AMERICAN CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS:

NEW ISSUES, ENDURING PROBLEMS

Douglas Johnson

and

Steven Metz

April 24, 1995
LL

*******

The views expressed in this report are those of the authors

and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of

the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the

U.S. Government. This report is approved for public release;

distribution is unlimited.

*******

The authors would like to thank Douglas Lovelace, James

Kievit, and Zane Finkelstein for insightful comments on earlier

drafts of this manuscript. Parts of this monograph were

previously published as "Civil-Military Relations in the United

States: The State of the Debate," Washington Quarterly, Vol. 18,

No. 1, Winter 1995, pp. 197-213.

*******

Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be

forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army

War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050. Comments also may

be conveyed directly to the authors. Dr. Metz can be contacted at

(717) 245-3822, DSN 242-3822, FAX (717) 245-3820, or at Internet

address metzs@carlisle-emh2.army.mil. Dr. Johnson can be

contacted at (717) 245-4057, DSN 242-4057, FAX (717) 245-3820, or

at Internet address johnsond@carlisle-emh2.army.mil.
LLL

FOREWORD

The authors were invited to prepare a paper for a conference

on Civil-Military Relations in the fall, 1994. That paper was

translated into an article for the Winter, 1995 edition of The

Washington Quarterly under the title "Civil-Military Relations in

the United States: The State of the Debate." Although the

intensity of interest in this subject has fallen from the front

pages of the newspapers, the authors have here suggested that the

debate needs to continue and that it should start with

identification of the right questions. The basic issues are

inherent in the structure and beliefs of American political

society, but the questions may be changing as the nature of that

society and the manner in which it talks to itself and what it

sees its responsibilities to be are also changing.

While the authors do not see a current crisis in the

relationship, they attempt to explain many of the basic features

of that relationship, providing some of its history along the

way. They have pointed out several conditions which put the

relationship under particular strain and suggest that the

Secretary of Defense is, by virtue of several institutional

peculiarities, at the nexus of the relationship. It is the

author's intent that this study lead to sustained debate within

the military and civilian policy-making communities.

The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to publish this

monograph to foster debate on this important subject.

WILLIAM W. ALLEN

Colonel, U.S. Army

Acting Director

Strategic Studies Institute
LY

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES OF THE AUTHORS

DOUGLAS V. JOHNSON II is an Associate Research Professor,

Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), U.S. Army War College. He

served in SSI as a Strategic Research Analyst for seven years

before retiring from the U.S. Army with 30 years service and has

continued since then in his present capacity. He is a 1963

graduate of the U.S. Military Academy, received his master's

degree in history at the University of Michigan and took his

Ph.D. in history from Temple University. Dr. Johnson also holds a

diploma from the U.S. Army War College. While on active duty he

served in a variety of field artillery and staff positions,

taught at the U.S. Military Academy, and his a co-founder of the

School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and

General Staff College. Dr. Johnson is the author or coauthor of a

number of SSI studies, the most recent dealing with the role of

the media in national security policymaking.

STEVEN METZ is Associate Research Professor at the Strategic

Studies Institute. Dr. Metz has taught at the Air War College,

the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, and several

universities. He holds a B.A. and M.A. in international studies

from the University of South Carolina, and a Ph.D. in political

science from the Johns Hopkins University.
Y

SUMMARY

The debate over proper civil-military relationships began

while America was still a collection of British colonies. The

relationship was the subject of intense and acrimonious debate

during the framing of the Constitution and periodically the

debate reemerges. The author feel the relationship exists on two

levels. The first is focused on specific issues and key

individuals and is transitory in nature. The second level deals

with the enduring questionswith essential values. At the latter

level individuals merely represent the issues. Two questions are

addressed in this study: What is the appropriate level of

involvement of the military in national security policymaking?

and Within that context, with what or whom does an officer's

ultimate loyalty lie?

Most Americans agree that the objective is a competent,

professional military able to contribute to national security

policymaking but not to dominate it, but there is no consensus on

the changes that the evolution of the global security environment

will bring, or on the risks of too much military involvement in

policymaking.

The issues that will shape the future such as the changing

nature of armed conflict and alterations in U.S. national

security strategy are clear, but their precise impact on civilmilitary relations is not. There is no crisis in American civilmilitary relations now, but what will happen in a decade or so

when the psychological legacy of the Cold War fully fades and

fundamental assumptions are again open to debate remains to be

seen.


AMERICAN CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS:

NEW ISSUES, ENDURING PROBLEMS

Introduction.

For Americans, few tasks are more vexing than establishing

the appropriate role of the military in the shaping of national

policy. From the beginning of the Republic, this process has

assumed transcendental importance, reflecting fundamental debates

about the proper distribution of power in a democratic system and

following deep fissures in the polity. Because armed forces are

simultaneously seen as a bulwark of freedom and potential threat

to it, as protector of national values and possible challenger to

them, civil-military relations have been characterized by a

series of precarious compromises, each with a limited lifespan.

Today, the end of the Cold War is forcing another painful

reassessment of the appropriate role of the military in national

policymaking. This is a crucial process for the military:

decisions made now will affect its policymaking role well into

the 21st century.

Major adjustments in civil-military relations are never

easy. The heart of the problem is an enduring tension: to succeed

at warfighting, the military must be distinct in values,

attitudes, procedures, and organization but must, at the same

time, represent American society.1 "America's armed forces,"

Colin Powell writes, "are as much a part of the fabric of U.S.

valuesfreedom, democracy, human dignity, and the rule of law–as

any other institutional, cultural or religious thread."2

 The

result of this tension is a mixed, even contradictory, attitude

toward military involvement in policymaking. To the extent the

military is different than the rest of society, there is a

rationale for limiting its involvement in framing policy or even

excluding it altogether. But to the extent the military reflects

and represents society, it should be fully integrated into

policymaking. The only solution is a fragile balance, shifting in

response to changes in the strategic environment.


Tensions, contradictions, and interludes of crisis and

readjustment make American civil-military relations a tumultuous

affair. In daily manifestations of this, officers involved in

policymaking often become frustrated when dealing with civilian

officials. The U.S. military, as Eliot Cohen points out, has a

"persistent preference for excessively neat patterns of civilianmilitary relations."3

 Reality seldom obliges. The tendency is to

blame personality, to castigate the inability or unwillingness of

civilian officials to fully grasp the needs and appropriate uses

of the military. Such explanations are myopic. In reality, the

basic structure of American civil-military relations is imbued

with unsolvable problems, perplexing dilemmas, and deliberate

inefficiencies, all reflecting the deeper intricacies of the

American political system. The military's frustration is both

intentional and necessary. Knowing this–and understanding its

historic background–can help officers play a constructive role in

the ongoing transformation to a post-Cold War national security

policymaking process.

First Principle: Civilian Control.

The relationship of the uniformed military and civilian

policymakers in the United States is complex and fluid, but is

based on a single principle: civilian control. All other facets

of the relationship reflect this or are designed to assure it.

Like most first principles, this one has become sacrosanct and is

seldom scrutinized, but as civil-military relations are adapted

to the late 20th century, it would be useful to reexamine the

notion of civilian control. Why is it the foundation on which all

else is built?

Support for civilian control initially emerged from the

American interpretation of European history. Most of the Founding

Fathers accepted the Radical Whig notion that standing armed

forces invariably became a tool of tyranny.4

 Liberty and a

powerful military were considered antithetical; only citizen

soldiers could provide national defense without threatening

political freedom. Richard H. Kohn explains:

Few political principles were more widely known or more

universally accepted in America during the 1780s than

the danger of standing armies in peacetime. Because of


its arms, its isolation from society, its discipline,

and its loyalty and obedience to its commander, an army

could not necessarily be controlled by law or

constitution. An army represented the ultimate in

power, capable, even when it did not attempt a coup on

its own, of becoming the instrument by which others

could terrorize a population, seize power, or

perpetuate tyranny.5

This posed a dilemma for the Founding Fathers. Facing

threats in every direction, whether Indians, British, French,

Spanish, pirates, or internal rebellion, the United States needed

military strength. On the other hand, memories were fresh of

repression at the hands of Redcoats and Hessians. Amid intense

debate and calls to ban a standing army altogether, the framers

of the Constitution crafted a compromise between military

effectiveness and political control. They trusted balance, the

diffusion of power, and shared responsibility–all basic elements

of the new political system–to control the military. Congress,

with more direct ties to the people, was charged with raising and

equipping an army. Appropriations for the Army were limited to 2

years. The President commissioned and promoted officers, but

required Senate approval. And the Constitution mandated state

militias that were to be the firebreaks of last resort to the

power of the standing army.

In terms of assuring civilian control, these techniques

worked. Kohn writes, "The unbroken record of subordination and

loyalty by the American armed forces under the Constitution of

the United States, has been a blessing of the American political

system, and the envy of nations the world over."6 By sustaining

democracy and avoiding military intervention in politics–whether

direct or indirect–for more than 200 years, the principle of

civilian control has become an intrinsic part of American

political tradition. While this alone may not justify its

preservation, it cannot be discounted. There is inherent value in

tradition as a means of sharing values and expectations. It is

not necessary to constantly re-prove the utility of time-tested

principles, but simply to show the absence of adverse effects.

Professional officers–a group whose emergence the framers of

the Constitution did not anticipate–sometimes forget that most

Americans see a dichotomy between the military mindset and that


of the wider public. As Samuel P. Huntington, the preeminent

scholar of American civil-military relations, argues, "Military

officers are overall far more conservative in their attitudes

than other major groups in American society." More to the point,

the belief is widespread that the greater the role of military

professionals in policymaking, the greater the reliance on the

military instrument of national power. "One of the basic beliefs

of American liberalism," writes Stephen E. Ambrose, "is that

professional military men are right-wing, anxious to extend

America's overseas bases, quick to urge the use of force to

settle problems, eager to increase the size of the armed forces,

and above all powerful enough to enforce their views on the

government."8 Despite the lack of empirical verification, this

notion has a long tradition.9 Tocqueville contended that "of all

armies those which long for war most ardently are the democratic

ones."10 Charges that American foreign policy had become overmilitarized were common during the Cold War, reaching such a

crescendo during Vietnam that even career military officers

subscribed.11 One purpose of civilian control was thus "to ensure

that defense policy and the agencies of defense are subordinated

to other national traditions, values, customs, governmental

policies, and economic and social institutions."12

Some years ago Lieutenant General Victor Krulak, when asked

to justify the existence of the United States Marines, concluded

that the Corps existed because the American people wanted it to.13

This same logic holds for civilian control of the military. It

might be possible to show that there is no fundamental normative

difference between the military and civilians, or that civilian

leaders do not always reflect public opinion better than military

professionals. It might be possible to prove military involvement

in policymaking does not necessarily lead to a greater reliance

on the military element of national power. But so long as most

Americans believe these things and so long as the beliefs of the

American public shape national policy, then civilian control of

the military remains a vital national interest.

Dilemmas and Problems.

While diffusion of power and shared responsibility have led

to effective civilian control of the military, they have also

contributed to persistent dilemmas and problems. These cause much

of the daily tension and frustration felt by officers in the


policymaking world. One problem, for instance, is that the

specific functions of the military and civilians in the

policymaking process change over time. Civil-military relations

tend to be placid when both sides understand and accept the

distribution of responsibility for specific issues and functions.

Three things can upset this: a perception by one side that the

other is unable or unwilling to fulfill its responsibilities;

deliberate encroachment by one party on an issue or function

considered the prerogative of the other; or, the emergence of new

issues or functions not yet allocated to one party or the other.

Of these, the first is most common. For instance, the 1783

Newburgh Conspiracy was a veiled threat of an officers' revolt

over military pay.14 Pay was erratic during the Revolution and the

conspirators considered Congress unwilling or unable to make

arrears. Other crises such as Andrew Jackson's 1817 invasion of

Spanish Florida or Douglas MacArthur's conflict with President

Truman arose from the belief by military leaders that civilian

authorities did not understand the strategic situation and could

not provide cogent policy. During the late 1950s, the Joint

Chiefs of Staff (JCS) frequently testified before Congress that

President Eisenhower's defense budgets reflected a

misunderstanding of the extent of the Soviet military threat.15 In

1978, Major General John Singlaub publicly denounced President

Jimmy Carter's proposal to cut forces in Korea as strategically

dangerous and irresponsible. More recently, JCS Chairman Colin

Powell assumed an active role in the formulation of post-Cold War

American strategy–and provoked charges of a crisis in civilmilitary relations–largely because the National Security Council,

Department of State, and Department of Defense were "so devoid of

a vision of the future international system."16

Yet perceptions of inadequacy work both ways. Truman fired

MacArthur because he considered the General "without any real

appreciation of the larger political implications of the war that

he was fighting."17 In fact, "all of the post-World War II

presidents have accused the JCS of failing to fulfill its

responsibilities in the policy process."18 President Kennedy was

so dissatisfied with the military advice he received during the

Bay of Pigs operation that he called General Maxwell Taylor–who

had earlier impressed the young Senator from Massachusetts with

his intellect and forthrightness–out of retirement to be his

personal advisor (and later named him Chairman of the JCS).19

Lyndon Johnson was even more dismayed by what he considered a


lack of creativity on the part of the Chiefs during Vietnam.19 It

was possible for presidents to limit military involvement in

policymaking during the Cold War because the rise of a community

of civilian defense experts provided a real alternative to

military advice.20 As Mark Perry points out when discussing NSC

(National Security Council) 68, one of the seminal documents

establishing U.S. strategy during the first decade of the Cold

War, "that the NSC would be assigned a leading role in writing

what was then considered a purely military assessment was a clear

signal that the opinion of the JCS was not as valued in 1950 as

it had been in 1940."21 In addition to the NSC, civilian

strategists in universities, think thanks like the RAND

Corporation, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense had no

qualms about offering guidance to policymakers on topics

previously the purview of the military. While civilians offering

strategic guidance was nothing new, what was unique was the

rigorous education and training of the Cold War generation of

strategic thinkers. This stood in contrast to the politicianscum-strategists of earlier periods.

Ironically, perceptions of inadequacy by civilians and the

military often mirror each other. The military occasionally feels

that civilian policymakers do not fully understand military

affairs or are "too political," while civilian leaders see the

military as parochial and insensitive to political

considerations. Problems can easily occur when officers believe

civilian officials are basing military decisions on electoral

politics rather than strategic necessity or the national

interest. In 1861, Major General John C. Fremont, commanding the

Western Department, declared martial law and announced the

freeing of the slaves throughout the territory despite the fact

that Lincoln, who was concerned with the support of the border

states, was opposed.22 Throughout Reconstruction, Ulysses Grant

frequently defied Andrew Johnson when he felt the President's

policies were mostly intended to affect party politics.23 Grant

also rebuked the President before the Cabinet when Johnson

attempted to use the general's prestige to improve his prospects

of reelection.24 The JCS nearly resigned in response to Secretary

of Defense McNamara's politically-inspired "defense of a clearly

discredited strategy" during congressional hearings on Vietnam.25

Jimmy Carter's fulfillment of a campaign pledge to cancel the B-1

bomber was "by far the most controversial defense decision he

made as president" and alienated officers who considered the


aircraft vital for preserving nuclear deterrence.26 And the same

process continues: in March 1995 senior military leaders accused

the Clinton administration of "manufacturing" a military crisis

with Iran.27 The implication was that this was for political

purposes. Yet the politicization of national security is

certainly not limited to presidents. The increased role of

Congress in national security can, according to David

Hendrickson, "encourage the intrusion of narrow political

consideration into the determination of matters that ought

ideally to be resolved by professional experts."28

Civil-military relations have also been tense when

presidents used the armed forces as a tool of social change. In

1947, Secretary of the Army Kenneth C. Royal defied President

Harry S. Truman's order to integrate the Army. Royal based his

stance on an Army study that held that racial integration eroded

combat effectiveness. With the Secretary defending the results of

the study, uniformed officers did not have to take a visible

stand even though most opposed integration. Eventually the

manpower demands of the Korean War solved the issue.29 Similarly,

when President Clinton pledged to change the law so that

homosexuals could serve openly in the military, he struck a major

nerve.

The entry of new issues onto the security agenda also upsets

the civil-military balance. By forcing the United States to

mature as a strategic power, the Cold War sparked the most

radical restructuring of civil-military relations in American

history. From 1814 to the mid-20th century, the United States

faced no truly serious external threat. The Cold War changed

that, and gave defense issues a salience that brought intense

scrutiny. Suddenly, national security strategy was too important

to be left to generals and admirals. At the same time, the

military began to use a portion of the national income

unprecedented in peacetime, thus linking military strategy to the

economic health of the nation.30

On a more specific level, the emergence of nuclear weapons

forced a re-evaluation of civil-military relations.31 The military

was slow to develop a clear understanding of the role of nuclear

weapons in American strategy. According to Lieutenant General

James M. Gavin, "military thinking seemed, at the outset, to be

paralyzed" by the challenge.32 Such new problems demanded a type


of creativity that was not the strong suit of military

strategists. Civilian defense experts quickly filled this

conceptual vacuum, chipping away at the prestige and prerogative

of the military.33 And competition between the military services

for control of nuclear forces sparked civil-military tension as

each sought political allies.34 At the other end of the conflict

spectrum, U.S. military involvement in counterinsurgency and

nation-building, both of which fell on the border between

traditional military and traditional civilian responsibilities,

also complicated civil-military relations.35 Official policy gave

the State Department authority for organizing and managing

American efforts.36 But military officers were often dissatisfied

with the diplomats' informal methods of problem-solving and

disdain for armed force. More recently, an article by a serving

military officer warned of the damage to civil-military relations

that could emerge from the involvement of the armed forces in

peacekeeping, humanitarian relief, counter-narcotrafficking, and

support to civil authorities.37

Even when responsibilities are clear, problems emerge from

the different approaches to decisionmaking favored by civilian

policymakers and the military. Because the military's raison

d'etre is the organization of extensive and expensive resources

for dangerous and intricate tasks, it favors linear logic and

formal decisionmaking procedures. Within the Department of

Defense, this is codified in the Joint Strategic Planning System

and the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System.38 Even at

lower levels, standardized products (five paragraph operations

orders, standard operating procedures, rules of engagement,

memoranda of policy, program objective memoranda, etc.) dominate.

Everything from training schedules to doctrine has an official

method and format, all designed to maximize effectiveness and

minimize flaws. Personal relationships are structured by rank and

protocol. A glance at the shoulders or sleeves gives a reasonable

assessment of an individual's influence and importance. Despite

popular stereotypes, military thinking is not necessarily

inflexible and rigid, but it is as orderly as humanly possible.

In effect, military decisionmaking is similar to the legal

process where the existence of clear, transcendental objectives–

whether adherence to the law or attainment of the military

mission–facilitate formality and complexity in deicisionmaking.

Political decisionmaking is markedly different. Its


currencies are bargaining, compromise, and consensus-building.

Trade-offs, deals, and "backscratching" are tools of the trade.

"End runs" and emotional public appeals are acceptable.

Informality dominates. Politics assumes that individual interests

coexist with collective interests that apply to all. The

objective is an outcome where at least the key players attain

their particular interests while the group as a whole attains an

acceptable level of the collective interest. Political

decisionmaking thus seeks solutions that all can abide rather

than the "best" outcome in terms of long-range effectiveness or

efficiency. An outcome that attains short-term objectives but

alienates important constituencies is unacceptable.

Formal and informal decisionmaking are not incompatible.

Part of the genius of the American political system is that it

successfully intermingles the informality of politics with the

formality of law to spark creative tension. Similarly, an

ingrained aversion to budgetary politics does not always make the

military inept at political maneuvering. "There isn't a general

in Washington," according to General Colin Powell, "who isn't

political, not if he's going to be successful, because that's the

nature of our system."40 Or as Admiral William Crowe put it, "Few

officers these days made it into the higher ranks without a firm

grasp of international relations, congressional politics, and

public affairs."41 Yet few officers ever grow fully comfortable

with political-style decisionmaking. As Sam C. Sarkesian and John

A. Williams note, "Military professionals historically have been

suspicious of politicians and contemptuous of political activity.

Bargaining, negotiations, compromises, and consensus building

have been seen as self-serving and contrary to professional

principles."42 The inclination of those is uniform is to deny that

they seek the particular institutional interest of their service,

but to consider the service objectives as in the national

interest. The Air Force truly believes that it is in the national

interest to retain manned, fixed-wing aircraft; the Navy truly

believes the national interest demands carrier battlegroups; the

Marines truly believe that it is in the national interest to

retain amphibious warfare capability; and the Army truly believes

that it is in the national interest to have armor-heavy

divisions. The services resist thinking in terms of direct tradeoffs between major weapons systems and job training, schools,

roads, prisons, and health care. Political leaders do.


No one would argue that the U.S. military should move away

from formal, orderly thinking processes or become more overtly

political in terms of making public appeals and engaging in dealmaking. The world would be a much more dangerous place if it did.

Similarly, few would suggest that political leaders can or should

make decisions in a radically different way. In the American

political system, decisionmaking is deliberately inefficient. The

more power and authority are diffused, the harder they are to

abuse. The military must recognize this, and accept the

frustrations and inefficiencies of democratic politics. Of course

the obverse is also true: military decisionmaking is poorly

understood outside Washington. According to William Crowe, even

Congress does not fully grasp it.43 Civilians hold even more

caricatures of the military than the military does of civilian

policymakers. The services try to ameliorate this through a range

of outreach and public education efforts, but the gap can never

be fully bridged.44 This tension is part of the landscape of

American civil-military relations; its adverse effects can only

be minimized and controlled.

The military must also recognize that it can inadvertently

intimidate civilians. This is a common phenomenon in the world of

politics. Americans, for instance, are often perplexed when

friendly or allied nations are alarmed by U.S. influence in world

affairs. This can be called the "paradox of unintended

intimidation" as the ability to impose power receives greater

attention than statements of good intent or even benign behavior.

The same paradox applies to military involvement in policymaking.

While military leaders fully know they have no intention of

seizing power or playing a praetorian role in politics, the fact

that they could is sometimes a source of anxiety. The warfighter

ethos amplifies this distrust. The military professional is a

useful but alien being to mainstream America. He not only

dresses, talks, and behaves differently, but also seems driven by

unusual goals and values. Steps to foster communication and

understanding between military professionals and the civilian

mainstream–outreach programs, the reserve system, civilian

education for commissioned and noncommissioned officers, military

involvement in domestic disaster relief, the Army's emphasis that

it is "America's Army"–are useful, but not ultimate solutions to

the problem of unintended intimidation. Promoting the image of

obedience to civilian authorities is a never-ending task. Damage

from even murmurs of disobedience or disrespect, much less what


historian Richard Kohn depicted as the "ridicule and contempt

expressed openly" about President Clinton within the officer

corps, takes years to repair.45

This suggests another important dilemma of American civilmilitary relations: perceptions and appearances often matter more

than reality. Formal institutional arrangements are often less

important than attitudes.46 During his initial meeting with the

JCS, Nixon's first Secretary of Defense, Melvin Laird, accorded

the chiefs great esteem–something McNamara had not done.

According to Mark Perry, this "stands out as the primary example

of just how a civilian leader can both dampen military mistrust

and gain military allegiance" by according its leaders respect.47

Public appearances are also vital. When Air Force Chief of Staff

Larry Welch began espousing a plan for upgrading the ballistic

missile force somewhat at odds with the Bush administration's

position, new Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, who "understood

the symbolic importance of first impressions," publicly rebuked

him, leaving Welch "stunned."48 The general's major lapse was

forgetting the symbolic content of civil-military relations and

the frequent need for exaggerated acquiescence.

All of these dilemmas and problems are structured by the

fact that the military is the subject of civil-military relations

rather than a full partner; its role and function are largely

outside its control. As such, it can become an intentional or

unintentional pawn in political struggles among civilians. In

fact, disputes between Department of Defense civilians,

especially those pitting the Secretary of Defense and Congress,

often are cast as problems or crises of civil-military relations

rather than intra-civilian conflicts.49 Those at odds with the

military on policy issues will often blame inadequate civilian

control.50 During the Cold War the informal alliance between the

uniformed military and congressional conservatives sometimes led

congressional liberals to complain of faltering or inadequate

civilian control of the military. The military found that it

could not participate in policymaking without charges of

partisanship. Policymaking is an inherently partisan activity; to

participate is to be political. Since disengagement or silence is

not an option for the modern military, the only solution again is

extreme, perhaps even exaggerated, reminders of nonpartisanship

and obedience to civilian authorities. For the system to function

smoothly civilian allies of the military (especially the service


secretaries) must take the lead in rebuffing charges of

inadequate civilian oversight when the roots of such charges are

actually policy differences.

American civil-military relations are built on an ingrained

asymmetry between the services, each organized as a coherent,

corporate body, and its civilian overseers who are not.51

Civilians control the military's budget, can fire individual

military leaders, approve senior-level promotions and

assignments, and, in the case of the National Command

Authorities, can give direct orders. In addition, many civilians,

both permanent civil service and political appointees, have a

long tenure in the policymaking world while military officers

come and go. On the other hand, a well-structured career pattern

makes it easier for the military to deliberately improve the

political skill and strategic acumen of its members. Officers can

be required to study world politics and strategy before attaining

senior positions. Civilians are sometimes self-taught in the

strategic arts, often with a background in law rather than

international studies or national security affairs. As a result,

their knowledge is frequently less systematic than their military

counterparts (although not necessarily less extensive) . To some

extent, recent reform legislation widened this gap. According to

James Kitfield:

Tight ethics restrictions have discouraged good

candidates for top civilian posts at the Pentagon from

serving. And as an unintended result, the pendulum of

power over defense affairs has swung from the civilian

to the military side of the government's national

security apparatus.52


This is an important point. Because warfighting is an

inherently chaotic activity, the military has developed an

institutional abhorrence of disorder. In policymaking, inadequate

or inconsistent attention to important problems and the absence

of logical, sequential planning procedures are considered

disorderly. Military officers thus grow frustrated by the failure

of civilians to adopt rigorous procedures for defining strategic

objectives and allocating resources and attempt to seize

functions that they perceive civilians are not performing or not

performing adequately. But the arrogation of function occurs

within narrow confines. In the broadest sense, the American

system offers several informal techniques for influencing policy:

deal-making, populism, and coalition-building. These are not

exclusive–on some issues, the military may use all three–but only

the last of these is readily available to the military. Open

deals and direct public appeals are unacceptable; the military

only turns to them as a last resort on particularly vital issues.

Officers must be willing to pay the political price when using

public fora to air dissent. When Congress was considering wideranging reform of the Department of Defense in the early 1980s,

Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger expressed open displeasure

when JCS Chairman David C. Jones and Army Chief of Staff Edward

C. Meyer published articles supporting change.53 More recently,

General Colin Powell was twice the center of controversy due to

public statements seemingly at odds with official policy and for

publication of an essay in the influential journal of opinion,

Foreign Affairs. In both cases, it was less the content of

dissent than its form that mattered.


Because the military's influence over national security

policy is largely informal, its influence is directly related to

whether its recent endeavors are considered successes or

failures. Influence is thus iterative. Following perceived

failures like Vietnam or the attempted hostage rescue in Iran,

the prestige and influence of the services diminished. Since the

American military has never faced outright defeat, such declines

are usually temporary, lasting only until the next success. The

obverse is also true: after perceived successes such as Desert

Storm, the military's influence surges, but this, too, is

fleeting. This relationship of influence to perceived operational

success or failure may cause the military to become timid in its

recommendations to national policymakers. For instance, Michael

R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor suggest that Colin Powell's

highly cautious approach to the use of American military power

reflected his fear "that American public opinion could turn

against the armed forces, as it did during the Vietnam War."54

Adjustments.

American civil-military relations evolve in a distinct

pattern.55 First, changes in the domestic and international

political environments make existing attitudes and structures

obsolete. Then there is usually dramatic change, either through

galvanizing events such as Truman's firing of MacArthur and

Cheney's rebuttal of General Welch, or by key legislation such as

the National Security Act of 1947 or the Goldwater-Nichols

Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. Throughout the process, there

is an attempt to sustain equilibrium and balance between the

military and its civilian overseers. Today, the extent of change

in the strategic environment suggests that American civilmilitary relations are approaching disequilibrium again and major

readjustment may be imminent.

The basic nature of armed conflict, for instance, may be

shifting with conventional state-versus-state war declining in

strategic salience. Some writers predict a melding of law

enforcement and traditional military functions in response to

"gray area" threats, the privatization of security, and new forms

of high-tech terrorism.56 The concept of national security may be

expanded to include protection of cyberspace, the ecology, and

public health. Future armed conflict may often involve

subnational enemies, whether ethnic militias or well-armed and


highly organized criminal gangs. As Martin van Creveld argues,

low-intensity conflict may pose the dominant security threat.57 At

the same time, the ongoing "revolution in military affairs" (RMA)

might alter the nature of essential military skills, further

eroding the distinction between things military and nonmilitary.58 Prophets of the RMA predict the American military will

increasingly rely on precision, stand-off weapons and,

eventually, robots. If national security can be protected at a

computer terminal rather than on a traditional battlefield, it

may no longer make sense to have a distinct military. The crux of

civil-military relations has always been finding a way to both

preserve and control the unique skills of the warrior. If these

skills become obsolete, civil-military relations must change.

The role of military power in American national security

strategy has always shaped civil-military relations. If the

strategic role of military power changes, so, too, must civilmilitary relations. Over the next decade the United States may

militarily disengage from many parts of the world, leaving

responsibility for security to regional powers, alliance, or

international organizations. This could greatly lessen the need

for power projection and erode the rationale for military

involvement in policymaking. During the Cold War, the armed

services became major players in policymaking largely because the

military element of national power was a central component of

U.S. national security strategy. If the importance of military

power diminishes, the political influence of the armed forces

must decline. The expanded use of the U.S. military in operations

other than war, whether peacekeeping, disaster relief, ecological

clean-ups, or counter-narcotrafficking, could also have long-term

effects on civil-military relations. The military services and

civilian leaders currently agree that the primary tasks of the

armed services are to deter and win wars. But if traditional war

is replaced by conflict short of war as the preeminent security

threat faced by the United States, the military may become a

peripheral actor in policymaking. Moreover, ambiguous, protracted

military operations can erode the support and popularity that the

armed services earned in the Gulf War, thus altering the

political balance of power between the military and their

civilian overseers. Recognizing this, the military might oppose

its use in operations other than war, thus sparking a true crisis

with civilian policymakers.


The changing composition of Congress and of Executive Branch

civilians may affect relations with the military. With the end of

the draft and the shrinking of the armed forces, only a small

proportion of the American public has had military service.

Moreover, as fewer and fewer American political leaders have

military service, they may understand the military less. This gap

is enlarging. Samuel Huntington argued that the American military

is essentially and necessarily a conservative organization nested

in a liberal society.59 During the Cold War, the tendency to

"rally round the flag" papered over deep differences in values

and perspectives between the military and the majority of the

American public. The end of the Cold War, in conjunction with the

ongoing socio-cultural diversification of the United States, may

further isolate the military from mainstream American culture and

affect civil-military relations.

In the past, declining defense budgets often set the

military services against one another as they competed for

resources. This made civilian control easier but eroded the

coherence of military advice to policymakers to unacceptable

levels. It is possible that "jointness"–cooperation among the

armed services–has now become so fully ingrained that they will

continue to cooperate even as budgets decline. However, the

intensity of service debate during the ongoing "roles and

missions" study suggests that under the veneer of inter-service

comity lurks the potential for conflict. If this explodes into

the open, civil-military relations will be affected as the

services scramble for allies. Similarly, changes in the defense

industrial and technological base may also change civil-military

relations. During the Cold War, defense spending affected most

parts of the United States–a fact not lost on Congress. Today,

the old military-industrial complex is greatly weakened if not

all together dead. This may lessen the military's influence in

Congress.

Some changes not designed to affect civil-military relations

end up doing so. For example, closing military bases was intended

to make the services more efficient. An unintended side effect

has been the end of military presence in many parts of the United

States. Physically, the military is abandoning locations in the

northeast and midwest and moving nearly all its resources to the

nation's southern and western littoral. This simplifies power

projection, but also means that an increasing number of


Americans–as well as their representatives in Congress–will have

little or no first-hand experience with the military. And in

response to declining resources, the armed services, particularly

the Army, are beginning to reconsider or adjust the relationship

between Active and Reserve Components. Some military leaders and

defense analysts feel that during a time of frugality for the

armed services, a large Reserve Component is a luxury. Dollar for

dollar, the argument goes, more is gained from money spent on

active forces, especially as warfare becomes increasingly complex

and crisis reaction more central to our national security

strategy. But the reserve components have long been one of the

primary connections between the military and American society.

Thus, decisions to diminish reserve forces–even if made solely on

the grounds of military effectiveness–may have unintended side

effects for civil-military relations.

Enduring Questions.

American civil-military relations exist on two distinct

levels. The first is transitory and fluid. It includes specific

issues and key individuals, each rising to prominence and then

receding. To a large extent the president is the maestro of this

ebb and flow as he shapes the policymaking process according to

his needs and proclivities. The interface between the Secretary

of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff is probably the single

most important one in American civil-military relations. The

Secretary of Defense provides the interface between civilians and

military. Whether he is seen as pro- or anti-military sets the

tenor for all of civil-military relations. The other level

consists of enduring questions–the normative base of civilmilitary relations. Here debates do not concern budgets, force

sizes, deployments, and weapons systems, but essential values.

Individuals and issues are only important to the extent they

represent enduring questions that must be re-debated and reanswered as the United States and the global security environment

changes. Two such enduring questions are particularly important.

The first is whether the military should sustain or even

increase its role in national security policymaking. Some

analysts feel that the military ethos of duty and devotion, when

combined with officers' extensive education in world affairs and

national security policy, justify an expanded role for the

military in policymaking. Mark Perry writes, "Is the military


influencing our nation's foreign policy? T'wer it so."60 This

position assumes that civilian control is so ingrained that the

U.S. military poses no threat to democracy. It also rejects the

notion that there is a distinctly military approach to foreign

policy. It is not immediately clear, though, that the military

should want a greater role in policymaking. After all, this would

bring responsibility for the outcome of particular policies and

thus has the potential to damage the public respect that the

military worked so hard to re-earn after Vietnam. The only real

justification for a deliberate attempt to gain a greater role in

policymaking by the military would be persistent incompetence on

the part of civilian strategists and policymakers. Under such

circumstances the real solution may not be an expanded role for

the military, but some way of creating and cultivating better

civilian strategists and policymakers.

Other analysts contend that with the end of the Cold War,

the policymaking role of the U.S. military–which was temporarily

enlarged in response to a temporarily imminent security threat–

should diminish. Samuel Huntington, for instance, writes, "The

military must abandon participation in public debate about

foreign and military policy, stop building alliances amongst the

public and in Congress for defense spending–and resist the

temptation to maneuver in the bureaucracy to achieve its own

ends, however commendable."61 This is based on the assumption that

military intervention in politics remains feasible and risky. It

also assumes officers and civilians hold distinct perspectives on

national policy, and that the military one should only dominate

in times of serious threat. Such assumptions may be obsolete in

the modern world. Today the precise extent of military

involvement in policymaking is less important than the type of

individuals involved. It the military chooses senior leaders so

focused on the military element of national power that they are

unable to deal with the subtle complexity of strategy, then its

role in policymaking should be limited. If civilian participants

are more politicians than strategists, then the military–if it

generates senior leaders who are astute strategists–may have to

assume greater responsibilities.

If the military does seek an active role in national

policymaking, it must consider whether its existing procedures

produce senior leaders adept at managing civil-military

relations. According to Mark Perry, the Goldwater-Nichols Defense


Reorganization Act guaranteed the Joint Chiefs a voice in

national policymaking, but cannot ensure this advice will be

heeded.62 In terms of producing politically sensitive leaders, the

U.S. military in general and the Army in particular has exhibited

contradictory tendencies. On one hand, advanced civilian

education, often in political science or related disciplines, is

encouraged and the senior service schools (especially the

National War College) devote large portions of their curriculum

to national policymaking. On the other hand, field command is the

most important criterion for the attainment of flag rank in all

the services. To be an "intellectual" in terms of education and

publication may not be a hinderance for promotion, but it is far

less important than command of troops, airplanes, ships, or

submarines. As Henry Kissinger noted, "A man who has been used to

command finds it almost impossible to learn to negotiate, because

negotiation is an admission of finite power."63

Ongoing changes in the nature of armed conflict and national

security suggest that the military should, in fact, explicitly

develop civil-military relations skills among its leaders. The

growing importance of operations in which the military works

closely with civilian government and non-government agencies, as

well as the global publicity that accompanies military activity,

amplify this need. There is now a need for smooth civil-military

relations at the operational and tactical levels as well as the

strategic, thus changing the skills needed by even junior

officers. By contrast, the argument can be made that education

for officers in civil-military relations, constitutional law,

diplomacy, politics, and economics is a distraction from crucial

warfighting skills. In Samuel Huntington's words, "Politics is

beyond the scope of military competence, and the participation of

military officers in politics undermines their professionalism,

curtailing their professional competence, dividing the profession

against itself, and substituting extraneous values for

professional values."64 From this perspective, the goal for the

military should be minimally acceptable civil-military relations

skills and warfighting proficiency. This issue must be decided

within a much larger strategic framework. The key is the role of

military power within the nation's array of foreign policy tools.

If military power is to be fully and seamlessly integrated with

other elements of national power, political skill is vital for

officers at all levels. But if military power is to remain

somehow distinct from the other elements of national power, then


political skill will remain a secondary capability for

warfighters, necessary only at the highest levels.

The second enduring issue concerns the ultimate loyalty of

officers within the framework of civilian control. Clearly this

loyalty should lie somewhere outside officers' individual desires

or even the good of their service. Transcendental allegiance is,

after all, one thing that distinguishes militaries like the

American from the coup-prone, corrupt, and politicized

institutions found in some parts of the Third World. The question

is whether ultimate loyalty resides with the commander-in-chief,

the national interest, or the Constitution. Most of the time,

there is no divergence or incompatibility between the three.

Legally and ethically, ultimate loyalty should lie with the

Constitution. A member of the U.S. military swears allegiance to

the Constitution, not the commander-in-chief. But while this

concept is clear, reality is not so neat. Peter Feaver contends

the Truman-MacArthur dispute was based on the general's "novel

and dangerous interpretation of civil-military relations" in

which an officer could ignore the president in the name of the

national interest.65 And, in what could have been one of the most

difficult decisions ever faced by American military leaders,

there were rumors that President Nixon considered declaring

emergency powers and using the armed forces to prevent his

removal from office by Congress.66 What, then, should an officer

do when convinced that the president or official policy is wrong?

One alternative is what Lenin called "democratic

centralism." This holds that an officer may dissent in private

or even openly while a policy is being formulated, but once a

decision is made, he must adhere. However sound in principle,

this has at least two problems. First, the American system

sometimes makes it difficult to know exactly when official policy

has been promulgated or what that policy is. Policy is not law.

Presidents and civilian policymakers sometimes choose to leave it

vague in order to retain flexibility or deflect opposition.

Second, slavish adherence to official policy by the military can

erode an important corrective to misguided policy. If the Joint

Chiefs had been more prone to question Lyndon Johnson's strategy,

American involvement in Vietnam might have ended differently. A

military willing to obey and apply badly flawed policies, in

other words, can be as dangerous as one seeking to wrest control

of policymaking from civilian officials.67 As former Secretary of


Defense James Schlesinger told Dick Cheney, "After a lifetime of

taking orders, generals and admirals were, if anything, too

compliant."68 There is then, a tender and complex balance between

too much autonomy and too little.

Another approach is to distinguish the president (or the

presidency) from his policies. This allows an officer to actively

support the commander-in-chief even while opposing policy

considered wrong or misguided. At its simplest, it entails saying

"I think this order is blatantly stupid, but I will implement

it." But if dissent is allowed, what means are acceptable? One

answer is that only private disagreement with existing policy is

permitted if the officer intends to continue service. In extreme

cases of dissent, public resignation is acceptable. Another

answer holds that under some circumstances, the military should

and must publicly air its disagreement with official policy in

order to inform debate. Smooth civil-military relations,

according to this line of reasoning, are not always desirable–

sometimes creative tension is needed. During the implementation

of the "New Look" strategy during the Eisenhower administration,

the Chiefs often took issue with official policy during

congressional testimony (despite Eisenhower's displeasure), but

did not take their case to the public or resign in protest (even

though they considered it). More recently, senior military

leaders have taken issue with official policy in even more open

fora such as interviews and publications. Occasionally this was

punished and at other times accepted, thus showing that the

parameters of acceptable dissent are not immutable. As a general

rule, disagreement with Congress and even official military

policy is tolerated to a greater extent than disagreement with

the President or Secretary of Defense.

The final approach–and the most dangerous one–holds that an

officer's loyalty is not to the president or even the presidency,

but to the Constitution or the national interest as he defines

it. This, of course, was MacArthur's position. The pitfalls are

obvious. To make it work, officers must be experts on

constitutional law and the national interest. "If each

professional military officer were to defend the constitution as

he interpreted it individually without reference to the

administration in power," Donald Bletz writes, "the American

democratic system would be unworkable."69 This approach could also

pave the way toward military intervention in politics. Many Third


World coups are led by officers who claim to understand the

national interest better than civilian politicians, and who feel

that seizure of power by the military is the only way to save the

nation. Moreover, the advent of nuclear weapons, which accorded

military issues an unprecedented importance and immediacy, made

autonomous decisions by officers all the more dangerous. Still,

the right of an officer to appeal to higher loyalties must not be

rejected a priori. There is always the possibility of an

emergency so dire or a president so misguided that a dedicated

officer must be willing to defy the commander-in-chief, all the

while willing to pay the personal price this will entail.

Conclusions.

As with so many political and strategic issues, the future

of American civil-military relations can be distilled to

assumptions. Most Americans agree that the objective is a

competent, professional military able to contribute to national

security policymaking but not dominate it, but there is no

consensus on the changes that the evolution of the global

security environment (including the concept of national security)

will bring, or on the risks of too much military involvement in

policymaking. Like all assumptions, these must be periodically

reexamined and debated in order to preserve a working consensus.

Future historians will consider the Cold War a seminal event

in the evolution of American civil-military relations. Today,

policymakers and students of national security affairs can sense

the extent of change it will require, but do not yet understand

the specifics. Many of the perceptions, beliefs, and attitudes

that shaped American national security policy during the Cold War

still linger–we are in the "post-Cold War" security era, awaiting

the birth of a new one. The issues that will shape the future

such as the changing nature of armed conflict and alterations in

U.S. national security strategy are clear, but their precise

impact on civil-military relations is not. The best analysts can

do at this time is illuminate the debate, point out the central

determinants of future problems, and explain the complex

relationship between new issues and perennial problems. Doing

this suggests that if there is to be a crisis in American civilmilitary relations, it is not occurring now, but will happen in a

decade or so when the psychological legacy of the Cold War fully

fades and fundamental assumptions are again open to debate. The


changes undergone by American civil-military relations in the

last decades of the 20th century will thus pale in comparison to

those of the first few decades of the 21st century.

ENDNOTES

1. David R. Segal, "National Security and Democracy in the

United States," Armed Forces and Society, Vol. 20, No. 3, Spring

1994, p. 375; Samuel P. Huntington, "The Soldier and the State

in the 1970s," in Andrew J. Goodpaster and Samuel P. Huntington,

Civil-Military Relations, Washington, American Enterprise

Institute for Public Policy Research, 1977, p. 27.

2. Colin L. Powell, "U.S. Forces: Challenges Ahead," Foreign

Affairs, Vol. 20, No. 4, Winter 1992/93, pp. 32-33.

3. Eliot A. Cohen, "The Strategy of Innocence? The United

States, 1920-1945," in Williamson Murray, MacGregor Knox, and

Alvin Bernstein, eds., The Making of Strategy: Rulers, States,

and War, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994, p. 428.

4. Peter Maslowski, "To the Edge of Greatness: The United

States, 1783-1865," in Murray, Knox, and Bernstein, eds., The

Making of Strategy, p. 212.

5. Richard H. Kohn, "The Constitution and National Security:

The Intent of the Framers," in Richard H. Kohn, ed., The United

States Military under the Constitution of the United States,

1789-1989, New York: New York University Press, 1991, pp. 81-82.

6. Ibid., p. 87.

7. Samuel P. Huntington, letter reprinted in "Exchange on

Civil-Military Relations," The National Interest, No. 36, Summer

1994, p. 28. See also Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the

State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations,

Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 1957, p. 79.

8. Stephen E. Ambrose, "The Military Impact on Foreign

Policy," in Stephen E. Ambrose and James A. Barber, Jr., eds.,

The Military and American Society, New York: Free Press, 1972, p.

122.


9. Donald F. Bletz, The Role of the Military Professional in

U.S. Foreign Policy, New York: Praeger, 1972, pp. 167-168; Donald

M. Snow, National Security: Enduring Problems of U.S. Defense

Policy, New York: St. Martin's, 1987, pp. 25-77. For the

historical background, see Arthur A. Ekirch, Jr., The Civilian

and the Military: A History of American Antimilitarist Tradition,

Colorado Springs: Ralph Myles, 1972.

10. Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, trans.

George Lawrence, Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1969, p. 647.

11. For example, James A. Donovan, Militarism, U.S.A., New

York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1970.

12. Allan R. Millett, The American Political System and

Civilian Control of the Military: A Historical Perspective,

Columbus: Mershon Center of the Ohio State University, 1979, p.

2.

13. Victor H. Krulak, First To Fight: An Inside View of the

U.S. Marine Corps, Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1984.

14. Dave Richard Palmer and James W. Stryker, The West Point

Military History Series: Early American Wars and Military

Institutions, Wayne, NJ: Avery, 1984, p. 40; and Russell F.

Weigley, History of the United States Army, New York: Macmillan,

1967, pp. 76-77.

15. Mark Perry, Four Stars, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1989,

p. 58.

16. Richard H. Kohn, "Out of Control: The Crisis in CivilMilitary Relations," The National Interest, No. 35, Spring 1994,

p. 10.

17. Roy K. Flint, "The Truman-MacArthur Conflict: Dilemmas

of Civil-Military Relations in the Nuclear Age," in Kohn ed., The

United States Military under the Constitution of the United

States, p. 225.

18. Lawrence J. Korb, The Fall and Rise of the Pentagon:

American Defense Policies in the 1970s, Westport, CT: Greenwood,

1979, p. 112.


19. Perry, Four Stars, pp. 114-116.

20. Korb, The Fall and Rise of the Pentagon, 115.

21. Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of War: A History

of United States Military Strategy and Policy, Bloomington:

Indiana University Press, 1973, pp. 399-440.

22. Perry, Four Stars, p. 21. Of course, there were no Joint

Chiefs in 1940, but the point is still valid.

23. "Civil War and Emancipation," in Bernard C. Nalty and

Morris J. MacGregor, eds., Blacks in the Military: Basic

Documents. Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 1981, pp. 19-21.

24. See William S. Mcfeely, Grant: A Biography, New York:

W.W. Norton, 1981, pp. 247-273.

25. Brooke D. Simpson, Let Us Have Peace: Ulysses S. Grant

and the Politics of War and Reconstruction, 1861-1868. Chapel

Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1991, pp. 109, 156,

166. See also "Ulysses Grant I, Emperor of America?: Some CivilMilitary Continuities and Strains of the Civil War and

Reconstruction," in Richard H. Kohn, ed., The United States

Military Under the Constitution of the United States, 1789-1989.

New York: New York University Press, 1991, pp. 175-192.

26. Perry, Four Stars, pp. 163-165.

27. Ibid., p. 268.

28. Rowan Scarborough, "Top Brass Fear White House Is

'Manufacturing' Iran Crisis," Washington Times, March 27, 1995,

p. 1.

29. David C. Hendrickson, Reforming Defense: The State of

American Civil-Military Relations, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins

University Press, 1988, pp. 32-33.

30. "Segregation Under Siege," in Nalty and MacGregor, eds.

Blacks in the Military. Particularly see analysis of attempts to

implement the Gillem Report, War Department Circular 124, 27


April 1946. Also see "The Fahy Committee," pp. 243-293, which

describes the Army's rationale for adherence to the Gillem Report

which was used to dodge the integration issue. Further

developments led the Army to continue to insist on racial quotas

to maintain balance. This condition was not abolished until 1954.

See "Integration," p. 314.

31. Eisenhower's "New Look" was an explicit attempt to forge

a defense strategy with minimal impact on the national economy. 

Steven Metz, Eisenhower as Strategist: The Coherent Use of

Military Power in War and Peace, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army

War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 1993, pp. 67-77.

32. For a comprehensive analysis, see Peter Douglas Feaver,

Guarding the Guardians: Civilian Control of Nuclear Weapons in

the United States, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992.

33. James M. Gavin, War and Peace in the Space Age, New

York: Harper and Brothers, 1958, p. 112.

34. See, for instance, Henry A. Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons

and Foreign Policy, New York: Harper and Brothers, 1957; Bernard

Brodie, The Absolute Weapon, New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1946;

Klaus E. Knorr and Thornton Read, eds., Limited Strategic War:

Essays on Nuclear Strategy, New York: Praeger, 1952; Bernard

Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age, Princeton, NJ: Princeton

University Press, 1959; and Herman Kahn, On Thermonuclear War,

Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1960.

35. Perry, Four Stars, pp. 65-94; Flint, "The TrumanMacArthur Conflict," p. 261; and, Kohn, "Out of Control," pp. 4-

5.

36. James S. Dickey, "A Personal Statement," in Bruce M.

Russett and Alfred Stepan, eds., Military Force and American

Society, New York: Harper and Row, 1973, pp. 23-25.

37. U.S. Interdepartmental Committee on Overseas Internal

Defense Policy, U.S. Overseas Internal Defense Policy, July 24,

1962.

38. Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., "The Origins of the American

Military Coup of 2012," Parameters, Vol. 22, No. 4, Winter 1992-


93, pp. 2-20.

39. For a description of the formal planning systems, see

AFSC (Armed Forces Staff College) Pub 1, The Joint Staff

Officer's Guide, Norfolk, VA: Armed Forces Staff College, 1993.

40. Quoted in Bob Woodward, The Commanders, New York: Simon

and Schuster, 1991, p. 155.

41. William J. Crowe, Jr., The Line of Fire: From Washington

to the Gulf, the Politics and Battles of the New Military, New

York: Simon and Schuster, 1993, p. 23.

42. Sam C. Sarkesian and John Allen Williams, "CivilMilitary Relations in the New Era," in Sam C. Sarkesian and John

Mead Flanagin, eds., U.S. Domestic and National Security Agendas:

Into the Twenty-First Century, Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1994, p.

212.

43. Crowe, The Line of Fire, p. 227.

44. One of the tools to ameliorate this problem–sending

officers to civilian graduate schools–appears to be losing

ground. This could be a serious step away from maintaining mutual

understanding. Sarkesian and Williams, "Civil-Military Relations

in the New Era," p. 219.

45. Kohn, "Out of Control," p. 13.

46. Hendrickson, Reforming Defense, p. 28.

47. Perry, Four Stars, p. 217.

48. Bob Woodward, The Commanders, New York: Simon and

Schuster, 1991, pp. 74-80.

49. The authors are indebted to James Kievit for this

observation.

50. For instance Mackubin Thomas Owens attributes the

charges by strategic theorist Edward Luttwak that the Joint Staff

is inadequately controlled to the Pentagon's failure to adopt

Luttwak's policy proposals. See Mackubin Thomas Owens, "Civilian


Control: A National Crisis?" Joint Force Quarterly, Autumn/Winter

1994/95, p. 82; and Edward N. Luttwak, "Washington's Biggest

Scandal," Commentary, May 1994, pp. 29-33.

51. But, as Stephen Ambrose points out, "the Armed Services

are not an entity with a single world view, but rather a loose

association of groups which, while agreeing on certain basic

necessities, nevertheless is full of internal contradictions." 

(Ambrose, "The Military Impact on Foreign Policy," p. 122.)

52. James Kitfield, "Pentagon Power Shifts," Government

Executive, April 1994, p. 72.

53. Perry, Four Stars, p. 300.

54. Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, The Generals'

War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf, Boston:

Little, Brown, 1995, p. viii.

55. This section is based on Douglas Johnson and Steven

Metz, "Civil-Military Relations in the United States: The State

of the Debate," Washington Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 1, Winter

1995, pp. 208-212.

56. See Steven Metz, "Insurgency After the Cold War," Small

Wars and Insurgencies, Vol. 5, No. 1, Spring 1994, pp. 71-73.

57. Martin van Creveld, The Transformation of War, New York:

Free Press, 1991, pp. 192-227.

58. See Steven Metz and James Kievit, The Revolution in

Military Affairs and Conflict Short of War, Carlisle Barracks,

PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 1994, pp.

20-21; and Bill Gertz, "Mass Attacks Feared by Future

Terrorists," Washington Times, February 22, 1995, p. 4.

59. Huntington, The Soldier and the State, pp. 143-162.

60. Mark Perry, letter to Brad Roberts, editor of Washington

Quarterly, January 17, 1995.

61. Huntington, letter in "Exchange on Civil-Military

Relations," p. 30.


62. Perry, Four Stars, p. 341.

63. Henry A. Kissinger, A World Restored: Metternich,

Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace 1812-1822, Boston:

Houghton-Mifflin, n.d., p. 43.

64. Huntington, The Soldier and the State, p. 71.

65. Feaver, Guarding the Guardians, pp. 4-5.

66. Perry, Four Stars, pp. 257-259.

67. Ibid., p. 243.

68. Ibid., p. 243.

69. Bletz, The Role of the Military Professional in U.S.

Foreign Policy, p. 49.
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Richard A. Chilcoat

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Acting Director

Colonel William W. Allen

Director of Research

Dr. Earl H. Tilford, Jr.

Authors

Dr. Douglas V. Johnson II

Dr. Steven Metz

Editor

Mrs. Marianne P. Cowling

Secretary

Mrs. Shirley E. Martin

*****

Composition

Mrs Mary Jane Semple

Cover Artist

Mr. James E. Kistler