THE CFE TREATY:

A COLD WAR ANACHRONISM?

Jeffrey D. McCausland

Department of National Security and Strategy

U.S. Army War College

Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013

February 15, 1995
ii

*******

The views expressed in this report are those of the

author and do not necessarily reflect the official

policy or position of the Department of the Army, the

Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. This

report is cleared for public release; distribution is

unlimited.

*******

Comments pertaining to this report are invited and

should be forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies

Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA

17013-5050. Comments also may be conveyed directly to

the author by calling commercial (717) 245-3298 or DSN

242-3298.

*******

This research effort was funded by a grant from the

U.S. Air Force Institute for National Security Studies,

U.S. Air Force Academy. The author wishes to acknowledge

the support of LTC Jeff Larsen, Dirctor, INSS, and CPT

Greg Rattray, Deputy Director, in this effort, He also

appreciates the assistance provided by LTC Jim

Chamberlain and LTC(R) Dorn Crawford, Arms Control and

Disarmament Agency.
iii

FOREWORD

On November 19, 1990, the Conventional Armed Forces

in Europe (CFE) Treaty was signed in Paris following the

successful completion of 20 months of negotiations

between the members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact Treaty

Organization. At its completion President Bush hailed

the agreement as ending the" . . . military

confrontation that has cursed Europe for decades."

Despite the dramatic nature of this document, the large

scale reduction required of all signatories, and the

complex inspection regime it established; the completion

of the treaty was overshadowed by the ongoing

deterioration of the Warsaw Pact, end of the Berlin

Wall, and impending conflict in the Persian Gulf between

Iraq and the coalition headed by the United States. Even

these events paled to insignificance in comparison to

the dissolution of the Soviet Union roughly 1 year

later. In this study, the author examines the viability

of this agreement in the post-Cold War era. He describes

the scope of the treaty, how it was adapted to meet many

of the changes that have occurred, and how it has moved

towards final implementation in November 1995.

The author describes the problem of the flank

limitations that Russian and Ukrainian forces must

subscribe to at the end of the implementation period.

Both countries have argued that they can no longer live

with these restrictions and have formally requested that

they be removed or modified. He notes that there has

been little progress towards resolving this impasse, and

there is every indication that the Russian Federation

will be in violation of the CFE accord in November of

this year. This development indicates not only Russian

disquiet with the treaty but larger questions concerning

the role of various "players" in the Russian national

security process and the direction of Russian foreign

policy. The author then suggests a framework that NATO

should adopt in formulating a policy towards the flank

question.

The final portion of the study is devoted to the
iv

future role of conventional arms control in American

foreign policy. Here the author discusses the

implications that a compromise or failure in CFE

implementation may have on broader questions of policy

as well as the areas of emphasis for the Review

Conference scheduled for spring 1996.

The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to

publish this report as a contribution to understanding

this issue of U.S. national security policy.

WILLIAM W. ALLEN

Colonel, U.S. Army

Acting Director

Strategic Studies Institute
v

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

COLONEL JEFFREY D. MCCAUSLAND is currently Director of

European Studies at the United States Army War College,

Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. He holds a Ph.D. in

International Relations from the Fletcher School of Law

and Diplomacy, Tufts University. During his military

career he has served in a variety of command and staff

positions in the United States and Europe. This includes

an assignment to the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff

for Operations working on the Conventional Forces Europe

Treaty (CFE)from 1988 to 1989. He commanded the 3rd

Battalion 17th Field Artillery, VII Corps during

Operations Desert Shield and Storm. He was previously a

member of the Department of Social Sciences, West Point;

a visiting fellow at the Center for International

Affairs, Harvard University; and a research fellow at

the International Institute for Strategic Studies,

London. His articles have appeared in The Fletcher

Forum, Parameters, Naval War College Review, Comparative

Strategy, Armed Forces and Society, Defense Analysis,

Field Artillery Journal, Military Review, and

International Defense Review. He is also the author of a

monograph, The Gulf War: A Military Analysis, published

by the International Institute for Strategic Studies,

London. He is a contributing author to two books,

Conventional Deterrence (1984) and Arms Control in the

1990's (forthcoming).
vi
vii

SUMMARY

This study examines the Conventional Armed Forces

in Europe (CFE) Treaty with respect to the process of

implementation to date and prospects for final

implementation in November 1995. It describes the basic

points of the treaty and the danger posed by the ongoing

disagreement between NATO and the Russian Federation

over the limitations imposed by the treaty on Russian

forces in the "flank areas" (Leningrad and North

Caucasus Military Districts in the Russian Federation).

It analyzes the positions of the primary NATO members,

Russian Federation, Ukraine, as well as the United

States, and places the treaty in the broader context of

Russian foreign policy and the future of conventional

arms control. The main findings are as follows.

The Treaty and Implementation Process.

• The Treaty consists of over 110 pages of text

encompassing 23 Treaty articles, protocols, and two

annexes. There are two legally binding agreements and

four other political documents associated with the

overall accord. It limits five categories of weapons

between the NATO and Warsaw Pact (tanks, artillery,

armored combat vehicles, helicopters, and attack

aircraft). The area of agreement is further subdivided

into geographic subzones with limits for each area.

Overall limits for each alliance are 20,000 tanks;

30,000 armored combat vehicles; 20,000 artillery pieces;

6,800 combat aircraft; and 2,000 attack helicopters. The

treaty is designed to be implemented by stages with each

country reducing by 25 per cent of its overall

requirement the first year, 60 per cent in 1994, and 100

per cent by November 1995 with a period of four months

(until March 1996) to verify residual levels.

• Despite the tremendous changes that have occurred

since 1989, the treaty remains in the best interest of

the United States. It has prevented arms racing,

increased the level of transparency, reduced the
viii

possibility of both surprise attack and miscalculation,

and enhanced conventional deterrence. The treaty also

provides for annual notifications of changes to force

structure as well as overall information exchanges.

Lastly, it requires countries to comply with stringent

force requirements and assists in the continuing

momentum of the process which may have positive effects

in other areas.

• Implementation has proceeded well. All reduction

targets have been achieved with the exception of Armenia

and Azerbaijan. The treaty has provided opportunities

for NATO to cooperate with the new states of Eastern

Europe and emerging countries of the former Soviet Union

in terms of arms control inspector training and transfer

of data. By September 1994 over 18,000 items of treaty

limited equipment (TLE) had been destroyed including

6,000 from the Russian Federation. There has been no

evidence of a concerted effort by any party to cheat or

intentionally mislead inspection teams.

The Problem of the Flanks.

• The eventual implementation of the treaty by the

end of 1995 remains uncertain. The Russian Federation

has protested that it must be relieved of Article V

which limits Russian forces in the Leningrad and North

Caucasus Military Districts (referred to as the

"flanks"). The Ukraine has also protested these

restrictions as discriminatory and beyond its

capability. Russian officials have argued that they will

need roughly 400 tanks, 2,400 ACVs, and 800 artillery

pieces in excess of what they are authorized to confront

growing tensions particularly on their southern flank.

This area includes Chechnya where the Russians are

likely to desire a large force for an extended period of

time to defeat Chechen forces and maintain control.

• The Russians and Ukrainians have proposed various

solutions to this impasse, but most have required a

significant change to the treaty which might well
ix

require the agreement to be resubmitted to national

assemblies for ratification. NATO has opposed these

solutions and urged Russia and the Ukraine to seek

solutions within the "flexibility of the treaty." Turkey

and Norway (the countries most directly affected by

increased Russian forces on the flanks) have strongly

opposed any change to the treaty, and this position has

been endorsed by France in the High Level Task Force

(HLTF). Turkey has suggested that it might withdraw from

the treaty if Russian demands are met.

Implications of the Ongoing Disagreement.

• The position of the Russian Federation on this

issue may well reflect other factors and difficulties.

The various "players" in the Russian national security

process (Ministry of Defense, General Staff, President,

Foreign Minister, and Ministry of the Interior) have at

times openly disagreed. Furthermore, it is difficult to

envisage Russian leaders compromising on this issue

shortly before the next Russian presidential elections

in June 1996. Lastly, any compromise which allows a

significant increase in Russian forces in the south has

serious implications for their policies towards the

"near abroad" and reincorporation of these countries

into the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

• As we approach the last year of implementation,

NATO must act quickly to find a solution. In doing so

the NATO members must keep in mind the broader issues

confronting the Alliance. Failing to do so may not only

compromise the treaty but also submit NATO to severe

internal dissension. If a compromise can be found and

the treaty is fully implemented many of the issues now

being discussed will be on the agenda at the followup

conference in the spring of 1996.
x
THE CFE TREATY:

A COLD WAR ANACHRONISM?

Introduction.

On November 19, 1990 the Conventional Armed Forces

in Europe (CFE) Treaty was signed in Paris following the

successful completion of 20 months of negotiations

between the members of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty

Organization (WTO). At its completion, President Bush

hailed the agreement as ending the ". . . military

confrontation that has cursed Europe for decades."1

Despite the dramatic nature of this document, the large

scale reduction required of all signatories, and the

complex inspection regime it established, the completion

of the treaty was overshadowed by the ongoing

deterioration of the Warsaw Pact, end of the Berlin

Wall, and impending conflict in the Persian Gulf between

Iraq and the coalition headed by the United States. Even

these events paled to insignificance in comparison to

the dissolution of the Soviet Union roughly one year

later. Consequently, many observers announced the

imminent demise of the CFE Treaty. The London Times, for

example, sounded a particularly distressing note when it

announced: "Europe"s most ambitious arms control treaty

risks becoming unworkable because of the Soviet Union"s

disintegration."2

Almost paradoxically, the CFE Treaty has survived

the early reports of its demise. This is perhaps

testimony to its value and the relative importance

participating states attach to it. Ongoing changes did

slow its entry into force as it was not provisionally

applied until July 17, 1992. It became legally binding

on all parties 10 days after the last country deposited

its instruments of ratification which was not until

November 9, 1992.3

 The purpose of this study is to

examine the future viability of the CFE Treaty for the

United States. This suggests two additional queries:

Will the treaty be fully implemented within the 40

months allocated? If so, what are the prospects for

future conventional arms control in Europe?

The rapid pace of the CFE negotiations, the ability
2

of participating states to deal with extraordinary

change, and the steady progress towards full

implementation illustrate many of the primary aspects of

arms control in general and conventional arms control

specifically. First, arms control only serves as a part

of any nation"s overall national security strategy. As

such it is a "method" to be used in seeking the overall

"objective" of improved security. It is not an objective

in isolation. Consequently, though the focus of any

negotiation is the details of the prospective agreement,

the arms control process must always be consistent with

the overall direction of national security strategy.

Second, "arms control" differs significantly from

"disarmament." While this may seem self-evident to most

people, the terms are misused so frequently that it

deserves emphasis. "Arms control" is a policy method

whereby states seek through negotiations to improve

their security. It can not change ideologies and may not

reduce hostilities. Normally objectives are to improve

predictability, diminish the possibility of

miscalculation (particularly in a crisis), and reduce

confrontation. "Disarmament," however, is either

unilateral or imposed on states normally by the victors

in war such as Germany and Japan after World War II or

Iraq (to some degree) following the Gulf War. Third,

arms control is a political process and can not be

divorced from other aspects of a nation"s security or

foreign policy. It is affected by domestic events, other

issues between states, and the bureaucratic process of

the participating parties. Consequently, progress in one

arms control forum may be affected (positively or

negatively) by the success or failure of other

negotiations and previous agreements. Lastly,

conventional arms control is more difficult and less

likely to result in success than nuclear arms control.

The military resources at issue in a conventional

negotiation are complex components of a nation's overall

military capability. Furthermore, as in CFE,

conventional negotiations are coalition or alliance

undertakings which means that the political and economic

institutions of many states are both involved and

affected by the result. The final result must improve
3

the overall security of all member states and be

consistent with agreed alliance strategy.4

The Treaty.

The CFE Treaty consists of over 100 pages

encompassing 23 Treaty Articles, several protocols, and

two annexes. There are also six legally binding

statements and several other political documents

associated with the overall accord. The agreement limits

five categories of weapons in the European territory of

the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

and the former Warsaw Pact (referred to as "groups of

states parties") stretching from the Atlantic Ocean to

the Ural Mountains. The area of the application (AOA) is

further subdivided into five geographic sub-zones. Each

of these areas have sublimits for the amount of treaty

limited equipment. The purpose of zones was to force the

relocation of Soviet forces eastward from the innerGerman border and to prevent their concentration within

the Soviet Union. The AOA changed with the dissolution

of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) as the

Baltic States left the treaty upon achieving their

independence. Any forces from the Russian Federation

present on their soil, however, counted against the

overall total for the Russia. In addition, a portion of

southeastern Turkey is excluded from the treaty due to

Turkish concerns about security issues relating to Syria

and Iraq.

Though the treaty was negotiated in a multilateral

forum, it is firmly rooted in the alliance formations of

the Cold War--NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Despite the

dissolution of the Warsaw Pact the bloc-to-bloc

character of the treaty continues and will do so until

at least final implementation in 1996. Overall limits

for each alliance are as follows: 20,000 main battle

tanks; 30,000 armored combat vehicles (ACVs) with

subcategories for three different varieties; 20,000

artillery pieces; 6,800 combat aircraft which excludes

trainers, strategic bombers, and transport aircraft; and
4

2,000 attack helicopters. In addition, no single nation

may have more than 33.3 percent of the total group

entitlement for tanks (i.e., 13,300); 33.3 percent of

armored combat vehicles (i.e., 20,000); 34.4 percent of

the artillery (i.e., (13,700); 37.9 percent of the

aircraft (i.e., 5,150) and 37.5 percent of helicopters

(i.e., 1,500). Each Alliance (NATO and WTO) had to

negotiate the entitlements for its members consistent

with these ceilings. Following the dissolution of the

Soviet Union the successor states agreed to limitations

for each state at Tashkent on May 15, 1992. Additional

adjustments were made upon the division of

Czechoslovakia. Table 1 contains all the CFE

entitlements for the participating states (referred to

as treaty limited equipment (TLE). The treaty also

requires that states place a portion of their allocation

in designated permanent storage sites (DPSS).

Lastly, the treaty also places additional

restrictions on the so-called "flanks" (see Figure 1).

This area includes all of Romania, Bulgaria, Moldova,

Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan. It also consists of

the North Caucasus and Leningrad Military Districts of

the Russian Federation and the southeastern portion of

Ukraine. The total, for example, for Russian forces in

this area is 700 tanks, 1,280 artillery pieces, and 580

ACVs in active units for this area. It further allows

the Russian Federation to place 600 tanks, 400 artillery

pieces, and 800 ACVs in DPSS in the northern portion of

the flank (i.e., Leningrad Military District). The flank

zone concept was the result of efforts by Turkey and

Norway. Neither country wanted to see Soviet forces

removed from the Central Region only to reappear on

their borders.

In addition to the revised totals for each of the

emerging states of the former Soviet Union, two other

official statements by the Soviet Union deserve

particular mention. First, the Soviets formally

announced on June 14, 1991 that all treaty limited

equipment (tanks, artillery, and armored combat

vehicles) assigned to naval infantry or coastal defense
5

forces count against their total authorized TLE. This

was to assuage concerns that the Soviet Union might

transfer large amounts of equipment from the army to its

naval forces in order to circumvent treaty obligations.

The second commitment went into effect at the same time

and acknowledged the requirement of the Soviet Union to

destroy roughly 14,500 pieces of TLE east of the Ural

Mountains (i.e., outside of the area of the treaty). The

first of these statements is considered legally binding

on the Soviet Union while the second is construed to be

a political obligation. These responsibilities were also

acknowledged in the Tashkent Agreement by the Russian

Federation and Ukraine as successor states of the USSR.

North Atlantic Treaty Group

Country Tanks Arty ACVs Helos Aircraft

Belgium 334 320 1,099 46 232

Canada 77 38 277 13 90

Denmark 353 533 316 12 106

France 1,306 1,292 3,820 352 800

Germany 4,166 2,705 3,446 306 900

Greece 1,735 1,878 2,534 18 650

Italy 1,348 1,955 3,339 142 650

Netherlands 743 607 1,080 69 230

Norway 170 527 225 0 100

Portugal 300 450 430 26 160

Spain 794 1,310 1,588 71 310

Turkey 2,795 3,523 3,120 43 750

UK 1,015 636 3,176 384 900

US 4,006 2,492 5,372 518 784

Budapest/Tashkent Group

Country Tanks Arty ACVs Helos Aircraft

Armenia 220 285 220 50 100

Azerbaijan 220 285 220 50 100

Belarus 1,800 1,615 2,600 80 260
6

Bulgaria 1,475 1,750 2,000 67 235

Czech Rep. 957 767 1,367 50 230

Georgia 220 285 220 50 100

Hungary 835 840 1,700 108 180

Moldova 210 250 210 50 50

Poland 1,730 1,610 2,150 130 460

Romania 175 1,475 2,100 120 430

Russia 6,400 6,415 11,480 890 3,450

Slovakia 478 383 683 25 115

Ukraine 4,080 4,040 5,050 330 1,090

Table 1. CFE Treaty Entitlements

Source: Dorn Crawford, Conventional Armed Forces in

Europe (CFE)--A Review and Update of Key Treaty

Elements, Washington: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament

Agency, 1994, p. 6.
7
8

 The treaty additionally contains numerous other

specifications that would logically be required in

effecting an agreement of this complexity. It includes

careful definitions of such diverse topics as "groups of

parties," "artillery" (must, for example, be 100mm or

larger), and "designated permanent storage sites." It

further lists procedures for the establishment of the

Joint Consultative Group (JCG) consisting of

representatives from every state involved in the treaty

to monitor problems that may occur during

implementation, proper methods of verification, the

requirement for periodic exchanges of information, etc.5

Treaty Analysis.

While the amount of equipment and geographic

limitations imposed are important, they are still only a

technical reflection of the strategic goals that both

sides had when the negotiations commenced. The

objectives of the CFE Treaty are described in its

mandate. They include strengthening stability and

security in Europe through the creation of balanced

conventional forces; establishing lower levels for

conventional armaments and equipment; eliminating

disparities prejudicial to stability and security; and,

as a priority, precluding the capability for launching

surprise attacks or large scale offensive operations.6

These conditions are an appropriate mechanism to

evaluate conceptually whether or not the United States

should continue to participate in the implementation of

the accord.

Despite the tremendous changes in the world since

1990 the treaty continues to foster the objectives

outlined and remains in the best interests of the United

States for several reasons. First, the stabilizing

limits established mean that no participating signatory

can exceed its agreed limit in any category of forces or

increase its allowed CFE-reduced arsenal without both
9

the concurrence of all the other members in its group

and corresponding reductions by one or more states in

the group to avoid exceeding the allowed alliance total.

Consequently, it has prevented arms racing throughout

the continent. Curiously while this may be most

important in troubled areas in the CIS such as the

Russian Federation and Ukraine, it also provides Hungary

the means to prohibit the expansion of the Rumanian

military and Turkey a mechanism to limit Greece.7

Second, it enhances conventional deterrence by

expanding the "transparency" states have with each

other"s military forces and further reduces the

possibility of accidental conflict. Deterrence is

further advanced by the asymmetrical nature of the

reductions which in the aggregate requires NATO to

reduce only a fraction of the amount required of the

former members of the Warsaw Pact and results in

balanced forces between the two "groups of states

parties."

Third, the treaty requires states to notify

participants of change in the size and character of

their military forces and provide an annual exchange of

information. Fourth, the strict inspection and

verification regime insures compliance. This, coupled

with information exchanges, insures that all members

have a great deal of predictability in forecasting the

military forces of their neighbors. Lastly, while

requiring all sides to live up to stringent requirements

the treaty also establishes a clear momentum in the

process which may bear fruit in other areas.

It is important to remember that the United States

was also able to protect certain operational objectives

during the negotiations. These included the maintenance

of Alliance unity, exclusion of nuclear weapons from the

discussions, exclusion of naval forces in the

negotiations, preservation of American rights to store

prepositioned material in Europe, and avoidance of the

mandatory disbandment of withdrawn U.S. forces or any

permanent limitations on the overall size of U.S.
10

forces.8 These advantages have not been compromised by

events since and may be even more important today.

Consequently, it would make little to no sense for

the United States to consider abrogating the treaty.

This is particularly true in light of the changes that

have occurred in Europe and a desire to reflect those

changes in reduced U.S. troop presence. Furthermore,

while the members of NATO have differed on many aspects

of policy, there is absolute unity in the desire of all

Alliance members for the treaty to be fully implemented

and insure its establishment as a key element in the

overall European security framework. This is also true

in legal terms as there would hardly seem to be the

extraordinary circumstance that has jeopardized U.S.

security (as outlined in Article XIX) which would allow

withdrawal. In summary, the treaty appeals to the

enlightened self-interest of the United States as well

as its Alliance partners. The national security of the

United States is far more effectively enhanced by the

final implementation of CFE than by its abrogation.

Implementation.

Implementation of the treaty has progressed

surprisingly well. The verification regime established

targets for states to achieve during a 40- month period.

The lengthy time of implementation is due to the

overwhelming complexity of the treaty and the monumental

task of either removing or destroying a vast array of

equipment. This amounted to roughly 32,000 pieces of TLE

for the Warsaw Pact and 16,000 for NATO (this includes

East German equipment to be destroyed by the Federal

Republic following reunification). The initial target

(September 1993) required each state to meet 25 percent

of their reduction requirement for each type of

equipment. Goals of 60 percent by September 1994 and 100

percent by November 1995 were also established. Flank

limitations go into effect in November 1995 as well. At

that time 4 months is allocated to verify residual force

levels of all states parties before the treaty is
11

declared fully implemented. When that is accomplished a

review conference of all signatories will be convened to

discuss difficulties, possible changes to the treaty,

and potential future agreements.

It is perhaps axiomatic for successful arms control

agreements that they receive their most intense public

scrutiny during the negotiations, and little attention

is paid to the implementation process. If that is true

then CFE has been very effective to date with little to

no fanfare. All states parties with the exception of

Armenia and Azerbaijan (due to the ongoing conflict in

Nagorno Karabakh) reached their reduction goals in

September 1993 and also for 1994. Overall, roughly

18,000 pieces of TLE have been destroyed in the former

Warsaw Pact alone and approximately 6,000 of this was

accomplished by the Russian Federation. None of the

inspections of this process has revealed discrepancies

of a significance to suggest circumvention or violation

of treaty provisions.

The process of implementation has also changed to

meet the evolving international conditions in Europe,

and this has presented NATO with opportunities as well

as difficulties. The preamble of the treaty includes a

clause which commits the signatory to strive "to replace

military confrontation with a new pattern of security

relations based on peaceful cooperation."9 Though the

agreement is very specific in its technical content, it

does not provide any description about how these new

"patterns" are to be accomplished. The creation of the

North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) which includes

all of the former members of the Warsaw Pact as well as

NATO was done in some measure to adjust the security

environment in light of the demise of the Warsaw Pact

(one of the two "group of states parties" described in

the accord). This has resulted in an increase in the

flow of information and ideas on the conduct of

implementation, to include seminars on verification run

by NATO for NACC members, attendance by Eastern European

officers at the NATO arms control inspection course, and

access to NATO"s verification data base (VERITY) which
12

now provides on-line access to many capitals in the

former Warsaw Pact. These new contacts have been

formalized as NATO"s Enhanced Cooperation Program.10

Difficulties have arisen, however, in the desire of the

former members of the Warsaw Pact to conduct so-called

"East-on-East" inspections. These demonstrate the

emerging security concerns of Central European countries

but also reduce the total number of inspections

available to NATO of those states in the East of

particular interest (i.e., the Russian Federation and

the Ukraine). In addition, the creation of NATO"s

Partnership for Peace (PfP) may expand these

possibilities into such things as the participation of

non-NATO participants in Western inspections as a PfP

"event." It may also allow non-signatories to the CFE

Treaty (e.g., Slovenia) who have joined PfP to

participate or observe the conduct of inspections.

The Problem of the "Flanks"

Despite the optimism generated by the obvious

progress, serious difficulties have arisen which may

imperil final implementation of the CFE accord. The most

serious of these is the request by the Russian

Federation and Ukraine to be relieved of the Article V

limitation on the amount of TLE that can be located in

the flank areas of their country which consists of the

Leningrad and North Caucasus Military Districts (see

Figure 1). U.S. officials were first made aware of these

concerns in early 1993.11 General Grachev (Russia's

Minister of Defense), returning from an inspection tour

of military units in the Transcaucasus, stated that the

"geopolitical situation has changed" since the treaty

had gone into effect and that Russia ". . . now finds it

necessary to reconsider the armed quotas envisioned by

the (CFE) accords." Later Grachev"s press office

reported that a Defense Ministry Collegium had discussed

the pressing problem of CFE quotas and "expressed

concern" that CFE limitations were forcing Russia to

distribute arms in the European part of the country

"without taking account of security interests."12
13

Curiously, the problem of the flanks was formally

presented to the JCG by the Ukrainian ambassador on

September 14, 1993. Ambassador Kostenko pointed out that

the flank limits were ". . . completely unjustified at

the present time." Their implementation would force the

Ukraine to defend one quarter of its territory with only

17 percent of its tanks, 7 percent of its ACVs, and 22

percent of its artillery.13 This was quickly followed by

a rather abrupt letter from Russian President Yeltsin to

all NATO leaders. Yeltsin noted the drastic changes that

had occurred in the political situation on the

continent, the increased turmoil along Russia"s borders,

and the complex economic and social problems the Russian

Federation was suffering in the redeployment of massive

numbers of troops from Eastern Europe as his principal

rationale. Yeltsin also observed that the two districts

constrained by Article V (Leningrad and North Caucasus)

comprise over half the territory of European Russia and

the restraints imposed were discriminatory as they were

not imposed in a similar fashion on any Western state.

Finally, the President noted that a solution to this

problem needed to be reached quickly so that Russia

could conduct the redeployment of its forces properly

and construct sufficient infrastructure.14

 First Deputy Chief of the Russian General Staff

Lieutenant General V.M. Zhurbenko underscored the

seriousness with which his country took the issue in

remarks delivered in October 1993. General Zhurbenko

described the changes that have occurred in the world

since the end of the Cold War and expanded on the

rationale provided by President Yeltsin. He observed

that the flank limits placed the Russian Federation in a

position of "unjustified discrimination," forced Russia

to place the majority of its forces along the Western

borders in contravention to the treaty"s stated

objectives, and denied his country the necessary forces

to deal with rising instability in the Caucasus.15 He

proposed the suspension of Article V of the treaty as a

means to solve the problem and further suggested that

Russia would be willing to consider certain additional

guarantees such as a prohibition on any increase in the
14

military forces assigned to the Leningrad Military

District, no "over concentration" of forces in the North

Caucasus, and a willingness to limit forces in the

Kaliningrad Region.

Since these initial proposals Russian statements on

the issue have appeared in almost every JCG plenary. One

can discern a degree of increased concern about the

matter as time has elapsed. For example, the Head of the

Russian Delegation V.N. Kulebiakin commented in January

1994:

. . . if someone is nourishing the hope that,

by not doing anything but waiting for the end

to the period of reductions the problem of the

flank restrictions will disappear in and of

itself, these reckonings are absolutely

groundless. If in the next six months this

knot has not been untied, then it will

necessary to cut it. (Emphasis added.)16

In April Kulebiakin cited recent analysis by Chief

of the Russian Armed Forces General Staff, Colonel

General M. Kolesnikov in an article published in

Kraznaya Zvezda (Red Star). General Kolesnikov observed

that a decision on this issue could not be postponed

because of the need for ". . . clarity today to choose

Russia"s optimum defensive configuration and prepare the

appropriate infrastructure to build our forces."

Kolesnikov concluded that if some kind of accommodation

is not made ". . . then we see the fate of the treaty in

danger."17 Finally, in June 1994 First Deputy Chief of

the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, Colonel

General V.M. Zhurbenko addressed the JCG and again

warned:

We think that the Treaty may be wrecked not by

an amendment which results from objective

changes in circumstances and existing

realities, but rather by a deaf and

impenetrable wall erected on the path of

adaption of individual treaty tenets to these
15

new conditions. It seems that several

countries have become so enamored of the

Treaty to its very last letter, that they are

ready to suffocate it in their embraces of

inviolability.18 (Emphasis added.)

Overall, the rationale presented by Russian

spokesmen in the JCG and elsewhere has been fairly

consistent during the intervening year since the Yeltsin

letter in explaining why the treaty should be changed.

The Russian leadership has essentially presented seven

arguments in its analysis. First, the drastically

changed political environment in the world makes the

basis for the treaty and its bloc-to-bloc character no

longer valid. In this regard the treaty unfairly

discriminates against Russia by placing internal

restrictions with respect to where forces may be

positioned on its territory. Second, the new Russian

military doctrine which has now been approved by the

government and parliament requires a more all-around

balanced military defense.19 Third, the logic of the

flanks has changed. Whereas previously the North

Caucasus Military District was considered a rear area,

it is now a border district.20 Consequently, it is

illogical to expect that the deployment of only 15

percent of Russian forces is adequate in an area (the

Leningrad and North Caucasus Military Districts) that is

over half of European Russia. Fourth, the rising threat

to stability, particularly in the southern area due to

Muslim fundamentalism, is the greatest challenge to

Russian security. To meet this threat General Grachev

commented in a press interview on March 2, 1994, "Today,

the North Caucasus Military District, is the base, the

main district of the Russian armed forces." Fifth, the

North Caucasus Military District is better suited to

station forces returning to Russia due to its climate as

well as economic and social reasons. There already

exists some of the necessary infrastructure for

returning forces in this region. Sixth, changes to the

treaty do not represent a precedent as it has evolved

over the intervening years. Russian spokesman normally

cite the example of the Baltic states leaving the treaty
16

upon achieving their independence as well as the

addition of new states (i.e., the former members of the

Soviet Union, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia).21

Finally, several Russian spokesman have privately

suggested that while the Russian government strongly

supports the treaty its key elements remain the

reductions and associated inspections. They argue

further that despite this fact the treaty is not wellregarded by many members of the military. A display of

flexibility by the West on this issue would serve to

dispel the lingering doubts of many of these critics.22

Russian leaders have also been quick to point out that

they seek no increase in the total allocation of TLE

under the CFE accord but rather simply the removal of

the flank restriction on what could be positioned in the

flanks.

There have also been signs that Russia is now

moving in the direction of being outside the flank

limitations in November 1995. Lieutenant General

Kharchenko, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces,

reported to the JCG in February 1994 that the Russian

military was taking into account improved command and

control and structural changes as it positioned forces

returning from Germany. As a result, ". . . we shall

have on the southern flank approximately 600 tanks,

around 2200 armored combat vehicles, and about 1000

artillery pieces (not counting temporary deployment

possibilities)".23 This would obviously suggest that

Russian forces would be far in excess of the 700 tanks,

1280 artillery pieces, and 580 ACVs they are authorized

for the entirety of this area as well as the Leningrad

Military District. Some analysis has suggested that

overall Russian forces could exceed their CFE

entitlements in the flank areas by about 2000 ACVs, 400

tanks, and 500 artillery pieces.24 Russian planners have

been keen to point out that the CFE Treaty establishes

". . . the clear cut guidelines for the new military

policy of Russia and development of her Armed Forces."

With this is mind and based on announced figures this

excess equipment would amount to roughly the equivalent

of three mechanized divisions.25 Furthermore, General
17

Grachev stated in a press conference in March 1994 that

"the formation of mobile forces in the North Caucasus

Military District to include three airborne brigades, an

airborne division, and two motorized rifle brigades has

already started." There is also evidence that Russian

military planners are proceeding now to insure

sufficient facilities are available to accommodate the

planned force irrespective of the resolution of the

flank issue. Russia has underway an extensive military

housing construction program in the North Caucasus at 15

military bases. This housing is being built to

accommodate the ground and air units that have arrived

in the North Caucasus since 1992. A Russian press report

in November 1993 listed over 9000 new apartments being

constructed during the period 1992 to 1994 at 8 of the

15 locations.26

Russian experts have suggested several solutions to

this problem. Initially, proposals focused exclusively

on the total suspension of Article V of the treaty which

established the flank limitations. Alternatively, the

suggestion has been made to remove the North Caucasus

from the flanks and recategorize it as a "rear district"

which would change the map associated with the Treaty.

This was coupled with some of the previously made vague

assurances about the level of forces in the Leningrad

Military District, no "over concentration of forces" in

the North Caucasus, the right under the treaty to

station large quantities of equipment in Kaliningrad

would not be abused, and the implementation of these

changes would not ". . . prejudice the security of any

State Party to the Treaty."27 In February, the Russian

Federation added more ideas which attempted to avoid any

interpretation of a "change" in the treaty but rather a

"reinterpretation" of key portions. This included the

exemption of naval infantry and coastal defense forces

from flank limits, since this was part of a Declaration

by the Soviet Union considered an addition to the treaty

but not an integral part of the text. They further

suggested that the authorization to remove equipment

from designated storage which was allowed as a total for

each "group of states" be reinterpreted to mean that
18

each state party had this allowance. This would be

coupled with the right to "temporary deployments" to

create the force desired.28 In a statement that did

little to advance this argument, however, General

Grachev defined temporary as "forever minus one day."

Most recently Russian spokesmen have suggested that the

time period for returning TLE to storage sites

(established as 42 days in Article X) be considered a

"recommendation."29

 While the particular remedy has changed over time,

all suggestions still appear to be viable from the

Russian perspective. Furthermore, the objective in each

case seems to be the same--to increase TLE in active

forces particularly those stationed in the North

Caucasus region and establish as a precedent that the

internal limitations imposed on Russia by the flank

requirement are in essence no longer valid.

The Flank Limits and Ukraine.

The flank limitation also restricts the deployment

of forces within the borders of Ukraine (see Figure 2).

This obviously complicates achievement of a solution

satisfactory to all parties. Ukraine has also been

adamant since September 1993 that the flank limitations

must be reviewed for many of the same reasons cited by

the Russian Federation. Ukrainian officials have

observed, for example, that the flank limitation

stipulates that it can position no more than 7 percent

of its total TLE allocation in a portion of the Odessa

Military District which takes up nearly one quarter of

its entire territory.30 Ukrainian totals on the flank

are:

Tanks ACVs Artillery

Active units 280 350 390

DPSS 400 0 500
19

Subtotal 680 350 890

Ukrainian defense experts have argued that their

country requires a more balanced distribution of its

forces. Implementation of the flank limitations would

force them to position the majority of their forces in

the Carpathian Military District which would seem to be

in contravention of a stated NATO goal of reducing

forward deployed forces. Furthermore, they observed that

a solution to this problem must be found by the middle

of 1994 in order to give military planners sufficient

time to react.31 Obviously, this problem is further

exacerbated by changes brought about by the dissolution

of the Soviet Union and emerging problems between Russia

and Ukraine. This includes the disappearance of the Kiev

Military District which was shared with Russia, the

presence of Russian forces in eastern Moldova, and

emerging Russian nationalism in the Crimea. In addition,

the Russian Federation and Ukraine have yet to settle

the final distribution of TLE assigned to the Black Sea

Fleet which still includes a significant amount of

equipment.32
20

In essence, this is an issue of sovereignty for

Ukraine as it attempts to establish itself as a midlevel power and not the "spinoff of an old empire." The

Ukrainians have also been somewhat wary of the Russian

Federation receiving any relief on the flanks for

obvious security reasons. Finally, implementation of the

flank limits presents the Ukrainians with a tremendous

economic problem. It would require them to abandon

infrastructure currently available in the restricted

area and construct new facilities in the Carpathian

Military District and Northern Odessa which they simply

cannot afford based on their severe economic
21

difficulties. In September 1994 General Gennadiy Gurin

reported to the JCG:

Under the present conditions of our economy,

we do not have the means needed to relocate

troops in order to fulfill the flank limits,

and we want only one thing --to retain the

existing infrastructure of military units.

Proposals tied to the possibility of

disbanding troops do not stand up to

criticism, since disbanding troops is more

expensive than relocating them, due to the

unavoidable costs of providing housing for

officers" families, paying compensations,

etc.33

The Ukrainians have concluded that the simplest

solution is to exempt the naval infantry and coastal

defense forces from the sublimits established by the

flank limitations, while retaining the rule that they

would count against overall national totals. While this

might have the desired effect, it is unclear how this

would resolve the continuing impasse between Ukraine and

the Russian Federation over the Black Sea Fleet and

would also require a similar accommodation being offered

the Russian Federation.

While there is no doubt that this seeming impasse

given the flanks is a threat to the full implementation

of the CFE Treaty, the manner in which it has unfolded

does contain some positive aspects. All efforts by the

parties involved (particularly Russia and Ukraine)

appear to have been overt. Even the construction of

infrastructure that may lead to forces in excess of the

flank limitations has been reported publicly. No attempt

to disguise or hide the problem and the difficulties

associated with it has been made. Furthermore, all

parties have used the Joint Consultative Group to air

the issues. As a result, the procedures established in

the treaty have been working, but one can still question

whether this forum is sufficient to resolve the

conflict. Lastly, the Russian military has been "out in
22

front" on the issue in military-to-military contacts.

The NATO Response.

The public response of NATO members has emphasized

the position that the CFE Treaty is the "cornerstone of

European security." Consequently, it cannot be

renegotiated and to do so would establish a bad

precedent for other arms control forums. This includes

not only the basic text of the treaty but also all

related documents, protocols, and declarations.

Furthermore, the Russian Federation freely accepted the

treaty as negotiated to include the agreements with the

former members of the Warsaw Pact and declarations by

the Soviet Union prior to its demise. As a result, any

alteration to these documents such as those proposed can

not occur until the review conference which will occur

in spring 1996. Furthermore, Russia has not sufficiently

explained the analysis of new threats to its frontiers

that substantiates the removal or modification of flank

limits.

The West has also suggested that the treaty

provides sufficient "flexibility" to meet Russian needs.

Representatives of the United Kingdom and the United

States have observed the following possibilities: First,

Russian troops in the North Caucasus could be "light"

forces equipped with equipment that is not limited by

the CFE Treaty (e.g., trucks, infantry weapons, small

calibre artillery, and certain tracked vehicles that are

not part of the ACV category). Such a force would also

seem more appropriate to the terrain of the Caucasus as

well as the threats of internal instability. Second, the

Russians should recognize that there is no flank

limitation for their aircraft (either fixed or rotary

wing) which can be rapidly moved from zone to zone to

meet any emerging threat. Third, they could deploy

additional ACVs and other tracked vehicles with their

internal security forces as allowed in Article III and

XII (which do not count against their overall CFE

total). Article XII, for example, allows for up to 1,000
23

ACVs to be placed with internal security forces (only

600 in the flank area) and not be counted against CFE

totals. It does not, however, allow for any transfer of

tanks or artillery to such forces. Fourth, equipment for

Russian units in the CFE flank zone could be stored

outside the area but close enough for rapid deployment

in time of crisis. Fifth, Russia and Ukraine might also

seek to renegotiate their allocation with the other

former members of the Soviet Union (Armenia, Azerbaijan,

Georgia, and Moldova).34 The total in the flank area for

these countries amounts to 870 tanks, 870 ACVs and 1,105

artillery pieces which, though not an insignificant

force, is insufficient to satisfy the demands of Ukraine

and Russia previously discussed. It is also unlikely

that any of these states would be willing to give up

sizable parts of their allocation, since their

respective portions are relatively small and ongoing

conflicts in the region involve several of them.

Other members of NATO have shown more or less

willingness to compromise within the NATO High Level

Task Force (HLTF) due in large measure to how such an

alteration would affect their respective security.

Throughout the implementation period Germany has

appeared sensitive to Russian concerns and has

previously cosponsored proposals with Russia for less

costly destruction procedures. Germany has also proposed

that the timetable for equipment destruction might be

extended, or that excess equipment not destroyed at the

end of the reduction period could be placed temporarily

at secure storage sites pending final destruction.35

France has been uniformly opposed to any

concessions to the Russian Federation out of fears that

they could result in multiple proposals by other

signatories on portions of the treaty they find

objectionable, thereby threatening the entire basis of

the accord. Obviously, Turkey and Norway have been

outspoken opponents to any compromise based on the fact

that they border the flank areas.36 They echo the doubts

of France and, furthermore, Turkey believes that Russia

maintains imperialist ambitions in the Caucasus region
24

and is the primary motivator behind hostilities in

Georgia as well as the war between Armenia and

Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh. An increase in forces

in the flank area would also reduce the warning time

available to Turkey and Norway and thus be counter to

their security interests. Lastly, a dramatic change in

the CFE Treaty or its overall demise could open the way

for a new European or regional arms race. Consequently,

Turkey has also hinted that any concessions to the

Russians could result in an overall Turkish review of

continued participation in the accord. Due to the

intense feelings by the Turks and Norwegians, NATO has

not yet agreed upon a formal Alliance approach to

solving this problem.

As the treaty nears the end of the implementation

period, it seems increasingly clear that some solution

to this impasse must be found. While the technical

details may differ and the degree to which the Russian

Federation is willing to compromise is unclear, certain

key factors are evident. First, NATO needs to decide in

the High Level Task Force (HLTF) precisely what it means

by the phrase "within the flexibility allowed in the

treaty". This is fundamental to maintaining a united

front in the negotiations; will avoid an interpretation

by the Russian Federation that NATO can not accept; and

also avoid any possibility of a "take it or leave it"

confrontation in November 1995. Russian objectives at

this stage may be to meet the overall national levels

with enough ambiguity so as to argue compliance in

November 1995. In determining an acceptable level of

flexibility the Alliance should also consider that the

Russian Federation must offer something to the states

most affected--Turkey and Norway. This could include

such things as Russian assistance in the settlement of

the war in Nagorno-Karabakh, buffer zones, or additional

inspections allocations for these areas.

Second, all Alliance members (especially the United

States) need to avoid any appearance of this issue

becoming bilateral between their country and the Russian

Federation. Russian tactics in the negotiations so far
25

seem focused on emphasizing its "strategic partnership"

with the United States, and other attempts to split the

Alliance depending on the type proposal presented or

assurances offered. In many ways Alliance members need

to be aware of the stress these negotiations place on

the Alliance.

Third, every effort must be made to frame the

result in a fashion that avoids any renegotiation of the

treaty. This implies at this stage that the JCG must

remain the forum for finding a compromise. The treaty

allows for the calling of an "extraordinary" conference

but this is doubtful due to the short time remaining.

Consequently, a dichotomy exists as all members realize

that the European security landscape has changed

significantly since 1991 but to reopen the negotiations

on this treaty would either doom it to failure or at

least a significant period of discussion.

Fourth, NATO members need to quietly but firmly

remind the Russian Federation of the severe penalties

associated with noncompliance in this forum and others.

As discussed at the very onset of this study, arms

control can not occur in isolation. The Russian

Federation could lose substantial aid (particularly due

to the congressional requirement to certify treaty

compliance) and its entry into the G7 by flagrantly

violating the accord.

Fifth, a solution must be found to the problem of

Ukraine that may differ from the overall settlement. The

future of Central Europe may well be defined in terms of

the relationship established between Ukraine and Russia.

From a strict security perspective the Ukrainian problem

is more persuasive than the Russian Federation.

Furthermore, the severe economic deprivations occurring

in Ukraine add credence to their statements that they

will be unable to comply due to financial limitations.

Finally, NATO members must have no illusions. They

cannot wish the problem away. To do so risks "winning

the game and losing the treaty." The prospects for a
26

"last minute" compromise or change in Russian attitudes

are unlikely, particularly in light the recent

hostilities in Chechnya and elsewhere in the flank area.

It is conceivable that the Russian Federation might

declare itself fully in compliance with the treaty in

November 1995 and "challenge" the West to argue that

interpretation. This would place renewed strains on NATO

and U.S.-Russian relations. It would make a compromise

extremely difficult politically given the impending

Russian parliamentary elections (December 1995) and

Russian presidential elections (June 1996) not to

mention the upcoming American presidential elections.

The Russian Response.

In assessing the depth of Russian willingness to

compromise it may be useful to examine some additional

factors affecting this problem from their perspective.

There can be no doubt that this issue serves as a

surrogate for broader internal and external problems

facing the Russian Federation. It illustrates, for

example, the ongoing friction between several players in

the Russian "bureaucratic politics" process. The Russian

military was skeptical of the agreement from the very

onset and questioned whether or not it had been left

with adequate resources to defend the political and

territorial integrity of the country.37

But the military is far from a unitary actor. The

appointment of Pavel Grachev as Russia"s first Minister

of Defense caused resentment among senior officers on

the General Staff which has continued.38 Grachev has also

had serious disagreements with Colonel General

Nikolayev, head of Interior Security Forces, over

resources, the potential transfer of army assets to

border troops, and major military exercises.39 There have

also been differences among the military, Foreign

Ministry and the Office of the President over such

issues as Russian participation in the Partnership for

Peace. Foreign Minister Kozyrev, for example, was

initially viewed by many as too pro-Western and willing
27

to accept Western arms control proposals, but more

recent analysis has suggested that there is a growing

convergence between the positions he and the military

have adopted.40 Finally, several political parties during

the 1993 elections advocated Russian rejection of CFE as

well as the START II accord as being counter to Russian

national security interests.41 These tensions have led

some to suggest that civil authorities may be losing

control of the military42 and consequently may not be

able to force a compromise on their own military

leaders. The attitudes of these various groups are

unlikely to slacken and may in fact harden as the

deadline for final implementation approaches. It will be

difficult for President Yeltsin to compromise on this

issue and risk being perceived as weak before the

Russian presidential elections in June 1996. It should

also be understood that this is viewed as a "military"

problem to the Russian Federation while in many ways it

is a "political" problem for the United States. Russian

critics of the treaty, while describing the "flank

issue" as discriminatory, have pointed out repeatedly

how the treaty has placed the Russian Federation in an

overall position of inferiority. Many Russians argue it

is a concerted effort to "keep Russia down" and

indicates a lack of willingness on the part of the

United States to develop a true "strategic partnership."

Aleksey Arbatov, Director of the Geopolitical and

Military Forecast Center, noted in an article in Novoye

Vremya

Following the execution of the CFE Treaty, in

the latter half of the 1990"s, the balance

will be the opposite (in NATO"s favor), and

the ratio of forces between Russian and NATO

will be 1:2.8 in favor of the West. If, on the

other hand, the former Soviet Warsaw Pact

allies are added to NATO, the balance will be

1:3.7. If, however, for strategic

extrapolation purposes, the forces of former

Soviet Republics in the European zone which

are now independent states are added to the

West, the ratio becomes 1:4.5 to Russia"s
28

disadvantage.43

Consequently, the resolution of this problem is

tied not only to Russia"s relations with the West but

also to its future relations with the former members of

the CIS, perceived responsibilities toward the so-called

"near abroad" (Russian citizens living outside the

borders of the federation), and concern for strife on

their borders. The view that Russia is threatened by

future external and internal threats (particularly in

the Caucasus) is also reflected in the new military

doctrine. This document suggests that priority must go

to the restoration and expansion of a mutually

advantageous relationship between Russia and the other

members of the CIS to meet these challenges.

Furthermore, Russia proceeds from the fact that its

security is indivisible from the security of the other

Commonwealth States.44 In other words, Russia considers

its forward defense to begin at the borders of the

former Soviet Union and not the Russian Federation.

Not surprisingly one of the primary objectives of

Russian foreign policy is the integration of the border

states of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Ukraine, and

Moldova into the CIS as a security alliance not unlike

NATO.45 This will logically result in the stationing of

Russian forces on the territory of these states, which

will count against their overall flank limitations. Some

experts believe that elements of the Russian military

have pursued a policy of destabilizing several of the

regimes in the Caucasus in an effort to encourage their

reentry into the CIS. Russian military commanders may

have provided arms to both Armenia and Azerbaijan in

their war over Nagorno-Karabakh in an effort to ensure

the continuation of that conflict. It supported the

rebels of Abkhazia until they appeared on the verge of

defeating the Georgian government. Once Georgia agreed

to join the CIS and cede basing rights to Russian

forces, Russian troops came to the aid of the

Shevardnadze government.46

With this policy in mind, Russian leaders have
29

argued that the Russian Federation, working within the

authority of the CIS, should have the primary

responsibility for peacekeeping operations within the

borders of the former Soviet Union. Foreign Minister

Kozyrev initially broached this issue in a speech given

to the U.N. on September 2, 1993. Kozyrev sought

recognition and financial support for Russian

peacekeeping operations in the "near abroad." He argued:

Either we learn to conduct military actions to

support and establish peace in the zones of

our traditional geopolitical interests or we

risk losing influence there and the vacuum

will be filled by others.47

General Grachev also raised this issue in

discussions with Secretary General Boutros Ghali in

early 1994. Grachev argued that if the conflict in

Rwanda involves the Organization of African Unity and

peacekeeping operations in Haiti include members of the

Organization of American States, why should operations

by the CIS not be sanctioned under the Charter of the

U.N.?

Grachev also asserted that forces assigned to

peacekeeping operations and their authorized armaments

should not count toward the maximum permissible levels

under the CFE Treaty. Otherwise a difficult situation

would arise in which the deployment of units trained for

peacekeeping (such as the 45th Motorized Rifle Division

based in the Leningrad Military District) could not be

replaced while operating in Tajikistan or elsewhere in

the CIS.48 This concept was again reiterated by President

Yeltsin during his address to the U.N. and subsequent

summit with President Clinton. Yeltsin asserted that

Russia has similar rights to that of the United States

in quelling disturbances on its borders. He added that,

"The main peacekeeping burden in the territory of the

former Soviet Union lies upon the Russian Federation."49

Obviously, this has significant implications for

the flank problem. Russian thoughts on peacekeeping are
30

embedded in its new doctrine and are quite different

from those normally found in similar Western

publications. The Russian military does not necessarily

view "peacekeeping" as normally low intensity conflict

that can be accomplished by light forces. Rather, it

sees such efforts as operations needed to head off the

expansion of a conflict and consequently appropriate for

heavy forces. In this regard it is frequently mentioned

that the Russian word mirotvorets, which is generally

translated in English as "peacekeeper," literally means

"peacemaker." Russian experts on peacekeeping often use

their operations in Afghanistan as illustrative. General

Boris Pyankov, who is responsible for peacekeeping in

the Russian General Staff, observed: "Here in Russia,

everything is the other way round . . . first we use

overwhelming force, then we bring the parties to the

negotiating table."50 In a June 21, 1994 Red Star

interview, Russian Deputy Defense Minister Colonel

General Georgy Kondratyev noted that the Ministry of

Defense was preparing 2-3 motorized rifle divisions for

peacekeeping (making) operations.51 He further reported

that by the beginning of 1995 Russian airborne forces

will no longer have the primary role in peacemaking

operations. The use of heavy mechanized forces in

Chechnya may be further evidence of the Russian penchant

to use "overwhelming force in peacemaking."

In the summer of 1994 roughly 3,000 Russian

peacemaking troops deployed to the Georgian-Abkhazian

border.52 Some reports suggest that Russia may eventually

have two divisions deployed to Georgia. The Status-ofForces agreement between the two countries allows basing

facilities for two divisions (at T"bilisi, Batumi, and

Akhalkalaki), the presence of Russian border guards on

the Georgian-Turkey border, use of Georgian airspace by

Russian military aircraft, access to all

telecommunications facilities, joint operations of all

training facilities, and a lease to the Poti Naval Base

for the Russian Black Sea Fleet. A similar arrangement

has been achieved with Armenia with the possibility of

one Russian division on its territory. Moldova also has

one "peacemaking" division and pressure is being placed
31

on Azerbaijan to accept Russian "peacemakers." It is

also likely that Russia will wish to maintain a

significant force in Chechnya which will make the flank

limits even more burdensome. In summary, a combination

of Russian foreign policy and a reluctance on the part

of other U.N. members to become involved in peacekeeping

along the southern border of the Russian Federation may

offer the Russian military an additional argument for

exceeding their flank authorizations.

Other Problems.

Besides the flank issue, only two major obstacles

seem to confront the final implementation of the treaty-

-cost and Russian military equipment that was moved east

of the Urals prior to the treaty coming into effect.

Several of the countries of the former Soviet Union

(most notably Russia, Belarus and Ukraine) are

experiencing serious problems due to the dramatic cost

associated with the destruction of equipment in

accordance with the strict procedures outlined in the

treaty. In an article in Kraznaya Zvezda on November 16,

1993, Russian experts complained that the cost of

destroying a single tank was over 800,000 rubles at

current prices.53 This problem has been reviewed in the

JCG and simpler methods have been discussed to destroy

equipment including even considerations of so-called

"environmental destruction." Under this procedure

equipment to be destroyed would be segregated and

exposed to the elements so that over time it was

rendered militarily useless.

Despite these efforts, however, alternative means

of destruction may not resolve the problem for several

reasons. First, the cost of destruction in these

countries is affected by three supplemental factors--the

use of high numbers of laborers to effect destruction,

rising costs of energy to run the facilities, and a

desire to recover the maximum amount of metal from the

weapons in the process. Obviously alternative

destruction procedures may solve the CFE problem while

creating others such as greater unemployment, reducing
32

the possibility of recovering the metal, and also will

result in a serious environmental cleanup requirements.

As discussed earlier in this monograph the Soviet

Union agreed to destroy roughly 16,000 pieces of TLE

which it had transported east of the Urals and out of

the AOA as a commitment related to the treaty. Russia

assumed this responsibility as part of the Tashkent

Accord although this has always been considered a

"political" rather than "legal" requirement. By the

middle of 1994 Russia had destroyed only a fraction of

this equipment. It would need to dramatically accelerate

its current effort to achieve the required total by

November 1995. Curiously, the Russians have resisted

offers of assistance in the destruction of this TLE

though most of it appears to have been stored out in the

open and may be now of little military value. This is

probably due to a bit of paranoia and a desire to keep

inspections in the eastern part of the Russian

Federation (that portion of the country not covered by

CFE) to an absolute minimum. Still the requirement

remains and Western countries need to achieve consensus

on their policy should (as it now appears) the Russian

Federation be in violation of this commitment by the end

of this year. Several general ideas come to mind. First,

NATO must continue to impress upon the Russian

Federation that this is a serious, albeit political

requirement. Second, since it lies outside of the AOA of

the treaty, alternative means of destruction are

permissible and should be encouraged. Third, the

segregation of these storage areas into known locations

would allow the West to monitor the progress on

destruction and status of the TLE using national

technical means. In addition, the entry into force of

the "Open Skies Treaty" in the spring/summer of 1995 may

offer an additional means to monitor the status and

readiness of this equipment.

The Future--Where Do We Go Now?

If the treaty is in fact implemented and the

verification of residual levels is accomplished a Review
33

Conference will occur, most likely in April or May 1996.

It is important for U.S. policymakers to begin to

consider what will likely be "on the table" at this

conference. Furthermore, it is important to contemplate

what U.S. policy should be with respect to future

conventional arms control regimes in Europe.

The CFE Treaty is designed to continue with no time

limit. Still if solutions are found to the difficulties

discussed here there may be cause for only a brief

respite, and it is certain that several issues will be

of immediate interest at the review conference. There is

no doubt that Russia and Ukraine will immediately press

for the removal of Article V covering flank limits at

the onset of any Review Conference. It must also be

recognized that several states from the East may insist

that the "bloc-to-bloc" character of the Treaty

disappear since one of the "groups of states parties" is

gone. This may be inevitable, but its implications must

be thoroughly considered now in preparation for future

discussions. First, many of the limitations which are

ascribed to "groups of states parties" (such as

equipment placed in DPSS) would probably be raised.

These could be converted to national totals, but this

might result in higher entitlements for some countries.

Second, it would reduce the flexibility that NATO now

has to shift forces or entitlements between members of

the Alliance. Lastly, it would have important

implications for the post-1996 verification regime and

for the allocation/conduct of inspections. Furthermore,

destruction procedures and costs must be reviewed. Some

participants have already questioned whether or not the

destruction of TLE below authorized levels must be done

along the strict guidelines established in the treaty.

The treaty is certainly mute on the issue of what

procedures states parties may use to maintain numerical

limitations once residual levels have been verified in

the spring of 1996.54 Lastly, it seems clear that there

is little interest in extending the agreement to other

pieces of equipment or negotiating lower levels of TLE

for the participating states though there has been some

suggestion in Russian publications of an interest in the
34

inclusion of naval forces in the arms reduction process

and the limitation of naval activities.55 Still, while

there may be little interest in extending the treaty to

other categories of equipment, close attention must be

paid to continually update the Protocol on Existing

Types of Conventional Armaments and Equipment (POET) in

order to categorize new models as they are brought into

service.

Article XVIII of the treaty does state that states

parties ". . . shall continue the negotiations on

conventional armed forces with the same mandate and with

the goal of building on this Treaty."56 With this in mind

many experts have argued that the agreements reached in

the Forum for Security Cooperation (FSC) in Europe have

created a requirement to seek a "harmonization" of CFE

limitations among its 30 signatories with the

confidence/security building measures (CSBMs) by the 52

members of the Organization on Security and Cooperation

in Europe (OSCE). The initial proposal in this area was

presented by the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and

Slovakia in October 1992. It proposed the creation of

national force levels for non-CFE states (in many cases

this might simply be a declaration of current levels

with no need for reductions). In addition, appropriate

commitments for information exchange, verification, and

implementation of the CFE Treaty would have to be made

by these additional states.57 Obviously, those states

currently participating in the CFE accord would be

required to notify these states (primarily the former

"neutrals and non-aligned"--Sweden, Finland, Austria,

and former Yugoslavian states) of their maximum levels.

So far there has been little overall interest in

this proposal by those states who are not currently

signatories to the CFE Treaty (e.g., Finland,

Switzerland, Sweden, etc.) for several reasons. As

suggested at the very beginning of this monograph, arms

control is used a means of reducing tensions between

states. Therefore, it has little possibility of success

when states are engaged in warfare and may have little

meaning or momentum when they enjoy good relations.
35

Consequently, the Swiss have openly questioned the value

of such an agreement, and the possibility of including

Serbia in such an agreement is extremely unlikely prior

to the resolution of current hostilities. The interest

of the neutral states is also tempered by the nature of

their respective militaries and views on deterrence.

Most of these countries depend heavily on reserve forces

and militias for their defense. A verification regime

that included a detailed transfer of information on

mobilization procedures, depot locations, restrictions

on the activities of these forces, etc. is construed by

many experts in these countries as not contributing to

improved national security or deterrence.

There have also been suggestions on the creation of

so-called "regional tables" that could either build on

previous agreements or use the concepts applied in CFE

to reduce tensions in particular areas. In Europe, the

suggestion has been applied to the former Yugoslavia in

an initiative led by Hungary in OSCE.58 There have also

been some suggestions that the Baltic states (Estonia,

Latvia, and Lithuania) would also be interested in this

type of arrangement because of their concerns over

Russian forces stationed in the Leningrad Military

District. Outside Europe scholars have speculated that

such arrangements might have application for the Far

East or Middle East. In this regard it is extremely

interesting that the Republic of Korea, Japan, and

Macedonia have observer status at OSCE negotiations, and

there is some belief that Israel may also apply for a

similar position. While such an approach would seem

consistent with the regional focus of U.S. strategy, it

must be recognized that the prospects for success in

these areas appear slight. Enormous problems such as

defining the "region," the mandate, and role of the

great powers would have to be solved prior to the

beginning of any such negotiation. The key to this

approach may be to develop an arms control dialogue in

tandem with a more formal peace process. Neither is

likely to achieve decisive results by itself, but

together they may create the critical mass necessary for

a settlement.59 In a similar fashion there have also been
36

proposals to refine a number of the current CSBMs and

create others for the trouble spots in the OSCE area.

All of these harmonization proposals seem focused

on transforming the arms control process in Europe from

a "quantitative" to a "qualitative" effort, which

certainly seems logical. But at a more fundamental

level, there are serious implications for the United

States that must be considered. At its ultimate extreme,

"harmonization" suggests the transformation of OSCE into

a regional organization that coordinates security

activities on the European continent and would logically

place NATO in a subordinate role. This may be desirous

and is certainly supported by various segments of

European officials. French experts, for example, support

this approach as necessary to ". . . establish the

structures and procedures that are required to allow

Europeans to act autonomously if necessary."60 Foreign

Minister Kozyrev from the Russian Federation has also

proposed the conversion of OSCE into a full fledged

international organization with "a genuine division of

labor between the CIS, NATO, European Union, NACC, and

WEU with the OSCE playing a coordinating role." He

further suggested that OSCE create a governing body of

10 members to deal with the requirement for consensus

prior to action.61 Such action could be dangerous. It

would dramatically reduce the role of the United States

in European security and could become a means for the

Russian Federation to legitimize the CIS as a regional

organization while undermining NATO.

In preparing for the future, one other area may be

appropriate to consider. There seems little doubt that

the character of arms control among the CFE participants

is moving towards qualitative aspects and crisis

prevention. Still the United States and Europeans (to

include the former members of the Warsaw Pact) bear a

heavy responsibility in the fueling of conventional arms

races and conflicts around the globe. In 1993, the U.S.

sold $33 billion in government-to-government arms sales.

Russian military doctrine has stated a goal of exporting

sufficient arms to earn enough hard currency to sustain
37

research/development, insure production for domestic

use, finance limited defense conversions, and "ensure

the social protection of personnel employed in defense

industries."62 As we enter the CFE sustainment period

with a reduced requirement for equipment due to smaller

force levels, there will be increased pressure in many

states to expand exports in order to maintain industries

and employment. Consequently, it may be prudent to

consider the use of the CFE/OSCE forum for a discussion

on not only future destruction/verification procedures

but also national conventional arms export policies,

with the view of limiting sales to regions experiencing

turmoil and greater international incentives being

offered for states to convert excess defense industrial

capacity.63

As we consider what role conventional arms control

should have in future U.S. national security strategy,

it is essential to remember that it remains a means to

an end. It is also important to maintain a short and

long term perspective. In the near term the final

implementation of CFE is not assured, and will not occur

without concerted action by the United States. For the

future we must remember that our arms control policies

have a tremendous resonance in broader areas having to

do with the future of the U.S.-European relationship. As

a result answers to wider questions may well serve as a

guide to arms control policies. Does the United States

wish to continue its role as the leader of NATO with the

Alliance being the premier security organization on the

continent? What is the U.S. policy towards the assertion

by the Russian Federation of a preeminent role in the

security affairs of the former members of the Soviet

Union? While certainly these are questions of tremendous

complexity, it is still necessary to keep in mind that

seemingly "tactical choices" now in CFE may define their

ultimate answers. How the United States and its allies

deal with the problems in the final implementation of

CFE as well as American policy towards the Review

Conference will contribute significantly to establishing

a framework for future U.S. policy towards Europe.
38

The United States and its NATO partners won a

tremendous victory in the Cold War through their

policies and perseverance. CFE is described by many as a

"cornerstone for European security" in the future.

Having achieved this peace it remains to be seen how we

build on this cornerstone to achieve a "secure and

lasting" peace.

ENDNOTES

1. Lee Feinstein, "CFE: Off the Endangered List?",

Arms Control Today, October 1993, p. 3.

2. Ibid., pp. 2-3.

3. NATO Office of Information and Press, "Basic

Fact Sheet--chronology of Key Arms Control Treaties and

Agreements (1963-1994)," Brussels: NATO Information

Service, April 1994, pp. 3-5.

4. For a good discussion of many of these factors

see Ralph A. Hallenbeck and David E. Shaver, On

Disarmament: the Role of Conventional Arms Control in

National Security Strategy, Carlisle Barracks, PA:

Strategic Studies Institute, 1990, pp. 17-18.

5. For a thorough examination, see U.S. Department

of State, Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe

(CFE), Treaty Document 102-8, Washington: U.S.

Government Printing Office, 1991.

6. Ibid., pp. 2 and 223.

7. Lee Feinstein, "CFE: Off the Endangered List?",

Arms Control Today, October 1993, p. 3.

8. Hallenbeck and Shaver, On Disarmament: The Role

of Conventional Arms Control in National Security

Strategy, pp. 19-26.

9. U.S. Department of State, Treaty on Conventional

Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), p. 223.
39

10. Necil Nedimoglu, "NATO and Partner Countries

Cooperate in Implementing CFE Treaty," NATO Review, June

1994, pp. 18-20.

11. Daniel Sneider, "Russia Seeks CFE Changes as

Warfare Rages at Border," Defense News, August 2, 1993,

p. 3.

12. Foreign Broadcast Information Service Media

Analysis, "Russia Increasing Pressure to Revise CFE

Flank Quotas," November 17, 1993, pp. 2-3.

13. Ambassador Yu. V. Kostenko, Head of the

Ukrainian Delegation, Statement to the Joint

Consultative Group CFE Treaty, September 14, 1993, pp.

3-4.

14. LTC James F. Holcomb, "The Russian Case for

Renegotiation" (Central and East European Defense

Studies, SHAPE Headquarters, 28 September 1993), pp. 1-

2. See also "Russia Increasing Pressure to Revise CFE

Flank Quotas," Foreign Broadcast Information Service,

November 17, 1993, p. 1.

15. LTG V.M. Zhurbenko, "Statement to the Joint

Consultative Group CFE Treaty", October 12, 1993

(unofficial translation), pp. 3-4.

16. V.N. Kulebiakin, Head of the Russian Delegation

to the JCG, "Statement to the Joint Consultative Group

CFE Treaty," January 25, 1994, p. 2.

17. LTC James Holcomb, "Chief of the Russian

General Staff and the CFE Flank Issue," (Central and

East European Defense Studies, SHAPE Headquarters, April

22, 1994), p. 2. See also V.N. Kulebiakin, Head of the

Russian Delegation to the JCG, "Statement to the Joint

Consultative Group CFE Treaty", April 26, 1994, p. 1.

18. First Deputy Chief of the Russian General Staff

Colonel General V.M. Zhurbenko, "Statement to the Joint
40

Consultative Group CFE Treaty", June 21, 1994, p. 4.

19. For a thorough discussion of the doctrine and

its implications, see Charles Dick, The Military

Doctrine of the Russian Federation, Sandhurst, UK: Royal

Military College, Conflict Studies Research Center,

1993.

20. Holcomb, "Chief of the Russian General Staff

and the CFE Flank Issue," p. 1.

21. For a thorough discussion of Russian objections

to the flanks, see Colonel General Mikhail Kolesnikov,

Chief of General Staff of the Russian Federation Armed

Forces, "Problems of Flanks and Future of Treaty on

Conventional Armed Forces, Kraznaya Zvezda (Red Star),

April 19, 1994, pp. 1 and 3.

22. Jane M. Sharp, "Russian Perspectives on the

Future of Conventional Arms Control," paper presented at

the KCL Conference, London, July 1994, pp. 23-29. See

also Celestine Bohlen, "Russia Says It Needs to Keep

More of Its Weapons on Borders, New York Times, April 3,

1994, p. 8.

23. Lieutenant Genera Karchenko, Deputy Chief of

Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation,

"Statement to the Joint Consultative Group CFE Treaty,"

February 15, 1994.

24. Michael E. Gordon, "Russian Troop Movements

Rouse NATO Concern on Treaty Limits," New York Times,

April 3, 1994, p. 1.

25. Dr. Oleg Amirovet, et al., Conventional Force

Deployments Within the Commonwealth of Independent

States in Compliance with the CFE Treaty and the

Republics' Security Requirements, Washington: The

Brookings Institution, 1992, p. 35.

26. Lieutenant General Zhurbenko, "Understanding

Sought on CFE Flank' Limits," Kraznaya Zvezda (Red
41

Star), November 16, 1993, pp. 1-2.

27. Lieutenant General Zhurbenko, "Statement to the

Joint Consultative Group CFE Treaty," October 12, 1993,

p. 4. See also V.N. Kulebyakin, "Statement to the Joint

Consultative Group CFE Treaty," November 2, 1993, pp. 2-

4.

28. Lieutenant General Karchenko, "Statement to the

Joint Consultative Group CFE Treaty," February 15, 1994,

pp. 5-6.

29. V.N. Kulebiakin, "Statement to the Joint

Consultative Group CFE Treaty," 26 April 26, 1994, p. 2.

30. "Russia Chafes at Force Limits," New York

Times, April 16, 1994, p. A20.

31. Volodymyr Belayshov, Deputy Director, Ukrainian

Arms Control and Disarmament Department, "Statement to

the Joint Consultative Group CFE Treaty," April 6, 1994,

pp. 3-5.

 32. International Institute for Strategic Studies,

The Military Balance 1994-1995, London: Brassey's

Publishers, 1994, pp. 105, 116-117.

33. Lieutenant General Gennadiy Gurin, First Deputy

Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of

Ukraine, "Statement to the Joint Consultative Group CFE

Treaty," September 27, 1994, p. 2.

34. Jane Sharp, "Russian Perspectives on the Future

of Conventional Arms Control," pp. 32-33.

35. Jane Sharp, "Should the CFE Treaty Be

Revised?", paper presented for members of the Select

Committee on Defense, British House of Commons, London,

June 14, 1994, pp. 8-9.

36. Ambassador Ole Peter Kolby, "Statement of the

Norwegian Delegation to the Joint Consultative Group CFE
42

Treaty," November 9, 1993; and "Statement by the Turkish

Delegation to the Joint Consultative Group CFE Treaty,"

September 21, 1993.

37. Sharp, "Russian Perspectives on the Future of

Conventional Arms Control," pp. 24-25.

38. Renee de Nevers, Russia's Strategic Renovation,

London: International Institute for Strategic Studies,

Adelphi Paper 289, July 1994, p. 20. For a thorough

discussion of the Russian military's attitudes, see Roy

Allison, Military Factors in the Foreign Policy Making

of Russia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan Brussels, Belgium:

Office of the Special Adviser for Central and Eastern

European Affairs, NATO Headquarters, 1993, passim.

39. Bill Gertz, "Moscow Losing Control of Army,

Washington Times, September 30, 1994, p. 1.

40. John W. Lepingwell, "The Military and Russian

Security Policy," paper presented at the IISS

Conference, St. Petersburg, Russia, April 27, 1994, pp.

14-15.

41. de Nevers, Russia's Strategic Renovation, pp.

25-26, 34.

42. Gertz, "Moscow Losing Control of Army", p. 1.

See also C.J. Dick, The Current State of the Russian

Army and Its Possible Implications for Politics

Camberley, United Kingdom: Conflict Studies Research

Center, 1993, passim.

43. Aleksey Arbatov, "The West Will not Defend

Russia Against the West: the Countries of Eastern Europe

are Striving to Join NATO. Why? Against Whom?" Novoye

Vremya, October 26, 1993, p. 23. For a further

elaboration of Russian views, see Dr. Alexander J.

Motyl, Russian Security, Neoimperialism, and the West, Camberley, United Kingdom: Conflict Studies Research

Center, 1994, pp. 1-8.
43

44. C.J. Dick, The Military Doctrine of the Russian

Federation, United Kingdom: Conflict Studies Research

Center, 1993, p. 12. For the background behind the

development of the CIS, see Dr. Yuriy Ivanov, The

Possibility of Creating Common Defense Organizations

within the Commonwealth, Washington: Brookings

Institution, 1992.

45. Dr. Roy Allison, Military Forces in the Soviet

Successor State, London: International Institute for

Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper 280, October 1993, pp.

72-78. See also Denis Dragouski, "Russia and the

Caucasus," paper presented at IISS Conference, St.

Petersburg, September 1993, passim.

46. de Nevers, Russia's Strategic Renovation, pp.

55-56. See also Lepingwell, "The Military and Russian

Security Policy," pp. 2-7. Lally Weymouth, "Azerbaijan--

Who'll Stop the Russians?" Washington Post, October 11,

1994, p. A17.

47. Dick, The Military Doctrine of the Russian

Federation, p. 16.

48. Mikhail Pogorely, "Russia's Peacekeeping

Activities Are Far from the 'Imperial Ambitions' of a

Great Power," Kraznaya Zvezda (Red Star),

April 5, 1994, pp. 1 and 3.

49. John M. Goshko, "Yeltsin Claims Russian Sphere

of Influence, Washington Post, September 27, 1994, p.

A10. See also "Clinton and Russia," Wall Street Journal, September 27, 1994, p. A16.

50. James Sherr, Russia Returns to Europe, Brussels: Special Adviser for Central and Eastern

European Affairs, NATO Headquarters, April 1994, p. 10.

See also Michael Orr, "Peacekeeping--A New Task for

Russian Military Doctrine," Jane's Intelligence Review, July 1994, pp. 307-309; and Maxim Shashenkov, "Russian

Peacekeeping in the Near Abroad," Survival, Autumn 1994,
44

pp. 3-25.

51. Major Mark Davis, Russian Peacemaking

Operations in Georgia-Abkhazia, Mons, Belgium: Central

and East European Defense Studies, SHAPE Headquarters,

June 1994, p. 3.

52. Ibid., p. 1.

53. "Understanding Sought on CFE 'Flank" Limits,"

Kraznaya Zvezda, November 16, 1993, p. 1.

54. U.S. Department of State, Treaty on

Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), p. 33.

55. Dick, The Military Doctrine of the Russian

Federation, pp. 6-7 and 14-15.

56. U.S. Department of State, Treaty on

Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), p. 242.

57. John Borawski and Bruce George, "The CSCE Forum

for Security Cooperation," Arms Control Today, October

1993, pp. 13-14.

58. Ibid, p. 14.

59. Daalder, "The Future of Arms Control," p. 160.

60. Phillipe H. Mallard and Bruno Tertrais,

"France's European Priority," Joint Forces Quarterly 5,

Summer 1994, pp. 19-21.

61. A. Kozyrev, "Document 433: Letter of the

Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation

to the Chairman of the CSCE, presented at the CSCE

Parliamentary Conference," Vienna, Austria, June 30,

1994.

 62. Dick, The Military Doctrine of the Russian

Federation, p. 20.
45

63. Lee H. Hamilton, "The United States Needs a

Conventional-Arms Policy, Christian Science Monitor,

September 13, 1994, p. 18. See also David Mussington,

Understanding Contemporary International Arms Transfers,

London: International Institute for Strategic Studies,

Adelphi 291, 1994, passim.
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Richard A. Chilcoat

Commandant

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STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

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Colonel William W. Allen

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Author

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