BALIK-TERRORISM:

THE RETURN OF THE ABU SAYYAF

Zachary Abuza

September 2005

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 The author would like to thank John Dacey for his rigorous review of the 

manuscript and thoughtful comments. He would also like to thank Simon 

Elegant of Time Magazine, Anthony Davis of Janes Defense Weekly, and three senior 

Philippine intelligence officials who asked to remain nameless for their help. 

This research was made possible by a generous grant from the Smith Richardson 

Foundation. The author is grateful to Eugene Martin and John Crist of the United 

States Institute of Peace for their support in the writing of this study.

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iii

FOREWORD

 Since early 2002, U.S. forces have provided training and intelligence support to members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines 

(AFP) as a component of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. The 

AFP have been engaged in combat with the Abu Sayyaf, a group 

previously known for its brutal, though hardly political, kidnappings. 

Though “Abu Sayyaf” is usually proceeded with the words the “al 

Qaeda-linked,” there was little tangible evidence of such a link from 

the mid-1990s to 2002. From its founding in 1991 by Afghan veteran 

Abdurrajak Janjalani through Ramzi Yousef’s Bojinka Plot in 1995, 

the links were clear and convincing. However, in 2002, the leaders 

of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), al Qaeda’s regional affiliate responsible 

for the bombings of the Sari Nightclub in Bali (October 2002), the 

J. W. Marriott Hotel (August 2003), and the Australian Embassy 

(September 2004), were reeling from a number of arrests and 

setbacks. JI’s leadership ordered their Mindanao-based operatives 

to restore ties to the Abu Sayaaf. Since then, the group has waged a 

steady and consistent campaign of urban terrorism. Though they are 

not the greatest threat to Philippine security, they have the ability to 

create economic instability. Their terrorist capabilities have steadily 

improved. 

 The conflict against the Abu Sayyaf is complicated by the 

ongoing peace process between the Moro Islamic Liberation Front 

(MILF), a 10,000-12,000 man strong insurgent force fighting for an 

independent Islamic state since 1978, and the Government of the 

Republic of the Philippines (GRP). The MILF had clear ties to al 

Qaeda beginning in the late 1980s when they dispatched troops to 

Afghanistan for training. Later, the MILF availed itself to al Qaeda 

by opening their camps to al Qaeda trainers and members of JI. 

Although the MILF deny these ties, they persist to this day. MILF 

members provide training and sanctuary to JI members, giving the 

terrorist organization resiliency. For the MILF, it is a show of Islamic 

solidarity, as well as a hedge, should the peace process fail. But the 

Abu Sawaf Group (ASG) has taken advantage of this. Members 

have moved into MILF-controlled regions and are trained in MILF 
iv

camps alongside JI members. The MILF uses the ASG when it needs 

plausible deniability and cover for its terrorist operations. At some 

point, it becomes impossible to clearly distinguish between these 

groups: ASG members may perpetrate the terrorist act, often with 

the help of MILF or JI members; they were trained in MILF camps 

by Indonesian JI instructors. The Philippine government downplays 

this triangular relationship, for fear of upsetting the peace process of 

the MILF, limiting U.S. policy options. Yet, the mutual relationship 

between the groups has given JI a new lease on life, and perpetuated 

the terrorist threat to the region. 

 This monograph provides an in-depth analysis of the ASG and 

the triangular relationship between them, the MILF and JI. It seeks 

to understand the regional impact that this group’s resurgence will 

have on the war on terror in Southeast Asia, and the impact on 

America and her allies. The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to 

offer this monograph as part of the ongoing debate on global and 

regional security.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director

Strategic Studies Institute 
v

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

ZACHARY ABUZA is currently a Senior Fellow at the United States 

Institute of Peace (USIP) and Associate Professor of Political Science 

at Simmons College, Boston. Dr. Abuza specializes in Southeast 

Asian politics and security issues. He is the author of Militant Islam in 

Southeast Asia (2003) and Renovating Politics in Contemporary Vietnam

(2001). He has also authored two studies for the National Bureau 

of Asian Research, Funding Terrorism in Southeast Asia: The Financial 

Network of Al Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiya, NBR Analysis (2003); and 

Muslims, Politics and Violence in Indonesia, NBR Analysis (2004). Dr. 

Abuza is currently undertaking a major study of the Moro Islamic 

Liberation Front under support from USIP and the Smith Richardson 

Foundation. He is also working on two separate studies on the Abu 

Sayyaf Group and the insurgency in Southern Thailand. He consults 

widely and is a frequent commentator in the press. Dr. Abuza 

received his MALD and Ph.D. from the Fletcher School of Law and 

Diplomacy. 

vii

SUMMARY

 The Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) has re-emerged as one of the 

more important terrorist groups confronting the Government of 

the Republic of the Philippines (GRP), the United States, and our 

allies in Southeast Asia. Founded in 1991 by Abdurrajak Janjalani, 

a veteran of the Afghan Mujiheddin and colleague of Osama bin 

Laden, the group quickly rose to prominence as a lethal terrorist 

organization committed to the establishment of an independent 

Islamic state. With funds from Saudi charities administered by 

bin Laden’s brother-in-law, Mohammad Jamal Khalifa, the ASG 

grew quickly. The group focused its terrorist, assassination, and 

kidnapping efforts on sectarian targets. Yet, following the plot led 

by Ramzi Yousef and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed to blow up 11 U.S. 

jetliners and assassinate the Pope, Khalifa’s and the ASG’s roles were 

uncovered. 

 Khalifa was unable to return to the Philippines, and while his 

charities remained open, they were unable to support the larger Moro 

Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the ASG as they had in the past. 

The ASG was further weakened by a number of arrests and the death 

of their founder in December 1998. The group quickly degenerated 

into a number of violent, though hardly political, kidnappers. The 

group gained international notoriety in 2000 with high-profile raids 

on diving resorts in Palawan and Sipidan, Malaysia, which led to the 

deaths of several tourists, including Americans. The 2000 kidnapping 

of the Burnhams, along with the group’s previous connections with 

al Qaeda, were the the cassus belli for the U.S. military to re-engage 

in the Philippines following the September 11, 2001, attacks by al 

Qaeda.

 Philippine President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo pledged close 

support for Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, and with that came 

considerable military assistance and training, beginning in early 

2002. U.S. forces provided training and intelligence support for the 

Armed Forces of the Philippines, while U.S. naval engineers engaged 

in popular civic action campaign in Basilan. 

 The ASG struck back in October 2002, detonating a bomb that 

killed a U.S. Special Forces Officer. Since then, it dramatically cut 
viii

back on its kidnappings, while at the same time began to engage 

in a systematic campaign of terrorism. In February 2004, ASG 

operatives blew up a SuperFerry out of Manila, killing 194 people. 

On Valentine’s Day, 2005, they executed a triple bombing across 

three cities. ASG members have engaged in a number of other attacks 

while several others have been disrupted. 

 Why the shift back to terrorism? This author contends that it was 

the confluence of internal and external factors. Internally, there was 

a change in leadership within the organization. Abu Sabaya and 

Ghalib Andang, the leaders most responsible for the kidnappings, 

had been killed and captured, respectively. This allowed Khadaffy 

Janjalani, the younger brother of the group’s founder, to consolidate 

his leadership and bring the organization back to its roots. The ASG 

was also trying to benefit from the ongoing peace process between the 

GRP and the MILF. The ASG began to search for hardline members 

of the MILF, who were sure to reject an autonomy agreement with 

the government. 

 Other factors were also at work. In 2002, the leaders of al Qaeda’s 

regional affiliate, Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), were reeling from a number 

of arrests of operatives that had occurred around the region. That 

year they decided to forge closer ties with the ASG and invited them 

to begin training with JI within the MILF’s camps in Mindanao. The 

ASG readily agreed. While the MILF publicly denies the relationship 

with both the ASG and JI, a number of arrests in the Philippines, 

Malaysia, and Indonesia of key JI suspects confirms that the training 

of JI recruits in Mindanao has continued. Moreover, in a number of 

terrorist incidents that have transpired in the past 2 years, it has been 

all but impossible to differentiate between the groups: JI members 

provide training to MILF and ASG members in MILF camps. 

Members of the MILF and ASG engage in joint terrorist operations. 

 Despite their denials to the contrary, considerable evidence 

suggests that the MILF continues to coddle JI and ASG members. 

However, as the MILF is currently engaged in a peace process with 

the GRP, the Philippine government continues to give them the 

benefit of the doubt and has resisted pressure from the United States 

to follow a harsher line against them. 

 The ASG remains of concern for a number of reasons. The first is 

their willingness to engage in indiscriminant violence against civilian 
ix

targets and the increases in their technical capacity. On two occasions 

now, JI blueprints for larger truck bombs have been discovered. The 

second is their public call for greater sectarian violence. This is very 

much in line with JI’s strategy of fomenting sectarian violence in the 

Malukus and Sulawesi, Indonesia, where a fragile peace is holding. 

This also ties in with the ASG’s original strategy that they followed 

in 1991-95. Third, the ASG has taken advantage of the Balik Islam 

(Christian converts to Islam) networks. Converts have played a 

role in every major or attempted attack in the past year. The use 

of converts has extended JI’s reach beyond Mindanao and the Sulu 

archipelago into Luzon and and the Visayas, greatly broadening the 

battlefield. Finally, the ASG has been built upon the original charitable 

and nongovernment organization (NGO) networks established by 

Mohammed Jamal Khalifa that have remained stubbornly resilient 

to counterterror operations.

 The author warns that, despite the regeneration of the ASG as 

a bonafide terrorist organization, the primary security threat that 

is confronting the GRP comes from the Communist Party of the 

Philippines and their armed wing, the New People’s Army. To 

that end, the GRP will focus on the ASG and MILF inasmuch as 

they expect it to garner U.S. materiel support and assistance. The 

author counsels U.S. Defense Department policymakers regarding 

the institutional frailties of the GRP and the institutional corruption 

within the Philippine armed forces. While the author suggests that 

training continue, he cautions about being drawn into a quagmire. 

Despite the MILF’s ties to the ASG and JI, he also suggests that the 

United States should continue to support the peace process and try 

to wean the MILF off their relationship with terrorist organizations.

1

BALIK-TERRORISM:

THE RETURN OF THE ABU SAYYAF

 On February 27, 2004, a bomb detonated on SuperFerry 14 after 

departing Manila, killing 194 people. Although the Government of 

the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) initially dismissed the claim 

of responsibility by the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), evidence emerged 

that confirmed the group’s immediate claim of responsibility. It was 

the second most lethal terrorist attack in Asia after the Bali bombing, 

perpetrated by Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) on October 12, 2002, and the 

single most deadly terrorist attack in the Philippines. Since then, 

Philippine security officials arrested several Abu Sayyaf members 

in metro-Manila who were in the final stages of preparation for 

bombings. Between October 2004 and January 2005, there were three 

aborted bombings, including a planned attack on the U.S. Embassy.1

On February 14, 2005, the ASG claimed responsibility for three near 

simultaneous bombings in Manila, Davao, and General Santos that 

left 11 people dead and 136 wounded.2 In May 2005, Philippine 

officials uncovered a cache of bomb making chemicals in a Manila 

warehouse.3

 In short, the ASG has reentered the arena of terrorism. Although 

the group is thought to have only 200-300 members, Philippine 

National Security Adviser Norberto Gonzales named the Abu 

Sayyaf as the “most dangerous” of all rebel groups in the country. 

“Compared with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front and the New 

People’s Army, the Abu Sayyaf is the most dangerous because these 

terrorists even volunteer to conduct attacks to win the recognition 

of international terrorist groups, including al-Qaida,” Gonzales 

said.4 This is hyperbole, directed at the U.S. Government, as the 

primary internal security threat remains the Communist Party of 

the Philippines/New People’s Army. But the ASG and their ties 

to JI have the potential to cause instability and negative economic 

impacts.

 Why has this brutal kidnap-for-ransom gang reentered the fray 

and abandoned its 8-9 year reign of deadly, though hardly political, 

kidnappings? What are the endogenous and exogenous factors in 

explaining the Abu Sayyaf’s reinvention? What are the implications 
2

for both Philippine and regional security? This monograph will 

provide a brief history of the ASG, before trying to explain the 

group’s reorientation and their implications for Philippine and 

regional security.

HISTORY

The Founding Years (1988-91).

 The origins of the Abu Sayyaf5

 (literally “bearer of the sword”), 

formally known as Al-Harakatul al-Islamiya, can be traced to 

Afghanistan. In the early 1980s, between 300 and 500 Moro 

fundamentalists arrived in Peshawar, Pakistan, to serve with the 

Mujiheddin fighting the Soviet Afghanistan invasion and occupation. 

One of them, Ustadz Abdurajak Janjalani, emerged as a leader. 

Janjalani was the son of a Basilan ulama and became a fiery Islamic 

orator himself. He attended an Islamic university in Saudi Arabia, 

graduating in 1981 before studying Islamic jurisprudence at Ummu 

I-Qura in Mecca for 3 years. He returned to Basilan and Zamboanga 

to preach in 1984. In 1987 he traveled to Libya and then continued 

on to join the Mujiheddin and fought the Soviets for several years 

in Afghanistan. In Peshawar, Janjalani befriended a wealthy Saudi 

supporter of the Mujiheddin, Osama bin Laden. Janjalani, and later 

his younger brother, Khaddafy Janjalani, received training in the late 

1980s and early 1990s at a training camp near Khost, Afghanistan, 

that was run by a professor of Islam, Abdur Rab Rasul Sayyaf, whose 

belief in the strict Wahhabi interpretation of Islam found him favor 

with many wealthy Saudis, including Osama bin Laden. Abdur Rab 

Rasul Sayaf was also the mentor of an Indonesian jihadi, Riduan 

Isamudin, better known as Hambali. There is some evidence that the 

elder Janjalani was a member of the 48-person Executive Council of 

the Islamic International Brigade, the nucleus of what would become 

the al Qaeda organization.6

 In 1989, Abdurajak Janjalani vowed to pursue “jihad qital”—armed 

struggle—to create a pure Islamic state in the southern Philippines 

based on Salafi Wahhabism. Following the Soviet withdrawal from 

Afghanistan in 1989, Janjalani traveled between his home in Basilan 
3

and the Peshawar-Afghan border region to recruit supporters. Ten 

leading Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF)7

 officials, who felt 

sidelined or disagreed with Nur Misuari, joined Janjalani, including 

Ustadz Wahab Akbar, Amilhussin Jumaani, and Abdul Ashmad. 

Philippine intelligence officials believe that the ASG’s primary goal 

at the time was to sabotage the ongoing peace process between the 

MNLF and the GRP and to discredit the MNLF’s leaders.8 When 

Osama bin Laden wanted to expand his al Qaeda network, established 

in 1988, he turned to Janjalani to establish a cell in Southeast Asia.9

This cell also would be an important base of support for terrorist 

operations. Despite ties between al Qaeda and the MILF, in the early1990s they were nascent and, moreover, the MILF indicated little 

interest in conducting or assisting terrorist operations. It was not 

until 1999-2000, when the MILF experienced significant battlefield 

losses, that it founded its Special Operations Group (MILF-SOG) 

and began to engage in terrorism; before this it remained focused on 

waging conventional guerrilla warfare. 

 Philippine National Police (PNP) intelligence documents suggest 

that the mastermind of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, Ramzi 

Yousef, strongly encouraged the formation of the ASG to serve as 

his contact and support group in the Philippines. Yousef, who was 

teaching bomb making at the Khost camp, traveled with Janjalani 

to the Philippines from December 1991 to May 1992 at bin Laden’s 

request, where he trained ASG members in bomb making in their 

camp on Basilan Island.10 When Yousef was introduced to Janjalani’s 

assistant and a leader of the Abu Sayyaf, Edwin Angeles,11 it was 

as an “emissary from bin Laden,” and he was referred to as “the 

Chemist,” owing to his proficiency in bomb making. Yousef spent 

a short period of time on Basilan, where he trained approximately 

20 Abu Sayyaf militants in the art of bomb making. Though he left 

the Philippines, Yousef returned in 1994 following the February 1993 

bombing of the World Trade Center in New York City.

 In addition to providing funding to Janjalani, bin Laden also 

provided expertise to the new organization. Wali Khan Amin Shah, 

who fought alongside bin Laden in Afghanistan and who was a close 

personal friend, was dispatched to recruit, organize, and assist the 

Abu Sayyaf. Funds from al Qaeda also began to flow, and the ASG 
4

began to receive large deliveries of weapons—mainly Libyan 

models—from Victor Blout, the Tajik arms dealer who was later 

linked to both the Taliban regime and al Qaeda.12

Anti-Christian/Islamic State Terrorism (1991-95).

 The ASG organization quickly made its mark, establishing a 

reputation and seen as a small but lethal organization. Abu Sayyaf 

began its terrorist attacks in the Philippines in 1991. Most of their 

attacks at this time were directed at Christian churches, missionaries, 

and non-Muslim communities.13 These attacks include the 1991 

grenade attack in Zamboanga city that killed two American 

evangelists; the bombing of the Christian missionary ship, M/V 

Doulosin Zamboanga, in August 1991; the killing of an Italian priest 

in Zamboanga on May 20, 1992; the August 10, 1992, bombing of 

a building in Zamboanga that killed 2 and wounded 40 staffers of 

a Christian missionary ship; the kidnapping of two Spanish nuns 

in Sulu on January 17, 1993; the kidnapping of a Spanish priest on 

March 18, 1993; the kidnapping of an American missionary on Sulu 

on November 14, 1993; and, the December 26, 1993, bombing of 

a cathedral in Davao that killed 6 and wounded 132. On June 10, 

1994, a series of bombs in Zamboanga, attributed by the AFP to the 

ASG, killed over 71 people. In one of the most brutal, grisly, and 

publicly remembered and reviled attacks in modern Philippine 

terrorism, ASG operatives attacked the western Mindanao town of 

Ipil on April 4, 1995, killing 53, wounding 48, and then burning and 

looting 17 commercial buildings. In February 1997, ASG operatives 

assassinated a Catholic bishop. Between 1991-95, the Abu Sayyaf 

Group was responsible for 67 terrorist attacks, more than half of 

which were indiscriminant bombings. All led to the death of some 

136 people and hundreds of injuries.14

Deepening Ties to al Qaeda (1991-95).

 Parallel to their development as a terrorist organization, engaged 

in fomenting sectarian conflict, the ASG deepened their relationship 

with transnational terrorist organizations. Early on, the Abu Sayyaf 

was funded through a financial network established by Mohammed 
5

Key Dates in Evolution of the ASG

April 4, 1991 Grenade attack in Zamboanga City kills two American 

evangelists

August 1991 Bombing of Christian missionary ship M/V Doulos

May 20, 1992 Killing of Italian priest Fr. Salvatorre Carzedda in Zamboanga

August 10, 1992 Bombing of building in Zamboanga resulting in 2 deaths and 40 

other casualties (from Christian missionary ship)

January 17, 1993 Kidnapping of two Spanish nuns in Sulu

March 18, 1993 Kidnapping of a Spanish priest

November 14, 1993 Kidnapping of an American missionary

December 26, 1993 Bombing of a cathedral in Davao

June 10, 1994 Bombings in Zamboanga kill 71 people

April 4, 1995 Attack on Ipil resulting in 53 deaths, 48 wounded, and the 

destruction of 17 commercial buildings

Table 1. ASG Terrorist Targets, 1991-95.

Jamal Khalifa, Osama bin Laden’s brother-in-law, who was 

dispatched to the Philippines in 1991 and established a network of 

Islamic charities.15 Khalifa was officially the regional director for the 

Saudi-based charity, the Islamic International Relief Organization 

(IIRO), responsible not just for projects in the Philippines but also 

in Indonesia, Thailand, and Taiwan.16 As with most of the Islamic 

charities that have been implicated in terrorist financing, Khalifa’s 

charities did do some good work, albeit for politically motivated 

purposes. According to Philippine National Security Advisor Roilo 

Golez, Khalifa “built up the good will of the community through 

charity and then turned segments of the population into agents.”17 The 

IIRO’s charitable activities included the construction of an orphanage 

and dispensary in Cotabato City and dispensaries and pharmacies in 

Zamboanga. The IIRO funded a floating clinic to serve Muslims in 

remote villages in western Mindanao. It provided food and clothing 

to internally displaced people who fled war zones. In addition, 

IIRO funding went to schools and scholarships. Khalifa established 

Al Maktum University in Zamboanga using funds from the IIRO. 

The IIRO asserted that, while it did not always cooperate with the 

government on these projects, it at least had official approval.18
6

 Khalifa does not deny contacts to the Abu Sayyaf or its founder, 

Abdurrajak Janjalani. As director of the Muslim World League 

(MWL), “Abu Sayyaf [the nom de guerre of Abdurrajak Janjalani] 

was one of the people whose acquaintance I made. He was a student 

at the Islamic university, and I met him several times. But that does 

not mean that I am with him.”19 He took pride in that, during a period 

of fighting in the Basilan, the IIRO provided 3 million Pesos, three 

times the assistance that the government provided.20

 The IIRO was also a key funder of the Markazzo Shabab AlIslamiyah (MSI), one of the MILF’s most important front organizations that was engaged in da’wah and recruitment activities. Based 

in Lanao del, many ASG members passed through the Islamic 

academy.

 Yet, the IIRO quickly caught the interest of the Philippine police 

and military intelligence: “The IIRO which claims to be a relief 

institution is being utilized by foreign extremists as a pipeline 

through which funding for the local extremists are being coursed 

through (sic),” a Philippine intelligence report noted.21 An Abu Sayyaf 

defector acknowledged that “The IIRO was behind the construction 

of mosques, school buildings, and other livelihood projects,” but 

only “in areas penetrated, highly influenced, and controlled by the 

rebel group, Abu Sayyaf.”22 For example, in Tawi Tawi, the director 

of the IIRO branch office was Abdul Asmad, thought to be the Abu 

Sayyaf’s intelligence chief before he was killed on June 10, 1994. 

Many IIRO projects were located in Campo Muslim, a poor Muslim 

community in Cotabato city. This was seen as part of the attempt 

to help the MILF and ASG broaden their base of support from the 

countryside into urban areas. Scholarships, likewise, were given to 

students to become Islamic scholars. One Abu Sayyaf defector said 

the IIRO was used by bin Laden and Khalifa to distribute funds for 

the purchase of arms and other logistical requirements of the Abu 

Sayyaf and MILF: “Only 10 to 30 percent of the foreign funding goes 

to the legitimate relief and livelihood projects and the rest goes to 

terrorist operations.”23

 While the ASG had limited capabilities to perpetrate terrorism, 

it played a supporting role in Ramzi Yousef’s Bojinka plan, a plot 

to blow up 11 U.S. jetliners simultaneously over the Pacific, and to 

kill the Pope.24 Although Yousef conducted a trial of his bomb plot 
7

on December 10, 2004, by detonating one of his small nitroglycerine 

bombs aboard a Philippines Airlines flight en route from Cebu to 

Tokyo, he publicly claimed responsibility on behalf of the Al-Harakat 

Al-Islamiyya (AHAI). This was an aggrandizement. Abu Sayyaf 

members played important supporting, though not leadership, roles 

in the cell. Yousef and his assistant, Wali Khan Amin Shah, were 

willing to train them but did not trust them or think them capable 

enough to carry out serious terrorist acts, but instead used his own 

men, all flown in from the Middle East. Members of the ASG provided 

logistical services and assisted Yousef and Wali Khan in exfiltrating 

the country. Philippine National Police (PNP) investigations found 

that Abdul Hakim Murad, the third member of the Bojinka cell, 

was in regular contact with a top ASG commander, Abu Abdullah 

Aziz.25

The Group Degenerates (1995-2001).

 With the breakup of the Ramzi Yousef cell, the ASG began a steady 

decline. The Yousef-bin Laden connection was the major source of 

their funding, and without a steady supply of al Qaeda money, the 

group atrophied. Although the U.S. Government designated the 

ASG a foreign terrorist organization in October 1997, the group had 

all but abandoned terrorism. The ASG declined further following 

the death of Abdurrajak Janjalani in a shootout with police on 

December 18, 1998, which effectively split the group into factions 

which then degenerated into criminal kidnap-for-ransom gangs. 

Their commitment to establishing an Islamic state was reduced, and 

became secondary at best. Hector Janjalani, Abdurajak’s brother, 

was captured by the Philippine government and arrested for 

masterminding a string of bombings in Manila in December 2000.26

Despite this public appearance of adherence to the jihad way, the 

group was engaged almost completely in perpetrating very highprofile kidnappings:

 • In March 2000, the ASG kidnapped 55 people, mainly school 

children, teachers, and a priest in Basilan;

 • In April 2000, it kidnapped 20 foreigners and a Filipino from 

a dive resort on the Malaysian island of Sipidan; and,
8

 • In May 2001, the ASG kidnapped 30 tourists, including two 

Americans, from the Dos Palmas resort on Palawan.

In 2000-01 they were responsible for 16 deaths and 140 hostagetakings, but no acts of political-religious terrorism.27 They were 

a well-armed criminal gang, but not an ideologically motivated 

political-religious organization. The label “terrorism” was applied 

to them by both the U.S. and Philippine governments, but that had 

more to do with their brutality than their political agenda.

 The demands for US$1 million in ransom per hostage led many 

to consider the Abu Sayyaf as nothing more than a criminal menace, 

rather than a secessionist insurgency with legitimate grievances.28

As Philippine National Security Advisor Roilo Golez said, “We have 

no evidence that Abu Sayyaf has gotten financing from bin Laden 

recently. Otherwise, they would not have to resort to kidnapping.”29

One Abu Sayyaf defector said that he quit the movement because 

“. . . the group lost its original reason for being. The activities were not 

for Islam but for personal gratification. We abducted people not any 

more for the cause of Islam, but for money.”30 As a Filipino Muslim 

journalist who had spent a week with the ASG told me, the links 

had been cut: “Before they were tied to bin Laden, but now no. They 

[ASG] are independent. They get money from kidnappings. They are 

an independent cell.”31 He continued, “How they are linked to Osama 

bin Laden now is a spiritual link [because of a] shared interpretation 

of jihad.” Though the ASG continually has demanded the freedom of 

Ramzi Yousef and the blind Egyptian sheikh, Abdulrahman Omar, 

links to al Qaeda and international terrorism were at that time 

dormant, if not severed.

 Estimates of the ASG’s size varied. From the mid 1990s to 2000, 

they were estimated to have 600 members. Philippine intelligence 

officials estimated that the ASG was able to use the ransom payments 

from 2000 to expand to roughly 1,000 men, as well as to acquire new 

equipment, radios, boats, and guns. The U.S. military estimated at 

the time of their intervention that the ASG had 1,200 men,32 though 

there was not a lot of evidence to support this number.
9

Post-9/11 and the Global War on Terror (2001-03).

 The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) were engaged heavily 

in combat operations against the ASG in 2000-01, but these were 

hampered by mountainous and jungle terrain, poorly equipped 

troops, lack of clear national command and operational level 

guidance, and rampant corruption. In one well-reported incident, 

ASG members were encircled in a church compound in Lamitan 

town on Basilan Island in June 2001. Yet, inexplicably the AFP troops 

pulled out of position, allowing the ASG to slip out of the cordon. 

A senate investigation implicated not just local commanders, but 

senior members of the Department of National Defense.33

Past links to al Qaeda and the kidnapping of Americans, 

including two American missionaries held at the time, led the U.S. 

Government, on September 24, 2001, to put the Abu Sayyaf Group 

on the first list of 27 individuals and organizations whose assets 

were frozen by the United States because of links to the al Qaeda 

network. President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo’s enthusiastic support 

of the Bush administration’s global war on terror led to a heightened 

degree of military cooperation. The approach to the ASG was cited 

as a prime model of how the Bush administration’s National Strategy 

to Combat Terrorism would be applied.34 The U.S. military used 

the ASG as the impetus to restore ties damaged by the Philippine 

government’s closure of the U.S. naval base in Subic Bay in 1991. In 

FYs 2002-04, the U.S. Government provided the Philippine military 

with US$284.86 million in aid.35

 From January to July 2002, some 1,300 U.S. troops, including 

160 Special Operations personnel, were in the Philippines engaged 

in a joint training operation, Exercise Balikatan.36 On October 2, 

2002, the ASG conducted a bombing in Zamboanga, which killed 

three people, including a U.S. special forces soldier; this was a joint 

operation with two Indonesian members of the Jemaah Islamiyah, 

and was supported by a Jordanian resident of the Philippines who 

was linked to the Palestinian terrorist group, Hamas. It was overseen 

by Khadaffy Janjalani. This attack explicitly targeted U.S. forces and 

signaled a shift in the group’s tactics. This was the group’s first 

bombing since 1994. 
10

 The 2002 Balikatan exercise was, by all counts, successful and 

led to the degrading of the ASG. By September 2002, the ASG was 

estimated to have had only 200-400 fighters. Since then, the AFP 

have continued operations against the Abu Sayyaf, although not at 

the feverish pitch as in the first half of 2002.

 In many ways, the successful operations against the ASG hardened the group’s resolve to return to their roots as a separatist 

organization. Counterterror operations resulted in the capture and 

death of key leaders, who had directed the organization away from 

a Salafist-based notion of global jihad towards the purely criminal 

activity of kidnapping, while concerted combat operations against 

them since 2000 gave them considerable combat experience.37

 AFP-U.S. bilateral training and joint military operations have 

continued in the Philippines. A small number of U.S. advisors 

continue to train and provide field intelligence to their Philippine 

counterparts, as well as provide roughly US$86 million annually 

in military assistance, but the AFP’s operations against the ASG 

have been hampered by the terrain, dilapidated equipment,38 and 

endemic corruption.39 For example, Fathur Rohman al-Ghozi, a top 

JI operative who was arrested in January 2002, walked out of his jail 

cell in Camp Crame along with a senior ASG operative in July 2003. 

Then in April 2004, ASG inmates led an escape of 53 prisoners from 

a Basilan jail; 10 remain at large.40

THE REGENERATION OF THE ASG (2003-PRESENT)

 In March and April 2003, members of the ASG were implicated, 

along with JI and MILF members, in the bombing of the Davao 

airport and Sasa Wharf, both in Mindanao, which together killed 48 

and wounded 204.41 Since then, the ASG has emerged as the most 

potent terrorist force in the Philippines, executing or attempting 

a number of terrorist attacks, including the SuperFerry bombing, 

which killed more than 100 people.42 On March 4, 2003, two ASG 

members were arrested in Manila with a large cache of explosives 

that they hoped to put in backpack bombs to be detonated in malls.43

In June 2004, six more ASG members were arrested for possessing 

explosives. Philippine intelligence officials believe that this cell 

was plotting another round of attacks on SuperFerries in July.44
11

Philippine intelligence reports stated that the ASG had formed an 

urban assassination squad, known as Fisabillilah, in Zamboanga in 

March under the direction of Khaddafy Janjalani and two other Abu 

Sayyaf and JI members.45 In October 2004, three ASG members were 

arrested for plotting to bomb the U.S. Embassy.46 In December 2004, 

they bombed a market in General Santos, killing 14 and wounding 

70. December 2004 to January 2005 saw three aborted bombings. 

Then on February 14, 2005, they executed three near simultaneous 

bombings in three separate cities, killing 11 and wounding roughly 

136. Following a prison uprising on March 14, 2005, in which 24 

ASG members including three detained leaders were killed, the 

ASG spokesman vowed to take the war “right to your doorsteps” in 

Manila.47 An arrest on March 23 led to the recovery of 18 improvised 

explosive devices (IEDs) and 10 sacks of chemical precursors in a 

safe-house in Manila.48 The suspect admitted that the ASG leadership 

was planning a wave of bombings in Manila during Holy Week.49

 At the same time, almost all kidnapping incidents by the ASG 

have ceased. Since October 2004, there were five separate kidnapping 

incidents by ASG operatives, but all of those ended in executions, 

not demands for ransom.50 The trend now seems to be to kill all 

suspected intelligence operatives or informers. (See Table 2.)

 This change in strategy to bombings, and attacks in Manila in 

particular, caught intelligence officials by surprise. As one Western 

police official based in Manila explained: “ASG never had a presence 

or interest in Manila before. So why now?” His hypothesis is that 

JI funding to the group resumed, but only on the condition that 

the group conducts operations with a larger, geo-political regional 

impact.

 The government still labels the ASG as “bandits,” which galls 

the ASG. As Abu Sulaiman stated, “The irony about the Philippine 

government is that . . . they are belittling us, but they are exaggerating 

the problem of terrorism in the country and using, as an example, 

the likes of the Jemaah Islamiyah, which is based in Indonesia. But 

what is in front of them, they do not see.”51

 These incidents beg two questions: Why is the ASG getting back 

into the terrorism business? And why is it giving up its lucrative 

kidnap-for-ransom business? There are two important endogenous 

explanations: changes within the ASG and their leadership, as well 
12

 Date Action Description Victim(s) Location

November 12, 2004 Kidnapping, Photojournalist Gene Boyd 1 Jolo, Sulu

followed by Lumawag of MindaNews

execution executed

November 13, 2004 Kidnapping, Philippine journalist Herson 1 Aklan

followed by Hinolan, manager and 

execution commentator of Bombo Radiyo

radio station executed. 

Authorities suspect ASG 

connection to assassination

November 19, 2004 Abduction Dr. Alberio Canda abducted 1 Parang, 

from municipal health office, Sulu

purportedly to be used to treat

wounded ASG members

December 11, 2004 Execution Provincial director of Philippine 1 Zamboanga

Coconut Authority shot in head

on way to market. Authorities 

believe he was mistaken for 

intelligence agent

January 8, 2005 Kidnapping, ASG elements abduct, try, execute 3 Siasi, Sulu

followed by 3 salesmen. Authorities believe

execution they were mistaken for military 

intelligence agents

Sources: “Reward Offered for Hinolan’s Attacker” MT, November 16, 2004; 

“Suspected Abu Sayyaf Gunmen Abduct Doctor in Sulu,” PDI, November 22, 2004; 

“Philippine Government Official Dies in Suspected Abu Sayyaf Attack,” Deutsche 

Presse-Agenteur, December 12, 2004; Julie Alipala, “Sayaff Men Abduct, Execute 3 

Salesmen from Pampanga,” PDI, January 11, 2005.

Table 2. ASG Kidnapping Incidents, October 2004-February 2005.

as a shift in their relationship to the MILF. There is also an exogenous 

explanation: the JI has reached out to the ASG and made them their 

partner in jihad.

The Emergence of Khadaffy Janjalani.

 Following the death of the ASG’s founder, Abdurajak Janjalani, 

in 1998, the ASG split up into three distinct factions which became 

nothing more than extraordinarily violent bandits and kidnappers. 

Much of this, according to Philippine intelligence officials, was 
13

driven by Aldam Tilao (Abu Subaya) and Ghalib Andang, who had 

a “domineering personality” and was driven solely by greed.52

 Often the only way that organizations can change policy is by 

changing their leaders. In the case of the ASG, leadership transition 

was involuntary. Abu Subaya was killed in a joint U.S.-Filipino 

ambush in June 2002, while Ghalib Andang (aka Commander 

Robot) was captured in December 2003. Authority in the loosely knit 

group appears to have been consolidated by Khadaffy Janjalani,53

the younger brother of the founder, who seems more intent on 

bringing the group back to its religious origins. His brother, Hector 

Janjalani, was arrested previously for plotting terrorist acts in Manila. 

Khadaffy Janjalani, himself, was trained in Afghanistan. He had been 

a computer science student first in Marawi and later in Zamboanga 

when he was recruited by his brother and sent to Afghanistan. He 

was trained at an al Qaeda camp near Mazar e-Sharif in the early 

1990s, where he led a group of 20 Moros.

 To be sure, Khadaffy Janjalani is no innocent when it comes 

to kidnapping. He was implicated in the kidnapping incident on 

Palawan Island on May 27, 2000, that led to the capture of 20 people, 

and the subsequent beheading of an American hostage. But PNP 

debriefs of six ASG members who were captured in October 2002 

present a very clear picture that Khadaffy Janjalani was focused 

primarily on waging jihad through an urban bombing campaign. 

He directed his underlings to reconnoiter targets and acquire bomb 

making skills and ingredients, organized training by Middle Eastern 

operatives, and ordered bombings in Zamboanga, General Santos, 

and elsewhere.54 He organized the December 2002 bombing in 

Zamboanga that killed a member of the U.S. Special Forces.

 Janjalani is “working very hard to get the ASG back to its roots,” 

one Philippine intelligence official said to me. But this was more 

for personal reasons: he was “trying to assert his legitimacy based 

on the religious authority of his brother.”55 Janjalani seems truly 

interested in reasserting the ASG as a legitimate national liberation 

front organization, and stated so in a July 2004 radio interview.56

And the ASG has not been implicated in any kidnapping-for-ransom 

since the capture of Ghalib Andang. In this apparent shift in doctrine 

and tactics, Khadaffy Janjalani has sought to improve ties with the 

largest independence movement in the southern Philippines, the 

Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).
14

MILF Links to the Abu Sayyaf Group. 

Competition (1991-99). The MILF has a mixed relationship with 

the Abu Sayyaf Group. In 2002, the MILF spokesman condemned the 

ASG’s attacks and kidnapping as being completely un-Islamic. “Most 

of their activities are against Islam. We do not sanction most of their 

activities.”57 There were “unity talks” between the two organizations 

in the 1990s, though MILF officials say that nothing materialized 

due to “differences over ideology and tactics.”58 Interrogations of 

captured ASG members reveal a lot of anger that the MILF did not 

share much of the resources and funding from the Saudi charity 

network established by Mohammed Jamal Khalifa.59 Omar al-Faruq, 

a key al Qaeda operative who was dispatched to the region in 1994-

95 by Abu Zubaidah and who was a trainer at the MILF camps, was 

responsible for forming a union between the then-small ASG and the 

MILF to create “a stronger jihad force,” but was spurned by the ASG, 

who did not consider the MILF a “reliable jihad partner.”60 Some 

joint training occurred at MILF camps in the early to mid-1990s, but 

this seems to have been enforced or facilitated by the presence of al 

Qaeda trainers, who also included Al-Mughirah al-Gaza’iri and Abu 

al-Abbas al-Khatami.61

 For 3 to 4 years in the early 1990s, despite some rivalry and 

competition over resources, Muhammad Jamal Khalifa was also able 

to forge working ties between the two groups. Khalifa established the 

Daw’l Imam Shafi’ie Center (DISC) in 1988-89, funded by the Saudi 

IIRO charity which Khalifa also controlled. DISC has a mosque/

madrasa in Marawi where the MILF and ASG sent operatives for 

religious training before going on to military training in MILF 

camps. The school is believed to have graduated three classes of 

militants between 1990 and 1993. The classes, of roughly 50 cadets 

each, were divided between MILF and ASG.62 Abdurajak Janjalani 

was a graduate of the class of 1992.

The Special Operations Group and Deepening Ties (1999-2005). 

Debriefs of captured ASG members reveal a working-level relationship between the MILF’s Special Operations Group (founded in 

1999) and the ASG.63 In addition to joint training, the two groups 

increasingly were involved in joint operations. This was often 

facilitated, not by organizational ties, but by personal ties. For 
15

example, Patta Edris, a MILF-SOG member, was the cousin of Abdul 

Mukmin Edris, who was a top ASG operative and trainer, and one of 

Khadaffy Janjalani’s closest lieutenants.64 In another case, two of the 

ASG members who were arrested on October 6, 2004, for the 2003 

Davao bombings, Abdul Manap Mentang and Mursid Mubpon, 

were former MILF members.65 Eid Kabalu, the MILF spokesman, said 

that the MILF expelled the two and that they then joined the ASG.66

Mentang, however, claimed he was still a member of the MILF.67

Mentang also asserted that he was a member of a 15-man MILF 

class trained by senior JI operative Zulkifli at Camp Hudaibiyah 

in 1995.68 How many MILF operatives went through JI’s advance 

class in demolition is unknown, but estimates are around 60.69 As 

the bombing appears to have been a joint operation between the 

MILF-SOG, JI, and the Abu Sayyaf, it is very difficult to know where 

to draw the line. Based on the available evidence, the two groups 

have maintained a long-standing, yet ad hoc relationship that has 

depended on mission, time, personal/family connections, training 

experience, available personnel, and funds.

 In another case, two of the bombers responsible for the 2005 

Valentine’s Day attack in Makati, Abu Khalil Trinidad and Gamal 

Baharan, admitted that Khadaffy Janjalani recruited them into the 

ASG. In the summer of 2004, they were dispatched to Butig, the seat 

of the MILF’s 103rd Base Command,70 where they met with Khadaffy 

Janjalani and Abu Solaiman, and were trained in bomb making by 

Rohmat (aka Zaki), an Indonesian JI liaison officer.71 Baharan stated 

that there were two other ASG members who were being trained 

there at the same time.72

 It also belies evidence provided by U.S. and Philippine military 

commanders who believe that there is a working relationship 

between the two organizations. During the 2002 Balikitan exercises, 

a trilateral agreement was reached, assuring the MILF that joint 

U.S.-Philippine patrols in Basilan would not enter MILF-held zones. 

U.S. commanders complained that the MILF gave the ASG passive 

support, allowing them to use their territory for safe haven. As 

Admiral William Fallon, Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Pacific 

Command, recently stated:

The Government of the Philippines, bolstered by U.S. training and 

support, achieved success in 2004 against the terrorist Abu Sayyaf Group; 
16

however, the Jemaah Islamiyah appears to pose a greater threat to U.S. 

and allied interests in the region. JI became more active in the Philippines 

in 2004 and continued to train with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front and 

supported ASG and MILF attack operations. While the GOP efforts likely 

disrupted attacks, the JI and associated groups have shown resilience and 

continue training future Southeast Asian terrorists.73

Why Does the MILF Stand to Gain? While there have been differences between the two groups, the MILF clearly enjoys having the 

Abu Sayyaf around. For one thing, it keeps AFP forces spread thin. 

The AFP is spread so thin that recent operations in Jolo precluded 

operations against the MILF in the Liguasan Marsh area.74

 For another thing, it gives the MILF a degree of plausible 

deniability when it engages in terrorism. The MILF uses the ASG as 

a direct-action proxy. The MILF has pledged peace, is engaged with 

the GRP and Malaysians, and has a public image to uphold; using 

the ASG as a proxy allows this.75

 The two groups have not held formal unity talks, but ample 

evidence suggests that cooperation is stepped-up between them. 

There is some indication that the MILF sold or transferred some 

weapons to the ASG since the Basilan exercise, as ASG ranks have 

increased. Philippine intelligence officials have told me that they 

have seen ASG members using MILF boats in Tawi-Tawi.76

 The MILF sees any campaign against the ASG as a convenient 

way for the government to target them (MILF). In photos of the 

Malaysian International Monitoring Team’s Advance Survey Mission 

to the 108th Base Command in Silocon, Zamboanga del Norte, in 

May 2004, MILF soldiers are seen showing fresh wounds to the 

Malaysian observers. Despite the cease-fire that has held remarkably 

well in the rest of Mindanao, stepped-up operations against the 

ASG in Zamboanga del Norte either have given the military the 

cover to violate the cease-fire and to go after the MILF on the sly, 

or indicate the close working relations between the two groups on 

the ground. It should be noted that increased AFP operations in the 

region have resulted in much of the 108th base command relocating 

to the Lanao del Sur coastal region. The commander of the MILF’s 

26th unit command, Abu Ashraf Balindong, confirmed the presence 

of units of the 108th command under Kummander Aloy al-Ashre, 

who is known to have close ties with the ASG, and who, himself, is 

involved in kidnapping.77
17

 The relationship between the MILF and the ASG has deepened in 

the past year. First, the MILF is really trying to take advantage of a 

fractious and weakened MNLF, dominated by Tausogs, to strengthen 

its position in the Sulu archipelago. The MILF has pockets of support 

(such as with the Yaccans on Basilan), but have tried to broaden their 

base of support beyond Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sarangani, and 

Sultan Kudarat. It should be noted that the replacement for Aleem 

Abdulaziz Mimbintas as the Vice Chairman for Internal Affairs is 

a Tausog from the Zamboanga region.78 This was clearly done to 

maintain an ethnic and geographical balance in the leadership. The 

MILF would benefit significantly from the ASG’s social networks 

throughout the archipelago, as they seek to supplant the MNLF as 

the dominant political voice and action arm of the Bangsamoro. 

 To that end, the MILF has reached out to Khadaffy Janjalani. 

Reportedly, U.S. signals intercepts have tracked Janjalani from Basilan 

to Palimbang in Sultan Kudarat, to the Carmen region of North 

Cotabato, and then to Camp Jabal Quba, a subcamp of Camp Bushra 

in Butig, which is the headquarters of the 103rd Base Command. He 

could not be there without explicit MILF approval, knowledge, or 

support. As one senior AFP commander in Maguindanao said to me, 

“Of course, he [Khadaffy Janjalani] is close to the MILF. When he 

arrived from Jolo, he relied on the MILF. He was adopted by them. 

Even the shipment of his group’s weapons was organized by MILF 

leaders.”79

 The MILF clearly hopes to use the ASG to keep government forces 

spread thin and to help build up its network in the Sulu archipelago. 

This factor, coupled with Janjalani’s rejection of kidnapping in favor 

of national liberation struggle, has led to much closer ties between 

the two organizations.80 At the same time, hard-line elements of 

the MILF are predisposed ideologically to the ASG and JI, and are 

forging active alliance with these groups.

The ASG’s Motivation. The ASG have their own reasons for 

forging ties with the MILF. At the most basic level, the MILF offers 

what the ASG does not have on its own: money, shelter, training, 

infrastructure, control over large areas of land, logistics assistance, 

and help with operations. The ASG “owes” the MILF for allowing 

them (ASG) to exist, operate, train, recruit, and raise funds in MILF 

areas, and the MILF exploits that.81
18

 As they did in the early-1990s, the MILF want to serve as spoilers 

to the peace process. In a recent statement, the ASG’s spokesman, 

Abu Solaiman, warned, “To our brothers in the MILF, don’t 

waive our nation’s honor, dignity, and right, even in exchange 

for the whole world. No amount of development can pay for our 

homeland’s illegal and immoral occupation or annexation.”82

Whereas the ASG has forged relationships with the MILF, it is not 

clear that they are institutional. Stronger evidence suggests that the 

ASG’s relationship is to individual commanders of the MILF, and in 

particular to the 106th and 109th Base Commands, under Salamat 

Samir, Ustadz Abdulwahid Khalil Tondok, and Ustadz Umberil 

Kato, respectively,83 that stretch from the Liguasan Marsh through 

to Datu Saudi Ampatuan and Datu Piang (see Figures 1 and 2 for 

details). As mentioned above, there is also some relationship to the 

commanders of the MILF’s 108th Base Command. 

 The ASG appears to be forging closer ties with commands that 

are less inclined to support the MILF’s senior leadership in the peace 

process. It is highly unlikely that all of the MILF will support a peace 

agreement that falls significantly short of the MILF’s avowed goal 

of an independent state. The ASG is looking for potential allies. 

As one senior AFP commander said to me, “Khadaffy Janjalani is 

consolidating the radicals. He has the money to support the religious 

hardliners who will challenge [Ebrahim el Haj] Murad.”84

 Tondok, in particular, seems to have cultivated the deepest ties to 

JI and ASG. Senior AFP leaders contend that he has given sanctuary 

to roughly 30 JI and ASG militants.85 The presence of Isnilon Hapilon 

in the region under Tondok’s control, accompanied by Dulmatin, 

a senior JI operative who is linked to the Bali bombing, led to the 

November air assault by the AFP on Barangay Linantangan, in 

Talitay in the Butulan marsh area.86

 The JI operative who was in charge of liaison work and training 

of the ASG, Rohmat (aka Zaki), was arrested at a military checkpoint 

as he was leaving MILF-controlled territory (109th Base Command) 

outside of Datu Saudi Ampatuan.87 He asserted that not only was JIASG training being conducted in MILF territory at Camp Jabal Quba 

(MILF’s 103rd Base Command) and Mamasaparo town (MILF’s 109th 

Base Command), but that the ASG leadership had given members of 

the MILF P100,000 ($1,850) to launch terrorist attacks during Easter 

week.88 The MILF, unsurprisingly, denied the allegation.89
19

Figure 1. MILF Base Commands.
20

109th Base Command

104th Base Command

106th Base Command

105th Base Command

Note: The various base commands do not have a demarcated territory. While they 

are all headquartered in various towns, the claims often overlap. For example, the 

106th(Pikit, North Cotabato), 109th (Talayan, Maguindanao) and 105th (Columbio, 

Sultan Kudarat) Base Commands regional jurisdiction all converge on the southern 

edge of the Liguasan Marsh. The 104th Base Command (Maitum, Sarangani) also 

extends across the mountains into the marsh region.

Figure 2. MILF Base Commands Detail 

of the Liguasan Marsh Region.
21

EXPLAINING THE TRANSFORMATION: 

EXOGENOUS FACTORS

 While the reorientation of the ASG has Khadaffy Janjalani 

imprimatur, it raises questions of whether exogenous factors are at 

work. Has the ASG been “activated” by the JI or al Qaeda? Who 

is paying for the materials? Has the JI stepped up training of ASG 

members? Have there been financial inducements for the ASG 

to engage in terrorist acts? Some evidence suggests that these 

connections have been rekindled and that JI sees the ASG for the 

first time as a reliable partner.

Did the Breakup Really Occur?

 Some evidence also suggests that ties were never completely 

severed. In October 2000, hostages who escaped from their Abu 

Sayyaf captors asserted that two Yemenis were in the camp advising 

the Abu Sayyaf in September and October.90 One ASG defector stated 

that four foreign instructors (three Afghans and a Syrian) were in the 

ASG camp in Tugas, on Sulu Island.91 A PNP intelligence report stated 

that “In 2001, Asraf Kunting, member of the ASG shurah, was sent 

to Malaysia to fetch four al Qaeda operatives who trained the Abu 

Sayyaf on explosives.”92 This was partially corroborated by several 

ASG suspects detained in October 2002 who revealed that Khadaffy 

Janjalani hosted two Middle Eastern operatives in September 2001. 

These operatives conducted training for a month before traveling 

to Malaysia.93 Abdul Mukmin Edris revealed that two al Qaeda 

members, a Yemeni (aka Azzam) and an Arab (aka Sunawa), were 

in Basilan in September 2002.

 An Indonesian crew member of a tug boat hijacked by Abu 

Sayyaf members off Jolo in June 2002 identified several Yemenis 

who attended a meeting with ASG leaders in Patikul, Sulu, on May 

3, 2003. They were accompanied, according to his testimony, by Abu 

Sophia, the nom de guerre of Ahmad al-Ghozi, the brother of the late 

Fathur Rohman al-Ghozi, a senior Indonesian JI operative who was 

the group’s emissary in the southern Philippines and liaison to the 

MILF.
22

MILF Resistance to the Emerging JI-ASG Relationship.

 Abu Sophia, like his brother, was dispatched to central Mindanao 

where he was a JI bomb instructor in MILF camps. He also was 

charged with brokering talks between the ASG and MILF. Most of 

the resistance at this time came from the MILF leadership, which 

saw the ASG as a loose band of nonreligious and nonideological 

kidnappers.

 Other JI members also were instructed to open channels to the 

ASG leadership. Nassir bin Abbas, the captured leader of JI’s Mantiqi 

3 region, which includes Mindanao, has admitted that in February 

2004, the JI’s acting amir, Abu Rusdan, ordered him to establish 

ties with the ASG.94 He in turn ordered his subordinate, Zulkifli, 

to establish ties with Khadaffy Janjalani. Zulkifli, an Indonesian JI 

member, was a longtime JI trainer in MILF camps in Mindanao (since 

1995), who, starting in early 2001, began to offer training to the ASG 

at Camp Jabal Quba. At the time, however, the ASG had lost much 

of their national liberation fervor and few operatives were trained.95

 The International Crisis Group (ICG) reported that, “Khadaffy 

Janjalani had long wanted to send men for training at Camp 

Hudaibiyah but the MILF rejected the idea.”96 In part, this reflects 

that Khadaffy had little control over anything but his own faction 

of the ASG. In 2001, Khadaffy Janjalani approached Zulkifli, then 

the head of the JI cell Wakalah Hudaibiyah, and asked him again 

to restore joint training. Zulkifli agreed, but also arranged training 

for JI operatives in ASG camps in Tawi Tawi and Basilan in return.97

Zulkifli ordered his lieutenant, Rohmat (aka Zaki), an Indonesian JI 

member who came to the Philippines in 2000, to be the official gobetween.98

A Triangular Relationship Develops.

 As a result of this training, the ASG began to work with JI 

operatives and members of the MILF-SOG in the execution of several 

terrorist attacks. On April 22, 2002, a joint team bombed the FitMart 

Department Store in General Santos City; 15 persons died and 60 

were injured.99 On October 2, 2002, ASG operatives working for 

Khadaffy Janjalani conducted a bombing in Zamboanga with two 

Indonesian members of the Jemaah Islamiyah that killed 3 people, 

including a U.S. Special Forces soldier.
23

 Joint operations increased after that. A string of bombings and 

arsons were done in large part with MILF logistical assistance and 

ASG operatives. For example, Nassir bin Abbas asserts that Khadaffy 

Janjalani provided RP100,000 (roughly US$2,000) to Zulkifli to fund 

the February 2003 bombing of the Cotabato airport. A MILF-SOG 

operative, Abdul Jabidi (aka Bedz), provided explosives for both the 

bombing of the Cotabato airport and the March 4, 2003 bombing of 

the FitMart in Tucarong.100

Interdependence.

 Institutionally, relations between JI and the ASG deepened. 

Following the Zamboanga bombing in October 2002, Zulkifli went 

to Zamboanga to liaise with the ASG leadership. The second batch 

of JI terrorists graduated from Camp Jabal Quba in Lanao del Sur, 

in November 2002. In January 2003, JI appointed a liaison officer, 

Mustaqim, the head of “Wakalah Hudaibiyah,” to work with the 

ASG. The JI operative, Rohmat (aka Zaki), had been a JI trainer at 

Camp Hudaibiyah in Camp Abu Bakar in 2000, and then in Camp 

Jabal Quba from 2000 through 2002. At the start of 2003, he was 

dispatched to the Zamboanga-Basilan region with the ASG. He served 

as an instructor for the ASG in Sulu, and held a high-level meeting 

with the ASG leadership in July 2003.101 “I’m JI,” Rohmat (Zaki) told 

ABS-CBN News. “But I was told to work with Abu Sayyaf, and we 

were all together, so my life is now Abu Sayyaf.”102

 According to Taufiq Riefqi, Zulkifli appointed “Zammy,” a 

30-year-old Indonesian JI operative and graduate of the second 

class at Camp Jabal Quba, to be the “Wakalah contact of the Abu 

Sayyaf Group in Zamboanga City, as well as the liaison contact 

with the MILF.”103 Taufiq Refqi, himself, “was arrested while in the 

process of arranging with a senior Abu Sayyaf cadre the scheduled 

training for the ASG at JI’s training camp, Muaskar Jabal Quba.”104

Rohmat (aka Zaki) returned to Camp Jabal Quba where he continued 

to instruct ASG and JI members. He admitted that, at the time of his 

arrest, there were 23 JI members at Camp Jabal Quba (MILF’s 103rd 

Base Command) undergoing bomb training and an additional 10-

member cell in Mamasaparo town (MILF’s 109th Base Command). 

“There were 23 men who have just finished the course. I heard they 
24

would be sent back home and others would stay behind to train a 

new batch.”105

 Close operational ties between the ASG and JI were disclosed, 

following a number of arrests in late 2004 to early 2005. Abdul 

Manap Mentang and Mursid Mubpon have confessed that when 

they received their training in an MILF camp in Butig in mid2004, Rohmat (aka Zaki) was there with Khadaffy Janjalani and 

Abu Solaiman.106 On December 14, 2004, Philippine police arrested 

three Indonesian JI members, along with a local ASG contact.107

Dulmatin ordered a JI operative in Indonesia, Abdullah Sonata, 

who was arrested in conjunction with the September 4 Australian 

Embassy bombing, to dispatch additional JI members to Mindanao 

for training. Three members, Faiz Saifuddin, and Nasir and Dedy 

Rusdiana, were arrested by Philippine authorities. Sonata later 

dispatched two additional members, Maulana Musa and Salman, 

who were arrested in Tawau Malaysia on June 9, 2005. Two others, 

Abu Nida and Ahmad managed to get into the Philippines.108

Leaked but unconfirmed Philippine intelligence documents contend 

that in 2004 JI gave US$18,500 to the ASG leadership to fund 

training.109 It is a reasonable figure. 

 More alarming is that significant evidence suggests there is 

currently a cadre of first-generation, al Qaeda-trained JI leaders in 

Mindanao.110 (See Table 3.) While the ASG does not control territory 

and they are most certainly under the protection of the MILF, the 

concurrent presence of ASG leaders reinforces the notion of an 

interdependent relationship between the three organizations, in 

which money and training are exchanged for protection and base 

camps. Clearly the training is continuing apace.111

 The ASG is no longer devoid of ideology, and their newly 

rediscovered (or imposed) radical interpretation of Islam meshes 

with al Qaeda’s. The JI’s need for a regional base area to regroup 

and train, alone, has fundamentally altered the ASG’s direction. The 

ASG’s more radical position has allayed JI’s suspicion that it is an 

unreliable partner. 
25

Dulmatin Indonesian national; senior JI operative and top bomb maker; 

educated at Al Mukmin; protégé of Dr. Azahari

Umar Patek Indonesian national; senior JI operative; played a leading role in the aka “Daud” October 2002 Bali bombings. According to Nassir bin Abbas, he

trained in Afghanistan. Came to Mindanao first in 1995. Took over

from Nassir, who was a trainer in MILF camps from 1995-96. He 

reportedly was killed by AFP forces in August 2005. 

Indonesian national. Believed to be JI’s top trainer in Mindanao at

present. He replaced Mustaqim who was arrested on June 30, 2004, in Indonesia.

Usman Indonesian national. Trainer in the Mt. Cararao region. (sometimes Osman) 

aka Rizal 

Ahmad al-Ghozi Indonesian national. The brother of Fathur Rohman al-Ghozi. Senior

(sometimes goes by trainer in the Camp Bushrai, Butig, lanao del Sur to Mt. Cararao

Abdulsamad al-Ghozi) region.

Samudra al Ormatan Indonesian national. Was intended target during the bombing of the 

aka Marwan JI-ASG safe house on January 27, 2005. 

Abdul Rati Talang Hat 

aka Bigok

Abdul Rahim Ayob From Central Java. Senior JI leader. Dual Indonesian-Australian national. With his brother, former leaders of Mantiqi 4. Were in Java 

for a leaders’ meeting on October 15, 2002. Based in Butig, Lanao 

del Sur.

Ahmad

Abu Nida

Mawia A Singaporean member

Zulkifli bin Hir

Asep (Darwin)

Mhmd bin al Faiz Trainer for the MILF in the Kabacan, North Cotabato region.

Mhmd bin Alzaad Trainer for the MILF in the Kabacan, North Cotabato region.

Mhmd Yusop Trainer in Cararao (Mt. Makaturing region)

Mhmd Adzari Trainer in Cararao (Mt. Makaturing region)

Abu Huzayme Trainer in Cararao (Mt. Makaturing region)

Abu Nomar Trainer in Cararao (Mt. Makaturing region)

Mhmd al-Saad Trainer in Cararao (Mt. Makaturing region)

Abu Hamdi Trainer in Cararao (Mt. Makaturing region)

Abu Mashood Trainer in Cararao (Mt. Makaturing region)

Abu Guiati Trainer in Cararao (Mt. Makaturing region)

Sources: Karl B. Kaufman and Johnathan Vicente, “3 Held in Plot to Bomb U.S. 

Embassy,” The Manila Times, October 22, 2004; Jaime Laude, “Terror Threat 

Remains Despite Capture of Bombers,” PS, March 1, 2005; various interviews.

Table 3. Suspected Indonesian Members of JI at Large in Mindanao.
26

Financial Interconnectivity.

 Further evidence of renewed ties between the ASG, JI, and al 

Qaeda emerged in April to May 2004, with the arrest of two financiers, 

Khair Malzam Mundus and Jordan Mamso Abdullah. Abdullah was 

a currency trader in Cotabato City, believed by Philippine intelligence 

officials to have transferred US$25,000 from the JI to the ASG and 

local JI operatives, which were deposited in several bank accounts 

he had established. They also believe that the US$28,000 provided 

by senior JI and AQ operative Hambali in 2003 went through him.112

Abdullah was very close to Zulkifli, the senior JI operative.

 Mundus was a more important financier for the group, described 

by Defense Secretary Eduardo Ermita as a “direct intermediary of 

al-Qaida funds” channeled to Abu Sayyaf leader Khadaffy Janjalani 

to be used in “bombing and terroristic activities.”113 PNP chief 

Hermogenes Ebdane said Mundus was a much bigger catch than 

Jordan “because he became a direct source of funds for the ASG.”114

Mundus, who was a student in Saudi Arabia from 1996 to 2003, 

was able to direct al Qaeda funding for Abu Sayyaf through the Al 

Haramain Foundation. “He also negotiated and solicited money in 

Saudi Arabia for the Janjalanis,” according to Chief Superintendent 

Ismael Rafanan, head of the PNP intelligence group. 115 Mundus 

first worked with Abdurajak Janjalani, and later worked directly 

with Khadaffy Janjalani, who succeeded his slain brother as Abu 

Sayyaf leader. Mundus is purported to have raised US$89,000, or 

about RP5 million, which he deposited in accounts in the Arraji 

Bank in Saudi Arabia and the Arab National Bank, and transferred 

to bank accounts in branches of Philippine banks in Zamboanga City 

and Cotabato City. About RP2.76 million of the funds went to the 

purchase of supplies and equipment for the Abu Sayyaf, including 

rifles, uniforms, and a speedboat which was used in the kidnappings 

at the Dos Palmas resort in May 2001. The remainder was used for 

bombings.116

 Other financial links between the ASG and both JI and al Qaeda 

are still being investigated. Baharan, the Valentine’s Day 2005 Makati 

bomber, asserted in his interrogation that the money for the three 

Valentine’s Day bombings came from an Indonesian courier who 

gave the ASG leaders RP1 million.117 Philippine intelligence officials 
27

expressed disgust when Mohammad al-Sughayir, a Saudi Arabian 

national suspected of funding JI and the ASG, was released from 

custody and deported to Saudi Arabia the following day.118 While 

Philippine intelligence officials lacked strong evidence against the 

Saudi as they were unable to question him, the speed and forcefulness 

of the Saudi response raised eyebrows.

THE ABU SAYYAF ORGANIZATION

 This monograph is premised on the notion that the loose band 

of kidnap-for-ransom gangs has been somewhat consolidated by 

Khadaffy Janjalani. It is important not to overestimate either the 

degree of his control or the organizational unity of the ASG. It is 

a geographically divided organization which operates throughout 

the Sulu archipelago (especially in Basilan, Jolo, and Tawi Tawi) 

and now across Mindanao (from Sirawai in Zamboanga del Norte 

to Sarangani, Sultan Kudarat, North Cotabato, and Lanao del Sur). 

There is little command and control, and communications are 

simplistic; for the most part based on mobile phones. There is little 

discipline or internal unity. 

Strength.

 The current size of the ASG is roughly 250-300 hard-core 

militants. This is a very amorphous group which relies primarily on 

small compartmentalized cells for specific operations.119 They tend 

to recruit young operatives who are given the minimal amount of 

training for an operation. They are treated as one-offs, or amateurs, 

who most likely will be caught. With increased JI training, their 

technical capacity has improved. But JI’s real legacy will be if they 

can impose greater discipline on the organization.

Organization.

 Philippine analysts and government officials usually overemphasized the formal structure of the ASG. Citing Philippine 

military documents, Rommel Banlaoi contends that “When Janjalani 

formed the ASG, his original vision was to form a highly, organized 
28

systemic, and disciplined organization of fanatical secessionist 

Islamic fighters.”120 To that end, he established the Islamic Executive 

Council comprised of 15 religious leaders. “Under the IEC were two 

special committees. The first committee was the Jamaitul Al-Islamia 

Revolutionary Tabligh Group in charge of fund raising and Islamic 

education. The second committee was the Al-Misuaratt Khutabah 

Committee in charge of agitation and propaganda activities.”121

Finally, there was the armed wing, formally known as the Mujahidden 

al-Sharifullah. Likewise, a Philippine Marine Colonel wrote that in 

2000-01, the ASG was believed to be comprised of 16 armed units:

Each group, more often than not; operates as separate entities, particularly 

centered on its leader. They support and reinforce each other when in 

the face of a common enemy during combat, mainly because they share 

the same culture, religion, historical roots, status in the society, and 

former organization (MNLF). However, when questions or doubts in the 

division of the loot or sharing of ransom arise, they come into conflict 

and revert to their basic motivation of money. Various interests of their 

leaders and individual members include personal interests in money, 

vendetta against another group, family or individuals, and connections 

or relations with politicians.122

Yet these analyses at best reflect the goals of the leaders, and not the 

actual organization on the ground. Banalaoi is more accurate when 

he describes the the organization based on known “groups,” closer to 

gangs, in each geographical location. Though using 3-year-old AFP 

data, on Basilan he identifies 10 groups, while in Sulu, he identifies 

16 groups.123

 There is no formal process of ASG recruitment, training, or 

indoctrination. Several first-generation members were former MNLF 

combatants or trained in Afghanistan. Young men, either wanted 

criminals or ideologically predisposed youths are recruited, usually 

for a single specific task for which they are given ad hoc training. 

 The ASG is a protean organization. There is little understanding 

about the leadership structure.124 While Banalaoi argues that the 

Islamic Executive Council is still intact, little evidence supports this. 

Khadaffy Janjalani sits at the top of the organization as much as 

anyone does.125 Beneath him are several lieutenants who are with him 

in Mindanao. Then there are a handful of other commanders based 

on Jolo, Basilan, and Tawi Tawi. Little is known about their personal 
29

or command relationships. The archipelagic commanders appear to 

have little knowledge or role in ASG’s terrorist operations. While 

they are not completely breakaway factions, and there is evidence 

of limited coordination, Khadaffy Janjalani does not have effective 

control over them. The ASG changes shape every day, depending on 

arrests. During 2002-03, police arrested 100 suspected ASG members. 

It is a very fluid organization. 

 Khadaffy and Isnilon have roughly 30-40 armed combatants with 

them, though they travel in smaller groups. Abu Solaiman is not 

known to have armed combatants. The forces in the Sulu archipelago 

are larger.

CAUSES FOR CONCERN

 While the ASG remains a very small organization, its willingness 

to employ terror and develop close working ties to other terrorist 

organizations which allow it to leverage its strength are troubling. In 

particular, analysts and policymakers should take the threat of the 

ASG seriously for three reasons: 1) Improvements in ASG technical 

capacity to conduct terrorist attacks; 2) Stated ASG interest in 

fomenting sectarian violence, and; 3) Adept ASG penetration of Balik 

Islam networks and recruitment of Christian converts to engage in 

terrorist acts. 

Ratcheting It Up a Notch Or Two.

 The technical capacity of the ASG, in terms of bomb making, 

has increased dramatically in the past year. As a top Philippine 

intelligence official told me, “the ASG’s bomb technology is getting 

much more sophisticated.”126 Until recently, the ASG’s bombs were 

small, often little more than pipe bombs, or bombs strapped onto the 

back of motorcycles.

 While they have not put together large truck bombs as JI has 

used three times in Indonesia, evidence suggests that the technology 

transfer has occurred. Abdul Mukmin Edris had diagrams of car 

bombs on him when he was arrested. One ASG member who was 

captured in October 2002 revealed that lessons in putting together 
30

Isnilon Hapilon aka Abu Musb, aka Abu 

Tuan, aka Tuan Isnilon, aka the Deputy, 

ala Salajudin

Known as Janjalani’s deputy. He has most 

recently been based in the SaranganiSultan Kudarat region, and occasionally in 

the Butalan Marsh area in Talitay, Maguindanao. 

Jainal Antel Sali Jr. aka Abu Solaiman The self-described spokesman. Recently, 

he has been based in MILF camps and 

seems to be in charge of liaison activities. He has no fighters directly under his 

command, though he has organized terror 

cells.

Hajijul aka Alex Took over from Abdul Mukmin Edris, when 

he was killed. Top urban terrorist trainer/

operative.

Borhan Mundus Liaison officer on Kota Kinabalu, Malaysia.

Mohammad Hatta Haipe Liaison officer on Kota Kinabalu, Malaysia

Abu Khalid aka Ashraf Kunting ASG finance operative in Manila

Esmin Radullan (sometimes listed as 

Ismin Sahiron)

Son of Radullan Sahiron. Reportedly 

moved to Mindanao to liaise/join with MILF.

Table 4. Janjalani’s Lieutenants.

Radullan Sahiron aka 

Commander Putol

Based on Sulu. The one armed commander has been 

described as a very charismatic, but fiery, preacher. He 

held the Indonesian tug-boat crew. His troops are some of 

the ASG’s fiercest combatants and in October 2002, they 

handed the Philippine marines their heaviest combat losses since the 1970s. At the time he was believed to command around 100 fighters. He has a P1 million bounty. His 

son, Esmin Radullan (sometimes listed as Ismin Sahiron), 

and other subleaders, Jundam Jamalul aka Black Killer 

and Kiri Hamid reportedly went to Mindanao to merge with 

the MILF. His two nephews, Muin Maulod Sahiron and 

Adbumon Sahiron are his top lieutenants.

Gumbahali Abu Jumdail

aka Dr. Abu

Commander on Jolo. At one time he was thought to have 

roughly 300 fighters. He was involved in the April 23, 

2000, Sipidan raid.

Mubin Ibba Commander on Basilan. Was Isnilon Hapilon’s deputy. 

Led a mass-breakout from a jail on Basilan in April 2004. 

25 ASG members escaped.

Albader Parad Commander on Jolo

Borhan Mundus

Hadon Adak Deputy commander on Jolo

Hadji Radi Upao Commander in Tawi Tawi

Table 5. ASG Commanders in the Sulu Archipelago.
31

Tanakalun Lianson Top commander on Basilan. Killed in January 2005.

Hamsiraji Sali aka Jose Ramirez Killed in Basilan in April 2004.

Mujib Susukan Killed in February 2003.

Redendo Cain Dellosa aka Hakid Akmal Arrested in 2004. Admitted to planting the 

bomb on the SuperFerry in February 2004. 

Balik Islam convert.

Galib Damon Arrested on October 21, 2004

Alhamser Manatad Limbong Arrested on February 27, 2004.

Table 6. Senior ASG Lieutenants/Commanders 

Neutralized in 2003-05.

a truck bomb were conducted, and that JI had the capacity to do 

so if it wanted.127 Indeed one of the leading bomb makers for JI, 

Dulmatin, is reported to be in the southern Philippines. In December 

2004, Philippine security agents arrested an Abu Sayyaf member 

accompanying three JI members to MILF camps in Mindanao, where 

they were to conduct training on car bombings. As the head of 

PNP Intelligence, Chief Superintendent Ismael Rafnan, ominously 

warned, “They were planning to go into car bombs. They have 

reached that level of sophistication. They are ready to do it.”128

 The ASG demonstrated with the SuperFerry incident that they 

have graduated to a more lethal scope of attacks. The Valentine’s 

Day bomb in General Santos City was made from a 105mm howitzer 

shell, significantly larger than the mortar shell bombs they have 

traditionally used. The fact that they were able to execute three 

bombings across the country nearly simultaneously displays a degree 

of technical sophistication. I would argue that, in this specific case, 

there is no difference between an artillery shell and mortar shell, 

except for the size of the bang. Same priming, wiring, and detonation 

are used, and were used. Also, simultaneous bombings translate into 

an improved degree of operational sophistication, not technical. It 

shows they are better at coordinating what they are doing.

 In the ASG’s safehouse on 141 Aglipay Street, used as the 

Valentine’s Day bomber’s base of operations, police discovered not 

just a huge inventory of bomb making equipment and explosives, 

but ominously 12 small bombs made of C4 mixed with kerosene 
32

and reinjected into personal care products (toothpaste tubes and 

shampoo bottles). Intelligence officials believe that the only purpose 

for such small bombs is to blow up airplanes.129

 As the ASG is reverting to its terrorist past, they also are harkening 

back to the period of tutelage under Ramzi Yousef and taking a page 

out of his playbook which is: the potential for more lethal attacks 

is clearly evident, and the ASG leaders seem bent on escalating the 

level of violence. 

The Potential for Sectarian Violence.

 The MILF has never turned their war into a sectarian conflict. 

Indeed, the MILF has worked with Christian communities and 

members of the Catholic clergy effectively. Leading ideologues have 

contended, “Jihad is not meant to wage indiscriminant fighting 

against non-Muslims, mush less Christians.”130 The ASG, in contrast, 

was founded on the notion of sectarian violence. For the first 5 years 

of the organization’s life, its attacks were directed almost exclusively 

at Christian targets: bombings and grenade attacks of churches, and 

assassinations and kidnappings of clergy and missionaries. There is 

growing concern that the ASG will return to these tactics to provoke 

the desired conflict. Planned and thwarted attacks in metropolitan 

areas during Holy Week point to the conscious desire to target nonMuslim religious elements. 

 The impetus also has come from JI, which always has used 

sectarian conflict to further their cause and bolster their ranks. This 

is what JI and its leaders were consumed with in 1998-2000 when 

they established two separate paramilitaries, the Laskar Mujiheddin 

and the Laskar Jundullah in the Malukus and Sulawesi, respectively. 

This was an important tool for JI in indoctrinating their members, 

giving them a sense of defending their religion and reinforcing their 

Manichean view of the world. In 2004-05, the number of bombings, 

attacks, and assassinations must be seen as a deliberate attempt to 

break the uneasy truce that has held since the negotiation of the 

Malino Accords in 2002. 

 • In October 2004, 123 IEDs were discovered in a cache hidden 

in a Muslim cemetery outside of Poso.
33

 • On March 28, 2005, Indonesian police raided safe houses used 

by Islamic militants in Ambon, seizing a cache of some 95 

IEDs and ammunition.

 • On April 24, another sectarian conflict flared in Mamasa 

Regency in Central Sulawesi. A gang of Muslim “Kommandos” 

torched houses in a Christian community, killing six. The first 

suspect arrested in conjunction with the attacks admitted his 

“plans to carry out terror attacks and bombings across the 

country.” His arrests were followed by two bombings in April 

in Poso.

 • On May 2, Indonesian police arrested three suspects wanted 

in conjunction with the August 2003 bombing of the J. W. 

Marriott Hotel in Jakarta. All three, as well as a fourth who 

escaped, were involved in not only the sectarian bloodletting 

in Ambon in 1999-2000, but also the April 24 attacks in 

Mamasa.

 • On May 28, twin bomb blasts at a market in Tentana, Central 

Sulawesi, killed 22 people.

 At the same time the Laskar Mujiheddin reconstituted themselves 

and appeared in Aceh in the wake of the December 26 tsunami.131

Their revival, following the release from jail of their leader and 

founder, Mohammad Iqbal Abdurrahman (aka Abu Jibril), should 

come as no surprise. Unlike other JI leaders, such as Wan Min Wan 

Mat or Nassir bin Abbas, who have been released after renouncing 

JI and its violent means,132 Abu Jibril has not. 

 One Philippine Intelligence official confirmed to me that several 

members of the Laskar Jundullah were currently in Mindanao. He 

went out of his way to differentiate them from common JI members.133

Other JI members, such as Zulkifli, encouraged their MILF and ASG 

contacts to escalate attacks on Christians. 

 Why would the ASG engage in sectarian conflict? What would 

they stand to gain? The answer is two-fold. First, they seek to prove 

to JI that they are a reliable jihad partner. By following JI’s line on the 

issue of sectarian violence, they will deepen the bond. Second, while 

the MILF assiduously has not reverted to sectarian violence, they 

have also failed in their struggle. Not only has the MILF not won 
34

an independent homeland, but also the number of Christian settlers 

continues to increase. Muslims now comprise a majority in only 

five provinces and two cities in Mindanao, with the ratios declining 

rapidly (by Manila design). The ASG might see sectarian conflict as a 

means to win over disaffected and frustrated members of the MILF. 

 To that end, the MILF, in a very interesting recent posting on 

their website, warned of the ASG’s move towards fomenting “lateral 

violence.”134 It is worth recounting the March 22, 2005, statement:

In the same vein, Ameen also hit the Abu Sayyaf, especially its self-styled 

spokesman, a certain Abu Sulaiman, for equally promoting MuslimChristian animosity in this country.

“Only the ‘enemy’ will benefit when Muslims and Christians start cutting 

each other throat [sic] in this country,” he warned.

He reiterated earlier call [sic] to the Abu Sayyaf to abandon their “terrorist 

ways” and return to the correct teachings of Islam that even during war 

“non-combatants” are spared from harm, adding that such activities 

will only alienate them from the people being one of the most important 

factors in a truly revolutionary warfare.

“When you offended (sic) the people,” he warned, “you lose their support 

and you’re in great trouble.”135

 Unlike other MILF postings on www.luwaran.com, which tend to 

respond to events in the news, there was no real news event to prompt 

this statement. Clearly the MILF is attuned to the ASG’s avowed 

intention, and it is causing some concern among the leadership. The 

saving grace is that the ASG’s numbers remain quite small, and it is 

not evident to me that they actually have the capability to engage in 

such acts. That said, they clearly have demonstrated the will.

 While the vast majority of Muslims in the South would not 

support a broader sectarian conflict as it would eventually bring 

a heavy-handed and in certain areas more or less indiscriminate 

PNP and AFP response, the ASG is not a mass movement, nor does 

it strive to be. It is an elite organization which is trying to follow 

what it believes to be the correct path, regardless of current popular 

support.
35

Balik Islam and Christian Converts.

 The third concern for Philippine security officials is the degree to 

which ASG members have recruited from Balik Islam organizations.136

This has given the ASG and JI a reach into the Luzon-Manila regions, 

beyond the Muslim-dominated south. While the MILF has availed 

itself of Balik Islam groups to a small degree, the Abu Sayyaf adroitly 

has exploited the zeal of new adult converts to Islam. According to 

statistics gathered by Luis Q. Lacar in his study of the Balik Islam 

phenomenon, by 1995 there were 98,500 converts.137

 Abu Sayyaf worked closely with one group of converts, called 

the Rajah Solaiman Movement (RSM) in the late 1990s. The RSM was 

a cell of militant students and teachers at the Madrasah of Fi Sabilila 

Daw’ah and Media Foundation in Luzon Island, which was broken 

up in early 2002. Although it was amateurish, it gained the attention 

of Philippine police and intelligence officials for three reasons. 

 First, the RSM had clear ties to both the MILF and the ASG. 

The group’s leader, Ahmed Islam del Rosario Santos, and his two 

brothers traveled to Camp Abu Bakar in August 1999 to meet with 

MILF leaders; and in December 2001, Santos underwent military 

and explosives training at Camp Bushra at Lanao del Sur. The RSM 

received funding from the Darul Hijrah Foundation, which was 

founded by several MILF members including Abbas Kansi, Abdul 

Nasser Nooh (former MILF liaison officer in Manila), Khairoden 

Macarya, Abdulla Akmad, and Bashir Hasan, and is under the 

unofficial leadership of Yusop Alongan, the former MILF Financial 

Committee Chairman. Sheikh Omar Lavilla, another RSM leader and 

a former classmate of Janjalani at Mindanao State University, was 

promised support from the ASG leader in late-2000.138 A suspected 

ASG front in Manila, the Philippine Association of Muslimah Daul 

Eemanm Inc., was connected to the RSM and Balik Islam activities.139

But the connections are also based on kinship. Three sisters, all Balik 

Islam converts, are the wives of Khadaffy Janjalani (Zainad Lim 

Dungon), Abu Solaiman, the ASG “spokesman” (Amina Lim Dungon) 

and RSM’s founder Ahmed Santos (Lorraine Lim Dungon).140

 Second, it was based in Luzon, the primary Philippine Christian 

stronghold and the seat of national political, cultural, and financial 

power. This indicated that at the very least, there was a large 
36

disaffected population, so cut off from mainstream Philippine life 

that they actually would convert from Chrisianity to Islam, and 

at worst, that the southern Muslim rebels wanted to expand the 

battlefield physically to relieve some of the pressure the government 

was putting on them. For instance, of the 1,890 madrassas in the 

Philippines, only 1,000 or so are in Mindanao; the remainder are 

spread across the rest of the country.

 The third and more urgent cause for alarm was that the RSM was 

built upon Mohammed Jamal Khalifa’s NGO network, left unscathed 

by the Philippine authorities after 1995. These include the Islamic 

Studies Call and Guidance (ISCAG),141 the Islamic Information 

Center led by Nedal al-Dhalain,142 and Islamic Wisdom Worldwide 

Mission (IWWM). The IWWM is led by Mohammad Amin Soloman 

Al Ghafari, a long-time associate of Khalifa, and absorbed the IRIC 

staff after it was closed in 1995. The IWWM also has a long history of 

providing money for MILF.

 More recently, Philippine National Security Adviser Norberto 

Gonzales said Abu Sayyaf chieftain Khadaffy Janjalani has deployed 

80 Muslim converts mainly to Manila and other key cities to bomb 

civilian and government targets.143 To date, there is no known 

organizational presence in Manila. 

 What is most alarming is not just that these charities remain 

operating, but the militancy of their converts. Since the regeneration 

of the ASG as a bona fide terrorist organization in the start of 2004, 

Muslim converts have played key roles in every attack, attempted 

attack or operation:

 • Redendo Cain Dellosa, aka Hakid Akmal, arrested in 2004, 

admitted to planting the bomb on the SuperFerry in February 

2004;

 • Angelo Abu Khalil Trinidad, aka Abu Khalil, one of the two 

Valentine’s Day (Makati) bombers, was arrested on February 

22, 2005;

 • Allan Burlognatan, shot after escaping from Camp Crame, was 

arrested for attempting a bus bombing in Manila in February 

2005;144

 • Ibrahim Mutu Kessel, a cell member under the leadership 

of Abdul Manap Mentang, arrested in November 2004; was 
37

thought to be the ring-leader of a group of 40 Balik Islam 

recruits to the ASG;145

 • Jaybe Ofrasio, a Balik Islam convert in Ireland, was arrested 

by authorities there for wiring money to ASG and JI suspects; 

he provided a safehouse for Taufiq Riefqi, an Indonesian 

JI operative in Cotabato; Zulkifli, a top JI operative in the 

Philippines, was arrested in 2003 as he tried to enter Malaysia 

using a passport in the name of Dani Ofrasio;146

 • Tyrone Dave Santos, aka Daud Santos or Dawud Muslim del 

Rosario Santos, was arrested on March 23, 2005, in Manila 

for possession of explosives that were intended for a string 

of attacks during Holy Week; he is the brother of the RSM’s 

founder Ahmed Islam del Rosario Santos.147

 As one senior security official complained to me, they knew that 

the ASG was actively using the Balik Islam network to recruit and 

indoctrinate new members, but they did not have smoking gun 

evidence that the Saudi and Gulf-funded charities that supported 

Balik Islam were actively complicit in supporting the militants, 

which limited their response.148

IMPLICATIONS FOR SECURITY

 The regeneration of the ASG has implications for both Philippine 

security, especially in terms of its impact on the ongoing GRP-MILF 

peace process, as well as on regional security. 

Implications for the MILF, the Peace Process, 

and Philippine Security.

 The MILF currently is engaged in peace talks with the Philippine 

government.149 The 12,000-man rebel army has been fighting since 

1978 for the establishment of its own homeland, governed by Islamic 

law. Chairman Ebrahim El Haj Murad has indicated that he is truly 

committed to finding a durable political solution to the civil war. 

While the cease-fire is holding well, little has been agreed to in the 

talks between the two sides.
38

 While the GRP asserts that the MILF is a loose coalition and highly 

factionalized, I come to a different conclusion. Based on dozens 

of interviews with MILF officials, their negotiators and advisors, I 

contend that the MILF is a more unitary organization than it is given 

credit for (though it is hardly monolithic), with effective (though it 

can be slow) command and control.150 There are clearly differences 

of opinion over certain policies (Jemaah Islamiyah and the ASG, 

for example), but there is no overt factionalism that hampers 

decisionmaking or threatens the organization as a whole. Chairman 

Ebrahim el-Haj Murad is in effective control, for now. Even before 

Salamat died, “Murad presided over executive functions”151 so that 

there was no question as to who would take over the organization. 

Members have told me that the Central Committee decision to 

appoint Murad as chairman was unanimous.152

 Yet the potential for factionalism is there, especially over a 

peace agreement with the government, which, if it is reached, 

likely would fall short of full independence or a referendum. An 

MNLF-like autonomy agreement, such as that signed between 

the GRP and MNLF, which in the MILF’s eyes has been a dismal 

failure and did not address the root causes of the insurgency, will 

lead to the factionalization of the organization. We know where the 

factionalization will come from: the base commands/units loyal 

to Samir Hashim, Ustadz Abdulwahid Khalil Tondok, and Ustadz 

Ameril Umbra Kato; and a handful of subcommanders, including 

Abdul Kitogi Icow. A few other base commanders are “on the border 

line.” Alloy al-Ashre of the 108th has been close to ASG members in 

the past. These individuals have shown that they are welcoming to 

foreign jihadis, willing to use indiscriminant violence, and willing to 

escalate the conflict. For now, the Central Committee is in control, 

and the MILF’s leadership appears to be trying to contain these 

hardcore elements, but they will not be able to hold on for much 

longer.

 Rather than factionalism, the real rifts in the organization seem 

to be generational. “The younger set thinks different. They are 

radicals in a different way,” Attorney Michael Mastura told me.153

This phenomenon can be explained in two ways. First, a critical mass 

has returned from the Middle East that has been socialized in a more 
39

militant and austere interpretation of Islam. Second, some frustration 

exists within the ranks that after 20 years the older generation was 

not able to free the Bangsamoro people. The MILF was shocked in 

May 2004 when four of its members had admitted that they had 

been recruited by JI. Some leaders now describe JI as a “virus” 

that is targeting their youth.154 Talking about the MILF revolution, 

one leader said to me, “It is not religious fundamentalism. It is 

nationalism. We have to stop it now. It could become an issue of 

fundamentalism.”155

 And this seems to be what is driving the MILF leadership’s 

thinking. One MILF negotiator told me that if they signed a peace 

agreement that was detrimental to the MILF, then there would be 

large scale defections: “The Abu Sayyaf will welcome them with 

open arms,” one member told me.156 Chairman Murad warned Time 

Magazine about the radicalism of Moro youth and how they will be 

drawn toward JI and the ASG if the peace agreement is not reached 

soon: “Once they see some hope, then they will think twice before 

joining groups that advocate suicide bombing, and so on. But when 

they believe there is no future, then they will go to these groups.”157

 And perhaps that is part of the Abu Sayyaf’s calculation: if the 

MILF makes peace with the government and accepts autonomy 

rather than full independence, then more radical leaders of the MILF 

will join with the ASG. As one ASG leader stated recently, “If this 

sell-out succeeds, more blood will flow because the young are more 

determined jihadis. We will soon find out there are more Osama bin 

Laden’s in our midst.”158

 On February 1, 2005, the AFP launched a major attack on Jolo. 

The provocation is still disputed: AFP troops say that ASG, with 

some local MNLF cadres, ambushed and killed 14 AFP soldiers. 

Local Muslims do not deny that an ambush took place, but assert 

that it was a local MNLF commander, Ustadz Sadir Malik, and his 

troops only, who were responding to an unprovoked attack that led 

to the death of a local religious leader, his wife, and child.159 The 

AFP insisted the individuals in the targeted house were members 

of the ASG. In the ensuing conflict, the AFP has now renewed the 

war with members of the one group that they had made peace with. 

The ASG claims that they are fighting side by side with the MNLF, 

something that the MNLF vehemently denies.160 Yet even this small 
40

and concentrated offensive has depleted the AFP of the resources it 

needs to fight elsewhere. As mentioned above, the primary security 

threat to the Philippine government remains the CPP/NPA, which 

is increasing in both numbers and strength.

 In short, the ASG will capitalize if there is a peace agreement 

(whether it is meaningful or unimplementable) between the GRP and 

the MILF as radical members will defect to their ranks. At the same 

time, the ASG also stands to gain if there is no peace agreement, or 

if the GRP-MNLF agreement begins to unravel. Should the cease fire 

breakdown, as one side seeks to improve its strategic position at the 

negotiating table, the MILF will depend more on the ASG to keep 

government forces spread thin.161

 At present there is so much overlap between the ASG, MILF 

and JI that Philippine security officials are often truly at a loss as to 

which group is responsible for an attack. Delineations are becoming 

particularly difficult as the groups increasingly work together. 

IMPLICATIONS FOR REGIONAL SECURITY

 While JI continues to train its members in MILF camps in the 

Lanao del Sur-Maguindanao region, some evidence suggests that JI 

members are availing themselves of ASG bases in Tawi-Tawi. These 

reports are unconfirmed, but if true, they would further indicate that 

there are ties between the two groups. 

 Clearly JI leaders worry that the MILF sees them as expendable. 

While some in the MILF see JI as fellow travelers and allies, many 

in the MILF leadership see the JI as a liability. At best, they see JI as 

their strongest card to be played in the peace talks. To that end, JI has 

to hedge its bets and strengthen ties to the ASG.

 A true core of hardened JI operatives is now in Mindanao 

working with the ASG and some members of the MILF. They offer 

unimpeachable terrorist credentials and cachet, a wealth of terrorist 

expertise, ideological tutelage, and bomb making skills. Most 

significantly, they have a neo-Darul Islam orientation, the stated 

endstate goal of a pan-Southeast Asian Islamic caliphate necessitating 

provoking radical sectarian conflict. To that end, I have been told 

that Laskar Jundullah operatives are now encamped in the region. 
41

 The ASG has a vast reservoir of recruits and they control pockets 

of territory, while JI has the technical expertise that the ASG needs 

to escalate the war against Manila and become an effective fighting 

force. The implications of this are clear.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

 The ASG has reemerged as a terrorist element in Southeast Asia. 

Though a small group, they are of concern to the United States for three 

primary reasons. First, they will continue to target Americans and 

U.S. interests. Second, they have shown a propensity for establishing 

working ties with transnational terrorist groups like JI and al Qaeda.162

Third, they seek to spoil the MILF-GRP peace process, which is of 

great importance to U.S. and regional security, since without access 

to MILF sanctuaries, JI will have trouble reconstituting its depleted 

ranks. For those reasons, the United States should take the ASG 

threat seriously.

 Nonetheless, U.S. officials must recognize that neither the ASG 

nor the MILF pose the largest security threat to the GRP. Indeed, the 

ASG is a nuisance, though were it to be able to attack Manila on a 

regular and sustained basis, serious economic repercussions would 

result. All evidence suggests that these groups will continue to do 

this.163 The single greatest threat to the Philippine state continues 

to come from the CPP/NPA. This has two important implications: 

First, the GRP should be expected to play up the ASG threat when 

speaking to a U.S. audience in order to elicit more aid and military 

assistance; at the same time they may deny the MILF relationship 

with and training of JI.164 Second, the GRP will often engage in 

quick half-measures to deal with the ASG and MILF. For example, 

though the GRP and the MILF are currently engaged in peace talks, 

expectations are slight that the GRP has the capacity or will to actually 

implement any final agreement, thereby sowing the seeds of the next 

insurgency. Disaffected members of the MILF and ASG will lead this 

insurgency. 

 The MILF-GRP peace talks are important and the U.S. Government should support them. With the conclusion of a peace agreement, the MILF will have certain rights, but it will also have 

obligations, in particular, policing its autonomous region. Both the 
42

ASG and JI rely on the MILF as neither control territory or have ready 

access to guns, materiel, and money. The majority of the MILF can be 

weaned off of their relationship with terrorist groups.

 There has been talk of placing the MILF on the U.S. Foreign 

Terrorist Organization list as punishment for its continued support 

for the ASG and JI.165 While most bureaucratic entities understand 

that the MILF is a legitimate entity (certainly their grievances are), 

patience is wearing thin. Only the State Department continues to 

resist the designation, and even it is divided on the issue.166 The MILF 

believe that links between them and JI are at a low enough level that 

they have a degree of plausible deniability. What is of significant 

concern to American and regional intelligence officials is not simply 

that the training is continuing, but that a cadre of first-generation, 

Afghan-trained JI members is now based in Mindanao, including 

Dulmatin and Umar Patek, two of the Bali bombers. Increasingly, 

Mindanao is seen not just as a rear base of operations, but as a 

potential center of operations. As Deputy Chief of Mission Joseph 

Mussomelli said, “The threat remains, and, frankly, on some ways it 

is growing. The number of JI that are there, the links between JI and 

MILF factions and ASG may even be increasing.”167

 In a trip to Manila in early April, the newly appointed Commander 

of U.S. Forces in the Pacific, Admiral William Fallon, raised the issue 

of designation,168 causing an outcry from the Philippine government, 

including President Arroyo.169 Admiral Fallon’s statement reflects 

U.S. frustration with both the MILF and the Philippine Government. 

Regarding the former, the intelligence is making it hard for anyone 

to believe the MILF’s denials. Regarding the latter, the Philippine 

government has shown little seriousness or vision regarding the 

peace process. President Arroyo has shown little leadership that is 

needed if she is to succeed in reaching a deal with the MILF that 

will stabilize Mindanao. The Philippine government does not want 

the United States to do it, because it will stall the peace process and 

potentially lead to a resumption of war;170 something the Philippine 

government can ill-afford.

 While the MILF publicly scoffs at designation, they should not. 

Designation would delegitimize their movement and hurt their 

dream of an East-Timor styled United Nations (UN)-sponsored 

referendum. Moreover, the UN Security Council will likely follow 
43

suit, and the MILF has no friends on the Security Council. Moreover, 

it will set back the peace process and give hardliners in the Philippine 

military the incentive to continue the war. 

 The recalcitrant wings of the MILF and the ASG must be dealt 

with militarily. There is nothing to negotiate with these groups. 

They are too willing to use indiscriminate violence in pursuit of their 

radical agenda, and they are too willing to form tactical alliances 

with transnational terrorist organizations, linking themselves with 

the pan-Islamic Salafi Jihadist agenda.

 But to deal with the ASG and radical elements of the MILF 

militarily is not going to be easy. The AFP does not have the capability 

or resources to accomplish this mission. And at some level, they do 

not have the integrity: the AFP is so fraught with corruption that 

at certain points they have made a mockery out of fighting the war 

on terror. While individual Filipino soldiers have demonstrated 

remarkable valor in the field, too many of their leaders have enriched 

themselves at their subordinates’ expense. The AFP has taken well 

to U.S. training. Units in the field that I have interviewed take great 

pride in their U.S. training. It is certainly good for morale. U.S. 

training, especially small unit, special operations training, should 

continue. 

 But U.S. policymakers and Pentagon officials have to be concerned about falling into a trap: With roughly $80 million in annual 

military assistance to Manila and little to show for it, the United 

States should both reevaluate the aid program as well as establish 

better auditing mechanisms for the equipment provided. Aid in the 

current fiscal year is purported to have been cut to $31.76 million.171

While the training programs have accorded some results, one gets 

the impression that when U.S. advisors are not with their Philippine 

trainees, combat operations grind to a halt, and ASG members 

mysteriously break through cordons. 

 Since the debacle in early 2003, when the Pentagon announced 

the plans for Balikitan-03, in which U.S. forces would “conduct 

or support combat patrols” for an open-ended period,172 and then 

had to delay the deployment owing to the political uproar, U.S. 

officials have been more sensitive to the domestic response in the 

Philippines. There is considerable public and congressional concern 

in the Philippines that the United States is simply out to reestablish 
44

permanent bases. These concerns seem misguided at a time when 

the Pentagon is actually consolidating bases, but they still exist.173

 If U.S. forces continue to be engaged in Mindanao, they should 

increase their civil action programs. They are exceptionally 

well-received by the local communities, whose information and 

intelligence is essential to effective counterinsurgency operations. 

Road construction, well building, and medical treatment are a lowcost, high-yield investment.

 Finally, we need to further assist the Philippine government in 

its ability to monitor and disrupt terrorist financing. To that end, 

the U.S. Government must also push the Saudi Arabian government 

to fulfill its pledge to monitor the activities of their charities. Much 

of the ASG’s funding and support comes through the charities 

established by Mohammad Jamal Khalifa in the early-1990s that 

have either remained open to this date, or simply proliferated into 

a number of smaller charities. 

CONCLUSION

 The ASG remains a very loose coalition of groups. I question the 

degree of control that Khadaffy Janjalani has over the ASG groups in 

Jolo, Basilan, and Tawi Tawi. They have neither the discipline nor the 

command and control that the MILF has over their troops. It remains 

to be seen whether Khadaffy Janjalani can consolidate his power. It 

is also not clear how durable either organization would be with the 

capture or neutralization of Janjalani.

 But the ASG has emerged as a serious security threat to Philippine 

and arguably regional security. They have forged closer relations 

with hard-line MILF elements, and have proven themselves to be 

a reliable partner for JI. There is a critical mass now of senior JI 

operatives, not just young recruits. Many now see Mindanao as a 

base of operations, rather than a rear training area.

 Any surge in terrorist activities will have a devastating impact 

on the Philippine economy, already beset by an ongoing, serious 

fiscal crisis. The government, which is calling on its line ministries 

to accept a 40 percent budget cut this fiscal year, can ill afford either 

increased security costs or a loss of foreign investment. Already, 

there is little foreign direct investment (FDI) because the huge public 
45

sector debt, which has more than doubled to RP3.36 trillion (US$60.32 

billion) since the Asian Economic Crisis in 1997, is not leaving the 

government money to invest in infrastructure. The national debt 

rose by 13.6 percent to RP3.8 trillion between 2003-04 (78.7 percent 

of gross domestic product (GDP), one of the highest ratios in the 

developing world). FDI is 19 percent of GDP, and must be increased 

to 28 percent, to deal with the country’s surging unemployment that 

has increased from 12.2 percent in first quarter of 2003 to 13.7 to the 

same period in 2004. Of the country’s 36.5 million-man labor force, 

more than five million are unemployed, and countless more are 

underemployed. 

 And yet little meaningful government counterterrorism 

movement or action is in the offing, as it is a very low priority of 

the public, and hence a poll-driven president. In March 2005 public 

opinion surveys by both the Social Weather Station and Pulse Asia, 

the president’s performance approval ratings plummeted. Approval 

of her performance fell to 36 percent, while disapproval was up to 

48 percent.174 The Pulse Asia study found that her public support fell 

from 55 percent in June 2004 to 38 percent in March 2005.175 Public 

perception of the country’s direction is plummeting, mainly due 

to economic issues: 59 percent of Filipinos believe that the country 

will be worse off in 12 months’ time. When asked to list their three 

most pressing issues, counterterrorism only garnered support from 

6 percent of the respondents, while economic issues dominated 

their concerns: controlling prices (45 percent), poverty reduction 

(32 percent), national economic recovery (31 percent), low pay (30 

percent), and the national deficit (10 percent).176 While peace rated 

highly (35 percent), disapproval of the government’s peace initiatives 

rose from 28 to 35 percent.177 These numbers do not bode well for 

either counterterror efforts or peace initiatives in the Philippines. For 

a president concerned with her political standing, most efforts will 

be focused on core economic issues, and not the threat of terrorism. 

ENDNOTES

 1. Karl B. Kaufman and Johnathan Vicente, “3 Held in Plot to Bomb U.S. 

Embassy,” The Manila Times, October 22, 2004; Jaime Laude, “AFP: JI Plot to Bomb 

U.S. Embassy Foiled,” The Philippine Star, October 22, 2004.
46

 2. In a radio statement claiming responsibility, Abu Solaiman, the group’s 

spokesman, said, “Our latest operation in GenSan, Davao, and Manila, planned 

and executed with precision by the gallant warriors of Islam, is our continuing 

response to the government’s atrocities committed against Muslims everywhere.” 

Joel Francis Guinto, “Bomb Blasts Rock Davao, General Santos, Makati,” Philippine 

Daily Inquirer, February 14, 2005.

 3. “Cache of Bomb Chemicals Seized in Manila Warehouse,” Agence France 

Presse, May 3, 2005.

 4. See http://www.manilatimes.net/national/2004/aug/13/yehey/top_stories/200408

13top3.html.

 5. Marites D. Vitug and Glenda M. Gloria, Under the Crescent Moon: Rebellion in 

Mindanao, Quezon City: Ataneo Center for Social Policy and Public Affairs and the 

Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism, 2000, p. 2.

 6. For more on the Islamic International Brigade, see Peter Bergen, Holy War 

Inc.: Inside the Secret World of Osama bin Laden, New York: The Free Press, 2002.

 7. The Moro National Liberation Front was founded in 1972 by Nur Misuari. 

It was the largest of the Muslim secessionist movements and in its heyday had 

considerable state sponsorship from the Libyan and Malaysian governments, 

in particular from the governor of Sabah, Tun Mustapha. In 1976 the Libyan 

government brokered a peace accord between the GRP and MNLF, but it was 

poorly implemented, and fighting quickly resumed. In 1978, a faction led by 

Salamat Hashim broke away from Misuari, whom they accused of being too 

secular. The offshoot was formally founded as the Moro Islamic Liberation Front 

(MILF) in 1984. 

 8. National Intelligence Coordinating Agency (NICA), “Briefing on Al Harakat 

al Islamiya (AHAI),” No date given, p. 6.

 9. 9/11 Commission Report, New York: WW Norton, 2004, p. 58.

 10. Ramzi Yousef and his uncle, the 9/11 mastermind, were not members of 

al Qaeda at the time. The 9/11 Commission Report describes them as “. . . rootless 

but experienced operatives who--though not necessarily formal members of 

someone else’s organization--were traveling around the world and joining in 

projects that were supported by or linked to bin Ladin, the Blind Sheikh, or their 

associates.” The 9/11 Commission Report, p. 59. For more on Ramzi Yousef and the 

Bojinka plot, see Philippines National Police, “After Operations Report,” 1995. 

 11. Edwin Angeles (aka Yusuf Ibrahim) fought the Soviets in Afghanistan. 

Following his return to the Philippines in 1991, he was captured by PNP/AFP 

elements, and recruited to serve as a double agent for the government. He was 

released and rejoined the ASG, but was killed soon after, most likely by the ASG.

 12. Donald G. McNeil, Jr., “Belgium Seeks Arms Deals With Suspected Qaeda 

Ties,” New York Times, February 2002, p. 27.

 13. NICA, “Briefing on Al Harakat al Islamiya,” no date given, p. 3.
47

 14. Ibid.

 15. For more on Khalifa’s financial network, see Zachary Abuza, Funding 

Terrorism in Southeast Asia: The Financial Network of al Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah, 

NBR Analysis, Vol. 14, No. 5, Seattle: The National Bureau of Asian Research, 

December 2003, pp. 26-28.

 16. The IIRO actually was established in 1978, but co-opted in 1979 by Saudi 

Arabian intelligence in order to serve as a financial conduit for Saudi, U.S., and 

Gulf-state funding to the Mujiheddin in Afghanistan. Through the 1980s, the IIRO 

legitimized itself and grew. It now has more than 30 offices, and its activities cover 

more than 75 countries. In the early 1990s, the IIRO decided to have separate 

directors for each of the countries, and Khalifa became the IIRO director for the 

Philippines. The IIRO claims to have begun charitable work in the Philippines in 

1988, but according to documents registered at the Philippine Securities Exchange 

Commission (PSEC), the IIRO was legally incorporated in the Philippines on 

September 20, 1991, with offices in Makati and in several cities in Mindanao, 

including Cotabato and Zamboanga. Khalifa was listed as the IIRO’s president 

and chairman of the board of trustees. Based on IIRO documents at the PSEC, 

Khalifa was one of five incorporators who signed the documents of registration; 

another was Khalifa’s wife, Alice “Jameelah” Yabo. Dr. Adnan Khalil Basha, 

“Largest Islamic Relief Organization Maligned,” Letter to the Editor, Philippine 

Daily Inquirer, August 2000, p. 18; Christine Herrera, “Gemma Linked to Bin Laden 

Group Funding Sayyaf, MILF,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, August 10, 2000. 

 17. Mark Lander, “US Advisors May Aid Philippine Anti-Terror Effort,” New 

York Times, October 11, 2001, p. B4.

 18. Basha, “Largest Islamic Relief Organization Maligned.” 

 19. “Bin Ladin’s In-Law Responds to New York Times Report on Terrorist 

Links,” Al Sharq al-Awsat, London, May 2002, p. 4, in Foreign Broadcast Information 

Service (FBIS)-NES, May 5, 2002, p. 6.

 20. Ibid., p. 7.

 21. Christine Herrera, “Bin Laden Funds Abu Sayyaf Through Muslim Relief 

Group,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, August 9, 2000.

 22. Ibid.

 23. Ibid.

 24. For more on Ramzi Yousef and the Bojinka plot, see The 9/11 Commission 

Report, p. 147; Philippines National Police, “After Operations Report,” 1995. 

 25. Philippine National Intelligence Coordinating Agency, NICA, “Briefing on 

Al Harakat al Islamiya,” p. 5.

 26. “Government Junks Abu Demand to Free Bandit Leader For Americans,” 

Philippine Daily Inquirer, October 2001.

 27. See U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) Fact Sheet, “Abu Sayyaf History,” 

March 5, 2002, at http://www.pacom.mil/piupdates/abusayyafhist.shtml.
48

 28. For more on the Libyan payment of ransoms, see Seth Maydans, “Libyan 

Aid Helps to Free Hostages Held in the Philippines,” The New York Times, October 

21, 2001; and Deidre Sheehan, “Buying Trouble,” Far Eastern Economic Review 

(FEER), September 2000, p. 7.

 29. Carlos Conde, “Muslim Cleric Confirms bin Laden Visit to Mindanao,” 

Philippine Daily Inquirer.

 30. Cited in Jose Torres Jr., Into the Mountain: Hostaged by the Abu Sayyaf, Quezon 

City: Claretian Publications, 2001, p. 41.

 31. Interview with Philippine Information Agency journalist, Cotabato, 

January 9, 2002.

 32. USPACOM Fact Sheet, “Abu Sayyaf History,” March 5, 2002, at http://www.

pacom.mil/piupdates/abusayyafhist.shtml.

 33. Rajiv Chandrasekaran, “Rebel’s Escape Draws Scrutiny,” Washington Post, 

September 1, 2001.

 34. See www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/counter_terrorism/counter_

terrorism_strategy.pdf.

 35. See http://www.pacom.mil/news/news2004/040727ctphil.shtml.

 36. For more on U.S. military operations in the Philippines, see Andrew 

Feickert, “U.S. Military Operations in the Global War on Terrorism: Afghanistan, 

Africa, the Philippines, and Colombia,” CRS report for Congress, February 4, 2005, 

pp. 9-12.

 37. The author would like to thank John Dacey for making this point.

 38. In 2004, the AFP had 10 functioning helicopters, down from 80 in the 

1980s. Of its three C-13 cargo planes, only one was operational, the other two 

were cannibalized for spare parts. Andrew Spaeth, “Under the Gun,” Time-Asian 

Edition, May 9, 2005.

 39. In 2003, an independent commission examining the Oakwood Mutiny 

drafted the Feliciano Report on the state of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and 

found that approximately 30 percent of the procurement budget was embezzled. 

Currently Major General Carlos Garcia, the former logistics comptroller, is on trial 

for corruption. He allegedly amassed more than $1 million. 

 40. Marco Garrido, “After Madrid, Manila?” Asia Times, April 24,2004.

 41. The special panel created by the government, the Maniwang Commission, 

cleared senior MILF leaders of the bombings at the Davao International Airport 

and Sasa Wharf. The Maniwang Commission issued its findings on March 25, 2004. 

Government officials have linked several JI members, who were trainers at MILF 

camps and are now held in custody in Malaysia, to the bombings. “Prosecutor to 

MILF on Davao Bombings: Face Trial,” MindaNews, June 1, 2004. 

 42. Jainal Antel Sali (aka Abu Sulaiman) first claimed responsibility for the 

SuperFerry 14 bombing, though it was perpetrated by Redondo Cain Dellosa (aka 

Arnulfo Alvarado).
49

 43. Four other cell members were arrested that month. The four-man cell 

claimed it was responsible for the February SuperFerry bombing. They were 

captured with 36kg of explosives. One of the four was identified as al-Hamsed 

Manatad Limbong (aka Kosovo), a second cousin of Khadaffy Janajalani, who 

was implicated in the 2002 Zamboanga bombing that killed a U.S. servicemen and 

in the beheading of an American tourist, Guillermo Sobero, in 2001. The other 

three suspects were Redendo Cain Delosa, Abdusaid Lim (aka Abu Khalifa), and 

Radsamar Sangkula. Juiet Labog-Javellana, et al., “Metro Bomb Plot Foiled; 4 Abu 

Men Nabbed,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, March 30, 2004. 

 44. Interview with a Philippine NICA officer, Quezon City, September 15, 2004. 

Further evidence that the ASG was planning more attacks on ferries came on June 

1, when Philippine naval intelligence officers arrested Alzhezar Salappudin Jila in 

Jolo, Sulu, with a cache of various explosives. “The raid [on Jila] was conducted 

based on a report from an informant saying the [Abu Sayyaf Group] will bomb 

the fast craft Water Jet of Alleson Shipping Lines, which plies the Zamboanga-Jolo 

route,” said a Navy spokesman. Among the items seized from Jila were an 81-mm 

rifle, 42 pieces of dynamite, a half-gallon of high explosive powder, and assorted 

components of improvised explosive devices, along with documents in Arabic 

writing and electronic equipment. Jila admitted in his interrogation that his group 

was behind four bombings in Sulu Island since December which left four people 

dead, and authorities believe that he was also responsible for the 2002 bombing in 

Zamboanga in which an American soldier was killed.

 45. Simon Elegant, “The Return of the Abu Sayyaf,” Time-Asian Edition, August 

30, 2003.

 46. Karl B. Kaufman and Johnathan Vicente, “3 Held in Plot to Bomb U.S. 

Embassy,” Manila Times, October 2004, p. 22; Jaime Laude, “AFP: JI Plot to Bomb 

U.S. Embassy Foiled,” The Philippine Star, Philippine Star, October 2004, p. 22.

 47. The three leaders were Nadzmie Sadual (aka Commander Global), 

Alhamser Manatad Limbong (aka Commander Kosovo), and Ghalib Andang 

(aka Commander Robot). The standoff took place at Camp Bagong Diwa Prison 

after the ASG members had weapons smuggled in. Three guards were killed. 

“Abu Sayyaf, Very Much Alive, Threaten Retaliation for Bloody Prison Assault,” 

Associated Press, AP, March 2005, p. 15.

 48. Donna Pazzibugan, “10 Sacks of Explosives Seized,” Philippine Daily 

Inquirer, March 24, 2005.

 49. Manny Mogato, “Philippine Army Says Finds Bombs for Easter Attacks,” 

Reuters, March 23, 2005.

 50. “Reward Offered for Hinolan’s Attacker,” The Manila Times Internet Edition, 

November 16, 2004; “Suspected Abu Sayyaf Gunmen Abduct Doctor in Sulu,” 

Philippine Daily Inquirer, November 22, 2004; “Philippine Government Official 

Dies in Suspected Abu Sayyaf Attack,” Deutsche Presse-Agenteur, December 12, 

2004; Julie Alipala, “Sayaff Men Abduct, Execute 3 Salesmen from Pampanga,” 

Philippine Daily Inquirer, January 11, 2005.
50

 51. Cited in Garrido.

 52. Interview with a senior Philippine NICA official, Quezon City, June 28, 

2004. 

 53. Khadaffy is roughly 30 years old, the youngest of five children. Khadaffy 

conducted Islamic studies in Marawi City, Mindanao, before traveling to Pakistan 

and later an al Qaeda camp in Afghanistan. He is married to Sherma, his first 

cousin and the daughter of Ustadz Hussein Manatad, one of the religious directors 

of the Tabuk Mosque in Isabela, Basilan.

 54. “An Update of the Recent Bombing in Mindanao and Metro Manila,” 

November 25, 2002, p. 12.

 55. Interview with a Philippines NICA officer, San Juan, Manila, July 1, 2004.

 56. Elegant.

 57. Interview with Eid Kabalu, MILF spokesman, Cotabato, January 9, 2002.

 58. Ibid.

 59. “An Update of the Recent Bombing in Mindanao and Metro Manila,” 

November 25, 2002. 

 60. Philippine NICA, “Summary of Information: Umar Faruq,” no date 

provided.

 61. Romesh Ratnesar, “Confessions of an Al Qaida Terrorist,” Time, September 

16, 2002; BIN Interrogation Report of Omar al-Faruq, June 2002.

 62. Edris was the individual who escaped from Camp Crame, Manila with JI 

member Fathur Rohman al-Ghozi, who was killed in Pigkawayan, North Cotabato. 

International Crisis Group, p. 22.

 63. Important founding members of the MILF-SOG include Muchlas Syafullah 

Yunos and Basit Usman. 

 64. “An Update of the Recent Bombing in Mindanao and Metro Manila,” 

November 25, 2002.

 65. Abdul Manap Mentang said that the MILF members Rahman Camili (aka 

Barok) and Rio Manamba (aka Bobot) planted the bombs at the Davao airport and 

Sasa wharf respectively. The two were arrested in November 2004.

 66. The two, along with Mentang’s girlfriend, Monawara Usop, were the 

plotters of the attack on the U.S. Embassy. Marichu Villanueva and Jaime Laude, 

“Palace Updates ‘Order of Battle’ Versus Terrorists,” Philippine Star, October 24, 

2004; AFP, “Australians Warned of Terrorist Threats in the Philippines,” October 

23, 2004. 

 67. Ben Tesiorna, “2 More Davao Bombers Nabbed in Davao Norte,” Sun-Star, 

November 19, 2004.

 68. Camp Hudaibiyah was the portion of the MILF base, Camp Abu Bakar es 

Siddique, that was given to al Qaeda trainers and their JI students. Some MILF 

members were also trained in these classes. This class also included Sammy 
51

Abdulghani. Jaime Laude, “AFP: JI Plot to Bomb U.S. Embassy Foiled,” Philippine 

Star, October 2004, p. 22.

 69. Interview with a senior NICA official, Quezon City, March 3, 2005.

 70. The 103rd Base Command is under the leadership of Abdulaziz Mimbintas, 

the Vice Chairman for Military Affairs of the MILF.

 71. Jaime Laude and Christina Mendez, “2 Abu Suspects Tagged in V-Day 

Blasts Arrested,” Philippine Star, February 23, 2005; Alcuin Papa and Christian 

Esguerra, “2 Bombing Suspects Fall,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, February 23, 2005.

 72. He did not know their names, but their aliases were aka Ian and aka 

Khatan.

 73. Statement of Admiral William J. Fallon, Commander, U.S. Pacific 

Command, Before the Senate Armed Services Committee, March 8, 2005, at 

www.senate.gov/~armed_services/statemnt/2005/March/Fallon%2003-08-05.pdf.

 74. Interview with Major General Raul Reylano, Commander, 6th Infantry 

Division, Awang, Maguindanao, March 10, 2005. For more on the sorry state of 

the AFP, see Andrew Spaeth, “Under the Gun,” Time-Asian Edition, May 9, 2005.

 75. The author would like to thank John Dacey for making this point.

 76. Interview with a Philippine NICA officer, San Juan, Manila, July 1, 2004.

 77. Bantay Ceasefire, p. 23. Operation THUNDERSTORM was launched in 

mid-October 2002 after the AFP learned that 600-700 MILF and ASG were massing 

in Lanao del Norte. Some 200 were from the Zamboanga peninsula.

 78. Interview with Ghazali Jafaar, Vice Chairman for Political Affairs, Sultan 

Kudarat, Maguindanao, June 17, 2004.

 79. Interview with a senior AFP commander, 6th Infantry Division, Camp 

Siongco, Datu Odin Sinsuat, Maguindanao, September 21, 2004. 

 80. The Malaysian government has exerted considerable pressure on the MILF 

to “expel ASG in their midst.”

 81. The author would like to thank John Dacey for making that point.

 82. “Abu Sayyaf Warns MILF Against Forging Peace with Gov’t,” Philippine 

Daily Inquirer, February 8, 2005. 

 83. Tondok is reportedly the new head of the 106th Base Command; though 

some reports suggest that he replaced Umbra Kato as the 109th Base Commander 

who, in turn, replaced Samir as the 106th Base Commander. 

 84. Interview with Major General Raul Reylano, Commander 6th Infantry 

Battalion, Awang, Maguindanao, March 10, 2005.

 85. Ibid.

 86. Despite AFP claims that Dulmatin was killed, there was neither evidence 

to prove that, nor verification of his presence. Another JI operative, Rohmat (aka 
52

Zaki), who was wounded in the attack stated that Dulmatin was still alive. Isnilon 

Hapilon and his dozen or so bodyguards/combatants are believed to be based in 

the Mt. Dagadabi area, between the 104th and 105th Base Commands.

 87. Manny Mogato, “Philippine Army Says Finds Bombs for Easter Attacks,” 

Reuters, March 23, 2005.

 88. Ibid. 

 89. Eid Kabalu, the MILF spokesman, asserted that, “There is a policy statement 

from the MILF leadership for all members to turn their backs on other groups . . . . 

We are categorically denying that we will stage attacks. We are focused on the 

peace talks.” “MILF Denies Terror Plan Anew,” AFP, March 24, 2005. 

 90. “Separatist Rebels Met Arab Pair, Say Former Captives,” South China 

Morning Post, October 15, 2001.

 91. Torres, Into the Mountain, p. 34.

 92. Philippine National Police, “The Threat of Terrorism and PNP 

Countermeasures,” undated, pp. 6-7.

 93. “An Update of the Recent Bombing in Mindanao and Metro Manila,” 

November 25, 2002.

 94. Interrogation of Nassir bin Abbas. Nassir claimed to have trained 540 

militants a year until early 1998 at MILF camps.

 95. Zulkifli was captured in September 2003 while trying to surreptitiously 

enter Malaysia’s Sabah state from the Sulu archipelago in the Philippines. He 

was captured with five other JI members. Though the Malaysian government 

announced this arrest, they did not disclose the fact that there were two additional 

Middle Eastern operatives with them. One is believed to be an al Qaeda operative 

while the other confessed to being a member of the Tabliqh.

 96. ICG, p. 22.

 97. Interrogation of Nassir bin Abbas.

 98. Rohmat was a senior trainer and one of JI’s top liaisons to the ASG in 

Mindanao. He was implicated in funding bombings in General Santos (2002), 

Zamboanga (2002), Cotabato (2003), Tucurong (2003), Davao (2003), and Parang 

(2004). Jim Gomez, “Terror Suspect Details Training, Plots,” AP, March 23, 2005.

 99. Three suspects, Bernard Balinao, Romy Ksaim, and Bai Hairan Paglala, 

were arrested in Tacurong City on May 6, 2002. The police asserted that they were 

“all members of the MNLF and MILF” and that they also were “linked to the . . . 

Abu Sayyaf.” See http://www.mindanews.com/2002/05/2nd/nws09abu.html.

 100. Abdul Jabidi and another operative, Sammy Abdulghani, were believed 

to be very close to a local MILF commander, Abdul Kitogoi Icow.

 101. Jeff Antiporda and Anthony Vargas, “Terrorist Trainer Nabbed,” Manila 

Times, March 23, 2005; Philippine National Police, “The Threat of Terrorism and 

PNP Countermeasures,” undated, p. 7.
53

 102. ABS-CBN News, http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/topofthehour.aspx?StoryId=

128.

 103. Interrogation Report on Taufiq Riefqi (aka Zammy) stated he arrived in 

the Philippines sometime in April 2000 and is presently an instructor of religion at 

Camp Jabal Quba. 

 104. Philippine National Police, “The Threat of Terrorism and PNP Countermeasures,” undated, p. 7.

 105. Jim Gomez, “Terror Suspect Details Training, Plots,” AP, March 23, 2005.

 106. Rohmat has confirmed that he was present. Jaime Laude, “AFP: JI Plot to 

Bomb U.S. Embassy Foiled,” Philippine Star, October 22, 2004; Jim Gomez, “Terror 

Suspect Details Training, Plots,” AP, March 23, 2005; Joel Francis Guinto”Abu 

Sayyaf Planned Bombings in metro, Key Cities—JI Member,” Philippine Daily 

Inquirer, March 23, 2005.

 107. At first, Ted Yolanda was described as a Malaysian. The other two 

Indonesians were Mohamed Naasir Hamid and Mohamad Yusuf Karin Faiz (aka 

Pais). Faiz was a student at Ngruki in Java for 4 years in the early to mid-1990s, 

though he did not graduate. In 2001 he attended Ibn Saud University in Saudi 

Arabia. The ASG member, a Balik-Islam convert, was Muhair dela Merced. The 

group was arrested in Zamboanga, having entered the country through Tawi 

Tawi. The group was caught with US$7,000, 10 terrorist manuals, al Qaeda VCDs, 

and other materials. The four were on their way to MILF camps in Mindanao to 

conduct training. According to head of PNP Intelligence Chief Superintendent 

Ismael Rafnan, “They were planning to go into car bombs. They have reached that 

level of sophistication. They are ready to do it.” Cited in Joel Francis Guinto, “Car 

Bomb Attacks Foiled as JI, Abu Terror Suspects Fall,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, 

February 24, 2005. 

 108. Eva C. Komandjaja, “Police Search for Two JI Members in Philippines,” 

The Jakarta Post, August 16, 2005.

 109. Jim Gomez, “Terror Suspect Details Training, Plots,” AP, March 23, 2005.

 110. I.e., individuals who joined the organization in the mid-1990s, before the 

JI began their public campaign of bombings in August 2000.

 111. On March 4, 2005, the Philippine daily, Malaya, published the names of 

21 Indonesian JI members who had entered the country on January 21, 2005, for 

training in MILF camps in Lanao del Sur. The names were leaked to them by an 

intelligence official. According to the paper, 26 arrived in two groups, the first 

on January 21, the second on January 28. They included Anwar Narsid, Sahibon 

Gulam, Farhan Jiahod, Zia Autad, Gafor Wadood, Omar Amiril, Farnan Dawalis, 

Ishaq Buday, Zainal Mandaya, Hashim Mufri, Watani Azibul, Farouk Rajab, 

Burnhan Usungan, Nur Salih, Jazali Mauladie, Hesam Abul Guimadil Mojib, and 

Habib Taloot. The paper asserts that the group transited Sabah state, where they 

were provided safe quarters by the MILF representative, Ismael Haraiba. They 

traveled to Palimbang before transiting to MILF camps in Lanao del Sur. There 
54

is no way to validate this list. It is likely drawn from immigration records in 

Zamboanga. “26 Indons in Lanao for Terrorist Training,” Malaya, March 4, 2005.

 112. Interview with a Senior NICA official, Quezon City, March 3, 2005.

 113. “Al-Qaeda Financier for Abu Sayyaf Arrested in Philippines,” Sun-Star, 

May 14, 2004.

 114. Ibid.

 115. Alcuin Papa, “Bin Laden Man in RP Captured,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, 

May 15, 2004. There had been a warrant for Mundus’ arrest in connection with 

bombing operations carried out by the Abu Sayyaf, in Kidapawan City on October 

10, 2002, and the other in General Santos City on July 8, 2001.

 116. Ibid.

 117. Interview with an Armed Forces of the Philippines Intelligence 

Service(AFP-IS) official, Awang, March 4, 2005.

 118. He was arrested on January 17, 2005, in Zamboanga and deported on 

January 18. This reportedly was ordered by President Arroyo herself, who was 

under pressure from the Saudi Arabian ambassador. 

 119. For example, of the five people who have now been arrested in conjunction 

with the Valentine’s Day bombing, only Khalil Trinidad was known to the police. 

He had been arrested previously and charged with possession of explosives, but 

had skipped bail. 

 120. Rommel Banlaoi, “Leadership Dynamics in Terrorist Organizations in 

Southeast Asia: The Abu Sayyaf Case,” paper presented to The Leadership and 

Structure of Terrorist Threats in Southeast Asia, Kuala Lumpur, April 18-20, 2005, 

p. 3.

 121. Ibid.

 122. Rustico O. Guerrero, “Philippine Terrorism and Insurgency: What to Do 

about the Abu Sayyaf,” Master’s Thesis, U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff 

College, 2002.

 123. Banlaoi, “Leadership Dynamics in Terrorist Organizations in Southeast 

Asia: The Abu Sayyaf Case,” p. 5.

 124. According to Lieutenant Colonel Guerrero, the ASG’s “central committee 

in Basilan, the highest governing body, is under the supervision of Isnilon Hapilon 

(aka Tuan Isnilon). It has six functional and one special staff. These are Personnel 

and Operations, Urban Demolitionist and Intelligence, Logistics/Supply/Budget, 

Finance, Liaison, and Medical. Hector Janjalani heads the special staff.” This 

overstates the group’s organization even in its heyday. See “Philippine Terrorism 

and Insurgency: What to Do about the Abu Sayyaf.” 

 125. Despite Malacanang’s call for the AFP and intelligence services to draw 

up a new “order of battle” in October 2004, nothing has been completed or publicly 

released. Marichu Villanueva and Jaime Laude, “Palace Updates ‘Order of Battle’ 

Versus Terrorists,” Philippine Star, October 24, 2004.
55

 126. Interview with a senior Philippine NICA official, Quezon City, March 3, 

2005.

 127. “An Update of the Recent Bombing in Mindanao and Metro Manila,” 

November 25, 2002.

 128. Cited in Joel Francis Guinto, “Car Bomb Attacks Foiled as JI, Abu Terror 

Suspects Fall,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, February 24, 2005.

 129. Elegant, “Terror, Visible,” Time - Asia Edition, March 28, 2005.

 130. Prof. Moner M. Bajunaid, “The Concept of Jihad,” posted on 

www.luwaran.com at http://web.archive.org/web/20010206044447/www.luwaran.com/

concept_of_jihad.htm.

 131. For more, see Zachary Abuza, “Out of the Woodwork: Islamist Militants in 

Aceh,” February 8, 2005. A brief version of the paper an be found in the Jamestown 

Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 3, No. 2, January 27, 2005, available at http://

www.jamestown.org/publications_details.php?volume_id=411&issue_id=3213&article_

id=2369164.

 132. Syed Azhar, “Ex-KMM Member to Start Anew,” The Star, March 25, 

2005.

 133. Interview with a Philippine NICA officer, Cotabato, March 7, 2005. The 

Lakar Jundullah’s founder and JI shura member, Agus Dwikarna, is currently 

imprisoned in the Philippines. Dwikarna was also a leader of Abu bakar Ba’asyir’s 

Mujiheddin Council of Indonesia (MMI), as well as the South Sulawesi branch 

officer of both the Indonesian charity Kompak and the Saudi Arabian charity, 

Al Harramain. For more, see International Crisis Group, Indonesia Backgrounder: 

Jihad in Central Sulawesi, February 3, 2004; Zachary Abuza, Funding Terrorism in 

Southeast Asia: The Financial Network of al Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah, NBR Analysis, 

Vol. 14, No. 5, Seattle: The National Bureau of Asian Research, December 2003, p. 

28-34. 

 134. See https://www.luwaran.com/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=341.

 135. Ibid.

 136. “Balik,” literally “return.” Islamic groups refer to the Muslim concept that 

all people are born Muslim; and that in their life they might stray, i.e., join another 

religion. Balik Islam groups are simply missionary organizations. Balik Islam 

organizations in the Philippines began in Mindanao, especially with hill tribes, 

but have since spread to Luzon and Manila. Muslim press organs claim that there 

have been 1 million converts. There are now nearly 10 million Muslims, about 

7-8 percent of the total population, making Islam the fastest growing religion in 

the Philippines. Though many individuals converted while working as overseas 

Filipino Workers (OFWs) in the Middle East, Balik Islam networks have been 

proliferating.

 137. Luis Q. Lacar, “Balik Islam: Christian Converts to Islam in the Philippines, 

c. 1970-98,” Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations, Vol. 12, No. 1, January 2001, pp. 

39-60, esp. n4, 57.
56

 138. Interview with a PNP-IS official, Makati, June 27, 2002.

 139. Banlaoi, “Leadership Dynamics in Terrorist Organizations in Southeast 

Asia: The Abu Sayyaf Case,” p. 9.

 140. Ibid.

 141. Since February 2, 1998, Humoud Mohammad Abdulaziz al-Lahim 

was also the IIRO’s director. ISCAG was established in the mid-1990s in Saudi 

Arabia by a group of primarily Balik Islam converts who were working in the 

Kingdom. The movement grew considerably when the founders returned home. 

It established a headquarters in Dasmarinas, Cavite; a 1.6 hectare compound with 

an elementary school, medical clinic and apartment block. The project was funded 

in part by Saudi donations and from the Islamic Development Bank. ISCAG is 

currently headed by Nooh Caparino. It is engaged in both propagation (da’wah) 

for Balik Islam converts as well as Muslim “backsliders.” ISCAG buys blocks of 

time on local radio stations for its da’wah programming, as well as making prison 

and house visits. ISCAG claims to have won back some 1,387 reverts between 

January 2000 to June 2003. The organization clearly maintains its ties to Saudi 

Arabia. ISCAG’s annual budget is approximately P12 million ($240,000), though 

that does not include funding for schools, hospitals, or mosques. ISCAG has 

funded the construction of six mosques around the country; at a cost of roughly P4 

million each ($80,000). ISCAG also pays for the education of the children of many 

MILF leaders. Al-Lahim was forced out of the Philippines on April 7, 2002, due to 

allegations of sponsoring terrorism, and is currently based in Saudi Arabia, where 

he continues to fundraise for ISCAG. For more see, Marites Dañguilan Vitug, 

“The New Believers,” Newsbreak, May 27, 2002; Philippine Center for Investigative 

Journalism, “Troubled Return of the Faithful,” imagazine, on line, Vol. IX, No. 2, 

April-June 2003; Johnna Villaviray, “Muslims Identify With ‘Terrorist’ Ideals,” 

Manila Times, November 19 2003; and ISCAG’s website, http://www.islamicfinder.

org/surf.php?ht=http://www.angislam.org.

 142. The Islamic Information Center (IIC) was led by a Jordanian citizen 

Nedal Falah Awwad al-Dhalain who first came to the Philippines in July 1995. 

Based in Makati, the IIC is another da’wah group that purports to be a library 

and resource center that receives “financial and moral support” from “generous 

brothers.” The organization, like ISCAG, divides its operations between Balik 

Islam efforts and activities geared toward fellow Muslims. They engage in prison 

visits and distribute massive amounts of literature. For example, in 2000 alone, 

they “printed 90,000 books and pamphlets, and distributed 4,570 pieces of Islamic 

literature, 307 copies of the Koran in English, and thousands of cassette tapes in 

lecture form.” There was considerable overlap in membership with Fi Sibilillah. 

Al-Dhalain was forced out of the country on October 27, 2001, on suspicion of 

supporting terrorism. The ICC remains open; their website is www.angislam.org.

 143. See http://www.manilatimes.net/national/2004/aug/13/yehey/top_stories/20040

813top3.html. 

 144. Anthony Vargas, “SuperFerry Bomb Suspect Tipped PNP About Attacks,” 

Manila Times, February 17, 2005.
57

 145. Anthony Vargas, “PNP Hunting 40 Balik Islam with Abu Sayyaf Ties,” 

Manila Times, December 24, 2004.

 146. This was the name of Jaybe Ofrasio’s brother. Kymina Lyall, “Filipino 

Held in Belfast Wanted for Helping JI,” The Australian, February 6, 2004. 

 147. Donna Pazzibugan, “10 Sacks of Explosives Seized,” Philippine Daily 

Inquirer, March 24 2005.

 148. Interview with a Philippine NICA officer, Quezon City, September 15, 

2004.

 149. For more on this, see Benny Bacani, “The Mindanao Peace Talks: Another 

Opportunity to Resolve the Moro Conflict in the Philippines,” U.S. Institute of Peace 

Special Report 131, January 2005, http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr131.html. 

 150. See, Zachary Abuza, “The MILF at 20,” unpublished paper, October 

2004.

 151. Interview with Aboud Syed Lingga, Cotabato, January 2004.

 152. See excerpted minutes from the July 30-31 meeting of the Central 

Committee.

 153. Interview with Atty. Michael Mastura, Cotabato, January 7, 2004.

 154. Interview with a member of the MILF-CCCH-Secretariat, Cotabato, 

January 12, 2004.

 155. Interview with a MILF political officer, Cotabato, January 16, 2004.

 156. Interview with a member of the MILF-CCCH-Secretariat, Cotabato.

 157 Elegant.

 158. Cited in Ibid.

 159. Carlos Conde, “Violence in the Philippines Tangles Terrorism Fight,” 

International Herald Tribune, February 15, 2005; Anthony Spaeth, “Southern 

Exposure,” Time-Asian Edition, February 21, 2005.

 160. “Abu Sayyaf Is Not in Sulu Clashes, MNLF Says,” Luwaran.com, February 

14, 2005, at http://www.luwaran.com/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=295.

 161. Already 65-75 percent of Philippine ground troops are based in Mindanao 

and the Sulu archipelago. Yet resources are scarce enough that major offensives in 

one area often preclude concurrent offensives in other regions. 

 162. In March 2005, for example, Philippine authorities arrested a Palestinian 

national for allegedly training ASG members. See Joel Francis Guinto, “Palestinian 

Held in RP over Links with Abu Sayyaf,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, March 31, 2005; 

“Suspected Palestinian Terror Trainer Arrested in Zambo,” AP, March 31, 2005.

 163. “Cache of Bomb Chemical Seized in Manila Warehouse,” AFP, May 3, 

2005.

 164. Ma. Theresa Torres, “MILF Not A Terror Group, Says GMA,” Manila Times, 
58

April 2, 2005; “RP Rejects U.S. Warning on ‘New Afghanistan’ Tag on Mindanao,” 

AFP, April 11, 2005.

 165. Jim Gomez, “Philippines Asks U.S. to Keep Group Off Terror List,” AP, 

March 30, 2005.

 166. See, for example, the comments of Joseph Mussomelli in “Mindanao 

Could Be Next Afghanistan: U.S. Diplomat,” AFP, April 11, 2005. 

 167. Ibid. The expected Philippine rejection of Mussomeli’s comments can 

be found in “RP Rejects U.S. Warning on ‘New Afghanistan’ Tag on Mindanao,” 

AFP, April 11, 2005.

 168. “US: MILF Tied To 2 Al-Qaeda Outfits,” AFP, April 1, 2005.

 169. Ma. Theresa Torres, “MILF Not A Terror Group, Says GMA,” Manila 

Times, April 2, 2005. 

 170. “Mindanao Could Be Next Afghanistan: U.S. Diplomat,” AFP, April 11, 

2005.

 171. “US to Back GMA in Fight Versus MILF Renegades,” The Philippine Star, 

January 25, 2005.

 172. Eric Schmidt, “U.S. Combat Force of 1,700 is Headed to the Philippines,” 

New York Times, February 22, 2003.

 173. For example, the Mindanao People’s Causus statement, in which they 

warned “Various U.S. officials have been harping on this point--MILF ties with 

foreign terrorist groups--since last month. It seems that there is ground laying, 

testing the waters, getting the public pulse, for greater U.S. interventions in the 

military sphere.” See MindaNews, April 12, 2005, for the full statement, http://

www.mindanews.com/2005/04/11vcs-mpc.html.

 174. Social Weather Survey, “Ratings of High Officials Tumble: Net Satisfaction 

with GMA Falls to –12,” March 30, 2005, at http://www.sws.org.ph/.

 175. Pulse Asia, “Media Release on Quality of Life, Urgent Concerns and 

PGMA Performance,” March 30, 2005, p. 2.

 176. Ibid., p. 4.

 177. Ibid., p. 6.