Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-61 | November 14, 2023 Page 1 of 16

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT

Theodore E. Rokita

Attorney General of Indiana

Frances Barrow

Supervising Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES

Jacob M. O’Brien 

Scott L. Starr 

Starr Austen & Miller, LLP 

Logansport, Indiana 

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Marion Superior Court 

Probation Department,

Appellant-Defendant,

v. 

Cheryl Trapuzzano and Jennifer 

Trapuzzano, as Co-Personal 

Representatives of the Estate of 

Nathan Trapuzzano, Deceased,

Appellees-Plaintiffs.

November 14, 2023

Court of Appeals Case No.

23A-CT-61 

Appeal from the Marion Superior 

Court

The Honorable Bruce E. Petit, 

Special Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

49D12-1603-CT-9812 

Opinion by Judge Tavitas 

Judges Bailey and Kenworthy concur.

Tavitas, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-61 | November 14, 2023 Page 2 of 16

Case Summary

[1] In this interlocutory appeal, the Marion Superior Court Probation Department 

(“Probation Department”) appeals the trial court’s denial of its motion for 

summary judgment regarding claims brought by Cheryl Trapuzzano and 

Jennifer Trapuzzano, as co-personal representatives of the Estate of Nathan 

Trapuzzano (“Trapuzzano”) (collectively, “the Estate”). The Estate brought 

claims against the Probation Department after a probationer shot and killed 

Trapuzzano during an apparent robbery. On appeal, the Probation Department 

argues that the trial court erred by denying its motion for summary judgment 

because: (1) the Probation Department did not owe a duty to Trapuzzano; (2) 

the Probation Department has common law immunity and immunity under the 

Indiana Tort Claims Act (“ITCA”) from liability for the Estate’s claims; and (3) 

the Probation Department was not the proximate cause of Trapuzzano’s death. 

We find one issue dispositive and hold that the Probation Department has 

quasi-judicial immunity from liability for the Estate’s claims. Accordingly, we 

reverse and remand.

Issue

[2] The Probation Department raises three issues. We find one issue dispositive, 

which we restate as whether the trial court erred by determining that genuine 

issues of material fact existed regarding whether the Probation Department has 

quasi-judicial immunity from liability for the Estate’s claims. 
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Facts

[3] S.A. had an extensive juvenile history, which included offenses involving 

handguns. In December 2013, the State alleged that S.A. committed acts that 

would be auto theft, carrying a handgun without a license, possession of 

marijuana, operating a vehicle without a license, fleeing law enforcement, 

resisting law enforcement, and dangerous possession of a firearm if committed 

by an adult. The juvenile court found the auto theft and resisting law 

enforcement allegations to be true and dismissed the other charges. On 

February 10, 2014, S.A. was given a suspended commitment to the Department 

of Correction; placed on probation; placed on home confinement with his 

uncle; ordered to attend school; submit to a substance abuse evaluation; and 

attend counseling and the Restoring Excellence Program. 

[4] Between February 11, 2014, and March 9, 2014, S.A. was in non-compliance 

with the terms of his probation on at least fifteen occasions because he was not 

at home during checks, was suspended from school, attended neither the 

Restoring Excellence Program nor counseling, and failed to submit to a 

substance abuse evaluation. Probation Department policy required S.A.’s 

probation officer, Tracy McDonald, to file a notice with the juvenile court after 

the third violation, but McDonald did not do so. On March 5, 2014, 

McDonald’s supervisor, Christina Gibson, addressed the violations with 

McDonald in an email and asked why they “shouldn’t go ahead and do a 

[petition to modify] on [S.A.].” Appellant’s App. Vol. VI p. 218. 
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[5] On March 5, 2014, the Probation Department filed a petition for modification 

of the dispositional decree. The Probation Department alleged that S.A. 

received a five-day out of school suspension, failed to participate in the 

Restoring Excellence Program, and had unauthorized leaves from his residence 

on nine occasions. The Probation Department requested that the juvenile court 

schedule a hearing on the matter but did not request any emergency relief or 

request a change in S.A.’s placement. The juvenile court set the matter for a 

hearing on April 7, 2014. While waiting on the April 7 hearing, S.A. continued 

to violate the terms of his probation, burglarized a gun shop, shot a man outside 

of a restaurant, and on April 1, 2014, shot and killed Trapuzzano during an 

apparent robbery. 

[6] In March 2016, the Estate filed a complaint against Marion County, the 

Probation Department, the Marion Superior Court Executive Committee, 

Christine Kerl, Tracy McDonald, and Marion County Community Corrections 

Agency.1

 The complaint was amended twice, and the second amended 

complaint alleged:

38. Defendants were negligent in many ways, including, without 

limitation, by:

1 The parties do not mention whether the Estate filed a notice of tort claim pursuant to Indiana Code Section 

34-13-3-8.
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a. Failing to exercise reasonable care in the operation and 

administration of the Marion County Superior Court 

Probation Department;

b. Failing to exercise reasonable care in carrying out the 

responsibilities of probation officers in the Marion County 

Superior Court Probation Department;

c. Failing to follow the policies and procedures of the 

Marion County Superior Court Probation Department;

d. Failing to fulfill the mandatory duties of probation 

officers as prescribed by Indiana Code 11-13-1-3;

e. Failing to fulfill the duties of probation officers as 

required by the policies and procedures of the Marion 

County Superior Court Probation Department;

f. Failing to properly supervise Tracy McDonald and/or 

other probation officers;

g. Failing to properly hire, retain, train, oversee, and 

employ Tracy McDonald and/or other probation officers;

h. Failing to properly monitor and/or supervise [S.A.] per 

the terms of his probation; and

i. Failing to properly record, track, supervise, and notify 

authorities of violations of [S.A.’s] home detention.

Appellant’s App. Vol. II pp. 41-42.
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[7] The trial court dismissed all of the defendants except the Probation 

Department, and the Probation Department filed a motion for summary 

judgment. The Probation Department alleged that: (1) the Probation 

Department did not owe a duty to Trapuzzano; (2) the Probation Department 

had immunity from the Estate’s claims; and (3) the Probation Department was 

not the proximate cause of Trapuzzano’s death. The Estate filed a response, 

and the trial court conducted a hearing in July 2022. 

[8] In November 2022, the trial court denied the Probation Department’s motion. 

The trial court concluded that: (1) the Probation Department owed a duty to 

Trapuzzano; (2) genuine issues of material fact exist which may negate quasijudicial immunity; (3) genuine issues of material fact exist which may negate 

discretionary function immunity under the ITCA; (4) law enforcement 

immunity under the ITCA is inapplicable; and (5) genuine issues of material 

fact exist regarding whether the Probation Department was the proximate cause 

of Trapuzzano’s death. Regarding quasi-judicial immunity, the trial court 

found:

13. Courts are reluctant to apply quasi-judicial immunity too 

broadly and if the acts do not involve the judicial process so that 

a fear exists that freedom of judicial decision making may be 

stifled, then the person or act should not be shielded by 

immunity. Lake County Juvenile Court v. Swanson, 671 N.E.2d 429 

(Ind. Ct. App. 1996). While it is true that the filing of a notice of 

probation violation should be considered an arm of the judicial 

officer who is immune and entitled to quasi judicial immunity, 

that may not be the case if the actor knowingly filed a false 

probation violation. Thornton v. Pietrzak, 120 N.E.3d 1139 (Ind. 
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Ct. App. 2019). In this cause, there is evidence that not only did 

[the Probation Department] omit information in the Petition filed 

with the Court which would be vital to the Court in determining 

appropriate action to take, but they also made recommendations 

contrary to their own belief and mandatory policies. I.C. 11-13-

1-1(C) creates a mandatory duty to notify the Court when a 

violation of conditions or probation occurs and to keep accurate 

records of cases investigated by Probation Department and make 

these records available to the Court. Id. at 1144 ([e]mphasis 

added). If the facts alleged by the [the Estate] as set out in the 

depositions and emails from [Probation Department] employees 

are true, then the trier-of-fact could find that not only was the 

Petition filed by the [Probation Department] not in furtherance of 

a judicial determination, but an actual deterrence to that process. 

The [Estate] cites evidence that presiding Juvenile Judge Moores 

was extremely angry and upset to not have been provided with 

accurate information in the Violation of Probation Petition as 

filed. This could further support a finding that Probation’s 

actions were outside the protection of quasi-judicial immunity. 

Based upon depositions of Christina Gibson, the trier-of-fact 

could find that the probation officer intentionally withheld vital 

information in the Petition filed which would negate the granting 

of immunity. Parke City v. Ropak, Inc., 526 N.E.2d 732 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 1988).

14. The Court believes that there is also an issue of fact as to 

whether Probation was carrying out a Court Order. In order for 

judicial immunity to apply, the [d]efendant must be carrying out 

an order of the Court. Preparing reports for the Court’s review to 

assist the Court in making a judicial determination is closely tied 

to a judicial proceeding. D.L. v. Huck, 978 N.E.2d 429 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2012). However, to omit vital information as is alleged in 

the [Estate’s] cause of action may be found to be actions not 

enforcing the Court’s Order, but rather a direct violation of that 

Order. This is a question of fact for the trier and not appropriate 

for summary judgment.
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15. The Court finds that there are sufficient questions of fact 

which may negate the protection afforded through quasi-judicial 

immunity and [the Probation Department’s] Motion for 

Summary Judgment is denied on that ground.

* * * * *

Appellant’s App. Vol. II pp. 30-31. This Court then granted the Probation 

Department permission to bring this interlocutory appeal pursuant to Indiana 

Appellate Rule 14(B).

Discussion and Decision

[9] The Probation Department appeals the trial court’s denial of its motion for 

summary judgment. “‘When this Court reviews a grant or denial of a motion 

for summary judgment, we stand in the shoes of the trial court.’” Minser v. 

DeKalb Cnty. Plan Comm’n, 170 N.E.3d 1093, 1098 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021)

(quoting Burton v. Benner, 140 N.E.3d 848, 851 (Ind. 2020)). “Summary 

judgment is appropriate ‘if the designated evidentiary matter shows that there is 

no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to 

a judgment as a matter of law.’” Id. (quoting Murray v. Indianapolis Pub. Schs., 

128 N.E.3d 450, 452 (Ind. 2019)); see also Ind. Trial Rule 56(C).

[10] The summary judgment movant invokes the burden of making a prima facie

showing that there is no issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment 

as a matter of law. Burton, 140 N.E.3d at 851. The burden then shifts to the 

non-moving party, which must then show the existence of a genuine issue of 
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material fact. Id. On appellate review, we resolve “[a]ny doubt as to any facts 

or inferences to be drawn therefrom . . . in favor of the non-moving party.” Id.

[11] We review the trial court’s ruling on a motion for summary judgment de novo, 

and we take “care to ensure that no party is denied his day in court.” Schoettmer 

v. Wright, 992 N.E.2d 702, 706 (Ind. 2013). “We limit our review to the 

materials designated at the trial level.” Gunderson v. State, Ind. Dep’t of Nat. Res., 

90 N.E.3d 1171, 1175 (Ind. 2018), cert. denied. Because the trial court entered 

findings of fact and conclusions of law, we also reiterate that findings of fact 

and conclusions of law entered by the trial court aid our review, but they do not 

bind us. In re Supervised Estate of Kent, 99 N.E.3d 634, 637 (Ind. 2018).

[12] In Benton v. City of Oakland City, 721 N.E.2d 224, 232 (Ind. 1999), our Supreme 

Court held: “In general, it is only after a determination is made that a 

governmental defendant is not immune . . . that a court undertakes the analysis 

of whether a common law duty exists under the circumstances.” Accordingly, 

we begin by addressing the parties’ immunity arguments. “More than forty 

years ago, a series of judicial decisions almost entirely abolished common law 

immunity for government entities and activities in this state.” F.D. v. Ind. Dep’t 

of Child Servs., 1 N.E.3d 131, 135-36 (Ind. 2013). “Under Indiana common law, 

with very limited exception, governmental entities are thus subject to liability 

under traditional tort theories.” Id. at 136. The three limited exceptions are 

“crime prevention, appointments to public office, and judicial decisionmaking.” Id. (citing Benton, 721 N.E.2d at 227) (emphasis added). In 

response, the Indiana General Assembly passed the ITCA. “This statute 
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granted absolute immunity to governmental entities in a number of specific 

circumstances, and codified rules of liability for other areas of governmental 

activity.” Id. 

[13] Whether immunity applies is a question of law for the court, and the party 

seeking immunity bears the burden of demonstrating that immunity applies. Id. 

“The negligence of a defendant ‘is not relevant if it is immune. Immunity 

assumes negligence but denies liability.’” Id. (quoting Catt v. Bd. of Comm’rs of 

Knox Cnty., 779 N.E.2d 1, 5 (Ind. 2002)). 

[14] Although the parties discuss both common law quasi-judicial immunity and 

immunity under the ITCA, we resolve this matter on the basis of common law 

quasi-judicial immunity. “It is well-settled that judges are entitled to absolute 

judicial immunity from suits for money damages for all actions taken in the 

judge’s judicial capacity, unless those actions are taken in the complete absence 

of any jurisdiction.” H.B. v. Indiana-Elkhart Div. of Fam. & Child., 713 N.E.2d 

300, 302 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied. “The underlying purpose of the 

immunity is to preserve judicial independence in the decision-making process.” 

Id. “[T]he same policies that underlie the grant of absolute judicial immunity to 

judges justify the grant of immunity to non-judicial officers who perform quasijudicial functions.” Id. “Absolute judicial immunity therefore extends to 

persons performing tasks so integral or intertwined with the judicial process that 

these persons are considered an arm of the judicial officer who is immune.” Id. 

“In determining whether a person is entitled to judicial immunity, the United 

States Supreme Court has established a functional approach, where the court 
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looks to the nature of the function performed, not the identity of the actor who 

performed it.” Id. (citing Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 224, 108 S. Ct. 538 

(1988)).

[15] “Probation in Indiana is a court function, and probation officers are trained, 

tested, hired, and supervised directly by the judiciary.” Ryle v. State, 842 N.E.2d 

320, 324 (Ind. 2005); see also Ind. Code Chapter 11-13-1 (discussing probation 

administration); Ind. Admin. Rule 18 (discussing the governance of county 

probation departments). Probation officers “serve at the pleasure of the 

appointing court and are directly responsible to and subject to the orders of the 

court.” Ind. Code § 11-13-1-1(c).

[16] This Court has held that individual probation officers were entitled to quasijudicial immunity where the plaintiff alleged that the probation officers 

“exceeded the scope of their authority as probation officers by failing to 

maintain accurate records and providing the sentencing court . . . with 

knowingly false information.” Thornton v. Pietrzak, 120 N.E.3d 1139, 1143 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 2019), trans. denied. The plaintiff in Thornton alleged that probation 

officers erroneously filed a petition to revoke probation where he was not on 

probation. We noted that, “[p]ursuant to statute, probation officers have 

mandatory duties, including, to ‘notify the court when a violation of a 

condition of probation occurs’ and to ‘keep accurate records of cases 

investigated by [them] and of all cases assigned to [them] by the court and make 

these records available to the court upon request.’” Id. at 1143-44 (citing Ind. 

Code § 11-13-1-3(7), (9)). 
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[17] In Thornton, the probation officers “followed their statutory duty to notify the 

court when a violation of a condition of probation occurred pursuant to the 

original sentencing order . . . and their belief that Thornton was still on 

probation at the time he committed new offenses because his probation had 

been tolled when he served an executed sentence in an unrelated case.” Id. at 

1144-45. We concluded that, “in filing the notice of probation violation, [the 

probation officers] were ‘performing [a task] so integral or intertwined with the 

judicial process’ that they should be ‘considered an arm of the judicial officer 

who is immune.’” Id. at 1145. Accordingly, we held that the probation officers 

were entitled to quasi-judicial immunity and that the trial court properly 

granted summary judgment to the probation officers. See also J.A.W. v. State, 

650 N.E.2d 1142, 1151-53 (holding that a probation officer had quasi-judicial 

immunity despite the claims that the probation officer was “derelict in the 

performance of his duties”), vacated in part and summarily aff’d in relevant part by

687 N.E.2d 1202, 1203 n.3 (Ind. 1997).

[18] Here, as in Thornton, the Estate alleges that the Probation Department withheld 

vital information from the petition for modification and intentionally provided 

false information. We find little to distinguish the actions at issue here from the 

actions at issue in Thornton. The Estate, however, argues that Thornton is 

inapplicable because quasi-judicial immunity does not apply to governmental 

entities. In support of this argument, the Estate cites federal cases addressing 

Section 1983 claims. Our Court, however, has applied quasi-judicial immunity 

to governmental entities in connection with other types of claims. In 
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Mendenhall v. City of Indianapolis, 717 N.E.2d 1218, 1227 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), 

trans. denied, a property owner brought an inverse condemnation action against 

several governmental entities, including the Indianapolis Police Department 

(“IPD”) after IPD executed a trial court’s order to seize the property owner’s 

bookstore. We held that IPD was entitled to quasi-judicial immunity because 

IPD’s actions were in furtherance of the trial court’s order. Accordingly, we 

held that the City of Indianapolis could “not be held liable for protected actions 

by IPD . . . .” Mendenhall, 717 N.E.2d at 1227.

[19] Similarly, in H.B., 713 N.E.2d at 302, children filed a complaint against the 

State of Indiana—Elkhart County Office Division of Family and Children 

(“DFC”). While the children were removed from their mother and her 

boyfriend and placed in foster care, DFC became aware that the boyfriend 

molested one of the children on a weekend visit. DFC did not report the abuse 

to law enforcement and later recommended to the trial court that the children 

be reunited with mother, who was still living with the boyfriend. The trial court 

took the recommendation and reunited the children with their mother, and the 

boyfriend later molested the children again. The complaint alleged that DFC 

was negligent in recommending that the children be reunited with their mother 

and by failing to report the first molestation to law enforcement.

[20] We held that DFC was entitled to quasi-judicial immunity as follows:

[T]he case workers employed by the DFC were acting to assist 

the juvenile court judge in his decisions regarding the care and 

custody of the Children. The DFC and its employees were acting 
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under the direction of Ind. Code § 31-6-11-11 (1988)[2]

, which 

states that case workers from the DFC “shall assist the juvenile 

court . . . during all stages of the proceedings in accordance with 

the purposes of [the chapter regarding reporting and investigation 

of child abuse and neglect].” Specifically, after the Children were 

adjudicated Children in Need of Services (“CHINS”), the case 

workers were required to complete a case plan for the Children, 

Ind. Code § 31-6-4-6.6 (1988)[3]

, and to prepare a predispositional 

report that included a recommendation for the care, treatment, 

and rehabilitation of the Children. Ind. Code § 31-6-4-15 

(1988).

[4]

 The case workers, in addition to acting under the 

statutes, were acting in accordance with the juvenile court’s order 

to monitor the progress made by the Children, Mother and 

Boyfriend. Further, the DFC’s recommendation to reunify the 

Children with Mother was made during a judicial proceeding. 

Thus, the case workers were acting as an arm of the juvenile 

court judge by implementing the court’s order, and ultimately 

recommending that the Children be returned to Mother. We 

hold that . . . these were acts intimately associated with a judicial 

proceeding and entitled the DFC to absolute immunity from suit. 

Too, because the initial molestation took place after the Children 

were adjudicated CHINS and came under the supervision of the 

DFC, we hold that the failure of the DFC to report the 1989 

molestation to law enforcement officials occurred in the course of 

the DFC’s court-ordered duties[] and falls within the scope of the 

DFC’s judicial immunity. Thus, the trial court did not err by 

entering summary judgment for the State on its claim for judicial 

immunity.

2 Repealed by P.L. 1-1997, § 157.

3 Repealed by P.L. 1-1997, § 157.

4 Repealed by P.L. 1-1997, § 157.
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Id. at 302-03 (footnotes omitted); cf. D.L. v. Huck, 978 N.E.2d 429, 433-34 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 2012) (distinguishing H.B. and holding that the Department of Child 

Services (“DCS”) was not entitled to quasi-judicial immunity where DCS’s 

removal of the child was not at the direction of a court and occurred after the 

CHINS proceedings had been closed), aff’d on reh’g by 978 N.E.2d 429 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2012). Given our holdings in Mendenhall and H.B., we disagree with the 

Estate’s contention that quasi-judicial immunity does not apply to the 

Probation Department. 

[21] Finally, we note that the trial court focused on what it described as genuine 

issues of material fact as to whether the probation officer intentionally withheld 

vital information. Quasi-judicial immunity, like judicial immunity, is 

“absolute.” Melton v. Ind. Athletic Trainers Bd., 156 N.E.3d 633, 652 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2020), trans. denied. “Such immunity totally insulates officials from 

liability for actions taken in their judicial or quasi-judicial capacity; the shield of 

absolute immunity cannot be pierced even if the official acts in error, 

maliciously, or corruptly.” Id. at 655. Regardless of whether the probation 

officer’s conduct was intentional or negligent, quasi-judicial immunity applies. 

Because the Probation Department has immunity from the Estate’s claims, we 

need not address the parties’ other arguments. Accordingly, we conclude that 

the trial court erred by denying the Probation Department’s motion for 

summary judgment. 
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Conclusion

[22] The Probation Department is entitled to quasi-judicial immunity for the Estate’s 

claims, and the trial court erred by denying the Probation Department’s motion 

for summary judgment. Accordingly, we reverse and remand.

[23] Reversed and remanded.

Bailey, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.