### D IS TRICT 

### C OURT 

### O F 

### A PPEAL 

### O F 

### T HE 

### S TATE 

### O F 

### F LORIDA

F OURTH D ISTRICT

STATE OF FLORIDA
, Appellant,

v.

DYLAN MORRIS
, Appellee

.

No. 4D 18

- 2470

[ April 24, 2019 ]

Appeal of nonfinal order from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Broward County ; Barbara R. Duffy , Judge; L.T. Case No.

17

- 14519CF10A

.

Ashley B. Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee , and Allan R. Geesey,

Assistant Attorney General , West Palm Beach, for appell ant

.

Russell L. Cormican, Fort Lauderdale, for appellee.

M AY
, J.

License plate frames and whether they violate section 316.605(1), Florida Statutes (2017), are challenged in this appeal. The State appeals a suppression order . It argues the trial court erred in finding that a license plate frame did not violate section 316.605( 1) . We dis agree and affirm.

Law enforcement conducted a traffic stop of the defendant for violating section 316.605(1). The State charged the defendant with possession of

cocaine , which was seized as a result of the stop. The defendant moved t o suppress the cocaine , arguing that the traffic stop was invalid.

The parties agreed to the facts. The legal question was whether the Drive Pink AutoNation license plate frame around the defendant’s license plate was “obscuring matter” over the words “MyFlorida.com” and

“Sunshine State

, ” providing a legal basis for the traffic stop

.

The statute’s 2017 version provides that on a Florida license plate, “all letters, numerals, printing, writing, the registration decal, and the alphanumeric designation shall be clear and distinct and free from . . .2 other obscuring matter, so that they will be plainly visible and legible at

all times 100 feet from the rear or front.” § 316.605(1), Fla. Stat. (2017).

Th e defendant’s license plate looked like this:

D e fense counsel argued the license plate frame d id not obscure any of

the words

, although it cover ed part of a few letters

. Regardless, h e argued,

all t he words could be read from a hundred feet. The only letters that were partially covered were in the words “ Sunshine State ” and “MyFlorida.com. ” Counsel argue d that only “Florida,” the tag number, and registration decal

were “necessary information

. ” See State v. Pena , 247 So. 3d 61 , 61 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018) (interpreting the 2015 version of the stat ute)

.

The State responded that the statute requires “all” letters and writing be “clear and distinct from . . . obscuring matter,” even if the frame covers only “a little top portion” of “MyFlorida.com

. ” And, b ecause the frame obscured part of “Sunshin e State

, ” the stop was valid.

T he trial court found “that the word ‘Florida’ [was] not obscured. . . . [E]verything that needs to be identified [was] identifiable,” even with the

frame. The court granted the motion to suppress, “find[ing] that the tag [was] not obscured as the law require [d] for purposes of stopping a vehicle.” The State now appeals.

The State continues to argue the trial court erred i n suppressing the

cocaine because the plain language of section 316.605(1) , Fla. Stat.

, requires “a ll” writing on the license plate to be clear and free from

“ obscuring matter

. ” The statute indicates that “ [n] othing shall be placed

up on the face of a Florida plate except as permitted by law. . . .” § 316.605(1), Fla. Stat. (2017). It also argues that even if the stop were illegal, the evidence should not be suppressed because the officer acted

under a reasonable mistake of law

.3 The defendant responds that the trial court ’s finding is supported by competent, substantial evidence and should not be dist urbed on appeal.

He argues case law interpreting the statute’s prior version supports the

trial court’s legal conclusion . L astly, he argues that because the State failed to argue the officer’s reasonable mistake of law in the trial court,

th at argument is unpreserved

.

W e review an order on a m otion to suppress to determine whether the trial court’s factual findings are supported by competent, substantial

evidence. Martin v. State , 921 So. 2d 697, 698 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) . We have de novo review of the legal issue. Id

.

When reviewing a statute, we should first look to the actual language and its plain meaning. English v. State , 191 So. 3d 448, 450 (Fla. 2016)

. If the language is clear and unambiguous, we need not loo k behind it or

resort to statutory construction to determine legislative intent. Id

. Plain meaning controls unless that meaning leads to a result that is unreasonable or clearly contrary to legislative intent. Id.

The statute’s current version provides that, “ all letters, numerals, printing, writing, the registration decal, and the alphanumeric designation shall be clear and distinct and free from defacement, mutilation, grease, and other obscuring matter, so that they will be pl ainly visible and legible

at all times 100 feet from the rear or front. ” § 316.605(1), Fla. Stat. (2017)

. 1

Our supreme court has held that the predecessor version of “ section 316.605(1) does not distinguish between obscuring matter that is on or

external to the license plate. ” English , 191 So. 3d at 45 1. It did so in concluding “ that a tag light, hanging down in front of a license plate, obscuring its alphanumeric designation, constitute [d] a violation of section 316.605(1). ” Id

.

Here, all the lette rs and words on the license plate were visible within 100 feet. In fact, t he officer who stopped the defendant testified in deposition that “he didn’t have any trouble” reading the word “Florida.” The trial court specifically found that “ e verything that needs to be identified is identifiable,” even with the frame. The trial court further suggested that if the legislature wanted to outlaw license plate frames

,

1 The parties correctly point out that no Florida court has yet to interpret th is version of section 316.605(1), Florida Statutes, which went into effect on July 1,

2016.4 which are most often placed on the plates by auto dealers, it could have

done so.

We agree with the trial court that the “ letters, numerals, printing, writing, the registration decal, and the alphanumeric designation [were] clear and distinct and free from defacement, mutilation, grease, and other obscuring matter, so that they [were] plainly visible and legible at all times

100 feet from the rear or front .” § 316.605(1), Fla. Stat. (2017). For this reason, we affirm. 2

Affirmed.

G ERBER
, C.J

., and K LINGENSMITH

, J., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition o f timely filed motion for rehearing.

2 Because the State failed to raise the “mistake of l aw” argument below, it is unpreserved.