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CSI REPRINT

Introductory Material

to

Summary of the Art of War

by Jomini

From Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War or A New Analytical Compend of the

Principal Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy (New York:

G. P. Putnam & Co., 1854), 1—21.

SUMMARY

OF THE

ART OF WAR,

OR

A NEW ANALYTICAL COMPEND

OF THE

PRINCIPAL COMBINATIONS OF STRATEGY, OF GRAND

TACTICS AND OF MILITARY POLICY

BY

BARON DE JOMINI

GENERAL-IN-CHIEF, AIDE-DE-CAMP GENERAL TO HIS MAJESTY

THE EMPEROR OF ALL THE RUSSIAS.

TRANSLATED FROM THE FRENCH

BY

MAJOR O. F. WINSHIP, ASS'T. ADJT. GENERAL, U.S. A.

LIEUT. E. E. MCLEAN, IST INFANTRY, U.S.A.

NEW YORK

Published for the Proprietors,

BY G. P. PUTNAM & CO., 10 PARK PLACE

1854

TO HIS MAJESTY,

THE EMPEROR OF ALL THE RUSSIAS.

SIRE,

YOUR IMPERIAL MAJESTY, in his just solicitude for all

that can contribute to the progress and the propagation of the

sciences, deigned to order the translation into the Russian

language of my TREATISE UPON GRAND MILITARY

OPERATIONS, for the institutes of the crown.

Eager to respond to the benevolent views of YOUR

MAJESTY, / believed it my duty to augment this work by an

ANALYTICAL COMPEND, which would serve as a compliment

[sic] to it. This first essay, published in 1830, accomplished

the object for which it had been written; but I have since

thought that by enlarging somewhat its frame, it would be

possible to render it more useful and to make of it a work

complete in itself; I trust I have obtained that result.

Notwithstanding its small compass, this Summary now

contains all the combinations which the general of an army

and the statesman can make for the conduct of a war: never

was so important a subject treated within limits at the same

time more compact and more in the reach of all readers.

I take the liberty of doing homage through this Summary

to YOUR IMPERIAL MAJESTY, begging him to be pleased to

receive it with indulgence. My wishes would be crowned if this

work could merit the suffrages of a judge so enlightened, or a

monarch so versed in the important art which elevates and

preserves empires.

I am, with veneration,

SIRE,

YOUR IMPERIAL MAJESTY'S

Most humble and faithful servant,

GENERAL JOMINI

St. Petersburg, 6th March, 1837.

NOTICE OF THE OF

WAR, AND OF ITS UTILITY

The summary of the art of war, which 1 submit to the

public, was written originally for the instruction of an

august prince, and in view of the numerous additions

which I have just made to it, I flatter myself that it will be

worthy of its destination. To the end of causing its object to

be better appreciated, I believe it my duty to precede it by a

few lines upon the present state of the theory of war« I

shall be forced to speak a little of myself and my works; I

hope I shall be pardoned for it, for it would have been

difficult to explain what I think of this theory, and the part

which I may have had in it, without saying how I have

conceived it myself.

As I have said in my chapter of principles, published

by itself in 1807, the art of war has existed in all time, and

strategy especially was the same under Caesar as under

Napoleon. But the art, confined to the understanding of

great captains, existed in no written treatise. The books

all gave but fragments of systems, born of the imagination

of their authors, and containing ordinarily details the most

minute (not to say the most puerile), upon the most

accessory points of tactics, the only part of war, perhaps,

which it is possible to subject to fixed rules,

Among the moderns, Feuquires [sic],* Folard and

Puysegur had opened the quarry: the first by very

interesting, critical and dogmatical accounts; the second by

his commentaries upon Polybus and his treatise upon the

* Feuquieres was not sufficiently appreciated by his cotemporaries [sic], at least as a

writer; he had the instinct of strategy as Folard that of tactics, and Puysegur that of la

logistique.
column; the third by a work which was, I believe, the first

logistic essay, and one of the first applications of the

oblique order of the ancients.

But those writers had not penetrated very far into the

mine which they wished to explore, and in order to form a

just idea of the state of the art in the middle of the 18th

century, it is necessary to read what Marshal Saxe wrote in

the preface to his Reveries.

"War," said he, "is a science shrouded in darkness, in

the midst of which we do not move with an assured step;

routine and prejudices are its basis, a natural consequence

of ignorance.

"All sciences have principles, war alone has yet none;

the great captains who have written do not give us any; one

must be profound to comprehend them«

"Gustavus Adolphus has created a method, but it was

soon deviated from, because it was learned by routine.

There are then nothing but usages, the principles of which

are unknown to us."

This was written about the time when Frederick the

Great preluded the Seven Years War by his victories of

Hohenfriedberg, of Soor, &c. And the good Marshal Saxe,

instead of piercing those obscurities of which he

complained with so much justice, contented himself with

writing systems for clothing soldiers in woolen blouses, for

forming them upon four ranks, two of which to be armed

with pikes; finally for proposing small field pieces which he

named amusettes, and which truly merited that title on

account of the humorous images with which they were

surrounded.
At the end of the Seven Years War, some good works

appeared; Frederick himself, not content with being a

great king, a great captain, a great philosopher and great

historian, made himself also a didactic author by his

instructions to his generals. Guichard, Turpin, Maizeroy,

Menil-Durand, sustained controversies upon the tactics of

the ancients as well as upon that of their own time, and

gave some interesting treatises upon those matters.

Turpin commented Montecuculi and Vegetius; the

Marquis de Silva in Piedmont, Santa Cruz in Spain, had

also discussed some parts with success; finally

d'Escremeville sketched a history of the art, which was not

devoid of merit. But all that by no means dissipated the

darkness of which the conqueror of Fontenoy complained.

A little later came Grimoard, Guibert and Lloyd; the

first two caused progress to be made in the tactics of battles

and in la logistique* This latter raised in his interesting

memoirs important questions of strategy, which he

unfortunately left buried in a labyrinth of minute details

on the tactics of formation, and upon the philosophy of war.

But although the author has resolved none of these

questions in a manner to make of them a connected system,

it is necessary to render him the justice to say that he first

pointed out the good route. However, his narrative of the

Seven Years War, of which he finished but two campaigns,

was more instructive (for me at least), than all he had

written dogmatically.

Germany produced, in this interval between the Seven

Years War and that of the Revolution, a multitude of

writings, more or less extensive, on different secondary

branches of the art, which they illumined with a faint

* Guibert, in an excellent chapter upon marches, touches upon strategy, but he did

not realize what this chapter promised.
light. Thielke and Faesch published in Saxony, the one,

fragments upon castrametation, the attack of camps and

positions, the other a collection of maxims upon the

accessory parts of the operations of war. Scharnhorst did

as much in Hanover; Warnery published in Prussia a

pretty good work on the cavalry; Baron Holzendorf another

on the tactics of manoeuvres. Count Kevenhuller gave

maxims upon field warfare and upon that of sieges. But

nothing of all this gave a satisfactory idea of the elevated

branches of the science.

Finally even Mirabeau who, having returned from

Berlin, published an enormous volume upon the Prussian

tactics, an arid repetition of the regulation for platoon and

line evolutions to which some had the simplicity to

attribute the greater part of the successes of Frederick! If

such books have been able to contribute to the propagation

of this error, it must be owned however that they

contributed also to perfecting the regulations of 1791 on

manoeuvres, the only result which it was possible to expect

from them.

Such was the art of war at the commencement of the

19th century, when Porbeck, Venturini and Bulow

published some pamphlets on the first campaigns of the

Revolution. The latter especially made a certain sensation

in Europe by his Spirit of the System of Modern Warfare,

the work of a man of genius, but which was merely

sketched, and which added nothing to the first notions

given by Lloyd. At the same time appeared also in

Germany, under the modest title of an introduction to the

study of the military art, a valuable work by M. de

Laroche-Aymon, veritable encyclopedia for all the

branches of the art, strategy excepted, which is there

scarcely indicated; but despite this omission, it is

4
nonetheless one of the most complete and recommendable

of the classic works.

I was not yet acquainted with the last two books,

when, after having quitted the Helvetic service as chief of

battalion, I sought to instruct myself by reading, with

avidity, all those controversies which had agitated the

military world in the last half of the 18th century;

commencing with Puysegur, finishing with Menil-Durand

and Guibert, and finding everywhere but systems more or

less complete of the tactics of battles, which could give but

an imperfect idea of war, because they all contradicted

each other in a deplorable manner.

I fell back then, upon works of military history in

order to seek, in the combinations of the great captains, a

solution which those systems of the writers did not give

me. Already had the narratives of Frederick the Great

commenced to initiate me in the secret which had caused

him to gain the miraculous victory of Leuthen (Lissa). I

perceived that this secret consisted in the very simple

manoeuvre of carrying the bulk of his forces upon a single

wing of the hostile army; and Lloyd soon came to fortify me

in this conviction. I found again, afterwards, the same

cause in the first successes of Napoleon in Italy, which

gave me the idea that by applying, through strategy, to the

whole chess-table of a war (a tout V echiquier d'une querre),

this same principle which Frederick had applied to battles,

we should have the key to all the science of war.

I could not doubt this truth in reading again,

subsequently, the campaigns of Turenne, of Marlborough,

or Eugene of Savoy, and in comparing them with those of
Frederick, which Tempelhoff had just published with

details so full of interest, although somewhat heavy and by

far too much repeated. I comprehended then that Marshal

de Saxe had been quite right in saying that in 1750 there

were no principles laid down upon the art of war, but that

many of his readers had also very badly interpreted his

preface in concluding therefrom that he had thought that

those principles did not exist.

Convinced that I had seized the true point of view

under which it was necessary to regard the theory of war in

order to discover its veritable rules, and to quit the always

so uncertain field of personal systems, I set myself to the

work with all the ardor of a neophyte.

I wrote in the course of the year 1803, a volume which

I presented, at first, to M. d'Oubril, Secretary of the

Russian legation at Paris, then to Marshal Ney. But the

strategic work of Bulow, and the historical narrative of

Lloyd, translated by Roux-Fazillac, having then fallen into

my hands, determined me to follow another plan. My first

essay was a didactic treatise upon the orders of battle,

strategic marches and lines of operations; it was arid from

its nature and quite interspersed with historical citations

which, grouped by species, had the inconvenience of

presenting together, in the same chapter, events often

separated by a whole century; Lloyd especially convinced

me that the critical and argumentative relation of the

whole of a war had the advantage of preserving connection

and unity in the recital and in the events, without

detriment to the exposition of maxims, since a series often

campaigns is amply sufficient for presenting the

application of all the possible maxims of war. I burned

then my first work, and re-commenced [sic], with the
project of giving the sequel of the seven years war [sic]

which Lloyd had not finished. This mode suited me all the

better, as I was but twenty-four years old and had but little

experience, whilst I was about to attack many prejudices

and great reputations somewhat usurped, so that there

was necessary to me the powerful support of the events

which I should allow to speak, as it were, for themselves. I

resolved then upon this last plan, which appeared

moreover, more suitable to all classes of readers.

Doubtless a didactic treatise would have been preferable,

either for a public course, or for retracing with more

ensemble the combinations of the science somewhat

scattered in the narration of those campaigns; but, as for

myself, I confess I have profited much more from the

attentive reading of a discussed campaign, than from all

the dogmatic works put together; and my book, published

in 1805, was designed for officers of a superior grade, and

not for schoolboys. The war with Austria supervening the

same year, did not permit me to give the work all the care

desirable, and I was able to execute but a part of my

project.

Some years afterwards, the Arch Duke gave an

introduction to his fine work by a folio volume on grand

warfare, in which the genius of the master already showed

itself. About the same time appeared a small pamphlet on

strategy by Major Wagner, then in the service of Austria;

this essay, full of wise views, promised that the author

would one day give something more complete, which has

been realized quite recently. In Prussia, General

Scharnhorst commenced also to sound those questions with

success.

Finally, ten years after my first treatise on grand

operations, appeared the important work of the Arch Duke
Charles, which united the two kinds, didactic and historic;

this prince having at first given a small volume of strategic

maxims, then four volumes of critical history on the

campaigns of 1796 and 1799, for developing their practical

application. This work, which does as much honor to the

illustrious prince as the battles which he has gained, put

the complement to the basis of the strategic science, of

which Lloyd and Bulow had first raised the veil, and of

which I had indicated the first principles in 1805, in a

chapter upon lines of operations, and in 1807, in a chapter

upon the fundamental principles of the art of war, printed

by itself at Glogau in Silesia.

The fall of Napoleon, by giving up many studious

officers to the leisures of peace, became the signal for the

apparition of a host of military writings of all kinds.

General Rogniat gave matter for controversy in wishing to

bring back the system of the legions, or of the divisions of

the republic, and in attacking the somewhat adventurous

system of Napoleon. Germany was especially fertile in

dogmatic works; Xilander in Bavaria, Theobald and

Muller of Wurtemberg, Wagner, Decker, Hoyer and

Valintini in Prussia, published different books, which

presented substantially but the repetition of the maxims of

the Arch Duke Charles and mine, with other developments

of application.

Although several of these authors have combatted my

chapter on central lines of operations with more subtlety

than real success, and others have been, at times, too

precise in their calculations, we could not refuse to their

writings the testimonials of esteem which they merit, for

they all contain more or less of excellent views.

8
In Russia, General Okounief treated of the important

article of the combined or partial employment of the three

arms, which makes the basis of the theory of combats, and

rendered thereby a real service to young officers.

In France, Gay-Vernon, Jacquinot de Presle and

Roquancourt, published courses which were not wanting in

merit.

Under these circumstances, I was assured by my own

experience, that there was wanting, to my first treatise, a

collection of maxims like that which preceded the work of

the Arch Duke; which induced me to publish, in 1829, the

first sketch of this analytical compend, adding to it two

interesting articles upon the military policy of States.

I profited of this occasion to defend the principles of my

chapter on lines of operations, which several writers had

badly comprehended, and this polemic brought about at

least more rational definitions, at the same time

maintaining the real advantages of central operations.

A year after the publication of this analytical table,

the Prussian General Clausewitz died, leaving to his

widow the care of publishing posthumous works which

were presented as unfinished sketches. This work made a

great sensation in Germany, and for my part I regret that

it was written before the author was acquainted with my

summary of the Art of War, persuaded that he would have

rendered to it some justice.

One cannot deny to General Clausewitz great learning

and a facile pen; but this pen, at times a little vagrant, is

above all too pretentious for a didactic discussion, the

simplicity and clearness of which ought to be its first merit.
Besides that, the author shows himself by far too skeptical

in point of military science; his first volume is but a

declamation against all theory of war, whilst the two

succeeding volumes, full of theoretic maxims, proves that

the author believes in the efficacy of his own doctrines, if

he does not believe in those of others.

As for myself, I own that I have been able to find in

this learned labyrinth but a small number of luminous

ideas and remarkable articles; and far from having shared

the skepticism of the author, no work would have

contributed more than his to make me feel the necessity

and utility of good theories, if I had ever been able to call

them in question; it is important simply to agree well as to

the limits which ought to be assigned them in order not to

fall into a pedantry worse than ignorance;* it is necessary

above all to distinguish the difference which exists

between a theory of principles and a theory of systems.

It will be objected perhaps that, in the greater part of

the articles of this summary, I myself acknowledge that

there are few absolute rules to give on the divers subjects of

which they treat; I agree in good faith to this truth, but is

that saying there is no theory? If, out of forty-five articles,

some have ten positive maxims, others one or two only, are

not a 150 or 200 rules sufficient to form a respectable body

of strategic or tactical doctrines? And if to those you add

the multitude of precepts which suffer more or less

exceptions, will you not have more dogmas than necessary

for fixing your opinions upon all the operations of war?

* An ignorant man, endowed with a natural genius, can do great things; but the

same man stuffed with false doctrines studied at school, and crammed with pedantic

systems, will do nothing good unless he forget what he had learned.

10
At the same epoch when Clausewitz seemed thus to

apply himself to sapping the basis of the science, a work of

a totally opposite nature appeared in France, that of the

Marquis de Ternay, a French emigre in the service of

England. This book is without contradiction, the most

complete that exists on the tactics of battles, and if it falls

sometimes into an excess contrary to that of the Prussian

general, by prescribing, in doctrines details of execution

often impracticable in war, he cannot be denied a truly

remarkable merit, and one of the first grades among

tacticians.

I have made mention in this sketch only of general

treatises, and not of particular works on the special arms.

The books of Montalembert, of Saint-Paul, Bousmard, of

Carnot, of Aster, and of Blesson, have caused progress to be

made in the art of sieges and of fortification. The writings

of Laroche-Aymon, Muller and Bismark, have also thrown

light upon many questions regarding the cavalry. In a

journal with which, unfortunately, I was not acquainted

until six years after its publication, the latter has believed

it his duty to attack me and my works, because I had said,

on the faith of an illustrious general, that the Prussians

had reproached him with having copied, in his last

pamphlet, the unpublished instructions of the government

to its generals of cavalry. In censuring my works, General

Bismark has availed himself of his rights, not only in

virtue of his claim to reprisals, but because every book is

made to be judged and controverted. Meanwhile, instead of

replying to the reproach, and of giving utterance to a single

grievance, he has found it more simple to retaliate by

injuries, to which a military man will never reply in books,

which should have another object than collecting

personalities. Those who shall compare the present notice

11
with the ridiculous pretensions which General B

imputes to me, will judge between us.

It is extraordinary enough to accuse me of having said

that the art of war did not exist before me, when in the

chapter of Principles, published in 1807, of which I have

before spoken, and which had a certain success in the

military world, the first phrase commenced with these

words: "the art of war has existed from time immemorial."

* * * What I have said is, that there were no books which

proclaimed the existence of general principles, and made

the application of them through strategy to all the

combinations of the theatre of war: I have said that I was

the first to attempt that demonstration, which others

improved ten years after me, without, however, it being

yet complete. Those who would deny this truth would not

be candid.

As for the rest, I have never soiled my pen by

attacking personally studious men who devote themselves

to science, and if I have not shared their dogmas, I have

expressed as much with moderation and impartiality; it

were to be desired that it should ever be thus. Let us

return to our subject.

The artillery, since Gribeauval and d'Urtubie has had

its Aide-Memoire, and a mass of particular works, in the

number of which are distinguished those of Decker,

Paixhaus, Dedon, Hoyer, Ravichio and Bouvroy. The

discussions of several authors, among others those of the

Marquis de Chambray and of General Okounieff upon the

fire of Infantry. Finally, the dissertations of a host of

officers, recorded in the interesting military journals of

Vienna, of Berlin, of Munich, of Stutgard [sic] and of Paris,

12
have contributed also to the successive progress of the

parts which they have discussed

Some essays have been attempted towards a history of

the art, from the ancients down to our time. Tranchant

Laverne has done so with spirit and sagacity, but

incompletely, Cario Nisas, too verbose with regard to the

ancients, mediocre for the epoch from the revival to that of

the Seven Years War, has completely failed on the modern

system. Roquancourt has treated the same subjects with

more success* The Prussian Major Ciriaci and his

continator have done still better. Finally, Captain Blanch,

a Neapolitan officer, has made an interesting analysis of

the different periods of the art as written and practised.

After this long list of modern writers, it will be judged

that Marshal de Saxe, if he were to return among us, would

be much surprised at the present wealth of our military

literature, and would no longer complain of the darkness

which shrouds the science. Henceforth good books will not

be wanting to those who shall wish to study, for at this day

we have principles, whereas they had in the 18th century

only methods and systems.

Meanwhile, it must be owned, to render theory as

complete as possible, there is an important work wanting,

which, according to all appearances, will be wanting yet a

long time; it is a thoroughly profound examination of the

four different systems followed within a century past: that

of the Seven Years War; that of the first campaigns of the

Revolution; that of the grand invasions of Napoleon;

finally, that of Wellington. From this investigation it

would be necessary to deduce a mixed system, proper for

regular wars, which should participate of the methods of

Frederick and of those of Napoleon; or, more properly

13
speaking, it would be necessary to develop a double system

for ordinary wars of power against power, and for grand

invasions. I have sketched a view of this important labor,

in article 24, chapter HI: but as the subject would require

whole volumes, I have been obliged to limit myself to

indicating the task to him who should have the courage

and the leisure to accomplish it well, and who should at the

same time be fortunate enough to find the justification of

those mixed doctrines, in new events which should serve

him as tests.

In the meantime, I will terminate this rapid sketch by

a profession of faith upon the polemics of which this

compend and my first treatise have been the subject. In

weighing all that has been said for or against, in

comparing the immense progress made in the science for

the last thirty years, with the incredulity of M. Clausewitz,

I believe I am correct in concluding that the ensemble of

my principles and of the maxims which are derived from

them, has been badly comprehended by several writers;

that some have made the most erroneous application of

them; that others have drawn from them exaggerated

consequences which have never been able to enter my

head, for a general officer, after having assisted in a dozen

campaigns, ought to know that war is a great drama, in

which a thousand physical or moral causes operate more or

less powerfully, and which cannot be reduced to

mathematical calculations.

But, I ought equally to avow without circumlocution,

that twenty years of experience have but fortified me in the

following convictions:

"There exists a small number of fundamental

principles of war, which could not be deviated from without

14
danger, and the application of which, on the contrary, has

been in almost all time crowned with success.

'The maxims of application which are derived from

those principles are also small in number, and if they are

found sometimes modified according to circumstances,

they can nevertheless serve in general as a compass to the

chief of an army to guide him in the task, always difficult

and complicated, of conducting grand operations in the

midst of the noise and tumult of combats.

"Natural genius will doubtless know how, by happy

inspirations, to apply principles as well as the best studied

theory could do it; but a simple theory, disengaged from all

pedantry, ascending to causes without giving absolute

systems, based in a word upon a few fundamental maxims,

will often supply genius, and will even serve to extend its

development by augmenting its confidence in its own

inspirations.

"Of all theories on the art of war, the only reasonable

one is that which, founded upon the study of military

history, admits a certain number of regulating principles,

but leaves to natural genius the greatest part in the

general conduct of a war without trammeling it with

exclusive rules.

"On the contrary, nothing is better calculated to kill

natural genius and to cause error to triumph, than those

pedantic theories, based upon the false idea that war is a

positive science, all the operations of which can be reduced

to infallible calculations.

"Finally, the metaphysical and skeptical works of a

few writers will not succeed, either, in causing it to be

believed that there exists no rule for war, for their writings

15
prove absolutely nothing against maxims supported upon

the most brilliant modern feats of arms, and justified by

the reasoning even of those who believe they are

combatting them/'

I hope, that after these avowals, I could not be accused

of wishing to make of this art a mechanism of determined

wheelworks, nor of pretending on the contrary that the

reading of a single chapter of principles is able to give, all

at once, the talent of conducting an army. In all the arts,

as in all the situations of life, knowledge and skill are two

altogether different things, and if one often succeed

through the latter alone, it is never but the union of the

two that constitutes a superior man and assures complete

success. Meanwhile, in order not to be accused of pedantry,

I hasten to avow that, by knowledge, I do not mean a vast

erudition; it is not the question to know a great deal but to

know well; to know especially what relates to the mission

appointed us.

I pray that my readers, well penetrated with these

truths, may receive with kindness this new summary,

which may now, I believe, be offered as the book most

suitable for the instruction of a prince or a statesman.

I have not thought it my duty to make mention, in the

above notice, of the military historical works which have

signalized our epoch, because they do not in reality enter

into the subject which I have to treat. However, as those of

our epoch have also contributed to the progress of the

science, in seeking to explain causes of success, I shall be

permitted to say a few words on them.

16
Purely military history is of a thankless and difficult

kind, for, in order to be useful to men of the art, it requires

details not less dry than minute, but necessary in order to

cause positions and movements to be judged accurately*

/Therefore, until the imperfect sketch of the Seven Years

War which Lloyd has given, none of the military writers

had come out of the beaten track of official narratives or of

panegyrics more or less fatiguing.

The military historians of the 18th century who had

held the first rank were, Dumont, Quincy, Bourcet, Pezay,

Grimoard, Retzow and Tempelhoff; the latter especially

had made of it a kind of school, although his work is a little

overcharged with the details of marches and

encampments: details very good, without doubt for fields

of combat, but very useless in the history of a whole war,

since they are represented almost every day under the

same form.

Purely military history has furnished, in France as in

Germany, writings so numerous since 1792, that their

nomenclature alone would form a pamphlet. I shall,

nevertheless, signalize here the first campaigns of the

Revolution by Grimoard; those of General Gravert; the

memoirs of Suchet and of Saint-Cyr; the fragments of

Gourgaud and of Montholon; the great enterprise of

victories and conquests under the direction of General

Beauvais; the valuable collection of battles by Colonel

Wagner and that of Major Kaussler; the Spanish War by

Napier; that of Egypt by Reynier; the campaigns of

Suwaroff by Laverne; the partial narratives of Stutterhein

andofLabaume.*

* We might cite yet the interesting narratives of Saintine, of Mortonval, of

LapenneU Lenoble, Lafaille, as well as those of the Prussian Major Spahl upon

Catalonia, of Baron V :lderndorf on the campaigns of the Bavarians, and a host of other

writings of the same nature.

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Until the fall of Napoleon, politico-military history

had had for many centuries but a single remarkable work;

that of Frederick the Great, entitled History of my time*

This species, which demands at the same time an elegant

style and a vast and profound knowledge of history and

politics, requires also a military genius sufficient for

judging events accurately. It would be necessary to

describe the relations or the interests of states like

Ancillon, and recount battles like Napoleon or Frederick,

to produce a chef-d'ouvre of this kind. If we still await this

chef-d'ouvre, it must be owned that some good works have

appeared within the last thirty years; in this number we

must put the war in Spain of Foy; the summary of military

events of Mathieu H. Dumas, and the manuscripts of Fain;

although the second is wanting in firm points of view, and

the last sins through too much partiality. Afterwards come

the works of M. Segur the younger, a writer full of genius

and of wise views, who has proved to us, by the history of

Charles VIE, that with a little more nature in his style he

might bear away from his predecessors the historic palm of

the great age which yet awaits its Polybus. In the third

rank we shall place the histories of Toulongeon and of

Servan.t

Finally, there is a third kind, that of critical history,

applied to the principles of the art, and more especially

designed to develop the relations of events with those

principles. Feuquieres and Lloyd had indicated the road

without having had many imitators until the Revolution.

* Several political historians, like Ancillon, Segur the elder, Karamsin, Guichardin,

Archenholz, Schiller, Daru, Michaud and Salvandy, have recounted also with talent

many operations of war, but they cannot be counted in the number of military writers.

11 do not speak of the political and military life of Napoleon recounted by himself

because it has been said that I was the author of it; with regard to those of Norvinsand of

Tibaudeau, they are not military.

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This last species, less brilliant in its forms, is for that

perhaps only the more useful in its results, especially

where criticism is not pushed to the rigor which should

often render it false and unjust.

Within the last twenty years, this half didactic, half

critical history has made more progress than the others, or

at least it has been cultivated with more success, and has

produced incontestable results. The campaigns published

by the Arch-Duke Charles, those anonymous ones of

General Muffling, the partial relations of Generals Pelet,

Boutourlin, Clausewitz,* Okounieff, Valentini, Ruhle;

those of Messrs, de Laborde, Koch, de Chambrai, Napier;

finally, the fragments published by Messrs. Wagner and

Scheel, in the interesting journals of Berlin and Vienna,

have all more or less assisted in the development of the

science of war. Perhaps I may be permitted also to claim a

small part in this result in favor of my long critical and

military history of the wars of the Revolution, and of the

other historical works which I have published, for, written

especially to prove the permanent triumph of the

application of principles, those works have never failed to

bring all the facts to this dominant point of view, and in

this respect at least, they have had some success; I invoke

in support of this assertion, the piquante critical analysis of

the war of the Spanish Succession, given by Captain

Dumesnil.

* The works of Clausewitz have been incontestably useful, although it is often less

by the ideas of the author, than by the contrary ideas to which he gives birth. They would

have been more useful still, if a pretentious and pedantic style did not frequently render

them unintelligible. But if, as a didactic author, he has raised more doubts than he has

discovered truths, as a critical historian, he has been an unscrupulous plaigerist [sic],

pillaging his predecessors, copying their reflections, and saying evil afterwards of their

works, after having travestied them under other forms. Those who shall have read my

campaign of 1799, published ten years before his, will not deny my assertion, for there is

not one of my reflections which he has not repeated.

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Thanks to this concurrence of didactic works and of

critical history, the teaching of the science is no longer so

difficult, and the professors who would be embarrassed at

this day, in making good courses with a thousand examples

to support them, would be sad professors. It must not be

concluded, however, that the art has arrived at that point

that it cannot make another step towards perfection.

There is nothing perfect under the sun!!! And if a

committee were assembled under the presidency of the

Arch Duke Charles or Wellington, composed of all the

strategic and tactical notabilities of the age, together with

the most skillful generals of engineers and artillery, this

committee could not yet succeed in making a perfect,

absolute and immutable theory on all the branches of war,

especially on tactics!

*U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE:1999-555-001/02033

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