CHINA'S STRATEGIC VIEW:

THE ROLE OF THE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY

June Teufel Dreyer

April 25, 1996
ii

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The views expressed in this monograph are those of the

author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or

position of the Department of the Army, the Department of

Defense, or the U.S. Government. This monograph is cleared for

public release; distribution is unlimited.

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Comments pertaining to this monograph are invited and should

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This monograph was originally presented at the U.S. Army War

College Seventh Annual Strategy Conference held April 23-25,

1996, with the assistance of the Office of Net Assessment. The

Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to publish the paper as

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iii

FOREWORD

In April 1996, the Army War College's Strategic Studies

Institute held its Seventh Annual Strategy Conference. This

year's theme was, "China into the 21st Century: Strategic Partner

and . . . or Peer Competitor."

Dr. June Tuefel Dreyer, Professor of Political Science at

the University of Miami, on a panel examining "China's Strategic

View," argued that the armed forces of China, although large,

simply are not capable today of militarily endorsing the kind of

truculent actions recently undertaken in the Taiwan Straits. The

qualitative advantage possessed by the sum total of Asian nations

with interests at stake, not to mention those of the United

States, exceeds that of the People's Liberation Army. Professor

Dreyer provides a good overview of the current and projected

strengths of the PLA's land, sea and air forces.

Pressure is growing throughout the Pacific and around the

world for China to attenuate hard line positions of the past. Dr.

Dreyer argues that the PRC's actions may be eliciting equal and

opposite reactions from states that feel their interests are

being threatened. On the other hand, domestic pressures may make

it difficult for the Chinese leadership to back away from some of

the positions they have taken.

The course China pursues into the 21st century will directly

bear on the strategic interests of the United States in a

significant way--and vice-versa. For this reason, the Strategic

Studies Institute offers Dr. Dreyer's views for your

consideration.

RICHARD H. WITHERSPOON

olonel, U.S. Army

Director, Strategic Studies Institute
iv

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

JUNE TEUFEL DREYER is Professor of Political Science at the

University of Miami. She received her Ph.D. from Harvard and the

second edition of her latest book, China's Political System:

Modernization and Tradition, was recently published by Allyn and

Bacon. Dr. Dreyer is a frequent commentator on Chinese military

affairs.
1

CHINA'S STRATEGIC VIEW:

THE ROLE OF THE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY

China's Strategic View.

Although the militant rhetoric of past decades has abated,

the leadership of the People's Republic of China (PRC) is

profoundly dissatisfied with the international status quo. The

dissolution of the Soviet Union weakened China's ability to wrest

concessions from the United States by threatening to move closer

to the USSR, and from the USSR by threatening to support the

United States. While some leverage can, and is, gained by

negotiating with the major successor state to the Soviet Union,

this leverage is more limited than in the past. The Russian

Republic is significantly weaker than the USSR, and finds aid and

investment from capitalist states such as the United States

useful to its rebuilding efforts. It is unlikely to jeopardize

this aid by becoming too closely associated with Chinese

positions that these countries oppose.

Other indications are that the Chinese leadership's goal is

to replace the United States as the hegemonic power in the Asian

region. It sees the PRC as an ascendant power while America,

which has withdrawn from bases in the Philippines, downsized its

military personnel, slashed its defense procurement programs, and

consigned its navy to a littoral role, is seen as declining.

Should China assume the role of hegemon, there are likely to be

territorial readjustments in the region. The PRC contests

ownership of several different islands and island chains with no

less than six other countries, and there are concerns within

India that the close relationship that has developed between

China and the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) in

Burma may have a Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean as one of

its goals. Though Sino-Indian relations have been quite good in

recent years, there are unresolved issues between the two

countries, and China's victory over India in a 1962 border war

is a painful memory for many Indians.

The PLA and the Formulation of Chinese Strategy.

The Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) plays a dual role

in the country's strategic view: it participates in the

formulation of strategy at the same time as it is charged with

implementing that strategy. The apparent active involvement of

higher echelons of the PLA in formulating national policy sets

the Chinese military apart from the Western ideal in which

politicians decide upon policy and the military implements it.

Several caveats are in order here. Mao Zedong formulated a

principle that is not very different from the Western ideal of

the separation of army and politics: "the party must always
2

control the gun; the gun must never control the party." And

Clausewitz, though saying that "there can be no question of a

purely military evaluation of a great strategic issue, nor of a

purely military scheme to solve it," also cautioned that

political leaders should be careful not to ask the impossible of

the military, and advised them to consult with senior commanders

in planning and conducting military operations.1 Finally,

virtually all the recent information indicating that the PLA is

exerting pressure for a harder line internationally comes from

the Hong Kong press and cannot be confirmed through mainland

sources. Hence, the dichotomy between the role of the military in

the PRC and that in the West may be overdrawn.

Analysts of recent Chinese foreign policy portray it as a

struggle between soft liners and hard liners. Those who espouse a

soft line believe that the PRC's best interests are served by

negotiating settlements to China's territorial disputes with

other nations and engaging foreign powers in dialogue on

contentious issues such as trade disputes and intellectual

property rights. Hard liners assume a more defiant posture. The

doctrine of absolute sovereignty, the unilateral right of the PRC

to annex territory it considers part of the sacred territory of

China, and a skeptical attitude toward the claims of other

countries characterize their stance. According to the Hong Kong

press, the PLA is definitely in the hard line group.

There is no conclusive evidence that this is the case. Much

of the characterization of the PLA as urging a more militant

international stance cites rumors.2 There is no confirmation more

convincing than noting that a high-ranking PLA officer, usually

the vice-chair of the party's Central Military Commission (CMC)

Liu Huaqing, is present when militant policy pronouncements are

given. It is, however, equally possible that the leadership would

want to have a high-ranking military figure on hand simply to

symbolize the country's determination to back up its strong

statements. The fact that the officer is physically present does

not necessarily mean that he had any part in formulating the

policies being announced.

When interviewed last year, Western military attaches who

have served in China tended to reject the idea of a PLA 

corporate view on international relations that it is urging on

the civilian leadership. One Western officer stated that he had

tried to confirm the existence of the numerous joint letters that

the Hong Kong press has reported that military leaders send

urging the leadership to take a stronger stand on some issue, and

has been able to do so with only one of the missives: that

circulated just before the attack on demonstrators in 1989. It

should be noted that this letter concerned a domestic matter

rather than an international one, and also that it urged a soft

line rather than a hard line: the generals opposed the use of
3

force against the demonstrators. Moreover, as one Western

intelligence operative points out, there is no need for PLA

leaders to write letters to the leadership: they have input into

the policy process at a variety of levels, and can make their

views known long before decisions are made. And, at the very

highest level, Liu Huaqing, the senior member of the Central

Military Commission, is a member of the Standing Committee of the

party Politburo. Recently, Western analysts seem more willing to

credit reports that at least certain elements of the military

have been in the forefront of the PRC's more aggressive policies.

Two other points should be noted with regard to the PLA's

views on China's strategic posture: first, the top echelons of

the officer corps do not necessarily share a common point of

view. And, second, the advice they give is not necessarily

militaristic. With regard to the first point, factionalism has

been an ongoing characteristic of the PLA's high command. While

the presence of differences of opinion within any sizeable

organization is hardly surprising, the communist leadership has

adamantly opposed such differences, and frequently warns that any

deviations from its model of a unified force marching forward

under the party line will simply not be tolerated. Since the

official press mentions factionalism within the military from

time to time, it must be assumed that such factionalism continues

to exist. The last public manifestation thereof occurred from

late 1992 through early 1993. Generals Yang Shangkun and Yang

Baibing and at least several hundred officers associated with

them were removed from power, reportedly for trying to make plans

for the post-Deng Xiaoping era. The purgees were accused of

trying to place their supporters in positions of power, and of

discussing how to prevent the outbreak of civil disorder after

the death of Deng. Their concerns were therefore centered on

personal power and internal problems rather than international

security matters.

The weakening of the Yangs cannot be assumed to have ended

factionalism in the high command: as one Western intelligence

analyst commented at the time, opposition to the Yang clique had

been the one issue uniting the other members of the CMC. Recent

attention has focussed on an alleged "Shandong clique" and its

control of the military. Here there is supportive indirect

evidence. Of the 175 top-ranking PLA officers listed in the

latest (1994) edition of the Beijing-published reference work

Who's Who in China: Current Leaders, 46, or 26.3 percent are

from Shandong, a province with only 7.2 percent of the PRC's

population.3 Shandong natives also comprise one-third of the

Central Military Commission's nine members; the commander and

commissar of the navy were born in Shandong, as were four of the

fourteen (29 percent) commanders and commissars of the PRC's

seven military regions.4 In describing preparations for the

February- March PLA exercises in the southeastern province of
4

Fujian, the pro-communist newspaper Wen Wei Po noted that "large

amounts of Shandong cabbage, which southerners do not like to

eat, appeared in the market."5 Wen Wei Po made no attempt at

interpreting this datum, apparently because it assumed that its

readers would understand that where there is a heavy military

presence, there will be many natives of Shandong. Observers are

agreed that this Shandong clique is a personalistic network

rather than one which espouses a policy point of view. This does

not necessarily mean that high-ranking officials are comfortable

with its continued existence: an article in another Hong Kong

paper in February 1996 interpreted several recent personnel

changes in the PLA as part of Jiang Zemin's effort to weaken the

Shandong group's power by promoting people from his native

province of Jiangsu.6

It is also entirely likely, though more difficult to verify,

that differences of opinion exist within the military leadership

on policy toward Taiwan and with regard to specific issues

confronting the deployment of the PLA garrison in Hong Kong, as

well as broader strategic issues involving the major powers of

the world. The December 1995 issue of a Beijing-published

magazine on militia work contained a major article emphasizing

the need for members of the people's armed forces to "willingly

subordinate themselves to the overall situation whenever local

interests clash with overall ones," and to do whatever the party

orders.7 At the same time, a Hong Kong publication, citing

mainland sources, reported that Fujian leaders were complaining

that the PLA's frequent military exercises in their area were

hurting the local economy.8

With regard to the second point, there is no conclusive

evidence to support the assumption that what advice the PLA gives

favors an assertive strategic stance. Most officers are

patriotic: they are proud of their country, want it to be

internationally respected, and support the territorial claims

made by China's civilian leadership. However, they are also

acutely aware--perhaps more so than most civilian leaders--of the

PLA's military deficiencies. The authors of the controversial Can

China Win the Next War,9

 published in mid-1993, consider the

equipment and manpower available to the country in a variety of

scenarios, and are not optimistic that they will be victorious in

most of them. There is an entire section entitled "The Next War

Will Not Be So Easy"; the document is studded with statements

such as " . . . the problem of the return of Taiwan is better

resolved by peaceful means than by armed force"10 and "holding on

to the Nansha Islands is a big question mark."11 There are some

problems with the document,12 and the authors are unabashed

advocates of a specific vested interest: the PLA navy's need for

an aircraft carrier. But it is important to note that the message

being delivered is conservative: the authors' message is that it

would not be a good idea for the PRC to become involved in a
5

confrontation unless or until existing military deficiencies are

rectified.

A Western intelligence source conjectures that in recent

months high-ranking Chinese naval and air force officers may have

been more supportive of a militant stance in the Spratly Islands

and Taiwan. They, rather than the PRC's ground forces, have

received the benefits of increases in the defense budget, and

hence are apt to be eager to test their new capabilities. He

believes that CMC vice-chair Liu Huaqing, a former PLA navy

commander, plays an active role in this scenario.

The PLA's Ability to Support Chinese Strategy.

The PLA has not been regarded as a potent fighting force.

Its four million men were poorly trained; weapons technology was

10-20 years behind the state of the art; and logistics support

was woefully inadequate. Although this force could have been

expected to fight valiantly on the exceedingly unlikely

circumstance that an outside power should choose to invade the

PRC, the PLA had very limited ability to project power beyond the

mainland's borders. Its performance against Vietnam in February

1979 was abysmal, thus giving impetus to those officers and

civilian leaders who had argued for years that the PLA could not

make a strong showing in combat.13 Under Deng Xiaoping, who served

for many years as head of the PLA's General Staff Department and

later headed the party's CMC, ameliorative measures were

introduced.

Over the course of 10 years, a demobilization removed more

than one million soldiers from the PLA. Its current strength is

estimated at just under three million; further reductions are

likely. Educational requirements were instituted for officers.

Military academies increasingly focussed on military training and

academic subjects, while decreasing the attention given to

political and ideological courses. The military rank system,

which had been abolished in 1964 in a move toward radical

egalitarianism that foreshadowed the Cultural Revolution, was

reinstated. A large number of elderly officers were induced to

retire. In order to perpetuate this rejuvenation of the officer

corps, a military service law instituted an "up or out" system,

with mandatory retirement for senior officers at age 65.

Doctrine shifted away from the expectation of a massive

apocalyptic war involving the superpowers and concentrated on

preparing for local and regional conflicts. Command, control,

communications and intelligence improved. Training exercises were

conducted more frequently and in a more sophisticated fashion.

Efforts were made to coordinate air, sea, and land forces. The

exercises were conducted under more varied conditions, from the
6

dry mountainous north to the jungles of the southwest. And their

outcome was no longer predetermined: whereas the red team had had

to triumph before, the blue team was now allowed to win if its

performance was superior. Naval vessels began to venture further

from coastal waters, prompting observers to note that the PLAN

was moving toward a modest blue-water capability. The country's

nuclear program continued to progress. The International

Institute for Strategic Studies estimates that the PRC has 17

intercontinental ballistic missiles and more than 70

intermediate-range ballistic missiles. Its one nuclear- powered

Xia-class submarine is equipped with 12 warheads.14 China's recent

nuclear testing program shows a developing capability for

miniaturization.

The modernization of non-nuclear weapons proceeded more

slowly. There was indecision about what and how much to import

from which foreign countries, with a vocal faction opposing

imports and advocating self-reliance and indigenous development.

Foreign procurement projects were bedeviled by additional

problems. There were lengthy negotiations on price and method of

payment. For example, while China preferred to settle accounts

with Russia through barter, Russia preferred hard currency.15 The

PRC terminated discussions on the procurement of the Su-30, a

two-seat, long-duration derivative of the Su-27 after Russia

insisted that the barter payment be lowered to 50 percent instead

of 75 percent.16 Cost overruns and political problems with

supplier countries caused delays and a few cancellations. Both

factors were involved in China's 1990 decision to terminate its

Peace Pearl project for upgrading its F-8 fighter plane. With an

arms embargo imposed by the United States after the bloody

suppression of demonstrations in Beijing in 1989, Russia and

Israel have emerged as the PRC's major foreign suppliers of arms

and technology.

Air Force. Russia has sold 72 Su-27s to China in three

separate deals over the past 4 years. Whereas the first 24 were

basic models, later shipments are rumored to include improved

variants with both attack and multi-role capability. Aviation

experts describe the Su-27 as among the most modern, capable

fighter planes in the world. It has a state-of-the-art weapon

system and can utilize a wide variety of air-to-air and air-toground ordnance.17 A second plane being developed is the FC-1

lightweight fighter based on the design for the MiG-33 rejected

by the Soviet Air Force. Israel and several European countries

are being considered as suppliers for the plane's avionics.18 A

third fighter plane, the J-10 (F-10), multi-role fighter is based

on technology developed for the U.S.-financed Lavi fighter

program, which was cancelled in 1987. It is unclear what specific

technologies and systems Israel has provided. Some experts

believe that the Israeli contribution will focus on avionics and

radar, with Russia supplying the engines.19
7

There is a tendency to overstate what this means for combat

capability. While a reporter for Jane's Defence Weekly trumpeted

that "China's double-digit economic growth is funding three major

combat aircraft development programmes at a time when the whole

of Europe can barely afford two,"20 other sources portray a far

different situation. A former Air Force attache in Beijing points

out that production of one of the three planes, the FC-1 is a

joint project with Pakistan with the plane designed for export.

He does not believe that China will be able to afford to procure

both J-10s and Soviet planes, and sees the J-10 as the more

probable choice since it is more acceptable to the faction that

favors indigenous development and production of weapons. However,

he cautions, it may be a long time before the J-10 is

operational. China's A-2 attack plane was not deployed until 8

years after its initial test flight, and there is no reason to

think that the J-10 will enter service any faster. Problems have

occurred which hamper production and, in this expert's view, the

plane is unlikely to be deployed before 2004.

Despite Western journalists' description of sales of Soviet

weapons to China as "a fire sale," the Su-27 purchase was no

bargain: at a cost of $1 billion for 26 planes, this works out to

nearly $40 million per plane, the fact that 35 percent of the

cost was in barter notwithstanding. Disagreements over price

meant that the second batch of planes was sitting out in harsh

Russian weather for more than 2 years, suffering significant

deterioration. Metal fatigue has been a problem. The final batch

will have suffered even more. Chinese maintenance procedures are

poor: of 24 Sikorsky helicopters purchased from the United States

12 years ago, only 3 or 4 are still in service. PLA air force

(PLAAF) pilots train only about 80 hours a year on the average.

They almost never practice over water--surely a major deficiency

in preparing for the type of missions they are likely to have in

a confrontation involving disputed islands. The PRC's pilots are,

moreover, reluctant to push an aircraft to the edge of its

capabilities. The former attache predicts that after the first

Su-27 crashes, pilots will be still more reluctant to push the

envelope. While Russian trainers complain about Chinese pilots,

the Chinese note that the planes arrived without training

manuals. They are also causing damage to Chinese runways, which

were constructed for lighter planes than the Su-27.21

Taiwan sources independently confirm these points, with one

officer describing the planes as having "a very low operational

readiness capability due to poor logistics and maintenance. The

number of takeoffs and flights is not frequent." He was skeptical

that the licensing agreement allowing the PRC to produce Su-27s

would result in mass production of the plane, predicting that the

mainlanders would encounter real difficulties in providing the

necessary logistical support and maintenance to ensure an
8

acceptable operational readiness capability for the final

product.22 And a former New York Times correspondent reported

that, even after lengthy training in Russia, the Chinese pilots

designated to take over the Su-27s were so unskilled that Russian

pilots had to deliver the planes to Chinese bases.23 Yet another

observer of the Chinese military, noting the difficulties that

PRC pilots were having with Su-27s, predicted that the planes

would "leak into the PLAAF's inventory rather than pour in."24

Navy. Naval capabilities have been upgraded with more

success. Until about 15 years ago, PLAN lacked surface-to-air

missile (SAM) protection for its ships, which were equipped

solely with guns and had no surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs).

It had very little anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capability.

Western analysts doubted that the Chinese navy would be

effective, even against smaller navies, once its ships left the

mainland's coast. This has changed significantly: PLAN is now

better able to defend itself, even in the absence of air cover,

in contested waters such as the South China Sea.25 By the early

1990s, PLAN had a line-of-sight air defense capability out to 13

kilometers and up to 8,000 meters in altitude. Its missiles are

judged effective against aircraft as well as sea skimming

surface-to-surface or air-to-surface anti-ship missiles. The PL-8

missile, believed to have been derived from the Israeli Python,

is infrared guided, can detect a target from any angle, and can

be mounted on a ship along with anti-aircraft guns. More

sophisticated radars reach to the horizon and allow the

identification of targets for anti-ship SSMs. Electronic

countermeasures have also improved.

China's destroyers have been equipped with both SAM and SSM

systems. Anti-submarine warfare has improved to what one Western

analyst describes as good to fair depending on the size, nature,

and location of conflict. Given a concentrated effort of ASW

resources in a limited and shallow zone such as the East China

Sea, he believes that the PLAN could perform credibly. Dauphin

helicopters, produced under license with France, have enhanced

the PLAN's ASW capability. Since the best submarine killer is

probably another submarine, China's purchase of Kilo-class diesel

electric boats from Russia represents a significant addition to

the PRC's ASW capabilities. Two of these have already been

delivered;26 two more are expected in the near future. The latter

group will be fitted with upgraded sonars which will allow better

detection of enemy vessels. Kilos carry twelve 21-inch torpedoes

and constitute a significant upgrade from China's elderly Whisky

and Romeo class boats.

Submarines and surface combatants have been fitted with a

reverse-engineered version of France's Exocet missile; frigates

and destroyers are equipped with surface-to-air (SAM) missiles

giving them protection against air and missile attacks at sea.
9

Some ships carry indigenously manufactured SAMS; others have

French-made Crotales. Ships without integral SAM capability may

carry short-range, shoulder-fired SAMs derived from the SA-7.

SSMs include the Ying Ji, derived from the Exocet. With a

relatively short 40 kilometer range, it is active radar homing

and carries a 165 kilogram warhead. The radar homing and infrared

homing HY-2 anti-ship Sea Eagle has a longer effective range of

approximately 80 kilometers. The Sea Eagle carries a 513 kilogram

warhead, and is believed nuclear-capable. The C-802 may have a

range of 120 kilometers.

These advances notwithstanding, efforts to enhance naval

capabilities have experienced problems similar to those faced by

the air force. Systems integration continues to pose

difficulties. American-made General Electric LM 2500 gas turbine

engines were purchased to power China's newest class of

destroyers, the Luhu. However, the Chinese naval architects

responsible for designing the Luhu's hull and engine space seem

to have disregarded the engines' size specifications. The hull

had to be returned to the shipyard for redesign after at least

one ship had already been built.27 The navy has over-the-horizon

missiles, but not the targeting techniques to make them

effective. And, after more than a decade of efforts to improve

educational standards, difficulties remain. A 1995 story reported

in the Chinese press described a junior-high school educated

radarman assigned to submarine duty who could not maintain the

equipment he was responsible for.28

Ground Forces. As might be expected, the world's largest

country has the world's largest army, comprising about 2.2

million people. Ground forces include 24 group armies, equivalent

to Western corps, composed of 73 infantry divisions, 9 main force

divisions with a rapid-reaction role, 11 tank divisions, and 5

artillery divisions. This does not include garrison forces,

border and coastal guards, People's Armed Police, or reservists.

The last category is estimated at about 900,000 men, the majority

of them demobilized veterans of the regular armed forces.29

They are equipped with large numbers of weapons--for

example, an estimated 7,500 to 8,000 medium battle tanks. Most

are copies of older Soviet models, though Israeli technology has

upgraded the turrets and fire control systems of a number of

these. Ground force modernization has received a lower priority

than that of the navy and air force, and neither troops nor their

equipment are believed to be of high quality. Since Deng's

economic reforms provided opportunities to become wealthy through

entrepreneurial activities, the best and the brightest young men

generally do not wish to join the PLA. The fact that the military

is expected to raise much of its own meat and vegetables detracts

from training.
10

So does the PLA's multi-faceted business empire and the

corruption it has engendered. Durability of equipment is a

recurrent problem. Artillery tubes deteriorate quickly in heavy

firing, degrading accuracy and posing hazards to gun crews. Tires

on Chinese vehicles are substandard; drive trains and

transmissions break down far too frequently.30 The Thai military,

which bought a number of Chinese tanks at bargain prices,

complains that treads wear out prematurely and fire control

systems need excessive maintenance.31 There are exceptions: the

23rd and 54th armies are described as highly disciplined and

motivated, with good equipment maintenance procedures. The 1st

and 31st armies are also well regarded, as are the 15th Airborne

Army and the marines (naval infantry).32 These are the troops that

would have to be relied on in any confrontation with China's

neighbors.

Recent Demarches.

China's present ability to project power, though still quite

limited, has improved significantly over the past two decades.

More importantly, if the leadership were to decide to pursue

aggressively the PRC's claims in disputed areas including the

Spratly Islands, the Senkakus, and Taiwan, China will have the

advantage of size. For example, its navy is, at 260,000 men,

larger than those of the seven members of ASEAN plus Taiwan

combined.33 Another advantage is that its neighbors are not united

against China, and are highly unlikely ever to be so. A number of

the ASEAN countries, including Malaysia, the Philippines,

Vietnam, and Brunei, claim parts of the Spratly Islands, and in

some cases contest ownership with each other as well as with the

PRC.

There are minor disagreements among them on other matters as

well. For example, in early 1996, Thailand voiced its displeasure

over a wall built by Malaysia on the border between the two

countries, as well as to reports that Malaysia had equipped its

coastal patrol boats with weapons to attack foreign vessels that

entered its waters for fishing.34 And the Vietnamese government

recently demanded that Thailand cease violating its territorial

waters.35 In addition to its differences with China over the

Senkaku/Diaoyutai Islands, Japan contests ownership of Takeshima

Island with Korea; the island is known to Koreans as Tokto.36

While these are fairly mild irritants, they illustrate a more

important point: there is not necessarily an "us versus them"

view of China.

Several navies, including Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia,

have a qualitative advantage over China in terms of more modern

ships equipped with Harpoon and Exocet anti-ship missiles. But it
11

is difficult to imagine the circumstances under which these or

other ASEAN countries could combine, much less that they could be

joined by Taiwan--with whom none of them has formal diplomatic

relations--to resist a PRC bent on expansion.

Japan presents a different picture. Its highly competent

navy has modern ships equipped with state-of-the-art weaponry and

staffed by well-educated officers and men. The Japanese navy has

twice the underway replenishment capacity of China. However,

article nine of the Japanese constitution forbids the use of

force to solve international disputes and there is a wellorganized, articulate anti-defense sector within the country's

population. However, just as with the ASEAN states, it is

difficult to imagine the circumstances under which Japan would

wish to challenge the PRC militarily.

 Until fairly recently, Asian-Pacific states tended to take

a rather detached view of "the Chinese threat," believing that

disputes with the PRC would be settled in due course through

peaceful negotiations. For example, in mid-1993, then-Australian

defense minister Robert Ray pointed out that there would be at

least several years' warning time before any major threat

actually materialized.37 That period of warning appears to have

begun even before Ray spoke.

Military budgets had been rising steadily since the late

1980s, and China was conducting extensive negotiations with

Russia over the purchase of military equipment. Some Soviet

weapons experts whose talents were no longer needed in their own

country found employment in the PRC. China had already become the

chief, and perhaps only, external source of support for Burma's

pariah government. Its assistance in the construction of three

highways from the border of China's Yunnan province into Burma

caused concerns that Beijing's real motive might be to use the

roads as invasion routes to take over the country. The PRC's

upgrading of naval bases at Mergui and the Cocos Islands,

including the installation of radars in the latter, was

interpreted as facilitating surveillance of the area by China's

intelligence personnel. India became concerned that the Burmese

government had provided the PRC with an outlet to the Bay of

Bengal and the Andaman Sea, where India's own navy had hitherto

held sway. Japanese diplomats were particularly uneasy about a

Chinese military presence in Mergui, near the entrance to the

Strait of Malacca, which connects the South China Sea with the

Indian Ocean. In addition to being strategically important in its

own right, this channel is as well a crucial transit point for

Middle Eastern oil shipments to Japan.

In February 1992, China's National People's Congress passed

a law asserting ownership of all contested islands: the Spratlys,

the Paracels, the Senkakus, and Taiwan. It further claimed the
12

right to "adopt all necessary measures to prevent and stop the

harmful passage of vessels through its territorial waters" and

for "PRC warships or military aircraft to expel the intruders."38

This caused anxiety not only among the other claimants to the

islands but also among neutral nations who feared interference

with established transportation routes in and around the area.

Japanese diplomats, aware of long-standing concern within

the Chinese leadership that Japan may re-militarize, quietly

suggested that this action had strengthened right-wing forces

within their country. They also hinted that a visit from the

Japanese imperial couple which the Chinese leadership greatly

desired--anticipating an apology for Japan's actions against

China in World War II--might have to be postponed. This caused a

slight softening of the mainland's position: the Chinese foreign

ministry issued a statement saying that the law was part of a

normal domestic legislative process, did not represent a change

in Chinese policy, and would not affect the joint development of

the islands with countries involved in the dispute.39 The foreign

ministry did not, however, address the question of why it was

felt necessary to pass the law. And, since the foreign ministry's

explanation could not have had the effect of changing the

legislation, the law could be advanced again in support of

Chinese actions in the future. Moreover, a few months later,

China granted oil exploration rights in a disputed area of the

Spratlys to an American company, the Crestone Energy Corporation.

In 1995, a series of Chinese actions indicated that the pace

of assertiveness had been stepped up. In the spring, the

Philippine government announced that the PRC had built concrete

structures, including radar installations, in a contested area

known as Mischief Reef; it had also placed boundary markers meant

to demarcate China's territorial waters only 50 miles away from

the Philippines' Palawan Island. The PRC argued that the

structures had no military significance, and were solely for the

convenience of its fisherfolk. This prompted Filipino President

Fidel Ramos, a former military leader, to arrange a tour of the

installations for the media which indicated that the facilities

were more sophisticated than Chinese fishermen would normally

need or expect. Pictures were produced of PLAN vessels nearby.

Ramos also ordered the destruction of the boundary markers.

Beijing accused Manila of bullying China and warned that the

PRC's previous restraint over the Spratlys could not be

permanent. Another media tour might be resisted with armed force.

It also warned the Philippines not to involve the Association of

Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in the matter: the two countries

could discuss the issue bilaterally in due course.

In January 1996 Filipino anxieties were again raised by a

confrontation near Zambales between their navy and two Chinese

ships. Manila subsequently decided to downplay the issue with the
13

not very convincing explanation that the "pirate ships" were not

owned by the Chinese military but by the Chinese militia.40 The

Chinese militia does possess some boats, but they typically stay

very close to the mainland's coastline. In March, Manila revealed

that the PRC had mounted electronic equipment on its

installations on Mischief Reef, with a Filipino general

describing the new upgrades were "certainly a cause for worry."41

Only weeks after the publicity about PRC installations on

Mischief Reef, the Indonesian government made public a Chinese

map showing the Natuna Islands as part of China's exclusive

economic zone. Since the islands were not hitherto regarded as

disputed territory, and because they contain rich gas deposits,

there was immediate concern in Jakarta. Indonesian foreign

minister Ali Alatas quickly departed for Beijing where, he

announced, his Chinese counterpart had assured him that the PRC

does not claim the islands and regards them as under Indonesia's

jurisdiction.42 As with the passage of the 1992 law, however,

there remained questions as to the motivation for creating and

circulating the map.

The PRC's intention to enforce its claims in the Spratlys

and elsewhere cannot be doubted. In November 1995, a naval 

expedition sent to pour more than a thousand tons of stone and

concrete onto a submerged reef in order to bolster the PRC's

claims of sovereignty in that area persevered in its task despite

hurricane-force winds and freezing temperatures. Half of its

hundred-man crew returned with pneumonia and assorted injuries.43

In the closing days of 1995, Japan revealed that the PRC had for

several months been conducting oil exploration in an area of the

Senkaku Islands, known to the Chinese as the Diaoyutai, and

claimed by Japan. One of Japan's leading dailies interpreted

China's activities in the area as "a highly political move aimed

at testing Japan."44

Yet another indication that the PRC might be in the midst of

the several years warning period envisioned by Robert Ray was the

series of nuclear tests conducted since 1994. Protests by several

nations were ignored; when Japan announced that it would suspend

its grant aid to the PRC until the tests ceased, the reaction was

belligerent: China described Japan's decision as "unwise . . .

totally unreasonable [and] harmful to Sino-Japanese relations."45

Japanese sources privately speculated that the PRC's decision to

begin oil exploration in the Senkakus had been taken in

retaliation for Japan's suspension of grants.46

The most recent manifestation of the PRC's commitment to its

territorial claims has been a series of missile tests that had

the effect of imposing a blockade of Taiwan. While China

explained that these were undertaken to deter Taiwan's President

Lee Teng-hui from declaring the island's independence and to
14

discourage his drive to seek greater international recognition

for his nation's separate existence, skeptics pointed out that

Chinese actions amounted to describing the victim as the

perpetrator: unlike his major parliamentary opposition, the

Democratic Progressive Party, Lee and his fellow Kuomintang party

members had steadfastly advocated unification--albeit on an

indefinite and extended timetable. The more likely explanation,

they argued, was the PRC's desire to disrupt the island's first

direct presidential election.

The PLA and the Execution of Strategy.

As noted above, the People's Liberation Army's ability to

support an aggressive strategy is limited. This, however, assumes

that those who feel their interests have been adversely affected

are willing to resist. So far, PLA shows of strength--what some

have seen as a strategy of bluff--have been relatively successful

in intimidating its neighbors. There have been few indications

that the neighbors are disposed to fight back. Vietnamese and

Chinese gunboats exchanged fire briefly in 1984 and 1988; the

Taiwan military is put on a state of high alert when war games or

missile tests are carried out near its territory; and, when the

PRC announced that a series of tests would be conducted with live

ammunition, the United States ordered two carrier battle groups

into the area.

Non-military responses have been taken: Japan's suspension 

of grant aid in response to the PRC's refusal to cease nuclear

testing is one example. Another is the founding in July 1994 of a

new organization, the Asian Regional Forum (ARF), to provide a

forum for the resolution of disputes between member countries.

Although China has joined, it has refused to discuss these

disputes except on a bilateral basis with the countries involved.

Presumably this is because the PRC's leaders fear that the image

costs of being perceived as intransigent in multilateral

negotiations are much higher than those involved in a one-on-one

bargaining situation. The sheer size of the PRC relative to most

of its neighbors also confers advantages in bilateral

negotiations. In any case, the ARF has created no dispute

resolution mechanisms, and has so far functioned only as a venue

for general discussion of issues.

There are indications that the PRC is willing to back down,

at least temporarily, under pressure. The foreign ministry's

softening the interpretation of the 1992 law unilaterally

annexing many disputed territories after Japan threatened

suspension of the imperial couple's visit is a case in point. So,

as well, is the PRC's distancing itself from what appeared to be

a claim to the Natuna Islands after the Indonesian government

protested. Other bilateral and unilateral moves by concerned
15

countries indicate that the PRC's actions may be calling forth

equal and opposite reactions from the states who feel their

interests being threatened. Immediately after the Philippine

government asked the United States to relinquish its bases in

that country, Singapore offered to allow the United States to use

its facilities. Both Singapore and Malaysia undertook expensive

military modernization programs as well as reactivating the Five

Power Defense Arrangement (FPDA) with Britain, Australia, and New

Zealand.47 In 1993, India and Indonesia began holding joint naval

exercises, and in December 1995, Indonesia and Australia signed a

mutual security agreement.48 Only a few months after discovering

Chinese activities on Mischief Reef, the Philippine legislature

agreed to fund a large increase in military spending, earmarking

most of it for combat ships and sophisticated fighter planes.49

Japanese foreign ministry officials have discussed growing

perceptions of a China threat with their opposite numbers in

China, suggesting that the PRC heighten transparency on defense

issues and hold regular discussions with its counterparts.50

The sum total of these reactions may persuade the PRC to

soften its positions on a number of security issues. Yet domestic

pressures may make it difficult for the Chinese leadership to

back away from some of the stands they have taken. Jiang Zemin is

an untested leader with no power base of his own, no military

experience, and several rivals for power. On the other side of

the argument, for the PRC to court military confrontation while

armed only with forces as deficient as the PLA carries even

greater strategic risks for Jiang as well as for China.

ENDNOTES

 1. Carl von Clausewitz, Two Letters on Strategy, trans. and

ed., Peter Paret and Daniel Moran, Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War

College, 1984, p. 9.

2. For example, an unsigned editorial in the Hong Kong daily

South China Morning Post (February 18, 1996, p. 18) that

described Chinese President Jiang Zemin as cautioning his senior

generals that their desire to invade Taiwan could wreck the Hong

Kong economy and kill all hope of a smooth transition.

"Unfortunately, it is far from clear this warning will be

heeded." If true, this implies that the PLA does not take orders

from its commander-in-chief--an implication fraught with danger

not only for the PRC but for regional security. No source is

cited.

3. Who's Who In China: Current Leaders, 1994, Beijing:

Foreign Languages Press, 1994. Author's calculation based on a

PRC population of 1.2 billion and Shandong provincial population

of 86,700,000 (1990 census).
16

4. Ibid., and Defense Liaison Office, United States

Consulate General, Hong Kong, Directory of PRC Military

Personalities: 1995, Hong Kong, October 1995.

5. Fujian-based reporter (no name specified), "Special

Dispatch: Fujian People Talk About Military Exercise During

Spring Festival," Wen Wei Po (Hong Kong), February 26, 1996, p.

2, in FBIS-CHI, February 22, 1996, p. 41.

6. Yen Hua, "Jiangsu, Shandong Factions Carve Up Military

Power--Inside Story of Unusual PLA Top-Level Changes," Chien

Shao, February 1, 1996, pp. 38-40, in FBIS-CHI, February 22,

1996, pp. 25-28.

7. Commentator, "Better Vertical Leadership by the Military

of the Militia," Zhongguo minbing, December 9, 1995, p. 1, in

FBIS-CHI, February 8, 1996, pp. 29-30. Zhongguo minbing is

published by the PLA's General Political Department.

8. Willy Wo-Lap Lam, "Coastal Leaders Express ‘Reservations'

About PLA Exercise," South China Morning Post, February 8, 1996,

p. 8.

9. Xiao Bing and Qing Bo, Zhongguojun nengfou dabai xia

yizhang zhanzheng (Can the Chinese Military Win the Next War),

Chongqing: Southwestern Normal University Publishing House, June

1993. The document, stamped neibu, or for internal circulation

only, was placed on a bookshelf in Beijing, presumably

accidentally, where a Western diplomat discovered and purchased

it. An English translation was published by United States

Technical Information Services, Joint Publication Research

Service Report 94-024-L, May 5, 1994, marked For Official Use

Only. For a summary and analysis of the main points, see Ross H.

Munro, "Eavesdropping on the Chinese Military: Where It Expects

War--and Where It Doesn't," Orbis, Vol. 38, No. 3, Summer 1994,

pp. 355-372.

10. Zhongguojun, p. 32.

11. Ibid., p. 76.

12. For example, the authors state that China has 8 military

regions; there are actually only 7.

 13. A publication that appeared in 1982 quotes Deng

Xiaoping as having said in January 1975 that " . . . the army has

become bloated and is not a crack outfit that will make a good

showing in combat." Deng Xiaoping, "Army Needs Consolidation,"

January 25, 1975, in Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping (1982),

trans. in U.S. Department of Commerce, Joint Publications

Research Service, China Political and Sociological Report, No.
17

468, July 1, 1983, pp. 2-3. Deng's speech was not reported in the

Chinese press at the time it was supposedly made.

14. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The

Military Balance, 1995-1996, Oxford: Oxford University Press,

1995, p. 176.

15. A Russian diplomat once asked his American friends, only

partly in jest, if they had any idea how difficult it was to

decide how many Chinese thermos bottles and sets of long winter

underwear it took to equal the cost of a fighter plane.

16. Bates Gill, "Russia, Israel Help Force Modernization,"

Jane's Defence Weekly, January 31, 1996, p. 54.

17. Kenneth W. Allen, Glenn Krumel, and Jonathan D. Pollack,

China's Air Force Enters the 21st Century, Santa Monica, CA: The

RAND Corporation, 1995, p. 156.

18. Nick Cook, "Lifting the Veil on China's Fighters,"

Jane's Defence Weekly, January 31, 1996. p. 52.

19. Allen, et. al., p. 155.

20. Cook, p. 52.

21. Author's interview with Major Kenneth W. Allen, March 7,

1996. Mr. Allen, now retired from the military, served as

assistant Air Force attache in Beijing and is the author of

several scholarly studies on the Chinese air force.

22. Anonymous officer interviewed in "Officer Assesses PRC's

Su-27 Fighter Production," Chung-kuo shih-pao (China Times,

Taipei), February 4, 1996, p. 3, in FBIS-CHI, February 8, 1996,

p. 75.

23. Nicholas Kristof and Sheryl WuDunn, China Wakes: The

Struggle For the Soul of a Rising Power, New York: Vintage, 1995,

p. 382.

24. Author's conversation, March 17, 1996. The informant

requested that his name not be used.

25. Larry M. Wortzel, "China Pursues Traditional GreatPower Status," Orbis, Spring 1994, p. 164.

26. Wortzel, pp. 163-164.

27. "Tight Fit," Far Eastern Economic Review, April 1, 1993,

p. 9.
18

28. The story has a happy ending: with the help of a book, a

female engineer who took pity on him, and great diligence, the

young person succeeded and "became a famous radar man." Xinhua

(New China News Agency), February 14, 1995, in FBIS-CHI, February

16, 1995, p. 43.

29. IISS, p. 176.

30. Wortzel, p. 171.

31. See, e.g., Naeo Na (Bangkok), April 21, 1989, in FBIS

East Asia (FBIS-EAS), April 24, 1989, pp. 68-69; Nation

(Bangkok), April 23, 1989, in FBIS-EAS, April 28, 1989, p. 75.

The Thais also purchased fighter planes from China; after similar

complaints about the planes, it decided against additional

purchases.

32. Wortzel, p. 171.

33. Indonesia, 40,500; Singapore, 2,900; Thailand, 66,000;

Mayasia, 12,000; Philippines, 23,000; Brunei, 7,000; Vietnam,

42,000; Taiwan, 68,000 equal 200,200. All figures from The

Military Balance, 1995/1996.

34. "A Question We Must Ask Malaysia," Krungthep Thurakit

(Bangkok), February 17, 1996, p. 2, in FBIS-EAS, February 20,

1996, pp. 74-75.

35. Vietnamese News Agency (Hanoi), February 23, 1996, in

FBIS-EAS, February 26, 1996, pp. 76-77.

36. Kyodo (Tokyo), January 27, 1996, in FBIS-CHI, January

29, 1996, pp. 11-12.

37. "Interview With Robert Ray," Defense News, June 21-27,

1993, p. 30.

38. The text of the law was promulgated by Xinhua on

February 25, 1992; see FBIS-CHI, February 28, 1992, pp. 2-3.

39. Ma Baolin, "Legislation Doesn't Mean Policy Change,"

Beijing Review, March 30-April 5, 1992, pp. 10-11.

40. GMA-7 Radio-Television Arts Network (Quezon City),

January 30, 1996, in FBIS-EAS, February 1, 1996, pp. 61-62.

41. Kyodo, March 1, 1996, in FBIS-EAS, March 1, 1996, p. 56.

42. Antara (Jakarta), July 21, 1995, in FBIS-EAS, July 24,

1995, p. 75.
19

43. (no author), "Concrete Claims," Far Eastern Economic

Review, December 21, 1995, p. 14.

44. Hiroyuki Sugiyama, "PRC Likely To Increase Activity in

Japanese Waters," Yomiuri Shimbun (Tokyo), January 4, 1996, p. 3,

in FBIS-EAS, January 23, 1996, p. 7.

45. Gu Ping, "An Unwise Move," Renmin ribao (People's

Daily), September 9, 1995, p. 3.

46. See, e.g., Hiroyuki Sugiyama, "PRC Likely To Increase

Activity in Japanese Waters," Yomiuri Shimbun (Tokyo), January 4,

1996, p. 3, in FBIS-EAS, January 23, 1996, pp. 7-8.

47. (no author), "Bilateral Fora are Important for Promoting

Mutual Trust," Kompas (Jakarta), January 12, 1996, (received via

Internet).

48. According to the agreement, Australia and Indonesia

undertake to consult at ministerial level on a regular basis

about matters affecting their common security and to cooperate to

benefit their own security and that of the region. They undertake

to consult each other in case of adverse challenges to either

party or to their common security interests and, if appropriate,

consider individual or joint measures. See Ferdinandus Sius, "The

Significance of the Republic of Indonesia- Australia Security

Agreement," Suara Pembaruan, January 10, 1996, pp. 2-3, in FBISEAS, January 24, 1996, pp. 79-82.

49. Kyodo, August 13, 1995, in FBIS-EAS, August 14, 1995, p.

79.

50. (no author), "Japan-People's Republic of China Security

Dialogue," Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, January 19,

1996, via Internet, in FBIS-EAS, January 19, 1996, p. 7.
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Richard A. Chilcoat

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director

Colonel Richard H. Witherspoon

Director of Research

 and Conference Organizer

Dr. Earl H. Tilford, Jr.

Author

Dr. June Teufel Dreyer

Director of Publications and Production

Mrs. Marianne P. Cowling

Secretaries

Mrs. Devona A. Peck

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Mrs. Mary Jane Semple

Cover Artist

Mr. James E. Kistler