John Matthew Woodlin v. State of Maryland, No. 107, September Term 2021, filed May 

31, 2022. Opinion by Friedman, J.

HEADNOTES:

CRIMINAL LAW — EVIDENCE — OTHER SEXUALLY ASSAULTIVE BEHAVIOR

— BALANCING PROBATIVE VALUE AND PREJUDICIAL EFFECT

When determining whether “[t]he probative value of the evidence is not substantially 

outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice” under CJ § 10-923(e)(4), courts must 

consider whether and how similar the two instances of sexually assaultive behavior actually 

are. The more similar the prior sexually assaultive behavior is to the charged offense, the 

more probative of propensity it is, and the less unfairly prejudicial. Conversely, the more 

dissimilar the prior sexually assaultive behavior is to the charged offense, the less probative 

of propensity it is, and the more unfairly prejudicial.

CRIMINAL LAW — EVIDENCE — OTHER SEXUALLY ASSAULTIVE BEHAVIOR

— BALANCING PROBATIVE VALUE AND PREJUDICIAL EFFECT

While the precise contours of how much evidence of prior sexually assaultive behavior 

should be admitted must be decided on a case-by-case basis by circuit courts, it is 

insufficient merely to admit the fact of the prior conviction. Instead, circuit courts must 

admit sufficient factual detail of the prior sexually assaultive behavior to allow the jurors 

to compare and contrast the current allegations with the prior sexually assaultive behavior 

to determine for themselves whether and to what extent the prior sexually assaultive 

behavior is probative—or not—as to whether the defendant committed the act for which 

they are on trial.
Circuit Court for Wicomico County

Case No. C-22-CR-19-000613

REPORTED

IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS

OF MARYLAND

No. 107

September Term, 2021

______________________________________

JOHN MATTHEW WOODLIN

v.

STATE OF MARYLAND

______________________________________

Friedman, 

Shaw,

Wilner, Alan M.

 (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned),

JJ.

______________________________________

Opinion by Friedman, J.

______________________________________

Filed: May 31, 2022
This case concerns the application of Section 10-923 of the Courts Article of the 

Maryland Code, a new evidentiary statute enacted by the Maryland General Assembly to 

permit, in certain circumstances, the admissibility of evidence of prior sexually assaultive 

behavior in the prosecution of sex crimes.

John Woodlin was convicted of child sexual abuse and related sexual offenses

arising from a 2019 incident involving his then eleven-year-old grandson, A.H.1 Although 

evidence against Woodlin included testimony from A.H. and other family members, a 

critical piece of the State’s case, and the focus of this appeal, was evidence of Woodlin’s 

2010 conviction for another sexual assault. The arguments before us on appeal are 

two-fold: first, that the allegations of the 2010 conviction are so dissimilar from those of 

the 2019 incident that they ought not be admissible; and second, that the evidence that the 

State used to prove Woodlin’s 2010 conviction was too “salacious” to be admissible. In 

addition to disputing each of these arguments on their merits, the State also argues that 

Woodlin waived the latter complaint by not raising it at trial.

As to Woodlin’s first argument—that his 2010 conviction was too dissimilar to be 

admissible—we will hold that while there were both similarities and dissimilarities 

between the two offenses, the motions court did not abuse its discretion in admitting

evidence of the prior sexual assault. As to Woodlin’s second argument—that once the 2010 

conviction was determined to be generally admissible, the evidence that the State actually 

1 To protect the privacy of the minor victim in this case, the initials “A.H.” have 

been chosen at random. Neither A.H.’s given name, nor his surname, begins with these 

letters.
2

introduced was too “salacious” to be admissible—we will hold that Woodlin waived this 

argument by failing to preserve it below. Nevertheless, we will provide some comment to 

explain our view that the General Assembly did not intend to allow the admissibility of 

only a mere “bare-bone[s]” reporting of the prior sexually assaultive behavior, but to allow 

the admission of sufficient evidence from which jurors can reasonably compare and 

contrast the current allegations to the prior. We, therefore, affirm Woodlin’s convictions.

FACTS

On September 13, 2019, Woodlin spent the night at the home of his daughter and 

her family, including Woodlin’s eleven-year-old grandson, A.H. After everyone went to 

bed, Woodlin went upstairs to A.H.’s room. At trial, A.H. testified that Woodlin touched his 

“private parts,” pulled down A.H.’s underwear, and put his mouth on A.H.’s penis while he 

held A.H. by the arm and had his hand over A.H.’s mouth. According to A.H., Woodlin also 

put his fingers on and licked A.H.’s buttocks. A.H.’s mother testified that Woodlin left the 

home sometime during the night and called her the next morning crying, claiming that A.H.

had touched him sexually and was “trying to get him locked up.” A.H. later told his aunt 

what had happened, triggering the investigation that followed. 

When questioned by local police, Woodlin denied having been inside his daughter’s 

home that night or ever having spent the night there. Woodlin also denied having had any 

contact with A.H. in years and specifically denied having had any sexual contact with him. 

Woodlin was arrested and charged with child sexual abuse and related sexual offenses. 

Before trial, the State filed a timely motion of intent to introduce evidence of a prior 

conviction for sexual assault under Section 10-923 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings 
3

(“CJ”) Article, seeking to admit evidence that in 2010 Woodlin pleaded guilty to a 

third-degree sexual assault. Pursuant to CJ § 10-923(d), the court held a hearing. Over 

Woodlin’s objection, the motions court ruled that the evidence would be admissible. At 

trial, among other evidence, the State offered, and the court admitted, the testimony of the 

police officer who investigated the 2010 offense, a certified copy of Woodlin’s 2010 

conviction, and substantial portions of the transcript of Woodlin’s 2010 guilty plea 

proceedings.2 The jury ultimately convicted Woodlin of child sexual abuse and related 

offenses. Woodlin subsequently filed this timely appeal.

2 The full transcript introduced at the pretrial hearing was thirty-three pages long

and included references of up to three other criminal charges against Woodlin that do not 

relate to the 2010 sexual offense or otherwise fall under the exception provided by CJ 

§ 10-923. First, the transcript mentions in four places that at the same time Woodlin 

pleaded guilty to the 2010 sexual offense, he also pleaded guilty to a charge of reckless 

endangerment arising out of a different incident. Second, the transcript mentions in two 

places that in exchange for Woodlin’ guilty plea, the State dismissed a third charge “of a 

theft-related nature,” also arising out of a different incident. Third, the transcript includes 

a brief discussion about Woodlin already being “on some type of probation or parole when 

these events happened,” thus raising the prospect that he had been convicted of a third 

unrelated crime. Before offering the transcript into evidence at trial, however, the State 

redacted eleven pages, which included, among other things, details of the reckless 

endangerment charge against Woodlin and what may have been the underlying crime for 

which Woodlin was on probation at the time of the 2010 charges. As a result, the jury had 

access to a detailed description of the 2010 sexual assault, but no details about the other

unrelated charges. The remaining parts of the transcript that were introduced at trial refer 

only to the fact of Woodlin’s conviction for reckless endangerment, the fact that he was 

also charged with theft but that the charge was dismissed in exchange for Woodlin’s guilty 

plea, and the fact that Woodlin had otherwise violated probation or parole. Because we are 

concerned here with what the jury saw, references throughout the rest of this opinion to the 

“transcript” are to the redacted version that was introduced at trial.
4

CJ § 10-923

Because this is among the first convictions to reach the appellate courts using 

evidence made admissible by virtue of CJ § 10-923, and because of its centrality to the 

issues presented, we will begin with an overview of this new statute. 

It is a fundamental principle of our jurisprudence that evidence that “tends to show 

that the accused committed another crime independent of that for which [the accused] is 

on trial, even one of the same type, is inadmissible.” Hurst v. State, 400 Md. 397, 407 

(2007). Evidence of prior crimes is considered propensity evidence in that it suggests that 

the defendant is the type of person who has the propensity to commit this type of crime. 

Thus, evidence of prior crimes was prohibited by the traditional common law rules of 

evidence and, when the Court of Appeals codified our rules of evidence, this prohibition 

was included as Rule 5-404(b), which provides that “[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, 

or other acts ... is not admissible to prove the character of a person ... to show action in 

conformity therewith.” MD. R. 5-404(b). Despite this general rule, however, both the 

common law and the Maryland Rules permit the admission of evidence of prior crimes or 

other bad acts in cases in which the evidence is found to have “special relevance” to a 

contested issue in the case, Hurst, 400 Md. at 407-08, such as proof of “motive, 

opportunity, intent, preparation, common scheme or plan, knowledge, identity, absence of 

mistake or accident.” MD. R. 5-404(b).

In 2018, the General Assembly adopted CJ § 10-923. Acts of 2018, chs. 362, 363.

This new law changes the rules of evidence and makes admissible evidence that was 
5

previously inadmissible regarding prior sexually assaultive behavior.3 As is often the case 

in Maryland statutory law, the gravamen of the statute is found in subsection (b),4 which 

provides that when a defendant is on trial for sexual crimes or sexual abuse, evidence of 

prior “sexually assaultive behavior” can be admissible.5 CJ § 10-923(b). Subsection (a)

defines “sexually assaultive behavior” as (1) all Maryland sexual crimes; (2) sexual abuse 

of a minor; (3) sexual abuse of a vulnerable adult; (4) federal sexual abuse crimes; and 

(5) equivalent sexual crimes in other jurisdictions. CJ § 10-923(a). Subsection (c) requires 

that the State file a motion of intent to introduce evidence of prior sexually assaultive 

3 Under the Maryland Constitution, the General Assembly and the Court of Appeals 

share responsibility for the rules of practice and procedure in Maryland courts. MD.

CONST., Art. IV, § 18(a) (“The Court of Appeals from time to time shall adopt rules and 

regulations concerning the practice and procedure in and the administration of the appellate 

courts and in the other courts of this State, which shall have the force of law until rescinded, 

changed or modified by the Court of Appeals or otherwise by law.”) (emphasis added); 

Murphy, et al. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., ___ Md. ___, No. 005, Sept. Term 2021, 

Slip Op. at 2-3 (Apr. 27, 2022); see also Johnson v. Swann, 314 Md. 285, 289-90 (1988) 

(noting both that “the legislature may rescind, change, or modify a rule promulgated by the 

Court of Appeals,” and that a Rule will supersede an inconsistent prior-enacted statute 

unless and until a subsequent statute repeals or modifies the Rule). Thus, while the Court 

of Appeals drafted Rule 5-404(b), the General Assembly was acting within its power to 

modify that Rule by law, which it did in adopting CJ § 10-923. The Court of Appeals, as is 

its right, then chose to revise Rule 5-404(b) to conform to CJ § 10-923. 

4 See DEP’T OF LEG. SERV., MARYLAND STYLE MANUAL FOR STATUTORY LAW ch. 

16 at 63 (Oct. 2018) (representing that in the standard organization of a statute, 

“definitions” and “rules of construction” ordinarily appear before “legislative policy”); see

also id. ch. 9 at 33 (requiring placement of definitions “at the beginning of the smallest 

statutory unit”).

5 Because the sexually assaultive behavior at issue here occurred prior to the 2019 

incident giving rise to the current charges, we refer throughout this opinion to “prior

sexually assaultive behavior.” We note, however, that the statute allows for the admission 

of “other sexually assaultive behavior” which can occur either before or after the charged 

offense. CJ § 10-923(b).
6

behavior. In the motion, the State must describe the evidence it intends to rely on to prove 

the prior sexually assaultive behavior. CJ § 10-923(c). And subsection (d) requires the court 

to hold a hearing as to the admissibility of the evidence of the prior sexually assaultive 

behavior. CJ § 10-923(d). Finally, subsection (e) allows the court to admit evidence of that 

prior sexually assaultive behavior if the court finds and states on the record that:

(1) The evidence is being offered to:

(i) Prove lack of consent; or

(ii) Rebut an express or implied allegation that a

minor victim fabricated the sexual offense;

(2) The defendant had an opportunity to confront and

cross-examine the witness or witnesses testifying to the

sexually assaultive behavior;

(3) The sexually assaultive behavior was proven by clear

and convincing evidence; and

(4) The probative value of the evidence is not substantially

outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.

CJ § 10-923(e). The fourth element of the test—that the “probative value ... is not

substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice”—appears to us consciously to

echo identical language in Rule 5-403.6 Absent evidence to the contrary, we assume that

the General Assembly intended also to invoke the existing body of case law interpreting

this phrase.7

6 The text of Rule 5-403 provides: “Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if 

its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion 

of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or 

needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” MD. R. 5-403 (emphasis added).

7 The legislative history of CJ § 10-923 further supports our conclusion that the 

General Assembly intended for us to interpret the phrase “probative value is [not]

substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice” to mean the same thing in CJ
7

DISCUSSION

As noted above, Woodlin’s appeal requires us to consider two primary issues 

regarding the application of CJ § 10-923 to his case: (1) whether his 2010 conviction was 

sufficiently similar to the charged offense so as to allow its admission; and (2) whether the 

evidence used to prove the 2010 conviction was too “salacious” to be admitted.

8

I. SUFFICIENT SIMILARITY

Pursuant to CJ § 10-923(c), the State filed a timely motion of intent to introduce 

evidence of Woodlin’s 2010 conviction. In that motion, the State indicated that it intended 

to prove the 2010 conviction through the testimony of the investigating police officer, a 

certified copy of the conviction, and the transcript of Woodlin’s guilty plea proceedings. 

The motions court held a pretrial hearing, pursuant to CJ § 10-923(d), at which the State 

identified that in 2010 Woodlin pleaded guilty to third-degree sexual assault for inserting 

§ 10-923(e)(4) as it means in Rule 5-403. For example, Senate Bill 270 (which became CJ 

§ 10-923) initially required that “the probative value of the evidence is not substantially 

outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” 2018 S.B. 270 First Reader (Jan. 22, 2018), 

available at https://perma.cc/46LM-BRVR. The bill was amended to instead require that 

“evidence meets the requirements of Maryland Rule 5-403.” 2018 S.B. 270 Third Reader 

(Mar. 14, 2018), available at https://perma.cc/JP52-MTNS. As noted supra n.6, Rule 5-403 

contains the same language. Finally, the bill was amended back to the original language. 

2018 House Judiciary Committee Amendments to S.B. 270 (Mar. 27, 2018), available at 

https://perma.cc/68CF-YGU5. Although the General Assembly appears to have considered 

and reconsidered how to draw the connection between CJ § 10-923(e)(4) and Rule 5-403, 

we gather that a connection was intended. 

8 Woodlin’s brief presents just one question on appeal: “Did the trial court [abuse] 

its discretion in admitting into evidence the facts and details surrounding [Woodlin’s] 2010 

conviction for third degree sexual offense under [CJ] § 10-923?” Because we find it

necessary to treat the admission of the facts of Woodlin’s 2010 conviction separately from

the admission of the allegedly “salacious” detail, we have rephrased Woodlin’s one 

question as two.
8

a broomstick handle and vacuum hose into the rectum of an unconscious man. At that 

pretrial hearing, Woodlin argued that for evidence of prior sexually assaultive behavior to 

have probative value, and therefore be admissible under CJ § 10-923, it must be similar to 

the offense charged. Woodlin further argued that evidence of his 2010 conviction was so 

dissimilar from the alleged 2019 offense against A.H. that any probative value was 

substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, and that the evidence was, 

therefore, inadmissible.

9

In response, the State argued that there is no requirement that the 

two offenses be similar in nature, and that even if there were such a requirement, the two 

offenses here were sufficiently similar that the probative value was not outweighed by the 

danger of unfair prejudice. The motions court agreed with the State and found on the record 

that the prerequisites of section 10-923 were satisfied, including that “the nature of th[e 

2010] offense ... is consistent enough with the offense here ... that the probative value is 

not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” It is this finding under CJ 

§ 10-923(e)(4) that Woodlin challenges on appeal. 

As a legal matter, we must first determine what role the similarity or dissimilarity 

between the offenses plays in balancing probative value against the danger of unfair 

prejudice. Only then, as a factual matter, can we determine whether the probative value of 

evidence of Woodlin’s 2010 conviction was substantially outweighed by the danger of 

9 At the pretrial hearing, and again at trial, Woodlin also argued that because he 

pleaded guilty in 2010 rather than go to trial, he hadn’t “had an opportunity to confront and 

cross-examine the witness or witnesses testifying to the sexually assaultive behavior,” as 

is required by CJ § 10-923(e)(2). Woodlin did not argue this issue on appeal, however, so 

we do not reach it here.
9

unfair prejudice. In doing so, we are mindful that we review the motions court’s decision 

balancing these competing interests for abuse of discretion. Wagner v. State, 213 Md. App. 

419, 454 (2013) (citing State v. Simms, 420 Md. 705, 725 (2011) (applying abuse of 

discretion standard when reviewing a trial court’s balancing of the probative value of 

evidence against the danger of unfair prejudice under Rule 5-403). As we have often 

explained:

A ruling reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard will 

not be reversed simply because the appellate court would not 

have made the same ruling. Rather, the decision under 

consideration has to be well removed from any center mark 

imagined by the reviewing court and beyond the fringe of what 

that court deems minimally acceptable.

Wagner, 213 Md. App. at 454 (cleaned up). 

As in the context of Rule 5-403, courts determining whether to admit evidence of 

prior sexually assaultive behavior must engage in a balancing of “the proponent’s need to 

introduce the challenged evidence against the danger that this evidence would unfairly 

prejudice the party objecting to it.” JOSEPH F. MURPHY, JR. & ERIN C. MURPHY,

MARYLAND EVIDENCE HANDBOOK § 506[B] at 229 (5th ed. 2020). In so doing, the 

question is not simply whether the evidence results in prejudice to the defendant, but rather 

whether the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs any probative value:

[E]vidence is never excluded merely because it is 

“prejudicial.” If prejudice were the test, no evidence would 

ever be admitted. The parties have a right to introduce 

prejudicial evidence. Probative value is outweighed by the 

danger of “unfair” prejudice when the evidence produces such 

an emotional response that logic cannot overcome prejudice or 

sympathy needlessly injected into the case.
10

MURPHY & MURPHY, § 506[B] at 230; see also 5 LYNN MCLAIN, MARYLAND EVIDENCE,

STATE & FEDERAL § 403:1(b) at 650-51 (3d ed. 2013). 

A. Similarity Under CJ § 10-923(e)(4)

The first question we must address on appeal is what role the similarity or 

dissimilarity of the offenses plays in balancing probative value against the danger of unfair

prejudice under CJ § 10-923(e)(4). Woodlin argues that “similarity or dissimilarity of the 

prior offense to the crime for which the defendant is on trial is critical to a determination 

of whether the probative value of the prior crime substantially outweighs its danger of 

undue prejudice, and hence to its admission.” For its part, the State argues that CJ § 10-923 

does not require that the two offenses be “of a substantially similar nature,” but nonetheless 

concedesthat similarity is a factor that courts may consider when balancing probative value 

and the danger of unfair prejudice. 

We hold that the similarity or dissimilarity of the offenses is relevant to the question 

of admissibility under CJ § 10-923(e)(4). Courts must consider whether and how similar 

the two instances of sexually assaultive behavior actually are when determining whether 

“[t]he probative value of the evidence is not substantially outweighed by the danger of 

unfair prejudice.” CJ § 10-923(e)(4). The more similar the prior sexually assaultive 

behavior is to the charged offense, the more probative of propensity it is, and the less 

unfairly prejudicial. Conversely, the more dissimilar the prior sexually assaultive behavior 
11

is to the charged offense, the less probative of propensity it is, and the more unfairly 

prejudicial.10

B. Similarity Between Woodlin’s 2010 Conviction and the 2019 Allegations 

Having determined that the question of similarity is necessarily a part of the 

balancing between probative value and unfairly prejudicial effect under CJ § 10-923(e)(4), 

we further hold that the facts of Woodlin’s 2010 conviction and the 2019 allegations 

involving A.H. were sufficiently similar that the motions court’s decision to admit the 2010 

conviction did not constitute an abuse of discretion. The motions court acknowledged its 

duty to balance the competing interests and heard arguments from the parties on the relative 

value and danger of admitting the evidence. The motions court recognized that there were 

differences between the two offenses but focused on the lack of consent in both, ultimately 

10 We stop short, however, of engrafting onto this balancing test a requirement that 

courts consider a set list of factors, as Woodlin urges us to do. In enacting CJ § 10-923, the 

General Assembly considered but then deleted language that would have imposed a 

factor-specific rule. Compare 2018 H.B. 301 First Reader (Jan. 22, 2018), available at 

https://perma.cc/LJ8N-75UR (requiring courts to consider the following: “(1) [w]hether 

the issue for which the evidence of the sexually assaultive behavior is being offered is in 

dispute; (2) [t]he similarity between the sexually assaultive behavior and the sexual offense 

for which the defendant is on trial; (3) [t]he closeness in time of the sexually assaultive 

behavior and the sexual offenses for which the defendant is on trial; and (4) [t]he 

independence of the sexually assaultive behavior from the sexual offense for which the 

defendant is on trial”), with 2018 H.B. 301 Third Reader (Mar. 13, 2018), available at 

https://perma.cc/73JA-GNGV (omitting these factors). Given the General Assembly’s 

conscious choice to omit a set list of factors it would be inappropriate for us to do that 

which the General Assembly specifically rejected. Moreover, in our view, given the 

operation of Article IV, § 18(a) of the Maryland Constitution, if there is to be a modification 

of the rules of practice and procedure, it must come from the Court of Appeals, not an 

inferior tribunal. See supra n.3.
12

determining that the 2010 offense “is consistent enough with the offense here [that] the 

probative value is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” 

Our review of the record reveals that there was evidence to support both sides of 

this argument. On the one hand, as the State argued, the 2010 offense and the 2019 offense 

could reasonably be characterized as similar because both involved vulnerable, male 

victims who were unable to consent, and both involved an “assault on the victim’s anal 

area.” On the other hand, as Woodlin argued, the two offenses could also reasonably be 

characterized as dissimilar because one involved an adult victim incapable of consent 

because he was unconscious while the other involved a child victim incapable of consent 

because of his age, and one involved anal penetration with foreign objects while the other 

involved anal touching and licking. Given the evidence on both sides, we cannot say that 

the motions court’s decision to put the evidence to the jury was “well removed from any 

center mark” or “beyond the fringe of what [we deem] minimally acceptable.” Wagner, 

213 Md. App. at 454. We, therefore, hold that the motions court did not abuse its discretion 

in admitting evidence of Woodlin’s 2010 conviction.11

11 This is not to suggest, of course, that any other sexually assaultive behavior is 

probative of a defendant’s propensity to commit any other sexual assault. There may indeed 

be cases where offenses are so dissimilar that any probative value would be substantially 

outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Moreover, in this case, there was limited 

evidence on which to base the determination. In future cases, expert testimony may help to 

establish a more robust basis for determining similarities and dissimilarities, especially in 

matters outside the courts’ experience and comfort, such as the likely comorbidity of the 

paraphilias involved.
13

II. ALLEGEDLY “SALACIOUS” DETAIL

Woodlin’s second argument on appeal assumes that even if the fact of his prior 

conviction is admissible, the trial court nevertheless abused its discretion by admitting “the 

inflammatory and dissimilar parts of that conviction which were not at all relevant to [the 

allegation] but were sure to rouse the jury’s hostility.” According to Woodlin, the police 

officer’s testimony and the guilty plea transcript contained “salacious” detail about the 

prior sexual assault that “should have been excluded from the trial testimony and ... 

redacted from any transcript presented to the jury.” The State, for its part, argues that 

Woodlin waived this argument by not seeking at the motions hearings or during trial to 

limit the evidence to be admitted. Even if the argument was not waived, the State argues 

that the evidence presented was not unfairly prejudicial.

Pursuant to CJ § 10-923(c), the State included with its motion of intent a description 

of the evidence it planned to introduce to prove the conviction: testimony from the 

investigating police officer; a certified copy of the conviction; and the transcript from the 

guilty plea hearing. The certified copy of Woodlin’s conviction is brief, simply listing the 

plea, disposition, and sentence for each charge as well as the associated docket entries. The 

police officer’s testimony, too, was, as the State characterizes it, “brief and bare-bone[s].” 

At the 2019 trial, the totality of the police officer’s testimony about the 2010 sexual assault

was as follows: 

STATE: Can you tell us what your investigation 

revealed?

DEF. COUNSEL: I object.

THE COURT: Overruled.
14

OFFICER: The investigation concluded that 

[Woodlin] had sexual contact with 

another male individual, had placed, I 

believe, a broomstick and a vacuum hose 

inside the individual’s rectum while he 

was unconscious by some form of 

intoxicant or another.

STATE: And this was an adult male?

OFFICER: Yes, ma’am.

STATE: Was there photographic evidence of this 

that was recovered as part of your 

investigation?

OFFICER: Yes, ma’am, from --

DEF. COUNSEL: I object.

THE COURT: Overruled.

OFFICER: From [Woodlin]’s cell phone.

No more detail about the assault was provided. By contrast, twenty-two pages of the 

transcript from the guilty plea proceeding were admitted at the 2019 trial, including four 

pages of potentially prejudicial details about the 2010 assault, such as: (1) details of the 

victim’s injuries, including that “there was trauma to the rectal area and ... severe bruising 

in the hips and back area” requiring the victim to be flown to Shock Trauma; (2) Woodlin’s 

statement to a witness “that he was ‘going to get that asshole,’ referring to [the victim’s] 

rectum”;12 (3) statements from a witness to events after the assault, including that she 

believed that Woodlin “had assaulted [the victim] prior to this one occasion”; and 

12 We note that although the transcript says that when Woodlin said he was “going 

to get that asshole” the witness understood him to mean the victim’s rectum, we aren’t quite 

convinced and think he may just have meant it in its derogatory slang meaning, as if he 

said, “I’m going to get that jerk.” We need not resolve that conflict.
15

(4) statements from the victim that he believed Woodlin “must have put pills into his 

drink.” 

The record shows that Woodlin was provided the transcript of the 2010 guilty plea 

proceeding in advance of the pretrial hearing, at the pretrial hearing, and again when it was 

entered as evidence at trial. Despite having access to what he now calls “inflammatory and 

dissimilar [facts that] were not at all relevant ... but were sure to rouse the jury’s hostility,” 

Woodlin failed to bring either the motions or trial court’s attention to this “salacious” detail 

that he now claims the motions court and the trial court should have limited or redacted. 

We will, therefore, agree with the State and find that Woodlin waived this argument. 

Moreover, even if Woodlin had properly preserved the argument, we would find that neither 

the motions court nor the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the details that they 

did. We explain.

A. Failure to Preserve

Under Maryland Rule 8-131(a), “[o]rdinarily, [this] court will not decide any ... 

issue unless it plainly appears by the record to have been raised in or decided by the trial 

court.” MD. R. 8-131(a). The purpose of this rule of preservation is, in part, “to require 

counsel to bring the position of their client to the attention of the lower court at the trial so 

that the trial court can pass upon, and possibly correct any errors in the proceedings.” 

Robinson v. State, 404 Md. 208, 216-17 (2008). Under the contemporaneous objection rule, 

“[a]n objection to the admission of evidence shall be made at the time the evidence is 

offered or as soon thereafter as the grounds for objection become apparent. Otherwise, the 

objection is waived.” MD. R. 4-323(a). When, as here, an objection is initially raised in a 
16

pretrial motion, and the pretrial ruling results in the admission of evidence, the objection 

must be renewed at trial to preserve the issue for appeal. Reed v. State, 353 Md. 628, 643 

(1999). While a general objection to evidentiary issues is sufficient to preserve all grounds 

of appeal on that objection, Cousar v. State, 198 Md. App. 486, 511 n.18 (2011), once a 

general objection to the admission of evidence is overruled, a party seeking to redact or 

otherwise limit the scope of the evidence admitted must “raise the issue to the judge.” 

Belton v. State, 152 Md. App. 623, 634 (2003) (holding that the trial court did not err in 

playing an audiotape in its entirety when the defendant failed to request a redaction or 

limitation after his general objection to the admission of the tape was overruled); see also

Colkley v. State, 251 Md. App. 243, 282-83 (2021) (holding that “general objections will 

not suffice” to properly raise the issue of redaction); Streater v. State, 352 Md. 800, 824-25 

(1999) (Raker, J., dissenting) (finding it unfair to require a trial judge to, sua sponte, 

recognize that a generally admissible document contains potentially inadmissible parts). 

But see Streater, 352 Md. at 805 n.4 (presuming that petitioner’s objection to the document 

as a whole was sufficient to preserve objection to its potentially inadmissible parts because 

Court of Appeals denied certiorari on question of preservation). 

Here, Woodlin never raised the issue of redaction or otherwise limiting the scope 

of the evidence admitted to the pretrial motions judge. Instead, his pretrial objections 

focused on the general admissibility of any evidence of the 2010 offense. Later, Woodlin 

sought clarification about what specifically would be allowed into evidence,

13 but again 

13 This occurred at a hearing on Woodlin’s Motion to Reconsider the motions court’s 

decision to admit evidence of the 2010 conviction.
17

did not object to the scope of the evidence offered or otherwise alert the motions court to 

the potentially inadmissible details embedded within the transcript:

DEF. COUNSEL: I will just be asking, whatever the Court’s 

ruling, ... for a little bit further direction 

... and I think [the State] agrees with me 

that some direction from the Court would 

be helpful. What information ..., if the 

Court’s going to permit it, what 

specifically is going to be able to be 

admitted as opposed to just saying 

information from the case can be 

admitted[?]

THE COURT: Well, let’s maybe clarify what exactly is 

the State seeking to introduce?

STATE: What I had laid out in the [motion] for the 

[CJ §] 10-923 was the State’s intent to 

introduce and use the transcript of the plea 

itself and that was introduced at the 

hearing. And I think probably the easiest 

way to proceed in that way is through the 

detective, who can provide testimony of 

his investigation itself, and then introduce 

the transcript of the plea. ...

THE COURT: When you say testimony of his 

investigation. How far down the rabbit 

hole are we going with that?

STATE: I think I would only limit it to essentially 

what’s contained within the transcript, ... 

rather than simply introducing the 

transcript, rather having him summarize 

what [Woodlin pleaded] guilty to, which 

is the contents of his investigation.

THE COURT: So basically it’s introduction of the 

transcript and him testifying in terms of 

the facts that are alleged in the transcript. 

STATE: Yes.

* * *
18

THE COURT: Okay. [Counsel], do you have anything 

further to add?

DEF. COUNSEL: No. It at least clarifies for me what it is the 

State’s seeking. I’ll re[-]object at the 

appropriate time, but I would ask the 

Court to make a ruling in limine or to 

reconsider its ruling in limine.

* * *

THE COURT: All right. Well, ... the Court’s going to 

deny the request to reconsider. 

At trial, Woodlin repeatedly objected to the testimony of the investigating police 

officer as well as to the admission of both the certified copy of the conviction and the

transcript of the guilty plea proceedings. But when the trial court sought to clarify that the 

transcript being offered had already been ruled admissible by the motions judge, Woodlin 

again failed to object to the scope of the evidence offered. Instead, Woodlin objected again 

only to the general admission of any evidence of the 2010 conviction. Indeed, the only 

basis Woodlin provided for his objection was his inability to cross-examine the witnesses, 

a basis he has abandoned here:

14

THE COURT: Where are you going with this?

STATE: Your Honor, this was the subject of the 

[CJ §] 10-923 hearing that we already had 

where the Court granted the State the 

ability to introduce the evidence that 

relates to the investigation from 2010 by 

way of a transcript of his actual plea and 

then the true test of his conviction.

THE COURT: Okay. This was already ruled on?

STATE: So it was already ruled on. There was a 

motion to reconsider that was also denied. 

14 See supra n.9. 
19

I’m only limiting ... the [investigating 

police officer’s] testimony to the contents 

of the transcript which is what [Woodlin

pleaded] guilty to.

THE COURT: And that was the subject of the prior 

hearing --

STATE: Yes, it was --

THE COURT: -- before another judge?

STATE: -- and it’s to rebut the implication that the 

child victim is fabricating the allegation.

DEF. COUNSEL: And I want to make this clear to this 

Court. ... [N]either [Woodlin] nor I have 

ever had an opportunity to cross-examine 

the individual who is the alleged victim in 

this case. It never happened before. It 

didn’t happen here. The alleged victim in 

that case is deceased. So just advising the 

Court I’m going to have to just keep 

saying I object a lot.

THE COURT: All right. Overruled.

Because Woodlin failed at both the motions stage and at trial to object to the scope of the 

evidence offered or otherwise raise the issue of redaction to the judge, we hold that he has 

waived this argument on appeal.15

15 Woodlin also attempts to avoid waiver by asserting that a CJ § 10-923 hearing is 

more like a suppression hearing than a hearing on a motion in limine because the 

admissibility of the sexual propensity evidence is definitively decided before trial. As in 

the case of a suppression hearing, Woodlin argues, no additional objection at trial should 

be necessary. See MD. R. 4-252(h)(2)(C) (“If the court denies a motion to suppress 

evidence, the ruling is binding at the trial unless the court, on the motion of a defendant 

and in the exercise of its discretion, grants a supplemental hearing or a hearing de novo and 

rules otherwise.”). This argument, however, ignores two important points. First, Woodlin 

did not raise the issue of redaction or recommend redactions at the motions hearing either. 

And second, even in the case of a denial of a motion to suppress, defense counsel can, and 

should, still object at trial to inadmissible parts of an otherwise admissible item of evidence.
20

B. Scope of the Details Admitted

Even if Woodlin had preserved his objection to the court’s failure to redact the 

“salacious” details, we would find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by 

admitting details about the 2010 conviction. We explain.

While the General Assembly clearly intended for evidence of the prior sexually 

assaultive behavior to be admissible, it did not tell us how much evidence. Woodlin argues 

that the General Assembly meant only for the jury to be informed of the fact of the prior 

conviction. The State, without specifying exactly how much evidence should be admitted, 

argues that the details admitted here were not unfairly prejudicial. While the precise 

contours must be decided on a case-by-case basis by circuit courts, we hold that it is 

insufficient merely to admit the fact of the prior conviction. Instead, we hold that circuit 

courts16 must admit sufficient factual detail of the prior sexually assaultive behavior to 

allow the jurors to compare and contrast the current allegations with the prior sexually 

assaultive behavior to determine for themselves whether and to what extent the prior 

sexually assaultive behavior is probative—or not—as to whether the defendant committed 

the act for which they are on trial.

Because there are as yet no cases interpreting the scope of what is admissible under 

CJ §10-923, in coming to this determination we have looked for guidance to the closest 

16 We are careful not to assign this task more specifically to the judges at either the 

CJ §10-923(d) motions hearing or at trial. Rather, we expect that, as with motions in limine, 

a motions judge may, but is not required to, give preliminary guidance on what may or may 

not be admitted, subject to refinement at trial by the trial judge when confronted by the 

actual evidence.
21

analogies, the federal sexual propensity exceptions,

17 and other Maryland exceptions to the 

general prohibition against prior crimes evidence under Rule 5-404(b).

18 For instance, we

think this case is analogous to Cousar v. State, in which we held, pursuant to Maryland

Rule 5-404(b), that the detailed circumstances of a prior sexual assault were “reasonably 

necessary” to establish the relevance of that assault. 198 Md. App. at 511, 514 (internal 

citations omitted) (concluding that details like that the defendant “contacted [the victim] 

for sexually related activity, produced a gun, and demanded oral sex of [the victim] with 

the results of the defecation remaining in her mouth” were “reasonably necessary” to 

demonstrate the non-accidental nature of the charged sexual assault). Similarly, in U.S. v. 

LeMay, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in applying Federal Rule 414 said, “the 

relevance of the prior act evidence [is] in the details.” 260 F.3d 1018, 1029 (9th Cir. 2001). 

In LeMay, the Ninth Circuit rejected the argument that the district court should have limited 

the prosecution to merely proving the fact of the defendant’s prior conviction for rape, and 

instead held that testimony of an “emotional and highly charged nature” about the 

17 Federal Rules of Evidence 413 and 414 provide that in a criminal case in which a 

defendant is accused of a sexual assault or child molestation, a federal court may admit 

evidence that the defendant committed any other sexual assault or child molestation. FED.

R. EVID. 413(a), 414(a).

18 Rule 5-404(b) provides for exceptions to the general prohibition against evidence 

of other crimes, wrongs, or acts if the evidence is used for another purpose, “such as proof 

of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, common scheme or plan, knowledge, identity, 

absence of mistake or accident.” MD. R. 5-404(b). As of 2019, this list now also includes 

the exception for evidence of prior sexually assaultive behavior (by reference to MD. R. 

5-413, which adopted this exception into the Maryland Rules). Because the Court of 

Appeals saw fit to group these exceptions together, it is appropriate to look to the admission 

of other Rule 5-404(b) evidence for guidance.
22

defendant’s conviction for “sexually abusing his young relatives, by forced oral copulation, 

while they were in his care” was “necessary to fill in the details that made the prior rape 

conviction relevant.” Id. at 1029-30.

Here, too, for the jurors to be able to determine how probative Woodlin’s 2010 

conviction was of the likelihood that he sexually abused A.H. in 2019, they had to know 

something about the similarity or dissimilarity between the offenses. Some degree of detail 

was, therefore, necessary to establish a factual basis on which the jury could compare and 

contrast the current allegations with the prior sexually assaultive behavior. Moreover, were 

we to omit the potentially prejudicial details that establish the relevance of prior sexually 

assaultive behavior, we might, in fact invite the jury to assume the worst. Without details, 

jurors would be left to speculate as to the nature and circumstances of the offense and could

draw all manner of conclusions. As in LeMay and Cousar, “[e]stablishing the simple fact 

of conviction” would not have been enough. See id.; Cousar, 198 Md. App. at 514. 

For these reasons, we hold that even if Woodlin had properly preserved his objection 

to the scope of the evidence admitted at trial, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

admitting what Woodlin refers to as the “salacious” detail of the prior sexually assaultive 

behavior.19

19 As noted in footnote 2, above, our review of the transcript from the guilty plea 

proceeding also revealed that the transcript referenced up to three other unrelated criminal 

charges against Woodlin: reckless endangerment, theft, and a violation of probation or 

parole. See supra n.2. There is no theory that would make this evidence admissible. It 

would generally be error for a trial court to admit such evidence and any such erroneous 

admission would be reversible unless this Court could declare a belief, beyond a reasonable 

doubt, that the error was harmless. Hurst, 400 Md. at 418. Woodlin, however, failed to 

bring this evidence to the attention of the motions court, the trial court, or this Court. Given 
23

CONCLUSION

In summary, we hold that: (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting 

evidence of Woodlin’s 2010 conviction; and (2) Woodlin’s argument that the court should 

have redacted the “salacious” detail was not properly preserved and, thus, waived, but also 

meritless, as jurors need sufficient detail to compare and contrast the offenses. For these 

reasons, we affirm Woodlin’s conviction.

JUDGMENTS OF THE CIRCUIT COURT 

FOR WICOMICO COUNTY ARE

AFFIRMED. COSTS TO BE PAID BY 

APPELLANT.

his failure to raise the issue, we do not reach the question of whether the trial court’s error 

in admitting evidence of these three unrelated criminal charges was harmless or whether it 

would be grounds for reversal of his conviction. 
The correction notice(s) for this opinion(s) can be found here: 

https://mdcourts.gov/sites/default/files/import/appellate/correctionnotices/cosa/0107s21cn.pdf