SECURITY IN THE AMERICAS:

NEITHER EVOLUTION NOR DEVOLUTION—IMPASSE

Max G. Manwaring

March 2004
ii

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ISBN 1-58487-154-7
iii

FOREWORD

This monograph comes at a time of promise for greater economic 

integration between the United States and Latin America, but also one 

of profound concern about the deteriorating security situation in several 

countries in the region. Importantly, the benefi ts of stability, economic 

growth, and democracy depend on effective national sovereignty and 

security. These realities are gaining credence as we grow to understand 

that Colombia is a paradigm of the failing state, and that has enormous 

implications for the well-being of the Western Hemisphere. Yet, no 

consensus on the threat and how to deal with it has emerged. As a 

consequence, hemispheric security cooperation is at an impasse.

In this context, Dr. Max Manwaring identifi es the political-strategic 

challenge of effective sovereignty and security, with a focus on 

nontraditional threats. He recommends that leaders rethink the problem 

of nontraditional threats and develop the conceptual and strategicpolitical multilateral responses necessary to deal effectively with them. 

Piecemeal tactical-operational level responses to nontraditional threats 

and actors must be supplemented by broader strategic-political efforts. 

Also, cooperative national and international efforts designed to inhibit 

and reverse the processes of state failure must supplement military 

and law-enforcement emphasis on the attrition of individual “narcoterrorists.” 

Dr. Manwaring’s recommendations constitute no easy task. 

However, if the United States and the other countries of the 

hemisphere ignore what is happening in Latin America, the expansion 

of terrorism, “lawless areas,” and general instability easily could 

destroy the democracy, free market economies, and prosperity that 

has been achieved. That would profoundly affect the health of the 

U.S. economy―and the concomitant power to act in the global security 

arena. The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this important 

and timely monograph as a part of the ongoing debate on security 

cooperation in the Americas.

 DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director

Strategic Studies Institute 

v

PREFACE

Professor Max Manwaring, in this persuasive essay, reminds 

us that security issues in the Western Hemisphere demand more 

attention from Washington than they often get and, importantly, a 

different kind of attention. Indeed, he invites collective Washington 

to stretch its mind, broaden its horizons, and accept a more holistic 

view (realistic, he would contend) of what national security really 

means in 2004.

The stakes, he argues, are high. Preoccupied as the United 

States is with the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), often treating 

“terrorism” as if it were a single enemy rather than a means to 

an end, this country loses sight of the overall risk of cross-border 

instability caused by failing states. Some of them are in the Western 

Hemisphere. That is too close to home, a threat we can ill afford.

An important circle of linkages which Manwaring wants us 

to consider is the interdependence among security, stability, 

development, democracy, and sovereignty (the last term including 

the notion of legitimacy). That linkage is not lost in our hemisphere, of 

course. This monograph was written looking forward to the “Special 

Summit of the Americas” in Monterrey, Mexico, in mid-January 

2004. The agenda responds to major Latin American concerns,1 and 

to Manwaring’s invitation to planners to look beyond the present 

levels of analysis of Western Hemisphere security issues.

Nevertheless, as he warns us, some “sticking points” keep 

North-South relations from being harmonious. Latin Americans, 

despite recognizing their own security and fi nancial problems, are 

loath to take directions from Washington. On the eve of the Special 

Summit, certain leaders (Kirchner, Fox, and Chavez, among others) 

had publicly bristled at various comments from Washington about 

such matters as their relations with Fidel Castro and their fi nancial 

restructuring. Moreover, Washington is still perceived as focused 

principally on drug traffi cking and “narco-terrorism,” while Latins 

want to discuss its fault lines of security and stability which are 

mainly economic and social. 

Not all the news from Latin America is bad, of course. In January, 

dramatic gains by Colombia’s government against the insurgent 
vi

Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) included the 

capture of Ricardo Palmera (aka Simón Trinidad), considered the 

fourth-ranking man in that organization.2 Such a move will reinforce 

the will of the U.S. Congress to continue its aid to Colombia and 

to support President Alvaro Uribe. The gains are also evidence 

of increasing regional cooperation with Colombia, acccording to 

Professor Manwaring’s War College colleague, Colonel Joseph 

R. Núñez. Denying the FARC the ability to hide in “ungoverned 

spaces,” says Núñez, is essential; yet cooperation is still not good 

with Hugo Chavez’s Venezuela.3

Such gains, however, certainly do not contradict Manwaring’s 

warning that Colombia is the “paradigm of a failing state.” In fact, 

a recent study released by the Council on Foreign Relations in New 

York criticizes the U.S. policy on “Drugs and Thugs” in the Andean 

region, saying that it cannot possibly achieve the stated U.S. goals of 

democracy, prosperity and security. The report, as does Manwaring, 

argues for a far broader approach.4

The “ultimate threat” of state failure, Manwaring tells us, is 

a Pandora’s box of instability, criminality, insurgency, regional 

confl ict, and terrorism, a spectrum of ills which fl ow well beyond 

the failed state’s borders. But, he points out, we don’t have to wait 

for the state to fail. The process itself, which we can already see in 

many instances, profoundly is destabilizing. Until there is common 

agreement on the threat, though, he says, things will be at an 

impasse. What is called for is “the highest level of strategic-political 

thought.” If Manwaring is right, we had better not wait too long for 

it.5

 Ambler Moss

Professor of International Studies

University of Miami
vii

ENDNOTES-PREFACE

1. The stated purpose of the summit was to engage the themes of Economic 

Growth with Equity, Social Development, and Democratic Governance.

1. See The Economist, January 10, 2004.

2. Financial Times, January 9, 2004.

3. Council on Foreign Relations, Andes 2020: A New Strategy for the Challenges of 

Colombia and the Region, December 2003. The report was prepared by a high-level 

commission of experts from the private sector, civil society and academia.

4. A similar clarion call is expressed by former diplomat Chester A. Crocker 

and now James R. Schlesinger, Professor of Strategic Studies at Georgetown 

University’s School of Foreign Service, in “Engaging Failed States,” Foreign Affairs, 

Vol. 82, No. 5, September-October 2003.
viii

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

MAX G. MANWARING holds the General Douglas MacArthur 

Chair and is Professor of Military Strategy at the U.S. Army War 

College. He is a retired U.S. Army colonel and an Adjunct Professor of 

International Politics at Dickinson College. He has served in various 

civilian and military positions, including at the U.S. Army War 

College, the U.S. Southern Command, and the Defense Intelligence 

Agency. Dr. Manwaring is the author and coauthor of several 

articles, chapters, and reports dealing with political-military affairs, 

democratization and global ungovernability, and Latin American 

security affairs. He is also the editor or coeditor of El Salvador at 

War; Beyond Declaring Victory and Coming Home: The Challenges of 

Peace and Stability Operations; Deterrence in the 21st Century; and The 

Search for Security: A U.S. Grand Strategy for the Twenty-First Century. 

Dr. Manwaring holds a B.S. in Economics, a B.S. in Political Science, 

an M.A. in Political Science, and a Ph.D. in Political Science from the 

University of Illinois. He is also a graduate of the U.S. Army War 

College.
ix

SUMMARY

This monograph begins with a discussion of sovereignty and then 

considers national security threats with reference to two different 

levels of analysis. The fi rst is the traditional-legal versus a more 

realistic contemporary level of analysis; second, the operational, 

strategic, and political levels of analysis. The traditional concept 

tends to focus attention on the tactical-operational levels of activity; 

the more contemporary notion broadens analysis to more strategicpolitical concerns. 

In these strategic-political terms, it is useful to outline the 

circular linkage among and between security, stability, development, democracy, and sovereignty. This linkage clarifi es the 

interdependence of these elements, and provides beginning points 

from which to develop the strategic-political vision necessary for 

success against the most likely current and future security challenges 

and threats at the international, national, and intra-national levels. In 

that context, two case studies are examined: Colombia over the past 

40 to 50 years, and the “New War” in Central America; toward an 

understanding of how Colombia, Central America, and their U.S. 

ally have dealt with nontraditional threats to national security, 

stability, and sovereignty in their respective situations. The Central 

American case focuses on the traditional versus the more modern 

approach, and the Colombian case centers on the tactical versus the 

strategic approach to the problem. These cases further illustrate that 

instability, and the people who create and/or exploit it, are tacticaloperational threats in their own right. But, the ultimate politicalstrategic threat to more general hemispheric and global security and 

sovereignty is that of state failure. 

The author concludes with the argument that a broadened 

concept of threat to national security and sovereignty is meaningful 

and important. This is particularly crucial for those governments in 

the Western Hemisphere―and elsewhere―that do not discern any 

serious security issues, or proverbial clouds, on their traditionally 

defi ned peaceful horizons. Ample evidence indicates that 

nontraditional security problems can take nation-states to a process 
x

that ends in failing or failed state status—as examples, dysfunctional 

states, criminal states, narco-states, rogue states, and new “peoples’ 

democracies.” Moreover, it is important to note that failing and failed 

states tend not to (1) buy U.S. and other Western-made products; (2) 

be interested in developing democratic and free market institutions 

and human rights; and, (3) cooperate on shared problems such 

as illegal drugs, illicit arms fl ows, debilitating refugee fl ows, and 

potentially dangerous environmental problems (e.g., water scarcity). 

In short, failing and failed states tend to linger, and go from bad to 

worse. The longer they persist, the more they and their problems 

endanger global peace and security.
1

SECURITY IN THE AMERICAS:

NEITHER EVOLUTION NOR DEVOLUTION―IMPASSE

INTRODUCTION

Contemporary security and stability are fragile in the Western 

Hemisphere. As a corollary, an insecure and unstable hemisphere 

threatens regional national security and sovereignty, regional 

economic and socio-political development, U.S. security, and, 

ultimately, global stability. Those challenges or threats are 

exacerbated by “spill-over” problems from the crisis generated 

by Colombia’s three wars (i.e., narco-terrorism, insurgency, and 

paramilitary vigilantism), and by global terrorism. These threats 

are gaining credence, as it is generally recognized that Colombia 

is a paradigm of the failing state that has enormous implications 

for the prosperity, stability, democracy, and peace of the Western 

Hemisphere.1

Nevertheless, two sticking-points arise in the hemispheric 

security dialogue regarding risks for Colombia and the world around 

it―and what the United States and the region can do cooperatively to 

deal with them. First, general agreement appears to exist that there 

is a need to go beyond U.S.-mandated, myopic, ad hoc, piecemeal, 

tactical-operational, and primarily military solutions to the so-called 

“drug war” and/or “narco-terrorism.” Moreover, Latin American 

countries perceive that the United States is going its own way in 

the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), and is oblivious to the more 

strategic nonmilitary problems in Latin America and the Caribbean 

that spawn illegal drug traffi cking, terrorism, and myriad human 

and other destabilizers leading to crime, corruption, violence, and 

confl ict. Thus, a tendency to reject U.S. domination, and leadership 

and solutions exists.2

The second sticking-point is that no consensus on the “threat” 

has emerged. The security dialogue indicates strong consensus on 

a strategic vision of peace, stability, security, prosperity, and civil 

society for the entire Western Hemisphere. But, with no agreement 

on the threat, there can be no agreement on a unifi ed ends-ways-
2

means policy and strategy that could contribute directly to achieving 

that strategic vision. The problem of threat appears to revolve 

around the levels of analysis issue. The legal-traditional level of 

analysis defi nes national security and sovereignty in relatively 

narrow military terms. Generally it involves the protection of 

the “nation” against conventional military aggression by another 

country. A nontraditional and more realistic concept of threat 

goes beyond conventional external aggression to the protection 

of national security and sovereignty against internal and nonstate 

destabilizers.3

The impasse generated by these sticking points is complicated 

further by a general desire in the Latin American and Caribbean 

communities to devolve the responsibility for hemispheric security 

and security cooperation to the Organization of American States 

(OAS). That is logical because it is well-understood that today’s 

security and stability requirements call for a coordinated and 

cooperative multilateral application of national civilian and military 

instruments of power. The OAS can provide a moral position 

and structural framework from which member states can operate 

together when necessary and separately when desired. Yet, the OAS 

is not known for its interest in security matters, or the speed with 

which it deals with them.4

One reason for this lack of movement is that, without a 

consensus on the threat and the ways and means of dealing with 

it, an additional major complication to the threat issue exists. That 

is, most OAS member nations are reluctant to take the broadened 

“realist” defi nition of national security to its logical conclusion and 

correspondingly broaden the role of the military to a controversial 

unilateral and multilateral protection of peoples and governments. 

This is a serious civil-military relations issue in much of Latin 

America, because a well-founded concern is that some military 

institutions of the region might revert to past practices of acting as 

parallel and autonomous political actors superior to the civil political 

power. As a consequence, the hemispheric security cooperation 

concept remains at an impasse, and the countries of the hemisphere 

continue to deal with it―if at all―separately.5

Thus, this monograph begins with a discussion of sovereignty 

(i.e., the supreme power over a body politic), and then of national 
3

security threats with reference to two different levels of analysis. 

First, the traditional-legal versus a more realistic contemporary 

level of analysis; and, second, the operational, strategic, and political 

levels of analysis. Interestingly and importantly, the traditional 

concept tends to focus attention on the tactical-operational levels 

of activity, and the more contemporary notion broadens analysis to 

more strategic-political concerns.6

In these strategic-political terms, it is useful to outline the 

circular linkage among security, stability, development, democracy, 

and sovereignty. This linkage will clarify the interdependence of 

these elements, and will provide beginning points from which to 

develop the strategic-political vision necessary for success against 

the most likely current and future security challenges at the 

international, national, and intra-national levels. In that context, 

the author examines two case studies: Colombia over the past 40 

to 50 years, and the “New War” in Central America. He intends to 

illustrate how Colombia, Central America, and their U.S. ally have 

dealt with nontraditional threats to national security, stability, and 

sovereignty in their respective situations. The Central American case 

will focus on the traditional versus the more modern approach, and 

the Colombian case will center on the tactical versus the strategic 

approach to the problem. Additionally, these cases further defi ne the 

ultimate contemporary threat to more general hemispheric security 

and effective sovereignty. 

The monograph concludes with the argument that a broadened 

concept of threat to national security and sovereignty is meaningful 

and important. That, in turn, leads to a call for a paradigm change. 

This is particularly important for those governments in the Western 

Hemisphere―and elsewhere―that do not discern any serious 

security issues, or clouds, on their peaceful horizons. These realities 

of the contemporary and future global security environments call 

for civilian and military leaders to reexamine the problems of 

threat, cooperative civil-military relations, and effective sovereignty 

before they resolve themselves. Ample evidence demonstrates that 

nontraditional security problems can lead nation-states to failing or 

failed state status;7 as examples, dysfunctional states, criminal states, 

narco-states, rogue states, and new “peoples’ democracies.” 
4

PART ONE: THE LEVELS OF ANALYSIS PROBLEM

The Western mainstream, legally-oriented security dialogue 

demonstrates that many political and military leaders and scholars 

of international relations have not yet adjusted to the reality that 

internal and transnational nonstate actors can be as important as 

traditional nation-states in determining global political patterns 

and outcomes in world affairs. Similarly, many political leaders 

see nonstate actors as bit players on the international stage. At 

most, many consider these nontraditional actors to be low-level 

law enforcement problems, and, as a result, many argue that 

these political actors do not require sustained national security 

policy attention.8 Yet, more than half the countries in the world 

are struggling to maintain their political, economic, and territorial 

integrity in the face of diverse direct and indirect nonstate (including 

criminal) challenges.9 The resultant impasse regarding “threat” to 

national security and effective sovereignty―and how to deal with 

it―revolves around the levels of analysis issue.

To understand just how such a threat can exist―and that it 

must be dealt with both conceptually and practically―we need to 

comprehend the context in which it operates. Thus, this section 

briefl y will examine: 1) the traditional and more modern concepts of 

the threat to national security and sovereignty; 2) the linkage among 

security, stability, development, democracy, and sovereignty; 3) 

the levels of analysis issue in the Colombian and Central American 

cases; (4) some additional implications; and 5) the ultimate threat.

Traditional and More Modern Concepts of Threat to National 

Security and Sovereignty.

Again, the legal-traditional concept of threat to national security 

involves the protection of national sovereignty against external 

military aggression.10 National sovereignty tends to be defi ned as 

the integrity of national borders and national interests at home and 

possibly abroad. The enemy is, thus, a traditional nation-state, with 

recognizable military formations, that violates national borders and 

threatens the major institutions and perhaps natural resources and 

external interests of the state. In these terms, the enemy includes 
5

the specifi c military formations involved and the industrialtechnical ability of the aggressor state to support the military attack 

materially. A related concept of threat to national security involves 

“strategic access” and “strategic denial.” That is, maintaining a 

traditional nation-state’s access to sea lines of communication, 

markets, resources, bases, choke points, or other specifi c strategic 

assets or denying another traditional nation-state access to specifi ed 

assets or interests.11 In any case, the traditional level of analysis tends 

to defi ne threats to national security in relatively narrow nation-state 

and military terms. 

The more realistic contemporary nontraditional security dialogue 

tends to focus on enhancing real and popular perceptions of relative 

stability and well-being. Stability and well-being tend to refer to 

the use of a variety of means―only one of which is military―in the 

pursuit of political and economic objectives. In turn, enemies can 

be traditional nation-states, nontraditional external nonstate actors 

or proxies, or violent nontraditional intra-state actors that might 

threaten the achievement of those objectives and the vitality of the 

state. As a result, the enemy is not necessarily a recognizable military 

entity or has an industrial/technical capability to make war. At base, 

the enemy now becomes the individual political actor that plans and 

implements the kind of violence which threatens national well-being 

and exploits the root causes of instability.12

Thus, the entire international community will inevitably face 

horrible new dilemmas at home and abroad that arise from the 

chaos engendered in the contemporary global security environment. 

The threat of devastating attacks by anyone controlling nuclear 

weapons retains credibility. At the same time, the threat of biological 

and chemical war and cyber war intensify. At a lower level on the 

likelihood ladder of warfare as a whole, conventional military attack 

also retains certain credibility. But, more important, according to 

General (Ret.) Michael P. C. Carns,

These challenges to stability and well-being are gravely complicated 

by threats and menaces emanating from rogue states, substate and 

transnational terrorists, insurgents, illegal drug traffi ckers, organized 

criminals, warlords, militant fundamentalists, ethnic cleansers, and 

1,000 other “snakes” with a cause―and the will to conduct asymmetrical 

warfare [to achieve their own political objectives.]13
6

Many of these kinds of attacks challenge the traditional defi nition 

of a threat to national security. As one example, terrorism in much 

of the world and in most of the Western Hemisphere is defi ned as a 

serious criminal phenomenon, but a crime nevertheless.14 Since the 

events of September 11, 2001, the United States and some of its allies 

have begun to emphasize terrorism as a serious threat to national 

security and meaningful sovereignty.15 In these terms, it is helpful 

to examine the linkage among security, stability, development, 

democracy, and sovereignty. This operational, strategic, and political 

level analysis will establish two things: it will clarify that some 

issues now considered to be singular law enforcement problems are 

threats to the nation as we know it; and, it will provide a foundation 

for a reexamination of nontraditional security and stability threats 

to national security and sovereignty, and their implications for 

contemporary civil-military relations in Latin America.

The Linkage among Security, Stability, Development, 

Democracy, and Sovereignty. 

Finding solutions to the problems of security, stability, and wellbeing in the current global arena takes the international community 

or individual intervening actors beyond providing some form of 

humanitarian assistance in cases of human misery and need. It 

takes international political powers beyond traditional monitoring 

of bilateral agreements or protecting a people from another group 

of people or from a government. It takes these actors beyond 

compelling one or more parties to a confl ict to cease human rights 

abuses and other morally repugnant practices or repelling some 

form of conventional military aggression. Solutions to the problems 

of stability and well-being take us to fi ve highly interrelated and 

reinforcing lessons that should have been learned by now.16

The Relationship of Security to Stability. As noted above, one 

infl uential nontraditional school of thought within the international 

security dialogue has been attempting to defi ne national security 

as national and regional well-being since the end of World War II. 

More and more, that task appears to consist of two closely associated 

elements. First, security involves the defense of sovereignty 
7

(defi ned as supreme power over a body politic) in an increasingly 

interdependent and aggressive world. Second, security depends on 

the continued and expanded building of a country’s socioeconomic 

infrastructure (that is, the bases of well-being and stability). 

Essentially, security with stability is the deliberate socioeconomic 

development of a nation and the concomitant development 

of regional and global infl uence and power. The reasoning is 

straightforward; the level of development has a decisive bearing on 

preserving internal order and external peace and enhancing national 

well-being.

The Relationship of Stability to Development. In the past, the world 

generally provided economic and fi nancial aid to developing 

countries under the assumption that personal and collective security 

and political development would automatically follow. That has 

not happened. Coherent long-term, multilevel, and multilateral 

capability-building measures must be designed to create and 

strengthen human and physical infrastructure. At the same time, 

these measures must generate the technical, professional, and ethical 

bases through which competent and honest political leadership can 

effectively provide individual and collective well-being. In the 

context of socioeconomic-political development, facilitated by the 

establishment of legitimate law and order, a governing regime can 

begin to develop sustainable peace and prosperity.

The Relationship of Development to Democracy. The relationship 

of development to democracy relies on legitimate governance or, 

in other words, responsible democracy. Legitimate governance 

is necessary to generate the capability to manage, coordinate, 

and sustain security, stability, and development effectively. 

This capability implies the competence and honesty to generate 

responsible democratic governance. This capability also implies 

the political competence to engender a national and international 

purpose to which a people can relate and support. Unless and until 

a population feels that its government deals with issues of personal 

security and socioeconomic-political development fairly and 

effectively, the potential for internal or external factors to destabilize 

and subvert a government is considerable. Regimes that ignore this 

lesson often fi nd themselves in a “crisis of governance.” They face 
8

increasing social violence, criminal anarchy, terrorism, insurgency, 

and overthrow. 

The Relationship of Democracy to Sovereignty. Responsible 

democracy and political legitimacy are based upon the moral 

right of a government to govern and the ability of the regime to 

govern morally. Globally, popular perceptions of corruption, 

disenfranchisement, poverty, lack of upward social mobility, 

and lack of personal security tend to limit the right and the 

ability of governments to conduct the business of the state. As a

government loses the right and ability to govern fairly and morally, 

it loses legitimacy. In turn, the loss of moral legitimacy leads to the 

degeneration of de facto state sovereignty. That is, the state no longer 

exercises effective control of the national territory and the people in 

it.

From Sovereignty Back to Security. Again, a fundamental societal 

requirement for acceptance and approval of state authority 

(sovereignty) is that a government must ensure individual and 

collective security. It begins with the provision of personal security 

of individual members of the citizenry. It then extends to protection 

of the collectivity from violent internal nonstate actors (including 

organized criminals and self-appointed vigilante groups) and 

external enemies―and, perhaps in some cases, from repressive 

internal (local and regional) governments. The security problem 

ends with the establishment of fi rm but fair control of the entire 

national territory and the people in it, which takes us back to the 

concept of sovereignty. That is, without complete control of the 

national territory, a government cannot provide the elements that 

defi ne a more contemporary and meaningful concept of sovereignty: 

an effective judicial system, rule of law, or stability; long-term 

socioeconomic development; responsible democratic processes; 

sustainable peace. 

The Levels of Analysis Issue from Two Cases: The Current 

Colombian Crisis and The “New War” in Central America.

The Colombian and Central American cases are particularly 

good examples of the Levels of Analysis Problem. The intent herein 
9

is to illustrate how each country and its U.S. ally has dealt with 

its respective “terrorism” or other “destabilizer” threat. Although 

there are elements of the traditional versus more contemporary and 

tactical versus strategic-political approaches in both cases, each case 

will focus on the different approaches. For example, the Colombian 

case will center on the tactical versus the strategic approach to the 

threat problems, and the Central American case will focus on the 

traditional approach. At the same time, these cases further defi ne the 

ultimate threat to national security and meaningful sovereignty. 

An Example of the Tactical versus the Strategic Approach from the 

Current Colombian Case. During the late 1960s through the 1980s, 

the illegal drug industry began to grow and prosper in Colombia’s 

unstable environment of virtually uncontrolled violence, rural 

poverty, political disarray, and government weakness. The 

prosperity of the drug industry, in turn, provided resources that 

allowed insurgent organizations to grow and expand. Later, as the 

Colombian government proved less and less effective in controlling 

the national territory and the people in it, the self-defense “vigilante” 

paramilitary groups emerged.17 The thread that permitted these three The thread that permitted these three 17

violent internal nonstate actors to develop, grow, and succeed was―

and is―adequate freedom of movement and action over time and 

space. The dynamics of this Hobbesian Trinity18 of “narco-terrorists,” 

various insurgent organizations, primarily the Revolutionary 

Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarios de 

Colombia [FARC]) and paramilitary groups, the United Self-Defense 

Groups of Colombia (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia [AUC]), have 

substantially expanded freedom of movement and action, and 

correspondingly eroded that of the state.19 This case, then, is a point 

from which to examine the complexities of the “Colombian Crisis.” It 

is also a point from which to assess the generally tactical-operational 

levels of analysis that the Colombian government and its U.S. ally 

have applied to that situation and a point from which to compare 

the traditional idea of threat against a broader defi nition of threat to 

national security.

Colombia’s Three Wars. Colombia and its potential are deteriorating 

because of three ongoing, simultaneous, and interrelated wars 

involving the so-called “Hobbesian Trinity.” This unholy trinity of 
10

internal nonstate actors, supported heavily by outside sources of 

funding, is perpetrating a level of corruption, criminality, human 

horror, and internal and external instability that, if left unchecked at 

the strategic and political levels, can ultimately threaten Colombia’s 

survival as a sovereign democratic state and undermine the political 

stability and sovereignty of its neighbors. In that connection, there 

is now explicit recognition that Colombia’s current situation has 

reached crisis proportions.20

Stated Motives of the Narco-Insurgent-Paramilitary Nexus. Each of 

the three violent nonstate players in the Colombian crisis separately 

generates formidable problems, challenges, and threats to the 

state and the region in its own right. What, then, of an alliance of 

the willing―even if that alliance represents a complicated mosaic 

of mutual and confl icting interests? The motives for the narcoinsurgent-paramilitary nexus are straightforward. They are the 

accumulation of wealth, the control of territory and people, freedom 

of movement and action, and legitimacy. Together, these elements 

represent usable power, power to allocate values and resources in a 

society.

Narcos may not seek the overthrow of the government as long as 

it is weak and can be controlled to allow them maximum freedom 

of movement and action.21 The insurgents, on the other hand, seek 

the eventual destruction of the state as it now exists. Whether the 

insurgents are reformers or criminals is irrelevant. Their avowed 

objective is to take direct control of the government and the state.22

Likewise, the paramilitaries want fundamental change. They seem 

to be interested in creating a strong state, capable of unquestioned 

enforcement of law and order. Whether the vigilante groups are 

“democratic” or authoritarian is also irrelevant. For their own selfpreservation, they have little choice but to try to take direct or indirect 

control of the state.23 In this sense, the nexus is not simply criminal 

in nature. It is a political-economic-military force that has become a 

major national and transnational nonstate actor. To be sure, this is 

a loose and dynamic merger subject to many vicissitudes, but the 

“marriage of convenience” has lasted for several years and appears 

to be getting stronger.

The General Response. Colombia, the United States, and other 

countries that might ultimately be affected by the destabilizing 
11

consequences of the narco-insurgent-paramilitary nexus in 

Colombia have tended to deal with the problem in a piecemeal 

fashion or even to ignore it. For over 40 years, the various Colombian 

governments dealt with the problem without a strategic-level plan; 

without adequate or timely intelligence; without a consensus among 

the political, economic, and military elites about how to deal with 

the armed opposition; and, importantly, within an environment of 

mutual enmity between the civil government and the armed forces.24

With the promulgation of Plan Colombia in 2000 and a so-called 

Defense Strategy in 2003, at least there is the basis of a coherent 

political project, but not much else.

The United States largely has ignored the insurgent and 

paramilitary problems in Colombia, except for making rhetorical 

statements regarding the peace process, terrorist activities, and 

human rights violations. The United States has focused its money, 

training, and attention almost entirely on the counter-drug 

campaign, and has viewed the Colombian crisis in limited tactical 

and operational terms: the number of hectares of coca eradicated, the 

number of kilos of coca detected and destroyed, and the number of 

traffi ckers jailed. And, even though the United States and Colombia 

have achieved a series of tactical “successes” in the coca fi elds, the 

laboratories, and on the streets, the violent nonstate actors remain 

strong and become ever more wealthy.25

Neighboring countries that are affected by the nefarious activities 

of Colombia’s Hobbesian Trinity tend to be doing little more than 

watching and debating about what, if anything, to do about the 

seemingly new and unknown phenomenon.26 In the meantime, the 

fundamental political-social-economic causes and consequences 

of the Colombian crisis act as continuing stimulants to regional 

instability and confl ict. 

Conclusions. Strategic victory in any kind of war, including the 

most likely types of violence on the confl ict spectrum, is not simply 

the sum of the number of “enemies” killed or the number of arrests 

made during the course of a given confl ict. Rather, it is the product 

of connecting and weighting the various elements of national and 

international power within the context of strategic appraisals, 

strategic vision, and strategic-political objectives―as a “purpose 

built” bridge connecting political, economic, informational, and 
12

military/police power to civil-political goals.27 In all the years of the 

Colombian crisis, none of this has been completely understood or 

achieved. 

The narco-terrorist nexus in Colombia has generated a triple 

threat to the state. First, through murder, kidnapping, intimidation, 

corruption, and other means of coercion, these violent internal 

nonstate actors undermine the ability of the government to perform 

its legitimizing functions. Second, by violently imposing their 

will over the “democratically elected” government, these actors 

compromise the exercise of the authority of the state. Third, by 

taking control of large portions of the national territory, including 

the people in it, the various components of the narco-terrorist nexus 

are directly performing the tasks of government and acting as states 

within a state. Yet, legally and ironically, this set of problems remains 

a law enforcement issue, not a threat to Colombian national security 

and sovereignty.

An Example of the Traditional Approach to National and Regional 

Security from the Current Central American Case. An examination of 

the “New War” in Central America is a good point from which to 

observe the complexities of contemporary challenges in much of 

the world. It is also a good example of “spillover” from one place to 

another. Moreover, contemporary Central America is a case through 

which to examine the non-utility of the traditional approach in the 

defense of contemporary stability, security, and sovereignty.

The General Situation. Despite high hopes for a “peace dividend” 

stemming from the ending of the Cold War and the various peace 

accords of the 1990s that ended the confl icts of the 1980s in Central 

America, the region has become a prime example of the “new world 

disorder.” 

Today the region’s seven small republics, rather than exhibiting the 

new harmony and prosperity that were expected to come with peace, 

bear only the scars and open wounds of traumatized societies: rampant 

corruption, gang warfare, drug smuggling, intense urban poverty and 

overpopulation, and neglect from the international community.28

The Destabilizers’ Behavior and Apparent Motives. As the illegal 

drug trade has moved north and Central America has become 
13

home to more and more poppy producers, and has become the 

pipeline for something like 60 percent of the cocaine moving into the 

United States, that the region is being “Colombianized” is feared. 

The corruption, violence, and political-economic chaos that have 

devastated Colombia are now quite evident in all the countries 

of Central America. As examples, fi rst, the illegal drug trade has 

created a dangerous synergy between political terror and narcotraffi cking, and the line between criminal and political violence is 

blurring. Second, opportunities for profi t and power that the drug 

trade provides have been exploited by many of the same groups that 

fought in the insurgency wars of the 1980s. Third, in many cases, 

law enforcement agencies must confront former colleagues from 

the security or intelligence services, as well as former insurgents, 

who have turned to crime. Fourth, in that context, many of these 

“new criminals” have powerful friends in government and law 

enforcement entities, and are virtually immune from prosecution. 

Fifth, as these various players jockey for position, infl uence, and 

power, rumors of coups and impending coups have intensifi ed to the 

point where the OAS passed a resolution on one occasion supporting 

the rule of Guatemala’s President Portillo.29 Sixth, general crime 

rates have increased substantially, and, in addition to having to deal 

with organized criminal “mafi as,” law enforcement organizations 

must also deal with American-style gangs that have taken control 

of urban neighborhoods and even entire villages. Seventh, and 

fi nally, the drug trade and associated criminal activities move with 

impunity from one country to another, making destabilizing illegal 

enterprise a transnational regional as well as a national security and 

sovereignty issue. 

In Central America’s “New War,” it appears that commercial 

profi t is the primary motivation for the various destabilizing and 

violent activities. Like their narco-terrorist cousins in Colombia, 

Central American narco-traffi ckers are not particularly interested 

in taking de facto control of a state. And they are not sending 

conventional military forces across national borders. They are 

interested, however, in controlling the regional governments to 

allow maximum freedom of movement and action within and 

between national territories. Ample evidence clearly demonstrates 
14

that this kind of commercial motive is, in fact, a political agenda. In 

that context, effective sovereignty is being seriously challenged in 

Central America today.

The General Response. The Central American governments and the 

United States have tended to ignore the continuing destabilization 

of the region. The United States is involved elsewhere, and in the 

GWOT. Central American governments tend to be too weak and 

too compromised to act effectively against what Ana Arana calls 

the “Army of Darkness.”30 Most local law enforcement agencies are 

poorly funded and equipped and are unable to deal with the level 

of criminalization sweeping the region. Moreover, as noted above, 

police and intelligence organizations must confront former colleagues 

who―in any case―have powerful friends in current governments. 

And, artifi cial sovereignty and long-remembered enmities preclude 

any serious regional cooperation against those who take advantage 

of porous political borders for their own nefarious purposes.

At the same time, military response to the surge in crime and 

violence in Central American has been totally inadequate. Many 

of the same problems confront the armed forces that plague police 

organizations―most specifi cally, lack of resources and corruption. 

Additionally, because of the generally deep-seated political desire to 

weaken general military infl uence and power, the armed forces of the 

region tend to be focused on traditional external defense only. Some 

countries are providing military forces for the GWOT in the Middle 

East, but―in any event―current Central American governments are 

not prepared to mobilize their various instruments of national and 

regional power to confront contemporary nontraditional threats 

to stability, security, and sovereignty. As a consequence, Central 

America is sliding back into chaos and bloodshed that is vaguely 

reminiscent of the 1980s.

Conclusions. The primary implications of this analysis are clear. 

The ability of fragile, “besieged,” failing, or failed governments to 

control, protect, and enhance their stability and well-being is severely 

threatened in the contemporary global security environment. The 

conscious choices that individual nation-states and the global 

community make about how to deal with destabilizing elements 

in their respective security environments, now and in the future, 
15

will defi ne the process of national reform, regeneration, well-being, 

and, thus, relative internal and external peace and security. For 

whatever reasons, shrinking from these inevitable national security 

requirements for success in contemporary security situations only 

prolongs and worsens the struggle. Sun Tzu reminds us that, 

“. . . there has never been a protracted war from which a country 

has benefi ted.”31 The current situation in Central America is a case 

in point.

Clearly, this is a Central American instability problem that 

will not and cannot be resolved without strong Central American 

involvement and will. Nevertheless, the United States has signifi cant 

interests in the region, and could and should be more deeply involved 

in helping to strategically-politically contend with the processes by 

which states lose the capacity and/or the will to perform their 

essential governance and security functions. The United States 

must remember that it shares with its Central American neighbors 

an increasingly and vitally important fi nancial, commercial, and 

security/stability stake in the political and economic growth of 

the hemisphere. Any further political-economic-social-security 

deterioration in the region will affect the health of the U.S. economy 

profoundly―and the concomitant power to act in the global security 

arena.

Some Additional Implications for the Levels of Analysis Problem.

The linkages among security, stability, development, democracy, 

and sovereignty illustrate strong interdependence and focus on 

the idea that although the contemporary security environment is 

political, economic, and socio-psychological, it can also be violent. 

In these terms, no successful security strategy or policy can be 

formulated that does not explicitly and implicitly take into account 

all the elements that link security to sovereignty. Thus, global, 

national, and intra-national security will depend on a balanced 

combination of internal and external political-diplomatic, socioeconomic, moral-psychological, and military-police activities. At 

the same time, as important and compelling as the specifi c causes 

and consequences of national and global instability might be, they 
16

must be understood and dealt with on two general levels―the 

tactical-operational level and the strategic-political level. Experience 

demonstrates that ignoring an instability problem or only providing 

a tactical-operational level response to it can be debilitating. In short, 

for ultimate success, tactical-operational efforts must be coupled and 

coordinated with strategic-political responses.32

Basic critical points concerning the linkage between security and 

sovereignty must be understood on four different planes.33 First, 

leaders around the world are now discussing these issues in terms of 

the structural-organizational and political-military reforms required 

to deal more effectively with the “new” security problems that were 

submerged in the morass of the East-West confl ict and unleashed by 

the Eastern European and Soviet Revolutions of 1989. Yet, strategic 

theory and maximization of political opportunity (the strategicpolitical approach) have thus far played little part in that discussion. 

This is a lamentable situation because effectiveness in any security 

environment must be preceded by a strategic-political vision, and a 

cooperative civil-military effort derived from a macro analysis of a 

given situation.

Second, in that connection, despite the obvious differences 

between the organizations, tactics, motives, and objectives of the 

various elements that constitute threats to stability, security, and 

effective sovereignty, all have one thing in common. They are 

engaged in what the OAS has defi ned as grave common crime. 

This situation, however, is more than a complex law enforcement 

problem. The threat posed by nonstate and nontraditional human 

destabilizers is too great and too complex for civilian institutions to 

confront by themselves. Likewise, it is too great and too complex 

for military institutions to combat by themselves. Resolving the 

problem requires a total unity of effort using all the instruments of 

national and international power. As a corollary, the military and 

other security organizations must be properly organized, trained, 

and equipped―and their operational roles must be carefully limited 

and controlled by legitimate democratic regimes. 

Third, the task, within that context of change and reform, is to 

mount a coherent political-economic-psychological-humanitariansecurity effort to create internal and external conditions that can lead 
17

to maintaining and enhancing peace and stability with justice. Thus, 

national and international security will depend not so much on 

traditional military-police law enforcement activities at the tacticaloperational level as on global and domestic strategies and policies 

on the strategic-political level, which provide for the strengthening 

of the state in terms of political reform and competence, socioeconomic development, and personal and collective security. This, 

in turn, adds up to legitimate governance. Thus, the highest priority 

for a besieged government struggling against the forces of instability 

must be to strengthen and legitimize the state. 

Fourth, as a result, every policy, every program, and every action 

of a “besieged” or failing state and its external allies must contribute 

directly and positively to developing, maintaining, and enhancing 

the ability and willingness of the associated government to exercise 

effective sovereignty by controlling its territory and governing its 

people in a responsible and morally acceptable manner. We must 

remember that attacking “nodes of vulnerability,” providing shortterm cosmetic and tactical-operational solutions to an instabilityrelated threat can be ineffective or even counterproductive. Nodes 

of vulnerability are just that―they are not strategic centers of 

gravity. Short-term and cosmetic solutions are just that―short-term 

and cosmetic. This takes us back to the strategic-political issue of 

legitimate governance. The wisdom of Sun Tzu is relevant. He 

argues, “Those who excel in war fi rst cultivate their own humanity 

and justice and maintain their laws and institutions. By these means 

they make their governments invincible.”34 The implication is 

clear: a decision that the necessary balance of political, economic, 

psychological, and security actions required to address this societal 

requirement is “too hard” will implicitly result in a fi nal decision for 

failure.

The Ultimate Threat―State Failure.

Thus, civilian and military leaders today must understand 

the force of the arguments made by Hamilton, Madison, and Jay 

that fl ow through The Federalist Papers. That is, the price of peace 

is justice, the price of justice is the rule of law, the price of law is 
18

government, the price of government is stability and order, and, 

fi nally, government must apply to all men and women within a 

polity, not merely to those who are overtly willing to accept a given 

regime.35 In that connection, probably the most insidious security 

problem facing the world and the nations in it today centers on the 

threats to a given nation-state’s ability and willingness to control: 1) 

control the national territory and the people in it fairly and justly; 

and 2) internal factions or nonstate actors seeking violent change 

within the borders of the nation-state.

The traditional problem of external aggression retains credibility, 

but not the urgency it once had. For sovereignty to be meaningful 

today, the state and its associated government, working under the 

rule of law, must be the only source of authority empowered to make 

and enforce laws and conduct the business of the people within the 

national territory. The violent, intimidating, and corrupting activities 

of illegal internal and transnational nonstate actors can abridge or 

negate these powers.36 At base, this is a major personal and collective 

security issue. That, in turn, is a governance issue.

Probably the most fundamental societal requirement regarding 

governance is that of security. Personal and collective security, 

in turn, are the primary bases upon which all forms of societal 

acceptance and allegiance to the state are built. John Locke reminds 

us that, in addition to being subjected by a foreign power, 

There is one way more whereby a government may be dissolved, and 

that is, when he who has the supreme executive power neglects and 

abandons that charge [to provide governance and concomitant security], 

so that the laws already made can no longer be put in execution. This is 

demonstratively to reduce all to anarchy, and so effectually to dissolve 

the government.37

The primary implication of the complex and ambiguous situations 

described here is straightforward. The contemporary, chaotic global 

strategic environment refl ects a general lack of legitimate governance 

and civil-military cooperation in many parts of the world. Instability 

thrives under those conditions. Instability, violence, terrorism, 

and criminal anarchy are the general consequences of unreformed 

political, social, economic, and security institutions and concomitant 
19

misguided governance.38 Thus, inept governance is the root cause 

and the central strategic problem in the current unstable security 

arena. Governments, international organizations, transnational 

entities, and other symbols of global power that have not responsded 

to the importance of the general legitimate governance requirement 

often fi nd themselves in a “crisis of governance.” Ultimately, this 

instability―along with the human destabilizers who exploit it―lead 

to a fi nal downward spiral into failing and failed state status.39

Why State Failure Matters. 

The argument in general is that failing and failed state status 

is the breeding ground for instability, criminality, insurgency, 

regional confl ict, and terrorism. These conditions breed massive 

humanitarian disasters and major refugee fl ows. They can host 

“evil” networks of all kinds, whether they involve criminal business 

enterprise, narco-traffi cking, or some form of ideological crusade. 

They spawn all kinds of things we do not like such as human rights 

violations, torture, poverty, starvation, disease, the recruitment and 

use of child soldiers, traffi cking in women and body parts, traffi cking 

and proliferation of conventional weapons systems and weapons 

of mass destruction, genocide, ethnic cleansing, warlordism, and 

criminal anarchy. At the same time, they usually are unconfi ned and 

“spill-over” into regional syndromes of poverty, destabilization, and 

confl ict.40

Additionally, failing and failed states simply do not go away. 

Ample evidence demonstrates that failing and failed states become 

dysfunctional states, “rogue states,” criminal states, narco-states, 

or new people’s democracies. Moreover, failing and failed states 

tend not to (1) buy U.S. and other Western-made products, (2) be 

interested in developing democratic and free market institutions 

and human rights, or (3) cooperate on shared problems such as 

illegal drugs, illicit arms fl ows, debilitating refugee fl ows, and 

potentially dangerous environmental problems. In short, the longer 

they persist, the more they and their associated problems endanger 

global security, peace, and prosperity.41
20

PART TWO: COMPLETING THE ARGUMENT 

FOR BROADENING THE CONCEPT OF THREAT 

TO NATIONAL SECURITY

This section builds on the concepts and lessons noted above 

and completes the argument for broadening the concept of national 

security. To fi nalize the argument supporting the idea of broadening 

the notion of security, we elaborate on 1) change in the global 

security environment, 2) the primary problems of the contemporary 

security arena, and 3) the resultant transformation of contemporary 

confl ict. 

Change in the Security Environment.

A global revolution has been taking place since the end of the 

Cold War. Global political violence is clashing with global economic 

integration. As in all revolutions, fundamental change is the primary 

defi ning factor. At the same time, old versus new elements of society 

are coming into confl ict with each other, and old versus new shifts of 

wealth and power are confl icting with each other. And, more often 

than not, the causes and consequences of the resultant instabilities 

tend to be exploited by powerful and not-so-powerful destabilizers 

for their own narrow, commercial, and ideological purposes. The 

intent is to impose self-determined desires for “change” on a 

society, nation-state, and/or other perceived symbols of power in 

the global community―and, perhaps, to revert to the questionable 

glories of the 12th century. This new world security environment 

and the confusion and chaos that accompany it are essentially the 

products of a lack of consensus as to how to deal with the current 

situation. Thus, we have the privilege of contemplating a world that 

is more and more unifi ed economically and increasingly divided by 

the pathological claims of opposed ideologies, nationalisms, and 

commercial motivations. We see these problems of change in the 

following six ways.42

First, the one constant in world politics that virtually guarantees 

change is that of global anarchy. As noted above, nothing checks 

the vicissitudes of the modern sovereign nation-state or any other 
21

global political actor except the power of other actors. At the same 

time, the independent traditional or nontraditional political actor 

defi nes what is right and wrong and good and bad in terms of his 

own perceived interests. The resultant security environment cannot 

possibly be predictable or benign.

Second, despite there being one global superpower, the world is 

becoming more and more multipolar and dangerous. In addition to 

the United States and some other well-known international actors, 

several little noticed regional powers are emerging as effective 

players in the global security arena. At the same time, the various 

poles exert different types and levels of effectiveness of power: 

military (e.g., the United States); economic/fi nancial (e.g., Germany, 

Japan, Asian “tigers”); demographic (e.g., India, China, Brazil, 

Mexico); and terrorist/asymmetrical (e.g., al Qaida, drug lords, 

Sendero Luminoso, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, 

and criminal anarchists). Moreover, psychological opinion-making 

power and bond-relationship targeting belong to any state or 

nonstate actor willing and able to gain access to the mass media 

and to engage in cyber or net war. Its effectiveness is limited only 

by the imaginative and quantitative efforts of any given individual 

political actor. As another example, information campaigns using 

the internet have been key to the political-strategic successes of the 

Zapatista insurgency in Mexico.

Third, the problems of governance and the failure of states 

constitute another kind of change in the global milieu. More than half 

the countries of the world have been brought to the point of economic 

and political collapse by corrupt and/or incompetent leadership.43

The gravity of the problem is hard to exaggerate. As examples, 

however, hundreds of thousands of people have voted with their 

proverbial feet and have been emigrating, creating new problems as 

refugees in other countries. Hundreds of thousands have become a 

part of the illicit drug industry. Those millions of people who have 

been unable to leave their countries or otherwise improve their 

lives through involvement in the black or gray economies tend to 

isolate themselves mentally from their governments. Others become 

revolutionaries, or criminal anarchists, or at least tacit supporters 

of those who promise change. In most of the poorly governed and 
22

impoverished countries of the world, not many people remain with 

the necessary skills who are willing to provide their time, treasure, 

and blood to serve the state. The resultant susceptibility to upheaval 

and instability can only benefi t new as well as established enemies.

Nonetheless, we must remember that, as important as instability 

might be in a national or transnational threat environment, it is 

only a symptom―not the threat itself. Rather, the ultimate threat 

is “state failure” and stems from a failure to alleviate the various 

manifestations of political, economic, and social injustices that are 

the root causes of instability. A related threat stems from a failure 

to deal properly with the confl icts that are the consequences of 

instability. Clearly, the central strategic problem is the challenge to 

the government’s moral right to govern. The basis for the challenge 

is the perception that the current regime is not providing or cannot 

provide the necessary stability, development, freedom, and security 

that the peoples of a targeted nation-state want and need. In that 

context, we can argue that a given human destabilizer’s political 

philosophy and system represent relatively better ways and means 

of achieving those goals.

Fifth, the lessons of the Persian Gulf War, the Iraqi War, and the 

hundreds of other confl icts that have taken place since the end of 

World War II are not being lost on the new powers emerging into 

the contemporary multipolar international security arena. Ironically, 

strategies being developed to protect or further the interests of a 

number of traditional and nontraditional political actors are inspired 

by the dual idea of evading and frustrating superior conventional 

military or police force. The better a government has become at 

the operational level of conventional war or law-enforcement, the 

more a potential external or internal state or nonstate opponent 

has turned to the more political-psychological types of confl ict that 

are being called asymmetric or “knowledge-based” warfare. B. H. 

Liddell-Hart saw all this in the early 1960s. Thus, the concepts of 

conventional attrition and maneuver warfare are being superseded 

by that of “camoufl aged war.”44 Normally, the primary aim of such a 

war is to politically and psychologically gain control of a population 

or government, not simply gain some sort of limited concession. 

As a consequence, the stakes in these confl icts are total from the 

standpoint of both the eventual winners and losers.
23

Sixth, the political-psychological issues of contemporary change 

in the global security environment translate into constant subtle and 

not-so-subtle struggles for governmental power that dominate life 

throughout much of the world today. This, in turn, leads to the slow 

but sure destruction of the state, its associated government, and the 

society. And, again, the basic threat devolves to that of state failure.

A Closer Look at the Primary Problems in the Contemporary 

Security Arena.

The lessons from a half-century of bitter experience suffered 

by governments and peoples involved in contemporary confl ict 

show that struggles against all forms of asymmetric warfare often 

fail. This is because these are, at base, essentially strategic-political 

governance problems. The easier, cheaper, and more manageable 

“symptomatic” tactical approach generally leads nowhere, and ends 

in political failure.45

Responsible Governance. In this context, it is important to remember 

four things.46 First, state failure is a process, not an outcome. It is a 

process by which the state loses the capacity and/or the will to 

perform its essential governance and security functions. At the same 

time, it may be a process by which the state never developed those 

capabilities in the fi rst place. 

Second, if we focus only on the capacity to govern, we may lose 

sight of the fact that the state and its institutions may lack effective 

legitimacy. Haiti, North Korea, Taliban Afghanistan, and Saddam 

Hussein’s Iraq illustrate this point. History shows that individuals 

and groups can frequently prop-up the capacity of the state to govern 

through the use of sheer force and “state terrorism.” However, the 

inherent weakness in the lack of governmental legitimacy will likely 

lead to the eventual erosion of its authority, and to a process of state 

failure.

Third, a tendency resulting from the focus on state failure 

has been to concentrate attention on state collapse; that is, the socalled “failed state.” To be effective, however, we must address the 

processes of state failure before they begin and certainly while they 

are underway―not simply when they have already run their courses 

and have achieved crisis proportions. 
24

Fourth, and perhaps most important, responsible governance 

concerns the manner of governing rather than the fact of governing 

or the legal international recognition that a given regime represents 

a sovereign state. Thus, responsible and legitimate governance is 

defi ned as governance that derives its just powers from the consent 

of the governed and generates a viable political competence that can 

and will manage, coordinate, and sustain security; social harmony; 

social, economic, and political development; and stability.47 These are 

the necessary fundamental elements that defi ne the “social contract” 

between a people and their government and give a regime the moral 

right to govern. These are also the very pragmatic foundations for 

national and global well-being and stability. 

The Road to Political Failure. As noted above, the thread that 

permits human destabilizers to develop, grow, and succeed is 

adequate freedom of action over time. These individuals and groups 

attempt to maintain their freedom of action through appropriate 

security systems and measures such as establishing remote base 

areas and sanctuaries, using multiple and secret routes, developing 

supporting underground infrastructure, and prelocating arms and 

food caches. Other measures include infi ltrating government and 

social organizations for intelligence and political purposes and for 

recruiting popular support (whether willing, bribed, or intimidated). 

Simultaneously, an attempt is made to enhance freedom of action and 

security through direct actions that distract and disburse security 

forces and correspondingly weaken the incumbent government. 

These include deliberate acts of terror against key individuals and 

institutions associated with governance, military attacks against 

symbols of central government authority, such as weak police or 

military installations, and the physical destruction of a country’s 

economic infrastructure. 

Peru’s Sendero Luminoso calls activities that facilitate the 

processes of state failure and generate greater freedom of movement 

and action “armed propaganda.” Drug cartels operating in the 

Andean Ridge of South America and elsewhere call these activities 

“business incentives.” Thus, in addition to helping to provide wider 

latitude to further their causes, Sendero’s and other violent nonstate 

actors’ armed propaganda and business incentives are aimed at 
25

lessening a regime’s credibility and capability in terms of its ability 

and willingness to govern and develop its national territory and 

its populace. An example of Sendero’s objectives is instructive.48

At the strategic level, Sendero Luminoso is taking a low military 

profi le, increasing sabotage and terrorism, and waiting for the time 

when its interior bases of support are well enough reconstituted 

to make serious attacks upon the capital city of Lima feasible. The 

intent, now―similar to what it was in the past―is to reestablish its 

infrastructure and refocus its primary attack psychologically on the 

Peruvian government’s right and ability to govern. 

At the operational level, Sendero is currently on the offensive. 

Doctrinally and in dialectical terms, other antithetical activities 

generally considered “defensive” in nature are also pursued in 

the “offensive” at all levels. As examples, Sendero continues to 

develop cadres to man the expanding political, military, and 

support components of the movement; to maintain psychological 

and organizational efforts with the “masses”; and to consolidate 

its position in Peru’s interior and poor districts of the major cities. 

The thesis in Sendero’s offensive strategy at the operational level 

includes―fi rst and foremost―“armed propaganda.” The primary 

purpose of this part of the “armed struggle” is to convince the 

Peruvian people that Sendero Luminoso is and will be the real power 

in the country. 

Tactically, Sendero operates in small units with political, 

psychological, and military objectives―in that order. Examples 

of these activities include assassinations, kidnappings, terrorism, 

destruction of transportation and communications nets, and 

reconstitution of its bases for the reestablishment of control and 

governance within specifi c areas. Sendero will continue to jab and 

probe and enforce its will against carefully selected targets, but there 

will be no direct confrontations with the armed forces on any large 

scale. The strategic-political objective to which tactical operations 

must contribute is to bring into question the ability and moral 

right of an elitist, foreign-dominated, and non-Indian minority 

regime to govern the country. The intent of these activities is to 

lessen regime credibility and to show the country that―even after 

its initial defeat―Sendero is still working to provide the freedom of 
26

revolutionary movement that is necessary to take power―and to 

create a “nationalistic,” “Indian,” “popular,” and “truly Peruvian” 

democracy.49

Experience shows that, if carefully done, the long-term combined 

use of indirect moral-psychological infl uences, organizational development, viable security measures, and direct violence techniques 

can eventually undermine the position and legitimacy of other 

political actors by breaking the bonds uniting a people, its political 

leadership, and its protective security organizations. These 

“persuasive and coercive” political activities cannot be considered 

simple legal and, therefore, solely law enforcement problems. They 

are real and substantive threats to national security and sovereignty, 

and they must be addressed as such.50

The Transformation of Confl ict.

To understand contemporary warfare as it operates within 

the global security environment, it is important to understand the 

transformation of confl ict. In these terms, then, we must examine 

1) the strategic-political types of war, and 2) the difference between 

military victory and strategic victory.

Strategic-Political Types of War. Metz and Millen assert that four 

distinct but interrelated dominant strategic battlespaces exist. They 

are 1) direct interstate war, 2) nonstate war, 3) intrastate war, and 4) 

indirect interstate war. 51 Direct interstate war is the traditional and 

conventional type of war, but is declining in frequency. Nonstate 

war involves criminal and terrorist actors that thrive among 

various host states and use information technology for funding, 

intelligence, internal communication, and command and control, 

and use terrorist and insurgency methods to maintain freedom of 

movement and their own security. The al Qaida terrorist network is 

an example. Institutionalized criminality in West Africa is another. 

Intrastate war involves a confl ict between a state and nonstate 

actors, such as insurgents or separatists, or a confl ict between two or 

more nonstate actors. A classical example of this phenomenon is the 

confl ict between and among the state, FARC, ELN, AUC, and narcotraffi ckers in Colombia. Indirect interstate war entails aggression by 
27

a state through proxies. Serbia’s support of the Bosnian and Krajina 

Serbs is also illustrative. 

Logic would dictate that military transition, to ensure dominance, 

must adopt two parallel tracks: one aimed at direct interstate war 

and the other aimed at nonstate war, indirect interstate war, and 

intrastate war. But, as General Sir Frank Kitson argues, these tracks 

should not be considered as independent forms of warfare. They are 

parts within the concept of total war.52 Moreover, two other points 

are worth serious consideration. First, the various types of warfare do 

not always follow each other in ascending or descending order. They 

often overlap in terms of time and place, so that it is possible to have 

insurgency and conventional war going on at the same time. Second, 

although many countries, including the United Kingdom and the 

United States, prefer to use police or other civil entities rather than 

the military to counter “nonmilitary” or “nonlethal” threats in any 

of the forms of war, that does not mean that these types of threats 

are any less a manifestation of war than direct interstate war. As a 

consequence, it is important to consider and prepare for “warfare as 

a whole.”53

Contemporary confl ict is not a kind of appendage, a lesser 

or limited thing, to the comfortable vision of conventional war. 

Contemporary confl ict is a great deal more. As long as opposition 

exists that is willing to risk everything violently to depose a 

government, destroy a society, or cause great harm to a society―there 

is war. This is a zero-sum game in which there can only be one winner, 

or, perhaps, no winner. It is, thus, total. And, as a consequence, it 

must be considered and implemented as a whole. Today and in the 

future, confrontation between belligerents is transformed from the 

level of military violence to the level of a multidimensional struggle 

for the proverbial “hearts and minds” of a people. Within the 

context of people being the ultimate center of gravity, antagonists 

can strive to achieve the Clausewitzian admonition to “dare to win 

all”―the complete political overthrow of a government or another 

symbol of power―instead of “using superior strength to fi lch some 

province.”54

Military Victory and Strategic Victory. In connection with the idea 

of warfare as a whole, the military role goes beyond traditional war-
28

fi ghting to nontraditional confl ict―and to help consolidate success 

by providing security and support to partners, other government 

agencies, and nongovernmental agencies in the aftermath. In these 

terms, military forces provide the capabilities needed to consolidate 

battlefi eld success and turn it into strategic victory. Thus, strategic 

victory requires not only the defeat of an enemy military force, but 

often occupation and a multiagency effort to change the society, 

culture, economy, and political system that undergirded the 

aggression that brought on the crisis in the fi rst place.55

Moreover, history is replete with instances when military victory 

did not lead to strategic success, and military and civilian leaders 

complained that they had “won” militarily but had “lost” politically―

as if there were no connection. The French experience in Algeria, the 

U.S. experience in Vietnam, and recent coalition experiences in the 

Gulf War and the Iraqi War immediately come to mind. In Vietnam, 

as an example, U.S. civilian and military leaders thought that 

“kicking ass” and destroying the enemy military force “dressed in 

black pajamas” was the goal of policy. A “limited war,” such as that 

in Vietnam, implied that it was a low-effort task unworthy of serious 

concern, and was something to be conducted with complaisance. 

It, thus, became a traditional war of attrition “writ small.”56

Nevertheless, the threat in Vietnam was not a limited or traditional 

one. Rather, below the level of U.S. consciousness, generated by their 

“armed propaganda,” other shows of force, and spectacular actions 

like the Tet Offensive, the “enemy”―dressed in their comical black 

pajamas―were making unconventional persuasive and intimidating 

preparations to take control of the state.57 Colonel Harry G. Summers 

takes this issue to its logical conclusion in the following account of a 

conversation that took place in Hanoi in April 1975, “‘You know you 

never defeated us on the battlefi eld,’ said the American colonel. The 

North Vietnamese colonel pondered this remark a moment. ‘That 

may be so,’ he replied, ‘but it is also irrelevant.’”58

In the contemporary security environment, international 

organizations, such as the UN, NATO, and the OAS, and individual 

national powers are increasingly called on to respond to confl icts 

generated by all kinds of instabilities and destabilizers. Furthermore, 

the international community is increasingly expected to provide the 
29

leverage to ensure that legitimate governance―once regained―is 

given to responsible, incorrupt, and competent leadership that can 

and will address the political, economic, and social root causes that 

created the crisis and intervention.59 Thus, to paraphrase the clear 

logic of Metz and Millen again, the capability to attain strategic 

victory will be even more important in the emerging security 

environment than it was in the past.60

PART THREE: WHAT IS TO BE DONE?

If there is one theme that stands out in this monograph, it is that 

understanding and dealing with the problems of effective security, 

stability, and sovereignty in the current global security environment 

requires a wide-ranging understanding and application of the 

strategic-political levels of threats and analysis that cumulatively 

lead either to state success or failure. By coming to grips analytically 

and practically with the salient realities that dominate contemporary 

nonconventional confl ict, Western Hemisphere political and 

military leaders should be able to maximize global opportunities 

and establish an effective collective security regime for the region.

All the countries of the hemisphere have vested national security 

interests in helping to reverse the current instability, insecurity, and 

ineffective sovereignty, and replace them with positive security, 

moderation, cooperation, stability, well-being, and effective 

sovereignty. Nevertheless, there is no agreement on the threat―and 

no agreement on a strategic-political ends, ways, and means policy 

and strategy to achieve the common hemispheric security-stability 

interests. As it stands now, the United States and its hemispheric 

partners are working together, separately, to achieve some level of 

national and regional security in the Americas. The result is neither 

evolution nor devolution toward or away from that objective. There 

is an impasse.

The Bottom Line.

The bottom line is that a unifying and realistic common agenda 

for Western Hemisphere security is needed. But, before the United 

States unilaterally initiates “building blocks” based on the Rio 
30

Treaty to implement a “common agenda,” before proposals for 

standing military and naval forces for the hemisphere are initiated 

by such countries as Argentina and Chile,61 and before the OAS is 

embarrassed into producing some sort of ad hoc security architecture 

to confront the current and future security environment; a few 

fundamental problems and reforms must be addressed.

The Basics. Hemispheric governments, their U.S. ally, and the 

supporting international community must do three things to begin 

to accomplish the fundamental task of regaining control of national 

territory and ensuring the cycle of meaningful security to effective 

sovereignty. First, together, they must help individual nation-states 

to strengthen and legitimize themselves. This means promulgating 

fundamental political, economic, and social reforms―and 

resolving the civil-military relations issue. Second, they must help 

professionalize and modernize national security forces and judicial 

systems to the point where they can enforce―under strong legitimate 

civilian control―the rule of law fairly and effectively. Third, strong 

legitimate hemispheric governments must professionalize and 

modernize their security institutions to a level where they have the 

capability to neutralize and/or destroy all illegal perpetrators of 

violence and instability―regardless of label. 

Solutions to these problems require the highest level of strategicpolitical thought, and exceptional civil-military and militarymilitary diplomacy, cooperation, and coordination. Solutions to 

these problems take the United States beyond unilateral training 

and equipping units for conducting tactical-operational level 

counternarcotics and counterterrorist operations to multilateral 

strategic-political approaches to broader professional military 

education (PME) and leader development, and organization for 

unity of effort.

As stated explicitly and implicitly throughout this monograph, 

these concepts must also go beyond the traditional-legal defi nition 

of national security and overcome its external orientation and 

conventional military bias. Yet, they must remain fi rmly rooted in 

the realistic political-military-strategic realm while being sensitive 

to political, economic, psychological, and social variables that have 

an impact on security and sovereignty. Importantly, these concepts 
31

can provide a point of departure from which allies and friends might 

advance the understanding―and implementation―of an appropriate 

common security agenda. The recommended basic direction for 

such efforts is beyond the scope of this monograph, but the sooner it 

is elaborated, the better.

The Most Fundamental Requirement. The realities of the global 

security environment and the fundamental tasks of reform and 

regeneration call for nothing less than a paradigm change. The 

primary challenge, then, is to come to terms with the fact that 

contemporary security, at whatever level, is at its base a holistic and 

long-term, strategic-political level, civil-military effort to preserve 

individual and collective security and stability. The corollary is to 

change from a singular tactical-operational level military or law 

enforcement approach to a multidimensional, multiorganizational, 

multinational strategic-political paradigm that addresses the 

legitimate and meaningful preservation of the state. That, in turn, 

requires a conceptual framework, and an organizational structure to 

promulgate unifi ed civil-military planning and implementation of 

the multidimensional concept. 

Conclusion.

Implementing the conceptual change and regeneration 

implied in this call for a paradigm shift will not be easy. That will, 

nevertheless, be far less demanding and costly in political, military, 

monetary, and ethical terms than to continue a traditional, generally 

military, tactical-operational level crisis management approach to 

contemporary global security. And, importantly, the alternative 

cannot be acceptable. This is not simple idealism. It is a marriage of 

(North) American pragmatism and realpolitik that provides a viable 

foundation for national, regional, and global stability and wellbeing.

PART FOUR: AFTERWORD

In light of the dynamics of the new world security environment, 

there is ample reason for worldwide concern. The traditional-legal 

level of analysis focuses on the short-term, tactical-operational, 
32

micro-level issues that have proved insuffi cient to deal with the 

complex political-psychological problems of globalism. Experience 

indicates that instability and the people who create and/or exploit it 

are tactical-operational threats in their own rights. But, the ultimate 

political-strategic threat to more general hemispheric and global 

security and sovereignty is state failure. 

As a consequence, a broadened concept of threat to national 

security and sovereignty is meaningful and important. This is 

particularly important for those governments in the Western 

Hemisphere―and elsewhere―that to not discern any serious security 

issues, or proverbial clouds, on their traditionally-defi ned peaceful 

horizons. Ample evidence, again, indicates that nontraditional 

security problems can take nation-states to a process that ends in 

failing or failed state status. That is to say, as examples, dysfunctional 

states, criminal states, narco-states, rogue states, and new “Peoples’ 

Democracies.” Moreover, it is important to note that failing and failed 

states tend not to 1) buy U.S. and other Western-made products, 2) 

be interested in developing democratic and free market institutions 

and human rights, and 3) cooperate on shared problems such as 

illegal drugs, illicit arms fl ows and weapons of mass destruction, 

debilitating refugee fl ows, and potentially dangerous environmental 

problems (e.g., confl ict over water scarcity). In short, failing and 

failed states tend to linger, and go from bad to worse. The longer 

they persist, the more they and their “spillover” problems endanger 

regional and global peace and security.

This situation is extremely volatile and dangerous, and requires 

careful attention. In these terms, the United States, the rest of the 

hemisphere, and the rest of the global community must understand 

and cope with the threat imposed by diverse actors engaged in 

destabilizing and devastating violence that is more and more 

often being called “terrorism.” If the United States continues to 

concentrate its efforts and resources elsewhere and ignores what is 

happening in Latin America and the Caribbean―and that is likely 

to happen without the implementation of the strategic reforms 

recommended in this monograph―the expansion of terrorism, the 

expansion of “lawless areas,” the expansion of general instability, 

and the compromise of effective national sovereignty could easily 
33

destroy the democracy, free market economies, and prosperity that 

have been achieved in recent years. In turn, that would profoundly 

affect the health of the U.S. economy―and the concomitant power to 

act in the global security arena. 

ENDNOTES

1. Consensus statement from the Conference on “Building Regional Security 

Cooperation in the Western Hemisphere,” co-sponsored by the North-South 

Center of the University of Miami and the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. 

Army War College, in Miami, FL, March 1-2, 2003.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid. Also see Organization of American States, Draft Declaration on Security 

in the Americas, approved by the Permanent Council, October 22, 2003.

5. Ibid.

6. As an example of this discussion, see Amos A. Jordan, William J. Taylor, 

Jr., and Michael J. Mazarr, American National Security, 5th ed., Baltimore, MD: 

The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999, pp. 3-46; and Sam C. Sarkesian, U.S. 

National Security: Policymakers, Processes, and Politics, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner 

Publishers, 1989, pp. 7-8. Also, these terms are developed in Lars Schoultz, National 

Security and United States Policy toward Latin America, Princeton, NJ: Princeton 

University Press, 1987, pp. 24-25, 143-330; and Frank N. Trager and Philip S. 

Kronenberg, eds., National Security and American Society, Lawrence: University 

Press of Kansas, 1973, p. 47.

7. Daniel C. Esty, et. al., “The State Failure Project: Early Warning Research 

for U.S. Foreign Policy Planning,” in John L. Davies and Ted Robert Gurr, eds., 

Preventive Measures: Building Risk Assessment and Crisis Early Warning Systems, 

New York: Rowman & Littlefi eld, 1998.

8. To be fair, it must be noted that some scholars and journalists are beginning 

to understand this problem and are writing in these terms. See, as three examples, 

Anthony T. Bryan, Transnational Organized Crime: The Caribbean Context, Miami: 

The Dante B. Fascell North-South Center Press, University of Miami, 2002; 

Ivelaw Lloyd Griffi th, Drugs and Security in the Caribbean: Sovereignty Under 

Siege, University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997; and “El 

delito como una amenaza geopolítica,” in Clarin.com, 3 de Julio de 2003. Related 

International Relations theory may be found in Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear, 
34

2nd ed., Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1991; Keith Krause and Michael 

C. Williams, eds., Critical Security Studies, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 

Press, 1997; and Mohammed Ayoob, “Defi ning Security: A Subaltern Realist 

Perspective,” in Krause and Williams, pp. 121-146. 

9. While it does not show many of the problems that Kaplan points up, one 

published map does emphasize this particular point. See “World Confl ict and 

Human Rights Map 2001/2002”; Kaplan, “The Coming Anarchy.”

10. Jordan, Taylor, and Mazarr, p. 3; Trager and Kronenberg; Schoultz, 

pp. 143-330.

11. Ibid.

12. Ibid.

13. General Michael P. C. Carns, “Reopening the Deterrence Debate: Thinking 

about a Peaceful and Prosperous Tomorrow,” in Deterrence in the 21st Century, 

Max G. Manwaring, ed., London: Frank Cass, 2001, p. 8.

14. Organization of American States, Inter-American Convention Against 

Terrorism, AG/RES. 1840, adopted at the second plenary session held on June 3, 

2002.

15. Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2000, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of 

State, April 2001.

16. These assertions are derived from statistical tests based on interviews with 

several hundred civilian and military offi cials and scholars with direct experience 

in approximately 100 internal confl icts. The effort originally was mandated by 

Vice Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army General Maxwell Thurman during 1984-1986. 

It was subsequently taken up by others and continues to be updated. The resultant 

statistical model predicts at an impressive 88.37 percent of the cases examined and 

is statistically signifi cant at the .001 level. The model, originally called SSI 1 and 

SSI 2, has also been called the SWORD model. The SWORD papers, although long 

out of print, are archived in their entirety by a private research organization, the 

National Security Archives, in Washington, DC Hereafter cited as Interviews.

17. A classic book on relatively recent Colombian violence is Vernon Lee 

Fluherty, Dance of the Millions: Military Rule and the Social Revolution in Colombia, 

1930-1956, Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1957. Also see Dennis 

M. Hanratty and Sandra W. Meditz, eds., Colombia: A Country Study, Washington, 

DC: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 1990; Luis Alberto Restrepo, 

“The Crisis of the Current Political Regime and Its Possible Outcomes,” in Violence 

in Colombia: The Contemporary Crisis in Historical Perspective, Charles Bergquist, 
35

Ricardo Penaranda, and Gonzalo Sanchez, eds., Wilmington, DE: SR Books, 1992, 

pp. 273-292; Angel Rabassa and Peter Chalk, Colombian Labyrinth, Santa Monica, 

CA: Rand, 2001, pp. 39-60; Eduardo Pizarro, “Revolutionary Guerrilla Groups 

in Colombia,” in Bergquist, Penaranda, and Sanchez, eds., pp. 169-193; and Hal 

Klepak, “Colombia: Why Doesn’t the War End?” Jane’s Intelligence Review, June 

2000, pp. 41-45. 

18. This term was coined by Joseph R. Nuñez in Fighting the Hobbesian Trinity 

in Colombia: A New Strategy for Peace, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies 

Institute, 2001.

19. Interviews conducted with Colombian civilian and military offi cials, 2000-

2003. 

20. Michael Shifter, Toward Greater Peace and Security in Colombia, New York: 

Council on Foreign Relations and the Inter-American Dialogue, 2000, pp. viii, 1-2, 

18.

21. Interviews.

22. Ibid.

23. Ibid. Also see Angel Rabassa and Peter Chalk, Colombian Labyrinth, Santa 

Monica, CA: Rand, 2001, pp. 39-60; and David Spencer, Colombia’s Paramilitaries: 

Criminals or Political Force? Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2001.

24. Interviews. Also see Dennis M. Rempe, The Past as Prologue: A History 

of U.S. Counter-Insurgency Policy in Colombia, 1958-66, Carlisle Bks, PA: Strategic 

Studies Institute, 2002.

25. Interviews. Also see Max Manwaring, “U.S. Too Narrowly Focused on 

Drug War in Colombia,” The Miami Herald, August 15, 2001. 

26. Ibid.

27. Ibid. Also see Colin S. Gray, Modern Strategy, Oxford: Oxford University 

Press, 1999, pp. 1-15.

28. This and the following statements regarding the Central American case 

come from Ana Arana, “The New Battle for Central America,” Foreign Affairs, 

November/December 2001, pp. 88-101.

29. Ibid.

30. Ibid.
36

31. Sun Tzu, The Art of War The Art of War, Samuel B. Griffi th, trans., Oxford, UK: Oxford , Samuel B. Griffith, trans., Oxford, UK: Oxford 

University Press, 1971, p. 73.

32. Interviews.

33. These assertions are derived from Interviews.

34. Sun Tzu, p. 88.

35. Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, and James Madison, The Federalist Papers,

New York: Mentor, 1961.

36. Ibid.

37. John Locke, Of Civil Government, Second Treatise Of Civil Government, New 

York: Gateway, n.d., p. 159.

38. Daniel C. Esty, et. al., pp. 27-38. Also see Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, 

Environment, Scarcity, and Violence, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999, 

pp. 138-168. 

39. Ibid.

40. Robert H. Dorff, “Strategy, Grand Strategy, and the Search for Strategy,” 

in Max G. Manwaring, Edwin G. Corr, and Robert H. Dorff, The Search for Security: 

A U.S. Grand Strategy for the Twenty-First Century, Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003, pp. 

127-140. 

41. Ibid.

42. The following assertions stem from Interviews.

43. After Kaplan, Jessica T. Mathews was one of the fi rst to acknowledge this 

problem. Ana Arana is one of the most recent. See Jessica T. Mathews, “Power 

Shift,” Foreign Affairs, January/February 1997, pp. 50-66; and Ana Arana.

44. B. H. Liddell-Hart, Strategy, 2nd rev. ed., New York: Signet, 1974, p. 367.

45. Esty; and Interviews. 

46. These assertions are derived from Dorff.

47. Ibid.; and Interviews.
37

48. See Abimael Guzmán, “El Discurso del Dr. Guzmán,” in Los partidos 

políticos en el Perú, ed., Rogger Mercado U., Lima, Perú: Ediciones Latinoamericanos, 

1985, pp. 85-90; Comité Central del Partido Comunista del Perú, Desarrollar la 

Guerra popular sirviendo a la revolución mundial, Lima: Comité Central del Partido 

Comunista del Perú, 1986, pp. 82-88; Comité Central del Partido Comunista del 

Perú, Bases de discusión, Lima: Comité Central del Partido Comunista del Perú, 

1987; “El documento ofi cial de Sendero,” in Mercado,; Interview with Chairman 

Gonzolo, San Francisco, CA: Red Banner Editorial House, 1988; Simon Strong, 

Shining Path: Terror and Revolution in Peru, New York: Random House, 1992, pp. 

225-231; and Simon Strong, Shining Path: A Case Study in Ideological Terrorism, No. 

260, London: Research Institute for the Study of Confl ict and Terrorism, April 

1993, pp. 1-2; 23-26. Also see Interviews.

49. Ibid.

50. Interviews.

51. Steven Metz and Raymond Millen, Future War/Future Battlespace: The Strategic 

Role of American Landpower Role of American Landpower, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2003, , Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2003, 

pp. ix, 15-17. 

52. Frank Kitson, Warfare as a Whole, London: Faber and Faber, 1987.

53. Ibid.

54. Clausewitz, p. 596.

55. Metz and Millin, pp. x, 22-23.

56. Interviews. Also see as one example, Eric M. Bergerud, The Dynamics 

of Defeat: The Vietnam War in Hau Nghia Province, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 

1991. 

57. Ibid., and General Vo Nguyen Giap, Peoples’ War, Peoples’ Army, New 

York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962, pp. 34-36; Jeffrey Race, War Comes to Long An: 

Revolutionary Confl ict in a Vietnamese Province, Berkeley: University of California 

Press, 1972; Robert W. Komer, Bureaucracy Does Its Thing: Institutional Constraints 

on US-GVN Performance in Vietnam, Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1972. 

Also see Interviews. 

58. Colonel Harry G. Summers, Jr., On Strategy: The Vietnam War in Context, 

Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1983, 

p. 1.
38

59. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, “Global Leadership After the Cold War,” Foreign 

Affairs, March/April 1996, pp. 86-98; and Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for 

Peace, New York: United Nations, 1992, pp. 11, 32-34.

60. Metz and Millen.

61. This is based on a statement by U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald H. 

Rumsfeld, at the Defense Ministerial of the Americas, Santiago, Chile, November 

19, 2002, reported by the U.S. Department of State’s Offi ce of International 

Informational Programs.