Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 45 / Wednesday, March 10, 2021 / Rules and Regulations 13633 

(3) Will not have a significant 

economic impact, positive or negative, 

on a substantial number of small entities 

under the criteria of the Regulatory 

Flexibility Act. 

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39 

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation 

safety, Incorporation by reference, 

Safety. 

The Amendment 

Accordingly, under the authority 

delegated to me by the Administrator, 

the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as 

follows: 

PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS 

DIRECTIVES 

■ 1. The authority citation for part 39 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701. 

§ 39.13 [Amended] 

■ 2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by adding 

the following new airworthiness 

directive: 

2021–04–16 Amendment 39–21438; Docket 

No. FAA–2020–0791; Project Identifier 

AD–2020–00676–R. 

(a) Effective Date 

This airworthiness directive (AD) is 

effective April 14, 2021. 

(b) Affected ADs 

None. 

(c) Applicability 

This AD applies to Sikorsky Aircraft 

Corporation (Sikorsky) Model S–92A 

helicopters, certificated in any category, with 

serial numbers (S/Ns) 920006 through 

920334 inclusive. 

(d) Subject 

Joint Aircraft System Component (JASC) 

Code 3220, Nose/Tail Landing Gear; 3210, 

Main Landing Gear. 

(e) Unsafe Condition 

This AD was prompted by the 

manufacturer determining that because of 

non-conforming threads, due to a quality 

escape, the life limit of the threaded hinge 

pin and main landing gear (MLG) and nose 

landing gear (NLG) actuator pins is reduced. 

The FAA is issuing this AD to prevent failure 

of components on the MLG and NLG. The 

unsafe condition, if not addressed, could 

result in damage to the helicopter and 

reduced ability to control the helicopter 

during landing. 

(f) Compliance 

Comply with this AD within the 

compliance times specified, unless already 

done. 

(g) Required Actions 

Within 300 hours time in service after the 

effective date of this AD, visually inspect the 

components of the right MLG assembly, left 

MLG assembly, and NLG kit for threaded 

hinge pins, part number (P/N) 92250–12281– 

101, and actuator pins, P/N 92240–12287– 

101 and 92240–12287–103, with serial 

numbers (S/Ns) identified in Table 1 or 2 

(threaded hinge pins) or in Table 1 (actuator 

pins), in Section 3, the Accomplishment 

Instructions, in the Sikorsky Aircraft 

Corporation Alert Service Bulletin (ASB) 92– 

32–008, Basic Issue, dated January 21, 2020 

(the ASB). 

Note 1 to the introductory text of 

paragraph (g): See Figures 1 and 2 in Section 

3, the Accomplishment Instructions, in the 

ASB for guidance on performing the visual 

inspection. 

(1) If there is any threaded hinge pin, P/ 

N 92250–12281–101, with an S/N listed in 

Table 1 or 2 in the ASB, before further flight, 

remove the threaded hinge pin from service. 

(2) If there is any MLG or NLG actuator 

pin, P/N 92250–12287–101 or P/N 92250– 

12287–103, with an S/N listed in Table 1 in 

the ASB, before further flight, remove the 

actuator pin from service. 

(h) Installation Prohibition 

As of the effective date of this AD, do not 

install any threaded hinge pin, P/N 92250– 

12281–101, or actuator pin, P/N 92240– 

12287–101 or 92240–12287–103, with an S/ 

N listed in Table 1 or 2 in Section 3, the 

Accomplishment Instructions, in the ASB, on 

any helicopter. 

(i) Alternative Methods of Compliance 

(AMOCs) 

(1) The Manager, Boston ACO Branch, 

FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs 

for this AD, if requested using the procedures 

found in 14 CFR 39.19. In accordance with 

14 CFR 39.19, send your request to your 

principal inspector or local Flight Standards 

District Office, as appropriate. If sending 

information directly to the manager of the 

certification office, send it to the attention of 

the person identified in paragraph (j)(1) of 

this AD. 

(2) Before using any approved AMOC, 

notify your appropriate principal inspector, 

or lacking a principal inspector, the manager 

of the local flight standards district office/ 

certificate holding district office. 

(j) Related Information 

For more information about this AD, 

contact Dorie Resnik, Aerospace Engineer, 

Boston ACO Branch, Compliance & 

Airworthiness Division, FAA, 1200 District 

Avenue, Burlington, MA 01803; phone: 781– 

238–7693; fax: 781–238–7199; email: 

dorie.resnik@faa.gov. You may view the 

related service information at the FAA, Office 

of the Regional Counsel, Southwest Region, 

10101 Hillwood Pkwy., Room 6N–321, Fort 

Worth, TX 76177. For information on the 

availability of this material at the FAA, call 

817–222–5110. 

(k) Material Incorporated by Reference 

(1) The Director of the Federal Register 

approved the incorporation by reference 

(IBR) of the service information listed in this 

paragraph under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR 

part 51. 

(2) You must use this service information 

as applicable to do the actions required by 

this AD, unless the AD specifies otherwise. 

(i) Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation Alert 

Service Bulletin 92–32–008, Basic Issue, 

dated January 21, 2020. 

(ii) [Reserved] 

(3) For Sikorsky service information 

identified in this AD, contact Sikorsky 

Aircraft Corporation, Commercial Systems 

and Services, 124 Quarry Road, Trumbull, CT 

06611; phone: 203–416–4000; email: 

product_safety.gr-sik@lmco.com. Operators 

may also log on to the Sikorsky 360 website 

at: https://customerportal.sikorsky.com. 

(4) You may view this service information 

at the FAA, Office of the Regional Counsel, 

Southwest Region, 10101 Hillwood Pkwy., 

Room 6N–321, Fort Worth, TX 76177. For 

information on the availability of this 

material at the FAA, call 817–222–5110. 

(5) You may view this service information 

that is incorporated by reference at the 

National Archives and Records 

Administration (NARA). For information on 

the availability of this material at NARA, 

email: fedreg.legal@nara.gov, or go to: 

https://www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ 

ibr-locations.html. 

Issued on February 9, 2021. 

Gaetano A. Sciortino, 

Deputy Director for Strategic Initiatives, 

Compliance & Airworthiness Division, 

Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. 2021–04940 Filed 3–9–21; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2020–0847; Product 

Identifier 2018–SW–087–AD; Amendment 

39–21434; AD 2021–04–13] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; Airbus 

Helicopters 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Final rule. 

SUMMARY: The FAA is adopting a new 

airworthiness directive (AD) for all 

Airbus Helicopters Model AS350B, 

AS350BA, AS350B1, AS350B2, 

AS350B3, and AS350D helicopters; 

Model AS355E, AS355F, AS355F1, 

AS355F2, AS355N, and AS355NP 

helicopters; and Model EC130 B4 and 

EC130 T2 helicopters. This AD requires 

a one-time inspection to verify the 

presence and correct installation of the 

main rotor mast (MRM) upper bearing 

retaining rings, a repetitive inspection of 

the sealant bead on the MRM for 

damage, and corrective actions if 

necessary. This AD was prompted by a 

13634 Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 45 / Wednesday, March 10, 2021 / Rules and Regulations 

report of a missing retaining ring of the 

inner race of the MRM upper bearing. 

The actions of this AD are intended to 

address an unsafe condition on these 

products. 

DATES: This AD is effective April 14, 

2021. 

The Director of the Federal Register 

approved the incorporation by reference 

of certain documents listed in this AD 

as of April 14, 2021. 

ADDRESSES: For service information 

identified in this final rule, contact 

Airbus Helicopters, 2701 N Forum 

Drive, Grand Prairie, TX 75052; 

telephone 972–641–0000 or 800–232– 

0323; fax 972–641–3775; or at https://

www.airbus.com/helicopters/services/ 

technical-support.html. You may view 

the referenced service information at the 

FAA, Office of the Regional Counsel, 

Southwest Region, 10101 Hillwood 

Pkwy., Room 6N–321, Fort Worth, TX 

76177. It is also available on the internet 

at https://www.regulations.gov by 

searching for and locating Docket No. 

FAA–2020–0847. 

Examining the AD Docket 

You may examine the AD docket on 

the internet at https://

www.regulations.gov by searching for 

and locating Docket No. FAA–2020– 

0847; or in person at Docket Operations 

between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday 

through Friday, except Federal holidays. 

The AD docket contains this AD, the 

European Aviation Safety Agency (now 

European Union Aviation Safety 

Agency) (EASA) AD, any service 

information that is incorporated by 

reference, any comments received, and 

other information. The street address for 

Docket Operations is U.S. Department of 

Transportation, Docket Operations, M– 

30, West Building Ground Floor, Room 

W12–140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, 

Washington, DC 20590. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Scott Franke, Aviation Safety Engineer, 

General Aviation & Rotorcraft Section, 

International Validation Branch, FAA, 

10101 Hillwood Pkwy., Fort Worth, TX 

76177; telephone 817–222–5110; email 

scott.franke@faa.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Discussion 

The FAA issued a notice of proposed 

rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR 

part 39 by adding an AD that would 

apply to all Airbus Helicopters Model 

AS350B, AS350BA, AS350B1, 

AS350B2, AS350B3, and AS350D 

helicopters; Model AS355E, AS355F, 

AS355F1, AS355F2, AS355N, and 

AS355NP helicopters; and Model EC130 

B4 and EC130 T2 helicopters. The 

NPRM published in the Federal 

Register on September 21, 2020 (85 FR 

59217). The NPRM proposed to require 

a one-time inspection to verify the 

presence and correct installation of the 

MRM upper bearing retaining rings, a 

repetitive inspection of the sealant bead 

on the MRM for damage, and corrective 

actions if necessary. The proposed 

requirements were intended to detect, 

and correct if applicable, a missing 

retaining ring of the inner race of the 

MRM upper bearing. The FAA is issuing 

this AD to address this condition, 

which, if not detected and corrected, 

can lead to damage to the MRM and 

surrounding elements, possibly 

resulting in loss of control of the 

helicopter. 

The NPRM was prompted by EASA 

AD 2018–0206, dated September 20, 

2018 (EASA AD 2018–0206), issued by 

EASA, which is the Technical Agent for 

the Member States of the European 

Union, to correct an unsafe condition 

for certain Airbus Helicopters Model 

AS350B, AS350BA, AS350BB, 

AS350B1, AS350B2, AS350B3, and 

AS350D helicopters; Model AS355E, 

AS355F, AS355F1, AS355F2, AS355N, 

and AS355NP helicopters; and Model 

EC130 B4 and EC130 T2 helicopters. 

Model AS355BB helicopters are not 

certificated by the FAA and are not 

included on the U.S. type certificate 

data sheet; this AD therefore does not 

include those helicopters in the 

applicability. EASA advises that during 

a scheduled inspection on an Airbus 

Helicopters Model AS350B3 helicopter, 

one of the two retaining rings of the 

inner race of the MRM upper bearing 

was found missing. These two retaining 

rings ensure that the inner race is 

correctly positioned with respect to the 

rollers, and, if one or both of these 

retaining rings are missing, it can lead 

to an unlimited shift of the inner race 

and compromise the function of the 

MRM upper bearing. This condition, if 

not detected and corrected, can lead to 

damage to the MRM and surrounding 

elements, possibly resulting in loss of 

control of the helicopter. 

Airbus Helicopters developed an 

inspection to check that the upper and 

lower retaining rings of the inner race of 

the MRM upper bearing are present and 

correctly installed. EASA determined 

that the same condition may exist or 

develop on Airbus Helicopters Model 

AS350 helicopters, Model AS355 

helicopters, and Model EC130 

helicopters because they share a similar 

design and supply chain. Until the 

check of the upper and lower bearing 

retaining rings is accomplished, EASA 

specifies that repetitive inspections of 

the MRM upper bearing sealant bead 

(sealant bead) should be accomplished 

to ensure the MRM remains serviceable. 

EASA considers its AD an interim 

measure pending further investigation 

results, and notes that further AD action 

may follow. 

Comments 

The FAA gave the public the 

opportunity to participate in developing 

this final rule. The FAA received 4 

comments in support of the NPRM. 

FAA’s Determination 

These helicopters have been approved 

by EASA and are approved for operation 

in the United States. Pursuant to the 

FAA’s bilateral agreement with the 

European Union, EASA has notified the 

FAA about the unsafe condition 

described in its AD. The FAA is issuing 

this AD after evaluating all of the 

information provided by EASA and 

determining the unsafe condition exists 

and is likely to exist or develop on other 

helicopters of the same type design and 

that air safety and the public interest 

require adopting the AD requirements as 

proposed. 

Differences Between This AD and the 

EASA AD 

Although EASA AD 2018–0206 

specifies accomplishing the inspection 

of the installation of the MRM upper 

bearing inner race retaining rings within 

660 hours time in service (TIS) or 24 

months, whichever occurs first, the FAA 

has determined that interval does not 

address the identified unsafe condition 

soon enough to ensure an adequate level 

of safety for the affected fleet. In 

developing an appropriate compliance 

time for this AD, the FAA considered 

the degree of urgency associated with 

the subject unsafe condition and the 

manufacturer’s recommendation. In 

light of all of these factors, the FAA 

finds that a compliance time of within 

660 hours TIS or 6 months, whichever 

occurs first, represents an appropriate 

interval of time for affected helicopters 

to continue to operate without 

compromising safety. 

Although paragraph (5) of EASA AD 

2018–0206 specifies that operators may 

contact the manufacturer for 

instructions if there are signs of 

degradation on the MRM inner race, 

paragraph (i)(3) of this AD requires 

operators to repair or replace the MRM 

if there is any degradation as indicated 

by damage to the retaining rings 

(including but not limited to cracks, 

scratches, and gouges), deterioration, or 

wear. 

Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 45 / Wednesday, March 10, 2021 / Rules and Regulations 13635 

Related Service Information Under 1 

CFR Part 51 

Airbus Helicopters has issued the 

following service information. 

• Airbus Helicopters Alert Service 

Bulletin AS350–62.00.42, Revision 0, 

dated September 17, 2018. 

• Airbus Helicopters Alert Service 

Bulletin AS355–62.00.37, Revision 0, 

dated September 17, 2018. 

• Airbus Helicopters Alert Service 

Bulletin EC130–62A017, Revision 0, 

dated September 17, 2018. 

This service information describes 

procedures for a one-time inspection to 

verify presence and correct installation 

of the MRM upper bearing retaining 

rings, a repetitive inspection of the 

sealant bead on the MRM for damage, 

and corrective actions. Damage of the 

sealant bead includes flaws, cracks, 

folds, separation, or absence of the 

sealant bead. Corrective actions include 

repair and replacement. These 

documents are distinct since they apply 

to different helicopter models. 

This service information is reasonably 

available because the interested parties 

have access to it through their normal 

course of business or by the means 

identified in the ADDRESSES section. 

Costs of Compliance 

The FAA estimates that this AD 

affects 1,212 helicopters of U.S. registry. 

The FAA estimates the following costs 

to comply with this AD: 

ESTIMATED COSTS FOR REQUIRED ACTIONS

Labor cost Parts cost Cost per product Cost on U.S. 

operators 

Up to 30 work-hours × $85 per hour = Up to $2,550 .............. $0 Up to $2,550 ........................... Up to $3,090,600. 

The FAA estimates the following 

costs to do any necessary on-condition 

actions that would be required based on 

the results of any required actions. The 

FAA has no way of determining the 

number of aircraft that might need these 

on-condition actions: 

ESTIMATED COSTS OF ON-CONDITION ACTIONS

Labor cost Parts cost Cost per product 

Up to 80 work-hours × $85 per hour = Up to $6,800 ............................. Up to $33,124 ................................ Up to $39,924. 

Authority for This Rulemaking 

Title 49 of the United States Code 

specifies the FAA’s authority to issue 

rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, 

section 106, describes the authority of 

the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII: 

Aviation Programs, describes in more 

detail the scope of the Agency’s 

authority. 

The FAA is issuing this rulemaking 

under the authority described in 

Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 

44701: General requirements. Under 

that section, Congress charges the FAA 

with promoting safe flight of civil 

aircraft in air commerce by prescribing 

regulations for practices, methods, and 

procedures the Administrator finds 

necessary for safety in air commerce. 

This regulation is within the scope of 

that authority because it addresses an 

unsafe condition that is likely to exist or 

develop on helicopters identified in this 

rulemaking action. 

Regulatory Findings 

This AD will not have federalism 

implications under Executive Order 

13132. This AD will not have a 

substantial direct effect on the States, on 

the relationship between the national 

government and the States, or on the 

distribution of power and 

responsibilities among the various 

levels of government. 

For the reasons discussed above, I 

certify that this AD: 

(1) Is not a ‘‘significant regulatory 

action’’ under Executive Order 12866, 

(2) Will not affect intrastate aviation 

in Alaska, and 

(3) Will not have a significant 

economic impact, positive or negative, 

on a substantial number of small entities 

under the criteria of the Regulatory 

Flexibility Act. 

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39 

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation 

safety, Incorporation by reference, 

Safety. 

Adoption of the Amendment 

Accordingly, under the authority 

delegated to me by the Administrator, 

the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as 

follows: 

PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS 

DIRECTIVES 

■ 1. The authority citation for part 39 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701. 

§ 39.13 [Amended] 

■ 2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by adding 

the following new airworthiness 

directive. 

2021–04–13 Airbus Helicopters: 

Amendment 39–21434; Docket No. 

FAA–2020–0847; Product Identifier 

2018–SW–087–AD. 

(a) Effective Date 

This Airworthiness Directive (AD) becomes 

effective April 14, 2021. 

(b) Affected ADs 

None. 

(c) Applicability 

This AD applies to all Airbus Helicopters, 

certificated in any category, as identified in 

paragraphs (c)(1) through (3) of this AD. 

(1) Model AS350B, AS350BA, AS350B1, 

AS350B2, AS350B3, and AS350D 

helicopters. 

(2) Model AS355E, AS355F, AS355F1, 

AS355F2, AS355N, and AS355NP 

helicopters. 

(3) Model EC130 B4 and EC130 T2 

helicopters. 

(d) Subject 

Joint Aircraft Service Component (JASC) 

Code 6230, Main Rotor Mast Inner Race 

Rings. 

(e) Reason 

This AD was prompted by a report of a 

missing retaining ring of the inner race of the 

main rotor mast (MRM) upper bearing. The 

FAA is issuing this AD to address this 

condition, which, if not detected and 

corrected, can lead to damage to the MRM 

and surrounding elements, possibly resulting 

in loss of control of the helicopter. 

(f) Compliance 

You are responsible for performing each 

action required by this AD within the 

13636 Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 45 / Wednesday, March 10, 2021 / Rules and Regulations 

specified compliance time unless it has 

already been accomplished prior to that time. 

(g) Definitions 

(1) For the purposes of this AD, an affected 

part is any MRM having part number (P/N) 

350A37–1290–XX (where XX can be any 

numerical combination) and a serial number 

as listed in Airbus Helicopters Alert Service 

Bulletin AS350–62.00.42, Revision 0, dated 

September 17, 2018; Airbus Helicopters Alert 

Service Bulletin AS355–62.00.37, Revision 0, 

dated September 17, 2018; or Airbus 

Helicopters Alert Service Bulletin EC130– 

62A017, Revision 0, dated September 17, 

2018, as applicable to your model helicopter, 

unless the upper bearing inner race retaining 

rings are verified to be installed correctly as 

specified in the inspection required in 

paragraph (i)(1) of this AD. 

(2) For the purposes of this AD, a Group 

1 helicopter is one on which an affected part 

is installed. 

(3) For the purposes of this AD, a Group 

2 helicopter is one on which an affected part 

is not installed. 

(h) MRM Upper Sealant Bead Inspection 

(1) For Group 1 helicopters, within the 

compliance time specified in Figure 1 to 

paragraph (h) of this AD, and, thereafter, at 

intervals not to exceed 165 hours time-inservice (TIS): Inspect the MRM upper bearing 

sealant bead for damage in accordance with 

section 3.B.2.a of the Accomplishment 

Instructions of Airbus Helicopters Alert 

Service Bulletin AS350–62.00.42, Revision 0, 

dated September 17, 2018; Airbus 

Helicopters Alert Service Bulletin AS355– 

62.00.37, Revision 0, dated September 17, 

2018; or Airbus Helicopters Alert Service 

Bulletin EC130–62A017, Revision 0, dated 

September 17, 2018, as applicable to your 

model helicopter, except you are not required 

to discard the plastic clamps (Item vv). For 

the purposes of this inspection, damage may 

be indicated by flaws, cracks, folds, 

separation, or absence of the sealant bead. 

Note 1 to paragraph (h)(1): Unless 

specified otherwise, the hours TIS specified 

in figure 1 to paragraph (h) of this AD are 

those accumulated on the effective date of 

this AD by the helicopter since first flight. 

(2) If, during any inspection of the MRM 

upper bearing sealant bead as required by 

paragraph (h)(1) of this AD, there is damage, 

before further flight, inspect the installation 

of the MRM upper bearing inner race 

retaining rings for discrepancies in 

accordance with paragraph (i)(1) of this AD. 

(i) MRM Inner Race Retaining Rings 

Inspection 

(1) For Group 1 Helicopters: Within 660 

hours TIS or 6 months, whichever occurs 

first after the effective date of this AD: 

Inspect the installation of the MRM upper 

bearing inner race retaining rings for 

discrepancies in accordance with the 

Accomplishment Instructions of section 

3.B.2.b of Airbus Helicopters Alert Service 

Bulletin AS350 62.00.42, Revision 0, dated 

September 17, 2018; Airbus Helicopters Alert 

Service Bulletin AS355–62.00.37, Revision 0, 

dated September 17, 2018; or Airbus 

Helicopters Alert Service Bulletin EC130– 

62A017, Revision 0, dated September 17, 

2018, as applicable to your model helicopter, 

except you are not required to discard the 

plastic clamps (Item vv). For the purposes of 

this inspection, discrepancies may be 

indicated by incorrect positioning or missing 

rings. 

(2) If, during the inspection required by 

paragraph (i)(1) of this AD there are any 

discrepancies, before further flight, remove 

the affected part, inspect the MRM inner race 

for degradation, and replace the retaining 

rings in accordance with the 

Accomplishment Instructions of section 

3.B.2.c of Airbus Helicopters Alert Service 

Bulletin AS350 62.00.42, Revision 0, dated 

September 17, 2018; Airbus Helicopters Alert 

Service Bulletin AS355–62.00.37, Revision 0, 

dated September 17, 2018; or Airbus 

Helicopters Alert Service Bulletin EC130– 

62A017, Revision 0, dated September 17, 

2018, as applicable to you model helicopter, 

except you are not required to return parts to 

Airbus Helicopters. For the purposes of this 

inspection, degradation is indicated by 

damage to the retaining rings (including but 

not limited to cracks, scratches, and gouges), 

deterioration, or wear. 

(3) If, during the inspection of the MRM 

inner race, as required by paragraph (i)(2) of 

this AD, there is any degradation, before next 

flight, repair or replace the MRM. 

(j) Terminating Action 

Verification on a helicopter of correct 

installation of the MRM upper bearing inner 

race retaining rings, as required by paragraph 

(i)(1) of this AD, or corrective action on a 

helicopter, as specified in paragraphs (h)(2), 

(i)(2), or (i)(3) of this AD, as applicable, 

constitute terminating action for the 

repetitive inspections required by paragraph 

(h)(1) of this AD for that helicopter. 

(k) Parts Installation Prohibition 

As of the effective date of this AD, no 

person may install, on any helicopter, an 

affected part as identified in paragraph (g)(1) 

of this AD. 

(l) Alternative Methods of Compliance 

(AMOCs) 

(1) The Manager, International Validation 

Branch, FAA, may approve AMOCs for this 

AD. Send your proposal to: Scott Franke, 

Aviation Safety Engineer, International 

Validation Branch, General Aviation & 

Rotorcraft Unit, FAA, 10101 Hillwood Pkwy., 

Fort Worth, TX 76177; telephone 817–222– 

5110; email 9-AVS-AIR-730-AMOC@faa.gov. 

(2) For operations conducted under a 14 

CFR part 119 operating certificate or under 

14 CFR part 91, subpart K, notify your 

principal inspector or lacking a principal 

inspector, the manager of the local flight 

standards district office or certificate holding 

district office, before operating any aircraft 

complying with this AD through an AMOC. 

(m) Related Information 

The subject of this AD is addressed in 

European Aviation Safety Agency (now 

European Union Aviation Safety Agency) 

(EASA) AD 2018–0206, dated September 20, 

2018. This EASA AD may be found in the AD 

docket on the internet at https://

www.regulations.gov by searching for and 

locating Docket No. FAA–2020–0847. 

(n) Material Incorporated by Reference 

(1) The Director of the Federal Register 

approved the incorporation by reference of 

the service information listed in this 

paragraph under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR 

part 51. 

(2) You must use this service information 

as applicable to do the actions required by 

this AD, unless the AD specifies otherwise. 

(i) Airbus Helicopters Alert Service 

Bulletin AS350–62.00.42, Revision 0, dated 

September 17, 2018. 

(ii) Airbus Helicopters Alert Service 

Bulletin AS355–62.00.37, Revision 0, dated 

September 17, 2018. 

(iii) Airbus Helicopters Alert Service 

Bulletin EC130–62A017, Revision 0, dated 

September 17, 2018. 


ER10MR21.000</GPH>
Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 45 / Wednesday, March 10, 2021 / Rules and Regulations 13637 

(3) For service information identified in 

this AD, contact Airbus Helicopters, 2701 N 

Forum Drive, Grand Prairie, TX 75052; 

telephone 800–232–0323 or Fax: 972–641– 

3775; or at https://www.airbus.com/ 

helicopters/services/technical-support.html. 

(4) You may view this service information 

at the FAA, Office of the Regional Counsel, 

Southwest Region, 10101 Hillwood Pkwy., 

Room 6N–321, Fort Worth, TX 76177. For 

information on the availability of this 

material at the FAA, call 817–222–5110. 

(5) You may view this service information 

that is incorporated by reference at the 

National Archives and Records 

Administration (NARA). For information on 

the availability of this material at NARA, 

email fedreg.legal@nara.gov, or go to: https:// 

www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ibrlocations.html. 

Issued on February 8, 2021. 

Lance T. Gant, 

Director, Compliance & Airworthiness 

Division, Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. 2021–04806 Filed 3–9–21; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2021–0096; Project 

Identifier MCAI–2021–00040–R; Amendment 

39–21440; AD 2021–04–18] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; Airbus 

Helicopters 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Final rule; request for 

comments. 

SUMMARY: The FAA is superseding 

Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2020–23– 

02, which applied to all Airbus 

Helicopters Model EC225LP helicopters. 

AD 2020–23–02 required repetitive 

inspections of the bearing in the 

swashplate assembly of the main rotor 

mast assembly for discrepancies 

(ceramic balls that have a hard point or 

sensitive axial play or both) and, 

depending on the findings, replacement 

of an affected main rotor mast assembly 

with a serviceable main rotor mast 

assembly. Since the FAA issued AD 

2020–23–02, the FAA has determined 

additional main rotor mast assemblies 

are affected by the unsafe condition. 

This AD continues to require the actions 

specified in AD 2020–23–02, and also 

includes additional affected main rotor 

mast assemblies; as specified in a 

European Union Aviation Safety Agency 

(EASA) AD, which is incorporated by 

reference. The FAA is issuing this AD 

to address the unsafe condition on these 

products. 

DATES: This AD becomes effective 

March 25, 2021. 

The Director of the Federal Register 

approved the incorporation by reference 

of a certain publication listed in this AD 

as of March 25, 2021. 

The FAA must receive comments on 

this AD by April 26, 2021. 

ADDRESSES: You may send comments, 

using the procedures found in 14 CFR 

11.43 and 11.45, by any of the following 

methods: 

• Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to 

https://www.regulations.gov. Follow the 

instructions for submitting comments. 

• Fax: 202–493–2251. 

• Mail: U.S. Department of 

Transportation, Docket Operations, M– 

30, West Building Ground Floor, Room 

W12–140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, 

Washington, DC 20590. 

• Hand Delivery: U.S. Department of 

Transportation, Docket Operations, M– 

30, West Building Ground Floor, Room 

W12–140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, 

Washington, DC 20590, between 9 a.m. 

and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, 

except Federal holidays. 

For material incorporated by reference 

(IBR) in this AD, contact the EASA, 

Konrad-Adenauer-Ufer 3, 50668 

Cologne, Germany; phone: +49 221 8999 

000; email: ADs@easa.europa.eu; 

internet: www.easa.europa.eu. You may 

find this material on the EASA website 

at https://ad.easa.europa.eu. You may 

view this material at the FAA, Office of 

the Regional Counsel, Southwest 

Region, 10101 Hillwood Pkwy., Room 

6N–321, Fort Worth, TX 76177. For 

information on the availability of this 

material at the FAA, call 817–222–5110. 

It is also available in the AD docket on 

the internet at https://

www.regulations.gov by searching for 

and locating Docket No. FAA–2021– 

0096. 

Examining the AD Docket 

You may examine the AD docket on 

the internet at https://

www.regulations.gov by searching for 

and locating Docket No. FAA–2021– 

0096; or in person at Docket Operations 

between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday 

through Friday, except Federal holidays. 

The AD docket contains this AD, any 

comments received, and other 

information. The street address for 

Docket Operations is listed above. 

Comments will be available in the AD 

docket shortly after receipt. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Kathleen Arrigotti, Aerospace Engineer, 

Large Aircraft Section, International 

Validation Branch, FAA, 2200 South 

216th St., Des Moines, WA 98198; 

phone and fax: 206–231–3218; email: 

kathleen.arrigotti@faa.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Discussion 

The FAA issued AD 2020–23–02, 

Amendment 39–21318 (85 FR 73607, 

November 19, 2020) (AD 2020–23–02), 

which applied to all Airbus Helicopters 

Model EC225LP helicopters. AD 2020– 

23–02 required repetitive inspections of 

the bearing in the swashplate assembly 

of the main rotor mast assembly for 

discrepancies (ceramic balls that have a 

hard point or sensitive axial play or 

both) and, depending on the findings, 

replacement of an affected main rotor 

mast assembly with a serviceable main 

rotor mast assembly. The FAA issued 

AD 2020–23–02 to address defective 

ceramic balls in the bearing installed in 

the swashplate assembly of the main 

rotor mast assembly, which could lead 

to premature spalling of the ball itself 

and of the bearing, loss of function of 

the bearing, and overload of the main 

rotor mast scissor, resulting in reduced 

control of the helicopter. 

Actions Since AD 2020–23–02 Was 

Issued 

Since the FAA issued AD 2020–23– 

02, the FAA has determined that 

additional main rotor mast assemblies 

are affected by the unsafe condition. 

The EASA, which is the Technical 

Agent for the Member States of the 

European Union, has issued EASA AD 

2020–0264, dated December 2, 2020 

(EASA AD 2020–0264) (also referred to 

as the Mandatory Continuing 

Airworthiness Information, or the 

MCAI), to correct an unsafe condition 

for all Airbus Helicopters Model 

EC225LP helicopters. EASA AD 2020– 

0264 supersedes EASA AD 2020–0079, 

dated April 1, 2020 (which corresponds 

to FAA AD 2020–23–02). 

This AD was prompted by a report of 

a manufacturing and control issue 

regarding the ceramic balls in the 

bearing installed in the swashplate 

assembly of the main rotor mast 

assembly. The FAA is issuing this AD 

to address defective ceramic balls in the 

bearing installed in the swashplate 

assembly of the main rotor mast 

assembly, which could lead to 

premature spalling of the ball itself and 

of the bearing, loss of function of the 

bearing, and overload of the main rotor 

mast scissor, resulting in reduced 

control of the helicopter. See the MCAI 

for additional background information. 

Explanation of Retained Requirements 

Although this AD does not explicitly 

restate the requirements of AD 2020–