NUMBER 13-12-00368-CR

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG

 

JAVIER DE LA ROSA JR., Appellant,

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.

 

On appeal from the 107th District Court

of Cameron County, Texas.

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Rodriguez, Garza, and Benavides

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Benavides

On March 8, 2012, appellant Javier De La Rosa pleaded guilty to murder, a 

first-degree felony. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02 (West, Westlaw 2013 through 

3d C.S.). De La Rosa elected for the jury to determine his punishment, and a trial was 
2

held solely on the issue of punishment. The jury assessed punishment at ninety years’ 

imprisonment with the Texas Department of Criminal Justice’s Institutional Division. 

This appeal followed. De La Rosa’s court-appointed counsel has filed an Anders brief.1 

See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). We affirm.

I. ANDERS BRIEF

Pursuant to Anders v. California, De La Rosa’s court-appointed appellate counsel 

has filed a brief and a motion to withdraw with this Court, stating that her review of the 

record yielded no grounds of error upon which an appeal can be predicated. See id. 

Counsel’s brief meets the requirements of Anders as it presents a professional 

evaluation demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds to advance on appeal. 

See In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 407 n.9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (“In Texas, an 

Anders brief need not specifically advance 'arguable' points of error if counsel finds 

none, but it must provide record references to the facts and procedural history and set 

out pertinent legal authorities.”) (citing Hawkins v. State, 112 S.W.3d 340, 343–44 (Tex. 

App.—Corpus Christi 2003, no pet.)); Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 510 n.3 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 1991).

In compliance with High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807, 813 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel 

Op.] 1978) and Kelly v. State, 436 S.W.3d 313, 319–22 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014), De La 

Rosa’s counsel carefully discussed why, under controlling authority, there is no 

 

1

 On April 3, 2013, De La Rosa’s initial appellate attorney filed an Anders brief and corresponding 

motion to withdraw. On January 6, 2014, we issued an order noting that appellate counsel did not have the 

entire record before he filed his Anders brief. Accordingly, we: (1) granted De La Rosa’s appellate 

attorney’s motion to withdraw; (2) abated the appeal; and (3) remanded the case to the trial court to appoint 

a new appellate attorney to review the complete record on appeal. On August 18, 2014, De La Rosa’s 

second appellate attorney filed an Anders brief and corresponding motion to withdraw. 
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reversible error in the trial court's judgment. This Court has also ensured that De La 

Rosa has been (1) notified that counsel has filed an Anders brief and a motion to 

withdraw; (2) provided with copies of both pleadings; (3) informed of his rights to file a 

pro se response,2review the record preparatory to filing that response, and seek 

discretionary review if we conclude that the appeal is frivolous; and (4) provided with a 

form motion for pro se access to the appellate record, lacking only De La Rosa’s 

signature and the date and including the mailing address for the court of appeals, with 

instructions to file the motion within ten days. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; Kelly, 436 

S.W.3d at 319–20, Stafford, 813 S.W.2d at 510 n.3; see also In re Schulman, 252 

S.W.3d at 409 n.23. 

In this case, De La Rosa filed neither a timely motion seeking pro se access to the 

appellate record nor a motion for extension of time to do so. No pro se response was 

filed.3 

II. INDEPENDENT REVIEW

Upon receiving an Anders brief, we must conduct a full examination of all the 

proceedings to determine whether the case is wholly frivolous. Penson v. Ohio, 488 

U.S. 75, 80 (1988). We have reviewed the entire record and counsel’s brief, and we 

have found nothing that would arguably support an appeal. See Bledsoe v. State, 178 

 

2

 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has held that “the pro se response need not comply with 

the rules of appellate procedure in order to be considered. Rather, the response should identify for the 

court those issues which the indigent appellant believes the court should consider in deciding whether the 

case presents any meritorious issues.” In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 409 n.23 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2008) (quoting Wilson v. State, 955 S.W.2d 693, 696–97 (Tex. App.—Waco 1997, no pet.)).

3 This Court granted three motions for extension of time to give De La Rosa an opportunity to file a 

pro se brief, if any. A reasonable amount of time has passed, and no pro se response has been filed. 
4

S.W.3d 824, 826–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (“Due to the nature of Anders briefs, by 

indicating in the opinion that it considered the issues raised in the briefs and reviewed 

the record for reversible error but found none, the court of appeals met the requirement 

of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 47.1.”); Stafford, 813 S.W.2d at 509. There is no 

reversible error in the record. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

III. MOTION TO WITHDRAW

In accordance with Anders, De La Rosa’s attorney has asked this Court for 

permission to withdraw as counsel for appellant. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; see also 

In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 408 n.17 (citing Jeffery v. State, 903 S.W.2d 776, 779–80 

(Tex. App.—Dallas 1995, no pet.) (“[I]f an attorney believes the appeal is frivolous, he 

must withdraw from representing the appellant. To withdraw from representation, the 

appointed attorney must file a motion to withdraw accompanied by a brief showing the 

appellate court that the appeal is frivolous.”) (citations omitted)). We grant counsel’s 

motion to withdraw. Within five days of the date of this Court’s opinion, counsel is 

ordered to send a copy of this opinion and this Court’s judgment to De La Rosa and to 

advise him of his right to file a petition for discretionary review.4 See TEX. R. APP. P.

48.4; see also In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 412 n.35; Ex parte Owens, 206 S.W.3d 

 

4 No substitute counsel will be appointed. Should appellant wish to seek further review of this 

case by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, he must either retain an attorney to file a petition for 

discretionary review or file a pro se petition for discretionary review. Any petition for discretionary review 

must be filed within thirty days from the date of either this opinion or the last timely motion for rehearing or 

timely motion for en banc reconsideration that was overruled by this Court. See TEX. R. APP. P. 68.2. 

Any petition for discretionary review must be filed with the clerk of the Court of Criminal Appeals, see TEX.

R. APP. P. 68.3, and should comply with the requirements of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 68.4. 

See TEX. R. APP. P. 68.4.
5

670, 673 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).5

/s/ Gina M. Benavides

GINA M. BENAVIDES,

Justice

Do not publish.

TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2 (b).

Delivered and filed the

12th day of February, 2015. 

 

5 De La Rosa filed the following motions, which remain pending: (1) motion to supplement the 

appellate record; (2) motion to forward original exhibits to this Court; and (3) motion to hold appellate 

counsel in contempt. After due consideration, we deny all of these motions.