United States Court of Appeals

For the First Circuit 

Nos. 13-1938, 13-1945, 13-1946 

PAUL A. DECOLOGERO, PAUL J. DECOLOGERO, and 

JOHN P. DECOLOGERO, JR., 

Petitioners, Appellants, 

v. 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Respondent, Appellee. 

APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS 

[Hon. Rya W. Zobel, U.S. District Judge] 

Before 

Selya, Circuit Judge, 

Souter,* Associate Justice, 

and Lipez, Circuit Judge. 

 Matthew D. Thompson, with whom Butters Brazilian LLP was on 

brief, for appellant Paul A. DeCologero. 

 Jeanne M. Kempthorne for appellant Paul J. DeCologero. 

 Mark W. Shea, with whom Jean C. LaRocque and Shea and 

LaRocque, LLP were on brief, for appellant John P. DeCologero, Jr. 

 Jennifer Hays Zacks, Assistant United States Attorney, with 

 * Hon. David H. Souter, Associate Justice (Ret.) of the 

Supreme Court of the United States, sitting by designation. 
whom Carmen M. Ortiz, United States Attorney, was on brief, for 

appellee. 

September 21, 2015 
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LIPEZ, Circuit Judge. Appellants Paul A. DeCologero 

("Paul A."), Paul J. DeCologero ("Paul J."), and John P. 

DeCologero, Jr. ("John Jr.") were members of a Boston-based 

criminal organization known as the "DeCologero crew." In 2006, 

all three were convicted of violations of the Racketeer Influenced 

and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO") and a number of related 

crimes. Appellants have now moved under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate 

their convictions. Their motions are based on two Federal Bureau 

of Investigation ("FBI") reports that they claim are exculpatory 

evidence that the prosecution should have produced before trial 

under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). The district court 

denied the motions, finding that the prosecution team was not aware 

of the reports prior to the trial and that the reports were not 

material for Brady purposes. We only address the materiality issue 

and affirm on that basis. 

I. 

We recite the pertinent facts in the light most favorable 

to the verdicts. Bucci v. United States, 662 F.3d 18, 20 (1st 

Cir. 2011). The facts are described in greater detail in our 

opinion on the direct appeals. See United States v. DeCologero, 

530 F.3d 36 (1st Cir. 2008) ("DeCologero I"). 

In the 1990s, Paul A. ran the "DeCologero crew" criminal 

enterprise out of a gym he operated in Woburn, Massachusetts. His 

nephews Paul J. and John Jr., and other associates, assisted Paul 
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A. in his efforts to control part of Boston's drug trade. The 

crew traded in guns and drugs, and used force to compete with rival 

criminal factions. 

A. The Silva Murder 

In 1996, members of the crew, acting on orders from Paul 

A., murdered a 19-year-old woman named Aislin Silva, because Paul 

A. was afraid that she would betray the crew to the police. The 

testimony at trial regarding Silva's killing came primarily from 

Stephen DiCenso, a former member of the DeCologero crew who was 

closely involved in the murder. According to DiCenso, in November 

1996, the police found a stash of guns that the DeCologero crew 

had hidden in Silva's apartment. Paul A. decided to kill Silva 

because he was afraid that she would implicate him and his 

associates if the police interrogated her about the guns. 

Initially, Paul A. planned to get Silva to overdose on 

heroin, and he instructed Paul J. to acquire some high-grade heroin 

for that purpose. DiCenso and another DeCologero crew member, 

Kevin Meuse, then gave Silva the heroin and told her that it was 

good cocaine. She took the heroin but did not overdose. When 

that plan failed, Paul A. ordered Meuse to kill Silva by force. 

DiCenso testified that Meuse brought Silva to DiCenso's father's 

apartment and killed her by breaking her neck. DiCenso and Derek 

Capozzi, another DeCologero crew member, subsequently arrived at 

the apartment to help Meuse dispose of the body. The three of 
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them dismembered her body in a bathtub, stuffed her body parts 

into plastic garbage bags and gym bags, and then drove to Home 

Depot to purchase a shovel and other items to assist with Silva's 

burial. Then, they drove to a wooded-area on the North Shore of 

Massachusetts and buried her remains there. They disposed of the 

garbage bags and gym bags in a dumpster in Danvers, Massachusetts. 

DiCenso's testimony was corroborated by the testimony of 

two other former members of the DeCologero crew, John P. DeCologero 

("John P.") and Thomas Regan. As a crew member, Regan took orders 

from Paul A. and robbed a number of Boston-area drug dealers with 

other associates. John P. was the brother of crew leader Paul A. 

and father of Paul J. and John Jr. John P. testified that he had 

heard Paul A. say that the heroin intended to kill Silva did not 

work. He also testified that John Jr. told him that Meuse had 

killed Silva and that DiCenso and Capozzi had helped Meuse dispose 

of her body. Regan testified that Paul A. told him that Meuse and 

DiCenso had killed Silva and cut up her body. 

DiCenso's testimony was also corroborated by physical 

evidence, including the bloody trash bags and gym bags found in 

the dumpster in Danvers. DNA from the blood, hair, and tissue on 

the bags belonged to Silva. A security video from Home Depot 

showed Capozzi and Meuse leaving the store with a shovel and other 

items; a receipt from the Home Depot included the purchase of a 

shovel, gloves, and flashlights. Packaging for the flashlights 
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and gloves was found in the Danvers dumpster. Meuse's fingerprint 

was also found on an item in the dumpster. 

At trial, appellants attempted to argue, with little 

success, that another Boston-based criminal organization led by 

Vincent Marino, also known as Gigi Portalla, was responsible for 

Silva's murder. First, appellants contended that DiCenso was 

actually a member of Portalla's crew, not the DeCologero crew, 

because DiCenso had allegedly told a government informant that he 

worked for Portalla. However, on cross-examination, DiCenso 

denied that he made the statement and said that he had not worked 

for Portalla. Second, Portalla was seen at Silva's apartment a 

few weeks before her murder. However, the evidence demonstrated 

that Portalla was there with Paul A. to inspect the guns stored at 

the apartment to see if he wanted to purchase any guns from the 

DeCologero crew's stash. Finally, appellants argued that Regan 

was lying because he was not a member of the DeCologero crew, but 

in fact was a member of the rival Salemme faction. 

Appellants' case was hurt by their failure to get 

Portalla and his associates to testify at trial. Paul A.'s initial 

witness list included Portalla and Portalla's crew members Charles 

McConnell and Robert Nogueira. However, Nogueira had died years 

earlier, and McConnell was never subpoenaed. Portalla was 

subpoenaed during trial, but he was in federal custody at the time, 

and could not be transferred quickly enough to testify. Paul A. 
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appealed the district court's refusal to expedite Portalla's 

transport from a federal penitentiary in Pennsylvania or to provide 

a continuance until Portalla had arrived. We affirmed the district 

court's decision, faulting Paul A. for waiting until the middle of 

trial to make his request and stating that Portalla's proffered 

testimony was "tangential and potentially cumulative." DeCologero 

I, 530 F.3d at 75. 

For his part in ordering Silva's death, Paul A. was 

convicted of witness tampering conspiracy, witness tampering by 

misleading conduct, witness tampering by attempting to kill, and 

witness tampering by killing. Several predicate acts underlying 

his substantive RICO conviction also stemmed from his role in 

Silva's death. Paul J. was convicted of witness tampering 

conspiracy, witness tampering by misleading conduct, and witness 

tampering by attempting to kill; the latter two crimes were also 

predicate acts for his RICO conviction. John Jr. was not charged 

with any offenses relating to the Silva killing. All three were 

also convicted of other crimes not directly relevant to this 

appeal. Paul A. received a life sentence, Paul J. was sentenced 

to 25 years, and John Jr. was sentenced to 210 months. On direct 

appeal, we affirmed their convictions and sentences. See id. at 

79. 
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B. The FBI Reports 

In September 2010, more than four years after 

appellants' convictions, Paul J.'s former attorney received a fax 

containing two FBI reports describing interviews with a woman named 

Michelle Noe (the "Noe reports"). According to the reports, the 

interviews with Noe took place in the fall of 1999, about two years 

before appellants were indicted by a federal grand jury1 and three 

years after Silva was killed. The first report is three pages and 

describes two interviews that Noe had with Lt. Eugene A. Kee Jr. 

of the Massachusetts State Police and Detectives Thomas J. Romeo 

and Michael P. Murphy of the North Reading Police soon after she 

was arrested on an outstanding warrant for an unarmed bank robbery 

on September 10, 1999. Noe reported that, in mid-November 1996, 

McConnell -- her then-boyfriend -- came home in a panic with his 

clothes and arms covered in blood. After washing the blood off 

his arms, McConnell put the bloody clothes in a green garbage bag, 

and left the house. About 30 minutes later, Noe looked outside 

the window and saw McConnell talking to Portalla on the sidewalk. 

When McConnell returned to the house, he initially told Noe that 

Portalla would kill her if he told her what had happened. 

Eventually, McConnell said, "I did something, I can't believe I 

did. She was your age. I'm not going into details. Remember the 

 1 Appellants, and several co-defendants, were indicted as part 

of a 23-count indictment on October 17, 2001. 
- 9 - 

girl I used to take you by the house with [Portalla]. She worked 

at MVP. We did something to her, she ratted." McConnell stated 

that Portalla and Nogueira were with him at the time, and if the 

police talk to Noe, she should say that McConnell was with her the 

entire evening. Although the report does not identify Silva by 

name, the parties do not dispute that Noe was referring to Silva 

as the girl who "worked at MVP," a sporting goods store. 

Later (Noe was not sure of the time frame), when the 

news reported that human remains were found in a dumpster, 

McConnell told Noe, "They’re going to put the puzzle together. I 

had to get rid of the knife in salt water." Noe also stated in 

the interview that she had visited Silva's apartment in Medford, 

Massachusetts with McConnell and Portalla at least ten times over 

several months, and had seen Nogueira at the apartment at least 

twice. Noe added that McConnell had told her that Silva would 

purchase cocaine from Portalla and that Silva had been storing 

guns for Portalla in exchange for cocaine. 

Only one page of the second FBI report is in the record. 

It describes an October 7, 1999 interview of Noe with Lt. Kee, 

along with Lt. Vincent Martin and FBI Special Agent Charles 

Gianturco. Noe reported that in mid-November 1996, McConnell and 

Portalla came to her apartment and tortured her by drugging her 

and burning her back. The one page of the report does not explain 
- 10 - 

why they tortured her, or whether this event was related to the 

Silva killing. 

C. The § 2255 Motions 

In 2011, all three appellants filed § 2255 motions, 

arguing that the government violated their Fifth Amendment due 

process rights under Brady by failing to disclose the two Noe 

reports before trial. The motions were handled by the same 

district court judge who presided over appellants' trial in 2006. 

She denied appellants' § 2255 motions without holding an 

evidentiary hearing. See United States v. DeCologero, No. 01-

10373-RWZ, 2013 WL 3728409, at *10 (D. Mass. July 11, 2013) 

("DeCologero II"). The court provided two independent reasons for 

its decision. First, it held that appellants "have not shown any 

Brady violation" because they "have not shown that the prosecution 

team or any of its agents knew of the [Noe] exculpatory reports" 

before trial. Id. at *5. Second, the court held that, even if 

the prosecution team had been aware of the Noe reports, "the 

reports were not material for Brady purposes" because they "do not 

raise a reasonable probability of a different outcome on the counts 

related to the Silva killing [or] on unrelated counts." Id. at 

*6-*7. The district court granted a certificate of appealability 

"as to petitioners' Brady claims based on the FBI reports," id. at 

*10, and appellants timely filed this appeal. 
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II. 

Appellants contend that the district court erred by 

denying their § 2255 motions without holding an evidentiary 

hearing. They challenge the court's findings that (1) the 

prosecution team was not aware of the Noe reports, and (2) the 

reports were not material under Brady. We only address the 

materiality issue and do not consider whether the district court 

erred with regard to the government's knowledge of the Noe reports. 

Appellants make two arguments on materiality. First, 

they contend that the district court should have granted their 

§ 2255 motions and vacated their convictions based solely on the 

disclosure of the two Noe reports. Second, in the alternative, 

they contend that the district court erred by deciding the 

materiality issue without holding an evidentiary hearing. We 

address each argument in turn. 

A. Materiality

We ordinarily review the district court's dismissal of 

a Brady claim raised in a § 2255 motion de novo. See Moreno–

Morales v. United States, 334 F.3d 140, 145 (1st Cir. 2003). 

However, "[t]he materiality question under Brady . . . is a mixed 

question of law and fact." Conley v. United States, 415 F.3d 183, 

188 n.3 (1st Cir. 2005) (citing Ouimette v. Moran, 942 F.2d 1, 4 

(1st Cir. 1991)). For this reason, we accord some deference to 

the district court's resolution of the materiality issue. See 
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Conley, 415 F.3d at 188 n.3 ("Some deference to the district 

court's resolution of fact-dominated questions in the Brady 

context is . . . due, even on collateral review."); United States 

v. Sanchez, 917 F.2d 607, 618 (1st Cir. 1990) ("Due to its 

'inherently fact-bound nature,' the district court's determination 

on the materiality of newly discovered evidence in prosecutorial 

nondisclosure cases is ordinarily accorded deference." (quoting 

United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 685 (1985) (White, J., 

concurring))). Deference is particularly warranted where, as 

here, the district court judge reviewing the § 2255 motions was 

the same judge who presided over the trial. Cf. United States v. 

Paladin, 748 F.3d 438, 443 (1st Cir. 2014) (noting, in an appeal 

of the denial of a motion for a new trial based on a Brady claim, 

that "[t]he trial judge, having seen and heard the witnesses at 

first hand, has a special sense of the ebb and flow of the recently 

concluded trial. Thus, [her] views about the likely impact of 

newly disclosed evidence deserve considerable deference." 

(internal quotation marks omitted)). 

Under Brady, "[a] defendant's right to due process is 

violated when the prosecution suppresses evidence that is both 

favorable to the accused and material either to guilt or 

innocence." Moreno-Morales, 334 F.3d at 145 (citing Brady, 373 

U.S. at 87). To demonstrate that exculpatory evidence is material, 

appellants must show "a reasonable probability that, had the 
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evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the 

proceeding would have been different." Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 

419, 433 (1995) (quoting Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682) (Souter, J.). A 

"reasonable probability" is one that "undermines confidence in the 

outcome of the trial." Bagley, 473 U.S. at 678. We must consider 

the favorable, undisclosed evidence along with the evidence 

presented at trial, and determine whether it "could reasonably be 

taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to 

undermine confidence in the verdict." Kyles, 514 U.S. at 435; see 

also id. at 434 ("The question is not whether the defendant would 

more likely than not have received a different verdict with the 

evidence, but whether in its absence he received a fair trial, 

understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of 

confidence."). Withheld information is material under Brady only 

if it would have been admissible at trial or would have led to 

admissible evidence. See Ellsworth v. Warden, 333 F.3d 1, 5 (1st 

Cir. 2003).

Because the Noe reports are relevant in different ways 

to each appellant, we first analyze the materiality question 

separately for each of them, and then address the arguments that 

are applicable to all three.

1. Paul A. 

The jury convicted Paul A. for his part in overseeing 

and directing the conspiracy to kill Silva. He contends that the 
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Noe reports are material because they contradict the government's 

theory of the case that the DeCologero crew killed Silva. Instead, 

the reports support Paul A.'s theory that Portalla stored the guns 

at Silva's house and his crew (including McConnell and Nogueira) 

murdered Silva. Paul A. further argues that, if he had been aware 

of the reports before trial, he would have called Noe to testify 

at trial, and her testimony would have corroborated his version of 

Silva's murder. 

The government counters that the Noe reports themselves 

are inadmissible hearsay and appellants have failed to demonstrate 

how their disclosure would have led to material admissible 

evidence. Therefore, the government argues, and the district court 

found, that "given the overwhelming weight of the trial evidence, 

the FBI reports do not raise a reasonable probability of a 

different outcome." DeCologero II, 2013 WL 3728409, at *6. 

At trial, multiple witnesses testified that Paul A. led 

the DeCologero crew, that he stored guns at Silva's apartment, 

that he instructed his crew members to kill Silva because she could 

not be trusted if interrogated by the police, and that his crew 

members DiCenso, Capozzi, and Meuse killed Silva and disposed of 

her body. The witnesses who implicated Paul A. in Silva's murder 

included DiCenso, John P. (Paul A.'s brother), and Regan. 

Furthermore, as the district court stated, "the witnesses' 
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testimony was consistent and corroborated by the physical evidence 

discovered by police." Id. 

Paul A. counters that much of the witness testimony 

cannot be trusted because it was solicited from former members of 

the DeCologero crew, many of whom were testifying pursuant to 

cooperation agreements with the government. Furthermore, Paul A. 

argues that none of the physical evidence at trial directly 

implicated him in the murder. The physical evidence consisted of 

bloody bags containing Silva's DNA in a dumpster in Danvers, a 

security video and Home Depot receipt showing that Capozzi and 

Meuse had purchased items to assist in disposing of Silva's body, 

and Meuse's fingerprint on an item in the Danvers dumpster. While 

none of this evidence directly connects Paul A. to the crime, it 

does provide support for DiCenso's testimony that Meuse had killed 

Silva and that DiCenso and Capozzi had helped Meuse dispose of her 

body. Notably, no physical evidence supports the theory of the 

crime found in the Noe reports that Portalla, McConnell, and 

Nogueira were responsible for Silva's murder. 

Paul A. responds that even if DiCenso and Meuse were 

involved in Silva's murder, evidence supports his theory that they 

were actually members of Portalla's crew and were ordered by 

Portalla, not Paul A., to kill Silva. Regarding DiCenso, in a 

discovery letter before trial, the government disclosed to 

appellants' counsel that DiCenso had told a confidential informant 
- 16 - 

that he worked for Portalla and would collect money and distribute 

cocaine and heroin for him. Regarding Meuse, his cell phone 

records demonstrated that Meuse had made multiple phone calls to 

Portalla and his girlfriend around the time of Silva's murder in 

November 1996. According to Paul A., "[t]hese phone calls provided 

a strong connection between Portalla and Meuse right around the 

time of Silva's murder." Paul A. Br. at 41-42. 

While DiCenso denied at trial that he had worked for 

Portalla, Paul A. further argues that DiCenso's testimony should 

not be trusted. He notes that we have previously acknowledged the 

"strong incentive" DiCenso had "to testify in support of the 

government's theory of the case." United States v. Capozzi, 486 

F.3d 711, 724 (1st Cir. 2007). In Capozzi's direct appeal, we 

stated: 

DiCenso had pled guilty to a crime punishable 

by life imprisonment, and . . . DiCenso's 

cooperation allowed him to be sentenced to a 

much lower sentence. DiCenso was shown [at 

trial] to have had a powerful motive -- 

avoidance of a life sentence and possibly of 

prison altogether -- to cooperate with the 

government and to testify falsely if 

necessary. 

Id. 

Despite DiCenso's incentive to lie, his testimony that 

Paul A., and not Portalla, ordered Silva's killing was corroborated 

by a considerable amount of more reliable evidence. For example, 

numerous witnesses identified both DiCenso and Meuse as members of 
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the DeCologero crew, and both men were implicated in a variety of 

illegal activities tied to Paul A.'s criminal enterprise, 

including the robberies of drug dealers Albert Sapochetti, Michael 

"Slim" Stevens, and Jeff North. Although Paul A. presents a 

modicum of evidence that DiCenso and Meuse might have worked for 

Portalla, he fails to account for Capozzi, who, according to the 

physical evidence, also had a direct role in Silva's killing and 

was identified as a member of the DeCologero crew. Furthermore, 

a law enforcement officer involved in the investigation into 

Silva's death expressly disavowed any link between Portalla and 

the killing, stating that, besides the one occasion where Portalla 

was seen with Paul A. at Silva's apartment, he "really didn't have 

any connection between Portalla and Miss Silva." 

In addition to DiCenso, Regan and John P. also implicated 

Paul A. in Silva's murder. Regan testified that, after law 

enforcement had discovered the weapons at Silva's apartment, Paul 

A. stated in a meeting with DeCologero crew members that "[w]e got 

to get the girl away from the law." John P. testified that, around 

the same time, Paul A. told him that he was debating whether to 

"get rid of [Silva]" because the police were at her apartment. 

Moreover, after Silva was murdered, Paul A. told Regan that Meuse 

and DiCenso had "killed the girl and chopped her up." Paul A. 

told John P. that "she had to go. Kevin Meuse knew what time it 

was. He did what he had to do." 
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In contrast to the physical evidence tying DiCenso, 

Meuse, and Capozzi to Silva's murder and multiple witnesses 

testifying that Paul A. ordered the killing, the evidence 

supporting Paul A.'s alternative explanation for Silva's death 

found in the Noe reports consists of little more than hearsay and 

rumors. As the district court stated, the Noe reports "represent 

a hearsay account by a single witness." DeCologero II, 2013 WL 

3728409, at *6. In addition to DiCenso's alleged hearsay statement 

to a confidential informant that he worked for Portalla and Meuse's 

multiple calls to Portalla, the total sum of evidence supporting 

the theory that Portalla ordered Silva killed includes "some early 

news reports indicating that Portalla and his crew were suspects 

in the Silva murder," id., testimony that Portalla had been seen 

at Silva's apartment, and another hearsay report that a 

confidential informant told an inspector with the Stoneham Police 

Department that "s/he heard that the girl from Medford that is 

missing was holding guns for 'Portella.'" 

Because the Noe reports themselves are hearsay, they 

would not have been admissible at trial for the truth of the 

matters asserted, and "by definition [are] not material, because 

[they] never would have reached the jury and therefore could not 

have affected the trial outcome." United States v. Ranney, 719 

F.2d 1183, 1190 (1st Cir. 1983). Thus, Paul A. has the burden of 

demonstrating how the disclosure of the reports would have led to 
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admissible material exculpatory evidence. Paul A. argues that the 

reports would have prompted him to call Noe to testify at trial, 

and her testimony would have verified the allegations made in the 

Noe reports. However, Paul A. has not submitted any evidence to 

support this argument. For example, he has not provided an 

affidavit from Noe or any other evidence that Noe would have been 

available at trial and, furthermore, that she would have testified 

in accordance with the reports. See DeCologero II, 2013 WL 

3728409, at *7 (noting that Paul A. has "made no showing that Noe 

would have testified in accordance with [the Noe] reports if she 

had appeared at trial."). In fact, he makes no representation 

that, after the disclosure of the Noe reports, he made any attempt 

to contact or locate Noe, nor does he contend that Noe would have 

refused to cooperate with him if he indeed had contacted her. 

It is also unclear exactly what Noe would have been able 

to say if she had been called to testify at trial as much of the 

Noe reports consists of her recounting McConnell's incriminating 

statements, which would be hearsay. Paul A. argues that "[a] 

defendant has the right to present evidence of a third party 

culprit, including calling witnesses that would testify to outof-court admissions of the third party." Paul A. Br. at 39. 

On the one hand, we agree that Noe would have been able 

to testify to relevant information within her personal knowledge 

that would challenge the government's theory that the DeCologero 
- 20 - 

crew killed Silva, such as seeing McConnell come home with his 

clothes and arms covered with blood in mid-November 1996, observing 

McConnell and Portalla talking outside of her house that same day, 

and visiting Silva's apartment with McConnell and Portalla at least 

ten times. See, e.g., Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 328 

(2006) (recognizing a defendant's right to introduce evidence of 

third-party guilt). 

On the other hand, Paul A. has failed to demonstrate how 

Noe could have testified to McConnell's statements themselves.2 

While McConnell's statements would likely qualify as statements 

against penal interest under Federal Rule of Evidence 

804(b)(3)(B), the declarant must "be unavailable as a witness" for 

that hearsay exception to apply. Fed. R. Evid. 804(a). Paul A. 

has made no showing that McConnell would have been unavailable at 

trial. In fact, none of the appellants argue that they would have 

called McConnell as a witness at trial, or that, if he had 

testified and denied killing Silva, they would have impeached 

 2 Paul A.'s reliance on Mendez v. Artuz, 303 F.3d 411 (2d Cir. 

2002), is misplaced. In Mendez, the Second Circuit never addressed 

the admissibility of hearsay statements of a third-party culprit. 

The court affirmed the district court's decision granting habeas 

on Brady grounds because the government had suppressed evidence of 

a third-party culprit. The court did not address the admissibility 

of that evidence but simply stated that "the suppressed information 

would have allowed [the defendant] to challenge the state's motive 

theory . . . either through cross-examination or the presentation 

of contradictory testimony [which] . . . would have allowed the 

defendant to create reasonable doubt that he was the shooter." 

Id. at 414. 
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McConnell by introducing his statements in the Noe reports as prior 

inconsistent statements under Federal Rule of Evidence 613.3 

Paul A. asks us to vacate his conviction based solely on 

the disclosure of two hearsay reports. Given the strength of the 

trial evidence against him, the inadmissibility of the Noe reports 

themselves, the failure to demonstrate that the reports would have 

led to the discovery of admissible exculpatory evidence, and 

according "[s]ome deference" to the district court's factintensive analysis, Conley, 415 F.3d at 188 n.3, Paul A. has not 

"establish[ed] a reasonable probability of a different result" at 

trial. Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 291 (1999). 

2. Paul J. 

Paul J.'s materiality claim is weaker than Paul A.'s. 

Unlike Paul A., Paul J. was not convicted of playing a role in 

Silva's murder itself. Instead, his witness tampering convictions 

stem from his role in the failed attempt to kill Silva by 

overdosing her with heroin. While the Noe reports provide an 

alternative explanation for how Silva was actually killed, the 

reports do not directly contradict the evidence that Paul J. was 

ordered by Paul A. to buy the heroin needed to kill Silva, that 

 3 Federal Rule of Evidence 613(b) permits "[e]xtrinsic 

evidence of a witness's prior inconsistent statement . . . if the 

witness is given an opportunity to explain or deny the statement 

and an adverse party is given an opportunity to examine the witness 

about it, or if justice so requires." 
- 22 - 

Paul J. bought the heroin, and that Meuse and DiCenso gave Silva 

the heroin but she did not die. 

As with the evidence incriminating Paul A. in Silva's 

murder, DiCenso's testimony implicating Paul J. in the attempted 

overdose was also supported by other testimony. For example, 

Antonio Centeno, a heroin dealer, testified that Paul J. had 

requested heroin from him "strong enough for an overdose," and 

Centeno sold him 30 bags. A few days after the purchase, Paul J. 

returned and told Centeno that the heroin "wasn't strong enough" 

to "take care of someone out of the way." Additionally, John P. 

testified that he had heard Paul A. tell his son that the heroin 

intended to kill Silva "didn't work." In another conversation, 

John Jr. told John P. that Meuse had given Silva the heroin and 

that it had failed to kill her. 

Paul J. contends that, despite this evidence, the Noe 

reports are "core exculpatory evidence sufficient in weight to 

alter the entire balance of the case against [him]." Paul J. Br. 

at 39. He argues that, if the jury had heard testimony indicating 

that McConnell was involved in Silva's murder, it could have 

concluded that Portalla's crew was behind the entire conspiracy to 

kill Silva and would have discounted any testimony implicating 

Paul J. in the attempted heroin overdose. However, like Paul A., 

Paul J. fails to recognize that the reports themselves are 

inadmissible hearsay. Furthermore, he fails to demonstrate how 
- 23 - 

the reports would have led to admissible evidence. He has not 

provided any evidence to demonstrate that the jury would have heard 

any testimony implicating McConnell in Silva's death. He simply 

assumes that Noe (or someone else) would have testified in 

accordance with the allegations made in the Noe reports. 

Considering that the Noe reports have less relevance to Paul J.'s 

conduct than to Paul A.'s, and we have already found that the 

reports do not "undermine confidence in [Paul A.'s] verdict," 

Kyles, 514 U.S. at 435, we also find that, providing some deference 

to the district court, Paul J. has failed to establish a reasonable 

probability of a different result at trial. 

3. John Jr. 

John Jr. has the weakest materiality claim of all the 

appellants. He was not charged with any offense related to Silva's 

killing. Instead, he argues that the murder of Silva "loomed over 

the entire trial and was critical to the credibility of the key 

witnesses against John Jr.: Stephen DiCenso and Tommy Regan." John 

Jr. Br. at 7. Specifically, he contends that the Noe reports are 

material for their "ability to impeach Regan and DiCenso as to 

their testimony surrounding the Silva murder [and] would have cast 

doubt on their testimony as a whole." Id. at 30. Yet, John Jr. 

never explains how he could have introduced the reports at trial 

to impeach Regan and DiCenso. The reports do not purport to repeat 

any statements made by Regan or DiCenso. In fact, neither of them 
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is even mentioned in the reports. Therefore, it is doubtful that 

the reports could have been used at trial to impeach their 

testimony under the Federal Rules of Evidence. See, e.g., Fed. R. 

Evid. 608, 613. 

Moreover, as explained above, Regan and DiCenso's 

testimony regarding the Silva murder was corroborated by physical 

evidence and testimony of other witnesses. This corroboration 

significantly lessens any impeachment effect of the Noe reports, 

especially regarding John Jr.'s convictions, which are unrelated 

to the Silva killing. As the district court stated, because the 

Noe reports "do not raise a reasonable probability of a different 

outcome on the counts related to the Silva killing . . . [a] 

fortiori, they do not raise a reasonable probability of a different 

outcome on unrelated counts." DeCologero II, 2013 WL 3728409, at 

*7. 

4. Arguments applicable to all appellants 

 All appellants contend that the Noe reports are material 

for two additional reasons. First, they argue that, if the Noe 

reports were disclosed before trial, the district court would have 

granted their pre-trial discovery motions to obtain additional 

information regarding the connection between Portalla and Silva's 

murder, in particular Paul A.'s motion for the identities of two 

confidential informants, one who stated that DiCenso said that he 

worked for Portalla and the other who stated that Silva was holding 
- 25 - 

guns for Portalla. However, the district court judge who denied 

the discovery motions is the same judge who denied their § 2255 

motions, and she rejected appellants' argument that the Noe reports 

would have made any difference. See DeCologero II, 2013 WL 

3728409, at *7 (stating that "[w]hatever further evidence there 

might have been about Portalla, McConnell, and Nogueira, Paul A. 

did not need the FBI reports to find it"). 

Second, appellants contend that they could have used the 

Noe reports at trial to demonstrate that law enforcement failed to 

sufficiently investigate the connection between Portalla's crew 

and Silva's murder and were biased by focusing their investigation 

on the DeCologero crew. Given the considerable evidence tying the 

DeCologero crew to Silva's death, we agree with the district court 

that, even if the Noe reports could have been introduced for this 

purpose, there would not be a reasonable probability of a different 

outcome at trial. See id. at *6.

B. Evidentiary Hearing 

In the alternative, appellants argue that the district 

court erred by making its materiality determination, and denying 

their § 2255 motions to vacate their convictions, without holding 

an evidentiary hearing. We review a district court's decision not 

to hold an evidentiary hearing for abuse of discretion. Owens v. 

United States, 483 F.3d 48, 57 (1st Cir. 2007). 
- 26 - 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b), a district court 

"shall . . . grant a prompt [evidentiary] hearing" "[u]nless the 

motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show 

that the prisoner is entitled to no relief." Despite this 

seemingly petitioner-friendly standard, we have stated that 

"[e]videntiary hearings on § 2255 petitions are the exception, not 

the norm," Moreno-Morales, 334 F.3d at 145, and "the petitioner 

bears the burden of establishing the need for an evidentiary 

hearing." United States v. McGill, 11 F.3d 223, 225 (1st Cir. 

1993). 

When reviewing a district court's denial of an 

evidentiary hearing, "we take the petitioner's credible 

allegations as true." Owens, 483 F.3d at 57. A district court 

may deny an evidentiary hearing when "the movant's allegations, 

even if true, do not entitle him to relief, or . . . [when] the 

movant's allegations need not be accepted as true because they 

state conclusions instead of facts, contradict the record, or are 

inherently incredible." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Where, as here, the judge who presided at the petitioners' trial 

is the same judge who decided the § 2255 motion, "the judge is at 

liberty to employ the knowledge gleaned during previous 

proceedings and make findings based thereon without convening an 

additional hearing." McGill, 11 F.3d at 225; see also United 

States v. Baxter, 761 F.3d 17, 24 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 2014) ("A district 
- 27 - 

judge's decision not to hold an evidentiary hearing before denying 

a § 2255 motion is generally respected as a sound exercise of 

discretion when the judge denying the § 2255 motion also presided 

over the trial in which the petitioner claims to have been 

prejudiced." (internal quotation marks omitted)). 

In their § 2255 motions, all appellants allege that if 

the prosecution had disclosed the Noe reports, they would have 

called Noe as a witness, and she would have testified consistently 

with the reports that Portalla, McConnell, and Nogueira were 

involved in Silva's murder. In its ruling denying the motions, 

the district court did not take this allegation as true, and 

instead found that appellants had "made no showing that Noe would 

have testified in accordance with [the Noe] reports if she had 

appeared at trial." DeCologero II, 2013 WL 3728409, at *7. 

Because the district court denied their request for an 

evidentiary hearing, appellants contend that the court should have 

taken this allegation as true. However, appellants did not present 

any evidence to the district court to support their conclusory 

claim that Noe would have testified consistently with the 

statements that she had made in the reports. For example, they 

did not submit an affidavit from Noe, nor did they make any 

representation to the district court that they had located Noe or 

that she would have been available to testify at trial if called 

as a witness. Instead, they argue that an affidavit from Noe was 
- 28 - 

unnecessary because the Noe reports "sort of speak[] for 

[them]sel[ves]."4 However, as explained above, the reports are 

inadmissible hearsay, and appellants have the burden of 

demonstrating how the reports would have led to admissible 

evidence. See Ellsworth, 333 F.3d at 5. Because appellants have 

 4 At oral argument, counsel for Paul A. conceded that 

appellants never submitted an affidavit from Noe describing what 

she would have said if called at trial: 

Justice Souter: Is it correct that in the 

habeas proceeding you did not either call Noe 

as a witness or present an affidavit from Noe 

as to what she would testify? 

Counsel for Paul A.: We did not present an 

affidavit. . . . The Judge never ordered 

affidavits. . . . 

Justice Souter: You are the one who is 

bringing habeas. The Judge doesn't have to 

order it. 

Counsel for Paul A.: That could have been 

developed in an evidentiary hearing. 

Judge Lipez: But you are trying to make the 

case that there has to be an evidentiary 

hearing. Wouldn't the submission [of an 

affidavit] enhance your case that there should 

have been an evidentiary hearing? . . . You 

had an opportunity to convince the judge that, 

at an evidentiary hearing, [Noe] might be 

prepared to testify in conformity to that 302 

report . . . but you never made the effort to 

do that. 

Counsel for Paul A.: No, that is correct. . 

. . We did not present that to the district 

judge, and I have no explanation for it, other 

than that the report sort of speaks for 

itself. . . . 
- 29 - 

provided no factual basis to support their conclusory allegation 

that Noe would have testified in accordance with the reports, the 

district court did not abuse its discretion by denying their 

motions without holding an evidentiary hearing. See Owens, 483 

F.3d at 57. 

Affirmed.