CU @ THE FOB:

HOW THE FORWARD OPERATING BASE IS

CHANGING THE LIFE OF COMBAT SOLDIERS

Leonard Wong

Stephen Gerras

March 2006

This publication is a work of the United States Government as defined in Title 17, 

United States Code, section 101. As such, it is in the public domain, and under the 

provisions of Title 17, United States Code, Section 105, it may not be copyrighted.

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*****

	 The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not

necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, the 

Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. This report is cleared for public 

release; distribution is unlimited.

*****

All soldiers quoted in print or shown in video excerpts in this monograph 

gave their consent to publish their comments and post their interviews on the 

Internet.

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Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be forwarded to 

Dr. Leonard Wong at Leonard.Wong@carlisle.army.mil. 

*****

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page for electronic dissemination. Hard copies of this report also may be ordered 

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ISBN 1-58487-237-3
iii

FOREWORD

As this monograph points out, the situation in post-war Iraq is 

producing combat veterans accustomed to a perspective of combat 

that differs greatly from past wars. The Forward Operating Base (FOB) 

has become the mainstay of the U.S. presence in Iraq. Dr. Leonard 

Wong and Colonel Stephen Gerras explore the facets of fighting from 

the FOB and show that it gives soldiers the unprecedented advantage 

of gaining a respite from constant danger, minimizes the wearing 

effects of hunger and fatigue, and reduces the isolation of combat. As 

a result, many of the factors of psychological stress typically present 

in combat are greatly reduced. They also point out, however, that 

technology on the FOB allows soldiers to communicate frequently 

with home, shifting the family from an abstract to concrete concept in 

the minds of deployed soldiers. As a result, the competition between 

the family and the Army for soldier time, commitment, loyalty, and 

energy is renewed. Policymakers and commanders will find this 

monograph both reinforcing and thought-provoking.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director

Strategic Studies Institute 
iv

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES OF THE AUTHORS

LEONARD WONG is an Associate Research Professor in the Strategic 

Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College. He served in the 

Army for over 20 years, including teaching leadership at West Point, 

serving as an analyst in the Office of the Chief of Staff of the Army, 

and also in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel. He 

is a Professional Engineer and holds a B.S. from the U.S. Military 

Academy and an M.S. and Ph.D. in Business Administration from 

Texas Tech University. 

STEPHEN GERRAS is the Director of Leadership and Command 

Instruction in the Department of Command, Leadership, and 

Management at the U.S. Army War College. Colonel Gerras has 

served in the Army for over 24 years, including commanding a 

light infantry company and a transportation battalion, teaching 

leadership at West Point, and serving as the Chief of Operations 

and Agreements for the Office of Defense Cooperation in Ankara, 

Turkey. He holds a B.S. from the U.S. Military Academy and an M.S. 

and Ph.D. in Industrial and Organizational Psychology from Penn 

State University.
v

SUMMARY

The Forward Operating Base (FOB) has become the “home away 

from home” for the American soldier. It has evolved to a place 

where many of the stresses, frustrations, and discomforts commonly 

thought endemic in the combat soldier’s life are mitigated. In 

addition to being a base for launching tactical operations, FOBs have 

become refuges from danger, places of renewal for physical needs, 

a respite from the mental stresses of battle, and finally, a means for 

soldiers to stay connected with the world outside Iraq. On a FOB, 

soldiers can renew their fighting spirit and also find a psychological 

escape from the rigors of battle. Soldiers appreciate creature comforts 

like the good and abundant food, refreshing air conditioning, hot 

showers, and safety afforded by the FOB. Because of advances in 

communication technology, however, soldiers are also experiencing 

competition between the institutions of the family and the military 

for a limited amount of attention, time, and emotional capital. The 

competing demands of the family and the mission require the 

attention of commanders and policymakers. 

An electronic version of this monograph, including hyperlinks to video excerpts 

from soldier interviews, is available on the Strategic Studies Institute website.

CU @ THE FOB:

HOW THE FORWARD OPERATING BASE IS

CHANGING THE LIFE OF COMBAT SOLDIERS

For thousands of soldiers deployed to Iraq in support of Operation 

IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF), life can be divided into two distinct realms. 

There is the life spent conducting missions in Iraqi neighborhoods—

constantly scanning the area for suspicious activity, weapons locked 

and loaded for action, and adrenaline-pumping situations. And then 

there is the life on the Forward Operating Base (FOB)—catching up 

on sleep, pumping iron in the gym, and surfing the Internet. 

FOBs have evolved from the Department of Defense’s official 

definition of “an airfield used to support tactical operations without 

establishing full support facilities”1 to the centerpiece of the U.S. 

presence in Iraq. Instead of merely serving as a staging area for tactical 

operations, the FOB has become the “home away from home” for the 

American soldier. With over 100 FOBs in Iraq, conditions at each 

can vary greatly. On one extreme are the huge FOBs located near 

Baghdad International Airport that boast air conditioned sleeping 

and work trailers, cavernous dining facilities, spacious PXs (this 

acronym, as well as many others used by soldiers, is explained in the 

Appendix), cappuccino bars, well-stocked gyms, and Internet cafes.2

On the other end of the scale, some FOBs are located in old Iraqi 

Army bases or abandoned factories with soldiers still living in tents, 

food ferried from other FOBs, and more austere conditions.3 Overall, 

however, most soldiers in Iraq live on FOBs somewhere in the middle 

range—air conditioned quarters, a small PX, a MWR facility with 

Internet and phone lines, and a contracted dining facility. 

FOBs have become places where many of the stresses, frustrations, 

and discomforts commonly thought endemic in the combat soldier’s 

life are mitigated. On a FOB, soldiers can renew their fighting spirit 

and also find a psychological escape from the rigors of battle. In 

addition to being a base for launching tactical operations, FOBs have 

become refuges from danger, places of renewal for physical needs, 

a respite from the mental stresses of battle, and, finally, a means for 

soldiers to stay connected with the world outside Iraq. Of course, 
some critics may decry the FOB concept. They point out that the 

reliance on FOBs prevents soldiers from integrating into the local 

populace and reflects a bunker mentality. According to this view, a 

better approach would be to spread troops out in smaller outposts

throughout neighborhoods. Two points are important concerning 

this criticism. First, the goal of U.S. forces in OIF is to hand the 

counterinsurgency over to Iraqi forces. The Iraqi army and police are 

the primary forces working to gain the trust of the local population, 

not the U.S. military. Second, FOBs do not eliminate the potential 

use of combat outposts for specific purposes. Units can leave the 

FOB for periods of time to conduct operations, liaison with coalition 

forces, or work with a particular neighborhood. The key is that the 

FOB allows regeneration of combat effectiveness without leaving the 

battlefield. 

Of course, most wars have had rear areas, base camps, or firebases 

from which soldiers would come and go to wage war. Today’s 

FOBs are unique, however, for three reasons. First, the disparity 

between the environment inside and outside the wire is much more

pronounced than experienced with forward bases in past wars. The 

FOBs are, as one Army general put it, “little oases in the middle of 

a dangerous and confusing world.”4 Second, the FOBs are situated 

literally on the battlefields of Iraq. They are where combat soldiers 

actually live, not just visit for a few days of R&R. Finally, while 

rear areas in the past have afforded soldiers amenities and safety, 

only today are forward deployed combat soldiers in daily, or even 

minute-to-minute, contact with their families. FOBs and evolving 

technology provide that novel capability. 

This monograph presents a brief overview of the security and 

sustainment functions of the FOB, and then focuses on the often 

overlooked, but increased capability of deployed soldiers to interact 

with their families. The many amenities found on FOBs are allowing 

soldiers to recover physically and mentally from the strains of 

combat, but the expanded use of technology is also giving soldiers 

the ability to stay connected with families from a war zone. While 

increased interaction between soldiers and the home front improves

soldier morale, it also raises some interesting implications for combat 

readiness. 
The study relies heavily on observations collected from 

enlisted soldiers deployed to OIF in May 2005—specifically over 

50 structured interviews conducted with soldiers in the ranks of 

staff sergeant and below in locations throughout Iraq and Kuwait. 

Interviews included combat arms as well as combat service support

soldiers and involved Active, National Guard, and Army Reserve 

soldiers.5 The only prerequisite for inclusion in the interview sample 

was that the soldiers had to regularly carry out missions off the FOB 

(i.e., the study does not include soldiers who spend their combat 

tour exclusively on the FOB—and are irreverently called “fobbits.”) 

The interview sessions were conducted on the FOBs, followed an 

interview protocol, were taped, and were subsequently transcribed. 

The Oasis.

We have all the amenities we need. Really nothing to complain about 

besides being shot at and that’s our job. 6

Interviewed soldier

In his study of American enlisted men in Vietnam, Charles Moskos 

described the physical factors influencing the behavior of soldiers in 

combat: “There are the routine physical stresses of combat existence: 

the weight of the pack, tasteless food, diarrhea, lack of water, leeches, 

mosquitos, rain, torrid heat, mud, and loss of sleep.”7

Peter Kindsvatter, in his analysis of the American combat soldiers 

from both World Wars, Korea, and Vietnam, noted that in addition 

to the physical pressures of combat, there is a pervasive emotional 

strain on soldiers in a combat environment:

Even as the soldier contended with a harsh, seemingly evil, physical 

environment, he also found that war stressed him emotionally. He was 

never completely safe from harm, except when far to the rear, perhaps 

attending a military school or in a hospital, and even then he was 

hounded by the thought of having to return to the fighting. Thus the 

combat soldier was never completely free from fear and anxiety.8

Most combat veterans from World War II through the 2003 Iraq War 

would be able to relate to Moskos’s and Kindsvatter’s description of 

the combat situation. From the Battle of the Bulge to the drive into 
Baghdad, soldiers have understood combat to be tiring, draining, 

and emotionally exhausting. The situation in postwar Iraq, however, 

appears to be producing an entire generation of combat warriors 

whose wartime experience is drastically different from that of past 

combat veterans. 

Today’s soldiers, like those of yesteryear, are experiencing the 

horror, violence, and brutality common to battlefields. The dangers 

of urban warfare, as well as the possibility of IEDs, VBIEDs, and 

S-VBIEDs, weigh heavily on the mind of each soldier deployed to 

Iraq. Unlike previous conflicts, however, the forward operating base 

has emerged as a critical factor in shaping the ability for soldiers to 

maintain the requisite psychological readiness for combat operations. 

Several aspects of the FOB contribute to its vital role in mitigating 

the stress and fear usually confronting front-line soldiers. 

An obvious, yet critical role of the FOB is to isolate the soldier 

from the danger found in the hostile environs of Iraq. Off the FOB, 

troops are hypervigilant as they patrol dangerous neighborhoods or 

follow up on intelligence reports of insurgent activity. On the FOB, 

soldiers clear their weapons, requirements for helmets and body 

armor are relaxed, and while the threat of a rocket or mortar attack 

is always present, it is greatly minimized. Insurgent tactics against 

FOBs ranging from direct attack to indirect fire have been largely 

ineffective. Active defensive measures coupled with aggressive 

offensive tactics have given the insurgents pause in attacking 

FOBs. The result is that a primary cause of soldier fear and stress—

omnipresent physical danger—is largely absent from most FOBs. 

FOBs give soldiers the rare opportunity to be engaged in brutal 

combat one minute and yet return seconds later to a place where 

the threat of harm is exponentially diminished. The psychological 

benefit of not feeling threatened by the enemy is significant. A convoy 

commander, whose mission was delivering supplies throughout Iraq, 

described the psychological release of arriving at each FOB: “There 

is a sense of relief. You pull in at the next gate and it’s ‘Aaaahhhhhh 

. . . Relax!’” Another soldier commented on what life would be like 

without the safety found in FOBs: “Imagine you are under constant 

threat. . . . Your own tent wouldn’t relax you. You couldn’t relax 

when you go to take a hot shower. You couldn’t relax having a meal. 

. . . I can see how that would be way harder on people.” 
Interestingly, the enemy is also aware of the benefits of a safe haven. 

Abu Jalal, a self-proclaimed insurgent leader in Baghdad, spoke of 

the safety provided by FOBs: “The old [Iraqi] military officers know 

very well that the attacks on the bases of the enemy army weaken the 

morale of the soldiers and frighten them. The soldier feels safe when 

he goes back to his base. If he is attacked in the place that feels safe, 

that place is really hell.”9 Because of the largely unseen efforts of 

thousands of soldiers guarding the perimeter, searching vehicles and 

people, and being proactive in securing the FOBs, the vast majority 

of soldiers on FOBs are free from the ever-present threat of danger 

on the battlefield. 

Another persistent factor affecting soldier stress during combat 

is the lack of sleep. Studies have repeatedly shown that when 

conducting continuous combat operations, soldiers should ideally 

get 6 to 8 hours of sleep every 24 hours.10 A cumulative lack of sleep 

leads to soldier fatigue, disorientation, and will eventually diminish 

the ability to resist fear. John Keegan, in The Face of Battle, wrote, 

“It is a fairly safe generalization that the soldiers of most armies, at 

least before the development of mechanical transport, entered battle 

tired.”11

World War II surveys administered in the Italian theater shortly 

before the end of the campaign (when the fighting had quieted and 

conditions were “probably as favorable as ever exist in combat”) 

showed that despite a lull in combat, nearly one-third of the men 

averaged only 4 hours or less of sleep each day.12 Similarly, researchers 

chronicling the Vietnam War point out that most infantrymen in 

Vietnam could expect about an average of 4 hours of sleep a night in 

combat.13

Several aspects of FOBs influence the ability of soldiers to receive 

adequate amounts of sleep. First, as described earlier, insulating 

soldiers from the physical danger outside the wire eliminates the 

requirement for them to be constantly concerned about the security for 

themselves and their unit. Second, the conditions on FOBs generally 

allow soldiers to escape the harsh environment of Southwest Asia 

in order to rest. Air conditioning and comfortable beds are critical 

luxuries in providing rest for soldiers. One infantry team leader 

commented, “I’ve got a bed, nice actual mattress, not those little 

foam things. I have got my sheets, my covers, my pillows and all my 
6

pictures. I just try to keep everything like I would at home.” Finally, 

because of the safety afforded by the FOB, commanders can set up a 

combat rhythm that includes allowing time for sleep. As one soldier 

noted, “My first sergeant and commander—they are adamant about 

giving the guys their personal time. We get 5 hours of personal time 

every night and 6 hours of sleep every night. . . . That takes the fear 

away from me.” 

Cumulative hunger or thirst, like the lack of sleep, adds to 

combat stress and a decreased psychological readiness. In the words 

of Major General Baade, Commander of the 90th Panzer-Grenadier 

Division during the siege of Stalingrad, “Eating just soup makes 

one cowardly.”14 In one of the earliest studies on fear in battle, John 

Dollard interviewed veterans of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade who 

fought in the Spanish Civil War. He concluded that “hunger and 

thirst, excessive heat and cold, prolonged fatigue—all tend to force 

men out of battle.”15 Despite the recognition of the link between 

hunger and a soldier’s ability to deal with fear, over half the combat 

soldiers in a World War II survey reported that they did not get as 

much to eat as they needed. The main reasons offered by the soldiers 

were that food was unavailable or they did not like the kind of food 

provided.16 Paul Fussell, in describing the lives of soldiers of World 

War II, noted that even in the good times, “hunger gnawed at the 

troops, despite the official carbohydrates ladled out three times a 

day.”17

Today’s soldiers would be hard pressed to claim they could 

not get enough to eat. An embedded journalist marveled over the 

culinary fare found on a FOB (and not one of the mega-FOBs near 

Baghdad):

For dinners during my first week here, I had sirloin steak, lobster tails, 

king crab legs, fried shrimp, meat lasagna and turkey a la king. (But not 

all at once.) For breakfasts, I had made-to-order omelets or grits. During 

lunches, I had vegetable lo mein, burritos or egg rolls. And for dessert? It 

seems that every soldier has some to top off their meals. The dining hall 

here has an ice cream sundae bar, including all the traditional toppings 

like cherries and whipped cream.18

As one infantryman dryly noted, “If my worst complaint is that there 

aren’t any tacos in the salad bar, I’ve got it pretty good.” 
By sheltering soldiers from danger, affording troops the ability 

to rest between missions, and providing sustenance in an otherwise 

hostile environment, FOBs are indeed oases for the physical 

needs of soldiers. In addition to providing a physical refuge for 

soldiers, however, FOBs in the Iraqi theater also allow care for their 

psychological needs. 

In his analysis of American soldiers in past wars, Kindsvatter 

noted that, “Once the troops had attended to the basics of cleaning 

up, eating, and resting, they began looking for diversions. Any 

entertainment was greatly appreciated.”19 Examples of amusements

included group singing; listening to radio broadcasts, especially 

music; and watching movies. A World War II soldier commented 

that the movies “took our minds off the war and transferred us into 

a fantasy world for a couple of hours.”20

For today’s soldiers, distractions on the FOB allow them also 

to mentally leave the war zone—although in newer ways. As one 

soldier pointed out, “Everybody has their way of unwinding. A lot 

of the younger guys have Xboxes they play with. . . . I got my little 

DVD player I watch every once in a while.” A team leader stressed 

the importance of recreation, “We work out every day, which takes 

away the stress. They play Playstation together, pool together, ping 

pong. . . . That is what they need.” 

Diversions on the FOB appear to accomplish two functions. First, 

distractions minimize idleness which can have a detrimental effect 

on psychological readiness. Dollard pointed out in his study of fear 

in battle that while some fear is beneficial to prevent complacency, a 

“good way to combat useless fear is to think about something else.”21

Stress and fear germinate in the minds of soldiers who have nothing 

to do but ruminate on upcoming missions and think about time away 

from home. As one infantryman noted, “Staying busy, keeping your 

mind active with other things. . . . When we are not going outside 

the gate, I try to keep busy with something.” Another soldier gave 

similar counsel, “If you stop and think about what you are doing 

and being away, then that’s when it gets to you. If you don’t stop 

and think about it, then it’s not as difficult.” 

A second role of distractions on the FOB is to remove temporarily 

(at least mentally) soldiers from the combat environment. In the 

words of one soldier, “When I come [to the FOB] I don’t feel like 
I’m in Iraq,”22 A combat engineer suggested, “We need to trick our 

minds that we’re somewhere else. Otherwise, we wouldn’t be able to 

go on, knowing today might be our last.”23

The analogy of the FOB as an oasis is appropriate because the 

FOB is a haven for safety, rest, and refreshment in an unforgiving 

environment. The FOB’s effect on combat effectiveness by giving 

soldiers the ability to recover from the stresses of combat is significant. 

The FOB, however, is more than just a refuge or a sanctuary. While it 

is a place that serves to isolate soldiers from the debilitating aspects 

of the battlefield, it also is a place that connects soldiers with the 

home front. 

Connecting with Home.

Of course, communicating with families always has been a critical 

factor in the morale of combat soldiers. Mail call traditionally has 

been a highlight (and occasionally a low point) of a soldier’s time 

in combat. In addition to postal mail being used to communicate 

with home, other methods have been introduced through the years. 

V, or Victory, mail was introduced in World War II to cut down 

on the valuable shipping space required for postal mail. Even with 

the patriotic lure of V-mail, however, most people continued to 

use regular first class mail which was much more private and less 

regulated.24

In 1948, the Military Affiliate Radio System (MARS) was 

established to assist in the training of amateur radio operators. A 

side benefit was that deployed soldiers could phone home free of 

charge.25 Because the calls were relayed over amateur radio networks, 

the calls were limited in availability and quality, were vulnerable to 

eavesdropping (including the two radio operators relaying the call), 

and subjected callers to using proper radio procedures (e.g., Hi mom, 

this is your son, over). The cumulative effect of the disadvantages 

discouraged most soldiers from using the system.26

While telephone calls were possible but extremely rare during 

the Vietnam War,27 the potential for commercial telephones for more

than a once-a-tour phenomenon became apparent during the invasion 

of Grenada when an officer called home in order to coordinate fire 

support.28 The telephone as a means to communicate with the home
9

front slowly increased during military operations in Panama,29 the

Gulf War, Somalia,30 the Balkans, and the Iraq War. Despite the 

growing availability of commercial telephones, however, expense 

and availability continued to be limiting factors. 

During the Gulf War, and especially during operations in Bosnia 

and Kosovo, e-mail emerged as a key means of communicating 

for deployed soldiers.31 As the use of e-mail surged in the civilian 

arena, soldiers were quick to adopt it as a means of communicating 

from the war zone. In the Iraq War, soldiers initially siphoned off 

bandwidth from military networks for access to the Internet and 

e-mail capability.32 As FOBs became established and major combat 

operations ceased, Internet kiosks began appearing—making e-mail 

access ubiquitous. This trend has continued in the FOBs of postwar 

Iraq to a point where currently more than 95 percent of soldiers in 

Iraq report using e-mail, and nearly two-thirds say they use it three 

or more times a week.33

Against this backdrop of electronic interconnectedness, soldiers 

interviewed for this study were asked how often they communicated 

from the FOB with their families. (All the soldiers interviewed were 

male, so families consisted of wives, children, and girlfriends). The 

expected response was three or four e-mails a week and maybe a 

weekly phone call. Instead, researchers were surprised to receive 

replies such as: “I talk to her every day when I am here,” or “I would 

say at least twice a day.” Amazingly, many soldiers reported that 

they were not just “keeping in touch” with their families with e-mails, 

but were instead communicating real time several times a day. 

With frequent communications from the FOB, soldiers reported 

that they are able to discuss topics beyond the superficial. For 

example, one soldier stated, “Well, we just talk about my wife trying 

to get her RN license. So we talk about her schooling.” Another soldier 

observed, “She is trying to buy [our] house right now, so there is a lot 

of conversation about that.” Two aspects of the communications from 

the FOB are important to note. First, the quantity of actual contacts 

that soldiers make from the FOB is staggering. Using all modes of 

communication, soldiers are extremely well-connected despite their 

deployment to a remote location in the world. Second, the quality 

of their communications reflects a depth and level of interaction not 
10

possible in a written letter or even an e-mail. Soldiers are handling 

problems, dealing with issues, and getting involved emotionally in 

real time.

Three factors help explain how this situation came about. The 

first concerns the increasing penchant of American youth for online 

communications. Today’s soldiers come from a youth cohort where 

92 percent of teenagers between 15 and 17 years old go online 

compared to just 66 percent of adults.34 E-mail has persisted as the 

most popular mode of communication with the youth cohort. The 

medium they use most often to talk to friends, however, is instant 

messaging (IM). 

Instant messaging allows real time communications over the 

Internet with exchanges resembling a telephone call more than an 

e-mail. Instant messaging is interactive, synchronous, and usually 

offers a “presence awareness” capability. The instant messaging 

presence awareness feature indicates if people on a user’s list of 

contacts are currently online and available to chat. In other words, 

a wife can look at the computer screen to check if her deployed 

husband is back from a mission and online. 

Instant messaging is currently a young person’s tool. For online 

youth 15 to 17 years old, 84 percent report using instant messaging 

compared to only 42 percent of adults.35 The shift toward instant

messaging for casual written communication is significant. For 

American youth—and today’s young soldiers—instant messaging is 

becoming the key interactive means of communication while e-mail 

has become “something you use to talk to ‘old people,’ institutions, 

or to send complex instructions to large groups.”36 Thus, one of the 

key factors affecting the FOB’s role as a center for interaction between 

soldiers and their families is the comfort level young soldiers have 

with online technology—especially instant messaging. A second 

factor behind the FOB emerging as a place for soldiers to remain 

connected to the home front concerns the introduction of inexpensive

and widely available phone service. 

As combat operations in the Iraq War subsided and FOBs were 

initially being established, the military sought to provide Internet 

connections for the troops that did not require military bandwidth. 

To fill that gap, enterprising Iraqi businessmen set up Internet 
11

kiosks, and soldiers were able to surf the Web as well as send emails. Unfortunately, those initial Internet kiosks relied on a fiber 

optic infrastructure that did not survive the postwar chaos. To 

restore Internet connectivity, a small Virginia-based company named 

Segovia was contracted in the summer of 2003 to provide satellite 

broadband Internet access across the Iraq theater. Almost as an 

afterthought, a small but very significant feature was included in the 

contract—Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) phone capability.37

VoIP can turn a standard Internet connection into the means 

of placing phone calls. The bottom line of this new technology is 

that by transmitting the digital signal of a phone conversation over 

the Internet, the phone company (and its long distance charges) 

is bypassed. VoIP phone calls can be made two ways: through an 

Internet Protocol (IP) phone, or PC to PC. IP phones resemble normal 

phones but connect directly to a router and an Internet connection. A 

PC to PC connection requires software, a head set, a sound card, and 

an Internet connection. 

With the Segovia contract, VoIP capability was added to the 

broadband service on FOBs, and soon soldiers could phone home on 

any of the 3,560 Internet terminals or 1,424 VoIP phones in 178 MWR 

Internet cafes.38 Prior to the introduction of VoIP, soldiers were paying 

$1.50 a minute or more to call the United States using traditional 

phone lines. Using VoIP, the price dropped to an amazing 4.7 cents a 

minute. At contract renewal, the price was reduced to 4 cents a minute 

for a call to the United States or Germany.39 Widespread availability 

and low cost have transformed the FOB-to-home telephone call from 

what was once a special treat to what is now a routine occurrence. 

While instant messaging has eclipsed e-mail as the communication 

tool preferred by today’s teens, the telephone remains the dominant 

communication medium for American youth. According to recent 

polls, 5 percent of teens use e-mail most often to communicate 

with friends, while 24 percent say they will most often use instant 

messaging. A significant 51 percent of U.S. young people however, 

still prefer the phone to talk to friends.40 The presence of VoIP 

phone service on the FOBs allows a generation of soldiers who are 

accustomed to staying connected via telephone to call home without 

worrying about exorbitant phone bills. 
12

While the Segovia contract was the command’s top-down 

response to the disabled fiber optic system of the original Internet 

kiosks, another technological development concerning the interaction 

of soldiers and their families emerged that reflected a bottom-up 

approach. After the fiber optic Internet kiosks failed, innovative 

Iraqi entrepreneurs (vaguely referred to by soldiers as “Baghdad 

Bob”) approached units on FOBs and offered to set up satellite links 

to the Internet. Soon groups of about 20 soldiers were pooling their 

money to purchase a satellite dish, router, and individual accounts 

for Internet access. Dividing the costs, soldiers would each spend 

somewhere around $300 for equipment and about $30 a month for 

high speed Internet access. (Soldiers recoup the installation costs 

when they sell the equipment to the next unit rotating onto the FOB). 

In addition to relying on many private business agreements instead 

of a single government contract, this decentralized approach has the 

key impact of delivering Internet access directly to the living quarters 

of soldiers—usually through wireless connections. 

With Internet access increasingly becoming available in their 

living quarters on the FOB, soldiers no longer have to wait for a 

30-minute time slot at a terminal in the MWR facility to send an email, use IM, or make a VoIP call. Instead, soldiers buying into this 

approach have continuous broadband capability beside their bunks–

often through laptops provided free of charge through eArmyU.41

Thus a wife sitting in Fort Benning, after checking that her husband 

is back from a mission in Baquba, can hold a real time conversation 

with him via instant messaging or VoIP. Of course, soldiers are quick 

to exploit new technological features as they become available. In the 

words of one infantryman who used instant messaging extensively, 

“We both have webcams. I bought her a webcam so I can see her 

almost everyday.” 

Soldiers have developed high expectations concerning life on the 

FOB. Security, plenty of food and drink, a place to rest, and moralebuilding activities are now taken for granted by combat veterans. 

Instantaneous communications with home are gradually joining 

the list of amenities expected by soldiers in combat. As one section 

leader observed:
13

We just had a census over in the company. The commander did his census 

and my guys’ biggest problem was the Internet. They want Internet. We 

have three MWR computers, but they would like some Internet in their 

rooms. I said if that is your biggest concern, then we are doing okay. 

Distant, but Not Disconnected.

This monograph has argued that the Army’s use of the FOB has 

changed the way soldiers fight. The FOB gives soldiers the ability to 

escape the omnipresent danger of the battlefield, avoid the debilitating 

effects of hunger and fatigue, and enjoy diversions to counter the 

stresses of combat. The result is a soldier who goes outside the wire 

as a more capable, revitalized, and refocused warrior. This study also 

pointed out that young soldiers come from a generation comfortable 

and competent with modes of communications that go beyond email and letters. The introduction of accessible, low cost VoIP phone 

service on the FOB as well as broadband Internet access into living 

quarters permits soldiers to interact with families at unparalleled 

levels. 

The implication of the FOB serving as an oasis from the stresses of 

battle is simple. Soldiers are more psychologically ready for waging 

war. Thus, the combat enabling conditions set by the FOB should be 

recognized and protected. The implications become more complex, 

however, when examining the role of the FOB as place where soldiers 

can stay connected to their families. As pointed out earlier, the 

amount of contact that soldiers have with their families is surprising. 

With many soldiers reporting that they talk to their families “every 

day, all night,” issues emerge that are not as prevalent with other 

forms of communication such as letters or e-mail. 

With phone calls and instant messaging from Iraq becoming 

almost routine, the concept of the family has shifted for deployed 

soldiers from the abstract to the concrete. The family is no longer 

a fond memory tucked in the back of the soldier’s mind only to be 

resurrected prior to turning in for the night. Instead, for many soldiers 

the family has become part of their battle rhythm—a tangible factor 

affecting their daily routine and perspectives. 

Before addressing the implications of the shift of the family from 

an abstract to concrete concept, it is important to point out that this 
14

phenomenon is found mostly in junior enlisted soldiers. Interviews 

in the field reflected that officers and more senior noncommissioned 

officers are less likely to communicate as frequently with home and 

thus tend to view the family in a more abstract perspective. Three 

reasons help to explain why. First, officers and senior NCOs are older 

and therefore tend to have relationships with wives, girlfriends, 

and children that have had more years to mature. There is less of 

a perceived need for frequent communication as relationships 

are more stable and family members become more independent. 

Second, senior NCOs and senior officers are less comfortable with 

the emerging technologies of VoIP and instant messaging (junior 

officers are quite adept, though). For older NCOs and officers, the 

traditional letters, e-mail, and an occasional phone call remain the 

standard means of communication. Finally, and most importantly, 

NCOs and officers do not have as much discretionary time or mental 

energy to contact home due to leadership responsibilities. While 

junior enlisted soldiers have periods of personal time after missions, 

NCOs and officers continue to be engaged with mission planning 

or checking on the troops. One soldier commented on his increased 

responsibilities upon becoming an NCO and the subsequent reduced 

communications with his wife: 

I have a greater responsibility. Before, I was a Bradley driver and now 

I am a 50 caliber [machine] gun team leader and all my direction and 

attention is on my soldiers and my job. Which is the way it has always 

been, but now it’s a little more so because I have troops underneath me 

and I don’t need to be burdened with family problems . . . I mean she 

understands. 

In past conflicts, when phone calls to home were rare, 

conversations were usually highly emotionally-charged events. One 

soldier described calling home on his first rotation into Iraq during 

the ground war in 2003:

We never got the chance to call back and use the phone pretty much from 

February to the beginning of May. . . . So when I first got a chance to call 

my wife, she had uncontrollable crying. I couldn’t get her to stop sobbing 

on the phone. I said, “Hey, we are pretty much done—we’re safe now. I 

should be coming home soon. Don’t worry about it.” All you heard on 

the other end was crying and I love you, and all that. 
15

In contrast, soldiers frequently calling or instant messaging their 

families from the FOB report that communications have moved 

from fleeting occasions of reassuring loved ones to more practical 

interactions.42 One soldier describing the daily exchanges remarked 

that the conversations were “just day-to-day stuff . . . basically like 

things going on with the kids and stuff like that.” The shift toward 

everyday issues is confirmed by research on the social aspects 

of communication media. According to research in that field, an 

increased frequency of communication leads to more informal and 

intimate interactions.43

Given the considerable amount of communication with home, 

soldiers were asked what types of topics were discussed with 

families. As expected, soldiers quickly pointed out they seldom 

mentioned any details of life in Iraq. The initial reason given for 

guarding their conversations was concern for operational security. 

When pushed for a deeper explanation, however, soldiers expressed 

a desire to shield their families from any information that could cause 

concern or worry. For example, in one interview, a soldier had these 

responses to a researcher’s questions:

Interviewer: Do you tell other people about what you do here?

Soldier: No.

Interviewer: Fiancée? Anything?

Soldier: No I try to keep them out of it. So that way she’s not worried. 

She knows I go on missions.

Interviewer: And you don’t give details?

Soldier: No, I told her about the IED, which I shouldn’t have done.

Interviewer: What made you feel afterwards that you shouldn’t have 

done that?

Soldier: She got all worried. I really shouldn’t tell her anything. 

Another soldier commented similarly, “I try not to tell her 

a whole lot except that I am doing OK and just the normal stuff. 

. . . I just don’t want her to worry as much as she does.” Today’s 

soldiers, much as soldiers from previous generations, have learned 

not to burden families with the stresses of the combat zone. The 

primary motivation in restricting the amount of detailed information 

conveyed about day-to-day happenings in the war zone is to prevent 

families from worrying. Soldiers believe that it is better to spare the 

details than to provoke apprehension in the home front. 
16

Despite the paucity of problems being communicated homeward, 

most soldiers surprisingly reported that family problems at home are 

being communicated to the FOB. While soldiers are careful that no 

potentially anxiety-producing information is relayed home, there is 

an unusual expectation—and a desire—to hear about the problems 

at home. An interview illustrated this interesting phenomenon:

Interviewer: Now, does she tell you problems from home?

Soldier: Oh I hear all of them. Well, I can’t say I hear all of them. I feel 

I have a stressful situation but I realize that she has a stressful situation 

and she does everything she can. It just gets away from her sometimes 

and she needs to vent [to someone].

Interviewer: And that’s you?

Soldier: That’s me, no matter how far away I am. 

When asked why concerns and anxieties seem to flow in only one 

direction, another soldier observed:

I like to think of her job—with four kids at home—as much worse than 

my job here. I try to make it as easy as possible on her. I don’t vent about 

my job. She asks, “How’s work?” and I say, “Work is work and I am 

here” and that’s all it’s going to be. . . . She knows I can handle that 

burden a lot more than she can hear about body parts blowing up in front 

of a position down the street. She doesn’t need to hear about that or she 

won’t sleep well or she’s going to worry. Versus me worrying about the 

kids, you know, “You got to e-mail your son; he’s kind of out of control 

right now.”

Another soldier put it simply, “I want to be able to listen to her and 

listen to her worries and I don’t want her to worry about what’s 

going on over here.” 

Why would soldiers facing the stresses of an insurgency in Iraq 

want to take on additional concerns from the home front? Researchers 

have long noted the detrimental effects of family problems on 

combat troops. For example, Michael Doubler wrote of World War 

II soldiers:

Mental anxiety was perhaps the greatest cause of low morale. The army 

learned that war fostered worries that could drain a soldier’s working 

and fighting efficiency. Troops thousands of miles from home, living and 

fighting under heartbreaking and nerve-wracking conditions, worried 
17

about immediate problems and the welfare of loved ones at home. Common 

concerns among officers and enlisted men included being gone from 

the United States for long periods, family matters at home, and the overall 

progress of the war.44

To help keep family problems from becoming distractions to 

deployed soldiers, the Army traditionally has relied on informal and 

formal organizations such as Family Readiness Groups (FRGs) to 

support and assist families. FRGs operate under the assumption that 

providing support to families allows soldiers to “concentrate on the 

mission at hand, and have the emotional readiness to carry out that 

mission.”45 FRGs continue to assist in vital problem-solving support 

for families, but communication technology is allowing soldiers to 

retain more of the role of providing emotional support to the family. 

Deployed soldiers understand that they cannot physically contribute 

to the family, but the informal and intimate nature of VoIP phone 

calls and instant messaging is allowing them to share the emotional 

burdens of parenting and marriage. One infantryman who called 

home on a daily basis explained why he called so often:

Being the man of the family, your job is to support them and protect 

them. Well I can’t protect them right now because I am not with them. . . . 

I know I am the one in the combat zone, but I just worry about them—

making sure they are all right constantly, stuff like that.

The Potential Benefits.

The availability of affordable synchronous communications has 

resulted in many deployed soldiers attempting to retain much of 

their roles as husbands and fathers. While they may be physically 

distant, they are not disconnected. Despite being thousands of miles 

away in a combat zone, soldiers have learned that technology and 

the protective qualities of the FOB enable them to still help redirect a 

wayward child or encourage a disheartened spouse. 

The most obvious outcome of this increased connectivity is 

an increase in morale. Today’s young soldiers, like their peers in 

American society, crave relationships and staying connected. Being 

involved in the lives of their families—including their problems—

is preferable to being isolated from the home front. As one soldier 
18

commented on the alternative, “One letter every month from your 

wife or fiancée? That would be hard. That would be very hard because 

I would be worried about her and what’s going on back home.”

Besides boosting morale, increased interaction with home may 

have some less obvious, but extremely significant effects. In his 

examination of combat trauma during Vietnam, psychiatrist Jonathan 

Shay describes the “the berserk state”—a condition characterized by 

rage, callousness, and unrestrained anger. According to Shay, soldiers 

descend into the berserk state as they become socially disconnected 

and “cut off from all human community.” Often driven by revenge, 

soldiers in a berserk state “cannot see the distinction between civilian 

and combatant” and are prone to committing atrocities.46 In a harsh

counterinsurgency environment where the insurgents are not easily 

identified and the populace may be sympathetic or even assisting the 

enemy, the potential for soldiers to move toward the berserk state 

is increased. One implication of remaining emotionally connected 

with home via technology on the FOB, however, is the calming effect 

on soldiers. 

With an instant messaging session or a VoIP phone call home, 

moral and social restraints on soldiers are restored. The social 

isolation normally found in a combat zone is diminished by the 

soldier’s interaction with a familiar voice from home as the soldiers 

are reminded of their humanity. A Humvee gunner described the 

effect of daily chats with his fiancée in Georgia: “She keeps my 

nerves calm.” A sergeant observed that lower ranking soldiers are 

often at the receiving end of orders and bear the psychological brunt 

of counterinsurgency operations. He pointed out that it is therefore 

important for soldiers to hear “a friendly voice.” Especially, he added, 

because “I am not a friendly voice. I am not their friend. I am their 

leader.” Frequent and intimate communications with home help to 

restore the human side of soldiers—a critical aspect in a prolonged 

counterinsurgency situation. 

Another potential outcome of the increased connections with 

home concerns the re-integration of the soldier back into the family 

upon redeployment. Upon returning home, soldiers traditionally 

have wondered “if their families still need them or if their children 

will recognize them. Spouses may worry about having to give up 

newfound independence or fear they have made bad decisions during 
19

their soldiers’ deployment.”47 With deployed soldiers increasingly 

involved through technology in the family’s everyday rhythm of life, 

the redeployment transition may be less troublesome. When soldiers 

were asked about the purpose of their communications, they replied 

with responses such as “We just talk about our daily routine and the 

kids,” or “I try to call home and talk to her and let my kids hear my 

voice, especially my little one.” In other words, many soldiers are 

taking deliberate steps to remain involved in their families despite 

their deployed status. 

Ironically, it is actually possible that many young soldiers are 

spending more time interacting with their spouses from the FOB 

than when not deployed. Soldiers reported that they had established 

routines of conducting phone calls or instant messaging sessions 

very early in the morning (e.g., 4:00 a.m.) and again late at night 

(e.g., midnight) because of mission cycles and the time difference in 

the United States. Consistently setting aside specific times of the day 

for the sole purpose of interacting with one’s spouse is a habit that 

would probably benefit the marriages of all soldiers—not just those 

deployed. Interestingly, a captain related that one of his concerns 

was that some of his troops were noticeably tired from waking up 

very early to communicate with home. Nevertheless, the availability 

of synchronous communications has great potential in reducing 

the debilitating effects of a deployment on family relationships. A 

significant subsequent implication is that soldiers and families could 

be more apt to tolerate future deployments, given this trend toward 

increased connectivity while deployed. 

The Potential Problems.

Of course, there are also potentially detrimental effects of 

instantaneous interactions from the FOB to home. A frequently cited 

possible danger is the compromised security resulting from sending 

sensitive information over unsecured lines. The recent attention 

placed on posting IED damage to U.S. vehicles on Internet discussion 

forums—complete with photographs—illustrates how the Internet 

can be a potentially valuable source of information for the enemy. 

Two factors, however, suggest that VoIP phone conversations and 
20

instant messaging sessions may be less of a concern. First, nearly 

all soldiers interviewed were careful to state that they were wary 

about operational security concerns when using technology. In other 

words, soldiers have been heavily sensitized to the hazards of using 

open Internet media. Second, the information transmitted over phone 

and IM is usually less fact-laden than letters, e-mails, or discussion 

forum postings. As discussed earlier, soldiers are using synchronous 

communications more to discuss family matters, not operational 

details. Still, even telling a family member that an instant messaging 

session has to be discontinued because the soldier is going out the 

wire is a security breach. 

A more likely misuse of instantaneous communications is 

sidestepping the chain of command during an incident involving 

unit casualties. It is standard procedure for the chain of command 

to hit the “kill switch” on outgoing communications immediately 

after casualties are known. For official channels (e.g., the MWR 

computers), the kill switch can be literal. For unofficial channels (e.g., 

private cell phones or Baghdad Bob’s broadband service), however, 

the kill switch relies on following the chain of command’s directive 

to enforce a communication blackout. Unfortunately, some soldiers 

relay unconfirmed information home in their earnestness to assure 

their families that they are all right. Such incomplete reporting is 

usually the grist of rumor mills at the home front. Possible security 

or casualty notification lapses, however, are not new issues. Units 

in past deployments have had to deal with identical concerns—just 

different technologies. 

The Greedy Institutions of the Family and the Military.

A less obvious, but potentially more troubling issue concerns the 

competing demands of the family and the Army. Communication 

advances on the FOB give the family access into the combat 

environment—a world traditionally dominated by the military’s 

hold on soldier attention and energy. Soldiers have a finite amount 

of energy and time, yet both the family and the military are what 

military sociologist Mady Wechlsler Segal calls “greedy institutions.”

Greedy institutions depend for their survival on the commitment of 

their members and, as a result, demand considerable amounts of 
21

their members’ loyalty, time, and energy.48 The military is a greedy 

institution because in combat, a soldier’s life is largely dedicated 

toward accomplishing the mission. On the other hand, the family is 

also a greedy institution as it must be sustained by plentiful attention 

and energy. 

Because technology on the FOB shifts the family from an abstract 

to concrete concept, the competition for soldier time and commitment 

is renewed. A very real possibility exists that soldiers may spend 

time thinking about family concerns when they should be focusing 

on the mission. During interviews, soldiers were questioned about 

this potential problem. 

Soldiers responded that while pressing family issues require 

increased attention, it is possible to remain focused on the mission. 

One soldier talked about turning off thoughts of his family while out 

on a mission, “It’s pretty tough, sir. It is. You just shut it off. You make 

it seem that whatever you’re doing at that time is the only thing that 

matters in this world.” Another soldier commented, “Once I roll out 

of the gate, my wife does not cross my mind because I talked with her 

before, and I can’t do my job properly if I think about her. That is the 

deal.” Another soldier talked of the attention demanded by both his 

family and his unit, “I had to learn not to focus on my family while I 

am out on my mission but focus on my crew, which is my immediate 

family here.” One soldier spoke of temporarily blocking his family 

from his mind when going out the wire, “I am mission focused. I am 

all about coming back alive and then get my lovey-dovey face back 

on.”

Some soldiers, however, candidly acknowledged the possibility 

that family concerns could be a distraction. For example, one soldier 

reported, “When I talk to my mom, and my mom will yell at me for 

not doing the right thing or for not being there—which I can’t do 

anything about—I’ll get [distracted] in the head for a day or two.” 

Nevertheless, a large majority of the interviewed soldiers contended 

that they were able to balance the attention required by their families 

and the mission. Nearly all interviewed soldiers asserted that when 

the situation demanded, the mission received their total focus. It 

may be that soldiers are over-confident in their ability to divide their 

attention and are underestimating the effects of the family on their 

focus. Or it may be that they were weaned on the frenetic pace of 
22

Sesame Street and MTV, grew accustomed to surfing the Internet 

while watching television, and are truly adept multitaskers able to 

compartmentalize the many demands on their attention. 

 Greedy institutions demand energy and time, but they also 

demand a person’s total commitment and loyalty. Loyalty to one’s 

comrades is a key aspect of combat effectiveness. The institution of 

the military—especially at the small unit level in the Army—requires 

that its members place loyalty above self-preservation. In combat, 

loyalty to fellow soldiers and the mission must overcome the fear 

of death. As Israeli military psychologist Shattai Noy stated, “The 

main conflict of a soldier in the battlefield is survival versus duty 

and loyalty. . . . In combat, this threat is pervasive and difficult.”49

Ben Shalit, Chief Psychologist of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) 

during the Yom Kippur War in 1973, interviewed soldiers after battles 

and asked what soldiers found to be the most frightening or stressful 

aspect in combat. Table 1 shows the responses for junior enlisted 

soldiers. Note that the soldiers’ most common fear was letting their 

comrades down.

Most Frightening Response Percentage

Letting comrades down 40.4%

Loss of limb, injury 26.6%

Death 20.7%

Letting the unit down 4.1%

Being captured 3.2%

Being abandoned 2.8%

Letting the country down 1.1%

Table 1. Factors listed as “The Most Frightening 

Aspect of Battle,” Israeli Soldiers.50

Combat effectiveness relies upon soldiers placing responsibility 

for their fellow soldiers above their own personal safety. In the 

extreme conditions of combat, the military becomes the ultimate 

greedy institution by demanding that soldiers fear letting their 

comrades down more than the possibility of their own death. With 

the greedy institution of the family entering the scene via increased 

connectedness, however, an interesting question emerges—does the 
23

family compete for deployed soldiers’ loyalties? In other words, as 

the family becomes a more concrete concept in the minds of young 

soldiers, does it affect their obligations to the unit?

Samuel Stouffer addressed this issue with World War II soldiers. 

He wrote: 

Closely related to this struggle [of overcoming concern for personal safety] 

is the problem of the tension between the requirements of military duty 

and the individual’s felt obligations to a social circle at home. Many men 

felt a deep obligation to a wife and children, or to a dependent mother 

and father. The society at large indicated that their highest obligation 

was to fight for their country. But it would be surprising if such men 

did not feel a strain between these obligations. Should they take risks 

which they might avoid but which seemed necessary for most effective 

accomplishment of their military mission?51

Stouffer proposed that the competing demands of the mission and the 

family should be manifested by greater worry and fear in the battle 

situation. In a survey of combat soldiers in Italy, he confirmed that 

married men were more likely to say that they worried a lot about 

their chances of becoming a casualty when they were in combat.52

Soldiers interviewed for this study were asked the same question 

posed by the IDF’s Ben Shalit—”What was the most frightening 

aspect of battle?” The responses were interesting. Because the IED 

or VBIED was the most prominent threat at the time of the study, 

soldiers generally were fatalistic about what they feared. They often 

related that there was no reason for any fear since the main threat 

was, in their minds, a random occurrence. Sniper attacks and IEDs 

were dangerous, but it was not worthwhile to be frightened because 

there was nothing they could do about it anyway. One soldier put it 

this way, “It is not going to happen unless the good Lord intends. If 

he punches your number, there is nothing you can do.” 

Very few soldiers commented that they were concerned about 

the possibility of their own death or injury. Most mentioned little 

about the fear of letting their comrades down. After some reflection, 

however, a surprising majority of soldiers commented on how 

the consequences of their death or wounds frightened them. One 

infantryman gave a typical response, “I could care less if I get shot, 

sir. . . . My kids growing up with no dad—that scares the [life] out of 
24

me.” Another soldier noted, “I try not to think about it. If it happens, 

it happens. You know, I sometimes think about what my family is 

going to do if something happens to me—to where I am incapacitated 

or killed, but I try not to put too much thought into that.” 

An infantryman who commented that he had no specific fears in 

battle stated:

If anything, I worry. I worry about the well-being of my soldiers. I 

worry about me not coming home. I don’t worry about me personally, I 

worry for my kids. I have taken such great pride in being a father to my 

children.

He went on to add: 

I just want to be there for [my wife]. She just wants me to be there for her. 

So I worry about not being able to come home to her. It doesn’t matter if 

I came home in a different condition as long as I come home for her. So 

those are my worries—never fear. . . . Since I have been in the Army, sir, 

I just haven’t been scared of anything.

As with Shalit’s findings with the IDF in the early 1970s, selfpreservation for the American soldier is not a major source of fear 

or stress. Unlike Shalit’s findings and more in line with Stouffer, 

however, today’s soldiers do show concern for their own safety 

when considering the impact on their families. It appears that because

the family has emerged as a concrete concept in the world of today’s 

deployed troops, the institution of the family is competing for 

soldiers’ attention as evidenced by observations such as, “I worry 

more about how my wife would react to something happening to 

me more so than I would worry about me personally getting hurt.” 

Concerns voiced by soldiers revolved not around their own personal 

injury, but instead on the effect an injury would have on their ability 

to continue being the family provider and supporter. Soldiers listed 

concerns such as, “What will happen to my family? How are my 

wife and kids going to handle it?” and “How will it affect my wife? 

Will they be taken care of?” 

Ironically, while FOBs have removed many traditional distracters 

and sources of stress for deployed soldiers, allowing the greedy 

institution of the family access through improved technology may 
25

be putting demands on soldiers at levels not experienced in previous 

conflicts. Soldiers today are interacting daily with their families 

resulting in stronger emotional family bonds and in turn raising 

their family’s welfare as an aspect of battle that frightens them the 

most.

Of course, other factors may also be contributing to the increased 

salience of the family in the minds of soldiers other than just increased 

interaction with the home front. First, today’s force is more married 

than in the past. Currently 48 percent of the enlisted force is married, 

while the junior enlisted soldiers studied by Stouffer in WWII 

reported a 36 percent marriage rate.53 Additionally, today’s soldiers 

may be more motivated to cite family concerns as a source of fear in 

battle based on their own family experiences. They come from an 

American cohort increasingly accustomed to growing up in singleparent homes. Currently 27 percent of American youth come from 

single-parent families—three times the amount in 1960.54 Soldiers

may be stating their desire to avoid that situation. Finally, soldiers 

may be more apt to be concerned about their role in supporting 

their families simply because they feel other support mechanisms 

are lacking. The connectedness between Americans and their family, 

friends, and neighbors has been gradually diminishing over the 

years (e.g., the amount of time that Americans entertained friends 

at home decreased 45 percent in the past 2 decades).55 With support 

from other social institutions declining, soldiers may feel that they 

are personally indispensable in providing for their families.

Implications.

This monograph has attempted to provide a glimpse of life on 

the forward operating base. For much of the Army, operating from a 

FOB has become the expected standard for fighting a war. And with 

plans to turn existing FOBs over to Iraqi forces and consolidate U.S. 

forces into four huge FOBs,56 the aspects of the FOB described in this 

study appear to be more permanent than temporary. The FOB gives 

soldiers engaged with the enemy the unprecedented advantage of 

gaining a respite from constant danger, minimizing the wearing 

effects of hunger and fatigue, and reducing the isolation of combat. 
26

As a result, many of the factors of psychological stress typically 

present in combat are greatly reduced. 

As conditions on the FOBs have improved, technological advances 

such as VoIP phone calls and instant messaging are allowing soldiers 

to step back into their roles of husbands and fathers (and wives and 

mothers). The benefits to morale are tangible. Just as soldiers in the 

past two centuries have looked forward to hearing their names called 

during mail call, instant connectivity from the FOB to the family is 

what soldiers look forward to upon returning from a mission. And 

yet the first implication of this study is that commanders must 

realize that increased interaction with families may not always be 

beneficial. 

At the group level of analysis, unit cohesion may suffer as soldiers 

devote time and energy into maintaining the emotional bonds with 

their families rather than with their comrades. While this study 

focused on soldiers who travel frequently off the FOB, maintaining 

cohesion could be especially troublesome in units that seldom leave 

the FOB with missions requiring little interaction between soldiers 

(e.g., administrative clerks). Soldiers may develop unhealthy 

battle rhythms of putting in their time during their shift and then 

retreating for the rest of the day and night to their virtual friends 

and families. Units with missions off the FOB have the advantage 

of more interaction between soldiers, but even in these units, it is 

not unusual for soldiers to cloister themselves back on the FOB with 

their own music, videos, and Internet connection to home. 

At the individual level, the Army and the family compete for 

the soldier’s attention. This study has proposed that soldiers are 

attempting to maintain simultaneously the emotional roles of 

husband and father, as well as soldier. By remaining an integral 

part of the family problem-solving process, soldiers continue to feel 

needed and valued by the family. Although the connectivity with 

the family significantly increases the level of conscious awareness of 

familial obligations and concerns, it also most likely places additional 

stress on the soldier. As mentioned earlier, for instance, the soldiers’ 

major concern for their own safety focused on the impact of their 

death on their family. Taken to the extreme, however, the perceived 

responsibilities to the family could result in a soldier’s hesitation 

to take risks required for mission accomplishment or unit welfare. 
27

Although this study found no evidence of this occurring, it is a 

possibility. 

Additionally, despite assurances from our multitasking young 

soldiers that they can compartmentalize the various demands on 

their attention, spending time ruminating on family concerns and 

events can disrupt a mission focus. It is difficult to imagine that a 

soldier, who learns from his wife during a phone call at 8:00 p.m. that 

his 5-year-old is having significant behavioral problems in school, 

will be able to devote complete attention to a mission occurring 30 

minutes later. Special Forces teams understand this and thus go into 

isolation prior to a deployment in order to “get their heads into the 

game.” Keeping a hypervigilant mission focus is especially critical 

in the streets of Iraq where random and infrequent enemy contact 

can gradually lull a soldier’s mind back to the last instant messaging 

session with home. 

Although eliminating or even reducing connectivity with the 

home front is neither a realistic nor desirable option, commanders 

can be proactive in managing the competing demands of family 

and mission. First, leaders must ensure that group cohesion is 

maintained. While combat soldiers need some time alone (and FOBs 

provide plenty of opportunities for that), leaders may have to subtly 

introduce activities that force soldiers to interact, build trust, and 

nurture the emotional bonds between warriors. Ironically, leaders in 

the past developed cohesion-enhancing activities as a distraction for 

deployed soldiers. In the future, leaders may have to create cohesionenhancing activities to counter an over-abundance of distracters on 

the FOB.

Similarly, in previous conflicts, limited connectivity between 

soldiers and their families enabled leaders to devote more energy 

to mission-related requirements instead of soldier personal and 

family issues. The connectivity between soldiers and their families 

described in this monograph points to a change to this paradigm. 

Leaders need to be constantly vigilant on the impact of the greedy 

institution of the family on their troops. In previous conflicts, leaders 

learned to be more vigilant for psychological stress indicators after 

mail call or after a 3-day rest and relaxation to the rear where phones 

were available. Today, leaders need to monitor their charges for the 
28

impact of potentially distressing family situations 24 hours a day, 7 

days a week. 

Predeployment education for soldiers and families should address 

the issue of the potentially detrimental effects of connectivity. Soldiers 

need to know that they probably cannot accommodate both greedy 

institutions simultaneously to the degree desired. Additionally, 

families should understand the impact of unloading home-life issues 

on the deployed soldier in a hostile environment. Conversations 

with senior NCOs and officers in Iraq generally supported the notion 

that the more mature the spouse, the more they tended to shy away 

from communicating problems from home to the deployed soldier. 

Predeployment training may be able to sensitize young spouses to 

this issue.

Conclusion.

In an odd twist, the same issues associated with fighting from a 

FOB are being played out 7,000 miles away at Nellis Air Force Base, 

Nevada—albeit with a slight variation. Instead of a battle rhythm 

of fighting the war in person and then returning to the FOB to 

connect virtually with families, Nellis pilots are remotely controlling 

Predators—Hellfire-armed unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)—in 

Iraq and then commuting home to their families in person. In other 

words, these pilots are fighting a long distance war via technology, but 

remaining at home. Despite the benefits of being home to fight the war 

(which parallel the many amenities of the FOBs—safety, rest, food, 

and comfort), many Predator pilots are reporting diminished morale 

and more problems in their personal lives. One pilot commented, “I 

get to sleep in my own bed,” but then pointed out that he feels pulled 

in two directions—between spending more time fighting the war and 

being an integral part of his family. Interestingly, he added that it 

was easier when he was physically deployed to Iraq because he was 

isolated from the emotional demands of family life.57 The commander

of the Predator unit commented on the psychological impact of this 

type of warfare: “Our people are proud they contribute to the war 

from home. But being at home brings some additional stresses.”58 A 

reporter chronicling the Nellis unit contrasted the stresses of Predator
29

pilots to those of deployed soldiers. She ironically concluded that 

“soldiers in the field have to cope with danger, but at least they live 

in one world, whereas their counterparts at Nellis commute daily 

from war to civilian life.”59

In reality, soldiers on FOBs in Iraq understand the issues that 

arise from commuting to war. They appreciate creature comforts 

like the good and abundant food, refreshing air conditioning, hot 

showers, and safety afforded by the FOB. But like Predator pilots, 

soldiers are also experiencing the competition between the greedy 

institutions of the family and the military for a limited amount of 

attention, time, and emotional capital. Fighting from the FOB has 

changed the fighting capacity of our combat soldiers. The entire 

impact of that change, however, has yet to be fully explored. 

31

APPENDIX

CHU Containerized Housing Unit

CU See You (Instant Messaging abbreviation)

DVD Digital Video Disk

IDF Israeli Defense Force

IED Improvised Explosive Device

IM Instant Messaging

IP Internet Protocol

MARS Military Affiliate Radio System

MRE Meal, Ready to Eat

MTV Music Television

MWR Morale, Welfare, and Recreation

PC Personal Computer

PX Post Exchange

RN Registered Nurse

S-VBIED Suicide Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device

UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle

VBIED Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device

VoIP Voice Over Internet Protocol

33

ENDNOTES

1. Department of Defense, Dictionary of Military Terms, 2005, http://www.dtic.

mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/data/f/02200.html

2. For example, see Kirk Semple, “G.I.’s Deployed in Iraq Desert with Lots of 

American Stuff,” New York Times, August 13, 2005, p. A1.

3. For example, see Dave Hirschmanm “Forward Base Grim, ‘Tolerable,’” 

Atlanta Journal-Constitution, June 15, 2005, p. 3F. 

4. Brigadier General Karl Horst in David Zucchino, “The Conflict in Iraq; 

Comforts of Home Amid Perils of Iraq,” Los Angeles Times, March 27, 2005, p. A1.

5. While the researchers did not specify gender as a criterion for selecting 

soldiers to be interviewed, only male soldiers arrived at the interview locations. 

Thus, the study refers mainly to soldiers and their wives or girlfriends. 

6. Unless otherwise noted, quotations are from transcribed interviews with 

soldiers deployed to the Iraqi theater of operations in May 2005.

7. Charles C. Moskos, Jr., The American Enlisted Man: The Rank and File in Today’s 

Military, New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1970, p. 141.

8. Peter S. Kindsvatter, American Soldiers: Ground Combat in the World Wars, 

Korea, and Vietnam, Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2003, p. 49.

9. Abu Jalal in Ellen Knickmeyer, “Zaqawi Said to be Behind Iraq Raid,” 

Washington Post, April 5, 2005, p. 1. 

10. Gregory L. Belenky, Effects of Continous Operations (CONOPS) on Soldier and 

Unit Performance, Walter Reed Army Institute of Research, 1987, p. 2-6. 

11. John Keegan, The Face of Battle, New York: Viking Press, 1976, p. 134.

12. Samuel A. Stouffer and Associates, The American Soldier: Combat and Its 

Aftermath, Vol. II, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1949, p. 78. 

13. James R. Ebert, A Life in a Year: The American Infantryman in Vietnam 1965–

1972, Novato, CA: Presidio, 1993, p. 154. 

14. Friedrich Karl von Plehwe, Reiter, Streiter und Rebell, Rheinfelden: Schäuble 

Verlag, 1976, as quoted in Elmar Dinter, Hero or Coward: Pressures Facing the Soldier 

in Battle, Totowa, NJ: Frank Cass, 1985, p. 183. 

15. John Dollard, Fear in Battle, New Haven, CT: Institute of Human Relations, 

Yale University, 1943, p. 52. 

16. Stouffer and Associates, p. 79.

17. Paul Fussell, Wartime: Understanding and Behavior in the Second World War, 

New York: Oxford University Press, 1989, p. 199.

18. Juliet Macur, “’A Hearty Diet,’ in the online Iraq Journal,” New York Times,

posted August 17, 2005.

19. Kindsvatter, p. 95. 
34

20. Roscoe C. Blunt Jr., Inside the Battle of the Bulge: A Private Comes of Age, 

Westport, CT: Praeger, 1994, p. 121, as noted in Kindsvatter, p. 95. 

21. Dollard, p. 42. 

22. Sergeant Jeanne Crochet quoted in Antonio Castaneda, “Between Bombs 

and Incoming Shells, Tanning and ‘Star Wars’ Offer Soldiers Respite from War,” 

Associated Press News, June 10, 2005.

23. Juliet Macur, “At War in Bomb Field, at Peace in Field of Dreams,” New 

York Times, August 19, 2005, p. A1. 

24. V-mail, online exhibit, National Postal Museum, http://www.postalmuseum.

si.edu/exhibits/2d2a_vmail.html.

25. See History of the Army MARS Program, http://www.asc.army.mil/mars/history.

htm.

26. See Larry W. Applewhite and David R. Segal, “Telephone Use by 

Peacekeeping Troops in the Sinai,” Armed Forces & Society, Vol. 17, Fall 1990, p. 

124. 

27. For example, see Ward S. Just, To What End: Report from Vietnam, Boston: 

Houghton Mifflin, 1968, p. 23. 

28. Rick Marshall, “Battlefield Communications: Technology’s Challenge,” 

Defense & Foreign Affairs, October, 1986, p. 26.

29. See Morten G. Ender, “G.I. Phone Home: The Use of Telecommunications 

by the Soldiers of Operation Just Cause,” Armed Forces & Society, Vol. 21, Spring 

1995, p. 440.

30. See D. Bruce Bell, Walter R. Schumm, Benjamin Knott, and Morten G. 

Ender, “The Desert Fax: A Research Note on Calling Home from Somalia,” Armed 

Forces & Society, Vol. 25, Spring 1999, p. 504. 

31. For the Gulf War, see Morten G. Ender and David R. Segal, “V(E)-Mail to 

the Foxhole,” Journal of Political and Military Sociology, Vol. 24, Summer 1995, p. 

94.

32. See Dan Morse and Jesse Drucker, “Private Messages: Soldier Helps 101st 

Stay Wired to Home,” Wall Street Journal, March 25, 2003. p. A1.

33. Morten Ender in Irene M. Wielawski, “For Troops, Home Can Be Too 

Close,” New York Times, March 15, 2005. p. F1. 

34. Amanda Lenhart, Mary Madden, and Paul Hitlin, Teens and Technology, 

Washington, DC: Pew Internet & American Life Project, 2005, p. 1. 

35. Lenhart, Madden, and Hitlin, pp. 15-16. 

36. Ibid, p. ii. 

37. See “Iraq Confidential: GI-Phone Home,” Broadband Business Forecast, July 

12, 2005, Vol. 15, No. 14. 

38. Ibid.
35

39. Ibid. Additionally, traditional phone company competitors have reacted by 

dropping calling card prices to as low as $.19 a minute from Iraq. In any case, the 

price of a phone call from Iraq has dropped dramatically. 

40. Lenhart, Madden, and Hitlin, p. 30. 

41. eArmyU is a Army distance education program offering approximately 

147 programs from 29 different educational institutions. Re-enlisting soldiers in 

the grades of E-4 through E-6 are eligible to receive a free laptop computer in this 

program. 

42. Unless, of course, the unit takes casualties or they are engaged in operations 

reported in the media. For those occasions, soldiers are quick to communicate that 

they are all right. 

43. Judith Donath, “Sociable Media” in Encyclopedia of Human-Computer 

Interaction, Vol. 2, William Sims Bainbridge, ed., Great Barrington, MA: Berkshire 

Publishing Group, 2004, p. 629. 

44. Michael D. Doubler, Closing With the Enemy: How GIs Fought the War in 

Europe, 1944-1945, Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1994, p.257 [emphasis 

added].

45. Headquarters, Department of the Army, DA Pamphlet 608–47, A Guide to 

Establishing Family Support Groups, Washington, DC, 1993, p. 2.

46. Jonathan Shay, Achilles in Vietnam: Combat Trauma and the Undoing of 

Character, New York: Touchstone, 1994, p. 86.

47. Michael C. Flowers, “Message from the Director of Human Resources and 

Policy,” Soldiers, August 2003, Vol. 58, p. H2. 

48. Mady Wechsler Segal, “The Military and the Family as Greedy Institutions,” 

Armed Forces & Society, Vol. 13, p. 9, based on the work by Lewis A. Coser, Greedy 

Institutions: Patterns of Undivided Commitment, New York: Free Press, 1974. 

49. Shattai Noy, “Combat Stress Reactions,” in Handbook of Military Psychology, 

Reuven Gal and A. David Mangelsdorff, eds., New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1991, 

p. 511.

50. Derived from Ben Shalit, Psychology of Conflict and Combat, New York: 

Praeger, 1988, p. 11.

51. Stouffer, et al., p. 84.

52. Ibid., p. 87. 

53. Current marriage rates are from Headquarters, Department of the 

Army, FY04 Army Profile, 2005, http://www.armyg1.army.mil/hr/demographics/

FY04%20Army%20Profile.pdf. WWII rates are from Samuel A. Stouffer, et al., 

The American Soldier: Adjustment During Army Life, Vol. 1, Princeton: Princeton 

University Press, 1949, p. 114. 

54. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Living Arrangements of Children Under 18 Years 

Old: 1960 to Present, 1999, http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/ms-la/tabch-1.txt, 
36

and U.S. Department of Commerce, U.S. Census Bureau 2000 Special Reports, 

Children and the Households They Live In: 2000, Washington, DC: 2004, p. 9. 

55. See Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American 

Community, New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000, p. 98, for this and other 

examples. 

56. Bradley Graham, “Commanders Plan Eventual Consolidation of U.S. Bases 

in Iraq,” Washington Post, May 22, 2005, p. A27.

57. Major Shannon Rogers as reported by Sally B. Donnelly, “LongDistance Warriors,” Time, December 12, 2005, http://www.time.com/time/magazine/

article/0,9171,1137653,00.html. 

58. Lieutenant Colonel John Harris as reported in Donnelly. 

59. Donnelly.