a

GAO

United States Government Accountability Office

Report to the Subcommittee on Oversight 

and Investigations, Committee on 

International Relations, House of 

Representatives

February 2006 PEACEKEEPING

Cost Comparison of 

Actual UN and 

Hypothetical U.S. 

Operations in Haiti

GAO-06-331
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

February 2006

PEACEKEEPING

Cost Comparison of Actual UN and 

Highlights of GAO-06-331, a report to the Hypothetical U.S. Operations in Haiti 

Subcommittee on Oversight and 

Investigations, Committee on International 

Relations, House of Representatives 

The UN employs about 85,000 

military and civilian personnel in 

peacekeeping operations in 16 

countries. The United States has 

provided about $1 billion annually

to support UN peacekeeping 

operations. In addition, the United

States has led and participated in

many such operations. UN reports 

and congressional hearings have

raised concerns about 

accountability for UN

peacekeeping operations and the 

need for reforms. 

We were asked to provide 

information relating to the cost and 

relative strengths of UN and U.S. 

peacekeeping. In particular, we

have (1) compared the cost of the 

ongoing UN Stabilization Mission in 

Haiti with the cost that the United

States would have incurred had an 

operation been deemed in the U.S. 

national interest and undertaken 

without UN involvement; (2) 

analyzed factors that could

materially affect the estimated 

costs of a U.S. operation; and (3) 

identified the strengths of the 

United States and the UN for 

leading the operation. 

We developed our cost estimate of a 

U.S.-led operation using cost

models from the Departments of 

Defense and State. The estimate is

based on various military 

assumptions, such as the use of

primarily active duty troops. It 

includes only those costs directly

attributable to the operation that 

would not otherwise be incurred. 

We estimate that it would cost the United States about twice as much as the 

United Nations (UN) to conduct a peacekeeping operation similar to the 

current UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (designated “MINUSTAH”). The UN

budgeted $428 million for the first 14 months of this mission. A U.S. 

operation in Haiti of the same size and duration would cost an estimated 

$876 million, far exceeding the U.S. contribution for MINUSTAH of $116 

million. Virtually all of the cost difference is attributable to (1) civilian 

police, (2) military pay and support, and (3) facilities, and reflects high U.S. 

standards for police training, troop welfare, and security. 

Comparison of Cost Estimate for a U.S. Operation and UN MINUSTAH Budget 

Millions of U.S. dollars

Source: GAO analysis of Department of Defense and State Department cost data. 

$876

$428

$116

0 200 400 600 800 1,000

Civilian police Military pay Facilities All other costs Cash contribution

U.S. contribution

for MINUSTAH

UN budget

for MINUSTAH

Estimated cost

of U.S. operation

Various military and nonmilitary factors can substantially affect the 

estimated costs of a U.S. operation. We analyzed three military factors: the 

mix of reserve and active duty troops, the rate of deployment, and the 

operational tempo. Deploying all reserve troops would increase the cost 

estimate by $477 million, since it would require paying more reservists a full

salary. Deploying troops at a faster rate than the UN—within the first 60 

days instead of 180—would cost an additional $60 million. Conducting the 

operation at a higher tempo—with more intensive use of vehicles and 

equipment—would increase estimated costs by $23 million. In addition to 

military considerations, including nation-building and development 

assistance activities in the scope of the operation would increase the cost 

significantly. Official donors, including the United States, distributed $382 

million for these activities during the first year of MINUSTAH. 

Cost is not the sole factor in determining whether the United States or the 

UN should lead an operation, and each offers strengths for this 

responsibility. U.S.-led operations in Haiti between 1994 and 2004 benefited 

from a vast military infrastructure, which provided strong communications, 

command and control, readiness to deploy, tactical intelligence, and public 

information. The UN’s strengths include multinational participation, 

extensive peacekeeping experience, and an existing structure for 

coordinating nation-building activities. Complex political considerations are 

likely to influence decisions about the role of the United States and the UN 

in peacekeeping. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-331.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Joseph A. 

Christoff at (202) 512-8979 or 

christoffj@gao.gov. 
Page i GAO-06-331 Peacekeeping

Contents

Letter 1

Results in Brief 2

Background 5

Estimated Cost of a Hypothetical U.S. Operation Is Twice as High as 

Ongoing UN Mission 7

Alternative Scenarios with Differing Assumptions Could Generate 

Higher Cost Estimates 11

U.S. and UN Peacekeeping Forces in Haiti Each Have Key 

Strengths 15

Conclusions 20

Agency Comments 21

Appendixes

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 22

Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 27

Tables Table 1: Comparison of UN and U.S. Costs for a Peacekeeping 

Operation in Haiti (dollars in millions) 9

Table 2: Additional MINUSTAH-Related Funding Disbursed by 

Donor, July 2004 to March 2005 (dollars in millions) 14

Figures Figure 1: Comparison of UN Budget for MINUSTAH and Cost 

Estimate for a U.S. Operation 4

Figure 2: Impact of Three Cost Factors on Base Estimate for 

Hypothetical U.S. Operation 12

Figure 3: U.S. Marines Arrive in Port-au-Prince, Haiti, Via C-17 

Military Transport in March, 2004 17

Figure 4: MINUSTAH Peacekeepers from Jordan Prepare to Patrol 

The Slum of Cite Soleil in Haiti, July 2005 19

Abbreviations

DOD Department of Defense

DPKO United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations

MINUSTAH United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti

UN United Nations

COST Contingency Operations Support Tool
Contents

Page ii GAO-06-331 Peacekeeping

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further 

permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or 

other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to 

reproduce this material separately.
Page 1 GAO-06-331 Peacekeeping

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

A

February 21, 2006 Letr

The Honorable Dana Rohrabacher 

Chairman 

The Honorable William D. Delahunt

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations

Committee on International Relations

House of Representatives

As of November 2005, the United Nations (UN) maintained about 70,000 

peacekeeping troops and about 15,000 related international civil servants in 

16 countries, including Haiti, Lebanon, Georgia, Cyprus, Sudan, and the 

Democratic Republic of the Congo. Currently, the United States provides 

about $1 billion annually to support UN peacekeeping missions. In addition 

to these financial contributions, the United States has led and participated 

in a variety of peacekeeping operations, most recently in Somalia, Haiti, 

Bosnia, and Kosovo. UN reports and congressional hearings have raised 

concerns about accountability for UN peacekeeping operations and the 

need for management reforms. 

To advance UN reform efforts and determine the value of peacekeeping 

operations to the United States, you asked us to provide information 

relating to the cost and relative strengths of UN and U.S. peacekeeping. In 

particular, we have (1) compared the cost of a specific UN mission with the 

cost that the United States would have incurred had an operation been 

deemed in the U.S. national interest and undertaken without UN 

involvement; (2) analyzed factors that could affect the estimated costs of a 

U.S. operation; and (3) identified strengths of U.S. and UN peacekeeping 

forces in leading the operation. We selected the UN Stabilization Mission in 

Haiti (officially designated “MINUSTAH”) as a case study for comparison. 

This mission provides a strong basis for estimating costs and assessing UN 

and U.S. strengths because it is located in a country in which both the U.S. 

and UN have a history of military intervention. However, given the 

operational, structural, and doctrinal differences between the U.S. and UN 

military and civilian infrastructures, it is uncertain whether the United 

States would implement a peacekeeping operation in Haiti in the same way 

as the UN, as we have generally assumed for the purposes of this report. 

Moreover, because the results of our review are based on a single case 

study, they cannot be generalized to all U.S. and UN peacekeeping 

operations. Nonetheless, we believe this case study provides some useful 
Page 2 GAO-06-331 Peacekeeping

insights into cost and effectiveness-related issues for other peacekeeping 

missions. 

We analyzed detailed cost and operational data from the UN relating to 

MINUSTAH for the first 14 months of this mission. Using these data, we 

developed a comparable scenario for a U.S. operation, which officials from 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff validated as reasonable; this scenario assumes 

deployment of the same number of military, civilian, and police personnel 

and aircraft in Haiti over the same period. We derived a cost estimate for 

the military portion of this scenario using the Department of Defense’s 

(DOD) Contingency Operation Support Tool, the official DOD cost 

estimation mechanism for all contingency military operations. For the 

civilian portions, we based cost estimates primarily on historical data and 

formulas from the Department of State. We determined that data we 

collected for this report are sufficiently reliable for the purpose of 

estimating U.S. peacekeeping costs and comparing them with UN budget 

figures. We conducted our work from June to February 2006 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. See 

appendix I for a detailed description of our scope and methodology. 

Results in Brief We estimate that it would cost the United States about twice as much as the 

United Nations to conduct a peacekeeping operation similar to 

MINUSTAH. According to UN records, the UN budgeted $428 million for 

the first 14 months of MINUSTAH, for which the United States is 

responsible for 27.1 percent, or $116 million.1

 A similar U.S. operation 

would cost an estimated $876 million. Virtually the entire cost difference 

can be attributed to three major elements: civilian police, military pay and 

support, and facilities, as shown in figure 1. First, the estimated cost of 

deploying U.S. civilian police officers is $217 million, compared to $25 

million budgeted by the UN for foreign police officers. Unlike the U.S. cost 

estimate, the UN budget does not include police salaries and 

compensation, as they are funded voluntarily by police-contributing

1

This total does not include an allocation for peacekeeping support costs—essentially 

overhead costs incurred outside of Haiti—primarily at UN headquarters in New York and 

the UN Logistics Base in Italy.
Page 3 GAO-06-331 Peacekeeping

nations.2 Compensation rates for U.S. police officers reflect a high standard 

of skills and experience. Second, we estimate that military pay and support 

would cost $260 million, compared to $131 million in the UN budget, 

reflecting high salary and equipment standards for U.S. soldiers and a 

higher level of support in health, nutrition, and morale. Third, facilitiesrelated costs would total about $208 million, compared to $100 million in 

the UN budget. Under MINUSTAH, mission facilities are donated by the 

Government of Haiti, while the U.S. estimate reflects the cost of posting 

U.S. civilian personnel in a secure embassy compound. 

2

We did not calculate the value of these donations, which are likely to vary widely by 

contributing country.
Page 4 GAO-06-331 Peacekeeping

Figure 1: Comparison of UN Budget for MINUSTAH and Cost Estimate for a U.S. 

Operation

Various military and nonmilitary factors can affect the estimated costs of a 

U.S. peacekeeping operation in Haiti. We analyzed the influence of three 

military factors on the cost estimate: the mix of reserve and active duty 

troops, the rate of troop deployment, and the operational tempo. First, 

deploying reserve soldiers instead of primarily active duty military 

personnel3

 could increase the operation’s costs by as much as $477 million. 

Regular pay for active duty soldiers is not included in the cost estimate, 

3

Our estimate is based on a force consisting of 85 percent active duty and 15 percent reserve 

troops.

0

200

400

600

800

1,000

 

Estimated cost 

of U.S. operation

UN budget for

MINUSTAH

U.S. contribution 

for MINUSTAH

Millions of U.S. dollars

Civilian police 

Military pay

All other costs

Facilities

Cash contribution

Source: GAO analysis of Department of Defense and State Department cost data. 

$876

$428

$116
Page 5 GAO-06-331 Peacekeeping

since DOD would incur this cost regardless of where these soldiers were 

deployed. However, DOD pays reservists a full salary and provides other 

benefits only when they are called into active duty. Second, deploying 

troops at a faster rate than the UN—within the first 60 days of the operation 

instead of 180—would raise estimated U.S. costs by about $60 million. 

Third, conducting the operation at a higher operational tempo, which 

entails heavier use of vehicles and equipment, would increase maintenance 

and support costs by $23 million. Most nonmilitary costs for nation building 

and development assistance are not included in the UN and U.S. estimates, 

and including them would increase both estimates substantially. 

International bilateral and multilateral donors contributed at least $382 

million for such activities during the first year of MINUSTAH, of which the 

United States directly funded more than a quarter. We did not include these 

costs in our estimate because the United States would rely on the 

international community to help achieve such goals in any case.

Cost is not the sole factor in determining whether the United States or the 

UN should lead a peacekeeping operation, and, in Haiti, each offers 

strengths suited to this responsibility. The United States’ strengths include 

strong communications, command, and control, which were proven 

militarily effective in past Haiti peacekeeping operations. The U.S. military 

infrastructure also afforded U.S.-led operations in Haiti three elements 

found by UN studies to be critical for effective peacekeeping but largely 

absent in MINUSTAH: rapid deployment capacity, tactical intelligence, and 

a public information strategy. For example, rapid troop deployment to Haiti 

in 1994 enabled a U.S.-led force to achieve its primary military objectives 

within 76 days. The UN’s strengths are rooted in the multinational 

character of its operation as well as its extensive experience with 

peacekeeping and related nation building. The UN has developed a 

structure for coordinating the activities of international organizations and 

has access to experienced and skilled international civil servants, including 

personnel with diverse language capabilities. The relative strengths of UN 

and U.S. peacekeeping forces may differ in other conflict zones. 

Furthermore, complex political considerations, including the interests of 

the United States and other UN member countries, are likely to influence 

decisions about the role of the United States and the UN in any 

peacekeeping operation.

Background Both the UN and United States have a long history of peace support 

operations upon which to base cost estimates. The UN has carried out 60 

peacekeeping missions worldwide since 1948. For each mission, the UN 
Page 6 GAO-06-331 Peacekeeping

Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) prepares a budget, which 

is reviewed in detail at high levels of UN management and is ultimately 

approved by the General Assembly. The UN assesses each member for its 

allocated portion of this amount based on the country’s per capita gross 

national income and its membership status on the Security Council. The 

United States currently pays about 27 percent of the total for each mission, 

and in fiscal year 2005 directly contributed about $1.3 billion in support of 

UN peacekeeping operations overall. The United States has also led and 

participated in a variety of peacekeeping operations since World War II, 

most recently in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo. U.S. military 

operations are funded largely by DOD appropriations, and, under DOD 

regulations, the budgets are based primarily on cost estimates generated 

with the department’s Contingency Operations Support Tool.4

 This 

computer model uses financial formulas that draw upon a database of 

historical costs from past military operations and other regularly updated 

cost information. In addition, the State Department has extensive 

experience posting foreign service officers in conflict areas and funding 

U.S. police officers to support UN peacekeeping missions, for which it 

maintains cost estimation formulas and historical cost databases. 

The UN Security Council has authorized five peacekeeping missions in 

Haiti since 1993, of which the United States has led two between 1994 and 

2004. The primary task of the ongoing MINUSTAH operation is to provide a 

secure and stable environment through its military and police presence and 

operational support to the Haitian National Police. MINUSTAH assists the 

transitional government in police reform and institutional strengthening; 

disarmament, demobilization and reintegration; elections monitoring; and 

promotion and protection of human rights and the political process. The 

initial authorized force strength was 6,700 troops, 1,622 civilian police 

officers, and 1,697 civilian administrators and staff. Although initially 

authorized for 6 months, the UN Security Council has renewed the 

mission’s authorization and funding through June 2006.

Criticism and controversy, including allegations of sexual misconduct of 

peacekeepers, have brought calls for reform of UN peacekeeping 

operations within the UN and from U.S. observers. In 2000, the UN 

Secretary General convened a high-level panel to review UN peace and

4

Department of Defense Financial Management Regulations, 7000.14-R, vol. 12, Ch. 23, para. 

2304.
Page 7 GAO-06-331 Peacekeeping

security, which recommended a variety of reforms.5 The 2005 bipartisan 

Task Force on the United Nations highlighted the need for more rapid 

deployment and more clearly defined mandates.6 Proposed legislation, the 

Henry J. Hyde United Nations Reform Act of 2005,7 calls for more oversight 

and investigation over UN operations and mandates that the UN adopt and 

enforce a code of conduct for all peacekeeping personnel. 

Estimated Cost of a 

Hypothetical U.S. 

Operation Is Twice as 

High as Ongoing UN 

Mission

We estimate that it would cost the United States twice as much as the UN to 

conduct an operation similar to MINUSTAH. The higher U.S. cost of civilian 

police, military pay and support, and facilities account for virtually the 

entire difference between our estimate and the MINUSTAH budget, and 

reflects the additional cost of ensuring high U.S. standards for training, 

troop welfare, and personnel security. 

From May 1, 2004, to June 30, 2005—the first 14 months of MINUSTAH—

the UN budgeted mission costs totaled $428 million. This budget assumed a 

phased deployment of 6,700 military personnel, 750 personnel in formed 

police units, 872 civilian police officers, and 1,184 civilian administrators 

and staff. It included the cost of personnel, operational support, equipment, 

facilities, and transportation.8 Using the same basic parameters of troop 

and staff deployment in Haiti for 14 months, we estimated that the United 

States would likely budget about $876 million, nearly twice the UN 

estimate, for a comparable U.S. peacekeeping operation. (This cost 

estimate is based on a variety of assumptions, described in detail in app. I.) 

The United States was financially responsible for $116 million of the 

budgeted cost of MINUSTAH, based on the U.S. assessed contribution of 

27.1 percent of the DPKO regular budget. Hence, we estimate that 

5

Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace 

Operations (Brahimi Report), a special report prepared at the request of the Secretary 

General of the United Nations. August 2000.

6

United States Institute of Peace Task Force on the United Nations, Report of the Task Force 

on the United Nations: American Interests and UN Reform, a special report prepared at 

the request of Rep. Frank Wolf, U.S. House of Representatives. June, 2005.

7

H.R. 2745, 109th Cong. (2005).

8

The UN cost estimate does not include general overhead costs incurred to support all 

peacekeeping missions, such as the cost to run DPKO at the UN Headquarters in New York 

and the UN logistics base in Brindisi, Italy. We did not include these costs because we were 

unable to estimate comparable overhead costs for U.S. operations due to major differences 

in budgeting practices between the two organizations.
Page 8 GAO-06-331 Peacekeeping

conducting a U.S. operation similar to MINUSTAH would cost the United 

States about 7.5 times as much as its official contribution to the UN for that 

mission ($876 million versus $116 million).9

Major disparities in the cost for civilian police, military pay and support, 

and facilities account for virtually all of the difference between the UN 

budget and our cost estimate. Our estimate reflects the additional expense 

of paying salaries for personnel that would otherwise be donated by other 

countries as well as the cost of ensuring U.S. standards for police training, 

the equipment and welfare of military personnel, and the security of staff 

posted overseas. (See table 1 for a detailed comparison of the UN budget 

and our estimate by major cost category.) 

9

This includes only cash contributions to the United Nations for MINUSTAH and does not 

include in-kind contributions, such as pay and benefits for U.S. police and military 

personnel participating in the UN mission. Since the United States has provided 25 police 

officers and 4 military personnel to MINUSTAH, this additional contribution of pay and 

benefits does not significantly affect the results of our analysis. 
Page 9 GAO-06-331 Peacekeeping

Table 1: Comparison of UN and U.S. Costs for a Peacekeeping Operation in Haiti 

(dollars in millions)

Source: GAO analysis of DOD and State Department cost data.

Civilian police. The UN budgeted $25 million to deploy 872 civilian officers 

for MINUSTAH, while we estimate that it would cost the United States $217 

million to deploy the same number of U.S. officers. The UN does not 

reimburse countries contributing police for the officers’ salaries and only 

pays for living expenses, clothing allowance, and death and disability 

compensation.10 U.S. costs, however, include salaries, special pay, benefits, 

equipment, and special training. Furthermore, U.S. officers deployed in 

Haiti under MINUSTAH are required to meet standards for training, 

experience, and skills significantly beyond those applied by the UN. For 

instance, U.S. officers deployed to Haiti must be proficient in French or 

Haitian Creole and have a minimum of 8 years’ work experience with five 

years in a position of sworn civilian law enforcement. Candidates must 

pass several tests that measure physical capabilities and weapons 

proficiency. UN-sponsored officers deployed to Haiti are required by the 

UN to demonstrate only the ability to operate a firearm and drive a vehicle; 

the ability to communicate in French is preferred but not required.

Major cost categories

Budgeted UN 

cost

Estimated 

U.S. cost

Difference between 

UN budget and U.S. 

estimate

Transportation $94 $100 -$6

Facilities and related costs 100 208 -108

Medical/health costs 5 22 -17

Military personnel pay and support 131 260 -129

Civilian personnel (non-police) 63 46 17 

Civilian police 25 217 -192

Miscellaneous 10 23 -13

Total cost $428 $876 -$448

10We did not calculate the value of the non-reimbursable salary and compensation costs 

incurred by police contributing nations, as the UN does not maintain data on these 

voluntary contributions. These costs are likely to vary widely depending on each nation’s 

economic development. For MINUSTAH, 33 nations have provided civilian police officers, 

ranging from developing countries, such as Cameroon and Senegal, to more developed 

countries, such as Canada and France.
Page 10 GAO-06-331 Peacekeeping

Military pay and support. The UN budgeted $131 million for pay and 

support of military troops, while we estimate it would cost the United 

States $260 million for the same number of soldiers. The UN costs are 

based primarily on a per-soldier payment to contributing nations of up to 

$1,400 monthly for basic pay and allowances, clothing, gear, equipment, 

and ammunition. U.S. costs include pay and allowances for reservists and 

active duty personnel as well as clothing, arms, protective gear, and rations. 

The higher U.S. costs help ensure a basic standard of living for U.S. soldiers 

and their families and relatively high standards of welfare in the field in 

terms of equipment, nutrition, health, and morale. For example, estimated 

costs for food and water for U.S. military personnel total $85 million, 

compared to $20 million in the UN budget. Medical support for the military 

and civilian personnel on a U.S. operation would cost an estimated $22 

million, over four times the UN budgeted cost of $5 million. According to 

officials of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, UN multinational forces in Haiti prior 

to MINUSTAH had difficulty providing adequate troop support and relied 

on accompanying U.S. forces for supplementary rations and health care. A 

Rand Corporation study of the multinational force cooperation in Haiti in 

1994 indicates that the U.S. forces provided UN forces with intelligence and 

training, as well as logistical and communications support, including 

housing, food, transportation, and vehicle maintenance.11

Facilities. The UN budgeted $100 million for facilities-related costs, while 

we estimate that the cost to the United States would be $208 million. The 

UN budget includes acquisition and construction of troop and civilian 

housing and other facility-related equipment and supplies. While 

MINUSTAH staff offices are donated by the Government of Haiti, U.S. 

facilities must meet State Department security standards, which include 

posting civilian staff within secure U.S. embassy or consulate compounds. 

In addition to administrative and security expenses, U.S. government 

agencies with staff in these compounds would be required to contribute a 

total of about $12 million to the State Department’s Capital Security CostSharing Program, which funds the construction of secure embassies 

worldwide.12

11Michele Tazini, et al., The Army and Multinational Force Compatibility (Arlington, VA, 

2000).

12The Capital Security Cost-Sharing Program was developed to accelerate the building of 150 

new secure embassies and consulates around the world. Each agency’s assigned cost is 

based on its total overseas personnel. See Pub. L. No. 108-447, 118 Stat. 2809, 2920, Div. B., 

sec. 629 (2004).
Page 11 GAO-06-331 Peacekeeping

Estimated costs in other categories are likely to be similar for the UN and 

the United States. For example, we estimate that the transport of U.S. 

troops, civilian personnel, and equipment would cost about $100 million; 

the UN budgeted $94 million for these costs. 

Alternative Scenarios 

with Differing 

Assumptions Could 

Generate Higher Cost 

Estimates 

Various military and nonmilitary factors can influence the composition of a 

peacekeeping operation and thus impact the estimated cost. We identified 

three different military scenarios that could substantially affect the 

estimated costs of a U.S. peacekeeping operation. Greater concentration of 

reserve troops could almost double the military costs, while a quicker 

deployment of forces and higher operational tempo would also increase 

costs. Further, the addition of nation-building and development assistance 

activities to the scope of an operation in Haiti would increase the estimated 

cost substantially. 

Analysis of Alternative 

Military Assumptions 

Generated Higher U.S. Cost 

Estimates

According to U.S. experts in military operations and cost estimation we 

consulted, various factors could significantly influence the cost estimate 

for a U.S. peacekeeping operation. These factors include the number of 

troops and types of military units deployed, the pace of deployment, the 

intensity or operational tempo, the modes of transportation for 

deployment, and the mix of active duty and reserve troops. These factors 

depend heavily on the needs of the operation and demands of other military 

commitments; decisions about such factors involve complex military, 

political, and financial considerations that can change rapidly.

We analyzed the potential impact of three principal cost factors by altering 

the assumptions of our cost estimate to reflect (1) military forces 

comprised entirely of reserve soldiers, (2) deployment of military forces 

within the first 60 days of the operation rather than 180 days, and (3) higher 

operational tempo (more intensive use of vehicles and equipment). Figure 

2 illustrates how altering the assumptions for these factors affects the cost 

estimate.
Page 12 GAO-06-331 Peacekeeping

Figure 2: Impact of Three Cost Factors on Base Estimate for Hypothetical U.S. 

Operation

Deployment of all-reserve forces. Our base cost estimates assume that the 

military contingent of a U.S. operation would consist primarily of active 

duty forces (85 percent). Officials from the Joint Chiefs of Staff confirmed 

that this is one of a number of possible scenarios, depending on the 

availability of active duty and reserve troops, ongoing military 

commitments, specific operational needs, and other factors. A change in 

this fundamental assumption can have a significant impact on the 

estimated cost of the operation, as pay for troops is one of the largest 

components of the estimate. We altered this assumption to reflect an 

operation comprised entirely of reserve forces, which increased the cost 

estimate by $477 million. This difference has such a significant impact 

because DOD does not include regular pay for active duty troops in the cost 

estimates; the department would incur these costs regardless of whether 

the troops were deployed in Haiti, the United States, or elsewhere. In 

contrast, pay for reserve troops is considered a direct cost of the operation 

Millions of U.S. dollars

Source: GAO analysis of Department of Defense and State Department cost data. 

0

250

500

750

1,000

1,250

1,500

Military costs

Civilian costs

Higher 

operational 

tempo

60-day 

deployment

All reserve 

forces

Base 

estimate

$575

$1,052

$635 $598

$301 $301 $301 $301
Page 13 GAO-06-331 Peacekeeping

since DOD would pay reservists full salaries only when activated for the 

operation. 

More rapid deployment. Although the UN Security Council Resolution 

establishing MINUSTAH calls for an immediate deployment of 

peacekeeping forces, the MINUSTAH budget reflects full military 

deployment within 180 days of mission authorization. Thus, similar to the 

UN budget, our base cost estimate assumes a military force strength below 

authorized levels during the first six months of the operation. We altered 

this assumption to reflect full deployment within the first 60 days. We 

estimate that this would increase U.S. costs by about $60 million, 

consisting essentially of military pay and support for additional troops 

deployed during the operation’s initial months. 

Higher operational tempo. DOD measures the intensity of a military 

operation, or operational tempo, on a scale from 1 to 3, with normal 

operations being level 1.13 The higher the operational tempo, the more 

heavily the forces use equipment and vehicles and the higher the cost for 

fuel, operations, and maintenance. Military experts we consulted at the 

Institute for Defense Analysis and the Joint Chiefs of Staff indicated that a 

peacekeeping operational tempo would normally be considered to be at 

level 1.5, as reflected in our base cost estimate. We altered this assumption 

to reflect a slightly higher operational tempo, level 2, which increased the 

estimated military costs by $23 million due to increased equipment, 

maintenance, and other support costs. 

Including Nation-Building 

and Development 

Assistance in the 

Operation’s Scope Would 

Significantly Increase Costs 

Our estimate does not include costs for complementary nation-building and 

development activities, which would be needed to support the economic 

and political goals of a peacekeeping operation. In 2004, to bolster 

MINUSTAH, official donors agreed with the Government of Haiti on an 

Interim Cooperative Framework, to which they pledged a total of $1.3 

billion for an array of activities to strengthen political governance and 

promote national dialogue, strengthen economic governance and 

contribute to institutional development, promote economic recovery, and 

13Operational tempo level 1 is the equivalent to peacetime operations, with tank miles and 

flying hours being those normally accrued during peacetime. Level 2 reflects heightened 

operations short of combat, with tank miles and flying hours (and associated total 

operational costs) at twice the rate of level 1. Level 3 reflects high intensity combat, with 

tank miles, flying hours (and associated total operational costs) at three times the rate of 

level 1. 
Page 14 GAO-06-331 Peacekeeping

improve access to basic services. From July 2004 to March 2005, bilateral 

and multilateral donors have spent more than $382 million for such 

activities (see table 2). The United States directly funded over 27 percent of 

this total, or $102 million, through its bilateral aid programs in Haiti.14 The 

United States has made additional contributions to this aid effort through 

its financial support of UN agencies and multilateral financial 

organizations, including the World Bank and the Inter-American 

Development Bank. Table 2 shows the distribution of funding for these 

activities by donor and type of activity. 

Table 2: Additional MINUSTAH-Related Funding Disbursed by Donor, July 2004 to March 2005 (dollars in millions)

Source: UN Development Program.

Note: UN agencies include the UN Population Fund; the UN Children’s Fund; the Food and Agriculture 

Organization; the UN Organization for Education, Science and Culture; the World Health 

Organization/Pan-American Health Organization; the UN Development Program; and the World Food 

Program.

Our cost estimate assumes that the United States and other donors would 

spend the same amount on these programs and activities regardless of 

whether the United States undertook a peacekeeping operation in Haiti.

Historically, the United States has depended on other official donors and 

multilateral organizations to participate in reconstruction and rebuilding 

efforts following an armed conflict.

14This does not include U.S. donations for development and humanitarian assistance 

programs not as closely related to MINUSTAH, such as $6 million in disaster relief in fiscal 

year 2004.

Type of assistance

United 

States Canada

European 

Community Japan

World 

Bank

Inter-American 

Development 

Bank

UN 

agencies Total

Political governance $6.9 $19.7 $1.3 $0 $0 $0 $1.3 $29.2

Economic governance 7.6 2.5 4.3 0 47.8 18.6 3.8 $84.6

Economic recovery 24.6 0.8 10.4 0.4 1.1 2.7 1.0 $41.0

Access to basic services 66.1 35.7 30.8 5.7 1.1 4.0 28.5 $171.9

Other 0 14.8 10.4 0.4 0.5 3.6 25.8 $55.5

Total $105.2 $73.5 $57.2 $6.5 $50.5 $28.9 $60.4 $382.2
Page 15 GAO-06-331 Peacekeeping

U.S. and UN 

Peacekeeping Forces 

in Haiti Each Have Key 

Strengths

In addition to cost, other factors would be considered when determining 

the most appropriate role of the United States and the UN in conducting 

peacekeeping operations. The United States and the UN each have 

strengths that can affect the achievement of peacekeeping objectives in 

Haiti. Past U.S. operations in Haiti have benefited from a strong central 

communications, command and control structure and a vast military 

infrastructure supporting its operations, particularly in terms of troop 

deployment, military intelligence, and public information. Among the 

strengths of a UN mission are its multinational participation, its extensive 

experience in peace operations, and a coordinated network of agencies to 

assist nation building. 

U.S. Peacekeeping Forces in 

Haiti Had Elements Found 

to Be Critical for Effective 

Peacekeeping

U.S. peacekeeping operations have benefited from strong communications, 

command and control structures, direct access to well-trained military 

personnel and equipment, and other advantages of a large, well-established 

military infrastructure. U.S.-led peacekeeping efforts in Haiti have been 

widely recognized as operationally effective, having achieved their military 

objectives rapidly and with minimal loss of life. As we previously reported, 

U.S. leadership has enhanced operational effectiveness of UN 

peacekeeping in Haiti.15 In the 1995 UN Mission to Haiti, the United States 

provided leadership to multinational forces that ensured adequate troops 

and resources were available to carry out assigned tasks, used its 

command and control structure for the operation, and applied its doctrine 

for “operations other than war” to help guide actions. Officials from the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff with experience with more recent multinational forces 

in Haiti also highlighted rigorous training, a reliable communications 

infrastructure, and a cohesive command structure as key factors that made 

U.S. forces operationally effective there. 

Furthermore, by virtue of the vast U.S. military infrastructure of DOD and 

other U.S. agencies, U.S. peacekeeping forces have many elements that UN 

peacekeeping studies have identified as critical for mission effectiveness, 

particularly in Haiti. In March 2000, the UN high-level panel reviewing UN 

peace and security identified elements critical to effective peacekeeping. In

15GAO, U.N. Peacekeeping: Issues Related to Effectiveness, Cost, and Reform, GAO/TNSIAD-97-139 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 25, 2001).
Page 16 GAO-06-331 Peacekeeping

May 2005, a UN Security Council evaluation of MINUSTAH16 emphasized 

the particular importance of three of these elements for operations in 

Haiti—rapid troop deployment, effective tactical intelligence, and a public 

information strategy—noting that MINUSTAH was hindered by weaknesses 

in these elements. 

Dedicated DOD organizations support U.S. military operations in these 

three elements, and have contributed to military successes in past 

operations in Haiti. Funding for these organizations is not reflected in cost 

estimates in this report because they are part of the infrastructure that 

supports all DOD objectives and operations, and costs are not readily 

attributable to specific contingency operations. 

Rapid deployment. The 2000 UN report on peacekeeping indicated that it 

was important to fully deploy an operation within 30 to 90 days after the 

adoption of a Security Council Resolution establishing the mission. 

According to the report, the first 6 to 12 weeks following a ceasefire or 

peace accord are often the most critical for establishing a stable peace and 

a credible new operation; opportunities lost during that period are hard to 

regain. At DOD, the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Readiness is 

responsible for developing and overseeing policies and programs, including 

training, to ensure the readiness of U.S. forces for peacetime contingencies, 

crises, and warfighting. Military readiness of both personnel and equipment 

is a major objective throughout DOD. The department spends more than 

$17 billion annually for military schools that offer nearly 30,000 military 

training courses to almost 3 million military personnel and DOD civilians. 

With continued heavy military involvement in operations in Iraq and 

Afghanistan, DOD is also spending billions of dollars sustaining or 

replacing its inventory of key equipment items. The United States has 

historically deployed troops in Haiti relatively rapidly. (Fig. 3 illustrates 

deployment of U.S. marines in Haiti.) For example, in 1994 the United 

States deployed an operation in Haiti within 60 days of the issuance of a UN 

Security Council Resolution authorizing the restoration of Haiti’s 

constitutionally elected leadership to power. The 20,000-member force 

quickly established itself in 500 locations throughout Haiti and achieved its 

primary goals within 76 days. 

16United Nations, Security Council mission. Report of the Security Council Mission to 

Haiti, 13 to 16 April 2005. May 2005. 
Page 17 GAO-06-331 Peacekeeping

Figure 3: U.S. Marines Arrive in Port-au-Prince, Haiti, Via C-17 Military Transport in 

March, 2004

Intelligence apparatus. The 2000 UN report on peacekeeping indicated 

that missions should be afforded the necessary field intelligence and other 

capabilities to mount an effective deterrence against violent challengers. 

For its intelligence needs in an operation in Haiti, DOD can draw upon the 

extensive resources of the U.S. intelligence community, consisting of a 

wide array of agencies, departments, and offices throughout the U.S. 

government. The Defense Intelligence Agency, for example, employing over 

7,500 military and civilian employees worldwide, produces and manages 

foreign military intelligence for warfighters, defense policymakers, and 

force planners in support of U.S. military planning and operations. The 

Central Intelligence Agency and the U.S. Navy, Army, Marine Corps, and Air 

Force, among other organizations, also provide intelligence support to U.S. 

military operations. U.S. forces had these resources at their disposal when 

they led multinational forces in Haiti in 1994-95, successfully disbanding 

the Haitian army and paramilitary groups and confiscating the weapons 

caches held by government opponents within 7 months. 

Public information. The 2000 UN report indicated that an effective 

communications and public information capacity is an operational 

Source: DOD photo.
Page 18 GAO-06-331 Peacekeeping

necessity for nearly all UN peacekeeping operations. According to the 

report, “effective communication helps to dispel rumor, to counter 

disinformation, and secure the cooperation of local populations.” 

Furthermore, it can provide leverage in dealing with leaders of local rival 

groups and enhance the security of UN personnel. The report recommends 

that such strategies and the personnel to carry them out be included in the 

very first elements deployed to help start up a mission. At DOD, the 

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs is responsible for 

developing programs and plans relating to DOD news media relations, 

public information, internal information, community relations, and public 

affairs in support of DOD objectives and operations. DOD developed a 

public affairs strategy that was a central element of the operation it led in 

Haiti in 2004; it included issuing regular press releases and briefing local 

and international media frequently on the progress and developments of 

the operation. U.S. military forces in Haiti were met with relatively little 

violent opposition, resulting in a minimal loss of life, either Haitian or 

American. 

UN Has Multinational 

Participation, Extensive 

Experience, and Structure 

for Coordinating Nation 

Building

The UN’s strengths in peacekeeping in Haiti are rooted in the multinational 

character of its operation as well as extensive experience with 

peacekeeping and related nation building. The UN’s experience has 

enabled it to develop a structure for coordinating international 

organizations involved in nation building and give it access to a pool of 

experienced and skilled international civil servants, including personnel 

with diverse language capabilities. 

Multinational participation. The multinational cooperation on UN 

peacekeeping missions, such as in MINUSTAH, provides some notable 

advantages. According to a 2005 study sponsored by the Rand Corporation, 

the UN may have the ability to compensate for its relatively small military 

presence with its reputation of international legitimacy and local 

impartiality.17 Furthermore, its multinational character likely lends the UN 

a reputation for impartiality that a single nation may not enjoy. The study 

concluded that this has afforded the UN a degree of success with relatively 

small missions that include both security and nation-building components. 

MINUSTAH represents a multinational effort that is not dominated by any 

single country. (Fig. 4 illustrates multinational peacekeeping operations 

17James Dobbins, et al. The UN’s Role in Nation-Building, From the Congo to Iraq 

(Arlington, VA, 2005).
Page 19 GAO-06-331 Peacekeeping

under MINUSTAH.) During its first year of operation in Haiti, MINUSTAH 

comprised 7,624 military staff and police personnel from 41 countries. 

Unlike earlier U.S.-led operations, where the U.S. troops represented up to 

90 percent of military personnel, U.S. participation on the ground in 

MINUSTAH was limited to 29 U.S. military and police personnel—less than 

1 percent of the total. As officials of the Joint Chiefs of Staff pointed out, 

development of coalition partners through multinational operations is 

important not only for strengthening ongoing and future operations in 

Haiti, but also for building strong international capacity for facing future 

military challenges globally. The advantages for the United States include a 

lower overall cost for peacekeeping and reduced exposure of U.S. 

personnel to the inherent dangers of operating in conflict zones. However, 

according to DOD and State Department officials, the multinational nature 

of a military force may also limit its operational effectiveness by 

introducing variations in training among the personnel from different 

nations and difficulties in communications, command, and control. 

Figure 4: MINUSTAH Peacekeepers from Jordan Prepare to Patrol The Slum of Cite 

Soleil in Haiti, July 2005

Source: UN photo.
Page 20 GAO-06-331 Peacekeeping

Experienced peacekeeping officials. The UN has developed a cadre of 

senior officials that has gained experience with peacekeeping and nationbuilding activities over many missions. While there are acknowledged 

deficiencies in UN peace operations, the UN established a best practices 

unit in DPKO in 1995 to study and adopt lessons learned. Senior 

MINUSTAH officials, including the Chilean UN Special Representative and 

his deputies, the Brazilian Force Commander,18 and the Canadian Police 

Commissioner bring experience in peacekeeping and development 

activities from diverse geographic areas, and particularly from other 

countries in the region. The international nature of the UN also provides 

access to a large pool of civil servants and security personnel with native 

language speaking abilities and translation skills. In Haiti, 11 Frenchspeaking countries have provided peacekeeping troops and police officers 

for MINUSTAH.

Structure for coordinating international assistance. The UN has fostered 

a network of agencies and development banks. UN peacekeeping missions 

can draw directly upon this network in coordinating the extensive 

humanitarian and developmental activities that are related to operations 

with expansive, integrated mandates that include nation building. In Haiti, 

MINUSTAH has established a framework for coordination integral to the 

mission’s organization. With UN co-sponsorship, official donors in this 

network, including the World Bank and the Inter-American Development 

Bank, have pledged $1.3 billion in development assistance. The UN 

Development Program coordinates the efforts of nine agencies in Haiti, 

which, during the first year of MINUSTAH, disbursed $60 million in 

development assistance. To help ensure that these funds are well 

coordinated and support MINUSTAH’s objectives, these UN agencies 

operating in Haiti report directly to a senior MINUSTAH official, who also 

serves as the chief UN Development Program representative for Haiti. 

Conclusions While a U.S. peacekeeping operation in Haiti would be more expensive 

than the current UN mission, it would be subject to higher operational 

standards and supported by an extensive military infrastructure. Strong, 

well-trained, and quickly deployed U.S. forces have proven militarily 

effective in short-term operations in Haiti in the past. However, involving 

the international community extensively in peacekeeping operations such 

18The original MINUSTAH Force Commander died on January 7, 2006. The Deputy Force 

Commander assumed command of all force elements.
Page 21 GAO-06-331 Peacekeeping

as MINUSTAH has notable advantages for leveraging development funding, 

experience, and other resources of nations and organizations. The situation 

in other peacekeeping missions may differ significantly from the conditions 

in Haiti, and complex domestic and international political considerations 

may ultimately weigh heavily in determining the role of U.S. and UN 

peacekeepers in future operations. Chief among these are the political 

interests of the United States and other UN member states. 

Agency Comments We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of Defense and State 

and the United Nations for their comment. They provided technical 

corrections, which we incorporated into the report as appropriate, but they 

had no further comments.

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of Defense and State 

and the Secretary-General of the United Nations. We will also make copies 

available to others on request. In addition, it will be available at no cost on 

our Web site at http://www.gao.gov.

If you have any questions regarding this report, please contact me at (202) 

512-8979 or christoffj@gao.gov. Contact points for our Office of 

Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page 

of this report. GAO contacts and staff acknowledgments are listed in 

appendix II.

Joseph A. Christoff

Director, International Affairs and Trade
Page 22 GAO-06-331 Peacekeeping

Appendix I

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology AAppenednxidexiIs

To compare the cost of a specific United Nations (UN) mission with the 

cost that the United States would have incurred had an operation been 

deemed in the U.S. national interest and undertaken without UN 

involvement, we obtained and analyzed cost data from the UN and the U.S. 

Government.

• To determine the UN costs for peacekeeping operations, we analyzed 

the 2004-2005 budget and supporting documents for the UN Stabilization 

Mission to Haiti (MINUSTAH). We spoke with officials of the UN 

Department of Peacekeeping Operations and other UN departments, 

offices, and agencies at UN headquarters in New York about the 

assumptions, cost factors and ratios, and cost estimation methods used 

to generate the budget. We used MINUSTAH as our case study because it 

illustrates the various categories of cost for a contemporary mission 

located in a country where the United States has an expressed national 

interest. Additionally, we believe this case provides a strong basis for 

estimating costs, given the long history of U.S. and UN military 

intervention in Haiti. We chose the period May 1, 2004 to June 30, 2005 

for analysis because it reflected the first approved mission budget and 

incorporated the initial start-up costs. According to UN officials, the 

budget provides a reasonable estimate of costs, though actual expenses 

may vary from the budget. We also discussed with UN officials the 

methodology for determining the U.S. assessment for MINUSTAH, 

which was 27.1 percent of the mission budget. We did not include 

peacekeeping support costs, which are indirect costs allocated to the 

mission for overhead and administrative expenses incurred outside of 

Haiti (at UN headquarters and the UN Logistics Base in Brindisi, Italy), 

as the U.S. Government does not allocate corresponding overhead and 

administrative costs to individual operations in a comparable way. 

• To estimate the military costs of a unilateral U.S. operation, we 

developed a comparable U.S. operational scenario based on the 

MINUSTAH budget and supporting documents, assuming deployment of 

the same number of military, civilian, and police peacekeeping 

personnel and aircraft in Haiti over a similar time period of time (14 

months). To devise the military portion of the scenario, we interviewed 

DOD officials and contractor staff involved in developing cost estimates 

for U.S. contingency operations. The Department of Defense (DOD) 

Office of the Comptroller and its contractor, the Institute for Defense 

Analyses (IDA), generated cost estimates for the military components of 

this scenario using the DOD’s Contingency Operations Support Tool 

(COST), since DOD financial management regulations designate COST 
Appendix I

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

Page 23 GAO-06-331 Peacekeeping

as the department’s common cost-estimating platform. The cost 

estimate DOD provided included only the incremental costs of the 

operation—those directly attributable to the operation that would not 

be incurred if the operation did not take place. We based the scenario, 

and hence the cost estimate, on the following assumptions, which 

correspond closely with MINUSTAH budget assumptions and actual UN 

personnel deployments.

• Military contingents: 6,594 total personnel divided as follows:

Hospital units: 500 personnel

Engineers: 200 personnel

Military police: 820 personnel 

Light infantry: 5,074 personnel less the number of aviation 

support personnel for 8 UH-60 Black Hawk and 10 CH-47 Chinook 

helicopters.

• Type of military personnel: 85 percent active duty, 15 percent reserve.

• Theater of operations: Haiti.

• Operation dates: orders provided April 30, 2004; costs end June 30, 

2005. 

• Deployment schedule: gradual deployment to theater over 180 day 

period; 30-day pre-deployment and deployment phase for active duty 

units and 60 days for reserve units; 6-month rotation period for all units; 

7-day re-deployment for all units.

• Operational tempo: level 1.5 for pre-deployment, deployment, and 

sustainment. 

• Construction of troop housing equivalent to semi-rigid soft wall 

dormitory tents.

• Transportation: departure from Columbus, Georgia, to Port-au-Prince, 

Haiti; personnel deployed and rotated by commercial air; all equipment 

shipped by sea. 
Appendix I

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

Page 24 GAO-06-331 Peacekeeping

We obtained input on the scenario design from DOD’s Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

who validated it as reasonable. However, the military component of the 

scenario and the corresponding cost estimate have some limitations. An 

actual U.S. military plan may differ significantly from the UN plan, due to 

differences between U.S. and UN military infrastructures in operations, 

structure, doctrine, and circumstances at the time of the operation. 

Additionally, we did not include reconstitution—the cost of returning 

equipment to useable standards after operation—in our cost estimate, 

since the UN does not include this cost in its peacekeeping mission 

budgets, and we assumed that reconstitution would occur after the initial 

budget cycle on which our comparison is based. Further, some cost factors 

used in COST, such as some pre-deployment costs and transportation for 

certain supplies and mail, are based on various contingency operations, 

such as Operation Iraqi Freedom, and may not be representative of costs in 

Haiti. 

• To estimate civilian police costs, we obtained and analyzed data from 

the Department of State’s Bureau for International Narcotics and Law 

Enforcement Affairs on actual contract costs for providing civilian 

police to support UN missions. As these contracts do not include the 

costs for daily subsistence and transportation, we calculated these 

additional costs based on the U.S. government meals and incidental 

expense rate for Port-au-Prince and published contract airfare 

schedules. We applied the average costs per officer to the total number 

of civilian police officers included in the MINUSTAH budget. Formed 

police units were not calculated in this manner, as we assumed that such 

personnel would be provided in the military portion of the operation as 

military police and are included as such in that estimate.

• To estimate U.S. civilian personnel costs for the operation, we obtained 

and analyzed data from the Department of State to determine the 

average annual cost of a foreign service officer in Haiti during fiscal year 

2005, including salary and benefits, office furnishings, housing, 

residential furnishings, post differential, airfare, shipping, rest and 

recuperation, danger pay, cost of living adjustments, educational 

allowance for one child, and miscellaneous expenses. We applied this 

average cost to the number of non-administrative international staff 

included in the MINUSTAH budget. (We subtracted several senior 

executive positions from this number, as the ambassador and U.S. 

Agency for International Development mission director and other senior 

U.S. officials already posted to Haiti would likely serve their functions.) 

To estimate the cost of locally-employed national staff, we obtained 
Appendix I

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

Page 25 GAO-06-331 Peacekeeping

staffing information for the U.S. embassy in Port-au-Prince for fiscal 

years 2004 and 2005 from the Department of State and calculated the 

average annual salary for locally-employed national staff in Haiti. We 

applied this figure to the number of non-administrative national staff 

included in the MINUSTAH budget. We calculated benefits for this staff 

at 27.6 percent of salaries, per information on these costs provided by 

the Department of State. 

• To estimate civilian facilities and administrative costs, we obtained and 

analyzed data provided by the Department of State and the U.S. embassy 

in Port-au-Prince. The department’s Capital Security Cost-Sharing 

Program requires agencies posting staff overseas to pay fees into a costsharing pool that funds construction of secure embassies and 

consulates. We used data on these fees to calculate the total cost-sharing 

fee for the civilian staff in our U.S. operational scenario for Haiti. To 

determine administrative support costs, we obtained and analyzed cost 

data from the Department of State’s International Cooperative 

Administrative Support Services program for the Port-au-Prince 

embassy for fiscal year 2004. We calculated the average administrative 

cost per non-administrative foreign service officer and applied this 

amount to the total number of non-administrative civilian personnel in 

the MINUSTAH budget.

• To estimate the cost of deploying civilian volunteers, we obtained and 

analyzed data from two U.S.-based nongovernmental organizations that 

contract with the U.S. government to provide volunteers for 

development and humanitarian activities overseas. These organizations 

provided the cost estimates for deploying 153 volunteers in Haiti for 14 

months, which corresponds to the parameters of the MINUSTAH budget 

for volunteers. Our cost estimate includes the average of these two 

estimates.

For all of the cost data used in these estimates, we obtained and analyzed 

supporting information or discussed the data source with the 

corresponding officials and determined that the data were sufficiently 

reliable for the purposes of this report. 

To analyze factors that could substantially affect the estimated costs of the 

U.S. operation, we developed alternative scenarios and cost estimates, 

varying one major assumption for each scenario. We identified the 

assumptions to vary through discussions with DOD and Institute for 

Defense Analysis officials, who identified those factors they believed, 
Appendix I

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

Page 26 GAO-06-331 Peacekeeping

based on their experience, would have the most influence on the cost 

estimate for the operation’s military component. The three variations we 

selected were (1) an all-reserve force, (2) deployment of all troops in Haiti 

within the first 60 days of the operation, and (3) an operational tempo of 2. 

DOD generated alternative cost estimates for each scenario, using COST, 

and we compared these with the base estimate to identify and explain the 

major differences associated with each alternative scenario.

To identify and assess the strengths of the United States and the UN in 

leading peacekeeping operations in Haiti, we obtained and analyzed UN 

reports and evaluations relating to MINUSTAH and information on past 

U.S.-led operations in Haiti. We interviewed officials from DOD, the 

Department of State, and the UN, as well as peacekeeping experts from the 

Stimson Center in Washington, D.C., to discuss their views on factors that 

contribute to successful peacekeeping operations. We also reviewed 

published reports from various organizations relating to the effectiveness 

of UN and U.S. peacekeeping operations.

We conducted our review from June through February 2006 in accordance 

with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Page 27 GAO-06-331 Peacekeeping

Appendix II

GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments ApendxiI

GAO Contact Joseph Christoff, (202) 512-8979

Acknowledgments Key contributors to this report include Tetsuo Miyabara (Assistant 

Director), James Michels, Charles Perdue, Kendall Schaefer, Suzanne Sapp, 

Grace Lui, Lynn Cothern, Joseph Carney, and Sharron Candon.

(320356)
GAO’s Mission The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation and 

investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its 

constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance and 

accountability of the federal government for the American people. GAO 

examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and policies; 

and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance to help 

Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO’s 

commitment to good government is reflected in its core values of 

accountability, integrity, and reliability.

Obtaining Copies of 

GAO Reports and 

Testimony

The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no cost 

is through GAO’s Web site (www.gao.gov). Each weekday, GAO posts 

newly released reports, testimony, and correspondence on its Web site. To 

have GAO e-mail you a list of newly posted products every afternoon, go to 

www.gao.gov and select “Subscribe to Updates.”

Order by Mail or Phone The first copy of each printed report is free. Additional copies are $2 each. 

A check or money order should be made out to the Superintendent of 

Documents. GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard. Orders for 100 or 

more copies mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent. Orders 

should be sent to:

U.S. Government Accountability Office

441 G Street NW, Room LM

Washington, D.C. 20548

To order by Phone: Voice: (202) 512-6000 

TDD: (202) 512-2537 

Fax: (202) 512-6061

To Report Fraud, 

Waste, and Abuse in 

Federal Programs

Contact:

Web site: www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm

E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov

Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470

Congressional 

Relations

Gloria Jarmon, Managing Director, JarmonG@gao.gov (202) 512-4400

U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7125 

Washington, D.C. 20548

Public Affairs Paul Anderson, Managing Director, AndersonP1@gao.gov (202) 512-4800

U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149 

Washington, D.C. 20548