The Honorable Pasco M. Bowman succeeded the Honorable Richard S. 1

Arnold as Chief Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the

Eighth Circuit at the close of business on April 17, 1998.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 97-2905

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Thomas L. Pertuis, Jr., *

*

Appellant, *

*

v. * Appeal from the United States

* District Court for the

Kenneth S. Apfel, Social * Western District of Arkansas

Security Administration *

Commissioner, *

*

Appellee. *

___________

 Submitted: April 16, 1998

 Filed: August 20, 1998 

___________

Before BOWMAN, Chief Judge, and McMILLIAN and MURPHY, Circuit Judges. 1

___________

McMILLIAN, Circuit Judge.
The Honorable Bobby E. Shepherd, United States Magistrate Judge for the

2

Western District of Arkansas. 

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Thomas L. Pertuis, Jr. (claimant) appeals from a final order entered in the United

States District Court for the Western District of Arkansas granting summary judgment 2

in favor of the Commissioner of Social Security and affirming the decision of the

administrative law judge (ALJ) denying claimant social security disability insurance

benefits pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(I), 423 and supplemental security income

benefits pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1381a. Pertuis v. Callahan, No. 96-6118 (W.D. Ark.

June 11, 1997) . For reversal, claimant argues that the district court erred in holding

that substantial evidence in the administrative record supports the ALJ’s determination

that he was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act during the

relevant time period. 

Jurisdiction in the district court was proper based upon 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

Jurisdiction in this court is proper based upon 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The notice of appeal

was timely filed pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 4(a). 

We have carefully reviewed the record and the parties’ arguments on appeal.

Upon review of the record, we find no merit to claimant’s argument that the ALJ posed

an improper hypothetical question to the vocational expert (VE) because the question

failed to take into account all of claimant’s debilitating conditions. The ALJ based his

hypothetical question upon those limitations which he found to be credible and

supported by the evidence. The limitations which the ALJ included in his hypothetical

question were proper and supported by the evidence. See, e.g., Rappoport v. Sullivan,

942 F.2d 1320, 1323 (8th Cir. 1991) (while hypothetical question must accurately set

forth all of the claimant’s impairments, the question need only include those limitations

accepted by the ALJ as true). Moreover, substantial evidence in the record as a whole

supports the ALJ’s conclusion, based upon the VE’s testimony, that there were jobs
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in significant numbers in the national economy which claimant could perform during

the relevant time period. See, e.g., Cruze v. Chater, 85 F.3d 1320, 1326 (8th Cir.
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1996) (holding that substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s decision where the

vocational expert testified, in response to a proper hypothetical question, that the

claimant would be able to perform jobs existing in significant numbers in the national

economy). Accordingly, we agree with the district court that substantial evidence in

the administrative record supports the ALJ’s conclusion that claimant was not disabled

within the meaning of the Social Security Act during the relevant time period. 

The order of the district court is affirmed. See 8th Cir. R. 47B. 

A true copy.

 Attest:

 U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.