Assessing Revolutionary and Insurgent Strategies

SPECIAL TOPICS IN IRREGULAR WARFARE: 

UNDERSTANDING RESISTANCE

United States Army Special Operations Command

Assessing Revolutionary and Insurgent Strategies

SPECIAL TOPICS IN IRREGULAR WARFARE: 

UNDERSTANDING RESISTANCE

 Erin N. Hahn, Editor

Katharine Raley Burnett, David J. Danelo, Eric Dunford, 

James A. Gavrilis, Erin N. Hahn, Jameel Khan, Jesse Kirkpatrick, 

W. Sam Lauber, Margaret McWeeney, Summer Newton, 

Guillermo Pinczuk, Theodore Plettner, Joseph M. Tonon, and 

Timothy Wittig, Contributing Authors

United States Army Special Operations Command

and

The Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory

National Security Analysis Department
This publication is a work of the United States Government in accordance with Title 17, United States Code, sections 101 and 105.

Published by:

The United States Army Special Operations Command

Fort Bragg, North Carolina

Reproduction in whole or in part is permitted for any purpose of 

the United States government. Nonmateriel research on special warfare is performed in support of the requirements stated by the United 

States Army Special Operations Command, Department of the Army. 

This research is accomplished at the Johns Hopkins University Applied 

Physics Laboratory by the National Security Analysis Department, a 

nongovernmental agency operating under the supervision of the USASOC

Sensitive Activities Division, Department of the Army.

The analysis and the opinions expressed within this document 

are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the positions of the US Army or the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics 

Laboratory.

Comments correcting errors of fact and opinion, filling or indicating gaps of information, and suggesting other changes that may be 

appropriate should be addressed to:

United States Army Special Operations Command

G-3X, Sensitive Activities Division

2929 Desert Storm Drive

Fort Bragg, NC 28310

All ARIS products are available from USASOC at www.soc.mil

under the ARIS link.
ASSESSING REVOLUTIONARY AND 

INSURGENT STRATEGIES

The Assessing Revolutionary and Insurgent Strategies (ARIS) series consists of a set of case studies and research conducted for the US Army Special 

Operations Command by the National Security Analysis Department of the 

Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory.

The purpose of the ARIS series is to produce a collection of academically rigorous yet operationally relevant research materials to develop and 

illustrate a common understanding of insurgency and revolution. This 

research, intended to form a bedrock body of knowledge for members of 

the Special Forces, will allow users to distill vast amounts of material from a 

wide array of campaigns and extract relevant lessons, thereby enabling the 

development of future doctrine, professional education, and training.

From its inception, ARIS has been focused on exploring historical and 

current revolutions and insurgencies for the purpose of identifying emerging trends in operational designs and patterns. ARIS encompasses research 

and studies on the general characteristics of revolutionary movements and 

insurgencies and examines unique adaptations by specific organizations or 

groups to overcome various environmental and contextual challenges.

The ARIS series follows in the tradition of research conducted by the 

Special Operations Research Office (SORO) of American University in the 

1950s and 1960s, by adding new research to that body of work and in several 

instances releasing updated editions of original SORO studies.

VOLUMES IN THE ARIS SERIES

Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare, Volume I: 1927–1962 (Rev. Ed.)

Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare, Volume II: 1962–2009

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Colombia (1964–2009)

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare: Cuba 1953–1959 (pub. 1963)

Case Study in Guerrilla War: Greece During World War II (pub. 1961)

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare: Guatemala 1944–1954 (pub. 1964)

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Palestine Series

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Sri Lanka (1976–2009)

Unconventional Warfare Case Study: The Relationship between Iran and Lebanese Hizbollah

Unconventional Warfare Case Study: The Rhodesian Insurgency and the Role of External 

Support: 1961–1979

Human Factors Considerations of Undergrounds in Insurgencies (2nd Ed.)

Irregular Warfare Annotated Bibliography

Legal Implications of the Status of Persons in Resistance

Narratives and Competing Messages

Special Topics in Irregular Warfare: Understanding Resistance

Threshold of Violence

Undergrounds in Insurgent, Revolutionary, and Resistance Warfare (2nd Ed.)

SORO STUDIES

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare: Vietnam 1941–1954 (pub. 1964)

v

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Preface .................................................................................................. vii

Exploring the Phases of Contemporary Resistance.............................1

The Public Component .......................................................................23

Interest, Identification, Indoctrination, and Mobilization: I3M ........55

Threshold of Violence..........................................................................71

Information Technology in Insurgency and 

Resistance Movements.........................................................87

Threat Finance.....................................................................................97

Effect of External Actor Resources on Local Economy................... 133

How Resistance Groups Generate Legitimacy ................................. 141

Transition from Resistance to Governance ...................................... 161

Internal Conflict and the Role of Outside Influence: How Foreign 

States Leverage Indigenous Resistance Movements to 

Achieve National Objectives.............................................. 179

Bibliography .......................................................................................223

Index ................................................................................................... 241
vi

ILLUSTRATION CREDITS

The authors acknowledge the sources of illustrations included in this study.

INTEREST, IDENTIFICATION, INDOCTRINATION, AND MOBILIZATION: I3

M. Figures 1 and 2 first published in Jesse Kirkpatrick and Mary Kate 

Schneider, “I3M–Interest, Identification, Indoctrination, and Mobilization: A Short 

Introduction to a New Model of Insurgent Involvement,” Special Warfare Magazine

26, no. 4 (October–December 2013): 23–27.

THRESHOLD OF VIOLENCE. Figures 2 and 3 first published in Guillermo 

Pinczuk, Mike Deane, and Jesse Kirkpatrick, Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Sri Lanka (1976–2009), ed. Guillermo Pinczuk (Fort Bragg, NC: US 

Special Operations Command, 2014).

THREAT FINANCE. Table 1 first published in Vulnerability Assessment Method: 

A Practitioner’s Handbook (Fort Meade, MD: United States Army Asymmetric Warfare Group, 2010).
vii

PREFACE

This Special Topics volume is an introduction to subjects related 

to the broad concept of resistance. Over the past six years, Assessing 

Revolutionary and Insurgent Strategies (ARIS) researchers have used 

the term resistance to cover a spectrum of actors who challenge existing 

social structures. Their research highlights the complex and dynamic 

characteristics of resistance and its associated concepts. The ARIS project has largely focused on resistance movements that emerge against a 

government or political actor, although the work acknowledges the very 

broad range of structures a resistance may confront (e.g., social norms 

and nongovernmental institutions or organizations). The research 

seeks to understand how and why a resistance develops and aims to 

identify emerging trends in operational designs and patterns relevant 

to special operations missions.

In pursuit of that goal, this volume covers topics that were identified as important to improving our understanding of fundamental 

issues associated with resistance movements. It provides an introduction to the relevant concepts, and in some cases, more in-depth studies 

will be undertaken. It covers wide-ranging topics, such as how a resistance organizes and develops (“Exploring the Phases of Contemporary 

Resistance” and “Interest, Identification, Indoctrination, and Mobilization: I3

M”) as well as discrete elements of a movement’s organizational 

structure and methods (“The Public Component” and “Threshold 

of Violence”). It also explores concepts relevant to a resistance movement’s ability to eventually govern (“How Resistance Groups Generate 

Legitimacy” and “Transition from Resistance to Governance”), among 

other subjects.

The ideas introduced in this volume should be seen as starting 

points for further analysis—a way of presenting special operations personnel and others with a set of concepts that are important to consider 

and grapple with so that they can gain a more complete assessment of 

resistance and its complexity. This, like the other ARIS products, is a 

learning tool that highlights just some of the elemental structures and 

attributes of resistance. After studying these topics, special operations 

personnel can apply their knowledge professionally.

EXPLORING THE PHASES OF 

CONTEMPORARY RESISTANCE

David J. Danelo

3

Political resistance, like war, is both timeless and ever-changing. 

Although twenty-first-century resistance organizations form and disperse by using increasingly varied methods and means, they do so along 

a continuum of phases that is similar to stages of warfare in past eras. 

These phases and stages are important for scholars to study—and for 

soldiers to understand—for two reasons. First, students need to achieve 

a more accurate understanding of what modern unconventional warfare (UW) and counterinsurgency (COIN) look like. Second, and more 

importantly, these studies equip soldiers (and their political leaders) 

with essential knowledge that will allow them to fight and win irregular 

conflicts by understanding how resistance movements move through 

each phase and the implications of each phase on operational planning.

Why is understanding the phases of contemporary resistance 

important? Understanding the sequential phases of organizational 

development in contemporary resistance, alongside the determinants 

and variables that compose each phase, enables Special Operations 

Forces planners to determine the course of action most likely to either 

enhance resistance or disrupt insurgent activity. Additionally, developing and understanding a phasing construct will assist in mission planning, ultimately leading to more effective adaptation and fluid decision 

cycles while operators are deployed. Although the phases of resistance 

are often fluid, each phase is distinct and requires appropriate planning and tools. Deeper analysis and study of the phasing of contemporary resistance movements will result in application of the equipment, 

gear, and tactics appropriate for the particular environment.

The purpose of this paper is to educate readers on the phases of 

contemporary resistance and propose a construct for more detailed 

research, study, and analysis. The method of study the authors followed 

when developing this document included deconstruction of existing 

literature, explanation of existing determinants and variables within 

current UW and insurgency phasing constructs, tabulated analysis 

of variables related to the phases, and recommendation for further 

study. After reading this paper, readers should have confidence in their 

understanding of existing literature and doctrine on resistance phasing; a thorough appreciation for the complexity of determinants and 

variables that influence changes in phases; and a detailed understanding of the additional research required to analyze the unknown variables and develop the proposed phasing construct.

DEFINING RESISTANCE

Separate definitions for resistance and insurgency exist within the 

Department of Defense and various academic communities. Generally 
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speaking, the term insurgency describes a movement designed to achieve 

political goals through armed conflict against an indigenous government or occupying power. Resistance suggests an insurgency focused 

on removing an occupying power. UW, according to US military doctrine, involves enabling, supporting, facilitating, or advising resistance 

movements to further US political objectives. COIN involves halting 

or reversing resistance movements. Doctrine describing both UW and 

COIN is relevant for understanding and analyzing the phases of contemporary resistance.

The phases of contemporary resistance also frame the narrative 

arc of resistance and insurgent groups. The use of narrative in resistance is not a new phenomenon, and during the American Revolution, 

colonial patriots slanted news in their favor, proselytized American 

national identity, and shaped their story to justify guerrilla tactics. Isaias Afewerki struggled for three decades to achieve Eritrean independence from Ethiopia, finally turning the last page in his own heroic 

struggle in 1991 when he became Eritrea’s first (and only) president. 

In a more recent example, the Sunni insurgency that has evolved into 

Islamic State envisions the final, absolute end of its struggle as a caliphate dominating the entire world.

UW doctrine also builds a narrative that includes seven phases of 

resistance that can be tailored to include only those phases required 

by the political and military situation on the ground. In contrast, Mao 

Zedong’s story about the phases of insurgency is normally framed as 

a three-act play—although, as we will see, this construct may limit the 

analysis and ultimately be inadequate for studying the phases of contemporary resistance. Seeing each phase of resistance as a discrete 

component—linked to but distinct from the other phases—enables 

Special Operations Forces to design strategies that will either enhance 

or interrupt the narrative and create an opportunity to write a different ending to the story.

DECONSTRUCTING THE LITERATURE ON PHASES

Mao

No conversation about doctrine on phases of contemporary resistance should start without a discussion of Mao Zedong, the Chinese 

Communist revolutionary whose twentieth-century theories of insurgent warfare helped him defeat his rivals and inspired parallel movements in North Korea, Cambodia, and Vietnam. Political science 

students commonly note Mao’s three phases of insurgency (and the 

Internet is replete with references to Mao’s three phases), and every US 
Phases of Contemporary Resistance

5

Army and Marine Corps publication on UW, resistance, insurgency, or 

COIN references this phasing construct.

Mao’s three phases can be summarized as follows:

1. Organization, consolidation, and preservation of base areas, 

usually in difficult and isolated terrain

2. Progressive expansion by terror and attacks on isolated 

enemy units to obtain arms, supplies, and political support

3. Decision, or destruction of the enemy in battle1

Field Manual 3-24: Mao Made Modern

Although scholars have challenged these three phases of insurgency, 

the basic construct has endured long enough to become enshrined in 

current military doctrine. Field Manual (FM) 3-24, Counterinsurgency,2

states the phases of insurgency as follows:

1. Latent and incipient

2. Guerrilla warfare

3. War of movement

In this way, current military doctrine—particularly with respect to 

countering insurgency—elevates Mao’s three phases to an almost sacrosanct status.

Before we set it aside, we should note that the three-phase construct 

has several benefits. It is simple. It is (or, at least it was) relatively accurate. It is easy to condense, classify, explain, and understand. And the 

simplicity of the three phases means they can be easily shaped into 

quotable congressional testimony and cable news sound bites.

Unfortunately, although the three-phase construct simplifies the 

flow of Mao’s narrative, it does not sufficiently explain how Mao operationalized his revolutionary insurgent campaigns. The three phases are 

quite broad and do not provide a level of detail that is operationally 

useful. This is the core challenge with any phasing construct: how can 

the theory be applied to force generation design? How do planners 

and operators identify which phase an insurgency is in and then create psychological and practical strategies to influence the insurgent 

campaign? These questions become more challenging to answer when 

looking at Mao’s theory through only the three-phase paradigm.

Mao Reconsidered

Mao himself actually had a more complex view of the phasing 

process. The following excerpt is from Fleet Marine Force Reference 
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Special Topics in Irregular Warfare

Publication 12-18, Mao Tse-tung on Guerrilla Warfare,3 a 1961 translation 

by US Marine Corps Brigadier General Samuel B. Griffith, who, two 

years later, completed what was then called the definitive translation of 

Sun Tzu’s The Art of War.4

Consider how Mao describes the campaign sequence in light of the 

three-phase construct:

This policy we pursue in order to gain our political 

goal, which is the complete emancipation of the Chinese people. There are certain fundamental steps necessary in the realization of this policy, to wit:

1. Arousing and organizing the people

2. Achieving internal unification politically

3. Establishing bases

4. Equipping forces

5. Recovering national strength

6. Destroying enemy’s national strength

7. Regaining lost territories

There is no reason to consider guerrilla warfare separately 

from national policy. (Emphasis added.)

If, as Mao states, guerrilla warfare should not be considered separately from national policy—and if the steps proposed to achieve success in contemporary resistance look anything like the ones outlined 

above—then accomplishing these objectives will require the use of 

measurable variables to make clear which steps have been completed. 

Mao’s examination of what determines advancement to the next phase 

was adequate for his purposes—particularly given China’s terrain, military resources, and substantial rural population. However, it is difficult 

to adapt in a contemporary construct because contemporary conflict 

often emerges in urban settings, features different methods to mobilize 

the resistance, and may be fought for different reasons (grievances). 

The differences in contemporary conflict do not mean Mao’s phasing is 

wholly inapplicable, but they do support the need to adapt the phasing 

construct to account for these differences.

Army Doctrine and Training Publication 3-05: UW and Mao

US Army Doctrine and Training Publication (ATP) 3-05, Unconventional Warfare,5

 also describes a seven-phase construct. Although developed as an operational rather than a strategic model, the ATP 3-05 

construct appears to mirror Mao’s model (the seven phases cited in 
Phases of Contemporary Resistance

7

Griffith’s translation, rather than the simplified three phases outlined 

in FM 3-24) more than any other source. For this reason, we will consider the seven-phase ATP 3-05 UW phase model below (with Mao’s 

corresponding phase noted parenthetically):

1. Preparation (arousing and organizing the people)

2. Initial contact (achieving internal unification politically)

3. Infiltration (establishing bases)

4. Organization (equipping forces)

5. Buildup (recovering national strength)

6. Employment (destroying enemy’s national strength)

7. Transition (regaining lost territories)

Unlike many of the doctrinal publications on COIN, which tend 

to reflect the bias of having been developed during the middle of a 

conflict, ATP 3-05’s UW approach stands out in the canon on resistance phases for three reasons. First, as mentioned, it parallel’s Mao’s 

seven phases. Second, it is easy to operationalize. Third, it is scalable in 

reverse: UW operators could use the model to understand (and interrupt) an adversary’s resistance movement just as easily as they could use 

the model to build capacity for resistance.

The singular challenge with the ATP UW phase model is its inability to enable identification of determinants and variables that correspond to each phase and to correlate those determinants with stages of 

organizational growth. Although straightforward and useful for operational planning, the ATP phase model still has weaknesses.

Galula: Mao Meets the Bourgeois-Nationalist “Shortcut”

David Galula’s theoretical classic, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory 

and Practice,6 offers another phasing construct. Galula wrote from the 

perspective of the French-Algerian War, and his work was as defined by 

that experience as Mao’s was by his own revolution. Galula’s proposed 

phasing construct is similar to Mao’s; however, he offers a “bourgeoisnationalist shortcut” through the guerrilla warfare pattern that entails 

waging successive terrorist campaigns. At once both respectful and 

dismissive, Galula describes Mao’s phasing construct as the “orthodox 

Communist” pattern and compares it to the “shortcut” construct that 

he saw at work in Algiers. Galula devotes almost a quarter of the book 

to an eight-step phasing construct for COIN operations, which was also 

drawn from the French campaign. Forms of this construct have often 

been operationalized in successive campaigns and are frequently referenced when creating new COIN doctrine (see FM 3-24).
8

Special Topics in Irregular Warfare

However, there are three problems with Galula’s approach. First, 

contemporary resistance cannot easily be classified as Algeria 2.0; the 

problem sets that operators and planners contend with can rarely be 

restructured into the eight-step campaign Galula proposes. In both Iraq 

and Afghanistan, US and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 

forces conducted four or five steps simultaneously, and the operational 

designs—and enemy counterattacks—rarely incorporated themselves 

into the Galula process. They were not carried out in a linear, methodical fashion as Galula believed the insurgent process should progress. 

Second, as with Mao, Galula is thin on determinants; his work tells 

operators what to do (e.g., “The Fifth Step: Local Elections” and “The 

Sixth Step: Testing the Local Leaders”) but does not describe the variables at work in reaching those steps. Third—and most often forgotten 

in the enthusiasm for Galula’s theoretical construct—history reminds 

us that the French did not succeed in defeating the Algerian insurgency. 

Galula’s work is important, and contributes well to the phasing analysis, 

but it should not be the final voice in developing the problem set.

Special Operations Research Office: The Determinants and 

Variables Solution

From Mao to FM 3-24 (which is essentially an updated version of 

Mao) to ATP 3-05 to Galula, we remain challenged with finding the 

determinants and variables that frame the phase paradigm. This brings 

us to a significant, and underappreciated, 1966 publication, Human 

Factors Considerations of Undergrounds in Insurgencies, from the Special 

Operations Research Office (SORO).7 The SORO publication proposes 

models of human behavior through multiple phases of resistance. The 

catalog of factors compiled in the SORO document, as well as the narrative model of five phases proposed early in the publication, offer a 

more detailed list of determinants and variables than was offered by 

either Mao or Galula, suggesting a bridge between ATP 3-05 and COIN 

doctrine. Although there may be better doctrinal prospects for defining the variables that drive insurgency phases, the thoroughness and 

clarity of the SORO publication are difficult to beat. For this reason, 

this paper assumes the SORO publication’s list of determinants and 

variables, which are outlined in its table of contents, as a point of departure for analysis. Although not comprehensive, this list offers a noteworthy possibility for framing a more detailed phasing study. Following 

is a condensed list, derived from the publication’s table of contents:

• Underground organization within insurgency

• Organization

• Motivation
Phases of Contemporary Resistance

9

• Ideology and group behavior

• Clandestine and covert behavior

• Recruitment

• Education and training

• Finance

• Propaganda and agitation

• Passive resistance

• Terrorism

• Subversive manipulation of crowds

• Planning of missions

• Operations

• COIN intelligence

• Defection programs

• Population control

• Civic action

As a starting point, this paper will take two initial steps when analyzing Mao’s phases of insurgency to help widen the aperture for study. 

First, instead of examining Mao’s phasing construct through the usual 

phases, the paper will use for analysis instead the seven steps as defined 

in the Griffith translation. Second, to establish a basis for comparison in Mao (and ATP 3-05, as well as any other proposed constructs), 

this paper will assume the SORO publication’s list of determinants and 

variables as a credible starting point. By deconstructing Mao (and, as a 

consequence, Galula) into more phases, we will gain a greater understanding of their nuances relative to the model in the SORO publication; examine the utility of the ATP 3-05 and FM 3-24 constructs 

relative to Mao; and develop a more credible sense of where the phasing paradigm is sufficient when compared with actual experience.

Validating any construct in follow-on studies will require analyzing 

only two case studies by using a proper methodology; of course, more 

case studies could be examined. For now, we can take what we know 

from observation and experience—both from history and from today’s 

headlines—to evaluate the utility of the current phases when measuring the determinants and variables (on one axis of the tables at the end 

of this paper) against the various phasing constructs (on the other axis 

of the tables). As with the components of the axes themselves, this serves 

as a point of departure for comparison, not a definitive conclusion.

The appended tables were developed by extrapolating the variables 

emphasized in the doctrine or from examples of warfare from the era 

during which the doctrine was developed. The tables do not provide 
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Special Topics in Irregular Warfare

answers; instead, they illustrate the prospective constructs. To validate 

the models—and to identify which is superior—the particular details 

in each table must be developed through proper case studies. Two 

things matter for our purposes: first, these tables should be accurate 

representations of how the existing phasing models work, and second, 

they should serve as a useful methodology for future case studies

Existing Phasing Constructs

Mao’s Guerrilla Warfare

Phases of Guerrilla Warfare: Mao Phasing Construct

Organization Political

Unication

Establishing

Bases

Equipping

Forces

Regaining Lost

Territories

Recovering

National

Strength

Destroying

EN National

Strength

EN, Enemy

The effective phasing constructs emerge more clearly by examining each phase and weighing the importance of each determinant 

and variable within that specific phase. Expanding Mao’s construct 

into seven phases enables a more specific awareness of which determinants have the greatest impact within each phase. This knowledge, 

in turn, enables operators to more accurately identify which phase an 

insurgency is in and to produce a more effective solution to counter or 

enhance the resistance.

ATP 3-05 UW

Phases of UW: ATP 3-05 Unconventional Warfare

Preparation Initial

Contact Inltration Organization Buildup Employment Transition

As mentioned, the ATP 3-05 phasing construct bears the greatest 

similarity to Mao’s, staying true to the model without risking oversimplification. Although the model was designed for employing UW, it could 

potentially be as effective in understanding how to interrupt resistance 

or insurgency movements, provided researchers could reach a better 

understanding of how the determinants and variables influenced each 

phase and how organizations changed through the phases.
Phases of Contemporary Resistance

11

Galula’s Bourgeois-Nationalist

Phases of Insurgency: Galula Bourgeois-Nationalist "Shortcut" Phasing Construct

Organization Selective

Terrorism

Establishing

Bases

Equipping

Forces

Recovering

National

Strength

Destroying

EN National

Strength

Regaining Lost

Territories

Blind

Terrorism

Replaces “Political Unication” in Mao Construct EN, Enemy

As noted before, the Galula model differs little from Mao’s model; 

the substantive difference is the substitution of blind terrorism and 

selective terrorism (Galula’s phases 2 and 3, respectively) for political 

unification (Mao’s phase 2). Although this construct may accurately 

model Galula’s perspective against Mao’s, more importantly, it gives 

planners and operators a greater likelihood of accurately identifying 

which phase an insurgency is in. Galula believed insurgency was carried out step by step in a systematic way. Phases 2 and 3 account for 

a more detailed assessment of an early insurgent phase, which could 

potentially provide operational planners with a more effective solution 

to influence the decision cycle of a resistance movement’s leadership.

FM 3-24 (Modern Mao)

Phasing and Timing: FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency

Latent and

Incipient

Guerrilla

Warfare

War of

Movement

Although the three phases of FM 3-24 may accurately represent 

Mao’s model—and may be easier to explain to the general public—

such a reduced construct limits the options planners and operators 

have for force generation. In this respect, simplicity—which is usually 

something doctrine strives to achieve—may have both positive and 

negative consequences. If the construct is too complex, it is merely theoretical and cannot be operationalized, but if it is too simple—as the 

FM 3-24 construct may be—it might not be useful or effective for force 

generation.

SORO’s Five Phases

Phases of Insurgency and Resistance: SORO Phasing Construct

Organization Covert

Activity Expansion Militarization Consolidation

So how, then, can we find the balance between complexity and simplicity? We noted that the SORO publication Human Factors provided a 

strong framework for determinants and variables; can it offer a better 
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Special Topics in Irregular Warfare

phasing construct than Mao, Galula, or ATP 3-05? Perhaps. An effective phasing construct for contemporary resistance exists in the SORO 

publication, both in the narration, and, later, through analyzing the 

relationship with the determinants and variables.

From the “Organization Synopsis” section in Human Factors Considerations of Undergrounds in Insurgencies:

To show how the organizational structure of undergrounds changes in protracted revolutions, it is useful to categorize phases in the evolution of conflict. 

The first phase is the clandestine organization phase 

in which the underground begins developing such 

administrative operations as recruiting, training cadres, infiltrating key government organizations and civil 

groups, establishing escape-and-evasion nets, soliciting 

funds, establishing safe areas, and developing external 

support. During this phase, cell size is kept small and 

the organization is highly compartmentalized.

The second phase is marked by a subversive and psychological offensive in which the underground employs 

a variety of techniques of subversion and psychological operations designed to add as many members as 

possible. Covert underground agents in mass organizations call for demonstrations and, with the aid 

of agitators, turn peaceful demonstrations into riots. 

Operational terror cells carry out selective threats and 

assassinations.

In the third or expansion phase the organization is 

further expanded and mass support and involvement 

are crystallized. Front organizations and auxiliary cells 

are created to accommodate and screen new members. During the militarization phase overt guerrilla 

forces are created. Guerrilla strategy usually follows a 

three-stage evolution. In the first stage, when guerrillas are considerably outnumbered by security forces, 

small guerrilla units concentrate on harassment tactics aimed at forcing the government to overextend its 

defense activity. The second stage begins when government forces are compelled to defend installations 

and territory with substantially larger forces. The third 

stage marks the beginning of the full guerrilla offensive of creating and extending “liberated areas.” [Note 

that this is the FM 3-24/Mao construct.]
Phases of Contemporary Resistance

13

During all of these stages the underground acts as 

the supply arm of the guerrillas, in addition to carrying out propaganda, terrorist, sabotage, and other 

subversive activities. Crude factories are set up by the 

underground and raids are conducted to obtain supplies and weapons. Caches are maintained throughout 

the country and a transportation system is established. 

Finances are collected on a national and international 

basis. Clandestine radio broadcasts, newspapers, and 

pamphlets carry on the psychological offensive. The 

underground continues to improve its intelligence and 

escape-and-evasion nets.

In the fifth phase, the consolidation phase, the underground creates shadow governments. Schools, courts, 

and other institutions are established to influence 

men’s minds and control their actions, and covert surveillance systems are improved to insure positive control over the populace.8

The five-phase paradigm set forth in the SORO publication offers two 

things. First, it achieves the balance between simplicity and complexity that covers the span of contemporary resistance. Second, and more 

importantly for practical purposes, this construct enables the operational planning necessary to either enhance or interrupt the growth of 

a resistance movement at a specific phase.

STAGES OF ORGANIZATIONAL GROWTH: 

THE MISSING LINK

After concluding that the SORO publication provides the most 

viable template with regard to both determinants/variables and phase 

design, the next step in evaluation is to consider whether the model 

is complete. The organizational diversity of contemporary resistance 

movements—from individual actors in “leaderless” radical anarchist 

movements (such as the Occupy Wall Street movement) to strategically organized religious extremist cadres (Islamic State) and criminalterrorist elements (FARC, Sinaloa Cartel, Boko Haram)—illustrates 

the complexity of contemporary resistance/insurgent organizations, 

suggesting the importance between phases of contemporary resistance 

and the variable stages of organizational growth. No phasing model 

studied—including the model developed by SORO—adequately covers 

this variable.
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Special Topics in Irregular Warfare

Given this void, it remains unclear which phasing construct is 

most appropriate for contemporary resistance. To more fully explore 

which construct best addresses the phases of contemporary resistance, follow-on work must utilize a case-study method to define the 

stages of organizational growth, analyze how they relate to phases of 

contemporary resistance as determinants/variables, and compare the 

advantages and disadvantages of two possible phasing models. Accomplishing this goal requires thorough and detailed study of the stages 

of organizational growth through case-study modeling that considers 

existing determinants and variables as they relate to the two proposed 

phasing constructs.

Proposed Construct A: ATP 3-05 + Organizational Growth

Phases of Contemporary Resistance: JHU/APL-Proposed Phasing Construct A (ATP 3-05 Starting Point)

+ Organizational Growth

Preparation Initial

Contact Inltration Organization Buildup Employment Transition

In the current doctrine covering contemporary resistance phases, 

only ATP 3-05, which appears to be an expansion of Mao’s seven phases, 

presents a model that is operational enough for further evaluation. 

FM  3-24’s three phases and Galula’s COIN theory and practice are, 

respectively, too simplistic and too COIN-centric. Only the ATP 3-05 

model offers a template from existing doctrine that could be scaled to 

either support or deter resistance movements.

Proposed Construct B: SORO + Organizational Growth

Phases of Contemporary Resistance: JHU/APL-Proposed Phasing Construct B (SORO Starting Point)

Organization Covert

Activity Expansion Militarization Consolidation

+ Organizational Growth

As the most viable alternative to the constructs in current doctrine, 

SORO provides the second of the two proposed constructs for phases of 

contemporary resistance. As with the first, investigation of this phasing 

construct should include research questions pertaining to the addition 

of the stages of organizational growth as a determinant and variable, 

along with an evaluation of the impact of the stage of organizational 

growth on the model’s five phases.
Phases of Contemporary Resistance

15

As with the construct put forth in ATP 3-05, it is important to test 

this five-phase construct against at least two case studies. By adding 

the stages of organizational growth as a determinant and variable, 

researchers can access the utility of the construct to provide planners 

with operational solutions. This assessment will give researchers a sense 

of the proposed SORO construct’s utility versus that of the UW model.

CONCLUSION: PHASES OF RESISTANCE 

AND FURTHER STUDY

This paper has accomplished three significant steps in developing 

and validating a construct for the phases of contemporary resistance. 

First, by reviewing the literature and analyzing existing constructs for 

the phases of resistance movements, we have deepened our understanding of how current doctrine developed and of other options for 

phasing. Second, by framing a list of determinants and variables as the 

primary point of comparison for operationalizing the phases, we have 

developed a valid testing model for assessing the utility of the phasing construct. Third, we have identified a determinant and variable—

stages of organizational growth—that the existing phasing constructs 

do not consider sufficiently and that require further study.

For additional research, the following next steps merit consideration:

• Confirmation and concurrence with the validity of the existing A 

and B phase model comparisons

• Identification of contemporary resistance case studies for 

modeling. In addition to being contemporary, ideally the case 

studies should account for both existing technology (Internet 

recruiting, financing through PayPal, psychological operations 

through Twitter, etc.) and the modern security environment (i.e., 

after 9/11).

• Careful selection of case studies that are comprehensive enough 

to cover as many of the prospective phases as possible for both 

UW and COIN

• Design and validation of the data collection methodology for the 

case studies

• Definition of a means for measuring the operational utility of 

phasing construct A versus phasing construct B

• Examination of case study data and recommendation of either 

construct A or construct B as the most effective phasing construct 

for understanding contemporary resistance movements
16

Special Topics in Irregular Warfare

APPENDIX. TABULATED ANALYSIS OF THE VALUES 

OF VARIABLES RELATED TO INSURGENCY PHASES Phases of Guerrilla Warfare: Mao Phasing Construct Determinants and Variables 1. Organization 2. Political Unifi cation 3. Establishing Bases 4. Equipping Forces 5. Recovering National Strength 6. Destroying EN National Strength 7. Regaining Lost Territories Grievance level High High High High High High High Capacity for violence Low Low Moderate High High High High Logistics capacity Low Low Moderate High High High High Importance of PsyOps High High High Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate Passive resistance Moderate High Moderate Low Low Low Low Use of terrorism Low Moderate High High High High High Group behavior Moderately important Very important Very important Very important Very important Very important Very important Individual behavior Very important Very important Low importance Low importance Low importance Low importance Low importance Clandestine behavior Very important Very important Very important Moderately important Moderately important Moderately important Moderately important Recruitment Very important Very important Very important Very important Moderately important Moderately important Moderately important Education and training Political ideology Political ideology Military logistics Military logistics Military operations Military operations Military operations Finance Very important Very important Very important Very important Moderately important Moderately important Moderately important Operational orientation Politically oriented Military oriented Military oriented Military oriented Politico-military oriented Politico-military oriented Terrain oriented Crowd manipulation Not important Very important Moderately important Low importance Very important Very important Very important Leadership importance Very important Very important Very important Very important Very important Very important Very important
Phases of Contemporary Resistance

17

Phases of UW: ATP 3-05 Unconventional WarfareDeterminants and Variables 

1. Preparation 2. Initial Contact 3. Infi ltration 4. Organization 5. Buildup 6. Employment 7. Transition

Grievance Level High High High High High High Moderate

Capacity for 

violence Low Low Moderate Moderate High High High

Logistics capacity Low Low Low Moderate Moderate High High

Importance of 

PsyOps High High High High High Moderate ModeratePassive Resistance High High Moderate Moderate Low Low Low

Use of Terrorism Low Low Low Low Low Moderate Low

Group Behavior Low importance Moderately important Very important Very important Very important Very important Very importantIndividual Behavior Very important Very important Low importance Low importance Low importance Low importance Low importanceClandestine Behavior Very important Very important Very important Moderately important Moderately important Moderately important Moderately importantRecruitment Very important Very important Very important Very important Moderately important Moderately important Moderately important

Education and 

Training None None Military tactics Military organization Military logistics Military operations Civil governanceFinance Very important Very important Very important Very important Moderately important Moderately important Moderately importantOperational Orientation Politically oriented Politically oriented Politico-military oriented Military oriented Military oriented Military oriented Politico-military orientedCrowd manipulation Not important Not important Not important Not important Moderately important Very important Very importantLeadership importance Very important Very important Very important Very important Very important Very important Very important
18

Special Topics in Irregular Warfare Phases of Insurgency: Galula Bourgeois-Nationalist “Shortcut” Phasing Construct Determinants and Variables 1. Organization 2. Blind Terrorism* 3. Selective Terrorism* 4. Establishing Bases 5. Equipping Forces 6. Recovering National Strength 7. Destroying EN National Strength 8. Regaining Lost Territories Grievance level High High High High High High High High Capacity for violence Low High High High High High High High Logistics capacity Low Low Low Moderate High High High High Importance of PsyOps High High High High Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate Passive resistance Moderate High High Moderate Low Low Low Low Use of terrorism Low High High High High High High High

Group behavior Moderately 

important

Not important Moderately 

important

Very important Very important Very important Very important Very important

Individual behavior

Very important Very important Moderately 

important

Low importance Low importance Low importance Low importance Low importance

Clandestine behavior

Very important Very important Very important Very important Moderately 

important

Moderately important

Moderately important

Moderately important

Recruitment Very important Very important Very important Very important Very important Moderately 

important

Moderately important

Moderately important

Education and training

Political ideology

Terror tactics Terror tactics Military 

logistics

Military logistics

Military operations

Military operations

Military operations

Finance Very important Moderately 

important

Moderately important

Very important Very important Moderately 

important

Moderately important

Moderately important

Operational orientation

Politically oriented

Population oriented

Population oriented

Military oriented Military oriented Politico-military 

oriented

Politico-military oriented

Terrain oriented

Crowd 

manipulation

Not important Very important Very important Moderately 

important

Low importance Very important Very important Very important

Leadership importance

Very important Not important Not important Moderately 

important

Very important Very important Very important Very important

* Replaces “Political Unifi cation” in Mao construct.
Phases of Contemporary Resistance

19

Phasing and Timing: FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency

Determinants and 

Variables 

Latent and Incipient Guerrilla Warfare War of Movement

Grievance level High High High

Capacity for violence Moderate High High

Logistics capacity Low High High

Importance of PsyOps High High Moderate

Passive resistance Moderate Low Low

Use of terrorism Moderate High High

Group behavior Moderately important Very important Very important

Individual behavior Very important Low importance Low importance

Clandestine behavior Very important Moderately important Moderately important

Recruitment Very important Very important Moderately important

Education and training Political ideology Military logistics Military operations

Finance Very important Very important Moderately important

Operational orientation Politico-military oriented Military oriented Politico-military oriented

Crowd manipulation Not important Low importance Very important

Leadership importance Very important Very important Very important
20

Special Topics in Irregular Warfare Phases of Insurgency and Resistance: SORO Phasing Construct Determinants and Variables 1. Organization 2. Covert Activity 3. Expansion 4. Militarization 5. Consolidation Grievance level Moderate Moderate High High High Capacity for violence No Possible High Yes Yes Logistics capacity None Low Moderate High High Importance of PsyOps High High High Moderate Moderate Passive resistance Moderate High Moderate Low Low

Use of terrorism None Selective terror High High Moderate

Group behavior Not important Focus on group agitation Very important Very important Very importantIndividual behavior Very important Very important Low importance Low importance Low importanceClandestine behavior Very important Very important Very important Very important Moderately importantRecruitment Very important Very important Very important Moderately important Moderately importantEducation and training Ideology and tactics Military tactics Military logistics Military operations Governance implementationFinance Very important Very important Very important Very important Very importantOperational orientation Covert activity 

oriented

Movement expansion Military oriented Military oriented Politico-military oriented

Crowd manipulation Not important Very important Moderately important Very important Very importantLeadership importance Not important Moderately important Very important Very important Very important
Phases of Contemporary Resistance

21

Phases of Contemporary Resistance: JHU/APL-Proposed Phasing Construct B (SORO Starting Point)Determinants and Variables 

1. Organization Origin 2. Covert Activity 3. Expansion 4. Militarization 5. Consolidation

+ Organizational Growth ? ? ? ? ?

Grievance Level Moderate Moderate High High High

Capacity for violence No Possible High Yes Yes

Logistics capacity None Low Moderate High High

Importance of PsyOps High High High Moderate Moderate

Passive Resistance Moderate High Moderate Low Low

Use of Terrorism None Selective terror High High Moderate

Group Behavior Not important Focus on group agitation Very important Very important Very importantIndividual Behavior Very important Very important Low importance Low importance Low importanceClandestine Behavior Very important Very important Very important Very important Moderately importantRecruitment Very important Very important Very important Moderately important Moderately important

Education and Training Ideology and tactics Military tactics Military logistics Military operations Governance implementation

Finance Very important Very important Very important Very important Very importantOperational Orientation Covert activity oriented Movement expansion Military oriented Military oriented Politico-military orientedCrowd manipulation Not important Very important Moderately important Very important Very importantLeadership importance Not important Moderately important Very important Very important Very important
22

Special Topics in Irregular Warfare

Phases of Contemporary Resistance: JHU/APL-Proposed Phasing Construct A (FM 3-24 Starting Point)

Determinants and 

Variables 

Latent and Incipient Guerrilla Warfare War of Movement

+ Organizational Growth ? ? ?

Grievance Level High High High

Capacity for violence Moderate High High

Logistics capacity Low High High

Importance of PsyOps High High Moderate

Passive Resistance Moderate Low Low

Use of Terrorism Moderate High High

Group Behavior Moderately important Very important Very important

Individual Behavior Very important Low importance Low importance

Clandestine Behavior Very important Moderately important Moderately important

Recruitment Very important Very important Moderately important

Education and Training Political ideology Military logistics Military operations

Finance Very important Very important Moderately important

Operational Orientation Politico-military oriented Military oriented Politico-military oriented

Crowd manipulation Not important Low importance Very important

Leadership importance Very important Very important Very important

NOTES

1 Mao Zedong, On Guerrilla Warfare (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2000).

2 Field Manual 3-24 (FM 3-24), Counterinsurgency (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2006).

3 Fleet Marine Force Reference Publication 12-18, Mao Tse-tung on Guerrilla Warfare, transl. 

Samuel B. Griffith (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Navy, 1989), 43.

4 Sun Tzu, The Art of War.

5 US Army Doctrine and Training Publication (ATP) 3-05, Unconventional Warfare (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army).

6 David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006).

7 Andrew R. Molnar, Human Factors Considerations of Undergrounds in Insurgencies (Washington, DC: Special Operations Research Office, American University, 1966).

8 Ibid., 2–3.
THE PUBLIC COMPONENT

Summer Newton and Eric Dunford

25

INTRODUCTION

For most insurgent groups, armed violence makes up only a small 

portion of its activities. Those individuals that do take up arms within 

a conflict zone are likewise few, about an estimated 5  percent.1 The 

remaining civilians either avoid involvement in the conflict entirely 

or participate in nonviolent supporting roles. Within insurgent campaigns, violence is only part of the story, but it is the one most often 

told. Current US Army doctrine, as depicted in previous Assessing Revolutionary and Insurgent Strategies (ARIS) writings, models insurgent 

organizations based on three primary components: the armed component, the underground component, and the auxiliary component.2

Each of these serves a different strategic purpose thought to be critical to the overall success of an armed campaign. The armed component constitutes the visible elements of a resistance movement actively 

and strategically employing violence through an armed paramilitary 

force. Armed components typically use a mixture of guerrilla and conventional tactics and primarily concern themselves with the palpable 

use of violence to achieve their goals. By contrast, the underground 

component denotes the group’s operations that are invisible, or clandestine, such as coercion, strategic manipulation of target populations, 

spying, and the covert dissemination of propaganda. Finally, the auxiliary component captures the population of noncombatant supporters 

who do not openly indicate their involvement in or sympathy for the 

movement but who nonetheless assist the day-to-day operations of the 

organization. Civilians might act as couriers, provide safe houses, or 

store weapons for insurgents, all of which are important to the success 

of the campaign despite being contributions nonviolent in nature.

These three components, which together form the heuristic model 

the US Army uses to conceptualize insurgent groups, first emerged 

after World War II. Since that time, however, examinations of insurgent 

campaigns have begun to highlight a range of additional nonviolent 

strategies and tactics insurgents use to achieve their goals. The provision of public goods to civilian populations by the Liberation Tigers 

of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and Hizbollah and the use of political parties 

to pursue a political agenda through existing state institutions by the 

Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) and Hamas speak to possible strategic approaches that fall outside the existing framework of 

irregular warfare.

Today’s insurgencies are more likely to include a public sphere in 

addition to the armed, underground, and auxiliary components outlined above. The public component refers to the strategic processes 

that insurgent organizations use to win over, activate, and interact with 
26

Special Topics in Irregular Warfare

civilian populations. It is the component of armed insurgencies that 

is public in nature—that captures an insurgency’s capacity to simultaneously engage in violent and nonviolent opposition.3

 Unlike the 

other components outlined above, the public component offers a strategic approach that is not necessarily violent, coercive, or subversive 

in nature, but rather one that uses familiar, “state-like” processes and 

mechanisms to create normalized channels through which governments and civilians alike can interact with an insurgency organization.

It is important to note that these components serve as analytic tools 

by which to classify and examine the various processes used by modern 

insurgency groups. The components seek to reduce a complex system 

into conceptual heuristics in an effort to provide researchers greater 

analytic leverage when assessing why rebel groups do what they do. 

That said, how groups use the various components is often more fluid 

and natural in real life than this definitional framework implies. Thus, 

the boundary where one component ends and another begins is not 

always easy to discern on the ground. This paper sets out to make that 

distinction more palpable by articulating why insurgent groups opt to 

develop a public component, the strategic benefits of doing so, and the 

underlying implications and insights that the existence of a public component offers policy makers and researchers alike. In this regard, the 

paper seeks not to usurp prevailing ARIS doctrine but rather to update 

it in order to provide a conceptual framework that more appropriately 

maps onto the empirical situation observed on the ground.

“OLD WARS” VERSUS THE NEW REALITY 

OF IRREGULAR WARFARE

Since the end of the Cold War, the nature of warfare has changed 

significantly. Whereas interstate conflict (i.e., a conflict between two 

or more states) used to be the norm, intrastate conflict (i.e., a conflict 

occurring within a state’s borders, such as a civil war) now dominates. 

As one researcher notes, of the thirty-seven conflicts occurring worldwide in 2011 alone, only one was an interstate conflict.4

 In addition to 

this change, how conflicts are resolved has also undergone a dramatic 

shift. Since the 1990s, more and more conflicts conclude not through 

military victory but through negotiated settlements, usually resulting 

in power-sharing agreements that leave both sides militarily intact.5 As 

a result, conflicts that end through negotiation tend to be highly unstable. Because of an inability to credibly punish defectors and enforce 

agreements when both sides are still armed, committing to a negotiated 

settlement can be problematic, especially as tensions rise. This inability 

to credibly commit to a negotiated settlement makes conflicts that end 
The Public Component

27

in this manner twice as likely to revert back to violence as ones that 

were resolved through military victory.6 However, the number of intrastate conflicts that are successfully resolved has greatly increased in the 

post–Cold War era thanks in large part to the prevalence of negotiated 

settlements as a viable form of conflict resolution. From 1990 to 2005, a 

total of 145 intrastate conflicts were successfully resolved, whereas from 

1946 to 1990, only a total of 141 conflicts ended.7

This shift in the nature of intrastate warfare is widely attributed to 

some of the larger changes that took place in the international system 

in the post–Cold War era. After the Cold War’s end, the money and 

resources that came from both the USSR and the United States to fund 

insurgency operations abroad stopped. The ideological motor that had 

been the driving force behind many civil wars quickly dwindled, and 

with the cessation of external support, many insurgency movements 

found themselves starved both of meaning and of the means to win. In 

concert with this, the end of a purely bipolar arrangement within the 

international system created new openings for concerned governments, 

nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and international organizations to enter the international scene and promoted conflict resolution 

and peacekeeping operations within ongoing conflict zones.8 All these 

factors had a dramatic impact on the nature of irregular warfare in 

how it was both fought and resolved.

This distinction between the “old wars” of the Cold War era that 

were ideologically and geopolitically driven, conventionally fought 

(i.e., violence was directed toward militaries and other armed actors), 

and state funded has given away to a new form of warfare. As Mary 

Kaldor notes, these “new wars” are ethnically, religiously, or regionally 

motivated and financed either through predatory tactics (i.e., looting); 

taxing humanitarian groups; or external support through either a 

“government in exile,” diaspora, or some other form of external actor.9

Kaldor contends that the methods witnessed within these new wars differ from their older counterparts. Traditionally, conventional battles 

were waged with an eye toward capturing and holding land. Victories 

were decisive in nature and were directed toward an armed opposition 

that met on some form of front. However, within the modern context, 

we see armed groups strategically using civilian populations to gain 

territory and grow. Modern insurgencies exploit holes in the state’s 

infrastructure and power. Thus, within weaker countries where state 

power is more difficult to project, especially in rural areas, insurgency 

groups use a cocktail of violence, public goods, and coercion that is 

specifically directed at the civilian population in order to capture and 

hold territory.
28

Special Topics in Irregular Warfare

The advantages of territorial control for an insurgency organization 

abound. Groups that are able to hold and control territory possess a 

greater capacity to coordinate and plan more sophisticated attacks (by 

having bases) and to expand both militarily (through greater resource 

extraction) and in size (through recruitment). In contrast, groups that 

fail to capture or keep territory must operate clandestinely, which often 

limits the types of tactics they can use (e.g., small explosions, terror tactics, and assassinations) while simultaneously undermining their ability 

to grow as an organization.10 In an environment where absolute victory 

is rare, gaining military and strategic advantages that can offer a rebel 

organization greater bargaining power during negotiations is often 

how groups gain and solidify their power in the long term. Capturing 

territory is one way for a rebel group to display organizational power 

that directly feeds into the type of concessions the group can demand 

once peace talks commence.

Holding territory, however, is often complicated by the civilian population already living there. To effectively take over and hold onto a 

stretch of land, contemporary rebel groups are finding that they must 

engage in some form of governance with civilian populations. The need 

to govern is not solely a function of maintaining territory, and at times 

rebel groups also seek to win over civilian populations through the provision of public goods and services. This process of winning the hearts 

and minds of a specific population can offer strategic advantages that 

can also translate into greater leverage at the bargaining table.

In this regard, it is useful to think of rebel organizations and incumbent governments as competing over two types of territory: one that is 

geographical in nature (such as land, waterways, resources, etc.) and 

another that is perceptual in nature (such as the approval and support 

of a population). The conquering of either “space” can directly feed 

into a group’s military strength, increasing its ability to seek greater 

concessions. For example, groups that enjoy public support are less 

likely to be politically marginalized, are more able to recruit new members, possess a more robust auxiliary component, and often need to 

expend fewer resources to govern. However, making the perceptual territory that a group controls known and easy to recognize is notoriously 

difficult to do, partly because of the fog of war, fears of retaliation or 

abuse on civilian populations that vocalize such support, and the inherent complications of polling the population to get a reliable and credible measure of support. In this regard, the public component offers a 

means by which insurgency groups can “publish” civilian support for 

the organization through the share of votes the group’s political party 

receives. Thus, in many ways, the formation of the public component 
The Public Component

29

by insurgency organizations is largely a function of this need to hold 

geographical and perceptual territory.

When assessing how groups use the public component, it is important to stress that not all groups have the same end goals in mind. 

Some organizations, such as the Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda, 

are largely predatory in nature. This organization does not seek to gain 

and hold geographic or perceptual territory; rather, they it is nomadic, 

largely seeking to extract resources and wealth with little regard for 

the local population. The group pursues economic predation (i.e., 

short-term wealth) rather than an eventual spot at the bargaining table 

(which could be thought of as the pursuit of more long-term gains). In 

contrast to this, groups such as Hizbollah in Lebanon expend great 

amounts of energy and resources on developing robust public components with the goal of governance in mind. Thus, it is useful to think of 

all insurgency groups as falling along a spectrum with respect to how 

they choose to treat and use civilian populations to achieve their goals. 

In this regard, the formation and use of a public component varies 

markedly depending on where groups fall along this spectrum.

PUBLIC COMPONENT AS A “PUBLIC INTERFACE”

The use of the public component by insurgent organizations implies 

a strategic approach that seeks to engage civil society through socially 

recognized, nonviolent channels. These are methods of access that 

incumbent governments and existing civilian populations immediately 

recognize and understand, such as free social services or political parties. Before coalescing into a fully operational insurgent organization, 

Hamas’s founder, Seikh Ahmed Yassim, concentrated his fundamentalist ideology and efforts into educational programs, charities, social aid, 

and other humanitarian activities. Acknowledging the limited public 

support for Hamas’s extreme Islamic take on the formation of a Palestinian state, Yassim sought to use the provision of public goods to 

impoverished Palestinians as a vehicle for gradual indoctrination. In 

this manner, he was able to pave the way for Hamas’s more militant and 

violent ambitions.11

The use of social services and other public institutions to gain support is strategic in nature. Whether it be to activate, win over, or placate 

civilian populations, the underlying strategic implication is the same: 

how civilians perceive a rebel organization matters. An organization’s 

ability to channel public support can yield positive wartime advantages. 

Thus, as Yassim’s efforts illustrate, to build support, insurgent groups 

must create channels that allow for daily interaction with civilian 
30

Special Topics in Irregular Warfare

populations in order to normalize the insurgent group’s presence and 

to socialize the population to its political goals and ambitions.

With that in mind, the public component should be thought of 

as a public “interface,” or put differently, the means by which illicit, 

covert organizations interact with their constituencies and incumbent 

governments (and vice versa). Much like an interface to a computer 

program, the public component offers a system of access that allows for 

quotidian interaction with a complex and often misunderstood organization. Given the fractured nature of irregular warfare, the ability 

to distinguish one organization from another is often more difficult 

than it may appear to the outside observer. In Syria, the number of 

groups fighting for power and control has grown rapidly since the conflict’s start in 2011. In a bid for relevance among the many groups, some 

opposition forces have sought to engender support from civilians by 

offering basic services, such as electricity, water, and stable prices for 

basic commodities.12

How rebel organizations choose to interact with noncombatant 

populations varies markedly. In Nigeria, Boko Haram’s campaign of 

kidnapping and violence among civilians has created an atmosphere 

of fear around the organization. However, its use of violence and coercion alone has begun to undermine, rather than reinforce, its efforts 

to create an Islamic state in Nigeria. As one Nigerian noted after the 

kidnapping of two hundred girls from a boarding school in northeastern Nigeria, “This thing backfired. You can see the condemnation is 

both Muslim and Christian; everybody is condemning this. Everybody 

is turning against the insurgents.”13 The indiscriminate use of violence 

has slowly begun to isolate Boko Haram among Nigerians. In contrast 

to this, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka used 

a mixture of coercion and social services to gain public support among 

the Tamil population it sought to represent. Using existing NGOs 

within its northern held territory, the LTTE redirected aid and provision efforts to appear as if they were coming from the rebels. In this 

manner, LTTE was able to manufacture a level of public dependence 

for services, which, in extension, translated into support for the organization itself.14

The creation of a public interface yields a number of strategic benefits that can help an insurgent organization further its goals outside 

the traditional scope of the armed component. As noted above, an 

accessible interface offers insurgents a method by which to distinguish 

themselves within a chaotic war environment. In addition, by providing goods and services to civilian populations or by representing them 

through a political party, rebel groups are able to garner greater levels 

of public support, which can then translate into a greater bargaining 
The Public Component

31

ability with an incumbent government in order to solidify any gains 

that the group has made during the conflict. As the Boko Haram 

example elucidates, public contempt and scorn can politically isolate 

rebels, making them more vulnerable to counterinsurgency efforts. A 

widely hated insurgent group is easier to destroy because the civilian 

population is less willing to cooperate with it.

Thus, the creation and maintenance of a public interface can be 

a vital strategic feature in waging an effective insurgency campaign. 

Doing so allows for everyday interactions with constituent populations, 

which can help the organization (1) gain public support, (2) gauge that 

support either through the share of votes the group’s political party 

receives or through daily observation, (3) vet and indoctrinate potential recruits, and (4) gradually push a group’s ideology and vision.

In addition, the use of a public component within irregular warfare 

creates an environment where negotiations and resolutions become 

possible. Since 9/11, governments have adopted a policy of zero tolerance toward terrorist groups. The act of negotiating with terrorist or 

insurgent organizations is complicated by the reality that the incumbent government rarely acknowledges the legitimacy of the group it is 

fighting. This stymies most attempts toward a meaningful resolution to 

a conflict, because governments often refuse to sit down with or even 

invite relevant rebel organizations to the negotiating table. However, 

through the use of a public interface—such as a political party—rebel 

groups are able to side step this issue. A political party can offer a legitimate face to an illicit organization, making government interaction 

possible. More importantly, it creates a means by which both sides can 

negotiate without either side appearing weak.

Conceptualizing the public component as a public interface offers 

a way to think about insurgent activities that fall outside the traditional 

realm of irregular warfare. In doing so, it is possible to articulate a gray 

area within modern conflicts where rebels become tacit governments 

or nascent politicians. There are two specific types of public interfaces 

that insurgent organizations can create: a “goods-based” interface and 

an “institution-based” interface. A goods-based interface is created 

when rebel groups selectively provide goods and services to a targeted 

population with the intention of gaining public support. As captured 

in previous ARIS analysis, this type of interface falls within the realm 

of “shadow governance,” where rebel organizations actively use the carrot versus the stick in shoring up public support.15 Existing simultaneously with or independently from this, an institution-based interface 

manifests when rebel groups create or use existing political parties to 

engage with the political framework of the state. As will be expounded 
32

Special Topics in Irregular Warfare

on below, an institution-based framework can manifest in a number of 

different ways.

The following two sections will further explore these two types of 

public interfaces, articulating the unique role each interface can have 

and the method and manner in which they can vary. It is essential to 

note that the types of interfaces a group can use are not restricted 

to one or the other. Some groups, such as the LTTE, only offer public goods, while other groups, like Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) in 

Spain, only have a political party. There are, however, groups that opt 

to have both, such as Hizbollah in Lebanon. The significant variation 

in how and why insurgent groups choose to use or not use the public 

component to achieve their strategic goals offers important insights 

into what the formation of a public component can mean for a group’s 

eventual success.

GOODS-BASED INTERFACE

The goods-based interface of the public component manifests 

through a rebel group’s willingness and propensity to selectively provide goods and services to a targeted population. In an effort to win 

over relevant populations, insurgent groups offer benefits and other 

public goods that are designed to normalize civilian interaction with 

the organization. Communities come to depend on these services, 

granting civilians the opportunity for quotidian interaction with the 

rebel organization. As previous research highlights, the power a social 

service provider has over the population it provides for is contingent on 

the recipient’s ability to seek those services elsewhere.16 Within conflict 

zones, as the security situation deteriorates and the state loses its capacity to provide for citizens in rebel-held territories, insurgent groups 

often become the sole provider of public goods and services within the 

areas under their control. Thus, the creation of a goods-based interface 

is often as much a product of necessity as it is of strategy.

Public goods are any goods and/or services that are nonexcludable 

(i.e., if it is given to one, it is given to all) and nonrivalrous (i.e., if 

one person uses it, the total quantity is not diminished). Air, national 

defense, and public streetlights at night are all forms of public goods. 

When provided by the state, these forms of goods often manifest as 

social services, such as health care, education, and security services. 

They are expected features of developed states, and the provision of 

such goods feeds directly into the legitimacy that states seek to manufacture and maintain.

During times of conflict, the state’s ability to provide public goods 

in war-torn areas is often severely hindered by the ensuing violence. 
The Public Component

33

More often than not, as rebel groups capture territory, the state’s jurisdiction becomes fractured. Civilian populations within conflict zones 

are characterized as existing in one of three zones of control: areas 

under the control of the state, areas of divided or contested control, 

and areas under insurgent control.17 When control of a territory shifts 

from the state to an insurgent group, the state’s ability to project its 

power ceases and the care of the civilian populations falls under the 

rebel group’s jurisdiction. However, how rebel organizations choose to 

manage this responsibility varies markedly.

Upon gaining territory, some rebellious groups have no intention 

of engaging the existing population. Often groups seek to depopulate 

local communities living in controlled territories in order to circumvent 

the costs that come with governing. After capturing territory in northern Rwanda, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) strongly distrusted 

the Hutu communities in the areas it controlled. Rather than invest 

valuable resources in policing and coercing them into submission, the 

RPF forced the civilian communities out.18

Other times rebel organizations opt instead to provide a comprehensive range of services to the civilian populations under their control. 

Shortly after its formation, Hizbollah began pouring large amounts 

of resources into providing public goods to the Shiite community in 

southern Lebanon. The group offered a whole range of services from 

social support and childcare networks to comprehensive education and 

health care systems.a

Why some groups choose to provide for populations while others 

do not depends largely on the kind of campaign being waged. For 

secessionist and ethnocentric groups, for which the formation of an 

independent state is the primary goal, winning over relevant portions 

of the population is essential to their overall success. Brute force and 

terror can keep populations in line for a time; however, oppression is 

poorly equipped to win over the hearts and minds of a population. As 

one researcher notes, “Fear alone does not suffice to sustain rule in 

the long term.”20 Furthermore, violence and coercion as a group’s sole 

form of governance can have lasting implications as the organization 

chooses to expand.21 In addition to this, discontented citizens living 

under rebel rule can also pose a number of other challenges for rebel 

leaders, often choosing not to comply with rebel directives or even seeking to collaborate with the state against the organization itself.22

Thus, groups selecting to control territory face the very real reality of having to provide for the populations under their jurisdiction. 

a Although the exact date when Hizbollah began providing public services to poor 

Shiite communities is unclear, providing social services to the poor has largely been one of 

the group’s key missions since its inception in 1982.19
34

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Within this context, support from relevant portions of the population 

may become strategically necessary. Groups neglecting to take this 

fact into account may find themselves expending valuable resources 

to maintain internal order. In the case of the Shining Path in Peru, 

the organization created such an atmosphere of fear among the civilian population living in the countryside that the government was eventually able to arm peasant militias to fight against the group, which 

played a key role in the Shining Path’s eventual demise.23

Shawn Flanigan notes how public support for a rebel organization 

exists along a continuum, where on one end of the spectrum, civilians 

actively resist the rebels (as was the case with the Shining Path), and on 

the other end, civilians choose to actively participate with the insurgent 

organization as “community members.”24,b Naturally, a given population of citizens will fall differently along Flanigan’s continuum, with 

some supporting the incumbent government and others the rebels. 

The key here, however, is the tipping point—below a certain threshold 

of popular support, governing a civilian population can be more work 

than it is worth. Thus, groups choosing to take and keep territory have 

an incentive to provide for the population under their control. How 

insurgent organizations go about this, though, differs greatly from 

group to group.

From its beginning, Hizbollah sought to develop its public infrastructure alongside its military one in an effort to “strike roots” within 

the poor Shiite community in southern Lebanon.26 Drawing large 

amounts of financial and logistic support from Iran, Hizbollah’s mission was crafted with an eye toward winning over the Shiite population residing in Lebanon. Providing public goods to the impoverished 

community was part of the essential mission of the organization, which 

termed the endeavor an act of jihad. At the time, Hizbollah was competing with another Shiite organization, Amal, for the Shiite community’s support. As a means of differentiating itself as an organization, 

Hizbollah began pouring considerable time and resources into social 

service provisions, which quickly helped increase the group’s popularity while simultaneously highlighting its organizational competence 

within a notoriously corrupt and ineffectual Lebanese state.27

Hizbollah’s social service system was both well structured and 

expansive, providing a generous range of social, educational, and health 

services. The organization created institutions designed to maintain 

b Civilians who support an insurgent organization to the degree that they are able to 

assist the group as community members is in large part the essence of the auxiliary component. Civilians aiding the organization either administratively, logistically, or through 

some other capacity, while simultaneously retaining their role as noncombatants, largely 

make up this aspect of an insurgency’s operation.25
The Public Component

35

southern Lebanon’s crumbling infrastructure—building roads, paying 

reconstruction compensation after Israeli bombings, and fixing and 

maintaining Beirut’s water mains.28 In addition to this, the organization’s provision of health services and “social insurance” reinforced its 

role as a caretaker of the Shiite people.29 Hizbollah’s creation of an 

extensive goods-based interface directly fed into the organization’s success and helped stabilize it within a rapidly changing political environment after Israel withdrew from southern Lebanon in 2000.

The amount of energy and resources that Hizbollah invested into 

developing such a robust goods-based interface was partly due to the 

group’s need to differentiate itself as an organization and partly due to 

the fact that such investment was a central aspect of the organization’s 

mission; however, external backing from Iran played a large part in 

Hizbollah’s ability to fund its service initiatives, potentially making it 

the exception rather than the rule. Because of funding constraints, not 

all groups opt to build their goods-based interface from the ground 

up, and many instead choose to co-opt existing institutions for their 

own purposes.

Upon acquiring the largely Tamil territory in the northern part 

of Sri Lanka, the LTTE was faced with a population accustomed to 

public services that had previously been provided by the incumbent 

state. Thus, there was an expectation that the LTTE would follow suit; 

however, without an external backer, building a service system from 

the ground up would have come at significant cost. Instead, the Tamil 

Tigers sought to redirect existing institutions and nongovernmental 

agencies to meet the LTTE’s needs.30

Deeply suspicious of the Sinhalese government’s use of rehabilitation and development programs as a means of undermining the LTTE’s 

authority in the north and east, the organization actively redirected 

government-provided services to appear as if they were coming from 

the organization.31 In addition to this, the LTTE levied taxes against 

NGOs operating within its territory while simultaneously steering 

where they were able to operate. As one Sri Lankan noted, “The LTTE 

does not provide services; instead they allow aid and relief NGOs to 

operate in their areas, while controlling where and how they operate.”32

By requiring NGOs to conduct their work through the Tamil Relief 

Organization (TRO), the LTTE could direct the flow of humanitarian 

activities in a manner that made it appear as if the services were coming 

from the LTTE. Their efforts in this regard helped boost the LTTE’s 

legitimacy in the eyes of the Tamil community.33 Through the use of 

the TRO and the services it provided, the LTTE was able to ensure 

public dependency on the organization, especially in the wake of the 

2004 tsunami.34 The strategic manipulation of existing services aided 
36

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the LTTE in creating a goods-based interface that boosted its standing 

among its civilian population while providing the organization with a 

much needed form of revenue. In addition, use of a goods-based interface helped engender a sense of loyalty and community among the 

Tamil youth, creating a sense of statehood, which reduced the LTTE’s 

need to use coercion to maintain order.35

For the LTTE, the strategic benefits of developing a goods-based 

interface were clear. The organization’s dream of statehood prompted 

it to focus on the Tamil population under its jurisdiction. By steering 

existing institutions and organizations, the LTTE was able to manufacture a public component that brought all the strategic benefits at 

limited cost. Furthermore, its efforts in doing so limited the need to 

use coercion and violence to maintain order. However, not all insurgent 

organizations that strive to create a goods-based interface are able to 

do so successfully.

From its beginning, the Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD) in 

eastern Congo was either uninterested or unable to do what LTTE and 

Hizbollah did. The organization’s brutal use of violence to maintain 

order among its civilian population and the internal fissures within 

the organization itself prevented the RCD from successfully manufacturing a goods-based interface. Much like Hizbollah, the RCD had an 

external backer; however, this forced the organization to myopically 

focus on taking the capital of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 

Kinshasa. This focus caused the RCD to neglect the populations living 

within the territory under its control and to overlook the diverse ethnic 

and political tensions that threatened to rip the insurgent group apart. 

Relying on largely defunct institutions and aid organizations, the insurgent group left the civilian population to largely fend for its own social 

services while continuing to maintain its authority and rule through 

coercion and violence.36 Thus, the RCD’s wish to rule was not coupled 

with the wherewithal to adequately provide the services for the population under its control, which limited the organization’s capacity to push 

on and achieve its organizational goals.

As these examples highlight, a goods-based interface can come in 

many forms and how organizations seek to develop it varies greatly. 

However, when implemented effectively, a goods-based interface can 

help insurgent organizations construct systems of interaction with civilian populations, which can eventually translate into increased levels of 

support and legitimacy for the group.
The Public Component

37

INSTITUTION-BASED INTERFACE

An institution-based interface of the public component manifests 

when rebel groups create or use existing political parties to engage 

with the political framework of the state. The goal of an institutionbased interface is to create a legitimate face for the insurgent organization that allows it to move and operate within the confines of civil 

society. Much like a goods-based interface, an institution-based interface seeks to normalize civilian and government interaction with the 

rebel organization; however, it does so in a much different capacity. 

With its focus on manufacturing legitimacy among both its constituents and opponents alike, it is a form of interface that exists through 

the political institutions of the state, offering governments and citizens 

a means to legally and credibly interact with an illicit organization.

The development of an institution-based interface becomes an 

important feature of irregular warfare as conflicts begin to draw to 

a close. In an attempt to stay politically relevant, armed organizations 

must discover new avenues of operation that extend beyond the mere 

use of violence. Groups that can anticipate the need for a legitimate 

political presence reduce their likelihood of being marginalized as the 

nature of the conflict changes. For example, shortly after the signing of 

the Oslo Accords and the creation of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) in 1993, Hamas quickly realized the importance of creating 

a legal Islamic party that would allow it to operate without being persecuted by security forces within the PNA.37

However, the use of political parties by insurgent groups is not monodirectional. Sometimes political parties create and use violent groups 

to achieve their own goals. The idea of political parties using violence 

to achieve specific political goals within modern democracies is not a 

foreign concept. In India, Hindu party leaders regularly set off antiMuslim protests and riots to shore up support. By making ethnic issues 

more salient around election times, Hindu parties are able to rally voters through the targeted use of mass violence and unrest.38 Examples 

of the strategic use of political violence abound. In Indonesia, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka, party-inspired ethnic and religious animosities are 

frequently used to help rally voters or remove opposition candidates.39

The use of an institution-based interface is thus more nuanced than 

its goods-based counterpart. A goods-based interface emerges only 

after a group’s armed component has acquired territory; in contrast, 

an institution-based interface can actually predate a group’s armed 

component, as was the case with Umkhonto we Sizwe and the African 

National Congress (ANC) in South Africa. Thus, when conceptualizing 

and assessing the role an institution-based interface plays within an 
38

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armed insurgency’s strategic thought process, it is important to understand who is calling the shots (the political party or the rebel group) 

and how that dynamic can change over time.

In political science and economic research, a principal–agent 

framework is often used to articulate this kind of dynamic between 

two actors. A principal–agent relationship occurs when one actor (the 

agent) performs tasks and makes decisions on the behalf of another 

actor (the principal). Operating in a world where one actor may have 

more information than the other and where each side has different 

preferences and methods, the principal cannot always ensure that the 

agent will operate in its best interest. Thus, the principal may reel the 

agent in, punish the agent, or break relations with the agent altogether 

if it fails to perform. Thinking of insurgency groups and political parties within a principal–agent framework offers a way of conceptualizing 

the dynamic relationship between a rebel organization and the legal 

political entity that represents it.

When examining the variation in the types of institution-based 

interfaces that may exist, it is important to assess how the principal–

agent dynamic plays out between the two actors. A rebel group that 

manufactures a political party to gain access to a political arena differs 

greatly from a political party that creates a military wing to further its 

political agenda. With this in mind, three types of relationships emerge 

between rebel groups and political parties: (1) political parties exist as 

“fronts” when the political party is subordinate to the insurgent group; 

(2) political parties exist as “principals” when the rebel group is subordinate to the political party; and (3) political parties exist “independent” of the rebel group when neither the party nor the group wields 

any level of control over what the other does. Understanding how these 

three possible arrangements work is key to assessing the strategic value 

of an institution-based interface.

Political Parties as Fronts

Within the first type of arrangement, a political party exists as a 

front that a rebel group uses to gain access to a state’s political arena. 

Within this setup, the political party has no agency or ability in and of 

itself to restrain the rebel organization from acting. Rather, the insurgents control (at least partially) the actions and agenda of the party 

in order to achieve specific goals. Under this arrangement, a political party might act as the legitimate face of the organization at the 

bargaining table; however, representatives of the political party often 

report back to the rebel organization to ensure that the group agrees. 
The Public Component

39

Thus, within this arrangement, the political party can be thought of as 

the agent and the rebel group the principal.

In the beginning, the Irish Republic Army (IRA) and Sinn Féin, a 

civilian political party, were largely separate and independent organizations seeking the unification of Ireland. However, in 1949, the two 

organizations’ paths became inextricably linked as IRA officials began 

“infiltrating” Sinn Féin and taking up key positions within the political 

party.40 From this point on, dual membership in both organizations 

was not uncommon. As one senior Irish official noted, membership in 

both the IRA and Sinn Féin was the “norm rather than the exception, 

particularly at the highest levels” of the party.41 As the conflict endured 

in Northern Ireland, the IRA’s Army Council, the main level of leadership within the IRA, was largely assumed to have control of Sinn Féin’s 

political agenda.42

In 1969, the nature of the conflict in Northern Ireland changed. As 

the cleavage between Protestants and Catholics became more salient, 

British troops were sent in to restore order between the two groups. 

However, the British military presence on the island altered how the 

conflict was viewed: many began to see British occupation as a barrier 

to the unification of the island.43 Around that time, a new, more violent 

breed of membership emerged within the IRA that eventually formed 

into the Provisional IRA (PIRA). This new faction of Irish Republicans 

relied largely on violence to achieve its goal of a united Ireland. However, some leaders within the PIRA began to argue that dependence on 

violence alone would only succeed in isolating the rebel organization.44

The PIRA sought to transform Sinn Féin into a fully fledged political 

party and attempted to achieve its goals through both conventional 

political channels and military offensives. From this point, Sinn Féin 

began participating in local elections. In this regard, PIRA relied on 

the ArmaLite and the ballot box, or the so-called “ballot bomb,” to 

achieve the organization’s goal of unification.45

The use of the political framework of Northern Ireland played a key 

role in helping the PIRA gauge its level of public support. Through the 

ballot box, the PIRA was simultaneously able to effect local legislation 

and understand where it stood among its constituents. For violent and 

covert organizations, it is often difficult to gauge public support. What 

that support means differs from group to group; however, as was noted 

above, public support can directly feed into an organization’s ability 

to achieve its goals. Thus, the ability to poll a group’s current standing 

through the use of timely elections can be as important as the seats it 

wins. For the PIRA, Sinn Féin offered a means by which to navigate the 

shifting political landscape of Ireland at the time—a fact that would 
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prove vital as the conflict drew to a stalemate in the late 1980s and 

peace negotiations commenced.

When negotiations began in 1994, many international actors promoting peace in Northern Ireland thought it best to keep the relationship between Sinn Féin and the PIRA as murky as possible.46 The British 

government concluded that it was pointless to exclude political parties 

with ties to paramilitary organizations from the peace talks, knowing 

that doing so would only succeed in derailing the process.47 Thus, Sinn 

Féin was invited to the negotiating table under the tacit understanding that the PIRA would be participating in the negotiations. During 

the negotiations, leading members of Sinn Féin reportedly ferried messages back to the PIRA’s leadership.48 After declaring a cease-fire in 

1997, Sinn Féin was kicked out of the negotiations when it surfaced that 

the PIRA played a role in a recent spate of terrorist attacks at the time. 

As this point illustrates, Sinn Féin operated largely as a front for the 

PIRA during the negotiating process. Seeking an end to the conflict, 

the British government and other actors opted to implicitly negotiate 

with the PIRA. Sinn Féin merely made this process possible.

The strategic use of Sinn Féin as an institution-based interface was 

central to the PIRA’s ability to stay relevant within a shifting political landscape. As conflicts draw to a close, possessing some form of 

legitimate interface is integral to keeping an organization from being 

marginalized or isolated. When violent campaigns draw to a standstill, 

insurgent groups must often enter into negotiations in order to solidify 

any gains made during the conflict. As the PIRA example demonstrates, 

the capacity in which this process of negotiation can take place is only 

made possible through the existence of an institution-based interface.

Like the PIRA, in 1993 with the signing of the Oslo Accords, Hamas 

faced the very real threat of being politically isolated within the new 

governing arrangement that brought about the creation of the PNA. 

In an attempt to reconcile its hard-line Islamic ideology and to gain 

influence among the Palestinian population residing in the West 

Bank, Hamas decided to enter the political arena, forming the Islamic 

National Salvation Party in 1995. By forming a political party, Hamas 

sought to pursue its vision for an Islamic state by engaging existing 

channels in order to influence the domestic political arena.49 The party 

was a marginal player within Palestinian politics until the turn of the 

century. However, through the creation of a goods-based interface, 

Hamas was able to strengthen its ties with the Palestinian community in 

the West Bank. Its efforts in this regard translated into a stunning victory in 2006, winning Hamas 74 of 132 seats within the Palestinian legislature.50 In 2007, Hamas’s forces took over the Gaza Strip, effectively 
The Public Component

41

dismantling the Palestinian Authority’s military forces and purging the 

political landscape of challengers.

Hamas’s use of the Islamic National Salvation Party to gain traction 

within a tumultuous political and security landscape was purely strategic. Through the formation of an institution-based interface, Hamas 

was able to access the political arena in an effort to win over much 

needed public support and recognition. Fearing isolation because of 

its strong ideological stance, Hamas’s strategic use of an institutionand goods-based interface allowed it to advance politically, putting the 

organization in a position to undermine challengers, who years before 

had sought to isolate the organization. The Islamic National Salvation 

Party was a front for Hamas’s military initiative, intimately tied to the 

insurgent organization itself. Through its political party, Hamas was 

able to advance militarily in a manner that would have proven impossible through armed violence alone.

Political Parties as “Principals”

In the second type of arrangement, rebel groups are subordinate to 

the political party. The political party within a principal arrangement 

is the primary decision maker, whereas the armed group serves as its 

agent. Traditionally, this type of dynamic manifests when political parties opt to have a violent wing in response to institutional restrictions, 

an inability to gain office via election, the state’s banning of the party 

altogether, or government repression. Under these conditions, a political party views the existing political framework of the state as inaccessible and thus attempts to change the status quo through alternative 

means. The formation and use of an insurgent organization can be a 

controlled effort or an attempt to channel a radical faction within the 

party itself. Either way, the principal arrangement holds as long as the 

party is able to wield influence over how and where violence is used.

Initially created in 1912, the ANC sought to bring equal political 

rights to South Africa. However, as a series of laws were put in place 

to segregate black communities within the country, the ANC turned 

to nonviolent resistance against the incumbent government. In 1948, 

an apartheid government was put in place, denying nonwhites access 

to the institutional framework of the state. For example, all nonwhites 

were removed from the electoral roll, preventing them from participating in general elections. When the ANC joined the Defiance Campaign 

of Unjust Laws, a transnational movement bent on curbing unjust legislation, the apartheid regime reacted harshly by arresting all the ANC’s 

leadership and initiating a number of “Treason Trials.”51 When the 

police opened fire during a nonviolent demonstration in 1960, protests 
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and strikes against the government increased, prompting the regime to 

initiate a state of emergency, making all nonwhite organizations illegal.

The ANC’s inability to access the institutional framework of the 

state in order to change the status quo forced it into active protest. 

However, its campaign of nonviolent demonstration proved ineffective 

at deterring the state from its violent and repressive course. The ANC 

leadership quickly realized that to achieve its goals, it needed an ability 

to fight violence with violence. The political party created a military 

branch called the Umkhonto we Sizwe (“Spear of the Nation,” or MK) 

with the intent of engaging in acts of sabotage against the apartheid 

state. Through the strategic and controlled use of violence, the ANC 

sought to use the rebel group as a tool for change. Although membership between the two organizations was often blurred, the ANC took 

great care to keep the operations and activities of the ANC and Umkhonto separate. As one researcher notes, “The ANC remained the political apparatus responsible for carrying out all political activities, while 

Umkhonto focused on armed resistance. Maintaining separate organizations, with distinct policies, meant that the ANC never officially 

adopted a policy of violent resistance.”52 Given the repressive apparatus 

of the state and the nonviolent nature of the movement itself, it was 

integral that the two groups remained separate, even if the ANC was 

still calling the shots.

The ANC’s formation of an armed component offers a reverse logic 

to how violent nonstate groups form within the context of irregular 

warfare. As the example illustrates, the public component may exist 

long before the other components of an insurgent group emerge. This 

highlights the conceptually tricky gray area that the principal arrangement of an institution-based interface occupies. How the various components are used matters only with regard to who is controlling the 

violence. In this regard, a principal arrangement is unique. However, 

not all principal arrangements emerge in the same manner.

Some political parties form as fronts but then slowly begin to gain 

in power and importance as an armed conflict subsides and civil society 

is reintroduced. In this context, an ad hoc principal arrangement can 

emerge where a front arrangement previously existed. After the death 

of Ayatollah Khomeini in 1989, Hizbollah was offered greater freedom 

to pursue its own goals separate from the edicts coming from Tehran. 

The organization decided to participate in the Lebanese national parliamentary elections in 1992. The choice to create a political party was 

strategically motivated. Hizbollah’s leadership believed that engaging 

Lebanon’s political system would offer it a voice in the drafting of any 

future political arrangement with Israel—which it hoped to derail.53

More importantly, Hizbollah understood that only through political 
The Public Component

43

channels could it ensure the organization’s survival even if it was called 

to disarm. Lastly, as a unified Lebanese state began to emerge after 

twenty years of civil war, Hizbollah sought access to lucrative governmental positions and resources that it could only activate via legitimate 

channels.54 Thus, the creation of a political party was Hizbollah’s way 

of responding to a rapidly shifting political environment in Lebanon 

at the time.

In the 1992 election, Hizbollah ran with Amal, another Shiite group 

that was the more popular of the two organizations at the time. The 

coalition won 8 of the 128 seats in the parliament that year.55 Bolstered 

by its political success, Hizbollah began expanding its goods-based 

interface to increase its political base in an effort to further its political pursuits. The organization’s ability to use a goods-based interface 

through the provision of social services in tandem with its creation of 

an institution-based interface played a large part in its ability to rally 

grassroots supporters. In the subsequent election, Hizbollah was victorious again.

Israel’s withdrawal from southern Lebanon in 2000 increased the 

strategic importance of Hizbollah’s institution-based interface. With 

the end of Israeli occupation, the organization’s armed component 

came second to the public component it had put in place. Hizbollah 

won twelve seats in the 2000 election, and then fourteen in 2004, as its 

officials began gaining key governmental positions within the executive cabinet. As Hizbollah the political party’s influence increased, the 

need for Hizbollah the armed group began to diminish, effectively 

changing the nature of the principal–agent dynamic from a front 

to a principal arrangement. Nonetheless, Hizbollah maintained its 

armed component, using it at times to influence Lebanese politics. In 

May 2008, Hizbollah staged a six-day takeover of the capital in Beirut 

in order to gain further political concessions—which it succeeded in 

doing, effectively winning veto power within the executive cabinet.56

Hizbollah the political party started as an organization bent on 

influencing the postconflict Lebanese political arena; however, its political success at the ballot box only underscored its strategic importance 

to the organization’s leadership. As its need for violence diminished, 

Hizbollah’s institution-based interface became the dominant actor in 

relation to its armed component. Thus, after 2000, the political party 

was largely calling the shots, using its armed wing only when the need 

arose. The transformation of Hizbollah’s institution-based interface 

from a front to a principal arrangement highlights the dynamic ways in 

which a political party and insurgent group can interact and how that 

interaction can change over time.
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Political Parties Independent of Insurgent Groups

The third form of arrangement seeks to elucidate instances when 

an institution-based interface is either no longer used by an insurgent 

group or never existed to begin with. A political party is “independent” of a rebel group when neither the party nor the group wields any 

level of control over what the other does. In effect, the principal–agent 

dynamic is no longer at play and the two organizations can be thought 

of as separate entities. These are parties that are thought to be affiliated 

with an insurgent organization either by standing for the same cause 

or representing the same ethnic group but that hold no real influence 

over the rebel groups’ agenda, actions, or goals and vice versa.

When the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (commonly known as the PKK) 

first emerged in the late 1970s in Turkey, the Turkish state responded 

with more than just a counterinsurgency campaign. The government 

implemented a range of laws that restricted basic rights in crisis zones 

where the conflict was most fierce while simultaneously condemning any 

political party or group that sought to represent the Kurdish cause.57 By 

equating national unity with ethnic homogeneity, the Turkish state had 

a long history of coercive assimilation of non-Turkish groups; however, 

the PKK’s bloody campaign for an independent state in the southeast 

part of the country exacerbated this tendency.58 The People’s Democracy Party (HADEP), a Turkish political party that stood for greater 

political rights for Turkey’s Kurdish minority, was outlawed and its leadership arrested because of alleged ties to the PKK.59 The Turkish state 

saw connections that were largely nonexistent in an effort to purge the 

political arena of groups that threatened the state’s national unity.

Just as an institution-based interface can be used to help further an 

insurgency’s goals, it can likewise be used by states to rid themselves of 

political competitors. Independent arrangements often emerge within 

this kind of setting. By purposefully finding patterns where none exist, 

governments often manufacture narratives of insurgent groups and 

political parties working together in order to isolate or remove them 

from the political arena. Thus, when examining the arrangement of an 

alleged institution-based interface, it is key to take into account historical circumstances that might motivate such a narrative.

An incumbent government seeking to push out competitors is not 

the only way an independent arrangement emerges. Some insurgent 

groups seek to manufacture ties with political parties in order to remain 

politically relevant. In the early 1950s, a number of violent sectarian 

conflicts erupted between Conservatives and Liberals in Colombia. In 
The Public Component

45

response, Gustavo Rojas Pinillac organized a political movement that 

pursued a populist agenda that sought to underplay ideological difference and emphasize state unity. He formed the National Popular 

Alliance (ANAPO), which became a key political contender in Colombia. However, during the 1970s election, Rojas’s bid for the presidency 

failed. Because Rojas lost by a margin of 1.6  percent, many loyal to 

Rojas believed the election results had been manipulated.60 Unable 

to accept defeat, Rojas’s loyalists formed the Movimiento 19 de Abril 

(M-19), which took its name from the April 19 election date on which 

Rojas lost. The rebel organization termed as the military wing of the 

ANAPO; however, the ANAPO detached itself from the organization. 

When ANAPO’s leadership, which was spearheaded by Rojas’s daughter 

Maria, took steps away from the M-19, the rebel organization continued 

to claim that it was the party’s military arm.

In reality, the insurgent organization, partly composed of leftists 

and disgruntled FARC members, became largely irrelevant to the 

ANAPO and thus did not serve the same kind of strategic usefulness 

that Umkhonto did for the ANC in South Africa. Sustaining ties with 

the M-19 yielded no real political benefit, especially within Colombia’s 

rapidly changing political environment. However, with no real ideological position, the M-19 needed the ANAPO to remain relevant as 

an organization. The relationship between the M-19 and the ANAPO 

highlights how certain arrangements can deteriorate.

In effect, an independent arrangement is a noncategory with regard 

to how an institution-based interface is used to further a rebel organization’s goals; however, it is important to distinguish it from the other 

types of arrangements. Being able to distinguish a front or principal 

arrangement from an independent one changes how one assesses the 

strategic utility of the public component being used. Only through 

understanding the principal–agent dynamic can the strategic use of 

the public component become clear.

THE STRATEGIC VALUE OF THE 

PUBLIC COMPONENT

As noted above, an insurgent group’s creation and implementation of a public component stems largely from the strategic benefits of 

doing so. The underlying assumption captured in this analysis is that 

the public component becomes strategically relevant as the likelihood 

c Gustavo Rojas Pinilla was a military general who ruled Colombia after mounting 

a successful 1953 coup d’état there. He sought to restore order to the country, which 

was beset with a bloody partisan civil war, known as La Violencia (The Violence), in the 

countryside. He was deposed in 1957 after public protests against his rule.
46

Special Topics in Irregular Warfare

of absolute victory begins to diminish. As groups realize that their 

political goals (be they secession, regime change, the reconfiguration 

of the rule of law, etc.) are no longer achievable in absolute terms, 

the need for an alternative interface with the government and public becomes strategically necessary to solidify any gains the group has 

made and to keep the organization from becoming politically isolated. 

Hizbollah, Hamas, and the PIRA all formed institution-based interfaces in response to changing political circumstances. Specifically, the 

PIRA noted during the height of The Troubles that violence could yield 

a form of legitimacy but it did not offer legality, and that to reach its 

goal of a unified Ireland, the group needed legality.61 Thus, the creation of a public component can be seen as a process of strategic adaptation, where rebel groups begin to use a number of different strategies 

simultaneously to generate effective campaigns that are more adept at 

achieving the group’s goals.

When used in concert with the armed, auxiliary, and underground 

components, the strategic benefits of the public component abound. 

The use of a public interface (through a political party, the provision of 

public goods, or both) serves three unique purposes for rebel groups: 

it offers a legitimate face that both the government and the public can 

credibly interact with, which becomes essential during negotiations; it 

shores up public support through the provision of goods and services; 

and it offers a means to publish public support for the organization.

By creating processes by which civilians can interact with the organization and services that make that interaction meaningful, rebel 

groups strategically attempt to win over select portions of the population to distinguish themselves, garner greater levels of cooperation, 

and generate a larger pool of recruits. Public support can manifest in a 

number of ways. It can emerge politically through the share of votes the 

group receives through a political party or it can emerge pragmatically 

when the group needs either resources or other forms of assistance. In 

this regard, the type of environment insurgents are fighting in matters. 

In resource-rich countries, resources are more readily available, but in 

resource-poor countries, rebels must appeal to civilian populations in 

order to extract valuable resources and recruits.62 To wage a successful 

campaign, groups require the guns, people, and provisions necessary 

to keep the fight going. However, when resources are more difficult to 

come by, groups must find ways to garner resources from civilian populations. In this regard, the public component is the strategic use of the 

carrot versus the stick in drawing support and resources from the civilian population. Furthermore, an insurgent group is more able to disappear into a civilian community that supports it, offering it a means by 

which to avoid state-led counterinsurgency efforts.
The Public Component

47

In addition to this, the creation of a public interface offers insurgent organizations the means by which to find, vet, and indoctrinate 

new recruits. Researchers have pointed to Hamas, Hizbollah, and the 

LTTE’s use of charities as a mechanism to socialize and recruit new 

members, often using services aimed at rewarding fighters and their 

families.63 Through a goods-based interface, rebel groups are able to 

interact with civilian populations on a more regular basis. Through 

health care and social services, rebel leaders are able to isolate potential 

recruits and systematically indoctrinate them.64 Thus, the creation of a 

public interface eases these forms of interaction by normalizing them.

Through a political party, insurgent groups are able to publish the 

level of public support they receive in an attempt to strengthen their 

position at the bargaining table. Through the use of an institutionbased interface, rebels have a means of polling civilians on a semiregular 

basis. As the level of public support a group receives grows, the group 

is able to demand more from the incumbent government and other 

competing parties. For example, after winning multiple elections, Hizbollah was able to use a mixture of politics and coercion to seek greater 

concessions from the Lebanese government. In this regard, groups that 

are able to project levels of support through a legitimate medium are 

more able to achieve their military objectives by better articulating 

their bargaining space.

Finally, through the creation of a public interface, insurgent groups 

increase their likelihood of being able to reach a negotiated settlement. As noted above, governments are rarely willing to speak directly 

to rebel organizations themselves; thus, political parties act as an interface through which negotiations can occur without either side appearing weak. By creating credible channels of interaction, rebel groups 

are more able to solidify political concessions and resources. Thus, the 

public component offers a means by which to credibly exit a conflict 

along negotiated terms and conditions rather than through capitulation, or worse, absolute defeat. When the prospect of absolute victory 

is no longer a reality, rebel groups face the dismal prospect of fighting 

a war of attrition or losing altogether. Within this context, the ability 

to facilitate and reach a negotiated settlement offers groups a means of 

ending the conflict in a position of power.

Furthermore, through a political party, rebel groups are able to 

bargain indirectly through the institutional framework of the state. By 

participating in the political arena, groups are able to influence the 

policy outcomes from which they would otherwise be barred. Thus, the 

use of an institution-based interface can potentially yield both a direct 

and indirect means of resolving a conflict.
48

Special Topics in Irregular Warfare

CONCLUSION: THE PUBLIC COMPONENT 

WITHIN EXISTING DOCTRINE

In an attempt to provide a heuristic model for irregular warfare, 

current ARIS doctrine seeks to articulate the various mechanisms that 

appear—at least empirically—to be most prevalent within modern 

intrastate conflicts. The theoretical partition of modern insurgencies 

into armed, underground, and auxiliary components offers analysts a 

method and means by which to assess, compare, and determine the 

likelihood of success of existing violent nonstate groups. However, the 

model’s empirical purchase stems primarily from its ability to map onto 

the situation being observed on the ground.

By introducing a new conceptual component to the current doctrine of irregular warfare, this paper seeks not to obfuscate prevailing attempts at systematically analyzing armed insurgencies. Rather, it 

attempts to expand on previous work by offering a more robust model 

that more appropriately speaks to the situation on the ground. In this 

regard, it is key to articulate how the public component fits into existing doctrine and why the incorporation of the public component into 

current military understanding of armed groups offers a more complete heuristic model when examining modern conflicts.

As outlined above, the universe of rebel activities that fall within 

the realm of the public component differs greatly from the established 

armed, auxiliary, and underground components. By definition, the 

public component constitutes a strategic approach that seeks to engage 

civil society through socially recognized, nonviolent channels; thus, 

as a theoretical category, the public component is empirically different from the violent, militarized activities traditionally captured in the 

armed component. Likewise, the auxiliary component speaks to the 

population of noncombatant supporters who participate within the 

rebel organization but who do not openly indicate their sympathy or 

involvement. Civilians aiding a rebel organization either administratively and/or logistically, while simultaneously retaining their role as 

noncombatants, largely make up this aspect of an insurgency’s operation. In contrast, the public component captures the public interfaces 

that rebel groups create to credibly interact with civilian populations 

that are not actively involved in the organization, be it openly or not.

The difference between the underground component as it is currently understood and the public component is the clandestine nature 

of the underground. By its very definition, the underground component operates almost exclusively in the shadows, out of the public eye. This characteristic is key to ensuring organizational security, 

particularly in urban environments where insurgents have little to no 
The Public Component

49

territorial control and battle strong states. Although in these conditions the underground component can fulfill some basic functions of 

a public component, such as disseminating propaganda or vetting new 

recruits, most of the activities associated with the public component 

require insurgents to engage in overt relations with the targeted public. 

As an example, the M-19 operated in major urban centers in Colombia. For most of its history, the M-19 relied heavily on its underground 

to maintain security and continue operations. The M-19 underground 

maintained a decentralized cellular structure with strict compartmentalization. When the insurgents met, all wore face masks, used noms de 

guerre, and took other measures to ensure that no one’s identity was 

revealed. As a result, the M-19’s ability to develop a robust public component was fairly limited. It was not until the group established “peace 

camps” as part of negotiations with the federal government that the 

M-19 used a public component. The peace camps were urban demilitarized zones where the M-19 could freely, and legally, engage with its 

target population. One insurgent described how the peace camps were 

one of the few places the guerrillas were able to take off their masks 

and speak with civilians in the neighborhood as M-19 members:

We determined the needs of the people in those neighborhoods and then carried out an armed operation to 

hand out food, clothes, and even construction materials. The muchachos would perform this operation 

with their faces unmasked. We reasoned that clandestine operations were for the enemy, not the people. We 

had to be careful with our identity, but we would show 

our faces, so they could see us in flesh and blood solving their daily problems with them.65

The insurgents took part in numerous shadow governance activities while part of the peace camps, such as intervening on behalf of 

locals against exploitative tactics of landlords. As another example, the 

shadow governance activities of Hizbollah, some of the most robust in 

the world, are not undertaken by clandestine elements of the group’s 

underground component. It would have been exceedingly difficult for 

the group to open hospitals and provide electricity, education, and 

garbage services to the residents in southern Beirut without doing so 

overtly and openly—garbage truck drivers and hospital workers do not 

wear balaclavas. In this regard, there is a qualitative distinction between 

the underground component and the public component.

The difficulty in explaining Hizbollah’s social services wing as being 

an element of either its underground or armed component highlights a 

serious shortcoming within the current doctrine’s capacity to map onto 

the empirical reality being observed, especially when considering that 
50

Special Topics in Irregular Warfare

much of Hizbollah’s support comes from its provision of social services 

to the Shia population in Lebanon. In this regard, expanding the heuristic model to account for these types of activities and strategies will 

offer the doctrine as a whole greater leverage when describing, contextualizing, and analyzing these sorts of phenomena.

The contextual factors that inevitably influence the scope and depth 

of an insurgency group’s public component are largely a function of 

state strength. As noted above, the importance of territorial control in 

formulating and maintaining a robust public component is central to 

understanding why or why not rebel groups opt to create a public interface. Without the freedom of movement that territorial control allows, 

insurgent groups are often too hard-pressed to engage in shadow governance activities, much less engage in the legal processes of the state. 

Thus, territorial control is key in explaining the emergence of a public 

component, and as noted before, the ability to capture and hold territory diminishes greatly when pitted against a strong state.66 On the 

other hand, if the insurgents are battling a weak state, the possibility 

of territorial control, and a robust public component, increases dramatically. For instance, in Lebanon, Hizbollah’s success was predicated 

on a weak central Lebanese government. Its ability to secure territory 

in Beirut and the Bekaa Valley would have been severely hampered if 

the central government had the capacity to rebuff its control. Indeed, 

the Lebanese state had historically ignored the Shia populations, offering Hizbollah (and Amal) an opening to gain a strategic foothold in 

those areas.

The public component can offer insurgent organizations strategic 

advantages that the use of violence alone cannot. However, the utility of any one component—be it armed, underground, auxiliary, or 

public in nature—needs to be taken in context. Within the realm of 

irregular warfare, each component of an insurgency seeks to achieve 

specific ends. By understanding the strategic purpose of each component, one’s conception of how these mechanisms are used in concert 

to achieve victory becomes clearer. With that said, the formation of a 

public component should be read in a positive light. The formation 

and use of a public component signals that a rebel group may have 

begun to move away from a campaign of absolute victory; in addition, 

the existence of a public interface increases the possibility of a negotiated settlement or power-sharing agreement. Since the end of the Cold 

War, more and more political conflicts are being resolved via negotiated settlements. The prevalence of negotiation as credible exit to a 

conflict highlights how victory is no longer perceived in absolute terms 

but rather as a series of conditions. The activities inherent to the public 

component are crucial in extending an insurgency group’s bargaining 
The Public Component

51

space, as violence alone cannot deliver concessions. Furthermore, it 

requires that the rebel groups interface with the public in order to 

demonstrate their legitimacy and capacity to rule. Further investigation into the variety of ways violent nonstate groups can potentially use 

the public component to gain power and resources, especially in weak 

or failing states, is needed; however, the above analysis has taken the 

first step in this direction. By articulating the strategic nature that the 

public component serves within irregular war environments, a more 

precise picture of modern conflicts emerges.

NOTES

1 Mark Lichbach, The Rebel’s Dilemma (Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1995), 18.

2 Nathan Bos, ed., Human Factors Considerations of Undergrounds in Insurgencies (Fort Bragg, 

NC: United States Army Special Operations Command, 2013), 35–36.

3 Ibid.

4 Lotta Themnér and Peter Wallensteen, “Armed Conflicts, 1946–2011,” Journal of Peace 

Research 49, no. 4 (2012): 565–575.

5 Monica Duffy Toft, Securing the Peace: The Durable Settlement of Civil Wars (Princeton, NJ: 

Princeton University Press, 2010).

6 Ibid.

7 Joakim Kreutz, “How and When Armed Conflicts End: Introducing the UCDP Conflict 

Termination Dataset,” Journal of Peace Research 47, no. 2 (2010): 243–250.

8 Human Security Centre, Human Security Report 2005: War and Peace in the 21st Century 

(New York: Oxford University Press, 2005).

9 Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era (Cambridge, England: 

Polity Press, 2012).

10 Luis de la Calle and Ignacio Sanchez-Cuenca, “Rebels without a Territory: An Analysis of 

Nonterritorial Conflicts in the World, 1970–1997,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 56, no. 4 

(2012): 583.

11 Ami Pedahzur and Leonard Weinberg, Political Parties and Terrorist Groups (New York: 

Routledge, 2013).

12 Menapolis, “Local Councils in Syria: A Sovereignty Crisis in Liberated Areas,” policy 

paper (Istanbul: Menapolis, September 2013).

13 Maram Mazen, “Bloodshed Corrodes Support for Boko Haram,” Al Jazeera, May 25, 2014.

14 Liz Philipson and Yuvi Thangarajah, The Politics of the North-East: Part of the Sri Lanka Strategic Conflict Assessment 2005 (Colombo, Sri Lanka: The Asia Foundation, 2005).

15 Summer Newton and Robert Leonhard, “Shadow Government,” in Undergrounds in Insurgent, Revolutionary, and Resistance Warfare, ed. Robert Leonhard (Fort Bragg, NC: United 

States Army Special Operations Command, 2013), 133–134.

16 Y. Hasenfeld, “Power in Social Work Practice,” Social Service Review 61, no. 3 (1987): 

469–483.

17 Stathis N. Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War (New York: Cambridge University 

Press, March 2006), 87–89.

18 Mahmood Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 

Press, 2001), 186–189.
52

Special Topics in Irregular Warfare

19 Shawn Teresa Flanigan and Mounah Abdel-Samad, “Hezbollah’s Social Jihad: Nonprofits as Resistance Organizations,” Middle East Policy 16, no. 2 (June 2009): 122–137.

20 Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, 114.

21 Nelson Kasfir, “Guerrillas and Civilian Participation: the National Resistance Army in 

Uganda, 1981–86,” Journal of Modern African Studies 43, no. 2 (2005): 271–296.

22 Zachariah Cherian Mampilly, Rebel Rulers: Insurgent Governance and Civilian Life during 

War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2011), 54.

23 Alberto Bolivar, “Peru,” in Combating Terrorism: Strategies of Ten Countries, ed. Y. Alexander 

(Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2005), 84–115.

24 Shawn Teresa Flanigan, “Charity as Resistance: Connections between Charity, Contentious Politics, and Terror,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 29, no. 7 (2006): 641–655.

25 For more, see Sarah Elizabeth Parkinson, “Organizing Rebellion: Rethinking High-Risk 

Mobilization and Social Networks in War,” American Political Science Review 107, no. 3 

(2013): 418–432; and Robert Leonhard, “Recruiting” in Undergrounds in Insurgent, Revolutionary, and Resistance Warfare, ed. Robert Leonhard (Fort Bragg, NC: United States 

Army Special Operations Command, 2013), 19–42.

26 Shimon Shapira, Hezbollah between Iran and Lebanon (Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuchad, 

2000), 140.

27 Ahmad Nizar Hamzeh, In the Path of Hizbullah (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2004).

28 Eyal Zisser, “Hizballah in Lebanon: At the Crossroads,” MERIA 1, no. 3 (1997).

29 Shawn Teresa Flanigan, “Nonprofit Service Provision by Insurgent Organizations: the 

Cases of Hizballah and the Tamil Tigers,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 31, no. 6 (2008): 

499–519.

30 Mampilly, Rebel Rulers.

31 Philipson and Thangarajah, The Politics of the North-East.

32 Flanigan, “Nonprofit Service Provision by Insurgent Organizations,” 511.

33 Philipson and Thangaraiah, The Politics of the North-East.

34 Ibid.

35 A. J. V. Chandrakanthan, “Eelam Tamil Nationalism: An Inside View,” in Sri Lankan 

Tamil Nationalism: Its Origins and Development in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, ed. 

A. Jeyaratnam Wilson (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2000).

36 Mampilly, Rebel Rulers, 190–206.

37 Shaul Mishal and Avraham Sela, The Hamas Wind: Violence and Compromise (Tel Aviv: Miskal, 2006), 195–196.

38 Steven Wilkinson, Votes and Violent: Electoral Competition and Ethnic Riots in India (New 

York: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

39 Pedahzur and Weinberg, Political Parties and Terrorist Groups, 72.

40 Patrick Bishop and Eamonn Mallie, The Provisional IRA (London: Corgi, 1992), 39.

41 Michael Noonan, “Ahern Says His View of Sinn Fein Remains the Same,” Irish Times, 

May 3, 2001.

42 A. Richards, “Terrorist Groups and Political Fronts: the IRA, Sinn Fein, the Peace Process and Democracy,” Terrorism and Political Violence 13, no. 4 (2001): 72–89.

43 Ed Moloney, A Secret History of the IRA (New York: W. W. Norton, 2002).

44 Pedahzur and Weinberg, Political Parties and Terrorist Groups, 132.

45 Adrian Guelke and Jim Smyth, “The Ballot Bomb: Terrorism and the Electoral Process 

in Northern Ireland,” in Political Parties and Terrorist Groups, ed. Leonard Weinberg (London: Frank Cass, 1992), 103–124.

46 George Mitchell, Making Peace (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1999), 23–24.

47 Pedahzur and Weinberg, Political Parties and Terrorist Groups, 134.

48 Richards, “Terrorist Groups and Political Fronts,” 75.
The Public Component

53

49 Avraham Sela, Non-State Peace Spoilers and the Middle East Peace Efforts (Jerusalem: The 

Floersheimer Institute for Policy Studies, 2005).

50 Arnon Reguler, “Achievement to Hamas in Local Elections: Won Most of Big Municipalities,” Haaretz, May 8, 2005.

51 M. Van Engeland Anisseh and R. Rachael, From Terrorism to Politics (Vermont: Ashgate, 

2007).

52 Ibid., 19.

53 Pedahzur and Weinberg, Political Parties and Terrorist Groups, 2013.

54 Norton Augustus Richard, Hezbollah: A Short History (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 

Press, 2007), 101.

55 Magnus Ranstorp, “Hezbollah’s Command Leadership: Its Structure, Decision-making 

and Relationship with Iranian Clergy and Institutions,” Terrorism and Political Violence 6, 

no. 3 (1994): 303–339.

56 Krista E. Wiegand, “Reformation of a Terrorist Group: Hezbollah as a Lebanese Political 

Party,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 32, no. 8 (2009): 669–680.

57 Gulistan Gurbey, “The Kurdish Nationalist Movement in Turkey Since the 1980s,” in The 

Kurdish National Movement in the 1990s, ed. Robert Olson (Lexington, KY: The University 

Press of Kentucky, 2006), 15.

58 Philip Robins, “The Overlord State: Turkish Policy and the Kurdish Issue,” International 

Affairs 69, no. 4 (1993): 661.

59 Ayla Yackley, “Turkey Outlaws Kurdish Political Party,” The Globe and Mail, 2003.

60 David Bushnell, The Making of Modern Colombia (Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1993), 201–205.

61 Pedahzur and Weinberg, Political Parties and Terrorist Groups, 132.

62 Jeremy M. Weinstein, Inside Rebellion the Politics of Insurgent Violence (New York: Cambridge 

University Press, 2007), 27–60.

63 Matthew Levitt, “Hamas from Cradle to Grave,” Middle East Quarterly 11, no. 1 (2004): 

1–12. Also see Flanigan, “Nonprofit Service Provision by Insurgent Organizations.”

64 Eli Berman and David D. Laitin, “Religion, Terrorism and Public Goods: Testing the 

Club Model,” Journal of Public Economics 92, nos. 10–11 (2008): 1942–1967.

65 María Eugenia Vásquez Perdoma, My Life as a Colombian Revolutionary: Reflections of a Former Guerillera (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2005), 194.

66 de la Calle and Sanchez-Cuenca, “Rebels without a Territory.”

INTEREST, IDENTIFICATION, 

INDOCTRINATION, AND MOBILIZATION: I3M

Jesse Kirkpatrick

57

INTRODUCTION

In 2013, researchers from the Johns Hopkins University Applied 

Physics Laboratory (JHU/APL) and United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC), G3 Sensitive Activities Division, attempted 

to delineate the factors leading up to and including insurgent mobilization. The result of this collaborative effort was the development of a 

new model of insurgent participation and involvement that leverages 

the findings of social science research while focusing on the four critical areas of interest, identification, indoctrination, and mobilization 

(I3M).a I3M is a model that at once draws upon the existing literature 

and, in some cases, simplifies and streamlines existing models, while 

also attempting to correct for some deficiencies found in the contemporary insurgency scholarship.

This thought piece explores how and why individuals become insurgents, with the ultimate goal of further developing the framework and 

boundaries of the conceptual I3M model by using existing empirical 

data, social science literature, and case studies. Drawing from the 

I3M model, this piece examines the process individuals go through to 

become active members of insurgent organizations by focusing on four 

phases: interest, identification, indoctrination, and mobilization (hereafter, I3

M).

This piece proceeds in four parts. Part one introduces the I3M 

model while situating it within the current scholarship on insurgent 

participation and motivation. Part two uses a brief case study to explore 

and demonstrate how I3M may be used to understand an individual’s 

progression toward becoming an insurgent. Part three concludes.

WHY MEN AND WOMEN FIGHT: 

A LAY OF THE LAND

Early scholarship on the genesis of political violence, of which insurgency is a part, was typically produced by historians who tended to 

focus largely on particular instances and cases of violence, as opposed 

to general theories of its origin.2,b Consequently, political scientists 

sought to take the particularized insights of historians and apply them 

a The original developers of the I3

M model are Bruce DeFeyter and Christina 

Phillips, with subsequent developmental contributions made by Jesse Kirkpatrick and 

Mary Kate Schneider. For a brief overview of the I3M model, see below; for a more thorough account, see Kirkpatrick and Schneider.1

b Political violence is taken to mean violence that is carried out with the aim of effecting political change or maintaining the political status quo. The term encompasses, but is 

not limited to, insurgencies and terrorism.
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Special Topics in Irregular Warfare

toward developing generalizable theories of the origin of political violence. In turn, for much of the 1990s, social scientists focused on the 

origins of large-scale interstate wars. One result of this effort was that 

it “tended to crowd out the study of other arenas for political violence 

as well as other forms of violence, including civil wars, genocide (and 

other types of mass killing), ethnic cleansing, and terrorism.”3 The outcome of such “crowding out” is that only in the very recent past have 

political scientists turned their attention to studying these other forms 

of political violence, such as insurgencies.

Although the widening in the study of political violence was certainly a welcome development, shortcomings nevertheless remained. 

In what one political scientist terms the “pre-1990s consensus,” scholars 

characterized participation in political violence (in this case, political 

violence leveled against noncombatants) as irrational, random, and 

motivated by ancient, primordial hatreds.4 In fact, this so-called consensus endured throughout the 1990s and was typified in such pieces as 

Kaplan’s Balkan Ghosts5 (in which he argues that the Balkans were torn 

apart because of ancient hatreds between various religious groups) and 

Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations6 (in which conflict is viewed as originating from incompatibilities between civilizations). By characterizing 

such political violence as illogical, wanton, and senseless, these analyses 

tended to exclude the possibility that participants in political violence 

may, in some cases, be subject to and involved in more systematic and 

rational processes.

A notable exception to the pre-1990s and 1990s consensus came 

from a small group of scholars whose focus was terrorism.7, c These 

scholars rejected the theses that participation in political violence is 

rooted in illogical, gut-level, deep-seated, ancient hatred, instead taking as their point of departure the possibility that such violence could 

be logical, strategic, purposive, and motivated and embarked upon by 

rational actors who are animated by reasons and incentives other than 

those related to mere irrationality.

As political scientists began to expand their cases of study to 

include insurgencies, revolutions, civil wars, and terrorism, they sought 

to explain not just the general causes for these types of conflict but also 

the motivations behind the various actors engaged in them.

c Within this scholarship exist many differing definitions of terrorism. For the purposes of this piece, and following Title 18, Part I, Chapter 113B, § 2331 of the United 

States Code, terrorism is taken to mean acts that are intended “to intimidate or coerce a 

civilian population; (ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or 

kidnapping.”
I3

M

59

While disagreement endures, scholars have pointed to various 

exogenous causes or risk contributors for conflict. These include socioeconomic and political conditions such as poverty,8

 income disparity 

and material depravation,d and political exclusion that may give way to 

endogenous motivations and incentives for individuals’ participation 

in conflict. For example, poverty may reduce individuals’ opportunity 

costs, thus making them more susceptible to identification and recruitment efforts.10

Since September 11, 2011, many continued this research and sought 

to puzzle out just why it is that men and women fight, why terrorists 

become terrorists, and why insurgents become insurgents.11,e Many of 

these scholars developed typologies and models that attempt to identify and explicate external conditions, motivations, and incentives that 

may cause or act as contributing factors toward individuals’ involvement in insurgent activity.

Much of this recent scholarship has focused on the process of radicalization as a key component for insurgent motivation.14 While it is 

certainly true that some insurgents are radicals, not all insurgents are 

radicalized.f Insurgents may be motivated by factors that have little or 

nothing to do with root or fundamental change—a key component 

of radicalization. Consequently, this area of research excludes a large 

number of insurgencies, thus failing to explore the incentives and 

motivations of nonradicalized insurgents. Therefore, one of the ultimate goals of the JHU/APL–USASOC research team was to account for 

such deficiencies and create a model that is objective and normatively 

neutral and may be applied across a range of insurgency cases.

d Income disparity may lead to relative depravation, the feeling that one is entitled 

to a good that one lacks while others in the population possess or have access to said 

good(s).9

e Note the distinction between terrorism and insurgency. The former, by definition 

(see note c), requires the intent to intimidate or coerce a civilian population, whereas 

the latter does not require the use of civilians (although it can). This is not to say that 

insurgents cannot engage in terrorism and become terrorists. For a similar definition of 

insurgency, see the U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide, which defines insurgency as 

“the organized use of subversion and violence to seize, nullify, or challenge political control of a region.”12 Also see the Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare, Volume II: 

1962–2009, which defines insurgency as “an attempt to modify the existing political system 

at least partially through unconstitutional or illegal use of force or protest.”13

f Radical is here defined as “associated with political views, practices, and policies of 

extreme change.”15
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I3M: AN OVERVIEW

Part One of the Model

I3M is a two-part model. The first part captures four behavioral 

processes. These include interest (what piques the curiosity of new 

recruits?); identification (what leads new recruits to associate themselves with the movement?); indoctrination (what causes new recruits to 

take the leap and actually join the movement?); and mobilization (the 

point at which individuals take action in support of the movement). 

Interest, identification, and indoctrination are the three factors leading up to mobilization.

Mobilization

(Active or Passive)

Interest

Identication

Indoctrination

Figure 1. Four behavioral processes of I3M.

It is important to note that while the components of I3M are interconnected, the processes are not determinatively linear; nor is there a 

single explanation for why individuals decide to mobilize.g While some 

individuals may be sympathetic to or in agreement with the message, 

aim, and tactics of an insurgency, it is no secret that most individuals 

will not be moved to action.h This raises the perennially interesting 

question: what, then, motivates or incentivizes individuals to become 

involved in an insurgency?

g As a developer of I3

M, I agree with Patel that it is incorrect to argue that “contrary 

to empirical social science studies . . . the path to terrorism has a fixed trajectory and that 

each step of the process has specific, identifiable markers.”16

h As an example, we can call to mind that approximately less than 1 percent of the US 

population serves in the US military, a number certainly dwarfed by those in the United 

States who identify with or have a sympathetic interest in the activities and mission of the 

armed forces.
I3

M

61

Part Two of the Model: Motivations and Incentives

Here we can turn to the second part of the I3M model, which identifies some general motivations and incentives for why individuals may 

engage in the I3M process. Following is an outline of nine representative examples of motivations and incentives that are captured in the 

I3M model. In identifying these motivations and incentives, the team 

drew from the aforementioned empirical work of insurgency scholars. While the sample populations that these scholars focus on varies from radicals in Saudi Arabia to secular combatants in Africa, an 

appropriate usage of these scholars’ typologies and models can help 

illuminate the contributing factors to insurgent interest and identification (a key part of motivation). This, in turn, can be used to help 

explain the process through which individuals become indoctrinated 

and eventually mobilized.17

Motivations and Incentives

1. Personal grievances: Grievance resulting from personal 

experience, such as observed or perceived injustices (e.g., 

torture of a family member) or relative depravation.18

2. Group grievances: Grievances resulting from the treatment 

or perceived treatment of a collective, i.e., group (e.g., one’s 

conationals or members of one’s religious community).

3. Slippery slope: Small instances and cases of, and exposure 

to, insurgent violence may incrementally increase one’s 

tolerance, acceptance, or endorsement of such activity.

4. Love or affection: Whether it is having a spouse or lover in 

a group or the desire for “romantic or comradely love,” love 

can be a strong motivator for insurgent I3M.20

5. Risk and status: Some individuals may find the status that 

comes with insurgent membership attractive. Likewise, the 

draw of risk taking may also be appealing.

6. Unfreezing: Some individuals value the camaraderie 

and social capital that can result from participation in 

an insurgency; insurgent groups and their members can 

sometimes fill the need for companionship.
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Special Topics in Irregular Warfare

7. Group polarization: The polarization of a group of which 

one is a member. A common example of group polarization 

is so-called prison universities, or the imprisonment of 

individuals who have existing affiliations, sympathies, and 

allegiances to a given insurgent group or those who are 

susceptible to creating such an affiliation.i

8. Group competition: Competition between groups, be it 

political, economic, or social, can sometimes lead individuals 

to engage in I3M.

9. Group isolation: The extant or perceived isolation or 

repression of a group may lead individuals in the group to 

engage in increased mobilization.

Emotional

motivations

and incentives

Physical

motivations

and incentives

Ideological

motivations

and incentives

I3M

Figure 2. Motivations for I3M.

In an attempt to streamline and simplify these motivations and 

incentives, the I3M model divides them (as depicted in Figure 2) into 

three categories: physical, emotional, and ideological.j It is important 

to note that although the tripartite division of these categories is a 

useful heuristic, in reality, the motivations and incentives influencing 

I3M can be cross-categorized. For example, imagine that a neo-Nazi 

Caucasian male residing in the United States witnessed law enforcement officers subdue his father through the use of force. This action, 

i It should be noted that with changes to communication and technology, groups 

can now be virtual (e.g., online), with a strong shared identity despite having never met 

in person.

j Some scholars have disaggregated “mechanisms” of political radicalization on the 

basis of the number of individuals involved, distinguishing between the individual, group, 

and mass levels.21 While some of these mechanisms may correspond with I3M’s individual 

motivations and incentives, the I3M model applies to the individual level. For a defense of 

this approach, see Hegghammer.22 The current approach does not, of course, preclude 

further I3M research examining motivations and incentives at these larger levels.
I3

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63

consequently, results in the son developing a personal grievance against 

law enforcement writ large. It is perfectly plausible that the motivations 

arising from this grievance could be categorized as physical (his desire 

to safeguard his and his father’s physical safety), emotional (the love 

he has for his father and his desire for redress of his grievances), and 

ideological (the belief that he and his family have a right to engage in 

the unlawful activity for which his father was arrested). It is in this way 

that the categorizations outlined in the I3M model are, admittedly, not 

entirely separable.

Similarly, individuals’ motivations and incentives for I3M are pluralistic. Returning to our example, the son may be interested in an 

insurgency, say, the neo-Nazi group White Knights United, for a variety 

of reasons. Perhaps it is because of his strong religious and political 

beliefs, but perhaps there are also enormous social pressures.k Just like 

in everyday life, individuals are influenced by numerous motives, which 

are further impacted by additional factors such as environment, social 

conditions, life history, and so forth.

CASE STUDY: 

AUTODEFENSAS UNIDAS DE COLOMBIA24

This brief section explores the short case study of the United SelfDefense Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia, or 

AUC) in the hopes of explicating some of the operative incentives and 

motivations that may contribute to an individual’s transformation into 

an insurgent, with the anticipation that future research may more fully 

explore potentially recognizable indicators of when an individual is 

progressing toward mobilization in an insurgency.

Background

Formed in 1997 and officially demobilized in 2006, the AUC was 

the main right-wing insurgency group in Colombia. The group served 

as the umbrella organization for the various semiautonomous paramilitaries operating in Colombia during its decades-long civil war. 

The group’s historical legacy and origination dates back to the early 

1950s, a period when wealthy landowners, ranchers, and businesspeople sought to protect their property and physical security against leftist 

insurgents. In doing so, these stakeholders backed and armed various right-wing militias. Later, finding a common enemy in the leftist 

k For an interesting computational prototype of a quantitative model that explores, in 

part, the role of social pressures on behavior, see Davis and O’Mahoney.23
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Special Topics in Irregular Warfare

guerrillas, the Colombian political and military establishment sought 

to collaborate with, support, and, ultimately, give legal protection to 

these “self-defense” groups.

In the 1980s, at the height of Colombia’s booming narcotics trade, 

the groups served as protectors of Colombia’s drug lords. By the 

1990s, Colombia’s narco-kingpins’ power waned, and the self-defense 

forces eventually moved into direct involvement with narcotrafficking, 

cementing their positions as the country’s leading narcotraffickers. 

The staple tactic of the AUC was violence; targets included noncombatant peasants, leftist guerrillas, politicians, and, in some cases, the 

Colombian military. This use of ruthless violence, such as the targeting 

of civilians, massacre of peasants, and attacks on the military, resulted 

in the group’s designation as a terrorist organization by the United 

States on September 10, 2001.l

Early in the peace talks between the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (the FARC) and the Colombian government, the 

FARC sought political legitimacy and recognition. Evidence indicates 

that this strategy was, in fact, pursued prior to disarmament negotiations; as early as 1991, Fidel Castaño advocated that the AUC’s groups 

“construct a solid and coherent political platform.”27 This strategy followed the AUC’s narrative and ideology of acting as a steward and protector of the middle class and landed elite against left-wing guerrillas. 

The AUC could at once engage in violence while claiming that it was 

doing so not to enrich its members but to act as a bulwark against the 

looming guerrilla threat.

In addition to aiding the group’s strategic communication efforts, 

the quest for legitimacy had a perhaps more important outcome for the 

group: knowing that when the government concluded a peace agreement with the left-wing guerrillas they would be without peer, the AUC 

understood that its size and power would ensure it a strong negotiating 

position and favorable disarmament conditions. This strategy resulted, 

in part, from the Colombian government’s disparate treatment of what 

it characterized as mere criminal narcotraffickers in contrast to organized armed rebel groups.m The former were pursued as states often 

pursue criminals—with arrest and prosecution—while the latter were 

treated as actors for which such a strategy was ineffective. Consequently, 

like many counterinsurgencies, the group was militarily eroded while 

offers of talks and favorable conditions were mounting.

l For a statistical compilation of the dates, actors, types, and locations of this violence, 

see the Global Terrorism Database.25

m For a discussion of how drug lords used the state’s treatment of the AUC, in contrast to its treatment of run-of-the-mill “criminal” groups, to their advantage, namely by 

folding (typically for a large fee) their drug outfits into the AUC, see Hristov.26
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65

As domestic and international pressure began to grow for Colombia to end its internal armed disputes, the government and the AUC 

entered into negotiations. Consequently, in 2003, under the Santa 

Fe de Ralito Accord, the group began demobilization. Although the 

demobilization was largely successful, reports suggest that remnants of 

the organization have reformed and continue to engage in violence 

and illegal activity.n

Motivations and Incentives for Members

The clandestine and opaque nature of the AUC makes it difficult 

to ascertain motivations for why members were interested in, identified with, were indoctrinated into, and, ultimately, mobilized for the 

AUC. In addition, one must appreciate the variation not only from 

individual to individual but also between the leadership and the lower 

rank-and-file members. Despite these caveats, the AUC leadership has 

maintained a public enough presence (through sources such as media 

interviews, court appearances, intelligence analysis, and their own 

online web presence) that one can arrive at some relatively firm conclusions regarding members’ motivations for joining and remaining in 

the AUC.

Although the AUC defined itself “as an anticommunist advance 

guard in ‘defense of private property and free enterprise,’ ” thus 

advancing a grievance narrative in which hardworking business owners, 

adherents of “traditional values,” and nonleftists were under the threat 

of the guerrillas, leaders were motivated largely by military power that 

permitted them to acquire large amounts of wealth.28 Throughout the 

group’s existence, AUC leaders sought to secure arms, land, political 

allies, and armed members for the purpose of enriching themselves 

economically. According to Chernick, the AUC’s leadership was most 

interested in land—its use, its acquisition, and keeping it in the hands 

of rural oligarchs.29 Such land policies ensured the AUC control over 

illicit drug production and smuggling routes, as well as direct links to 

petroleum pipelines and areas of resource extraction.

An interesting piece of the group’s history involves its leaders, Carlos and Fidel Castaño. The Castaño brothers’ father was murdered 

in 1981, leading the brothers to establish the right-wing self-defense 

group Las Tangas. It would seem, then, that their early involvement in 

the insurgency was motivated by a mix of personal grievance, love, and 

group grievance (under the notion that their traditional way of life was 

n Precise data and information about these attacks is difficult to obtain, largely 

because many of these groups have been renamed and operate in the shadows.
66

Special Topics in Irregular Warfare

under attack by the leftists), which can be categorized as physical, emotional, and ideological, respectively.

Perhaps more interesting than the motivations of the small number 

of top AUC leaders are those of the rank-and-file members. We are 

lucky to have two sets of in-depth interviews that scholars conducted 

with demobilized AUC members.30 These studies suggest that 

with ex-combatants of the AUC, their principal reasons 

for joining were: via an acquaintance who convinced 

the person to join (29 percent); because they lived in a 

zone under paramilitary control and joining was “just 

what you did” (17 percent); recruited by force or threat 

(14 percent); or economic motivations (27 percent).31

This research underscores two important possibilities: first, although 

some members may have been radicalized, this sample pool of interviewees indicates that most were not; and second, familial, peer, and 

social networks played an influential role in motivating individuals 

to join the AUC. Many members were also motivated by a desire for 

revenge, “a love of arms,” and the hope of increasing their economic 

opportunities.32 Another ex-combatant cited boredom, social status, 

and good pay.33

In addition to these motivations, social expectations and a culture 

of paramilitaristic machismo and status played a role in individuals 

joining the AUC and remaining in the group. Interviewees cite membership in the AUC as providing a feeling of self-worth, along with 

incentives such as respect from those in their communities, the ability 

to obtain fine clothes, and the lure of beautiful women and love.34

Retention (i.e., continued mobilization) was ensured by the AUC’s 

pay structure and incentives to kill. Members in command positions 

received a significant increase in salary and also bonuses tied to the 

number of guerrillas they killed and fought.35 As one ex-combatant put 

it, commanders had “cars, motorcycle, guns, and staff” that made their 

lives easier.36 Leadership positions were so coveted, and competition 

was so stiff that AUC members are reported to have killed family and 

friends just to ascend the ranks.37,o

o Again, interestingly, these motivations and incentives do not seem to indicate radicalization of most members.
I3

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67

CONCLUSION: QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTIONS 

FOR FURTHER STUDY

Although no model will be perfectly predictive of what will motivate 

and incentivize a person to engage in an insurgency, I3M offers the 

promise of a streamlined yet robust analytical tool. The model harnesses existing findings in the scholarship in a way that does not foreclose future refinements, adjustments, and revisions to I3

M.

This thought piece is intended to serve as an in-depth overview of 

the I3M model, a demonstration of its efficacy in application by way of 

case study, and, finally, a call for future study. The study and practice 

of (counter)insurgency could benefit from developing the I3M model. 

It is the hope of this author that future studies of insurgency will take 

I3M seriously.

Such future study of I3M could include an in-depth empirical study 

not dissimilar to the small case study found in this piece. The cases 

could be appropriately selected to ensure variation across types of 

insurgencies, when and where they occurred, and their participants. 

This increase and variation in cases could help tease out, identify, and 

in some cases, eliminate our currently speculative conclusions regarding insurgent motivations and incentives. A thorough analysis of the 

Assessing Revolutionary and Insurgent Strategies casebooks would be 

a good place to start.

In addition to an increase in the number and types of cases under 

analysis, I3M would also benefit from a real-time application. This 

should include analyses of current insurgencies such as the conflicts 

in Syria and Iraq. Open sources such as YouTube and Twitter, and the 

insurgents’ active, daily use of these technologies, provide a peek into 

the mediated, public reasons for why individuals are interested in an 

insurgency, why they identify with it, why they mobilize, and, although 

in far fewer cases, why they leave. In addition, further study should 

include conflicts such as those in Afghanistan that are (potentially) 

winding down and for which there exist numerous and extensive interview records.

These are just a few examples of how I3M could be developed, tested, 

and put to use.

NOTES

1 Jesse Kirkpatrick and Mary Kate Schneider, “I3

M–Interest, Identification, Indoctrination, and Mobilization: A Short Introduction to a New Model of Insurgent Involvement,” 

Special Warfare Magazine 26, no. 4 (October–December 2013): 23–27.
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Special Topics in Irregular Warfare

2 For a review of these developments, see Benjamin A. Valentino, “Why We Kill: The Political Science of Political Violence against Civilians,” Annual Review of Political Science 17 

(2014): 89–103, 90.

3 Ibid., 91.

4 Ibid.

5 Robert D. Kaplan, Balkan Ghosts: A Journey through History (New York: St. Martin’s, 1993).

6 Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?” Foreign Affairs 72, no. 3 (1993): 

22–49.

7 See, for example, Martha Crenshaw, “The Causes of Terrorism,” Comparative Politics, 13 

no. 4 (July 1981): 379–399; and B. M. Jenkins, “International Terrorism: A New Mode 

of Conflict,” in International Terrorism and World Security, ed. D. Carlton and C. Schaerf 

(London: Croom Helm, 1975), 13–49. For a representative sample of the early debates in 

the 1990s, see Walter Reich, Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of 

Mind (1998; repr., Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1990).

8 Nathan Bos, ed., Human Factors Considerations of Undergrounds in Insurgencies (Fort Bragg, 

NC: United States Army Special Operations Command, 2013), 15.

9 Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970).

10 Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, “Greed and Grievance in Civil War,” Oxford Economic 

Papers 56, no. 4 (2004): 563.

11 See Crenshaw, “The Causes of Terrorism,” 379–399; Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism

(New York: Columbia University Press, 1998); Eli Berman, Radical, Religious, and Right: 

The New Economics of Terrorism (Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology 

Press, 2009); Thomas Hegghammer, “Terrorist Recruitment and Radicalization in Saudi 

Arabia,” Middle East Policy, 8, no. 4 (2006): 39–60; James W. Jones, Blood That Cries out from 

the Earth: The Psychology of Religious Terrorism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); 

Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko, Friction: How Radicalization Happens to Them and 

Us (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko, 

“Mechanisms of Political Radicalization: Pathways toward Terrorism,” Terrorism and 

Political Violence, 20, no. 3 (2008): 415–433; Faiza Patel, Rethinking Radicalization (Brennan Center for Justice, New York University School of Law, 2011); and Ronald Wintrobe, 

Rational Extremism: The Political Economy of Radicalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University 

Press, 2006).

12 U.S. Government Interagency Counterinsurgency Initiative, U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide (Washington, DC: Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Department of 

State, 2009).

13 Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare, Volume II: 1962–2009, ed. Chuck Crossett 

(Fort Bragg, NC: United States Army Special Operations Command, 2009), xvi.

14 Hegghammer, “Terrorist Recruitment and Radicalization,” 39–60; McCauley and 

Moskalenko, Friction; and McCauley and Moskalenko, “Mechanisms of Political 

Radicalization.”

15 Radical as defined by Merriam-Webster.com, http://www.merriam-webster.com/

dictionary/radical.

16 Patel, Rethinking Radicalization, 1.

17 For a discussion of the various kinds of mobilization and participation, see Casebook on 

Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare, Volume II: 1962–2009.

18 See Syed Mansoob Murshed and Sara Pavan, Identity and Islamic Radicalization in Western 

Europe: Economics of Security Working Paper 14 (Berlin: Economics of Security, 2009), 1–35, 

4; for a discussion of relative depravation, see Gurr, Why Men Rebel.

19 See Stanley Milgram, Obedience to Authority (Harper Perennial Modern Classics, 2009).

20 McCauley and Moskalenko, Friction, 54.

21 Ibid.

22 Hegghammer, “Terrorist Recruitment and Radicalization in Saudi Arabia.” 
I3

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69

23 Paul K. Davis and Angela O’Mahoney, A Computational Model of Public Support for Insurgency and Terrorism: A Prototype for More-General Social-Science Modeling (Santa Monica, CA: 

RAND Corporation, 2013), http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/technical_

reports/TR1200/TR1220/RAND_TR1220.pdf.

24 For a comprehensive review and analysis of the main right-wing insurgent group in 

Colombia, see Katharine Raley Burnett et al., “Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia 

(AUC),” in Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Colombia (1964–2009), ed. 

Summer Newton (Fort Bragg, NC: United States Army Special Operations Command, 

forthcoming), 269–319.

25 Global Terrorism Database, http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/.

26 Jasmin Hristov, Blood and Capital: The Paramilitarization of Colombia (Athens, OH: Ohio 

University Press, 2009), 70.

27 James F. Rochlin, Vanguard Revolutionaries in Latin America: Peru, Colombia, Mexico (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), 148.

28 Mauricio Romero, “Changing Identities and Contested Settings: Regional Elites and the 

Paramilitaries in Colombia,” International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society 14, no. 1 

(2000): 66.

29 Mark Chernick, “PCP-SL: Partido Communista de Peru-Sendero Luminoso,” in Terror, Insurgency, and the State: Ending Protracted Conflicts, ed. Marianne Heiberg, Brendan 

O’Leary, and John Tirman (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007), 58–59.

30 For a fuller account of these interviews, their conclusions, and the motivation and behavior of AUC members, see Burnett et al., “Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC),” 

303–305; and Cristina K. Theidon, “Transitional Subjects: The Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of Former Combatants in Colombia,” International Journal of 

Transitional Justice 1, no. 1 (2007): 66–90. Also see Universidad Nacional de Colombia, 

Observatorio de Procesos de Desarme, Desmovilización y Reintegración, Dinámicas de las 

Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (Bogotá, August 2009), 16, http://alfresco.uclouvain.be/

alfresco/d/d/workspace/SpacesStore/f6c1ffc2-2a02-4823-94fa-2de37c2a7bf1/Universidad%20Nacional%20-%20Dinamicas%20de%20las%20AUC%202009.pdf.

31 Theidon, “Transitional Subjects,” 75.

32 Universidad Nacional de Colombia, Observatorio de Procesos de Desarme, Desmovilización y 

Reintegración, 16.

33 Theidon, “Transitional Subjects,” 75–76.

34 Ibid, 76.

35 Universidad Nacional de Colombia, Observatorio de Procesos de Desarme, Desmovilización y 

Reintegración, 13.

36 Ibid.

37 Ibid.

THRESHOLD OF VIOLENCE

Guillermo Pinczuk and Jameel Khan

73

INTRODUCTION

Violence, at its core, is the deliberate infliction of harm on other 

people or things.1 Within the arena of revolutionary warfare, actors use 

violence as a means to further their cause and realize political ends. 

Members of resistance or insurgent groups are those actors who seek to 

challenge, disrupt, or overthrow the existing order in a society, region, 

or country. Chief among the insurgent group’s means to achieving this 

end is the use of violence. Both the insurgency and the government 

often employ various forms of violence with the ultimate objective of 

defeating the other side and cementing their own governance.

This paper focuses primarily on the insurgent group’s use of violence and the population’s threshold of violence. These concepts can 

be represented with two positively sloped lines (see Figure  1), with 

the lower line indicating the level of violence an insurgent movement 

must use over time as an indicator of its influence and ability to effect 

change, and the upper line indicating the maximum level of violence a 

population will tolerate before abandoning the group.

Maximum level

of violence

Level of violence

Acceptable violence

zone

Minimum level

of violence

Time

Figure 1. Threshold of violence.

However, more precision is required to fully understand the concepts. 

No host population will view an insurgent group’s direct attacks as 

legitimate, so it makes little sense to talk about acceptable levels of violence waged by an insurgent group on a population. However, a populace may look favorably on violence committed by an insurgent group 

against what it sees as a hostile and illegitimate government. The downside, though, is that a certain level of insurgent violence may precipitate 

the government to wage a violent counterinsurgency campaign that 

inflicts significant costs (whether intended or not) on the population 

in question. Hence, for the lines indicating both the upper and the 
74

Special Topics in Irregular Warfare

lower threshold in Figure 1, the violence in question is carried out by 

an insurgent group against a government the host population views as 

hostile or illegitimate.

The insurgent group faces a conundrum: It needs to use a minimum level of violence against its targeted government to project an 

image of strength and attract recruits. At the same time it cannot use 

too much violence because doing so could lead to an aggressive government response that could result in widespread devastation, which, 

in turn, may cause the population to become angry with the insurgent 

group for dragging it into a costly conflict. The canonical example is 

the reaction of the Palestinian populace in the West Bank and Gaza 

Strip to the patterns of violence initiated by the Israeli government 

and Hamas. Complicating matters is the difficulty of measuring the 

thresholds, particularly the upper threshold, because a community is 

not likely to spell out the exact amount of violence it is willing to tolerate. Rather, the upper threshold usually becomes clear through reaction or resistance, and one of the goals of an insurgent group may be to 

attempt to increase the upper limit over time.

This short paper begins with a brief review of the reasons insurgent groups engage in violence against a government; note that these 

reasons extend beyond simply gaining concessions from a government 

or eliminating it entirely. Then there is brief discussion of some of the 

forms of violence used by an insurgent group against a government, 

followed by some preliminary thoughts on strategies a movement may 

adopt if it wants to increase the upper threshold of the acceptable level 

of violence a population is willing to tolerate.

MOTIVATIONS FOR THE USE OF VIOLENCE

Clearly one of the motivations for an insurgent movement to use 

violence is the desire to force a government to make concessions, or 

indeed even a desire to eliminate a government entirely. A more subtle 

notion closely connected to this idea is that of “costly signaling.” Essentially, in most cases an insurgency is much weaker than a government 

and therefore relies on terrorism and irregular techniques to signal to 

relevant audiences their resolve and ability to impose costs. This notion 

is captured by Kydd and Walter, who noted:

Given the conflict of interests between terrorists and 

their targets, ordinary communication or “cheap talk” 

is insufficient to change minds or influence behavior. 

If al-Qaida had informed the United States on September  10,  2001, that it would kill 3,000 Americans 

unless the United States withdrew from Saudi Arabia, 
Threshold of Violence

75

the threat might have sparked concern, but it would 

not have had the same impact as the attacks that followed. Because it is hard for weak actors to make 

credible threats, terrorists are forced to display publicly just how far they are willing to go to obtain their 

desired results.2

Although this passage discusses costly signaling within the context 

of terrorist actions, the concept is also applicable to the irregular or 

unconventional techniques adopted by insurgent movements.

The literature on the use of violence by terrorist and insurgent 

movements also notes that there are other signaling functions associated with using violence. More specifically, signaling through attacks 

on highly symbolic targets can overcome what is known as the collective action problem. This problem is a fundamental one for most insurgencies, so it is explored at some length in this paper.

In the 1960s the economist Mancur Olson3 noted that it is not necessarily the case that rational, self-interested individuals will act in 

support of a collective good or common interest even if doing so will 

better their individual situations. To take a concrete example, security 

is typically considered a collective or public good. In the context of 

international security, the United States has traditionally played an 

important role in providing security to Western Europe, particularly 

during the Cold War—so much so that it has often led to a concern 

among Americans that Europe was “free riding” on American defense 

spending by not spending a sufficient level of their own gross domestic 

product on defense.

The frustration American defense planners and politicians felt at 

low levels of European defense spending reflected frustration with the 

presence of a collective action problem with respect to the provision 

of the common defense of the Euro-Atlantic area. Olson noted a tendency toward the suboptimal provision of public goods, such as defense 

(especially as a group becomes larger) because individual members, 

believing that the collective good will be ensured anyway by the efforts 

of other members of the group, have an incentive to shirk their responsibility to provide for the public good. Such a strategy of free riding 

may be individually rational because often the consumption of a public 

good is available to all, not just to those who took action and paid the 

costs for its achievement. If many members of a group were to behave in 

this manner, this collective behavior would translate into the suboptimal provision of the collective good, and perhaps even its nonprovision.

How might the collective action problem help explain the mobilization challenges faced by insurgent movements? One can regard the 

desired outcome of an insurgency—such as a revolutionary socialist 
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Special Topics in Irregular Warfare

government, a territory under sharia law, a liberal democracy allied 

with the West, or an ethnocratic enclave carved out of a multinational 

empire—as a public good requiring self-sacrifice among the relevant 

population. Yet as McCormick and Giordano noted, insurgency is 

an inherently risky business that, in most cases, offers little probability of success.4

 More specifically, in the initial stages of a rebellion, an 

insurgent group tends to be small and less powerful than the state it is 

fighting. Under such conditions, the collective action problem is often 

insurmountable because most potential supporters (correctly) judge 

that the likelihood of success is remote, thus leaving only a small number of die-hard activists willing to risk their lives for a desired collective 

good. For this reason, most opposition groups die young.

How do groups that do go on to challenge the state for supremacy overcome this initial mobilization dilemma? One such strategy, as 

noted by McCormick and Giordano, is to wage violence against highly 

symbolic representations of state power. Such attacks, if successful, generate violent images that, whether factually correct or not, attest to the 

growing relative strength of the insurgents.5 The process by which this 

happens, and the role of violence in effectuating this process, is captured by McCormick and Giordano (who quote Thomas Thornton):

Violence . . . is used as an instrument of armed propaganda. The objective is to advertise the existence of an 

emerging opposition, raise popular consciousness and 

define the terms of the struggle. As Thomas Thornton 

has suggested, incumbents typically enter an insurgency in a natural state of political “inertia,” even in 

the absence of significant popular support. The insurgents, for their part, begin the game as outsiders, an 

alien political force which “the organism of society will 

be predisposed to cast out.” Before the opposition can 

even begin the process of building a base of popular 

support it must first be able to disrupt the system’s inertial stability. “In order to do this, the insurgents must 

break the tie that binds the mass to the incumbents’ 

by removing the structural supports that give [the system] its strength.” These actions, as Thornton goes on 

to explain, will gradually sever the socio-psychological 

bonds that tie conditional elements of the population 

to the state and force them to choose between a disintegrating status quo and an emerging opposition. This 

cannot be achieved with words; it can only be achieved 

with violence.6
Threshold of Violence

77

If highly symbolic acts are repeatedly carried out, the populace is 

then forced to choose between supporting what it perceives as a crumbling status quo and supporting an opposition that appears to be growing in strength. The natural choice is the latter, both as a result of a 

desire to support the winning side and partake in any spoils of victory 

and to avoid being on the receiving end of score-settling violence that 

may result from having supported the losing side (or not fully supporting the winning side).

Other scholars have noted other functions of violence against a 

state.a Jaeger et al. suggested that violence against Israel serves as a type 

of public good if indeed the Palestinian public desires to continue the 

violent struggle against Israel or if it simply has the desire for retribution.9

 Successful attacks by one Palestinian faction, such as Fatah 

or Hamas, could therefore lead to an increase in popularity for that 

group. Other scholars have noted that successful attacks reveal the 

“high quality” of a group, which signals that it will be successful in 

providing public goods.10 Consistent with this idea, Berman and Laitin 

noted that radical groups are able to carry out effective campaigns of 

violence because the prohibitions they impose on members allow them 

to select only those most committed to the cause of the group, thereby 

weeding out those likely to shirk on their responsibilities.11 Hence, as 

noted by Jaeger et al., “successful attacks against Israeli targets signal 

that the faction responsible has highly committed members and that 

those members will not be tempted by corruption and will deliver good 

governance in other dimensions of public activity as well.”12

a Note that other scholars have advanced various explanations for why insurgent 

groups make threats or carry out attacks directly against populations. For instance, 

Kalyvas7 suggested that insurgent violence against populations is a function of territorial 

control and information. Specifically, he argued that groups do not need to use violence 

against a populace if they already possess a high level of territorial control, and that lacking precise information on the identity and location of the enemy, they may wind up 

using indiscriminate violence. Wood noted that the Frente de Libertaçao de Moçambique 

attacked villages to demonstrate that Portuguese forces could not protect civilians. In general, Wood argued that groups with greater resources have the luxury of enticing populations with various forms of benefits and therefore do not need to use violence to compel 

loyalty or extract resources and recruits from a population. He stated, “In order to credibly and consistently deliver sufficient incentives to encourage and maintain large-scale 

civilian support, insurgents must possess some extant ability to control land, markets, or 

resources. Strong rebel organizations may be able to provide parallel political systems, 

public services, and similar incentives, but such goods exceed the capabilities of most rebel 

organizations. For this reason, weak insurgents are likely to be outbid by the government. 

Even in the context of high repression and low state capacity, incumbent regimes are likely 

able to offer a more competitive deal than insurgents. . . . Facing a highly unequal balance 

of capabilities, weak insurgent groups may view violence as an inexpensive alternative to 

supplying positive incentives to (temporarily) expand their resource base.”8
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TYPES OF VIOLENCE

The types of violence insurgent groups use include facility attacks, 

bombings, assassinations, kidnappings, hijackings, and violence against 

civilians. For example, during its nearly thirty-year campaign to politically separate the Tamil regions of the country from Sri Lanka, the 

Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) waged a terrorist and insurgency campaign that relied primarily on armed assaults and bombings, although a variety of other types of actions were undertaken (see 

Figure 2).

Armed assault 

Bombing/explosion 

Assassination 

Unknown 

Hostage taking (kidnapping) 

Facility/infrastructure attack 

Hijacking 

Hostage taking (barricade incident) 

Unarmed assault 

Figure 2. LTTE attack types.

Additionally, the group employed a wide target list, as shown in Figure 3.

Military 

Private citizens

and property 

Police 

Government

(general) 

Transportation 

Business 

Violent political

party 

Religious

gures/

institutions 

Utilities 

Maritime 

Terrorists 

Unknown 

Government

(diplomatic) 

Educational

institution 

Journalists

and media 

Other

Telecommunication

NGO

Food or water

supply

Airports

and airlines

Tourists

Figure 3. LTTE target types.
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Hizbollah is also an interesting case. In an empirical study highlighting the group, researcher Luis de la Calle concludes “the repertoire of 

violence insurgents can use is determined by its capacity to seize and 

hold territory from the state’s grip.”13 Groups without territorial control 

resort to terrorist tactics—such as improvised explosive devices, bank 

robberies, kidnappings, and assassinations—as they “maximize the 

impact of the act on the targeted audience.” By nature of their small 

size and limited resources, weaker insurgent groups must stay underground, operate clandestinely, and avoid the full brunt of conventional 

military force from the incumbent; surprise “terrorist” attacks are thus 

the best course for their ends.

History reveals this trend among many insurgent groups in their 

nascent development stage, including Hizbollah, Algeria’s National Liberation Front, Sri Lanka’s LTTE, and South Africa’s African National 

Congress. These groups waged campaigns of surprise attacks, public 

bombings, and urban terrorism. By contrast, stronger groups with 

territorial control are better equipped to employ guerrilla tactics—

ambushes, raids, facility attacks, and small-scale battles—against the 

incumbent and have greater capacity to “build larger irregular armies 

and produce more deadly conflicts.” The aforementioned groups, once 

they gained greater strength and more territory, changed their tactics 

from terrorism to guerrilla warfare.

Focusing on the case of Hizbollah, the insurgent group emerged in 

1982 after the Israeli invasion of South Lebanon, and it transitioned its 

tactics from terrorism to guerrilla warfare as a direct result of its territorial gains and its increasing military capacity (with Iran playing an 

important role in supplying the group with military arms). Before 1991, 

the year that saw Hizbollah consolidate considerable political and military might, the group carried out the deadly 1983 suicide bombings of 

the American military barracks in Beirut, killing 241 American and 58 

French troops.14 The group also commonly kidnapped Westerners in 

the 1980s. Together, these two tactics represent “quintessential terrorist” actions for a rogue underground group battling materially stronger 

incumbents. The deputy general-secretary of Hizbollah, Naim Qassem, 

said: “Up until 1985, Hezbollah [sic] was not yet a single entity that could 

stand up and speak for itself . . . the nature of our formation required 

clandestine behavior.”15 After 1991, Hizbollah’s tactics changed. With 

increased legitimacy among the Shiite community, more territorial 

control, and greater military capacity, the group started to “carry out 

raids and assaults against the Israeli Defense Forces that in some cases 

amounted to small scale battles that were sustained for hours.”

When engaging an insurgent group militarily, it is therefore important to assess the group’s level of territorial control and its resources 
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in order to gauge its likely toolkit of violence. Groups with territory 

are more likely to attract more recruits (as a result of their access to 

the population), increase resources, and wage guerrilla-like warfare, 

including facility attacks, small-scale battles, and hit-and-run tactics. By 

contrast, groups without territory are forced to operate clandestinely 

and use terrorist tactics such as improvised explosive devices, assassinations, and kidnappings. As of the writing of this paper, the Islamic 

State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) is a forceful insurgent group gaining considerable swaths of territory in northern Iraq, a trend that has 

seen the group employ more guerrilla and conventional assaults. Conversely, the global Islamist militant group al-Qaeda operates a stateless 

army and wages large-scale terrorist attacks, such as the 9/11 attacks on 

the United States. Carried out by a network of followers, affiliates, and 

adherents, such acts are indicative of organizations without territorial 

control in the places they employ violence.

IMPACTING THE UPPER THRESHOLD 

OF VIOLENCE

Following are some preliminary thoughts on how groups impact the 

upper threshold of violence. The threshold before the start of hostilities 

can be determined by a variety of contextual factors, such as the population’s attitudes toward an insurgent movement and its causes and the 

degree to which the economic and other needs of the population are 

currently being met. It would behoove the leaders of a movement to 

pay attention to such contextual factors before engaging in hostilities 

with the enemy. A useful example is provided by the attitudes of the 

Shia population in southern Lebanon after the 1982 Israeli invasion 

in the southern part of the country to root out the presence of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). It might seem logical that the 

Shia would side with their Muslim coreligionists in the PLO given the 

state of dispossession of the Palestinian people after Israel’s creation in 

the late 1940s and another refugee crisis created after Israel’s victory in 

the Six-Day War in 1967. However, it turns out that the Shia population 

was sick of the depredations of the PLO and had blamed the group 

for reprisal Israeli attacks before the 1982 invasion. In fact, the Shia 

in southern Lebanon initially welcomed the Israeli invasion, greeting 

incoming troops by throwing rice at them. Opinion would soon turn 

against the Israelis as it became apparent that they planned a long-term 

presence in the region. Nonetheless, the point is that the local population by the time of the 1982 invasion had a low (upper) threshold for 

Palestinian violence against Israel because such violence had resulted 

in reprisals that affected the Shia community. This low threshold, in 
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81

turn, resulted from a revealed unwillingness of the population to bear 

the brunt of costs of PLO violence waged against Israel.

Perhaps one of the more important tactics a movement can rely on 

to raise the upper threshold is to goad a government into unleashing 

a counterinsurgent campaign that lacks restraint and, whether intentionally or not, leads to a significant number of deaths of noncombatants and destroys the overall economy of the host society. An obvious 

example is the radicalization of segments of the Palestinian population after wars with Israel that led to many noncombatant deaths and 

the devastation of the economy and infrastructure of the Gaza Strip. 

Bueno de Mesquita and Dickson noted that an indiscriminate counterinsurgent campaign can mobilize support for a group by signaling 

the government’s unwillingness to offer concessions and by reducing 

the opportunity costs for participating in or simply supporting violent 

acts.16 A reduction of opportunity costs refers to the notion that an 

indiscriminate counterinsurgency campaign is likely to lead to the 

widespread destruction of infrastructure and the local economy, and as 

livelihoods are destroyed, potential insurgents would not have to forgo 

earnings that they could have earned had there been a functioning 

economy during the conflict. An indiscriminate campaign may also 

address the free-rider problem, as those who are unsure who to support 

may conclude that they would have greater security by actually joining 

the insurgency and fighting the government.b

However, movements that adopt this strategy play a dangerous 

game. If the damage is extremely widespread, governing in the aftermath of the conflict may be impossible, as the widespread destruction 

of an economy and civil society are likely to hamper the ability to govern, and some segment of the population is likely to blame the group 

for dragging the entire society into an unwanted conflict. After hostilities in 2009, one despondent Palestinian woman whose house was 

destroyed stated:

I will never vote for Hamas. They are not able to protect 

the people, and if they are going to bring this on us, 

why should they be in power? If I thought they could 

liberate Jerusalem, I would be patient. But instead they 

bring this on us.18

b As an accompaniment to the strategy of inducing an indiscriminate counterinsurgency campaign, a group may also suppress information regarding its role in bringing this 

situation about. For instance, during the July 2014 conflict with Israel, Hamas is reported 

to have threatened journalists for reporting that the organization used civilian sites to 

attack Israel. It has also urged social media users not to show evidence of rockets fired 

from population centers and to refer to all casualties as “innocent victims.”17
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More generally, Wood noted that the argument that a population 

traumatized by an indiscriminate counterinsurgency campaign would 

flock to the insurgents rests on an overstated assumption that the 

insurgents have the capacity to protect civilians and safeguard their 

livelihood, which may not be the case. He stated:

While regime backlash may mobilize civilians who 

were already at or close to the point of indifference 

between remaining neutral and supporting the rebels, it does not necessarily follow that most civilians 

would support insurgents in the wake of indiscriminate regime violence. Without credible security guarantees from the rebels, civilians likely have insufficient 

incentive for supporting the risk of insurgents. Indeed, 

civilians may blame the rebels for the escalation in violence and withhold support. Even when government 

forces kill large numbers of civilians, destroy property, 

and use other forms of collective punishments, civilians choose to collaborate with the incumbent’s forces 

if the rebels are seen as week.19

As an example, Wood cited the case of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), an Ethiopian group that fought against a ruling 

military committee known as the Derg, which came to power after the 

overthrow of the Haile Selassie regime in 1974. Wood noted:

The TPLF’s experience in Afar is telling. The Derg’s 

campaign of repression against the Afar generated 

significant grievances among the population but was 

insufficient to drive the people into the arms of the 

rebels. In order for the rebels to profit from Mengistu’s violence, they had to credibly demonstrate their 

commitment to making positive contributions to the 

lives of the Afar. This meant providing benefits such 

as economic development, political and educational 

structures, security, and justice systems.20, c

The upper threshold of tolerance for violence can potentially be 

maintained at a high level if a movement is fortunate enough to have 

an outside sponsor willing to provide resources to pay for reconstruction at the end of hostilities. An example is Iranian sponsorship of 

Hizbollah. Iranian financing has played a vital role in rehabilitating 

c Another example is the recent fighting between Israel and Hamas in Gaza. As one 

political scientist at Al Quds University in East Jerusalem put it, “All these achievements of 

Hamas, if they strike a deal without achieving something for the people of Gaza, they will 

lose everything and will bury themselves.”21
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83

areas of Lebanon devastated by Israeli attacks. For instance, Iran’s Martyrs Foundation has partnered with a Hizbollah-affiliated organization known as Jihad al-Bina' (Holy Reconstruction Organ) to rebuild 

homes destroyed by fighting between Israel and Hizbollah. Representatives of the insurgent group determine the validity of families’ housing 

needs and, if necessary, arrange for the required property transactions. Financing provided by the Martyrs Foundation is used to acquire 

land, with Jihad al-Bina' subsequently developing plans and building 

the finalized structure.22 Reportedly, one month after the 1996 Israeli 

military campaign Grapes of Wrath, Jihad al-Bina' rehabilitated more 

than 2,800 structures damaged by Israel in 106 locations in South Lebanon,23 and recent press reports indicate that Iran has spent $400 million to rebuild Dahiya, a southern suburb of Beirut, after the July 2006 

Hizbollah war with Israel.24

The Martyrs Foundation has also made noticeable contributions to 

the provision of health care, particularly after hostilities. Specifically, it 

financed the construction of the al-Rasul al-Azam Hospital in Dahiya.25

Injured Hizbollah fighters do not pay for medical expenses at this facility, while injured civilians pay 70 percent of their expenses. Such forms 

of outside sponsorship can potentially contribute to the maintenance 

of a high level of tolerance of a population for violence, particularly in 

the aftermath of hostilities.

There are other nonmaterial forms of rewards that a movement can 

offer to potentially maintain or increase the upper threshold of violence. Specifically, it could undertake a number of actions to raise the 

social status of the fallen, such as having its leaders make “Heroes Day” 

or “Martyrs Day” speeches commemorating the fallen, building monuments and painting murals dedicated to the fallen, or hanging oversized portraits of those who have given their lives for the movement. It 

may also decide to create a cult-like devotion to the notion of sacrifice 

or martyrdom, as was done by the LTTE and Iran’s revolutionary leaders. The former argued that sacrifices and martyrdom were necessary 

to bring forward the day of victory, while the latter exalted the fallen 

by claiming they had a privileged place in paradise next to the Prophet 

Muhammad and cherished Shia imams, such as Imam Ali. Speaking 

of one recently fallen member of the Imam Ali garrison of the Iranian 

Revolutionary Guards Corps, one Shia theologian stated, “Where others were found by martyrdom, he looked for it. Praise be to God as he 

will have the fragrance of Imam Hussein.”26 Showing evidence of the 

resolve of the insurgent group is another potential tactic, as in the case 

of the famous cyanide pills all members of the LTTE wore in small capsules around their necks.
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Lastly, many conflicts have a lengthy buildup, with governments 

and insurgents taking a variety of political and military actions in the 

belief that a conflict at some point in the future is likely. That being the 

case, to increase the upper threshold the leaders of an insurgency can, 

whether intentioned for this purpose or not, maneuver the group into a 

position where it is seen as moderate and willing to make political sacrifices while painting the opposing government as obdurate and itching 

for war. An Economist article on the recent fighting in Gaza noted:

More recently, say Gazans, the Israelis under Binyamin 

Netanyahu showed they were determined to destroy a 

peace-minded Palestinian unity government endorsed 

by Hamas and the more moderate Fatah party under 

Mahmoud Abbas, after the failure of Americanbrokered talks between Mr. Abbas and Mr. Netanyahu. The Israeli prime minister made it clear that he 

would never talk to a Palestinian government backed 

by Hamas, even though America cautiously welcomed 

it. So he has done everything, say the Palestinians, to 

thwart it.27

Motivated by such perceptions, a population is likely to tolerate a high 

upper threshold of violence, at least in the initial stages of a conflict. 

As the Economist article also notes, “Firing rockets, many of them [residents of Gaza] argue, is the only way they can protest, even though they 

know the Israelis are bound, from time to time, to punish them.”

NOTES

1 Stathis Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 

2006), 19.

2 Andrew H. Kydd and Barbara F. Walter, “The Strategies of Terrorism,” International Security 31, no. 1 (2006): 50–51.

3 Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009), 1–2.

4 Gordon H. McCormick and Frank Giordano, “Things Come Together: Symbolic Violence and Guerrilla Mobilisation,” Third World Quarterly 28, no. 2 (2007): 295–320.

5 Ibid., 309.

6 Ibid., 307; and Thomas Thornton, “Terror as a Weapon of Political Agitation,” in Internal 

War, ed. Harry Eckstein (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1980), 74.

7 Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, 12–13.

8 Reed M. Wood, “Rebel Capability and Strategic Violence against Civilians,” Journal of 

Peace Research 47, no. 5 (2010): 604.

9 David A. Jaeger et al., “Can Militants Use Violence to Win Public Support? Evidence from 

the Second Intifada,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 59, no. 3 (2015): 528–549.

10 Ibid.
Threshold of Violence

85

11 Eli Berman and David D. Laitin, “Religion, Terrorism and Public Goods: Testing the 

Club Model,” Journal of Public Economics 92, nos. 10–11 (2008): 1942–1967.

12 Jaeger et al., “Can Militants Use Violence to Win Public Support?,” 3.

13 Luis de la Calle, “The Repertoire of Insurgent Violence,” research paper, prepared for 

the American Political Science Association Conference, Seattle, September 2001.

14 CNN Library, “Beirut Marine Barracks Bombing Fast Facts,” CNN, June 13, 2013, www.

cnn.com/2013/06/13/world/meast/beirut-marine-barracks-bombing-fast-facts.

15 Hala Jaber, Hezbollah: Born with a Vengeance (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), 

62.

16 Ethan Bueno de Mesquita and Eric Dickson, “The Propaganda of the Deed: Terrorism, 

Counterterrorism, and Mobilization,” American Journal of Political Science 51, no. 2 (2007): 

364–381.

17 Ariel Ben Solomon, “Hamas Tells Social Media Activists to Always Call the Dead ‘Innocent Civilians,’ ” Jerusalem Post, July 21, 2014; and Lahav Harkov, “Journalists Threatened 

by Hamas for Reporting Use of Human Shields,” Jerusalem Post, July 31, 2014.

18 Ethan Bronner, “Parsing Gains of Gaza War,” New York Times, January 19, 2009.

19 Reed M. Wood, “Rebel Capability and Strategic Violence against Civilians,” Journal of 

Peace Research 47, no. 5 (2010): 604.

20 Ibid.

21 Jodi Rudoren and Ben Hubbard, “Despite Gains, Hamas Sees a Fight for its Existence 

and Presses Ahead,” New York Times, July 27, 2014.

22 Judith Harik, “Hizballah’s Public and Social Services and Iran,” in Distant Relations: Iran 

and Lebanon in the Last 500 Years, ed. H. E. Chehabi (London: I. B. Taurus & Co., 2006), 

282.

23 Ibid., 278.

24 “Hezbollah Heartlands Recover with Iran’s Help,” BBC News, June 12, 2013, http://www.

bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-22878198.

25 Harik, “Hizballah’s Public and Social Services and Iran,” 275.

26 Thomas Erdbrink, “With War at its Doorstep, Iran Sees Its Revolutionary Guards in a 

Kinder Light,” New York Times, July 18, 2014.

27 “Why Hamas Fires Those Rockets,” The Economist, July 19, 2014.

INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 

IN INSURGENCY AND 

RESISTANCE MOVEMENTS

Katharine Raley Burnett, James A. Gavrilis, and Theodore Plettner

89

Information technology is improving communications around the 

world. Today the Internet provides widespread, reliable, long-distance 

communications and technological access. Insurgents and resistance 

movements benefit from these improvements in communications 

technology and use existing popular networks, such as Facebook and 

Twitter, to support their activities.1 The Internet, cell phones, and text 

messaging are all examples of reliable, long-distance, real-time communications systems that greatly enable insurgents and resistance 

movements today but were unavailable only a few decades ago. Insurgents and resistance movements use information technology to conduct operations on the battlefield, swell popular support, recruit new 

members, and finance activities.

These improved capabilities have strengthened insurgent groups 

and raise questions about the appropriate response of governments 

seeking to counter insurgent groups. Directly countering this technology, but limiting access to equipment and networks, is proving to be 

increasingly difficult. Much of the technology groups use is designed 

and distributed for the consumer market, making it nearly impossible 

to restrict access. Taking down websites and removing users from social 

media sites is legally challenging, and sites and accounts can be easily 

replaced. This primer will highlight some of the information technologies that insurgents and resistance movements use to enable their organizations and operations as well as the challenges in countering the use 

of these technologies.

Information technology, specifically social media, was used during the numerous revolutions throughout the Middle East between 

2011 and 2015. Many journalists and scholars are examining the role 

of Facebook and Twitter in these revolutions and political upheavals, 

most notably during the Egyptian revolution ousting Hosni Mubarak 

in February 2011.

In a New York Times article, Jose Antonio Vargas describes “how 

the Egyptian revolution began on Facebook” when Wael Ghonim created the Facebook page “We Are All Khaled Said,” using the name 

of a young man beaten and killed by Egyptian police.2 His Facebook 

page epitomized the oppression felt by many in Egypt. In addition to 

providing a venue for expression, social media provided mass communications to the public. Rob Schroeder explains, “during the Egyptian 

protests, many users posted messages, images, and links to other web 

pages about what was occurring through Twitter. These helped create 

a global conversation about events in Egypt.”3

Similarly, Tunisians were posting Facebook photos of events as they 

occurred, and they communicated using YouTube videos during the 

revolution in Tunisia in January 2011.4 Closer examination is required 
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to determine the exact impact of social media in relation to other factors that may have also played a role in the uprisings.

In the past, developed national militaries were the only organizations 

on the battlefield that had sophisticated communications capabilities 

such as short- and long-range audio, video, and data communications 

networks. These capabilities provided them with a marked advantage 

over the insurgents or resistance movements that used low-tech capabilities such as messengers and landline telephones. In contrast, today, 

insurgents and resistance movements use the same communications 

technologies as their formal military adversaries. Insurgents and resistance movements can use these communications systems, including 

smartphones and satellite phones, to pass information and coordinate 

operations and logistics.

The introduction of cell phones into Afghanistan created competition between the Taliban and the Afghan government as both sides 

attempted to use the new technology to their advantage. The Taliban 

has used text messages to spread propaganda and intimidate the population.5

 The Afghan people also use the cell phone network to anonymously inform the to Afghan government forces of the movements and 

activities of the Taliban. The Taliban has attempted to control the network by forcing providers to shut off phone service at night and attacking cell phone towers of companies that do not comply.6

Taliban informants also frequently used cell phone networks to 

improve the accuracy of indirect fire against US military bases and to 

notify insurgents of US patrol movements so insurgents could successfully place improvised explosive devices or ambush. They used these 

phone networks to provide early warning of an impending US military 

raid on an insurgent base.

In the 2008 Lashkar-e-Taiba attacks in Mumbai, the terrorists 

planned their attack using Google Maps and they carried GPS systems 

with them.7 They were in constant cell phone contact with a command 

center that was monitoring the media coverage of the attack and providing the attackers with information about the identity of hostages. 

Whether individual hostages lived or died was determined by the 

results of a Google search.8 Moreover, insurgents and resistance movements have used cutting-edge information technology successfully on 

the battlefield. For example, an Army press release stated:

When a new fleet of helicopters arrived with an aviation unit at a base in Iraq, some soldiers took pictures 

on the flight line. From the photos that were uploaded 

to the internet, the enemy was able to extract the 

“geotags” and determine the exact location of the 
Information Technology

91

helicopters inside the compound, and conduct a mortar attack, destroying four of the AH-64 Apaches.9

The ability to communicate easily, quickly, and inexpensively with 

audiences near and far has greatly improved the ability of insurgents to 

recruit fighters, generate support among the population, gain necessary skills, and communicate and plan. The response of forces opposing 

these insurgencies must take these changes into account. Some governments have attempted to prevent access to information technology that 

facilitates rebellions, primarily by limiting access to the Internet or shutting down specific websites. The prospects for such actions in the future 

appear dim; increased access around the world means that adversaries 

will find new ways of communicating as soon as one is blocked.

There are also legal obstacles to stopping insurgent activity on the 

Internet. The US government attempted to prevent American groups 

from providing advice and training to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party 

(PKK), in Turkey because the group is a Department of State-designated 

terrorist organization. The government eventually won its legal battle, 

but only after first losing one case in a federal court10 before succeeding on appeal at the Supreme Court.11 The process took six years, illustrating the limitations of relying on legal processes to restrict terrorists’ 

and insurgents’ use of the Internet.

Governments trying to counter insurgents and resistance movements within their borders may want to monitor or control cell phone 

communications in a given area, which can be difficult and costly. 

Cell phone networks are not established in many remote locations in 

Africa, the Middle East, or Central Asia, such as the Sahel, where many 

insurgents and resistance movements take root and grow. Nevertheless, new technologies are surfacing and becoming available to insurgents and resistance movements. In areas that do not have a large-scale 

communications infrastructure, new capabilities are emerging, such 

as Bluetooth bump technology and Wi-Fi mesh networks, that enable 

insurgents to communicate without cell phone networks. Governments 

are challenged in their abilities to trace and monitor these new communications technologies.

Information technology entrepreneurs are developing new ways to 

provide connections throughout the world to grow market space and 

support economic growth in other industries. For instance, the Kenyan 

company BRCK Inc. developed a battery-powered cellular router for 

use when power grids go out or are nonexistent. This router maintains 

connectivity in difficult conditions, transfers data, identifies good cell 

towers, can be repaired remotely, and is able to run a secure network in 

extremely austere locations.12 Unfortunately, the same capabilities that 

support legitimate businesses and communities also enable insurgents 
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and resistance movements. The al-Qaeda global jihad network is an 

example of this trend. Information technology enables al-Qaeda’s network to pursue a transnational agenda across almost every continent. 

The organization’s affiliated groups provide support to a number of 

local jihadist insurgencies in various countries across the globe.13

Information technology provides numerous venues in real time to 

allow disparate groups to conduct mutually supporting activities. For 

example, an insurgent leader can post future actions and intentions on 

Facebook for others to see and then reinforce, if they so choose. This 

hypothetical leader can also use an Internet bulletin board to communicate quickly and immediately worldwide. Furthermore, there are a 

host of software applications and techniques involving private encryption programs, coding photographs, and shared e-mail accounts that 

a user can leverage to hide messages and communications.14 Insurgent 

and resistance movement intelligence operations have been greatly 

enabled by the new information technology tools available. These tools 

provide “cut outs” or hidden connections between insurgent groups 

and individuals, that challenge governments’ ability to identify command and control relationships, if and when they exist. Information 

technology allows insurgent individuals and resistance movements to 

operate in a mutually supporting yet decentralized manner.

The Internet and other information technologies have enabled 

small insurgent groups and resistance movements to amplify their propaganda and draw in regional resources. With technological improvements in mass communications, insurgent groups and resistance 

movements can have a much greater and much faster effect than they 

could in the past because they can reach larger audiences more efficiently. The internet allows individuals and groups wishing to spread a 

message to reach large audiences quickly and inexpensively. In a conflict setting, the Internet has evened the playing field between insurgent 

groups and governments. Governments that previously could monopolize the television, radio, and newspapers are now challenged by groups 

capable of spreading text and video messages over the Internet to both 

the local population as well as a global audience.

In the years after the US invasion of Iraq, insurgents fighting the 

United States began using the Internet for propaganda purposes. Insurgent organizations e-mailed professionally produced newsletters and 

provided links to online videos demonstrating their ability to successfully attack US forces, as well as material justifying their tactics, such as 

suicide bombing, and glorifying martyrs. The combination of different 

materials produced a synergy that allowed the groups to recruit members and build public support.15
Information Technology

93

Because communication is faster, it can be argued that perceptions change faster and the tipping points of mobilization are reached 

more rapidly than in the past. The Syrian Electronic Army’s fake tweet 

hoax is an example of the speed with which communication through 

new information technology can influence people’s perceptions and 

actions. In April 2013, via a hacked news agency’s Twitter account, 

the Syrian Electronic Army tweeted a fake news headline describing 

a bomb attack inside the White House. Panic spread quickly and Wall 

Street reportedly experienced $136 billion in losses.16

Some insurgents and resistance movements make cunning use of 

popular mass media, such as the international news networks, to carry 

their messages. This can potentially sway public opinion toward belief in 

the organization’s mission and belief that the movement is greater (more 

influential) than it really is. In Iraq, US forces identified insurgents 

using websites for regional recruiting and propaganda.17 In Afghanistan, 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces identified the use of 

text messages to pass propaganda and intimidate the population.18 The 

Taliban understands how important control of the population and the 

means of communications are to conflicts, and the group has warned 

that it may shut down civilian phone communications systems.19

Information technology such as Internet videos and DVDs allow for 

more colorful, lifelike, and comprehensive expression of propaganda 

themes. Video may be more impressive than a simple oral story, and it 

allows senior authorities to reach larger audiences than they otherwise 

could.a Anyone with access to the Internet can view propaganda videos 

online.20 Individuals can view a video in private, removed from family 

or friends who may counter the propaganda. Moreover, information 

technology makes producing propaganda easier and faster than ever 

before. During the Russian annexation of Crimea, numerous videos 

were uploaded and viewed as part of an information campaign to support political and military actions there.21 These videos complemented 

news broadcasts from television stations and undoubtedly shaped perceptions about the annexation.

A recent and very successful example of social media use for propaganda and recruitment is the Islamic State (IS). IS has produced 

rap videos, testimonials by soldiers, religious material, and videos of 

their successes in combat and grisly executions, all of which have been 

popularized through social media accounts. Many of the accounts promoting IS are run by individuals who have no real-world connections 

to the organization and who are connected only through the Internet. 

The quantity and diversity of online content has allowed for individuals 

a Hamas’s video of the graduation ceremony of its youth brigades and Fatah’s video 

glorifying female suicide bombers are two examples.
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to be radicalized entirely online, with people who have exhibited no 

history of Islamic extremism surprising family and friends by suddenly 

traveling to Syria to join IS.22

Information technology can help people build and expand networks. 

Insurgent groups and resistance movements may be empowered to stay 

connected to external support networks across borders and throughout 

their region. Although diasporas have been a resource for insurgents 

for many years,23 today‘s information technology enables insurgents to 

garner popular support from diasporas from around the world at much 

greater volumes, speeds, and frequencies than in the past.

Insurgents are sometimes able to raise funds by using these networks. Information technology has played a role in increasing insurgent financing. Information technology has enabled insurgents and 

resistance movements to embed in the myriad of black and gray markets and illicit financial networks, turning insurgency into a profitable 

endeavor.24 For example, in Iraq in 2005 insurgents generated large 

amounts of revenue through gas smuggling, money laundering, narcotrafficking, kidnapping, and extortion, creating a “shadow economy” 

that undermined development of Iraq’s legitimate markets as well as 

the government itself.25 The Iraqi insurgency has become very profitable, and donors from Syria have received a large return on their 

investment.26 Jihadists in Nigeria and northern Mali are now smuggling 

cocaine to Europe, which has generated millions of dollars more than 

their kidnapping activities garnered for their organizations.27

In addition to supporting the financial activities of insurgents or 

resistance movements, information technology supports other forms of 

external support. Political, psychological, and moral support can travel 

through social media with greater regularity than before. Regardless 

of where insurgents are, they now has vast amounts of knowledge available to them on the Internet, including information about how to make 

improvised explosive devices, how to make detonation devices, how to 

resist detention, and how to conduct guerrilla tactics and strategies. Individual insurgents are greatly empowered by this access and connectivity.

There are drawbacks to using information technology for insurgent activities. For instance, if the government is able to identify the 

insurgent or revolutionary, it can take swift action. This was the case 

in Iran during and after the Green Revolution. The Iranian government blocked social media networks to thwart protests, used text messages and e-mails as evidence against protesters and organizers, and 

monitored the calls of Iranians participating in the Green Revolution. 

These government techniques appear to have been successful because 

reports of detention, imprisonment, torture, and murder of protesters 

and opposition leaders followed.28
Information Technology

95

The difficulty governments face when responding to insurgents’ 

use of the Internet is highlighted by the ongoing debate and legal battle involving humanitarian assistance groups in California that were 

providing advice and training to the PKK in Turkey, a US Department 

of State–designated terrorist organization. A federal judge in California ruled that it was unconstitutional to ban “giving expert advice and 

assistance to terrorist organizations.”29 Later in 2010, the US Supreme 

Court ruled that it is illegal to provide any kind of assistance to terrorist organizations.30 This ruling sparked a great deal of backlash from 

groups who say that it prevents humanitarian organizations from helping to find peaceful settlements between warring factions.

The legality of government responses to insurgents’ use of information technology requires much more examination if governments are 

going to be capable of dealing with such use. It appears that it may not 

be effective for a government to try to counter or block any one form of 

insurgent communication, because the effects are short-lived and the 

insurgent or resistance movement can substitute other forms of communication. Governments will need more sophisticated techniques to 

identify the user, insurgent, or movement and then take action against 

the individual or group and not the form of information technology 

used. In addition, governments will need to come together to develop 

laws and enforcement mechanisms, both national and international, 

to instill more accountability and discipline in the use of national, 

regional, and international communications systems.

Information technology is continuing to advance, and insurgent 

groups will undoubtedly find ways to adapt new technologies to their 

struggles. To respond to the increased capabilities of these groups, the 

United States and other nations interested in countering insurgent activities will have to develop the ability to exploit insurgents’ use of technology, adapt to the changing information environment of the Internet, 

and increasingly engage with worldwide populations targeted by online 

propaganda. More research is needed to explore specifically how information technologies are enabling these movements. In particular, it 

would be useful to explore how information technologies are improving 

the functionality of insurgent organizations and impacting popular sentiments about resistance movement objectives and the overall influence 

of these technologies on the outcomes of conflicts and revolutions.

NOTES

1 Shaun Waterman, “Terrorists Discover Uses for Twitter,” Washington Times, April 28, 2011.

2 Jose Antonio Vargas, “Spring Awakening: How an Egyptian Revolution Began on Facebook,” New York Times, February 17, 2012.
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3 Rob Schroeder, Sean Everton, and Russell Shepherd, “Mining Twitter Data from the 

Arab Spring,” CTX2 no. 4 (November 2012).

4 Ethan Zuckerman, “The First Twitter Revolution?” Foreign Policy, January 14, 2011.

5 “ISAF Discusses Insurgent Propaganda Messaging,” International Security Assistance 

Force – Afghanistan Headquarters press release, August 5, 2010, http://www.isaf.nato.

int/article/isaf-releases/isaf-discusses-insurgent-propaganda-messaging.html.

6 Jon Boone, “Taliban Target Mobile Phone Masts to Prevent Tip-offs from Afghan Civilians,” The Guardian, November 11, 2011.

7 Gabriel Weinmann, “New Terrorism and New Media,” The Wilson Center Research 

Series, vol. 2 (Washington, DC: Commons Lab of the Woodrow Wilson International 

Center for Scholars, 2014).

8 Marc Goodman, “How Technology Makes Us Vulnerable,” CNN, July 29, 2012.

9 Cheryl Rodewig, “Geotagging Poses Security Risks,” US Army press release, March 7, 2012.

10 David Rosenzweig, “Judge Rules Against Patriot Act,” Los Angeles Times, January 27, 2004.

11 Chris McGreal, “U.S. Supreme Court: Nonviolent Aid to Banned Groups Tantamount to 

‘Terrorism,’ ” The Guardian, June 21, 2010.

12 Heidi Vogt, “Made in Africa: a Gadget Startup,” Wall Street Journal, July 10, 2014.

13 Seth Jones, “Resurgence of al Qaeda,” RAND Review 36, no. 2 (Fall 2012).

14 Weinmann, “New Terrorism and New Media.” 

15 Jake Tapper, “Iraqi Insurgents Increasingly Use Internet as Propaganda Machine,” ABC 

News, February 14, 2006.

16 Weinmann, “New Terrorism and New Media,” 8.

17 Tapper, “Iraqi Insurgents Increasingly Use Internet as Propaganda Machine.”

18 “ISAF Discusses Insurgent Propaganda Messaging.” 

19 Jon Boone, “Taliban Target Mobile Phone Masts to Prevent Tip-offs from Afghan Civilians,” The Guardian, November 11, 2011.

20 Laura Collins, “ ‘Jihad Cool’: The Young Americans Lured to Fight for ISIS Militants with 

Rap Videos, Adventurism, and Firsthand Account of the ‘Fun’ of Guerrilla War,” Daily 

Mail Online, June 19, 2014.

21 “Putin Awards Russian TV for Crimea Coverage: Kremlin-Controlled Media Accused of 

Propaganda Role,” Ukraine News One, May 6, 2014.

22 Collins, “ ‘Jihad Cool.’ ”

23 Daniel Byman et al., Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements (Santa Monica, CA: 

RAND, 2001).

24 David Grange and J. T. Patten, “Assessing and Targeting Illicit Funding in Conflict Ecosystems: Irregular Warfare Correlations,” Small Wars Journal (September 2009).

25 Robert E. Looney, “The Business of Insurgency: the Expansion of Iraq’s Shadow Economy,” The National Interest (Fall 2005): 70.

26 Bilal Wahab, “How Iraqi Oil Smuggling Greases Violence,” The Middle East Quarterly 13, 

no. 4 (Fall 2006): 53–59.

27 Rachel Ehrenfield, “Drug Trafficking, Kidnapping Fund Al Qaeda,” CNN, May 4, 2011.

28 “Iran: Halt the Crackdown: End Violent Attacks on Protesters, Arrests of Critics,” Human 

Rights Watch, June 19, 2009. Also see Narges Bajoghli, “Iranian Cyber-Struggles,” The 

Middle East Research and Information Project, May 3, 2012.

29 Rosenzweig, “Judge Rules Against Patriot Act.”

30 Chris McGreal, “U.S. Supreme Court: Nonviolent Aid to Banned Groups Tantamount to 

‘Terrorism,’ ” The Guardian, June 21, 2010.
THREAT FINANCE

Timothy Wittig

Portions of this work were adapted from Chapter 4, “Financing,” in 

Undergrounds in Insurgent, Revolutionary, and Resistance Warfare, 2nd ed., 

ed. Robert Leonard (Fort Bragg, NC: United States Army Special 

Operations Command, 2012), 57–73.

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INTRODUCTION

From the Taliban in Southwest Asia to al-Shabaab in the Horn of 

Africa to drug-trafficking organizations in Mexico, the behavior, capabilities, and ultimate success or failure of terrorist, criminal, and other 

transnational threats are closely tied to economic and financial factors. This close link among an adversary’s operational, strategic, and 

financial dynamics is widely recognized and has spawned a boutique 

art aimed at countering and taking advantage of what has come to 

be known as “threat finance” within not only the Special Operations 

Forces (SOF) but also within conventional military units, interagency 

counterterrorism and intelligence efforts, law enforcement, and the 

financial and charity sectors.

Finances are the lifeblood of an insurgent or revolutionary movement. Wise insurgent leaders think of financial matters as a key and 

defining activity of the overall strategy and ideology of the movement, 

rather than as a peripheral matter. The nature of the movement’s financial strategies tends to color the entire organization, in some cases in 

ways that undermine its founding ideology. When an insurgency dips 

into the lucrative illegal drug trade, it attracts attention. When an insurgency robs or extorts citizens within a country, it gains a reputation as 

a criminal organization. When a group subsists off of substantial funding from a foreign power, it tends to be viewed as a puppet organization 

taking its cues from that distant power. Likewise, the manner in which 

a movement handles acquired funds tends to characterize the organization in the eyes of the indigenous population. Insurgencies that 

distribute funds to impoverished citizens gain favor as the champions 

of the underprivileged. Conversely, leaders who succumb to the temptation of corruption tend to bring discredit on their organizations.

An economically sustainable insurgency is complex and must balance a number of critical factors. The insurgency must raise sufficient 

funds to sustain its operations and activities, but it must do so in ways 

that do not undermine its popular support. Undergrounds must do 

business with a myriad of people and suppliers, many of which are not 

sympathetic or are even antagonistic to the group’s cause. Terrorists, 

insurgents, and revolutionaries today must not only be entrepreneurs 

and businesspeople, but they must also know how to navigate and move 

smoothly between informal traditional local economies and highly formalized Western commercial systems. In the places where most insurgencies operate today, informal business is the norm, and trade and 

business are based on trust and long-term relationships—often within 

a particular cultural group. In these places, laws and regulations tend 

to be flexible, governments corrupt, patronage rife, and paperwork 

easily made to say whatever it needs to. Learning to understand and 
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leverage for advantage how militant underground movements navigate 

these dynamics is critical to determining successful SOF strategies.

When cultivating and supporting an underground, developing 

sustainable financial strategies and tactics can often be just as important as any other activity. Conversely, government forces conducting 

counterinsurgency must examine sources and management of insurgent finances as part of their overall strategy to defeat the movement. 

On a strategic level, exploiting an insurgency’s financial vulnerabilities 

can negatively impact an adversary’s operational, social, political, economic, or other capabilities and can provide friendly forces with critical insights regarding the adversary’s behaviors, relationships, trends, 

and strategies. Tactically, exploiting threat finance dynamics can simultaneously help identify an insurgent group’s critical capabilities and 

uncover its (sometimes hidden or counterintuitive) vulnerabilities. In 

particular, information about a threat’s finances can be leveraged to

• disrupt enemy supply lines for needed equipment, people, or 

services;

• shape the adversary’s behavior to create tactical windows of 

opportunity;

• degrade the adversary’s specific operational capabilities;

• disrupt the enemy’s exploitation of local economy;

• reduce the enemy’s disruption of development projects;

• strengthen the local population’s independence from enemyconnected value chains;

• undermine the enemy’s relationships with patrons, proxies, and 

the population;

• discredit the enemy’s objectives, operations, and propaganda; 

and

• create or validate advantageous propaganda narratives, among 

other things.

Threat finance is a critical issue for both undergrounds and SOF. 

Learning to understand economic and financial dynamics and leverage them for effect is a critical and perhaps underused weapon in our 

national arsenal.

FUNDING MECHANISMS OF RESISTANCE GROUPS

Nothing can happen for insurgent movements without money. 

Financing revolutionary movements is a key underground function, 

and the very methods of obtaining funds have a direct impact on the 

nature, ideology, and strategy of the movement. It is conceivable that a 
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101

spontaneous resistance movement might emerge from public dissatisfaction, a protest march, or a riot, but sustaining and growing a movement into something that will effect change requires time, patience, 

and, above all, money.

Depending on their activities, undergrounds may need money to 

pay salaries, to finance advances in support of missions, and to purchase communication equipment and materials (e.g., Internet access 

and propaganda publications) and materials for sabotage (e.g., explosives), among other things. An underground may also extend aid to 

families who shelter refugees to help defray the families’ costs; this 

occurred in Belgium during World War II after the Nazis eliminated 

many resistance collaborators from the bureaucracy. Previously, these 

sympathizers supplied fugitives with documents enabling them to 

switch identities and hold jobs. When these collaborators were removed 

from their positions, many evaders were forced into hiding, and money 

for their care was supplied by the treasury of the Armée de Belgique.

Financial aid may also be extended to the families of underground 

workers who have been captured or forced to flee. An example is the 

support the Luxembourg resistance provided to the dependents of 

4,200 persons who were deported and nearly 4,000 who were sent to 

prisons and concentration camps during the Nazi occupation. L’Oeuvre 

Nationale de Secours Grande-Duchesse Charlotte not only provided 

immediate care for orphans but also gave each a thirty-thousand-franc 

trust fund. At the same time in Belgium, the Mouvement National 

Belge began the Fonds de Soutien (Funds for Support) for the families of workers in hiding. Similarly, Hamas (or Harakat al-Muqawama 

al-Islamiyya) and other Palestinian resistance movements offer families of suicide bombers or other “martyrs” financial compensation as a 

means of encouraging other impoverished families to produce fighters 

for the cause.

Money is also needed for bribery. Insurgencies thrive under corrupt 

governments, and undergrounds often disperse money to key officials 

to obtain their protection or silence. Bribery also plays a part in subversion and intelligence gathering. In most areas of the world, money 

equates to power and influence.

An underground may also channel funds to military units to pay 

salaries and buy supplies. In the Philippines, one of the prime responsibilities of the Communist Politburo in Manila was to obtain money 

for the Hukbalahap movement; and in Malaya, the Min Yuen was the 

major supplier of money to the rebels, often obtaining funds by extorting money from large landowners and transportation companies and 

appropriating cash from Communist-dominated unions. Hizbollah in 

Lebanon required money to maintain a sizable guerrilla force, along 
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with missiles aimed at Israel. In a similar manner, undergrounds that 

support a guerrilla component require reliable funding sources.

Some insurgencies require funds to support their social outreach 

work and shadow government activities. Just as legitimate state governments struggle with the rising cost of medical care, unemployment 

insurance, food aid, housing subsidies, and pensions, some insurgent 

movements also struggle to provide similar services in an attempt to 

undermine the government, care for their constituents, and provide a 

cover for illegal and violent activities. These activities are expensive and 

require sustained and reliable income.

The cost of high-profile individual acts of violence tends to be miniscule compared with the overhead costs of simply sustaining and administering the underground, auxiliary, armed component, and public 

component. Spectacular acts of terror can inspire increased devotion 

and donations from supporters for a relatively low cost. But the day-today administration required to sustain and grow a movement is considerable.1

 Undergrounds obtain financing through a combination of 

external and internal sources.

EXTERNAL SOURCES OF MONEY

Foreign Governments

Often an underground is aided by an outside sponsor, usually a government, but more recent examples include sponsorship by non-state 

actors. Much of the money used by the anti-Nazi Belgian resistance 

of World War  II, for example, came from franc reserves in London 

released by the British government. At one time, these reserves provided ten million francs per month. Similarly, many of the funds used 

by the French resistance were remitted from the Bank of England or 

sent from the Bank of Algiers (after the Allied landing in North Africa). 

The Viet Cong’s resistance against the government of South Vietnam 

and its American allies was funded by both China and the Soviet 

Union, as well as by the authorities in Hanoi. Some external sponsors, 

such as Colonel Muammar Qadhafi in Libya, supported a number of 

different insurgencies. Qadhafi provided funding to groups ranging 

from Charles Taylor and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in 

Liberia and Sierra Leone, respectively, to the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) in Northern Ireland. However, other sponsors, such 

as Iran, tend to focus their sponsorship funding on insurgencies that 

advance the interests of Shia populations and those that undermine 

Israeli (and Western) influence, such as the Palestinian cause.
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103

Foreign governments extend support to undergrounds for several 

reasons. The most important reason is that the activities of an underground often contribute to the defeat of a common enemy. Such aid 

also enables the sponsor to demand some reciprocity on the part of 

the underground. However, an outside government may give financial assistance to an underground even if there is no common enemy. 

According to one report, such a case occurred in 1940 when the Japanese government—not yet allied formally with Germany and Italy—

provided the Polish underground in Rome with financial aid as well 

as technical equipment and Japanese passports in exchange for intelligence data on the German and Soviet occupying forces.2

Non-State Actors

In addition to governments, friendship societies or quasi-official 

aid groups may channel funds to an underground. Perhaps the best 

known of the latter was the Jewish Agency, which, during the Palestine 

revolution, had offices or representatives in every part of the Western 

world. In the run-up to the Israeli War of Independence, Palestinian 

Jews obtained critically needed financing from fellow Jews throughout 

the world, especially in Europe and the United States. Open appeals 

for money were made in newspapers and lectures and at charity balls 

and other social events.3

The vast majority of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) 

financing came from the large Tamil expatriate community, especially 

those contingents in Western countries (Canada, the United Kingdom, 

Australia, the United States, and Scandinavia) but also those living in 

the Indian province of Tamil Nadu. Indeed, many analysts identify 

the overseas Tamil communities as the single most important actor 

enabling the insurgency. Expatriate support included voluntary contributions from individuals and Tamil-owned businesses, as well as funds 

extorted from expatriates. LTTE collection methods evolved over time, 

from poorly coordinated, often violent acts of coercion to scheduled 

collections managed by computerized databases that allowed overseas 

collectors to avoid paying visits to individuals who supported rival Tamil 

groups or who were already regular contributors. Collections were made 

monthly or annually; additional collections were made according to 

special dates commemorating specific battles or individual “martyrs.” 

Information was also collected on extended families residing elsewhere 

in order to lend credibility to threats against those who did not make 

expected donations. A 2009 Canadian intelligence report revealed that 

the community of expatriates and sympathizers within Canada was one 

of the top contributors to the LTTE, with donations of approximately 
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$12  million per year. After the LTTE lost control of the Jaffna peninsula in the mid-1990s, this source of financing became increasingly 

important, by some accounts providing up to 90 percent of the group’s 

operating funds. However, the classification of the LTTE as a terrorist group by most Western countries, the result of an intense lobbying 

effort by anti-LTTE forces, put a serious strain on LTTE’s ability to 

raise and transfer expatriate funds and was probably a major contributor to the Tigers’ defeat in 2009.4

The main source of overseas funding for the New People’s Army 

(NPA) in the Philippines during the Ferdinand Marcos administration 

was humanitarian organizations, including a number of European 

churches, and radical groups in Europe. The Communists, working 

through their public face, the National Democratic Front (NDF), touted 

the NDF as the only viable opposition to the human rights abuses of the 

Marcos regime. By 1987, the NDF had attracted the support of numerous international human rights organizations and established support 

networks in more than twenty-five countries. The NPA strategy was 

to divert resources from the nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) 

through aboveground institutions that were run by NPA supporters 

under the auspices of rural aid and development. These organizations 

remained a major source of support even after the fall of Marcos.5

PIRA likewise relied on support from abroad. The group turned to 

the United States for money and weapons as soon as it was organized 

enough to send agents abroad, and the Irish communities of Boston 

and New York proved very supportive. In 1969, the Irish diaspora in the 

United States was five times the size of the population of Ireland. The 

Irish Northern Aid Committee (NORAID) was set up in New York City 

in 1970 to provide a steady stream of money to the IRA, mostly for the 

purchase of weapons.6

Charities and nonprofit organizations are attractive sources of 

funding for insurgent undergrounds because they tend to be less regulated and scrutinized than publicly owned corporations, and some 

have a global reach and presence, administering considerable sums of 

money. Insurgencies can abuse charities through fraud (e.g., appropriating monies from a real charity intended for charitable purposes and 

using them to fund the movement instead); through a sham organization (i.e., creating an entirely bogus charity that poses as legitimate); 

or through co-opting a charity’s money (i.e., using the money for the 

purpose intended by the donators but administering and distributing 

those funds through the insurgency).7
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105

Cash in the Local Currency

Aid is often given in the form of cash in the local currency, which 

has the advantage of being easily exchanged for goods or services. 

The main problem is the physical transfer of the money. Usually this is 

handled by a front business organization through diplomatic channels, 

clandestine couriers, or infiltrated agents. A growing concern and challenge for counterinsurgency organizations, however, is the expanding 

ability to transfer money internationally using informal funds transfer 

(IFT) systems, such as the hawala system in the Middle East, fei-ch'ien in 

China, hundi in India, and padala in the Philippines. These systems can 

provide cash in the local currency for the recipient and are discussed 

in more detail in the “Parallel Financial Systems” section.

Substitute Currency

Stable, widely convertible (“hard”) currency, such as US dollars or 

British pounds, is sometimes given to an underground when the sponsoring government lacks adequate reserves of the local currency. Hard 

currency makes a good substitute because it is easily exchanged on the 

black market for local currency or goods. Hard currency is also useful 

when the local currency is confiscated by the authorities and replaced 

by scrip, a frequent government countermeasure. The Castro regime 

took this measure soon after the Cuban Revolution.

Dollars were used extensively in financing World War  II undergrounds. One British agent in Yugoslavia reported that it was no trouble 

to use dollars (or gold pieces) because “there was invariably a market 

for ‘good’ money in the towns.”8 More recent developments include 

the potential use of electronic credits accrued and traded via mobile 

phones as a means of transferring funds from one location to the next, 

especially in East Africa where the use of this type of electronic currency is commonplace and the cash value for online video-gaming 

credits can be acquired and traded with little visibility.9

Counterfeit Money

One other way to finance an underground movement is through 

the use of counterfeit money. For example, Chechen separatists established multiple production facilities in cities and mountainous regions 

to produce counterfeit US dollars. Although production of counterfeit money is not exclusively the province of a sponsoring government, undergrounds usually lack the necessary facilities and technical 
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competence to produce counterfeit money; therefore, the main effort 

is generally undertaken by friendly governments.

Of course, the use of counterfeit money adds to the dangers underground members already face. During World War II, this factor reportedly prompted the Polish state underground to reject an offer of 

counterfeit money from London. It is possible that advances in digital 

printing technology could encourage insurgent groups to turn more to 

counterfeiting as a revenue source in the future.

Online Fraud

Insurgencies increasingly use illegal online operations to steal 

money or goods. Techniques include credit card and online banking 

fraud. In some cases, insurgents purchase stolen credit card or bank 

account numbers and passwords from criminal organizations and then 

use that information to withdraw money from compromised accounts 

or to buy goods directly. This avenue of obtaining funds illegally highlights an ongoing conflict between insurgents exploiting vulnerabilities 

in global computer networks and various government and international 

organizations attempting to fix those vulnerabilities and shut down 

online fraud through technical means, legislation, and enforcement.

Parallel Financial Systems

Islamic history and culture gave rise to an innovative and effective 

approach to financing insurgency as practiced by members of the Muslim Brotherhood and al-Qaeda. Hasan al-Banna, the founder of the 

Muslim Brotherhood, viewed finance as a critical weapon in undermining the infidels and reestablishing the Islamic caliphate. To meet these 

goals, he believed Muslims needed to create an independent Islamic 

financial system that would parallel and later supersede the Western 

economy.10 Al-Banna’s successors set his theories and practices into 

motion, developing uniquely Islamic terminology and mechanisms to 

advance the Brotherhood’s system of faith, as well as its unique financial apparatuses.

President Gamal Abdel Nasser negated the Brotherhood’s attempt 

to establish an Islamic banking system during the mass arrests in 1964. 

But Saudi Arabia welcomed this Egyptian dissident idea, and in 1961, 

King  Saud bin  Abdul  Aziz funded the Brotherhood’s establishment 

of the Islamic University in Medina to proselytize their fundamentalist Islamic ideology. In 1962, the Brotherhood convinced the king 

to launch a global financial joint venture that established numerous 

charitable foundations around the world. This joint venture became 
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107

the cornerstone of the Brotherhood and was used to spread Islam 

(and later to fund terrorist operations) worldwide. The first of these 

charitable organizations were the Muslim World League and Rabitta 

al-Alam al-Islami, which united Islamic radicals from more than twenty 

nations. In 1978, the kingdom backed another Brotherhood initiative, 

the International Islamic Relief Organization, an entity that has been 

implicated in funding organizations such as al-Qaeda and Hamas.

Most Muslim nations collect mandatory Islamic charity (zakat) 

of approximately 2.5 percent of annual income from Muslim institutions and companies.11 Zakat is intended to go to those who are less 

fortunate. However, the Brotherhood determined that those engaged 

in jihad against the enemies of Islam are entitled to benefit from the 

charitable offering. Muslims widely accept the interpretation that modern jihad is a serious, purposefully organized work intended to rebuild 

Islamic society and state and to implement the Islamic way of life in the 

political, cultural, and economic domains, and thus those involved in 

jihad are viewed as legitimate recipients of zakat.

12

The rise of global militant Islam, and al-Qaeda in particular, also 

benefited from the use of parallel financial systems. The roots of alQaeda lie in a number of different organizations, including the Maktab 

Al Khidamat (MAK) or Services Office, a clearinghouse established to 

facilitate the recruitment, transportation, organization, training, and 

equipping of Arabs to support the Afghan resistance. Established by 

Abdullah Yusuf Azzam, a Palestinian scholar of Islamic law, and Osama 

bin Laden in Peshawar, Pakistan, in 1984, the MAK also attracted other 

militant leaders.a The MAK consisted of a network of international 

recruiting offices, bank accounts, and safe houses and was also responsible for the construction of paramilitary camps for the training of 

militants and the fortifications used by Arab fighters.13,b Between 1982 

and 1992, estimates report approximately thirty-five thousand foreign 

fighters contributed to the Afghan effort, although there were probably 

never more than two thousand in Afghanistan at any one time. The 

a Azzam, who earned a PhD from Cairo’s Al-Azhar University, was a charismatic character and played a central role in crafting the narrative of resistance that drew thousands 

of Arabs to the Afghan cause. His previous combat experience (he fought the Israelis in 

1967), combined with his religious credentials (his education and his connections with the 

family of Sayyid Qutb, an important ideological leader of the early Muslim Brotherhood), 

made him a particularly appealing figure to bin Laden. Omar Abd Al-Rahman, an Egyptian militant also educated at Cairo’s Al-Azhar University and a key ideological figure for 

both Al-Jama'at Al-Islamiyya and the EIJ, also used MAK’s resources to contribute to the 

Afghan resistance.

b Azzam originally established the MAK and later persuaded bin Laden to join. 

Bin Laden used his family’s relationship with the Saudi royal family to support the effort 

overtly—through a strategic communications plan—and covertly, eventually matching US 

financial contributions to the resistance.
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MAK was responsible for training approximately twelve thousand to 

fifteen thousand of those fighters, with approximately four thousand` 

remaining connected through either chain of command or ideological 

affinity after the conflict.14 To complicate the tracking of finances, leaders used parallel financial systems drawn from historical Islamic roots.

Both the Egyptian Islamic Group (EIG) and the Egyptian Islamic 

Jihad (EIJ) likely used these mechanisms to their advantage. EIG often 

sought donations during Friday prayers at mosques to facilitate its 

social outreach programs. It is unknown how much of this funding 

went toward illicit activity; however, it is presumed that the preponderance of the collected funds was reinvested into public and legal organizational activities. The extent of the aid EIJ received from outside of 

Egypt is not known, although the Egyptian government has claimed 

that both Iran and Saudi Arabia have provided financial and material 

support to EIJ.15

Given the prevalence of obtaining funds through such means, 

it may be assumed that EIJ obtained some funding through various 

Islamic NGOs, cover businesses, zakat funding operations, and possibly, 

although not likely, criminal acts.16 The most evident external support 

to EIJ was its symbiosis with al-Qaeda and its increasing dependence on 

that organization. Few exact figures exist; however, from 1996 to 1997, 

EIJ received more than $5,000 per monthc from al-Qaeda.

In the hawala system, money is transferred from a worker in one 

country to a worker in another country through the use of intermediary hawaladars in each country. Although a fee (cash, goods, or services) is charged for this transaction, the fee is usually much less than 

that charged in the formal banking sector, and this system also allows 

for the transfer of funds to and from countries and regions with limited 

financial infrastructure.17

INTERNAL SOURCES OF MONEY

Noncoercive Means

Gifts

Voluntary gifts from wealthy individuals and, occasionally, from 

commercial enterprises have constituted a good source of income for 

c In late 1996, Dr. Ayman Al-Zawahiri traveled clandestinely to a number of former 

Soviet Caucasian republics (including Chechnya) and in December of that year was 

arrested by a Russian patrol in Dagestan. He was released in May, having stuck to his cover 

story without being identified by the Russians; however, he was chastised by al-Qaeda 

members for his carelessness and saw the subsidy (paid to EIJ by al-Qaeda) lowered to 

$5,000 during his imprisonment.
Threat Finance

109

many undergrounds and are easier to hide from security forces. A few 

wealthy Chinese businessmen in Manila made large gifts to the Hukbalahap; the Malayan Min Yuen received substantial aid from several 

Chinese millionaires in Singapore. Many industrialists and bankers 

provided funds for the anti-Fascist underground in Italy. However, 

donor firms in France during the resistance encountered difficulties 

in hiding their donations from the Germans, and this hampered the 

exploitation of this potential source of revenue. In addition, financial 

gifts to the underground can also come from friends and relatives of 

underground workers and, given the manpower and opportunity, an 

underground may canvas door to door for contributions. Finally, dues 

levied on underground members can also provide needed funds.

Loans

The underground may also borrow funds. The Yugoslav Partisans, 

for example, floated a twenty-million-lira loan, which was marketed 

among the Slovene populace as “Liberty Loans”; and Belgian banker 

Raymond Scheyven’s Service Socrates organization, in the name of the 

government-in-exile, managed to borrow more than two hundred million francs for the anti-Nazi Belgian underground from the end of 1943 

until the Allied liberation of Belgium.

An underground worker attempting to solicit funds from strangers is sometimes challenged to convince them of the agent’s good 

faith. The underground worker may provide strangers with an officiallooking document authorizing him or her to collect funds and sign 

notes. The Service Socrates used a more complicated system, however. 

This organization invited prospective lenders to suggest a phrase to be 

mentioned on British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) radio broadcasts on a given night. The underground passed the requests on to the 

London authorities, the phrase was broadcast at the designated time, 

and the individuals knew that they were dealing with bona fide agents 

of the underground. To safeguard the Service Socrates and the Belgian government in London against future false claims, lenders were 

given certificates stating the amount of the loans and bearing a number. Raymond Scheyven, using his pseudonym Socrates, signed these 

certificates, and a copy of this signature was on file in London for comparison at the time of repayment after the war.

If the underground can borrow in the name of some constituted 

authority such as a government-in-exile, it is more likely to receive a 

favorable response than if funds are sought in the name of an aspiring 

underground whose trustworthiness as a debtor organization may be 

in doubt. As one writer expressed it, governments-in-exile provide necessary “symbols of legalism.”18
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In addition, if an underground has access to some form of collateral, such as oil distribution networks or diamond fields, it may be able 

to secure funding, weapons, and other needed assets in exchange for 

granting access to this collateral or resource. The RUF in Sierra Leone 

obtained funds and weapons from Liberia and Libya in exchange for 

diamonds and access to mines.19

Embezzled Funds

An underground may obtain funds that have been embezzled from 

government agencies, trade unions, businesses, and nongovernmental 

organizations. An example is the secret appropriations that the Danish 

resistance received from the Royal Treasury to support the publication 

Information. Also, misappropriated grand duchy revenues constituted 

perhaps half of the money raised for the anti-Nazi resistance in Luxembourg. Trade union funds were embezzled on a fairly large scale by 

Communist leaders of Malayan trade unions in the years 1945–1947 

and provided a major source of income for the Malayan Communist 

Party (MCP) until the British replaced the Communists with unionists loyal to the government. In Somalia, drought relief funding and 

supplies were interdicted by al-Shabaab to support its network, and 

in Rwanda, an estimated $112 million worth of foreign aid was used 

to purchase weapons—mostly machetes—from France, South Africa, 

and Egypt.20

Sales

The sale of various items through door-to-door canvasing or 

through “front” stores may provide money to resistance groups. Yugoslav Communists once sold fraudulent lottery tickets. The Luxembourg 

resistance sold lottery tickets as well as photographs of the grand duchess. In post-World War II Malaya, the MCP treasury was supplemented 

by funds obtained from party-owned bookstores, coffee shops, and 

even small general stores. Similarly, the Yugoslav Communists raised 

money through sales at party-owned clothing stores.

Coercive Means

Robberies

To bring in money, undergrounds frequently resort to robberies. 

The Hukbalahap in the Philippines, for instance, was able to collect 

funds by staging train robberies. Likewise, the Organisation de l’Armée 

Secrète (Organization of the Secret Army/Secret Armed Organization, 

or OAS) in Algeria conducted a series of bank robberies. In Malaya, the 

Communists formed a “Blood and Steel Corps” to engage in payroll 
Threat Finance

111

robberies and raids on business establishments. Business firms, rather 

than individuals, are usually the targets of such robberies. The LTTE 

used numerous methods to mobilize resources to sustain operations. 

These methods included various criminal activities, such as bank robberies, extortion, and the smuggling of drugs and other contraband, 

but they also included more traditional fund-raising activities that also 

incorporated varying levels of coercion.21

Undergrounds generally avoid outright confiscations from the general populace for several reasons. First, widespread robberies tend to 

brand an underground as an outlaw band and destroy its public image 

as a potential legitimate authority. Second, simple confiscations of 

money are usually not as successful as other forms of coercion in making the victims compliant servants of the underground. Finally, robberies preclude the possibility of exacting continued support under the 

threat of exposing the affected persons’ assistance to the underground.

Kidnapping and Hijacking

Kidnapping to collect a ransom has been a practice of insurgent 

groups around the world, including al-Nusra and Islamic State militants 

in Syria and Iraq, the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia 

(Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, or FARC) in Colombia, the 

Taliban in Afghanistan, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in 

Northern Africa, and the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger 

Delta (MEND) in Nigeria. These organizations use elaborate networks 

of middlemen and negotiators to exchange their captives for funding. During the period of 2005–2010, AQIM alone raised an estimated 

$65 million from kidnappings, which accounted for 90 percent of its 

revenue and an average rate of $6.5 million for a Western hostage.22

The dramatic escalation in hijackings off the Somali coast and into the 

Red Sea and Indian Ocean in 2008 to 2012 reportedly also lined the 

pockets of al-Shabaab insurgents who charged pirates and their villages 

a protection fee or tax after the ransom is paid.

Forced “Contribution”

Although undergrounds usually do not rob the public in an effort 

to avoid alienating their constituency, they sometimes coerce individuals into making donations under the tacit threat of reprisals. This technique is usually applied aggressively only to wealthier targets. The OAS 

in Algeria fixed the amounts of contributions to be exacted from persons in professional occupations but allowed people of modest means 

to give what they wanted. A target received a typewritten note in the 

mail informing him or her that a percepteur of the OAS would call in 

the near future to collect his or her contribution. Percepteurs were well 
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Special Topics in Irregular Warfare

dressed and curt but polite. If their credentials were questioned—some 

crooks tried to extort money in the name of the OAS—they could show 

a photostat message signed by the commander in chief of the OAS, 

General Raoul Salan. If the person refused to pay, he or she would 

not be threatened, but a week later his car or home would probably 

be bombed with plastic explosives. The OAS would then increase its 

assessment to cover the cost of the reprisal. After a few such object lessons, most of the people approached were willing to make a “contribution,” and many agreed to make regular payments.

From its inception, the FARC in Colombia survived in part by 

obtaining funds through extortion, kidnapping and hostage-taking, 

and stealing supplies. At first, the FARC filled its coffers through extortion, using tactics that resembled those used by the Sicilian Mafia. 

The FARC asked businesses whether they needed “vaccinations.” One 

Colombian Coca Cola distributor that decided it did not need to be 

inoculated suffered the FARC’s response: forty-eight burned delivery 

trucks, eleven kidnapped workers (with seven eventually killed), and 

four hundred robberies.23

The Yugoslav Partisans were able to use this coercive technique to 

their political as well as financial advantage. By exacting large amounts 

from landowners, the Partisans were able to weaken their political 

opponents, and going one step further, they eliminated some of these 

political competitors by denouncing them to the Germans as helpers of 

the underground. A check of landowners’ financial records sometimes 

revealed unaccountable deficits, which led to the landowners’ arrest 

and the confiscation of their properties.

An underground may suffer a setback, however, if a popular person refuses to contribute and the underground does not dare to make 

the usual reprisal for fear of public indignation. A case in point is the 

widely publicized refusal of the French actress, Brigitte Bardot, to aid 

the OAS. Such a response serves to weaken the image of infallibility 

and complete control that the underground tries to cultivate.

Taxes

Taxes may be levied against the general public in areas where 

enemy forays are not frequent or serious enough to prevent underground municipal administrators from collecting taxes with the backing of nearby military units. Taxes may be levied on a per-capita basis, 

as was done in Philippine areas under Hukbalahap control, or they may 

be levied on a more selective basis, affecting only persons with regular 

incomes above a certain level, as was apparently the practice in the Slovene area of Yugoslav Partisan control.
Threat Finance

113

The LTTE raised funds domestically by levying taxes on the population, especially in the early stages of the conflict. Those who could not 

pay were often incarcerated, while those families with sons or daughters 

serving in the cadres were exempt. Proof of payment of this tax served 

as a pass for traveling through LTTE-controlled territory and for serving in administrative positions. Extracting payment was relatively inexpensive; once the LTTE established its reputation for ruthlessness, few 

families had to be reprimanded.

For the Taliban, the decision to formalize and tax the heroin economy led to significant revenues for the insurgency. By 2000, Afghanistan produced three times more opium than the rest of the world 

combined, with 96 percent of this Afghan production taking place in 

Taliban-controlled territory. The Taliban collected a 20  percent tax 

from opium dealers and drug transporters, leading to an annual tax 

revenue base of approximately $20 million by 2000.24

Narcotics and Black Market Trade

Modern insurgencies have increasing connections to illegal drug 

trade throughout the world. The burgeoning industry of supplying 

marijuana, cocaine, methamphetamine, heroin, and other drugs offers 

opportunities for financing that most underground leaders find too 

lucrative to ignore.

Although extortion and kidnapping sustained the FARC for many 

years, growing the “little guerrilla army” required a corresponding 

growth in funding. To do this, during the Seventh Guerrilla Conference, 

the FARC developed a plan to leverage four commodities on the black 

market: livestock, commercial agriculture, oil, and gold. This revenue 

would not prove to be enough, however. Eventually, without departing 

from the extortion and kidnapping, FARC reluctantly became involved 

in the narcotics trade. Initially, both Manuel Marulanda and Jacobo 

Arenas were opposed to las drogas for ideological reasons. In the long 

run, however, pragmatism won. The flow of illicit money and goods 

through FARC-controlled areas was just too rich a source to ignore. In 

1998 alone, for example, armed groups involved in the marketing of 

illegal narcotics in Colombia saw proceeds in excess of $550 million. 

Still, the FARC became involved piecemeal. Its first step was to tax narcotraffickers while protecting the peasant farmers who grew the coca, 

a practice that was not unlike its “inoculations.”25

The estimates of financing FARC obtained through narcotics range 

from at least $30 million annually to as high as $1.5 billion. In fact, the 

FARC became so sophisticated that it developed standard costs for the 

drug trade that in October  1999 equated to $15.70/kilo for cocaine 

paste, $5,263 to protect a laboratory, and $52.60 to protect a hectare of 
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coca. At one point, the FARC was responsible for exporting 50 percent 

of the cocaine consumed worldwide. Whatever the figure, the revenues 

from the narcotics trade still represented only half of the FARC’s funding. The Colombian government suggests that the rest came from the 

FARC’s classic funding lines of kidnapping, robbery, and extortion.26

Involvement in the drug trade or other black market activities often 

impacts the organization’s core ideology and strategy. The FARC experience, again, is illustrative. With the new drug trade came money and 

corruption. Some FARC members in coca-rich areas began to live as 

drug lords, replete with gold jewelry, fancy cars, and other luxuries. 

This created dissent in the ranks as FARC members who stayed true to 

the guerrilla life realized others were living as gangsters. To solve this 

problem, the FARC leadership created the National Financial Commission. Responsible for allocation of all FARC funds, including major purchases, the commission reported directly to the central leadership. A 

system was developed wherein all FARC units were given a funding line 

and direction in how to use it. When these measures did not completely 

solve the corruption issue, the senior leaders assigned ayudantías, or 

advisers, to monitor what was happening at every level and provide 

advice to local leaders from time to time. If they suspected any foul 

play, the ayudantías would call for an investigation. Theft or even misappropriation of FARC funding was punishable by death.27

Sendero Luminoso, the Maoist insurgency in Peru, likewise became 

involved in the illegal drug trade. By the mid-1980s, having expanded in 

the primary coca-producing region of Peru, the Upper Huallaga Valley, 

the Sendero Luminoso, or the Shining Path, was able to tap the profits 

of the drug traffickers. To exploit the ever-burgeoning cocaine trade, 

the group sent units into the Upper Huallaga Valley to identify and 

kill government enforcement agents and their supporters. Once they 

had taken effective control of the region, Sendero members served as 

middlemen between the coca growers and the drug traffickers, reportedly receiving 10 percent of the sale of every kilo of coca and earning 

between $20 and $50  million annually, which was used to purchase 

weapons and pay militants. Although Abimael Guzman originally disavowed any connection between Sendero Luminoso and the ongoing 

drug trafficking along the Andean ridge, pragmatic considerations 

appear to have triumphed. However, the perceived disconnect between 

Sendero’s purported ideological purity and its involvement in the black 

market drug trade did impact its legitimacy.
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115

TACTICAL ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

Obtaining Operational Advantage via Understanding and 

Influencing the Adversary’s Economic Behavior

“Amateurs talk strategy, professionals talk logistics.”

—General Omar Bradley

From sanctions to development programs, economic and financial 

instruments of national power are crucial components of military and 

interagency operations, strategy, and planning, but they are often underused or misused. The behaviors, capabilities, and ultimate success or 

failure of an adversary—or indeed also an ally—are closely tied to and 

sometimes determined outright by economic and financial factors. 

These factors not only impact an actor’s conduct and capabilities but also 

reflect their social, political, and operational relationships and dynamics. This reality makes adversaries vulnerable to disruption, destruction, or manipulation of their economic and financial relationships, 

access points, and supply lines and also opens up potentially important 

new subsets of exploitable information against or in support of a given 

actor. Economic and financial instruments are thus, as current joint 

doctrine observes, some of “the most powerful ideas in the arsenal of 

US power”28—a reality also reflected in the emerging interagency focus 

on “counter-threat finance” (CTF), as well as anti-trafficking, antimoney laundering, and other distinct but related efforts.

The problem, however, is that despite a consensus across the US 

government and among allies that understanding and influencing 

the economic domain is important—even to the extent of waging a 

so-called financial war on terrorist threats—to date this potential has 

gone largely unrealized. For example, military efforts to track and disrupt the financial bases of the insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan 

remain unsystematic and ad hoc, with some notable successes but also 

wasted effort and unrealized potential.29 Efforts of civilian agencies 

are similarly disconnected from both complementary programs within 

other agencies and even the economic realities of the threats they are 

meant to counter, particularly when it comes to understanding and 

exploiting adversaries’ economic activity outside of monetary-based 

Western formal financial systems. Overall, this lack of coordination in 

understanding the economic bases of our adversaries has resulted in 

a situation in which, in the words of knowledgeable observers, we are, 

“looking in the wrong places,”30 “asking the wrong questions,”31 and 

“fighting terror with error”32 to such an extent even that “our enemies 

are laughing at us.”33
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Partly, this is because economic and financial realities inherently 

resist simple definitions and categories, narrowly conceived and separated bureaucratic responsibilities, or direct and simplistic application 

of power, especially in societies outside of North America and Western Europe.d It also requires in a sense “knowing everything about 

everything,” in that successful use of economic and financial instruments depends on collecting and exploiting—correctly—often highly 

localized and tactical information, even though the impact of these 

instruments can be strategic and global in effect.34 But even more significantly, this failure relates to the lack of a holistic, systematic, “bigpicture” methodology for integrating and using for effect relevant 

information and practice—most of which, this paper argues, already 

exist but exist at local and tactical levels. Without such a methodology, 

use of economic and financial instruments will continue to have, at 

best, only ad hoc and sporadic impact, at least in terms of the ability to 

actually achieve national objectives rather than to simply justify organizational budgets and missions.

Overview of the Tactical Economic Analysis Methodology

Tactical economic analysis (TEA) is a holistic, systematic, big-picture 

methodology for integrating and using for effect information and practice relevant to economic and financial instruments of national power, 

initially within the Department of Defense but also eventually across 

the US government and among US allies as well as within the private 

and nongovernmental sectors.

In summary, the methodology applies the F3EAD (find, fix, finish, exploit, analyze, disseminate) focused targeting method to the economic and financial domain. The TEA method starts with two parallel 

baseline assessments of the target adversary’s critical economic and 

financial requirements as well as of the local economic and human 

terrain with which the actor must interact to meet these requirements. 

From this, one can then identify potential targetable vulnerabilities 

via investigation of particular gaps, overlaps, linkages, and anomalies 

between these two baselines, and in turn develop potential courses of 

action, assess them (for impact, risks, and deconfliction of effort), and 

ultimately decide on, execute, and exploit for advantage one or more 

of the vulnerabilities.

The TEA method was developed in 2011 by the political economist 

Timothy Wittig in partnership with the US Army Asymmetric Warfare 

d This is a paraphrase of FM 3-05.130’s description of some of the inherent difficulties of unconventional warfare—phrasing that fits here as well.
Threat Finance

117

Group in Fort Meade, Maryland, and later refined with input or funding from the Naval Special Warfare Development Group; the US Special Operations Command CTF detachments at US Pacific Command, 

US Africa Command (USAFRICOM), and US Central Command; the 

Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory; and numerous 

other military, civilian, and academic partners.

Focused targeting is a process for “developing actionable intelligence and hitting targets” in a way that “maintains the initiative” 

against an adversary. Although systematic and iterative, focused targeting is as much art as science, and a key factor for success is the methodical and continuous analysis and exploitation of ground intelligence 

“to conduct immediate follow-on operations.”35 TEA offers a means to 

achieve similar successes within and via the economic domain and thus 

represents a potentially important contribution to the CTF, counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, civil affairs, and counternarcotics mission sets, especially 

pertaining to nonlethal targeting, and improving collection of human, 

communications, and open-source intelligence.

The primary innovation of the TEA methodology is its shift of analytic focus from individuals or networks (which are often easily replaced 

or reconstituted) to “value chains” and the threat’s interaction with them. 

Targeting threat actors’ access to that which they most value enables 

more holistic approaches to countering, undermining, and defeating a 

variety of transnational threats to the United States. In particular, TEA 

makes the following general contributions to existing military practice:

• A common lexicon for the economic and financial dimensions of 

adversary activity

• A method for systematically identifying adversary vulnerabilities 

(economic and noneconomic)

• A method for identifying and evaluating potential courses of 

action against these vulnerabilities

• A framework for prioritizing adversary-related economic and 

financial information and intelligence that is applicable across 

different mission sets, geographic locations, and operational 

contexts

• A framework for linking existing information and practice, in 

particular CTF, anti-trafficking, and anti-money laundering 

programs with wider political, diplomatic, military, law 

enforcement, intelligence, and foreign aid efforts

• A structure with which policy, action, training, and acquisition 

for economic and financial instruments of national power can be 

made more accountable and can be better assessed and evaluated
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Overall, the TEA method dispenses with the pretense of being the 

“next big thing” and instead emphasizes above all better integration 

and use of existing information and practice to gain advantage against 

an adversary via targeted exploitation of its economic dimensions. 

The following sections outline the concepts, tools, and informational 

requirements of each component of this proposed methodology, along 

with how these apply to the case of al-Shabaab in Somalia.

Establishing a Baseline: The Analyze Phase

The analyze phase is the first and in many ways most important 

phase of the TEA method. It consists of two parallel informational 

baselines—(1) the human and socioeconomic terrain in which the 

adversary operates and (2) the adversary’s material and nonmaterial 

needs and how these are met. The focus for each is on initial rather 

than comprehensive observation that is conducted within one’s own 

resource, authority, and other constraints. That said, the unavoidable 

fact is that the better and more comprehensive these baselines are, the 

more efficient and more effective the later targeting will become.

Using PMESII-ASCOPE for Threat Finance Exploitation

One baseline is an assessment of the socioeconomic terrain, or 

in other words the licit and illicit markets, goods, services, and value 

exchange systems in a given area of operations, as well as the social, 

political, and economic structures that shape and are shaped by them. 

The information requirements for the socioeconomic terrain assessment are, in general terms, the same as those required for a PMESIIASCOPE assessment (see Table 1 for a sample PMESII-ASCOPE table).

The emphasis is on collection and aggregation of information about 

both specific entities (e.g., people, businesses, and locations) as well as 

value chains (i.e., the ways in which these entities interact with one 

another to produce or trade economic value). The concept of the value 

chain is important as it explains how various PMESII-ASCOPE factors 

relate to and interact with one another for the economic advantage or 

disadvantage to an adversary or ally. Various definitions of value chain 

exist,e but the term is most simply understood as the flows of economic 

e The term value chain is a useful but somewhat unsettled concept within academic 

literature, defined variously yet similarly as: “the shifting governance structures in sectors producing for global markets;” “the process by which technology is combined with 

material and labor inputs, and then processed inputs are assembled, marketed, and distributed;” and “the sequential set of primary and support activities that an enterprise performs to turn inputs into value-added outputs for its external customers.” For an extended 

discussion of the value chains in context of contemporary threats, see Wittig.36
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119

value that circulate from, to, or through a particular time and place. 

The key innovation of this methodology is to holistically (and typically 

nonlethally) target enemy interaction with these flows, rather than simply target the entities of which they (often only temporarily) consist. 

The details of this interaction will vary widely over time and place, but 

for reference the following list specifies which PMESII-ASCOPE elements are most commonly useful for this baseline analyze phase assessment of the relevant socioeconomic terrain:

• Aid, charity, religious, and educational entities

• Aid, charity, religious, and educational value chains

• Commercial practices and customs

• Financial services, entities

• Financial services, value chains

• Goods traded

• Goods, value chains

• Governmental organizations, entities

• Governmental organizations, value chains

• Laws/regulations/related authorities

• Productive enterprises, value chains

• Productive enterprises, entities

• Real properties

• Real property, value chains

• Services available

• Sociopolitical movements

• Souks/bazaars/marketplaces, entities

• Souks/bazaars/marketplaces, value chains

• Taxes/tariffs/checkpoints, entities

• Taxes/tariffs/checkpoints, value chains

• Trade/trafficking routes, entities

• Trade/trafficking routes, value chains

• Transportation systems, entities

• Transportation systems, value chains
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Table 1. Sample PMESII-ASCOPE table.

P	
  

Poli&cal

M	
  

Military/

Security

E	
  

Economic

S	
  

Social

I	
  

Infrastructure

I	
  

Informa&on

A	
  

Areas

District	
  	
  /	
  	
  

Provincial	
  

Boundary	
  

Improvised	
  

Explosive	
  Device	
  

(IED)	
  Sites,	
  

Military/

Insurgent	
  Bases	
  	
  

Bazaars,	
  Farms,	
  

Repair	
  Shops	
  

Picnic	
  Areas,	
  

Bazaars,	
  Mee&ng	
  

Sites	
  

Irriga&on	
  

Networks,	
  

Medical	
  Services	
  

Radio,	
  Gathering	
  

Points,	
  Graffi&,	
  

Posters	
  

S	
  

Structures

Shura	
  Halls,	
  Court	
   House	
   Police	
  

Headquarters,	
  

Military	
  Bases	
  

Bazaars,	
  Banks,	
  

Industrial	
  Plants	
   Mosques,	
  Wedding	
  Halls	
  

Roads,	
  Bridges,	
  

Electrical	
  Lines,	
  

Dams	
  

Cell/Radio/TV	
  

Towers,	
  Print	
  

Shops	
  

C	
  

Capabili&es

Dispute	
  

Resolu&on,	
  

Judges,	
  Local	
  

Leadership	
  

Military/Police	
  

Enemy	
  Recrui&ng	
  

Poten&al?	
  

Access	
  to	
  Banks,	
  

Development,	
  

Black	
  Market	
  

Tradi&onal	
  

Structures,	
  

Means	
  of	
  Jus&ce	
  

Ability	
  to	
  Build	
  /	
  

Maintain	
  Roads,	
  

Dams,	
  Irriga&on	
  

Literacy	
  Rate,	
  

Phone	
  Service	
  

O	
  

Organiza&ons

Governmental	
  

organiza&ons,	
  

NGOs	
  

Coali&on	
  and	
  

Host	
  Na&on	
  

Forces	
  

Banks,	
  

Landholders,	
  

Economic	
  NGOs	
  

Tribes,	
  Clans,	
  

Families	
   Governmental	
  Ministries,	
  

Construc&on	
  

Companies	
  

News	
  

Organiza&ons,	
  

Mosquies

P	
  

People

Governors,	
  

Councils,	
  Elders,	
  

Judges	
  

Coali&on/Host	
  

Na&on	
  Military/

Police	
  Leaders	
  

Bankers,	
  

Landholders,	
  

Merchants,	
  

Hawaladars,	
  

Criminals	
  

Religious/Civic	
  

Leaders,	
  Elders,	
  

Families	
  

Builders,	
  

Contractors,	
  

Development	
  

Councils	
  

Civic/Religious	
  

Leaders,	
  Family	
  

Heads	
  

E	
  

Events

Elec&ons,	
  

Mee&ngs,	
  

Speeches,	
  Trials	
  

Kine&c	
  Events,	
  

Military/Police	
  

Opera&ons	
  

Drought	
  Harvest,	
  

Business	
  Opening	
  

Weddings/

Deaths,	
  Births,	
  

Funerals,	
  Bazaar	
  

Days	
  

Road/Bridges,	
  

School	
  

Construc&on,	
  

Well	
  Digging	
  

Fes&vals,	
  Project	
  

Openings	
  

In practice, economically relevant PMESII-ASCOPE information is 

just as likely to be highly specific and localized as it is to be general and 

broad, and it will be of uncertain significance until the find and fix 

phases of the TEA method are completed. For instance, a study conducted for the Naval Special Warfare Development Group and National 

Defense University on al-Shabaab’s financing between 2009 and 2012, 

when the group was the de facto government in both Somalia’s capital Mogadishu and the southern half of the country, found that one 

of al-Shabaab’s key exploitable vulnerabilities was its relationship with 

the lucrative sugar trade through southern Somalia’s ports. This finding was based on, among other things, the following PMESII-ASCOPE 

information:

• An estimated twenty thousand to forty  thousand metric tons 

of sugar were imported each year into southern Somali ports, 

primarily Kismaayo but also Marka, Baraawe, and Buur Gaabo 

Eel Ma'an Qudha.

• Al-Shabaab effectively governed these ports and controls the 

territory around them, meaning that the group is able to earn 

considerable revenues—an estimated $7 to $10 million per year, 

or 10  percent of its annual revenue, according to the United 

Nations (UN)—from taxing the sugar trade moving through 

these ports.
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121

• The bulk of this sugar was shipped in fifty-kilogram sacks 

into Somalia by import-export businesses based—and legally 

registered— in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and it was then 

smuggled overland into Kenya for resale.

• In Kismaayo, for example, the import duty for sugar and other 

foodstuffs was, as of April 2011, $1.00 per fifty kilograms—a rate 

set by the Kismaayo port authorities who by necessity must abide 

by what al-Shabaab dictates and which doubled compared to 

winter 2011.

• This lucrative value chain appeared to be dominated by just two 

UAE-based companies—Nour Mowafaq General Trading LLC 

and Sinwan General Trading LLC—with which al-Shabaab has 

apparently established mutually beneficial business relationships.

• Sugar imports in Somalia are historically closely linked to the 

export trade in charcoal via the same ports, meaning that it is 

likely that targeting the sugar import trade will help eliminate 

the charcoal trade as well.

Although the tools available to obtain this initial observation of the 

economic terrain features will vary in accordance with the resources 

available in a specific area of operations, in general they will include 

existing or custom-tasked intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance and atmospherics reporting; relevant civilian information products (e.g., economic development data); academic publications; media 

reporting; and interviews (formal and informal) with local civilians, 

researchers, and other knowledgeable parties. USAFRICOM, for example, has a number of programs that could, hypothetically at least, provide economic terrain information, including the command’s Social 

Science Research Branch Socio-Cultural Analysis Teams, which has 

a deployed element in Djibouti, and the various ad hoc partnerships 

and exchanges USAFRICOM and other relevant US government entities (such as National Defense University’s Africa Center for Strategic 

Studies) regularly conduct with universities and individual external 

researchers. In the context of the al-Shabaab case study, economic terrain information was obtained from the following sources:

• Interviews (formal and informal) with members of the Somali 

diaspora in Nairobi, Djibouti, and Dubai; employees of 

humanitarian NGOs working in Somalia; US government officials, 

primarily from the US Agency for International Development and 

the Departments of State, Defense, and Justice; UN officials; and 

researchers and journalists working in or reporting on Somalia

• Personal observation, especially of business and trade dynamics 

in Nairobi, Djibouti, and Dubai
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• Published academic research and media reporting, especially 

economic anthropology literature that details the ethnography 

and technical processes of trade and business in and via Somalia 

and within Somali diaspora communities

• Gray literature, such as unreleased internal reports from relevant 

organizations and other unpublished material

Regardless of the specific mixture of tools used, it is important to 

note that virtually all of this economic terrain information is already 

being collected by someone, but may not be—and indeed probably is 

not being—applied to relevant efforts or missions.

The specific outputs of an economic terrain program will vary 

depending on resources and organizational priorities but in general 

will include mechanisms and authorities to request and collect relevant 

information (such as internal taskings or requests for information from 

external partners), as well as some kind of repository for this information (such as a database, a series of relevant and appropriately updated 

reports, maps and graphics, or even simply an individual tasked to 

this purpose).

Overall, the economic terrain baseline requires a focus on initial 

rather than comprehensive collection and analysis (any gaps or deficiencies that exist can and will be filled in later as needed), and given 

that most of the required information is likely already accessible, commitment to identifying reliable and high-quality sources of economic 

terrain information regardless of whether they are military or nonmilitary, classified or open source, or friendly or not.

Adversary Critical Resource Assessment

The other baseline to be conducted in parallel as part of the analyze phase is referred to as the adversary critical resource assessment. 

The critical resource baseline also emphasizes initial rather than comprehensive or definitive observation of known threat actors within an 

area of operations and the goods, services, and economic systems they 

use or control. When combined with economic terrain assessment, 

this is analogous to persistent surveillance of the economic bases of 

the enemy. The information requirements for the adversary critical 

resource assessment are outlined in Table 2.

As many readers will immediately note, much of this information—

economic and noneconomic—is already collected and aggregated via 

established channels (such as those related to the specially designated 

nationals lists, high-value individuals lists, joint effect list, or Joint prioritized effects list), as well as by various other analysts including other 

own-government offices (e.g., economic development), academics and 

researchers, and allied governments. In the case of the al-Shabaab 
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123

study, similar sources were used, although with perhaps a heavier 

reliance on interviews with NGO and governmental officials and the 

gray literature.

As with the parallel economic terrain assessment described above, 

the desired end state is not a final, comprehensive picture but simply 

an initial observation of the enemy’s economic requirements, activities, relationships, and dynamics to serve as a baseline from which systematic, targeted analysis can be conducted. As such, the tangible end 

products for this phase may include, depending on one’s resources and 

organizational priorities, intelligence requirements for field and headquarters elements; related databases, reports, and bulletins; and reachback support from other agencies or allied governments.

Table 2. Information requirements for adversary critical resource 

assessments (for each threat actor present).

Background attributes:

• Demographic composition 

(ethnic, sex, age, religion, etc.)

• Ideologies (explicit and implicit)

• Objectives, strategies, and tactics

– Military

– Political

– Socioeconomic

– Internal organizational

• Internal structures, processes, 

and culture (e.g., hierarchies, 

networks, discipline, dispute 

resolution, etc.)

• Personalities

• Leadership

• Other key personnel

• External relationships

Critical resources and resource 

requirements:

• Financial resources

• Human resources

• Logistical resources

• Military resources

• Sociocultural resources

• Political resources

Economic interaction with:

• Aid, charity, religious, and 

educational entities

• Financial services entities

• Governmental organizations 

entities

Economic interaction with (continued):

• Productive enterprises entities

• Souks/bazaars/marketplaces 

entities

• Taxes/tariffs/checkpoints 

entities

• Trade/trafficking routes entities

• Transportation systems entities

Social interaction with:

• Aid, charity, religious, and 

educational entities

• Financial services entities

• Governmental organizations 

entities

• Productive enterprises entities

• Souks/bazaars/marketplaces 

entities

• Taxes/tariffs/checkpoints 

entities

• Trade/trafficking routes entities

• Transportation systems entities

Access to:

• Aid, charity, religious, and 

educational institutions, value/

supply chains of

• Financial services industry

• Goods, trade flows in

• Governmental organizations, 

value/supply chains of

• Productive enterprise, value/

supply chains of

• Real property market
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Access to (continued):

• Souks/bazaars/marketplaces, 

value/supply chains of

• Taxes/tariffs/checkpoints, value/

supply chains of

• Trade/trafficking routes, value/

supply chains of

• Transportation systems, value/

supply chains of

Influence on:

• Aid, charity, religious, and 

educational institutions, value/

supply chains of

• Financial Services industry

• Goods, trade flows in

• Governmental organizations, 

value/supply chains of

• Productive enterprise, value/

supply chains of

• Real property market

• Souks/bazaars/marketplaces, 

value/supply chains of

• Taxes/tariffs/checkpoints, value/

supply chains of

• Trade/trafficking routes, value/

supply chains of

• Transportation systems, value/

supply chains of

Servicing of:

• Aid, charity, religious, and 

educational institutions, value/

supply chains of

• Financial services industry

• Goods, trade flows in

• Governmental organizations, 

value/supply chains of

• Productive enterprise, value/

supply chains of

• Real property market

• Souks/bazaars/marketplaces, 

value/supply chains of

• Taxes/tariffs/checkpoints, value/

supply chains of

• Trade/trafficking routes, value/

supply chains of

• Transportation systems, value/

supply chains of

Material support to and from:

• Material support to adversary’s 

nonviolent operations

• Material support to adversary’s 

violent operations

• Material support to sociopolitical 

movements related to adversary

Individual transactions:

• Locations

• Entities involve

• Date-Time Group

• Relevant linkages

One ancillary benefit of the framework presented here is that it 

provides a home for pieces of data that appear relevant but the actual 

usefulness of which may be unclear. For instance, the al-Shabaab case 

study exposed the following data points about the group’s critical 

resource requirements, among thousands of others:

• Financial resources: A firefight with African Union Mission 

to Somalia (AMISOM) forces in Mogadishu costs al-Shabaab 

approximately $10,000 per hour (before the group’s withdrawal 

from the city in July 2011).

• Human resources: Al-Shabaab uses adoosi as conscript fighters. 

(Adoosi, the Somali word for slave, typically refers to ethnically 

Bantu Somalis who historically have been exploited by militias to 

fight in exchange for being able to loot civilian villages.)
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125

• Sociocultural resources: Al-Shabaab appears to be a fully covert 

organization outside of Somalia, including in Eastleigh, Nairobi, 

the predominantly Somali area of the city and where media 

reporting had indicated the group operates openly.

Prioritizing Finite Analytic Resources: The Find Phase

The second phase, the find phase, of the TEA methodology aims 

to identify and investigate points of information that may indicate 

potentially exploitable vulnerabilities in the target group’s economic, 

social, political, military-operational, or other behavior. Most simply, 

this information is uncovered by comparing the two baselines from 

the analyze phase to identify and then investigate any evident gaps, 

overlaps, or anomalies that may indicate exploitable interaction by the 

enemy with known economic terrain.

The analyze phase by design is a clearinghouse for the huge amount 

of information about the adversary and its socioeconomic contexts. The 

find phase, by contrast, aims to identify only the highest priority sets 

of information—the suspicious activities or red flags—against which 

an organization’s finite analytic resources can be tasked. The intended 

end state of this phase therefore is a well-planned and well-executed 

investigation of each point of suspicious activity to determine whether it 

represents a vulnerability that could possibly be exploited for advantage 

in some way. When it does, then courses of action against this vulnerability will be developed in the following fix phase of the method. However, often such investigations will result in a determination that the 

identified suspicious activity should not be promoted to the fix phase, 

because for example it had an innocent (or at least nonthreatening) 

explanation or perhaps simply a lack of corroborating evidence. Even 

in these cases, the TEA method helps ensure that no effort is wasted, in 

that even unsuccessful investigations will necessarily result in improved 

analyze phase baselines, which will be useful in future cases.

In the Somalia study, dozens of potential vulnerabilities in alShabaab were identified using this method, which for the purposes of 

brevity can be aggregated into seven major vulnerabilities:

1. Sugar imports: Al-Shabaab gains significant revenues from 

taxing the importation of sugar into Kismaayo and other 

southern Somali ports, a trade that is dominated by only two 

UAE-based companies with which al-Shabaab is believed 

to have close, but primarily transactional, relationships. 

By targeting these particular relationships, a major 

source of revenue for the group could be disrupted if not 

eliminated outright.
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Special Topics in Irregular Warfare

2. Charcoal exports: Similar to the sugar trade, al-Shabaab 

taxes the exportation of charcoal produced in Somalia to 

primarily the Gulf states, via privileged business relationships 

with a small number of UAE-based shipping companies. 

This vulnerability is similar to the vulnerability related to 

the sugar trade.

3. Air traffic: Al-Shabaab relies on regular (scheduled and 

chartered) air transport links between southern Somalia 

and nearby countries for transport of cash, supplies, and 

personnel, most of which is legal or quasi-legal. Systematic 

monitoring of air traffic in and through al-Shabaab-controlled 

areas could yield important tactical-level intelligence about 

the group.

4. Material supporters: Al-Shabaab obtains significant 

financial and logistical support from both state and nonstate supporters, ranging from cash donations from wealthy 

sympathizers to logistical and technological support from 

state governments. This support is in many ways shallow 

and transactional, depending completely on al-Shabaab 

continuing to be a proxy through which its supporters can 

meet their varied objectives. These support flows could be 

diminished or eliminated by changing perceptions of alShabaab and/or the group’s ability to act as a proxy.

5. Bakaara market: Although al-Shabaab has long profited from 

business relationships with the arms and other merchants of 

Mogadishu’s Bakaara market, these relationships are highly 

dependent on al-Shabaab maintaining territorial control not 

just of Mogadishu but also of the city’s suburbs where many 

of Bakaara’s merchants keep their inventories. Continuing 

territorial gains from al-Shabaab in and around Mogadishu 

would be disproportionately more significant than elsewhere.

6. Humanitarian aid flows: Although al-Shabaab obtains 

significant revenues from taxing and diverting humanitarian 

aid, these flows at the same time cause significant internal 

dissension and even discord among the various factions within 

the group, caused by differing ideologies about accepting 

aid from Westerners and other “enemies,” even in the face 

of widespread suffering among the populations under alShabaab control. These divisions could be documented and 

exploited for advantage against al-Shabaab.
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127

7. Livestock, telecommunications, and xawilaad industries: 

Interestingly, al-Shabaab barely interacts with these three 

industries—the Somali economy’s most important and 

profitable—and when it does, it is often in an antagonistic 

way. Somalia’s powerful business elite is likely to be either 

indifferent or even actively disposed to oppose to al-Shabaab.

Each of these findings indicates a potential vulnerability in al-Shabaab, 

but determining how each can be best exploited is the subject of the 

next phase of the methodology.

Target Development and Risk-Benefit Assessment:

The Fix Phase

The fix phase is characterized by the systematic fusion, analysis, 

and dissemination of information involving the value chains accessed 

by threat actors until a specific actionable point of exploitation can be 

predicted against each previously identified vulnerability.

The fix phase has three subsidiary steps. The first is to confirm or 

deny assumptions regarding value chain access points involving threat 

actors. This is to provide a reality check and ensure that the identified target actually does represent a potentially exploitable vulnerability. This is accomplished by constructively challenging each and every 

assumption on which this determination is based, including both those 

pertaining to the adversary itself as well as the relevant economic terrain. Second, it is necessary to develop a range of courses of action that 

at least are theoretically available against each vulnerability identified 

in the find phase. These courses of action will generally fall into one of 

four categories of actions:

1. Shaping actions (i.e., actions that aim to limit the range of 

options the object has for action)

2. Disruption actions (i.e., any action meant to interrupt 

or otherwise disrupt the adversary’s interaction with the 

targeted value chain)

3. Kinetic actions

4. Monitoring actions

In the case of al-Shabaab, a number of courses of action are possible, including, for instance, those listed in Table 3.
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Special Topics in Irregular Warfare

Table 3. Abridged outline of a potential coordinated campaign 

against the economic foundations of al-Shabaab.

Shaping actions:

• Designate all trade via 

Kismaayo, Marka, Baraawe, 

and Buur Gaabo Eel Ma'an 

Qudha ports as violation of 

relevant UN Security Council 

Resolutions and US law.

• Subsidize US charcoal exports 

to Gulf Cooperation Council 

countries.

• Engage with and/or create and 

exploit leverage against Somali 

business elite, especially in the 

livestock, telecommunications, 

and finance (xawilaad) 

industries.

• Provide capacity-building 

support to major livestock 

middlemen.

• Lower duties in Mogadishu 

ports.

• Enter into discreet negotiations 

with local al-Shabaab 

commanders.

• Conduct relevant information 

operations.

Kinetic actions, against:

• Beach ports in al-Shabaabcontrolled areas of Somalia

• Bakaara arms market 

inventories

• Al-Shabaab shura

• Key foreign fighters

Disruption actions:

• Actively encourage 

humanitarian aid flows into alShabaab-controlled areas.

• Make the export of charcoal 

illegal in Somalia.

• Create and exploit leverage 

against material supporters of 

al-Shabaab to get them to stop 

or diminish donations to the 

group.

• Create and exploit leverage 

against those individuals and 

companies that do business with 

al-Shabaab or in al-Shabaabcontrolled areas.

Monitoring actions, focused on:

• Bakaara market inventories

• Companies that import goods 

into al-Shabaab-controlled 

locations

• Companies that export goods 

from al-Shabaab-controlled 

locations

• Somali business elite, inside and 

outside Somalia

• Al-Shabaab factional divisions

• Air traffic into, out of, and 

within southern Somalia

• Trade between Somalia and 

ports in Yemen, Djibouti, and 

the UAE

The third and final step of the fix phase is a comprehensive assessment of the PMESII impacts of each exploitation option, both positive 

and negative, namely the following:

• Operational benefits and risks, such as to friendly forces and risk 

of confliction with other efforts

• Political benefits and risks, such as to strategic policy or particular 

political or diplomatic relationships

• Social benefits and risks, such as relating to intercommunal or 

intracommunal relations among civilian populations
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129

• Economic benefits and risks relating to both the resource costs 

of the action, as well as the economic welfare of friendly nations 

and civilian populations

• Informational benefits and risks relating to both friendly and 

adversary information narratives

In the al-Shabaab case, for example, kinetic action against the port 

of Kismaayo would have severe and lasting economic effects on Somali 

civilians. However a more creative approach might include a combination of actions such as creating legal leverage via changes in international and US law combined with various diplomatic, intelligence, 

capacity-building, and even kinetic action.

The tangible end result of the fix phase is what could be called 

a target folder, including a recommended course of action against a 

specific target, as well as a comprehensive paper trail that includes the 

justification for this target as well as a rigorous examination of the 

potential second-, third-, and fourth-echelon effects of any potential 

course of action.

Taking Action, Gaining Advantage: Finish, Exploit, and 

Disseminate Phases

The final phases of the methodology rely on established practices 

to execute recommendations from the targeting package developed in 

the find phase. In practical terms, the biggest challenge is obtaining 

buy-in from the executing arms.

The goal of these phases is to successfully target the vulnerability and then gain as much advantage from doing so. Strategically, successful targeting of an adversary’s economic foundations will generally 

either negatively impact the adversary’s operational, social, political, 

economic, or other capabilities; facilitate a better understanding of 

the adversary’s behaviors, relationships, trends, strategies; or both. 

Although more work is required to confirm this, it can be assumed that 

most advantage will actually be at the tactical level, such as through 

the following:

• Disrupting enemy supply lines for needed equipment/people/

services

• Creating windows of opportunity and/or exploitable pressure 

points

• Degrading specific operational capabilities

• Disrupting the enemy’s exploitation of the local economy

• Reducing the enemy’s disruption of development projects
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Special Topics in Irregular Warfare

• Strengthening the local population’s independence from enemyconnected value chains

• Undermining the enemy’s relationships with patrons, proxies, 

and the population

• Discrediting the enemy’s objectives, and operations

• Creating or validating advantageous information operations 

narratives

In the case of al-Shabaab, its critical resource needs are met via 

a known and finite set of value chains. Importantly, al-Shabaab’s primary sources of revenue are not crucial to the stability of Somalia’s 

society or economy. This is a significant finding with both strategic 

and tactical importance, as it implies that targeting al-Shabaab’s access 

to these flows of economic value could degrade its capabilities and 

change its behavior but could do so without exacerbating existing security and humanitarian problems. This latter point is crucial, especially 

in the context of the many well-intentioned but often counterproductive actions of the United States and the international community in 

Somalia over the last twenty years. When combined with other actions 

(kinetic, information operations, sociopolitical), this would likely lead 

to the defeat of al-Shabaab and would open the door for meaningful 

stability in Somalia.

Overall, economic and financial instruments of national power are 

also critically important elements of US operations and policy. Use of 

these instruments, however, remains largely ad hoc, poorly conceptualized, and unsystematically integrated into other priorities and efforts, 

especially at tactical levels for SOF. It is important to improve the use 

of economic and financial instruments of national power to systematically exploit economic and financial information and to target a given 

adversary’s economic and financial dynamics at tactical levels. In particular, the TEA methodology does the following:

• Provides a more systematic approach to analysis and exploitation 

of the economic domain

• Improves data structuring and organization

• Improves the prioritization of finite information and action 

resources

• Makes analysis and action efforts more accountable

• Exposes new subsets of information

• Exposes new exploitable vulnerabilities in threat actors

• Enables coordinated economic-based campaigns against threat 

actors

• Enables better risk management
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131

CONCLUSION

Financing is the lifeblood of underground movements. Economic 

activity both impacts the behavior of militant groups and reflects key 

information and insight into an adversary. Systematically understanding and leveraging for advantage these economic dimensions is a critical element of successful SOF mission accomplishment against terrorist, 

insurgent, and transnational criminal actors.

NOTES

1 Financial Action Task Force/Groupe d’action financiere, “Terrorist Financing” (Paris: 

OECD, 2008), 7–10, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/28/43/40285899.pdf.

2 Andrew R. Molnar, Undergrounds in Insurgent, Revolutionary, and Resistance Warfare (Washington, DC: Special Operations Research Office, American University, 1963), 62.

3 Ibid.

4 Maegen Nix and Shana Marshall, “Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE),” in Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare, Volume  II: 1962–2009, ed. Chuck Crossett 

(Fort Bragg, NC: United States Army Special Operations Command, 2009), 233–275.

5 Ron Buikema and Matt Burger, “New People’s Army (NPA),” in Casebook on Insurgency and 

Revolutionary Warfare, Volume II: 1962–2009, 5–38.

6 Chuck Crossett and Summer Newton, “The Provisional Irish Republican Army: 1969–

1998,” in Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare, Volume II: 1962–2009, 379–421.

7 Financial Action Task Force, “Terrorist Financing,” 11–12.

8 Molnar, Undergrounds.

9 Darlene Storm, “Intelligence Agencies Hunting for Terrorists in World of Warcraft,” 

ComputerWorld (blog), April  13,  2011, http://blogs.computerworld.com/18131/intelligence_agencies_hunting_for_terrorists_in_world_of_warcraft; and “Al-Shabab Bans 

Mobile Phone Money Transfers in Somalia,” BBC, October  18,  2010, http://www.bbc.

co.uk/news/world-africa-11566247.

10 Rachel Ehrenfeld, “The Muslim Brotherhood New International Economic Order,” The 

Terror Finance Blog (blog), October 13, 2007, http://www.terrorfinance.org/the_terror_

finance_blog/2007/10/the-muslim-brot-1.html.

11 Ibid.

12 Ibid.

13 Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11 (New York: Vintage 

Books, 2006).

14 Peter L. Bergen, Holy War, Inc.: Inside the Secret World of Osama Bin Laden (New York: The 

Free Press, 2001).

15 Michael Scheuer, Through Our Enemies’ Eyes: Osama Bin Laden, Radical Islam, and the Future 

of America (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, Inc., 2008).

16 Marc Sageman, Understanding Terrorist Networks (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 

Press, 2004).

17 Mohammed El-Qorchi, “The Hawala System,” Finance and Development 39, no. 4 (December 2002), http://www.gdrc.org/icm/hawala.html.

18 Molnar, Undergrounds, 64.
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Special Topics in Irregular Warfare

19 Jerome Conley, “Revolutionary United Front (RUF)—Sierra Leone,” in Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare, Volume II: 1962–2009, 763–800.

20 Bryan Gervais, “Hutu–Tutsi Genocides,” in Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare, Volume II: 1962–2009, 307–342.

21 Nix and Marhsall, “Liberation Tigers.”

22 Jean-Charles Brisard, “AQIM Kidnap-for-Ransom Practice,” The Terror Finance Blog (blog), 

September  27,  2010, http://www.terrorfinance.org/the_terror_finance_blog/2010/09/

aqim-kidnap-for-ransom-practice-a-worrisome-challenge-to-the-war-against-terrorismfinancing.html.

23 Ron Buikema and Matt Burger, “Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias De Colombia 

(FARC),” in Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare, Volume II: 1962–2009, 39–70.

24 Sanaz Mirzaei, “Taliban: 1994–2009,” in Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare, 

Volume II: 1962–2009, 651–684.

25 Buikema and Burger, “FARC.”

26 Ibid.

27 Ibid.

28 Field Manual 3-05.130 (FM 3-05.130), Unconventional Warfare (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, September 2008).

29 Gretchen Peters, Seeds of Terror: How Drugs, Thugs, and Crime Are Reshaping the Afghan War 

(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2009).

30 John Cassara, Hide and Seek: Intelligence, Law Enforcement, and the Stalled War on Terrorist 

Finance (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2006).

31 Timothy Wittig, Understanding Terrorist Finance (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2011).

32 Nikos Passas, “Fighting Terror with Error: The Counter-productive Regulation of Informal Value Transfers,” Crime, Law and Social Change 45, no. 4–5 (2006): 315–336.

33 Cassara, Hide and Seek.

34 For an extended discussion see Wittig, Understanding Terrorist Finance, chap. 2.

35 Frank M. Buchheit, “The Task Force Targeting Meeting: Operations Synchronization,” 

Infantry Magazine, May–June 2008.

36 Wittig, Understanding Terrorist Finance, 2011, chap. 4.
EFFECT OF EXTERNAL ACTOR RESOURCES 

ON LOCAL ECONOMY

Guillermo Pinczuk

135

External aid can certainly play an important role in insurgencies, 

as it can allow both insurgent movements and governments to undertake actions they otherwise would not be able to carry out. In the case 

of both insurgents and counterinsurgents, external aid can be used to 

pay salaries of warfighters, underwrite a “hearts and minds” campaign, 

finance the purchase of necessary supplies, and help develop and disseminate propaganda targeted at specific audiences. Aside from these 

direct impacts, external aid can also have an indirect effect on a conflict, particularly with respect to decision making. For instance, DeVore 

noted that continued Iranian aid (and the provision of a safe haven 

in Iran) enabled Hizbollah to undertake long-range planning as well 

as promote organizational learning and the professionalization of 

personnel.1

External aid can also have an indirect economic impact. A classic 

example is the case of British aid to the Greek resistance against the 

Germans in World War II, where gold sovereigns used by the British to 

finance the resistance worsened an existing inflationary spiral.2 This 

short paper looks at the issue of the impact, and especially the indirect impact, of external aid on a local economy. As a baseline, we first 

provide some information regarding Iranian financial assistance to 

Hizbollah to provide a glimpse into the importance of aid in modern 

insurgencies. Next we address several of the main unintended consequences of the provision of external aid. These include the infamous 

“Dutch disease,” where external aid causes a reduction in a country’s 

economic competitiveness; the impact of external aid on inflation and 

local spending; and the impact of short planning horizons on the efficient allocation of resources. Given the paucity of data on direct transfers to insurgent movements and their economic impact, this paper 

also looks at examples of external aid in the context of United Nations 

(UN) missions.

Although the fact that external aid can be of enormous assistance 

to an insurgent movement is fairly obvious, it is useful to look at the 

various dimensions of Iranian aid to Hizbollah to develop an appreciation for the scope of activities such aid enables. Levitt noted that Iran 

provides Hizbollah nearly $200 million per year, and this figure may be 

as high as $350 million.3 In addition to funding salaries,a much of this 

aid is used by Hizbollah to fund various social services that have provided much-needed assistance to Lebanon’s long-neglected Shia community. For instance, in addition to paying 100 percent of the medical 

a A 1989 report noted that Hizbollah paid its militiamen $150–200/month, not 

including food and benefits.4 DeVore noted that by offering this level of salary, the group 

was able to attract veteran Shiite fighters formerly employed by Amal and Palestinian 

groups.5
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Special Topics in Irregular Warfare

expenses of Hizbollah’s injured fighters, Iran’s Martyrs Foundation 

also pays 70 percent of the expenses for caring for injured civilians, 

and it built the al-Rasul al-Azam hospital in Dahiya, a southern suburb 

of Beirut, to handle these cases.6 Harik also noted that the foundation 

paid monthly pensions as well.7

Additionally, when water and electricity services were cut in Dahiya 

in 1990 because of fighting, Iran helped finance the construction of 

four-thousand-liter water reservoirs in each district in Beirut’s southern 

suburbs, and these were built by Reconstruction Campaign, a Lebanese 

charitable organization.8 As of 2006, Reconstruction Campaign continued to be the source of drinking water for half a million people.9

Furthermore, as of 2006, the Imam Khomeini Assistance Committee 

had granted more than 130,000 scholarships and provided interest-free 

loans, and the Martyrs Foundation, along with Reconstruction Campaign and Hizbollah, financed the construction of housing for families 

in need, particularly those whose houses were damaged in war.10 Iranian 

financing is also used to fund al-Manar, Hizbollah’s television station.11

Clearly, as the case of Iranian funding of Hizbollah shows, external 

financing can play an important role in funding an insurgent movement’s operations and help it build legitimacy. Yet external aid can also 

generate various unexpected (and undesirable) higher-order effects. 

One such outcome is Dutch disease, an effect well known to economists who study the impact of foreign aid.12 Dutch disease refers to 

the reduced competitiveness of various sectors of a country’s economy 

after the receipt of external aid. More specifically, the inflow of aid 

can contribute to a rise in the real exchange rate, which in turn makes 

imports cheaper, thereby creating a disincentive for local entrepreneurs to make investments in those sectors that compete with them. 

This phenomenon was present in South Vietnam after the provision 

of US aid that accompanied the military presence during the Vietnam 

War,13 and there is some indication that external aid has led to Dutch 

disease in Afghanistan after the toppling of the Taliban. Specifically, 

a March 2006 International Monetary Fund (IMF) report noted that 

Afghanistan’s currency had appreciated by 20 percent in real terms in 

the thirty months that ended in September 2005, and the IMF attributed this rise to opium- and aid-related inflows.14 This appreciation in 

the real exchange rate affected the external competitiveness of Afghanistan’s economy.

Another potential impact, as the Greek example suggests, is inflation. First, it should be mentioned that spending enabled by external 

financing can potentially have a noticeable impact on a host economy’s gross domestic product (GDP). Economists measure the impact 

of fiscal stimuli through what is known as the “Keynesian multiplier,” 
Effect of External Actor Resources on Local Economy

137

which is an estimate of the number of times an additional dollar of 

fiscal stimulus cycles through an economy.15 Using a multiplier of 1.5,b

a March 2006 UN report noted that in four of nine missions (Kosovo, 

Burundi, Liberia, and East Timor), spending by the international mission boosted GDP by more than 6  percent.17 Much of the spending 

was through mission subsistence allowances (MSAs), which represent 

spending by deployed UN staff. Specifically, MSAs constituted more 

than half of total spending in four missions and between 40 and 50 percent in another four missions.18 The second-largest component was procurement, which contributed more than 40 percent of spending in four 

missions, followed by spending on national staff salaries.

Interestingly, mission spending did not have a noticeable economywide impact on inflation. Inflation rates actually decreased during UN 

missions in Haiti and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), 

and in the cases of Kosovo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and the Ivory Coast, 

the inflation rate was below 15 percent during UN missions, and often 

well below that rate.19 There is evidence, however, of localized inflation, 

particularly within housing sectors. For instance, the UN mission in 

Kosovo reported a doubling and tripling of rents during the period 

2000–2002, but there is limited evidence that such localized inflation 

spread throughout the economy.20

One area where UN missions did have a noticeable impact was in 

the hiring of local staff. Although the amount spent on wages for local 

staff was much smaller than that spent on procurement or MSAs, UN 

missions typically offered wages that were much higher than those 

in the local public sector, which contributed to a brain drain. For 

instance, in 2005, UN wages for midlevel staff in the DRC were $763/

month, whereas the comparable government wage was $25/month.21 In 

Kosovo, in 2004, the UN wage was €790/month, and the comparable 

government wage for midlevel personnel was €145/month.22 Anecdotal 

evidence indicated that these wage differentials led skilled labor to 

leave government jobs to join UN missions, in some cases accepting 

jobs for which they were overqualified.23

One case that may be relevant for special operators, particularly 

if they decide to fund rebel movements or incipient governments 

that establish civil administrations to fulfill government roles, is that 

of East Timor. In this mission, the UN hired a large local staff that 

drew significantly from the local supply of labor, and in the absence 

of a well-established local labor market, the UN mission played an 

active role in establishing a civil service pay scale for the East Timor 

Transitional Authority.24

b The authors of the UN report consulted with UN mission staff, the IMF, and World 

Bank field staff, who suggested a multiplier in the range of 1.5–2.0.16
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Another aspect of UN missions that may be relevant for the special 

operator is that such missions typically are of short formal duration 

(usually twelve months, which can be extended), and this short time 

frame leads to a condensed planning cycle that may encourage economically inefficient investments. For instance, by 2001, East Timor’s 

national electrical grid was destroyed, but UN managers were not permitted to make investments in fixed infrastructure, perhaps owing 

to fears over the sustainability of such investments once the UN had 

left.25 Rather than build a power plant, the UN relied on large portable 

generators to provide power to UN facilities and important population centers. One result of this decision is that East Timor at the time 

had the most expensive power generation system in Asia, at $0.20/kwh 

(compared with $0.03 in China and $0.05 in Indonesia).26

In conclusion, while external financial aid can be an important 

component of an overall assistance effort that supports an insurgent 

movement or a government engaged in a counterinsurgent campaign, 

special operators will need to be mindful of the distortions and secondorder effects such aid may have on a local economy.

NOTES

1 Marc R. DeVore, “Exploring the Iran-Hezbollah Relationship: A Case Study of How State 

Sponsorship Affects Terrorist Group Decision-Making,” Perspectives on Terrorism 6, no. 

4–5 (October 2012): 85–107.

2 D. M. Condit, Case Study in Guerrilla War: Greece during World War II (Washington, DC: 

Special Operations Research Office, American University, 1961), 9.

3 Matthew Levitt, Hezbollah: The Global Footprint of the Party of God (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2013), 12.

4 Judith Harik, “Hizbullah’s Public and Social Services and Iran,” in Distant Relations: Iran 

and Lebanon in the Last 500 Years, ed. H. E. Chehabi (London: I. B. Taurus & Co., 2006), 

271.

5 DeVore, “Exploring the Iran-Hezbollah Relationship,” 95.

6 Harik, “Hizbullah’s Public and Social Services and Iran,” 275.

7 Ibid., 280.

8 Ibid., 273.

9 Ibid.

10 Ibid., 282; and DeVore, “Exploring the Iran-Hezbollah Relationship,” 94.

11 Levitt, Hezbollah: The Global Footprint of the Party of God, 12.

12 For a recent study looking into the impact of Dutch disease, see Raghuram G. Rajan and 

Arvind Subramanian, “Aid, Dutch Disease, and Manufacturing Growth,” Journal of Development Economics 94, no. 1 (2011): 106–118.

13 Ethan Kapstein and Kamna Kathuria, Economic Assistance in Conflict Zones: Lessons from 

Afghanistan, Center for Global Development Policy Paper 013 (October 2012), 4.

14 Islamic Republic of Afghanistan: 2005 Article IV Consultation and Sixth Review under the Staff 

Monitored Program—Staff Report; Staff Statement; Public Information Notice on the Executive 
Effect of External Actor Resources on Local Economy

139

Board Discussion; and Statement by the Executive Director for the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 

Country Report No. 06/113 (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, March 

2006), 18.

15 Michael Carnahan, William Durch, and Scott Gilmore, Economic Impact of Peacekeeping

(United Nations, Department of Peacekeeping, March 2006), 15.

16 Ibid.

17 Ibid.

18 Ibid., 16.

19 Ibid., 11.

20 Ibid., 12.

21 Ibid., 32.

22 Ibid.

23 Ibid., 33.

24 Ibid., 33–34.

25 Ibid., 43.

26 Ibid.

HOW RESISTANCE GROUPS 

GENERATE LEGITIMACY

W. Sam Lauber and Margaret McWeeney

143

Legitimacy in international relations is a controversial subject and 

often a source of debate in the international community. At the state 

level, the standard for legitimacy is developed through a history of territorial wars, judicial decisions, and international agreements. This 

history provides a relatively clear standard for the legitimacy of state 

government, but the legitimacy of a group, cause, or organization 

remains less clear. This lack of clarity is problematic because states’ 

standing governments continue to face challenges from domestic resistance groups, or efforts organized by a country’s civil population to 

resist the legally established government or an occupying power,1 and 

to validate their challenge to power these groups often seek or rely on 

their legitimacy as perceived by domestic and international audiences. 

Establishing a clear definition or standard for the legitimacy of resistance groups will help those groups, as well as their proponents and 

opponents, understand how legitimacy is generated.

To a resistance group, legitimacy is a coveted position in which the 

group’s claims are acknowledged, its enterprise is supported, and its 

causes are championed domestically, internationally, or both. This position enables the group to pose a stronger, more meaningful challenge 

to an incumbent government. This paper argues that legitimacy of 

resistance groups can come in two main forms: (1) others’ recognition 

of the group as a powerful entity; and (2) validation and substantiation 

of the group’s claim. The intent of this paper is to explore definitions 

of domestic and international legitimacy, discuss how legitimacy can be 

gained or lost, and identify methods that resistance groups often use to 

generate legitimacy with domestic and international audiences.

THE MEANING OF LEGITIMACY TO 

INTERNATIONAL AUDIENCES

Throughout much of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, scholars and philosophers debated what constitutes legitimacy in international affairs. Robert Jackson argues that legitimacy is not a statement 

about fairness or justice, but it is about the degree of consensus between 

principal states. He states that legitimacy is ruled by the beliefs of the 

major powers and not by some universal right.2 Martin Wight contributes that major global powers construct a mutually agreed upon international values system by which they can determine the rightness and 

fairness of actions. This accepted international values system includes 

a standard of civilization, adherence to rights norms, and good government. These prerequisites serve as the conditionality for international 

society to recognize a state’s legitimacy.3
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When major global powers agree on a working order and form an 

international community, they then determine the normative standards 

for legitimacy, including Wight’s standard of civilization, adherence 

to rights norms, and good government. If a government or a group 

adheres to these standards, it is likely to achieve legitimacy in the eyes 

of the international audience, the community of states, which means its 

claim to power, its goals, and its means are validated. By defining the 

legitimacy of state governments, these scholars also help to advance a 

working definition for the concept of international legitimacy for nonstate groups that challenge governments.

As mentioned, this paper contends that resistance groups can 

achieve two forms of legitimacy: first, in the form of others’ recognition 

of the group as a relevant player, and second, in the form of substantive 

legitimacy. An examination of case studies illustrates that a resistance 

group gains recognition through engagement with the international 

audience. Governments outside the state in which the resistance takes 

place will either officially and formally recognize the resistance without necessarily taking a position on the validity of the group’s aims, 

or they will engage with the group as necessary to accomplish objectives such as negotiating a cease-fire or coordinating humanitarian 

aid. The same case studies illustrate that a resistance group gains or 

loses substantive legitimacy in the form of support or condemnation, 

respectively, from major players in the international community, particularly Western powers or international institutions such as the United 

Nations (UN). Groups that conform to the normative standards set by 

the international community “pass the test” of legitimacy in the eyes of 

the global powers and thus gain their support. Importantly, resistance 

groups need only pass the test, not ace it.

Historical examples make clear that even when a resistance group 

has committed humanitarian atrocities, particularly during battle or 

wartime, if the group demonstrates an attempt to abide by international standards, norms, and institutions it can receive support from 

major players that then validate the group’s aims. For instance, as will 

be explored in more detail later in the paper, the United States backed 

the resistance group RENAMO, or Resistência Nacional Moçambicana, 

in Mozambique, in the early 1990s in return for the group’s acceptance 

of the Rome Peace Accords, reduction of its use of violence, and transformation into a political party. RENAMO’s willingness to accept a 

peace agreement and encourage accountable and transparent governance in the region brought the group legitimacy in the eyes of the 

United States and other major players, who then helped support the 

group financially for more than a decade.4
How Resistance Groups Generate Legitimacy

145

Conversely, if a group does not adhere to these standards or refuses 

any appeals for reform, the international community will likely come 

to the consensus that the resistance group is illegitimate. This occurs, 

for instance, after accounts of a group’s indiscriminate violence against 

civilian populations, suicide bombings, genocide, and use of child soldiers, even after major powers appeal to the group and demand that 

the group end those activities. Once the group is deemed illegitimate, 

the international community can take measures to oppose the group 

and to remove its territorial claim and leadership.

An example is the Taliban, a resistance group that formed to 

provide a governance solution to the chaos in southern Afghanistan 

after Russian occupation. Although it became the ruling authority in 

Afghanistan and was accepted as legitimate domestically, because of its 

brutal ruling tactics, human rights abuses, and harboring of terrorist 

organizations, the regime was dismantled by the US global War on Terror and subsequent occupation of Afghanistan in 2001.5

This example helps illustrate that when a group openly defies the 

standards of substantive legitimacy as defined by the international community, the group makes itself vulnerable to delegitimation, universal condemnation, and elimination. Although the Taliban had gained 

legitimacy by recognition as the ruling authority of Afghanistan, it 

ignored the international standards against acts of terror and the use 

of indiscriminate violence. Because it refused to adhere to these standards, the Taliban had little to no chance of achieving international 

approval and substantive legitimacy, and this lack of legitimacy led to a 

military campaign to eliminate the Taliban forces.

THE MEANING OF LEGITIMACY TO 

DOMESTIC AUDIENCES

More abstract and philosophical is defining legitimacy at the domestic, community, or group level. Many political theorists recognize the 

definition proposed by Max Weber, which states, “Rule is legitimate 

when its subjects believe it to be so.”6 Thomas Franck contributes that 

group legitimacy does not have a definitive beginning but is a practice 

similar to accepting the Greenwich Mean Time, a social fact that is 

meaningful only to members of the community who accept it and those 

who can testify to the existence of that particular community.7

These scholars identify that a group can achieve legitimacy by recognition by being perceived as a relevant entity both from within a 

community and by other communities and powers. To the domestic 

audience this recognition and acceptance can come from other ethnic 
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and religious groups, the general civil population, nongovernmental 

groups, or the incumbent government.

Through examples, this paper will also explore how groups achieve 

substantive legitimacy at the domestic level. This is achieved when a 

large base of supporters or citizens recognize that the group’s claims 

are valid and compelling, as in the case of the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF). Groups also achieve domestic legitimacy by having 

a territorial or ethnic claim, as in the case of Hamas; or by proving 

to citizens that they can provide a viable alternative to the incumbent 

government, as in the case of the Tamil Tigers, or a better governance 

structure than the incumbent government, as in the case of Hizbollah.

While considering these understandings of legitimacy, the remainder of this paper aims to confront the challenge by identifying five 

concrete methods that have demonstrated importance in generating 

legitimacy in the eyes of domestic and international audiences, regardless of the cultural context. The paper will conclude with a look at a 

contemporary resistance group and its struggle for legitimacy within 

the international community.

METHODS OF ACHIEVING LEGITIMACY 

IN THE EYES OF DOMESTIC AUDIENCES

After discussing how groups achieve or fail to achieve substantive 

legitimacy, this paper will identify five ways that resistance groups 

achieve legitimacy, by recognition and/or substantive validation of 

claims, in the eyes of domestic and international audiences, which often 

prove mutually reinforcing. Therefore, the next sections will include a 

definition of the method of achieving legitimacy, the method’s contribution to a group’s legitimacy by recognition and to its legitimacy as 

substantive validation of a claim, a description of the mechanism by 

which the group achieves the method, and an example of its use.

Creating a Cause through the Use of Narrative

The first method by which a resistance group can achieve legitimacy 

is by creating a cause for action. The more attractive this cause, the 

greater chance that the resistance group will be successful in appealing 

to the civil population over the incumbent, or standing, government. 

A cause affords a resistance group the psychological force to “pry the 

population away from the [incumbent], to control it, and to mobilize 

it.”8 “With a cause, the [resistance] has a formidable, if intangible, asset 

that [it] can progressively transform into concrete strength.”9
How Resistance Groups Generate Legitimacy

147

An attractive and relatable cause creates legitimacy by recognition 

by producing a foundation, a purpose for the group’s existence, and a 

rallying flag for the group’s fight. This also contributes to substantive 

legitimacy by portraying to domestic and international audiences the 

reason behind the group’s movement. It illustrates that the resistance 

group is not fighting for sport or for a frivolous cause but rather for an 

identifiable reason. This illustration allows the group to gain traction 

with civilians who identify with its cause.

An important mechanism in the establishment of a cause is creating a compelling narrative that attracts the civilian population to the 

movement. The narrative is a “story [that an] armed struggle uses to 

justify its actions in order to attain legitimacy and favor among relevant 

populations.”10 Many resistance groups create this narrative to develop 

a group identity and an “us” versus “them” mentality. Resistance groups 

might strengthen their narratives through the use of websites, flyers, 

movies, propaganda materials, protests, and memorialization of fallen 

supporters of the resistance group.11

The EPLF provides an example of establishing a cause by creating 

a narrative to appeal to a population. The EPLF’s struggle for independence began in 1952, after the British relinquished the colonies 

of Ethiopia and Eritrea. Immediately after, the Ethiopian government 

took full control of Eritrea, banning the Eritrean flag and outlawing 

the Eritrean language. In response, a small group of Eritrean rebels, 

formed under the banner of the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF), fired 

on Ethiopian police forces in 1961, inciting a thirty-year struggle for 

Eritrean independence.12

From the onset, the ELF-turned-EPLF created a nationalist narrative to challenge “Ethiopian colonialism” and “expansionist hegemony.” This narrative was reinforced by local anecdotes, stories, and 

songs and became part of the collective consciousness of the Eritrean 

people. Catchphrases such as, “one people, one nation,” “independence of decision,” “state sovereignty,” and “self-reliant development” 

became the calling cards of the movement. Members of the group also 

referred to themselves as “freedom fighters,” rather than as members of 

a resistance or rebel army.13 Furthermore, during the 1960s and 1970s 

the EPLF fought against rival units and factions, eventually negotiating a unified movement under the EPLF command. This unification 

allowed the civilian population to focus on one group as the champion 

of independence.

In 1991, the EPLF took control of the city of Asmara, formed a provisional government, and attained de facto independence from Ethiopia. Ethiopia conceded to Eritrea’s military victory and agreed to hold 

a UN-sponsored national referendum on statehood for Eritrea. The 
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EPLF’s successful campaign of uniting Eritrea under one narrative 

over a thirty-year period contributed to 98.2 percent of registered voters in the state voting for Eritrea’s independence, prompting the UN to 

recognize Eritrea’s independence in 1992.14

Soon after Eritrea’s independence, the EPLF evolved into a political 

party, the People’s Front for Democracy and Justice (or PFDJ). In 1992, 

the leadership of the PFDJ transitioned unchallenged into the offices 

of the government, with the head of PFDJ, Isaias Afewerki, transitioning to the office of the president, a position he currently maintains.15

From its onset, the EPLF championed the cause of freedom by 

creating a narrative of one people united to relieve Ethiopian oppression. This narrative produced legitimacy by recognition by creating a 

unified and powerful front; it created substantive legitimacy by showing the local population why Eritrea deserved its independence and 

rallying the Eritrean population around the group. The fact that the 

EPLF was able to construct a relatable and compelling cause from 

the beginning of the conflict proved a critical building block in the 

achievement of domestic and international legitimacy and contributed 

to convincing domestic and international audiences of Eritreans’ right 

to self-determination.

Creating a Loyal Base of Support by Creating 

a de Facto Government

The second common method of achieving legitimacy is for resistance groups to create a loyal and willing a base of supporters. A loyal 

base of support generates legitimacy by recognition by defining a territorial base of action and securing willing fighters for and donors to the 

cause. This following shows that the incumbent government has failed 

in some sense to fully represent, serve, or appeal to the nation’s population and that the resistance group could provide a more equitable 

and competent governance structure. This base also creates substantive 

legitimacy by illustrating that the group is a viable and capable option 

to the incumbent government.

Creating such a base is commonly achieved by establishing a de facto 

government, or government in practice, which portrays the resistance 

group as a competent and reliable organization that can meet the 

everyday needs of the local population. Resistance groups have set up 

schools, job programs, medical facilities, charities, recreational clubs, 

and welfare programs to become indispensable parts of their communities, in the process making many civilians indebted followers.16

One example of this is Hamas, an organization that has maintained 

de facto authority, or authority in practice, over the Gaza Strip since 
How Resistance Groups Generate Legitimacy

149

2007 largely due to its grassroots strategy and support base. Hamas, 

or Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya, is a Sunni Islamist group in 

Palestine that organized in 1987 to become the ruling authority in 

Palestinian-occupied territories and to drive Israeli forces from Palestinian territories of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.17

To accomplish its goals, Hamas built an extensive infrastructure of 

social service organizations funded by neighboring Arab nations, such 

as Egypt and Qatar.18 This infrastructure included schools, universities, 

refugee shelters, orphanages, relief funds, medical clinics, technical 

institutions, sports clubs, religious institutions, and women’s institutions. Although these programs initially were intended to provide aid 

to their underserved population, Hamas exploited this infrastructure 

by recruiting tens of thousands of Palestinians for employment,19 funneling money through charities and prompting recruits to use their 

salaries to support military activism. The group also used this infrastructure to generate a community of volunteers to offer logistical help 

and shelter to militant operatives, including hideouts for suicide bombers.20 Citizens in Gaza also have turned to Hamas, feeling overlooked 

by the international community, particularly the United States and 

Europe, who traditionally have been outspoken in their support for 

Israel over Palestine.21

Over time, the de facto government’s provision of services and security has demonstrated its competence, generated a devoted base of followers, and allowed the group to gain both recognized and substantive 

legitimacy in the eyes of the domestic audiences in the Gaza Strip.

As a result, the 2006 elections resulted in success for Hamas in 

the national legislature, the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC). 

Hamas received 44.45 percent of the popular vote, won a majority of 

electoral districts, and installed leader Ismail Haniyeh as prime minister of the PLC.22 However, as a governing party, Hamas soon isolated 

Palestinians further from the international community by refusing to 

recognize Israel, which brought a series of economic sanctions on the 

country. These sanctions led to a brief military conflict between Fatah 

and Hamas in 2007 and concluded with a cease-fire and negotiations 

toward a national unified government with a power-sharing agreement, 

known as the Mecca Agreement, between Hamas and Fatah.

Despite the military conflict, the large base of support and demonstration of competence in the Gaza Strip empowered Hamas to be 

a serious negotiating party rather than a group that could be easily 

dissolved by Fatah, Israel, or the United States. For these reasons, the 

negotiation resulted in Hamas being granted authority over the Gaza 

Strip and veto power over the actions of the PLC.23 In sum, the base of 

support created by the de facto government generated legitimacy by 
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recognition through the group’s control of the territory of the Gaza 

Strip as a base of operations and control of a base of soldiers willing 

to fight. Its substantive legitimacy was illustrated through the Palestinians’ perception that the group could serve as a viable alternative ruling party, as evidenced in the 2006 elections.

At the time of writing, Hamas’s claims to legitimacy are being challenged as Israel commenced air strikes in the Gaza Strip to protect its 

border cities and remove Hamas’s base of support. In six weeks of fighting, more than two thousand Palestinians have been killed and thousands more have fled their homes as cease-fire and international peace 

negations are failing to quell the fighting.24 Although Hamas achieved 

domestic legitimacy by establishing a de facto government to create a 

loyal domestic base of support, it is still being challenged to prove its 

substantive legitimacy to the international community.

Developing an Armed Force that Can Battle the Incumbent by 

Leveraging the Resources of the Civilian Population

Many resistance movements form from neglect or even persecution 

by the incumbent regime. To combat continued mistreatment, resistance groups often develop an armed force dedicated to their cause 

and to overthrowing the incumbent. In turn, these armed forces help 

establish a group’s legitimacy in the eyes of domestic audiences by making territorial gains in the country, getting the incumbent’s attention, 

and, again, providing a viable threat to the incumbent regime.

The creation of armed forces also contributes to substantive legitimacy by illustrating the population’s passion, commitment, and force 

behind the movement. By participating in an armed struggle, innocent 

people are willing to sacrifice their lives or take the lives of others for 

this cause. The sharing of such an intense belief in the rightness of a 

cause demonstrates that the cause resonates deeply in the community, 

thereby validating it. Furthermore, forming a sophisticated, hierarchical, and regimented armed campaign again demonstrates the capabilities and discipline of the resistance.

One way to establish an armed force is to leverage the resources 

of a civilian base. Establishing a militia requires resources, and many 

resistance movements draw on the civilian population to supply most 

of their resources.25

One example is the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), 

a resistance group that developed from the Tamil ethnic group in 

Sri  Lanka, more commonly known as the Tamil Tigers. The Tamil 

Tigers organized when Sri Lanka gained its independence in 1948 and 

the ethnic Tamil population became the target of discrimination and 
How Resistance Groups Generate Legitimacy

151

violence by the majority ethnic group, the Sinhalese. Due to a prior 

relationship with the nation’s colonizers, approximately three hundred thousand Tamils had their citizenship revoked and lost their jobs 

in the civil service. Tensions escalated in 1981 when a Sinhalese mob 

ransacked Tamil-run businesses, including a sacred library that stored 

ancient Tamil literature. The Tamil population responded with a number of protests that evolved into a radical fringe group that mandated 

full independence for the Tamils.26

By 1983, the conflict had escalated into a guerrilla war against the 

Sinhalese government in the Tamil-held eastern Jaffna region.27 The 

Tigers fueled their struggle through illicit trade, terrorism, and donors 

from their sizable diaspora community located primarily in Western 

Europe, North America, and Asia. At the group’s height, it was reported 

that more than one million ethnic Tamils across the world provided support for the effort in Sri Lanka.28 The group also extorted more moderate members of the Tamil ethnic group to raise money.29 As a result, 

the Tamil Tigers generated between $200 million and $350 million per 

year (in 2008) to purchase arms and commit suicide bombings.30

The Tamils even leveraged the human capital of their community 

by recruiting or seizing Tamil children from a young age so that they 

could inculcate their nationalistic values and train them as soldiers/

suicide bombers.

Garlanded photos of young martyrs decorate the walls 

of Tamil Tiger training camps and Tamil-controlled 

cities and are regularly featured in Tamil newspapers  .  .  . Another inducement is that bombers are 

granted the privilege of eating their last meal with the 

group’s charismatic leader, Prabhakaran . . . Parents 

of the young martyrs are sometimes rewarded materially or are intimidated into relinquishing control over 

their children.31

After twenty years of fighting, the Sri Lankan government finally 

agreed to concessions making Tamil an official language of Sri Lanka, 

opening roads and air traffic to the Tamil-held Jaffna region, and allowing Tamils to serve in the civil service.32 The Tamils and the incumbent 

government also agreed to a federal solution, which ended the Tamils’ 

claim to an independent state.

However, sporadic fighting continued until 2009, when the Tigers’ 

rebel commander Karuna was sworn in as minister of national integration and the Tigers were defeated in the last rebel-held territory in the 

northeast, resulting in the death of Tamil leader Prabhakaran. Since 

that time, the Tigers have transformed into a political entity, known as 
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the Tamil National Alliance, which governs two-thirds of local councils 

in the north and east of the country.33

Despite their inability to realize their goal of an independent state, 

the Tamil Tigers leveraged the civilian population to develop a capable 

and competent armed force and generate domestic legitimacy, through 

both domestic recognition as a powerful player and substantive validation of their claim. This legitimacy was proven by the concessions the 

incumbent government made to the group. Although at times coerced, 

the local and diaspora populations formed the base of a significant 

military movement, which held territory in the eastern region, gained 

attention as a formidable movement from the Sri Lankan government, 

showed the group’s commitment to its cause, and posed a viable threat 

to the Sri Lankan government.

METHODS OF ACHIEVING 

INTERNATIONAL LEGITIMACY

In addition to methods that contribute to legitimacy in the eyes 

of the domestic audience, this paper also describes two methods that 

resistance groups use to achieve legitimacy in the eyes of international 

audiences.

Developing a Capable Nonviolent Arm that Can Resist, 

Disrupt, or Challenge the Incumbent and Its Policies by 

Transforming into a Political Entity

A resistance group can achieve international legitimacy by developing a nonviolent campaign that demonstrates that the resistance movement has a moral, ethical, or intellectual rationale for its grievance and 

capable, rational leadership willing to work toward a negotiated resolution in a fairly contested system of government.

This nonviolent campaign not only works to bring recognition to 

the group through actions such as political rallies, protests, and participation in elections, but it also brings substantive legitimacy to the 

group’s claim. A nonviolent campaign illustrates that the resistance 

group is not fighting solely for the sake of power and greed but instead 

is fighting for a moral or ethical struggle; it also illustrates that the 

group has rational leadership looking to seek some form of resolution 

from the incumbent.

A group can achieve legitimacy by transforming itself from an 

armed resistance group into a political party. This evolution into a 

political party may occur only after substantial international pressure, 
How Resistance Groups Generate Legitimacy

153

but it demonstrates that a violent campaign waged during wartime is 

an unfortunate consequence of being marginalized or treated poorly 

by the incumbent government. Second, it compels the resistance movement to gain the favor of the international community by identifying, 

recruiting, and retaining competent candidates for public office.34

Finally, it conveys to the international community and domestic audience that if a state is willing to transform into a more equal and democratic system of governance, the resistance group is willing to work 

toward a political and negotiated settlement rather than a violent solution to its grievance.35

One group that consented to international pressure to evolve into 

a nonviolent campaign is RENAMO. RENAMO is an anti-communist 

group that used violence to gain traction over the leading party, Front 

for the Liberation of Mozambique, or FRELIMO, after Mozambique’s 

declaration of independence in 1975. As a consequence of FRELIMO’s 

tight control of the governing apparatus, a civil war developed between 

the two groups in which both FRELIMO and RENAMO were supported by opposing international powers, including the United States, 

Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and South Africa.36

After a decade of attacks on Mozambique’s infrastructure and eight 

rounds of peace talks, the UN facilitated the Rome General Peace 

Accords in 1992 where RENAMO was persuaded to cease guerrilla warfare and embrace political organization to pursue its claim to power.37

As part of the agreement the party received a $17 million trust fund 

from multiple international donors and $55 million to defray the cost 

of elections.38 International sponsors of the peace process accepted 

the core leadership of RENAMO, including party President Afonso 

Dhlakama,39 although the group was compelled to use the trust fund to 

replace most of its internal organization with legitimate administrators 

and legislative candidates and encourage a commitment to democratic 

system of government.40 As a result, in Mozambique’s first democratic 

elections, RENAMO was successful in gaining 112 of 250 legislative 

representatives,41 and by the second election in 1999, RENAMO had 

cemented its position in the two-party system in Mozambique.42

Although RENAMO initially had support from the United States, 

after twenty years of fighting, the group faced the decision either to 

reform or to risk termination and international condemnation for its 

human rights abuses. By accepting the tenets of nonviolence in the 

Rome Accord and transforming into a political entity, RENAMO garnered international legitimacy as a recognized player and substantive 

legitimacy by being willing to work toward a peaceful solution to its 

claim to power. It achieved this legitimacy by developing an intellectual party platform, replacing its internal organization with competent 
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leadership, and participating in free and fair elections. Legitimacy has 

allowed the group to receive ample external funding to remain a politically salient resistance movement for more than thirty years.

Maintaining Relationships with States and International 

Political Institutions by Securing Support or Sponsorship 

through Moral, Political, Technical, Financial, and 

Military Means

Resistance groups can also generate and maintain legitimacy in the 

eyes of the international audience by maintaining relationships with 

states and international political institutions. These relationships allow 

the group legitimacy by recognition by propelling it to the international stage as a movement that spans regions or countries, while financial, technical, and military support can sustain the group’s presence 

for long periods, increasing its chances of achieving recognition.

This method also contributes to substantive legitimacy by demonstrating to the domestic audience and other international forces that 

the group has significant financial backing. This financial support suggests that there is a stake in the group’s success from major players in 

the international community and that the group could present a sustainable and credible alternative to the incumbent.

Many resistance groups maintain relationships with states and international institutions by securing sponsorship from an external donor 

or a variety of donors. In exchange for this support, resistance groups 

often act as a strategic arm of these donors, who may be reluctant to 

challenge another government on the international stage or in a traditional territorial war.

An example of this can be seen in the actions of Hizbollah, or 

“Party of God,” a Shia Islamic resistance group in Lebanon. The group 

came into prominence in the early 1980s when Israel invaded and occupied Lebanon to expel Palestinian militants operating in the south. 

In response to the occupation, Hizbollah began a violent campaign 

against the Israeli military.

Since then, Hizbollah has become known as the strategic arm for 

Iran in the Arab world, receiving financial support and training from 

Iran’s Revolutionary Guard. As part of the trade-off for such support, 

the organization vows loyalty to Iran’s Ayatollah Khomeini and aims to 

expel the influence of Western powers from the Arab world.43

Annual estimates of funding from Iran vary from tens of millions of dollars to one billion dollars, not including military training 

and sophisticated weapons systems. Other contributors to Hizbollah 
How Resistance Groups Generate Legitimacy

155

include wealthy Arab individuals, such as Mohammed Hammoud who 

was convicted in 2003 for accumulating millions of dollars in profit for 

Hizbollah, as well as a sizeable Lebanese expatriate community, which 

has been known to funnel illicit funds from the South American drug 

trade into Lebanon.44

Over thirty years, Hizbollah has achieved de facto control of southern 

Lebanon, leveraging its massive resources to become an indispensable 

part of the Lebanese community in areas underserved by the current 

government in south Lebanon and Beirut,45 and has transformed into 

a competent political and military entity.46 In 2006, Hizbollah fended 

off Israeli forces from southern Lebanon, and in 2009, Hizbollah won 

ten parliamentary seats in the Lebanese parliamentary elections under 

leader Hassan Nasrallah.47 By securing external support from Arab 

donors and states through political, technical, financial, and military 

means, Hizbollah has been propelled to the international stage as a 

leading player in the Arab world and has exhibited staying power for 

more than thirty years despite international and domestic attempts to 

dismantle the group. Additionally, Hizbollah’s close ties and sponsorship from Iran, specifically, show the incumbent government and international community that it has substantial weight and force behind its 

movement and that it will not be easily eliminated. These resources, and 

the political support of countries such as Iran, forced the incumbent 

government and international community to recognize Hizbollah’s 

formidable strength and resulted in the domestic audience's increased 

approval of the movement as a credible alternative.

CONCLUSION

By defining legitimacy in two ways, (1) recognition and (2) substantiation of claim, this paper discusses ways in which a resistance 

group gains or loses legitimacy and describes five common methods 

of achieving legitimacy in the eyes of domestic and international audiences. However, this paper aims only to contribute to the debate on the 

meaning or attainment of legitimacy by resistance groups.

Legitimacy remains an ambiguous concept, as evidenced by the 

recent events in Ukraine. In February 2014, the Ukrainian Parliament 

deposed its president and appointed an interim government under 

Oleksandr Turchynov, a leader recognized by the United States and 

European Union. However, Russia condemned this move and retaliated by taking control of the Crimean peninsula, a Ukrainian territory 

with an ethnic Russian majority. The Crimean Parliament voted to dismiss its government and call a referendum on Crimean independence. 

This referendum was vastly in favor of declaring independence from 
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Ukraine but was subsequently condemned by the European Union, the 

United States, and Ukraine.48

In March 2014, the separatist government of Crimea signed a treaty 

of accession into the Russian Federation, although the UN General 

Assembly declared the treaty invalid and incorporation by Russia illegal.49 The United States and European Union enacted sanctions against 

Russia,50 although a handful of countries, including Afghanistan, Venezuela, and Syria,51 have come out in support of the Crimean referendum. Russia has also heavily armed the area and is accused of inciting 

and orchestrating the revolt. This crisis has brought even greater attention as Crimean rebels have responded with acts of terrorism including downing a Ukrainian plane, a military helicopter, and a Malaysian 

airliner carrying almost three hundred civilian passengers.52

In sum, there remains no formula for achieving legitimacy. Application of these five methods and adherence to international rights norms 

will not make a resistance group a relevant domestic player that has 

just cause for its grievance overnight. However, this paper aims to contribute to the debate on what constitutes legitimacy by discussing paths 

to substantive legitimacy and identifying five common methods and 

mechanisms that have increased the likelihood of achieving domestic 

and international legitimacy for a number of resistance movements.

Table 1. Five ways resistance groups achieve legitimacy.

Group Intended 

Audience Method Rationale for Legitimacy Mechanism

EPLF Domestic

Establishing a 

relatable and 

compelling 

cause

Creating a cause creates a 

purpose for the group’s existence and a rallying flag for 

its fight and generates a base 

of support.

Creating an 

attractive 

narrative

Hamas Domestic Generating a 

loyal base of 

support

Generating a base of support allows the group a territorial base, secures fighters 

and donors, and depicts the 

group as an alternative to 

the standing government.

Establishing 

a de facto 

government

LTTE Domestic

Developing a 

capable and 

competent 

armed force 

to battle the 

incumbent

Developing an armed force 

allows the group to gain or 

maintain territory, grab the 

government’s attention, convey itself as a viable threat, 

and demonstrate the passion, commitment, and discipline behind the movement.

Using and 

leveraging the 

resources of the 

civilian population (including diaspora 

population)
How Resistance Groups Generate Legitimacy

157

Group Intended 

Audience Method Rationale for Legitimacy Mechanism

RENAMO Domestic/

international

Developing a 

capable nonviolent arm 

that can resist, 

disrupt, or 

challenge the 

incumbent

Developing a nonviolent 

arm conveys that the group 

maintains an intellectual, 

moral, or ethical arm and 

that the group has capable 

and competent leadership 

willing to be reasonable and 

to participate democratically in a fairly contested 

system of government.

Transforming 

into a political 

party

Hizbollah International

Maintaining 

relationships 

with states 

and international political 

institutions

By maintaining relationships with or sponsorship by 

external donors and states, 

the group is propelled to 

the international stage while 

financial, technical, and 

military support can sustain 

the group’s presence for 

long periods.

Securing external support 

through political, technical, 

financial, and 

military means

Source: Author’s synthesis and “Guide to the Analysis of an Insurgency.” United States 

Marine Corps (2012).

NOTES

1 Joint Publication 1-02 (JP 1-02), Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated 

Terms (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, November 8, 2010, as amended through 

August 15, 2014), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf.

2 Robert H. Jackson, The Global Covenant: Human Conduct in a World of States (Oxford: 

Oxford University Press, 2000), 91.

3 Martin Wight, “International Legitimacy,” International Relations 4, no. 1 (1972): 27.

4 Carrie Manning, “Armed Opposition Groups into Political Parties: Comparing Bosnia, Kosovo, and Mozambique,” Studies in Comparative International Development 39, no. 1 

(2004): 54–76.

5 Zachary Laub, “Backgrounder: The Taliban in Afghanistan,” Council on Foreign Relations, updated July 4, 2014, http://www.cfr.org/afghanistan/taliban-afghanistan/p10551.

6 Max Weber, On Charisma and Institution Building (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 

1968), 11.

7 Thomas Franck, The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations (New York: Oxford University 

Press, 1990), 204.

8 David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006), 11.

9 Ibid.

10 US Government, Guide to the Analysis of an Insurgency 2012, 6, http://www.mccdc.marines.

mil/Portals/172/Docs/SWCIWID/COIN/Doctrine/Guide%20to%20the%20Analysis%20of%20Counterinsurgency.pdf.

11 Ibid.

12 Charles E. Cobb Jr. and Roberto Caputo, “Eritrea Wins the Peace,” National Geographic

189, no. 6 (1996): 82–106.
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Special Topics in Irregular Warfare

13 Andebrhan Welde Giorgis, Eritrea at a Crossroads: A Narrative of Triumph, Betrayal, and Hope

(Houston: Strategic Book Publishing and Rights, 2014), 401.

14 Ibid., 161.

15 “World Report 2013: Eritrea,” Human Rights Watch, January 1, 2013, http://www.hrw.

org/world-report/2013/country-chapters/eritrea.

16 Ibid., 2.

17 “Who are Hamas?” BBC News, updated January 4, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/

hi/1654510.stm.

18 Matthew Levitt and Dennis Ross, Hamas: Politics, Charity, and Terrorism in the Service of 

Jihad (The Washington Near East Institute, 2006), 26–28; and Jonathan Masters and 

Zachary Laub, “Hezbollah (a.k.a. Hizbollah, Hizbu’llah),” Council on Foreign Relations, 

January 3, 2014, http://www.cfr.org/lebanon/hezbollah-k-hizbollah-hizbullah/p9155.

19 Scott Wilson, “In Politics, Hamas Gains in the West Bank,” Washington Post, 

June  29,  2005, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/06/28/

AR2005062801368.html.

20 Levitt and Ross, Hamas: Politics, Charity, and Terrorism in the Service of Jihad, 51.

21 “Middle East: Why Did Hamas Win Palestinian Poll?,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 

January 26, 2006, http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1065113.html.

22 Scott Wilson, “In Politics, Hamas Gains in the West Bank.”

23 “Who are Hamas?” BBC News; and Jim Zanotti, “Hamas: Background and Issues for 

Congress,” CRS Report no. R41514 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 

December 2, 2010), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/R41514.pdf, 3–4.

24 Katherine Butler, “Why Did Israel Attack Gaza?” Huffington Post, posted January 29, 2009 

and updated May 25, 2011, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2008/12/29/why-did-israelattack-gaz_n_153987.html; and Karin Laud and Josef Federman, “Israel Calls for North 

Gaza Evacuation after Raid,” Huffington Post, posted July 13, 2014 and updated September 11, 2014, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/07/13/israel-gaza-evacuationraid_n_5581540.html.

25 US Government, Guide to the Analysis of an Insurgency, 11.

26 Sumana Raychaudhuri, “Will Sri Lanka Drive the Tigers to Extinction?” The Nation, February 6, 2009, http://www.thenation.com/article/will-sri-lanka-drive-tigers-extinction.

27 Ibid.

28 Ibid.

29 Randall Law, Terrorism: A History (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2009).

30 Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler, and Dominic Rohner, “Beyond Greed and Grievance: Feasibility and Civil War,” Oxford Economic Papers 61, no. 1 (2009): 4.

31 Law, Terrorism: A History.

32 Ibid.

33 Ibid.

34 Manning, “Armed Opposition Groups into Political Parties,” 59.

35 Ibid., 57.

36 James M. Scott, Deciding to Intervene: The Reagan Doctrine and American Foreign Policy (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1996), 194–195 and 197.

37 “Terrorist Organization Profile: Mozambique National Resistance Movement,” National 

Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, http://www.start.

umd.edu/tops/terrorist_organization_profile.asp?id=314.

38 Christoph Zürcher et al., Costly Democracy: Peacebuilding and Democratization after War 

(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013), 104.

39 Manning, “Armed Opposition Groups into Political Parties.”
How Resistance Groups Generate Legitimacy

159

40 Carrie Manning, The Making of Democrats: Elections and Party Development in Postwar Bosnia, 

El Salvador, and Mozambique (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 48–53.

41 “Terrorist Organization Profile: Mozambique National Resistance Movement,” National 

Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism; Gwinyayi Dzinesa 

and Paulo Wache, “Mozambican Elections: What to Make of Dhlakama’s Intention to 

Run for President,” All Africa, May 27, 2014, http://allafrica.com/stories/201405270478.

html; and Manning, “Armed Opposition Groups into Political Parties.”

42 Manning, The Making of Democrats, 56.

43 Masters and Laub, “Hezbollah (a.k.a. Hizbollah, Hizbu’llah).”

44 US Department of Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, “Mohamad Youssef Hammoud Sentenced to 30 years in Terrorism Financing Case,” news 

release, January 27, 2011, http://www.ice.gov/news/releases/1101/110127charlotte.htm.

45 “Lebanon: The Many Hands and Faces of Hezbollah,” IRIN, March 29, 2006, http://www.

irinnews.org/report/26242/lebanon-the-many-hands-and-faces-of-hezbollah.

46 Iain Scobbie, “South Lebanon 2006,” in International Law and the Classification of Conflicts, 

ed. Elizabeth Wilmshurst (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 403.

47 Masters and Laub, “Backgrounder: Hezbollah”; and Shana Marshall, “Hizbollah: 1982-

2009,” in Casebook on Insurgent and Revolutionary Warfare, Volume II: 1962–2009, ed. Chuck 

Crossett (Fort Bragg, NC: United States Army Special Operations Command, 2012), 560.

48 Alissa de Carbonnel, “RPT-INSIGHT—How the Separatists Delivered Crimea to Moscow,” Reuters, March 13, 2014, http://in.reuters.com/article/2014/03/13/ukraine-crisis-russia-aksyonov-idINL6N0M93AH20140313; and “Ukraine Crisis: Russia Isolated 

in UN Crimea Vote,” BBC News Europe, March 15, 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/

world-europe-26595776.

49 Somini Sengupta, “Vote by U.N. General Assembly Isolates Russia,” New York Times, 

March 27, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/28/world/europe/General-Assembly-Vote-on-Crimea.html.

50 Kimberly Marten, “Why Sanctions against Russia Might Backfire,” Huffington Post, 

August 21, 2014, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/kimberly-marten/why-sanctionsagainst-rus_b_5696038.html.

51 Matthew Rosenberg, “Breaking with the West, Afghan Leader Supports Russia’s Annexation of Crimea,” New York Times, March 23, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/24/

world/asia/breaking-with-the-west-afghan-leader-supports-russias-annexation-ofcrimea.html?ref=asia&_r=0.

52 Richard Balmforth and Pavel Polityuk, “Ukraine: Rebels Have Shot down a Ukrainian Military Plane,” Huffington Post, August 7, 2014, http://www.huffingtonpost.

com/2014/08/07/rebels-ukraine-plane_n_5659861.html.

TRANSITION FROM RESISTANCE 

TO GOVERNANCE

W. Sam Lauber and Margaret McWeeney

163

INTRODUCTION

Contemporary scholarship on resistance movements has yet to comprehensively explain methods by which resistance groups successfully 

transition to governing authorities. Examples such as the American 

Revolution, in which a resistance group transitioned into a sustainable governance structure, have proven rare throughout history. In 

fact, most literature on resistance movements focuses on the group’s 

development in stages of governance, such as attainment of de facto 

authority (authority in practice) in a region, achievement of political 

representation in a national legislature, and finally, establishment of a 

new governing authority or creation of an independent state.

Through a careful analysis of seven contemporary resistance groups, 

this paper distills three commonalities that are found to be major contributing factors in a resistance group’s transition through these stages 

of governance: (1) a base of support for the resistance group; (2) the 

group’s relationship with internal and external donors; and (3) an 

internal organization and administrative structure.

BASE OF SUPPORT

The first factor contributing to transition from resistance to governance is a base of support, whether local, regional, or national. Resistance groups must form a base of support to bolster their claims, recruit 

volunteers, and support their movements. To achieve this support, resistance groups often exploit weaknesses in the incumbent regime, typically by providing goods or services that the incumbent regime fails to 

provide or that the resistance group feels are not being offered to the 

local population.1

Hamas

One illustrative case is Hamas, an organization that has maintained 

de facto authority of the Gaza Strip since 2007 due to its grassroots strategy and support base. Hamas, or Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya, 

is a Sunni Islamist group in Palestine that organized in 1987, at the 

beginning of a Palestinian uprising against the Israeli state. Its goals 

are to drive Israeli forces from Palestinian territories of the Gaza Strip 

and the West Bank and to replace Fatah, the ruling party in Palestine.2

To accomplish its goals, Hamas began building an extensive infrastructure of social service organizations funded by neighboring Arab 

nations, such as Egypt and Qatar.3 This infrastructure included schools, 

universities, refugee shelters, orphanages, relief funds, medical clinics, 
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technical institutions, sports clubs, religious institutions, and women’s 

institutions. Hamas also recruited tens of thousands of Palestinians 

for employment,4 began funneling money through its charities, and 

prompted recruits to use their salaries to support military activism. 

Furthermore, Hamas used this infrastructure to generate a community of volunteers to offer logistical help, shelter, and hideouts to militant operatives such as suicide bombers.5

 Over time, the provision of 

services allowed Hamas to gain the loyalty of citizens in the Gaza Strip 

who had grown weary of dealing with the corrupt and neglectful ruling party, Fatah. Citizens in Gaza also turned to Hamas as the international community, particularly the United States and Europe, had 

become outspoken in its support for Israel.6

As a result, the 2006 elections resulted in success for Hamas in the 

national legislature, the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC). Hamas 

received 44.45 percent of the popular vote, won a majority of electoral 

districts, and installed leader Ismail Haniyeh as prime minister of the 

PLC.7 This was a shock to both the international community as well as 

the incumbent government.

As a governing party, Hamas soon isolated Palestine further from 

the international community by refusing to recognize Israel, which 

brought a series of economic sanctions on the country. Incurring these 

economic sanctions led to a brief military conflict between Fatah and 

Hamas in 2007 that concluded with a cease-fire and internationally facilitated negotiations toward a national unified government with power 

sharing between Hamas and Fatah, known as the Mecca Agreement.

From its inception, Hamas worked diligently to become an indispensable player in Palestine and garner the loyalty of Palestinian citizens. 

Hamas exploited the weakness of the ruling party, Fatah, providing 

social services and employment opportunities to underserved areas. By 

doing so, Hamas created a domestic base of support that voted favorably for the organization in the 2006 elections. Hamas was able to resist 

Fatah’s military efforts to dismantle the group and was recognized by 

the international community as a relevant domestic player. Because of 

Hamas’s significant base of support in the region, it was brought to the 

table in international negotiations and offered a power-sharing agreement, giving it authority over the Gaza Strip and veto power over the 

actions of the PLC.8

The Taliban

A second example is the Taliban, a resistance group that came into 

prominence by exposing the corruption and misrule of the incumbent 

government in Afghanistan. The Taliban is also a good example of a 
Transition from Resistance to Governance

165

resistance group that was able to gain support of the local population, 

despite its extreme ideology, by providing security to local civilian populations in war-torn regions.

The Taliban’s strong hold in Afghanistan began after the Soviet 

Union withdrew from the country in 1989 and its communist, Sovietled successor government fell in 1992. When the Soviet government 

collapsed, several mujahideen, or resistance fighting groups, signed 

the Peshawar Accord to appoint a national government for the Islamic 

State of Afghanistan under interim President Burhanuddin Rabbani, a 

Tajik mujahideen leader.9

This government soon collapsed, plunging the country into chaotic 

civil war. During the civil war, the country was divided into “warlord 

fiefdoms  .  .  .  and all the warlords fought, switched sides and fought 

again in a bewildering array of alliances, betrayals, and bloodshed.”10

Southern Afghanistan and Qandahar were divided among dozens of 

ex-mujahideen warlords and bandits who plundered the population 

and prohibited international relief.

The Taliban formed from refugees and students in Pakistani 

madrassas to provide a solution to the chaos in southern Afghanistan. 

As a conglomeration of several groups of Pashtun origin, the Taliban aimed to fight against rampant corruption in the country, stop 

the conflict between the mujahideen warlords, and make Afghanistan 

an Islamic state.11 Over time, the Taliban demonstrated its capacity to 

govern in southern Afghanistan, particularly by providing security to 

Afghan citizens. Civilians began to favor the Taliban and saw it capable 

of purging the mujahideen resistance movement, which had been corrupted with the power of governance. For instance, a mujahideen military commander was reported to have abducted and raped two teenage 

girls. In response, Taliban leader Mullah Omar enlisted a small militia 

to attack and hang the commander and free the girls. From actions like 

this, Taliban members gained the mystique of “Robin Hood figures.”12

Soon after, the Taliban was seen as the ruling authority in southern Afghanistan. In 1994, Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir  Bhutto 

enlisted the Taliban’s help, rather than that of the Afghan government, 

to secure a trade route from Peshawar to Kabul. Pakistani trucking 

companies donated several hundred thousand Pakistani rupees (millions of US dollars) and promised a monthly stipend to the Taliban 

to clear the roads and guarantee security. Additionally, the Pakistani 

government gave the Taliban tens of thousands of pieces of artillery.13

The Taliban formally secured Qandahar in 1994 backed by Pakistan’s 

intelligence service and endowments from Saudi Arabia. In doing so, it 

captured the city’s tanks, armored cars, military vehicles, weapons, and 

helicopters. Leveraging power from controlled territories in the south, 
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the Taliban was eventually successful in removing Afghan President 

Rabbani in 1996 and establishing the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.14

Due to the Taliban’s brutal ruling tactics, human rights abuses, and 

harboring of terrorist organizations, the regime was dismantled during the US occupation of Afghanistan in 2001, sending many former 

Taliban leaders into neighboring Pakistan.15

The Taliban is a clear example of a resistance group that achieved 

control and eventually became the state authority by providing goods 

and services and aligning with the local population. Even if Afghan individuals did not agree with or approve of the Taliban’s ruling tactics or 

ideology, communities were compelled to support the group because of 

the egregious neglect and corruption of the standing government. Even 

after the US occupation of Afghanistan and the declared global War 

on Terror, the Taliban still remains a prominent movement in northern Pakistan. The Taliban example provides evidence that assuming the 

role of government for underserved populations can generate a domestic base of support that can propel a resistance group into a governing 

authority.16

RELATIONSHIP TO DONORS

To provide goods and services and gain de facto authority, resistance groups must finance their operations. Therefore, the second 

major factor contributing to a resistance group’s ability to gain governing authority is its relationship with internal and external donors.17

Extensive funding enables resistance groups to overcome various obstacles and opposition, as well as to try alternative avenues to stay in power.

Hizbollah

One example is Hizbollah, or “Party of God,” a Shia Islamic resistance group in Lebanon. The group came into prominence in the early 

1980s when Israel invaded and occupied Lebanon to expel Palestinian 

militants operating in the south. In response to the occupation, the Hizbollah movement began a violent campaign against the Israeli military.

Soon after, Hizbollah became the strategic arm for Iran in the Arab 

world, receiving financial support and training from Iran’s Revolutionary Guard. In fact, in the party’s manifesto, the organization vows loyalty to Iran’s Ayatollah Khomeini and aims to expel the influence of 

the United States, France, and Israel from Lebanon.18

Annual estimates of funding from Iran vary from tens of millions 

of dollars to one billion dollars, not including military training and 
Transition from Resistance to Governance

167

sophisticated weapons systems. Other contributors to Hizbollah include 

wealthy Arab individuals, such as Mohamad Hammoud, who was convicted in 2003 of accumulating millions of dollars in profit for Hizbollah, as well as a sizeable Lebanese expatriate community, which has 

also been known to funnel illicit funds from the South American drug 

trade into Lebanon.19 Hizbollah also works to recruit Lebanese professionals from government institutions, nongovernmental organizations, 

and universities and encourage them to contribute. This money, manpower, and artillery fuels Hizbollah’s organizational capacity to gain a 

presence and maintain de facto control in southern Lebanon, gain the 

trust of the Lebanese population, and propel its political agenda.20

However, over the group’s thirty-year development, Hizbollah leaders have come to understand that to survive the group must adopt 

legitimate practices, particularly because Israel is backed by the United 

States and because Lebanese citizens prefer not to associate with a terrorist organization.21 To address this, Hizbollah leveraged its massive 

resources to establish itself as a legitimate resistance movement instead 

of a terrorist group. Hizbollah developed an extensive social development program with four hospitals, twelve clinics, twelve schools, and 

two agricultural centers for assistance and training. The organization 

targeted these programs to address areas underserved by the current 

government in southern Lebanon and Beirut.22

Hizbollah’s demonstration of its ability to operate as an alternative 

to the ruling regime, combined with a 2006 military conflict in which 

it fended off Israeli forces in southern Lebanon, increased its popularity in the country and won the group ten parliamentary seats in the 

2009 Lebanese parliamentary elections under leader Hassan  Nasrallah.23 Although still a minority party, Hizbollah has been successful in 

leveraging its resources from donors to become a de facto government 

in southern Lebanon and gain political representation in the national 

legislature. The surplus of resources from Iran, individual donors, and 

the Lebanese expatriate community continue to allow Hizbollah to 

rule southern Lebanon and operate as a “state-within-a-state,”24 despite 

international pressures to dismantle the group because of its anti-Western agenda.

RENAMO

For the vast majority of conflicts that end in peace negotiations 

rather than military victory, negotiators generally aim to entice aggressive resistance groups to end their violent tactics in exchange for 

becoming legitimate political parties. Often external actors, such as 

international organizations like the United Nations (UN) or states with 
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Special Topics in Irregular Warfare

a particular interest, will offer financial incentives to encourage resistance groups to take that deal.

One group that accepted such an agreement is RENAMO, or 

Resistência Nacional Moçambicana, in Mozambique. RENAMO is an 

anti-communist organization that historically used violence to gain 

traction over the leading party, Front for the Liberation of Mozambique, or FRELIMO. FRELIMO became the ruling authority after 

Mozambique’s declaration of independence in 1975 and maintained 

tight control of the governing apparatus. As a consequence, a civil war 

developed between the two parties in which both FRELIMO and RENAMO became pawns of international players, including the United 

States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and South Africa.25

For instance, the Soviet Union entered into a “Treaty of Friendship” 

with the socialist FRELIMO, and Great Britain became sympathetic 

to the claims of FRELIMO after witnessing the kidnapping of British 

nationals abroad by rebel groups. RENAMO received financial and 

military support from conservatives within the Reagan White House in 

the United States and investment from Rhodesia and South Africa to 

punish FRELIMO for supporting national liberation movements such 

as the African National Congress, the black anti-apartheid group in 

South Africa.26

After a decade of attacks on Mozambique’s communication and 

trade infrastructure and eight rounds of peace talks, the UN facilitated 

the Rome General Peace Accords in 1992, in which RENAMO was persuaded to cease guerrilla warfare and embrace political organization 

to pursue its claim to power. RENAMO agreed to a cease-fire but only 

after it was guaranteed total amnesty for any violence that occurred 

during the civil war.27

As part of the agreement, the party received a $17  million trust 

fund from multiple international donors. Donors additionally paid 

$55 million to defray the cost of elections.28 International sponsors of 

the peace process accepted the core leadership of RENAMO, particularly party President Afonso Dhlakama, and allowed leaders to maintain control over financial resources, allocation of positions, relations 

with external actors, and communication.29 However, RENAMO was 

obligated to use the trust fund to replace most of its internal organization with legitimate administrators and legislative candidates and to 

encourage a commitment to a democratic system of government.30

In 1994, Mozambique held its first democratic elections. Despite 

FRELIMO’s victory in the legislature, RENAMO was successful in gaining 112 of 250 legislative representatives/seats, and only 18 of these 112 

representatives had participated in RENAMO during the civil war. 31

The majority of these positions were given to new recruits used to fill 
Transition from Resistance to Governance

169

out candidate election ballots. By the second election in 1999, RENAMO’s representatives had gained visibility and professional experience 

within both the country and the international community and had 

cemented the two-party system in Mozambique. RENAMO began to be 

known as the party that championed free and fair elections and adjudicated electoral disputes.32

Nevertheless, as relative peace in Mozambique continued and the 

international community turned its focus to other conflicts, RENAMO 

returned to its previous practices, reestablishing historic ethnic cleavages and reverting to a structure of centralized and personalized power 

in party President Dhlakama. In fact, instead of relying on proper 

administrative channels, Dhlakama is known to dismiss RENAMO officers or parliamentary delegates who gain too much power and visibility 

or who could pose a challenge to his authority. Dhlakama’s autocratic 

governing style has eroded the group’s initial commitment to democratic politics, made the party less effective in parliament, and reduced 

its chances of becoming the majority party.33 As a result, the party has 

lost gains made in previous elections, losing 27 legislative seats and 

maintaining only 90 of 250 seats in the 2004 election.34

In June 2014, the group renounced its truce with the FRELIMOdominated government, insisting that promises made by the government had not been fulfilled. Dhlakama plans to participate in the 2014 

elections but publicly ended the 1992 cease-fire, stating that the FRELIMO forces reneged on the Rome Accords.35 However, it has been suspected that the resurgent violence could be a strategy to regain some of 

the attention RENAMO received in the early 1990s and to avoid irrelevance in the eyes of the international community.36

RENAMO gained political representation as a direct result of its 

ability to leverage relationships with the major players in the international community to obtain financial aid. The leadership of RENAMO 

was willing to accept transformation into a political entity, despite facing continued bloodshed and elimination by FRELIMO forces. The 

negotiations that followed from the Rome Accords allowed RENAMO 

to become a significant player in Mozambican politics and gain de jure 

authority through political representation in the national legislature. 

The resurgence of violence came twenty years after initial funding, and 

observers speculate that a lack of sponsored funding has undermined 

the ability of RENAMO to maintain a de jure role in governance.
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INTERNAL ORGANIZATION AND 

ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE

Finally, in addition to mass support and relationships with internal 

and external donors, the last factor contributing to a resistance group’s 

transition to governance is the development of an internal administrative structure to manage the provision of goods and services and oversee finances. Having a highly capable administrative capacity allows 

the resistance group to demonstrate its capability to the populace, 

organize a legitimate political arm for resistance efforts, and offer a 

road map and structure for a nascent government.

Eritrean People’s Liberation Front

An example of a highly developed internal administrative structure 

within a resistance group is the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front, or 

EPLF, which fought to form an independent state from Ethiopia. The 

EPLF originated from the fighting factions of another resistance group, 

the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF), but eventually formed a coalition 

resistance movement with the ELF and other rival groups.37

This unification produced a political and organizational structure, 

headed by an administrative committee that was based on democratic 

centralism and obedience to an agreed-upon platform. The party also 

provided military training, basic education, and health benefits for its 

fighters. The ultimate goal of the unification was to remove any of the 

elements of rival factions incompatible with the movement or capable 

of conspiring for power.38

In 1978, the EPLF began organizing in towns in and near the city 

of Asmara to stop Ethiopian reprisals against the Eritrean liberation 

movements. After capturing this region militarily, the EPLF exercised 

de facto authority by providing health care for peasants and continuing to provide general education and military training. The EPLF also 

elected a central committee and established both a political bureau 

as well as departments for economics, health, social welfare, and mass 

administration, to govern Eritrean society in liberated, semi-liberated, 

and occupied areas.

Finally, in 1991, the EPLF took control of the city of Asmara, formed 

a provisional government, and attained de facto independence from 

Ethiopia. Ethiopia conceded to Eritrea’s military victory and agreed to 

hold a UN-sponsored national referendum on statehood for Eritrea. 

An overwhelming majority of the registered voters in the state voted 

for Eritrea’s independence, prompting the UN to recognize Eritrea’s 

independence in 1992.39
Transition from Resistance to Governance

171

After Eritrea gained independence, the EPLF transformed into the 

People’s Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ) and created the Constitutional Commission for Eritrea, or CCE. This fifty-member council, composed of legal experts, academics, and PFDJ members, created 

a national assembly and an executive branch and established political and religious freedoms. It also decided to remove party politics by 

allowing only one legal political party in the country, the PFDJ, and 

granting the executive branch a wide latitude of powers. With only one 

political party in power, the central committee and elected regional delegates of the PFDJ became the legislative branch of government, which 

appointed the head of PFDJ, Isaias Afewerki, as president. Moreover, 

former fighting brigades of the EPLF became the country’s military, 

and former war supporters were employed by ministries to facilitate 

the rebuilding of factories, restoration of electricity and water supplies, 

reconstruction of roads, and restoration of the agricultural sector.40

PFDJ is still the party in power, with President Afewerki maintaining 

an autocratic hold over the governing authority. In fact, although the 

constitution was ratified in 1997, the country has never held general 

elections for the office of the president, and the national legislature has 

not convened since 2002.41

From early in its inception, EPLF’s internal hierarchy and administrative structure enabled the organization to control the constitutional 

process, present a united front in the war with Ethiopia, and subsequently transition its party leaders into governmental office. The PFDJ 

has since remained in power, drawing on the tactics that enabled it to 

create a unified front, including increasing centralization under the 

executive and undermining competition or constitutional challenges 

to power.42

Sudan People’s Liberation Army

A second case in which administrative capacity facilitated the transition from de facto control to governing authority is the Sudan People’s 

Liberation Army (SPLA). The SPLA was a resistance group of former 

Sudanese military fighters who sought regional autonomy for southern 

Sudan from the northern-led Sudanese government. Regional autonomy was awarded to the south in a peace agreement in 1983, although 

shortly afterward northern Sudan violated the terms of the agreement 

and began appropriating southern natural resources, such as water 

and oil. The result was a twenty-year civil war between the two regions.

This conflict caught the attention of the international community because each party committed atrocities including discrimination, village displacement, disruption of UN peacekeeping efforts, 
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indiscriminate bombardment, creation of famine conditions, employment of child soldiers, and extreme repression.43 However, in the late 

1980s, the SPLA began cooperating with UN relief agencies to gain 

international credibility and protect the civilian population. This cooperation included declaring a cease-fire in designated areas that would 

permit famine relief agencies to conduct operations safely. By the 1990s, 

the SPLA gained de facto control in the southern region and claimed 

jurisdiction over the 4.1 million people residing in the south.44

After more than twenty years of devastation, the government of 

Sudan and the SPLA agreed to an internationally facilitated Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005, under which they would negotiate 

shared governance and oil revenues. Soon afterward, SPLA President 

and Commander-in-Chief Dr. John Garang established a conventional 

army structure to organize the more than 140,000 personnel under his 

command. He appointed a chief of general staff and four deputy chiefs 

of general staff in the areas of administration, operations, logistics, and 

political and moral orientation. The SPLA also divided its army into 

divisions and brigades to monitor jurisdictions in southern Sudan.45

Politically, the organization forged links with a prominent group 

of northern political parties sympathetic to its aims, known as the 

National Democratic Alliance, as well as southern rivals, the Sudan 

People’s Defense Forces/Democratic Front and the Lord’s Resistance 

Movement, to form the Sudan People’s Liberation Army/Movement.46

The SPLA then reorganized its structure by promoting its deputy chiefs 

of general staff to lieutenant generals and incorporating new officers 

from rival organizations into joint integrated units to avoid infighting 

among rival groups.47

During the final negotiation under the Comprehensive Peace 

Agreement, southern Sudan was permitted to hold a referendum for 

independence from the north.48 The referendum was held in 2011, and 

98.83 percent of the population voted for independence. As soon as the 

UN recognized South Sudan’s independence, SPLA authorities began 

to transition into the country’s administrative apparatus. For instance, 

John  Garang’s successor, Salva  Kir, became president of the government of South Sudan and appointed his deputies to fill newly created 

cabinets such as the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Defense 

and Veterans Affairs.49

The decade-long transformation of SPLA’s guerrilla fighting campaign into an organized army and then into the governing apparatus 

gained international approval for the party, allowing the administration to seamlessly transition into the offices of the government of South 

Sudan uninterrupted. A challenge to this administrative structure 

occurred in 2013, however, when the SPLA-dominated government 
Transition from Resistance to Governance

173

faced attacks by groups associated with President Kir’s former deputy, 

Riek Machar, on the nation’s oil fields, although parties are now working toward a negotiated settlement.50

CONCLUSION

The preceding six case studies illustrate the factors that contribute to a resistance group’s transition into a de facto authority, a party 

with national political representation, or a state governing authority. 

These factors are a base of support, a relationship with internal and 

external donors, and an administrative structure or internal organization. Although these factors aid in facilitating a move from resistance 

to governance, they are not necessarily sufficient for sustainable or successful governance. In the case of RENAMO, many of the reforms that 

facilitated the organization’s transition to governance are now being 

undone. Furthermore, although EPLF and SPLA were successful in 

attaining statehood, they still struggle to maintain sustainable control, 

with the government of Eritrea increasingly being condemned for its 

violent tactics to assert governmental authority and the government of 

South Sudan facing domestic resistance from rebel movements. A final 

example, describing the contemporary resistance group in Libya, will 

illustrate the complications associated with transitions to governance 

faced by most resistance groups.

Anti-Qadhafi Resistance Forces

The anti-Qadhafi resistance forces were successful in achieving 

their aims of overthrowing the standing government and becoming the 

governing authority in Libya, but they have been unable to transform 

this momentum into becoming a stable ruling authority. The antiQadhafi forces formed in 2010, when Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi responded to a number of civilian protests with brutal state force, 

killing fourteen protestors.51 Dissatisfied with forty years of repressive 

rule, anti-Qadhafi protesters and demonstrators around Benghazi 

began overwhelming government forces and driving Qadhafi loyalists 

out of the city.52

By February 2011, it was evident that what had started as civilian 

protests had fomented into an uprising to remove Qadhafi from power. 

Qadhafi’s own ministers began resigning from their posts, condemning the excessive use of force on protestors.53

In late March, the UN imposed a no-fly zone in Libyan airspace to 

stem some of the violence imposed by Qadhafi, while Great Britain, the 

United States, France, Qatar, and Turkey announced support for the 
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Special Topics in Irregular Warfare

resistance force, supplying civilians with communications equipment, 

training, and arms. Soon after, the international community made Libya’s previously frozen assets available to the anti-Qadhafi forces, which 

then transitioned into a political party known as the National Transitional Council (NTC).54

The NTC issued a Constitutional Declaration as “the sole representative of Libya.”55 The NTC’s executive board, chaired by Mahmoud Jibril, set a time line for interim governance until the liberation 

of Tripoli, the capital.56 After the capture of Tripoli in August 2012, the 

NTC transitioned into the General National Congress (GNC), a legislative body made up of more than two hundred members who appointed 

Ali Zeidan as prime minister and Mohammed Magariaf as president.57

However, since the successful overthrow of the incumbent government, the government has struggled to rebuild much of the national 

infrastructure and security apparatus, culminating in the 2012 attack 

on the US embassy in Benghazi. Moreover, the volatile security situation in the country has produced numerous armed bands, militias, and 

tribal groups working to gain territorial control as well as resistance 

groups that aim to control Libya’s vast oil reserves.58

Even though the NTC granted amnesty to those who committed 

crimes during the revolution, civilians, independently and in organized militias and tribal groups, remain well armed from fighting the 

regime and attack prosecutors, judicial police, and judges to prevent 

stable rule of law in the country. Furthermore, the freedoms, including freedom of speech and religion and women’s rights, promised by 

the NTC and GNC have yet to come to fruition as armed civilians and 

groups threaten the progress of elected officials, international activists, 

and journalists.59

To date, the GNC is still working with the United States, European 

Union, and UN on border assistance and state building focused on 

training an army and police force.60 Libya’s current challenges stem 

in part from the fact that the anti-Qadhafi forces became united only 

to remove Qadhafi from power. Once this occurred, the anti-Qadhafi 

forces formed a government with de jure authority and international 

approval but without a popular base of support for a party or centrally 

organized administrative apparatus under clearly defined leadership. 

Unlike the EPLF, the GNC is now faced with consolidating a myriad of 

parties, interests, and allegiances, which poses a substantial challenge 

to the creation of a stable and sustainable government in Libya.

The failures of governance in Libya demonstrate that transition 

from resistance group to governing authority is a complex process. 

Even if the resistance group is successful in building a base of support, 

cultivating a relationship with donors, and gaining de jure authority to 
Transition from Resistance to Governance

175

govern, the absence or weakening of any one contributing factor can 

undermine a resistance movement’s transition to governance or its ability to govern after a conflict. The anti-Qadhafi forces initially possessed 

the contributing factors to some degree (mass support for the antiQadhafi forces and NTC, relationship to donors, and attempts at internal organization) and were successful in gaining de jure authority, but 

they have since been unable to maintain a consolidated base of support 

and transform de jure authority into sustainable governance practices.

Although there is no single road map for successful transition of 

a resistance group to governance, the factors identified in this paper 

provide insight and may increase prospects for a successful transition. 

Future research could focus on understanding the weight or importance of each factor or ascertaining whether the presence of certain 

factors over others increases the likelihood of the success and sustainability of the transitioned de jure authority.

Table 1. Summary of Resistance Groups’ Transition to Governance

Resistance 

Group

Stage of 

Governing 

Authority

Primary 

Contributing Factor of Transition 

to Governance

Current

 Status

Hamas De facto governance 

in the Gaza Strip/

political representation in national 

legislature

Domestic base of 

support

Active—Controls Gaza 

Strip and has representation in a national unity 

government (powersharing agreement with 

Fatah)

Taliban De facto governance/

de jure (in law) governing authority

Domestic base of 

support

Inactive (as de jure 

authority in Afghanistan)—Dismantled by US 

troops in Afghanistan but 

active as de facto government in communities in 

northern Pakistan

Hizbollah

De facto governance/political 

representation

External relationship with donors

Active—De facto authority in southern Lebanon 

and has political representation in national 

legislature

RENAMO Political 

representation

External relationship with donorsActive—Has political 

representation in legislature, although severely 

weakened since the Rome 

Accords

EPLF De jure (in law) governing authorityInternal organization and administrative structureActive—State governing 

authority in Eritrea as the 

PFDJ
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Resistance 

Group

Stage of 

Governing 

Authority

Primary 

Contributing Factor of Transition 

to Governance

Current

 Status

SPLA De jure (in law) governing authorityInternal organization and administrative structureInactive—State governing 

authority in the government of South Sudan and 

inactive as the SPLA

Anti-Qadhafi 

forces/NTC

De jure (in law) governing authorityDomestic base of 

support

Active—State governing authority of Libya 

although faces considerable obstacles and challenges to power

NOTES

1 Jonte Van Essen, “De Facto Regimes in International Law,” Utrecht Journal of International 

and European Law 28, no. 74 (2012): 31–49; and Zachariah Cherian Mampilly, Rebel Rulers: Insurgent Governance and Civilian Life during War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 

2011), 39.

2 “Who are Hamas?” BBC News, updated January 4, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/

hi/1654510.stm.

3 Matthew Levitt and Dennis Ross, Hamas: Politics, Charity, and Terrorism in the Service of 

Jihad (Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2006), 26–28; 

and Jonathan Masters and Zachary Laub, “Hezbollah (a.k.a. Hizbollah, Hizbu’llah),” 

Council on Foreign Relations, January 3, 2014, http://www.cfr.org/lebanon/

hezbollah-k-hizbollah-hizbullah/p9155.

4 Scott Wilson, “In Politics, Hamas Gains in the West Bank,” Washington Post, 

June  29,  2005, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/06/28/

AR2005062801368.html.

5 Levitt and Ross, Hamas: Politics, Charity, and Terrorism in the Service of Jihad, 51.

6 “Middle East: Why Did Hamas Win Palestinian Poll?,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 

January 26, 2006, http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1065113.html.

7 Wilson, “In Politics, Hamas Gains in the West Bank.”

8 “Who are Hamas?” BBC News; and Jim Zanotti, “Hamas: Background and Issues for 

Congress,” CRS Report no. R41514 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 

December 2, 2010), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/R41514.pdf, 3–4.

9 Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil, and the New Great Game in Central Asia (London: I. B. Tauris, 2000), 21.

10 Ibid.

11 Kenneth Katzman, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, CRS 

Report no. RL30588 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, July 11, 2014), 

https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL30588.pdf, 3; and Zachary Laub, “Backgrounder: 

The Taliban in Afghanistan,” Council on Foreign Relations, updated July 4, 2014, http://

www.cfr.org/afghanistan/taliban-afghanistan/p10551.

12 Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil, and the New Great Game in Central Asia, 25.

13 Ibid., 29–30.

14 Katzman, “Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy,” 5.

15 Laub, “The Taliban in Afghanistan.”
Transition from Resistance to Governance

177

16 “How the Taliban Gripped Karachi,” BBC News, March 20, 2013, http://www.bbc.com/

news/world-asia-21343397.

17 Mampilly, Rebel Rulers, 234.

18 Masters and Laub, “Hezbollah (a.k.a. Hizbollah, Hizbu’llah).”

19 US Department of Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, “Mohamad Youssef Hammoud Sentenced to 30 years in Terrorism Financing Case,” news 

release, January 27, 2011, http://www.ice.gov/news/releases/1101/110127charlotte.htm.

20 Shana Marshall, “Hizbollah: 1982-2009,” in Casebook on Insurgent and Revolutionary Warfare, Volume II: 1962–2009, ed. Chuck Crossett (Fort Bragg, NC: United States Army Special Operations Command, 2012), 552.

21 Judith Palmer Harik, Hezbollah: The Changing Face of Terrorism (London: I. B. Tauris, 

2004), 60–62.

22 “Lebanon: The Many Hands and Faces of Hezbollah,” IRIN, March 29, 2006, http://www.

irinnews.org/report/26242/lebanon-the-many-hands-and-faces-of-hezbollah.

23 Masters and Laub, “Hezbollah (a.k.a. Hizbollah, Hizbu’llah)”; and Marshall, “Hizbollah: 

1982–2009,” 560.

24 Iain Scobbie, “South Lebanon 2006,” in International Law and the Classification of Conflicts, 

ed. Elizabeth Wilmshurst (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 403.

25 James M. Scott, Deciding to Intervene: The Reagan Doctrine and American Foreign Policy (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1996), 194–195.

26 Ibid., 197.

27 “Terrorist Organization Profile: Mozambique National Resistance Movement,” National 

Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, http://www.start.

umd.edu/tops/terrorist_organization_profile.asp?id=314.

28 Christoph Zürcher, Carrie Manning, Kristie D. Evenson, Rachel Hayman, Sarah Riese, 

and Nora Roehner, Costly Democracy: Peacebuilding and Democratization after War (Stanford: 

Stanford University Press, 2013), 104.

29 Carrie Manning, “Armed Opposition Groups into Political Parties: Comparing Bosnia, Kosovo, and Mozambique,” Studies in Comparative International Development 39, no. 1 

(2004): 54–76.

30 Carrie Manning, The Making of Democrats: Elections and Party Development in Postwar Bosnia, 

El Salvador, and Mozambique (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 48–53.

31 “Terrorist Organization Profile: Mozambique National Resistance Movement,” National 

Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism; Gwinyayi Dzinesa 

and Paulo Wache, “Mozambican Elections: What to Make of Dhlakama’s Intention to 

Run for President,” All Africa, May 27, 2014, http://allafrica.com/stories/201405270478.

html; and Manning, “Armed Opposition Groups into Political Parties.”

32 Manning, The Making of Democrats, 56.

33 Manning, “Armed Opposition Groups into Political Parties.”

34 Manning, The Making of Democrats, 51.

35 Foreign Staff, “RENAMO suspends Mozambique Ceasefire, Vows to Step Up Attacks,” 

Business Day Live, June 6, 2014, http://www.bdlive.co.za/africa/africannews/2014/06/06/

renamo-suspends-mozambique-ceasefire-vows-to-step-up-attacks.

36 Reuters, “Mozambique Army Launches Retaliatory Attack on RENAMO,” Yahoo Finance 

UK & Ireland, October 18, 2013, https://uk.finance.yahoo.com/news/mozambique-armylaunches-retaliatory-attack-183944138.html.

37 David Pool, From Guerrillas to Government: Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (Athens, OH: 

Ohio University Press, 2001), 55.

38 Ibid., 75–76.

39 Ibid., 161.

40 Ibid.,163.
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41 Tesfa-Alem Tekle, “Eritrean Leader Pledges to Draft New Constitution,” Sudan Tribune, 

May 24, 2014, http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article51115.

42 “World Report 2013: Eritrea,” Human Rights Watch, January 1, 2013, http://www.hrw.

org/world-report/2013/country-chapters/eritrea.

43 Jemera Rone, John Prendergast, and Karen Sorensen, Civilian Devastation: Abuses by All 

Parties in the War in Southern Sudan (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1994), 2–3.

44 Charles Tripp, “The Sudanese War in International Relations,” in After the Cold War: Security and Democracy in Africa and Asia, eds. William Hale and Eberhard Kienle (London: 

Tauris Academic Studies, 1997), 57.

45 Richard Rands, “In Need of Review: SPLA Transformation in 2006-2010 and Beyond,” 

Small Arms Survey, HSBA Working Paper 23, November 1, 2010, 19–20, http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/working-papers/HSBA-WP-23-SPLA-Transformation-2006-10-and-Beyond.pdf.

46 Claire Metelits, Inside Insurgency: Violence, Civilians, and Revolutionary Group Behavior (New 

York: New York University Press, 2010), 68.

47 Rands, “In Need of Review: SPLA Transformation in 2006-2010 and Beyond,” 21.

48 “Sudan: Southern Pull-out Threatens Peace Deal,” IRIN, October 11, 2007, http://www.

irinnews.org/report/74746/sudan-southern-pull-out-threatens-peace-deal.

49 Patrick Worsnip, “South Sudan Admitted to U.N. as 193rd Member,” Reuters, July 14, 2011, http://uk.reuters.com/article/2011/07/14/

uk-sudan-un-membership-idUKTRE76D3I120110714.

50 Nicholas Bariyo, “South Sudan Peace Talks Reach Apparent Breakthrough,”  Wall Street Journal, June 11, 2014, http://online.wsj.com/articles/

south-sudan-peace-talks-reach-apparent-breakthrough-1402473616.

51 “Protesters Take Control of Several Libyan Cities,” The News International, February 19, 

2011, http://www.thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?ID=31907&Cat=1.

52 Anne Barker, “Time Running Out for Cornered Gaddafi,” ABC News, February 24, 2011, 

http://w w w.abc.net.au/news/2011- 02-24/time-running-out-for-cornered-gaddafi/1955842.

53 Al Jazeera and Agencies, “Gaddafi Loses More Libyan Cities,” Al Jazeera English, February 24, 2011, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2011/02/2011223125256699145.

html; and “Libya: UN backs Action Against Colonel Gaddafi,” BBC News, March 18, 2011, 

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12781009.

54 “Libya Conflict: UN Agreement Sought to Unfreeze Assets,” BBC News, August 25, 2011, 

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-14661504.

55 “Founding Statement of the Interim Transnational National Council,” Lauterpacht Centre for International Law, March 5, 2011, http://www.lcil.cam.ac.uk/sites/default/files/

LCIL/documents/arabspring/libya/Libya_12_Founding_Statement_TNC.pdf.

56 Vivienne Walt, “How Did Gaddafi Die? A Year Later, Unanswered Questions 

and Bad Blood,” Time, October 18, 2012, http://world.time.com/2012/10/18/

how-did-gaddafi-die-a-year-later-unanswered-questions-and-bad-blood/.

57 Rana Jawad, “Libyan Voters Prepare for Change,” BBC News, July 5, 2012, http://

www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-18721576; and Ali Shuaib, “Libyan Assembly Votes 

Gaddafi Opponent as President,” Reuters, August 9, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/

article/2012/08/09/us-libya-assembly-idUSBRE8781ID20120809.

58 “World Report 2014: Libya,” Human Rights Watch, http://www.hrw.org/worldreport/2014/country-chapters/libya, 1.

59 Ibid., 3.

60 Ibid.
INTERNAL CONFLICT AND THE ROLE 

OF OUTSIDE INFLUENCE: HOW FOREIGN 

STATES LEVERAGE INDIGENOUS 

RESISTANCE MOVEMENTS TO ACHIEVE 

NATIONAL OBJECTIVES

Joseph M. Tonon, Erin N. Hahn, and Summer Newton

181

INTRODUCTION

Since the Cold War, external support of resistance movements has 

been a common method for states to achieve various strategic political 

objectives, such as destabilizing rivals, increasing regional influence, or 

instituting regime change. Working through indigenous populations, 

states have extended their ability to influence the outcomes of conflicts 

without having to engage directly with rival states. However, since the 

end of the Cold War, the nature of internal conflict has dramatically 

changed and, accordingly, so too has the type and scope of outside 

support. In particular, the amount of funding and resources outside 

actors provide to resistance movements has lessened, yet the impact 

and effectiveness of this support has not. The purpose of this paper is 

to provide an introductory understanding of the conditions that give 

rise to internal conflict as well as the strategies that outside actors, 

particularly sovereign states, use to shape the conflict or pursue other 

objectives through support of a resistance movement. In particular, this 

paper looks at the following questions:

1. Why and in what ways do outside actors provide external 

support to resistance movements to influence an internal 

conflict or achieve other objectives?

2. How has the nature of conflict changed since the end of the 

Cold War, and what implications does that have on external 

support?

The context in which one country may attempt to influence outcomes in another by employing indigenous populations is important 

to understand, particularly, from the United States’ perspective with 

regard to unconventional warfare (UW). The US military defines UW 

as “activities that are conducted to enable a resistance movement or 

insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying 

power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and 

guerrilla force in a denied area.”1 The ideas and concepts outlined in 

the current definition of UW are neither simple nor easy to implement. 

There are many implications that follow from the definition that have 

yet to be explored. However, to speak of external support from a US 

view is to speak of UW. This point matters because Special Operations 

Forces (SOF) personnel charged with carrying out UW need to understand how resistance movements operate, which requires the ability 

to recognize the agendas and forms of support provided by external 

states, as well as the relevance of other external actors (e.g., diasporas and refugee populations). Moreover, the dynamics of external support are important to understand not only so that the United States 

can be more effective at carrying out UW but also to ensure that SOF 
182

Special Topics in Irregular Warfare

personnel understand the effects of such support on groups the United 

States seeks to counter.

This paper was developed as an initial exploration of the topic of 

external support, with the goal of highlighting both relevant theoretical approaches and cases for more in-depth follow-on study. It provides 

an overview of key elements, including the forms of and motivation 

for post-Cold-War external support. Amid budgetary constraints and 

an ongoing threat to national security posed by global terrorism, it is 

likely that the United States will need to achieve national security and 

strategic political objectives through means other than direct combat 

operations. Given its historical use and current relevance in internal 

conflicts around the world, UW may be a viable option for furthering 

these objectives. To better understand why UW may be a viable strategic option for the US government to pursue, research needs to be conducted on the reasons behind a state’s decision to use an indigenous 

population (i.e., what theory or theories help explain state support of 

resistance movements, and is there theory that underpins existing UW 

doctrine)? Whether UW is pursued as a strategic policy option is also 

dependent on how it is presented and understood. What tool or tools 

can help explain why it is a viable option that will resonate with policy 

makers? Making the case for UW requires imparting a deeper understanding to nonpractitioners of what it involves and what risks are associated with its execution.

Because this paper is an introductory discussion of the topic, the 

overall goal is to conduct case studies over time that will permit a more 

in-depth understanding of the interplay of variables in external support and when it has worked or failed and why. Detailed study will lead 

to a better understanding of the questions posed above and to the eventual distillation of best practices, which can be used to maximize SOF 

personnel’s understanding of UW.

It is important to note that most if not all other foreign countries 

do not use the term unconventional warfare and instead embrace the 

language of insurgency and terrorism. In this context, insurgency 

usually means waging a guerrilla war against a sitting government or 

occupying power. Since the end of World War  II, these tactics have 

been employed in most inter- and intrastate conflicts. After the Cuban 

missile crisis, the superpowers realized that direct confrontation was 

too dangerous. Instead, they competed with each other on the periphery, and they used other nations in the context of internal conflicts 

between indigenous populations or sitting governments to do their 

bidding. For example, during the Angolan War of Independence, the 

United States indirectly supported the sitting government, while the 

Soviet Union supported the Popular Movement for the Liberation of 
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Angola, an insurgent group that was challenging the government for 

control of the country, with arms and other supplies. States have come 

to accept that it is too costly to engage in direct conflict, particularly if 

the political objective is important but not crucial to national security. 

External support is a viable option, but it comes with costs and benefits. 

Understanding the risks attendant to providing support is important.

The more current example in Syria underscores this point. After 

confirmation of the Syrian government’s use of chemical weapons 

June 2013, the United States provided direct military support to opposition forces aimed at toppling Assad’s regime. For at least two years 

prior, discussions encouraging US support of opposition forces swirled 

in Congress, and some news outlets even questioned whether Syria 

was the next proxy war. When President Obama did publicly authorize support, the Syrian opposition was in a somewhat fractured state. 

It consists of a coalition of different groups, often with very different 

ideologies and ideas about Syria’s future. The opposition forces subsequently formed an umbrella organization, but concerns remained that 

the loose confederation could quickly splinter over how to handle the 

transition if Assad were overthrown. Of more immediate significance 

was the strife within the opposition forces that forced both the United 

States and the United Kingdom to suspend outside aid. Meanwhile, 

Iran, Lebanese Hizbollah supported by Iran, and Iraqi Shiite factions 

were very effective at training progovernment paramilitary groups and 

merging disparate forces to create a strong coalition keen on keeping 

Assad in power. What factors made Iran’s support of pro-Assad groups 

so effective, and what factors contributed to the inability of the opposition forces to solidify? What were the US motivations for supporting 

the opposition forces, and to what extent were the risks borne out by 

later events understood in advance of the support? There are numerous factors that need to be explored to begin to answer these questions, in the Syria example and any other conflict involving significant 

external support. The factors are identified in this paper, and the subsequent UW case studies are intended to provide case-specific analysis 

of those factors.

This paper uses the term resistance movement to refer to any group 

opposing a standing government. This term was selected not only 

because it is used in the UW definition but also for its inclusiveness; 

it accounts for groups that external actors may wish to support, which 

may share many but not all the same characteristics. For instance, a 

group may be in the nascent stages of development and attract external 

support for that very reason. Others may be more sophisticated, participating in an insurgency, and may also be the target of external support 

based on their level of development and ability to help a state achieve 
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certain ends within another sovereign territory. The terms insurgents

and rebels are commonly used in the media and literature in generic 

fashion. Care has been taken to avoid the imprecise use of these terms 

here, and any reference to either should be understood as simply a specific type of resistance movement.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The literature we draw on for this paper is, for the most part, from 

economics and political science. With this literature in mind, there are 

two lenses through which to view this large body of work. The first is 

from the perspective of a group of indigenous actors trying to change 

or defeat a sitting government. Alternatively, the other perspective is 

from the outside actor, in this case some state that seeks to influence 

the outcome of a conflict.a

To begin to understand the effectiveness of external support and 

the best types of support for a state to provide, it is necessary to conduct 

a series of comparative case studies on support to indigenous resistance 

movements. By using the comparative method, it is possible to search 

for lessons that generalize but that also have enough historical context 

to allow the reader to adapt them to the circumstances of the particular case. By carrying out this research, it will be possible to establish 

a set of best practices for SOF personnel. The UW case studies along 

with work on correlating the phases of organizational growth with the 

stages of an insurgency are central to this effort and key for the SOF 

community as it continues to build its capacity to execute this difficult 

and demanding mission.

In the empirical sciences, there is always a dialogue between the 

development of theory to explain some type of social phenomenon and 

data collection and analysis. Researchers seek to strike an appropriate 

balance between the theoretical and the empirical. As we move forward with more-detailed case studies and use the comparative method 

to draw inferences, we will learn more about the types of support that 

are most effective and the best practices associated with their delivery.

Some of the questions that inform this work include the following:

• Why do states that are external to a conflict use indigenous forces 

to achieve their strategic objectives?

• Once states make the decision to use indigenous forces, what 

types of support are most effective?

a Three very important books in this area are Kalyvas’s The Logic of Violence in Civil 

War, Petersen’s Resistance and Rebellion, and Weinstein’s Inside Rebellion.
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• If you help create a capacity for societal change, violent or 

otherwise, can it be controlled?

• What types of mechanisms help with control?

• If a group receives assistance from outside a state’s borders, does 

this change the government’s response?

• Does outside support during an internal conflict lengthen the 

duration of the conflict?

These questions helped to frame our guidelines and criteria, which are 

discussed in the “Potential Case Studies and Case Selection” section.

CIVIL WAR DYNAMICS IN THE 

POST-COLD-WAR ERA

External-state supporters are providing resources, whether material, expertise, or other forms of support, to resistance movements 

opposing a standing government or occupying power. Gaining a 

clearer understanding of how such support can be an effective means 

of achieving national objectives requires a close look at the overall context in which it takes place. Not all instances of external support, or all 

historical periods in which it has taken place, are equal. Examining 

external support for resistance movements during the Cold War is an 

important component of understanding the practice. Yet, the demise 

of communism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe marked a 

watershed event that altered the conditions in which external support, 

and armed conflict, takes place. In many ways, the basic motivations 

that induce people to take up arms are enduring. Many do so to protect themselves and their families, to gain control of scarce resources, 

or to have more control over the future of their lives and community. 

However, patterns of armed conflict have changed considerably in the 

aftermath of the Cold War. Our examination of external support must 

take into account the ways in which these trends alter the practice and 

its expected outcomes. This section discusses these emerging trends in 

armed conflict: the frequency of intrastate war, the frequency and type 

of conflict resolution, altered organizational motivations for conflict, 

and, lastly, changes in methods of warfare.

Academics and policy makers are able to study patterns in armed 

conflict from a different perspective than the soldier concerned with 

the conflict. These patterns, and the structures that influence them, 

are often difficult to see for those experiencing the conflict firsthand. 

This is true of other domains of complex human interaction as well, 

such as economics. An American unemployed after the 2008 recession, for instance, is likely to explain his financial hardship in terms 
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close to home. Nevertheless, global commodity markets, international 

financial organizations, and political instability in remote regions are 

all factors far afield from our everyday lives that impact us intimately. 

Likewise, the actions of national governments, resistance movements, 

and even individuals are shaped by larger structures, such as the relationships between powerful states that form the architecture of the 

international system.

Frequency of Intrastate War

The end of the Cold War resulted in changes within the international system that impacted the dynamics of civil war the world over. 

During the Cold War, the rivalry between two superpowers, the United 

States and the Soviet Union, shaped the when, where, and how of internal conflict. The high costs of war between the two superpowers meant 

that the rivalry was carried out in other venues, usually in other states 

between combatants supported by either side.

With the end of that global rivalry, there was a noticeable uptick 

in the frequency of civil war, leading some to fear a period of coming 

anarchy. The sharp spike in the number of civil wars peaked in 1992, 

but many of those conflicts were contained by 1996.2 The frequency 

of interstate wars continued to drop. Today, most armed conflicts take 

place within states. In 2011, for instance, of the thirty-seven active conflicts (defined as those resulting in more than twenty-five battle deaths 

per annum) worldwide, only one of those conflicts was between states.3

During the Cold War, many civil wars were long-lived and difficult to 

resolve, most likely because of superpower support. Beginning in the 

1990s, by contrast, civil wars, many of which had begun in previous 

decades, resolved at a rapid rate. In the forty-five-year period of the 

Cold War, for example, only 141 intrastate conflicts ended. By contrast, 

in the short fifteen-year period after the end of the Cold War, 145 intrastate conflicts ended.4

Conflict Resolution

Not only are more civil wars finding resolution today, but the manner in which civil wars end has also experienced a sea change. Beginning in 1940 up until the end of the 1980s, most civil wars ended via a 

decisive military victory, whether by rebel forces or the incumbent government. From 1940 to 1999, civil wars were four times as likely to end 

via a military victory as a negotiated settlement. However, beginning in 

1990, not only did an astonishing number of civil wars (many of which 

had begun in the Cold War era) end, but many of them ended not 
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through a military victory but by a negotiated settlement between the 

opposing sides. In the 1990s, only four out of every ten civil wars ended 

through a military victory. Of the thirty-seven civil wars that ended 

in the 1990s, fifteen ended in a military victory, fifteen by negotiated 

settlement, and seven by a cease-fire/stalemate.5 When the dataset used 

to calculate those figures is extended to include low-intensity conflicts, 

the difference is even more striking. In the period 1990–2005, of the 

147 conflicts recorded, twenty-seven terminated through a negotiated 

settlement, whereas only twenty terminated via a military victory.6,b

Statistics reveal that not all resolutions to conflict are equal. The 

higher rate of negotiated settlements has left more room for the international community to influence outcomes as third-party states or 

international organizations help mediate settlements and keep the 

peace afterward. Despite the intervention by the international community, civil wars ended through such settlements are twice as likely to 

reignite as those resolved via a decisive military victory. Surprisingly, 

the most stable outcome of a civil war has proven to be a clear military 

victory by rebel forces.7

What about negotiated settlements makes them so precarious? 

These settlements are good at distributing important resources, such as 

political offices, making it easier to bring opposing combatants to the 

bargaining table. However, there is often no third party able to make 

certain that each side upholds its end of the bargain. Countries face 

many challenges in the aftermath of civil war. One political scientist, 

Monica Toft, has researched the instability of negotiated settlements 

extensively.8 She finds that the most important task for ensuring stability after a settlement is good security-sector reform. Combatants from 

both sides, whether government or rebel forces, must be well integrated 

and managed. However, the international community often perceives 

this task as being less pressing than those of humanitarian relief or the 

prosecution of war crimes.

b Kreutz uses the UCDP-PRIO dataset that includes conflicts resulting in more than 

twenty-five battle-related deaths per annum. Monica Duffy Toft, by contrast, uses the Correlates of War dataset, which only tracks conflicts that result in one thousand or more 

battle-related deaths per annum. As an example of how Toft’s higher threshold affects the 

dataset, two successful insurgencies, the April 19th Movement (based in Colombia), or 

M-19, and the Provisional Irish Republican Army (based in Northern Ireland), or PIRA, 

are both excluded from the Correlates of War dataset. Both groups, incidentally, terminated their armed struggle after reaching a negotiated settlement with the incumbent 

government.
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Conflict Motivation

The end of the international system structured by the Cold War 

has also altered the motivations for conflict. Certainly, the incidence 

of insurgencies fueled by communist-inspired ideologies decreased, 

especially in Latin America. Conflicts fought over issues of ethnic identity, by contrast, increased. Another theory describes armed conflict 

motivated more by “greed” than “grievance.”9 According to this understanding of armed conflict today, insurgents are no longer ideologically 

inspired rebels struggling for justice but rather opportunistic groups 

whose primary goal is personal enrichment. Now, most agree that this 

trend is most often found in Sub-Saharan Africa.10 Another theory contrasts current “new wars” with “old wars” fought during the Cold War. 

The new wars prevalent today, proponents of this theory argue, are 

more likely to be fought by irregular forces and motivated more by 

issues of identity than geopolitical interests or ideologies. These forces 

are also more likely to target civilians than enemy combatants. Lastly, 

resources fueling the fight derive from more unconventional sources, 

such as from loot or taxes on humanitarian aid.11

Methods of Warfare

One last important shift in the post-Cold-War era relates to changes 

in the methods by which armed conflicts are typically fought today. 

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, conflicts erupted in its former republics and buffer states in Eastern Europe. The antagonists 

in these wars were usually competing factions of former government 

forces. The conflict dynamics in these countries, as well as others, have 

increased the number of conventionally fought wars after the Cold War. 

Irregular or guerrilla warfarec was the most common method of rebellion during the Cold War. It emerged as “people’s war” in 1930s with 

the help of Mao. The techniques were further honed by communist 

resistance movements in Europe and Asia during World War II. Soon 

after, the methods migrated to the developing world. Irregular warfare 

proved remarkably effective. Previously, conventional armies were most 

c Stathis Kalyvas distinguishes irregular or guerrilla warfare as asymmetrical conflict 

between states and rebels. The methods adopted by the guerrillas include “indirect and 

low-level engagement” with a high frequency of ambush and raid.12
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often able to defeat irregular armies.d During the Cold War, resistance 

movements using irregular warfare methods were more likely to defeat 

conventional forces than ever. A mixture of factors contributed to this 

success, including external support from superpowers. The Soviet Union 

was especially adept in this regard. Its provision of materials, revolutionary ideology, and military doctrine helped many resistance movements mount successful campaigns against standing governments.14

One of the consequences of the end of the Cold War is weaker states. 

During the Cold War period, funds regularly flowed from the coffers of 

the United States and the Soviet Union to prop up weak regimes. When 

those states stopped receiving support, many no longer had the same 

capacity to exert sovereign authority over their territory. These weak 

states are especially prevalent in Sub-Saharan Africa. Not surprisingly, 

many of the conflicts fought after the Cold War have been in regions 

with a surfeit of weak states. In these conflicts, weak challengers fight 

against weak states. The rebel and government forces fighting in these 

weak states are typically equally militarily matched—albeit poorly.

The quintessential model of irregular warfare is a weak challenger 

against a strong state, but this pairing does not occur as frequently as 

it used to. What is not yet understood is whether these conflicts, which 

pair weak states with weak challengers, are the same animal as the typical irregular conflict pairing strong states with weak challengers. One 

academic thinks this is a new method of warfare, substantively different 

from irregular warfare. If he is right, then according to his research, the 

incidence of what he calls “symmetrical nonconventional,” or SNC, warfare is the most frequent method of warfare today.15 This is contrary to 

the prevailing wisdom of the Department of Defense, which would cite 

irregular conflict as the most frequent method of warfare. According 

to this research, the incidence of irregular conflict has decreased from 

its heyday in the Cold War. Thus far, overall no smoking gun points to 

a significant difference between so-called SNC and irregular methods 

d One fascinating study describes why conventional armies were so successful in 

combating irregular armies in the nineteenth century as compared with the twentieth 

century. In the nineteenth century, militaries were “foraging” armies, requiring a great 

deal of interaction with local populations while gathering necessary supplies in conflict 

zones. As a result, they were able to acquire more information from local populations, 

helping them to more easily tell the difference between combatants and noncombatants. 

The increasing mechanization of Western armies in the twentieth century made them less 

dependent on local populations for survival, which, in turn, made them less effective at 

counterinsurgency. In addition to examining a large dataset of historical insurgencies, the 

researchers also use case studies on the intelligence-gathering capabilities of two US Army 

divisions in Iraq to support their conclusions. Most research on the impact of technology 

focuses on its capacity to create a level playing field in asymmetric conflict. This research 

highlights some unusual, and much less discussed, second- and third-order effects of technology on warfare.13
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of warfare, but due attention should be given in future research on conflicts fought between weak challengers and weak states.

Implications for External Support

The impact of these trends on the practice, and utility, of external 

support to resistance movements is not fully understood. Transitioning a resistance movement to governance in the wake of a military victory is a difficult endeavor regardless of the circumstances. The peace 

is precarious as members of the former resistance movement struggle 

to transition from soldiers to politicians, build legitimacy among the 

population, and contain or integrate former government combatants. Current research tells us that these processes only become more 

challenging when conflict resolution occurs as part of a negotiated 

settlement. Close attention to security-sector reform is especially vital. 

Likewise, most external support no longer occurs in the premade ideological framework that pitted liberal democracy against socialism and 

communism. Only radical Islam has managed to construct comprehensive political and social visions that are compelling on a global scale. 

The component of resistance movements in the Arab Spring touting 

liberal democratic ideals—and their external supporters such as those 

in Egypt, Libya, and Syria—failed to meaningfully influence the political trajectory of those countries.

As of yet, we do not have a good understanding of how the method of 

warfare and the phase of the resistance movements affect the scope, strategies and tactics, and tenor of external support. External support provided in the incipient phase will of necessity differ from support provided 

to a full-blown militarized resistance movement like Hizbollah. Likewise, 

not all resistance movements are engaged in combat with strong government forces. Some of these conflicts are conventional, whereas others, 

mostly fought in weak states, are SNC. Much of what we know about 

external support applies primarily to support for irregular forces.

Lastly, in the absence of robust superpower support, resistance 

movements and their external supporters rely on unconventional revenue streams, sometimes by methods adverse to local populations, such 

as looting or organized crime. Many movements also take advantage 

of the significant amounts of humanitarian aid flowing into conflict 

zones. Academics and policy makers are only now beginning to shed 

light on how well-intentioned humanitarian aid impacts the duration 

and severity of conflicts. Perhaps the trend that overshadows even these 

concerns is the track record of nonviolent movements. Throughout the 

last century, it has not been force of arms that most often brought down 
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despots or reformed corrupt government practices, but peaceful organized resistance.16

TYPES OF ACTORS PROVIDING 

EXTERNAL SUPPORT

External support can dramatically impact the development and 

effectiveness of a resistance movement. Both state and non-state support can be critical to a group and may serve to increase the intensity 

and duration of the conflict17 or even cause a civil conflict to become 

internationalized.e The nature of the support is related to the external 

actor providing the support. During the Cold War, state actors provided 

the majority of external support to resistance movements, often in the 

form of generous financial backing or the broad provision of other 

resources.19 However, the characteristics of conflict have changed since 

the end of the Cold War, and so have the actors providing external support. This paper discusses four main categories of actors that provide 

support to resistance movements: states, diasporas, refugees, and other 

non-state supporters such as religious organizations, nongovernmental 

organizations (NGOs), and affluent individuals, among others.f

The categories of non-state supporters (e.g., diasporas and refugees) 

are important because of their relevance starting at end of the Cold 

War, when “state support [was] no longer the only, or necessarily the 

most important, game in town.”21 Although non-state support may prove 

crucial to a resistance movement, particularly in the early stages of its 

development, state support is the focus of this and subsequent related 

studies because of the nature and scope of aid that external states can 

provide throughout a movement’s life span. Nonetheless, it is important 

to understand other influential categories of actors and in what ways 

they may influence a resistance movement through external support.

Who provides support and why can vary significantly across resistance movements. The four categories of actors each offer specific 

e For an explanation of how external support can internationalize a conflict, see 

Hahn and Lauber.18 One example is the 2011 conflict in Libya, where a United Nations 

Security Council resolution established a no-fly zone and permitted outside states to offer 

support to the opposition in order to protect civilians. Even though foreign troops were 

not allowed to occupy Libyan territory pursuant to the resolution, the introduction of such 

significant outside support arguably created an international armed conflict.

f Byman et al.20 identify the categories that are used here. Within the category of other 

non-state support, their report looks at religious organizations, other revolutionary or insurgent groups, human rights organizations, wealthy individuals, inspirational religious leaders, 

NGOs, and volunteers from neighboring states. This document will not look at these other 

non-state groups in detail, as their support may strengthen a resistance movement early on, 

but their long-term impact is not comparable to that of states, diasporas, or refugees.
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types of support based on a variety of different motivations. The decision to offer external support and the decision of a resistance movement to accept it involve a cost–benefit analysis on each side.22,g

 The 

value of the support offered depends on a number of factors, such as 

the requirements of the resistance at the particular time the support is 

introduced and the incentives in place to accept it. The external supporter does not hold the only bargaining chip, even though it ostensibly 

can offer resources that appeal to the resistance movement or are even 

required for it to progress. Indeed, in some instances, an actor may be 

coerced into providing support, especially if it is part of a disenfranchised group, such as refugees.24 The resistance movement may have 

reasons for attracting one external supporter over another, particularly 

if acceptance would increase the amount of influence the supporter 

has over the group’s major operational decisions. The actors’ motivations to provide support, and the forms of support they offer (e.g., 

money, arms, personnel), are discussed in more detail in the “Motivations for External Support” and “Forms of External Support” sections, 

respectively. This section provides a brief overview of the characteristics 

of the actors, recognizing that the motivations and forms of support 

are intertwined with the identity of the actor.

State Support

A state actor refers to a recognized sovereign power. As previously 

noted, the Cold War rivalry between the United States and the Soviet 

Union is a classic example of state support, where the two superpowers 

and regional partners freely provided money to their preferred resistance movements. At that time, states were the primary actors providing outside aid. Although the amount of aid states furnish to groups 

has diminished in the post-Cold-War era, their level of support has still 

had a profound impact on many resistance movements in subsequent 

years.25 Examples of key state support include the Ugandan and Rwandan support of the Congolese Rally for Democracy (CRD) and a corollary group, the Movement for the Liberation of the Congo (MLC) in 

g Salehyan, Gleditsch, and Cunningham discuss this dynamic in the context of the 

theory of supply and demand.23 The supply side has determinants that may explain why an 

external supporter identifies a particular group, including the motivations and trade-offs. 

For example, an external state may delegate conflict to a rebel group if the state seeks to 

avoid international condemnation and if the interests at stake are not critical to the state. 

The state can afford to lose some control inherent in delegation if its interests are not 

critical to state security or cannot be better served in another way. The demand-side determinants are those factors that may explain why a resistance movement seeks or accepts 

external support. For example, a rebel group may need funding or arms but must weigh 

acceptance of such support against the loss of autonomy that occurs when beholden to an 

outside patron.
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the late 1990s.h The CRD and MLC were not popular locally and lacked 

resources, making the outside state support a critical factor in their 

formation and existence, even though the scale of the support did not 

rival the levels common during the Cold War.

Diaspora Support

A diaspora refers to an immigrant community established in a foreign country. Diasporas often continue to identify themselves with the 

country from which they came, which in some cases can manifest as a 

powerful sense of obligation to their homeland. This tie to a homeland 

may serve as the primary motivation for providing external support to 

a group. Diaspora support has played a significant role in sustaining 

insurgent and other groups, and the support is often related to resistance movements catalyzed by ethnic conflict. In fact, diaspora support 

in the form of money, arms, and recruits has occurred in every region 

of the world except Latin America.27 The relevance of diaspora support to resistance movements has increased, particularly in ethnic or 

ideological conflicts, in part due to the diminished, albeit still important, role of state support. For example, the population of ethnic Tamils in India supported the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) 

against the Sinhalese regime in Sri Lanka. The LTTE is recognized 

as an insurgency that was extremely effective at integrating significant 

diaspora support into a larger global support system.28

Refugee Support

As used here, refugees refers to displaced populations living outside of their home country or territory. Refugees have been important 

supporters of resistance movements largely because the violence or 

discrimination that caused their displacement fuels their desire to contribute to the conflict and regain the ability to return home. Unlike 

states or diasporas, refugees are often living in substandard conditions 

and are therefore unable to provide support in the form of funds or 

weapons. Instead, they more commonly provide personnel by sending 

recruits to back a movement or by developing a resistance themselves. 

One example is the group of Afghan refugees displaced in Pakistan 

who eventually formed the Taliban. In some instances, the vulnerability of refugees may be exploited and they may be coerced into providing support to a group, as has happened when refugee camps fall 

h The CRD and MLC are also discussed with additional context in the “Supported 

Resistance Movements” section. For a detailed discussion of the formation of these groups 

and the eventual split of the CRD into competing factions, see Byman et al.26
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under the control of rebels. Refugees may require the support of the 

host nation where they are encamped in order to effectively back movements in their home country.

Other Non-State Support

The remaining actors who fall within this category have provided 

important support to resistance movements but overall have contributed less significant levels of support than the previous three categories 

of actor. They include religious leaders and organizations, NGOs, and, 

in particular, human rights groups, wealthy individuals, and a rebel or 

insurgent group supporting another rebel or insurgent group. In addition to providing money and volunteers, religious groups can be critical in providing nonmaterial support in the form of justification for the 

cause through religious rulings or interpretations of religious doctrine. 

Wealthy individuals may support a movement out of ethnic affinity or 

common ideology, or because the movement’s objectives resonate or 

align with personal values.i

Unlike the other actors, NGOs may inadvertently rather than 

purposely support a resistance movement in order to carry out their 

mission. For example, relief groups may provide resources to assist individuals in need and unintentionally pass resources to a rebel or insurgent group. In some cases, NGOs may knowingly provide resources 

directly to the resistance movements in order to ensure that emergency 

supplies reach individuals in areas that are rebel strongholds. Similarly, 

human rights groups that call attention to a conflict’s atrocities (e.g., a 

government’s use of torture or child soldiers) may unintentionally generate support for antigovernment resistance movements that results in 

international assistance from groups and individuals alike.

One rebel group that is supporting another rebel group is arguably one category of actor that has been more influential than others 

in this category, as exemplified by Charles Taylor’s National Patriotic 

Front of Liberia (NPFL) and its support for the Revolutionary United 

Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone. At the time the RUF came into existence, 

Taylor was Liberia’s president, and NPFL’s support of the RUF helped 

it gain traction in its early development and allowed the group to 

quickly develop a footprint throughout the country.30 The RUF helped 

destabilize Sierra Leone, which was Liberia’s main competitor, and 

gave Taylor access to the country’s diamond mines. The RUF’s ability to assert control over the diamond trade helped undermine Sierra 

i A striking example is a California physician who is known to have provided as much 

as $4 million to the LTTE over a decade.29
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Leone’s economy, and the sadistic tactics the group used against civilians caused an exodus of refugees and near-total destruction of the 

country’s political structure.

SUPPORTED RESISTANCE MOVEMENTS

One of the first challenges facing states wishing to utilize external support and resistance movements seeking that support is finding a good match. The process requires decisions by both parties. 

States must choose which resistance movement will best help them 

reach their objective. Resistance movements must make similar decisions when courted by potential external supporters. Movements must 

decide whether to accept the support and, in some cases, may have the 

option to choose between one or more potential supporters. Moreover, 

resistance movements can opt to actively seek out external supporters 

rather than passively waiting for offers of support to materialize. This 

section analyzes and discusses which resistance movements are likely to 

receive external support from a state. Factors internal to the group, as 

well as external factors, are explored.

Preferences and Agency Slack

One way to conceptualize how states decide which resistance movement to support is through the principal–agent model.j

 In choosing to 

delegate the fulfillment of its foreign policy objectives through a third 

party, states must manage some challenges. The principal actor in this 

model, the state, is delegating the performance of its goals to an agent, 

the resistance movement, which may have a different set of objectives. 

Ideally, the principal would like to fully control the actions of the agent 

so that it pursues the principal’s goals just as if the principal itself were 

in the theater.k

One of the struggles both parties face in this regard is asymmetric information. Clear communication is a problem in most, if not all, 

complex human undertakings. While both the principal and the agent 

articulate their objectives to one another, neither party has absolute 

guarantees that they are being provided with all of the accurate information needed to make good, informed decisions on how to proceed. 

Each party has good reason to withhold information in order to make 

j An analysis of the motivation of states to provide external support is provided in the 

“Motivations for External Support” section.

k The discussion of the principal–agent model is based on Salehyan, Gleditsch, and 

Cunningham.31
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itself a more attractive partner. State actors, for instance, may tell potential partners that their objective is to overthrow or reform a target government but may secretly plan to only disrupt the target government 

or bleed it of its resources. Likewise, resistance movements may feign 

objectives similar to those of the state but use the state’s resources for 

their own purposes.

Additionally, principals have little hope of exerting that much control over the actions of their agents, sometimes called “agency slack.” 

Rwanda, for instance, choose to support the CRD, a resistance movement in the Democratic Republic of the Congo headed by Laurent 

Kabila. The Tutsi-dominated Rwandan government hoped to unseat 

the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) leader, Mobutu, who supported Hutu militias (the interahamwe) during and after the 1994 Rwandan genocide. Mobutu allowed the Hutu militias to use eastern Congo 

as a safe haven while raiding Rwanda from across the border. The CRD 

was ultimately successful in driving out Mobutu, and Kabila took control of the government himself. However, he then turned on his Rwandan patrons by supporting, not opposing, the interahamwe shortly after 

gaining power.32 Rwanda failed to secure any benefit from its agent, 

the CRD, because Kabila sought to secure the legitimacy of his new 

regime by aligning with the Hutu militias and acted in accordance with 

his new preferences. Part of the selection process for states is choosing 

resistance movements that are less likely to act independently of their 

patrons.

To lessen the potential impact of agency slack and asymmetric information, states often choose to support groups with similar preferences. 

During the Cold War, preferences were shaped by the ideological divide 

between the United States and the Soviet Union. Resistance movements 

typically fell on one end or the other of the left–right spectrum. States 

must rely on other indicators of preference after the decrease of ideological conflicts in the post-Cold-War era. One of the easiest selection 

methods states can follow is to support resistance movements that have 

ethnic or religious ties. Some resistance movements appeal to a specific 

ethnicity or religious affiliation that spans the national boundaries of 

the state in which it operates. The LTTE represented ethnic Tamils in 

Sri Lanka. India, home to a sizable Tamil population, supported the 

Tamils for a number of years against the Sinhalese regime in Sri Lanka. 

Likewise, Shia-dominated, theocratic Iran chose Lebanese Hizbollah, 

a Shia-based movement, to act as its regional buffer against Israel. 

Resistance movements representing ethnicities or religions with transnational constituencies are more likely to receive state external support 

than resistance movements that have only local appeal.33 Supporting a 
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resistance movement with similar preferences lessens the chance that 

the resistance movement will act against the preferences of its patron.

Internal Characteristics of Resistance Movements

In selecting resistance movements, states also seek those movements that can successfully challenge the target government. A weak 

resistance movement is likely to offer a poor return on investment for 

the state supporter. A state supporter invests sizable resources in resistance movements and expects dividends in achieving its foreign policy 

objectives. A viable resistance movement might be one with good organization and leadership, group cohesion, and a history of successful 

operations against the state.

Some researchers speculated that movements with strong, central 

commands exercising a good deal of control over their members were 

likely to receive support over those movements without such a structure. In the end, their research did not point to this conclusion. The 

organizational model adopted by insurgencies should be dictated as 

much by strategy as by choice. Insurgents, such as the Provisional Irish 

Republican Army (PIRA) in Northern Ireland, adopt flatter, cellular 

structures to maximize security when the movement is in its infancy 

or experiencing pressure from counterinsurgent campaigns. At its 

inception in 1969, PIRA maintained its traditional, hierarchical military structure emphasizing strict command and control. However, as 

it faced increasing pressure from British authorities in the mid-1970s, 

it adopted a cellular structure that compartmentalized its operatives 

from one another. Operatives only had knowledge of the few members of their cells, preventing captured operatives from compromising 

the entire organization.l The foresight of PIRA leadership in aligning 

structure with strategy helped the insurgents survive an especially penetrating British counterinsurgent campaign. Agile, successful groups 

such as PIRA evidence the ability to adapt organizational structure to 

meet strategic needs.

States elect to support moderately strong resistance movements over 

very weak or very strong ones. The strength of a resistance movement is 

measured relative to the state it is targeting. Here, strength is measured 

according to several indicators, including the number of fighters a group 

can mobilize, its capacity to procure arms, and conventional fighting 

capacity compared to the target government.35 When selecting which 

resistance movements to support, states optimally seek the strongest 

available insurgents. However, these groups, already well-established 

l For a discussion of insurgent groups’ organizational structure, see Bos.34
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and successful, are less likely to accept constraints on their actions by 

external supporters in exchange for resources. The strongest groups 

are able to procure sufficient resources without external support. The 

weakest groups, meanwhile, are the least attractive option for state supporters because these groups are untried or unsuccessful. Moderately 

strong groups are in the “Goldilocks Zone,” neither so strong that they 

can turn down help nor so weak that they are not an attractive option 

for state supporters. Moderately strong groups, therefore, are the resistance movements most likely to attract, and accept, external support.36

External Characteristics

Factors external to resistance movements also impact which groups 

are selected for external support. States choose to support resistance 

movements in order to achieve specific foreign policy objectives. To 

be an attractive option, resistance movements must target foreign governments over which state supporters seek some sort of leverage. For 

this reason, resistance movements operating in states engaged in international rivalries with other states are more likely to receive external 

support. Here, an international rival is one that another state perceives 

as threatening enough to be considered an enemy.37 Not surprisingly, 

states are more likely to support resistance movements in foreign states 

perceived as international rivals.38 International rivals are also likely to 

be close to home. Most states select resistance movements in nearby, 

neighboring states.39 Alongside these factors, states are also likely to 

select resistance movements as a counter–external support measure. 

In this instance, the targeted government is receiving support from 

another government, so that states compete indirectly through third 

parties, whether the targeted government or the resistance movement.40

Much of the current research related to external support for resistance movements focuses on support for insurgent groups already in 

conflict with targeted governments. The available research derives 

mostly from political science research on external intervention in civil 

wars. In terms of phasing, this means that a great deal of what we currently know about external support derives only from cases occurring 

during the militarization phase. However, in some instances, external 

support occurs during earlier stages when a resistance movement is 

nonviolent or has not yet kinetically engaged the target government. 

Again, in terms of phasing, external support can occur during the 

latent and/or incipient phases of resistance. The focus on external 

support in armed conflict overlooks crucial information, especially on 

research involving the decision-making process potential external supporters use to select potential resistance movements and vice versa. In 
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some cases, external support for the resistance movements may have 

begun far sooner than a military conflict. Currently, Iran is supporting Hizbollah’s assistance to the beleaguered Assad regime in Syria. 

However, Iran’s support for both Assad and Hizbollah fighters in the 

conflict began decades ago.

MOTIVATIONS FOR EXTERNAL SUPPORT

External actors’ motivations for providing support to a resistance 

movement are highly dependent on their own objectives. As touched 

on in the “Types of Actors Providing External Support” section, the 

motivations and forms of support are linked to the identity of the actor. 

Diaspora motivations, for example, are considerably different from the 

motivations of an external state. A state may support a group to gain 

a strategic foothold in the region in order to exploit resources or gain 

additional territory. Diasporas may support a movement less for strategic reasons and more out of support of ethnic kinship. The goals the 

external actor hopes to achieve through support of a resistance movement may align with or be in addition to the goals of the movement it 

supports.41 This section offers an overview of motivations for external 

support, with a focus on motivations for state-sponsored support.

Motivations for Non-State-Actor Support

Before focusing on the motivations for state support, it is worth 

summarizing the general motivations of non-state actors.m In general, 

non-state actors are motivated more by religious and/or ethnic affinity 

and shared ideology than are state supporters. These reasons may play 

a role in a state’s decision to provide external support but are rarely the 

only motivators. For non-state actors, the relevance of these motivators 

is much easier to understand. While a diaspora may be motivated by a 

shared identity with the supported movement, similarly, refugees are 

often motivated by a desire to return home or restore stability in the 

country from which they are displaced. They retain a strong link to 

the place and its people, perhaps even more so than diasporas because 

they may not want to settle permanently as immigrant communities but 

to return to life in their former country.

Refugees and diasporas may believe that military action is the only 

option for addressing their grievances, although both groups can be 

subjected to coercion. A resistance movement may capitalize on the 

m This section draws heavily from the work of Byman et al.42 A more detailed analysis 

of motivations of non-state actors can be found in that study, particularly in chapters 3–5.
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guilt of the diaspora community to garner support, or it may influence 

the internal politics of the diaspora, which often remains isolated from 

the larger community in which the group is settled. Refugees may be 

forced to support a resistance movement in order to ensure their own 

safety and access to resources. If rebels control a refugee camp and 

no other group or government agency can provide support, the refugee population may support the rebels out of fear of survival and not 

because there is a shared identity or shared set of values and objectives.

Other non-state actors, including rebel groups, NGOs, religious 

groups, and individuals, are often motivated by a shared ideology. Religious organizations will likely support resistance movements that share 

a commitment to religious doctrine (e.g., the theological support of 

Lebanese Hizbollah by clerics in Iran). Some individuals may even consider financial support of insurgencies to be an appropriate method of 

fulfilling charitable religious obligations. However, wealthy individuals who may serve as key benefactors to a resistance movement may 

be motivated by things other than shared religious beliefs. Individuals may share an ethnic kinship or a common ideology with a group 

or feel that the group’s cause is just, even if there is no other link to 

the resistance movement through shared place or identity. NGOs rarely 

purposely support a resistance movement. Rather, their motivations for 

providing support are often based on their mission to provide supplies 

and aid to individuals in need, which may require working through a 

resistance to channel supplies or inadvertently supplying the movement 

along with the susceptible population that is the focus of their efforts.

Even though support from diasporas and refugees has arguably 

become more significant to resistance movements in the past twenty 

years, support from these groups still differs greatly from state support 

in scope and nature. State motivations may also be less clear, particularly if the strategic objectives of the state do not align with the resistance movement’s, but can be achieved indirectly through the provision 

of external aid. For these reasons, it is important to devote more attention to state-actor motivations for supporting resistance movements.

Motivations for State-Actor Support

States often have strategic ambitions that serve as the primary motivation for supporting resistance movements, even if shared religious 

or ethnic identities are an underlying factor, which in some instances 

may serve as a pretense for support even though the real objectives 

are much more political in nature. Although many objectives for statesponsored support exist, this paper focuses on five broad categories: 

regional influence, destabilization of other governments or rivals, 
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regime change, influence within the resistance movement, and internal security.n The pursuit of these objectives often complicates a conflict or emerging conflict. States do not necessarily support a group to 

lessen the duration of or end a conflict.43 If one of the above objectives 

is the motivation for support, the state likely does not intend to help 

the combatants win but rather to help advance an independent agenda; 

having one side win may not be necessary to achieve that end.

Regional Influence

A state may back a resistance movement in order to increase its 

regional influence, which may help it gain control over local rivalries 

or maintain control over larger swaths of territory. An example is Russia’s support of various movements in territories that were formerly part 

of the Soviet Union. The objective was to maintain dominion over as 

much territory as possible, and the external support has proved effective. States such as Georgia, Tajikistan, and others had insurgencies that 

benefited from Russian support, and this support made these states 

more attuned to Russian concerns and perspectives in the region.44

Destabilization of Governments or Rivals

Support of a resistance movement may be a way for a state to weaken 

an enemy state or group without having to engage in direct conflict. 

Conflict requires a major commitment of resources not to mention 

exposure to international scrutiny and diplomatic discord. Working 

through a resistance movement reduces the investment of resources 

the state must commit and also allows it to plausibly deny involvement 

if the objective is to keep the support clandestine.

Regime Change

A state may aim to unseat a ruling government and work through a 

resistance group to achieve this end. This objective can be extremely difficult to achieve because it may require a dramatic increase in resources, 

especially if the government that it seeks to depose is strong. Moreover, 

other states may see the destabilization and back groups themselves 

with the objective of maintaining the current government. In this case, 

the state seeking to unseat the government will have to overcome a 

n Byman et al. reference thirteen motivating factors, which include those referenced 

here as well as payback, prestige, support of coreligionists, support of coethnics, irredentism (seeking control of territories governed by another state on the basis of common ethnicity or perhaps prior historical possession), and leftist ideology. As mentioned, although 

ethnic, religious, and ideological motivations may play a role in state support of a resistance movement, they are rarely the sole or dispositive factor.
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particularly formidable set of circumstances and may settle for weakening the rival and attempting to extend its influence in other ways.

Ensuring Influence within the Resistance Movement

In some instances, a state may support a resistance movement in 

order to ensure some level of control over the group and keep it from 

adopting policies that are counter to the state’s interests. It may also 

wish to gain influence over the movement so it can later shape or 

change the group’s goals, which will allow the state to exert influence 

through the resistance movement for future initiatives.

Internal Security

A state may support a resistance movement to counter dissidents 

within its own territory and maintain security. An insurgency within 

a state’s territory may stage attacks on targets outside of the state. 

Although the insurgency does not necessarily exist to threaten the 

state, in order to ensure that the insurgency does not undermine the 

state’s standing with the local population or its objectives, it may support a resistance movement to counter the insurgents’ influence and 

ensure internal security.

FORMS OF EXTERNAL SUPPORT

In its starkest, stylized form, every militarized resistance movement 

needs three basic things to survive: beds, beans, and bullets. What this 

list underscores is that a resistance movement seeking to overthrow a 

government or occupying power absolutely needs a highly motivated 

force that is adequately resourced and has a haven from which it 

can operate.

There are a number of ways for a resistance movement to begin 

to equip itself. It can acquire materials through theft, ambush, local 

sympathizers, or black-market purchases. Support can also come from 

nations that are not actively participating in the conflict but that seek 

to influence its outcome. States can provide all types of support to an 

insurgent. Some types of support clearly matter more than others. Over 

time, through the development of UW case studies, this research will 

identify which types of support matter most and how they are best provided to the resistance movement.

Even though we do not know which types of assistance matter the 

most, from our initial research for this paper, we have identified ten 

important forms of support:

1. Safe haven
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2. Propaganda

3. Training

4. Weapons and other materials

5. Organizational assistance

6. Financial resources

7. Logistics

8. International political support

9. Direct military support

10. Intelligence

As we begin to develop our knowledge of how states support indigenous resistance movements through the UW case studies, this list will 

change. However, for the time being, we view the first six types of assistance as being more important than the last four.

No resistance movement can survive for long if it cannot rest, 

recover, and plan future operations. To this end, every insurgent group 

needs some type of safe haven. It can be located either in the contested 

country or outside of it. Although Hizbollah maintained weapons 

caches and bases in Syria, it also maintained a number of safe havens 

in Lebanon. By doing so, it kept itself close to the people and tailored 

its operations to garner support from them. The Palestinian Liberation 

Organization (PLO) did not always do this, and, as a result, its operations in the West Bank and Gaza Strip suffered and many Palestinians 

stopped supporting the group.

To be successful, a movement needs to convince people to support, 

join, and follow it. A resistance group needs a constant stream of new 

recruits to fight and sustain its operations. Additionally, it must convince the local population that it can govern. As a resistance movement 

grows, its narrative or raison d’être is critical to its continued success. 

Oftentimes, narratives are accompanied by sophisticated propaganda 

campaigns. Presenting the governing authority as feckless and corrupt 

is essential to convincing a local population that it is better off supporting the resistance. Hizbollah is a master of messaging. It crafts its 

actions so that they can be scripted into a broader message, namely that 

Israel persecutes Muslims and that only Hizbollah can keep Lebanon 

free from Israeli occupation.

By definition, insurgents must operate in a clandestine manner. 

Additionally, because they are often weaker than the state they oppose, 

they must resort to guerrilla tactics, which place a premium on surprise and disciplined operational practices. Given this, basic training 

in tradecraft and fieldcraft is critical. The support that Pakistan’s intelligence agency, Directorate for Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI), has 
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provided to Lashkar-e-Taiba has allowed the extremist group to successfully infiltrate and attack targets deep inside India. Furthermore, 

the ISI’s support and training of a number of extremist groups operating in Jammu and Kashmir have, by all accounts, made the groups 

far more effective and frustrated Indian security forces, leading many 

observers to consider the fight a draw.

Every resistance movement has materiel needs, to include weapons 

and explosives. Without access to weapons and other supporting materiel, a movement cannot forcefully challenge an established power and 

move to the next phase of the conflict. Because of Iran’s materiel support, Hizbollah now has one of the most formidable arsenals in the 

region, and it has successfully employed it against Israel.

Even with the most highly trained and motivated individuals, a 

resistance movement will always lose to a well-run and disciplined organization. Coordinated effort is critical to challenging an established 

power. Before Iran’s efforts to grow and empower it, Hizbollah was a 

militant group with a cause and little else. Its ability to have any type of 

impact, politically or militarily, was at best marginal. With Iran’s guidance, which occurred very early in the group’s development, Hizbollah built an effective organization capable of disciplined political and 

military action. Today, Hizbollah is a powerful political party with a 

potent military arm that by most accounts exceeds the capabilities of 

the Lebanese military.

For any organization, financial resources are critical to its continued success. Most insurgencies are long. If a resistance movement is 

to prevail, it must be able to recruit new members, compensate those 

in the fold, have continued access to materials, develop sources of 

intelligence, and create and distribute a compelling narrative. All of 

these tasks require access to capital at some level. Over the years, ISI 

has provided substantial sums to Lashkar-e-Taiba. These resources 

bought time and space for the organization to grow. Today, Lashkar-eTaiba appears to be a self-sustaining entity, with legitimate businesses 

throughout South Asia.

As mentioned above, the remaining four types of support do not 

appear to be as critical to a resistance group’s success. One such example is intelligence. Because a resistance movement is by definition part 

of the country, it is often closer to and has better access to individuals with key information about the government’s aims and capabilities. 

Although an outside nation will, more often than not, have intelligence 

capabilities that the indigenous force does not, these capabilities are 

often of limited value, especially if the information cannot be widely 

distributed because its existence would compromise either the group’s 

legitimacy or the sources and methods of the supporting nation. For 
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these reasons, there continues to be an open debate about the role of 

outside intelligence in an insurgency. A similar kind of logic applies to 

the other kinds of support as well (i.e., their impact on the outcome of 

the conflict is not as great as the others on the above list).

Although external support can prove to be critical, it comes with a 

cost. Once a resistance group welcomes outside support, it runs the risk 

of losing both legitimacy in the eyes of its supporters and control of the 

group. A commonly recited theme is that groups that rely too much on 

outside support are often bound to fail. However, this wisdom is open 

to question and further research. It appears that aid in the early stages 

of a conflict—primarily during the clandestine organization or incipient phase—is absolutely critical to a group’s success. Understanding 

both when to provide support (i.e., the timing) and how much support 

to provide (i.e., the level) are crucial considerations, especially if we 

are to establish a set of best practices for practitioners. The UW case 

studies, along with the work seeking to correlate the phases of organizational growth with the stages of a resistance movement, are central to 

this effort and key for the SOF community.

EFFECTIVENESS OF EXTERNAL SUPPORT

What types of support matter and why they matter are important 

questions. As discussed in the previous section, timing and levels of 

support are also crucial to our understanding of outside support to 

indigenous forces. Although there is some literature that examines 

the effectiveness of external support, all of these questions largely 

remain open.

The existing literature45 indicates that the following types of support are most effective:

1. Safe haven

2. Propaganda

3. Training

4. Weapons and other materials

5. Organizational assistance

6. Financial resources

Several very basic questions are not adequately answered in this literature, namely: What are the measures of effectiveness? Do they generalize from one conflict to another? If so, why? To begin to answer 

all of these questions, it is necessary to conduct a series of comparative case studies on support to indigenous resistance movements. By 

using the comparative method, it is possible to search for lessons that 
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generalize but that also have enough context to allow readers to learn 

to adapt them to the circumstances in which they finds themselves.

The literature as it stands today indicates that the six types of support listed above are important. When they should be provided (i.e., 

at which phase of a resistance group’s growth) and at what level they 

should be provided are open questions that will have to wait until some 

of the UW case studies are complete.

POTENTIAL CASE STUDIES AND CASE SELECTION

Appendix A lists the cases considered for selection for further 

research. This section discusses the guidelines and criteria developed 

to help prioritize the potential case studies that could be analyzed.

1. Cases that received significant state support. Only those 

resistance movements that received significant support from 

external-state actors are considered. To mitigate difficulties 

with determining causality, we also selected cases in which 

states, and no other actors, such as diasporas or refugees, 

provided crucial support for the resistance movement.

2. Successful cases. For the purposes of this research, we first 

want to investigate those cases of external support in which 

the external-state sponsor has met with a measure of success in 

achieving national objectives. As discussed above, this could 

be support to a resistance movement that has overthrown a 

government but also a resistance movement that succeeded 

in destabilizing or disrupting the targeted regime.

3. Post-Cold War. Because of the impact of the changes in the 

international system, we considered cases in which external 

support spanned both the Cold-War and post-Cold-War eras, 

or cases of external support that took place solely in the postCold-War era.

4. Method of warfare. The method of warfare adopted by 

resistance movements is a potentially important variable 

to consider. We considered cases that spanned numerous 

methods, from irregular to more conventionally fought 

conflicts.

5. State capacity. Regimes that exercise little control over their 

territory are more prone to experience armed resistance. 

Weak states facing weak challengers are also a more common 

conflict dyad than strong states and weak challengers in 

the post-Cold-War era. We considered cases that involved 

resistance movements in both weak and (relatively) 
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stronger states.

The following sets of possible case studies are organized by geographic regions (i.e., Middle East, Asia, Africa, other) and generally 

appear to meet the selection guidelines and criteria.

Middle East

Iraq (2004–present)

• Insurgents: Many Islamist groups, including Al-Mahdi Army, 

Soldiers of Islam (Ansar al-Islam), Islamic Army of Iraq (IAI), 

Islamic State in Iraq (ISI), Reformation and Jihad Front (RJF), 

Army of Ansar Al Sunna (JAAS), and Organization of Jihad’s 

Base in the Country of Two Rivers (TQ JBR)

• External support to insurgents: Iran (particularly to Shia 

insurgents), Saudi Arabia and other Arab states (particularly 

to Sunni insurgents), and various non-state actors (refugees, 

other revolutionary groups, religious organizations, wealthy 

individuals)

Israel (1987–present, with emphasis on 2006–present, i.e., Gaza war, 

Lebanon war, and overall Israel–Iran proxy war)

• Insurgents: Fatah/PLO, Islamic Resistance Movement (HAMAS), 

Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), and Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades 

(AMB)

• External support to insurgents: Iran and Hizbollah as well 

as various other non-state actors (refugees, diasporas, other 

revolutionary groups, religious organizations, wealthy individuals)

Lebanon (1982–2000, i.e., up to the point that Israel was driven from 

Southern Lebanon)

• Insurgents: Hizbollah (party of God)

• External support to insurgents: Iran, Syria, and various nonstate actors (refugees, other revolutionary groups, religious 

organizations, wealthy individuals)

Syria (2011–present)

• Insurgents: Syrian National Council (SNC) and National 

Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces

• External support to insurgents: Saudi Arabia and other Arab states 

as well as various non-state actors (refugees, other revolutionary 

groups, religious organizations, wealthy individuals)
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Asia

Afghanistan (2001–present)

• Insurgents: Taliban and Hezb-i-Islam (Islamic Party terrorist 

group)

• External support to insurgents: elements of Pakistan (e.g., 

ISI) and various non-state actors (refugees, other revolutionary 

groups, religious organizations, wealthy individuals)

Afghanistan (1992–1996)

• Insurgents: Taliban

• External support to insurgents: Pakistan and various nonstate actors (refugees, other revolutionary groups, religious 

organizations, wealthy individuals)

India/Kashmir (1989–present)

• Insurgents: Hizb al Mujahideen, Harakat al-Ansar, Jammu and 

Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), Lashkar-e-Taiba, and others 

(collection of Kashmiri insurgents)

• External support to insurgents: Pakistan and various non-state 

actors (other revolutionary groups, religious organizations, 

wealthy individuals)

Africa

DRC (1998–2001)

• Insurgents: MLC, Congolese Rally for Democracy–Goma 

(CRD-Goma), and Congolese Rally for Democracy–Liberation 

Movement (CRD-ML)

• External support to insurgents: Ugandan support to MLC and 

CRD-ML; Rwandan support to CRD-Goma plus various nonstate actors (other revolutionary groups)

Sierra Leone (1991–2002, with emphasis on 1991–1997)

• Insurgents: RUF and Armed Forces Revolutionary Council 

(AFRC)

• External support to insurgents: Liberia plus various non-state 

actors (other revolutionary groups)
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209

Uganda (1986–2009, with emphasis on 1994–2002)

• Insurgents: Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), Uganda’s People’s 

Army (UPA), Holy Spirit Movement (HSM), Alliance for 

Democratic Forces (ADF), West Nile Bank Front (WNBF), and 

Uganda National Resistance Front II (UNRF II)

• External support to insurgents: Sudan during 1994–2002 plus 

various non-state actors (other revolutionary groups)

Rhodesia (1960–1979)

• Insurgents: Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), led by 

Robert Mugabe, and Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU), 

led by Joshua Nikomo

• External support to insurgents: Soviet Union, as well as competing 

interests of China

Other (Americas, Europe)

Bosnia-Herzegovina (1992–1995)

• Insurgents: Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina (Srpska or 

Bosnian Serbs) and Croatian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina 

(HVO or Bosnian Croats)

• External support to insurgents: Serbian support to Srpska; 

Croatian support to HVO

Croatia (1992–1995)

• Insurgents: Serbian Republic of Krajina (Croatian Serb Army) 

revolt in Krajina

• External support to insurgents: Serbia

RECOMMENDED CASES

Case Study 1: Iranian Support for Hizbollah in Lebanon 

(1982–2000, i.e., up to point that Israel was driven from 

Southern Lebanon)

The main desire of the insurgent (Hizbollah) and its external-state 

supporters in the short term was to drive out a foreign power (Israel) 

from southern Lebanon. Their common long-term goal is to continue 

a Shia Islamic revolution with Iranian external support and ultimately 

to drive Israel from the Levant. Before Israel withdrew from Lebanon, 

the insurgents conducted a significant number of suicide bombings. 
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They also conducted paramilitary operations, psychological operations, shadow-government activities, and other types of guerrilla warfare. External states such as Iran and Syria have provided extensive and 

varied support to Hizbollah.

This case fulfills nearly all of the criteria and guidelines discussed 

above. Iran has provided significant, crucial support to Hizbollah. With 

the withdrawal of Israel from southern Lebanon (with the exception of 

Sheba Farms), Iran has achieved a significant national objective. Hizbollah’s near victory over Israeli forces in the summer of 2006 further 

consolidates Iran’s success in this case. Iran also began its support in 

the early 1980s, still firmly in the Cold War. Its support continued after 

the fall of the Soviet Union, so the case spans both of these important time periods. When Iran began supporting Hizbollah, the nascent 

movement relied on irregular warfare methods, but in the ensuing 

decades, the group has also incorporated conventional methods, which 

were levied against Israel in 2006. Lebanon remains a weak state, which 

is a factor that is important to explore in Iran’s success.

Case Study 2: Pakistani Support for Lashkar-e-Taiba in 

Kashmir/India (1989–present)

The various insurgents and their external-state supporter (Pakistan) have a main desire to drive out a foreign power (India) from 

their area (Kashmir). They have been fighting for their independence 

since 1989 by employing guerrilla warfare, including terrorist attacks. 

Elements of Pakistan’s intelligence and military forces have been supporting the Kashmir rebels, and support for these types of attacks on 

Indian forces is reportedly part of an overall strategy by elements in 

Pakistan to use various non-state actors to harass and otherwise occupy 

Indian security forces (e.g., use of the Lashkar-e-Taiba terrorist group 

in the 2008 attack on Mumbai).

Pakistani support for the Lashkar-e-Taiba also fulfills a number of 

guidelines and criteria discussed above, with some important variance. 

Lashkar-e-Taiba insurgents have received crucial, significant support 

from Pakistan. As an external-state supporter, Pakistan has met success 

in imposing a high cost on Indian security forces combating Lashkare-Taiba and other Kashmiri-based insurgents. This case differs from 

Iranian support for Hizbollah with regard to several crucial factors. 

Lashkar-e-Taiba has been active primarily in the post-Cold-War era. 

The group has relied primarily on irregular methods, combatting a 

strong, conventional force in India, a relatively strong state (although 

the rugged terrain of Kashmir has proven difficult).
The Role of Outside Influence

211

Case Study 3: Soviet Support for Insurgency in Rhodesia

Both the Soviet Union and China were active supporters of insurgencies in Africa in the 1970s, and Rhodesia is one example. The 

Soviet Union mainly provided support to ZAPU, led by Joshua Nikomo, 

through the use of its special operations forces, front companies, 

paramilitary forces, intelligence agencies, and clandestine networks. 

An interesting dynamic of this case is China’s competing support to 

ZANU, led by Robert Mugabe, although at times the Soviet Union also 

provided support to ZANU.

This case addresses a variety of broader topics that weigh on the 

Soviet Union’s practice of UW, including strategic interests and alliances and how they align with those of the groups it works with; Soviet 

attitudes to collateral damage and noncombatants; and Soviet risk calculations surrounding the willingness to form tactical alliances with 

groups who, for ideological or religious reasons, are opposed or only 

loosely aligned with communism.

Case Study 4: Rwandan and Ugandan Support for Various 

Insurgents in the DRC (1998–2001)

Rwanda and Uganda intervened in the DRC after they were betrayed 

by the DRC leader Kabila (who they had supported in the overthrow of 

Mobutu). At that point, Rwanda and Uganda united in armed support 

of a new rebel alliance. The resultant insurgents owed their existence 

and very survival to the two external-state supporters (because they 

were too weak to fight the Kabila forces on their own). The motives for 

Rwanda and Uganda varied. The former wanted revenge, to crush the 

previous Hutu forces responsible for the earlier genocide in Rwanda, to 

ensure its influence over various opposition groups (particularly near 

its border), and to plunder some of the Congo’s diamond wealth. The 

latter also wanted revenge, to plunder Congo’s mineral wealth, to maintain its influence over its neighbor, and to ensure that anti-Ugandan 

insurgents could not use the Congo to launch their attacks.

Rwandan and Ugandan support for various resistance movements 

in the Congo also fulfills the criteria and guidelines discussed above. 

External-state support was both significant and crucial for the supported resistance movements. In the case of Kabila’s CRD, Rwanda 

helped form the resistance movement in its earliest phases. The CRD 

was ultimately successful in overthrowing Mobutu, but with important 

consequences for Rwanda when Kabila turned his back on his Rwandan supporters. The CRD and other resistance movements took place 
212

Special Topics in Irregular Warfare

in the post-Cold-War era in a weak state facing a weak challenger relying on irregular methods.

CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 

AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Much of what we currently know about external support revolves 

around superpower support for resistance movements during the Cold 

War. External support was common in this era after the Cuban missile crisis, when the United States and the Soviet Union realized that it 

was simply too costly to confront each other head on, competing thereafter in the periphery for more power and influence. Although some 

of these cases are interesting, often the proximate causes of the conflicts and the ideological debate that shaped them were squarely rooted 

in a period with substantial differences from the contemporary world. 

Resistance movements often couched their motivations in anticolonial, 

leftist ideologies. External support, when it did come, came from superpowers struggling in predetermined frameworks and with seemingly 

limitless pockets. This does not mean that there is no utility in studying 

these cases, but building a body of knowledge of how external support for resistance movements functions in today’s world requires that 

attention be paid especially to cases in the contemporary, post-ColdWar era. It is clear from the research that more attention should be 

paid to contemporary cases. There is much work to be done to better 

understand the use of external support. With a deeper understanding 

of many of the issues surrounding the use of resistance movements to 

achieve external-state national objectives, it will be easier for senior 

decision makers to develop policy options that will allow the United 

States to better confront this threat. To that end, there are several recommendations for follow-on work.

The first recommendation is to expand the body of work devoted 

to UW to include not only additional UW case studies to help distill 

best practices but also the development of a typology for understanding UW. The typology will be used to help clarify the various concepts 

embedded in the definition and to remove ambiguity in terms. It is a 

starting point for conducting more rigorous research and can be used 

to develop different methods of analysis.

The second recommendation is to begin to expand the knowledge base of cases of external support, a starting point for this knowledge base being the table of cases included in Appendix A. This table 

includes a list of cases, with the following information provided for 

each: start–end dates; participating parties (external supporters); type 

of insurgency; type of support provided (at a high level); mechanism 
The Role of Outside Influence

213

of support provided; and outcome of the conflict, if known. A more 

expansive knowledge base would allow for more quantitative analysis of the variables, which provides a different way to understand the 

phenomenon of UW. Moreover, quantitative analysis can be extremely 

useful in presenting the case for UW if the results more concisely articulate the resources required, the associated risk, or even the likelihood 

of success. Although answers to those questions take time to develop, 

both the expanded knowledge base and the development of a typology 

are necessary prerequisites to undertaking this type of analysis.

The third recommendation is to ensure that current UW case 

studies have clearly formulated research objectives to address the key 

questions raised throughout this paper. If the goal is to better understand the theory that supports UW doctrine, only research appropriately designed to answer those questions will yield useful insights. The 

research design of the case studies should be developed to allow for 

theory development. Along with the research design, to make the studies truly valuable, all new research should depend on fieldwork and 

primary documents, when possible. Although it may be difficult to 

travel to some locations, there are plenty of areas in the United States 

and Europe where there are large diasporas with populations from 

these regions, which would allow team members to conduct interviews. 

Additionally, there are a number of former group members in prison. 

These resources should be exploited for valuable information in order 

to produce research that draws on the most useful information and 

provides a new perspective for understanding the complicated dynamics of external support to resistance movements.

APPENDIX. CASES CONSIDERED FOR SELECTION 

FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

Case (Start–End) Government Insurgent External Supporter 

(to insurgents)

Type of 

insurgency

Type of 

Support

Mechanism of 

Support

Outcome

Afghan-Northern 

Alliance War 

(1996–2001)

Afghanistan UIFSA 

(Northern 

Alliance)

Russia, Iran, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan (US 

and others in 2001)

Revolution State Territory, weapons, materiel, 

funding

Insurgent 

victory

Afghan-Soviet 

War (1978–1992)

Afghanistan Mujahideen US, Egypt, Saudi 

Arabia, Iran, China, 

Pakistan

Revolution State Weapons, 

materiel, training, funding

Insurgent 

victory

Afghan-Taliban 

War (1992–1996)

Afghanistan Taliban Saudi Arabia, 

Bahrain, Qatar, 

Uzbekistan, Pakistan

Revolution State Weapons, 

materiel, 

funding

Insurgent 

victory

Afghan-Taliban 

War (2001–

Ongoing)

Afghanistan Taliban Al Qaeda (alleged 

Iran and Pakistan)

Revolution Other Military and 

intelligence 

infrastructure 

(alleged 

weapons from 

Iran)

Ongoing

Algerian 

Independence 

War (1954–1962)

Algeria FLN Morocco, Tunisia Rebellion State Territory Insurgent 

victory
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Special Topics in Irregular Warfare

Case (Start–End) Government Insurgent External Supporter 

(to insurgents)

Type of 

insurgency

Type of 

Support

Mechanism of 

Support

Outcome

Algerian lslamists 

War (1992–

Ongoing)

Algeria GIA, FIS, 

AQIM

Sudan, Iran, IIRO, 

Algerian diaspora

Revolution State, 

diaspora, 

other

Funding, 

weapons

Ongoing

Angolan 

Independence 

War (1961–1974)

Angola UNITA, 

MPLA, FNLA

Soviet Union, China, 

Cuba, US, Zaire

Rebellion State Territory, 

weapons, 

materiel, training, funding

Insurgent 

victory

Angolan War 

(1975–2002)

Angola UNITA, 

FNLA

US, Zaire/DRC , 

South Africa

Revolution State Troops, territory, weapons, 

materiel, training, funding

Draw

Cabinda Independence War 

(1991–Ongoing)

Angola FLEC Zaire/DRC Rebellion State Territory, weapons, materiel, 

intelligence

Ongoing

South Yemeni 

Independence 

War (1994–1994)

Arab 

Republic of 

Yemen

DRY Saudi Arabia Rebellion State Weapons Government 

victory

NagornoKarabakh 

Independence 

War (1991–1994)

Azerbaijan NKR Armenia Rebellion State Troops, weapons, training, 

funding

Draw

Chittagong 

Hill Tracts 

Independence 

War (1975–1992)

Bangladesh JSS/SB India (1975–1977) Rebellion State Access to territory, weapons, 

materiel, 

training

Draw

Bosnian-Serb 

Independence 

War (1992–1995)

Bosnia Republica 

Srpska, 

Croatian 

Republic of 

HerzegBosnia

Croatia, Yugoslavia Rebellion State Territory, 

weapons, 

materiel, training, funding

Government 

victory

Burmese Leftist 

War (1948–1988)

Burma Communist 

Party of 

Burma

China Revolution State Training, 

funding

Government 

victory

Kachin Independence War 

(1961–1992)

Burma KIO China, India Rebellion State Funding Draw

Karen Independence War 

(1949–Ongoing)

Burma KNU India Rebellion State Funding Ongoing

Shan Independence War 

(1959–Ongoing)

Burma MTA, SSA Thailand Rebellion State Access to 

territory

Ongoing

Burundi Hutu War 

(1991–2008)

Burundi PalipehutuFNL, 

CNDD-FDD

ALIR, FDLR Revolution Neighboring 

co-ethnic 

rebel 

group

Draw

Cambodian War 

(1970–1975)

Cambodia Khmer 

Rouge

North Vietnam Revolution State Troops Insurgent 

victory

Cambodian War 

(1978–1998)

Cambodia Khmer 

Rouge, 

KPNLF, 

FUNCINPEC 

(Royalists)

China, Thailand, US Revolution State Territory, weapons, materiel, 

funding

Draw

Cambodian War 

(1978–1978)

Cambodia 

(Khmer 

Rouge)

KNUFNS Vietnam Revolution State Troops Insurgent 

victory

Chad War 

(1966–1972)

Chad FROLINAT Libya, Sudan Revolution State Troops, 

territory

Draw

Chad War 

(1976–1982)

Chad FAN, FAP, 

FAT

US, France, Sudan, 

Egypt

Revolution State Weapons, 

training, access 

to territory 

(Sudan)

Insurgent 

victory

Chad War (1991–

Ongoing)

Chad FUCD, RADF, 

UFDD, AN, 

UFR

Sudan Revolution State Weapons, 

materiel, 

funding

Ongoing
The Role of Outside Influence

215

Case (Start–End) Government Insurgent External Supporter 

(to insurgents)

Type of 

insurgency

Type of 

Support

Mechanism of 

Support

Outcome

Chad War 

(1983–1990)

Chad (FAN) GUNT Libya Revolution State Territory, 

troops, weapons, funding

Insurgent 

victory

Tibetan Independence War 

(1950–1951)

China Tibetan 

resistance 

groups

US Rebellion State Materiel, 

training

Government 

victory

Tibetan Independence War 

(1956–1959)

China Tibetan 

resistance 

groups

US Rebellion State Materiel, 

training

Government 

victory

Colombian War 

(1964–Ongoing)

Colombia FARC, M-19, 

ELN, EPL

Venezuela, IRA, ETA 

(all alleged)

Revolution State, 

other 

insurgents

Ongoing

Congo-Brazzaville 

War (1997–2002)

Congo and 

supporting 

militias

Cobras France, Chad, 

Angola, Elf Aquitaine

Revolution State, 

corporate

Troops (Chad 

and Angola), 

weapons, 

materiel, 

funding

Draw

Katanga 

Independence 

War (1960–1962)

CongoLeopoldvilleKatanga Belgium, South 

Africa, France

Rebellion State Troops (South 

African and 

Belgian 

mercenaries), 

training, logistics, weapons, 

funding

Government 

victory

Cote d’Ivoire 

Military War 

(2002–2004)

Cote d’Ivoire MJP, MPCI, 

MPIGO

Liberia, Burkino Faso Revolution State Access to territory, weapons, 

materiel, 

training

Draw

Croatian-Serb 

Independence 

War (1992–1995)

Croatia RSK Yugoslavia Rebellion State Troops, weapons, materiel, 

training

Government 

victory

Turco-Cypriot War 

(1974–1974)

Cyprus TMT Turkey Rebellion State Troops Draw

Democratic 

Republic of Congo 

War (1998–2001)

DRC MLC, RCD Uganda, Rwanda Revolution State Troops, weapons, materiel, 

training, 

funding

Draw

Democratic 

Republic of Congo 

War (2006–2009)

DRC CNDP Rwanda Revolution State Access to 

territory, intelligence, materiel, 

training

Draw

El Salvador War 

(1979–1991)

El Salvador FMLN Soviet Union, Cuba, 

Vietnam, Nicaragua

Revolution State Weapons, 

materiel, training, funding

Draw

Eritrean 

Independence 

War (1964–1991)

Ethiopia ELF, EPLF Egypt, Libya, Saudi 

Arabia, South 

Yemen, Sudan, Syria, 

Iraq, Kuwait, UAE, 

Eritrean diaspora, 

TPLF (Ethiopian 

Insurgents)

Rebellion State, 

diaspora, 

other

Access to territory (Sudan), 

weapons, 

materiel, 

funding

Insurgent 

victory

Ethiopian War 

(1974–1991)

Ethiopia Ethnic, 

leftist, and 

royalist 

groups 

(TPLF, 

EPDM, EDU, 

EPRDF, 

SALF)

EPLF, ELF, Sudan, 

Saudi Arabia, US

Revolution 

(EPDM, 

EDU, 

EPRDF), 

rebellion 

(TPLF, 

SALF)

State Access to territory (Sudan), 

weapons, 

materiel, training, funding

Insurgent 

victory

Ogaden Independence War 

(1976–Ongoing)

Ethiopia WSLF, ONLF Somalia, Eritrea Rebellion State Access to territory, weapons, 

materiel, training, funding

Ongoing

Oromo Independence War 

(1977–Ongoing)

Ethiopia OLF Sudan, Eritrea, ONLF, 

EPLF, TPLF, Oromo 

diaspora

Rebellion State Access to territory, weapons, 

materiel, 

training, 

intelligence

Ongoing
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Case (Start–End) Government Insurgent External Supporter 

(to insurgents)

Type of 

insurgency

Type of 

Support

Mechanism of 

Support

Outcome

Cambodian 

Independence 

War (1946–1953)

France Khmer 

Issarak

Viet Minh Rebellion Other Other Insurgent 

victory

French-Indochina 

Independence 

War (1946–1954)

France Viet Minh, 

Pathet 

Lao, Khmer 

Issarak

Soviet Union, China Rebellion State Weapons, 

materiel, 

training

Insurgent 

victory

Abkhazian 

Independence 

War (1992–1993)

Georgia Republic of 

Abkhazia

CCMP, elements 

of Soviet military, 

Krasnodar Krai 

(Soviet district)

Rebellion Other Troops, weapons, materiel, 

training, 

funding

Draw

South Ossentian 

Independence 

War (1991–1992)

Georgia Republic 

of South 

Ossetia

Russia Rebellion State Troops Draw

Guinean War 

(2000–2001)

Guinea RFDG RUF Revolution Other Intelligence, 

infrastructure

Government 

victory

Guinea-Bissau 

Military War 

(1998–1999)

GuineaBissauMJCDPJ MFDC Coup d’etat Other Intelligence, 

infrastructure

Insurgent 

victory

Assamese 

Independence 

War (1990–2010)

India ULFA NSCN, UNLF, KNU, 

KIO, PREPAK, NDFB, 

Myanmar, Bhutan

Rebellion State, 

other

Access to territory, weapons, 

materiel, 

training, 

intelligence

Draw

Bodoland 

Independence 

War (1989–2004)

India BDSF, NDFB Bhutan, Bangladesh, 

Myanmar, NSCN, 

ULFA

Rebellion State, 

other

Access to territory, training, 

intelligence

Draw

Indian 

Naxalite War 

(1967–Ongoing)

India Marxist 

insurgents 

(PWG, MCC, 

CPI-M)

LTTE, Pakistan, 

Nepal, CCOMPOSA, 

CPN-M

Revolution State, 

other

Weapons, 

materiel, training, intelligence

Ongoing

Kashmiri Independence War 

(1989–Ongoing)

India Kashmir 

Insurgents

Pakistan Rebellion State Access to 

territory

Ongoing

Manipur 

Independence 

War (1982–2009)

India PLA, 

UNLF, KCP, 

PREPAK

KNU, KIO, NSCN, 

ULFA, Pakistan, 

Bangladesh

Rebellion State, 

other

Access to 

territory 

(Bangladesh), 

weapons, material, training, 

intelligence

Draw

Nagaland 

Independence 

War (1956–1997)

India NSCN Pakistan, Bangladesh, Myanmar, 

China, UNLF, KNU, 

KIO

Rebellion State, 

other

Weapons, 

materiel, training, funding

Draw

Punjabi Sikh 

Independence 

War (1982–1993)

India Sikh 

Insurgents

Sikh diaspora Rebellion Diaspora Funding Government 

victory

Tripura Independence War 

(1978–2006)

India TNV, ATTF, 

NLFT

MNF, Bangladesh, 

ULFA, NSCN, others

Rebellion State, 

other

Weapons, 

materiel, 

training, 

intelligence,

Draw

Iranian AntiKhomeini War 

(1979–2001)

Iran MEK Iraq Revolution State Access to territory, fundingGovernment 

victory

Iranian Kurdish 

Independence 

War (1979–1989)

Iran KDPI PUK, Iraq Rebellion State, 

other

Weapons, 

intelligence

Ongoing

Iraqi Islamist War 

(2004–Ongoing)

Iraq Al-Mahdi 

Army, Ansar 

al-Islam, 

TQJBR, IAI

Iran, Al Qaeda Revolution State, 

other

Weapons, 

materiel, training, funding

Ongoing

Iraqi Kurdish 

Independence 

War (1961–1996)

Iraq PUK, PDK Iran, Syria Rebellion State Troops, 

weapons, 

intelligence

Government 

victory
The Role of Outside Influence

217

Case (Start–End) Government Insurgent External Supporter 

(to insurgents)

Type of 

insurgency

Type of 

Support

Mechanism of 

Support

Outcome

Iraqi Shia War 

(1985–1996)

Iraq SCIRI Iran Revolution State Access to territory, weapons, 

materiel, training, funding

Draw

First Israeli Intifada (1987–1993)Israel PLO, PFLP, 

Fatah, 

Hamas

Arab League, Syria, 

Lebanon, Iran

Rebellion State, 

other

Access to territory, training, 

funding

Draw

Israeli-Gaza War 

(2006–2009)

Israel Hamas Syria, Iran Rebellion State Access to territory, weapons, 

materiel, 

funding

Draw

Second Israeli 

Intifada 

(2000–2005)

Israel Palestinian 

Authority, 

Fatah, Hamas, 

PFLP, 

Islamic 

Jihad

Syria, Iran Rebellion State Access to territory, training, 

funding

Draw

Jordanian 

Palestinian War 

(1970–1971)

Jordan PLO Syria Revolution State Troops Government 

victory

Laotian Leftists 

War (1959–1973)

Laos Pathet Lao North Vietnam, 

China, Soviet Union

Revolution State Troops, other Government 

victory

Lebanese War 

(1975–1990)

Lebanon LNM, LAA, 

NUF, Amal, 

Aoun, 

Hobeika 

faction

Iraq, Syria, PLO, 

Lybia

Revolution State, 

other

Troops, 

weapons, material, training, 

intelligence, 

funding

Government 

victory

Liberian War 

(1989–1995)

Liberia NPFL Ivory Coast, Burkina 

Faso, Libya

Revolution State Territory, 

weapons, 

materiel, training, funding

Insurgent 

victory

Liberian War 

(2000–2003)

Liberia LURD Guinea Revolution State Territory, 

weapons, 

materiel

Insurgent 

victory

Libyan War 

(2011–2011)

Libya NLA US, Britain, France, 

Italy and other NATO 

members

Revolution State Troops (air), 

materiel, 

funding

Insurgent 

victory

Azawad Independence War 

(1990–1994)

Mali MPA Libya Rebellion State Weapons Draw

Mali War (2012–

Ongoing)

Mali MNLA, 

Ansar Dine

Al Qaeda Rebellion 

(MNLA), 

revolution 

(Ansar 

Dine)

Other Other Ongoing

Dniestr Independence War 

(1992–1992)

Moldova PMR Elements of Soviet 

military

Rebellion Other Troops, weapons, materiel, 

training

Draw

Western Sahara 

Independence 

War (1975–1989)

Morocco Polisario Algeria, Libya Rebellion State Territory, 

weapons, 

materiel, training, funding

Government 

victory

Mozambique War 

(1977–1992)

Mozambique Renamo Rhodesia, South 

Africa, Kenya, 

Mozambique 

diaspora

Revolution State, 

diaspora

Territory, 

weapons, 

materiel, training, funding

Draw

Nepal Maoist War 

(1996–2006)

Nepal CPN-M Alleged support from 

MCC, LTTE, KLO, 

ULFA, CPI-M

Revolution Other Weapons, training, intelligenceDraw

Nicaraguan 

Contra War 

(1982–1990)

Nicaragua Contras/

FDN

US, Honduras, Saudi 

Arabia

CounterrevolutionState Territory 

(Honduras), 

weapons, 

materiel, training, funding

Draw
218

Special Topics in Irregular Warfare

Case (Start–End) Government Insurgent External Supporter 

(to insurgents)

Type of 

insurgency

Type of 

Support

Mechanism of 

Support

Outcome

Nicaraguan 

Sandinista War 

(1978–1979)

Nicaragua Sandanistas 

(FSLN)

Cuba Revolution State Weapons, 

materiel, 

training

Insurgent 

victory

Biafra Independence War 

(1967–1970)

Nigeria Republic of 

Biafra

Israel, France, 

Portugal, South 

Africa

Rebellion State Weapons, 

materiel, 

humanitarian 

supplies

Government 

victory

Nigerian Islamist 

War (2009–

Ongoing)

Nigeria Boko Haram Al Qaeda (allegedly) Revolution Other Unknown Ongoing

North Yemeni 

Royalists War 

(1962–1970)

North Yemen Royalist 

Partisans

Saudi Arabia, 

Jordan, Britain

Coup 

d’etat, 

followed by 

counterrevolution

State Weapons, 

materiel

Government 

victory

Dhofar Independence War 

(1972–1975)

Oman PFLO South Yemen Rebellion State Troops, access 

to territory

Government 

victory

Baluchi Independence War 

(1974–1977)

Pakistan Baluchi 

separatists

Afghanistan Rebellion State Territory, weapons, materiel, 

funding

Government 

victory

Bengali Independence War 

(1971–1971)

Pakistan Bangladesh India Rebellion State Troops, access 

to territory, 

weapons, 

materiel, 

funding

Insurgent 

victory

Pakistani Islamist 

War (2007–

Ongoing)

Pakistan TNSM, TTP Taliban, Al Qaeda Revolution State, 

other

Intelligence, 

infrastructure

Ongoing

Bougainville 

Independence 

War (1989–1996)

Papua New 

Guinea

BRA Alleged support from 

Solomon Islands

Rebellion State 

(alleged)

Unknown Draw

Sino-Nationalists 

War (1949–1958)

People’s 

Republic of 

China

Republic of 

China

US Revolution, 

rebellion

State Weapons, 

materiel, training, funding

Government 

victory

Moro Independence War 

(1970–Ongoing)

Philippines MNLF, MILF, 

ASG

Libya, Iran, CPP, 

Jemaah Islamiya, Al 

Qaeda

Rebellion State, 

other

Weapons, 

materiel, training, funding, 

intelligence

Ongoing

Philippine 

Communist War 

(1969–Ongoing)

Philippines CPP MNLF, MILF Revolution Other Weapons, 

materiel, training, intelligence

Ongoing

Mozambique 

Independence 

War (1964–1974)

Portugal FRELIMO Soviet Union, China, 

Cuba, Tanzania, 

Zambia

Rebellion State Weapons, 

materiel, 

training

Insurgent 

victory

Sino-Communist 

War (1946–1949)

Republic of 

China

CPC/PLA Soviet Union Revolution State Weapons, 

materiel

Insurgent 

victory

Chechen 

Independence 

War (1994–1996)

Russia Chechen 

Republic of 

Ichkeria

Alleged support from 

Al Qaeda, Taliban 

and other Islamist 

organizations

Rebellion Other Training, 

funding

Draw

Rwandan Hutu 

War (1997–2002)

Rwanda ALiR DRC Revolution State Weapons, 

materiel, 

training

Draw

Rwandan Hutu 

War (2009–Ongoing)

Rwanda FDLR DRC Revolution State Weapons, 

materiel

Ongoing

Rwandan Tutsi 

War (1990–1994)

Rwanda FPR Uganda Revolution State Access to 

territory

Insurgent 

victory

Casamance Independence War 

(1990–Ongoing)

Senegal MFDC Guinea-Bissau, 

Libya, Iraq

Rebellion State Access to territory, weaponsOngoing

Sierra Leone War 

(1991–2002)

Sierra Leone RUF, AFRC Burkina Faso, Libya, 

Liberia

Revolution Other Territory, weapons, materiel, 

training

Government 

victory
The Role of Outside Influence

219

Case (Start–End) Government Insurgent External Supporter 

(to insurgents)

Type of 

insurgency

Type of 

Support

Mechanism of 

Support

Outcome

Somalia War 

(1982–1991)

Somalia SSDF, SNM, 

SPM, SNM

Ethiopia Revolution State Access to 

territory

Insurgent 

victory

Somalia War 

(1991–1996)

Somalia USC/SNA Alleged support from 

Libya

Revolution State Funding Draw

Somalia War 

(2006–Ongoing)

Somalia Al-Shabaab, 

ARS/UIC, 

Hizbul Islam, 

Harakat Ras 

Kamboni

Eritrea Revolution State Weapons, 

materiel, training, funding

Ongoing

Inkatha-ANC War 

(1981–1988)

South Africa ANC East Germany, 

Soviet Union, Cuba, 

Tanzania, Angola, 

Mozambique, Zambia

Revolution State Territory, 

weapons, 

materiel, training, funding

Insurgent 

victory

Namibian 

Independence 

War (1966–1988)

South Africa SWAPO UNITA, Soviet Union, 

Zambia, China, North 

Korea, OAU Liberation Committee

Rebellion State, 

other

Territory, 

weapons, 

materiel, training, funding

Insurgent 

victory

Vietnamese War 

(1955–1975)

South 

Vietnam

Viet Cong North Vietnam, China Revolution State Territory, 

weapons, 

materiel, training, funding

Insurgent 

victory

Tamil Independence War 

(1984–2009)

Sri Lanka LTTE India, Tamil diaspora Rebellion State, 

diaspora

Territory, 

weapons, training, funding

Government 

victory

Southern Sudan 

Independence 

War (1963–1972)

Sudan SSLM Ethiopia, Uganda, 

Israel

Rebellion State Weapons, 

materiel, training, funding

Draw

Sudanese Darfur 

War 

(2003–Ongoing)

Sudan SLM/A, JEM Chad, Eritrea, Libya Rebellion State Weapons, 

materiel, training, funding

Ongoing

Sudanese War 

(1983–2004)

Sudan SPLA Ethiopia, Uganda, 

Eritrea, Israel, Egypt

Rebellion State Territory, 

weapons, 

materiel, training, funding

Draw

Syrian War (2011–

Ongoing)

Syria Free Syrian 

Army, 

Islamic 

Front, 

Al-Nustra, 

others

Saudi Arabia, Qatar, 

Turkey, US, Al Qaeda 

and other Islamist 

Groups

Revolution State, 

other

Weapons, 

materiel, training, funding

Ongoing

Tajik War 

(1992–1998)

Tajikistan UTO Afghanistan Revolution State Access to 

territory

Draw

Thai Leftists War 

(1974–1982)

Thailand CPT China, Laos, Vietnam Revolution State Territory, weapons, materiel, 

training

Government 

victory

Turkish-Kurdish 

Independence 

War (1984–

Ongoing)

Turkey PKK Syria, Iran, Greece, 

PJAK, Kurdish 

diaspora

Rebellion State, 

diaspora, 

other

Territory, 

weapons, materiel, training, 

intelligence, 

funding

Ongoing

Ugandan War 

(1979–1979)

Uganda Fronasa, 

KM, UNLF

Tanzania Revolution State Troops Insurgent 

victory

Ugandan War 

(1980–1986)

Uganda FUNA, NRA, 

UNRF

Libya Revolution State Weapons, 

training

Insurgent 

victory

Ugandan War 

(1986–2009)

Uganda UPA, LRA, 

ADF

Sudan, Zaire/DRC Revolution State Territory, weapons, materiel, 

training

Draw

Northern Irish 

Independence 

War (1969–1999)

United 

Kingdom

IRA Libya, Irish diaspora Rebellion State, 

diaspora

Weapons, 

funding

Draw

Aden Emergency 

(1964–1967)

United Kingdom (Aden 

Protectorate)

NLF, FLOSY Egypt, North Yemen Rebellion State Territory, 

weapons

Insurgent 

victory

Malayan 

Independence 

War (1948–1957)

United 

Kingdom 

(Federation 

of Malaya)

MNLA Soviet Union, China Rebellion State Unknown Government 

victory
220

Special Topics in Irregular Warfare

Case (Start–End) Government Insurgent External Supporter 

(to insurgents)

Type of 

insurgency

Type of 

Support

Mechanism of 

Support

Outcome

Yemeni Islamist 

War (2004–Ongoing)

Yemen AQAP Revolution Ongoing

Zaire Shaba War 

(1977–1978)

Zaire FNLC Angola (alleged) Revolution State Unknown Government 

victory

Zaire Simba War 

(1964–1965)

Zaire PSA Cuba, Soviet Union Revolution State Troops, weapons, materiel, 

training, 

funding

Government 

victory

Zaire War 

(1996–1997)

Zaire AFDL Uganda, Zambia, 

Rwanda, Barrick 

Gold Corporation

Revolution State Troops (Uganda, 

Rwanda), territory, weapons, 

materiel, training, funding

Insurgent 

victory

NOTES

1 US Department of the Army, Joint Publication (JP) 3-05, Special Operations (Washington, 

DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff), July 14, 2014.

2 Peter Wallensteen and Margareta Sollenberg, “Armed Conflicts, Conflict Termination 

and Peace Agreements, 1989–96,” Journal of Peace Research 34, no. 3 (1997): 339–358. 

Conflict peaked in the early 1990s when there were as many as fifty active conflicts worldwide, defined as organized violence leading to more than twenty-five battle deaths per 

annum.

3 Lotta Themnér and Peter Wallensteen, “Armed Conflicts, 1946–2011,” Journal of Peace 

Research 49, no. 4 (2012): 565–575.

4 Joakim Kreutz, “How and When Armed Conflicts End: Introducing the UCDP Conflict 

Termination Dataset,” Journal of Peace Research 47, no. 2 (2010): 243–250.

5 Monica Duffy Toft, Securing the Peace: The Durable Settlement of Civil Wars (Princeton, NJ: 

Princeton University Press, 2010).

6 Kreutz, “How and When Armed Conflicts End.” 

7 Toft, Securing the Peace: The Durable Settlement of Civil Wars..

8 Ibid..

9 Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, Greed and Grievance in Civil War, World Bank Research 

Working Paper 2355 (Washington DC: World Bank, 2010).

10 Stathis N. Kalyvas and Laia Balcells, “International System and Technologies of Rebellion,” American Political Science Review 104, no. 3 (2010): 415–429.

11 Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era (Cambridge, England: 

Polity Press, 2012).

12 Stathis N. Kalyvas, “The Changing Character of Civil Wars,” 2011, Unpublished, 202–219.

13 Jason Lyall and Isaiah Wilson III, “Rage Against the Machines: Explaining Outcomes in 

Counterinsurgency Wars,” International Organization 63 (2009): 67–106.

14 Kalyvas and Balcells, “International System and Technologies of Rebellion.”

15 Ibid.

16 Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan, Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of 

Nonviolent Conflict (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011).

17 David E. Cunningham, “Blocking Resolution: How External States Can Prolong Civil 

Wars,” Journal of Peace Research 43, no. 2 (2010): 115–127.
The Role of Outside Influence

221

18 Erin N. Hahn and W. Sam Lauber, Legal Implications of the Status of Persons in Resistance 

(Fort Bragg, NC: United States Army Special Operations Command, forthcoming), 

chaps. 1, 5, and 6.

19 Daniel Byman et al., Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements (Santa Monica, CA: 

RAND, 2001).

20 Ibid.

21 Ibid., xiv, 71.

22 Idean Salehyan, Kristin Skrede Gleditsch, and David E. Cunningham, “Explaining 

External Support for Insurgent Groups,” International Organization 65 (2011): 712–717.

23 Ibid., 709–744.

24 Christopher Paul, “As a Fish Swims in the Sea: Relationships between Factors Contributing to Support for Terrorist or Insurgent Groups Studies,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 

33 (2010): at 492–493.

25 Byman et al., xiv, 1–2.

26 Ibid., 18–23.

27 Ibid., 41.

28 Ibid., 42–43.

29 Ibid., 80.

30 Ibid., 74–76.

31 Salehyan, Gleditsch, and Cunningham, “Explaining External Support for Insurgent 

Groups,” 709–744.

32 “Peace in the Congo: Rwanda and Uganda at Odds,” Strategic Comments 5, no. 7 (1999): 

1–2.

33 Salehyan, Gleditsch, and Cunningham, “Explaining External Support for Insurgent 

Groups,” 709–744.

34 Nathan Bos, Jason Spitaletta, and SORO authors, “Organizational Structure and Function,” in Human Factors Considerations of Undergrounds in Insurgencies, ed. Nathan Bos (Fort 

Bragg, NC: United States Army Special Operations Command, 2012), 33–88.

35 David E. Cunningham, Kristin Skrede Gleditsch and Idean Salehyan, “It Takes Two: A 

Dyadic Analysis of Civil War Duration and Outcome,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 53, 

no. 4 (2009): 570–597.

36 Salehyan, Gleditsch, and Cunningham, “Explaining External Support for Insurgent 

Groups,” 709–744.

37 William R. Thompson, “Identifying Rivals and Rivalries in World Politics,” International 

Studies Quarterly 45, no. 4 (2001): 557–586.

38 Salehyan, Gleditsch, and Cunningham, “Explaining External Support for Insurgent 

Groups,” 709–744.

39 Byman et al., Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements.

40 Salehyan, Gleditsch, and Cunningham, “Explaining External Support for Insurgent 

Groups,” 709–744.

41 Cunningham, “Blocking Resolution: How External States Can Prolong Civil Wars,” 

115–127.

42 Byman et al., Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements.

43 Cunningham, “Blocking Resolution: How External States Can Prolong Civil Wars,” 

116–117.

44 Byman et al., Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements.

45 Daniel Byman, “Outside Support for Insurgent Movements,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 26, no. 12 (2013): 981–1004, and Byman et al. Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent 

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INDEX

243

A

Administrative structure, and 

transition from resistance to 

governance, 170–173

Adversary critical resource assessment, 

122–125

Afewerki, Isaias, 4, 171

Affection, as motivation for insurgent 

interest and identification, 61

Afghanistan

civil war in, 165

Dutch disease in, 136

foreign fighters in, 107–108

information technology use in, 90, 

93

opium produced in, 113

phases of insurgency in, 8

as potential case study, 208

support for Crimean referendum 

in, 156

Taliban in, 145, 164–166

US attempts to disrupt financial 

bases of insurgencies in, 115

Africa, 208–209; See also individual 

countries

African National Congress (ANC), 37

and Defiance Campaign of Unjust 

Laws, 41–42

FRELIMO support for, 168

types of violence used by, 79

African Union Mission to Somalia 

(AMISOM), 124

Agency slack, 196

Al-Banna, Hasan, 106

Al-Nusra, 111

Al-Qaeda

and EIJ, 108

information technology used by, 92

roots of, 107–108

threat financing for, 106–108

types of violence used by, 80

Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb 

(AQIM), 111

Al-Shabaab

tactical economic analysis of, 120–

130

threat financing by, 110, 111

Al-Zawahiri, Ayman, 108n.c

Amal, 34, 43

American Revolution, 4

AMISOM (African Union Mission to 

Somalia), 124

Analyze phase (TEA), 118–125

ANAPO (National Popular Alliance), 

45

ANC; See African National Congress

Angolan War of Independence, 182–

183

Anti-Fascist underground (Italy), 109

AQIM (al-Qaeda in the Islamic 

Maghreb), 111

Arab Spring, 190

Arenas, Jacobo, 113

Armed component, 25

Armed force, groups’ development of, 

150–152

Asia, 208; See also individual countries

Assassinations, 78

Asymmetric information, 195–196

AUC (Autodefensas Unidas de 

Colombia), 63–66

Auxiliary component, 25, 48

Aziz, King Saud bin Abdul, 106

Azzam, Abdullah Yusuf, 107

B

Balkan Ghosts (Kaplan), 58

Bangladesh, 37

Bank of Algiers, 102

Bank of England, 102

Bardot, Brigitte, 112

Baselines (analyze) phase (TEA), 

118–125

Base of support

creating, for legitimacy, 148–150
244

Special Topics in Irregular Warfare

for transition from resistance to 

governance, 163–166

BBC (British Broadcasting 

Corporation), 109

Behavioral processes, in I3M model, 60

Belgium, threat financing in, 101, 102, 

109

Benghazi US embassy attack (2012), 

174

Berman, Eli, 77

Bhutto, Benazir, 165

Bin Laden, Osama, 107

Black market trade, for threat 

financing, 113–114

Bluetooth bump technology, 91

Boko Haram, 30, 31

Bombings, 78

Bosnia-Herzegovina, 209

Bourgeois-nationalist model; See

Galula’s bourgeois-nationalist 

model

Bradley, Omar, 115

BRCK Inc., 91

Bribery, 101

British Broadcasting Corporation 

(BBC), 109

British pounds, in threat financing, 

105

Bueno de Mesquita, Ethan, 81

C

Cash in local currency, as threat 

financing, 105

Castaño, Carlos, 65–66

Castaño, Fidel, 64–66

Castro regime, 104

Cause, creating a, 146–148

CCE (Constitutional Commission for 

Eritrea), 171

Cell phones, 90, 91

Charities, threat financing from, 104, 

106–107

Chechen separatists, 105

Chernick, Mark, 65

China, 102, 105

Civilian population

leveraging resources of, 150–152

violence against, 78

Civilian supporters, 25; See also Public 

component

Civil war dynamics, in post-Cold War 

era, 185–191

Clandestine operations, 25

Clash of Civilizations (Huntington), 58

Coercion, as form of governance, 33

Cold War, 75, 192

Cold War-era conflicts, 26–27; See also

Post-Cold War era

civil wars, 186

external support of, 191, 212

and ideological divide, 196–197

methods used in, 188–189

“new” vs. “old” wars, 188

Collective action problem, 75–76

Colombia, 44–45, 63–66

Communist Politburo (Manila), 101

Companionship, as motivation 

for insurgent interest and 

identification, 61

Comprehensive Peace Agreement 

(2005), 172

Conflict resolution, 26–27

in post-Cold War era, 186–187

and use of public component, 31

Conflicts

causes/risk contributors for, 59

internal (See Internal conflict)

Congo, 36

Congolese Rally for Democracy (CRD), 

192–193

Constitutional Commission for Eritrea 

(CCE), 171

Costly signaling, 74–75

Counterfeit money, as threat financing, 

105–106

Counterinsurgency (COIN)

defined, 4
Index

245

goading government into, 73–74, 

81–82

and threat financing, 100

Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and 

Practice (Galula), 7–8

Counter-threat finance (CTF), 115

CRD (Congolese Rally for Democracy), 

192–193

Credit card fraud, threat financing 

through, 106

Crimean annexation, 93, 155–156

Croatia, as potential case study, 209

CTF (counter-threat finance), 115

Cuban Revolution, 104

D

Danish resistance, 110

De facto government, creating, 148–

150

Defiance Campaign of Unjust Laws, 

41–42

De la Calle, Luis, 79

Democratic Republic of the Congo 

(DRC), 196

as potential case study, 208, 211–212

UN mission in, 137

Derg, 82

Determinants related to phases of 

resistance; See Variables related 

to phases of resistance

DeVore, Marc R., 135

Dhlakama, Afonso, 153, 168, 169

Diasporas, 94, 193, 199–200

Dickson, Eric, 81

Directorate for Inter-Service 

Intelligence (ISI), 203–204

Disseminate phase (TEA), 129–130

Domestic legitimacy

achieving, 146–152

meaning of, 145–146

DRC; See Democratic Republic of the 

Congo

Drug trade, for threat financing, 

113–114

Dues, for underground members, 109

Dutch disease, 135, 136

E

Eastern Europe

after dissolution of Soviet Union, 

188

demise of communism in, 185

East Timor, 137–138

Economic analysis; See Tactical 

economic analysis (TEA)

Economist, 84

Egypt

Arab Spring support from, 190

funding for Hamas from, 163

revolution in, 89

threat financing from, 108

Egyptian Islamic Group (EIG), 108

Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ), 108

EIG (Egyptian Islamic Group), 108

Eight-step phasing construct of 

insurgency; See Galula’s 

bourgeois-nationalist model

EIJ (Egyptian Islamic Jihad), 108

Electronic credits, as threat financing, 

105

ELF (Eritrean Liberation Front), 147, 

170

Embezzled funds, for threat financing, 

110

Employment phase, 7

EPLF (Eritrean People’s Liberation 

Front), 146–148, 170–171

Eritrea, 4, 147–148

Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF), 147, 

170

Eritrean People’s Liberation Front 

(EPLF), 146–148, 170–171

ETA (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna), 32

Ethiopia, 82, 147–148, 170–171

European defense spending, 75

European Union

and Crimean peninsula, 155–156
246

Special Topics in Irregular Warfare

support for anti-Qadhafi resistance 

forces, 174

Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA), 32

Exploit phase (TEA), 129–130

External financial aid, local economic 

effects of, 135–138

External sources of threat financing, 

102–108

External support, 27

for achievement of external 

national objectives (See

Leveraging indigenous 

resistance movements)

in Cold War-era conflicts, 191, 212

effectiveness of, 205–206

expanding knowledge base of cases 

of, 212–213

finding movements to support, 

195–199

forms of, 202–205

information technology-supported, 

94

international legitimacy through 

securing, 154–155

motivations for, 199–202

in post-Cold War era, 185–191

transition from resistance to 

governance and relationship 

with donors, 166–169

types of actors providing, 191–195

F

Facebook, 89–90, 92

Facility attacks, 78

Families, aid to, 101

FARC (Fuerzas Armadas 

Revolucionarias de Colombia), 

64, 111–114

Fatah, 149, 164

Field Manual (FM) 3-24, 

Counterinsurgency, 5; See 

also Three-phase model of 

insurgency (FM 3-24)

Financing, 204–206; See also Funding; 

Threat finance

of “new wars,” 27

via information technology 

networks, 94

Find phase (TEA), 125–127

Finish phase (TEA), 129–130

Five-phase model of insurgency 

(SORO)

compared to other models, 11–12

description of phases in, 12–13

determinants and variables in, 8–10

and organizational growth, 13–15

Fix phase (TEA), 127–129

Flanigan, Shawn, 34

Fleet Marine Force Reference 

Publication 12-18, Mao Tse-tung 

on Guerrilla Warfare, 5–6

Focused targeting method (F3EAD), 

116, 117; See also Tactical 

economic analysis (TEA)

Fonds de Soutien (Funds for Support), 

101

Forced “contribution,” for threat 

financing, 111–112

Foreign governments

achievement of national objectives 

through indigenous resistance 

movements (See Leveraging 

indigenous resistance 

movements)

motivations for support from, 

200–202

support from, 192–193

threat financing from, 102–103

France, 173–174

Franck, Thomas, 145

FRELIMO; See Front for the Liberation 

of Mozambique (Frente de 

Libertaçao de Moçambique)

French-Algerian War, 7

French resistance (World War II), 102

Front for the Liberation of 

Mozambique (Frente de 

Libertaçao de Moçambique; 

FRELIMO), 77n.a, 153–154, 168, 

169
Index

247

F3EAD focused targeting method, 116, 

117; See also Tactical economic 

analysis (TEA)

Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de 

Colombia (FARC), 64, 111–114

Funding; See also Financing

mechanisms of, 100–102

in post-Cold War era, 27

G

Galula, David, 7

Galula’s bourgeois-nationalist model, 

11

analyzing phases in, 9

as eight-step phasing construct, 7–8

Garang, John, 172

Gaza Strip

devastation of, 81

Hamas’s authority over, 148–150, 

163–164

threshold of violence in, 84

General National Congress (GNC), 174

Geographical territory, 28–29

Ghonim, Wael, 89

Gifts, for threat financing, 108–109

Giordano, Frank, 76

GNC (General National Congress), 174

Goods-based public interface, 25, 

31–36, 149

Google Maps, 90–91

Governance

shadow, 31–32, 102

transition from resistance to (See

Transition from resistance to 

governance)

by violence and coercion, 33

GPS systems, 90–91

Great Britain, 168, 173–174; See also

United Kingdom

Greek resistance, British aid to, 135

Griffith, Samuel B., 6

Group competition, as motivation 

for insurgent interest and 

identification, 61

Group grievances, as motivation 

for insurgent interest and 

identification, 61

Group isolation, as motivation 

for insurgent interest and 

identification, 61

Group polarization, as motivation 

for insurgent interest and 

identification, 61

Guzman, Abimael, 114

H

HADEP (People’s Democracy Party), 

44

Haiti, 137

Hamas (Harakat al-Muqawama alIslamiyya)

charities as recruitment 

mechanisms for, 47

de facto authority of, 148–150

domestic legitimacy of, 146

family aid from, 101

free social services from, 29

institution-based public interface 

of, 37

and Islamic National Salvation 

Party, 40–41

patterns of violence initiated by, 74

threat financing for, 107

transition from resistance to 

governance by, 163–164

use of political parties by, 25

Hammoud, Mohamad, 167

Haniyeh, Ismail, 164

Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya; See

Hamas

Harik, Judith Palmer, 136

Hijackings, 78, 111

Hizbollah

arsenal of, 204

charities as recruitment 

mechanisms for, 47

impact of, 204
248

Special Topics in Irregular Warfare

Iran’s sponsorship of, 82–83, 166–

167, 196, 209–210

legitimacy of, 146, 154–155, 167

local economic effects of Iran’s aid 

to, 135–136

political party created by, 42–43

propaganda of, 203

public component of, 49–50

safe havens of, 203

support of Syrian opposition forces, 

183

territorial control by, 50

threat financing for, 101–102

transition from resistance to 

governance by, 166–167

types of violence used by, 79

use of public component by, 25, 29, 

32–35

Holy Reconstruction Organ (Jihad alBina’), 83

Hukbalahap movement, 101, 109, 110, 

112

Human Factors Considerations of 

Undergrounds in Insurgencies

(SORO), 8–13

Humanitarian aid

al-Shabaab’s revenues from, 126

and duration/severity of conflicts, 

190

Huntington, Samuel P., 58

Hutus, 196

I

Identification, in I3M model, 60; See 

also Interest, identification, 

indoctrination, and mobilization 

(I3M)

Ideology of movements, threat finance 

and, 99

IFT (informal funds transfer) systems, 

105

Imam Khomeini Assistance 

Committee, 136

IMF (International Monetary Fund), 

136

Incentives

for AUC members, 65–66

in I3M model, 61–63 (See also

Interest, identification, 

indoctrination, and mobilization 

[I3M])

India

Hindu parties in, 37

informal funds transfer in, 105

as potential case study, 208, 210

Indoctrination, in I3M model, 60; See 

also Interest, identification, 

indoctrination, and mobilization 

(I3M)

Indonesia, 37

Inflation, as result of external aid, 

136–137

Informal funds transfer (IFT) systems, 

105

Information technology, 89–95

cell phones, 90, 91

difficulty in countering, 89

Google Maps and GPS systems, 

90–91

legal issues with, 91

legality of government responses to 

insurgents’ use of, 95

mass media, 93

in Middle East revolutions (2011-

2015), 89

social media, 89–90, 93–94

uses of, 91

video, 93

Institution-based public interface, 25, 

31–32, 37–45

Insurgency(-ies)

components of, 25–26

definitions of, 3–4, 182

funding of, 27 (See also Threat 

finance)

terrorism vs., 59n.e

Insurgents (term), 184

Intelligence

as form of support, 204–205
Index

249

information technology for, 92

Interest, identification, indoctrination, 

and mobilization (I3M), 57–67

AUC case study, 63–66

behavioral processes in, 60

future study of, 67

motivations and incentives in, 

61–63

and scholarship on genesis of 

political violence, 57–58

Interest, in I3M model, 60

Internal conflict

changing nature of, 181

foreign states’ leveraging of 

(See Leveraging indigenous 

resistance movements)

in post-Cold War era, 185–191

Internal organization, transition from 

resistance to governance and, 

170–173

Internal sources of money, 108–114

coercive, 110–114

noncoercive, 108–110

International Islamic Relief 

Organization, 107

International legitimacy

achieving, 152–155

meaning of, 143–145

International Monetary Fund (IMF), 

136

International values system, 143

Internet; See also Information 

technology

bulletin boards on, 92

legal issues with, 91

responding to insurgents’ use of, 95

Interstate conflict, 26

Intrastate conflict, 26–27, 186

Invisible operations, 25

IRA (Irish Republic Army), 39

Iran

Hizbollah as strategic arm for, 154, 

166, 196

local economic effects of aid to 

Hizbollah, 135–136

social media networks during 

Green Revolution, 94

sponsorship of Hizbollah, 82–83, 

166–167, 209–210

support of Syrian opposition forces, 

183, 199

threat financing from, 102, 108

threshold of violence increased by, 

83

Iraq

information technology use in, 93, 

94

phases of insurgency in, 8

as potential case study, 207

US attempts to disrupt financial 

bases of insurgencies in, 115

Irish Northern Aid Committee 

(NORAID), 104

Irish Republic Army (IRA), 39

IS; See Islamic State

ISI (Directorate for Inter-Service 

Intelligence), 203–204

ISIL (Islamic State of Iraq and the 

Levant), 80

Islamic National Salvation Party, 40–41

Islamic parallel financial system, 

106–108

Islamic State (IS), 4

kidnappings by, 111

in Nigeria, 30

social media use by, 93–94

Islamic State of Afghanistan, 165

Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant 

(ISIL), 80

Islamic University (Medina), 106

Israel

Gaza Strip air strikes, 150

Hamas’ refusal to recognize, 164

Lebanon invasion by, 154

patterns of violence initiated by, 74

as potential case study, 207
250

Special Topics in Irregular Warfare

I3M; See Interest, identification, 

indoctrination, and mobilization

Ivory Coast, 137

J

Jackson, Robert, 143

Jaeger, David A., 77

Japan, 103

Jewish Agency, 103

Jibril, Mahmoud, 174

Jihad al-Bina’ (Holy Reconstruction 

Organ), 83

Johns Hopkins University Applied 

Physics Laboratory, 117

K

Kabila, Laurent, 196

Kaldor, Mary, 27

Kalyvas, Stathis N., 77n.a

Kaplan, Robert D., 58

Karuna (Tamil leader), 151

Kashmir, as potential case study, 208, 

210

Keynesian multiplier, 136–137

Khomeini, Ayatollah, 166

Kidnappings, 78, 111

Kir, Salva, 172

Kosovo, 137

Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK), 44, 

91, 95

Kydd, Andrew H., 74–75

L

Laitin, David D., 77

Lashkar-e-Taiba, 90, 204, 210

Latin America, 188

Lebanese expatriates, 167

Lebanon

Hizbollah in government positions 

in, 42–43

Israel’s invasion of, 154

as potential case study, 207

Shia population after 1982 Israeli 

invasion, 80–81

Legality

of government responses to 

insurgents’ use of information 

technology, 95

legitimacy vs., 46

Legitimacy, 143–157

achieving, in eyes of domestic 

audiences, 146–152

achieving, in eyes of international 

audiences, 152–155

creating appearance of (See

Institution-based public 

interface)

forms of, 144

legality vs., 46

meaning of, to domestic audiences, 

145–146

meaning of, to international 

audiences, 143–145

sources of, 143

state standards for, 143

Leveraging indigenous resistance 

movements, 181–213

civil war dynamics in post-Cold War 

era, 185–191

effectiveness of support, 205–206

finding movements to support, 

195–199

forms of support, 202–205

motivations for support, 199–202

potential cases for further research, 

206–209, 213–220

recommendations for studying, 

212–213

recommended cases of, 209–212

research questions concerning, 

184–185

types of actors providing external 

support, 191–195

Levitt, Matthew, 135

Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 

(LTTE; Tamil Tigers)

armed force developed by, 150–152
Index

251

charities as recruitment 

mechanisms for, 47

diaspora support for, 193

domestic legitimacy of, 146

mix of coercion and social services 

used by, 30

provision of public goods by, 25, 32, 

35–36

support for, 196

threat financing for, 103, 111, 113

threshold of violence increased by, 

83

types of violence used by, 78, 79

Liberia, 137

Libya, 173–175, 190, 191n.e

Loans, for threat financing, 109–110

Local economies, effects of external 

aid on, 135–138

L’Oeuvre National de Secours GrandeDuchesse Charlotte, 101

Lord’s Resistance Army (Uganda), 29

Lord’s Resistance Movement, 172

Love, as motivation for insurgent 

interest and identification, 61

LTTE; See Liberation Tigers of Tamil 

Eelam

Luxembourg resistance, 101, 110

M

Machar, Riek, 173

Magariaf, Mohammed, 174

Maktab Al Khidamat (MAK), 107–108

Malayan Communist Party (MCP), 

110–111

Mali, 94

Mao Zedong, 4, 188; See also Sevenphase model of insurgency 

(Mao); Three-phase model of 

insurgency (Mao)

Marcos, Ferdinand, 104

Martyrs Foundation, 83, 136

Marulanda, Manuel, 113

Mass media, 93

Material needs, 204–206

McCormick, Gordon H., 76

MCP (Malayan Communist Party), 

110–111

Mecca Agreement, 164

MEND (Movement for the 

Emancipation of the Niger 

Delta), 111

Methods of warfare

in “new wars,” 27

in post-Cold War era, 188–190

Middle East

informal funds transfer in, 105

potential case studies in, 207

Min Yuen, 101, 109

Mission subsistence allowances (MSAs), 

137

MK (Umkhonto we Sizwe), 37, 42

MLC (Movement for the Liberation of 

the Congo), 192–193

M-19 (Movimiento 19 de Abril), 45, 47

Mobilization

in I3M model, 60 (See also Interest, 

identification, indoctrination, 

and mobilization [I3M])

through violence against symbolic 

representations of state power, 

76–77

use of information technology for, 

93

Mobutu, 196

Motivations

for AUC members, 65–66

in Cold War and post-Cold War era, 

188

in I3M model, 61–63

for use of violence, 74–77

Mouvement National Belge, 101

Movement for the Emancipation of the 

Niger Delta (MEND), 111

Movement for the Liberation of the 

Congo (MLC), 192–193

Movimiento 19 de Abril (M-19), 45, 47

Mozambique, 153–154, 168–169
252

Special Topics in Irregular Warfare

MSAs (mission subsistence allowances), 

137

Mubarak, Hosni, 89

Mumbai, attacks in, 90

Muslim Brotherhood, 106–107

Muslim World League, 107

N

Narcotics trade

in Colombia, 64

for threat financing, 113–114

Narrative, 4, 146–148

Nasrallah, Hassan, 155, 167

Nasser, Gamal Abdel, 106

National Defense University, Africa 

Center for Strategic Studies, 121

National Democratic Alliance, 172

National Democratic Front (NDF), 104

National Liberation Front (Algeria), 79

National objectives of foreign 

states, leveraging indigenous 

resistance movements to achieve; 

See Leveraging indigenous 

resistance movements

National Patriotic Front of Liberia 

(NPFL), 194

National Popular Alliance (ANAPO), 

45

National Transitional Council (NTC), 

174

NATO (North Atlantic Treaty 

Organization) forces, 8, 93

Naval Special Warfare Development 

Group, 117

NDF (National Democratic Front), 104

Negotiated resolution of conflicts, 

26–27, 47, 187

Negotiations, use of public component 

and, 31

New People’s Army (NPA), 104

“New wars,” 27

NGOs (nongovernmental 

organizations), 194, 200

Nigeria, 30, 94

Noncombatant supporters, 25; See also

Public component

Nongovernmental organizations 

(NGOs), 194, 200

Nonprofit organizations, threat 

financing from, 104

Non-state actors, 194–195

motivations for support from, 

199–200

threat financing from, 103–104

Nonviolent campaigns, for achieving 

international legitimacy, 152–

154

NORAID (Irish Northern Aid 

Committee), 104

North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

(NATO) forces, 8, 93

North Vietnam, 102

Nour Mowafaq General Trading LLC, 

121

NPA (New People’s Army), 104

NPFL (National Patriotic Front of 

Liberia), 194

NTC (National Transitional Council), 

174

O

OAS (Organisation de l’Armée 

Secrète), 110–112

Obama, Barack, 183

Olson, Mancur, 75

Omar, Mullah, 165

Online banking fraud, 106

Online fraud, 106

Organisation de l’Armée Secrète 

(OAS), 110–112

Organization, and transition from 

resistance to governance, 170–

173

Organizational assistance, 204–206

Organizational growth, stages of, 

13–15

P

Pakistan, 165, 166, 203–204, 210
Index

253

Palestine, Hamas in, 163–164

Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC), 

149, 164

Palestinian Liberation Organization 

(PLO), 80–81, 203

Palestinian National Authority (PNA), 

37

Palestinian resistance movements, 101

Parallel financial systems, 106–108

People’s Democracy Party (HADEP), 

44

People’s Front for Democracy and 

Justice (PFDJ), 148, 171

Perceptual territory, 28–29

Personal grievances, as motivation 

for insurgent interest and 

identification, 61

Peshawar Accord, 165

PFDJ (People’s Front for Democracy 

and Justice), 148, 171

Phases of contemporary resistance, 

3–22

definitions of resistance and 

insurgency, 3–4

existing phasing constructs, 10–13

further study on, 15

importance of understanding, 3

literature on, 4–10

and stages of organizational 

growth, 13–15

values of variables related to, 16–22

Philippines, 101, 104, 105

PIRA; See Provisional Irish Republican 

Army

PKK; See Kurdistan Worker’s Party

PLC (Palestinian Legislative Council), 

149, 164

PLO (Palestinian Liberation 

Organization), 80–81, 203

PMESII-ASCOPE assessment, 118–122

PNA (Palestinian National Authority), 

37

Polish underground, 103

Political party(-ies); See also Institutionbased public interface; individual 

parties

achieving legitimacy as, 152–153

as fronts for insurgent groups, 

38–41

independent of insurgent groups, 

44–45

as legitimate face for illicit 

organizations, 31

rebel groups subordinate to, 41–43

use of violent groups by, 37

Political violence, studies of, 57–58

Popular Movement for the Liberation 

of Angola, 182–183

Post-Cold War era

civil war dynamics in, 185–191

funding in, 27

nature of internal conflicts in, 181

Prabhakaran, 151

Principal–agent relationship, 38, 

195–197

political parties as fronts for 

insurgent groups, 38–41

rebel groups subordinate to 

political parties, 41–43

Prioritize (find) phase (TEA), 125–127

Propaganda, 203, 205–206

Provisional Irish Republican Army 

(PIRA)

internal characteristics of, 197

and legitimacy vs. legality, 46

and Sinn Féin, 39–40

threat financing for, 102, 104

use of political parties by, 25

Public component, 25–51

and change in nature of warfare, 

26–29

defined, 25–26

within existing doctrine, 48–51

goods-based interface of, 32–36

institution-based interface of, 37–45

as “public interface,” 29–32

strategic value of, 45–47
254

Special Topics in Irregular Warfare

Public goods; See also Goods-based 

public interface

defined, 32

scope of activities in, 135–136

Public support, level of, 47

Q

Qadhafi, Muammar, 102, 173–174

Qassem, Naim, 79

Qatar, 163, 173–174

R

Rabbani, Burhanuddin, 165, 166

Rabitta al-Alam al-Islami, 107

Radical Islam, 190

Radicalization, 59

Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD), 

36

Rebels (term), 184

Recognition, 144–146, 148, 154

Reconstruction Campaign, 136

Recruitment, 47

Refugee support, 193–194, 199–200

RENAMO; See Resistência Nacional 

Moçambicana

Resistance; See also individual topics

defined, 3–4

phases of, 3–22

transition to governance from, 

163–176

Resistance movements

defined, 183–184

external characteristics of, 198–199

internal characteristics of, 197–198

leveraging of (See Leveraging 

indigenous resistance 

movements)

Resistência Nacional Moçambicana 

(RENAMO), 144, 153–154, 

167–169

Revolutionary United Front (RUF), 

102, 110, 194–195

Rhodesia, 168, 209, 211

Risk, as motivation for insurgent 

interest and identification, 61

Risk-benefit assessment (TEA), 127–

129

Robberies, for threat financing, 110–

111

Rojas Pinilla, Gustavo, 45

Rojas Pinilla, Maria, 45

Rome General Peace Accords (1992), 

153, 168

RPF (Rwandan Patriotic Front), 33

RUF; See Revolutionary United Front

Russian Federation, 155–156

Rwanda, 110

CRD and MLC support from, 192–

193, 196

support for DRC insurgents, 211–

212

Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), 33

S

Safe havens, 203, 205–206

Salan, Raoul, 112

Salaries, paying, 101–102

Sales, for threat financing, 110

Santa Fe de Ralito Accord (2003), 65

Saudi Arabia, 108, 165

Scheyven, Raymond, 109

Schroeder, Rob, 89

Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path), 34, 

114

Service Socrates, 109

Seven-phase construct of insurgency 

(ATP 3-05 UW), 6–7

compared to other models, 10

and organizational growth, 14

Seven-phase model of insurgency 

(Mao), 5–8

analyzing phases, 9

expanding phase concept, 10

Shadow governance, 31–32, 102

Shiites

in Iraq, 183
Index

255

in Lebanon, 33–35

Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso), 34, 

114

Sierra Leone, 137, 194–195, 208

Sinhalese, 151, 196

Sinn Féin, 39–40

Sinwan General Trading LLC, 121

Slippery slope, as motivation 

for insurgent interest and 

identification, 61

SNC (symmetrical nonconventional) 

warfare, 189–190

Social media, 89–90, 93–94

Social outreach, funding for, 102

Social Science Research Branch 

Socio-Cultural Analysis Teams 

(USAFRICOM), 121

Social service provisions; See Goodsbased public interface

Somalia, 110, 120–130

SORO (Special Operations Research 

Office), 8; See also Five-phase 

model of insurgency

South Africa, 168

South Vietnam, 136

Soviet Union (USSR)

and Angolan War of Independence, 

182–183

cessation of insurgency funding 

from, 27

demise of communism in, 185

FRELIMO and RENAMO as pawns 

of, 168

funding for weak regimes from, 189

support for insurgency in Rhodesia, 

211

threat financing from, 102

withdrawal from Afghanistan, 165

Spear of the Nation (Umkhonto we 

Sizwe; MK), 37

Special Operations Research Office 

(SORO), 8; See also Five-phase 

model of insurgency

SPLA (Sudan People’s Liberation 

Army), 171–173

Sponsorship, international legitimacy 

through securing, 154–155

Sri Lanka

development of LTTE armed force 

in, 150–152

political party-inspired animosities 

in, 37, 196

provision of public goods in, 35–36

Stages of contemporary resistance; 

See Phases of contemporary 

resistance

State actors, 192–193, 200–202

Status, as motivation for insurgent 

interest and identification, 61

Strategic political objectives of foreign 

states, leveraging indigenous 

resistance movements to achieve; 

See Leveraging indigenous 

resistance movements

Strategic value

of goods-based public interface, 

29–30

of public component, 30–31, 45–47

Strategy of movement, threat finance 

and, 99

Sub-Saharan Africa, 188, 189

Substantive legitimacy, 144

at domestic level, 146

at international level, 154

through narrative, 147

Substitute currency, as threat 

financing, 105

Sudan People’s Defense Forces/

Democratic Front, 172

Sudan People’s Liberation Army 

(SPLA), 171–173

Sudan People’s Liberation Army/

Movement, 172

Sunni insurgency, 4

Supplies, paying for, 101–102

Symmetrical nonconventional (SNC) 

warfare, 189–190

Syria

Arab Spring support from, 190
256

Special Topics in Irregular Warfare

distinguishing among groups 

fighting for power in, 30

as potential case study, 207

support for Crimean referendum 

in, 156

US support of opposition forces in, 

183

Syrian Electronic Army, 93

T

Tactical economic analysis (TEA), 

115–130

analyze phase (baseline) in, 118–

125

disseminate phase in, 129–130

exploit phase in, 129–130

find phase (prioritize) in, 125–127

finish phase in, 129–130

fix phase (target development/riskbenefit assessment) in, 127–129

methodology overview, 116–118

for obtaining operational 

advantage, 115–115

Taliban, 90, 93

legitimacy of, 145

refugee support for, 193–194

threat financing for, 111, 113

transition from resistance to 

governance by, 164–166

Tamil communities, LTTE financing 

from, 103–104

Tamil National Alliance, 152

Tamil Relief Organization (TRO), 35

Tamil Tigers; See Liberation Tigers of 

Tamil Eelam (LTTE)

Target development (fix) phase (TEA), 

127–129

Taxes, for threat financing, 112–113

Taylor, Charles, 102, 194

TEA; See Tactical economic analysis

Territorial control, 27–29

public component of, 33–34, 50

zones of control in conflict zones, 

33

Terrorism

definitions of, 58n.c, 182

insurgency vs., 59n.e

and threat finance, 99

Threat finance, 99–131

critical factors in, 99–100

external sources of money, 102–108

funding mechanisms, 100–102

internal sources of money, 108–114

and maintenance of popular 

support, 99

and overall strategy/ideology of 

movement, 99

tactical economic analysis of, 115–

130

Three-phase model of insurgency (FM 

3-24), 5, 11

Three-phase model of insurgency 

(Mao), 4–5

Threshold of violence, 73–84

determining, 80

impacting upper threshold of 

violence, 80–84

motivations for use of violence, 

74–77

types of violence, 78–80

Tigray People’s Liberation Front 

(TPLF), 82

Toft, Monica, 187

Training, 203–206

Transition from resistance to 

governance, 163–176

anti-Qadhafi resistance forces in 

Libya, 173–175

base of support for, 163–166

internal organization/

administrative structure for, 

170–173

and relationship with donors, 

166–169

in wake of military victory, 190

TRO (Tamil Relief Organization), 35

Tunisian revolution, 89–90

Turchynov, Oleksandr, 155
Index

257

Turkey, 44, 173–174

Tutsis, 196

Twitter, 89, 93

U

Uganda, 192–193, 209, 211–212

Ukraine, 155–156

Umkhonto we Sizwe (Spear of the 

Nation; MK), 37, 42

Unconventional warfare (UW)

defined, 4

expanding body of work devoted 

to, 212

narrative in, 4

research objectives for case studies, 

213

as strategic option for US 

government, 182 (See also

Leveraging indigenous 

resistance movements)

US military definition of, 181

Underground component, 25

funding for (See Threat financing)

public component compared to, 

48–49

Unfreezing, as motivation for 

insurgent interest and 

identification, 61

United Kingdom, 102, 183; See also

Great Britain

United Nations (UN) missions

external aid in context of, 137–138

in Sudan, 171–172

United Self-Defense Forces of 

Colombia (Autodefensas Unidas 

de Colombia; AUC), 63–66

United States

and Angolan War of Independence, 

182–183

cessation of insurgency funding 

from, 27

and Crimean peninsula, 155–156

definition of unconventional 

warfare in, 181

FRELIMO and RENAMO as pawns 

of, 168

and Internet communication with 

PKK, 91

Internet propaganda against, 92

RENAMO backed by, 144, 153

security provided to western 

Europe, 75

support for anti-Qadhafi resistance 

forces, 173–174

support of Syrian opposition forces, 

183

and threat financing, 104, 115

weak regimes funded by, 189

UN missions; See United Nations 

missions

US Africa Command (USAFRICOM), 

117, 121

US Army Asymmetric Warfare Group, 

116–117

US Army Doctrine and Training 

Publication (ATP) 3-05, 

Unconventional Warfare, 6; See 

also Seven-phase construct of 

insurgency (ATP 3-05 UW)

US Central Command, 117

US dollars, for threat financing, 105

US Special Operations CTF 

detachments at US Pacific 

Command, 117

USSR; See Soviet Union

UW; See Unconventional warfare

V

Values system, international, 143

Vargas, Jose Antonio, 89

Variables related to phases of 

resistance, 9–10

SORO list of, 8–9

values of, 16–22

Venezuela, 156

Video technologies, 93

Viet Cong, 102

Violence; See also Threshold of violence
258

Special Topics in Irregular Warfare

defined, 73

as form of governance, 33

and government counterinsurgency 

campaigns, 73–74, 81–82

motivations for use of, 74–77

types of, 78–80

W

Walter, Barbara F., 74–75

Warfare, change in nature of, 26–29

Weapons, 204–206

Weber, Max, 145

Wi-Fi mesh networks, 91

Wight, Martin, 143, 144

Wittig, Timothy, 116–117

Wood, Reed M., 77n.a, 82

World War II

local economic effects of external 

aid in, 135

threat financing in, 101–103, 105, 

106, 109

Y

Yassim, Seikh Ahmed, 29

YouTube, 89–90

Yugoslavia, 110

Yugoslav Partisans, 109, 112

Z

Zeidan, Ali, 174