THE U.S.-INDIA RELATIONSHIP:

STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP 

OR COMPLEMENTARY INTERESTS?

Amit Gupta

February 2005

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iii

FOREWORD

 This monograph examines the U.S.-India security relationship 

and argues that significant differences in their worldviews precludes 

the development of a strong strategic relationship at present. 

However, India’s continued economic and military growth, as well 

as its ongoing commitment towards secularism and democracy, 

makes it a future ally towards establishing strategic stability in Asia 

and in assisting future nation-building efforts across the globe.

 In the short run, therefore, the relationship should be based 

on securing complementary interests: ensuring stability in the 

Indian Ocean; democracy across the world; and getting the Indian 

government to work proactively to prevent the proliferation of 

weapons of mass destruction and their associated systems.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director

Strategic Studies Institute 
iv

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

AMIT GUPTA is a Visiting Professor in the Department of 

Strategy and International Security at the U.S. Air War College in 

Montgomery, Alabama. He is the author of Building an Arsenal and 

co-editor with Raju Thomas of India’s Nuclear Security. His writings 

have appeared in Orbis, Asian Survey, Mediterranean Quarterly, Round 

Table, Armed Forces Journal International, and the International Journal 

of the History of Sport. He is currently editing a book on the India’s 

future military force structure and is also writing an extended piece 

on the globalization of cricket. 
v

SUMMARY

 Can India and the United States create a strategic partnership that 

will further the security and foreign policy interests of both countries? 

This monograph argues that given the divergent worldviews of the 

two countries, it would be difficult to develop a strategic partnership. 

Further, the two countries differ about India’s nuclear status, with 

the United States not in favor of making India into a de jure nuclear 

weapons state. Indian analysts also remain concerned about the 

reliability of the United States as a supplier of high technology, and 

continued U.S. support to Pakistan is also seen as slowing down the 

positive growth of the relationship. 

 The two countries do, however, have complementary interests, 

and it is in American interests to facilitate the development of a strong 

India that can play a role in ensuring strategic stability in Asia as 

well as promoting shared values of democracy and secularism. One 

needs to qualify this statement by saying that, given the self-imposed 

limitations on India’s part, any such partnership would only evolve 

in the long term. In the short term, U.S. interests partially are served 

by having India work to secure multilateral security initiatives in 

Asia, particularly in the Indian Ocean littoral.

 From an American perspective, the following steps can be taken 

to enhance the U.S.-India relationship and to make India play a more 

proactive role in furthering U.S. international security interests. 

First, the United States could further develop Indian educational 

capabilities to provide higher technological and managerial 

education to a growing number of students from West, Southwest, 

and Central Asia. Second, the Indian Navy could be used to enforce 

a broader maritime security framework in the Indian Ocean. Third, 

India has the capacity to provide significant numbers of troops 

for peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and nation-building efforts. 

Fourth, the United States should expect India to play a more proactive 

role in nonproliferation issues. Fifth, Indian diplomatic assets can be 

used to start a substantive dialogue with Iran. Sixth, the United States 

must expect India to continue to develop its nuclear and conventional 

military capability and use this capability, as Henry Kissinger has 
vi

suggested, to “prevent the rise of another dominant power to emerge 

between Singapore and Aden. And this is compatible with American 

interests.”1

 For India to carry out such a role and emerge as a long-term 

strategic partner, the United States has to reshape some of its own 

policies to permit the rise of India to the status of a major power. 

Reshaping American policies would specifically include:

 • Supporting India’s quest to become a permanent member of 

the United Nations Security Council.

 • Reshaping international nonproliferation regimes to permit 

India, Israel, and Pakistan to become de jure nuclear weapons 

states.

 • Eventually, recognizing the Line of Control in Kashmir 

as the international border and, therefore, freezing the 

territorial status quo in South Asia. This would help reduce 

India-Pakistan tensions and permit India to play a greater 

international role. 

ENDNOTES

 1. “Analysis. On the record: Dr. Henry Kissinger,” The Indian Express, 

November 16, 2004.
1

THE U.S.-INDIA RELATIONSHIP:

STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP 

OR COMPLEMENTARY INTERESTS?

Introduction.

 Can India and the United States create a strategic partnership 

that will further the security and foreign policy interests of both 

countries? Since the advent of the second Bush administration, there 

has been a warming in relations between the two countries, with 

increased military contacts and talk of technology transfers. Further, 

the two countries share democratic values and are concerned about 

the spread of terrorism in the broader Asian region. Economically, 

India remains a large and relatively untapped market that would 

be of interest to American multinationals. These ties have led to 

some speculation about a potential U.S.-India security partnership 

emerging. 

 This monograph argues, however, that given major differences 

in the worldviews of the two countries, it would be difficult to 

develop a strategic partnership. The two countries do, however, have 

complementary interests and, therefore, it is in American interests to 

facilitate the development of a strong India. That country can then 

play a role in ensuring strategic stability in Asia, as well as promote 

American values of democracy and secularism (which India also 

shares). One needs to qualify this statement by saying that, given the 

self-imposed limitations on India’s part, any such partnership would 

only evolve in the long term. In the short term, U.S. interests are 

partially served by having India work to secure multilateral security 

initiatives in Asia, particularly in the Indian Ocean littoral.

Background.

 In the past, U.S.-Indian relations have been marked by divergent 

worldviews that led both countries not to develop the type of relations 

that the United States had with other major democracies, despite 

several instances of overlapping security interests. Initial suspicions 

about post-independence India stemmed from its unwillingness to 
2

commit to the western alliance in the emerging Cold War, as well as 

India’s adoption of a quasi-socialist economy. While the relationship 

briefly blossomed during and immediately after the Korean War with 

India as a member of the United Nations (UN) armistice commission, 

it soon ran aground with the twin crises of 1956—Hungary and Suez. 

India condemned the Israel-French-British invasion of Suez but was 

far more reluctant to condemn the Soviet Union’s brutal crushing 

of the Hungarian revolt. Relations between the two countries again 

briefly flourished after the Sino-Indian war of 1962 when the United 

States transferred conventional weapons to India, discussed covering 

India under its nuclear umbrella, and for a while was inclined to 

set up intelligence posts in the country to monitor China. At the 

economic level, India became a major recipient of U.S. assistance. 

The United States provided significant amounts of food aid to India 

in the 1960s first to tide over the country during the Bihar famine 

and, later, to start an agricultural Green Revolution in the country. 

 Subsequent attempts to get India and Pakistan to negotiate a 

settlement on the disputed state of Kashmir, however, made the 

Indian government distance itself from the United States. At the same 

time, growing Soviet problems with China led to a strengthening 

of the India-Soviet Union relationship―particularly in the sphere of 

military cooperation. The two countries signed a peace and friendship 

treaty in August 1971 that allowed New Delhi greater diplomatic 

and military freedom to counter Pakistan. 

 Difficult relations with the United States continued in 1971 

during the Bangladesh war. Indian officials believe that the Nixon 

administration sent an aircraft carrier, the U.S.S. Enterprise, into the 

Bay of Bengal to put pressure on India to halt the military campaign 

against Pakistan.1

 The relationship remained cool in the 1970s both due to American 

disinterest―the Vietnam war and events in the Middle East had 

taken priority in U.S. foreign policy―and because India, in 1974, 

decided to test a nuclear device. U.S. nonproliferation measures 

automatically were implemented against India, and the 1974 test 

led to a strengthening of both U.S. nonproliferation policies (with 

the Glenn-Symington Amendments to the Foreign Assistance Act 

and the 1978 Nuclear Nonproliferation Act) as well as those of other 
3

western suppliers―through the creation of the London Club in 1975 

and the decision by Western nuclear suppliers to ask for “fullscope” 

safeguard over any future technology transfers to other countries. At 

the same time, the United States had decreasing interest in Pakistan 

because it was no longer relevant as a frontline state in the Cold 

War. 

 The situation of disinterest changed after the Soviet Union’s 

invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. The United States, seeking to 

contain Soviet expansion toward the Indian Ocean and the Persian 

Gulf, decided to supply arms to Pakistan and to use Pakistani 

territory as a conduit for supplying weapons to and for training the 

Afghan Mujahideen. This was done even while it became apparent 

that Pakistan had decided to follow India’s example and initiated 

a nuclear weapons program. Although the personal relationship 

between President Reagan and Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi 

was cordial, and her son and successor, Rajiv Gandhi, was able to 

garner considerable goodwill in the United States, the rationale 

of the Cold War kept the two countries apart. It was also during 

the Rajiv Gandhi period (1984-89) that the first discussions about 

transferring defense related technology began. India expressed an 

interest in purchasing American avionics and powerplants for its 

Light Combat Aircraft program.2

 It was only after the end of the Cold War and the coming to power 

of the Narasimha Rao government in India in 1991 that relations 

began to improve. The new Indian government, recognizing that the 

economy was in a crisis, sought to carry out a series of structural and 

market reforms that relaxed previous obstacles to foreign investment 

in the country and allowed the economy to be rejuvenated. Indian 

and American groups began to meet to discuss defense cooperation, 

especially the transfers of technologies to assist in the development 

of India’s conventional weapons production programs. At the same 

time, the first Bush administration declared in 1990 that Pakistan 

was not complying with the nonproliferation measures and cut off 

military and economic assistance to Islamabad (the President could 

not certify under the Pressler Amendment of 1985 that Pakistan did 

not have a nuclear device). 

 The Clinton administration sought to improve relations further, 

but the May 1998 nuclear tests by India and Pakistan led to 
4

another series of sanctions being imposed on both countries. While 

subsequent congressional amendments were to pull back most of the 

economic sanctions, key ones remained, particularly in the area of 

military technology transfers. India’s Light Combat Aircraft program 

was delayed because of its inability to obtain General Electric F404 powerplants to power the prototypes. While sanctions led to a 

cooling down of the relationship, the United States was proactive in 

keeping the peace between the two nuclear neighbors. 

 After the nuclear tests of 1998, Deputy Secretary of State Strobe 

Talbott conducted nine rounds of meetings with India’s then foreign 

minister Jaswant Singh in an effort to reduce the dangers emanating 

from both countries’ going overtly nuclear. The discussions led to a 

shift in U.S. policy on nuclear issues in the region. The earlier position 

of the Clinton administration was to “cap, reduce, and rollback” the 

nuclear programs of both countries. This position changed, at least 

in the short term, to one of urging India and Pakistan to keep their 

nuclear forces nondeployed and at the lowest possible levels.3

 The Clinton administration also made a significant differentiation 

between India, which it treated as a nuclear democracy, and other 

proliferating states whom it first labeled rogue states and later states 

of concern. By treating India and Pakistan differently, it was able 

to continue developing relations with the two countries―although 

far more warmly with India than Pakistan―while seeking to limit 

the damage caused by regional proliferation. At the same time the 

Clinton administration successfully practiced international crisis 

diplomacy in the region. 

 In 1999, during the Kargil crisis (which followed a Pakistani 

advance into a remote, high altitude part of Kashmir on the Indian 

side of the Line of Control), the United States was instrumental in 

getting Pakistan to withdraw its troops from the Kargil and Drass 

sectors of Indian Kashmir and in staving off a potential full-scale 

nuclear conflict between the two countries. Former White House 

staffer Bruce Riedel has written that President Clinton applied 

pressure on the Nawaz Sharif government in Pakistan to back down, 

and that the Pakistan military was thought to be readying its nuclear 

warheads.4 The United States, however, did proceed to develop 

bilateral linkages with India on issues of mutual interest―one such 

forum being the Joint Commission of Counterterrorism. 
5

 The relationship took a turn for the better with the advent of the 

second Bush administration which saw India as playing an important 

role in future U.S. foreign policy towards Asia. As Secretary of State 

Colin Powell put it in his confirmation hearing:

We must deal wisely with the world’s largest democracy. Soon to be the 

most populous country in the world, India has the potential to help keep 

the peace in the vast Indian Ocean area and its periphery. We need to 

work harder and more consistently to assist India in this endeavor, while 

not neglecting our friends in Pakistan.5

Some have argued that this appraisal of India’s position came from 

the administration’s stance that China was no longer just a major 

trading partner but had become a strategic competitor that needed 

to be contained in Asia. This proposed strategy gained further 

credence after the April 2001 collision and forced landing of a Navy 

PC-3 surveillance aircraft by the Chinese Air Force. 

 By mid-2001 it seemed that India and the United States were 

building a new relationship that was based on military ties and an 

increasingly similar worldview. Thus the Indian government was 

one of the first to endorse the Bush administration’s National Missile 

Defense proposal, especially welcoming the fact that missile defense 

would go hand-in-hand with deep cuts in U.S. nuclear arsenals. 

There was also some degree of agreement between the two countries 

on the limitations of the International Criminal Court, particularly 

on the issue of peacekeepers. In addition, the two governments 

decided to not criticize each other in public―moving away from a 

policy that the Indians had followed in the Cold War days. Indian 

concerns about the U.S. stand on the Kyoto treaty were conveyed 

privately to the Bush administration. The administration, similarly, 

muted its criticism of India’s test of a 700-kilometer medium range 

Agni-1 missile in early 2002.6

 The attacks of September 11, 2001, however, saw the United 

States, much to India’s consternation, renew its security relationship 

with Pakistan.7

 India offered unconditional support to the United 

States, including basing rights for carrying out an air campaign 

over Afghanistan, but Pakistan’s proximity to Afghanistan made it 

necessary for the United States to renew its alliance with Islamabad. 

India’s concerns about terrorism were highlighted by the attack on 
6

the Indian parliament on December 13, 2001, which was viewed in 

New Delhi as an attack carried out reportedly by the banned Lashkare-Taiba group at the behest of Pakistan’s InterServices Intelligence 

(ISI).8 India mobilized its armed forces and placed them along the 

border with Pakistan but decided not to pursue a military action, 

following a U.S. undertaking to put pressure on President Musharraf 

to halt cross-border infiltration. New Delhi remains dissatisfied with 

these efforts because it argues that infiltration has not been totally 

halted. Thus there has been talk among some analysts in India that 

the U.S. ability to intervene successfully in South Asian crises is 

declining, and that India in future crises will have to rely on itself to 

address the problems posed by Pakistan-sponsored infiltration.9

 After 1 year of exceptionally hostile relations between India and 

Pakistan (with then Indian foreign minister Yashwant Sinha stating 

that India had a much better case to go for preemption against Pakistan 

than the United States had against Iraq),10 the Indian prime minister, 

in April 2003, offered to talk to the Pakistani leadership in a third 

and final attempt to secure peace between the two countries (the first 

attempt was the Lahore summit of 1999, and the second, the Agra 

summit of 2001). The Indian government set aside its precondition 

that Pakistan halt all cross-border infiltration and Pakistan, in turn, 

ratcheted up its demands for negotiations on the “core issue” of 

Kashmir. 

 Since then India-Pakistan talks have taken a more positive turn 

as both countries have conducted negotiations on a range of issues 

including Kashmir. India has proposed a list of 72 confidence-building 

measures, and Pakistan has responded with its own set of proposals. 

More importantly, the two countries agreed to a ceasefire along 

the Line of Control in Kashmir, which was extended in September 

2004. 

 The U.S. role remains one of facilitating negotiations between the 

two sides which has left the two countries somewhat dissatisfied. 

India would like the United States to put more pressure on Islamabad 

to halt cross-border infiltration, while Islamabad would like the 

United States to act as an intermediary between the two countries―

carrying out the same role it fulfills for Israel and Palestine. The 

dissatisfaction with U.S. efforts is compounded because the two 

countries have somewhat contradictory worldviews.
7

U.S. Worldview and India.

 As the remaining superpower, the United States is in a unique 

position in contemporary international relations. Not only does it 

have military and technological superiority over its closest rivals, 

but also is positioned to dictate political and diplomatic outcomes 

in a way that it never has before. This was brought home during 

the buildup to the Gulf War when the United States withdrew its 

resolution in the UN Security Council and, with limited international 

support, successfully carried out regime change in Iraq. The U.S. 

strategic superiority is unlikely to fade away in the near future for 

three reasons. First, American military superiority continues to grow 

not only in terms of technological prowess but increasingly in terms 

of training and tactics. 

 As Barry Posen has argued, America’s military supremacy rests 

on its control of the commons―the deep seas, airspace over 15,000 

feet, and outer space.11 While no nation has sovereignty over these 

environments, a country must have control over them to prosecute 

modern warfare successfully. 

 America has control over all three commons and is likely to retain 

this advantage for some time because of its commitment to military 

research and development (R&D) that provides it with a growing 

technological edge over potential challengers (as Posen points out, 

current U.S. R&D expenditure almost matches the combined defense 

budgets of Germany and France).12 This capability is enhanced by 

two additional factors: a world-wide network of bases that extend 

the U.S. military reach; and the division of the world into a series 

of commands that can work together effectively to prosecute U.S. 

military strategy.13

 This military capability can prevail over any standing military in 

the world and permitted the second Bush administration to believe 

that it would militarily prevail in Iraq, establish democracy there, 

and set the template to bring about change in the Middle East. 

 While the United States has control over the commons, one 

environment in which its military preponderance can be challenged 

is the land environment. There, regular and irregular forces that have 

sufficient manpower, are motivated, and know the terrain will fight 
8

American forces. As we have seen in Iraq, such forces, despite their 

technological backwardness, have been able to exact a considerable 

toll from the technologically superior and better-trained U.S. forces. 

In short, technology does not successfully substitute for personnel 

on the ground. 

 Having said that, the costs are high for a regime that opposes 

U.S. interests. While the United States has had problems with regime 

installation in Iraq, it easily succeeded in toppling Saddam Hussain’s 

Baathist government. Any country opposing U.S. security interests, 

therefore, runs the risk of having its regime overthrown unless it has 

a high level of domestic legitimacy. In fact, this lack of legitimacy may 

have made the Libyan government of Colonel Mohammar Qaddafi 

recognize its vulnerability and move to dismantle its Weapons of 

Mass Destruction (WMD) programs and sue for peace with the 

United States.

 Second, the U.S. economy remains attractive enough for foreign 

and domestic investors to continue to keep their investments. 

Neither Europe nor Japan will be able to completely take over as 

an economic alternative to the United States. While there has been 

some discussion of how the United States suffers from an economic 

deficit,14 and this may lead to a pullout of funds from this country 

to more lucrative foreign markets, the fact remains that the United 

States continues to attract high levels of external investments, thus 

making it possible to sustain its domestic and foreign policies. 

 The third factor that works in the favor of the United States is its 

soft power, particularly its attractiveness to global intellectual labor. 

Much has been written about the flow of migrants from the developing 

world into the West, but this has tended to focus on those working 

in the lower economic spheres in western societies―the Mexicans 

in the United States, the Turks in Germany, and North Africans in 

Italy. Less discussed is the flow of highly-skilled or intellectual labor 

across boundaries, and the United States was the clear winner in this 

process. Highly-skilled labor flows in Europe tended to be between 

European Union (EU) members or in the sporting arena―the global 

flow of soccer players into Europe.15 But the United States was able to 

attract the best intellectual minds from around the world to work in 

its universities and high-technology industries for several reasons. 
9

 Europe, particularly Britain, had cut off financial aid to foreign 

students, making higher education in these countries unattractive to 

prospective intellectual labor imports from the rest of the world. The 

United States, in contrast, retained a vibrant university system that 

actively recruited the best minds from around the world. 

 Racism and cultural intolerance also raised their ugly faces in the 

1990s, thus reducing the attractiveness of Western Europe to highlyskilled professionals; the rise of le Pen in France, Haider in Austria, 

Bossi in Italy, and neo-Nazis in Germany contributed to making 

the EU the second choice for high-level professionals. Further, the 

inability of these states to become truly multicultural and accepting 

made it unlikely that they would be the best targets for anyone 

seeking to emigrate. A case in point was the flow of Hong Kong 

Chinese to Canada and the United States rather than to England. 

Finally, competing European firms and universities could not match 

the much higher wages in the United States. These three inducements 

have made the United States not just the military leader of the world 

but also its economic and cultural leader.

America’s Security Agenda.

 At the same time, however, the limits of American military 

power and global leadership are also apparent. While the United 

States has the military capability to intervene and prevail in any part 

of the world, the more difficult task is to stay in a country for an 

extended time to carry out nation-building and the restoration of civil 

society. The challenges faced in Iraq and Afghanistan with policing 

the country, restoring civil order, and helping shape democratic 

institutions point to the need to have forces willing to stay in country 

for extended periods of time to create the needed civil situation. 

The coalition of the willing in Iraq lacks enough countries with 

the military experience to wage a counterinsurgency successfully. 

Further, the traditional allies of the United States may not be the 

best suited for carrying out peacekeeping and peace enforcement 

operations in a non-Western setting. Thus, if the United States is to 

counter charges of being an imperial power in the Middle East, it 

will require non-Western states by its side in its military efforts. In 
10

his exasperation with Paris and Berlin, Secretary of Defense Donald 

Rumsfeld may have labeled France and Germany “old Europe,” but, 

in another way, he was closer to the truth. Using European countries 

to establish peace only further fuels the allegations that a new kind 

of imperialism is being imposed on the world.

 The other central challenge for the United States is the need to 

help create secular democracies around the world. While the events 

of September 11, 2001, demonstrated the need for a proactive military 

policy to target terrorism, it also brought home the realization that 

the international system had to be moving in the direction of secular 

democratic states. This became apparent in Central Asia where the 

various authoritarian regimes were combating Islamic fundamentalist 

groups. While the countries of Central Asia cannot be described as 

democracies, their populations are both educated and relatively 

secular. Helping to consolidate these trends, while strengthening the 

role of democracy in the region, will not only combat radical Islam 

there but also globally serve as a role model for modern Muslim 

states. With both these issues, the United States may be able to get 

support from India and develop a series of complementary interests, 

particularly in the latter area of promoting democratic secularism. 

 A third important area for the United States is strategic stability 

and the containment of China. Strategic stability in Asia is affected 

by the proliferation of WMD, the spread of terrorism, and the rise 

of China as a potential hegemonic power in the region. Of these, the 

Indian role may be most influential in future attempts to constrain 

China. 

 The Bush administration, unlike its predecessor, was to brand 

China a strategic competitor,16 and there was some discussion on how 

to contain it. China’s military modernization efforts, its territorial 

dispute with Taiwan, its claims over the Paracel and Spratly Islands 

(which are rich in energy reserves), and its policy on the transfers of 

WMD and related delivery systems pose long-term concerns for the 

United States. 

 In the aftermath of 9/11, some of these issues have been pushed 

into the background, and a new level of cooperation has emerged 

with China, particularly on the issue of Islamic terrorism. China 

has worked with the United States on the global counterterrorism 

effort, adopted stringent regulations on dual-use missile technology 
11

exports and other proliferation issues, and facilitated the diplomatic 

discussions between the United States and North Korea in April 

2003. China’s concerns about radical Islamic groups helping foment 

the insurgency in Xinjiang would also work to strengthen the ties 

with the United States.

 On the other hand, the post-September 11 presence of the United 

States in Central Asia is viewed with concern in Beijing since it 

puts the United States in another geographic location that encircles 

China. China also remains as concerned about U.S. plans to carry 

out a National Missile Defense program as it is about Washington’s 

possible change of attitude to the reunification of Taiwan with 

China. 

 Further, the huge volume of trade with China has placed the 

United States in a situation where it now depends on the cheap supply 

of goods from China. Breaking away from a trading relationship that 

is in excess of $180 billion will be difficult for the United States to do 

in a relatively short period of time. Yet if the United States at some 

point is to attempt to put greater diplomatic and military pressure 

on China, it may precisely have to achieve a lesser trade dependence 

on that country. 

 The three challenges of nation-building, democratization, and 

containing China will require money, manpower, and a new set of 

alliance partners than those used traditionally by the United States. 

India could be a useful partner in these endeavors, but it would 

require recognizing the contradictions between the American and 

Indian worldviews. 

The Indian Worldview: The Reformist State.

 Indian foreign policy is best understood by recognizing that the 

country has assumed a somewhat unique position in international 

affairs because its leadership has sought to make the country into a 

reformist state. Typically, the international system is viewed as being 

divided between status quo and revolutionary states. Status quo 

states are those that seek to maintain the structure of the international 

system and the order that ensues from it.

 Revolutionary states seek to dismantle the structure and the order 

that goes with it, partially or completely. Revolutionary states have 
12

been described as rogue states, states of concern, and, more recently, 

as the axis of evil. While one can question which states are placed 

in this category, especially since the newer members lack the global 

capacity to challenge the hegemonic power of the status quo states 

(unlike the way the former Soviet Union and, to a lesser degree, 

Mao’s China did during the Cold War), the fact remains that such a 

category of states continues to exist.

 India, on the other hand, is a reformist state―one that by and 

large accepts the structure and order of the international system but 

wishes to make incremental changes to it in order to improve its own 

power potential and status within the international system. India’s 

first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, envisaged such a position 

for India when he suggested that, while India was a poor country, 

it was a great country, and that it had a pivotal role to play in world 

affairs. This role was to try and achieve the needs of world peace 

and freedom that were not only part of the post-colonial revolution 

occurring in the post-World War II world but also critical to India’s 

internal development and national security objectives.17

 As a reformist state, India has sought to participate in maintaining 

the status quo in the international system while shaping it so that 

New Delhi gets a greater say in world affairs. Thus India has been a 

consistent supporter of the United Nations and participated in over 

50 peacekeeping operations. But India’s objective remains to become 

a permanent member of the UN Security Council. India has refused 

to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, but at the same time the 

Indian government has not assisted in the proliferation of nuclear 

weaponry or its associated delivery systems―in the late 1980s, for 

example, India refused to sell nuclear weapons to Libya.18 Similarly, 

India has joined the Antarctic Club and is a Pioneer member of the Law 

of the Seas treaty, thus signaling its commitment to international law 

yet ensuring that it will influence decisionmaking in both bodies. 

 The second part of the Indian foreign policy, which is also an 

evolutionary response to the shift in power within the international 

system in the 1990s, is to seek a multipolar world (as defined by Indian 

policymakers, it is a quest to strengthen multilateral institutions). 

During the Cold War, India, through the nonaligned movement, 

sought to prevent the international system from becoming a tight 
13

bipolar system that put the countries of the world into two armed 

camps. Now India, like other major actors in the international 

system, would prefer to have a world order where the United States 

was counterbalanced by a group of powers. Former Foreign Minister 

Yashwant Sinha alluded to this, as well as to India’s international 

ambitions, when he said:

We must also work to spread democracy at the national and also 

international level. Sometimes the multilateral vocation of the United 

States is forgotten. Almost all the significant multilateral institutions 

were created as a result of U.S. initiative. The United Nations, the World 

Bank, the International Monetary Fund [IMF] and the GATT [General 

Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] reincarnated now as the World Trade 

Organization. They needed initial guidance. Now several decades after 

their creation will require changes in their governance. We need to 

readjust the structures of decisionmaking in international bodies to reflect 

contemporary reality. We cannot hope to foster a democratic culture in 

the world until the principal international institutions are themselves 

democratized and made more representative.19

 The India-Russia relationship could possibly serve as a basis 

for future cooperation and for securing a multilateral international 

order, but it is restricted by the internal weaknesses of Russia and 

its diminished international stature. After the collapse of the Soviet 

Union, Russia, as the successor state, sought to distance itself from 

its traditional ally, India, and pursue a pro-Western policy. During 

the premiership of Yevgeny Primakov, Russian interest in India was 

revived, as the Russian premier proposed a strategic partnership 

between India, China, and Russia.20 In 2000, India and Russia signed 

the Declaration on Strategic Partnership but made it clear that it was 

aimed exclusively at countering terrorism and extremism. Since 

then, little has happened to suggest that India, China, and Russia 

will form a strong alliance that could potentially counter the United 

States. Russian Ambassador to India Alexander Kadakin has argued, 

“Strategic partners means that we support each other in our joint 

vision of the world. We are against a so-called unipolar world; we 

stand for a multipolar world. We are for political cooperation, we are 

against terrorism together.”21

 India, however, has downplayed the idea of a strategic 

partnership. At the same time, it has continued to buy significant 
14

amounts of weaponry from Russia, including systems that will 

potentially enhance its nuclear force structure. These sales should not 

be viewed, however, as a strengthening of the Russia-India strategic 

partnership but, instead, as a commercial venture on the part of 

the Russians. For the Indians, similarly, the purchase of weaponry 

from Russia comes as much from the inability to conclude domestic 

weapons programs successfully, as the willingness of Russia to 

once again throw open its arms cupboard and provide India with 

weapons systems that it could neither afford or get the permission 

to purchase from western suppliers. At the same time India-Russia 

trade relations no longer have the importance that they did during 

the Cold War. Indian exports to Russia are less than 2 percent of the 

country’s total exports, while its imports from Russia are less than 1 

percent of total imports. Optimistic assessments of India-Russia trade 

suggest that the two countries may reach $5 billion in bilateral trade 

by 2005, almost half of what is projected for India-China trade. 

 But perhaps the most difficult part of creating a Russia-India 

strategic partnership is how little Russia can now offer politically or 

economically to India. Politically, Russia is no longer the force the 

former Soviet Union was and consequently cannot serve as a counter 

to either China or the United States. Economically, Indian businesses 

remain pessimistic about the prospects in the Russian market. 

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov complained in an interview 

that India had yet to recognize that Russia was a market economy, 

and that Indian banks and other financial structures needed to accept 

the guarantees of private Russian banks.22

 The decline of Russia’s fortunes have led the Indian political 

leadership to recognize the limits of this old relationship, and, 

while Russia continues to serve as India principal armorer, it is 

not a relationship that can be used politically to enhance India’s 

ascension to a great power status. Thus while being uncomfortable 

with America’s unipolar status, India will have to rely on the United 

States to achieve its own great power aspirations. 

 The third contradictory factor is that India continues to seek a 

South Asia that is free from the influences of external powers and 

where it is the paramount country in the region. Such a goal may 

remain at odds with those of the United States, which views a 
15

relationship with Pakistan as a key part of the War on Terror. India 

views with concern the perceived American attempt to equate the 

two countries (particularly in their nuclear policies) and believes 

that the United States has not put enough pressure on Pakistan to 

halt its support to jihadi groups operating in Indian Kashmir. 

 From an Indian perspective, the other important aspect of U.S. 

foreign policy that has implications for India is that only two longterm strategic partnerships with the United States actually exist―

one with Israel and the other with the United Kingdom. With these 

countries, the United States is the closest when it comes to consulting 

on operations, commitments of defense, the sharing of technology, 

and the willingness to apply pressure on other states to facilitate 

these countries’ diplomatic strategies and to enhance their national 

security. 

 It would be difficult for India to create a similar strategic 

relationship with the United States because it neither has the historical 

and cultural ties that have forged these strategic relationships, nor 

does it want, as a reformist state, to pursue the types of policies that 

would cement such a relationship. India would be unwilling to be 

the type of military partner that the United Kingdom has been in 

U.S. global military efforts. The Indian unwillingness to commit to 

the first and second Gulf War coalitions is a case in point. Further, 

India does not have the type of historical and cultural-emotional 

ties that have forged a strong U.S.-Israel relationship. While IndianAmericans have played a role in cementing these ties,23 it would be 

an exaggeration to suggest that they have the type of political and 

economic influence that the American Jewish community does. 

 Lastly, for a congruence of American and Indian worldviews, there 

has to be recognition of India’s quest to become a global power. Yet 

current American policies, both intentionally and unintentionally, 

serve to restrict such progress. The first major constraint is the 

U.S. lack of recognition of India’s nuclear status. Despite the 1998 

tests and the subsequent lengthy meetings between then Deputy 

Secretary of State Strobe Talbott and then Foreign Minister Jaswant 

Singh, official U.S. policy remains one of not recognizing India as a 

nuclear weapons state. Instead, the official policy is to get India to 

become a signatory to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) 

and to terminate its nuclear weapons program. As U.S. Assistant 
16

Secretary for Nonproliferation John Wolf stated at the Third Session 

of the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the 

Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York, 

May 4, 2004):

Turning to South Asia, our focus there is not on compliance, as neither 

India nor Pakistan is a party to the NPT. While we remain committed to 

universal NPT adherence, our focus in South Asia has been, and remains, 

on preventing actions that would undermine the global nonproliferation 

regime and regional stability―be it through nuclear testing, deployment, 

nuclear use, or proliferation to other countries. The United States has an 

active dialogue with both countries on these issues. 

We have taken steps recently with both countries to strengthen relations 

in order to advance our regional goals, enhance the fight against terrorism, 

and to secure cooperation from both countries on export controls. These 

steps should not, however, be taken to suggest that we have “accepted” the 

status of either country as a nuclear weapon state under the NPT. We have 

not. Moreover, we will not reward either country for their decisions to acquire 

nuclear weapons or for the 1998 tests that made the world and the region a more 

dangerous place (emphasis added). 

We have steadfastly avoided taking any actions that would be contrary to our 

long-established nuclear export control policy. India and Pakistan remain 

ineligible under U.S. law and policy for any significant assistance to their 

nuclear programs. We continue to call on India and Pakistan not to conduct 

nuclear tests, to end the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, to 

take steps to reduce regional tensions and to prevent the use of nuclear weapons 

(emphasis added).24

Such recognition is crucial, however, because it would lead to a 

change in the policies of all the de jure nuclear powers that continue 

to deny India its rightful nuclear status. Further, the lack of a legal 

nuclear status prevents the transfer of vital technologies that India 

requires for its own modernization and economic development. 

 India would like to get a range of dual use and space technologies 

from the United States since these are crucial to the country’s 

future economic and technological growth. For several reasons, 

the United States has been reluctant to transfer such technologies.25

Nonproliferation concerns drive such reservations since American 

officials are worried about the transfer of sensitive technologies to 

third parties. While the United States has agreed to ease some of the 
17

restrictions on the sale of dual-use, space, and nuclear technologies 

to India,26 the U.S. Department of Commerce has made it clear that 

such transfers will be for civilian purposes and take place within the 

limits set by multilateral nonproliferation regimes.27 This has led to 

suggestions that the recent reported progress in the National Security 

Studies Program (NSSP) is cosmetic at best.28 U.S. officials, however, 

contend that significant changes have taken place, removing the need 

for 25 percent of all license applications for U.S. exports to India.29

At some stage, however, technology transfers in the military field 

also will have to be considered. And as long as such multilateral 

limits exist, it could mean the imposition of sanctions when India 

takes measures in the military field that are inimical to broader U.S. 

interests. 

 Coupled with the problems associated with technology transfers 

are the divergent views on the Indian nuclear program. Despite 14 

meetings between Talbott and Singh (after the India’s 1998 nuclear 

tests), the United States remains committed in the long term to 

having India rollback its nuclear program and sign the NPT. Until 

this official position is reversed, India will neither achieve its status 

as a legitimate major power nor can Washington expect New Delhi 

to be a willing and cooperative partner in matters of international 

security. This lack of international recognition for its nuclear 

ambitions has placed India in the position of not being able to utilize 

its nuclear capability to enhance its security and its international 

status. Resolving the nuclear issue is vitally important to India, given 

that it has the status of a third tier nuclear state.

India: Third Tier Nuclear State? 

 In fact, since 1998, India has been a third-tier nuclear state. First 

tier nuclear states (the United States and Russia) have far greater 

numbers of nuclear weapons than their nearest rivals. They also 

have global reach with their nuclear weapons and can deter nuclear 

retaliation by other states, particularly those at lower tiers in the 

nuclear hierarchy.30

 Second tier nuclear states have smaller nuclear forces with 

less advanced technological capabilities than first tier states and 

an extraregional, but not global, reach. While they have a first use 
18

capability against more powerful states, they do not have a first 

strike capability. Nor do they have a credible deterrent capability 

against first tier states. 

 Third tier nuclear states (which currently include India, 

Israel, Pakistan, and possibly North Korea) have forces that are 

numerically small, not technologically advanced, limited in range to 

their regions, and do not have a deterrent capability against first or 

second tier nuclear states.31 The management of nuclear crises at the 

third tier level also has required the intervention of external parties. 

Additionally, no third tier nuclear state has been involved in the 

decisionmaking processes that framed the legal and institutional basis 

of the international nuclear order. Instead, these states have been the 

targets of the international regimes created to check proliferation. 

 Indian analyst Sisir Gupta explained the limitations of the third 

tier state when he wrote that becoming a nuclear state would be 

insufficient for enhancing the country’s security or its international 

status. Instead, India would become just one of several countries to 

have a nuclear capability. Gupta argued that if India had to be more 

than just another nuclear state (the n plus 20 dilemma), it would have 

to use its nuclear status to reshape the international system.32

 Gupta’s analysis is still relevant in the present-day international 

context. India’s current nuclear capability and its glacial progress 

towards developing a stronger nuclear capability condemn it to the 

status of a third tier nuclear state. For India to be viewed as more 

than a regional nuclear power that is obsessed with Pakistan, it has 

to develop a nuclear deterrent that is taken seriously by China as 

well as the other first and second tier nuclear states. 

 In the case of China, India, at present, lacks the ability to target its 

eastern seaboard and, therefore, lacks a credible deterrent against that 

country. The Indian government has, in fact, repeatedly postponed 

the testing of the Agni III missile that would give India such a 

capability. India’s reticence to do so may result from technical delays 

or the desire to not strain a Sino-Indian relationship that is beginning 

to thaw and move forward along positive lines. Yet without such 

a capability, India will not be taken seriously in China’s strategic 

calculations. 

 A credible deterrent also would require the acquisition of 

a nuclear submarine fleet that would provide a second strike 
19

capability against both China and Pakistan. Indian Navy Chief 

Admiral Arun Prakash has asked for such a capability, but the 

indigenous Advanced Technology Vehicle Project is making slow 

progress, and India, officially at least, has not penned a deal with 

Russia to acquire the nuclear-powered Akula submarines.33

 The United States is not keen to see the development of an Indian 

nuclear capability. As Ashley Tellis has argued, the United States 

would like India to have a nuclear force that has no intercontinental 

ballistic missiles (ICBMs), where the growth of the nuclear force is 

slow, and the number of weapons built is low.34 The no ICBM, slow 

and low approach satisfies Washington because it does not give India 

a military capability to threaten the continental United States. At the 

same time, the slow and low approach would ensure that the South 

Asian arms race did not escalate rapidly or that the rapid growth of 

a nuclear force presented the problems of ensuring the security of 

nuclear weapons.

 For the United States, the central concerns are that India and 

Pakistan not enter into a shooting war that escalates rapidly to a 

potential nuclear showdown. Such a conflict would jeopardize U.S. 

counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and drag 

Washington into a South Asian nuclear conflict. The other concern 

is that both Indian and Pakistani nuclear forces remain secure and 

do not fall into the wrong hands. Here, too, there is a real problem 

created by India’s de facto, as opposed to de jure, nuclear status. 

Lacking legal recognition, neither India, or for that matter Pakistan, 

can receive technologies like permissive action links (PALs)―

electromechanical locking mechanisms that safeguard nuclear 

weapons from unauthorized use―to make their weapons safer. 

The American logic is that, apart from being a violation of existing 

nonproliferation laws,35 transferring such technologies would make 

it easier to deploy such weapons and increase the likelihood of their 

usage.

 The three American concerns of no ICBMs, slow growth, and 

low numbers condemn India to a third tier nuclear status that not 

only makes it difficult for the country to achieve a credible nuclear 

capability, but also to be a nuclear state that will not be taken 

seriously when it comes to engaging in discussions about the future 

of the international nuclear order. No ICBMs and the lack of a 
20

submarine-launched force essentially would take away the Indian 

ability to deter China (with Pakistan being a different case).36 The 

present nuclear force provides a second use capability against China 

and that, too, is only against mid-level towns in the southwestern 

regions of China and not China’s industrial heartland.37 A second 

use capability provides an ability to hurt China, but it is difficult to 

say whether an attack on a second level town that is not in China’s 

political heartland would deter military action by Beijing. 

 A second problem with the possession of a third tier nuclear 

force is that it does little to enhance the country’s prestige or its 

ability to translate its military capability into political leverage. As 

Bharat Wariawalla has argued, if nuclear weapons are the currency 

of international power, then a country has to be able to display that 

currency.38 An India that is reduced by international constraints to 

possessing a third tier nuclear force with limited range and limited 

capabilities would never be invited by the major powers to participate 

in global disarmament negotiations since the currency it displays 

would be a weak one. 

 Third, if India is to play the role of stabilizer in Asia, it 

requires fewer restrictions placed on its nuclear and conventional 

capabilities. This not only requires giving India a freer hand with 

its nuclear force structure but also providing the technologies to 

enhance its conventional capabilities. At the conventional level, 

one such restriction is the denial of missile defense technology to 

India. If India is to successfully operationalize its no-first use nuclear 

doctrine, it has to build in a capability to deal with an accidental or 

unauthorized launch of nuclear weapons by an enemy state. To do 

so, a national missile defense capability is essential since it could 

help protect against such an attack and maintain a high nuclear 

threshold. A national missile defense capability would also reiterate 

India’s intention to be a defensive, as opposed to an offensive, nuclear 

power. On the other hand, some would argue that providing India 

with a nuclear missile defense (NMD) capability would enhance its 

ability to wage war against Pakistan and thus destabilize the South 

Asian region. For this reason, sections of the U.S. Government have 

opposed the sale of the Israeli Arrow anti-ballistic missile to India. 
21

Domestic Political Opposition.

 There is also continued opposition among some Indian domestic 

political groups about forging a closer relationship with the United 

States. The main party in the ruling United Progressive Alliance, the 

Indian National Congress, would like to continue India’s traditional 

policy of nonalignment even though it has limited utility in the 

present-day international system. While in the opposition, current 

Indian foreign minister Natwar Singh argued that nonalignment 

had effectively served the country’s interests. As he put it, “The 

broad foreign policy framework left behind by Nehru has stood us in 

good stead. There is no other foreign policy India can follow without 

becoming a satellite. The people of India will not allow this country 

to be a camp follower of any country, howsoever powerful.”39

 Reflecting the continued wariness about unipolarity, the Indian 

parliament, in fact, unanimously condemned the U.S. attack on 

Iraq even as the two countries were headed towards joint military 

exercises. More recently, the various Indian political parties strongly 

criticized the government when it said it would closely consider a 

U.S. proposal for sending Indian troops to Iraq. The Communist 

Party of India (Marxist) said in a statement that the foreign minister’s 

ambiguous remarks in Washington (about taking a close look at the 

idea of sending troops) had to be clarified and that, “The government 

must make it clear that there is no question of sending troops to Iraq 

to bolster the American occupation.” The statement continued that 

there had been no change in the situation in Iraq whatsoever and, 

“Iraq has been under American occupation for the last 14 months. 

There is a popular uprising against the brutal occupation.”40

 On the other hand, the death of the Cold War presented a series 

of opportunities to India as the constraints of bipolarity no longer 

shaped the conduct of Indian foreign policy. No longer constrained 

by Cold War politics that had seen a growing dependence on the 

Soviet Union and an attempted relationship with the Arab countries, 

India was to move in the 1990s to forge a closer relationship with the 

United States. From a military-strategic perspective, it recognized 

Israel in 1992, and, a decade later, Israel had emerged as the second 

largest seller of weaponry to India. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) 
22

viewed a strong relationship with the United States as essential to its 

plans for developing India and securing it from external threats. As 

part of the move towards the United States, India also redefined its 

policy towards Israel.

 In the period of nonalignment, India supported the Arab nations 

and never gave full diplomatic recognition to Israel. This changed 

in the early 1990s when the Narasimha Rao government recognized 

Israel, and an exchange of ambassadors took place. Under the BJP 

government, the relationship rapidly improved primarily in the area 

of security cooperation. Israel became the second largest supplier of 

arms to India. It proved its worth as a reliable supplier by dipping 

into its war reserves and providing India with the much need 

artillery shells and mortars to fight the 1999 Kargil limited war with 

Pakistan.

 Since then, a burgeoning military relationship has emerged 

between the two countries, and Israel is providing the critical 

subsystems to upgrade India’s Russian arsenal. Israel has also 

sold the Green Pine early warning radar to India and would like to 

complement it with the Arrow 2 anti-ballistic missile. The sale of the 

Phalcon airborne early warning system has also been finalized.41

 Israeli analysts and some proponents of the relationship in India 

view this as a U.S.-Israel-India coalition against terrorism. While 

this posture has definite advantages, particularly the fact that three 

democratic nations are cooperating, it has also led to the danger 

of being branded as a Hindu-Zionist-Christian alliance against the 

Islamic world.

 The Israel-India relationship is unlikely to breakdown since 

the two countries have complementary interests, and the Indian 

government is careful to maintain a continued and strong relationship 

with the Arab nations and Iran. Indian firms have found natural 

gas in Yemen, Oman is considering investments in Indian industry, 

and India working with Iran to create a Mumbai-Chah Bahar-St. 

Petersburg corridor that will cut down the time taken to transport 

goods, but also work to open economic possibilities along the 

length of the proposed corridor. India has signed an agreement to 

purchase natural gas from Iran, and there has been some discussion 

about extending the proposed Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan 
23

pipeline to India. These foreign policy moves brought India into 

greater consonance with U.S. global strategy. 

 The tension between such constraints and opportunities is 

shaping Indian policy towards the United States. India is moving 

towards a closer relationship with the United States while still 

maintaining reservations about how strongly to develop these ties. As 

a consequence, the U.S.-India security relationship is growing along 

two lines: on the one hand, there is increasing military and other 

security related cooperation between the two countries, as witnessed 

by 10 joint military exercises in the past 2 years; on the other, there is 

a feeling of disquiet in New Delhi that the United States is unable to 

get Pakistan to halt cross-border terrorism completely. Given these 

tensions between constraints and opportunities, it is necessary to 

look at the supposed bases of the current relationship to see which 

of these can actually help the development of stronger bilateral ties.

Basis of the Relationship.

 Analysts argue that the recent upswing in India-U.S. relations 

has been driven by three factors: the existence of an Indian diaspora 

in the United States; the tactical need to coordinate strategies with 

India following the demands of the War on Terror; and the Bush 

administration’s belief that India could play a role in the long run as 

a strategic partner of the United States. 

 The long-term effectiveness of all three factors in cementing the 

relationship has to be qualified. First, the role and influence of the 

Indian diaspora has been overhyped, and its ability to bring the 

relationship forward has to be tempered. One of the mistaken beliefs 

about the Indian diaspora is that it can do for India what the American 

Jewish community has been able to do for Israel. As the Government 

of India’s High Level Committee on the Indian Diaspora put it:

A section of financially powerful and politically well-connected IndoAmericans has emerged during the last decade. They have effectively 

mobilized on issues ranging from the nuclear tests in 1998 to Kargil, played 

a crucial role in generating a favorable climate of opinion in Congress and 

defeating anti-India legislation there, and lobbied effectively on other 

issues of concern to the Indian community. They have also demonstrated 

willingness to contribute financially to Indian causes, such as relief for the 
24

Orissa cyclone and the Latur and Gujarat earthquakes, higher technical 

education and innumerable charitable causes.

For the first time, India has a constituency in the U.S. with real influence 

and status. The Indian community in the United States constitutes an 

invaluable asset in strengthening India’s relationship with the world’s 

only superpower.42

 For a number of reasons, however, the Indian-American 

community is not similar to the American Jewish community and, 

therefore, it cannot be used as a role model for influencing policy 

decisions. The Indian American community is relatively small, 

approximately 1.7 million people, according to the 2000 census, 

and even if it were to double in the next decade, as it conceivably 

will, it will only be about 1 percent of the American population of 

approximately 300 million. Second, the community does not have 

the spatial concentration that the Jewish community does in New 

York or the Cuban-American community has in Miami. Its ability to 

influence elections in key constituencies or states is limited. Third, 

the Indian-American community gave about $7 million in election 

contributions for the 2000 campaign. This is a miniscule amount 

when compared to the billions of dollars that were raised in campaign 

contributions. Fourth, the Indian community, for the most part, 

is a new community, with its most successful members only now 

reaching that age group, between 50-65, that contributes generously 

to political campaigns. When compared with the century-long Jewish 

community’s political contributions and public philanthropy―the 

creation, for example, of first rate hospitals―the Indian community’s 

influence is far more modest.43

 In some areas, notably on the India-Pakistan issue, the Indian 

diaspora has played a useful role, but it should be recognized that 

policy measures taken in this area have been in consonance with 

American foreign policy objectives and not sharply against them. 

After 9/11, it was only a matter of time before the United States 

rescinded the economic sanctions it had imposed on India. Finally, 

some evidence suggests that the support the Indian diaspora provides 

India on the India-Pakistan issue may not survive a generational 

change. The generation of Indians who first migrated to this country 

are the ones most concerned with the issue. The generation born in 
25

America is less concerned about it and, in fact, some have taken to 

identifying themselves as South Asian-Americans much in the same 

way as Latinos or African-Americans. Others, however, have taken 

the path of calling themselves Hindu-Americans.44 The ability of the 

diaspora to significantly shape India-U.S. relations, therefore, must 

be placed at a more modest level than what some analysts, including 

members of the Indian government, have been arguing.

The War on Terror.

 The second rationale for security cooperation and stronger 

ties comes from the mutual challenges that India and the United 

States face in the War on Terror effort. This has seen the growth of 

cooperation in the areas of law enforcement, intelligence sharing, 

and, more recently, discussions on technology controls. While these 

are important steps, they have the tendency of becoming one-sided 

and may cause legal problems within the country. The United States, 

as in the case of Pakistan, may ask for an access to Indian airports to 

conduct biometric scans of outgoing passengers. Such scans can be 

considered intrusive and may violate the rights of Indian citizens. 

Further, there is no guarantee that India will get reciprocal rights to 

identify, track, and extradite people implicated in terrorist activities 

against it. These, however, are technical issues that can be resolved 

through bureaucratic negotiations. More problematic are the 

contradictory views of the United States and India on what exactly 

constitutes a War on Terror.

 In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, the Indian government 

offered its wholehearted support to the United States because 

it viewed the U.S. newly declared War on Terror as one that was 

aimed at comprehensively dismantling radical groups in South Asia. 

It also erroneously believed that the United States would view the 

problem of terror as emanating from both Afghanistan and Pakistan 

and work militarily and politically to isolate both countries.

 Instead, the United States took a position that did not satisfy 

Indian security interests. It agreed to put diplomatic pressure on 

General Musharraf to halt cross-border terrorism but was unable to 

bring about a complete halt of terrorist activity. As C. Raja Mohan 

explains:
26

In India, there is rising disenchantment at the American unwillingness or 

inability to deliver Pakistan on cross-border terrorism. This is compounded 

by renewed calls from Washington for a dialogue with Pakistan. New 

Delhi says it stood down in the military confrontation with Islamabad 

last summer following assurances from the highest level in Washington 

that the Pakistan President, Pervez Musharraf, had promised to put an 

end to infiltration of terrorists on a permanent basis. Having failed to get 

Gen. Musharraf to keep his promise, the Government argues, the U.S. 

has no business to push India into an engagement with Pakistan.45

Despite ongoing negotiations between India and Pakistan, 

disappointment continues in New Delhi about the efforts to get the 

United States to create an anti-terrorism policy that is in consonance 

with Indian objectives. This led the Indian prime minister, in 

September 2004, to express his frustration before the UN:

We speak about cooperation [against terrorism] but seem hesitant to 

commit ourselves to a global offensive to root out terrorism, with the 

pooling of resources, exchange of information, sharing of intelligence, and 

the unambiguous unity of purpose required. This must change. We do 

have a global coalition against terrorism. We must give it substance and 

credibility, avoiding selective approaches and political expediency.46

 Indian analysts also point out that India’s dependence on the 

United States, and its deference to Washington’s goals in the region, 

cost the country its military credibility vis-à-vis Pakistan. While, 

in the aftermath of the military standoff of May-June 2002, Indian 

policymakers congratulated themselves on the ability to use coercive 

diplomacy against Pakistan, the statements emerging from Islamabad 

suggested that General Musharraf thought otherwise. Instead, the 

Pakistani government congratulated itself on calling the Indian 

bluff through a mixture of conventional and nuclear deterrence. 

Thus Islamabad, much like New Delhi, may have learned the wrong 

lessons from the 2002 crisis. 

Strategic Partnership? 

The Constraints of a Hyphenated Relationship.

 The third potential basis for the relationship is the idea of a 

strategic partnership, but any such partnership would depend on 

removing the hyphen in U.S.-India relations―by making it separate 
27

from the relationship with Pakistan. On September 9, 2002, Indian 

foreign minister Yashwant Sinha declared in a speech at the 

Brookings Institution that the India-U.S. relationship would no 

longer be a hyphenated one that included Pakistan. Instead, it would 

be a bilateral relationship where the problems caused by the U.S. link 

with Islamabad would be downplayed. In fact, India continues to 

link the Pakistan issue in its dealings with the United States. Before 

discussing the broader U.S.-India relationship, it is necessary to 

discuss the misperceptions that complicate Pakistan-India relations 

and the U.S.-India-Pakistan hyphenated relationship. 

India-Pakistan Relations.

 The Indian and Pakistani views of each other are based on 

unrealistic appraisals. Sections of India’s leadership view Pakistanis 

as long-lost prodigal brothers who will one day see the light and 

move towards a more constructive relationship with people who 

are culturally and ethnically similar to them. This view was echoed 

by India former deputy prime minister L. K. Advani who said, “If 

East and West Germany could unite despite acrimonious political 

relations, why not India and Pakistan? There may be difficulties, 

but it is not impossible. A day will come when the people of both 

countries will realize that partition has done no good to them.”47

 The opposite is true. For Pakistan, a closer relationship with India 

essentially would mean undoing partition and would place severe 

challenges on the Pakistani national identity. It would also be the 

first step in wiping out the political and cultural distinctiveness of 

Pakistan. Such a distinctiveness could be retained if Pakistan’s identity 

as a nation-state was secure, but two sets of constraints―economic 

and political―make it difficult to have a concrete Pakistani identity. 

Economically, the War on Terror has benefited Pakistan by obtaining 

U.S. assistance in securing International Monetary Fund (IMF) 

loans and in stabilizing the economy, and the country has witnessed 

creditable economic growth. But the larger structural constraints 

that drive the economy have yet to be removed successfully, most 

notably a halting drive towards market reforms and the ability of 

the Pakistani government to raise revenues. Coupled with this is the 

problem of alleviating poverty in Pakistan. The last available figures 
28

on poverty levels in the country show an increase in the population 

share of people living below the official poverty line from 26 percent 

in 1990-91 to 32 percent 2000-01.48

 Politically, Pakistan remains a society where ethnic identities 

supercede national loyalties. Thus both the North West Frontier and 

Baluchistan remain feudal holdouts as witnessed by the delicate 

balancing that President Pervez Musharraf has had to undertake to 

carry out operations against al-Qaeda in these areas. There has also 

been talk of rising secessionist feelings in Baluchistan. The rise of 

the fundamentalists in Pakistan, while not threatening the territorial 

integrity of the state or for that matter the control of the Pakistani 

military, also suggests that the potential for greater domestic 

instability exists in that country. 

 Pakistan’s perceptions of India are similarly flawed and come, by 

and large, from two historical frames of reference―the partition of 

1947 and the creation of Bangladesh in 1971. Thus official Pakistani 

statements, as well as those of analysts and scholars, continue to 

harp on the two-nation theory, even though it was discredited with 

Bangladesh’s creation. Within this framework falls the Kashmir issue, 

which Pakistani analysts argue is a core part of Pakistan’s national 

identity. 

 President Musharraf has stated that the only way for Pakistan to 

have a peace with honor is for a settlement to the Kashmir dispute.49

This denies a fundamental problem in India-Pakistan relations: that 

Kashmir is a symptom and not the cause of hostile relations between 

India and Pakistan. The real threat for Pakistan remains India’s 

size (which does matter) and the fact that it remains a multiethnic, 

multireligious state. Aslam Siddiqi, a Pakistani scholar writing in 

1948, argued that when a small nation bordered a larger nation, the 

larger nation was likely to dominate it. Geo-political considerations 

therefore, made it necessary for the smaller country to resist such 

domination.50 For Pakistan, this geo-political constraint continues to 

exist, and it grows with the strengthening of the Indian economy and 

the country’s conventional military capability. The other problem 

comes from the fact that a secular and democratic India makes the 

need for a Pakistan irrelevant. 

 Given these facts, resolving Kashmir may not be in the long-term 

interests of the Pakistani elite. A satisfactory solution for Pakistan, 
29

one that fulfills its national identity, requires a transfer of all, or 

at least a significant portion, of Indian Kashmir to Pakistan. Yet 

this is likely to create more problems for Pakistan that it resolves. 

It would still leave India a large country of a billion people with 

a rabidily nationalist government armed with nuclear weapons. 

This would exacerbate Pakistan’s security dilemma. On the other 

hand, continuing a Kashmir dispute, with casualty levels that are 

acceptable to India, works to further Pakistan’s military interests. A 

low level insurgency keeps significant numbers of Indian troops tied 

down in Kashmir, thus preventing them from being used against 

Pakistan. The domestic consequences of such a resolution would be 

equally problematic. Once Kashmir is resolved, the rationale for high 

defense expenditure in Pakistan would be removed, thus threatening 

the power and prestige of the Pakistani military. 

 From the perspective of U.S.-India relations, the Pakistani link 

will continue until India attempts to develop a new bilateral means 

to deal with Pakistan. This includes the ability to communicate with 

Pakistan in a crisis and, most importantly, to be able to make a range 

of credible threats to Pakistan to ensure that Islamabad is deterred 

from carrying out actions seen as inimical to Indian interests. In 

the existing situation, however, the credibility of India to achieve 

compellance is limited. Its 2002 mobilization along the India-Pakistan 

border was claimed as a victory for coercive diplomacy by the Indian 

government. Yet Pakistani officials issued statements arguing that 

they were coerced by the Indian threat. Instead, President Pervez 

Musharraf argued that what prevented India from initiating a war was 

his threat, conveyed through world leaders, to use unconventional 

measures to halt an Indian conventional attack.51

 Coupled with the perceived inability to use nuclear weapons 

as tools of compellance lies the problem that India and Pakistan 

are now starting to put mechanisms in place that permit direct 

communications in a crisis. While a “hotline” exists between the 

military commanders in the field, it did little to provide any sense of 

security or information to Pakistan about what Indian motives were 

in a possible conflict in 2002. In fact, during the May-June 2002 crisis, 

Ambassador Lodhi claimed that the hotline had not been working 

“for some days now.”52 Thus Pakistan’s leadership had to prepare 
30

for the worst and issue threats for the possible first use of nuclear 

weapons. 

 In the past few months, both countries have recognized the need 

for more effective communications so as to prevent the escalation 

of tensions and to further confidence-building. In June 2004, the 

two countries agreed to establish a hotline between their Foreign 

Secretaries and Directors General of Military Operations “to 

prevent misunderstandings and reduce risks relevant to nuclear 

issues.”53 While establishing direct lines of communications (LOC) 

is important, the real problem lies in getting both sides to trust the 

messages they send each other in a crisis. Removing the hyphen thus 

may seem rhetorically easy, but it cannot happen unless the Indian 

government is able to negotiate on substantive issues with Pakistan. 

The problem, however, remains one of how to enter into negotiations 

without dealing with the Kashmir issue. 

 A more plausible basis for the relationship comes from the idea 

that both the United States and India are democracies that share 

the values of freedom and secularism. Like the United States, India 

views with concern the breakdown of democracy in the surrounding 

regions and is also worried by the rise of radical Islamic groups in 

Central, South, and Southwest Asia. Like the United States, it also 

would like to see stability in the Indian Ocean littoral and prevent the 

growth of piracy and maritime terrorism―the 1993 Mumbai bomb 

blasts were done by a group that smuggled eight and a half tons of 

cyclotrimethylene trinitramine (RDX) explosives into the country by 

sea. If these mutually shared values and complementary interests are 

taken into account, then there is a potential for cooperation between 

the two states on a range of issues.

Cooperation and Its Limits.

 In the past few years, India-U.S. relations have focused on military 

cooperation, the possibility of technology transfers, and discussions 

about India’s potential as an emerging market. Military cooperation 

has been the most highly visible aspect of the changed relations 

between the two countries. The two militaries have conducted 

10 joint exercises, and Indian naval vessels have been escorting 
31

American naval assets from the Straits of Malacca to the Arabian 

Sea, thus freeing up American ships for other operations. 

 Military cooperation can be carried out in joint operations 

or in India providing forces for peacekeeping operations. Both 

technological limitations and political attitudes make joint operations 

difficult in the near future. At the technological level, Indian military 

equipment and communications infrastructure is a generation 

to a generation-and-a-half behind that of the United States. This 

makes it difficult to launch operations or share information in real 

time. Unless the United States is willing to transfer the requisite 

technologies, such cooperation would not be possible. For India to 

acquire this technology, a qualitatively different relationship would 

have to emerge where the United States trusted India’s ability to keep 

transferred technology secure from theft or illegal transfers. It would 

also require the type of close political and military cooperation that 

the United States has with its NATO allies. 

Technology Transfers: The Development 

of India’s Space Program.

 The NSSP undertakes to move India gradually from a country 

that was on various U.S. export control lists to one that can avail 

itself of civilian nuclear, civilian space, dual-use, and eventually 

ballistic missile defense (BMD) technology―what has been dubbed 

the glide path. Of these, BMD technology transfers will only happen 

in the long run because, given India’s creeping weaponization, it 

will take New Delhi considerable time to figure out what its BMD 

and theater missile defense (TMD) requirements are. In the short 

run, the transfer of civilian space technology may work to further 

the relationship, but here, too, there is a divergence of views on the 

utility of the NSSP. On the American side, Deputy Assistant Secretary 

for Export Administration Matthew S. Borman has pointed out that 

the significance of the NSSP lies in the fact that both the United 

States and India share common interests of nonproliferation and 

facilitating high-technology trade. Consequently, they have taken a 

set of reciprocal steps that are consistent with each others’ laws. The 

United States has removed the Indian Space Research Organization’s 
32

(ISRO) headquarters from the Commerce Department’s entity list. It 

has also applied a presumption of approval for all dual-use items 

(although this does not cover the troubled Indian nuclear reactors 

at Tarapur that come under restrictions placed by the Nuclear 

Suppliers Group). The United States has also agreed to eliminate the 

need for export licenses for 25 percent of U.S. items that India seeks 

to import.54

 On the Indian side, doubts remain about the reliability of the 

United States as a supplier and the extent to which restrictions, in 

fact, have been removed. It has been argued that because the United 

States will adhere to its international commitments and to its domestic 

laws, India will acquire few substantive items for its space program. 

Further, the fact that ISRO’s subsidiaries remain on the restricted list 

means that the space organization will be able to import few of the 

items it requires.55

 Traditional Indian concerns about the challenges posed to Indian 

sovereignty have also been raised. Indian commentators point out 

that the sanctions on particular Indian scientists have not been raised, 

that the Indian Ministry of External Affairs has not clarified what 

reassurances India had to give the United States, and that India had 

to accept the appointment of a technology control attaché at the U.S. 

embassy in New Delhi as examples of how the country’s sovereignty 

was being restricted.56

 If the NSSP is to work, therefore, it becomes imperative that a 

satisfactory level of technology transfers takes place in this area, 

satisfying supporters of the initiative in the Indian government as 

well as silencing critics both within and outside it. The only way to 

do this is to develop a credible record of technology transfers over 

a period of time. At the same time, the Indian government would 

need to prove that the technology transfers it receives continue to be 

protected and are not leaked to third parties. If such a track record is 

created by both countries, then a level of mutual trust would arise and 

permit them to graduate to more significant levels of cooperation.

Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement.

 India has a long tradition of peacekeeping, and it could play 

an important part in future nation-building efforts by the United 
33

States around the world. As General Arjan Ray has pointed out, 

the Indian armed forces have experience, or trained for, diverse 

military operations that include nuclear war, conventional war, 

counterinsurgencies, and civilian relief efforts. The Indian armed 

forces also have combat experience in high altitude warfare, as well 

as desert and jungle warfare. The strong tradition of civil-military 

relations in the country are also beneficial to peacekeeping efforts 

since it means the Indian military force is conducive to receiving 

orders from civilian administrators and implementing them. 

 Additionally, the Indians have a rich experience in peacekeeping, 

having participated in UN efforts since the Korean War. In Somalia, 

for instance:

The Indian contingent dug a large number of wells, constructed schools 

and mosques, and ran mobile dispensaries and relief camps, which 

provided veterinary care, and medical and humanitarian relief to a large 

number of Somalis and their livestock. It also organized and carried out 

rehabilitation and resettlement of thousands of refugees and helped to 

repatriate them to their homes. The Indian contingent played a vital role 

in reviving the political process by organizing reconciliation meetings.57

 Politically, peacekeeping missions run into Indian concerns 

about American unilateralism and the differing worldviews on the 

threats in the international system. India is unlikely to send troops 

on peacekeeping or joint military operations unless it is legitimized 

by a resolution from the UN or some other multilateral institution. 

The decision to not send troops to Iraq was taken because such a 

multilateral consensus was unavailable. Having said that, the Indian 

government would be particularly interested in maintaining peace 

in the Indian Ocean littoral and in the broader Asian region. It 

would, therefore, seriously consider all requests for peacekeeping 

forces. What would make India more proactive in this area would be 

recognition of its regional role and a formal recognition of its global 

role through UN Security Council membership. The other area where 

India could facilitate America’s broader military-strategic interests is 

helping to promote strategic stability in Asia.
34

India in Asia: Implications for the United States.

 India’s growing role in Asia and its perceived security challenges 

mean that it shares complementary interests with the United States. 

These interests can be summed up in three words: terrorism, energy, 

and China. From 1962, when India lost its border war with China, 

until the mid-1980s, when India was to engage in a military show of 

strength along the Sino-Indian border, New Delhi had maintained a 

policy on non-antagonism vis-à-vis Beijing. This did not mean that 

the Indian government did not see China as a threat or that New 

Delhi had given up its claim to the territories that China had seized 

in 1962. Instead, there was a recognition that little could be done to 

get China to withdraw from its aggression. At the same time, India 

also tolerated Chinese assistance to the Pakistani nuclear program. 

 After the 1998 nuclear tests, however, India started to show a new 

confidence in its dealings with China, and the country’s strategic 

analysts began to discuss possible ways to contain China. India’s 

shift in thinking came from a growing confidence in the country’s 

military capabilities, as well as an increasing irritation with China 

for having provided Pakistan with a missile capability that gave it a 

credible nuclear delivery system against India. 

 Since then, India has followed a dual path in its relations with 

China. On the one hand, it has sought to normalize relations and, in 

2003, the visit of Prime Minister Vajpayee brought about significant 

progress in this area. The two countries agreed to appoint special 

representatives to resolve the border dispute. More crucially, India 

stated that Tibet was a part of China, thus removing a long-standing 

irritant in the relationship. China reciprocated by tacitly accepting 

that the state of Sikkim was part of India.58 Second, trade between the 

two countries has flourished as China has replaced Japan as India’s 

largest trading partner in Asia. The two countries expect bilateral 

trade to cross $10 billion by the end of 2004.59

 The burgeoning economic ties also have important consequences 

for the development of their respective domestic economies. For 

China, the economic development of its western regions lies in 

moving south through India and Burma. Lhasa to Kolkota was, until 

the Chinese takeover of Tibet, a long-standing trade route. For India, 
35

its eastern and northeastern regions would benefit similarly from 

the opening of trade with China.60 The Northeast remains relatively 

underdeveloped, and Indian observers believe that greater trade 

with China would not only lead to greater prosperity, but also serve 

to lessen the support to existing insurgencies in the region. 

 On the other hand, Indian military capabilities that have been 

growing incrementally provide India with the ability to contain 

Chinese expansion in Asia. Indian military doctrine has also started 

to shift from a South Asian focus to one that recognizes the need for 

a greater role in Asia. Indian Naval doctrine, for example, has been 

rewritten to give the Navy a blue water role and an operational sphere 

that stretches from the Straits of Hormuz to the Straits of Malacca.61

With this in mind, the Indian naval chief has publicly asked for the 

acquisition of two nuclear submarines so that the Navy can be part, 

ostensibly, of the country’s Minimum Nuclear Deterrent, and India 

is reportedly in the last stages of negotiating the acquisitions of two 

Akula class nuclear submarines.62

 The Indian Navy is concerned about the growing Chinese presence 

in the Indian Ocean, particularly its using Myanmar as a location for 

monitoring facilities. Further, Indian defense analysts point out that 

the Chinese development of the Pakistani port of Gwadar helps the 

Chinese Navy encircle India. In fact, the fear of encirclement by China, 

coupled with the use of proxies like Pakistan, has driven India’s plans 

to build up its long-range military capability. The Indian Air Force 

is now planning to have its Su-30s visit the Andaman Islands (that 

belong to India but are 1,200 miles from the Indian coastline) so as 

to give the military a strike capability that can reach Southeast Asia. 

The obvious mission would be to stop a hostile Chinese incursion 

into the Indian Ocean. Indian nuclear submarines, armed with the 

300 kilometer Klub missile or the BrahMos PJ-10 supersonic missile, 

could give the Indian Navy a second use capability against China.63

 At the same time, India has been cautious about provoking China 

with its military buildup. It has repeatedly postponed the testing of the 

Agni-III missile that would give it the capability to hit targets deeper 

in China. It has committed itself to a reduction of forces along the 

Sino-Indian border, and in 1993 and 1996 signed confidence-building 

measures with China―the Peace and Tranquility Agreements―that 

reduced force levels and pulled backed forces along the border. 
36

 Practical considerations also limit the extent to which the Indians 

can project military capability against China. India’s new aircraft 

carrier, the Admiral Gorshkov, will not enter service till the end of the 

decade. Nuclear submarines, when procured, are likely to have a 

similar time frame for induction. 

 The pace at which Indian nuclearization is being carried out also 

indicates the Indian belief that, while China’s intentions may be 

suspect, Beijing is unlikely to attempt to alter dramatically the status 

quo in the near future. Ashley Tellis has described India’s nuclear 

buildup as creeping weaponization.64 The slow speed at which 

warheads and delivery systems are being put together would suggest 

that Indian security perceptions do not require rapid development 

of a warfighting force. 

 To sum up, the Indians are cautious about China’s future ambitions 

but, at the same time, are beginning to recognize that India-China 

relations are not necessarily a zero-sum game. India-China relations 

could go in three possible directions―coexistence, cooperation, and 

conflict. Coexistence would entail the following trends:

 • A slow movement towards the resolution of the Sino-Indian 

border dispute. While there might be rhetorical exchanges, a 

backslide in the progress made in the resolution of the dispute 

is unlikely. 

 • A growth in trade with slower movement on the Indian side 

towards greater regional integration between the Chinese 

west and the Indian eastern and northeastern states. 

 • A slow move to build up the conventional and nuclear 

forces so that India would be in a position to deter China’s 

extraregional power projection, should the political-military 

situation change. 

A cooperative relationship, on the other hand, would mean:

 • Continuing progress that led to the relatively quick resolution 

of the border dispute.

 • A move towards force reductions, especially reducing Chinese 

nuclear force levels. 
37

 • A concerted move by both countries towards regional economic 

integration, and attempts at joint research and development 

of civilian and possibly defense related technologies. 

 • China’s recognition of India’s role as a major Asian power 

and commensurate moves by Beijing to accommodate Indian 

interests. These would include dampening the Chinese 

relationship with Pakistan. 

A conflictual relationship could arise because of:

 • The irretrievable collapse of the border talks and hostile 

Chinese movements in South East Asia. A significant Chinese 

boost to Pakistan’s nuclear and missile capabilities would also 

provoke a hostile reaction from India. 

 • A rapid move by India to militarize and upgrade its long range 

military capability. This would mean a move from creeping 

nuclearization to rapid nuclearization. 

 • A growing Chinese military presence in the Indian Ocean, 

particularly if one sees the entry of Chinese nuclear submarines 

into the area. 

 In the two less optimistic scenarios, Indian military power will 

continue to develop and serve to counterbalance Chinese military 

growth. The optimistic scenario, on the other hand, can only happen 

when there is a transformation of Chinese behavior that leads 

to a more cooperative framework of relations with all the major 

countries of Asia. If that happens, not only would the Chinese threat 

be reduced, but also true strategic stability would be established in 

Asia. Since the coexistence and conflict scenarios are more likely, 

it remains in American interests (as well as in those of the smaller 

Southeast Asian and East Asian nations) to see the emergence in 

Asia of a counterbalance to China. This particularly would be the 

case if China sought to use force to change the status quo vis-à-vis 

Taiwan. 

 As an Asian power, India would be ideologically and militarily 

different from China. Being a democracy that espouses social justice 

and economic growth, India provides an alternative role model to the 
38

nations of Asia that have based their economic growth models on the 

Chinese approach―one that places community rights over individual 

liberty. In its external policies, India, as a democracy, believes both 

in multilateralism and the rule of international law. While China 

also officially subscribes to both, its totalitarian structure and past 

behavior make it suspect in the eyes of its neighbors. Economically, 

India is a large market with a bourgeoning middle class and 

technologically skilled labor force. This provides an alternative to 

China, although substantial reforms will be required before India 

becomes as attractive a market for foreign direct investments as 

China is. 

 The other area where Indian military capability could be 

harnessed to facilitate American interests is in Central Asia. Indian 

interests there are driven by three factors: the need for energy 

resources and the potential of the Central Asian market; the attempt 

to counterbalance Chinese and Pakistani presence in the region; and 

the concern about radical Islam spreading from the region into India 

(especially Kashmir).65

 India viewed with concern the rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan 

and the subsequent destabilization of the region caused by that 

fundamentalist regime. It provided support to the Northern Alliance 

and, with the Taliban’s ouster, has sought to develop a presence in 

Central Asia. India has increased its cooperation with the Central 

Asian states, particularly Tajikistan, where it has reportedly 

established an air base.66 Such a base would not only permit military 

action against anti-government forces in Central Asia, but also serve 

to counter Pakistan’s efforts to establish “defense in depth” in the 

region. Like India, the Central Asian states are concerned about the 

growth of radical Islam and the threat it poses to their regimes that, 

because they are post-Soviet in orientation, tend to be secular.

 It has also actively engaged the Karzai government and established 

a major diplomatic presence in Afghan cities and has reached an 

agreement to train the Afghan national army.67 Like most regional 

countries, India would like to prevent the reemergence of radical 

Islamic groups in Central Asia and therefore would be willing to 

help build the indigenous security capabilities of these countries. For 

a United States strapped for manpower, Indian security assistance 
39

especially would be welcome since it would further Washington’s 

own goal of checking radical Islam in the region―thereby freeing 

U.S. troops for action in other theaters in the war against terror. 

 In terms of energy and economics, India would like to play a 

growing role in Central Asia both to check the role of China and 

Pakistan but also to satisfy its own developmental needs. By 2010, 

Indian demand for natural gas may be as high as 77 billion cubic 

meters, and a steady supply of gas from the resource rich Central 

Asian countries would satisfy this demand.68 India, with Russia 

and Iran, is engaged, therefore, in the development of a NorthSouth corridor (one that passes from Mumbai to Tehran and from 

there to St. Petersburg) that would, among other things, open the 

Central Asian economies to the outside world.69 India’s stakes in 

Central Asia are, therefore, expanding, and we are seeing a series of 

complementary U.S. interests emerge. For both countries, checking 

the rise of radical Islam in the region is important. The opening of 

the Central Asian economies, in which India is participating, will 

reduce these countries’ crippling dependence on the other former 

Soviet states, particularly Russia. And if India is able to help bring 

Iran back into the international community of nations, it will create a 

safer energy corridor than the one currently proposed to run through 

Afghanistan and Pakistan. 

 As mentioned earlier, a growth in security cooperation between 

the United States and India would rest on the removal of constraints 

on Indian military and technological development, as well as an 

appreciation of India’s emerging power potential. This, however, is 

likely to be a long-term process and one marked with several speed 

bumps as the American war against terror and the global policies 

of nonproliferation work to limit what can be achieved in IndoU.S. relations. Given these limitations, it is important that India, in 

the short-to-medium term, look for other avenues for successfully 

engaging the United States. Two such avenues are that both the 

United States and India share democratic values, and the other is to 

look at nonmilitary approaches to engagement. Both these avenues 

intersect in the growth of India’s soft power. 
40

The Value of Indian Soft Power.

 As one of the major democracies of the world, India also has a 

degree of soft power. It is a secular democracy, with a good and 

affordable education system as well as an independent media. 

As a secular democracy, India would like to see its immediate 

neighborhood and the larger Asian region comprise nations that 

share its political and cultural values. The spread of these values 

is important if a long-term solution to the radicalization of Asian 

societies is to be effected. The War on Terror attempts to deal only 

with the symptoms of the greater problems of social injustice and 

economic underdevelopment that plague developing societies. 

To bring about such changes, there is a pressing need to provide 

such societies with better educational training―especially for the 

young people who form the majority populations in some of these 

countries. 

 The United States has attempted to do this in Pakistan by 

providing money to improve that nation’s phantom educational 

system. But this effort is localized to one country, and its effectiveness 

has yet to be determined. For such measures to have a significant 

impact, however, there is the need to provide higher technological 

and managerial education to a growing number of students in such 

countries. And there the United States runs into to both security and 

resource problems. 

 In the post 9/11 world, the United States has started to place 

restrictions on the entry of Muslim students. Even when it has 

allowed students in, the high educational costs in the United States 

make it difficult to educate more than a very small number of students 

from these countries. India, with its large number of universities 

and its ability to provide a cheap and good education, makes a very 

attractive alternative. India has approximately 226 universities, 428 

engineering colleges, and more than 100 medical colleges, but the 

number of foreign students studying in India is small―in 2003, it 

was only 8,145.70

 What India needs to do, therefore, is propose that the United 

States help in expanding the Indian educational sector to make 

Indian universities a viable and cost-effective alternative for students 
41

from West, Southwest, and Central Asia. The Indian government 

could ask American educational institutions to collaborate with it 

to develop educational programs as well as provide fellowships to 

students from these countries. From an Indian perspective, such an 

influx of foreign students would increase India’s soft power, provide 

it with greater influence in neighboring countries since it had trained 

their technocratic elite, and help create a new leadership in these 

states. For the United States, a population with a modern technocratic 

education would serve as the entry point for American corporations 

into such countries. 

 The other way of spreading Indian soft power is to create a virtual 

classroom that can be accessed across Asia. Some have discussed 

making Indian Institute of Technology classes accessible virtually 

across Asia, and this would be the first step in bringing about a larger 

educational system that is deliverable across the world wide web. It is 

envisaged that, “A hybrid satellite-based network capable of digital 

video broadcast over two or three channels, data broadcasting, to 

use idle hours between video broadcasting and very small aperture 

terminal (VSAT), all coexistent on the same transponder, will form 

the backbone of the virtual institute.”71

 Following the launch in September 2004 of the Geostationary 

Satellite 3 (GSAT 3 or EDUSAT) by the Indian Space Resesarch 

Organization (ISRO), the ability to cover other South Asian countries, 

either partially or fully, already exists.72 With this comes the ability 

to impart a quality education in the rural areas of South Asia, thus 

helping alleviate the problem created by the phantom education 

system that exists in these areas.

Making New Delhi a Partner.

 While such possibilities for cooperation exist, the question 

becomes, “What incentives must be provided to make New Delhi 

a willing player in securing complementary security goals?” The 

Indian government would like to secure three objectives in its foreign 

relations―the legalization of its nuclear status, a permanent seat on 

the Security Council, and international recognition of the Line of 

Control as the border between India and Pakistan. 
42

 Although not a member of the NPT, India has adhered to the 

terms and conditions of the treaty insofar as they seek to prevent 

the proliferation of nuclear weapons, technology, and materials. 

Thus the Indian government has not transferred nuclear technology 

or materials to other states and reportedly refused to sell nuclear 

weapons to Libya. Yet official U.S. policy, and indeed that of the 

other established nuclear weapons states, remains one of asking 

India to rollback its nuclear weapons program and sign the NPT. 

 The American position of adhering to legal technicalities rather 

than accepting the nuclear reality in South Asia hurts India’s nuclear 

weapons program, undermines its security, and prevents India from 

rising to its perceived international status. Given the U.S. role as 

the remaining superpower and its leadership in nonproliferation 

initiatives, it is imperative to start a change of official policy in 

Washington. 

 The general consensus is that the NPT is set in stone and that the 

presence of arms control supporters in various branches of the U.S. 

Government makes it difficult to change this policy. Yet such a belief 

goes against the actions the United States has taken in reshaping, or 

moving away from, treaties written during the Cold War. Thus the 

Bush administration decided to walk out of the Anti-Ballistic Missile 

(ABM) treaty and instead go ahead with the development of a 

NMD capability. Despite dire warnings about the consequences, the 

American action actually elicited no strident and aggressive response 

from Russia. Similarly, the Bush administration decided to move 

beyond the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) negotiations 

and call for deep cuts in the existing nuclear weapons inventories. It 

is not inconceivable, therefore, that the Bush administration could 

consider a revision of the NPT to include the three de facto nuclear 

states that were left out of the original treaty. 

 A realistic appraisal would suggest that bringing India, Israel, 

and Pakistan into the nuclear club has advantages, particularly in the 

attempts to halt the further spread of nuclear weapons. As members 

of the club, the three countries would have to abide by the rules of 

membership, which include the refusal to transfer technology and 

materials.73 Further, it would permit the legal transfer of technologies 

like PALs, at least in the case of Pakistan, would help increase 
43

the security and safety of these arsenals. It is also in India’s interests 

to ensure that the Pakistani nuclear arsenal was secure since it would 

reduce the risk of an accidental or unauthorized launch of these 

weapons. 

 Both India and Pakistan can also make the convincing argument 

that the knowledge that their nuclear weapons are secure from 

international censure makes it possible for them to be more 

transparent in their dealings with each other and with the greater 

international community. 

 The second Indian objective is to attain a permanent seat on 

the Security Council since this provides formal acceptance of the 

country’s status as a nuclear power and as a major actor in the 

international system. India has succeeded in getting Britain, Japan, 

Germany, Russia, and even China to endorse its case. The United 

States remains opposed to this proposal. There are advantages to the 

greater international community in Indian inclusion in the Security 

Council. India has diplomatic links with nations like Iran, Syria, 

and Libya that, while having rocky relations with the international 

community, are important to any long-term solution of regional 

disputes. Further, Indian peacekeeping and peace enforcement 

capabilities make it a good partner in the quest to maintain regional 

security and deal with problem of reestablishing order in failed states. 

A permanent seat in the Security Council would not only give India 

the encouragement to act more proactively in the quest to maintain 

international peace and security, but it would also provide greater 

legitimacy to Indian initiatives in this process. 

 The third objective must be to get the United States to officially 

declare its support for the Line of Control as the official border 

between India and Pakistan. It is stating the obvious that until India 

is no longer immersed in the India-Pakistan dispute, it will be unable 

to carry out effectively its policies in the rest of the world. An India 

that has a less hostile relationship with Pakistan also becomes more 

attractive to investors, particularly if it means using the economic 

advantages provided by the geographical linkages between the two 

countries. Pipelines from Central Asia and Iran make the most sense 

if they can come through Pakistan to the large energy market that is 

India. 
44

 Potentially, this is not a position that the White House would 

be averse to taking. In the Arab-Israeli context, it has advocated a 

two state solution, but one that would require moving away from 

established UN resolutions to a more pragmatic approach that 

recognizes the realities on the ground. Further, the legalization of the 

LOC helps reduce tensions between two nuclear rivals and thus does 

not complicate American efforts in the War on Terror. Legitimizing 

the LOC also makes a statement in the global War on Terrorism―

that the international community will not reward terrorist actions. 

While this may be the weakest point to make, given the American 

focus on anti-American terrorist organizations, it has relevance in 

sending a clear signal to other terrorist groups about the value of 

violent actions in precipitating political change. 

 The question then arises, why would any American administration 

agree to even consider the Indian policy objectives? The answer lies 

in the greater problems the United States faces in the pursuit of its 

post-9/11 international security policy. Manpower shortages, an 

expanding global battlefield, and a potential resource crunch make 

the prosecution of the War on Terror increasingly difficult. These 

constraints are felt not only in the short-term objective of destroying 

terrorist networks and regime change, but also in the more long-term 

and problematic issue of nation-building. For both such objectives, 

India has the trained manpower to be an ally in constructing a more 

secure world. 

 In any such arrangement, Indian concerns about deploying troops 

and using military force will, however, have to be accommodated. 

Any Indian government would require the legitimacy provided by 

resolutions from international organizations like the UN or from 

regional organizations like the African Union. Thus India readily 

provided naval vessels to ensure maritime security for the 2003 

African Union summit.74 Similarly, the Indian Navy will work 

alongside its Singaporean, Thai, and Filipino counterparts to check 

piracy, weapons, narcotics trafficking, and other maritime threats.75

On the other hand, India backed down from providing troops for the 

Iraq war because of the lack of a UN mandate. 

 The other aspect of peacekeeping and peace enforcement is the 

need to give diplomatic efforts a better chance at succeeding and, 

as mentioned earlier, India has the ability to serve as a facilitator in 
45

discussions with several national regimes that the United States has 

major problems with. The United States has traditionally depended 

on its NATO allies and Japan for this type of role but, as the Chinese 

role in getting North Korea to the multiparty talks shows, new allies 

can be equally effective. India could, therefore, offer its good offices to 

help engage the United States in new discussions with, for example, 

Iran. 

 A complementary security worldview on Asia would also help 

build the Indian case to secure its objectives. Maritime security 

efforts that began with the escort of American naval vessels can 

now be expanded to create a maritime security framework for Asia 

that attempts to counter threats that all states face―piracy, weapons 

trafficking, and the transport of illegal narcotics―and are, therefore, 

least controversial. If India were to take the first step to develop a 

Maritime Security Cooperation Regime, this would serve as a major 

contribution towards developing a common security perspective in 

Asia. 

 In conclusion, one must, therefore, argue that there is a need for 

a more proactive policy towards India that helps secure its national 

objectives and, in doing so, makes it easier to attain broader U.S. 

goals. 

ENDNOTES

 1. Dennis Kux, Estranged Democracies: India and the United States, Washington, DC: 

National Defense University Press, 1993, p. 307.

 2. Raju G. C. Thomas, “U.S. Transfers of “Dual-Use” Technologies to India,” Asian 

Survey, Vol. XXX, No. 9, September 1990, pp. 840-843. 

 3. Strobe Talbott, “Dealing with the bomb in South Asia,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 78, 

No. 2, March 1999, p. 120. For greater details, see Talbott, Engaging India: Diplomacy, 

Democracy, and the Bomb, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2004. 

 4. The U.S. role in getting Pakistan’s troops to withdraw from Kargil is described 

in Bruce Riedel, “American Diplomacy and the 1999 Kargil Summit at Blair House,” 

Center for the Advanced Study of India, Policy Paper Series 2002, available at http://

www.sas.upenn.edu/casi/reports/RiedelPaper051302.htm.

 5. Washington File, January 17, 2001.

 6. Dennis Kux, “India’s Fine Balance,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2002, Vol. 81, No. 

3, p. 97.

 7. Ibid.
46

 8. Ranjit Bhushan, “Shock Therapy,” Outlook India, December 24, 2001. 

 9. K. Subrahmanyam, “Enduring Failures: US Dancing to Pakistan’s Tune,” The 

Times of India, July 26, 2002. 

 10. B. Muralidhar Reddy, “Pak. Rejects Sinha’s ‘Talk of Pre-emption’,” The Hindu, 

April 4, 2003.

 11. Barry R. Posen, “Command of the Commons: The Military Foundation of U.S. 

Hegemony,” International Security, Vol. 28, No. 1, Summer 2003, pp. 7-15. 

 12. Posen, Ibid., p. 10.

 13. Ibid., pp. 16-19. 

 14. See Niall Ferguson, Colossus: The Price of America’s Empire, New York: Penguin, 

2004, p. 290.

 15. See Pierre Lanfranchi and Matthew Taylor, Moving with the Ball: Migration of 

Professional Footballers, New York: Berg Press, 2001, pp. 69-110, 167-190. 

 16. See Robert Sutter, “Grading Bush’s China Policy: A-,” CSIS Pacnet Newsletter

#10, March 8, 2002. 

 17. The best discussion of the assumptions, motivations, and style of India’s foreign 

policy is provided in Sisir Gupta, India and Regional Integration in Asia, Bombay: Asia 

Publishing House, 1964, pp. 1-27. 

 18. For a discussion of the restrictive nature of Indian arms transfer policies, see 

Amit Gupta, “I Want My M-i-G: How India’s Force Structure and Military Doctrine are 

Determined,” Asian Survey, Vol. XXXV, No. 5, May 1995, pp. 441-458. 

 19. Speech to The Brookings Institution, Washington, DC, September 9, 2002. 

 20. For a discussion of the pros and cons of such a relationship, see Galina Yaskina, 

“Russia-China-India: Prospects for Trilateral Cooperation,” Far Eastern Affairs, Vol. 31, 

No. 1, 2003, pp. 16-27.

 21. Amit Baruah, “India, Russia May Invite China to Join Fighter Aircraft Project, 

The Hindu, June 27, 2004.

 22. Amit Baruah, “Multilateralism the Best Solution,” The Hindu, October 11, 

2004. 

 23. See Robert Hathaway, “Unfinished Passage: India, Indian Americans, and the 

U.S. Congress,” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 24, No. 2, Spring 2001, pp. 21-22.

 24. Available at http://www.state.gov/t/np/rls/rm/32293.htm.

 25. For a discussion of U.S. concerns see, Anupam Srivastava, “Positive-Sum Game 

Accruals in US-India Relations,” Bharat Rakshak Monitor, Vol. 51, July-September, 2002. 

Available at http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/MONITOR/ISSUE5-1/anupam.html.

 26. Sridhar Krishnaswami, “U.S. to Ease Curbs on Space, N-facilities,” The Hindu, 

September 20, 2004.

 27. K. Alan Kronstadt, “India-U.S. Relations,” CRS Issue Brief for Congress, July 29, 

2004, p. 15. 
47

 28. R. Ramachandran, “India, U.S. & Trade in Technology, The Hindu, September 

27, 2004.

 29. Matthew S. Borman, “NSSP: U.S., India Interests in Action,” The Hindu, October 

2, 2004. 

 30. The definition of first, second, and third tier nuclear states and the implications 

for state behavior are discussed in Amit Gupta, “N plus 20? India’s Third Tier Nuclear 

State Dilemma,” Asian Survey, Vol. XLI, No. 10, November/December 2001, pp. 1054-

1055.

 31. There are, of course, exceptions to the idea of deterrence. North Korea may 

have a deterrent capability against the United States because it has the capacity to 

destroy Seoul and to kill thousands of U.S. soldiers based in South Korea. While not 

threatening the United States homeland with acceptable damage, Pyongyang still has 

a deterrent capability that prevents a U.S. invasion. 

 32. Sisir Gupta, “The Indian Dilemma,” in Alastair Buchan, ed., A World of Nuclear 

Powers? Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1966, pp. 58-60.

 33. “Seal Scorpene Deal Fast: Navy Chief,” The Times of India, August 12, 2004. 

 34. Ashley J. Tellis, “The Strategic Implications of a Nuclear India,” Orbis, Vol. 26, 

No. 1, Winter, 2002, p. 41.

 35. For a recent discussion of the different problems associated with securing 

the Pakistani nuclear weapons, see Graham Allison, “Tick, Tick, Tick,” The Atlantic 

Monthly, Vol. 294, Issue 3, October 2004, p. 60.

 36. Indian analysts have exaggerated the number of weapons needed to deliver a 

second strike against Pakistan. Pakistan has three major cities, and their destruction 

essentially would destroy the country’s industrial and administrative capability. 

 37. Ashley J. Tellis, India’s Emerging Nuclear Posture: Between Recessed Deterrence and 

Ready Arsenal, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 61.

 38. Amit Gupta, “Fire in the Sky: The Indian Missile Program,” Defense and 

Diplomacy, October 1990.

 39. “Bad Domestic Policy can never Produce Good Diplomacy,” Frontline, Vol. 19, 

Issue 16, August 3-16, 2002. 

 40. “Left Turns Red at Natwar’s Iraq Troops Remark,” The Times of India, June 11, 

2004. 

 41. Jay Bushkinsky, “Radar System Sale to India Approved,” The Washington Times, 

March 1, 2004. 

 42. High Level Committee Report on the Indian Diaspora, New Delhi: Government of 

India, January 8, 2002, pp. xx-xxi.

 43. Amit Gupta, “The Indian Diaspora’s Political Efforts in the United States, ORF 

Occasional Paper, September 2004, pp. 11-12. 

 44. Ibid., p. 12.

 45. C. Raja Mohan, “Indo-U.S. Dialogue on Pakistan?” The Hindu, April 10, 2003.
48

 46. Harish Khare, “We Will Carry Forward Composite Dialogue, Says Manmohan,” 

The Hindu, September 24, 2004.

 47. “Indo-Pak Confederation Possible: Advani,” The Times of India, June 8, 2002.

 48. “Sixth and Seventh Reviews Under the Three Year Arrangement Under the 

Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility and Request for Waiver of Performance 

Criteria,” IMF Country Report, No. 03/338, Washington: IMF Publications Services, 

October 2003, p. 13. 

 49. For a discussion of both sides’ concerns and objectives on the Kashmir issue, 

see “India/Pakistan Relations and Kashmir: Steps Toward Peace,” International Crisis 

Group Asia Report No. 79, June 24, 2004, Islamabad, New Delhi, Brussels. 

 50. Aslam Siddiqi, Pakistan Seeks Security, Karachi: Longman Green, 1960, p.17. 

 51. “‘Unconventional’ Warning Averted War: Musharraf,” Daily Times, December 

31, 2002. Pakistani officials subsequently backtracked and suggested that what 

President Musharraf had meant was that, “[I]n case of an Indian attack, the people of 

Pakistan would fight alongside the Pakistan military.” See “Editorial: Unconventional 

Wisdom,” Daily Times, January 1, 2003. In India, however, President Musharraf’s 

statement was seen as a threat to carry out a first use of nuclear weapons. 

 52. Interview with Fox News Sunday, June 2, 2002, available at http://www.foxnews.

com/story/0,2933,54270,00.html.

 53. John Cherian, “Building Confidence: India and Pakistan,” Frontline, Vol. 21, 

Issue 14, July 3-16, 2004. 

 54. Borman.

 55. Ramachandran.

 56. Harinder Sekhon, “NSSP—Are We Really Moving Forward?” ORF Strategic 

Trends, Vol. II, No., 43, November 1, 2004.

 57. A History of Indian Participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations, Embassy of 

India, Washington, DC, release, available at http://www.indianembassy.org/policy/Peace_

Keeping/history_india_UN_peace_keeping.htm.

 58. Mira Sinha Bhattacharjea, “A New Phase,” Frontline, Vol. 20, Issue 14, July 5-18, 

2003. 

 59. C. Raja Mohan, “India and China: A Shifting Paradigm,” The Hindu, July 29, 

2004. 

 60. Kalyan Chaudhuri, “Routes of Promise,” Frontline, Vol. 20, Issue 14, July 5-18, 

2004. 

 61. Rahul Bedi, “A New Doctrine for the Navy,” Frontline, Vol. 21, Issue 14, July 

3-16, 2004.

 62. Ibid.

 63. “The Seventh Flight of the Brahmos,” Frontline, Vol. 21, Issue 13, June 19-July 2, 

2004. 

 64. Tellis, India’s Emerging Nuclear Posture: Between Recessed Deterrence and Ready 

Arsenal, p. 474. 
49

 65. Stephen Blank, “India’s Rising Profile in Central Asia,” Comparative Strategy, 

Vol. 22, No. 2, 2003, p. 140; Shahram Akbarzadeh, “India and Pakistan’s Geostrategic 

Rivalry in Central Asia,” Contemporary South Asia, Vol. 12, No. 2, June 2003, p. 220.

 66. Rahul Bedi, “India and Central Asia,” Frontline, Vol. 19, Issue 19, September 

14-27, 2002. 

 67. Rahul Bedi, “Strategic realignments,” Frontline, Vol. 20, Issue 13, June 21-July 4, 

2003. 

 68. Akbarzadeh, p. 222. 

 69. Sudha Ramachandran, “India, Iran, Russia Map Out Trade Route,” Asia Times, 

June 29, 2002. 

 70. “Foreign Students Diminishing in Indian Universities,” The Hindustan Times, 

February 9, 2004. 

 71. See “Indigenous Technology Development: A Holistic View,” IIT Kharagpur 

website, available at http://www.iitkgp.ernet.in/acad_n_res_fac/cet/cal.php.

 72. N. Gopal Raj, “A Satellite to Serve Students,” The Hindu, September 22, 2004.

 73. For a detailed discussion of this argument, see Amit Gupta, “After the Bomb: 

U.S. Policy Towards a Nuclear South Asia,” Mediterranean Quarterly, Spring 1999, pp. 

40-63.

 74. Jane’s Defense Weekly, June 4, 2003.

 75. Bedi, “A New Doctrine for the Navy.”