NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 10a0782n.06 No. 09-6241 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT
ADRIAN NE HE B RO N, AD RI AN RI VE RSMCKI SSI E, ANGELA HARRI S, BYRON CATRON, DAVI D DODSON, D EL I NDA MI TCH EL L , E ME R

A L D G O R D O N , V ELMA J O N E S , J A

N IC E M
. J O H N S O N , J E S IE EDD I NGS, J ONATH AN Q. I RVI N, MARQUERI TE RHYMES, PA M E L A FORD, P A T R IC IA C O M M O D O R E , R O N A LD BO YD, S HAWN MAKL I N, SYREETA ST A N L E Y , T E RE SA WI L SON, AND TH EL MA SAN DE R, Pla int if fs -A pp e lla nts , v. SHEL BY COUNTY GO VERNMENT, Def endant- Appellee
. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON APPEALFROM THE U NI TED S TATES DI STRI CT COURT FOR THE WES TERN DI STRI CT OF TEN NESSEE

B e fo re : MO OR E, SUT TO N a nd Mc KE AG UE , Ci rc uit

Judg e s.
SUT TO N, Cir c uit

Judg e . Th e pla int if

fs , sev e ra l Shel by

Cou nty de pu ty c or re c tio na l of

fi c e rs , sued the county when it pr omoted other de puties to the rank of serg eant. The district court dismissed the c omp la int

on the g ro un d (a lon g wi th one oth e r) that it wa s time -b a rr e d. B e c a us e the pla int if

fs ’
case comes to us on a motion to dismiss under Civil Rule 12(b)(6) a nd beca use plausible theor ies of re lief re main, we r ever se.No. 09-6241

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- 2 - I.
I n J une 2003, S helby County eliminated 33 serg eant posit ions at its C riminal J ustice Center due to budg etar

y constraints. Shelby

County officia ls ga

ve the serg eants a choice : (1) discha rg e or (2 ) tempora

ry demotion to deputy

until additional serg eant positions became ava ilable. The pla int if fs a c c e pte d th e de mot ion s. S ever al mo nth s late r, the c ounty re ins ta te d f

ive pr e vio us ly de mot e d s e rg e a nts to the ir or ig ina l r a nk

a nd the pla int if

fs wa ite d f

or a dd iti on a l po sit ion s to be c ome available
. The plaintiffs c ontinued to wait for three y ear s when, in O ctober 2006, the county announce d a promotions proce ss f

or sever al serg eant positions. The promotions posting ran f rom Octobe r 31, 2006, throug h November 13, 2006. Yet the co u n t y d i d not offer to reinstate a

ny of the de moted de pu tie s to the ir pr e vio us ra nk
. Th e de mot e d de pu tie s ask e d ab ou t bei ngre ins ta te d, a nd the c ounty tol d th e m t h e y h a d to p a rti c ip a te in

th e n e w r o u n d

o f te s ti n g to d e te r

mi n e w h o w o u ld

o b ta in the promotions. On Aug ust 1, 2008, the county promoted ele ven deputies to the r ank of se rg eant. None of the de moted deputies re ceive d a promotion.
On Oc tob e r 2 2, 20 08 , the de mot e d de pu tie s file d this laws uit a g a ins t th e c ounty

a nd a c ounty sheriff in state court. The deputies alleg ed that the de fenda nts had violated § 12-44 of the Shelby County Cod e , wh ic h pr ov ide s that “ [a]n y e mpl oy e e la id o ff or te mpo ra ri ly de mot e d .
. . un de r t

his section shall be g iven pr ior ity over othe r applica

nts to reinstateme nt.” Shelby Cnty . Code § 12-44 (empha sis added); R.3-1 at 3– 4
. T h e deputies a lso invoked 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that theNo. 09-6241

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- 3 - defe ndants had de prived them of the ir proper ty

— conti nued employ

ment and ra

nk—without due proce ss of law, be cause the d ef en d ants had not complied with the applica ble county

ordinanc e g overningdemotions. R.3-1 at 5. I n their complaint the deputies appea red to pre sent two diffe rent du e pr oc e ss the or ie s: in som e pla c e s cla imi ng the y we re “ e nti tle d to pri or ity ov e r o the r a pp lic a nts to reinstatement,” id. ¶ 23, in o th e r p la c e s c la im in g th e y

w e r e e n ti tl e d

to “ im me d iate [] reinstate[ment],” id. at 6 ¶ 4.
The de fenda

nts removed the c ase to feder al cour t, and the deputies voluntar ily dismiss ed the Shelby County sheriff from the suit, leavingthe county as the sole de fe n d an t . The c ounty filed a motion to dismiss on two g rounds: (1) the statute of limit ations barr ed the plaintiffs’ suit, and (2) § 12-44 of the Shelby County Code did not contain a private right of action. R.10. The district cour t ag ree d with both arguments and dismissed the suit. The deputies appe aled the statute-of- limit ations ruling
. II.
A fe w principles g

u id e o u r r e s o lu ti o n o f the statute-of- limit ations question. Tennesse e’s one

y ear statute of l imitations applies t o the pl aintiffs’ § 1983 claims. Montgomery v. Carter Cnty. , 226 F .3 d 75 8, 77 2 (6 th Cir . 2 00 0) ; see Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104( a). Fede ral lawdeter mines when the s tatute of limit ations beg ins to run. Sharpe v. Cureton , 319 F.3d 259, 266 (6th Cir. 2003) . Under fede ral law , the l imitations clock beg ins to run when the claimants know or should have known that the def endant violated the ir rig hts, Ruff v. Runyon , 258 F.3d 498, 500 (6th Cir. 2001), which oc cursNo. 09-6241

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- 4 - when the c laimants learn of an illeg al ac tion, not when the claimants fe el the ef fec ts of the ac tion,

see De l . State Coll. v. Ricks , 4 49 U. S. 2 50 , 2 58 (1 98 0) ; United Air Lines, Inc. v. E vans , 4 31 U. S. 553, 557–58 (1977).
Of e qu a l i mp o rt , t h i s a

p p e a l a r i s e s f

r o m t h e c o u n t y ’ s m o t i o n t o d i s m i s s u n d e r C i vil Rul e 12 (b )( 6) . Wh ile re c e nt d e c isi on s of the Sup re me Court e sta bli sh that, t o s ur

viv e a mot ion to d ism iss , plaintiffs must state “plausib l e” gro u n d s for r elief, the decisions do not alter the basic rule that pla i n t i f f s m u s t p l e a d o n l y t h e b a s i c e l e m e n t s o f a c l a i m , n o t d e v e l o p a l l o f t h e f a c t s n e c e s s a r

y to support the claim. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 12 9 S. Ct. 19 37 , 1 94 9 ( 20 09 ); Be ll Atl. Cor p. v . Two mb ly , 550 U.S. 5 4 4 , 5 5 6

– 5 7 , 5 6 2 (2007). Nor do Iqbal and Twom bly

displace the g ener al rule that we construe a ll reasona

ble infere nces, including those related to a plaintiff’s leg al theory , in favor of the claimants. See B eaudry v . TeleCheck Servs., I nc. , 579 F.3d 702, 704 ( 6th Cir. 2009).
At this ear ly stag e in the l itigation, it is possibl e to re ad the c omplaint as raising two distinct leg al theorie s. The first is an “ automatic re instatement” theor y —that the deputies had a rig ht to be “immediately

reinstate[d]” to their former positions as serg eants onc e new positions o p en ed
. See R.3-1 at 6. The second is a “priority ” theor

y —that the plaintiffs had a rig ht to a “priority

over othe r applicants to re i n s t atement,” Shelby Cnty . Code § 12-44; R.3-1 ¶ 23, whic h could mean nothing
mor e tha n a dd inga

fe w p oin ts t o th e sc or e s o f p a rt ic ipatin g de pu tie s in

the pr omo tio ns pr oc e ss. The automatic reinstatement theory

. I n assessing whether this theory clea

red the one-y ear statute of limitations, t he district cour t applied the cor

rec t leg al fra

mework, one that undermi nedNo. 09-6241

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- 5 - many of the plaintiffs’ arguments. Gaug ed by the principle that the statute-of- l imitations clock be g ins to r

un wh e n th e c la ima

nts kn owor

sh ou ld h a ve kn ow n that the de fe nd a nt v iol a te d th e ir ri g hts , Ru ff , 2 58 F .3 d at 50 0, th e dis tr ic t c ourt c or re c tly he ld t hat th e on e -y e a r l imi ta tio ns pe ri od wo uld be g in t o r un wh e n the c la ima

nts le a rn e d or sh ou ld have le a rn e d th a t th e c ounty a nn ounc e d it

wo uld
us e ne w pr oc e dure s to fill the se rg e a nt ope nin g s ra the r tha n re ins ta tin g the de mot e d de pu tie s. I t is that a c tio n, no t th e e ve ntu a l pr omo tio n, th at sh ou ld h a ve fi rs t a le rt e d th e de pu tie s o f t he ne e d to protec t their alleg ed prope rty interest: re instatement. See R icks , 449 U.S. at 258. Calling the pr omoti o n s a “c o n tinuing violation” does not he lp the deputies. The de puties
may have fe lt a dd iti on a l fin a nc ia l ef fe c ts fr om t

he c ounty ’s a c tio ns in Aug us t 20 08 , w he n th e c ounty promoted others to the se rg eant positions, but the Supreme Court has long h el d that the ong oing eff ects of an allege dly illega l action do not amount to continuing violations. See Ricks , 449 U.S. at 25 8; Evans , 4 31 U. S. at 557 –5 8. Al l tha t th e c ounty did in 2 00 8 w a s f

oll owthr ou g h o n it s
a nn ounc e me nt b y

takin g the ne xt log ic a l st e p, fi lli ngthe po sit ion s base d o n th e pr oc e dure s it
announce d it would use. The 2008 promotions amount to the eff ects o f any

initial viol ation—the
c ounty ’s re pu diatio n o f a

ny ri g ht to re ins ta te me nt an d ad op tio n o f i mpe rm iss ibl e ne w p ro c e dure s in its place— not a continuing violation that starts the limit ations clock anew . See R icks , 449 U.S. at 25 8; Anderson v. City of Bristol , 6 F .3 d 11 68 , 11 75 (6t h C ir . 1 99 3) ; Cox v . Ci ty of M e mp his , 230 F.3d 199, 202, 204–05 ( 6th Cir. 2000).
The de puties also claim they could not ha ve filed a lawsuit ear lier than they

did beca use they h a d n o tye ts u f

f e r e d a n y i n j u r y. B u tt h e d e p u t i e s h a d

a c c e p t e d d e m o t i o n s , a l o s s o f

p a y a n d s e n i o r i t y,No. 09-6241

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- 6 - on the condition t h at the county would automatically

reinstate the m when new serg eant positions be c a m e a v a i l a

b l e . T o t h e e xt e n tt h e c o u n t y a n n o u n c e d

p r o c e d u r e s o t h e r

t h a n a u t o m a tic reinstateme nt for filling serg eant positions within a y ear of October 22, 2008, the deputies ha d the rig ht to seek injunctive relief to pr event the county from implementing the new policy and to require the c o u n ty

to c o mp ly

w it h th e c o u n ty

o r d in a n c e b y

im me d iate ly

f il li n g th e p o s it io n s w it

h the de mot e d d e pu tie s.
All of t his shows that the di strict court corre ctly stated t he applicable law. Our one que stion relates to timi ng . Parag raph 16 of t h e complaint leave s unclea r the timing of

the county ’s
a nn ounc e ment th a t th e de pu tie s w ou ld h a ve to p a rt ic ipate in t he pr omo tio ns pr oc e ss a lon g wi th
ever y one else in order to obtain a s er gea n t positi on. The pa rag raph note s only

that “[w]hen the Plaintiffs inquired, the Depa rtment said it would not reinstate them to the rank of ser g eant,” R.3-1 ¶ 16, but there is no further spe cification about the “whe n.” Any conc es s i o n the deputies made below re lates only

to the announ ce m en t t h e county posted in November

2006. Nowher e did the de pu tie s sp e c if

y or a g re e on

a date wh e n th e c ounty

inf or me d th e m th e y

wo uld have to p a rt ic ipate in the competitive promotions proce ss.
Given the Rule 12(b)( 6) st ag e of this case, plaintiffs de serve limit ed discove ry on at least two points: (1) when a

nd how the county

informed the de puties they would have t o participate in the pr omo tio ns pr oc e ss a

nd the natur e of the no tic e a nd (2 ) the tim ingof the pr omo tio ns po sti ng . I f t his dis c ov e ry c on fi rm s th e dis tr ic t c ourt ’s c on c lus ion s a bo ut t he e vid e nc e , it s le g a l c on c lus ion s a re a lso
corr ect. Othe rwise, plaintiffs a re e ntitled to move to the nex t stag e of the case .No. 09-6241

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- 7 - The pr ior ity

the or y . A l s o e m b e d d e d i n t h e d e p u t i e s ’ c o mp l a i n t , a s n o t e d , i s a s e c o n d t h e o r y: the “pr iority ” theor

y . The district cour

t did not dis cuss this the o ry . And with ample re ason: the deputies did not actively

pursue it. I n response to the county ’s m o t i o n t o dismiss , the deputies focuse d their c o m p l ai n t s on the county ’s fa ilure to reinstate them immediately when positions beca me open, R.15 at 7 (twic e), 8 ( twice) , 9, and mentioned priority just four times, R.15 at 4, 5, 10 (twice ).
Whil e the de pu tie s d id n ot f e a tur e the “ pr ior ity” the or y be fo re the dis tr ic t court or thi s c ourt , the theory appea rs in the complaint, and it is not an implausible conce ption of liabilit y . Parag raph 23 of the c omplaint quotes the statut e and claims the deputies “ar e entitled to ‘prior ity over othe r applicants to re instatement.’” R.3-1 ¶ 23. I t is also quite possibl e that this theory of rec overy is not time-barr ed. The plaintiffs may not have known, a nd may not have ha d any

rea son to know, that the county would deprive them of “pr iority ” until the county announce d the re sults of the promotions proce ss. Up to this poi nt, the deputies would not nec essar ily have know n o f t h e d enial of a pr omo tio n, a nd the y wo uld no t ne c e ssa ri ly have kn ow n that the y did no t re c e ive a “ pr ior ity” bu mp in the promotions process (or for that matter

that they rec eiv ed a p ri o ri ty

bump, though not one
su ff ic ie nt t o o bta in a

pr omo tio n) . U nd e r t

he se c ir c ums tanc e s, it i s a pp ro pr ia te to g ive the c la ima nts
a sh ot at th e the or

y —mo re sp e c if

ic a lly a sh ot be fo re the dis tr ic t c ourt of de te rm ini ngwh e the r t

his theory survives Rule 12(b)( 6), per haps af ter limited discovery

on the re levant points.No. 09-6241

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- 8 - III
.
F or the se re a so ns , w e re ve rs e a nd re mand fo r f ur the r p ro c e e din g s.