SAUDI ARABIA:

ISLAMIC THREAT, POLITICAL REFORM,

AND THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR

Sherifa Zuhur

March 2005

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 The views expressed in this report are those of the author and do not 

necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, the 

Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. This report is cleared for public 

release; distribution is unlimited.

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 I would like to thank C. Beau Daane, Colonel James Allen, Dr. W. Andrew 

Terrill, Ms. Kay Campbell, Dr. David Commins, Dr. Steven Metz, the friends and 

colleagues in Saudi Arabia for their suggestions and assistance, and my contacts in 

the democracy movement in other Arab states for improving my understanding of 

the arduous process of political change.

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to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 122 Forbes Ave, 

Carlisle, PA 17013-5244. 

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ISBN 1-58487-189-X
iii

FOREWORD

 U.S. foreign policy and the domestic concerns of Middle Eastern 

states are influencing the pursuit of the global war on terror in the 

Middle East. A close view of Saudi Arabia reveals the complex 

interaction of these forces. The U.S. relationship with Saudi Arabia 

and the global war on terror are important challenges to the U.S. 

administration that have region-wide ramifications. Saudi Arabia has 

been facing down Islamist insurgency along with other challenges 

since September 11, 2001, and with even more urgency since May 

2003. 

 The Kingdom clearly remains a major political and economic force 

in the region. The income from its vast oil resources primarily has 

funded its strong influence, and the Kingdom has, in turn, sponsored 

poorer developing Arab nations. Furthermore, its Islamic influence 

has been apparent in the broader Muslim world, and the United 

States has maintained a strong relationship with the Kingdom for 

many decades. 

 The current war on terror is testing the U.S. ability to craft and 

implement sound policy in the region and predict future strategic 

needs. Untended, Saudi-American antipathies might jeopardize an 

effective pursuit of counter- and antiterrorist strategies for the future. 

The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this monograph 

which examines the emergence and progress of an Islamist threat in 

Saudi Arabia and the simultaneous development of other forces for 

political change, and assesses the strategic situation in the Kingdom 

in light of the regional war on terrorism.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director

Strategic Studies Institute 
iv

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

SHERIFA ZUHUR is a Distinguished Visiting Research Professor of 

National Security Affairs at the Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army 

War College. She has been a faculty member or researcher at various 

universities including MIT; the University of California, Berkeley; 

and the American University in Cairo. Dr. Zuhur has lectured 

internationally, appeared on National Public Radio, television, and 

provided congressional briefings. Her research includes Islamic 

movements and insurgencies, modern Middle Eastern politics, war 

and peace in the Middle East, and social and cultural developments 

in the region. Dr. Zuhur has published 7 books and more than 27 

monographs, articles, and chapters in edited books. Her most recent 

book is The Middle East: Politics, History, and Neonationalism in the 

Middle East (Institute of Middle Eastern, Islamic, and Diasporic 

Studies, 2005). She recently co-authored Islamic Rulings on Warfare, 

an SSI monograph, with Youssef El-Enein. Dr. Zuhur holds a B.A. 

in Political Science and Arabic, a Master’s in Islamic Studies, and 

a Ph.D. in Middle Eastern History, all from the University of 

California, Los Angeles.
v

SUMMARY

 The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United States have been 

allies for more than half a century. In the wake of the terrible events 

of September 11, 2001, and in the midst of a Saudi battle against a 

wave of Islamist terrorism on their own soil, the two nations are 

drawing apart. This monograph questions this unfortunate advent in 

the context of Islamist challenges and the growth of forces for reform 

in the Kingdom. The Saudi government has been strongly criticized 

for setting too narrow an agenda and too slow a pace for change. 

External sources also debate the efficacy of measures taken to control 

Islamic terror cells, in particular those associated with al-Qa’ida on 

the Arabian Peninsula (QAP), and to rein in those who provide 

ideological support to extremism. Sources internal to Saudi Arabia 

argue that, as their entire state structure and society is founded on 

religious principles, they must move cautiously.

 As similar battles against Islamist extremists are being waged 

in Iraq today, it seems clear that the future of U.S.-Saudi relations 

is contingent on a redefinition of the two countries’ interests. Both 

have high stakes in the future of the war on terror in the region. 

American policymakers and military leadership urgently need to 

comprehend clearly the nature and interests of the “Islamic threat” 

in Saudi Arabia, as well as other broadly defined arguments swirling 

around the war on terror. Some have accused the Kingdom of gross 

sponsorship of terrorism. Yet they should distinguish the sectarian 

origins of Wahhabism from the new Islamic and Islamist discourses 

emerging in that country. 

 As the U.S. policy for the global war on terror recommends the 

“forwarding of freedom” and prevention of “failed states,” Saudi 

Arabia’s reform movement has assumed new importance as well. 

U.S. policymakers should determine future courses of action in 

light of the various pitfalls inherent in bolstering authoritarianism, 

empowering reform, treating the Kingdom as an essentially 

unwelcome ex-ally, or abandoning it in the event of a serious 

challenge. The future of security in Saudi Arabia is related to the 

future of political, educational, administrative, and social reforms. 

Current U.S. strategy calls for the attainment of both aims.
vi

Principal recommendations for U.S. policymakers include:

1. Developing a well-established plan in the event of catastrophic 

events in the Kingdom.

2. Creating, facilitating, and participating in ad hoc and formal 

multination discussions of antiterrorism and its relationship to 

democratic or other reforms. 

3. Responding to Saudi conventional military and security needs 

and proposals regarding Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 

force or multinational Muslim force creation. 

4. Encouraging Saudi improvement and modernization of the 

General Intelligence Presidency, the Saudi intelligence service, 

including the areas of research, human intelligence, and 

strategic thinking. 

5. Urging Saudi responsiveness to international efforts to 

improve human, legal, and workers’ (international) rights. 

This might be bolstered by the development of a Bill of 

Rights.

6. Examining and more carefully analyzing the influence of Saudi 

`ulama and Islamic institutions in the Kingdom and upon 

the progress of reform and democratization in neighboring 

countries. 

7. Monitoring the impact on Saudi Arabia of the security situation 

in Iraq, and eliciting allies’ cooperation in monitoring travel for 

religious purposes in the Kingdom and regionally. 

8. Encouraging the Saudi government in its efforts to increase 

political participation and administrative transparency.

More detailed recommendations may be found on pages 48-50.
1

SAUDI ARABIA:

ISLAMIC THREAT, POLITICAL REFORM,

AND THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR

Introduction.

 Saudi Arabia has been under more U.S. scrutiny since the events 

of September 11, 2001 (9/11), than ever before. Both Saudis and 

Americans were shaken by the fact that 15 of the 19 jihadists who 

committed the crimes of 9/11 were Saudis. Had Saudi Arabia’s panIslamic policies, its global mission (da`wa) to foster Islam and Islamic 

knowledge, charities, and causes, licensed or nurtured Tanzim alqa’ida fi jazirat al-`arab (al-Qa’ida on the Arabian Peninsula) and the 

subsequent hydra-like emergence of al-Qa’ida franchises? Saudis 

were even more disturbed by the May 6, 2003, discovery of a huge 

arms cache in Riyadh; followed by two major attacks on residential 

compounds there on May 12 and in November; further discoveries 

of arms; and by shootings, skirmishes with extremists, bombings, a 

beheading, drive-by killings, and an attack on the U.S. Consulate in 

Jeddah since, claiming the lives of over 176 policemen and civilians 

by December of 2004, many of whom were foreigners. That violence 

convinced Saudis that al-Qa’ida on the Arabian Peninsula (hereafter 

QAP) specifically, and Islamist extremism in general, pose a threat 

to their homeland, and not merely to the United States. Despite 

cooperation between counterterrorism agencies, that violence has 

threatened and negatively recast the shared interests of Saudi Arabia 

and America with regard to oil policy, the containment of Islamic 

threats, management of regional security, and Gulf Cooperation 

Council (GCC) state interactions. Fear, new impediments to dialogue, 

and acrimonious perceptions also have diminished the American 

share in the currently expanding Saudi economy, and discouraged 

travel on both sides. Thus, the QAP has been able to further one of 

its goals: attacking and wounding the relationship between America 

and the government of Saudi Arabia.

 QAP and other jihadist violence, and Saudi responses to it, 

coincided with the emergence of a multistranded Islamic opposition 

and calls for political reform from the 1990s to the present. The 

Awakening Shaykhs (clerics who represented rising Islamist 
2

consciousness in the country), Saudi opposition groups, and liberal 

petitioners have effected to some degree a new method for engaging 

the government. They anticipate minor reforms and dream of major 

ones. The internal debate on the Islamist threat and the future of 

Islam is important, especially in view of concerns about succession 

and the economy. Both internally and externally, it has touched 

on the present and future role of religion in Saudi politics, and the 

Kingdom’s international endeavors in the service of Islam.

 The Saudis have taken numerous actions to confront the radicals. 

They have cooperated with other governments in this regard, 

including the United States, and are simultaneously waging an 

internal and external public relations campaign. All the same, 

Saudi self-scrutiny and U.S. condemnations of the country have 

not produced well-iterated policies or recommendations that 

will enhance strategies for the global war on terror (GWOT). This 

shortcoming is understandable because compelling questions 

about the undergirding and future of the Islamic threat are more 

perplexing than a simple query about the stability of the House of 

al-Saud. Saudis, unlike much of the Western world, are aware of the 

compelling nature of the Islamist phenomenon. They know that it 

transcends violent expressions, forcing liberal elites to accommodate 

a new discourse. In addition, observers are asking about the nature 

of the Saudi government, its contract with its citizens, and its future 

role in a Middle East that is to feature democratization alongside a 

war on terror. What impact will the GWOT as fought in the Kingdom 

have on any potential democratization, or on other regional actors?

 One could argue the stability of the Saudi royal family, the alSaud, is reasonably secure. It is important that the family leadership 

determine succession without external pressure. Certain aspects of 

political struggle might emerge between the next King and his Crown 

Prince, and that prospect has not yet been factored into strategy for 

a war on terror. Previous crises have been managed successfully; 

for example, the transfer in 1958 of King Saud’s statutory powers 

to Prince Faisal,1 the assassination of King Faysal ibn `Abd al-`Aziz 

in 1975 by a nephew, and Juhayman al-`Utaybi’s 1979 uprising and 

take-over of the grand mosque in Mecca.

 However, some sources suggest that, as conflicts within the 

royal family might prove destabilizing or since other Gulf countries 
3

also anticipate changes at the helm, potential Islamist strategies 

should be considered.2

 An alternative to the Saudi royal family has 

not been the subject of any careful brainstorming by the political 

opposition, except for the extremists who call for the establishment 

of a caliphate.

 While the current form of Saudi monarchy may have no 

satisfactory alternative, uncritical U.S. support of authoritarian and 

repressive practices because of our commitment to the GWOT may 

belie our stated preference for democratization and human rights 

in the region. Saudi Arabia has been the subject of serious charges 

by Amnesty International, the Human Rights Watch Organization, 

the Commission on International Religious Freedom, women’s 

rights advocates, and a host of other critics who call for reform in 

the Kingdom. The government has reacted negatively or claimed 

that the consequences of such reforms are too politically risky. After 

many decades of suppressing internal expressions of dissent ranging 

from the late author `Abd al-Rahman Munif, who sharply criticized 

the Kingdom in his fictive portrayal of the “sultanate of Mooran” 

in Mudun al-Milh (Cities of Salt),3 to dissatisfied members of the 

elite or middle classes, Saudi rulers experienced new, collective 

demonstrations of discontent.

 The nature and effects of Wahhabism’s linkage with the state 

have been called into question, along with that ideology’s elements 

of extremist, or salafi (purist)-jihadist thought.4 It is the confusion 

between salafism and Wahhabism, or between versions of Wahhabism, 

and possibly the supporters of the clash of civilizations theory that 

fuel irresponsible, damaging critiques of the Kingdom. Introspection 

is taking place from Riyadh to the Hijaz, but if the U.S.-Saudi rift 

deepens, and if any of a number of other destabilizing factors take 

place, then some believe that the consequences will be dire. Saudis 

expressed concerns about a destabilized Lebanon and Syria, a weak 

Iraq, a threatened Iran, and U.S. establishment of “democracy hubs” 

via the McCain Act.5

 Optimists think that anti-Americanism in Saudi Arabia may 

have peaked in 2003 and could be ebbing today. Pessimists warn 

that as the two nations retreat from each other, anti-Americanism 

will increase.6

 Terrorist actions seen through the lens of anti-Saudi 

sentiment in the United States, stoked by the film, “Farenheit 9/11” 
4

and books attacking politicians’ connections to the oil industry, 

evangelical preachers7

 prejudice, and good old fashioned ignorance, 

were sufficient to argue for a retreat from Saudi Arabia. Let the 

Kingdom sort out its own problems. Americans could stage military 

actions from Qatar, and U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia have been 

reduced to 400. However, that withdrawal may have aggrandized 

Iraqi jihadist claims that Americans are wrongfully engaged on 

Muslim soil (dar al-Islam). Also, the uncontrolled Iraqi environment 

may represent the site for future organized campaigns against Saudi 

Arabia, or other neighbors of Iraq. The GWOT thus requires Saudi 

cooperation; otherwise, it will remain vaguely interpreted and 

unrealized. Eliciting Saudi cooperation, in the context of heightened 

anxieties about the “reshaping of the region,” would benefit from a 

theoretically sound policy.

 The most obviously applicable portions of U.S. policy on the 

GWOT are its stated aims of 1) eliminating terrorist sanctuaries—

whether physical, ideological or cyber-sanctuaries—and 2) preventing the growth of terrorism through a “forward strategy of freedom” 

that will support the rule of law, tolerance, openness, and progress 

toward democracy.8 The U.S. characterization of the causes of terror 

also suggests that actions should be taken to prevent Saudi Arabia 

from becoming a “failed state.” Here, the notion is that a successful 

state, one where freedom is present, is less likely to foster terrorism, 

although as we know, terrorists have managed to operate in the 

United States and in Europe.

 President Bush more explicitly related this trajectory to the 

Middle East:

As long as the Middle East remains a place of tyranny and despair and 

anger, it will continue to produce men and movements that threaten the 

safety of America and our friends. So America is pursuing a forward 

strategy of freedom in the greater Middle East. We will challenge the 

enemies of reform, confront the allies of terror, and expect a higher 

standard from our friend.

He also spoke of new media efforts and the encouragement of free 

elections, markets, press, and labor unions.9

 Scholars of Islamic radicalism are highly divided on the causes 

of that phenomenon, though few would dispute the presence of 
5

tyranny in the Middle East. The question is whether or not tyranny, 

or even despair and anger, are the primary reasons for Islamism. 

Do we not see more despair and utter wretchedness today in, say, 

Darfur, Sudan? In fact, has not Islamism arisen from a combination 

of push-and-pull factors from Morocco to Indonesia, ranging 

from dissatisfaction to lack of mobility and impeded political 

participation, to increased religiosity and a desire to revitalize the 

religious dimension after the failure of other secularist ideologies? 

The most destructive and energetic of Islamic radicals were not 

members of the most miserable of social rankings. Some of the most 

influential have been middle-income professionals, while others, like 

Usama bin Ladin, are wealthy. Their message was spread through 

new means: first, cassette tapes, publications, and faxes; and then, 

e-mail, the Internet, videos, satellite TV, and cellular telephone text 

messaging. Saudi Arabia and other countries have been affected by 

Islamist ideology, and not necessarily due to the presence of misery 

or lack of freedom. On the other hand, the genuine socioeconomic 

woes of the greater Muslim world and lack of “social justice” are 

used by Islamists in their argument for a new order10 and to attract 

recruits.

 Another argument can be made that Islamist extremism, however 

it arose, can be combated more effectively if a larger number of 

citizens have a stake in nonextremist, increasingly democratized 

political systems. More freedom should be created to foster enhanced 

political participation and human investment in Middle Eastern 

states. A greater degree of participation may occur without the 

implementation of other requisites of democracy. If our definition of 

freedom is free elections, a free press, and labor unions—it is absent 

in Saudi Arabia.

 Supporters of the Kingdom point to other methods of creating 

balance and justice in society, whereby the royal family protects 

the citizens and defends their values in exchange for their loyalty. 

While this may smack of feudalism to the reader, such bargains were 

fulfilled in Islamic history through the Ottoman concept of the circle 

of equity; self-governance of religious minorities; and the recognition 

of local, tribal, and familial authorities. Today’s Middle Eastern rulers 

are facing similar questions about the ways that democratization will 

alter earlier understandings of leadership or threaten its longevity.
6

 Opinions inside the Kingdom can be confusing. A wide range 

of Saudi voices are speaking: some for political reform, others for a 

more or much less liberal version of Islam. They are uncertain about 

the potential effects of reform. Will it heighten or lessen the power of 

certain Islamist voices? The regime expresses a more limited vision of 

the degree of democratization to be anticipated than the various civil 

society actors who would prefer speedier progress toward greater 

freedoms.

 This monograph will present an introduction to Saudi Arabia’s 

geostrategic situation, and the origins, themes, and trends in Saudi 

Arabia’s Islamic discourse. It will describe the efficacy of Saudi 

responses to these Islamic threats and the emergence of Islamist neoliberalism, and non-Islamist liberalism, possible counterweights to 

extremism. Finally, it will summarize proposed political and legal 

reforms and their confluence with the Islamic threat, and offer some 

thoughts on U.S.-Saudi relations. A glossary of Arabic terms and 

names is provided at the end of the monograph.

 This overview of the situation in Saudi Arabia is being presented 

because there is an urgent need for American policymakers and 

military leadership to comprehend the nature and membership 

of the “Islamic threat” in Saudi Arabia, as well as the arguments 

swirling around the war on terror. They should be able to distinguish 

prevailing conditions that fuel terrorism from those that need not, and 

identify differing elements of Islamist discourse. U.S. policymakers 

should then determine policy in full comprehension of the respective 

dangers in bolstering authoritarianism, empowering reform, treating 

the Kingdom as an unwelcome ally, or abandoning it in the event of 

a serious challenge.

Country Context.

 Saudi Arabia’s leaders developed its strategic policies with one 

clear-eyed gaze at its own vast, arid, sparsely populated terrain 

and status as the world’s largest oil exporter, and a second keen 

assessment of the threats from neighboring powers. King `Abd al-

`Aziz ibn `Abd al-Rahman al-Faysal ibn al-Sa`ud, commonly known 

as Ibn Saud, had begun his quest to recover a Saudi Kingdom in 

1902 when he captured Riyadh,11 attained it in full by 1934, and 
7

ruled until 1953. With insufficient manpower and weaponry for 

defense against stronger regional powers, Ibn Saud sought and 

found a Western protector, Great Britain. He struggled, though not 

to the point of alienation, with the consequences of that protector’s 

sponsorship of other political rivals, Iraq and Jordan, states ruled by 

Hashemites, the descendents of Sharif Hussayn, keeper of the Holy 

Cities of Mecca and Medina in the Hijaz. He then transferred this 

special relationship to the United States. The United States did not 

agree to a formal alliance with Saudi Arabia but offered technicians, 

loans, military aid, a military mission, a treaty of friendship, rights 

to navigation and trade, and an agreement regarding an airfield at 

Dhahran.12

 King Saud, Ibn Saud’s successor, brought the kingdom closer 

to the prevailing political discourse of the United Arab Republic, 

as Egypt’s union with Syria was entitled, and the cause of Arab 

nationalism, encumbering the battle against Nasser in Yemen.13

Eventually under King Faysal, the Kingdom reclaimed its autonomy 

and exercised strong influence over the region, shifting from certain 

alignments to others; retaining its strong relationship with the United 

States, but uncomfortable with U.S. support for Israel and the lack 

of resolution of the Palestinian situation. Faysal officially abolished 

slavery in 1962, promoted education, and led the nation as the region 

began to experience a wave of Islamization.

 Saudi Arabia is the birthplace of Islam and guardian of the holy 

cities of Mecca and Medina. Prior to the discovery of oil, the Hijaz, 

the western province of Saudi Arabia derived a certain amount of 

yearly income from the hajj, the pilgrimage to Mecca that is the duty 

of each Muslim who can afford to travel. The national economy was 

otherwise insubstantial until the receipt of oil income. That income 

made Saudi Arabia a tempting target for regional enemies, and the 

country has weathered hostilities with Iran, Iraq, the southern states 

of the Arabian peninsula, and radical states in the Arab cold war of 

the mid-20th century.14

 This situation is now quite different. Challengers like Gamal 

`Abd al-Nasser of Egypt and Saddam Husayn no longer threaten 

the Kingdom. Indeed, the driving ideological forces of the region, 

Arab nationalism and neo-Marxist populism, have been, to a large 

degree, transformed or replaced with a region-wide heightening of 
8

religiosity, Islamic revival, and the growth of Islamic radicalism. 

The Saudi-Iranian relationship was transformed when the Islamic 

Revolution ousted the Shah of Iran, replacing him with a theocratic 

state. Prior to that, both oil-producing countries were “pillars” in the 

Nixon Doctrine of the early 1970s, sharing common cause in their 

antipathy to radical Arab nationalism and communism,15 although 

the Shah’s ambition to advance Iranian interests in the Gulf and 

the region conflicted in certain ways with Saudi Arabia’s needs. 

Ayatollah Khomeini initially proclaimed an active Islamic foreign 

policy, like early Soviet diplomacy under the Narkomindel (People’s 

Commissariat of Foreign Affairs). Trumpeting Islam’s antipathy to 

monarchy, Khomeini challenged the House of Saud, calling it an 

American satellite, and its brand of Islam, “American Islam.”16 The 

revolutionaries were afraid that the United States would attack the 

new regime, then were emboldened when it did not do so, following 

the seizure of hostages. When Saudi dissidents seized the Grand 

Mosque, Khomeini blamed that attack on the United States.17

 Saudi Arabia supported Saddam Husayn during the lengthy 

Iran-Iraq war. Husayn’s invasion of Kuwait then threatened the 

Saudis. The Saudi government quietly has reassessed its strategic 

situation since and has not been baited into overt confrontations with 

Iran. Somewhat of an accommodation with Iran, in view of Iraq’s 

currently weak status, seems prudent, but the Kingdom is watching 

Iranian-linked actors in Iraq carefully.

 The House of Saud had ruled according to the Islamic principle 

of shura, which means consultation. Today it rules with a Cabinet. 

Because Saudi Arabia considers shari`ah, Islamic law, to be the law 

of the land, and it is uncodified, a constitution was considered 

unnecessary, or less suitable than the principles to be found in 

the Qur’an and shari`ah. King Fahd18 spoke throughout the 1980s 

about his intention to establish a Basic Law of Government for the 

Kingdom. Disputes concerning the order of succession prevented its 

issuance until March 1992, although some of these disputes were not 

resolved. In 1991, King Fahd announced the revival of a majlis alshura, an appointed body, and named its 60 members in 1993. None 

of these reforms, nor anticipated ones, have threatened the power or 

stability of the royal family, but it is true that some disputes among 

the Sudayri, Jiluwi, and Thunayan branches of the House of Sa`ud 
9

have been acrimonious. Moreover, the large size of the royal family 

is a factor19 as its members earn substantial salaries from birth, and, 

in what amounts to a social class of royals, corruption of a few can 

taint the system.

 Current and future challenges arise from Saudi Arabia’s closed 

system, its relationship to Islamic politics and idealism, and its 

relationship with the world’s largest oil importer, the United States. 

Also, Saudi incomes have greatly decreased. The height of the oil 

boom came in the late 1970s and 1980s, when it was common for 

many princes to pay large sums and salaries to large numbers of 

the visitors to their majlises, just as a matter of course. Corruption 

was rampant, and high fees for intermediary services were common. 

The scale of spending has now decreased, diminishing the trickledown effect to the lower classes, and Saudis have taken on types of 

labor that they once would have disdained. While far less densely 

populated than Egypt, the Saudi population has grown in the last 

20 years. Estimated at 25,795,938 in July 2004, that figure includes 

5,576,076 non-Saudis, according to one source,20 and is estimated 

by other sources in the Kingdom as being 7 to 8.8 million. In 1980, 

the country’s population was estimated at 5 to 6 million, of which 

2 million were non-Saudi workers and their families.21 The relative 

proportion of foreign workers has decreased somewhat. Saudis are 

now employed in service industry positions likely to have been filled 

by foreigners in the late 1980s or early 1990s. Today, many foreign 

workers are contracted from Asian rather than Arab countries.

 Economic and demographic conditions will challenge the future 

Kingdom. The population is quite young, the median age is 21 years. 

Differing estimates of the percentage of those under the age 15 range 

from 38.3 percent22 to 45.6 percent of the population.23 The high birth 

rate (5.5 children per woman) portends a large increase in future 

population. In the short term, the economic situation appears good, 

although there are impoverished sectors that the government had 

not acknowledged in previous years. With some future uncertainties 

and concerns about the imported workforce, the Saudi government 

must create jobs, plan for a more diversified economy, and shift 

budget expenditures to some degree from defense. Pessimists state 

that a future Saudi Arabia will be a “rotted welfare state,” poor, but 

with a very wealthy royal family.24
10

 Studies of Saudi Arabia routinely attribute Saudis with more 

conservative attitudes than those of citizens of neighboring states; 

significantly more conservative than those of their own government. 

This may be true of certain regions of the country, but perhaps 

the conservative political and religious elites make this argument 

to advocate a slower pace of change. This truism rings with less 

authenticity today; youth are expected to argue for more reform and 

opening than their parents’ generation. Dissent has been tolerated at 

the level of conversation; less so in print or in public action. Young 

people, speaking anonymously, critique the hypocrisy of the ruling 

family, saying that “there are two laws in the country—one for the 

ruled and one for the rulers.” As the royal family is so large, an 

impression arises of a dual-class society. The radicals’ complaints 

about corruption of the `umara (the princes) are compelling to young 

people, whether they are attracted to a liberal message of reform, 

or one of increased fidelity to Islamic principles. Many are finding 

it difficult to obtain employment.25 Youth, like their elders, resort to 

a system of patronage (wasta) to find jobs. That social connectivity 

has positive and negative aspects, as do laxer work or business 

standards.26 This patronage system derives from another prevailing 

feature of life, tribalism, or more properly, familialism. Informal, 

pragmatic, and trusted methods of lobbying, mediating, and 

distributing political goods are constantly compared to the external 

and formal institutions that Saudis hope to, or are told they should, 

develop.

 As an arm of economic and fiscal reform, the Saudi Arabian 

government announced a policy of Saudization of the workforce, 

although social norms prevent or discourage Saudis from accepting 

certain types of employment. These attitudes, along with a continuing 

need for specialized training, mean that Saudization will take place 

alongside a continuing policy of worker importation. Thus far, some 

experts state that Saudization policies, plotted into various 5-year 

plans, are barely implemented.27 Others praise programs such as the 

government’s Human Resources Development Fund, and believe 

the private sector will benefit.28 These policies are not necessarily 

exacerbating the tensions between Saudis and non-Saudis, but 

conditions and procedures have become more difficult for the latter. 

To that end, some new policies on longtime expatriates’ ability to 
11

apply for Saudi citizenship were announced. New measures may 

address the sale of “free” visas sponsored by Saudis and the illegal 

deduction of recruitment visas from immigrants’ salaries.29

 The Kingdom spent huge sums to modernize its armed forces. 

Saudi strategic interests required the building of an efficient air force 

because of vast, undeveloped, and inhospitable topography. Ibn 

Saud’s dream for defense alongside a strong foreign power resulted 

in an Air Force, and an Air Defense Force capable of effective action 

under the right circumstances. Nonetheless, the army, navy, and air 

forces cannot deal with a powerful attack without foreign assistance.30

Moreover, Saudi Arabia has, through the 1990s, experienced a sharp 

decrease in revenues and spent about $55 billion on the Gulf War. 

Multiple economic, political, and social pressures on the Kingdom 

have coincided just as Islamic terrorism has emerged as the major 

security threat, rather than attacks by hostile neighbors. Military and 

intelligence and policing arms of internal security are being employed 

in the war on terror, but the question is how to develop nonterror, 

or antiterrorist measures and policies along with counterterrorist 

campaigns.

 Prior to the latest wave of violence in the Kingdom and inflamed 

feelings in both countries, those writing on security issues predicted 

a continuing “flexible cooperation” with the United States for 

training and procurement. It was suggested that training could 

enhance reliance on other GCC nations in order to reduce a U.S. commitment.31 This view may now be under advisement in both countries. 

Saudis were critiqued for the lack of coordination and assessment 

among the five defense branches (National Guard, Army, Navy, Air 

Force, and Air Defense Force) and the various intelligence and internal 

security forces, and the lack of transparency in security expenditures. 

Moreover, patronage systems affect the military like other strata of 

Saudi society, as do some problems of administration—purchases 

in the absence of planning—which plague organizations, not only 

military, worldwide. There have been reports that some National 

Guard officers and personnel were arrested for ties to the extremists, 

and other reports that corruption at the top levels might have affected 

the Air Force.32 In lieu of any other support, the Saudis will require 

U.S. help in the event of a major terrorist challenge, the likelihood 

of which is difficult to assess. And the Kingdom, though possessing 
12

greater military resources than any other peninsular power, cannot 

match Iran in manpower.33

 Since May 2003, purely military assessments of Saudi Arabia 

cannot provide a comprehensive view of the war on terror. Instead 

one must understand the domestic factors exerting pressure on the 

Saudis. The wave of Saudi-bashing in the United States seems to stem 

from the shock of September 11, 2001. It may have been aggravated 

by aspects of the 2004 American presidential election and concerns 

about Iraq and the GWOT, impeding a proper view of the Kingdom. 

Even with open minds, it is difficult for all but the one group of 

Americans with a lengthy history of business ties with the Kingdom 

to agree with the official Saudi assessment that progress, if slow, is 

being made in the areas of political reform and that control over the 

Islamic threat has been achieved.

Saudi Arabia and the GWOT.

 The GWOT has been defined in various ways and with a 

multiplicity of innuendo. Clearly, it is easier to describe what terrorism 

does than what it is. The White House has thus far stated that the 

GWOT is “an ideological war as well as a physical struggle.”34

Terrorism:

 • Is “a new kind of evil.”35

 • A form of violence “perpetrated against noncombatant targets 

by sub-national groups or clandestine agents.”36

 • Has no single point of origin.

 • Has taken advantage of the increasing porosity and interconnectedness of today’s world.

As for our strategy in fighting the GWOT:

 • It will be a lengthy struggle perhaps lasting for “decades.”

 • It will be “waged in multiple theaters.”

 • We must employ “all the instruments of national power” 

against it37 to defeat, deny, and cause it to diminish, and to 

defend ourselves and the world.38

This general policy does not single out the Muslim world, nor 

specify the ideological basis for Islamic terrorism. As ideology and 

weltanshauung (worldview and sensibilities) matter greatly, this 

policy must be refined for the Saudi and Muslim world context.
13

 The project of ideologically combatting terrorism is occurring 

in the midst of one broad ongoing debate about the role of religion 

in modern life, and a second about the future of the Kingdom. 

President Bush declared the need to support “moderate and modern 

government, especially in the Muslim world” to render it infertile 

to terrorism, and use diplomacy to cause those “in societies ruled 

by global terrorism” to aspire to freedom.39 But to what degree 

was Saudi Arabia moderate or modern? To what degree could the 

encouragement of democracy possibly destabilize the regime? To 

what degree can addressing development, and defusing regional 

conflicts—other stated components of U.S. policy—be achieved if the 

United States must use means other than a large physical presence, 

since that presence triggered a backlash against it?

From the GWOT to the U.S. Security Concerns in Saudi Arabia.

 Saddam’s Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Libya were defined as state 

sponsors of terrorism in the Middle East and North Africa, but Saudi 

Arabia has not been so labeled. Saudi Arabian officials decried alQa’ida’s actions in the United States, and have captured and killed 

operatives, arrested more than 600 suspects, forced key clerical 

figures to recant their radical views on television, recalled more 

than 1,400 imams who were counseled on their divergent opinions, 

and took a variety of measures to diminish the financial support of 

terrorist organizations. The government also announced modest 

political reforms that began with voter registration from 2004-

05, and municipal elections in 2005 which will enhance political 

participation.

 A public discussion about reform faces various obstacles but 

nevertheless provides a contrast to the past. The U.S. military has 

essentially withdrawn operations other than training and a certain 

amount of coordination from the Kingdom. Whether that will be a 

positive decision over the long run, releasing the Saudi rulers from 

the charge that they are encouraging infidel penetration of a Muslim 

land, or, more unhelpful, in surrendering the terms of this argument 

to the Islamists, can only be judged in the future.

 Certainly, there are new worries. Islamists in Saudi Arabia have 

vowed to link their campaigns with those in other Arabian peninsula 
14

countries, Egypt, and Iraq.40 The strongest element of the Iraqi 

insurgency are Sunni Islamists who might, one supposes, retreat 

across the border, or use Iraq as a staging ground for operations in 

Saudi Arabia or Jordan. This is not a fantastic proposition; insurgents 

organized themselves in Syria to attack targets in Saudi Arabia in 

1996. There is also the far less likely prospect of a revolution in Saudi 

Arabia, or a situation in which Islamist and tribal factions might 

ally.

 For now, the key objectives are to improve counterterrorism 

measures, and to diminish tensions between the United States and 

Saudi Arabia. U.S. leaders have also implied that democratization is 

of utmost importance in the region and recommended reform and 

more open dialogue in the Kingdom, as have other international 

observers.41 But there are several serious questions that have been 

asked in the process of examining Saudi Arabia’s specific security 

challenges. Does not self-examination and inquiry show that Saudi 

Arabia, particularly in its position of leadership in the Muslim world, 

has fostered extremist and intolerant views, or at least views that 

are antithetical to tolerance and compromise? Second, are the paths 

to containing the Islamic threat in Saudi Arabia and that leading 

eventually to democracy, coinciding routes, or pathways to very 

different political locations? Third, can Western concerns about the 

Kingdom, and Saudi misapprehension of U.S. plans to reshape the 

region, be addressed in the polarized U.S. political atmosphere, or in 

a Middle East so antagonistic to U.S. efforts in Iraq?

The Islamic Threat in Saudi Arabia.

 The current Islamic threat in Saudi Arabia is operating alongside 

other tensions. Outsiders can, as some do, simplistically argue that 

the lack of secularism in the Kingdom, or more properly the bargain 

struck between the political powers and the Wahhabi ideology, are 

the root of the problem. Instead, we might interpret that bargain as 

an a priori condition, and look instead to the imbalances arising since 

the outbreak of the Islamic Awakening in the early 1990s and the 

simultaneous emergence of global Islamic radicalism.
15

Systemic Islam: Wahhabism Is the Source of Radicalism.

 Islamic principles, practice, and discourse vary from country 

to country. In Saudi Arabia, the Hanbali school of law (madhhab) 

is followed, and the views of Muhammad ibn `Abd al-Wahhab, a 

religious reformist and ally of the Saudi family in the 18th century, 

became the prevailing version of Islam. Both the royal family and 

today’s salafi opposition are Wahhabis, hence Wahhabism is not 

necessarily a cohesive ideology in terms of its proposals regarding 

the state.

 Non-Wahhabis describe the sect as highly conservative, for `Abd 

al-Wahhab sought to purify his belief from degrading innovations 

(bid`a) that had been assimilated, according to him, from non-Islamic 

customs or mores. These included practices dear to the hearts of many 

Muslims such as the veneration of the Prophet Muhammad’s grave 

and those of other holy men and women, and the teachings and rituals 

of Sufi Muslims (the mystics of Islam), and the Shi`a. The Wahhabis 

considered tomb worship to be polytheistic, a form of shirk—because 

something other than God is revered. They were offended by the 

Shi`a conception of the imamate (the legitimate spiritual rulers of 

the Muslims) and the Sufi search for union in this lifetime with God, 

as well as the practices of the “ecstatic” Sufi orders. The Wahhabis 

also condemned the Ottoman rulers of their era for their corruption, 

addiction to luxury, use of prayer beads, and other innovations.

 The Saudi Shi`a comprise about 40 percent of the population of 

the eastern oil-rich province of the Kingdom, and are approximately 

10 percent of the indigenous Saudi population. Wahhabi warriors 

attacked the Shi`a in both Saudi Arabia and Iraq in ibn `Abd alWahhab’s day. The Wahhabi claim that the Shi`a are apostates renders 

their status difficult in Saudi Arabia, and has led to discrimination 

against them. The Wahhabi rulers forbade various rituals, Shi`a 

mosque construction and their doubled call to prayer; and this 

antipathy created tensions between the Kingdom and Iran.

 Wahhabism caused Saudi Arabia to pursue a foreign and cultural 

policy of da`wa, or Islamic mission. This spirit of proselytization and 

reform can be, with all of the usual ambiguity, traced to early Islam. 

Yet, more liberal Muslims find it antithetical to the ethos of the Muslim 

world in later periods, and they cite Surah Hud of the Quran, “If thy 
16

Lord had so willed, He could have made mankind one People: but 

they will not cease to dispute” (11:118) or Surah al-Baqarah, “Let 

there be no compulsion in religion” (2:256) to explain their aversion 

to zealotry. As part of this da`wa, and as it is the Guardian of the 

Holy Cities, Saudi Arabia has created or participated in various 

sorts of Islamic institutions, from the Muslim World League and 

the World Assembly of Muslim Youth, to the Organization of the 

Islamic Conference, which includes the International Islamic Court 

of Justice (ratified by only a small number of states), and a long 

list of affiliated groups, banks, and federations.42 These activities, 

along with Saudi support for Islamic academies, academic chairs 

(at Harvard, University of Moscow, University of California, Santa 

Barbara, and the University of London), institutes, mosques, and 

Islamic centers in Asia, Africa, the Middle East, Canada, the United 

States, Australasia, and Europe,43 are, on the one hand, expressions 

of zakat, which is not merely charity, but furtherance of Islam. On 

the other, these endeavors are an aspect of Saudi Arabia’s foreign 

policy, disseminating various Wahhabist principles to the point 

that today many Sunni Muslims see them as a norm. Critics accuse 

these efforts and institutions of supporting Islamists in other Middle 

Eastern nations, and in Europe. Saudi Arabia’s religious officials have 

even been able to interfere with secularizing reforms by directly or 

indirectly pressuring local religious leaders or other Saudi-influenced 

constituencies, as occurred in Lebanon in 1999 with the tabling of the 

new optional civil law of personal status.

 The idea of cleansing Islam from foreign influences is not unique 

to the Wahhabis. Many other parallels exist between Wahhabism 

and other strands of Muslim, or fundamentalist, or Islamist thought. 

Various critiques of Wahhabism exist; one characterizes the sect 

as an aberrantly puritanical trend in the otherwise tolerant and 

multicultural tradition of Islam. Wahhabism in such a view is a 

distinct sect or reactive movement and not really a part of mainstream 

Sunni Islam. The writings of ibn `Abd al-Wahhab were very sparse, 

limited to the booklet, Kitab al-Tawhid (Book of Unicity). A key to his 

philosophy is tawhid (unicity or oneness of God, sometimes translated 

as monotheism) of three types. Before explaining these three 

types, non-Muslims should understand that all Muslims, not only 

Wahhabis, are committed to tawhid. This principle has been 
17

expressed in art, literature, devotion, indeed in every facet of what 

can be termed Muslim culture. `Abd al-Wahhab wrote about tawhid 

al-ibada (unicity of worship), tawhid al-rububiyya (God’s unique 

attribute of creator of and dominion over the world), and tawhid alasma wa al-sifat (the idea that God’s [multiple] names or attributes 

that may be found in the Quran, solely apply to God and should 

not be applied to others).44 Tawhid is so central to the followers of 

`Abd al-Wahhab that they called themselves muwahhidun, those who 

support monotheism. Ibn `Abd al-Wahhab’s extremism was due to 

his followers’ enforcement of tawhid al-ibada which they equated with 

attacks on polytheism, or shirk. Ibn `Abd al-Wahhab thought that 

other Muslims who were insufficiently devout, or associated “others 

with God” by virtue of their sect or orientation, were tantamount 

to polytheists, and thus subject to attack by true believers. As other 

Muslims acknowledge tawhid, the concept itself does not distinguish 

Wahhabism, rather it was ibn `Abd al-Wahhab’s idea that he could 

deny the Muslim identities of others and pronounce them unbelievers, 

if, after God’s proof was communicated to them, the other persisted 

in alternate forms of worship, or failed to uphold Islamic duties. This 

labeling is the takfiri project, and its presence or absence is a way of 

determining the “extremism” of any given Islamist group.

 A recent article in a prestigious academic journal, highlighting 

Saudi ambiguity to its “Islamic threat,” focused on tawhid, seeing 

in it an embodiment of Prince Nayif, the Interior Minister, further 

described as a dark force, supporting the clerics and even al-Qa’ida, 

while Crown Prince `Abdullah is supposedly the supporter of 

taqarrub (accomodation), the foil to tawhid.

45 Yet, Wahhabism has, 

in a sense, globalized other Muslims, so they can hardly perceive 

tawhid as being deviant.

 Wahhabism served to support Sa`udi political rule, for `Abd alWahhab and his heirs, the Shaykh family, demanded obedience to 

the ruling Saudi family from the people.46 This produced a quiescence 

that differs from the oppositionism called for by Ibn Taymiyya, an 

intellectual inspiration of `Abd al-Wahhab and the 20th century 

Islamists like Sayyid Qutb and Usama bin Ladin. They, in contrast, 

advised believers to counter and label impious rulers infidels. Bin 

Ladin’s attacks on the piety of the Saudi family aim to delegitimize 

the rulers (takfir in Arabic, meaning to call someone a kaffir, or 

unbeliever).
18

 The second type of critique grossly oversimplifies the alliance 

between the Saudi family and the Wahhabis, without fully accounting 

for public sensibilities.47 A historical view of Wahhabism shows that 

its purist impulse and the exhortation to jihad have created problems 

for Saudi rulers for some time. Ibn Saud faced challenges first from 

the Ottoman forces, and later from the Hashemites, who remained 

staunch enemies as he had divested them of the Hijaz (the Western 

province of Saudi Arabia where the cities of Mecca and Medina are 

located). He drew on militant Wahhabism at times, but in 1927, the 

Ikhwan (Brotherhood, as the Wahhabi warriors are known) tried to 

force him into a more severe conflict with the Hashemites. Ibn Saud 

who had already weathered trouble with the Ikhwan, employed his 

political wiles until they overstepped their bounds. Then, in 1929 

he utilized other tribal forces to defeat them and destroyed certain 

Ikhwan colonies, but did not ban the Wahhabis; they helped him to 

win a war with Yemen in 1934.48 The principle of tribal/dynastic 

leadership was useful then and later in containing the zeal for jihad, 

but that does not translate into a recommendation that the royal 

family should or could separate itself from the Wahhabi creed 

particular to much of the Saudi citizenry.

Wahhabism Is Not the Source of Radicalism.

 Conversely, one may argue that Wahhabism is central to Saudi 

Arabia, a part of its founding political bargain. Wahhabism usefully 

served as a philosophy and mobilizing means for the alliance of the 

House of Sa`ud and the House of Shaykh (the Wahhabi family) to 

define a state.49 It was moderated, moving from its earlier extremism 

and ideological rigor to a more adaptable stage in which the 

Council of Senior `Ulama could issue a fatwa legalizing Saudi rulers’ 

invitation to non-Muslim soldiers to defend the Kingdom, lest it be 

captured like Kuwait.50 However, a newer and more ardently salafi

movement now exists and has overtly challenged the government. 

The main objections to this movement arise from its oppositionist, 

anti-Western, and uncompromising character. In contrast to the idea 

that if one might rid the Muslim world of Wahhabist tendencies, 

all would be well, this strategy is that one should encourage the 
19

Saudis to continue modernizing under the umbrella of Wahhabism, 

but eradicate, defuse, or co-opt the new radicalism in the Kingdom 

and, by extension, the Muslim world. There is a problem with this 

second approach in that more liberal reformers assert Wahhabism’s 

potential for revision. But many in the clerical establishment and 

outside of it do not agree, rather they identify with the salafists’ 

notion of the purification of Islam through ending corruption and 

serving society. These ideas are Wahhabist, after all. That strand is 

willing to overlook a certain amount of corruption by the rulers, so 

long as Wahhabist doctrine remains intact. If, however, there is to 

be true reform, it must differentiate the offensive jihad promoted 

by a Qutbist/Wahhabist bin Ladin in his quest to expand Islamic 

territory (dar al-Islam as opposed to dar al-harb, or the lands of the 

nonbelievers) from the defensive jihad intended by Wahhabism’s 

founder, according to Delong-Bas.50 In fact, it is difficult to agree 

with Delong-Bas in this regard, for jihad, as it has been taught in 

Saudi Arabia, is a true obstacle to the reformation of Wahhabism.52

 Saudis explained away the new salafis and their movements as 

fads or imports. They reluctantly admitted that they were homegrown, though influenced by regional phenomena of radical 

Islam. Prince Nayif ibn `Abd al-`Aziz, Minister of the Interior, was 

criticized in the wake of 9/11 for his attribution of militance to the 

influence of the Egyptian Ikhwan, and for comments he made about 

Zionist linkage to the attacks. The comments communicate the 

Prince’s understandable desire to view extremism as an “import.” 

Other leaders of Muslim states have taken very similar positions 

in the past, in Tunisia and Egypt, until so much was known about 

the indigenous nature of movements like the Gama`at al-Islamiyya or 

the Jihad that this form of rationalization alternated with claims that 

activists were simply lunatics or criminals. Official concerns with 

the regional environment are not entirely specious, as the Islamic 

Revolution in Iran inspired what it could not export, and since the 

jihad phenomenon in Afghanistan, Bosnia, and Chechnya have 

blurred national and even doctrinal distinctions.

 In June 2004, Prince Bandar, the Saudi Ambassador to the United 

States, issued a strong and introspective declaration of war on salafist 

extremism. He categorizes the extremists as criminals, but also as 
20

“seceders,” like the Kharijites, a group who withdrew from the 

majority Muslim community to pursue their own purist doctrines, 

and “renegades.” (This designation carries an irony to those in the 

know, for the Ottomans called the Wahhabis “Kharijites” in the 18th 

and 19th centuries.53) By locating the fundamentalist phenomenon in 

Muslim history, Prince Bandar warns his listeners not to blame their 

emergence on the government’s ties with the United States, Christians, 

or Jews, or on the Palestinian situation, Iraq, or Chechnya.54

Prologue to the Salafis.

 In the 1970s and 1980s, other sources of opposition could be 

found in Saudi Arabia. The main sources of dissension stemmed 

from disputes with neighboring Arabian Peninsular states. These 

disputes were more than purely territorial, thanks to the swelling 

of Arab nationalism in combination with radical local nationalisms 

and communist movements like the Bahrain National Liberal Front, 

the Communist Party of Saudi Arabia, and the Popular Democratic 

Union in Yemen. Other groups that derived from the Arab 

Nationalist Movement (Nasserists) were somewhat more popular, 

influenced intellectuals, and aggrandized the Third Worldist 

discourse of revolution, setting a model for guerrilla actions. These 

groups managed to fuel the generalized public feeling that Saudi 

Arabia had a responsibility for the Arab world and its unity, and to 

Palestine, above and beyond its historic Islamic duty of protector of 

the Holy Cities and hosts of the hajj. Like the Ba`thists of Syria and 

Iraq, these movements were anti-Western in orientation, equating 

the West with neo-imperialism.

 Today’s Islamic threat is quite distinct from this earlier legacy, 

though the anti-Westernism, calls for political reform, end to 

corruption, and rule on behalf of the people owe something to it. 

Saudis and other Muslims refer to an Islamic Awakening (sahwa 

Islamiyya) that took place in Saudi Arabia, and which, in other usage, 

has mushroomed in many locations of the Muslim world. In the Arab 

world, the Awakening developed in the 1970s and 1980s following 

the defeat of secular Arab nationalism after the 1967 war and in 

response to repressive regimes. The Islamic Revolution in Iran was 
21

a catalyst of sorts. A large number of those involved were aware of, 

or inspired by, the Awakening, disapproved of the excesses carried 

out in Islam’s name in Iran, but applauded the rise or renewal of 

political Islam, or simply an enlargement of the role of religion in 

modern life.

 The question arises: Why was the Islamic Awakening appealing 

in a country where Islam and state were already linked and where 

the shari`a (Islamic law) is the law of the land? Some trace this 

popularity to the politically oppositionist Muslim Brethren who, 

exiled from Egypt, brought certain trends of thought to the Gulf.55

These were the radical ideas of rejecting any state authority in favor 

of God’s (hakmiyya), and the notion that one should counter and 

punish inauthentic and un-Islamic Muslims, even rulers (takfir). 

Although it is probably wrong to establish a direct link between the 

Saudi salafis and the Egyptian Ikhwan, the sense that Islamism should 

be fostered regionally and the Egyptian Ikhwan’s emphasis on social 

justice may have indirectly impacted them. Secondly, Saudi Islamists 

began to critique an “establishment” `ulama, or religious scholars 

whose interests were supported by the state, or were apolitical, and 

later on, in their view, manipulated by the regime to legitimize its 

actions, as in the Gulf War I fatwa described above. The emergence of 

religious counter-elite should be traced, then, to internal and external 

influences.

Juhayman al-`Utaybi’s Uprising 

and Riots in the Eastern Province.

 On November 29, 1979, a charismatic leader with long hair 

and grandson of an Ikhwan warrior, Juhayman al-`Utaybi, along 

with his brother-in-law, Muhammad ibn Abdullah al-Qahtani,56

and hundreds of followers took over the Grand Mosque in Mecca. 

They had emerged from a movement called al-Jam`a al-Salafiyya alMuhtasiba, which rejects the legal schools of Islam and argues for 

literal readings of religious texts. After the gates of the mosque were 

closed, trapping the worshippers, al-`Utaybi delivered a speech 

calling for a true Islamic ruler in place of the monarchy and severing 

ties with unbelievers. His fighters held 130 hostages and remained for 
22

3 weeks, fiercely fighting the 10,000 security forces, Pakistani troops, 

and the French Intervention Group of the National Gendarmes that 

finally removed them.57 Once defeated, they were swiftly executed 

(67 were beheaded) or thrown in prison.58 The uprising shocked the 

Kingdom, and the government responded to the Islamic dimension 

of the challenge, at least in part, by bolstering the religious authorities 

and increasing the funding for religious endeavors. Some Saudis 

complain that it was in the 1980s that increasingly strict measures 

were implemented.

 In the same year, another unprecedented uprising took place when 

the Shi`a of the Eastern province, who complained of discrimination 

and other oppressive practices, insisted on celebrating `Ashura, 

the Shi`i holiday of mourning that had been banned by the Saudi 

government. The regime responded violently, and the National 

Guard put down the resultant riots or “revolt.” Saudi authorities 

pointed fingers at Iran, and Shi`i activists fled the country, some 

returning only recently to play a role in the reinvigorated discussions 

about reform over the previous year.

From Local to Regional and International Salafism and al-Qa’ida.

 Usama bin Ladin is emblematic of the cross-currents of salafist 

politics that emerged in years 1979 and 1980. Just prior, the Camp 

David treaties had horrified many Islamists and Arab supporters of 

Palestine who saw these as an Egyptian abandonment of the cause. 

In 1979 bin Ladin first went to Pakistan and took on the cause of 

liberating Afghanistan from pro-Soviet forces, a quest that many 

in the Arab world supported. Indeed, Saudi support of the Islamic 

cause in Afghanistan continued until 1990, and that cessation angered 

Usama bin Ladin, who had spent a decade on that crusade.

 During that decade, bin Ladin recruited from other strands 

of jihadist movements, joined forces with Abdullah `Azzam, a 

Palestinian who ran the office for aid to the mujahidin in Peshawar, 

Pakistan, and who had taught bin Ladin and served as something of 

a mentor. Al-Qa’ida finally emerged with its world mission just prior 

to bin Ladin’s disenchantment with the Saudis. He went into exile in 

the Sudan where the Bashir/Turaybi Islamist regime sheltered him, 

as the Saudis stripped him of his citizenship.
23

 Bin Ladin bears some resemblance to `Utaybi, in that both call for 

a purified ummah. `Utaybi nonetheless, represented frustrated ultraWahhabism as compared to Bin Ladin’s radicalism that bears more 

semblance to the former Egyptian General Guide of the Muslim 

Brotherhood, Sayyid Qutb. Bin Ladin criticized Ibn Baz’ fatwa that 

licensed Arab-Israeli peace talks by attacking the Muslims who were 

party to the talks (neither true Muslims, nor legitimately Islamic 

leaders) and Bin Baz himself.59

 Two points worth remembering are 1) that bin Ladin’s primary 

goals are worldwide jihad against the West and Muslim “pretenders,” 

and his greatest complaints about the Saudi regime are that it is 

corrupt, anti-Islamic, and supports non-Muslim, or non-Islamist, 

causes (the Maronites of Lebanon, the Christians of Sudan, Arafat, 

etc.) “Your kingdom is nothing but an American protectorate, and 

you are under Washington’s heel,” he railed in a 1995 letter to King 

Fahd;60 and 2) the Saudi regime was well aware of bin Ladin, but 

could do little to control his activities outside of their country, though 

they stripped him of Saudi citizenship. Few other Afghan Arabs 

came under such scrutiny, and those who went on to seek jihadist 

experience in Bosnia or Chechnya, or who recruited in the strong 

Islamist bases in Europe, were even further outside the sphere of 

Saudi control.

 The generalized public support for those who would defend 

Muslims who faced genocide or repression was certainly not limited 

to bin Ladin or other jihadists in pursuit of just causes. It must also be 

mentioned that the Saudi public supported Palestinian resistance to 

Israel and also that waged by Hizbullah in Lebanon. The argument 

was made that Israel had unfairly and unjustly imposed collective 

punishments, tortured prisoners, and was clearly inhibiting 

Palestinian aims to sovereignty. Calls increased for Palestinian selfrepresentation within the limitations of the Authority in the post-Oslo 

period. Saudis, like others in the region, therefore did not believe 

that by supporting Palestinians, whether in Hamas or through other 

organizations, they were supporting terrorism. Approval of an 

Islamically-defined resistance was stronger in Saudi Arabia than in 

some other quarters of the Middle East. Usama bin Ladin, whose 

mission is essentially political, nonetheless casts his support of 

Palestine in the terms of a religious cause and a matter of ethics.
24

Gulf War I Sparks Calls for Reform and Islamist Activism.

 Many thousands of Saudis volunteered to join the Saudi military 

before January 1991, including, for the first time, Shi`a volunteers. 

The Saudis permitted complete foreign supervision and control 

over their troops. Paradoxically, the 1991 Gulf War actually 

encouraged Islamists in Saudi Arabia and throughout the region.61

Relatively quiescent moderates became activists as huge protests 

against participation in the Coalition were mounted in a number 

of Middle Eastern and North African states. While demonstrations 

are commonplace in the United States, they are illegal in countries 

like Egypt where emergency laws are employed, prohibiting such 

assemblies. Egyptian and other North African populations were 

galvanized in anticipation of a U.S. military presence on both antiimperialist and Islamic grounds. What was really being protested 

was the closed nature of their own political systems above and 

beyond their alliances with the West.

 The U.S. presence in Saudi Arabia during the Gulf War provided 

ammunition to various forces opposed to the royal family and also 

to the American presence. The King had to issue an edict reining in 

the religious police (mutawa’in). A group of 45 women who staged 

a driving demonstration were punished, fired from their jobs, and 

the affair generated even more controversy about the possibilities of 

change or the need to reassert custom as it stood. Islamists accused 

them of trying to Americanize the Kingdom, of being “infidels,” 

communists, and whores. The women had pointed out the hypocrisy 

of a rule that permits them to be alone with an unrelated man (their 

driver) and to drive overseas, but not in their own homeland. No 

actual law against women’s driving existed, but Shaykh `Abdul `Aziz 

Ibn al-Baz issued a fatwa in response to this polarizing incident.

 The mutawa’in, the Organization to Prevent Vice and Promote 

Virtue, the modern day equivalent of the medieval muhtasib (a state 

official who could enforce penalties at the level of ta`zir) monitor the 

dress code that requires women to cover completely in public, break 

up any gatherings of women in public, punish men who attempt to 

speak to them, and ascertain the closure of businesses during the 

five daily prayers. They have detained and tortured citizens and 
25

foreigners. They blocked and beat female students fleeing a fire in 

a public school in Mecca, on March 11, 2002, because they were not 

fully veiled, and obstructed the entry of Civil Defense officers into 

the building. Fourteen students were killed.62 Prince Nayif issued 

a directive in 2002 that the mutawa’in should alter their forceful 

approach,63 and an Academy of Islamic Police was established at 

Umm al-Qura University, but Saudis continue to complain about the 

mutawa’in who may encourage the extremists’ views. A legal scholar 

suggested that the Saudi government might revisit the classical 

Islamic texts’ interdiction on spying on and confining citizens and 

regulating crimes outside the shari`a.

64 Better yet, Saudi citizens’ 

rights should be protected within a Bill of Rights.

The Awakening Preachers.

 During the first Gulf War, the so-called Awakening preachers, 

Salman al-Awda and Safar al-Hawali, strongly criticized the 

regime for its alliance with the West and circulated taped sermons 

throughout the country. This method of communication, difficult 

to control, had also bolstered the reputation of Khomeini prior to 

the Islamic Revolution, and various popular Muslim preachers 

in neighboring countries. Shaykh Al-Hawali has a background in 

Islamic scholarship and argues, as had bin Ladin, against Western 

influence and modernization. Unlike bin Ladin, he did not personalize 

his attack against specific members of the royal family, or question 

its authority. Al-Hawali decried America’s pursuit of its interests, 

including access to oil in the region, to be achieved through alliances 

with moderate, secularist Arab regimes as well as with Israel. He also 

focused on American Christian fundamentalist televangelists like 

Jerry Falwell and Pat Robertson who, to al-Hawali’s mind, support 

Zionism through their anti-Arab/anti-Muslim statements.65

 Shaykh al-Awda comes from a village not far from the city of 

Burayda, once a hotbed of Ikhwan activity. Farmers there protested the 

late delivery of subsidies. He preached and wrote about some of the 

socioeconomic ills of the country and the need to rebuild the alliance 

between Islamic society and state, and he decries normalization with 

Israel.66 Others like `A’idh al-Qarni had actually emerged earlier, in 
26

the late 1980s. He, along with Sa`id al-Ghamidi, attacked liberals and 

liberal ideas in Saudi Arabia. The governor of Asir province accused 

al-Qarni of sodomy and child molestation and imprisoned him. He 

was found innocent in court and then toured the country, lecturing—

a fairly unusual activity in Saudi Arabia.

 The Awakening preachers differed from the more senior 

and established `ulama because they criticized the regime. They 

characterized their own royal leaders as being submissive to the 

West. That elided both with extremist discourse and the general 

sense of malaise and anger of the young and disenfranchised Saudis. 

The Saudi government tried various measures to control and combat 

the Awakening preachers, eventually imprisoning them. They also 

encouraged a countermovement under Shaykh Rabi` al-Madkhali, 

who refuted the awakening preachers, but like them utilized cassette 

tapes and websites as well as formal conferences to spread their 

Wahhabi and politically conservative views.

Public Complaints.

 Intellectuals and university students were attracted by the 

Awakening, and some professors organized discussion groups. In 

March 1991, several of these figures wrote the Letter of Demands 

which was signed by more than 400 religious figures and preachers, 

including those inside of the establishment `ulama, and sent it to 

King Fahd. This Letter followed on the heels of a so-called “secular” 

petition (though it contained signatures of religious personages as 

well and argued for closer observance of Islamic mores) to King 

Fahd, written in December 1990, which proposed the establishment 

of a consultative assembly; the revival of municipal councils; 

independence of, and equality in, the judiciary; equality of the 

citizenry; more freedom of the media; reformation of the principle of 

hisba (commanding the good and forbidding the evil); encouraging 

women’s participation in society; and reform of the educational 

system.67 Next, a group of emboldened clerics in 1992 produced a 

document called the Memorandum of Advice that called for stricter 

observance of the shari`ah (Islamic law) in all areas of national life, an 

end to corruption, and cessation of relations with Western and nonMuslim entities.
27

 The government asked the most senior clerics to condemn the 

Memorandum, and, the highly-respected Shaykh ibn al-Baz did so. 

Seven among this highest-ranking clerical association procrastinated, 

not signing onto the regime’s denunciation of clerical activism. King 

Fahd dismissed these seven and then attacked preachers of radical 

discourse and other regional Islamist influences. It seemed however, 

that the genie of dissent had escaped from the magic lamp. The clerics 

had attempted, in a manner consistent with their social role, to consult 

with and advise their ruler and to substantiate their arguments with 

religious scripture; secularists and Islamists were attempting to 

exercise the same function. What was new and nearly intolerable to 

the government was the public nature of this criticism.

Committee for the Defense of Legitimate Rights (CDLR) 

and the Movement for Islamic Reform (MIRA).

 In May 1993, a new organization launched itself by issuing a 

communiqué by a group of young Islamist professionals who, along 

with others, obtained the signatures of very prominent Saudis on this 

first message. In addition, a cassette tape referred to as “Supergun” 

was circulated to explain the demands of the petitioners to the 

public. The CDLR broadcast its formation on the radio, and cast 

itself as both a human rights organization and channel for popular, 

legitimate opposition. The Council of the Higher `Ulama denounced 

the group, and the government cracked down on the new Islamist 

trend, arresting various leaders, and CDLR’s leaders fled to London, 

where Muhammad al-Mas`ari emerged as chief spokesperson. 

The group cleverly utilized faxes, e-mail, and websites to criticize 

the Saudi government and what it deems the establishment clerics 

(`ulama al-sulta). Mas`ari was nearly deported from England but 

managed to remain there through an appeal process.

 The MIRA was created in 1996 when its leader, Sa`d al-Faqih, split 

with Mas`ari of the CDLR. One reason for the split concerned Mas`ari’s 

support for two other Islamist groups: the Hizb al-Tahrir (literally, 

Liberation Party), an older Islamist organization responsible for the 

establishment of many worldwide jihadist offshoots that disavows 

the validity of any current Muslim government, even the two Islamist 
28

states of Iran and the Sudan, because they hold that Muslims must 

be governed by a Caliph. His second association was with a group 

called the Muhajjirun. Mas`ari developed money troubles as a result 

of suspicions about these associations and declared bankruptcy in 

1997.68 Al-Faqih is also an Islamist admirer of Sayyid Qutb’s jihadist 

doctrine. He remains in London and distinguishes his opposition 

to the royal family from al-Qa’ida’s aims. His web-based activism 

targets the Saudi Arabian government for human rights abuses and 

probably exaggerates the degree of opposition.

Violence in the 1990s.

 Violence broke out in 1995 when a car bomb attack in Riyadh at 

a facility that housed the U.S. Army Materiel Command’s Office of 

the Program Manager for the Saudi Arabian National Guard led to 

fatalities and many injuries. Three of those executed for the crime 

were “Afghan” or “Bosnian” Arabs, part of the global jihad, and 

the fourth was also an Islamist. None of the men were members of 

the three groups that actually claimed responsibility: the Movement 

for Islamic Change in the Arabian Peninsula, the Tigers of the Gulf, 

and the Combatant Partisans of God (who demanded the release 

of Shaykh `Umar `Abd al-Rahman and Musa Abu Marzuq from 

American custody). There were suspicions that another individual, 

Hassan al-Suraihi, might have been involved.69 This earlier incident 

is referred to in 2004 Islamist statements as “the first attack against 

the barracks of the Crusaders,” or Riyadh/East.70

 Then in 1996, the U.S. barracks in Khobar exploded in a truck 

bombing. The huge bomb killed 19 Americans and injured 373. 

Experts were divided on whether this was an al-Qa’ida related attack, 

or more probably a group or splinter of Hizballah of Saudi Arabia, 

a Shi`i organization. Warnings of an attack had been issued. The 

result of the Khobar incident was that the United States relocated its 

Air Force personnel to an isolated air base at Al-Kharj, more secure 

than the Khobar site. Other results were Saudi crackdowns on Shi`i 

figures, suspicions of Iranian involvement, and a U.S.-Saudi failure 

to coordinate or cooperate successfully in the investigation of the 

incident.71
29

 The information that eventually emerged about Saudi Hizbullah, 

thought to be a small group of fewer than 1000 members, was 

illustrative of Middle Eastern governments’ difficulties in controlling 

jihadist organizations. This organization was essentially independent 

of its Lebanese namesake, although the U.S. indictment of the group 

issued on June 21, 2001,72 mentions that an unidentified member 

of the Lebanese Hizbullah allegedly assisted the Saudi group to 

construct their large bomb. The U.S. indictment detailed meetings 

and recruitments of certain members at the Sayyida Zaynab shrine 

in Damascus, a site that attracts a large amount of Iranian pilgrim 

traffic. Damascus is also a frequent destination for Saudi tourists and 

home to a Hizbullah office, and not far from the Lebanese border 

via the Maysalun road. The U.S. view of the group implied rather 

more dependence on Iran and Lebanese Hizbullah than the Saudis 

initially accepted, as the Saudi Hizbullah had defined its goals as 

being in Saudi territory.

 Four interesting aspects of this event have a bearing on the current 

Islamist threat in the region, and not only in Saudi Arabia. First, the 

Islamists’ ability to recruit via religious travel and at religious sites 

is an extraordinarily difficult capacity to contain. Second, it is clear 

that Saudi-Syrian, Syrian-Iranian, and Saudi-Iranian relations and 

ideas of mutual interest are quite distinct from those of the United 

States with each of these three countries. Third, one must avoid overor underemphasizing connections between Islamist organizations. 

Saudi officials cancelled a trip to Lebanon after it became publicly 

known that a Saudi Hizbullah leader, Husayn Mubarak, was, in fact, 

able to receive colleagues in the Biqa` Valley in eastern Lebanon 

and that these colleagues had fled from Saudi Arabia through Iran. 

American leaders have, on the other hand, overestimated the degree 

of Iranian control over Lebanese and Saudi Hizbullah. Fourth, the 

Khobar incident triggered anti-Shi`a actions and so both militant 

and quietist responses from the Saudi Shi`a.

Regrouping and the Shock of September 11, 2001.

 Many of the Awakening preachers were released from prison 

in the late 1990s, when the Saudi regime finally permitted limited 

use of the Internet, and calls for political reform reemerged. Some 
30

leaders like Mishari al-Zaydi and Mansur al-Nuqaydan recanted 

their previous ideas and called for a new revision of scriptural 

interpretation. Other Awakening leaders were less critical of the 

Saudi state, which in turn sought their input, as if to legitimize 

the regimes’ Islamic credentials after two of the best known proestablishment clerics had died (one being the above-mentioned Ibn 

al-Baz). Different names for these neo-liberals are Islamist-liberals or 

new Islamists; they also include certain Shi`i leaders and are apt to 

call themselves islahiyyun (reformers).

 Of these, `Abd al-`Aziz al-Qasim is notable in promoting an 

adapted democratic system, and in fostering a free and active civil 

society. Unlike secularist or earlier liberals, he promotes jihad, and 

unlike Islamists, supports Saudi nationalism. He says that Islamistliberals must better communicate with liberals, but he does not 

support Saudi women’s rights activists.73 Other leaders of this trend, 

like Abdullah al-Hamid, who calls for an innovative instead of a 

conservative salafism; Hasan al-Maliki, who has attacked the Saudi 

curricula and version of Islamic history; Mansur al-Naqaydan, who 

wants to see an enlightened form of Islamic law; and Muhammad 

Sa`id Tayyib, who holds a political salon and calls for an “open door” 

policy by political leaders, differ from each other but share goals 

to re-read or revise religious ideas, retain Islamic law, and create 

bonds with other Islamists. Likewise, Shi`a leaders like Shaykh Zaki 

al-Milad, Muhammad Mahfuz, and Ja`far al-Shayib seek to redefine 

rather than to reject Islamism, and to be seen as Saudis first.74

 Outside the Middle East, some experts have called for a single 

figure like Martin Luther who would lead Islamic reform. They seem 

unaware that Islam has experienced reform movements in the past, 

with a reaction to these in the form of Rashid Rida’s (a Syrian thinker) 

salafism earlier in the 20th century. In the Saudi context, it is probably 

more reasonable for reform to emerge in this piecemeal and eclectic 

manner, and outsiders would do well to remember that those here 

described as Saudi liberals hold views more familiar to them than 

Islamist-liberals or neo-salafis.

 Other new salafists came to the fore—these being Nasir al-Fahd, 

Hamud al-Shu`aybi and `Ali al-Khudayr, who had a following 

in the Wahhabist stronghold of Burayda. These leaders strongly 

disapproved of Saudi liberals who hoped to modernize the Kingdom 
31

and reform it along the lines of other Arab “democrats.” Admirers 

of these salafists included local followers and jihadists with global 

ties, QAP, and other smaller groups that share bin Ladin’s goals 

of worldwide jihad. As Sa`d al-Faqih has pointed out, observers 

sometimes mistake QAP or bin Ladin’s aims as the destruction of the 

royal family. Members of the royal family have not been the primary 

target of bin Ladin, but al-Faqih suggests that this has frustrated 

some of the jihadists.75

 The non-Islamist or liberal stream (al-tayyar al-librali, the Liberal 

Trend) also merits attention as the counterweight to Islamists. Earlier 

liberals were pan-Arabists, whereas the new generation are attentive 

to the Saudi demand for Islamic authenticity and are not merely 

“secularists,” as their Islamist opponents call them. Those outspoken 

in exchanges with the regime are highly educated academics and 

professionals, and not clerics. They were poorly organized, but had 

begun publishing the al-Watan newspaper and had their own website 

prior to 9/11.76

 All three groups appeared to gain energy after 9/11, although for 

very different reasons. Many Saudis were shocked by the attacks on 

the World Trade Center and the resulting charges of responsibility that 

the country was guilty of harboring terrorists and for an environment 

featuring disdain for the rule of law and the emergence of takfiri 

discourse. If Saudis are arguably even more conservative than their 

government, a reformation of key religious ideas is much more palatable 

than wholesale dismissal or challenging of these notions.

 The more violent and oppositionist strain of salafists also gained 

strength as some unknown number of fighters returned from 

Afghanistan to Saudi Arabia. Regional factors like the escalation 

of violent Israeli responses to Palestinian attacks and the growing 

awareness that the United States would likely attack Iraq sharpened 

anti-Westernism. According to the Gallup poll conducted in February 

2002 and a Zogby poll issued in March 2002, anti-American attitudes 

and disapproval of the United States were high among Saudis who 

characterized the country as being “pretentious,” “brutal,” and 

“arrogant,” although its technology, media, and educational system 

obtained higher ratings.77 Also, once the Saudi officials began to mount 

a variety of counterterrorist actions, militants like the QAP saw a need 
32

to demonstrate their resilience. This may explain the wave of violence 

since May 2003. Among these measures were those designed to control 

the financial support of extremist activities and money laundering 

stemming from the lack of control or accounting over charitable monies, 

donations, and the foundations that funneled money. The assets of the 

Haramain Islamic Foundation were frozen, and the Foundation was 

scheduled to be closed prior to Ramadan of 2004.

 The giving of zakat or charity, one of five major duties for Muslims, 

is simultaneously private and voluntary, and religiously incumbent. As 

supporters of the Saudi government’s efforts have stated, controlling 

this outflow is no easy matter when in every mosque there has been 

an unguarded box for donations.78 With the embarrassing evidence 

from recanting Islamists that these funds had been used by extremists 

along with meal coupons for Ramadan, donations henceforth will be 

collected in specified bank accounts.

Limited Reform and the 2003-04 Violence.

 Introspection arising from the 9/11 events and existing critiques 

of corruption and bifurcated lifestyles—the privileged royals as 

compared to the Saudi poor—and the concerns over unemployment 

and anticipated future declines in oil prices, and changes made to 

the governing system in the 1990s, along with Islamist challenges, 

combined to produce a veritable Saudi obsession with reform in 2003. 

Liberal reformers sent their “Strategic Vision for the Present and 

the Future” to Crown Prince `Abdullah in January 2003, a detailed 

proposal that calls for the building of constitutional institutions 

under the framework of the existing monarchy: separation of powers, 

an elected representative consultative council, independence for the 

judiciary, human rights, and permission to form associations, as well 

as an agenda for economic reforms.

 In April 2003, a group of Saudi Shi`a also presented a petition 

to Crown Prince Abdullah that stressed tolerance, an end to 

discrimination, the need for human rights and freedom, and 

equality of the citizenry.79 All of this seemed hopeful, but in the 

wake of the May 2003 attacks, the liberals attacked Wahhabi ideas 

that fund salafism in a public fashion via al-Watan. The government 
33

then fired Jamal Khashoggi, editor-in-chief of al-Watan,

80 whether 

fearing backlash from the Islamists, or in direct response to `ulama 

demands,81 illustrating the travails of political opening and freedom 

of expression. Khashoggi continued to write in the Arab press, and 

now works for Amir Turki ibn Faysal, the former head of Royal 

Intelligence and Ambassador to the United Kingdom.

 However, 13 pro-reform activists, who called for a transition 

from absolute to constitutional monarchy and for a governmentally 

provided timetable for changes to be implemented, were arrested 

in March 2004. Seven were released, and more than 130 petitioned 

to release the remaining detainees, but talks between activists and 

Prince Nayif were unproductive.82

 Despite the situation, many Saudis agree on at least one idea, 

greater financial transparency, meaning more accurate reporting of 

state budgets and an end to financial corruption.83 Several members 

of the Islamist reform front deny any need for social reform, which 

has been a problematic issue for the government as well. Official 

objections to women’s voting in the municipal elections cited the 

lack of sufficiently qualified women to manage female-only polling 

places, and that few Saudi women have the photo identification 

necessary for voting. Saudi women activists retorted that if Afghans 

could manage such problems, Saudis could as well, once the general 

reluctance to make changes was addressed.

 In January 2004, Lubna al-Olayan, a leading Saudi businesswoman, 

addressed an economic forum without being completely covered by 

the abaya, or a headscarf. Saudi newspapers published pictures of her 

and other “unveiled” women. Shaykh `Abd al-`Aziz al-Shaykh, the 

grand mufti, denounced the women’s behavior and the publication 

of photographs.84

 Women, a natural constituency for democratizing reform, are also 

salient to unemployment and Saudization. A Saudi Management 

Association survey of 2,550 women designated acceptable spheres 

of female activity in the family, in the religious sphere, education, 

management and social services, but recognized that women could 

perform many other types of employment. Women may study 

medical science, dentistry, medical technology, science, home 

economics, administration, economics, humanities, and the arts, but 
34

this will not translate into large numbers of jobs until many practices 

are amended. Prince al-Walid ibn Talal, who possesses his own fleet 

of aircraft, recently hired a woman pilot, Hanadi Zakariya Hindi,85 a 

first for the Kingdom, although efforts to hire female flight attendants 

were stymied.86 Lubna al-Olayan, mentioned above, was the first 

woman to be elected to the board of a major Saudi bank.87 One of 

the women of the driving demonstration actually participated in the 

Third National Dialogue, whose subject was women, held in June 

2004. Two women have been appointed members of the 120-seat 

Majlis al-Shura, and Amira al-Jawhara Fahd ibn Muhammad ibn 

Abd al-Rahman al-Saud was appointed assistant Undersecretary for 

Education Affairs in 2000, another important first. Women’s desks 

are being established in all ministries; Foreign Minister Prince Saud 

al-Faysal announced that women will be hired in his ministry for the 

first time, and Saudi businesswomen are optimistic as well. Though 

resistance to change persists, personal observation in the Kingdom 

reveals that women are far more active than the Western or Saudi 

press might lead one to believe.

 Women also played a role in the spread of salafi views. Some 

attribute this to instructors in the women’s colleges. Though purges 

took place, the women previously affected are now raising families, 

and their influence cannot be easily contained in that private 

sphere.

 Other areas questioned by reformers face problems or challenges 

depending on one’s perspective. The first nongovernmental human 

rights organization, the National Organization for Human Rights 

(NOHR), was officially approved on March 9, 2004. It was mocked 

for declaring that certain hudud punishments like amputations 

and flogging are not torture—a position that the United Nations 

Organisation Contre La Torture and other human rights groups 

disagree with. Torture and enforced elicitation of confessions also 

have a direct bearing on the security situation and progress toward 

reforms. Research on legal practice has shown that past judicial 

tendencies (mostly outside of Saudi Arabia) were to soften extremely 

strict legal interpretations by recourse to the concept of doubt 

(shubha). Unfortunately, the practices of regimes like the Taliban, the 

Islamic Republic of Iran, and Saudi Arabia have eroded elements 

of moderation. Weekly public beheadings, stonings, or amputations 
35

are shocking to the outside world, and have influenced Muslim 

extremists who beheaded hostages in the Kingdom, and also in Iraq, 

although Saudi and other religious officials have denounced these 

incidents.88 Enforced confessions obtained through duress or torture 

are a violation of Islamic evidentiary rules; while the application of 

beheadings to women violates tradition. Shari`a punishments are 

applied to non-Muslims and non-Saudis who reside or work in the 

Kingdom. An Egyptian national’s eye was surgically removed as a 

legal punishment in 2000 to uphold the eye-for-an-eye principle in 

a qisas offense89 and Pakistanis, Afghans, and others were beheaded 

along with Saudis last year.90 Former British accusees won an appeal in 

their effort to sue the Saudi government for torturing them in prison, 

after they were pardoned for alleged crimes.91 Beyond criminal law, 

foreign workers make up a huge proportion of the Saudi workforce. 

While some are well-paid, others are indebted to the agencies that 

contract them to the Kingdom where they have no way of combating 

their exploitation with long work hours, slave-like conditions, and 

sometimes assault, rape, incarceration, and sentencing without 

recourse.92

 Exactly how the United States could encourage the NOHR to 

open a genuine discussion of human and legal rights (including 

those of foreign workers), the subject of a recent Human Rights 

Watch inquiry,93 is unclear. Some external entity must do so, if 

freedom is to be forwarded. Influence from and dialogue with other 

Muslim nations that have reformed penal codes would be useful in 

this endeavor.

 With all of this in mind, mild political reforms in 2003, triggered 

by a decade of increasingly public discussion and violence, are 

significant. A bomb exploded in a home in Riyadh on March 18, 

2003. This premature explosion led authorities to the discovery of an 

enormous arms stockpile. Then a gun battle between the police and 

extremists took place in Riyadh on May 6, following a raid. Six days 

later on May 12, 12 suicide bombers attacked residential compounds 

in Riyadh, killing 30 people, wounding 200, and signaling a crisis 

on Saudi soil. Many clashes followed suggesting the presence of 10 

or more QAP cells. These extremists’ refuges were discovered in 

various parts of the country, and the QAP’s leader, Yusuf al-Ayiri, 

was killed. Another suicide attack took place at the al-Muhayya 
36

residential compound on November 8, 2003, but police were able to 

prevent a large-scale attack in Riyadh.

 A group called the Haramayn Brigades surfaced and was thought 

to be a cell of QAP. By March, the police had killed Khalid al-Hajj, 

the subsequent QAP leader. Gunfights, attempted bombings, and 

assassinations continued. Divisions arose in the terrorist groups on 

the issue of whether or not to attack Saudis, Jews, Christians, and 

Americans (i.e., Western foreigners) as `Abd al-`Aziz al-Muqrin, 

a QAP leader, ordered. In May 2004, the Yanbu offices of a Swiss 

company were penetrated by militants who moved freely around 

the installation, killing Westerners. On May 31, gunmen charged 

into an office and then through a housing compound in Khobar, 

killing 22 foreigners. In June, an Irish cameraman for the BBC, Simon 

Cumbers, was killed in Riyadh, and his colleague, correspondent 

Frank Gardner, seriously wounded.

 Lone Westerners were attacked in Riyadh, one in his own house, 

and an American employee of Lockheed Martin, Paul M. Johnson, 

Jr., was beheaded by the self-proclaimed Falluja Brigade, horrifying 

many Saudis. The police reported that they had killed Abd al-Aziz 

al-Muqrin along with three other leading militants on June 19, 2004, 

and then offered an amnesty to militants who would surrender 

within a month. That effort was largely unsuccessful, although 

Safar al-Hawali attempted to broker a deal with the Islamists. Three 

militants surrendered, one on the first (May 2003) list of 18 remained 

at large, or 10 at large on a December list of 26 individuals. Further 

attacks of lone Westerners continued. Saudis could not but note the 

replication of similar attacks in Iraq. Abdelmajid bin Mohammad 

Abdallah al-Manaya, another extremist leader, was killed on October 

11, 2004, and a Saudi policeman was killed in a clash on November 

17, 2004. Official views were cautiously hopeful that the worst of 

the violence might have passed, but in October other reports spoke 

of a renewed campaign and alluded to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s 

declaration of membership in al-Qa’ida. This optimism was dashed 

when extremists attacked the U.S. consulate in Jeddah on December 

6, 2004. 

 Extremists have promulgated their messages via the internet, 

and began publishing a bi-weekly magazine, Sawt al-Jihad (the Voice 

of Jihad), and in late August 2004, al-Khansa, a jihadist magazine for 
37

women on the Web. These have included bloodcurdling defenses 

of the slaying of Paul Johnson and Islamist critiques of U.S. policy. 

They provide a means for salafist extremists to maintain visibility, 

even while suffering losses at the hands of Saudi counterterrorist 

forces. Sawt al-Jihad gave notice that Sa`ud Humud al-`Utaybi was 

a leader in QAP’s struggle. In his youth, Sa`ud had grown his hair 

long like Juhayman al-`Utaybi and called himself Abu Muhammad 

just like that leader of the Mecca uprising. 

 Assessments of the “Falluja Brigade”’s storming of the U.S. 

consulate in Jeddah were mixed. The boldness of the attack was 

surprising, but it also appeared improperly or incompletely planned, 

as the gunmen who entered through a side gate set off an explosion. 

Five non-Western employees of the consulate were killed, but others 

moved into the administrative section of the compound. Three of 

the gunmen were killed by Saudi security officers, and a fourth died 

later.94 The attack shocked many in the Red Sea port who regard 

Jeddah as the most cosmopolitan of Saudi Arabia’s cities due to its 

commercial importance and role in pilgrim traffic to the Holy Cities. 

The vulnerability of the highly protected Consulate and subsequent 

coordinated bombings in December give credence to QAP’s 

assertions that the Islamic threat was not on the wane. However, 

news of attacks was replaced by news about the municipal elections 

in January and February of 2005, and a new anti-terrorism campaign 

directed toward the Saudi public in March 2005.

 How should one measure the progress of the war on terror? 

Saudi officials wisely have decided to forego producing a new list 

of extremists. Too much energy could be devoted to the pursuit of 

just these individuals, when others will no doubt take their places 

and require expenditures of time and investigative energy. Closing 

down Internet traffic and inhibiting new recruitment are far more 

difficult tasks.

 Saudi Arabia took a variety of actions to improve its internal 

security functions and defeat extremists prior to and following May 

2003. These are listed in detail in Saudi sources and by Anthony 

Cordesman, and testify to Saudi efficacy and cooperation with 

international entities.95 Arrests, detentions, and extraditions, the 

establishment of anti-money laundering units, a financial intelligence 

unit, other controls over banks and charitable organizations, and 
38

efforts to control mosque-based and mutawwa`in activities could 

take up pages of this monograph. Cordesman and Obaid note 

the effectiveness of the various security services, as well as some 

problems with detention practices and in the intelligence service 

since Prince Turki al-Faysal resigned and was replaced by Prince 

Nawwaf ibn `Abd al-`Aziz, who then suffered a stroke.96 Certain 

U.S. officials have issued supportive statements concerning Saudi 

efforts, but the Western media covered extremist violence more than 

Saudi efforts to subdue it.

 The current state of the liberal reform movement has been affected 

by the U.S. presence in Iraq, which has aggravated further Saudi 

anti-Americanism. At the same time, talk of reform is everywhere 

in the Arab world today, more pervasively than Americans imagine. 

Instead of out-Islamizing the Islamists, as the Saudi regime did in the 

early 1980s following the `Utaybi uprising, liberals hope that it will 

realize the necessity of reforms to re-legitimize its authority. Some 

Saudi watchers doubt that anything will emerge but a Mubarakstyle short-term victory97 over the Islamist extremists, because the 

Saudi Arabian government cannot afford to dislodge, or remake, its 

conservative Wahhabist base of support.

 Saudis are not agreed on whether external pressure might speed 

the pace of reform. Businessmen, who share the aim of stability and 

limited change with the regime, warned that American pressure 

would actually aid the extremists if reform is perceived as an 

American-driven phenomena.98 Yet, reformers from all over the 

region have reported that external pressures from international 

groups or the West have had an effect in encouraging previously 

intransigent governments to make changes.

Saudiphobic America and Anti-Americanism in Saudi Arabia.

 Family members of those killed in 9/11 filed a $116 trillion lawsuit 

in a U.S. District Court against Osama bin Ladin, al-Qa’ida, the Taliban, 

three Saudi princes, seven banks, eight Islamic foundations, other 

financiers, and the government of the Sudan. Anti-Saudi sentiments 

were also affected by the polarized domestic situation prior to the 

2004 elections, by certain books,99 and by the film, Farenheit 9/11, that 

sought to provide Americans a simple explanation for the events of 

9/11.
39

 Sharp emotions are further inflamed by what seems to Americans 

to be a campaign against them that seeped from Saudi Arabia all 

over the region, and in which Westerners are being kidnapped and 

slaughtered, while even Arab liberals and opponents of Islamism 

revile American foreign policy. The sources of this profound lack 

of understanding are many and go back in time. At present, what 

ties remain are being eroded due to inflamed discourse. Saudis are 

not traveling to the United States for study, business, or medical 

treatment as in the past, if only because new immigration and 

travel procedures100 intended to protect the homeland are greatly 

discouraging, and individuals with no connection to terrorism have 

been stranded, publicly humiliated, or worse; while xenophobia and 

even physical attacks on Arabs and Muslims (or Sikhs mistaken for 

them) in the United States have surged.101

 Lack of contact and access and “text assaults”—partial or 

misreadings of each other’s statements102—will most probably 

worsen the situation. A Gallup poll conducted February 9-12, 2004, 

showed that 28 percent of the Americans polled regarded Saudi 

Arabia favorably, while 66 percent regarded the country unfavorably. 

Americans preferred Saudi Arabia to Iran (77 percent unfavorable), 

the Palestinian Authority (76 percent unfavorable) and North Korea 

(83 percent unfavorable), but less than Egypt (32 percent unfavorable) 

or Israel (35 percent unfavorable).103

 Beyond the effects of events on public opinion, we must be 

concerned with policy recommendations that vilify or destabilize 

the Kingdom. The bottom line is that Saudi Arabia and the United 

States have been allies for more than half a century. Their military 

and economic ties exist in addition to political ones. This admittedly 

ambiguous relationship is well described by Thomas Lippman in his 

chronicle of Americans who lived and worked in the Kingdom, as 

the “ultimate marriage of convenience”104 which, now threatened, 

could result in a lengthy separation, divorce,105 or reorientation. 

Many Saudis want to cooperate with the United States, although 

some fundamental differences—differing orientations toward 

Israel,106 religious institutions, and the pace of political and social 

changes—will not easily be resolved.107

 Anti-Americanism in the Kingdom may stem in part from 

the pressure of American influences; the consequences of Saudi 
40

dependence on American military strength—which to Saudis 

appeared detrimental to Arab and Muslim unity—Saudi frustrations 

with the American reaction to the al-Aqsa intifadha, and erosion 

of peaceful efforts between Palestinians and Israelis,108 as well as 

sympathies or favorable views of Islamism. Those salafists who have 

not accommodated with the Saudi government are unrelentingly 

critical of the United States. The Gulf War of 1991, the U.S. invasion of 

Afghanistan, and the subsequent campaign in Iraq are all considered 

to be acts of a colonialist power determined to impose its will on the 

world. Salafists, including `A’idh al-Qarni, Muhamad al-Fawzan, 

and Safar al-Hawali, produced a document dedicated to creating a 

dialogue, “How We Can Coexist,” that raises many objections to a 

perceived U.S. course of antipathy to, and war on, Muslims rather 

than a war on terror.109 Similarly, salafists have been angered by 

media attacks on Islamic charities and the religious curricula.110

 It is more difficult for Americans to understand that non-salafi 

Saudis, indeed much of the Arab world, would disapprove so 

strongly of American foreign policy, as well. Recently, an open letter 

signed by some of the Islamist figures mentioned in this monograph, 

as well as other academics, called for support for the people of Iraq 

and legitimized resistance to the occupation. The Saudi Ambassador, 

Prince Bandar, distanced the government from the statement.111 The 

letter was then misinterpreted, and the Saudi response ridiculed 

in terrorist-studies media sources.112 These sources appear unable 

to understand the separation of Islamist `ulama from the Saudi 

government. This issue is of concern in Iraq as well, where U.S. 

troops attempted to rein in Shaykh Harith al-Dhari and Shaykh 

Mahdi al-Sumaidi, Sunni clerics who called for a boycott of elections 

and criticized other clerics who had not condemned the campaign to 

retake Falluja.113

 Beyond Iraq, and as Prince Bandar mentioned elsewhere, 

unhappiness with the Israeli-Palestinian situation and America’s role 

in that crisis is not the source of Islamist extremism, but it remains an 

element in extremist anti-American discourse. It is a thorn in the side 

of many Arab liberal reformers because Saudis perceive the situation 

as a contradiction to the U.S. policy of “forwarding freedom” and the 

historic American championing of representation and justice under 
41

the law. Relations with anti-extremist Saudis would be improved if 

the United States were to invigorate the effort to achieve an IsraeliPalestinian-Arab peace. Saudis, like other Arabs were amazed that 

Crown Prince Abdullah’s initiative in Beirut in 2002 on this matter 

was not met with a very public enthusiastic response in the United 

States. The acts of Palestinian terrorists destroyed that opportunity, 

some officials would respond, but if any such opportunities arise 

again, they should not be missed.

The Future of Security in Saudi Arabia—

The Future of Political Reform?

 The future of security in Saudi Arabia will depend strongly 

on actions taken in the next 5 years. The United States, so actively 

engaged in shaping future states in Afghanistan and Iraq, cannot 

afford to retreat entirely from its relationship with Saudi Arabia. 

Neither should it wish to put its ally in an impossible position where 

slurs on local competence or directives for change embolden a regime 

change that could more likely favor radicals and conservatives than 

liberals.

 Still, many U.S. and non-U.S. observers equate the future of 

security and stability in Saudi Arabia with the future of reform. 

Three types of arguments are given: first, that without reforms, 

Saudi Arabia could result in a “failed state” where sanctuary cannot 

be denied to terrorists, and they may freely recruit; second, that 

Saudi Arabia already comprises an environment antithetical to the 

war on terror; or third, that Saudi citizens who have more freedoms 

will better defend their own country against extremism. We might 

add that successful reforms would redeem the United States to some 

degree for the costs of its interventionist, reshaping experiment in the 

region, and salvage the relationship between the Saudi government 

and its more liberal, non-Islamist critics.

 Anthony Cordesman and Nawaf Obaid write, “[T]here is no 

dilemma between improving intelligence and the security services 

and liberalization,” and that progress can be made at the Saudi 

rate and on Saudi terms.114 Here “Saudi” must equate with the 

government, for other Saudis are frustrated by the preferred slow 

pace and reversals. A group of 306 non-Islamist Saudis submitted a 
42

petition, “In Defense of the Nation,” that incorporated some aspects 

of the “Vision” and the Shi`i petition, mentioned above, on September 

24, 2003.115 Petition-signers were not punished by the regime, but the 

regime blocked a website listing the reformers’ agenda. Reformers 

were told that the royals feared a backlash by the Islamists.116

 Saudi riot police employed live ammunition to dispel a proreform march at an October 2003 Saudi Red Crescent Society 

conference on human rights. Even more troubling to reformers and 

ordinary Saudis was a September 2004 statement by the Council 

of Ministers forbidding military personnel and civil servants from 

voicing opposition to governmental policy. 117 Two days later, a 2-

month salary bonus was paid to members of the military and security 

services. A reformer complained that the security personnel were 

being rewarded for their efforts against extremism, yet the Saudi 

people were punished for their enthusiasm for reform.118

What Kind of Democratic Reforms?

 Calls for reform from above are the hallmark of Middle Eastern 

liberals, or “democrats” in a number of countries in the region. 

When we dare to be optimistic, we see these, elite-based, flawed, 

and miniscule in influence, as the best antidote to extremism. The 

encouragement of such groups requires actions by individual states, 

but also something more—something outside the ken of U.S. policy 

proposals and that is a reexamination of a) the `ulama establishment, 

and b) the future role of moderate Islamists.

 Arab intellectuals have been calling for reforms in Islamic thought 

and jurisprudence for more than 120 years.119 These efforts did not 

coincide particularly with the earlier rise of liberals, Arab nationalists 

who hoped for political change to arise from the will of the masses. 

In the Kingdom, today’s pro-reform liberals face a conundrum. 

They must convince rulers not to act against them to prove to the 

conservative and Islamist elements of the `ulama establishment, as 

well as the neo-Islamists, that they can out-Islamize any alternative. 

The liberals have called for rethinking and revisioning rather than 

discarding the status quo. They have embraced, to some degree, the 

spirit of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in the region, which 

also calls for a vibrant civil society and the furthering of reform.
43

 In the West, we find many interpretations of democratization. 

Scholars familiar with the Middle East, like Udo Steinbach, agree 

that a democracy in the Middle East has “no blueprint,” but note 

the weakness of NGOs and their vulnerability to state control 

there.120 Others, angered by the anti-Americanism of NGOs, argue 

that they are a means for the replacement of democracy with a postdemocratic condition, and they will co-opt the U.S.-funded initiative 

of democratization.121 Few understand that democratization may 

require an accommodation with moderate Islamists, and that might 

impede progress of the process just as surely as regime cautiousness 

will. Differently put, pursuit of a liberal constitutional ideal may 

necessitate curtailment of certain popular rights, producing, 

according to Frédérick Volpi, a “pseudo-democracy.”122

What Kind of Security?

 At a minimum, Saudi Arabia needs to reestablish internal security, 

continue to guard its oil fields, and consider its current vulnerability 

to Iran and militants in Iraq. If Iran continues on its current path of 

nuclear development, Saudi Arabia must meet that risk by continuing 

to fund its defense and training program while also hoping that, in a 

crisis, the United States would be willing to restore an equilibrium to 

the situation. The conventional wisdom is that the smaller size of the 

Saudi military prevents it from being used in an internal coup. Some 

have speculated that the Saudis may buy arms from the Russians 

and could invest in the natural gas sector.123 Further, they could and 

might wish to develop a nuclear arsenal because of the worsening 

relationship with the United States, the size of their defense forces, 

and likely future Iranian development of nuclear weapons.124

 Doomsday scenarios to be avoided are:

 • an assassination, or death and subsequent crisis in the royal 

family leading to regime disintegration;

 • a civil war between regime supporters and Islamist extremists, 

and their respective tribal and familial allies;

 • an unmanageable attack on the oil region; or

 • a serious conflict with Saudi Arabia’s neighbors.
44

 The danger of a civil war might arise from a situation in which 

a segment of the Saudi government is radicalized from within. If 

that were the case, then the alliances of security, military, or national 

guard forces might be subverted, unlikely as this is at present. An 

attack on the oil facilities is a serious concern. More than one-half 

of Saudi Arabia’s oil reserves are located in just 8 of about 80 fields, 

including Ghawar, which produces nearly half of the country’s 

total production. Extremists attacked oil installations in 2004, and 

Saudi security has foiled other and earlier attacks. The 2004 attacks 

specifically targeted expatriates, but perhaps attacks will become 

less specific as in Iraq where Iraqi crude exports were affected, and 

pumping was deliberately halted in August 2004.125 Oil loading 

facilities and the two main pipelines, the Petroline and the AbqaiqYanbu natural gas liquids pipeline, as well as tankers, might also be 

targeted. Strategic planners and military games must not predicate 

easy victory; rather, the lessons of the Iraqi insurgency should be 

carefully integrated into scenarios concerning the oil fields, which 

are now protected by forces of over 30,000, and possess sophisticated 

surveillance equipment. Still, the likelihood of infiltration by small 

groups seeking to keep their cause alive or future coordinated 

multiple attacks must be considered. Even the brief attack on the 

U.S. consulate in Jeddah triggered a rise in oil prices, so the economic 

impact of any such scenarios should also be assessed.

 In light of these scenarios, the current goal of restoring security 

is merely a mid-level concern. But with these scenarios in mind, 

political reform appears more risky, though morally and politically 

imperative to the discouragement of Islamist extremism in the long 

run. And if the U.S.-Saudi relationship worsens, these crises might 

present very different outcomes than we now imagine or anticipate. 

Sunni extremists’ abilities to bolster each other in a wide swathe of 

states extending from Saudi Arabia to Jordan to Syria to Iraq, and 

westward to Egypt are exactly what QAP and other groups have 

been trying to demonstrate. Their role in any doomsday scenario is 

worth consideration.
45

The Risks of Security and Democracy.

 The risks of a security policy geared to suppression of the midlevel crisis involve a concomitant suppression of Saudi-led calls for 

liberal reform. That might occur whether we actively aid the Saudis 

in their effort, or stand back and hope that they can manage on their 

own. This type of policy—foreign and security—will not do anything 

for the future of Saudi Arabia 10, 20, or 50 years down the road.

 At present, we should not write off the royal family, as do their 

Islamist opponents, or blame them entirely for the slow progress 

toward reform, but the United States can and should understand that 

improving internal security can well mean threatening civil liberties 

as has been the case in Egypt and Morocco, and that aiding allies 

to increase justice and political participation while also efficaciously 

zeroing in on extremists are aims fraught with cross-purpose.

 The risks of encouraging liberal constitutionalist or democratic 

reform, on the other hand, are a) destabilization, b) an even more 

violent backlash by the Islamists against the regime, or more likely, 

c) many Islamists will try, as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, 

Hizbullah in Lebanon, or the Islamists of Jordan, to transform 

themselves into legitimate political actors to outweigh the liberals 

and block their aims at legislative reforms.

The Benefits of Security and Democracy.

 The potential benefits of democratization are not too difficult 

to imagine either. If the process can be successfully managed, the 

cooperation now found in Saudi and U.S. counterterrorism efforts 

might be translated to other spheres of the relationship. In a less 

charged and antagonistic atmosphere, Americans might be more 

open to Saudi views on regional issues; indeed Saudis have many 

valuable insights to share about the processes of rapid modernization 

and the nature of Islamism itself.

Religious Reform.

 Saudis do not want to reject their own cultural legacy (turath). 

We cannot easily convince a country dedicated to the principles of 
46

Islamic law that it should allow proselytization or visible worship of 

other faiths. But we can ask how well it serves Saudis to be taught that 

invective against Jews or Christians validates their own faith. Saudis 

have begun to reform religious and national education in order to 

grapple with these issues; for instance, reforming instructions on 

how one greets non-Muslims, and in directives to and retraining of 

preachers.

 Sharp external criticisms like the 2004 International Commission 

on Religious Freedom Report that characterizes the Kingdom 

as a chief violator of religious freedom126 had a stinging effect on 

government officials. It was true that the Shi`a suffer discrimination 

and public worship by non-Muslims is not permitted, but for years, 

Christian groups met weekly and held services in private. Tolerance 

should be encouraged, but it should be noted that mosques open to 

non-Muslims and the presence of churches in other Muslim countries 

did not dampen the growth of Islamist thought, nor can they alter 

the teaching of jihad or other problematic doctrines; self-generated 

moderation is needed.

 Further, it is not simply the presence of Wahhabism that has 

fostered Islamism in Saudi Arabia. Certain tribal and geographic 

tensions are unknown to most Americans. For instance, Saudis note 

that al-Qa’ida and QAP have drawn many adherents from Asir 

province, an area that has in some ways resisted its incorporation into 

the Wahhabi state. The Hijaz has also been characterized as a locus 

of identity127 and a tolerant spirit. Conversely, the town of Burayda, 

a Wahhabi stronghold, has proved a great source of salafist strength, 

but other likely locations have not. The fact that a large number of 

liberal reformers are from Najd is, on the other hand, thought to be 

a positive sign of their ability to “speak” to the government’s power 

base there.

 Election registrations for the 178 municipal council seats showed 

that a certain amount of education about elections, issues, procedures, 

and civic spirit is needed. Half of the seats in these elections were 

open to male candidates who could self-nominate. The fact that male 

prisoners, but no women, could vote created some disgruntlement 

and calls for women to be appointed to some of the nonelected seats. 

Less then 150,000 voters registered in Riyadh, where 7 seats were 

open, disappointing those who hoped that more of the 400,000 eligible 
47

to register would do so. Municipal organization, creating community 

projects, protecting and creating green spaces, and cleaning up the 

environment were part of candidates’ agendas. This connects to “antiterrorism” if candidates help foster a sense of public ownership of 

and responsibility for communities. The large number of candidates, 

646 in the Riyadh area, was a positive sign, as was public excitement 

about the elections and candidates’ public meetings which serve to 

educate the public.128 Six of the seven winners were Islamists aided 

by cell phone text messages and Internet links that emphasized 

their religiosity.

 Saudi Arabia can provide many lessons for a strategy to defeat 

salafist extremism. At the grand level of such a strategy, we perceive 

the interrelationship of informational, political, security, economic, 

and social factors, and that calls out for their coordination. At the 

country operational level, a military and intelligence battle can more 

easily be won with public cooperation and understanding, as well as 

support for the type of transition intended to public responsibility, 

civic-mindedness, efficacy, and transparency, if a degree of open 

dialogue between government and citizenry can be created and 

maintained. That, in turn, rests on reforms. We in the West can 

encourage this process.

 The “soft” aspects of a policy of antiterrorism, unlike the “hard” 

facts of counterterrorist needs, are much more difficult to incorporate 

into a meaningful policy position. Even if we restricted ourselves to 

the specific needs of counterterrorist entities in the Kingdom, it would 

be easier to chart a course for Saudi and American cooperation if 

there were a simple and distinct enemy, a single and non-franchising 

al-Qa’ida. That is not the case. QAP may be eradicated or put 

out of commission for a time, but other insurgent groups, small 

factions of the original, or new ones will emerge. Counterterrorist 

measures alone are insufficient to dampen Islamist appeal or to deter 

recruitment. What U.S. policymakers may not realize is the depth 

to which ordinary citizens identify with many aspects of Islamist 

goals. As Islamism has swept the region for the last 28 years, Middle 

Eastern and other governments have uncertainly developed a 

pragmatic strategy: defeat the violent opposition and try to co-opt 

those who may share their views, but act with restraint. It is more 
48

difficult for ordinary citizens neatly to separate extremists from 

those whose Islamist views may more likely lead to sheltering, or 

tolerating extremism, particularly if they are intimidated or tricked 

into cooperation. It is very much in U.S. interests to resurrect a better 

working relationship with the Kingdom to prevent such outcomes, 

since we may anticipate a campaign against oppositionist and 

extremist Islamism for decades to come.

 Thus, the general American prescription for fighting terrorism—

while forwarding freedom—is, in the long run, more compelling than 

it might seem on first glance. What would be helpful is clarification 

of how far or how short a distance we are willing to travel in the 

furtherance of freedom, and how the stabilization of Iraq, or a further 

outbreak of violence or instability in the Kingdom will or will not 

affect our foreign policy aims there.

 Recommendations can be issued with several scenarios in mind. 

U.S. policymakers should:

1. Be wary of wholesale condemnations of Wahhabism, while 

encouraging reform of its more extreme permutations both inside 

and outside of Saudi official institutions.

2. Offer to create, or merely facilitate and participate in, ad hoc 

and more formal meetings that include Saudi Arabia and other 

Arab and European countries, as well as nonstate actors, held 

in neutral locations to discuss the future of antiterrorism and its 

relationship to democratic or other reforms.

3. Monitor and support, on a variety of levels, the efforts of liberal 

reformers who can, by working within the system, more effectively 

dampen salafi support than the United States itself can.

4. To facilitate Recommendation #3, U.S. officials should reestablish 

or reinvigorate ties with Saudis that will allow for influence in 

uncompromising, less formal situations, where advice may be 

offered, rather than dictated. This, in turn, implies,

5. Encourage modifications within and cooperation between Saudi 

and American private sectors to stimulate employment and 

investment, and provide better protection and insurance for 

workers.

6. Carefully consider that rational Saudi calculations that higher 

levels of oil production are not in its best interest might occur. 
49

Up to now, the Kingdom has played the role of market regulator 

in response to American concerns with high oil prices.129

7. Be responsive to Saudi conventional military and security 

needs, recognizing that the former are far more costly than the 

latter, and begin discussions about GCC multi-country forces, 

or the multinational Muslim force proposal that the Saudis had 

previously floated. Either of these alternatives would provide at 

least some assistance in a crisis.

8. Be realistic concerning stated Saudi desires that governmental 

policies vis-à-vis Islamist extremism or political reform should be 

untainted by any U.S. input. Both parties must be flexible, but if 

there is to be an alliance, respectful consultation must continue.

9. Understand that antiterrorism laws and the legal limbo of states 

of emergency can be utilized to strengthen regimes, Saudi 

Arabia’s and others, rather than to promote reform. This leads to 

the problematic goal of promoting legal reform in Saudi Arabia. 

Here, liberal reformers may provide the best rationalization for 

reforms capable of reconciling the original intent of Hanbali 

jurists with the exigencies of international standards of human 

and civil rights.

10. Encourage Saudi counterparts to improve and modernize the 

General Intelligence Presidency, the Saudi intelligence service 

which had deteriorated to some degree since Prince Turki alFaysal resigned. Research, human intelligence, and strategic 

thinking are essential complements to the performance of security 

forces.

11. Use formal and informal channels to urge Saudi responsiveness 

to international bodies governing human rights, as with the now 

extremely tardy response to the U.N. Committee to Eliminate 

Discrimination Against Women, and in responding to the U.N. 

Committees monitoring racial discrimination (pertains to foreign 

workers) and torture. On the national level, Saudis should be 

encouraged to develop a Bill of Rights. Chapter Five of the Basic 

Law of Government is inadequate in its articulation and defense 

of citizens’ rights, nor are they protected under the Majlis alShura law or the Law of the Provinces.
50

12. Strongly encourage their Saudi allies to examine and analyze 

the tangible and intangible influence of the Saudi `ulama and 

institutions of Islamic foreign policy on the progress of reform, 

rationalization, and democratization in neighboring countries.

13. Be aware that the security situation in Iraq has triggered some 

degree of transnational insurgency, running at present from 

Saudi Arabia to Iraq. Should stabilization be achieved in Iraq, 

measures must be taken to constrain militants who may return to 

Saudi Arabia.

14. Use all channels to provide better intelligence and coordination of 

information in surrounding countries or Europe to prevent future 

incidents such as the 1996 Khobar attack. Travel for religious 

purposes is just one element to be considered here.

15. Similarly, develop a more purposeful use of information concerning the role of religious clerics, and what constitutes dangerous, 

infuriating, or annoying provocation, while recommendation #12 

is being pursued.

16. Encourage the Saudi government in its efforts to increase political 

education and participation through elections, the enhancement 

of civic consciousness, and creation of transparency.

17. Better educate ourselves about Saudi Arabia’s pivotal role in the 

Middle East of today and tomorrow.

18. Develop a well-grounded plan in the event of catastrophic events 

in the Kingdom, or its eastern provinces, based on Saudi forces and 

a regional coalition, and anticipate U.S. involvement. Such plans 

must now include the prospect of longer-term commitments and 

resultant insurgencies, and not only dramatic and swift military 

operations.
51

GLOSSARY OF ISLAMIC TERMS, PERSONALITIES, 

AND ORGANIZATIONS

Apostate: An apostate is one who denies his or her faith in Islam, or converts to 

another religious creed. Apostasy is one of the most serious crimes in Islamic 

law. 

`Ashura: The Shi`i celebration of mourning the death of Husayn at Karbala in the 

early Islamic era. Ritual parades, self-flagellation, or wounding to the point of 

blood-letting are traditional. Celebration of the holiday has been banned by the 

Saudi government (and was limited in Saddam Husayn’s Iraq).

Bid`a: An innovation. Entities not indigenous to Islam, or the Islamic way of life, 

were regarded negatively, although through the process of conquest, the Muslim 

warriors and dynasties acquired many new practices and customs. Religious 

scholars therefore seek to determine if an innovation, a form of technology for 

instance, is in conflict with the spirit of Islam or any principles of Islamic law, 

and may not necessarily condemn them. The Wahhabis called for the rejection of 

various previously accepted innovations.

Caliph (Khalifah): A political office used to govern urban areas of pre-Islamic Arabia 

and chosen by the consensus of tribal elders. The term pre-dates Islam and simply 

means “successor.” The four Caliphs to succeed Muhammad were, in order, Abu 

Bakr, `Umar, `Uthman, and `Ali from 570-632 A.D.

Dar al-Islam: Literally, abode or house of Islam. The territory controlled by Muslims 

where Islamic law is observed.

Dar al-harb: Literally, the abode or house of war. Territory that is not controlled by 

Muslims.

Da`wa: The mission to spread Islam in the world, and to Islamize, or remake, the 

Muslim world in a more authentic form.

Fatwa: An opinion or responsa issued by an Islamic jurist. A fatwa answers a question 

about the lawfulness of a particular topic or action. In Sunni Islam, jurists utilize 

the Quran, hadith, legal analogy and consensus in fatwa construction, while Shi`i 

jurists may also use a creative process known as ijtihad. A highly educated `alim

or religious scholar is qualified to issue a fatwa, whereas Usama bin Ladin is not 

qualified to do so.

Gama`at al-Islamiyya: Refers to the Egyptian radical Islamist umbrella organization 

that developed in the late 1970s and 1980s in that country, and waged a low-level 

war with the government.
52

Hanbali school of Islamic law: The legal tradition of Ahmad ibn Hanbal, the most 

strict of the four Sunni legal schools (madhdhahib).

Haramayn Brigades. Haramayn refers to the two holy places. A cell of al-Qa’ida on 

the Arabian Peninsula.

Hashemite: Descendents of the Sharif Hussayn of Mecca and Medina, whose 

lineage goes back to the prophet. Hussayn’s sons led the Arab Revolt against the 

Ottomans, aiming at an Arab kingdom. After World War I, one son became the 

ruler of Jordan, and the other of Iraq, and their enmity to the House of Saud stems 

from their expulsion from the Hijaz.

Hijaz: The western province of Saudi Arabia. The holy cities of Mecca and Medina 

are located here, and the Hashemite family, formerly the authorities of the holy 

cities, came from the Hijaz.

Hudud: Severe penalties for the capital crimes in Islamic law which include apostasy, 

sedition, adultery, and fornication. At the court’s discretion, the penalties may be 

death by the sword, lapidation (stoning, usually to death), or lashing.

Ibn `Abd al-Wahhab, Muhammad: Founder of Wahhabism. Cleric who lived in the 

mid-18th century and sought to purify Islam. His strict brand of Islam and mission 

to purge Arabia of pre-Islamic practices was adopted by Muhammad Ibn Saud and 

his warriors in the 1740s. The Wahhabis call themselves Muwahidun (Unitarians).

Ibn Taymiyyah: A 13th century Islamic jurist who redefined jihad and takfir to address 

the Crusades and the Mongols who had invaded the region and influenced local 

rulers in his day. He is considered a spiritual source for Islamic militants and alQa’ida.

Ijtihad: To construct an independent judgment in responding to a theological issue, 

or a fatwa that goes beyond the other sources of law. Also, the opposite of taqlid,

or blind imitation.

Ikhwan: Brethren, brotherhood. Refers to both the Wahhabi warriors, or in Egypt, 

Jordan, or Syria, to the Muslim Brotherhood established in 1929 in Isma’iliyya, 

Egypt.

Islahiyyun: Reformers. Liberal reformers in today’s Saudi Arabia.

Imam: An imam is, in one meaning of the word, merely a prayer-leader. Certain 

imams may also be preachers who deliver the Friday sermon. The term imam may 

imply the legitimate ruler, who was historically called the caliph. For that reason, 

radical leaders have sometimes used the title of Imam.
53

Imamate: The Shi`a Muslims believe in the institution of the a`ima, or imamate, a 

chain of imams appointed by God to lead the Muslims. 

Al-Jama`a al-Salafiyya al-Muhtasiba: Radical purist group with tribal affiliations 

whose members took over the Grand Mosque in Mecca in 1979.

Jihad: Struggle or offensive war. Frequently defined in English as “holy war,” 

Muslims distinguish between the greater jihad, the daily struggle to fulfill the 

requirements and ideals of Islam, and the lesser jihad, fighting for the faith. Also 

refers to the Jihad organization of Egypt.

Khariji: Khawarij, the Arabic plural; Kharijites, English: those who seceded from 

the early Muslim dynasty to avoid what they saw as the degradation of Islamic 

principles through adaptation. One member killed an early Caliph, `Ali, objecting 

to his assent to arbitration with the Ummayads.

Mahdi: The guided one. An individual who will restore Islam prior to the Day of 

Judgment, and who must descend from the Prophet’s lineage.

Madhhab: Pronounced “math-hab” in English, it refers to a system of lawmaking, 

or jurisprudence. Often termed a legal school (of thought).

Majlis: A meeting or council. In the Kingdom, a hall and occasion for entertaining 

guests where royals may respond to requests.

Muhtasib: A state official who could enforce penalties at the level of ta`zir, a crime 

of second degree severity. This official had other responsibilities such as ensuring 

fair prices and practices in the markets.

Mutawa’in: The religious police. The Organization to Prevent Vice and Promote 

Virtue who enforce the Wahhabi interpretation of religious duties and restrictions 

and separation of the sexes.

Muwahhidun: Wahhabis. Literally means those who support monotheism, or 

tawhid.

al-Qa’ida on the Arabian Peninsula (QAP): Known in Arabic as Tanzim al-qa’ida fi 

jazirat al-`arab, it is simply a branch of the organization.

Qisas: The second level of criminal punishments in Islamic law that punish murder, 

manslaughter, or bodily injury, and require a blood payment or injury in kind.

Sahwa Islamiyya: Islamic awakening. A reference to the general movement of 

religious revival and discourse across the Muslim world, and also to the Islamist 

movement or sentiments within Saudi Arabia.
54

Salafi: An adherent of the salafiyya movement. This actually refers to the 19th 

century movement for Islamic reform and modernization of thought led by 

Muhammad `Abduh (1849-1905). One line of salafis continued on in `Abduh’s 

endeavors, whereas some others believed that a return to a religious order was 

necessary. Today, the term usually does not refer to liberals, but rather to Islamists 

seeking a purified creed.

Al-Saud, King `Abd al-`Aziz al-Rahman. The founder of the modern state of Saudi 

Arabia. This was actually the third state formed under the al-Saud family. Al-Saud 

was survived by 44 sons and an unknown number of daughters.

Al-Saud, Prince Bandar ibn Sultan ibn `Abd al-`Aziz: Ambassador of Saudi Arabia to 

the United States.

Al-Saud, King Faysal ibn `Abd al-`Aziz. A modernizing King who was assassinated 

in 1975 by a nephew.

Al-Saud, King Fahd ibn `Abd al-`Aziz: The current King who was debilitated by a 

stroke and therefore many of his state duties are performed by the Crown Prince.

Al-Sa`ud, Crown Prince Abdullah ibn `Abd al-Aziz: Heir to King Fahd and currently 

acting head-of-state of Saudi Arabia.

Al-Saud, Prince Nayif ibn `Abd al-`Aziz. Minister of the Interior.

Al-Saud, Prince Sultan ibn `Abd al-`Aziz: Minister of Defense and Aviation and 

Inspector General. He is the next in line to be Crown Prince.

Al-Saud, Prince Turki al-Faysal. Previously headed the General Intelligence 

Directorate until 2001. The Directorate has since been renamed the General 

Intelligence Presidency.

Saudi Hizbullah: The Party of God. To be differentiated from the group of the same 

name in Lebanon.

Shahid: One who is martyred for the cause of Islam.

Shari`ah: Islamic law. Islamic law is based upon the Quran, the hadith, qiyas

(analogy), and ijma` (consensus). Jurists of the Shi`i tradition may also utilize ijtihad

(a creative interpretive process) to issue an Islamic legal ruling or fatwa. Prior to 

19th century Ottoman reforms, Islamic law was not codified.

Shirk: Polytheism, idol worship. Many pre-Islamic Arabs believed in a pantheon 

of gods and goddesses.
55

Shura: Consultation. The King and princes may consult with their advisors and 

inner circles, or hold open majlises (councils) to allow for questions, petitions, 

and grievances of others. Many Islamists say that shura is an Islamic method of 

government, whereas democracy is not.

Takfir: Declaring someone, even a Muslim, to be a nonbeliever.

Tanzim al-qa’ida fi jazirat al-`arab: al-Qa’ida Organization on the Arabian 

Peninsula.

Tawhid: Unicity, or oneness of God, according to Muslims.

Tawhid al-ibada: Unicity of worship.

Tawhid al-rububiyya: God’s unique attribute of being the creator of the world and 

holding dominion over it.

Tawhid al-asma wa al-sifat: The belief that God’s multiple names or attributes (such 

as the Generous, or the Beneficent) that may be found in the Quran, solely apply to 

God and should not be applied to others.

Ta`zir: A penalty for crimes less serious than capital offenses.

Turath: Islamic or Arab legacy or precedent. The Arab and Muslim intellectual 

circles frequently argue over the definitions of this legacy, always seeing it as 

a core social, political, cultural, and religious element under siege in an era of 

globalization.

`Ulama: Religious scholars, or clerics.

`Umara: The princes of Saudi Arabia.

Umma: The community of Muslim believers; transcends national, ethnic, racial, or 

linguistic divisions.

Al-`Utaybi, Juhayman: Leader of the 1979 uprising in Mecca.

Al-`Utaybi, Sa`ud ibn Hammud: A current extremist leader. His call to jihad was 

published in Issue 27 of the Internet journal, Sawt al-Jihad.

Wahhabism: The religious philosophy and sect developed by Muhammad ibn `Abd 

al-Wahhab.

Wasta: Connections used to obtain a job, a favor, or to influence an outcome.

Zakat: Charity. A voluntary payment of a set percent of a Muslim’s income and 

assets that is one of the five duties, or Pillars, of Islam.

57

ENDNOTES

 1. Immediately following the revelation that Saud had contracted the assassination of 

Egypt’s President Nasser. Nadav Safran, Saudi Arabia: The Ceaseless Quest for Security, Ithaca: 

Cornell University Press, 1985 and 1988, pp. 85-88. Others explain this arrangement on the 

basis of fiscal issues, and also, according to Joseph A. Kechichian, Saud’s appointments of 

his own sons instead of more senior and experienced relatives. The arrangement faltered 

as Saud, who agreed to the transfer of power to Faysal, allied himself with others, forcing 

Faysal to resign until the decline of Saud’s health in 1961. Joseph A. Kechichian, Succession 

in Saudi Arabia, New York: Palgrave, 2001, p. 41. When Faysal resumed his duties, Saud 

attempted to gain back his powers, and a permanent transfer of power from Saud to Faysal 

was finally arranged during 1964.

 2. Concerns about aging rulers have been expressed for some time. See Judith Yaphe, 

“Islamic Radicalism in the Arabian Peninsula: Growing Risks,” Strategic Forum, No. 67, 

March 1996; as well a discussion of intrigue in the royal family, “Saudi Arabia: An Anatomy 

of Crisis?: Politics of the Royal Court,” DEBKAfile, October 3, 2002, and Simon Henderson’s 

various opinions on succession. Numerous Arabic sources also discuss intrigue, the most 

virulent (and also unreliable) of which is probably Nasr al-Sa`id, Tarikh al-Sa`ud, n.pub., no 

date, a book that was banned and its author probably assassinated since his disappearance 

in 1979. `Asad Abu Khalil comments on the Saudi government’s influence in the Arab 

press, The Battle for Saudi Arabia: Royalty, Fundamentalism and Global Power, New York: Seven 

Stories Press, 2004, pp. 35, 102-103, 105; and on factionalism among the royals, see pp. 113, 

117.

 3. Abdelrahman Munif, Mudun al-milh, 5 Vols. 9th ed., Bayrut: al-Mu’assasah al-

`Arabiyah lil-Dirasat wa-al-Nashr, 5 Vols. 9th ed., 1999; Cities of Salt, Peter Theroux, trans., 

New York: Random House, 1989. Munif, half-Saudi, half-Iraqi, according to some sources, 

and born in Jordan, according to his publisher, was stripped of his Saudi citizenship after 

the work’s publication, and it was banned in the Kingdom. 

 4. The U.S. defense establishment has adopted the term salafi-extremism to describe 

the version of militant Islamism in question in this monograph. Foreign representatives 

may object, as this particular term translates poorly into Arabic just as Arabic terms 

like islamiyyun translate poorly into English, or for other reasons. It is far preferable to 

“fundamentalist,” or neo-Wahhabi, or even khariji, this referring to a sect that seceded from 

the Muslim community in the first Islamic century who called for a purer version of Islam 

than the acknowledged leadership. 

 5. Personal communications with the author, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, March 2005.

 6. One view is that the violence in 2003 caused Saudi revulsion, despite disapproval 

for aspects of U.S. Middle Eastern policy. Nawaf Obaid conducted a poll of 15,000 Saudis 

between August and November 2003 of Osama bin Ladin’s political rhetoric, but not alQaida’s acts of violence. Nor did they want him to rule the Kingdom. For discussion despite 

the misleading title, see Henry Schuster, “Poll of Saudis Shows Wide Support for Osama’s 

Views,” CNN.com, June 9, 2004, http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/meast/06/08/poll.binladen/. 

A much simpler D3 poll sampling 1,003 Saudis from September 13-24, 2004, showed that 56 

percent disapproved of the United States, but that percentage of the sample was lower than 

disapproval in Egypt (96 percent), Turkey (66 percent), Pakistan (65 percent), or Iraq (61 

percent). “Five of Eight Muslim Countries Surveyed Report Negative Image of the U.S.,” 

D3 Systems, http://www.d3systems.com.
58

 7. Reverend Franklin (Billy) Graham’s statement, “I believe it’s [Islam is] a very evil 

and wicked religion,” was widely circulated. See Nicholas Kristof, “Bigotry in Islam—And 

Here,” New York Times, July 9, 2002. 

 8. Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defense, referred to President Bush’s 2002 State 

of the Union address and a speech given on November 6, 2003, in Wolfowitz’ speech to the 

House Armed Services Committee, Washington DC, August 10, 2004, http://www.defenselink.

mil/speeches, last visited September 30, 2004. 

 9. President George Bush, “State of the Union Address,” released January 20, 2004, 

http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/01/print, last visited September 29, 2004. Also 

see President Bush’s March 8, 2005, speech on terrorism delivered at the National Defense 

University, http://www.cnn.com/2005/allpolitics/03108/bush.transcript/.

 10. Alan Richards, “Socio-Economic Roots of Radicalism? Towards Explaining the 

Appeal of Islamic Radicals,” Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army 

War College, July 2003, pp. 22-23. 

 11. Amin Rihani, Muluk al-`Arab, Beirut, Lebanon: Sadir, 1929. 

 12. Safran, Saudi Arabia, pp. 66-67. 

 13. In 1962, Colonel Abdallah al-Sallal enacted a coup against the Imam of Yemen and 

declared the establishment of the Yemen Arab Republic. The Imam’s forces resisted, and 

Egyptians intervened in support of the coup. This led to a Saudi war-by-proxy with the 

Egyptians and the Yemeni republicans. 

 14. In the Arab “cold war,” more radical, populist, Arab socialist states like Egypt, 

Syria, Iraq, and the Palestinians confronted the regional influence of the more traditional 

monarchies or Western-aligned states like Saudi Arabia and Jordan. Malcolm Kerr, The 

Arab Cold War: Gamal Abdal Nasir And His Rivals, 1958-1970, London and New York: Oxford 

University Press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1971. 

 15. Henner Fürtig, Iran’s Rivalry with Saudi Arabia Between the Gulf Wars, Reading: 

Ithaca, 2002, pp. 1-18. 

 16. Ibid., p. 40, citing “Message of Revolution,” Journal of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards 

Corps, Vol. 2, No. 6, 1981, pp. 35-36. 

 17. David Menashri, Iran: A Decade of War and Revolution, New York: Holmes & Meier, 

1990, p. 152.

 18. One version of Fahd’s rule is Fouad al-Farsy, Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques: 

King Fahd bin Abdul Aziz, Channel Islands: Knight Communications, 2001. 

 19. Fahd al-Qahtani, Sira` al-Ajniha fi al-`A’ila al-Sa`udiyya, London: Safa, 1988, p. 38.

 20. “Saudi Arabia,” The World Factbook 2004, Washington, DC: Central Intelligence 

Agency, http://www.cia.gov.

 21. Safran, Saudi Arabia, p. 2.

 22. World Factbook 2004, http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/, last visited October 

29, 2004. 

 23. Bradley C. Bourland, The Saudi Economy at Mid-Year 2002, Riyadh: Saudi American 

Bank, 2002, cited in Anthony H. Cordesman, Saudi Arabia Enters the Twenty-First Century: 

The Political, Foreign Policy, and Energy Dimensions, Westport: Praeger, 2003, p. 271. 
59

 24. Fareed Zakaria, “The Saudi Trap: A Trip Through the Kingdom Reveals What 

Really Needs to Be Done in the War on Terror,” Newsweek, June 28, 2004, available at http://

www.fareedzakaria.com/articles, last visited September 20, 2004. 

 25. Mai Yamani, Changed Identities: The Challenge of a New Generation in Saudi Arabia, 

London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2000, pp. 42, 77.

 26. Ibid., pp. 87-91. 

 27. Anthony H. Cordesman, “The Prospects for Stability in Saudi Arabia in 2004,” 

Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2003, p. 15.

 28. Robert Looney, “Saudization: A Useful Tool in the Kingdom’s Battle Against 

Unemployment?” Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. XXVII, No. 3, Spring 

2004, p. 30. 

 29. Divya Pakkiasamy, “Saudi Arabia’s Policy for Changing Its Workforce,” Migration 

Information Source, November 1, 2004, reprinted in Saudi-U.S. Relations Information Service, 

December 3, 2004.

 30. Anthony Cordesman, Saudi Arabia: Guarding the Desert Kingdom, Boulder: Westview 

Press, 1997, pp. 5-6; and for an updated assessment, see Anthony Cordesman and Nawaf 

Obaid, “Saudi Military Forces and Development: challenges and Reforms,” Washington, 

DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, draft, May 30, 2004.

 31. Naef bin Ahmed al-Saud, “Underpinning Saudi National Security Strategy,” Joint 

Force Quarterly, Issue 32, Autumn 2002. 

 32. Anthony Cordesman, “The Security Apparatus in Saudi Arabia,” Draft, Washington, 

DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, May 10, 2004, p. 6. 

 33. Estimated by Anthony H. Cordesman at 200,000 for Saudi Arabia and 580,000 for Iran, 

“Saudi National Security: Military and Secruity Services—Challenges & Developments,” 

Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, Working Draft, September 

29, 2004, Figure 12, p. 49.

 34. Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, “A Strategic Approach to the 

Challenge of Terrorism,” Remarks delivered to RAND, Washington DC, September 8, 2004, 

available at http://www.defenselink.mil, last visited October 20, 2004. 

 35. President Bush’s remarks of September 8, 2001, quoted by Wolfowitz in the same 

speech. 

 36. President George Bush, “Goals and Objectives,” National Strategy for Combating 

Terrorism, February 2003, p. 1. 

 37. Wolfowitz, “A Strategic Approach to the Challenge of Terrorism.” 

 38. Bush, “Goals and Objectives,” pp. 15, 29. 

 39. President George W. Bush, Washington DC, September 14, 2001, included in The 

National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 2002, pp. 5-6.

 40. Abu al-`Abbas al-`A’edhi, “From Riyadh/East to Sinai” 24/8/1425 h./October 

8, 2004, posted on various Islamist websites. He advances the transnationalism of radical 

Islamists and casts the attack on Israeli tourists and others in Taba in the Sinai as an 

introduction to a new jihad in Egypt and parallel to the attacks in the peninsula. 

 41. International Crisis Group, “Can Saudi Arabia Reform Itself?” ICG Middle East 

Report No. 28, Cairo/Brussels, July 14, 2004. 
60

 42. Naveed Sheikh, The New Politics of Islam: Pan-Islamic Foreign Policy in a World of

States, London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003. 

 43. A partial list is provided in Al-Farsy, Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques, pp. 220-

228. 

 44. Hamid Algar, Wahhabism: A Critical Essay, Oneonta, NY: Islamic Publications 

International, 2002, pp. 31-32.

 45. Michael Scott Doran, “The Saudi Paradox,” Foreign Affairs, January/February 2004, 

pp. 35-51. One wonders what the response would be if the author suggested that the U.S. 

global war on terror required its country’s leaders to abandon their belief in the Trinity or 

the principle of original sin. 

 46. As`ad Abukhalil, The Battle for Saudi Arabia, pp. 61-62.

 47. As in Craig Unger, House of Bush, House of Saud, New York: Scribner, 2004, pp. 83-86. 

In contrast, see Natana J. Delong-Bas, Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad, 

New York: Oxford, 2004. 

 48. Safran, Saudi Arabia, pp. 50-56.

 49. Gwen Okruhlik argued that Saudi “nationhood” was not really achieved, but that 

the current struggle expresses the ongoing process of national definition (this being a timehonored academic approach to the lack of congruence between “state” and “nation” in 

Middle Eastern studies). “Struggles for the Soul: Building a Nation in Arabia,” 38th Annual 

Middle East Studies Association meeting, San Francisco, CA, November 23, 2004. 

 50. “Statement by the Council of Senior `Ulama Supporting Actions Taken by the Leader 

Inviting Qualified Forces to Respond to the Aggression Against This Country.” Partially 

quoted in Abdulaziz H. Al-Fahad, “From Exclusivism to Accomodation: Doctrinal and 

Legal Evolution of Wahhabism,” New York University Law Review, Vol. 79, 2004; reprinted in 

Saudi-U.S. Relations Information Service, July 17, 2004. 

 51. This is, for instance, the thrust of Natana Delong-Bas’s defense of `Abd al-Wahhab. 

Natana J. Delong-Bas, Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad, New York: 

Oxford University Press, 2004, pp. 288-289. 

 52. Youssef H. Aboul-Enein and Sherifa Zuhur, Islamic Rulings on Warfare, Carlisle 

Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute, October 2004, pp. 11-12.

 53. Communication from David Commins. Commins delineated the intellectual legacy 

of Wahhabism in “Wahhabism as a Regional Religious Culture,” 38th Annual Middle East 

Studies Association meeting, San Francisco, CA, November 20, 2004.

 54. Prince Bandar ibn Sultan ibn `Abd al-`Aziz al-Saud, “We Will Lose the War on 

Terrorism Unless . . .,” http://www.saudiembassy.net/2004News/Statements/StateDetail.

asp?cIndex=437, last visited October 28, 2004, and cross-posted on Foreign Broadcast 

Information Service (FBIS) as “Saud Envoy to US Exhorts Religious Scholars ‘To Proclaim 

Jihad’ on Terrorism,” Document ID GMP2004601000168, June 1, 2004. 

 55. The earlier works on the Muslim Brotherhood, on the other hand, trace their 

increasing strictness and insistence on da`wa to their sojourns in Saudi Arabia and the 

Gulf. 

 56. Al-Qahtani bore the name of the Prophet, and Juhayman al-`Utaybi claimed that he 

was the mahdi—the figure who will restore Islam, and who must descend from the Prophet’s 

house.
61

 57. Ironically, the bin Ladin construction company’s trucks had been used to smuggle 

arms into the mosque, and they also provided plans of the Holy Places to the police to 

defeat the rebels. Jacquard, In the Name of Osama bin Laden, pp. 13-14.

 58. Dilip Hiro, War Without End: The Rise of Islamist Terrorism and Global Response, 

London: Routledge, 2002, pp. 138-140.

 59. Osama bin Ladin, “An Open Letter to Sheikh bin Baz Refuting His Fatwa Concerning 

the Reconcilliation With the Jews,” Communique No. 11, Advice and Reform Committee 

(ARC) December 29, 1994, pp. 1-4; and “al-Risal al-Thaniyah to Shaykh Abdul Aziz bin 

Baz,” ARC, January 20, 1995, pp. 1-14, discussed by Mamoun Fandy, Saudi Arabia and 

Politics of Dissent, New York: Palgrave, 1999, pp. 187-188.

 60. Osama bin Laden, “Communiqué No. 17, August 3, 1995” in Roland Jacquard, In 

the Name of Osama bin Laden: Global Terrorism and the Bin Laden Brotherhood, Durham and 

London: Duke University Press, 2002, p. 174.

 61. James Piscatori, ed., Islamic Fundamentalisms and the Gulf Crisis, Chicago: University 

of Chicago Press, 1991.

 62. “Saudi Arabia: Religious Police Role in School Fire Criticized,” Human Rights Watch, 

March 15, 2002, http://www.hrw.org/press/2002/03/saudischool.htm, last visited December 9, 

2004.

 63. Anthony Cordesman, “Saudi Arabia and the Challenge of Terrorism: Reacting to 

the ‘9/11 Report’,” Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies, August 1, 

2003, pp. 131-132. 

 64. Frank E. Vogel, “The Public and the Private in Saudi Arabia: Restrictions on the 

Powers of the Committees for Ordering the Good and Forbidding the Evil,” Social Research, 

Vol. 70, Issue 3, Fall 2003. 

 65. Safar Hawali, Haqa’iq hawl `Azmat al-Khalij, Cairo: Dar Makka al-Mukarram, 1991. 

For English readers, a thorough explanation of Hawali’s views may be found in Mamoun 

Fandy, Saudi Arabia and the Politics of Dissent, New York: Palgrave, 1991, pp. 61-87.

 66. Fandy, pp. 89-113.

 67. English translation of the Petition, Appendix 11, Joseph Kechichian, Succession in 

Saudi Arabia, pp. 196-197.

 68. Joshua Teitelbaum, Holier Than Thou: Saudi Arabia’s Islamic Opposition, Washington, 

DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2000, pp. 63-65. 

 69. Anthony Cordesman, Saudi Arabia Enters the Twenty-First Century, pp. 188-189.

 70. Al-`Aedhi, “From Riyadh/East to Sinai.” 

 71. See “Interview with Richard Clarke,” Public Broadcasting Service, http://www.pbs.

org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/knew/interviews/clarke.html, last visited January 10, 2005. 

 72. Saudi Hizbullah and the U.S. federal indictment of 13 Saudis and 1 Lebanese for the 

Khobar Tower attacks are discussed at length in Anthony Cordesman, Saudi Arabia Enters 

the Twenty-First Century, pp. 196-206. Craig Unger reports President Clinton’s national 

security adviser, Sandy Berger’s frustration with Prince Bandar, and suggests, in keeping 

with the theme of his book, that former President Bush (senior) enabled a breakthrough in 

Saudi/FBI cooperation. Craig Unger, House of Bush, House of Saud: The Secret Relationship 

between the World’s Two Most Powerful Dynasties, New York: Scribner, 2004. 
62

 73. Stéphane Lacroix, “Between Islamists and Liberals: Saudi Arabia’s New “IslamoLiberal” Reformers,” Middle East Journal, Vol. 58, No. 3, Summer 2004, pp. 347-349.

 74. Ibid, pp. 345-358. 

 75. Mahan Abedin, “Accessing [sic] the Present and Future Threat in Saudi Arabia: An 

Interview with Saad al-Faqih,” Terrorism Monitor, Supplement, Vol. II, Issue 9, September 7, 

2004. 

 76. Richard Dekmejian, “The Liberal Impulse in Saudi Arabia,” Middle East Journal, Vol. 

57, No. 3, Summer 2003, pp. 400-414. 

 77. F. Gregory Gause III, “L’anti-américanisme en Arabie saoudite,” Rachel Bouyssou, 

trans., Critique internationale, No. 18, January 2003, p. 17. 

 78. Comments by David Aufhauser in a January 23, 2004, Middle East Policy Council 

Spring conference. David Aufhauser, Frank Anderson, David E. Long, Nathaniel Kern, 

Hussein Shobokshi, Middle East Policy, Vol. 11, Issue 1, Spring 2004, pp. 1-25. 

 79. Dekmejian, “The Liberal Impulse.” 

 80. Jamal Khashoggi’s views may be found in other Arab dailies, for instance, in “Saudi 

Arabia Aims to Open Up to Islam in its Entirety,” Daily Star, March 13, 2004; “You’re Either 

With Terrorism Or Against It,” Daily Star, May 20, 2004; “Saudi Arabia’s Neo-Islamist 

Reformers,” Daily Star, March 29, 2004, http://www.dailystar.com.lb, last visited October 6, 

2004.

 81. Neil MacFarquhar, “A Saudi Editor Who Offended Clerics Is Ousted from His 

Post,” New York Times, May 28, 2003. 

 82. “Talks to Release Saudi Reformists Fail,” Aljazeera.net. http:://english.aljazeera.net, 

last visited October 25, 2004. 

 83. International Crisis Group, “Can Saudi Arabia Reform Itself?” ICG Middle East 

Report, July 14, 2004, pp. 12-13. 

 84. “Unveiled Women Anger Saudi Cleric,” BBC News, January 21, 2004, http://news.bbc.

co.uk/2, last visited October 27, 2004. 

 85. “Saudi Woman Pilot Takes Prince Walid’s Plane to Sky,” Middle East Online, http://

www.middle-east-online.com/english, last visited November 29, 2004.

 86. “Kingdom on the Brink,” CNN television program narrated by Nic Robertson, 

November 20, 2004. 

 87. First Woman on Saudi Bank Board, BBC News World Edition, December 2, 2004, 

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/4063723, last visited December 3, 2004. 

 88. James Shirreff, “Beheading Saudi Arabia,” Saudi Institute, June 24, 2004, at http://

www.saudiinstitute.org/index.php?option=content&task=view&id=115&Itemid=, last visited 

November 17, 2004. 

 89. “Medical Letter Writing Action: Abdel Moti Abdel Rahman Mohammad, Saudi 

Arabia,” http://www.web.amnesty.org/library. 

 90. Shirreff, “Beheading.” 

 91. “Appeal Win for Saudi Jail Britons,” BBC News, October 28, 2004, http://www.bbc.

co.uk, last visited October 28, 2004. A string of bombings in 2000-01 injured a number 

of people and killed a Briton. In 2002 another Briton was killed in a blast of a borrowed 

vehicle. It was rumored that these incidents were linked to alcohol smuggling, or were set 
63

off by dissidents, or possibly counterintelligence gone awry. Several accusees confessed on 

television, then appealed their sentences, and were pardoned. 

 92. Human Rights Watch, “Bad Dreams: Exploitation and Abuse of Migrant Workers 

in Saudi Arabia,” Human Rights Watch Reports, July 2004, http://www.hrw.english/docs, last 

visited October 28, 2004.

 93. Ibid; also see Human Rights Watch reports on executions in the Kingdom on the same 

site; and Virginia Sherry, “Workers’ Hell in Saudi Arabia,” Human Rights Watch Reports, 

July 24, 2004, http://www.hrw.english/docs (also published in the South China Morning Post), 

last visited October 26, 2004. 

 94. Neil MacFarquhar, “U.S. Consulate in a Saudi City Is Hit, Killing 9,” New York 

Times, December 7, 2004. 

 95. Cordesman, “The Security Apparatus in Saudi Arabia,” pp. 42-45; also see Embassy 

of Saudi Arabia, “Initiatives and Actions Taken by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in the 

Financial Area to Combat Terrorism,” December 3, 2002, at http://www.saudiembassy.org.

uk/news-and-press-releases/actions-in-the-financial-area-to-combat-trrorism.htm, last visited 

October 27, 2004; followed by “Initiatives and Actions Taken by the Kingdom of Saudi 

Arabia to Combat Terrorist Financing and Money Laundering,” Saudi Monetary Agency, 

April 2004, at http://www.saudiembassy.net/Reports.asp, last visited October 27, 2004. 

 96. Anthony H. Cordesman and Nawaf Obaid, “Saudi Internal Security: A Risk 

Assessment. Terrorism and the Security Services—Challenges & Developments.” 

Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, May 30, 2004, pp. 16-21.

 97. Communication to the author, December 2004. The deal struck between Egyptian 

Islamist extremists and the state was shaken by the attack in Taba, and QAP declarations 

that the armistice could be shaken. Others see that Islamists have suspended attacks, but 

conflict with the state is bound to break out anew if a working dialogue is not established. 

 98. Edward S. Walker, Jr., “The Quiet Revolution—Saudi Arabia,” Middle East Institute 

Perspectives, reprinted in Saudi-American Forum, January 16, 2004, http://www.saudi-americanforum.org/Newsletters2004/SAF-Item_Of_Interest_2004_01, last visited September 27, 2004. 

 99. Unger, House of Bush, which is reminiscent of Steven Emerson, The American House 

of Saud: The Secret Petrodollar Connection, New York: Franklin Watts, 1985; Americans also 

read Michael Moore, Dude, Where’s My Country? New York: Warner, 2003. 

 100. Gawdat Bahgat, “Saudi Arabia and the War on Terrorism,” Arab Studies Quarterly, 

Vol. 26, Issue 1, Winter 2004, p. 3. 

 101. Kevin Anderson, “US Muslims Suffer Backlash,” BBC News, http://www.news.bbc.

co.uk, last visited February 18, 2005. Hate crimes against Arabs and Muslims in the United 

States increased by 1,700% in 2001, according to crime statistics compiled by the FBI, 

according to Anderson. Not all hate crimes are reported, but in Chicago alone there were 

51 reported crimes in 2001 as compared to 4 anti-Muslim or anti-Arab crimes in 2000. The 

Council on American Islamic Relations reports many such incidents, http://www.cair.com/.

 102. Tawfiq Abu Bakr, “The Lack of Understanding between Arabs and the West,” 

Al-Hayat, October 17, 2004, http://english.daralhayat.com/opinion/contributors/10-2004/Article20041016, last visited October 18, 2004.

 103. For the second part of a poll that examined American opinions on the threat posed 

by Iran, see “Americans’ Opinions About Iran,” The Gallup Organization, http://www.gallup.

com/poll/, November 30, 2004. 
64

 104. Thomas W. Lippman, Inside the Mirage: America’s Fragile Partnership with Saudi 

Arabia, Boulder: Westview, 2004, p. 5. 

 105. Shobokshi’s comments in Aufhauser, Anderson, Long, Kern, Shobokshi, 

“Saudi Arabia, Enemy or Friend?” In contrast, David E. Long, former executive director 

of Georgetown University’s Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, characterizes the 

relationship as a “marriage from which there is no divorce.” He contends that U.S.-Saudi 

mutual interests are too compelling. David E. Long, “US-Saudi Relations: Evolution, Current 

Conditions, and Future Prospects,” Mediterranean Quarterly, Vol. 15, No. 3, Summer 2004, 

pp. 34-35. 

 106. Jamal A. Khashoggi, “How the Saudis Can Defend Against American Critics,” The 

Daily Star, January 28, 2004, available at http://www.dailystar.com.lb. 

 107. The Shi`i petition of 2003 mentioned in this monograph shocked some observers 

as it was iterated in the language of citizens, rather than using a religious discourse. 

 108. Josh Pollack, “Anti-Americanism in Contemporary Saudi Arabia,” Middle East 

Review of International Affairs, Vol. 7, No. 4, December 2003.

 109. On the website of Salman bin Fahd al-Oadah (`Awda), “How We Can Coexist,” 

http://www.islamtoday.net/english/showme2002, last visited October 21, 2004. For a more 

complete discussion, see F. Gregory Gause III, “L’anti-américanisme en Arabie saoudite.” 

 110. `Abd al-Wahhab al-Turayri, “Our Curriculum and Something Called Terrorism,” 

http://www.islamtoday.net/english, last visited October 21, 2004. 

 111. Raid Qusti, “Kingdom Doesn’t Support Armed Resistance in Iraq: Bandar,” Arab 

News, November 9, 2004, http://wwww.arabnews.com, last visited November 10, 2004. 

 112. “Saudi Arabia: Riyadh Sends Washington Signal Over Ulema Petition,” Stratfor, 

November 9, 2004, http://www.stratfor.biz/Story.neo?storyId=239081. 

 113. Hannah Allam and Yasser Salihee, “U.S. Troops Raid Homes of 2 Critical Sunni 

Clerics,” Philadelphia Inquirer, November 12, 2004. 

 114. Anthony H. Cordesman and Nawaf Obaid, “Saudi Internal Security: A Risk 

Assessment,” Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, Working 

Draft, May 20, 2004. 

 115. Toby Jones, “Violence and the Illusion of Reform in Saudi Arabia,” Middle East 

Report Online, November 13, 2003, http://www.merip.org/mero/mero111303.htmil, last visited 

October 8, 2004. 

 116. John Bradley, “Are the Saudis Sunk?” Prospect Magazine, September 2003, www.

prospect-magazine.col,uk or http://www.saudi-us-relations.org/ubb/threads, last visited October 

8, 2004. 

 117. For a reformer’s response to the Saudi government’s action, see Khalid al-Dakhil, 

“Quiet Time,” New York Times, Op-Ed, November 27, 2004, or online, http:/www.nytimes.

com/2004/11/27/opinion/27al-dakhil, last visited November 30, 2004.

 118. Ibid. 

 119. One specific plea, that the “doors to ijtihad open,” is a reference to a creative 

method of legal response that was discarded by Sunni Islam in the 10th century, although 

Shi`a jurists retain it. 

 120. Udo Steinbach, “Democratizing the Mideast,” Internationale Politik, Volume 5, No. 

3, Fall Issue, 2004. pp. 69, 72.
65

 121. John Fonte, “Democracy’s Trojan Horse,” The National Interest, No. 76, Summer 

2004, pp. 117-129. 

 122. Frédérick Volpi, “Pseudo-Democracy in the Muslim World,” Third World Quarterly, 

Vol. 24, No. 6, 2004, p. 1064.

 123. Gawdat Bahgat, “Terrorism and Energy,” World Affairs, Vol. 167, Issue 2, Fall 2004, 

pp. 51, 58. 

 124. Michael A. Levi, “Would the Saudis Go Nuclear?” The New Republic, June 2, 2003, 

posted at The Brookings Institution, http://www.brrok.edu, last visited September 29, 2004.

 125. Sudha Mahalingam, “Scare Not Scarcity Behind Soaring Oil Prices,” The Hindu, 

August, 16, 2004, http://www.hinduonnet.com, last visited December 13, 2004. For background 

on the oil industry, see “Saudi Arabia,” Country Analysis Brief, http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/

cabs/saudi.html, last visited June 22, 2004. 

 126. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, U.S. Department of State, “Saudi 

Arabia. International Religious Freedom Report 2004,” http:////www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/

irf/2004/35507.htm, last visited September 17, 2004. 

 127. Mai Yamani, Cradle of Islam: The Hijaz and the Quest for Arabian Identity, London and 

New York: I. B. Tauris, 2004. 

 128. Ali Khalil, “Election Fever Grips Riyadh,” Middle East Online, February 7, 2005,

http://www.midle-east-online.com/english/saudi, last visited February 7, 2005.

 129. A future energy relationship is well-explained by Ambassador Charles Freeman 

in “Defining Interests and a Changing Relationship,” Interview, Part I, Saudi-U.S. Relations 

Information Service, October 29, 2004, http://www.saudi-us-relations.org/newsletter2004, 

last visited November 8, 2004. While many call for a new U.S. policy that would reduce 

oil consumption and develop alternative fuels, it should be remembered that a) these 

alternatives will take time and transformation of the automobile industry and the highway 

system, and poorly supported rapid transit systems would also be difficult and costly; and 

b) many other oil consumers make up the market.