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95–684 PDF 2015

DEFENSE SUPPORT OF CIVIL AUTHORITIES: A 

VITAL RESOURCE IN THE NATION’S HOMELAND 

SECURITY MISSIONS 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS, 

RESPONSE, AND COMMUNICATIONS 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

JUNE 10, 2015 

Serial No. 114–20 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas, Chairman 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

PETER T. KING, New York 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan, Vice Chair 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

LOU BARLETTA, Pennsylvania 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

CURT CLAWSON, Florida 

JOHN KATKO, New York 

WILL HURD, Texas 

EARL L. ‘‘BUDDY’’ CARTER, Georgia 

MARK WALKER, North Carolina 

BARRY LOUDERMILK, Georgia 

MARTHA MCSALLY, Arizona 

JOHN RATCLIFFE, Texas 

DANIEL M. DONOVAN, JR., New York 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

CEDRIC L. RICHMOND, Louisiana 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

DONALD M. PAYNE, JR., New Jersey 

FILEMON VELA, Texas 

BONNIE WATSON COLEMAN, New Jersey 

KATHLEEN M. RICE, New York 

NORMA J. TORRES, California 

BRENDAN P. SHIELDS, Staff Director 

JOAN V. O’HARA, General Counsel 

MICHAEL S. TWINCHEK, Chief Clerk 

I. LANIER AVANT, Minority Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE, AND 

COMMUNICATIONS 

MARTHA MCSALLY, Arizona, Chairman 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

MARK WALKER, North Carolina 

BARRY LOUDERMILK, Georgia 

DANIEL M. DONOVAN, JR., New York 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas (ex officio) 

DONALD M. PAYNE, JR., New Jersey 

BONNIE WATSON COLEMAN, New Jersey 

KATHLEEN M. RICE, New York 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi (ex officio) 

KERRY A. KINIRONS, Subcommittee Staff Director 

DEBORAH JORDAN, Subcommittee Clerk 

MOIRA BERGIN, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS 

The Honorable Martha McSally, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Arizona, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Communications: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 1 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 2 

The Honorable Bonnie Watson Coleman, a Representative in Congress From 

the State of New Jersey ....................................................................................... 3 

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress From 

the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on Homeland 

Security: 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 5 

WITNESSES 

PANEL I 

Mr. Robert J. Fenton, Jr., Deputy Associate Administrator, Office of Response 

and Recovery, Federal Emergency Management Agency, U.S. Department 

of Homeland Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 6 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 8 

Mr. Robert G. Salesses, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Homeland Defense Integration and Defense Support of Civil Authorities, U.S. Department of Defense: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 13 

Joint Prepared Statement ................................................................................... 14 

Brigadier General Joseph E. Whitlock, Deputy Director, Western Hemisphere, 

The Joint Staff, J–5, Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate, U.S. Department of Defense: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 19 

Joint Prepared Statement ................................................................................... 14 

Mr. Joseph W. Kirschbaum, Ph.D., Director, Defense Capabilities and Management, U.S. Government Accountability Office: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 21 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 22 

PANEL II 

Major General Michael T. McGuire, The Adjutant General, Department of 

Emergency and Military Affairs, State of Arizona: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 42 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 44 

Mr. Jimmy J. Gianato, Director, Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Management, State of West Virginia, Testifying on Behalf of the 

National Emergency Management Association: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 54 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 56 

Mr. Peter T. Gaynor, Director, Emergency Management Office, State of Rhode 

Island: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 59 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 61 
Page

IV 

APPENDIX 

California Governor’s Office of Emergency Services, National Emergency 

Management Association: 

Statement for the Record .................................................................................... 77 
(1) 

DEFENSE SUPPORT OF CIVIL AUTHORITIES: 

A VITAL RESOURCE IN THE NATION’S 

HOMELAND SECURITY MISSIONS 

Wednesday, June 10, 2015 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS, 

RESPONSE, AND COMMUNICATIONS, 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:11 a.m., in Room 

311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Martha McSally [Chairman of the subcommittee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives McSally, Loudermilk, Donovan, Watson 

Coleman, and Rice. 

Also present: Representative Langevin. 

Ms. MCSALLY. The Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Communications will come to order. The subcommittee is meeting today to 

examine the important role played by the military in homeland security missions. 

Before we begin, I would like to welcome the gentleman from 

New York, Mr. Donovan, to the subcommittee. We look forward to 

working with you on this committee. 

Mr. DONOVAN. Thank you. 

Ms. MCSALLY. I will now recognize myself for an opening statement. 

Like politics, all disasters are local. Whether it is a hurricane 

making landfall in a coastal State, a bomb exploding in a mass 

gathering, or a wildfire threatening life and property, State and 

local first responders and emergency managers will be the first on 

scene to manage the response. 

Sometimes, however, the magnitude of these emergencies will exceed the capabilities of the local responders. Governors may activate their National Guard forces, in addition to requesting Federal 

Government support. Coordinated by the Federal Emergency Management Agency, this assistance may also include assets from the 

Department of Defense. 

Today’s hearing will examine the vital role played by the military 

in these homeland defense missions. So far this year we have seen 

record snowfalls, destructive tornados, massive flooding around the 

country. Last week marked the start of the 2015 hurricane season, 

and in areas out West, including my home State of Arizona, we are 
2 

gearing up for what is predicted to be an above-average wildfire 

season as well. 

In such emergencies, defense personnel and assets act as flexible 

force multipliers to the response. When activated by a Governor, a 

State’s National Guard can provide, on short notice, search and 

rescue, logistics, firefighting, and law enforcement support. Federal 

military forces may also supplement State capabilities. 

We have seen this in action. National Guard forces responded to 

the massive flooding in Texas and Oklahoma by rescuing stranded 

citizens, transporting supplies, and providing equipment that assisted in accessing areas isolated by the floodwaters. Arizona National Guard personnel and resources have contained and suppressed wildfires, protecting the life and property of Arizona citizens. National Guard and Federal military forces deployed in response to Hurricane Sandy, which tested the use of the dual-status 

command structure. I am interested to hear more from our witnesses about the coordination and integration of defense capabilities during these and other responses. 

The National Guard also executes an important law enforcement 

support function. More than 400 Massachusetts National Guardsmen were on site during the 2013 Boston Marathon to supplement 

local law enforcement. These personnel were quickly able to pivot 

their mission to assist victims and secure the crime scene after the 

bombs detonated. 

As the threats to our Nation have evolved, so too have the military’s homeland defense capabilities. DOD and the National Guard 

have units dedicated to responding to incidents involving chemical, 

biological, radiological, or nuclear—CBRN—agents or explosives. 

This subcommittee has held two hearings so far this year on the 

threat of chemical and biological terrorism. We know that the terrorists have long had an interest in using CBRN agents in their 

attacks. The resources and expertise provided by these specialized 

military teams are essential capabilities to meet this threat. 

We have two distinguished panels of witnesses before us today 

to discuss the importance of defense support to State and local 

emergency response providers and the lessons that have been identified in previous response collaborations. I mentioned lessons have 

been identified. We were just talking earlier, often in the military 

we call them lessons learned, but they are not learned until they 

have actually been learned. So I call them lessons identified until 

they are actually lessons learned. 

I look forward to learning more about the coordination of local, 

State, Federal, and military response capabilities, along with the 

areas that could be improved to make this vital response capability 

even more nimble. 

[The statement of Ms. McSally follows:] 

STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN MARTHA MCSALLY

Like politics, all disasters are local. Whether it is a hurricane making landfall in 

a coastal State, a bomb exploding at a mass gathering, or a wildfire threatening life 

and property, State and local first responders and emergency managers will be the 

first on the scene to manage the response. 

Sometimes, however, the magnitude of these emergencies will exceed the capabilities of these responders. Governors may activate their National Guard Forces, in addition to requesting Federal Government support. Coordinated by the Federal Emer-
3 

gency Management Agency, this assistance may also include assets from the Department of Defense. 

Today’s hearing will examine the vital role played by the military in these homeland defense missions. 

So far this year, we have seen record snowfalls, destructive tornados, and massive 

flooding around the country. Last week marked the start of the 2015 hurricane season and areas out west, including in my home State of Arizona, are gearing up for 

what is predicted to be an above average wildfire season. 

In such emergencies, defense personnel and assets act as flexible force multipliers 

to the response. 

When activated by a Governor, a State’s National Guard can provide, on short notice, search and rescue, logistics, firefighting, and law enforcement support. Federal 

military forces may also supplement State capabilities. 

We’ve seen this in action. National Guard forces responded to the massive flooding in Texas and Oklahoma by rescuing stranded citizens, transporting supplies, 

and providing equipment that assisted in accessing areas isolated by floodwaters. 

Arizona National Guard personnel and resources have contained and suppressed 

wildfires, protecting the life and property of Arizona’s citizens. 

National Guard and Federal military forces were deployed in response to Hurricane Sandy, which tested the use of the dual-status command structure. I’m interested to hear more from our witnesses about the coordination and integration of defense capabilities during this, and other, responses. 

The National Guard also executes an important law enforcement support function. 

More than 400 Massachusetts National Guardsmen were on site during the 2013 

Boston Marathon to supplement local law enforcement. These personnel were quickly able to pivot their mission to assist victims and secure the crime scene after the 

bombs detonated. 

As the threats to our Nation have evolved, so too have the military’s homeland 

defense capabilities. DOD and the National Guard have units dedicated to responding to incidents involving chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) 

agents or explosives. 

This subcommittee held two hearings on the threat of chemical and biological terrorism earlier this year. We know that terrorists have long had an interest in using 

CBRN agents in their attacks. The resources and expertise provided by these specialized military teams is an essential capability to meet this threat. 

We have two distinguished panels of witnesses before us today to discuss the importance of defense support to State and local emergency response providers and the 

lessons that have been identified in previous response collaborations. 

I look forward to learning more about the coordination of local, State, Federal, 

and military response capabilities, along with areas that could be improved to make 

this vital response capability even more nimble. 

Ms. MCSALLY. The Chairman now recognizes the gentlelady, 

Mrs. Watson Coleman, for an opening statement. 

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Good morning. I would like to thank Chairman McSally for holding this important hearing on the role of defense resources in disaster response. 

The capabilities of our defense resources are vast and diverse. 

Though ordinarily jurisdictions may not look to partnering with 

National Guard or the Defense Department, the boots on the 

ground and the capacity that they can supply are a great multiplier. Just last month, units from the Texas and Oklahoma National Guards provided surge capacity to State and local responders 

during and after massive floods pummeled the region. With the upcoming 10-year anniversary of Hurricane Katrina and 3-year anniversary of Superstorm Sandy, we are reminded once again of the 

important role that defense resources play in response to recovery. 

Although many important reforms to facilitate improved integration of defense assets into civil response plans were implemented 

between Hurricane Katrina and Superstorm Sandy, every after-action report identified improvements that must be made. From clarifying the role of the dual-status commander, to improving training 
4 

to ensure that command-and-control structures are well-exercised, 

there is more work to be done to drive efforts for better coordination on the ground, particularly during complex multi-State catastrophes. 

The testimony prepared by Mr. Kirschbaum underscores my 

point. Madam Chair, today’s hearing could not come at a more appropriate time. As a subcommittee we have expended significant 

time when exploring response challenges associated with chemical 

and biological threats. In the event of a catastrophic chemical or 

biological incident, we know that defense resources are an integral 

part of an effective response. Today’s hearing affords the subcommittee the opportunity to deepen our understanding of how defense resources support our Nation’s chem-bio response capabilities. 

Another area of great interest to Members on both sides of the 

aisle is the Nation’s response capability when it comes to another 

emerging threat area, and that is cybersecurity. The disclosure last 

week by the Department of Homeland Security and the Office of 

Personnel Management that the personnel files for possibly 4 million current and former Federal employees were hacked brings 

threat into real focus. 

The challenge of securing our Nation’s cyber infrastructure and 

networks demands an all-hands approach. DHS has a dual cyber 

role. It is responsible for helping to protect Federal networks and 

partnering with critical infrastructure owners and others in the 

private sector to bolster cybersecurity. In the event of a major 

cyber incident which results in cascading failures of multiple independent, critical, life-sustaining infrastructure sectors, an effective 

and timely civilian response will necessarily depend on coordination with defense resources. 

Recent announcements by the National Guard Bureau of the creation of cyber protection teams is a welcome development and reflects an awareness of the likelihood that civilian authorities will 

look to the Guard for such support. These cyber protection teams 

will train and operate on a traditional part-time basis in support 

of their respective State National Guards. But when activated for 

Federal Active Duty, the teams will provide surge support to Army 

Cyber Command and support defense cyber space operations. I will 

be interested in learning more about how this capability will coordinate with and complement the civilian response capability. 

Along these lines, I would like to thank Mr. Gaynor, the director 

of Rhode Island Emergency Management, for being here today to 

talk to us about how the State leverages defense assets in its cyber 

response plans. 

Although I am encouraged to learn that cyber response coordination is underway, I was concerned to learn in GAO’s written testimony that the Department of Defense has not yet adequately 

aligned its guidance on preparing for and responding to domestic 

cyber incidents with National-level guidance. I hope we can learn 

more about DOD’s progress in that regard today. 

Once again, I thank the Chair for holding this timely hearing. I 

thank the witnesses for being here today, and I look forward to 

their testimony. With that I yield back my time. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Thank you. The gentlelady yields back. 
5 

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. Madam Chair, I ask unanimous consent 

that Mr. Langevin be permitted to participate in today’s subcommittee meeting. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Okay. Without objection. 

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. Thank you. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Other Members of the subcommittee are reminded 

that opening statements may be submitted for the record. 

[The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:] 

STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER BENNIE G. THOMPSON

JUNE 10, 2015 

Good morning. I would like to thank Ms. McSally and Mr. Payne, Jr. for holding 

this important hearing. 

Nearly 10 years ago, Hurricane Katrina slammed into the Gulf Coast and devastated the communities in its path. 

During the response and recovery efforts, we learned painful lessons about planning and training gaps that undermined successful response efforts. 

One of the most important lessons that emerged after Hurricane Katrina was the 

failure to coordinate Federal, State, and local assets to allow for rapid deployment 

of much-needed resources. 

In Mississippi, for example, household goods supplied by the Federal Government 

never made it into the hands of disaster survivors, and were given instead to State 

agencies. 

In the storm’s aftermath, I worked with my colleagues in Congress to enact the 

Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act, which provided a mechanism for 

the FEMA administrator to be elevated to the President’s Cabinet during a disaster 

and directed FEMA to develop pre-scripted mission assignments for Federal agencies, including the Department of Defense. 

Although Hurricane Katrina triggered many reforms to improve the ability to leverage defense support of civil authorities during emergencies, it is important to 

note that Hurricane Katrina was not the first time that defense resources were not 

effectively leveraged during a disaster response. 

Following the September 11 attacks, Federal Reservists tried to respond to 

Ground Zero, but there was no legal authority to put them to work—so an on-thefly approach was employed. 

In the weeks and months that followed, Congress and the Executive branch began 

to reassess the Department of Defense’s role in domestic responses to terrorist attacks and major disasters. 

While some progress was made to bolster DOD’s role in certain civil response activities, Hurricane Katrina demonstrated that critical gaps remained. 

For example, our National Response Plan did not distinguish the type of defense 

support that might be required during a small disaster versus a catastrophic disaster. 

The Plan did not include detail about how defense support would be provided, 

whether resources would be supplied by Federal forces or the National Guard, nor 

how long it would take to deliver defense assets. 

Most notably, we did not conduct training exercises for catastrophic disasters in 

which DOD assets were fully deployed. 

Accordingly, Military, Federal, State, and local responders were determining what 

defense assets could be supplied and who would supply them while response efforts 

were underway. 

For example, in Mississippi, Governor Barbour initially called up about 1,000 National Guard troops, and put an additional 600 on stand-by—which was consistent 

with the State’s response to Hurricane Camille but did not account for the population increase. 

The military deserves credit for its response to Hurricane Katrina—50,000 National Guard Troops and 20,000 Federal troops were ultimately deployed, which undoubtedly saved lives. 

That said, the response would have been more effective had appropriate plans 

been in place before the Hurricane. 

Nearly 3 years ago, Hurricane Sandy pummeled the northeast, and it was the 

first time many of the post-Katrina reforms were utilized. 

Although efforts to bolster and clarify the role of the dual-status commander after 

Hurricane Katrina did appear to improve coordination between National Guard 
6 

troops and Federal forces during Hurricane Sandy relief efforts, many involved in 

the response did not fully understand the chain-of-command. 

Additionally, Hurricane Sandy revealed challenges presented by multi-State disasters, in which more than one dual-status commander is appointed but no coordinating process exists. 

I will be interested in learning what training is underway to help those in the 

chain-of-command better understand the role of the dual-status commander and 

how DOD and FEMA are working together to improve response capabilities for 

multi-State disasters. 

I will also be interested in learning how FEMA is working with DOD to identify 

capability needs and develop pre-scripted mission assignments at the regional level 

to ensure that defense assets can be deployed in a timely manner. 

Finally, I will be interested to understanding how defense resources have supported the response to the horrific flooding in Texas and Oklahoma. 

I look forward to the witness’ testimony, and I yield back the balance of my time. 

Ms. MCSALLY. We are pleased to have two panels of very distinguished witnesses before us today on this important topic. I will 

now introduce our first panel. 

Mr. Robert Fenton currently serves as the deputy associate administrator of the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s Office 

of Response and Recovery. He previously served as the assistant 

administrator for response and was responsible for coordinating the 

Federal response in support of States during major disasters. 

Since joining FEMA in 1996, Mr. Fenton has held a number of 

positions at both headquarters and in Region IX. I understand Mr. 

Fenton will be soon departing headquarters to assume the role of 

regional administrator for Region IX. My home State is in Region 

IX, and I look forward to working with you in this capacity. 

Mr. Robert Salesses serves as the deputy assistant secretary of 

defense for homeland defense integration and defense support of 

civil authorities. Okay, these are long titles here. Mr. Salesses previously served as the deputy special assistant for the Homeland Security Task Force, a position he assumed shortly after the September 11 terrorist attacks. Mr. Salesses is a retired United States 

Marine Corps officer. 

Brigadier General Joseph Whitlock is the deputy director for political-military affairs, western hemisphere, strategic plans and policy directorate, at the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In this capacity his 

portfolio includes issues associated with homeland defense and defense support to civil authorities. 

Mr. Joseph Kirschbaum is the director in the defense capabilities 

and management team of the Government Accountability Office, 

the GAO. In this capacity he oversees evaluation of the Department of Defense programs in the homeland defense and emerging 

threats and capabilities portfolio. In 2013, Mr. Kirschbaum served 

as acting director in GAO’s Homeland Security and Justice Team, 

overseeing evaluations of Federal emergency preparedness and 

homeland security programs. 

The witnesses’ full written statements will appear in the record. 

The Chair now recognizes Mr. Fenton for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF ROBERT J. FENTON, JR., DEPUTY ASSOCIATE 

ADMINISTRATOR, OFFICE OF RESPONSE AND RECOVERY, 

FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. FENTON. Chairman McSally, Ranking Member Payne, and 

Members of this distinguished subcommittee, I am Robert Fenton, 
7 

deputy associate administrator of the Office of Response and Recovery for FEMA. It is my pleasure to be here today to discuss how 

the Department of Defense and FEMA coordinate to ensure efficient, effective, and well-orchestrated response and recovery activities in support of States and local governments in response to all 

hazards. 

In my testimony I will highlight four areas today. First, integration, personnel, and collaboration. A clear example of the collaboration is with regard to the exchange of subject-matter expertise between FEMA and the Department of Defense. We have liaison officers in FEMA from OSD Policy, Joint Staff, and NORTHCOM, and 

in each of our 10 regions we have defense coordinating officers assigned there. FEMA has embedded also FEMA officials who serve 

in NORTHCOM as the Deputy Plans and Integration for the J–5. 

The defense coordinating officer is a key position who are members in disasters of the Unified Coordination Group to ensure unity 

of effort in helping provide support to State and local governments. 

They participate in developing Federal-State plans and maintain 

well-established relationships with DOD installations of the National Guard through the region. 

Additionally, DOD has provided individuals to support our National IMATs. Then lastly, the employment of the dual-status commander during large-scale incidents improves unity of effort by establishing standardized procedures for the command and integration of State and Federal military forces for the contingency operations of no-notice operations. 

The second area is catastrophic preparedness and planning. 

Since the implementation of Presidential Policy Directive 8, FEMA 

has facilitated the development of the National Planning System 

and a National response Federal interagency operational plan for 

all 10 regions, as well as specific annexes for unique catastrophic 

hazards based on National and regional threat assessments. DOD 

engages as a member of the core planning team for every National 

and regional planning initiative. 

Additionally, NORTHCOM is in the process of developing incident-specific playbooks to execute defense roles and fulfill supporting capability requirements identified in the FEMA regional 

plans. NORTHCOM playbooks have already been developed based 

on FEMA plans for a southern California earthquake, Cascadia 

Subduction Zone earthquake, Alaska earthquake. Playbooks are in 

the process of being developed for the nuclear effort, improvised 

nuclear device events, in the Atlantic hurricane and New Madrid 

Seismic Zone events. 

Lastly, the National Guard is key as they assist in planning at 

the State and multi-State level and also help connect whole community integration, civilian and military emergency management 

concepts. 

The third area I would like to talk about is the progress we have 

made in mission assignments. Following the Post-Katrina Reform 

Act, FEMA was directed to develop prescripted mission assignments for all Federal departments and agencies. With regard to 

Department of Defense, we developed 28 prescripted mission assignments for DOD, specifically, 48 for the U.S. Army Corps of En-
8 

gineers, and 6 for the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency. 

These allow us to further expedite the response. 

In addition, FEMA has recently placed the whole prescripted 

mission assignment library in our Crisis Management System, 

WebEOC, which allows Federal agencies, State, local, Tribal agencies to access those mission assignments during events. 

We further tested a new concept by bundling those mission assignments in response to a catastrophic event. What we were able 

to do is, previously it would take us about an hour to process a 

mission assignment, by bundling together in nine big bundles 

based on the plans developed for southern California, we were able 

to process about 70 prescripted mission assignments in 2 hours, 

which allows us to expedite the process for providing resources to 

State and local governments for life-saving measures. 

The fourth area I would like to talk about is exercise activities 

and testing capabilities. The National Exercise Program is the 

principal exercise mechanism for National preparedness and measuring readiness. FEMA and DOD have collaborated and participated in various activities, most recently a southern California exercise in 2015. FEMA and DOD have begun to synchronize these 

exercise schedules and aligning those with FEMA and 

NORTHCOM operational planning. FEMA and DOD also are joint 

participants in the National Exercise Capstone Program that allows us to better test our capabilities. 

In conclusion, as I present my testimony today we are collaborating, integrating, and sharing resources and capabilities with 

DOD via embedded liaisons, comprehensive planning, flexible mission assignment procedures, and overarching exercise activities. Ultimately, FEMA and DOD continue to take all necessary actions to 

maximize the utility and effectiveness of DSCA. 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I look forward to 

and am prepared to respond to any questions you have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Fenton follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ROBERT J. FENTON, JR. 

JUNE 10, 2015 

INTRODUCTION

Chairman McSally, Ranking Member Payne, and Members of this distinguished 

subcommittee, I am Robert J. Fenton, deputy associate administrator for the Office 

of Response and Recovery of the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Federal 

Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). I am grateful for the opportunity to be 

here today. 

In this testimony, I will discuss how the Department of Defense (DOD) supports 

FEMA under Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA). FEMA and DOD work 

closely together to ensure that our efforts are well-orchestrated and that DOD capabilities are available to support States and Tribes as they respond to and recover 

from disasters. DOD is always in support of a lead Federal agency in providing 

DSCA. 

COLLABORATION BETWEEN FEMA AND THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Past incidents highlighted specific limitations under Federal law and Federal response doctrine that resulted in the slow application of resources during initial 

phases of disaster response. Over the last decade, FEMA has made significant 

strides to mitigate these limitations and enhance operational preparedness for future catastrophic events. DOD policies, processes, and procedures have evolved to 

incorporate these changes. 
9 

By leveraging the authorities of the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform 

Act of 2006 (PKEMRA) and the mandates set forth in Presidential Policy Directive 

(PPD) 8 on National Preparedness, FEMA improved planning and coordination 

among State, local, Tribal, and Federal stakeholders to include the DOD. Moreover, 

both FEMA and DOD have been heavily involved in the exchange of subject-matter 

expertise through the use of liaison officers (LNOs) and through DOD’s Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO) program that maintains a presence in each of the ten 

FEMA regions. 

In order to compress DOD response time lines and expedite the mission assignment request and approval process, FEMA and DOD developed 28 Pre-Scripted Mission Assignments (PSMAs) that remain working drafts based on lessons learned 

from previous disasters. Although not pre-approved, PSMAs facilitate a more rapid 

response by standardizing the process of developing Mission Assignments. They 

specify what type of assistance is required (personnel and equipment), identify a 

statement of work, and provide projected costs. 

Through PKEMRA, these mission assignments can be authorized in advance of 

known events such as hurricanes. 

FEMA MISSION ASSIGNMENT AUTHORITIES

Stafford Act 

The Stafford Act constitutes the statutory authority for most Federal disaster response activities, especially as they pertain to FEMA programs in support of State 

and Tribal governments. It vests responsibility for emergency preparedness jointly 

in the Federal Government, State, Tribal, and territorial governments and their political subdivisions. It also gives FEMA responsibility for coordinating Federal Government response to support State, local, Tribal, and territorial efforts. 

Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 

PKEMRA gives FEMA the authority needed to lean forward and leverage the entire emergency management team in response and recovery efforts. This team includes not only Government, but also private, non-profit, and citizen partners to successfully prevent, protect against, respond to, recover from, and mitigate all hazards. 

PKEMRA also requires that each Federal agency with responsibilities under the 

National Response Framework (NRF) develop operational plans to ensure a coordinated Federal response. 

Presidential Policy Directive 8: National Preparedness 

After the policy changes ushered in following PKEMRA, PPD–8 was released with 

the goal of strengthening the security and resilience of the United States through 

systematic preparation for the threats that pose the greatest risk to the security of 

the Nation. 

PPD–8 defines five mission areas, including: Prevention, protection, mitigation, 

response, and recovery. It mandates the development of policy and planning documents to guide the Nation’s approach for ensuring and enhancing National preparedness. 

National Preparedness Goal 

While PPD–8 describes the Nation’s approach to preparing for threats and hazards that pose the greatest risk to the security of the United States, the National 

Preparedness Goal defines success by increased security and resilience through the 

use of core capabilities. 

The National Planning Frameworks, which are part of the National Preparedness 

System, set the strategy and doctrine for building, sustaining, and delivering the 

core capabilities identified in the National Preparedness Goal. 

National Response Framework 

The NRF is a guide to how the Nation responds to all types of disasters and emergencies. It is built on scalable, flexible, and adaptable concepts identified in the National Incident Management System (NIMS) to align key roles and responsibilities 

across the Nation. 

This Framework describes specific authorities and best practices for managing incidents that range from the serious, but purely local to large-scale terrorist attacks 

or catastrophic natural disasters. The NRF describes the principles, roles and responsibilities, and coordinating structures for delivering the core capabilities required to respond to an incident and further describes how response efforts integrate with those of the other mission areas. 
10 

The objectives of the response mission area define the capabilities necessary to 

save lives, protect property and the environment, meet basic human needs, stabilize 

the incident, restore basic services and community functionality, and establish a 

safe and secure environment moving toward recovery. 

Under the NRF, Emergency Support Function (ESF) Annexes describe the Federal 

coordinating structures that group resources and capabilities into functional areas 

that are most frequently needed in a National response. The Federal Government 

organizes response resources and capabilities under the ESF construct. ESFs have 

proven to be an effective way to manage resources to deliver core capabilities. The 

Federal ESFs bring together the capabilities of Federal departments and agencies 

and other National-level assets. ESFs are not based on the capabilities of a single 

department or agency, and the functions for which they are responsible cannot be 

accomplished by any single department or agency. Instead, Federal ESFs are groups 

of organizations that work together to deliver core capabilities and support an effective response. 

DOD, through the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) is a lead and coordinating agency for ESF No. 3—Public Works and Engineering and is a support agency for every ESF. The ESFs are vital structures for responding to Stafford Act incidents; however, they may also be used for other incidents. 

Response Federal Interagency Operational Plan 

In addition to the National Planning Frameworks, FEMA completed the Federal 

Interagency Operational Plans (FIOPs) as part of the National Planning System. 

This includes one for each mission area to provide further detail regarding roles and 

responsibilities, specify the critical tasks, and identify resourcing and sourcing requirements for delivering core capabilities. 

The Response FIOP builds upon the NRF, which sets the strategy and doctrine 

for how the whole community builds, sustains, and delivers the response core capabilities identified in the National Preparedness Goal. 

This plan describes how the Federal Government delivers core capabilities for the 

response mission area. Specifically, the response FIOP is an all-hazards plan that 

describes how the Federal Government, pursuant to the Stafford Act, supports 

State, local, Tribal, territorial, and insular area efforts to save lives, protect property 

and the environment, and meet basic human needs following an emergency or disaster. 

DEFENSE SUPPORT OF CIVIL AUTHORITIES

Like any lead or supporting agency under the NRF/ESF construct, the DOD is 

mission assigned when their assets or capabilities would best meet FEMA requirements in support of State-requested assistance. This process pertains to DSCA as 

it is defined by DOD Directive 3025.18 as ‘‘Support provided by U.S. Federal military forces, DOD civilians, DOD contract personnel, DOD Component assets, and 

National Guard forces (when the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Governors of the affected States, elects and requests to use those forces in Title 32, 

U.S.C., status) in response to requests for assistance from civil authorities for domestic emergencies, law enforcement support, and other domestic activities, or from 

qualifying entities for special events. Also known as civil support.’’ 

Process 

The Defense Coordination Element (DCE) is an integral part of a region’s all-hazards preparedness and response. The DCE participates in the development of regional plans, familiarizes regional staff with DSCA capabilities and maintains wellestablished relationships with DOD installations and National Guard leadership 

throughout the region. These relationships are critical since they allow the region 

to rapidly identify potential facilities to serve as Federal Staging Areas or Incident 

Support Bases. 

During disasters, the response process begins when the President issues either an 

Emergency Declaration or a Major Disaster Declaration under the Stafford Act. 

After a declaration, the DCO and the DCE are activated in response to a FEMA 

Mission Assignment (MA), which are used by FEMA to request assistance from the 

DOD, to task other Federal agencies, and to provide reimbursement for direct assistance during emergencies and disaster. 

The DCO is a member of the Unified Coordination Group and works alongside the 

State/Tribal and Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO), State and regional partners, 

including ESFs, to identify capability gaps and either known or anticipated DOD 

requirements. FEMA Mission Assignments are generated by the FCO at the FEMA 

Joint Field Office. Those Mission Assignments requesting DOD assistance are validated by the DCO and then sent by the FCO through FEMA to the Secretary of 
11 

Defense. PSMAs for the most commonly-requested assistance from DOD are available to significantly reduce processing delays. 

This process ensures that resources are coordinated and arrive at the disaster site 

as quickly and efficiently as possible. 

HURRICANE SANDY SUCCESSES AND LESSON LEARNED

FEMA deployed significant numbers of personnel, both before and after Hurricane 

Sandy made landfall, to support response and recovery efforts. At the peak of response and initial recovery efforts, more than 17,000 Federal personnel—including 

more than 7,500 FEMA staff—were deployed. In addition, States deployed over 

11,000 National Guard personnel in the impacted areas. 

FEMA successfully used its mission assignment authority to provide coordinated, 

efficient response to survivors after the storm, issuing over $6.3 million in mission 

assignments to Federal partners the day Hurricane Sandy made landfall, directing 

them to provide assets and services to support State, local, and Tribal efforts. Federal assets and services included communications system restoration, debris removal, aerial imaging and surveillance, as well as health and medical care. 

Despite these successes, the significant response to Sandy also revealed notable 

challenges in how FEMA coordinates with its Federal partners, supports State, 

local, and Tribal officials and disaster survivors, integrates with the whole community, and prepares and deploys its workforce. FEMA’s Sandy After-Action Report 

identified issuing timely mission assignments as an area for improvement. 

Specific to DOD mission assignments, FEMA continues to work with DOD to develop PSMAs which enable FEMA to expedite resources to the affected communities 

during a disaster. These mission assignments were directed by law in PKEMRA and 

while they are not pre-approved, they instead provide a basis for language that is 

agreed to prior to an incident—promoting common understanding and reducing 

processing time. 

FEMA currently has a total of 251 approved PSMAs for 31 departments and agencies. FEMA has a close partnership with the DOD as evidenced by the 28 PSMAs 

for DOD support, along with an additional 48 for the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 

and 6 for the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency. The PSMA catalogue will be 

continually updated based on experiences and lessons learned from disasters and 

simulation exercises. 

FEMA recently revamped its PSMA review process and transferred the PSMA 

process to FEMA’s WebEOC Crisis Management System to make tracking draft 

PSMAs, and accessing approved PSMAs, more visible to departments and agencies 

and to streamline their coordination within FEMA. A PSMA Technical Review Team 

was also created, made up of representatives from FEMA headquarters and the regions, to conduct a comprehensive review of each draft PSMA, ensuring eligibility, 

clarity, completeness, proper format, legality, and cost efficiency. In addition, FEMA 

developed a new comprehensive Mission Assignment Guide to help clarify the mission assignment process, effectively managing the time required for issuing, executing, and financially closing out mission assignments. 

ENHANCED PARTNERSHIPS, INTEGRATED PLANNING, AND EXERCISES

DOD and FEMA enjoy a very close relationship in deliberate planning and exercising for catastrophic incidents. 

Doctrine, Guidance, and Plans Guide Integration at the State, Regional, and National Level 

A new ‘‘All-Hazards’’ planning construct is in place to execute PPD–8 and ensure 

that all ten FEMA regions are synchronized and using a single all-hazards FIOP. 

FEMA also develops incident-specific annexes to plan for unique situations or requirements that would not otherwise be addressed in the all-hazard plan. A single 

5-year planning schedule enables FEMA to synchronize its planning efforts with 

other departments and agencies, including DOD, to ensure planning addresses regional Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessments (THIRAs), as well 

as the Strategic National Risk Assessment. 

We are proud of substantial improvements in the integration of planning assumptions, concepts of operations, and support requirements with the DOD represented 

in intergovernmental planning for catastrophic incidents. 

Through the leadership of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Homeland Defense and Global Security, NORTHCOM, the Joint Staff, National 

Guard Bureau, and other organizations, the NORTHCOM CONPLAN 3500, DSCA 

Response plan has been developed, which represents NORTHCOM’s plan for exe-
12 

cuting its supporting roles and responsibilities set forth by the NRF and the FIOPResponse. 

Similarly, NORTHCOM is beginning to develop incident-specific playbooks to execute DOD roles and responsibilities identified in Regional All-Hazard Plans and 

their incident-specific annexes. National Guard planning at the State and multiState level help to close the loop on whole community integration of civilian and 

military emergency management concepts. 

To illustrate our success in integration, new NORTHCOM Playbooks are under 

development now to specifically support the tasks and requirements set forth in the 

FEMA Region IX Southern California Earthquake Plan and the FEMA Region X 

Alaska and Cascadia Subduction Zone Annexes. The NORTHCOM Playbooks will 

function as annexes to the NORTHCOM CONPLAN 3500 (DSCA Response). 

Embedded Partners 

To maintain momentum with the planning integration, FEMA and NORTHCOM 

are in the process of embedding officials to serve in each other’s Plans Divisions. 

A FEMA official was detailed to NORTHCOM last summer and currently serves as 

a deputy plans chief to support the development of NORTHCOM playbooks. 

DOD also supplies a number of personnel within FEMA headquarters and its regional offices to coordinate and synchronize its operations. Liaison officers from Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the Joint Staff, and NORTHCOM 

permanently reside within the FEMA Response Directorate to coordinate and ensure situational awareness on a broad array of program efforts. These liaisons also 

serve in positions in the National Response Coordination Center (NRCC) to coordinate operational support missions to the States and survivors during disasters. 

NORTHCOM also supplies permanent DCOs in each FEMA region and an operational planner within the FEMA Headquarters Response Directorate Planning Division. These personnel are engaged as part of the core planning team for each regional and National planning initiative. Routine coordination meetings, a 

NORTHCOM National Planning Integration Team, and other forums provide opportunities for our organizations to raise awareness of new and on-going planning initiatives, to solicit formal feedback on planning products and to synchronize our collective planning efforts. 

Additionally, FEMA is looking to enhance the capabilities of its Incident Management Assistance Teams (IMATs) by including some of our key interagency partners 

as members of the IMATs. This will enable the IMATs to more quickly establish 

an effective unified response with our State and local partners. DOD has provided 

two full-time personnel to two of the National IMATs, (an Noncommissioned Officer 

and an Officer in the rank of Colonel). Their primary role will be as planners working closely to ensure that all DOD resources are properly integrated in the response 

and recovery efforts in support of the State objectives. When not engaged in a response, these individuals will also be engaged with FEMA’s on-going deliberative 

planning efforts. This will further enhance our abilities to fully understand the full 

capabilities of DOD in support of response operations. 

Exercising: National Exercise Program Capstone Event 

FEMA doctrine reflects that the planning process is not complete until after it has 

been validated through an actual event or exercise. Exercises are also the means 

to test Federal department and agency policies, procedures, and capabilities. For instance, the National Exercise Program Capstone 14 exercise that was held March 

27 through April 3 tested capabilities of the broad homeland security enterprise, as 

well as the specific capabilities of FEMA and DOD. Key DOD components participated in the event which served to validate and improve upon the recent joint planning efforts conducted by FEMA, the State of Alaska, DOD components, and other 

departments and agencies. 

Senior Leader Engagement 

FEMA engages senior leaders throughout the military community through: 

• Quarterly senior leader video teleconferences, which include participation from 

the deputy commander of NORTHCOM and FEMA’s associate administrator for 

the Office of Response and Recovery 

• Quarterly dual-status commander courses 

• Monthly ESF Leadership Group 

• Periodic senior executive DSCA course, which features FEMA instruction 

• Participation in Capstone, which is a DOD General Officer senior leader development course. 
13 

CONCLUSION

FEMA’s mission is to support our citizens and first responders to ensure that as 

a Nation we work together to build, sustain, and improve our capability to prepare 

for, protect against, respond to, recover from, and mitigate all hazards. FEMA coordinates with other departments and agencies, such as the DOD, which enables 

FEMA to better serve the Nation. This supports FEMA’s broad strategic goals as 

an agency, including its strategic priority of posturing and building capability for 

catastrophic disasters. DOD is a key partner for FEMA and through liaisons, senior 

leadership engagement, and planning efforts, this relationship is strengthening. 

Thank you for the opportunity to discuss this important authority. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Thank you, Mr. Fenton. 

The Chair now recognizes Mr. Salesses for a 5-minute opening 

statement. 

STATEMENT OF ROBERT G. SALESSES, DEPUTY ASSISTANT 

SECRETARY, HOMELAND DEFENSE INTEGRATION AND DEFENSE SUPPORT OF CIVIL AUTHORITIES, U.S. DEPARTMENT 

OF DEFENSE 

Mr. SALESSES. Chairwoman McSally, Congresswoman Watson 

Coleman, distinguished Members of the subcommittee, thank you 

for the opportunity to address you today on the Department of Defense’s defense support to civil authorities mission, affectionately 

known as DSCA. 

I want to emphasize four key points today. DOD plays a supporting and important role in the National response system. DOD 

relies on a broad range of defense capabilities to provide that support. DOD has made significant improvements to our preparedness 

to support civil authorities. Last, DOD is better prepared to support civil authorities at this time than any other time in history. 

A fundamental tenet of the National response system is that 

DOD is always in support of domestic civil authorities. DOD understands this and is well prepared to assist our Federal partners in 

sustaining and saving lives in the aftermath of man-made or natural disasters. 

DOD supports FEMA as the primary Federal agency and is prepared to support each of the 14 emergency support functions, the 

ESFs. Working closely with our ESF partners, DOD has identified 

critical capabilities to assist them. 

DOD has made significant investments in equipping and readiness of the National Guard. The National Guard is a critical Statelevel resource, providing needed capabilities to State Governors 

quickly in response to disasters and emergencies. In addition, 

through pooling of National Guard resources under emergency 

management assistance compacts, State Governors may draw upon 

additional National Guard capabilities from other States. 

DOD supports disaster response with a broad range of defense 

capabilities, much more than just our military. DOD’s approach to 

the DSCA mission starts at the installation level. DOD encourages 

installations to enter into mutual aid agreements providing reciprocal capabilities between the local community and the military installations. Under immediate response authority, installation commanders may make the resources under their control immediately 

available to save and sustain life in the local community. 

When providing assistance, DOD leverages the total military 

force, Active, Reserve, and National Guard. DOD also relies on its 
14 

defense agencies, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the Defense 

Logistics Agency, and the National Geospatial Agency. 

USTRANSCOM’s strategic air, maritime, and intermodal lift capabilities enable DOD to provide responsive transportation capabilities to our Federal partners. 

The third point, DOD has made significant improvements in its 

preparedness. DOD has a strong, direct, day-to-day relationship 

with the Department of Homeland Security, FEMA, and all of our 

ESF partners. That relationship is enabled from full-time DOD advisers at the DHS headquarters, DOD liaisons at the FEMA headquarters, and coordinating offices at each of the 10 FEMA regions. 

DOD works closely with FEMA to integrate planning efforts at 

both the State, regional, and Federal levels. DOD and FEMA have 

developed many prescripted mission assignments and are continually improving upon those to expedite the request for assistance 

process. DOD’s standing defense support to civil authorities, 

EXORD, identifies critical capabilities that are postured military 

forces to respond rapidly in support of our Federal partners. 

DOD has also developed a wide range of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear—CBRN—response capabilities and has 

trained a force of 18,000 personnel postured to respond rapidly in 

support of civil authorities in the aftermath of a CBRN event. 

DOD supports the FEMA-led National Exercise Program, and 

DOD also hosts numerous exercises at the Federal, State, and local 

partner level, most recently out in Colorado Springs, Ardent Sentry, which is a major West Coast earthquake scenario, working 

very closely with the State of California and Arizona. DOD has leveraged the dual-status commander concept to improve the unity 

of effort between State National Guard and military forces. 

As a result of these advances and others, DOD is well prepared 

to maximize its capabilities and forces to act quickly to save and 

sustain lives in the aftermath of catastrophic disasters. 

Thank you for the opportunity to appear. I appreciate your leadership, Chairwoman McSally and distinguished Members of the 

committee, and I appreciate your support of the Department of Defense. I look forward to your questions. 

[The joint prepared statement of Mr. Salesses and General 

Whitlock follows:] 

JOINT PREPARED STATEMENT OF ROBERT G. SALESSES AND JOSEPH E. WHITLOCK

JUNE 10, 2015 

Chairwoman McSally, Ranking Member Payne, distinguished Members of the 

subcommittee: Thank you for the opportunity to address you today on the Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) role in responding to man-made and natural disasters in 

the United States. 

We would like to emphasize four key points for you today: (1) DOD plays a supporting but important role in the National response system; (2) DOD relies on a 

broad range of defense capabilities to provide support; (3) DOD has made significant 

improvements in its preparedness to support civil authorities; and (4) DOD is now 

better prepared to support civil authorities than at any other time in our Nation’s 

history. 

DOD’S ROLE IN THE NATIONAL RESPONSE SYSTEM

DOD is prepared to assist civil authorities in saving and sustaining lives after 

man-made and natural disasters, including extreme weather events, pandemics, and 
15 

1Department of Defense, National Defense Strategy, June 2008, page 7. 2The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Public Law 93–288), 

as amended. 3 31 U.S.C. § 1535. 4Sections 300hh–ll and 5121 et. seq. and Chapter 15A of Title 42, U.S. Code. 

industrial accidents. DOD understands this and is well-prepared to meet this expectation. 

As stated in the National Defense Strategy, while defending the homeland, the 

Department must also maintain the capacity to support civil authorities in times 

of National emergency such as in the wake of catastrophic man-made and natural 

disasters.1 DOD refers to this support as ‘‘Defense Support of Civil Authorities’’ (or 

‘‘DSCA’’): Support provided by U.S. Federal military forces, DOD civilians, DOD contract personnel, and DOD component assets in response to requests for assistance 

from civil authorities for domestic emergencies, law enforcement support, and other 

domestic activities, or from qualifying entities for special events. 

DOD plays a supporting but important role in the National response system. As 

provided in the National Response Framework, the National response system and 

its protocols provide tiered levels of support when additional resources or capabilities are needed. Most incidents begin and end locally and are managed at the local 

level. Some may require additional support from neighboring jurisdictions or State 

governments. 

The Federal Government and many State governments organize their response resources and capabilities under the Emergency Support Function (ESF) construct. 

The 14 Federal ESFs bring together the capabilities of Federal departments and 

agencies and other National-level assets to perform such functions as transportation, public works and engineering, mass care and temporary housing, logistics, 

public health and medical services, and search and rescue. DOD is available to support all 14 Federal ESFs when requested. 

A fundamental tenet of the National response system is that DOD is always in 

support of domestic civil authorities. It is also important to note that the chain of 

command always runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense to the combatant commander concerned. DOD fully supports the Incident Command System of 

the National Incident Management System. However, at no time does the supported 

agency exercise any formal command and control over DOD forces. 

In this National response system, the National Guard serves as a critical State 

resource in disaster responses and can provide much-needed capabilities to State 

Governors very quickly. The majority of National Guard support in disaster responses is performed at the direction of a State Governor and in a State Active-Duty 

status as a State militia. 

Normally, DOD provides DSCA in support of the Federal Emergency Management 

Agency (FEMA) or another lead Federal agency, when directed by the President or 

when the Secretary of Defense has approved a request for assistance pursuant to 

the Stafford Act 2 or the Economy Act.3 This arrangement helps DOD ensure that 

its resources are used—lawfully—to satisfy prioritized Federal Government requirements as outlined by the President and the lead Federal agency. This arrangement 

is absolutely critical when DOD is supporting a Federal multi-State response so that 

lead Federal agency requirements are appropriately prioritized and personnel and 

resources are deployed/employed in the affected region effectively. 

There are, however, exceptions, including support provided under the immediate 

response authority or pursuant to a mutual and automatic aid agreement, as well 

as DOD organizations with independent authorities. 

Immediate Response Authority.—Under immediate response authority, Federal 

military commanders, heads of DOD components, and responsible DOD civilian officials may, in response to a request for assistance from a civil authority, under imminently serious conditions and if time does not permit approval from higher authority, may provide an immediate response by temporarily employing the resources 

under their control, subject to any supplemental direction provided by higher headquarters, to save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate great property damage 

within the United States. Support provided under the immediate response authority 

should be provided on a reimbursable basis, where appropriate or legally required, 

but will not be delayed or denied based on the inability or unwillingness of the requester to make a commitment to reimburse DOD. 

Mutual and Automatic Aid.4—Installation commanders may provide DSCA to 

local jurisdictions under mutual and automatic aid agreements (also known as reciprocal fire protection agreements), when requested. Support provided pursuant to a 
16 

5The 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance designated DSCA as a primary DOD mission. The Unified Command Plan assigned DSCA as a core mission of two geographic combatant commands: 

U.S. Northern Command (responsible for DSCA in the 48 contiguous States, Alaska, the District 

of Columbia, and the territories of Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands) and U.S. Pacific 

Command (responsible for DSCA in Hawaii and the territory of Guam). The Defense Planning 

mutual and automatic aid agreement is not reimbursed with funding, but instead 

is reimbursed in-kind by reciprocal support. 

Organizations with Independent Authorities and Agreements.—Many DOD organizations possess independent authorities to provide DSCA. For example, the U.S. 

Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) has independent statutory authorities regarding 

emergency management, such as section 5 of the Flood Control Act of 1941 (Public 

Law 84–99) (e.g., providing technical assistance; direct assistance such as providing 

sandbags, pumps, and other types of flood fight materials, emergency contracting; 

and emergency water assistance due to contaminated water source). Under the National Response Framework, USACE is assigned as the primary agency for Emergency Support Function No. 3—Public Works and Engineering. USACE assists 

FEMA by coordinating Federal public works and engineering-related support, as 

well as providing technical assistance, engineering expertise, and construction management to prevent, prepare for, respond to, and/or recover from domestic incidents. 

Likewise, the National Geospatial—Intelligence Agency (NGA), in accordance 50 

U.S.C. §3045, is authorized to provide geospatial intelligence support to other Federal departments and agencies, including FEMA. 

Other DOD organizations have unique agreements for support. For instance, the 

Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) has an interagency agreement with FEMA to provide commodities including fuel to civil authorities responding to disasters. 

DOD RELIES ON A BROAD RANGE OF DEFENSE CAPABILITIES TO PROVIDE DSCA (SUPPORT

TO SUPERSTORM SANDY AS AN EXAMPLE)

DOD supports disaster response with a broad range of defense capabilities, including the Total Force (Active and Reserve Components, including the National 

Guard), DOD civilians, and the significant capabilities of the Defense Agencies. 

During the response to Superstorm Sandy in 2012, for example, USACE 

unwatered the longest tunnel in North America—the Brooklyn-Battery tunnel—and 

did the same for other vital tunnel and subway lines, at a scale and on a pace never 

before seen in a disaster. USACE also installed 198 generators in critical locations 

(e.g., hospitals, shelters, and other facilities at the Hoboken Ferry Terminal, Long 

Island, and Indiantown Gap, as well as first responder operating locations) and sent 

power experts and generators to support New York Public Housing. At peak capacity, USACE generated 55 megawatts of power, enough to support the power needs 

of 50,000 families. 

During the Superstorm Sandy response, DLA, under its interagency agreement 

with FEMA, provided 9.3 million gallons of fuel to over 300 gas stations and emergency vehicle fueling depots, and, together with USACE and the U.S. Transportation Command, provided essential support for restoring the electric grid, the gasoline distribution system, and other critical infrastructure. DLA also used 500 trucks 

to distribute 6.2 million meals, 92,000 Meals-Ready-to-Eat, 72,000 bottles of water, 

172,500 blankets, 4,000 cots, 18,734 mats, 6 portable X-ray machines, 51 generators 

(with a 71,250-kilowatt capacity), and 107 unwatering pumps (providing a 1 million 

gallons per minute capacity). 

Prior to Sandy’s landfall, NGA reviewed more than 21,000 square miles of satellite data to produce pre-strike hurricane products that included images of 24 

coastal cities whose critical infrastructures and key resources would be susceptible 

to damage if a hurricane landed in their vicinity. NGA also deployed teams of analysts to support FEMA in Boston, New York City, and Philadelphia. After landfall, 

NGA worked closely with FEMA and the U.S. Coast Guard to provide mission-essential support by enabling access to and supplying analyzed images to improve situational awareness, including flooding and damage assessments, monitoring energy 

distribution centers, and evaluating airfields for possible evacuation and relief missions. 

DOD HAS MADE SIGNIFICANT IMPROVEMENTS IN ITS PREPAREDNESS TO PROVIDE DSCA

DOD continually pursues improvements in its ability to provide DSCA when needed, and to work closely with its domestic agency partners. 

Strategic Guidance.—DOD’s strategic guidance recognizes DSCA as a priority mission.5 One of the three pillars emphasized by the Defense Strategy is protecting the 
17 

Guidance for Fiscal Years 2017–2021 prioritizes the capabilities, capacities, and readiness of the 

Joint Force to perform the DSCA mission. 

homeland—deterring and defeating attacks and supporting civil authorities in mitigating the effects of potential attacks and natural disasters. 

Integrated Regional Planning.—Consistent with the Presidential Policy Directive 

8 (PPD–8) on National Preparedness, FEMA initiated a deliberate planning process 

to ensure integrated regional plans are in place for each FEMA region. The purpose 

of these plans is to speed disaster responses by enabling quick decisions based on 

pre-determined plans. DOD has worked closely with FEMA to integrate planning efforts and identify both response requirements and coordination challenges during 

major disasters. 

Complex Catastrophe Initiative.—DOD has taken steps to improve its preparedness to help civilian authorities save and protect lives during a complex catastrophe. 

The Complex Catastrophe Initiative directed improvements in DSCA for regional 

planning and plans integration, force sourcing, training and exercises, and the role 

of military installations and Defense Agencies in emergency response operations. 

Pre-Scripted Mission Assignments.—DOD continues to work closely with FEMA to 

develop all-hazard, pre-scripted mission assignments (PSMAs). FEMA PSMAs translate civilian support requirements into military tasks to expedite the request for assistance process. Although more are in development, there are 28 all-hazards, 

PSMAs for DOD support, more than 30 PSMAs for USACE support, and 6 PSMAs 

for NGA support. These all-hazards PSMAs include: • Heavy and medium rotary-wing lift; • Tactical transportation; • Strategic transportation; • Communications support; • Emergency route clearance; • Damage assessment; • Mobilization centers and operational staging areas; • Airspace control; • Deployable temporary medical facilities; and • Rotary-wing medical evacuation. 

DSCA Execute Order.—DOD published a standing DSCA Execute Order (EXORD) 

that provided the commanders of U.S. Northern Command and U.S. Pacific Command—the two combatant commanders responsible for DSCA—more delegated authority to provide critical life-saving and life-sustaining capabilities faster, including: • Defense Coordinating Officers and Defense Coordinating Elements; • DOD installations that could have been used for FEMA mobilization centers; • Medium- and heavy-lift helicopters; • Search aircraft for disaster area reconnaissance; • Robust, deployable communications support packages; • Joint task forces to command and control Federal military forces; • Combatant Commander Assessment Elements; • Aeromedical patient evacuation/transportation; • Forward Surgical Teams; and • The DLA Deployment Distribution Center. 

Access to the Total Force.—The Army Reserve, Navy Reserve, Marine Corps Reserve, and Air Force Reserve—more than 365,000 men and women living in thousands of communities across our Nation, who are ready on short notice to put on 

a uniform and serve when called—are an invaluable resource to our Nation. 

For example, the Army Reserve provides a significant portion of the Army’s disaster response capabilities, including mortuary affairs (75 percent), quartermaster 

(65 percent), medical (59 percent), transportation (44 percent), and engineer (31 percent) capabilities. In the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, 

Congress approved the administration’s request to grant the Secretary of Defense 

the authority to order to active duty this invaluable resource to provide assistance 

in responses to major disasters and emergencies in the United States. To maximize 

the value of this authority to mitigate human suffering and save lives, DOD established policies to expedite the sourcing of these invaluable forces, including consideration of proximity to the region affected and time to employment. 

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Response Enterprise.— DOD has developed a wide range of CBRN response capabilities, and has trained 

to employ these capabilities rapidly in support to civil authorities to help save lives 

in the aftermath of a CBRN incident. 

The CBRN Response Enterprise—almost 17,000 military personnel strong—currently consists of 57 National Guard Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support 
18 

Teams (one in each State and territory and two in California, Florida, and New 

York), 17 National Guard CBRN Enhanced Response Force Packages (stationed in 

Alabama, Colorado, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, 

Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, Oregon, Puerto Rico, Virginia, West Virginia, and 

Wisconsin), 10 National Guard Homeland Response Forces (one stationed in each 

of the 10 FEMA regions), one Defense CBRN Response Force, and two Commandand-Control CBRN Response Elements. 

The CBRN Response Enterprise provides such critical capabilities as detection 

and assessment of CBRN hazards; casualty search and extraction; casualty decontamination; emergency medical, patient triage, trauma care, and surgical and intensive medical care; fatality recovery; ground and rotary-wing air patient movement; 

security; command and control; engineering; logistics; transportation; and aviation 

lift. 

DOD published a standing domestic CBRN Response EXORD that establishes a 

response posture system for the Federal components of the CBRN Response Enterprise, and provides the Commanders of U.S. Northern Command and U.S. Pacific 

Command with authorities to conduct Federal CBRN response operations in support 

of a lead Federal agency, such as FEMA. 

Defense Coordination and Liaison.—In addition to interagency planning and other 

initiatives, DOD has forged strong, direct, day-to-day relations with the Department 

of Homeland Security (DHS) and FEMA, including full-time DOD advisers in DHS 

headquarters, Defense Coordinating Officers and Defense Coordinating Elements at 

each of the 10 FEMA regional headquarters, and DOD liaisons at FEMA’s deployed 

joint field offices. 

DOD also established a National Guard Joint Force Headquarters–State in all 54 

States, territories, and the District of Columbia. These Joint Force Headquarters 

provide expertise and situational awareness to DOD authorities to facilitate integration of Federal and State-level activities. They also develop plans to support civil 

authorities in response to man-made or natural disasters, and coordinate these 

plans, through the National Guard Bureau and the Joint Staff, with U.S. Northern 

Command and U.S. Pacific Command. 

Exercises.—Exercises are critical to ensuring readiness and identifying gaps and 

potential weaknesses within and across agencies in responding to man-made or natural disasters. DOD has fully supported the FEMA-led National Exercise Program. 

For years, DOD has also hosted numerous exercises involving Federal, State, and 

local partners, including annual DSCA exercises such as Ardent Sentry 2014 (Alaska earthquake) and Ardent Sentry 2015 (California earthquake). In April of this 

year, the Commander of U.S. Northern Command hosted a Senior Leader Seminar 

with Federal, State, and local partners. This seminar used a large-scale California 

earthquake with a cascading effects scenario as a framework to integrate key State, 

interagency, and DOD perspectives on how best U.S. Northern Command can provide support. 

Dual-Status Commanders.—In 2010, DOD and the States agreed to utilize dualstatus commanders in disaster responses. Until 2010, dual-status commanders had 

only been used in deliberately-planned special events. 

A dual-status commander is a military commander who may, in accordance with 

the law, serve in two statuses, State and Federal, simultaneously, while performing 

the duties of those statuses separately and distinctly. In State status, the dual-status commander is subject to the orders of the State Governor and Adjutant General, 

and, on their behalf, exercises command or control of State National Guard forces 

to execute State missions. In Federal status, the dual-status commander is subject 

to the orders of the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the supported Combatant Commander, and, on their behalf, exercises command and control of Federal 

military forces for the purpose of executing DSCA missions. The appointment of a 

dual-status commander does not grant the President (or other Federal officials) command of non-Federalized State National Guard forces or a State Governor (or other 

State officials) command of Federal military forces. 

The intended benefit of appointing a dual-status commander is to facilitate unity 

of effort within our National response system between State National Guard forces, 

operating on behalf of a State Governor, and Federal military forces, operating on 

behalf of the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the supported Combatant 

Commander in achieving common objectives in a disaster response or in securing 

a special event. 

To expedite appointment of dual-status commanders, DOD has established standing memorandums of agreement with 52 of the 53 States and territories. 
19 

6 42 U.S.C. § 5170a, § 5170b, § 5192. 

DOD IS BETTER-PREPARED TO PROVIDE DSCA

As a result of these advances, DOD is better-prepared to defend the United States 

and assist civil authorities in the aftermath of a catastrophic incident than at any 

other time in our Nation’s history. 

DOD is prepared, when directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense, to 

provide, as part of the Federal Government’s support of State and local emergency 

assistance efforts, capabilities and resources to save lives, sustain lives, and protect 

property and public health and safety, including search and rescue, emergency medical care, emergency mass care, emergency shelter, and provision of food, water, and 

other essential needs, including movement of supplies or persons.6 DOD is well-prepared and has capabilities and forces postured to act, with a sense of urgency, when 

needed, to maximize the saving and sustaining of lives in the aftermath of a catastrophic disaster. 

DOD maintains this high level of preparedness by continually investing in its preparedness, including through integrated planning, training, and exercises. 

CONCLUSION

DOD plays a supporting, but important role in the National response system. 

DOD relies upon a broad range of defense capabilities to provide support. DOD 

has made significant advances in its ability to provide DSCA, when needed, by: (1) 

Recognizing DSCA as a priority mission in DOD’s strategic guidance; (2) working 

closely with FEMA to support the deliberate planning process to develop integrated 

regional plans for each FEMA region; (3) enhancing DSCA for regional planning and 

plans integration, force sourcing, training, and exercises, and the roles of installations and Defense Agencies through the Complex Catastrophe Initiative; (4) expediting the request for assistance process by establishing FEMA PSMAs; (5) empowering Combatant Commanders to provide DSCA via a standing DSCA EXORD; (6) 

incorporating the extensive capabilities and outstanding personnel of the Army Reserve, Navy Reserve, Marine Corps Reserve, and Air Force Reserve; (7) fielding the 

best-funded, best-equipped, and best-trained CBRN response force in the world; (8) 

forging strong, direct, day-to-day relations with DHS and other partners; and (9) 

promoting unity of effort through such concepts as the use of dual-status commanders. 

As a result, DOD—Active, Reserve, National Guard, and civilians and contractors—is better prepared to defend the United States and assist civil authorities in 

the aftermath of a catastrophic incident than at any other time in our Nation’s history. DOD’s men and women—both military and civilian—are well-prepared to act, 

with a sense of urgency, when needed. 

To continue to meet interagency preparedness requirements, DOD will work with 

its partners to: (1) Build and sustain partnerships; (2) establish well-developed networks for sharing information and setting joint priorities; (3) forge pre-arranged 

agreements; (4) continually improve on integrated planning; (5) train and exercise 

to execute integrated plans; and (6) rapidly integrate National efforts. As then-Deputy Secretary Carter stated in DOD’s 2013 after-action report for Superstorm 

Sandy, ‘‘[t]his is a new frontier for the Department as counter-insurgency 

was . . . and we continue to learn and adapt.’’ 

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. We appreciate your 

leadership, Chairwoman McSally, Ranking Member Payne, and distinguished Members of the subcommittee, and your support for the Department of Defense. We look 

forward to your questions. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Thank you, Mr. Salesses. The Chair now recognizes Brigadier General Whitlock. 

STATEMENT OF JOSEPH E. WHITLOCK, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, 

WESTERN HEMISPHERE, THE JOINT STAFF, J–5, STRATEGIC 

PLANS AND POLICY DIRECTORATE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 

DEFENSE 

General WHITLOCK. Chairwoman McSally, Representative Watson Coleman, distinguished Members of the subcommittee, I am 

Brigadier General Joe Whitlock, the deputy director for western 

hemisphere of strategic plans and policy, what we call J–5, in the 
20 

Joint Staff. Thanks for the opportunity to address you today on the 

role the Department of Defense plays in supporting civil authorities 

during disasters. 

In this testimony, we will discuss the progress DOD has made 

with regard to in-depth planning with the geographic combatant 

commands, that is U.S. Northern Command, U.S. Pacific Command, our two combatant commands responsible for DSCA. 

In 2013, the Department of Defense published a standing DSCA 

execute order, or EXORD, that provided commanders of 

NORTHCOM and PACOM more delegated authority to provide 

critical life-saving and life-sustaining capabilities faster, including 

defense coordinating officers and the defense coordinating elements 

they bring, aircraft for disaster area search and rescue, joint task 

forces to command and control Federal military forces, and 

aeromedical patient evacuation and transportation. 

DOD has also developed a wide range of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear—CBRN—response capabilities, and has 

trained to employ these capabilities rapidly to support civil authorities to help save lives in the aftermath of a CBRN incident. 

DOD has also published a standing domestic CBRN response 

execute order in 2011 that establishes a response posture system 

for the Federal components of the CBRN response enterprise and 

provides the commanders of NORTHCOM and PACOM with authorities to conduct Federal CBRN response operation in support of 

a lead Federal agency, such as FEMA. 

DOD has also worked closely with our interagency partners to 

exercise their support capabilities during disasters. Exercises are 

critical to ensuring readiness and identifying gaps and potential 

weaknesses within and across agencies in responding to man-made 

or natural disasters. 

DOD fully supports the FEMA-led National Exercise Program. 

For years DOD has also hosted numerous exercises involving Federal, State, and local partners, to include our annual DSCA exercise, such as Ardent Sentry 2014 that focused on a major Alaska 

earthquake and Ardent Sentry 2015 that focused on a southern 

California earthquake. And in April this year, as you heard the 

earlier witnesses, the commander of U.S. NORTHCOM also hosted 

a senior leader seminar with Federal, State, and local partners. 

Again, that helps us get better left with an incident. 

As the DOD objective is to ensure unity of the effort between 

Federal and State forces, the DOD and States have procedures in 

place to utilize the dual-status commander in disaster response if 

warranted. In 2010 dual-status commanders had only been used in 

delivery plan special events. We have used them in other cases 

since them. A dual-status commander is a military commander who 

may, in accordance with the law, serve in two statuses, State and 

Federal simultaneously, while performing the duties of those 

statuses separately and distinctly. 

The intended benefit of appointing a dual-status commander is 

to facilitate unity of effort within our National response system between the State National Guard forces operating on behalf the 

State Governor and Federal military forces operating on behalf of 

the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the supported combat-
21 

ant commander in achieving common objectives in a disaster response or in securing a special event. 

Chairwoman McSally, Representative Watson Coleman, and distinguished Members of the subcommittee, that you again for the 

opportunity to appear before you today. I look forward to taking 

your questions. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Thank you, General Whitlock. 

The Chair now recognizes Dr. Kirschbaum. 

STATEMENT OF JOSEPH W. KIRSCHBAUM, PH.D., DIRECTOR, 

DEFENSE CAPABILITIES AND MANAGEMENT, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Mr. KIRSCHBAUM. Chairman McSally, Mrs. Watson Coleman, and 

Members of the subcommittee, I am pleased to be here today to discuss the progress the Department of Defense has made addressing 

our recommendations in its defense support of civil authorities mission. 

The National response framework highlights the understanding 

that incidents, disasters, and other emergencies are managed at 

the lowest jurisdictional level and are then supported by additional 

response capabilities as needed. In a sense, direct support from the 

Department of Defense is meant as a last resort. 

However, the Department recognizes, as Mr. Salesses said, the 

Department is often expected to play a prominent role, and early 

on, in supporting civil authorities and must be prepared to provide 

rapid response when called upon. This in turn highlights the importance of vigilance in planning, coordinating, and assessing the 

ability of the Department to provide these capabilities. 

My statement is based on reports we have issued from March 

2010 through December 2014 and discusses the Department’s 

progress in addressing our recommendations on strategy, plans, 

and guidance, interagency coordination, and sustaining capabilities 

to support civil authorities. 

Despite the rapidly-developing relationships between the Department of Defense and its domestic Federal and State partners in the 

years after 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina, we consistently found that 

key defense strategy, plans, and guidance were outdated and incomplete, did not reflect new common terms or such National guidance as the National response framework. 

We found during this time that the Department of Defense, and 

particularly the new U.S. Northern Command, were not consistently applying to domestic planning the same rigorous strategic 

operational and tactical planning the Department has been using 

for decades for more traditional military operations abroad. For example, we found gaps in guidance on command-and-control structures for Federal military forces during complex catastrophes and 

for the aforementioned dual-status commander concept, which is 

intended to be a regular Army or Air Force or National Guard officer who would command both State and Federal military forces in 

a domestic setting. 

In response to our recommendations, the Department has made 

critical progress. In 2013, the Department issued an updated strategy for homeland defense and defense support of civil authorities 

and a critical revised joint doctrine publication. More recently, 
22 

Northern Command and U.S. Pacific Command reported that they 

have updated their civil support concept plans to address command-and-control issues, and DOD is now currently updating an 

instruction on the dual-status commander concept. DOD also 

agreed to address gaps we found in guidance and plans for domestic cyber incidents, but has not yet fully addressed these recommendations. 

With respect to interagency coordination, we identified gaps in 

DOD’s guidance related to who does what, translating for interagency partners DOD’s terms and prophesies, and management of 

DOD’s interagency liaisons. An example of the latter was that for 

a time early on DOD was not aware of how many of its personnel 

were assigned to DHS as liaisons or in some other capacity. 

To address our recommendations, the Department updated key 

guidance, issued an interagency partner guide, and signed a memorandum of understanding with DHS that includes key personnel 

management practices for interagency liaisons. 

With respect to sustaining capabilities to support civil authorities, DOD has taken steps to evaluate existing capabilities and 

identify gaps. One of the specific gaps we identified was in planning for complex catastrophes. In 2014, DOD reported that this 

planning had been completed and covered such areas as complex 

catastrophes, wildland firefighting, and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear responses. 

DOD continues to work on this and told us that future efforts 

will also include revised planning for pandemic influenza and infectious diseases and civil disturbance operations. 

In conclusion, DOD has made significant progress in improving 

strategy, plans, and guidance, interagency coordination, and capabilities needed to support civil authorities. Our work also shows 

that DOD recognizes that there remains room for improvement. 

The gaps we identified, as well the Department’s efforts to close 

those gaps, are also a cautionary tale about the sustained effort required by DOD and its Federal and State partners to plan in advance and coordinate constantly and closely to ensure that DOD is 

positioned to support civil authorities in responding to the myriad 

threats we face. 

Looking ahead, we are beginning additional work in the area of 

defense support of civil authorities. These reviews will include 

DOD’s cyber civil support, the status of the homeland response 

forces, DOD’s preparedness for civil support in the event of a pandemic, and coordination with Federal agencies to counter improvised explosive devices in the United States. 

Chairman McSally, Mrs. Watson Coleman, Members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify before you 

today, and I am happy to answer your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Kirschbaum follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOSEPH W. KIRSCHBAUM

JUNE 10, 2015 

Chairman McSally, Ranking Member Payne, and Members of the subcommittee: 

I am pleased to be here today to discuss progress and challenges in the Department 

of Defense’s (DOD) efforts to serve the American people through its defense support 
23 

1Defense support of civil authorities is support provided by Federal military forces, DOD civilians, DOD contract personnel, DOD component assets, and, in certain circumstances, National 

Guard forces in response to requests for assistance from civil authorities for domestic emergencies, law enforcement support, and other domestic activities, or from qualifying entities for 

special events. 2DOD, Strategy for Homeland Defense and Defense Support of Civil Authorities (February 

2013). 3 In January 2015, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy reorganized its missions and renamed the assistant secretary of defense for homeland defense and America’s security affairs as the assistant secretary of defense for homeland defense and global security. For 

the purpose of consistency, we will refer to the position in this report as the assistant secretary 

of defense for homeland defense. 4 Joint Task Force–North, formerly referred to as Joint Task Force–6, was created in 1989 to 

serve as the planning and coordinating operational headquarters to support local, State, and 

Federal law enforcement agencies within the Southwest Border region to counter the flow of illegal drugs into the United States. In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks 

on the United States, the command was officially renamed Joint Task Force–North and its mission was expanded to include providing homeland security support to the Nation’s Federal law 

enforcement agencies. 5 A Defense Coordinating Officer is a DOD single point of contact for domestic emergencies 

who is assigned to a joint field office to validate requests for assistance, forward mission assignments through proper channels to the appropriate military organizations, and assign military 

liaisons, as appropriate, to activated emergency support functions. An Emergency Preparedness 

Liaison Officer is a senior reserve officer who represents their service at the appropriate joint 

field office conducting planning and coordination responsibilities in support of civil authorities. 

See Joint Publication 3–28, Defense Support to Civil Authorities (Jul. 31, 2013). 6This statement is based on the following reports that are cited throughout and include GAO, 

Emergency Preparedness: Opportunities Exist to Strengthen Interagency Assessments and Accountability for Closing Capability Gaps, GAO–15–20 (Washington, DC: Dec. 4, 2014); Civil Support: Actions Are Needed to Improve DOD’s Planning for a Complex Catastrophe, GAO–13–763 

(Washington, DC: Sep. 30, 2013); Homeland Defense: DOD Needs to Address Gaps in Homeland 

Defense and Civil Support Guidance, GAO–13–128 (Washington, DC: Oct. 24, 2012); Homeland 

Defense: DOD Can Enhance Efforts to Identify Capabilities to Support Civil Authorities During 

Disasters, GAO–10–386 (Washington, DC: Mar. 30, 2010); and, Homeland Defense: DOD Needs 

Continued 

of civil authorities (DSCA) mission.1 The United States continues to face an uncertain, complex security environment with the potential for major disasters and emergencies, such as Hurricane Sandy in 2012. The 2013 Strategy for Homeland Defense 

and Defense Support of Civil Authorities recognizes DOD is often expected to play 

a prominent role supporting civil authorities and must be prepared to provide rapid 

response when called upon.2 DOD must coordinate with a number of other agencies 

on its civil support mission, which include providing support during disasters and 

declared emergencies (both natural and man-made); providing support for restoring 

public health and services and civil order; providing support for National special security events; and periodic planned support. Examples of such DOD coordination 

with civil authorities include aiding the identification and interdiction of suspected 

transnational criminal organizations’ activities conducted within and along the approaches to the continental United States; assisting the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) during the annual hurricane season; assisting the Department of Transportation after the I–35 bridge collapse in Minnesota in 2007; and 

supporting the U.S. Secret Service regarding Presidential inaugurations. In these 

and other events, DOD offered a broad array of resources that were developed for 

its warfighting mission but were brought to bear when civilian-response capabilities 

were overwhelmed or exhausted—or in instances where DOD offered unique capabilities. 

In an effort to facilitate defense support of civil authorities across the Nation and 

at all organizational levels, DOD has assigned responsibilities within the Office of 

the Secretary of Defense (such as the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense 

for Homeland Defense and Global Security),3 the Joint Chiefs of Staff, various combatant commands (such as Northern Command and Pacific Command), the National 

Guard Bureau, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the Defense Logistics Agency, 

joint task forces (such as Joint Task Force–North),4 the intelligence agencies (such 

as the National Geospatial—Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency), and regional interagency liaisons (such as the Defense Coordinating Officers 

and Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers).5

My testimony is based on reports we issued from March 2010 through December 

2014 that examined DOD’s DSCA mission, and discusses DOD’s progress in implementing recommendations that we made to strengthen: (1) DOD’s strategy, plans, 

and guidance documents; (2) interagency coordination; and, (3) capabilities to support civil authorities.6
24 

to Take Actions to Enhance Interagency Coordination for Its Homeland Defense and Civil Support Missions, GAO–10–364 (Washington, DC: Mar. 30, 2010). 7DOD, Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support (June 2005). 8GAO–13–763, GAO–13–128, GAO–10–364, and GAO–10–386. 

9 Joint Publication 3–28, Defense Support of Civil Authorities, (July 31, 2013). 10The National Response Framework is a guide to how the Nation responds to all types of 

disasters and emergencies. It is built on scalable, flexible, and adaptable concepts identified in 

This statement includes selected updates that we conducted in June 2015 on 

DOD’s DSCA mission. Our reports contained information that we obtained from reviewing and analyzing relevant DOD documents, including the 2013 Strategy for 

Homeland Defense and Defense Support of Civil Authorities; The DOD Cyber Strategy from 2015; Northern Command and Pacific Command planning documents; 

DOD directives, instructions, and doctrine; and Northern Command capability assessments. We also conducted interviews with DOD officials within the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, combatant commands, military services, defense 

agencies, and Reserve officials. We also conducted interviews with other Federal officials from organizations such as the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), 

FEMA, Customs and Border Protection, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 

Federal Bureau of Investigation, Drug Enforcement Agency, Centers for Disease 

Control and Prevention, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, and officials 

located in the El Paso Intelligence Center. More detailed information about our 

scope and methodology can be found in our reports. For the updates, we collected 

information from DOD officials on actions the Department has taken to address 

findings and recommendations made in our prior reports. The work upon which this 

testimony is based was conducted in accordance with generally accepted Government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the 

audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence 

obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our 

audit objectives. 

DOD CONTINUES TO TAKE ACTION TO STRENGTHEN ITS DSCA STRATEGY, PLANS, AND

GUIDANCE

DOD has and continues to take action to address our prior recommendations to 

strengthen its DSCA strategy, plans, and guidance. As we have previously reported, 

clear, current, and complete strategies, plans, and guidance documents are important for reflecting the direction of the Departments’ civilian and military leadership, 

defining DOD and its components’ policies and responsibilities, and sharing practices that could facilitate effective support of civil authorities. In 2005, DOD issued 

its first Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support.7 In four reports we issued 

in 2010 through 2013, we found that DOD’s DSCA strategies and guidance were 

outdated, not fully integrated, or were not comprehensive.8 Since 2010, DOD has 

taken action to address many of our findings and recommendations. For example: • DOD updated its strategy and doctrine for civil support.—In 2010, and then 

again in 2012, we found that DOD’s 2005 Strategy for Homeland Defense and 

Civil Support had not been updated to reflect the current environment in which 

DOD supports civil authorities. For example, while the strategy primarily discusses DOD’s DSCA mission in the context of the Department’s response to a 

weapon of mass destruction—DOD’s primary focus after the 2001 terrorist attacks—it did not address the breadth of DSCA missions that DOD must be prepared to support subsequent to Hurricane Katrina in 2005. Based on our recommendation that DOD should update its strategy, in February 2013 DOD 

issued an updated Strategy for Homeland Defense and Defense Support of Civil 

Authorities. In this update, DOD acknowledged that National security threats, 

hazards, vulnerabilities, strategic guidance, and political and economic factors 

had evolved since the 2005 strategy, and recognized that its support to civil authorities included a broader set of missions—to include catastrophic natural or 

man-made disasters, pre-planned National Special Security Events (like summits and high-profile sports events), cyber attacks, and the Southwest Border 

counterdrug efforts. We also reported in 2012 that DOD had not updated its 

joint publication for DSCA and recommended that the Department needed to 

do so. DOD agreed with our recommendation and in July 2013, DOD updated 

its joint publication for Defense Support for Civil Authorities.9 In this update, 

among other things, DOD described more fully the National Response Framework, which is a framework based on a tiered, graduated response to major disasters and emergencies where incidents are managed at the lowest jurisdictional level and are supported by additional response capabilities, as needed.10
25 

the National Incident Management System to align key roles and responsibilities across the Nation. This framework describes specific authorities and best practices for managing incidents 

that range from the serious but purely local to large-scale terrorist attacks or catastrophic natural disasters. The National Response Framework describes the principles, roles, and responsibilities, and coordinating structures for delivering the core capabilities required to respond to 

an incident and further describes how response efforts integrate with those of the other mission 

areas. 11GAO–13–763. 12DOD has defined a complex catastrophe as a natural or man-made incident, including cyber 

space attack, power grid failure, and terrorism, which results in cascading failures of multiple 

interdependent, critical, life-sustaining infrastructure sectors and causes extraordinary levels of 

mass casualties, damage, or disruption severely affecting the population, environment, economy, 

public health, National morale, response efforts, and/or Government functions. 13Dual-status commanders are military commanders who serve as an intermediate link between the separate chains of command for State and Federal forces. 14GAO–13–128. 15GAO–13–128. 

• DOD has reported that it has updated its DSCA plans.—In September 2013,11

we found that DOD did not have a clear command-and-control structure for 

Federal military services during complex catastrophes.12 We found that DOD 

had not identified the roles, responsibilities, and relationships among command 

elements that may be involved in responding to such incidents across multiple 

States. This issue was illustrated by events such as National Level Exercise 

2011 that examined DOD’s response to a complex catastrophe. Similarly, DOD’s 

after-action reports on Hurricane Sandy in 2012 found that the command-andcontrol structure for Federal military forces was not clearly defined, resulting 

in the degradation of situational awareness and unity of effort, and the execution of missions without proper approval. Northern Command officials agreed 

with our findings and stated that they would address this issue and the associated recommendation we made in our report by updating their DSCA plans. As 

of June 2015, DOD reported that Northern Command and Pacific Command 

had updated their DSCA plans to address our recommendation. • DOD implementation guidance on the use of dual-status commanders is in development.—DOD established the dual-status commander structure—active-duty 

military or National Guard officers who command State and Federal responses 

to civil-support incidents and events—and has used this structure for certain 

events.13 For example, DOD used the dual-status commander structure for the 

2012 Colorado wildfire response and the Hurricane Sandy response. In October 

2012, we reported that DOD had not developed guidance for the use of dualstatus commanders for incidents affecting multiple States and territories.14 For 

example, DOD had not developed specific criteria and conditions for when and 

how State Governors and the Secretary of Defense would mutually appoint a 

commander. Consequently, we recommended and DOD concurred that the department develop implementation guidance on the use of dual-status commanders. In June 2015, Northern Command officials reported that an instruction about dual-status commanders was being drafted in coordination with 

DOD, Northern Command, and the National Guard Bureau. 

• DOD has agreed to take steps to align cyber support roles and responsibilities.— 

In October 2012, we found that DOD had not updated its DSCA guidance, such 

as joint doctrine, to ensure that it was consistent with National plans and preparations for domestic cyber incidents.15 We recommended that DOD align guidance on preparing for and responding to domestic cyber incidents with Nationallevel guidance to include roles and responsibilities. DOD partially concurred 

with this recommendation. However, the Department has not yet taken action 

that meets the intent of the recommendation. 

DOD HAS TAKEN ACTION TO STRENGTHEN INTERAGENCY COORDINATION FOR SUPPORT

OF CIVIL AUTHORITIES

DOD has and continues to take action to address our prior recommendations to 

strengthen the Department’s interagency coordination for support of civil authorities. As numerous events within the homeland in the last decade have pointed out, 

it is critical that DOD coordinate, integrate, and synchronize its DSCA mission with 

a broad range of interagency partners that the Department may need to support. 

Such partners can include FEMA, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Customs and 

Border Protection, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, and the Centers for 

Disease Control and Prevention. As we have previously reported, there are three 

key areas that DOD needs to focus on to enhance and institutionalize its interagency coordination efforts. DOD has since taken action to address these areas: 
26 

16DHS, National Response Framework, Second Edition (May 2013); DOD, Joint Publication 

3–08, Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations (June 24, 2011); GAO–10–364; 

DOD, National Defense Strategy (June 2008); and GAO, Results-Oriented Government: Practices 

That Can Help Enhance and Sustain Collaboration Among Federal Agencies, GAO–06–15 

(Washington, DC: Oct. 21, 2005). 17GAO–10–364. 18DOD Directive 3025.15, Military Assistance to Civil Authorities (Feb. 18, 1997). 19 Joint Publication 3–28, Defense Support of Civil Authorities (July 31, 2013); and Joint Publication 3–08, Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations (June 24, 2011). 20GAO–10–364. 

• DOD Has Better Defined Interagency Roles and Responsibilities.—Previous GAO 

work, the National Response Framework, and DOD strategic guidance identify 

the need for clearly-defined roles and responsibilities to enhance interagency coordination.16 In our 2010 review of DOD’s interagency coordination efforts, we 

found that the key documents used to define roles and responsibilities were outdated, not fully integrated, or were not comprehensive.17 We found that DOD’s 

series of civil-support policies and guidance, such as a 1997 DOD directive on 

military assistance to civil authorities,18 were outdated and did not reflect 

changes that occurred subsequent to their issuance. For example, the guidance 

documents did not refer to DHS, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense 

for Homeland Defense, Northern Command, or roles and responsibilities under 

the National Response Framework. Similarly, we found that roles and responsibilities for support to law enforcement—including Joint Task Force–North, 

which provides defense support of civilian law enforcement agencies along U.S. 

borders—were unclear as were the roles and responsibilities between the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense. Consequently, we recommended and DOD concurred that the Department should update key documents that outline roles and 

responsibilities. Subsequently, DOD has, for the most part, issued new guidance 

documents or updated older guidance to better define roles and responsibilities 

within the Department for interagency coordination. 

• DOD has issued an interagency partner guide.—DOD’s joint doctrine on interagency coordination and support of civil authorities notes that a unified ‘‘wholeof-Government’’ approach to National security issues requires Federal partner 

agencies to understand core competencies, roles, and missions and that sharing 

information is critical for the success of interagency coordination between Federal agencies.19 To support interagency coordination on DSCA, DOD has taken 

action to communicate with its Federal partners through conferences and other 

forums and multiple documents. In our 2010 review of DOD’s interagency coordination efforts, we found that DOD’s approach to communicating with Federal partners could be improved, and the Department had not clearly identified 

the roles and responsibilities and day-to-day coordination processes with its 

Federal partners through a single, readily accessible source.20 Specifically, 

DOD, DHS, and the Department of Justice officials told us that the benefits 

gained through interagency forums, such as Homeland Security Council meetings and annual National Interagency Fire Center conferences, are transient because they depend on personnel who rotate out of their positions frequently. 

The National Interagency Fire Center had addressed this challenge by creating 

a partner handbook that identified key information. DOD had not developed a 

similar vehicle for institutionalizing its information-sharing efforts so that Federal partners could maintain knowledge and have readily accessible information 

about key issues, such as the different DOD entities that have DSCA missions. 

For those cases where DOD internally documented its missions, roles, and responsibilities, we found the information was dispersed among multiple sources; 

also, the documents may not have always been readily accessible to Federal 

partners, and they may have been written in a manner that led to unclear expectations. Therefore, we recommended that DOD develop and issue a partner 

guide that identifies the roles and responsibilities of DOD entities, processes, 

and agreed-upon approaches for interagency coordination for homeland defense 

and civil-support efforts. DOD concurred with our recommendation and, in November 2011, issued its Defense Support of Civil Authorities Interagency Partner 

Guide. 

• DOD has taken action to implement key practices for managing some liaisons 

the Department exchanges with its Federal partners.—Prior GAO reports and 

DOD guidance recognize that leading organizations employ key practices for effective and efficient workforce planning, such as situational awareness, staffingneeds assessments, position descriptions, training, and performance assess-
27 

21DOD Instruction 1315.18, Procedures for Military Personnel Assignments (Jan. 12, 2005); 

DOD Instruction 1400.25, DOD Civilian Personnel Management System (Nov. 18, 2008); DOD 

Instruction 1000.17, Detail of DOD Personnel to Duty Outside the Department of Defense (Apr. 

16, 2008); GAO, Human Capital: Key Principles for Effective Strategic Workforce Planning, GAO–04–39 (Washington, DC: Dec. 11, 2003; and GAO, A Model of Strategic Human Capital 

Management, GAO–02–373SP (Washington, DC: Mar. 15, 2002). 22GAO–10–364. 23 In responding to a draft of this statement, DOD stated that, according to a 2004 DOD–DHS 

memorandum of agreement on personnel exchange, there were at least 38 DOD personnel detailed to (or assigned as liaisons at) DHS headquarters and 86 DOD personnel to DHS, in general. However, during the audit, DOD documents and officials reflect that DOD’s numbers were 

inaccurate and that the officials did not have an exact count on the number of DOD personnel 

located at DHS headquarters or throughout the DHS organization. 24DOD, Quadrennial Defense Review 2014 (Mar. 4, 2014). 25GAO–10–386. 26DOD Directive 3025.18, Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) (Dec. 29, 2010, incorporating change 1, Sep. 21, 2012). 27GAO–13–763. 

ments.21 However, in our 2010 report, we found that DOD had not implemented 

such key practices.22 For example, DOD did not have complete situational 

awareness of all the liaisons detailed to its interagency partners. According to 

DOD records, in 2009, there were only 2 DOD personnel at DHS headquarters—yet an informal survey by the representative for the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense to DHS found that more 

than 110 DOD personnel, from a variety of DOD entities, were working at DHS 

as liaisons, subject-matter experts, or in other capacities.23 Therefore, we recommended and DOD agreed that DOD develop and issue additional workforce 

management policy and guidance regarding DOD liaisons to other Federal agencies, as well as other Federal agencies’ liaisons to DOD. In October 2013, the 

deputy secretary of defense and the acting deputy secretary of homeland security signed an updated memorandum of agreement that outlines ways in which 

DOD and DHS will incorporate key practices for managing liaisons in the National capital region. 

DOD HAS TAKEN ACTION TO IDENTIFY NEEDS AND ADDRESS CAPABILITY GAPS

REGARDING ITS SUPPORT OF CIVIL AUTHORITIES

In response to our prior recommendations, DOD has taken action to identify needs 

and address capability gaps for its DSCA mission. In the 2014 Quadrennial Defense 

Review, DOD notes that the key pillar of protecting the homeland includes sustaining capabilities to assist U.S. civil authorities in protecting U.S. airspace, 

shores, and borders, and in responding effectively to domestic man-made and natural disasters.24 In 2008, DOD conducted a capabilities-based assessment of its 

homeland defense and civil support missions to enable improvements for DOD 

homeland defense and civil-support policy, evaluate existing DOD capabilities and 

identify capability gaps, improve DOD’s integration with interagency mission partners, and recommend further action to promote future capability development. In 

2010, we found that DOD and DHS had undertaken initiatives to address gaps in 

strategic planning that should assist DOD in identifying its capability requirements 

for the DSCA mission.25 For example, DOD and DHS issued catastrophic plans for 

responding to and recovering from a category 4 hurricane in Hawaii. In addition, 

DHS had established a pilot initiative entitled Task Force for Emergency Readiness 

pilot initiative that sought to integrate Federal and State planning efforts for catastrophic events, which in turn would assist DOD in determining the capabilities it 

may be asked to provide. However, we found that DOD’s DSCA policy and guidance 

was outdated, which limited DOD’s ability to address capability gaps. We therefore 

made a recommendation and DOD concurred that the Department should update its 

DSCA guidance. Since then, DOD has updated or replaced several DSCA guidance 

documents, such as DOD Directive 3025.18.26 By updating this guidance, DOD addressed our recommendation and DOD is in a better position to address remaining 

capability gaps. 

Additionally, we found in 2013 that DOD had not taken all of the necessary steps 

to identify capabilities for DSCA. Additionally, we found in 2013 that DOD had not 

taken all of the necessary steps to identify capabilities for DSCA.27 Specifically, we 

found that Northern Command and Pacific Command were updating their DSCA 

plans to include a scenario for a complex catastrophe; however, the commands delayed identification of capabilities that could be provided to execute the plans in 

light of FEMA’s plan to complete its regional planning efforts in 2018. We recommended that the commanders work through the defense coordinating officers to 
28 

28The National Response Framework states that the Secretary of Homeland Security is to ensure that overall Federal preparedness actions are unified, complete, and synchronized to prevent unfilled gaps or seams in the Federal Government’s efforts to respond to all hazards. The 

emergency support functions are organized by specific functional areas for the most frequently 

needed capabilities during an emergency—including communications, medical services, and 

search and rescue—and are designed to coordinate the provision of related assets and services 

by Federal departments and agencies. See DHS, National Response Framework, Second Edition 

(May 2013). 29GAO–15–20. 30FEMA serves as the chair of the Emergency Support Function Leadership Group. 

develop an interim set of specific capabilities that could be provided to prepare for 

and respond to complex catastrophes while FEMA completes its plans. DOD concurred with our recommendation and, in May 2014, according to DOD officials, 

Northern Command and Pacific Command had updated their plans to incorporate 

complex catastrophes, including identifying capabilities that would be available to 

the lead Federal agency during such an event. Specifically, DOD officials told us, 

in June 2015, that planning had been completed, covering issues such as complex 

catastrophes; wildland firefighting; and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear response. Additionally, DOD officials told us that future planning efforts will 

include additional branch plans addressing issues such as pandemic influenza and 

infectious diseases and civil disturbance operations. 

Under the National Response Framework, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 

serves as the coordinator for the ‘‘Public Works and Engineering’’ emergency support function—1 of 14 emergency support functions that serve as the Federal Government’s primary coordinating structure for building, sustaining, and delivering response capabilities.28 The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, in its emergency support 

function coordinator role, is responsible for engaging in appropriate planning and 

preparedness activities, which could include establishing capability requirements, 

cataloguing current capabilities, and conducting capability gap analyses that might 

be needed if the Federal Government is asked to support local, State, Tribal, territorial, and insular area Government response operations during a disaster. In a recent assessment of the Federal preparedness to respond to no-notice catastrophic 

disasters, such as improvised nuclear device attacks and major earthquakes, we 

found that the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers had taken an insular approach to 

identifying, cataloguing, and analyzing gaps for public works and engineering capabilities.29 Since we concluded that the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ actions—as 

well as actions by other non-DOD agencies that serve as coordinators for different 

emergency support functions—were attributable to unclear guidance, and recommended that FEMA issue supplemental guidance to the agencies that serve as 

coordinators for the different emergency support functions.30 FEMA concurred with 

this recommendation and estimated that it would complete this supplemental guidance by June 30, 2015. 

In conclusion, threats to the homeland and major disasters and emergencies, such 

as cyber attacks and earthquakes, frequently are unpredictable or occur with little 

or no notice. DOD’s 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review emphasizes protecting the 

homeland, including deterring and defeating attacks on the United States and supporting civil authorities in mitigating the effects of potential attacks and natural 

disasters, as the first of the defense strategy’s three pillars. DOD has made significant progress in improving strategy, plans, and guidance; interagency coordination; 

and capabilities needed for DSCA. Our work also shows that there remains room 

for improvement and that DOD recognizes this and intends to fully address the remaining recommendations from our prior reports. We continue to believe that their 

implementation will buttress the advanced planning and interagency coordination 

effort DOD requires to support civil authorities in responding to the myriad threats 

and challenges we face. On that note, looking ahead, we will continue to monitor 

and evaluate: (1) DOD’s cyber civil support, (2) the status of the homeland response 

forces, (3) DOD’s preparedness for civil support in the event of a pandemic, and (4) 

coordination with Federal agencies to counter improvised explosive devices in the 

United States. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Thank you, Dr. Kirschbaum. 

I now recognize myself for 5 minutes for questions. 

I will first say, in my 26 years in the military I had zero dealing 

with this issue, defense support to civil authorities, zero experience 

dealing with this issue, which I think probably is the preponderance of military personnel, just as a framing mechanism there, un-
29 

less you are in a specific job that has to deal with it. But my views 

on it are formed and shaped by my experiences at Africa Command 

working with military support to USAID OFDA overseas, and we 

were dealing with overseas response to disasters. 

What I saw was oftentimes basically the military, we would show 

up, beyond the sort-of inherent danger, and we would be like we 

are in charge because we are very action-oriented and then we are 

just going to figure it all out. We don’t even realize there is another 

lead Federal agency there. We have just got colonels and lieutenant 

colonels, they want to do the Lord’s work out there and save people’s lives, and so they just get going. There is often very confusing, 

cumbersome, and in a very chaotic environment to start with, there 

are turf battles, there is misunderstanding, there is not a unity of 

effort. 

So I have got a lot of experience with that overseas. So I would 

imagine in looking at this and preparing for this hearing we have 

similar dynamics that could happen here at home in response to 

an emergency, especially when you are dealing with getting ActiveDuty Forces involved with many individuals in the chain of command not necessarily understanding what the roles and responsibilities are, what the legal authorities are. 

Again, aside from that, the imminent danger, and then doing 

life-saving response, it seems we have got some examples of that 

even as recently as Hurricane Sandy, right, where we had Marines 

showing up like we are going to start doing a bunch of stuff that 

maybe they don’t even have the legal authority to do. 

So my question really, Mr. Salesses and General Whitlock, is: 

What are we doing to make sure that the military understands, especially the chain of command understands, their role and responsibility? It is too late to be teaching them about that when you are 

in the middle of responding to something up and down the chain 

of command? 

Mr. Fenton, or anybody want to give some after-action lessons 

identified from Sandy and any responses since Sandy related to, 

again, maybe turf battles or misunderstandings of roles and responsibilities and what we can do to fix that in the DSCA mission? 

Mr. SALESSES. Chairman McSally, I will start if you don’t mind. 

You are absolutely right. Having had the opportunity to work 

overseas in humanitarian disaster relief events, it is very chaotic. 

Although we have great partners in the international area too, 

with Department of State, USAID, and OFDA, I can tell you from 

my experience that the way we are organized domestically far exceeds the way that we are organized to do overseas humanitarian 

disaster relief. 

That really starts with the National response system, the National response framework. The work that FEMA has done to organize the Federal Government in particular, and the ESF structure, 

and the way that they manage things under Administrator 

Fugate’s leadership really makes a difference here at home, first of 

all, in bringing together the Federal departments and agencies and 

the way that we do this. 

Your point about education, training, exercising, planning, I 

think all of those things are critical to this issue of making sure 

that people understand their roles and responsibilities. Everything, 
30 

of course, starts with authorities. I think in my statement recognizing right up front we play a supporting role, we recognize the 

environment that we are in here, and the Defense Department is 

prepared to support our Federal partners in their efforts. 

But we do spend a lot of time educating and training. Northern 

Command, which you are familiar with out in Colorado Springs, actually runs five different education courses. They run the DSCA executive course, which is a 2-day course, and they bring in State 

emergency management, local emergency management, other Federal partners, and military members, Active, Reserve, and Guard. 

They have a regular week-long course. They run the dual-status 

commander force, along with the National Guard Bureau. So there 

is a lot of work underway to continue to educate people. 

I would also say very quickly that there has been a tremendous 

evolution in the Defense Department in understanding its responsibilities for defense support to civil authorities, and I can talk 

more about that. I don’t want to overuse my time. I will give somebody else an opportunity. 

General WHITLOCK. Chairwoman McSally, I agree with everything Mr. Salesses has said. Just one kind of top-level thing. 

NORTHCOM was formed in 2002 in response to the terrorist acts 

of September 11, 2001, and I think we have made significant 

progress. I served at NORTHCOM as the Deputy J–5, and I was 

there for Hurricane Sandy response. 

A key is training, exercises, and education, and oftentimes you 

won’t have officers that have done that if they were just on the 

Federal side. But we have a great civilian workforce out there. 

Those officers get up to speed quickly. As you might know in your 

AFRICOM experience, the supporting and supported commander 

relationship, we understand that. We have operationalized that 

across the Department of Defense, with NORTHCOM being the 

supporting command for DSCA or PACOM if there is an incident 

in the PACOM area. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Great. Thanks. 

There is a lot of discussion about support to FEMA, but there is 

a great potential that the military will be called to support other 

agencies as well, even within DHS, whether it is Customs and Border Protection, HHS for some sort of health crisis, DOJ. So it 

seems like a lot of work has been done related to integration with 

FEMA, but could you speak to integration with those other agencies that you might be called to support as well? 

Mr. SALESSES. We actually do a lot of work with the other departments and agencies. I will pick HHS as an example. Assistant 

Secretary Nicki Lurie and her staff, we spend a lot of time working 

with them, just like we do with Mr. Fenton and his team, but specifically focused on the public health response kinds of activities. 

The Department of Defense in particular is responsible, along with 

HHS and VA, to support natural disaster medical system. That is 

where we provide transportation of critical care patients, and in 

particular USTRANSCOM has the responsibility to air lift critical 

care patients, and we have done that in a number of disasters. 

We also work with HHS on their Federal medical staging stations. They are responsible for standing up these. We work very 

closely with them on planning and looking at the kinds of capabili-
31 

ties that the Department of Defense could provide beyond the Public Health Service capabilities that would be available in a disaster. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Great. Thanks. My time is well expired. I hope we 

get a second round of questions here, but I appreciate your responses so far. 

So the Chair now recognizes Mrs. Watson Coleman. 

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Thank you very much. I really have a respect for the work that 

you do and how difficult and complicated the issues that you confront are. In fact, I was reading through the material last night, 

and I was absolutely struck by all the different protocols and touch 

points and responsibilities. So I have got a couple of questions regarding how that is actually working. 

The Chairman spoke for a moment about the issue of the Marines deploying under Sandy in New Jersey before being asked to 

and before having the authority to do that. Specifically, what is 

done to avoid that happening again? I don’t even know who answers that. I am sorry. Staten Island. Just right across the bridge. 

General WHITLOCK. Ma’am, I will take that question. We have 

done extensive after-action reviews, and we have lessons identified, 

and I think we are learning them now. 

In my military career, Hurricane Sandy was the most extensively 

after-action-reviewed event I have done. NORTHCOM did a really 

complex and thorough one with its components and partners with 

the National Guard Bureau and OSD and even FEMA there, and 

I saw that go up through the Department of Defense. 

So I think we continue to learn and understand, and we will constantly have the training and education challenges, new Members 

come in, or Marines that are operating off the coast in the area or 

in proximity to respond, how they respond, but also the Defense 

Coordinating Officer is key and integral there, each one of those in 

FEMA region, his or her team. Then NORTHCOM has what the 

command calls a Title 10 deputy, and there is a Title 10–06 colonel 

or Navy captain that goes out and helps that dual-status commander or that adjutant general. So those are key players in making sure that we have the right command and control. 

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. Thank you. That kind of leads me to Dr. 

Kirschbaum, because I did notice that there are a lot of offices, 

there are a lot of protocols, there are a lot of memorandums of understanding, there is a lot of positioning of one Department’s staff 

in another Department’s office for certain issues. 

So from a Government accountability perspective, are we doing 

all that we need to be doing in the leanest, most effective way, costeffective and efficient way, or have we overresponded to the things 

that we haven’t done well that we are creating layers and layers 

and potential contradictions and confusion? Dr. Kirschbaum. 

Mr. KIRSCHBAUM. Thank you, Mrs. Watson Coleman. 

One of the things that we noticed over time in particular, when 

we look at the kind of planning necessary to do this kind of response to major disasters and what-not, it requires, as we talked 

about, fast levels of planning, and particularly in the case of the 

Department of Defense, where the focus for decades has not been 

on that kind of planning here in the homeland. 
32 

There is extra effort involved. We saw a lot early on, especially 

when U.S. Northern Command was establishing, where there was 

a lot of effort, but the outcomes weren’t as satisfactory because of 

those things. Lots of activity that wasn’t necessarily coordinated 

and planned. 

Fortunately that has gotten better. General Whitlock mentioned 

the after-action reviews. We love after-action reviews, for two reasons. No. 1, because it helps us identify those things that tend to 

be recurring problems. So that is obviously the indicator that 

things like the ever-present interoperability issues with communications. They are in the Sandy AAR. So you pay attention to 

those. 

We also love them because it shows materially how seriously the 

Department takes looking at exercises. The way the Department 

exercises, they exercise to break things, figure out where the problems are, and fix them. So they are very good in that score. 

The overarching issue for us is when it comes to planning for 

these kind of things, is that it is a plant that needs to be watered 

all the time. You have to have a plan, know the plan, test the plan, 

and that has to happen every single day. So the level of effort that 

applies to that often is a very high level of effort. So it is up to the 

departments to determine in doing that over time you become more 

efficient because you have done it and you recognize where the 

pain points are, where you are doubling up effort, and where you 

can afford to make the risk-management decision so you don’t end 

up double-counting. 

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. It just seems very confusing the way 

some of the protocols were identified, who does what, when, under 

what circumstances, who is in the FEMA office that doesn’t work 

for FEMA but brings an expertise from someplace else. So just for 

someone from the outside looking in, particularly for the first time, 

it just seemed like there were a lot of steps and touchstones and 

protocols and memorandums of understanding and whatever. I am 

just wondering how long does it take to execute from the time that 

you know that you are needed to the time that you actually get 

some resources into that area, if there is an answer to that? 

Mr. SALESSES. I think there is. It is a fascinating system, our National response system, a Federalist system built on a transactional 

process with systems within systems. You are right, there is a tremendous amount of activity and organizations involved in this. But 

the way that I think that we have collectively tried to deal with 

that is by understanding what the State needs are and translating 

those State needs into prescripted mission assignments, identifying 

capabilities that are needed. 

FEMA manages that process. We in DOD have 28 prescripted 

mission assignments. Those are essential for translating the task 

that needs to be done into military-speak and the kinds of capabilities that are needed. 

Then we mentioned, General Whitlock and I both mentioned the 

DSCA EXORD. That is actually a document where we have gone 

through and identified military capabilities and postured them on 

time lines so that those capabilities will be made available rapidly 

to support our Federal partners in that regard. That is just the beginning part of the discussion. 
33 

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. I know there were lots of lessons 

learned in Katrina, and I know that there are still lessons being 

learned from Sandy. Is Sandy the event that you employed this 

sort-of new system of checks and balances and accountabilities and 

identification? Is that the only event that we can tell whether or 

not you are responding more quickly, more effectively, more efficiently, or is there something that I am missing, some other incident? Thank you. 

Mr. SALESSES. I would say probably Sandy, but we also learned 

a lot from a number of events around the world, Haiti in particular, the Fukushima earthquake and tsunami. When those 

events happen, we collectively get together and plan to look at 

what was needed in those cases, and we refine our processes. But 

to employ the DSCA EXORD, we did use that in Sandy to provide 

capabilities. 

Then the other thing is, I spoke in my opening statement, the 

Department of Defense does more than provide military capabilities, when you think about the Corps of Engineers and what they 

did in Sandy, pumping out the tunnels, helping the city and the 

State in regards to dewatering and the kinds of things that were 

necessary, the Defense Logistics Agency, which provided over 9 

million gallons of fuel for the 2,500 gas stations that were out up 

there. 

When you start to look at the cascading effects of infrastructure 

and what happened, the ability to rely on the Defense Department 

initially is very, very important. So maximizing our capabilities 

with the Corps of Engineers, using DLA, using USTRANSCOM, 

which airlifted utility vehicles from the West Coast to the East 

Coast to help out the power companies, again working with the Department of Energy. So understanding this and pulling this all together is a pretty significant task. 

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. Thank you. 

Thank you, Chairman, for your indulgence. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Absolutely. 

The Chair will now recognize other Members of the subcommittee for questions they may wish to ask the witnesses. In accordance with the committee rules and practice, I plan to recognize 

Members who were present at the start of the hearing by seniority 

on the subcommittee. Those coming in later will be recognized in 

the order of arrival. 

The Chair now recognizes Mr. Loudermilk from Georgia. 

Mr. LOUDERMILK. Thank you, Madam Chairman, and I appreciate everyone being here. 

September 11 was a wake-up call for our Nation. During my time 

in the military during the Cold War most of our emphasis was defending the homeland, but it was abroad. September 11 showed 

how vulnerable we were. Since 9/11, we have seen a growing emphasis on local and State, the needs of local and State, for support 

with the increase of natural disasters and the impact of those disasters, terrorist attacks, civil unrest, riots, violent protests, and 

those continue. 

I have worked on both sides of that, from the purely Federal 

side, as well as in the last several years working with our State 

and local as boots on the ground and in the air and search and res-
34 

cue and disaster response. One of the things that I have seen from 

working both with the purely Federal side and our State is the National Guard has unique capabilities for working in those local disasters for several reasons. 

Of course, our purely Federal Department of Defense has constraints on them such as the Posse Comitatus that the National 

Guard doesn’t have. The National Guard also has been working 

with local law enforcement. They usually know the local law enforcement, the local emergency management agency heads. They 

are from those communities, and they are continually doing joint 

exercises. 

From working on that side, I have seen that the response, the 

coordination, and the flexibility to transition, especially if it is 

under Title 32, to transition from purely just disaster response to 

assisting law enforcement is there that we don’t have on the Federal side. Also, and rightly so, purely on the DOD, there is a constraint that it cannot degradate our National security posture. 

With that, Mr. Salesses, a question for you is, I understand that 

the DOD has made some changes to DOD Instruction 3025.22 recently as it regards to the National Guard and the response. Can 

you describe what those changes were and what effect that is having? 

Mr. SALESSES. Absolutely, Congressman. First of all, you are absolutely right too, the National Guard is a tremendous capability 

and available to the Governors, and as I spoke to, with EMAC it 

is able to pull resources together and be a very, very effective organization in supporting the Governors in those responsibilities. 

But as we look at the National response system, and I am going 

to defer to my partner here, Bob Fenton, part of that National response system is, as you opened, is State responsibilities. Clearly 

when there is an event in the State, the State will deal with it or 

use the EMAC. 

When it goes beyond that, the Governor obviously has the opportunity to declare the Stafford Act. The Stafford Act, as we all know, 

provides Federal resources. It also provides the capability for the 

State to be reimbursed through the DERF fund, and there is almost $8 billion, I understand, in the DERF fund today. That fund 

is there to fund the National Guard and State response, and so 

clearly that is the most effective way to do that. 

The challenge going forward in Title 32 is when we want, the Defense Department, the Defense Department has determined that 

we have a requirement from FEMA that we are going to employ 

the National Guard in. When we do that and we determine through 

the sourcing process that the National Guard as opposed to the 

Marine Corps or the Army or the Air Force has the best capability 

to support that, we can ask the Governor consent to put National 

Guardsmen in Title 32. That is what that directive is all about, and 

that is what it is designed to do. 

Mr. LOUDERMILK. Well, my question was: What changes have 

been made recently to the standing procedures? 

Mr. SALESSES. No changes. It was just the policy was codified. 

That is what the directive does. It codifies the policy that has been 

in long existence. 
35 

Mr. LOUDERMILK. Okay. So you are saying there were no changes 

recently to DOD Instruction 3025.22? 

Mr. SALESSES. It was published. It was published a couple years 

ago. The process and the way that the Department operates and 

supports the use of Title 32 has been employed that way, and the 

policy codified that. 

Mr. LOUDERMILK. Okay. I will reserve other questions for the 

next panel. Thank you. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Great. Thanks. 

The Chair now recognizes Mr. Langevin from Rhode Island. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. First of all, I want to thank our panel of witnesses here today. Madam Chair, thank you for letting me sit in 

on this first panel. 

If I could, let me begin with Mr. Salesses. I am pleased to hear 

that all of the witnesses touched on cybersecurity in their testimony. Some of them spent quite a bit of time on it. I would like 

to dig a little deeper into DSCA’s role with respect to a cyber incident. 

So, Mr. Salesses—who, for the record, I want to mention hails 

from my own alma mater, Rhode Island College, so it is good to see 

a Rhode Island College alum here—per JP 3–28, DSCA’s operations, DOD forces may be required to assist and local networks to 

operate in a disrupted or degraded environment. 

With that in mind—and I would like to ask all of our witnesses 

in your answers to be brief because I have a slew of questions— 

in the event of a cyber attack, how would determination be made 

that DOD forces would assist civil authorities, and what is the 

threshold for involving them? Have those things been worked 

through yet? 

Mr. SALESSES. Congressman Langevin, I apologize, but cyber is 

not an area under my purview. But my understanding obviously is 

if there is support needed at the State level, that the DHS and 

DOJ would request DOD support, which would be the normal 

course. But, again, this is out of my purview, so I am glad to take 

questions related to cyber. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Okay. Would we turn to FEMA then? Would that 

be something that has been worked out under your jurisdiction? 

Mr. FENTON. Sure. The part that would fall into FEMA’s responsibility is the consequences of a cyber event. So if there were physical consequences of that event, we would look at it as the same 

as with regard to those consequences of any other type of event and 

look at the authorities within the Stafford Act to be able to provide 

support to State and local governments in support of requirements. 

One of the things that we have recently done is looking at the 

cyber threat and look at areas of critical infrastructure that may 

be most threatened from that is power and utilities. So what we 

are doing this year is developing a long-range power outage plan 

and how we respond and support the private sector with regard to 

assisting them and getting systems back up and operational and 

those kind of things. 

From a crisis perspective, you are really looking over at FBI, the 

NCCIC within the Department of Homeland Security where those 

authorities sit, to respond to the crisis, and FEMA’s responsibility 

would really be the consequences of such an event. 
36 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Maybe I would go back to Mr. Salesses. Who 

within DOD or DSCA would be responsible for a cyber-related 

event where DOD would be involved? 

Mr. SALESSES. Congressman, we have an office, deputy assistant 

secretary for cyber, that oversees the policy for that. Of course we 

have Cyber Command, the operational command that would oversee the kinds of support that the Defense Department would provide. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. But how would the assistant secretary of cyber 

interact with civil authorities? Has that been worked out yet? 

Mr. SALESSES. Sir, again, a little out of my purview. I will do the 

best I can. Normally it would be very similar to what we do here 

in defense support to civil authorities as it relates to disasters. 

Normally if the State and local need support, they go to the Federal department, in this case the Department of Homeland Security 

and DOJ and the FBI. Then in turn, if one of those Federal agencies didn’t have the capability to assist in that regard and they 

needed DOD resources, they would come to us and we would support that Federal agency down to the State and local level. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Very good. Would GAO have something to say 

about that? 

Mr. KIRSCHBAUM. Mr. Langevin, thank you for the question. We 

are actually currently starting work to look specifically at that 

issue, and our most recent work was from 2013. My understanding 

is there are still a lot of questions about just the things you are 

asking. We ask mostly, like at U.S. Northern Command, they understand that they are responsible for command and control of Federal forces that are applied to civil support, and this would be one 

of those cases. 

I think what the Department is working on is how that chain 

would work, where the request would go from Northern Command 

and others, who would it go to, what is the right scope of the operations in terms of what they would do. Those are all still under 

consideration. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. I think these are obviously vitally important to 

get answered now since it is in the cyber domain, where milliseconds matter. How quickly we can work things out would be essential. 

Mr. SALESSES. Congressman, if I could add, in this case, Cyber 

Command would be the supported combatant command, not 

NORTHCOM. So the bottom line is any request for cyber support 

from the Defense Department would come through the OSD element into the combatant command, in this case, Cyber Command, 

not NORTHCOM. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Very good. 

Well, my time has expired. I have a bunch of other questions. 

Maybe we will get to a second round. But thank you. 

I yield back. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Thank you, Mr. Langevin. 

The Chair now recognizes Mr. Donovan from New York. 

Mr. DONOVAN. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

First of all, gentlemen, I would like to thank you. I represent 

Staten Island. For the people of my community who you came to 

help during our time of disaster—one of the things Government 
37 

should do for their citizens is come to their aid in the time of disaster, and you did. So thank you on behalf of all the people of Staten Island and southern Brooklyn. 

I saw first-hand, sir, what you are talking about, pumping out 

those tunnels in my city. So I just wanted to take a moment to 

thank you. 

A lot of the questions I had were already asked, but I understand, when you were saying that you learned lessons from 

Katrina, that you applied to your methods in dealing with 

Superstorm Sandy and the aftermath there. 

Are there any things that you, now looking back—you said you 

would do an assessment afterward. Are there things, looking back 

now in the response to Sandy, that you wish you had known then 

to help back then 21⁄2 years ago? Anyone. 

Mr. SALESSES. Congressman, thank you for those comments. 

I think in disasters there is a common set of issues that we continually improve upon. The first is gaining situational awareness. 

Because of the Federalist system that we operate in, you can imagine how complex that is, the five boroughs of New York City and 

the ability to provide the insight from those boroughs to the mayor 

of New York City and then from the city to the State government 

in Albany and through that process. It is a very challenging process. So the ability to gain situational awareness for what is needed 

rapidly is a real challenge. 

The way that I believe—and I will let my friend Bob talk more 

about this. One of the things that FEMA has done is expanded 

their IMAT capability to include additional expertise. So when we 

send out an IMAT, which is basically an assessment team that 

FEMA has that works with the State and locals to determine that, 

I think it begins to gain that. 

But I think there is other improvements that can be made. I 

think the requirements generation process, for lack of a better 

term, the ability to generate the requests for assistance from the 

local to the State level and then from the State level to the Federal 

level, is quite a process. By using pre-scripted mission assignments, 

I think that is helping. But that can always be done better, in my 

view. 

I think the other thing that is key is the investment that we 

make in our partnerships on a daily basis. I think that is a key 

aspect of what we all do at the Federal, State, local level, private 

industry, volunteer organizations. I think it is critical to being successful in this area. 

Then the leadership. I can tell you, from my vantage point at the 

Defense Department, during that whole period of Sandy—and Joe 

was there—the Secretary of Defense, the chairman of the joint 

chiefs, the service chiefs, the combatant commands—NORTHCOM, 

TRANSCOM—all the most senior officials in the Defense Department met once, sometimes twice, a day to figure out how the Defense Department could be more effective. 

I think with FEMA providing the requests directly to the Defense 

Department for things that haven’t even been asked for yet is very, 

very effective. Chief of the National Guard Bureau was in that 

meeting. Every day we would work together to figure out what we 

could do to be more effective. 
38 

Mr. FENTON. I would just add, you know, as someone that has 

been at FEMA for 20 years and has been the operations chief for 

9/11 in New York at Ground Zero and Katrina in Mississippi and 

then was helping with Superstorm Sandy for the first week and a 

half there, in these events, in the early hours, there is a fog of war 

that happens. 

Our administrator all the way up to the President, you know, 

is—you know, we are going to preposition resources. In fact, our 

administrator says, ‘‘Think big. Go big. Go fast. But be smart’’ in 

what we do. So we are going to move to make sure we have the 

right resources from the Federal Government prepositioned, anticipating requirements. 

So, as this fog of war happens—and I think, you know, good 

Americans wanting to help other Americans in need respond to 

those. I think what we are trying to do now is do more deliberate 

planning—and I touched on that—not only doing it at the National 

level, but doing it really at the whole community level with States, 

local governments, private sector, nonprofits being part of that, to 

understand really what is the true capability, what are the gaps, 

so we can better determine, to Bob’s point, what are the resource 

requirements, how do we better identify where they are coming 

from and logistics time frames and get them there to make a difference. 

So I think what we learned from Sandy, obviously, is the huge 

requirements from water and some of the other missions that we 

really didn’t get into previously with better surge, better situational awareness, those kinds of things, that over the last 2 years 

we have improved tremendously. 

Mr. DONOVAN. Thank you. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Thanks. 

The Chair is now going to recognize myself for a second round 

here. Just a couple of our Members, myself, and Mr. Langevin have 

a few follow-up questions. 

Mr. Salesses, I am equally as concerned as my colleague here 

about that cybersecurity is in somebody else’s area of responsibility. Because when it comes to defense support to civil authorities, that is your duty title. 

So, if we have got rice bowls and stovepipes even within the Pentagon, I mean, this is a domain. Cyber is just one domain that we 

might be using the military to support other agencies. 

So I think we do need to follow up on that, even if it is not here, 

on where our shortfalls are. Because if that is not something 

squarely in your domain, then we are not thinking about that in 

the DSCA mission. Then we have got to figure out how to break 

down those stovepipes. 

So any further comments on that? 

You know, similarly, it is really important—look, I have been in 

the military. So stovepipes, bureaucracies, lack of nimbleness, turf 

battles, I mean, this is part of our tribal culture, and it often inhibits our ability to be able to respond quickly to do things well. 

Certainly, as we have seen from all of you today, the tight coordination with State, National Guard, and the Federal level is really 

important in a situation like this. 
39 

Even in preparation for this hearing—I mean, one of the reasons 

we have two panels is because, to my understanding, Mr. Salesses, 

your office didn’t even want to be on a panel with my adjutant general because they are a State person with a Federal person sitting 

next to them. God forbid. We have a State and a Federal person 

sitting next to each other on a panel for a hearing on a topic like 

this. 

So that just makes me concerned about, you know, the integration still not being where it needs to be for something that is really 

important. So I just wonder if you could comment on that. 

Mr. SALESSES. Absolutely. Again, it is a National response system. I understand the value of not just the Federal partners, the 

State partners, the local partners, private industry. I actually sit 

on the National Advisory committee for FEMA, and there is a 

cross-section of State, local, Federal, private, volunteer organizations. 

I have great appreciation for the fact that we need to coordinate 

and integrate well, and I spend a lot of time doing that. This past 

Wednesday I was in Minneapolis speaking to all the new State 

emergency managers. Bryan Koon is the president of NEMA, National Emergency Managers Association, is a good friend and somebody I spent a lot of time with. 

In fact, Bob and I in March, along with Don Boyce from HHS, 

were on a panel. We spent a lot of time trying to educate and inform and learn from those at the State and local level and at private industry and how they can help. A couple weeks ago I had the 

president of the International Association for Emergency Managers 

in my office at the Pentagon. 

Because, as you look at the municipalities and the major cities, 

their emergency management community is different than the 

State emergency NEMA. So it is the ability to bridge all that together and to take the opportunity to explain what the Defense Department can do greatly, more than just our military capabilities. 

I can’t overemphasize our ability to bring other capabilities to 

bear on these kinds of events. It is an education. It is a training. 

It is a planning. We have done a lot to integrate planning. 

The Department invested heavily in the Joint Force Headquarters–NCR, which is at the State level, and working on an initiative with Secretary Panetta, Secretary Hagel, and now Secretary 

Carter, the Complex Catastrophe Initiative. We focused on integrative planning. 

DOD is unique because of the Joint Force Headquarters–State. 

We have folks at the State level. We have folks at the regional 

level. We have folks at the Federal level with NORTHCOM and 

PACOM. So the ability to integrate that kind of planning is very 

unique, and we have done those kinds of things. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Great. Thanks. I mean, I appreciate that perspective. I am just trying to wrap up here quickly. 

Just one final quick question is—you know, one of the greatest 

abilities we need in a disaster is situational awareness using surveillance capabilities, and manned and unmanned aircraft can help 

with that. I know there has been some challenges in the past domestically with the use of unmanned aircraft because of the FAA 

restrictions. 
40 

Where are we on that right now? If we had a disaster, are there 

quick emergency authorities so that we could use the unmanned 

aircraft to be able to provide that situational awareness where we 

currently can’t because of the FAA restrictions? 

Mr. SALESSES. As you may or may not know, we did UASs in the 

fire season last year in California. But as we spoke about the 

DSCA EXORD, we also have a military capability, manned capability, available immediately to do the kind of wide-area awareness 

that is needed in these kinds of disasters. 

We also have NGA, the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency, 

which has incredible capability and uses commercial satellites and 

is able to do the kinds of things that we need in that area. 

Ms. MCSALLY. But do we have procedures in place? I mean, it is 

very restrictive right now as to where drones can fly. So do we 

have procedures in place to break glass and allow them to provide 

that unique capability? 

Mr. SALESSES. We actually published domestic use of UAS guidelines. It talks specifically about how UASs can be used in DSCA 

events. I would be glad to share that with you and your staff. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Great. Thank you. 

So my understanding is Mr. Langevin now has more questions. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Sure. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Again to our panel, thank you for your testimony today. 

I guess I will go back to this and just work this through. You 

know, maybe it is because cyber—and, actually, use of cyber tools 

in an attack that would cause physical damage thankfully hasn’t 

happened to any significant degree here in the United States. It is 

kind of unchartered territory. 

But, obviously, anticipating things ahead of time is essential because I think it is just a matter of when and not if something like 

that could happen, as we have seen on a number of cases in other 

places around the world where these things have happened. 

But I would like to say, you know, if you are a State EMA director, you know, you are used to dealing with, whether it is FEMA 

or NORTHCOM, who then do they turn to in a related cyber event 

like this where it may have multiple interactions, if you will? 

You may have physical damage to recover from, say, a turbine 

or if a generator goes down, but then you also have to ensure that 

the adversaries are not still on your network. So, therefore, who do 

you recommend that a State EMA director would turn to? 

Mr. FENTON. So State emergency management I think has two 

different avenues to go on this. One that affects is us, you know, 

the consequences. With regard to the threat, they are coordinating 

through DHS’ Office of National Preparedness Protection. 

Specifically the NCIC, there is the cyber center within DHS that 

coordinates the State emergency management, and also then the 

FBI obviously would be involved in that. Those are the two. They 

coordinate with the rest of the cyber centers within the Federal 

Government to then coordinate and communicate those threats. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. So, obviously, that goes to the fact that they 

would go to people they have dealt with in the past. But I don’t 

know that—it seems like it hasn’t yet been institutionalized that 

an EMA director would know who to go to in the event of a cyberrelated incident. 
41 

Let me just ask this. Again, when things move very quickly, 

what, if any, of this has been exercised? How is the DOD adjusting 

its annual exercise program to account for this type of a new eventuality? 

Mr. SALESSES. Again, Congressman, not an expert in the cyber 

area. But we do have, obviously, CYBERCOM and the whole office 

and the OSD staff that deals with cyber. 

But right now, for example, there is an exercise on-going called 

CYBERCOM and NSA—CYBERCOM, rather—it is called—Cyber 

Guard is the exercise. Cyber Command and the National Guard 

Bureau are running an exercise for the next 2 weeks focused on 

cyber, specifically how to deal with the cyber threat, the cyber intrusion, and those kinds of things. 

It doesn’t focus on the consequences of an event where infrastructure may be impacted, but does focus on the issue that you 

keep raising, is: How do State and local connect at the Federal 

level to get support from the Federal Government? 

As Bob mentioned, it would be through DHS and the NCIC and 

DOJ. Then, if support was needed from DOD, DOD would make 

that support available through CYBERCOM and DHS and DOJ, in 

particular, FBI. But there is an on-going exercise. I would be glad 

to provide that information to your staff. 

Mr. KIRSCHBAUM. Mr. Langevin, this is an excellent example of 

what we have been talking about, the need to really continue the 

diligence on the planning. 

As Cyber Command gets the cyber mission teams established 

and going, the command and control for them, the structure, this 

is the kind of thing throughout the Department that they need to 

determine—who does what, who is supposed to do what—so, when 

that connection happens during a major disaster, when forces are 

already deployed in the field to assist civil authorities, when requests come to them, they know who to send them to and when 

and how that goes. 

So that is a lot of internal duties to work on, and then that external piece is going to have to be a major priority. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Sure. Sure. Well, that is part of what we are 

going to ensure in our oversight responsibility, is to make sure that 

we are working these things through. 

I sit on the Armed Services Committee and am the Ranking 

Member that oversees Cyber Command and NSA. I am going to be 

sure that we press these issues there as well to work out these 

things sooner rather than later so that, in the event that something 

happens, the questions have already been answered. 

Thank you to our panel. 

Madam Chair, I yield back. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Thank you. 

I want to thank these witnesses for their valuable testimony on 

our first panel. This panel is dismissed. 

The clerk will now prepare the witness table for our second 

panel. 

Ms. MCSALLY. All right. I would like to welcome our second panel 

to today’s hearing. Thank you all for participating. 

Major General Michael McGuire is Arizona’s adjutant general 

and currently serves as the director of the Arizona Department of 
42 

Emergency and Military Affairs. In this capacity, he is responsible 

for managing the day-to-day activity of Arizona’s Army and Air National Guard’s joint programs and the Division of Emergency Management. 

Mr. James Gianato serves as the homeland security advisor for 

the State of West Virginia, a position he has held since December 

2010. In this capacity, he also serves as the chairman of the State 

Emergency Response Commission. 

Mr. Gianato has 35 years of experience in emergency response, 

which includes service as the director of 9–1–1 and emergency 

services in McDowell County and active membership in the 

Kimball Volunteer Fire Department. Mr. Gianato is testifying on 

behalf of the National Emergency Management Association. 

I now recognize the gentleman from Rhode Island, Mr. Langevin, 

to introduce our final witness. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Welcome to our panel. I, in particular, just want to thank you for 

the opportunity to say a few words of introduction about Mr. 

Gaynor from my home State of Rhode Island. 

Pete Gaynor has spent his career in public service, first as a Marine, where he rose to the rank of colonel, and more recently as an 

emergency manager. From 2008 to 2014, Pete served as the director of the City of Providence’s Emergency Management Agency, 

where he was widely lauded for professionalizing its operations. 

Last December Pete was appointed by Governor Gina Raimondo 

as the head of the Rhode Island Emergency Management Agency, 

where he immediately helped lead the response to the January 

blizzard and the many blizzards and significant storms after that, 

as a matter of fact. I also want to add that Pete is also an alumnus 

of our Rhode Island College. Good to see a fellow alum here. 

I welcome you, Mr. Gaynor, as well as our panel, and I look forward to hearing your testimony as well as our other witnesses. 

With that, I yield back. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Thank you. 

The witnesses’ full written statements will appear in the record. 

The Chair now recognizes General McGuire for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF MAJOR GENERAL MICHAEL T. MCGUIRE, THE 

ADJUTANT GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF EMERGENCY AND 

MILITARY AFFAIRS, STATE OF ARIZONA 

General MCGUIRE. Good morning, Madam Chairman. Thank you 

for the opportunity. 

Distinguished Members of the panel, I appreciate the opportunity 

to appear before you today on behalf of Governor Ducey, serving in 

his cabinet as the director of emergency management and military 

affairs, serving also concurrently as the adjutant general for the 

nearly 8,200 soldiers and airmen of the Arizona Army and Air National Guard. 

I want to take the opportunity to quickly just talk through a couple of things. I did provide a visual aid up there today that I will 

refer to at least once when we talk about why the Guard is the first 

choice and put it in military parlance for the Chairman’s reference, 

as she talked about being forward-deployed and rice bowls and 

stovepipes that exist in the military. 
43 

Then I will take the last couple minutes of my time to try to reference a couple of the questions about cyber and some of the questions that have come up from the other Members in the name of 

time and then, hopefully, get your questions. 

On the historic perspective, I think it is important for us to understand that the National Guard has been at this mission for 379 

years, dating back to the Pequot wars of 1634 and the appointing 

of the first adjutant general in the Massachusetts Bay Colony in 

1636. 

That is important to understand. You know, there is a lot of confusion about why the Guard, what the existence of the Guard is 

about, and, truly, it is the father of the modern United States 

Army. As we have evolved in the Guard, we have been involved 

and will continue to be involved in every major conflict since 1634 

to the current overseas contingency operations. 

We look at the Guard very clearly as an organization that has 

to train for what we believe to be the most demanding and complex 

mission, but can instantly pivot to respond to support the States 

and the citizens under the command of the Governor at a moment’s 

notice. So, when you hear people say that the Guard is the first 

choice, it is the first choice because of that slide. 

Now, that slide doesn’t have every single armory installation 

around the country. But you can see every one of those stars represents an area where there is a prepositioning of National Guard 

equipment and personnel that can be called at a moment’s notice 

to meet an emergent response in a State and local community. 

In a military sense, the Guard is prepositioned. They are forward-deployed. In Arizona, for example, members of the Arizona 

National Guard hail from all 15 counties in the State. 

In my role as State emergency manager, I understand better 

than anyone that those 15 county emergency managers work with 

their local incident management system and their first responders, 

police and fire, and that every single emergency is a critical action 

and that, while we train for the most complex mission, the most 

emergent really will be supporting our citizens. 

So that is why you hear that the Guard is the first choice. They 

are just out there. They are out there in every community, and 

they are able to respond. They have these relationships with local 

community responders, as well as bringing their civilian skills as 

citizen soldiers and airmen, to the fight. Carpentry, plumbing, 

legal, contracting, whatever it might be, the Guard is expertly designed to be able to do both missions. 

The final thing is that, because we are prepositioned, we have a 

huge base of tactical knowledge about at-risk areas, understanding 

the local geography and lay of the land, areas where flooding is 

most prone to occur, areas where we have had issues with power 

grids and those types of things in the past. So that is really why 

the Guard is critical. 

As a preferred choice, the Guard has statutory reasons, as has 

been mentioned, under Posse Comitatus that makes it very clear 

under Title 10 we are very restricted when Federalized. 

But operating under the Governor’s authority under Title 32, 

where Federal resources are provided, or State Active-Duty where 
44 

1Maj Gen McGuire submits this written testimony and corresponding oral testimony in his 

State capacity as the director of the Arizona Department of Emergency and Military Affairs and 

on behalf of the Governor of the State of Arizona. Neither the written testimony nor Maj Gen 

McGuire’s oral statements to the subcommittee have been reviewed by the Department of Defense. 2See ADP 3–28, Defense Support of Civil Authorities, July 2012 (‘‘Most domestic disasters require no Federal military assistance. State and Federal emergency management agencies receive 

the military assistance needed from the National Guard in State active duty or Title 32 status.’’). 3The majority of this paragraph taken by permission from Major General (Retired) Timothy 

J. Lowenberg, The Role of the National Guard in National Defense and Homeland Security, 

http://www.ngaus.org/sites/default/files/pdf/primer%20fin.pdf (last visited June 6, 2015). 

State resources are provided, the Guard provides a huge swing capability that we cannot tap into in our Title 10 forces. 

Just some quick closing comments on two issues that were 

touched on here, the CBRN enterprise. As we get ready in the 

Armed Services Committee for the mark-ups, it is important for all 

the Members to understand that 80 percent of the CBRN capacity 

is currently resident in the National Guard Army or Air. So any 

indiscriminate cuts to force structure need to be reviewed by anybody that is working on the Homeland Security side to make sure 

that that CBRN response capacity is not affected. 

When we look at future missions—cyber, RPA, firefighters en 

masse—the use of Title 32 funding and the ability to quickly respond is something that is yet to be clearly defined, as we saw from 

the earlier testimony, first that I have heard that Cyber Command 

will be taking the lead in the event of an emergency response in 

the cyber domain in the States. 

So I am more than happy to answer your questions, and I yield 

the final 17 seconds of my time to my colleagues from Rhode Island 

and West Virginia. 

[The prepared statement of General McGuire follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MICHAEL T. MCGUIRE

JUNE 10, 2015 

INTRODUCTION 1

As the number of overseas deployments of U.S. forces continues to decline, the 

focus of military planners has begun to shift to domestic operations to include disaster preparedness, emergency response, and homeland security. But the military 

departments’ renewed focus on domestic operations merely highlights a mission that 

the National Guard has capably executed for the past 379 years. The National 

Guard has performed this critical domestic response duty while simultaneously engaging in combat operations around the globe. From the Pequot War in 1634 to the 

current Overseas Contingency Operations, National Guard troops have been involved in every major military campaign in this Nation’s history. Thus, the National 

Guard is uniquely trained and situated as the first line of support to the Nation’s 

communities if first responders and local resources are overwhelmed.2

The National Guard is the modern-day militia, the formation of which predates 

the founding of our country. The Massachusetts National Guard traces its lineage 

to the first regiments established by the General Court of the Massachusetts Bay 

Colony in 1636. Each of the States, the U.S. territories and the District of Columbia 

(referred to herein as ‘‘the States’’) have equally rich histories. Militia units patterned after the English militia system were common throughout the colonies and 

played a central role in our Nation’s fight for independence. They also assured the 

security of new States as the Nation expanded westward. Because of the critical militia role in the birth and expansion of our Nation, the right of the States to raise, 

maintain, and employ their own military forces (known since 1824 as the ‘‘National 

Guard’’) is guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution and the constitutions and statutes 

of the several States.3
45 

4See Exhibit 1. 

5Lt Col Mike Domingue, New Hampshire National Guard, ‘‘National Guard Civil Support,’’ 

National States Geographic Information Council, http://www.nsgic.org/publiclresources/SunDominge-National-Guard-Briefing-for-NSGIC.pdf (last visited June 6, 2015). 

Consistent with the citizen-soldier model of the early militias, the present-day National Guard is embedded in the local communities. The Soldiers and Airmen that 

comprise the National Guard are members of the communities—policemen and firemen, small business owners, carpenters, civil engineers, plumbers, and mechanics. 

This fact provides intangible benefits. First, response time during an emergency is 

much shorter for National Guard troops than their Federal counterparts because the 

majority of Guardsmen are already located in and around the affected area. Second, 

relationships already exist between Guardsmen and local officials, first responders 

and residents because, again, the Guardsmen live and work in the community. 

Third, affected communities benefit from a response force that can bring not only 

military capabilities but also civilian skills such as carpentry, mechanical, civil engineering, and business negotiation. And fourth, National Guard troops have hometown familiarity with the geographic layout of the affected community, combined 

with an understanding of the most at-risk areas. Put another way, with nearly 

3,300 installations in 2,700 communities around the country, the National Guard is 

America’s ‘‘forward-deployed’’ homeland response force.4 Accordingly, any proposal 

to impose ‘‘proportionate’’ cuts on the various military branches must consider the 

effect an arbitrary cut would have on this critical homeland response force. 

THE NATIONAL GUARD AS THE PREFERRED DOMESTIC RESPONSE FORCE

Disasters typically begin and end locally, and most are managed at the local level. 

It is therefore the goal of any emergency response plan to be able to resolve an 

event at the lowest possible level of jurisdiction—our cities and counties. Local first 

responders are the first line of defense during any emergency or disaster that 

strikes our homeland. The Nation’s local first responders are supported by the 

‘‘Whole Community,’’ a concept that recognizes preparing for and responding to 

emergencies is the collective responsibility of our citizens, local governments, faithbased and non-profit organizations, and the private sector in conjunction with State, 

Tribal, and Federal government agencies. The Whole Community concept is essential to the National Preparedness System. Developed in response to Presidential Policy Directive 8: National Preparedness, the National Preparedness System is based 

upon and driven by the National Preparedness Goal—‘‘A secure and resilient Nation 

with the capabilities required across the whole community to prevent, protect 

against, mitigate, respond to, and recover from the threats and hazards that pose 

the greatest risk.’’ The existing National Incident Management System (NIMS) provides the foundation on which the National Preparedness System is built, and has 

developed over time to guide the Whole Community in the response and management of a disaster or emergency, from local first responders and across all levels 

of government, while recognizing the sovereignty and responsibility of State. 

The National Preparedness System is broken into five preparedness frameworks: 

Prevention, Protection, Mitigation, Response, and Disaster Recovery. The National 

Response Framework provides the structure to enable the Whole Community response. Local first responders address nearly 85% of the disasters and emergencies 

that impact our communities on daily basis.5 Occasionally, disasters and emergencies occur that exceed the resources and abilities of our local first responders; 

and in those rare cases where our first responders are not sufficiently able to respond and recover from a disaster or emergency the response escalates to higher 

levels of government through the National Response Framework—first the State, 

then multiple States, and finally Federal. This scalability is the essential strength 

of the National Incident Management System, and enables the Whole Community 

to meet and manage incidents involving all threats and hazards—regardless of 

cause, size, location, or complexity. Although the scalability includes the ability to 

integrate national resources, the National Incident Management System and National Response Framework respect the sovereignty of the States and recognize that 

command and control of the disaster or emergency response remains with the 

State(s) or lowest level of jurisdiction. 
46 

6See Exhibit 2. 

7DOD Directive 3025.18, also known as the ‘‘Immediate Response Authority,’’ grants Federal 

military commanders and/or responsible DOD civilian officials the ability to act from a request 

by a competent civilian authority to save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate great property damage within the United States. 8Domingue. 

As an event grows in size or complexity, the National Response Framework guides 

the incorporation of additional resources from the Whole Community to respond, 

from city to county and then to the State level. At the State level, the incident is 

managed through the State’s emergency manager and no matter how large or small 

the incident becomes, the State remains in control of all response assets, Federal 

or otherwise. There are three models for the State emergency manager found among 

the States and territories. A majority of the States and territories, 37, have a standalone emergency manager, five States assign the Adjutant General of the National 

Guard the dual role of State emergency manager, and 12 States assign the Adjutant 

General the roles of State emergency manager and homeland security advisor.6 The 

Governor ultimately exercises command and control of the response to an emergency 

or disaster through his or her emergency manager. As a State institution, one of 

the tools available to the Governor is his or her National Guard, and the Governor 

can task the National Guard to provide Military Support for Civil Authorities 

(MSCA) missions to help in the response. In addition, the Governor can request assistance from neighboring States through the Emergency Management Assistance 

Compact (EMAC), which has been ratified by all States and territories. 

If the event exceeds the resources and ability of the State to respond, the Governor will then request assistance from the Federal Government through FEMA. It 

is important to note that the resourcing agent for all Federal resources, including 

requests for support from the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) not related to the 

State’s National Guard MSCA mission, is FEMA. Despite the DOD’s ‘‘immediate response’’ authority, FEMA manages and assigns requests for Federal assistance to 

the most capable organization.7

Capability is more than force structure: It is the ability to provide the most effective, versatile, scalable support to the local community—the type of support only 

found in the National Guard. In the 5% of emergencies and disasters that require 

assistance beyond the resources and capabilities provided by the National Guard, 

neighboring States, and non-DOD Federal agencies, FEMA will task the DOD to respond.8 The request for DOD resources, however, does not transfer command and 

control of the incident to the DOD. Instead, in a properly-executed response to an 
47 

9DR Dave Sherry and LCDR Robert Pirone, Domestic Operational Law Handbook (CLAMO, 

The Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School, U.S. Army, Charlottesville, Virginia, 

2013), 3. 10 ADP 3–28, 3. 11Lowenberg, 1. 12The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5121, et 

seq., as amended by the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 

109–295 (2007), and the Sandy Recovery Improvement Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113–2 (2013). 13Sherry and Pirone, 25. 

emergency or disaster, it brings those DOD resources to the incident and works at 

the direction of the Governor and State emergency manager through a Dual-Status 

Commander as part of the National Response Framework. Despite the additional resources that the DOD brings, its support to civil authorities is slow and mission assignment cumbersome because providing those resources requires Secretary of Defense authorization. The National Guard, because it is locally based and responsive 

to the State, is the first line of support to your constituents’ first responders once 

local resources are overwhelmed. Beyond being the first choice, it is also most appropriate choice based on applicable legal authorities. 

THE ROLE OF THE NATIONAL GUARD IN DSCA OPERATIONS

National Guard (NG) units, under the control of their respective State Governor 

and their ‘‘The Adjutants General’’ (TAGs), have traditionally been the primary military responders in domestic operations and emergencies. The use of Federal forces 

to support State and local governments was, and remains, the exception rather than 

the rule. Federal forces are generally used only after State resources are exhausted 

or overwhelmed and Federal assistance has been requested by State officials.9

As detailed above, management of natural disasters and similar incidents is based 

upon the principal of ‘‘tiered response.’’ Pursuant to that concept, response and support to affected areas begin at the lowest level of Government and escalate to the 

next tier based upon requirements. Each successive level of Government maintains 

enough capability to carry out the responsibilities imposed upon it by law. Each has 

some reserve capability to address exceptional circumstances that occur within its 

jurisdiction. When an incident overwhelms the capacity of any level of Government, 

it calls upon the next higher level of Government for support. The key players in 

the tiered response framework are local, Tribal, State, and Federal governments.10

To understand the role of the National Guard in National defense and homeland 

security, one must understand the Constitutional and statutory provisions governing use of military force by the Federal and State governments. Governors and 

Federal officials must also have a clear understanding of current and evolving National defense and homeland security strategies and the organizational structure, 

funding sources, and operational capabilities of today’s Army and Air National 

Guard.11

Several statutes govern the use of military forces in response to a natural or manmade disaster. The first is the Stafford Act.12 The Stafford Act is the primary legal 

authority for Federal emergency and disaster assistance to State and local governments. It authorizes the President to issue major disaster declarations and authorizes Federal agencies to provide assistance to States overwhelmed by disasters. Most 

of the Stafford Act provisions come into play after an emergency request from a 

State’s Governor. The Stafford Act also sets the guidelines for reimbursements from 

Federal funds to Federal agencies and States. As is the case with many of the legal 

authorities governing disaster relief, the Stafford Act ‘‘is based on the premise that 

most incidents begin and end locally and are managed on a daily basis at the lowest 

possible geographical, organizational, and jurisdictional level.’’13
48 

14 18 U.S.C. § 1385. 15 10 U.S.C. §§ 331–334. 16Sherry and Pirone, 82 (citing 10 U.S.C. §§ 331–333). 17This paragraph taken in its entirety by permission from Lowenberg, 1. 

One of the oldest and most restrictive of the laws applicable to Defense Support 

to Civilian Authorities is the Posse Comitatus Act (PCA).14 The PCA prohibits the 

use of Federal troops for law enforcement purposes, with some limited exceptions. 

But while the PCA restricts the use of Federal troops in law enforcement roles, such 

as traffic control points or patrolling in the aftermath of a disaster, National Guard 

troops serving in their State capacities are exempt from the restrictions of the PCA. 

The Federal versus State characteristics of the National Guard are discussed in 

greater detail below. 

One of the few exceptions to the PCA’s prohibition on use of Federal troops for 

law enforcement purposes is the Insurrection Act,15 which permits the President to 

use the armed forces to enforce the law when: (1) There is an insurrection within 

a State, and the State legislature (or Governor if the legislature cannot be convened) 

requests assistance from the President; (2) a rebellion makes it impracticable to enforce the Federal law through ordinary judicial proceedings; or (3) an insurrection 

or domestic violence opposes or obstructs Federal law, or so hinders the enforcement 

of Federal or State laws that residents of that State are deprived of their Constitutional rights and the State is unable or unwilling to protect these rights.16

As a unique State-based military force (albeit largely funded by the Federal Government and trained in accordance with Federal standards), the National Guard is 

the only military force shared by the States and the Federal Government. It is a 

ready operational force accessible to the States for both State and combined State 

and Federal purposes and to the Federal Government for Federal purposes.17

State Active Duty 

States are free to employ their National Guard forces under State control for 

State purposes and at State expense as provided in the State’s Constitution and 

statutes. In doing so, Governors, as commanders-in-chief, can directly access and 

utilize the Guard’s Federally-assigned aircraft, vehicles, and other equipment so 

long as the Federal Government is reimbursed for the use of fungible equipment 

and supplies such as fuel, food stocks, etc. This is the authority under which Governors activate and deploy National Guard forces in response to floods, earthquakes, 
49 

18 Ibid, 2. 19 Ibid. 20 Ibid. 21 Ibid. 

wild fires and other natural disasters. It is also the authority under which Governors deploy National Guard forces in response to human-caused emergencies such 

riots (e.g., World Trade Organization meeting, Seattle, 1999), civil unrest (e.g., 

World Bank meeting, District of Columbia, 2000) and terrorist attacks (e.g., World 

Trade Center attacks, New York City, Washington DC and Pennsylvania, September 11, 2001). Unlike active-duty and Federal military reserve forces such as the 

Army and Air Force Reserves, all National Guard personnel and equipment (or so 

much thereof as are not already ‘‘Federalized’’) are directly accessible to the Governor in State or local emergencies and as otherwise provided by State law. Such 

service is performed in accordance with State law; National Guard members performing duty at the call of the Governor are therefore said to be in ‘‘State ActiveDuty status’’, meaning, among other things, that command and control rests solely 

with the Governor and the State or territorial government. Execution of State active-duty missions is accomplished by delegation of authority from the Governor to 

the adjutant general.18

Title 32 Duty 

The Militia Clause found in Article 1, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution also authorizes use of the National Guard under continuing State control but in the service 

of the Federal Government to ‘‘execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections 

and repel invasions’’. These provisions are unique to the National Guard and are 

the authority by which Governors answered the President’s request for deployment 

of National Guard forces to our Nation’s airports following the terrorist attacks of 

September 11, 2001. State-controlled National Guard forces were deployed by Governors at Federal expense and in compliance with prescribed Federal operational 

standards to assure aerial port security and compliance with Federal inter-State 

commerce and aviation laws. Unlike subsequent border security missions (described 

below), National Guard forces mobilized within hours and promptly deployed to airports where they remained under State control for the duration of the 6-month airport security mission. These arrangements preserved State-level management of National Guard personnel and assured maximum flexibility for responding to other unforeseen or emerging State and Federal requirements.19

These and similar domestic military missions have been performed by the National Guard at various times since September 11, 2001 under the authority of Title 

32, section 502(f) of the United States Code (USC); National Guard members performing such duty are therefore commonly said to be serving in ‘‘Title 32 duty status’’, meaning, among other things, that command and control remains with the 

Governor and the State or territorial government even though the Guard forces are 

being employed ‘‘in the service of the United States’’ for a primary Federal purpose 

or a shared State-Federal purpose.20

Notwithstanding clear Constitutional authority for these arrangements (State control of Guard operations having a primary Federal purpose or a shared State-Federal purpose), DOD officials frequently questioned the Guard’s statutory authority 

for Title 32 domestic operations. Statutory authority for National Guard training at 

Federal expense is clear. The argument, however, was that 32 USC 502(f), which 

authorizes use of the National Guard at Federal expense but under continuing State 

control for ‘‘training or other duty’’ is somehow intended to authorize training only, 

as opposed to duties such as military support to civil authorities. Some of these 

DOD officials therefore questioned President Bush’s request for National Guard 

Title 32 operational assistance at the Nation’s airports in 2001–2002, subsequent 

support for Federal border security agencies and other periodic National Guard assistance to Federal and State civil authorities. Enactment of 32 USC 901 et. seq., 

resolved much of this claimed ambiguity by authorizing the Secretary of Defense to 

‘‘provide funds to a Governor to employ National Guard units or members to conduct 

homeland defense activities that the Secretary determines to be necessary and appropriate.’’ See 32 USC 902.21

The statute defines ‘‘homeland defense activities’’ as activities ‘‘undertaken for the 

military protection of the territory or domestic population of the United States, or 

of the infrastructure or other assets of the United States determined by the Secretary of Defense as being critical to National security, from a threat or aggression 

against the United States.’’ (32 USC 901(1)). The Secretary of Defense may request 

domestic use of National Guard forces and fund such operations (as was done with 

the Governors’ support for airport security in 2001–2002). ‘‘A Governor of a State 
50 

22 Ibid. 23 Ibid, 3. 24 Ibid. 25 Ibid. 26See Exhibit 3. 27 Ibid. 

may [also] request funding assistance for the homeland defense activities of the National Guard of [their] State.’’ (32 USC 906). 32 USC 901 et seq. explicitly authorizes use of the National Guard under continuing State control but at Federal expense, when approved by the Secretary of Defense, for a wide variety of operations, 

including, when appropriate, protection of oil refineries, nuclear power plants and 

other critical infrastructure and responding to catastrophic natural disasters and 

adaptive human threats.22

Title 10 Duty 

The War Powers Clause of the U.S. Constitution grants the Federal Government 

plenary authority to raise military forces and to employ such forces, including mobilized (sometimes referred to as ‘‘Federalized’’) National Guard units, under Federal 

control and at Federal expense for National defense purposes. This is the authority 

under which the Federal Government mobilizes and deploys National Guard units 

and personnel for combat, combat support, and combat service support missions at 

home and throughout the world. Such service is performed under the authority of 

Title 10 USC; service members performing such duty are therefore commonly said 

to be in ‘‘Title 10 duty status’’, meaning, among other things, that command and 

control rests solely with the President and the Federal Government.23

Since the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine, and Coast Guard Reserves, like their 

active-duty counterparts, are Federal military forces wholly controlled by the Federal Government, they are not directly accessible by Governors and duty performed 

by such personnel is always in ‘‘Title 10 status’’. When performed within the United 

States, Title 10 duty (including Title 10 duty performed by National Guard personnel) is subject to a number of legal restrictions, including, as stated above, provisions of the Posse Comitatus Act (18 U.S.C. 1385), which severely limit the use of 

Federal military forces in support of domestic law enforcement operations.24

When employed at home or abroad in Title 10 status, National Guard forces are 

stripped of all State control and become indistinguishable elements of the Federal 

military force. This was the authority used by the Federal Government to mobilize 

and deploy National Guard forces to augment Federal law enforcement agencies at 

the Canadian and Mexican borders in the spring and summer of 2002. In stark contrast to the speed and efficiency with which Governors deployed National Guard 

Soldiers and Airmen to airports (more than 450 airports were secured within a matter of hours or days), it took more than 6 months for the DOD to agree to a Memorandum of Understanding with the U.S. Border Patrol and increased security at our 

Nation’s borders was delayed until these negotiations and legal arrangements had 

been finalized.25

Duty Statuses Summarized 

Federal and State constitutions and statutes provide the primary authority for 

use of military force by the Federal and State governments. These provisions, inso-far as they apply to the National Guard, reflect the Constitutional balance of 

power between the sovereign States and the central Federal Government. National 

Guard forces are unique among all other military components in that they may be 

used in one of three legally distinct ways: 

(1) by the Governor for a State purpose authorized by State law (State Active 

Duty); or 

(2) by the Governor, with the concurrence of the President or the President’s 

designee (e.g., the Secretary of Defense), for shared State/Federal purposes or 

for a primary Federal purpose (Title 32 Duty); or 

(3) by the President for a Federal purpose authorized by Federal law (Title 10 

duty).26

When in State Active-Duty or Title 32 status, National Guard forces remain under 

the operational, tactical, and administrative control of the Governor and the State 

government. This authority is reposed in the Governor as commander-in-chief and 

executed by the adjutant general, as the State’s senior military commander. By contrast, Title 10 military forces (active-duty, reserve, and ‘‘Federalized’’ National 

Guard forces) are under the exclusive control of the President and the Federal Government and are beyond the access, control, or supervision of the Governor even 

when operating within his or her State.27
51 

28 Ryan Burke and Sue McNeil, Toward a Unified Military Response: Hurricane Sandy and 

the Dual-Status Commander (Strategic Studies Initiative, The U.S. Army War College Press, 

Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, April 2015), 53–78. 

THE DUAL-STATUS COMMANDER CONCEPT

In responding to a complex catastrophe, there is a potential for confusion in the 

chain of command between the response initiated at the State-level National Guard 

forces, and the Federal active-duty and reserve forces provided by the DOD for 

DSCA operations. In reviewing the responses to modern catastrophes, the first lesson learned to preserve the respect for civil authorities is establishing a clear chain 

of command. Second, coordination and operational unity of effort between the State 

and Federal efforts must be maintained. Finally, imposing multiple voices from different uniformed services on stressed local, State, and Federal civilian agencies 

must be avoided.28

The 2012 National Defense Authorization Act, found in Public Law 112–81, fused 

earlier legislative efforts from both the Council of Governors and the DOD to enable 

individual States and the DOD to coordinate their efforts through a single commander. The Dual-Status Commander concept involves a command arrangement 

that legally authorizes one military officer, usually a National Guard officer, to assume simultaneous but mutually exclusive command authority over both National 

Guard forces and Title 10 Federal military forces. While State and Federal military 

forces maintain separate and distinct chains of command, the Dual-Status Commander is capable of leading all military forces and directs their response efforts. 

This achieves a level of unity of effort that was unachievable or difficult prior to 

implementation of this construct. The unique command architecture of the Dual- 
52 

29Schumacher, Ludwig J. ‘‘Dual-Status Command for No-Notice Events: Integrating the Military Response to Domestic Disasters.’’ Homeland Security Affairs 7, Article 4 (February 2011). 30Gen. Charles H. Jacoby, Jr., and Gen. Frank J. Grass ‘‘Dual-Status, Single Purpose: A Unified Military Response to Hurricane Sandy’’ http://www.ang.af.mil/news/ 

story.asp?id=123339975 (last visited June 6, 2015). 31 Brig Gen Richard J. Hayes, Jr. ‘‘DOD Response Under the Stafford Act: A Call to Action.’’ 

(Joint Forces Quarterly, Issue 77, 2nd Quarter 2015, St. Louis, Missouri) 84–86. 32 Jacoby and Grass. 33Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense from Maj Gen Arnold L. Punaro, USMCR (Ret), 

Chairman, Reserve Forces Policy Board, Re: Report of Reserve Forces Policy Board on New Policies and Clearer Funding Flows for Reserve Component Operations in the Homeland, April 9, 

2012. 34 Ibid. 35 Ibid. 

Status Commander respects the various Constitutional and legal considerations governing the use of military forces in a domestic capacity. It further alleviates the tension experienced in past responses between States and the Federal Government during complex disaster mitigation.29

Ultimately, nobody knows a State better than its Governor; the individual elected 

by the people and accountable to them during their time of greatest need. The Governor, working with his or her State adjutant general, will continue to lead disaster 

response and recovery efforts within their State. A dual-status commander allows 

them to do it better by ensuring all types of DOD support work together within the 

Governor’s intent. It allows the President and Secretary of Defense to bring the 

weight of unique DOD capabilities and National capacity to bear when our citizens 

most need it, and when the interests of the entire country are at stake. And, it allows U.S. Northern Command to achieve its vision of working with partners to outpace threats and support the American people in their times of greatest need.30

Dual-Status Commanders have successfully been employed for multiple planned 

events since 2004 and multiple unplanned wildfires and hurricanes. Most notably, 

Dual-Status Commanders were used during the G8 Summit at Sea Island, GA in 

2004; at the Republican and Democratic National Conventions in both 2004 and 

2008; and the G20 Summit in Pittsburgh, PA in 2009. Dual-Status Commanders 

were also employed for Hurricane Irene in 2011, the Colorado wildfires in 2012, the 

Colorado floods of 2013, Tropical Storm Isaac in 2012, and Hurricane Sandy in October of 2012.31 The Governor for the State of New Jersey, the Title 10 Commander 

for US Northern Command, and the Chief of the National Guard Bureau all heralded the successful use of Dual-Status Commanders in the response to Hurricane 

Sandy.32

CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE WAY FORWARD

Since the deployment of Dual-Status Commanders to both pre-planned, as well as 

no-notice/limited-notice incidents, improvements at both the State and Federal levels can be made. Future modifications must preserve the authority of a State Governor to manage incidents in the State and mitigate the risk of failed State and Federal coordination mechanisms. 

Difficulties in Receiving 32 USC 502(f) Authority and Resourcing 

The DOD receives—and often denies—requests from States for the Secretary of 

Defense to approve 100% DOD-funded operations under 32 USC 502(f).33 The current articulated criteria for a 502(f) operation from the DOD are: (1) Effects of event 

are catastrophic; (2) the event is National in character; and/or (3) requires a significant multi-State National Guard response.34 In April of 2012, The DOD’s Reserve 

Forces Policy Board published its report on New Policies and Clearer Funding Flows 

for Reserve Component Operations in the homeland. In this report, the Reserve 

Forces Policy Board discussed the denial of requests for 502(f) funding and recommended that the Office of the Secretary of Defense should collaborate with the 

National Guard to develop clearer guidelines and criteria.35 This recommendation 

would provide greater predictability for State leaders regarding the likelihood of approval by the Secretary of Defense for State-requested operations under Section 

502(f). Additionally, the Board recommended that the DOD should work with Department of Homeland Security, FEMA, and the Office of Management and Budget 

to clarify in writing the policy for the reimbursement of the pay of both National 

Guard and Reserve forces when assigned missions by the Secretary of Defense for 

purposes of conducting disaster relief operations. Specifically, the dialogue should 

cover possible revision of 44 CFR 206.8 or the creation of an agreement in writing 
53 

36 Ibid. 38 Ibid, 73–74. 37 Burke and McNeil, 106. 39 Ibid, 80. 40 Ibid, 74. 41 Ibid. 42 Ibid, 90. 43 Ibid, 64. 44 Ibid, 95. 

between DOD and FEMA regarding reimbursement for the military pay of National 

Guard personnel employed for disaster operations under 32 USC 502(f).36

Title 10 Awareness of the Dual-Status Commander Construct 

Of the noted areas needing improvement, perhaps none is more important than 

DSCA education for senior military leaders.37 While there are many subject-matter 

experts in all things related to defense support of civil authorities, there appears 

to be a critical gap in DSCA knowledge among some senior military commanders. 

As evidenced by the failure to follow mission assignment processes and the notable 

confusion over the role and authority of the dual-status commander. It appears that 

some senior leaders, often with decision-making authority, lack the required knowledge to ensure their decisions fall within established legal, financial, and doctrinal 

barriers of DSCA operations. The critical triad of DSCA considerations—the legal, 

financial, and doctrinal guidelines—were abused during the Sandy response in New 

York, in many cases due to a lack of DSCA knowledge among commanders and their 

support staffs.38

Some of the Title 10 active-duty officers who participated in Hurricane Sandy suggested overturning the National Response Framework and that prepositioning Title 

10 forces was the preferred strategy, rather than activating National Guard troops 

through Emergency Management Assistance Compact and other sourcing mechanisms.39 Aggressive posturing of Title 10 forces risks complicating the incident response framework on multiple levels, including command-and-control confusion and 

functional interoperability. A Governor should be able to enlist the aid of a local 

Title 10 engineer unit in a flood, but even the unmatched capabilities found in active-duty units must be applied in a coordinated fashion. 

After-Action Reports indicate that U.S. Army Corps of Engineers commanders 

were equally unfamiliar with the dual-status commander construct.40 In this case, 

Title 10 forces attached to Task Force Pump and in support of the U.S. Army Corps 

of Engineers as the lead Federal agency for Emergency Support Function–3 were 

assigned missions beyond the scope of any pre-approved mission assignments for 

Title 10 forces. Reports suggest that the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers personnel 

were unaware of certain Title 10 restrictions for Federal military forces and did not 

have an effective process in place to facilitate coordination with the dual-status commander.41

Additionally, the Marine Corps’ arrival on Staten Island resulted from a series of 

conversations outside of the established chain of command and perhaps without consideration for normal Title 10 request for assistance procedures.42 A number of 

After-Action Reports support the claim that the commandant of the Marine Corps, 

through the II Marine Expeditionary Force commanding general directed the 26th 

Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) commander to deploy his unit to the USS Wasp 

off the coast of New York. The guidance from the commandant instructed the MEU 

to: ‘‘Get to New York City, go ashore, do good, and relieve the suffering that is occurring.’’43 As a result, without a mission assignment or notifying the dual-status 

commander, Marines carried out their orders and began support efforts on November 4, 2012. Except for justifying the Marine Corps’ arrival on Staten Island as Immediate Response Authority, the legal basis for the Marines’ activity on Staten Island during Hurricane Sandy remains questionable and ambiguous.44

Impacts of Sequestration and a Reduction in Force on the CBRN Response 

The Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Response Enterprise 

is composed of both Title 10 Active-Duty and Title 32 National Guard forces which 

are divided into State-assigned/resourced units and teams, and allocated Federal response forces. Forces assigned to State National Guard command and control include 57 Weapons of Mass Destruction—Civil Support Teams (WMD–CSTs) with 22 

personnel in each, with one in every State (two in FL, CA, and NY), plus one in 

the District of Columbia and each of the U.S. territories within U.S. Northern Command’s area of responsibility. There are also 17 CBRNE Enhanced Response Force 

Packages (CERFPs), and 10 Homeland Response Forces (HRFs). The Federal re-
54 

45LCDR David M. Aliberti, ‘‘Preparing for a Nightmare: USNORTHCOM’s Homeland Defense 

Mission Against Chemical and Biological Attack.’’ (U.S. Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island, May 2014). 

sponse force includes the Defense CBRN Response Force (DCRF) and the Command 

and Control CBRN Response Element (C2CRE).45

A review of the different emergency concept plans through the lens of the National Response Framework, indicates that a Nation’s comprehensive defense strategy and robust capability to manage chemical and biological events resides primarily with the Title 32 National Guard forces. In every State, National Guard 

WMD–CSTs, CERFP, and HRFs stand ready to deploy at the direction of the Governor to integrate under the on-scene incident commander in support of the civilian 

LFA. Title 10 allocated forces would deploy on U.S. Northern Command’s order to 

further augment local teams. 

Any reduction in force as a result of sequestration must ensure that this CBRN 

capability is not diminished in any form. In fact, any realistic application of sequestration must consider preservation of the fundamental State ability to respond to 

CBRN incidents before divesting Federal DOD capacities from the National Guard. 

The United States is strengthened by having 54 individual States and territories 

that can handle immediate needs and only seek Federal assistance when it is truly 

required. 

Future Missions for Homeland Response in Cybersecurity 

For all of the same statutory reasons presented, the National Guard is the most 

appropriate force to augment community, private business, and State partners in 

the event of a cyber-incident affecting the health and welfare of our citizens necessitating an emergency response. We should respond in the same manner for these 

types of incidents utilizing the existing National Response Framework with the established protocols in the National Incident Management System. If the event exceeds State capabilities and first responders are overwhelmed, the same dual-status 

commander concept to integrate DOD capabilities into a coordinated response 

should be utilized. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Thank you, General McGuire. You could join us 

here. It sounds like you know the procedures really well. 

So, anyway, the Chair will now recognize Mr. Gianato. 

STATEMENT OF JIMMY J. GIANATO, DIRECTOR, DIVISION OF 

HOMELAND SECURITY AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT, 

STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA, TESTIFYING ON BEHALF OF THE 

NATIONAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION 

Mr. GIANATO. Good morning, Chairman McSally, Ranking Member Payne, Members of the subcommittee. Thank you for holding 

this hearing this morning on the important topic of military assistance and disaster response. 

Today I am pleased to represent the National Emergency Management Association as the legislative committee chairman and Region III vice president. I am also the director of the West Virginia 

Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Management. 

Effective collaboration between emergency management agencies 

and the military is crucial if we want to see successful responses 

to disasters. In West Virginia, we are very fortunate to have had 

great success working with our National Guard. 

One of the most prominent examples of this has been our collaboration on the National Boy Scout Jamboree, which is a unique 

event held at the Summit Bechtel Reserve in rural Fayette County, 

West Virginia. This gathering of approximately 45,000 Scouts, leaders, and staff over the course of 10 days in the summer happens 

every 4 years. 

Given the size of West Virginia, it is a monumental task to handle the logistics, security, and operational support for such a major 
55 

event. One of our challenges with the Jamboree was obtaining and 

managing resources for an event of that magnitude while still sustaining the ability to respond to any other disaster or emergency 

that occurred at that same time. 

To accomplish the cooperation required to manage the Jamboree 

and other events, West Virginia developed a Joint Interagency 

Task Force, or JIATF, at the direction of Governor Tomblin in 

2010. The Governor appointed me as the lead for that task force 

and the adjutant general of the National Guard to serve as the colead. A senior leader from the Governor’s also office served as his 

liaison to the task force. 

Not only did the task force work exceptionally well for the Jamboree, it was also successfully implemented during responses to a 

derecho that impacted our State and Hurricane Sandy, both of 

which created major power outages and infrastructure challenges 

for the State. 

Within minutes of the derecho moving through West Virginia, 53 

of our 55 counties were without power. The State had to quickly 

make decisions on how it would handle power restoration. After a 

discussion among the JIATF leadership, FEMA, and consultation 

with the Governor, West Virginia elected to use a capability developed by the West Virginia National Guard to support this mission 

in a cost-effective and efficient way. Such collaboration resulted 

with the State being able to manage its own power restoration capabilities at a significant cost savings. 

Of course, West Virginia is not the only State to see such successful collaboration. In North Carolina, the North Carolina Department of Emergency Management was able to take advantage 

of the National Guard cybersecurity team to evaluate its IT architecture. They conducted a detailed study that identified several 

areas of improvement. This mission was conducted expertly and efficiently at a low cost. 

The State of Washington has also built a successful partnership, 

as was seen during the deployment of the National Guard during 

flooding and the mudslides that occurred last year. The National 

Guard assisted the State’s donations manager by supporting the 

movement of commodities, staffing warehouses, and assisting with 

the distribution of food. 

The Emergency Management Assistance Compact has played an 

important role in facilitating collaboration among States and enabling them to share National Guard assets. EMAC provides a legal 

and procedural mechanism whereby emergency response resources 

can quickly move throughout the country, which lessens the need 

for Federal resources. 

During Hurricane Sandy, for example, a helicopter crew was sent 

to New Jersey and staging and warehouse operations personnel 

were sent to New York. More recently, during the historic snowstorms in Massachusetts this past winter, Maine and Vermont provided Massachusetts with front-end loaders and dump trucks for 

snow removal. Just a few weeks ago, Louisiana provided helicopters and crews to Texas to assist with water rescue activities 

after floods hit the State. 

The use of dual-status command is another development that has 

played an important role to strengthening the unity of effort and 
56 

overall coordination. As I mentioned earlier, the use of the dualstatus command at the National Boy Scout Jamboree enabled effective coordination and integration and kept the operational control 

of the military units at that event under the control of the Governor, who consequently was able to retain control over the response. 

Colorado has also successfully used a dual-status commander in 

several instances, including its 2013 floods, 2012 wildfires, and the 

2014 Black Forest fires. 

If we hope to see effective response to disasters, we must involve 

the whole community. One of the key partnerships in the whole 

community is between emergency management agencies and the 

National Guard. 

Going forward, States must continue to look for opportunities to 

improve collaboration among emergency managers, the National 

Guard, and Federal forces. One method for doing this is the creation of formal mechanisms as we did with the JIATF. 

Further, we need to continue to support EMAC. It has been invaluable in deploying National Guard assets throughout the country. We also need to continue support for the dual-status command, 

which has greatly promoted coordination in FEMA grant programs 

such as the Emergency Management Performance Grants, which 

have built and strengthened State capabilities. 

I thank you for the opportunity to be here today, and look forward to answering any of your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Gianato follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JIMMY J. GIANATO

JUNE 10, 2015 

INTRODUCTION

Thank you Chairman McSally, Ranking Member Payne, and Members of the subcommittee for holding this hearing today. As director of the West Virginia Division 

of Homeland Security & Emergency Management and a regional vice president of 

NEMA, which represents the State emergency management directors of the 50 

States, territories, and District of Columbia, I am pleased to be here to discuss the 

role of the military in disaster response and how emergency managers and the military work together. 

As you know, emergency management is a ‘‘whole community’’ endeavor. It involves the public sector, the private sector, voluntary organizations, and individual 

citizens—all of whom are crucial to preparing for disasters and responding to and 

recovering from them. The National Guard and the military are an important part 

of the whole community and play a key role in efforts to address disasters, largely 

by supporting State and local responses. In my testimony this morning, I will focus 

on key lessons learned concerning how emergency managers and the military can 

work together effectively. Specifically, I will discuss the importance of collaboration, 

the value of the Emergency Management Assistance Compact, and the dual-status 

command. 

LESSONS LEARNED

Partnerships Have Been Effective in West Virginia 

More than anything else, effective collaboration between emergency management 

agencies and the military is crucial if we want to see successful responses to disasters. In West Virginia, we are very fortunate to have had great success working 

with the National Guard. One of the most prominent examples of this has been our 

collaboration on the National Boy Scout Jamboree, which is a unique event held at 

the Summit Bechtel Reserve in rural Fayette County, West Virginia. This gathering 

of approximately 45,000 scouts, leaders, and staff, over the course of 10 days in the 
57 

summer, happens every 4 years. Given the size of West Virginia, it is a monumental 

task to handle the logistics, security, and operational support of such a major event. 

The Jamboree has posed some distinct challenges. Most significantly, the State 

needed to develop the resources for the Jamboree while also maintaining the capability to respond to and recover from any other disaster or emergency that could 

occur at the same time. It was obvious that coordination and collaboration with the 

National Guard were going to be crucial to making this happen. In 2010, Governor 

Earl Ray Tomblin brought together key members of his emergency response team 

and directed them to develop a construct that could be easily adapted to handle the 

Jamboree, as well as any major disaster that could affect the State. We subsequently adopted the concept of a Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) to develop 

the necessary planning and response capabilities. 

The Governor appointed me to lead the JIATF and the adjutant general of the 

National Guard to serve as the co-leader. In addition, a senior leader from the Governor’s office served as the liaison for the Governor to the JIATF. The JIATF included Department of Defense assets from the active-duty, reserve, and National 

Guard. These military elements served under a dual status, West Virginia National 

Guard Brigadier General who reported to and supported the JIATF. Utilizing the 

dual-status command kept the operational control of the military units at the National Boy Scout Jamboree under the control of the civilian leadership and allowed 

the Governor to retain control of the response to the event. 

We successfully implemented the JIATF in 2012 during responses to a derecho 

and Hurricane Sandy. Both events created major power outages and infrastructure 

challenges for the State. For example, within minutes of the derecho moving 

through West Virginia, 53 of the 55 counties were without power. This included numerous water and sewer systems, hospitals and nursing homes, as well as many 

other types of critical infrastructure and retail facilities. Much of the power infrastructure was significantly damaged, and repairs took weeks to finish. This left the 

State with shortages of water, ill-functioning sewer systems, off-line gas stations, 

and many big box retailers that were unable to open. The State had to quickly make 

key decisions as to how it would handle power restoration and provide supplemental 

power to many of these facilities. After discussion among the JIATF leadership, 

FEMA, and consultation with the Governor, West Virginia elected to use a capability developed by the West Virginia National Guard to support this mission in a 

cost-effective and efficient way. Such collaboration resulted in the State being able 

to manage its own power restoration capability. 

Collaboration Has Been Invaluable in a Number of States 

Of course, West Virginia is not the only State to see such successful collaboration. 

Florida, for example, has seen a number of instances over the years. These include 

the Republican National Convention in 2012; the Annual All-Hazards Coordination 

Workshop; the FEMA Region IV Defense Coordinating Officers Defense Support to 

Civil Authorities Conference; State-wide annual hurricane conferences and exercises; the Annual United States Army Corps of Engineer, South Atlantic Division, 

Hurricane Rehearsal of Concept Drill; and Vigilant Guard 2013, which included 

Title 32 Forces, Title 10 forces, and dual-status commanders. Florida’s efforts have 

not been without their challenges, however. They have found that there are numerous ‘‘common operating pictures’’ at the local, State, and Federal level that do not 

communicate interchangeably. This frequently creates gaps in response and recovery. 

Similarly, North Carolina has also taken a number of steps to promote collaboration. For example, the Department of Emergency Management invites a North Carolina National Guard Domestic Operations officer to attend the weekly staff meetings 

in an effort to enhance coordination. Moreover, the Department of Emergency Management and National Guard work together on the State’s Helo-Aquatic Rescue 

Team. The National Guard provides helicopters, along with pilots and aircrews, 

while the Department of Emergency Management coordinates the provision of local 

responders to serve as highly-skilled rescue technicians. In order to maintain the 

team’s abilities at a high level, the Department of Emergency Management conducts 

monthly training. They are called out frequently during the summer months to rescue climbers in western North Carolina. Further, in April and May of this year, the 

Department of Emergency Management was able to take advantage of the National 

Guard Cybersecurity Team to evaluate its IT Architecture. They conducted a detailed study that identified several areas of improvement. This mission was conducted expertly and efficiently at a low cost. The team provided the Department of 

Emergency Management with a checklist to improve its IT infrastructure. 

The State of Washington has built a successful partnership as well, as was seen 

during the deployment of the National Guard during flooding and the mudslide that 
58 

occurred last year. The National Guard assisted the State’s donations manager by 

supporting the movement of commodities, staffing the warehouses, and assisting 

with the distribution of food. In addition, personnel from the military department 

provided transportation to and from school for children in communities isolated by 

the landslide. This made it possible for the children to stay on pace with the curriculum and to graduate on time. The National Guard also provided helicopters that 

supported movement of critical resources and movement of recovered human remains. Teams from the Washington Homeland Response Force and Colorado National Guard supported local responders as they uncovered the remains and delivered them to the medical examiner. 

The Emergency Management Assistance Compact Facilitates Working Together 

The Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) has played an important role in facilitating collaboration among States and enabling them to share National Guard assets. When States and the U.S. territories joined together and Congress ratified EMAC (Pub. L. 104–321) in 1996, it created a legal and procedural 

mechanism whereby emergency response resources such as Urban Search and Rescue Teams could quickly move throughout the country to meet disaster needs. All 

50 States, the District of Columbia, the U.S. Virgin Islands, Puerto Rico, and Guam 

are members of EMAC and have committed their emergency resources in helping 

one another during times of disaster or emergency. 

Since its ratification by Congress, EMAC has grown significantly in size, volume, 

and the types of resources States are able to deploy. For example, over 67,000 personnel from a variety of disciplines deployed through EMAC to the Gulf Coast in 

response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, and 12,279 personnel deployed to Texas 

and Louisiana during Hurricanes Gustav and Ike. More recent uses of EMAC have 

included the response for the manhunt in Pennsylvania, severe weather in Mississippi, wildfires in Washington, tropical storms in Hawaii, and the historic snowstorms in Massachusetts. National Guard assets are often deployed through EMAC. 

During Hurricane Sandy, for example, a helicopter and crew were sent to New Jersey, and staging and warehouse operations personnel were sent to New York, among 

other things. During its 2013 flooding, Colorado received search-and-rescue assistance, as well as road work repair assistance. More recently, during the snowstorms 

in Massachusetts mentioned earlier, Maine and Vermont provided Massachusetts 

with front-end loaders and dump trucks for snow removal, and just a few weeks ago, 

Louisiana provided helicopters and crews to Texas to assist with water rescue activities after floods hit the State. EMAC has made it easier for States to assist each 

other effectively and share National Guard assets—with the added benefit of lessening the need for Federal resources in the process. 

In addition to deploying throughout the country through EMAC, the National 

Guard works with EMAC members to improve the system. For example, in an effort 

to better integrate mutual aid partners before a disaster into the EMAC system, an 

EMAC Advisory Group was established. The group includes representatives from 

State and local government associations, the National Guard Bureau, emergency responder associations, public utility associations, the private sector, DHS/FEMA, and 

the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. The discussions and interactions 

of this group have assisted in incorporating local government assets into the EMAC 

system for a unified response. 

The Dual-Status Command Has Been a Success 

The creation of the dual-status command has been an important development over 

the past few years. In the wake of Hurricane Katrina, policymakers realized that 

the separate chains of command for State and Federal military forces had made coordination difficult and contributed to the shortcomings of the response. In the years 

that followed, policymakers developed the dual-status command, which allows a single National Guard officer, responsible to the Governor of the affected State, to simultaneously direct both State (Title 32) and Federal (Title 10) military forces to 

ensure coordination during emergency response. This occurs with the consent of the 

Governor and authorization of the President. Ideally, it greatly strengthens unity 

of effort, a keystone of the National Incident Management System, and reduces the 

kinds of coordination problems seen during the response to Katrina. 

The emergency management community has had great success with the dual-status command and shown that it is an effective way to operate and provide the appropriate command and control of all military forces during a response. Significantly, these forces remain under the control of the Governor—who has the ultimate 

responsibility for public safety of the State’s citizens. Since 2004, 25 dual-status 

commanders have been appointed, and of those, 16 have had Title 10 forces assigned. In 2013, four States requested dual-status commanders for real-world 
59 

events. Two of those received Title 10 forces, including the National Boy Scout Jamboree in West Virginia. 

As I mentioned earlier, the use of the dual-status command at the Jamboree enabled effective coordination and integration and kept the operational control of the 

military units at the event under the control of the Governor—who consequently 

was able to retain control over the response to the event. Another successful use 

of the dual-status command was seen at the 2012 Republican National Convention 

in Florida. During this special National security event, Tropical Storm Isaac 

wreaked havoc on the convention schedule and interrupted travel plans of many of 

the estimated 50,000 delegates, media, and others planning to attend. The use of 

dual-status command greatly facilitated coordination and enabled the State to respond more effectively to a very challenging incident. 

Colorado has also successfully used a dual-status commander in several instances—including its 2013 floods, 2012 wildfires, and the 2013 Black Forest fires— 

and its use promoted effective coordination and response. Further, the outstanding 

relationships between the State, FEMA Region VIII, the FEMA Region VIII Defense 

Coordinating Officer, the Colorado National Guard, and the Department of Defense 

facility commanders in the State facilitated the seamless initiation of disaster requests, transition of command, and effective coordination. While each of these disasters had severe consequences—such as fatalities, damaged and destroyed infrastructure, and environmental damage—each would have been worse without the missions 

completed by the Colorado National Guard and Department of Defense assets. 

Training for State emergency management and military personnel concerning defense support to civil authorities has been invaluable, helping to familiarize them 

with relevant capabilities and procedures, as well as strengthening important relationships. 

CONCLUSION

If we hope to see effective responses to disasters, we must involve the whole community, and one of the key partnerships in the whole community is between emergency management agencies and the National Guard. In West Virginia, we have had 

great success in strengthening this partnership, and other States have as well. As 

a result, these States are better prepared to respond to and recover from disasters. 

Going forward, States must continue to look for opportunities to improve collaboration among emergency managers, the National Guard, and Federal forces. One 

method for doing this is the creation of formal mechanisms, as we did with the 

JIATF in West Virginia. But as Florida, North Carolina, Washington, and Colorado 

show, there are other ways as well. Further, we need to continue to support EMAC. 

It has been invaluable in deploying National Guard assets throughout the country 

and enabling States to support each other more effectively, consequently reducing 

the need for Federal resources. We also need to continue to support the dual-status 

command, which has greatly promoted coordination, and FEMA’s grant programs, 

such as the Emergency Management Performance Grant, which have built and 

strengthened State capabilities. 

I thank you for the opportunity to testify today and welcome any questions you 

may have. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Thank you, Mr. Gianato. 

The Chair now recognizes Mr. Gaynor for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF PETER T. GAYNOR, DIRECTOR, EMERGENCY 

MANAGEMENT OFFICE, STATE OF RHODE ISLAND 

Mr. GAYNOR. Good morning, Chairman McSally, Ranking Member Payne, and distinguished Members of the subcommittee. It is 

a pleasure to be here today to discuss the State of Rhode Island’s 

long and on-going partnership with our National Guard. Again, my 

name is Pete Gaynor. I am the director of the State Emergency 

Management in the State of Rhode Island. 

As the director and a professional emergency manager, I am responsible for preparing for emergencies, coordinating the activation 

and use of resources, ensuring an integrated and unified response, 

and managing the recovery effort in order to support our local, 

State governments, citizens, and businesses. 
60 

I am pleased to be testifying before the committee today and 

have submitted my full statement to the committee, which I ask be 

made part of the hearing record. 

Today with this testimony I want to provide the subcommittee 

with information on the long-standing history of cooperation and 

partnership between our State government and the Army and Air 

Guard forces based in our State. I hope to give you a sense of how 

we in Rhode Island have coalesced to make our State safer, more 

secure, and more resilient against a host of natural and man-made 

hazards. 

Additionally, I would like to highlight the challenges and opportunities we face in addressing the growing cyber threat. The Rhode 

Island National Guard consists of about 3,300 members. Most of its 

members are residents of Rhode Island and neighboring States. 

Under State law, the National Guard provides protection of life 

and property, preserves the peace and order and public safety. The 

Rhode Island National Guard has served and remains engaged in 

the global war on terror and overseas contingency operations with 

units that have deployed world-wide in direct support of National 

security objectives. 

Within the State of Rhode Island, the Guard is consistently 

called upon in disasters by the Governor to provide military support to civil authorities during local emergencies, National disasters, and significant severe weather events. The Rhode Island National Guard provides a unique role with a distinct local response 

mission. They are our neighbors. They are our citizen soldiers. 

Since 2010, the Rhode Island National Guard has activated over 

1,750 citizen soldiers to respond to numerous natural disasters and 

events while simultaneously deploying over 1,400 individuals to 

overseas assignments. Specific events at home consist of the 2010 

March floods, Hurricane Irene in 2011, Hurricane Sandy in 2013, 

the Boston Marathon bombing in 2013, and the winter blizzards of 

2013 and 2015. They all required National Guard personnel and 

equipment. 

Compared to the previous 50 years, the Rhode Island National 

Guard activation over the last 5 years for State emergencies has 

increased over 200 percent. Emergency management requires a 

team effort from all facets of our community to assist with the response and recovery, from citizens preparing to be on their own for 

the first 72 hours of an emergency, to electrical and gas providers 

teaming up with us in our State emergency operations center, 

State departments such as the Department of Transportation providing sand and salt to communities in need, and then our National Guardsmen providing law enforcement support during special events. We simply require the whole community to be successful to navigate a crisis or one of these special events. 

Again, the Rhode Island Emergency Management Agency is only 

one part of the State’s emergency management team. We must leverage all the resources of our collective team in preparing for, protecting against, responding to, and recovering from all hazards. 

Collectively, we must all meet the needs of the entire community 

in each of these areas. 

The National Guard is a unique and indispensable force multiplier in preparedness efforts and during times of need, from pro-
61 

viding expert training and exercise support or in the movement of 

dispensing commodities to local communities or providing technical 

assistance in our cyber initiative. The National Guard is ready, reliable, and a diverse force, accessible for State, multi-State, and 

Federal purposes. 

Cybersecurity is an emerging role, requiring a synchronized and 

holistic approach, not unlike the counter-drug mission or the 

CBRN, or chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear forces. Cyber 

and cyber defense are emerging roles for the National Guard, in 

partnership with local, State, and Federal agencies, and businesses, requiring updated and new laws to mitigate and prevent 

network attacks from domestic and foreign players. 

This is a new paradigm in consequence management. Hacking 

into infrastructure nodes such as power grids, telecommunications 

sites, financial institutions can be as devastating as a hurricane or 

a blizzard. 

In conclusion, the cohesive partnership between the civil authorities and the National Guard is instrumental in life safety and the 

protection of our citizens. This partnership enhances our ability to 

prepare for, respond to, and recover from disasters and assists in 

defending the United States against increasing cyber attacks and 

acts of terrorism. 

We look forward to working with our partner and continuing our 

mission to reduce loss of life and property in disasters, to protect 

our State’s critical infrastructure from all hazards by means of 

comprehensive emergency management policies, and legislative initiatives. 

Chairwoman McSally and subcommittee Members, thank you for 

the opportunity to be here today. I stand ready to answer any questions you may have about our partnership with the Rhode Island 

National Guard. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Gaynor follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF PETER T. GAYNOR

JUNE 10, 2015 

Good morning Chairman McSally, Ranking Member Payne, and distinguished 

Members of the subcommittee. It is a pleasure to appear before you today to discuss 

the State of Rhode Island’s long and on-going partnership with our National Guard. 

My name is Pete Gaynor and I am the director of emergency management in the 

State of Rhode Island. As the director and a professional emergency manager, I am 

responsible for preparing for emergencies, coordinating the activation and use of resources, ensuring an integrated and unified response, and managing the recovery 

effort in support of our local and State governments, citizens, and businesses. 

I am pleased to be testifying before the subcommittee today. I have submitted my 

full statement to the committee, which I ask be made part of the hearing record. 

Today, with this testimony, I want to provide the subcommittee with information 

on the long-standing history of cooperation and partnership between our State government and the Army and Air National Guard forces based in our State. I hope 

to give you a sense of how we in Rhode Island have coalesced to make our State 

safer, more secure, and more resilient against a host of natural and man-made hazards. Additionally, I would like to highlight the challenges and opportunities we face 

in addressing the growing cyber threat. 

The Rhode Island National Guard consists of more than 3,300 members. Most of 

its members are residents of Rhode Island and neighboring States. Under State law, 

the National Guard provides protection of life and property and preserves peace, 

order, and public safety. The Rhode Island Guard has served and remains engaged 

in the Global War on Terror and Overseas Contingency Operations, with units that 

have deployed world-wide in direct support of National security objectives. 
62 

Within the State of Rhode Island, the Guard is inconsistently called upon in disasters by the Governor to provide military support to civil authorities during local 

emergencies, natural disasters, and significant severe weather events. The Rhode Island National Guard provides a unique role with a distinct local response mission. 

They are our neighbors, they are our citizen soldiers. 

Since 2010, the Rhode Island National Guard has activated over 1,750 citizen soldiers to respond to numerous natural disasters and events while simultaneously deploying over 1,400 individuals in four company-sized units overseas. Specific events 

such as the 2010 March floods, Hurricane Irene 2011, Hurricane Sandy 2013, the 

Boston Marathon bombing in 2013 and the winter blizzards of 2013 and 2015 all 

required Rhode Island National Guard personnel and equipment. Compared to the 

previous 50 years, Rhode Island National Guard activation over last 5 years for 

State emergencies has increased over 200 percent. 

Emergency Management requires a team effort from all facets of our community 

to assist with response and recovery. From citizens preparing to be on their own 

for the first 72 hours of an emergency, to electrical and gas providers teaming up 

with us in the State Emergency Operations Center, State departments, such as the 

Department of Transportation providing sand and salt to local communities in need, 

and our National Guardsman providing law enforcement support during special 

events. We simply require the whole community to help successfully navigate a crisis or special event. 

The Rhode Island Emergency Management Agency is only one part of our State’s 

emergency management team; we must leverage all of the resources of our collective 

team in preparing for, protecting against, responding to, recovering from, and mitigating against all hazards; collectively we must meet the needs of the entire community in each of these areas. The U.S. Armed Forces and National Guard have a historic precedent and enduring role in supporting civil authorities during times of 

emergency, and this role is codified in the National defense strategy. 

The National Guard is a unique and indispensable force multiplier in preparedness efforts and during times of need, from providing expert training and exercise 

support in the movement and dispensing of commodities to local communities to providing technical assistance to our Cyber Initiative. The National Guard is a ready, 

reliable, and diverse force accessible for State, multi-State, and Federal purposes. 

Typical State active-duty missions include Security, Traffic Control, Evacuation, 

Search and Rescue, Civil Disturbance Control, Fire Protection & Fighting, Natural 

Disaster Relief, Debris Clearance and Emergency Response & Recovery efforts. 

Our Civil Support Team (CST), a high-tech hazardous response and monitoring 

team works hand-in-hand with local, State, and Federal agencies in all mass-gathering events such as the recently-concluded 2015 Volvo Ocean Race in Newport, 

Rhode Island. The Rhode Island National Guard continues to be called upon during 

winter storms, flooding, and hurricanes. The National Guard spectrum of support 

includes a Cyber Defense Team that provided network security support for the Presidential Inauguration in 2013. 

Cybersecurity is an emerging role requiring a synchronized and holistic approach. 

Not unlike the counter drug mission or the Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, Explosives (CBRNE) forces, the CBRNE Enhanced Response Force Package 

(CERFP), and the Homeland Response Force (HRF); cybersecurity and cyber defense 

are emerging roles for the National Guard in partnership with local, State, Federal 

agencies and businesses requiring updated or new laws to mitigate and prevent network attacks from domestic and foreign players. This is a new paradigm in consequence management; hacking into critical infrastructure nodes such as power 

grids, telecommunications sites, or financial institutions can be as devastating to the 

public as a hurricane or blizzard. 

CONCLUSION

The cohesive partnership between civilian authorities and the National Guard is 

instrumental in life safety and the protection our citizens. This partnership enhances our ability to prepare for, respond to, and recover from disasters and assists 

in defending the United States against increasing cyber attacks and acts of terrorism. 

As challenges continue to evolve, we must continue to adjust and shape our emergency management and homeland security strategy and enhance our whole-community concept. In the State of Rhode Island, the National Guard has proven its value 

time and time again. Its relentless commitment and dedication to serve and protect 

is unmatched. 

We look forward to working with our partner and continuing our mission to reduce the loss of life and property in disasters, and to protect our State’s critical in-
63 

frastructure from all hazards by means of comprehensive emergency management 

policies and legislative initiatives. 

Thank you, Chairman McSally and subcommittee Members, for the opportunity 

to appear before you today. I stand ready to answer any questions you might have. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Thank you, Mr. Gaynor. 

I now recognize myself for 5 minutes to ask questions. 

General McGuire, with your experience and listening to the other 

panel, I would like your unique perspective on any gaps in structure and procedures in planning related to this mission and specifically the role of the National Guard. 

I am just thinking about it. It is all local. So I am thinking a disaster or crisis happens in southern Arizona. My assumption would 

be Governor Ducey would first be looking to use the capabilities 

that you have in the Guard and then, if it exceeds that capability, 

perhaps the disaster be declared and then you would be under Title 

32. Then the next level would be, you know, Title 10 forces also 

supporting. 

So my assumption is that Davis-Monthan and Fort Huachuca 

forces would be the next ones that would be asked to potentially 

support. Because, just like you, they live in the community, they 

are familiar with the community, they understand the dynamics 

there. 

Is that a valid assumption? Are there table-top discussions within sort-of geographic regions to be able to make sure that the proper understanding of roles and responsibilities would happen or is 

that all being done at kind of the FEMA regional levels and, you 

know, Colonel Meger, the DM commander, and General Ashley at 

Fort Huachuca would just sort of have to do a pick-up game with 

their forces in the event of a disaster or a response within southern 

Arizona? 

General MCGUIRE. So let me start with the etymology of a disaster question, and I will go back to the gaps thing. 

So as the State emergency manager, what would happen if we 

had a major event in southern Arizona is that there would be an 

incident command stood up under the National Incident Management System and every asset delivered from the State would be in 

support of that incident command. 

When the resources were exhausted in southern Arizona, that 

would go to the county level. Let’s say it is in Pima County. Once 

Pima County has been overwhelmed, they direct the resource request to the State. 

Coincident to that, the Governor is making, in consultation with 

me, a decision about whether or not to declare a state of emergency. If a state of emergency is declared in Arizona—and I will 

talk specifically about our case—we have, by statute, legislatively 

set aside $4 million for a State emergency fund. 

Those funds could be used to call guardsmen immediately to duty 

under State Active-Duty provisions. As the resource meter begins 

to run—and it is not just for the Guard. It could be for overtime 

for neighboring county sheriffs or whatever we believe is the best 

resource to deliver. 

As that is evolving, the Federal bases—Fort Huachuca, DavisMonthan, Luke Air Force Base, anybody in the affected area— 

those are seen at the State level as community partners. So in a 
64 

State like Georgia, where you have Fort Benning and Moody Air 

Force Base and all these installations, they are community partners in our communities, and we look to them to see if there is any 

mutual aid compacts. 

But the answer to your question about—once we believe there is 

going to be a Stafford Act invoked, we work through the DCO at 

FEMA Region IX. We have very—what I would call well-codified 

paths about how to respond or get response from the Federal authorities. 

I am not a NORTHCOM guy, but my observation is they don’t 

link back capabilities to a region. So if an engineering battalion is 

not available at Fort Huachuca and the closest one is at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, that is where they are going to come from. 

So, really, we look at the airmen and soldiers at that base as citizens of Arizona in terms of providing life, limb, protection of property. Unless they have a specific capacity that is needed by the incident management system, they are not necessarily part of the response unless the incident happens at their installation. Then you 

get into a situation where you could have a dual-status commander 

that is a Title 10 guy. So that is how that works. 

Do you want me to talk about the gaps? 

Ms. MCSALLY. Yeah. Absolutely. The gaps, if you could, from 

your perspective and knowledge. 

General MCGUIRE. So the gaps I think goes a little bit to the 

Representative from Rhode Island’s question about—we just had 

last week in Arizona a State-wide emergency exercise with a focus 

on cyber. 

This is the best way I can crystallize that 1-day exercise, that a 

cyber attack or a cyber incident only becomes an emergency when 

there is a kinetic impact on the citizens. So you have lost power, 

wastewater. There is inability to support continuity of Government. 

Police and fire is affected so we can no longer respond. Hospitals 

are shut down. 

Those types of events, invariably, we have found are a result of 

some nefarious act, which goes to the idea of why the Guard is 

uniquely situated to be what I call the defensive and restorative 

force. 

Because when we run those drills in Arizona, we can deal with 

the National Cyber Incident Center, the NCIC and DHS, and all 

the lead Federal law enforcement agents to help us with that. But 

what we find in Arizona is we lack the manpower to literally go 

out and do the restorative mission. 

We have also found that, when we do these exercises, invariably 

we are going to run into Posse Comitatus issues if we use Title 10 

forces to do that because there will be exculpatory evidence discovered as a result of that action that more than likely will make forensic discovery of who committed this act inadmissible at least in 

our court system, where, if we use a Guardsman under Title 32 or 

Title 10, we are, for lack of a better term, a good manpower pool 

that is tied to the tech industry in Arizona—Intel, Microsoft, whatever—Guardsmen are there that can come in and do that, discover 

that, and then turn it over to Federal, State, and local law enforcement folks. 
65 

I have never heard before today that there is an involvement of 

U.S. Cyber Command taking the lead for any kind of a Federal disaster inside the continental United States. So I think that DOD 

should come back and explain that. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Yeah. We need to follow up on that. That was 

alarming as well. I am out of my time. Perhaps we can have another round here. But I want to give everybody an opportunity 

here. 

So the Chair now recognizes Mr. Langevin—I am sorry—Mrs. 

Watson Coleman. I am sorry. I was looking right past you. I didn’t 

mean to. So, please. 

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. Thank you, Madam Chair. Thank you 

for being here. 

Major General McGuire, the unpredictable Federal budget process of recent years, coupled with sequestration, has taken a toll on 

important programs across the Federal Government. Components 

even within Federal agencies are competing for limited dollars, resulting in robbing Peter to pay Paul. This approach is even evident 

in the Department of Defense. 

Can you talk about how the lack of predictability and uncertainty 

surrounding the Federal appropriations process, coupled with the 

reduced budgets, has affected the National Guard’s readiness to 

fulfill its domestic response mission? 

General MCGUIRE. Yes, ma’am. The unpredictability and the nature of the continuing resolutions and operating on sequester budgets has made it difficult on all components of the DOD. In my role 

as a State cabinet secretary receiving resources from the State, we 

have seen cuts in those areas affect our ability to get formations 

ready. 

That said, when you talk about domestic response, I often ask 

my Army subordinate commanders, ‘‘What is the Army military 

specialty for filling sandbags?’’ There isn’t one. Really, what I look 

at is the unique capability of our soldiers, and this is why I am so 

passionate about the idea of indiscriminate cuts to end strength in 

the Guard. 

In a resource-constrained environment, the most cost-effective 

force, the most embedded force forward, to protect our most valuable resource, our citizen—why in a resource-constrained environment we wouldn’t holistically look at how can we best build a force 

in a resource-constrained environment that can meet the expeditionary National security strategy to fight wars, yet maintain a 

huge base of trained and ready M-Day or drill-status Reserve-status Guardsmen in our States that can be called forward? 

So our military commanders are doing very well in terms of 

maintaining the morale of the citizen soldiers and airmen. They 

are excited about the missions that they do. I haven’t yet seen huge 

losses in attrition as a result of declining dollars. 

But I do see that weapons system modernization and some of the 

things that need to happen as a result of Federal priorities—those 

things that aren’t happening will eventually take a toll. But in 

terms of our ability to meet citizens’ requirements right now, there 

has been no wavering in that. 

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. Thank you. 
66 

Sort-of to drill down on a particular issue, could you discuss the 

impact of this on CBRN capabilities specifically? 

General MCGUIRE. So my example in my written statement 

about the chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear response force. 

So post-9/11 there were similar, I think, type hearings. We talked 

about the idea that we have prepositioned people that could serve 

in State Active-Duty Title 32 or Title 10 statuses, and wouldn’t 

that be a convenient place for us to station those response forces? 

So there was deliberate decisions made to move 80 percent of the 

18,000 that Mr. Salesses referred to. Eighty percent of that capacity is in the National Guard. So, of those 18,000 MOS-trained specialists that are resident in the Guard, my comment to this subcommittee is to say that any cut to the Guard needs to evaluate 

how that 18,000-man force is affected in the force structure 

changes that they make. 

While this subcommittee doesn’t have the necessary purview of 

HASC and HAC–D, it still affects everything we do with homeland 

response. So that was the reason for those comments in my written 

statement. 

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. Thank you. I yield back. 

Ms. MCSALLY. The good news is both myself and Mr. Langevin 

are on the Armed Services Committee as well. So we can bring 

these perspectives to our work on that other committee. 

The Chairman now recognizes Mr. Loudermilk from Georgia. 

Mr. LOUDERMILK. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

General, I want to ask you the same question that I asked the 

previous panel about DOD Instruction 2025.22. The gentleman answered the question by saying there was no changes made to that 

DOD instruction, only just codifying procedures that was already 

there. 

How would you answer that same question? What changes has 

the Department of Defense made to pre-established procedures in 

DODI 3025.22 and how do they affect the Governor’s ability to request authorization to use National Guard forces for Title 32 Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) purposes? Additionally, 

what changes to preestablished procedures have been made, and 

what is the effect? 

General MCGUIRE. I am unfamiliar with pre-established procedures. But my reading of it would indicate that it makes it at least 

appear procedurally more difficult for a Governor to request authorization for Title 32 resources in an event where he believes 

there is going to be a Federal nexus, either a Federal declaration 

or a multi-State or a Federal interest, in our case, like the Southern Border with Mexico. 

It doesn’t prohibit the Governor from going directly to the Secretary of Defense to request additional Title 32 dollars under 

502(f), a provision that was well scrutinized after 9/11 and one that 

I think is really critical. 

As we mirror that against the comment that the Chairman made 

about AFRICOM and the HADR, Humanitarian Assistance Disaster Relief, it is my observation, having just finished up CAPSTONE just a few weeks ago, this Goldwater-Nichols Act-required 

course, that the comment would be that, of my 48 classmates, there 

is a huge dearth of knowledge that there is even a Federal statute 
67 

1Department of Homeland Security, National Response Framework, Second Edition (May 

2013) 13, available at http://www.fema.gov/national-response-framework. 

called Title 32 and an authorization that exists in such a way 

where we can deliver Federal resources to the State and maintain 

command and control under the Governor as commander-in-chief. 

The more we push that out of the equation and make it either 

a Title 10 answer or a State Active-Duty solution, you start to 

make the burden very arduous for the State to power up jet aircraft to do surveillance or helicopter and rotary wing. 

I wouldn’t categorize it as that there was a change. But when 

you read it to someone who is not familiar with it—there was a 

comment made about it is very complex—it doesn’t specifically say 

in there, sure, the Governor can always go VFR direct. 

I think that was intentionally written in the language so that it 

didn’t say that. Does that make sense? That is my opinion. But I 

wasn’t part of that DOD panel that created it. I can certainly look 

into it more and get back to you in more detail. 

[The information follows:] 

Historically, Governors have communicated directly with the Secretary of Defense 

(SECDEF), the Chief of National Guard Bureau (CNGB), and even the White House 

to request Title 32 authorization for National Guard DSCA missions. As recognized 

by the National Response Framework, Governors are the individuals that possess 

the greatest situational awareness in a State-based disaster and the Constitutional 

and statutory responsibility for public safety and welfare within their sovereign 

States.1 Title 32 status has traditionally been used in preparing for and responding 

to domestic emergencies, such as Hurricane Katrina in 2005 and Hurricanes Ike & 

Gustav in 2008, and for National Special Security Events such as the Democratic 

and Republican National Conventions. 

The authors of DODI 3025.22, however, all but eliminated the Governor from the 

process. For example, Paragraph 3(f) of DODI 3025.22 states: ‘‘The use of the National Guard for DSCA will not be approved to: (1) Perform DSCA operations or 

missions at the direct request to DOD of a State or local civil authority . . . ’’ (emphasis added). Instead of the Governor of the affected State, DODI 3025.22 vests 

the authority to recommend the use of National Guard forces in Title 32 status in 

‘‘the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and America’s Security 

Affairs (ASD(HD&ASA)), as the principal civilian advisor for DSCA... ’’. This 

constitutes an unprecedented doctrinal shift of authority from the Governors, i.e. the 

commanders-in-chief of the States to non-military DOD appointees. The Governors 

of the sovereign States are now relegated to simply providing their ‘‘concurrence’’ 

to the use of their National Guard forces. Of course, it is inconceivable that any 

Governor faced with a disaster in his or her State would withhold his or her concurrence and the Governor’s authority to concur is, therefore, merely symbolic in practice. DODI 3025.22 improperly removes the well-established role of the State’s Governor in this critical dialogue with the Federal Government. 

There are other areas of concern in DODI 3025.22. For example, paragraph 3(a) 

should be amended to recognize the CNGB’s role as the principal military advisor 

for National Guard DSCA, instead of vesting all advisory authority in the 

ASD(HD&ASA)—a Federal civilian appointee. Paragraph 3(c) also suggests that 

Title 32 funding for National Guard troops responding to an emergency or disaster 

must be reimbursed by the State in all instances. This paragraph should include 

a brief statement recognizing that non-reimbursable support may be provided in certain situations, such as when required by law or when authorized by law and approved by SECDEF. 

Mr. LOUDERMILK. In effect, have there been some changes in the 

way that Governors request Title 32? 

General MCGUIRE. I don’t know that it was codified in a DODI, 

a DOD instruction, previously. But it was informally understood 

that the Governor always had the ability to go through the adjutant general right to the Secretary of Defense and say, ‘‘We need 

additional Title 32 authorization.’’ 
68 

Mr. LOUDERMILK. Currently what are they proposing? 

General MCGUIRE. Currently that procedure still exists, but the 

DODI says it needs to make sure that it is going to rise to the level 

of the Stafford Act and that there is a clear Federal nexus. 

An example of 502(f) that is being executed right this minute in 

Arizona is our Southwest Border mission, where we have Guardsmen serving in 502(f) because of—Title 32 because of the law enforcement piece and the counter-narcotics incidents that occur 

down there and the collection of evidence. 

It is the right status to use those National Guard forces in. So 

it would be disingenuous to say that status isn’t used. It is used 

currently today on the Southwest Border and could be used in an 

emergent response at any time. 

Mr. LOUDERMILK. Now, do you know if Governors were consulted 

with these changes? 

General MCGUIRE. I do not know what level of consultation that 

Governors were on. We—I say Arizona—was previously a member 

of the Council of Governors, working with the National Governors 

Association on that collaboration. 

When Governor Ducey was elected, the seat went with the actual 

individual. So we have not been a member of that Council since 

January. So I haven’t been familiar with current negotiations. I can 

follow up with more information after the hearing. 

[The information follows:] 

As I mentioned during my oral testimony before the subcommittee, the Governor 

of Arizona is no longer a member of the Council of Governors and I therefore cannot 

speak on the Council’s behalf. My understanding after speaking with representatives of the Council of Governors, however, is that the authors of DODI 3025.22 did 

not seek input from the Council before implementing these unprecedented changes 

to established policy and procedures. In fact, it appears that the authors ignored repeated requests from the Council of Governors to meet, confer, and exchange views 

and information regarding the DODI 3025.22 when it was still in draft form. 

For further information and an official response from the Council of Governors, 

I recommend the subcommittee contact the National Governors Association. 

Mr. LOUDERMILK. Okay. I appreciate that. To the best of your 

knowledge do the Nation’s Governors still object to these changes? 

General MCGUIRE. I can tell you the Council of Governors advocates for all 50 Governors, the 3 territorial Governors, and there 

has been no communication about concurrence or nonconcurrence 

on that. Let me check on that more thoroughly and get back to you. 

[The information follows:] 

It is my understanding from speaking with representatives of the Council of Governors that the Nation’s Governors are adamantly opposed to these unilateral 

changes to long-standing policy; changes that interfere with the Governors’ right to 

engage in direct communications with the Secretary of Defense, the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, and even the White House if necessary. Again, I respectfully 

refer the subcommittee to the Council of Governors through the National Governors 

Association. 

Mr. LOUDERMILK. Thank you. I yield back. 

Ms. MCSALLY. The Chair now recognizes Mr. Langevin from 

Rhode Island. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Again to our panel of witnesses, thank you for being here, for 

being on the front lines, EMA, and all that you do to keep our people safe. 
69 

If I could begin with our witness from Rhode Island, Mr. Gaynor, 

again I want to thank you for coming down to testify today, especially on short notice. 

Continuing on the cyber domain, you know, clearly, when you 

think of cyber, this is a new concept to really think of this potentially as an EMA-related issue for emergency preparedness and response. 

But can you talk about Rhode Island EMA’s role in convening 

stakeholders to protect critical infrastructure in the State from 

cyber attack and, at least as importantly, help ensure that the 

State is able to quickly recover from a disaster. 

Mr. GAYNOR. Thank you, Congressman. 

For a couple years now, the State, in partnership both within the 

State, State government, and within the region of New England, 

have been partnering on some planning efforts to bolster our cybersecurity effort. 

The first thing that we actually did, again, as a region, was develop these teams called cyber disruption teams that consist of 

emergency managers, law enforcement, private industry, public industry, IT professionals, that can help both State and local jurisdictions deal with a low-level cyber incident. 

As we have moved through the past couple years, we have matured. We have written a cyber protection plan. We have written 

a cyber incident action plan. Most recently, Governor Raimondo of 

Rhode Island instituted an Executive order establishing the Cybersecurity Commission to look at two basic things to ensure that the 

State is ready should it be the recipient of a significant cyber attack. 

So, first, we want to make sure that we improve State cybersecurity practices in order to protect both Government, businesses, and 

citizens of Rhode Island. The second part of that is, because there 

is a significant deficit of cyber experts these days, to accelerate the 

growth of Rhode Island’s cybersecurity industry in order to bring 

jobs and opportunity to Rhode Island. 

So two phases: Let’s get our house in order and then let’s kindof build a home-grown cybersecurity expertise within the State. 

Parallel with all those efforts we have been exercising with numerous critical infrastructure, key resource sectors, in cyber tabletops, from the banking sector to the wastewater sector, to the electrical sector, and trying to get everyone to understand what is at 

stake and what the consequences could be should Rhode Island 

have a cyber attack. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Very good. Thank you for that update. 

If I could follow up, the 102nd Information Warfare Squadron of 

the Rhode Island Air National Guard based in North Kingstown is 

obviously an important State resource. 

As someone who is on the ground and the front lines as an emergency manager, can you share some thoughts about the specific opportunities that the presence of the National Guard cyber capabilities provides both proactively and reactively in the cyber domain? 

Mr. GAYNOR. So in my opening statement I talked about the 

uniqueness of the Rhode Island National Guard and National 

Guard in general. In Rhode Island, as you referenced, the 102nd 

Network Warfare Squadron is a unique capability resident in 
70 

Rhode Island, made up, again, of our National Guardsmen. In their 

uniform they are part of the squadron and in their civilian attire 

they work for cybersecurity companies. It is a resource that we 

have tapped for numerous training and exercises. 

If you ask some of my partner agencies within the State, like the 

Rhode Island State Police Cyber Crimes Unit, there is a daily need 

for cyber experts that we don’t have, whether it be in a local jurisdiction or even in the State. 

So, again, just like you would call a guardsman to help with a 

hurricane or a blizzard, those neighbors coming to help you, some 

of the friction that we have had in, again, tapping these unique 

neighbors, our cyber experts, to help locals and State in a cyber attack has been difficult. Again, we are pressing the envelope in 

every way. So for the most part the 102nd is helping us with training and assist and technical support. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Very good. Thank you. 

Well, I have other questions, but my time has expired, so I will 

yield back. 

Ms. MCSALLY. We could either do another round, or I could give 

you a couple more minutes. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Okay. That would be great. Just one. Thank you 

then. 

On those particular issues, what limitations do you face that prevent you from realizing the vision where you would like to see it 

be more effective, and is it a problem of resources, authorities, or 

lack of experience in working together through exercises? 

Mr. GAYNOR. I think our gap is the legal justification to use cyber 

forces, National Guard cyber forces, and again in a State event, 

whether it be local or a State event, because the cyber threat is 

unique, and it is much different than a hurricane or a winter 

storm. In the hurricane season, you can see that hurricane coming 

days and days ahead of time, and you kind of know what is going 

to happen when the hurricane comes by, you know the effects of 

that, and then it is gone. Most communities, both local and State, 

are prepared for a hurricane, so they have some resources. 

When it comes to a cyber attack or a cyber incident, again, it is 

happening right now. You don’t see it. It is hard to describe. You 

may not know it has happened even after it has happened. Local 

and State for the most part does not have enough bandwidth to 

deal with a cyber incident, cyber crime. Again, being able to tap 

into that unique capability, again, is one of those things that as the 

State emergency manager, I want to use all resources at my disposal. 

So whether it is from Department of Transportation, I am looking for a plow, or it is from the National Guard, I am looking for 

a cyber expert on a particular threat, I think it is one of these, 

again, I will say emerging threat, but it has been with us for a 

while, but it is a growing threat that will only get worse. If we 

don’t figure out how to instantaneously deploy those guardsmen, 

again, in support of their home State, then I think we are going 

to fall short. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Sure. On those authorities in the National Defense Authorization Act, I am actually asking for some more clarification on those so that we are thinking these things through more 
71 

proactively and we will have some answers hopefully within the 

year. 

But, General McGuire, did you want to comment on anything? I 

know that you obviously are on the front lines. 

General MCGUIRE. Well, I would say that the legal authorities as 

they—so I am not very good at cyber, like I turn on the computer 

and things are working. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. You are like most Americans. 

General MCGUIRE. But I understand this part of it, that that is 

how all of our SCADA systems and critical infrastructure is managed right now. So the kinetic effect that it can have can be tremendous. 

So I in some ways say let’s just keep this simple. We have a National response framework. That National response framework, if 

you had listened to the previous panel, means that it is a National 

requirement. No, the National response framework is something 

that we all agree to Nationally that would be how we would respond, and it would start at the local level. 

So in any incident there is a point of impact. In this case it could 

be the banking industry or whatever it might be. Typically we find 

with these incidents that our partners in many of these areas are 

private industry or not Governmental agencies that run some of 

these critical infrastructure networks for us. 

So they have to have a motive to come to the table, and we have 

tried to make sure that we reach out to them and understand that 

we are there, especially in the National Guard, to be, as I mentioned, restorative—so that requires manpower—and defensive. We 

are not outward-looking trying to counterattack a nation-state, 

were that to be the responder. That clearly I think falls in the domain of U.S. Cyber Command. 

But the problem is we are having a hard time defining where 

that line lies, which is why I believe that the National Guard is 

the right force to be trained with the technical skills so that they 

are more capable than I am at cyber, and that they can deploy 

under legal authorities, either State Active-Duty or Title 32, not 

unlike Southwest Border, where we don’t run into these evidentiary collection issues that would be evident under Posse Comitatus. 

So that is kind of how I view the National Guard’s role in cyber, 

is that we are always going to be defensive and restorative and 

that we are the correct first choice for that for the same reason I 

made in my opening statement. We are the right first choice when 

local first responders are overwhelmed because we are there, we 

are knowledgeable, we have tactical understanding of even the 

local banks, and we have relationships there in each of those organizations. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Completely agree. As having had interaction with 

our 102nd Network Warfare Squadron, I think that the National 

Guard in some ways, in many ways, is an underappreciated resource in that we have people that are in the National Guard and 

that also in their private lives are day-to-day at work in these 

fields developing and using this expertise on a day-to-day basis. So 

we could make better use of that, I think, and appreciate it more. 
72 

General MCGUIRE. Yes, sir. The synergy gained between your 

commercial industry point of employment—let’s say you are a software writer for Microsoft and you are also a drill status guardsman—boy, while we train them at U.S. Cyber Command, many of 

the skills that they have learned at Microsoft are going to be just 

as valuable in these kind of responses, not unlike a plumber or a 

carpenter or a law enforcement officer or a contracting attorney 

when we have a big disaster. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Without a doubt. 

So, Madam Chair, thank you for the extra time. 

I would just mention that on the preparedness side of it, one of 

the things I am very proud of in what we are doing in Rhode Island, and Mr. Gaynor mentioned it, is developing the Cyber Disruption Team—this actually happened under the previous administration, under Governor Chafee—and the Rhode Island State Police 

taking the lead, along with the EMA, and working with the private 

sector went out and identified our elements of critical infrastructure that could be affected by a cyber-related event. 

Then they work to determine how they would both prepare 

against it from happening in the first place, but then also developing a recovery plan for resilience purposes as well. So it is a good 

model, and I know we are going to continue to learn a lot from it. 

So thank you, and I yield back. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Thank you. 

Okay. Last round for myself, I guess, for a couple more questions. 

Mr. Gianato, you have got vast experience in emergency response, and a lot of these procedures and things, as we have talked 

about in both panels, have been getting better over the years. In 

your current position, have you recently had to use the National 

Guard, or has the National Guard responded in either of their capacities? Specifically, last year’s chemical spill that was impacting 

30,000 residents. What is your perspective on the benefits of using 

the National Guard in this role? 

Mr. GIANATO. To answer your question on the chemical spill, the 

National Guard was actively involved and played a major role in 

the response to that. I think it coupled, to build upon what General 

McGuire was saying, we utilized the CST teams. One of those 

teams that was developed in each State is the primary resource for 

doing a lot of the base chemical analysis on the product that was 

in the river. That CST team then became the focal point of the collection of all the samples that were done throughout that entire 

water system. 

That was just one aspect. They also were instrumental in helping 

with the logistics. That was one of the largest water logistics missions that not only has West Virginia run, but that FEMA has run, 

when you had that many people without water for that duration 

of time. 

But another thing, and just a couple of points with the Guard 

and the cyber piece, that we had concerns with is the SCADA system that ran the water facility. So we had built the capability during the Boy Scout Jamboree and the intelligence unit of the Guard 

that did monitoring of social media. So we utilized that capability 

to pay attention to what was being said, where we were seeing 
73 

issues, and also to see if there was anybody out there that was 

planning to try to take advantage of the situation to do further 

harm. 

We were also concerned of making sure that the plant systems 

were functional. But then as we started to recover from this event, 

the water company used a GIS-based application to let people know 

when the water was safe. As they cleared different zones of the 

water system and turned the systems back on for public use, we 

had a concern that someone could hack into that system and 

change those, so you would have people in zones that weren’t safe 

drinking the water. So we used the Guard for that capability, to 

monitor that, and to work with the water company on monitoring 

their SCADA systems as well. 

The second point, we had a phishing attack on the State network 

in West Virginia, and it was what appeared to be a fairly benign 

attack but turned into a little bit more. But we used some of the 

capabilities that the Guard has developed to help us go in and look 

at the systems, identify that, collect some of the, again, the evidence that was used by the FBI to try to track this down. Then 

in the recovery phase, to actually come in, we had about 4,000 or 

so computers that were infected, and help our State technology office go in and literally clean those machines and get them back online. 

One of our concerns with that is building the depth of the pool 

of people that can maintain this capability going forward. We are 

very fortunate, several years ago the West Virginia Legislature 

passed a piece of legislation that provides college tuition if you join 

the National Guard. So they will pay for a 4-year college education 

if you join the Guard, or if you already have a college degree, they 

will pay for up to a master’s degree. So our Guard, working with 

some of the local colleges, is building a cyber capability or a cyber 

program with one of those colleges to help build that depth that 

they are going to need moving forward. 

So I think the Guard is an integral part of all of our emergency 

response. It is directly under the control of the Governor. It keeps 

that response local. But yet if that response still needs to be broadened out to other States, we are still maintaining that control by 

the Governor using the EMAC process. I don’t know what we 

would do in West Virginia without those capabilities. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Great. Thank you. Were there any interoperability 

issues in the response to the chemical spill as far as just basic communication? 

Mr. GIANATO. In West Virginia we have a State-wide trunked 

radio system that everybody shares, including the National Guard, 

so we were all on the same system. We purposely provided the 

Guard with those types of radios so that they can interact with us. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Great. Thank you. 

General McGuire, I have just a couple of wrap-up questions here. 

The first is related to the dual-status commanders. In Sandy, all 

the dual-status commanders were Guard and not Title 10, so a 

guardsman leader taking on responsibility of Title 10 is one model, 

right, so that they have got both of those, but the other model is 

you bring in an Active-Duty leader who is then responsible for Title 

10 and Title 32. 
74 

Based on your comments of Capstone and just our experiences of 

the Active-Duty and their understanding of these roles and responsibilities, are you aware of any Title 10 generals that have been 

trained for this role, and what are your thoughts and concerns 

about that? 

General MCGUIRE. So the statute—I don’t know if it is a statute 

or a DOD regulation instruction—says that the dual-status commander will be a guardsman by exception, so unless there is a reason not to. So an example that I gave was if the incident occurred 

on Davis-Monthan, the dual-status commander in that case would 

be a Title 10 officer. The reason for that legally was there is no 

way to revert a Title 10 officer and put him under Title 32 or State 

Active-Duty. Where I currently am serving as the Adjutant General, but I also hold a Major General authorization in the Air Force 

Reserve where I could be called to duty and go—— 

Ms. MCSALLY. Right. It is easier to go that way than the other 

way. 

General MCGUIRE. Right. So there is no revision clause. So by 

and large, all your dual-status commanders. I have been through 

that NORTHCOM course. We did have Title 10 deputies. The purpose of that is that that Title 10 deputy is to be the guy that really 

handles what I will call the block and the tackle. 

Should you have any kind of significant requirement for legal, 

Article 15, judicial action, any of that kind of stuff, that they all, 

ADCON, OPCON, TACON, during the time of that event through 

this dual-status commander, but you have a Title 32 and a Title 

10 deputy that are dealing with that. 

But we are synching effort, unity of effort, so mission assignments are going to the right places. We are not sending two engineering battalions to one location and an area where we need an 

engineering battalion is uncovered once the resources are exhausted. 

That said, I will go back to your comment about education and 

the training piece in the previous hearing. I think there is probably 

a need for at least some National discussion about the idea that 

maybe we have, require some of our senior officers to serve a Title 

10 duty, not in a command element, but as a 04, 05, 06, kind of 

like we do in the joint world, in the National Guard so that when 

they arrive to be the J–5 or the NORTHCOM commander or the 

NORTHCOM J–3, they are not shocked and surprised by these 

crazy adjutants general they have to deal with. 

That is how Goldwater-Nichols evolved in 1986, and I think some 

of these events like Katrina and Sandy have kind of led us to the 

idea that maybe—and that would come from you as a Federal 

body—to decide that maybe you want to modify statutory language 

that says something to that effect. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Great. Thanks. 

My last question is related to the mission you mentioned of using 

our guardsmen on the Southwest Border. First of all, just for the 

record, what is the current role that our guardsmen are serving on 

the Southern Border, and your perspectives of the best roles that 

they could and should be serving in related to the Southern Border? 
75 

Obviously steady-state in a perfect world, DHS has got a better 

strategy and is securing the Southern Border. We are often calling 

up the Guard sort of in an emergency, but we seem to have lots 

of emergencies. If we were just actually to fix the problem, then 

maybe we wouldn’t need to be continuing to call you all to duty. 

So what are the best roles, and is it the best use of our guardsmen to be serving in that capacity, both from a capabilities and talents, and then also resources? 

General MCGUIRE. Well, I don’t know that I can quantify if it is 

best use. So let me talk about the roles. 

In the supported and supporting, we are supporting in this case 

DHS is the lead Federal agent, not unlike we would support FEMA 

as the lead Federal agent in a response if we were providing forces. 

We have two separate missions that are going in Arizona, primarily focused geographically on the Southwest Border under different authorities. One is the Joint Counter Narcotics Task Force 

and very clearly-defined rules for use of force, as well as authorities 

under Title 32, Federally-resourced, Posse Comitatus. Those people 

are working with and support of the war on drugs, the counternarcotics piece. 

Separate and independent, we have a Southwest Border Task 

Force that was an outgrowth of the 2007 Operation Jump Start 

that continues today. Operation Guardian Eye is the name of that. 

Those roles are unique and distinct, so there is no commingling of 

your rules for use of force and the rest. 

In the former you have guardsmen uniquely designed to help 

with support of aviation, rotary wing assets, moving people around, 

moving Customs and Border Enforcement agents around, not really 

getting on the pointy end of doing the arresting, but helping with 

logistic support, movement, administration, all kind of things that 

they need. 

But ultimately I think that once DHS says that they are on their 

feet and ready to go, that is a mission that is very clearly the purview of the Department of Justice and the Department of Homeland Security. 

Separately, the Southwest Border mission, big issues there for us 

are issues like supporting engineering, supporting, again, all of the 

things with movement of, in this case, Customs and Border Patrol 

is the lead Federal agent, moving their forces around, helping them 

with the logistical piece. 

As you know, in Arizona we have nearly 400 miles of border. 

Only 35 miles of it is private land. The balance of it is Federal or 

State land. So we have a lot of public entities and equities, it is 

a lot of ground to cover in relatively unpaved terrain. So rotary 

wing assets is where we primarily focus in the logistical piece. Because we have large rotary wing assets in the Guard it is a great 

place to do that down in southern Arizona. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Thanks. Just one quick follow-up. Do you see is 

there any role for any ISR assets that are in the Air National 

Guard as they are doing their training missions for them to actually be communicating and just providing ad hoc support? 

General MCGUIRE. I would say our greatest strength would be to 

help Customs and Border Patrol put up more aircraft in the launch 

and recovery element that we just stood up down in Fort Huachuca 
76 

as the National Guard. We could gain great training benefit to our 

airmen, hand those aircraft off to trained and qualified enforcement agents so we don’t trespass the intel oversight rules on citizens inside this country and let law enforcement agents deal with 

that. 

But that would relieve a huge amount of stress on them because, 

truthfully, having been qualified as an MQ–1 guy, it is much easier 

to just drive in a straight line than take off and land. So we do all 

the take off and landings, and they go out and send out. So we 

could increase capacity significantly in that area. 

That mission though, that mission set where we talk about incident awareness, the IAA kind of thing, I think that is a good example of even in emergency response, your question earlier about the 

FAA, I think that that is going to be a huge force multiplier and 

a seam that needs to be explored as to where the statutory limitations are, because as we get ready for wildfire season, I would 

much prefer to have one of our crews, Guard or DHS, utilizing an 

overhead asset to prevent something like what happened on 

Yarnell Hill, where we could have greater situational awareness on 

changing weather patterns, where the fire is at, those types of 

things. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Great. Thanks. I look forward to following up. 

Maybe we can connect with CBP on the integration related to the 

ISR assets. I think that is a great increased capacity as well, so 

I look forward to following up with you on that. 

Okay. Well, thank you, everybody, for your time and your participation today. I really appreciate your valuable insights and experience. I thank the Members for their questions. 

The Members of the subcommittee may have some additional 

questions for the witnesses. We just ask that you respond to those 

in writing. Pursuant to Committee Rule VII(E), the hearing record 

will be held open for 10 days. 

The subcommittee stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:30 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 
(77) 

A P P E N D I X 

STATEMENT OF THE CALIFORNIA GOVERNOR’S OFFICE OF EMERGENCY SERVICES, 

NATIONAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION

CALIFORNIA’S STANDARDIZED EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (SEMS)

The breadth and magnitude of emergencies that face the State of California are 

unique in scope and resulted in the development of the Standardized Emergency 

Management System (SEMS). SEMS is a systematic approach that coordinates the 

resources of all Californian agencies and departments, from the local level up to 

larger jurisdictions, to prevent, protect against, respond to, recover from, and mitigate the effects of a disaster. SEMS has been tested, and proven to be effective in 

response to disasters, regardless of cause, size, complexity, or location and many of 

its tenets were included in the National Incident Management System (NIMS). 

SEMS and NIMS were designed to seamlessly integrate the capabilities of local, 

State, and Federal Government entities as well as non-Governmental and volunteer 

organizations, to provide a rapid and effective response to a disaster. It is imperative that any entity that provides resources in response to a disaster do so within 

the framework of SEMS/NIMS in order to ensure unity of effort, synchronization, 

and prioritization of resources. 

DEFENSE SUPPORT OF CIVIL AUTHORITIES IN CALIFORNIA

In addition to the California National Guard (CNG) under Title 32, Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) under Title 10 is utilized on a daily basis in coordination with the State, and has prescribed roles within the State’s regional catastrophic plans. The CNG is a key partner in Wildland Search and Rescue (SAR) and 

provides capabilities within SEMS that largely include aviation support when local 

assets are unavailable or not capable of supporting the mission. Within the State’s 

catastrophic plans and in coordination with the Unified Coordination Group (UCG), 

CNG provides assistance under the designation of dual-status command. 

The most widely-used CNG asset within Wildland SAR are the UH60 Blackhawk 

and CH47 Chinook airframes. Both of these platforms combine high-altitude performance, heavy-lift capacity and hoist capabilities that facilitate the insertion and 

extraction of SAR personnel and equipment into remote areas. Fires in California 

are expected to increase to an unprecedented number in 2015, due to the severity 

of California’s on-going drought. To meet the demands of this volatile scenario, the 

CNG provides essential support for fire missions, with a requirement to deploy and 

maintain over a dozen helicopters and be prepared to surge beyond that for a short 

duration. The National Guard also supports homeland security within the State by 

participating in regional and State-wide exercises supporting cybersecurity efforts 

and providing aviation support for local efforts to eradicate illicit drugs. 

The CNG and the Department of Defense (DOD) all play vital DSCA roles to support the State’s three catastrophic plans for Southern California, the Bay Area, and 

the Cascadia Subduction Zone. These plans identify the resources and capabilities 

needed during a catastrophic incident within one construct, and facilitate integration across all levels of government. In some of these scenarios, the shortfalls that 

cannot be filled using the mutual aid system will be forwarded to the UCG to be 

filled by Federal assets, which connects the State to DOD resources. In the catastrophic plans, CNG and DOD support under the dual-status commander, a CNG 

officer, includes supplying emergency water and sanitation needs for response operations, establishing and maintaining functional and interoperable communications 

for responders, implementing and directing acute care medical response in support 

of Operational Areas, and operating the DOD Mortuary Affairs Team. 
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DSCA AND DUAL-STATUS COMMAND (DSC)

The California National Guard and other Title 32 Guard forces available through 

the Emergency Management Assistance Compact are integral components of California’s disaster management capability set. To meet the challenges of catastrophic 

scenarios, the DOD has developed standing Joint Task Forces (JTFs) under U.S. 

Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) to roll up multiple capabilities under a single 

command structure to provide mutual aid support during emergencies. 

Historically, these JTFs have not effectively integrated into SEMS without being 

placed under the responsibility of the dual-status command (DSC), giving the Governor effective control over their activities. In its current state, DSCA doctrine and 

procedures lack connectivity to SEMS, resulting in disordered response trainings 

and exercises in California. 

The DOD’s overly broad interpretation of ‘‘Immediate Response’’ during emergency scenarios effectively circumvents, and at times, undermines the dual-status 

command structure. This runs counter to the principles of unified command and 

hinders resource allocation, protocols, and other vital elements of emergency response operations, as well as processes already established and agreed to in our catastrophic plans. In the absence of DSC control over T–10 assets deployed in operational support to a catastrophic scenario, SEMS’ effectiveness in prioritizing response across a wide area and multiple jurisdictions is jeopardized. 

LOOKING FORWARD: DSCA AND SEMS/NIMS

DSCA must integrate into SEMS/NIMS if it is to effectively contribute to catastrophic incidents in California. When DSCA’s policies contradict California law, or 

violate its civil authority framework, the integrity of SEMS is compromised. There 

must be greater DOD recognition of, and adherence to, SEMS prior to incidents, 

during trainings, exercises, and other preparatory activities to ensure that DOD’s 

‘‘Immediate Response’’ activities are consistent with SEMS. The California Governor’s Office of Emergency Services is committed to working with the DOD to ensure there is clarity on the tactical and legal guidelines that need to be factored into 

a response in California, and it is critical that these issues are addressed before 

California experiences its next large-scale catastrophe. 

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