CHINA’S GROWING MILITARY POWER: 

PERSPECTIVES ON SECURITY, BALLISTIC 

MISSILES, AND CONVENTIONAL 

CAPABILITIES 

Edited by 

Andrew Scobell 

and 

Larry M. Wortzel 

September 2002 
ii

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ISBN 1-58487-093-1 
iii

CONTENTS 

Foreword 

 Ambassador James R. Lilley .................................................... v 

1. China’s Response to a Firmer America 

 Andrew Scobell and Larry M. Wortzel .................................... 1 

PART I: PERSPECTIVES ON CHINA’S SECURITY 

AND MILITARY POWER ................................................................. 17

2. The View from Beijing: U.S.-China Security Relations 

 from Kosovo to September 11, 2001 

 David M. Finkelstein ................................................................ 19

3. A View from Tokyo: China’s Growing Military Power 

 and Its Significance for Japan’s National Security 

 Hideaki Kaneda ....................................................................... 63 

4. A View from Moscow: China’s Growing Military Power 

 Anatoly V. Bolyatko ............................................................... 81 

PART II: CHINA’S BALLISTIC MISSILES AND 

EAST ASIAN REACTION TO 

U.S. MISSILE DEFENSE INITIATIVES .............................................................. 105 

5. Chinese Ballistic Missile Forces in the Age of Missile 

 Global Defense: Challenges and Responses 

 Mark A Stokes ...................................................................... 107

6. Chinese Reactions to New U.S. Initiatives 

 on Missile Defense 

 Eric A. M cVadon ................................................................. 169 
iv

7. East Asian Reactions to U.S. Missile Defense: Torn 

 between Tacit Support and Overt Opposition 

 Tahoe Kim .......................................................................... 199 

PART III: IMPROVEMENTS IN PLA 

 CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITIES: FORCE 

PROJECTION AND AIR FORCE LOGISTICS .............................. 221 

8. Rough but Ready Force Projection: An Assessment 

 of Recent PLA Training 

 Susan M. Puska ................................................................. 223

9. Logistics Support for PLA Air Force Campaigns 

 K enneth W. Allen ................................................................ 251 

ABOUT THE CONTRIBUTORS ................................................................... 307 
v

FOREWORD

 The tenor of U.S.-China relations for much of the first year of the 

administration of President George W. Bush was set by a crisis that 

need not have occurred. How the situation was handled and eventually 

resolved is instructive. It tells us about a beleaguered communist 

leadership in the buildup to major generational transition (scheduled 

for late 2002 and early 2003) and the mettle of a democratically 

elected U.S. government tested early in its tenure by a series of foreign 

policy crises and a carefully coordinated set of devastating terrorist 

strikes against the continental United States. 

 The way the April 2001 crisis on Hainan Island was resolved must be 

chalked up as a success for the United States. the key was 

Washington’s ability to convince Beijing that holding the air crew was 

hurting, and not advancing, Chinese interests. That is something Beijing 

seems not to have grasped when, without warning, the EP-3 suddenly 

swept down onto the runway in Haikou, bringing a treasure trove of 

super-secret electronics and 24 Americans, who looked at first to be 

valuable bargaining chips. With the plane and the crew, China seemed 

to hold the best cards and behaved accordingly. the top leaders who 

Ambassador Joseph Prueher had tried to cultivate did not return his 

calls, and Chinese President Jiang Zemin, after demanding an apology 

from Washington, left for a Latin American tour. Let the Americans 

stew in this for awhile, Jiang’s message seemed to be. 

 But Washington managed to reduce the value of those bargaining 

chips. This was done, first, by making clear that no substantive 

concessions would be made to secure their release; and, second, by 

persuading Beijing that continuing to hold the Americans would bring 

real damage to Chinese interests. As indignation mounted in the 

United States, economic dangers began to loom on China’s horizon. 

The Beijing government, after all, counts on a rising standard of living to 
vi

limit dissent, and even a brief loss of access to the American market 

could be damaging. Nor did Asian neighbors rally to support China. They 

worry, mostly in private, about Beijing’s growing military strength 

and assertiveness. The State Department boycotted Chinese embassy 

functions and Secretary of State Colin Powell, while offering regrets 

and condolences—even eventually sorrow over the loss of the Chinese 

pilot—showed no inclination to consider the apology China 

demanded. 

 The most sensitive nerve in Beijing, however, may have been the 

Olympics. Having the games in their capital is a cherished Chinese 

aspiration, and when members of Congress began organizing against it 

as the crisis developed, the Chinese embassy took the unusual step of 

sending rather snippy letters to the offenders. Only releasing the 

hostages could possibly remove the very real threat, and even then not 

with certainty. Hence Beijing’s decision to send the crew home, which, 

once made, began the search for a linguistic formula to explain it. 

Washington had not, in fact, apologized, but we could not prevent 

Beijing from pulling some of what we had said out of context and 

presenting it through state-controlled media as being, in fact, the 

apology China’s leaders sought. That, plus the usual “humanitarian 

considerations,” provided sufficient cover to end the crisis. 

 Americans were reminded that the Chinese are not always their 

friends. Despite some real economic progress, the regime still often 

becomes confrontational with its own people and with other 

countries. The United States must treat it with prudence and respect, 

hedging against dangers even as it seeks to promote positive 

development. By the same token, China has been reminded that 

Washington cannot be relied upon to yield when the two states 

collide. Our growing economic interests in China and our hopes for a 

future positive relationship with China would be negatively affected 

if our fundamental American national interests or our commitments 

to democratic friends and allies in Asia are challenged by China. 
vii

 During the period that the Chinese changed course, from seeking 

concessions to seeking an exit, the United States calmly followed 

procedures. First the Ambassador, then the Secretary of State—and 

briefly the vice President—took the spotlight to deliver an authoritative 

“no” to the demand for apology. Skilled State Department 

wordsmiths cobbled together a precisely crafted letter that gave 

China cover, but no more. President Bush choreographed all of this, 

mostly behind the scenes, and earned our applause. President Jiang 

seems to have concluded that the matter should be handled expeditiously 

with civilians, not the PLA taking the lead in the negotiations. Once the 

Hainan Island Incident was resolved and strategic clarity was emphasized 

on Taiwan, the U.S. moved swiftly to put economics at the top of our 

agenda, and China’s entry into the WTO become the first priority. 

 This volume, comprised of papers originally presented at a 

conference held at Carlisle Barracks in September 2001, helps to put the 

Hainan Island incident in the broader context of China’s strategic 

aspirations and its growing military capabilities. I am proud to be a 

prime initiator of this conference on the People’s Liberation Army, 

which has been an annual event for more than a decade. Last year’s 

conference’s co-sponsors were the American Enterprise Institute, the 

Heritage Foundation, and the U.S. Army War College. For the fourth 

consecutive year, the War College’s Strategic Studies Institute is 

publishing the proceedings. The nine chapters in this volume, all written 

by leading experts, cover a diverse set of important topics: East Asian 

perspectives on China’s security ambitions, the status of the Chinese 

ballistic missile program and regional reactions to U.S. missile 

defense initiatives, and China’s ever-improving conventional military 

capabilities. I commend China’s Growing military Power to you. 

 AMBASSADOR JAMES R. LILLEY 

 Senior Fellow 

 American Enterprise Institute 
1

CHAPTER 1 

CHINA’S RESPONSE TO A FIRMER AMERICA 

Andrew Scobell 

Larry M. Wortzel 

 President George W. Bush made it clear as a candidate for office that 

U.S. policy toward China “will require tough realism.” Presidential 

Candidate Bush’s speech on September 23, 1999, at the Citadel, the 

military college of South Carolina, foreshadowed his firm approach to 

Beijing.1 In that speech, Candidate Bush recalled for the American people that 

“in 1996, after some tension over Taiwan, a Chinese general reminded 

America that China possesses the means to incinerate Los Angeles with 

nuclear missiles.”2 Bush followed up in a speech in Simi Valley, 

California, with the warning to China that it is a “competitor, not a 

strategic partner,” that the United States would deny the right of Beijing to 

impose their rule on a free people (Taiwan), and that the United States 

would help Taiwan defend itself.3 He also made clear early in the 

campaign that he would pursue ballistic missile defense for the United 

States.4 Thus, the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party in Beijing 

had early notice that they would not be dealing with a President 

William J. Clinton who considered China to be a “strategic partner” of the 

United States. 

 For Beijing, this was a very different America. Under Clinton, U.S. 

foreign policy was generally more solicitous of Beijing. Defense officials 

ran off to China with packages of “deliverables” that the Chinese had 

come to expect out of meetings in which the United States sought more 

dialogue and cooperation between the armed forces of each country. 

Clinton responded to China’s march 1996 missile launches off Taiwan with 

two American aircraft carrier battle groups.5 However, once the Taiwan 

elections were over later that month, Clinton dispatched National Security 
2

Council and State Department officials to Taiwan to encourage the leaders 

of that island to work harder at getting along with the People’s Republic of 

China (PRC). Thus policy seemed to vacillate between a firm foreign policy 

line toward China and one that sought to placate the Chinese leadership when 

it complained about the U.S. position.6 

Once Bush took office, Beijing dispatched successively higher-level 

diplomats to Washington — former ambassadors, foreign ministry 

officials, and advisers to Chinese President Jiang Zemin—to gauge the 

White House’s position on China and Taiwan. This culminated in the visit 

to Washington of vice Premier Qian Qichen on March 20, 2001. The 

Chinese were clear on one major point: they worked hard to deliver the 

message that the sale of the Aegis-class guided-missile destroyer to Taiwan 

by the United States was “unacceptable” and, in Beijing’s eyes, amounted 

to the creation of a new alliance among the United States, Taiwan, and 

Japan. 

 The Bush position on Taiwan was clear. he did not back away from his 

campaign position that “we’ll help Taiwan defend itself.” The President 

and his appointees at the Departments of State and Defense, pointing 

to the large-scale buildup of ballistic missiles on the Chinese coast opposite 

Taiwan, also made sure that Beijing understood that the United States would 

meet its commitments under the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 98-6) 

to provide Taiwan adequate defensive arms and services to respond to the 

Chinese threat. 

 On April 1, 2001, during a mid-air intercept by the Chinese Navy, a 

Chinese F-8II fighter aircraft collided with an unarmed American EP-3 

reconnaissance aircraft operating in international airspace in the South 

China Sea. The American aircrew was detained by China for 11 days and 

subjected to lengthy and unpleasant interrogation. China made 

expansive claims about its sovereign territory, insisting that the entire 

exclusive economic zone, 200 miles off the Chinese coast, was its own. 

The United States insisted that China’s territorial waters and seas 
3

extended out 12 miles, consistent with international law. This 

incident, and the treatment of the aircrew, probably did more to 

convince the President and the American people that firmness was the 

only way to deal with Beijing than any other action or statement from either 

capital. From the perspective of many in the United States, the actions and 

rhetoric of the Chinese government were confirmation that Beijing did not 

have friendly intentions toward Washington. The release of the crew 

and, eventually, the aircraft is seen as the successful outcome of 

firmness coupled with flexibility and superb interagency coordination 

from the most senior officials in Washington to the members of the actual 

negotiating team on Hainan Island. In the face of this, Chinese 

truculence gave way to Chinese pragmatism.7 

On April 25, 2001, after 100 days in office, President Bush restated 

that the United States will help Taiwan defend itself, and in a television 

broadcast went further, saying that the United States will “do whatever it 

takes” to defend Taiwan against Chinese aggression. Lest any one 

misinterpret just how serious President Bush was about that statement, it 

was repeated for emphasis. In St. Petersburg, Florida, on March 11, 

2002, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, speaking to an 

audience that included Taiwan’s Defense Minister Tang Yao-ming, 

reiterated Bush’s pledge. 

Security Policy. 

 Under the Clinton administration, military-to-military contacts 

between China and the United States were treated as routine matters. In a 

number of ways, the “Engagement Policy” of the United States Pacific 

Command also treated military contacts with China as more or less 

routine, even desirable, despite concerns expressed in the Congress. From 

Capitol Hill, many conservatives expressed concerns that such contacts 

were only helping the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) learn more about 

U.S. defense establishment plans and systems, with no reciprocity from 

the Chinese side. That, too, changed with the Bush administration. 
4

 Soon after assuming his post, Secretary of Defense Donald 

Rumsfeld conducted a review of military contacts with China. That 

review concluded that the United States should cease pursuing military 

contacts or engagement with China as a matter of routine practice. 

Instead, future U.S.-China military contacts and exchanges would be 

conducted on a case-by-case basis, with decisions in line with U.S. 

interests. Contacts should benefit the United States and should not 

strengthen the PLA. 

Ballistic Missile Defense. 

One of Candidate Bush’s strongest foreign policy and defense 

positions during his presidential campaign was to call for a ballistic 

missile system that would defend forward-deployed American forces, 

U.S. allies, and the homeland of the United States. In Simi, California, he said: 

“We still, however, need missile defense systems—both theater and 

national. If I am commander-in-chief, we will develop and deploy them.”8 

Of course, the implicit message in this was that the Anti-Ballistic missile 

(ABM) Treaty with the Soviet Union had to be reexamined. Two years 

later, in December 2001 at the Citadel, President Bush made it explicitly 

clear that the United States must move beyond the ABM Treaty.9 Since June 

13, 2002, the United States is no longer be constrained by that treaty. 

This means that ABM testing can go ahead against warheads of any speed 

and with interceptors of full capability. The United States can also work 

on cooperative programs with friends and allies as well as conduct testing at 

sea; things that were prohibited under the ABM treaty. 

 China saw this coming, and Beijing’s security planners were not happy 

about the turn of events. At a conference on arms control in Beijing, China, 

September 14-15, 2000, representatives from China’s arms control community 

argued that any attempt at developing a ballistic missile defense system in the 

United States “is inherently destabilizing and will foster a world-wide arms 

race.”10 The Chinese attendees argued that China was the primary target of 
5

ballistic missile defenses, and a United States goal was to seek “absolute 

security and military superiority.”11 U.S. ballistic missile defenses have never 

been “aimed” at another country. They are aimed at incoming missiles. 

Nonetheless, from the time that the U.S. Congress directed the Department of 

Defense (DoD) to explore ballistic missile defenses in Asia in the Fiscal Year 

1998 “Strom Thurmond” Defense Authorization Act, to the time that President 

Bush assumed office, Beijing repeated these arguments in nearly every 

international and bilateral forum it could. A year after Bush assumed the 

presidency, China’s representatives continued to argue that the ABM Treaty 

constitutes “the cornerstone of international strategic stability.”12 

From the time of the Presidential campaign, the incoming Bush 

administration made it clear that its approach to China would differ from 

Clinton’s and perhaps even differ from that of Bush’s father, the 41st President 

of the United States. After the election, to the surprise of some in China and 

the United States, President Bush actually followed through on the principles 

he had expounded in his campaign speeches. This surprise was the result of a 

failure to recognize the firm commitment to principles on the part of President 

Bush and senior members of his administration stemming from their deeplyheld conservative Realpolitik beliefs.13 China’s reaction is the focus of the 

chapters in this book. 

China’s Reaction. 

This book was developed against the backdrop outlined in the first 

section of this introduction. The conference organizers sought to 

capture the changes in China, not only in terms of rhetoric, but also in 

military doctrine, training, and hardware purchases, in response to Bush’s 

firmer tone. Of course, we recognize that Beijing had already taken note of 

the deployment of two U.S. aircraft carrier battle groups to the vicinity of 

Taiwan during the 1996 Strait Crisis. But as noted above, this strong 

message was soon diluted by more conciliatory moves from the Clinton 

administration toward Beijing. As a result, the firmness displayed by 

Washington in early 1996 was not perceived as a permanent shift in 
6

institutionalized approaches to American security policy on China. 

 Then there was the accident in Belgrade. Despite all of the U.S. apologies, 

investigations, and fact-finding commissions, many in Beijing, 

particularly in the PLA and the intelligence community, remain 

suspicious that the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1998 

was not an accident.14

 In this volume, some of the best analysts of contemporary China 

assess how Beijing has reacted, and can be expected to react, to the changes 

in United States foreign policy. The authors examine Chinese perceptions 

of the United States, American security and foreign policies in Asia, and 

the effects of those policies on the Asia-Pacific region. 

 In chapter 2, Dr. David Finkelstein, Director of Project Asia at the 

Center for Naval Analyses, examines security relations between China 

and the United States from the events in Kosovo through America’s 

reaction to the attack on the United States by terrorist forces of the alQaeda network. Finkelstein argues that the United States has serious 

worries about China’s activities in four vital areas: Taiwan, the 

proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and delivery means, the 

intentions of China’s military modernization programs, and whether 

China is attempting through diplomacy to push the United States out of 

the Asia-Pacific region. 

 In Finkelstein’s view, although Bush and Jiang were able to 

improve U.S.-China relations, and to convey the impression that in the 

war on terrorism at least, Washington and Beijing see eye-to-eye, there was 

not much substance in the Bush visit to China in October 2001.15 But a 

reduction in tension has some value in and of itself, according to 

Finkelstein, because increased tensions between the United States and 

China complicate such other key U.S. security concerns as stability on the 

Korean Peninsula and the prosecution of the war on terrorism. 
7

 Finkelstein concludes that there remains deep-seated mutual distrust 

between China and the United States, particularly among members of the 

security establishment in both countries. In Beijing, a number of 

influential security thinkers appear to have concluded that the ultimate 

objective of United States policies is to obstruct China’s rise as a more 

rich and powerful nation. Therefore, “U.S. policies in the region are 

increasingly filtered through a set of lenses [in Beijing] that are already 

calibrated to ensure some distortion.” More and more Chinese security 

thinkers are concluding that the United States wants to “change China,” 

to “deter China,” and to “collect intelligence on China.” Finkelstein argues 

that the depth of this mistrust, which is to a certain extent mutual, is 

reason enough to maintain some sort of security dialogue aimed at 

dispelling misperceptions and avoiding conflict. 

 In Chapter 3, Hideaki Kaneda, a retired vice Admiral in Japan’s maritime 

Self Defense Forces, addresses China’s growing military power and its 

significance for Japan’s national security. Kaneda makes the point that 

China has used its own military strength to advance territorial claims, 

while ignoring the sovereignty and jurisdiction of other nations in the 

East China Sea and South China Sea. He outlines what he characterizes 

as a methodical effort by China’s navy to eventually control “biological and 

nonbiological resources in China’s peripheral waters.” The resources 

Kaneda sees as the object of China’s goals are primarily undersea gas 

and petroleum deposits, but also fishing grounds to secure food 

supplies. 

 The major security component of Beijing’s strategy is a “near-water 

defense” of the “first island chain” stretching from the Aleutian 

Islands, across to the Kuriles, the Japanese Islands, the Ryukyu 

Islands, Taiwan, the Philippine Islands, and Borneo. Kaneda notes that 

many of China’s territorial claims, the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea, 

and the Spratly and Paracel Islands in the South China Sea, fall with in 

the perimeter of this “first island chain.” He also argues that control of the 

waters within this area gives Beijing not only the resources it needs, but 
8

also the strategic position to bring military power to bear on Taiwan with 

reduced fear of outside intervention. 

 Kaneda believes Japan must call for more transparency in Chinese 

defense policy. He also argues that China must be prepared to come to 

agreements that permit joint exploitation of undersea resources by the 

countries with competing claims. As early confidence-building 

measures, Kaneda seeks to involve China in regional efforts to provide for 

maritime safety, combat piracy, stop drug transfers, control and end the 

trade in persons, and work to control environmental pollution. He takes 

a firm position on resisting any expansion by China, and insists that Japan 

must be ready to counter any illegal reconnaissance efforts by the Chinese 

navy in Japan’s territorial waters. Finally, he calls for a firm U.S.-Japan 

alliance as a counter to China’s expansionary tendencies. 

 In Chapter 4, Anatoly Bolyatko of the Institute of Far Eastern Studies 

in Russia discusses how in military doctrine and exercises the PLA has 

reacted to the incoming Bush administration. Bolyatko predicts that, as 

joint military exercises are conducted between the United States and its 

East Asian allies in Korea and Japan, and as the United States moves 

forward with a “missile defense shield, ”China will react by producing 

thousands of missiles, aircraft, and tanks. He believes that such 

production will stress China’s military-industrial base, but that such 

stresses can be tolerated by the Chinese economy. His conclusion is 

that China will seek to be more effective at force projection and defense 

in the Asia-Pacific region and will strengthen its forces against Taiwan, 

but will not seek to become a world military power, as was the Soviet Union, 

with the capability to conduct military operations outside East Asia. 

 Lieutenant Colonel Mark Stokes of the U.S. Air Force explains 

China’s reactions to the Bush administration’s plans for developing a 

ballistic missile defense system to protect deployed U.S. military forces, 

American friends and allies, and the U.S. Homeland. As Stokes notes in 

Chapter 5, China’s campaign against the U.S. withdrawal from the 1972 
9

ABM Treaty dates to well before the Bush administration took office. 

But as a candidate for office, Bush and his security advisers made it clear 

that the United States would pursue these defenses. Stokes sees China’s 

development and modernization of its own strategic missile forces as “an 

integral part of PRC coercive strategies.” Whether discussing China’s 

theater-level missile programs, short-range missiles, or intercontinental 

missiles, Stokes believes that any American missile defenses, however 

modest, are perceived by Beijing as having “serious implications for the 

viability of its nuclear deterrent and for its expanding inventory of 

conventional short and medium range ballistic missiles.” 

 Beijing’s ballistic missile forces are a political and military “trump 

card” intended to stem any moves for more autonomy and international 

recognition from Taiwan, and also limit the freedom of action of the 

United States to respond to contingencies not only in the Taiwan Strait, 

but in the Asia-Pacific region. Moreover, Stokes notes, Beijing fears that, 

if viable ballistic missile defenses are deployed, the command and 

control architecture for these systems could turn into a “de-facto” alliance 

if Japan, South Korea, the United States, and Taiwan integrate their 

missile defense programs. 

 Stokes predicts that Taiwan will adopt a combination of passive 

defensive measures to complicate PRC targeting, while Chinese military 

planners will develop better plans to absorb and reconstitute forces after 

a PRC first strike. America’s withdrawal from the ABM Treaty on June 13, 

2002, hands China’s diplomats a defeat of monumental proportions. 

Russia not only accepted the end of the ABM Treaty, but also agreed to 

major cuts in the numbers of its offensive weapons. Thus the predictions of 

not only China’s arms control community but of the supporters of China’s 

position in the United States ring hollow. Indeed, if there is a missile 

buildup in reaction to the end of the ABM Treaty, it will come from China, 

seeking to maintain what Stokes calls a “trump card.” 

 In Chapter 6, Eric McVadon, a consultant on Asian security and 
10

former U.S. Defense Attache in Beijing, explains in great detail the 

positions China has taken in reaction to the Bush presidential campaign 

statements on missile defense and to the actions taken by the Bush 

administration in its first 6 months in office to address China’s 

concerns over U.S. ballistic missile defense plans. McVadon outlines the 

efforts by the PRC arms control and diplomatic community to so limit any 

American defense efforts that they would have no practical effect on China’s 

nuclear force. China’s negotiators, according to McVadon, “could not 

tolerate” an American missile defense force of 250 interceptor missiles, 

but “might be able to tolerate 10 interceptors devoted to the defense of 

the American homeland.” According to McVadon, China’s negotiators 

argued that one factor forcing Jiang to take a firm position is “public 

opinion in China.” McVadon opines that the United States must find ways 

to demonstrate that it “will not be hegemonic” and must continue a dialogue 

with China on the purpose and extent of any U.S. ballistic missile defense 

system. 

 Asia, too, has reacted to American ballistic missile defense plans, 

explains Dr. Taeho Kim, Senior China Analyst at the Korean Institute 

for Defense Analyses. In Chapter 7, Kim acknowledges the profound 

changes in the strategic environment produced by the September 11, 2001, 

terrorist attacks on the United States. Kim examines missile defenses as 

part of a more comprehensive effort to transform not only the U.S. 

military, but also American strategy. He notes that the Bush 

administration’s approach to security represents a radical departure from 

that of the Clinton administration. Kim predicts an approach that has 

nuances in policy and missile defense deployments in East Asia, taking 

into account the political sensitivities in Japan, where some are wary of 

going beyond the research stage, and in Korea, where the popular focus is 

on North Korea and its conventional forces, not on China’s or North 

Korea’s ballistic missiles. 

 Colonel Susan Puska, currently U.S. Army Attaché at the American 

Embassy in Beijing, assesses Beijing’s efforts at force projection in Chapter 8. 
11

She asserts that China is modeling its own military modernization and 

efforts to develop advanced capabilities based on the capabilities of the 

U.S. military. To increase military capabilities, China is focusing more on 

power projection in peripheral areas by its own military, while changing 

training methods to increase effectiveness. Puska documents new 

scenarios for Chinese military training that focus on meeting what Beijing 

sees as its main threat—the forces of the United States. The PLA also 

seems to be conscious of its own relative weaknesses in comparison to U.S. 

forces. Therefore it is focusing on what it sees is the main vulnerability of 

the United States, a dependence on the electromagnetic spectrum for 

communication and the exchange of intelligence and threat data. 

 Beijing is improving management in the PLA, improving the quality of its 

own military personnel by better educating them and recruiting more 

qualified personnel. The PLA is also increasingly able to coordinate and 

use effectively reserve and militia forces. The Central military 

Commission, the Chinese Communist Party’s leading military body, is 

also trying to reduce corruption and waste. Puska concludes that today 

Beijing has a “rough but ready” force projection capability that will improve 

over time and create greater risks and costs to any country that seeks to 

challenge China on its periphery. 

 In Chapter 9, Mr. Kenneth Allen, an expert on Chinese security at the 

Center for Naval Analyses, examines the changes in the PLA Air Force 

(PLAAF) as it modernizes and reforms its logistic systems in order to fight 

high-technology wars. In the 1990s the PLAAF began transforming itself 

from a force reliant upon single branch deployment to one able to utilize 

multiple branches in joint service campaigns, indicating a shift in the focus 

of the PLAAF from a primarily positional, defense oriented operation, to a 

more mobile, maneuverable, preventative force, able to address local 

concerns and strike quickly. Allen analyzes this shift through 

examination of the PLAAF operational theory, logistics structure and 

theory, and the types of training used to implement these changes. Allen 

then addresses the specific changes enacted by the PLAAF in preparation 
12

for a military confrontation with the United States. Over the last 50 years, 

China’s PLAAF has engaged in only three external campaigns, in Korea, 

Taiwan Strait (1958) and Vietnam. Given recent military history, the 

PLAAF has realized the need for a transregional strike force and has 

initiated the training necessary to create one. While it is not yet clear 

how effective the PLAAF would be during a real conflict, particularly 

if facing anticipated U.S. strategies such as interior airfield 

destruction, the PLAAF has made significant strides in improving pilot 

proficiency, sortie generation and sustainability, logistical support, 

communications, and intelligence. Thus, Allen concludes that, while the 

PLAAF may not currently be able to field a rapid strike force of any 

threat to the United States, it is making definite progress in this 

direction. 

 Each of the authors has effectively captured the main trends in 

regional security in East Asia. The terrorist attacks on the United States, 

and the subsequent war on terrorism, only increased American resolve 

to deploy a ballistic missile defense. They also brought about the 

deployment of American forces on China’s western periphery, 

something that was not foreseen in the days before the attack on the 

United States. The trends outlined in this book, therefore, have perhaps played 

themselves out over a more compressed timeframe. But the assessments by each 

author hold up, and provide some framework for understanding how 

Beijing may react to the firmer positions taken by the United States. 

ENDNOTES-CHAPTER 1 

1. George w. Bush, “A Period of Consequences,” Charles ton: the 

Citadel, September 23, 1999, http://citadel.edu/pao/address/pres_bush.html. 

2. The remarks, which have been attributed to General Xiong 

Guangkai, were made in a private conversation with a former U.S. 

government official, Ambassador Chas. W. Freeman, and should not 
13

carry the weight of an official Chinese statement. Moreover, according to 

Freeman, these words were not couched as a threat and should be 

evaluated in the context of an extended off-the-record discussion 

between himself and the Chinese military official. See Ambassador 

Chas. Freeman, ”Did China Threaten to Bomb Los Angeles?” 

Proliferation Brief, Vol. 4, March 22, 2001, available at www.ceip.org/files/ 

publications/proliferationbrief404.asp?from=pubtype; and Allen S. Whiting, 

“China’s Use of Force, 1950-1996, and Taiwan,” International Security, 

Vol. 26, Fall 2001, pp. 129-130. In Scobell’s view, Xiong’s comments 

should be seen as providing important insights into the mindset of 

Chinese military elite perceptions of U.S. strategic priorities and the 

existence of an “asymmetry of motivation” between Beijing and 

Washington on Taiwan. See Andrew Scobell, China’s Use of military Force: 

Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March, New York: Cambridge University 

Press, 2003, forthcoming, chapter 8. Zhu Chenghu, then a senior colonel 

in the PLA serving at China’s National Defense University and now a 

major general, repeated the warning that Americans face the threat of 

nuclear attack from China in the event of a response by the United States 

to an attack on Taiwan. See Jiefangjun Bao, February 28, 2000 and Larry M. 

Wortzel, “Should the United States Feel Threatened by China’s 

Growing Role in the International military-Political Arena?,” the Retired 

Officer, December 2000, p. 35. 

 3. George w. Bush,” A Distinctly American Internationalism,” Simi 

Valley, CA, November 19, 1999. 

 4. http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/election/2000debates/2ndebate1.html. 

5. Chinese Exercise Strait 961: 8-25 march 1996, Washington, DC: Office of 

Naval Intelligence, May 1996. 

 6. For a detailed and comprehensive analysis of Clinton’s China 

policy, see David M. Lampton, Same Bed, Different Dreams, Berkeley and Los 

Angeles: University of California Press, 2001. 
14

 7. John Keefe,” A Tale of ‘Two very Sorries’,” Far Eastern Economic 

Review, March 21, 2002, pp. 30-33. Significantly, China also concluded 

that its handling of the incident was virtually exemplary. Chinese 

analysts insist that Beijing handled the situation in a mature, measured 

way and demonstrated the effectiveness of China’s “crisis management 

ability.” See, for example, the discussion in “Thinkers’ Forum: Midair 

Collision and the Future of Sino-U.S. Relations,” Zhongguo Pinglun 

(Hong Kong) June 1, 2001, translated in Foreign Broadcast Information 

Service-China, June 21, 2001. 

 8. Bush,” A Distinctly American Internationalism,” November 19, 

1999. 

 9. George W. Bush, “Bush at the Citadel,” Charles ton, SC, December 

11, 2001. www.cbsnews.com. 

10. Evan S. Medieros, Rapporteur, US-China Arms Control and 

Nonproliferation Cooperation: Progress and Prospects, Monterey: Monterey 

Institute of International Studies, October 2000, p. 19. 

 11. Ibid., p. 20. 

 12. Li Daozhong,” An Interpretation of Challenges Imposed by U.S. 

Unilateralism on International multilateral Arms Control Regime,” Peace, 

No. 61, December 2001, p. 19. 

 13. See, for example, Andrew Scobell,” Crouching Korea, Hidden 

China: Bush Administration Policy Toward Pyongyang and Beijing,” 

Asian Survey, Vol. XLII, No. 2, March/April 2002, pp. 344-345. Scobell 

contends that Bush appears to see China not so much as a strategic 

competitor but rather with uncertainty about whether it is a friend or 

foe. The President’s thinking about China might be called “strategic 

ambivalence.” Ibid., pp. 363-364. This ambivalence was likely only 
15

reinforced as the result of the war on terrorism and the two face-to-face 

meetings in late 2001 and early 2002 with Jiang in Shanghai and 

Beijing, respectively. 

 14. On Chinese suspicions about the Belgrade bombing and Chinese 

suspicions about U.S. intentions generally, see Andrew Scobell, China 

and Strategic Culture, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies 

Institute, May 2002, pp. 18-19. 

 15. The authors of this introduction would add that, like the BushJiang talks in Shanghai and Beijing, there was not much of substance 

that came out of the Hu Jintao visit to the United States at the invitation 

of Vice President Cheney in May 2002. On the Bush-Jiang talks, see, for 

example, Scobell,: “Crouching Korea, Hidden China,” p. 359. 
17

PART I: PERSPECTIVES ON CHINA’S 

SECURITY AND MILITARY POWER 
19

CHAPTER 2 

THE VIEW FROM BEIJING: 

U.S.-CHINA SECURITY RELATIONS 

FROM KOSOVO TO SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 

David M. Finkelstein 

Introduction. 

On October 19, 2001, Presidents George W. Bush of the United States 

and Jiang Zemin of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) had their first 

face-to-face meeting on the fringes of the Asia-Pacific Economic 

Council (APEC) meeting in Shanghai after almost a year of 

increasingly strained bilateral relations. What was originally scheduled 

to be a full-blown summit meeting, to include a visit by Bush to Beijing, 

was curtailed to a half-day of talks due to the unforeseen and tragic 

terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11.1 

By all accounts, the meetings went well enough. The official Chinese 

press characterized the discussions as “constructive and fruitful” and 

held in a “friendly and candid atmosphere.”2 In their joint press 

conference, Bush readily agreed with Jiang that the discussions were useful 

and that the two men had “a very good meeting.”3 Both men agreed to improve 

relations. Jiang called for “constructive and cooperative relations,” as did 

Bush, who added the word “candid” to the construct.4

 The usual “deliverables” that are associated with and often 

anticipated as a result of these types of U.S.-China summits were modest. 

But given many months of tense relations and the events of September 11, 

Bush and Jiang were able to accomplish two key objectives: establish a 

baseline dialogue from which to attempt to improve relations, especially 

security relations, and publicly present a “united front” on the issue of the 
20

war on terrorism. In the future, these two threads may become 

increasingly interwoven as operations in Afghanistan continue. Indeed, 

for both countries, the war against terrorism will only magnify the 

importance of placing U.S.-China relations, especially security relations, 

on an even keel. 

 For China, the next few years will witness a significant leaders hip 

succession—the accession to power of the “Fourth Generation” of 

leaders in 2002. These are the men who will have to grapple with the 

increasingly difficult task of pushing forward economic and structural 

reforms, while managing the social and political dislocations attendant to 

those reforms. They will have to move forward with the development of 

China’s western region, tackle the internal problems plaguing the Chinese 

Communist Party (CCP), and manage the issues associated with World 

Trade Organization (WTO) entry. All of this will be going on while China 

will be increasingly placed under the international microscope in the leadup to the 2008 Olympics. Moreover, the Taiwan issue is becoming more 

complex for Chinese leaders as political developments and domestic 

politics in Taipei become more complicated. And now that the United States 

is actually prosecuting military operations in a country with which 

China shares a land border—always a high order Chinese security 

concern—Beijing now has a serious stake in not being cut out by 

Washington. China simply cannot afford a confrontational relationship with 

the United States at this point in time if it can be avoided. 

 Needless to say, a confrontational relationship with China will not 

serve U.S. interests either. Especially because of the campaign in 

Afghanistan and the global nature of Washington’s war on terrorism, 

stable bilateral relations between the United States and China are a must. 

The issue of terrorism notwithstanding, strained security relations with 

China serves no ends if it can be avoided. 

 Increased U.S.-China tensions will only unnerve Washington’s 

allies and friends in the Asia-Pacific region. An unstable relationship 
21

could have a deleterious impact on U.S. business and trade interests at a 

time of economic uncertainty. Increased tensions could complicate 

key U.S. security concerns in East Asia, such as the maintenance of 

stability on the Korean Peninsula and especially across the Taiwan Strait. 

Overall, worsening bilateral relations with China could become an 

unending foreign policy distraction to a Bush white house that needs to 

focus its foreign policy energies on the war against terrorists. 

 At the same time, due to a growing mutual distrust that has evolved with in 

the two security establishments over the past few years, security differences 

between the two nations will be the most challenging area in which to 

repair relations and move them forward. 

 U.S. concerns vis-à-vis China are well known. For the most part, U.S. 

worries on the security front have revolved around the following four key 

issues. First, growing concerns that Beijing is prepared to use force to 

resolve the Taiwan issue “sooner rather than later,” based on a calculus 

that few in the west can claim to understand with any degree of 

certainty.5 Second, U.S. concern about Chinese proliferation behavior. 

Third, given the lack of defense transparency in China, uncertainties in 

the United States as to the intentions behind China’s military 

modernization programs—conventional and nuclear. And fourth, 

questions in the United States as to whether China would like to see the 

U.S. Military pushed out of the Pacific, or at least pulled back.6 All of 

these issues are critically important to the regional security interests of 

the United States. On a 4-tier scale of national interests—(1) survival, (2) 

vital, (3) major, (4) peripheral—they rate in the vital and major categories. 

This is not insignificant. 

 Likewise, in Beijing, the “U.S. factor” in the Chinese national security 

calculus appears to have grown even greater than in the past. Over the past 

few years, the perceived “challenges” to Chinese national sovereignty and 

security interests posed by the security policies of the United States—

real or imagined on their part—are being viewed by a good number of 
22

Chinese security analysts with increasing alarm. Whereas, one could 

argue, U.S. security concerns about China range backwards from 

“vital” to “major,” many Chinese see U.S. challenges as ranging upwards 

from “major” to “vital” and, in some cases, even “survival.” This trend is 

extremely worrisome if true. 

 Because most American analysts are already well aware of the Chinese 

security policies that give pause in the United States, the assignment 

given this student by the conference organizers was to identify the 

Chinese concerns—which are not always self-evident. The author of this 

chapter, therefore, will review the growing uncertainty, concern, and angst 

with which Beijing has viewed the United States over the past couple of 

years. He will attempt to view the world through Chinese eyes. He will attempt 

to convey the Chinese analytic framework vis-à-vis the United States—an 

analytic frame of mind, if you will—as well as specific policy concerns. 

 The best way to do so is to review for readers the serious national 

security debates that have taken place in China in the very recent past that, 

in many ways, have been driven by Chinese angst about the United States. 

The author will present an overview of the very significant national security 

debate that took place in China in 1999 in the aftermath of NATO’s Kosovo 

intervention.7 he will touch briefly on the April 2001 EP-3 incident, and 

address the “America debate” that was unfolding in Beijing as of the summer 

of 2001, just prior to September 11. Finally, the author will speculate 

about the concerns Chinese analysts might have as they view the security 

implications of the American campaign in Afghanistan, and, presumably, the 

war against terrorism beyond. 

 A caveat at the outset is in order. It is important that the Chinese 

Weltanschauung be fully understood and explained, especially as it 

concerns the United States. However, doing so does not imply agreement. 
23

1999: Kosovo and the “Great Peace and Development Debate.” 

Overview. From March 1999 through the late fall of 1999, a national 

security debate took place in China. It was remarkable on two counts. 

 For the first time since 1985, Deng Xiaoping’s basic assessment of 

the state of the international security environment—that “peace and 

development” (Heping Yu Fazhan) were the trends of the times—was 

seriously questioned and intensely scrutinized. Of key significance, the 

efficacy of China’s foreign policies and the validity of China’s national 

defense policies were especially subjected to fervid internal debate. 

 The second reason that this was a remarkable event was that this was 

likely the first time since 1949 that Chinese foreign policy and defense policy 

were openly discussed and debated in the government-controlled media as 

matters of public concern—to include criticisms of government policies by 

the general populace. 

 Judging from the Chinese press, during the height of the debate (the 

summer of 1999) almost every literate sector of the China polity was 

apparently engaged in a media free-for-all on foreign policy and defense 

issues. This included intellectuals, middle class entrepreneurs, 

students, and even Chinese government analysts who took to the op-ed 

pages, radio call-in shows, and TV roundtables.8 

Public discourse revolved about the state of the world, China’s place 

in it, the state of Chinese security, as well as what the government in 

Beijing should do about these issues and about the United States. 

 The proximate cause of this debate was NATO’s military intervention 

in Kosovo in March 1999. NATO’s errant bombing of the PRC Embassy 

in Belgrade in May added fuel to the debate. However, behind these 

issues were long-simmering Chinese concerns that the post-Cold war 

international order was not unfolding as Chinese international 
24

relations theorists had predicted. The debate, especially the internal debate, 

was also driven by increasing Chinese concerns about U.S. strategic 

intentions and policies in the post-Cold war order in general, and 

towards China in particular. 

 At its most fundamental level, the debate that took place in 1999 was 

about how the Chinese government should assess the state of the 

unfolding international security environment. But most important, it 

was about the implications of that assessment for China’s external 

security. 

 The overarching question was simple: had China’s external security 

situation fundamentally deteriorated as a result of NATO’s intervention 

in Kosovo? This question brought others to the surface: what did other 

global and regional security developments portend? And should China adjust 

its domestic priorities, its foreign policies, or its defense policies? 

 On the diplomatic front, for example, questions were raised as to 

whether the Chinese government had been placing too much emphasis on 

cultivating the “developed world”—especially the United States—

instead of the “developing world,” which it had traditionally emphasized? 

Others asked whether the government was becoming involved in 

international affairs that were too far removed from China’s traditional, 

more narrowly defined national interests. In effect, this question asked 

whether the central leadership was walking away from Deng 

Xiaoping’s oft-quoted dictum that in foreign affairs” China should keep a 

low profile and never take the lead.” 

 On the issue of national defense modernization, some voiced concerns 

that the “U.S.-led” Kosovo intervention was evidence that China could no 

longer afford to continue to subjugate defense modernization to 

economic development. Indeed, some argued that it was now time to place 

equal emphasis on the two. 
25

 As we shall see, it was not just the Kosovo intervention that made this 

an issue. Other issues simmering in the background were at work, and it 

is important to point out that those who saw a need for enhanced 

military defense were not just in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA): 

they were as likely to be found in civilian ministries and their affiliated 

institutes. 

 But at the heart of the debate in official circles were questions about 

the United States as a world actor in general, Washington’s specific 

intentions toward China, and the future of U.S.-China relations. Indeed, 

almost all Chinese on every side of the debate were able to agree that any 

deleterious changes in the international security environment and any 

degradation of China’s own security were a function of the actions and 

intentions, real or perceived, of the United States. 

 By most accounts, the “U.S. question” in particular was the most 

contentious issue debated internally by Chinese government analysts and 

other officials. As one Chinese put it, “The Chinese reaction to Kosovo 

created the political atmosphere that unleashed a debate by those 

unsatisfied with PRC policy toward the U.S.” At a certain point in the 

discourse, the question of whether confrontation with the United States 

was inevitable became the centerpiece of discourse. Other questions 

revolved about how to deal with the United States and the tradeoffs 

between cooperation and confrontation with Washington. 

 In the lexicology of Chinese analyses, all of these issues and others 

were captured by asking whether “peace and development” was still “the 

key note of the times.” 

 To grasp the significance of the question, one must understand the 

implications of questioning the validity of “peace and development” as 

the “key note of the times” (shidai zhuti). Doing so requires a step back to 

recall Mao Zedong’s assessment and Deng Xiaoping’s reversal of that 

assessment. In China these assessments are not mere exercises in 
26

theoretical discourse: they are the starting point for justifying or 

rationalizing specific national policy decisions.9 Therefore, a review of 

the differences in domestic, foreign, and military policies justified by the 

very different assessments made by Mao and Deng provides a historical 

context with which to view the debate of 1999. 

The Maoist Line: “War and Revolution.” In the 1960s and 1970s, the Maoist 

assessment of the international security environment was commonly stated 

as “war and revolution” (zhanzheng yu geming). This was a result of the 

perceived military threats to China from the United States and 

especially the Soviet Union after the break between Moscow and Beijing. It 

was also a function of the ideological lens through which Mao viewed the 

world. 

 As a result of this assessment, China’s security posture and its 

domestic policies were characterized by keeping the Chinese nation and 

the PLA on a war footing, perpetuating “class struggle” within China, and 

pursuing a foreign policy focused on the “socialist camp” and the 

revolutionary “Third world.” For the most part, China remained “closed” 

to the capitalist world. 

 As we know, this assessment had a profound impact on the economy 

and society. The combined requirements of being on a war footing and 

Mao’s ideological imperatives resulted in an autarkic economy; an 

emphasis on heavy industries moved inland; the perpetuation of the policies 

of the communization of agriculture and industry; and the neardestruction of the national bourgeoisie. 

 For its part, the PLA was told to expect “early war, major war, and nuclear 

war.” This meant maintaining a massive defense establishment, relying 

on “People’s war” as a military strategy, and a belief that “superior” 

political will could overcome the advanced technologies of potential 

opponents. It also perpetuated the highly elevated status of the PLA in the 

Chinese polity. 
27

The Dengist Line: “Peace and Development.” In the late 1970s and early 

1980s, Deng Xiaoping began taking China down a path of bold change. 

Deng’s reassessment of the “key note of the times” provided a critical 

ideological basis for the myriad of sea-change reforms that would ensue. It 

also was the justification for a change in national priorities. By 1985 Deng 

had reversed the Maoist assessment completely. 

 Where Mao saw “war and revolution “as the context for international 

security, Deng acknowledged the changes in superpower relations and 

China’s own prospects. Deng’s reassessment held that “peace and 

development” (heping yu fazhan) more correctly described the trends in the 

world. The Dengist view held that, in spite of the continuing dangers to 

China posed by wars and conflicts, the possibility of a world war was 

remote, the chance of a nuclear war between the superpowers was slight, 

China did not face the prospect of imminent invasion, and China would enjoy at 

least 2 decades of a peaceful international environment. 

The policy changes derived from this assessment are well known. 

Domestically,” economics as the central task” replaced “class struggle as 

the key link.” In foreign relations, China began to seek contact and 

good relations with the capitalist world as well as the socialist camp, and 

with developed countries as well as developing countries. “Reform and 

opening up” (gaige yu kaifeng) became the major thrust. 

 In the area of defense policy, the PLA was taken off a war footing and 

shifted onto a prolonged period of “peacetime army-building,” thus 

initiating the reforms of the Chinese military that persist today: namely 

moving toward a (relatively) leaner, but more technologically advanced 

PLA. Just as importantly, Deng placed military modernization as the last 

priority in his “Four modernizations.” 

 At an enlarged meeting of the Central military Commission in 

June 1985, Deng explained his reassessment to his generals. While 
28

recognizing the dangers that persisted, he asserted that “the world 

forces for peace are growing faster than the forces for war.” Deng told his 

military leaders to be patient, to place economic construction above all 

else, and to wait for at least 20 years. At that time China’s economic 

strength would permit a greater emphasis on military modernization. 

 Fast forward to 1999. Clearly then, the critique of the Dengist 

assessment during the Kosovo debate engendered major implications for 

the broad sweep of Chinese domestic, foreign, and defense policies. If 

“peace and development” were no longer the trend, what was? Did Kosovo 

signify the triumph of the “forces for war” over the “forces for peace”? 

Should China raise defense modernization at the expense of economic 

reform? Should Beijing turn its back on the developed and capitalist 

world and focus its foreign policies on the developing world exclusively? 

Is conflict with the United States inevitable? 

 Draconian as these questions may seem, the highly charged 

atmosphere in Beijing in the aftermath of the Kosovo intervention (and 

especially after the errant bombing of the PRC Embassy in Belgrade) 

provided a backdrop against which these types of questions could be 

asked and debated for the first time in many years as Chinese analysts 

attempted to make sense out of a post-Cold war international order 

that, from the perspective of some, now seemed to be moving against 

Chinese national interests. 

 The degree of angst in Beijing during this period is partially 

explained by comparing China’s successes in the preceding 3 years, 1996-99, 

with events in late 1998 and in early 1999. 

Prior to 1999: Riding the waves of Self-Confidence. Between 1996 and late 

1998, Beijing had every reason to feel newly confident in its place in the 

world order, especially in foreign affairs. 

• In the wake of the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait crises, U.S.-China relations 
29

seemed to be back on track after the two presidential summits in 1997 

and 1998. An agreement to seek a “Constructive Strategic 

Partnership” was announced, and President William Clinton 

publicly stated the “Three No’s” in Shanghai.10

• Nearly 10 years after Tiananmen, almost all foreign economic 

sanctions against China had been lifted. 

• Between 1996 and 1998, a very proactive foreign policy spearheaded 

by Jiang resulted in the establishment of a series of “partnerships” 

around the globe with key developed countries.11

• Hong Kong’s retrocession to China was accomplished, and Macao’s was 

to be next. 

• Human rights issues no longer appeared to be a major impediment to 

China’s foreign economic relations. Not only had Europe seemingly 

lost interest in this issue but also, for the first time in many years, the 

United States in 1998 did not sponsor a resolution condemning China 

at the annual meeting of the United Nations (U.N.) Human Rights 

Commission in Geneva. 

• Beijing was making excellent progress in resolving border disputes 

with neighbors, notably Russia and even Vietnam. Moreover, the 

“Shanghai Five” arrangement between China, Russia, Kazakhstan, 

Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan was well underway.12

• China had received accolades from around the world for “responsible” 

behavior during the Asian financial crisis, and for the moment the 

focus of regional concern in Asia was on financial recovery, not China’s 

rise as a regional power. 

• On the Taiwan front, the PRC seemed to be on the move, and Taipei 

appeared to be on the defensive. In addition to obtaining the “Three 
30

No’s” from the U.S. President, China was pressuring Taiwan for 

political talks and waging an active diplomatic offensive to woo those 

countries that still recognized Taipei. The loss of diplomatic relations 

with South Africa in 1998 was a serious blow to Taiwan in this regard. 

 Domestically, the situation was tolerable. China was able to weather 

the Asian financial crisis with out devaluating its currency. Growth 

was acceptable, if not as great as desired. The social dislocations 

attendant to economic reform seemed manageable, although concerns 

about labor unrest persisted. 

1999: A Year of Disasters. Juxtaposed against 3 years of relatively 

smooth sailing, the close of 1998 and the first months of 1999 brought, 

from a Chinese perspective, ominous developments in key areas of 

concern: Japan, Taiwan, and relations with the United States. Some of 

these events took place before the Kosovo intervention or the Embassy 

bombing, others afterwards. The net effect, however, was to raise fears 

among many Chinese officials and analysts that security trends were now 

turning against China’s interests. These events provided both a context for the 

debate of 1999 and, in some cases, new impetus during the debate. 

Japan. Through out this period (1998, 1999) developments in Japan 

begin to be viewed with increasing apprehension by the Chinese analytic 

xitong. 

• In December 1998 the Government of Japan announced its decision 

to join the United States in co-research of the upper-tier theater 

Ballistic missile Defense program. 

• In March 1999 the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force fired upon 

North Korean vessels—the first shots fired in anger by the Japanese 

armed forces since the end of World War II. 

• The Japanese Diet ratified the Revised Guidelines for Defense 
31

Cooperation with the United States in May 1999, refusing to specify for 

Beijing whether Taiwan was included in the ambiguous phrase “areas 

surrounding Japan.” 

• All of this added to concerns about Japan in the wake of Jiang’s less than 

successful visit to that country in late November 1998. 

Taiwan. In early July 1999 then-President Lee Teng-hui issued his 

“Two-State theory,” which resulted in another “mini-crisis” in crossStrait relations. Enough said. 

United States. To one degree or another, the United States, during 

the debate, began to be viewed by many analysts in Beijing as the root 

cause of the negative trends in Japanese and Taiwan affairs in addition to 

becoming a problem in its own right. What did Chinese analysts focus on? 

• In January 1999 the Clinton administration announced its decision to 

move forward on National missile Defense. 

• In April 1999 Zhu Rongji’s visit to Washington for the expressed purpose 

of negotiating Chinese permanent normal trading relations (PNTR) 

and WTO membership ended in failure. Indeed, in late March there 

had been a “mini-debate” in China as to whether Zhu should have gone at 

all, given the inauguration of the NATO air campaign against Serbia and 

a lack of consensus within the Chinese bureaucracy about the types of 

concessions Beijing could afford to make in those negotiations. 

• Through out this period, Chinese analysts began to assess that the socalled "anti-China" voices in the United States were gaining the 

upper hand over China policy. Some of the more prominent “data 

points” they cited included the “Cox Committee Report” (May) and 

the Los Alamos espionage case; the tabling of the Taiwan Security 

Enhancement Act (April-May); the requirement levied on the 

Department of Defense to publish its study on hypothetical theater 
32

ballistic missile defense (TBMD) architectures in Asia including 

Taiwan; the possibility of the sale of TBMD-related radars to Taipei 

(June); and the concern over China’s alleged future influence over the 

Panama Canal (July). 

NATO and Kosovo. Then, of course, there was the issue of Kosovo 

itself. Some Chinese security analysts believed it established precedents for 

military interventions in the “internal affairs” of sovereign states and 

demonstrated the “will” of the United States (as viewed from Beijing) 

to use force” to maintain its world dominance.” Kosovo shocked many 

Chinese into questioning whether the global trends were in fact away 

from war and toward China’s much-touted multipolar world order—

the previous analysis. 

 The air campaign began in March while Jiang Zemin was in Italy, a 

NATO member, as part of a three-nation European visit. In deciding to 

intervene with military force, NATO sidestepped the U.N. and 

marginalized Security Council members China and Russia. Then, in early 

May, the PRC Embassy was inadvertently attacked. 

 Just as disconcerting to the Chinese were other NATO-related 

events. In April, NATO accepted Poland, Hungary, and the Czech 

Republic as new members. During NATO’s 50th anniversary celebrations 

in Washington, a new “Strategic Concept” was declared that included 

out-of-area missions. Also around that time (June) was the coining of the 

“Clinton Doctrine,” which was interpreted in China as espousing the 

legitimacy of military interventions in sovereign nations for humanitarian 

purposes. Beijing immediately thought of the implications for Taiwan, 

Xinjiang, and Tibet, and carefully watched developments in Chechnya.13

Domestic Concerns. Even on the domestic front, the first half of 1999 

presented issues for concern within Zhongnanhai. High-profile 

corruption cases continued to embarrass the Party; reforms of the 

state-owned enterprises were becoming difficult to carry out; and 
33

consumer demand at home was slowing. If the Hong Kong press is to be 

believed, large-scale and often-violent incidents of labor unrest 

continued to plague local governments on the mainland. Even more 

unsettling were the rise in the profile of the China Democracy Party 

following the Clinton visit to China (1998) and the “shock” of the Falun Gong 

phenomenon beginning in April 1999 and continuing today. 

 Overall then, in just a few months the confidence of Chinese 

leaders and their analysts was significantly shaken. They were no longer 

so certain of their place in the world order or of their assessment of 

world trends as favoring China’s continued rise both at home and 

abroad. 

The Results of the Debate. At the end of the day, after reams of analysis 

and incessant rounds of meetings, the debate re-looked many of these 

key issues. And by the time the Beidaihe meetings took place in August 1999, 

there was closure on many of them: at least on an official level (if not 

intellectually). 

 That closure came in the form of a new shorthand for the state of the 

international security situation referred to as ”The Three No Changes and 

the Three New Changes.” 

 The “Three No Changes” assert the following: 

• Peace and development remain the trend in international relations 

and the movement toward a multipolar world continues; 

• Economic globalization continues to increase; and, 

• The major trend is toward the relaxation of international tensions. 

 But these three points were modified by the “Three New Changes”: 
34

• Hegemonism and power politics are on the rise; 

• The trend toward military interventionism is increasing; and, 

• The gap between developed and developing countries is increasing. 

 Clearly, these two sets of seemingly contradictory assessments 

represented a compromise position between those who were relatively 

optimistic about long-term trends and those who were very much 

focused on and concerned about near-term negative developments. 

 The “Three No Changes” reaffirmed the basic thrust of Deng’s earlier 

analysis. China did not now face “early war, major war, and nuclear 

war.” It reaffirmed the analyses by Chinese international relations theorists 

since the late 1980s that the world would eventually move toward a 

multipolar international order and that China would become one of the 

key poles. It also recognized the growing importance of economics in 

international relations. So, to a great degree, it accounted for the views of 

those who did not see Kosovo and other security-related events of concern 

as requiring a major readjustment of the Dengist assessment. 

 This formulation had direct and immediate implications for Chinese 

domestic policies. It reaffirmed the correctness of “economics as the 

central task” and provided the continued ideological justification for 

the leadership in Beijing to press forward with the next phases of 

economic and structural reform, to include the pursuit of WTO 

membership. So when Chinese interlocutors say that “nothing changed” 

as a result of Kosovo, they are not being disingenuous. There was, in fact, 

no decision to reverse the Dengist line and the direction of domestic 

reforms. 

 However, something did change after Kosovo. The “Three New 

Changes” added serious caveats to the generally positive long-term 

trends cited in the first part of the construct. 
35

 For one thing, the “Three New Changes” was an admission that 

previous Chinese government analyses of the near-term trends in the 

international security had been much too optimistic about the pace of 

global multipolarization and much too quick to dismiss the potentially 

destabilizing effects that local wars and world wide military 

interventions might have on China’s interests. 

 Clearly, Beijing’s much-hoped-for multipolar world order was not 

around the corner. In addition, the new assessment certainly undercut 

the assertion in the 1998 Defense white Paper that “the influence of armed 

conflicts and local wars had been remarkably weakened.” In fact, the “Three 

New Changes” undercut the entire tenor of the first section of the 1998 

Defense white Paper. 

 The second change implicit in the “Three New Changes” is the Chinese 

assessment of the root cause of the problems facing world security and 

stability. 

 Previously, Beijing had seen the United States as one source of some 

of the problems plaguing world security, both economic and military. But 

there were plenty of other nations and non-national actors viewed as 

problematic. In the wake of Kosovo and a host of other events since 1998, the 

mix of problems remained the same. But the United States and its policies 

were now starting to be viewed as a principal source of these problems, 

especially for China. And by most accounts the “Three New Changes” is 

about the United States almost exclusively. 

 Of equal significance, the new assessment, and a reinforced view of 

the United States as a superpower “hegemon,” seemed to have put to rest 

previous de rigueur internal and academic assessments that the 

“comprehensive national power” of the United States was in a slow 

decline—an analytic “line” that had been commonplace for at least a 

decade.14 The new line seems to be accompanied by an assessment that the 
36

United States will maintain its status as “sole superpower” for the next 20 

years, if not longer. 

 At the end of the day, then, the degree to which the post-debate 

analysis of the international and regional security environment, and the 

assessment of the U.S., became an official “line” was reflected in the 

formulations in the first section of the October 2000 Defense White 

Paper. 

 The October 2000 Defense White Paper, China’s National Defense 

2000, provided a much more sober assessment of the trends in 

international and regional security than had been articulated in the July 

1998 version. Some of the assessments from the important first section of the 

October 2000 Defense White Paper is worth reviewing.15

• “In today’s world factors that may cause instability and uncertainty 

have markedly increased.” 

• “Hegemonism and power politics still exist and are further developing.” 

• “Certain big powers are pursuing neointerventionism, neo-gunboat 

diplomacy, and neo-economic colonialism... Which are seriously 

damaging the sovereignty, independence, and development interests of 

many countries, and threatening world peace and security.” 

• “The United Nations’ authority and role in handling international 

and regional security affairs... are being seriously challenged.” 

• “Local wars and armed conflicts . . . have increased again.” 

• “There are . . . new negative developments... in the security of the AsiaPacific region.” 

• “The Taiwan Straits situation... is complicated and grim.” 
37

Finally, to underscore increasing concern over Chinese security, the 

Defense White Paper of 2000 announced the following: 

. . . in view of the fact that hegemonism and power politics still 

exist and are further developing, and in particular, the basis for 

the country’s peaceful reunification is seriously imperiled, China 

will have to enhance its capability to defend its sovereignty 

and security by military means. 

The Unique Interests of the PLA. If there was any institution in China 

that had a significant corporate stake in the events surrounding Kosovo, it 

was the PLA. Needless to say, closely watching and studying NATO’s 

campaign against Serbia as it unfolded was a matter of intense 

professional interest. But the PLA had an equally large bureaucratic 

interest in the internal and public debate triggered by Kosovo. The 

debate provided a window of opportunity for China’s military 

establishment to argue publicly, and likely behind closed doors as well, 

that national defense and military modernization deserved a greater 

priority in overall national development than had been accorded hitherto. 

 The arguments surrounding the need for a greater emphasis on 

defense modernization by the PLA (and others) gained momentum as a result 

of two events: the May 1999 bombing of the PRC Embassy in Belgrade (in 

which a Chinese military attaché was wounded), and Lee Teng-hui’s 

espousal of the “Two-State theory” in July 1999. In the past, such arguments 

by the top PLA leadership in public fora had been somewhat politically 

incorrect, although once in a while a senior PLA leader would make his 

case. For example, in 1996 Defense Minister General Chi Haotian wrote a 

long article in CCP’s official journal, Seeking Truth (Qiushi), in which he 

stated,” The building of national defense... cannot exceed the 

limitation of tolerance of economic construction, nor can it be laid aside 

until the economy has totally prospered.”16 For the most part, however, in 

public, the top PLA leadership had for years dutifully recited the 

Dengist mantra that “defense modernization must remain subordinate 
38

to economic construction.” Here was a chance to press the case for more 

funding. 

 It should be pointed out, however, that publicly the top PLA 

leadership did not challenge this line during the debate. As mentioned 

above, having the leadership of the Central Military Commission, for 

example, make the case in the press during such a period of 

emotionalism and sensationalism was likely still too sensitive from a 

domestic political standpoint.17 Nevertheless, there seemed to be plenty 

of senior colonels and other field grade officers who were quite willing to 

make the arguments. Consequently, during the period of the debate the 

PLA ’s official newspaper, Liberation Army Daily (Jiefangjun Bao), 

carried an unending stream of “opinion pieces” from individual 

officers that warned the nation of the consequences of ignoring 

national defense, hyped the threat posed by the United States to 

international peace and stability, and, in some cases, argued that 

military modernization should at least be equal to national economic 

construction. 

 In these regards, the timing of Kosovo could not have been better. 

For one thing, work on the 10th Five-Year PLAN (2001-05) was already 

under way but not yet complete. There was still a chance to press for an 

increase in funding. Moreover, just 8 months earlier in July 1998, Jiang had 

ordered the PLA to divest itself of its commercial enterprises—the large 

corporate empire that it had run for many years which provided the military 

with a source of (1) extra-budgetary funds for soldier “quality of life,” 

(2) employment for PLA spouses and demobilized officers, (3) 

supplemental operations and maintenance (O&M) funds, and (4) 

funds for equipment procurement. Not only did the PLA lose many of its 

corporate entities, but it did so under a cloud. The decision to have the 

military divest was tied to evidence brought to the attention of Jiang of 

large-scale smuggling and corruption by some military commercial 

entities in the south. Consequently, the Kosovo intervention, and 

especially the bombing of the PRC Embassy in Belgrade, gave the PLA 
39

an opportunity to burnish its image among the general public by riding 

the crest of nationalist sentiment as the defenders of Chinese sovereignty. 

 These particularistic interests aside, NATO’s Kosovo intervention 

also drove home to many in the PLA once again just how large a capabilities 

gap still existed between their own armed forces and those of the advanced 

western nations, especially the United States, even after nearly a 

decade of post-Gulf war reform and modernization. The frustration of 

some military officers at the relatively low priority of military 

modernization in the greater scheme of national development was 

articulated by a general line of argument that goes like this: “We were told 

that we would have to be patient, that military modernization would have to 

await economic modernization. We have been patient for 20 years. How 

long must we wait?” 

 But the PLA rhetoric surrounding Kosovo served another important 

purpose. It was used to highlight to the Chinese armed forces the importance 

of following through with the wide-ranging programs of reform that had 

been underway for the last decade. Many of these reforms—especially 

in the areas of force structure downsizing and personnel 

administration—had been meeting some resistance below. As Chief of 

the General Staff Fu Quanyou had pointed out a year earlier, grassroots 

units had to overcome “selfish departmentalism and overemphasis of 

local interests” and move forward with change for the greater good of the 

PLA.18 Especially in light of the situation on Taiwan, the PLA leadership 

used the Kosovo intervention and the debate to lecture its own people 

that reform and modernization of the military was a serious undertaking 

and not merely a bureaucratic exercise. 

 While it is clear that military modernization was not going to 

supplant economic construction as the national priority, or even be 

equal to it in emphasis, some of these arguments by the PLA, or by others 

on behalf of the PLA, probably had an impact on the top Chinese 

leadership. Clearly, for various internal political reasons, the concerns of 
40

the PLA could not be totally ignored. Consequently, not long after the 

PRC Embassy bombing, rumors abounded that the central government 

had provided the military with a large, supplemental lump-sum infusion 

of funds.19 

Given the call for enhanced national defense by the PLA and others in 

the post-Kosovo debate, the demise of many PLA business interests, the 

security assessment articulated in the October 2000 Defense White Paper, 

and the politics of succession, it was not too much of a surprise when in 

December 2000 the Chinese Finance Minister announced an increase of 

17.7 percent for defense spending for 2001. 

 Overall then, the debate of 1999 was an occasion for Beijing to vent, 

anguish, and wonder about China’s national security and the future of U.S.-

China relations. 

Interregnum: December 1999 Through April 2001. 

At an official level, “the great debate” came to a close in late August 

1999 when the Beidaihe leadership meetings promulgated the “Three No 

Changes and Three New Changes.” It was not until December, however, 

that the public debate in the Chinese media finally came to a close. At this 

point in time, the central authorities apparently decided that enough 

public debate on the issues of national defense, national security, and 

Chinese foreign policy had taken place among the masses. By the end of 1999, 

editors of the major newspapers were reportedly no longer accepting op-eds 

from their readerships or writing editorials on these issues. There were 

other pressing issues with which to grapple: WTO accession, the inception 

in February 2000 of the “Go west” campaign, the continuing “Three 

Represents Campaign,” and a host of other domestic and foreign policy 

issues; not the least of which was the work needed to be done on the 10th 

Five-Year PLAN, the beginning of the succession process, and the 

preparatory work for the 16th Party Congress. 
41

 By the summer of 2000, however, Chinese foreign policy analysts were 

once again running fast to keep up with events in the United States. 

Attention was now focused on two issues: the ongoing presidential 

election campaign and the perception that American military strategy was 

shifting to Asia—a Chinese concern that surfaced even before the Bush 

election victory and the subsequently published Quadrennial Defense Review 

(QDR) issued by the Pentagon in September 2001. 

 The catalyzing event for Chinese analysts wondering about a U.S. 

"strategic focus shift” (zhanlue zhongdian zhuanyi) to Asia were news reports 

that the U.S. Air Force desired to forward-deploy stockpiles of cruise 

missiles to Guam in the summer of 2000. Chinese concerns about a 

“strategic shift” linger today, especially given some of the language in the 

recent QDR document. 

 For the most part, however, the Chinese community of America experts 

was fully engaged following election politics in the United States and 

wondering and speculating about what would be “better for China”—a 

Bush or a Gore election victory. The only people likely more frustrated than 

the American public at the time it took finally to decide the election winner 

was the corps of Chinese America experts who were probably under 

tremendous pressure to explain what was going on, and what the 

implications of a Bush or Gore victory or defeat meant for China. And 

many a Chinese institute wasted its funds in having delegations go to the 

United States in late November 2000 for post-election fact-finding, 

only to arrive without an election decision made. 

 After the Bush election was confirmed, arguments went back and forth 

in China as to the implications. Cautious optimists pointed to Bush’s 

father, “Lao Bushe,” as a probable force for ameliorating the Republican 

Party campaign rhetoric. Especially disconcerting to Beijing was the 

excoriation of the Clinton-Jiang “Constructive Strategic Partnership” 

construct and the substitution of the “Strategic Competitor” label. They 

pointed out as well that, sooner rather than later, economic realities would 
42

triumph, and the U.S. business community would eventually weigh in. 

After all, Bush and some of his principal deputies were from corporate 

America. They argued as well that all administrations start out 

“tough” on China, and they recalled the Clinton campaign slogan 

about “coddling dictators.” Those on the other side of the argument 

dismissed these lines of analysis as delusion. The trend, they argued, was 

already clear: the United States is bent on confronting China on all fronts, 

and the Bush victory means the ascendance of the “anti-China” elements. 

At the end of the day, they argued, the United States was still determined 

to pursue a strategic objective of “westernizing and splitting” China. 

 When the EP-3 incident occurred on April 1, 2001, these arguments were 

far from resolved, but for the moment they were held in check as the PRC 

Government tried to decide what to do about a situation that could quickly 

deteriorate. It is far too early to even attempt to understand (if we ever can) 

the calculus by which Beijing acted vis-à-vis the United States during the 11 

days the American aircrew was detained on Hainan Island. But for this 

student, at least, it was clear at the time and remains clear today that domestic 

politics in China were paramount. 

 Jiang and the senior party leadership had learned some important lessons 

as a result of the errant NATO attack on the PRC Embassy in Belgrade in 

May 1999. Most of these lessons had to do with the domestic scene, not 

international relations or U.S.-China relations. It was clear at the time of the 

EP-3 incident in April 2001, that Jiang would not countenance a 

repetition of the situation that took place after the bombing almost 2 

years earlier. 

 There were three very clear indicators of this. First, Jiang and the central 

leadership came out “tough” on the United States from the start. There 

would be no room allowed for accusations from any quarter in China 

that the Party and government was unwilling or incapable of defending 

Chinese sovereignty and dignity as was the case, some had argued, after the 

Belgrade bombing. 
43

 Second, there would be no students marching through the streets or 

gathering at or besieging the U.S. Embassy as in May 1999. This, one 

suspects, was not so much out of concern for the Americans as out of 

concern about stability on the streets of Beijing and beyond. The sensitive 

“May 4th” period was much too close at hand, as was the anniversary of 

the death of Hu Yaobang (April 15, 1989), a significant event for the student 

movement in the spring of 1989. And, of course, the Falun Gong problem 

had yet to be completely resolved. 

 Third, unlike the immediate period after the bombing in May 1999, 

there would be no media “free for all,” no great and public debates 

about national security policy, no criticisms of the government, and no reopening of the “peace and development” question. All things considered, 

during the EP-3 incident, the PRC Government demonstrated once 

again how capably it is able to reign-in the media when it chooses to do 

so.20 Relatively speaking, there was no radical editorializing that could 

undercut PRC Government positions or serve to reopen debates that had 

already been resolved “officially.”21 Any bile that needed to be vented in 

the press could be done at the expense of the United States this time 

around. 

 In other words, and overall, in the wake of the EP-3 incident, the Party 

this time stayed ahead of Chinese nationalism and popular indignation and 

was not chasing after it, as was the case after the embassy bombing in 1999. 

Post EP-3 and the Summer of 2001: Is China the U.S.’s New Enemy? 

The EP-3 incident did not reopen debate on the prospects for “peace 

and development” or the state of the international security situation. 

But it did reopen the portion of the “Great Debate of 1999” that was the 

most contentious and upon which there was the least consensus at the time: 

the future of U.S.-China relations. 
44

 Before the U.S. EP-3 was returned, and before Secretary of State Colin 

Powell even confirmed his visit to Beijing, a new debate was underway 

among the Chinese America-watching community. Since at least May 

2001 they had apparently been engaged in another round of intense 

debates, seminars, meetings, and conferences at which the issue of U.S. 

policy toward China was being discussed. 

 The EP-3 incident was the proximate cause of the new round of 

meetings and discussions. But it was not the sole cause. Like the 

unprecedented debate in 1999, the debate that began after the April 2001 

incident dredged up a growing list of concerns that were awaiting 

evaluation. 

 But there was one aspect of the EP-3 incident that clearly had a very 

profound impact upon analysts and the general public in China (and, 

incidentally, upon the American public as well). Specifically, the intense 

news coverage of the event in the west and in China made very public for 

probably the first time just how much “cat and mouse” activity was going 

on between the U.S. and Chinese militaries. 

 So as of the summer of 2001, the following questions were being 

explored in Chinese analytic circles once again: 

• How should China assess the current state of U.S.-China relations? 

• What “China policy” will the Bush administration adopt? and, 

• What are the prospects for future relations? 

 Central to these other questions was “Had the United States decided 

that China is the enemy and that this will drive U.S. policy toward China 

and the U.S. larger security strategy in Asia?” 

 As was the case during the debate in 1999, a wide range of views among 
45

Chinese security analysts on these questions was allegedly held. Moreover, 

as was also the case in 1999, analysts of like-minded opinion could be 

found crossing institutional and bureaucratic boundaries. Some 

observers offered that the PRC Government “learned its lesson” from the 

debate of 1999: although the debate was “active and intense,” it was 

conducted in a “cool-headed and analytic fashion “and mostly kept out of 

the media. 

 No conclusions are known to have been reached. Many Chinese analysts 

believed that it was still too early to make any conclusions about U.S. 

policies or intentions toward China. At the same time, many Chinese 

analysts were said to agree with a general assessment that the trends in U.S. 

policies and actions toward China in the last few months had been 

“negative.” There was along list of data points that many Chinese cited as 

indicating a negative trend in “Bush administration” China policy. (Again, 

listing these points does not indicate concurrence.) These included: 

• The Bush campaign rhetoric portraying China as a “strategic 

competitor,” not a “strategic partner”; 

• Bush administration plans to move ahead with BMD (perceived to be 

directed partially at China); 

• The strengthening of U.S.-Japan military relations (also perceived to be 

directed at China); 

• The “loud anti-China voices” that openly point to Beijing as the next 

enemy, and research monographs by some U.S. think tanks (wrongly 

perceived to represent U.S. Government policy) that propose a U.S. 

China policy option termed “congagement”; 

• The perception that the focus of the new U.S. military strategy is shifting 

from Europe to Asia and that this shift is directed against China; 
46

• The U.S. desire to move closer to India; 

• Bush’s April 2001 remarks about the defense of Taiwan; 

• Increasing arms sales to Taiwan and especially expanding military 

contacts with Taiwan (some Chinese analysts argue the United States 

is moving toward a de facto military alliance with Taipei); 

• The recent U.S. visit by Lee Teng-hui; 

• The belief of some Chinese analysts that the United States “pressured” 

Tokyo to allow Lee Teng-hui to visit Japan; 

• The U.S. Transit of Chen Shui-bian; 

• The “attitude” of the Pentagon toward military relations with China 

since the EP-3 episode; 

• The U.S. “attack” on human rights in China in Geneva; 

• The appointment of a State Department coordinator for Tibetan affairs 

and the Dalai Lama visit; and, 

• The general “anti-China” attitudes of some officials appointed to the 

new administration. 

 Clearly, there were some Chinese analysts who were already 

convinced that the United States had designated China as its next 

enemy. Others believed that the United States had already decided upon a 

“two-track” China policy that combines “economic engagement and 

military containment.” Still others argued that Bush’s China policy had yet 

to be decided. 

 Not all were convinced that the future of relations was as dire as recent 
47

events would suggest. These individuals tended to argue that 

Beijing’s and Washington’s mutual interest in stable relations for 

reasons of strictly selfish national interests were so strong that the 

“negative trend” would be arrested “at some point,” that pragmatism 

in Washington “would eventually prevail,” and that relations would 

eventually improve. 

 For example, in late May 2001 the China Institute of Contemporary 

International Relations (CICIR) held a forum on U.S.-China relations to 

which various experts were invited to present their views. In 

summarizing the results of the conference in their journal, CICIR editors 

pointed out many of the challenges from Washington. But the conference 

summary in the journal ended on a relatively optimistic note: 

Most of the participants to the forum traced the current state of 

affairs to policy guidelines of President Bush in designating 

Beijing a “strategic competitor” and its tilt to the Taiwan 

authorities in support of elements advocating “Taiwan 

independence.” China has clearly been the target of 

Washington’s current endeavor at strengthening ties with its 

allies and pushing ahead with its NMD program. But all this does 

not signify the last word in the Bush team’s China policy because 

external and internal restraints would make the Bush 

administration return to a relatively rational course after a 

period of reassessments. Based on the above analysis, most 

participants believe that there is no need for pessimism about the 

future of the China-US relationship. Unavoidable 

contradictions and frictions do not necessarily spell loss of 

control because the prices for conflicts would be prohibitively 

high for both parties.22

 It is difficult to say with any certainty that the above “optimistic” 

assessment (“hopeful” might be a better word) was representative of a 

majority of PRC security analysts or that it represented a commonly held view 
48

point. Some of the actual papers that were presented at the CICIR conference 

seemed, on the whole, less optimistic than reported above.23 

Operation “ENDURING FREEDOM”— 

Speculating About PRC Security Concerns. 

Obviously, the events of September 11 changed the entire context of 

the Bush-Jiang Summit. Although the Bush visit to China was much 

curtailed, the fact that the American President went to Shanghai to attend 

APEC and meet with Jiang under the circumstances was clearly a 

decision with positive impact both in China and throughout the region. The 

meeting clearly provided both leaders the ability to move back on a track 

toward more stable relations. And to the degree that both men have been 

constrained somewhat by domestic politics in their approach to bilateral ties, 

their professed common cause in the war against terrorism enhanced the 

arguments for engagement on a strategic level. 

 At the same time, how the United States and the coalition campaign 

against the Taliban—and the greater war against terrorism—unfolds will 

be watched with great care by the corps of Chinese security analysts. One 

can speculate that the Chinese will be very wary of the potential negative 

collateral impact of the post-September 11 world order for Chinese security 

concerns in general and specific key Chinese national security interests in 

particular. In this final section, permit a bit of speculation about the 

negative impact Chinese security analysts might see in what has transpired 

since September 11. 

Impact on Pakistan: A Key Security Partner. China claims that it has no 

military alliances, and in the technical sense that is quite true. But for many 

years Pakistan and China have been very close security partners. Their 

common cause is based on shared distrust of an enduring mutual 

antagonist—India. But China’s interests in Pakistan transcend that 

shared animosity. 
49

 For Beijing, Pakistan is one of many key Islamic states that it 

cultivates in order to achieve some leverage in the Moslem world, 

owing to concerns about its own restive north west province of 

Xinjiang. Pakistan’s importance to China has been on the rise since January 

2001. China has nervously watched as the Bush administration has relooked at previous U.S. allegations that China continues to transfer 

missile technologies to Islamabad, and Beijing analysts have evinced 

concerns watching the new impetus in the United States for rapprochement 

with India. 

 In the blink of an eye the events of September 11 have witnessed an 

amazingly quick U.S. return to engagement with Pakistan. Forced to 

“choose” between the United States and the Taliban regime it had 

hitherto supported, Islamabad made its choice, and Chinese security 

analysts cannot but wonder about the long-term implications of the 

reemergence of U.S.-Pakistani security relations for its own equities 

there. Moreover, should the government in Pakistan undergo its own 

internal dislocations as a result of its support for Washington, Chinese 

interests will be open to question. Having moved from proliferating pariah 

to active partner in the U.S. War in Afghanistan, a long-time and very close 

Chinese security partner now has a foot in both camps. 

Impact on Sino-Russian Relations. Rapprochement with Russia is likely the 

greatest Chinese foreign policy success of the post-Cold War (1991) 

period. Geostrategically, the end of Sino-Russian animosity has resulted in 

China having today the most secure land borders it has ever enjoyed. In 

July 2001, capping 10 years of steadily improved relations, Presidents Jiang 

and Vladimir Putin signed a major treaty aimed at institutionalizing their 

“Cooperative Strategic Partnership.” 

 While Beijing and Moscow have their own historical reasons to look 

askance at each other, events of the last few years have drawn them closer 

together politically. Both nations are fundamentally dissatisfied with 

how the post-Cold war world order has unfolded. In short, the global 
50

political, economic, and military prowess of the United States has been 

an unhappy state of affairs for each. Both nations want global power 

diffused—with at least some power accruing to them—in a muchtheorized multi-polar world order. 

 The convergence of political views between Beijing and Moscow has 

been manifold: opposition to the expansion of NATO and Partnership for 

Peace; common cause against the strengthening of military alliances in 

the Pacific (read U.S.-Japan, U.S.-Australia, U.S.-ROK); opposition to 

the U.S. National missile Defense program; mutual support for their 

respective claims to sovereignty in Chechnya and Taiwan; conjoined 

opposition to external military interventions under the “pretext” of 

humanitarianism; a new-found belief in the sanctity of the U.N.; 

mutual concerns about instability in Central Asia, and a security 

arrangement of convenience in which Beijing procures military weapons 

and technologies unavailable to it elsewhere in return for propping up 

Russia’s failing defense industrial complex with those purchases. 

 In October 2001, less than 3 months after inking the much-heralded 

treaty, Russia seemed to be throwing its tacit support behind the U.S. 

Military operations against Afghanistan by not standing in the way of 

American forces staging in former Soviet clients in Central Asia, and, 

reportedly, Moscow began to step up its arms shipments to the opposition 

Northern Alliance forces. 

 But probably much more disconcerting from a Chinese perspective, 

Putin began transmitting what appeared to be serious “feelers” about 

actually joining NATO under certain conditions of change in that 

organization. Russia seemed to realize that the tragic events of 

September 11 might actually be an opportunity finally to align itself in a 

serious way, with dignity, as an equal partner with the west after almost 

10 years of Russian foreign policy limbo. It may just be that Putin realized 

this was Moscow’s opportune moment to do so in a way that could ultimately 

resuscitate Russia’s faltering economy and at the same time enhance its 
51

international prestige. Indeed, the Bush-Putin meeting on the fringes of 

APEC in October 2001 seemed to be reported in the western press as much 

more robust than the meetings with Jiang in the latter’s own country. The 

prospects of Russia “leaning to the west” cannot be a comfortable 

thought in Beijing, even though revived Russian relations with the west 

would certainly not be at the expense of China in the sense that such 

alignments were played out during the Cold war. 

Impact on the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. If rapprochement with 

Russia is likely the greatest Chinese foreign policy success of the post-Cold 

war period, then Beijing’s second is achieving membership in the WTO. 

Beijing’s third major foreign policy success, although less well known, was 

serving as the motive force behind the creation of the Shanghai 

Cooperation Organization (SCO) in June 2001. 

 Originally known as the “Shanghai Five,” China, Russia, Kazakhstan, 

Tajikistan, and Kyrgizstan had been working together since 1996 to 

resolve their border disputes, enhance military confidence-building 

measures among their armed forces, and coordinate security work against 

the so-called “three evils” of “terrorism, separatism, and fanaticism” in 

Central Asia. In short, the SCO represents one of the post-Cold war world’s 

first new regional security architectures. And to the degree that China has 

been the motive force behind it, it is claimed as a success. 

 In June 2001 the “Shanghai Five” transformed itself into the “Shanghai 

Cooperation Organization,” added Uzbekistan as a sixth member, and 

formalized its intentions to pursue military security in the border 

regions in a multilateral fashion, to include establishing a 

counterterrorism center in Bishkek and even holding out the prospects 

for combined military exercises in the future. The importance of these 

initiatives to China’s security interests in Central Asia is underscored by 

the fact that this is the first time ever that the PRC has been a formal 

signatory to a multinational security architecture. Moreover, should 

combined military exercises ever take place, it will be the first time ever that 
52

the PLA has trained or exercised with any foreign military in anything 

other than the role of “advisors” or trainers—this is simply 

unprecedented for China. 

 Enter the events pursuant to September 11. Where China and Russia 

enjoyed dominance of presence in this critical region, there is now the 

obvious presence of the U.S. military—not merely as trainers or as 

participants in combined exercises such as CENTRAZBAT-97—but in force 

and prosecuting a joint, and likely combined, military offensive. To the 

degree that the SCO served the collateral Chinese interest of keeping U.S. 

Military forces from achieving a foothold in Central Asia, that objective has 

been undermined in a clear, significant, and profound way. To what 

degree the de facto presence of U.S. Military forces in the region, and the 

obvious political and economic presence in the region that will persist 

post-combat, will change the viability or nature of the SCO as an 

organization is a question that must be getting asked in Chinese 

analytic circles. At a minimum, a U.S. presence in Uzebekistan in a 

post-Taliban Afghanistan is a real possibility, given the security 

assurances Tashkent has reportedly asked of Washington in return for its 

very active support. 

Impact on Japan. Tokyo’s decision to be proactive in offering the 

United States logistic support by the Japan Maritime Self Defense Forces in 

the vicinity of the Indian Ocean is not going to assuage Beijing’s 

concerns about Japan’s “real security aspirations” in the region—in spite 

of Prime minister Junichiro Koizumi’s assertion that Jiang expressed 

his “understanding” of the rationale behind it during their meeting in 

Beijing in early October 2001. 

 Always on the alert for any indication of Japan’s potential for an 

expanded military presence in Asia, Chinese analysts will likely view 

Tokyo’s support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM as a codicil under 

which the Japanese will continue what the Chinese believe is the inexorable 

march away from Article 9 of the “Peace Constitution.” (And it may just 
53

be that Beijing’s concerns on this account will be buttressed by likeminded thinking emanating from Seoul.) Japan’s actions in support of the 

United States will be seen through the lens of a continuum that includes 

perceived Japanese support for Taiwan independence, concerns about 

the Revised U.S.-Japan Guidelines for Defense Cooperation—especially the 

nebulous phrase “areas surrounding Japan,” and Tokyo’s co-research 

with Washington on upper-tier sea-based TBMD. 

Impact on Border Security. Clearly, the most obvious deleterious effect 

of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM for China is the very fact that it is 

taking place in a country with which China shares a border. Stability and 

security in the 14 nations with which China shares common borders—not 

to mention maintaining good relations with those countries—is a 

priority-one security issue for Beijing. 

 Controlling events on its periphery, stability on its periphery, and 

ensuring there is no spillover from instability on its periphery are 

ongoing and historical Chinese concerns. One might point out that since 

1949, China has consistently viewed instability on its periphery as a serious 

threat, and most of its military interventions, overt or otherwise, have 

been the result of the perceived need to shape wars along its border, 

preempt possible aggression, or assert sovereignty along those borders.24 

The immediate Chinese concern will be the potential for refugees to 

stream across the small border it shares with Afghanistan. China’s second 

concern will be the potential for “blow back” in Xinjiang Province by 

non-Han Turkic Uighurs who oppose Chinese rule. The third tier of Chinese 

concerns will be longer term—how long will the U.S. campaign last, 

what type of government will replace the Taliban, and how long will U.S. 

Military forces remain in the region after the collapse of the Taliban? And, 

of course, as mentioned already, the impact of all of the above on the 

viability of the Musharaf regime in Islamabad. Overall, from a Chinese 

point of view, it is unlikely the current U.S. campaign will be viewed as a 

“good thing.” 
54

Impact on National missile Defense. China’s objections to the U.S. 

National missile Defense Program are well known by now and need no 

explanation. Suffice it to say that Beijing will be concerned that the attack 

on the United States will accelerate the nuclear missile defense (NMD) 

program, not inhibit it. The best indicator of Chinese concerns along 

these lines is the analytic argument one could read in the PRC press 

post-September 11 declaring that the terrorist attack on the United States 

“proved” that the greatest threat to the United States is not a so-called 

“rogue state” with a missile, but low-tech weapons used by nonstate 

actors. 

 The efficacy of this argument aside, there will be concern that in the 

wake of September 11 previous disagreements over NMD with certain 

European allies will fall by the wayside in an ongoing show of support 

for Washington. Also, there will be Chinese concern that the voices in the 

United States citing the September 11 events as “proof positive” of the 

need for NMD will prevail—especially now that the specter of biological 

weapons is no longer hypothetical. But most disconcerting, from a 

Chinese perspective, will be the possibility that Russian resolve on the issue 

of the anti-Ballistic missile (ABM) Treaty will start to weaken. 

 Overall then, while the events of September 11 and the Bush-Jiang 

summit have served a critical Chinese (and U.S.) security objective—

namely stabilizing bilateral relations—it is not entirely clear, based 

quite admittedly on my own speculation, that the overarching prosecution 

of the war against terrorism waged by the United States and the potential 

collateral changes in the international security milieu will be seen as 

positive for China across the board. By the time this volume is published, the 

international security environment may well have changed and turned over 

once again, and the Chinese calculus might be quite different in ways 

that at time of writing are impossible to speculate about. 
55

Concluding Comments. 

One constant in the U.S.-China relationship that will persist and that 

will transcend current events, is simply this: there is ample reason in both 

Washington and Beijing to seek and secure mutually beneficial bilateral 

relations—especially security relations. 

 However, there is a deep-seated mutual distrust between the 

respective security establishments on both sides of the Pacific that will 

not go away very soon, regardless of the pragmatic steps each nation 

takes on the road to better relations. This chapter, by assignment, has 

focused on Chinese concerns. The United States has its own set of 

misgivings. 

 If the trend in Chinese security analyses presented in this chapter is 

even close to being on the mark, then it will be very difficult to change 

attitudes in Beijing. Chinese concerns about U.S. intentions are beginning 

to transcend specific policies in contention, transcending perhaps even the 

issue of Taiwan. In China, analytic momentum has been building over the past 

few years that argues that the United States is inherently hostile to China 

and that the strategic objective of the United States toward China is 

nothing less than the obstruction of China’s rise as a more rich and powerful 

nation—despite statements by Bush and Powell to the contrary. 

Consequently, U.S. policies in the region or toward China itself will be 

increasingly filtered through a set of lenses that are already calibrated 

to ensure some distortion. The phrase, “Seeing the acorn but imagining the 

oak tree” comes to mind.25 

Relations with the United States more and more present the Chinese 

leadership with a growing dilemma. On one hand, a stable relationship 

with the United States is increasingly viewed by Beijing as one 

prerequisite for the success of the all-important reform agenda that 

faces Zhongnanhai at home. And to the degree that successful 

continuing reform at home is the key to the longevity of the CCP, the “U.S. 
56

factor” plays as well, even if indirectly.26

At the same time, perceived challenges by the United States to Chinese 

national interests—especially those viewed as challenges to sovereignty—

cannot be ignored by the Chinese leadership. One hears and reads more 

and more in the Chinese press about the need to up hold “the dignity” of the 

Chinese people, not just the sanctity of Chinese sovereignty. 

 The summit of October 2001 augurs a hopeful beginning for the two 

nations to renew serious strategic dialogue on the spectrum of issues that 

have been addressed in this chapter. But amid the pledges by the two 

presidents to establish new mechanisms for strategic dialogue, amid the 

rededication to continue mutually beneficial economic cooperation, in 

the midst of presenting a united stand in dealing with global 

terrorism, there was one summit “basket” that was conspicuous by its 

absence—a statement about future military-to-military relations. 

 Since at least 1989 the military dimension of bilateral relations has 

become one of the most contentious and difficult aspects of U.S.-China 

ties. It has become a domestic political issue in both Beijing and Washington. 

Even in the best of times, finding a mutually satisfying military 

dimension to bilateral ties has been a frustrating endeavor for both parties 

due to growing mutual suspicion, institutional asymmetries, and 

competing objectives. In times of bilateral duress, military relations are 

the first links to be suspended. In the best of times, they are the last to be put 

into place. 

 Some in the United States have argued that, with the demise of the 

Soviet Union, there is no longer a “strategic rationale” for the United 

States to engage the PLA. In Beijing, some Chinese have also argued 

that the “rise of American hegemonism” has likewise undermined a Chinese 

rationale for engagement with the U.S. Department of Defense. Detractors 

of military relations in the United States have complained that the PLA 

does not “reciprocate” U.S. openness and that “the PLA gets more out 

of the relationship than does the United States.” For their part, some 
57

Chinese argue that the objectives of U.S. military ties and U.S. “openness” 

are inherently” hostile.” The United States wants “to change China,” to 

“deter (scare) China,” and “collect intelligence” on China by using the 

military relationship.27

 All of these arguments may very well be true of the past. But it is not 

correct for either side to argue that there is no longer a strategic rationale 

for a military relationship. The fact of the matter may be that at long last, for 

the first time since the end of the Cold war, there finally is a strategic 

rationale for military-to-military contacts. And it is simply this: conflict 

avoidance. 

 It is clear that the military forces of the United States and of China 

will increasingly be operating in proximity to each other. This was shown 

most graphically on April 1, 2001, and the subsequent EP-3 incident. It is 

also clear that there is a growing distrust between the two military 

establishments. It is clear as well that both sides acknowledge 

(sometimes quietly, sometimes publicly) the possibility of an unwanted 

confrontation over Taiwan. These points alone are the most pressing 

arguments for the resumption of military contacts, the enhancement of venues 

in which discussion of differences can take place, and new venues aimed at 

dispelling misperceptions. 

 Hopefully, as the months go on, as political dialogue increases and 

the benefits of stable relations are seen to outweigh mutual suspicions, 

then wise men and sober thinkers on both sides will start searching 

for new and realistic ways to manage differences, and conclude that 

both the U.S. Armed Forces and the PLA will have a constructive role to play. 

ENDNOTES-CHAPTER 2 

1. Cancelled altogether were the President’s planned stopovers in 

Tokyo and Seoul prior to arriving in Shanghai. 
58

 2. Tang Hongwei, Zhongguo Xinwen She, Foreign Broadcast Information 

Service (hereafter FBIS), October 19, 2001. 

 3. “U.S., China Stand against Terrorism: Remarks by President Bush 

and President Jiang Zemin in Press Availability, western Suburb Guest 

house (Shanghai, PRC),” October 19, 2001, www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases 

(hereafter, White house). 

 4. Ibid. 

 5. This is a concern that has become somewhat heightened since 

February 2000 when Beijing issued its “Taiwan white Paper” that 

articulated the “third if.” Since that time a common question debated in 

Washington’s analytic circles is whether Beijing has a “timetable” for 

reunification. 

 6. For an excellent review of the actions and policies of Beijing that 

will continue to give pause to U.S. Government officials, see Bates Gill,” 

Powell In China: Modest Progress will Be better Than None,” 

International Herald Tribune, July 27, 2001. 

 7. For a very detailed account and analysis of the post-Kosovo debate 

in China, see David M. Finkelstein, China Reconsiders Its National Security: 

the “Great Peace & Development Debate” of 1999, Alexandria: the CNA 

Corporation, Country Assessment, December 2000. 

 8. The construction of the narrative account of the debate that follows 

was possible due to the highly public nature of the debate. The Chinese 

press was an invaluable source for following the debate. Most of the key 

Chinese newspapers devoted space to reader comments on the key 

questions under contention after the bombing of the PRC Embassy. 

Examples are the PLA’s Liberation Army Daily (Jiefangjun Bao), China Youth 

Daily (Zhongguo Qingnian Bao), Brightness Daily (Guangming Ribao), and 
59

People’s Daily (Renmin Ribao). By most accounts, the periodical that ran the 

column most read and most contributed to by government specialists (and 

most contentious in that analysts took each other on) was the Global 

Times (Huanqiu Shibao), a subsidiary newspaper of People’s Daily. The

column in question was entitled “China’s Countermeasures and 

Choices” (“Zhongguo Duice Yu Xuanze”). I am grateful to Dr. Alastair 

Iain Johnston of Harvard University for bringing this column to my 

attention. This account of the debate was also informed by a good number 

of interviews as well. 

 9. For a superb primer on the necessity in China for having 

theoretical assessments of the international security environment and 

their evolution since 1949, see Ren Xiao,” The International Relations 

Theoretical Discourse in China: A Preliminary Analysis,” Sigur Center Asia 

Papers No. 9, Washington, DC: Elliott School of International Affairs, 

George Washington University, 2000. 

 10. The United States affirmed its policy of: (1) No independence for 

Taiwan, (2) No “One China, One Taiwan” formula, and (3) No 

membership for Taiwan in international organizations that require 

statehood as a prerequisite for membership. 

 11. “Cooperative Strategic Partnership with Russia” (April 1996); 

“Comprehensive Cooperative Partnership” with France (May 1997); 

“Constructive Strategic Partnership” with the U.S. (October 1997); 

“Good-neighborly Partnership of Mutual Trust” with ASEAN 

(December 1997); “Long-term and Stable Constructive Partnership” with 

the European Union (April 1998); “Enhanced Comprehensive Partnership” 

with Great Britain (October 1998). 

 12. In June 2001 the “Shanghai Five” was transformed into the 

“Shanghai Cooperation Organization” and a sixth member, Uzbekistan, 

was added. 
60

 13. As remarkable as it may seem from a U.S. perspective, there was a 

good deal of discussion in some Chinese analytic circles as to whether the 

United States would intervene in Chechnya. 

 14. In his excellent Volume, China Debates the Future Security 

Environment, Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2000, 

Michael Pillsbury argues that previous Chinese political constraints 

precluded analysts from asserting that the “comprehensive national 

power” of the United States would do anything but eventually decline. 

While that may have been the case prior to 1999, the post-Kosovo debate 

in China clearly removed all taboos along this line. 

 15. Emphases added by author. 

 16. Chi Haotian, “Taking the Road of National Defense 

modernization which Conforms to China’s National Conditions and 

Reflects the Characteristics of the Times—My Understanding Acquired 

From the Study of Comrade Jiang Zemin’s Expositions on the 

Relationship Between Building the National Defense and Economic 

Development,” Qiushi, No. 8, FBIS, April 16, 1996. Emphasis added. 

 17. Of interest, however, was a reprint of a December 1986 speech by 

former Defense Minister General Zhang Aiping in which the venerated 

general warned that, even though the international security situation 

did not portend world war, the nation needed to remain vigilant, move 

forward with defense modernization, and recognize the potential 

threats to China’s security. In retrospect, the speech, given to an 

expanded meeting of the Central Military Commission in 1986, can be 

viewed as having caveated Deng’s reassessment of China’s security as 

espoused in June 1985. It was reprinted in the journal, Zhanlue Yu Guanli 

(Strategy and Management), published by the Chinese Society for Strategy 

and management, with the permission of the retired General Zhang. See 

Zhang Aiping, “National Defense Development in Peacetime,” Zhanlue Yu 

Guanli, FBIS, August 1, 1999. 
61

 18. Fu Quanyou,” Make Active Explorations, Deepen Reform, 

Advance military work in an All-Round Way,” Qiushi, No. 6, FBIS, 

March 1998. For an overview of the PLA’s programs of reform, see 

Finkelstein, China’s National military Strategy. 

19. For example, see John Pomfret,” Chinese Military Uses 

Anniversary to Polish Its Image,” Washington Post, October 2, 1999. 

According to Pomfret, “In March (1999) and again over the summer, the 

army is said to have received billions of dollars in additional funding...” 

Pomfret’s use of the term “billions” is likely an overstatement. 

Knowledgeable observers do agree that there was a one-time infusion in 

the summer of 1999 and that it was about 1.2 billion U.S. dollars (USD). This 

figure is separate and distinct from the lump-sum payment the PLA 

received in December 1998 as a result of the order to divest itself of its 

commercial holdings. The latter payment, according to David 

Shambaugh, was about 400 million USD. See David Shambaugh, 

Reforming China’s Military, Berkeley: University of California Press, 

forthcoming. 

 20. Clearly a scientific sampling of the Chinese press during this period 

was not made by this student, and I am open to counter arguments on 

the issue of the Chinese press during the April through May 2001 period. But 

having just completed a very detailed study of the post-Kosovo debate, I 

fully expected the EP-3 incident to reopen the entire issue. It did not 

occur. 

 21. There were a few interesting, but rare exceptions. At least one 

paper tried to reopen the “peace and development debate.” But it did so 

not by criticizing the PRC Government, but by criticizing those Chinese 

analysts who still “cherished illusions” about the United States. See 

“Cherishing Illusions About China-U.S. Relations will Bring harm To 

Both the Country and the People,” Commentary article in Guangzhou Ribao, 

FBIS, May 16, 2001. 
62

 22. “Free Discussion on China-U.S. Relations,” in Contemporary 

International Relations, Beijing: China Institute of Contemporary 

International Relations, June 2001, pp. 7-30. 

 23. FBIS has posted some of the conference papers in translation. 

 24. We recall Korea (1950), the French-Indochina War (early 1950s), 

the Sino-Indian war (1962), the U.S.-Indochina war (1960s), the northern 

clashes with the Soviets (especially 1969), the Sino-Vietnamese war 

(1979), Chinese concerns about Cambodia, and, in a “back to the future 

mode,” Chinese concerns about the Soviets in Afghanistan (late 1970s), 

not to mention ongoing Chinese concern about Indo-Pakistani clashes 

over Kashmir. While the Chinese likely hold no brief for the Taliban, the 

prosecution of a major campaign in Afghanistan—especially one waged 

by the United States—is not going to be a reassuring event from a 

Chinese point of view. 

 25. This is not just a Chinese phenomenon. It occurs in the United States 

as well. 

 26. This is not to suggest that the United States is the “sole” foreign 

factor in Beijing’s domestic reform agenda. China has hedged against the 

possibility of a prolonged period of tension with the United States. Over the 

past few years, it has worked to diversify and strengthen its foreign ties 

across the developed world, one suspects, because it realizes the “danger” of 

having all of its eggs in the U.S. basket when it comes to foreign investment, 

trade, technology acquisition, etc. 

 27. For an in depth study of Chinese views of the military relationship, 

see David M. Finkelstein,” Engaging DoD: Chinese Perspectives on Military 

Relations with the United States, Alexandria, VA: the CNA Corporation, 

CRM 99-004 6.90, October 1999. 
63

CHAPTER 3 

A VIEW FROM TOKYO: 

CHINA’S GROWING MILITARY POWER 

AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE FOR JAPAN’S 

NATIONAL SECURITY 

Hideaki Kaneda 

CHINA’S AMBITION 

China’s Maritime Advance. 

China has pursued a national strategy of consistent and active 

advancement toward peripheral waters. China’s activity patterns, as they 

did in the 1970s to the South China Sea and in the 1980s to the East China Sea, 

have been to advance to such areas using force, while ignoring the 

sovereign rights and jurisdiction rights of neighboring nations. Finding 

little or weak resistance from these countries, China strengthened 

presence there by creating a fait accompli, ultimately leading to the 

practical control of these areas. What is the objective of China’s maritime 

advance? The answer is the key to designing Japan’s deterrent strategy 

against China. 

 First is the economic aspect involved. China aims to develop and utilize 

biological and nonbiological resources in its peripheral waters, especially 

seabed oil resources. In addition, China’s food and energy supply 

situation is rapidly deteriorating as a result of its remarkable economic 

growth since the adaptation of policies for economic revolution and the 

opening of China’s market to the world, combined with its drastic 

population growth. In particular, China’s energy situation is so severe that 

the world’s seventh largest oil producing nation can hardly keep up 
64

with the growing demand, and today China the oil producer has become an 

oil-importing consumer. 

 For further economic development, China must continue to secure food 

and energy supplies. Therefore, it becomes extremely important for China 

to procure fishing grounds in the peripheral waters and adjacent seas, to 

acquire good quality seabed oil resources, and to secure sea lines of 

communication (SLOCs) for oil imports from the middle East. 

Dependence on the seas is a logical consequence for China in order to 

maintain continuous economic growth. 

 Second is the issue of national security. In China, naval and air forces 

have been built and operated as supporting forces to assist the army. 

However, they learned from the historical experience of the Qing Dynasty 

when, because of China’s lack of awareness of the importance of sea power 

and maritime rights, foreign powers usurped their sovereign and 

territorial rights. Based on these experiences, China adopted a clear 

military strategy of “near water defense,” with the so-called “First Island 

Chain Defense Line” being China’s sea defense line, connecting the 

Aleutian Islands, Kuril Islands, Japanese Islands, Ryukyu Islands, 

Taiwan, Philippine Islands, and Borneo. The Senkaku Islands, claimed by 

Japan, and the Spratly and Paracel Islands, over which several South-East 

Asian countries claim territorial rights, are included in this First Island 

Chain Defense Line. Taiwan also has claims on some of these islands, an issue 

which China calls a domestic matter. In other words, China’s near water 

defense strategy includes military force deployments to attack Taiwan 

and prevent counterattacks. One must not forget that the military 

forces that are capable of crossing the water to attack Taiwan and 

preventing counterattacks can certainly be used against the Senkaku, 

Spratly, and Paracel Islands. 

 With the end of the Cold war, China’s negotiations on national 

border issues and military withdrawal from borders with Russia and 

former Soviet Union countries in Central Asia have progressed smoothly and 
65

the opportunity for negotiation with India to solve border issues has arisen. 

China can feel secure for the moment regarding its land borders to the 

north and west and can reduce its army forces drastically, thereby 

generating enough reserves to shift their interests and redistribute 

resources to focus on their east and southern “oceans.” 

 Third is the shift of China’s military strategy. By 1985, the People’s 

Liberation Army (PLA) had already attempted the strategic shift from a 

“global war” to a “local war” orientation, and after the end of the Cold 

war, shifted from a mere “general local war” to a “local war under hitech conditions” based on what they learned from the Gulf war. Through 

such strategic shifts, then General Secretary Jiang Zemin started to 

emphasize the “defense of maritime interests” along with the defense 

of sovereign rights of territorial lands, air space, and seas. 

 By October 2000, China had conducted large-scale exercises of “all 

army exchange activities to demonstrate the result of scientifictechnological training” incorporating the “new three attacks and three 

defenses” (attacks by stealth aircraft, ballistic missiles, and armed 

helicopters, and defense by precision weapons, electronic interference, 

and reconnaissance surveillance), which involved learning from the 

Kosovo air-raids as well as from “scientific-technological military 

training.” At that time, it was noted that the exercises were “attack” 

oriented with the oceans as the main stage, rather than conventional 

“defense” oriented maneuvers. 

 Fourth is an intention to improve China’s position in the international 

community. China’s view toward international relationships is to 

break away from the situation of “one superpower and several 

powers” dominated by the United States and to work toward” multipolarization,” with China itself sharing the position of one of the powerful 

pole leaders. China recognizes that the unstable situation of the 

international community will persist longer because of tensions between 

the major countries, China’s own conflicts in securing its sphere of 
66

interests, and increased incidents of regional conflicts. However, China 

assumes that such a situation is merely the transition toward the establishment 

of a new international order, and will eventually lead to the collapse of 

U.S. single-country dominance and the emergence of a multi-polar 

world with China, the United States, the European Union, Russia, and 

Japan as the poles. At any time in history, the China-U.S. relationship has 

had a mix of stability and instability factors, but in purely military 

terms, they are basically in a contentious relationship. From China’s 

point of view, the path toward multi-polarization must go through the 

point of rivalry and contention with American military power. 

 The tone of logic in China that stands out these days is that the power 

that controls the ocean is the one that earns the right of survival and 

development. Moreover, there is much evidence of the importance of 

comprehensive marine power and that the 21st century will be the “Century 

of Oceans.” The search to grow from “near water” to “open ocean” 

operations is already underway in the PLA. In a situation of increased 

confidence in the economy and limited elements of instability in 

national security, China’s ultimate ambition appears to be preparing to 

step beyond the basic strategy of near water defense to secure 

domination over the Pacific Ocean, which is adjacent to its peripheral 

waters. 

 Japan’s “Defense white Paper” of 2001 reported the recent striking 

build-up of China’s military preparedness in the quality and quantity of 

both its navy and air force. What is their ultimate objective? To speak in 

extremes, is it not possible to put forth a hypothesis that China uses the excuse 

of capturing Taiwan to hide China’s true and ultimate objective of 

winning a war against the United States? We, the Japanese people, must 

ascertain China’s future intentions. 
67

China Takes a Serious Step toward “MultiPolarization”—Establishment 

of the “Shanghai Cooperation Organization.” 

On June 14 and 15, 2001, the “Shanghai Five” countries of China, 

Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgistan, and Tajikistan, with the newly-added 

Uzbekistan, established the “Shanghai Cooperation Organization.” A 

“Shanghai Five” summit has been held yearly since 1996, originally for the 

purpose of resolving border tensions between China and the Central Asian 

countries that had newly arisen after the collapse of the Soviet Union, 

with China leading the discussion. Since they successfully agreed 

upon the reduction of military forces deployed to border areas, the 

focus has shifted toward cooperation in the control of Islamic 

extremists, which has been the major problem of the Central Asian countries. 

Moreover, in recent years, China has used the Shanghai Five forum as a 

means to check the United States, as demonstrated in its appeal for ties 

between Russia and China, especially on international security and 

disarmament issues, and against the U.S. Monopolistic control of 

global political, economic, and military affairs. 

 The significance of this organization for China is, on the surface, multinational regional cooperation to control expanding Islam extremists. 

In reality, it is a way to deal with the threat of Xinjiang separatism, which 

is like a snake in China’s bosom, the stability of Xinjiang being essential 

for the realization of China’s national project of the Great west 

Development. Reading even deeper into China’s intentions, however, one 

can find the possibility of China’s desire to transform this organization 

into an alliance against the United States and its set of bilateral alliances 

with regional countries, which will have a greater significance for 

China in the future. 

 Originally, China was eager to improve bilateral relationships with 

their continental neighboring countries. In June 2001, China concluded 

the Treaty of Good and Friendly Relationship with Russia. They also 

concluded bilateral agreements with each Central Asian country as the 
68

fruit of the Shanghai Five process. Among major continental neighboring 

countries, only India has not entered into a bilateral agreement with 

China. However, China is attempting to improve its relationship with India, 

as evidenced by the re-opening of a Sino-Indian dialogue that had been 

halted since India’s nuclear test in 1998, probably in response to the recent 

U.S. approach toward India. 

 The “Shanghai Cooperation Organization” is the first multilateral 

organization begun under China’s initiative. Some moderates believe 

this organization will develop into a moderate Association of South East 

Asian Nations (ASEAN)-type regional forum. Others consider that the 

current member countries of this organization aim to “promote 

multipolarism of the world” and other countries such as Pakistan, 

Mongolia, and Iran will seek the opportunity to join the organization, 

while North Korea and Vietnam are said to show interest in it. 

Through this organization or its advanced form in the future, China 

possibly will attempt to extend its influence over a vast land and water area 

extending from the Asia-Pacific region to South west Asia and the 

Middle East, with continental China and Central Asia as the central force. 

 In addition, China is likely to use this forum to counter perceived 

U.S. containment against China, and in the future to confront the existing 

web of alliances centered on the United States, while hiding the potential 

to develop it into an organization similar to the Warsaw Pact at the time of 

the Cold War. For the moment China will use it as a platform to eliminate 

U.S. influence by expressing opposition to the missile defense 

initiative and international and regional talks led by the United States, as 

well as to express China’s persistent claim that Taiwan, which is under 

the influence of the United States, is an inseparable part of Chinese 

territory. In this sense, how China will react to the U.S. response against the 

September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks may be significant. 
69

China Aims to Become a Regional Superpower—Preparedness on the 

Continent and Advancement Toward the Oceans. 

What is the meaning of China’s advancement toward the oceans, and 

improved relationships with its continental neighbors? Originally 

described as “ships in the South and horses up North,” China is a 

country that has two faces: "Continental China “ and “Oceanic China.” 

 Despite having some domestic problems, China seems to realize that it has 

successfully created an unprecedented stable situation in diplomatic 

and military relationships with neighboring countries. Moreover, 

China has grown from being a regional political power to becoming a 

regional superpower, both in name and actuality, in all political, 

military, economic, and industrial aspects, and is about to secure a 

position as one of the world superpowers (and the strongest in Asia), 

capable of threatening the U.S. Monopoly. To achieve such an objective, 

China cannot afford to limit its interests to the continent and must have 

the strong maritime capability of an “Oceanic China.” 

 In view of the Chinese Communist Party’s position in a one-party-ruled 

country, it is impossible for China to allow the United States to remain the 

“one ultra-superpower” indefinitely. At least, China wishes to gain the power 

of “not losing,” if not winning, over the United States in every spectrum. 

Thus, China, starting with stability on the continent, steadily will 

promote a drive for the attainment of its secret ambition to fulfill the 

supreme proposition of “confrontation in the ocean” with the United 

States and its allied countries, within China’s unique time scale, 

regardless of their targeted year. 

 Certainly, China never makes the mistake of mentioning the 

possibility of direct confrontation at sea with U.S. military power. 

There is no need, for it has an appropriate and convenient excuse called 

Taiwan. At every opportunity, China sends out a strong warning to U.S. 

forces against intervention in relation to the Taiwan issue. Moreover, China 
70

stresses that it will not hesitate to confront U.S. forces if anything 

happens in Taiwan. However, this is not likely to be China’s true intention. 

Though I used the word “hypothesis” earlier, China’s real intention is 

confrontation beyond Taiwan, not with Japan, Korea, the ASEAN 

countries, or Australia, but with the United States. 

 To find proof of this, one only needs to look into the nature of 

Chinese military forces. If China seriously considers taking over Taiwan 

at present, what is the significance of the limited capability of the Chinese 

navy to transport troops across oceans? Undoubtedly, they have troops 

and equipment with a certain capability, so China might venture attacks 

on Taiwan, should the political necessity arise. Yet in view of Taiwan’s 

defense capability, it would be difficult for China to send troops to Taiwan’s 

main island. The natural interpretation is that China’s capability is only 

sufficient for a very limited attack, such as ballistic missile attacks 

against part of the main island for intimidation purposes, or the attacks 

on Quemoy Island and Matsu Island, which China could complete 

before the United States could intervene. 

 On the other hand, viewing the recent direction of naval and air force 

modernization of the Chinese armed forces, one can easily notice that 

these efforts cannot be described in terms of quality, let alone quantity, 

as the rational development of equipment and systems purely to capture 

Taiwan or defend the neighboring seas. Wouldn’t aircraft carriers, fleet 

ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) with sea-launched ballistic 

missiles (SLBMs), and nuclear attack submarines (SSNs) with shiplaunched cruise missiles (SLCMs) under development by the armed forces 

be better suited for confrontation with U.S. forces? Also, what does 

China’s oceanic advancement into the Pacific Ocean, including Japan’s 

exclusive economic zone (EEZ), mean? Isn’t it logical to interpret these 

moves as China’s efforts to steadily prepare to confront the United States 

by building up a maritime operational capability and assuming the 

United States and its allies are potential enemies? 
71

Chinese Way of war—“Beyond Limited War” (Irregular and Asymmetric 

Tactics). 

We can also see China’s future prospects for the direct confrontation 

with the United States in its concrete military strategy and tactics. The 

book, Beyond Limited war—Concept of War and Tactics for the Times of 

Globalization written in 1999 by two Air Force colonels in active service of 

the PLA, is drawing attention in China and the United States.” Beyond 

limited war” means “a war that transcends any limitation” or a “war 

without any norms and regulations.” In other words, it can be called a 

“forbidden strategy.” The authors recommended that China implement such a 

strategy to confront the United States. They say “modern war is a hi-tech 

war, and China cannot win over the United States, which has overwhelming 

power, unless it confronts with them through this beyond-limited-war.” 

 The book recommends seeking “irregular” war tactics that go beyond 

the nation, territories, methods, and war scales, including so-called 

“illegal” tactics. The authors themselves claim, “For the weaker to confront 

the stronger, the weaker does not need to follow the rules set by the 

stronger.” Among the items of consideration in Beyond Limited war, we 

need to note ”asymmetric tactics.” U.S. military forces are troubled 

with the Chinese forces’ inclination to regard asymmetric tactics as 

important. A former U.S. Ambassador to China indicated,” China 

regularly adopts a unique strategy to make up for its own weakness and 

to display its strength.” This concept has a common thread with the 

September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on America. 

 This book is said to have been written without any instruction 

from the Chinese leadership. Some observe, however, that the book has 

won strong support from Chinese political and military leaders. 

 As stated above, China has learned numerous lessons from the largescale conflicts involving the United States in the post-Cold war era: the Gulf 

war and Kosovo conflicts, and China has proceeded with a great strategic 
72

conversion to “improvement of defensive combat capability under the 

high-tech conditions,” while exerting efforts to eliminate functional 

shortcomings and avoiding any significant technological and operational 

gap. In other words, China is exerting efforts to avoid showing any decisive 

weakness of its own, while consistently being conscious of the possibility 

of war against the United States. 

 However, such a strategy does not provide any opportunity to win 

against overwhelming U.S. military power. Therefore, China pursues its 

own areas of superiority over U.S. Weaknesses and will try to strike the 

weak spots of the United States. Such strategies are “irregular tactics” 

and “asymmetric tactics.” China’s recent emphasis on cyber wars, for which it 

has made little effort to hide its intentions, is an example. By taking such 

dual stances, China seems to be looking for an opportunity to ensure 

future victory over the United States. 

JAPAN’S DETERRENT STRATEGY AGAINST CHINA 

China’s Strategy Against Japan. 

Now, how must Japan build its deterrent power against China? First, let 

the United States investigate China’s strategy against Japan based on an 

analysis of China’s political and military ambitions discussed in the 

previous section. 

 In China, there is a group that perceives the Japan-China 

relationship merely as a part of the power balance in the Asia-Pacific 

region. Also, it wishes to let Japan remain an economic giant only. To 

have Japan as a political superpower or military giant is hardly acceptable 

for China, as its greatest wish is to be the only superpower in Asia. 

 China’s ultimate objective is to become the “unitary superpower” in 

the region. In Northeast Asia, four political poles consist of Russia, China, 
73

Japan and the United States. The Soviet Union used to be the threatening 

power during the Cold War but it collapsed, and its successor, Russia, 

maintains friendly relations with China as they share the basic policy of 

taking a hard-line against the United States. Concerning Japan, China 

anticipates Japan’s contribution to China’s economic growth as a 

economic and technology superpower, yet tries to prevent Japan from 

becoming a political and military superpower. For the United States, 

China is likely to maintain a friendly “engagement” relationship as 

long as the United States approves of China’s economic development, 

which is key for China’s promotion of its national power while 

recognizing potential rivalries in every political, economic, and military 

aspect. 

 For China’s ambition, to become the only superpower in the region, the 

greatest barrier will be the stable and strong alliance between the United 

States, the world’s unitary superpower, and Japan, a strong regional pole. 

Considering a future confrontation with the United States, it will be 

preferable for China to minimize the number of powerful countries 

allied with the United States. China is likely to take every opportunity 

to break up any Japan-U.S. alliance and to attempt the alienation of these 

two countries. China can use several methods for this purpose, and the one 

with the highest probability of success is China’s special tactic of “to win 

without fighting,” that is “beyond limited war.” First, China will try to 

weaken or lessen U.S. sentiment and consciousness to support and 

cooperate with Japan, then to undermine Japan’s capability and intention 

to support the United States. Next, China will campaign in Japan and the 

United States for the alienation of the Japan-U.S. relationship. In 

addition, China can make “beyond limited war” more effective by 

building a capability to fight an information technology (IT) war, such as 

cyber war, toward which China is directing its efforts. This is not the talk 

of something to come. Such a fight has already begun. 

 Even if Japan and the United States successfully maintain their 

alliance, it is most convenient for China when Japan has as many 
74

restrictions on defense cooperation with the United States as possible, like 

those imposed in Japan today. The greater the number of restrictive 

measures in Japan’s defense cooperation with the United States, the 

higher the appreciation in China. What China would like to see is for Japan 

to maintain its exclusively defense framework, not to change its 

constitution including collective self-defense rights, not to proceed 

with wartime or national emergency legislation, and not to loosen the 

actual restrictions under “the law concerning measures to ensure peace 

and security of Japan in situations in areas surrounding Japan.” 

Basic Strategy against China. 

Then what strategy should Japan take against China? The best approach 

is a strategy of building a very practical and mutually beneficial economic 

relationship, while avoiding political aspects as much as possible. China is 

a country that can maintain close economic ties even with Taiwan. It 

cannot ignore Japan’s economic and technological strengths, which far 

exceed those of Taiwan. In turn, Japan finds sufficient appeal in the 

enormous scope of China’s ever-growing market. In other words, for Japan 

as well as for China, a mutual close economic relationship is essential. 

 From the military view point, China does not actually seem to consider 

Japan’s defense power as a true threat, contrary to its political propaganda 

claims, which at every opportunity refer to “Japan’s tendency of 

militarization.” It is feasible to assume that China has already factored 

into its strategy all the shortcomings in Japan’s defense functions: 

imperfection in defense-related legislation; independent defense 

policies; defects in equipment; restrictions on various operations 

defects from such policies; less awareness of the Japanese people and 

government in defense matters; and the lack of fundamental strength to 

sustain wars, such as a basically weak defense industry and defense 

logistics system. Therefore, one must not ignore the possibility that China 

may maneuver Japan into some conflicts over, for example, the Senkaku 
75

Islands and other territorial and EEZ conflicts if a situation can be 

generated in which the United States will not (or cannot) intervene. Japan 

must deter such possibilities by itself and establish a system that can 

respond to crises effectively. It must stop being a nation without any 

sense or preparation for emergencies as described above, and 

establish its own national security system to respond against China. 

Otherwise, such a time will come some day. 

Securing U.S. and Japan Alliance as an Axle. 

For Japan, the best possible option in national security adaptable to 

the various future prospects is a secure Japan-U.S. alliance. No other 

option is conceivable. In the environment of the geo-political situation of 

Northeast Asia, Japan is certainly free to consider other options such as 

nonalliance, bilateral alliance with a country (even China) other than 

the United States, or a multilateral alliance including Russia, China, 

and the United States. Some debates and propositions about such 

options have taken place in and out of Japan. However, these options are 

either implausible, or lack future prospects. Certainly after the end of the 

Cold War, the aspect of a peace dividend was emphasized, and some 

even questioned whether a Japan-U.S. alliance would be needed any 

longer. The joint declaration of Japan and the United States in 1997 

redefined the alliance and identified a clear direction toward an even 

stronger relationship. 

 For the United States, the significance of a Japan-U.S. alliance is, first 

of all, providing regional deterrent effect through the presence of U.S. 

forces in Japan, mainly navy, Air Force, and marines. The second 

significance is developing acceptable support mechanisms that can satisfy the 

U.S. standard in terms of every thing from supply and repair to medical 

services. From a different view point, the United States is well aware 

that its military withdrawal from Japan would provide Japan with a good 

motive to fortify its military power. Moreover, the United States 
76

realizes that the alliance serves to deter any possible conflicts between 

a unified Korea, China, and Japan in the future. 

 Whether such U.S. aims are involved or not, it is preferable for the 

region for the United States and Japan to maintain a solid alliance and to 

retain a mutually complementary relationship, while the alliance remains 

as a linch pin for regional security, including Japan’s security. China and 

North Korea do not welcome such an alliance. Russia is no longer like 

the Soviet Union of the old days. North Korea does not have sufficient 

power to confront the United States. Only China occasionally has 

shown a willingness to confront the United States in military power, and it 

is the only country that has the potential to do so. Thus the only option for 

Japan is to maintain and solidify the Japan-U.S. alliance, which not only 

provides the stability necessary for favorable regional development, but 

also is important for the safety and security of Japan. At the same time the 

alliance is anticipated to function as a deterrent against China. 

 The Bush administration considers Japan as the most important U.S. 

ally in Asia. An Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) Special 

Report,1 which is said to be the fundamental statement of the 

administration’s Japan policy, expresses, with carefully selected phrasing 

to avoid the impression of pressuring Japan, the strong wish to secure and 

further solidify the Japan-U.S. alliance through Japan’s efforts to solve the 

problem of the right of collective self-defense. 

 China will take every opportunity to disrupt the relationship 

between Japan and the United States. Japan must not be influenced by 

such a move, and must exert every effort to solidify the Japan-U.S. 

alliance, while perseveringly eliminating any elements that might alienate 

Japan and the United States. 
77

Creation and Maintenance of Defense Power without Functional 

Deficiencies. 

What will happen if Japan develops effective military deterrents against 

China? Because of its national policy, at least, Japan will not become a 

military superpower. Its basic strategy is to rely on the deterrent effect 

of U.S. support based on the Japan-U.S. alliance. However, some future 

argument may develop as to whether the role sharing in the Japan-U.S. 

alliance must be limited to Japan providing the shield and the United 

States providing the sword. 

 The United States is currently studying a new defense strategy 

incorporating the missile defense initiative. Preceding this, a new 

Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) was announced on October 1, 2001. The 

new QDR, strongly reflecting the shocks of the September 11 terrorist attacks 

on America, abandoned the conventional two major theater war (2MTW) 

strategy and identified a policy of securing new U.S. bases, stations, and 

facilities for temporary uses, while reconfirming the importance of 

forward deployed forces. Inevitably it will become more difficult to 

operate U.S. armed forces abroad, and, in some cases, the situation of 

reduced military capability may continue semipermanently or 

temporarily. 

 Under such a situation, Japan needs to create defense forces that are 

fully functional qualitatively, if not quantitatively, to sustain the 

deterrent power against China that previously has been maintained 

through the Japan-U.S. alliance. Such a move will inevitably bring 

changes in role-sharing in the Japan-U.S. alliance, but at the same time will 

enable Japan to take on the role of a deterrent against China 

independently. Assuming the case of U.S. hesitation to exercise the articles of 

the Japan-U.S. security arrangement, for example, in the case of 

intimidation attacks related to the Japan-China territorial dispute area 

over the Senkaku Islands or mid-range ballistic missile attacks on 

nearby U.S. bases in Japan using conventional warheads, Japan must 
78

effectively and independently deter or defend against such intimidation 

or actual attacks by China and thwart China’s intention. For this, it is 

necessary for Japan to build sufficient defense forces in every spectrum, 

including capabilities for ballistic missile defense, swift amphibious 

operations against islands by marines, paratroop landings, and assault 

landings by heliborne troops. Furthermore, possessing the capability to 

attack enemy strategic centers by anti-surface cruising missiles will 

become the next issue. To develop such defense forces, Japan needs not 

only to have domestic discussions, but also to make adjustments with the 

United States concerning its share of military functions. 

Developing Political and Military Diplomacy against China, with Both 

hard-line and moderate Stances. 

Japan must take a stance that is both hard-line and moderate against 

China’s political and military diplomacy, which is based on China’s 

unique view of nations and values. 

 First, Japan needs to ask China to be “an open country” in military 

aspects as well as in others. China recently stressed that its military forces are 

purely defensive. China published its “White Paper on National 

Defense,” but China’s transparency is still far below that of neighboring 

countries. In Europe, there is rapid and significant promotion of 

confidence-building measures embracing former West and East 

countries, with developments to ensure transparency. Recognition of 

China as a country that complies with the world’s standards is wide-spread 

in economic and cultural aspects, as exemplified by China’s World Trade 

Organization (WTO) membership and winning the bid for the 2008 

Olympics in Beijing, despite domestic human rights problems which have not 

been fully corrected. Japan must take every opportunity to ask China to act as 

a more open country in the aspect of confidence-building, and to try to 

improve military transparency. 
79

 Second, Japan must ask China to take a more positive stance toward 

regional dialogue. China used to be inactive in regional councils, but today 

there is a striking change in China’s posture. China has begun to participate 

actively in regional councils, especially on political and economic issues. 

However, China’s participation is extremely limited in security-related 

matters, probably because China finds it disadvantageous in many cases, or 

it has less awareness of the need for transparency. 

 In terms of maritime issues, regional-wide SLOCs are the property not 

only of Japan or China but are also common to the region, and to secure 

their safety is a common task shared by regional countries. For regional 

development, it is important that SLOC safety be ensured through the joint 

efforts of regional countries and not be left under the control of any 

particular country. We need to let China realize that the region as a whole 

must share such recognition. 

 In recent days, the focus of attention has been piracy at the converging 

points of international sea routes such as the Malacca Strait. It may be 

important for Japan to take the initiative to create an environment in which 

China can participate, starting from the easy-to-address issues of safety, 

environment, and human rights cooperation, and as a part of regional efforts 

to deal with common issues like piracy, drug sales, the slave trade, and 

environmental pollution, ultimately and gradually stepping up to national 

security issues. 

 Regarding such pending problems between Japan and China as the midline between them in the East China Sea, an issue related to EEZs, Japan 

must abandon its obscure attitude and initiate a serious discussion to 

establish a temporary border for the true Japan-China mid-line. 

Moreover, where both countries claim territorial rights, the two countries 

need to agree to temporary joint control of these regions and to 

establish a council to control them while immediately establishing 

guidelines for Japan-China joint control over the regions. 
80

 Simultaneous to such negotiations, Japan must prevent any illegal 

activities performed by naval vessels and survey ships that clearly infringe 

upon Japan’s jurisdiction in its territories and EEZ. Japan must declare that 

it will take necessary and decisive actions against any illegal activities and 

adopt effective measures. As long as Japan leaves such territorial issues 

pending, China will undoubtedly proceed with one act after another to 

promote its effective control over the East China Sea, as it did in the South 

China Sea. 

 The Japanese government needs to implement these actions 

methodically, meticulously, and vigorously based on a grand strategy. 

For this, we must remember how U.S. diplomatic strength in international 

negotiation has been supported by “brains” consisting of and organized 

by international law researchers, think-tanks and relevant authorities 

and experts in various fields represented by the Department of State or the 

Department of Defense. 

 China’s oceanic expansion is somehow reminiscent of U.S. actions. 

or Japan to win over international competition, it must aggregate the 

wisdom of not only the bureaucrats, but also of the private sector, and 

develop a strong spirit to launch a national strategy. Thus, it is strongly 

anticipated that Japan will pursue its national interests jointly by public 

and private sectors under the strong leadership of Prime minister 

Junichiro Koizumi. 

ENDNOTE-CHAPTER 3 

1. The United States and Japan: Advancing Toward a mature Partnership, 

Richard L. Armitage, ed., Washington, DC: National Defense University, 

October 2000. 
81

CHAPTER 4 

A VIEW FROM MOSCOW: 

CHINA’S GROWING MILITARY POWER 

Anatoly V. Bolyatko 

 China’s military doctrine is an outgrowth of Beijing’s strategic 

concept of national security, their perception of external threats, and 

their estimation of the likelihood of war. This military doctrine includes 

positions not only on the training of the armed forces, but their 

composition and role. The leadership of the People’s Republic of China 

(PRC) sees national security as a process of eliminating internal and 

external threats, and as a way to achieve regional and global objectives 

by escalating what China’s strategists call “the comprehensive power of a 

state.” A well-developed economy, a high level of science and engineering achievement, internal political stability, and a strong defense are 

considered as main components of the comprehensive power of a state. 

 In China, military threats are seen in connection with potential 

challenges in the economic and socio-political spheres. Judging from 

Chinese publications, Beijing still sees economic growth as its main 

priority. Another significant domestic concern is the maintenance of 

the social-political order and “national unity.” This includes opposing 

what Beijing sees as the tendencies of minorities, and Taiwan, to separate 

from the Chinese state. Based on Beijing’s assessment of the contemporary 

international situation at the regional and global levels, the maintenance of 

military security ranks third among the major national priorities of China. 

 The PRC leadership, meaning the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Central 

Military Commission (CMC), and the Politburo Standing Committee, believes 

that the prospects for an outbreak of a world war are low. Therefore, the 

process of building the Chinese military can be carried out methodically 
82

under conditions that depend on long-term peace matched with the 

nation’s economic development. Thus, the requirement for the People’s 

Liberation Army (PLA) is to increase strength according to military and 

civil developments.1

 In the international sphere, Chinese leaders foresee a return to a multipolar world because of several regional conflicts, albeit with different 

duration and varying intensity, and the increasing occurrence of civil 

wars. 

 In China’s view, the security situation in the Asia-Pacific region is 

stable, although there are some negative developments: 

• The increased military presence of the U.S. in areas close to China’s 

borders; 

• The scheduled deployment of the theater missile defense (TMD) system 

in East Asia; 

• The development of a base of support in Japan for a relaxation of 

restrictions on military action in a zone surrounding Japan; 

• Increase in the scope of joint military exercises, especially between 

the United States and its allies; and, 

• Instability on the Korean Peninsula and in South Asia and territorial 

disputes in the South China Sea.2

 Taiwan is a special concern of the Chinese leadership. Weakened by a 

bitterly divided political leadership, Taiwan is further subject to the 

influence of external forces, easing the way for eventual reunification 

with the motherland. In China’s opinion, certain factors are inimical to 

their interests in Taiwan: 
83

• Activities of those who harbor separatist aspirations among Taiwan’s 

leaders; 

• Military aid from the United States, which includes weapon sales, 

with the likelihood of future increases if the American Congress passes 

the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act; 

• The possible inclusion of Taiwan into the U.S.-led theater missile 

defense system; and, 

• The presence of U.S. Troops in Japan, which enables the United States 

to intervene in a possible military confrontation in the Taiwan Strait.3

 In resolving the problem of Taiwan, the Chinese government 

adheres to the principles of peaceful reunification and “one country, 

two systems.” It has put forward some proposals on developing crossstrait relations, with the eventual goal of peaceful reunification. China 

considers the Taiwan question wholly an internal affair and insists that it 

will do every thing in its power to achieve peaceful reunification. However, if events result in a separation of Taiwan from China under any slogan, 

China is willing to use force to protect its sovereignty and its territorial 

integrity.4

 

 With this as its impetus, China has upgraded its military capability, 

retrofitting its armed forces in an effort to transform them into a 

powerful, modern army. Ideally, the PLA should be able to protect China 

against external threats, maintain internal stability, and—if necessary—

guarantee Taiwan unification with the motherland. 

 In order to achieve its goals, China seeks to boost its tactical 

capabilities, including battlefield management, particularly during 

radical shifts in conditions, as well as usage of modern technology. Thus, 

China has paid special attention to improving the battle efficiency of its 

troops, shifting the focus to quality rather than quantity. This recent 
84

trend of military improvements came from a operational analysis of 

Operation DESERT STORM in 1991. This is reflected in the solutions proposed by the CCP’s Central Committee in September 1995 and in the directives of the PRC Perspective Development Program until 2010, which the 

National People’s Congress (NPC) Standing Committee approved in March 

1996.5

 At the end of 1998, China’s CMC approved a schedule of defense 

modernization as well as a new military strategy and doctrine. In its new 

military strategy, the PLA is directed to train for waging battle in 

peripheral regions of China, small in scale and short in duration, but nonetheless intensive. The preparation for such a war differs radically from its 

previous strategy which focused on waging wars of attrition, which was 

the focus during its period of confrontation with the Union of Soviet 

Socialist Republics (USSR).6

 China’s military strategy foresees five main types of local wars: 

• Small scale wars within the territorial boundaries of China; 

• War to control adjacent water areas and islands; 

• Sudden air attack on strategic resources within Chinese territory; 

• Defensive operations against deliberate invasions of restricted areas of 

China; and, 

• Counteroffensive against an opponent’s territory in retaliation for 

aggression and to protect national sovereignty.7 

 Common to all those listed above is the pursuit of limited political ends 

achievable with the help of a military ready for immediate deployment 

and capable of routing the opponent. The main prerequisite for achieving 

such an outcome is the effective use of military force. Thus, Beijing consid-
85

ers the readiness to wage local wars an indispensable tool for achieving 

limited political ends, and this should include effective intimidation and 

the ability to escalate to a full-scale war.8

 The strategic concepts of reassessing the sources of military threats 

and targeting the political and military leadership to create a new military 

paradigm was approved in the doctrine of China. China’s military 

reorganization would allow for a sufficiently constrained military 

during peacetime and the deployment of a large armed force during war. 

The armed forces of China should correspond to its economic capabilities, 

ensure socio-political unity, and not violate the integrity of the country. 

Within the framework of possible military conflicts, the nuclear forces of 

the PRC are invoked to deter aggression against China and the 

conventional forces are intended to manage local wars.9

 The modern Chinese nuclear strategy is characterized by the 

following two positions. During peacetime, nuclear forces are intended to 

deter potential adversaries from unleashing nuclear war against China 

and to guarantee that China is free to exercise an independent foreign 

policy. The purpose of nuclear forces during wartime is to prevent China’s 

enemies from turning a conventional war into a nuclear war. 

 China has several hundred warheads, including several inter-continental 

ballistic missiles, some of which are deployed on tactical aircraft. 

Apparently, China has no intention of achieving nuclear parity with the 

United States and Russia. It has found a philosophy, adopted in the 1980s, 

of “restricted nuclear counter attack with the purposes of selfdefense.” This concept not only takes into consideration the limited 

financial resources of the country, but also recognizes that the United 

States and Russia plan to retrofit existing systems or deploy new 

defensive systems that will neutralize any achievable Chinese 

strategic nuclear buildup. The calculation demonstrates that Chinese 

delivery vehicles are not capable of overcoming prospective anti-ballistic 

missile systems and air defense systems; consequently, they will lose the 
86

ability to prevent the United States from interfering in China’s political 

affairs. This is one of the main potential threats China faces at the global 

level.10

 China’s leaders have openly declared that they will not use nuclear 

weapons first. Furthermore, China’s strategic nuclear forces operate on a 

three-component structure: strategic missile forces, strategic aviation, 

and nuclear submarines. This compact structure of forces is necessary to 

deter wars against the China, to execute combat missions in response to 

various international scenarios, and to intimidate the smaller 

hegemonists in the Asia-Pacific region.11 

It is necessary to identify the inconsistency between China’s 

political declarations regarding its no first-use policy and its 

technological capabilities. Only about a dozen of China’s strategic nuclear 

delivery systems are located in protected silo launchers. Hence, in terms of 

the theory of mutually assured destruction, China’s existing nuclear forces 

have neither a first strike capability nor is China capable of unleashing a 

massive retaliatory strike to wipe out an aggressor. This reality is 

mentioned in the military doctrine of China. 

 However, it does allow China to avoid participation in nuclear 

weapons reduction agreements, such as the strategic arms reduction 

treaties. In 2000, this author asked Sha Zukang, Director-General of the 

Department of Arms Control and Disarmament of the Chinese Foreign 

ministry, what China’s role was in the U.S.-Russian arms reduction initiatives. He believes that China would participate in such treaties when 

Russia and the United States reduce their existing arsenal to one-fifth 

of their current levels. It is difficult to imagine Moscow and Washington taking this step. 

 Chinese battle training and strategic nuclear-missile exercises are 

contingent on properly maintained rocket systems. The Chinese rockets 

are technologically similar to the Soviet R-5 and R-7. These rockets were 
87

designed in the late 1950s—a period of cooperation between nuclearmissile specialists in the USSR and China. The extent of the RussianChinese exchange should not be over-estimated. Far from the quoted 

level of $20 billion, a realistic amount lies in the region of $5-7 billion 

per year of which only $1 billion consists of military equipment. An 

amount this small will have little significance in increasing military 

modernization. At the same time, the relationship between Russia and 

China should not be underestimated. It takes time and effort to build a 

partnership in which the sharing of information—especially related to 

weapons—is done willingly. In addition to Russia, China has received 

limited military aid from other countries and broad economic assistance from western powers—both types of aid are efficiently incorporated into the Chinese plan for national modernization. 

 It is unlikely that the Chinese arsenal will perform well in educational 

and combat-trainer tests, due to the small volume of production and 

limited early testing. China’s technological lag behind the U.S. Missile 

program bolsters doubts of any successful missile firings. 

 On July 12, 2001, U.S. Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz 

submitted a statement to the Senate Armed Services Committee 

describing the unsuccessful test launch of American Thor (4 of 5), Atlas 

(5 of 8), and Polaris (66 of 123) strategic missiles.12 Soviet missile testing 

during the 1960s yielded similar results. Apparently, China’s missile 

experimentation has met with the same outcome. Though government and 

industry forces want more extensive testing of China’s arsenal to 

eliminate design flaws, the high cost of failure has frustrated further 

efforts. A missile system must be tested periodically to ensure immediate 

response in a combat situation. The lack of testing on a large scale poses 

two major problems for the reliability of China’s arsenal: first, the current 

stock may have flaws, and second, the probability of a flawed launch 

increases the longer a missile sits idle and unmaintained. 

 The Chinese rely on lessons from past conflicts to shape their view of 
88

building general-purpose forces and deploying them into battle. Of 

particular importance in this respect has been the Gulf War in which 

technological superiority was used to quickly defeat the opponent. Thus, 

China’s strategy has evolved from the traditional “grand army” model 

in favor of concepts like “fast reaction” and “local warfare.” These 

concepts mandate that joint state and military institutions be able to 

quickly and effectively mobilize in the face of combat situations and that 

the armed forces be prepared to immediately wage war in one or several 

theaters. 

 The new ideal of “fast reaction” has fostered considerable change in 

battle training, unit organization and unit formation as the 

modernization of the PLA advances. The creation and content of the PLA 

battle component structure (“alert forces” and “fast-reacting forces” 

capable of quick decisions on emerging issues) has been recognized as 

indispensable. 

 The PLA military command is well-trained and has equipped 

battalions and brigades to be used as impact units capable of quick, 

retaliatory action. These units are trained to execute the following primary 

objectives: 

• Breakthrough, 

• Shock missions on the base camps of enemy military, 

• Massive retaliations with the purpose of defeating opposition 

strongholds, and 

• Tactics by which PLA troops flank the opponent.13

 Units intended to execute these mission objectives are currently 

trained in each military district. The changing international situation, in 

connection with the end of the Cold war and economic concerns, has 
89

induced China to reduce the ranks of the PLA in the short term. The army 

will drop to 2.5 million members (from more than 4 million) and embark on 

a vigorous modernization effort. This effort will close a number of bases 

and reduce the number of military divisions and regiments. However, the 

problem of updating the army to modern levels has not been addressed. The 

present condition of the PLA is characterized by a lack of materials 

used by more developed countries and a great deal of obsolete equipment 

and weaponry. 

 The traditional military doctrine of China since Mao Zedong held that 

people were indispensable to develop a modern army. Currently, 

though, this view has been tempered with doctrines of expediency and 

capability—concepts that surfaced after China’s civil wars and conflict with 

Japan. In addition to their own experience, the Chinese also 

“steadfastly keep track of strategic situations in the world and combine 

the best tactics from foreign countries with national experience.”14 In 

the end, the doctrine of “People’s war under modern Conditions” was 

adopted. This doctrine recognizes the increasing importance of 

technology in warfare and envisions an army with a balance between 

weaponry and troops that effectively functions in five dimensions: air, 

land, sea, space, and technology. In addition, the plan calls for the 

updating of already existing military-industrial operations. 

 Special attention is paid to the preparation of armed forces in peacetime 

to allow for immediate response in case of conflict. Additionally, 

however, plans are made to efficiently transform the national 

economy, civil air defense, and national transportation defense from a 

peaceful state to one of wartime operations. Legislation has been passed so 

that, if the state so decrees, all state bodies, political parties, firms, 

institutes, and citizens are obligated to mobilize according to enacted 

guidelines 15. 

During the last 2 years, fundamental changes have taken place in the 

field of defense education. The state has transformed the curriculum to 
90

target all citizens by training in broader and more general areas. Defense 

education now consists of regular, intensive training combined with 

correspondence and daytime classes.16

 It will be difficult for the Chinese to combine the traditional 

military practice of mass infantry and simple tactical operations with 

the usage of new, high-precision weaponry and aerospace technology. 

Undoubtedly, the transformation will demand severe modifications to the 

existing military infrastructure. 

 The most serious impediments to China’s military development are 

its aging military bases and centers of production. In contrast to the way 

in which former Cold war period installations were funded, the current 

administration recognizes the need for a solid national economy and 

the importance of coordinating economic and military building efforts. 

Chinese propaganda works to create a unified economic system in 

which production can serve both civil and military uses—the former 

during times of peace and the latter during times of conflict. Creating the 

system, however, will be problematic due to China’s current level of technical 

expertise. 

 At present, military research and development is largely ineffective 

due, in part, to poor state financing. China’s bureaucracy also has a 

hand in the slow pace of military R&D. The rigid chain of command 

often stifles scientific ideas before they can reach decisionmakers. In 

addition to poor organization, negative public reactions hamper 

progress when news of military development leaks out to the public. 

Small gains have been realized by studying Russian military 

equipment like submarines, destroyers, aircraft and air defense systems; 

the knowledge gained, however, is minimal. 

 The modernization of the PLA often proceeds at the whim of 

officials; even then, it moves at a slow pace due to the limited defense 

budget and obsolete equipment. The sectors of the military slated to 
91

advance most rapidly are nuclear operations and rapid deployment-type 

land troops. Import purchases are forgone to boost spending on military 

transport planes as well as air-defense troops. Chinese naval vessels 

with high performance ratings are entered into service. 

 In the short term, prospects for military development will rest on 

China’s continued economic growth—currently 8 percent per year. 

However, the current administration has recently assigned a low 

probability to future, external military threats; this places military 

spending near the end of the line for budget increases. At this point, it appears 

as if the bulk of government spending will focus on retrofitting a research 

complex, creating new arms with Chinese-produced elements, and 

laying the financial groundwork for a military technology base.17

 The process of developing market mechanisms in the country and 

obtaining the experience of commercial activity led to similar developments in the PLA. Special attention was paid to maintaining scientific 

and technological development in areas pertaining to defense building 

and raising the standards of engineering to modern requirements. 

China has conducted structural reforms to create a new, high-performance science of defense systems, engineering, and industries. Among these 

was the creation of the Commission of Science, Technology and Industry 

for National Defense in March 1998. This commission operates as a leading 

department of the State Council and enacts policies, laws, rules, 

schedules, and standards in areas of military influence. In July 1999, five 

military organizations that specialize in nuclear weapons, spacecraft, 

aircraft, naval vessels, and weapons manufacturing were reorganized 

into ten corporations.18

 With the help of the national defense science, engineering, and 

industry reforms, competition was introduced into the military 

production sector. The war industry’s structure was improved, its ability 

to transition between peace and war streamlined, and plans were made for 

the creation of a new open system of military production.19
92

 The current style of battle training focuses on making individual 

soldiers part of a cohesive unit. On the regiment and division scale, 

officer drilling through computer simulation has largely replaced the 

expensive, live ammunition training practiced earlier. The combined 

tactical training base system provides a versatile training ground by 

providing networked tactical, weapon, and service simulation models. 

An interactive command and control simulation, new equipment 

operation simulation, and computer-aided training systems have been 

widely applied.20

 Poor military financing, the inability to incorporate technologically 

advanced equipment with current troops and the evolving model of 

small-scale operations troops have forced PLA officials to create a 

number of “elite” brigades and battalions, specially trained for 

immediate mobilization. These divisions receive the larger part of 

allotted funds and are thus better equipped with arms and equipment, 

which enhances their training. 

 The majority of the PLA, PLA reserve units, the Chinese People’s Armed 

Police Force, and the militia are provided with few resources for 

training exercises. For example, an ordinary PLAAF pilot typically trains 

in a Soviet prototype jet designed in the early 1950s. He only spends 80 hours 

per year in the air—not enough time to master the complex skills of 

piloting, let alone grasp the handling of high-tech weaponry used in 

combat planes. 

 The gap between current military doctrine about modern war and 

the actual practices of the armed forces has resulted in a deficit of experience 

among Chinese soldiers. 

 Though political rhetoric promotes extensive training and 

increased usage of technology in combat operations, the bulk of the 

military has no modern equipment with which to train. The situation became 
93

so pronounced in 1998 that the PRC CMC decided to train cadres abroad 

and recruit foreign specialists to train various elements of the PLA. 

Though many Chinese soldiers trained in the Soviet Union during the 1950s, 

this is no longer the case. The decreased desire to learn Russian has 

contributed to the decrease in numbers, while schools that offer English 

have become more popular. Although the Chinese still hold conferences 

with the Russian military, they are mostly restricted to the general 

headquarters and district level. The military leaders feel that the 

impact of foreigners will raise technological knowledge through out the 

PLA. The participants in this new initiative will be officers of high and 

middle rank, those who received a broad education, or those possessing 

specialized military knowledge. President Jiang Zemin himself stated that 

“it is better to let the professionals wait for weapons than for the weapons 

to wait for professionals.”21

 The practice of training troops for battle looks imposing, even on paper. 

The quantity of required exercises, maneuvers, and officer drillings 

testifies to the challenging studies of the PLA. With the advent of military 

reform, the number of exercises was increased, but the subject content 

became broader and displayed a deeper understanding of geopolitics and 

military structure. After 1980 combined arms exercises became more 

commonplace. Strategies of encirclement, disembarkation from marine 

and air-vehicles, and usage of weapons of mass destruction were discussed 

from both offensive and defensive positions. As early as 1984, 27 

divisions, 269 regiments, and over 200,000 servicemen were trained in the 

Shenyang and Lanzhou districts alone. Involved in exercises were 3,600 

artillery pieces, over 1,000 tanks and other armored vehicles, 13 ships, and 

10,000 automobiles. The number of aircraft missions completed was 508. 

The military districts of Shenyang, Jinan, and Wuhan saw an increase of 

battalion scale exercises (1,726), regiment scale exercises (596), and 

division scale exercises (67). Strategic operations exercises were run with 

the participation of tens and even hundreds of thousands of servicemen.22

 Each of the seven military districts of the PLA carries out annual 
94

independent staff and field exercises in preparation for local war. Joint 

operations in retaliation for border skirmishes and other local incidents are 

regularly carried out. Increased hostilities along border regions 

fostered the desire that such exercises should create a military zone 

where independent operations could be carried out during certain times. 

The commander in chief of a military district becomes the head of an 

integrated command. Orders to all attached land, air, and, when 

necessary, naval troops are sent from a central command facility in a 

seaside zone.23 Also contributing to peaceful borders is the Friendship 

and Cooperation Treaty between the Russian Federation and the PRC. 

Although the treaty contains many military-support sounding references 

like “concerning guards of state unity and territorial integrity,” the 

agreement is effectively a statement of mutual support for policy concerns; 

it falls far short of a military alliance. 

 Until the end of the 1980s, the majority of large-scale operations were 

conducted in northern military districts based on the supposition that 

conflict would arise between China and the Soviet Union. In addition, 

the Guangzhou region also hosted large-scale exercises with Vietnam as 

the potential opponent. Special attention was paid to these later exercises, 

though, for two reasons. First was the need to carry out the defense of 

coastal territories, especially those along the South China Sea, with as 

much efficiency as possible. Second was the comprehensive nature—

divisions from all branches of the PLA were used—of the training 

missions. of special import was the commander of the coastal district, who 

also had control of naval operations. The skills of this leader could 

easily be transferred to battle in other countries. PRC Naval Command 

wants to increase the battle capabilities of the Chinese fleet to a zone of 

operations of 400 miles and enable independent operations of the fleet.24 

In the 1990s, specialized exercises commenced with the use of high-tech 

armament and equipment. The development of electronic warfare, such 

as implanting viruses into enemy computer systems, is considered the 

primary goal of these simulations. The military district of Sheyang hosted 
95

these specialized exercises, which included Chinese specialists in electronic 

technology.25

 During the last few years, the military districts of Lanzhou, Jinan, 

Nanjing, and Guangzhou hosted training missions incorporating multiple 

branches of the armed forces.26

 Chinese military specialists have been able to acquaint themselves with 

the expertise of other countries. Combining foreign learning with their 

knowledge of historic conflict, they modify and shape military strategy 

and doctrine as it relates to tactical operations and troop preparation. 

 A similar trend was seen in Soviet forces during the 1970s and 1980s. 

During this time, Russian preparation for nuclear world war was 

completed, and included the amassing of thousands of rockets and tens of 

thousands of nuclear warheads. The central research base of the country 

provided a huge variety of Russian and foreign designed armaments. In 

the advent of another world war, a massive nuclear strike against the 

opponent could be guaranteed. 

 The situation became more complicated when the United States 

and NATO—followed by the USSR and countries of the Warsaw 

Pact—began preparations for conventional warfare in addition to 

nuclear war. This preparation resulted from the change in perspective 

called the “antinuclear revolution in military affairs.” It appeared, though, 

as if the mindset had changed without a result in actual practice. New 

ideas became widespread, such as the use of missiles, artillery and air 

forces to guarantee success; multi-point observation of opponents; and 

usage of a division—or even an army—to flank an adversary. In view of 

the great advances in military engineering, all of these things seemed 

possible. In training simulations, the speed of an offensive was established at 

50 or even 100 kilometers per day. When questioned on how the 

necessary ammunition, fuels, lubricant oils, means of operation, and 

battle maintenance would come to be, the common answer was that in a 
96

short time these “necessaries” would be invented. Samples of arms 

had already been created, and there were promises of spreading them 

through out the armed forces. On paper, the revolution had already 

encompassed all aspects of military art. The reality of the situation, 

however, was quite different. The Soviet army simply did not have the 

proper formations and number of troops to carry out the tactical plans 

they had. 

 The problem of possible transition to the use of nuclear weapons was 

solved by diagramming hundreds of potential nuclear strikes on cards. Each 

drew the appropriate impact zone and estimated the consequences of 

using nuclear weaponry. Included in the plans were 2-3 days to allow the 

effects of a nuclear attack to clear. This period, however, was not included 

in field training exercises. There is also a decided lack of skill, even in the 

elite units, relating to material support, logistics, and even the use of some 

forms of weaponry. 

 It is believed that the gap between PLA ideals like “high-tech local 

warfare” and “revolution in military affairs” and the actual practices of 

military units is even more pronounced than in the Soviet Army. Although 

the PLA is linked to the concept of “people’s war” through weapons and 

equipment designed in the 1950-60s, its target of territorial defense creates a 

foundation of reliable security for China. The 1960-70s were a difficult 

time for the PLA as the administration did not allow military spending 

on updating weapons and engineering. They waited while other 

countries went through 2-3 generations of armaments. Even now, there 

is not enough support in the Chinese leadership to fund a full scale 

modernization of the PLA. I believe that the Chinese will continue 

applying existing weapons to their military theories for quite some time. 

 One area in which the PLA has attained a high degree of success is in 

the creation of a courageous officer and executive soldier class. These 

servicemen are willing to wage war in the name of their country despite the 

army’s aging equipment and untrained troops. 
97

 The author’s above representation of Chinese military doctrine was 

only in brief. The question then arises as to whether China’s military 

policy has recently changed due to warming relations with the United 

States. The answer is, of course, negative. The doctrine and practice of 

battle training are staples of the Chinese military structure and require 

tremendous impetus before alteration. 

 The U.S. hardening policy towards China is expressed first in 

intentions, second in political steps, and, finally, in military action. It 

will be interesting to discover how the George W. Bush administration’s 

new foreign policy initiatives will be met by the PRC—both politically 

and militarily. 

 In China, as in other countries of the world, the latest steps of the 

United States in the international arena are perceived as America’s 

attempt to assert itself as the last superpower and disrupt the present 

world order in the field of international security. 

 The developments of such a policy include: 

• A power diktat and the use of force without international approval; 

• The departure from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic missile (ABM) Treaty and the 

organization of a national ABM and theater missile defense (TMD) 

system which upset the strategic balance and fractured the system of 

agreements regarding the limitation and reduction of offensive forces 

and nuclear arms; and, 

• The expansion to the East. 

 The developments in U.S. foreign policy have little direct impact on the 

Asia Pacific region in which China is situated. There has been, however, a 

buildup of smaller incidents like the bombing of the PRC embassy in 
98

Belgrade and the collision of the Chinese fighter with the American EP-3 

off the island of Hainan. Furthermore, the Bush administration’s support 

of Taiwan could substantially complicate the political and military 

situation in the region. 

 This is, of course, not a full list of the events instigated by the United 

States to overtly restrain the concerns of the PRC. If continued, these 

events may lead to complex operating measures in both political and 

military spheres between the two countries. 

 The PRC leadership strongly reacted to the events in Yugoslavia—

to the extension of NATO and the creation of an anti-missile defense 

system. Its reactions are of a political and diplomatic nature: statement, 

demonstration, consulting and coordination with like-minded 

countries. There are also, however, cases of military reaction as 

evidenced by the illegal airspace infringement of the EP-3. 

 The PRC has put forth a schedule of transformation that lasts into the 

middle of the 21st Century. This plan consists of 3 parts: first, economic 

growth and an increased living standard for the Chinese people; second, the 

socio-political stability of the country; and third, the guarantee of military 

security and the territorial integrity of the country. 

 The first part of China’s strategy allows little room to decisively act 

in the international arena. Moreover, any Chinese plans of military 

expansion will severely damage its foreign economic relations and slow 

its national economic growth. 

 The second part of the Chinese plan is connected to the active 

extraction of government forces from the economy. One of the functions 

of China’s armed forces has traditionally been to assist in natural 

disaster relief projects and to rebuild damaged houses. Natural disasters 

seem to plague the country and so distract the PLA from training 

objectives. Furthermore, with the significant reduction in the army (from 
99

4 to 2.5 million) and the continuing call for disaster relief, China may 

hasten the removal of the PLA from the economy. 

 The third part of the Chinese plan relies on its military potential and the 

modernization of the PLA. The pattern has been the gradual 

destruction of obsolete items (including tanks, artillery systems, 

aircraft, etc.) and the purchase and dissemination of new equipment 

throughout the army. This process is not threatening to other countries and 

does not change the balance of power on regional or strategic levels. 

 It should be noted that, when laying out its national goals, the 

Chinese leadership traditionally thinks in large categories, in large time 

periods, and exhibits significant patience. China never entered an arms 

race by massing its field troops or by buying expensive modern 

weapons systems. Since the 1950-60s, the PRC has based its strength on 

ground troops, although it has received and created samples of nuclear 

weapons, missiles, aircraft and marine vessels. Subsequently, China did 

not conduct broad retrofits of its existing weaponry, though it was 

considerably outdated. It has only done the minimum to ensure military 

security during the difficult times of the 1960-80s during which minor 

confrontations occurred with the Soviet Union and the United States. 

 Currently, the international situation is more favorable for Chinese 

security. Using the concept of “people’s war,” the PLA reliably guards the 

country’s borders. China’s nuclear arms serve only as a deterrent to 

potential aggressors. 

 China is not prepared for major conflicts outside of its own territory, 

and there have been no rumors of plans in this direction. Even the 

statements of Chinese leaders regarding the possibility of forcing Taiwan 

to rejoin the country should be dismissed as no more than a political 

show. Now, and in the near future, an assault on Taiwan is outside of 

China’s capability. 
100

 This situation can be changed by large international political and 

military events such as: 

• Obstacles on the path of reunification with Taiwan, international 

support of the Taiwanese government, or careless political and 

military maneuvers in the Taiwan Strait; 

• Allowing the PRC to build a nuclear arsenal unrestrained; and, 

• Dramatic changes in the political or military situation in the Asia Pacific 

Region or in the world as a whole. 

 Developments of this nature may force the leadership of the PRC to 

revise its military strategy and pursue an accelerated modernization of 

the armed forces. The rapid economic growth of China and its 

increasing military potential—combined with its active and firm military 

policy towards its opponents, including the United States—may result in 

an unexpectedly large threat, should China be forced to think outside 

of its borders. 

 Should these events occur, China will have to overcome considerable 

difficulties, including: 

• A weak technical and technological base; 

• A vulnerable economy if a drastic increase in military consumption 

and research and development (R&D) demands occurs; and, 

• Decreasing economic relations with other nations. 

 The path to war is fraught with economic and sociopolitical 

difficulties for China, thus there is slight chance the country will pursue it. 

It has as an example the Soviet Union, which could not balance the arms 

race with its overstrained economy. At the same time, however, foreign 
101

powers should not expect China to take a passive stand in military 

operations. At a minimum, the PRC can engage in military action within 

its borders. 

 If the Chinese tendencies manifested over the last 15-20 years persist, the 

PLA will only have the potential to defend the PRC. It is difficult to imagine 

a scenario in which China would pose a real threat to the continental 

United States or even to American military bases in East Asia. 

 For this reason, the international situation over the next 15-20 years will 

be determined largely by U.S. policy. If America shows restraint, does 

not excessively increase its military, does not promote unilateral 

expansion plans in foreign regions, does not destroy the present 

system of strategic stability, does not engage in an arms race (under 

the pretext of deployment of ABM systems, for example) and does not 

proliferate nuclear and conventional armaments, then China will have 

no incentive to increase its own military capacity. Rivalry between 

China and the United States will then originate only from economic and 

political sources. 

 If the United States and its allies dictate politically or militarily to 

other countries, it may place the United States and China on the road to a 

new Cold War. We are now witnessing the destruction of a series of 

international agreements regarding the reduction and limitation of 

nuclear armaments. The United States has terminated its participation in 

the ABM Treaty of 1972. U.S. National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice 

recently compared the present system of agreements to the geocentric 

concept of the universe; the future system of the world to the 

heliocentric system. Copernicus, though, had to formulate his concept of the 

cosmos and demonstrate its consistency with fact before he received the 

recognition of the world.27 

Russia is often charged with giving China the modern air, anti-aircraft, 

and marine arms that helped increase the military potential of the country. 
102

Making this statement, however, requires the following suppositions: 

 1. Russian arms shipments to China were meant as defensive tools 

to protect the nation’s borders. 

 2. China does not itself possess the capacity to manufacture its 

entire spectrum of military equipment. It also testifies to the reluctance of 

the Chinese leadership to enter an arms race and, in so doing, to become 

dependent on the military-industrial complex. 

 Former President Dwight Eisenhower spoke of the relationship 

between a country’s leadership and its arms producers in his farewell 

address. He warned of a military-industrial complex that dictates both 

defense and economic policies. 

 Neither the United States nor the USSR could avoid such a situation, 

however. The United States has not experienced the consequences, 

though, for two reasons: (1) high general economic potential, and (2) 

military-industrial corporations producing diversified commodities, 

selling both to the military and to civilians. In the Soviet Union, though, 

a diktat of the producers of military equipment resulted in the economic 

weakness of the country’s private sector, a redundancy of production, and 

that production’s low quality. 

 It is plausible to view the national ABM system proposed by the Bush 

administration as a concession to the military-industrial complex of 

America, which stands to profit substantially from the undertaking. 

They prefer not to speak about the battle effectiveness of the system, but 

rather to point at the nonexistent threat of North Korean nuclear weapons. 

China, though, perceives the creation of the American national anti-missile 

shield very differently. 

 The military policy of the United States will shape that of China. If 

momentum is given to the missile shield, it will provoke the Chinese to 
103

institute a full-scale military-industrial complex capable of producing 

thousands of rockets, aircraft, and tanks. Should this occur, it will 

heavily stress China’s economic base, yet the transformation is possible. 

 In the early 1980s, the author studied t the military Academy of General 

Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces. Here he learned the three major strategic 

ones of the globe: the west, the South, and the East. The Soviet Armed Forces 

had the resources and capabilities necessary for such operations. The 

PLA, on the other hand, does not have the capability to think of theaters 

outside of the Asia Pacific Region. I do not think that the United States 

and its allies should view the PLA as having such capabilities—a fact 

that should be taken into account before hardening foreign policy against 

China. 

 The transformation of Chinese military doctrine and the combat 

training of their armed forces characterize a country trying to reach a 

higher level of conventional military capabilities. It is obviously 

necessary for China to react against aggressors, but not always through 

military operations. The fundamentals of strategy and deception are 

with good reason the bases of “people’s war” at the strategic level. 

CHAPTER 4-ENDNOTES 

1. Renmin Ribao, October 9, 1995. 

 2. China National Defense in 2000, Beijing, October 2000, p. 6. 

 3. Ibid., pp. 6-7. 

 4. Ibid., pp. 12. 

 5. Renmin Ribao. 

6. ITAR-TASS, Beijing, December 9, 1998. 

 7. Ibid. 
104

8. Ibid. 

9. ITAR-TA SS, Beijing, May 23, 1996. 

 10. Krasnaya Zvezda, July 11, 1995. 

 11. Zarubezh noevoennoe obozrenie, 9, 1994. 

 12. Paul Wolfowitz, Prepared testimony on Ballistic missile Defense, July 12, 2001. 

 13. ITAR-TASS. Beijing, December 9, 1998. 

 14. P. Kamennov, Military-Technological Aspects of China’s Defense modernization, Moldova: 

International Foundation for Election Services, 2001, p. 19. 

 15. China’s National Defense in 2000, p. 18. 

 16. Ibid., p. 19. 

 17. P. Kamennov,” PRC Military Construction in 1990s,” Problemy Dalnego Vostoka, Vol. 

3, 1997. 

 18. China’s National Defense in 2000, p. 24. 

 19. Ibid., pp. 24-25. 

 20. Ibid., pp. 37-38. 

 21. ITAR-TASS, Beijing, December 10, 1998. 

 22. Military Activities of Contemporary Chinese Army, Part 2, Beijing, 1989, p. 362. 

 23. The China Quarterly, No. 146, June 1996. 

 24. Ibid. 

25. ITAR-TASS, Beijing, December 10, 1998. 

 26. China’s National Defense in 2000, p. 38. 

 27. Remarks by Condoleezza Rice at the National Press Club, July 12, 2001. 
105

 

PART II: CHINA’S BALLISTIC MISSILES 

AND EAST ASIA REACTION TO U.S. 

MISSILE DEFENSE INITIATIVES 
107

CHAPTER 5 

CHINESE BALLISTIC MISSILE FORCES 

IN THE AGE OF GLOBAL MISSILE DEFENSE: 

CHALLENGES AND RESPONSES 

Mark A. Stokes 

INTRODUCTION 

Since the days of Sunzi and beyond, nations have pursued defenses 

against offensive weapons. Naturally, sparked by the advent of the first 

ballistic missiles in World War II, interest in defending against ballistic 

missiles over the past several decades has increased significantly. Today, 

strategic and conventional ballistic missiles pose challenges to the United 

States and to its national interests around the world. Weapons of mass 

destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery place significant portions 

of the U.S. population at risk. These systems, in the hands of 

governments that are hostile to U.S. national interests, challenge the security 

of allies and friends. No system exists today that is capable of defending 

U.S. territory and only a limited capability exists to protect allies and 

friends, as well as U.S. forces deployed overseas. 

 To address the growing proliferation of ballistic missiles and WMD, 

President George W. Bush has set out on a path to field ballistic missile 

defenses to protect the United States, its forces overseas, and allies and 

friends. At the same time, the United States seeks to reduce its nuclear 

arsenal to the “lowest possible number of nuclear weapons.” U.S. Missile 

defense programs are designed to counter the existing and growing short, 

medium, and intermediate range missile threats to our allies and friends 

and deployed forces; as well as the long-range threat to American cities 

that is just over the horizon. 
108

 The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is concerned about U.S. plans to 

deploy a global missile defense architecture. From Beijing’s perspective, 

even a modest missile defense system could have serious implications for 

the viability of its nuclear deterrent and for its expanding inventory of 

conventional short and medium range ballistic missiles (SRBMs and 

MRBMs). Beijing’s anxiety over maintaining its nuclear deterrent is not 

new. Development of missile defense countermeasures dates back at 

least to the mid-1980s, when a series of responses to the U.S. Strategic 

Defense Initiative (SD I) were contemplated. These responses included 

plans for a significant expansion of China’s nuclear intercontinental 

ballistic missile force. 

 The author of this chapter examines the PRC’s strategic and theater 

ballistic missile development and the growing role of ballistic missiles as an 

integral component of PRC coercive strategy. U.S. Missile defense 

programs are outlined in order to provide the necessary context for 

subsequent discussion of the wide range of PRC technical responses that 

are underway. These countermeasures are intended to undercut the 

political and military utility of U.S. Missile defense programs. 

 In addressing PRC technical responses to U.S. Missile defenses, three 

caveats are in order. First, this discussion does not necessarily imply that 

U.S. Missile defense programs are motivated by a perceived Chinese threat 

to the U.S. Homeland. U.S. Missile defense programs are driven by 

rogue nations equipped with limited numbers of relatively 

unsophisticated ballistic missiles, as well the prospects of an accidental 

Russian or Chinese launch. While missile defenses are not necessarily 

driven by a perceived PRC threat, Beijing’s track record of proliferating 

ballistic missile-related technology to rogue states—to include 

countermeasures—is a legitimate concern. 

 Secondly, defense against ballistic missiles, particularly the shorterrange threats, requires an integrated approach consisting of survivable 

command, control, communications, and battle management systems; 
109

passive defense such as hardening and rapid recovery measures; active 

ballistic missile defenses that destroy missiles in the boost, mid-course, 

and terminal phases of flight; and attack operations intended to suppress 

the use of ballistic missile forces at their source. This chapter focuses only 

on the active component of missile defense. 

 Finally, China’s opposition to missile defenses often is viewed 

through the cognitive prism of Taiwan. Therefore, special attention is 

placed on the relationship between the development of missile defenses and 

their potential use in a Taiwan Strait conflict, since it is within this 

context that Beijing perceives U.S. development of missile defense. The 

PRC’s growing arsenal of strategic ballistic missiles and increasingly 

accurate and lethal theater ballistic missiles threatens to disrupt the 

security situation in the Taiwan Strait and limit U.S. freedom of action 

should the PRC resort to the use of force to resolve differences with 

Taiwan. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of China has an 

expanding inventory of conventional ballistic missiles, linked with other 

forms of coercive airpower, which could give Beijing a decisive edge in 

any future conflict with Taiwan. From a political and military 

perspective, missile defenses threaten to undermine the PRC’s ballistic 

missile “trump card.” 

PRC BALLISTIC MISSILE DEVELOPMENT 

The PRC relies heavily upon its ballistic missile forces—the PLA 

Second Artillery Corps—for deterrence, coercion, and warfighting. With 

some foreign assistance, Beijing is expanding and modernizing its 

limited inventory of nuclear ballistic missiles and is continuing to 

deploy increasingly accurate and lethal conventional ballistic missiles 

opposite Taiwan. Its small intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) force 

provides a modicum of assured retaliation should China suffer 

nuclear attack. The second Artillery’s conventional ballistic missile 

force is be coming not only an important instrument of psychological 

intimidation, but also a potentially devastating force of military utility. 
110

The nuclear and conventional missile buildup is taking place 

regardless of the scale of any future U.S. Missile defense architecture or 

the provision of missile defenses to Taiwan. A 1998 U.S. Department of 

Defense report asserted that China’s space and missile industry probably 

will have the capacity to produce as many as 1,000 ballistic missiles in the 

next decade.1

 The PRC’s strategic nuclear doctrine is based on the concept of limited 

deterrence—the ability to inflict unacceptable damage on an enemy in a 

retaliatory strike. China’s nuclear forces generally are believed to follow 

a countervalue strategy that targets population centers. China has 

sufficient nuclear weapons to hold approximately 15-20 million U.S. citizens 

at risk, or about 5-10 percent of the total U.S. population.2 

China’s primary organization for ballistic missile research, 

development, and production is the China Aerospace Corporation’s 

First Academy. The First Academy, also known as the China Academy 

of Launch Technology (CALT), consists of an overall design and 

systems integration department, 13 research institutes, and 7 factories 

which are responsible for engines, control technology, inertial systems, 

warheads, materials, testing, and launchers. With more than 27,000 

personnel, the First Academy is the largest research and development 

(R&D) organization within the China Aerospace Corporation (CASC). In 

its work on solid systems, the First Academy is dependent upon the Fourth 

Academy in Hohhot, Inner Mongolia, for its solid motors. CALT is also 

supported by institutes and factories subordinated to various bases deep 

inside China. One of these bases, the Sanjiang Space Group (066 Base) in 

Hubei province, has developed its own complete ballistic missile system, 

the 300-kilometer DF-11 and its 600 kilometer variant, the DF-11A. 

 Today, the First Academy’s research and development resources are 

devoted to ensuring its nuclear ballistic missile force remains a viable 

deterrent in the face of missile defenses. CALT and the 066 Base in Hubei 

province are leveraging foreign technology in order to achieve 
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tremendous advances in accuracy. At the same time, they are diversifying 

the payloads of their ballistic missiles to increase their lethality. CALT 

and the PLA are also examining a wide range of countermeasures to 

ensure their ballistic missile force remains effective as missile defenses 

are introduced in to the Asia-Pacific region. Key organizations 

responsible for technical countermeasures include CALT’s 4th planning 

Department (systems design); the 14th Research Institute 

(warhead/payload development); and the 703rd Research Institute 

(materials). CALT and the 066 Base are working on no less than six 

research and development programs that will increase the range, size, 

mobility, accuracy, and survivability of the second Artillery’s 

inventory of ballistic missiles. Many of these programs have been placed 

on an accelerated R&D schedule since May 1999.3

Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles 

The PRC’s existing ICBM force consists of liquid-fueled DF-5 (CSS-4) 

and DF-4 (CSS-3) systems. Mobile, solid fueled ICBMs will augment these 

older systems over the next 5 years. The second Artillery currently 

possesses approximately 20 DF-5 ICBMs that are capable of targeting any 

location in the United States. This figure is expected to grow to 24 over 

the next few years. CALT is working on an improved version of the DF-5 

that could incorporate multiple independent reentry vehicle (MIRV) 

technology. Deployment of at least twelve 6,000-kilometer range DF-4 (CSS-3) 

ICBMs began in the mid-1970s. Western sources indicate that these two stage, 

liquid fueled missiles are distributed among three brigades under the 54 

Base in Henan province, 55 Base in western Hunan province, and 56 Base in 

Qinghai province.4 

China’s liquid fueled ICBM force will be augmented by mobile, solid 

fueled systems within the next 5 years. At least one source alleges that China 

could deploy up to 100 new land or sea-launched ICBMs over the next 15 

years. These new systems include the DF-31, an extended range DF-31, and 

a sea-based version of the DF-31, the JL-2.5 The DF-31 is a solid-fueled, three 
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stage nuclear missile with an 8,000-kilometer range, sufficient to strike 

targets in Hawaii, Guam, Alaska, and some portions of northwestern 

United States. Two successful DF-31 flight tests were conducted in 

1999 and 2000. Slated for deployment before 2005, the DF-31 eventually 

will replace the DF-4 intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBMs). The 

DF-31 is estimated to carry a single warhead and could incorporate 

penetration aids, including decoys and chaff. At least 10-20 DF-31 missiles 

can be expected to enter the force over the next 5 years, sufficient to outfit 

one brigade with a notional structure of 9-16 launchers as signed to 

three or four battalions.6

 Two variants of the DF-31 also are under development. First is an 

extended range version of the DF-31 with a range of at least 12,000 

kilometers. This longer range missile, known as the DF-31A, likely will be 

tested within the next several years and will be targeted primarily against 

the United States. Japanese observers note that the DF-31A is in some 

respects more advanced than some Russian systems, such as the TopolM. As many as 10 DF-31A ICBMs could be fielded by 2010. Another 

variant of the DF-31—the JL-2—will be launched from submarines. The JL2 missile was successfully tested in early 2001. A modified Type 94 

submarine that will be equipped with 16 tubes allegedly will carry the JL-2. 

Projected for deployment by 2005, the 8,000-kilometer range missile 

would be able to strike targets in Alaska, Hawaii, and the western part of 

the United States when operating in Chinese coastal waters.7 Indications 

exist that the timeline to field the DF-31, its longer range variant, and the 

JL-2 was accelerated in May 1999.8

DF-21 MRBM System. 

The PRC’s principal MRBM is the solid fueled DF-21 (CSS-5). 

Research and development on the DF-21 began in 1967 and the missile was 

first tested in 1985. Assembled at the 307 Factory in Nanjing, the initial 

introduction of the missile into an experimental regiment took place as 

early as 1991. With a 600-kilogram warhead and an estimated CEP of 700 
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meters, the 2,100 kilometer range DF-21 is currently equipped for nuclear 

missions only. A longer range version of the DF-21, the 2,500 kilometer 

range DF-21 Mod 2, is reportedly under development. Both the DF-21 Mod 

1 and Mod 2 likely have missile defense countermeasures, including 

endoatmospheric decoys that were tested in 1995 and 1996.9

 There are indications that a conventionally armed variant of the 

DF-21—the DF-21C—has been underway since at least 1995. This 

system may adopt a terminal guidance package that uses on-board 

computers to correlate stored images with land marks and that 

theoretically could achieve a circular error probability (CEP)of 50 meters 

or better.10 Such a capability naturally would require a maneuverable 

reentry vehicle. The reentry speed of the DF-21C is likely to be fast 

enough to preclude engagement by lower-tier missile defense systems, 

such as the PAC-3. Equipped with a conventional warhead as large as 

1,500 kilograms, the DF-21C could force defenders on Taiwan to move 

toward mid-course or upper terminal phase missile defenses, such as the 

theater high Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system and sea-based midcourse interceptors. As many as two conventional DF-21 brigades could 

be in operation before 2010.11

 Because of its warhead size and the limited ability of lower tier missile 

defense systems to engage longer-range MRBMs, incorporation of a 

terminal guidance system could have significant military implications. 

The high reentry speed significantly reduces the footprint of the area that 

is defended by terminal interceptors, such the PAC-3. A high reentry 

speed, combined with a penetrator warhead, also could be effective 

against hardened targets, such as intelligence facilities and 

strategic/operational command centers. The DF-21C could also range 

U.S. bases in the region. In addition, a terminally guided system with 

a maneuvering payload could complicate the U.S. carrier operations in 

the western Pacific.12
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SRBMs. 

The deployment of the first conventional SRBM brigade opposite Taiwan 

in 1994 marked a significant departure from the traditional role and 

mission of the second Artillery. Conventionally armed SRBMs have become 

a key tool of PRC statecraft. The PRC’s expanding SRBM inventory is 

intended to deter or coerce neighbors such as Taiwan. Should Beijing 

resort to the use of force, conventionally armed ballistic missiles, 

operating jointly with the PLA Air Force and other armed services, 

could serve as critical enablers in gaining information dominance and air 

and naval superiority. Second Artillery conventional doctrine stresses 

surprise and disarming first strikes to gain the initiative in the opening 

phase of a conflict.13

 The second Artillery is said to be currently equipped with 350 

conventional SRBMs distributed among three brigades opposite Taiwan. 

One source indicates that during annual meetings at Beidaihe in August 

1999, China’s senior leadership decided to accelerate the production and 

deployment of enough ballistic missiles to outfit four SRBM brigades by 

2002.14 western sources believe the PLA may deploy as many as 650 SRBMs 

opposite Taiwan over the next several years, while Taiwan’s ministry of 

National Defense statements indicate that as many as 800 SRBMs could be 

deployed by 2006.15 These missiles would be distributed into as many as 

seven brigades in the 2005-2010 timeframe.16 Chinese writings indicate that 

after an initial salvo, launchers would move to new pre-surveyed launch 

sites within that brigade’s assigned area of operations.17 Should the 

PRC decide to use force, the PLA intends to carry out synchronized 

launches from a wide range of azimuths in order to stress active missile 

defenses and associated battle management systems.18

 To be politically and militarily effective, the PLA’s conventionally 

armed ballistic missiles must survive any attempt to intercept the missile 

in flight; and impact within a set radius that will damage the intended target. 

The PLA is seeking to maximize the lethal radius with more effective 
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warheads and minimize its CEP with improved guidance systems. Such a 

development strategy is intended to reduce the number of ballistic missiles 

required per target and perhaps minimize collateral damage. Until 

CEPs reach 50-100 meters, it is difficult to hit a single point. Therefore, the 

PLA would require expending a considerable number of missiles per 

each target. As a general rule, two ballistic missiles would be required for 

a 50 percent probability of hit if they have a 50 meter CEP; three with a 100 meter 

CEP; and nine with a 300 meter CEP. 

 In a future contingency in the Asia-Pacific region, PLA writings 

indicate intent to use highly accurate SRBMs, MRBMs, and land attack 

cruise missiles against U.S. assets, to include key bases in Japan and 

aircraft carriers operating in the western Pacific. Chinese researchers have 

conducted extensive feasibility studies of the use of theater ballistic 

missiles against aircraft carriers. Analysts have noted how such a capability 

would require four components: ocean surveillance; mid-course 

guidance; terminal guidance; and applicable control systems to maneuver 

the reentry vehicle to the target. Proponents advocate use of a global 

positioning system (GPS) for mid-course inertial corrections and the 

use of a millimeter wave seeker for terminal guidance.19 Aware of the 

vulnerability of millimeter wave seekers to jamming, PLA engineers are 

surveying electronic counter-countermeasure (ECCM) techniques to 

ensure effectiveness of terminally guided ballistic missiles.20 In 

addition to aircraft carriers, Chinese writings indicate other targets 

would include regional airbases, naval facilities, and key C4I and 

logistical nodes.21

DF-15 (CSS-6). 

The DF-15 is a solid-fueled, 600 kilometer SRBM. Manufactured by 

CALT, the DF-15’s payload reportedly has an attitude control mechanism 

that permits steering corrections from separation to impact.22 the 

detachable warhead offers a much smaller target than a surface-tosurface missile system (SCUD), and its potential maneuverability would 
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complicate missile defense radar tracking, computations, and 

interception. Assuming a nominal trajectory at a range of 500 kilometers, 

the DF-15 would reach an altitude of about 120 kilometers, achieve a 

reentry speed of about two kilometers per second, and have a flight time of 

only 6 or 7 minutes.23 Some reporting indicates the DF-15 currently has 

a 100-meter CEP.24 However, there are indications that the DF-15 has been 

flight tested to an accuracy of better than 50 meters.25

 To diversify its theater ballistic missile inventory, the PRC is said to 

be developing a 1,000 to 1,200 kilometer range version of the DF-15.26 

Strong incentives likely exist to develop an extended range version of 

the DF-15. An extended range DF-15 would significantly reduce the 

defended area or “footprint” of land-and sea-based lower tier missile 

defense systems due to its reentry speed. Deployment of a longer range 

DF-15 in Southeast China would eliminate the requirement to transport 

missile assets nearer Taiwan, permit the targeting of Okinawa from sites 

along the East China Sea, and, if mated with a terminally guided 

payload, potentially force carrier battle groups(CVBGs) operating east 

of Taiwan to move further away from the area of operations. 

DF-11 (CSS-7). 

The DF-11—better known by its export designator, the M-11 (CSS-7)—is 

a solid propellant, road-mobile SRBM with an estimated range of 300 km. 

The main advantage of the DF-11 over the DF-15 is its ability to carry a 

larger payload. Some sources credit the 300-kilometer version with an 

800-kilogram warhead and a 150-meter CEP.27 the DF-11 is manufactured by 

the CASC’s 066 Base, also known as the Sanjiang space Corporation, based 

in Hubei province. The DF-11’s 300-kilometer range presents 

challenges for active missile defenses due to its brief flight time of 3 

minutes. Because its flight would remain within the atmosphere, upper tier 

systems would be unable to engage the 300-kilometer DF-11.28

Deployment of a 600 kilometer extended range version of the DF-11, the DF11A (CSS-7 Mod 2), is reportedly underway as well.29
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U.S. MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAMS 

Beijing views U.S. plans for a limited missile defense capability as a 

threat to the viability of its growing inventory of increasingly accurate 

and lethal ballistic missiles. While U.S. missile defense programs are 

not necessarily driven by a perceived PRC threat, Beijing’s ballistic 

missile development and export of technologies to rogue states has 

increased regional interest in missile defenses. The key driver for U.S. 

investments in missile defenses is a potential missile attack by rogue 

nations such as North Korea, Iraq, or Iran. A limited national defense 

is also needed to defend against an accidental or unauthorized Russian or 

Chinese missile launch, which might involve only one or a few warheads. 

Ballistic missile defense requires layered, active defenses that can 

intercept ballistic missiles in all phases of their flight: (1) the boost phase, 

(2) mid-course phase, and (3) the terminal phase. 

Boost phase. 

Boost phase begins at launch and lasts up to 5 minutes for a primitive 

liquid-fuel ICBM or 3 minutes for solid fueled systems. Intercept during 

the boost phase engages the missile when it is at its most vulnerable stage 

of flight. Boost phase intercept enables destruction of the missile before it 

is able to deploy countermeasures and can reduce the number of 

targets that mid-course and terminal systems must engage. The key 

boost phase system under development is the Airborne Laser (ABL). 

Experimental space-based systems are under development as well. Chinese 

sources note that the ABL system, slated for initial demonstration as early as 

2003 and initial fielding in 2008, could be deployed to the theater of 

operations in a matter of hours. The PRC believes that at least one 

operational concept is for a pair of Boeing 747-400F ABL aircraft to orbit over 

friendly territory above the clouds at 40,000 feet, 90 kilometers off the 

enemy coast, scanning the horizon for the plume of missiles rising above 

enemy territory. With a maximum laser range of several hundred 
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kilometers and mission time of 12-18 hours, each aircraft carries enough 

fuel for 200 laser shots against missiles in the boost phase when the 

missile offers a bright, slow target under high aero dynamic stress.30

 The space Based Laser (SBL) flight experiment is a demonstration 

effort to explore the feasibility of destroying ballistic targets with a high 

powered laser. According to Chinese sources, at least one architecture 

under consideration includes 30 satellites, a constellation of five rings 

with six satellites each at 40 degree inclinations, and an altitude of 1,300 

kilometers. The 30 satellite constellation can counter more than a 100 

SRBMs in a 2-minute period. Such a system provides a 24-hour 

intercept capability and would neutralize ballistic missile strikes before 

implementation of countermeasures, to include early release 

submunitions and decoys. The Chinese note that the SBL also is highly 

effective against direct ascent anti-satellite systems. An experimental SBL 

could be tested early next decade.31 In addition, there are experiments 

underway that examine the feasibility of space based kinetic interceptors.32

Mid-Course. 

During the midcourse phase of flight, the warhead travels freely through 

space outside the atmosphere. For an ICBM, this stage lasts about 20 

minutes, making the mid-course the longest phase of missile flight. 

Engaging ballistic missiles in the mid-course phase offers several 

advantages for the defense. Mid-course intercept solutions offer greater 

time for higher level decisionmaking to be integrated in the command 

and control system. Multiple shoot-look-shoot opportunities become 

possible. Midcourse defenses may be based farther away from the 

country launching the missile, possibly reducing system vulnerability. 

There are at least two systems under development that will be able to 

engage missiles during the mid-course phase of flight: (1)land-based 

exoatmospheric kill vehicles to counter longer range ICBMs; and (2) a 

sea-based mid-course system to counter medium- and short-range 

ballistic missiles. 
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Land Based mid-Course. The Land Band mid-Course system is the 

principal mid-course intercept system for defense of the United States. 

Its mission is to intercept incoming ballistic missile warheads outside 

the earth’s atmosphere (exoatmospheric) and destroy them by force of the 

impact. During flight, the interceptor receives information from a battle 

management, command, control, and communications (BMC3) system to 

update the location of the incoming ballistic missile, enabling the kill 

vehicle’s onboard sensor system to identify and home in on the target. 

The land based interceptor would consist of a multi-stage solid 

propellant booster and an exoatmospheric kill vehicle (EKV). Three options 

are being examined for the booster: the Minuteman III ICBM; a 

combination of other existing solid-rocket systems; and an entirely 

new booster. Until booster development is complete, EKV flight tests will 

be flown on the Payload Launch Vehicle (PLV), which is a booster 

consisting of a Minuteman II second and third stage.33

 The EKV would use a highly capable infrared seeker to acquire and 

track targets, and to discriminate between the intended target (i.e., the 

reentry vehicle) and other objects, such as tank fragments or decoys. 

This enables the interceptor to be launched against a cluster of objects 

and subsequently identify and intercept the targeted reentry vehicle. 

The seeker will be able to discriminate penetration aids and warheads, 

though it would require assistance from ground-based radar systems or 

space-based sensors to address more complex and sophisticated targets. 

The EKV would receive one or more in-flight target updates from other 

ground and space-based sensors in order to enhance the probability of 

intercepting the target. Based on this data and its own sensors, the kill 

vehicle uses small on-board rockets to maneuver so as to collide with the 

target.34

 In a previous concept, an initial architecture for defense of all 50 

United States, known as “Capability 1” (C1), would have included 

deployment of 20 interceptors in the middle of Alaska.35 An additional 80 
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interceptors could be added (100 interceptors total) to form a “Capability 

2” (C-2) architecture.36 An even more advanced architecture (C-3) would 

have added and spread interceptors between two or more sites.37 Today, 

however, this growth plan is under review. The ultimate scope or 

architecture of a U.S. Missile defense system has yet to be determined and 

will be based on the existing or projected threat at the time a decision is 

made. 

Sea-Based mid-Course. The sea-Based mid-Course missile defense 

system builds upon the Navy theater wide (NTW) program and the 

cancelled Navy Area Defense program. Sea-Based mid-Course will 

use a hit-to-kill interceptor—the SM-3 Light Exo-Atmospheric Projectile—

instead of the proximity fused SM-2 Block IVA that was developed for 

the Navy Area Defense system until that program was cancelled in 

December 2001. The Sea-Based Mid-Course missile defense program is 

unique in that Aegis destroyers equipped with the SM-3 missile can 

patrol a large area to intercept ballistic missiles without the need to be 

collocated with the defended asset. The ships can be positioned 

forward of the defended area allowing for exoatmospheric mid-course 

or even ascent phase engagements after the missile departs the atmosphere. 

In doing so, a single Sea-Based Mid-Course platform can defend an 

area or footprint that is tens of thousands of square kilometers. Like 

the THAAD system and the GBI, the SM-3 interceptor is a hit-to-kill 

system that uses an infrared seeker and miniature thrusters. Due to 

speed limitations (4-5 km /sec), the SM-3 is intended to counter 

primarily medium range ballistic missiles. An initial NTW capability 

should be available by the 2005-2010 timeframe.38

Lower Tier. 

Lower tier missile defense systems intercept ballistic missiles in the 

terminal phase of flight, within the atmosphere at an altitude below 100 

kilometers, during the last 1 or 2 minutes of flight, depending upon the range 

of the missile. The warhead, along with any decoys or chaff, reenters the 
121

atmosphere. Aerodynamic drag then produces different behavior for light 

as opposed to heavy objects. Decoys decelerate significantly and may 

burn up, but the warhead does neither. Thus at reentry the defense can 

discriminate the warhead. At least two lower tier systems are intended to 

counter short range threats during the terminal stage of flight: 1) 

THAAD; and 2) the PAC-3 missile.39

THAAD. The THAAD system will be able to engage longer range 

theater ballistic missile threats (i.e., less than 3,500 kilometers) during the 

upper terminal phases of flight. As an essential component of a family of 

systems, THAAD can reduce the number of missiles that other 

terminal defense systems must engage. Using hit-to-kill technology to 

destroy its target, THAAD can operate autonomously, but is required to 

be interoperable with other lower tier defenses and external sensors. 

An important feature of the THAAD weapon system is its shoot-lookshoot capability. Kill assessment will determine if a warhead is destroyed, 

and, if necessary, a second interceptor should be launched. The THAAD 

system uses a mobile X-band ground based radar with a detection range of 

up to 1,000 kilometers. The interceptor uses a staring infrared seeker 

assembly, including an indium-antimonide focal plane array; cryogenic 

cooler assembly; signal processing electronics; and an electro-optical 

telescope. THAAD will operate in the upper tier to 150 km and in the 

intermediate tier down to around 40 km.40 Chinese sources estimate the 

THAAD probability of kill against a 3,500-kilometer ballistic missile 

using a single interceptor at 85 percent, and 97.7 percent if two 

interceptors are used.41

 The ultimate plan is to equip two THAAD battalions to support two 

major regional conflicts. Each THAAD battalion includes four 

subordinate fire units each with a Battle management Command, Control, 

Communications, and Intelligence (BMC3I) element, one radar, nine 

launchers and 144 missiles. Design parameters call for each THAAD 

system to be transportable by land, rail or road, sea and air (by C-141 or 

larger aircraft).42 The May 1999 DoD Report to Congress on TMD 
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Architecture Options in the Asia-Pacific Region notes that only one 

THAAD fire unit would be needed to provide complete coverage of 

Taiwan. 

PATRIOT Advanced Capability 3 (PAC-3). The missile defense system 

slated for nearest term deployment is the PAC-3 missile. Scheduled for 

introduction before the end of 2001, many in the Asia-Pacific region, 

including Taiwan, are expected to procure the PAC-3 missile over the 

next several years.43 Taiwan currently is equipped with PAC-3 ground 

systems (radar, trucks, command and control) and the Guidance 

Enhanced Missile (GEM), which has some missile defense capability.44

Procurement of the PAC-3 missile will complete the PAC-3 Growth plan 

that began with the initial deployment of PAC-3 ground equipment in 1997. 

One prominent Taiwan journal, Defense Technology, posits that Taiwan 

eventually may procure enough PAC-3 missiles and additional PAC-3 

ground equipment to outfit between 9 to 12 fire units.45 The PAC-3 is a 

much more capable derivative of the GEM system in terms of both 

coverage and lethality. The PAC-3 has a new interceptor missile with a 

different kill mechanism—rather than having an exploding warhead, it is 

a hit-to-kill system. The PAC-3 missile is an evolutionary outgrowth of the 

Extended Range Interceptor (ERINT). The canister is the same size as a GEM 

canister, but contains four missiles and tubes instead of a single 

round. Selected Patriot launching stations will be modified to accept 

PAC-3 canisters. Each launcher may be loaded with four GEM Rounds or 16 

PAC-3 missile rounds if the launchers are modified to accommodate the 

PAC-3 missile.46

 PLA affiliated sources assert the PATRIOT GEM (PAC-2+) will only 

be able to intercept 10-20 percent of incoming missiles. Taiwan sources 

claim that two GEM interceptors will have an 80 percent success rate 

against PLA short range ballistic missiles.47 with the PATRIOTs only 

deployed around Taipei, other critical targets around the island are 

unprotected. There are indications, however, that the military intends to 

provide some coverage for Taichung and Kaohsiung.48
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Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence. 

Missile defense systems are reliant upon a steady stream of space- and 

ground-based command, control, communications, and intelligence 

systems. Current and future sensors include: (1) Defense Support 

Program satellites; (2) Space-Based Infrared System-High; (3) SpaceBased Infrared System-Low; (4) Upgraded Early warning Radars; and (5) 

X-B and Radars. 

Defense Support Program Satellites. The U.S. existing missile defenses 

rely on Defense Support Program (DSP) satellites and 1970s vintage radar 

systems for early warning purposes. The U.S. DSP satellites can detect 

a launch 50-60 seconds after launch and then relay warning information 

about 90 seconds after launch. In clear weather, these satellites can detect 

a missile launch within 10 seconds of launch. Cueing a ground based 

radar from space based sensor data can greatly reduce the airspace that 

must be searched to find the theater missiles. Such data can cue ballistic 

missile defense assets to search a specific area, allowing radar acquisition 

at the maximum range.49

Space Based Infrared System-High (SBIRS-High). The SBIRS-High satellites 

will begin to augment the DSP satellites as early as 2002. The first 

SBIRS-High will be placed into a highly elliptical orbit for coverage of 

polar regions. Of the seven satellites being procured, four will be placed 

into geosynchronous orbit above the equator and the other two will be in the 

highly elliptical orbits. SBIRS-High offers numerous advantages over the 

DSP system. It will have a revisit rate of once every few seconds thus 

enabling establishment of a track on the missile flight based on more 

numerous plots of the missile’s location. The SBIRS system will have a larger 

focal plane array, providing a launch point prediction of less than one 

kilometer. The system also will provide continuous coverage of the polar 

regions. SBIRS-High will have a “stare” capability that will allow them to 

continuously observe a designated sector of the earth. This technology 
124

can be particularly useful in countering fast burn boosters that limit the 

time available to determine the missile’s flight path.50

Space-Based Infrared System-Low (SBIRS-Low). An outgrowth of the SDI, 

SBIRS-Low will provide precise mid-course missile tracking and target 

discrimination. The SBIRS-Low program is a low earth orbit satellite 

constellation that could observe the deployment of reentry vehicles and 

penetration aids immediately following burnout of the booster. Projected 

for initial deployment during the latter part of the decade, 24 SBIRS-Low 

satellites, operating in a low earth orbit of about 1000 kilometers, will be 

equipped with two independent sensors. First is an optical system that can 

track the booster and reentry vehicle throughout all phases of flight. The 

second are infrared sensors that can detect heat signatures in various 

portions of the frequency spectrum—shortwave infrared that can detect 

targets in the boost phase; and medium and long wave infrared that are 

able to detect reentry vehicles in the mid-course phase of flight. Once a 

target is acquired, information on the target will be forwarded to a 

telescope that would be able to track the missile after booster 

burnout.51

 Because penetration aids deploy differently than reentry vehicles, it 

is easier to identify those objects that must be attacked if the deployment is 

observed. SBIRS-Low will also be able to provide missile defense operators 

with sufficient tracking data to enable interceptors to be launched soon 

after booster burn-out and well before the early warning radar detects 

the incoming reentry vehicles. SBIRS-Low offers first generation 

processing capabilities to interpret a target object map that was derived from 

another infrared sensor rather than a radar.52

 SBIRS-Low is considered to be a critical factor in any future decision to 

adapt the AEGIS-based mid-course interceptors for use against longer 

range ICBMs. AEGIS radar—the SPY-1D—has limitations that prohibit it 

from being used in an autonomous mode. For example, its range is 

limited to approximately 500 kilometers, depending on the size of the 
125

target and the frequency at which it operates (S-Band: 2-4 GHZ). The SPY1D does not provide as much resolution as the X-B and radar system. 

AEGIS requires some type of external cueing to engage an ICBM in 

mid-course.53

Upgraded Early warning Radars. The current U.S. early warning 

network relies on ultra-high frequency (UHF) radars (430 MHZ range), as 

well as one L-Band radar based in Shemya, Alaska. These systems were 

designed to provide warning of an incoming attack, permitting 

sufficient time to launch our bomber force and facilitate movement of 

key government officials. They were not designed to supply fire 

control quality data of sufficient precision to guide interceptors and 

discriminate individual objects within an incoming target array.54

However, the United States intends to upgrade existing radars in order to 

provide more precise and timely data that can be used to anticipate a 

future intercept area. This will allow an interceptor to be launched and 

begin its flight—the earlier the fly out, the larger the defended area or 

footprint. These Upgraded Early warning Radars (UEWRs) would be able to 

discriminate between dozens or hundreds of objects that could be in a 

target cluster and eliminate objects that do not fit the characteristics of a 

reentry vehicle.55

X-Band Radars. While UEWR systems will provide a greater degree 

of accuracy, they still will not be able to provide the detailed data 

needed to discriminate the right objects in a target array that must be 

destroyed in flight. The degree of precision requires a radar that operates in 

the X-B and (8-12 et array, including calculating the amount of nose 

wobble motion that would be characteristic of a reentry vehicle, 

measuring the diameter and length of objects within the target array, as 

well as the spin rate, velocity, and position of objects.56 Because X-B and 

radar systems will operate within a fairly broad band width, they are 

considered difficult to jam.57

 One concept is for one X-B and radar to be deployed to Alaska. 
126

However, a single radar based at this location likely will not be able to 

provide radar coverage of all potential threats to the United States. 

Additional radar systems would be needed. X-B and radar systems should 

be able to detect an incoming target array at a range of about 4,000 

kilometers, although discrimination will not be possible until the target 

array is at a distance of around 2000 kilometers. 

CHINESE RESPONSES 

From Beijing’s perspective, U.S. ballistic missile defense programs 

threaten to undercut the political and military utility of the PRC’s 

growing inventory of strategic and conventional ballistic missiles. The 

PRC places a premium on ensuring its ballistic missile force would be 

able to penetrate any future missile defense architecture. Defense 

industry analysts are examining a range of sophisticated missile 

defense countermeasures in order to reduce the effectiveness of active 

missile defense systems. PRC collection of information that would support 

development of effective missile defense countermeasures has a relatively 

high priority. With a limited force consisting of only a couple dozen ICBMs, 

Chinese analysts believe that even a limited American missile defense system 

with 20 interceptors (i.e., the previous “C1” architecture) could reduce 

or negate China’s minimal nuclear deterrent. PRC military planners have 

been contemplating a worst-case scenario in which the U.S. could launch a 

first-strike destroying most of the Chinese ICBMs on the ground because 

these missiles require several hours to fuel, arm, and launch. In the 

aftermath, a limited U.S. Missile defense system could engage the 

remnants of China’s second-strike missile force.58

Background 

Beijing’s interest in countering ballistic missile defenses dates back to 

the 1960s. In response to U.S. Missile defense programs in the 1960s, Beijing 

began to examine means to ensure the viability of its incipient missile force, 

and, at the same time, develop the basic technologies that would be needed 
127

to field an indigenous strategic missile defense system. This effort, 

known as the 640 Program, was cancelled in the 1970s.59

 Interest in missile defense countermeasures reemerged in the wake of 

President Ronald Reagan’s march 1983 SDI. The Chinese ministry of 

foreign Affairs drafted an initial study to assess the implications of SDI 

in 1984. In late 1984 or early 1985, the central leadership tasked several 

ministries and research institutes to develop a detailed examination of 

the SDI and its implications for China. During 1985, the defense 

industrial complex sponsored a series of conferences on SDI, and a 

consensus was developed that Soviet and U.S. development of ballistic 

missile defense systems had significant implications for China’s nuclear 

deterrent. By 1986, Chinese experts generally agreed there were three 

potential responses: expansion of offensive forces; development of 

technical countermeasures, such as hardening and spinning of ballistic 

missiles, to penetrate missile defense systems; and deployment of antisatellite (ASAT) weapons to destroy space-based systems.60

 The Commission of Science, Technology, and Industry for National 

Defense (COSTIND) played a key role in formulating Beijing’s 

response to the “global technical revolution” prompted by the U.S. Missile 

defense initiative. In September 1984, COSTIND delivered a proposal to the 

Central Military Commission (CMC) suggesting that relevant PLA 

branches develop defense science and technology game plans out to the 

year 2000. Working in conjunction with the State Council, COSTIND 

formulated a defense technology strategy that focused on key 

technologies and presented it at a November 1985 meeting with the CMC 

leadership. Afterwards, in February 1986, COSTIND, with CMC support, 

commissioned a long term development program that included the 

formation of 18 study groups to focus on designated critical technologies.61

 However, some within the defense S&T community believed 

COSTIND’s plan was not sufficient to meet the technical challenges 

posed by U.S. Missile defense programs. In March 1986, four of China’s 
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most prominent defense engineers presented a petition to the Central 

Committee calling for establishment of a “High technology Research and 

Development plan Outline.” The plan, referred to as the 863 Program, 

was implemented in parallel to COSTIND’s Long Range plan to Year 

2000 and was jointly managed by COSTIND and the State Science and 

Technology Commission. The 863 program, still a guide and funding 

source for numerous preliminary R&D projects, focuses on some of the 

same technologies included in the SDI and Europe’s answer to SDI, the 

Eureka program, including space systems, high powered lasers, 

microelectronics, and automated control systems.62

Technical. 

With studies and research conducted in the 1980s providing the 

foundation, Beijing has embarked upon a far-reaching and multifaceted program to ensure the viability of its ballistic missile force. 

These programs include technical countermeasures, an expansion of 

its missile force, as well as asymmetrical measures, such as anti-satellite 

operations. The PRC is investing significant resources into countering 

missile defense through the development of technical penetration aids. 

Contemporary Chinese literature on technical countermeasures is focused 

on “two categories and eight major penetration technologies” 

(liangdalei, badatufang jishu): these include countersurveillance (electronic 

countermeasures, stealth, decoys, and fast burn motors) and 

counterintercept (multiple warheads, maneuvering reentry vehicles, 

hardening, and saturation). 

Countersurveillance. One technical strategy is focused on denying 

U.S. sensors the ability to properly detect and discriminate ballistic missiles 

and their payloads. Chinese research and development into 

countersurveillance (fanzhencha) systems is centered on four areas: 1) 

electronic countermeasures; 2) stealth; 3) decoys; and 4) fast burn 

motors. 
129

 1. Electronic Countermeasures. From China’s perspective, passive 

and active electronic countermeasures are a fundamental yet effective 

means of ensuring ballistic missiles are able to reach their targets. Chinese 

literature cites use of passive electronic countermeasures, such as chaff, to 

confuse enemy radar systems, such as the X-B and UEWR systems. 

Chinese testing has demonstrated that ballistic missiles can carry a 

significant amount of chaff that can affect a large volume of space. 

Development is focused in part on production of metallic strips that are 1.5 

centimeters in length that can target radar systems that operate at 10 GHZ 

(i.e., X-band radars).63

 Research also is underway on radio frequency and infrared 

countermeasures. CASC has conducted tests on active jammers that can 

broadcast a signal designed to interfere with a radar’s ability to detect the 

target object or corrupt the signal in such a way as to cause the radar to 

receive a false echo.64 National University of Defense Technology 

analysts have examined electronic countermeasure packages on board 

theater ballistic missiles as a means to counter millimeter wave amplifiers 

used on the PAC-3 missile and infrared seekers on GBI, THAAD, and 

Sea-Based mid-Course interceptors.65 The PRC also is investing 

significantly into ground and air based jammers that could effect radar 

systems supporting missile defenses deployed around its periphery.66

 2. Stealth. In addition to active and passive electronic 

countermeasures, PRC engineers are working to reduce the ability of 

early warning and tracking radar systems to detect ballistic missiles in 

the mid-course and terminal phase of their flight. The intent is to 

decrease available reaction time and thus reduce the probability of kill 

and footprint of missile defense systems. One of the most effective and 

readily implemented countermeasures is to reduce the radar cross 

section (RCS) of the reentry vehicle. CASC designers already have taken 

simple steps, such as shaping their reentry vehicles by bringing the nose 

to a sharp point and rounding the backed GES. The DF-11 and the DF-15 

have shaped warheads that separate from the remainder of the missile 
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body. Chinese researchers also have experimented with complex reentry 

vehicle surfaces that use radar absorbent materials that can counter X-band 

radar systems used by THAAD and the GBI. Engineers have taken note 

of an advanced Russian stealth technology, a plasma (denglizi) coating 

that does not affect flight dynamics and can significantly reduce the 

ability of radar systems to detect the reentry vehicle.67

 PRC missile engineers also are lowering the infrared signature of their 

reentry vehicles. Engineers have analyzed in detail the types of infrared 

focal plane arrays that are intended for use on the land- and sea-based 

mid-course systems and THAAD.68 Experiments have been conducted using 

“coldscreen” (lengpeng) technology that thermally shrouds the reentry 

vehicle. An aluminum alloy is used to encase the warhead and liquid 

nitrogen is placed in between the aluminum shell and the warhead. In 

one experiment, engineers noted that systems, such as the Land- and 

Sea-Based mid-Course and THAAD, normally could acquire a reentry 

vehicle with a five micron infrared signature at a range of 3,000 kilometers. 

Equipped with the cold screen, detection range of the reentry vehicle 

would be reduced to three meters.69

 3. Decoys. Chinese engineers note two basic decoy (you’er) 

measures: 1) saturation; and 2) deception. Saturation (baohe) measures 

include the use of metallic balloons or other objects that simulate the 

reentry vehicle in the mid-course or terminal phase of flight. Engineers 

highlight the relative ease of this technology as well as its low cost. In 1995 

and 1996, the Chinese allegedly tested DF-21 endoatmospheric decoys.70 

Deception measures under evaluation include electronic decoys or 

transponder jammers that transmit a radar return similar to that of the true 

reentry vehicle.71

 4. Fast-Burn motors. Chinese engineers have demonstrated concern 

over potential deployment of U.S. airborne and space-based lasers. Another 

method under consideration as an explicit countermeasure to boost phase 

interceptors is a fastburn booster (suran zhutui) for China’s next 
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generation of solid fueled strategic ballistic missiles. Chinese engineers 

caution designers about potential quality control problems related to 

stage separation and accuracy, and suggest this technology should be 

divided into three stages based on the pace of foreign missile defense 

developments.72

Boost Phase Maneuvering. One other countermeasure that Chinese 

observers have noted is a boost phase maneuver designed to fool U.S. DSP 

satellites. By changing directions during the ascent phase of flight, the 

ballistic missile can complicate the defense’s efforts to predict its flight 

trajectory. While no hard evidence exists that the Chinese have an active 

program to develop a boost phase maneuver, there is potential for 

cooperation between Russia and PRC missile engineers on technology 

used on the Russian Topol-M program (SS-27).73

Counterintercept (fanlanzai). 

The second major category of countermeasures seeks to deny missile 

defense interceptors the ability to properly engage their targets. These 

include: (1) multiple warheads, (2) maneuvering reentry vehicles, and 

(3) hardening/spinning of ballistic missiles. 

 1. Multiple Warheads. China has had the capability to develop and 

deploy a multiple reentry vehicle system for many years, including a 

MIRV system. As of January 1996, CALT was in the midst of developing 

multiple warhead payloads, each with its own guidance system and 

maneuvering capability.74 Research and development on multiple 

independent reentry vehicles (MIRVs) was initiated as early as 1970. 

Technical difficulties, however, stalled the program. CALT renewed 

research and development in 1983, shortly after the SDI announcement in 

March 1983. The DF-5A, able to strike targets throughout the United 

States, was the designated recipient of the MIRVs, although there is no 

evidence to date that they have been deployed. The U.S. intelligence 

community assesses that China could develop a multiple RV system for the 
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DF-5 ICBM in a few years. Chinese pursuit of a multiple RV capability for its 

mobile ICBMs and SLBMs would encounter significant technical hurdles 

and would be costly.75

 Critical to this effort is the miniaturization of warheads, a possible 

objective of tests at Lop Nur over the last few years.76 According to 

Chinese missile designers, real and decoy warheads can be mixed using 

multiple warhead technology. Real warheads can be coated with radar 

absorbing materials in order to weaken radar returns and reduce the 

ability of interceptors to discriminate real from decoy warheads.77

 2. Maneuvering Reentry Vehicles. CALT also is developing 

maneuverable reentry vehicles in order to complicate missile defense 

tracking. Missile designers believe maneuvering is not only a means to 

complicate ballistic missile defenses, but is essential for terminal 

guidance packages. While vehicles can maneuver at any time during 

flight, Chinese engineers see most utility in programming a reentry 

vehicle to maneuver in its terminal phase, 20-30 seconds before striking its 

target. A reentry vehicle traveling a notional range of 10,000 kilometers has 

the ability to maneuver within a lateral range of 556-900 kilometers. 

Another maneuvering option discussed is to send the warhead up to a 

higher altitude after separation from the missile, slowly descending in a 

glide for a very long distance, and then finally dive toward the target. 

Missile designers have demonstrated a special interest in the speed control 

maneuver used in the 1,800-kilometer range Pershing-II.78 Chinese 

engineers are addressing problems associated with maintaining accuracy 

after exoatmospheric maneuvering.79 Through modeling and simulation, 

CASC has determined that maneuvering is a viable means to reduce 

land-based lower tier missile defense systems’ probability of kill.80

China allegedly acquired PATRIOT technology to calibrate an auxiliary 

propulsion system on the DF-15 reentry vehicle to enable the payload 

to outmaneuver a PATRIOT system as it reenters the atmosphere.81 After 

computer simulations and modeling exercises, CALT is confident that its 

maneuverable theater ballistic missile reentry vehicles can defeat 
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opposing PATRIOT systems.82

 3. Hardening. Looking ahead to the potential deployment of boost 

phase intercept systems, such as the airborne laser (ABL), CASC analysts 

are examining ballistic missile spinning and hardening. spinning their 

ballistic missiles is intended to prevent concentration of a high powered 

laser on a singles pot.83 Chinese engineers are developing a coating for 

ballistic missiles that could complicate use of high power lasers. Using 

their own indigenously developed high powered lasers, Chinese 

institutes have tested various coating materials to protect the outer shell of 

ballistic missiles, a process known as laser cladding (jiguang rongfu). 

Laser cladding, together with the spinning of theater ballistic missiles, may 

not make ballistic missiles immune to boost phase missile defense systems 

but could increase required lasing time, thus reducing the number of 

laser shots available per ABL mission.84

OTHER. 

In addition to the techniques described above, a range of other technical 

and operational countermeasures also are under consideration. These 

include: (1) trajectory techniques, (2) longer range development of nonnuclear electromagnetic pulse warheads, (3) indigenous missile defense 

development, (4) anti-satellite (ASAT) development, and (5) multi-axis 

strikes. 

 1. Trajectory Techniques. The type of trajectory Second Artillery 

engineers select can affect the ability to penetrate missile defense 

systems. Types of trajectories include: (1) fractional orbital 

bombardment system, (2) depressed trajectories, and (3) lofted 

trajectories. China conducted a feasibility study on a fractional orbital 

bombardment system (FOBS) in 1966. This system launches a missile into 

very low orbit, approximately 160 kilometers above earth. Before 

completion of the first orbit, a retro-rocket reduces the speed of the 

warhead, which hits the target with only a few minutes warning. Chinese 
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engineers explored the potential of launching a missile to a 

predesignated point over Antarctica as a means to penetrate the weakest 

point in the U.S. Warning network.85 Still viewing a FOBS as an 

alternative, Chinese designers continue feasibility studies on fractional 

orbiting missiles (bufen guidao daodan).86

Chinese analysts view depressed trajectories (yadi guidao) as another 

option to counter space-based and mid-course missile defense systems. 

Chinese engineers note that ICBMs often reach altitudes of 2,000 

kilometers on a normal trajectory. However, launching a missile at a 

depressed trajectory could allow the missile to achieve only a 100 

kilometer altitude, complicating the ability of some space-based systems to 

engage the ballistic missile. Testing and modeling has been done on the 

DF-3, which normally has a range of 2,780 km and an altitude of 550 km 

when flying a nominal trajectory. With depressed trajectory, the DF-3 

travels 1,550 km at 100 km altitude.87

 Lofted trajectories (tagao dandao) are another option that Chinese 

missileers may consider. A longer range ballistic missile does not 

necessarily mean the missile will be used at its maxim umeffective 

range. A longer range system, fired on a lofted trajectory, can also 

serve as a technical countermeasure to missile defenses. Lofted 

trajectories can increase reentry speed, thereby complicating intercept 

solutions for terminal defense systems or reducing the footprint or 

defended area.88

 2. EMP warheads. PRC engineers also are conducting feasibility studies 

on electromagnetic pulse weapons (EMP) to overcome defenses. EMP 

systems, such as a high powered microwave (HPM) warhead, could negate 

space or ground-based sensors that support a missile defense 

architecture. PLA writings indicate that fielding of an EMP warhead is a 

relatively high priority. HPM devices in particular are viewed as a 

“natural enemy” of more technologically advanced militaries and an 

“electronic trump card” (dianzi shashou).89 Due to challenges related to 
135

weaponizing a device with enough power, a first generation Chinese HPM 

warhead likely would only be effective against radiating targets within 

the immediate area of impact. Radar systems and communications centers 

would be the prime candidates. As the technology progresses, however, 

HPM warheads could achieve wider effects.90 The developers of the DF-11 

SRBM—the 066 Base—have demonstrated the most interest in HPM 

warheads.91

 In addition to non-nuclear EMP weapons, Taiwan observers are 

concerned about the potential use of high altitude EMP (HEMP) bursts 

that use an actual nuclear device. Such a device, detonated at an altitude 

of 40 kilometers, would avoid casualties on the ground, yet would have 

significant effects on the island’s electronic systems. The solution, 

according to Taiwan analysts, are missile defenses, such as the seabased mid-course, that can engage the ballistic missile in its ascent 

phase and before detonation.92

 3. Missile Defense. Beijing has an indigenous missile defense 

development program intended to ensure that at least a portion of its 

inventory could survive a first strike. China’s research on missile 

defenses dates back to the 1960s. Under the 640 Program, the space 

and missile industry’s Second Academy, traditionally responsible for 

SAM development, set out to field a missile defense system, consisting of a 

kinetic kill vehicle, high powered laser, space early warning, and target 

discrimination system components. While this program was abandoned 

in 1980, engineers associated with this effort are still active. 

Preliminary research on missile defenses was resumed in the 1980s, at 

least partly funded under the 863 Program.93

 The CASC Second Academy and the Shanghai Academy of space flight 

Technology are playing a leading role in missile defense research. 

Western reporting and Chinese technical journals indicate that the 

Central Military Commission has approved funding for a 10-year 

developmental program for a missile defense system, to include 
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satellites for missile launch warning. The PLA Air Force and CASC 

advocate a 15-year, three-phase approach to missile defense. The first step is 

to field a “Patriot-like” system, such as the HQ-9, followed by research 

and development on an extended range interceptor modeled on the PAC-3 

missile; and basic conceptual research on a THAAD-like mid-course 

intercept system.94

 Chinese engineers are focused on development of infrared and 

radio-frequency seekers that could engage both medium and shortrange ballistic missiles. Engineers are developing short and medium wave 

infrared band (3-12 microns) focal plane arrays that would be able to 

engage reentry vehicles during the mid-course phase of their flight path.95 In 

addition to infrared seekers that could be used to counter medium and 

short range ballistic missiles, the PRC has stepped up research into 

millimeter wave (KA-band) amplifiers similar to those used on the PAC-3 

missile. In fact, a special state laboratory on millimeter wave research was 

established in Nanjing to help achieve technological breakthroughs.96 One 

conceptual design for a lower tier missile defense interceptor adopts an 

integrated millimeter wave and infrared seeker assembly.97

 There also are indications that Chinese aerospace engineers are 

examining the feasibility of space-based early warning. Technical writings 

indicate the space industry is working to master specific technologies 

associated with missile early warning satellites. The second Artillery has 

conducted modeling and simulation of alternative early warning 

architectures.98 China has a well-established technology base in infrared 

sensors, which, when placed on satellites, can detect a missile almost 

immediately after launch by detecting the infrared radiation from its 

engine or motor plume.99 In a potentially related program, the China 

Academy of Space Technology is developing a satellite bus for an infrared 

telescope, which, according to design outlines, will be placed in a 

geosychronous orbit shortly after the turn of the century.100

 4. Counterspace. Negating U.S. space systems is another approach to 
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countering missile defenses. Chinese research and development on antisatellite technologies has been underway since the 1960s. Technical 

literature suggests that a direct ascent ASAT program is underway involving 

an assessment of various design proposals for seekers and propulsion 

systems. As part of a missile defense countermeasure program, ASAT 

operations would be directed against satellites in low earth orbit, such 

as the SBIRS-Low system or against the SBIRS-High satellites in highly 

elliptical orbits. Technical papers demonstrate some of the greatest obstacles 

in developing an active counterspace capability are with development of 

a kill vehicle and associated terminal guidance. Modeling has been 

carried out on infrared, radar, and impulse radar terminal guidance 

systems.101 Harbin Institute of Technology and Beijing University of 

Astronautics and Aeronautics, for example, have carried out modeling 

and simulation of various space intercept control and terminal guidance 

systems. One concept introduces several small solid motors for orbital 

control stabilization.102 There also have been unconfirmed reports that the 

China Academy of Space Technology (CAST) is developing nanometersized “parasitic satellites” that could function in an ASAT mode.103

 Engineers have conducted studies to counter satellite decoys as 

well.104 The PRC has stepped up its efforts to distinguish decoys from 

real satellites. One study, carried out by the National University of 

Defense Technology, determined that this problem could be solved through 

use of at least three ground stations using infrared sensors and neural 

networks.105 China’s existing space tracking network can detect and track 

most satellites with sufficient accuracy for targeting purposes.106

 China’s desire to field a direct ascent ASAT asset may be affiliated with 

a program intended to support the launch of small satellite 

constellations. A small solid fueled launch vehicle, most likely a 

derivative of the DF-21, will be able to place small payloads in orbit at a time 

and place of Beijing’s choosing. China intends to field these mobile, solid 

fueled launch vehicles by 2005. Reduced size and complexity allows 

for faster manufacturing time and production in significant 
138

numbers.107 Chinese engineers are conducting conceptual studies on a 

space based satellite tracking system that would serve as a potentially 

important component of any ASAT system.108

 Beijing also is investing in the development of high powered lasers 

that, under certain conditions, could affect optical components of 

satellite systems, such SBIRS-Low. The 1998 Report to Congress on PRC 

military Capabilities (pursuant to Section 1226 of the FY98 National 

Defense Authorization Act) states “China already may possess the 

capability to damage, under specific conditions, optical sensors on 

satellites that are very vulnerable to damage by lasers. However, given 

China’s current interest in laser technology, it is reasonable to assume 

that Beijing would develop a weapon that could destroy satellites in 

the future.”109

 

 5. Multi-Axis Strikes. In addition to technical countermeasures, the 

PLA is examining operational methodologies intended to penetrate U.S., 

allied, or friendly missile defense systems. The second Artillery and China’s 

space and missile industry have conducted modeling and simulation to 

test China’s ability to break through the wide range of projected U.S. 

Missile defense deployments. Modeling has been carried out that 

involves various combinations of surface-to-surface, air-to-surface, 

sea-to surface, air-to-air and naval air defense missile systems.110 

Among the most important are synchronized, multi-axis strikes as a 

fundamental principle of Second Artillery conventional doctrine 

(duodian, duofangxiang, tongshi tuji). Associated are deception and 

timing measures that could ensure penetration of at least a large 

portion of a salvo. These involve coordinated launches from different 

launch azimuths and use of infrared “disruption” to confuse DSP 

satellites and complicate enemy attack operations. Another 

methodology includes closely spaced salvos that could take advantage of 

reload time. Launches from different azimuths, combined with use of 

infrared radiation “disruption,” could confuse enemy satellite early 
139

warning systems and complicate enemy attack operations. Another 

concept involves the use of two strike waves, the first “screening” the 

second exhausting missile defenses, before they have time to reload.111

Anti-Radiation missile Development. An asymmetrical approach to 

countering missile defenses includes attacking critical nodes within the 

missile defense system, particularly radar systems. The PRC is 

acquiring and/or developing an anti-radiation missile (ARM), such as 

the Russian KH-31P, that is intended to negate early warning and fire 

control radar systems that are able to detect and/or track ballistic missiles 

during various phases of flight.112 There are persistent rumors of PLA 

procurement or joint production arrangement on the KH-31P, which 

Chinese engineers note was specifically developed to counter the 

PATRIOT’s MPQ-5 3 radar, and AEGIS SPY-1D phased array radar. 

China’s defense industrial complex, specifically the Third Academy 

with support from the Harbin Institute of Technology, is aggressively 

pursuing deployment of a long range anti-radiation missile.113

Foreign Cooperation on missile Defense Countermeasures. 

There are indications of Russian space Agency assistance in Chinese 

development of ballistic missile defense countermeasures, perhaps 

dating back to the mid-1990s or earlier. Cooperation between China and 

Russia in the field of space and missiles was formalized into a series of 

agreements between CASC and the Russian space agencies when 

representatives from Chinese and Soviet space industries signed an 

initial agreement in Moscow in May 1990 on 10 cooperative 

projects.114 The relationship was solidified when CASC and the Russian 

Space Agency signed an official protocol for the sharing of space 

technology in 1992. This agreement was raised again as a deliverable during 

President Yeltsin’s visit to Beijing, but only after the two countries signed a 

no-first-use pledge. A follow-on agreement was signed by Chinese and 

Russian space officials. The agreement included ten areas of 

cooperation, including satellite navigation, space surveillance, 
140

propulsion, satellite communications, joint design efforts, materials, 

intelligence sharing, scientific personnel exchanges, and space systems 

testing. Chinese sources indicate cooperation also included countering 

U.S. missile defense programs.115 

CONCLUSIONS 

The United States has expressed its intent to develop defenses 

capable of defending against limited missile attacks from a rogue state 

or from an accidental or unauthorized launch. U.S. Missile defense 

engineers are developing layered defenses, capable of intercepting 

missiles of any range at every stage of flight: boost, mid-course, and 

terminal. Layered defenses would permit reductions in nuclear forces, 

thus contributing to strategic stability. These defenses will be introduced 

incrementally, deploying capabilities as the technology matures and then 

adding new capabilities over time. 

 Since research on missile defenses began in the 1980s, Beijing has 

been concerned about the potential undermining of their limited 

nuclear deterrence, and, more recently, their ability to deter and coerce 

neighbors such as Taiwan. To ensure the viability of its nuclear deterrent 

and for its expanding inventory of conventional SRBMs and MRBMs, 

Beijing has implemented numerous measures to counter U.S. missile 

defense programs. These measures are targeted against sensors that 

support missile defenses and against missile defense interceptors 

themselves. Other initiatives include ASAT development as well as an 

indigenous missile defense program that could ensure some modicum of 

assured retaliation. A number of conclusions can be drawn from the 

range of measures underway to undermine U.S. missile defense 

programs. 

China’s Countermeasure Challenge. 

Chinese research and development of missile defense countermeasures 
141

is extensive and appears relatively sophisticated. However, 

countermeasures introduce an added element of complexity into an 

already complex system. Despite significant investment, PRC 

countermeasures on longer-range ballistic missiles are unlikely to 

keep pace with U.S. Technology. With more than 30 years experience, the 

United States is the world’s leader in countermeasure technology. Such 

expertise naturally is integrated into countering penetration aids. 

Chinese engineers will face challenges as they attempt to put into 

practice many of the concepts described above. Countermeasures can 

be time consuming, and can reduce available space and weight. As a 

result, penetration aids could lower performance (i.e., range and 

accuracy) or force a reduction in payload (i.e., a trade off between a 

decoy or a MIRV). 

 Simple countermeasures, such as chaff and employment of a limited 

number of decoys, likely already have been incorporated into some 

missiles, such as the DF-21 MRBM. Integration of more sophisticated 

countermeasures, however, such as balloon decoys, fast burn motors, 

and boost phase maneuvering are likely to be many years away. Russian 

technical assistance may hasten their timeline. Regardless, as new 

countermeasures come online over the next 10 years, the United States 

should be able to keep pace, particularly given the general requirement 

for CALT missile designers to conduct flight tests. The layered defense 

approach is perhaps the most effective means to reduce the effectiveness 

of missile defense countermeasures. 

 Nevertheless, the U.S. should hedge against unforeseen breakthroughs in 

PRC countermeasure technology. China’s technological progress, 

Russian assistance to PRC programs, and Beijing’s propensity to provide 

technical assistance to rogue state missile development all require 

careful monitoring. Testing of new penetration aids should be easily 

observed via national technical means. 

 It should be noted that among the entire range of U.S. Missile 
142

defense programs, PRC specialists seem most concerned about the 

deployment of SBIRS-Low satellites. Slated for initial deployment 

during the latter part of the decade (about the same time as the PRC’s 

new generation of solid-fueled extended range ICBMs are fielded), 

SBIRS-Low has the potential to undercut an entire category of Chinese 

countermeasures. Specialists note that the dual surveillance and tracking 

capability of SBIRS-Low (infrared and electro-optical) would reduce the 

effectiveness of counter-surveillance measures, such as electronic 

countermeasures, radar stealth, and thermal shrouds. Therefore, 

greater emphasis must be placed on counter-intercept measures, and a 

combination of decoys and thermal shrouds.116

Planned Expansion of PRC Ballistic Missile Forces. 

The discussion above focuses on technical and asymmetrical 

countermeasures that the PRC may adopt. To augment sophisticated 

penetration aids, limited expansion of China’s ballistic missile force is to 

be expected, depending on the scope of the U.S. missile defense 

architecture. The second artillery’s arsenal of strategic and 

conventional ballistic missiles already is expected to grow substantially 

through the introduction of more sophisticated silo-based ICBMs, such 

as the DF-5A; mobile systems, such as the DF-31 and the longer range 

DF-31A; and the JL-2 SL BM. Further expansion, beyond current plans, 

is to be anticipated. However, the scope likely would be limited due to 

Beijing’s desire to avoid presenting a threatening image to its neighbors 

and economic partners around the world.117 If Beijing chooses to expand 

its nuclear ballistic missile force, the most likely route would be to 

increase production, beyond current plans, of the DF-31 and its longer 

range variant. 

 As discussed above, by 2005, Beijing is expected to have 24 DF-5 ICBMs; 

10-20 DF-31 ICBMs that should replace the second Artillery’s approximately 

a dozen DF-4 ICBMs; and perhaps the same number of JL-2s, assuming the 

Type 94 submarine is produced according to schedule. At least one 
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additional DF-31 brigade (10-20 missiles) could be fielded by 2010. 

Initial deployment of the DF-31A could be expected in the 2005-2010 

timeframe, with as many as ten DF-31A ICBMs ostensibly being in 

operation by the end of the decade. With as many as 100 new ICBMs 

entering the PLA’s inventory over the next 10 years, the PRC is in effect 

more than doubling its arsenal of nuclear ballistic missiles able to range 

targets throughout the United States. This expansion appears to be 

taking place independent of U.S. plans to field limited missile defenses. 

 Upgrading all or a portion of the PRC’s DF-5 force structure with 

MIRVs is another potential response should a CMC decision be made to do 

so. The specific number of MIRVs per DF-5 cannot be determined at 

this time.118 Prospects that a layered missile defense system could include 

a boost-phase intercept capability could dampen any incentive to deploy 

MIRVs. Boost-phase defenses would destroy the missiles early in flight, 

when they are most visible and before they can release their warheads. 

Missile Defenses and Beijing’s Six Specious Arguments. 

Since the early 1990s, Beijing’s technical and doctrinal responses have 

been supported by a coordinated foreign policy and propaganda 

campaign to influence international opinion and shape the debate within 

the U.S. regarding missile defenses. As its nuclear and conventional 

ballistic missile inventory grows, Beijing’s political leadership has 

formulated a number of arguments against missile defenses that are based 

on half-truths and over-simplifications. First, Beijing argues that missile 

defenses will cause an arms race. In fact, in the conventional military 

context, arms races generally are caused by one side’s rapid buildup in 

offensive capabilities.119 One could argue that an accelerated arms race 

has been underway in the Taiwan Strait since the early 1990s. 

Undercutting Beijing’s overwhelming offensive advantage through viable 

defenses would enhance cross-Strait stability by raising the costs of using 

force. Active missile defenses, combined with other approaches, would 

reduce the perceived utility of ballistic missiles as Beijing’s preferred tool 
144

of coercion. 

 Secondly, Beijing asserts that U.S. Missile defense programs will 

violate the Anti-Ballistic missile (ABM) Treaty. However, at this time, 

there is no intention to violate the ABM Treaty, which was a bilateral 

agreement between Moscow and Washington to help manage and 

stabilize the strategic bilateral relationship. because the ABM Treaty is 

an artifact of the Cold war, the treaty needs to be adjusted or eliminated 

altogether. A dialogue has been initiated with Moscow to ensure that such a 

move would be made with the consent of both parties. 

 Beijing also posits a misleading argument that missile defenses will 

encourage Taiwanese independence sentiment. There are more 

important factors besides defenses that fan the flames of Taiwanese 

independence. PRC policies that alienate Taiwan are most relevant. 

besides, active missile defenses would not encourage independence 

sentiment any more than other weapon systems, such as F-16 fighters, 

PATRIOT Guidance Enhanced missiles, or PFG-2 frigates. One also could 

argue that Taiwan’s indigenous capacity for defense is only a minor 

factor influencing public sentiment regarding greater autonomy since, 

according to some sources, Taiwan’s domestic polity is largely 

uninterested in defense issues. 

 PRC spokesmen argue that active missile defenses can be used 

offensively. Much to the contrary, missile defenses are defensive—they 

threaten no one. If anything, building effective defenses will reduce the 

value of ballistic missiles, and thus remove incentives for their 

development and proliferation. One could argue that converting upper 

tier interceptors to surface-to-surface missiles could enable strikes 

against targets at long ranges. However, using interceptors in this way 

is not cost efficient due to payload limitations. It is cheaper and more 

effective to develop a dedicated ballistic missile than to use a missile 

defense interceptor. 
145

 A corollary to this argument is that missile defenses can shield 

offensive assets, such as ballistic missiles or strike aircraft. This 

supposition blurs the distinction between offensive and defensive 

action—whether or not a system is offensive or defensive depends upon 

the user’s intent, strategy, and doctrine. Beijing also argues that U.S. 

provision of missile defenses to Taiwan would transfer technologies 

useful to ballistic missile development. This assertion assumes that 

Taiwan does not have the indigenous capacity to develop the necessary 

technology; would be willing to violate missile Technology Control 

Regime-related assurances made to the U.S. government; and would take 

the trouble to reverse engineer propulsion, guidance, or other associated 

technologies. 

 Chinese arguments that missile defenses could lead to a militarization of 

space have some merit. However, since deployment of the first 

reconnaissance and military communications satellites, space has long 

been exploited for military purposes. There is a relationship between 

missile defense and a SAT interceptors. If supported by a robust search, 

acquisition, and tracking network, upper tier mid-course systems 

could be used to strike some satellites in low earth orbit. Chinese 

observers, such as Du Xiangwan from the China Academy of 

Engineering Physics, have noted that intercepting satellites is easier than 

engaging reentry vehicles. 

 Finally, the PRC has argued that provision of active missile 

defenses to Taiwan would “violate” the Three Communiqués. The 

Three Communiqués are parallel statements of policy that have little 

standing in international law. Provision of missile defenses would not 

“violate” the 1982 Communiqué any more than other weapon systems. As 

Assistant Secretary of State John Holdridge pointed out in his August 

1982 Congressional testimony, the U.S. agreement to reduce arms sales 

to Taiwan was contingent upon Beijing’s peaceful approach to resolving 

the Taiwan issue, generally characterized by its military posture directed 

against Taiwan. As Holdridge noted in his testimony, a rise in the 
146

military threat to Taiwan theoretically would be accompanied by a rise in 

U.S. security assistance, in accordance with U.S. domestic law under the 

Taiwan Relations Act. 

 Beijing argues that provision of active missile defenses to Taiwan would 

revive the U.S.-Taiwan defense alliance, undermining the foundation of 

U.S.-PRC relations as spelled out in the 1979 Communiqué. Such an 

argument is based on the faulty assumption that a Taiwan missile 

defense architecture would require some form of operational 

connectivity with U.S. Space-based early warning and command and 

control systems. While DSP early warning could enhance the effectiveness 

of missile defenses, systems such as THAAD can operate 

autonomously against SRBMs. Early warning radar systems can 

supplant the need for satellite early warning. 

Missile Defense in the Taiwan Strait. 

As can be seen from these arguments, China’s opposition to missile 

defenses is viewed largely through the cognitive prism of Taiwan. 

Ballistic missiles are a political and, increasingly, military trump card 

intended to stem political movement in Taiwan toward greater 

autonomy. At the same time, China’s strategic nuclear force affects 

cost-benefit calculations of regional players, such as the United States and 

Japan, as they contemplate intervention. In theory, Washington policy 

makers would be less likely to intervene if the risks of escalation were 

high. Beijing has a no-first-use policy, but regional actors cannot be 

assured that Beijing would not use nuclear weapons to retaliate against 

foreign intervention, particularly if that intervention involved strikes 

against military targets on the mainland opposite Taiwan. 

 SRBMs, combined with certain types of countermeasures, present 

Taiwan’s missile defense planners with significant challenges. The 

potential for large raid sizes; the short flight time of SRBMs (approximately 7 

minutes for the 600 kilometer DF-15); and wide range of attack 
147

azimuths would stress any missile defense architecture. 

 Despite these challenges, Taiwan’s interest in ballistic missile defenses 

can be expected to grow with the threat. A modest missile defense 

architecture could reduce the effectiveness of limited PRC use of 

ballistic missiles in a coercive air campaign. In addition to land and seabased lower tier systems, the deployment of conventional MRBMs and 

extended range SRBMs in significant numbers likely will drive 

Taiwan’s interest in sea-based mid-course missile defense and THAAD. 

 However, to defend against large-scale raids, exclusive reliance on 

active missile defenses will be insufficient to offset the overwhelming 

advantages Beijing holds with its expanding arsenal of ballistic missiles. As 

a result, Taiwan can be expected to adopt asymmetrical approaches to 

augment active missile defenses. These include passive defense 

measures to complicate targeting and enhancing its ability to sustain or 

reconstitute operations after a first strike. Even more important, Taiwan 

force planners can be expected to invest in active defense measures, 

such as suppression of enemy air defenses and interdiction operations 

that would target critical nodes with a conventional ballistic missile 

organization.120

 The PRC is concerned about U.S. plans to deploy a global missile 

defense architecture. PRC observers understand that the United States, 

should it so choose, has the ability over the longer term to develop a 

robust, layered global missile defense architecture that could challenge 

the viability of China’s deterrent. To ensure the viability of its deterrent, 

Beijing is in the midst of a long-term program to upgrade its strategic 

nuclear force, in both qualitative and quantitative terms. MIRVing and 

success in fielding missile defense countermeasures would be factors in 

the ultimate size of the force. Beijing has the ability to influence the 

nature and scope of future U.S. Missile defense development, as well as 

the transfer of those systems to allies and friends such as Taiwan. The 

scope of a future U.S. Missile defense architecture has not been 
148

determined yet. Positive steps that Beijing could take to moderate 

development, deployment, and transfer of U.S. Missile defenses include a 

reduction in PLA missile deployments opposite Taiwan and 

cooperation in limiting the proliferation of weapons of mass 

destruction and their means of delivery. 

ENDNOTES-CHAPTER 5 

1. Department of Defense, Selected military Capabilities of the People’s Republic of 

China (Report to Congress Pursuant to Section 1305 of the FY97 National 

Defense Authorization Act), Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing office, 

1997, p. 4. The report states that most of these missiles are likely to be short- or 

medium-range systems. 

 2. This figure assumes 15-20 ICBMs (between 75 and 100 percent of the PRC’s 

current ICBM force) are directed against U.S. urban areas and able to liquidate a 

million people per city. 

 3. A summary of CASC organization is included in Mark A. Stokes, China’s 

Strategic modernization: Implications for U.S. National Security, Carlisle: Strategic 

Studies Institute, September 1999. 

 4. See Federation of American Scientists, WMD Around the world, www.fas.org; 

Bill Gertz, Betrayal, Washington DC: Regnery Press, p. 250; and U.S. Congress, 

House of Representatives, Report of the Select Committee on U.S. National Security 

and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People’s Republic of China (Cox Report), 

Vol. I, chap. 4, 105th Congress, 2nd Session, Washington, DC: U.S. Government 

Printing office, 1999. Also see Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile 

Threat Through 2015, Unclassified Summary of a National Intelligence Estimate, 

Director of Central Intelligence, January 2002. 

 5. Walter Pincus,” China may Add 100 missiles Over 15 Years,” Washington 

Post, May 26, 1999; and “China: Long Range ICBM Could Reach U.S. Mainland,” 

Flight International, August 14, 2001. 

 6. See Federation of American Scientists webpage, www.fas.org; Bill Gertz,” 
149

Chinese missile To Threaten U.S. By 2000,” Washington Times, May 23, 1997. 

 7. Department of Defense, Proliferation and Response, January 2001, China 

Section; “China: Long Range ICBM Could Reach U.S. Mainland,” Flight 

International, August 14, 2001; “Kongjun yu haihang zhuangbei fazhan” (Air Force 

and Naval Modernization) in Zhonggong junshi xiandaihua (PRC Military 

Modernization), Taipei: Ziyou Publishing, June 2000; and Shintaro Ishihara,” An 

Urgent Threat,” The Shield, Vol. xviii, No. 2, March /April 2001. The relationship 

between the DF-31A and the DF-41 is unknown. The number of Type 94 submarines 

that will be built is unknown; one could surmise that two-four hulls (i.e., 32-64 tubes 

with a like number of JL-2s)is a safe estimate. 

 8. A series of meetings were held in the aftermath of the accidental bombing of 

the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade. A total of 15 programs were designated for 

acceleration. A CASC committee was formed to plan for the accelerated timeline. See 

“Beiyue zhaxing: wuqi yanzhi jiasu,” (NATO Bombing: Accelerate Weapons 

R&D), Zhongguo Hangtian Bao, May 12, 1999, p. 1. Attending the meetings were 

retired aerospace advisors, Xia Guohong (CAMEC Director), Zheng Quanbao 

(First Academy Deputy Party Chairman), Yin Xingliang (Second Academy 

Deputy Director), Huang Ruisong (Third Academy Deputy Director), Ye Peijian 

(Fifth Academy Chief Engineer), and Hua Linsen (066 Base Director). 

 9. The 700-meter CEP is extracted from Janes Strategic weapons Systems, 1998. See 

Bill Gertz, “New Chinese Missiles Target All of East Asia,” Washington Times, July 

10, 1997. Also see “Dongfeng-21 zhongcheng daodan (DF-21 MRBM), Shijie 

junshi luntan (World Military Forum), January 2000, in Chinese; and Bill Gertz, 

The China Threat, Washington, DC: Regnery Press, 2000, pp. 234-235; and Bill 

Gertz, Betrayal, p. 254. 

 10. The conversion of the DF-21 from a strictly nuclear mission to a 

conventional role was reported as early as 1994 in the Chinese journal, Guoji 

Hangkong (International Aviation). Further indications of a terminally guided 

DF-21 are from discussions between Richard Fisher and an engineer from 

CALT’s Beijing Research Institute of Telemetry (704th Research Institute) at the 

1996 Zhuhai Air Show. Extensive CASC technical writings on terminally guided 

theater ballistic missiles tend to substantiate the engineer’s comments. Other 

sources indicate that the conventional DF-21C program, referred to as the DF-21 
150

mod 3 by some sources, is influenced in large part by the Pershing-2, entered the 

applied R&D (xinghao yanzhi) phase in 1995, and that the primary payload will be a 

penetrator warhead (zuandi dantou) for use against semi-hardened facilities such 

as command centers. See Will Young, “Shenmi de zhongguo daodan budui” (The 

Development of the Chinese Second Artillery), Shijie junshi luntan (World military 

Forum), internet edition (www.wforum.com), January 2000, in Chinese. It is not 

clear how far engineers have gone in their preliminary research in this type of 

ballistic missile terminal guidance. For a discussion of terminally guided 

ballistic missiles, see Gan Chuxiong and Liu Jixiang, Daodan yu yunzai huojian zongti 

sheji (General Design of missiles and Launch vehicles), Beijing: Defense Industry 

Press, January 1996, pp. 68-69. Also see Wang Honglei (Second Artillery 

Corps),” Optical Image Guidance Technology,” in Zhidao yu Yinxin, in Chinese 

Astronautics and Missilery Abstracts (hereafter referred to as CAMA), Vol. 2, No. 3, 

January 1995, pp. 34-37. 

 11. “Kongjun yu haihang zhuangbei fazhan” (Air Force and Naval 

Modernization) in Zhonggong junshi xiandaihua (PRC Military Modernization), 

Taipei: Ziyou Publishing, June 2000. One should note, however, that the PAC-3 

could engage an incoming MRBM if the missile was targeted directly against the 

fire unit itself. 

 12. Use of ballistic missiles in support of a naval blockade and for use against 

carrier battle groups is a key theme of a recent internal publication on blockade 

operations. See Hu Wenlong (ed), Lianhe fengsuo zuozhan yanjiu (Study on Joint 

Blockade Operations), Beijing: National Defense University Press, 1999. A PAC-3 

interceptor could, under certain conditions, engage a DF-21C given sufficient early 

warning and if the missile was targeted directly against the PAC-3 fire unit. 

 13. Among numerous references on conventional Second Artillery doctrine, see 

Wang Houying and Zhang Xingye, Zhanyixue (Campaign Studies), Beijing: National 

Defense University Press, 2000, pp. 375-385. 

 14. A brigade consists of at least four battalions, probably with three to four 

companies each. Each brigade would be equipped with approximately 100 SRBMs. 

Each company likely is responsible for at least one launcher. If one assumes a 

notional structure of four battalions per brigade with four companies/launchers 

each, then a brigade would be able to execute a raid size of at least 16 SRBMs at one 
151

time. In a major campaign, seven Second Artillery brigades notionally could 

achieve a raid size of at least 112 theater missiles. Three salvos would utilize 336 

missiles. Remaining theater missiles in the PLA arsenal would likely be kept in 

reserve for other contingencies and/or to support naval operations and 

amphibious landings. See Bill Gertz,” China Adds To missiles Near Taiwan,” 

Washington Times, August 28, 2001, p. 1; and Will Young,” shenm de zhongguo 

daodan budui,” (The Development of the Chinese Second Artillery), shijie junshi 

luntan (World military Forum), internet edition in Chinese (www.forum.com), January 

2000. 

 15. See Tony Walker and Stephen Fidler,” China Builds Up missile Threat,” 

Financial Times, February 10, 1999, p. 1; and “Taiwan Boosts Defenses with Live Fire 

Test of Patriot System,” AFP, June 20, 2001. 

 16. Lianhe zhanyi di erpaobing zuozhan (PLA Second Artillery Joint Campaign 

Operations), unpublished manuscript, 1996, p. 10. The document is believed to be 

an internal PLA academic paper, but its authenticity has not been established. 

However, a number of sources have corroborated much of the paper’s content. 

PLA writings indicate that the mission of the second Artillery’s conventional 

ballistic missile force is deterrence; the second mission is to achieve the “Three 

Superiorities”—information dominance, air superiority, and maritime superiority. 

 17. See Wang Jixiang and Chang Lan,” Guowai jidong dandao daodan dimian 

shengcun nengli yanjiu” (Study on Survivability of Foreign Mobile Ballistic 

Missiles), in Xu Dazhe, Guowai dandao daodan jishu yanjiu yu fazhan (Study and 

Development of Foreign Ballistic Missile Technology), Beijing: Astronautics Press, 

October 1998, pp. 96-108. Wang and Chang are from CALT’s systems integration 

department. 

 18. Lianhe zhanyi di erpaobing zuozhan, p. 17. 

 19. Xu Minfei, Zhu Zili, and Li Yong,” Feasibility of Technologies for Use of 

Ballistic missiles to Counter Aircraft Carriers,” Guofang Keji Cankao, 1997, 18(4), pp. 

126-130, summarized in CAMA. Also see Feng Jianbao, “Feasibility Study of 

Conventional Ballistic missiles Attacking Aircraft Carriers,” paper presented at the 

Annual China Astronautics Society UAV Specialists Conference, April 1998, 

summarized in CAMA, Vol. 6, No. 1. 
152

 20. Wang Guobao,” Initial Discussion on Tactical Ballistic missile Electronic 

warfare,” Hangtian dianzi duikang, April 1997, pp. 1-7, summarized in CAMA. 

China’s interest in millimeter wave (MMW) technology is best exemplified by a 

Chinese firm’s illegal acquisition of a MMW traveling wave tube amplifier in 1996. A 

special MMW laboratory was established in 1995. 

 21. See Wang Jixiang and Chang Lan, p. 107. Most vulnerable would be 

Kadena AB and Yokosuka Naval Base in Japan. 

 22. Duncan Lennox, ed. Jane’s Strategic weapon Systems, Issue 24, May 97, 

Surrey, England: Jane’s Information Group. 

 23. George Lindsey, The Information Requirements for Aerospace Defense: Limits 

Imposed by Geometry and Technology, Bailrigg Memorandum 27, CDISS, Lancaster 

University, p. 18. If moved closer to its target, the DF-15 likely would be launched 

on a lofted trajectory that would increase the flight time outside the atmosphere, 

thus increasing the missile’s vulnerability to upper tier systems. On the other hand, a 

lofted trajectory could increase the missile’s reentry speed, reducing the footprint, 

or defended area, of lower tier systems such as PATRIOT. 

 24. Zhao Yunshan, Zhongguo daodan jiqi zhanlue, jiefangjun de hexin wuqi

(China’s missiles and Strategy: the PLA’s Central weapon), Hong Kong: Mirror 

Books, p. 232. Other sources credit the DF-15 with only as good as a1 50-meter CEP. 

See “Missiles! China Has Them Too!” Wen wei po, June 1, 1999, p. A5, in Foreign 

Broadcast Information Service (hereafter FBIS)-CH I-00169, June 22, 1999. 

 25. Brian Hsu,” M-Class missiles’ Bark worse Than Bite: Military,” Taipei Times, 

August 16, 2000. 

 26. Zhao Yunshan, Zhongguo daodan jiqi zhanlue, jiefangjun de hexin wuqi 

(China’s Missiles and Strategy: The PLA’s Central weapon), Hong Kong: Mirror 

Books, p. 232. Informed sources assert the mirror (Mingjing) series of books have a 

mixed record of reliability. However, development of a longer range version of the 

DF-15 is also alluded to in Bill Gertz,” China Adds To missiles Near Taiwan,” 

Washington Times, August 28, 2001, p. 1. Zhao states that the expanded range DF-15 

incorporates a more advanced propellant. There is often confusing reporting on an 
153

unidentified 1000 kilometer system—the-M-18—that may in fact be the rumored 

extended range DF-15. 

 27. Zhao, p. 234. 

 28. Department of Defense, Report to Congress on Theater Missile Defense 

Architecture Options for the Asia-Pacific Region, Washington, DC: U.S. Department 

of Defense, 1999. 

 29. See Department of Defense, The Security Situation in the Taiwan Strait 

(Report to Congress Pursuant to the FY99 Appropriations Bill), Washington, DC: 

U.S. Government Printing office, 1999. Also see Bill Gertz, The China Threat, p. 232. 

 30. Hui Zhong, “Meiguo Kongjun Shishi Jiguang Fandao Jihua” (USAF 

Implements Laser Missile Defense Plan), Zhongguo Hangtian (China Aerospace), 

February 1996, pp. 38-39; and Zhang Yaping, “Jiguang Wuqi de Zuozhan Xiaoneng 

yu Fazhan Qushi,” (Capabilities and Trends in Laser weapon Development), 

Zhongguo Hangtian, July 1997, pp. 37-40. Presence of longer range surface-to-air 

missiles could force the ABL to operate further out. As a high value asset, the ABL 

would require fighter escort for protection. If based on Haitan Island, the S-300/PM 

U1 coverage extends out to central and northern Taiwan’s west coast. 

 31. Ibid. 

32. See special briefing on missile defense programs and testing by Lieutenant 

General Ronald T. Kadish, July 13, 2001. 

 33. National missile Defense: A Candid Examination of Political Limits and 

Technological Challenges, Cambridge, MA: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc., 

1998, pp. 21-22. 

 34. Federation of American Scientists website, Ground based Interceptor, 

www.fas.org/spp/starwars. 

35. According to the Federation of American Scientists, the basic “threshold” 

threat that drove the C1 architecture is said to consist of an attack of five singlewarhead missiles with unsophisticated decoys that could be discriminated, plus 

chaff, obscurant particles, flares, jammers, and other countermeasures. 
154

 36. According to the Federation of American Scientists, a C2 architecture 

would have defended against any authorized, unauthorized, or accidental 

attack by sophisticated payloads at the basic threshold level, said to consist of 

an attack of five single-warhead missiles, each with either a few (about four) 

credible decoys that could not be discriminated (and would have to be 

intercepted), plus chaff, obscurant particles, flares, jammers, and other 

countermeasures. 

 37. According to the Federation of American Scientists, the C3 

architecture would have defended against any authorized, unauthorized, or 

accidental attack by sophisticated payloads at the “objective” level. The 

“objective” level is said to consist of an attack of twenty single-warhead 

missiles, each with either a few (perhaps as many as five) credible decoys that 

could not be discriminated [and would have to be intercepted], or a larger 

number of less sophisticated decoys that could be discriminated, plus chaff, 

obscurant particles, flares, jammers, and other countermeasures. 

 38. Charles Swicker,” Ballistic Missile Defense From the Sea: A Commander’s 

Perspective,” NWC Review, May 1997. 

 39. A third lower tier capability, the cancelled Navy Area Defense system, 

was to be a near term capability for lower tier area defense of ports, airfields, and 

forces ashore. The centerpiece of the Navy Area Defense System—the SM-2 

Block IVA area defense interceptor—is an evolution of the Navy’s Standard 

missile and is one of the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization’s core 

programs. The SM-2 Block IVA is a high speed, solid fueled system with a dual 

mode (infrared and semi-active radio frequency) homing and a blastfragmentation warhead specifically designed to enhance the ballistic missile 

defense mission. The combination of precise guidance with a powerful explosive 

proximity fused warhead makes this interceptor highly effective 

augmentation to the PAC-3’s kinetic-energy hit-to-kill systems. Its footprint, 

or defended area, was larger than the PAC-3. Naval Area Defense systems 

generally are most effective if they are located near the assets they are supposed to 

protect. At-sea testing was expected to begin in late 2003/early 2004. Taiwan 

has requested four AEGIS-equipped destroyers that could, in the future, 

provide some limited missile defense should Taiwan decide to pursue such a 
155

capability. However, Taiwan’s current pursuit of AEGIS-equipped destroyers is 

driven by the need to defend against air breathing threats, such as cruise 

missiles and strike aircraft. 

 40. J. R. Wilson, THAAD: In the Eye of The Storm, unpublished paper, 1996; and 

BMDO Fact sheet,” Theater high Altitude Area Defense (THAAD),” 

https://www.acq.osd.mil/bmdo/bmdolink/pdf/thaad, May 1999; and THAAD Program office 

home Page, https://lmmg.external.lmco.com/thaad/. 

41. See Li Feizhu,” Taikong daodan genzhong xitong dui tufang cuoshi de 

yingyong (Influence of Space and Missile Tracking System on Penetration 

Measures), unpublished China Academy of Engineering Physics paper, April 1999. 

 42. J. R. Wilson, THAAD: In the Eye of the Storm, 1996. 

 43. Statement of Lieutenant General Ronald T. Kadish, USAF Director, 

Ballistic missile Defense Organization, before the House Armed Services 

Committee Subcommittee on Military Research & Development, Thursday, June 

14, 2001, http://www.acq.osd.mil/bmdo/bmdolink/html/kadish14jun01.html. 

44. The Guidance Enhanced Missile (GEM) is sometimes referred to as the 

“PAC-2+.” The GEM incorporates improvements to the front end of the PAC-2 

missile receiver to enhance its effectiveness and lethality against ballistic 

missiles. 

 45. Zhang Lide,” Woguo goujian feidan fangyu yu yuanju gongji feidan 

xitong de pinggu,” (Analysis of Taiwan’s missile Defense and Long Range 

Attack Missile Systems), in Jianduan Keji, (Defense Technology), March 2000, p. 

66. 

 46. Federation of American Scientists homepage, PATRIOT, (www.fas.org). 

 47. Lu Te-yun,” A Patriot Anti-Missile Defense Umbrella is Forming in the 

Greater Taipei Area,” Lien-ho Pao, August 24, 1998, p. 1, in FBIS-CHI-98-246; and 

Yuen Lin,” Probing the Capability of Taiwan’s Antiballistic missiles,” Kuang 

Chiao Ching, August 16, 1998, pp. 54-61, in FBIS-CHI-98-252. To counter a DF-15 

traveling at 2 km/sec, MADs operators have 25-40 seconds after radar 

acquisition to fire and intercept the incoming missile. With cueing data, 
156

reaction/intercept time would increase to 50 seconds or more. 

 48. “Military May Join Theater Missile Defense Project,” The China Post, 

November 19, 1998, p. 1. 

49. For a discussion on the potential impact of DSP support for PATRIOT 

operations, see Yuen Lin,” Probing the Capability of Taiwan’s Antiballistic 

Missiles,” Hong Kong Kuang Chiao Ching, August 16, 1998, pp. 54-61, in FBIS-CHI98-252. 

 50. National Missile Defense: A Candid Examination of Political Limits and 

Technological Challenges, Cambridge, MA: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 

Inc., July 1998, pp. 21-22. Chinese interest in this “staring” capability was 

reflected in at least one study. See Qiu Yulun,” Staring Focal plane Array 

Imaging for Missile Early Warning,” Kongjian Jishu Qingbao Yanjiu (Space 

Technology Information Studies), May 1995, pp. 150-160, in CAMA, Vol. 4, No. 

2,1997. 

 51. "Spectrum Astro/Northrop Grumman Complete SBIRS Low Review,” 

Space Daily (internet version), 7 May 2001. Very hot objects radiate high 

quantities of short wave infrared (SWIR: 1-3 microns); warm bodies radiate 

significant quantities of medium wave infrared (MWIR: 3-8 microns); cold objects 

primarily radiate long wave infrared signal (LWIR: 8-14 microns); while very cold 

objects emit very long wave radiation (VWLIR: 14-30 microns). Different options 

for focal plane arrays include mercury-cadmium-telluride (HgCdTe) or silicon 

based sensors. HgCdTe arrays, which will be used on SBIRS-Low satellites, can 

detect infrared signatures up to about 12 microns (LWIR)but are very difficult 

to manufacture and susceptible to radiation and EMP effects. However, a key 

advantage of HgCdTe arrays is that they do not require cooling to the extreme 

low temperatures that other infrared materials do. For a detailed Chinese 

evaluation of SBIRS-Low, see Li Feizhu,” Taikong daodan genzhong xitong dui 

tufang cuoshi de yingyong (Influence of Space and Missile Tracking System 

on Penetration Measures), unpublished China Academy of Engineering Physics 

paper, April 1999. 

 52. National Missile Defense, pp. 21-22. 
157

 53. Ibid. 

54. Ibid., pp. 25-26. 

 55. Ibid., p. 26. 

 56. Ibid., pp. 26-31. 

 57. Ibid. 

58. See the Cox Report (Vol. I, Chapter 4). Also see Li Bin,” The Effects of NMD 

on Chinese Strategy,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, March 1, 2001. 

 59. John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai,” China’s Strategic Seapower: The Politics of 

Force Modernization in the Nuclear Age, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 

1994. 

 60. Bonnie S. Glaser and Banning N. Garrett,” Chinese Perspectives on the 

Strategic Defense Initiative, Problems of Communism, March-April 1986, pp. 28-44. 

 61. China Today: Defense Science and Technology, Beijing: National Defense 

Industry Press, 1993, pp. 149-150. 

 62. Ibid, pp. 152-153; also see Richard P. Suttmeier,” China’s High Technology: 

Programs, Problems, and Prospects,” in China’s Economic Dilemma, pp. 546-564. 

The Senior engineers responsible for the 863 Program included Wang 

Daheng, a preeminent optics expert who played a role in China’s space 

tracking network; Wang Ganchang, one of the founding fathers of China’s 

nuclear program; Yang Jiachi, a satellite attitude control expert; and Chen 

Fangyun, an electronics engineer and leader of program to develop China’s 

space tracking network. To focus R&D investment for the longer term, Hong 

Kong media sources reported that the State Council authorized a new 

initiative, similar to the 863 Program, that ostensibly will emphasize six key 

areas: 1) aerospace technology; 2) information technology; 3) strategic defenses; 

4) deep strike technology; 5) optics and laser technology; and 6) advanced 

materials. The project, dubbed the 126 Program, allegedly was formally 

proposed during the 26 January 2000 Annual COSTIND National Conference in 
158

Beijing. The effort, to be overseen by Wu Bangguo, Wang Zhongyu, Cao 

Gangchuan, and Liu Jibin, is to funded over the next 12-15 years. See Wen 

Jen,” Jiang Orders High Tech Aerospace Weapons Development—‘126 Program 

signed and placed Under Hu Jintao’s Command,” Tai Yang Pao, in FBIS-CHI0040, March 21, 2000, p. A19. 

 63. Lu Hongquan and Yang Liandong,” Zhanlue he zhanshu dandao daodan 

de tufang” (Penetration of Strategic and Tactical Ballistic missiles), published 

in an unknown journal in March 1999. Lu and Yang are from the China Academy 

of Engineering Physics (CAEP); also see Bai Hande,” Ganraodan de zhonglei he 

zuozhan fangshi” (Types and Operational Styles Associated with Jamming 

warheads), Xiandai bingqi (Modern Weaponry), 1995, pp. 152-153. 

 64. Gan Chuxiong and Liu Jixiang, Daodan yu yunzai huojian zongti sheji 

(General Design of Missiles and Launch vehicles), Beijing: Defense Industry Press, 

January 1996, p. 45. 

 65. Wang Guobao,” Initial Discussion on Tactical Ballistic Missile 

Electronic Warfare,” Hangtian dianzi duikang, CAMA, April 1997, pp. 1-7. 

 66. “Kongjun yu haihang wuqi zhuangbei fazhan,” (Development of the Air 

Force and Naval Aviation Equipment) in Zhonggong junshi xiandaihua (PRC 

Military Modernization), Taipei: Freedom Publishing, June 2000; also see Bai 

Hande,” Ganrao de zhonglei he zuozhan fangshi” (Types of Jamming and 

Operational methods) Xiandai wuqi (Modern Weaponry), 1995, pp. 152-153. 

 67. Lu Hongquan and Yang Liandong,” Zhanlue he zhanshu dandao daodan 

de tufang” (Penetration of Strategic and Tactical Ballistic Missiles), published 

in an unknown journal in March 1999. Lu and Yang are from the China Academy 

of Engineering Physics (CAEP). 

 68. For example, Cai Yi, “Status and Development of Two Color Infrared 

Detectors,” Hongwai jishu, (Infrared Technology), 1997, 19(5), summarized in 

CAMA, Vol. 4, No. 6, details the indium-based (InSb) infrared detectors used 

on the THAAD missile; and the mercury-cadmium-telluride (HgCdTe) 

detectors that are part of the Raytheon EKV sensor system. 
159

 69. Lu Hongquan and Yang Liandong,” Zhanlue he zhanshu dandao 

daodan de tufang” (Penetration of Strategic and Tactical Ballistic Missiles), 

published in an unknown journal in March 1999. Lu and Yang are from the China 

Academy of Engineering Physics (CAEP). 

 70. Bill Gertz, Betrayal, p. 254. 

 71. Lu Hongquan and Yang Liandong,” Zhanlue he zhanshu dandao daodan 

de tufang” (Penetration of Strategic and Tactical Ballistic Missiles), published 

in an unknown journal in March 1999. Lu and Yang are from the China Academy 

of Engineering Physics (CAEP). 

 72. Wang Jixiang,” Fast Burn Boost Strategic Ballistic Missile 

Technology,” Aerospace S&T Intelligence Studies Abstracts (2), 92(4), pp. 68-78, in 

CAMA, Vol. 3, No. 6, 1996. Wang is from the Beijing Institute of space 

Systems Engineering (Beijing yuhang xitong gongcheng yanjiusuo); also see 

Qin Guangming,” Application of Slotted Tubular Grain in Fast Burn Solid 

Motors,” Bingong xuebao (Ordnance Journal), Vol. 18, No. 2, 1996, pp. 41-43, in 

CAMA, Vol. 3, No. 6. Qin is from the Xian Institute of Modern Chemistry. 

 73. See National Missile Defense, p. 16. The Topol-M is believed to change 

directions during the last phase of its ascent. 

74. Gan Chuxiong and Liu Jixiang, Daodan Yu Yunzai Huojian Zongti Sheji 

(General Design of Missiles and Launch Vehicles), Beijing: Defense Industry 

Press, January 1996, p. 42. 

 75. Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat Through 2015, 

Unclassified Summary of a National Intelligence Estimate, Director of Central 

Intelligence, January 2002. 

 76. Stokes. 

 77. Gan and Liu, p. 46; Gui Yongfeng,” Penetration of Tactical Ballistic 

Missile’s Decoy,” Hubei Hangtian Keji (Aerospace Hubei), February 1994, pp. 

36-38, in CAMA, 1995, Vol. 2, No. 1; and Li Hong,” Motion Characteristics of 

Atmospheric Reentry Ballistic Missile warheads and Their Applications To heavy 
160

Decoy Design,” Jiangnan Hangtian Keji (Jiangnan Space Technology), 1997 (1), 

pp. 26-30, in CAMA, 1997, Vol. 4, No. 3. 

 78. Gan Chuxiong and Liu Jixiang, Daodan yu yunzai huojian zongti 

sheji(General Design of Missiles and Launch Vehicles), Beijing: Defense Industry 

Press, January 1996. p. 42-43; and Wu Ganxiang,” Guowai fanjichang wuqi,” 

(Foreign Antirunway Weapons), in Xu Dazhe, Guowai dandao daodan jishuy anjiu 

yu fazhan, Astronautics Publishing house, 1998, pp. 65-76. The control maneuver 

may be necessary to slow down the reentry speed to allow acquisition of the 

target image in the ballistic missile’s seeker. 

 79. Gan and Liu, p. 43. Also see Cai Yuanli,” Research on trajectory Recovery 

in Exo-Atmospheric Flight,” in Daodan Yu Hangtian Yunzai Jishu (Missiles and 

Space Vehicles), March 1995, pp. 10-15, in CAMA, Vol. 2, No. 5; and Zhao 

Hanyuan,” Simulation, Analysis of Maneuverable Reentry Vehicles,” Yuhang 

Xuebao, January 1,1997, pp. 96-99, in FBIS-CST-97-012. Zhao is from the National 

University of Defense Technology. 

 80. Zhang Minde, “Simulation Research of Defenses Against 

Conventional Ballistic Missile Reentry vehicles,” Xitong gongcheng yu dianzi jishu, 

Vol. 19, No. 4, 1997, pp. 45-49. The simulation was conducted by CASC’s Beijing 

Optoelectronic Engineering General Design Department. For general 

background on saturation, see Harshberger, pp. 169-170. 

 81. David Fulghum,” China Exploiting U.S. Patriot Secrets,” Aviation week 

and Space Technology, January 18, 1993, pp. 20-21. 

 82. Zhang Demin and Hou Shiming,” Simulation Research of offensive 

and Defensive Capability of Conventional Maneuvering Reentry Missile,” 

Xitong Gongcheng Yu Dianzi Jishu, Vol. 19, No. 4,1997, pp. 45-49, in CAMA, 1997, 

Vol. 4, No. 5. Full translation in FBIS-CHI-97-272. Zhang is from the Beijing 

Electromechanical Engineering Design Department, also known as the CASC 

Fourth Systems Design Department. According to one evaluation, PAC-2 has a 

probability of kill of 10-25 percent against an unidentified tactical ballistic 

Missile. See Zhao Yuping,” Probability of PAC-2 Intercepting a Certain Tactical 

Ballistic Missile,” paper presented at the November 1997 conference of 

National Missile Designers Specialist Network, in CAMA, Vol. 5, No. 3. 
161

 83. Meng Daikui,” Simulation of Control and Guidance of spinning 

Missiles,” Xitong Gongcheng yu Dianzi Jishu, Vol. 5, No. 3, 1994, summarized in 

CAMA, Vol. 2, No. 1, 1995; Wan Chunxiong and Yang Xiaolong, “Identification 

of flight Disturbances on Spinning Missiles,” Zhanshu Daodan Jishu (Tactical 

Missile Technology), March 1995, pp. 1-8, in CAMA, Vol. 2, No. 3. For a general 

assessment on methodologies to protect Missile systems against high powered 

lasers, see Ji Shifan, “Protection of Missiles Against Lasers,” Daodan yu 

Hangtian Yunzai Jishu, Vol. 5, 1996, pp. 35-42, in CAMA, Vol. 4, No. 1. Ji’s research 

concentrated on the effects of high powered lasers on a variety of materials 

and optoelectronic systems. 

 84. Li Qiang,” Current Status and Follow-On Development of Laser Cladding 

Wear-Resistance Coatings,” Yuhang cailiao gongyi, January 1997, pp. 13-18. At 

least one institute involved in the testing is Harbin Institute of Technology. Also 

see Ji Shifan,” Laser Resistant Protection of Missiles,” Daodan yu Hangtian yunzai 

jishu, May 1996, pp. 35-42. 

 85. Lewis and Hua, p. 17. 

 86. Gan and Liu, p. 44. 

 87. Du Xiangwan,” Ballistic Missile Defense and Space Weapons,” in Quanguo 

Gaojishu Zhongdian Tushu, Jiguang Jishu Linghuo, (National High Technology 

Key Reference-Laser Technology Realm). Use of depressed trajectories may 

incur costs associated with accuracy. 

 88. Lu Hongquan and Yang Liandong,” Zhanlue he zhanshu dandao daodan 

de tufang” (Penetration of Strategic and Tactical Ballistic Missiles), published in 

an unknown journal in March 1999. Lu and Yang are from the China Academy of 

Engineering Physics (CAEP). 

 89. Gong Jinheng, “High Powered Microwave Weapons: A New Concept 

in Electronic Warfare,” Dianzi duikang jishu, February 1995, pp. 1-9. Gong is from 

the South West Institute of Electronic Equipment (SWIEE), China’s premier 

electronic warfare research entity. 
162

 90. For a comprehensive overview of the technologies associated with HPM 

weapons, see Carlo Kopp,” The E-Bomb-A Weapon of Electrical Mass 

Destruction,” in Winn Schwartau, Information Warfare, New York: Thunder’s 

mouth Press, 1994, pp. 296-297; Also see J. Swegle and J. Benford,” State of the Art 

in High Power Microwaves: An Overview,” paper presented at the 1993 International 

Conference on Lasers and applications, Lake Tahoe, Nevada, December 6-10, 

1993. Swegle and Benford point out that the US, Russia, France, and the 

United Kingdom have HPM programs in addition to China. Zhu Youwen and 

Feng Yi, Gaojishu tiaojianxia de xinxizhan, (Information warfare Under High 

Technology Conditions), Academy of Military Science Press, 1994, pp. 308-

310; “Beam Energy Weaponry: Powerful as Thunder and Lightning,” 

Jiefangjun bao, December 25, 1995, in FBIS-CHI-96-039; Outlook for 21st Century 

Information warfare,” Guoji hangkong, (International Aviation), March 5, 

1995, in FBIS-CHI-95-114; “Microwave Pulse Generation,” Qiang jiguangyu lizishu, 

May 1994, in JPRS-CST-9 4-014. CAEP’s Institute of Applied Electronics, 

University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, and the Northwest 

Institute of Nuclear Technology in Xian are three of the most important 

organizations engaged in the research, design, and testing of Chinese HPM 

devices. The PRC appears to have mastered at least two HPM power sources—the 

FCG and vircator. The greatest challenge is the weaponization process. 

 91. See Liu Shiquan, “A New Type of ‘Soft Kill’ Weapon: The 

Electromagnetic Pulse warhead, “Hubei hangtian jishu (Hubei Space Technology), 

May 1997, pp. 46-48. Liu is from the Sanjiang Space Industry. 

 92. Chung Chien, “High Tech War Preparation of the PLA: Taking Taiwan 

without Bloodshed,” Taiwan Defense Affairs, October 2000, pp. 141-163. 

 93. See John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, China’s Strategic Seapower: the 

Politics of force modernization in the Nuclear Age, Stanford: Stanford University 

Press, 1994, for information on the 640 program. As a side note, leading U.S. 

experts have noted that ABM systems generally have inherent capabilities as 

ASATs, but the converse is not always true. 

 94. Gao Fuli,” Development Strategy and Serial Research of Anti-Tactical 

Ballistic Missiles,” in Foreign Missile Technology Development in 2000, October 1994, 

pp. 48-59, in CAMA, Vol. 2, No. 4. The three phase approach (sanbuzou) for 
163

China’s Missile defense development is also discussed in Yang Chunfu and 

Liu Xiao’en,” Research Study on U.S. Ballistic Missile Development plan,” 

Aerospace Information Paper HQ-96009, 1996, in CAMA, Vol. 4, No. 2. 

 95. See Zhu Zhenfu and Huang Peikang,” TBMIR Radiant Signature, 

Selection of Optimum Operating Band for Anti-Missile IR Seekers,” Xitong 

gongcheng yu dianzi jishu (Systems Engineering and Electronics), January 1996. Zhu 

is from CAMEC’s Second Academy 207th Research Institute. Wu Jianwen,” Do 

we have TMD?” Jiefang ribao, December 8, 1999, in FBIS-CHI-0987. 

 96. “Centers Established In Universities of China,” (no source listed) in 

FBIS-CHI-0983-95, September 9, 1995. Director of the state key lab is Professor 

Sun Zhongliang. 

 97. Wu Guanghua,” Dual-Mode millimeter wave-IR Seeker for An EndoAtmospheric Interceptor,” Danjian jishu (Projectile and Rocket Technology), Vol. 9, 

No. 3, 1996, pp. 15-20, in FBIS-CHI-97-26 1. The key component is a 35 GHz KaBand traveling wave tube amplifier. 

 98. See Zhao Jiufen and Wang Minghai,” Yujing weixing dui daodan yu jing 

moxing de fangzhen” (Modeling and Simulation of Ballistic Missile Early 

warning Satellites), Guti huojian jishu (Journal of Solid Rocket Technology), Vol. 

24, No. 3, 2001, pp. 1-3. The authors are from the second Artillery’s Engineering 

Academy in Xian. 

 99. AMS and defense industry officials consistently advocate missile early 

warning satellites in concepts for a national reconnaissance network. 

Leading institutes for infrared detector R&D include Beijing Institute of 

Remote Sensing Equipment, Shanghai Institute of Technical Physics, North 

China Research Institute of Optoelectronics, Kunming Institute of Physics, and 

Shanghai Xinyue Instruments Factory. CAST’s Lanzhou Institute of Physics is 

a key provider of cyrogenic equipment for cooling the infrared sensors. See 

Liu Jintian,” Hongwai Qijian Guoneiwai Fazhan Dongtai” (Developmental 

Prospects of Chinese and Foreign Infrared Devices), Zhongguo Hangtian, March

1992, pp. 41- 5; and Wu Runchou,” Hangtian linghuo Hongwai jishu de fazhan 

(Development of space Infrared Technology), Zhongguo Hangtian, March 1993, pp. 

19-23. For other references to China’s space-based infrared/ultraviolet 
164

telescope designs, see Chen Longzhi,” New Developments in space Cryogenic 

optics,” Diwen gongcheng (Cyrogenic Engineering), March 1994, pp. 9-13, in 

CAMA, Vol. 1, No. 5; and Ma Pinzhong, “Woguo kongjian Wangyuanjing 

fazhan” (Development of China’s space Telescope), Zhongguo Hangtian, July 1994, 

pp. 29-32. 

 100. For information on Chinese Missile early warning systems and associated 

technology, see Lu mingyu, Yi Kui, Yang Junfa, and Deng Ruzhen, “Development 

of Signal Source for Real-Time Infrared Earth Sensor,” Zhongguo kongjian kexue 

jishu, June 1996, pp. 63-70. in FBIS-CST-96-016; and Qiu Yulun, “Staring Focal plane 

Array Imaging for Missile Early warning,” Kongjian jishu qingbao yanjiu, May 1995, 

pp. 150-160, in CAMA, 1997, Vol. 4, No. 2. One should not discount the possibility 

of Russian assistance should Beijing have an interest in highly elliptical molniya 

orbits. 

 101. Stokes, pp. 118-119. One should note that in the 1980s, the United States 

considered modification of the Pershing-2 for ASAT missions, a system similar to 

the DF-21. 

 102. For references to control problems, see Deng Zichen,” Problems in high 

Precision Computation for nonlinear Control of space Interceptors,” Feixing lixue, 

Vol. 16, No. 1, 1998, pp. 85-89, in CAMA, Vol. 5, No. 5. Yang Yingbo,” Control 

Research on a space Interceptor in the Terminal Guidance phase,” unpublished 

BUAA paper, May 1994; Shi Xiaoing,” Study on Pulse Guidance Law for Space 

Interception,” in Zhidao yu Yinxin, No. 4, 1994, pp. 1-4, in CAMA, Vol. 2, No. 3. Shi is 

from the Harbin Institute of Technology’s Simulation Center. Deng is from 

Northwest Polytechnical University. For other studies, see Li Zhongying, “Study on 

Mid-Course Guidance for Aerodynamic Control of Anti- Missile Defense,” 

unpublished paper (Bh-B4774), Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics 

(BUAA), May 1996, in CAMA, Vol. 5, No. 5; and Li Zhongying,” Approximative 

Estimation of Optimal Guidance for Frontal Ballistic Missile Intercepts,” 

unpublished BUAA paper (Bh-B4776), in CAMA, Vol. 5, No. 5; and Li Zhongying, 

“Mathematical Modeling of Optimal Guidance for Anti-Tactical Ballistic Missiles,” 

unpublished BUAA Paper (Bh-B4854), May 1996, in CAMA, Vol. 5, No. 5. 

 103. Cheng Ho, “China Eyes Anti-Satellite System,” Space Daily, January 8, 2000. 
165

 104. Xu Hui and Sun Zhongkang,” Temperature Differences between Satellites 

and Satellite Decoys,” NUDT Journal, Vol. 16, No. 3, 1994; also see Li Hong, 

Identification of Satellites and Its Decoys Using Multisensor Data Fusion,” Xiandai 

fangyu jishu, June 1997, pp. 31-36. Li is from the NUDT Electronic Technology 

Department. 

 105. Li Hong’an, Wei Xuhui, and Sun Zhangkang,” Duo chuanganqi shuju 

ronghe shixian weixing jiqi xiliu xiu’er de zhibie” (Multi-sensor Data Fusion To 

Discriminate Satellites and Decoys), Xiandai fangyu jishu (Modern Defense 

Technology), November 1997, pp. 31-36. 

 106. DoD Report to Congress, Security Situation in the Taiwan Strait. 

107. “Hangtian guti yunzai huojian youxian gongsi chengli” (Aerospace 

Solid Launch vehicle Corporation Established), Zhongguo Hangtian, June 2000 

(internet version). The corporation will be jointly administered by at least four 

key entities involved in the development of the DF-21 and its sea- launched 

sister, the JL-1: Beijing Electromechanical Engineering Design Department (4th 

Department); Academy of space Solid Rocket Engine Technology (4th 

Academy); Beijing Institute of Control and Electronic Engineering (17th 

Research Institute); Nanjing Chenguang Factory (307 Factory); and the China 

Aerospace Electromechanical Corporation. For a complete history of the DF21/JL-1 program, see Lewis and Xue, China’s Strategic Seapower. Also see Zhang 

Dexiong,” Guowai xiaoxing weixing de guti huojian tuijin xitong” (Solid 

Rocket Propulsion Systems for Foreign Small Satellites), in Hangtian qingbao 

yanjiu, HQ-93011, pp. 139-155; Wang Zheng,” Screening Studies and 

Technology for All-Solid space Launch vehicles,” Guti huojian fadongji sheji yu 

yanjiu (Solid Rocket Engine Design and Research), April 1996, pp. 63-73, in 

CAMA, Vol. 3, No. 6, 1996; and Zhang Song,” Design and optimization of 

Solid Launch vehicle Trajectory,” Guti huojian jishu, Vol. 20, No. 1, 1997, pp. 1-5; and 

Zhang Dexiong,” China’s Development Concept for Small Solid Launch vehicles,” 

CASC Fourth Academy Information Research Reports, the Fourth ed., October 

1995, pp. 1-11, in CAMA, Vol. 5, No. 2. 

 108. Cheng Yuejin,” Information transmission System of Data Relay 

satellites,” Kongjian jishu qingbao yanjiu, July 1994, pp. 185-193, in CAMA, Vol. 1, 

No. 6. Cheng is from the Xian Institute of Radio Technology. Also see Tan 
166

Liying,” Selection of Wave length Region for Optical Intersatellite 

Communication,” Haerbin gongye daxue xuebao, Vol. 26, No. 3, 1994, pp. 24-27, in 

CAMA, Vol. 1, No. 6; Chen Daoming, “Frequency and Orbit of Data Relay 

Satellites,” in Zhongguo kongjian kexue jishu, Vol. 16, No. 1, 1996, pp. 26-31, in 

CAMA, Vol. 3, No. 3. 

 109. Department of Defense, Future military Capabilities and Strategy of the 

People’s Republic of China (Report to Congress pursuant to Section 1226 of the 

FY98 National Defense Authorization Act), Washington, DC: U.S. 

Government Printing office, 1998. 

 110. Jin Weixin,” Mathematical Modeling of Tactical Surface to Surface 

Missiles Against TMD,” in Systems Engineering and Electronic Technology, Vol. 17, 

No. 3, 1995, pp. 63-68, CAMA, Vol. 2, No. 3, 1995. 

 111. Senior Colonel Wang Benzhi,” Didi changui daodan huoli yunyong de jige 

wenti,” (Some Questions Related to the Use of Conventional Surface-to-Surface 

Missile Firepower), in Lianhe zhanyi yu junbingzhong zuozhan, (Joint Theater and 

Service Operations) Beijing: National Defense University Press, 1998, pp. 236-

241. As of 1998, Wang was the Chief of Staff of the second Artillery Huaihua Base 

(80305 Unit). The concept of synchronized, multi-axis strikes is a fundamental 

principle of Second Artillery conventional doctrine (duodian, duofangxiang, 

tongshi tuji). Other important operational concepts discussed by Wang from 

Huaihua include “xushi bingyong, shengdong xiji,” (literally “use reality, make a 

noise in the east, but strike to the west”); and “xiaojiange, duoboci tuji” (literally 

“cut time and strike in multiple waves”). The first calls for integration of 

simultaneous launches from different launch azimuths and use of infrared 

radiation “disruption “to confuse enemy satellite early warning systems and 

complicate enemy attack operations. The second includes use of two strike waves, 

the first “screening” the second by exploiting “time lags” (shijiancha) in missile 

defenses. 

 112. Gan and Liu, p. 45. Also see Zhang Demin,” Study on Penetration 

Techniques on New Generation Ballistic Missiles,” in Xinjunshi gemingzhong 

daodan wuqi fazhan qianjing, November 1996, pp. 18-24, in CAMA, Vol. 4, No. 2. 

 113. Si Xicai,” Research on Long Range Antiradiation Missile Passive 

Radar Seeker Technology,” in Zhanshu daodan jishu (Tactical Missile Technology), 
167

Vol. 2, 1995, pp. 42-52; other studies on specific approaches to ARM technology 

include Yang Huayuan,” Study on Super-wideband high Accuracy microwave 

DF System,” in Daojian yu zhidao xuebao, February 1995, pp. 7-12. At least one 

Second Academy entity that has conducted work on anti-radiation missile 

seeker technology is the Beijing Institute of Remote Sensing Equipment 

(probably the CASC 25th Research Institute). 

 114. Wang Chunyuan, China’s Space Industry and Its Strategy of International 

Cooperation, Stanford University Center for International Security and Arms 

Control, July 1996, p. 4; Marat Abulkhatin,” official on Prospects for space 

Cooperation,” Itar-Tass, October 10, 1996, in FBIS-SOV-96-198; and author’s 1994 

discussions with Chinese space officials responsible for international cooperation. 

 115. “Wang Liheng fujuzhang lutuan fangwen E’Wu liangguo (CASC 

Deputy Director Wang Liheng Leads Delegation to Russian and Ukraine), 

Zhongguo Hangtian bao, April 11, 1994, p. 1. 

 116. See Li Feizhu, “Taikong daodan genzhong xitong dui tufang cuoshi 

de yingyong (Influence of space and Missile Tracking System on Penetration 

Measures), unpublished China Academy of Engineering Physics paper, April 1999. 

 117. This point is made by Dr. Li Bin from the Institute of International 

Studies, Qinghua University in “The Effects of NMD on Chinese Strategy,” 

Jane’s Intelligence Review, March 1, 2001. 

 118. Federation of American Scientists estimates that the DF-5 could 

accommodate six warheads similar in size to those used on the DF-21 Mod 2. 

 119. See Stephen van Evera, “Offense, Defense, and the Causes of war,” 

International Security, Vol. 22, No. 4, Spring 1998, pp. 5-43. 

 120. U.S. joint doctrine notes that attack operations are the most effective and 

efficient means of countering the theater ballistic missiles. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

Joint Publication 3-01.5, Joint Doctrine for Countering Air and Missile Threats, 

Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1999. 
168

CHAPTER 6 

CHINESE REACTIONS TO NEW U.S. 

INITIATIVES ON MISSILE DEFENSE 

Eric A. McVadon 

INTRODUCTION 

The author of this chapter describes and analyzes Chinese views of 

U.S. Missile defense initiatives, based largely on interviews, meetings, 

lectures, and conversations with various Chinese officials, People’s 

Liberation Army (PLA) officers, think tankers, academics, and other 

strategic studies and security specialists in China.1 The core research was 

done during 3 weeks on the mainland in July and October 2001, plus other 

meetings held and materials obtained in the weeks before and after 

those visits. In general, it was not necessary to raise the missile issue with 

Chinese interlocutors; there was eagerness among these Chinese contacts to 

address the topic, describe Chinese positions, and raise questions. Given 

the similarity of many of the responses, it was clear that the topic has 

received ample attention, that the same material had been read all over 

China, and that there was universal support among officials and 

academics for the central objections to U.S. Missile defense initiatives, 

albeit with interesting modifications. 

PRC VIEWS OF THE UNITED STATES IN MID-2001 

Some observers in the United States have concluded that 2001 is a bad 

year for U.S.-China relations, that Washington’s drive toward missile 

defense and more arms for Taiwan, coup led with many other bilateral 

strains, has left Beijing unready, even unwilling, to deal with 
169

Washington. Chinese observers have a different view. Chinese diplomats 

in Washington asserted as early as the spring of 2001 that Beijing is, at the 

outset of the George W. Bush presidency, exercising restraint and being 

accommodating—despite many U.S. administration statements, 

including those on missile defense, that might be considered offensive to 

China. 

 The frequently expressed hope was that the anticipated meeting between 

Presidents Jiang Zemin and Bush in Beijing, coincident with the AsiaPacific Economic Council (APEC) session in Shanghai in October 2001, 

would result in much enhanced understanding and a steadily improving 

bilateral relationship. This expectation was particularly evident among 

interlocutors in China in July and encompassed a publicly expressed 

willingness, even desire, to discuss missile defense issues. This was in 

contrast to an earlier Chinese attitude of making righteous public 

pronouncements in opposition to missile defense programs but largely 

avoiding serious discussion, especially any form of discussion that would 

suggest Chinese behavior might be the subject of legitimate concern or 

reproach. As a consequence of the September 11, 2001, attacks on the 

World Trade Center and Pentagon, the Beijing meeting between Bush and 

Jiang did not occur, and missile defense was not prominent in their brief 

talks in Shanghai on the periphery of the APEC forum. 

 Amid this alleged Chinese willingness to accommodate2 and to await 

patiently the outcome of what is seen as a developing U.S. policy for 

China (and, more broadly, for Asia), there were seeming contradictions. 

These contradictions prominently included the arrests and trials (and 

subsequent deportations) of ethnic Chinese scholars with American 

connections, the continuing harsh crackdown on the Falun Gong 

movement, the sharp Chinese reaction to the reductions of military-tomilitary contacts initiated by the U.S. Department of Defense in 2001, and 

the handling of the April 2001 downing of the U.S. EP-3 surveillance 

aircraft. These topics could not be addressed fruitfully by the author in 

most open discussions in mid-2001; however, points were made by the 
170

Chinese, mostly in private discussions, that these should be understood 

as exceptional situations and kept in context (the Chinese context, of 

course). The Chinese side, they suggested, did not link these events to 

the Bush administration policy toward China or missile defense 

initiatives; and it was hoped that an American understanding of the 

factors involved would ensure that discussions of missile defense issues 

would not be prejudiced by these unrelated events. 

 The implications were that these events reflected three primarily domestic 

factors: 

 1. An obsession with the Taiwan issue that overrides considerations of how it 

might affect relations with the United States. The state security organs had 

doggedly sunk their teeth into the issue of scholars “misusing” information 

about the mainland, especially in such matters as making comparisons 

with Taiwan society and the like. In a written response to questions 

submitted to Jiang by the New York Times, it was asserted that the scholars 

were “members of Taiwan espionage organizations” and had “engaged in 

spy activities on many occasions on the mainland of China.”3 Discretion 

overrode valor for those Chinese officials who recognized the negative 

effects on China of such actions. Moreover, American reactions to the 

detentions and trials were not given high priority in evaluating the crusade; 

the audience for the actions was the body of ethnic Chinese scholars 

abroad who are inclined to undertake such work—and the Chinese 

public. As Senator Joseph Biden, Chairman of the U.S. Senate Foreign 

Relations Committee, said after meeting with Jiang and other officials at 

Beidaihe in August 2001,” They [the Chinese] are sending a not-sosubtle message. You [Americans] have a problem with [Chinese actions 

toward] Pakistan, with Iran; we have a problem with [American actions 

toward] Taiwan.” Biden said Jiang appeared preoccupied with the fate of the 

island Beijing regards as a rebel province.4

 2. Paranoia about the Falun Gong on the part of Jiang. Jiang, personally, 

was still firmly convinced that the regime was threatened by the Falun Gong 
171

“cult,” and no one with influence thought it prudent or useful to try to 

convince him of the counterproductive character of the actions; moreover, 

the campaign to discredit the movement and persuade the Chinese people of 

its evil nature was, indeed, succeeding—so why relent now?5

 3. Insecurity of Jiang about his future, especially as Chairman of the CMC. 

Jiang, although misled by the military as to the antecedent and 

proximate causes and circumstances of the collision between the PLA 

Navy F-8 and the U.S. Navy EP-3, did not think it prudent to take on the 

PLA leadership about the post-accident events or the their anger about the 

military relationship machinations by U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald 

Rumsfeld. Jiang was reluctant to ignore their ranting against the United 

States because this might complicate his expected retention of the position 

as Chairman of the Central military Commission after his upcoming 

retirement from the positions of President of China and Communist 

Party General Secretary. Thus avoiding confrontation with the military 

leadership is a major part of Jiang’s effort to ensure that he retains an 

influential position and protects his aspiration to gain “paramount leader” 

status comparable to that enjoyed by Deng Xiaoping and Mao Zedong. He, 

consequently, was not inclined to confront the military, and in both 

instances let the PLA have its way. 

 In short, these events that seemed to be avoidable incidents, almost 

gratuitously harming the relationship with the United States, were 

characterized by the Chinese as Jiang and others playing primarily to 

domestic—not international—audiences. There is another important 

aspect to this somewhat oblique explanation of contradictory conduct 

offered by Chinese specialists. These complications in the relationship were 

not in any way a reaction to U.S. missile defense initiatives, neither those 

against long-range nuclear missiles nor short-range conventional 

missiles, according to these Chinese sources. 

China is the Target of Nuclear missile Defense. 
172

Chinese specialists suggest that, indeed, their government is taking 

a measured, reasonable approach to U.S. missile defense initiatives. They 

do, nevertheless, argue, rather righteously (as usual), that U.S. statements 

about national missile defenses not being intended for use against 

China’s intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) force are not credible. 

One interlocutor pointed out that China has been a factor in U.S. 

concerns about defending itself against or deterring missile attacks since 

the middle of the last century. Moreover, most Chinese experts do not 

take seriously the expressions of U.S. concerns about missile threats from 

the “rogue states,” arguing generally that North Korean missile forces are 

not now, and will not become, significant, and that North Korea and 

other rogue nations have been and will continue to be deterred by the 

overwhelming U.S. conventional and nuclear capabilities. 

 The geography of the proposed defense sites (in Alaska) seems to the 

Chinese to be a placement specifically chosen to protect the United States 

against China’s long-range missiles—which they term a minimal 

deterrent arsenal. Based on the prevalent Chinese assertion that North Korea 

is not a real present or potential threat to the United States, the argument 

that the placement is to defend against a Pyongyang threat is discounted, 

even scorned. The Chinese believe firmly and state publicly what several 

hawkish Americans have stated (some more publicly than others): 

Regardless of what is said, China is the target of U.S. missile defenses. If the 

United States succeeds in developing a small interceptor force, 

Washington will inexorably move to a larger, more capable force, they 

assert. Less loudly spoken is that Beijing does not trust Washington as a 

world player with such a force any more than Washington trusts Beijing 

with its small (but probably increasing) and obsolescent (but 

modernizing) ICBM arsenal, allegedly useful only as a deterrent. 

It all depends on Washington, as the Chinese see it. In the eyes of the Chinese, 

much of the to-and-fro on the missile defense issue depends on the 

state of the bilateral relationship and the degree of mutual trust, a 
173

factor that could erode badly, remain stagnant, or improve 

significantly. They consider that the quality of the relationship 

depends almost wholly on Washington’s thinking and actions. From their 

perspective, an important factor is whether Washington has, indeed, made, or 

is in the process of making, a fundamental change in its strategic outlook 

with respect to China. A prominent Chinese thinker in talks in Washington in 

early summer 2001 opined that he thought his government had taken a waitand-see attitude. For him and others, there is the hope that the U.S. adheres to a 

one-China policy and that the bilateral relationship returns to a less 

bumpy track, but there is no conclusion yet. The apparent warming of 

Sino-U.S. relations after September 11 and the cordial, if truncated, 

Bush-Jiang meeting in Shanghai, have most Chinese wondering if the 

enhanced relationship will persist or return to bickering over the same old 

disputes as time passes. 

 In mid-2001 another Chinese strategist and specialist in American studies 

described two schools of thought in China on U.S. Strategy. One is the 

conviction that U.S. strategy is “aimed at China.” The other is that U.S. 

strategy is more globally directed (aimed at much more than China). He 

noted that, predating Bush administration pronouncements, President 

William Clinton had stated the U.S. shift to a focus on Asia. These and 

other such arguments made by other interlocutors seemed to hold out the 

prospect that U.S. policy for China and Asia was not yet in concrete, and that 

it was still in the process of formulation, implying an opportunity for 

those in Beijing and elsewhere to influence it. This, coup led with the events 

in September and October, encourage Beijing’s hopes that, despite U.S.-

Russian deal-making, it has not been relegated to an altogether passive role 

on the missile defense issue. 

 A well-connected academic remarked that hearing U.S. Secretary of 

State Colin Powell and Rumsfeld talk about issues relating to China or 

about which China was concerned was like listening to two governments. 

He made this observation on the day that Powell arrived in Beijing in July 

2001 to prepare for the meeting between the two presidents, then 3 
174

months in the future. The Chinese are convinced that they have taken the 

rational position, and that it is the Bush administration, in its early 

pronouncements about favoring Japan and Taiwan and being firmer on 

China, that was producing uncertainty and instability in the bilateral 

relationship—and could return to that once Beijing’s support is seen as no 

longer needed in the war on terrorism. Furthermore, the Chinese do not 

believe that their conduct warrants such harsh treatment and insulting 

affronts by Washington. They refuse, for example, to recognize that 

Beijing’s firm position on the Taiwan problem including its refusal to 

renounce the use of force, plus other issues such as human rights, makes 

Washington conclude that Beijing is the culprit. 

CHINESE REACTION TO DEFENSES AGAINST ICBMS (NMD) 

Although the Bush administration has merged the concepts of 

national missile defense (NMD) and theater missile defense (TMD) into 

the common term missile defense system (MDS)6, China’s reactions can 

best be described and analyzed while preserving the distinction of defenses 

against ICBMs and defenses against short-range and medium-range 

ballistic missiles (SRBMs and MRBMs). For the most part, China, while 

acknowledging the blurring of the distinction, continues to object to the 

two in different ways and on different grounds, and there are also specific 

objections to the concept of MDS—the merging of the two concepts into 

some sort of layered defense of wide areas. 

Measured Chinese Opposition. 

Beijing is not ranting about NMD. It is not using alarmist 

expressions and is not engaging in name-calling, as it so often does on 

other issues—and as it did earlier on this one. There is little, if any, rhetorical 

excess, as was the case in the fall of 2000 when the Defense White Paper 

described the Taiwan issue as “complicated and grim.” Absent in 
175

missile defense discussions are the term shegemonism and power politics, 

and the accusations, like those from the White Paper, that “certain big 

powers are pursuing ‘neo-interventionism’ [and] neo-gunboat 

diplomacy.” In Jiang’s written responses to the New York Times questions 

in August 2001, the points on missile defense are only that (1) China does 

not favor the proposed U.S. move that it fears would jeopardize strategic 

stability, (2)it wishes to discuss solutions that would not harm the security 

of any side, and(3) China needs to maintain the effectiveness of its “selfdefense” nuclear force.7

NMD Can be Overwhelmed or Defeated. 

That was the tone struck by Chinese interlocutors. In June, a 

prominent Chinese think tanker went so far as to suggest (a bit 

simplistically) that China could tolerate ten interceptor missiles because 

that would not defeat China’s 20 ICBMs and that China could, in any 

case, build additional ICBMs in the 10 or more years before such a system 

could be deployed—if it works. On the matter of NMD efficacy, many 

Chinese specialists think that it will not work and that it certainly will not 

work soon. Several referred to NMD as Great Wall or Maginot Line 

thinking. A PLA general officer, who is considered a strategic thinker, 

commented on the analogy that missile defense is a train that has already 

left the station. He said that might be true but that the tracks are not yet 

complete; effective missile defense, in his view, simply may not be feasible, 

especially in the short term. 

NMD Will Cost a Lot and Not Work. 

Some put a positive spin (for China) on this argument, suggesting that 

China will not follow the Soviet example of reaction to President Ronald 

Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI, or Star Wars) but could 

easily maintain sufficient missiles to overcome the defenses while the 
176

United States expends enormous resources on its ineffective obsession. 

China, they say, will increase and improve its ICBM arsenal, but U.S. 

NMD will not be a central impetus for that undertaking because NMD is not 

expected to work very well. Some Chinese go so far as to argue that fewer 

resources than planned need now to be expended on ICBM modernization 

because NMD, by whatever name, will not be effective, that minor offensive 

changes will continue to overcome difficult defensive modifications. 

 The PLA general officer strategist, when pressed, tempered his 

argument a bit. He said that although effective missile defenses may be 

infeasible, if the technology is present, they would be built; no American 

president could refuse to do so. However, he forecast that NMD could not 

be developed before the end of this decade, so China has time to ensure 

its nuclear forces are effective. It is, of course, hard to determine if this 

theme of NMD ineffectiveness is mouthed in order to discourage its 

development or because the Chinese have, indeed, convinced themselves 

that it will not work. The latter seems most likely. 

No Nuclear Arms Race. 

China, it was said, does not want to expend resources on building up a 

much larger ICBM force; it wants both economic development and a 

deterrent. That combination seems feasible to the Chinese specialists. A 

PLA general officer suggested that China’s response would be 

proportional and would not result in an arms race or even a priority item in 

the Chinese defense budget. China, he said, would do extra things, but 

just enough; it would not go overboard. Others said China would not 

react strongly to NMD and would not build a large number of missiles. 

Nuclear weapons, one civilian specialist argued, are just for deterrence, 

not real weapons. China will not waste its resources on a useless 

system. 

 There has a bit of gloating among some of the specialists that the United 
177

States would likely proceed headlong and spend an enormous amount of 

money on a system not likely to work and that, putting a finer point on 

earlier arguments, offensive missiles and imaginative penetration 

techniques were far easier and cheaper to devise and produce than 

defensive missiles and complex target discrimination technologies. 

However, none of the interlocutors, even in response to provocative 

questioning, took a position that the United States would rue the day it 

undertook NMD against the wise and wily Chinese, or anything 

resembling that position. Other threats and bluster were not offered. The 

tone of the conversations resembled that taken by Sha Zukang, Director 

of the Arms Control Department in China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in 

March 2001 when he said that, even if NMD were developed by the United 

States, China would not necessarily take radical steps such as 

withdrawing from the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty [implying also 

ending its moratorium on nuclear weapon testing], as had been 

threatened previously.8

NMD Would Reduce Security. 

Instead, the gentler suggestion was made often that the United States 

and China might both be less secure as a result of NMD. The general 

officer strategist and a civilian specialist in Beijing said China is concerned 

about the ramifications for outer space, fearing a U.S. move to put missile 

defenses in space would invite others to employ weapons in space or to 

react unpredictably to one country’s “weaponizing space.” In the short 

term, there would be an increase in the capability of the United States to 

defend itself; but in the long term the United States will “repent.” The 

general went on to argue that the United States spent many years building a 

nonproliferation regime and now seems to be throwing all that away 

and inviting proliferation. The crux of his argument was that the 

national security of one country cannot be based on increased 

insecurity of others, and that absolute security cannot be achieved. 

Defenses, he suggested, sometimes invite proliferation rather than stop it. 
178

As did others, he pointed the finger at countries other than China, 

forecasting that, in reacting to U.S. missile defense, China will do just a 

few things; others will do much more. 

 Others elaborated on this theme. An arms control specialist said 

some countries would react to NMD by developing an improved 

capability to penetrate defenses; others would turn to other methods of 

delivery or to alternatives such as biological weapons. He then made a less 

familiar argument. He said NMD would lead to a sense of false security. If it 

were to work, the United States would feel secure against North Korea, 

for example. Yet Washington would, in building missile defenses, not 

only have further antagonized Pyongyang but also would have failed to 

give the appropriate attention to resolving the underlying problems in 

relations with North Korea—and probably further exacerbated them. 

To bolster his argument, he said Pyongyang has reacted favorably to 

overtures from Beijing and Moscow to curtail its missile program. A 

tough message from Washington about missile defense would be 

counterproductive, he argued. Almost in passing, he added that all this is 

about a country that does not, in the view of China, pose a credible 

nuclear missile threat to the United States—a country that wants and 

needs better relations with the United States.9

 A specialist in Beijing gave it a geopolitical twist. He said that if Bush’s 

plan for missile defenses were completed, the world would be divided into 

two parts: that covered by MDs, and that left uncovered. That returns us to a 

bipolar world. The real security problems in the world are based on lack of 

trust. MDs would exacerbate the underlying problem of lack of trust 

between various countries and work counter to the concept of confidencebuilding measures (CBMs), he argued. 

North Korea No Threat. 

As mentioned previously, the Chinese argue frequently and with 
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conviction that North Korea is not now, and will not become, a threat to 

the United States. As one civilian specialist put it, North Korea’s territory is 

too small to develop a nuclear weapon system that would include 

launching facilities, force protection, etc. North Korea cannot develop 

the technology to get missiles even to the western United States, he 

asserted. In any event, North Korea could only launch, not survive; it 

would be a real suicide, he said emphatically. Several others pointed out 

that North Korea’s failure to initiate military action over half-acentury makes the point that the leaders in Pyongyang are not irrational. 

Chinese press this argument about the lack of credible threat from 

North Korea in significant measure to support their belief that U.S. 

defenses against ICBMs are ultimately intended to negate China’s nuclear 

deterrent. 

Piling On. 

One gains the sense in talking to Chinese specialists on the missile 

defense issue that a great deal of time has been spent contriving and 

cataloguing arguments against missile defenses, apparently in the belief 

that the number of arguments made will count in the debate. As an example, 

a think tanker in Beijing said that China is worried about the prospect of an 

arms race but not between China and the United States. He feared that, 

if the United States builds missile defenses, other countries could build 

up their missile forces in response and then later could turn those 

missiles on China, or at least those missiles would be a threat to China. 

Nevertheless, most of the arguments offered are along similar lines and 

often employ precisely the same words and phrases, such as the 

comparison of NMD with the Great Wall and the Maginot Line mentioned 

previously. At a minimum, one must conclude that the specialists have 

all read the same material or heard the same spiel. 

The Second-Strike Issue. 
180

Two quite different views were offered (quite clinically) by two 

interlocutors on the issue of Chinese interest in a second-strike 

capability (after an initial U.S. nuclear strike on China). A Chinese 

strategist speaking (not for attribution) here in the United States said that 

China needs a second-strike capability—in addition to the ability to 

overwhelm a U.S. defense against ICBMs.10 A Beijing civilian specialist 

suggested it was all moot. He argued privately (and gravely) that 

Chinese leaders would be unable to find a single major American city 

where close relatives of important Chinese leaders do not now live. He 

concluded on that basis that there is no realistic utility to China’s ICBMs; 

they have only deterrent value, no real value as weapons. This was 

offered, not frivolously, but as a serious appraisal. He also noted that the 

United States had, for very different reasons, elected not to use nuclear 

weapons in Korea in 1953, suggesting that neither country has the stomach 

to employ them. 

THE ABM TREATY ISSUE 

Most of the interlocutors predicted, in one way or another, that 

Moscow would not, in the end, stand firmly with China on the matter of 

opposition to any meddling with the 1972 Anti-Ballistic missile (ABM) Treaty 

that might permit missile defenses desired by Washington but 

prohibited by the treaty. At least as early as June 2001, a prominent 

specialist said that he expected Russia to concede its opposition to NMD 

and that China should be ready to go its own way. A civilian specialist 

in Beijing, noting that Russia must for economic reasons reduce the 

size of its nuclear arsenal, said in advance of the July 2001 Putin-Bush 

meeting in Genoa that Russia would compromise on the ABM Treaty 

issue. He explained further that on a scale of 1-10 Russia was at 10 in its 

concern about NMD and 5 about TMD; China was at 5 on NMD and 10 on 

TMD. He translated that into an expectation that Moscow would 

compromise with Washington and enter into some form of cooperation 
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on NMD and warhead numbers. 

 After Russian President Vladimir Putin stated publicly with Bush in 

Genoa in late July 2001 that offensive missiles and missile defense would 

be treated as a set, Chinese specialists uniformly took the position that we 

were later to hear from Jiang in his New York Times interview: the 

matter could be worked. Possibly their concern was less than most 

American analysts expected, they expected that Putin had another card up 

his sleeve, or Beijing decided to put the best face on their disappointment. 

A retired senior PLA officer now with a strategic studies institute told a 

small international audience in Hong Kong in very late July 2001 that he 

had expected Russia to make a deal with the United States on the matter, or 

at least thought it was possible. Not even the Bush-Putin November 2001 

meeting on this issue seemed to discourage the Chinese. 

 A well-connected senior think tanker put it this way: China’s 

preference was to stand solid with Russia in opposition to change to the 

ABM Treaty that would permit NMD, but China had seen very early the 

prospect for change in Russia’s position. He said that there are in this 

matter “gray areas.” China, he asserted, could still work with Russia 

and talk with the United States. Noting that China’s former principal arms 

control official, Sha Zukang, has said he wants to discuss missile defense 

with the United States, he said there could be talk on the “merits” of 

missile defense and on overall relations; may be there is room for 

maneuvering, he ruminated. He concluded with the hope that Jiang and 

Bush, in Beijing in October 2001, would discuss the issue and find some 

way out. Although that meeting did not take place, it still seems that Beijing 

wants to finesse the issue, make the best of it, or at least not to give the 

impression that China is panicky over the unfavorable development—whatever 

precise form it may take as Bush and Putin continue to talk without a 

representative from Beijing present. 

CHINA’S VIEWS ON THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE (TMD) 
182

TMD to Protect U.S. Forces and Bases Is Okay. 

Ambassador Sha Zukang, who has now left his post as China’s primary 

arms control official, has for half a decade voiced his assertion that TMD 

intended to shield U.S. forces and bases in Asia were understandable to 

Beijing and would not draw a radical reaction from China. He has referred 

to this as “pure” TMD, implying apparently that it did not involve Japan 

or Taiwan or threaten Chinese strategic missiles. He repeated that 

position in March 2001 in response to questioning about U.S. plans to 

deploy systems to protect U.S. forces based in Asia. He said, “There is a gray 

area here. China is not opposed to [theater missile defense]... To protect troops 

and military bases.” Nothing has been heard from a successor on this 

issue, affirming or denying the position. This may be in part because of the 

uncertainty about where the U.S. TMD program is headed as major changes 

are made in the overall U.S. missile defense program and Washington’s 

attention and resources are concentrated on the war on terrorism. 

For the Republic of Korea (ROK). 

Chinese officials and specialists are generally relaxed about TMD 

and South Korea because Seoul has, so far, chosen not to participate. 

There is satisfaction among the Chinese that part of the reason Seoul does 

not want to obtain a TMD system is that Koreans do not want to “poke China 

in the eye.” South Koreans have expressed the view that TMD is not an 

effective defense against their biggest concern: North Korean artillery and 

other forces just north of Seoul, that the North Korean threat may in any case 

go away, and that then the ROK would be stuck with a very expensive system 

seemingly suitable only to defend against Chinese missiles. Chinese are not 

giving much attention yet to the rumblings among some ROK military leaders 

that it would be a mistake for them to get left behind in missile defense 

technology—technology that many think will be an integral part of any 
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modern armed force in coming decades. 

For Japan. 

China’s objections to TMD for Japan persist. Various concerns are 

expressed with various degrees of seriousness.11 The earlier arguments that 

TMD would provide a militaristic Japan with the shield behind which it could, 

in a matter of months, develop and deploy nuclear missiles is heard 

infrequently now. Nevertheless, there remain concerns that the technology 

shared with Japan as a result of Japanese participation with the United States 

on TMD research and development will aid a future Japanese ballistic missile 

program. One specialist pointed out that Japanese Aegis-equipped ships 

could be used in the Taiwan Strait, obviously thinking that he had made a 

telling point which would cause even Americans to recoil at the very thought 

of such a thing. The Chinese have been attentive to the Japanese sending of 

destroyers to the Indian Ocean in noncombat support of the U.S. effort in 

Afghanistan. At least in part because of this Chinese angst, Aegis-equipped 

ships, although already a part of the Japanese maritime Self-Defense Force, 

were not dispatched by Prime minister Junichiro Koizumi. 

 More generally, the Chinese argue that TMD is yet another American 

mistake in dealing with Japan. Beijing argues that Japan is the real future 

threat to regional stability and that the United States is aiding the potential 

resurgence of Japanese militarism by many of the things it is doing to aid 

the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (JSDF). The aspect of the U.S.-Japan 

alliance that has been seen as controlling Japan or curbing Japanese 

militarism has led in the past to Chinese acceptance that the alliance was, 

on balance, favorable for China, but TMD is seen as part of a shift toward 

the alliance making the JSDF more capable and more likely to threaten 

China, even to come to the support of Taiwan in some way in a conflict—

especially one with U.S. involvement. 

 Some Chinese interlocutors will acknowledge that the real root of their 
184

concern about TMD for Japan is that the Japanese, while wringing their 

hands about North Korean Taepodong missiles, are actually looking 

over their shoulders at Chinese missiles. The essence of the concern, then, 

is that China wants to be able to hold at risk with its ballistic missiles Japan 

and, of course, U.S. bases in Japan and yet does not want to make loud 

public pronouncements to that effect. TMD for Japan would spoil that. 

For Taiwan. 

Beijing continues to express in the strongest term sits opposition to 

TMD for Taiwan. It has said it will react harshly to the transfer of missile 

defense from the United States to Taiwan. There has been no diminution 

of this opposition to providing defenses for Taiwan, even as Beijing has seemed 

to take a more measured outlook with respect to NMD. The drum beat has 

intensified on the assertion that TMD for Taiwan is bad enough in itself 

but that the introduction of real missile defense there will mean far 

greater and closer coordination between the armed forces of the United 

States and those of Taiwan. That is described as a greater concern by far than 

the acquisition of the various TMD systems. 

 There is also in China now a more intense concern than expressed 

previously about the prospect of the transfer of Patriot Advanced 

Capability 3 (PAC-3) ground-based air and missile defenses to Taiwan. 

This is the most likely real TMD that Taiwan might obtain, although it is 

still a rudimentary capability against short-range ballistic missiles. 

Previously, Chinese concerns over PAC-3 had been muted in favor of 

decrying the prospective transfer of ships equipped with the U.S. Navy Aegis 

air and missile defense system, a system that is expected eventually to have a 

TMD capability. The Chinese are still more wrought up about Aegis 

than PAC-3, but now both are of considerable concern. 

 A well-informed Chinese think tanker has suggested that the 

deployment (already) by China of 300 or more short-range ballistic 
185

missiles (SRBMs) in Fujian, with about 50 more missiles coming each year, 

might be stopped or reversed were Taiwan to accept the one-China principle. 

(He went on to say that Beijing could not now make such a move because it 

would redound to the benefit of current Taiwan President Chen Shuibian and aid his political party, the hated Democratic Progressive Party 

[DPP].13) Furthermore, other Chinese interlocutors now at least accept the 

fact that these missiles threatening Taiwan are indeed being deployed by 

their military. They now assert that all should understand that the 

purpose of these missiles is only for deterrence of a Taiwan move toward 

autonomy, not for use as weapons. Previously, even senior PLA officers 

have often denied the missile deployments or refused to discuss the 

subject. They simply said that every thing concerning Taiwan was purely 

an internal affair. It is not that these developments signal that a 

solution to the issue is at hand, but at least, when conditions for removing 

missiles are raised and the fact of deployments by the hundreds is 

acknowledged, the prospects for reasonable discussion and even 

negotiation are enhanced. 

Might the Door be Open a Crack? 

Because of the intertwining of TMD and Taiwan, Beijing’s concerns 

about TMD clearly exceed those about NMD. Nonetheless, Chinese 

official and unofficial spokesmen, as has been described, have at least 

acknowledged that TMD for U.S. forces in Asia is reasonable and that 

their SRBMs threatening Taiwan exist and are part of the problem and an 

element in its possible solution. 

CHINESE REACTIONS TO THE MERGING OF NMD AND TMD INTO 

MDS 

Chinese Confusion: Real or Feigned? 
186

There is among Chinese specialists confusion (or professed 

confusion) about the Bush administration’s merging of NMD and 

TMD. Beyond the uncertainty, acknowledged by Rumsfeld, about just 

what the new concept of a missile defense system (MDS) implies,14 the 

Chinese ask questions about Japan and Taiwan. Does MDs means that the 

Japanese TMD cooperation with the United States would have, as part of 

MDS, an NMD component against China’s long-range missiles? Others 

raised the issue of whether PAC-3 would then be a part of MDS, thinking 

that it was absolute anathema to any logical person to suggest that 

Taiwan (which may get PAC-3) could be a part of MDS. Underlying many 

of the concerns expressed was the profound worry: beyond the direct 

implications for China’s ICBM force, would Taiwan be construed as 

part of MDS, meaning an even greater degree of coordination between U.S. 

and Taiwan armed forces? It is difficult at this early stage in the “MDS 

merger” to ascertain the degree to which the Chinese confusion is real or 

whether the MDS matter is being used as a peg on which to hang more Chinese 

arguments against missile defenses and to offer up more concerns 

about Taiwan. 

MDS Could Negate All China’s Ballistic Missile Arsenals. 

There is inherent in this inchoate MDS concept the specter of a world 

wide system, including sea-based and land-based interceptor missiles of 

various sorts and an airborne laser (to kill missiles in their boost-phase 

ascent), that would put in jeopardy China’s ICBM deterrent arsenal, its 

SRBMs, and even medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs). Powell’s 

visit to Beijing in late July 2001 did not assuage Chinese concerns on this 

issue. His arguments that the U.S. missile defense system would be 

limited and no threat to Chinese long-range missiles was, for the Chinese, 

drowned out by noises from elsewhere outside (but close to) the 

administration that send other signals and the silence within the 

administration, based on acknowledged uncertainty, about how the 

concept will evolve. 
187

The Taiwan Complication. 

A young researcher at a strategic institute in Shanghai summed up the 

Chinese view of MDS: the Bush administration’s blurring of NMD and 

TMD is apparently a program to cover more countries with a missiledefense blanket. This complicates the Chinese view of missile defense 

with respect to Taiwan and gives China more reason to object to any form 

of missile defense for Taiwan. This is not a positive development from 

the Chinese military view point. Coupled with the announced U.S. focus on 

Asia, this will give Chinese hard-liners a stronger argument. As with other 

arguments concerning Taiwan, the speaker considered that his point had 

been made tellingly when he said even Taiwan might be protected by MDS. 

THE CHINESE DESIRE OR WILLINGNESS TO TALK ABOUT MISSILE 

DEFENSE ISSUES 

For some American observers, it appears that Beijing and Washington 

are so firmly entrenched in mutually irreconcilable positions that there 

might seem to be no hope for negotiation of a positive outcome or any 

other form of resolution. Yet Sha, then head of the arms control 

department of the Chinese MFA, in March 2001 agreed to talks on NMD 

that he hoped would “narrow... differences,” and he welcomed Assistant 

Secretary of State James Kelly to Beijing in May. In Kelly’s departure 

statement after those talks, he said he had explained the overall American 

strategy, and that there was agreement to a continuing dialogue. 

Beijing wants Both Economic Progress and Deterrence. 

Although this statement by Kelly may have had an understandably 

optimistic tilt, there are other positive signs. As is well known, China is 
188

already testing a modern ICBM, the DF-31, to replace its obsolescent 

DF-5A force, but Beijing does not want to expend the resources to build 

hundreds of missiles (enough to overcome any NMD envisioned) or to 

greatly improve its missiles to make them less vulnerable to intercept. As 

alluded to previously, a responsible Chinese specialist on this issue has 

suggested that Beijing might be able to tolerate the 10 NMD interceptors 

recently mentioned by Rumsfeld, but that China could not tolerate 250 

interceptor missiles. According to Chinese sources, when Kelly met Sha, 

Sha did not indicate a readiness to compromise so far; however, if 

China’s core interest is respected “to some extent,” China may be flexible, 

according to this well-informed security specialist. China, it was 

suggested, wants both economic development [unfettered by a need for a 

large nuclear buildup] and to maintain a deterrent. This speculative 

tidbit about possible Chinese compromise is certainly not a breakthrough, 

but it does reflect, it seems, a desire by China to talk and offers 

Washington a bit of negotiating room. 

 The talks with Kelly were viewed in China as successful only in that they 

held out the promise of further talks. The Chinese were apparently unhappy 

at the level of seniority—an assistant secretary rather than the deputy 

secretary of state who had visited other Asian countries (and Australia) on the 

tour that included Kelly. It was noted that Bush administration very 

senior people talk to Russia and other countries, as did the Clinton 

administration; but that there had been, as of mid-July 2001, no such talks 

with China. An arms control specialist pointed out bluntly that Bush has 

personally spoken to other presidents on missile defense(by phone and in 

person, he volunteered), but he had not, to that point, spoken to Jiang on that 

topic. Yet Powell was in Beijing in late July, he reported that, although 

missile defense was a major agenda item for his session with Foreign 

Minister Tang Jiaxuan, there had been no in-depth discussion about 

missile defense. The Chinese had only “listened and responded with a 

question or two.”15
189

Chinese Suggestions about Missile-Defense Talks with the United 

States. 

In any event, the Chinese were, in the weeks preceding the expected 

Bush-Jiang October meeting, indicating a readiness to talk and making 

suggestions about how that might proceed. They now have the prospect of a 

summit in 2002, and the prospect that Sino-U.S. relations may be much 

improved over early 2001. The arms control specialist in Beijing explained 

what Americans should understand before the United States talks to 

China on the missile defense issue. He said that Americans need to 

understand more fully the Chinese political situation. Jiang has to 

contend with pressure from public opinion. He has to convince the 

Chinese people and the Chinese media16 that the United States is not to be 

feared. 

 He then suggested that, in developing an agenda for talks, it is important 

for China to know what form of missile defense the United States 

contemplates because missile defenses are seen in China as a form of U.S. 

hegemony. Next, talks should turn to the threat missiles pose to the United 

States and to China and Russia. Options other than missile defenses that 

could reduce the threat should be discussed, as well as options with 

respect to the issue of the ABM Treaty.17 Then, options for missile defense 

systems to be deployed would be appropriately discussed. He added that, 

in the Chinese view, there is now no real threat that warrants a national 

missile defense. 

 Viewed cynically, this carefully laid out proposal for an agenda 

illustrates that what China, in the view of this well-informed specialist 

in Beijing, wants to do is force the United States to describe the concept in 

at least some detail, talk about options other than missile defense to cope 

with the threat, and then argue that national missile defense is neither 

needed nor appropriate and that abandoning the ABM Treaty is unwise. 

 Another interlocutor suggested that the United States and China 
190

should begin now to exchange views at other than the very senior level, 

that an early diverse dialogue would be beneficial. He said that it is 

important to find a way to discuss missile defense issues seriously at 

senior levels, expert levels, and in Track 2 (nongovernmental 

channels) or other such unofficial venues. His reasoning was that, if 

the United States deploys missile defenses, China would have to increase 

the number and quality of its nuclear forces. The United States should 

use all these diverse opportunities to persuade China that NMD is not 

intended against China. [This suggestion by a somewhat senior PLA 

reserve officer at a strategic institute is noteworthy primarily because he 

was the only specialist who seemed to take seriously the U.S. position 

that missile defenses are not ultimately intended to be able to defeat 

China’s ICBM force.] 

Does China Want to Share in Missile Defense? 

On the issue of the Americans possibly offering to share missile 

defense technology with China, there were two divergent views: An 

arms control specialist at a Beijing institute opined that China may, contrary 

to previous positions, be interested in having the United States share missile 

defense technology with China. China is concerned that the United States may 

react to a Chinese attack on Taiwan with a first strike, and that the United 

States could then defeat a Chinese retaliatory strike with its missile defenses. 

He rushed to add that he did not consider the scenario realistic, but that such 

theoretical scenarios were the stuff of arms control strategic thinking. 

 The other view was offered by a civilian specialist and former diplomat 

associated with the State Council. Chinese officials, he said, think that the 

United States is not inclined to share missile-defense technology with China 

but believe the United States is more likely to share that technology with 

Russia. Moreover, he asserted, the examples of disaster with military 

technology transfers from the United States in 1989, after events at 

Tiananmen Square, serve as a lesson for Chinese who might consider a 
191

program of U.S. transfer of important technology. After more than a decade, 

the Tiananmen sanctions are still in place. China cannot risk cooperation with 

the United States, he stated flatly and without acrimony. 

China Wants to be Heard. 

An arms control specialist who is currently working on precisely the topic 

of how China should react to the Bush administration missile defense issues 

made a hopeful observation. He said that, propitiously, there have been no 

final decisions yet by the United States on missile defense. He expects [or may 

be hopes and is, in effect, making a plea to Americans to whom he talks] the 

United States to talk to China and not present China with a fait accompli on 

the issue. It is not good, he said plaintively, for Americans to say that missile 

defenses will be deployed regardless of the views of others, “no matter 

what.” A senior and well-connected figure at a prestigious think tank 

summed up China’s reaction to the Bush program saying that China wants to 

talk more on missile defense issues and wants the United States to leave 

room in its policy formulation for the legitimate concerns of China. 

China, he reminded, has small but “legitimate” nuclear forces. If MDS 

works and these forces are neutralized, what is China to do? he asked, 

apparently rhetorically, seeming to know that there would be no answer 

forthcoming. 

Nurture the Good or Attack the Bad? 

Professor Yang Jiemian at the Shanghai Institute for International 

Studies used the analogy of western and Chinese medicines in 

explaining his view of how Beijing and Washington approach the missile 

defense issue and the root problem of the threat of missile attacks. He 

said Western medicine is like missile defense in that it vigorously 

attacks a specific aspect of the problem, concentrating potent, even 

dangerous, medication or therapy on a certain component of the situation 
192

that seems to be producing the symptoms. By contrast, Chinese medicine 

more broadly attempts to nourish the positive aspects of a situation to 

create steady improvements that overcome or resolve the narrow problem and 

prevent its recurrence. 

Prognosis. 

It was made quite clear that a central theme of any discussions the 

United States may have with China on missile defenses will be the 

Chinese conviction or assertion that such a protective shield, even if 

successful technologically and militarily, will ill serve the overarching 

security interests of the United States, its allies and friends, and China. If 

Washington wishes to respond to that criticism, the reply would probably 

begin with an argument that the United States can find a way to have 

adequate missile defenses and, at the same time, improve or sustain its 

bilateral and multilateral relation ships and demonstrate that it will not 

be hegemonic. That argument would almost certainly fall on deaf ears, 

because the Chinese have convinced themselves that missile defenses are 

“false security,” counterproductive, and even obstacles to resolving 

international security problems; many Chinese strategists have also convinced 

themselves that the United States increasingly acts in an interventionist and 

hegemonic fashion. 

 Nonetheless, it appears that, if desired by Washington, there is a real 

prospect of having meaningful discussions with China on missile defenses 

because Beijing is sending the clear signal that it is willing to talk—or at the 

very least that it wants to be heard. It will be left to the patience and skill of the 

negotiators and to other unpredictable factors whether avenues for progress 

and understanding will open during the talks, if they are held, or whether both 

sides will simply bog down in their deeply rutted tracks—or may be they 

should be termed “preset trajectories.” 
193

ENDNOTES- CHAPTER 6 

1. Although it is not appropriate to mention the individual 

interlocutors, spokesmen, and questioners, the organizations 

represented in the discussions included: in Beijing, the Division of Arms 

Control and Security Studies at the China Institute of Contemporary 

International Relations (CICIR), the Institute for Strategic Studies at the 

PLA National Defense University, the School of International Studies 

American Studies Center at Beijing University, and the Institute of 

world Development of the State Council of the PRC, Institute of 

American Studies of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS); in 

Harbin, the Heilongjiang Provincial Academy of Social Sciences; in 

Shanghai, the Shanghai Institute for International Studies (SIIS), 

Shanghai Institute for East Asian Studies, and the Shanghai Center for 

Rimpac Strategic and International Studies; in Hangzhou, Zhejiang 

Academy of Social Science; in Guangzhou, Center for Asia Pacific 

Studies (CAPS) and Institute of Southeast Asia Studies of Zhongshan 

University, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies at Jinan University, and 

the Institute of International Studies of the Guangzhou Academy of 

Social Sciences; in Xiamen, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies of 

Xiamen University. Additionally, the topic was discussed extensively at 

the three-day 2001 Hong Kong Convention of International Studies 

sponsored by the International Studies Association (ISA) and the 

University of Hong Kong, 26-28 July. 

 2. There was more than rhetoric to the Chinese assertion that, 

despite affronts by the Bush administration, China would turn the other 

cheek. For example, Chinese officials announced in early August 2001 

that China would buy 36 Boeing 737 jetliners that could be worth up to $2 

billion. Martin Fackler, “China Airlines to Buy Boeing Jets,” Associated 

Press wire report, August 9, 2001. In contrast to this announcement, 

China has in the past made decisions not to buy American commercial 

aircraft to demonstrate its annoyance with Washington’s actions on 

various matters. China quickly offered its support of the U.S. response to 
194

the September 2001 terrorist attacks. This likely stemmed from both a 

desire to enhance bilateral relations, express outrage at the attacks, and 

gain U.S. support (or at least more understanding and acceptance of 

China’s problems with terrorism in Xinjiang—where it has long warned 

of the dangers of Islamic fundamentalism). 

 3. "Jiang’s Responses to Questions Submitted Prior to Interview,” 

New York Times, August 10, 2001. 

 4. Jeremy Page, “China’s Jiang Preoccupied with Taiwan—U.S. 

Senator,” Reuters wire report, Beijing, August 9, 2001. 

 5. “Jiang’s Responses to Questions Submitted Prior to Interview.” 

Jiang asserted in the written response to a New York Times question that 

the Falun Gong did not have the capacity to be a serious threat to China. 

In defending his harsh crackdown, he focused on the harm that Falun 

Gong does to its followers and Chinese society. The tone and intensity of 

the response tends to confirm, despite the defensive words to the 

contrary, that Jiang is, indeed, irrationally fearful of the power of the 

Falun Gong organization. It also reflects his apparent belief that his 

anticult campaign is working, having the desired effect, so that the Chinese 

people are convinced the Falun Gong is an evil cult that does harm and 

should be eliminated by government action. 

 6. The abbreviation MDS (missile defense system, implying a 

merging by the Bush administration of various elements of missiles 

defenses so as to provide layered, wide protection) should not be 

confused with the abbreviation GMDS (ground-based mid-course 

defense segment), roughly synonymous with the earlier term NMD—

knocking down ICBMs after boost phase and before re-entry, roughly 

put. Some, seeing the letters GMDS, have assumed incorrectly that it meant 

global missile defense system. 

 7. Questions are asked about why China is concerned about U.S. 
195

NMD if it does not intend to launch those missiles against U.S. targets. 

Chinese might ask the same question about the United States and its ICBM 

arsenal. Most Americans would answer as the Chinese do: we have no 

intention of attacking any country with nuclear missiles, but we feel 

we must maintain a deterrent force. 

 8. John Pomfret, “Beijing Eases Stand on Missile Defense,” 

Washington Post, March 15, 2000, p. A21. 

 9. Given the tone of these arguments and private comments offered after 

the terrorist attacks, it seems only a matter of time before the Chinese 

will, gently or harshly—depending on the state of bilateral relations at 

the time, suggest that missiles defenses would not have stopped the 

September 11 attacks. 

 10. With the advent of the mobile, solid-fueled Dongfeng 31 ICBM, and 

especially the anticipated longer-range follow-on version, the problem 

of survivability of Chinese ICBMs (against a first strike) would seem to be 

appreciably lessened. Beijing may feel adequately confident that at least 

some of its ICBM arsenal would survive if they are not pinned to a fixed 

(and probably known) location. Use of mobile decoys could, of course, 

further complicate U.S. targeting. 

 11. For a detailed examination of China’s objection to ballistic 

missile defense for Japan, see the recently published Michael D. Swaine, 

et al., Japan and Ballistic missile Defense, RAND, Santa Monica, 2001, pp. 

79-83. 

 12. Neither Aegis-equipped ships nor PAC-3 missiles have yet been 

approved by the United States for transfer to Taiwan. 

 13. The Democratic Progressive Party of President Chen Shui-bian had 

traditionally been known as a pro-independence party, although Chen has 

not embraced that concept during his time in office. 
196

 14. Vernon Loeb,” Rumsfeld in Moscow for Talks,” Washington Post, 

August 13, 2001, p. A9. Rumsfeld acknowledged, as reported in this 

article, Russian complaints that they did not understand the kind of 

missile system envisioned by the Bush administration and was quoted as 

saying, “It’s not knowable, what we’re going to deploy, because we’re in 

a testing mode.” 

 15. U.S. State Department transcript of a press conference held by 

Powell on July 29, 2001. The transcript was entitled “Sec. Powell 

Outlines Results of visit to Asia-Pacific Region.” 

 16. He reduced his credibility a bit by explaining how independent 

the Chinese media had become. 

 17. This arms control specialist raised a point that no one else 

mentioned. He said that, rather than talk about abrogating or 

modifying the ABM Treaty, unidentified Europeans are suggesting that it 

would be preferable to try to impose some broad version of restrictions 

on missiles, possibly something similar to MTCR. He went on to describe 

it rather vaguely as an “international court” on missiles. The idea, it 

seemed, would be the establishment of an international body to impose 

restrictions or prohibitions on the development and deployment of 

missiles. The concept, crudely put, was that, rather than building missile 

defenses, missiles would be outlawed. 
199

CHAPTER 7 

EAST ASIAN REACTIONS TO U.S. MISSILE 

DEFENSE: TORN BETWEEN TACIT SUPPORT 

AND OVERT OPPOSITION 

Taeho Kim 

In light of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United 

States homeland, it is increasingly certain that the George W. Bush 

administration’s initial policy priorities and future visions will go 

through a reappraisal, readjustment, and reconfirmation. It is also true 

that war in Afghanistan, together with the broader international 

antiterrorist efforts, has significantly altered the administration’s 

working definition of its friends and foes around the world—at least for 

the time being. There is also little doubt that antiterrorism will remain a 

priority agenda in future U.S. foreign policy. 

 It is equally likely, however, that given its recent origin and its varying 

degrees of significance to other governments, the antiterrorism agenda 

will be severely contested by other compelling U.S. priorities and budgetary 

concerns that have been put on hold during the war in Afghanistan. The 

Bush presidency’s initial policy priorities and future visions, albeit at a 

reduced scale and a slower pace, will be back on the front burner sooner 

rather than later. 

 Ranging from future national security threats to the United States 

to the future possibility of armed conflict in international politics to U.S. 

relationships with such major powers as Russia, China, and Japan, 

they—if fully implemented—would have constituted a sharp departure 

from those of the William Clinton presidency. In particular, the 

administration strongly intended to not only slash the size of its nuclear 

arsenal but also develop both defensive and offensive missile systems. 
200

 Thus, missile defense (MD) stands tall as a premier defense issue in 

the Bush administration’s larger “military transformation” with the basis 

of defense planning now being shifted to a future “capability-based” 

approach from the previous “threat-based” one.1 One of the key 

questions for U.S. policy makers is how to mesh America’s MD program 

with East Asian security—now in the larger context of international 

antiterrorist efforts. 

 In this chapter, I argue that in light of the political sensitivities, 

technological challenges, and budgetary constraints associated with 

U.S. MD, as well as the diverse defense requirements of major East Asian 

states, there is no such thing as a uniform, “one-size-fits-all” approach in 

coupling American MD with East Asian security, and that those states, as the 

MD issue inches toward the central place in their crowded security agenda, 

are highly likely to take a bifurcated and polarized position with some 

different nuances and shades—that is, between tacit support and overt 

opposition. 

 At present and for the foreseeable future, no single regional security 

issue seems more multifaceted and potentially divisive than MD. It 

touches upon a variety of issue areas ranging from regional stability, 

power balance among major states, and arms control to U.S. alliance ties. 

As such, a great many factors intervene in each state’s calculus before any 

actual MD deployment within the region, while an equally great number 

of consequences are possible as well. To better understand the complex 

calculations the regional states must factor in, it is necessary to identify 

and prioritize some major variables that affect the debate and the likely 

courses of action by individual regional states. At a minimum, four 

major considerations stand out: 

• Their primary sources of current and likely future threat and the 

relative weight of MD in their security calculus; 
201

• The evolution of domestic politics and their relationships with the 

United States, including an assessment of the latter’s future role in 

and commitment to regional security; 

• Technological feasibility and budgetary considerations as the MD 

plan takes a more concrete shape in the years ahead; and, 

• Possible reactions (either positive or negative) by neighboring states, 

especially major powers, to their decision to develop and deploy MD. 

 Among the four, the first factor falls within the realm of reasonable 

prediction, as it concerns geography, familiar threats, and the availability 

of defense measures. Both lateral and vertical proliferation of missile 

and other WMD technologies over the past decades have almost invariably 

increased the need to deter this type of security threat. The domestic 

variable is far more complex and more uncertain than the first factor and 

involves many unknowns and unknowables down the road. The 

relationship with the United States, which would normally be treated as 

separate from domestic considerations, is often an issue of critical 

importance in the vortex of politics in Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea, as 

all three depend to a varying extent on the United States for their security. 

Regarding the third variable, a thick cloud of technical uncertainties 

overshadow the MD architecture, especially national missile defense 

(NMD), while Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea, the so-called economic 

powerhouses, now look pale in the face of grim economic prospects. The 

regional reactions, of which China’s appears the most important, are likely to 

be mixed, complicated, and nested so that they may defy a simple 

prediction, even if recent developments and existing trends are 

extrapolated. 

 As befits a premier defense issue in the Bush administration’s 

“military transformation,” MDS have attracted enormous attention 

within a short period of time on both sides of the Pacific Ocean. While there 

has not been a shortage of conference proceedings, edited Volumes, and 
202

policy papers, they tend to highlight certain aspects of theater missile 

defense (TMD ) and /or NMD only.2 This much more brief essay is no 

exception. In particular, as other observers have pointed out, the debate 

has already incurred diplomatic costs prematurely: Even if program 

feasibility has yet to be proven by repeated test results, many observers 

have assumed the most effective system.3 I would further argue that 

America’s current ad hoc, on- and - off approach to explain its MD 

program overseas is not sufficient and has yet to be replaced by a more 

frequent and institutionalized one that aims at addressing each state’s 

defense requirements, its political as well as technical issues, and 

finally, future regional stability and prosperity. 

 With the above considerations in mind, this chapter throws some 

light on each of the four Northeast Asian powers’ perceptions, reactions, and 

likely future actions toward missile defense. It is intended to be a think 

piece highlighting select aspects of the MD debate in Japan, Taiwan, 

South Korea, and North Korea only, as China’s position and its likely 

actions are addressed in greater detail by Eric McVadon and Mark Stokes 

in this volume and by others.4 As the author is technologically uninitiated, 

this chapter will forgo any arcane talk about the world of science except to 

invoke the relevant authorities, but will address in some depth South 

Korea’s perspectives, which have often attracted scant attention. It concludes 

with an assessment of the potential regional consequences of the MD 

program and a set of policy proposals that might enhance the prospects 

for coupling missile defenses and regional security. 

Japan: Limited Research and Development (R&D) Commitment and 

Alliance Consideration. 

As an island nation, Japan is particularly concerned with a missile 

threat. The North Korean missiles, especially their currently deployed 

Nodongs, figure prominently in Japan’s security planning. While the 

possibility is very low, China’s potential threat to use its medium-range 

ballistic missiles (MRBMs)in various contingencies also cannot be ruled 
203

out. For instance, in the context of an inter-Korean or a cross-Strait 

conflict, Japan would remain worried about a potential or actual missile 

threat by north Korea and/or China and the collateral cost of being a 

host to U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ) as well as a close ally of the United States. 

 As compelling as the perceived missile threat is the consideration of 

alliance maintenance. Even if Japan’s decision to commit to a limited joint 

R&D program on TMD was precipitated by the August 1998 flight-test of the 

North Korean Taepodong-1, the American request for Japan’s 

participation in MD harkens back to the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) 

program in 1983. As long as Japan regards its alliance relationship with the 

United States as vital to its national interest, its limited participation in 

MD should be taken as a measure to strengthen the U.S.-Japan alliance in 

the post-Cold war era. Thus, alliance considerations, together with a 

potential missile threat, constitute a primary rationale influencing 

Japan’s decision to join the R&D program, which is also in line with 

Japan’s overall strategic tilt toward the United States in the post-Cold war 

era. 

 At present, Japan participates in a joint R&D program on four 

technical areas of the Navy theater-Wide (NTW) missile program, but 

has not committed itself to development or deployment of TMD.5 It 

currently operates six battalions of 24 enhanced Patriot Advanced 

Capability-2 (PAC-2 Plus) fire units, which, under the 1975 agreement 

with the United States, are part of Japan’s air-defense role for U.S. Military 

installations. As of the end of 2001, Japan is likely to acquire PAC-3 as part 

of its force improvement plan and or an up graded PAC-3 Configuration-3 

system to fully function as part of a layered TMD architecture. In addition 

to the current four Kongo-class AEGIS-equipped destroyers, the Japan 

Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF)plans to acquire two additional 

ships in the new mid-term Defense Program (2001-05), with the decision 

likely in 2003. For reasons related to Japan’s requirements and system 

characteristics, other TMD components, such as theater high altitude area 

defense (THAAD) and naval air defense (NAD), are not likely to be 
204

seriously considered. 

 Before moving beyond the current R&D stage, however, Japanese 

policymakers need to pay attention to a host of major domestic and 

external factors. First, as the Japanese economy suffers from nearly 0 

percent growth for a decade, coupled with growing nonperforming and 

underperforming loans and a record-high unemployment rate of 5 

percent throughout 2001, the JSDF is doomed to engage in an uphill battle 

against the national level social programs and economic restoration 

efforts, as well as within its three services. 

 Second, Japan’s MD debate is subject to well-known bureaucratic 

in-fighting and legal constraints. It is the complex and divisive nature of 

MD that brings to bear upon the debate the continued competition among 

the ideological camps(left vs. right), interest groups (anti-China groups vs. 

arms control supporters) and government agencies (Ministry of 

Finance vs. Japan Defense Agency). The weakening of the traditional 

left and the new “Koizumi factor”—as Japan’s wider security role in the 

wake of the war in Afghanistan demonstrates—could make a stronger 

case for missile defense, although a fragile political coalition and the 

ensuing frequent change of government could steer the debate back into a 

more familiar bureaucratic tug- of-war among the ministries concerned 

with the issue.6 As Stephen A. Cambone has pointed out in a perceptive 

study, the MD program is set to stir domestic debate in Japan as it 

touches upon such sensitive issues as the peaceful use of space, the right 

of collective defense, and the export of defense-related technologies.7

 Third, Chinese reactions will have an important role to play. Japanese 

policymakers will remain concerned with the negative impact of its MD 

decision on Sino-Japanese relations, even if China’s relations with both 

the United States and Japan are likely to be strained for the foreseeable 

future regardless. As to the most sensitive issues involving Japan in the eyes 

of Beijing—that is, Japan’s potential role in a Taiwan contingency, Japan 

has no practical option other than taking an ambiguous stance. For 
205

this reason, Japan will be very cautious and remain mindful of the socalled “international security situation,” in which the China factor 

occupies a central place. Aside from political developments in crossStrait and inter-Korean relations that many American officials and 

analysts often believe to be important variables, the positions by Taiwan 

and South Korea on TMD acquisition could significantly affect the 

Japanese decision as well. 

 Fourth, even if the PAC-3 low-tier and AEGIS-based NTW upper-tier 

systems were eventually to be acquired by Japan, it would leave no role 

for the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force (JGSDF). Not only does the 

army still remain the most dominant service in Japan—as well as in 

Korea—but inter-service rivalry among the services, with each trying to 

secure its respective crown jewels (e.g., tanks, ships, and aircraft), does not 

bode well for TMD funding. Under such circumstances a real 

opportunity cost exists between major platforms and TMD. 

 Fifth, and closely related to the fourth factor, interoperability and 

command and control problems will arise sooner rather than later. As 

the JSDF is not structured to operate under a combined forces command 

with the United States, unlike the U.S.-Republic of Korea (ROK)case, it 

needs to address such complex questions as the level of interoperability, 

surveillance and cueing, adjustments of force structure, and operational 

control. 

 Taken together, these issues confront Japan with diverse challenges, 

which it must face before moving beyond the current R&D phase. If 

Japan ever takes that course of action, it would transpire in the context of 

domestic politics and an external environment characterized by a 

dramatic departure from the past patterns. In order to prepare for such an 

eventuality, as one Japanese observer noted, a political decision based 

on the criticality of the U.S. alliance as well as public education intended 

to provide a better understanding of this arcane issue will be a good 

beginning.8
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Taiwan: In Search of a Political shield. 

A missile threat from mainland China, together with a limited naval 

blockade, constitutes a primary source of concern to Taiwan, especially 

at the opening stages of a large-scale cross-Strait conflict. besides its 

longer-range missile inventory, China is reported to have deployed a 

minimum of 150-200 short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) opposite 

Taiwan and doubtless has a capability to significantly increase its 

existing missile arsenal.9 Short warning time further complicates any 

missile defense scheme by Taiwan. 

 Even if Taiwan possesses a limited missile defense capability 

consisting of three PAC-2/Modified air Defense System (MADS)fire 

units with 200 missiles as well as of Tien Kung (Sky Bow) surface-toair missiles (SAMs), it by no means possesses sufficient measures to 

counter the large and apparently growing Chinese missile threat. For this 

reason, Taiwan has considered other options, such as development of 

longer-range missiles that can reach the targets inside the mainland and 

has implemented various passive defense measures. None of them are 

likely to be very effective against the Chinese missiles, however. 

 As many observers in Washington, Beijing, and Taipei have pointed 

out, Taiwan’s search for a missile defense capability centering on the United 

States is primarily aimed at securing political, rather than military, 

deterrence. As the need to counter the mainland’s threat and to maintain 

relations with the United States is a well-established fact of life among 

politicians and the general public in Taiwan, it is natural for Taiwan to 

consider joining U.S. MD to an extent and in ways that maintain stability in 

the Taiwan Strait. 

 The danger lies, according to Thomas J. Christensen, in the false sense 

of safety MD might create for Washington as well as for Taipei. In his 

words, “The acquisition of missile defenses thus may perversely make the 
207

island appear safer than it actually is in the eyes of the American public 

and leadership, to the detriment of Taiwan’s security.”10 

Furthermore, as a Stimson Center report has persuasively argued,11 any 

TMD components transferred to Taiwan that are interoperable and linked 

with U.S. forces would not only invite a strong reaction from China, including 

tensions in the Taiwan Strait, and in U.S.-China relations, but could actually 

send another wrong signal to the Taiwan people, as noted before. 

 For its part, Taiwan made an official call for common defense against the 

growing Chinese missile threat to itself as well as to the United States and 

Japan. In a recent interview, Taiwan President Chen Shui-bian argued that 

“A PRC [missile] threat against Taiwan is something that the United States, 

Japan, and Taiwan must jointly deal with through the division of 

responsibility and cooperation.”12 In a similar vein, Taiwan’s ministry of 

National Defense made clear that if invited it would “seriously” consider 

joining U.S. MD. 

 While Taiwan’s reactions to U.S. MD will very much depend upon the 

level of missile and other threats from mainland China, the Chinese 

leadership, for its part, remains worried about any possible connection 

between U.S. TMD and the Taiwan question. China’s reactions to TMD 

transfers to Taiwan will be most serious. As MD would compromise its ability 

to coerce Taiwan not to move beyond the limits set by Beijing, the PRC is very 

opposed to Taiwan TMD. In particular, as a recent study by the Monterey 

Institute of International Studies (MIIS) has pointed out, a TMD linked with 

Taiwan—especially the AEGIS-equipped destroyers—would severely impair 

China’s ability to deter the United States or the United States and Japan in a 

major Taiwan contingency and would constitute a quasi-alliance between 

Taiwan and the United States.13 It may thus further reinforce a circle of 

containment against China. 

 In light of both Taiwan’s need for a political shield in the face of a clear 

missile threat and of China’s strong reactions against closer ties between 
208

Taiwan and the United States, any viable future for Taiwan would fall 

between the opposite positions. This also points to the fact that any 

resolution in cross-Strait relations will and should be of a political, and 

hopefully peaceful, nature. However, continued stalemate in the crossStrait talks, coup led with the highly limited scope of the MD debate in 

Taiwan,14 would continue to make the issue a dormant yet highly 

consequential one in the three-way relationship among Beijing, Taipei, 

and Washington. 

South Korea: Self-Reliant Now, Linked with the United States Later? 

Countering missile threats in South Korea’s overall defense 

requirements should be seen in a different context from those of Japan 

and Taiwan. For one thing, the kaleidoscopic changes in post-Cold war 

global and regional security notwithstanding, the crux of the Korean 

security problem has remained remarkably unchanged to date: a landbased military threat from North Korea. Even without a Nuclear, 

Biological, and Chemical (NBC) capability, North Korea’s conventional 

military capability in general and the size, deployment, and equipment of 

the North Korean People’s Army (NKPA) in particular pose a 

significant threat to the defense of South Korea. Not only is the NKPA 

numerically superior and highly mechanized, but 65 percent of its 

offensive elements are currently concentrated within 60 miles north of 

the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). Since Seoul, the South Korean capital and 

home of 12 million people, is located less than 30 miles south of the DMZ), 

the South Korean forces would have little strategic depth and warning time. 

While it is true that the South Korean forces, backed by the United States 

forces and by their own industrial infrastructure, do retain a substantial 

technological edge, then KPA’s quantitative and geographical 

advantages could well lead to unacceptable damage upon the South, 

especially upon Seoul.15

 Throughout the 1990s, moreover, North Korea’s accumulation of 

an NBC capability posed an additional threat to South Korean security. 
209

North Korea’s consistent efforts to develop various types of missile 

systems were manifest in at least three flight tests: the May 1993 test of the 

Nodong missile (an improved version of Scud-C) with the range of over 

500 miles; the June 1994 test of two 60-mile antiship missiles; and the 

well-publicized three-stage Taepodong-1 medium-Range Ballistic missile 

(MRBM) in August 1998.16 North Korea is believed to possess 300-500 

Scud short-Range Ballistic missiles (SRBMs) of various types and about 

100 Nodong MRBMs. 

 However, most worrisome, especially at the opening phases of war, is the 

threat of barrage tactics by North Korea’s 11,500-strong artillery. In 

particular, the 240-mm Multiple Rocket Launchers (MRLs) and 170-mm 

self-propelled guns, with a range of 65 kilometers and 45 kilometers, 

respectively, can literally shower Seoul with thousands of rounds 

within a few hours—a fact pointedly made in an apocalyptic statement 

in March 1994 by North Korean negotiator Park Young Soo who 

threatened his counterpart that, in case of a war, Seoul would become a 

“sea of fire.” As an additional reminder of this artillery threat, the 

NKPA’s two artillery corps are currently deployed below the 

Pyongyang-Wonsan line. Thus, it can be concluded that North Korea’s 

missile capability constitutes a significant, but not the primary, threat to 

South Korean security. 

 The relative weight given to missile threats in South Korea’s 

overall defense requirements was a major factor in the ROK 

government’s March 1999 announcement that it would not participate in a 

U.S. TMD system on the ground that “South Korea’s geographical 

characteristics and its limited strategic depth as well as our technical 

capability and economic conditions would not allow us to join it at this 

stage.”17

 ROK policymakers are well aware, however, that missile defense is an issue 

that could critically affect the health of its alliance relationship with the 

United States. Besides its alliance ties, South Korea remains central to an 
210

overall U.S. MD plan and its regional components: the North Korean 

missile as a primary rationale, the mutual Defense Treaty (MDT)-

mandated deployment of U.S. weapons in and around South Korea, and 

the presence of U.S. Forces Korea (USFK). 

 It would be an exaggeration to say, however, that in South Korea there 

has been an extensive debate on the MD issue at either the public or 

government level.18 The government’s position has largely been confined 

to that of the Ministry of National Defense (MND), while any in-depth 

discussions on the pros and cons of missile defenses in South Korea have 

so far been held only by a handful of policy institutes, universities, and 

nongoverment organizations (NGOs).19 From those limited debates, a 

few emerging perspectives can be discerned that could affect South 

Korea’s likely course of action. 

 First, how could peace and unification, the primary national objective 

of South Korea, be reconciled with missile defenses? Would the peace 

process on the peninsula be inversely correlated with U.S. missile 

defense, as Michael Green and Toby Dalton, among others, have 

posited?20 Or would missile defense constitute a part of South Korea’s 

preparation for its future security environment regardless? 

 Second is the possibility for a change of government in the 

December 2002 presidential election. Unlike the incumbent 

government, which puts a heavy emphasis on reconciliation with North 

Korea, Lee Hoei Chang, the current chairman of the opposition Grand 

National Party, who was defeated in the 1997 presidential election by a 

narrow margin, is known to have a much tougher policy stance toward 

North Korea in general and toward the latter’s missile and weapons of 

mass destruction (WMD) capability in particular.21

 It should also be noted parenthetically that much of the confusion in the 

ROK’s North Korea policy stems from the tension between a progressive 

government and conservative society in South Korea, while the 
211

opposite—that is, a conservative government and progressive society—

has long been the case in post-war Korean politics. 

 Third, while the ROK government decided not to join U.S. TMD, it 

does not necessarily mean that it will be deprived of any missile 

defense capability in the future, a point frequently raised by the 

inquisitive media and the critical NGOs. 

 While it is rare for senior ROK officials to make public statements on 

MD, one of the most explicit statements was made by the defense minister 

in early 2001, which deserves a long quotation. 

The U.S. NMD plan, which is still at a conceptual stage, needs to 

cope with technical problems, budget appropriation, 

consultations with allies including NATO, and Russian and 

Chinese responses and will therefore take some time to be 

finalized. The [ROK] government, when the Bush 

administration’s NMD plan becomes more concrete, will 

cautiously clarify our position after taking a comprehensive 

view of our capability and other security considerations. 

Regarding TMD, the government is not considering to 

participate in it at this stage in light of our geographical 

characteristics, economic capability, and the urgency of [our] 

responses to North Korea’s long-range artillery and shortrange threats [Scuds?]. Over the longer term, given the current 

North Korean missile threat and future battle environment, 

we are reviewing to construct a missile defense system suitable 

to our own [security] environment.22

 Furthermore, the South Korean military is now in the middle of 

making five major weapons procurement decisions: the F-X, the AH-X, 

the E-X, the SAM-X, and KDX-III.23 Among the five big-ticket items, 

totaling over $10 billion ($1 = 1,200 won), the SAM-X, the KDX-III, and 

the E-X (Airborne warning and Control System) programs are relevant to 
212

an MD architecture, even if the eventual form of any ROK missile 

defense system is a matter of conjecture at this time.24 For the SAM-X 

program the PAC-3 Configuration-3 is a serious contender, while the 

KDX-III includes two destroyers with the AEGIS system. As for the remaining 

three platforms, it seems safe to say that they are still being contested by 

American and European defense bidders. 

 While the government still insists—only when asked by the inquisitive 

Korean and foreign media—on an MD system that fits into South 

Korea’s needs, it begs the question of how the ROK would ever acquire 

and operate the surveillance, cueing, and Battle management/Command, 

Control, and Communications (BM/C3) capability, which immediately 

puts a big question mark on its technical feasibility and funding 

availability. At present, USFK operates only one battalion of Patriot 

missiles with six firing batteries, which can barely defend its key 

installations—again a pointed reminder of the ROK government’s future 

need for a larger missile-defense system. 

 Finally, like many other states in the region, South Korea will also 

factor in the impact of its MD decision on its larger neighbors, especially 

on China. This is quite understandable, as peace and security on the 

peninsula is as much an international issue as an inter-Korean one and the 

majority of the South Korean public perceives, rightly or wrongly, that China 

will play a growing and benign role in peninsular affairs in the 

future.25 To make a long story short, however, the China factor, while 

important, will not dominate the decision, as a combination of factors 

including South Korea’s defense needs, its elite perceptions, and the 

emerging strategic configuration in the region all point to the 

prolongation of the existing “strategic prioritization” with the United States 

in the decades to come. 

North Korea: A Matter of Regime Survival. 

Being singled out as a primary rationale for U.S. MD, North Korea 
213

adamantly opposes the plan. North Korea’s visceral reaction to MD, 

however, should be seen in the context of its fundamental goal: regime 

survival. Its nuclear and missile capability is a multipurpose enabler that 

helps to keep the Kim Jong Il regime afloat.26 Militarily, for one thing, it 

deters the United States or the ROK-U.S. combined forces from attacking 

the North in case of a contingency as its Scuds, nodongs, and possibly 

Taepodongs could threaten South Korea, Japan, and the United States, 

respectively. Diplomatically, for another, its missile capability helps 

North Korea to maintain its own leverage and prestige in the international 

arena. For still another, its missile capability is a major hard currency 

earner in its overall declining outside trade. 

 For these reasons, while taking a “diplomatic united front” against 

U.S. MD with Moscow and Beijing, Pyongyang has offered the most 

acerbic phrases in its official Rodong Shinmun, which says that the United 

States has intended to “run over the Republic [DPRK] by MD,” “push to 

death those who do not surrender,” and “aim at the whole world as its 

strategic coordinates.”27 It further argues that the “so-called theory of the 

North Korean missile threat is an unashamed casuistry,” and that the 

United States is now threatening North Korea by military means and 

would launch a preemptive strike at it at the right moment.28

 Among a long list of negative impacts of MD unto itself, MD waters 

down and may eventually neutralize the utility of North Korea’s nuclear 

and missile program as a bargaining chip (if it was ever intended to be 

so) in its negotiation with the United States. It is also possible and even 

likely, however, that the North Korean leadership has already understood the 

fact that despite its repeated hostile rhetoric, TMD/NMD is not an issue to be 

bargained away at any price. North Korea’s perspectives and positions on 

MD are similar to those of China in that it sees U.S. MD as having a 

political motive based on military and technological prowess and that 

MD is aimed at “rogue states,” “states of concern,” “missile 

proliferators”—in other words, the dislikes of the United States. 
214

 While the Bush administration has confirmed the resumption of 

negotiations with Pyongyang, the latter understands full well that unless 

its WMD capabilities, missile proliferation, and conventional forces are 

addressed, there will be little hope for improved relations between itself and 

Washington. Notwithstanding Secretary of State Colin L. Powell’s call for a 

resumption of U.S.-North Korean talks “any where, at any time,” 29 the 

new U.S. administration’s demand for an “improved implementation” of 

the 1994 Geneva Agreement, “verifiable constraints” on missile programs 

as well as the conventional force issue—which are significantly different 

from those of the Perry Process—are seen by North Korea as tantamount 

to giving up its trump cards. 

 North Korea’s possible reactions to U.S. MD deployment and 

particularly South Korea’s future involvement in it are by no means 

certain. A limited range of options North Korea might take, such as 

expansion, improvement, and sophistication of the existing missile 

arsenal, development of new types of missiles or countermeasures, and 

increased missile sales, would be prohibitively costly and/or 

diplomatically unwise. In their stead, North Korea’s short-term solution 

is a diplomatic clarion call with China and Russia, while waiting for a 

change of atmospherics in a recalcitrant Washington. As long as Seoul 

and Tokyo remain vulnerable to its missile and NBC capability, North 

Korea may take a coercive option combined with separate negotiations 

with the United States and South Korea. 

 It was, however, in this constricted external environment of North 

Korea that the September 11 attacks intervened. For one thing, North Korea 

had never held a priority in the Bush administration’s long foreign 

policy agenda—at least before September 11. For another, now is not the 

time for North Korea to draw world attention by making its time-proven 

provocations or incidents, which are nonetheless necessary for a continued 

flow of international assistance onto itself.30 For still another, as Russia’s 

ostensibly moderate response to U.S. withdrawal from the ABM treaty 

might indicate, North Korea’s strong opposition to MD may end up 
215

with a chorus of one—arguably the worst situation in the eyes of 

Pyongyang. In short, North Korea’s limited military and diplomatic 

options as to MD would likely result in delaying tactics in separate talks 

with the United States and with South Korea over the longer term. 

Conclusions and Implications for East Asian Security. 

In the closing pages of this chapter, it is appropriate to sum up the 

findings and arguments with respect to the questions raised at the outset. 

First, in light of the varying consequences of U.S. MD on regional security 

and of equally diverse reactions to it by individual states, it is critical to 

address the specific defense requirements of U.S. regional allies and 

friends and their concerns with regard to the MD issue. This is all the more 

necessary because—even if U.S. regional allies and friends generally 

support the MD program—there will be nuances in policies, shades in 

commitment, and delays in implementation in their reactions. 

 Second, as the highly circumscribed nature of the MD debate in the 

three countries—at both public and governmental level—strongly 

indicates, more regular and more systematic efforts on the U.S. part are 

necessary to explain its MD plan to regional states. Focused discussions 

on the different levels of missile threat to individual states and 

consideration of their domestic politics—the two most important factors 

driving their individual responses to MD—would be a good starting 

point. An institutionalized discussion of the MD issue in regular U.S. 

defense talks with its allies would be another approach enhancing mutual 

understanding on the subject. 

 This also undergirds the third recommendation, which is that the sooner 

the United States copes with the major defense and strategic concerns of 

regional states on MD, the easier it will be to tackle the specific technical 

and even budgetary issues later. Without a semblance of thought, for 

instance, on the future possibility of possessing either individualized 

MD assets or those of an integrated Northeast Asian MD system, the 
216

regional states would continue their own soul-searching with significant 

waste of political and budgetary resources likely down the road. For 

another, the China factor, and more specifically America’s understanding 

with China on the MD issue, should be conveyed to regional states so 

as to allay their concerns about China’s potential reactions to the MD 

issue and to their respective bilateral ties. This would be particularly 

pertinent as China enters the critical period of the generational change 

in leadership and of projecting benign images to the outside world. 

 Fourth, while there is little doubt in America’s need and determination 

for a MD plan, a more sensible and more balanced approach is necessary 

to cope with other types of international and regional sources of threat. 

As the September 11 attacks have vividly shown, a fuller spectrum of threats 

to national security is now the order of the day for most nations in the 

world. They include, but are not limited to, biological and chemical 

attacks, border/homeland infiltration, computer viruses, and 

international terrorism.31 In brief, a viable MD program should 

complement, not supplant, other compelling defense requirements of a 

nation. 

 Finally, it is trite, but true, to note that MD ultimately intends to 

enhance both U.S. security and regional stability. Neither goal should be 

pursued at the expense of the other. Nor should the MD issue be taken as a 

litmus test for “making or breaking” U.S. bilateral relationships with its 

allies and friends in the region. Barring any unforeseen developments or 

regional shocks, it is certainly possible for U.S. regional allies and friends 

to adjust their respective defense requirements for the sake of regional 

stability and prosperity. Whether or not the MD issue will open up a new 

possibility for this goal will hinge on a renewed effort and mutual 

understanding on both sides of the Asia-Pacific. 

ENDNOTES-CHAPTER 7 

1. “Military transformation “is the key word of the Quadrennial Defense 

Review (QDR) Report released by the Pentagon on September 30, 2001. For the 
217

operational goals of the military transformation, see p. 30 of the QDR Report. See 

also Kim Burger,” QDR Report Blurs Edges on Specific Strategy,” Jane’s Defence 

weekly, October 10, 2001, p. 10; Andrew Koch, “QDR Aims to Transform US 

Forces,” Jane’s Defence weekly, August 22, 2001, p. 6. 

 2. For a fuller discussion of U.S. MD and East Asian security, see Michael 

D. Swaine, Rachel M. Swanger, and Takashi Kawakami, Japan and Ballistic Missile 

Defense, Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2001; Evan S. Medeiros, ed., Ballistic 

Missile Defense and Northeast Asian Security: Views from Washington, Beijing, and 

Tokyo, Monterey: the Stanley Foundation and the Monterey Institute of 

International Studies, 2001; Michael J. Green and Toby F. Dalton, Asian 

Reactions to U.S. Missile Defense, NBR Analysis, Vol. 11, No. 3, November 2000; 

Theater Missile Defenses in the Asia-Pacific Region, Working Group Report No. 34, 

Washington, DC: Henry L. Stimson Center, June 2000. See also the conference 

papers presented at the “Partnership for Peace: Building Long-term Security 

Cooperation in Northeast Asia,” 

http://www.nautilus.org/nukepolicy/workshops/shanghai-01/papers.html, and ”East Asian 

Regional Security Futures: Theater Missile Defense Implications,” 

http://www.nautilus.org/nukepolicy/TMD-Conference/index.html. 

3. See, for example, Medeiros, p. i. 

 4. For China’s official positions on MD, see a series of statements by 

Ambassador Sha Zukang at the PRC Foreign Ministry’s web page, 

www.fmprc.gov.cn. See also Yan Xuetong,” TMD Rocking Regional Stability,” 

Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Vol. 11, No. 1, Summer 1999, pp. 67-86; Xie 

Wenqing, “US TMD and Taiwan,” International Strategic Studies, Serial No. 57, 

July 2000, pp. 25-31; Xia Liping, “Prospects for Cooperative Security in East 

Asia: From Chinese Perspectives,” a paper presented at the “Partnership for 

Peace: Building Long-term Security Cooperation in Northeast Asia,” 

http://www.nautilus.org/nukepolicy/workshops/shanghai-01/papers.html; Li Bin, “The Effects 

of NMD on Chinese Strategy,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, March 2001, pp. 49-52. 

 5. The four areas of cooperative research based on the August 1999 

Memorandum of Understanding between Japan and the United States are the 

lightweight nose cone, the infrared sensor, advanced kinetic warhead, and 

second stage propulsion. See Defense of Japan 1999, p. 84. 
218

 6. Michael Swaine and his colleagues have offered by far the most detailed 

examination of the Japanese bureaucratic actors on the MD issue. See Swaine, et 

al., Japan and Ballistic Missile Defense, esp. chap. 3. 

 7. For further details, see Stephen A. Cambone,” The United States and 

Theatre Missile Defence in North-east Asia,” Survival, Vol. 39, No. 3, Autumn 1997, 

pp. 68-69. 

 8. This comment is attributed to Satoshi Morimoto in Plutonium, No. 33, 

Spring 2001, in Japanese. 

 9. The most recent figure is 350 missiles. See Bill Gertz,” China Increases 

Missile Threat,” Washington Times, August 28, 2001. 

 10. Thomas J. Christensen,” Theater Missile Defense and Taiwan’s Security,” 

Orbis, Vol. 44, No. 1, winter 2000, p. 89. 

 11. Taiwan’s reactions to MD are best analyzed in the Henry L. Stimson 

Center, Theater Missile Defenses in the Asia-Pacific Region, esp. pp. 41-60. 

 12. Quoted in Brian Hsu,” Military Says US National Missile Defense an 

Option,” Taipei Times, July 18, 2001. 

 13. Medeiros, p. 19. 

 14. A series of interviews with defense officials and security analysts 

conducted in Taiwan indicate there is no serious public debate on the MD 

issue, which is still regarded as an arcane issue of technological and military 

nature. Interviews, Taipei, December 2001. 

 15. For a succinct yet focused overview of the military situation on the 

peninsula, see “2000 Report to Congress: Military Situation on the Korean 

Peninsula,” September 12, 2000, available at 

www.defenselink.Mil/news/Sep2000/korea09122000.html. 

16. See Chosun Ilbo, June 16, 1993; New York Times, June 1, 1994. 
219

 17. See Sisa Journal, April 8, 1999, pp. 64-65. For an objective assessment on the 

relative weight of MD in South Korea’s overall defense needs, see the Henry 

L. Stimson Center, Theater Missile Defenses, esp. pp. 33-39. 

 18. In Japan and Taiwan as well, any in-depth discussions over MD are 

confined to a small group of security experts inside and outside of their 

respective governments and generally do not extend to the wider public or 

throughout the government. Interviews, Taipei, December 2001. See also 

Swaine, et al. 

19. One of the most vocal NGOs is the Civil Network for a Peaceful Korea. 

See its web page at www.peacekorea.org, which is available in both Korean and 

English. 

 20. Green and Dalton, pp. 21-25. 

 21. Wook-Shik Chung,” Why Should we Oppose MD?” a paper presented 

at the KIDA Policy Forum on “The MD Plan and [Our] Security Interest,” 

KIDA, Seoul, July 13, 2001, p. 17. 

 22. Unofficial translation by the author. Defense minister Cho SeongTae’s statements on the ROK’s position on NMD and TMD at the 218th 

provisional session of the ROK National Assembly, February 20, 2001. In a 

similar vein, an ROK foreign ministry official argues that South Korea should 

maximize the “benefit of ambiguity” until MD feasibility is proven, but 

nonetheless support U.S. efforts in the end. See Shin, Kak-Soo, “The 

Implications for South Korea of the United States missile Defense,” New Asia, 

Vol. 8, No. 4, Winter 2001, pp. 178-207. 

 23. They are Fighter-Experimental, Attack helicopter Experimental, Early 

warning Aircraft-Experimental, Surface-to-Air missile-Experimental, and 

Korean destroyer-Experimental-III, respectively. See Shim Jae Hoon, “South 

Korean Projects may Face Further Delays,” Jane’s Defence weekly, April 19, 2001, p. 

20; Darren Lake, “South Korea Announces Record High Budget,” Jane’s Defence 

Weekly, July 4, 2001; John Larkin, “Dogfight over Seoul,” Far Eastern Economic Review, 

July 5, 2001, pp. 16-18, 20. 
220

 24. For a report that South Korea plans to acquire MK-41 VLs, see 

http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/prs/cfm?docid=2856. For South Korea’s introduction of the 

300-km-range ATACMS Block-IA SRBM, see Dong-a Ilbo, January 5, 2002, p. A2. 

 25. For details on the South Korean public perception of China and its role on 

the peninsula, see Taeho Kim,” South Korea and a Rising China: Perceptions, 

Policies, and Prospects,” in Ian James Storey and Herbert Yee, eds., The Dragon 

Awakes: Perceptions and Prospects of the China Threat, London: Curzon, forthcoming in 

2002. 

 26. For an in-depth discussion of the various purposes of the North Korean 

missiles, see Chung Min Lee, “North Korean Missiles: Strategic Implications and 

Policy Responses,” Pacific Review, Vol. 14, No. 1, 2001, pp. 85-120; idem.,” North 

Korea and its Missiles,” Far Eastern Economic Review, July 29, 1999, p. 26. 

 27. Rodong Shinmun, North Korea, August 15, 2001, available at 

http://www.hani.co.kr/20010816. 

28. Ibid.; and North Korea’s official announcements via Chosun Central News 

(Chosun jungang tongshin) and Pyongyang Broadcasting (Pyongyang bangsong), at 

http://www.hani.co.kr/20010805. 

29. See “Transcript: Powell Discusses Korean Peninsula, Missile Defense,” 

Washington File, No. 2890, July 27, 2001, available at www.usinfo.state.gov. 

30. L. Gordon Flake has noted the current North Korean dilemma between its 

need to lie low when the cost for its provocative action is high and its equally 

compelling need to draw world attention for the sake of international assistance 

and aid. See his “North Korea’s Options After Sept. 11,” Pac Net No. 47, 

November 23, 2001. 

 31. A perceptive study is available on the issue of balancing MD with other 

defense requirements. See Michael E. O’Hanlon, “Beyond Missile Defense,” Brookings 

Policy Brief, No. 86, August 2001. 
221

 

 

 

PART III: IMPROVEMENTS IN PLA 

CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITIES: FORCE 

PROJECTION AND AIR FORCE LOGISTICS 
223

CHAPTER 8 

ROUGH BUT READY FORCE PROJECTION: 

AN ASSESSMENT OF RECENT PLA TRAINING 

Susan M. Puska 

Introduction. 

Over the last 3 years,1 the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has 

significantly advanced its near-periphery power projection capability 

through concerted experimentation and adaptation of modern 

warfighting capabilities during threat-based training and exercises 

among targeted army, navy, air, and missile forces.2 This experience 

base now reaches into all seven of its military Regions (MRs),3 and 

includes a growing number of younger, innovative military thinkers and 

fighters who are versed in modern operational art. 

 Against a potential threat that closely resembles the advanced 

capabilities of the U.S. military, the PLA has shown a determination, 

particularly since Kosovo, to enhance its confidence and competencies 

with the means and resources that are presently available. To maximize 

what it has now, the PLA has more concertedly used training as the 

warfighting laboratory in which to develop creative ways to compensate 

for its own relative weaknesses, while it aggressively and innovatively 

seeks ways to exploit the vulnerabilities of an advanced, informationdependent opponent. 

 During 2000-01 training, in particular, the PLA’s warfighting 

training aimed at maximizing its offensive and defensive operations within 

the PLA’s area of operation, including its maritime periphery, through a 

combination of threat-based military training and civilian augmentation. 

 The author of this chapter examines these developments in terms of 
224

mobility; joint operations; logistics; missile operations; coastal/maritime 

operations; communications, electronic warfare (EW), and Computer 

Network Attack (CNA); and special operations. The materials used for 

this examination are primarily Chinese national and regional military 

newspapers, although some recent journal articles and books have also 

been consulted. 

Background. 

The last 3 years have been a particularly dynamic period in the 

modernization of the PLA. The results of experimentation and 

innovation during this time have been summed up in the seventh 

generation of military training and examination programs, which will 

be implemented during 2002.4 These programs will concentrate on 

seven areas—ground, naval, and air forces; Second Artillery; scientific 

research and test units; reserve units; and the People’s Armed Police.5

 During the last 3 years, the scope of military exercises has steadily 

increased to include out- of-sector MR forces performing increasingly 

complex tasks in parallel and increasingly joint operations. Maritime 

(individual and unit) training has been stressed during this time and 

culminated in major near periphery exercises during the summers of 

2000 and 2001 near Dongshan Island in southern China opposite Taiwan. 

 Then in the fall, the PLA sought to showcase its accomplishments in 

applying science and technology to training up to that point by 

conducting concurrent drills and exercises on October 13-16, 2000.6

Foremost among those was a “grand military show” said to be the first 

since 1964, which was held near Beijing at the foot of the Yanshan 

Mountain.7 Jiang Zemin, as the Central Military Commission (CMC) 

Chairman, inspected the Beijing exercise on October 13. This exercise 

was said to demonstrate primarily defensive measures to counter 

stealth technology, aerial surveillance and reconnaissance, precision 

guided weapons, and EW. It also employed various concealment and 
225

deception measures, such as “infrared decoys,” to interfere with enemy 

operations and conceal combat operations.8

 Concurrently, selected ground units trained in Inner Mongolia, 

while naval units conducted training in the Bohai Sea, and Second 

Artillery strategic missile forces exercised in Jilin Province in northeast 

China.9 Elsewhere in China on October 13, a Chengdu MR unit conducted a 

sabotage raid against vital enemy targets, while a naval helicopterborne marine unit attacked an enemy rear command center. PLA 

digitized artillery, armored corps, and mechanized infantry 

demonstrations were held, while the “first successful” multi-direction 

airborne operation (including personnel and gear, rockets, and 

vehicles) was conducted against an enemy on the March 10. 

 Throughout 2000-01, the Nanjing and Guangzhou military Regions 

(MRs) led the PLA for their innovations in training and operations. Since 

both MRs play key roles in potential force projection against Taiwan, as well 

as into the South China Sea, their training appears to have had greater 

emphasis and perhaps, resources. 

 A 2000 assessment of the Guangzhou MR’s training reflects the 

progress its units made in training during 2000-01. The report noted that 

MR training in 1999 focused on company and battalion level training. 

During 2000, it progressed to training in Joint Operations, during which 

Army, Navy, and Air Force units fought under high-tech conditions.11

 This assessment also observed that achievements in training during 

1999 depended on innovations in equipment. In 2000, however, over 

one-half of all innovations related to methods of operations, military 

theory, and methods of training, accomplishments that depend upon the 

ability of personnel to apply concepts and new ideas. While training in 

the Guangzhou MR solved “common” problems in 1999, during 2000 the 

MR units could solve more complicated and important problems. Further, 

most of the 1999 training achievements came from combat units; while in 
226

2000, the majority of training achievements were in joint logistics and 

armament.12

 Regarding joint operations, the graduated mobilization response 

(GMR) assessment described pre-2000 Service relations in military 

exercises as “friendly support” or “guest performances” through 

negotiations. By 2000, the training among the Guangzhou MR’s three 

Services was assessed as more joint and extended from individual level 

training up to operational, tactical, and technical training, and, finally, 

to unit training.13

 Although the Guangzhou MR and the Nanjing MR training have 

been most extensive, improvements in training within the other five MRs, 

as well as the Strategic Rocket Forces, have also been significant, 

particularly out-of-sector support and support to cross-sea operations, 

which have been stressed throughout all seven military regions. 

 Building on the 2000 priority on “three strikes and three 

defense,”14 PLA training and operational priorities during 2001 

concentrated on rapid mobility operations,15 including combat use of 

helicopters;16 emergency logistics support;17 special operations;18 sea 

landing and cross-sea operations;19 maritime denial (anti-submarine 

and blockades);20 air combat and support;21 mobile missile operations; 

and EW and countermeasures.22 Cover and concealment, psychological 

training to counter battle and operational stress, and enhancing 

confidence in PLA equipment, operational strategy and doctrine, were 

also stressed. Based on Chief of the General Staff General Fu 

Quanyou’s direction, the training objective during 2001 was no longer to 

simply “fight” a local regional war under high-technological 

conditions, but “fight to win” against a qualitatively superior force 

that was based on U.S. military capabilities.23

 In the General Staff Department (GSD) training plan for 2001 PLA 

units were specifically asked to deepen advances in science and 
227

technology (S&T) training.24 Priority was placed on the following 

guidelines and tasks: 

• Innovate in light of actual conditions; 

• Achieve rapid advancement in fighting capacity; 

• Further upgrade the quality of officers and men; 

• Apply research results to training; 

• Deepen research on military theory; 

• Closely study adversary operational concepts, equipment, and 

weaponry and develop countermeasures;25

• Accelerate innovation in training; 

• Carry out realistic, warlike training; 

• Expand the use of computers, simulators, and online training; and, 

• Exert greater effort in Joint Operations training. 

 While the GSD 2001 training plan continued to stress the “three 

strikes, three defenses,” night training and physical fitness were also 

emphasized. Operationally, the 2001 plan specifically called on units to 

make greater efforts to solve problems in the following areas: defense 

penetration and counter-penetration; destruction and counterdestruction; sea and air control; and electronic warfare.26 

Fu, in an address to an enlarged party committee meeting of the 

GSD, stressed that 2001 military work must be based on the basic 

requirement to “win in battle.”27 He said the PLA must strengthen 
228

studies of the international situation, high-tech local war, and the 

application of rule of law to military management during 2001. He called 

on the PLA to organize and coordinate all efforts between units, 

schools, academies, research centers and test units. He urged that the 

process of transforming research accomplishments into policies, training, 

war-readiness, and combat strength be accelerated. He also stressed the 

importance of science and technology to enhance combat capability 

throughout the entire Armed Forces. He called on the PLA to enhance 

command and control, Joint Operations, and combat effectiveness, 

and stressed the importance of training a large number of “new-type” 

high-quality military personnel.28 The March 2001 National People’s 

Congress added a sense of urgency to the need to modernize the PLA to 

conduct “military struggle” as soon as possible.29

Rapid, Long Distance Mobility: Land, Air, and Sea. 

Military training conducted during 2000-01 emphasized the need for 

rapid mobility across long distances by air, sea, and land. Air movement, 

for example, continually stressed long-range air raids and various air 

combat missions. In mid-March 2001, a Nanjing air regiment was 

highlighted for flying 3,000 km across five provinces to conduct a 

surgical raid on enemy radar, guided missiles, and AAA positions, 

using live ammunition. The unit was credited with successfully 

penetrating enemy electronic interference, radar tracking, and guided 

missile attacks.30 In early March, one Second Artillery equipment 

inspection regiment (Zhuang Jian Tuan) demonstrated its enhanced rapid 

delivery capabilities during an exercise in which units simultaneously 

delivered equipment to several launch positions over long distances via 

highway and railway networks.31 

A Beijing MR motorized infantry brigade held rapid reactions 

maneuvers that covered 1,000 km within Inner Mongolia during late 2000. 

These maneuvers also stressed information countermeasures, coordinated 

operations, field defense, and comprehensive logistics support.32
229

 Reserve units have also stepped up mobility training. On April 20, 

2001, for example, a reserve regiment on Hainan Island held a rapid 

mobilization and assembly exercise following the release of the EP-3 crew. 

It was reported to be the first ever reserve exercise held between four 

provinces and one autonomous region in south China. All preappointed officers, specialized technical soldiers, demobilized 

soldiers, squad leaders, and assistants answered the callup within 1 hour 

from notification. Among them were 168 reservists working in Haikou, 

Shenzhen, and Zhuhai.33

 Logistics mobility, which will be essential to support of any force 

projection, was also tested. In the Guangzhou MR, for example, mobile 

command, control, and logistics support modules were developed. The 

Guangzhou MR reportedly invested two million yuan during 2000-01 

to reform its command and control and logistics support in the field. At 

least one unidentified Guangzhou MR Group Army and division were 

equipped with mobile command systems that can be disassembled and 

moved within 1 hour. The same unit’s logistics and armament technical 

support facilities also were made mobile for field operations. Modular 

barracks were developed, which can accommodate ten bunks, 

presumably for command and operations personnel.34

Joint Operations: A Work in Progress. 

Joint operations continued to develop slowly. The PLA consequently 

has not yet realized the full potential of joint operations. Nonetheless, 

substantial progress has been made, particularly at the operational level 

of each MR. 

 At least three problems inhibit the PLA’s transformation to joint 

operations so far. First, the PLA views “joint” in unique and flexible 

terms which allow for independent interpretation that undermines 

synergy of effort. Second, there is resistance, perhaps even confusion, 
230

about what “joint operations” means and why they should be conducted. 

Finally, the command and control of the PLA under a MR system and an 

Army-dominated General Staff perpetuates combined arms operations, 

at best augmented by parallel air, navy, and missile forces operations, 

rather than facilitating joint integration. But PLA leaders and defense 

intellectuals recognize these problems, and appear committed to 

achieving sufficiently joint operations to suit the PLA’s operational 

needs. 

 To address these challenges and enhance understanding of joint 

operations within the PLA, military scholars and commanders published 

several articles and books on joint operations during 2000 and 2001. Yang 

Zhiqi, director of the GSD, military Affairs Department, in late 2000,35

for example, urged the PLA to accelerate changing from a combined 

arms command system to a joint operations command system, which is an 

essential link to realizing joint operations. He argued that a joint 

command system could not be established at the last minute during a 

crisis, but must be put in place during peacetime. Although Yang observed 

that the PLA has made substantial progress to achieve greater joint 

coordination between Services during operational level training, he noted, 

all the services tend to fight in different ways once an exercise begins. 

Yang attributed this deficiency to a fundamental lack of an 

“authoritative” joint command.36

 In a National Defense Publication entitled, “New Theory of Joint 

Operations,”37 the authors argue that despite similarities in its nature to 

combined arms, joint operations represents a great, even radical, change 

for the PLA.38 Through joint operations, they wrote, the Armed Forces will 

unify combat capabilities through coordination to defeat the enemy. 

 In December 2000, a symposium entitled “War Patterns and War Theory 

in the Early 21st Century” was held in Beijing.40 The meeting was 

sponsored by the Beijing Military Region and the Strategic Studies 

Department, Academy of military Sciences (AMS). It was attended by 
231

representatives from the seven military regions, the National Defense 

University (NDU), and the Air Force Command Academy. The Beijing 

MR Chief of Staff, Yu Chenghai, presided over the meeting, which was 

reported to be the first joint activity held between the PLA’s highestlevel strategic studies department and a theater command. The purpose of 

the meeting was to promote transformation of military strategic research 

into combat strength throughout the Armed Forces. Development trends 

in joint operations were among the topics discussed. 

 On December 29, 2000, the Nanjing Military Region published an 

article that also stressed the importance of forming a joint operations 

command system.41 The article identified several problems that centered on 

command and control. Specifically, it criticized “factionalism” 

(parochialism) between Services. The article argued for the need to 

establish truly separate units under Joint Operations Groups (JOG), in 

order to eliminate command and control interference by the units’ parent 

Services. The article stressed that Services should only provide combat 

support and coordination to units assigned to a JOG.42 Other writings 

discussed the need to significantly reduce the layers of command—

changing from a “tree-type” command structure to a “flat” one.43

 Training within all Services of the PLA has stressed joint 

operations. Air Force training, for example, increasingly emphasized 

joint support to both ground and navy forces. In March 2001, a 

Guangzhou Military Region Air Force aviation regiment was high 

lighted for its joint operations. This unit is equipped with a “new-type 

fighting aircraft” (probably SU-27) to conduct blue water combat 

patrols, combat escort missions, and military exercises. The regiment had 

recently shifted from technical to tactical training on the new equipment. 

It reportedly had achieved an all-weather offensive and defensive flying 

capability. Its capabilities included low-altitude and ultra low-altitude 

flying, the ability to attack ground targets at great speed, live bomb 

operations, deep sea interception, and over-the-horizon air combat 

during electronic countermeasures (ECM).44
232

 During 2000-01, PLA training focused on Taiwan-like scenarios 

within all seven military regions. Priority was given to sea-crossings, 

island seizures, and special operations behind enemy lines. The threatbased scenarios employed forces that were modeled on the advanced 

technology of the U.S. military, including armed helicopters; cruise 

missiles; sophisticated reconnaissance; EW capabilities; stealth 

technology; and extensive maritime assets. 

 The intent of this training seems to have been multifold—first, it 

gave PLA units experience against a Taiwan and U.S.-type opponent, 

which provided a better understanding of the strengths and weaknesses 

of potential opponents. Second, more realistic training focused on likely 

scenarios helps to build confidence in PLA equipment, as well as 

defensive and offensive operations. Finally, more realistic training 

exposes PLA weaknesses that can be solved or avoided before actual 

combat. 

Logistics: Flexibility and Forward Support. 

Progress in the Joint Logistics System benefited from the stress on 

war preparation, which revealed the need for more field logistics support 

and mobility. During 2000-01, consolidation of common garrison 

functions, such as military hospitals, which have been opened up to 

civilians as well as other Services, and consolidation of key commodity 

items, such as bulk petroleum, continued. Emergency stockage of 

generic, dual-use items were also developed. In some cases, emergency 

supplies were integrated into civilian warehouses to provide emergency 

and training replenishment to military forces through contracted or 

other support arrangements. 

 During 2000-01 emphasis was placed on components of operational level 

logistics, such as field feeding, field medical support, forward 

maintenance, and on-site repair and re-supply. Rapid reaction and 
233

emergency support units were tested to provide multiple types of support to 

combat forces in near-combat field conditions. Throughout the Air Force, 

Navy, Army, and Second Artillery units, logistics support emphasized 

enhancements of core support capabilities. In addition, within the 

Nanjing and Guangzhou MRs, civilian augmentation to military logistics 

was stressed. This support included the coordinated use of the civilian air, 

land, and sea infrastructure; acquisition of maritime vessels; access to 

civilian telecommunications; and acquisition of materiel and supplies. 

 While much of the logistics support is managed by the General 

Logistics Department (GLD), the new General Armament Department 

(GAD), created in 1998,45 played the central role in ammunition 

replenishment and maintenance of weapons and armor. Like Second 

Artillery, GAD made a concentrated effort to enhance the quality and 

expertise of its personnel through greater cooperation with civilian and 

military institutions. In November 2000, General Cao Gangchuan, 

Director of GAD, noted that reforms in armament, national defense 

science and technology, and industry now are reaching an 

unprecedented level in China. He encouraged further reform and 

innovation, citing a Party and CMC directive to raise the rate of success in 

scientific testing.46

 In October 2000, GAD hosted an all-Army symposium at the Armored 

Force Engineering Academy, commanded by major General Wang 

Hongguang, in Changxindian, Beijing, with the stated purpose of 

enhancing comprehensive armament support.47 During October 2000, 

GAD initiated a 1-month rotational course, open to the entire PLA 

command cadre, to take advantage of peacetime to improve armament 

management and raise the level of comprehensive armament support for 

wartime. The main focus of this training was on the science of armament 

and wartime armament support.48

 In 2000, Guangzhou MR set up a “theater command center for 

armament support,” which was the first in the PLA.49 The center provides 
234

mobile command posts for field armament support to the MR, army, and 

divisional levels. Additionally, the MR has developed a command 

automation system for the Guangzhou war Zone. This system links 

information vertically and horizontally between armament and support 

units and higher headquarters. It greatly enhances command and 

control over ammunition assets, and facilitates decision making and 

operational management.50

 During February 2001, the GAD convened a symposium in Beijing to 

discuss its military training tasks for the year. These included: (1) assess 

training achievements and transform these into training capabilities; (2) 

strengthen guidance and theoretical studies, and regulate the scientific 

development of military training; (3) renew training content, methods 

and quality; (4) train high-quality personnel to achieve leap frogging 

development in armament; and (5)strengthen infrastructure construction 

and maintain the sustained development of military training.51

 In the summer of 2000, the Jinan MR conducted an emergency 

logistics support drill based on a flood relief scenario.52 Materiel, POL, 

transportation, and medical support modules were quickly mobilized. 

The support modules were based on warehouses, hospitals, and other 

specialized units, and encompassed ordnance, material, POL, 

transportation, medical, and maintenance support. During peacetime, 

these units are sent on firefighting, flood relief, and other major projects 

and operations. The division developed new approaches to conceal supply at 

fixed points, maneuver under concealment of smokescreens, and 

coordinate logistics support with naval and air units.53

 Nanjing MR formed an “Emergency Mobile Logistics Support model” 

that met the CMC’s standards to perform combat missions without 

personnel and equipment replenishment and pre-battle training (i.e., 

no notice).54 One brigade spent over three million yuan improving its 

company-level combat-readiness provisions, standard storage rooms, 

field medical kits, combat-readiness coffers, and wartime light sets. 
235

The brigade developed new equipment, including floating stretchers, 

field kitchen containers, and rapid reaction tankers, and participated in 

numerous exercises with the Navy, Army, and Air Force units over the 

past 3 years.55

 Guangzhou MR developed multitube POL tankers for field 

refueling that significantly raised field support efficiency. Water 

tankers could support up to 20 kitchen units at one time. Field repair 

vehicles could perform various emergency repairs. In addition, support 

equipment for sea operations was also developed by GMR’s Logistics 

Department and an unidentified GMR division.56

 Although there has been some emphasis on field medical support, most 

medical support improvements, including joint logistics, have focused on 

reforms, as well as garrison and near-garrison support. In this regard, the 

Guangzhou MR medical training objectives, which varied according to a 

unit’s level, may be representative.57 The brigade or regiment focuses on 

rapid deployment of a first-aid post. The battalion or company focuses on 

rescue of personnel injured on the firing line. Medical units above the 

division hospital level focus on treatment of critical cases and research 

in traumatology. In recent years the Guangzhou MR has built or 

renovated 80 percent of its division hospitals and brigade or regiment 

medical teams.58 Emergency support units have been issued “advanced” 

field mobile medical equipment, such as field surgery vehicles and 

decontamination trucks. The GMR reported that the medical warreadiness of “key units” within “key combat divisions and brigades” 

now meets war readiness standards.59

 By early October 2000, two-thirds of all PLA hospitals completed 

construction of “Project Number 1,” which laid a foundation for an 

“informationized” medical service system that can be used by both the 

military and civilian medical services.60

 The PLA’s first airborne medical teams conducted battle drills during 
236

the summer of 2000.61 Three planes airdropped medical personnel and 

medical supplies onto a captured airfield. The medics boarded air-dropped 

vehicles and set up a first aid station. Twenty medics of the First 

Airborne Medical Team parachute unit, made up of personnel from 

the PLA 457th Hospital, landed by plane. The second medical Unit, 

consisting of 50 personnel, arrived by plane and set up a comprehensive 

multipurpose medical post. During the exercise, transport aircraft 

evacuated critical personnel.62

 The Nanjing Military Region’s Fujian Military District also worked 

hard to improve its wartime integrated logistics support capabilities during 

2000. The military district medical support forces conducted an exercise 

during the summer that included an evacuation of casualties brought in 

on an unidentified vessel “from distant seas.” 

 A notable feature of the PLA’s extended logistical system during 

2000-01 was the integration of civilian fixed facilities, infrastructure, 

personnel, and resources into contingency operations and training. 

This support is established through a combination of pre-arranged 

contracts, legal confiscation of support and civilians, as well as integration 

through local reserve and militia units. The coordination and integration 

of civilians and domestic resources provides a “total war” logistical 

multiplier to PLA support, especially along China’s coastal region and in 

the south west, where this type of support has so far been most emphasized. 

The types of civilian resources, including possible fiscal augmentation, 

are extensive and continue to develop. In addition to supplies, material, 

and personnel, they also include airports, ports, rail networks, 

expressways, and bridges that have been adapted to military 

specifications and support military missions. For example, the 

construction of some high speed roads and bridges was coordinated with 

the military to include extra exits and upgraded surfaces to bear the 

weight of military vehicles, better withstand air attack, and facilitate 

quick rebuild in case of an air attack. In certain areas, such as the 

Guangzhou MR, the military works closely with civilian authorities to 
237

capitalize on civilian assets and ensure these can easily be integrated into 

military operations when needed. 

 With a priority on cross-sea operations and island seizures during 

2000-01 training, the use of civilian marine vessels was also tested. In some 

cases, maritime exercises were conducted with a mix of civilian vessels that 

have been integrated into war planning. Civilian vessels and personnel 

even participated in antisubmarine exercises—showing that the use of 

civilian assets by the PLA is not limited by either imagination or legal 

restrictions. 

 In July 2000, the Navy held a 17-day, 4,000 nautical miles wartime 

shipping drill across the Bohai, Yellow, East China, and South China Seas, 

using the National Defense Mobilization Ship, Shichang.63 The exercise 

was the first successful drill of “wartime emergency mobilization and 

drafting of civilian personnel vessels.” The exercise was jointly 

organized by the State National Defense Mobilization Committee and 

the PLA Navy. Dozens of military and civilians participated from the 

State Planning Commission, Finance Ministry, Communications Ministry, 

Chinese Academy of Engineering, General Staff Department, and 

General Logistics Department. The exercise tested and enhanced the 

efficiency of drafting civilian vessels into service in an emergency.64 

Reserves and militia also have increasingly facilitated local support 

to military exercises and operations. For example, in Zhejiang Province 

a militia seaborne refueling unit was set upon April 18, 2001, at the 

Zhejiang Petroleum Limited Company in Yuhuan. The unit was made up of 

100 militiamen whose mission is to set up permanent refueling points at 

ports along the eastern coastline and highways, as well as small mobile 

refueling teams on land, to provide POL support during peacetime and 

war.65
238

Missile Operations: Concealment, Mobility, and Quality. 

Missile Operations, which have been a pocket of excellence in the 

PLA for several years,66 continued to improve in terms of the quality of 

personnel, rapid mobility, concealment and deception, and logistics 

support. During 2000-01, Second Artillery pushed enhancements, 

particularly to address key problems in rapid mobility and information 

countermeasures under high-tech conditions.67

 To improve the quality and quantity of its science and technology 

personnel, for example, Second Artillery has actively recruited about 2,000 

university students in recent years.68 Like other elements of the PLA, it has 

sought not only to deepen the quality of its personnel, but also to 

encourage innovative high-tech solutions to its training and operations 

through closer cooperation with civilian institutions, as well as the 

recruitment of civilian-educated specialists. On March 9, 2001, for 

example, the second Artillery Engineering Academy signed a 

cooperative agreement on research and teaching with Northwest 

Industrial University.69

Coastal/Maritime Operations: Key Focus. 

With a concerted effort to enhance coastal operations, all Services 

emphasized sea-crossing and island seizure training. A Nanjing MR 

Group Army held sea training on the southern Fujian Coast during midJuly 2000 that is representative.70 Training included infantry and tanks 

seizing beaches, scouts conducting reconnaissance from the sea, artillery 

employed on ships, amphibious armored troops seizing beaches and 

carrying out fire attacks at sea; and engineers clearing obstacles. The 

GA has been engaged in sea training since the beginning of the summer 

2000. Mock ups of an amphibious landing field have also been set up in 

garrison so that infantry regiments could continue sea training year 

round.71
239

 The Shenyang MR developed amphibious training in early 2000. On 

January 22, 2000, the division experimented with live-fire practice from a 

freighter, and tested several ways to secure equipment onto vessels 

(presumably civilian).72 Between January and July, the division trained in 

loading equipment onto vessels, firing armored car guns over water, 

striking at aerial targets using ship-borne anti-aircraft artillery, and 

striking beach targets with ship-borne artillery.73

 In June 2000, a Naval landing Ship Unit that is attached to PLA unit 

38091 at Haikou, Hainan Island, conducted training in night landing 

operations with troops, armored cars, and amphibious tanks against an 

enemy objective.74 Because the unit’s equipment was outdated, it tried to 

develop innovative ways to enhance its capabilities and compensate for its 

deficiencies. This included training during the heavy fog season (March 

through June) in fishing areas and narrow channels. Air defense 

training was also stepped up to “take advantage” of heavy air traffic in the 

area. During the first half of 2000, the unit conducted 42 single ship drills 

and eight formation landing drills, half of which were conducted at night, in 

heavy fog, and in other environments resembling realistic warfare 

conditions.75

 A submarine flotilla that underestimated the capability of the enemy 

and failed a training test 2 years before stepped up its study of enemy 

capabilities and consequently was able to penetrate an enemy port to 

enforce a blockade during a summer 2000 drill.76 The unit has focused its 

study on submarine attack of aircraft carrier and destroyer formations, 

and submarine coordination with the aviation corps and surface vessels to 

penetrate an enemy blockade and lay mines in a port. The unit established 

a file on each enemy vessel and adjusted its training to counter enemy 

anti-submarine capabilities.77

 In August 2000, the Beijing MR reported on an Air Force unit that had 

participated in sea operations.78 The unit, which had only trained over 

land before, trained for 2 months over water beginning in April 2000. 
240

During the sea training, special attention was paid to low-altitude 

acrobatics, formation and navigation.79

Communications: Connectivity, EW, and CNA.80

 The PLA recognizes that it must enhance its command and control, 

EW, and counterelectronic warfare capability, as well as its computer 

network attack and counterattack capabilities, if it hopes to fight to win a 

regional war under high-tech conditions. Consequently, the PLA has 

taken increased efforts to boost all of these capabilities. As an example, 

Group Army Deputy Commander Zhang Hetian of the Nanjing MR held 

network warfare drills81 on July 11, 2000, in which Blue Force (enemy) 

reconnaissance and attacks on Red force targets were simulated. The 

Group Army achieved an initial network capability at the time of the 

exercise, but Zhang noted that some PLA commanders had not yet grasped 

the demands of “achieving victory.” 

 The Lanzhou MR held an Electronic warfare Defense work meeting on 

July 3-4, 2000, at a Group Army that had been a pilot for electronic defense 

operations during the previous 2 years.82 During the meeting, the MR 

reviewed the accomplishments in “three anti’s, one resist” (antireconnaissance, anti-jamming, anti-network attack, and resist 

destruction). The ability of commanders and staffs to organize and 

direct information/electronic warfare was reportedly significantly 

enhanced.83 

Beijing MR (BMR) held a major electronic warfare exercise in early 

August 2000 in conjunction with a combined arms operation.84 This was 

the first time all the new and main battle EW equipment of the ground 

forces were brought together, and comprehensive assessments were made 

of the combat capability of the equipment systems and units.85 BMR has 

also developed online Operational Forces (OPFOR) training for 

electronic warfare to enhance training.86
241

 In the “Southwest 2000” Exercise, two formations separated by 500 

km fought against each other in a “virtual reality laboratory” in 

Chengdu MR’s first online test of its command and staff. This 

developed from online “checks” held during late 1999. Chengdu MR 

applied its experiences, which were ahead of other PLA units, to 

cooperation with NDU to develop a “Campaign Command Training 

model System” that formally went into operation during the Southwest 

2000 Exercise.87

 NDU experts characterized this as the first true “War Laboratory” 

for PLA campaign training. The main characteristics of the exercise 

were: 

 1. Units in five south western provinces and regions were linked by 

dozens of local networks and several hundred terminals. 

 2. Real-time, force-on-force simulation that provided information on 

the campaign situation, disposition of orders, and Red Force and Blue 

Force postures. 

 3. The exercises unfolded synchronously in real-time at numerous 

campaign units and included sound, image, text, and data online, thanks 

to an emergency doubling of the transmission capability. (4) the exercise 

led to a significant change in network architecture, re-routing of 

transmission routes, renovation of equipment, and breakthroughs in 

achieving secure information transmission under dynamic long-range 

network characteristics.88 

The PLA Air Force (PLAAF) of the BMR held an online training exercise 

in conjunction with a meeting on headquarters science and technology 

training in mid-June 2000.89 This exercise simulated an attack on 

Beijing by multiple sorties of enemy aircraft flying at low altitude. The 

system greatly reduced training planning and preparation time and can 

be used to access information about enemy aircraft and meteorological 
242

information, as well as draw up plans for integrated simulated training 

and joint training with army units.90

Special Operations: Strike Deep Behind Lines. 

Special operations forces have concentrated on enhancing basic 

skills to conduct operations deep behind enemy lines. The “Cheetahs,” a 

model unit commanded by Colonel Liu Youchun, is one example of the 

accomplishments in recent Special Operations training.91 The 56294 unit is a 

Chengdu MR Special Reconnaissance Dadui that has made notable progress 

to develop special operations soldiers. Cheetah soldiers can perform 

multiskills including operating light to heavy weapons, basic 

knowledge of foreign armies’ weapons, and the ability to operate 

transport that ranges from ground, to tank, to helicopter, and to 

assault boats. 

 Shenyang Military Region lauded personnel improvements in one 

special operations unit that is commanded by Li Jizhao, and political 

commissar, Han Baosheng. The unit expects to train 100 officers in both 

command and technical tasks, and develop 100 personnel who are experts in 

airborne operations, island-landing and sabotage operations, 

psychological warfare, enhanced instructor skills (with the “four 

abilities”), and all-round special operations skills.92

 One Special Operations Unit that had previously failed a spot 

examination in Lanzhou MR was high lighted in the MR newspaper for 

passing an inspection without prior notification. No advance information 

was provided on the subjects to be tested, which was a change from 

previous years. The unit had previously failed some tasks and only 

achieved good results in about half of the 23 test subjects. The unit had 

consistently performed with excellent results in yearly training.93 The 

inspection reinforced the need for units to develop a no notice capability. 
243

Overall Improvements. 

PLA training has become increasingly more sophisticated and 

complex, incorporating evolving joint operations and national defense 

mobilization. Training within a core of elite and experimental units is 

characterized by use of more professional and capable Opposing 

Forces (OPFOR);94 near-combat conditions; all-weather and night 

operations; sea and island force projection; and long distance 

deployments into unfamiliar terrain.95 Acceptance of “failure” (i.e., 

defeat of the Red Force by the Blue Force), as well as more open discussion 

of deficiencies has also lead to a more realistic appraisal of strengths and 

weaknesses, with the potential for more realistic measures to correct 

shortcomings. In addition, training is conducted more frequently 

throughout the year, rather than simply relying on end-of-year training. 

Greater use of simulation and “online” training are becoming more widespread and sophisticated, providing an augmentation to field training in 

everything from command and control, to asymmetrical warfare, to mobile 

operations, to nuclear and biological warfare training.96

Conclusion. 

The PLA lacks a sufficient budget to support faster and more extensive 

military hardware and technology acquisition, and is handicapped by 

China’s deep-seated preference for independent domestic capabilities that 

can be obtained through reverse engineering, domestic innovation, or 

acquisition of technical information. Moreover, China needs to sustain 

an export-led economic strategy that could be undermined if the region or 

the west were alarmed by China’s military modernization efforts before 

China is ready.97 The PLA has been able to make a virtue out of 

necessity by focusing on software modernization. Among these are 

steps: (1) improving the quality of personnel through educational and 

recruiting reforms and initiatives; (2) instituting organizational 

changes that will enhance efficiency, reduce wasteful practices, 

including corruption, and will ultimately enhance combat force 
244

capabilities, such as adaptation of joint operations and joint logistics; 

(3) selectively adapting relevant foreign military management 

practices and modern (specifically information age) asymmetric 

strategies; (4) stream lining organizations; and (5) intensively studying 

and assessing potential threats, with particular emphasis on the United 

States, and more recently on Taiwan’s military capability. 

 Relying on key units that serve as both the vanguards and testing 

grounds for new equipment, structures, techniques, and strategies for 

offensive and defensive operations in a high-tech environment, the PLA 

has tested a myriad of equipment, made operational improvements, and 

innovations to enhance its combat effectiveness in a high-tech 

environment. The PLA is poised to capitalize on the lessons learned to 

enhance its regular, reserve, and militia units. At the very least, the PLA 

now has developed a sound basis for continuing enhancement of the its 

force projection capability, and has established a jump off point for 

modernization of the entire PLA as resources increase, modern 

technology is absorbed, and innovation and adaptation further 

develop.98

 While hardware and technology acquisition will continue, the 

PLA’s recent concentration on modern thinking, innovation, and 

experience of leaders and fighters provides a more potent base for 

accelerated modernization. The PLA today possesses a rough but ready 

force projection capability, one that will continue to steadily improve over 

time, which adds greater risks and costs for potential opponents in 

China’s near periphery. The modernizing PLA increasingly provides the 

Chinese leadership with credible coercive strength—one that can back up the 

threat of the use of force and/or selective employment of force to promote 

China’s national sovereignty and security interests along its land, air, and 

maritime borders. 
245

ENDNOTES-CHAPTER 8 

1. Jiefang Jun Bao (hereafter JJB), August 10, 2001. 

 2. “Modernization” of the PLA must be viewed in relative terms. This chapter does 

not argue that the PLA has become an “advanced” military in the past 3 years, since most 

PLA equipment and weaponry still remains up to 20 years behind advanced militaries. 

This chapter, however, starts from the firm belief that hardware-based comparisons to 

advanced militaries are insufficient to fully assess the growing coercive power of China’s 

military in both real and psychological terms within the Asia-Pacific region. 

 3. Beijing, Shenyang, Jinan, Guangzhou, Lanzhou, Nanjing, and Chengdu Military 

Regions. 

 4. JJB, August 10, 2001. 

 5. Ibid. 

6. Ibid., October 14, 2000. 

 7. Lanzhou Military Region Jundai Bao (hereafter RMJD), October 17, 2000; Nanjing Military 

Region Renmin Qianmin (hereafter RMQX), October 17, 2000; Rocket Force News, October 17, 

2000; Guangzhou Military Region Zhanshi Bao (hereafter ZSB), October 16, 2000. 

 8. Ibid. 

9. JJB, October 14, 2000. 

 10. Ibid. 

11. Guangzhou MR ZSB, October 13, 2000. 

 12. Ibid. 

13. Ibid.

 14. Reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance; air raid and counterair raid; and 

jamming and antijamming. 

 15. See, for examples, JJB, December 2000; Shenyang Military Region Qianjin Bao 

(hereafter QJB), April 4, 2001; JJB, May 7, 2001; Beijing Military Region Zhanyou Bao 
246

(hereafter ZYB), November 4, 2000; ZYB, November 7, 2000. 

 16. See, for examples, JJB, May 6, 2001; ZSB, March 6, 2001; JJB, May 16, 2001; 

RMJD, April 26, 2001; ZSB, March 6, 2001. 

 17. See, for examples, China National Defense News, May 21, 2001. 

 18. See, for examples, QJB, April 9, 2001; JJB May 4, 2001; ZSB, March 6, 2001; JJB, 

December 4, 2000; QJB, April 9, 2001; JJB, May 29, 2001; ZSB, March 6, 2001. 

 19. See RMQX, March 2, 2001; RMQX, April 5, 2001; RMQX, November 2, 2000; 

ZSB, November 3, 2000; ZSB, March 6, 2001; Air Force News, April 19, 2001; China National 

Defense News, May 21, 2001; ZSB, March 6, 2001. In addition, six of the PLA’s 29 proposals 

submitted at the National People’s Congress in March 2001 addressed maritime issues, 

which testifies to an increasing interest. This was said to be the largest number of PLA 

proposals ever submitted (JJB, March 11, 2001). For coordination of sea-land unit 

coordinated training, see People’s Navy, 10 April 2001. 

 20. See, for examples, People’s Navy, April 7, 2001. For People’s Liberation Army 

Navy (PLAN) sub-chasing training in coordination with PLA army, see People’s Navy, 

April 12, 2001. 

 21. For People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) Opposing Forces (OPFOR) 

support, see People’s Navy, April 5, 2001; for long range operations (up to 3,000 

kilometers), see Air Force News, April 19, 2001. 

 22. See, for examples, ZSB, April 19, 2001; JJB, May 20, 2001; China National Defense 

News, May 24, 2001; RMJD, March 15, 2001. 

 23. See, for examples, JJB, May 27, 2001; ZSB, March 3, 2001; JJB, May 29, 2001. 

 24. JJB, February 2, 2001. 

 25. In Chinese open source writings, “opponents” are most frequently 

characterized in terms of capabilities, which most frequently implies U.S. military 

capability. Recently, however, materials have been increasingly published that 

specifically identify Taiwan military capabilities as a threat and name the United States as 

an opponent, or even “enemy.” 

 26. Ibid. 
247

27. JJB, January 12, 2001. 

 28. Ibid. 

29. See ZSB, March 3, 2001. 

 30. Air Force News, April 19, 2001. 

 31. Rocket Force News, March 8, 2001. 

 32. JJB, December 28, 2000. 

 33. JJB, April 28, 2001. 

 34. Guangzhou MR ZSB, March 1, 2001. 

 35. JJB, October 31, 2000. 

 36. Ibid. 

37. Zhou Xiaoning, Peng Xiwen, and An Weiping, Lianhe Zuozhan Xinlun, National 

Defense University Press, Beijing, 2000. 

 38. JJB, October 10, 2000. 

 39. Ibid. 

40. ZYB, December 28, 2000. 

 41. RMQX, December 29, 2000. 

 42. Ibid. 

43. JJB, January 9, 2001. 

 44. Air Force News, March 15, 2001. 

 45. Directory of PRC Military Personalities, October 2000, p. iv. 

 46. JJB, November 14, 2000. 
248

 47. Ibid.

 48. China Defense Industries, November 9, 2000. 

 49. ZSB, October 20, 2000. 

 50. Ibid. 

51. China Defense News, March 1, 2001. 

 52. JJB, August 9, 2000. 

 53. Ibid. 

54. RMQX, March 8, 2001. 

 55. Ibid. 

56. ZSB, March 1, 2001. 

 57. ZSB, July 26, 2000. 

 58. Ibid. 

59. Ibid. 

60. JJB, October 25, 2000. 

 61. Air Force News, August 17, 2000. 

 62. Ibid. 

63. China National Defense News, August 11, 2000. 

 64. Ibid. 

65. China National Defense News, April 26, 2001. 

 66. For more detailed and authoritative discussion of missile modernization, see Mark 

Stokes, China’s Strategic modernization: Implications for the United States, Carlisle, PA: Strategic 

Studies Institute, 1999; and “China’s Military Space and Conventional Theater Missile 
249

Development: Implications for Security in the Taiwan Strait,” in People’s Liberation Army After 

Next, Susan M. Puska, ed., Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2000. 

 67. Rocket Forces News, March 1, 2001. 

 68. JJB, May 10, 2001. 

 69. Rocket Forces News, March 15, 2001. 

 70. JJB, August 8, 2000. 

 71. Ibid. 

72. QJB, July 10, 2000. 

 73. Ibid. 

74. People’s Navy, July 8, 2000. 

 75. Ibid. 

76. People’s Navy, July 15, 2000. 

 77. Ibid. 

78. JJB, August 8, 2000. 

 79. Ibid. 

80. Computer Network Attack. 

 81. JJB, August 8-9, 2000. 

 82. RMJD, July 11 and 15, 2000. 

 83. Ibid. 

84. JJB, August 11, 2000. 

 85. Ibid. 
250

86. Ibid. 

87. Ibid. 

88. Ibid. 

89. Air Force News, July 8, 2000. 

 90. Ibid. 

91. JJB, May 4, 2001. 

 92. Shenyang MR Qianjin Bao, April 4, 2001. 

 93. JJB, December 31, 2000. 

 94. See, for examples, ZYB, April 2, 2001; JJB, December 1, 2000; People’s Navy, April 7, 

2001; CONMILIT, October 2000; Renmin Qianxian, September 9, 2000; JJB, October 10, 2000; 

PLA Pictorial, January 2001; Air Force News, March 29, 2001; and People’s Navy, April 5, 

2001. 

 95. See, for examples, Air Force News, April 5, 2001. 

 96. See, for examples, ZYB, April 24, 2001; RMJD, April 21, 2001; Rocket Force News, 

April 26, 2001. 

 97. Michael D. Swaine and Ashley J. Tellis, Interpreting China’s Grand Strategy, Past, 

Present, and Future, Santa Monica: RAND, 2001, pp. 141-147. 

 98. Finance Minister Xiang Huiacheng announced in March 2001 that the PLA budget 

would be increased by 141.004 billion yuan, 17.7 pecent. Xiang attributed this defense 

budget increase to (1) salary increases; (2) adaptation to drastic changes taking place in the 

world military situation; and (3)the need for the PLA to prepare for defense and combat. 

(See JJB, March 6, 2001). This increase is a consistent trend—in 1998 the official defense 

budget was increased by 93.47 billion yuan, in 1999 it was increased by 107.67 billion yuan, 

and in 2000 it was increased by 121.29 billion yuan. 
251

CHAPTER 9 

LOGISTICS SUPPORT FOR PLA AIR FORCE 

CAMPAIGNS 

Kenneth W. Allen1

Under today’s wartime conditions, aviation troops must be prepared to 

deploy quickly across borders to a war zone and be prepared to fight 

immediately. Currently, some of China’s war zones do not have many firstline airfields, so the existing airfields must support several types of aircraft. 

The PLAAF must also hide its aircraft by dispersing them to field airstrips 

and highway landing strips. Therefore, PLAAF logistics troops must have the 

capability to support multiple types of aircraft at different types of airfields.2

 Logistics Support for Mobile Operations, 1997

INTRODUCTION 

The purpose of this chapter is to examine what the People’s 

Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) is doing to reform its logistics 

systems in order to fight and win high technology wars under modern 

conditions, employing all five of its branches. Many of these reforms have 

come about as a direct result of contingency planning for a possible war 

with the United States over Taiwan, but there forms are applicable to the 

PLAAF as a whole. 

 In the 1990s, the PLAAF began the process of transforming itself 

from a force capable of employing single branches (aviation, surface-toair missiles [SAMs], antiaircraft artillery [AAA], radar, and airborne 

troops) and single types of aircraft in positional defensive campaigns to 

one capable of using multiple branches and several types of aircraft in air 

force combined arms, mobile offensive operations campaigns, with 

the goal of shifting to operations in joint service campaigns.3 In order to 

reach this goal, the PLAAF has had to implement some significant 
252

changes in its logistics system, which traditionally has not been structured 

for supporting mobile, offensive operations. While many of the changes are 

still underway, some are still only aspirational. 

 The chapter is divided into four sections. In Section I, I will provide the 

setting for changes in the PLAAF’s logistics operations by discussing 

PLAAF operational theory. In Section II, I will define PLAAF logistics 

and provide a brief discussion of the PLAAF logistics structure. In Section 

III, I will examine PLAAF logistics theory and what types of training 

the PLAAF has conducted to implement this theory. In Section IV, I 

will provide some conclusions about changes in the PLAAF’s logistics 

system in relation to possible campaign operations against the United 

States. 

SECTION I: PLAAIR FORCE OPERATIONS THEORY 

PLAAF Positional Defense. 

The PLAAF basically has two modes of operations—positional and 

mobile.4 Traditionally, the PLAAF’s primary mission has been positional air 

defense for China’s airfields, national political and economic centers, 

heavy troop concentrations, important military facilities, and 

transportation systems.5 As a result, most fighter airfields and virtually 

all of the PLAAF’s SAMs and AAA are concentrated around China’s 

large cities. During the its first 3 decades, the types of weapon systems the 

PLAAF had and the location of the airfields made it difficult for the 

PLAAF to conduct any other type of operations. 

 According to Paul Godwin, the PLAAF’s reliance on positional 

defense became even more apparent during the late 1970s, when the core 

of the PLA’s new strategy of “People’s war Under Modern 

Conditions” was forward defense.6 Godwin states, 

This strategy meant that China would be defended at selected critical points as 

close to its borders as possible to prevent Soviet forces from driving deep into 
253

China. Positional defense was not the preferred option for China’s military 

strategists, who would have preferred a more flexible mobile defense. But, the 

superior arms and equipment of Soviet forces conducting joint warfare 

granted them such mobility, speed, and destructive power that the PLA’s 

operations could not realistically be based on a war of maneuver. 

The PLAAF’s Search for a Strategy. 

Serious changes in the way the PLA thought about its future took place 

between the 1979 border conflict with Vietnam and Deng Xiaoping’s 1985 

“strategic decision” that directed the armed forces to change from 

preparation for an “early, major, and nuclear war” to preparing for 

“local limited wars around China’s borders, including its maritime 

territories and claims.” whereas the PLA Navy (PLAN) had 

conceptualized a change in its strategy from coastal defense to offshore 

defense, the PLAAF entered the second half of the decade still in search of a 

strategy.7

 The PLAAF’s search was driven, in part, by a desire to seek 

independent missions and to try to break away from its near total 

submission to the ground forces. This dependence was exemplified in the 

early 1980s when the PLA began reorganizing its ground forces into 

group armies, and the PLAAF was tasked to provide defense for 

group army positions. Specific guidance from the General Staff 

Department (GSD) was given that “each branch and unit of the PLAAF must 

establish the philosophy that they support the needs of the ground forces 

and that the victory is a ground force victory.”8

Wanghai Initiates Shift Toward Simultaneous Offensive and 

Defensive Operations. 

Under Wanghai, who became the commander in 1985, the PLAAF began 

articulating its views on mobile, offensive operations. First, in a break from 

the PLAAF’s focus on positional defensive campaigns, Wang laid out a 

program in 1987 that formally set forth the thought (sixiang) of
254

“building an air force with simultaneous offensive and defensive 

capabilities” (jianli gongfang jianbei xing kongjun).

9 Wang emphasized 

that the combined arms combat environment of the 1980s required a force 

that “could move quickly over long distances, could fight in an 

electronic environment, could have the capability to attack an enemy, 

and could keep the PLAAF from sustaining complete damage from an 

enemy air attack.” 

 In the late 1980s, the PLA began experimenting with the concept of 

rapid-reaction units. In 1990, the PLAAF published an authoritative 

book entitled Air Force Operations Research that stated, “The rapidreaction strategy (kuaisu fanying zhanlue)is based on the premise that 

China will only be engaged in local wars for the foreseeable future, 

and the PLA must strike to end the war quickly and meet the political 

objectives.”10

 Given China’s military limitations compared with those of the Soviets and 

Americans, the study advocated the concept of deploying air defense 

forces according to the principle of ”front light, rear heavy” along with the 

principle of “deploying in three rings.”11 The fixed-base logistics 

system that existed at that time met the PLAAF’s requirements for 

positional defense. 

 Using the “front light, rear heavy” concept, the PLAAF stated it 

should organize its SAM and AAA troops into a combined high-, 

medium- and low-altitude and a far-, medium-, and short-distance air 

defense net. The air force would also set up many intercept lines and 

organize its aviation troops into a layered intercept, especially along the 

enemy’s main routes. In deciding how to deploy its forces, the PLAAF 

divided the battle area into three lines, using the front line of enemy 

airfields as the baseline. The first line would extend to a radius of 500 

kilometers (300 miles) from the baseline, within which the notional enemy 

will mainly use its fighters and fighter-bombers. The second line would 

extend to 1,000 kilometers (600 miles), where the enemy will primarily 
255

use its fighter-bombers and bombers. The third line extends beyond 1,000 

kilometers, where the enemy would mainly use its long-range strategic 

bombers. 

 Information from The Republic of China 1993-94 National Defense 

Report described the situation as follows,12

The deployment of the Air Force is aimed primarily at defending against 

Russia and secondarily at defending against the Republic of China and 

Vietnam. Their deployment adopts the principle that “a minimum number of 

troops are deployed on the front line while the main forces are mobile.” 

Currently (1994), within 250 nautical miles (450 kilometers) from Taiwan, 

mainland China has 13 airbases capable of accommodating more than 1,000 

aircraft. However, there are only about 100 fighters stationed there now. In 

the second line, which is 250-500 nautical miles (450-900 kilometers) from 

Taiwan, there are more than 20 airbases with over 1,500 [PLAAF and Naval 

Aviation] combat aircraft of various types. 

The Republic of China 1998 National Defense Report states,13 “At present, 

1,300 aircraft are stationed at airbases within 500 nautical miles of Taiwan, 

of which 600 have a radius of operation over Taiwan proper.” The 2000 

National Defense Report states, “Already deployed within 600 nautical 

miles (1,000 kilometers) of the Taiwan proper are about l,000 [PLAAF 

and Naval Aviation] planes of various types which could undertake 

operational missions at any moment.”14 In December 2000, Taiwan’s 

ministry of defense stated, “There were 14 military and civil airfields 

within 250 nautical miles of Taiwan. They currently have 121 fighters, but 

could accommodate 1,279 fighters, not including SU-27s, on short 

notice . . .”15

 Looking at a map, the area out to 1,000 kilometers described in 

Taiwan’s reports starts at the Shandong Peninsula, arcs halfway 

through Hubei and Hunan Provinces, then goes down to the Leizhou 

Peninsula, covering almost all of the Nanjing MR and about half of the 

Guangzhou MR. According to the Federation of American Scientists’ 

Map 1, there are 50 airfields within 800 kilometers of Taiwan, 
256

including 36 military airbases—not all of which are permanently 

occupied.16

 Source: Federation of American Scientists. 

Map 1. Chinese Airfields within 800 Kilometers of Taiwan. 

According to Taiwan military officials, since the mid-1990s, the 

PLAAF has been deploying small units from designated rapid reaction 

units from throughout the PLAAF into some of the bases directly opposite 

Taiwan for 6-month familiarization deployments.17 The deployments have 

given the PLAAF’s logistics system the opportunity to practice supporting 

those forces. 
257

 In using the “light front, heavy rear” concept, the air force believed 

it would have to deal with two important problems. The first was that the 

PLAAF’s aircraft in the 1980s did not have the capability to fly to the border 

from their home bases, loiter for any length of time, conduct an intercept, 

and return home again. This problem was exemplified during the 1979 

border war with Vietnam. In addition, the PLAAF believed that, during 

any sudden attack on China, it must be able to scramble all of its first 

line aircraft to meet the attack and prevent the incoming aircraft from 

striking any airfields. 

 The second, and contradictory, problem was that the most likely 

anticipated adversaries at that time—the United States and Soviet 

Union—had aircraft capable of conducting deep strikes into the heart of 

China. Therefore, the PLAAF believed it should station most of its air defense 

weapon systems in the second and third lines so they could intercept any 

longer-range aircraft as they converged on key targets. Furthermore, the 

attacking aircraft would most likely not have the proper escorts at those 

distances, and the PLAAF’s early warning radars might be able to give 

enough advance notice of an attack for the air defense systems to be 

ready. 

 Several simultaneous forces are pulling on the PLAAF today. 

Although current PLAAF writings do not mention the “front light, rear 

heavy” concept, the air force still faces the same concerns about air 

defense and aircraft survivability at facilities near the coast. They are 

being told to prepare for offensive operations, possibly against U.S. forces, 

but they are also analyzing the types of operations and weapons, 

including long-range cruise missiles used during the Gulf War and 

Kosovo conflict that successfully targeted air defense networks and 

airfields.18
258

Teaching the Theories. 

Beginning in the 1990s, the PLAAF began training its mid-level officers 

in some of these new theories. According to an article in China’s Air Force 

magazine:19

The PLAAF Command College implemented an in-depth teaching reform in 1993 to 

change the PLAAF’s operating methodology from employing single branches 

and single types of aircraft to using multiple branches and several types of 

aircraft in an air force combined arms campaign, with the goal of shifting to 

operations in a joint service campaign. Prior to then, the training of 

middle-ranking commanders was aimed mainly at directing combat 

involving a single branch and single types of aircraft in warfare under 

general conditions. Commanders who graduated from such training were 

good at the tactical operations of their own types of aircraft and their own 

branch, but they did not know much about other types of aircraft or other 

branches and services. The PLAAF’s joint operations consisted of aircraft 

flying combat air patrols and attack airplanes flying far apart from each 

other and not having much to do with each other. 

 As part of the reforms to produce “transcentury commanders,” the 

Command College also began focusing on theories such as joint combat 

operations, mobile warfare, information warfare, and electronic 

warfare.20 The new combat theory embodied “four changes”: 

 1. Change from studying air combat under general conditions to 

studying air combat under high-tech conditions. 

 2. Change from stressing air defense to stressing air offense. 

 3. Change from air combat supported by joint operations with the army to 

air combat supported by joint operations of army, navy, and air force. 

 4. Change from warfare involving a single branch and single type of 

aircraft to combined arms warfare involving the multiple branches and types 

of aircraft. 
259

The PLAAF under Liu Shunyao. 

Whereas Wanghai initiated the concept of simultaneous offensive and 

defensive operations in 1987, it did not receive much publicity until late 1996, 

when Chinese leaders, including Central Military Commission (CMC) 

Chairman Jiang Zemin and PLAAF commander Liu Shunyao, began to 

emphasize the PLAAF’s need to fight offensive battles.21 During 1997, Liu 

stated, “The PLAAF must improve its capabilities in actual combat by 

highlighting campaign and tactical training.”22 He further emphasized that 

campaign training involves air deterrence, air interdiction, air strikes, and 

participation in joint exercises. 

 In the February-March 2000 issue of China’s Air Force magazine, four 

authors provided a candid assessment of the PLAAF’s shortcomings and 

requirements for it to be able to conduct simultaneous offensive and 

defensive operations.23 The article stated, “The PLAAF must change the 

direction of its strategic thinking from an emphasis on territorial air defense, 

primarily because the concept of modern high-tech war has changed. If the 

PLAAF does not change its thinking, then its development will be 

constrained and fall behind with the rest of the world’s weak countries.” 

 The article also stressed that the ability to attack is the PLAAF’s weak link. 

This weakness was a direct result of the PLAAF’s past operational thought, 

which was reflected in the air force’s flight training program. The authors 

stated that if the PLAAF wants to develop a simultaneous offensive and 

defensive capability, then reforming the training system is urgent. Some 

of the reforms include upgrading the professional military education 

(PME) system, overhauling the pilot recruitment and training 

requirements, and focusing on realistic flight training. 

PLAAF Mobile Operations. 

As the PLAAF acquires better weapon systems and contemplates 
260

using its rapid-reaction units in simultaneous offensive and defensive 

operations, it has begun to focus more on mobile operations. In 1997, the 

General Logistics Department (GLD) published a series of books on 

logistics support of local wars under modern high-tech conditions. 

One of those books, Logistics Support for Mobile Operations, provides 

valuable information on PLAAF logistics. 

 The PLAAF Dictionary defines mobile operations as “Aviation troops 

seizing the right moment to move to the objective by air, land, or water. 

Normally, this entails deploying mobile fendui to concealed locations to 

conduct their attack.”24 Although this is the official definition, the 

PLAAF’s use of mobile operations is not limited to fendui-size forces, 

not is it limited to the aviation forces. Today, all five of its branches 

and support units train in mobile operations. According to Logistics 

Support for Mobile Operations, the PLAAF has five types of mobile 

operations—long-range, air interdiction, support for other services and 

branches, airborne supply, and ambush—as described below.25

 1. Long-range operations. According to the PLAAF’s view of mobile 

operations, bombers and fighter-bomber aircraft are the primary 

means for conducting mobile long-range air attack operations. 

Normally, these are planned attacks on land or maritime targets by 

aircraft carrying specific weapons and supported by all types of escort 

aircraft. Therefore, in order for the PLAAF to adopt this method, it must 

take into consideration the current condition of its bomber units. When 

planning the bomber force’s future attacks, the PLAAF must select the 

right forward bases. Therefore, it must strengthen the ability of the 

airfields in peacetime to support bomber operations during wartime. 

The PLAAF must plan on having its bomber airfields attacked after 

the PLAAF’s bombers conduct their attack, so the PLAAF must carefully 

select its targets and decide upon pre- and post-attack procedures. Based 

on the PLAAF’s bomber and escort aircraft range capabilities, it must 

determine the appropriate distance for long-range attacks, so that the 

attacking task force will have enough time over the target to accomplish its 
261

mission and the electronic support aircraft will have enough time to support 

them. 

 2. Air interdiction operations. The PLAAF uses its fighters as the 

primary method for air interdiction operations. This method is used 

for air superiority, air defense over key points, and air cover missions. 

Operations during the Gulf war showed that an attacking force cannot 

completely destroy all of the opposing force’s aircraft on the ground, so the 

best way to keep your aircraft from being destroyed on the ground is to 

conduct air interdiction operations against the attacking force. In future 

wars, the PLAAF will adopt the following methods for air interdiction: 

concentrate force by stressing quality and combat power to carry out 

emergency (ji), difficult (nan), dangerous (xian), and significant (zhong) 

missions as the edge of the knife; attack the aircraft that are 

supporting the attacking aircraft, such as airborne early warning and 

jamming aircraft; attack the enemy at all levels along the entire route as 

far out as possible; and pay attention to attacking low and super low 

level air targets. 

 3. Aviation Support for Other Services and Branches. The PLAAF’s 

aviation troops will also provide support for the ground and naval 

forces, including airborne cover missions, airborne firepower support, 

aerial reconnaissance and electronic countermeasures to degrade the 

enemy’s overall combat capabilities. This includes the enemy’s 

campaign rear air defense system, second echelon units (or campaign 

reserve forces), logistics support system, communications system, 

helicopters, and massing forces. It also means the PLAAF’s attacking force 

must avoid ground or maritime corridors and guarantee friendly ground 

and naval forces’ freedom of movement. 

 4. Airborne drop operations. The PLAAF is responsible for air transport of 

supplies, which can be either airdropped by parachute or brought into an 

airfield. Since transport planes do not have any air defense capability, it is 

important to consider their routes and vulnerability to air attack. 
262

 5. Patrol and ambush operations. The PLAAF uses its aviation, AAA, 

and SAM troops as the primary methods for these operations. These 

operations require a high degree of independence, use little firepower, 

are highly flexible, and usually receive good results. In order to execute 

these types of operations, the PLAAF will deploy small aviation 

elements or AAA and SAM units to areas where the attacking aircraft 

will pass. AAA and SAMs will be effective against low and super low 

flying targets, including armed helicopters. 

SECTION II: WHAT IS PLA AIR FORCE LOGISTICS? 

This section begins the discussion of PLAAF logistics reforms by 

first laying out what PLAAF logistics encompasses. Basically, the logistics 

system is responsible for providing all the PLAAF’s general purpose 

supplies, construction, health services, food, shelter, clothing, fuel, and 

transportation, as well as managing its budget and expenditures. The 

PLAAF Dictionary defines air force logistics as the overall term for the 

logistics structure that supports combat, training, and air forcebuilding.26 PLAAF logistics consists of command, plus finance, health, 

armament, fuel, materials, transportation, capital construction, and 

airfield management support services. Logistics is organized into four 

operational levels—headquarters Air Force, military region air forces 

(MRAF ), air corps, and units. The administrative structure consists of a 

Logistics Department at headquarters Air Force and each of the MRAF 

and air corps headquarters. In addition, each ground unit (nonaviation) division, brigade, and regiment has a logistics Department or 

Logistics Division. 

 The most important logistics organization for operational aviation 

units at the division and regiment level is the field station (changzhan), 

which is an independent logistics support unit under dual leadership of 

the air division and the MRAF headquarters. In the PLAAF, the field 

station director serves the same function as a U.S. Air Force(USAF) base 
263

commander. Prior to February 1970, the field station was called a base, 

and had the status of a division.27 Today, it has the status of a regiment. 

The field station is responsible for organizing and supplying material and 

equipment, and also for providing continuous combined service support 

for operations and training. Each airfield housing aircraft assigned to the 

division has its own field station. Each airfield generally has 1-2 aircraft 

regiments, which determines the field station’s size. For example, a 

field station at an airfield supporting two fighter regiments has about 930 

personnel, including 170 officers and 760 enlisted troops.28 According to 

Logistics Support for Mobile Operations, the field station will be 

augmented by additional logistics personnel when necessary. 

 The PLAAF’s supply depot system is organized into a three-tier 

structure—first level depots are located in various military regions but 

are subordinate to headquarters Air Force; second level depots are 

located in each military region and are subordinate to the MRAF 

headquarters; and third level depots are located at and subordinate to 

operational units.29 For example, each airfield has a third level depot, 

and the second level depots can support the third level depots when 

required. In addition, first level depots can either supply the second level 

depots or send items directly to the unit if necessary. 

 The PLAAF Dictionary states that the air force’s strategic and 

campaign rear area depots can be divided into composite depots, where 

all types of materials are stored, and specialized depots for air materiel, 

armament, fuel, vehicles, and quartermaster articles, etc.30

 In the past, the PLAAF’s Logistics Department has also been responsible for 

some weapon systems maintenance. The PLAAF has always made a clear 

distinction between its aviation (aircraft) and air defense forces (AAA, 

SAM, and radar troops). This can be seen throughout the entire 

PLAAF’s administrative, operational, logistics, maintenance, and 

training structure. Whereas the PLAAF has always had a separate first level 

department that was responsible for aviation maintenance,31 the 
264

Logistics Department has been responsible for air defense equipment 

maintenance.32 In 1998, the Logistics Department transferred its 

second level Air materiel33 Department (hangcaibu) and Armament 

Department (junxiebu)to the PLAAF’s Equipment Department. Today, the 

Logistics Department is responsible for all general purpose supplies, and the 

Equipment Department is responsible for all special purpose supplies and 

all weapon systems and equipment maintenance.34

 Finally, there are PLAAF academies, schools, and training regiments 

and groups to train logistics and nonaviation maintenance personnel. 

In addition, the PLAAF has several subordinate research Institutes for 

aviation medicine, fuels, clothing, aviation munitions, four stations 

(oxygen generation, compressed air, battery charging, and power 

supply) equipment, and capital construction.35

Operational and Logistics Command Posts. 

The PLAAF has identified several types of operational command posts 

(zhihuisuo), some of which are established only during exercises and 

wartime campaigns.36 The PLAAF’s logistics system also has a separate 

set of command posts, which may or may not coincide with the operational 

command posts. According to a report in the South China Morning Post, the 

PLAAF built 100 command posts, operational offices, and aviation control 

centers between 1994 and 1999.37

Operational Command Posts. Each of the following PLAAF headquarters 

have operational command posts:38 headquarters Air Force, MRAF 

headquarters; air corps; aviation divisions and regiments; and AAA 

and SAM divisions, brigades, and regiments. The Senior staff for each 

type generally consists of the following representatives: a commander, 

chief duty officer, chief of staff, and logistics support staff officer. 

Depending on the organization level, other staff officers include 

representatives from the various second level administrative offices 

under the four major departments (headquarters, political, logistics, 
265

and equipment), including operations, intelligence, communications, 

confidential (security for classified material), navigation, SAM, AAA, 

flight management, weather, radar, political, logistics, and maintenance. 

 Based on their mission, command posts can be categorized as main 

(jiben), alternate (yubei), advance (qianjin), auxiliary (fuzhu), or rear area 

(houfang) command posts. Main command posts are permanent command 

posts that are normally established at each echelon’s headquarters. During 

campaigns, the commander is the Senior officer in the command post. 

Alternate command posts are established before the start of a campaign at 

headquarters Air Force, each MRAF , and each air corps with the 

responsibility of commanding units at the division and below. They are 

built at the same time as a main command post but are not used unless 

the main command post is no longer functional. Alternate command posts 

can also be set up for special purposes or to command lower level units. 

 Advance command posts are established in the operational area to 

assist the main command post in a general command role or to command 

air force units that are assisting ground and naval forces. For example, 

during the 1979 border conflict with Vietnam, the Guangzhou MRAF 

headquarters established an advance command post at an 

unidentified location, which worked together with the 7th Air Corps 

Headquarters at Nanning as the unified authority for the PLAAF’s 

participation.39 An auxiliary command post is created to assist a main 

or advance command post in combat areas where command is difficult. In 

addition, depending on the type of activity, command posts can either be 

fixed or mobile, and depending on their physical location, they can be on 

the surface, underground, shipborne, or airborne. 

War Zone Joint Logistics Command Posts. According to Logistics Support 

for Mobile Operations, the war zone joint logistics structure is the joint 

logistics command center for all of the various services and branches, and 

is the highest logistics command structure for the campaign.40 Normally, the 

war zone logistics organization forms the base, which then incorporates 
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people from the participating navy, air force, and second artillery 

campaign juntuan logistics organizations, and local command 

structures that are supporting the campaign, as well as the appropriate 

people from the headquarters, political, and equipment departments. 

When necessary, the GLD and the headquarters Navy and air Force 

Logistics Departments send representatives to participate. Under 

normal circumstances, the war zone deputy commander who is in charge of 

rear area logistics work becomes the joint logistics center commander, and 

the war zone logistics department director and each of the war zone 

service and branch logistics directors are assigned as deputy commanders. 

 Depending on the mission, the joint logistics command structure can 

organize four other types of command posts: rear area basic command 

post, rear area reserve command post, advance command post, and a 

direction command post. Normally, a rear area basic command post is located 

in the rear area where it is safe to conduct complete, unhindered 

command of joint logistics for mobile operations. 

 A rear area reserve command post is established early to take over from 

the basic command post if necessary. Normally, the reserve command 

post is staffed by the war zone deputy logistics commander, other 

required staff officers, and logistics support fendui. The reserve command 

post is located to the flank or to the rear of the basic command post. 

They maintain a close relationship. In the event that the basic command 

post is damaged or is unable to command the logistics units and fendui, 

the reserve command post immediately takes charge. 

 A rear area advance command post is established to strengthen the 

logistics command for the primary direction or for the important operations. 

When the war zone deploys an advance command post, the war zone 

logistics organization must deploy a logistics command team to be part of 

the advance command post, or it must establish a rear area advance 

command post in front of the basic command post to assist the basic 

command post in carrying out its command. 
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 A rear area direction command post is established to strengthen 

logistics command for independent campaign directions. When the war 

zone creates a direction command post, the war zone logistics 

organization should simultaneously create a direction command post 

composed of a logistics deputy commander (unspecified from what 

logistics level he comes from) and key staff officers to assist the basic 

command post and to command the logistics for that particular direction. 

Other personnel for the advance logistics command post can come from 

logistics branch departments along the direction, including naval 

bases, from the highest campaign juntuan joint logistics organization, 

and from the warzone logistics organization. 

 The GLD stresses that in order to provide the best command, the 

command posts must remain survivable, must have good communications, 

and must have good camouflage. According to the requirements and 

capabilities, logistics mobile command posts can be placed in fast, mobile 

vehicles, aircraft (including helicopters), ships, and trains. In order to support 

command for technical (maintenance) support units and elements, each level 

of war zone logistics organization should also make every effort to create 

technical (maintenance) branch command posts. 

PLAAF Logistics Command Posts. According to the GLD book, for future 

wars, the war zone air force logistics structure must create a “three-tiered 

command system” comprised of a war zone air force logistics command post, 

air corps and base logistics command posts, and field station basic command 

posts or flight logistics support command offices. The war zone air force 

logistics command post will be the command coordination center. The GLD 

book did not indicate whether this was part of the joint logistics command 

center. The air corps or base logistics command post or air force forward 

command post is responsible for managing logistics along the direction of the 

war, and the field station or flight logistics support office will be responsible 

for the lowest level of logistics command tasks. 
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 The PLAAF stresses that the key to making this system work during a war 

is communications along the chain of command, since logistics is the link 

between a campaign and the units involved in battles. The brigade and 

regiment level is the basis for the budui logistics. Therefore, when lines of 

communication are disrupted, logistics along this chain are also disrupted. 

SECTION III: PLAAF LOGISTICS THEORY AND TRAINING 

PLAAF Logistics Support Theory. 

Having looked at the PLAAF’s logistics structure, this section will focus 

primarily on logistics support theory and applied training for mobile 

operations, which can be utilized in both offensive and defensive campaigns. 

The PLAAF has traditionally conducted its combat operations as a series of 

air campaigns within the PLA’s overall campaign. The term “air force 

campaign” is a general term for all types of air force campaign operations.41

The PLAAF describes an air force campaign as “using from one to several 

campaign large formations (zhanyi juntuan) or campaign tactical formations 

(zhanyi zhanshu bingtuan) to carry out the integration of a series of battles 

(zhandou) according to a unified intention and plan to achieve a specific 

strategic or campaign objective in a specified time. An air force campaign is 

implemented under the guidance of the national military strategy and the 

PLAAF’s strategy.”42

 An air force campaign is also described as “a campaign conducted 

independently by an air force campaign large formation or with the 

coordination of other services and branches. An air force campaign involves 

various air-to-air, air-to-ground, and surface-to-air battles to achieve specific 

military objectives. The campaign determines the battle’s character, goals, 

missions, and actions, and directly supports the local and overall war. 

PLAAF Logistics Support for the 1979 Vietnam Border Conflict.

 The 1979 border conflict with Vietnam was a watershed for the PLAAF, 
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whose operational capabilities had deteriorated significantly during the 

Cultural Revolution. Although the conflict clearly pointed out that the 

PLAAF’s existing aircraft were not capable of projecting force beyond 

China’s borders and were not capable of conducting sustained operations, it 

did show that the PLAAF’s logistics forces were proficient at implementing 

their basic missions. Even though the PLAAF has corrected many of its 

deficiencies, a review of the PLAAF’s conduct during the conflict provides 

some valuable clues about how the logistics forces might prepare and operate 

during the next campaign. 

 Although the PLAAF deployed over 700 aircraft to the border area, 

neither the PLAAF nor the Vietnamese Air Force flew any combat missions 

in direct support of their ground troops.44 According to PLAAF statistics, 

The air force flew 8,500 sorties, using 3,131 groups of aircraft during the 

campaign. Transport aircraft performed a very crucial logistics support 

function, flying 228 sorties, carrying 1,465 troops and 151 tons of materiel. The 

number of sorties also included a large number of helicopter sorties, including 

those used to transport over 600 wounded soldiers from frontline hospitals 

to Nanning.45

 Several reasons contributed to the lack of Chinese air combat 

operations, including the fact that most airfields were not near the 

Vietnamese border, the existing aircraft (primarily F-5s, F-6s, and Il-28s) 

had short legs and limited loiter time, and the PLAAF did not train for 

sustained sorties, especially from airfields other than their home bases.46 

Equally important was Beijing’s concern that any PLAAF air involvement 

would escalate the conflict, which was planned to last only 45 days.47 

Beijing met its goal of “using its aircraft to deter the Vietnamese from 

escalating the conflict,” even though 20,000 to 30,000 PLA ground 

troops were killed during the 45-day campaign.48

 The PLAAF’s logistics forces were thoroughly involved from the time 

preparations began in the Guangxi Autonomous Region and Yunnan 

Province opposite the Vietnamese border about 45 days prior to the first 
270

day of operations. The PLAAF’s overall preparations include 

destablishing a command structure; preparing airfields to receive 

aircraft, AAA, SAMs, and over 20,000 PLAAF troops; and delivering 

propaganda designed to get the troops and local populace ready for the 

war. 

 The Guangzhou MRAF commander (and future PLAAF Commander), 

Wanghai, was placed in charge of PLAAF troops in the Guangxi 

operations area.49 The Kunming MRAF command post director, Hou 

Shujun, was placed in charge of PLAAF troops in the Yunnan operations 

area.50 Each operations area was further divided into several operational 

directions, and a combined command post was established at one 

strategically located airfield within each operational direction to 

command and coordinate all matters among different branches and 

aircraft types within that district. The Guangzhou MRAF headquarters 

also established a forward command post at an unidentified location, 

which worked closely with the 7th Air Corps at Nanning as the unified 

authority for the PLAAF’s participation in the conflict. 

 Before and during the conflict, the PLAAF’s logistics organizations 

had two primary missions—to support housing for those troops already 

stationed in Guangxi and to prepare housing, food, water, and 

electricity for the incoming troops. These organizations issued about 

10,000 mobile beds, over 32,000 meters of water pipe, and 200 

kilometers of electric cable; built 43,000 square meters of bamboo sheds; 

and repaired over 23,000 square meters of old housing. In addition, the 

air force used vehicles and its boat troops to transport mobile housing with 

the troops to Tianyang. During the conflict, the Nanning Wuxu field 

station dispatched over 16,500 vehicles to provide support for portions of 

one aviation regiment and one independent air group. 

 The logistics organizations also had to acquire and supply enough 

fuel for the incoming aircraft. Based on initial estimates of the amount 

of fuel required, the PLAAF’s fuel supply was totally inadequate, and 
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several depots were almost empty. Therefore, during the preparation 

period, fuel depots at all of the region’s airfields were filled. This included 

the depot at Tianyang, which relied on water transport for its fuel 

supply. Some of the airfields did not have rail spurs, so vehicles had to 

bring in all the fuel. In addition, all of the combat readiness tanks 

available throughout the MR and some from outside the MR were quickly 

transferred to the frontline airfields. These expanded the amount of 

aviation fuel by over 50 percent. By the time the conflict began, the amount 

of fuel supplied to all the Guangxi airfields was 4.3 times the normal 

amount. 

 Supplying fuel during peacetime in China was difficult enough, but it 

proved even more difficult during wartime. because some airfields, such 

as Ningming, are close to the border, their fuel storage was partially 

underground, and the rail lines supplying the bases were overscheduled. As a 

result, the PLAAF was concerned that the Vietnamese might destroy 

or disrupt fuel supplies. because of this concern, the PLAAF took 

about 45 days to build over 50 kilometers of semipermanent fuel pipes 

leading to three different airfields. 

 Because the air force did not fly any actual combat missions during 

the conflict, only about one-fourth of the fuel estimated for combat was 

used, and the difficulties with fuel consumption were fewer than 

expected. However, several organizational and facilities problems 

were high lighted. For example, the fuel depot capacity at the PLAAF’s 

airfields was too small, and there was no way to support several types of 

aircraft or the sustained combat use of fuel for several batches of 

aircraft. In addition, the refueling equipment was deemed backwards 

and incompatible—a problem the PLAAF states it grappled with 

through most of the 1990s but has now solved for the most part. 

What Logistics Changes have Taken place? 

As noted earlier, by the early 1990s, the PLAAF had not progressed 
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sufficiently toward combined arms training, let alone joint service 

training. Because of this, the PLAAF’s logistics system was still not 

organized to support mobile operations for long periods of time. By the 

late 1990s, however, that situation had begun to change. 

 The testing ground for the PLAAF’s operational and logistics 

concepts has been the advanced training center at Dingxin, Gansu 

Province, in the Lanzhou MRAF. In 1958, the PLAAF built a large center 

for testing its air-to-air missiles (AAMs) and SAMs in the Gobi Desert 

near Dingxin.51 During the mid-1990s, the PLAAF began expanding 

this base to include a large tactics training center, where multiple 

PLAAF units could practice the tactics developed at the Tactics 

Training Center at Cangzhou, Hebei Province, and tested in individual 

units throughout the force. The PLAAF also established a smaller-scale 

“joint tactical training base” in the Nanjing MRAF in 1995.52 A 1995 

Liberation Army Daily article alluded to the Dingxin training center 

while describing a large-scale exercise as follows:53

The exercise involved three categories and six types of combat aircraft, including 

fighters, attack planes, large transport planes, armed helicopters, and 

transport helicopters. Units have made efforts to turn airfield and support 

stations from those that provided logistic support for only one category of 

combat planes in the past into those that provide support for all categories and 

all types of combat planes. Since different categories and different types of 

combat planes are to participate in future air battles in one air fleet, units 

have worked out different types of support plans, renovated and 

transformed existing combat planes’ service equipment and facilities, and 

imported advanced foreign logistic support equipment and facilities with 

the result that airfield and support stations can now provide logistics 

support for different categories and different types of combat planes. 

 The most important logistics changes have taken place at the field stations, 

which have tried to implement three basic changes in order to support 

mobile operations. First, the field stations have had to adapt their 

organizational structure to support the regiment(s) housed at their airfield 

when they deploy to other airfields. Second, the field stations have had 
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to organize themselves to support multiple types of aircraft that deploy to 

their airfield. For example, in March 2001, several aircraft from a 

Guangzhou MRAF bomber division conducted a long-range mobility 

exercise, involving “round the clock flying for several thousands of 

kilometers, and stops at several unfamiliar airfields.”54 Third, the field 

stations have had to prepare to support operations from dispersal airfields 

and highway landing strips. 

 To assist the local field stations, the PLAAF is also trying to create 

central field stations that act as regional support centers. The goal of 

establishing central field stations is to change the current system of 

providing support for only one type of aircraft or one branch to a system 

that can support multiple types of aircraft and branches, such as AAA, 

SAM, and radar units in the area of an airfield. This center will have 

additional fuel, ammunition, and supplies for the aircraft. 

 In order to support aircraft deploying in or out of a permanent 

airfield, the PLAAF began establishing in the mid 1990s a rapid-reaction 

logistics structure organized of various fendui as follows:55

• Emergency mobile flight support fendui will deploy to field airstrips, 

highway landing strips, or to other airfields when needed. 

• Emergency mobile transportation fendui, equipped with large fuel 

trucks, tow trucks, and container trucks, will deploy to an area quickly 

to supply personnel and materiel. 

• Emergency field fuel pipe fendui will be responsible for providing 

fuel to airfields not serviced by rail. 

• Emergency mobile field medical and rescue fendui. 

• Emergency mobile repair fendui will be responsible for repairing special 

equipment. 
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• Emergency mobile airfield repair fendui, consisting of 150 personnel, 

will augment the central field station repair runways and do other 

required engineering tasks. 

• The fendui can either deploy to another base with the aviation unit they 

support, or they can deploy to a base that requires additional support for 

incoming aircraft. In addition, they can be used to help prepare and support 

aircraft dispersing to auxiliary airfields, field strips, or highway landing 

strips. 

 According to a 1995 Liberation Army Daily article, the PLA moved from 

the theory phase to testing phase for “group contingency logistics 

support” to meet the requirements of local wars under high-tech 

conditions.56 The article stated, “The PLAAF had already formed various 

mobile support battalions to be transported by air, along with creating 

field station contingency support fendui. At that time, over 90 percent of the 

personnel had reportedly been placed in service and over 80 percent of 

the major required logistic equipment was already available.” 

 An April 2001 article in Air Force News described several exercises that 

the Nanjing MRAF had conducted since 1996.57 Each exercise involved 

deploying emergency support teams of 100-300 personnel to unoccupied 

airfields to set up support operations for aircraft to perform combat sorties. 

During one exercise, four aircraft landed and took off again after 15 

minutes of refueling and provisioning of ammunition. 

 By the end of 2000, the PLAAF felt comfortable enough to begin 

expanding the concept to larger units. For example, at the end of 2000 the 

Jinan MRAF conducted “the first organic deployment of an entire 

aviation division.” According to a PLA Pictorial article,58

A Jinan MRAF aviation division received orders for combat maneuvers and 

immediately went into a state of combat readiness. Four hours later, several 

transports carrying an advance echelon of officers, men, and all kinds of 
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support equipment and supplies left for the war zone. The next day, dozens of 

combat aircraft took off and flew across three provinces to the designated 

area, where support activities were quickly accomplished and an advance 

command post was established. Shortly after landing, the combat aircraft 

engaged in exercise training up to 400 kilometers away. Ten days later, the 

division returned home. 

The Role of Transport Aircraft. 

Although the use of civil aircraft is not new to the PLAAF, there are 

differing opinions about the PLA’s ability to use civil aircraft, as well as 

military aircraft, to transport supplies and personnel during wartime. 

Unlike the U.S. military, the PLA transports almost all of its troops, 

equipment, and supplies by road or rail. The PLAAF’s transports are 

used primarily for VIP support and to support the PLAAF’s 15th 

Airborne Army. In June 1989, the PLA used civil aircraft to transport 

troops to Beijing prior to the Tiananmen assault. In December 1992, the 

PLAAF used three TU-154 transports to ferry over 10,000 troops in and out 

of Xinjiang and Tibet during the annual troop rotation.59 The aircraft flew 

83 sorties and also carried 153.3 tons of supplies. In 1995, the PLAAF for the 

first time ordered that large transport aircraft carry support personnel and 

equipment to accompany large deployments of aircraft in emergency 

mobile combat support exercises.60 In addition, military officials in New 

Delhi reported that the PLA used civil aircraft to ferry troops to Tibet 

during a recent exercise.61 According to a 1999 Department of Defense 

report, the PLAAF’s current complement of large transport aircraft is 

limited to about a dozen Il-76/Candids and about 30 Y-8/Cubs, the 

remainder of the transport force consists of smaller aircraft like the An24/Coke, An-26/Curl, and Y-5/Colt.62 Beijing can be expected to 

purchase a few additional Russian Il-76s or similarly-sized foreign aircraft. 

The ongoing expansion of China’s civil aircraft fleet will also allow the 

PLAAF to use the country’s civil airlines to supplement its transport 

capability during crises. 

 In September 2000, Taiwan’s Tung Sen news quoted high level 
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Taiwan military sources as saying that the PLA plans to use civil aircraft, 

which are capable of transporting 20,000 troops to Taiwan within 24 hours, 

to carry out a first-wave assault.63 Regardless of what the PLA does 

during peacetime, there are limits to using civil aircraft to ferry troops 

into a hostile environment. 

 Since the early 1990s, the PLAAF’s 15th Airborne Army’s exercises 

have become more sophisticated in scope. For example, analysis of a 75-day 

offensive exercise held in April-May 2001 showed that “the PLA now 

has the capability to airdrop an organic regiment plus an 

accompanying logistics support unit, together with necessary 

equipment and supplies, in one airborne operation, and to sustain the 

operation with reinforcements in succeeding airdrops less than six hours 

later.”64

 In July 1999, the Liberation Army Daily provided information about 

a large-scale airborne operation in the Dabie Mountains in central 

China.65 The article emphasized that the exercise included airdropping 

pieces of light artillery, boxes of ammunition, combat vehicles, 

communications equipment, and individual air defense missiles. 

According to the article, this was the first time heavy equipment and assault 

vehicles were para-dropped by the PLA airborne force, marking a 

historic leap of the force from sole para-landing operations to combined 

arms operations. The reporters stated, “This emergency logistics support 

unit, otherwise called an ‘airborne warehouse,’ carrying tens of tons of 

war supplies, can be air-dropped at any location according to 

operational needs. It can be employed in a concentrated form in one 

direction, or separated into small segments and dropped over scattered 

locations to provide supplies to the battlefield in many directions.” 

Fuel Support. 

One of the most important challenges for the field station is 

maintaining sufficient materials, especially fuel, on hand before the start 
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of a campaign, and then maintaining enough supplies to sustain the 

campaign. The PLA states that the cost for fuel per flying hour for the 

PLAAF’s “comparatively advanced” aircraft can reach 10,000 renminbi

(USD 1,250).66 Assuming this refers to an F-8, the cost for a regiment of 24 

aircraft with each pilot averaging 100 hours per year, and 1.5 pilots per 

aircraft, means the regiment’s aircraft would fly 3,600 hours at a cost of 

approximately 36 million renminbi (USD 4.52 million) per year. According to the 

PLAAF,67

Fuel is 80 percent of the PLAAF’s materiel. Based on PLAAF 

statistics, a small scale local war requires 90,000 to 140,000 tons of 

aviation fuel. Given this large quantity of usage, it would be difficult 

for the PLAAF’s water and ground transportation system to supply 

this amount completely today. The best way to solve this problem is to 

build a pipeline network, which would be easy to open, could transfer 

large quantities of fuel, is easy to hide, and its ability to exist is high. 

 Given the PLAAF’s historical problems with refueling equipment, in 1999, 

the PLAAF reportedly developed and tested a new airfield petroleum, oil, 

and lubricant (POL) supply system in the Jinan MR.68 The system is an 

emergency mobile refueling device capable of supporting transregional 

air operations, and can be quickly deployed to forward airfields. It is 

mainly for use on sod airstrips, reserve airfields, and on high way 

runways opened for wartime operation. It can also be used on fixed 

airfields in case of damage to POL installations or power outages. 

During the exercise, the system was brought in and withdrawn after 

refueling two warp lanes in 15 minutes. It can simultaneously refuel two 

aircraft of any model by gravity or pressure. 

 The importance of the PLAAF’s emphasis on its fuel supply and 

refueling techniques was demonstrated during an exercise in Nanjing in 

April 2000. According to a Liberation Army Daily article, 

Minister of Defense Chi Haotian observed a PLAAF logistics exercise that 

focused on building a field oil depot capable of providing support to 
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several hundred planes. The exercise also covered several other logistics tasks, 

including cleaning up after an enemy air attack on an airport, restoring the 

airport’s support capability, providing mobile combat support by ground 

units, implementing camouflage and protection for aircraft, battle positions, 

and oil depots.69

 Given the PLAAF’s dual concerns of supplying its forces with sufficient material 

in a timely manner and protecting its supplies from being destroyed, it states,70

Because the PLAAF’s transportation capability is weak and requirements for 

supplying lots of material during wartime is high, the most material should be 

stored at the primary war direction rather than secondary war directions. 

Fuel and ammunition used during battles are primary targets for the enemy, so 

it is not easy to store lots of material together. Therefore, the PLAAF should 

use campaign rear area bases as the primary with stores in several places. Airfields 

in the focal point direction can store some common use material, but the most 

important material should be stored and controlled by the war zone PLAAF 

logistics organization or by PLAAF headquarters logistics for emergency 

purposes. When necessary, they can be air transported to the combat area 

units. 

Logistics Support for Combat Sorties. 

The PLAAF has established procedures for what it calls the “four flying 

phases,” so that all aviation and support units train and fight from the same 

sheet of music.71 This is especially important for the logistics system when 

aircraft deploy to a new airfield, or the receiving airfield’s field station does 

not necessarily have the proper facilities or experience to support the new 

type of aircraft or equipment. Therefore, the field station is required to follow 

established procedures. According to the PLAAF Dictionary, the four 

flying phases are as follows:72

 1. Advance preparation phase, which usually takes place the day before a 

flight. 

 2. Direct preparation phase, which occurs the day of the flight. 
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 3. Flight implementation phase. 

 4. Flight appraisal phase. 

 Whereas the commander determines the missions, the political 

commissar’s responsibility throughout the four phases is to ensure that the 

pilot is trustworthy enough to fly under the particular circumstances. Other 

people are responsible for ensuring the pilot has the proper technical 

qualifications to perform a particular mission, he is healthy, and the flight 

plan conforms with the reality of the pilot’s situation. In addition, others 

prepare the aircraft for the mission. 

Sortie Generation and Sustainability. 

The key to any conflict for the PLAAF is sustained combat, and the 

PLAAF has not yet demonstrated the capability to conduct sustained, 

high intensity operations. The PLAAF does not have any real world 

experience in planning and executing the kind of high intensity air 

campaign that has proven so successful in U.S. and allied operations over 

the past decade. Although one should not analyze the PLAAF through 

mirror imaging, information about U.S. and allied air force activities 

during the Gulf war and the Kosovo Conflict provide a measure of combat 

sortie generation and sustainability. 

 During the early stages of the conflict in Kosovo, allied air forces 

deployed approximately 400 aircraft to the area.73 By the end of the conflict, 

the number of U.S. and NATO combat aircraft participating in strike 

delivery rose from 214 to 590 aircraft. 

 During the 78 days of Operation ALLIED FORCE, U.S. and NATO 

aircraft flew a total of 37,465 combat sorties—an average sortiegeneration rate of 486 missions per day.74 Of the total, 14,006 were strike 

and suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) missions (10,808 of which 

were dedicated strike sorties). According to Pentagon information, 23,000 
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bombs and missiles were used. In the early days of the campaign, however, 

the sortie rate over Yugoslavia was more like 150 missions per day. The 

maximum intensity of operations was reached on day 57, when 1,000 sorties 

were flown, 800 of which were combat missions. These figures compare 

to 109,876 combat sorties over the 43-day Gulf war, or an average of 2,555 

missions per day. Of the total flown in the Gulf, about half were strike 

missions, averaging around 1,600 sorties per day. These numbers do not 

include noncombat transport support sorties. These figures 

demonstrate the capability needed to ramp up and maintain high 

intensity operations, orchestrate operations through a unified daily air 

tasking order (ATO), and the need to sustain intense air operations when 

faced with a determined adversary.75

 Weather affected nearly half the sorties during the Gulf war (in a desert 

environment), and the air offensive against Yugoslavia ground to a halt for 

days on end while targets remained obscured by cloud.76 During the 78-

day operation, there was at least 50 percent cloud cover for over 70 percent of 

the time. The need to minimize civilian casualties demanded visual 

identification and the use of precision weapons. Without a reasonably 

clear optical path, however, laser-guided bombs could not be employed. 

 NATO and U.S. forces were also hampered by the political decision 

to restrict the operating height of NATO attack aircraft to a baseline of 

15,000 feet for much of the 77 while this kept NATO pilots beyond the 

range of most Yugoslav hand-held surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems 

and antiaircraft artillery (AAA) over Kosovo, it placed what many saw 

as highly artificial limits on the freedom of air campaign planners and 

strike crews to employ the full range of battlefield air interdiction 

techniques for which they had long been trained. It also, on occasion, 

challenged the alliance’s ability to identify targets correctly, contributing 

to a number of targeting errors. The worst of these was an attack on a 

Kosovar Albanian refugee column, when high-flying USAF pilots 

apparently mistook tractors and other civilian vehicles for Serbian armor. 

These examples indicate that restrictive rules of engagement will most 
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likely guide any future air campaign by the U.S. and possibly the PLAAF as 

well. 

 It is clear that the PLAAF has never conducted the high intensity sortie 

generation capability the allied forces showed in the 1990s. Based on an 

analysis of Chinese literature and interviews in China, it is evident that 

PLAAF pilots do not fly as many hours as their western counterparts. 

According to interviews with PLAAF and foreign air force officials, the 

PLAAF’s flying hours have not changed appreciably over the past 15 years, but 

they have changed their training techniques. Since the end of the 1970s, 

bomber pilots have consistently flown an average of 80 hours per year; 

fighter pilots 100 to 110 hours; and A-5 ground attack pilots up to 150 

hours.78 This compares to about 215 hours per year for USAF bomber, 

fighter, and attack crews. USAF pilots also conduct numerous hours 

training on advanced simulators.79

 The PLAAF’s official magazine, Zhongguo Kongjun [China’s Air 

Force], has provided information on the number of sorties certain 

divisions have flown, which gives a glimpse of how the PLAAF as a whole 

operates. The 1994-4 issue discusses flight activity by the 39th Air Division 

in the Shenyang MR for a 5-year period.80 From 1989-94, the division flew 

12,153 sorties in 1,715 changci, equating to 7 sorties per changci.81

 A 1995 article in China’s Air Force provided information about a fuels 

branch assigned to a PLAAF field station located on the Leizhou 

Peninsula. Based on the information contained in the article, the field 

station is part of the 2nd Air Division in the Guangzhou MR and supports 

a mix of F-6 and F-7 fighters. The gist of the article was that the Leizhou 

Peninsula has severe thunderstorms 11 months out of the year, and the fuels 

branch conducted its activities safely under difficult weather 

conditions. The article touted the fuel branch’s safety record by stating 

that it supported 54,506 sorties over the 8-year period during 1987 through 

1994, equating to 6,813 sorties per year.82 Based on the author’s calculations 

of these types of articles over a 15-year period, an average sortie lasts from 
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45-60 minutes. It is not clear from the article whether the field station 

supports one or two regiments. Assuming the field station supports one 

regiment with a standard table of organization and equipment (TO&E) 

of at least 24 aircraft and 1.5 pilots per aircraft (36 pilots), this equates to 

190 sorties per pilot per year, or 3.6 sorties per week. If the field station 

supports two regiments of 48 aircraft and 72 pilots, this equates to 85 

sorties per year or 1.6 sorties per week. If there are more aircraft and pilots 

per regiment, then the sortie rate is lower. 

 According to Air Commodore Ramesh Phadke of the Indian Air 

Force,83

Nearly 50 per cent of the PLAAF consists of ageing and difficult-to-maintain 

F-6s, while the remaining aircraft belong to the reasonably modern category. 

Maintaining operational readiness must be a difficult undertaking. It would 

be safe to assume that at the rate of approximately 1.5 pilots per aircraft, the 

PLAAF would have to provide a minimum of 120-150 flight hours annually 

to 4,500-5,000 of its active duty pilots. Allowing for those employed in staff and 

headquarters appointments, it would mean that at least 4,000 pilots would 

need regular flying training. A rough calculation would show that to provide 

150 hours of flying to 4,000 pilots at 60-70 percent rate of service ability, the 

PLAAF fleet would have to fly some 285 to 335 hours per serviceable aircraft per 

year, or 24-28 hours per month, which would be a huge task by any standards. 

 In the past, the PLAAF tried to overcome the individual aircraft sortie 

generation gap by having high numbers of aircraft available, such as 

when the PLAAF deployed over 700 aircraft near the Vietnam border in 

1979. Another reason for low sortie generation rate is that most engines (F6, F-7, and F-8) can only be used from 100 to 300 hours before they are 

overhauled, the aircraft availability rate would probably be reduced 

considerably during periods of sustained use during a conflict. Although 

the engines for the Su-27s and Su-30s are much better, the PLAAF still 

faces the airframe serviceability. The PLAAF has facilities to overhaul all 

of its F-6s, F-7s, and B-6s, and their engines, but its F-8s must still return to 

the Shenyang Aircraft Factory to be overhauled—a process that can take 

from 6-12 months per aircraft.84 Until the Shenyang Aircraft Factory has the 
283

full capability to overhaul the Su-27s and Su-30s, the PLAAF must send these 

aircraft back to Komsomolsk to be overhauled. It is not clear what the 

overhaul service period for a Su-27 is; however, assuming the original Su-27s 

that arrived at the 3rd Air Division in June 1992 have been flown a minimum of 

150 hours per year (1.5 pilots at 100 hours each), then those airframes have at 

least 1,350 total hours each. The PLAAF must decide whether to fly those 

aircraft more or less as time progresses. Flying less means a reduced 

readiness capability, but flying more means more time on the airframes 

that cuts down the time before they must be overhauled. 

 The two latest examples of PLAAF sortie generation and massing 

aircraft come from the 1996 exercise opposite Taiwan and the sorties flown 

in response to President Lee Teng-hui’s “state-to-state” comments in July 

1999. 

 The PLAAF was actively involved during the PLA’s large-scale 

exercises opposite Taiwan during March 1996. According to available open 

source material, “The exercise included 12,000 PLAAF and 3,000 Naval 

Aviation servicemen. More than 280 aircraft deployed to the exercise area 

and conducted total 680 sorties, including 82 transport sorties. Over 800 

combat aircraft were within a combat readiness of 550 miles or were on 

the alert.” Another report stated the PLA deployed fewer than 100 

additional aircraft to the 13 Fujian airfields from other bases, raising the 

total to only 226 aircraft. Based on a briefing by the U.S. office of Naval 

Intelligence, the PLA conducted a total of 1,755 sorties during the 

exercise.85 Further press reporting stated that the PLAAF deployed aircraft 

from its second and third line airfields to first line airfields, where they 

conducted their exercise activity. It took about 3.5 hours for the PLAAF 

fighters to prepare for takeoff, compared to the 10 hours they had needed 

previously. In addition, the PLAAF demonstrated rapid aircraft sortie 

regeneration of 40 minutes, which was considerably quicker than the 

past.86 What was not indicated in the reporting is the number of sorties 

each pilot flew per day and whether they flew every day. 
284

 During July and August 1999, only 12 PLAAF aircraft were airborne 

at any time, not all of which were over the Strait, and the PLAAF flew only 

about 30 total sorties per day.87 The air environment over the Taiwan Strait 

also provides limitations on the number of sorties that can be flown. 

Most of the airspace immediately north and south of Taiwan, flying 

to/from Taipei and Kaohsiung, is dedicated to civil air routes, and over 

1,000 civil air flights fly through Taiwan’s airspace daily.88 Although the 

PLAAF did not fly that many sorties in the Strait, Beijing definitely sent a 

clear message that the PLAAF could fly in the Strait if it wanted to and 

psychologically altered the view of the PLAAF in Taiwan. 

 The PLAAF has classified its flying regiments into several 

categories as an indicator of their combat effectiveness. The highest is 

Category-A (jia lei). In 1997, Liu stated that 90.5 percent of the combat 

regimens were Category-A and the number of pilots capable of “allweather” combat had reached 76.2 percent, the highest ever. 89 In 1999, Liu 

stated that 98 percent of the regiments were Category-A.90

Camouflage, Concealment, Deception, and Dispersal. 

Throughout the PLAAF’s writings, there are references to concerns 

about secrecy and early detection of its plans for offensive operations, 

given today’s intelligence satellite and airborne surveillance collection 

capabilities. PLA writers have stated, “Major military operations cannot 

escape from such an intelligence net,”91 so conducting frequent 

movement and a certain amount of dispersal is an effective concealment 

method.92 “Forces should integrate the use of feints, camouflage, 

screening, and dispersion to conceal our command, control, 

communications, and intelligence systems and to deceive and jam 

enemy information reconnaissance.”93

 The PLAAF’s logistics forces have the primary responsibility for 

implementing most of the camouflage, concealment and deception (CC&D) 

measures. While some CC&D and dispersal activities will take place 
285

during the campaign preparation phase, others will occur during the 

execution phase. As a result of the need to conduct undetected 

offensive operations, at least during the early stages of a campaign, yet 

provide for survivability in a counterattack, the PLAAF’s logistics forces 

have invested considerable time and money into passive CC&D measures, 

such as building aircraft cave shelters, small hangars, single aircraft 

shelters, false targets, and “concealing the real and making the false 

obvious.”94 The PLAAF has identified additional measures that must also 

be taken to ensure survivability, such as building hardened entrances to 

caves, underground command posts, aircraft hangars, and personnel 

shelters, as well as fuel, ammunition, materiel, and equipment storage 

facilities.95 Other passive CC&D measures have also been tried. For example, 

in an October 2000 exercise, a Nanjing MRAF airfield conducted a 

complete blackout as their aircraft returned from an air strike.96

 The PLAAF has paid particular attention to trying to enhance these 

CC&D measures through the use of dispersing its weapon systems and 

equipment. The PLAAF states that the key to gaining air superiority is 

keeping airfields available for operations. According to Logistics 

Support for Mobile Operations,97

The PLAAF must have a network of three types of runways—permanent, field, 

and highway. During the first ten days of the Gulf war, 40 percent of the Iraqi 

Air Force’s aircraft were destroyed. The majority of the aircraft survived, but 

they were notable to take off from their airfields for combat, so it was the same as 

not having them at all. Therefore, the best way to deal with this type of situation 

is to hide your aircraft and air defense equipment by dispersing them to field 

airstrips and highway landing strips from which they can continue to 

conduct their combat operations. The dispersal is especially important 

because airfield protection is weak. Currently, some war zones do not have 

many first-line airfields, so logistics support should be strengthened at firstline airfields to support multiple types of aircraft prior to or returning from a 

strike, or aircraft stopping to refuel en route to their home bases. When mobile 

operations units are massing and there are not enough airfields, then the 

warzone logistics must open up field airstrips and highway landing strips and 

support them with emergency logistics support fendui. 
286

Over the past decade, the PLAAF has tried to increase the number of 

airfields, as well as to open up many of its airfields for civil aircraft. A 1996 

Xinhua report stated, “The PLAAF had opened 71 military airports and 

offered 53 reserve airports to civilian airplanes since 1990.”98 According 

to a 1999 South China morning Post article, “The PLAAF built 37 airports 

between 1995 and 1999. In addition, more than 100 large weaponry and 

equipment warehouses and war-readiness facilities had been enlarged and 

renovated.”99 Unfortunately, the article did not provide a list of the airfields 

or state whether they were strictly for military use or joint civil-military 

use. 

 In the late 1980s, the PLAAF began practicing dispersing its aircraft 

from permanent bases to alternate runways, including highway and sod 

landing strips. For example, in September 1989, three F-8 interceptors 

from the 1st Air Division at Anshan and one Il-14 transport used the 

Shenyang-Dalian highway as a dispersal runway for the first time ever.100 The 

F-8s landed singly and took off quickly in a three-ship formation. The 

1996-4 issue of China’s Air Force showed several photos of a logistics fuel 

team setting up fuel pipes to support a single F-8-2 from the 1st Air 

Division landing on the Shenyang-Dalian highway during mobile 

operations “for the first time” in May 1996.101

 The PLAAF has established set procedures for providing logistics 

support for dispersing aircraft. According to Logistics Support for 

Mobile Operations, logistics forces will follow a four-step process to 

prepare for aircraft to arrive at a field strip or highway landing strip.102 The 

first step is the arrival of the advance team, that will coordinate with the 

local civilians and militia for securing the area and make an initial check of 

the runway, aprons, and facilities. The second step includes the arrival 

of the first echelon, which is responsible for setting up the logistics 

command post, closing the highway to civilian traffic, inspecting and 

clearing the runway and parking apron, assisting maintenance 

personnel prepare for flight operations, setting up fuel and 

ammunition storage, and organizing housing and health facilities. The 
287

next step includes opening the air strips and arrival of additional logistics 

forces. The final step is arrival of the aircraft and more logistics support 

troops. 

 Although this type of dispersal training was rarely noted in the open 

media until the late 1990s, an exercise in April 2000 provides a good 

example of recent training.103

At 0615, an unidentified PLAAF airfield in the Jinan MR initiated an 

emergency dispersal exercise following a simulated cruise missile 

counterattack on the airfield. Given the scenario, the cruise missile 

counterattack appears to have occurred while the PLAAF’s aircraft were 

returning from an attack. One group of support troops and over 50 special 

vehicles, including fuel trucks, power supply trucks, and oxygen trucks, 

dispersed to a designated highway landing strip to support the regiment’s 

takeoffs and landings. At the same time, a second group of emergency 

support personnel begin repairing bombed runways, extinguishing aircraft 

fires, giving first aid to injured pilots, and repairing oil pipelines. 

 Besides using emergency runways for pre- and post attack 

dispersal airfields, the PLAAF has also gradually tried to build up the 

capability to provide logistics and maintenance support at auxiliary 

airfields for more than one type of aircraft over a sustained period of 

time. The PLAAF has gradually moved from supporting a few aircraft of a 

single type at an airfield for increasingly longer periods of time, to 

supporting multiple types. In doing this, they have had to tackle a number 

of long-standing problems that undermine support efficiency, including 

backward plane refueling technology and backward bomb loading 

technology.104

Support for Nonaviation Units. 

Although most of the PLAAF’s reporting focuses on its aviation 

branch, nonaviation units have also conducted CC&D and dispersal 

operations. A September 1999 Liberation Army Daily article described a 

North Sea Fleet Naval Aviation radar brigade exercise that most likely 
288

represents the type of activity the PLAAF’s radar units would 

implement during a campaign.105 The article stated, “On receiving orders to 

set out, the brigade took only 40 minutes to dismantle its nonmobile 

radar station and begin a motorized advance of several hundred 

kilometers. On reaching the combat area, the radars were quickly set up to 

provide air situation reports to the command post. In addition, decoy 

radars and positions were setup at the same time to confuse 

reconnaissance planes.” In November 2000, a Beijing MRAF SAM division 

equipped with three types of SAMs used “mixed deployment, concealing 

the real and displaying the false, and mobile ambush operations” during a 

live-fire exercise.106

Unanswered Questions. 

There are many questions this chapter was not able to answer due to 

the lack of open source information. For example, as someone who has 

observed China’s defense industry for decades stated,107

Logistics revolves basically around systems and numbers. What kind of 

relationships does the PLAAF have with its suppliers? What do we know about their 

supply chain management skills? What do we know about packaging—are 

consumables such as ammunition and petroleum, lubricants and oils (POL) 

packaged so they can be used right away “out of the box,” or do they require 

assembly and/or processing before they can be used? What do we know about 

operating standards and rates, including sortie rates, ammunition and fuel 

consumption rates, maintenance rates (manhours of maintenance per hour of 

flight time), and other crucial logistics metrics? 

These are just a few of the basic questions that need to be answered to really 

understand what the PLAAF’s logistics capabilities are. 

 Although little open source information is available about the 

PLAAF’s actual supply system, some generalizations can be made by 

looking at the way the U.S. military’s logistics system manages similar 

responsibilities. The following information is taken from AFSC Pub 1, 

The Joint Staff officer’s Guide, 1997.108 “The hundreds of thousands of 
289

items in the U.S. Federal supply system are categorized into one of 10 

broad classes shown below. Deployment planning focuses on very broad 

categories, but it does subdivide the 10 classes into a total of just over 40 

subclasses. For example, ammunition is subdivided into ammo-air and 

ammo-ground; subsistence is divided into subclasses for in-flight rations, 

refrigerated rations, non-refrigerated rations, combat rations, and 

water.” 

• Class 1: Subsistence 

• Class 2: Clothing, individual equipment, tools, administrative 

supplies 

• Class 3: Petroleum, oils, lubricants 

• Class 4: Construction materiel 

• Class 5: Ammunition 

• Class 6: Personal demand items 

• Class 7: major end items; racks, pylons, tracked vehicles, etc. 

• Class 8: medical materials 

• Class 9: Repair parts 

• Class 10: material for nonmilitary programs. 

 The officer’s Guide further states, “Strategic movement of people, 

equipment, and supplies is only part of a complex logistics problem, 

whereby units must move, supplies must be requisitioned and delivered on 

time, combat force loading must be done according to the type of off 

loading expected, and there are always competing demands for transport 
290

resources and support facilities.” Based on the author’s experience with the 

PLAAF and aviation ministry in the late 1980s and follow up discussions 

with aviation business representatives since then, the PLAAF has moved 

closer to a fully automated logistics system, but there are still problems 

with standardizing parts to put into the system. 

SECTION IV: CONCLUSIONS 

The bottom line is what the PLAAF’s logistics forces have done to 

better prepare the PLAAF to fight against the United States if required to do 

so. It is clear that the logistics forces have made adjustments in their 

organizational structure and operational methods to support the PLAAF’s 

shift toward joint mobile, offensive operations, but they are not there yet. 

 Over the past 5 decades, the PLAAF has only been involved in three 

major external campaigns—the Korean war, the 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis, 

and the 1979 Vietnam border conflict.109 During those campaigns, the 

PLAAF deployed several hundred aircraft to a handful of airfields near 

the border, but their per pilot sortie rate was minimal. 

 More importantly, none of those campaigns involved enemy attacks 

against targets inside China’s borders, so the PLAAF’s aircraft, airfields, 

and troops were safe. The PLAAF has studied the Gulf War and Kosovo 

conflict and knows that the next war will most likely be completely 

different. Their aviation and air defense assets, not only near the front 

but also in rear areas, will not be safe from attack by Americans. Stealth 

aircraft and long-range cruise missiles. This is why the PLAAF is 

concentrating on CC&D and dispersal measures, and why China has placed a 

higher emphasis on national military and civil air defense capabilities the 

past couple of years. 

 The current description for PLAAF fighter, bomber, and ground attack 

offensive air campaign operations can be summarized as “transregional 

rapid mobility integrated long-distance strikes at night in all weather 
291

conditions from multiple levels and different directions under unknown 

conditions. These attacks can be conducted against land or maritime 

targets, and the navigation routes can be over land or over water.” Media 

reports discussing the PLAAF’s exercises have mentioned all of the above, 

but from the PLAAF’s perspective, one of the strongest aspects of its training 

program is that during exercises both antagonists are told when a war 

begins, but they are not told the other side’s number of sorties, location, or 

altitude. Therefore, they must decide how to achieve victory in a 

completely unknown environment. An exercise conducted by a Jinan 

MRAF fighter regiment indicates the PLAAF’s trend in training for 

emergency mobile transregional operations. 

 According to a November 2000 report in Air Force News,

110 

A regiment of fighters consisting of over 20 aircraft departed its home base in 

the Jinan MR (which includes Shandong and Henan Provinces) on a rainy 

night “under concealment” in late October. The aircraft flew to an airfield 

south of the Yangzi River (probably in the Nanjing MR), to conduct air 

patrols and render air support to the war zone. This emergency combat 

mobility drill signified a new breakthrough in its capability for large-fleet, 

long-range, all-weather operations at all hours and in all air spaces. The 

regiment holds monthly simulated drills of emergency take-off and mobility, 

and change of alert conditions. It has switched to unfamiliar field targets 

for target practice, and changes ground markers frequently to enhance 

aviators’ capabilities for independent navigation and target identification. It 

flies frequent low- and ultra-low altitude flights, some oversea areas under 

unknown conditions. It also subjects aviators to maximum daily flying time 

training. Training for complicated weather conditions is conducted in 

minimal weather conditions. On the recent maneuver, the regiment also 

practiced electronic countermeasures, penetrating enemy defenses from 

different directions, coordinated attacks from high and low altitudes, and 

simulated attack over water. 

 Throughout this chapter, there have been references to the PLAAF’s 

requirement during the 1990s to transform itself from a force capable of 

employing single branches and single types of aircraft in positional defensive 

campaigns to using multiple branches and several types of aircraft in air force 
292

combined arms, mobile offensive operations campaigns, with the goal of 

shifting to operations in joint service campaigns. Within this goal, the 

PLAAF’s logistics forces have had to change their operational structure and 

methods of operation from supporting single types of aircraft at their home 

base to supporting multiple types of aircraft at their home or deployed bases 

for short and long periods of time. 

 Based on the material available to write this report, it appears that the 

PLAAF’s logistics system has made progress toward reaching its goal of 

supporting mobile forces. Organizationally, it has established emergency 

mobile fendui to support deploying aircraft into and out of airfields. These 

fendui are also responsible for helping set up mobile operations at field 

airstrips and highway landing strips. Although the articles reviewed discuss 

the need to preposition adequate material in the campaign areas before a war 

breaks out, they did not discuss whether this has actually happened. 

 From a training perspective, it appears that the PLAAF’s logistics 

forces are applying their theory to operational exercises. The exercises 

involve repairing damage to airfields after notional enemy attacks, 

including runway repairs, taking care of wounded personnel, putting out 

fires, and preparing to recover aircraft that are en route home and have 

been damaged during their mission. At the same time, the logistics forces have 

deployed some fendui to begin preparing the field airstrips or highway 

landings trips for recovering aircraft or for generating follow-on combat 

sorties. 

 One of the most important issues that is not clear from the articles 

reviewed is how proficient the PLAAF would be during a real conflict, 

especially if some of the key first line airfields were destroyed—as the 

PLA anticipates will happen in a conflict with the United States. 

Would the PLAAF, in fact, be able to conduct combat sorties out of field 

airstrips and highway landing strips, or would they merely be somewhere to 

disperse the aircraft until they could fly to another operational airfield? 

Would the PLAAF opt to move its aircraft further to the rear as its 
293

airfields began sustaining damage? Will the PLAAF actually be able to 

provide logistics support to multiple types of aircraft at a single base? 

Many airfields have a single regiment with two types of aircraft (generally F6s and F-7s), or have two regiments with different types of aircraft, such 

as one regiment with F-7s and one with F-8s. The field stations are 

organized appropriately to support more than one type of aircraft. But how 

proficient will the logistics forces at first line airfields be if they have to 

support several regiments of different types of aircraft? Although 

bombers have conducted exercises where they stopped at multiple 

airfields, the media reports did not specify the types of airfields they 

transited or the types of support they received. 

 Two probable weak links for the logistics forces during a campaign will 

be communications and transportation. Logistics Support for Mobile 

Operations states that “when lines of communication are disrupted, logistics 

along this chain are also disrupted. Therefore, the PLAAF needs to establish 

an independent command communications network, consisting of radio, 

land line, and computers.”111 It is not clear from the media reports or the PLA 

books whether this is taking place. 

 Although the PLAAF has ordered that transport aircraft should be 

used to move logistics forces during campaigns, road and rail will still 

be the most likely means. A logistics transportation exercise 

conducted during summer 2001 in the Guangzhou MRAF emphasized 

that the PLAAF is not yet prepared to operate under poor weather 

conditions or non-scripted exercises. During his critique, the 

Guangzhou MRAF transportation director emphasized “the key is that 

training still consists of form without substance, including training for 

show to pass the test. Some units were thrown into disorder with just the 

slightest change in the predetermined disposition.”112

 If the PLAAF does have to engage the United States in battle sometime in 

the near future, the keys will be pilot proficiency, sortie generation and 

sustainability, adequate logistics support across the board, reliable 
294

communications and intelligence, and equipment maintenance capabilities. 

The PLAAF has made much progress in all of these areas over the past 

decade, beginning with establishing the theory, then providing the training to 

implement the theory. It is clear, at least from reading PLAAF writings, that 

much of what they want to do is still aspirational, but they are definitely 

putting the pieces of the administrative and operational structure in place to 

accomplish their goals sometime in the future. The PLAAF is also in the 

process of acquiring the types of weapon systems that will allow them to 

operate from airfields that are farther from the borders and to deploy SAMs 

with ranges that can reach out beyond China’s borders. The logistics forces 

are also definitely changing accordingly to support these new systems. 

ENDNOTES-CHAPTER 9 

1. The author would like to thank Major Bill Belk (USAFR) for his assistance in 

gathering the FBI’s material for this chapter, and to Ken Ashley, Jeff Goldman, 

and Jeremy Morrow for their comments on early drafts. The author would 

especially like to thank Rick Kamer for his assistance in identifying certain 

PLAAF units by their aircraft tail number, using his website, www.Chinadefense.com/aviation/numbering-system. 

2. Wen Guangchun, ed., Jidong Zuozhan houqin Baozhang, (Logistics Support 

for Mobile Operations), PLA General Logistics Department Headquarters 

Department, PLA Press, January 1997, p. 184-185. 

 3. This description is a composite of information taken from Hong Heping 

and Tian Xia, “Head to the New Century,” Zhongguo Kongjun (China’s Air Force)

1996-5; and Wen Guangchun, ed., Jidong Zuozhan houqin Baozhang. This is one of 

six books under the title, Gaojishu Tiaojian Xia Jubu Zhanzheng houqin Baozhang 

(Logistics Support for Local wars under high-Tech Conditions), that the General 

Logistics Department commissioned the National Defense University and all 

logistics organizations to compile in 1995. 

 4. The PLA adds guerilla operations as the third mode for its ground forces. 

 5. Teng Lianfu and Jiang Fusheng, eds., Kongjun Zuozhan Yanjiu (Air Force 
295

Operations Research), Beijing: National Defense University Publishers, May 1990, 

p. 187. 

 6. Paul H. B. Godwin,” Change and Continuity in Chinese military Doctrine: 

1949-1999,” a paper presented at the Center for Naval Analyses Corporation’s 

1999 conference on PLA warfighting. Harlan W. Jencks provided a detailed 

critique of this strategy in “People’s war Under Modern Conditions: Wishful 

Thinking, National Suicide, or Effective Deterrent,” The China Quarterly, No. 98, 

June 1984, p. 305-319. 

 7. The PLAAF Dictionary defines air strategy as “The overall plan and guiding 

plan for air force building and combat. It is part of a country’s military 

strategy and consists of three interrelated parts: air force strategic objectives, 

air force strength, and air force strategic employment.” Zhu Rongchang, ed., 

Kongjun Da Cidian (Air Force Dictionary), Shanghai: Shanghai Dictionary 

Publishing House, September 1996, p. 6. 

 8. Chengdu Military Region Campaign Training Office, Jituanjun Yezhan 

Zhendi Fangyu Zhanyi Kongjun de Yunyong (Air Force Utilization During the 

Campaign to Defend Group Army Field Positions), February 1982, p. 1. This ground 

force domination is not surprising, since every PLAAF commander and deputy 

commander until the late 1980s had their roots in the ground forces. It was not until 

1973 that the PLAAF had its first aviator as a deputy commander, and 1985 until the 

first aviator became the commander. Even so, the Army still selects the PLAAF 

senior officers, and there are no air force general officers in any of the four PLA 

general departments (General Staff, Political, Logistics, and Equipment 

Departments). 

 9. Hua Renjie, Cao Yifeng, and Chen huixiu, eds., “Kongjun Xueshu Sixiang 

Shi,” (Air Force Art and Thought History) Jiefangjun Publishers, Beijing, 1991, pp. 

294-331. 

 10. Teng Lianfu and Jiang Fusheng, eds., Kongjun Zuozhan Yanjiu, p. 261. 

 11. Ibid., p. 186. 

 12. The Republic of China 1993-94 National Defense Report, Taipei: Liming Cultural 
296

Enterprise Co., Ltd., 1994, p. 65-66. 

 13. Republic of China: 1998 National Defense Report (Taipei: Li Ming Cultural 

Enterprise Co., Ltd., 1998, pp. 30-31. 

 14. Republic of China: 2000 National Defense Report, Taipei: Li Ming Cultural 

Enterprise Co., Ltd., 1998). 

 15. Briefing from Ministry of National Defense, December 2000. 

 16. http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/facility/airfield.htm. There are 6 military 

airfields within 400 kilometers, 11 more between 400-600 kilometers, and 19 more 

between 600-800 kilometers. 

 17. Interviews in Taiwan, December 2000. 

 18. In late 1999, the PLA began a program of training called the “three defenses 

and three attacks,” including attacks against stealth planes, cruise missiles and 

armed helicopters, and defense against precision strikes, electronic jamming, and 

electronic reconnaissance and surveillance. 

 19. Hong Heping and Tian Xia, “Head to the New Century,” China’s Air Force, 

1996, No. 5, pp. 4-7. 

 20. Ibid. 

21. The timing of Liu’s comments on an offensive capability came as he took over 

the commander’s position in December 1996 and as Taiwan began final preparations to 

receive the first squadron of 150 F-16s and Mirages in April 1997. 

 22. Sun Maoqing, “Make Efforts To Build Modernized People’s Air Force: 

Interview with Air Force Commander Lieutenant General Liu Shunyao,” Beijing 

Liaowang, April 14, 1997, No. 15, pp. 20-21. 

 23. Yu Xiao, Tai Yang, Fu Song, and Wang Jianyun, “We must win the Next Battle: 

Two Fighter Division Commanders’ Views of Simultaneous Offensive and Defensive 

Capabilities,” China’s Air Force, 2000, No. 2, pp. 4-8. 
297

 24. Air Force Dictionary, p. 30. The PLAAF’s units (budui) includes divisions, 

brigades, and regiments. The regiment is the lowest level for logistics management. 

Below the unit level are elements (fendui), which include battalions, platoons, 

companies, and squads. Aviation troop equivalents of battalions and platoons are 

groups (dadui) and squadrons (zhongdui),respectively. Fendui consist of the troops that 

actually carry out the logistics work. 

 25. Logistics Support for Mobile Operations, Chapter 1. 

 26. Air Force Dictionary, p. 274. 

 27. Yao Jun, ed., Zhongguo hangkong Shi (A History of China’s Aviation), Zhengzhou: 

Dajia Publishers, September 1998. 

 28. Kenneth W. Allen, People’s Republic of China’s Liberation Army Air Force, 

Washington, DC: Defense Intelligence Agency, 1991, Section 7, p. 5. 

 29. Ibid. 

30. Air Force Dictionary, p. 165. Composite depots are zonghe ku, and specialty 

depots are zhuanye ku. 

31. In May 1976, the Aeronautical Engineering Department (hangkong 

gongchengbu/konggong), which had been downgraded to a second level 

department in 1969, was re-established as the fourth first level department and 

changed its name to the Equipment-Technical Department (kongjun zhuangbei 

jishubu) in November 1992. Following the April 1998 creation of the General 

Equipment Department, the PLAAF changed the name of the EquipmentTechnical Department to the Equipment Department (kongjun 

zhuangbeibu/kongzhuang). According to interviews with PLA officials, the 

headquarters Department transferred its second level Equipment Department and 

Scientific Research Department (keyanbu) to the Equipment Department, so 

that its responsibilities matched those of the General Equipment Department. Air 

Force Dictionary, p. 146; Shijie Junshi Nianjian 1999 (World Military Yearbook), 

published by PLA Press, Beijing, p. 103. 
298

 32. Air Force Dictionary, p. 276. 

 33. The difference between material (wuzi) and air materiel (hangcai) is 

that the former consists of items such as lumber and concrete for the entire 

PLAAF, and the latter consists of items only for the aviation branch’s aircraft 

and aviation troops. The four other branches (AAA, SAM, radar, and 

airborne) and specialized support elements (communications troops, etc.) do 

not use air materiel. 

 34. Interview with PLA officials. The same situation now exists at the 

military region headquarters, where the Joint Logistics Department is responsible 

for general purpose supplies and the Equipment Department is responsible for 

special purpose supplies and all maintenance. 

 35. A History of China’s Aviation. 

36. Air Force Dictionary, pp. 70-71. 

 37. Oliver Chou, “Air Force Building Projects Take Off in Past 5 Years,” South 

China Morning Post, April 17, 1999. 

 38. The term command post is sometimes confusing, since the PLAAF 

has also created several air corps level command organizations called command 

posts. beginning in 1993, the PLAAF changed the names of six of its seven 

existing command posts to bases (jidi)—Dalian, Tangshan, Xian, Shanghai, 

Wuhan, and Kunming. Apparently the Lhasa Command Post did not convert to a 

base. 

 39. Title unknown, General Logistics Department document, June 1979, p. 

35. 

 40. Logistics Support for Mobile Operations, Chapter 3. 

 41. Air Force Operations Research, p. 157. 

 42. Ibid., p. 152. Wang Houqing, Zhang Xingye (ed.), Zhanyi Xue (The study of 

Campaigns), Beijing: National Defense University Press, May 2000, p. 346. 
299

 43. Ibid. The Chinese is Kongjun zhanyi, you kongjun zhanyi juntuan dandu huo 

zai qita junbingzhong peihe xia shishi de zhanyi. 

44. Li Man Kin, Sino-Vietnamese War, Hong Kong: Kingsway International 

Publications, Ltd., 1981, pp. 33-35. The PLAAF deployed F-5, F-6, and F-7 fighters, plus 

Il-28 bombers, to the border. At that time, the Vietnamese Air Force was equipped 

with MiG-21s, plus U.S. F-5As and A-37s left over from the war. The Vietnamese also 

had SA-2, SA-3, SA-6, and SA-7 SAMs plus the formidable ZSU-57-2 self-propelled 

AAA. 

 45. Dangdai Zhongguo Kongjun (China Today: Air Force), Beijing: China Social 

Sciences Press, 1989, p. 638. Since the nearest point from Nanning was 110 km and 

the farthest was 280 km, each helicopter trip took 2 to 4 hours. During most sorties, 

the helicopters could not turn off their engines or refuel at the pickup points. It was 

not until 1986 that the PLAAF turned almost all of its helicopters over to Army 

Aviation. 

 46. China Today: Air Force, p. 638. 

 47. Information on the PLAAF’s activities during the 1979 conflict come from a 

General Logistics Department document, (Title Unknown), June 1979, pp. 35-37. 

 48. King C. Chen, China’s War with Vietnam, 1979: Issues, Decisions, and 

Implications, Stanford, CA: Hoover Institute Press, 1987, p. 114. 

 49. Wanghai’s autobiography published in January 2001 does not even mention 

the 1979 conflict. Wang Hai, Wang Hai Shangjiang: Wode Zhandou Shengya (General 

Wang Hai: My Combat Career), Beijing, Zhongyang Wenxian Chubanshe [Central 

Literature Publishers], February 2000. 

 50. On August 1, 1960, the Kunming MRAF CP (Kunming junqu kongjun 

zhihuisuo/Kunzhi) was formed and was responsible for controlling PLAAF units in 

Yunnan Province. The Chengdu MRAF was not established until 1985, at which time 

the Kunming MRAF CP became subordinate to it. The Kunming MRAF Command 

Post was renamed the Kunming Base (Kunming jidi/Kunji) sometime after 1993. 
300

 51. China Today: Air Force, p. 311. 

 52. Yuan Zhong and Hong Heping, “Air Force Completes Joint Tactical 

Training Base, First of Its Kind, To Provide Simulated Battlefield Environment 

for Combat Exercises Between Various Arms of Service,” Jiefangjun Bao (Liberation 

Army Daily), April 13, 1995. 

 53. Zhao Xianfeng and Zhang Jinyu,” Lanzhou MR Air Force Improves 

Logistics Support for high-Tech Air Battles,” Liberation Army Daily, December 6, 

1995. 

 54. This same bomber regiment, which is most likely the 48th Air Division at 

Leiyang, Hunan Province (identified by Rick Kamer), has conducted several 

“first time” exercises over the past 2 years. In October 1999, the division’s airborne 

refueling B-6s were part of the flyover of Tiananmen for the PRC’s 50th 

anniversary. In October 2000, one of the division’s regiments conducted “a 4-

hour integrated long-range mobile exercise under unknown conditions, 

covering a distance of more than 2,000 km across four provinces. The raid was led 

by division commander Yu Jijun.” In December 2000 or early January 2001, the 

same division conducted a 10-hour mobility exercise. In March 2001, the same 

division conducted its “first exercise involving bombers and tankers flying 

together in a combined task force (huncheng biandi). The task force implemented 

new campaign methods (zhanfa), including conducting a transregional flight 

with stopovers at several unfamiliar airfields and live bombing.” In May 2001, the 

division implemented another “first” by conducting a division-scale 

reconnaissance and bombing exercise. An undetermined number of aircraft 

from the division conducted yet another “first” by flying a mobility exercise 

during the second half of the night. All of these articles stressed that the 

exercises were conducted during poor weather conditions. Wang Dinghua 

and Niu Yingfu, “Guangzhou Region Air Force’s ‘Bomber’ Regiment Conducts 

maneuver Exercise,” Liberation Army Daily (Internet), December 5, 2000; Yang 

Mingde, Wang Dinghua, and Tang Baiyun, “PRC Guangzhou Bomber 

Regiment Conducts ‘Long-Distance’ Bombing Flight Drill,” Zhongguo Xinwen She 

in Chinese, January 5, 2001; Wang Dinghua, “A Certain Air Division Forges 

Large Aircraft Assault Capability,” Liberation Army Daily (Internet version), August 

22, 2001; Wang Dinghua and Fan Haisong, Liberation Army Daily (Internet), 

September 8, 2001. 
301

 55. Logistics Support for Mobile Operations, p. 191-193. Zhao Xianfeng and Zhang 

Jinyu,” Lanzhou MR Air Force Improves Logistics Support for high-Tech Air 

Battles,” Liberation Army Daily, December 6, 1995. Several Liberation Army Daily 

articles have stated, “The PLAAF has set up a rapid mobile emergency support 

regiment with centralized command organization, to practice 11 special 

wartime support tasks such as rush-repairing bombed runways, extinguishing 

aircraft fires, giving first aid to injured pilots, and repairing bombed oil pipelines.” 

 56. Yang Yang, “Training for Logistic Support Units viewed,” Liberation Army 

Daily, December 29, 1995. 

 57. Kongjun Bao (Air Force News), April 3, 2001. 

 58. PLA Pictorial, January 2001. 

 59. China’s Air Force, 1993, No. 1, p. 49. 

 60. Zhao Xianfeng and Zhang Jinyu, “Lanzhou MR Air Force Improves 

Logistics Support for High-Tech Air Battles,” Liberation Army Daily, December 6, 

1995. 

 61. Interview with Ministry of Defense officials in New Delhi, May 1999. 

 62. “The Security Situation in the Taiwan Strait,” Report submitted by Secretary 

of Defense William Cohen to the U.S. Senate as directed by the FY99 Appropriations 

Bill, February 17, 1999. 

 63. “China reportedly to transport troops by civil aircraft to attack Taiwan,” 

British Broadcasting Corporation, Ming Pao (Internet), September 26, 2000. 

 64. Tan Jun and Li Yundou,” Chief Military Officers of a Certain Unit of Hubeibased Airborne Forces Carries Out First Military Drill,” Wuhan Hubei Radio 

(Internet), April 24, 2001. The airborne forces also paradropped pieces of light 

artillery, boxes of ammunition, combat vehicles, and logistics supplies. 

 65. “Large-Scale PLA Airborne Opex in Central China,” Liberation Army Daily, 
302

July 21, 1999. 

 66. Lu Wen, Lianhe Zhanyi Zhanlue Houqin Zhiyuan (Strategic Logistics Support 

in Joint Operations), Beijing, National Defense University Press, April 2000, p. 153. 

The paper did not identify which aircraft were being described as comparatively 

advanced (bijiao xianjin), but most likely it is the F-8 and/or Su-27. 

 67. Logistics Support for Mobile Operations, p. 196. 

 68. Air Force News, December 11, 1999. 

 69. Lian Juntao and Zhang Jinyu, “Chi Haotian Watches Air Force Logistic 

Exercise Aimed at Promoting Scientific and Technological Training and Large-Scale 

Stage Opera ‘Matsu’ in Nanjing,” Liberation Army Daily, April 14, 2000. 

 70. Logistics Support for Mobile Operations, pp. 197-199. 

 71. Ibid., p. 214. 

 72. Air Force Dictionary, pp. 195-196, 234-235. 

 73. Sergey Sokut and Ilya Kedrov, “War in Europe: Yugoslavia: 78 Days Under 

Missile and Bombing Attacks: NATO’s Limited war Was Uncompromising,” 

Moscow Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, FBIS, No. 25, July 2-8, 1999, p. 2. 

 74. Nick Cook, “War of Extremes,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, Vol. 32, No. 1, July 7, 

1999. 

 75. Sokut and Kedrov. 

 76. Mark Hewish, “Waging War with Weather,” International Defense Review, 

Vol. 32, No. 12, December 1, 1999. 

 77. Nick Cook, “War of Extremes.” 

 78. Kenneth W. Allen, Glenn Krumel, and Jonathan D. Pollack, China’s Air Force 

Enters the 21st Century, Santa Monica: RAND, 1995, p. 130. Examples of flying hours 
303

are as follows. China’s Air Force, No. 2, 1993, p. 43, identifies a PLAAF regiment 

commander who entered the military in December 1970 and had flown 1,600 

hours, equating to an average of 123 hours per year. China’s Air Force, No. 6, 2000, p. 

31, identified four young pilots in the Nanjing MR who averaged 150 hours per 

year in the new F-7-3 (identified as the 29th Air Division by Rick Kamer). Two 

pilots were squadron commanders and two were deputy group commanders. 

China’s Air Force, No. 5, 1993, p. 53, identified a second-grade deputy group 

commander pilot in the Chengdu MR who joined the PLAAF in 1982 and had flown 

900 hours, for an average of 80 hours per year. 

 79. Robert S. Dudney, “Fifteen in a Row,” Air Force Magazine, No. 25, April 1999. 

Unfortunately, figures are not readily available for other Asian air forces. 

 80. China’s Air Force, No. 4, 1994, pp. 30-31. Rick Kamer identified the unit based 

on a photo of one of the unit’s aircraft. 

 81. Air Force Dictionary, pp. 276-277. The PLAAF uses the term changci to rate 

the logistics support for flying—excellent, good, and bad. According to an 

interview with a PLA official, the term is also used to describe the number of 

flying days or missions per year, based on two “flying days” per 24-hour period—

one daytime and one nighttime. The 1992-2 issue of China’s Air Force, p. 48, provides 

another example of the use of changci, the August 1st Aerobatics Team, which is 

the PLAAF’s “Thunderbird” equivalent, conducted 180 changci 

(demonstrations) from 1962-92 for 58 countries and 149 delegations. This equates 

to six demonstrations per year. 

 82. Mo Qiang, Liang Weitong, and Zhang Lianfu, “Leizhou Bandao 

Shangde Youliao Bing” [Leizhou Peninsula Fuel Troops], China’s Air Force, 1995-

5, p. 32. The unit identification was made based on information from Rick 

Kamer from photos in China’s Air Force, 1993-3, p. 24. The 2nd Air Division 

began receiving the PLAAF’s second regiment of Su-27s in 1996. The 3rd Air 

Division at Wuhu received the first regiment in 1992. 

 83. Ramesh V. Phadke, “People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF): 

Shifting Air Power Balance and Challenges to India,” paper written for the 

Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University, 

September 2001. 
304

 84. A B-6 bomber must have its airframe overhauled after 800 flying hours. 

PLAAF Aeronautical Engineering Department, Hangkong Weixiu (Aviation 

Maintenance), No. 10, 1988. 

 85. “Chinese Exercise Strait 961: March 8-25, 1996,” briefing presented by 

the U.S. office of Naval Intelligence at a conference on the PRC’s military 

modernization sponsored by the Alexis de Tocqueville Institute, March 11, 1997. 

 86. Lo Ping,” It Costs China 3 Billion Yuan to Make a Show of Its military 

Strength,” Cheng Ming, Hong Kong, April 15, 1996; Steven Mufson, “China 

Masses Troops on Coast Near Taiwan,” The Washington Post, February 14, 

1996. 

 87. State Department Briefing with James Rubin, Federal Information Systems 

Corporation, Federal News Service, August 3, 1999. 

 88. Victor Lai,” PRC Jets Twice Cross Taiwan Strait Center Line,” Central 

News Agency, August 10, 1999. According to this report, about 340 international 

flights and 730 domestic flights fly over the Taiwan Strait every day. 

 89. Sun Maoqing, “PLA Commander on Modernizing Air Force,” Beijing 

Liaowang, FBIS-CHI, April 14, 1997. The PLAAF’s definition of flying in “weather 

conditions” is divided into “three weather conditions” (i.e., day and night 

visual flight rules [VFR], and day instrument flight rules [IFR]), and ”allweather” or “four weather conditions” which adds night IFR flights. Although 

this particular reference does not mean being able to fly in poor weather 

conditions, some reference to flying in weather conditions does mean exactly 

that. The exact meaning is usually clear. 

 90. China’s Air Force, 1999-6, p. 15. 

 91. Huang Xing and Zuo Quandian, “Holding the Initiative in our Hands 

in Conducting Operations, Giving Full Play to our Own Advantages to Defeat 

our Enemy—A Study of the Core Idea of the Operational Doctrine of the 

People’s Liberation Army,” Zhongguo Junshi Kexue [China Military Science]in 

Chinese, No. 4, November 20, 1996, pp. 49-56. Senior Colonel Huang Xing and 
305

Senior Colonel Zuo Quandian are research fellows of the Academy of Military 

Science. 

 92. Liu Xuejun and Zhang Changliu, “Study of Measures to Counter 

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles,” Guoji Hangkong [Flight International], March 1, 

1996. 

 93. Xu Xiangdong, Gu Gang, and Yang Jun, ”Mobilize Local Information 

Warfare Resources to Participate in Anti-Air Raid Combat,” Beijing Guofang, 

December 15, 2000, pp. 7-8. 

 94. Chengdu Military Region Campaign Training Office, Jituanjun Yezhan 

Zhendi Fangyu Zhanyi Kongjun de Yunyong (Air Force Utilization During the 

Campaign to Defend Group Army Field Positions), February 1982. 

 95. Logistics Support for Mobile Operations, pp. 194-195. 

 96. “The Aviation Unit Under the Air Force of the Nanjing Military Region 

Takes a New Step Forward in Tactical Training,” Liberation Army Daily Internet 

version, October 8, 2000. 

 97. Logistics Support for Mobile Operations, pp. 194-195. 

 98. “Air Force Opens 71 Airports for Civilian Flights,” Xinhua, January 18, 

1996. 

 99. Oliver Chou, “Air Force Building Projects Take Off in Past 5 Years,” 

South China Morning Post, April 17, 1999. 

 100. Hangkong Zhishi [Aerospace Knowledge], November 1989, p. 3. 

 101. China’s Air Force, 1999-96, p. 20. Rick Kamer helped identify the unit as the 1st 

Air Division. 

 102. Logistics Support for Mobile Operations, pp. 229-230. 

 103. Wang Jinyuan and Jin Zhifu, “A Certain Jinan Air Force Unit Focuses on 
306

New ‘Three Attacks and Three Defenses’ to Explore Wartime Emergency 

Support—Warplanes Do TOL’s on Expressways,” Liberation Army Daily, May 8, 2000. 

 104. Liberation Army Daily, May 15, 1997. 

 105. Ibid., September 26, 1999. 

 106. Guangming Daily, November 22, 2000. 

 107. Interview with John Frankenstein, Research Associate, East Asia Institute, 

Columbia University. 

 108. AFSC Pub 1, The Joint Staff Officer’s Guide, 1997, U.S. Government Printing 

office, Chapter 6. 

 109. No aircraft were used during the 1962 border conflict with India or 1969 

with the Soviet Union. 

 110. “Air Regiment Holds Transregional Night Maneuver,” Air Force News, 

November 23, 2000. 

 111. Logistics Support for Mobile Operations, pp. 189-190. 

 112. Zhao Bo, “Seven Days and Nights of Exercises in the South China Sea: 

Revelations as Guangzhou Military Region Air Force Military Transportation 

System Conducts a Comprehensive Support Exercise under Modern Conditions,” 

Liberation Army Daily, August 5, 2001 (Internet version). 
307

ABOUT THE CONTRIBUTORS 

KENNETH W. ALLEN is a Research Analyst at the CNA Corporation’s 

Center for Strategic Studies. Previously, he was a Senior Analyst at TASC, 

Senior Associate at the Henry L. Stimson Center, Executive vice President of 

the US-Taiwan Business Council, and served 21 years in the U.S. Air Force, 

including assignments in Taiwan, Berlin, Japan, Headquarters Pacific Air 

Forces, China, and the Defense Intelligence Agency. He has written 

extensively on China’s airpower. He received a B.A. from the University of 

California at Davis, a B.A. from the University of Maryland in Asian Studies, 

and an M.A. from Boston University in International Relations. 

ANATOLY V. BOLYATKO joined the Far Eastern Studies Institute in 1992 

and is Director of the Center for Asian Pacific Studies at the Russian Academy 

of Sciences. He is a Professor of International Affairs, Doctor of Sciences 

(military) and Academician at the Russian Academy of Military Sciences. 

Retired Soviet Major General Bolyatko also served as Deputy Chief of the 

Treaty and Law Directorate of the Soviet General Staff and the head of the 

Military Delegation during the negotiations that led to the conclusion of the 

Soviet-American Agreement on Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities 

(1989). Later, as head of two Soviet military delegations, he developed similar 

agreements with Canada and Greece. He also took part in the creation of the 

START-1 and CFE Treaties. After a long and distinguished career in the Soviet 

military, he retired in 1992. His most recent publications include The 

Negotiations on the Prevention of Dangerous military Activities (1991) and 

articles on problems of international security in academic journals. In 1996 his 

monograph titled On Regulating Military Activities was published in Moscow. 

DAVID M. FINKELSTEIN is the Director of “Project Asia “ at the CNA 

Corporation’s Center for Strategic Studies. He is a retired U.S. Army Foreign 
308

Area officer for China with extensive joint political-military 

assignments at the national level. Among these assignments, he served as 

the Director of Asian Studies;, Joint Chiefs of Staff, J-8; and Assistant 

Defense Intelligence Officer for East Asia and the Pacific. A long-time 

student of Chinese security affairs, Dr. Finkelstein holds an M.A. and 

Ph.D. in Chinese history from Princeton University and studied the 

Chinese language at Nankai University in Tianjin. Dr. Finkelstein has 

written many articles on Chinese security issues and the People’s Liberation 

Army. His 1993 book-length study, Washington’s Taiwan Dilemma, 1949-

1950: From Abandonment to Salvation, was hailed in a Presidential Studies 

Quarterly review as “blazing a new trail” and should “take an important 

place in the literature of U.S. Chinese relations in the mid-20th century.” 

HIDEAKI KANEDA retired from the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force 

with the rank of vice Admiral in 1999. He is currently a Senior Research 

Advisor for National Security, Mitsubishi Research Institute, Inc. He also 

serves as Special Research Advisor for the Okazaki Institute and a member 

of the Policy Proposal Committee for the Japan Forum for Strategic Study. 

During the 2001-2002 academic year, he was a Senior Fellow at the Asia 

Center and J. F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. He is 

the author of a number of books and articles about security, including 

“International Consensus in National Defense of Japan,” World and Japan, 

Tokyo, September 2000; “Changing Situation of China’s and Japan’s 

National Security,” World and Japan, Tokyo, September 2001; “Proposal 

for Maritime Coalition in East Asia and West Pacific Region,” IMDEX, 

Germany, November 2000; “Introduction to BMD,” The Okazaki 

Institute, Tokyo, November 2000; and “Role of JMSDF in Peace Time,” 

Securitarian, Tokyo, August 2001. Admiral Kaneda graduated from the 

National Defense Academy in 1968, the Maritime war College in 1983, and 

the U.S. Naval War College in 1988. 

TAEHO KIM is a senior China analyst at the Korea Institute for Defense 
309

Analyses (KIDA), Seoul, Korea, and a nonresidential research associate of 

the Mershon Center, Ohio State University. He is also a co-editor of the 

SSCI-listed Korean Journal of Defense Analysis. Dr. Kim is the author and coauthor of over ten books, policy reports, and monographs, including 

China’s Arms Acquisitions from Abroad: A Quest for “Superb and Secret weapons” 

(with Dr. Bates Gill, Oxford University Press, 1995), The Dynamics of 

Sino-Russian military Relations: An Asian Perspective (CAPS, 1994), and The 

ROK Defense Policy after the ROK-PRC Normalization (KIDA, 1993). His most 

recent English articles include “A Testing Ground for China’s Power, 

Prosperity and Preferences: China’s Post-Cold war Relations with the 

Korean Peninsula” (forthcoming in 2001), “Sino-ROK Relations and the 

Future of Asian Security: A Developing Continental Power Balance?” 

(2000), “Strategic Relations between Beijing and Pyongyang” (1999), 

“Korean Perspectives on PLA Modernization and the Future East 

Asian Security Environment” (1998), “A Reality Check: The ‘Rise of China’ 

and Its military Capability toward 2010” (1998), “Korean Views on 

Taiwan-PRC Relations and the Japan Factor” (1997), and “China and 

virtual Nuclear Arsenals” (1997). His research interests are SinoRussian military cooperation, Chinese arms acquisitions, and China’s 

relations with Northeast Asian countries, including Sino-North 

Korean relations. 

JAMES R. LILLEY was born in China, educated at Yale University, and 

served for a number of years in Southeast Asia. He was the Director of the 

American Institute in Taiwan from 1982-84, the U.S. Ambassador to the 

People’s Republic of China from 1989-91 and to the Republic of Korea 

from 1986-89. He served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International 

Security Affairs from 1991-93 and is presently Senior Fellow at the 

American Enterprise Institute. Ambassador Lilley is the co-editor of 

Beyond MFN: Trade with China and American Interests (AEI Press, 1994), Crisis in 

the Taiwan Strait (NDU Press, 1997), and China’s Military Faces the Future 

(M. E. Sharp, 1999). He has written extensively on Asian issues. 
310

ERIC A. MCVADON, retired U.S. Navy Rear Admiral, is a senior 

consultant on East Asian Security Affairs for Areté Associates, the Center 

for Naval Analyses, and several other organizations, and Director of 

Asia-Pacific Studies for National Security Planning Associates, a 

subsidiary of the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis. He was defense and 

naval attaché at the U.S. Embassy in Beijing, 1990-92. His navy career 

included extensive experience in air antisubmarine warfare and 

politico-military affairs, including service as the NATO and U.S. SubUnified Commander in Iceland, 1986-89. His recent undertakings 

include work on the People’s Liberation Army, the China-Taiwan 

problem, Chinese attitudes toward regional security, and diverse issues 

involving the Korean Peninsula. He writes and speaks widely in North 

America and East Asia on security and defense matters. Admiral 

McVadon’s publicly available writings include an article on China and the 

PLA in the Autumn 1996 Naval War College Review and chapters in the 1997 

National Defense University book entitled Crisis in the Taiwan Strait 

(published in English and Chinese in the 1999 RAND book, The People’s 

Liberation Army in the Information Age, and in the 1999 AEI-M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 

book, China’s Military Faces the Future). 

SUSAN M. PUSKA is a colonel in the U.S. Army Ordnance Corps. She 

has served as the U.S. Army Attaché, Beijing, People’s Republic of China 

(PRC) since January 2001. During 1996-99, she served as a China political 

military officer in the office of the Deputy Under Secretary of the Army, 

International Affairs. In 1992-94, she was assigned as an Assistant Army 

Attaché in Beijing, PRC. She is a graduate of the U.S. Army war College, 

and the University of Michigan, where she was awarded an M.A. in 1988. 

Her publications include Peoples’ Liberation Army After Next (ed., 2000), 

and New Century, Old Thinking: The Dangers of the Perceptual Gap in U.S.-

China Relations (1998), both published by the Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. 

Army war College. 
311

ANDREW SCOBELL joined the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) in 

August 1999 and is SSI’s specialist on Asia. Prior to this he taught at the 

University of Louisville, Kentucky, and Rutgers University, New Jersey. 

Since 1988 Dr. Scobell has published articles in such journals as Armed 

Forces and Society, Asian Survey, China Quarterly, Comparative Politics, 

Current History, and Political Science Quarterly. Recent articles and 

monographs have focused on China-Taiwan relations, China’s military 

modernization, and Chinese strategic culture. His book, China’s Use of 

Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March, will be published by 

Cambridge University Press next year. Dr. Scobell earned a Ph.D. in 

Political Science from Columbia University. 

MARK A. STOKES is Country Director for the People’s Republic of 

China (PRC) and Taiwan within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, 

International Security Affairs (OSD/ISA). He is the author of China’s 

Strategic Modernization: Implications for the United States published by the 

U.S. Army war College, Strategic Studies Institute, in 1999. Lieutenant 

Colonel Stokes has served as a signal intelligence and electronic combat 

support officer in the Philippines and West Berlin. He served as an assistant 

air attaché at the U.S. Defense Attaché Office in Beijing, PRC, from 1992-95. 

Before his assignment to OSD/ISA, he was the Asia-Pacific regional 

planner within the Headquarters U.S. Air Force Operations and plans 

Directorate from 1995-97. He holds graduate degrees in International 

Relations and Asian Studies from Boston University and the Naval 

Postgraduate School. He received his formal Chinese Mandarin language 

training from the Defense Language Institute in Monterey, California, 

and the Diplomatic Language Services in Rosslyn, Virginia. 

LARRY M. WORTZEL is Director of the Asian Studies of the Heritage 

Foundation and a member of the U.S.-China Security Review Commission. 

He retired in November 1999 as a colonel in the U.S. Army after 32 years of 

military service. During his military career, he served in infantry and 
312

intelligence positions in Morocco, Korea, Thailand, Singapore, and 

China. Dr. Wortzel also served in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the 

U.S. Pacific Command, and on the Department of the Army staff. His last 

position before retiring was as Director of the Strategic Studies Institute 

at the U.S. Army war College. Dr. Wortzel is the author of two books on 

China and has edited and contributed to two other books, as well as 

many journal articles and monographs. Dr. Wortzel earned a B.A. from 

Columbus College, Georgia, and an M.A. and Ph.D. in Political Science 

at the University of Hawaii. 
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE 

Major General Robert R. Ivany 

Commandant 

***** 

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE 

Director 

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr. 

Director of Research 

Dr. Steven Metz 

Editors 

Dr. Andrew Scobell 

Dr. Larry M. Wortzel 

Director of Publications 

Ms. Marianne P. Cowling 

Publications Assistant 

Ms. Rita A. Rummel 

Composition 

Ms. Kimberly A. Rockwell