United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Report to Congressional Committees

DEFENSE

ACQUISITIONS 

Missile Defense 

Agency Fields Initial 

Capability but Falls 

Short of Original 

Goals 

March 2006 

 

GAO-06-327 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

March 2006

DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS 

Missile Defense Agency Fields Initial 

Capability but Falls Short of Original 

Goals 

Highlights of GAO-06-327, a report to 

congressional committees 

MDA made good progress during fiscal year 2005 in the development and 

fielding of two of the seven elements reviewed. Most of the others 

encountered problems that slowed progress. Meanwhile, contractors for the 

seven elements exceeded their fiscal year budget by about $458 million, or 

about 14 percent, most of which was attributable to cost overruns in 

developing the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) element. 

Accelerating Block 2004 allowed MDA to successfully field missile defense 

assets faster than planned. But, MDA delivered fewer quantities than 

planned and exceeded the cost goal of $6.7 billion by about $1 billion. The 

increased cost is primarily the added cost of sustaining fielded assets. 

However, the increase would have been greater if some development and 

other activities had not been deferred into Block 2006. Also, MDA has been 

unable to verify actual system performance because of flight test delays. 

Block 2004 Goals, as of February 2003, Compared with Fielded Assets, as of December 2005 

Activities Planned Fielded

Ground-based Midcourse Defense interceptors 20 interceptors 10 interceptors

Aegis missiles Up to 20 missiles 9 missiles 

Aegis destroyer upgrade 15 destroyers 10 destroyers

Aegis cruiser upgrade 3 cruisers 2 cruisers 

Command, control, battle management, and 

communications software 

Development 

and testing of

upgrades 

Testing of final 

upgrade 

incomplete 

Source: MDA (data); GAO (presentation and analysis). 

Time pressures caused MDA to stray from a knowledge-based acquisition 

strategy. Key aspects of product knowledge, such as technology maturity, 

are proven in a knowledge-based strategy before committing to more 

development. MDA followed a knowledge-based strategy with elements not 

being fielded, such as Airborne Laser and Kinetic Energy Interceptor. But it

allowed the GMD program to concurrently mature technology, complete 

design activities, and produce and field assets before end-to-end testing of 

the system—all at the expense of cost, quantity, and performance goals. For 

example, the performance of some GMD interceptors is questionable 

because the program was inattentive to quality assurance. If the block 

approach continues to feature concurrency as a means of acceleration, 

MDA’s approach may not be affordable for the considerable amount of 

capability that is yet to be developed and fielded. MDA has unusual 

flexibility to modify its strategies and goals, make trade-offs, and report on 

its progress. For example, MDA’s Director may determine when cost 

variations are significant enough to report to Congress. 

MDA is taking actions to strengthen quality control. These actions are

notable, but they do not address the schedule-induced pressures of fielding 

or enhancing a capability in a 2-year time frame or the need to fully 

implement a knowledge-based acquisition approach. 

The Department of Defense (DOD)

has spent nearly $90 billion since

1985 to develop a Ballistic Missile

Defense System (BMDS). In the 

next 6 years, the Missile Defense

Agency (MDA), the developer, 

plans to invest about $58 billion 

more. MDA’s overall goal is to 

produce a system that is capable of

defeating enemy missiles launched 

from any range during any phase of 

their flight. MDA’s approach is to 

field new capabilities in 2-year 

blocks. The first—Block 2004—was 

to provide some protection by

December 2005 against attacks out 

of North Korea and the Middle

East. 

Congress requires GAO to assess

MDA’s progress annually. This 

year’s report assesses (1) MDA’s 

progress during fiscal year 2005 

and (2) whether capabilities fielded 

under Block 2004 met goals. To the 

extent goals were not met, GAO 

identifies reasons for shortfalls and 

discusses corrective actions that

should be taken. 

What GAO Recommends

To better ensure the success of 

future development efforts, GAO 

recommends that MDA implement 

a knowledge-based acquisition 

strategy for future missile defense

efforts, assess whether such a

strategy is compatible with a 2-year 

block strategy, and adopt more 

transparent criteria for reporting 

significant departures from plans.

DOD did not agree to take any of

the actions we recommended. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-327.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Paul L. Francis 

at (202) 512-4841 or francisp@gao.gov. 
Contents 

Letter 1

Results In Brief 3

Background 6

MDA Makes Progress During Fiscal Year 2005, but Some Activities 

Not Completed as Planned 9 

Block 2004 Delivers Assets Faster, but With Unverified 

Performance 18

Schedule Pressures Caused Management to Stray from KnowledgeBased Practices 28 

MDA Is Taking Several Corrective Actions 33 

Conclusions 37

Recommendations for Executive Actions 38 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 39 

Appendix I Comments from the Department of Defense 43 

Appendix II Block 2004 Element Assessments 46 

Appendix III An Assessment of BMDS Prime Contractors’ Cost 

and Schedule Performance 67 

Appendix IV MDA’S Audit of GMD Interceptor Contractors 78 

Appendix V Integrated Management Plan 80 

Appendix VI Scope and Methodology 82 

Appendix VII GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgment 84 

Page i GAO-06-327 Missile Defense
Tables 

Table 1: BMDS Elements 8 

Table 2: Prime Contractor Fiscal Year 2005 and Cumulative Cost 

and Schedule Performance 16 

Table 3: Evolution of Block 2004 Quantity Goals versus Fielded 

Assets 19 

Table 4: Composition of the Block 2004 Fielded Configuration Cost 

Goal, February 2003 22 

Table 5: Composition of the Block 2004 Fielded Configuration Cost 

Goal, February 2004 23 

Table 6: Expected Cost of Block 2004 Fielded Capability, Including 

Initial Sustainment 24 

Table 7: C2BMC Risk Areas 55 

Table 8: Airborne Laser Technical Issues and Their Potential

Impact on Program 71 

Figures 

Figure 1: Components of the GMD Element 49 

Figure 2: Aegis BMD Weapon System Fiscal Year 2005 Cost and 

Schedule Performance 68 

Figure 3: Standard Missile 3 Fiscal Year 2005 Cost and Schedule 

Performance 69

Figure 4: Airborne Laser Fiscal Year 2005 Cost and Schedule 

Performance 70

Figure 5: Ground-based Midcourse Defense Fiscal Year 2005 Cost 

and Schedule Performance 73 

Figure 6: Space Tracking and Surveillance System Fiscal Year 2005 

Cost and Schedule Performance 75 

Figure 7: Terminal High Altitude Area Defense Fiscal Year 2005 

Cost and Schedule Performance 77 

Page ii GAO-06-327 Missile Defense
Abbreviations 

ABL Airborne Laser 

ASIC application-specific integrated circuit 

BMDS Ballistic Missile Defense System 

CPR Contract Performance Report 

C2BMC Command, Control, Battle Management, and 

 Communications 

DCMA Defense Contract Management Agency 

DOD Department of Defense 

DOT&E Director, Operational Test and Evaluation 

EKV exoatmospheric kill vehicle 

FBX-T Forward-Based X-Band Transportable 

FM Flight Mission 

FTM Flight Test Mission 

GMD Ground-Based Midcourse Defense 

ICBM intercontinental ballistic missile 

IFT integrated flight test 

KEI Kinetic Energy Interceptor 

MAIP Mission Assurance Implementation Plan 

MAP Missile Defense System Assurance Provisions 

MDA Missile Defense System 

NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration

NFIRE Near Field Infrared Experiment 

SAR Selected Acquisition Report 

SBX Sea-Based X-Band 

SDACS Solid Divert and Attitude Control System 

SM-3 Standard Missile-3 

SBIRS Space-Based Infrared System 

STSS Space tracking and Surveillance System 

THAAD Terminal High Altitude Area Defense 

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further 

permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or 

other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to 

reproduce this material separately. 

Page iii GAO-06-327 Missile Defense
United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

March 15, 2006 

For nearly 50 years, the Department of Defense (DOD) has been spending 

money to develop a missile defense system capable of protecting the U.S. 

homeland and U.S. deployed forces from ballistic missile attacks. Since 

1985, DOD has spent almost $90 billion for this purpose, and it plans to 

invest an additional $58 billion, or about 14 percent of its research and 

development budget, over the next 6 years. The Ballistic Missile Defense 

System (BMDS) under development includes a diverse collection of land-, 

air-, sea-, and space-based assets located around the globe and founded on

cutting-edge technology. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA)—the 

component within DOD responsible for managing the development of the 

various missile defense programs—originally focused on developing a test 

bed in which the design of the various BMDS assets could be matured and 

demonstrated. However, in 2002, the President directed MDA to begin 

fielding an initial BMDS capability in the 2004 and 2005 time frame. 

MDA is currently developing eight BMDS elements: Ground-Based 

Midcourse Defense (GMD); Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (Aegis BMD); 

Command, Control, Battle Management, and Communications (C2BMC); 

Airborne Laser (ABL); Kinetic Energy Interceptors (KEI); Space Tracking

and Surveillance System (STSS); Terminal High Altitude Area Defense 

(THAAD); and BMDS Sensors.1

 MDA has adopted an evolutionary 

acquisition approach in which the BMDS will be developed and fielded in

2-year blocks. The first block, known as Block 2004, ended on December 

31, 2005. The block fielded an initial capability that includes initial 

versions of GMD; Aegis BMD; Patriot Advanced Capability-3; and the 

Command, Control, Battle Management, and Communications elements. 

This capability is designed to provide limited protection of the United 

States from ballistic missile attacks out of North Korea and the Middle 

East and protection of U.S. forces and critical assets from short- and 

medium-range ballistic missiles. Future blocks are expected to enhance 

 1

The BMDS also includes a ninth element, Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3), which 

has been transferred to the Army for production, operation, and sustainment. This report 

does not evaluate PAC-3 because its initial development is complete and it is now being 

managed by the Army. In addition, the report does not separately evaluate the BMDS

Sensors program; but with its assessment of GMD, the report includes an assessment of 

MDA’s progress in developing and fielding the Forward-Based X-Band-Transportable (FBXT) radar, the sensor being developed by the Sensors Program Office. 

Page 1 GAO-06-327 Missile Defense
this capability. Over time, MDA expects its block approach to produce an

overarching BMDS capable of protecting the United States, deployed 

forces, friends, and allies from ballistic missile attacks of all ranges. 

To facilitate oversight of the ballistic missile defense program, the Defense 

Authorization Acts for fiscal years 2002 and 2005 mandated that we 

prepare annual assessments of MDA’s ongoing progress.2

 To date, we have 

delivered assessments covering fiscal years 2003 and 2004 to Congress.3

Because our assessment of MDA’s fiscal year 2005 progress was ongoing 

when Block 2004 ended, we were also able to make observations about the 

outcome of the block. Specifically, this report 

1. assesses the progress MDA made during fiscal year 2005 toward the 

fiscal year plans of work established by seven of the BMDS elements; 

2. compares the fielded Block 2004 capability with the quantity, cost, and 

performance goals established for that capability; 

3. identifies reasons why the fielded capability fell short of goals; and 

4. discusses corrective actions being taken by MDA. 

To address our objectives, we looked at the accomplishments of seven 

BMDS elements—GMD, Aegis BMD, C2BMC, ABL, KEI, STSS, and 

THAAD. These elements collectively account for about 73 percent of 

MDA’s research and development budget. For each element, we examined 

documents such as System Element Reviews, test plans and reports, 

production plans, and Contract Performance Reports. We also interviewed 

officials within each element program office and within MDA functional 

offices, such as the Office of Safety, Quality, and Mission Assurance. In 

addition, we discussed each element’s test program and the results of tests 

with DOD’s Office of the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation 

(DOT&E). We performed our work from May 2005 to March 2006 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

 2

The act for 2002 is the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, Pub. L. No.

107-107, section 232. The act for 2005 is the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, Pub. L. No. 108-375, section 233. 

3

GAO, Missile Defense: Actions Are Needed to Enhance Testing and Accountability, 

GAO-04-409 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 23, 2004); GAO, Missile Defense: Status of Ballistic

Missile Defense Program in 2004, GAO-05-243 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 31, 2005). 

Page 2 GAO-06-327 Missile Defense
Additional details of our scope and methodology can be found in 

appendix VI.

MDA made progress in fiscal year 2005 on seven elements of the BMDS 

program, but it did not complete all of the activities scheduled. By 

September 30, 2005, MDA planned to develop improved C2BMC software, 

field eight Aegis BMD missiles, upgrade seven Aegis destroyers and two 

Aegis cruisers for the missile defense mission, emplace 10 GMD 

interceptors, and conduct nine flight tests to demonstrate the performance 

of various components and elements of the BMDS. At the end of 

September, MDA had completed development, but not testing, of 

improvements to the C2BMC, delivered all eight Aegis BMD missiles, 

delivered 4 of 10 GMD interceptors, upgraded six of seven Aegis 

destroyers and two Aegis cruisers, and successfully completed two of nine 

flight tests. Two additional tests were completed by the end of calendar 

year 2005. Some activities that would have furthered the development of 

elements planned for later blocks, such as the THAAD element, slipped 

into fiscal year 2006, which could potentially delay the elements scheduled

integration into the BMDS. Although MDA did not complete all work 

scheduled during the fiscal year, most of MDA’s prime contractors 

reported that the accomplished work cost more than expected. 

Collectively, the contractors overran their fiscal year 2005 budgets by 

about $458 million, or about 14 percent, with the GMD contractor 

accounting for most—over $365 million—of the overrun. The GMD 

contractor alone overran its fiscal year budget by 25 percent.

Results in Brief 

By December 31, 2005, when Block 2004 officially ended, MDA had 

delivered an initial missile defense capability—composed of the GMD, 

Aegis BMD, C2BMC elements—to the field faster than it had originally 

planned. While it fielded assets, MDA did not meet its quantity, cost, or 

performance goals. Block 2004 delivered fewer components than planned,

cost more than anticipated, and its performance is unverified. Compared 

to its original goals set in 2003, MDA fielded 10 fewer GMD interceptors 

than planned, two fewer radars, 11 fewer Aegis BMD missiles, and six 

fewer Aegis ships. Despite some work being deferred to Block 2006, MDA 

expected the cumulative cost of developing and fielding the components 

to be about $7.7 billion, or about $1 billion more than originally expected. 

The $7.7 billion cost represents the added cost of sustaining fielded assets 

as well as cost reductions from the deferral of some Block 2004 

characterization and verification activities into Block 2006. Although it has 

successfully tested various functions of the BMDS engagement—such as 

launch detection, tracking, interceptor launch, and intercept—MDA 

Page 3 GAO-06-327 Missile Defense
cannot estimate the performance capability of the Block 2004 assets 

because it has not successfully completed an end-to-end test of the GMD 

element using production representative hardware. Doubts about the rigor 

of quality control procedures have also raised additional questions about 

the performance of fielded GMD interceptors. 

Management compromises made to accelerate fielding prevented MDA 

from meeting its Block 2004 goals. In 2002, MDA adopted an acquisition 

strategy that includes many of the knowledge-based practices that enable

leading commercial developers to field sophisticated products on time and 

within budget. Had MDA followed its original plan, the GMD program 

would have moved through a sequence of eight events that included 

assessing the maturity of critical technology, designing the element, and 

demonstrating the stability of the element’s design in an end-to-end test 

using production-representative components—all before making a 

decision to produce and field the element. At the end of each block, MDA 

could have determined whether to continue development in the next 

block; transfer all or part of the capability to a military service for 

operation, production, and sustainment; or terminate the development 

effort completely. However, to place a capability in the field quickly, MDA 

allowed the GMD program to accept significant risk by condensing its 

acquisition cycle. GMD concurrently matured technology, designed the 

element, tested the design, and produced and fielded the system, even 

though the stability of the element’s design had not been demonstrated in 

an end-to-end test and production processes were not mature. Quality 

control problems occurred when the program was accelerated. According

to MDA’s own audits, the interceptor’s design requirements were unclear

and sometimes incomplete, design changes were poorly controlled, and 

the interceptor’s design resulted in uncertain reliability and service life. 

MDA does have unique flexibility to make changes to its strategy—

including revising its goals or making trade-offs among the seven BMDS 

elements—without necessarily having to seek prior approval from a 

higher-level DOD acquisition executive, as most other major acquisition 

programs are required to do. DOD acquisition regulations have been 

effectively deferred for MDA, and although the Director confers with the 

warfighter to define the performance of the BMDS, MDA works with 

flexible performance, cost, and quantity goals that can be changed if they

are not achievable with the time or money available. In addition, there are 

no criteria to identify which variances are significant enough to be 

reported to Congress or when they should be reported. For example, the 

Director, by statute, may decide whether a cost variation is significant 

enough to be reported to Congress. 

Page 4 GAO-06-327 Missile Defense
MDA is taking several actions to address overall quality control 

weaknesses in the BMDS program. Some are simple, such as having the 

Director for Safety, Quality, and Mission Assurance report directly to 

MDA’s Director and establishing toll-free telephone numbers to report 

problems. MDA is also taking actions to make contractors aware of the 

emphasis being placed on product quality. For example, contract award 

fees will be based, in part, on the contractor’s implementation of good 

quality control procedures and industry best practices. Contracts are also 

being modified to implement mission assurance provisions that promote 

process improvements, which are expected to reduce costs, improve 

productivity, and enhance safety, quality, and mission assurance. MDA is 

also placing renewed emphasis on surveillance activities by placing MDA 

Safety, Quality, and Mission Assurance personnel in major contractors’ 

facilities; giving the Office of Safety, Quality, and Mission Assurance 

unfettered access to all MDA contractor operations, activities, and 

documentation; and strengthening the quality assurance role of the 

Defense Contract Management Agency. In addition, MDA also examined 

the test strategy of the troubled GMD program and laid out an approach 

that increases the role of ground testing, progressively increases the 

complexity and realism of flight tests, and ensures that progress through 

the test process is based on having requisite knowledge. 

While we believe that MDA is taking many of the actions needed to correct 

problems within the BMDS program, we believe that others are needed. 

We are making recommendations to the Secretary of Defense to ensure 

that all of the BMDS elements are put back on a knowledge-based path 

and to provide a more transparent basis for reporting changes from the 

plan. DOD partially concurred with our recommendations that MDA direct

all of its programs to adapt a knowledge-based acquisition strategy and to

assess whether the agency’s plan to improve the BMDS in 2-year blocks is

compatible with such a strategy. DOD stated that MDA’s use of knowledge 

points remains consistent with DOD acquisition regulations while 

providing MDA’s Director with the flexibility to determine the regulation’s

applicability to the BMDS block development concept. In its comments, 

DOD also stated that it believes that MDA’s block goals are compatible 

with a knowledge-based strategy because knowledge points are used to 

establish block goals and make adjustments to the block when necessary. 

DOD did not concur with our third recommendation, that MDA adopt 

more transparent criteria for identifying and reporting significant changes 

in quantities, cost, or performance, because it believes that current 

reporting requirements and reviews offer an adequate level of oversight. 

Page 5 GAO-06-327 Missile Defense
A weapon system for ballistic missile defense, even a rudimentary one, 

requires the coordinated operation of a diverse collection of components. 

For example, the initial capability emplaced in 2004 employs early-warning 

satellites for launch detection, ground-based radars in California and 

Alaska, and sea-based Aegis radars in the Sea of Japan for surveillance and 

tracking of enemy missiles, interceptors at launch sites in Alaska and 

California to engage and destroy incoming warheads, and command and 

control nodes in Alaska and Colorado to orchestrate the mission. 

Background 

A typical scenario to engage an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) 

would unfold as follows: 

• Infrared sensors aboard early-warning satellites detect the hot plume of a 

missile launch and alert the command authority of a possible attack. 

• Upon receiving the alert, land- or sea-based radars are directed to track 

the various objects released from the missile and, if so designed, to 

identify the warhead from among spent rocket motors, decoys, and debris. 

• When the trajectory of the missile’s warhead has been adequately 

established, an interceptor—consisting of a “kill vehicle” mounted atop a 

booster—is launched to engage the threat. The interceptor boosts itself 

toward a predicted intercept point and releases the kill vehicle. 

• The kill vehicle uses its onboard sensors and divert thrusters to detect,

identify, and steer itself into the warhead. With a combined closing speed 

on the order of 10 kilometers per second (22,000 miles per hour), the 

warhead is destroyed through a “hit-to-kill” collision with the kill vehicle 

above the atmosphere. 

To develop a system capable of carrying out such an engagement, MDA is 

executing an evolutionary acquisition strategy in which the development 

of missile defense capabilities is organized in 2-year increments known as 

blocks. In 2001, when it adopted the block strategy, MDA planned to 

construct a test bed in which new sensors, weapon projects, and 

enhancements to existing capabilities could be matured. When assets were 

considered mature, MDA planned to integrate them into the BMDS to 

increase the system’s capability to respond to the evolving threat. 

However, with the President’s directive to begin fielding an initial BMDS 

capability beginning in 2004, MDA switched its emphasis from developing

a test bed to developing and fielding an operational capability.

Page 6 GAO-06-327 Missile Defense
MDA is completing its Block 2004 program of work. The associated 

military capability of this block is primarily one for defending the United 

States against ICBM attacks from North Korea and the Middle East, 

although the block increases the United States’ ability to engage short- and 

medium-range ballistic missiles.4

 Block 2004 is built around the GMD 

element, augmented by shipboard Aegis BMD radars and missiles, and 

integrated by the system-level C2BMC element. In addition, MDA 

attempted to accelerate the fielding of the Forward-Based X-BandTransportable (FBX-T) radar into Block 2004. This radar, being developed 

by the Sensors Program Office, was originally intended for operation 

during Block 2006. 

MDA is also carrying out an extensive research and development effort to 

expand its current operational capability into future blocks. During fiscal 

year 2005, MDA funded the development of four other major BMDS 

elements in addition to the four elements that were to be fielded as part of

the Block 2004 BMDS. These elements are the ABL, KEI, STSS, and 

THAAD. MDA expects to field a limited THAAD capability during Block 

2008. The other elements, which are primarily in technology development, 

will likely be fielded in later blocks. Table 1 provides a brief description of 

all elements being developed by MDA. More information about them is 

provided in appendix II.

 4

The Patriot Advanced Capability-3 system, which is managed by the Army, also provides a 

capability against short-range ballistic missiles. 

Page 7 GAO-06-327 Missile Defense
Table 1: BMDS Elements 

Element Missile defense role 

Ground-based Midcourse Defense GMD is a ground-based missile defense system designed to destroy ICBMs during the 

midcourse phase of their flight. Its mission is to protect the U.S. homeland against 

ballistic missile attacks from North Korea and the Middle East. GMD is part of the initial 

capability fielded in 2004-2005 with an inventory of 10 interceptors. MDA plans to field 

26 additional interceptors in Alaska and California through 2010. 

Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense Aegis BMD is a ship-based missile defense system designed to destroy short- and 

medium-range ballistic missiles during the midcourse phase of their flight. Its mission is 

twofold: to protect deployed U.S. forces, allies, and friends against ballistic missile 

attacks and to serve as a forward-deployed BMDS sensor, especially in support of the 

GMD mission. MDA has plans to deliver about 100 Aegis BMD missiles—the Standard 

Missile 3—and to upgrade 18 ships for the BMD mission by the end of 2011. 

Command, Control, Battle Management, 

and Communications 

C2BMC is the integrating and controlling element of the BMDS. During 2004-2005, 

C2BMC’s role is to provide deliberate planning, situational awareness, sensor 

management and control of the Forward-Based X-Band-Transportable (FBX-T) radar, 

and network support for fire control and situational awareness. 

BMDS Sensors MDA is developing various stand-alone radars for fielding. In particular, MDA is 

leveraging the THAAD radar’s hardware design and modifying existing software to 

develop the FBX-T. MDA expects to emplace the first FBX-T in Japan to augment 

existing BMD surveillance and tracking capabilities. 

Airborne Laser ABL is an air-based missile defense system designed to destroy all classes of ballistic 

missiles during their boost phase of flight. ABL employs a high-energy chemical laser to 

rupture a missile’s motor casing, causing the missile to lose thrust or flight control. MDA 

plans to demonstrate proof of concept in a system demonstration no earlier than 2008. 

The fielding of a militarily useful ABL capability is not planned through 2011. 

Kinetic Energy Interceptors KEI is a land-based missile defense system designed to destroy medium, intermediate, 

and intercontinental ballistic missiles during the boost phase and all parts of the 

midcourse phase of their flight. The agency expects to demonstrate defensive capability 

through flight testing during 2012-2015. This capability could be expanded to seabasing in subsequent blocks.

Space Tracking and Surveillance System The Block 2006 STSS consists of a constellation of two demonstration satellites. MDA 

intends to use these satellites for testing missile warning and tracking capabilities in the 

2007-2009 time frame. If the demonstration satellites perform successfully, MDA plans 

an operational capability of next-generation satellites that will be available in the next 

decade. 

Terminal High Altitude Area Defense THAAD is a ground-based missile defense system designed to destroy short- and 

medium-range ballistic missiles during the late-midcourse and terminal phases of flight. 

Its mission is to defend deployed U.S. forces and population centers. MDA plans to field

a fire unit, including 24 missiles, in 2009 and a second unit in 2010. 

Sources: MDA (data); GAO (presentation). 

Note: The Patriot Advanced Capability-3 system is also part of the BMDS, but it is not included in the 

table because management responsibility for this element has been transferred to the Army. 

Page 8 GAO-06-327 Missile Defense
Since 2002, missile defense has been seen as a national priority and has 

been funded nearly at requested levels. However, DOD’s Program Budget 

Decision of December 2004 called for MDA to plan for a $5 billion 

reduction in funding over fiscal years 2006-2011. In addition, MDA will 

continue to compete with hundreds of existing and planned technology 

development and acquisition programs for research, development, and 

evaluation funding. Cost growth of existing weapon programs is also likely 

to affect MDA’s share of future DOD budgets. 

MDA made progress during fiscal year 2005 in carrying out the fiscal year 

plans of work established by the seven BMDS elements, but it was not able 

to field all planned components or conduct all scheduled tests. Also, some 

activities that would have furthered the development of elements planned 

for later blocks slipped into fiscal year 2006, possibly delaying the 

elements’ scheduled integration into the BMDS. In addition, although MDA 

did not complete all work scheduled during the fiscal year, most of MDA’s 

prime contractors reported that the work accomplished cost more than 

expected. 

During fiscal year 2005, MDA intended to improve the C2BMC, field eight

Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) missiles, make seven Aegis destroyers capable 

of performing long-range surveillance and tracking, upgrade two Aegis 

cruisers with a missile defense contingency engagement capability, 

upgrade two radars (Beale and Fylingdales early warning radars), and 

deliver and emplace 10 GMD interceptors. In addition, MDA planned a

number of flight tests—six GMD flight tests, four of which Aegis BMD 

would participate in to detect and track ICBM targets, and three Aegis 

BMD intercept tests. 

The C2BMC program completed most activities required to provide 

situational awareness of the missile defense battle. The C2BMC element, 

whose development is in its early stages, is initially expected to monitor 

the operational status of each BMDS component and display threat 

information, such as missile trajectories and impact points. In 2005, the 

program installed C2BMC suites (communications software and 

hardware) at U.S. Strategic Command, U. S. Northern Command, and U.S.

Pacific Command. The additions at U.S. Strategic Command and U.S. 

Northern Command provide redundant capability and more flexibility to 

test, exercise, and maintain the C2BMC. MDA also planned to install a Web 

browser in the United Kingdom, to provide situational awareness for the 

British government. However, the Web browser will not be operational 

MDA Made Progress 

during Fiscal Year 

2005, but Some 

Activities Were Not 

Completed as Planned 

Good Progress Made in the 

C2BMC and Aegis 

Elements 

Page 9 GAO-06-327 Missile Defense
until 2006 because DOD did not complete final policy agreements as 

scheduled. 

Development of two C2BMC software upgrades was also completed 

during the fiscal year. The first upgrade gave C2BMC the ability to display 

GMD assets on the user’s computer monitors, improved the user’s ability 

to call up BMDS information, reduced the time to transfer force-level

planning files, and installed the software and hardware necessary to 

provide an operational capability at U.S. Pacific Command. The final 

decision to make the U.S. Pacific Command suite operational has not yet 

been made, but a decision is expected in March 2006. Completion of the 

second upgrade was a little behind schedule, but it was completed by the 

first quarter of calendar year 2006. Development of the upgrade, known as 

Spiral 4.5, was completed by the end of September 2005, but all testing is 

not expected to be completed until the end of March 2006. Spiral 4.5 gives 

C2BMC the capability to receive, distribute, and display information 

developed by three new sensors—the FBX-T and Sea-Based X-Band (SBX) 

radars and the Fylingdales upgraded early warning radar. It also improves 

the consistency between the data displayed by the C2BMC and the GMD 

fire control monitors, both of which receive information directly from 

various sensors. 

The Aegis BMD program made good progress in developing and delivering 

missiles and upgrading Aegis ships for the missile defense mission. To 

increase the United States’ capability to defend against short- and mediumrange ballistic missiles, the program produced and delivered eight 

Standard Missile-3s—the “bullet” for the Aegis BMD element. These 

missiles will be launched from Aegis cruisers, two of which were upgraded 

in fiscal year 2005 to enable them to perform their engagement and longrange surveillance and tracking missions. Six destroyers, whose ballistic 

missile defense mission is to provide long-range surveillance and tracking 

of ICBMs for the GMD element, were also upgraded in fiscal year 2005. 

The program was unable to upgrade a seventh destroyer during the fiscal

year as scheduled—although assets required to proceed with the upgrade

were in place—because the Navy had scheduled the ship for other 

activities. However, the destroyer was upgraded before the end of Block 

2004. 

GMD Program Makes Less 

Progress 

Although the GMD program made progress during fiscal year 2005, it did 

not meet all expectations. The GMD program had planned to field 

10 additional interceptors during the fiscal year, but actually fielded 4.

Two additional GMD interceptors were delivered and fielded at Fort 

Page 10 GAO-06-327 Missile Defense
Greely, Alaska, and the first 2 interceptors were emplaced at Vandenberg 

Air Force Base, California. The 2 interceptors installed at Vandenberg 

provide a redundant launch site and a better intercept trajectory against 

some ICBM threats. MDA also upgraded two early warning radars—one at 

Beale Air Force Base, California, and another at Fylingdales in the United 

Kingdom. In some scenarios, each of these radars will act as the primary 

fire control radar for the GMD element. 

Interceptor production slowed as the year progressed primarily because 

technical problems were discovered, mostly in the interceptor’s 

exoatmospheric kill vehicle (EKV). MDA officials explained that these 

problems were traced back to poor oversight of subcontractors, too few 

qualification tests, and other quality assurance issues. By the end of the 

fiscal year, the program had reduced its fiscal year plan for fielding 

interceptors from 10 to 6 so that additional interceptors could be made 

available for ground tests, but the contractor was only able to emplace the 

2 interceptors at Fort Greely and the 2 at Vandenburg Air Force Base. 

Two of Nine Flight Tests 

Successfully Completed 

The GMD and Aegis BMD programs also planned to conduct a number of 

flight tests during the fiscal year. The GMD program planned three 

nonintercept and three intercept flight tests. However, the program was 

able to successfully complete only one of the nonintercept flight tests and 

none of the intercept tests. The successful nonintercept test demonstrated 

that the upgraded Cobra Dane radar could detect and track a target of 

opportunity. However, a second nonintercept flight test that would have 

examined upgrades to the Beale upgraded early warning radar was 

delayed, when GMD’s test plan was restructured to make it less 

concurrent. Also, the other nonintercept test (integrated flight test [IFT]-

13C) that was to demonstrate operational aspects of the fielded 

configuration of GMD’s interceptor could not be completed because the 

interceptor failed to launch. Of the three planned intercept tests, the 

program conducted one (IFT-14). However, this test was also aborted 

when the interceptor failed to launch.

5

 MDA planned two other intercept 

tests, but the tests did not take place because MDA restructured GMD’s 

test plan after the interceptor failures to implement a less risky test 

strategy. The first test in the restructured plan—which was a nonintercept 

 5

The launch failure was traced back to a quality assurance problem, which is discussed in 

more detail later in this report and in appendix IV. 

Page 11 GAO-06-327 Missile Defense
test to assess the interceptor’s operation in space—was successfully 

completed in December 2005. 

The Aegis BMD Program Office planned to participate in four of the GMD 

tests during fiscal year 2005. Aegis BMD did not participate in any of these 

tests because weather conditions prevented the ship from participating in

one test, the ship was unavailable during another, and GMD’s test plan was 

restructured, causing two tests to be canceled. 

In addition to participating in GMD tests, the Aegis BMD program planned 

three intercept tests during fiscal year 2005. However, only one test was 

conducted. The program delayed the two other tests because of budgetary 

constraints and technical problems. MDA completed one of the delayed 

tests in the first quarter of fiscal year 2006 and canceled the second 

delayed test because most of its objectives had been accomplished in the 

completed test. In the fiscal year 2006 test, an SM-3 missile successfully 

engaged a separating target, that is, a target whose warhead separates 

from its booster. In defeating this target, the program demonstrated that 

the Aegis BMD element has a capability against a more advanced threat 

than the nonseparating targets included in earlier tests. 

Developmental Elements 

Progress but Experience 

Some Setbacks 

MDA made progress in developing the four elements that are expected to

enhance the BMDS during future blocks—THAAD, ABL, STSS, and KEI—

but some planned activities fell behind schedule. The THAAD Program 

Office completed numerous ground and component qualification tests that 

led to a successful first flight test in the first quarter of fiscal year 2006.

The program also worked to solve technical problems that could have 

affected the success of the first flight tests. The ABL program completed 

the first major milestones of its restructured program—First Flight and 

First Light, completed scheduled activities associated with a series of 

Beam Control/Fire Control low-power passive flight tests, and began

integrating the full Beam Control/Fire Control with other laser systems 

Page 12 GAO-06-327 Missile Defense
aboard the aircraft.6

 The STSS program tested and integrated spacecraft 

components for the demonstration satellites that the program expects to 

launch and began testing the first satellite’s payload. The KEI program 

completed the construction of a shelter to house prototype fire control 

and communications equipment and conducted several demonstrations 

during which the prototype equipment collected data from overhead 

nonimaging infrared satellites in a timeline that, according to program 

officials, proves a boost phase intercept is possible. In addition, the 

program completed studies of communications equipment—which uplinks 

information from KEI’s fire control and communications component to its

interceptor—that allowed the program to optimize the equipment’s design 

to operate in a nuclear environment or against jamming threats. 

However, all four programs experienced some setbacks. The THAAD 

program delayed the start of flight tests until the first quarter of fiscal year

2006. The ABL Program Office did not complete laboratory testing of the

element’s high-energy laser in September 2005, as planned, and the STSS 

Program Office rescheduled tests of the first satellite’s payload until the 

second quarter of fiscal year 2006. The fourth element, KEI, also delayed

some activities related to its Near Field Infrared Experiment (NFIRE), 

which is being conducted to gather data on the risk in identifying the body 

of a missile from the plume of hot exhaust gases that can obscure the body 

while the missile is boosting. 

The THAAD Program Office expected to begin flight tests in June 2005. 

However, the first test was delayed until November 2005 because of 

unexpected integration problems. For example, one delay was caused by a 

tear in a filter in the missile’s divert attitude control system. Program 

officials expect to recover the test schedule and conduct 14 flight tests 

before turning the first THAAD fire unit over to the Army in 2009 for 

operational use and testing. However, the test schedule is aggressive, 

 6

First Flight was the first of a series of planned flight tests with the Beam Control/Fire 

Control segment that demonstrated the completion of all necessary design, safety, and 

verification activities to ensure flight worthiness. It also began the process of expanding 

the flight envelope—types and combinations of flight conditions—in which ABL can

operate. First Light refers to the first ground test and demonstration of the integration of 

six individual laser modules that produced a single beam of laser energy. Passive flight 

tests are conducted without the use of the Beacon Illuminator Laser (BILL) or the Tracking

Illuminator Laser (TILL). The BILL and TILL are part of the laser beam control system used 

to mitigate the effects of the atmosphere on beam quality and to focus the laser beam on 

the target. In contrast, active flight tests include the use of the illuminator lasers.

Page 13 GAO-06-327 Missile Defense
requiring as many as 5 tests in some years. To complete all tests as 

planned, the officials told us that there can be no test failures. 

The Airborne Laser Program Office planned to complete tests of the 

element’s high-energy laser by September 30, 2005. The laser is a 

component of the ABL prototype that will be used to demonstrate the 

element’s lethality as early as the 2008 time frame. Prior to installing the 

laser on the prototype aircraft, the program tested the laser in its System 

Integration Laboratory at Edwards Air Force Base. Program officials 

expected the tests, which began in November 2004, to be completed by the 

end of fiscal year 2005. During this time frame, officials wanted to 

demonstrate that the laser could generate 100 percent of its design power 

and that it could repeatedly operate at that power for periods of about 

10 seconds. As of October 2005, the laser had produced 83 percent of the 

power it is designed to generate and was able to operate for periods of 

about 5 1⁄4 seconds. After solving technical problems with the laser’s abort 

system and completing the planned installation of an ammonia cooling 

system, the program was able, in December 2005, to extend the laser’s 

operating time to more than 10 seconds. Although the laser has not 

reached 100 percent of its design power, officials told us that the 

83 percent obtained thus far is sufficient to achieve 95 percent of 

maximum lethal range against all classes of ballistic missiles. The ABL 

Program Manager originally told us that he expected the laser to remain in 

the system integration laboratory until it produced 100 percent of its 

design power. Nonetheless, on December 9, 2005, MDA’s Director gave the 

ABL program permission to disassemble the System Integration 

Laboratory and install the laser on the aircraft. Program officials told us 

that they would continue to test the laser, when the aircraft is on the 

ground, in an attempt to demonstrate that the laser can produce 

100 percent of its design power. 

During fiscal year 2005, the STSS program intended to integrate and test 

the spacecraft for two demonstration satellites and integrate and test the 

sensor payload, which includes surveillance and tracking sensors, for the 

first of the two satellites. The program is constructing the demonstration

satellites from hardware developed by the Space-Based Infrared SystemLow program before it was canceled in 1999 and plans to launch the 

satellites in fiscal year 2007, after all hardware has been integrated and 

tested. The program did not complete the payload integration and test 

activities in fiscal year 2005, as planned, because thermal vacuum testing 

Page 14 GAO-06-327 Missile Defense
is taking longer than expected.7

 Hardware issues have emerged as the 

payload is being tested in a vacuum and at cold temperatures for the first 

time. For example, in a vacuum, the sensors’ optics did not cool to the 

desired temperature and the power supply to the acquisition sensor’s 

signal processor failed. The program office believes that repairs will 

correct the problems, but program officials are in the process of deciding

whether further tests must be completed after the repairs are made and 

before the sensor payload is placed aboard the satellite. 

As part of its fiscal year 2005 activities, the KEI program intended to 

complete a number of tasks that would have enabled it to conduct the 

NFIRE experiment. The experiment places sensors aboard a satellite that

will be launched into space, where the sensors will observe and collect

infrared imagery of boosting intercontinental ballistic missiles. In fiscal 

year 2005, the KEI program expected to calibrate and deliver the sensor 

payload, complete the space vehicle integration and acceptance test, 

procure targets, and certify mission operation readiness. However, 

anomalies in the sensor payload delayed the delivery of the payload, in 

turn delaying the remaining activities. The day-to-day management of all 

NFIRE activities has since been transferred to the STSS program, which 

has extensive experience with the development of satellites. STSS officials 

told us that they do not expect the fiscal year 2005 delays to affect the 

experiment’s launch date. 

Completed Work Cost 

More than Expected 

Although MDA was unable to complete all activities during fiscal year 2005 

as planned, the completed work cost more than expected. Collectively, 

prime contractors for the various elements overran their budgets by about

$458 million, or about 14 percent, with GMD accounting for approximately 

80 percent of the collective overrun. Although the GMD contractor 

experienced the largest overrun, exceeding its fiscal year 2005 budget by 

approximately 25 percent, it is notable that the ABL contractor overran its 

fiscal year budget. The ABL contract had been restructured in 2004 to 

provide a more realistic cost estimate for the work planned. It is also 

noteworthy that continuing cost growth in the development of the THAAD 

missile caused the contractor to overrun its fiscal year budget for the first 

time since the contract was awarded. 

 7

A thermal vacuum test verifies that the temperature control design will maintain the

spacecraft and all its elements within allowable flight temperature ranges while operating

over the environmental extremes expected for the mission. 

Page 15 GAO-06-327 Missile Defense
Table 2 contains our analysis of the contractor’s cost and schedule 

performance in fiscal year 2005 and the potential overrun or underrun of 

each contract at completion. All estimates of the contracts’ costs at 

completion are based on the contractors’ performance through fiscal year 

2005. Collectively, the six contracts, for which data were available to 

estimate a cost at completion, could overrun their budgets by about 

$1.3 billion to $2.1 billion. It should be noted that the cost variance at 

completion projected for most of the contracts is based on more than one 

block of work. For example, the STSS contract covers the contractor’s 

work on Block 2006 and Block 2010. Appendix III provides further details 

regarding the performance of the prime contractors for the seven elements 

shown in the table. 

Table 2: Prime Contractor Fiscal Year 2005 and Cumulative Cost and Schedule Performance 

BMDS Element 

FY 05 cost 

variance

FY 05 

schedule 

variance

Cumulative 

cost 

variance

Cumulative 

schedule 

variance

Percentage

of contract 

completed

Estimated contract 

underrun/overrun

ABL ($29.6) ($22.0) ($23.1) ($23.6) 69% Overrun: $43.8 to $231.7

GMD ($365.1) ($38.9) ($713.1) ($227.9) 75% Overrun: $1,042 to $1,360

Aegis BMD 

(Weapon System) $2.6 $2.0 $6.1 0 67% Underrun: $7.1 to $12.5

Aegis BMD(SM-3)a$10.9 ($9.6) $10.9 ($9.6) 74% Underrun: $11.5 to $17.8

THAAD ($19.0) ($4.6) ($15.0) $10.1 72% Overrun: $16.9 to $48.2

C2BMC $1.0 $6.4 $1.7 ($0.9) 87% Underrun: $1.8 to $2.4

KEI $3.0 ($3.9) $3.0 ($5.9) 4% b

STSS ($61.5) $6.8 ($96.9) ($20.3) 65% Overrun: $248.3 to $479.4c

Source: Contractors (data); GAO (analysis). 

Note: Negative variances are shown with parentheses around the dollar amounts. 

a

Contract performance reporting data for the Aegis BMD SM-3 element were not available prior to 

fiscal year 2005. Therefore, cumulative and fiscal year 2005 values are the same. 

b

We could not estimate the likely outcome of the KEI contract at completion because a trend cannot 

be predicted with only 4 percent of the contract complete. 

c

The overrun projected for STSS is based on the contractor’s performance through fiscal year 2005 in

carrying out both Block 2006 and Block 2010 work. The STSS Program Office noted that considering 

the contractor’s performance on Block 2006 alone, a contract overrun of $80 million to $120 million is

anticipated. In addition, program officials told us that the prime contractor’s Block 2006 performance 

has been affected by the poor performance of a subcontractor whose work effort will be completed in 

fiscal year 2006. All remaining work will be performed by the prime contractor, whose performance 

has been significantly better. 

About $240 million of the GMD overrun can be traced to the interceptor, 

with the EKV accounting for more than 42 percent, or $102 million, of that 

amount. The EKV’s cost growth was caused by poor quality control 

Page 16 GAO-06-327 Missile Defense
procedures and technical problems during development, testing, and 

production. The interceptor’s cost also grew when the contractor had to 

bring a new supplier online to produce the motors for the BV+ booster, 

one of the two boosters being developed to carry the EKV into space. A 

new supplier was needed because explosions at the old supplier’s plant 

prevented it from delivering the motors. 

As of September 30, 2005, the SBX radar, which is also being developed by

the GMD program, had also overrun its fiscal year budget by about 

$55 million. The cost of developing this component increased when 

numerous unplanned changes were made to the platform that holds the 

radar, subcontractor costs could not be negotiated at the expected price, 

and additional efforts were required to ensure a functional radome.8

The ABL prime contractor also experienced cost growth during fiscal year

2005, even though the ABL contract had been restructured in 2004. This 

action provided a more realistic budget and schedule for remaining 

contract activities leading up to a 2008 ABL lethality demonstration. With 

the restructure, the contractor was no longer required to report past cost 

and schedule growth. However, in fiscal year 2005, the contractor once

again reported that ABL’s cost was growing and that some work had been

delayed. Cost grew and schedules slipped as the contractor made software 

changes to address problems identified during tests of the Beam 

Control/Fire Control, modified the laser’s abort system so that it would not 

shut down the operation of the laser prematurely, and reprioritized 

activities throughout the program. Other costs were attributable to 

problems with ABL’s Active Ranger System and Beacon Illuminator Laser.9

For example, the contractor’s cost grew when it redesigned and replaced 

contaminated, damaged, and inefficient optics in the commercial off-theshelf Active Ranger System. In addition, the contractor incurred additional 

cost because numerous faults in the power supply for the Beacon 

Illuminator Laser forced changes in circuit cards and circuit boards. 

 8

The radome is a domelike shell transparent to radio-frequency radiation that is used to 

house a radar antenna. 

9

ABL’s Active Ranger System is designed to estimate an enemy missile’s launch and impact 

point. The Beacon Illuminator Laser measures atmospheric disturbance so that the highenergy beam can be shaped, preventing the atmosphere from scattering and weakening the 

beam’s energy. 

Page 17 GAO-06-327 Missile Defense
For the first time since the THAAD contract was awarded, in 2000, the cost 

of the work being performed in a given fiscal year was greater than the 

funds budgeted for that work. The THAAD Program Office attributed the 

contractor’s overrun to unanticipated missile integration problems. For 

example, the Flight Termination Assembly, which is responsible for 

terminating a THAAD missile in flight, failed qualification tests that in turn 

delayed qualification of the next larger assembly. In another instance, 

work was delayed while engineers determined why telemetry equipment, 

which is placed aboard a test missile to report the missile’s condition in 

flight, sent corrupted data to the test station. Program officials told us that 

the program solved all known problems that could have prevented a 

successful first flight test. However, the officials said that the missile still 

has telemetry problems that prevent the test station from collecting all of 

the data that will be generated in the third flight test. Program officials 

expect to find solutions for these problems prior to the third test. 

MDA succeeded in fielding an initial missile defense capability by the end 

of fiscal year 2004 and in improving that capability by December 31, 2005,

when Block 2004 ended. However, the block included fewer components 

than planned, cost more than anticipated, and its performance is 

unverified. In February 2003, MDA forwarded to Congress the goals that it

had established for the initial BMDS capability that it planned to develop 

and field during Block 2004. The goals included the quantity of 

components that would compose the block, the cost of developing and 

producing those components, and the performance that the initial BMDS

capability was to deliver. However, over the course of the block, MDA 

progressively reduced the number of components that it expected to field 

and increased its cost goal, primarily to recognize the cost of sustaining 

fielded assets. Even with changes, MDA was unable to meet its quantity 

goals, and MDA is reporting that the cost of Block 2004 will be greater 

than expected because of additional sustainment costs. However, the 

Block 2004 cost being reported by MDA does not include the cost of some 

activities that must still be completed. MDA did not change its 

performance expectations for the block. 

Between 2003 and mid-2005, MDA progressively decreased the number of 

components it planned to field as part of the Block 2004 capability. 

However, even with the reductions, MDA was unable to deliver all 

components planned. Table 3 illustrates the evolution of MDA’s quantity 

goals and compares those goals with the number of assets fielded. 

Block 2004 Delivers 

Assets Faster, but 

with Unverified 

Performance 

Significantly Fewer Block 

2004 Assets Fielded than 

Planned 

Page 18 GAO-06-327 Missile Defense
Table 3: Evolution of Block 2004 Quantity Goals versus Fielded Assets 

BMDS Element 

Goal as of 

Feb. 2003 

Goal as of 

Feb. 2004 

Goal as of 

Feb. 2005 

Goal as of 

mid-2005 

Assets available for 

operational use as 

of Dec. 31, 2005 

GMD Interceptors • Up to 20 • 20 • 18 • 14 • 10 

Radars • Cobra Dane

• 2 Upgraded early 

warning radar 

(UEWR)a

• Sea-Based XBand Radar 

• Cobra Dane

• 2 UEWR

• Cobra Dane

• 2 UEWR

• Sea-Based XBand Radar 

• Forward- Based 

X-BandTransportable 

Radarb

• Cobra Dane

• 2 UEWR

• Sea-Based XBand Radar 

• Forward-Based XBandTransportable 

Radarb

• Cobra Dane

• 1 UEWR

Aegis BMD 

SM-3 Missiles 

• Up to 20 • 9 • 8 • 8 • 9c

Aegis BMD ships • 15 destroyersd

• 3 cruisers 

• 10 destroyers 

• 3 cruisers 

• 10 destroyers 

• 2 cruisers 

• 10 destroyers 

• 2 cruisers 

• 10 destroyers 

• 2 cruisers 

Sources: MDA (data); GAO (analysis). 

a

Upgraded early warning radars are located at Beale Air Force Base, California, and Fylingdales Air 

Base, United Kingdom. 

b

The FBX-T was originally planned as a Block 2006 asset, but MDA accelerated it to make it available 

in 2005. 

c

The Aegis BMD program planned to field eight SM-3 missiles even though more than eight missiles 

were to be produced. The program was able to field nine SM-3 missiles because one that was 

planned for testing was diverted to operational use when it was no longer needed for test purposes. 

d

The Aegis BMD Program Office told us that the goal of upgrading 15 destroyers was based on a 

capability-defined block, that is, a block that ended when the final ship was upgraded. 

By mid-2005, MDA had reduced its February 2003 goal for operational 

GMD interceptors from 20 to 14. The first reduction occurred when MDA 

recognized that an explosion at a subcontractor’s facility would reduce the 

number of boosters available for interceptors slated for fielding.10

Although MDA was developing an alternate source for boosters, the 

second developer could not produce all of the boosters needed to field 

20 interceptors. Therefore, MDA decided two interceptors would be 

 10The interceptor is composed of a booster that carries an EKV into space. MDA was 

developing two sources for boosters. One booster, known as the BV+, was being produced

by Lockheed Martin, and the other by the Orbital Sciences Corporation (OSC). An

explosion at the facility of a Lockheed Martin subcontractor responsible for producing

motors for the BV+ booster stopped the booster’s production until an alternate source for

the motors could be found. The first BV+ booster is expected to be produced in calendar

year 2006. 

Page 19 GAO-06-327 Missile Defense
diverted for testing. One was used in ground testing, and the second, 

which will not be built until calendar year 2006, will be used in a flight test. 

In mid-2005, after two unsuccessful flight tests, the GMD Program Office 

reduced its goal for operational interceptors further—from 18 to 14—to 

set aside more interceptors for ground tests. The test missiles will be 

assembled in a later block. 

Even with the reductions, MDA failed to meet its quantity goals. By the 

end of Block 2004, MDA had delivered 10 GMD interceptors. Production 

slowed as the program addressed technical issues and quality control 

problems discovered during testing and in quality control audits. Further, 

GMD program officials also told us that the SBX radar will not be 

operational until 2006 because funds that were to be used to integrate the 

radar into the BMDS were used to cover some of the cost of the 

restructured test program. 

MDA was also unable to place the FBX-T radar and the Fylingdales 

upgraded early warning radar in operation before the end of the block. 

While MDA did not formally add the FBX-T to its Block 2004 Statement of

Goals, agency officials told congressional committees that they were 

developing this radar and expected to have it fully operational by the end 

of the block. MDA was able to accelerate this capability by 1 full year and 

to ready the radar for deployment within Block 2004. However, 

negotiations with Japan, the host nation for the radar, were not completed 

by December 2005, and site preparation, which will commence once 

negotiations are complete, is expected to take 8 to 9 months. Full 

functionality of the Fylingdales upgraded early warning radar was also 

delayed. MDA used the funds that were needed to make the radar fully 

functional to cover part of the cost of the restructured GMD test program. 

Over time, MDA also altered the number of SM-3 missiles that it planned to 

procure. MDA’s goal of producing up to 20 missiles was never reached 

because of fiscal constraints and missile parts availability. MDA set aside 

funding for 11 SM-3 missiles, 9 of which were to be made available for 

operational use. Program officials told us that had MDA funded more than 

11 missiles it would have been necessary to restart some component 

production lines, which had been closed. Reopening these lines would 

have caused the additional components to be expensive. Also, the 

production lines could not have produced the components in a time frame 

that would have allowed the Aegis BMD program to meet the President’s 

directed fielding date. In December 2004, MDA further reduced its 

operational goal for SM-3 missiles from 9 to 8 in response to a DOD 

reduction in MDA’s fiscal year 2005 budget request. However, by the end 

Page 20 GAO-06-327 Missile Defense
of 2005, MDA was able to make 9 missiles available for operational use 

because 1 missile that the Aegis BMD program expected to use for testing 

was not needed for that purpose. 

MDA’s February 2003 Statement of Goals also included the planned 

upgrade of 15 destroyers and three cruisers for the missile defense 

mission. However, the Aegis BMD Program Office told us that the 

established goals were based on a capability-defined block, that is, a block 

that ended when the final ship was upgraded. In February 2004, MDA 

corrected Aegis BMD goals to take into account the agency’s definition of

a block as a 2-year time period. In making this correction, MDA reduced 

the number of destroyers to be delivered during Block 2004 from 15 to 10. 

By February 2005, budgetary constraints also caused MDA to reduce its 

planned Block 2004 upgrade of cruisers from three to two. 

Block 2004 Cost Is 

Understated 

MDA is reporting that the cost of Block 2004 will exceed the cost goals 

established in 2003 and 2004, but the reported cost does not include the

cost of Block 2004 activities that have been deferred until Block 2006. In 

February 2003, when it sent its Statement of Goals for Block 2004 to 

Congress, MDA estimated that in addition to the funds received in 2002, 

the agency would need $5.5 billion more, or a total of about $6.7 billion, to 

field this capability. Table 4 shows how MDA estimated those funds would 

be used. A year later, in 2004, the goal had increased to approximately 

$7 billion. However, the expected cost of the capability is now about 

$7.7 billion, or around $600 million more than the revised goal and 

$1 billion, or about 15 percent, more than the original Block 2004 goal. 

MDA primarily attributes Block 2004’s increased cost to the sustainment of 

fielded assets, which officials told us they could not fully estimate until 

they prepared their fiscal year 2006 budget request. However, the 

$7.7 billion cost does not include some work planned for Block 2004, 

which the contractor could not complete before December 31, 2005. 

According to GMD officials, this work has been deferred until Block 2006 

and its cost will be recognized as part of that block’s cost. 

Page 21 GAO-06-327 Missile Defense
Table 4: Composition of the Block 2004 Fielded Configuration Cost Goal, February 2003 

Dollars in millions 

Program element FY 2002 FY 2003 FY 2004 FY 2005 FY 2006 Total

C2BMC $21 $80 $114 $79 0 $294

Hercules Block 2004 Joint Warfighter Support 0 0 $18 $27 0 $45

Test and Evaluation Block 2004 $47 $57 $37 $33 0 $174

Targets and Countermeasures $75 $104 $197 $170 0 $546

GMD Test Bed Block 2004 $636 $452 $1,205 $868 0 $3,161

Aegis BMD Test Bed Block 2004 $413 $440 $648 $894 $98 $2,493

Total $1,192 $1,133 $2,219 $2,071 $98 $6,713a

Source: MDA budget submission, February 2003. 

a

The total cost goal for Block 2004 includes MDA’s actual costs for fiscal year 2002 and its cost goals 

for 2003 through the first quarter of fiscal year 2006, which corresponds to the end of Block 2004. 

The Aegis BMD element was the only element of the BMDS program that 

estimated it would need funds during the first quarter of 2006 to complete 

Block 2004 fielding. GMD and C2BMC predicted that all work related to 

fielding the Block 2004 capability would be completed by September 30, 

2005, when MDA expected to place a limited defensive operational 

capability on alert. 

In February 2004, MDA revised its estimated cost for fielding a Block 2004

capability to a little over $7 billion, or about $332 million more than 

originally projected. Table 5 presents the changes in the composition of 

the goal. 

Page 22 GAO-06-327 Missile Defense
Table 5: Composition of the Block 2004 Fielded Configuration Cost Goal, February 2004 

Program element FY 2002 FY 2003 FY 2004 FY 2005 FY 2006 Total

C2BMC $21 $71 $117 $154 0 $363

Hercules Block 2004 Joint Warfighter Support 0 0 $18 0 0 $18

Test and Evaluation Block 2004 $47 $46 $37 $39 0 $169

Targets and Countermeasures $75 $95 $224 $233 0 $627

GMD Test Bed Block 2004 $636 $397 $1343 $861 0 $3,237

Aegis BMD Test Bed Block 2004 $413 $433 $641 $966 $178 $2,631

Total $1,192 $1,042 $2,380 $2,253 $178 $7,045

Source: MDA Budget estimate submission, February 2004. 

The cost of fielding the Block 2004 capability will be about $939 million 

more than the originally estimated cost of $6.7 billion and approximately 

$607 million more than the revised cost goal of $7 billion. Officials 

primarily attribute the increased cost to MDA’s sustainment of fielded 

assets. However, the Block 2004 cost that MDA is reporting does not 

include work that the contractor was unable to complete within the 

block’s time frame. Program officials told us that in fiscal year 2006 the 

contractor will conduct additional Block 2004 development and 

deployment efforts. This will be followed in fiscal year 2007 with work 

needed to characterize and verify the Block 2004 fielded elements. The 

officials said that Block 2006 funds will be used to pay for these activities. 

Table 6 shows the actual cost incurred between October 1, 2002, and 

December 31, 2005, for the Block 2004 fielded capability and the 

sustainment cost expected to be incurred in fiscal years 2006 and 2007. It 

should be noted that this is not the full cost of the initial capability 

because DOD began to spend funds to develop the current missile defense 

capability in 1995, and as noted above, additional Block 2004 work will be

completed and funded during Block 2006. 11

 11Although DOD began developing a missile defense capability as early as 1958, it was not 

until 1995 that it began development of the predecessors of the current BMDS elements. 

DOD launched development of the Theater Missile Defense system, the predecessor of 

Aegis BMD, in 1995; National Missile Defense System, GMD’s predecessor, in 1996; and 

C2BMC in 2002. However, it should be noted that initial versions of C2BMC build on 

existing Air Force and GMD fire control software. 

Page 23 GAO-06-327 Missile Defense
Table 6: Expected Cost of Block 2004 Fielded Capability, Including Initial Sustainment 

Dollars in millions

Program element FY 2002 FY 2003 FY 2004 FY 2005 FY 2006 FY 2007 Total

C2BMC $ 21 $ 80 $ 92 $ 154 $ 23 $ 16 $ 386

Hercules Block 2004 Joint Warfighter Support 0 0 $ 5 0 0 0 $ 5

Test and Evaluation Block 2004 $ 47 $ 57 $ 41 $ 143 0 0 $ 288

Targets and Countermeasures $ 75 $ 104 $ 183 $ 176 0 0 $ 538

GMD $ 636 $ 369 $1,357 $ 955 $279 $375 $3,971

Aegis BMD $ 413 $ 386 $ 606 $ 943 $101 $15 $2,464

Total $1,192 $ 996 $2,284 $2,371 $404 $406 $7,652

Source: MDA. 

Note: According to MDA officials, all cost incurred in fiscal years 2006 and 2007 are for the 

sustainment of fielded assets. 

BMDS Performance Is 

Unverified 

Because test data are not available to anchor simulations that MDA uses to 

predict BMDS performance, the capability of Block 2004 cannot be 

verified. MDA has conducted a variety of tests that suggest Block 2004 

offers some protection against ballistic missile attacks. However, MDA 

cannot be sure how well the BMDS will perform against ICBMs because 

tests needed to characterize the system’s performance have not yet been 

conducted. Test officials have also suggested that to fully characterize the 

BMDS’s ability to defeat short- and medium-range ballistic missile threats, 

more tests of Aegis BMD are needed. Additionally, the performance of 

emplaced GMD interceptors is uncertain because inadequate mission 

assurance/quality control procedures may have allowed less reliable or 

inappropriate parts to be incorporated into the manufacturing process. 

In February 2003, MDA set performance goals12 for Block 2004 that 

included a numerical goal for the probability of a successful BMDS 

engagement, a defined area from which the BMDS would prevent an 

enemy from launching a ballistic missile, and a defined area that the BMDS 

 12Unlike traditional DOD programs, MDA is not developing the BMDS to meet firm 

requirements established by the warfighter. Instead, MDA is using a capabilities-based 

approach that establishes goals or objectives that address a threat identified by the range

of parameters within which a threat ballistic missile is likely to operate and that consider 

the capability that the U.S. defense industry can realistically build to address this threat. 

Page 24 GAO-06-327 Missile Defense
would protect from ballistic missile attacks.13 MDA did not alter Block 

2004 performance goals, despite its actions on quantity and cost goals. 

A combination of tests and simulations is necessary to demonstrate 

whether the Block 2004 capability can meet its performance goals. 

Because it does not always conduct a sufficient number of tests to 

compute statistical probabilities of performance, MDA uses models and 

simulations to measure the probability that the BMDS will perform as 

designed. By employing digital simulations, estimates of system 

effectiveness are obtained over a wide range of conditions, scenarios, and 

system architectures. However, to ensure that models underlying these 

simulations are reflective of real-world operation, the models must be 

anchored by data collected during both ground and flight tests. 

MDA has completed simulations, ground tests, and flight tests that 

demonstrate various functions of the BMDS engagement, such as launch 

detection, tracking, interceptor launch, and intercept. However, it has not 

successfully completed an end-to-end flight test of the GMD element—the 

centerpiece of the BMDS—using production-representative components. 

In the absence of these data, MDA’s assessment of GMD’s Block 2004 

performance is based on data derived from a number of sources, including 

design specifications, output from high-fidelity simulations, and integrated 

ground tests of various components. Officials in DOD’s Office of 

Operational Test and Evaluation told us that MDA’s computer-based 

assessments are appropriate for a developmental program but could 

present difficulties in interpreting results for operational considerations. 

During fiscal year 2005, MDA planned four integrated flight tests to 

demonstrate the ability of the Block 2004 BMDS against ICBMs. Together 

these tests were to assess the ability of different radars to detect and track 

targets for the GMD element, the ability of GMD’s fire control system to 

formulate a firing solution from each radar’s data, and the interceptor’s 

ability to hit and kill the target. Two of these tests were initiated. However, 

both tests were aborted because, in each, the GMD interceptor failed to 

launch. MDA postponed and has not rescheduled the third and fourth tests 

because, after the test failures, MDA decided to restructure its test 

program to make it less concurrent.

 13The specifics of the performance goals are classified. 

Page 25 GAO-06-327 Missile Defense
MDA’s cancelation of the third flight test was particularly problematic 

because it prevented MDA from exercising Aegis BMD’s long-range 

surveillance and tracking capability in a manner consistent with an actual

defensive mission. The Aegis BMD Program Office told us that Aegis BMD 

can adequately perform detection and tracking for the GMD element 

because in one test Aegis BMD demonstrated the ability to track a real

target and in another test the ability to communicate track data to GMD’s 

fire control. However, DOT&E officials told us that having Aegis BMD 

perform long-range surveillance and tracking in real time would determine 

the degree to which errors are introduced when these activities are 

combined. 

MDA also planned to have the third test fulfill a congressional mandate to

test the Block 2004 configuration in an operationally realistic manner. For 

the first time, a test would have included production-representative GMD 

hardware and software operated by sailors and soldiers. All successful 

GMD intercepts, to date, have used surrogate and prototype components. 

Test Officials Suggest 

Further Aegis BMD 

Characterization Tests Are 

Needed 

DOT&E officials suggested that further tests are needed to fully 

characterize Aegis BMD’s capability against ballistic missiles. The officials 

told us that Aegis BMD is making good progress in incorporating 

operational realism into its flight tests. Operational crews execute the 

intercept flight missions without advance notice of launch time. However, 

in early tests, ship position with respect to the target’s trajectory is still 

controlled to increase the probability of intercept. In addition, the tests 

have been constrained by sea states, time of day, weather, target 

dynamics, and the need to baseline Aegis BMD’s performance and concept 

of operations. The officials are recommending that in future tests Aegis 

BMD’s tactical mission planner should dictate the ship’s position and the 

sectors that its radar searches, rather than the program scripting the ship’s

locations and its radar’s search sectors. 

Aegis program officials explained that the need to baseline Aegis BMD’s 

performance has indeed affected the ship’s position during tests. An 

intercept attempt in February 2005, for example, that tested a specific 

burn sequence for the missile’s booster required the ship be placed close 

to the target track. Yet another test, in November 2005, placed the ship 

relatively far from the target track. The officials emphasized that in both 

tests Aegis BMD performed successfully. 

Page 26 GAO-06-327 Missile Defense
Even if MDA had successfully completed flight tests needed to anchor the 

models and simulations used to predict the performance of the initial 

BMDS capability, the performance of some emplaced GMD interceptors 

would still be uncertain. GMD officials told us that before emplacing 

interceptors at Fort Greely and at Vandenberg Air Force Base for 

operational use, the interceptors undergo various tests. However, quality 

control procedures may not have been rigorous enough to ensure that 

unreliable parts or parts that were inappropriate for space applications 

would be removed from the manufacturing process. Two unsuccessful 

flight tests have been traced to poor quality control procedures. GMD 

officials have recommended that MDA remove the first nine interceptors 

emplaced at Fort Greely and Vandenberg Air Force Base, as the 

interceptors are scheduled for upgrades, so that any parts that tests have

shown may not be adequately reliable or appropriate for use in space can

be replaced.

Quality Control Issues 

Raise Additional 

Performance Questions 

One of the two test failures (IFT-10) occurred in December 2002 when the 

EKV could not separate from its booster. A team of engineers that 

investigated the test failure found that an open circuit occurred in one part 

of the interceptor’s Laser Firing Unit, which disconnects the EKV from the 

booster. The open circuit was caused by a broken pin in an applicationspecific integrated circuit (ASIC) that controlled one aspect of the 

EKV/booster separation. The pin was fatigued during flight vibration. 

According to the test report, the ASIC’s design did not allow for variations 

in the assembly process and the contractor did not lay out an adequate 

process to uniformly produce the part. Additionally, the contractor did not 

adequately test to identify the problem. In earlier tests, the board on which 

the ASIC was mounted was stabilized with a foam material so that the 

board was not as affected by the severe vibrations that occur at launch.

However, to improve producibility and reliability, the foam was removed 

prior to IFT-8. 

The second flight test (IFT-14) failure occurred in fiscal year 2005. The 

interceptor in this test failed to launch because two of the three arms that 

support the interceptor within its silo did not fully retract and lock. MDA’s 

investigation into the test failure found that the arms could not retract 

because the surface of one part was significantly corroded, and crush 

blocks, which absorb the impact of the arms as they retract and lock into 

position, were an earlier design that required more force to crush. MDA’s 

Deputy Director for Technology and Engineering pointed out that the 

corroded part was subjected to a more severe environment than it was 

designed to withstand. However, officials in the Office of Safety, Quality,

and Mission Assurance told us that if simple quality assurance procedures 

Page 27 GAO-06-327 Missile Defense
had been in place, the corroded part would have been detected and the 

earlier design of the crush blocks would not have been installed. 

The GMD program considered four options for dealing with the first nine 

interceptors emplaced for operational use (seven at Fort Greely and two at 

Vandenberg Air Force Base). The options included (1) leaving the 

interceptors in their silos and accepting them as is; (2) using the 

interceptors in reliability tests; (3) over time, returning the interceptors to 

the contractor’s facility for disassembly and remanufacture; or (4) a 

combination of the other options. GMD program officials recently told us

that their recommendation to MDA is to replace questionable parts when 

the interceptors are upgraded in fiscal year 2007. The officials said to 

replace the parts, the interceptors will be removed from their silos. 

The problems encountered during Block 2004, which ultimately prevented 

MDA from achieving all of its goals for the block, were brought about by 

management compromises. Time pressures caused MDA to stray from a 

knowledge-based acquisition strategy, allowing the GMD program to 

condense its acquisition cycle at the expense of cost, quantity, and 

performance goals. DOD has given MDA the flexibility to make such 

changes. 

MDA programs follow a structured acquisition plan called the Integrated 

Management Plan that is meant to guide the development of elements and 

components, as well as their integration into the BMDS. If the plan, which 

includes eight events, is completed in an orderly manner, it will increase 

the likelihood that programs will attain knowledge at appropriate points in

the acquisition cycle. Successful developers have found that attaining 

certain knowledge at specific points decreases the likelihood of cost 

growth, schedule slips, or degraded performance. However, because 

MDA’s plan allows early deployment of a capability well before the eight 

events are completed, programs may gain knowledge too late in the 

process to prevent such problems. MDA officials told us that because the 

agency was directed to field a capability earlier than planned, it accepted 

additional risks. The risks were greatest in the GMD program that 

concurrently matured technology, designed the system, and produced and

fielded operational assets as it attempted to meet its Block 2004 fielding

dates. 

Schedule Pressures 

Caused Management 

to Stray from 

Knowledge-Based 

Practices 

GMD Program Sacrificed 

Knowledge-Based 

Approach to Accelerate 

Schedule 

A primary tenet of a knowledge-based approach to product development is

to demonstrate the maturity of critical technologies before starting 

Page 28 GAO-06-327 Missile Defense
product development and to demonstrate design maturity and production

process maturity before committing to production and fielding. MDA’s 

Integrated Management Plan provided for this orderly progression through 

the acquisition cycle. At Event 1, an assessment of all technology critical 

to the system’s design was to be completed. By the end of Event 2, design

work was to be finished, and at the end of Event 4, the design was to be 

demonstrated in developmental tests. By the close of Event 5, an 

assessment of the element’s operational capability would be complete and 

MDA would decide whether the element was ready to be handed over to a 

military service for production, operation, and sustainment or whether the 

element should be developed further. 

However, the Integrated Management Plan also allows a program to depart 

from a knowledge-based acquisition strategy if a decision is made to field 

all or part of a capability early. At the end of each event from Event 3 on,

MDA may elect to accelerate fielding of all or part of a capability by 

simultaneously completing all phases of the acquisition cycle. That is, a 

program can concurrently mature technology, design its system, and 

produce and field assets for operational use—which is contrary to a 

knowledge-based acquisition strategy. According to MDA officials, GMD 

was at Event 3—the point at which a pilot production line produced its 

first components and the components’ functionality had been tested— 

when the presidential decision was made to deploy an early capability. 

MDA’s Integrated Management Plan is presented in appendix IV. 

Until the President’s directive, the GMD program was focused on 

developing a test bed. If GMD had serially progressed through all eight 

events of the Integrated Management Plan, components would have been 

matured and demonstrated in the test bed. At the end of Block 2004, MDA 

could have (1) transferred GMD to a military service for production, 

operation, and sustainment; (2) developed GMD further in a subsequent 

block; or (3) terminated the program altogether. However, to field early, 

the GMD program condensed its Block 2004 acquisition cycle. The 

program attempted to simultaneously demonstrate technology, design an 

integrated GMD element, and produce and emplace assets for operational 

use—all within 2 years of the President’s directive. 

The GMD program fielded an initial capability in 2004 and 2005, as it was 

directed to do. However, there were consequences of the accelerated 

schedule. The fielding schedule for some GMD components slipped, and 

the program could not complete an end-to-end test needed to verify GMD’s 

performance. Production and fielding of GMD interceptors was slowed by 

technical problems and the program’s need to address quality control 

Page 29 GAO-06-327 Missile Defense
issues. To address these issues, the program restructured its test plan at a 

cost of about $115 million; but it funded the plan at the expense of making 

the Sea-Based X-Band and Fylingdales upgraded early warning radars 

operational. Block 2006 funds will now be used to complete these Block 

2004 activities. 

Other BMDS elements, whose fielding was not planned as part of Block 

2004, are currently following a knowledge-based acquisition strategy. For 

example, the ABL program is concentrating on maturing technologies 

critical to the element’s design by designing a prototype. If the prototype 

successfully demonstrates its lethality in a demonstration planned no 

earlier than 2008, it will become the basis for the design of an operational 

capability. Similar to ABL, the KEI program is also concentrating on 

demonstrating technologies critical to its design. If these demonstrations

are successful, they could be incorporated into KEI’s design. 

GMD Management Became 

Inattentive to Quality 

Control Risks 

GMD officials told us that in the process of accelerating GMD’s schedule 

they became inattentive to weaknesses in the program’s quality control 

procedures. The GMD program had realized for some time that its quality

controls needed to be strengthened. However, the program’s accelerated 

schedule left little time to address the problems. The extent of the 

weaknesses was documented in 2005 when MDA’s Office of Safety, 

Quality, and Mission Assurance conducted audits of the contractor 

developing the interceptor’s EKV and the Orbital Boost Vehicle. 

In its audit of the EKV contractor, the MDA auditors found evidence that 

• The prime contractor did not correctly communicate all essential EKV 

requirements to its subcontractor and the subcontractor did not 

communicate complete and correct requirements to its suppliers. 

• The EKV subcontractor did not exercise good configuration control. 

• The reliability of the EKV’s design cannot be determined, and any 

estimates of its serviceable life are likely unsupportable. 

• The contractor has no written policy involving qualification testing and 

does not require that its EKV subcontractor follow requirements 

established by industry, civilian, and military users of space and launch 

vehicles. 

Page 30 GAO-06-327 Missile Defense
• The contractor’s production processes are immature, and the contractor 

cannot build a consistent and reliable product. 

More details on MDA’s audit of the EKV contractor can be found in 

appendix IV.

Similarly, the auditors found that the contractor producing the Orbital 

Boost Vehicle needed to improve quality control processes and adherence 

to those processes. According to deficiency reports, the contractor did not 

always, among other things, flow down requirements properly; practice 

good configuration management to ensure that the booster met form, fit, 

and function requirements; implement effective environmental stress 

screening; or have an approved parts, material, and processes 

management plan. 

Ironically, the pitfalls that result from an accelerated fielding had already 

been learned in the THAAD program. In 2000, we reported that pressure 

on the THAAD program to meet an early fielding date nearly resulted in

the program’s cancelation in 1998.14 When flight testing began, in 1995, the 

THAAD missile experienced numerous problems. Eight of the first nine 

flight tests revealed problems with software errors, booster separation, 

seeker electronics, flight controls, electrical short circuits, foreign object

damage, and loss of telemetry. According to several expert reviews from 

both inside and outside the Army, the causes of early THAAD flight test 

failures included inadequate ground testing, poor test planning, and 

shortcomings in preflight reviews. One study noted that failures were 

found in subsystems usually considered low-risk. Subsequently, the 

THAAD program manager adopted a knowledge-based strategy, which led 

to successes in later tests. 

Compared with other DOD programs, MDA has greater latitude to make 

changes to the BMDS program without seeking the approval of high-level

acquisition executives outside the program. In early 2002, DOD allowed 

MDA to effectively defer the application of DOD acquisition regulations to

the BMDS program until a decision is made to transfer a BMDS capability 

to a military service for production, operation, and sustainment. This 

MDA Has Flexibility in 

Making and Reporting 

Program Changes 

 14GAO, Best Practices: : A More Constructive Test Approach Is Key to Better Weapon 

System Outcomes, GAO/NSIAD-00-199 (Washington, D.C.: July 31, 2000). 

Page 31 GAO-06-327 Missile Defense
allows MDA to make program changes without asking for prior approval.15

For example, MDA has the flexibility to make trade-offs between BMDS 

elements. That is, the MDA Director can decide to accelerate one element

while slowing another down. That is not to say that DOD and Congress are 

not kept informed of MDA’s progress or changes, but that the MDA 

Director, by statute, has the discretion to determine which variations are 

significant enough to be reported. Accountability has thus become broadly 

applied as to mean delivering some capability within funding allocations. 

Under DOD’s acquisition regulations, each BMDS element would likely 

have met the definition of a major acquisition program. Major acquisition

programs are required by statute (10 U.S.C. § 2435) to develop a program 

baseline when the program begins system development and 

demonstration. The baseline, which includes cost and schedule estimates 

and formal performance requirements developed by the warfighter, is 

considered the initial business case for the acquisition effort. Once a 

baseline is approved, major acquisition programs are required to operate 

within the baseline or to obtain approval from a high-level acquisition 

executive outside the program to make cost, schedule, or performance 

changes.16 Changes in any of these baseline parameters would reflect a 

change in the program’s business case. Approved programs also report 

program status measured against the baseline and any baseline changes to

Congress in an annual Selected Acquisition Report (SAR). Congress has 

also established criteria to identify significant variations in a weapon 

system’s cost or schedule and requires that those changes be reported 

more often, in a quarterly SAR.17

 15MDA is subject to overall direction and guidance, however, from the Under Secretary of 

Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, and the Senior Executive Council, 

chaired by the Deputy Secretary of Defense. 

16For major defense acquisition programs, this executive, known as the Milestone Decision 

Authority, is typically the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and 

Logistics; the component head; or the component’s acquisition executive. 

1710 U.S.C. § 2432(b)(2); 10 U.S.C. § 2433(e)(1).

Page 32 GAO-06-327 Missile Defense
MDA is not yet required to have an approved program baseline as defined 

by 10 U.S.C. § 2435 for either the BMDS or its elements.18 Instead MDA 

develops more flexible cost and quantity goals and capability-based 

performance objectives. MDA has a separate statutory requirement to 

establish and report cost, schedule, and performance baselines for block 

configurations of the BMDS being fielded.19 But these baselines are more 

flexible than the rigid baselines required of other acquisition programs 

that DOD and Congress use in performing program oversight. While MDA 

reports its cost, quantity, and performance information to Congress in an 

annual Selected Acquisition Report, it is free to revise its goals and 

objectives, as it did during Block 2004, if they are not achievable with the 

time or funds available.20 MDA is also required by statute to report 

significant variations from the baselines in its annual SAR.21 However, 

there are no criteria to identify which variations are significant enough to 

report. Instead, MDA’s Director, by statute, has the discretion to determine 

which variations will be reported. For example, the Director decides 

whether to report that activities that Congress funded in one block are 

being deferred to a later block and will be paid for with the latter block’s 

funding. 

MDA has begun to address the quality control weaknesses in the BMDS 

program. Some actions are as simple as revising reporting lines so that 

MDA’s Chief of Safety, Quality, and Mission Assurance reports directly to 

MDA’s Director and Deputy Director and establishing toll-free telephone 

numbers for the report of safety and quality issues. MDA is also 

MDA Is Taking 

Several Corrective 

Actions 

 18The BMDS as a whole meets the definition of a major acquisition program and is treated 

as such. However, MDA does not divide research, development, test, and evaluation of the

BMDS or its elements into the acquisition phases defined by DOD acquisition regulations, 

and thus neither the BMDS nor its elements will enter system development and 

demonstration. Accordingly, the baseline required by 10 U.S.C. § 2435 will not be required 

of the BMDS or its elements until they enter the formal DOD acquisition cycle (i.e., while 

being transferred to the warfighter for production and deployment). 

19Section 234(e) of the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 

Year 2005 (Pub. L. No. 108-375) established the requirement for MDA’s cost, schedule, and 

performance baselines and the reporting of those baselines in the Selected Acquisition 

Report. 

20However, MDA must report any modifications to its cost, schedule, and performance

baselines to the congressional defense committees, with the rationale for the modification. 

Pub. L. No. 108-375 § 234(g). 

21Pub. L. No. 108-375 § 234(f). 

Page 33 GAO-06-327 Missile Defense
renegotiating some aspects of its prime contracts to revise the award fee 

determination process in an effort to place more emphasis on quality 

control and the implementation of industry best practices, and adding 

mission assurance provisions to contracts that promote process 

improvements, improve productivity, and enhance safety, quality, and 

mission assurance. Furthermore, MDA is placing more emphasis on the 

definition and correction of quality control weaknesses by conducting 

audits of major contractors and subcontractors. It has also renewed the 

emphasis on the role of the Defense Contract Management Agency in 

performing quality assurance functions in support of MDA programs. 

Finally, MDA has adopted a more conservative test approach for the GMD 

program that includes increased ground tests and an incremental 

approach to flight testing. However, the actions have not gone so far as to 

ensure that all BMDS programs implement knowledge-based practices or 

to ensure that the activities planned to develop, demonstrate, and produce 

the capabilities intended for future blocks are achievable within the block

time frames without resorting to a concurrent schedule. 

MDA plans to revise prime contracts to reflect the importance of good 

quality assurance procedures and the contractor’s implementation of 

industry best practices. GMD officials told us that in fiscal year 2005 award 

fee on the GMD contract was partially based on a good quality control 

program. The officials said that of the $407 million award fee available for

the period running from October 1, 2004, through September 30, 2005, 

$9 million was based on the contractor’s implementation of good quality 

assurance and supplier management procedures. In November 2005, MDA 

awarded the contractor $2.1 million of the $9 million set aside for the 

implementation of quality assurance procedures. MDA officials also told 

us that in fiscal year 2006, the overarching criteria for the entire award fee 

pool of $302 million will be the contractor’s implementation and 

adherence to industry standards and best practices. 

MDA also expects to modify prime contracts to incorporate a document 

referred to as MDA Assurance Provisions (MAP). All prime contracts are 

to include MAP standards, but not all contracts have been modified 

because MDA and some contractors have not reached agreement on the 

cost of implementing the MAP. For example, the GMD prime contractor

estimates that implementation costs will be somewhere around 

$280 million. However, officials in MDA’s Office of Safety, Quality, and 

Mission Assurance told us that at least one contractor has agreed to 

implement the MAP at no additional cost. 

Contracts to Reflect the 

Importance of Good 

Quality Assurance Strategy 

Page 34 GAO-06-327 Missile Defense
The MAP provides a measurable, standardized set of safety, quality, and 

mission assurance requirements to be applied to developers for missionand safety-critical items in support of evolutionary acquisition and 

deployment of MDA systems.22 For example, the document includes 

standards regarding the collection and reporting of foreign object damage

and debris incidents, a requirement for working-level peer reviews 

throughout design and development to identify and resolve technical 

issues and concerns prior to formal system-level reviews, and a 

requirement for ensuring that commercial off-the-shelf items meet all 

functional and interface requirements and are qualified to operate in their 

intended environment. 

In addition to requiring contractors to abide by MAP standards, MDA also 

requires each BMDS element program office to compare its mission 

assurance plan with the MAP. As a result of the comparison, the program 

is expected to identify critical mission assurance needs that are not being 

met. The results are catalogued in a Mission Assurance Implementation 

Plan (MAIP), which element program directors are accountable for 

implementing. Each element is to continuously assess MAIP execution so 

that feedback can be used to improve both the MAP and the MAIP. 

So that the quality assurance weaknesses in the BMDS program are 

accurately defined, the MDA Director also gave the Office of Safety, 

Quality, and Mission Assurance unfettered access to all MDA contractor 

operations, activities, and documentation. Under this authority, MDA 

quality personnel have been placed in each prime contractor facility to

monitor the contractor’s quality procedures, and the office is auditing 

major contracts to identify quality assurance deficiencies and areas where 

procedures can be improved. As of November 2005, the office had 

completed audits of the Aegis BMD SM-3, GMD EKV, and Orbital Sciences 

Corporation booster, and THAAD contracts. 

MDA is also placing a renewed emphasis on the Defense Contract 

Management Agency’s (DCMA) quality assurance role. In a May 2005

delegation letter, MDA directed DCMA to 

MDA Renews Emphasis on 

Contractor Surveillance 

 22Mission- and safety-critical items are those items whose failure would directly affect 

system or personnel safety, mission success, or operational readiness. 

Page 35 GAO-06-327 Missile Defense
• perform quality assurance surveillance activities in accordance with 

DCMA policies and directives; 

• ensure that mandatory government inspections authorized by MDA are 

incorporated into the contractor’s manufacturing process plans and/or 

critical suppliers’ plans; 

• report mandatory government inspection test results, missed inspections, 

and requests for permission to waive inspections to MDA’s Office of 

Safety, Quality, and Mission Assurance for that office’s approval; and 

• support technical surveillance activities by carrying out such duties as 

participating in mission critical item and component Material Review 

Boards and providing insight and recommendations on engineering change 

proposals, requests for waivers, employee training, and the contractor’s 

critical manufacturing processes. 

In 2005, the MDA Director established a new position—Director, Mission 

Readiness—whose primary focus during fiscal year 2005 was to examine 

the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense test program. To assist in this 

examination, a small, highly experienced Mission Readiness Task Force 

was established. The goals of the task force were to establish confidence

in GMD’s ability to reliably hit its target, establish credibility in setting and 

meeting test event dates, build increasing levels of operationally realistic 

test procedures and scenarios, raise confidence in successful outcomes of 

flight missions, and conduct the next flight test as soon as practical within 

acceptable risk bounds. 

To meet these goals, the task force recommended a knowledge-based 

flight readiness process and flight test program. Before a test is held, the 

GMD program presents evidence that all components are ready for test. 

Program officials explained that senior executives from all key 

stakeholder organizations review the evidence and make a 

recommendation to the MDA Director as to whether the test event should 

proceed. GMD’s test plan has also been restructured to place more 

emphasis on successful ground tests prior to each flight test. According to

MDA program officials, part of the evidence for proceeding from one flight 

test to another is success in the preceding ground and flight tests. 

The first flight tests have simple objectives. For example, flight test 1, 

conducted in December 2005, demonstrated the successful launch of the 

GMD interceptor and the separation of the EKV from its booster. By flight

MDA Restructures GMD’s 

Test Plan

Page 36 GAO-06-327 Missile Defense
test 4, MDA expects to be ready to demonstrate that the GMD system is 

capable of hitting an operationally representative target. Tests that follow 

will become progressively more difficult. 

Although MDA is taking many actions to address quality assurance 

problems, it has not taken any steps to ensure that all elements follow a 

knowledge-based acquisition strategy or to ensure that the time is 

available to follow such a strategy. For example, a number of activities 

planned for the GMD element during Block 2004 have been deferred to 

Block 2006. Also, developmental efforts for other elements did not 

progress as planned, leaving more work to be completed during Block 

2006 and, perhaps, later blocks. 

Missile defense is one of the largest weapon system investments DOD is 

making. To date, around $90 billion has been spent, and over the next 

6 years, DOD expects that it will need about $58 billion more to enhance 

the BMDS. Beyond that, more funding will be required if DOD is to reach

its ultimate goal of developing a system capable of countering ballistic 

missile launches from any range during all phases of flight. By driving to a 

fielding date during Block 2004, MDA placed assets in the field faster than

originally planned. However, in doing so, MDA strayed from the 

knowledge-based approach that allows successful developers to deliver, 

within budget, a product whose performance has been demonstrated. 

Instead, MDA fielded assets before their capability was known. In 

addition, the full cost of this capability is not transparent to decision 

makers because MDA has deferred the cost of some Block 2004 activities 

into the next block. 

The fielding of the Block 2004 capability provides an opportunity for DOD 

to take stock of the approach it has taken thus far on missile defense and

determine whether changes are warranted for its approach to future 

blocks. We believe they are. The concurrent development approach 

dictated by the directed fielding date and enabled by considerable 

flexibility to lower goals and defer capability has resulted in delivering 

fewer assets than planned. Accountability has been very broadly applied 

as to mean delivering some capability within funding allocations. While 

recognizing this approach did successfully accelerate fielding, to the 

extent it continues to feature concurrency as a means for acceleration, it 

may not be affordable for the considerable amount of capability that is yet 

to be developed and fielded. While the effects of this approach were 

perhaps most keenly felt with the Block 2004 capability, signs of its 

Corrective Actions May 

Not Alleviate Pressures 

Associated with ScheduleDriven Block Approach 

Conclusions 

Page 37 GAO-06-327 Missile Defense
continuance can be seen in the developmental activities that were 

deferred during fiscal year 2005. 

It is possible for MDA to return to a knowledge-based approach to 

development while still fielding capability in blocks. To its credit, MDA 

instituted its own audits and is heeding the results of those audits in taking

a number of steps to correct the quality assurance and testing problems 

encountered thus far. Yet these corrective actions have not gone far 

enough to put all of the BMDS elements on a knowledge-based approach

to development and fielding. MDA’s experience during Block 2004 shows 

that it may not always be possible to deliver a capability in a 2-year time 

frame. Clearly, a block or stepped approach to fielding a new system is 

preferable to attempting a single step to full capability. However, a 

primary tenet of a knowledge-based acquisition strategy is that a program 

should be event- rather than schedule-driven. This philosophy is consistent 

with the evolutionary acquisition approach preferred by DOD in its 

acquisition regulations. It also provides a better basis for holding MDA 

accountable for what it can deliver within estimated resources. 

To better ensure the success of future MDA development efforts, we 

recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Director, MDA, to 

take the following three actions. 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 

• Direct all BMDS elements to implement a knowledge-based acquisition 

strategy that provides for demonstrating knowledge points for major 

events or steps leading up to those events. These knowledge points should 

be consistent with those called for in DOD’s acquisition regulations. For 

example, markers could be established that would demonstrate that 

programs have the knowledge to meet design review standards and are 

ready to hold those reviews. 

• Assess whether the current 2-year block strategy is compatible with the 

knowledge-based development strategy recommended above. If not, the 

Secretary should develop event-driven time frames for future blocks. 

Events could represent demonstrated increases in capability, such as the 

addition of software upgrades, stand-alone components, or elements. 

• Adopt more transparent criteria for identifying and reporting on significant 

changes in each element’s quantities, cost, or performance, such as those 

that are found in DOD’s acquisition regulations. Coupled with a more 

knowledge-based acquisition strategy, such criteria would enable MDA to 

Page 38 GAO-06-327 Missile Defense
be more accountable for delivering promised capability within estimated 

resources. 

DOD’s comments on our draft report are reprinted in appendix I. DOD 

partially concurred with our first recommendation. DOD stated that MDA 

has implemented a knowledge-based acquisition strategy that relies upon 

discrete activities to produce data that can be used to judge an element’s

progress. DOD noted that unlike the knowledge points discussed in DOD 

acquisition regulations, the knowledge points used by MDA are discrete 

points, not reviews. According to DOD, MDA’s strategy is consistent with 

the principles of DOD acquisition regulations while providing MDA’s 

Director with the flexibility to determine their applicability to the BMDS 

block development concept. We agree that knowledge is obtained through 

discrete events, such as a successful test or the completion of a 

cost/benefit analysis, but we define knowledge points as meaning more 

than discrete events. Rather, knowledge must be looked at in the 

aggregate. For example, the knowledge gained from a number of discrete 

events must be considered collectively to confirm that the design of a 

system is stable. It is these aggregations that we consider to be the 

knowledge points that should form the basis for investment decisions. For 

example, the GMD program’s successful demonstration of various 

functions of the BMDS engagement may have been sufficient to continue 

funding of the element’s development, but the discrete events were not 

sufficient to demonstrate that the element’s design and production 

processes were sufficiently mature to begin production and fielding. We 

also note that the knowledge points discussed in DOD acquisition 

regulations do represent measurable, demonstrated knowledge, such as 

technology and design maturity, that then become the basis for reviews. 

They are not the reviews themselves, as reviews can take place regardless 

of the level of knowledge available. 

DOD also partially concurred with our recommendation that MDA assess 

whether the 2-year block strategy is compatible with a knowledge-based 

acquisition strategy. DOD stated that MDA uses knowledge points to 

establish block goals and makes adjustments to those goals when 

necessary. DOD noted that the 2-year block strategy is compatible with 

this approach. We have not seen the decisions made on Block 2004 as 

being consistent with knowledge points. During Block 2004, MDA allowed 

the GMD program to complete all phases of the acquisition cycle—

technology development, product design, production, and fielding—

simultaneously to enable the program to field a capability within the 2-year 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 

Page 39 GAO-06-327 Missile Defense
time frame. If MDA is to be truly knowledge-based, it must be dedicated to

taking the time to gather the knowledge needed to be successful in the 

next acquisition phase. Because MDA did not follow this strategy in Block 

2004, we still believe that MDA should assess future blocks to determine 

whether those blocks can be developed within the 2-year time frame 

without resorting to a concurrent schedule. 

DOD did not concur with our third recommendation to adopt more 

transparent criteria for identifying and reporting program changes. In 

responding to this recommendation, DOD responded that MDA in 2005, by 

statute, began submitting fielding baselines to Congress and must report 

significant cost, schedule, or performance variances to these baselines in

future reports. DOD believes that these reports and the quarterly reviews 

conducted by DOD staff provide an adequate level of oversight. We agree 

that MDA is required to report significant variances to established 

baselines to Congress and that MDA keeps DOD informed about the 

Ballistic Missile Defense program. However, given the management 

flexibilities accorded MDA and the large amount of resources (more than

$50 billion) that DOD currently plans for missile defense, more transparent 

criteria is needed for better program management and oversight. 

DOD provided technical comments to our draft report, which we 

considered and incorporated as appropriate. In its technical comments, for 

example, DOD expressed concern that our draft report measured Block 

2004 against goals established in February 2003 rather than the fielded

baseline goals established in 2005. We chose the 2003 goals as a baseline 

because the goals were MDA’s official notification to Congress of the 

agency’s expectations for the block. In addition, goals are meant to be a 

result that an organization strives to achieve. If goals are changed over 

time to more closely reflect actual performance, they lose their validity. 

We have included in the report a discussion of the changes that MDA made

in its Block 2004 goals from 2003 through 2005 and the reasons for those 

changes. 

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense and to the 

Director, MDA. We will make copies available to others upon request. In 

addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at 

http://www.gao.gov. 

Page 40 GAO-06-327 Missile Defense
If you, or your staff, have any questions concerning this report, please 

contact me at (202) 512-4841. Contact points for our offices of 

Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page 

of this report. The major contributors to this report are listed in appendix 

VII. 

Paul Francis

Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management 

Page 41 GAO-06-327 Missile Defense
List of Congressional Committees

The Honorable John Warner 

Chairman 

The Honorable Carl Levin 

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on Armed Services 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Ted Stevens 

Chairman 

The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye 

Ranking Minority Member 

Subcommittee on Defense 

Committee on Appropriations 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter 

Chairman 

The Honorable Ike Skelton 

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on Armed Services 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable C.W. Bill Young 

Chairman 

The Honorable John P. Murtha 

Ranking Minority Member 

Subcommittee on Defense 

Committee on Appropriations 

House of Representatives 

Page 42 GAO-06-327 Missile Defense
Appendix I: Comments from the Department Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Defense 

of Defense 

Page 43 GAO-06-327 Missile Defense
Appendix I: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 44 GAO-06-327 Missile Defense
Appendix I: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 45 GAO-06-327 Missile Defense
Appendix II: Block 2004 Element Assessments

Page 46 GAO-06-327

Appendix II: Block 2004 Element 

Assessments 

The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) developed and fielded in Block 2004 

three Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) elements for operational 

use in the event of an emergency. These elements are the Aegis Ballistic 

Missile Defense (Aegis BMD); Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD); 

and the Command, Control, Battle Management, and Communications 

(C2BMC) elements. MDA also attempted to accelerate the fielding of the 

Forward-Based X-Band Transportable (FBX-T) radar being developed by 

the Sensors Program Office into Block 2004. Although the agency was able

to complete the radar’s development, DOD did not complete negotiations 

with Japan, the host nation, in time to make the FBX-T operational during 

the block. 

During Block 2004, MDA also carried out development efforts for other 

elements that are expected to be incorporated into the BMDS during later

blocks to enhance the system’s capability. These elements include the 

Airborne Laser (ABL), Kinetic Energy Interceptor (KEI), Terminal High 

Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), and Space Tracking and Surveillance 

System (STSS). Development of the THAAD element, which is being 

designed to attack short- and medium-range ballistic missiles during the 

terminal stage of their flight, is further along than the other developmental 

elements, and MDA expects to make one THAAD fire unit available for 

operational use in fiscal year 2009. The other three developmental 

elements are at an early stage. The ABL element, which is to attack 

missiles during the boost phase of their flight, is developing a prototype to

demonstrate technologies critical to the system’s design. MDA expects to 

demonstrate the technologies no earlier than 2008, when the program will 

test the element’s lethality against a short-range ballistic missile. Similarly, 

the KEI program’s work during Block 2004 is focused on technology 

demonstration. MDA will assess KEI’s progress in 2008 and decide the 

future of its effort to develop a mobile, multi-use system capable of 

intercepting ballistic missiles during the boost and midcourse phases of 

flight. During Block 2004, the STSS program readied demonstration 

satellite and sensor hardware for launch. MDA expects the STSS to 

provide surveillance and tracking of enemy ballistic missiles for other 

BMDS elements. If the two STSS satellites being launched in 2007 

successfully demonstrate this function, a constellation of STSS satellites 

could be launched beginning in 2013.

The Aegis BMD element is a sea-based missile defense system designed to 

defeat short- and medium-range ballistic missiles in the midcourse phase 

of flight. Its mission is to protect deployed U.S. forces, allies, and friends 

from such attacks, and to employ its shipboard radar as a forwardAegis BMD 

Missile Defense
Appendix II: Block 2004 Element Assessments

deployed Ballistic Missile Defense System sensor to support 

intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) engagements.1

The Aegis BMD element builds upon the existing capabilities of Aegisequipped Navy cruisers and destroyers. Planned hardware and software 

upgrades to these ships will enable them to carry out the missile defense 

mission in addition to their current role of protecting U.S. Navy ships from 

air, surface, and subsurface threats. The program is also developing the

Standard Missile-3 (SM-3)—the system’s “bullet”—which is designed to 

destroy enemy warheads through hit-to-kill collisions above the 

atmosphere. The SM-3 is composed of a kinetic warhead (kill vehicle) 

mounted atop a three-stage booster. 

The program fielded Block 2004 assets mostly on schedule. Nine (Block I) 

SM-3 missiles were ready for operational use by December 2005, as 

planned. In addition, two Aegis BMD cruisers received system upgrades 

making them capable of launching missiles to engage ballistic missile 

targets. Ten Aegis BMD destroyers were equipped with long-range 

surveillance and tracking software during Block 2004. 

Aegis BMD conducted the most realistic tests of all the BMDS elements, 

but further tests are needed to fully characterize the element’s missile 

defense performance. The program has successfully tested Aegis BMD’s 

engagement capability in six intercept attempts since 1999 using variants 

of the SM-3 missile. One of these successful intercepts, Flight Test Mission 

(FTM) 04-1, was conducted in fiscal year 2005. Operational test officials 

reported that the test incorporated many operational characteristics. For 

example, the warfighter had no preknowledge of the target launch time, 

the target was representative of a real-world threat, and the fielded missile 

configuration was used. However, the officials said that in early tests, 

including FTM 04-1, ship position with respect to the target’s trajectory 

was controlled to increase the probability of intercept. The officials are 

recommending that in future tests Aegis BMD’s tactical mission planner 

should dictate the ship’s position and the sectors that its radar searches, 

rather than the program scripting the ship’s locations and its radar’s 

search sectors. 

Program Accomplishes 

Fielding Plan 

Test Results Are Good, but 

Further Tests Are Needed 

 1

The terms “intercontinental ballistic missile” and “long-range ballistic missile” are used 

interchangeably. They are, by definition, ballistic missiles with ranges greater than 5,500 

kilometers (3,400 miles). 

Page 47 GAO-06-327 Missile Defense
Appendix II: Block 2004 Element Assessments

Additional tests are also needed to demonstrate that the program has 

resolved problems that limit the SM-3 missile’s ability to divert to its 

target. Although the current configuration is adequate for the current 

threat, the missile will require more divert capability if it is to hit more 

complex targets and targets with more challenging trajectories than were 

seen in early tests. For example, the missile’s Solid Divert and Attitude 

Control System (SDACS) needs to operate in a pulse mode, rather than its 

current sustain mode, to increase the missile’s ability to maneuver toward 

its target. Performance problems with the SDACS’s pulse mode of 

operation were first noticed in a June 2003 flight test, Flight Mission (FM)-

5, and have remained a concern to the program. Program officials 

modified the SDACS’s design in fiscal year 2005, and they believe that the 

root cause of the problem is understood. However, ground and flight tests, 

planned for fiscal year 2006, are needed to verify that the SDACS will 

perform as designed. If the tests are successful, the pulsed SDACS could 

be incorporated into the missile in fiscal year 2007. Although the earliest 

fielded missiles will not be capable of pulse mode operation, which will 

reduce their divert capability, program officials believe that these missiles 

will provide a credible defense against a large population of the threat. A 

test (FTM 04-2) successfully conducted in November 2005 against a 

“separating” target—a target whose warhead separates from its booster 

rocket—also showed that the SM-3 has some capability against a more 

advanced target than the nonseparating targets used in prior tests. 

The program has also flight-tested Aegis BMD’s long-range surveillance 

and tracking capability, but further verification of fielded system upgrades 

is needed. In fiscal year 2005, the program successfully used the system 

upgrade (Ballistic Missile Defense 3.0E) to track live ICBM targets of 

opportunity in two separate events. However, because GMD did not 

participate in these tests, track data developed from the live target were 

not used to formulate a task plan for a GMD interceptor, as it would need 

to do in an actual defensive mission. Although track data have been passed 

to the fire control unit in a separate event, this has not been demonstrated 

in real time. MDA expected to test Aegis BMD’s long-range surveillance 

and tracking capability in several fiscal year 2005 flight tests, but it was 

unable to do so, mostly because of delays in the GMD test program. Aegis 

BMD was unable to participate in Integrated Flight Test (IFT)-13C because 

of weather conditions and in IFT-14 because of fleet scheduling conflicts. 

Other GMD tests were put on hold and later folded into a new test 

schedule to begin in fiscal year 2006. MDA has not yet rescheduled a GMD 

flight test that uses Aegis BMD in its long-range surveillance and tracking 

role. 

Page 48 GAO-06-327 Missile Defense
Appendix II: Block 2004 Element Assessments

The GMD element is a missile defense system being developed to protect 

the United States against ICBM attacks launched from Northeast Asia and 

the Middle East. The GMD element relies on a broad array of components, 

including (1) space- and ground-based sensors to provide early warning of

missile launches, (2) ground- and sea-based radars to track and identify 

threatening objects, (3) ground-based interceptors to destroy enemy 

missiles through hit-to-kill impacts above the atmosphere, and (4) fire 

control and communications nodes for battle management and execution

of the GMD mission. Figure 1 illustrates the various GMD components, 

which are situated at several locations within and outside the United 

States. 

Figure 1: Components of the GMD Element 

GMD’s progress toward meeting Block 2004 goals was less than expected.

Silos and other construction at GMD facilities were completed on 

schedule, but the program was unable to meet its fielding goals for groundbased interceptors. Most of the GMD radars are fielded and could be used 

for defensive operations if needed. However, some radar upgrades were 

delayed, and none of the radars have been tested in integrated flight tests. 

In addition, an operational flight test and other key tests needed to 

characterize GMD’s performance were delayed into fiscal year 2006. 

Ground-Based Midcourse 

Defense 

Ground-based interceptor

Mission: The interceptor consists of an exoatmospheric kill vehicle mounted atop a three-stage 

booster. The kill vehicle is the weapon component of the interceptor that attempts to detect and 

destroy the threat through a hit-to-kill impact.

Location: Missile fields in Fort Greely, Alaska, and Vandenberg Air Force Base,California

Mission: The fire control (battle management) component is the integrating and controlling entity 

of the GMD element. Its software plans engagements and tasks GMD components to execute a

mission. The in-flight interceptor communications system enables the fire control component to 

communicate with the kill vehicle while in flight.

Location: Fire control nodes in Fort Greely, Alaska, and Shriever Air Force Base, Colorado

Mission: X-band radar emplaced on a sea-based, mobile platform in the Pacific. It is planned to be 

available in the summer of 2006 for use in flight testing or as an operational assest for midcourse tracking and 

discrimination.

Location: Adak, Alaska (home port)

Mission: Principal fire control radar for 

tracking missiles launched out of 

Northeast Asia.

Location: Eareckson Air Station, Alaska

Mission: Upgraded early-warning radars for 

midcourse tracking in support of the GMD 

mission.

Locations: Beale Air Force Base, California; 

Fylingdales, England

Sources: MDA (data); GAO (presentation).

Exoatmospheric

kill vehicle

Fire control and

communications

Upgraded earlywarning radars

Cobra Dane 

radar

Sea-based 

X-band radar

Progress during Block Falls 

Short of Expectations 

Page 49 GAO-06-327 Missile Defense
Appendix II: Block 2004 Element Assessments

The infrastructure for the missile defense complex is complete, but MDA 

was unable to deliver almost half of the interceptors initially planned for 

the Block 2004 inventory. MDA completed, on schedule, construction of all 

facilities needed to place the GMD system on alert, including the 

construction of the first missile field at the missile defense complex at 

Fort Greely, Alaska. However, the GMD program emplaced only 10 of the 

20 interceptors originally planned for Block 2004. In fiscal year 2004, the 

program designated 2 of the 20 interceptors as test assets after an 

explosion at a plant producing motors for the interceptor’s booster caused

the interceptor’s delivery schedule to slip. In fiscal year 2005, the program 

diverted 4 more interceptors to the test program in response to a MDA 

task force recommendation for a revised test plan. According to GMD 

officials, delivery of five of the six test assets and the remaining four 

missiles for operational use were delayed beyond December 2005. 

MDA has two radars ready for operation, Cobra Dane and the Beale 

upgraded early warning radar. However, tests have identified a Cobra 

Dane shortcoming, and neither radar’s capability has been verified in 

system-level flight tests. The Cobra Dane radar has been ready for limited 

defensive operations since September 2004. It has participated in ground

tests and successfully tracked several targets of opportunity. Because the 

radar’s location prevents it from participating in integrated flight tests, an 

air-launched target was used in a September 2005 flight test (FT 04-5). The 

test was designed to assess the radar’s ability to transmit track data, in real 

time, to the missile defense fire control system. Cobra Dane performed as 

expected in these test events, but officials in the office of the Director, 

Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) are concerned that the radar’s 

software, as currently written, could cause the GMD element to waste 

inventory. The Beale radar is also ready to conduct the missile defense 

mission, but software deficiencies and lack of testing are still a concern. 

While Beale radar hardware and communications upgrades are complete, 

software deficiencies caused software upgrades planned for Block 2004 to

fall slightly behind schedule. The program planned to resolve the 

deficiencies, which could cause some degradation in the radar’s 

performance, in early 2006. However, officials consider Beale ready to 

perform its basic missile defense mission should the BMDS be placed on 

alert prior to the resolution of the deficiencies because the radar has 

successfully tracked several targets of opportunity. A test to certify all 

radar upgrades is currently scheduled for fiscal year 2006. In early fiscal

year 2007, MDA also plans to test Beale’s operational capability as the fire 

control radar in an intercept attempt. In this test, for the first time, Beale 

will track a live target and provide track data to the GMD fire control 

component that will use the data to develop a weapon system task plan. 

Program Did Not Meet 

Scheduled Deliveries 

Page 50 GAO-06-327 Missile Defense
Appendix II: Block 2004 Element Assessments

Full functionality of two additional early warning radars was delayed into 

later blocks. Fylingdales upgraded early warning radar was delayed

slightly to cover some of the cost of additional flight tests added to the 

GMD program. Its missile defense capability will be available in early 

Block 2006, after a distributed ground test scheduled for the second 

quarter of fiscal year 2006. Full radar functionality, which will allow the 

radar to perform both its missile defense mission and its legacy Air Force 

mission, is expected in October 2006. Likewise, deployment of the Thule 

upgraded early warning radar, which MDA had planned to upgrade 

incrementally, was postponed to Block 2008 so that the radar could be 

fully upgraded before taking on its missile defense mission. 

The Sea-Based X-Band radar (SBX) is also slightly behind schedule. 

Additional funding needs for new flight tests prevented the GMD program 

from integrating the Sea-Based X-Band radar into the BMDS by December 

31, 2005, as planned. The radar is able to track targets but will not be able

to pass track data to the fire control center until it is integrated with the 

GMD system during the distributed ground test scheduled for April 2006. 

The radar is expected to be transported to its home port at Adak, Alaska, 

by the third quarter of calendar year 2006 where it will be available in the 

event of an emergency. However, MDA does not plan to verify the 

performance of the radar in a system-level flight test until late in 2007. 

The GMD program was unable to demonstrate the Block 2004 GMD 

system in flight tests. The program attempted two integrated flight tests in 

fiscal year 2005, IFT-13C in December 2004 and IFT-14 in February 2005. In

both tests, interceptors failed to launch from their silos. In IFT-13C, a 

timing problem with the interceptor’s flight computer caused the 

interceptor to abort its launch. In IFT-14, the first intercept attempt since 

2002, the interceptor was unable to lift off because the arms inside the silo

failed to fully retract and lock out of the way. Program officials traced the 

root cause of this failure to poor quality control procedures. 

In response to these test failures, MDA delayed upcoming plans for future 

tests and chartered the Mission Readiness Task Force to review the 

program and propose changes. The task force found that MDA’s problems 

were primarily linked to inadequate quality assurance processes. An 

independent review team attributed these problems to the urgency of the 

fielding schedule, which drove decision making and program planning. 

The task force provided guidance for improving the test program by 

significantly restructuring the focus of upcoming test events. MDA 

adopted the recommended test strategy at an additional cost of 

$115 million. 

GMD Unable to Carry Out 

Flight Test Plan 

Page 51 GAO-06-327 Missile Defense
Appendix II: Block 2004 Element Assessments

Although early tests in the restructured plan have simple objectives, the 

tests get progressively more difficult, and DOT&E is concerned that MDA 

cannot meet its schedule to conduct the first four tests between November 

2005 and November 2006. The first flight test (FT-1) was successfully 

conducted in December 2005, 1 month later than planned. The objective of

the test was not to intercept a live target, but to verify that an interceptor, 

representative of the configuration being fielded, could be successfully 

launched and to evaluate its booster’s delivery performance. The next 

intercept attempt, FT-4, is not scheduled until late calendar year 2006. 

One consequence of restructuring the GMD test program was MDA’s 

inability to fulfill the statutory mandate that required DOD to conduct an 

operationally realistic test of the BMDS by October 1, 2005. MDA had 

planned to conduct this test in the third quarter of fiscal year 2005. 

However, after the two flight test failures, the task force recommended 

that MDA spend additional time addressing mission readiness before 

attempting an operational test of the BMD system. FT-4, scheduled for 

November 2006, is the first test that has the potential to fulfill the 

mandated objectives. FT-4 is planned as an intercept attempt using the 

Beale radar as the fire control radar. This will be the GMD program’s first

intercept attempt to use a nonsurrogate fire control radar. 

While the GMD program has proved the concept of destroying ICBMs 

during the midcourse of their flight, the program has not proved GMD’s 

design will deliver the performance desired. The GMD program, the 

centerpiece of the BMDS Block 2004 defensive capability, has 

demonstrated its ability to intercept target warheads in flight tests since 

1999. The program has conducted five successful intercept attempts, the 

last one in 2002. While the program maintains that each piece of the 

engagement sequence has been demonstrated by flight and ground tests, 

the program has been unable to verify that the integrated system, using 

production-representative components, will work in an end-to-end 

operation. Until further testing is done, MDA will not know for sure that 

the integrated system using operational interceptors and fire control 

radars will perform as expected, or that technical problems with the kill 

vehicle and its booster have been fixed. 

Quality control weaknesses also raise concerns about the performance of 

GMD interceptors. Quality control procedures may not have been rigorous 

enough to ensure that unreliable parts, or parts that were inappropriate for 

space applications, would be removed from the manufacturing process. 

For example, a leak in an attitude control system regulator was traced to 

unauthorized rework. Although production has slowed as the program 

Program Proves GMD Concept, 

but Not Its Design 

Page 52 GAO-06-327 Missile Defense
Appendix II: Block 2004 Element Assessments

introduces initiatives to strengthen quality controls, interceptors are still 

being emplaced in silos before all initiatives are in place. Additionally, the

first nine interceptors emplaced for operational use—seven at Fort Greely 

and two at Vandenberg Air Force Base—could include questionable parts 

that were not detected during the interceptor’s acceptance tests. Program 

officials told us that they are recommending that such parts be replaced in

2007, when the interceptors are scheduled to be upgraded. Making the

replacements will require that the interceptors be removed from their 

silos. 

The C2BMC element is being developed as the integrating and controlling 

entity of the BMDS. Leveraging existing infrastructure, it is initially 

designed to provide connectivity between the various BMDS components 

and in later blocks will manage their operations as part of an integrated,

layered missile defense system. Over time, C2BMC will not only provide 

planning tools to assist the command structure in formulating defensive 

actions, it will also generate detailed instructions for executing various 

missile defense functions, such as tracking enemy missiles, discriminating 

the warhead from decoys and associated objects, and directing the launch

of interceptors. It will also manage the exchange and dissemination of 

information necessary for carrying out the missile defense mission. 

The Block 2004 C2BMC element provides situational awareness by 

monitoring the operational status of each BMDS component, and it 

displays threat information such as missile trajectories and impact points. 

When the FBX-T becomes operational, C2BMC will also provide sensor 

control, sensor tasking, and sensor monitoring of the radar and forward 

the data to GMD. 

The incorporation of battle management capabilities into the C2BMC 

element begins with Block 2006. In the 2006-2007 time frame, the element 

is expected to track a ballistic missile threat throughout its entire 

trajectory and select the appropriate element to engage the threat. For 

example, the Block 2006 C2BMC configuration would be able to generate a 

single, precise track from multiple radars and transmit it to the other 

elements. This allows elements to launch interceptors earlier, providing 

more opportunity to engage incoming ballistic missiles. 

Block 2006 is also expected to enhance C2BMC’s communications with 

each BMDS component. C2BMC program officials will work to establish 

communications with all elements of the BMDS, overcome limitations of 

legacy satellite communications protocols, and establish redundant 

Command, Control, Battle 

Management, and 

Communications 

Page 53 GAO-06-327 Missile Defense
Appendix II: Block 2004 Element Assessments

communications links to enhance robustness. Such upgrades will improve

operational availability and situational awareness. 

The C2BMC team executed all of its planned fiscal year 2005 activities as 

scheduled and nearly all of the activities needed to complete the Block 

2004 capability. Program officials completed software development and 

testing, and integration activities, and enhanced the system’s robustness. 

Additional suites were also installed at command centers to provide the 

warfighter with the capability to plan and monitor the missile defense 

mission. 2

 A number of activities in preparation for Block 2006 were also 

completed during fiscal year 2005. For example, design and planning 

requirements for Block 2006 software upgrades (Spirals 6.1 and 6.2), along

with a Block 2006 system requirements review, were completed in June 

and July of 2005 respectively. 

During fiscal year 2005, program officials completed the development of 

the final two upgrades (Spirals 4.4 and 4.5) to Block 2004 C2BMC element 

software. The first upgrade (Spiral 4.4) added the ability to display GMD 

assets on users’ computer monitors, improved the user’s ability to call up 

BMDS information, and reduced the time to transfer force-level planning

files. The second upgrade (Spiral 4.5) gave C2BMC the capability to 

receive, distribute, and display information developed by three new 

sensors—the Forward-Based X-Band and Sea-Based X-Band radars and 

the Fylingdales upgraded early warning radar. It also improved the 

consistency between the data displayed by the C2BMC and the GMD fire 

control monitor, which also receives information directly from various 

sensors. 

The program office installed a suite at the U.S. Pacific Command during 

fiscal year 2005, and it is waiting on policy agreements to turn on a Web

browser— providing summary screens of the unfolding battle—in the 

United Kingdom. Additionally, second suites were added at the U.S. 

Strategic Command (STRATCOM) and the U.S. Northern Command 

(NORTHCOM) to allow for concurrent operations and system upgrades as 

well as to make the C2BMC a more robust system. 

The C2BMC program also completed most of the activities needed to 

verify its Block 2004 capability. In August 2005, the program completed 

Most Block 2004 Activities 

Completed on Schedule 

 2

The C2BMC element includes hardware, such as workstations and communications 

equipment. 

Page 54 GAO-06-327 Missile Defense
Appendix II: Block 2004 Element Assessments

testing that proved the readiness of Spiral 4.4 software for operations. The 

program also participated in demonstrations with other elements to 

practice transitioning the BMDS to alert. By the end of Block 2004, the 

final software upgrade (Spiral 4.5) was tested to verify that the C2BMC 

could interface with each BMDS element and that the improved software 

was ready for operational use. However, further testing is needed to verify

that Spiral 4.5 can provide planning and situational awareness at U.S. 

Northern Command, U.S. Strategic Command, U.S. Pacific Command, and 

the Department of Defense’s Cheyenne Mountain Operations Center. 

Program officials told us that they expect to complete the verification tests 

by the end of March 2006. 

The C2BMC program successfully demonstrated its ability to maintain 

situational awareness during several ground- and flight-testing activities. 

Program officials were able to monitor the operational status of BMDS 

components and display threat information, such as missile trajectories 

and impact points. However, during tests, program officials discovered 

three primary risk items that have the potential to affect C2BMC’s 

performance. Table 7 identifies these risks, the possible impact on 

program performance, and the actions being taken to address each. 

Performance Mostly on Track 

Table 7: C2BMC Risk Areas

Program risks Impact of risk Corrective actions

Track association from multiple 

new Block 2004 sensors 

Significant riska: If the sensor tracks are 

unidentified, the situational awareness displays 

are degraded by overstating or understating the 

number of lethal objects impacting in a certain

region. 

• Implemented improvements to algorithms to

handle new Block 2004 sensors—initial 

testing results are meeting requirements. 

• Continue to participate in and analyze results 

of various live and simulated tests with the 

other MDA elements. 

High-availability communications 

network equipment design 

Extensive riskb: If high-availability design does

not function properly, the reliability of the 

second set of communications network 

equipment at each controlling command and 

regional gateway is degraded.

• First network nodes have been upgraded 

with high-availability system—nodes have 

been tested and are operating as designed. 

Integration of new Block 2004 

interfaces (Ground-based

Midcourse Fire Control and FBXT) 

Significant risk: If C2BMC cannot transmit or 

receive messages from GFC and FBX-T, then 

ability to control FBX-T radar, forward track 

messages from FBX-T to GFC, and display 

GFC sensor track data, engagement data, and 

health and status data is degraded. 

• Developed interface documents to allocate 

functionality, define work, and clearly 

articulate interfaces. 

• Holding weekly technical interchange 

meetings to identify and resolve issues. 

• Completed pair-wise testing, as well as 

integration testing to identify and resolve 

problems quickly. 

Source: MDA (data); GAO (analysis). 

Page 55 GAO-06-327 Missile Defense
Appendix II: Block 2004 Element Assessments

a

Significant risk: can meet requirements with about a month’s time or cost to develop work-arounds or 

alternatives. 

b

Extensive risk: severe issues and items that cause program officials to be unable to meet 

requirements without about a quarter of a year ‘s time or cost to develop alternatives.

Terminal High Altitude 

Area Defense 

The THAAD element is being developed as a mobile, ground-based missile 

defense system to protect forward-deployed military forces, population 

centers, and civilian assets from short- and medium-range ballistic missile 

attacks. A THAAD unit consists of a THAAD fire control component for 

controlling and executing a defensive mission, truck-mounted launchers, 

ground-based radars, interceptor missiles, and ground support equipment.

The THAAD missile is composed of a kill vehicle mounted atop a singlestage booster and is designed to destroy enemy warheads through hit-tokill collisions. 

The THAAD program is not expected to deliver an initial capability until 

2009, when a fire unit and 24 missiles will be handed over to the Army for 

concurrent test and operation. Fiscal year 2005 activities focused on 

developing and ground-testing THAAD components in preparation for the 

initiation of THAAD’s flight test program. While several of these 

preparatory activities were completed on schedule, others were deferred, 

causing a further delay in the flight test program. According to program 

officials, unanticipated missile integration issues caused the delay. 

Assessment of Element 

Progress 

During fiscal year 2005, the THAAD program accomplished several key 

activities in preparation for flight tests, but flight tests began later in the 

block than planned. Program officials successfully integrated software 

upgrades into the launcher and radar and completed missile qualification 

tests that lead to flight readiness certification. However, a flight test delay

that we reported last year has lengthened. 3

 Two explosions in the summer 

of 2003 at a subcontractor’s propellant mixing facility delayed the start of

flight testing from December 2004 to March 2005 and led to revisions of 

the program’s flight test plan. However, because of unanticipated 

integration issues, the first flight test, which validated missile performance 

in a high endoatmospheric flight environment, was further delayed from 

March to November 2005.

4

 The delay occurred because program officials 

found problems with THAAD’s Laser Initiated Ordnance System and its 

Integration Problems Delay 

Flight Tests 

 3

GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Status of Ballistic Missile Defense Program in 2004, 

GAO-05-243 (Washington, D.C.: March 2005). 

4

MDA successfully completed the first THAAD flight test on November 22, 2005. 

Page 56 GAO-06-327 Missile Defense
Appendix II: Block 2004 Element Assessments

telemetry system during ground tests and assembly operations.5 The 

discovery of these problems delayed other ground tests and the assembly 

of the THAAD missile being manufactured for the first THAAD flight test. 

Tests identified two problems in the Laser Initiated Ordnance System. A 

design issue caused one subcomponent to fail during testing, delaying the 

Laser Initiated Ordnance System’s qualification test. Also, during assembly 

operations, the program identified a change in the Laser Initiated 

Ordnance System’s power output that required the program to improve the 

design robustness of a fiber optic cable assembly. Additional qualification 

testing was then required to obtain range safety approval. Both of these 

problems, which were discovered during ground and qualification tests, 

were solved, but not before they affected the flight test schedule. 

The program also identified a problem with the missile’s telemetry system, 

which transmits flight test data to ground stations for observation during 

testing. During integration testing, transmission errors occurred between 

the missile’s telemetry system and the ground test station. Program 

officials told us that a solution was found that eliminated transmission 

errors in the first flight test. However, the telemetry system is not 

providing as much information as wanted in one mode of operation. 

According to the officials, this does not present a problem until flight test

3, which is scheduled for July 2006, and a solution is expected by that 

time. 

The THAAD program also had to address a number of range safety 

requirements prior to the initiation of flight testing. In September, the 

officials told us that they had addressed all requirements related to the 

first flight test, which did not involve an intercept attempt, and the 

majority of the requirements related to the second flight test. Officials do 

not expect any range safety requirements to delay future flight tests. 

THAAD program officials plan to conduct 14 more flight tests between 

April 2006 and December 2008. To complete these tests prior to handing 

the first THAAD fire unit over to the Army for concurrent operation and 

tests in 2009, the program will have to successfully conduct as many as 

5 flight tests in each fiscal year. Program officials told us that if all tests 

 5

The Laser Initiated Ordnance System initiates THAAD missile artillery events such as 

boost motor ignition, separation, and flight termination. THAAD’s telemetry system 

transmits flight test data to ground stations for observation during tests. 

Page 57 GAO-06-327 Missile Defense
Appendix II: Block 2004 Element Assessments

are successful, they can meet this schedule. However, a failure will cause 

delays. 

THAAD’s performance and effectiveness remain uncertain until the 

program conducts flight tests with updated hardware and software. Data 

from flight testing are needed to anchor simulations of THAAD’s 

performance and to more confidently predict the element’s effectiveness. 

THAAD’s Performance 

Remains Uncertain 

Airborne Laser The ABL element is a missile defense system designed to shoot down 

enemy missiles during the boost phase of flight, the period after launch 

when the missile’s rocket motors are thrusting. The concept involves the 

coordinated operation of a high-energy laser and a beam control system 

that focuses the laser on a target missile. By rupturing the missile’s fuel or 

oxidizer tank, the laser causes the missile to lose thrust or flight control, 

and the missile cannot reach its intended target. 

The ABL element consists of three major components integrated onboard 

a highly modified Boeing 747 aircraft—a high-energy chemical oxygeniodine laser; a beam control/fire control component to focus the laser’s 

energy on a targeted spot of the enemy missile; and a battle 

management/command control, computers, communications, and 

intelligence component to plan and execute the element’s defensive 

engagements. In addition, the element includes ground support 

infrastructure for storing, mixing, and handling chemicals used in the 

laser. 

Commensurate with its fiscal year 2004 restructuring effort, the ABL 

program continued to focus on near-term milestones. By accomplishing its 

near-term goals, the program expects to increase confidence in its longerterm program objectives of demonstrating ABL’s lethality against a shortrange ballistic missile target.6

 During fiscal year 2005, the program focused 

its efforts on testing ABL’s Beam Control/ Fire Control and its high-energy 

laser. Nearly all activities related to these milestones were completed on 

schedule. Program officials noted that the program’s progress over the 

past 18 months caused Congress to appropriate an additional $7 million 

for ABL’s fiscal year 2006 budget. 

Most Fiscal Year 2005 Activities 

Completed on Schedule 

 6

In January 2004, MDA restructured the ABL program to focus on near-term milestones and 

to improve confidence in longer-term schedule and cost projections. 

Page 58 GAO-06-327 Missile Defense
Appendix II: Block 2004 Element Assessments

Both First Flight and First Light—the first major milestones of the 

restructured program—were achieved during the first quarter of fiscal 

year 2005.7

 First Flight was the first of a series of planned flight tests with 

the Beam Control/ Fire Control segment. The test demonstrated that all 

necessary design, safety, and verification activities to ensure flight 

worthiness had been completed. It also began the process of expanding

the flight envelope—types and combinations of flight conditions—in 

which ABL can operate. The program also completed scheduled activities

associated with a series of Beam Control/ Fire Control low-power passive 

flight tests.8

 The program is currently integrating the full Beam Control/ 

Fire Control with the Beacon Illuminator Laser, which helps mitigate the 

effects of the atmosphere on the laser beam’s quality and with the 

Tracking Illuminator Laser, which helps focus the laser beam on its target. 

Once integration is complete, the program plans to conduct a series of 

active flight tests planned for summer 2006.9

First Light, which integrated six individual laser modules to demonstrate 

that the combined modules can produce a single beam of laser energy, was 

completed in November 2004. Further tests to extend the duration of the

laser’s operation were scheduled for completion in September 2005. 

However, the tests were not completed until fiscal year 2006.

The program plans to conduct its lethality demonstration—a flight test in

which the ABL aircraft will attempt to shoot down a short-range ballistic 

missile—no earlier than 2008. If this test is successful, MDA believes it will

prove the concept of using directed energy for missile defense. 

As previously noted, the ABL’s fiscal year 2005 test program was centered 

on its Beam Control/ Fire Control passive flight test series and its highenergy laser ground tests. The flight test series included 28 tests that 

enabled the program to 

Program Moves Forward with 

Testing 

 7

“First Light” refers to the first ground test and demonstration of the integration of six 

individual laser modules that produced a single beam of laser energy. 

8

Passive flight tests are conducted without the use of the Beacon Illuminator Laser (BILL)

or the Tracking Illuminator Laser (TILL). The BILL and TILL are part of the laser-beam 

control system used to mitigate the effects of the atmosphere on beam quality and to focus 

the laser beam on the target. In contrast, active flight tests include the use of the

illuminator lasers.

9

Active flight tests include the use of a functioning BILL and TILL. 

Page 59 GAO-06-327 Missile Defense
Appendix II: Block 2004 Element Assessments

• demonstrate the performance of the aircraft’s turret, laser optics, and 

initial integration of Beam Control/ Fire Control software; 

• verify the structural performance of the Active Ranger System—a system 

that helps ABL predict a missile’s launch point; 

• complete flights under various combinations of flight conditions; 

• collect data critical for readying the aircraft for laser installation; and 

• demonstrate the performance of Link-16—a communications component 

that ABL uses to interact with other elements of the BMDS. 

The demonstration of First Light proved that individual laser modules, 

which have the fit and function needed to be placed on the aircraft, could 

be successfully integrated to produce a single laser beam for a fraction of 

a second. The program planned a series of tests during fiscal year 2005 

that would gradually increase the length and power of the laser’s 

operation. However, problems encountered during testing limited the 

duration of lasing to less than 1 second and affected the program’s ability 

to determine the laser’s maximum power output. Program officials told us

that two of the laser’s individual laser modules experienced alignment 

issues that prompted the system to shut down prior to completing 

extended lase times. The alignment problem was rectified and the program 

was able to conduct additional tests at longer durations. Over the fiscal 

year, the program operated the high-energy laser 51 times for a total of 

23.5 seconds, with the longest duration being 5.25 seconds. On December 

6, 2005, the program conducted a longer-duration test of the high-energy 

laser and was able to sustain the beam for more than 10 seconds. The ABL 

also produced approximately 83 percent of its design power. 

Although the ABL has not reached 100 percent of its design power, 

program officials told us that the 83 percent power is sufficient to achieve 

95 percent of maximum lethal range against all classes of ballistic missiles. 

Prior to the longer-duration test, program officials told us that the laser 

would not be installed on the aircraft until it produced 100 percent of its 

specified power. However, on December 9, 2005, the Director, MDA, gave 

the program permission to disassemble the System Integration Laboratory 

and begin installation of the laser on the aircraft. Program officials said 

that the program will continue to test the laser when the aircraft is on the 

ground in an effort to demonstrate that the laser can produce 100 percent 

of its design power. 

Page 60 GAO-06-327 Missile Defense
Appendix II: Block 2004 Element Assessments

The program continues to characterize jitter as a risk to the ABL system’s 

overall performance. Jitter is a phenomenon pertaining to the technology 

of controlling and stabilizing the high-energy laser beam so that vibration 

unique to the aircraft does not degrade the laser’s aim point. Jitter control 

is crucial to the operation of the laser because the laser beam must be 

stable enough to focus sufficient energy on a fixed spot of the target 

missile to rupture its fuel or oxidizer tank. Program officials told us that 

they will not be fully confident that jitter can be controlled until it is 

demonstrated in an operational environment during the lethality 

demonstration, but data on the two major components that cause jitter 

were collected in ABL’s System Integration Laboratory. These data were 

fed into simulations and models that help the program understand the 

effects of jitter and how components can be designed to reduce jitter. 

According to program officials, data obtained during recent laser and flight 

tests increased the program’s understanding of the phenomenon. 

The KEI element is being designed as a mobile, multi-use land-based 

system designed to destroy medium, intermediate, and intercontinental 

ballistic missiles during boost and all midcourse phases of flight. MDA 

originally planned to develop KEI to defeat threat missiles during the 

boost phase of their flight. However, in 2005 MDA directed the KEI 

program to incorporate the capability to engage missiles during both the 

ascent and the descent portions of the midcourse phase of flight, as well as 

the boost phase. 

The KEI program is currently focused on developing a mobile, land-based 

system that according to program officials is expected to be available in 

the Block 2014 time frame. The land-based system will be a deployable

unit consisting of a fire control and communications unit, mobile 

launchers, and interceptors. The KEI element has no sensor component, 

such as radars, for detecting and tracking boosting missiles. Instead, it will 

rely on external ballistic missile defense system sensors, such as spacebased infrared sensors and forward-deployed radars. 

A sea-based capability is planned in subsequent blocks. Preliminary work 

will also begin on a space-based interceptor in fiscal year 2008. If MDA 

should decide to go forward with a space-based interceptor, it would not 

be deployed until the next decade. 

Although the KEI program completed many planned activities on 

schedule, the program continued to progress slower than anticipated. KEI 

Jitter Continues to Threaten 

ABL Performance 

Kinetic Energy Interceptor 

KEI Progresses Slowly

Page 61 GAO-06-327 Missile Defense
Appendix II: Block 2004 Element Assessments

officials were forced to replan several activities and reduce the scope of 

others after both Congress and MDA reduced program funding. 

The activities completed during the fiscal year included constructing a 

shelter to house prototype fire control and communications equipment 

and conducting several demonstrations. According to program officials, 

the demonstrations showed the prototype equipment could collect data 

from overhead nonimaging infrared satellites in a time frame that would 

make a boost phase intercept possible. In addition, the program completed 

studies that allowed it to optimize the design of communications 

equipment that uplinks information from KEI’s fire control and 

communications component to its interceptor so that there is a decreased 

likelihood that communications will be jammed. The studies also allowed 

the program to optimize the equipment’s design to operate in a nuclear 

environment. 

Other activities scheduled to be completed during fiscal year 2004 were 

deferred into fiscal year 2005 and have now been further delayed. For 

example, the System Requirements Review, which documents mission 

objectives, identifies critical components, and establishes a program plan, 

was delayed from fiscal year 2004 to 2005 and then to fiscal year 2007. 

Program officials noted that funding shortfalls also forced the program to 

eliminate some of its initial risk reduction activities. For instance, the 

program originally planned to develop a two-color seeker, which would 

aid in plume-to-hardbody handover.10 However, because of a reduced 

program budget, program officials now plan to take advantage of the Aegis 

Ballistic Missile Defense program’s development of a two-color seeker and 

to work on a KEI-specific two-color seeker later in the program. 

In fiscal year 2005, the KEI program office planned to continue work on its 

Near Field Infrared Experiment (NFIRE), an experimental satellite that 

will collect infrared imagery of boosting intercontinental ballistic missiles. 

In 2004, the KEI program office signed a memorandum of agreement and 

transitioned day-to-day management and execution of NFIRE to the Space 

Tracking and Surveillance System program. The STSS Program Office has 

experience with satellite development and can leverage its resources to 

manage the experiment. STSS expects to launch NFIRE in September 

2006, the launch date established by the KEI Program Office. 

NFIRE Management 

Transferred To STSS 

 10“Plume-to-hardbody” handover refers to the identification of the actual missile from 

among the plume of hot exhaust gas that obscures the body of the boosting missile. 

Page 62 GAO-06-327 Missile Defense
Appendix II: Block 2004 Element Assessments

At this early stage of element development, data are not available to 

evaluate element performance. However, the program office identified 

areas of high risk that could affect performance.11 The interceptor’s 

booster motors, which demand high performance for KEI engagements, 

and the algorithm enabling the kill vehicle to identify a target missile’s 

body from its luminous exhaust plume, are high-risk technologies. Initially, 

program officials were focused on designing KEI and maturing these 

technologies concurrently. However, the program has adopted an 

approach that lets it proceed with less risk. KEI is now focused on 

maturing the high-risk technologies before integrating them into the landbased capability. 

In 2008, KEI is scheduled to participate in its first booster flight test. 

According to program officials, at that time a decision will be made on the 

program’s future. In spite of program uncertainties, program officials are 

working to extend the prime contract. Currently, KEI’s contract, which 

was awarded in December 2003, has a term that extends through January 

2012 (98 months). Program officials are now working to extend this period 

until September 2015 (143 months). 

MDA is developing STSS as a space-based sensor element of the BMDS. It 

is currently working on the first increment of STSS, which is focused on 

the preparation and launch of two technology demonstration satellites 

partially built under the former Space-Based Infrared System-Low (SBIRSLow) program.12 Each satellite making up the program’s “space segment” 

includes a space vehicle and a payload of two infrared sensors—an 

acquisition sensor to watch for the bright plumes (hot exhaust gas) of 

boosting missiles, and a tracking sensor to follow the missile through 

midcourse and reentry. The STSS element also has supporting ground 

infrastructure, known as the ground segment, which includes a ground 

station and mission software to support the processing and 

communication of data from the satellites to the BMDS. 

Too Early to Assess KEI’s 

Performance 

Contract Extended despite 

Uncertain Future 

Space Tracking and 

Surveillance System 

 11“High-risk” means that the program will not meet its objectives without priority 

management actions and risk reduction activities. 

12The two technology demonstration satellites were called the Flight Demonstration 

System. The satellites are expected to assume low-earth orbits at an altitude much less 

than satellites in geosynchronous orbit. 

Page 63 GAO-06-327 Missile Defense
Appendix II: Block 2004 Element Assessments

MDA plans to launch these satellites in 2007, in tandem, in an effort to 

assess how well they perform surveillance and tracking functions. Using 

data collected by the satellites, MDA will determine what capabilities are 

needed and what goals should be set for the next generation of STSS 

satellites. The first operational constellation of satellites is expected to be 

available in the 2012 time frame. 

The STSS program accomplished many of the activities planned for 

completion in fiscal year 2005. Both spacecraft buses have been integrated

and tested, the first of two ground software builds has successfully 

completed acceptance testing, and the second software build is 

progressing on schedule. However, one key activity, delivering the payload 

for the first satellite, was delayed because of problems in testing of the 

payload. By contract, the payload for the first satellite was supposed to be 

delivered in January 2005, but delivery has been delayed twice, with the 

last delaying delivery until early 2006. The delays are affecting scheduled 

work on the second satellite’s payload, potentially delaying the satellites’ 

launch date.

During our last assessment of STSS, the program office expected the 

satellites to be launched in February 2007, earlier than the contract date of

July 2007. However, the more recent problems and delays may result in the 

launch being later than February 2007, but still before the required launch 

date of July 2007. The program office is so confident that it will launch on

time that it has placed an order through the National Aeronautics and 

Space Administration (NASA) for the Delta II launch vehicle, with a 

requested launch date during the second quarter of fiscal year 2007. 

The first satellite payload is being delayed because problems occurred 

during thermal vacuum testing. Hardware issues emerged when the 

payload was tested in a vacuum and at cold temperatures for the first time. 

Although the significance of the problems is not yet clear, repairs will have 

to be made. The program office and contractors plan to make the repairs 

and then decide if further testing is needed to ensure that all problems 

have been corrected. Several options for testing the payload are being

considered. They include (1) retesting the payload in the thermal vacuum

chamber without making repairs; (2) taking the payload out of the 

chamber, completing the repairs, and then retesting; (3) taking the payload 

out of the chamber and conducting tests at ambient (room) temperatures; 

or (4) shipping the payload as is to the prime contractor for retest at the 

contractor’s facility. However, if the program decides to return the payload 

to the contractor’s facility, the contractor could not test as specifically as

could be done in the vacuum chamber, making it challenging to isolate 

Progress on Demonstration 

Satellites Slows 

Vacuum Tests Delay Delivery 

of Payload 

Page 64 GAO-06-327 Missile Defense
Appendix II: Block 2004 Element Assessments

problems. If further testing is completed before returning the payload to 

the prime contractor, several weeks will be added to the schedule because 

the payload will have to be removed from the vacuum chamber, 

disassembled, repaired, reassembled, and placed back in the chamber. The 

chamber will then have to be returned to the right vacuum and 

temperature conditions and the payload retested. 

The program office is having an independent team review the situation 

with the first payload to determine how much more testing should be 

conducted. The program manager does not believe any of the thermal 

vacuum testing problems are mission assurance or performance issues. 

In addition to the thermal vacuum issues, integration issues have been 

discovered as the subcontractor continues to integrate and test the 

payload at successively higher levels of integration. The payload ambientlevel testing took nearly 3 months longer than expected to complete. This 

was due to the large number of software and hardware integration issues 

discovered when the flight hardware and software were tested together for 

the first time. Most software issues are due to the configuration 

differences between the pathfinder hardware that served as the test bed 

for the payload software and the actual flight hardware. 

The quality and workmanship problems with the payload subcontractor 

have continued to persist. These problems have been ongoing for the last 

2 years and have contributed to a schedule delay in delivering the payload. 

According to program officials, the quality and workmanship problems are 

the result of the subcontractor’s lack of experience. Examples of the 

quality and workmanship issues include the initial failure of the second 

satellite’s track sensor during vibration testing. The failure occurred 

because fasteners were not tightened according to specifications and 

because payload cables were poorly manufactured by a third-tier vendor. 

Although neither of these issues resulted in damage to the flight hardware, 

both have taken substantial management attention and considerable effort 

to correct. In response to the quality and workmanship issues, quality 

control at the subcontractor’s site has undergone significant restructuring. 

In addition, the prime contractor’s on-site quality organization at the 

subcontractor’s site stepped up its inspection and supervision of all 

processes and is providing mentoring. A reeducation effort was also 

undertaken to ensure that all personnel on the program knew and 

understood the program instructions. 

The program office expects that the quality improvements the payload 

subcontractor has implemented will reduce the probability of additional 

Program Continues to Address 

Quality Problems 

Page 65 GAO-06-327 Missile Defense
Appendix II: Block 2004 Element Assessments

quality-related issues in the future. According to the program office, the

integration issues that have been discovered are not unusual for a firsttime integration effort, but are taking more time than planned to work 

through. However, the second satellite’s hardware is consistently moving 

through integration and testing much more efficiently than the first 

satellite’s hardware. 

Page 66 GAO-06-327 Missile Defense
Appendix III: An Assess

Contractors’ Cost and S

ment of BMDS Prime 

chedule Performance 

Page 67 GAO-06-327

Appendix III: An Assessment of BMDS Prime 

Contractors’ Cost and Schedule Performance 

Prime contractors typically receive most of the funds that MDA requests 

from Congress each fiscal year to develop elements of the BMDS. To 

determine if it is receiving a dollar of value for each dollar it spends, each 

BMDS program office requires its prime contractor to provide monthly 

reports detailing cost and schedule performance. In these reports, which 

are known as Contract Performance Reports (CPR), the prime contractor

makes comparisons that inform the program as to whether the contractor 

is completing work at the cost budgeted and whether the work scheduled 

is being completed on time.1

 If the contractor does not spend all funds 

budgeted or completes more work than planned, the CPR shows positive 

cost and/or schedule variances. Similarly, if the contractor spends more 

than planned or cannot complete all of the work scheduled, the CPR 

shows negative cost and/or schedule variances. Using data from the CPR, 

a program manager can assess trends in cost and schedule performance, 

information that is useful because trends tend to persist. Studies have 

shown that once a contract is 15 percent complete, performance metrics 

are indicative of the contract’s final outcome. 

We used CPR data to assess the fiscal year 2005 cost and schedule 

performance of prime contractors for seven BMDS elements. When 

possible, we also predicted the likely cost of each prime contract at 

completion. Our predictions of final contract cost are based on the 

assumption that the contractor will continue to perform in the future as it

has in the past. An assessment of each element is provided in this 

appendix. 

The Aegis BMD program has a prime contract for each of its two major 

components—the Aegis BMD Weapon System and the Standard Missile-3. 

During fiscal year 2005, both contractors completed most of their planned 

activities on time and at or less than budgeted costs. Based on the weapon

system contractor’s performance through fiscal year 2005, the contractor 

could underrun the budgeted cost of the contract by about $7.1 million to 

$12.5 million, while the SM-3 contractor could underrun its budgeted costs 

for the contract by about $11.5 million to $17.8 million. 

Weapon System CPRs show that the contractor underran its budgeted 

costs for the prime contract and was able to complete all of its planned 

Aegis BMD Contractors 

Deliver Good Performance 

Aegis BMD Weapon System 

Contractor Mostly on Track 

 1

In March 2005, DOD directed that CPRs be named Contract Performance Reports. 

Formerly, CPRs were known as Cost Performance Reports.

Missile Defense
Appendix III: An Assessment of BMDS Prime 

Contractors’ Cost and Schedule Performance 

work on schedule. The weapon system contract’s cumulative cost and 

schedule variances—variances that take into account all work completed 

on the contract since its award—are highlighted in figure 2. 

Figure 2: Aegis BMD Weapon System Fiscal Year 2005 Cost and Schedule 

Performance 

According to program officials, the minimal schedule variance during the 

fiscal year was driven by ship availability and changing test event 

schedules. Additionally, the contractor incurred a $6 million positive cost 

variance as a result of underruns for Block 2004 and Block 2006 efforts. In 

September 2005, work tasks were replanned for the Block 2004 

completion effort to reflect funding impacts. 

The prime contractor for the SM-3 missile component performed within its 

budgeted costs, but was slightly behind schedule. By the end of fiscal year 

2005, the contractor reported a positive cost variance of $10.9 million and 

a negative schedule variance of $9.6 million. Figure 3 illustrates the 

cumulative cost and schedule performance for the SM-3 prime contractor. 

-6

-4

-2

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

S

Au

ept. '05

g. '05

Mar.

Apr. '05

May '05

June '05

July '05

 '05

Oct. '04

Nov. '04

Dec. '04

Jan. '05

Feb. '05

Dollars in millions

Source: Contractor (data); GAO (analysis).

Fiscal year

Cumulative cost variance

Cumulative schedule variance

Standard Missile-3 Contractor’s 

Cost Performance Is Mostly 

Good 

Page 68 GAO-06-327 Missile Defense
Appendix III: An Assessment of BMDS Prime 

Contractors’ Cost and Schedule Performance 

Figure 3: Standard Missile 3 Fiscal Year 2005 Cost and Schedule Performance 

Our analysis of CPR data shows that the contractor spent less than 

budgeted because it did not need all staff originally planned to conduct 

test events; these events were delayed because of ship availability and 

fleet priorities. Program officials told us that the tests were rescheduled 

when the contractor was unable to meet the planned test dates. The funds 

budgeted for these tests will be used to conduct the tests at the 

rescheduled dates. 

The delayed test events also caused the contractor to fall slightly behind 

schedule. In addition, the contractor could not complete some planned 

work because hardware deliveries were late, delaying related integration 

activities. Despite these delays, the program asserts that the contractor 

has met most of its contractual delivery dates thus far, and the program 

expects the contractor to meet future delivery obligations. 

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

S

Au

ept. '05

g. '05

Jun

July '05

e '05

Apr.

May '05

 '05

Oct. '04

Nov. '04

Dec. '04

Jan. '05

Feb. '05

Mar. '05

Dollars in millions

Source: Contractor (data); GAO (analysis).

Fiscal year

Cumulative cost variance

Cumulative schedule variance

Page 69 GAO-06-327 Missile Defense
Appendix III: An Assessment of BMDS Prime 

Contractors’ Cost and Schedule Performance 

Our analysis of ABL CPRs indicates that the prime contractor’s cost and 

schedule performance declined during fiscal year 2005 despite the 

program’s restructuring efforts in the spring of 2004. The program 

restructured the contract to give the contractor a more realistic budget

and schedule to do work that is needed to get ready for and complete a 

lethality demonstration of the ABL element. Despite these adjustments, 

the contractor was unable to complete fiscal year 2005 activities within 

budget or on schedule. As illustrated in figure 4, the ABL contractor 

incurred a negative cost variance of $23.1 million and a negative schedule 

variance of $23.6 million during fiscal year 2005. 

Figure 4: Airborne Laser Fiscal Year 2005 Cost and Schedule Performance 

Note: As agreed to by both the contractor and the ABL System Program Office, August 2005 CPR 

data included actual costs only. Therefore, the data point for August 2005 is not included. 

The program planned to complete two major activities during fiscal year 

2005—passive flight tests of ABL’s Beam Control/Fire Control component 

Despite Restructure, ABL 

Contractor Experiences 

Cost and Schedule Growth 

-50

-40

-30

-20

-10

0

10

20

30

Dollars in millions

Source: Contractor (data); GAO (analysis).

Fiscal year

Cumulative cost variance

Cumulative schedule variance

S

Au

ept. '05

g. '05

Oct. '04

Nov. '04

Dec. '04

Jan. '05

Feb. '05

Mar. '05

Apr. '05

May '05

June '05

July '05

Page 70 GAO-06-327 Missile Defense
Appendix III: An Assessment of BMDS Prime 

Contractors’ Cost and Schedule Performance 

and duration tests of the system’s high-energy laser. 2 However, technical

challenges associated with these activities increased costs and delayed 

scheduled work. Changes had to be made to Beam Control/Fire Control 

software, and additional work was needed on the Beam Control/Fire 

Control Hard Wire Abort System to support test activities. In addition, the 

program also reprioritized activities throughout the program. 

Furthermore, the contractor informed the ABL program office that 

negative cost variances caused by technical problems related to the 

element’s Active Ranger System and Beacon Illuminator Laser 

components cannot be recovered.3

 These problems and their potential 

impact on the program are outlined in table 8. 

Table 8: Airborne Laser Technical Issues and Their Potential Impact on Program 

Component Technical issue Potential impact

Active Ranger System 

(ARS) 

• Laser range receiver cannot consistently 

perform as expected 

• Contaminated, damaged, and inefficient 

optics must be redesigned and replaced 

• The ARS does not meet all design 

requirements 

• Schedule delays—the program currently anticipates 

that the ARS will not be delivered until after ABL’s 

lethal demonstration, which is scheduled to be

completed no earlier than 2008. According to 

program officials, the ARS is not required for lethal 

demonstration.

• Decrease in expected performance—without the 

ARS, the ABL has reduced ability to estimate missile 

launch and impact points. ABL’s ability to respond to 

simultaneous missiles may also be reduced. 

Beacon Illuminator Laser • Rapid prototyping led to numerous faults in 

power supplies

• Delays in completing performance testing of the 

component 

Source: MDA. 

According to program officials, the late delivery of the Active Ranger 

System will not affect ABL’s planned 2008 lethality demonstration because 

the test will not require ABL to estimate the target missile’s launch or 

impact point. Neither will the test include more than one target. However, 

the delay could affect the contract’s schedule and cost because planned 

work related to the Active Ranger System may not be completed and the

 2

The Beam Control/Fire Control component’s primary function is to maintain the beam’s 

quality as it travels through the aircraft and into the atmosphere. Passive flight tests of this

component are tests conducted without ABL lasers that measure atmospheric disturbance

and that track the target.

3

The Active Ranger System is the laser that sits atop the aircraft and provides preliminary 

range and tracking of a target missile. The Beacon Illuminator Laser is the laser that 

bounces a beam off the target missile back to the aircraft and thus measures the amount of

atmospheric disturbance between the aircraft and the target.

Page 71 GAO-06-327 Missile Defense
Appendix III: An Assessment of BMDS Prime 

Contractors’ Cost and Schedule Performance 

cost of unplanned work needed to resolve the technical problems was not 

included in the contractor’s budget. 

Despite program challenges, program officials noted that the contractor 

still believes it can complete the contract within the current contract 

ceiling. However, based on our analysis of the program’s fiscal year 2005 

performance, we estimate a contract overrun of between $43.8 million and 

$231.7 million. 

Our analysis of the performance of the contractor developing the C2BMC 

element was limited because the program did not deliver CPRs for 

6 months during fiscal year 2005. Program officials cited the dynamics of 

the program as the primary reason for the suspension. In 2004, the C2BMC 

program office directed the contractor to add requirements to integrate a 

Forward-Based X-band—Transportable radar into the program’s 

architecture, adjust its schedule to absorb funding reductions, and make 

several high-priority engineering changes. The contractor was unable to 

update its work plan and realign its budget quickly enough to reflect these 

changes. Without changes, CPRs would have compared the work under 

way with an outdated schedule and budget and would not have reflected

the contractor’s true performance. The contractor completed all activities 

needed to replan its work in May 2005 and began to deliver CPRs in June 

2005. By the close of fiscal year 2005, the contractor reported that it was 

performing work within budget and slightly behind schedule. The 

cumulative cost and schedule variances for the contract were 

approximately positive $1.7 million and negative $ 0.9 million, respectively. 

Our analysis shows that based on its performance so far, the contractor 

should be able to complete all scheduled contract work within the 

contract’s negotiated cost. 

The GMD prime contractor’s cost and schedule performance continued to 

erode during fiscal year 2005. By September 2005, the cumulative cost of 

all work completed was $713 million more than expected, and the 

contractor had incurred a cumulative negative schedule variance of 

$228 million. In fiscal year 2005 alone, work cost about $365 million more 

than budgeted. Furthermore, CPRs show that the contractor incurred a 

negative schedule variance of approximately $39 million during the fiscal

year. However, officials in MDA’s Office of Business Management told us 

that the schedule variance does not capture some work planned for fiscal 

year 2005 that was deferred. The officials said that if the contractor 

deferred fiscal year 2005 work to another fiscal year before the work was 

Lack of Reporting Limits 

Knowledge of C2BMC 

Contractor’s Performance 

GMD Contractor’s

Performance Continues to 

Decline 

Page 72 GAO-06-327 Missile Defense
Appendix III: An Assessment of BMDS Prime 

Contractors’ Cost and Schedule Performance 

begun, the CPR would not show that the contractor was behind schedule 

in completing that work. 

Judging from the contractor’s cost and schedule performance in fiscal year 

2005, we estimate that at the contract’s completion, the contractor will 

have overrun the budgeted cost of the contract by between $1.0 billion and 

$1.4 billion. Figure 5 shows the unfavorable trend in GMD fiscal year 2005 

performance. 

Figure 5: Ground-based Midcourse Defense Fiscal Year 2005 Cost and Schedule 

Performance 

-800

-700

-600

-500

-400

-300

-200

-100

0

Dollars in millions

Source: Contractor (data); GAO (analysis).

Fiscal year

Cumulative schedule variance

Cumulative cost variance

S

Au

ept. '05

g. '05

July '05

Feb.

Mar. '05

Apr. '05

May '05

June '05

 '05

Jan. '05

Oct.

Nov. '04

Dec. '04

 '04

Developmental issues with the interceptor continue to be the leading 

contributor to cost overruns and schedule slips for the GMD program. 

Interceptor-related work cost $240 million more than budgeted in fiscal

year 2005, with the kill vehicle accounting for more than 42 percent of this

overrun. Poor quality control has led to a number of technical problems 

with the kill vehicle—such as foreign object debris in wiring harnesses and 

leaks in thermal batteries—that have increased manpower and rework 

costs. Additionally, the contractor for the BV+ booster incurred increased

Page 73 GAO-06-327 Missile Defense
Appendix III: An Assessment of BMDS Prime 

Contractors’ Cost and Schedule Performance 

costs as a result of inefficiencies related to its transition to a new supplier. 

New requirements and redesign efforts related to the BV+ booster also 

contributed to the prime contractor’s negative cost performance. 

The program’s schedule variance grew as flight and ground tests were 

delayed. During fiscal year 2005, several flight tests were deferred after the 

interceptors in two flight tests failed to launch. The GMD program has 

restructured its test plan, and the first flight test was successfully 

conducted in December 2005. Program officials noted that the contractor 

expects to reduce its schedule variance in fiscal year 2006. However, the 

program’s negative performance forced the program to restructure its 

future work efforts and extend its prime contract by 1 year. 

Kinetic Energy 

Interceptors 

In March 2005, we reported that plans to restructure the KEI contract 

prompted program office officials to suspend CPRs.4

 The contract has 

since been restructured, and the contractor began delivering CPRs in 

March 2005. As of September 2005, the KEI prime contractor had 

completed approximately 4 percent of its planned work and was 

performing within its budgeted costs, but slightly behind schedule. The 

program incurred a positive cost variance of $3.0 million and a negative 

schedule variance of $3.9 million during the fiscal year. Because the 

contractor has completed a small percentage of the work required by the 

contract, the contractor’s performance to date cannot be used to estimate 

whether the contract can be completed within its estimated cost. 

The KEI program is undergoing several contract modifications to address 

additional requirements. In July 2005, the program modified the contract 

to require that KEI be capable of intercepting enemy missiles in the 

midcourse of their flight. Consequently, the program plans to extend the 

prime contract to better align its cost and schedule objectives with the 

new work content. Future CPRs will compare the contractor’s 

performance with the new cost and schedule objectives. Program officials 

plan to begin work on the midcourse capability in fiscal year 2008 and will

continue to develop this capability through the end of the contract, which 

is expected to be September 2015. 

 4

GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Status of Ballistic Missile Defense Program in 2004, 

GAO-05-243 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 31, 2005). 

Page 74 GAO-06-327 Missile Defense
Appendix III: An Assessment of BMDS Prime 

Contractors’ Cost and Schedule Performance 

Our analysis of contractor performance reports shows that the STSS 

program continued to experience a decline in contractor performance 

during fiscal year 2005. As depicted in figure 6, the contractor incurred 

cumulative negative cost and schedule variances of $97 million and 

$20 million, respectively. If the contractor’s performance continues to 

decline, we estimate that at its completion the contract will exceed 

budgeted cost by between $248 million and $479 million. However, 

program officials noted that more than 90 percent of the contractor’s past 

performance can be attributed to a subcontractor whose work will be 

completed in fiscal year 2006. 

STSS Contractor’s

Performance Declines 

Figure 6: Space Tracking and Surveillance System Fiscal Year 2005 Cost and 

Schedule Performance

-120

-100

-80

-60

-40

-20

0

Dollars in millions

Source: Contractor (data); GAO (analysis).

Fiscal year

Cumulative schedule variance

Cumulative cost variance

S

Au

ept. '05

g. '05

July '05

Oct. '04

Nov. '04

Dec. '04

Jan. '05

Feb. '05

Mar. '05

Apr. '05

May '05

June '05

Quality issues with the subcontractor were the primary reason that the 

STSS prime contractor overran its fiscal year 2005 budget. For example, 

poor workmanship caused a satellite’s sensor payload to fail a vibration 

test because fasteners—designed to hold the sensor steady—were not 

tightened according to specifications. Additionally, poor workmanship at a 

third-tier vendor led to difficulties in manufacturing payload cables. 

Page 75 GAO-06-327 Missile Defense
Appendix III: An Assessment of BMDS Prime 

Contractors’ Cost and Schedule Performance 

Program officials told us that the prime contractor had to direct 

management attention and considerable effort to rectify the effects of the 

subcontractor’s poor quality control procedures. In addition to citing 

quality issues, program officials told us that they continue to encounter 

integration-related problems as the program progresses with testing the 

payload at successively higher levels of integration. 

Program officials noted that the subcontractor has made some 

improvements to its quality control program that should minimize future 

quality-related problems. For example, the subcontractor instituted an onsite Quality Assurance Council to develop improvements to the quality 

process at all levels of the organization. Additionally, quality personnel 

increased the number of inspections and supervision of all processes to 

ensure quality control. 

Overall Performance of 

THAAD Contractor 

Declines 

During fiscal year 2005, the THAAD program incurred cumulative cost 

overruns on its prime contract. As of September 2005, the contractor was 

overrunning its budgeted costs for the fiscal year by approximately 

$19 million, but it was still ahead of schedule. Because the cost 

performance of the contractor prior to fiscal year 2005 was positive, the 

cumulative overrun through September 2005 was about $15 million. Figure 

7 illustrates the cumulative cost and schedule variances incurred by the 

program during the fiscal year. Judging from the contractor’s cost 

performance to date, we estimate that the contract could exceed its 

budgeted cost by about $48 million.

Page 76 GAO-06-327 Missile Defense
Appendix III: An Assessment of BMDS Prime 

Contractors’ Cost and Schedule Performance 

Figure 7: Terminal High Altitude Area Defense Fiscal Year 2005 Cost and Schedule 

Performance 

-20

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

Dollars in millions

Source: Contractor (data); GAO (analysis).

Fiscal year

Cumulative schedule variance

Cumulative cost variance

S

Au

ept. '05

g. '05

Feb.

Mar. '05

Apr. '05

May '05

June '05

July '05

 '05

Oct. '04

Nov. '04

Dec. '04

Jan. '05

During fiscal year 2005, the missile component continued to be the lead 

cause of the contractor’s negative performance. Major factors contributing

to the missile’s cost variance include delays in activating a test facility at 

the Air Force Research Laboratory, redesign of faulty valves, performance 

issues related to vibration and shock testing, and unplanned hardware 

fabrication, assembly, and support costs. Redesign, material growth, and 

integration issues related to the missile also contributed to the program’s 

unfavorable cost performance. 

Page 77 GAO-06-327 Missile Defense
Appendix IV: MDA’S Audit of GMD Appendix IV Interceptor Contractors : MDA’S Audit of GMD 

Interceptor Contractors 

In 2005, MDA’s Office of Safety, Quality, and Mission Assurance conducted 

audits of the contractor developing the interceptor’s exoatmospheric kill

vehicle and the Orbital Boost Vehicle. In its audit of the EKV contractor, a 

number of quality control weaknesses were documented. First, the MDA 

auditors found evidence that the prime contractor had not correctly 

communicated all essential EKV requirements to its subcontractor and the 

subcontractor had not communicated complete and correct requirements 

to its suppliers. For example, the prime contractor did not require the EKV 

contractor to use space-qualified parts—parts that have been proven to 

reliably withstand the harsh environment of space. Similarly, the auditors

found that the subcontractor had not always provided its suppliers with 

correct parts, materials, and processes requirements. For example, the 

auditors found multiple incidents in which the subcontractor required one 

supplier to abide by incorrect or outdated compliance documents. 

The audit also identified numerous instances in which the EKV 

subcontractor had not exercised good configuration control. In some 

cases, drawings did not reflect current changes. In others, assembly 

records did not agree with build records. For example, the assembly 

record for one component showed that it included a different part from 

the one recorded in its build record. In another, the assembly tag showed 

that a component was not built in the same configuration shown in the 

build record. 

Auditors found that the reliability of the EKV’s design cannot be 

determined and any estimates of its serviceable life are likely

unsupportable. The audit team established that the results from a March 

2004 failure modes effects and criticality analysis were not fully used to 

influence the design of the EKV and that the contractor has not planned or

performed a reliability demonstration, a maintainability analysis or 

demonstration, and does not plan reliability growth testing. Additionally, 

major requirements waivers approved on the basis of a short-term, limitedlife mission significantly limit service life and have not been fully vetted, 

accepted, and mitigated for longer-term operational use. 

Further, auditors determined that the contractor has no written policy 

involving qualification testing and does not require that its EKV 

subcontractor follow requirements established by industry, civilian, and 

military users of space and launch vehicles. For this reason, tests of the 

EKV under thermal vacuum conditions representative of those found in 

space are not being conducted. The auditors also identified numerous 

issues with EKV shock and vibration testing and found that the contractor

performs no formal qualification or acceptance tests on the EKV. 

Page 78 GAO-06-327 Missile Defense
Appendix IV: MDA’S Audit of GMD 

Interceptor Contractors 

Finally, the audit showed that because the contractor’s production 

processes are immature, the contractor cannot build a consistent and 

reliable product. For example, auditors found instances where work 

instructions were not followed and a number of deficiencies in the build 

books that lay out the plans and processes for manufacturing the EKV. 

Similarly, the auditors found that the contractor producing the Orbital 

Boost Vehicle needed to improve quality control processes and adherence 

to those processes. According to deficiency reports, the contractor, did 

not always, among other things, flow down requirements properly; 

practice good configuration management to ensure that the booster met 

form, fit, and function requirements; implement effective environmental 

stress screening; or have an approved parts, material, and processes 

management plan. 

Page 79 GAO-06-327 Missile Defense
Appendix V: Integrated Management Plan

Appendix V: Integrated Management Plan 

Event 0 – Block Capability Alternative 

• Block planning process completed 

• Long lead targets, tests and exercises identified 

• Affordability analysis completed 

• Acquisition strategy approved 

• Preliminary block plan approved 

Event 1 – Preliminary block definition 

• Block performance assessments updated 

• Detailed cost estimates/estimates at completions (EAC) available 

• Costs/benefit analysis updated 

• Risks assessed and mitigation programs established 

• Preliminary operational concept and operations architecture drafted 

• Integration test objectives defined 

• Preliminary designs for all elements/components/targets completed 

• Required funding identified for development 

• Integrated master schedule created 

• Preliminary block definition approved 

Event 2 – Final block definition 

• Performance assessments updated 

• Detailed cost estimates/EACs available 

• Risks assessed and mitigation programs updated 

• Military utility characterized and operational concept refined 

• Preliminary integration test plan available 

• Final design for all elements/components/targets completed 

• Funding available for development 

• Integrated master schedule updated 

• Block activation plan available 

• Block definition updated

Event 3 – First complete development article

• Detailed cost estimates/EACs available 

• Operational concept defined and operations architecture available 

• Test range and support planning completed 

• Military utility assessment completed 

• First development article/targets built and initial tests completed 

Page 80 GAO-06-327 Missile Defense
Appendix V: Integrated Management Plan

Event 4 – Element/Component development complete 

• Detailed cost estimates/EACs available 

• Block integration test planning completed 

• Element/component/targets development and testing complete 

• Support systems defined 

• Training systems defined 

• Fielding readiness assessed (initial defensive operations) 

Event 5 – Interim block integration and capability assessment 

• Detailed cost estimates/EACs available 

• Initial operational characterization completed 

• Interim block capability performance assessment 

• Initial transition planning completed

Event 6 – Fielding completed 

• Detailed cost estimate/EACs available 

• Transition plans completed and funded 

• Operational characterization and certification completed 

• System/element/component performance assessment completed 

• Support systems planned, budgeted and approved

• Training systems planned, budgeted and approved 

• Production plans available 

• Updated block definition available 

• Combatant commander and service memorandum of agreements 

coordinated

• MDA capability declaration 

Event 7 – Block capability activation 

• Combatant commander planning complete 

• Equipment introduction and checkout 

• Unit level training, qualification, and certification complete 

• Integrated BMDS level training, qualification, and certification compete 

Page 81 GAO-06-327 Missile Defense
Appendix VI: Scope and Methodology Appendix VI: Scope and Methodology 

To examine the progress MDA made in fiscal year 2005 toward its Block 

2004 goals, we examined the efforts of individual programs that are 

developing BMDS elements under the management of MDA, such as the 

GMD program. The elements included in our review collectively 

accounted for 73 percent of MDA’s fiscal year 2005 research and 

development budget requests. We compared each element’s completed 

activities, test results, demonstrated performance, and actual cost 

achieved in fiscal year 2005 with those planned for fiscal year 2005. In 

making this comparison, we examined System Element Reviews, test 

schedules, test reports, and MDA briefing charts. To assess each element’s 

progress toward its cost goals, we reviewed Contract Performance 

Reports and Defense Contract Management Agency’s analyses of these 

reports (if available). We applied established earned value management 

techniques to data captured in Contract Performance Reports to 

determine trends and used established earned value management formulas 

to project the likely costs of prime contracts at completion. We also 

developed data collection instruments, which were submitted to MDA and 

each element program office, to gather detailed information on completed 

program activities, including tests, design reviews, prime contracts, and 

estimates of element performance. In addition, we discussed fiscal year 

2005 progress with officials in MDA’s Business Management Office and 

each element program office, as well as the office of DOD’s Director, 

Operational Test and Evaluation. 

To determine whether MDA achieved the quantity, cost, and performance 

goals it set for Block 2004 in February 2003, we examined fielding 

schedules, System Element Reviews, test reports, budget estimate 

submissions, and the U.S. Strategic Command’s Military Utility 

Assessment. We also held discussions with the Aegis BMD, GMD, and 

C2BMC program offices; MDA’s Office of Safety, Quality and Assurance; 

and the Office of the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation. 

We determined the conditions that prevented MDA from achieving its 

Block 2004 goals by examining MDA’s implementation of its Integrated 

Management Plan, the Secretary of Defense 2002 memo establishing the 

Ballistic Missile Defense Program, and audits conducted by MDA’s Office 

of Safety, Quality, and Mission Assurance. We also held discussions with 

MDA’s Offices of Business Management and Safety, Quality, and Mission 

Assurance and the GMD Program Office. 

In determining the actions MDA is taking to address problems that 

affected the outcome of Block 2004, we reviewed MDA Assurance 

Provisions, recommendations of the Mission Return to Flight Task Force,

Page 82 GAO-06-327 Missile Defense
Appendix VI: Scope and Methodology 

memorandums of agreement between MDA and the Defense Contract 

Management Agency and MDA and the National Aeronautics and Space

Administration, GMD award fee letters, and directives issued by MDA’s 

Director. We also discussed MDA’s plans with members of the Mission 

Readiness Task Force and officials in the agency’s Office of Safety, 

Quality, and Mission Assurance. 

To ensure that MDA-generated data used in our assessment are reliable,

we evaluated the agency’s management control processes. We discussed 

these processes extensively with MDA upper management. In addition, we 

confirmed the accuracy of MDA-generated data with multiple sources 

within MDA and, when possible, with independent experts. To assess the 

validity and reliability of prime contractors’ earned value management 

systems and reports, we analyzed audit reports prepared by the Defense 

Contract Audit Agency. Finally, we assessed MDA’s internal accounting 

and administrative management controls by reviewing MDA’s Federal 

Manager’s Financial Integrity Report for Fiscal Years 2003, 2004, and 2005. 

Our work was performed primarily at MDA headquarters in Arlington, 

Virginia. At this location, we met with officials from the Kinetic Energy 

Interceptors Program Office; Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense Program 

Office; Airborne Laser Program Office; Command, Control, Battle 

Management, and Communications Program Office; Business Management 

Office; and Office of Safety, Quality, and Mission Assurance. In addition, 

we met with officials from the Space Tracking and Surveillance System 

Program Office, El Segundo, California; and the Ground-based Midcourse 

Defense Program Office and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense Project

Office, Huntsville, Alabama. We also interviewed officials from the office 

of the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, Arlington, Virginia. 

We conducted our review from May 2005 through March 2006 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Page 83 GAO-06-327 Missile Defense
Appendix VII: 

A

GAO Contact and Staff 

cknowledgments 

Page 84 GAO-06-327

Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

Paul Francis (202) 512-4841 or FrancisP@gao.gov

In addition to the individual named above, Barbara Haynes, Assistant 

Director, Ivy Hübler, LaTonya Miller, Karen Richey, Adam Vodraska, and 

Jonathan Watkins made key contributions to this report. 

Missile Defense

GAO Contact 

Acknowledgments 

(120442) 
GAO’s Mission The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation and 

investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its 

constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance and 

accountability of the federal government for the American people. GAO 

examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and policies; 

and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance to help

Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO’s 

commitment to good government is reflected in its core values of 

accountability, integrity, and reliability. 

The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no cost

is through GAO’s Web site (www.gao.gov). Each weekday, GAO posts 

newly released reports, testimony, and correspondence on its Web site. To

have GAO e-mail you a list of newly posted products every afternoon, go 

to www.gao.gov and select “Subscribe to Updates.” 

The first copy of each printed report is free. Additional copies are $2 each. 

A check or money order should be made out to the Superintendent of 

Documents. GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard. Orders for 100 or 

more copies mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent. Orders 

should be sent to: 

U.S. Government Accountability Office 

441 G Street NW, Room LM 

Washington, D.C. 20548 

To order by Phone: Voice: (202) 512-6000 

TDD: (202) 512-2537 

Fax: (202) 512-6061 

Contact: 

Web site: www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm

E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov

Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470 

Gloria Jarmon, Managing Director, JarmonG@gao.gov (202) 512-4400 

U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7125 

Washington, D.C. 20548 

Paul Anderson, Managing Director, AndersonP1@gao.gov (202) 512-4800

U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149 

Washington, D.C. 20548 

Obtaining Copies of 

GAO Reports and 

Testimony

Order by Mail or Phone 

To Report Fraud,

Waste, and Abuse in 

Federal Programs 

Congressional 

Relations 

Public Affairs 

PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER