NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

PATRICK MOERS, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

JOSH MCCALLISTER REID; et al., 

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 19-15256 

D.C. No. 

2:18-cv-01418-JCM-NJK 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Nevada

James C. Mahan, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted May 7, 2020**

Portland, Oregon

Before: WATFORD and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges, and BATTAGLIA,***

District Judge.

Patrick Moers appeals from the district court’s order granting the

defendants’ motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b). We 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

*** The Honorable Anthony J. Battaglia, United States District Judge for 

the Southern District of California, sitting by designation.

FILED

MAY 11 2020

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
Page 2 of 3

affirm.

1. The district court properly dismissed Moers’s federal claims with 

prejudice under Rule 12(b)(6). The separation agreement Moers signed released 

all of his claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against all of the defendants.1 The release 

provision covers “the City and each of its City Councilmembers, agents, 

employees, representatives, attorneys, and all persons acting through or in concert 

with any of them.” Contrary to Moers’s argument, the defendants plainly fall 

within the scope of the release, despite not being specifically named. The

provision releases “any and all matters, causes of action, charges, complaints, [and] 

claims, . . . whether known or unknown, arising from or relating to, directly or 

indirectly, [Moers’s] employment with and separation from the City.” All of 

Moers’s § 1983 claims fall squarely within this language, as they all arise from the 

defendants’ alleged participation in an unlawful scheme designed to oust Moers as 

chief of police. 

Moers argues that the release is invalid because it had to be executed by the 

city council rather than the city manager. According to Moers, the city manager 

lacked authority to execute a severance agreement with him because the city 

manager has no supervisory powers over executive officers appointed directly by 

1 Moers voluntarily signed the separation agreement while represented by counsel. 

We therefore reject Moers’s argument, raised for the first time in his reply brief on 

appeal, that he signed the agreement under duress. 
Page 3 of 3

the city council. See Henderson Municipal Code § 2.10.020(A); Henderson City 

Charter art. I, § 1.090. That argument is without merit. The city council does not 

directly appoint the chief of police; the city manager does. Henderson Municipal 

Code § 2.10.020(C)(1). Accordingly, the city manager—who has general

supervisory powers, including the authority to execute severance agreements, over 

all departments of the City—was authorized to execute Moers’s separation 

agreement. See id. §§ 2.10.020(A), 2.10.040(G). 

2. The district court did not err in dismissing without prejudice Moers’s 

state law claims because Moers failed to name the State or appropriate political 

subdivision as a defendant. See Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.0337(1). 

AFFIRMED.