THROUGH “ENGAGEMENT”:

ASSESSING THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENS

THEATER ENGAGEMENT PLANNING PROC

Thomas M. Jordan

Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Thomas-Durell Young

April 2000
The views expressed in this report are those of the authors 

not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Depart

the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Governmen

report is cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.

*****

The authors would like to express their sincere gratitude 

following offices and individuals for assistance in researchi

subject, as well as providing comments on earlier drafts of this 

the J-5 Strategy Division, Joint Staff, COL John Nelsen, U

Thomas Szayna, LTC Mike Staszak, USAR, Dr. Jim Wirtz, C

Lord (Ret), COL Paul Guzowski, USAF, and LTC James Huggins

*****

Comments pertaining to this report are invited and sh

forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Arm

College, 122 Forbes Ave., Carlisle, PA 17013-5244. Copies of thi

may be obtained from the Publications and Production Office by 

commercial (717) 245-4133, FAX (717) 245-3820, or via the Inte

rummelr@awc.carlisle. army. mil

*****

Most 1993, 1994, and all later Strategic Studies Institut

monographs are available on the SSI Homepage for ele

dissemination. SSI’s Homepage address is: http://carlisle-ww

.mil/ usassi/welcome.htm

*****

The Strategic Studies Institute publishes a monthly 

newsletter to update the national security community on the res

our analysts, recent and forthcoming publications, and up

conferences sponsored by the Institute. Each newsletter also pro

strategic commentary by one of our research analysts. If y

interested in receiving this newsletter, please let us know by e

outreach@awc.carlisle.army.mil or by calling (717) 245-3133.

ISBN 1-58487-020-6

ii
The Department of Defense (DoD) launched in 1997

ambitious planning initiative that could have a major 

upon how resources are allocated among the mi

departments and the combatant commanders-in-chief (C

The National Command Authorities have directe

geographic CINCs to implement the administration’s stra

“shaping” within their areas of responsibility. In the pa

single, unifying planning mechanism existed within the 

Strategic Planning System to address shaping. As a resu

DoD now seeks to ensure that all shaping activities conduc

the U.S. armed forces are executed to further U.S. poli

national security objectives.

The Theater Engagement Plan (TEP) system has b

existence for almost 4 years. From its early problematic ini

and the reluctance of many in the DoD and the armed fo

take it seriously, the TEP has become a major agend

particularly for the geographic CINCs. Many in the com

commands see the TEP as providing an important instr

that strengthens their respective positions in the never 

struggle to obtain the forces and capabilities needed to imp

theater strategies. Therefore, the TEP must be consisten

military department Title 10 responsibilities to raise, tra

equip the U.S. armed forces.

The authors of this study assess the TEP with the v

analyzing how to make the planning system better. The St

Studies Institute is pleased to offer this study fo

consideration of the national defense community, partic

those who have an interest in the joint strategic planning 

Department of Defense.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR

Interim Director

Strategic Studies Institute

iii
 OF THE AUTHORS

COLONEL THOMAS M. JORDAN is commander of t

Infantry Regiment, The Old Guard, at Fort Meyer, Vir

He was a Strategic Analyst in the Commandant’s Init

Group from June 1998 to June 1999. He has command

infantry rifle company, and served as operations offic

mechanized infantry battalion in the United State

Germany. He most recent assignments include Ch

Warplans, G3, III Corps at Fort Hood, Texas; Comman

2-16 Infantry at Fort Riley, Kansas; and Strategy Pla

Strategy Division, J5, the Joint Staff, Washington

Colonel Jordan holds a B.A. in Political Science from U

Iowa University, an M.P.A. from Troy State Universit

a Masters in Military Art and Science from the Sch

Advanced Military Studies at Fort Leavenworth, Ka

His military education includes ranger and air

training, Command and General Staff College, the Sch

Advanced Military Studies, and the Army War Colle

PROFESSOR DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR., becam

Interim Director of the Strategic Studies Institu

October 1999. He holds the Douglas MacArthur Profes

Research Chair at the U.S. Army War College. He join

Strategic Studies Institute in September 1994 o

retirement from the U.S. Army. His army career inclu

combat tour in Vietnam and a number of command and 

assignments. While serving in the Plans, Concept

Assessments Division and the War Plans Division 

Joint Staff, he collaborated in the developme

documents such as the National Military Strategy, the 

Strategic Capabilities Plan, the Joint Military 

Assessment, national security directives, and presid

decision directives. He also was Director of Mi

Requirements and Capabilities Management at the 

Army War College. He is a graduate of the U.S. 

Command and General Staff College and the Nationa

iv
Aeronautical University and a J.D. from Wid

University School of Law.

DR. THOMAS-DURELL YOUNG is at the Cent

Civil-Military Relations, Naval Postgraduate S

Monterey, CA. From 1992 until 2000, he was a Res

Professor at the Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Arm

College. He received his Ph.D. from the Univers

Geneva, Geneva, Switzerland and is a 1990 graduate 

U.S. Army War College.

v
 THROUGH “ENGAGEMENT”:

ASSESSING THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENS

THEATER ENGAGEMENT PLANNING PROC

Every dollar we devote to preventing conflicts, promot

democracy, opening markets, and containing disease a

hunger brings a sure return in security and long-te

savings.

1

The Department of Defense (DoD) has launched 

and ambitious planning initiative that could have a 

impact upon how resources are allocated among the a

services and the combatant commands. The administ

has directed the geographic combatant comman

in-chief (CINCs) to implement the administra

strategy of “shape, respond and prepare now.”

2

 Of c

DoD, the Military Departments, and constituent ag

have long been accustomed to “preparing” for pot

conflicts so that the U.S. armed forces could “respond” 

directed by the national command authorities (N

“Shaping,” however, has been a bit more problematic. A 

strong argument could be made that the U.S. a

services have long been engaged in shaping activities 

international environment. From U.S. Marines a

occupying and governing Caribbean and Central Ame

countries in the early part of this century, to 

servicemen and women engaged in peace-enforce

operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina today, many pas

present U.S. operations can be categorized as sh

activities.

3

What is perhaps new is how these activities are 

planned and managed within DoD.

4

 First, the 

strategic ambiguity that followed the Cold Wa

dissipated sufficiently for the administrati

contemplate taking advantage of what Secretary of De

Cohen calls a period of “. . . strategic opportunity.”

1
values of representative democracy and market economics 

embraced in many parts of the world, creating n

opportunities to promote peace, prosperity, and enhan

cooperation among nations.

5

In other words, “shaping” seeks to promote the spr

“Western” liberal norms (e.g., representative demo

respect for basic human rights, adherence to the rule o

etc.), with the primary objective of obviating the ne

“respond” to future crises.

6

 There should be no quest

the growing import of “shaping” from the perspect

DoD; of the two critical corporate goals of the departm

required by the Government Performance and Resul

of 1993, “shaping” constitutes the first.

7

The mission of shaping is to be conducted with

framework of the administration’s strateg

“engagement,” which states, “[W]e must be prepare

willing to use all appropriate instruments of national 

to influence the actions of other states and non

actors.”

8

 The administration rejects isolationism, let 

adopting a reactive, passive approach towar

relationship with the world.

9

 On the contrary, the wor

be engaged and the adoption of Western ideals and n

will be advocated to further U.S. national interests. Sh

the international environment has become, in esse

primary national objective, as opposed to, perhap

important instrument of policy.

Second, with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

playing a more direct role in the “planning” of shap

DoD envisages that “shaping” will achieve greater res

efficiencies and more direct strategic relevance. DoD 

has the objective of ensuring that all shaping act

conducted by the U.S. armed forces are executed with

parameters of law

11

 and policy.

12

 In this particular as

implementing the president’s strategy, DoD faces di

challenges and opportunities. In the past, no single, u

planning mechanism within the Joint Strategic Pla

2
situation stands in contrast to the elabo

well-developed, and time-tested planning methodolog

Joint Staff (acting on behalf of the Chairman of the 

Chiefs of Staff (CJCS)), employs in directing the geogr

combatant commanders-in-chief to develop deliberat

plans.

1 3

 In effect, the Joint Staff and comb

commanders are now asserting greater influence 

control over the shaping activities that the armed 

have been carrying out for many years.

The method designed by the CJCS to bring disc

and central control to these diffuse activities is the re

introduced “Theater Engagement Planning” process

five geographic combatant CINCs and the Joint 

(acting as an Executive Agent for two Theater Engage

Plans [TEPs]) have been tasked by the CJCS to de

TEPs which express their “. . . intent, priorities, task

resources required to achieve objectives over the [F

Year Defense Program].”

14

Heretofore geographic combatant CINCs individ

employed their assigned forces for shaping acti

without discernible corporate consideration of relative 

and global priorities. Furthermore, these commanders 

been primarily concerned with executing operation

conducting deliberate planning and the key res

allocation battles have traditionally been fought amon

Services. The TEP process could provide the comb

CINCs a stronger opportunity to influence this polit

sensitive debate. Moreover, given the criticality of sh

missions, combatant commanders may now have a 

objective mechanism to compete for resources

implications for the assignment of roles and definit

missions among the various components of the U.S. a

services are staggering.

The purpose of this essay is to assess the TEP syst

order to identify problems and recommend refor

improve the overall process. The authors argue 

3
direction, it has a number of weaknesses that need 

eliminated if DoD is to gain better control over, and pr

direction to, shaping activities. At the same ti

reformed “TEP” process could replace certain atavisti

War planning practices with those suited to the cu

international environment. In view of the potential fo

far-reaching implications, it is in the best interests 

U.S. Government and DoD that the TEP process be re

as quickly as possible.

Background.

The National Military Strategy defines shaping 

following way:

U.S. Armed Forces help shape the international environm

primarily through their inherent deterrent qualities 

through peacetime military engagement. The shaping elem

of our strategy helps foster the institutions and internatio

relationships that constitute a peaceful strategic environm

by promoting stability; preventing and reducing conflict 

threats; and deterring aggression and coercion.

15

And indeed, particularly since the end of the Cold Wa

U.S. armed forces have been involved in shapin

international security environment. Partnership for 

(PfP) exercises and exchanges, International Mi

Education and Training, mobile education team sem

under the Expanded International Military Educatio

Training program, in addition to the “Enhanced Rela

programs and activities which have been undertak

U.S. Army Pacific since the mid-1970s, are but a very 

the types of missions in which the armed services ar

engaged.

16

 More to the point, “shaping” is not a pa

issue or ephemeral policy. The National Defense Pa

bipartisan body hardly known for shying away 

criticizing the administration’s defense policy, str

endorsed the concept of shaping.

17

 “Done well, [shapin

enable the United States and its allies to influenc

4
benefit.”

18

What has been missing in these engagement progra

an effective and coherent national-level meth

orchestrating and effecting a priority of these act

above the level of individual geographic comb

commander’s regional focus. To be sure, ther

inter-agency processes in Washington for coordinatin

approving various shaping activities, funded b

Services, and executed under the command authority 

geographic combatant CINCs. Until the CJCS 

combatant CINCs implemented the TEP process, how

there was no mechanism for an individual, let 

collective, assessment of the efficacy of these activiti

other words, there have been no centralized mea

examining whether, or to what extent, the va

CINC-conducted shaping activities supported the na

strategy of engagement. There have been no acc

standard measures of effectiveness or merit. While 

are a number of avenues that combatant commanders 

to influence the program objective memoranda (POM

the military departments, there are no specific mea

rationalize the provision of forces for CINCs’ engage

programs to ensure the most effective and eff

employment of defense resources by the combatant CI

The release of the president’s 1997 National Se

Strategy marked a significant change from the 1995 e

in that the 1995 strategy of “engagement” was given g

fidelity and direction in 1997 through “shaping.” The 

document establishes the need to “shape, respond, pr

now” which was strongly reflected in the administra

Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR).

19

 These forces br

to the fore in DoD the need for a disciplined approa

planning and executing shaping missions. A major ob

to overcome was the issue of whether, and how, the 

should become involved in a process traditionall

largely to the discretion of the combatant CINCs

attempt to provide oversight over the shaping activi

5
the geographic combatant CINCs know best 

respective areas of responsibility and should be left al

carry out their missions. After all, as stipulated in Tit

the geographic CINCs (vice the Joint Staff) carr

deliberate planning in their areas of responsibility (A

in accordance with direction from the Chairman cont

in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP).

20

 The 

developed by the CINCs are individually reviewed 

approved by the CJCS.

21

The reluctance by CINCs’ staffs to expand the pla

system to provide the Chairman with a means to infl

shaping missions was overcome by the Chairman an

Director of the Joint Staff whose personal involve

expedited the acceptance of the TEP concept. Subsequ

planners from the Office of the Secretary of Defense an

Joint Staff developed planning guidance to incorporat

shaping missions. This important reform initiativ

formalized by the revision of the Joint Strategic Pla

System (JSPS) in September 1997. The new 

Instruction stated that the JSCP would task CIN

develop, inter alia, “theater engagement plans (TE

peacetime engagement.” The NCA, via the Contin

Planning Guidance document, will direct the Chairm

specify which types of engagement and shaping act

will be carried out by the U.S. armed forces.

22

The Theater Engagement Planning Process.

Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG). The C

required by law to be promulgated annually and 

close-hold, highly classified document with lim

circulation.

23

 The CPG contains contingency pla

guidance from the NCA that is directly translated b

Chairman into the JSCP’s taskings to the CINCs. Foll

the QDR and as part of the Office of the Secreta

Defense’s keen interest in seeing a more disciplined m

6
established in the September 1997 CPG:

24

1. Directed the development of regional CINC TE

to include the full range of engagement activities . . .

2. Defined “Theater Engagement.”

3. Directed that TEPs be based on Prioritized Reg

Objectives.

4. Established a submission, review and app

process.

25

The appended “Prioritized Regional Objectives” w

be pursued by the geographic combatant commanders

are articulated in the following priority:

Tier I: shaping activities to be carried out;

Tier II: shaping activities to be carried out to the e

possible; and,

Tier III: shaping activities to be carried out as reso

permit.

A major weakness in the Prioritized Regional Obje

in the 1997 CPG is the absence of stated priorities 

theaters or regions, or even within tiered objectives

combatant command planner criticized the Prior

Regional Objectives stating that they are far too de

(i.e., they are, in effect, “tasks,” vice objectives). Mor

priorities among the combatant commands have yet 

established. A slight, but significant, nuance i

transmission of this guidance is that Prioritized Reg

Objectives are established in the CPG by regions, vice 

aligned with the Unified Command Plan’s (UCP) divis

geographic areas of responsibilities for the geogr

combatant commanders to facilitate their contin

planning.

27

Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). As part 

deliberate planning process the JSCP provides gui

and apportions resources to the regional comb

7
provided by the CPG, the Chairman subsequently tas

combatant CINCs, through the JSCP, to prepare 

respective operation plans, e.g., contingency plans,

2

some cases, functional plans.

29

 The revisions initiated 

TEP process led to the current JSCP including a ch

(Enclosure E, Engagement Planning Guidance) w

transmits the Prioritized Regional Objectives from 

CPG. Initial guidance in the JSCP for TEP directe

CINCs to shape the security environment in peacetim

the following objectives:

1. Access, interoperability, regional stability,

2. Strengthen coalitions, and

3. Facilitate the ability to respond.

30

This revision, in effect, gives the JSCP a dual role

now an operational document, as well as a delib

planning tool.

31

 The JSCP’s Prioritized Regional Obje

are given in the following order of import:

Tier I: vital

Tier II: important

Tier III: lesser important

32

The JSCP further reflects three categories of TEP e

as defined in the CJCS Manual on Theater Engage

Planning:

1. operations

2. exercises

3. other foreign military interaction (FMI), e.g.

visits, military-to-military contacts, International Mi

Education and Training, etc.

33

With this guidance the CINCs are expected to pr

two additional planning documents.

8
Theater Engagement Strategic Concept. This is defin

containing,

. . . a narrative statement of how engagement activities will 

employed to support achieving the CINC’s or execut

Agent’s objectives. [It] becomes the foundation of the TEP a

includes the commander’s intent; prioritized objectives; an

general discussion of the engagement tasks and activiti

Additionally, it identifies at the macro-level the forces a

other resources required to accomplish the mission.

35

Theater Engagement Strategic Concepts look out 5 

and remain effective until updated or superced

regional developments or prioritized regional objectiv

changed in the CPG or the JSCP. The initial str

concepts were due to the Joint Staff on April 1, 1998

Second, CINCs and Executive Agents de

Engagement Activity Annexes to their Theater En

ment Strategic Concepts. These annexes, all of 

support the CINC’s strategic concept, address the sp

military activities (operations, exercises, and fo

military interaction) that will take place each year of 

years covered by the TEP. The JSCP does not assign 

specifically for shaping. Rather, as a starting 

combatant CINCs plan their shaping activities using 

assigned to the combatant command (from the “Force

document), forces that rotationally deploy to the th

and those forces temporarily deployed for engage

activities.

37

 Any significant resource shortfall

identified and theoretically adjudicated in the TEP r

process.

38

 The CINCs submitted the initial Engage

Activity Annexes (designated as a “trial run” by the 

Staff) to the Joint Staff on August 1, 1998.

National Level Review of TEPs. After CINCs 

approved their TEPs, they are forwarded to the Joint 

for “review” and integration.

39

 The Chairman is respo

for ensuring that TEPs conform to the CPG’s 

guidance. In this review capacity he is responsib

9
plans and judging the impact such inadequacies could 

on achieving national strategic objectives and policies.

Joint Staff Operational Plans and Interopera

Directorate (J-7), specifically the Conventional War 

Division, is charged with overseeing the TEP r

process.

41

 The process affords review by the Office 

Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the Services

Defense Agencies, as well. The criteria for review ass

whether strategic concepts and supporting annexes su

the JSCP regional objective priorities, as well as addi

guidance derived from other national-level docum

Specifically, the review process uses three criteria:

1. adequacy (does the plan satisfy JSCP tasks and 

guidance?),

2. feasibility (is resource availability adequa

requirements?), and

3. acceptability (is the plan worth the cost?).

42

If the review finds any deficiencies, the respo

command will be required to address these issue

perhaps make changes. Once the TEPs have been revi

they are integrated into a “global family of plans

submitted as a whole to the Chairman for his approva

thereafter, for further review by the Under Secret

Defense for Policy.

43

Assessing the TEP Process.

As a general observation one must not be too crit

DoD’s effort to introduce a disciplined planning syst

shaping activities conducted by the U.S. armed force

TEP initiative attempts to exert control over diffus

long-standing defense activities and progr

Significantly, these activities and programs 

established by various pieces of key legislation 

administered widely throughout the U.S. de

community. Given the importance the administratio

10
engagement, the rapid introduction of the TEP p

should be seen as a significant advancement in planni

light of instituting a new process within DoD, the 

planning guidance was envisaged as a first effort 

evolutionary process. In view of the novel nature o

planning process, however, a number of procedura

conceptual problems have surfaced.

There are two levels of analysis when assessing the 

First, does the current system, as designed, work? Se

does the current TEP system feature the necessary lin

to the Planning, Programming and Budgeting S

(PPBS)

44

 and the Joint Strategic Planning System

authors argue that not only does the current TEP s

possess what can fairly be described as shortcoming

the system, as it now exists, is unlikely to introduc

necessary discipline effectively and efficiently to execu

shaping element of the president’s strategy. 

specifically, an examination of the TEP system ind

that many of its key features are not yet in harmony 

the JSPS and PPBS and, therefore, sub-optimally re

to the direction provided by the NCA. This section iden

where specific shortcomings in the existing TEP p

exists and recommends reforms to the TEP and 

processes. If implemented, these improvements s

enable the process to support better a strategy for sh

the international security environment, while ens

U.S. forces remain capable of responding to challen

U.S. national interests.

1. Measuring merit/effectiveness. An essential asp

strategic planning is the requirement for senior lead

establish priorities and develop a mechanism to m

compliance with their guidance. The current TEP p

fails to define or to examine what constitutes effe

shaping activities. While the system is well structu

inform the Joint Staff what the geographic comb

CINCs and their Executive Agents are doing, it is cur

incapable of demonstrating how effectively the

11
designed, does not set forth an appropriate “meas

merit/effectiveness.” This major oversight inhibit

Chairman’s ability to assess which “activities” conduc

a geographic CINC are more or less effective than o

For example, a combatant CINC can claim that “pres

is a shaping activity, but he is not asked in the proc

demonstrate how this is an effective tool of “engagem

The lack of a standardized, across-combatant com

system to measure the merit/effectiveness of sh

activities conducted within combatant commands ne

any attempt to assess all of the TEPs, individuall

collectively. If priorities within regions were establish

absence of measures of merit/effectiveness prec

efficient application of scarce resources to accom

regional objectives. Even if inter-regional priorities 

established at the national level, it follows that the l

measures of merit/effectiveness prevents effi

allocation of resources among regions or commands.

2. Title 10, United States Code Ambiguities. C

linked to the lack of measures of effectiveness i

politically sensitive issue of Title 10 authority o

Services that relates to the actual costs associated wi

shaping activities conducted by the CINCs. While Tit

U.S. Code designates that combatant CINCs po

“combatant command” over their assigned forces, C

possess little budgetary control over forces provided b

Services. Financial control remains predominantly w

the grasp of the Military Departments. Such cont

established by Title 10 Service functions that includ

responsibilities to “raise, train, and equip” the force

Services continue to guard their Title 10 authorities ag

encroachment by the combatant commanders.

As a result of this legal and bureaucratic hi

combatant command headquarters are not in a 

position to ascertain the effectiveness and efficien

shaping activities. Even the Services are not well-pre

12
activities are not segregated in Service Program Obj

Memoranda (POMs). In short, TEP planning and exec

conducted by the combatant CINCs, and the activities 

Services in providing TEP forces, are not harmoniz

ensure effective and efficient shaping activities. Ther

TEP activities cannot be assessed, even on a di

command or Service basis. While addressing this pr

could result in visceral reactions by the Services to 

scrutiny and resistance by the combatant CINCs to 

oversight, an essential aspect behind the developm

TEP, i.e., the ability to judge overall effectivene

engagement activities, will be unattainable otherwis

3. Future Years Defense Program. An early proble

issue concerning TEP was its incompatibility wit

important Planning, Programming, and Budgeting S

(PPBS), the process by which DoD translates mi

capability requirements into defense programs and b

items. As initially structured, the submission o

Engagement Activity Annexes was not aligned wit

POM development process. The TEP process was in

planned to cover the immediately succeeding 5 years, 

the Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP) covers the peri

years from the present. This programmatic mism

further isolated engagement activities from 

considered in the Services’ development of 

requirements. The top-down guidance provided i

engagement planning process is in the form of the 

Prioritized Regional Objectives, whereas the budg

authority to develop forces resides in the Services who 

their programs in a bottom-up fashion. Not surpris

after the first “trial run” of the TEP, five of the six C

TEPs had unfunded activities. Also, the dates of the C

TEP submissions were not aligned with submission o

Integrated Priority Lists (IPLs),

45

 further inhibiting 

from influencing the PPBS process.

In a move to improve this situation, the Director 

Joint Staff effected several important reforms in Feb

13
every other year (vice yearly as initially envisaged), e

in certain circumstances.

47

 Second, Engagement A

Annexes will be submitted annually on October 

harmony with the Integrated Priority List submissio

the combatant CINCs. IPLs are employed by the comb

commanders as a way to submit their force pro

priorities through the CJCS to the Assistant Secret

Defense for Program Analysis and Evaluation.

48

 Thi

finally, the reform extended the planning horizon from 

years, aligning the last 6 years of this planning period 

the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG),

49

 as well as wi

Future Years Defense Program. Significantly, comb

commanders will be able to identify force requiremen

shaping early enough to include them in their IPLs.

5

4. “Review” vice “Assessment” of TEPs. One will 

that the current TEP system specifies that the CINCs’ 

are reviewed and presented for approval to the CJCS 

part of a “globally-integrated family of engagement pla

Thus, the Joint Staff chose not to “review” TEPs ag

each other. In effect, the lack of measur

merit/effectiveness limits the review of the Joint 

simply to examining whether a particular comma

Theater Engagement Strategic Concept is supported 

accompanying Engagement Activity Annexes. There 

yet, no step that assesses whether a specific TEP sup

national objectives. Where there are shortfalls, the l

comparable data at the strategic level inhibit

Chairman from being able to make informed res

decisions. Indeed, one can see where “have” CINCs 

EUCOM) will wish to protect their peacetime allo

forces by demonstrating their heavy involveme

shaping, while “have not” CINCs (e.g., U.S. Sou

Command) may attempt to master the TEP proce

establish that their shaping requirements necessit

higher peacetime allocation of forces. Again, stra

disciplined planning, and priorities are likely to be left 

the decisionmaking equation.

14
process is the decision to incorporate TEP directly in

Chairman’s deliberate planning system. The r

criteria, one recalls, is essentially the same as 

employed when reviewing deliberate plans developed 

combatant commanders: (1) feasibility, (2) adequacy

(3) acceptability.

52

 Two fundamental problems resul

the decision to incorporate TEP into the deliberate pla

system. One relates specifically to TEP and the other, 

broader than TEP, concerns the incomplete adheren

the CJCS to statutory strategic planning requiremen

As to the first point, the decision to incorporate TE

the deliberate planning system reflects the Joint S

initial decision to view TEP similarly to conventiona

planning. The problem is that these plans, let 

activities executed by the plans, are not at all simi

typical war plans. Some examples of these difference

1. Unlike deliberate plans, TEPs are plans tha

presently and continually executed. A TEP more accu

resembles the kinds of products that emerge from 

action planning where one sees the results of plannin

its relationship to outcomes.

2. Deliberate planning products address a sp

situation or contingency and describe a projected end-

while engagement is open-ended. A shaping end-st

more like a vision than an objective. Moreover, 

successes and failures cannot be ascertained quickly 

building “institutions” takes time).

3. Combatant CINCs do not completely control m

the constituent elements in a TEP.

53

4. Risk assessment in the area of shaping is dif

from risk assumptions and assessments applied i

development of operation plans.

54

5. Deliberate planning is not focused on operation t

or force readiness. Units are apportioned for pla

purposes assuming that they will be ready at 

15
and, therefore, depend more directly upon the readin

the forces assigned to these missions.

6. The assessment process in deliberate planning fo

on the application of military judgment withi

parameters of the defined situation that provides the 

for the plan. TEP, on the other hand, involve

expenditure of resources at some level of effort. The

TEP must be assessed in view of the national and th

strategy, NCA priorities and regional objectives.

Two points emerge from this review of TEP an

Deliberate Planning System. First, while TEP

generally developed in conformity with the Joint Ope

Planning and Execution System (JOPES) format, the

markedly different from deliberate plans. Second, give

finding, other than accomplishing a perfunctory over

it makes little sense for the Joint Staff merely to “re

vice assess them.

55

 Clearly, a full assessment is requ

DoD is to be able to make accurate and rational res

decisions regarding shaping requirements.

5. Areas of Responsibility and the UCP. Cu

planning guidance documents categorize Prior

Regional Objectives within regions; regions which d

match with the assigned areas of responsibility o

geographic combatant CINCs. The Office of the Secret

Defense and the Department of State are organized 

regional lines which simply do not match up with 

defined areas of command responsibility. It is unreaso

to assume, let alone argue, that CINC AORs, whic

subject to change, should be aligned with regional bu

in the Departments of State and Defense.

Another vexatious issue relates to shortcomings 

UCP itself. Three countries key to U.S. national sec

Russia, Canada, and Mexico do not fall unde

responsibility of any geographic combatant comman

Thus, the TEP for Russia is developed by the J-5 Divis

the Joint Staff, but executed by various comb

16
TEP purposes, is assigned to U.S. Southern Comm

whereas the Canadian TEP is the responsibility of 

Forces Command, previously known as USAC

Notwithstanding the Mexican and Canadian cases, th

of command nullius for Russia leads to, due to 

overlapping, five combatant CINCs listing sh

activities with Russia in their respective TEPs

assigning these three countries to combatant CINCs r

in inefficiencies and muddled guidance. Moreover, it m

little sense to have the Joint Staff engaging in this t

deliberate planning since the staff is removed fro

execution.

TEP: Unfinished Business.

Notwithstanding the important reform of b

aligning the TEP and PPBS processes, additional re

should be considered for implementation. These ref

that the authors envisage, would greatly improv

current process and fall under four broad categories:

1. the requirement of the Chairman to reform the 

Strategic Planning System the better to effect str

plans to establish global and regional priorities for sha

2. the need to revise the UCP,

3. the need to develop measures of merit, and

4. the merit of fusing the TEP and the Delib

Planning processes.

1. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Two 

current authors have argued elsewhere that one o

weaknesses of the JSPS since the end of the Cold Wa

been the reluctance of successive Chairmen of the 

Chiefs of Staff to exercise their Title 10 responsibilitie

effect strategic plans.

59

 This would require the Chairm

take NCA guidance (the National Security Strateg

Contingency Planning Guidance) and establish g

17
regional priorities, as well as the developmen

operational orientation of the U.S. armed forces. Ap

the issue of TEP, the Chairman, by establishin

strategic priorities, could make significant improveme

this endeavor in two important areas.

First, strategic priorities would enhance the Chair

Program Recommendation (CPR) for influencin

development of Service POMs to ensure that they ad

the force structure requirements entailed by “shaping

CPR provides the personal views of the CJCS t

Secretary of Defense concerning key defense pla

issues. These issues are gleaned from a variety of so

including the work of the Joint Requirements Ove

Council (JROC),

60

 and the Joint Warfighting Capab

Assessment (JWCA)

61

 teams, CINC input, and 

deliberations. Similarly the CJCS provides his per

evaluation of the adequacy of support afforded the CIN

the Service and Defense Agency POMs in the Chair

Program Assessment (CPA), the content of which is 

informed by a variety of sources.

Second, exercising his authority to effect strategic 

the Chairman should also take the Prioritized Pla

Objectives contained in the Contingency Plan

Guidance (CPG) document and derive from them prio

and guidance for the combatant CINCs. Just a

Chairman must take the CPG and establish prioritie

guidance in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSC

the CINCs to develop operation, contingency and func

plans, he should do the same as regards guidance f

development of Theater Engagement Plans. This r

would provide improved guidance to the CINCs. I

would force the Joint Staff to think of force assignmen

TEP missions as being more than simply the process u

assign forces to combatant CINCs, those rotatio

deployed forces to the theater, and temporarily dep

forces for engagement activities.

18
the Chairman of the JSCP as outlined above would sol

current problem where the CPG’s Prioritized Reg

Objectives are listed by region, vice AOR as establish

the Unified Command Plan. Yet, other nettlesome 

remain to be addressed regarding the UCP. Most impo

is the need for Russia to be addressed in the UCP. 

sure, how the U.S. armed forces will deal with Rus

determined in the UCP has repercussions far beyond 

related to TEP. That said, one would think that

minimum, a coherent and effective Russian TEP, 

implies clear lines of responsibility and allocati

resources, should be a high priority for the NCA and 

The issue of Mexico and Canada need to be addr

separately, though they share one key common

Defense cooperation with both Mexico and Canada ha

been addressed through special bilateral bodies f

under the Joint Staff.

62

 As such, both countries are a

deal directly with the Joint Staff and by-pass a comb

CINC: a coveted status. The TEPs for both countrie

developed by the J-5 Strategic Plans and Policy Direc

of the Joint Staff.

Canada presents a relatively easy case to addres

Joint Staff through the Canada-U.S. Cooper

Committee coordinates defense cooperation with Ca

and political guidance is derived from the Permanent 

Board on Defense. Whereas cooperation with Mex

strictly limited, that with Canada is all-inclusive.

63

 

the breadth and depth of cooperation that exists be

our two departments of defense and armed forces

rather ridiculous even to consider thinking there is a 

for a “TEP” for Canada, let alone assigning it to U.S. 

Forces Command for engagement purposes. Indeed

mere existence of such a plan could be politically exp

in Ottawa: why does the U.S. DoD think it needs to “sh

developed democracy which is also a global ally? One 

think that Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia

select NATO allies should not be addressed by a comb

19
time and effort, let alone politically injudicious. In

combatant CINCs should coordinate their TEP cam

plans with key allies to ensure that we are not duplic

their own shaping efforts.

64

 Defense activities carried 

combatant CINCs with allied armed forces should fall 

the “respond” strategic concept (as they are consider

Chairman’s exercise program) in the National Se

Strategy where they would more appropriately be pla

and executed.

Bilateral defense cooperation with Mexico is addr

in the Joint Mexico-U.S. Defense Commission

implementation of the TEP for Mexico was muddled i

both U.S. Southern Command and U.S. Joint F

Command (formerly U.S. Atlantic Command)

6

responsibilities for that country’s TEP implement

However, since March 1999, as mentioned above

Southern Command has the lead for TEP plannin

implementation. While perhaps outside of the purv

this particular essay, it seems to make little sense to 

Mexico in a state of command nullius for delib

planning purposes given that U.S. Southern Comman

has the lead to develop the Mexico TEP.

Finally, the Continental United States (CONUS

not formally fall under a combatant commander. The c

commander that fills that requirement is CINC U.S. 

Forces Command. This is an important consideration 

that many “shaping” activities physically take pla

CONUS under the sponsorship of another combatant C

or use assets assigned to the Service components of 

Joint Forces Command (e.g., Partnership for 

exercises that take place in CONUS). Given that 

Forces Command’s AOR currently consists of the A

Islands, Greenland, and Iceland (and Canada for T

consideration should be given to directing tha

command concentrate its focus on developing supp

TEPs for the other CINCs, as opposed to spendi

resources on such a limited TEP program of its own. W

20
CONUS and most of them falling under U.S. Joint F

Command, ensuring that the other geographic comb

commanders’ TEPs have adequate forces and reso

based in CONUS should be that CINC’s priority.

67

3. Assessing TEPs. DoD has determined that the 

Staff will “review” TEPs, as opposed to “assess” the

present, the TEP review process is incapable of ascerta

which specific shaping activities undertaken 

combatant CINC should be denied to provide resour

another CINC with greater priority or who can make 

use of the resources. Hence, there is a need to deve

standard by which shaping activities are judged to 

value in meeting national objectives. This is not, howev

argue for the introduction of a cumbersome quantitat

based assessment process that would provide a limite

rigid means of assessment. To be useful, the assess

process must be capable of addressing accuratel

intangible, and admittedly subjective, aspects of sh

activities. For this reason, the authors argue that s

system needs to be based upon the principle of “merit

“effectiveness” to inhibit the introductio

quantitative-based methodology.

The genesis of this problem can be traced to the fail

DoD planning to establish priorities among regions. 

the case of the problem of the mismatch of the 

Prioritized Regional Objectives to the geogr

combatant commander’s AORs, however, this doe

absolve the Chairman from his Title 10 responsibilit

effect strategic plans. This responsibility includes de

from NCA guidance the establishment of glob

inter-regional priorities to direct the operation of the 

armed forces.

68

 In consequence, the creation of a syst

measures of merit, broadly applicable across all comb

commands, along with the revision of transl

Prioritized Regional Objectives into prioritized guida

the JSCP to the combatant CINCs, would greatly im

the ability of DoD to ascertain whether planned sh

21
and where resources need to be redirected.

69

4. Deliberate Planning and TEP. TEPs are cur

treated similarly to deliberate plans developed 

combatant CINC. For the numerous reasons cited a

the current authors argue that TEP are simpl

deliberate plans, and importantly, should not mere

“reviewed,” but also “assessed” by the Joint Staff. In

U.S. Code requires that the CJCS should:

Advis[e] the Secretary [of Defense] on critical deficiencies 

strengths in force capabilities (including manpower, logis

and mobility support) identified during the preparation 

review of contingency plans and assessing the effect of su

deficiencies and strengths on meeting national secu

objectives and policy and on strategic plans (emph

added).

70

In other words, the law is quite clear that there 

expectation that the CJCS should “assess” all o

deliberate plans produced by the CINCs, i.e., produ

analysis of all of the plans collectively to ensure tha

meet the stated intentions and spirit of the administra

policy. This requirement should extend the to TEPs, a

“review” alone of individual TEPs does not provid

additional level of analysis, nor does it mee

requirements of Title 10, U.S. Code.

Additionally, the early determination to include T

the Deliberate Planning system raises an unintende

important question. What should be the relatio

between a combatant commander’s TEP and his delib

planning requirements? In other words, should comb

CINCs continue to develop separate plans for “shaping

“responding” using two discrete systems, where they 

not be mutually supportive, let alone closely coordina

It would appear that the developers of the TEP s

placed it in the deliberate planning process without 

considering these important questions. Either intend

22
to develop, between shaping and responding that is 

artificial and not particularly useful in implementin

National Security Strategy. To be sure, the delib

planning system served the country well during the 

War when threats were clearly discernable, predic

and quantifiable. Shaping was undertaken during 

period, however, only as a secondary mission for the 

armed forces to that of preparing for global conflict. 

rather blunt, given the current international environ

one needs to consider what is the utility of addre

shaping and responding through the Deliberate Pla

process separately.

Given the priorities of the administration and D

more inclusive and holistic approach to operation pla

and shaping should be considered. This initiative s

begin with the fact the U.S. armed forces spend more 

resources and effort engaged in “shaping” than th

“responding.” This is not to argue that preparatio

conflict should be eschewed. Rather, one must reco

that the current Joint Strategic Planning System pro

separate, and not necessarily coordinated, plan

“shaping” and “responding.” The authors argue 

combatant command and Joint Staff planners s

approach shaping and responding in the same pla

continuum, vice continuing the current system w

response planning remains reactive and detached 

shaping.

More specifically, JSCP-directed deliberate pla

guidance should outline the outcomes NCA expects 

each planning scenario and how U.S. forces engag

shaping can effect positive changes short of war

guidance to develop TEPs should address the poss

that shaping activities might not have the desired eff

specific countries. In short, operation and contingency 

and TEP could be conducted simultaneously 

concomitantly. Under such a revised planning system

plans to shape and those to respond would be di

23
One could envisage (see Figure 1) that a refo

TEP/deliberate planning system would resemble 

broadly the CJCS’s standing rules of engagement w

planning would transition as threat increased:

1. Peacetime activity (Shape/TEP),

2. Transition from peacetime to crisis (TEP/Delib

Planning), and

3. Transition from crisis to war (Respond/execut

Operation Plans).

 The implications of such reforms to the Joint Str

Planning and the Joint Operation Planning and Exec

systems would extend far beyond the current systems 

by the combatant CINCs. However, the benefits from s

change appear to far outweigh any disadvantage

addressing both missions in the same plan

24

Figure 1.

Integrated Shaping/Execution Planning Proc
for shaping and responding would facilitate coordin

between supporting and supported comba

commanders. This, in turn, would be reflected i

combatant commanders’ IPL submissions. 

improvement would enable the Services in their 

development to program the forces that the comb

CINCs will require for TEP purposes in the future. A fu

necessary step would be to introduce a cycle of TEP 

assessments, perhaps as part of the CJCS’s assessm

TEPs. The purpose of this risk assessment would be to 

the Chairman to reallocate resources globally to respo

changes in the international security environmen

better to exploit shaping opportunities. Thus, the allo

of forces for shaping activities would not necessarily h

be limited to the JSCP planning period of 2 years, but 

be made more responsive to the developme

international “opportunities.”

Treating shaping and responding in more equal ba

has great implications for force assignments t

combatant CINCs for both contingency and sh

planning requirements. Allocation of forces for sh

would be directly linked to the Chairman’s establishm

global and regional priorities in the revised JSCP tas

to the combatant CINCs. No longer would 

commanders be constrained to develop shaping plans 

only those forces assigned to the command. Rathe

JSCP would allocate forces to combatant commande

shaping and responding, thus ensuring that CINCs 

sufficient forces to carry out their full spectru

requirements.

Conclusion.

The Theater Engagement Planning process repres

major attempt at reforming a key aspect of the JSPS

the aim of aligning better the activities of the Service

combatant CINCs to national level strategic guidan

25
potential of obviating possible future threats to U.S

Western security interests, as well as facilitating the a

of the U.S. armed forces to respond to crises should sh

fail. DoD is attempting to move away from solely re

planning for potential conflict to where it can capture 

the U.S. armed services are already doing in the a

shaping and then ascertain where there are successe

deficiencies. Given the difficulty of effecting any ty

reform in an organization the size of DoD, it should 

surprising that change is often accomplished incremen

At present, significant progress has been made in 

aligning the joint planning process to suppor

engagement strategy of shaping. Many key reforms n

be taken, however, before shaping earns its rightful pl

the planning and budgeting processes in DoD. Measu

merit must be developed, as well as a clarification of T

prerogatives to force the Services to support comb

commanders with the necessary data to make measu

merit useful for decision making at the NCA leve

alignment of the TEP planning process with PPBS sig

an important advance. However, the Chairman 

continue this reform to its logical conclusion by ens

that his Chairman’s Program Recommendation (CPR

Chairman’s Program Assessment (CPA) are principal

independently influenced by IPLs submitted b

combatant CINCs. Moreover, the CJCS needs to imple

a more systematic assessment of TEPs to ensure tha

are collectively meeting the objectives of, and a

conformance with, the guidance given by the NCA

Unified Command Plan (UCP) needs to be revised t

more effectively with Canada and Russia. And finally

and the deliberate planning systems need to be merge

better to enable combatant CINCs to shape their ar

responsibility, as well as to be better prepared to tran

to crises and war when required. Albeit perhaps dism

by some as a minor issue in defense planning, the cont

reform of the TEP process has the potential to continu

26
secure the hard won peace that was produced followin

end of the Cold War.

Recommendations.

1. A system of measures of merit needs to be develo

enable the effective “assessment” of TEPs. The CJCS s

develop categories and combatant CINCs should be dir

to demonstrate how they meet their own measures of 

This reform will eliminate the current practice of the 

Staff merely “reviewing” TEPs, but include an assess

of them collectively.

2. Title 10 needs to be reexamined to ensure that S

components must provide the necessary informat

combatant CINCs to enable them to undertak

assessment of measures of merit. Specifically, comp

commands must be prepared to supply budg

information for any component temporarily or perman

assigned to a combatant CINC.

3. Global and regional priorities, guidance, and res

allocations for shaping should be communicated b

Chairman in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan.

4. The Unified Command Plan (UCP) should be re

in the following manner:

 a. Global allies (e.g., Canada) and select NATO al

not require TEPs. Combatant CINCs should be direc

coordinate their TEP campaign plans with select alli

 b. For TEP planning and execution purposes, R

should be assigned to U.S. European Command.

 c. U.S. Joint Forces Command should not develop 

for Iceland, Greenland, and the Azores. Rather, it s

focus its attention to becoming the force provider fo

TEPs planned and executed by the other comb

commanders.

27
basis for the Chairman’s Program Recommendation 

and the Chairman’s Program Assessment (CPA).

6. The Joint Staff needs to consider combining TEP 

response planning methodologies. A new plan

methodology should be developed that combines TE

deliberate planning in a coherent and integrated fash

ENDNOTES

1. William J. Clinton, A National Security Strategy for 

Century, Washington, DC: The White House, December 1999, p

2. Ibid., pp. 12-27. The strategy of “shape, respond and prepa

was first articulated in the administration’s previous NSS. See W

J. Clinton, A National Security Strategy for a New Century, Wash

DC: The White House, May 1997, pp. 6-14.

3. There is some conceptual blurring between what con

shaping and responding. For example, U.S. participation 

Stabilization Force in Bosnia is commanded by U.S. Eu

Command (USEUCOM). Officials at HQ USEUCOM claim th

participation in this force is not a “shaping” activity, but ra

“operation.” It is instructive to note that in the command’s “st

“support NATO operations” in Bosnia falls under “shapin

“Strategy of Readiness and Engagement,” Stuttgart, U.S. E

April 1998, p. 26.

4. Since the first National Security Strategy (NSS) was publ

1987, “shaping” the international security environment, in 

definitions, has been identified as an important national object

specific guidance for defense planning purposes has been slow to 

Note how guidance from the president has become more spe

terms of providing guidance to the Department of Defense. Exam

example, the evolution of the verbiage in the NSS: 1987 (p. 5, p

and 1988 (pp. 4-5, point 5) discusses the importance of “relation

1990 (p. 18) “project American values”; 1991 (p. 1) “an accurate 

the opportunities that history has put before us” and (p. 4) “prom

growth of free, democratic political institutions”; 1993 (p. 3) “a s

of engagement and leadership”; 1994 (pp. 18-20) “pro

democracy”; 1995 (p. ii) “leverage to reshape existing secur

economic structures and create news ones”; 1996 (p. ii), “A

remains engaged in the world and by enlarging the commu

secure, free market and democratic nations”; 1997 (p. 5) “Our 

28
and 1998 (p. 6) “Our strategy of enhancing U.S. security recogni

we face diverse threats requiring integrated approaches to def

nation, shape the international environment, respond to cris

prepare for an uncertain future.” Note that the National M

Strategy (NMS) has been equally ambiguous over time in t

providing direction for shaping activities. The 1992 NMS state

“Strengthen and enlarge the commonwealth of free nations that 

commitment to democracy and individual rights.” The next ve

the document (1995) provided a much more descriptive explan

how DoD was implementing the strategy of engagement (see p

8-9). The 1997 NMS provides the best explanation of shapi

description of DoD’s extensive efforts (pp. 1-2; 6-7; 12-14). The 

this discussion is to demonstrate that national guidance re

“shaping” has been ambiguous until rather recently and that onc

been made more clear, DoD has responded.

5. William S. Cohen, Annual Report to the President and the C

1999, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1999, 

6. For an informative journalistic review of U.S. shaping ac

see the numerous articles by Dana Priest in The Washingto

December 5, 14, and 31, 1998.

7. See Annual Report 1999, Appendix J-1 through J-4.

8. A National Security Strategy for a New Century, p. 1.

9. “The alternative to engagement is not withdrawal from th

it is passive submission to powerful forces of change—all the mor

at a time when our capacity to shape them is as great as it h

been.” Ibid., p. 2.

10. Through revisions in the Contingency Planning Gu

(CPG), September 1997. This issue is discussed below in greate

and length.

11. Law regarding security assistance is addressed in a st

sense throughout the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amend

the Arms Export Control Act, as amended. For an in depth ana

the legal and programmatic details and nuances of security ass

see The Management of Security Assistance, 18th E

Wright-Patterson AFB, OH: Defense Institute of Security Ass

Management, 1998, particularly pp. 49-59. The specific respons

of the combatant commanders established in law and policy are f

the UNAAF. “The combatant commanders are responsible 

29
they act to deter war and prepare for war and military operation

than war.” Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), Joint P

February 24, 1995, p. IV-6.

12. “Policy” governing aspects of security assistance is esta

in PDD-34, “Conventional Arms Transfer Policy,” February 17

See http://fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd34.htm. There were press 

published in 1998 that implied foreign training activities condu

U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) were conducted ou

U.S. law and policy. Given that such military activities can 

planned and executed with both the knowledge and support 

country teams in U.S. Embassies, it stretches the credibility of th

to suggest that these activities were done by SOCOM “free of ove

See the series of articles by Dana Priest in The Washington Po

12, 14, 15, 1998.

13. For a description of the deliberate planning system, se

Operation Planning and Execution System, Volume I: Plannin

and Procedures, Joint Pub 5-03.1, August 4, 1993. Specifica

Chapter II (Joint Planning Process); Chapter III (Deliberate P

Process); Chapter V (Crisis Action Planning); and, Annex A 

Action Planning Checklist).

14. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction, 

Strategic Planning System,” CJCSI 3100.01, September 1, 1997, 

15. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military S

of the United States of America: Shape, Respond, Prepare 

Military Strategy for a New Era, Washington, DC, 1997, p. 1

interesting to note that these activities in the first NMS fell un

description of “forward presence.” See NMS 1992, p. 7.

16. For example, in just the realm of “security assistan

Department of Defense oversees: (1) Foreign Military Sales Pr

and Foreign Military Construction Sales Program, (2) Foreign M

Financing Program, (3) Direct Commercial Sales, (4) Intern

Military Education and Training Program, (5) Economic Suppor

(6) Peacekeeping Operations, as well as the leasing of equipmen

of excess defense articles, emergency drawdown of defense a

services and training, and third country transfer of equipment. 

Management of Security Assistance, pp. 53-59.

17. Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21

st

 C

Report of the National Defense Panel, Washington, DC, Decemb

p. 29.

30
a lesser mission, should be viewed as an essential compone

of U.S. national security. The evolution of a more secure a

predictable environment will allow the United States 

promote its interests globally without employing milita

forces as often as we do today, and should be central to o

security strategy.

See, as well, p. 31. A thoughtful critique of the NDP’s structu

processes can be found in John E. Tedstrom and John G. M

Planning America’s Security: Lessons from the National Defens

Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1999.

18. Ibid., p. 31.

19. William S. Cohen, Report of the Quadrennial Defense 

Washington, DC, May 1997, p. 9.

. . . the Department of Defense has an essential role to play 

shaping the international security environment in ways th

promote and protect U.S. national interests. . . . To do so, t

Department employs a wide variety of means including: for

permanently stationed abroad; forces rotationally deploy

overseas; forces deployed temporarily for exercises; combin

training, or military-to-military interactions; and progra

such as defense cooperation, security assistan

International Military Education and Training (IME

programs, and international arms cooperation.

For a superb review of the QDR process, see John Y. Schrade

Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Analysis: A Retrospective 

Joint Staff Participation, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1999.

20. Title 10 U.S. Code, Chapter 5, section 155 (e); and, Ch

section 164(a)(2)(c).

21. See Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instr

“Responsibilities for the Management and Review of Operation 

CJCSI 3141.01A, February 15, 1999.

22. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction, 

Strategic Planning System,” p. C-1.

23. See Title 10, United States Code, Armed Forces, 

113(g)(2).

31
Engagement Planning,” CJCSM 3113.01, Final Coordinating 

August, pp. A-3; A-7; B-1.

25. Briefing, “Theater Engagement Overview,” presented 

Army War College, J-5, Theater Engagement Branch, Join

February 2000, slide 13.

26. Cohen, Annual Report to the President and the Congress, 

27. The Unified Command Plan (UCP) assigns g

responsibilities and delineates geographic areas of responsibility 

unified combatant commands. Note that the document is cla

however, sanitized versions are available. The most recent U

Unified Command Plan, Office of the Chairman of the Joint C

Staff, September 29, 1999. For an excellent history of the U

Ronald H. Cole, et al., The History of the Unified Comman

1946-1993, Washington, DC: Office of the Chairman of the Join

of Staff, Joint History Office, February 1995.

28. “A plan for major contingencies that can reasona

anticipated in the principal geographic subareas [sic] of the com

Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated 

Joint Pub 1-02, June 10, 1998, p. 103.

29. Ibid., p. 185.

Plans involving the conduct of military operations i

peacetime or permissive environment developed by combat

commanders to address requirements such as disaster re

nation assistance, logistics, communications, surveillan

protection of US citizens, nuclear weapons recovery 

evacuation, and continuity of operations, or similar disc

tasks. They may be developed in response to the requirement

the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, at the initiative of 

CINC, or as tasked by the supported combatant comman

Joint Staff, Service, or Defense agency.

30. Briefing, “Theater Engagement Overview,” slide 13.

31. “Joint Strategic Planning System,” C-1 through C-2.

32. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual, “T

Engagement Planning,” CJCSM 3113.01, February 1, 1998, p

Note that this manual has been substantially revised and h

32
August 1999.

33. “Theater Engagement Planning,” CJCSM 3113.01, Febr

1998, p. A-10. Note that a draft revised version of this manual 

this category and defines TEP activities as including: oper

activities, combined exercises, security assistance, combined tr

combined education, military contacts, humanitarian assistan

any other activity the CINC designates. Cf., CJCSM 3113.01

Coordinating Draft, A-2.

34. “A term used in Department of Defense and Service regu

to indicate a delegation of authority by a superior to a subordina

on behalf of the superior.” Joint Pub 102, p. 163.

35. Ibid., p. A-10.

36. For guidance as to the exact format and details which a

contained in the TEP Strategic Guidance, see ibid, pp. C-1 throug

37. See CJCSM 3113.01, “Final Coordinating Draft, “ pp. A

A-10.

38. Ibid., p. A-10.

39. For a description of the deliberate planning and review p

in general, see Joint Operation Planning and Execution System, 

I, Joint Pub 5-03.1, August 4, 1993.

40. CJCSM 3113.01, “Final Coordinating Draft,” p. B-1.

41. For the complete responsibilities of the CWPD of the 

regards TEP, see Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Inst

“Responsibilities for the Management and Review of T

Engagement Plans,” CJCSI 3113.01, April 1, 1998, pp. B-1 throu

42. Note that the criteria for the review of TEPs is similar to 

deliberate plans, except for the absence of “conformity to joint doc

43. For background on the entire TEP review process, see 

B-1 through B-7.

44. See Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instr

“Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, CINCs [sic] of the Com

Commands and Joint Staff Participation in the Pla

Programming, and Budgeting System,” CJCSI 8501.01, April 

For an explanation of PPBS see, The Joint Staff Officers Guid

33
through 5-21.

45. “A list of a combatant commander’s highest p

requirements, prioritized across Service and functional lines, d

shortfalls in key programs that, in the judgment of the com

commander, adversely affect the capability of the com

commander’s forces to accomplish their assigned missio

integrated priority list provides the combatant comma

recommendations for programming funds in the Pla

Programming, and Budgeting System process.” Joint Pub 1-02, J

1998, p. 223.

46. These reforms are reflected in CJCSM 3113.01, 

Coordinating Draft,” pp. A-4 thru A-6.

47. These exceptions are:

(1) the CINC or Executive Agent chooses to develop a S

Concept more frequently, (2) National Security or National M

Strategy changes require modification of existing Strategic Co

(3) CPG/JSCP Prioritized Regional Objective changes require c

to existing Strategic Concepts, (4) significant changes to r

security environment make revision of existing Strategic C

compelling, (5) significant changes in engagement resource ava

which require updates to existing strategic concepts, (6

exceptional circumstances (i.e., NCA direction).

Joint Staff Message, 052229Z FEB 99, Subject: Theater Enga

Plan (TEP) Process Adjustments, UNCLASSIFIED.

48. It should be stressed that IPLs are keyed to the Futur

Defense Program under consideration. The ASD (PA&E) reque

IPLs by a memorandum to the combatant commanders. For ex

see the June 24, 1991, memorandum, Subject: Submission 

1994-99 Integrated Priority Lists.

49. For greater detail on the Defense Planning Guidance do

see Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr. and Thomas-Durell Youn

Department of Defense Strategic Planning: The Missing Nexus, 

Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, September 1, 1995, 

and n. 50, pp. 37-38.

50. Joint Staff Message, 052229Z FEB 99, UNCLASSIFIED

51. Cohen, Annual Report to the President and the Congress, 

34
criterion when reviewing operation plans, i.e., conformance 

doctrine. See Joint Operation Planning and Execution System, 

I, Joint Pub 5-03.1, p. IV-4.

53. Not only do combatant commanders have limited co

influence over certain key shaping instruments, e.g., the extens

growing National Guard State Partnership programs, but many 

timelines impede effective planning. For example, security assis

based on an annual budget cycle and is tightly controlled by Co

component exercises are planned 2 years out, while the Chairma

Joint Chiefs of Staff’s Exercise Program is based on a 5-year p

cycle. Indeed, component commands routinely conduct exerci

other shaping exercises activities that are not coordinated/contr

combatant commanders.

54. In deliberate planning, risk assessment is considered 

each phase of the campaign. Risk management in a TEP 

disciplined in its application and requires further sophisticat

universal implementation.

55. Note that a full discussion of the differences between “

and “assess” is provided later.

56. Joint Chiefs of Staff, J-5, “Unified Command Pla

September 29, 1999, p. 6 (para 15).

57. “Theater Engagement Planning Process Revis

Discussion” UNCLASSIFIED, J-5, Strategy Division Brief

December 1998, slide 10.

58. Joint Staff Message, 241149Z MAY 99, Subject: Reassess

Executive Agents for Canada and Mexico (U). This reform 

represented in the final revised CJSCM 3113.01.

59. Lovelace and Young, U.S. Department of Defense S

Planning.

60. See Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction, “C

of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council,” CJCSI 5123.01, 

1997.

61. See Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction, “Th

Warfighting Capabilities Assessment Process,” CJCSI 31

January 22, 1999. Despite the growing importance of JWCAs sin

introduction in 1994 in defining joint requirements, there 

analysis of their role in the literature. A major exception 

35
Capabilities (JWCA) Integration, Report on Phase 1 Research

Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1998.

62. See CJCSI 3141.01, B-2 (paras d and e).

63. Albeit dated, the following report is comprehensive and 

in its listing of defense cooperation with the United States. C

House of Commons, Standing Committee on External Affa

National Defence, NORAD 1986, Report, Thirty-third Parl

February 1986, pp. 3-15.

64. For example, see the recent Australian foreign polic

paper which addresses shaping. In the National Interest, Au

Foreign and Trade Policy White Paper, Canberra: Commonw

Australia, August 1997, particularly the overview and Chapter 

65. “Unified Command Plan” (U), September 29, 1999, p

(para 16).

66. Ibid.

67. This prescription for the redesignation of Joint 

Command’s AOR is established in the 1999 UCP. That said

reforms are required. The command should loose the last of its A

“CINC Americas” which would subsume, inter alia, the 

Southern Command. Should this come to pass, then all p

responsibility for Mexico under the UCP should be transferred t

Americas. See Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr. and Thomas-Durell 

Defining U.S. Atlantic Command’s Role in the Power Pr

Strategy, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute

particularly pp. 37-39; 41-42; 44-46.

68. Title 10, United States Code, Armed Forces, section 153(a

(C), and (E). For an in-depth assessment of the question 

Chairman’s responsibilities to establish priorities and effect “s

plans,” see Lovelace and Young, U.S. Department of Defense S

Planning.

69. An example of this type of measuring merit is the sy

“measures of effectiveness” employed by U.S. Army Pacific (whic

its methodology of assessment might be better described as mea

merit). The methodology is based on the responsible desk 

recommending an assessment based upon: (1) the comm

general’s guidance, his judgments and experience, (2) Countr

judgments and experience, (3) higher guidance and assessmen

36
information from the intelligence community, (6) occasional inte

with national armies, (7) after action reviews, and (8) desk 

judgment, training and experience. To be sure, this type of asse

would be appropriate for use within a combatant command, 

providing an over-arching, strategic methodology template. Th

the criteria used for assessments in the U.S. Army Pacific Co

warrants close examination. U.S. Army Pacific Command, “F

(Strawman) Expanded Relations Program Briefing,” June 5, 19

70. Title 10, United States Code, Armed Forces, Sec. 153 (a

37
Major General Robert H. Scales, Jr.

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Interim Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Earl H. Tilford, Jr.

Authors

Colonel Thomas M. Jordan

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Dr. Thomas-Durell Young

Director of Publications and Production

Ms. Marianne P. Cowling

Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Mrs. Christine A. Williams

Cover Artist

Mr. James E. Kistler