UKRAINE AFTER THE ORANGE REVOLUTION:

CAN IT COMPLETE MILITARY TRANSFORMATION

AND JOIN THE U.S.-LED WAR ON TERRORISM?

Deborah Sanders

October 2006

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ISBN 1-58487-253-5
iii

FOREWORD

Ukaraine is located at a pivotal crossroads in Europe between 

east and west and has the potential to play an important role in 

combatting terrorism in two ways. First, by consolidating democracy 

and democratic control over its armed forces, Ukraine can be a 

stabilizing force in Eurasia. Second, the country can contribute 

toward the defeat of terrorism by developing niche capabilities, 

particularly in its peacekeeping forces.

Dr. Deborah Sanders, the author of this External Research 

Associates Program (ERAP) monograph, argues that for Ukraine 

to be an effective U.S. ally in the war on terror, it must engage in 

comprehensive military transformation. Such a transformation 

depends on developing its military professionalism, democratic 

political control, and democratic professionalism. She also contends 

that Ukraine must consolidate democracy and develop good relations 

with its neighbors, beginning with the Russian Federation, to fulfill 

its potential as an ally.

Dr. Sanders examines Ukraine’s progress in these crucial areas 

and provides recommendations for the U.S. Government, the U.S. 

military, and the international community to assist that country 

in accomplishing its military and democratic transformation. The 

Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to publish this ERAP monograph 

as a contribution to the national security debate on this strategic 

issue.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director

Strategic Studies Institute 
iv

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

DEBORAH SANDERS is Senior Lecturer in Defence Studies at 

King’s College London located at the Joint Services Command and 

Staff College in the Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, where 

she specializes in relations between Russia and Ukraine since their 

independence. Since 2001 she has widened her research interests 

to include security sector reform and military transformation in 

Ukraine and the Newly Independent States of the former Union 

of Soviet Socialist Republics. In recognition of her research interest 

in security sector reform in Ukraine and Russia, Dr. Sanders was 

awarded a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO-EAPC) 

Fellowship to conduct research into how foreign military assistance 

programs facilitate mature and stable relations between Russia and 

Ukraine. She regularly visits Ukraine and is currently working on 

Ukraine’s contribution to stability and security in the Black Sea. Dr. 

Sanders was awarded her doctorate from Aberystwyth University 

and subsequently published her thesis entitled Security Cooperation 

between Russia and Ukraine in the Post-Soviet Era with Palgrave in 

2001.
v

SUMMARY

Located at the crossroads of Europe between east and west, 

Ukraine’s pivotal location and recent path towards democracy mean 

that this state has the potential to play an important role in the global 

coalition in combatting both regional and international terrorism. 

Ukraine can contribute to the U.S.-led struggle against international 

terrorism in two ways. First, the consolidation of democracy and 

democratic control over its armed forces will allow Ukraine to be 

a force for stability in the Eurasian region. It will give Ukraine the 

authority and credibility to play a diplomatic and peacekeeping role in 

frozen conflicts in the former Soviet Union—where conflict resolution 

has yet to take place. Ukraine can make a second contribution to the 

U.S.-led defeat of international terrorism through the development 

of niche capabilities—in particular its peacekeeping forces. 

The author argues that, if Ukraine is to realize its potential as 

an effective U.S. ally in the war on terror, it needs to engage in 

comprehensive military transformation. This will necessitate 

the reform of all security stakeholders—all those organizations 

responsible for the provision of security in Ukraine. Effective military 

transformation in Ukraine will be dependent on the development of 

military professionalism, democratic political control, and democratic 

professionalism. Professional militaries are efficient, well-equipped, 

and highly motivated modern forces whose institutions and internal 

structures reflect democratic civilian control. Democratic control 

would ensure that all security stakeholders are accountable through 

the democratic structures in Ukraine; this would include both 

constitutional limits and accountability to the executive branch, 

legislative branch, and Ukrainian society. Democratic professionalism is an important benchmark used to determine progress in military 

transformation and the extent to which Ukraine can contribute to 

the war on terror. Democratic professionalism is the development of 

new styles of leadership and promotion in Ukraine so that military 

commanders have the confidence and flexibility to make timely 

decisions in a complex battlespace such as stabilization operations 

in Iraq. The author argues that Ukraine has made considerable 
vi

progress in developing military professionalism, democratic political 

control, and democratic professionalism in the military sphere, but 

has made far less progress in reforming its security services. 

Successful military transformation will allow Ukraine to 

provide niche capabilities, in particular well-trained and equipped 

peacekeeping troops able to contribute to the international struggle 

for peace and stability. Ukraine has made considerable progress 

in developing effective and professional peacekeeping forces. 

However, it is clear that, at present, Ukrainian peacekeeping forces 

lack the training and capability to perform strategic or more complex 

peacekeeping operations. Stabilization operations in Iraq have 

demonstrated that there is a need for future coalition members to 

develop the capability for full-spectrum military activities beyond 

traditional peacekeeping. The changing nature of contemporary 

conflicts means that members of the international community have 

to be able to deploy forces that are able to engage simultaneously 

in all aspects of strategic peacekeeping—peace building, peace 

enforcement, and traditional tasks related to maintaining the 

peace. A case study of Ukrainian peacekeepers in Iraq suggests that 

these forces currently lack the capability and training for anything 

more than rigid adherence to traditional as opposed to strategic 

peacekeeping tasks. The author argues that effective and well-funded 

military transformation in Ukraine will give the Ukrainian forces the 

capability to perform more complex tasks in support of the war on 

terror. 

The author argues that Ukraine’s ability to perform future military 

tasks in support of the war on terror also will be contingent on the 

consolidation of democracy and the development of good relations 

with neighbors. Ukraine has made some notable progress in the 

consolidation and building of its democratic and electoral institutions 

since the Orange Revolution at the end of 2004. Ukraine has a 

flourishing civic society and increasingly a free press. Democratization in Ukraine, which will provide one of the key catalysts for progress in military transformation, may mean, however, that Ukraine 

lacks the political commitment and domestic support necessary to 

deploy forces into high-risk environments. Increased democratic 

political control, accountability, and oversight could limit the 
vii

discretion of the Ukrainian Government to deploy its military in 

support of the war on terrorism. More democratic and inclusive 

political control over peacekeeping activities could limit the range 

of activities and the type of operations Ukraine will commit to in the 

future. 

Ukraine’s geo-strategic environment also affects the pace and 

shape of military transformation and the consolidation of democracy. 

The author argues that the parameters and possibilities of military 

change will be affected by the degree to which Ukraine maintains 

good relations with its neighbors—not least of which the Russian 

Federation. Russian interference in Ukraine’s presidential election 

in 2004 and disagreement over the price of Russian-supplied gas in 

early 2006 have strained relations between these two states. Russia 

and Ukraine also have a number of unresolved and contentious 

legacy issues that hamper the prospects for the normalization of 

relations in the short to medium term. These include the speed and 

shape of the Single Economic Space and the conditions under which 

the Russian fleet remains in Ukraine’s Black Sea port, Sevastopol. 

Ukraine’s foreign policy objectives connected with Euro-Atlantic 

integration will facilitate military transformation, but this ultimately 

could damage relations further with Russia. Deterioration in 

relations could lead to the reemphasis of traditional definitions of 

defense rather than the development of niche capabilities such as 

peacekeeping forces, thus hampering Ukraine’s ability to contribute 

to the war on terror.

UKRAINE AFTER THE ORANGE REVOLUTION:

CAN IT COMPLETE MILITARY TRANSFORMATION

AND JOIN THE U.S.-LED WAR ON TERRORISM?

INTRODUCTION 

“Razom nas Bahato! Nas ne podolaty!” The rhythmic chant spread 

through the crowd of hundreds of thousands that filled Kiev’s 

Independence Square on the evening of November 22 [2004]. “Together, 

we are many! We cannot be defeated!” Emerging from a sea of orange, 

the mantra signalled the rise of a powerful civic movement, a skilled 

political opposition group, and a determined middle class that had come 

together to stop the ruling elite from falsifying an election and hijacking 

Ukraine’s presidency.

Over the next 17 days, through harsh cold and sleet, millions of 

Ukrainians staged nationwide nonviolent protests that came to be 

known as the “orange revolution.” The entire world watched, riveted 

by this outpouring of the people’s will in a country whose international 

image had been warped by its corrupt rulers. By the time victory was 

announced—in the form of opposition leader Viktor Yushchenko’s 

electoral triumph—the orange revolution had set a major new landmark 

in the postcommunist history of eastern Europe.

Adrian Karatnycky1

Launched almost 5 years ago, the Global War on Terrorism 

(GWOT) is a U.S.-led campaign with the twin aims of ending 

international terrorism through the defeat of terrorist groups, and 

ending state sponsorship of terrorism. This protracted struggle has 

taken many forms, ranging from U.S.-led invasions of Afghanistan 

and Iraq to the promotion of democracy in unstable regions. There is 

a recognition within the U.S. Government that, ultimately, progress 

in defeating terrorist networks and groups, as well as ending state 

sponsorship of terrorism, will be dependent upon the “sustained 

efforts of a global coalition.”2

Located at the crossroads of Europe between east and west, 

Ukraine’s pivotal location and recent path towards democracy mean 

that this state has the potential to play an important role in the global 

coalition in combatting both regional and international terrorism. 
Ukraine can contribute to the U.S.-led struggle against international 

terrorism in two ways. First, the consolidation of democracy and 

democratic control over its armed forces will allow Ukraine to be 

a force for stability in the Eurasian region. It will give Ukraine the 

authority and credibility to play a diplomatic and peacekeeping 

role in “frozen conflicts” in the former Soviet Union. Ukraine can 

make a second contribution to the U.S.-led defeat of international 

terrorism through the development of its peacekeeping forces. 

However, if Ukraine is to realize its potential as an effective U.S. 

ally in the war on terrorism, it needs to make considerable progress 

in its military transformation. Successful military transformation, 

which intrinsically is linked to democratization in Ukraine, will 

allow Ukraine to continue to provide niche capabilities, with welltrained and fully equipped peacekeeping troops able to contribute to 

the international struggle for peace and stability.

The Ukrainian government clearly is interested in realizing this 

potential to contribute to the war on terrorism. The new Ukrainian 

president, Viktor Yushchenko, has confirmed his government’s 

commitment to fighting international terrorism. After the bomb 

attacks in London in July 2005, Yushchenko stated that terrorism was 

“a common challenge for every country which requires a common 

solution.”3 He called on all countries of the world to unite to stop 

the threat of terrorism. Then in September 2005, Ukraine signed the 

International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear 

Terrorism at the United Nations (UN) Summit.4 In a statement after 

the signing, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Borys Tarasyuk stressed 

Ukraine’s readiness to cooperate with the international community 

in developing and implementing effective and practical measures to 

combat the terrorist threat.5

In theory, then, Ukraine has a role to play as a U.S. partner in 

combatting terrorism. However, declarations of political support do 

not equate automatically to a substantial capability to act. The author 

argues that progress in military and democratic transformation will 

be important factors in determining the extent to which Ukraine will 

be a reliable partner in the struggle against terrorism. The shape of 

military transformation also will affect the nature of the military 

contribution that Ukraine can make, especially in the provision of 
niche capabilities such as peace support operations. Ukraine has 

made considerable progress towards developing effective, welltrained, and professional peacekeeping forces able to contribute to 

stabilization operations as required by the international community 

to facilitate peace and stability. However, it is clear that, at present, 

Ukrainian forces lack the training and capability to perform 

“strategic peacekeeping” operations.6 Stabilization operations in 

Iraq have demonstrated that there is a need for future coalition 

members to develop the capability for full-spectrum military 

activities beyond traditional peacekeeping. The changing nature of 

contemporary conflicts means that there is a need for members of 

the international community to deploy forces that are able to engage 

in peace building, peace enforcement, and traditional peacekeeping 

roles simultaneously. Currently, Ukrainian peacekeepers lack the 

capability and training for anything more than rigid adherence to 

traditional peacekeeping tasks. Effective and well-funded defense 

reform in Ukraine will give the Ukrainian forces the capability to 

perform more complex tasks and be a more reliable partner in the 

war on terror. Paradoxically, however, democratization in Ukraine, 

which will provide one of the key catalysts for greater military 

effectiveness, may weaken its political commitment to deploy forces 

into high-risk environments. 

WHAT CAN UKRAINE CONTRIBUTE 

TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM?

This section begins by examining in greater detail what Ukraine 

can contribute to the war on terrorism. Broadly, the contribution 

lies in two areas: (1) Ukraine can play an important role as a force 

for stability in the Eurasian region; and (2) it can provide niche 

capabilities such as peacekeeping forces. The publication of the U.S. 

National Security Strategy (NSS) in March 2006 provides a useful 

indication of the important contribution Ukraine can make to U.S. 

attempts to defeat global terrorism and to prevent future terrorist 

attacks. Section III of the NSS outlines how, in the long run, winning 

the war on terror means winning what is referred to as the battle 

of ideas through promoting and encouraging democracy, freedom, 
and human dignity. Ukraine has made some notable progress in 

building its democracy, suggesting that it is no longer a “state of 

concern,” but, more importantly, that it can promote freedom, 

dignity, and democracy in the region by example. In addition to 

providing peacekeeping troops to regional conflict zones, Ukraine 

can play a positive diplomatic and military role in “frozen conflicts” 

in the former Soviet Union, such as those in Trans-Dniester, 

Abkhazia, and Nagorny Karabakh. These are conflicts in which the 

use of force has ended and conflict termination has been achieved, 

but conflict resolution has yet to take place. The NSS outlines how 

important defusing regional conflicts is in the fight against terrorism. 

It suggests that, if conflicts are not addressed, they can lead to failed 

states, which can become safe havens for terrorists. A democratic 

Ukraine with an effective and reformed military and security sector 

could play an important diplomatic and military role in conflicts in 

the former Soviet Union. These regional conflicts provide numerous 

opportunities for the growth of organized crime and terrorism and 

a strengthening nexus between the two due to a significant number 

of ethnic conflicts and the density of criminal and terrorist groups 

in the region. As the U.S. Department of Justice notes, it is evident 

that, in the Black Sea region, “instability, as well as growing ties 

between ethnic minorities engaged in political struggles, have made 

the region a useful one for terrorists to operate within.”7

For example, Trans-Dniester, the tiny separatist enclave that 

broke away from the Republic of Moldova in 1991, shares a land 

border with Ukraine and has long been seen as an economic black 

hole through which all types of contraband move.8 The head of the 

Ukrainian Security Services Ihor Drizhchanyy has noted the threat 

from Moldova, stating that the “Dniester is a region with a very 

complex crime and socio-economic situation in which a large number 

of shadow and criminal structures operate. The law enforcement 

bodies are waging a fight against them, but in our view, it is not 

effective enough.”9 In March 2006, Ukraine signaled its willingness 

to deal firmly with the threat from Dniester when it imposed new 

customs regulations on the enclave. In a further sign that Ukraine 

is willing to use both diplomatic and military tools to deal with 

regional threats, Ukraine also has agreed to send peacekeepers to the 
disputed enclave of Nagorny Karabakh if international agreement 

can be reached. Secretary of the National Security and Defense 

Council Anatoly Kinakh stressed that “Ukraine will stand for 

territorial integrity of Azerbaijan and back peaceful and democratic 

settlement of the problem.”10 In August 2005, the new government 

in Kiev again demonstrated its commitment to dealing with regional 

terrorist challenges when the secretary of the National Security and 

Defense Council held a meeting with the head of the Russian Foreign 

Intelligence Service. The two neighbors met to discuss new forms 

of cooperation in fighting terrorism, organized crime, and the drug 

trade.11

Ukraine can make a second contribution to the war on terrorism—

through the development of niche capabilities, it can continue to 

be an active provider of peacekeeping troops to zones of conflict. 

Niche capabilities can be defined as “high-demand, low-density, 

and technologically-advanced military assets that are deployable, 

interoperable, and sustainable.”12 Capabilities provided by Ukraine 

could improve the effectiveness of future coalition operations 

and enhance their legitimacy. Ukraine has been a long and active 

supporter of peacekeeping operations, with its service personnel 

having performed peacekeeping missions in Eastern Slovenia, 

Macedonia, Angola, Abkhazia, Guatemala, Tajikistan, and Lebanon. 

Ukraine has played an important role in NATO-led peacekeeping 

in Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as Kosovo. The Ukrainian 

government demonstrated its commitment to the U.S.-led defeat of 

international terrorism when it deployed a chemical and biological 

decontamination unit to Kuwait during the first phase of the U.S.-

led invasion of Iraq. Indicating the new government’s support for 

the provision of niche capabilities, Ukrainian transport aircraft have 

provided airlift for cargo and peacekeepers in Afghanistan. Former 

President Leonid Kuchma further signaled Ukraine’s military 

commitment to defeat terrorism and promote peace and stability 

when he authorized the deployment of 1,600 Ukrainian peacekeeping troops to the Polish-controlled sector of Iraq. Ukraine also 

is engaged in cooperation with NATO in the fight against terrorism. 

Ukraine has recently pledged its support to Operation ACTIVE 

ENDEAVOR, NATO’s maritime operations in the Mediterranean 
launched on a U.S. initiative after the September 11, 2001 (9/11), 

terrorist attacks.13 This operation involves navies from Germany, 

Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom 

(UK), and the United States, which monitor ships on order to deter 

criminal and terrorist activity in the region.14

However, Ukraine’s ability to perform future military and 

diplomatic tasks in support of the war on terrorism will be contingent 

on building a professional military and security service, consolidating 

its democracy, and developing good relations with its neighbors. If 

Ukraine can make significant progress in these areas, it will be better 

able to participate in the diverse range of security, military, and 

diplomatic operations required by the international community to 

enhance peace and stability. 

UKRAINE’S MILITARY TRANSFORMATION

This section begins by examining what Ukraine needs to do to 

achieve a successful military transformation so that it can make a 

positive contribution to the GWOT, and what internal and external 

factors might affect this process. It then examines progress made 

by the new government based on information from interviews 

conducted in Kiev in April 2006 and the careful analysis of official 

documents.15 By means of a case study of the attack by Al Sadr forces 

on the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) compound in Wasit 

province in Iraq, focusing on the role played by Ukranian forces, 

the last part of this section examines just how much real progress 

Ukraine has made in developing democratic professional forces and 

democratic political control. 

Military transformation can be defined as “a strategy designed 

purposefully to achieve a cogent vision of the future.”16 As is well 

known and frequently remarked, the U.S. military itself is currently 

undergoing military transformation. The aim of this military 

transformation is to enable the United States to achieve three key 

goals: win the GWOT; build efficient fighting forces; and prepare for 

future wars.17 It is a process aimed at developing forces capable of 

defending U.S. security and interests, as well as swiftly defeating an 

enemy.18
The Ukrainian government has stated that the two key goals 

of military transformation in its case are Euro-Atlantic integration 

and acquiring the ability to provide support to international 

peacekeeping operations. In order to meet these objectives and be 

an effective contributor to the defeat of terrorism, Ukraine will need 

to undertake, first and foremost, the development of professional 

military forces. Professional militaries are those accepting that “their 

role is to fulfil the demands of the civilian government of the states 

and are capable of undertaking military activities in an effective and 

efficient way and whose organization and internal structures reflect 

these assumptions.”19 These guidelines are important because military 

effectiveness is predicated on efficient well-equipped and modern 

forces that are highly motivated. This definition of professionalism 

offers an ideal type of military professionalism and a number of 

important benchmarks for successful military transformation. It 

suggests that one of the key elements of professionalism is the 

development of forces that are capable of defending the state and 

engaging in a range of missions determined by the Ukrainian 

government. Such capabilities will necessitate a fundamental 

restructuring and reorganization of its fighting power and, more 

importantly, the development of an effective, well-equipped, and 

fully trained peacekeeping contingent. 

Successful military transformation in Ukraine, with the aim of 

achieving Euro-Atlantic integration, also is dependent on creating 

democratic control of all security stakeholders.20 Thus military 

transformation requires not just reform of the military, but broader 

security sector reform. The concept of security sector reform reflects 

the new security environment in which states find themselves 

facing external, internal, and asymmetrical threats. The old borders 

between domestic and external security, and between the different 

security forces, as well as between public and private security, 

essentially have been blurred by the changes in the international 

system.21 This complex environment necessitates accepting a wider 

definition of actors and organizations responsible for the protection 

of the state and its interests. Such protection would entail reform of 

regular armed forces, paramilitary and irregular forces, police, and 

other law enforcement agencies. Effective military transformation 
with the aim of facilitating Ukraine’s integration into Europe would 

require as well the reform of relevant nonmilitary structures in 

Ukraine, which have increased in size quite considerably from the 

time of their creation in the early 1990s but basically have remained 

unreformed.22 Reform of the security services would allow Ukraine 

to play a more significant role in the struggle against international 

terrorism as it would increase efficiency and facilitate interagency 

cooperation, thus allowing Ukraine to have full-spectrum visibility 

of regional and international threats. Such reform would also negate 

the potential challenges that the security services could pose to 

the consolidation of democracy in Ukraine. Ian Leigh argues that 

the major threat posed by terrorism to democratic states is that of 

over-reaction, which in turn leads to the erosions of civil liberties 

and a loss of openness and transparency, all of which undercut the 

legitimacy of the state.23 He argues that terrorist challenges necessitate 

developing constitutional, legislative, and administrative oversight 

of the security services so that they can protect society effectively 

without undermining democracy. 

Reform of Ukraine’s security sector is long overdue. There have 

been recent allegations that the Sluzhba Bezpeky Ukraiyiny24 (SBU, the 

Ukrainian security services) was complicit in the illegal export of 

arms to China, Iran, and Iraq.25 The urgent need for reform of the 

security sector was recognized by former National Security and 

Defense Council Secretary Petro Poroshenko in August 2005.26 In an 

interview, he stated that reform of the law enforcement and special 

services was one of the key tasks for the new government. He went 

on to point out that, in their present form, the law enforcement 

agencies and special services pose a serious threat to national security. 

Evidence of this was seen during the presidential elections when 

allegations were made that the Interior Ministry had Yushchenko 

under surveillance.27 This raised questions about the politicization 

of the Interior Ministry and the degree to which Ukraine’s security 

sector was impartial and apolitical. The need for reform was 

recognized by the new government with the appointment in eary 

2005 of Yuri Lutsenko, a popular opposition politician and a leader of 

antigovernment protests in 2000, as Interior Minister.28 The Interior 

Ministry, tasked with fighting endemic corruption in Ukraine and 
employing 500,000 people, will now be headed for the first time by 

a civilian minister. Lutsenko’s task is to end corruption among the 

police and to mobilize them to serve the people. The new head of the 

SBU, Igor Drizhchanyy, outlined a reform agenda for it. This included 

the need for a comprehensive review of threats facing Ukraine and 

responsibilities of the various security agencies in Ukraine to increase 

efficiency in the fight against terrorism.29 In particular, Drizhchanyy 

has called for a clear allocation of responsibilities in the fight against 

corruption and organized crime, a responsibility now currently 

shared by the SBU, the Interior Ministry, and the Prosecutor General’s 

Office.30 The Ukrainian president also has called for a shakeup of 

law enforcement agencies, and in July 2005 took the first step by 

abolishing the traffic police—one of the most corrupt institutions in 

Ukraine.31

Effective military transformation also requires treating all 

security stakeholders within the larger context of democratization 

taking place in Ukraine. Democracy cannot succeed without military 

transformation and vice versa; the two are inseparably linked and 

interdependent. The creation of effective military and security 

structures under civilian and democratic control is an important 

element of effective military transformation, an eventuality 

intrinsically linked to the consolidation of democracy in Ukraine. 

Theodor H. Winkler argues that, if security providers are not 

accountable through the democratic process, “then democracy cannot 

flourish; human rights and dignity and security are in jeopardy and 

the road to good governance, socio-economic development, and the 

rule of law is blocked.”32 The breadth of democratic control required 

over the security stakeholders, however, is subject to debate. For 

example, Andrew Cottey, Timothy Edmunds, and Anthony Forster 

take a narrowly straightforward view. They argue that “democratic 

control should be understood in terms of political control of the 

military by the legitimate, democratically elected authorities of the 

state.”33 Marybeth Ulrich offers a more detailed taxonomy of the 

types of democratic political control. She divides these into four key 

elements: constitutional provisions, executive oversight and control, 

legislative oversight and control, and societal support.34 Ukraine 

has made significant progress in all of these areas. It has developed 
10

mechanisms for civilian control; there is a clear chain of command 

from the executive to military leaders. The Ukrainian Rada, or 

parliament, has oversight of the defense budget and broad policy 

issues relating to defense; and within society itself there is broad 

respect for the military. 

Ulrich argues that democratic political control is not enough. She 

maintains that what is required for effective military transformation 

is democratic military professionalism, since in her view the 

process of transformation as treated in the security sector reform 

literature is insufficiently penetrating and comprehensive. Instead, 

for Ulrich effective transformation in Ukraine would necessitate 

the incorporation of key democratic norms into their structures, 

organizations, mode of thinking, and cultural outlook.35 She outlines 

a number of key requirements for military professionalism in a 

democracy. These include a merit-based system of promotion, styles 

of leadership that reflect society’s democratic norms and human 

rights, high levels of military education and training, military 

acceptance of its role in society, high public accountability, and 

operational doctrine reflective of society’s values.36 That is, democratic 

military and security professionals would accept, internalize, and 

uphold democratic values, while their structures and organization 

reflect those values. 

For the Ukrainian military and security services to contribute 

effectively to the war on terrorism, they need to do more than just 

come to terms with operating in a democracy and accept civilian or 

democratic political control.37 Instead, security stakeholders would 

need to develop new training courses which promote democratic 

professionalism, introduce a new promotion system insulated from 

extrinsic pressures, and adopt new styles of leadership to reflect 

democratic changes in society. Progress in these three areas would 

add an important qualitative aspect to military transformation in 

Ukraine. In particular, the adoption of a more democratic style of 

leadership and the promotion of Ukrainian military personnel based 

on merit would go some way toward encouraging and facilitating the 

development of effective, well-trained, and adequately supported 

commanders willing and able to assume authority in a complex 

environment. Military command is the art of decisionmaking, 
11

motivating, and directing forces to accomplish particular missions. 

Mission command is giving commanders on the ground the scope 

and authority to make timely and important decisions. It requires the 

development of a style of command which promotes decentralized 

command, speed of action, and initiative on the part of the individual 

commander. The freedom, confidence, and flexibility required to 

make timely and important decisions, particularly in peacekeeping 

or stabilization operations, will be facilitated by allowing democratic 

and liberal values to shape training and education, as well as 

organizational command in the Ukrainian military. Although there 

is no automatic link between democracy and effective military 

command, the former is an important foundation for the latter. 

Democratic professional forces are less political and better able to 

make timely and informed decisions. In a democracy, decisions of 

military operational detail are decoupled from issues of political 

dogma. This does not mean that an effective military commander 

is indifferent to politics. Good commanders will think about all of 

the implications of their actions.38 The adoption of new styles of 

leadership and command, as well as increased training and education, 

also are likely to increase the prospects for recruitment and retention 

of military and security personnel, since their conditions of service 

would improve considerably. 

What is required in Ukraine is a change in the organizational 

thought process in both the security services and military, and in 

how they do business. First deputy head of the Ukrainian Security 

Services Vasyl Krutov has recognized the need for a change in the 

SBU. He has described how the security services need to change 

to reflect the democratic changes in Ukraine in the context of the 

threat from international terrorism.39 He points out that new people 

have come in, and that the priorities of the service have changed 

to reflect the values and standards of European integration and the 

democratization of Ukrainian society after the Orange Revolution. 

Fundamental and far-reaching reform of Ukraine’s security sector is 

essential and could have a positive spill-over effect in the war on terror. A democratically controlled security sector that is accountable 

to the government will be better placed to protect Ukraine against 

regional and international terrorist threats simultaneously, while 

at the same time upholding and protecting Ukraine’s fragile 

democracy. 
12

The parameters and possibilities of military transformation in 

Ukraine also will be affected by internal and external factors. The 

professionalization of armed forces and democratic control in Central 

and Eastern Europe are affected by both international and domestic 

factors.40 The balance between these factors explains the extent of 

professionalization as well as the foreign, internal, external, historical, 

institutional, and cultural determinants of democratic control in 

this region. This suggests that successful military transformation 

in Ukraine will be contingent on democratic consolidation and the 

strategic environment in which relations take place—in particular, 

relations with neighbors. Military change is affected by three factors: 

international, domestic, and historical.41 States have to respond to 

the security threats and external environment in which they operate, 

and develop military forces to meet these international pressures. 

Domestically, a state’s military must respond and reflect the values 

of their society. Lastly, a state’s political legacy (e.g., communist or 

imperial), historical military posture (e.g., aggressive or passive), or 

means of raising armies (e.g., mass levies, conscription, volunteers) 

will condition the constraints and opportunities for effective reform.42

Therefore, in the next section, we shall consider the impact of both 

internal and external pressures on the building of professional military 

forces in Ukraine. Ukraine’s progress in military transformation, its 

capabity for membership in the Euro-Atlantic community and for 

providing peacekeeping troops, and its democratic consolidation 

are likely to be affected by the strategic environment in which 

Ukraine operates. For instance, the normalization of relations 

between Russia and Ukraine would allow Ukraine to shake off its 

communist legacy, both politically and militarily, and redefine its 

identity as European—and then restructure its military accordingly. 

Normalizing relations with its largest and most powerful neighbor 

would ameliorate concerns about Russia’s inability to come to terms 

with an independent Ukraine. In effect, good relations between 

Russia and Ukraine would allow Kiev to concentrate on the detail 

of military transformation and the building of closer cooperation 

with NATO and the European Union (EU). However, Ukraine’s 

membership in NATO is likely to damage relations between 

these two states. Moreover, deteriorating relations with Ukraine’s 
13

neighbors could impact negatively on military transformation. This 

would likely affect Ukraine’s ability to contribute, both generally 

and specifically, to the war on terrorism. 

Before proceeding in the next section to the question of building 

an effective security sector, let us glance at a number of benchmarks 

that will be used to evaluate progress in military transformation. For 

Ukraine to achieve Euro-Atlantic integration and become a provider 

of peacekeeping troops—i.e., be an effective contributor to the 

war on terror—it will need to build an effective fighting force that 

is controlled democratically and has incorporated key democratic 

norms and values into how it trains and engages in operations. 

Progress in military transformation will be affected by internal and 

external factors. Ukraine’s consolidation of democracy, the building 

of democratic electoral institutions, establishment of a free press, and 

development of a civic society will all impact directly on military 

transformation and on Ukraine’s ability to be a force for stability and 

security in the region. In addition, economic growth and progress 

in the development of a market economy also will impact directly 

on the government’s plans to reform, restructure, and modernize 

the military, as well as affect democratic consolidation. Externally, 

relations between Ukraine and Russia, as well as U.S. engagement, 

will shape the possibilities of Ukraine’s involvement in the war on 

terror. 

PROGRESS SO FAR IN BUILDING 

AN EFFECTIVE SECURITY SECTOR

This section explores what progress Ukraine has made in 

transforming its military and security sector, and evaluates how 

this impacts on its ability to contribute to the defeat of international 

terrorism. Ukraine’s progress in security sector reform will be 

examined in light of the benchmarks of effective military transformation outlined above. Informed by interviews conducted in Kiev in 

April 2005 and drawing on key policy documents, we shall consider 

the extent to which Ukraine is developing professional, well-equipped, 

and fully funded military and security forces that are controlled 

democratically and marked by robust democratic professionalism. 
14

Ukraine has made significant progress in consolidating its democracy, a key enabler for military transformation, and has the potential 

to be an effective military contributor to the war on terrorism. 

Military Professionalism—Building a Fighting Force.

Ukraine has made progress in developing its military 

professionalism. It has a clear plan for modernizing, restructuring, 

and enhancing interoperability. The Strategic Defense Bulletin, a key 

government document on defense reform, outlines how Ukraine 

will pursue its national strategic interests and creates a vision of the 

future organization and configuration of Ukraine’s armed forces.43 It 

deals primarily with the development of Ukraine’s manpower and 

hardware assets—the key ingredients for building a professional 

military able to undertake military activities in an effective and 

efficient way. Between 2001 and 2005, Ukraine had reduced the 

number of its service personnel from 416,000 to 245,000, divided into 

40 percent combat units and 60 percent service support. During this 

same period, the armed forces discarded over 6,300 pieces of obsolete 

and inoperable equipment and disposed of 97,800 tons of degraded 

or useless missiles and ammunition (more on this topic below). At 

the end of 2005, Ukraine had over 3,000 tanks, 4,290 armored combat 

vehicles, 3,437 artillery systems, 575 combat aircraft, 182 combat 

helicopters, and 15 combat ships.44 To develop Ukraine’s fighting 

force, the government will introduce a new structure for the military, 

including better command, control, and logistics. It also has plans for 

additional significant cuts in personnel and reductions in stockpiles 

of arms and the upgrading and modernization of hardware—all 

encompassed in an increasing defense budget. 

The key goals of defense reform are to achieve full interoperability 

with NATO forces and command structures and to establish the 

means to respond quickly to requests by the UN or other international 

organizations for peacekeeping troops. In a detailed study of U.S.-

Ukraine military cooperation programs, Leonid Polyakov45 has 

argued that full combat interoperability with U.S. forces is not a 

realistic possibility for the Ukrainian military in the short term.46 But 

he does acknowledge that the extensive program of U.S.-Ukrainian 
15

military cooperation has created at least the necessary foundations 

for interoperability between these two states at the tactical level in 

low-intensity operations such as peacekeeping. In other words, the 13 

years of military cooperation between the United States and Ukraine 

have enhanced interoperability between these two states to the 

extent that they can now conduct successful combined peacekeeping 

operations.47

For the Ukrainian government and military, developing even 

limited—let alone full—interoperability with U.S. and all other 

NATO forces will have an implicit positive spillover effect. It will 

increase the democratic professionalism of the Ukrainian forces, 

and will allow Ukraine to deploy democratically controlled forces 

regionally or internally to support the fight against terrorism. To 

enhance interoperability and develop its peacekeeping potential, 

as we noted earlier, the Ukrainian government plans to reduce and 

restructure its personnel, increase sustainability, and modernize 

its equipment. The new restructured military also will be reduced 

significantly in size. The total strength of the military by 2011 could be 

in the vicinity of 100,000 personnel.48 In an attempt to professionalize 

its military, Ukraine also plans to move towards a full standing 

army by 2010, a year before the final stage of reform in Ukraine as 

outlined in the State Program of Development of the Armed Forces 

of Ukraine, 2006-2011. In the transition period, Ukraine will continue 

with a mixed system of staffing, assuring that all positions critical to 

ensuring operational effectiveness are occupied by contracted service 

personnel.49 To facilitate this transition, Ukraine has selected three 

brigades, one from each service, to be manned fully by volunteers 

by the end of 2006. The economic and social costs of moving towards 

a professional, standing, well-equipped, and adequately trained 

fighting force will be sizeable. 

Sustainable progress in military transformation in Ukraine’s army 

is dependent on its successful transition to a market economy. A 

modern and efficient market economy also is an important enabling 

condition for democratic consolidation.50 This suggests that, for 

Ukraine to make a military contribution to the war on terrorism 

and build a stable democratic state as the bulwark against regional 

terrorism, then economic growth and the rapid development of a 
16

flourishing market economy are vital. Anders Aslund has pointed 

out that the government’s economic policy, under former Prime 

Minister Yulia Tymoshenko, was disastrous, with growth plummeting owing to a fall in investment. Aslund argues that the interference 

of the Prime Minister in pricing and property disputes, compounded 

by the disruptive effects of widespread nationalization and renewed 

sales of privatized companies, all acted to undermine property rights 

and investment in Ukraine.51 An assessment by the Razumkov Centre 

of the new government’s economic policy also suggests that progress 

thus far has been slow and patchy.52 Yushchenko’s government 

has managed to raise social benefits, pensions, and wages, but its 

administrative methods have affected business, the investment 

climate, and economic growth adversely.53 Poor economic progress 

in Ukraine will constrain the ability of the government to engage 

in military transformation, which is a costly process. It involves 

such infrastructural costs as those for the resettlement and housing 

of military personnel, as well as such operational costs as those 

incident to buying new equipment, training, and educating security 

providers. 

In recognition of the explicit link between Ukraine’s economy 

and military transformation, the new government has developed 

a plan which will concentrate financial resources on key priority 

areas to enable Ukraine to develop modern and combat-capable 

armed forces within tight budgetary constraints.54 During 2005, the 

imposition of strict fiscal controls on the military and the elimination 

of inappropriate expenditures has allowed for a more effective use 

of budget resources.55 In addition, the Ministry of Defense (MoD) has 

clear plans to radically change the structure of the defense budget, 

reduce high personnel costs while shifting the emphasis to spending 

on force training, weapons, and equipment. The White Book, the official evaluation of progress in defense reform in Ukraine in 2005, 

points out that “the defense budgets for 2000-2004 were not wellbalanced and left no headroom for development or investment as most 

of the money was spent on meeting the fixed costs of personnel.”56

During 2005, Ukraine spent 81.5 percent of its defense budget on 

personnel costs, as compared with Germany, which spent 50.7 

percent, and Poland at 28 percent. In 2006, Ukraine plans to reduce 
17

its fixed personnel costs to 66.5 percent, which are slated to fall to 

57.6 percent by 2011. In February 2006, in a clear sign of democratic 

support for the defense priorities set by the new government, the 

Ukrainian parliament approved a significant increase in the defense 

budget for 2006 amounting to a gross domestic product (GDP) rise 

from 1.36 to 1.74 percent.57 The Ukrainian Defense Ministry’s finance 

director Ivan Marko stated that the new budget would allow the 

government to move from merely sustaining the military to actually 

developing the military.58 This budgetary increase, combined with 

efficiency drives, restructuring, and reduction of forces, will allow 

Ukraine to continue to develop professional, well-equipped, and 

trained military personnel. Full realization, however, is contingent 

on continued economic growth in Ukraine. 

In reorganizing and restructuring its military forces, Ukraine 

plans to create three functional divisions within the armed forces: the 

Joint Rapid Reaction forces (JRRF), the Main Defense Force, and the 

Strategic Reserves. The JRRF, which is responsible for peacekeeping 

operations, will be the most powerful part of the fighting forces, with 

an operational readiness capability in 30 days. By 2011, the JRRF 

will be staffed by 29,000 personnel, or 30 percent of the total combat 

strength of the military.59 The JRRF will have two components: the 

Immediate Reaction Forces and Rapid Reaction Forces. These forces 

will be equipped with medium and light equipment and trained for 

peacekeeping, counterterrorism, and emergency relief operations. 

Ukraine has made significant progress in training of its JRRF. 

Prioritizing the development and training of the rapid reaction forces 

in Ukraine will allow it to continue to be an active participant in 

peacekeeping operations. In a recent interview, the Defense Minister 

stated that during 2005 priority was given to training the Joint Rapid 

Response Forces rather than other forces.60 Clearly drawing attention 

to this priority in defense reform, the White Book states that special 

“attention will be focused on accelerated development of the JRRF.” 

This prioritization also is reflected in the share of defense spending 

allocated to the JRRF during the second stage of defense reform 

during 2006-11. The JRRF will receive almost a third more funding 

than the Main Defense Force, even though the former is half the 

size of the latter.61 The Defense Academy in Kiev has trained 1,000 
18

peacekeeping troops since its inception. Ukrainian peacekeepers 

currently are trained to work in the diverse range of roles required by 

the international community—from traditional peacekeeping roles to 

observation missions. Ukraine’s active involvement in peacekeeping 

operations has a positive side effect in terms of developing skills 

among service personnel. Writing in 1999, before he became the 

current Defense Minister, Hrytsenko acknowledged the importance 

of Ukraine’s involvement in peacekeeping operations in terms of 

developing key military skills and experience.62 A recent survey of 

Ukrainians participating in peacekeeping operations in the former 

Yugoslavia revealed that almost half of those surveyed identified the 

desire to improve their level of professionalism as a key motivator in 

volunteering for peacekeeping.63

The Main Defense Force will operate at a lower state of readiness, 

its main tasks being to provide national defense, reinforce the 

JRRF, and serve as a rotational pool for units deployed abroad on 

peacekeeping missions. Placing too much emphasis on this particular 

element of defense reform, in terms of funding, training, and 

equipment, would leave the remainder of Ukraine’s forces weak and 

could damage morale in the short term. The emphasis placed on the 

acquisition of the English language, in the absence of comprehensive 

facilities for all military personnel to acquire this skill, could, in 

effect, reinforce this two-tier system of elite and non-elite military 

forces. Unless personnel in the Main Defense Force are offered the 

same opportunities and training as those in the JRRF, Ukraine might 

struggle to recruit, let alone retain, a standing professional force of 

100,000 personnel by 2011. 

There also is a clear recognition by the new government in 

Ukraine of the need to invest in new equipment if it is to develop a 

professional military. The White Book states that professionalism of 

the Ukrainian armed forces will necessitate “ensuring the provision 

of state of the art weapons and equipment.” In emphasizing the 

importance of the JRRF, the government asserts that these forces are 

considered to be the top priority for equipping with modern and 

upgraded weapons and equipment. This will include modern digital 

communications equipment and a new AN-70 transport aircraft in 

2006. The last section of the Strategic Defense Bulletin highlights the 
19

challenges facing Ukraine in equipping its JRRF for deployment, 

noting that “the Ukrainian Armed Forces are equipped with almost 

all types of [outdated] armament and equipment. The most obsolete 

equipment can be found in Ukraine’s Naval Forces combat ships, its 

missile and artillery system, and guided antiaircraft missiles. First 

Deputy Minister for Defense Leonid Polyakov has drawn attention 

to one of the difficult consequences of modernizing Ukraine’s 

equipment: the disposal of surplus small and light arms. 

A report by the Razumkov Centre in 2005 points out that the 

depots and arsenals belonging to the Ukrainian MoD contain huge 

stocks of conventional ammunition that is not only obsolete and unfit 

for combat use, but also exceeds the needs of the military by up to 75 

percent.64 The continued storage of this ammunition inherited after 

the breakup of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) is a 

costly process detracting from the funding of the Ukrainian military. 

More significantly, the accidental explosions at the ammunition 

depots in Artemisvsk in October 2003 and near Melitopol in May 2004 

clearly demonstrate that these depots pose a threat to the security of 

the Ukrainian people. In addition, the existence of large stockpiles of 

ammunition and small and light arms in Ukraine “offers a deferred 

supply for terrorist activity or for equipping organized criminals, 

extremist groups, irregular armed forces, or feeding the criminal 

‘black market.’”65 The disappearance of 100 decommissioned S75 missiles from a facility near Zhytomyr in 2004 provided a stark 

indication that the Defense Ministry had failed to establish a clear 

system of weaponry accountability and control in Ukraine, making 

it a potential arms sales provider to terrorist groups.66

By the end of 2005, however, Ukraine had made significant 

progress in reducing its stockpiles of excess ammunition and small 

arms, and can now claim to have data “on every single weapon 

and equipment piece” owned by the Ukrainian military.67 The new 

government also has made some limited progress in modernizing, 

repairing, and upgrading equipment. During 2005, seven Bulat T64 tanks were modernized; 19 Barsuk reconnaissance stations were 

upgraded; and over 550 units of automotive, engineering, navigation, 

and computer equipment were repaired.68
20

Democratic Control of Ukrainian Forces. 

With the signing of the NATO-Ukraine Action Plan, the new 

government in Ukraine also has acknowledged the importance of 

ensuring democratic control of the armed forces and security services. 

This plan outlines the need for institution-building in Ukraine as well 

as for the processes by which these institutions exercise democratic 

control over society in general, and the military specifically, as well 

as a need for increased transparency and accountability. The first 

NATO-Ukraine Action Plan, approved in Prague in November 2002, 

was a result of Ukraine’s decision to move towards full membership 

in the Alliance. The new Ukrainian government agreed to a NATOUkraine Annual Target Plan for 2005 which detailed the activities 

required of Ukraine to achieve the objectives laid out in the NATOUkraine Action Plan, which takes a comprehensive approach 

to security sector reform in Ukraine by linking it explicitly with 

democratic objectives. John Colston, the Assistant Secretary General 

for Defense policy and Planning at NATO, stated that “defense 

and security sector reform has been on the NATO-Ukraine agenda 

for a long time—the Allies are determined to assist Ukraine in 

strengthening the democratic credentials of its security sector.”69

Ukraine has made some notable progress in increasing transparency and openness in its defense reform. The publication of the 

White Book in early 2006, which was the first in an annual series 

of open reports by the MoD on the armed forces in Ukraine, is an 

important first step. This document provides an open and honest 

appraisal of the challenges facing the Ukrainian military, as well as 

a clear statement of priorities over the next 5 years. In an attempt 

to speed up democratic civilian control of the military, Ukraine has 

been appointing predominantly civilian employees to the main 

managerial offices of the MoD.70 More importantly, while four out of 

the five Deputy Ministers of Defense in Ukraine were former military 

officers, all are now civilians. The appointment of civilian personnel 

to the Defense Ministry has created the enabling conditions for the 

building of close and supportive relations between the MoD and the 

Ukrainian parliament’s Defense Committee. This has had a positive 

side effect in terms of democratic political control of the military and 
21

has allowed the MoD to make its case for a budgetary increase in 

2006 to cover the costs of reform. 

There also is recognition within the Ukrainian parliament of 

the need to extend democratic control and oversight to the security 

services. Chairman of the Defense Committee of the Ukrainian 

parliament Georgiy Kryuchkov emphasized the need for the new 

parliament elected in March 2006 to create laws, as well as a new 

committee, to ensure democratic oversight of the security sector.71

Until the new government is fully formed in Ukraine, progress in 

this area will be on hold and is likely to be slow since the security 

services have yet to come to terms with operating in a democracy. 

Traditionally, the Ukrainian parliament played a very limited role 

in defense reform. Its main areas of responsibility are approving the 

defense budget, adopting laws on defense and security, implementing 

those laws, determining the broad principles of foreign policy, and 

warmaking. These powers are more extensive even than those of the 

UK’s House of Commons and are on a par with those of the U.S. 

Congress. The role of the Ukrainian parliament has been constrained 

by a lack of access to information and presidential resistance to 

parliamentary oversight of defense issues. While it has the formal 

powers to approve the budget, it lacked the capacity to scrutinize 

detailed legislation. The relevant committees in parliament have 

had few professional military or defense advisers. It is clear that this 

situation now has changed quite fundamentally, as the Ukrainian 

Defense Committee today plays an increasingly important role in 

shaping military transformation in Ukraine.

Democratic Professionalism in Ukraine’s Forces.

Hardest to evaluate is how much progress Ukraine has made 

in developing democratic professionalism among its military and 

security personnel. Democratic professionalism is the acceptance 

and internalization of key norms and values through changes in 

education, training, promotion, career advancement, recruitment, 

and retention. The Ukrainian military, compared with the security 

services, has made the most significant progress. Ukraine has 

increased the level of training across all branches of the armed forces. 
22

In addition to increasing the number of tactical military training 

exercises, the Ukrainian military also plans to delegate responsibility 

for the delivery and evaluation of training to individual commanders. 

This would suggest the adoption of a merit-based approach to 

promotion—at least at command level. It also hints at the adoption 

by the Ukrainian military of a more positive approach to “mission 

command,” i.e., decentralization of authority to commanders in 

the tactical/operational realms. The White Book foreshadows these 

changes in stating that the “promotion of command personnel 

will directly depend on the training levels of their subordinate 

elements.”72

Movement toward the development of a centralized system of 

personnel management in 2005, aiming eventually to comply with 

NATO standards, further suggests that the Ukrainian military is 

setting up the institutional framework necessary for a move to a 

merit-based approach to promotion.73 Moreover, it signifies recognition of the need to manage the career development of individual 

service personnel, which is likely to enhance recruitment and 

retention and build morale. The dramatic reduction in military 

personnel also has necessitated the streamlining and reevaluation 

of the role and function of military education in Ukraine. The MoD 

has signified its readiness to increase the level of military education 

of all military officers so that they can perform their role adequately 

as leaders. The White Book states that “for brigade commanders, 

the standards of education will be raised to the operational and 

strategic level, and for battalion commander they will be raised to 

the operational and tactical level.74 Indicating that Ukraine is keen to 

embrace a merit-based approach to promotion, it also has adopted 

a new system of officer training to provide officers with the skills 

and knowledge they need prior to promotion to higher ranks. In a 

further sign of qualitative improvements in military education, the 

Ministry also has accepted the concept of sponsoring university 

students before they join the military. Currently, Ukraine has over 

1,000 university students who, on completion of their degrees, will 

complete a year of military training and become military officers, 

somewhat on the model of the U.S. ROTC programs. 
23

THE CONSOLIDATION OF DEMOCRACY 

AND MILITARY TRANSFORMATION

As was discussed earlier, the U.S. National Security Strategy 

draws an explicit link between democratization and defeating 

terrorism. The consolidation of democracy in Ukraine is, therefore, 

a means to achieve greater stability. Democratization also is a force 

enabler in facilitating military transformation in this state. If Ukraine 

continues along the democratic path, it will be a force for stability in 

the region and at the same time also will be better placed to contribute 

militarily and diplomatically to the war on terrorism. 

Ukraine has made some notable progress in the consolidation 

and building of its democratic and electoral institutions since the 

Orange Revolution, thus boding well for military transformation. In 

December 2004, in an attempt to break the political impasse between 

the two contending presidential camps growing out of the Orange 

Revolution, the parliament adopted far-reaching constitutional 

changes in which Ukraine would become a parliamentary-presidential system. After the elections and the formation of a new 

government in Ukraine in March 2005, the Cabinet, rather than the 

President, became the supreme executive decisionmaking body. 

The President retains the right to appoint the Defense Minister, 

the Prime Minister, and Foreign Minister. The move in Ukraine 

towards a parliamentary system, where members are elected on a 

purely proportional basis from the national party lists, theoretically 

encourages democratic institution-building and increases 

parliamentary oversight of military transformation. The introduction 

of a parliamentary system with a Prime Minister accountable to 

parliament heading a Cabinet will ensure a better balance of power 

between the executive and legislative branches in all areas of 

government. It also will encourage cross-party cooperation and has 

the potential to increase transparency in decisionmaking—including 

defense and security policy.75 However, despite the need to widen 

access to decisions in the defense sphere, there is no guarantee that 

a new parliament necessarily will facilitate military transformation 

in Ukraine. The current parliament has acted as a spoiler in terms 

of defense reform, and consistently has thwarted attempts by the 
24

Defense Minister to implement desirable aspects of reform. For 

instance, the parliament has turned down a number of bills needed 

for cooperation with NATO, including the use of Ukraine’s transport 

aviation in NATO airlift operations and the admittance of foreign 

militaries onto Ukrainian territory for multinational exercises.76

Ukraine has a flourishing civic society and increasingly a 

free press—two of the key components for successful military 

transformation as laid out in the NATO Action Plan. A free press 

encourages governmental accountability in the security sphere, and 

provides people information about defense and security issues. A 

developed civic culture ensures that all security stakeholders in 

society have access to the decisionmaking process and can influence 

policy. The Orange Revolution created the enabling conditions and 

motivation for the uniting of the many opposition groups in Ukraine—

nongovernment organizations (NGOs), youth, church groups, and 

all sectors of society—to overthrow the old regime. Ukraine had 

benefited from more than a decade of civil society engagement and 

support from NATO, the EU, the United States, and NGOs, the rise 

of a significant middle class, and a new and critical news media 

on the Internet.77 Public response to the massive election fraud on 

November 21, 2004, as embodied in the Orange Revolution, resulted 

in the highest level of civil engagement in the political process in 

Ukraine since independence in 1991.78 A further sign of the mature 

civic culture in Ukraine was the peaceful nature of the protests and 

the compromises that were struck by the opposition to ensure the 

peaceful transfer of power. A key element for successful military 

transformation is a free and open press, an area in which Ukraine has 

made considerable progress. The news media began to operate more 

freely in Ukraine after the revolution. With the previous regime, 

intimidation, pro-government ownership, favoritism in granting 

broadcasting rights, and government guidance on what to publish 

and how to publish were the order of the day. Some concerns have 

been expressed, however, about the actual level of governmental 

support for a free press when a reporter was heavily criticized for 

revealing damaging information about the finances and lifestyle of 

Yushchenko’s son.79

Although Ukraine has made considerable progress in the 

consolidation of its democracy, a key barrier to democratization, 
25

and hence military transformation, is the high level of corruption. 

Alexander Motyl recently has described Ukraine as an “excessively 

corrupt country.”80 Corruption, in the sense of the misuse of public 

power for private gain or the misuse of entrusted power, is a major 

cultural and structural impediment to military transformation in 

Ukraine. The absence of the rule of law, inefficient bureaucracies, 

over-regulation of the economy, alternative systems for organizing 

society, and the lack of accountability and transparency in government 

have formed a breeding ground for corruption. One of the most 

damaging effects of corruption is its undermining of the consolidation 

of democracy.81 Distrust in elected officials breeds cynicism, apathy, 

and eventually alienation from the democratic process.82 The collapse 

of the ruling coalition in Ukraine in September 2005 amid allegations 

and counterallegations of corruption has delayed much needed 

economic, social, and political reforms. Even more importantly, the 

poor showing of Yushchenko’s party in the parliamentary elections 

indicates that his reputation has been damaged significantly. 

EXTERNAL PRESSURES ON 

MILITARY TRANSFORMATION

Ukraine’s geo-strategic environment also has affected the pace and 

shape of its military transformation and consolidation of democracy. 

In particular, the parameters and possibilities of change will be 

affected by the degree to which Ukraine maintains good relations 

with its neighbors—not least of which is the Russian Federation—

and by its level of engagement with the United States and Europe, in 

the process of transformation more generally. 

In a pragmatic recognition of the importance of maintaining 

good relations with its larger neighbor, President Yushchenko’s first 

formal state visit after his inauguration was to Russia in early 2005. 

During that year, relations between these two states went through 

a long overdue, at times painful, process of reevaluation, including 

particularly the nature of the relationship. Some limited progress in 

changing the nature of relations was evident during 2005 when the 

two states agreed to begin demarcating a land border between the 

two; they also finalized an agreement on simplifying border-crossing 
26

regimes for their citizens. Signifying a recognition of the mutual 

benefits of continued pragmatic relations, economic ties between 

these two countries during 2005 also continued to develop.83

The attempt to build pragmatic relations between these two 

states has been hampered by Russia’s interference in the Ukrainian 

presidential elections and Russia’s decision to force Ukraine to pay 

world prices for Russian gas. Russian interference in the democratic 

process in Ukraine before and during the presidential elections in 

2004 was both covert and overt. In an attempt to secure the victory of 

the pro-Russian Viktor Yanukovych, the Russian government sent 

what are referred to in Russia as “political technologists” to advise 

and shape the candidate’s presidential election campaign. President 

Putin all but publicly endorsed Yanukovych with his strategically 

timed visits to Kiev just prior to the first and second round of 

voting in the Ukrainian presidential elections. Interfering overtly 

in the Ukrainian elections, President Putin telephoned Yanukovych 

to congratulate him on his victory when the controversy over his 

supposed victory had caused mass protests in the streets in Ukraine. 

President Putin’s attempt to influence the outcome of the Ukrainian 

presidential elections damaged relations in the short term between 

these two states. Independent Duma Deputy Vladimir Ryzhkov 

stated that the president’s meddling in the Ukrainian election had 

harmed Russia’s long-term interests in Ukraine by alienating millions 

of Ukrainians.84

In a sign of strains in the relationship, in early 2006 the Russian 

natural gas company, Gazprom, announced that it had cut off 

supplies of gas to Ukraine. This unilateral action was in response to 

Ukraine’s rejection of a proposed gas price increase. Under pressure 

from Europe, Russia and Ukraine worked out a compromise deal 

whereby Ukraine pays more for gas, but the higher price is offset by 

supplementing Russian supplies with cheaper Central Asian gas.85

The deal has been criticized heavily in the Ukrainian parliament and 

press, not least because the intermediary through which Ukraine will 

buy this cheaper gas, RosUkrEnergo, was investigated for criminal 

activity in 2005.86 Although Russia has been condemned for what 

was termed economic pressure and blackmail by the Ukrainian 

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the new agreement has facilitated the 
27

normalization of relations with its neighbor.87 By paying what are in 

essence world prices for gas, Ukraine will no longer be a petitioner for 

Russian good will and instead can build relations with its neighbor as 

an equal partner. Since Ukraine’s accession of independence in 1991, 

Russia had subsidized the Ukrainian economy with cheap gas, in 

effect allowing Ukraine to postpone hard economic decisions about 

restructuring its own industries.88 The compromise deal worked out 

with Russia now halts the resulting waste of energy and encourages 

Ukrainian enterprises to introduce energy-saving technologies. Most 

important of all, it will facilitate Ukraine’s ultimate acquisition of 

economic and political independence from Moscow. 89

Russia and Ukraine do have a number of unresolved and 

contentious legacy issues that are likely to hamper the prospects for 

normalization of relations in the short to medium term. The first of 

these is the disagreement over the speed and shape of the Single 

Economic Space (SES). During the Commonwealth of Independent 

States (CIS) summit in Yalta in September 2003, a treaty creating the 

SES between Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine was signed. It 

was ratified by the Russian and Ukrainian parliaments in April 2004. 

The SES would entail the establishment of a Free Trade Area followed 

by a customs union and eventually the formation of an economic 

union among the member states. However, there is some concern in 

Kiev that the SES will jeopardize Ukraine’s efforts to join the World 

Trade Organization (WTO) and the EU, that Ukraine could lose its 

economic sovereignty, and that Russia, as the state among the four 

with the largest GDP, will dominate key decisions in any SES.90 The 

new government in Ukraine has been keen to advance a new modified 

model of the SES—one that aims to preserve amicable relations 

with its neighbor but does not preclude Ukrainian membership in 

the WTO and the EU.91 Ukrainian Foreign Minister Boris Tarasyuk 

explained Kiev’s approach to the SES with his assurance that Ukraine 

would not withdraw but merely would seek a free trade zone with 

its four neighbors.92 However, this watered-down model of the SES 

is unlikely to satisfy the other three states, all of which are resolved 

to move towards full economic integration. 

A second key issue that will affect the possibility of normalizing 

relations with Russia is Ukraine’s success in resolving the status of 
28

the Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) based in Sevastopol in bilateral 

negotiations with Russia. There was a clear sign just months into 

the new government’s tenure that Kiev was prepared to advance 

Ukraine’s legitimate interests in the region by arranging the 

eventual removal of the Russian naval base located on its territory. 

Specifically, in April 2005, President Yushchenko announced that the 

status of the Russian BSF in Sevastopol needed to be reconsidered.93

A few days earlier, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Boris Tarasyuk had 

stated that the 1997 agreement according to which Russia could 

use the base of Sevastopol until 2017 would not be extended.94 This 

statement was made in response to a number of highly publicized 

incidents in the Crimea which have threatened Ukraine’s territorial 

integrity and Ukrainian law. At the end of March 2005, for example, 

a Russian landing craft carried out an unauthorized practice landing 

near Feodosia in Ukraine. A few weeks later in mid-April, a group 

of Ukrainian observers were denied access to the Russian base in 

Sevastopol to check on allegations that the Russians were subletting 

Black Sea Fleet facilities. Ukraine’s response to these incidents 

suggests that the new government is prepared to assert its full 

sovereignty in the region, which is likely to damage relations with 

the Russian Federation.

Normalization of relations between these two states is affected 

not only by the legacy issues outlined above, but also by Ukraine’s 

relationship with Europe and the West. Since his inauguration, 

President Yushchenko has declared that Ukraine’s main foreign 

objective will be securing EU and NATO membership. Ukraine’s 

strategic reorientation towards Europe will affect the prospects 

for military transformation in two ways. It will shape Ukraine’s 

perception of threats in the external environment, and also will 

affect Ukraine’s democratic transformation, which in turn will 

have a bearing on military transformation. In a recent lecture, 

Francis Fukuyama draws attention to the importance of what he 

terms national “neighborhoods” in determining the prospects for 

democratization.95 Fukuyama argues that, as societies fall under 

the influence of what goes on around them in a globalized world, 

it is inevitable that people begin to copy the norms and political 

movements of other societies and polities. This suggests that EU and 
29

NATO engagement with Ukraine serves two vital purposes. First, 

it enhances Ukraine’s long-term security; and second, it promotes 

and encourages democracy through proximity and the consequent 

spread and institutionalization of democratic norms and values. 

Relations between Ukraine and the United States have improved 

significantly since the election of President Yushchenko. In a 

successful visit to the United States, Yushchenko succeeded in 

normalizing Ukrainian relations with its most important ally after 

many years in the wilderness. During this visit, Yushchenko secured 

a pledge of support for lifting the Jackson-Vanik Amendment that 

restricts U.S. trade with Ukraine, a U.S. commitment to support 

Ukraine’s entry into the WTO, endorsement of Ukraine’s NATO 

membership aspirations, easing of the visa restrictions, and an aid 

package to facilitate Ukraine’s domestic transformation. Moreover, 

the decision by the new government of Ukraine to withdraw its 

forces from Iraq apparently has not damaged U.S.-Ukraine relations. 

However, those relations could be damaged if Yushchenko is unable 

to implement the far-reaching reforms in the economic and political 

spheres that are required to transform Ukraine into a stable and secure 

democracy. Progress in reform is dependent on good relations with 

the United States, Europe, and Russia. However, good relations with 

the United States and Europe also ultimately depend on Ukraine’s 

democratization and military transformation.

CASE STUDY OF UKRAINIAN 

PEACEKEEPERS IN IRAQ

Through a case study, this section critically evaluates the 

performance of the Ukrainian peacekeepers in Iraq during a 

particularly difficult operation, the defense of the Coalition 

Provisional Authority compound in Wasit province. Such a study 

of the effectiveness and capability of Ukrainian peacekeepers has 

been chosen because peacekeeping is a key niche capability that the 

Ukrainians are keen to develop and to which they have assigned 

a high priority. An evaluation of the Ukrainian peacekeepers’ 

performance will allow for a determination of just how much progress 

Ukraine really has made on the ground in developing a democratic 
30

professional force able to be deployed in behalf of the international 

community to promote peace and stability in conflict zones. In 

addition, the Ukrainian peacekeepers in Iraq are of interest because 

they provide an important test case of the ability of the Ukrainian 

units to be reliable coalition performers as stabilization peacekeepers 

in contrast to more traditional peacekeepers who focus narrowly 

on preventing violence between opposing camps. As discussed 

earlier, these stabilization operations are more complex tasks in an 

uncertain and rapidly changing environment in which the parties 

have not reached a formal agreement on peace. Finally, this case 

study has been chosen to highlight the paradoxical effects of military 

transformation in Ukraine from an American perspective. On the 

one hand, effective reform allows Ukraine to develop the capability 

to be an effective contributor to the war on terrorism. On the other, 

however, this case study suggests that democratic consolidation 

is likely to weaken the commitment of the Ukrainian government 

to become involved in stabilization or strategic peacekeeping. The 

new government in Ukraine is unlikely, in the future, to have the 

domestic support it needs to send peacekeepers on complex national 

stabilization operations. Instead, a restructured, reformed, more 

efficient and effective Ukrainian JRRF might find itself deployed only 

in traditional peacekeeping operations designed to keep warring 

parties apart.

Ukraine clearly has demonstrated its commitment to peacekeeping through its active involvement in various operations since 1992. 

Recently Ukraine has cooperated with NATO in maintaining security 

and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area. In the Balkans, Ukraine has 

contributed an infantry battalion, a mechanized infantry battalion, 

and a helicopter squadron to the NATO-led peacekeeping force 

in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It has deployed peacekeeping forces 

in Kosovo, and 300 Ukrainian peacekeepers still serve there as 

part of the joint Polish-Ukrainian battalion. The final contingent of 

Ukrainian peacekeepers in the Wasit province of Iraq performed a 

number of significant duties. The 7th Detached Mechanized Brigade 

detained suspected or known terrorists, confiscated weapons and 

ammunition, and, with the cooperation of the Kazakhstan field 

engineering detachment, defused and destroyed ammunition and 
31

unexploded ordnance.96 In addition, the brigade completed civil 

support projects such as repairing and refurbishing schools and 

hospitals, restored water supply lines and sewer systems, and 

supplied the local population with potable drinking water. 

Events in Kut in Iraq in April 2004 suggest that more robust 

strategic peacekeeping by the Ukrainian forces lacks sufficient 

domestic political support. Followers of rebel Shia leader Moqtada 

al-Sadr launched a well-coordinated uprising across southern 

Iraq. It included attacks on the Coalition Provisional Authority’s 

(CPA) headquarters in the city of Kut in Wasit province where the 

Ukrainian peacekeepers were based. Allegations have been made 

that the Ukrainian forces failed to defend the compound when it 

was attacked and pulled out of Kut, thus abandoning the Iraqi city 

to Shia insurgents.97 The most damning criticisms of the Ukrainian 

peacekeepers’ resolve have come from CPA governance coordinator 

Mark Etherington, a former member of the British parachute regiment. Etherington claims that the Ukrainian forces in Kut abandoned 

the city without a word of warning to CPA headquarters, and the 

province then simply collapsed.98 In explaining this unauthorized 

withdrawal of Ukrainian forces, brigade commander Sergey 

Ostrovskiy told Etherington that, because of disturbances in other 

cities, Sadr followers informed him that the safety of Ukrainian forces 

in Kut could not be guaranteed and that they had thus withdrawn 

to avoid bloodshed, leaving CPA to wonder who was supposed to 

be guaranteeing safety to whom.99 Etherington is even more critical 

of the performance of Ukrainian soldiers inside the compound 

during the attack by Sadr’s forces, stating that he detected “limited 

enthusiasm for the fight among our Ukrainian soldiers. Some were in 

firing positions, but many were not; and a few had quietly absented 

themselves.”100 Etherington further questions the commitment of the 

Ukrainian peacekeepers. He points out that, despite being told by 

coalition superiors that U.S. General Ricardo Sanchez had ordered 

the Ukrainians to stay and defend the compound, the Ukrainians 

disobeyed orders and evacuated to Camp Delta two and a half miles 

away, leaving the compound and its personnel undefended.101

These criticisms of Ukrainian peacekeepers raise two important 

interrelated questions. First is whether or not events in Kut indicate 

that Ukrainian peacekeepers in general are willing to stand and 
32

fight if the mission so requires in strategic peacekeeping. Second 

is whether or not these alleged failings in Kut indicate a lack of 

commitment by the political masters of the Ukrainian troops to more 

robust peacekeeping. David Stokes suggests that the explanation 

might indeed be the lack of political commitment from above. 

Stokes, a coalition security contractor and site supervisor of the 

CPA compound in Kut, avers that the Ukrainian soldiers stationed 

at the CPA compound fought valiantly and tirelessly during the 

attack.102 In his unclassified report on the attack against the CPA 

compound, Stokes goes on to draw attention to the limited military 

capability of the Ukrainian peacekeepers. He points out that they 

“were never prepared to fight a ground offensive. Towards the end 

of night on the 6th of April, the Ukrainians began to run low on 

ammunition. Additionally, they had no night vision equipment nor 

did they have any heavy weapons which could be set up in defensive 

positions.”103

Admitting a degree of mismatch between what the Ukrainian 

peacekeepers were trained for and what was expected by CPA in this 

more complex and hostile environment, Etherington draws attention 

to the key difficulties of the Ukrainian peacekeepers. He asserts that 

what was needed in Wasit province was a more aggressive program 

of foot patrols in the streets and alleys, but that this was beyond the 

capabilities and experience of the Ukrainians.104 Ukrainian Defense 

Minister Yevhen Marchuk had made clear that the Ukrainians in Iraq 

were expected to be involved in traditional peacekeeping, not strategic

peacekeeping. More explicitly, he stated that “our peacekeepers 

were not to engage in hostilities in Kut because this was not their 

mission.”105 He went on to explain that the mission for his forces 

was not to guard or defend the city of Kut, but rather to guard local 

Iraqi officials who had fled government offices at the start of the 

uprising. Major General Leonid Holopatiuk, head of the Ukrainian 

military’s Euro-Atlantic Cooperation Department, felt that the 

Ukrainian mission became dramatically more challenging during 

April and that “the majority of our contingent in Iraq was ready for a 

more classic peacekeeping mission,” even if not for the heavy attack 

actually received106 Thus legitimate questions do remain as to the 

capability and commitment of Ukrainian soldiers on the ground and 
33

politicians back in Kiev to move from light peacekeeping tasks to 

strategic peacekeeping in a complex and potentially hostile theater 

of operations. 

This case study also raises questions about the degree to which 

Ukrainian forces generally, and the peacekeepers in particular, accept 

and reflect the democratic and liberal values of Ukrainian society—

that is, the level of democratic professionalism. On their return from 

Iraq, security forces detained the Ukrainian peacekeepers at the 

Boryspil airport in Kiev. The Ukrainian Defense Ministry confirmed 

that over $300,000 were confiscated from the troops.107 The Ukrainian 

news media reported allegations that money intended for operations 

in Iraq had been diverted illegally and smuggled back into Ukraine 

by the Ukrainian peacekeepers.108 In June 2005, former commander 

of Ukraine’s troops in Iraq Major General Serhiy Savchenko was 

arrested on money smuggling charges.109

The question of Ukrainian peacekeepers’ commitment, capability, 

and democratic professionalism ultimately cannot be separated from 

the issue of increased democratic political control in Ukraine in light 

of its consolidation of democracy. The U.S.-led invasion of Iraq was 

unpopular in Ukraine, with little support in parliament or among 

the Ukrainian people for the deployment of Ukrainian peacekeepers. 

The death of eight Ukrainian soldiers in Iraq in an explosion at an 

ammunition dump led to calls by the Ukrainian parliament for 

immediate withdrawal of forces.110 In January 2005, the Ukrainian 

parliament again called on the President to withdraw the Ukrainian 

peacekeepers.111 During his presidential campaign, Yushchenko 

felt the need to declare that he would withdraw Ukrainian forces 

from Iraq.112 There was increasing domestic concern that Ukraine 

itself would become a future target for terrorist attacks.113 In light 

of terrorist attacks in London in July 2005, Yushchenko was under 

increased domestic pressure to speed up the withdrawal of Ukrainian 

forces. The Communist Party issued a statement demanding that the 

president go ahead and act in line with the parliament’s decision to 

withdraw the Ukrainian military contingent from Iraq.114 It would 

thus seem that increased democratic political control in Ukraine 

could limit Ukraine’s willingness to deploy its military in support of 

the war on terrorism. More democratic and inclusive political control 
34

over peacekeeping activities is therefore very likely to limit the range 

of activities and the types of operations Ukraine will commit to in 

the future.

SUMMARY 

• The author has argued that Ukraine can contribute to the 

U.S.-led war on terrorism in two key ways: through the 

consolidation of democracy, which allows Ukraine to be a 

force for stability and peace in the region, and through the 

development of peacekeeping forces.

• In Ukraine, the goals of military transformation are EuroAtlantic integration and the development of deployable 

peacekeeping forces, both of which will promote democracy 

and allow Ukraine to be a net contributor to the war on 

terror. 

• To meet these goals, Ukraine needs to engage in 

military transformation, which is the development of a 

professional military, obtaining democratic control over 

all security stakeholders, and bringing about democratic 

professionalism. 

• Ukraine has made considerable progress in all three areas of 

military reformation, but has made less progress in reforming 

its security services. Progress in achieving these goals and 

contributing to the defeat of terrorism depends on normalizing 

relations with its larger and more powerful neighbor, the 

Russian Federation. 

• An evaluation of progress in defense reform suggests, 

however, that, while the JRRF has the capability and training 

for stabilization operations, the Ukrainian military is not yet 

ready for more robust peacekeeping tasks. 

• Ukraine’s goal of Euro-Atlantic integration, if not wellmanaged, risks damaging further relations with Russia. This 

could hamper effective military transformation in Ukraine and 

the development of niche capabilities such as peacekeeping 

forces.
35

• Democratic consolidation and increased democratic oversight 

of the military might limit Ukraine’s ability to perform more 

strategic peacekeeping roles. 

RECOMMENDATIONS

• The U.S. Government and military must recognize the unique 

nature of Ukraine’s military transformation and the complex 

relationship between the internal and external challenges, and 

then tailor programs that encourage military and democratic 

transformation and promote good relations with the Russian 

Federation. 

• The United States and the international community need to 

recognize the inherent contradictions in Ukraine’s attempt to 

consolidate its democracy. There is a trade-off—a democratically stable Ukraine, which would be a force for stability 

in the region, might be less willing to deploy peacekeeping 

troops in nontraditional peacekeeping operations, even those 

with a UN mandate. 

• The United States in particular must work with Ukrainian 

forces to develop key leadership skills required by future 

commanders in peacekeeping roles. This would include 

tailoring courses that deal with the broader challenges of 

peace support operations such as effective and decentralized 

command. The Defense Academy in Kiev presents courses 

for peacekeeper commanders prior to deployment. The 

operative assumption here is that commanders undertaking 

these courses already have developed key command skills. 

However, the case study of Ukrainian peacekeepers in Iraq 

presented earlier suggests that this assumption may be illfounded, and that these skills need to be learned earlier in an 

officer’s career.

ENDNOTES

1. Adrian Karatnycky, “Ukraine’s Orange Revolution,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 84, 

No. 2, March/April 2005, p. 33.
36

2. “Executive Summary, Attacking Terrorist networks at home and Abroad,” 

Progress Report on the Global war on Terrorism, The White House, www.whitehouse.

gov/homeland/progress/summary.html.

3. “Ukraine Leader Urges Fighting Terrorism Together After London Blasts,” 

Ukrainian news agency UNIAN, Kiev, in Ukrainian, July 8, 2005, as reported in 

BBC Monitoring. 

4. “Ukraine Signs UN Nuclear Terrorism Convention,” Interfax-Ukraine news 

agency, Kiev, in Russian, September 14, 2005, as reported in BBC Monitoring. 

5. Ibid.

6. This term is taken from Christopher Dandeker and James Gow, “The Future 

of Peace Support Operations: Strategic Peacekeeping and Success,” Armed Forces 

and Society, Spring 1997, Vol. 23, No. 3, pp. 327-347.

7. Louise I. Shelley et al., “Methods and Motives: Exploring Links between 

Transnational Organized Crime & International Terrorism,” Document, No. 

211207, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, September 2005, p. 65.

8. Taras Kuzio, “Ukraine’s Decade Long Illegal Trade in Arms,” Radio Free 

Europe/Radio Liberty Crime, Corruption and Terrorism Watch, Vol. 2, No. 1, January 

10, 2002. 

9. “Ukrainian Security Service Chief Interviewed,” Interfax-Ukraine news 

agency, Kiev, in Russian, March 24, 2006, as reported in BBC Monitoring, March 

25, 2006. 

10. “Ukrainian Peacekeepers May Be Sent to Nagorny Karabakh,” ForUm, 

February 2, 2006, en.for-ua.com/news_print.php?news=3921.

11. “Ukrainian Security Supreme, Russian Spy Chief Discusses Terrorism, 

Crime,” ITAR-TASS news Agency, Moscow, in Russian, August 8, 2005, as 

reported in BBC Monitoring. 

12. Taken from “Conference Proceedings, NATO and the Challenges of Global 

Security 2004 European Symposium,” January 28-29, 2004, sponsored by the 

Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defence University. 

13. “Yushchenko Decrees Ukraine Ships Part in NATO Antiterror Operations,” 

Valery Rzhevsky, ITAR-TASS News Agency, Kiev, January 27, 2006.

14. For a good review of Operation ACTIVE ENDEAVOR, see David J. Smith, 

“Opinion: Turkey Needs to Let NATO Safeguard the Black Sea,” Jane’s Defence 

Weekly, October 12, 2005. 

15. The section that examines progress in military transformation is informed 

by interviews conducted with U.S., UK, and Ukrainian military officials in Kiev in 

April 2006. 

16. Major Christopher D. Kolenda, “Transforming How We Fight, A Conceptual 

Approach,” Naval War College Review, Vol. LVI, No. 2, Spring 2003. 
37

17. This is taken from “Message from the Director, Office of Force 

Transformation,” Military Transformation: A Strategic View, www.oft.osd.mil/library/

library_diles/dcoument_297_MT_StrategyDoc1.pdf.

18. Ibid., p. 2.

19. Anthony Forster, Timothy Edmunds, and Andrew Cottey, eds., The Challenge 

of Military Reform in Postcommunist Europe, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002, 

p. 6.

20. For a discussion of this point, see Timothy Edmunds, “Defining Security 

Sector Reform,” CMR Network, October 2001.

21. Hans Born, “Introduction,” in Alan Bryden and Philipp Fluri, eds., Security 

Sector Reform: Institutions, Society, and Good Governance, Baden-Baden, Germany: 

Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft Die Deutsche Bibliothek, 2003, p. 43.

22. For a discussion of this point, see Oleksiy Melnyk and Leonid Polyakov, 

“Ukraine: The Armed Forces and Beyond,” Kiev: The Ukrainian Centre for 

Economic and Political Studies at the Razumkov Centre, January 1, 2004.

23. Ian Leigh, “Democratic Control of Intelligence and Security Services: A 

Legal Framework,” in Security Sector Reform, pp. 113-129.

24. The SBU is responsible for state security, including secret police tasks; 

counterintelligence, including inside the armed forces; fighting terrorism, 

smuggling, and illegal trading of restricted substances; and the personal security 

of the President, Parliament, and other important personages. 

25. For discussion of this point, see Taras Kuzio, “Under Kuchma, Ukraine sent 

missiles to Iran and China,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol. 2, Issue 57, The Jamestown 

Foundation, March 23, 2005. 

26. Serhii Rakhmanin, “National Insecurity Council,” Zerkalo Nedeli on the web, 

No. 31, August 13-19, 2005. 

27. For details, see Taras Kuzio, “Ukraine’s Interior Ministry Shadowing 

Presidential Candidates,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol. 1, Issue 73, August 13, 2004, 

The Jamestown Foundation. 

28. January Maksymiuk, “Ukraine: Street Rebel Becomes Country’s Top 

Policeman,” RFE/RL Friday, February 11, 2005.

29. Yulia Mostovaya, “Offside Or Off Siding,” Zerkalo Nedeli on the web, No. 39 

(567), October 8-14, 2005.

30. “Ukrainian Security Service Chief Interviews,” Interfax-Ukraine news 

agency, Kiev, in Russian, March 24, 2006, as reported in BBC Monitoring. 

31. Valentinas Mite, “Ukraine: Yushchenko Orders Law-Enforcement 

Overhaul,” July 19, 2005, RFE/RL. 

32. Theodor H. Winkler, “Keynote Paper: Managing Change. The Reform and 

Democratic Control of the Security Sector and International Order,” in Security 

Sector Reform, p. 18.
38

33. Cottey, Edmunds, and Forster, eds., Democratic Control of the Military in 

Post-Communist Europe, Guarding the Guards, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001, 

p. 6.

34. Marybeth Peterson Ulrich, Democratizing Communist Militaries. The Cases of 

the Czech and Russian Armed Forces, Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 

2000, p. 12.

35. Ibid., p. 23.

36. Ibid. For details of each of these, see pp. 23-41.

37. Chris Donnelly, “Defence Transformation in the New Democracies: A 

Framework for Tackling the Problem,” NATO Review, Web edition, Vol. 45, No. 1, 

January 1997, pp. 15-19. 

38. The author would like to thank Mr. Chris Tuck, Lecturer in Defence Studies 

at the Joint Services Command and Staff College, for his helpful advice on the 

issues of effective command. 

39. “Deputy Head of Ukrainian Security Says Service Changing With Times,” 

Glavred, Kiev, in Russian, August 9, 2005, as reported in BBC Monitoring. 

40. Forster, Edmunds, and Cottey, The Challenge of Military Reform in 

Postcommunist Europe. 

41. Christopher Dandeker, “Military and Society: The Problem, the Challenges, 

and Possible Answers,” in Security Sector Reform.

42. Ibid., p. 134. 

43. For a published text in English, see “Ukraine’s Strategic Defence Bulletin :

Brief Review With Comments,” in National Security & Defence, No. 8, 2004, pp. 7-

12, as published by the Razumkov Centre, Kiev, Ukraine. 

44. All details taken from The White Book 2005 Defence Policy of Ukraine, Zapovit 

Publishing House, Kiev, 2006. 

45. Leonid I. Polyakov was appointed the Deputy Defence Minister of Ukraine 

in 2005 after the Orange Revolution. 

46. Leonid I. Polyakov, U.S-Ukraine Military Relations and the Value of 

Interoperability, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War 

College, 2004, www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil.

47. Ibid. pp. 1-2.

48. Ibid., p. 8.

49. Ibid., p. 11.

50. Olaf Hillenbrand, “Consensus-Building and Good Governance—A 

Framework for Democratic Transition,” Centre for Applied Policy Research, Munich: 

University of Munich, November 22, 2004, www.cap.lmu.de/download/2004/2004_

ukraine.pdf
39

51. Anders Aslund, “Ukraine’s Orange Revolution Can Still Succeed,” The 

Financial Times, September 26, 2005. 

52. “The New Government’s Economic Policy: First Steps and Their Effects,” 

National Security & Defence, Razumkov Centre, No. 9 (69), 2005, Section 1.

53. Ibid., p. 21. 

54. For details, see The White Book. 

55. Ibid., p. 100.

56. Ibid. 

57. “Ukraine Should Spend 2 Percent of GDP on Defence—Minister,” Text of 

report by Interfax-Ukraine news agency, Kiev, in Russian, February 23, 2006, as 

reported in BBC Online Monitoring, February 23, 2006. 

58. “Ukraine Defence Ministry Reveals Budget Figures,” UT1, Kiev, in 

Ukrainian, February 17, 2006, as reported in BBC Online Monitoring, February 

17, 2006. 

59. The White Book, p. 35.

60. Vladimir Kravchenko, “White Book, Black Mark,” Zerkalo Nedeli on the web, 

No. 7 (586), February 25-March 3, 2006. 

61. The White Book, p. 35.

62. Anatoli Hrytsenko, “Ukraine’s Defence Sector in Transition: Impacts 

on Foreign and Security Policy,” Chapter 4, in Derek Müller, Kurt R. Spillman, 

Andreas Wenger, eds., Between Russia and the West, Foreign and Security Policy of 

Independent Ukraine, Centre for Security Studies, Vol. 2, No. 1, 1999, pp. 95-120.

63. Volodymyr Chumak and Alexander Razumtsev, “Ukrainian Participation 

in Peacekeeping: The Yugoslavian Experience,” in Jean Callaghan and Mathias 

Schonborn, eds., Warriors in Peacekeeping, London: Transaction Publishers for 

George C. Marshall European Centre for Security Studies, 2004, p. 385.

64. “Aging Stocks of Ammunition and SALW in Ukraine: Risks and Challenges,” 

An Razumkov Centre Analytical Report in National Security & Defence, No. 2, (62), 

2005. 

65. Ibid., p. 6.

66. For details, see Yuri Butusov, “Rockets at Large Ukrainian Weapons Are 

Easily Available for Both Metalworkers and Terrorists,” Zerkalo Nedeli on the web, 

No. 15 (490), April 17-23, 2004.

67. The White Book, p. 69.

68. Ibid., p. 70.

69. Interview with John Colston, NATO HQ Brussels, January 11, 2006, www.

nato.int/docu/speech/2006/s060111a.htm.

70. For details, see The White Book, p. 17.
40

71. Georgiy Kryuchkov, Chairman of the Defence Committee of the Ukrainian 

Parliament at the Open Meeting of the Ukraine-NATO Parliamentary Council, 

April 27-28, 2005, www.nato-pa.int/Default.asp?SHORTCUT=721. 

72. The White Book, p. 47.

73. Ibid., p. 53.

74. Ibid., p. 56.

75. Mykola Riabchuk, “European Dreams and the Soviet Legacy,” December 

28, 2004, as published in The Ukraine List, UKL 330.

76. The Ukrainian Minister of Defence made these points in an interview. For 

details, see “White Book, Black Mark,” Vladimir Kravchenko, in Zerkalo Nedeli on 

the web, No. 7 (586), February 25-March 3, 2006. 

77. This point is made by Karatnycky, “Ukraine’s Orange Revolution.”

78. This point is also made by Oleksandr Sushko, “Nations in Transit 2005: 

Ukraine,” published by Freedom House 2005, www.freedomhouse.org/template. cfm?p

age=47&nit=378&year=2005.

79. “Yushchenko Under Fire From Ukrainian Media Over Journalist Rebuke,” 

Agence France Presse, July 26, 2005. 

80. Alexander Motyl, “Democracy Is Alive in Ukraine,” OpenDemocracy.net, 

September 12, 2005.

81. For details of this argument, see Donald Bowser, “Corruption, Trust, and 

the Danger to Democratization in the Former Soviet Union,” www.transparency.

org.ru/CENTER/DOC/article_18.doc. 

82. Ibid.

83. “Known by the Company,” Zerkalo Nedeli on the web, No. 51 (579), December 

30-January 13, 2006. 

84. Jeremy Bransten, “Did President Putin Miscalculate in Ukraine?” RFE/RL, 

November 30, 2004, as printed on Johnson’s Russia List, www.infoukes.com/rfeukraine/2005/0121.html.

85. For details, see Sergei Pletnev, “Russia Will Profit from the Central Asian 

Gas,” Strana.ru, January 4, 2006, as reported in The Ukraine List (UKL) No. 378, pp. 

3-4.

86. Roman Kupchinsky, “Questions Raised About Gas Deal Intermediary,” 

RFE/RL.org., January 4, 2006.

87. “Ukraine Officially Called Russia a Blackmailer,” Ukrainska prava, January 

2, 2006, as translated in The Ukraine List (378), pp. 17-19.

88. For discussion of this point, see Eugene Rumer, “Russia’s strong arm tactics 

may do Ukraine a favour,” The Financial Times, January 4, 2006. 

89. For details, see Mykol Riabchuk, “Who Blinks First,” Tagesspiegel (Germany), 

January 4, 2006, as reported in The Ukraine List (378), pp. 14-16.
41

90. Askold Krushelnycky, “CIS: Russian, Ukrainian, Kazakh Parliaments Ratify 

Treaty on Single Economic Space,” RFE/RL, April 21, 2004. 

91. For details, see Vladimir Socor, “Yushchenko in Moscow,” Eurasia Daily 

Monitor, January 25, 2005. 

92. “Ukraine Cool to Russian-led Economic Zone,” www.theallineed.com/

news/0502/212114.htm.

93. Andrei Chernikov, “Naval Retreat,” Transitions Online: Russia and Ukraine, 

April 19, 2005.

94. Ibid.

95. Remarks by Francis Fukuyama, “Do We Really Know How To Promote 

Democracy?” May 24, 2005, meeting of the New York Democracy Forum as 

published by Pol Sci Lectures, www.ned.org/nydf/francisFukuyama05.pdf. 

96. Taken from “New Ukraine Government Continues in the Global War on 

Terror, Ukraine Will Remain in the Coalition Until the Mission in Iraq Is Complete,” 

Major General Petro Haraschuk, Armed forces of Ukraine, December 10, 2005, 

www.centcom.mil/CENTCOMNews/Stories/06_05/16.htm.

97. For details of these allegations, see Peter Baker, “Revolt in Kut Echoes in 

Ukraine, Pressure for Troop Pullout Builds as Mission Turns Deadly,” Washington 

Post, April 13, 2004; also see David Blair, “Urban Warfare Grips Iraq,” The Telegraph, 

London, April 8, 2004. 

98. Mark Etherington, Extracts from Revolt on the Tigris, London: C. Hurst & Co, 

July 2005, as published by The Times Online, July 3, 2005.

99. Ibid. 

100. Ibid.

101. Ibid.

102. David Stokes, “Al-Kut, Iraq: After Battle Report,” Middle East Quarterly, 

Fall 2004, www.meforum.org/article/699.

103. Stokes.

104. Etherington.

105. Taken from Kevin Begos, “Plan for Democracy Comes Under Siege,” as 

published on the Journalnow.com online partner of the Winston-Salem Journal, www.

journalnow.com/servlet/Satellite?pagename=WS%FMGArticle%2FWS.

106. Quotation taken from Peter Baker, “Revolt in Kut Echoes in Ukraine,” 

Washington Post, April 13, 2004. 

107. “Ukrainian Peacekeepers Detained With Cash from Iraq,” UNIAN 

news agency, Kiev, in Ukrainian, February 10, 2005, www.bhhrg.org/mediaDetails.

asp?ArticleID=12.

108. “Ukrainian Military Official Detained on Iraq Smuggling Charges,” Moscow 

News, June 14, 2005. 
42

109. “Ukraine Iraq Force Ex-Head Held,” BBC News, June 14, 2005, newsvote.

bbc.co.uk/mpapps/pagetools/print/news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/Europe/409285.

110. Vladimir Kravchenko, “Leonid Kuchma’s Iraq Legacy,” Zerkalo Nedeli on 

the web, No. 1 (529), January 15-21, 2005. 

111. Kravchenko, “Leonid Kuchma’s Iraq Legacy.” 

112. Ibid.

113. Taras Kuzio, “Ukrainian Parliament Debates Future of Its Troops in Iraq,” 

Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol. 1, Issue 14, May 20, 2004. 

114. “Ukrainian Communists Demand Immediate Withdrawal from Iraq,” Text 

of report by Ukrainian news agency UNIAN, Kiev, in Ukrainian, July 22, 2005, as 

reported in BBC Monitoring online.