Strategic Outreach Roundtable

and Conference Report

THE EUROPEAN UNION'S COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY:

CENTRAL ISSUES . . . KEY PLAYERS

Fraser Cameron

Roy Ginsberg

Josef Janning

With a Summary of Discussion by:

Stuart MacKintosh

Sponsored by

The Strategic Studies Institute,

The American Institute for Contemporary German Studies of the

The Johns Hopkins University

and

Delegation of the European Commission to the United States

Washington, DC

May 10, 1995
ii

*******

This document was edited by Thomas-Durell Young and William

T. Johnsen of the Strategic Studies Institute; who, with Lily

Gardner Feldman, served as organizers of this roundtable.

*******

The views expressed in this report are those of the authors

and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of

the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the

U.S. Government. This report is approved for public release,

distribution is unlimited.
iii

FOREWORD

The role of the European Union (EU) as a key international

economic player is both highly developed and widely recognized.

The Union's profile as an international political actor is much

more limited, even though its activities are considerable. One of

the principal objectives of the workshop on "The Common Foreign

and Security Policy [CFSP] of the European Union: Germany's Dual

Role as Architect and Constrictor" was to familiarize American

policy and research communities with the realities of the

structure, practice and limits of this policy initiative. The

workshop, held on May 10, 1995, and sponsored by the American

Institute for Contemporary German Studies, the U.S. Army War

College, and the Delegation of the European Commission to the

United States, also highlighted the special role Germany has

played in the development of the CFSP, while considering, as

well, the contributions of France and the United Kingdom.

The future course of the CFSP matters to the United States

as it raises questions about the nature of sovereign decision

making on the part of principal American allies. Will these

allies increasingly come to the table with singular collective

positions? Will such a development enhance European stability?

Will greater European unity diminish U.S. influence? How will

NATO accommodate the change? The resolution of these issues in

the early years of the coming century will have a profound impact

on U.S. European relations and gives added salience to this

report.

 The workshop involved presentations by Fraser Cameron

(European Commission, Brussels), Roy Ginsberg (Skidmore College

and Center for Strategic and International Studies), Josef

Janning, (Forschungsgruppe Europa, Universität Mainz), whose

papers are reproduced in this volume; commentary by Daniel

Hamilton (U.S. Department of State), Philip Thomas (British

Embassy), Lily Gardner Feldman (American Institute for

Contemporary German Studies), Gerd Wagner (Embassy of the Federal

Republic of Germany), Karen Donfried (Congressional Research

Service), Pierre Buhler (Embassy of France); and extended

discussion with the audience. Mr Stuart Mackintosh has provided a

superb summary of the discussions.

We are pleased to provide these proceedings to encourage a
iv

greater understanding and appreciation of the European Union's

evolving common foreign and security policy.

LILY GARDNER FELDMAN RICHARD H. WITHERSPOON

American Institute for Colonel, U.S. Army

 Contemporary German Director, Strategic Studies

 Studies Institute
v

SUMMARY

Rapporteur: Mr. Stuart P. Mackintosh

Panel I–The Bureaucratic Politics of CFSP in the European Union:

The Roles of Germany, France and Britain.

Since the signing of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), the

European Union (EU) has undertaken a number of actions under the

aegis of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). An

important development has been the ability to move from

declaratory statements to operational actions.

The actions sanctioned have been broad in their scope,

ranging from monitoring elections in Russia and South Africa, the

provision of humanitarian aid in Bosnia, support for the Middle

East Peace process, and launching the Stability Pact.

Most participants agreed that the Stability Pact has been

modestly successful in mitigating ethnic and border disputes in

Eastern Europe. The EU's involvement in the process implicitly

stressed that those countries wishing to join the EU must take

steps to rectify outstanding ethnic and border disputes. The

recent treaty between Hungary and Slovakia (March 1995) may be

indicative of future CFSP successes in this arena.

However, concern has been expressed over the lack of aims

and objectives for the CFSP. The failure of the EU leadership to

formulate broad principles of action has confused and

disappointed external partners. Within the EU, this issue is seen

as less important. Security policy is linked to member states'

national interests, which often diverge. Therefore, a sudden

enumeration of the aims of CFSP and an expansion of joint actions

is considered unlikely. Those within the Union expect CFSP to

evolve gradually.

Possible Inter-Governmental Conference (IGC) Changes to the CFSP

Process.

 The UK government appears adamant that the three pillars of

the TEU (European Community, CFSP, Justice and Home Affairs) be

maintained. Nevertheless, there are concerns over the need to

improve policy making, organization, and implementation. The UK
vi

supports the Political Committee's central role on the CFSP

process and may push for regularization and an increase in the

number of Political Committee meetings. Support would be

forthcoming for a strengthening of the Council of Ministers

Secretariat.

British opposition to moves to provide an oversight role for

the European Parliament, an interpretive role for the European

Court of Justice (ECJ), or a right of initiative for the

Commission, remain strong. As a small number of anti-European

British members of Parliament appear to be controlling the

British government's EU policy, it is unclear whether the UK

position is sincere or being driven by domestic political

necessity.

Some Member States believe it is important to change the

voting system used for CFSP at the Council of Ministers. Others,

including the British, are opposed to the use of Qualified

Majority Voting (QMV) for CFSP matters. The consensus of

conference participants was that the EU Council of Ministers

appears reluctant to override vital national interests in the

CFSP process because of the potential damage to EU unity.

It is not yet clear whether the 1996 IGC is likely to make

incremental operational changes that will make CFSP work more

effectively. If carefully phrased, the U.S. position on such

changes could be a positive influence in shaping them.

Financing of the CFSP.

Conference participants disagreed over how accounting for

national contributions for CFSP monies would be carried out. Some

supported the German view that greater powers should be given to

the European Parliament, while others took the Franco-British

line that oversight should be retained at the Council of

Ministers. Whatever the eventual formulation, the syphoning of

monies from other priorities without a specific Community budget

line may well be opposed by the European Parliament.

EU Enlargement.

Enlargement of the EU from its present 15 members to as many

as 25 in the next century may cause problems but also provides
vii

opportunities and impetus for change in the institutional

structure of the EU. Clearly, further enlargement will severely

complicate the decisionmaking process of the EU which is already

under stress. However, enlargement of the Union can spur

institutional reform.

If the political will does not materialize, then enlargement

could damage the CFSP, as the decision- making process will

become even more convoluted and difficult. A possible short-term

solution to this problem would require EU agreement that smaller

groups of member states might act where broader agreement is not

forthcoming. The development of a multi-speed CFSP in the 1996

IGC would allow for this option.

U.S./EU Relations.

The Clinton Administration policy of supporting European

integration and of championing joint EU/U.S. partnership is

notable for its vigor in comparison to other recent

administrations. U.S. efforts to coordinate action whenever the

EU's CFSP allows will be maintained. Cooperation is being

promoted through bi-annual summits and regular ministerial

consultations, both formal and ad hoc.

There is growing Congressional concern over the apparent

unwillingness of the EU to take more responsibility for security

within Europe. This may be due to the difference between rhetoric

which may be necessary to overcome internal inertia and the

reality of what can reasonably be accomplished. The EU should

refrain from claiming too much for the CFSP, which is still in

its infancy. Rather, it must concentrate on achievable goals.

Congress must be made more aware of the CFSP process and the

Union must demonstrate that the EUROCORPS and the WEU can fit in

a cooperative framework with NATO and the United States.

The U.S./EU relationship is dependent on effective joint

action, and the impression that the U.S. is having to pursue

actions alone could result in a backlash from Congress. Both the

EU and the United States must avoid undue concen-tration on

domestic issues to the detriment of their common goals.

Partnership must be maintained even if the number of the U.S.

forces based in Europe declines.
viii

Currently the Clinton Administration, Senator Dole and

Representative Gingrich support NATO. The Joint Chiefs of Staff

still see the integrated military structure of NATO as essential.

This shows strong support for NATO at present. Perhaps a degree

of redefinition of the transatlantic relationship is needed, but

exactly how this might be accomplished is unclear.

Panel II–The Bureaucratic Problems of the CFSP in the EU: The

Roles of Germany, France and Britain.

A number of key differences exist in the new CFSP system.

First, post-TEU there are no taboo areas. In the past, Council of

Ministers meetings could not discuss issues with military

implications. Second, the concept of joint action commits

resources to particular policies within an agreed time frame.

Third, CFSP opens up the defense dimension to a far greater

degree than before.

The final text of the TEU articles regarding the CFSP was a

compromise between the Community approach (eight states

represented by Germany), and those in favor of a

intergovernmental approach (four states, led by the UK). Because

of the need for unanimity, the minority position triumphed.

France.

The French government opposes the Community approach and

wishes to leave the CFSP pillar as an intergovernmental process.

In approaching CFSP and the development of the Community, they

perceive the option as either a "German Europe" or a "European

Europe" with France continuing to be a pivotal player.

Philosophical differences between France and Germany over the

future political development of the EU will not stop the French

government from maintaining the close Franco-German alliance. The

alliance is the core of French foreign policy, and President

Chirac is unlikely to alter this position.

Germany.

Germany is committed to the Community approach. It supports

an increase in the powers of the European Parliament in the

foreign policy sphere. The FRG also wants stronger Community

institutions while accepting that such changes may not occur
ix

until after 1996. Deepening and strengthening of U.S./EU ties

followed by a widening of the EU remain central to the Federal

Republic's European policy.

Germany's position stresses NATO's preeminence in the

European security architecture. The German adminis- tration

wishes to see (viz. Kinkel's Chicago Council on Foreign

Relations' speech) a stronger transatlantic relationship.

Although there will not be direct U.S. involvement in the EU

decisionmaking process, cooperation and coordination must be

enhanced.

Chancellor Kohl, despite his belief in integration as

opposed to intergovernmentalism, will continue to cooperate with

the French to influence the EU agenda in areas where mutual

interests coincide. Their cooperation in less contentious areas

such as EMU will ensure their central role in the 1996 IGC and

beyond. No other two member states have the critical mass to run

the Community.

Britain.

A continued split in the British Conservative Party over

their European policy will undermine the UK's influence in the

IGC process.

The British government believes that the CFSP is too new a

mechanism to consider altering it in the upcoming IGC. In

particular, British Foreign Minister Douglas Hurd has rejected

QMV in the Council of Ministers on CFSP.

Decisionmaking in the CFSP.

Dispute arose over the relative merits of decisions being

taken in the Political Committee and Committee of Perma-nent

Representatives (COREPER). Some conferees agreed that the

Political Committees' role should be enhanced and that it would

maintain its position at the core of CFSP decisionmaking.

Others pointed to COREPER as the natural place for CFSP

decisionmaking. COREPER meets weekly and decides on multiple EU

issues and is fully cognizant of Community dynamics. Doubts were

expressed over the Political Committee's ability to understand
x

the full range of EU concerns.

A suggested median was the relocation of the Political

Committee to Brussels, with COREPER members advising. However,

national foreign ministries may balk at such changes.

EU Enlargement and NATO: A Fundamental Disagreement.

Opinions differed over whether EU enlargement should come

before NATO enlargement. Some conferees saw the need for NATO to

expand first, given that the next EU enlargement will not occur

until after the year 2000. Security guarantees for Central and

Eastern Europe were seen as important for stability in the

region; expanded NATO membership would underpin democratization.

Others disagreed, stressing the importance of the EU

relationship with Russia. Russian concerns over the expansion of

NATO, resulting from domestic political pressure, ought to be

recognized.

Preparations for EU enlargement are already underway.

Gradual development of eastern European economies (through

Association Agreements), and eventual membership of the EU, have

not been opposed by Russia. Enlargement of the EU is a lengthy

process, but prospective members are linked to the EU long before

they actually join. This is apparent in the Visegrad countries

which are aiming at membership by 2005. Preparations for EU

enlargement engender stability in the whole region rather than

undermining democratic forces in Russia. According to this

thesis, rapid NATO enlargement could be extremely divisive within

Europe and expose differing national interests and priorities

within the Community.

U.S./EU Decisionmaking.

Conferees agreed on the necessity to improve the quality of

intervention in each partner's decisionmaking process. How to

accomplish this end was not agreed. That said, each side should

establish mechanisms to ensure that the interests and concerns of

the other are taken into account in advance of any foreign policy

decisions. Failure to do so causes friction as was evident after

the U.S. decision to impose sanctions on Iran.
xi

WEU and the EU.

The U.S. Administration appears supportive of the

development of the WEU as a partner either exterior to, or

contained within, the institutions of the EU. While the latter is

not on the immediate horizon, there is a growing acceptance by

the elites in new member states that future membership of the WEU

will be required.

The neutral status of new member states is therefore less

troubling than in the past. Indeed they (Finland, Austria,

Sweden) bring not only new financial resources for CFSP actions

but also new perspectives on foreign policy development.

Europeans argue that care must be taken not to develop the

WEU at the expense of U.S. support of security in Europe through

NATO. This impression is contrary to the stated U.S. position

which stresses a willingness to cooperate with the EU and WEU on

security matters where possible. Rather U.S. concern rests on

stopping duplicative efforts; e.g., is the EUROCORPS taking

monies away from the NATO alliance, which could undermine support

for the alliance?

 It is important neither side of this debate overemphasize

the capabilities of WEU or NATO. U.S. support for modest steps on

collective defense should not be misconstrued as a major shift of

support from NATO to WEU. Moreover, European support for WEU

varies from country to country, and a consensus of opinion has

not yet emerged among EU members.

Panel III–The Importance of CFSP for German Foreign Policy.

This discussion highlighted the centrality of CFSP in

Germany's European policy. The discussion also stressed the FRG's

wish to see CFSP support the EU's strategic role and future

enlargement to the East.

German Motivations for Integration.

The German integrationist solution would support German

interests while keeping her policy goals within the institutions

of the EU. It also addresses the German public's reluctance over

future unilateral actions on security and defense matters outside
xii

Germany's borders. A gradual building of the CFSP and defense

arms of the Union would allow possible future German

collaboration in intervention, peacemaking, and European defense

solutions. The enthusiasm for this pillar of Maastricht is shown

by the current German support for the EUROCORPS, C3I, transport

facilities, and the EU linkage with the WEU.

Given German elite's stress on CFSP development, a move to

QMV on CFSP in the Council of Ministers is seen as desirable,

perhaps also including a movement of certain areas of foreign

policy competence to the Community level. This a far more radical

step than contemplated by other current member states.

The obvious differences between Germany and France on CFSP

development do not preclude continued collaboration. Instead a

trade-off may occur between German CFSP aims and French

objectives for EMU. Neither country can achieve its aims without

the other. Germany might secure an integrated defense policy in

return for other policy concessions. This more assertive German

position on defense matters may indicate a change in the balance

of power between France and Germany.

Variable Geometry or Concentric Circles and the CFSP.

The 1996 IGC may result in the development of further

"variable geometry" or "concentric circles" within the EU. The

outer circle characterizes those countries with partnership

agreements with the EU; the second, full EU members; and a third,

core group who "opt in" to greater CFSP solidarity. Such a

multilayered Community will be resisted by certain member states,

but the decision of France and Germany on these formulations will

be crucial to the outcome.

In the opinion of the French, successful enhancement of CFSP

will work if it conforms to subsidiarity, at the same time

allowing increased cooperation between willing states. Enhanced

solidarity of the type envisaged in the concentric circles would

allow faster development of CFSP.

Whether this new CFSP is a core group or a fourth pillar in

the Community structure is less important than decisions over the

institutional allocation of power in an enhanced CFSP.

Regardless, it is an area which will create conflicts of
xiii

interest.

Finally, participants stressed the importance of considering

CFSP as only one part of the Union's external policy options.

Security policy can no longer be divorced from economic policy.

The latter can be used to achieve aims contained in the former.
1

THE BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS OF CFSP IN THE EUROPEAN UNION:

THE ROLES OF GERMANY, FRANCE AND BRITAIN1

Fraser Cameron

Introduction.

These are confusing times for anyone trying to work out

whether the European Union (EU) has any prospect of developing a

common foreign and security policy (CFSP) worth the name. When

the CFSP was established, it was in answer to a range of internal

and external challenges. Internally, the completion of the Single

Market and the drive toward economic and monetary union (EMU)

necessitated corresponding moves towards Political Union, of

which CFSP was a central element. Externally, Europe was expected

to use its economic weight to achieve more political influence

and ensure stability around its borders.

The 1991 Maastricht negotiations to establish the Treaty on

European Union (TEU) took place in the midst of a geopolitical

earthquake which hit Europe following the collapse of communism

and failed to take into account, let alone attempt to meet, the

enormous challenges posed by the unification of Germany, the

sweeping changes in central and eastern Europe, and the

disintegration of the Soviet Union. There were high expectations

for the CFSP which superseded the previous light framework of

European Political Cooperation (EPC). The European Council became

directly involved, not only through the single institutional

structure, but also as the body to issue mandates for joint. The

views expressed are personal and do not commit the European

Commission in any way.> actions. Title V included a number of

improvements, such as the ending of taboo areas (one could now

discuss issues having military implications), the provision for

joint actions (Article J.3), and even for majority voting, albeit

only on the implementation of joint actions, common positions

(Article J.2) and the inclusion of security and defense (Article

J.4) with the WEU designated "an integral part of the development

of the European Union."

The final text of the Treaty represented a compromise

between the advocates of a community approach (8 member states

led by Germany) and those in favor of an inter-governmental

approach (4 member states led by the UK and France). Given the
2

need for unanimity at the IGC, the minority in favor of an

intergovernmental approach were able to carry the day. A pillar

structure was thus established which involved different

arrangements for CFSP (and the third pillar covering

Justice/Internal Affairs) than used for the first, or Community

pillar. Jacques Delors considered the changes a recipe for

confusion. Regrettably, his forecast has been proved all too

accurate with numerous EU disputes over competencies between the

different pillars.

The treaty text also papered over a dispute between the socalled Atlanticists and Europeans as regards the question of

common defense. It was agreed to review the defense aspect and

the institutional working of CFSP at the IGC in 1996.

Since Maastricht, three countries (Austria, Sweden and

Finland), one of which has a 1200 km border with Russia, have

joined the EU. It is likely that by the Cannes European Council

in June there will be ten associated states in central and

eastern Europe–all of whom have made it crystal clear that EU

membership is a top priority. Turkey, Switzerland, Cyprus and

Malta all still have applications on the table. In short, it is

not difficult to imagine a 25-30 strong EU within the next

decade.

This paper seeks to examine the CFSP in operation, discusses

its weaknesses, suggests some areas for improvement and assesses

the attitudes of Germany, France and Britain both to current

arrangements and likely future proposals.

The CFSP in Operation.

Although the CFSP only has been in operation for less than

18 months, it has been widely criticized for its cumbersome

procedures and lack of effectiveness. Kissinger's question in the

early 1970s, "Who do we call in Europe?", remains unanswered. An

earnest debate on how to improve the CFSP is gathering pace at a

time when the EU's three biggest diplomatic players–Germany,

France and Britain–are struggling hard to maintain a minimum of

consensus over some of the biggest foreign policy challenges they

face, such as the conflict in former Yugoslavia. Throughout much

of the Bosnian drama, Germany has shown more sympathy with U.S.

attitudes than with those of her EU partners. On policy toward
3

Iraq, the alignment is different: London backs the U.S. tough

stance, while France and Germany take a softer line. In respect

to Iran, however, the Europeans are united in their opposition to

the U.S. big stick approach.

These difficulties do not mean that the quest for a more

effective CFSP should be abandoned. The main argument in favor of

such a policy is quite simple: in most parts of the world, the EU

will either speak with one voice, or its voice will not be heard

at all. This also applies in Washington where U.S. officials,

unlike the situation in 1991, have made clear their preference

for a single European voice in international affairs. Indeed the

Clinton administration is perhaps the strongest supporter of the

need to create an European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI).

Discussions on how to establish ESDI and the corresponding

Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) are currently taking place

between WEU and NATO but it is unlikely that there will be any

agreement on the details until the new French President has

reviewed French security policy, and perhaps not before the

outcome of next year's intergovernmental conference (IGC), at

which a review of CFSP in operation and the defense dimension

will be high on the agenda.

An initial assessment of the CFSP in operation is not very

encouraging. Certainly there has been a vast increase in the

number of meetings and a considerable reorganization of the

various bureaucracies involved. The European Commission has

established a separate Directorate General (DG1A) to cover CFSP,

under the mixed authority of President Santer and Hans van den

Broek; the Council has also established a new Directorate to deal

with CFSP, headed by a British diplomat; while the WEU's

Secretariat has moved from London to Brussels.

Since the TEU came into operation on November 1, 1993, the

EU has agreed to a number of Joint Actions including:

• monitoring elections in Russia and in South Africa;

• providing humanitarian assistance in former Yugoslavia and

establishing an administration for Mostar;

• supporting the Middle East Peace Process;
4

• lobbying for the extension of the NPT;

• agreeing to export guidelines for the use of dual use

goods; and,

• promoting the Stability Pact to tackle problems concerned

with borders/minorities in central and eastern Europe.

In addition to these "joint actions," a number of "common

positions" (i.e., alignment of policies but not necessarily

taking action together or committing resources) have been adopted

on Libya, Sudan, Haiti, Rwanda, Ukraine and Burundi.

While these actions have been useful (particularly the

Stability Pact with its mixture of diplomatic pressure and

community assistance) in concerting the positions of member

states on some key issues, they have not led to increased EU

visibility nor really decisive action. The scope has been modest

and the added value of CFSP not always apparent. The most visible

failures have been in Yugoslavia and, to a lesser extent, in

Rwanda.

Weaknesses of CFSP.

The first obvious weakness–and the most difficult to

overcome–is the lack of political will to act decisively as a

Union. This may be due either to divergent perceptions of

national interests, or to unwillingness to accept the political

and sometimes budgetary costs of firm action. While most member

states seem to accept that they cannot hope to gain as much

influence by acting alone, they still seem reluctant to move

toward a credible and effective CFSP. This criticism is directed

more toward the larger member states but not exclusively (viz.

Greece's attitude toward Macedonia and Albania). As a result,

there is still too much reliance on declaratory diplomacy.

The second weakness has been the lack of any definition of

essential common interests of the Union in specific foreign

policy situations. In addition to divergent national perceptions,

this can be attributed to a failure to analyze the implications

of pursuing, or not pursuing, different courses of action.

A third weakness has been the decisionmaking procedure which
5

is based on unanimity. This means that the Union's capacity to

act may depend on the inclination of its most reluctant member

state on any given issue. A further problem is the rather

leisurely pace of Political Committee proceedings (usually

monthly) compared to the continuous activity in the Committee of

Permanent Representatives (COREPER) with weekly meetings.

Fourth, present financing arrangements for joint actions are

inadequate. There is confusion over the relationship between the

CFSP budget line as such, and budget lines for the Community

activities which may support actions under the CFSP.

Other weaknesses can be cited such as confusion over the

pillars which operate under different rules and procedures;

ambiguity concerning the respective roles of the Presidency and

the Commission (disputes over the interpretation of "fully

associated") and the form of the Union's external representation.

Some Foreign Ministers holding the Presidency seem to have

difficulty in making any distinction between representing a

national position and an EU position. Furthermore, in many

capitals outside Europe, the presence of the EU is conspicuous by

its absence.

The Need for Improvements.

Given the prospect of a substantially enlarged Union in the

not too distant future, an increasingly unstable international

environment and encouragement from the U.S. to achieve a credible

CFSP, it is imperative that the IGC results in an enhanced and

effective CFSP. Although an absence of political will cannot

itself be tackled through procedural improvements, such

improvements, taken together, may reinforce the sense of common

objectives and common interests, leading to a greater propensity

to act together. Some proposals already on the table include:

Policy Planning. An awareness of common European interests

can be increased by partially pooling the Union's capacity for

policy analysis. This already takes place to some extent through

the exchange of information on the EU telegraphic COREU network

and by joint meetings of policy planning staff from the member

states and the Union's institutions. Such cooperation is limited,

however, and could be enhanced by establishing a joint structure

for the evaluation of information, policy analysis and
6

preparation of policy actions. One proposal is that this body

should be a joint Commission-Council body, which would maintain

close links with WEU and which could be enhanced by officials on

detachment from member states and perhaps also academic

specialists.

Policy Objectives and Priorities. The TEU and recent

European Council conclusions provide only a general guide to the

objectives and priorities of the CFSP. This hampers decisive

action when situations arise requiring preventive diplomacy,

crisis management or conflict resolution. The Union's capacity

for action could be enhanced if it were to produce an annual

report and guidelines for the Union's external relations. This

could be a task for the policy planners mentioned above. The

Council would then debate the guidelines, having first sought the

views of the European Parliament. After Parliament had given its

opinion, the guidelines could be reviewed by the Council and then

transmitted to the European Council for approval. These

guidelines would then create the parameters for EU decisionmaking

on external policy during the course of the year.

Decisionmaking. Until now unanimity has been required for

joint action under the CFSP although, in principle, the Treaty

allows for decision by qualified majority on the details of

implementing measures. This means that the Union's capacity for

action can be limited by the reluctance of a single member state.

While respecting national prerogatives on matters of vital

interest in fundamental areas of foreign and security policy,

decisionmaking rules could be changed to permit member states

wishing to take action together, to do so within the framework of

the treaty. Such actions would only be agreed if they fell within

the broad guidelines approved by the European Council. Other

member states, though not necessarily participating directly,

would not be able to prevent the joint action from taking place.

Indeed, such an approach, which will be even more desirable in an

enlarged EU, finds its origin in the declaration attached to the

Treaty concerning the CFSP, which aims at preventing the blockage

of unanimity where a qualified majority exists. Obviously there

needs to be a reform of the voting system to allow for a greater

correlation with population size. Ministers also need to discuss

issues working from a similar information basis; and the CFSP

infrastructure (Political Committee, European Corre- spondents,

Planners, Working Groups) must prepare options for ministerial
7

decision.

Finance. The Union would lose effectiveness and credibility

if such actions were held up, as in the past, because of

difficulty in mobilizing the necessary resources. It is thus

essential that the Council determine the modalities of financing

whenever it decides on a joint action. Normally, financing

through the Union's budget is to be preferred to national

contributions for reasons of coherence and transparency. The CFSP

budget line should receive an adequate initial allocation,

estimated on the basis of past experience, through the annual

budgetary procedure. Finance from this line should be mobilized

quickly when the need arises. It may also be necessary to

mobilize resources from relevant budget lines for Community

activities in support of joint actions, as has occurred 

hitherto. Depending on the evolution of needs under the CFSP, it

may be necessary to revise the financial perspectives to make

sufficient resources available to ensure that the Union's

external policy is fully effective.

External Representation. Under the treaty, the Presidency

was given an increased role as regards external representation of

the Union. The Commission was also tasked with ensuring coherence

between the pillars. It is doubtful, however, whether the present

6-monthly rotation system can be maintained in an enlarged Union.

It is difficult to imagine Malta running the Presidency. And a

troika of Latvia, Lithuania and Luxembourg stretches the

imagination. Even with adjustments to the troika rotation, one

cannot escape the fact that future enlargements will concern

mainly small and indeed very small states. The solution is not a

directoire nor a new body to oversee CFSP but rather a

strengthening of the Community institutions.2

 This is the logical

path which two senior officials from the Auswärtiges Amt

correctly identified in the article in the Frankfurter Allgemeine

on 30 March 1995.

As far as the Commission's role is concerned, it is fully

associated with the implementation of the CFSP and has the right

of initiative, a right shared with the Presidency and other

member states. The Commission is uniquely well placed to provide

the European perspective and has demonstrated this in the past

year by preparing numerous, well-received papers covering EU

policy toward central and eastern Europe, Russia, Ukraine, the
8

Baltic states, the Mediterranean, Asia, Japan, Common Market of

the South (MERCOSUR), etc. Member states inevitably approach

problems from a national perspective while the Council has

neither the experience nor the critical mass of officials to

undertake new tasks in CFSP.

Furthermore, the Commission is an institution which provides

continuity through changing presidencies and troikas. On the

whole, the Presidency-Commission form of external representation

(e.g., for démarches) is more coherent than the somewhat unwieldy

troika formula. In the longer term, under the impact of

enlargement, there is a strong case for the Commission to act,

under a Council mandate, in the whole range of external policies.

One could envisage a senior Vice-President for foreign affairs

(rather like Sir Leon Brittan's role on the trade side) who would

speak for, and represent the Union in areas agreed upon by the

Council. An alternative proposal which has been suggested would

involve an independent CFSP Secretariat, roughly modelled on the

NATO example.

Security and Defense.

The Maastricht Treaty provides for the possibility of a

common defense policy, which might in time lead to a common

defense. In the past two years little progress has been made

toward achieving this goal. The relationship between the WEU and

NATO is indeed more highly developed than that between the WEU

and the EU.

The relationship between the WEU, which is, according to the

 Treaty, "an integral part of the development of the European

Union," the EU itself, and NATO, which is today the principal

framework for ensuring the defense of its members, is of course a

sensitive area and the IGC will wish to consider various options:

whether to maintain the status quo, whether to enhance the

capability of the WEU but leave it outside the EU, or whether to

bring it within the single institutional framework of the EU,

albeit perhaps as a separate pillar. At present it is difficult

to envisage agreement to bring the WEU into the EU framework in

1996, but it is important not to relinquish this as an EU goal.

Obviously the extent of any changes will depend on outside

developments, particularly in Russia and the United States, as

well as EU internal dynamics.
9

While working toward a consensus on the future division of

responsibilities between the WEU and NATO, the Union is gradually

attempting to create a European intervention force, under the WEU

umbrella, for use in the framework of joint actions under the

CFSP. There is increasing awareness that one of the most glaring

lessons of the Yugoslav crisis is that the lack of a credible

military instrument severely handicaps diplomatic efforts.

One of the most significant changes since 1991 has been the

change in the U.S. position as regards ESDI. Indeed there is a

strong argument that the future health of the transatlantic

relationship depends on the EU developing an effective CFSP,

including a defense dimension. Talk of a new transatlantic treaty

is premature, however, at least until the Union demonstrates that

it is capable of an effective foreign and security policy.

The German Position.

The Germans have consistently been one of the strongest

supporters of a communautaire approach to CFSP. At Maastricht

they were not in favor of establishing separate pillars, but

could not persuade the British or French to change their views.

The Germans have continued to snipe at the British for their

negative attitude towards Europe in general and CFSP/Bosnia in

particular. Although they have not yet defined their position for

the IGC, German spokesmen have stated that they will attempt to

secure a greater community involvement in CFSP.

During their Presidency (July-December 1994), the Germans

did not seek to introduce any new initiatives under CFSP. The

federal elections took place in the middle of their Presidency

which meant that German leaders, and in particular, Klaus Kinkel,

the Foreign Minister and former FDP leader, were unable to

concentrate fully on EU affairs. The Germans had indicated at the

start of their Presidency that central and eastern Europe would

be their top priority and they worked steadily, with strong

Commission support, to achieve agreement on the "pre-accession

strategy" at the Essen European Council. Apart from their

traditional and expected concentration on central and eastern

Europe, the Germans also provided for a wider dimension with a

well-received Asia strategy paper which called for greater EU

involvement in the Far East.
10

The debate in Germany about the IGC has been dominated by

the Schäuble/Lamers paper on a "hard core" Europe. Published in

September 1994, a month before the federal elections, the paper

aroused considerable controversy and not a little anxiety in

Germany and Europe. Although never adopted officially by the

government, the proposals were given wide currency as they had

been supported by the highest levels in the CDU. At present, the

German position would seem to be more in favor of all member

states proceeding to commitments entered into at the IGC, and to

revert to the hard core idea only as a last resort.

German external policy will continue to be restrained by a

number of factors including the burden of its history. This has a

twofold impact. First is the general burden of the Nazi period

and the reluctance to send the Bundeswehr to any country where

the Wehrmacht was active. Second is the burden of the 1949-89

period which saw Germany achieve unrivalled prosperity as a

result of no military engagement. For many Germans, not only on

the left of the political spectrum, there seems no reason to

change a tried and successful low-key foreign policy.

Another constraint is the restricted interpretation of the

Karlsruhe decision of July 1994 on sending the Bundeswehr out of

area. According to Kohl and Kinkel, such engage-ments will only

take place under UN or OSCE authority and with full the support

of the Bundestag. One should add to this the continued reluctance

of public opinion to expose German soldiers to dangerous

situations. (In this aspect the Germans are in good company with

most Americans.) It is perhaps worth adding that Germany has no

tradition of playing a global role. It never had a real empire

(cf., UK and France) and since 1949 has been perfectly content to

leave the U.S. to dominate its security policy.

For a variety of reasons, Germany will be reluctant to

assume either the mantle of European leadership or to have to

choose between the U.S. and France. Sitting on the fence may at

times be uncomfortable, but it is the preferred German position.

Thus Germany is in favor of widening and deepening the EU; of

enlarging to the east and to the south; of enlarging NATO and

seeking a strategic partnership with Russia; of strengthening WEU

and NATO–but not increasing its defense budget. If and when

Germany secures a permanent seat on the UN Security Council,
11

attitudes may change, but probably very slowly. Germany will thus

seek to continue its current successful mix of policies, to

become only gradually involved in global affairs (preferably

through the EU) and to avoid having to make hard choices.

The French Position.

The French have been consistently opposed to extending the

community approach to CFSP. For the French, the Elysée is the

center of decisionmaking in foreign and security policy. They

have a completely different approach than the Germans to the

concept of the nation-state. For the French (and the British) it

is something positive: for the Germans something rather negative.

There is little doubt that the French have been the big

losers as a result of the geopolitical changes since 1989. French

discomfort at the possible consequences of German unification

were obvious. Some have pointed to the marginalization of France,

politically, strategically, and geographically. The EU is now

looking east, where the main new markets are situated, rather

than to the south, which is widely regarded as a trouble spot.

France may still have its seat on the UN Security Council but

Germany also looks set to join this club. France still has

nuclear weapons, but what relevance are they in today's world?

French angst has been recognized in Bonn and Kohl has gone

out of his way to assuage French concerns by consulting Paris on

all important foreign policy issues. He has also made it clear

that Bonn and Paris should coordinate their positions for the

IGC.

In the aftermath of German unification and the recognition

that the countries of central and eastern Europe were turning

toward the EU in the expectation of membership, the French

launched the idea of a European Confederation. It was never clear

how this body would relate to the OSCE (then the CSCE), nor to

the EU. President Havel led the attack on the French proposal,

suggesting that it was a scarcely veiled device to postpone EU

membership for the new democracies of central and eastern Europe.

The French proposal for a Stability Pact (basically pressing

the central and east European states to resolve their minority

problems) also met with initial skepticism in Europe but as the
12

roundtables began to work, it was recognized that the mix of EU

diplomatic pressure and carrots (more money for cross-border

projects) was able to achieve results. The Stability Pact

concluding conference held in Paris in March 1995 was generally

welcomed as a useful exercise in preventive diplomacy.

The French Presidency also coincided with national elections

which meant that French leaders could not devote their full

attention to EU affairs. The Stability Pact was timed to conclude

during their Presidency (a month before the elections!) Other

priority areas included the Mediterranean and Rwanda, where the

French (and Belgians) initially acted alone and then were

supported, albeit with varying degrees of enthusiasm, by other

member states.

The French debate on the IGC has been extremely bland as a

result of the Presidential elections. It remains to be seen

whether the new President will continue Mitterrand's general

support for the European enterprise or whether he will seek to

develop a more Gaullist approach. There are strong voices in

France arguing for such an approach, whereas the supporters of

closer European integration are conspicuous by their absence. In

some areas (e.g., opposition to qualified majority voting in

CFSP, opposition to increased powers for the European

Parliament), the French will have the British as their

(un)natural allies. On other issues (e.g., economic and monetary

union) they will be seeking to maintain the German commitment.

The British Position.

John Major returned from Maastricht claiming "game, set and

match" for the British, having successfully negotiated an opt-out

on economic and monetary union and on social policy. He had also

ensured that there would be a separate pillar structure,

organized on inter-governmental lines, for CFSP and Justice/Home

Affairs. Despite these "achievements," the British government

almost tore itself apart during the ratification of the

Maastricht Treaty. The divisions over Europe within the

Conservative Party are such that the government's overriding

objection at the IGC will be to refrain from accepting any

proposal which could further deepen party divisions. Indeed Major

is on record as stating that he will veto any change to the

present institutional system.
13

The British Presidency (last half of 1992) was overshadowed

by the dramatic and unsuccessful fight to keep the pound within

the European Monetary System. The CFSP was not then in operation

and the British were reluctant to take any initiatives in advance

of the TEU's ratification. Since its entry into force on November

1, 1993, the British have spoken in favor of a strengthened CFSP

but have not been prepared to countenance any significant changes

to the operation of CFSP. Douglas Hurd has argued that CFSP

requires a running-in period and that it is out of the question

to move to majority voting.

In the spring of 1995 the British put forward a proposal

designed to increase modestly the capabilities of the WEU. The

proposal was received coolly by partners as it appeared to take a

step back from the Maastricht text describing the WEU as an

integral part of the development of the EU. The British have also

been extremely cautious about any moves which they consider might

tempt the U.S. to further disengage from Europe. At times their

insistence on the preeminence of NATO seems more American than

the U.S. position.

The British have made some attempts to improve their

relations with both France and Germany. With France the main area

of interest has been in the defense field, while with Germany, it

has been the economic field. But London suffers a credibility gap

in both Paris and Bonn for its failure to articulate a clear

commitment to the goals of European integration.

Conclusion.

Jacques Delors used to pose three questions about foreign

policy to member states of the EU: "What are our essential common

interests? Are we prepared to act together to defend these

interests? If so, with what resources?" These questions, to which

the member states have given no adequate response, remain valid

today and will become even more valid in light of subsequent

enlargement of the Union.

No one doubts that developing a credible and effective CFSP

will take time and will require familiarity, practice and 

confidence. Time is not on the Union's side, however, since the

need for an effective CFSP, recognized by public opinion in the
14

member states, is even greater now than it was at the time of

Maastricht. The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the

Soviet Union have been accompanied by the appearance of new risks

to European security.

There can be no effective CFSP without the whole- hearted

participation of all member states. The British (and the French)

seem incapable of overcoming their ideological hostility to the

community approach in foreign policy. They certainly have an

argument concerning the sensitive issue of distribution of votes

in the Council. But even if they were to receive a larger number

of votes, it seems unlikely that they would agree to drop their

veto in CFSP. Nor do they seem willing to accord the Commission a

greater role in representing the EU to the outside world.

At present, the British and French governments take the view

that only minor adjustments are required and that the CFSP must

remain firmly on an inter-governmental basis. It must be

doubtful, however, whether an enlarged EU with perhaps up to 25-

30 member states can operate an effective CFSP purely on an

inter-governmental basis. The danger is, as French Minister

Lamassoure pointed out in March, that the EU would degenerate

into the OSCE or League of Nations. Germany will thus have a key

role to play in moves to strengthen the CFSP. Will it be content

to join the Big Three and form a de facto 'directoire'? Or will

it put itself at the head of the community camp? At some stage

Germany will have to make a hard choice.
15

THE EUROPEAN UNION'S COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY

RETROSPECTIVE ON THE FIRST EIGHTEEN MONTHS

Roy H. Ginsberg

Introduction.

Title V provisions for a Common Foreign and Security Policy

(CFSP) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) entered into force

on November 1, 1993. Eighteen months later, what can be said of

CFSP as a process of decision- making and a deliverer of goods?

Is it a step up, or a step back, from its predecessor, European

Political Cooperation (EPC)? Or, is there standstill? These

questions are of particular moment as the European Union (EU)

gears up for the next round of Treaty revisions in the 1996

Intergovernmental Conference (IGC). The IGC is slated to draft

proposals which could improve the EU's decisionmaking and

institutional structure ahead of EU enlargement to include many

of the Central/Eastern European states. The last IGC–which ended

in December 1991 in Maastricht–produced the TEU.

Whereas "maximalists" argue that there is an oppor- tunity

to improve the functioning of the CFSP and to make headway in

realizing the TEU's objective of a European Security and Defense

Identity (ESDI), "minimalists" prefer to keep things as they are

or to make only marginal changes. This paper is written just when

the Reflection Group–representatives of the Foreign Ministers–is

convening in June 1995 to prepare for the IGC. Four observations

are offered at the outset.

First, there is a gap between what many of the TEU drafters

sought to do when they authored Title V in 1991 and what has

since transpired. Their vision of harnessing the resources and

expertise of both the national governments engaged in political

cooperation and the common bodies engaged in foreign economic

diplomacy to form more consistent, rounded, and higher-profile

joint actions has not materialized. Although some of the

controversial issues of CFSP's functioning have been sorted out

at least temporarily, many in the EU and the member governments

remain very dissatisfied. Why the gap between vision and outcome?

Either not enough time has passed for the wrinkles to be

ironed out of the provisions for joint CFSP actions and for
16

closer links between the EU and its defense arm–the Western

European Union (WEU)–or such provisions are flawed and in need of

repair. The 1991 IGC which gave birth to CFSP itself was hastily

conceived: many questions of procedure and substance were left

unanswered. Haste made waste.

Current political conditions are less conducive to CFSP than

they were in 1991. The Belgian Presidency was instrumental in

putting CFSP into operation in late 1993, yet the Greek

Presidency which followed won no such kudos. France and Germany

held their EU Council Presidencies during national elections:

needed attention and leadership were diverted from CFSP. CFSP's

growth may also have been retarded as a result of the crisis of

democratic legitimacy which has eroded public confidence in the

EU and in the member governments since the Maastricht debates

began.

Second, the anti-EU backbenchers now hold hostage the

British Government's EU policy. Whereas in 1991 the government

pushed for and received at Maastricht an inter-governmental

pillar for CFSP, it now appears to take a much more narrow/strict

(some would say obstructionist) view of CFSP's evolution. Are the

British backpeddling? Have they lost interest in their own intergovernmental creation?

There is a split in the EU over how to develop CFSP and an

absence of political will to overcome inevitable differences

which accompany cooperation in such a sensitive sector. British

ambivalence contrasts sharply with the support of Germany, the

Commission, the Low Countries, and Ireland, among others. While

the latter group was opposed to an inter-governmental approach in

the first place, it has lent support to CFSP's implementation as

originally envisaged: i.e., the better to relate the work of the

EC bodies–the Commission and the Committee of Permanent

Representatives (COREPER) aided by the Council Secretariat

(called Pillar One in the TEU)–to that of the national capitalsbased Political Directors who report to the Foreign Ministers

(Pillar Two). Although generally keen to develop CFSP, the French

have been known to resort to unilateral foreign policy action

with more zest and frequency than most other members.

Third, with or without CFSP, the political/economic/ 

diplomatic influence of the EU will still be largely defined by
17

the traditional Rome Treaty-based civilian actions of the

European Community (EC). The EC still exists as one of the three

pillars of the EU. CFSP/ESDI may in time enable the EU to back

its economic diplomacy with a military capability; yet should

they flounder, the EU will remain one of the two most influential

actors in the global political economy (along with the United

States).

Fourth, political will to make CFSP happen cannot be

legislated. It should come as no great surprise that there is

opposition to CFSP–after all, it is perceived to be a frontal

assault on one of the last great bastions of state sovereignty.

Whereas the IGC is widely expected to make only marginal changes

in the functioning of CFSP, it is more likely to make headway in

bringing the WEU and the EUROCORPS closer to the EU. The wars in

Kuwait and ex-Yugoslavia–where the gap between European interests

and capabilities was stunning–point to the need for the EU to

move beyond its historical security constraints and from the

rhetoric to the reality of a ESDI.

External stimuli have always played a large role in the EU's

development as an international actor. It was never realistic to

expect that the common market would forever remain isolated from

the current of international politics. Indeed the quest to

enhance the security of the common market goes back to the 1950s

when the then Six came very close to achieving a defense

community. Thus, whether or not ready, the EU is virtually

condemned to act abroad. This means not just responding to

external stimuli but representing and defending collective

interests. Failure over time to develop and improve CFSP could

demoralize, then contribute to the demise of the EU.

If the Fifteen are unable to agree as a whole to fix and

revive CFSP at the 1996 IGC, a two or multiple speed CFSP may

result. So long as the members either agree in general (or

abstain) over a common position shared by a majority, some subset

of the membership may wish to proceed with implementation, while

others, less committed, may distance themselves without blocking

"coalitions of the willing."

Primer.

The EU is an unorthodox international actor. Neither a state
18

nor a conventional international organization, its foreign policy

activities cannot be judged in traditional terms. EU foreign

policy actions draw on two great traditions of cooperation:

• the integrationist tradition of the Rome Treaty based on

the acquis communautaire (acquired EC laws and agreements),

elements of supranational law, common institutions, habits of

cooperation, and usage of qualified majority voting; and,

• the intergovernmentalist tradition of EPC, now CFSP, with

its acquis politique (acquired political declarations/actions),

legitimacy rooted in national interests and electorates,

expertise drawn from the members' Foreign Ministries, and

decisionmaking by consensus or unanimity.

Since its first incarnation in 1951, the EU has had a long

and rich tradition of relations with many states, regions, and

international organizations/regimes, and active involvement in a

wide array of international commercial and political issues.

Never a purely economic entity, yet never endowed with such

state-like attributes as a common will and a military capability,

still it has always been intimately linked to the security of

Europe, the balance between East and West, and the functioning of

the international political economy.

Common foreign economic diplomacy–the mainstay of today's EC

civilian (nonmilitary) foreign policy–is rooted in the provisions

of the Rome Treaty and based on qualified majority voting in some

areas, consensus or unanimity in others. Examples of areas in the

Treaty reserved for EC action include: enlargement, preaccession

cooperation, association and preferential trade accords, tariff

preferences, support for regional integration outside Europe,

development/emergency aid, coordination of aid to Central/Eastern

Europe on behalf of the Group-24, active support of human rights,

bilateral political dialogues, multilateral trade liberalization

negotiations, trade dispute settlement, economic/diplomatic

sanctions, and diplomatic recognition.

Specific examples of recent Treaty-based foreign policy

actions include mediation efforts in the war in ex-Yugoslavia and

the establishment of the European Community Monitoring Mission

(ECMM), withdrawing support for the new EU-Russian Partnership

Accord over the Russian invasion of Chechnya, pressing President
19

Yeltsin to accept a mission from the Organization of Security and

Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to maintain a permanent presence in

Chechnya, working on a financial plan to close down the Chernobyl

nuclear power plant, renewal of the financial protocol of the

Lomé Convention, reviving relations with the Maghreb and the

Mediterranean Basin, and developing ties with such new trade

blocs as MERCOSUR–the Common Market of the South.

EPC, now CFSP, picks up where the Rome Treaty leaves off,

given the latter's silence on foreign (political) policy and

security. EPC started with foreign policy coordination in the

1970s and began considering the political-economic aspects of

security in the 1980s. EPC had its strengths and weaknesses: it

facilitated coordinated positions at the OSCE and toward the

Arab-Israeli dispute, but it failed miserably to provide rapid

responses to international crises (e.g., the run-up to and the

outbreak of the U.S-Libyan conflict in 1986). EPC had neither an

institutional nor a treaty base until 1987 when the Single

European Act brought it closer to the EC and gave it a small

secretariat.

Now in the 1990s the TEU opens up the door to a ESDI which

years earlier was considered taboo. CFSP has the potential to be

a major qualitative improvement over its predecessor. It

explicitly links foreign and defense policy, raises the level of

member governments' commitments to common action, and thus could

go beyond the declaratory diplomacy which characterized but also

limited the work of EPC.

While a main criticism of the CFSP is that the EU has yet to

articulate a global and strategic vision for European foreign

policy, there are a number of basic principles which are implicit

in many of the EC/EU's foreign policy activities. Surely those

principles are not uniformly applied to all foreign policy

positions, but EU principles are as much at work in its actions

as Canadian, German, or U.S. principles are at work in their

actions.

The EU is a symbol of structural peace and reconciliation

among ancient enemies. Championing human and civil rights,

respect for the law, market and democratic reform, and the

integration of other regional groups are corner- stones of EU

foreign policies. These principles are inspired by the
20

experiences of war, 19th century European liberalism, and the

success of European regional integration in the last half of the

20th century.

The experience of digging out of the rubble of war to

reclaim the dignity and rights of the individual and to achieve

stability, prosperity, and security through regional integration

is embedded in the shared Western European political culture of

the post-war era. The EU is a magnet for nonmember European

states and a model for other regions of the world. A prerequisite

for membership in, and association with, the EU is that the

applicant state must be a practicing democracy. This is a

powerful inducement to change as evidenced by the dramatic

democratic transitions in Greece, Spain, and Portugal. The EU's

interregional policies, designed to support regional integration

movements from Central and South America to Africa and from the

Middle East to East Asia, testify to the wider legacy and example

of European integration.

The gross violations of basic human rights by the Nazis and

their collaborators before and during World War II have left an

indelible mark on the EU members. As a result, human rights

provisions are now regular features in most of the EU's foreign

trade accords and the EU resorts to economic and diplomatic

sanctions against foreign governments which violate basic human

and civil rights (e.g., against Vietnam, Turkey, Rhodesia,

Greece, and South Africa in the past and Nigeria, Sudan, Serbia,

and Russia at present). A large share of common political

positions and declarations are in response to violations of human

rights and assaults on democratic government throughout the

world.

EU foreign policy activity may be guided by a set of

principles closely linked to the European project itself, but the

EU is unable independently to defend those interests by military

force–a contradiction with which the EU has had to grapple for

over 40 years.

CFSP in Treaty Form.

The TEU created a new edifice–the European Union–supported

by three pillars: the EC (Rome Treaty) formed Pillar One, EPC

became CFSP and formed Pillar Two, and cooperation in justice and
21

home affairs formed the basis for Pillar Three. Title V sought

to develop high-profile joint actions which draw on the assets of

the pillar system. The pillar system was designed to ensure

consistency of actions across the various policy domains. To

enhance EU security, the TEU designated the WEU to be its defense

arm and charged the WEU with the task of devising plans to

achieve that goal.

The potential for more rounded and consistent foreign policy

across the pillars was given a boost by the Title V provisions

which put COREPER in charge of preparing the meetings of the

Council of Foreign Ministers. Previously, the Political Committee

(comprised of Political Directors or senior staff from the

members' Foreign Ministries) prepared for the EPC meetings of the

Foreign Ministries outside the Rome Treaty framework. COREPER–a

Brussels-based EC body of permanent representatives (or

Ambassadors) from the member governments and serviced by the

Council Secretariat–is well placed to link the foreign economic

and political arms of the EU. Whereas COREPER has a panorama view

of EU affairs, the Political Directors are far removed by virtue

of their geographical location and political/national

orientation. The extent to which the COREPER-Political Committee

relationship has worked in ways consistent with the intentions of

the most of the TEU founders is examined in the section on "CFSP

Assessed."

Title V–as implemented under the Belgian Presidency–brought

the old EPC secretariat inside the Council Secretariat, gave it a

larger, more permanent staff, and a budget (EPC had a tiny staff

seconded from the capitals and no budget). Title V highlights the

notion of a joint action as the main medium for EU foreign

policy. The topic of a joint action must be initially decided by

the European Council on a unanimous basis but may then be

implemented on the basis of qualified majority voting. Any member

state, the Council, or the Commission may initiate a proposal for

a joint action. The European Parliament (EP) is consulted at

various stages of decisionmaking but otherwise the drafters chose

to keep it at bay in the CFSP edifice. The extent to which the

European Court of Justice (ECJ) has purview over an intergovernmental undertaking remains to be seen. Administrative

expenses of joint actions were to come from existing budget lines

in either the Commission or Council Secretariat. Operational

expenses were to come from contributions from the member
22

governments. What formula was to be used to achieve the latter

and how the European Parliament was expected not to stick its

nose in the former were left to the imagination.

CFSP in Practice.

On the basis of general guidelines issued by the European

Council and pursuant to Article J.3 of the TEU, the Council

decided on seven joint actions between November 1993-December

1994. This section briefly describes the basic actions and the

next section offers a critical assessment.

Humanitarian Aid to Bosnia and the EU Civil Administration

of Mostar. In the first CFSP joint action (November 8, 1993–

Belgian Presidency), the Council decided, after having received

the European Council's general guidelines (October 29), to

increase its contributions for use by the U.N. High Commissioner

for Refugees (HCR) and support the convoying of international aid

in former Yugoslavia, particularly through the identification,

restoration, and preservation of priority routes. Consultations

were held between the EU (Presidency, Commission, the EC

Monitoring Mission), the United Nations Protection Force

(UNPROFOR), and the HCR.

In subsequent renewals and extensions, the Council included

the EU's administration of the city of Mostar in this joint

action in collaboration with the WEU. Financing came from either

the EU budget (for operations) or from the member states on the

basis of a GNP scale (for other costs). On June 13, 1994, the EU

and WEU Presidents and the Bosnian Government agreed to a

memorandum of understanding to establish the conditions for the

EU administration of Mostar for a two-year period. Mr. Hans

Koschnick was appointed Administrator. In October 1994 the

Council allocated ECU 80 million to finance support for the EU

Administration in 1995.

Dispatch of a Team of Observers for the Russian

Parliamentary Elections. In the second CFSP joint action

(November 9, 1993–Belgian Presidency), the Council decided, after

having received the European Council's general guidelines

(October 29), to support Russia's democratic transition by

dispatching a team of observers to witness the Russian

parliamentary elections of December 1993. The action was at the
23

request of the Russian Government. The EU set up an elections

monitoring unit in Moscow under the charge of the Presidency with

full association of the Commission. The unit coordinated EU

observers, coordinated with international organizations and other

observers, and provided a link with Russian authorities.

Administrative costs were borne by the Council budget;

expenditures of observers were covered by the member governments

who sent them.

Support for South Africa's Democratic Transition. In the

third CFSP joint action (December 6, 1993–Belgian Presidency),

the Council decided, after having received the European Council's

general guidelines (October 29), to support South Africa's

democratic transition by setting up a program of assistance to

prepare for and monitor the first all-racial democratic

elections. The EU electoral unit in South Africa assisted in the

preparations for the elections in terms of offering advice,

technical support and training, and support for nonpartisan voter

education in advance of the election. Operational expenditures

were drawn from the EC budget. Salaries and travel expenses

incurred by the monitors were charged to the member states which

sent them.

Sponsorship of an Inaugural Conference in Support of a Peace

and Stability Pact. In the fourth CFSP joint action (December 20,

1993–Belgian Presidency), the Council decided, after having

received the European Council's general guidelines (October 29),

to hold a European conference to inaugurate a process by which

ethnic and border disputes might be settled before they lead to

war. Central and Eastern European states with border disputes and

minority population problems are strongly encouraged by the EU to

enter into bilateral compacts in which they agree to settle those

disputes and protect those minorities' rights. Administrative

costs associated with the holding of conferences were charged to

the Council budget.

The inaugural conference was held in Paris on May 26-27,

1994. Delegates from 52 OSCE states attended as did

representatives from other European and international

organizations. The conference adopted conclusions setting out the

aims and principles and operational arrangements for the

establishment of regional roundtables. The EU declared its

readiness to play an active role in bilateral talks and regional
24

roundtables and make available appropriate aid. The agreements

which come of the talks will be entrusted to OSCE. The OSCE will

be asked to evaluate and monitor the implementation of the

accords and the commitments made in them. Implicit in the joint

action is how the lure of EU membership will catalyze Central/

Eastern European states, all of whom seek to join, to sign on to

the pact. The historic treaty signed by Slovakia and Hungary in

1995 testifies to the success of the EU action.

Support for Middle East Peace. In the fifth CFSP joint

action, the Council decided (April 19, 1994–Greek Presidency),

after having received the European Council's general guidelines

(October 29, 1993), to support the Middle East peace process by

monitoring the settlements in the Occupied Territories, working

to lift the Arab boycott of Israel, supporting the organization

of an international economic conference on infrastructure

projects in the region, supporting a new EU-Israel agreement,

partici-pating in a future temporary international presence in

the Occupied Territories as provided for in UN Security Council

Resolution 904, helping to organize and monitor elections in Gaza

and the West Bank, and supporting the new Palestinian Police

Force. The financing of this joint action was not elaborated and

was left to a future Council decision.

Support for the Renewal of the NNPT. In the sixth CFSP joint

action, the Council decided (July 25, 1994–German Presidency),

after having received the European Council's general guidelines

(June 25, 1994), to strengthen the nuclear nonproliferation

system by promoting the universality of the Nuclear

Nonproliferation Treaty (NNPT) and by extending it indefinitely

and unconditionally. The action includes EU approaches to states

not yet party to the NNPT with offers to assist them with the

decision to accede and with establishing procedures required for

meeting Treaty obligations.

Control of Exports of Dual-Use Goods. In the seventh CFSP

joint action, the Council decided (December 19, 1994–German

Presidency), after having received the European Council's general

guidelines (June 25, 1994), to establish a list of third country

destinations to which the EC's new regime for the control of

exports of dual-use goods (goods which can be used for both

civil and military purposes) may be restricted.
25

CFSP Assessed.

Although small in number, the seven joint actions to date

provide at least some empirical evidence with which to begin to

assess how CFSP has worked in practice. Member governments took

less ambitious actions at first to ensure success and to build

public support. The joint actions were kept fairly low-key in

part because they were designed as much for effect as for

internal consensus-building. Over time, as confidence increases,

joint actions may become more ambitious, but for now the premium

has been on the "inward development" aspects over the outward

ones. Five problem areas are identified for particular attention

because, left neglected, they unnecessarily diminish CFSP.

Definition of Joint Action. Title V elaborates on the

process of making joint actions, but offers no definition of what

a joint action is. Is it joint among the 15 members or is it

joint between the 15 members operating in CFSP on the one hand

and the EC operating under the Rome Treaty on the other? The act

of defining may have eluded the Maastricht negotiators because of

the difficulty of reaching consensus among the member governments

over such a sensitive matter, but if the member governments

cannot agree to a definition of a joint action, it then boggles

the mind to envisage the practice of joint action. A definition

will help clarify the roles of the different pillars and

demystify CFSP for European citizens–a goal worthy of the

Reflection Group's consideration as it prepares for the next IGC.

Financing. With each of the joint actions which carried

financial obligations, there were divisive debates. No one wanted

to pay for joint actions. Title V does not create a CFSP budget.

Pillar Two, the essence of intergovernmental cooperation, for all

intents and purposes "raids" Pillar One's budget. Pillar One

constitutes the entire EC budget, so it is rich in resources. The

problem is that those resources have been approved by the

European Parliament, audited by the Court of Auditors, and

subject to the legal purview of the European Court of Justice.

All three bodies belong to the EC in Pillar One.

Pillar Two depends completely on the Council Secretariat (a

communitarian body) for institutional support and on the budget

of the Commission or Council Secretariat to fund the

administrative costs of joint actions. Article J.11 of the TEU
26

stipulates that the administrative costs of CFSP joint actions

may be charged to the EC budget and that the Council shall decide

whether or not to charge the EC budget or the member governments

for operational expenditures associated with joint actions. No

guidance was offered as to how member governments would be

assessed contributions. The Council has subsequently determined

that contributions will be based on a GNP scale.

There can be no CFSP without a budget. Member governments

are loathe to pay for joint actions–many are willing to siphon

off funds already allocated to EC foreign aid programs under

Pillar One. There are two problems with this stopgap measure.

First, since the Council has not codified the rules of

financing joint actions, since many of the member governments do

not have CFSP budget lines, and since the Commission and Council

Secretariat have limited CFSP budgets, as each new joint action

is proposed there will be a debate over how it is to be financed.

This is hardly desirable in terms of the speed necessary to adopt

joint actions which are in response to international crises.

Additionally, if Pillar Two raids Pillar One's resources for the

purposes of financing CFSP joint actions, then there are a number

of legal and political problems which the Reflection Group will

want to note. The three EC institu-tions with Rome Treaty

mandates over spending and programs have been locked out of CFSP

decisionmaking by the TEU drafters and the Foreign Ministers. The

use of EC resources by a non-EC body infringes on the legal

rights of EC bodies. How can EC funds be spent without proper

safeguards, oversight, and accountability?

The British, who do not want Pillar One to "contaminate"

Pillar Two, are also quick to shy away from funding of CFSP joint

actions from national budgets. If the British accept Pillar One

financing of Pillar Two actions, they will, in effect, be

accepting the interpillar vision of CFSP they have publicly

opposed.

Second, there is no such thing as a strictly

intergovernmental framework for CFSP. For CFSP to work, it has to

draw on the expertise, resources, continuity, stability, and

memory of the EC institutions. An interpillar approach to CFSP

means that when EC money is being spent and EC staff is being

employed in the service of Pillar Two, the EC bodies must be able
27

to fulfill their consti- tutional responsibilities. If the

governments want CFSP to be divorced from the EC, they will have

to staff and fund joint actions independently of the EC.

Institutions and Interpillar Relations. The pillar system is

divisive. Every twist and turn in the development of CFSP has

been a virtual battleground for the integrationists (or

maximalists) and the inter-governmentalists (minimalists). This

was not the vision of the majority of the TEU drafters. Their

concept of a European Union was to create a single institutional

framework to draw on both traditions of European cooperation. The

Permanent Representatives sitting in COREPER were designated to

be the liaison between the EC and CFSP and to coordinate EC and

CFSP actions. Whereas in the past the Political Directors sitting

in the Political Committee prepared EPC meetings of the Foreign

Ministers (and hoped to retain that privilege), COREPER was

charged by Title V to perform this important function. As

mentioned, COREPER is uniquely situated to ensure EC-CFSP or

interpillar consistency because it is a body which serves both

the EC under the Rome Treaty and the national governments as

Ambassadors.

Although the Political Committee must now pass its reports 

and agenda items through COREPER, this has apparently not

diminished the Political Directors' impact on CFSP. Indeed, the

Political Committee has remained more powerful and resilient to

change than many TEU founders envisaged. Since COREPER is spread

too thin simply covering the complexity of EC business, it must

defer to the Political Committee's foreign policy advice and

expertise. By appealing directly to their Foreign Ministers,

there is ample room for the Political Directors to circumvent

COREPER's new role. Since Political Directors work for national

Foreign Ministers, they cannot be expected to play the role of

ensuring interpillar consistency. Simply put, Political Directors

are responsive to political administrations who in turn serve

party and national interests. While representing national

interests in Brussels, the Permanent Repre- sentatives work daily

on European issues in a setting which demands sensitivity to

reach common positions. Only COREPER can do this. The COREPERPolitical Committee relationship encapsulates the tug of war

between contending approaches to EU decisionmaking. The future of

CFSP may well depend on how the two bodies work out a modus

operandi.
28

The Commission is caught between a rock and a hard place. It

was granted the right of initiative in Pillar Two long denied to

it when it was associated loosely with the old EPC. So far it has

not chosen to exercise that right. It is concerned that if it

fully engages in the procedures of Pillar Two, its independence,

resources, and competencies under the Rome Treaty will be eroded.

It fears the "intergovernment- alization" of Pillar One by Pillar

Two. Yet it wants to play a constructive role. It has reorganized

itself to bolster its foreign policy staff of experts in

anticipation of playing a critical role in CFSP. Only time will

tell how the Commission manages to balance EC and CFSP foreign

relations without undermining its independence and competencies

under the Rome Treaty. The Commission is well situated to ensure

that CFSP actions are consistent with EC ones.

The Council Secretariat, now home to the old EPC operations,

has been slow to fully integrate the culture of intergovernmental political cooperation with the culture of the

permanent staff and their communitarian way of doing things. The

new CFSP Directorate has been slow to take shape. Its size–about

25 professional staffers (half seconded from the Foreign

Ministries for 5-year periods and half permanent)–will remain

small relative to the 250 or so professionals staffing the

Commission's international operations and thus may constrict its

ability to provide timely forward analyses. Nonetheless, the CFSP

staff will have more permanence and resources than did its

predecessor.

The EP got the short end of the stick in the CFSP apparatus.

Parliament wants CFSP to be financed from the EU budget so that

it may exercise its full powers with regard to approving budgets

for and scrutinizing expenditures of joint actions. A number of

Foreign Ministers tend on the whole to reject such parliamentary

intrusion. A CFSP which lacks democratic legitimacy with, and

accountability to, the European electorate will be undercut by

the lack of popular support. The 1996 IGC ought to give the EP

the right to exercise its powers over any CFSP expenditures which

are drawn from EC resources. In exchange for its place in the

CFSP edifice, Parliament may be willing to propose that a

permanent portion of the Commission's yearly budget include a

CFSP reserve.
29

The WEU has made some progress in moving closer to the EU,

but the pace of WEU-EU (as well as WEU-NATO) cooperation is much

slower than many of the TEU founders had envisaged. The WEU

headquarters has moved from London to Brussels and the WEU

Presidential term of one year has been reduced to 6 months to

complement the EC Council Presidency. There is an attempt to have

the EC Council Presidency coincide with the WEU Council

Presidency to the extent possible. The WEU has established a

planning cell, identified areas in which it can make a

contribution to enhancing European security, and beefed up its

intelligence and research capabilities. Despite these and other

adjustments and innovations (e.g., WEU-EU collaboration in Mostar

and expansion of the WEU to include additional EU members as

either full or associated members), the slowness with which the

member governments have moved to develop WEU-EU ties reveals

reservations some EU member governments have over developing the

ESDI. It bodes well for the future of the EU as a security actor

that in January 1994 the NATO Council endorsed ESDI, CFSP, the

WEU as the EU's defense arm and as the strengthened European

pillar of NATO, and the notion of a Combined Joint Task Force (to

enable the WEU to take military action using NATO assets). Still,

much of the above remains in the planning stage and little

substantive action has followed.

Decisionmaking. Title V opened the door to qualified

majority voting (QMV) in the implementation of joint actions, but

to date all actions have been decided on the basis of consensus.

This is due no doubt to the fear of beginning a precedent. After

all, what most clearly differen- tiates the integrationist from

the inter-governmentalist approach is voting method: continued

use of unanimity (consensus), even where the TEU opens the door

to QMV, ensures the triumph of inter-governmentalism and the

sovereignty of the states. The eventual introduction of QMV in

the implementation of joint actions may help "break the ice."

However, there is no substitute for the opportunity to use QMV in

the European Council when the Heads of Government make the

initial commitment to act in tandem and lay down the broad

guidelines for the Council (of Foreign Ministers) to implement.

A CFSP which remains based on unanimity lacks the

flexibility which a group of 15 states needs in dealing with the

outside world. Increased use of abstention may help get around

the requirement of unanimity. "Consensus minus one" could help
30

the EU take international action over the objections of one

member government. A two- or multiple-speed CFSP may permit

coalitions of the willing to take common action so long as the

membership as a whole– or a qualified majority or a consensus

minus–either supports (or does not oppose) a general framework

for such action.

Lastly, since QMV as currently devised gives more weight to

the smaller states relative to the largest ones and given the

future growth of the EU to include many new small states, the

Reflection Group will likely recommend a new QMV formula. A new

formula would retain QMV, and thus not eliminate the influence of

smaller states, but give the four most powerful states (United

Kingdom, France, Germany, and Italy) a heavier weighing to take

into account population size. There is no hope for increased

usage of QMV unless it is revised to accommodate the big states,

without whom there can be no CFSP. At the same time, a new QMV

formula which grossly reduces the influence of the smaller states

threatens to erode the very foundations of the EU–foundations

which respect the rightful place of all states in the European

project.

The Scope of Joint Actions to Date. Based on the experience

to date, the concept of joint action may be too much of a

straitjacket to be useful. For example, each time a joint action

is proposed and the philosophical, budgetary, and interpillar

implications are assessed, old wounds are opened between the

minimalist-inter-governmentalists and the maximalistintegrationists. Fights occur not over the value of action but

over the means. The competition and mistrust which exist between

Pillars One and Two have stymied the evolution of CFSP.

The joint action to convoy humanitarian aid in ex-Yugoslavia

would probably have been achieved under the old EPC. However, the

decision to set up a civil admin- istration in Mostar with the

aid of the WEU does represent a step up from EPC. How the WEU and

EU cooperate in Mostar may affect the pace of their future union.

Despite wishes to the contrary, the EU cannot walk away from the

Balkans, and the Mostar action represents a new phase in the

development of its foreign policy. The action to dispatch a team

of election observers to Russia in some respects diminishes

rather than validates CFSP. However, it was designed more for the

inward development aspect of CFSP–to build inner confidence in
31

the use of joint action–than to have important external effects.

After all, nongovernmental organizations are perhaps better

suited to handle election monitoring given the host of other

foreign policy actions worthy of the EU's attention.

The South African action was different from the Russian one.

The EU spent considerable time and resources in South Africa

educating people and carefully preparing them for the democratic

transition. It was more than a mere monitoring mission. It was a

step up from EPC but yet modest enough so that the EC could claim

a CFSP success. The Peace and Stability Pact Conference and

follow-up was a major success for CFSP. Having experienced the

failure of its mediation efforts in ex-Yugoslavia and having

failed to better prepare for, indeed seek to preempt, the

inevitability of ethnic strife in the post-Tito period, the EU

sought to use a new approach: i.e., to use preventative

diplomacy. It proceeded to work closely with states who have

border disputes or minority problems by offering rewards (EU

membership) in exchange for confidence-building contracts

stabilizing border regions and guaranteeing the rights of ethnic

minorities in foreign lands. The joint action concerning the

Middle East peace process was an example of the EU looking for

something constructive to do in this volatile region. Much of

what is in this joint action has already been done or could have

been done by the EC in conjunction with the old EPC. Support for

renewal of the NNPT and for limits of exports of dual-use goods

are security-type actions which may pave the way for the future

ESDI but are still rather modest in scope.

The number of joint actions remains low. While some of the

actions would have been undertaken under the pre-CFSP regime,

others did add value to the old EPC and bode well for the future.

As a means to develop CFSP, the use of joint action may end up

diminishing rather than elevating common European positions. CFSP

is more than joint actions: besides the requisite political will

to act together, it includes common positions and declarations

and the many ways in which political cooperation and economic

diplomacy interact to form more consistent and effective "joint

EC-CFSP joint actions."

CFSP and the Next Intergovernmental Conference.

What are some of the likely outcomes of the IGC? Minimalists
32

call for only changes at the margins–reforming QMV to take into

account national population (British view), strengthening the

Council Secretariat CFSP Directorate to handle CFSP (French

view), and bringing the WEU closer to, but not necessarily

inside, the EU by possibly creating a fourth pillar (British and

Danish view). Maximalists call for permanent CFSP budget lines

for the Commission, the Council Secretariat, and the member

governments; the EC bodies to assume their legal right of purview

over CFSP spending drawn from the EC budget; increased usage of

modified QMV in the implementation of joint action; introduction

of modified QMV in the initial adoption of the principle of a

joint action; and reexamination of the COREPER-Political

Committee relationship to determine how best to manage the CFSP

agenda and to ensure interpillar consistency. Some maximalists go

as far as to press for the integration of the defense industry

into the common market to create the conditions for harmonized

product standards and thus hasten the coming of a ESDI.

The EU's future enlargement, which could double its

membership, is a strong possibility. Decisionmaking will become

even more difficult than it is now. One antidote is to introduce

modified QMV into all CFSP decisionmaking. Another antidote is to

accept a two- or multiple-speed CFSP as an unfortunate but

necessary concomitant of an enlarged Union. This would require a

complicated formula in which a minority of members would agree

not to block the wishes of the majority and would not participate

in the implementation of an action. The precedents for such a

scenario come from other areas of the EU: monetary and social

integration where members agree to move at different speeds

within the same general direction. In the end, the IGC, which may

last 2 or more years, will likely produce outcomes straddling the

fault lines of the minimalists and the maximalists.
33

THE IMPORTANCE OF CFSP FOR GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY

Josef Janning

Introduction.

To develop a coherent Common Foreign and Security Policy

(CFSP) has been and remains of principal interest to Germany's

European policy. This is partly due to external pressures on the

European Union (EU) as perceived in Germany and partly due to

internal preferences and constraints on the country's role in

Europe and beyond. Among the motives and interests governing this

policy, three arguments deserve closer attention. First is the

functional argument, i.e., the adaptation of the Union's

framework to the post-1989 perspective of European integration.

Second is the solidarity argument, i.e., the interest in

developing the EU's partnership quality. And third is the

alliance argument, i.e., the ability of Germany fully to

participate in the preservation of European security and defense.

Negotiating CFSP at Maastricht: Interests and Achievements in a

German Perspective.

In close, but not full cooperation with France, Germany was

among the key proponents of increasing European Political

Cooperation into a foreign and security policy framework beyond

the inter-governmental level. The Franco-German initiatives in

the preparation of the Maastricht Treaty drove the negotiations

in 1990 and 1991. As seen from Bonn, Political Union was to be

the wished for twin sister of Monetary Union; a quid pro quo

approach to the French strategy of strengthening the ties that

hold member states together beyond the East-West conflict. At the

time, the new demands on Germany's ability to contribute to the

security and defense of the West and of western interests had

already become a political issue with the Gulf War, the KurdishTurkish issue, the break-up of Yugoslavia and other variants of

the out-of-area debate. In the European theater, concerns about

the impact of German unification for the balance of the new

Europe opened the window for a significant advancement in the

field of foreign and security policy.

Building on the French determination to strengthen the ties

of integration, the German government was able decisively to
34

shape this process of deepening. Monetary Union was devised

mostly along the German preferences helped by the sensible

management of Jacques Delors except for one issue of principle

nature in the German politico-academic debate: European Monetary

Union (EMU) implementation would adhere to objective criteria

but would also follow a defined time-table that could run counter

to the German "Kronungsthese" according to which the EMU should

be the ultimate reward to states for achieving coherence in

monetary and fiscal stability.

The inclusion of foreign policy and security policies into

the deepening of the European integration was based on a range of

motives and interests among which three were probably most

important:

• the risk of a falling apart of the foreign policy

priorities and orientations as a result of the recasting of

Europe and a tendency of de-solidarization under the new

conditions among essential member-states;

• the interest to maintain and develop an integrated

framework for security and defense issues, which could also

adequately reflect the security challenges and the growing

political responsibility of the West Europeans for the

organization of their own security; and,

• the perception of the emergence of new risks and

challenges to the stability of the political, economic and social

systems in Western Europe, their territorial integrity and

normative quality that would not be or insufficiently be

protected through the old instruments.

In the negotiations, these motives were not shared by all of

the member-states. For France and Germany, however, all of these

issues were of special importance. Based on their respective

national interests, both states articulated an interest to

integrate the other into a common framework. The balance sheet on

Political Union, namely on CFSP, indicates a lower leverage of

Germany and France than could have been expected at the outset of

the negotiations. On the one hand, the Franco-German position, by

and large, prevailed both in the EU and within NATO: the

development of foreign policy making, security and defense in

Western Europe was to be conceived as complementary to the other
35

areas of European integration and this result could not be

achieved through the partial identity of the actors in different

organizations alone. The provisions on a CFSP continue the

experimental and pragmatic approach of integration policies since

the 1970s.

In perspective, the provisions sketch out the option of a

security union in which the Western European Union (WEU)

organizes a common and potentially integrated defense under the

roof of the European Union. However incremental, the Maastricht

Treaty clarified the Union's position in two directions:

• The deepening of European integration will not proceed on

the basis of a civilian power that abstains from the conflicts in

international politics.

• Within the future development of the Atlantic Alliance,

the "European Pillar" would be made up by a WEU which is an

integral part of the European Union. Thus, an old debate within

NATO had been settled from the European side. In addition, the

West Europeans had offered a complementary model for both their

continuing interest in NATO and the necessities of integration

within the EC.

Some of the Franco-German proposals were not realized,

namely in the sector of foreign policy. Six issues from the

position papers were not or were inadequately translated into

treaty language:

• The assignment of specific tasks to the CFSP process,

including the relations to the eastern and southern neighborhood

of the EU, transatlantic relations, CSCE and the UN;

• A common policy on arms control and arms exports, nonproliferation and arms procurement;

• The ability of the Union to participate in peacekeeping

and peace-enforcement beyond the UN peacekeeping scheme;

• The linkage of the Union to multilateral and integrated

defense structures;

• A clear assignment of the WEU to act as the EU's European
36

pillar within NATO; and,

• The integration of development policies and development

assistance into the CFSP framework.

The list reflects the reluctance of other member states to

begin CFSP with substantive assignments but it also indicates the

limits of Franco-German cooperation. As government sources in

Bonn have occasionally hinted, the German side was prepared to

move far ahead in integrating its foreign policy and defense

resources; but could not win full support from Paris. After a

phase of pressing for more integration in 1990, French policy

became less explicit in the actual negotiations. Illustrative of

the policy style inside the "axis," most of the subsequent texts

were drafted in Bonn and issued in Paris.

The Functional Argument: Ostpolitik and CFSP.

Since the early steps of European integration in the 1950s,

German European policy has looked upon the process as being

functional to German foreign policymaking. From Adenauer's

strategy of seizing sovereignty in order to regain it to Helmut

Kohl's approach to a European Germany, administrations have used

the integration framework for the articulation of German

interests. Among the multi- lateral settings, the EC/EU was

probably most responsive to Germany's needs and its policy style.

The EC's implicit values were closer to the internationalist

spirit of the Federal Republic's diplomacy, depicted ironically

as a form of "Machtvergessenheit" ("power forgetfulness") by

Hans-Peter Schwarz in 1985.

Beyond such behavioral patterns, the conduciveness of

integration to German interests was put to a new test after 1989.

From the German point of view, the grand political project of the

coming decade will be to realize the integration of the European

democracies on the terms of the European Union. In this context,

CFSP is seen as the vehicle to tackle the far-reaching foreign

policy implications of the enlargement process–from the

management of relations with Russia and the Russian-controlled

parts of the CIS, to the trade and subsidies related aspects of

integrating "tiger economies" or the balancing of security

concerns of the South and the East of the expanded European

Union.
37

Germany's particular interest in adapting the EU framework

to its own perspective is evident. The prospective members are

mostly direct neighbors of Germany or close neighbors to these

countries, their trade is focused on the attractive German

market, and migratory flows are centered on Germany. Bearing the

investment patterns and the anticipated effects of market

integration for East Central Europe in mind, Germany probably has

the strongest interests and position in the region. Overshadowed by the burden of history in its various bilateral

relationships, German politics and business are often confronted

with positions and demands from these countries that could

neither be met nor rejected without political or fiscal harm. In

all of these cases, applying the integration framework to these

issues would help the German position, be it on property rights

or labor mobility, security concerns or, simply, communication

styles in the day-to-day management of bilateral affairs.

European norms and procedures, demands or interferences are not

subject to a hegemonic suspense–yet.

In addition to this, European integration is functional to

German interests in another important dimension. For a number of

reasons, Germany does not want to choose between East and West

and thus has no interest in conducting its relations with the

East in a different mode than those with the West. Without

integrating the new democracies into the Union, however, such a

difference could hardly be avoided, given the asymmetry between

Europe's largest population and economy and its East Central

European neighbors. Each of the historic German Sonderwege

(special ways) has a reflex of the geopolitical position of the

country in the center of Europe. In this sense, enlarging the

Union eastwards offers a way out of geopolitical determinism–in a

European Union of 20 or 25, there is no Mittellage (middle

position) for Germany in the old sense of the word. Attached to

these considerations is the issue of balance of power and

counterbalancing strategies. Enlarging the EU would not make such

strategies altogether impossible, but could contribute to their

taming.

With this centrality of Eastern enlargement in mind, the

reform interests of Germany's European policy with regard to CFSP

aim at a strengthening of the Union's international position–if

only to be able to communicate with Russia on a proper basis.
38

Furthermore, the Union should prepare to extend forms of security

assurances to those incoming members that are not covered by

other institutions–a second or maybe even third best alternative

but one that could be disregarded if the interest in NATO

enlargement were to be credible.

Finally, reforms should reflect the change in the

relationship between member states and European institutions. The

ratification of Maastricht signalled that the linear approach to

European integration, leading toward the emergence of a European

federal state, had been surpassed by the peaceful revolutions.

For the future, European politics should seek to make effective

use of the reappearing national resources and power of its

members. Now that a purely communitarian approach to CFSP (which

had enjoyed some sympathy in Germany prior to the Maastricht

treaty) is out of the question, majority voting and community

procedures are hardly to be expected. Therefore, a CFSP reform

should allow for greater flexibility to permit "coalitions of the

willing" or "coalitions for action." The German preference may

rather be on those options that promise greater ability to act

than on those whose principal merit is institutional progress.

The Solidarity Argument: Europe as a Power in the Making.

To look at CFSP as a vehicle for the assumption of

partnership quality represents a special case of addressing the

external implications of the Union's internal devel-opment and

its changing environment. The completion of the internal market

program has put flesh on the implicit argument in favor of

integration as a process involving the creation of a community of

destiny that does not stop at the level of mutual economic

benefits. In consequence, the almost unrestricted opening of

markets is accompanied by the perception that the external

interests, risk assessments and security concerns of one member

are shared by all other partners beyond the level of "mutual

recognition"; to apply a term from the internal market

linguistics.

However deeply the collapse of the Soviet Union has changed

those perceptions and facts, Europe remains the most exposed and

highly vulnerable region in world affairs. It directly neighbors

two zones of potential instability and threat and it is located

on the border of major civilizations which face large challenges,
39

even if a clash among them may not become reality. Thus, the EU

could be confronted with conflicts that will bring with them

economic losses, migratory waves, a new quality of terrorism and

blackmail (from boycott or environmental hazards to nonconventional weapons) and it has prototypes of the new

aggressions and low-intensity conflicts in its neighborhood. Just

as the other centers of the former First World (but more directly

so), European states feel the implications of the known and newly

emerging "global issues" arising from disruptions of the earth's

ecological, demographic and social balances. At the same time,

the EU has moved into the need for policies of scale. Most

visibly in the sectors of trade and aid, decisions taken by the

EU and its members affect third parties decisively. These are the

factors that ground Germany's interest in developing the European

Union's capacity to act on the global scale. As a key country of

the union, much of Germany's own world political interests center

around the stability interests of the EU as such and therefore

require effective policymaking at the union level in order to

optimize the ability to articulate and protect the collective as

well as the embedded national interests of its members.

Clearly, the range of Germany's interests that are to be

pursued via the EC/EU framework has expanded beyond securing the

country's position in the West, its acceptance as a democratic

state, or the preservation of an environment conducive to special

German interests such as the German option for unification. For

the future, EU foreign policy-making should thus be conducive to

the new items on Germany's agenda–from competitiveness vis-à-vis

Asia to the establishment of global trade and finance schemes,

from development policies to global stability management, from

partnership with Russia on an equal footing to the strengthening

of transatlantic relations with the United States. On many of

these issues Germany's potential and influence may be essential

to the formulation of a European response, but in all of them the

country lacks the critical mass to respond by its own means only.

Beyond the bloc structure, Germany's centrality to other

actors is bound to change. In the multi-layered system of the

1990s there exists no clearly defined central front. The critical

mass for the articulation of Germany's interests now rests within

the institutions of European integration and its organization has

become the resource for partnership relations with the world

powers. With regard to transatlantic relations, the perspective
40

of "partners in leadership" in Western affairs will require an EU

capable of action rather than the added-up foreign policy

("zusammengesetzte Aussenpolitik," as Rummel has called it) of

the EPC-type. Germany should be among those leading the way into

a partnership of this sort given her interests in attracting the

United States to Europe under the conditions of the new era.

In terms of CFSP reform, the emergence of the EU as a global

actor seems to be too much of a challenge to be realized easily.

Rather, the process to be started in 1996 will be confined to

gradual and careful advances. Of immediate concern in this

direction is the advancement of an EU planning capacity through a

combined infrastructure at the EU-level and forms of direct

access to the resources of the national foreign policy

administrations (e.g., in the form of a diplomatic doublehatting). The link between the EU's commercial power and its

security components needs to be stronger and more visible.

Political leadership and personalization of policies should not

be limited to the top bureaucratic level but could be expressed

through a CFSP-presidency of one member state within a reformed

troika system.

The Alliance Argument: The Role of CFSP and WEU in the Defense

of Europe.

To the present day, Germany's armed forces are integrated

into the military structure of NATO to a higher degree than any

of her neighbors. In the public awareness, military spending and

the maintenance of Western Europe's largest conventional army has

been a direct function of the Soviet threat and was almost

exclusively legitimized by the existence of the Warsaw Pact. At

no time has the acceptance of armed forces for the "purposes of

greatness" in Germany been lower than in the past decades and

assignments outside of the central front scenario hardly ever

have been debated. Both of these formative factors of the German

defense posture have been put to question in the aftermath of the

peaceful revolutions in Eastern Europe. Among NATO's European

members, the degree of renationalization and unilateral

disarmament has surpassed the expectations of the early 1990s,

the southern, south-eastern and the Baltic flank have been

seriously weakened; and the pressures on the fiscal burdens of

defense have multiplied. At the same time, the emergence of new

conflicts and war in Europe as well as the applicability of
41

conventional forces to their control have found Germany ill

prepared–in legal, structural and mental terms.

Germany is least able to react to those challenges that are

most likely to require the use of military force in almost all of

the forms these actions may take. A gap between the capabilities

and the interests has opened up that harms Germany's political

position and role. The emergence of zones of lesser security in

East Central Europe affects the German interest in the stability

of the region. The constraints on the use of the German armed

forces minimize the German influence in conflict management, as

well as Germany's role in the new military cooperation schemes on

the continent. And, the fragmentation of arms procurement

structures imposes a rising burden on the federal budget already

stressed by the costs of unification, and the weakness of a

credible European framework to integrate Germany's defense

resources feeds public skepticism and resentment.

The renationalization of defense structures and the

multilateralization of military action on the basis of voluntary

national contributions tend to cement the German problem. Just as

the country seeks to avoid a choice between East and West, it

seems yet unprepared to choose between defense integration and

military contributions to actions in a multilateral setting.

Equally unattractive appears the choice between acting under

these circumstances and not acting at all. The German preference

is clearly directed toward collective forms of a permanent rather

than an ad hoc-nature. On the basis of collective institutions,

participation in multilateral activities seems manageable in the

future. Germany has no interest in maintaining the current trap

of not fully being able to act in solidarity. Given the patterns

of change within NATO, collective frameworks should build on the

defense of Europe's territorial integrity (which in a German

perspective is still a valuable and necessary collective task);

should include collective risk assessment and contingency

planning; provide mandating power for action; share

reconnaissance, C3

I and airlift capabilities; and, be accountable

to the European pillar of the Western alliance. NATO should be

understood as an alliance of the democracies of Europe and North

America rather than as a defense pact of the "old" West.

Current CFSP and its future development have a crucial role

in Germany's thinking. It is the link between the soft power of
42

the EU and the emerging resources of WEU, as well as an anchor

for the new elements of defense integration in the bi- and multinational military units that could compensate for Germany's past

symbiosis of German and allied forces. Thus, the time for a

common defense policy and a common defense seems to be nearer

than the Maastricht Treaty on European Union has stated. CFSP

reform along these lines should seek to turn the implicit

security guarantee of EU-membership into an explicit one by

introducing a solidarity clause of the type of NATO's or WEU's

Article V to the treaty, assigning the WEU clearly to the

security of the union and establishing a link to the EUROCORPS,

including the other multinational units existing and under

preparation. Also, such an arrangement of responsibilities and

institutional settings would make more plausible a binary

relationship between the EU and the United States inside and

outside the larger alliance of democracies.

Conclusion.

In sum, the centrality of the CFSP process to Germany and

German foreign and security policy will be articulated in the

upcoming negotiations. This should not be read as an almost

unrestricted push on the part of the German government for major

advances–negotiators have become rather careful if not timid in

light of the ratification experience of the Maastricht Treaty. It

should also not be misread as a government policy position which

oscillates between integrationist proposals and the attraction of

inter-governmental and extra-EU offerings. It rather suggests a

rationale for a reform perspective of the CFSP of the EU that is

compatible with, and conducive to, the interests and preferences

that may be attributed to the united Germany in the 1990s.

ENDNOTES

1. The views expressed are personal and do not commit the

European Commission in any way.

2. This is the logical path which two senior officials from

the Auswärtiges Amt correctly identified in an article in the

Frankfurter Allgemeine on 30 March 1995.