2024) (explaining long lies in both injured 

and uninjured "fallers" and noting studies showing that older fallers who could not 

get up were "more likely to suffer a lasting decline in activities of daily living," but 

1 Included in the record as a trial exhibit is a 1996 special article from the New 

England Journal of Medicine examining the long lie phenomenon. This article notes 

that "[t]he total mortality was [67%] for patients who were estimated to have been 

helpless for more than [seventy-two] hours, as compared with [12%] for those who 

had been helpless for less than [one] hour." However, the study acknowledged that 

it was unable "to determine the independent influence of functional status, the length 

of time spent helpless, the extent of social support, diagnosis, demographic 

variables, or a number of other factors on the outcomes of persons found dead or 

helpless in their homes." 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

that the increased likelihood of death and hospitalization arising therefrom was not 

statistically significant). 

I. Background on Sandpiper and its Check-In Policy 

In the independent living community where Parrott lived, Sandpiper offered 

several amenities to its residents. These amenities included two meals per day, 

planned activities for the residents, general maintenance services, weekly laundry 

and housekeeping services, and transportation for social events. Though it was not 

contained in the lease, Sandpiper also operated a daily check-in policy whereby a 

staff member would sign off for each resident on a sheet at the front desk once daily, 

confirming that the resident had been seen or at least heard from. Specifically, an 

internal document outlining procedures and policies for Sandpiper's front desk 

workers stated, "All residents must be seen by staff and initialed off every day. If 

you do not see someone, call them[. I]f you can't get them on the phone, go to the 

apartment and check on them." Corrine Carrington, the executive director of 

Sandpiper's independent living community, further explained: 

We check the residents daily, make sure we saw them. If 

we hadn't seen the residents by a certain time at night, we 

were to be calling them. If they didn't answer their phone, 

we should be going to the units to check on them, to make 

sure we saw them. 

Carrington also explained that Sandpiper had duplicate keys for each apartment in 

addition to a master key and that if a resident who had not yet been checked on did 

not answer the door, the staff would use one of these keys to enter the apartment. 

Residents at Sandpiper were also issued a "panic button"—a wearable device 

that allowed residents to call for help in an emergency. Carrington testified that 

although "the majority [of residents] probably wore their panic button[,] . . . it was 

not uncommon for some of them not to wear it." Carrington and Beth Auld, a 

longtime Sandpiper employee, agreed that the panic button was Sandpiper's primary 

response to falls. It is undisputed that Parrott was not wearing her panic button when 

she was attempting to hang the curtains. 

II. Background on Parrott 

Parrott signed a lease to live at Sandpiper in April 2013. Joan Acosta, Parrott's 

daughter and personal representative, explained that, prior to this, even though 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Parrott "was still independent," Acosta "wanted to be proactive . . . and get [Parrott] 

in a situation where there would be transportation available, where she would have 

activities available, [and] where she was checked [on] every[ ]day." The lease 

Parrott signed contained the following language: 

Sandpiper is not responsible for the negligence of its 

[o]ccupants including acts or omissions that cause injury 

or death to other persons or damage to property. . . . You 

agree to be responsible . . . and hold 

Sandpiper . . . harmless from and against[] any and all 

claims . . . resulting from any injury to or death of any 

person and/or any damage to property caused by, resulting 

from, attributable to, or in any way connected with acts or 

omissions of or on the part of you as occupant. 

The lease further stated: 

Both Sandpiper and you agree that your freedom to make 

personal health and non-health related decisions, the 

freedom to travel, to come and go as you please, the 

decisions that [a]ffect and control your day-to-day 

activities should all remain within your sole decision so 

long as it does not adversely affect other occupants. As 

such, both Sandpiper and you understand and realize that 

such decision making ability carries an inherent possibility 

of adversity that may directly or indirectly affect you as 

occupant. Therefore, you . . . agree to assume such risk 

and related consequences and, as it relates to 

Sandpiper, . . . waive any and all liability against 

[Sandpiper] from any and all damages, both direct and 

indirect, that may result from such activities, the risks[,] 

and the . . . damages resulting from such activities. 

(emphases added). Though Parrott began suffering from mental health problems 

around 2009, which included periods of delusions, her condition was considered 

stable prior to the fall. In her report following Parrott's fall, Carrington described 

Parrott as "very private" and noted that Parrott had told her at least once that she 

(Parrott) did not want anyone in her apartment. Consequently, Carrington made a 

note on Parrott's file that Parrott was "fearful of people coming in without her 

knowledge" and that "no one is allowed in [Parrott's apartment] without [Parrott] 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

being present." Carrington also testified that Parrott "was probably concerned about 

her privacy[] more than any other resident," but noted that a resident's privacy should 

not deter staff from entering for the purposes of conducting a check-in.2 

Carrington also stated that about four months prior to the fall, Parrott had 

changed her locks. Carrington explained that she learned about the changed locks 

only after she came upon Parrott struggling to unlock her apartment and that though 

Parrott was hesitant to provide Sandpiper with a duplicate key for the changed locks, 

she ultimately relented and provided one. 

III. Parrott's Fall and Long Lie 

Though the parties disputed at trial the timeline for Parrott's fall, the circuit 

court accepted Respondent's formulation: Parrott fell on the evening of Tuesday, 

June 3, and was not found until Friday, June 6, despite the daily check-in policy. 

Towards the end of the day on Wednesday, June 4, one of Sandpiper's employees, 

Rebecca Munoz, noticed that Parrott was not signed off on the daily check-in sheet. 

Consequently, Munoz walked over to Parrott's unit with the master key to check on 

her after unsuccessfully trying to call her. Munoz knocked on the door, but no one 

answered. Munoz attempted to enter the apartment using the master key, but it did 

not work because Parrott had changed her locks. However, Munoz did not walk the 

"very short distance" back to the office from Parrott's apartment to obtain the 

duplicate key that would have allowed her to enter the apartment.3 Instead, she 

called Auld, who, in addition to being a longtime Sandpiper employee, is also 

Munoz's mother. Together, they decided Munoz did not need to enter Parrott's 

apartment that night to complete the check-in; instead, Munoz asked Auld to check 

on Parrott on Thursday. Although Auld did not recall the details of the conversation 

with Munoz, she agreed that Parrott's privacy concerns "definitely" factored into the 

decision not to enter Parrott's apartment, and Munoz testified to the same. Munoz 

completed her shift and went home having never visually confirmed Parrott's 

wellbeing. Munoz was not scheduled to work again until Friday, June 6. 

2 Carrington later seemed to acknowledge that even though it should not impact a 

decision on whether to enter a resident's apartment, it could. 3 Munoz claimed that she did not know where to find the duplicate key for Parrott's 

apartment after she tried to enter unsuccessfully with the master key. However, she 

answered affirmatively when asked if she knew where to locate the key when she 

eventually returned and entered Parrott's apartment Friday evening. 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The next day—Thursday, June 5—Auld reported to work and signed off on 

having seen Parrott. Auld later maintained to Carrington that her marking the 

check-in sheet was accurate and reflected the fact that Auld had seen Parrott on June 

5. However, even though Sandpiper's practice was to preserve records of the 

check-in sheets, the June 5 record with Auld's signature no longer existed at the time 

of the trial. Additionally, Auld could not recall at trial exactly when or where she 

purportedly saw Parrott on Thursday. A friend and neighbor of Parrott's, Lila 

Watters, stated that she did not see Parrott on June 5 even though the two regularly 

dined together. 

On Friday, June 6, Munoz returned to work. That evening, at the urging of 

Watters, Munoz used the duplicate key to enter Parrott's apartment and found Parrott 

lying on the floor. Though Parrott told EMS that she had fallen on Tuesday, she 

later told Carrington that she fell on Wednesday. Parrott's longtime physician, Dr. 

Richard Mills, testified: 

I would be willing to say with a reasonable degree of 

medical certainty that [Parrott] was on the ground most 

likely, in my mind, somewhere between thirty-six hours to 

three days. But I don't think it was in the four-hour to the 

twenty-four-hour range. And I tend to think that based on 

the things I saw . . . in the record that it was longer than 

that. 

Respondent's theory of the case at the bench trial was that although Parrott recovered 

physiologically from her broken hip, the extended period of time she spent on the 

floor amounted to a long lie. Further, they maintained that this long lie drained 

Parrott of her will to live and resulted in her death. Dr. Mills agreed at the bench 

trial that Parrott's long lie shortened her life. Dr. Mills explained that based on 

Parrott's recovery from the surgery for her hip, he expected her to live "many more 

years" and that her death within eight months was unexpected. Dr. Mills also 

testified that the longer the amount of time Parrott spent on the floor, the more 

adverse the consequences of the long lie would have been on her mental health. 

Respondent also introduced testimony from Dr. Lawrence Bergmann, an 

expert witness in trauma, that Parrott's psychological condition continually declined 

following the fall and that the scientific literature supported finding a causal link 

between Parrott's time on the floor and her eventual death.4 

4 Dr. Bergmann's testimony was presented via a deposition de benne esse. 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

In October 2016, Acosta, as personal representative of Parrott's estate, brought 

wrongful death and survival actions against Sandpiper, alleging that Sandpiper 

negligently caused Parrott's death by breaching its internal policy requiring a 

Sandpiper staff member to sign off on a check-in sheet each day indicating they had 

verified the wellbeing of each resident. Following a bench trial, the circuit court 

awarded Respondent $500,000 for the wrongful death cause of action and $500,000 

for the survival action. Sandpiper moved post-trial for relief from the judgment, 

which the circuit court denied on November 18, 2020. This appeal follows. 

ISSUES ON APPEAL 

I. Did the circuit court err by finding that Sandpiper owed Parrott a duty? 

II. Did the circuit court err by finding that Sandpiper's breach of the duty it owed 

Parrott proximately caused Parrott's conscious pain and suffering and death? 

III. Did the circuit court err by failing to find comparative negligence on the part 

of Parrott? 

IV. Did the circuit court err in its calculation of the $1,000,000 award? 

STANDARD OF REVIEW 

"In an action at law tried by a judge without a jury, the appellate court will 

correct any error of law, but it must affirm the trial court's factual findings unless no 

evidence reasonably supports those findings." Frazier v. Smallseed, 384 S.C. 56, 

61, 682 S.E.2d 8, 11 (Ct. App. 2009) (per curiam). Wrongful death and survival 

actions are actions at law. See First Union Nat'l. Bank of S.C. v. Soden, 333 S.C. 

554, 574, 511 S.E.2d 372, 382 (Ct. App. 1998) ("[T]he character of an action as legal 

or equitable depends on the relief sought."); see also Longshore v. Saber Sec. Servs., 

Inc., 365 S.C. 554, 560, 619 S.E.2d 5, 9 (Ct. App. 2005) ("An action in tort for 

damages is an action at law."); S.C. Code Ann. § 15-51-10 (2005) (establishing the 

wrongful death cause of action as "an action for damages."). 

LAW AND ANALYSIS 

We hold that Sandpiper owed Parrott no duty because (1) internal policies 

cannot, standing alone, create a duty in South Carolina, and (2) there is no evidence 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

that Parrott's harm was caused by her reliance on the check-in policy. Therefore, we 

reverse the circuit court. 

Section 15-51-10 of the South Carolina Code imposes liability on tortfeasors 

who cause the death of another party through a wrongful act, neglect, or default that 

would have entitled the injured party to maintain an action for damages had they 

survived.5 See generally Land v. Green Tree Servicing, LLC, 140 F. Supp. 3d 539, 

544–45 (D.S.C. 2015) (exploring the history of wrongful death actions in South 

Carolina and concluding that "the plaintiff in a wrongful death action must establish 

that the wrongful act or negligence of the defendant caused the death of the 

decedent." (emphasis added)). 

"A plaintiff must prove three elements on a negligence claim: '(1) a duty of 

care owed by [the] defendant to [the] plaintiff; (2) breach of that duty by a negligent 

act or omission; and (3) damage proximately resulting from the breach of duty.'" 

Dawkins v. Sell, 434 S.C. 572, 581, 865 S.E.2d 1, 5 (Ct. App. 2021) (alterations in 

original) (quoting J.T. Baggerly v. CSX Transp., Inc., 370 S.C. 362, 368–69, 635 

S.E.2d 97, 101 (2006)). "If no duty has been established, evidence as to the standard 

of care is irrelevant. Only when there is a duty would a standard of care need to be 

established." Doe ex rel. Doe v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 393 S.C. 240, 247, 711 

S.E.2d 908, 912 (2011). Here, Sandpiper contests the circuit court's conclusions on 

duty and causation. 

5 In full, the statute reads: 

Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by the 

wrongful act, neglect or default of another and the act, 

neglect or default is such as would, if death had not 

ensued, have entitled the party injured to maintain an 

action and recover damages in respect thereof, the person 

who would have been liable, if death had not ensued, shall 

be liable to an action for damages, notwithstanding the 

death of the person injured, although the death shall have 

been caused under such circumstances as make the killing 

in law a felony. In the event of the death of the wrongdoer, 

such cause of action shall survive against his personal 

representative. 

§ 15-51-10. 
"A tortfeasor's duty arises from his relationship to the injured party." Ravan 

v. Greenville County, 315 S.C. 447, 467, 434 S.E.2d 296, 308 (Ct. App. 1993) 

(quoting S.C. State Ports Auth. v. Booz-Allen & Hamilton, Inc., 289 S.C. 373, 376, 

346 S.E.2d 324, 325–26 (1986)). "It is essential [for] liability for negligence to 

attach that the parties shall have sustained a relationship recognized by law as the 

foundation of a duty of care." Id. Whether a duty exists is a question of law. 

McCord v. Laurens Cnty. Health Care Sys., 429 S.C. 286, 296, 838 S.E.2d 220, 225 

(Ct. App. 2020). Furthermore, 

 

 

 

 

 

 

[t]here is no formula for determining duty; a duty is not 

sacrosanct in itself but only an expression of the sum total 

of those considerations of policy which lead the law to say 

that a particular plaintiff is entitled to protection. Suffice 

it to say that a multiplicity of factors come into play when 

courts contemplate the question of duty. These factors 

include the policy of deterring future tortfeasors, the moral 

culpability of the tortfeasor and numerous other 

conceivable factors; duty is seen in general terms as 

requiring a person or corporation to conform his or its 

conduct to a standard which is adequate to protect others 

from unreasonable risk of harm. 

Araujo v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 291 S.C. 54, 57–58, 351 S.E.2d 908, 910 (Ct. App. 

1986) (footnote omitted). 

In South Carolina, "there is no general duty to control the conduct of another." 

Madison ex rel. Bryant v. Babcock Ctr., Inc., 371 S.C. 123, 136, 638 S.E.2d 650, 

656 (2006). Consequently, "a person usually incurs no liability when he fails to take 

steps to protect others from harm not created by his own wrongful conduct." 

Degenhart v. Knights of Columbus, 309 S.C. 114, 116, 420 S.E.2d 495, 496 (1992). 

However, there are five main exceptions to this rule: 

(1) where the defendant has a special relationship to the 

victim; (2) where the defendant has a special relationship 

to the injurer; (3) where the defendant voluntarily 

undertakes a duty; (4) where the defendant negligently or 

intentionally creates the risk; and (5) where a statute 

imposes a duty on the defendant. 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Babcock Ctr., 371 S.C. at 136, 638 S.E.2d at 656. Beyond these exceptions, "[a]n 

affirmative legal duty may be created by statute, a contractual relationship, status, 

property interest, or some other special circumstance." Id. at 136, 638 S.E.2d at 

656–57. 

Here, the circuit court based its finding of duty on the third exception—where 

the defendant voluntarily undertakes a duty. A formulation of this exception is 

contained in section 323 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts and has been 

oft-repeated by South Carolina courts: 

One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to 

render services to another which he should recognize as 

necessary for the protection of the other's person or things, 

is subject to liability to the other for physical harm 

resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to 

perform his undertaking, if 

(a) his failure to exercise such care increases the risk of 

such harm, or 

(b)the harm is suffered because of the other's reliance 

upon the undertaking. 

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 323 (Am. L. Inst. 1965); see also Doe 2 v. Citadel, 

421 S.C. 140, 147, 805 S.E.2d 578, 582 (Ct. App. 2017) ("Under South Carolina 

law, the Restatement [(Second)] of Torts establishes the recognition of a voluntarily 

assumed duty . . . ."). "In most of the cases finding liability [for a voluntary 

undertaking], the defendant has made the situation worse, either by increasing the 

danger, by misleading the plaintiff into the belief that [the danger] has been removed, 

or by depriving him of the possibility of help from other sources." W. Page Keeton, 

et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 56 at 381 (5th ed. 1984). In South 

Carolina, both subsections of section 323 apply only to duty and not to proximate 

cause. Wright v. PRG Real Estate Mgmt., Inc., 426 S.C. 202, 219, 826 S.E.2d 285, 

294 (2019). 

I. Internal Policies as a Basis for a Legal Duty 

Our courts have held that internal policies cannot establish the voluntary 

undertaking of a duty pursuant to section 323; instead, they can be used only as 

evidence to establish the contours of the standard of care once a duty has been 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

established. See Citadel, 421 S.C. at 148, 805 S.E.2d at 583 ("[W]e find the internal 

policies created by [the respondent] do not establish a voluntary undertaking of a 

duty; rather, they can only serve as evidence of the standard of care if the duty was 

established by law."); see also Wal-Mart, 393 S.C. at 248, 711 S.E.2d at 912 (finding 

that an "internal policy cannot be said to constitute the voluntary undertaking of a 

duty," but instead could serve only as evidence of the standard of care); Pacicca v. 

Jackson, No. 3:21-CV-03136-DCC, 2023 WL 8242180, at *3 (D.S.C. Nov. 28, 

2023) ("[U]nder South Carolina law, a company's internal policies do not establish 

a duty for purposes of a negligence claim."); Bernstein v. Walmart, Inc., No. 

2:22-CV-1637-BHH, 2024 WL 476300, at *4 n.1 (D.S.C. Feb. 7, 2024) ("[W]hile a 

failure to follow company internal policies 'may be evidence of a breach of a 

standard of care,' South Carolina law is clear that [the defendant]'s alleged failure to 

comply with its [standard operating procedure] does not create a duty towards [the 

plaintiff]." (quoting Pacicca, 2023 WL 8242180, at *3)); see generally Peterson v. 

Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 365 S.C. 391, 397, 618 S.E.2d 903, 906 (2005) ("[W]e 

hold that evidence of [the r]espondent's deviation from their internal maintenance 

policies is admissible to show the element of breach." (emphasis added)); Caldwell 

v. K-Mart Corp., 306 S.C. 27, 31, 410 S.E.2d 21, 24 (Ct. App. 1991) ("In negligence 

cases, internal policies or self-imposed rules are often admissible as relevant on the 

issue of failure to exercise due care." (emphasis added)). 

Courts in other jurisdictions have often reached similar conclusions. See, e.g., 

Killian v. Caza Drilling, Inc., 131 P.3d 975, 982 (Wyo. 2006) (distinguishing using 

violations of internal policies as evidence of the standard of care from using the same 

as evidence of duty); Zdrojewski v. Murphy, 657 N.W.2d 721, 729 (Mich. Ct. App. 

2002) ("Defendants are correct in their assertion that internal policies of an 

institution . . . cannot be used to establish a legal duty in a negligence claim."); Doe 

v. Coe, 135 N.E.3d 1, 12 (Ill. 2019) ("We first note that '[w]here the law does not 

impose a duty, one will not generally be created by a defendant's rules or internal 

guidelines. Rather, it is the law which, in the end, must say what is legally required.'" 

(alteration in original) (quoting Rhodes v. Ill. Cent. Gulf R.R., 665 N.E.2d 1260, 1272 

(Ill. 1996))); Estate of Catlin v. General Motors Corp., 936 S.W.2d 447, 451 (Tex. 

App. 1996) (holding that "the mere creation of an internal policy" prohibiting 

employees from drinking alcohol did not create a duty to plaintiffs injured by an 

inebriated employee's conduct and that "[m]ore [wa]s required"); Doe v. Saint 

Francis Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 72 A.3d 929, 963 (Conn. 2013) ("[A]lthough a violation 

of an employer's work rules can be viewed as evidence of negligence, . . . regulations 

and policies do not themselves establish the standard of care." (quoting Petriello v. 

Kalman, 576 A.2d 474, 479 (Conn. 1990)); Va. Ry. & Power Co. v. Godsey, 83 S.E. 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

1072, 1073 (Va. 1915) ("A person cannot, by the adoption of private rules, fix the 

standard of his duty to others. That is fixed by law, either statutory or common."). 

In Citadel, a young male (Doe) who was the victim of sexual abuse at the 

hands of a former camp counselor of The Citadel sued The Citadel alleging that it 

failed to act on an April 2007 report made to the college's general counsel that the 

counselor had sexually abused a former camper. 421 S.C. at 142–44, 805 S.E.2d at 

579–80. Doe's abuse transpired from the summer of 2005 to the summer of 2007, 

and although Doe never attended "any summer camps or educational programs at 

The Citadel," he sued under the theory that but for The Citadel's failure to exercise 

due care in its 2007 investigation, the former camp counselor would have been 

exposed sooner and the harm to Doe would have been mitigated. Id. at 148, 805 

S.E.2d at 582. The Citadel had adopted policies for the oversight of its camps and 

counselors, which Doe argued "required action following the April 2007 

allegations." Id. Doe appealed the circuit court's grant of summary judgment in 

favor of The Citadel, arguing, in part, that these policies established the voluntary 

undertaking of a duty to investigate and arrest the former camp counselor. This court 

rejected this argument, finding that "any violation of an internal policy [requiring 

investigations into allegations of sexual abuse did] not give rise to the voluntary 

assumption of a duty and [did] not establish that The Citadel owed a duty of care as 

a matter of law." Id. at 149, 805 S.E.2d at 583. 

In Wal-Mart, the aunt of a minor who was physically and sexually abused 

sued Wal-Mart for destroying photographs that the aunt had taken to prove to the 

Department of Social Services that the minor was being abused by the minor's father. 

393 S.C. at 242–44, 711 S.E.2d at 909–10. The aunt took the roll of film containing 

the evidence of abuse to Wal-Mart to have the film developed, but when the aunt 

returned to pick up the photos, an employee told the aunt that the employee had 

destroyed some of them because the store's policy required destroying photos 

depicting nudity. Id. at 243, 711 S.E.2d at 909. The minor's abuse was proven 

several months later, and the aunt, as guardian ad litem for the minor, sued 

Wal-Mart, alleging that Wal-Mart caused the delay by violating its internal policies 

that the aunt maintained required the employee to turn the photos over to a supervisor 

rather than destroy them. Id. at 243, 711 S.E.2d at 910. Our supreme court affirmed 

the circuit court's grant of summary judgment to Wal-Mart, holding that Wal-Mart's 

internal policy requiring photos depicting nudity be turned over to management 

"cannot be said to constitute the voluntary undertaking of a duty. Rather, it could 

simply serve as evidence of the standard of care, once that duty was established by 

law." Id. at 248, 711 S.E.2d at 912. 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Here, the circuit court found that Sandpiper "had a policy of providing daily 

wellness checks and that this policy created a duty to . . . exercise reasonable care in 

utilizing the systems/protocols it put in place." To the extent that the circuit court 

relied on the mere existence of Sandpiper's check-in policy to create a duty, we 

reverse. See Citadel, 421 S.C. at 148, 805 S.E.2d at 583 (holding that internal 

policies do not create voluntary undertakings of a duty); see also Wal-Mart, 393 S.C. 

at 248, 711 S.E.2d at 912 ("It is undisputed that Wal-Mart created an internal policy 

that was subsequently violated when the photo technician destroyed the photos and 

did not inform the store manager or keep them as evidence. However, this internal 

policy cannot be said to constitute the voluntary undertaking of a duty. Rather, it 

could simply serve as evidence of the standard of care, once that duty was established 

by law."). 

II. Analysis Under Section 323 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts 

Regardless of whether Sandpiper's check-in policy is an internal policy akin 

to those in Citadel and Wal-Mart, no evidence in the record supports the circuit 

court's conclusion that Parrott's reliance on the check-in policy caused her harm. 

Respondent points to Wright as controlling authority in this regard. In Wright, an 

opinion published after Citadel and Wal-Mart, our supreme court held that it was a 

question of fact for the jury as to whether an apartment complex voluntarily assumed 

a duty under section 323 when it undertook to provide a courtesy officer service to 

its tenants. 426 S.C. at 220–21, 826 S.E.2d at 295. Specifically, the apartment 

complex allowed residents affiliated with law enforcement "to receive reduced rent 

in exchange for their service as courtesy officers for the apartment complex." Id. at 

207, 826 S.E.2d at 287. Employed as independent contractors for the complex, these 

courtesy officers were required to devote time to walking the property, answering 

calls from tenants about incidents on the property, and reporting daily to the property 

manager. Id. The plaintiff in Wright was the victim of an armed robbery in the 

parking lot of the apartment complex. Id. at 207–08, 826 S.E.2d at 287–88. Prior 

to moving in, an apartment complex manager told the plaintiff that there were 

security officers on duty even though an internal employee manual instructed 

employees to not indicate that the complex provided security to residents. Id. at 206, 

826 S.E.2d at 287. However, this internal instruction was not made available to the 

plaintiff. Id. at 206–07, 826 S.E.2d at 287. Our supreme court held that summary 

judgment was inappropriate because resolution of the factual conflicts underlying 

the analyses of subsections (a) and (b) of section 323 was in the province of the jury. 

Id. at 221, 826 S.E.2d at 295. Importantly, the court in Wright was not asked to 

address or consider whether the courtesy officer program constituted an internal 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

policy. The court also emphasized that its holding was tailored to the "existence of 

a duty under the narrow facts of this case." Id. at 220, 826 S.E.2d at 294. 

In Wright, there was conflicting evidence as to whether the plaintiff relied on 

the courtesy officer program and whether the plaintiff's harm arose from this 

reliance. Here, on the other hand, there is no evidence supporting the circuit court's 

conclusion that Parrott suffered the harm from her long lie because of her reliance 

on Sandpiper's check-in policy. Specifically, Respondent proffered no evidence to 

suggest that Parrott took the risk of hanging curtains while standing on a rocking 

chair—or of not wearing her panic button—because she was relying on the 

expectation that someone from Sandpiper would have come by pursuant to the 

check-in policy to rescue her. If anything, the evidence in the record suggests that 

Parrott was not keen on Sandpiper's check-in policy and the panic button system, 

which undermines the notion that Parrott's harm resulted from her reliance on the 

check-in policy. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 323(b) (Am. L. Inst. 1965) 

(recognizing a duty may arise when "the [plaintiff's] harm is suffered because of the 

other's reliance upon the undertaking"); see also W. Page Keeton, et al., Prosser and 

Keeton on the Law of Torts § 56 at 381 (5th ed. 1984) ("In most of the cases finding 

liability [for a voluntary undertaking], the defendant has made the situation worse, 

either by increasing the danger, by misleading the plaintiff into the belief that [the 

danger] has been removed, or by depriving him of the possibility of help from other 

sources."). 

The Wright court held that there was an issue of fact for the jury as to "whether 

any failure by [the apartment complex] to exercise due care in performing the 

undertaking [of offering a courtesy officer program] increased the risk of harm to 

[the plaintiff]." 426 S.C. at 221, 826 S.E.2d at 295. Here, however, the circuit court 

made no finding under subsection (a) that Sandpiper's negligent execution of its 

check-in policy increased Parrott's risk of harm. It is therefore unnecessary to 

analyze the instant case under subsection (a). See Staubes v. City of Folly Beach, 

339 S.C. 406, 412, 529 S.E.2d 543, 546 (2000) ("Without an initial ruling by the trial 

court, a reviewing court simply would not be able to evaluate whether the trial court 

committed error."). 

Because we reverse the circuit court's finding that a duty existed, Respondent's 

wrongful death claim against Sandpiper must fail. See Ravan, 315 S.C. at 467, 434 

S.E.2d at 308 ("It is essential [for] liability for negligence to attach that the parties 

shall have sustained a relationship recognized by law as the foundation of a duty of 

care."). It is therefore unnecessary to address the remaining issues. See Futch v. 

McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 
(1999) (noting that an appellate court need not address remaining issues when 

resolution of a prior issue is dispositive). 

CONCLUSION 

Based on the foregoing, the judgment of the circuit court is 

REVERSED. 

HEWITT and VINSON, JJ., concur.