U.S.-UK RELATIONS AT THE START OF THE 21st CENTURY

Edited by

Jeffrey D. McCausland

Douglas T. Stuart

January 2006

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 Michael Calingaert wishes to thank Leo Buzzerio and Andrew Felton for their 

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ISBN 1-58487-217-9
iii

CONTENTS

Introduction 

Mitchell B. Reiss . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v

Acknowledgments

Jeffrey D. McCausland and Douglas T. Stuart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix

1. The U.S. - UK Special Relationship in Historical Context:

 Lessons of the Past 

 Ray Raymond . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Section I: Economic and Business Aspects 

of the Special Relationship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

2. The Special Relationship—Economic and Business Aspects:

 American Perspective

Michael Calingaert . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

3. Anglo-American Economic and Business Relationships:

 British Perspective

Ray Raymond . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

4. The Economic and Business Dimension:

 Panel Chairman’s Summary and Recommendations

Erik R. Peterson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

Section II: Political and Legal Aspects 

of the Special Relationship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

5. The Anxiety of Sovereignty: Britain, the United States, 

 and the International Criminal Court

Douglas E. Edlin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

6. Stranded between Two Receding Shorelines? 

 The Anglo-American Special Relationship 

 after the May 5, 2005, Elections

Mark Gilbert . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77

7. Political and Legal Aspects of the Special Relationship: 

 Panel Chairman’s Summary and Recommendations

Andrew Apostolou . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
iv

Section III: Foreign Policy and the Special Relationship . . . . . . 111

8. A Conservative Vision for U.S. Policy Toward Europe

John C. Hulsman and Nile Gardiner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113

9. Past, Present, and Future Foreign Policy: 

 The British Perspective

Nicholas Childs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125

10. The Special Relationship and Foreign Policy:

 Panel Chairman’s Report

Philip Stephens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135

Section IV: Security and Defense Aspects 

of the Special Relationship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145

11. Observations on the Special Relationship 

 in Security and Defense Matters

Leo Michel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147

12. The Defense Dimension of the Anglo-American 

 Special Relationship

Charles Dick . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175

13. When You Come to a Fork in the Road, Take It — 

 Defense Policy and the Special Relationship:

 Panel Chairman’s Report

Jeffrey D. McCausland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201

14. “Well, Isn’t That Special?” Concluding Remarks 

 on U.S.-UK Relations at the Start of the 21st Century

Douglas T. Stuart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203

About the Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .211
v

INTRODUCTION

 With the end of the Cold War, a popular parlor game in foreign 

ministries, think tanks, and academia has been to develop a theory of 

international relations that best explains the new international order. 

Although there is widespread agreement that the United States is 

the world’s most powerful country in military, economic, and 

diplomatic terms, and is likely to remain so for the foreseeable future, 

there is little agreement as to how the rest of the world will react 

to America’s lead. Concepts such as “balancing,” “bandwagoning,” 

“buck-passing,” and “free riding,” to name just a few, have been 

advanced and debated. And although none presents a unified field 

theory, each explains some aspect of international relations. 

 Theory has an even more difficult time explaining the relationship 

between the United States and the United Kingdom (UK), especially 

its remarkable endurance over the past 6 decades. The U.S.-UK 

partnership flourished during World War II, deepened during the 

long twilight struggle with the Soviet Union, and has prospered 

further since the end of the Cold War. It is likely to survive any new 

challenges that may loom on the horizon. 

 The United States has the same track record with no other state, 

even those who were also once part of the British Empire. America’s 

relations with Canada, our neighbor and largest trading partner, and 

with Australia, with whom we share a common heritage of mass 

immigration and frontier-taming, are robust, yet do not attain quite 

the same scope and depth as the U.S.-UK special relationship. 

 Many observers and commentators, even former officials who 

should know better, ascribe the success of the relationship to an 

affinity of purpose, rooted in a shared heritage of law, traditions, 

blood ties, and culture. They have a tendency to place the relationship 

on a pedestal, to be handled reverently as if by liveried servants. They 

conjure up endless vistas of Anglo-American harmony, unblemished 

by harsh words or furrowed brows—vistas of sunny days and clear 

skies, of unanimity on all matters, large and small. 

 Nothing could be further from the truth. An accurate history, not 

hagiography, is essential to understanding the relationship and what 

makes it special. Our interests are similar, but not always identical. 

Our strategic goals may overlap, but our tactics may differ. 
vi

 Almost from its inception, the relationship has been fraught with 

disagreement and acrimony, often over existential matters of war and 

peace. No sooner had our extensive wartime collaboration succeeded 

in defeating the Axis powers than Washington passed the Atomic 

Energy Act of 1946, which terminated all atomic energy cooperation 

with the UK. Quickly forgotten was the immense contribution 

British scientists had made to the Manhattan Project. Less than a 

decade later, Washington and London had a fundamental and very 

public disagreement over Suez, with the United States eventually 

compelling the removal of all British forces from Egypt by forcing a 

sterling crisis that threatened to bankrupt the UK. These were two 

of the earliest, and in some ways the most startling, of a series of 

disagreements the two countries have had, and continue to have, 

on issues that affect their interests and the world. More recently, the 

United States and the UK have worked closely together to advance 

the peace process in Northern Ireland. But it hasn’t always been 

smooth sailing. 

 During the 1960s and 1970s, American politicians like Hugh 

Carey, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Thomas Phillip “Tip” O’Neill, 

Jr., and Edward “Ted” Kennedy were among the first to draw 

international attention to the discrimination against the Catholic 

community in education, employment, and housing in Northern 

Ireland. The Clinton administration weathered a firestorm with the 

British over its decision to grant a visa to Gerry Adams, entertain 

him at the White House, and generally elevate the profile of Sinn 

Fein. On Northern Ireland, there have been other disagreements over 

the years, although no one doubts the fundamental commitment of 

all American administrations, and especially President Bush, to the 

peace process. 

 It is in these disagreements that the true nature of the special 

relationship can be found. It is our ability to disagree, to argue 

passionately, candidly, and forcefully with each other ― and then 

to pick up the pieces, place our anger behind us, and go forward 

together—that makes the relationship special and explains why it 

has thrived. Disagreement and resolution are the hallmark signs of a 

healthy partnership. Despite being a cliché, it nonetheless is true that 

the United States has no more reliable, trustworthy, or stalwart ally 

than the United Kingdom. I believe the UK feels the same way about 

the United States.
vii

 So how best to explain this special relationship? It may simply 

defy categorization. Like the theater owner in the film Shakespeare in 

Love (another Anglo-American collaboration) explaining how plays 

are produced, “It’s a mystery.” But it is very special nonetheless.

AMBASSADOR MITCHELL B. REISS 

Special Envoy to the Northern Ireland Peace Process

Washington, DC 

ix

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

 In reality, this project has its roots in our collective experiences 

for over 30 years. We have both had the good fortune to work, think, 

debate, discuss, and reflect on issues affecting international security 

in general, and transatlantic relations in particular, throughout our 

professional careers. In the process, we were fortunate to meet and 

get to know a tremendous group of British colleagues, due to the 

very close relationship our country and the United Kingdom (UK) 

shared during the Cold War. Following the collapse of the Soviet 

Union and the horrific events of September 11, 2001, it seemed 

only appropriate to undertake an in-depth audit of this unique 

relationship. We are both, therefore, indebted to a host of friends 

and mentors with whom we have worked over the years on various 

aspects of British-American relations and on common problems 

facing both our countries.

 This book is a compilation of all of the papers submitted during 

the conferences we conducted at both Dickinson College and the 

Defense Academy of the United Kingdom on the topic “The Future of 

the Special Relationship.” We are grateful to the outstanding group 

of experts who contributed their collective wisdom to our discussions 

and this volume. This effort also reflects the hard work and assistance 

of a number of other people. First, we wish to thank the Strategic 

Studies Institute (SSI), the Center for Strategic and International 

Studies (CSIS), and the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) for 

their support and guidance, and for hosting events associated with 

this project. We are also extremely grateful for the assistance which we 

received from Mr. Tom Kalaris, CEO, Americas, for Barclays Capital, 

and a Trustee of Dickinson College. We are also very proud of four 

Dickinson students—Sara Lybeck, Alex Stout, Helena Berrizbeitia, 

and Dan Emery—for their superb contributions to the conferences’ 

overall success. In the UK, we were warmly hosted by the Advanced 

Research and Analysis Group (ARAG) at the Defense Academy of 

the United Kingdom. We wish to express our thanks to Christopher 

Donnelly, ARAG Director, and Sara Auchinleck, Research Manager. 

Finally, we are both particularly indebted to the staff of the Leadership 

in Conflict Initiative, Kitzi Chappelle and Tanya McCausland, for 
x

their tireless efforts in organizing and arranging the conferences 

associated with this volume. Without them this effort would never 

have succeeded.

JEFFREY D. McCAUSLAND, Director DOUGLAS T. STUART

Leadership in Conflict Initiative, Professor of Political Science

Department of International Studies, and International Studies

Dickinson College Dickinson College
1

CHAPTER 1

THE U.S.-UK SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT: 

LESSONS OF THE PAST

Ray Raymond

 Winston Churchill once wrote, “Learn all you can from history, 

for how else can one even make a guess what is going to happen in 

the future . . . in history lie all the secrets of statecraft.” Churchill 

was right, and his advice is especially appropriate to the study of 

the special relationship. Properly understood, the lessons of the past 

not only help us keep the problems of the present in perspective, 

but also point to one central conclusion: some kind of intimate and 

unbreakable link does exist between the United States and Britain, 

and its roots are very deep. 

 Throughout the deliberations of the two conferences that form the 

basis of this book, I was struck that so many of my fellow participants 

knew so little of the history of the Anglo-American relationship. 

Stereotypes abounded, particularly in the British delegation. Many 

of these participants appeared eager to deny the existence of a shared 

heritage so critical in helping us resolve disputes past and present. 

This chapter attempts to explain what the special relationship is and 

to provide a more balanced view of its value. 

KEEPING THE PRESENT IN PERSPECTIVE 

 To begin, the lessons of the past put our current problems in 

perspective. Anti-Americanism is one example. Throughout the 

Carlisle and Shrivenham conferences, many participants expressed 

serious concern about the extent, intensity, and nature of antiAmericanism in the United Kingdom. They were right to do so. 

The current level of anti-Americanism is indeed disturbing and, 

in my judgment, poses the biggest single threat to the special 

relationship. But anti-Americanism in Britain is nothing new. It has 

been a prominent feature of the ideology of the left and right wings 

of British politics ever since 1945. Yet, over the past 60 years, the 

special relationship has not only survived but prospered, making a 

vital contribution to international security. 
2

 The years immediately following World War II offer a very 

good example. The war had marked a substantial shift in economic 

power—and hence political and military power—from Britain to the 

United States. This was a terrible shock to a proud nation accustomed 

to controlling the destiny of much of the world. The psychological 

repercussions of this transfer of power were clearly identifiable in a 

strongly anti-American mood intensified by moral unease over the 

dropping of the atomic bombs on Japan, resentment at the abrupt 

termination of Lend Lease, and fear that the rapid demobilization 

and withdrawal of U.S. forces from Europe would leave a weakened 

Britain unable to deter Soviet aggression. In August 1948, U.S. 

Ambasador Lew Douglas reported to Washington that “there is 

an undercurrent of feeling here against the U.S., both in and out of 

government . . . at times their attitude towards the U.S. borders on 

the pathological.” But this intense anti-Americanism did not prevent 

Britain and the United States from collaborating closely to ensure the 

success of the Marshall Plan in 1947, nor did it impede the AngloAmerican diplomacy that led to the foundation of the North Atlantic 

Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949. 

 History also reminds us that vigorous arguments between 

London and Washington are nothing new. There was never a 

golden age of Anglo-American relations free from acrimony. 

Franklin D. Roosevelt and Churchill had profound disagreements 

on the desirability of the continuation of the British Empire in Africa, 

Asia, and the Middle East, and of the continued existence of British 

imperial trade preferences in the postwar era. These disagreements 

were compounded by difficulties over the detailed arrangements 

for Lend Lease, over British sterling and dollar balances, and over 

access by U.S. companies to protected markets within the Empire 

and Commonwealth. On military strategy and tactics, Churchill—the 

incorrigible worshiper of the periphery—had ferocious arguments 

with Dwight Eisenhower and George Marshall, who remained 

wedded to a cross-channel attack on the core of Nazi power. 

 The true essence of the special relationship was captured in a 

lunchtime conversation in Washington in the late 1980s when Lord 

Franks, who had been British Ambassador during the Harry Truman 

administration, asked the then current Ambassador Sir Oliver 

Wright, “How are things?” Sir Oliver replied, “Oh, just fine. I have 
3

got about six rows going on with the administration and Congress at 

present.” Lord Franks replied, “Oh, good . . . sounds normal to me.” 

The point is that, over the decades, there have been frequent strong 

disagreements between London and Washington, but they have 

never prevented us from working effectively together to achieve 

shared objectives so long as the disagreements were conducted in 

private like family squabbles. Picking fights in public with the United 

States is utterly counterproductive. 

 History also shows that the other grave threat to the special 

relationship is the continued miniaturization of the British armed 

forces. As Lord Renwick, one of our greatest Ambassadors in 

Washington, has shrewdly observed: “Britain has influence on 

American policy to the extent that it still has some power and influence 

itself in various parts of the world . . . the price of consultation is 

presence and participation.” In other words, sound, unvarnished 

advice and diplomatic support—though welcome—will not be 

enough. The more and the more relevant military capability we 

have, the greater will be our influence in Washington. The reduction 

of the British armed forces must stop. 

THE LONG-TERM ROOTS OF THE SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP

 Some years ago, the elder President George Bush described the 

special relationship as “the rock upon which all dictators this century 

have perished.” He was referring to the importance of the special 

relationship in combating fascism and communism in the 20th 

century. In the 21st century, the special relationship has confounded 

the skeptics by emerging with renewed vigor. President George W. 

Bush, for example, frequently describes Britain as America’s most 

important global ally in the war on terror. British Prime Minister 

Tony Blair commands the stage in Washington and the admiration 

of the American public as no other British leader since Churchill. 

 Among the cynical British chattering classes, it has long been 

fashionable to dismiss the special relationship as mere “rhetorical 

nonsense, sometimes majestic and often moving, yet nevertheless 

nonsense.” And yet even the most hardened cynics have been forced 

to admit that some kind of intimate connection does exist between 

the United States and Britain. But defining it is not easy. The special 
4

relationship is not like a sentence that you can parse or a treaty 

that you can analyze. The most intriguing clue I have found is in a 

speech given in London by John Hay in the early 1890s when he was 

U.S. Ambassador to the Court of St. James. Describing the AngloAmerican relationship, John Hay said that Britain and the United 

States “are bound by a tie we did not forge and which we cannot 

break; we are joint ministers of the same sacred mission of liberty.” 

Hay’s insightful phrase suggests to me that to unravel the mystery of 

the special relationship we need a longer historical perspective; that 

we need to understand the American Revolution in its full complexity 

as well as the three pillars of the relationship—the shared common 

law heritage, the mutual economic investments, and the diplomatic 

and security ties.

 What I am suggesting, contrary to conventional wisdom, is that 

this relationship does have the “patina of antiquity,” and that the 

usual view of Anglo-American relations—warm and close since 

1941, cold and distant before—is mistaken. Instead, I want to offer 

a provocative working hypothesis: that the solution to the mystery, 

the real reason the special relationship is special, is that so much 

of the basic DNA of the infrastructure of the American political, 

legal, and economic system is British. And I will go further: the basic 

assumption of Roosevelt’s security policy in World War II—the idea 

that the United States and Britain shared a common strategic interest 

in preventing a single hostile power from dominating the European 

continent—can be traced back to the Federalists’ foreign policy of 

the 1790s. In a very real sense, therefore, the United States, however 

foreign it may sometimes appear to many modern-day Britons, 

is—to borrow David Hacket Fisher’s memorable phrase—“Albion’s 

seed.”

 Therefore, let’s linger a moment on the American Revolution, a 

subject on which the latest British and American scholarship offers 

some fascinating insights. To begin with, this scholarship suggests that 

the secession of the American colonies and the birth of the American 

Republic were not inevitable. Until well into the 1770s, whatever 

differences the colonies may have had with London or with each 

other, few questioned their common allegiance to the crown or their 

intense pride in their common British identity. Some—including the 

illustrious Benjamin Franklin—thought the center of gravity of the 
5

British Empire and perhaps even its capital eventually must shift to 

the United States.

 The Founders of the British Empire in America envisaged a loose 

maritime commercial empire cemented by the 17th-century Puritan 

concept of liberty which was rooted in resistance to the idea of an 

Absolutist Monarch. This concept of liberty meant parliamentary 

consent to taxation, representative government, habeas corpus, trial 

by jury, and protection of the individual citizen from arbitrary arrest 

and from a corrupt government. As Simon Schama has written, this 

concept of liberty also included, 

the constant reiteration of its historical epics—Magna Carta, the Petition 

of Right, and most recently, and therefore most hallowed, the Bill of 

Rights of 1689 and its heroes and martyrs: John Hampden, John Milton, 

and Algernon Sidney (ironically, the same heroes and martyrs beloved 

by John Adams, Thomas Jefferson, and Benjamin Franklin) . . . . The 

British Empire was supposed to satisfy itself with just enough power, 

and just enough regulation, to make the interlocking parts of its economic 

machinery work with well-oiled smoothness.

 Those American colonists who had taken these professions of 

freedom seriously felt betrayed. In the end, they rebelled not because 

of excessive taxation—the was merely a convenient rallying cry—but 

because they were concerned that the most sacred principles of British 

freedom were at stake; that they were the custodians of the true British 

Constitution which had been abandoned by a corrupt oligarchy in 

London. I believe they were right. The government of Lord North, 

in order to protect short-term economic interests, abandoned Pitt 

the Elder’s concept of an empire of liberty based on mutual consent 

and respect. It was a disastrous mistake. The underlying issue was 

one of constitutional principle: the difficulty was the failure of the 

British government to adhere to its own professed ideals of liberty, 

coupled with the failure of both the American colonists and the 

British government to agree to a constitutional relationship that 

clearly defined the rights of the colonial assemblies and the authority 

of the Westminster Parliament. The American War of Independence, 

therefore, can be seen as a legitimate rebellion rooted in the English 

common law. The colonists were not trying to reject their treasured 

British heritage, but rather to reaffirm and reclaim it from a foolish 

King and a corrupt political cadre. 
6

 The American War of Independence can also be seen as a tragic 

British civil war in that it divided social classes, towns, villages, and 

families both in Britain and in the 13 colonies. At least one-third of 

the colonists—including Benjamin Franklin’s son and John Jay’s 

brother—remained loyal to the crown. In Britain, large numbers 

of Puritans and other religious dissenters strongly supported the 

American cause because of a shared religion, shared values, and 

a heartfelt community of friendship. They were joined by English 

republicans and other radicals whose grandparents had supported 

Cromwell and the Parliamentary cause against the Stuart Kings: the 

skilled craftsmen, shopkeepers, and owners of taverns and coffee 

houses in London, in East Anglia, and in the industrial towns of 

central England. Opposition to the war also included many elements 

of the press, as well as members of the Whig opposition in the House 

of Commons and Lords and many senior officers in the British army 

and Royal Navy who were especially reluctant to take up arms against 

their kith and kin in America. This was not, therefore, the case of a 

united American nation fighting British imperialists determined to 

subjugate it by force, but rather of one transatlantic “Anglosphere” 

divided against itself. 

Pillar I: Common Law.

 The first pillar of the special relationship is, of course, the shared 

heritage that was and is our great common law tradition. The central 

point here is that America’s Founding Fathers enthusiastically 

embraced the profoundly British concept of a law-based state 

shaped by centuries of British political philosophy, jurisprudence, 

and practice dating back to the Magna Carta. As a result, our shared 

conception of individual freedom, of a law-based state, and of 

the pragmatic common law approach to justice rooted in custom, 

experience, and precedent is now firmly embedded in the American 

legal system. America’s founding documents—the Declaration 

of Independence, the U.S. Constitution, and the Bill of Rights—

do not divide us. They unite us. As Winston Churchill once said, 

“The Declaration of Independence and the U.S. Constitution are 

not only American documents. They follow on the Magna Carta 

and the English Bill of Rights as the great title deeds in which the 
7

liberties of the English-speaking peoples are founded.” As leading 

colonial American historians have demonstrated, this was not mere 

Churchillian romanticism, fuelled by several after-dinner brandies. 

The political and legal structures created by the colonists were 

deeply rooted in British constitutional history, political philosophy, 

and jurisprudence 

 In its form and content, the Declaration of Independence, for 

example, is a profoundly British document and part of a centuriesold British tradition. Pauline Maier has shown that, in both England 

and Scotland, declarations were important political and legal 

instruments. Politically, declarations were issued to explain and 

justify the removal of a king. For the Founding Fathers, the most 

important declaration was the English Declaration of Rights of 1689. 

It ended the reign of King James II and began that of William and 

Mary. For the Founding Fathers, the English Declaration became a key 

source of inspiration: a document which set out certain fundamental 

political and legal truths to inspire and shape the political and legal 

structures of the new American republic, as well as to proclaim the 

end of an old regime. 

 Jefferson used the English Declaration of Rights as his model 

when writing the preamble of his constitution for Virginia, one of the 

two texts we know he had with him in his lodgings in Philadelphia 

that hot summer of 1776. The other was George Mason’s Declaration 

of Rights for Virginia which was even more closely modeled on the 

English Declaration of Rights. So Jefferson, the assiduous student 

of British law and history, was acting as so many Britons had acted 

before him: drawing up a declaration to explain and justify bringing 

the reign of George III to an end in his American colonies.

 And it is not just a matter of form, but of content. Jefferson relied 

heavily on two of the leading thinkers of the 18th-century Scottish 

Enlightenment—David Hume and Francis Hutcheson—for many of 

his ideas. Hutcheson, for example, wrote that human rights included 

the right of a people to oppose tyranny and the right of colonies 

to secede if their mother country treated them unjustly. English 

philosopher John Locke argued that sovereignty derived from the 

people, who have a right to remove an unjust monarch. This argument 

clearly shaped Jefferson’s thinking. Indeed, much of the language in 

the opening paragraphs of the Declaration of Independence closely 
8

resembles passages from Locke’s Two Treatises of Government. 

As Dick Howard has written, the English Bill of Rights not only 

“anticipates the American document of a century later, but also 

some of the American bill’s specific provisions—for example, the 

Eighth Amendment’s ban on excessive bail and fines and on cruel 

and unusual punishment.” 

 That leads me to a central point as best expressed by the 

distinguished colonial American historian Gordon Wood:

The English had worked out a respect for the law and a semblance of 

popular self-government, however flawed by modern standards, long 

before the Americans. Whatever innovations Americans made to their 

English heritage, and they were undeniably considerable, their ultimate 

success in governing themselves and protecting individual freedom 

owed more to their English heritage than in did to their constitutional 

inventions in 1787. From decades of experience they had acquired an 

instinctive knowledge of English liberty and the English Common Law, 

and this inherited and inherent knowledge, this long experience with 

English political culture, was what ultimately enabled them to succeed 

as well as they did in establishing new governments.

Pillar II: Mutual Investment.

 The second pillar of the Anglo-American relationship is the 

extraordinary interpenetration of our two economies. Today, Britain 

and America invest over $250 billion in each other’s economies, 

more than any two other countries, and they lead in cross-border 

mergers and acquisitions. This relationship did not begin yesterday. 

For over 300 years, the prosperity of Britain and America has always 

been closely linked. Indeed, the great paradox of the American 

Revolution is that those rebelling against the Crown in the 1770s 

were its wealthiest subjects, to a large degree the beneficiaries of 

British investment and trade.

 The foundation of the modern investment relationship can be 

traced to Alexander Hamilton’s tenure as the first U.S. Treasury 

Secretary. The American War of Independence left financial chaos 

in its wake: the 13 states suffered Weimar-levels of inflation because 

they had printed unsecured paper with reckless abandon. And it 

took all of Alexander Hamilton’s financial genius, his knowledge of 
9

British best practice, and British investment to bring order out of 

chaos and lay the foundations for modern American capitalism. As 

Treasury Secretary, Hamilton created the first Bank of the United 

States, modeled closely on the Bank of England. To achieve the 

financial stability necessary to attract the British investment that was 

in turn essential to help pay off the American debt, Hamilton once 

again turned to the British model of monetizing the national debt by 

issuing long-term bonds that could be traded on the open market. 

And as Hamilton studied the British financial system in 1789, he also 

borrowed William Pitt’s idea of the sinking fund—earmarking a 

portion of annual tax revenues to pay off the national debt. This helped 

tame rampant inflation resulting from the War of Independence and 

restored investor confidence. Building on the investor confidence 

established by Hamilton, British capital financed the construction of 

the American railroads—which knitted a continent into a country—

and also financed much else of the American Industrial Revolution.

Pillar III: Diplomatic and Security Partnership.

 The third and final pillar is the unique diplomatic and security 

partnership formed by the two countries. Since World War II, there 

has been a unique collaboration in defense and national security 

between Britain and the United States and in the closeness of our 

consultation and action about most world crises. 

 FDR and Churchill invented this unique defense and intelligence 

relationship, of course. They not only gave it its unique flavor, but 

also helped create the vast network of institutions and consultative 

arrangements to sustain the partnership. It would be absurd to 

suggest that a special relationship of this kind existed before 1941. 

But the theme of confronting the common adversary was not new to 

Anglo-American relations. It had existed since the 18th century as a 

shared assumption of common interest even when bilateral relations 

between Washington and London were strained. There are two 

striking examples of this. The first can be found in the foreign policy 

of the Federalists in the 1780s and the 1790s; the second even more 

striking example can be found in the foreign policy of Theodore 

Roosevelt and Lord Salisbury when there was a Falklands in reverse. 
10

As John Lamberton Harper has argued, in the late 1780s and 1790s, 

John Jay, Alexander Hamilton, and George Washington created and 

implemented a prudent, realistic foreign policy of strength through 

peace. It was a foreign policy anchored in the belief that America’s best 

interests lay in an alliance with Britain based on common interests. 

Like their counterparts in the British government, Hamilton, Jay, and 

Washington saw it as an irreducible interest of the United States, as 

well as Britain, to prevent the domination of the European continent 

by any single power. They saw British financial and naval power as 

America’s first line of defense against French and Spanish ambitions 

to control the Mississippi Valley, thereby threatening the territorial 

integrity of the United States.

 This policy found expression in Jay’s Treaty in 1794, which 

represented the culmination of their earlier efforts to foster 

reconciliation based on reciprocity and shared interests and a common 

desire to heal the wounds of the Revolutionary War. Jay’s Treaty 

not only repudiated the Franco-American alliance of 1778, but also 

marked the birth of a common Anglo-American strategic outlook 

and the hesitant beginnings of a mutual understanding. It also linked 

American and British security policy because it recognized that the 

Royal Navy was America’s first line of defense against potential 

aggressors like France and Spain.

 This said, it must be admitted that the 19th century was a difficult 

period for Anglo-American relations. Despite the best efforts of John 

Jay and Alexander Hamilton to heal the wounds of the Revolutionary 

War, this tragic conflict left a bitter legacy of mistrust. The War of 1812, 

another unnecessary war, made it worse. But in the decades before 

the Civil War, Anglo-American relations improved because Britain 

and the United States supported Latin American independence and 

opposed French and Spanish attempts to reconquer their former 

colonies. 

 The main source of friction arose out of the American Civil War 

and Britain’s ambivalent response to it. While some British leaders, 

including then Prime Minister Lord Palmerston, hoped that the Civil 

War might lead to the breakup of the Union, the overwhelming 

majority wanted to keep out of the war. The ambivalence of British 

policy had deeper roots, however. On the one hand, the British 
11

anti-slavery movement (which had helped finance the American 

“underground-railroad” enabling slaves to escape to the North) had 

convinced almost all Britons that slavery must be abolished, and it 

lobbied successfully against recognition of the Confederacy. On the 

other, the powerful British textile industry needed continued access 

to cheap raw cotton, and the bankers of the City of London had to 

protect their loans to the big cotton plantation owners. Add to that the 

pressure from the large British shipbuilders eager to accommodate 

Confederate orders for warships, and one gets an idea of how 

difficult it was for the British government to formulate a consistent 

and balanced policy that did not offend either side in the Civil War. 

 But the British policy of nonrecognition was compromised 

by its decision to allow the Confederates to order warships from 

British shipyards. One such ship, the Alabama, built in the Cammell 

Laird shipyard on Merseyside, reached Confederate hands and 

sank nearly 60 Union vessels in 2 years. Afterwards, the victorious 

North was understandably angry that the British government 

had allowed the building of the Alabama and two other warships. 

What was important was not the dispute, but how it was resolved 

through a Joint High Commission. The Commission, whose actions 

personified the shared pragmatic Anglo-American common law 

tradition, agreed on suitable compensation for the damage caused 

by the Alabama and resolved the other outstanding grievances. Once 

again, the common law heritage helped ensure a joint approach and 

a successful resolution of a difficult, divisive problem. 

 Throughout the later part of the 19th century, despite the 

frictions caused by embittered Irish-Americans, Anglo-American 

relations grew much closer. There were three reasons for this. First, 

the passage of time and deft British diplomacy combined to soften 

Britain’s image as the colonial oppressor and enemy of American 

independence. Second, America’s remarkable economic growth 

after the Civil War created new opportunities for British investors, 

which they eagerly snapped up, thereby strengthening the AngloAmerican business relationship. Third, the arrival of steam-powered 

transatlantic liners, combined with changes in British and American 

social structure, facilitated closer social relationships between the 

elites of both countries. America’s new Gilded Age millionaires 
12

wanted the social prestige of links to the British aristocracy, which 

needed an infusion of American dollars to meet the ever-increasing 

costs of maintaining their vast country mansions. Between 1895 

and 1903, the daughters of more than 70 American millionaires 

married prominent British aristocrats, many of them in key positions 

in government. The great Anglo-American rapprochement did 

indeed build on the these closer links, but it was driven primarily 

by a common strategic outlook: both governments agreed on the 

“Open Door” policy in China, and were deeply concerned about the 

emergence of an aggressive militaristic Germany in Europe and in the 

Pacific. Both governments saw each other as key allies in containing 

German power. U.S. Ambassador and later Secretary of State John 

Hay spoke for both governments when he wrote, “There is in the 

German mind something monstrous in the thought that a war should 

take place anywhere and they not profit by it.” Lord Salisbury saw 

the Spanish-American War in 1898 as an excellent opportunity for a 

show of solidarity with the United States. Just after the outbreak of 

hostilities, Lord Salisbury’s government not only declared its political 

support for the United States, but also gave the U.S. Navy the use of 

British bases in the Caribbean. The Royal Navy also gave Admiral 

Dewey every possible assistance in Hong Kong as he prepared to 

attack the Spanish fleet in the Philippines. It was truly a Falklands in 

reverse. So as the 20th century began and America stepped forcefully 

onto the world stage for the first time, she did so with Britain’s full 

diplomatic, intelligence, and military support. The impact on U.S. 

leaders was profound. President Theodore Roosevelt (TR) wrote to 

his closest British friend, Cecil Spring Rice, “I am greatly mistaken 

if we ever slide back into the old conditions of bickering and angry 

mistrust.” TR was right. We never have. 

CONCLUSION

 I hope I have provided a clue to unraveling the mystery of the 

special relationship. Before 1941, there was, of course, bickering and 

hostility, but underlying geopolitics and a common heritage continue 

to be inescapable. Both countries were always wary of expansionism 

on or from the European continent, so the implied partnership was 
13

always there. But it took the Nazi threat and the leadership of FDR 

and Churchill to make it explicit. They succeeded in building so well 

and so fast because the foundations were already there, strong and 

deeply rooted. Then and now, we are indeed “bound by a tie we did 

not forge and which we cannot break.” Or, as Margaret Thatcher 

put it in an address to the Joint Houses of Congress on February 20, 

1985, 

Our two countries have a common heritage as well as a common language. 

It is no mere figure of speech to say that many of your most enduring 

traditions—representative government, Habeas Corpus, trial by jury, a 

system of constitutional checks and balances—stem from our own small 

islands. But they are as much your lawful inheritance as ours. You did 

not borrow these traditions: you took them with you, because they were 

already your own. 

SECTION I:

ECONOMIC AND BUSINESS ASPECTS 

OF THE SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP

17

CHAPTER 2

THE SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP — ECONOMIC AND BUSINESS 

ASPECTS: AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE

Michael Calingaert

 What constitutes a “special relationship”? And, particularly, 

what is “special”? Is it “distinctive”? “Unusual” or “unique”? Does 

it make a value judgment, connoting a relationship that is more 

important than other bilateral relationships? If so, how does one 

define or measure the scale of importance? Is it a relationship between 

governments, between peoples, or both? Is it a relationship that is 

distinguished by being privileged or preferential in some sense? If 

so, how? Or is the United States’ relationship with every country 

“special”—perhaps some simply more “special” than others?

 These are questions that underlie the assessment one is asked to 

make about the nature of a U.S.-UK relationship characterized as 

being “special.” Viewed from the economic/business perspective, 

the relationship is, in many respects, distinctive and, in some 

respects, unique. On the other hand, many aspects of the relationship 

fit the pattern of U.S. relations with other countries of the developed 

world.

 A related issue is American and British attitudes toward the 

existence of such a special relationship. To what extent does 

promoting the existence of and drawing attention to this special 

relationship promote national interests? What advantages are gained 

from doing so? While any such relationship is necessarily complex, 

and thus generalization can be misleading, the United Kingdom, 

as the smaller of the two partners, must compete for U.S. attention 

to enhance its influence over U.S. economic policies, particularly 

foreign economic policy, and promote its trade and investment 

objectives. Thus, there are clear advantages to the United Kingdom 

in propagating the idea that a special relationship exists, which is 

presumably why special relationship rhetoric is more prevalent 

there than in the United States. Of course, it is also important for 

the United States to obtain support for its foreign economic policies 
18

and to achieve its trade and investment goals. However, the United 

Kingdom plays a less important role relatively for the United States 

than the other way around. In any event, there is a downside for the 

United States in touting a special relationship—for it implies that 

other bilateral relationships are less “special.” 

CONTEXT OF THE RELATIONSHIP

 Two essential constituents distinguish economic interaction 

between the United States and United Kingdom. In one respect, the 

economic relationship is distinctive and important to both sides, 

while in the other, it is less so. 

 The key of the U.S.-UK economic special relationship is the 

shared belief in and practice of what is often called the “Anglo-Saxon 

economic model” (while one can debate the appropriateness of this 

term, the intended distinction is between it and the more regulated 

form of capitalism prevailing in much of continental Europe). It refers 

to a web of laws, practices, and attitudes that reflect acceptance of a 

business culture and system that facilitate entrepreneurial activity 

(and permits failure), encourages wealth accumulation, promotes 

competition, and provides flexibility in the use of labor and other 

inputs. 

 The “model” contains many elements. One is a relatively reduced 

role of government as a participant in and, especially, regulator of the 

economy. Another is the preponderant role played by the stock and 

bond markets as a source for investment capital—compared to the 

Continent, where the banking system is more heavily involved—and, 

related to that, the high percentage of shareholding by the general 

public, which thus has a direct stake in the economy. A third is the 

similarities of the two countries’ legal and accounting systems. Fourth 

is the strength of the financial services sector, consisting of a vast 

array of market participants ranging from financial intermediaries 

and accountants to insurance and pension funds. And, finally, the 

economies operate in a relatively transparent manner. This is perhaps 

more so in the United States than the United Kingdom in regard to 

the government and, increasingly, the private sector, as corporate 

governance issues assume ever greater prominence. 
19

 For the United States, these elements represent an essentially 

continuous pattern of policy and practice, whereas in the United 

Kingdom, they are the result of a significant measure of policies 

promoted by and adopted under the prime ministership of Margaret 

Thatcher in the 1980s, and, after their success became apparent, 

continued by the Labour government under Tony Blair. The net 

result of the mutual embrace of this economic model is a strong 

tendency to look at economic issues—domestic and international—

from a similar point of view. 

 However—and this is the second constituent—this similarity 

of system and outlook is to some extent counterbalanced by UK 

membership in the European Union (EU). The United Kingdom is 

thus not a free agent in terms of economic policies and actions. EU 

economic integration has progressed to a remarkable degree. The EU 

single market, while clearly deficient in many areas, is nonetheless 

a reality over a wide range of economic activities. The EU has 

competence in major areas, notably competition policy and trade 

policy. Thus, the United Kingdom is but one of 25 member states 

making an input to those policies. Similarly, the voluminous corpus 

of EU law and regulation, the acquis communautaire, covers economic 

subjects, and the United Kingdom, like all member states, is bound 

by them. Thus, the freedom of action of the United Kingdom is, in 

many respects, limited.

 Nonetheless, there is an important exception; that is the British 

“opt-out,” i.e., nonparticipation, in the EU’s Economic and Monetary 

Union, whose central feature is the single currency. This sets the 

United Kingdom apart—and enables it to play an independent 

role—in a major area of economic activity, one where the U.S.-UK 

bilateral relationship is unique, as will be described below. With that 

exception, however, the economic counterpart of the United States is, 

in large measure, the EU rather than the United Kingdom, or, indeed, 

any of the other EU member states. Thus, the United States cannot 

interact in the economic area with the United Kingdom in isolation 

from the EU, which means dealing with the European Commission 

and many or all of the member states.
20

PRIVATE SECTOR RELATIONSHIP

Trade.

 The simplest measure of bilateral economic interaction is trade—

a significant, though not special, relationship. The United Kingdom 

consistently has been an important trading partner of the United 

States. In terms of trade in goods, the United Kingdom is currently 

the fourth ranking overseas U.S. partner—not counting its contiguous 

neighbors, Canada and Mexico—after Japan, China, and Germany. 

It accounts for 3.6 percent of total U.S. goods trade, about the same 

level as Korea, amounting to just over $80 billion per year.1

 However, 

the composition of U.S.-UK trade has changed dramatically from 

goods to services, a trend that is likely to continue. In this sector, the 

United Kingdom, which accounts for 12 percent of world trade in 

services, ranks as the biggest U.S. trading partner.2

 Regarding total trade flows in the two directions, the United 

Kingdom was the destination for 4.3 percent of U.S. exports in 2004, 

while imports from the United Kingdom were a smaller share of the 

total—3.1 percent. Interestingly, these shares are lower than those 

achieved in recent years: export share peaked at 5.3-5.7 percent in 

1997-2001, while imports fell within the 3.4-3.8 percent range during 

the period 1991-2002.3

Investment.

 Trade is, however, a much narrower indicator of economic 

interaction than investment. Intracompany trade accounts for a 

significant share of total trade, and sales by foreign affiliates dwarf 

trade volumes. In addition, of course, investment relations are deeper 

and more lasting than trade.

 Looked at in terms of both investment flows and stock of 

investment, the United Kingdom is the top destination for U.S. direct 

investment. In 2004, over $23 billion was invested in the United 

Kingdom, amounting to 10 percent of U.S. worldwide investment 

and 28 percent of its investment in Western Europe. The total stock 

of U.S. investment in the United Kingdom is almost $300 billion, a 
21

figure approximately 30 percent greater than that in the next most 

important destination, Canada.4

 Over one million people in the United 

Kingdom work for U.S.-owned companies. Small and medium-sized 

U.S. enterprises participate very actively in this investment.5

 By the same token, the United Kingdom predominates as a 

destination for U.S. investment in the EU. Except for one “bad” year 

(2001), the United Kingdom accounted for between 28 percent and 

49 percent of annual U.S. foreign direct investment (FDI) that flowed 

into the EU during the 10-year period from 1994 to 2003. Similarly, 

when measuring the stock of U.S. FDI in the same period (without 

excluding 2001), the United Kingdom has accounted for a range of 

32-41 percent in the EU. Of possible significance, both shares (the 

United Kingdom as a destination of U.S. FDI in the EU and in the 

world) peaked in the late 1990s; nevertheless, the United Kingdom 

easily maintained its number one position. 6

 The attractions of the United Kingdom as a destination for U.S. 

investment are many—some tangible, others less so. A common 

language and, to a somewhat lesser extent, common culture rank 

high on the list. The business environment is clearly favorable: the 

United Kingdom offers a well-developed infrastructure, receptivity 

to inward investment (and more generally to “outsiders” doing 

business in the United Kingdom), a political and legal system that 

offers confidence to investors that they will be equitably treated, 

ease of entry (and departure), low taxes, a skilled and well-educated 

workforce, labor flexibility, a strong research and development 

(R&D) sector, and, finally, an intangible but significant factor of 

comfort level. 7

 In the early stages of the EU, the United Kingdom was viewed 

by many U.S. companies as a gateway or staging area into what 

began as a customs union and then developed into an increasingly 

integrated economic area. However, over time the attraction of the 

United Kingdom was reduced by rising costs, competition from 

other destinations (notably Ireland, which featured low taxes, a 

common language, and a plentiful and well-educated workforce), 

and American firms’ increasing comfort with locating elsewhere 

in the EU. Thus, there has been some increase in investment in the 

rest of the EU. Reflecting the decline in manufacturing in the United 
22

Kingdom, the share of that sector in U.S. investment in the United 

Kingdom has fallen from 39 percent to 15 percent. However, the 

decline was offset by other attractive areas, with most of that money 

moving into the finance, information technology, and property 

sectors.8

 One factor potentially affecting investment in the United Kingdom 

is the British opt-out of the single currency, and its continued 

reluctance to join. The “drying up” of inward investment predicted 

by some when the Euro was introduced, without UK participation, 

has not taken place. However, the further away British entry into the 

Economic and Monetary Union seems, the more likely investment 

in the United Kingdom—not only by U.S. firms—will be adversely 

affected. That will be particularly so if the UK economy ceases to 

outperform that of the Eurozone. Observers in the United Kingdom 

report that Britain’s opt-out has not been a major factor in inward 

investment decisions thus far, as most investors have assumed that 

the United Kingdom will eventually join the eurozone. However, 

firms that operate on small margins and are currency sensitive are 

concerned about the situation.

 Another potentially negative factor in U.S. investment decisions 

is the further development of EU social legislation—regulating many 

of the conditions of employment and the rights of workers—and its 

extension to the United Kingdom. Although the United Kingdom 

received an opt-out from this legislation, there are pressures within 

the EU to terminate this exemption. Were the exemption to be 

rescinded, the attractiveness of the United Kingdom as a destination 

for U.S. investment would be diminished. Still, developments in these 

two areas—the future of the single currency and social legislation—

may be affected by the crisis within the EU as a result of the French 

and Dutch rejection of the draft EU Constitution. 

 On the other side of the ledger, the United Kingdom remains 

a popular site for U.S. companies. An estimated 7,500 U.S. firms 

have offices in the United Kingdom. Of these, 500 are corporate 

headquarters, often of regional operations. It is estimated that onehalf of U.S. companies with corporate offices in Europe have located 

those offices in the United Kingdom.9
23

Tourism.

 The United Kingdom is the most important U.S. partner in twoway tourism. Although U.S. residents travel more frequently to 

Canada and Mexico, expenditures on travel and transportation are 

highest for visits to the United Kingdom. In 2000, more than four 

million Americans spent over $11 billion traveling to the United 

Kingdom, compared with $7.5 billion (the second highest sum) in 

Mexico. In the other direction, British visitors to the United States 

number annually just under five million and spend almost $13 

billion, figures that place it only slightly below Japan.10

Financial Market.

 Here is perhaps where the “special economic relationship” is 

most evident—indeed, the word “unique” is not out of place. The 

historical ties between American and British capital date back to the 

19th century, when British investment played an important role in the 

economic development of the United States. Banking relationships 

have a long history; many banks were well-established in the other’s 

country in the period between the two world wars, if not before. 

 One can speak of a single financial market, located in London and 

New York. Each is a financial powerhouse, and each is an undisputed 

financial center—London in Europe and New York in the United 

States. The New York Stock Exchange is the biggest stock exchange 

in the world, and it, together with New York-based Nasdaq, gives 

the United States its preeminent position for stock trading. London 

manages almost half of Europe’s institutional equity capital, and 70 

percent of Eurobonds are traded in London. It is also the world’s 

largest international insurance and foreign exchange market.11

 American and British financial institutions are major players in the 

world, accustomed to working globally. The U.S. investment banking 

community has acquired a preeminent position in London, while UK 

commercial banks are very competitive and present globally. Of the 

world’s top 15 “tier one capital” banks, over one-half are American 

or British (four banks each).12 There are more American banks in 

London than in New York (a reflection of the prevalence of U.S. 

regional—not New York—banks that have international operations). 
24

These developments were facilitated by the similarity of economic 

and legal systems and the role of stock and bond markets in the two 

countries. It also has spurred the expansion of American-British ties 

in other related sectors, notably insurance and law firms. 

 In one manifestation of this relationship, U.S. bank claims on and 

liabilities to the United Kingdom are vast, second only to the Cayman 

Islands. U.S. claims on the United Kingdom and Cayman Islands at 

the end of 2004 were both about half a trillion dollars, with the next 

country, the Bahamas, accounting for only about one-fifth of that 

amount. U.S. liabilities to the British were about $430 billion (for the 

Cayman Islands, it was double that figure). The total U.S. banking 

relationship (claims and liabilities) with the United Kingdom has 

grown from the equivalent of 10 percent of world trade in 1978 to 19 

percent in 2004.13

Defense Industry. 

 Although close relationships exist in a number of industrial sectors, 

probably none is closer than in the defense industry. However, unlike 

the other sectors, government policies and actions largely determine 

the nature and extent of the relationship. Closely held and subject to 

government control, U.S. defense technology sharing takes place at a 

higher level with the United Kingdom than with virtually any other 

country (Australia and Canada also vie for that position).

 Trade in defense equipment is significant, and it flows in both 

directions. American firms are routinely invited to bid on British 

defense tenders, and they have registered many successes. The 

United Kingdom is by far the largest overseas buyer of American 

products. Major British purchases have included the Apache 

helicopter, Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), and 

Airborne Stand-off Radar (ASTOR). Moreover, the United Kingdom 

is the launch customer for the C-130J aircraft. 

 By the same token, UK companies are among the most active 

participants in the “special security arrangement,” under which 

U.S.-based subsidiaries of foreign companies can be certified to bid 

as subcontractors on U.S. tenders. The most notable recent instance 

was the U.S. Navy’s decision in early 2005 to accept the Lockheed-
25

Martin-led bid for the new Presidential helicopter fleet, which 

includes a British component. 

 Significant shares of the U.S. market are held by such British firms 

as Rolls Royce, Martin Baker, and Smith Industries. However, the 

leading British player is BAE, the fifth largest supplier of hardware to 

the U.S. military (and the largest foreign supplier). Like other British 

firms, BAE has been looking to increase its business opportunities 

in the United States. Its recent multibillion dollar purchases include 

Lockheed-Martin’s electronic assets and United Defense Industries, 

the latter ($3.5 billion) being the largest foreign takeover of an 

American defense company. By any measure, BAE is a significant 

player in the U.S. defense industry sector, employing over 25,000 in 

its U.S. operations. 

 A further example of close cooperation is the Joint Strike Fighter 

project, in which the United Kingdom is a major partner. BAE is an 

associate prime contractor, participating in the work and technology 

on the new aircraft, which will be purchased by both governments. 

 The dispute that erupted in 2004 between the United States and 

the EU over the possible lifting of the latter’s embargo on arms sales 

to China placed the British defense industry in a delicate position. 

While it did not want to forgo business opportunities in China, at 

the same time it did not want to jeopardize existing and potential 

business and the transfer of technology with the United States. 

On balance, the latter consideration prevailed, and BAE, for one, 

announced publicly it would not participate in trade with China. 

The British government generally reflected industry’s position, at 

first going along with the French and German-led initiative to lift the 

embargo, but backing away quickly when vociferous U.S. opposition 

surfaced. 

GOVERNMENT-TO-GOVERNMENT RELATIONSHIP

Multilateral.

 The world’s multilateral economic agenda is vast, and so is the 

range of multilateral institutions that deal with it. Both the U.S. and 

UK governments interact on these many issues as they operate in a 

multilateral context.
26

 In general, the two governments convey similar messages 

on issues relating to the world economy—what policies national 

governments should follow to enhance economic growth, operation 

of the international monetary system, trade policy, operation of 

the international financial institutions, and the like—in the course 

of what might be called normal international discourse, including 

more specifically the G-7/G-8 and the Organization for Economic 

Cooperation and Development (OECD). On the whole, the United 

States and United Kingdom work together in those forums to 

promote their mutual interests. 

 In some areas, however, there is a significant difference in 

policy. The most notable example is the environment, particularly in 

attitudes toward the Kyoto Convention. The United Kingdom has 

agreed with the consensus view within the EU—and indeed virtually 

the rest of the world—and worked toward the adoption of the 

Convention, while the United States has firmly refused to accede to 

it. Nonetheless, the United Kingdom accepts that the United States 

will not accede to Kyoto, and thus seeks to find common ground in 

other aspects of environmental policy. 

 On the other hand, the two governments have traditionally seen 

eye-to-eye on trade, where they have been leaders in efforts to build 

and maintain a liberal trading system, including the current work 

on the Doha multilateral trading round. However, on trade, the 

United Kingdom cannot carry out an independent policy because 

competence for trade lies with the EU. Thus, the United Kingdom 

remains one voice out of 25—albeit a strong and influential one—on 

all trade issues. Nonetheless, that has not prevented U.S. and UK 

negotiators on the Doha round from working closely together. 

European Union. 

 The United States and EU have grappled with a host of trade 

disputes over the years, while at the same time enjoying an 

unprecedented and flourishing economic relationship (a sometimesoverlooked, but critical, fact). Looking through the list of recent 

issues, one finds some concordance of position, but also many 

instances where the United States and the United Kingdom are on 

opposite sides of the argument. 
27

 • EU regulation of chemical substances: With similar industrial 

interests and views on regulation (less is better than more), 

the two governments have fought for an extensive wateringdown of the proposal of the European Commission for 

registering, evaluating, and authorizing chemicals (REACH).

 • U.S. foreign sales corporation: In the long struggle over U.S. 

legislation, the United Kingdom played a constructive role in 

the ultimately successful effort to keep the issue from getting 

out of control, giving the United States leeway in terms of time 

and modalities for settlement. Following the adoption of new 

tax provisions in the United States, the British government 

sought to prevent a return of the issue to the World Trade 

Organization (WTO) and the reimposition of sanctions by the 

EU. 

 • EU banana regime: The United Kingdom historically protected 

the banana exports of its former colonies in the Caribbean at 

the expense of Latin American producers, and thus it was not 

particularly sympathetic to U.S. efforts to prevent a restrictive 

EU regime from replacing the various national regimes. 

However, it believed the EU should comply with the WTO 

ruling in favor of the United States, a view that was reinforced 

by U.S. retaliation against imported cashmere sweaters. 

 • Biotechnology/genetically-modified organisms: In the long-running U.S.-EU battles over a number of issues in this area, 

the United Kingdom generally has supported the U.S. view 

that decisions should be based on scientific evidence, despite 

strong opposition from the British public that is very “proenvironmentalist.” 

 • U.S. safeguard action against steel imports: Like the rest of the 

EU, the United Kingdom, which exports significant quantities 

of specialty steel to the United States, sharply criticized 

President Bush’s first-term action (subsequently rescinded). 

It pressed for, and received, exemptions from the increased 

tariffs. 

 • Airbus subsidies: As a major participant in the Airbus 

consortium, the United Kingdom has stoutly defended 

Airbus against U.S. allegations of unfair subsidization and 
28

criticized what it considers to be comparable subsidies by 

the U.S. military to U.S. commercial aircraft manufacturers. 

Nonetheless, it favors a negotiated settlement rather than 

seeking recourse to the WTO.

 • EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP): Because of the nature 

of its agriculture and its domestic agricultural policy, the 

United Kingdom has been among the sharpest internal critics 

of the CAP, thus lending support to the United States in its 

long-standing efforts to reduce the distortions it has caused to 

world agricultural trade. Prime Minister Blair made this clear 

in the EU budgetary dispute in June 2005.

 • Regulatory convergence: This is a major undertaking designed 

to reduce the impediments arising from differences in 

regulatory regimes in the United States and EU. While 

American and British regulators generally share a similar 

regulatory philosophy, some problems have arisen from 

differences between the regulatory structures in the two 

countries. The United Kingdom has been bothered by the 

reluctance of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 

to recognize decisions of British regulators and the problems 

caused by regulation of insurance at the state, rather than 

national, level. On the other side, U.S. regulators occasionally 

have felt that the UK Financial Services Authority has not 

adopted sufficiently tough positions in the EU, where it plays 

an influential role.

 Whether in agreement or not, there is intense, extensive, and 

positive interaction between the two governments. U.S. government 

officials have found their British counterparts to be open and helpful. 

The British are good sources of information on the inner workings of 

the EU for their American colleagues. However, this occurs primarily 

when the two governments are on the same side of an issue. Not 

surprisingly, when they are not, the United Kingdom is considerably 

less helpful. 

 Traditionally, there has been a tendency for some parts of the 

U.S. government to assume that the United Kingdom is on its side 

on issues under consideration at the EU, and that the British can, or 
29

should, be counted on to promote U.S. views. As seen above, the first 

premise is by no means universally correct. While overall the British 

outlook and objectives are in accord with those of the United States, 

on many specific issues that simply is not the case. With regard to 

the British role inside the EU, the United Kingdom is an active and 

influential player in the EU deliberations. Suspect in the eyes of many 

other members for Britain’s “outsider” status—i.e., opt-out of the 

Euro and generally weak support for further integration and market 

regulation—British officials have to take care not to be perceived by 

other member states as carrying water for the United States as they 

pursue UK policy objectives. 

Bilateral.

 Significant bilateral economic differences are rare. The major 

exception is the civil aviation relationship. This relationship is 

governed by a long-standing bilateral agreement, Bermuda II, which 

specifies the conditions under which American and British carriers 

can operate between the two countries. It has long been a bone of 

contention, with the United States chafing under what it considers to 

be unduly restrictive provisions, particularly as regards access of its 

carriers to Heathrow Airport; and the United Kingdom complaining 

about U.S. restrictions on foreign ownership of U.S. airlines and 

the ban on foreign carriers flying between points inside the United 

States. The United Kingdom has stoutly resisted U.S. efforts to bring 

the bilateral agreement more closely into accord with the series of 

“open skies” regimes it has negotiated with almost all European 

countries in recent years. However, after an unsuccessful 2-plus year 

effort to renegotiate Bermuda II bilaterally, the issue will move from 

the bilateral to the EU sphere. The European Court of Justice has 

confirmed that civil aviation agreements fall within the competence 

of the EU, rather than the individual member states, and thus this 

issue will be added to the U.S.-EU portfolio.

CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

 The U.S. economic and business relationship with the United 

Kingdom is without any doubt among its most important. The 
30

United Kingdom is a major economic partner, both in the public 

and private spheres. In some respects the relationship is distinctive, 

unique, and—yes—special. 

 Are there ways this relationship can be improved, i.e., rendered 

more effective in meeting the two countries’ objectives? On the 

business side, the answer is probably “not to any significant extent.” 

The framework within which businesses operate and business 

decisions are made is firmly established, well-known, and not 

notably in need of change. On the government-to-government side, 

there is little apparent need for structural or institutional change. 

The governments know each other well and communicate freely and 

frequently.

 The one area where improvement could be made is the quality 

of government-to-government interaction. This has two aspects. 

First, exchanges between American and British bureaucrats should 

be expanded. A program similar to the existing exchange of U.S. 

and British diplomats, under which Americans serve a tour in the 

Foreign and Commonwealth Office and British do likewise at the 

State Department, should be introduced for the UK Department of 

Trade and Industry and the Treasury. In addition, British bureaucrats 

visiting Washington should regularly add the U.S. Congress to their 

schedule. Both sides can profit from an improved understanding 

of the other’s points of view and positions in the decisionmaking 

process .

 Second, the selection of the American ambassador to the United 

Kingdom should be made on the basis of competence rather than 

political indebtedness, as has almost invariably been the case. 

Unless the function of the ambassador is deemed to be superfluous 

to bilateral dialogue and interaction—certainly not the view of the 

British government, which has invariably sent its most qualified 

diplomat—it behooves the United States to send ambassadors with 

the experience and skills to promote U.S. interests and enhance this 

special relationship, whether it be a career or a noncareer person. 

Indeed, at this time of heightened transatlantic misunderstanding, it 

is all the more essential for the United States to field an ambassador 

who can articulate U.S. policy and seek to influence government 

policy and public opinion abroad. 
31

 Finally, in the EU context, it is essential that the remarkably 

effective relationship between American and European trade 

negotiators Robert Zoellick and Pascal Lamy be replicated by their 

successors. The personalities of their successors, Peter Mandelson 

and Robert Portman, give grounds for hope, but only time will tell 

how effectively their relationship works as they grapple with a 

range of difficult issues, which will necessarily affect the bilateral 

relationship between the United States and the United Kingdom. 

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 2

 1. U.S. Census Bureau, “Top Trading Partners—Total Trade, Exports, Imports,” 

published February 2005, http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/statistics/highlights/

top/top0412.html.

 2. U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, “U.S. International Services: CrossBorder Trade 1986-2003, and Sales Through Affiliates, 1986-2002,” published 

October 2004, http://www.bea.gov/bea/di/1001serv/intlserv.htm.

 3. Ibid.

 4. On a historical cost basis. U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, “U.S. Direct 

Investment Abroad: Balance of Payments and Direct Investment Position Data,” 

published March 2005, http://www.bea.doc.gov/bea/di/di1usdbal.htm.

 5. British-American Business, Inc.

 6. U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis.

 7. Ibid.

 8. Union des Industries de la Communaute europeenne (UNICE).

 9. American Embassy, London.

 10. U.S. Bureau of Transportation Statistics, U.S. International Travel and 

Transportation Trends, 2002.

 11. London as a Financial Centre, from http://www.london.gov.uk/london-life/

business-and-jobs/financial-centre.jsp.

 12. The Banker, 2004, Top 1000 World Banks, from http://www.thebanker.com/

news/fullstory.php/aid/1699/Top_1000_World_Banks.html.

 13. U.S. Department of the Treasury, Treasury International Capital System, 

“U.S. Banking Liabilities to Foreigners” and “U.S. Banking Claims on Foreigners,” 

published April 2005, http://www.treas.gov/tic/ticliab.html and http://www.treas.gov/

tic/ticl.

33

CHAPTER 3

ANGLO-AMERICAN ECONOMIC AND BUSINESS

RELATIONSHIPS: A BRITISH PERSPECTIVE

Ray Raymond

 The great British Prime Minister Lord Salisbury is said to have 

remarked to Her Majesty Queen Victoria, “Change, change, why do 

we need more change? Aren’t things bad enough already?”

 As one of the architects of the Anglo-American rapprochement 

at the end of the 19th century, Lord Salisbury would be delighted by 

the revitalization of the British economy and the strengthening of the 

Anglo-American economic relationship over the past 25 years, and 

especially over the last 8. They completely refute the conclusions 

of the influential Wilson Center–Ditchley Foundation conferences 

published in 1988 that Britain’s importance to the United States as an 

economic partner was diminishing rapidly. Simply put, the WilsonDitchley analysis — understandable in the context of the times 

— was that the United Kingdom (UK) was sinking into increasing 

poverty because of its declining productivity and competitiveness. 

In broader strategic terms, therefore, Britain was counting for less 

and less, and its ability to function as an effective strategic partner 

for the United States was almost at an end. 

 What a difference the consistent and rigorous application of 

sound fiscal, micro, and macro economic and monetary policies 

make. Today, in 2005, Britain is experiencing the longest period of 

continuous economic growth and increased living standards seen 

in the past half a century. As UK Chancellor Gordon Brown said in 

his budget speech earlier this year, “Britain begins the 21st century 

from a firm foundation of the lowest inflation for 30 years, the lowest 

interest rates for 40 years, and the highest level of employment in 

our history. Unlike the United States, the Eurozone, and Japan, the 

British economy has grown uninterrupted every quarter over the 

past 6 years.” 

 Despite the world economic downturn of 2001-02, Britain has 

overtaken France as the world’s fourth largest economy and, if 

current economic trends continue, some experts believe the UK 
34

could overtake Germany as the world’s third largest economy 

by about 2012. Perhaps the most telling statistics are that British 

unemployment is approximately half that in the Eurozone; that unlike 

the United States, the UK actually gained jobs during the slowdown 

of 2001-02; that the UK’s productivity per capita has overtaken Japan 

and is poised to overtake Germany. Britain still lags far behind the 

United States in productivity, but continues to learn from American 

innovation, competition, and enterprise. 

 There are two main reasons for this dramatic transformation: the 

first is the supply-side reforms of the Thatcher years, supplemented 

by those of Gordon Brown since 1997; the second is the new monetary 

and fiscal framework introduced in 1997 which has helped create a 

stronger, more flexible, more enterprising Britain. UK monetary and 

fiscal policy has responded successfully to the recent world economic 

downturn and kept the British economy stable and growing. This 

economically resurgent Britain is a more important economic partner 

for the United States than at any time since the beginning of the 20th 

century. 

The Private Sector Relationship.

 The first key feature of the U.S.-UK economic special relationship 

is the remarkable interpenetration of the two economies. Today, more 

than half of the total earnings of U.S. overseas investors are accounted 

for by Europe. And, within Europe, the UK is overwhelmingly the 

most important single national market for corporate America. On 

average, about 40 percent of all U.S. investment in Europe goes to 

the UK. British officials estimate that over 60 percent of American 

companies doing business in the European Union (EU) have their 

European headquarters in the UK. During the 1990s, U.S. investment 

in the United Kingdom (at $175 billion) was nearly 50 percent larger 

than the total invested by American firms in the whole Asia-Pacific 

region.

 Of course, U.S. firms are investing very large sums in China, 

India, and Brazil, but what is little noticed is that America’s stock 

of assets in the UK alone is almost equal to the combined overseas 

affiliate base of U.S. firms in Asia, Latin America, Africa, and the 
35

Middle East. In an average year, total sales by U.S. firms in the UK 

alone, at over $400 billion, are greater than aggregate U.S. sales in the 

whole of Latin America and almost double those in Germany. 

 And what about jobs? Today, U.S. firms employ about 1.3 

million workers in Britain. That is more than the entire U.S. affiliate 

work force in all developing Asia and five times greater than those 

working for American firms in China. Moreover, the British return 

the compliment. Over 1.2 million Americans go to work each day in 

British-owned companies in the United States. And just as the United 

States is Britain’s largest investor, so the UK by far is America’s 

largest foreign investor, with total foreign direct investment (FDI) of 

over $280 billion. 

 If the investment relationship is special, the links between the 

London and New York financial markets are truly unique. The 

historical relationship between British and American capital dates 

back to the 18th century when British investment played an important 

role in the economic development of the original 13 colonies and in 

stabilizing U.S. public finances after the Revolutionary War. Later, 

British investment bankers provided much of the capital that financed 

America’s phenomenal economic growth in the 19th century. 

 As Michael Calingaert writes in his contribution to this book, it is 

now possible to “speak of a single financial market located in London 

and New York. Each is a financial powerhouse,” and all the evidence 

is that they will continue to dominate global financial markets for the 

rest of 21st century. Together, London and New York account for 

just over 50 percent of global foreign exchange dealing, 92 percent of 

foreign equity trading, and 28 percent of cross-border bank lending. 

London is the world leader in fund management, New York a close 

second. New York is the global leader in mergers and acquisitions, 

London second. Their shared dominance is underpinned by the 

shared Anglo-American legal systems that govern such a large 

portion of international mergers and acquisitions and public stock 

offerings. Their shared dominance is reinforced by the UK-U.S.-led 

surge in international mergers and acquisitions throughout the 1990s 

and by the UK-led move to privatization of publicly-owned services 

and utilities.

 Above all, the London-New York link has been reinforced 

by globalization and, ironically, the introduction of the Euro. 
36

Globalization has done three things to reinforce the unique New 

York-London partnership. The first is that it has encouraged the 

major players — Goldman Sachs, Citigroup, Merrill Lynch, HSBC 

— to have operations in both cities. The second is that globalization 

has compelled the big American investment houses to increase their 

operations in London because it is the best way to win more business 

in global markets. The third way globalization has reinforced the New 

York-London dominance is that it gives investors and issuers of stock 

what they both want: access to the widest range of global securities 

and investment products and a worldwide pool of global investors. 

The introduction of the Euro has also strengthened the New YorkLondon link because it has encouraged more U.S. investment houses 

to see London as their base for European mergers and acquisitions 

work and to increase their presence there accordingly. 

The Anglo-American Model.

 The second special feature of Anglo-American economic relations 

is the remarkable breadth of agreement between contemporary 

U.S. administrations (Democrat or Republican) and contemporary 

British governments (Conservative or New Labour) over so many 

fundamental areas of economic policy. This level of agreement 

is the product of more than 20 years of convergence in thinking 

about economic policy and in results achieved. Britain has shaped 

U.S. thinking on deregulation, privatization of public services, and 

enterprise zones. The United States taught Britain the importance of 

flexible labor markets, welfare reform, and having an independent 

central bank responsible for monetary policy. Overall, the AngloAmerican “model” aims to reduce the role of government as a 

regulator of economic activity and to change it from a provider 

to an enabler of services; to create flexible labor markets and 

entrepreneurship, promote competition, and encourage wealth 

accumulation through ownership of property and stocks, thereby 

creating an “ownership society.” There are areas where we differ — 

the financing of health care being the most obvious. But what unites 

us is far more powerful than what divides us. In my judgment, what 

the Anglo-American model boils down to is: (1) the abandonment of 
37

the old-style socialist or Great Society welfare state in favor of free 

market capitalism, and (2) the belief that government should be an 

enabling force empowering, encouraging, and equipping its citizens 

to meet the challenges of globalization. Lest there be any doubt, 

compare the essence of President George W. Bush’s compassionate 

conservatism with that of Prime Minister Tony Blair’s Third Way. 

Here is Myron Magnet, the intellectual architect of compassionate 

conservatism on the welfare state: President Bush’s campaign for 

Social Security reform “is part of the large and coherent worldview 

that has evolved out of compassionate conservatism. What has made 

America exceptional is limitless opportunity for everyone, at all 

levels — the chance to find a job, to advance up the ladder as you 

prove yourself, and to prosper. A giant welfare state hampers the job 

creation that makes all this opportunity possible. Bush is determined 

to keep the dynamism vibrant and to encourage and empower the 

poor to take part in it, rather than suggest that they are unequal to 

the task.” And here is Tony Blair on the same topic: “The challenge 

of modern employment is about extending welfare to work, making 

work pay, and investing in the skills individuals need. In a more 

insecure and demanding labor market, it recognises that people will 

change jobs more often, and believes government has a vital role 

in equipping individuals to prosper.” Unless I am badly mistaken, 

the President and the Prime Minister would agree with the recent 

comments of the White House Director of Strategic Initiatives: 

“Government’s default position should not be to view citizens as 

wards of the state, but rather as responsible and independent, selfsufficient and upright.” 

 And it is no accident that the two major economies which have 

performed best over the last decade are the two that have put this 

philosophy into practice: Britain and the United States. And because 

Britain and the United States have created this model, the two 

governments generally approach most domestic and international 

economic policy issues from a shared perspective.

 In his chapter, Michael Calingaert suggests that, apart from civil 

aviation, there are very few differences between the two governments. 

This is true, but understates the closeness and intensity of the policy 

collaboration between London and Washington today in all the key 
38

multilateral forums, including the EU. The UK and United States 

not only share a common business model, but also a belief that they 

must lead the process of labor, capital, and product reform in Europe 

so that they can create a more open market across the Atlantic which 

will benefit the EU as well as the United States. The total annual twoway flow of foreign direct investment of goods and services between 

the United States and the EU is over $2.5 trillion, but it could be even 

higher.

 The British and U.S. treasuries believe that if the United States 

and EU break down more of the remaining transatlantic barriers and 

create a more open market across the Atlantic, then this could bring 

about $350 billion in benefits for both the United States and the EU. 

How to get there? Faster removal of industrial tariffs and nontariff 

barriers, liberalization in services, labor market reforms, common 

accounting standards, and closer regulatory cooperation to prevent 

domestic regulators from putting up barriers to trade and causing 

needless conflicts.

 Not surprisingly, elements of this reform agenda are key priorities 

for the British Presidency of the EU, including initiatives to reassess 

and, if necessary, roll back unnecessary regulation now damaging 

competitiveness; and strengthening systems used to monitor whether 

the benefits of proposed regulations outweigh the costs, etc. That 

Britain will be able to achieve any of these much needed reforms is 

highly questionable. 

Britain, the United States, and the EU.

 Unfortunately, the similarity of outlook, policy, and system 

between the United States and the United Kingdom is offset by 

British membership of the EU. This limits Britain’s freedom of action 

especially in trade and competition policy, where, for better or worse, 

competence has been ceded to Brussels. As Michael Calingaert 

points out, the UK has had to absorb the entire corpus of EU law 

and regulation into its domestic law which, in my judgment, has 

often worked against the UK government’s own efforts to embrace 

the challenges of globalization, forcing British Ministers and officials 

to spend enormous amounts of valuable time fighting the EU’s 

damaging directives. The prolonged showdown over Britain’s wise 
39

opt-out from the absurdly restrictive EU working time directive is just 

one example. Calingaert is right in pointing out that today in large 

measure, the U.S. economic counterpart is now the EU rather than 

the UK or, indeed, any of the 24 other EU member states. Whether 

that will continue to be the case remains to be seen. As the recent 

U.S. National Intelligence Council Report on the World in 2020 has 

correctly argued, continuing economic sclerosis in the Eurozone 

“could lead to the splintering or, at worst, the disintegration of the 

EU.” 

 The crisis of confidence and direction which the EU now faces 

after the rejection of the EU Constitution by French and Dutch 

voters and the collapse of the its June 2005 Budget summit are about 

much more than economics. The crisis was brought on by profound 

anger over the EU’s democratic deficit: the failure of European 

governments to consult their electorates about key decisions, 

combined with the lack of democratic accountability in the EU’s 

own decisionmaking. It is a crisis brought about also by the failure 

of the European economic model to deliver jobs and prosperity, by 

enlargement, by the reemergence of nationalism, and by the rejection 

of the more integrationist vision of Europe’s future. It is now clear 

that there exists a yawning chasm between the integrationist vision 

of European bureaucratic and political elites and the legitimate 

aspirations of their citizens to retain their national identity. 

 Above all, however, the truth is that globalization has thrown 

a harsh light on the failure of the Eurozone. Or, as Myron Magnet 

has rightly put it, “The failure of the European model . . . is one 

of the signal facts of our era. In Europe, the idea that capitalism 

creates a permanently jobless class has become a self-fulfilling 

prophecy, as strict regulation and the high taxes needed to pay 

lavish welfare and unemployment benefits have resulted in half the 

U.S. rate of job creation, twice the rate of unemployment, and much 

less opportunity.” The Organization for Economic Cooperation 

and Development (OECD) agrees with Magnet, warning European 

leaders this summer that without labor market and welfare reform, 

the Eurozone is doomed to terminal economic decline. 

 The conclusion is clear: The Anglo-American model offers the 

only credible way forward, and its European critics should be 

honest enough to recognize that it is not the Dickensian bogeyman 
40

they like to say it is. For example, both Britain and the United States 

have increased national public spending on primary and secondary 

education and on health care. Both countries have also implemented 

welfare reform and reduced child poverty. As Blair argued in his 

masterful speech to the European Parliament on June 23, 2005, 

Europe can either huddle together under the bed covers hoping 

globalization will go away, or it can confront its challenges head on. 

But will it? 

 The evidence is not encouraging. Like the German voters of 

North Rhine Westphalia in May 2005, the voters of France and the 

Netherlands a month later emphatically rejected the structural reforms 

necessary to increase productivity and enhance competitiveness. 

Financial Times columnist Quentin Peel is surely right when he argues 

that “the prospects for embracing difficult economic reforms may be 

as moribund as those for ratifying the constitutional treaty.” 

 Worse, the political influence of Britain, the one European power 

willing to fight for structural reform, has been seriously weakened 

by recent developments. In 2004, British influence appeared to be 

increasing. The defeat of the Franco-German-backed candidate for 

President of the European Commission, the election of the British–

backed Barosso and his pro-growth, pro-reform agenda (much of 

which was shaped by British thinking), and the continuing economic 

failure of the Eurozone, suggested that the UK might be able to change 

the European agenda. This hope was reinforced because enlargement 

changed the correlation of forces within the EU by giving Britain 

new allies who wanted more open, flexible economies. 

 In April 2005, because of this background, I was far too optimistic 

in my presentation to the second of the two conferences on which this 

book is based. I thought that economic realism would prevail within 

the EU, but I was wrong. As I write in early July 2005, the EU is in 

utter disarray, and the prospects for real reform are more remote than 

ever. The regional election results in North Rhine Westphalia alluded 

to above showed that German voters deeply opposed even the initial 

steps towards labor market reform proposed by Chancellor Gerhard 

Schroeder. The referendum results in France and the Netherlands 

showed that the revolt against labor market reform was not confined 

to Germany. The EU crisis has been made worse by the failure of the 

recent Brussels summit, for which most Europeans blame Blair. The 
41

Prime Minister’s firm and justified insistence that any reduction in 

the British rebate must be linked to broader reform of the EU budget 

and the Common Agricultural Policy alienated even his closest allies 

in East-Central Europe. They were understandably upset because 

they needed a budget deal to release funds to help rebuild their 

economies. Most of them remain supportive of his reform agenda, 

but relations need to be repaired. Even when they are, however, the 

Prime Minister faces a much more difficult obstacle: weakened and 

defensive French and German governments. As Peel astutely put 

it: “Far from clearing the way for British leadership, such FrancoGerman weakness is more likely to guarantee gridlock.” In other 

words, getting an EU-wide commitment to structural reform is 

further away than ever. 

Conclusion. 

 In his speech to the European Parliament on June 24, 2005, Blair 

was right to warn that Europe faced “failure on a grand strategic 

scale” if it tried to hold back the forces of globalization and block 

the economic reforms necessary to save it from terminal economic 

decline. I believe that that moment of failure is already at hand: 

The core of the Eurozone is already many miles down the road to 

terminal decline, and neither its voters nor its elected leaders appear 

to have the political will to embrace the painful reforms necessary 

to reverse it. The result — as the U.S. National Intelligence Council 

predicts — will be the splintering and possible disintegration of the 

EU. 

 So where does that leave the special relationship? The short 

answer is that it becomes more special and more vital than ever. The 

interpenetration of our two dynamic economies is deeper than ever. 

The vast flows of investment between our two countries grow ever 

greater, and the London-New York dominance of world financial 

markets seems assured for the foreseeable future. Britain and the 

United States have never been more important economic partners 

for each other. Together they need to look beyond Europe to meet 

the challenge from the two sunrise economies of the 21st century: 

China and India. In addition to investing more in each other, this is 

where the United States and UK should be investing their financial 

and diplomatic resources.

43

CHAPTER 4

THE ECONOMIC AND BUSINESS DIMENSION:

PANEL CHAIRMAN’S SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Erik R. Peterson

Look back 60 years, to the end of the Second World War, and imagine that 

it had marked too the end of the alliance between Europe and America. 

We would not have the great institutions which that alliance forged in 

the aftermath of war—the UN, NATO, the World Bank, the IMF. Without 

America’s support, Europe’s reconstruction would have been longer and 

more arduous; its democracies today far less firmly entrenched; and the 

unique enterprise of the European Union might never have got past 

the planning stage. The Cold War might not have been won—it might 

even have been lost, in Europe at least. The great wave of economic 

liberalization and political freedom which has so enriched billions of 

lives might have been no more than a ripple.

 The words above were spoken on May 18, 2005, at my 

organization, the Center for Strategic and International Studies 

(CSIS), by UK Foreign Secretary Jack Straw, as part of a speech he 

entitled “A Partnership for Wider Freedom.” Three months earlier, 

U.S. President George W. Bush had described the importance of 

U.S.-European relations this way: “Our strong friendship is essential 

to peace and prosperity across the globe—and no temporary debate, 

no passing disagreement of governments, no power on earth will 

ever divide us.”1

 Both these statements emphasize the significance of cooperation 

between Europe and the United States in a range of events that helped 

shape the world around us today, and by their nature and context 

imply that such cooperation is equally necessary if we are to confront 

effectively challenges that lie in the future. And by their respective 

contexts, they both clearly imply that the role of the United Kingdom 

(UK) in bridging Europe and America is as important today as it was 

60 years ago. 

 This is the basis for the “special relationship” writ large, the 

relationship that bundles critical U.S. and UK political, security, 

economic, financial, and other interests across the Atlantic. It is also 
44

the basis for the relationship described by U.S. Undersecretary of 

State for Political Affairs Nicholas Burns soon after he assumed his 

most recent portfolio at the State Department: “As a career diplomat, 

I am convinced that our ability to succeed on this daunting agenda is 

directly related to our ability to work closely and productively with 

Europe. That is why it is fitting to start my tenure here in Europe—

our indispensable partner—and specifically, in the United Kingdom, 

our most trusted and indispensable ally.”2

 In looking forward, the operative question is whether in a 

highly complex future environment, the United States and the UK 

can continue to give effect to these kinds of sweeping declaratory 

statements. The key uncertainty is whether the two countries will 

be able to maintain what has been “special” about their relations—

whether the UK will be able to maintain its identity as both a member 

of the European Union (EU) and a close partner of the United States, 

and whether the United States will continue to regard the UK at once 

“part of” and yet “separate and distinct from” the rest of Europe. In 

the end, the challenge is to create the basis of a continued “special 

relationship” that will enable leaders to trumpet the benefits of 

cooperation, as Secretary Straw did last May, 60 years in the future. 

How well we succeed will depend on our capacity to “build a better 

and safer world through a renewed and reinvigorated alliance for 

freedom between Europe and the United States,” as Secretary Straw 

observed in his speech at CSIS. 

 There can be little doubt that economic and commercial relations 

are at the core of the current “special relationship.” The two 

countries have long been bound by significant and longstanding 

trade, investment, and business ties. And for good reason. First 

and most obvious, they speak the same language. But the depth of 

the relationship goes well beyond the common vocabulary of the 

English language. Owing to the shared grammar of the “Anglo-Saxon 

economic model” and commonly-held beliefs and practices when it 

comes to corporate culture, the level of effective interaction at both 

the government and private business levels has been pronounced. 

Then there is the “tense” of U.S.-UK relations—past, present, and 

future. The legacy of the special relationship itself is a foundation for 

the perpetuation of the “special ties” that exist. That both sides are 

building on a well-established pattern of cooperation shows that the 

relationship benefits from its own historical momentum.
45

 As impressive as they are, the empirical data on trade, investment, 

and commercial cooperation only partially reflect the depth of the 

relationship. Overall U.S.-EU economic relations are unparalleled. In 

aggregate terms, the economic and commercial linkages between the 

United States and Europe total some $2.5 trillion. More importantly, 

the economies are inextricably linked at one level after the other—

through cross-investment, employment, trade of goods and services, 

trade in services, capital flows, and so on. Furthermore, cooperation 

between the two largest economic entities on the planet3 is a 

precondition for progress in dealing with the range of issues outside 

their direct relations, stretching from progress in trade liberalization 

through dealing with third-party states—in particular, the rapid 

emergence of China as a global economic force—to the Doha 

Development Round of the World Trade Organization and then to 

the various G-8 agendas. These agendas include, most recently, such 

important items as economic development in Africa and the spread 

of weapons of mass destruction.4

 Obviously, these dimensions of 

transatlantic relations are often overshadowed by more immediate 

political and security challenges, but the capacity of the two sides 

to work together on broader economic and economic development 

issues is essential to progress in a number of areas.5

 Within this context of overall U.S.-European economic, 

commercial, and financial ties, the bilateral relationship between 

the United States and the UK stands out. Despite the asymmetry 

that characterizes the size of their respective economies (the UK 

economy in 2004 was roughly 15 percent of its U.S. counterpart), 

the two countries are important trading partners. The United States 

was the UK’s largest export partner in 2005, accounting for some 15 

percent of UK exports. In imports, the United States was the UK’s 

second largest partner at 9.2 percent (behind only Germany).6

 For 

the United States, the UK is the sixth largest overseas partner in 

trade in goods. In trade in services, the UK is now competing with 

the Caribbean financial centers as the largest U.S. trading partner. 

In two-way tourism, also, the UK is Washington’s most important 

partner. In 2004, the UK accounted for 4.3 percent of total U.S. 

exports, while imports from the UK that year were 3.1 percent of 

total U.S. imports.
46

 More significant is the level of cross-investment. The UK is the 

top destination for U.S. investment, accounting in 2004 for 10 percent 

of total U.S. worldwide investment and 28 percent of its investment 

in Europe. The total stock of U.S. investment in the UK, nearly $300 

billion, is about 30 percent greater than the second most important 

destination for U.S. investors—Canada. Thanks to U.S. investment, 

1.3 million UK workers go to work each morning; on the other side of 

the Atlantic, a few hours later, 1.2 Americans go to work generated 

by investment from the UK.

 These levels of interaction in trade and investment are 

representative samples of a much fuller set of economic and business 

relations that bind the two countries. Two other areas help define the 

wider set of relations. The first—the area in which the rubric “special 

relationship” is perhaps most defensible—is in financial markets, in 

which both countries are world powers. Is it a surprise, then, that 

there are more U.S.-owned banks in London than in New York? 

The second is in defense industry cooperation—the by-product of 

the strong bilateral and multilateral defense ties between the two 

countries. This cooperation extends from trade in defense equipment 

to technology sharing.

 In addition, there is the element of economic dynamism. Pause 

to consider the background of a Europe that has been anemic 

economically over recent years, with an environment of relatively 

high unemployment and pervasive workforce rigidities, all in the 

context of political and social welfare systems that have failed to 

demonstrate a capacity to adapt to future challenges (such as their 

aging population and associated financially challenged welfare and 

retirement systems). Compared with all of this, the UK is truly a 

bright spot. As Dr. Ray Raymond noted during our deliberations, the 

UK economy has grown steadily over the past 6 years—pushing it in 

front of France as the world’s fourth largest economy and positioning 

it to overtake Germany as the third largest, possibly by the year 2012. 

That economic dynamism, coupled with the similarities between the 

economic and business systems, suggests that the UK is already a 

“strategic” partner of the United States and poised to become an 

even more significant partner in the future.

 The contrast between this economic performance and other EU 

countries is striking. Over the past 2 years, for example, growth in 
47

France has slowed from 2.1 percent to 1.9 percent, and unemployment 

has risen from 9.0 percent to 10.2 percent; in the Netherlands, the 

unemployment rate last April was at its highest level in 9 years, 

while the growth rate has fallen from 1.4 to 1.0 percent.7 These two 

countries—two states which rejected by popular referendum the 

EU constitution this spring—are symptomatic of many other of 

the EU member states with respect to less than favorable economic 

prospects. They make the economic dynamism in the UK all the 

more noteworthy.

 For these reasons—a shared “language,” a common outlook 

based on the Anglo-Saxon model, vibrant bilateral trade and 

investment ties, and economic vitality—there is a solid case that the 

special relationship carries over to the economic and commercial 

sphere. To suggest, however, that these elements will allow for the 

perpetuation of the distinctive nature of the long-term relationship 

may be premature. As Winston Churchill observed, “It is a mistake 

to try to look too far ahead. The chain of destiny can only be grasped 

one link at a time.“ 

How Special?

 In the light of the foregoing areas of established cooperation, 

then, what are the factors that should temper our optimism about the 

future of the special relationship? The first and most obvious element 

is London’s membership in the EU. That the UK has committed itself 

to the integration implied by the EU process suggests a number of 

constraints on how “special” bilateral relations with the United 

States can be. Despite the fact that the UK and the United States 

share a number of priorities with respect to international economic 

and financial policies, ultimately London is bound by its relationship 

with the EU and the process by which the EU member states seek to 

effect higher levels of economic and financial integration, inter alia. 

Because the United States and the EU sometimes have conflicting 

interests and positions, this by definition suggests the possibility 

that London and Washington may find themselves on the opposite 

sides of disputes.

 As Michael Calingaert described it during our deliberations, by 

virtue of its EU membership, the UK is “not a free agent in terms of 
48

economic policies and actions.” The fact is that the UK has conferred 

competences to Brussels in a number of areas—not least of which 

are trade and competition policy. It follows that from the standpoint 

of Washington, Brussels—and not London or the other EU memberstate capitals—must be the focus in these broader economic and 

business interactions.

 True, the UK can play an even more significant role in shaping 

developments within the EU and therefore in U.S.-EU relations. 

London has played a positive role over the years in many of the 

trade issues that have surfaced between Washington and Brussels 

including, for example, chemical substances, the action on the Foreign 

Sales Corporation, biotech and genetically-modified organisms, and 

steel imports. Still, a number of bilateral problems persist—including 

frictions over civil aviation. Another consideration is that London’s 

capacity to influence the course of EU decisionmaking is in itself 

limited.

 The second element overshadowing the special relationship is 

the ongoing shift in the global economy. The United States must 

necessarily determine how its relations with the UK compare with 

the sets of relations that Washington has with other economic 

powers. As other countries—in particular, Brazil, Russia, India, and 

China (the “BRIC” countries)—continue to expand rapidly and in 

the process shift production and consumption patterns and the very 

balance of the global economy, the United States must also pursue 

and balance a number of newly “special” relations as it seeks to 

achieve its broader economic and commercial goals. 

 There are looming demographic issues, especially in continental 

Europe, which suggest potential structural constraints in longerterm economic growth. Aging populations in many of the European 

countries will bring to the surface long-postponed adjustments in 

retirement and health benefits. Among other things, increasing 

expenditures on pension and medical care could crowd out public 

spending on everything from infrastructure to the military. My 

CSIS colleague, Richard Jackson, has estimated that public pension 

and health care benefits for the G-7 countries will rise from 5.8 

percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in 1960 to 21.7 percent in 

2030, leaving little room for other areas of public spending.8 A key 

uncertainty, therefore, is whether Europe’s freedom of maneuver 
49

will become increasingly limited—with the obvious implications 

that such a reduction suggests for alliance politics between Europe 

and Washington. That, it turn, has ominous overtones for the future 

of U.S.-UK relations as well.

 Developments on the U.S. side of the Atlantic could also serve 

to constrain the extent to which relations are authentically special. 

Adrian Kendry highlighted during our discussions the concern in 

Europe—and the UK—that the outlook for relations is contingent on 

broader economic and financial trends in the United States. Not least 

of these concerns are the “twin deficits” in the United States (the 

Federal budget as well as trade) and the capacity of the United States 

to maintain economic dynamism in the face of potential dislocations 

generated by these imbalances.

 Beyond that, there is the potential that widening political positions 

between the United States and Europe—on the current military 

operation in Iraq, for example—could spill over into the economic 

and commercial realms. A number of such issues—ranging from 

differences on the Middle East to international frameworks such as 

the Kyoto Protocol—could manifest themselves in a gradual erosion 

of traditional U.S.-Europe trade and financial ties. This would have 

an obvious impact on U.S.-UK relations.

Moving Forward.

 When these important links between Washington and London 

and potential future divisions are weighed together, what 

recommendations materialize? I would point to four.

 • The first is to acknowledge that the relationship, even if 

tempered by uncertainties about the future and qualifications 

about current directions, is genuinely special, and that 

perpetuation of this special relationship, as Secretary Straw 

argued, could indeed be instrumental to achieving a better 

and safer world. After all, leaders in Washington and London 

have a very significant common agenda with respect to 

economic, trade, investment, and commercial issues.

 • Second, despite the shifts in world economic powers and the 

diverse nature of U.S. interests around the world, the UK does 

indeed represent an important set of bilateral relations with 
50

the United States. It is also a key player inside the EU. As such, 

furthering the special relationship implies the possibility that 

London could “bridge” issues between the United States and 

Europe—including trade liberalization, the pursuit of jointly 

determined interests with third-party states, etc.

 • Third, in order to effect such an authentically special 

relationship, the two sides must redouble efforts to strengthen 

structural consultations and communication. Although 

this applies to communication across the board, it is no less 

important to making progress in a constellation of bilateral 

economic and commercial issues. In that regard, both sides 

would be well-served were it possible to emulate the “ZoellickLamy” model (based on the prior interaction between then 

U.S. Trade Representative Robert Zoellick and then EU Trade 

Commissioner Pascal Lamy)—at both the bilateral level as 

well as in U.S.-EU relations.

 • Finally, it is in the interest of both sides to define a more nearly 

strategic agenda in the economic and commercial realm and 

then seek to implement that agenda in the respective national 

contexts. This implies challenging both sides to engage in a 

frank assessment of common interests and obstacles, and then 

to work together to achieve commonly defined objectives.

 In the final analysis, the U.S.-UK special relationship transcends 

the fact that we have a common language and a common outlook. 

The relationship is special for many more reasons, not least of which 

is that leaders on both sides have a long-standing commitment to 

work together on the many international challenges—economic and 

otherwise—that they confront. 

ENDNOTES

 1. President George W. Bush, “President Discusses American and European 

Alliance in Belgium,” Concert Noble, Brussels, Belgium, February 21, 2005.

 2. “A Trans Atlantic Agenda For the Year Ahead,” Remarks by Under Secretary 

of State for Political Affairs Nicholas Burns, Chatham House, London, April 6, 

2005.

 3. The CIA Factbook suggests that in the year 2004, as measured in purchasingpower-parity terms, the U.S. economy stood at $11.75 trillion and the EU economy 
51

at $11.65 trillion. Together, the two economies accounted for more than 42 percent 

of global economic output. See http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/. 

 4. For a description of the G8’s program on African development, see 

for example the official site of the July 6-8, 2005, G8 meeting at the Gleneagles 

Summit at Perthshire, Scotland, UK, at http://www.g8.gov.uk/. For a description 

of the G8’s program on weapons of mass destruction, see the statement on “The 

G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass 

Destruction,” Kananaskis, Canada, June 27, 2002, at http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/

summit/2002kananaskis/arms.html. 

 5. See, for example, Harold Brown and Giuliano Amato, “Six Attainable 

Transatlantic Goals,” The Financial Times, April 8, 2005, at http://www.csis.org/

europe/050406_SixGoals.pdf.

 6. Data for 2004. CIA Factbook, at http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/

geos/uk.html#top. 

 7. Robin Niblett, “Shock Therapy,” CSIS Euro-Focus, Vol. 11, No. 2, June 3, 

2005, p. 1.

 8. Unpublished presentation entitled “The Challenge of Global Aging,” June 

2005. Jackson bases his projections on Central Intelligence Agency, Organization 

for Economic Cooperation and Development, and Office of Management and 

Budget data from various years. 

SECTION II:

POLITICAL AND LEGAL ASPECTS 

OF THE SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP

55

CHAPTER 5

THE ANXIETY OF SOVEREIGNTY:

BRITAIN, THE UNITED STATES, AND THE 

INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT

Douglas E. Edlin

INTRODUCTION

 The United States and Britain disagree about several legal 

issues with a political dimension, or political issues with a legal 

dimension, ranging from landmines to climate change.1

 But unlike 

disagreements over the Ottawa Convention and the Kyoto Protocol, 

given both nations’ shared cultural, historical, and constitutional 

commitments to the rule of law and judicial independence as a means 

of securing fundamental values and governmental accountability, 

the disagreement between Britain and the United States over the 

International Criminal Court (ICC) seems especially unexpected. As 

I will explain in this chapter, though, the nations’ divergent positions 

toward the ICC perhaps are not as surprising as they first appear.

 Given the current international political and military mobilization 

against agents of terrorism around the world, the presence of an 

international criminal tribunal provides a legal mechanism for 

prosecuting those who commit terrorist acts (as well as, perhaps, 

those who might resort to untoward methods while pursuing 

otherwise legitimate military operations on foreign soil). This chapter 

examines the development of the ICC, outlines the positions of and 

disagreements between Britain and the United States concerning it, 

and analyzes the specific objections to the ICC raised by the United 

States. In this discussion, I will argue that the contrasting positions 

of Britain and the United States toward the ICC can be understood 

in terms of each nation’s differently configured perception of its 

own sovereign power. For various reasons, it seems that Britain’s 

sovereignty is tested most acutely by its relationship with the 

European Union (EU),2

 while the United States feels its sovereignty 

is encroached upon primarily by its relationship with the United 

Nations (UN).3
56

THE ORIGINS AND JURISDICTION

OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT

 The ICC traces its antecedents back, ultimately, to the Nuremberg 

Trials.4 British leaders had grave doubts about the efficacy of 

an international tribunal; the official British position toward the 

punishment of identified war criminals from 1943 until the end of 

the war was summary execution.5

 Nevertheless, Nuremberg and 

the aftermath of World War II generated international awareness of 

and momentum for the creation of an international legal tribunal 

responsible for the prosecution and punishment of those responsible 

for war crimes.6 After Nuremberg, and in light of persistent 

questions about the legal legitimacy of those proceedings,7 the UN 

General Assembly appointed a body of experts to organize and 

codify international legal principles. In particular, this International 

Law Commission (ILC) was asked to draft a statute instituting an 

international criminal court along with an international criminal code, 

the so-called “Nuremberg Principles,” which would be enforced by 

the international criminal tribunal.8

 These efforts culminated in the ILC’s draft statute for the creation 

of an international criminal court in 1994. Two years later, the ILC 

completed its draft international criminal code. As background to 

the ILC’s work, international pressure was building for the creation 

of tribunals to try individuals in connection with the human rights 

atrocities in the former Yugoslavia. In 1994 the UN Security Council 

passed a resolution to create a second ad hoc tribunal as a result of 

the genocidal activities in Rwanda.9

 Building on the ILC’s draft statute and referencing the two ad 

hoc tribunals as prototypes, the UN General Assembly issued 

resolutions that led to the Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries 

on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, which met 

in Rome beginning on June 15, 1998. On July 17, the Rome Statute 

of the International Criminal Court was signed by 120 states, with 

21 abstentions and over the objections of seven states, including the 

United States.10 The ICC was formally created upon the ratification 

of the Rome Statute by 60 states and entered into force on July 1, 

2002.
57

 Four crimes may be prosecuted before the ICC: genocide, crimes 

against humanity, war crimes, and aggression.11 These crimes are 

understood to possess an intrinsic international dimension as a 

result of their scope and extraordinary inhumanity, which raise a 

concern for all nations. The jurisdictional limitation of the ICC to 

these four crimes is tied to its historical predecessor at Nuremberg, 

because all four of these crimes also were prosecuted in some form at 

the Nuremberg Trials.12 Also, like Nuremberg, the ICC was created 

to provide a forum for prosecution of leaders and organizers most 

responsible for these crimes, not lower-level functionaries.13 Indeed, 

the Rome Statute specifically rejects official capacity as a bar to 

prosecution and highlights the potential criminal responsibility 

of commanders and other superiors.14 At the same time, the ICC 

hearkens back to Nuremberg by expressly precluding exculpation 

for core crimes through the defense that those responsible were “just 

following orders.”15 Finally, the ICC contains explicit provisions 

that preclude the legal and theoretical challenges raised concerning 

the legitimacy of Nuremberg. By specific, separate articles, the ICC 

incorporates the principles of nullum crimen sine lege, nulla poena sine 

lege, and a prohibition against ex post facto criminalization.16

 The ICC is most sharply distinguished from its predecessor 

tribunals by its jurisdictional mandate. Unlike the Nuremberg 

tribunal and the Yugoslav and Rwandan ad hoc tribunals,17 the 

ICC’s jurisdiction is consensual and complementary. In other words, 

the states that consented to the jurisdiction of the ICC also consented 

to permit prosecutions in a supranational court of crimes committed 

on their soil or by their citizens. However, the ICC’s jurisdiction 

only complements or supplements the authority of a state’s national 

courts. The ICC assumes jurisdiction over trials for the four core 

crimes when, and only when, the national judiciary of the state in 

question is unwilling or unable to proceed.18

BRITISH AND AMERICAN POSITIONS REGARDING THE ICC

 Britain’s support was pivotal to the creation of the ICC, beginning 

with the formative discussions in 1997 of the Preparatory Committee 

on the Creation of an International Criminal Court (PrepCom). At the 
58

December 1997 PrepCom meeting, Britain agreed to withdraw the 

demand that ICC proceedings would depend upon prior Security 

Council approval. This “dramatic shift” altered the course of the 

negotiations and was a departure from the American position,19

although the issue of prior referral by suitable authority would return 

and remain contentious in Rome.20 In addition, in contrast to other 

Security Council members, Britain joined the so-called “like-minded 

group” (LMG) of smaller and mid-level states that wished the ICC 

to be a strong, influential court.21 Britain signed the Rome Statute on 

November 30, 1998, and ratified the Statute on October 4, 2001.22

 As the varying and contradictory U.S. formal postures indicate, 

American attitudes toward the ICC have been decidedly ambivalent. 

This ambivalence is further demonstrated by the U.S. decision to vote 

against the Rome Statute when it was initially adopted in Rome on 

July 17, 1998. The United States then chose to sign the Rome Statute 

on the final day it remained open for signature, December 31, 2000. 

The United States then reversed its position again and “unsigned” 

the Rome Statute on May 6, 2002.23

 The United States followed its repudiation of the ICC with the 

enactment by Congress of the American Servicemembers’ Protection 

Act (ASPA), which ensures (so far as U.S. domestic law and policy 

are concerned) that no American soldier or government official 

will be subject to ICC jurisdiction.24 In fact, Section 7423 of ASPA 

specifically precludes any American court, state entity, or agency 

from supporting or assisting the ICC, and prevents any agent of 

the ICC from conducting any investigative activity on American 

territory.25 Where American and allied forces conduct joint operations 

in which an American is under the command of a state party national, 

ASPA authorizes the President to attempt to reduce the risk of 

American exposure to ICC jurisdiction.26 As a preemptive tactic, the 

United States has entered into bilateral agreements with dozens of 

nations in an effort to guarantee that these nations will never refer 

any American for prosecution before the ICC and has conditioned 

American participation in multinational military operations upon 

international immunization from ICC prosecution.27
59

U.S. OBJECTIONS TO THE ICC

 American reluctance to join the ICC might seem peculiar, given 

that the ICC was originally an American idea.28 The ICC has been 

accepted by the other allied nations and Security Council members 

that formed the Nuremberg tribunal (Britain, France, and Russia), 

every NATO nation (except Turkey), and Mexico. Nevertheless, 

the ICC was perceived by certain influential government officials 

as a “threat to American sovereignty and international freedom of 

action.”29 This perceived threat related, at least according to these 

officials, to the prospect of the ICC restricting the United States 

(regardless of whether the United States subjected itself to ICC 

jurisdiction) from pursuing certain forceful responses to acts of 

aggression out of fear of prosecution before the ICC. As these officials 

put it, “The last thing America’s leaders need is an additional reason 

not to respond when our nation’s interests are threatened.”30

 American objections to the ICC all stem, in one form or another, 

from perceived threats to United States sovereignty.31 At hearings 

on the ICC held one week after the Rome Conference, Senator Rod 

Grams stated to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that “the 

United States will not cede its sovereignty to an institution which 

claims to have the power to override the U.S. legal system and 

pass judgment on our foreign policy actions,” and Senator Larry 

Craig claimed that the ICC represented “a fundamental threat to 

American sovereignty.”32 Such rhetoric demands, but sometimes 

overwhelms, careful examination of the concerns the ICC raises for 

the United States. In an effort to clarify and analyze these concerns, 

I will organize America’s objections to the ICC into six distinct 

but overlapping categories: institutional, constitutional, doctrinal, 

security, prosecution, and symbolic. 

Institutional Objections.

 Institutionally, the ICC is viewed by some as supplanting the UN 

Security Council. According to the UN Charter, the Security Council 

has “primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace 

and security . . .” and provides the Council with power to “determine 
60

the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of 

agression and . . . [to] decide what measures shall be taken. . . .”33 The 

ICC, at least arguably, frustrates the UN Charter by usurping this 

role from the Security Council and by depriving the United States 

of its veto of Security Council measures. Accordingly, the United 

States (and others) sought prior review by the Security Council as a 

precondition for ICC proceedings. Absent a prior Security Council 

imprimatur, action by the ICC strikes some as displacing the role of 

the Security Council and nullifying the effect of the UN Charter.34 Of 

course, the response to this point is that the requirement of Security 

Council permission prior to ICC action effectively would negate any 

authority the ICC could have as an independent tribunal, particularly 

where an investigation or prosecution of a Security Council member 

or its allies was deemed necessary.

Constitutional Objections.

 The ICC does not offer criminal procedures and protections that 

coincide completely with those offered under the U.S. Constitution. 

Most obviously, the ICC trial of an American need not (and would 

not) take place in “the State and district wherein the crime shall have 

been committed.”35 Moreover, the ICC has no jury trial provision36

and does not protect against unreasonable searches and seizures, 

although it does acknowledge a modified form of exclusionary rule 

for improperly obtained evidence.37 Despite the presence of many 

familiar, fundamental constitutional protections afforded to criminal 

defendants under the U.S. Constitution and traditional American 

criminal procedure—such as Miranda warnings, presumption of 

innocence, notice of charges, assistance of counsel, prompt and public 

trial, modified confrontation and compulsory process, privilege 

against self-incrimination, and double jeopardy38—the ICC does 

not protect Americans to the same degree that the U.S. Constitution 

does. 

 Another constitutional objection to the ICC concerns the legal 

source of its judicial authority. If we imagine that the U.S. Senate 

ratified the Rome Statute, it might seem that the ICC is just another 

court, which Congress has chosen to accept through its Article II 
61

advice and consent power39 rather than to create through its Article 

III power.40 The problem is that Article III of the Constitution vests 

U.S. judicial power “in one supreme Court” and grants Congress the 

power to ordain and establish “inferior Courts.” Joining the Rome 

Statute would give the ICC jurisdiction over American citizens for 

acts committed on American soil. Given the theoretical possibility 

that the ICC could prosecute an American for a crime committed in 

the United States and that the ICC’s decision could not be reviewed 

by the U.S. Supreme Court, the ICC would be exercising U.S. 

judicial authority in a manner not contemplated or tolerated by the 

Constitution.41 Under these circumstances, the ICC genuinely could 

not be considered an “inferior court” and the ICC’s recognition as 

a judicial authority over American citizens by the U.S. government 

would seem to conflict with the constitutional mandate that there 

be “one Supreme Court.” Granting the ICC judicial authority 

over American nationals in a manner consistent with the U.S. 

Constitution would seem to require a constitutional amendment 

rather than a treaty. The need for a constitutional amendment prior 

to American acceptance of the ICC underscores the advantage (or 

the disadvantage) of having a written constitution.

Doctrinal Objections.

 A central U.S. concern involves the ICC provision granting it 

jurisdiction over nationals of nonparty states who are accused of 

crimes committed on the territory of party states.42 According to 

settled and fundamental doctrines of international law, a treaty 

is binding only upon the parties that sign and ratify it (unless the 

treaty codifies general customary international law principles).43 The 

subjection of nonparties to ICC jurisdiction seems to conflict with 

this fundamental doctrine.44

 There are three related responses to this objection. First, American 

resistance to the existence of the ICC or to American participation in 

the ICC could not prevent Americans from being tried by a foreign 

tribunal if, for example, members of the American military carrying 

out operations on foreign soil were accused of one of the crimes within 

the jurisdiction of the ICC (i.e., genocide, crimes against humanity, 
62

war crimes, or aggression). On the contrary, American military 

personnel who found themselves in this situation would, according 

to principles of international law, be subject to the jurisdiction of the 

courts of the state in which the operations were conducted.45 Second, 

and related to the previous point, the ICC’s jurisdictional mandate 

simply incorporates the traditional jurisdictional foundations 

of nationality and territoriality. In other words, Article 12 of the 

Rome Statute merely allows the ICC to do what national judiciaries 

commonly do, viz., exercise jurisdiction over their own nationals for 

crimes committed outside state borders and exercise jurisdiction over 

nationals from other states who commit crimes within the subject 

state’s territory. Third, the United States has ratified several treaties 

that require prosecution by state parties of any individual suspected 

of defined criminal activity, even if the accused’s home country has 

not ratified the treaty. These treaties apparently conflict with the 

notion that a treaty cannot authorize jurisdiction over nonparties. 

Certainly this notion has not prevented the United States from 

executing these treaties.46 Such inconsistency raises doubts about the 

gravity of American objections to the ICC grounded on its purported 

violation of fundamental principles of international law.

Security Objections.

 In a manner related to ICC jurisdiction over nonparties, the 

United States argued in Rome and subsequently maintained that this 

unprecedented extension of international jurisdiction could restrict 

significantly military operations necessary to preserve American 

national security or to restore or maintain peace in politically volatile 

regions. For example, the United States maintains a wide-ranging 

commitment to employ its forces in peacekeeping missions around 

the world. This, it is argued, raises a not unlikely possibility:

American servicemen on duty in the 1990-91 Persian Gulf conflict or in 

the operations in Somalia would be subject to frivolous charges raised in 

the [International Criminal] Court by Iraqi President Saddam Hussein or 

Somali leader General Aidid solely to deflect international criticism from 

their own egregious behavior. Then, in order to avoid the possibility of 

“malicious prosecution” of this nature, the U.S. reduces its commitment 

to participate in crucial international peacekeeping missions, thereby 
63

increasing the risk of global instability and war. In particular, this 

jurisdictional element has led to the United States seeking and securing 

immunization from ICC prosecution prior to committing troops for 

international peacekeeping missions.47

These concerns are raised not only by politicians and others who 

oppose any form of international influence on U.S. policymaking. 

The concern about the threat of malicious prosecutions inhibiting U.S. 

participation in international peacekeeping missions is considered 

significant even by Ambassador David Scheffer, who headed the 

American delegation at the Rome conference.48

Prosecution Objections.

 A concern closely related to the previous discussion addresses 

the possibility that the ICC might be used to pursue political agendas 

rather than war criminals. The United States sees itself as a likely 

target for politically-motivated prosecutions before the ICC and 

therefore is reluctant to support the creation of a tribunal that might 

be manipulated pursuant to such political motivations. Additionally, 

America objects to the authority of the ICC prosecutor to initiate 

an investigation even in the absence of any state party or Security 

Council complaint or referral.49 For many U.S. military members, this 

is the insurmountable obstacle to America signing the Rome Statute 

or complying with the ICC. As Lieutenant Colonel William Lietzau 

puts it:

Because the jurisdictional regime does not adequately protect U.S. troops 

and commanders from politically motivated prosecutions, the United 

States cannot sign the treaty . . . . [T]he Rome negotiators settled on a 

regime that fell short of U.S. objectives to maintain certain jurisdictional 

control over its own forces. . . . Referrals initiating such [ICC] jurisdiction 

can derive from any of three sources: the UN Security Council, a state 

party to the Statute, or the prosecutor acting in his or her independent 

capacity. The U.S. military has been much criticized for its stance on this 

critical aspect of the ICC Statute, but what the critics sometimes fail to 

recognize are the unique and vital national security responsibilities of the 

U.S. armed forces and the consequences of their front-line role in carrying 

out the nation’s national security strategy. . . . [N]o other state regularly 

has nearly 200,000 troops outside its borders, either forward deployed or 
64

engaged in one of several operations designed to preserve international 

peace and security. . . . Soldiers deployed far from home need to do their 

jobs without exposure to politicized proceedings.50

However, other American military personnel, such as Major General 

William Nash (Retired), point out that few foreign nations have 

accepted American assertions of exemption from ICC jurisdiction. 

So in the event that an ICC investigation or prosecution required 

compliance by foreign states or actors, American opposition to the 

ICC is unlikely to have much effect.51 Moreover, the military might 

have an interest in supporting the ICC, because American forces 

serving overseas are at the greatest risk of becoming victims of 

war crimes. So it could be in the interest of the military to see war 

crimes investigated, prosecuted, and punished as extensively and 

vigorously as possible.52

Symbolic Objections.

 The final, and in some ways the most fundamental, U.S. objection 

to the ICC is captured by the imagined spectacle of an American 

president or high-ranking military or political official standing trial 

before a non-American tribunal. The ICC does not recognize claims 

of official immunity,53 and it is unclear whether the ICC would 

honor a national grant of amnesty that shielded individuals from 

ICC prosecution. Accordingly, the concern about the spectacle and 

its symbolic and practical effects on American position, prestige, and 

power is not merely hypothetical. Its very possibility is intolerable to 

the sensibilities of many Americans. Of course, the response to this 

objection is that the prospective national embarrassment of a leader 

being prosecuted before the ICC would itself be a salutary deterrent 

effect of the tribunal’s existence. This is hardly a basis for American 

objections to the ICC. 

NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY IN A GLOBAL COMMUNITY

 One plausible explanation for the disparate British and U.S. 

reactions toward the ICC might be found in their reactions to 

the perceived sovereignty threats posed by the EU and the UN, 
65

respectively. Britain has, after some constitutional indigestion, 

accepted the supremacy of EU law in two judicially relevant ways. 

First, Britain accepts—as all EU members ultimately must—the 

supranational jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and 

the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). Given that British 

citizens and the British government may appear as parties before 

the ECJ and the ECHR, and that the decisions of those courts are 

binding upon Britain’s national judiciary, Britain has acknowledged 

the judicial authority over its citizens of courts outside its borders. 

Second, EU law is directly enforceable by the national courts of 

Britain. British courts therefore apply external legal doctrine that has 

been incorporated into British law through, for example, the Human 

Rights Act of 1998.54 As a result of these two factors, by virture of 

which Britain has made its (sometimes uneasy) peace with its presence 

within the EU, it likely does not view the ICC as a radical challenge 

to the authority or autonomy of its governmental structure. 

 Unlike Britain and the EU, influential elements of the U.S. 

government continue to view the UN with measured circumspection. 

The United States tends to be most supportive of UN action when that 

action has no direct repercussions on U.S. foreign policy. Moreover, 

Americans tend to view their courts and their law as entirely 

sufficient for the expression and maintenance of legal doctrine and 

government accountability. Indeed, Supreme Court justices still 

have serious reservations about citing, to say nothing of following, 

decisions of foreign courts such as the ECHR.55

 In other words, there is a constitutional dimension to sovereignty 

itself, which some would say American subjection to the ICC 

would contravene. The unwritten British constitution is generally 

understood to grant Parliament the unfettered authority to bind 

Britain and its subjects to supranational jurisdiction as a condition of 

its constitutional authority. As with the EU, the power of Parliament 

to submit Britain to the ICC is a demonstration of Parliament’s 

constitutional sovereignty. Unlike the case of the British Parliament, 

however, the very act of subjecting an American citizen to ICC 

jurisdiction might be a violation of America’s constitutional authority 

in the absence of a constitutional amendment. Without amending 

the Constitution, some Americans would claim that deference 
66

to the ICC is tantamount to the abandonment of republican selfgovernment.56 According to this view, the mere existence of the ICC 

(should the United States ever join it) would constitute a challenge to 

American constitutional democracy, because for the first time in U.S. 

history, an institution outside the U.S. government would have “the 

ultimate authority to judge the policies adopted and implemented 

by the elected officials of the United States—the core attribute of 

sovereignty and the sine qua non of democratic self-government.”57

 Nevertheless, it seems entirely plausible that American republican 

government permits Congress to commit the United States, on 

behalf of the people, to an international or supranational institution 

with genuine influence over U.S. policy. There is nothing inherently 

undemocratic about giving governmental representatives the 

authority to bind their constituencies in ways that the constituents 

find surprising or objectionable. To borrow a phrase from the 

British context, so long as this congressional authority is not viewed 

as “self-embracing,” there is no threat to American sovereignty 

or democracy, because not all delegations of sovereignty are 

derogations of sovereignty. Indeed, some would say it is the essence 

of constitutional democracy that the majority’s representatives may 

take certain actions to preserve and promote constitutional values, 

fundamental rights, and the rule of law, despite the majority’s 

disapproval.58

 Notwithstanding these differing perceptions of their place in 

the international community, the Anglo-American commitment to 

the rule of law both within and beyond national borders offers a 

meaningful incentive to support an international court of criminal 

justice. In the end, as Gary Bass explains, “[A] war crimes tribunal 

is an extension of the rule of law from the domestic sphere to the 

international sphere. . . . [T]he serious pursuit of international 

justice rests on principled legalist beliefs held by only a few liberal 

governments.”59

 Britain and the United States are two of these few liberal 

governments. Britain’s preference for summary execution of war 

criminals rather than legalism after World War II was the sole 

aberration in the commitment of liberal states to legalism when 

confronting war crimes.60 The rejection of the ICC by the United States 
67

is now, arguably, the second. The Anglo-American commitment 

to the rule of law and the historical contribution of both nations 

to the development of due process and norms of justice enforced 

by an independent judiciary has, in the past, anchored a shared 

commitment to legalism in the pursuit of international justice.61

Britain and America have supported international war crimes 

tribunals largely out of a belief in the fundamental fairness of their 

own tradition of constitutional protection of criminal defendants 

and the intrinsic value of their principles and process as a means of 

achieving justice domestically and internationally.62 At Nuremberg, 

the United States had to persuade (or remind) Britain that trials alone 

were the only means of achieving justice for war crimes consistent 

with Anglo-American legalism.63 Perhaps Britain needs to return the 

favor with respect to the ICC. Though, to be fair, the United States 

strongly supports an international court of criminal justice (but not 

one that would try Americans without American consent). 

 Inasmuch as Anglo-American dedication to international norms 

of justice enforced by international tribunals derives, at least in part, 

from the recognition and reinforcement of domestic rule of law 

values in those international norms and tribunals, it is reasonable 

to see Anglo-American legalism itself as a manifestation of national 

sovereignty. After all, “sovereignty does not arise in a vacuum, but 

is constituted by the recognition of the international community, 

which makes its recognition conditional on certain standards. . . .”64

Just as American democracy theoretically is predicated upon a 

relinquishment of a measure of liberty in exchange for security and 

individual autonomy in a larger social context, so too can support for 

the ICC be viewed as the relinquishment of a measure of sovereignty 

in exchange for security and international respect in a global context. 

Put differently, supporting the ICC does not just mean sacrificing 

sovereignty, it also enhances sovereignty.65

 To be sure, this view of sovereignty depends upon a particular 

view of the nature of political power. Power, in this view, is more 

than the ability of one state to bend other states to its will through 

coercion; it is also the ability of one state to persuade other states 

that their interests align. In other words, soft power can, in certain 

circumstances, be more effective than hard power.66 If the United 
68

States will achieve more, including the achievement of more of its 

own political goals, in a world that respects American leadership, 

then its ongoing opposition to the ICC may engender a very real loss 

of American influence and, ultimately, of American sovereignty and 

security.67 The international perception that U.S. opposition to the 

ICC tarnishes the long-standing American commitment to the rule 

of law inside and outside its borders could limit America’s ability 

to influence international affairs and thus ultimately detract from 

America’s sovereignty.68

CONCLUSION

 U.S. rejection of the ICC has angered U.S. allies, increased 

resentment toward the United States around the world, raised 

doubts about American commitments to the preservation of the rule 

of law nationally and internationally, and seemingly distanced the 

United States from the nation otherwise most closely associated with 

American values of legalism and support of norms and institutions 

of international justice. All of these factors inevitably lead one to 

wonder whether the current U.S. position toward the ICC is prudent 

politically. Some commentators suggest that a less unilateral position 

toward the ICC would serve American interests for four reasons: 

(1) the practical risk of prosecution of American citizens before the 

ICC is extremely remote;69 (2) American negotiating influence would 

not be weakened in contexts such as the Security Council, where 

U.S. rejection of the ICC, among other things, led to international 

reluctance to support American military intervention in Iraq;70 (3) the 

current U.S. policy has floundered because of the backlash against 

bilateral agreements immunizing Americans against future referral 

for ICC prosecution, the refusal of most significant powers to sign 

them, and the U.S. inability to alter the fundamental structure of the 

ICC or to influence policy relative to the ICC now that the United 

States is no longer a party to the Rome Statute;71 and (4) the apparent 

inconsistency between America’s commitment to rule of law values 

and its unwillingness to comply with the ICC as an institution 

dedicated to the preservation of human rights through international 

legal norms has eroded America’s political and moral capital as a 

leader in international affairs.72
69

 Our friends influence our decisions even, or especially, when 

we disagree with them. Just as Britain’s acceptance of the Ottawa 

Convention influenced America’s decision not to employ landmines 

during joint military operations in Afghanistan after September 11, 

2001,73 so too can Britain’s decision to join the ICC influence American 

actions during joint military operations. To the extent that the very 

existence of the ICC promotes a “culture of accountability,”74 the 

ICC may exert an influence over American policy even if Americans 

are never subject to ICC jurisdiction. Of course, this influence on 

American policy will strike those Americans who oppose the ICC 

as validation of their initial concerns, and this influence will strike 

American supporters of the ICC as mitigation of their misgivings over 

U.S. withdrawal from the ICC. In the end, the ICC raises the question 

of whether constitutionalism is a domestic or a universal concept.75

In other words, the ICC tests the Anglo-American commitment to 

the rule of law, in part by asking what law will rule. Britain and the 

United States share a cultural, historical, theoretical, and doctrinal 

commitment to the rule of law, and this commitment has grounded 

Anglo-American support for international war crimes tribunals in 

the past. But Britain seems more willing than the United States to 

accept that, at least where the ICC is concerned, the law that will 

rule Britain and its leaders and citizens can sometimes be made by 

an institution beyond its borders, while the United States remains 

committed to the rule of law solely as defined and limited by U.S. 

law.

CHAPTER 5 - ENDNOTES

 1. See, e.g., Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and 

Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, September 18, 1997, 36 

I.L.M. 1507 (the Ottawa Convention, ratified by Britain but not by the United 

States); The Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 

Change, December 11, 1997, early draft reprinted at 37 I.L.M. 22 (the Kyoto Protocol, 

ratified by Britain but not by the United States).

 2. See, generally, Paul Craig, “Britain in the European Union,” in Jeffrey Jowell 

and Dawn Oliver, eds., The Changing Constitution (4th ed.), Oxford University 

Press, 2000, especially pp. 69-79. See also Rv Secretary of State for Transport, ex 

parte Factortame Ltd. (No. 2) [1991] 1 AC 603; Danny Nicol, EC Membership and the 

Judicialization of British Politics, Oxford University Press, 2000, ch. 7. 
70

 3. See, e.g., Representative Bob Barr, “Protecting National Sovereignty in an 

Era of International Meddling: An Increasingly Difficult Task,” Harvard Journal 

on Legislation, Vol. 39, 2002, pp. 299, 308 (“[T]he United Nations’ attempts to 

institutionalize intrusions into United States decision-making present a threat 

every bit as real to United States sovereignty as was posed previously by the Soviet 

Union”); Winston P. Nagan, “Strengthening Humanitarian Law: Sovereignty, 

International Criminal Law and the Ad Hoc Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,” 

Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law, Vol. 6, 1995, pp. 127, 138, n.46.

 4. See, generally, Andrew Clapham, “Issues of Complexity, Complicity and 

Complementarity: From the Nuremberg Trials to the Dawn of the New International 

Criminal Court,” in Philippe Sands, ed., From Nuremberg to The Hague: The Future 

of International Criminal Justice, Cambridge University Press, 2003, ch. 2; Marcella 

David, “Grotius Repudiated: The American Objections to the International 

Criminal Court and the Commitment to International Law,” Michigan Journal of 

International Law, Vol. 20, 1999, pp. 337, 346-354.

 5. See Richard Overy, “The Nuremberg Trials: International Law in the 

Making,” in Philippe Sands, ed., From Nuremberg to The Hague: The Future of 

International Criminal Justice, Cambridge University Press, 2003, pp. 3-4. 

 6. See, generally, Gary Jonathan Bass, Stay the Hand of Vengeance: The Politics of 

War Crimes Tribunals, Princeton University Press, 2000, pp. 149-173.

 7. See, generally, Judith N. Shklar, Legalism: Law, Morals, and Political Trials, 

Harvard University Press, 1964, pp. 155-179.

 8. See William A. Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court, 

2nd ed., Cambridge University Press, 2004, p. 8.

 9. Ibid., p. 11.

 10. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 

999 (hereafter, the Rome Statute).

 11. Interestingly, there was overwhelming support for including the first 

three crimes within the ICC’s jurisdiction. The crime of aggression ultimately 

was included “despite the knowledge that no agreement could be reached at the 

[Rome] conference either on its definition or on the role of the Security Council 

. . .” Mahnoush H. Arsanjani, “The Rome Statute of the International Criminal 

Court,” American Journal of International Law, Vol. 93, 1999, pp. 22, 30.

 12. See Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court, pp. 26-27.

 13. Ibid., p. 29.

 14. Ibid., Articles 27-28.

 15. Ibid., Article 33.

 16. Ibid., Articles 11, 22-24.

 17. See Arsanjani, The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Vol. 24, 

n.13.
71

 18. See Rome Statute, Article 17(1)(a). The conditional nature of ICC jurisdiction 

is referred to as “complementarity” or “admissibility.” See, generally, Schabas, 

“An Introduction to the International Criminal Court,” p. 68; Arsanjani, “The 

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,” pp. 24-25, 27-28.

 19. See Bartram S. Brown, “Primacy or Complementarity: Reconciling the 

Jurisdiction of National Courts and International Criminal Tribunals,” Yale Journal 

of International Law, 1998, Vol. 23, pp. 383, 429, n.225. The United States believed 

that prosecution before the ICC should be predicated upon a referral by the 

Security Council or a state party to the treaty. See David J. Scheffer, “The United 

States and the International Criminal Court,” American Journal of International Law, 

Vol. 93, 1999, pp. 12, 15.

 20. See Philippe Kirsch and John T. Holmes, “The Rome Conference on an 

International Criminal Court: The Negotiating Process,” American Journal of 

International Law, 1999, Vol. 93, pp. 2, 8. In the end, referral was maintained in the 

Statute. ICC jurisdiction depends upon a referral from the Security Council, a state 

party or the ICC independent prosecutor. See Rome Statute, Article 13.

 21. Kirsch and Holmes, “The Rome Conference on an International Criminal 

Court,” p. 4; Arsanjani, “The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,” p. 

23.

 22. See Schabas, “An Introduction to the International Criminal Court,” p. 

419.

 23. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, “Thinking Outside the Sovereignty Box: 

Transnational Law and the U.S. Constitution,” Texas Law Review, Vol. 82, 1989, 

2000, 2004.

 24. American Servicemembers’ Protection Act, 22 U.S.C. Sections 7401-7433, 

2003. 

 25. 22 U.S.C. Sections 7423(b) and 7423(h).

 26. See Lilian V. Faulhaber, “Recent Development: American Servicemembers’ 

Protection Act of 2002,” Harvard Journal on Legislation, Vol. 40, 2003, pp. 537, 546.

 27. See Security Council Resolution 1497, U.N. SCOR, 58th Session, 4803rd 

Meeting, 2003. See also Sean D. Murphy, “Efforts to Obtain Immunity from ICC 

for U.S. Peacekeepers,” American Journal of International Law, Vol. 96, 2002, pp. 

725.

 28. See, e.g., Michael A. Newton, “Should the United States Join the International 

Criminal Court?” University of California at Davis Journal of International Law and 

Policy, Vol. 9, 2002, pp. 35, 38.

 29. Letter from Lawrence S. Eagleburger to Rep. Tom DeLay, November 29, 

2000, quoted in Arthur W. Rovine, “Memorandum to Congress on the ICC from 

Current and Past Presidents of the ASIL,” American Journal of International Law, 

Vol. 95, 2001, pp. 967, 967.

 30. Rovine, “Memorandum to Congress on the ICC,” quoting letter from ibid., 

p. 967.
72

 31. See Bruce Broomhall, International Justice and the International Criminal 

Court: Between Sovereignty and the Rule of Law, Oxford University Press, 2003, p. 

165.

 32. Quoted in Diane Marie Amann and M. N. S. Sellers, “American Law 

in a Time of Global Interdependence: The United States of America and the 

International Criminal Court,” American Journal of Comparative Law, Vol. 50, 2002, 

pp. 381, 385, 386. 

 33. U.N. Charter, Articles 24(1) and 39.

 34. See, generally, Amann and Sellers, p. 387.

 35. U.S. Constitution, Amendment VI. Cf. Rome Statute, Articles 3(1) 62. 

 36. See ibid., Articles 39(2)(b)(ii) 74.

 37. See ibid., Article 69(7).

 38. See ibid., Articles 20, 55(2) 63, 66, 67.

 39. U.S. Constitution, Article II, Section 2, clause 2, “He [the President] shall 

have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate to make Treaties 

. . . .”

 40. Ibid., Article III, Section 1.

 41. See Casey, The Case Against the International Criminal Court, pp. 841-842.

 42. See Rome Statute, Article 12.

 43. See, e.g., Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, Articles 

34-38, 8 I.L.M. 693, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (hereafter the Vienna Convention). This is 

sometimes expressed through the maxims of pacta tertiis (pacta tertiis nec nocent 

nec prosunt) or pacta sunt servanda. Ironically, the United States has signed but not 

ratified the Vienna Convention. See, e.g., United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 94 

n.28, 2d Cir. 2003. This could be understood as U.S. refusal to accept the principle 

that a treaty binds only its signatories, which would weaken American objections 

to the Rome Statute based upon this doctrinal principle. See endnote 53 and 

accompanying text.

 44. See Scheffer, “The United States and the International Criminal Court,” p. 

18.

 45. Rovine, Memorandum to Congress on the ICC,” pp. 967-968.

 46. See Diane F. Orentlicher, “Unilateral Multilateralism: United States Policy 

Toward the International Criminal Court,” Cornell International Law Journal, Vol. 

36, 2004, pp. 415, 420.

 47. David, “Grotius Repudiated,” p. 357, footnote deleted.

 48. See Scheffer, “The United States and the International Criminal Court,” p. 

19:

Equally troubling are the implications of Article 12 for the future 

willingness of the United States and other governments to take 
73

significant risks to intervene in foreign lands in order to save human lives 

or to restore international or regional peace and security. The illogical 

consequence imposed by Article 12, particularly for nonparties to the 

treaty, will be to limit severely those lawful, but highly controversial 

and inherently risky, interventions that the advocates of human rights 

and world peace so desperately seek from the United States and other 

military powers. There will be significant new legal and political risks 

in such interventions, which up to this point have been mostly shielded 

from politically motivated charges.

See also William K. Lietzau, “International Criminal Law After Rome: Concerns 

From a U.S. Military Perspective,” Law and Contemporary Problems, Vol. 64, 2001, 

pp. 119, 125: “The Rome Treaty will become the single most effective brake on 

international and regional peacekeeping in the 21st century” (quoting Ambassador 

Scheffer’s testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee). 

 49. See David, “Grotius Repudiated,” p. 356, n.71.

 50. Lietzau, “Concerns From a U.S. Military Perspective,” pp. 125-126. See also 

Scheffer, “The United States and the International Criminal Court,” p. 18. 

 51. See William L. Nash, “The ICC and the Deployment of U.S. Armed Forces,” 

in Sewall and Kaysen, “The United States and the International Criminal Court,” 

p. 163.

 52. See Bass, Stay the Hand of Vengeance, pp. 282-283.

 53. See Rome Statute, Article 27.

 54. See Craig, “Britain in the European Union,” pp. 86-87.

 55. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 598, 2003 (Scalia, J., dissenting); 

Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 990, 1999 (Thomas, J., concurring). See also Vicki 

C. Jackson, “Ambivalent Resistance and Comparative Constitutionalism: Opening 

Up the Conversation on ‘Proportionality,’ Rights and Federalism,” University 

of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law, Vol. 1, 1999, p. 583; Mark Tushnet, 

“Returning with Interest: Observations on Some Putative Benefits of Studying 

Comparative Constitutional Law,” University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional 

Law, Vol. 1, 1998, 325. Cf. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21, 2002, pp. 324-325 

(Scalia, J., and Rehnquist, C. J., dissenting); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 921 

n.11, 1997. 

 56. See Amann and Sellers, “American Law in a Time of Global Interdependence,” pp. 400-402.

 57. Lee A. Casey, “The Case Against the International Criminal Court,” 

Fordham International Law Journal, Vol. 25, 2002, pp. 840, 843-844.

 58. See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Freedom’s Law: The Moral Reading of the American 

Constitution, Harvard University Press, 1996, pp. 15-26.

 59. Bass, Stay the Hand of Vengeance, pp. 7-8.

 60. See above at note 5. See also ibid., pp. 147, 181.
74

 61. Ibid., pp. 148-149, 281.

 62. Ibid., p. 173: “At the end of America’s most brutal war ever, the Germans 

would be accorded the benefit of legal procedure as it had evolved in America, 

because of an American belief in the rightness of its own domestic legalism”; p. 

181: “Britain would extend its domestic standards of due process to almost all 

German war criminals . . . .”

 63. Ibid., pp. 150, 180-182.

 64. Broomhall, “International Justice and the International Criminal Court,” p. 

43.

 65. Ibid., p. 59.

 66. See, e.g., Orentlicher, “Unilateral Multilateralism,” pp. 430-431.

 67. See, generally, Colonel M. Tia Johnson, “The American Servicemembers’ 

Protection Act: Protecting Whom?” Virginia Journal of International Law, Vol. 43, 

2003, p. 405. 

 68. A further point that I cannot develop here is that the concept of sovereignty 

itself is fundamentally incompatible with the enforcement of international law and 

should be abandoned. See, e.g., Thomas M. Franck and Stephen H. Yuhan, “The 

United States and the International Criminal Court: Unilateralism Rampant,” 

New York University Journal of International Law and Politics, Vol. 35, 2003, p. 519; 

Anthony D’Amato, “Human Rights as Part of Customary International Law: A 

Plea for Change of Paradigms,” Georgia Journal of International and Comparative 

Law, Vol. 25, 1995/1996, p. 47.

 69. See, e.g., Nash, “The ICC and the Deployment of U.S. Armed Forces,” in 

Sewall and Kaysen, The United States and the International Criminal Court, pp. 153, 

159.

 70. See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, “Transnational Legal Process After September 

11th,” Berkeley Journal of International Law, Vol. 22, 2004, pp. 337, 348; Orentlicher, 

“Unilateral Multilateralism,” pp. 428-429. Of course, two of the other actions that 

increased international animosity toward the United States were its recantation 

of the Kyoto Protocol and its rejection of the Ottawa Convention. See Orentlicher, 

“Unilateral Multilateralism,” p. 428.

 71. See Broomhall, “International Justice and the International Criminal Court,” 

p. 182; Orentlicher, “Unilateral Multilateralism,” pp. 430-431, 432: “It can hardly 

be doubted that the ICC is more likely to operate in accordance with America’s 

vision of the Court if the United States participates in shaping the institution than 

if it declares open war against it.”

 72. Cf. Koh, Transnational Legal Process After September 11th, 348: “[B]y rejecting 

a legal process approach, it [the United States] limited itself to coercive solutions, 

which have now ironically diminished its capacity for global leadership under a 

banner of rule of law.” 
75

 73. See Lesley Wexler, “The International Deployment of Shame, Second-Best 

Responses, and Norm Entrepreneurship: The Campaign to Ban Landmines and 

the Landmine Ban Treaty,” Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law, 

Vol. 20, 2003, pp. 561, 598.

 74. Broomhall, “International Justice and the International Criminal Court,” p. 3.

 75. Cf. Jed Rubenfeld, “Unilateralism and Constitutionalism,” New York 

University Law Review, Vol. 79, 1971, 1991-99, 2004; Casey, “The Case Against the 

International Criminal Court,” p. 867.

77

CHAPTER 6

STRANDED BETWEEN TWO RECEDING SHORELINES?

THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP

AFTER THE MAY 5, 2005, ELECTIONS

Mark Gilbert

 In the days immediately before Britain’s general election on 

May 5, 2005, one revealing insight into the politics of the “special 

relationship” between Britain and the United States was provided by 

typing the phrases “Tony Blair Special Relationship” and “Michael 

Howard Special Relationship” into Google. In the former case, the 

inquirer obtained thousands of hits and was able to access dozens 

of articles and think-tank commentaries on the importance of the 

Anglo-American partnership for world affairs. In the second case, 

the inquirer was presented mostly with a long list of speeches by 

Conservative leader Howard on the sanctity of marriage. 

 This anecdote reveals the difficulty Michael Howard has 

encountered in formulating a policy toward the United States that 

differs in any significant way from the prime minister’s. Mr. Blair 

has been one of a handful of British leaders who have influenced 

American policy successfully and, as a result, heightened British 

standing in Washington and the world in general. Ernest Bevin 

pulled this trick off; so, more unctuously, did Harold Macmillan. 

Anthony Eden disastrously failed; Harold Wilson exasperated 

Lyndon B. Johnson by jetting into Washington for an impromptu 

summit every time his poll ratings were slipping; Edward Heath, 

though he maintained a formal veneer of good relations with the 

Nixon White House, distrusted and disliked U.S. policy and did his 

best to encourage the emergence of a common European Community 

foreign policy in opposition to that of the United States.

 In part, the success or failure of the special relationship reflects 

personal chemistry between leaders. Bevin was esteemed and perhaps 

even slightly feared by his American counterparts. Macmillan and 

Kennedy, despite the age difference, do seem to have developed a 

mutual personal respect, as did George Bush senior and John Major. 
78

Thatcher and Reagan, at any rate in public, were a mutual admiration 

society. George W. Bush and Tony Blair, with their shared concern 

for religious values and worries about moral decadence, seem to 

have established an authentic friendship that seemed improbable in 

light of Mr. Blair’s even closer friendship with President Clinton.1

 But it seems clear that circumstances are more important than 

personal chemistry. The British statesmen who enjoyed the most 

influence in Washington were those in power at moments when the 

United States needed military, moral, or political support. Berlin 

could not have been saved during the early Cold War, the North 

Atlantic Treaty could not have been negotiated, and South Korea 

could not have been preserved without the giant figure of Ernest 

Bevin and the less great, but underestimated figure of Clement Attlee. 

Thatcher’s hostility to communism and her outspoken championing 

of free-market values were extremely useful to the United States in 

the early years of the Reagan presidency. Tony Blair, meanwhile, has 

given a gloss of respectability to the U.S.-led Iraq war and made it 

appear less of an exercise in high-tech gunboat diplomacy.

 Not surprisingly, the special relationship has been at its worst 

when Britain was perceived in Washington to have let the Americans 

down. Eden, whether from imperial hubris, lack of comprehension of 

the American position, or sheer irritability, hopelessly antagonized 

the United States, which was determined not to take sides in a 

conflict between colonialism and third world nationalism, by his 

policy towards Egypt in October-November 1956.2

 Wilson could 

have gotten away with reducing British commitments “East of Suez,” 

or with failing to commit troops in Vietnam, or with devaluing the 

pound; but his failure to live up to expectations on all three counts 

lost him Lyndon Johnson’s goodwill.3

 A warm special relationship therefore depends upon: (1) the U.S. 

need for British support for its immediate foreign policy goals, and (2) 

British policy being coherent with broader American objectives. This 

may sound banal, but I think the point is worth emphasizing, since 

the special relationship is suffused with so much sub-Churchillian 

rhetoric about cultural unities and our great common history. While 

it is no doubt true, to quote John Major, that “there is a unique rapport 

between Britain and the United States,” the undoubted cultural 
79

closeness of Britain and the United States has not guaranteed idyllic 

relations in the past, and does not guarantee that the two countries 

will remain on good terms in the near future. The two countries’ 

interests, as Major himself admitted, can diverge.4

 It is also worth remembering that the cultural similarities between 

the two nations can easily be taken for granted. Nations change over 

time. Although the United States unquestionably continues to be 

a very attractive society for many British citizens, and large parts 

of the British establishment certainly retain a deep respect for U.S. 

institutions, generosity, and military know-how, it is also true that 

this admiration is in many ways a remembrance of things passing. 

U.S. soft power reserves will be exhausted eventually, even in 

Britain, if she continues her present trend towards vociferous moral 

conservatism and unabashed hyper-patriotism. A society as deeply 

secular as Britain (weekly church attendance is well under 10 percent 

of the adult population, and the number of professing Christians 

is, by American standards, derisory) is not a natural partner for an 

American polity throbbing with moral majority rhetoric and action. 

On Sundays, most Britons wash their cars, trudge glumly around 

shopping malls, or worship do-it-yourself sofas at IKEA. 

Will the United States Need Britain? 

 So the first question is: Will the United States continue to need 

British support? The obvious answer is “yes.” Any regular reader 

of the quality press, or even The Times, could quickly reel off a list 

of reasons: (a) The United States needs British support in Iraq to 

help maintain order and to ease the transition to democracy; (b) The 

United States needs Britain to act, in Tony Blair’s somewhat clichéd 

metaphor, as a “bridge” between the two banks of the Atlantic; (c) 

the two countries cooperate over intelligence matters; (d) Britain is 

a useful veto-wielding ally in the United Nations Security Council 

(UNSC). In short, Britain is needed by the United States in order to 

make superpowerdom a little less lonely.

 These are all good reasons for thinking that the United States will 

continue to need Britain. Whether she will continue to need Britain 

quite so intensely is another matter. This surely depends largely 
80

upon events. If North Korea implodes, Japan, South Korea, and 

China will become the focus of American diplomacy; and Junichiro 

Koizumi, or his successor, will eclipse Tony Blair in importance. The 

same is true if a crisis should blow up between China and Taiwan. 

If tensions grow between Ukraine and Russia, Germany and Poland 

would weigh at least as heavily on American scales as Britain, and 

probably more. One can multiply the examples. The point is that since 

September 11, 2001, circumstances have conspired to place Britain 

at the heart of U.S. concerns (and Britain’s leaders certainly have 

exploited the situation with skill). But this need not be a permanent 

state of affairs. 

Will British Policy Remain Coherent 

with that of the United States?

 This is the more interesting and problematic question. Several 

factors might easily affect British policy toward the United States, 

the recent British general election for one. As expected, the Labour 

Party won a third successive electoral victory on May 5, 2005, but its 

majority was slashed by almost 100 seats. Mr. Blair can now count 

on a majority of just 67 seats in the House of Commons. For most 

third-term governments, a victory of this kind would be regarded 

as a considerable success. But as most commentators immediately 

recognized, in Blair’s case a majority of these dimensions has to be 

considered a personal defeat for the Prime Minister.

 The reason is that, in terms of votes, Labour’s performance was 

decidedly unimpressive. Labour lost votes to the Conservatives and 

barely came out ahead of them in the popular vote (35 vs. 32 percent). 

Overall, New Labour won just 9.6 million votes—hardly more 

than a fifth of Britain’s adult population. The two main Opposition 

parties—the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats—together 

took 15 million votes. It is fair to say that the lopsidedness of the 

British “winner-takes-all” electoral system rarely has been so vividly 

demonstrated. 

 Moreover, Labour’s unimpressive results were achieved against 

dismal opposition. The Conservative Party’s populist positions on 

a number of sensitive questions such as Europe, immigration, and 
81

crime, while appealing to a hard core of working class supporters, 

unnerved middle class centrists and obstructed the party’s return to 

the center ground in which British elections are won or lost. Michael 

Howard rightly fell on his sword when the mediocre nature of the 

Conservative Party’s electoral improvement became clear. Liberal 

Democrat leader Charles Kennedy could boast a gain of 11 new 

Ministers of Parliament (MPs) as compared to 2001 and a total of 

almost six million votes (22 percent), but Mr. Kennedy failed to 

impress as a leader during the electoral campaign and must now be 

regretting that he did not invade the political center more vigorously. 

The Liberal Democrats picked up many voters from Labour’s left, 

but did not modernize their traditional tax and spend policies to 

attract moderate Conservatives. It is hard to escape the conclusion 

that a centrist Tory with charisma—admittedly a rare beast—could 

and would have put Mr. Blair’s majority at risk. But the truth of the 

witticism that Mr. Blair remains the only centrist Tory politician in 

Britain was confirmed by the election campaign. 

 What will be the likely consequences of Mr. Blair’s muted victory 

for the relationship with the United States? Mr. Blair is the most 

pro-American Labour leader imaginable, and after a “defeat” of this 

kind he may not hold the office of prime minister for a full 5 years. 

His likely successor, Chancellor of the Exchequer Gordon Brown, 

is certainly an admirer of many aspects of the American economy 

and political system, but he is also more closely associated with the 

Labour grassroots than Mr. Blair. Many ordinary Labour members 

have been angered by the closeness of Blair’s ties with President 

Bush. A third of the Labour Party’s parliamentary contingent voted 

against the campaign in Iraq. Anybody who wants to know what 

ordinary Labour supporters (and many backbenchers) think about 

the United States need only read the Guardian or the New Statesman. 

These two newspapers at times have been hysterically anti-American 

since September 11, with the tone of their criticism going far beyond 

what even a highly negative evaluation of U.S. foreign policy might 

justify.5 After the May election, if only because the Blairite MPs from 

southern England have borne the brunt of the electoral losses, the 

likelihood is that the mood of the Labour Party will be less amenable 

to unconditional support for U.S. foreign policy. Mr. Brown 
82

probably will not put his leadership chances in jeopardy by publicly 

contradicting this mood. He has waited too long to be leader. 

 Much of the public disaffection with Blair is linked to the 

continuing Iraq crisis and the widespread perception that the Prime 

Minister had misled parliament and the public about Iraq’s weapons 

of mass destruction during the run-up to the second Gulf War. These 

issues were also a decisive factor in Labour’s poor performance in the 

recent election. The most striking individual victory in the election 

was secured by “Gorgeous George” Galloway, a pro-Iraqi ex-Labour 

MP, who formed the anti-war “Respect” party and campaigned in 

the London constituency of Bethnal Green and Bow, which has a 

large Muslim population. Mr. Galloway, who has been implicated 

in the United Nations (UN) “oil for food” scandal, but who strongly 

denies any wrongdoing, won a shattering victory against the Labour 

candidate. In his victory speech, he dedicated his votes to the people 

of Iraq and warned Mr. Blair that “all the people you have killed 

and all the loss of life have come back to haunt you, and the best 

thing the Labour party can do is sack you tomorrow morning.” Reg 

Keys, the father of a military policeman killed in Iraq, campaigned 

personally against Mr. Blair in his County Durham constituency and 

obtained 4,252 votes—hardly a negligible figure for an individual 

citizen without party support and organization.

 Indeed, there are already strong signs that the Labour Party’s 

left is drawing lines in the sand that Mr. Blair will cross at his peril. 

Shortly before the election, former Foreign Secretary and Iraq war 

rebel Robin Cook contributed a significant article to the Guardian

entitled “Why American Neocons Are Out for Kofi Annan’s Blood.” 

Cook’s theme in this article was that the U.S. right is leading the 

attack on the UN Secretary General precisely because Mr. Annan is 

a reformer who wishes to see improved global governance. More 

generally, Cook asserted:

The world is confronted with a choice between two competing models 

of global governance. The direction signposted by Kofi Annan is to a 

regenerated UN with new authority for its collective decisions. However, 

collective decisionmaking is only possible if there is broad equivalence 

among those taking part. And there is the rub. The neocons who run 

the U.S. administration want supremacy, not equality, for America and 

hanker after an alternative model of global governance in which the 
83

world is put to right not by the tedious process of building international 

consensus, but by the straightforward exercise of U.S. puissance.6

The woolly-mindedness of this passage doubtless will raise hackles 

in some U.S. circles. There is not “broad equivalence” among the 

major nation-states of the world today—some nations are plainly 

more equal than others. Robin Cook is, in substance, asking the 

United States to pretend it is Canada for the sake of international 

“governance”—whatever this buzzword actually means. 

Presumably, this will not happen. But it is certainly true that Mr. 

Cook speaks for many, perhaps most, Labour backbenchers when he 

expresses such views, and that these backbenchers, many of whom 

feel betrayed by Mr. Blair’s foreign policy since 2001, will vote, if 

necessary, against the government. It is clear that British support for 

further U.S. intervention anywhere in the world will be conditional 

upon there having been blatant breaches of international law. As 

Gerald Dorfman perceptively has argued, “Britain will be more 

hesitant and sceptical about embracing American initiatives and 

about committing its military to war.”7 Iraq has exhausted British 

enthusiasm for military conflicts undertaken at U.S. behest and on 

the basis of chancy photographs. 

 Mr. Blair’s foreign policy priorities in any case may not be as 

accommodating to the United States as most people think. As Blair 

powerfully argued at the Davos World Economic summit on January 

26, 2005, Britain’s priorities during the meeting of G-8 (consisting of 

France, the United States, Britain, Germany, Japan, Italy, Canada, 

and Russia) and European Union (EU) presidencies would be global 

warming and world poverty.8 Perhaps sensing that Blair would trim 

his coat to suit his cloth, the Guardian urged Blair to give salience in 

his foreign policy to issues such as poverty and development, AIDS, 

and Third World debt, and to “use his clout to ensure Washington 

sticks firmly to the road map to Israeli-Palestinian peace.”9 While 

such objectives are not necessarily contrary to U.S. priorities—as 

the Gleneagles accord in early July 2005 showed—they do suggest 

that Blair is not concentrating single-mindedly either on the war on 

terror or on the special relationship. Blair’s leadership on this score 

already has paid dividends in Europe, where British adherence to the 

Nordic countries’ long-term pressure for a greater aid commitment 
84

has led to the EU states making, on May 24, 2005, a powerful pledge 

to spend a substantially increased portion of gross domestic product 

(GDP) on aid to the Third World and Africa in particular. In Europe, 

this commitment was interpreted widely as an alternative foreign 

policy to that preferred by George W. Bush.

 In the same Davos speech, Blair went out of his way to stress 

that “interdependence is the governing characteristic of modern 

international politics” and that “international engagement” of 

the major power groups was essential. Blair’s political antenna is 

probably the most sophisticated of any contemporary political leader. 

He is well aware that U.S. unilateralism has outlived its welcome 

with British public opinion. Concentrating his efforts on building 

coalitions willing to deal with some major international problems 

is a strategy that has obvious appeal for a man, like Mr. Blair, who 

sincerely loves to do good, but who also likes to do well. The strategy 

has obvious personal benefits for the British Prime Minister. The 

kudos he receives from the left in both Europe and the United States 

will compensate for any chilliness that might ensue in his relations 

with Washington. 

 Another factor that might cause the new Labour government to 

cool towards the Atlantic relationship is the strength of its ties with the 

EU. Given the high profile of the Labour government’s Atlantic policy, 

it is easy to forget that Blair and Foreign Secretary Jack Straw have 

followed a very active European policy. Despite the Iraq diversion, 

Blair has largely continued, with no little success, John Major’s policy 

of placing Britain at the “heart of Europe.” Essentially, this campaign 

involves combating the federalist aspirations evoked in Europe in the 

1990s by Jacques Delors and, later, Joschka Fischer, while presenting 

an alternative vision of an enlarged economic confederation of 20-

plus states that respects the central decisionmaking role and political 

rights of the member states. 

 Who can dispute the success of British diplomacy in this regard? 

Contrary to the beliefs of the flakier British Conservatives and 

Euroskeptics, the current EU—with its various national opt-outs, its 

(still incomplete) single market, its (failing) competitiveness agenda, 

its strictly limited budgetary resources (Britain, the Netherlands, 

and Germany want to restrict the budget to 1 percent of Gross Union 
85

Product; it currently may not be more than 1.27 percent), and its 

sturdily intergovernmental approach to decisionmaking on major 

questions—is to a significant extent a British creation. Anybody who 

has studied the history of European integration since the 1986 Single 

European Act will know this.

 Moreover, Britain played an active role in promoting EU 

enlargement to embrace the new democracies of Central and Eastern 

Europe and played a decisive part in ensuring that relatively few 

concessions were made to supranationalist principles in the EU 

Constitution that was signed in Rome at the end of October 2004—an 

outcome that was far from certain when the constitutional process 

began in March 2001. The final version of the Constitution has Britain’s 

sticky fingerprints all over it. All the main policy areas will continue 

to be decided by unanimity; the role of the European Council is 

strengthened; matters decided by qualified majority voting will pass 

only with a very high degree of consensus, despite the influx of new 

members; the Union’s competences have been rigidly fixed; national 

parliaments will possess a de facto veto over controversial legislation; 

and amending the Constitution will be extremely difficult.10 It is not 

an accident that one of the main reasons given by French opponents 

of the Constitution during the electoral campaign prior to France’s 

dramatic rejection of the new Constitution on May 27, 2005, was that 

the document is much too “Anglo-Saxon” in character.

 With success comes responsibility. Britain would lose all credibility 

within the EU, and its diplomatic achievement would accordingly 

be threatened, were she to take America’s side consistently in all 

the disputes currently upsetting relations between the EU and the 

United States. London, and Mr. Blair personally, cannot allow critics 

across the Channel to cast doubt on Britain’s European credentials 

by depicting the Prime Minister as America’s poodle. 

 But, unfortunately, there are plenty of grounds for U.S.-EU 

disagreement. Despite President Bush’s recent charm offensive, 

which included his heartfelt appeal for a “new era of transatlantic 

unity” in a speech in Brussels in February 2005, arms to China, vital 

trade questions such as the Boeing/Airbus row, the ongoing conflict 

in Iraq, and the Iran nuclear question all divide the United States 

from most of the important EU states. If Britain is a “bridge” over 

the Atlantic, she risks finding herself stranded between two rapidly 

receding shorelines. If she is constrained to build bridges towards 
86

one bank or the other, it is possible that she may not choose the 

traditional route towards the United States. 

 The question is complicated by the fact that the EU is likely to 

prove a tricky diplomatic arena during the lifetime of the current 

Labour government. The next 5 years seem likely to be the most 

problematic period in European integration since the near-breakdown 

of the European Community in the early 1980s. The French and 

Dutch referendums in May-June 2005 have thrown the EU into total 

confusion; there is bound to be a concerted attempt to make Britain 

surrender its supposedly permanent rebate on its contribution to the 

EU budget. Furthermore, protectionist sentiment may grow in the 

EU, leaving neo-liberal Britain with no choice but to fight a series of 

hard battles from within the EU.

 This turbulent situation is both a threat and an opportunity for 

Britain. Mr. Blair may use the crisis in the EU to wrench leadership 

of the Union from the hands of France and Germany and shift the 

EU towards the liberalization agenda he clearly prefers. On the other 

hand, it is quite possible that Britain will be made a scapegoat for the 

Union’s present travails. In the latter case, the special relationship 

with the United States may come to seem a safe haven from the 

growing chaos of European entanglements. Macmillan’s famous 

admonition that we should never forget “events, dear boy, events” 

still holds good. 

American Perspectives.

 From an American perspective, therefore, the state of the special 

relationship is bound to be a delicate one over the next few years. 

British political and public opinion will warm only to a more 

multilateralist United States that eschews the “robust brand of 

internationalism” practiced in recent years.11 Britain will also have 

a Prime Minister who will raise issues that Americans may want to 

sweep under the carpet. Britain will also certainly be embroiled—this 

is the right word—in the internal politics of an EU whose purpose is 

increasingly contested and whose chief policy orientations are under 

threat. 

 From the American perspective, therefore, the central future 

political question of the special relationship, assuming the United 
87

States continues to regard the Atlantic link as a cornerstone of its 

policy, lies in understanding that Britain is less different than she 

often seems from the rest of the big EU states. Britain, while far more 

pro-American than almost any other European country, nevertheless 

shares some of Europe’s disquiet at current U.S. foreign policy and 

is alarmed by many of the same global trends as her European 

neighbors. Moreover, the paradox of Britain’s strongly “eurosceptical” public mood is that the United Kingdom (UK) is arguably 

the most Brussels-obsessed country in the whole of the EU (British 

public and political opinion rightly dedicate enormous attention to 

what is happening in Brussels).

 Britain is also not Berlusconi’s Italy. She won’t necessarily jump 

if the United States barks. Consider, for example, the following 

assertion (which I note from a 2002 article by a neoconservative author 

but which reflects a still-relevant strain of U.S. policy thinking): “[I]f 

Washington insists on Britain reshaping (or scuppering) European 

military plans, desisting from further European integration, and 

renewing its transatlantic focus, London will comply.” This assertion 

greatly misunderstands the complexity of the special relationship 

today.12 Nowadays an old-fashioned “command and obey” approach 

to marriage often leads to one spouse slamming the door on her way 

to her lawyer. The special relationship, like any other relationship, 

could fray at the edges if the United States becomes domineering 

and insists that Britain drop her friends. 

 If this statement is true, and if the considerations I outlined 

earlier about the U.S. need for the special relationship are also true, 

the U.S. task thereupon becomes that of helping the UK to remain in 

the U.S. camp. How can this be done? Continuing to accord Tony 

Blair a special status among international leaders will do no harm. 

Making the right noises (and writing some of the right checks) on 

global poverty, global warming, and the Palestinian question will 

positively do good. Avoiding unilateral strikes against rogue states 

is essential. Publicly acknowledging that the U.S. society contains 

blemishes and imperfections and that recent U.S. foreign policy has 

not been a triumphal chapter in the struggle to promote democracy 

would do most good of all, but expecting self-criticism from a 

hegemon is probably a forlorn hope. After all, the British political 

élite were prone to the same kinds of rhetorical excess before the sun 

set on the British empire. 
88

 U.S. policy towards Europe also will influence the future of the 

special relationship. There appears to be a growing perception in 

Washington policy circles—a perception encouraged by many 

prominent EU boosters—that the EU is a major threat to American 

hegemony in the West.13 Some voices therefore have been urging that 

the EU should be humbled before it challenges the U.S. leadership 

role. Suggestions for dissolving the EU’s power range from the crude 

to the sophisticated. An example of the latter has been advanced by 

John C. Hulsman, in a series of very well-researched and stimulating 

Heritage Foundation lectures and position papers (and in his chapter 

in this book).14 Hulsman contends that the United States should 

“cherry-pick” the more Atlanticist member states of the EU, with 

Britain obviously being the chief prize, to form a Global Free Trade 

Association (GFTA) parallel to the EU.

 This idea, which, if put into practice, would undermine one of the 

EU’s most solid historical achievements—its ability to act as a bloc in 

trade talks—has obvious similarities with Britain’s 1957 proposal for 

a European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and suffers from exactly 

the same defects. Like EFTA, it gives its main proponent (the United 

States) far too many economic benefits in exchange for far too little 

loss in sovereignty. After the experience of European integration, 

where free trade measures within the Community have been locked 

in by a series of treaties that have direct legal effect upon the citizens 

of the member states, few EU members, Britain included, would be 

enthused about joining an organization whose trade bargains would 

depend entirely upon the whim of the majority in Congress for their 

durability. The great advantage of the EU is that free trade within 

the Community is backed by law. Moreover, just as EFTA was seen 

as an attempt to dissolve the European Economic Community (EEC) 

like a “lump of sugar in a cup of hot tea,” so GFTA would inevitably 

be interpreted as a scheme to dismantle the EU. A possible result 

of this, especially in the light of the anti-globalization rhetoric so 

dominant during the French referendum, might be the formation of 

an anti-American and protection-inclined bloc of states within the 

EU. This would be in neither U.S. nor British interests. 

 The GFTA plan may be a useful “Plan B” for the United States 

if the EU plunges back into the futile bickering over budgets and 

institutions that characterized the EC in the early 1980s. John 
89

Hulsman is right to stress that there is a widening cleavage between 

the EU’s dinosaurs (France is an obvious example, but Italy is an 

even more striking case) and its more liberal-minded members (the 

flat-taxers of Central Europe and the Baltic, Ireland, Britain, but also 

modernized and competitive social democratic states like Denmark, 

Finland, and the Netherlands). Contrary to the mythology of the 

European movement, which has always assumed that progress to 

full political union was inevitable in the long march of history, this 

cleavage might easily have substantial political consequences in the 

next 5 to 10 years, and defections cannot be ruled out. 

 A better U.S. response, however, surely would be to intensify 

the “charm offensive” launched by President Bush and Secretary 

of State Condoleeza Rice, by encouraging more high-level political 

dialogue between the United States and the European nations. Jaw 

jaw is better than war war. There are already multiple forums for 

transatlantic cooperation, notably the Euro-Atlantic Partnership 

Council and the G-8, and it may be that further such institutions need 

to be developed. Why should there not, for instance, be a formal and 

regular Atlantic Economic Council, attended not only by government 

officials but by Congressmen and members of the European and 

national Parliaments which would be empowered to hold hearings, 

debate, and make recommendations to the national governments 

about trade questions, currency issues, and other pertinent matters? 

No sovereignty would be lost on either side, but both the U.S. trade 

administrator and the European Commissioner for trade would 

be forced to justify their positions in open debate. Progress might 

possibly accelerate as a result. At any rate, an understanding of 

why progress must be slow or nonexistent might be more widely 

diffused, and the relationship between the EU and the United States 

might seem less confrontational.

 Future political developments within Western Europe might 

make such transatlantic engagement a more promising strategy than 

it may currently appear. A Christian Democrat Germany, led by 

Angela Merkel, surely will prove to be more Atlanticist than the SPDGreen administration. At a minimum, a Merkel-led Germany will 

be unlikely deliberately to whip up anti-Americanism for electoral 

purposes. A post-Berlusconi Italy, governed by the center-left, while 

it will be less instinctively pro-American than the current government 
90

has been, will inevitably be open to persuasion and will not want 

to appear anti-American. France and Spain, if the United States 

could swallow its understandable annoyance with Jacques Chirac 

and José Luis Zapatero, might prove surprisingly responsive. Most 

important of all, Britain would welcome a re-launched Atlanticism 

as an opportunity to exercise leadership within Europe and to fulfil 

her bridging role. 

 What this chapter has sought to underline, in short, is that in 

its European policy, the United States must not put Britain in the 

position where she has no choice but to break with Europe or break 

with the United States. Such a policy would be stupid diplomatically 

and might not have the intended results. 

 It is worth remarking in conclusion that the current conjuncture 

offers enormous opportunities for statesmanship. As a very 

thoughtful book by MIT political scientist Richard Samuels recently 

has argued, the ability of leaders to “stretch constraints” is the 

definition of statesmanship. Leaders of stature are those who see 

opportunities for constructive initiatives when less gifted politicians 

see themselves as being hemmed in by the circumstances of their 

time.15 The current state of transatlantic relations is one such 

opportunity. As John Lewis Gaddis has argued, Washington needs 

to re-learn the art of “speaking more softly” and to remember that 

“it is never a good idea to insult potential allies, however outrageous 

their behaviour may have been.”16 If the United States can engage 

with Europe, institutionally and intellectually, she will lose little 

and may gain much. Certainly she will strengthen the relationship 

with Britain, which, as I have been suggesting, is shakier than many 

Americans think. Antagonism between the United States and Europe 

will leave Britain, to repeat the metaphor used once already in this 

chapter, “stranded between receding shorelines.” Such a situation 

would be a crisis for Britain, but it would be a grave problem for the 

United States as well. 

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 6

 1. For Blair’s friendship with Clinton and Bush, see P. Stephens, Tony Blair: The 

Making of a World Leader, New York, Viking, 2004, especially chaps 4, 7, and 11.
91

 2. On Suez, the literature is vast. D. R. Thorpe, Eden: The Life and Times of 

Anthony Eden, London: Pimlico, 2003, gives a compressed and more sympathetic 

account than usual of Eden’s behavior during the crisis.

 3. For Wilson and Johnson, I recommend J. Colman, A ‘Special Relationship’? 

Harold Wilson, Lyndon B. Johnson and Anglo-American Relations ‘at the Summit’, 1964-

68, Manchester, England: Manchester University Press, 2004.

 4. John Major, John Major: The Autobiography, London: HarperCollins, 2000, p. 

496.

 5. See Mark Gilbert, “Superman versus Lex Luther: British Anti-Americanism 

since September 11,” World Policy Journal, Vol. 19, No. 2, Summer 2002, pp. 88-92.

 6. Robin Cook, “Why American Neocons Are Out for Kofi Annan’s Blood,” 

Guardian, April 1, 2005.

 7. Gerald Dorfman, “Trouble at Number Ten,” Hoover Digest 2005, n. 1.

 8. Tony Blair, speech to the World Economic Forum, Davos, Switzerland, 

January 26, 2005, http://www.number-10.gov.uk.

 9. Guardian, Leading article, May 13, 2005.

 10. See Foreign and Commonwealth Office, White Paper on Treaty Establishing 

a Constitution for Europe, Command 6309, September 2004, for Britain’s satisfaction 

with the Constitution.

 11. The phrase by Robert Kagan and William Kristol in their introduction to 

Present Dangers: Crisis and Opportunity in American Defense Policy, San Francisco, 

CA: Encounter Books, 2000, p. 23.

 12. Robin Harris, “The State of the Special Relationship,” Policy Review, No. 

113, June 2002, p. 7 of online version.

 13. For American fears, see Jeffrey L. Cimbalo, “Saving NATO from Europe, 

Foreign Affairs, November/December 2004; Mark Leonard, Why Europe Will Run 

the 21st Century, London, Fourth Estate, 2005; and, egregiously, Stephen Haseler, 

Super-state: The New Europe and Its Challenge to America, New York: I. B. Taurus, 

2004.

 14. See, especially, John C. Hulsman, “European Arrogance and Weakness 

Dictate Coalitions of the Willing,” Heritage Lecture No. 777, December 19, 2002; 

and, with Nile Gardiner, “President Bush Should Advance a New U.S. Vision for 

Europe,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 1825, February 18, 2005, which 

actually comes quite close in its analysis to the position I’ve been taking here.

 15. Richard J. Samuels, Machiavelli’s Children: Leaders and their Legacies in Italy 

and Japan, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003, p. 7.

 16. John Lewis Gaddis, “Grand Strategy in the Second Term,” Foreign Affairs, 

January/February 2005. Quotations are from pp. 2, 3 of the online edition.

93

CHAPTER 7

POLITICAL AND LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE SPECIAL 

RELATIONSHIP: PANEL CHAIRMAN’S SUMMARY 

AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Andrew Apostolou

 The German statesman Bismarck reportedly once prophesied 

that the most important fact of the oncoming 20th century would 

be that Britain and America spoke the same language. Subsequent 

German leaders would discover that Bismarck was accurate in his 

prediction as to the weighty consequences of the bond between the 

two countries. Yet, at the time of the attributed comment, the late 

19th century, British-American relations were socially friendly but 

politically somewhat cooler. Lord Randolph Churchill, Maurice 

Crawford MacMillan, and Joseph Chamberlain married American 

heiresses, and offspring from the first two unions became British 

prime ministers. However, in 1890, the same year that the American 

Naval officer, Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan, published The Influence 

of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783, he also drew up a “Contingency 

Plan of Operations in Case of War with Great Britain.”1

 In 1902, British 

prime minister Lord Salisbury wrote concerning growing U.S. naval 

strength: “It is very sad, but I am afraid America is bound to forge 

ahead and nothing can restore the equality between us.”2

 So much, then, for the mawkish nostalgia and high-flown rhetoric 

about our common history that tends to bubble to the surface when 

the “special relationship” is discussed. With useful sobriety and 

illuminating detail, Professor Douglas Edlin of Dickinson College 

and Professor Mark Gilbert of the University of Trento in Italy remind 

us in their chapters on the legal and political aspects of the special 

relationship of the practicalities of the British-American alliance. 

Beneath the grandiose speeches celebrating that relationship, and 

the recent shrill denunciations of it, there are hard legal and political 

questions that we must confront. Edlin and Gilbert have done just 

that. 
94

Edlin on the ICC.

 One of the most troubling issues in recent years has been divergent 

transatlantic attitudes regarding international law. Not only have 

there been questions raised about the legality, or otherwise, of the 

Iraq war, but U.S. tactics in the war against terrorism also have come 

under scrutiny. In Chapter 5, Edlin provides a detailed analysis 

of an issue that predated both of these controversies, but that also 

overshadows them: the U.S. government’s decision not to join the 

International Criminal Court (ICC). The purpose of the ICC is to 

prosecute four types of major war crime—genocide, crimes against 

humanity, crimes in war, and aggression—if national courts are 

unwilling or unable to do so. So hostile is the United States to the 

ICC that it has adopted legislation that protects its officials and 

servicemen from potential ICC jurisdiction, no matter how unlikely 

that is. By contrast, Great Britain has both signed and ratified the 

Rome Statute (the ICC’s charter) and was an important player in 

crafting it.

 Edlin’s accessible and carefully structured analysis avoids 

the obvious positions—the first being the “everybody-does-it” 

defense, suggesting that all nations adapt international law to their 

convenience; and the second being the anti-U.S. reflex of invoking an 

imagined international legal system as a justification for attempting 

to tie the United States in juridical knots. Instead, Edlin outlines the 

four key aspects of the ICC that the United States finds objectionable 

and considers whether these arguments are well-founded. Not 

surprisingly, many U.S. objections ultimately stem from concerns 

over sovereignty.

 First, the ICC is criticized for unfair procedures that are at 

odds with the American constitution and that allow the ICC, an 

unaccountable body, to sit in judgment over the United States. Edlin 

observes that some of these claims do not stand up to scrutiny, and 

that ICC procedures do not differ much from the congressionallyenacted Universal Code of Military Justice applicable to the U.S. 

armed forces. War crimes prosecutions and domestic criminal 

prosecutions are very different and, indeed, are supposed to be.

 Second, the ICC is accused of attempting to bind nonparties, 

which is objectionable under the usual international legal practice 
95

that treaties apply only to those who have signed and ratified them. 

However, in the past the United States has acceded to treaties that 

have similar reach.

 Third, some critics worry that the ICC may engage in frivolous, 

politicized prosecutions of Americans. In fact, the ICC can take a 

case only if national courts either will not or cannot do so. However, 

the ICC can, in essence, earmark a case for future prosecution if it 

suspects that national proceedings are a means of protecting persons 

from legal jeopardy.

 Fourth, the ICC is opposed on the grounds that it is unaccountable. 

The United States wanted the ICC to be required to seek permission 

from the United Nations (UN) Security Council to proceed with a 

case. Great Britain, which initially took a similar stance, was willing 

to forgo this requirement. Making the ICC independent of the UN 

Security Council is, in fact, problematic—witness the way the UN 

General Assembly sidelined the Council by referring the Israeli 

security barrier case to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). At 

the same time, however, separating the ICC from the Council gives 

the Court an aura of independence. Indeed, the British-American 

legal tradition is the key champion of this principle of judicial 

independence. 

 American opposition to the ICC has potentially great ramifications. 

The U.S. commitment to the rule of law appears, Edlin argues, to 

have been weakened by the American stance on the ICC, a stance 

that limits U.S. influence. There are, in addition, implications for 

future military operations. British and American forces fight and 

operate side-by-side in a number of different theaters, which makes 

mutually-agreed legal standards and rules of engagement critical. 

For example, British forces apply the Geneva Conventions in their 

counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan, while U.S. forces do 

not.

 During the discussion of Professor Edlin’s paper, it became clear 

that no U.S. administration was likely to have gained congressional 

support for the ICC. This generated various questions. Could the 

U.S. government have dealt with the ICC issue more shrewdly? 

Could the United States have dodged both ratifying the ICC statute 

and the resulting opprobrium? As one participant asked, was there 

not a better alternative to just saying “no”? Could the United States 
96

have responded more constructively? The merits or demerits of 

the ICC notwithstanding, the diplomacy involved has not been 

impressive. President William Clinton’s administration signed the 

Rome Statute on the very last day of the signing period, December 

31, 2000. President Clinton thereby acceded to a treaty that he knew 

the incoming Bush administration opposed and that, even had the 

presidential election result in 2000 been different, stood little chance 

of being ratified by the U.S. Senate. President George W. Bush then 

“unsigned” the Rome Statute on May 6, 2002. Both decisions made 

little political sense. For his part, President Bush renounced the treaty 

and ignited controversy, making the United States an easy target for 

criticism, when all he had to do was to allow the Rome statute to be 

shelved, or rejected, by the Senate.

 The disagreement over the ICC has also had practical 

consequences, such as for the people of Darfur in western Sudan. 

Both sides of the argument have been able to manipulate the ICC 

controversy in a way enabling them to evade acting in the Darfur 

crisis. Neither the United States nor the critics of the its attitude 

toward international law in the European Union (EU) have any 

desire to take concrete measures to end the mass killings in Darfur. 

The United States correctly has declared Darfur to be genocide, even 

while it cooperates against terrorism with a Sudanese government 

that is largely responsible for that genocide and that was previously 

responsible for the terrorism. Invoking the word “genocide” but not 

taking action, or demanding that the UN act, is posturing. Many in 

the EU (Sweden is an exception)3

 shrink from calling the mass killings 

in Darfur genocide because such a finding by the UN would oblige 

international action, action that would either threaten their national 

interests or expose their lack of capabilities. Instead, they are content 

with the findings of a UN panel that carefully danced around this 

issue and that recommended referring the atrocities in Darfur to the 

ICC.4 That way, they also strike an attitude which implies that they 

care about the Darfur crisis, while reminding the world that they 

back the ICC and the United States does not.

 Fundamentally, however, there is also a clash of legal traditions 

at work here. Thomas Buergenthal, an American justice on the ICJ, 

has described this difference compellingly:
97

For much of our history, we have been able to look for protection to 

American courts and political institutions rather than to international 

human rights law and institutions when our human rights appeared to 

be threatened. This explains, I believe, why we tend not to appreciate 

why people in other countries often attach such great importance to 

international judicial and quasi-judicial human rights institutions and to 

human rights treaties.5

Gilbert on British Politics and the Special Relationship.

 Professor Mark Gilbert’s Chapter 6, prepared before the British 

general election and the EU crisis that followed the French and Dutch 

rejections of the new EU constitution, has held up extremely well to 

these changing events—requiring only small editorial updates for 

his contribution to this volume. Gilbert brushed aside what he called 

the “sub-Churchillian rhetoric about cultural unities and our great 

common history,” and instead analyzed the circumstances under 

which the special relationship had flourished. With a keen judgment 

of personalities, he described how personal relations between the 

president of the United States and the prime minister of Great Britain 

have played a role in bilateral relations. But three other factors, he 

argued, were even more critical: first, that the United States needs 

Great Britain to support its foreign policy; second, that British policy 

is coherently consistent with that of the United States; and, third, 

that the UK must not be perceived by Washington as letting the 

United States down. The special relationship is at its worst when 

this third condition is not fulfilled. Gilbert nonetheless concluded by 

arguing that leadership does matter, and that good leaders stretch 

constraints, refusing to allow themselves to be locked in by them.

 In Gilbert’s judgment, Tony Blair has been weakened by the 

result of the British elections. However, context matters. The terrorist 

attacks in London on July 7, 2005, and Blair’s strong leadership 

in their aftermath, have caused some to wonder whether he will, 

as he has promised, step down by the time of the next general 

election.6 It is hard to imagine any other British politician having 

the necessary skills and vision to rally the country in time of crisis 

and war. Furthermore, the EU crisis that began with the French 

rejection of the EU constitution in May 2005 has delivered a severe 
98

blow to the notion of the EU either as a rival pole of attraction for 

Britain’s primary loyalties or as a rival power to the United States 

in global affairs. Fears of the EU as a potential rival to the United 

States generally are exaggerated in any event. It is interesting to note 

that the U.S. government, in a policy review in early 2005, chose to 

retain its long-standing support of EU integration because, as the 

State Department successfully argued (in the face of Department of 

Defense [DoD] skepticism), the anti-Americanism represented by 

Jacques Chirac and Gerhard Schroeder would end when they left 

office, and their likely successors would probably take a more proU.S. stance. As one conference participant wisely observed, while 

the United States rates poorly in opinion polls in the EU, so does the 

EU itself.

 Gilbert called the current crisis in the EU “a threat and an 

opportunity for Britain.” The silly posturing over “freedom fries” 

(vice French fries) has masked the deep sense of disappointment in 

Chirac felt by the UK government.7 Blair was willing to accept some 

stress to the close defense ties between the United States and Great 

Britain by agreeing to Chirac’s demands at St. Malo, France, in 1998 

that the EU enhance its defense and security identity. The subsequent 

belief in London that Chirac ambushed the United States and Britain 

at the UN over Iraq and actively sought to engineer Tony Blair’s 

political downfall engendered antipathy that extends well beyond 

the culinary. While Blair publicly bemoaned the French and Dutch 

rejection of the EU constitution (a document that Gilbert astutely 

argues had represented a victory for British diplomacy), few doubt 

Blair’s satisfaction in seeing Chirac take the bullet for him. 

 In the light of recent EU developments, Blair looks downright 

strong, especially when the damage inflicted by the French and 

Dutch rejection of the EU constitution on both Chirac and Schroeder 

is given due weight.8 Indeed, commentators who have been busily 

interring the special relationship and its most eloquent advocate, 

the British prime minister, have now found that he is the last man 

standing in EU politics. 

 The British-American special relationship does face some serious 

problems, however, especially with some sections of British public 

opinion. Three explanations bear particular mention. First, the 
99

inequality in the relationship is bound to rankle from time to time in 

Britain. That the special relationship has endured as long as it has and 

survived repeated predictions of imminent demise is remarkable. 

The world is not replete with examples of former great powers that 

accept a demotion to junior partner status as the price of salvation. 

The British are the reliable allies of the Americans. There is great 

admiration throughout the United States for Great Britain’s staunch 

loyalty and contribution to the war against Islamist terrorism and 

in Iraq, in obvious contrast to the behavior of other EU states. In 

fact, one of the few items of agreement between George W. Bush and 

John Kerry during the presidential election foreign policy debate 

on September 30, 2004, was their respect for Tony Blair.9 On the 

other hand, Blair’s image in the United States as a reliable ally and a 

“stand-up kind of guy” who demonstrates “backbone and courage 

and strong leadership” (President George W. Bush’s words),10 has 

been the source of much of the bilious criticism by the British press 

that the Prime Minister is “Bush’s poodle.”11

 There has been a shift in British public opinion against the United 

States, but it is not as dramatic as the British news media would 

have us believe. According to the most recent poll from the Pew 

Research Center, 55 percent of British respondents have a favorable 

view of the United States (admittedly, a sharp drop from 83 percent 

in 1999/2000).12 Interestingly, those with low incomes view the 

United States more favorably than those with high incomes (57.6 

percent of low income Britons say that the United States is mostly 

a positive factor in the world, compared to 37.1 percent of those 

with high incomes).13 The British news media’s exaggeration of antiAmericanism thus stems from the simple fact that those who work in 

newspapers and television generally are not from Britain’s poorest 

classes.

 The second factor is, as Gilbert indicates, that British conservatism 

is in crisis. The pro-American consensus of British political life, 

summed up by the British politicians named in Gilbert’s chapter, 

has stretched from the socialist left to conservative right. The 

extreme left and the extreme right, meanwhile, have always been 

anti-American and will not change. What has changed, however, is 

that the British right and center-right have become anti-American. 

Britain’s Conservatives must now rank as one of the most xenophobic 
100

political movements in western Europe: They are anti-EU, anti-U.S., 

anti-immigrant, and, on occasion, anti-Irish. It is unclear who there 

is left for British Conservatives to hate.

 Conservative anti-Americanism has resulted in American 

Republicans distancing themselves from the British Conservatives. 

Instead of being embarrassed about this, British Conservatives are 

so pleased that George W. Bush closed the door of the White House 

in then-Tory leader Michael Howard’s face that they leaked the story 

to the British press.14

 Third, the Labour Party’s mismanagement of the Iraq issue has 

damaged the special relationship. Note that the problem is not the 

Iraq war in and of itself. Rather, the difficulty lies in the way that 

the government has handled criticisms of the war. Britain has been 

involved in other, less justified military operations without creating 

the same level of public controversy. The problem with Iraq is that 

Labour has simply ceded the issue to the antiwar movement and 

refused to debate it.

 How much this failure cost Blair during the May 2005 general 

election is unclear. The conventional wisdom is that Iraq explains the 

loss of Labour seats during the general election.15 However, a closer 

look at the results indicates that the Iraq effect was localized, and 

that there was no national trend during the elections. Labour held its 

two most vulnerable seats (Dumfries & Galloway and Dorset South) 

as well as Margaret Thatcher’s old seat (Finchley & Golders Green). 

Yet Labour lost far safer seats such as Dumfriesshire, Clydesdale, 

and Tweeddale (their 80th most vulnerable seat and number 96 

on the Conservatives’ target list). They also lost Hornsey & Wood 

Green, a seat that the BBC considered so safe that it was not even 

listed as a target. Indeed, the Liberal Democrats, who ran an antiwar 

and anti-U.S. platform, were probably surprised to win Hornsey & 

Wood Green as it was only number 77 on their target list.16 Local 

factors, such as tactical voting and an appeal to ethnic and religious 

prejudice, helped to hand the previously safe Labour seat of Bethnal 

Green & Bow to George Galloway, a former Labour Member of 

Parliament (MP) and apologist for Saddam Hussein.17

 Of course, for all the talk of Labour being somehow damaged 

by the May 2005 general election, it is worth bearing in mind that 

Blair won a third consecutive term, a feat achieved before only by 
101

Margaret Thatcher. Moreover, the size of Blair’s three parliamentary 

majorities exceeds those achieved by Margaret Thatcher. Far from 

being a threat, the Conservatives won fewer seats in the 2005 elections 

than Labour did at its low point in the 1983 elections. For all the 

talk of Blair’s leadership being threatened, it was the Conservative 

leader, Michael Howard, who resigned after the election. Blair has 

now put four Conservative leaders out of a job—not bad for a man 

whom the British media have repeatedly written off.

Conclusion and Recommendations.

 What, then, should be done to inject new life and direction into 

the special relationship? Five policies need to be pursued.

 First, the British government has to make the argument to its 

citizens that the special relationship serves Britain’s distinct national 

interests. Many Britons do not like the idea of doing favors for 

foreigners, whether through EU subsidies or helping the United States 

feel less lonely as a superpower. Situating the special relationship 

within the context of EU-U.S. relations may win plaudits from policy 

wonks and editorial writers, but it is meaningless to the practicalminded British electorate. Instead, what the government should be 

explaining is that the special relationship gives Britain unprecedented 

leverage and access with the United States and, as importantly, in 

the EU and elsewhere. The reason why British Foreign Secretary Jack 

Straw was welcome in Iran in the months immediately following 

September 11, 2001, was that both Iran and the United States knew 

that he would be an honest intermediary. Both sides knew where 

they stood with this middleman. Such services could not have been 

rendered by France or Germany, given the French pursuit of its 

commercial interests with Iran and German contacts with Iranian 

intelligence.

 For Britain, there is no need to make an exclusive choice between 

the EU and the United States. The dichotomy is false, since the EU 

is not a coherent bloc. What is often meant by the EU is nothing 

more than the Franco-German axis that claims to be the core of the 

EU. Were Britain to reduce its ties with the United States, there 

could well be important economic consequences and a humiliating 

reduction in British influence in the EU. The UK would be reduced 
102

to a third-rung power, a subsidiary of this Franco-German axis. On 

the other hand, were Britain to turn away from the EU, as Britain’s 

Conservatives advocate, the damage to the British economy, and to 

Britain’s influence on the continent, would be immense. 

 We need to understand that the problem for so many foreign, and 

in particular continental European, critics of the special relationship, 

is not its existence but its membership. Many EU states want to 

emulate Britain’s close relations with the United States. Indeed, we 

can rest assured that if tomorrow Britain were to renounce the special 

relationship, the president of France would board the first flight to 

Washington, and hasten to the White House to press his claim to fill 

the spot vacated by Britain.

 Second, the U.S.-British special relationship needs to demonstrate 

leadership across the spectrum of policy issues, not just security. If the 

special relationship is to matter, it must demonstrate leadership on 

precisely the economic and environmental issues which supposedly 

are its greatest weakness. A clear theme during the special relationship 

conference was the general failure of leadership on economic issues, 

with special reference to the complacent U.S. attitude toward its 

fiscal deficit and the unwillingness of the continental EU to pursue 

structural reform. The superficial thought in the EU regarding its 

economic future was neatly illustrated during the debate in France 

over the EU constitution. Chirac called neo-liberalism the new 

communism, and the only area of agreement during the referendum 

campaign was that both sides were hostile to the United States. 

 Blair challenged the continental critics of economic liberalism 

with his speech to the European Parliament on June 23, 2005, in which 

he pressed the EU for reform. The prime minister pointedly asked, 

“What type of social model is it that has 20 million unemployed in 

Europe.”18 It is an indication of how the continental EU is rethinking 

its approach to economic policy in the wake of the Franco-Dutch 

rejection of the EU constitution that the response to Blair’s speech 

was so positive.19 But Blair cannot defend free market economics on 

his own. George Bush must join him by demonstrating seriousness 

on the deficit. The President also needs to be more responsive to 

Blair’s call for a global campaign of economic assistance to Africa.

 The United States and the UK must also avoid easy solutions to 

complex economic and political problems exemplified by such long-
103

standing proposals as a Transatlantic Free Trade Area (TAFTA) or 

the more recent call for a Global Free Trade Area (GAFTA). These 

schemes, to a degree, are designed to satisfy conservative ideology 

and its fetish for sovereignty (our sovereignty, nobody else’s). To 

create such free trade arrangements would require destroying the 

EU single market, which conservatives dislike because it involves 

pooling sovereignty. Closing down the EU single market would, 

however, be too high a price for any British government to pay. 

 Britain also needs to lead the EU debate about the development of 

genuine security capabilities that complement rather than compete 

with the United States. At present, the EU is in the unfortunate 

position of being dependent upon Washington for its global security 

needs and unable to meaningfully contribute to its own defense. The 

result of this dependency is a climate of strategic irresponsibility in 

the EU. Again, Blair put it well on the eve of the Iraq war:

I would never commit British troops to a war I thought was wrong or 

unnecessary. But the price of influence is that we do not leave the U.S. 

to face the tricky issues alone. By tricky, I mean the ones which people 

wish weren’t there, don’t want to deal with, and, if I can put it a little 

pejoratively, know the U.S. should confront, but want the luxury of 

criticising them for it.20

 The luxury of criticism stems from the lack of capabilities of many 

EU states and their inability to come up with policy alternatives to 

U.S. proposals. The Franco-German position on Iraq boiled down 

to opposing the war in order to make the United States pay a high 

diplomatic price for changing a status quo that they had previously 

criticized. There was no expectation in either Paris or Berlin that 

diplomacy could resolve the issue of Iraqi noncompliance with UN 

Security Council resolutions, and both capitals accepted that war 

was inevitable. Their change of position was nothing more than 

posturing, without offering serious policy alternatives. As Jamie 

Rubin, the Clinton-era State Department spokesman, has observed, 

“After spending 1995 to 2000 criticizing Iraq sanctions, the Germans 

and French fell in love with containment.”21

 Third, the British government needs to privatize the state-owned 

news media. There is no need in a modern democracy for a stateowned broadcaster such as the BBC. The only reason why the BBC still 
104

exists is that the government controls its finances and so is able, from 

time to time, to prevent the BBC from broadcasting programs that it 

objects to. Margaret Thatcher engaged in this form of censorship on 

more than one occasion. Blair, meanwhile, has often found that this 

unrepresentative, state-financed media outlet has taken upon itself 

the mantle of the opposition to his government. He has tolerated 

this because he knows that during elections the left-leaning BBC will 

punish the Conservatives.

 Such short-term political benefits have generated a longer-term 

political cost—consistent BBC bias against the United States and, in 

particular, the war against terrorism and the war in Iraq. The BBC 

has been particularly active in propagating the notion that the British 

and American governments misled their electorates to justify the 

war in Iraq—an extremely serious allegation that has been knocked 

down by repeated inquiries. The case for war has been twisted into a 

preemptive strike and a hunt for weapons of mass destruction (WMD) 

stocks in Iraq, when the motion put before the House of Commons 

on March 18, 2003, repeatedly mentioned Iraqi breaches of UN 

Security Council Resolutions and was legally based upon repeated 

Iraqi violations of the March 1991 Gulf War ceasefire.22 The truly 

guilty party in distorting the case for the Iraq war was the BBC, as 

demonstrated by the Hutton inquiry which resulted in the resignation 

of the two top officials at the BBC, its chairman, Gavyn Davies, and 

its Director General, Greg Dyke. The journalist involved, Andrew 

Gilligan, also resigned and later joined a right-wing magazine that 

is edited by a Conservative MP, The Spectator. In a similar fashion, 

the BBC’s astonishing response to the July 7, 2005, terrorist attacks 

in London illustrated just how unaccountable the organization had 

become. For hours the BBC stuck to the initial report that there had 

been an electrical “power surge” on the lines powering the London 

Underground railway. Once events finally forced the BBC to report 

that there had been a series of terrorist attacks, the corporation then 

struggled with calling such an attack on London “terrorism.” Stories 

that initially used the words “terrorist” were subsequently edited to 

delete the word.23

 Of course, the BBC’s opinions are representative of a swathe of 

the educated class in London and the southeast, but they are not the 
105

opinions of the country, and they do not deserve to be funded by 

a form of regressive taxation. The unrepresentative nature of these 

views is encapsulated in the standard term used about the BBC and 

similar self-styled opinion formers—the “chattering classes.”

 Fourth, the United States must clarify its attitude towards 

international law and, in particular, torture. The perception that 

the United States wants international law à la carte is extremely 

damaging both to U.S. influence and to the legitimacy of the war 

against terrorism. Allegations, in some cases well-founded, of 

torture of detainees need to be fully addressed. Above all, the U.S. 

government needs to distance itself from those on the left and the 

right who are willing to countenance torture,24 and instead articulate 

a principled opposition to torture because it is morally wrong and 

damaging to any serious prosecution of the war against terrorism.25

 None of this means that the United States should bow to the new 

pseudo-legalism of human rights groups. The human rights industry 

consistently holds the United States and its allies to higher standards 

than the rest of the world and seeks to confound efforts by democracies 

to defend themselves against aggression and terrorism.26

 One argument put forward during the special relationship 

conference and mentioned by Philip Stephens in the sessions in both 

the United States and the UK bears some similarity to the unrealistic 

arguments of members of the human rights community. Stephens 

argued that no British prime minister could go to war again in support 

of the United States without UN backing. If Stephens had confined 

himself to saying that another Iraq-style venture was not politically 

feasible under present circumstances, then his judgment would have 

been correct. But his claim was broader and worrisome, implying as it 

did that a somehow chastened Britain could not risk taking assertive 

action abroad without the sanction of some ideal “international 

community.” Such a standard would unfairly tie Britain’s hands and 

its ability to defend itself. We cannot foresee future contingencies, 

and the right to use force in self-defense is a right recognized, not 

granted, by article 51 of the UN charter. It is interesting to note that 

when John Kerry suggested that any contemplated U.S. preemptive 

action should pass a “global test” of convincing the rest of the world 

of its justification,27 he was pounced on by critics.28 What Stephens is 
106

proposing resembles the right-wing caricature of Kerry’s comments, 

a surrender of British sovereignty to the UN Security Council.

 Fifth, Washington and London should continue to lead the battle 

against Islamist terrorism and Ba’athism, but they must do a better 

job of explaining that these wars are not elective. They must also 

present a more convincing case for a long-term political, military, 

and economic commitment to Iraq. To leave early, allowing Iraq’s 

nascent democracy to fail, would be to betray the Iraqis yet again 

and to nullify the value of either Britain or the United States as an 

ally.

 The war against Islamist extremism requires a careful melding 

of political and security measures. The battle for public opinion is 

an important aspect of the battle against the jihadists. Too often, 

however, Britain and the United States have defined the war in 

negative, defensive terms, for example, that it is not a war against 

Islam.29 Constantly on the back foot, they have failed to define what 

they are fighting for. Bush’s inaugural address and State of the 

Union speech in 2005 were sweeping renunciations of the realpolitik

practiced by his father.30 While Bush may think he is a conservative, 

his foreign policy is consistent with Blair’s vision of an ethical 

foreign policy and of a global community. In his willingness to shake 

up the existing world order, Bush’s policy carries strong echoes of 

the British left’s long-standing hostility to dictatorships and states 

that imprison unwilling populations. Blair’s speech following the 

London bombings, which echoed his comments to the Labour Party 

conference in 2004,31 began to address this deficit by pointing out 

that there can be no compromise or policy changes that will assuage 

the jihadists.32

 Still, more needs to be done.33 A world without terrorism should 

be our goal, but even for a world that often does not feel threatened by 

terrorism there needs to be more to offer. The promises of democracy 

without development and of globalization without global economic 

justice are not particularly appetizing. By contrast, Britain and the 

United States should pledge that more open societies will benefit 

from more open trade relations, and that there will be tangible 

economic benefits to societies that curb terrorism and extremism. 

Articulating a vision of how the world can look after the defeat of 
107

Islamist terrorism and Ba’athism will not convince all the skeptics, 

but it will force them to come up with their own alternatives.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 7

 1. Christopher Hitchens, Blood, Class and Empire: The Enduring Anglo-American 

Relationship (2nd Ed.), New York, 2004, pp. 118-119. 

2. John Gooch, “The Weary Titan: Strategy and Policy in Great Britain, 1890-

1918,” in Williamson Murray, MacGregor Knox, and Alvin Bernstein, eds., The 

Making of Strategy: Rulers, States and War, Cambridge, 1994, p. 289.

 3. Laila Freivalds, Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Carin Jämtin, Minister for 

International Development Cooperation, “Darfur Must be Treated as Genocide,” 

Ministry for Foreign Affairs, August 6, 2004, available at http://www.sweden.gov.

se/sb/d/3308/a/28085, last accessed July 17, 2005.

 4. United Nations, Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to 

the United Nations Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1564 of 

September 18, 2004, Geneva, January 25, 2005, available at http://www.un.org/News/

dh/sudan/com_inq_darfur.pdf, last accessed July 17, 2005.

 5. He then argues as follows:

Foreigners tend also not to understand why the U.S. is so reluctant to 

join in these international efforts. They know that many now democratic 

countries owe their freedom to international efforts and to the human 

rights support provided by international organizations. And they also 

believe that without external assistance they would not have been 

able to escape from under the oppressive rule of military governments 

or dictatorial civilian regimes that were in power in their countries. 

Moreover, the people who live in countries where such regimes still 

hold sway, have little faith in the willingness or capacity of their national 

judicial and political institutions to protect their human rights without 

strong international pressure.

Thomas Buergenthal, International Law and the Holocaust, Joseph and Rebecca 

Meyerhoff Annual Lecture, October 28, 2003, U.S. Holocaust Memorial 

Museum, Washington, DC, 2004, p. 24, available at http://www.ushmm.org/

research/center/publications/occasional/2003-10-28/paper.pdf, last accessed July 17, 

2005. Buergenthal was born in Czechoslovakia and survived the Holocaust.

 6. Ferdinand Mount, “Blair’s Back—Could His Current Kudos Persuade Him 

Not To Go?” The Daily Telegraph, July 13, 2005, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/

opinion/main.jhtml?xml=/opinion/2005/07/13/do1301.xml&sSheet=/portal/2005/07/13/

ixportal.html, last accessed July 17, 2005.

 7. Peter Stothard, Thirty Days: An Inside Account of Tony Blair at War, London, 

2004, contains numerous details on this.
108

8. Andrew Rawnsley, “The Lame Duck is Flying Again: The Hunted Prime 

Minister of the Election Campaign has been Transformed into a Man Back in 

Charge of the Agenda,” The Observer, June 26, 2005, available at http://observer.

guardian.co.uk/comment/story/0,6903,1514798,00.html, last accessed July 17, 2005.

 9. Commission on Presidential Debates, “The First Bush-Kerry Presidential 

Debate,” September 30, 2004, available at http://www.debates.org/pp./trans2004a.

html, last accessed July 17, 2005.

 10. “Bush, Blair Discuss Sharon Plan; Future of Iraq in Press Conference,” 

Remarks by the President and United Kingdom Prime Minister Tony Blair in Rose 

Garden, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/04/20040416-

4.html, last accessed July 17, 2005.

 11. Paul Routledge, chief political commentator, “Premier Creeps to Texan 

Idiot,” The Daily Mirror, April 17, 2004, available at http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/

allnews/tm_objectid=14154586&method=full&siteid=50143&headline=premiercreep

s-to-eejit-texan-name_p..html, last accessed June 26, 2005. The same newspaper 

declared the day after the U.S. presidential elections “DOH! 4 MORE YEARS OF 

DUBYA. How can 59,054,087 people be so DUMB?” See June Thomas, “Brits to 

America: You’re Idiots! Well, 51 percent of you, anyway,” Slate, November 4, 2004, 

available at http://slate.msn.com/id/2109242/, last accessed July 17, 2005.

 12. Pew Global Attitudes Project, “U.S. Image Up Slightly, But Still Negative: 

American Character Gets Mixed Reviews” Released June 23, 2005, available at 

http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=247, last accessed July 17, 2005.

 13. Anne Applebaum, “In Search of Pro-Americanism,” Foreign Policy, 

July/August 2005, available at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_

id=3080&p.=0, last accessed July 1, 2005.

 14. Trevor Kavanagh, “Bush: Stay away Howard,” The Sun, August 28, 2004.

 15. Nick Assinder, “Iraq hit Blair hard,” BBC News website, May 7, 2005, 

available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/vote_2005/frontp./4521337.stm, last 

accessed July 17, 2005.

 16. “BBC, Labour Defence and Targets,” May 23, 2005, available at http://news.

bbc.co.uk/1/shared/vote2005/html/gainsandlosses_lab.stm#target, last accessed July 17, 

2005.

 17. Jenny Booth, “Oona King Reveals ‘yid’ Taunts During Election,” The 

Times, London, May 11, 2005, available at http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,2-

1607947,00.html, last accessed July 17, 2005.

 18. PM speech to EU Parliament: full text, June 23, 2005, available at http://

www.number10.gov.uk/output/P.7714.asp, last accessed July 17, 2005.

 19. George Parker and Raphael Minder in Brussels and John Thornhill in Paris, 

“Blair’s vision for Europe Wins Praise of MEPs,” The Financial Times, June 24, 2005, 

available at http://news.ft.com/cms/s/63fe774c-e44c-11d9-a754-00000e2511c8.html, last 

accessed July 17, 2005.
109

 20. Michael White and Ewen MacAskill, “Listen to the World’s Fears, Blair 

Tells US,” The Guardian, January 8, 2003, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/

Iraq/Story/0,2763,870491,00.html, last accessed July 17, 2005. Put equally bluntly by 

Thérèse Delpech, “Insecurity has globalised, and a global vision as well as global 

cooperation are needed to meet the threat Today, Europe lacks both,” International 

terrorism and Europe, Chaillot Paper 56, December 2002, p. 49, available at http://

www.iss-eu.org/chaillot/chai56e.pdf, last accessed July 17, 2005.

 21. David Rieff, “Were Sanctions Right?” The New York Times, Sec. 6; Col. 

3; Magazine Desk; July 27, 2003, available at http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/

sanction/iraq1/2003/0727right.htm, last accessed July 17, 2005.

 22. “Motion to Approve the Actions of Her Majesty’s Government on Iraq,” 

available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200203/cmhansrd/vo030318/

debtext/30318-06.htm#30318-06_head1. The full debate is in Hansard, HC Deb 401 

c760-911.

 23. Gene Zitver, “The BBC’s ‘Terrorist’ Problem,” Harry’s Place, July 8, 2005, 

available at http://hurryupharry.bloghouse.net/archives/2005/07/08/the_bbcs_terrorist_

problem.php, last accessed July 17, 2005. A BBC story on July 7, 2005, had the 

headline “Bus Man may have seen Terrorist,” and the opening paragraph stated, 

“A bus passenger says he may have seen one of those responsible for the terrorist 

bomb attacks in London.” By July 8, 2005, the headline had been altered to 

“Passenger believes he saw bomber,” and the word “terrorist” had been excised 

from the article. Another article on the morning of July 8, 2005, which referred 

to “the worst terrorist atrocity Britain has seen” was altered within hours to “the 

worst peacetime bomb attacks Britain has seen.” Zitver’s analysis was picked up in 

The Times, London. See Daniel Finkelstein, “Politeness in the Photocopier Queue Is 

Why We’re Losing the War on Terror,” The Times, July 13, 2005, available at http://

www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,21129-1691644,00.html, last accessed July 17, 2005.

 24. Andrew C. McCarthy, “Torture: Thinking About the Unthinkable,” 

Commentary, Vol. 118, No. 1, July 2004, available at http://www.benadorassociates.

com/article/5900, last accessed July 17, 2005; Phillip Carter, “The Road to Abu 

Ghraib, the Biggest Scandal of the Bush administration, Began at the Top,” The 

Washington Monthly, November 2004, available at http://www.washingtonmonthly.

com/features/2004/0411.carter.html, last accessed July 17, 2005.

25. Anne Applebaum, “So Torture Is Legal?” The Washington Post, June 16, 

2004, p. A27, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A44874-

2004Jun15.html; “The Torture Myth,” The Washington Post, January 12, 2005, p. 

A21, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A2302-2005Jan11.

html, last accessed July 17, 2005.

 26. John Keegan, “Bad Law Is Making a Just War So Much Harder to Fight,” The 

Daily Telegraph, June 2, 2005, available at http://www.opinion.telegraph.co.uk/opinion/

main.jhtml?xml=/opinion/2005/06/02/do0201.xml&sSheet=/opinion/2005/06/02/

ixopinion.html, last accessed July 17, 2005.
110

 27. Commission on Presidential Debates, “The First Bush-Kerry Presidential 

Debate,” September 30, 2004, available at http://www.debates.org/pp./trans2004a.

html, last accessed July 17, 2005.

 28. Lee A. Casey and David B. Rivkin, Jr., “Kerry’s ‘global’ test,” The Washington 

Times, October 8, 2004, available at http://washingtontimes.com/op-ed/20041007-

092532-8329r.htm, last accessed July 17, 2005.

 29. Andrew Apostolou, “The War of Ideas,” The New York Post, November 8, 

2001.

 30. Bush had already publicly renounced realpolitik in his speech to the National 

Endowment for Democracy. “President Bush Discusses Freedom in Iraq and 

Middle East,” Remarks by the President at the 20th Anniversary of the National 

Endowment for Democracy; United States Chamber of Commerce, Washington, 

DC, November 6, 2003, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/11

/20031106-2.html, last accessed July 17, 2005.

 31. Blair speech to Labour Party conference, September 28, 2005, available at 

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/3697434.stm, last accessed July 17, 2005.

 32. Blair speech to the Labour Party’s national policy forum, July 16, 2005, 

available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/4689363.stm, last accessed July 17, 2005. 

Consider, for example, the following excerpt:

The extremist propaganda is cleverly aimed at their target audience. It 

plays on our tolerance and good nature. It exploits the tendency to guilt 

of the developed world, as if it is our behaviour that should change, that 

if we only tried to work out and act on their grievances, we could lift this 

evil, that if we changed our behaviour, they would change theirs. This is 

a misunderstanding of a catastrophic order.
SECTION III:

FOREIGN POLICY AND THE SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP

113

CHAPTER 8

A CONSERVATIVE VISION 

FOR U.S. POLICY TOWARD EUROPE

John C. Hulsman and Nile Gardiner

 The United Kingdom (UK) is likely to remain America’s 

paramount ally for the foreseeable future. That is why it is in America’s 

fundamental national interest to assist Britain to continue playing 

this pivotal role. Washington’s management of its relationship with 

the European Union (EU) will be a key determinant of the UK’s 

ability to maintain its influence and options as a global and regional 

actor.

 Since joining the then European Community in 1973, Britain 

has had an uneasy and sometimes tumultuous relationship with its 

European partners. During this period, the EU has evolved from a 

largely economic grouping of nation-states into an inward-looking 

political entity, with ever-greater political centralization. The British 

have found their national sovereignty gradually eroded by EU laws 

and regulations.

 Despite efforts by British Prime Minister Tony Blair to play a 

leading role in Europe, the British public has grown increasingly 

disillusioned with EU membership in the past few years. In a recent 

Institute of Commercial Management (ICM) poll commissioned by 

the New Frontiers Foundation, 59 percent of Britons agreed with the 

suggestion that the UK “should take back powers from the EU and 

develop a new global trade and defense alliance with America, some 

in Europe, and other countries across the world.” Just 30 percent of 

respondents said that Britain “should join the Euro and Constitution 

and aim for a political union in Europe.”

 The UK’s future direction in Europe will directly impact the 

United States. Economically, it is hard to imagine how two countries 

could be closer. Between 1995 and 2003, 64 percent of total U.S. 

direct investment in the EU went to the UK, while 62 percent of EU 

investment in the United States originated in Britain. The United 

States and the UK easily remain the largest foreign direct investors 
114

in each other’s economies. These extraordinarily close financial ties 

between the world’s largest and fourth largest economies would 

alone make the UK a primary U.S. national security interest.

 Militarily, along with France and the United States, the UK is one 

of only three North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) powers 

capable of sustaining a global military presence in terms of both 

transport capacity and logistics. It is unfortunate that Britain is 

embarking on major cuts in its armed forces as part of a modernization 

program. While supposedly improving Britain’s niche in military 

capabilities, the cuts are likely to leave the British military severely 

overstretched.

 Nevertheless, these three powers are the only Atlantic allies 

that can participate in the entire military spectrum, from highend, technologically intricate major warfighting through low-end 

peacekeeping. It is also helpful that both France and the UK are the 

only European countries with a genuine geopolitical grasp of military 

realities (partly due to their colonial histories) and a political tolerance 

for casualties. This state of affairs is not expected to change—it is 

highly unlikely that any other NATO power will obtain a significant 

global reach in the medium term.

 Perhaps the single greatest asset accruing to the United States 

from its relationship with Britain, however, is the UK’s proven 

political slant toward America. The two countries have a unique, 

long-standing tradition of working intimately with one another, as 

demonstrated in World Wars I and II, the Cold War, Afghanistan, 

Iraq, and the fight against al-Qaeda. This ingrained affinity—the 

product of a common cultural heritage, a common commitment to 

free markets and free elections, and common geopolitical views—is 

without parallel in the world. It explains why the UK is currently so 

vital to U.S. coalition-building and is likely to remain so.

 But this relationship obscures fairy tales America has told itself 

about the EU. For the past half-century, the policymaking elite 

in Washington has come to similarly positive conclusions about 

America’s relations with Europe at large: every effort at closer 

European integration is to be welcomed, if tepidly. The assumption 

has been that a unified Europe would inevitably prove more profree market, more pro-Atlanticist, and more pro-American. Today, 

however, following the transatlantic rift over the Iraq war and the 
115

public diplomacy calamity that has ensued for the United States, 

such simplistic analysis is starkly at odds with the schism at the heart 

of the post–Cold War transatlantic relationship.

 The United States should stop merely reacting to fundamental 

changes in Europe, voicing platitudes from the sidelines, and adopt 

a more proactive approach. Washington should develop a series 

of strategic, diplomatic, and analytical principles, with political, 

economic, and military dimensions, to guide its policies toward 

NATO and the EU and its plans for reviving the transatlantic 

relationship. In formulating these principles, the United States 

should follow the conservative precepts of the great 18th century 

British statesman, Edmund Burke, who insisted on seeing the world 

as it is, not as some might hope it to be.

 The first principle should be recognition of the continuing 

strategic centrality of Europe. Whatever the global issue—be it the 

war on al-Qaeda, the Doha trade round, Iran’s efforts to develop 

weapons of mass destruction (WMD), the Arab-Israeli conflict, or 

the future of Iraq—the United States simply cannot act effectively 

without the support of at least some European powers. The 

United States remains first among equals, but the world is neither 

genuinely unipolar nor multipolar, which makes it vital for America 

to continue to court allies. For the foreseeable future, there will be 

only one place to find those allies—Europe. It is the sole area of the 

world where political, diplomatic, military, and economic power 

can be generated in sufficient strength to support American policies 

effectively. The cluster of international powers in Europe—led by 

the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and Poland—

has no parallel.

 The leading European nations, however, rarely agree on most 

of today’s key issues of foreign and security policy. As a result, the 

United States must engage European states on an issue-by-issue, 

case-by-case basis to gain the greatest number of allies for the largest 

number of missions, thus maximizing its diplomatic effectiveness. 

 The second principle that should drive American policy toward 

Europe centers on the importance of national choice and sovereignty. 

American interests are best served when European states act 

flexibly according to their separate interests, rather than collectively 

according to some utopian ideal. Although the day may be far off, an 
116

EU implementing a genuinely supranational common foreign and 

security policy could clearly hamstring American efforts to form 

political, military, or economic coalitions with individual member 

countries.

 To illustrate the point, one need only look at the EU common 

commercial policy, under which the European Commission conducts 

international negotiations on behalf of the EU. Since the member 

states have not reached a consensus on the very principle of free trade, 

the EU formulates trade policy on the basis of the lowest common 

denominator. It can proceed only as fast as its most protectionist 

member allows. This adherence to supranationalism keeps largely 

free-trading nations with more open economies—such as the UK, 

Ireland, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, the Netherlands, and Estonia—

from following their sovereign interests and developing closer and 

mutually beneficial trading ties with the United States.

 This one-size-fits-all approach does not comport well with the 

political realities of the continent today. European countries have 

politically diverse opinions on all aspects of international life: free 

trade, NATO, relations with the United States, and how to organize 

their own economies. Ireland, for example, is a strong free-trading 

country, has extensive ties to the United States, and favors a large 

degree of economic liberalization. France, by contrast, is more 

protectionist, more statist in organizing its economy, and more 

competitive in its attitude toward America. Germany falls between 

the two on free trade and relations with the United States, but favors 

some liberalization of its economy to retain its corporatist model. 

Strategically, Ireland is neutral, France is inherently hostile to NATO, 

while Germany is more pro-NATO than France but prefers UN 

involvement in crises over that of the alliance. Such real European 

diversity ought to be reflected in each state’s control over its foreign 

and security policy. A more centralized Europe simply does not 

reflect the political reality on the ground.

 Third, the United States must follow Burke’s advice and see 

Europe as it is, not as some Europeans might wish it. Europe 

collectively is far weaker than its federalist adherents proclaim. 

Simply put, it is considerably less than the sum of its parts. In the 

wake of the Iraq war, the EU looks economically sclerotic, militarily 

weak, and politically disunited. 
117

 Economically, the Franco-German-Italian core of the Eurozone 

has structurally high unemployment. Staggeringly, according to the 

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 

between 1970 and 2000 the 12 countries now in the Euro area did 

not create any net private sector jobs. The demographic problems 

created by Europe’s falling birthrate and aging population—linked 

to its over-generous social safety net—make the preservation of 

its way of life highly dubious in the medium-term without radical 

reform. Unless Europe as a whole deals with this massive problem, 

it will be consigned to the status of an elderly theme park.

 Militarily, the collective picture is also grim. Despite a market 

that is slightly larger than that of the United States, European defense 

spending is two-thirds that of the United States and fields only 20 

percent of the fighting strength that American can deploy. Even the 

current level of spending and capability is in peril. In the words of 

leading American defense expert Richard Perle, Europe’s armed 

forces have already “atrophied to the point of virtual irrelevance.”

 Politically, Europeans remain deeply divided on seminal issues 

of war and peace, as demonstrated by the fundamental differences 

between Britain and France and Germany over Iraq. The basic 

reason is that national interests still dominate foreign policy-making 

at the most critical moments, even for states ostensibly committed 

to common foreign and security policies. For the European powers, 

Iraq has never been primarily about Iraq. It is about the attitudes 

of Europeans toward post-Cold War American power and their 

jockeying for position within common European institutions.

 One camp, championed by France, is distrustful of American 

power and strives to create a centralized EU as a rival pole of 

power to America. The other camp, led by Britain and including 

the Scandinavian, Baltic, and Central and Eastern European states, 

seeks to engage American power and favors a more decentralized 

Union. This very disparate political, economic, and military picture 

of Europe explains why the EU constitution—the latest attempt to 

impose greater central control over the European process—has been 

rejected by the voters in both France and the Netherlands. There 

is no doubt that the framers of the European project started with 

over-lofty goals, to the extent of making false comparisons with the 

drafting of the U.S. Constitution in Philadelphia in 1787. 
118

 According to the Laeken Declaration of December 2001, which 

launched the process of replacing the Union’s existing treaties, the 

new European document was supposed to clarify the division of 

competencies among the EU institutions, the member states, and the 

people, making the Union more efficient and open. The institutions 

were to be brought closer to Europe’s citizens in an effort to lessen 

the Union’s “democratic deficit.” This was to be a two-way process, 

with some powers returned to the member states and the people and 

some new competencies bestowed on Brussels. These high hopes 

bear little resemblance to the finished product. In fact, the document 

was riven with contradictions, many of which were to be worked out 

over time by the European Court of Justice, with “ever-closer union” 

as its mandate. This scheme can readily be seen as an effort at further 

centralization through the back door, a result wholly out of line with 

the notion of a diverse Europe. Tellingly, the constitution did little to 

provide citizens with a sense of control over the process of European 

government or the evolution of the Union.

 These egregious flaws explain why the constitutional referendum 

was soundly defeated by French and Dutch citizens. Indeed, these 

voters did other European governments a favor by killing the 

treaty before they were forced to confront ratification. American 

policymakers must now accept that the EU drive toward ever-closer 

union has at last decisively sputtered, and that engaging Europeans 

at the state level generally will be far more effective than engaging 

the EU itself.

 Given these broad principles, the United States should advance 

the following policies toward Europe. First, Washington should favor 

a multispeed Europe, with each state having greater choice about 

its level of integration. It now seems possible that France will make 

the case for the creation of a more integrated, confederal European 

core dominated by France and Germany, with Italy, Belgium, and 

Luxembourg as probable members. The United States should accept

this possible initiative since it will contribute to the development 

of a genuinely multispeed Europe. But the French cannot be the 

only ones to redefine their role. There must be at least two speeds 

to a reconstituted EU: the inner core, a group of states that wish to 

remain roughly as integrated as they are now, and an outer core that 

wants looser ties with Brussels. This latter group ought to regain the 
119

right to join trading blocs with non-EU countries. This will require 

a trade opt-out, just as a new confederal opt-in will be necessary for 

the inner core.

 Such a reconstituted process must be negotiated all at once, so 

that the newly defined inner core, led by France as described above, 

cannot stop other states from also altering their relationship with the 

EU. If such a policy is adopted, individual European states will be 

free to decide their own destinies.

 Second, the United States must launch a massive public diplomacy 

campaign in Europe if it is to retain the ability to engage European 

countries as allies. There is little doubt that the conflicts over the war 

in Iraq and its aftermath have been a diplomatic disaster of the first 

magnitude for Washington. While many European governments 

still support U.S. policy in Iraq, the general public remains extremely 

hostile to American foreign policy. The recently published Gallup 

transatlantic Trends 2004 poll of opinion in nine major EU countries 

found that 58 percent of European respondents believed that strong 

U.S. leadership in the world was “undesirable.”

 If Europe is the most likely place for America to find allies well 

into the new century, it must become the main focus of U.S. global 

efforts at public diplomacy. Fostering goodwill toward America will 

make a greater practical difference in Europe than anywhere else in 

the world. It may take a generation to rejuvenate the transatlantic 

alliance, and America must not underestimate the scale of the problem 

if this new strategy is to work. But unless public diplomacy is used 

effectively, America may have no European allies in the future.

 Third, the United States should help establish a Global Free 

Trade Alliance (GFTA), opening the door to genuine free trade with 

qualified European nations in the outer core. A GFTA would be an 

economic coalition of the willing, determined to liberalize trade 

among its members, augmenting already existing bilateral, regional, 

and multilateral free trade negotiations. It would not be a treaty but 

a legislative initiative, offering free trade between the United States 

and other nations with a demonstrable commitment to free trade 

and investment, minimal regulation, and property rights. Congress 

would offer GFTA members access to the U.S. market, with no 

tariffs, quotas, or other trade barriers, on the single condition that 

they offer the same access to the United States and other members of 

the group.
120

 The GFTA would associate the United States and genuine freetrading European nations with other dynamic economies around the 

world, such as Australia, Hong Kong, New Zealand, and Singapore. 

The GFTA would have no standing secretariat, and institutional 

cooperation would be limited to formal meetings of the member 

countries’ trade ministers, staffs, and technical experts. Further 

decisions on trading initiatives—such as codifying uniform standards 

on subsidies and capital flows—would be made on a consensual 

basis to further minimize barriers within the alliance.

 A GFTA could change the way people and countries think about 

free trade. Further global trade liberalization would no longer 

require wrangling over “concessions.” Instead, free trade would be 

seen for what it is, a policy that gives countries a massive economic 

advantage. As the benefits of the alliance become apparent, the 

GFTA would serve as a practical advertisement for global free 

trade. Such an organization would be extremely attractive to the 

outer European core, who are tired of the overly statist strictures of 

protectionist Brussels. And Britain would be America’s natural ally 

in the sponsorship of this initiative.

 Fourth, the United States should continue to press for NATO 

reform, particularly through increased use of the Combined Joint 

Task Force (CJTF) mechanism, endorsed by NATO governments in 

April 1999. Until recently, the alliance could take on a mission only 

if all its members agreed to do so. Under CJTF procedures, NATO 

member states do not have to participate actively in a mission if they 

do not feel their vital interests are at stake, but their absence does 

not stop other members from going ahead. As Iraq illustrates, there 

are almost always some allies who will go along with any specific 

American policy initiative.

 The new modus operandi would work both ways. Sometimes the 

United States would act together with those allies that wanted to join 

it; sometimes European countries would act without the United States. 

In fact, the first de facto use of the new procedure involved European 

efforts to head off civil conflict in Macedonia. The United States wisely 

noted that Macedonia was, to put it mildly, not a primary national 

interest. For Italy, however, with the Adriatic as its Rio Grande, 

upheaval in Macedonia would have had serious consequences, 

destabilizing a nearby region and causing an unwanted flow of 
121

refugees. By allowing a group of European states to use common 

NATO facilities—such as logistics, lift, and intelligence capabilities, 

most of which were American in origin—while refraining from 

putting U.S. boots on the ground, Washington followed a sensible 

middle course that averted a crisis in the alliance.

 Beyond the sacrosanct Article V commitment, which holds that 

an attack on one alliance member is an assault on all, the future of 

NATO consists of just these sorts of “coalitions of the willing” acting 

out of area. Such operations are likely to become the norm in an era 

of a politically fragmented Europe. The United States should call for 

full NATO consultation on almost every major politico-military issue 

of the day. If full NATO support is not forthcoming, Washington 

should doggedly pursue the diplomatic dance, rather than treating 

such a rebuff as the end of the process, as many strict multilateralists 

would counsel.

 If action by a subset of the alliance proved impossible, owing to a 

general blocking of such an initiative, the United States should form 

a coalition of willing countries around the globe outside NATO. 

After exhausting these options. America should be prepared to act 

alone if fundamental national interests are at stake. 

 Fifth, the United States must continue to encourage European 

members of NATO to modernize the alliance by developing 

a rapid reaction force—quickly deployable, highly lethal, and 

expeditionary—so as not to erode the sharing of risks that is so vital 

to the continued functioning of the organization.

 The present unequal division of labor between the United States 

and its European allies—with the United States fighting the wars 

and the Europeans keeping the peace—sets an awful precedent for 

the future of the alliance. France and Britain apart, Europe’s paltry 

military spending means that the continent’s only hope of making 

a viable contribution to allied security is to modernize and pool 

resources, in an effort to play niche roles in an overall American-led 

defense strategy.

 There is also a vast and growing technological discrepancy, with 

the United States spending nearly four times more than its European 

allies on defense research and development. Barely 10 percent of 

Western Europe’s 5,000 attack aircraft, for example, are capable of 

precision bombing, and Europe has almost no independent “lift” 
122

capacity to transport an army at will. If the United States continues to 

be the “mercenary” of the alliance while the Europeans are the “social 

workers,” this functional disparity will lead to constant differences 

in political views and imperil the viability of the alliance.

 Sixth, the United States should continue to realign and update its 

European base structure to meet the challenges of the 21st century. 

President George W. Bush has called for the removal of up to 70,000 

U.S. troops from Europe and Asia over 10 years, in a sweeping 

reorganization that would better prepare the armed forces to handle 

post–September 11, 2001, crises. Two armored divisions would 

return to the United States from Germany and be replaced by one 

light-armored brigade. The plan calls for more troops to be deployed 

farther south and east in Europe, nearer the arc of instability (the 

Caucasus, Iraq, Iran, the Middle East, and North Africa), where 

future crises are most likely to originate. 

 This redeployment is more consistent with the realities of today’s 

threats and will help to remedy NATO’s current inability to deploy 

troops quickly. By making more American troops ready for rapid 

deployment, the United States will help to revitalize the alliance and 

increase its relevance to today’s problems.

 The restructuring will also increase America’s geostrategic 

flexibility. The United States currently is too dependent on a few vital 

NATO countries. Developing a presence in other European nations 

will spread the strategic risk and decrease America’s dependence 

on any one NATO ally. Turkey, for example, will no longer be one 

of the few critical pressure points in mounting a military campaign 

in the Middle East, as it was during preparations for the war in 

Iraq. American bases in Bulgaria and Romania would shift some of 

the burden away from this hard-pressed ally, allowing Ankara to 

emphasize military action as regional in nature, not solely as a makeor-break U.S.-Turkish matter.

 It is also important to emphasize that any removal of American 

forces from Germany is not a reaction to Berlin’s opposition to the 

war in Iraq. It is imperative to reaffirm that Washington values its 

traditional European alliances, especially with Germany, and that 

the restructuring efforts will benefit all of Europe by adjusting 

NATO’s force structure to reflect the fact that the world has entered 

a different era.
123

Conclusion.

 Only by grounding American policy prescriptions in a new view 

of Europe will it prove possible to escape from the reactive nature of 

current American efforts to deal with the bewildering continent. By 

following Burke’s adage, it becomes clear that “Europe” is less than 

its admirers claim and more than its detractors admit. European 

countries remain the foundation of all coalitions that America can 

assemble well into the future, with the UK playing a critical role. 

It is also true that the United States simply cannot act effectively 

in the world without at least some European allies, whatever the 

issue. Furthermore, Europe is not the monolith bloc to which EU 

integrationists aspire. On the contrary, it shows amazing diversity, 

whether the issues are economic, military, or political. Europe 

is ultimately a hodgepodge, and this perfectly suits American 

interests.

 Simply put, America will be able to engage European governments 

most successfully in a Europe in which national sovereignty remains 

paramount in foreign and security policy, and in which states 

act flexibly rather than collectively. This flexibility, whether in 

international institutions or in ad hoc coalitions of the willing, is the 

future of the transatlantic relationship, for it fits the objective realities 

of the state of the continent. Such a Europe is worth conserving.

125

CHAPTER 9

PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE FOREIGN POLICY:

THE BRITISH PERSPECTIVE

Nicholas Childs

 A foreign policy guide to the special relationship is in some 

ways simple for anyone in Britain: Acknowledge its existence and 

inevitability, based on an amalgam of cultural, linguistic, economic, 

and emotional ties unmatched by any other partner of the United 

States. These factors encourage both Washington and London to 

cooperate on almost all the big questions. As the world’s dominant 

power, America will have “special relations” with many countries: 

Russia, China, and Israel. But not like this one. That is why, 

fundamentally, it is impossible to see Britain joining any camp that 

views the United States as a strategic rival rather than a strategic 

collaborator. And that is why, even when there is a falling out 

between Washington and London, it is still different from the way it 

would be with any other countries.

 But also accept that at times this can be a difficult, unrewarding, 

and unforgiving affair between two sovereign nations of vastly 

different weight, with different national interests. In the military and 

strategic jargon of our time, it is very “asymmetric.” But it was almost 

ever thus. I recall the uneasy smile on the face of President George 

W. Bush when the then visiting North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

(NATO) Secretary-General Lord Robertson paused by a bust of 

Winston Churchill in the White House (surely the fact that it is there 

at all speaks volumes) and recalled the great Prime Minister’s wry 

observation—which surely captures the essence of the issue—that 

the Americans can always be relied upon to do the right thing, once 

they have exhausted all other possibilities. Fundamentally, the 

Americans and the British agree on what is right and important. But, 

as the Cunard Company claimed when its great Anglo-American 

ambassadors, the liners Queen Mary and Queen Elizabeth, used to 

surge across the ocean creating their own transatlantic bridge: 

“Getting there is half the fun.”
126

 There is no getting away from the fact that the United States is 

the most powerful nation in the world by a huge margin. So it can be 

tough on friend and foe alike if it chooses. But within limits. While 

America may never have been so strong, and while globalization 

and the information revolution may mean that the planet has never 

seemed so small, it is also true that the international community has 

never been so unwieldy and willful, the levers of diplomacy so weak, 

and the costs of exerting real influence apparently so high. For these 

reasons, Washington must as a first resort invariably seek friends 

and allies. Then too, there is in Britain, in Whitehall, in the British 

news media, and sometimes among the population as well, a wish 

to be loved and appreciated. But, especially when the relationship is 

as lopsided as this one, there has got to be something in it for both 

sides.

 Of course, history is full of tensions and frictions in the relationship. 

The irony in this relationship is that, most often, it has been most 

influential when it has been most controversial. Think how difficult 

it was for President Franklin Roosevelt to extend a hand to Britain 

in the aftermath of the fall of France, and before Pearl Harbor? The 

heydays of the Thatcher-Reagan double-act were also some of the 

stormiest in terms of transatlantic tensions during the Cold War, 

with difficult and controversial choices for the British government, 

in particular, to make. These were the years of the cruise missile and 

Pershing ballistic missile deployments, Britain’s active support for 

the U.S. bombing of Libya, the Reagan-Weinberger arms build-up, 

and the Reagan fulminations against “the evil empire” of the Soviet 

Union. We can look back on each of these periods with a measure of 

historical perspective. We know the significance of the outcome: the 

successful partnership in World War II and the beginning of the end 

of the Cold War. In the current situation, however, we do not have 

the luxury of critical distance, and Washington and London must 

manage their relationship in the highly toxic environment existent 

since the invasion of Iraq. Clearly, the occupation and reconstruction 

of Iraq has cost much more in terms of lives and treasure than had 

been expected, at least by those who were making the political 

decisions. The insurgency is far from defeated. What will emerge 

from the political fluidity created in the region as a whole is very 
127

uncertain. It could all look very different from the vantage point of 

2015, but we cannot tell yet.

 The other immediate challenge is that the traditional mainstays 

of the special relationship have been military power and intelligence 

collaboration, currencies in which Britain has still had a relatively 

significant amount in the bank, and ones that carried particular 

value during the Cold War. But they are precisely the ones whose 

value and credibility have been most called into question as a result 

of Iraq. 

 On the military front, the close cooperation between the Pentagon 

and the Ministry of Defence in the run-up to war with Iraq was clear 

from my vantage point as the BBC correspondent at the Pentagon. 

U.S. defense officials always made it clear that if they had to do the 

major combat operation on their own, they could. And, indeed, we 

learned from Robert Woodward’s book, Plan of Attack, that that option 

was explicitly offered to Tony Blair because of his domestic political 

difficulties.1

 That is not to diminish the respect in which the British 

military is clearly held in the Pentagon. Without the British joining 

in at that stage, an already complex and finely-judged military plan 

would probably have been complicated still further, with even more 

serious consequences for the post-conflict phase.

 But 2 years after the invasion, as much as it is a symbol of the U.S.-

UK military alliance, Iraq is a reminder of the limits of conventional 

military power and a lesson, even for the United States, that military 

power is not a limitless resource. The Americans have just under 

140,000 personnel in Iraq, and will probably have a significant 

fraction of that number there for several years.

 Britain, for its part, has around 8,000 personnel still committed in 

its sector of Iraq. And the bottom line is that, whatever they say, both 

militaries are highly circumscribed in what they can and cannot now 

contemplate in terms of additional commitments, with the inevitable 

policy consequences. The Ministry of Defence has been more open in 

acknowledging that the British armed forces will not be in a position 

to replicate Operation IRAQI FREEDOM for several years. The 

recently departed Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, General 

Richard Myers, candidly acknowledged that the strains of Iraq mean 

that dealing with another major contingency would take more time 

and cost more in terms of casualties than would otherwise be the 

case. 
128

 Equally, the jewel in the crown of the special relationship has 

always been and remains the intelligence link. And yet, in the wake 

of the fallout from Iraq and the debacle over the weapons of mass 

destruction (WMD) issue, that link is surely the most tarnished 

element of all, at least for now. Intelligence is an area where, it is 

to be hoped, both countries are genuinely looking to learn lessons 

from the recent past, and have been re-evaluating the quality of the 

product they have been receiving recently, how it is used, and what 

it all means for their liaison.

 Of course, the response always is that the intelligence successes 

inevitably must remain secret. But the recent presidential commission 

on U.S. intelligence capabilities regarding WMD concluded with 

respect to Iraq that “the harm done to American credibility by our 

all too public intelligence failings . . . will take years to undo.”2 The 

same presidential commission concluded that the United States still 

knows “disturbingly little” about the weapons programs and even 

less about the intentions of many of its most dangerous adversaries—

which, by implication, include both Iran and North Korea. Such a 

situation clearly has considerable policy implications.3

 It may take years for the intelligence communities in America 

and Britain to regain their morale—condemned as they seem to be to 

years of perpetual radical “reforms”—and to restore their credibility 

with elements of the policymaking establishments in both countries. 

On the other hand, it is clear that they need to change, having not 

adapted sufficiently to what is admittedly a more challenging security 

environment, and having been notoriously resistant in the past to 

external pressures for reform. In any event, it seems inevitable that 

the revelations they offer will be viewed in a rather different light in 

the future from the way they were previously.

 It has often been remarked that the bar of proof that the United 

States will have to clear in the arena of international public opinion 

for any future intervention will be even higher now as a result of the 

experience of Iraq, making the construction of any future coalitions 

for action, willing or grudging, even more problematic. The question 

has also been raised as to whether a British prime minister, even the 

current one, could ever again sign up to a U.S.-led adventure like 

Iraq and take Britain to war in any similar circumstances. But the 

question is surely moot, since it must be equally inconceivable that 
129

any American president, even this American president, would be 

able to take HIS country to war again in the same set of circumstances 

as those of Iraq. Still, it must have raised a few eyebrows that the first 

published response by the new U.S. Secretary of State, Condoleezza 

Rice, to the presidential commission’s conclusions on intelligence 

was that “there are no guarantees where intelligence is concerned,” 

and that “while we may never know the exact nature of any of these 

[clandestine weapons] programs, we also have to be very careful not 

to underreact” to closed societies seeking WMD.

 If the military and intelligence pillars of the special relationship are 

circumscribed for the time being, what of the broader foreign policy 

front? The great good fortune for this relationship has been that, in 

the mainstream struggle of the Cold War, the two countries were 

the founding fathers of the Western alliance and shared a common 

ideal. The good fortune for Britain in the post-Cold War world has 

been that the main cockpits of concern have been in regions where it 

retains both real and direct influence and interest—in Europe itself, 

notably the Balkans, and in the Middle East, notably Iraq.

 More generally on the world stage, Washington and London have 

been far less in step. In the early post-World War II world, President 

Dwight Eisenhower’s cool attitude to empire and colonialism was 

as problematic for Britain as it was for France, culminating for both 

imperial powers in the fiasco of Suez. But it felt so much more hurtful 

for London than for Paris. In the 1960s and 1970s there were the 

strains over Vietnam. Even the golden age of the Reagan-Thatcher 

years had their moments of crisis. In the prime minister’s darkest 

hour, the Falklands crisis, Washington equivocated because the 

State Department feared what open support for Britain would do 

to U.S. interests in South America. The other oft-cited humiliation 

for London was the 1983 U.S. invasion of the Commonwealth 

country of Grenada. But the slight that surely must have been for 

Margaret Thatcher potentially the much more far-reaching was 

Ronald Reagan’s summit with Mikhail Gorbachov in the Icelandic 

capital, Reykjavik, in October 1986, when the two men came close to 

a sweeping nuclear disarmament pact without so much as a passing 

thought for the British Prime Minister.

 In the post-Reagan era, the ultimate diplomatist President, George 

H. W. Bush, gave Whitehall great cause for concern. His calculation 
130

of U.S. national interest and the likely international agenda prompted 

him early in his presidency to favor Germany over Britain. That sent 

shockwaves down the corridors of power in London. But more sober 

voices urged patience, counselled caution, and predicted that, when 

the chips were really down, the Americans would remember who 

their most trusted and valuable friends were. 

 So it proved to be. Vindication came in August 1990 when Iraq 

marched into Kuwait. The glue that kept the relationship solid over the 

next decade was none other than the former Iraqi president, Saddam 

Hussein. From the Kuwait invasion unfolded Operation DESERT 

STORM, the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM), the 

no-fly zones, containment (and the erosion of it), and finally—in 

the aftermath of September 11, 2001 (9/11)—Operation IRAQI 

FREEDOM. Now, of course, Iraq has morphed into the anvil on 

which the relationship has been most battered.

 Without Iraq, things begin to look shaky on the foreign policy 

front. On some of the Bush administration’s key agenda items, 

like North Korea, Taiwan, and the rise of China, Britain may have 

a view but hardly any influence. On those issues, Washington’s 

key partners and friends will surely be Seoul, Tokyo, and perhaps 

even Delhi. Equally, Tony Blair may be the most Atlanticist prime 

minister imaginable, but, absent Iraq, he espouses a liberal and moral 

international agenda on poverty, debt relief, and climate change that 

hardly sets the Bush White House on fire.

 So what is the diplomatic way forward for Britain in this unusual 

state of affairs? Tony Blair is clearly in the twilight of his premiership. 

His reduced parliamentary majority, and the fact that the locus of 

power is edging towards his assumed successor, Gordon Brown, 

give him less room for maneuver. Moreover, he has the image of 

“damaged goods” over Iraq, even if the charges that he was simply 

George Bush’s “poodle” are wide of the mark. 

 Part of the Prime Minister’s calculation over Iraq, for sure, was a 

desire to preserve the relationship and to be seen to be at America’s 

side in its hour of greatest need. But Tony Blair was not a reluctant 

follower in the argument of the threat of proliferation and WMD. 

His public statements in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 were in 

some ways in advance of those emerging from Washington at the 

time. He also went further in publicly broaching a moral case for 
131

removing Saddam Hussein than did the Bush administration. And, 

with hindsight, he probably wishes he had pressed that case further 

still.

 Equally, the concessions he extracted from Washington—in 

shaping its response to 9/11, on the U.S. demarche to the United 

Nations (UN) over Iraq, and over Middle East diplomacy—are not to 

be dismissed, especially given how otherwise deaf and impervious 

to the arguments of outsiders this particular U.S. administration 

generally is.

 Part of the problem for Britain’s international standing is its guilt 

by association with a vilified United States—so different from the 

times when everyone envied the closeness of the Thatcher-Reagan 

partnership, for example. Sorting out the temporary from the lasting 

elements of all that will be no small task.

 On the other hand, events may be conspiring to offer some new 

hope. Events in Iraq shattered the Blair vision—not a new or original 

vision, but clearly passionately felt—of Britain as the indispensable 

bridge between the United States and Europe. British attitudes 

toward Europe are part of its enduring, post-imperial identity crisis. 

But, ironically, there may now be a window of opportunity to rebuild 

that concept, and the possibility that Britain can exert real influence 

in Washington even when the two do not see eye-to-eye through the 

vehicle of the European Union (EU).

 Tony Blair may now look relatively weak domestically, but in 

comparison to most of his European counterparts, he is in a position 

of enviable strength. And, while the rows over the EU constitutional 

treaty and the budget may have provoked some serious political 

enmity between Britain and other key EU member states, they also 

offer the opportunity for Britain to press a reform agenda that would 

create a stronger but flexible Europe in which the British worldview 

could still hold sway. Above all, the EU also does not want to be seen 

as hobbled by internal debate, and it is more anxious than ever to be 

seen as an effective and constructive player on the world stage.

 The happy coincidence is that America’s and the EU’s travails 

have also prompted even the most Euro-sceptical in the Bush 

administration to take a more benevolent view across the Atlantic. 

The EU constitutional debacle probably has banished the neo-con 
132

specter of a monolithic strategic rival. At the same time, the prospect 

of Europe retreating into a period of introspective soul-searching is 

actually sounding alarm bells in the administration at a time when 

its own traditional instruments of global power projection are hugely 

circumscribed by Iraq. It would clearly be beneficial to engage with 

partners like the EU. All these considerations produced perhaps 

the most harmonious atmosphere in years for a U.S.-EU meeting in 

Washington in the wake of the catastrophic EU summit in Brussels 

in June.

 But if there is to be transatlantic engagement on British terms, it 

must also guide the agenda toward areas where it and Europe have 

common interests and real influence with Washington. That might 

be difficult, given how much Tony Blair has invested in his agenda 

for the economic development of Africa. But the issues are obvious: 

Iran, of course, for the time being at least; weapons proliferation 

in general; democratic prospects in Russia; and the challenge of an 

emerging China.

 Apart from the EU pillar, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

(NATO) pillar also cannot be neglected. Britain must more actively 

press for further reform in the Atlantic Alliance. NATO is to a 

remarkable extent pursuing a Pentagon/Rumsfeld agenda in terms 

of modernizing its military capabilities, but it is doing so reluctantly 

and half-heartedly, especially in terms of how much Europe’s NATO 

members are prepared to devote to defense spending. Moreover, 

there has hardly been the beginning of a debate on how NATO can 

organize itself for the future in order to use what capabilities it has. 

Nor has there been much substantive discussion about when to use 

these capabilities. Answers to these questions will determine NATO’s 

continuing relevance. The technicalities of military capabilities are 

important, but more important is creating a new concept of operations 

for the Alliance.

 Obviously, Britain itself cannot rest on its laurels as far as its 

own military capabilities are concerned. The current government 

has received many plaudits for the way it has transformed the 

British military through its initial Strategic Defence Review; and in 

technological and training terms, nobody is closer to the Americans 

than the British. But, as it pursues networked technology and 

transformational capabilities, Britain is perilously close to dipping 
133

below that critical mass of deployable force that would allow it 

to exercise real influence in the planning and execution of future 

interventionist missions on the scale of Iraq. Whatever government 

is in power in the coming years, it will have to look seriously and 

closely at what level of investment it is prepared to maintain in 

support of the country’s armed forces. Still, the military and NATO 

contexts only can be one element of a much broader diplomatic 

picture. “Strategic lift” and “precision-guided munitions” will not 

be ultimate benchmarks of whether this partnership will endure.

 And while America and Europe may have different ways of 

doing things, different traditions, and different strengths—in a fluid 

world in which powers of huge potential like India and China are 

on the rise—diplomatic engagement in an objective view must look 

more profitable than hostile for both America and Europe. This 

is so, regardless of America’s current position as the world’s only 

superpower and regardless of the European bloc’s status as America’s 

biggest trading partner. Instinctively, both sides of the Atlantic divide 

must also realize it surely cannot be in the interests of either America 

or Europe—let alone Britain—for the “ugly Americans” to be forever 

portrayed as wielding the big stick, while the “shifty Europeans” are 

always seen as tacking and maneuvering, managing and bargaining 

for everything but resolving nothing.

 Yet the legacy of the last few years of ill will and suspicion is 

not to be underestimated. The efforts to bridge this divide cannot be 

helped by the fact that the domestic political standings of key actors 

on each side of the Atlantic look relatively weak at the moment.

 Europe and Britain must also be wary of the fact that there is a 

debate within the right itself in Washington, not just between right 

and left, over what is the proper tone and course for U.S. foreign 

policy. For that reason, the jury must still be out as to the real 

motivation of Washington in terms of its European overtures.

 The second Bush term has certainly been focused very closely 

on Europe so far. And Europeans can take some satisfaction from 

the number of times President Bush and his top aides actually have 

crossed the Atlantic to talk to them. The words emerging from 

American lips for the most part have been soothing ones. But the 

Europeans should not be complacent. It is not a foregone conclusion 

that this administration will remain engaged across the Atlantic 
134

indefinitely if it does not see positive results. There are probably 

still some voices with influence on the White House arguing 

that Europe should not be the center of its attention, that it is by 

no means the indispensable partner on many of the issues which 

exercise Washington at the moment, like North Korea or China. So 

it will be working through Europe that Britain has the best chance 

of maintaining the special relationship and ensuring it is a real one, 

with real give and take, and real dividends for both sides.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 9

 1. Robert Woodward, Plan of Attack, New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004, 

pp. 237-238.

 2. The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States 

Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, March 31, 2005, p. 37.

 3. Ibid., Covering letter from the Commission.
135

CHAPTER 10

THE SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP AND FOREIGN POLICY:

PANEL CHAIRMAN’S REPORT

Philip Stephens

 What follows is the chairman’s report of the conference panel 

sessions on foreign policy. Needless to say, it borrows heavily from 

the excellent contributions of the panel speakers, John Hulsman and 

Nicholas Childs, and from the dialogue in our sessions in Carlisle, 

Washington, Shrivenham, and London. But, as with any synthesis, 

its conclusions will obviously be partial and, to the degree that they 

exclude some points and add others, the responsibility for errors and 

omission lies fully with the chairman.

 Our conference could not have been more timely. Events since 

the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11), including the 

war in Iraq, have exposed the enduring strengths of the special 

relationship. Rarely have a U.S. president and a United Kingdom 

(UK) prime minister worked so closely in pursuit of common foreign 

policy objectives as George W. Bush and Tony Blair. The interlocking 

strands of the relationship—historical, cultural, and economic as well 

as those in the traditional security arenas of defense and intelligencesharing—are mutually reinforcing. The habit of cooperation is deeply 

ingrained. 

 Yet even at this moment of maximum cooperation, our 

proceedings recognized that the context for the relationship has 

changed fundamentally. The transatlantic alliance has lost the glue 

provided by a common enemy in the form of the Soviet Union; a 

much expanded European Union (EU) has fractured over Iraq; and a 

cultural chasm between conservative, religious America, and liberal, 

secular Europe has raised deeper questions about shared values. 

Britain’s foreign policy establishment knows East Coast America; 

the Midwest and South are unfamiliar territory. The North Atlantic 

Treaty Organization (NATO), the vital hub of the postwar security 

alliance, has failed fully to adapt to the new global environment. The 
136

big conclusion that policymakers in Washington and London should 

draw from these changes is that theirs is no longer a friendship 

that can be taken for granted, but rather a relationship that must 

be worked at. Few could imagine divorce, but some of our number 

worried that, over time, this could become a marriage of separate 

lives.

 The value for the UK of intimate engagement with Washington 

is that, matched by its place in the EU, it allows the occupant of 10 

Downing Street to lay claim to a role in international affairs that 

would otherwise be denied a middle-ranking power. Tony Blair set 

out this ambition in a speech in the autumn of 1999. He alluded to 

Dean Acheson’s famous remark some 40 years earlier that Britain 

had lost an empire and failed to find a role. This had indeed been the 

case, Blair said. But the world had moved on: “We have a new role . . . 

not as a superpower but as a pivotal power, as a power that is at the 

crux of the alliances and international politics which shape the world 

and its future.”1

 Blair’s foreign policy has thus been guided by the 

hope, only sometimes fulfilled, that Britain can combine its position 

as America’s closest friend with one of foreign policy leadership in 

the EU. 

 For the United States, the benefit lies in a reliable ally—a nation 

that, by and large, shares America’s instincts and values and one, 

by virtue of history and tradition, that is willing to stand alongside 

Washington in moments of difficulty and conflict. During the Cold 

War, this translated into solidarity in the face of the Soviet threat. 

More recently, it has been reflected in Britain’s decision to stand 

shoulder to shoulder with the United States in Afghanistan and Iraq. 

Even a sole superpower needs friends.

 If most of the participants in our symposiums were optimistic 

that the partnership would endure, there was agreement that nothing 

should be taken for granted in a world as uncertain as the present 

one. During the 15 years since the collapse of the Soviet Union and 

the 4 years since the second geopolitical earthquake represented 

by 9/11, most, if not all, of the postwar arrangements established 

by Franklin D. Roosevelt, Harry S Truman, and Winston Churchill 

have come under scrutiny and strain. The world in 2005 is a different 

place from that of 1945, and the tectonic plates are still moving. 

After the fall of the Berlin Wall, the distinguished American political 
137

scientist, Francis Fukuyama, wrote a book characterizing the defeat 

of communism as the end of history.2

 It was a beguiling thesis, but 

premature. Surveying today’s still-shifting geopolitical landscape, 

the same author might agree that the beginning of history would 

have been a more apposite choice.

 If the post-World War II alliances and institutions are to endure, 

they will have to prove themselves again and, in most cases, be 

reshaped to meet the challenges of the 21st century. For the moment, 

the United States is the world’s sole superpower, the “hyperpuissance” 

in the description of former French Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine. 

The “status quo” power of the Cold War has since 9/11 become a 

revolutionary one, determined at once to intervene preemptively 

against its enemies and to embark on a long-term project to spread 

freedom and democracy in the Middle East. The United States is 

invincible but not invulnerable. The global order is being reshaped 

to reflect these new realities. The special relationship is no exception. 

Policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic recognize the worth of 

this particular alliance, but they have begun to appreciate that they 

must demonstrate its continuing relevance.

 The two nations share the same global outlook. Tony Blair 

understood more clearly than most world leaders how profoundly 

the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington of 9/11 had 

changed forever the psychology of an America that has preferred 

to eschew foreign adventures. That appreciation and a parallel 

determination to stand alongside the United States, both reinforced 

by the bombings in London itself in July 2005, explain the warmth 

between London and Washington of recent years. Though Blair 

and Bush come from different places on the political spectrum, they 

have forged a strong personal relationship built on mutual trust. 

Blair is a frequent visitor to the White House and the two men speak 

regularly—often weekly—via a video link installed in the basement 

of 10 Downing Street.

 Threat perceptions—from Islamist terrorism, proliferation of 

weapons of mass destruction (WMD), rogue and failing states—

and assessments of the appropriate long-term responses, including 

encouragement for the spread of democracy in the Middle East, 

are also similar. After a period in which the White House seemed 

indifferent to Tony Blair’s constant calls for action to resolve the 
138

Palestinian-Israeli conflict, George W. Bush has adopted a policy 

of active engagement in the region. The transatlantic, and transEuropean, wounds opened by the Iraq war—encapsulated in 

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s sardonic characterization of 

the continent’s division between Old and New Europe—have begun 

to close.

 The participants in our conferences, though, also recognized 

the challenges to the relationship that have flowed from sometimes 

different approaches to the fight against terrorism, from the strategic 

implications of rising powers in Asia, and from a diverging approach 

to international institutions and law. Blair’s aim has been to keep 

the United States committed to a vibrant transatlantic partnership, 

to a rules-based international system, and to global cooperation. 

The Bush administration often has been reluctant to accept such 

perceived constraints on its national sovereignty.

 We should not idealize the special relationship. It is as much a 

product of national interests as of cultural affinities and historical 

affections. British prime minister Harold Macmillan once mused that 

the UK could act as Greece to America’s Rome, steering “new world” 

power with “old world” wisdom. This conceit, though, has through 

the years both exaggerated British influence and underestimated 

American self-interest. Both partners have shown they can be hardheaded when national and mutual interests have seemed to diverge. 

In a masterful review of the historical roots of the alliance’s foreign 

policy dimensions, Nicholas Childs reminded us of the many 

moments when opinions and interests have collided, straining our 

transatlantic ties. Dwight D. Eisenhower’s disdain of empire forced 

Britain’s humiliation at Suez in 1956. During the following decade, 

British prime ministers adamantly resisted pressure from Washington 

to commit their troops to the war in Vietnam. Margaret Thatcher 

danced on the world stage with Ronald Reagan in a close embrace, 

but there were sometimes fierce arguments when the music stopped. 

France, not the United States, proved Britain’s most stalwart ally 

during the Falklands war. Washington provided vital intelligence 

and communications for the British task force in the South Atlantic, 

but only after a period of equivocation which saw Thatcher speak to 

her friend in the White House in the plainest possible terms. Reagan’s 

flirtation with a sweeping nuclear disarmament pact with the Soviet 
139

Union’s Mikhail Gorbachev at the Rejkjavik summit ignored British 

interests. A few years later, George W. H. Bush deeply offended his 

closest ally by declaring a reunified Germany his most important 

strategic partner in Europe.

 One could add to Nicholas Child’s list the casual disregard for 

Britain’s nuclear deterrent shown by John F. Kennedy when he 

cancelled the Skybolt missile system, and the deep divisions between 

John Major’s government and the Clinton administration over the 

Balkans during the early 1990s. For some in Washington—including 

some in the present administration—the presumption that it should 

consult London often has seemed an unwelcome encumbrance. 

 During the post-World War II decades, the relationship weathered 

such storms—whatever their intensity, they were peripheral to the 

binding imperative to preserve the coherence of the Western alliance 

in the face of the Soviet threat—but they were a reminder that it 

is an essentially lop-sided partnership. One of the recurring themes 

of our conferences was a feeling that the British, with customary 

self-deprecation, have often underestimated their influence in 

Washington. That may be so. But while the occupant of 10 Downing 

Street can claim influence in Washington, the lesson of recent history 

is that power lies with his or her counterpart in the White House.

 That said,our American participants stressed the importance of 

the alliance to Washington. John Hulsman set the special relationship 

in the broader transatlantic framework. The shifting sands of 

geopolitics meant that ties with London had to change, but that did 

not diminish their importance to the United States. The ingrained 

affinity between the two nations was a product of both common 

cultural heritage and a remarkably similar worldview. Britain was 

also one of only two European powers (the other is France) with the 

military capability and political will to project power in the world. 

In Hulsman’s view, that made the UK a vital partner in the pursuit 

of America’s global goals.

 We caught a glimpse of this during the Iraq war. In the weeks 

before the toppling of the Baghdad regime, Secretary Rumsfeld 

stated publicly that the invasion would go ahead with or without the 

UK’s armed forces.3 The Defense Secretary’s wholly undiplomatic 

remark spoke to the military reality: Britain’s contribution in men 
140

and materiel to the removal of Saddam Hussein was significant but 

not vital. Yet the presence of British troops in the invasion force spoke 

to a political commitment of far greater significance—the more so 

as the security situation in Iraq deteriorated in the aftermath of the 

war.

 In this part of our discussion, there was a discernible difference 

between some of our British and American participants. Childs, 

like Hulsman, set the relationship in the familiar context of a wider 

transatlantic alliance, but emphasized, from a British perspective, its 

interaction with the UK’s European alliances. A unique friendship 

with Washington has served as one axis of a triangle which has 

also seen the UK seek to maximize its influence in an integrating 

EU. For most (not all) postwar British governments, the two sets of 

relationships have been seen as mutually reinforcing. Influence in 

Washington has been parlayed into a louder voice in Paris or Berlin, 

and vice versa. Such a balancing act, however, has rested on the 

assumption of U.S. support for closer European cooperation. That 

assumption has now been challenged as a consequence of German 

and French opposition to the Iraq war. Some in Washington—and 

John Hulsman put the case eloquently—believe that the United States 

should withdraw its support for European integration. In particular, 

it should see the development of a common European defense 

and security policy as a threat to NATO. Instead, in his view, the 

administration should focus on building up its bilateral relationships 

with like-minded European allies—the UK most certainly, but also 

newly democratized nations in the east such as Poland and the Baltic 

states. There are many in Washington who favor such a strategy of 

building coalitions of the willing instead of seeking accord with a 

cohesive EU. But the implications for a British government of such a 

policy would be serious: It would be forced to make the choice that, 

since Suez, it has done its utmost to avoid—as between the United 

States and Europe.

 Such discussions invited the conclusion that policymakers face 

three sets of challenges in sustaining and adapting the special 

relationship. The first task was to recognize the potential strains, as 

well as the enduring strengths, in the relationship. Events since the 

terror attacks on New York and Washington on 9/11 have exposed 
141

a clash of strategic cultures between a United States determined to 

act decisively against its enemies and a Europe more wedded to the 

projection of “soft power” than of military might. Britain finds itself 

torn between the two: willing to act when necessary, but anxious 

that intervention carry international legitimacy.

 Tony Blair has paid a significant political price for his staunch 

support of the Iraq war. The conventional wisdom has it that Blair 

joined the mission against Saddam Hussein in order to protect a 

privileged position in Washington. That is far too simplistic a view. 

The desire to preserve the strategic alliance certainly played a part in 

the dispatch of British troops to the Gulf. But Blair was as convinced 

as was George W. Bush that the Iraqi leader could not be permitted 

any longer to defy the international community. He agreed that 

the attacks of 9/11 had changed the nature of the threat posed by 

Saddam. Where others saw British obsequiousness to Washington, 

Blair saw a common foreign policy interest in upholding the will 

of the international community and in sending a powerful signal to 

those other nations that might be seeking to develop WMD.

 These judgments were questioned, though, by the British 

electorate and by many in Blair’s own Labour party. A widespread 

view in the UK has been that Bush and Blair misled their voters 

into war—a suspicion reinforced by the failure to uncover WMD in 

Iraq and by the rising cost in lives and treasure of the post-invasion 

insurgency. In spite of his third election victory in May 2005, Blair 

has paid dearly in terms of trust and popularity for the war. One 

consequence is that it would be difficult, if not impossible, for the 

prime minister, or indeed his eventual successor, to join the United 

States in a similar preemptive strike against potential enemies. If 

Bush had to struggle to secure congressional backing for such action, 

the occupant of 10 Downing Street would almost certainly fail to win 

the support of the House of Commons. More worryingly, the war 

and its bloody aftermath have nurtured a growing anti-Americanism 

among some sections of the British electorate. Events at Abu Ghraib 

prison in Iraq and the controversy over the rights of those held at 

Guantanamo Bay have led to questions in the UK about the extent to 

which values are still shared across the Atlantic.

 Second, although Bush and Blair agreed to act in the face of 

hesitation at the United Nations (UN), there remains an underlying 
142

divergence in attitudes toward multilateral institutions and 

international law. Britain’s instinct is that of most of its European 

neighbors, that threats to the global order are best met by responses 

that carry the stamp of international law and assent. It was Blair 

who prodded the President into seeking Resolution 1441 in the UN 

Security Council, and he desperately wanted a second resolution. 

Britain is part of the International Criminal Court, has signed up to 

the Kyoto treaty on climate change, and has supported the additional 

protocol for the chemical weapons convention. More recently, Blair’s 

government has joined with those of France and Germany in seeking 

a negotiated end to Iran’s uranium enrichment process. The present 

U.S. administration has made it clear that it supports multilateralism 

on sufferance. Most international agreements are seen as unacceptable 

constraints on its national sovereignty. The differences between 

Washington and London have thus far been bridgeable. It may not 

always be so.

 Third, the geopolitical context for the special relationship has 

changed. For Britain, the close alliance with Washington was as 

much a product of the Anglo-French debacle at Suez in 1956 as the 

warmth of the wartime alliance between Churchill and Roosevelt. 

The ignominious withdrawal from Suez at Eisenhower’s insistence 

marked the moment when the UK finally acknowledged that the 

sun had set on its great power status. As the retreat from empire 

accelerated, Harold Macmillan, who succeeded the discredited 

Anthony Eden, accepted that henceforth Britain could not engage 

in foreign adventures against the wishes of the United States. It was 

Macmillan who made the special relationship the leitmotif of British 

foreign policy for succeeding decades, combining it with the policy 

of active engagement with the leading powers of Europe. Blair’s 

strategic vision of the UK as the pivotal power, or a bridge, between 

Europe and the United States was born of Macmillan’s decisions. 

 The collapse of communism, however, has removed the 

overarching framework provided by the Soviet threat. Europe is no 

longer at the center of Washington’s geopolitical interests—American 

security interests are linked more closely now to developments in 

the Middle East and Asia. Equally, in the absence of Soviet troop 

concentrations on the German borders, the U.S. security guarantee 

is no longer the sine qua non of European security. The weakening of 
143

NATO as the essential forum for western security and the divisions 

within Europe over the Iraq war reflected these new geopolitical 

realities. They raise questions also over the durability of the UK’s 

balancing act between the United States and Europe. For the past 40 

years, it has avoided choosing between its American and European 

friends. Can it continue to do so?

 The answer is “Yes, but.” The strategic interests of Europe and 

the United States, and thus London and Washington, remain the 

same: Stability and freedom in the Middle East, a sustained path to 

democracy in Russia, partnership rather than rivalry with emerging 

great powers such as China and India, a global effort to separate 

moderate Islam from al Qaeda terrorism, and an effective brake on 

the profileration of unconventional weapons.

 Mutual interests, however, are not a guarantee of mutual 

understanding. For 50 years the special relationship existed within 

the interlocking network of global institutions and treaties created 

after 1945. Many of these have been pushed to one side. The status quo 

superpower of the Cold War has become a hyperpower determined 

to remake the geopolitics of the Middle East and beyond. The United 

States looks out on a Hobbesian world in which overwhelming force 

is the most effective instrument of security; Britain views a terrain 

which also demands multilateral order and rules to avoid conflicts. 

Britain will strive to keep the special relationship, not only because 

it offers vital emotional reassurance for a power which still hankers 

after the influence of empire, but also because it depends on the 

United States for its nuclear deterrent. The special relationship also 

allows British prime ministers to take their place at the front of the 

international stage. But Europe is no longer America’s front line. 

Will Washington continue to think it worth the indulgence?

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 10

 1. “Shaping a Pivotal Role For Britain in the World,” Prime Minister’s speech, 

Lord Mayor’s Banquet, November 22, 1999, available at www.fco.gov.uk/files/kfile/

appendixjk.pdf. 

2. Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, New York: Free 

Press, 1992.

3. “Rumsfeld’s Latest Ad-lib Riles Britain,” Chicago Tribune, March 13, 2003, 

available at www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld. 

SECTION IV:

SECURITY AND DEFENSE ASPECTS 

OF THE SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP

147

CHAPTER 11

OBSERVATIONS ON THE SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP

IN SECURITY AND DEFENSE MATTERS

Leo Michel

 The substance of the U.S.-UK special relationship in security and 

defense matters was hardly mentioned during the 2005 parliamentary 

election campaign. British commentators agree, however, that 

broad public discomfort with Prime Minister Tony Blair’s decision 

to cooperate closely with President George W. Bush on Iraq was a 

key factor in Labour’s significant losses in the House of Commons. 

While it remains unclear how the voter’s message and the reduction 

of Labour’s majority in Westminster will affect specific outcomes 

on defense issues confronting the new Blair government (and its 

new Secretary of State for Defence, Dr. John Reid), it is reasonable 

to assume that Her Majesty’s Government’s (HMG) margin of 

maneuver on three fronts—the level of cooperation with U.S. forces 

in ongoing or possible future military operations; implementation of 

recent initiatives to restructure UK non-nuclear forces and capabilities 

(e.g., former Secretary of State for Defence Geoffrey Hoon’s July 

2004 Ministry of Defence report, Delivering Security in a Changing 

World); and looming future issues pertaining to the UK nuclear 

deterrent and role in missile defense—will be reduced. Ironically, 

these developments coincide with a marked increase in explicit and 

implied U.S. interest in broader and deeper security and defense 

cooperation with allies and partners, especially those—headed by 

the UK—with proven capabilities and a demonstrated political will 

to use them.

 I intend, therefore, to focus on four areas:

 • Impact of ongoing U.S. reviews affecting our defense 

strategy, military capabilities, and global and domestic basing 

posture;

 • Future of nuclear cooperation;

 • Missile defense; and,

 • UK’s “bridging” role between the United States and EU.
148

 In addition, where possible, I will weave in some modest 

recommendations on what might be explored to maintain and 

strengthen the special relationship that has largely benefited both 

our nations.

Defense Strategy.

 The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) is engaged in a number 

of high-level assessments and planning efforts that will reshape 

American strategy and capabilities for years, if not decades, to come. 

These include the:

 • National Defense Strategy and National Military Strategy

(developed in parallel and released in early 2005);

 • 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review (now underway and due to 

Congress in February 2006);

 • Global Posture Review (now in the negotiation and 

implementation stage); and,

 • Base Realignment and Closure recommendations approved by 

the Congress and President in November 2005. 

 Taken individually, none of these efforts represents a radical 

departure from core concepts developed during the first year or 

two of the Bush administration. Together, however, they probably 

represent a watershed in its efforts to “transform” American defense 

and its relationship with allies. Having analyzed “lessons learned” 

during the post-Cold War period and the aftermath of September 

11, 2001 (9/11)—and, in particular, its heavy engagement in Iraq 

and Afghanistan—the defense establishment and, in time, the White 

House and Congress will need to make a series of tough decisions on 

U.S. strategic priorities and resource allocations; the size, structure, 

equipment, and basing posture of U.S. military forces; and, of course, 

American relations with allies and partners.

 To describe these processes as “complex” would be grossly 

inadequate (even by British standards of understatement). Moreover, 

they do not necessarily predict how the United States might act in any 

specific crisis. But understanding how American strategists assess 

the evolving international security environment, as well as the forces 
149

and capabilities needed to protect and advance American interests, 

provides a good a set of clues to future American actions. This, in 

turn, might be of some help in determining how the UK—alone, or 

with the United States, or in cooperation with other nations—should 

frame its strategy and configure its military forces and capabilities. 

 By way of background, here is a thumbnail sketch of the key 

reports. In the National Defense Strategy, the Secretary of Defense 

provides guidance to DoD on what it must do to implement the 

President’s National Security Strategy of September 2002.1 (The 

latter is still in force and covers the broad range of national security 

concerns and tools, not just those under Defense’s purview.) A few 

points deserve emphasis:

 • First, the National Defense Strategy’s opening sentence—

“America is a nation at war”—speaks volumes. “Today’s 

war,” the report continues later, “is against terrorist extremist 

networks, including their state and non-state supporters.” 

Although the term “Global War On Terrorism” rankles many 

in Europe, who might see it as either simplistic or dangerous 

or both, terrorism is the most acute manifestation of what 

the document calls “irregular challenges,” i.e., challenges 

coming from those using unconventional means to counter 

traditional advantages of stronger opponents. However, 

“irregular challenges” are not the only category of strategic 

threat facing the United States. The document also identifies 

“traditional challenges” posed by states employing recognized 

military capabilities and forces; “catastrophic challenges” 

involving the acquisition, possession, and use of weapons of 

mass destruction (WMD); and “disruptive challenges” from 

adversaries seeking break-through technologies to counter 

current U.S. advantages in key operational domains. Moreover, 

these challenges might overlap; for example, al Qaeda is 

an “irregular” threat but is actively seeking “catastrophic” 

capabilities. Indeed, one reasonably could argue that, if 

evaluated in terms of likelihood and U.S. vulnerabilities, 

the potential combination of “irregular” and “catastrophic” 

challenges is the most pressing security problem facing us. 

That said, we do not have the luxury of focusing on only one 
150

or two challenges; thus, the strategy addresses the need to 

fight today’s fight, while simultaneously reassuring allies 

and friends and preparing to dissuade, deter, or defeat future 

adversaries in an environment of “strategic uncertainty.”

 • Second, against this backdrop, the National Defense Strategy

notes that U.S. forces currently are shaped and sized, at least 

in principle, to meet four major objectives set by the 2001 

Quadrennial Defense Review: (1) to defend the U.S. homeland; 

(2) to assure allies and friends through forward deterrence in 

four critical regions; (3) to swiftly defeat adversaries in two 

overlapping military campaigns; and (4) to “win decisively” 

(this includes the so-called “regime change” option) in one 

of those campaigns. These objectives are to be met while 

preserving the U.S. ability to conduct a limited number of 

“lesser contingencies.” In Pentagon jargon, this is known as 

the “1-4-2-1 planning construct.” 

 • Third, the strategy emphasizes that “battlefield success” is 

only one element of a long-term, multifaceted U.S. campaign 

against terrorism. Other military activities (such as training 

and assistance to humanitarian efforts) as well as nonmilitary 

efforts (such as diplomacy, strategic communications, 

law enforcement, and economic sanctions) also must be 

employed. As underscored several times in the report, this 

places a very high premium on strengthening alliances and 

partnerships with nations (in both military and nonmilitary 

spheres) that share our interests and principles—although, as 

noted in the report, “even among our closest partners, threats 

will be perceived differently and consensus may be difficult 

to achieve.”

 • Fourth, notwithstanding the multiple references to working 

with allies and partners to develop an “active, layered defense” 

and to prevent problems from becoming crises, the strategy 

states: “Allowing opponents to strike first—particularly 

in an era of proliferation—is unacceptable.” The strategy 

refers to the President’s range of options, including a single 

mention of “preempt(ing) a devastating attack,” but contains 

a potentially sweeping statement of intent: “At the direction 
151

of the President, we will defeat adversaries at the time, place, 

and in the manner of our choosing—setting the conditions for 

future security.” 

 In the National Military Strategy, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff takes the broad guidance within the National Security Strategy

and National Defense Strategy and translates this into a set of military 

objectives from which U.S. combatant commanders and the military 

services identify the capabilities they desire and against which 

the Chairman assesses risk.2

 Hence, the National Military Strategy

emphasizes the changing nature of military challenges, including: 

a wider spectrum of adversaries, ranging from states to nonstate 

organizations and individuals; a more complex “battlespace,” 

encompassing densely populated urban areas (as experienced in 

Iraq) as well as some of the most remote and inhospitable terrain 

(as in Afghanistan); and the global proliferation of technology and 

advanced weaponry that could “dramatically increase an adversary’s 

ability to threaten” the United States. 

 To counter such challenges, the National Military Strategy lays out 

a series of steps necessary to apply the three key principles to be 

considered by combatant commanders in planning and conducting 

operations: “agility” (i.e., the ability to rapidly deploy, employ, 

sustain, and redeploy capabilities in geographically separated 

and diverse regions); “decisiveness” (i.e., the ability to overwhelm 

adversaries, control situations, and achieve definitive outcomes 

without necessarily large force deployments); and “integration” (i.e., 

ensuring military activities are synchronized across military services, 

other government agencies and nongovernment organizations, and 

with overseas allies and partners).

 In some respects, the National Defense Strategy and National 

Military Strategy can be seen as the political and doctrinal foundation 

of the 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review, the congressionally mandated 

report that recommends the capabilities needed to execute strategy. 

In the 1997 and 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review, the defense strategy 

was an output of the reviews; this year, the National Defense Strategy

was decided first. Specifically, the Quadrennial Defense Review will be 

looking at four “core problems”:
152

 • What capabilities are needed to build partnerships to defeat 

extremism?

 • What capabilities are needed to defend the homeland in 

depth?

 • What capabilities are needed to shape the choices of countries 

at a “strategic crossroads”?

 • What capabilities are needed to prevent the acquisition or use 

of WMD by hostile state or nonstate actors? 

 Among the six high-level civilian and military panels preparing 

to execute the review, the three panels likely to produce the most 

visible changes in military posture will examine: (1) “capabilities mix” 

issues affecting force structure and modernization; (2) “manning and 

balancing” issues focusing on personnel; and (3) “enablers,” i.e., the 

capabilities essential to transforming the military, including airlift, 

sealift, logistics, and command, control, communications, computers, 

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR). One should 

not discount, however, the import of the panel examining “roles and 

missions,” which will look inter alia at how DoD is organized, and 

how it interacts with other U.S. government agencies, to address the 

range of strategic challenges.

 The review must tackle a number of tough questions, many of 

which will have significant consequences for how the United States 

apportions its defense budget, what risks it is willing to take, and 

what trades it might make among capabilities options to mitigate 

those risks. (According to senior defense officials, the review panels 

are told not to assume continuing real increases in defense spending. 

This leads some analysts to view the Quadrennial Defense Review 

as a critical tool to determine how much “transformation” must 

be trimmed to accommodate rising personnel costs. Of course, the 

potential trades between transformation and personnel costs are 

just one example among many others.) Examples of such potential 

questions might include:

 • How best to reconfigure and equip ground forces to confront the 

stubborn, low-tech, but deadly insurgency-terrorist enemies 

of the Iraqi type? How will the acknowledged importance 

of certain capabilities required for such warfare—including 
153

information warfare, special forces, and civil-military affairs 

and military police units—fare in the inevitable competition 

over budgets?

 • How best to reduce the ratio of administrative and support 

personnel to combat forces, and to reduce the strain on 

reserve forces? Regarding the latter, does the United States 

need a permanent increase in the size of its active duty land 

component (Army and/or Marines) and, if so, by how many, 

in what areas, and how fast?

 • How best to integrate and scale down redundant and costly 

programs in areas such as missile defense and advanced combat 

aircraft? (Congressional resistance to recently proposed budget 

cuts affecting, for example, the F/A-22 “Raptor” fighter and 

C-130J Hercules transport plane illustrates the problem.)

 • How should the United States construct its C4ISR capabilities 

in ways such that valued allies can “plug into” U.S. systems? 

More broadly, is the United States prepared to make tradeoffs 

in its capabilities in order to cooperate better with partners 

(European and non-European) who, in some areas, are not so 

capable—and, if so, where and at what levels of risk?

 • What DoD capabilities are needed to support the Department 

of Homeland Security and state and local authorities in the 

event of new terrorist attacks inside the United States? In 

this regard, according to recent press reports, the Quadrennial 

Defense Review will look at what would be necessary to 

respond to a small number of simultaneous attacks involving 

mass casualties.

 Completing this picture are the Global Posture Review and the Base 

Realignment and Closure process. Under the former, DoD is moving 

to implement the President’s plan outlined in August 2004 (after 

a 3-year review and extensive consultation with allies) to update 

U.S. military presence overseas and leverage 21st century military 

technologies. The plan follows major redeployments and adjustments 

in U.S. force structure that have been underway since the early 1990s, 

as American defense strategy adjusted to the end of the Cold War. 

Over the next decade, this plan is expected to result in the return to 
154

the United States of some 70,000 uniformed personnel and 100,000 

civilian employees and dependents.

 Details of the plan are still under discussion with allies and 

partners around the world, but the basic architecture is fairly well 

set. 

 • In Europe, roughly two brigades of “heavy” forces designed 

for Cold War-type scenarios—forces that have spent much of 

the last decade operating outside the continent—will return 

to the United States. In Germany, for example, General James 

L. Jones, USMC (Combatant Commander for Europe) foresees 

reducing the number of major U.S. Army communities from 

14 to 4 and redeploying about 37,000 of the existing 62,000 

troops back to the United States by late 2010. Meanwhile, 

a U.S. Stryker Brigade Combat Team and enablers will be 

stationed at Grafenwoehr, Germany, by late 2007, with an 

additional rotational brigade combat team to operate out of 

relatively austere forward operating sites in Eastern Europe. 

Ground, air, and naval headquarters will be streamlined and 

consolidated. Special forces, both forward-stationed and 

rotational, will increase in importance.3

 • In Northeast Asia, about 12,500 troops will be removed 

from the Republic of Korea during 2005-08. U.S. military 

headquarters will shift from Seoul to Osan, and U.S. forces 

close to the Demilitarized Zone will move in phases to 

locations south of the Han River, out of North Korean artillery 

range. Additional advanced air and naval strike assets will 

be stationed in the Western Pacific. Washington and Tokyo 

are discussing a possible realignment of U.S. forces in Japan, 

but major reductions below the 45,000 troops currently 

deployed appear unlikely. In Central and Southeast Asia, the 

United States is working to establish a network of austere 

sites to provide training opportunities and access both for 

conventional and special forces. 

 • In the Middle East, cooperation and access provided by 

coalition partners during Operations ENDURING FREEDOM 

and IRAQI FREEDOM provide a solid basis for other forms of 

future cooperation. Sites for rotational forces and contingency 
155

purposes, supported by forward headquarters and advanced 

training facilities, are envisaged, subject to the approval of the 

sovereign governments in the region. 

 In all of these regions, it is important to focus on capabilities—not 

just numbers of forces. Thanks to decades of investment, U.S. armed 

forces have achieved enormous advances in speed, reach, precision, 

and combat power. The number of forward-based forces in a given 

area is not the best measure of the military capability that the United 

States can bring to bear. Those who have suggested that these 

reductions will necessarily do grave damage to the North Atlantic 

Treaty Organization (NATO) are mistaken. The United States will 

retain substantial combat power in Europe, along with a robust 

reinforcement capability to deal with unexpected contingencies. 

The U.S. Joint Forces and European Commands are working closely 

with NATO’s Allied Command Transformation to ensure that allies 

and partners benefit from advanced training and experimentation in 

combined activities with U.S. forces. 

 The fifth round since 1988 of the Base Realignment and Closure

process has resulted in the proposed closure of 33 major domestic U.S. 

military bases and the realignment of an additional 29. Some existing 

facilities might be expanded to accommodate troops brought home 

from overseas. As in the past, this effort has involved difficult political 

negotiations and potential tradeoffs involving operations, training, 

and readiness. Still, the potential long-term savings to the Pentagon 

could amount to billions of dollars annually—freeing resources that 

can be plowed into personnel, equipment, and operations. 

 Against this backdrop, one can identify two broad areas where 

these various U.S. assessments and plans might affect the special 

relationship. 

Strategy—Implications for the UK.

 There is substantial positive news for the UK, in my view, in 

the National Defense Strategy and National Military Strategy. The U.S. 

experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, in particular, seem to have 

brought home the lesson that the United States needs stronger and 

broader international partnerships to meet its strategic objectives and 
156

to pursue an “active, layered defense” of its homeland and interests. As 

the National Defense Strategy puts it bluntly: “The U.S. cannot achieve 

its defense objectives alone.” Moreover, the Pentagon leadership 

acknowledges with unaccustomed clarity that these partnerships 

must be nurtured across a cohesive set of activities. These range from 

working with others to develop a common appreciation of threats, 

to increasing the capabilities and leadership roles of others, in both 

military and nonmilitary spheres, to prevent and defeat “irregular” 

challenges. Indeed, the National Defense Strategy’s language that “we 

must confront challenges earlier and more comprehensively” seems to 

echo that of the UK’s New Chapter of the Strategic Defence Review (2002) 

and EU’s European Security Strategy (2003). In addition, the renewed 

emphasis on broad security cooperation is eerily reminiscent of the 

Clinton administration’s “engagement and shaping” strategy that 

was not exactly embraced after the 2000 elections. More important, 

perhaps, is the implicit recognition that “made in the USA” threat 

assessments and strategies are not the best way to engage and sustain 

the international partnerships that the United States so manifestly 

needs.

 In a slightly more speculative vein, the National Defense Strategy’s

acknowledgement that, in a more complex world, the United States 

might not always agree with even its closest allies could be viewed as 

a nod toward the special relationship. In other words, if differences 

with the UK are anticipated, they probably can be better managed 

without a divorce. 

 That said, certain concerns of UK news media commentators and 

political-military analysts over the past few years likely will not be 

allayed by the strategy documents. For example, UK officials and 

strategic reviews have shied away from references to the “Global War 

on Terrorism,” although their perception of key threats to UK national 

security are essentially identical to Washington’s: international 

terrorism, WMD proliferation, regional conflict, and failed (or 

failing) states. Moreover, with the deadly July 2005 terrorist attacks 

against London’s mass transit system, UK public perceptions of the 

threat may move even closer to the U.S. view. However, despite the 

multiple (and patently deliberate) U.S. references to the key role of 

“allies and partners,” neither strategy document specifically mentions 
157

NATO as the primary vehicle for U.S. cooperation with its European 

allies on strategy or capabilities development. For those Britons who 

have grown uncomfortable with the perceived U.S. proclivity for 

“coalitions of the willing,” this might be a troublesome omission. 

And while the UK certainly has never forsworn its willingness to act 

alone if it deems its vital interests to be at stake, the aforementioned 

statement of U.S. presidential prerogatives might strike some British 

opinion leaders as unnecessary and possibly unhelpful. 

Capabilities—Implications for the UK.

 The 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review and Global Posture Review

likely will have more visible and practical consequences for the 

special relationship. Taking the Global Posture Review first, based on 

General Jones’ statement, the U.S. Air Force intends to maintain and, 

indeed, recapitalize critical base infrastructure at Lakenheath (the 

only U.S. F-15 fighter wing based in Europe) and Mildenhall, UK. 

At Mildenhall, U.S. air refueling, air mobility, reconnaissance, and 

intelligence units apparently will not be repositioned, but the special 

forces air component likely will be moved during the 2011-15 period 

as part of a planned consolidation of permanent and rotational special 

operations forces in Southern Europe.4

 (Although not covered by 

General Jones’ statement, one would assume that U.S. access to base 

facilities in Diego Garcia will remain important for both countries.)

 The UK enjoys a privileged position in the preparation of the 

2005 Quadrennial Defense Review, as British Defence Ministry experts 

are for the first time “embedded” in the Office of the Secretary of 

Defense staff that coordinates the review. This is a tangible sign that 

the promise of the National Defense Strategy to work closely with allies 

in strategy and capabilities development is being implemented.

 The Institute for National Strategic Studies does not participate 

as such in the 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review, and it would be 

premature to predict the review outcomes. However, it is possible to 

identify some of the issues that likely will be of particular interest to 

the UK as the review progresses.

 First, one must consider our respective military levels of 

ambition. A senior Pentagon official recently indicated that the 

previously mentioned “1-4-2-1 planning construct,” which was 
158

agreed to shortly before the 9/11 attacks, could change as a result 

of the review. Although this might seem like an arcane exercise, the 

planning assumptions that lie behind this construct, or its possible 

successor, will help determine where the U.S. military is prepared to 

trade some of its unparalleled capability in conventional warfare to 

improve capabilities against the other types of threats identified in 

the National Defense Strategy—that is, the “irregular,” “catastrophic,” 

and “disruptive” challenges. 

 The thrust of the July 2004 Ministry of Defence report, Delivering 

Security in a Changing World, is the UK’s level of ambition to “support 

three concurrent small and medium scale operations,” while retaining 

the “flexibility to reconfigure for less frequent large scale operations, 

while concurrently conducting a small scale operation.”5

 The UK 

report further states: “The full spectrum of capabilities is not required 

for large scale operations, as the most demanding operations could 

only conceivably be undertaken alongside the U.S., either as a NATO 

operation or a U.S.-led coalition, where we have choices as to what 

to contribute.” In such large-scale operations, the range of potential 

UK contributions would include special forces, C4ISR assets able to 

be integrated with the U.S. network, amphibious and carrier strike 

task groups, an air expeditionary task force, and a land maneuver 

division capable of conducting offensive operations. 

 What happens, however, if the U.S. “planning construct” were 

to change? Would this change the desired balance among UK 

capabilities? If the United States, for example, were to significantly 

enlarge its special operations forces (based on an assessment that 

“irregular challenges” have become more pressing than “traditional” 

ones), should the UK follow suit so that it can, to cite the Ministry’s 

report once more, “add real weight to the campaign and hence the 

UK’s ability to influence its outcome”?6

 Or should the UK instead shift 

its relative effort to one or more of its other areas of special strength, 

such as forces and capabilities useful for post-conflict stabilization? 

Would this translate into a requirement for a larger UK ground force 

(as some American experts are arguing is the case for the United 

States) or, at a minimum, not reducing its existing levels?

 Second, assuming the planned size and mix of UK forces are 

settled, a key to effective cooperation with the United States in 

operations will be the ability to integrate respective C4ISR capabilities. 
159

The National Defense Strategy and National Military Strategy place 

such great emphasis on these key operational capabilities that it 

is hard to imagine that the 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review and 

subsequent budgetary decisions will not follow suit. Recognizing 

that the Ministry’s report also emphasizes the importance of C4ISR, 

we then must ask: will the UK be able to keep apace with U.S. efforts 

in this area? A host of financial and technological issues, to include 

sensitive issues of technology-sharing arrangements, are likely to 

flow from the review’s recommendations.

 Third, as the United States determines what capabilities are 

needed to shape the choices of countries arriving at strategic 

crossroads (China and Russia come to mind, although these have 

not been explicitly cited by American officials) or to prevent the 

acquisition of use of WMD by a hostile state or nonstate actor, what 

will be the UK’s role? For the United States, missile defenses are one 

means of dissuading, deterring, and if necessary defending against a 

limited missile attack by a “rogue” nation. The twin strategy reports 

also seem to presage a wider use of small-scale military activities (for 

example, training and exercises) to build the capabilities of others. 

Will the UK be similarly inclined to increase its current contribution 

to such activities?

 Fourth, as the Pentagon (and the U.S. government as a whole) 

looks at its capabilities and structures to deal with homeland security, 

what lessons can we learn from the UK’s experience over the years? 

The need for close U.S.-UK cooperation in this area obviously 

transcends defense-to-defense channels, and—as we saw from 9/11, 

its aftermath, and now July 7, 2005 (7/7), in London—our common 

security, political, and economic stakes in this area are enormous.

Future of Nuclear Cooperation.

 The National Defense Strategy and National Military Strategy barely 

mention the role of U.S. nuclear weapons. This is understandable 

for a few reasons: the changed relationship with Russia; the priority 

given to capabilities needed to confront the “irregular” threats from 

insurgencies and international terrorism; and, perhaps, a desire to 

avoid any perceived brandishing of nuclear capabilities at a time when 
160

the United States is relying heavily on diplomatic tools to resolve 

concerns with North Korean and Iranian nuclear developments. 

 An additional explanation might be that little of substance has 

changed since the Nuclear Posture Review was completed in late 2001. 

To briefly recap some of the main findings of this review: 

 • Reliance on nuclear weapons should be reduced by developing 

non-nuclear offensive and defensive capabilities that allow 

the United States to raise the nuclear threshold. 

 • In keeping with the President’s guidance to reduce the number 

of operationally deployed nuclear weapons to the lowest 

possible level, and to do so without some of the drawbacks 

of Cold War-style arms control negotiations and treaties, 

the United States will look toward unilateral reductions. In 

terms of force sizing, the Nuclear Posture Review set a goal of 

1,700-2,200 operationally deployed warheads by 2012 (which 

represents a reduction of approximately 3,800 warheads from 

the level permitted by START I, which remains in force). 

 • Given the existing and emerging threat to the United States 

and its allies and friends from WMD and missile proliferation, 

U.S. nuclear planning needs to become more capable against 

a range of contingencies and less country-specific. The 

President needs a “more diverse portfolio of capabilities”—to 

include nuclear forces, non-nuclear strike forces, and missile 

defenses—to assure allies and friends, and dissuade, deter, 

and, if necessary, defeat adversaries.

 • So-called “life extension programs” would keep the current 

types of delivery systems in service until 2020 or longer. 

This represents an important budgetary and technical effort, 

as the average ages of U.S. delivery systems (when the 

review was completed) were 26 years for the Minuteman III

intercontinental ballistic missile, 9 years for the Trident II D5 submarine-launched ballistic missile, 40 years for the B-52 

bomber, and 5 years for the B-2 bomber. Four of the 18 Trident

strategic ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) would be taken 

out of strategic service, and the remaining 14 SSBNs would be 

fitted with Trident II D-5 missiles. In addition, the Peacekeeper

land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) would 
161

be retired, and the B-1 bomber force would no longer be 

maintained for a nuclear weapon role. 

 • The United States would rely on its “stockpile stewardship” 

program designed to ensure the safety and reliability of the 

nuclear weapons stockpile without nuclear testing, but it 

would not ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). 

It also would study options to reduce the preparatory time 

needed—currently somewhere between 2 to 3 years—if the 

President were to determine that a resumption of nuclear 

testing was necessary to rectify a stockpile problem.7

 The special relationship as related to nuclear weapon systems 

has had a long and enviable history. Indeed, there exists no other 

program where the United States has worked so intimately with 

another country for such an extended period of time on the gravest 

matters of national security. This aspect of our special relationship 

remains very much alive. One could posit that this relationship grows 

even more important as the size of our respective nuclear arsenals 

has shrunk over the past decade.

 It perhaps is worth recalling that a relationship that many take 

for granted today has not always been problem-free. During World 

War II, Anglo-American cooperation on nuclear matters was not 

covered by any binding legal agreements, and postwar cooperation 

was virtually stopped by the U.S. Atomic Energy Act of 1954. That 

law was not amended until early 1958, clearing the way, in July 

of that year, for the U.S.-UK Agreement on Cooperation on the Use of 

Atomic Energy for Mutual Defense Purposes. The agreement authorizes 

a broad range of cooperation on information, training, material, 

and equipment, but bars any transfer of a nuclear weapon by either 

party. Less than 5 years later, however, the “Skybolt affair” came 

close to wrecking U.S.-UK nuclear cooperation for a second time. 

Fortunately, an extraordinary set of negotiations between President 

John Kennedy and Prime Minister Harold Macmillan in December 

1962—nearly 4 days of what Macmillan described in his memoirs as 

“fierce and sometimes painful (arguments)”—produced the “Nassau 

Agreement,” which set the stage for formal arrangements for the U.S. 

sale of Polaris missiles for UK submarines and, subsequently, the sale 
162

of Trident II D-5 missiles and launch systems for the UK’s Vanguardclass submarines.8

 Accounts of the Nassau Agreement make for fascinating reading 

in light of subsequent developments. For example, Macmillan wrote 

that his government kept General Charles de Gaulle apprised of the 

Nassau talks on a day-to-day basis. He also hinted that he encouraged 

Kennedy’s subsequent offer of Polaris missiles to the French on terms 

similar to those agreed for the UK. Another observation by Macmillan 

seems particularly relevant. “The Americans,” he wrote, “were 

willing to defend Europe and had the means to do so. Would they 

always have the will? America must realize that the great nations of 

Europe, with their different histories and varying responsibilities, 

would demand a reasonable degree of dignity and security. Certainly 

Britain with her world-wide commitments must continue, for the 

present at any rate, to have some independent nuclear force.”9

 The international security environment obviously has changed 

since Macmillan’s days. And unlike the days of the Skybolt affair, 

when some in the UK suspected the United States of wanting to 

“force Britain out of the nuclear club,” Washington’s decades-long 

record of strong support for an independent UK deterrent shows 

no signs of eroding.10 Last year, the United States and UK agreed to 

a 10-year extension of their 1958 Agreement, and President Bush, 

in his letter to Congress on this subject, wrote that “the United 

Kingdom intends to continue to maintain viable nuclear forces.” The 

question now seems to be whether the UK in the coming years will 

reach the same conclusion as Macmillan. Specifically, will the UK 

opt to maintain its SSBN capability through cooperation with the 

United States, or diversify its nuclear delivery capability (perhaps 

in cooperation with France), or choose to allow its minimal nuclear 

deterrent to atrophy?

 Timing will no doubt play an important role here. In the case of 

the Trident II system, the United States has been able to extend the 

SSBN’s service life from 30 to 45 years. To address the mismatch 

between SSBN’s service life and the nominal 30-year service life of its 

D5 missile, the United States has begun a D5 “life extension” program 

(which includes the purchase of additional missiles as well as the 

replacement of some aging components) that will make it possible 

to retain the Trident II system until 2020 or longer. However, for a 
163

number of reasons, the UK likely will need to decide on a followon to its Trident II system during the next Parliament—that is, in 

advance of an eventual U.S. decision on its own Trident II followon. 

 I assume that the UK will want to keep a credible minimum 

nuclear deterrent for the foreseeable future, given the extant and 

potential future threats of WMD and missile proliferation. How the 

UK might define “credible” and “minimum” in the future are yet to 

be determined; as demonstrated by the Strategic Defence Review in 

1998, UK assessments of its nuclear force requirements are subject 

to change over time. In any event, given the security, technological, 

industrial, and budgetary ramifications of such decisions, the 

importance of close and timely U.S.-UK consultations on their 

possible future cooperation would seem self-evident. Neither side 

can afford the type of missed signals and lack of forethought that 

characterized the Skybolt debacle.

 This leads to three final observations. First, it seems to me that 

the U.S. decision not to pursue traditional Cold War-style nuclear 

arms agreements with Russia holds a significant benefit from a 

UK perspective: it effectively moots any future Russian attempt 

to limit the independent UK (and French) deterrent as a price for 

further negotiated reductions with the United States. Second, 

without discounting the importance, both real and potential, of 

increasing British defense cooperation with its European partners in 

conventional systems, it is hard for me at least to imagine alternative 

UK arrangements in the nuclear field—for example, either bilaterally 

with France or within a broader European context—that would 

match the strategic, technical, and cost benefits of its established 

relationship with the United States. Third, UK defense planners will 

need to consider some difficult budgetary trade-offs between future 

conventional and nuclear capabilities if, as most observers believe, 

significant real increases in the defense budget are not in the offing. 

Given the relatively recent “conversion” of New Labor to support 

for a “minimum” nuclear deterrent and the increased political 

sensitivities regarding close cooperation with the United States, a 

well-thought-out public campaign to explain HMG’s nuclear policy 

will be absolutely critical to sustaining any decision regarding a 

Trident II follow-on.
164

Missile Defense.

 As of late December 2004, the United States had emplaced six 

ground-based mid-course defense (GMD) interceptor missiles in 

underground silos at Fort Greely, Alaska, and one GMD interceptor 

at Vandenberg Air Force Base, California. If current plans hold, by 

the end of 2005 the United States will have deployed an additional 

10 GMD interceptors at Fort Greely and a second interceptor at 

Vandenberg, along with land-, sea-, and space-based sensors and 

command and control systems to support those weapons and up 

to eight Standard Missile-3 sea-based interceptors. These initial 

deployments are only the first step on the path to the administration’s 

goal of an integrated, global missile defense to protect the United 

States, its allies, and friends with deployed forces against limited 

attacks by ballistic missiles of all ranges and in all phases of flight. 

The main concern driving this goal is not the ballistic missile force of 

major powers such as Russia; rather, it is the proliferation of WMD 

and ballistic missile capabilities of states such as North Korea and 

Iran. Indeed, for the most part, the administration has been careful 

not to oversell the initial U.S. defensive capabilities, characterizing 

the first deployments as “very basic” and a “nascent defensive 

system.”

 To date, U.S.-UK cooperation related to missile defense has 

been limited but important. In February 2003, the UK gave the 

United States permission to upgrade the U.S.-owned, RAFoperated Fylingdales early warning radar, which is important to 

track potential threats from the Middle East region. Later that year, 

the sides signed a new memorandum of understanding on missile 

defense cooperation covering arrangements for joint work on system 

research, development, testing, and evaluation. These arrangements 

currently include British participation within DoD’s Missile Defense 

Agency in Washington and Colorado Springs. In addition, reflecting 

the high level of U.S. transparency with regard to the UK on missile 

defense operational issues, British officers are “embedded” in the 

U.S. Strategic Command.

 In addition to these bilateral arrangements, the United States and 

UK have worked within NATO to reach an Alliance consensus on a 
165

missile defense feasibility study, which was due to be completed by 

July 2005. That study examines the option of defending territory and 

population centers against the full range of missile threats. It also 

would complement Alliance agreement on an active layered Theater 

Missile Defense against short- and medium-range missile threats, 

wherein NATO would provide a command and control architecture 

that would be interoperable with sensors and interceptors fielded by 

individual nations. 

 The United States has not asked the UK to base GMD interceptors 

on its territory, and the UK has not decided to do so. That said, several 

of the operational issues facing senior U.S. decisionmakers, military 

commanders, and defense planners would need to be considered 

by the UK or other Allies that might be weighing such moves.11 For 

example,

 • Who would have weapons release authority? The timeline 

for decisions on launching interceptors is significantly 

shorter than the flight time for offensive ballistic missiles, 

which ranges from a few minutes for short-range systems to 

20-30 minutes for missiles of intercontinental range. Given 

such short timelines, it would seem infeasible to insist on a 

specific prior authorization from the political leadership to 

launch a defensive weapon. More likely, such authorization 

would need to be delegated to an appropriate level of military 

authority.

 • Assuming limited defensive assets, at least in the initial stages 

of deployment, what criteria should be employed in deciding 

which enemy missiles to target and how many interceptors 

should be allocated to them? Given the combination of possible 

intelligence uncertainties about the number of missiles 

available to the adversary and a defender’s preference to put 

multiple interceptors against each threatening missile (to 

have a higher probability of a successful intercept), defenders 

might face tough choices. For example, would defenders 

place highest priority on maximizing the population saved, or 

protecting the ability of government to continue functioning, 

or protecting other essential military capabilities? And if it is 

unclear whether the target of the offensive missile (or missiles) 
166

is one’s own territory or that of a neighbor, how should this be 

factored into a decision whether to launch interceptors and, if 

so, how many to launch?

 • What would be the appropriate role for senior government 

decisionmakers on the employment of missile defenses? Under 

the stress of attack, when defenders would be calculating 

what interceptor assets they have left and how best to use 

them, there would be precious little time for second-guessing. 

Presumably, the government leadership would have 

promulgated guidance during peacetime planning, subject to 

review and revision in the buildup to a crisis. At a minimum, 

government decisionmakers would need accurate, real-time 

information about the ongoing missile defense engagements, 

in part to determine whether to authorize either nuclear or 

non-nuclear strikes against strategic targets. It should not 

be forgotten, in this context, that effective missile defenses 

would give the leadership greater latitude in choosing a 

response to the attack—perhaps one that does not threaten 

massive casualties on the part of the state from where the 

attack originated. 

These are instances of the complex and vital questions associated 

with the deployment of missile defenses. While not unanswerable, 

they will require timely and serious attention as the UK considers its 

future level of cooperation with the United States in this area. 

UK as a “Bridge” between the United States and EU.

 Europeans can be forgiven for occasionally asking if Americans 

really support the EU’s European Security and Defense Policy 

(ESDP). Since NATO’s creation in 1949, Washington has alternately 

encouraged and hectored its allies to assume a larger share of the 

responsibilities and burdens of collective defense and—beginning 

with NATO’s involvement in Bosnia in 1995—crisis response. At the 

same time, Republican and Democratic administrations alike have 

looked to NATO as the anchor of U.S. engagement in European 

security affairs and the primary multilateral venue for shaping allies’ 

defense policies and capabilities. 
167

 Hence, when Prime Minister Blair and President Jacques Chirac 

agreed at St. Malo, France, in December 1998 that the EU “must have 

the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military 

forces, the means to decide to use them and a readiness to do so, 

in order to respond to international crises,” Washington’s initial 

response was polite but distinctly chilly. Fresh memories of intraEuropean wrangling over the former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s, 

combined with growing worries about the situation in Kosovo, no 

doubt played a role here. Some Americans worried whether, to use 

then French Defense Minister Alain Richard’s analogy, the EU would 

be capable of “taking care of fires in its own backyard.” Or would the 

EU, to be blunt, produce “all talk, no action”? More broadly, some 

U.S. officials wondered whether key consultations and decisions 

on security matters might migrate over time from NATO, where 

America’s unique political and military strengths ensure it has a 

preponderant role in shaping Alliance policies and operations, to the 

EU, where there is no U.S. seat at the table.

 Oscar Wilde once observed, “There are many things that we 

would throw away if we were not afraid that others might pick them 

up.” Perhaps Wilde’s insight reflected the U.S. dilemma in trying to 

elicit greater European spending and effort in behalf of their own 

defense while at the same time seeming to refuse to take “yes” for an 

answer for fear of losing its influence over them. Fortunately, time and 

experience have improved U.S. as well as European understanding 

of ESDP’s potential and limitations. 

 At the strategic level, one detects more convergent views on 

security threats to the Euro-Atlantic community. The European 

Security Strategy lists five key threats: terrorism; proliferation of 

WMD; regional conflict; state failure; and organized crime. Except 

for crime, the U.S. National Security Strategy of September 2002 and 

NATO’s April 1999 Strategic Concept (as well as recent declarations) 

list essentially the same threats. The European Security Strategy

emphasizes nonmilitary tools to prevent and diffuse crises but hardly 

strikes a pacifist stance. And to be fair, the U.S. National Security 

Strategy and NATO pronouncements recognize that states must use 

all their tools, not just the military, to meet 21st century threats.

 When it comes to military capabilities, the EU seems to have 

become more realistic about its ambitions and pragmatic in its 
168

procedures. Its focus has shifted from the 1999 “Helsinki Headline 

Goal”—i.e., to develop by 2003 the ability to deploy up to 50,000-

60,000 military personnel within 60 days and sustain them for at 

least 1 year on missions ranging from humanitarian and rescue tasks 

to peacekeeping and separating warring parties—to creating by 

2007 a reservoir of 13 rapidly deployable 1,500-man “battle groups.” 

According to EU plans, two of these battle groups should be able to 

undertake concurrent operations, normally under a UN mandate, 

lasting 1 to 4 months. The EU has pledged to make its battlegroup 

concept complementary and mutually reinforcing with NATO’s 

significantly more capable Response Force—a U.S. initiative endorsed 

by NATO leaders at their Prague Summit in 2002.

 Much remains be done to improve EU military capabilities, 

but the fundamental logic of close cooperation with NATO is 

now obvious. Of the 25 EU members, 19 are in NATO and 4 are 

in NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP). Each has a single army, air 

force, navy, and defense budget to meet NATO, EU, and national 

commitments. There is no margin for wasteful duplication, and 

divergent operational doctrines and practices would increase the 

inherent risks in military operations. 

 The proof of ESDP’s worth will rest with its performance on 

missions. On balance, its record so far has been positive, as the EU 

launched a police mission in Bosnia in January 2003 (complementing 

the NATO-led Stabilization Force, known as SFOR); assumed a 

small follow-on mission from NATO in Macedonia 2 months later; 

and conducted a 3-month “autonomous” operation (led by French 

forces) in the Democratic Republic of the Congo during the summer 

of 2003. On December 2, 2004, NATO-EU cooperation began a more 

critical test in Bosnia when NATO terminated its successful 9-yearold SFOR mission, and the EU deployed a new military mission, 

ALTHEA. NATO provides important support to ALTHEA under 

the NATO-EU “Berlin Plus” arrangements finalized in March 2003, 

and the Alliance will remain engaged with Bosnia through a NATO 

headquarters in Sarajevo. The United States has fully supported this 

transition.

 In each of these major areas—i.e., EU strategy, capabilities, 

and operations—one can find evidence of a positive UK influence. 

(Here I refer to the “UK” in the broadest sense of the term, meaning 
169

its government’s positions as well as the role played by very able 

UK nationals serving in NATO and EU structures.) This is not to 

suggest, however, that U.S.-EU or NATO-EU relations are or will 

be problem-free. NATO and the EU remain profoundly different in 

vision (NATO, for example, does not aspire to “ever closer union”), 

structure, scope, and procedures, despite many shared democratic 

values and security interests. Awkward moments between them are 

inevitable. Thus, one should not expect the United States to adopt an 

essentially laissez-faire attitude toward ESDP or to continue to rely 

on the UK as heavily as it might have in the past to “protect” U.S. 

security interests insofar as they might be affected by EU actions.

 For the most part, I would not expect to see significant differences 

between Washington and London over the more theoretical—if not 

theological—question of whether the EU should seek to become a 

“counterweight” to the U.S. “hyperpower” or a new grand actor in 

a “multipolar” world. Instead, I could foresee a continuing series of 

irritations arising from seemingly disparate and (in some instances) 

second-tier issues that take on a life of their own and, over time, 

begin to have a corrosive effect on the special relationship.

 Take, for example, the long-standing U.S. concerns (which 

predate the current administration) with the slow pace of European 

efforts to address acknowledged shortfalls in areas such as 

deployability; mobility; C4ISR; precision strike; sustainment; and 

chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defenses. Arguably, 

UK voices were more influential than those of other EU members 

in assuring American officials—some of whom were predisposed to 

be skeptical—that the EU “label” could mobilize serious European 

capabilities development in a way that NATO could not (at least, 

not alone.) However, nearly 6 years into ESDP, it is not easy to find a 

significant boost in real European capabilities attributable to the EU. 

The NATO-EU “Capabilities Group,” which the United States had 

hoped would be an important vehicle for building a close, cooperative, 

and transparent relationship between the two organizations in this 

crucial area, has been a serious disappointment.

 One could cite other areas of palpable American disappointment, 

as well, including:

 • The emergence (albeit nascent and incremental) of an 

EU operational planning capability that would appear to 
170

duplicate some of the planning functions of NATO’s Supreme 

Headquarters Allied Powers, Europe (SHAPE) (seemingly in 

contradiction to earlier European assurances);

 • The festering stalemate over establishing useful NATO liaison 

arrangements within the EU Military Staff, with a reciprocal 

EU liaison at SHAPE;

 • The apparently substantial and growing sentiment within the 

EU that the “Berlin Plus” arrangements used in the transition 

from the NATO-led SFOR mission to the EU’s Operation 

ALTHEA in Bosnia have proved so cumbersome that the 

EU should seek to avoid their use in the future (seeming to 

contradict the general view within NATO); and,

 • The absence of a sustained, multilevel, and strategic dialogue 

between NATO and the EU on issues that should be of mutual 

concern, such as Russia, Ukraine, the Caucasus, and African 

flash points.

To be clear, this is not to suggest that the UK is primarily responsible 

for difficulties in these or other areas. Various other actors within the 

EU and NATO have taken turns—some with demonstrably more 

élan than others—at erecting obstacles in the way of what logically 

should be a cooperative and mutually reinforcing relationship. The 

impression remains, however, that the UK might not, or cannot, or 

perhaps does not intend to “deliver” on every issue where U.S. or 

broader NATO interests reasonably should be taken into account. 

 On the one hand, Americans should not find this particularly 

shocking. The UK, like other EU members, has a number of interests 

at stake within that structure at any one time. Depending on 

circumstances and, in some cases, personalities, compromises might 

be necessary on some ESDP-related issues in order to better defend 

UK interests in non-ESDP areas. The notion of “horse trading” is 

not foreign to the U.S. Congress or Executive Branch, and even a 

casual observer of the EU must conclude that the “Old Continent” 

is just as practiced at it. The point remains, however, that when the 

UK does line up with EU partners in ways that appear to promote 

an “EU caucus” within NATO or to contradict or sidestep bilateral 

assurances to Washington, it is not only U.S. confidence in the EU as 

a body that is likely to suffer.
171

 Although not an ESDP issue per se, the U.S.-EU imbroglio over 

the possible lifting of the EU embargo on arms sales to China should 

serve as a chilling example of how the special relationship could 

suffer as a result of EU decisions. Fortunately, this impending train 

wreck was avoided—or at least deferred. Hopefully, U.S., UK, and 

other EU members will develop a future “strategic dialogue” on 

China and avoid the transfer of potentially destabilizing capabilities 

and technologies, which would incite Congress—perhaps with at 

least tacit administration support—to enact some type of punitive 

and ultimately counterproductive legislation.

 Over the longer term, I believe the United States needs to consider 

such steps as the following:

 • We should look at developing an approach to ESDP that 

puts greater emphasis on advance consultations with a broad 

range of individual EU members and, increasingly, with 

various staffs and structures within the EU. In other words, 

we should put less reliance on the special relationship to gain 

understanding into evolving attitudes within the EU before 

the EU’s positions are fixed and to explain U.S. perspectives 

and potential concerns. As Under Secretary of State for 

Political Affairs Burns recently noted, the United States has 

agreed to EU High Representative Javier Solana’s suggestion 

to upgrade the “U.S.-EU Senior Level Group,” a forum for 

high-level policy dialogue on a range of political and strategic 

issues. This is a step in the right direction. 

 • In parallel, we also should try to better understand EU 

procedures, decisionmaking timelines, the interrelationship 

between ESDP and non-ESDP issues, and where those fall 

in terms of the relative priorities of various EU members. To 

accomplish this, we probably will need to reexamine how 

we are organized—in Washington, our European embassies, 

and our NATO and EU missions—to better identify, track, 

and decide whether (and if so, how) to seek to influence (in a 

positive sense!) EU decisions on ESDP issues of interest.

 • In this context, one might consider a more routine, extensive, 

and substantive program of “embedding” UK diplomats 

and military officers in appropriate State Department and 
172

Pentagon staffs, with reciprocal arrangements for American 

diplomats and officers in the Foreign and Commonwealth 

Office and Ministry of Defence. This would pay dividends 

for both the special relationship and, more broadly, U.S.-EU 

relations. 

 These are not trivial steps, but I think they can be accomplished 

in time without falling into the trap of appearing to play off some 

Europeans against others—an occasional tactic that would be a 

disaster if elevated to an underlying strategy. I also think this can 

be done without prejudice to U.S. relations with NATO, which will 

remain the primary U.S. link to European security issues for the 

foreseeable future. 

 It is encouraging, in this regard, that after meeting with 

fellow Alliance leaders during his February 2005 visit to Brussels, 

President Bush traveled downtown to become the first American 

President to meet the European Council, Presidency, and College 

of Commissioners in the symbolic home of European integration. 

His remarks during that trip clearly indicate that the United States 

wants to deepen cooperation with its European allies and partners in 

both organizations, and to strengthen NATO-EU links, as well. Such 

a U.S., UK, and EU ménage à trois will not be a quick or easy affair, 

but it is incumbent upon the entire transatlantic community—and, 

of course, the special relationship—to nudge the relationship along.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 11

 1. National Defense Strategy is available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/

Mar2005/d20050318nds1.pdf. National Security Strategy is available at http://www.

whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html.

 2. National Military Strategy. 

 3. See statement of General James Jones before Senate Armed Services 

Committee on March 1, 2005, available at http://www.eucom.mil/Command/Posture/

Released%20-%20EUCOM%20FY%2006%20SASC%20Posture%20Statement%201

%20Mar%2005).doc.

 4. Ibid.

 5. See http://www.mod.uk/issues/security/cm6269/index.html.

 6. Then Secretary of State for Defence Hoon announced the creation of a new 

“special reconnaissance regiment” in April 2005.
173

 7. Briefing by Assistant Secretary of Defense, Dr. J. D. Crouch, on Nuclear 

Posture Review, January 9, 2002, available at http://www.defenselink.mil/

transcripts/2002/t01092002_t0109npr.html.

 8. Harold Macmillan, At the End of the Day, Harper & Row, New York, 1973, p. 

360.

 9. Ibid., p. 359.

 10. Ibid., p. 357.

 11. This section draws on the work of my INSS colleague, Ms. Elaine Bunn. See 

her paper, “Deploying Missile Defense: Major Operational Challenges,” Strategic 

Forum, No. 209, August 2004, available at http://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/SF209/

SF209.pdf.

175

CHAPTER 12

THE DEFENSE DIMENSION 

OF THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP

Charles Dick

A Historical Perspective.

 In the 19th century, there was no particular warmth in interstate 

relations between Britain and the United States. There was one, albeit 

short, war between them and periodic tensions. The United States 

continued to follow the advice of the founding fathers and avoided 

“entangling alliances,” concentrating on western hemispheric 

concerns.1 The United Kingdom (UK) devoted its energies to the 

empire and the maintenance of a balance of power in Europe. Even 

World War I, when both countries fought a common foe, did not 

bring the two noticeably closer together. Indeed, American hostility 

to colonialism and the British exploitation of victory to expand their 

empire left relations decidedly cool. Naval rivalry exacerbated this 

coolness. The British soon realized they could not afford a naval 

race and had to reach an accommodation on American terms, but 

neither this nor the abandonment of the Anglo-Japanese alliance 

modified the U.S. view that Britain was essentially a wicked colonial 

oppressor fundamentally at odds with American idealism. Even 

the growing threat of fascism failed to shift the United States away 

from a disapproving isolationism born of disillusionment with the 

Versailles settlement. 

 The “special relationship” was a product of the combined 

endeavor to defeat Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan. In origin, 

it was thus a relatively recent phenomenon. Moreover, the close 

wartime relationship, often stormy as a result of disagreements 

over strategy, masked continuing differences over the desired 

nature of the postwar world. Initially, as if little had changed, the 

UK reverted to the pursuit of national interest—a Mediterranean 

strategy and the maintenance of empire (though American wartime 
176

and postwar actions had fatally undermined Britain’s economic 

capacity for independent action). By contrast, with the adoption of 

the Truman Doctrine, the United States accepted that everything had 

changed. Containment of communism became the guiding principle 

of American foreign policy. As Britain, too, favored containment, 

cooperation continued, for instance over the defense of Greece and 

Korea and in the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

(NATO). However, different perceptions of national interests clashed 

in the Middle East. Imperial strategy led the British and French into 

the Suez intervention of 1956, an adventure successfully foiled by a 

United States impelled by a differing view of the Egyptian regime 

and visceral anti-colonialism.

 The British learned a painful lesson from Suez: the postwar UK 

lacked the economic basis necessary to give substance to its pretensions 

as a global power. Britain could no longer act globally without U.S. 

support. Henceforth, the UK would eschew independent action and 

direct its efforts to binding Europe and the United States together in 

common defense and security policies to face down the emerging 

Soviet threat.2

 As British power and influence steadily became more 

threadbare and the retreat from empire accelerated, Britain clung 

ever more closely to the United States. It argued, to itself as much as 

to other powers, that its influence over America, stemming from the 

special relationship, still gave it the status of a great power—a status 

underscored by its possession of a nuclear deterrent (even though 

the independent nature of its force soon became illusory as it became 

dependent on the United States for its delivery system).

 The special relationship thus assumed a central place in London’s 

worldview and strategy. It was not mirrored in Washington. The 

United States was a genuine world power, pursuing a global mission 

and interests. In doing so, it would cooperate with the UK where that 

was advantageous, for example in NATO and over the Falklands 

dispute. But where national interest dictated, it would cheerfully 

ignore Britain. Actually it was apparently a close call whether or not 

it would side with Argentina in 1982, and in the next year America 

trumped up an excuse to invade a Commonwealth country, Grenada, 

without so much as a word to its closest ally. 

 Nevertheless, the special relationship had substance during 

the Cold War as both parties shared a common, and overriding, 
177

strategic goal. While differing over some issues, for instance the 

desirability of closer European integration (favored by Washington, 

resisted in London), the two countries were happy to work together 

to give leadership and coherence to a sometimes wavering NATO. 

Of course, the United States gave the direction and Britain gave it 

loyal support. However, the end of the Cold War revealed important 

latent differences in national interests and in attitudes to problems. 

On a whole range of issues, from how to deal with the break-up of 

Yugoslavia, through the Israeli-Palestinian dispute and intrusive 

verification of the Chemical and Biological Weapons (CBW) 

convention to climate change and the importance of international 

law and organizations (to name but five), Britain found itself at odds 

with America. Britain was also finding that its relationship was not 

so special that it could significantly influence U.S. policy on many 

issues dear to its government’s heart. American exceptionalism and 

unilateralist tendencies, never wholly dormant even during the Cold 

War years, were now proving singularly resistant to outside opinion, 

including that of the most loyal U.S. ally.

 It is clear that the 40-year-old Anglo-American special relationship 

was a product of specific Cold War circumstances and based on 

a common need. The ending of those circumstances and needs is 

progressively revealing major differences in policy. The United 

States has global interests and aspirations that are not always shared 

by Britain. It could also be added that the relationship was never 

based on mutual admiration; for cultural and historical reasons, 

each partner traditionally has felt a measure of indifference, even 

condescension and disdain, for the other. 

The British Perspective Today on the Defense Relationship.

 During the Cold War, U.S. armed forces were far and away 

the most potent of those arrayed in NATO. Nevertheless, several 

European powers fielded significant military capabilities to meet the 

common threat. Those days are over. The implosion of the Warsaw 

Pact and the collapse of Russian power led all European countries to 

pay themselves large peace dividends (Britain, for instance, reduced 

the personnel strength of its armed forces from 315,000 to 210,000). 

Most European countries now maintain anachronistic militaries of 
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limited relevance to the security and defense needs of the early 21st 

century. And most have a strategic vision which extends little beyond 

the continent of Europe. The only notable exceptions are France and, 

particularly, the UK. 

 Britain is striving, though with greatly reduced resources, 

to maintain a full spectrum of capabilities. The emphasis on 

force restructuring has moved from meeting a defined threat to 

Europe to an international role in a disorderly world. The stress 

is now on expeditionary operations in a multilateral environment, 

doing everything from peace support through nation-building to 

warfighting—i.e., engagement across the entire spectrum of conflict. 

And when the British consider multilateral operations, they mean 

primarily in conjunction with the United States. British defence efforts 

are geared to ensuring that its armed forces can work intimately 

with, and under the command of, American formations. 

 This British approach to defense reflects the conviction of Prime 

Minister Tony Blair that Britain must conduct an active foreign policy, 

when necessary reinforcing it with armed intervention, to make the 

world a safer and better place. As the UK can do relatively little on 

its own, this will require close cooperation with a similarly activist 

United States. This, in turn, reflects—and dovetails nicely with—the 

primary aim of foreign policy as set out by Blair in his definitive 

address to British ambassadors in January 2003—that Britain should 

remain America’s closest ally (in the hope and expectation that the 

United States would reciprocate). In June of that year, then Defence 

Secretary Geoffrey Hoon echoed his master’s words, setting out the 

assumptions that guide his department’s work:

 • there is a moral requirement for Britain’s armed forces to be a 

force for good in the world;

 • the reality is that, in all but minor affairs, little can be 

accomplished without help from the Americans, who will 

participate only if they lead;

 • the special relationship is the bedrock of British foreign policy, 

and, to sustain it, the country must be prepared to pay a price, 

including blood, to prove that it is the most dependable U.S. 

ally;
179

 • UK defense gains much from close association with America; 

and,

 • loyalty and reliability gain Britain significant influence in 

Washington.

Accepting that the assumptions above still hold sway, there is 

much to be said in favor of Hoon’s analysis. On the other hand, the 

conclusions he draws are open to question; so, too, given resource 

restraints, is the ability of Britain’s armed forces to meet the challenge 

that he lays down. 

 To start with capabilities, it is certainly true that Britain gains much 

from defense cooperation with, and help from, the United States. It 

enhances the effectiveness of British forces and thus the ability of the 

country to “punch above its weight.” All three armed services, but 

especially the Navy and Air Force, are better off for their privileged 

access to American technology, and Britain’s defense industries are 

closely tied to, perhaps even dependent on, their links with their 

American counterparts. Like its predecessor, Britain’s nuclear force 

(now the Trident system) was purchased on the cheap from America 

and is dependent on the United States to keep it going. 

 Britain also profits from intelligence cooperation. The intelligence 

relationship goes back over 60 years (and cooperation continued even 

during periods of wider policy disagreements). Until the explosion of 

American investment in intelligence collection during the Cold War, 

especially in outer space (which the UK could not match), Britain led 

the field. Even today, its expertise in analysis in the areas of imagery 

intelligence (IMINT), signals intelligence (SIGINT), and technical 

intelligence (TECHINT) makes a significant contribution to the joint 

endeavor. But there can be no doubt that, deprived of uniquely 

privileged access to the fruits of American collection efforts, Britain 

would be critically lacking in situational awareness.

 While Britain undeniably gains more than it contributes to 

the defense relationship, a critical question for the country is how 

important its contribution to the United States is. In many ways the 

answer depends, at least in part, on how much influence Britain can 

exert on American decisionmaking. Is British support essential to 

America in the defense field, or is it now merely a nice-to-have add-on? 
180

It is certainly important politically, for instance, by providing a fig leaf 

of multilateralism to cover the nakedness of American unilateralism 

in launching the invasion of Iraq. The UK is also valuable to the 

United States as a stable and reliable base and site for missile early 

warning systems. But despite the wishful thinking, indeed boasting, 

of most politicians and journalists and some military men, the harsh 

reality appears to be that British participation is not highly valued 

in purely military terms. In a few niche areas, such as intelligence, 

mine clearance, photo reconnaissance, and special operations, the 

contributions are indeed important. However, the Royal Navy and 

Air Force as a whole are seen to be perilously close to critical mass and 

add little of significance to American strength. Similarly, in the realm 

of ground forces, any British contribution is somewhat marginal; 

numbers often still matter, as the Iraqi insurgency is demonstrating 

anew, and the Army lacks them. 

 Consequently, British influence on American military doctrinal 

development is marginal—at least unless and until events prove the 

former’s ideas to be superior. Similarly, in both the 1991 and 2003 

attacks on Iraq, while the British had an impact on tactical planning, 

their say in defining the end state and in campaign planning was 

minimal. There was no reestablishment of the wartime Combined 

Chiefs of Staff committee. British involvement was not critical to 

American success.

 The level of influence exerted on the United States at the policy 

level is rather more difficult to assess. Historically, it has waxed and 

waned according to the international situation and the personalities 

involved. Certainly, the British self-image of wise and discerning, 

if not strong, Greeks guiding the powerful but naïve and ignorant 

Romans was always, and is now more than ever, a product of 

wishful thinking rather than fact.3

 If appearances are anything to go 

by, the UK’s staunchly Atlanticist stance, even when it has cost the 

government dear (as over Iraq today), has given it little discernible 

influence in Washington in the post-Cold War era. For political 

reasons, not least to legitimize American actions, the British are 

considered useful to have alongside. But the United States does not 

consider it necessary to pay much of a price for the privilege. Rather, 

Washington seems to calculate that London will always come “on 

side” eventually, so no concessions are necessary. The UK tends to 
181

be taken for granted, like the loyal sidekick to the hero so beloved 

in Hollywood movies. Thus, for instance, President Bill Clinton 

undermined British policy over the wars of Yugoslav succession 

and interfered egregiously in the internal affairs of the UK over the 

Northern Ireland problem. President George W. Bush has conceded 

little or nothing to Prime Minister Blair over issues dear to the 

latter’s heart, such as involvement of the United Nations (UN) in 

the invasion of Iraq, combating climate change, the International 

Criminal Court, and the way in which the Israeli-Palestinian problem 

should be approached. These examples rather suggest that the special 

relationship has not survived the end of the Cold War in a fashion 

palatable to a UK that seeks to promote its own national interests. 

 The imbalance in capabilities is likely to grow as it is unlikely 

that the Defence Secretary and the British military can achieve their 

ambition of fully taking up and exploiting the advanced technologies 

produced by the latest revolution in military affairs. Costs are forever 

spiralling, often logarithmically, and increased spending on defense is 

not electorally rewarding these days. To compound the problem, the 

government will soon have to decide on whether or not to purchase 

a Trident replacement. If, as seems most likely, it decides that Britain 

should remain a nuclear power, the cost of any new system will have 

to be met at the expense of conventional forces as new money will 

not be in the offing. What value the United States attaches to British 

military assistance rests solely on the latter’s conventional forces. 

British Tridents are irrelevant to American defense and security. 

 This problem of defense spending may become more acute if 

the British public becomes progressively more disillusioned as a 

result of the Iraq war and insurgency and with the government’s 

interventionist proclivities. Moreover, however unfairly, there is 

a widespread perception that Blair is merely Bush’s poodle, and 

fighting in what is widely regarded as a bad cause to pull Bush’s 

chestnuts out of the fire is not popular. Given the unfavorable 

impression generated by the war and other high-handed, unilateral 

actions, anti-Americanism is on the rise in the UK, both on the right 

and left of politics. This perspective may grow more rapidly in the 

aftermath of the suicide bombings in London in July 2005. As a result, 

this may well act as a constraint on future combined operations. It 
182

may also undermine public support for the defense establishment’s 

desire to ensure interoperability with the American armed forces. 

 Another factor brought to the fore by the Iraq war and other 

American saber rattling also limits the perceived usefulness of a 

British commitment to fighting alongside the United States. There are 

considerable transatlantic differences in interpretation of the role of, 

importance of, adherence to, and development of international law. 

What Hoon called “lawfare” can dominate British military planning 

in a way that mystifies the Americans. Just as the United States tired 

of managing war by committee during the Kosovo conflict in 1999 

when countries making a negligible military commitment insisted 

on exercising influence on the conduct of operations, so they might 

come to deprecate British insistence on perceived legal niceties.

 All in all, Britain’s practical usefulness to the United States in the 

military field may well decline in the future (though its significance 

as a forward base will not). Britain may also cease to play its once 

valuable role as champion of U.S. policies within NATO. European 

members are mostly reluctant to expand the charter of the alliance 

much beyond the narrow confines agreed in 1949, and some favor 

the creation of a European Union (EU) military force that is not 

dependent on America. Increasingly, for its part, the United States 

favors ad hoc coalitions of the willing over working within the confines 

of an alliance in which most members are seen not to be pulling 

their weight. A combination of reducing conventional strength 

and political influence in NATO would lead to a diminution of the 

already small influence that London can exert in Washington. 

Should Britain Remain in the Nuclear Club?

 The original decision to acquire a nuclear capability was made 

in response to a perceived growth of anti-British and isolationist 

sentiment in the United States. The acquisition of an atomic bomb in 

1952 and of a hydrogen bomb in 1958 was seen as restoring the country 

fully to the ranks of the great powers. However, the UK possessed 

a genuinely independent nuclear deterrent for only 10 years. With 

the purchase, on very favorable terms, of the Polaris system in 1962, 

Britain became dependent on the United States to keep its deterrent 

functioning. However, as then Prime Minister Harold Macmillan 
183

put it, Polaris solved the “problem of being poor and powerful at the 

same time.” The same rationale underlay the acquisition of Trident

in the early 1980s, the British Chevaline warhead having proved both 

too expensive and not good enough as an upgrade to the existing 

system.

 Dependence on America to keep the nuclear “show on the road” 

was not seen to be a major weakness. Solidarity in the face of the 

Soviet threat made that vulnerability mainly theoretical. And if 

war were to come, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) 

might calculate that, when the chips were down, the United States 

might hesitate to risk nuclear immolation in retaliation for attacks on 

Europe. But it would be far less certain about the actions of a Britain 

that was more or less in the front line. 

 The British government accepts that the issue of a Trident

replacement has to be resolved in the current parliament. In its 

election manifesto, the Labour Party committed itself to retaining 

a nuclear deterrent. Now that the Soviet threat has gone, however, 

the case for retention is far weaker. Proponents put forward several 

arguments:

 • Britain should keep a nuclear capability as an insurance policy 

in an uncertain world;

 • being a nuclear power confers prestige and is almost the sole 

rationale for Britain’s continued holding of a permanent, vetowielding seat on the UN Security Council; and,

 • Britain cannot allow France to be the sole European nuclear 

power.

 These rationales are not wholly convincing. It is hard indeed 

to envisage a situation where Britain could alone face an enemy 

deterrable with nuclear weapons—certainly a terrorist group armed 

with weapons of mass destruction (WMD) could not be intimidated 

in the same way that a state can be. If countries facing a real threat, 

such as Germany and Japan during the Cold War, felt able to rely on 

American extended deterrence, why should not Britain do the same 

in less threatening times? Could the United States really remain 

indifferent to a serious military threat to Britain? A very expensive 

insurance policy against an unspecifiable danger is not worth paying 
184

if the cost of the premium means that you cannot afford the upkeep 

of real essentials. Any new nuclear system can be purchased only 

at the expense of conventional capabilities that will assuredly be 

needed—if only to sustain the special defense relationship with the 

United States.

 Does the British semi-independent nuclear deterrent provide the 

only justification for membership in the Security Council nuclear club? 

Does Britain’s activeness in the UN, particularly in peacekeeping 

and peace enforcement (both dependent on conventional armed 

forces) count for so little? In any case, membership in the nuclear 

club is no longer seen as a sine qua non of membership, now that 

the admission of other powers is under active consideration. In any 

event, the question arises once again, Is the cost too high? As to the 

French, how much leverage does their force de frappe really confer in 

today’s world? The cost of its maintenance certainly acts as a drag on 

developing a modern conventional capability. And would it really 

be to Britain’s disadvantage if France were Europe’s sole nuclear 

power?

 If it is deemed truly essential that Britain remain a nuclear player, 

it is to be hoped that the country pays the lowest possible stake to 

remain in the game. Another submarine-based system would put 

an impossible strain on the defense budget, even if the Americans 

waived the research and development (R&D) costs as they did with 

Trident. Cruise missiles such as Tomahawk would provide a cheap and 

cheerful—and dual-capable—alternative that should be adequate to 

deal with any threat Britain is likely to face. Alternatively, it could be 

worth pursuing an Anglo-French project. While France has showed 

no interest in the past in nuclear pooling, it, too, feels the cost of 

maintaining an independent system and could perhaps be induced 

to come in with the UK if the latter were seen to be making a genuine 

effort to put life into a European defense identity and capability. 

Britain’s Future Strategic Direction.

 Even after the disappearance of the Soviet threat, Britain and 

other European countries still have plenty of security interests 

and problems in common with the United States. These, as well 

as bureaucratic inertia, help to explain the continued existence of 
185

NATO despite the decay of danger from the east. All are concerned 

about: 

 • WMD proliferation;

 • international terrorism, especially of the messianic and/or 

nihilistic variety;

 • the prevalence of ethnic/religious conflict and its potential 

impact on wider stability;

 • organized crime, especially narcotics and people trafficking; 

and,

 • the emergence of weak and failing states and the possibility 

that they will become (as Afghanistan and others have done) 

havens for terrorists and criminal enterprises.

 However, the states of mainland Europe are reluctant to raise 

their strategic vision beyond their own continent. They have little 

appetite for committing NATO to “out of area” tasks and less for 

funding serious military capabilities to do so. They may bemoan 

developments such as the apparent Iranian threat to acquire nuclear 

weapons or the seemingly never-ending Israeli-Palestinian struggle, 

but they are not willing to go beyond aid and diplomacy (not backed 

by military power) in attempting to find answers. Things are different 

in the United States. As a result of the ending of the Cold War, the 

eclipse of Russian power, and, especially, the galvanizing effect of 

the September 11, 2001 (9/11), atrocity, America has apparently 

decided to pursue global hegemony, not, of course, for its own sake 

but as the only doable way to solve worldwide problems. It sees itself 

as a benign hegemon, one whose dominance and decisions are, by 

definition, good for all save so-called rogue states and other criminal 

and anti-democratic regimes. America seems determined to reshape 

the world in a way congenial to it, and in doing so not to be bound 

by any restrictions such as antiquated notions of international law. 

Rather it will follow its own judgments. 

 Most Europeans, save for the former Soviet satellites, distrust 

American ambitions, even motives. To an extent, especially with 

the French, this stems from the inevitable resentment against the 

now sole superpower—exacerbated by America’s egregious lack of 

sensitivity to the needs and opinions of others. There are, however, 
186

more substantive factors inhibiting the relatively close collaboration 

that characterized the Cold War era:

 • not all American interests and problems are seen as European 

ones too, e.g., the increasing capability of China’s military and 

the threat to Taiwan—indeed most developments in the Far 

East;

 • where they are held in common, perceptions of their causes 

and cures often differ, as with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict 

and its significance for the struggle against international 

terrorism, not to mention the way in which that struggle is 

conducted; and,

 • while most values, like adherence to democratic norms, are 

shared, there are important differences—for instance over 

the central role and importance of international law and 

institutions in finding solutions to international problems.

 This divergence of interests and, even when they coincide, of 

approaches between the United States and much of the EU, including 

its most influential members, is now causing a problem for the UK. 

Ever since the Suez debacle illustrated the hollowness of Britain’s 

great power pretensions, the first principle of British foreign policy 

has been that Britain remains the closest ally of the United States. 

As noted earlier, Prime Minister Blair reiterated this line as recently 

as 2003 in his speech to British ambassadors. In the same speech, 

however, he maintained that the country must also be at the heart 

of Europe. “Britain must be at the centre of Europe . . . . It will grow 

in power. To separate ourselves from it would be madness.” He 

asserts that there is no incompatibility between the two aims. Britain 

can, and must, be a transatlantic bridge between the two (also a 

self-assigned task of previous prime ministers and always greatly 

resented by French and German leaders).

 However much Blair believes (or pretends) that there is no 

contradiction between looking simultaneously west and east, the 

Iraq war and other contentious issues have blown the idea apart. 

The depth of acrimony and bitterness that has developed between 

the United States and the traditional leaders of Europe will not be 

overcome easily or quickly, whatever soothing words are spoken to 
187

paper over the cracks. Moreover,America is working to strengthen 

ties with former communist, and more Atlanticist, central European 

countries (especially those with large resident U.S. minorities) rather 

than cultivating what U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld 

contemptuously dismissed as “old Europe.” Clearly, the United 

States has abandoned its decades-old efforts to encourage a more 

closely integrated and therefore stronger Europe (a policy which 

used to cause much consternation in London. It no longer needs 

a stronger European arm of NATO to balance the USSR and fears 

that a stronger EU will be less malleable, perhaps even a competitor. 

America now seeks to divide and rule NATO, even the EU, and this 

will exacerbate divisions which have already come to light in several 

areas. Ideas and interests are diverging in several important areas 

of policy, and these differences will probably inhibit cooperation, 

even over issues where there is actually much common ground. Both 

sides of the Atlantic will demand that Britain choose between them. 

Persisting with a third way is an illusion, not an option.

 What should be the UK’s choice of strategic direction? Should the 

country continue to follow its traditional, hitherto immutable policy 

and cleave to the United States, clinging to a special relationship 

that has lost most of its substance with the end of the Cold War 

that sustained it? Or should it recognize and accept the realities of 

geography and economic interest and genuinely put itself at the heart 

of Europe? In essence, it is a choice between accepting the status of 

a U.S. satellite—Britain can never aspire to be more than a nominal 

partner—and being a shaping power in Europe where its weight 

would give it real influence.4

 Actually, the present Labour government (and any near-future 

Conservative alternative) is all but certain to duck the issue and 

continue sitting on the fence, insisting that the choice is artificial 

and need not be made. Governments hate to make hard choices, 

especially on such an issue as this with all the obfuscatory myths, false 

perspectives, chauvinistic sentiments, prejudices, and uncertainties 

that surround it. Adhering thus to the continuing balancing act will 

be interpreted in Europe as a de facto continuation of the Americafirst policy. Whatever its other benefits, it will cost the country dear 

in the EU, as it has done for the last 40 years since De Gaulle’s first 

veto on membership in the European Economic Community (EEC). 
188

Quite apart from French and others’ fears that Britain will act as a 

Trojan horse for the United States in its aim to divide and rule, there 

will always remain the fear that, when the chips are down, Britain 

will abandon its European partners in favor of its transatlantic ally. 

A country with such a suspicion hanging over it can never aspire to 

a leadership role.

 Such an outcome would probably be bad for the entire western 

world, not least in the realm of security and defense. As the Iraq 

entanglement and other contemporary issues are making clear, even 

the uniquely powerful United States cannot resolve every problem 

on its own. Indeed, overstretch in one area will weaken its ability 

to exercise decisive influence in others—as is arguably happening 

today in the cases of Iran and North Korea. Nor can Washington rely 

on a tame NATO to do its bidding. The cement that held the alliance 

together, a common fear of the USSR, has lost its power to bind and has 

not been replaced by a commitment to new missions. The Americans 

seem to have lost patience with NATO politics and its toothlessness 

and relegated it to a minor role. They seem to wish it to continue 

as the primary defense institution for Europeans mainly because it 

gives them a say in European affairs, and it prevents the emergence 

of any European decisional independence. The Europeans, for their 

part, seem content with shuffling deck chairs instead of facing new 

realities. 

 The Americans would benefit from the creation of an effective 

European security and defense policy backed by a strong military 

arm, to share burdens where agreement exists. Problems will arise 

in which the United States will not wish for involvement. There will 

be others for which, thanks to commitments elsewhere, America 

cannot find the resources to intervene. An EU force might be able to 

fill the breach. There would indubitably be disagreements between 

a strong EU and the United States, but, given fundamental values 

and interests that are shared, these can be resolved, as they currently 

are in the area of trade where the EU is now a power to be reckoned 

with. A militarily powerful EU need not be a rival to America, or to 

a NATO which will in any case always be ineffectual without the 

participation of the principal EU players. On the contrary, in most 

security and defense issues, it could and should be complementary.
189

 It has been persuasively argued that an effective European 

defense organization is a pipe dream. It may well be so. Two things 

are reasonably certain, though.

 • Effective European defense is much more likely to happen 

if Britain abandons its semi-detached attitude to the EU and 

offers genuine commitment and leadership. Many countries 

would welcome a lead from a major player that possesses a 

well-respected military and is neither burdened with the sins 

of the past nor driven by a visceral anti-Americanism.

 • If Britain remains cool towards the project but it nevertheless 

progresses, it will most likely do so under French direction. 

France, the EU’s other serious military power, would seek 

to make it a rival to, rather than an effective partner for, the 

United States.

 With the St Malo declaration of 1998, it appeared that Britain 

was shifting from its reluctance to contemplate any defense 

initiative outside NATO and was prepared, together with France, 

to give substance to a European security and defense identity. 

The two governments agreed that the EU “must have a capacity 

for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the 

means to decide to use them and the readiness to do so.”5

 At the 

same time, however, they both accepted that “the Atlantic Alliance 

is the foundation of Europe’s collective security.” Has the acrimony 

resulting from the split over Iraq and other nondefense-related 

issues made it impossible to return to this promising road? Has the 

embarrassment and shame resulting from the exposure of Europe’s 

incapacity to act without reliance on the Americans over Bosnia and 

Kosovo been forgotten? Or can the EU still get its act together and 

assemble a military capability that somewhat matches its economic 

strength? Obviously, this question looms particularly large in the 

aftermath of the rejection of the draft EU constitution by French and 

Dutch voters. 

 With Britain at least sharing the helm, European defense would 

not be defined by opposition to the United States in some zero-sum 

game. Cooperation wherever and whenever possible would be the 

goal, though the EU would not act as a mere satellite of America. 
190

Recognizing this, the United States would not, it is to be hoped, “cut 

off its nose to spite its face” by severing its often close relationship 

with the UK. After all, America gains something from it, too, and 

it would still need a friend at the European court. Certainly, as a 

shaper and leader of a significant European security and defense 

effort, Britain would enjoy more influence in Washington than it 

does today as a loyal but unassertive ally that is too weak to compel 

attention. This would be a better outcome for Britain than being coldshouldered in Europe and taken for granted in the United States. 

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 12

 1. Ironically, America’s Monroe Doctrine relied more on the dominance of the 

Royal Navy than on the power of the American fleet to dissuade intervention from 

the Old World. 

 2. Contrastingly, the French drew the lesson from Suez that the United States 

was an untrustworthy ally and that France needed to acquire the means to act 

independently. The difference in approach continues to this day.

 3. This Greek-Roman analogy to describe the relationship between Britain and 

America was coined by Harold Macmillan, a future prime minister, in North Africa 

in 1943. It has been clung to ever since to rationalize and ease the pain of having to 

accept inferior status. And Britain’s supposed influence over the superpower was 

regarded as increasing Britain’s diplomatic weight.

 4. Britain was faced with this choice as far back as 1957, when it chose an 

illusory great power status and the special relationship over membership in 

the fledgling EEC. Subsequent regrets, consequent on the collapse of traditional 

policy, led the UK belatedly to apply for membership, but this was blocked by 

a France mistrustful of British Atlanticism. The Edward Heath government, in a 

rare burst of Europe-first enthusiasm, succeeded in gaining entry in 1973. But by 

this time, the EEC had been shaped by France (mainly) and Germany in a fashion 

uncongenial to British interests. 

 5. To demonstrate British seriousness, the UK has offered 12,500 men, 18 ships, 

and 72 combat aircraft to give teeth to the new European Rapid Reaction Force. 

It also, however, resists (lest the Americans be upset) the establishment of an EU 

planning center at Tervuren, Belgium, separate from NATO. 
191

CHAPTER 13

WHEN YOU COME TO A FORK IN THE ROAD, TAKE IT—

DEFENSE POLICY AND THE SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP:

PANEL CHAIRMAN’S REPORT

Jeffrey D. McCausland

The famous American philosopher and baseball player, Yogi Berra, 

once said that when you come to a fork in the road—take it. There is 

common agreement that Britain today finds itself at a juncture with 

respect to the defense aspects of the special relationship it has enjoyed 

with the United States since World War II. While leaders in America 

and the United Kingdom (UK) agree on this, it is curious that national 

defense and Anglo-American relations played practically no role 

in the 2005 British election. British politicians reflected the public’s 

clear interest in immigration, healthcare, crime, and education. The 

defense panelists argued that in the aftermath of the reelection of both 

the American and British leaders, the United States must address 

four areas of fundamental importance if the special relationship is 

to flourish. These four areas are grand strategy, military operations, 

defense capabilities, and security organizations.

Prime Minister Tony Blair has on several occasions said that 

the role for Britain is to be closely allied with the United States and

remain engaged in the heart of Europe.1 He (like his predecessors) has 

argued repeatedly that the UK must be a bridge between the United 

States and continental Europe. But can the UK continue to perform 

this role in defense matters? This would seem daunting and perhaps 

even contradictory in a future that now requires reconsideration 

of the European Union (EU) Constitution, rejected by French and 

Dutch voters, as well as coping with a possible European desire to 

establish common approaches on defense and foreign policy. “Can 

Britain continue this triangular relationship or ménage a trois?”
192

Grand Strategy.

Strategy is the art of the possible. It requires successful management 

of three variables—ends, ways, and means. Consequently, any 

discussion of strategy and the special relationship must confront 

several fundamental questions. What is the end state—the politicoeconomic future—that American and British leaders are attempting 

to shape? And assuming they can agree on such a common vision, 

what are the defense policies best calculated to assist in its realization? 

And, finally, what are the means or resources both countries are able 

and willing to devote to this effort? 

Throughout the history of national partnerships and alliances, 

the presence of a mutual threat has been fundamental to achieving 

agreement on strategy. Benjamin Franklin famously said upon signing 

the Declaration of Independence, “We now must all hang together 

or we will surely hang separately.” The U.S.-UK relationship has 

“hung together” in the face of threats to national survival. Initially, 

the partners opposed imperial Germany, then confronted Hitlerian 

fascism, and finally faced down the threat posed by the Soviet Union 

and communism, acting in all three cases within the context of a 

broader alliance. During this time, the United States accepted the 

basic grand strategic principle that despite overwhelming American 

power, it needed allies for the capabilities they provided as well 

as the legitimacy gained from collective action. The two countries 

might have periodic severe disagreements over such issues as 

Suez, Vietnam, the Falklands, and Grenada, but both knew that the 

common threat was so great that reconciliation was likely, if not 

certain, in each case. 

This common threat ended with the collapse of the Berlin Wall 

and demise of the Soviet Union. But in terms of defense links, the 

experience of 75 years established certain cooperative arrangements 

that are now routine and indeed taken for granted. These include 

unparalleled sharing of intelligence, regular consultations on military 

doctrine, American support for the UK nuclear deterrent, robust 

liaison teams in both the Pentagon and Ministry of Defence, and 

now British representation at several American regional combatant 

commands. Furthermore, American and British officers regularly 

cooperated on a host of issues at North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
193

(NATO) headquarters and during conflicts in Iraq, Bosnia, and 

Kosovo over the past 20 years. 

In the aftermath of September 11, 2001 (9/11), many in continental 

Europe, however, did not share the view that 9/11 changed the way 

in which America should perceive the world and evaluate threats. In 

spite of the attacks on Spain, Greece, Turkey, and now even London, 

it appears, from the American side of the Atlantic at least, that 

many Europeans still view 9/11 as fundamentally a U.S. problem 

that somehow Europe can avoid if it chooses. In terms of the special 

relationship, however, President George W. Bush observed following 

the attacks in London in July 2005, “Just as America and Great Britain 

stood together to defeat totalitarian ideologies of the 20th century, 

we now stand together against the murderous ideologies of the 21st 

century.”2

Many Americans worry that continental Europe has failed to 

grasp the enormous impact 9/11 has had on the American psyche. 

As Leo Michel pointed out, the U.S. defense strategy as officially 

published by the Department of Defense (DoD) in March 2005 opens 

with the line: “America is a nation at war.”3 This view is not shared in 

Paris, Brussels, or Berlin. Consequently, will it be feasible for Britain 

to maintain its historical defense ties with the United States while 

working toward the greater European defense integration within the 

EU envisioned by the St. Malo agreement? How will British public 

attitudes be affected by the horrific events of July 2005? 

Strategy begins with an analysis of threats, and Al Qaeda and its 

associated groups do not provide as coherent a face in this regard 

as did the Soviet Union. Both Britain and America agree on the 

threats posed by nuclear proliferation, cyber terrorism, weapons 

of mass destruction (WMD), bioterrorism, international crime, and 

failed states. But many in the UK were unsettled, and rightfully so, 

by America’s “global war on terrorism” for its lack of definition. 

Many defense experts in both Britain and America have argued since 

2001 that terrorism ultimately remains a technique as opposed to 

an enemy. Consequently, establishing a common grand strategy to 

confront terrorism as a shared threat is certainly challenging. Such 

a strategy must both reflect and cement public support for policies. 

In this regard, it is interesting to note that at least in the immediate 

aftermath of the London attacks, pro-U.S. feeling actually increased 

in some polls in the UK.4
194

Military Operations.

Cooperation between the American and British militaries is 

unparalleled not only with respect to U.S. relations with other states 

but perhaps even in the annals of alliances. No other state has the daily 

involvement in the planning and preparation of operations that the 

UK has with the United States. U.S. and British forces have cooperated 

well in Iraq and adapted quickly to the changing conditions on the 

ground as the war evolved from its initial conventional phase to 

counterinsurgency operations. Still, Charles Dick is correct when he 

observed that many in Britain worry that this cooperation may occur 

only at the tactical level. They are concerned that British influence on 

American thinking at the operational or higher levels is limited.

Both Washington and Whitehall should be concerned that 

“the coalition in Iraq is becoming less a coalition and more a clear 

partnership.” The major European troop contributors to Iraq will 

remove their forces by the end of 2005. Outside NATO, there are 

no countries with sizable military forces lining up to assist. In 

Iraq, the January 2005 elections, continued training of indigenous 

security forces, and October 2005 referendum do, however, suggest 

that Britain and America may have at least reached the “end of the 

beginning.” But continued domestic political progress along with 

sustained increases in the size and sophistication of Iraqi security 

forces will be crucial if the insurgency is to be defeated. Even the 

most optimistic analysts in both countries agree that a large-scale 

presence by the United States and UK in Iraq for the foreseeable future 

is inevitable. Plans exist, however, if these efforts are successful, for 

British forces to be cut in half by the end of 2006.5

 Even American 

troop commanders have spoken publicly about the possibility of 

significant U.S. troop reductions in 2006.

In every challenge lies the seeds of opportunity, and this may 

be the case now. American and British leaders should collectively 

seek greater assistance not in providing combat forces for Iraq, but 

in contributions particularly from European states in the training 

of Iraqi police, border guardsmen, and military forces. Some of the 

reports discussing a possible reduction of British forces in Iraq in 

2006 suggest that this might result in a subsequent deployment by 
195

British troops to Afghanistan to lead NATO forces in the south of 

that country.6

 Such a move would clearly enhance British efforts to 

be a bridge in the transatlantic relationship. 

Defense Capabilities.

The eminent British historian Sir Michael Howard once observed 

that “capabilities lead to opportunities which lead to options and 

perhaps even intentions.” This aphorism must remind us that vision 

without resources is a fairy tale. Here, both the United States and 

the UK confront major budgetary choices. As both Michel and 

Dick point out, at the top of the list may be the future of the British 

independent nuclear deterrent. The UK has managed to maintain 

its nuclear forces and the ability to project significant conventional 

forces abroad, even following the reductions that occurred as part of 

the peace dividend at the end of the Cold War. It remains to be seen 

whether the next government will be able to continue to do both in 

the face of spiraling costs for conventional forces and the need to 

replace the Trident nuclear force. Former Defence Secretary Geoffrey 

Hoon stated that the first principle of British defense planning is to be 

interoperable with the United States. Consequently, a fundamental 

question is, Should Britain retain an independent nuclear deterrent 

and, if so, for what strategic purpose? If the new government chooses 

to retain the nuclear deterrent, will there be sufficient remaining 

funds to transform British conventional forces for global deployment? 

Obviously, this problem has become even more complex following 

the July 2005 attacks in London that will likely demand far greater 

investments in homeland security. 

In the aftermath of the 2005 elections, it appears that the Blair 

government intends to continue a British independent nuclear 

deterrent. John Reid, the new Defence Secretary, has opened talks 

with the United States on a successor to Trident. His government 

appears determined to maintain a British submarine-launched 

system because it is “invisible and invulnerable.”7 This represents 

an apparent shift from the earlier position, which seemed open to 

other less expensive options, such as ground or air-launched cruise 

missile systems. The full cost of developing the Trident replacement 
196

is estimated to be $25 billion to $35 billion. Such an investment would 

make even marginal increases in the size and continued technological 

improvements in conventional forces increasingly difficult. 

The United States also faces tough budgetary choices, confronted 

as it is by the rising costs of the war in Iraq, demands for greater 

attention to homeland security, the mandate to transform U.S. 

forces, and the aftermath of natural disasters like Hurricane Katrina. 

As Michel pointed out, the U.S. administration must confront these 

choices in the ongoing Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), scheduled 

for submission to Congress by February 2006.8

 It is interesting to 

note that representatives from the British military establishment are 

participating in the American QDR effort in Washington. Tellingly, 

DoD guidance for the QDR assumes no increase in American defense 

spending in the coming years. 

Finally, Michel suggested that three other issues regarding 

defense capability deserve mention. The first is the American 

Global Restationing Plan. This will see a significant reduction of 

American forces in continental Europe while retaining, consistent 

with UK agreement, air bases in Great Britain. These bases, as well 

as the strategic British island of Diego Garcia, may in fact take on 

even greater importance to American defense planning. Second, 

the United States has begun the initial deployment of anti-ballistic 

missiles in Alaska and California. This process will continue with 

additional forces being readied for sea-based deployment in the 

near future. There has been close UK-U.S. cooperation on this effort, 

to include the establishment of an American radar system in Great 

Britain. Anglo-American discussions will continue on future UK 

participation in the ballistic missile defense system. This will not 

only require the two parties to determine costs and deployments, 

but also to establish an appropriate bilateral command and control 

mechanism for these forces. Third, with respect to defense industrial 

cooperation, there is a serious disconnect in the United States between 

the executive branch’s longstanding desire for close defense and 

security cooperation with Great Britain (and a few others), on the 

one hand, and congressional restriction on foreign participation in 

U.S. defense programs, on the other. 
197

Security Organizations.

As Dick observed, there has been a clear skepticism about the 

relevance of NATO in the Bush administration. This is due in part to 

the dramatic reductions in European defense spending over the past 

decade that have brought most European conventional forces to the 

brink of irrelevance. Such skepticism was demonstrated in the tepid 

acceptance of the NATO countries’ offer to support the United States 

under Article V after 9/11 and continued with the very unfortunate 

comments by Secretary Donald Rumsfeld about “old Europe.” 

Agreement exists among defense experts that Iraq has done severe 

structural damage to the transatlantic bridge. In this first year of the 

second Bush term, efforts were made by the United States to repair 

the relationship with NATO, consult more frequently, and use NATO 

not only as a source of military capability, but also as a collaborator 

through expanded discussions and planning. Time will tell whether 

such positive steps translate into improved relations.9

Still, it is worrisome to reflect on former German Chancellor 

Gerhard Schroeder’s comments at Wehrkunde, Germany, in 2005 

when he suggested that NATO may have outlived its usefulness 

and that a new organization needs to be envisaged to manage the 

transatlantic relationship. In many ways the Chancellor, now turning 

over the reins of government to Angela Merkel, may have been 

speaking less to the Americans than to the continental Europeans and 

the British. So what, then, is the future of NATO from the standpoint 

of the special relationship and what, collectively, should British and 

American leaders do to move the organization in the direction of 

relevancy? 

In answering this question, existing NATO operations must 

also be taken into account. The Alliance conducted major out-ofarea operation in the last decade. It still has significant forces and

its credibility deployed in the Balkans. Unfortunately, the final 

political decision on the future of Kosovo has not yet been made, 

Montenegro’s independence movement may yet be successful, and 

Macedonia will continue to confront enormous challenges. All of 

these unsettling situations could lead to a future crisis.10 If another 

Balkans crisis occurs, two things might happen immediately. First, 

the United States, confronted by global overstretch, might well 
198

announce that the crisis is essentially a European problem. Second, 

this announcement would cause major problems for an already 

damaged transatlantic relationship.

Former U.S. Secretary of Defense Harold Brown and NATO 

Secretary General Lord George Robertson have broached another 

opportunity for Britain and America to provide leadership for the 

Alliance. Both have endorsed the need to create military capabilities 

and doctrine to take better advantage of network-based operations. 

They observed in a recent study that “the era of static, large, armored 

forces, in place to confront and deter the adversary’s massed 

formations, is over. The era of forces that train and exercise together, 

but are rarely used, is over as well.”11

A Final Word.

To mix metaphors, Britain may be at a fork in the road as it tries 

to be the transatlantic bridge as both shorelines threaten to recede. 

But the special relationship may itself be at a crossroads. There is a 

greater need than ever for reinvigorated consultation by leaders on 

a range of important issues that lie ahead and a need for leaders on 

both sides of the Atlantic to celebrate this relationship frequently and 

publicly. As we pass the 60th anniversary of the end of World War II, 

the current generation and those who focus on international politics 

are aware of the special relationship’s value. But both countries must 

attempt to underscore its value more emphatically to their respective 

populations now and in future.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 13

1. For two excellent summaries, see Steven Kramer, “Blair’s Britain After Iraq,” 

Foreign Affairs, Vol. 88, Issue 4, July/August 2003, pp. 90; and Rodney Braithwaite, 

“End of the Affair,” Prospect, May 2003, pp. 20-23. 

2. Jim Vande Hei, “Bush Defends Strategy Against Terrorist Attacks,” New 

York Times, July 12, 2005, p. A3. 

3. Donald H. Rumsfeld, The National Defense Strategy of the United States of 

America, Washington, DC: Department of Defense, March 2005, p. 1.

4. Poll taken for the Daily Telegraph, London, July 8, 2004, by the YouGov 

Polling Firm, www.YouGov.com.
199

5. Victoria Burnett, Jimmy Burns, and Peter Spiegal, “MoD Plans Iraq Troop 

Withdrawal,” Financial Times, July 2005, p. 1. See also Glenn Frankel and Josh 

White, “U.K. Memo Cites Plans for Troop Reduction,” Washington Post, July 11, 

2005, p. A01. 

6. Ibid. 

7. David Cracknell, “Talks Start With US on Trident’s 15bn Successor,” London 

Sunday Times, July 17, 2005, p. 1. 

8. Thom Shanker and Eric Schmitt, “Pentagon Weighs Strategy Change to 

Deter Terror,” New York Times, July 5, 2005, p. 1. 

9. Ambassador Nicholas Burns, “A Trans Atlantic Agenda for the Year Ahead,” 

remarks at Chatham House, London, April 6, 2005. 

10. Ibid. 

11. Guy Ben-Ari, ”European Commitment to Network-Based Operations and 

the Transatlantic Doctrine Gap,” Initiative for a Renewed Transatlantic Partnership, 

Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, August 2005, p. 

4.

CONCLUSION

203

CHAPTER 14

“WELL, ISN’T THAT SPECIAL?”

CONCLUDING REMARKS ON U.S.-UK RELATIONS 

AT THE START OF THE 21st CENTURY

Douglas T. Stuart

 I am sure that when some Americans hear the phrase “special 

relationship,” their first reaction is to think of comedian Dana 

Carvey’s “Church Lady.” When Carvey’s character is forced to 

confront some form of behavior or lifestyle which she disdains, she 

condescendingly replies: “Well, isn’t that special?” 

 The Anglo-American special relationship is nothing to sneer, 

or sniff, at. It is extremely important to both the United States and 

the United Kingdom (UK). It has also been, and continues to be, an 

indispensable source of productive leadership for the international 

community. 

 On the other hand, the special relationship needs to be viewed 

realistically. Some of the contributors to this volume have highlighted 

instances in which fundamental differences of principle or interest 

have strained the Anglo-American relationship. In some cases, these 

disagreements have been exacerbated by unrealistic expectations. 

The most well-known example is the 1956 Suez crisis. The comments 

of Lieutenant General Sir Hugh Stockwell, commander of the British 

1st Corps during the planning for the French-British-Israeli operation, 

illustrate the degree of misunderstanding on the UK side:

. . . as the British could fairly claim a “special relationship” with the 

Americans, by which they would hope to maintain the neutrality of the 

United States in the period of operation, Britain was the obvious choice 

for leadership.1

London was not prepared for the intensely negative American 

response to the Suez invasion, nor for Secretary of State John Foster 

Dulles’ subsequent explanation that the United States, which had 

extant defense arrangements with 44 other countries, “cannot have 
204

a hierarchy of relationships with allies around the world.”2 From the 

British point of view, a “hierarchy of relationships” was precisely 

the point.

 Washington has also fallen prey to self-deluding fantasies from 

time to time. One example is Lyndon Johnson’s efforts to convince 

Harold Wilson to contribute “a token force” to support America’s 

beleaguered troops in Vietnam. The President argued that “a platoon 

of bagpipers would be sufficient.”3 By the time that Johnson made 

this request, however, Wilson’s government was fully engaged in 

a campaign of retrenchment from East of Suez, and was unwilling 

to risk guilt by association with America’s quixotic campaign in 

Southeast Asia. The fact that many Britons believed that the United 

States had contributed to the pressures which forced the UK to 

abandon its empire made Wilson’s decision that much easier. 

 What is most interesting about the instances of disagreement and 

misunderstanding between the United States and the UK since World 

War II is their relative infrequency. In the overwhelming majority of 

cases when the two nations have taken international actions, they 

have acted either in unison or in harmony. Philip Stephens attributes 

this to a “deeply ingrained . . . habit of cooperation.” But Nicholas 

Childs and Leo Michel remind us that this habit is reinforced 

by institutional arrangements which give the two governments 

preferential access to each other’s intelligence and a “privileged” 

role in defense planning. 

 Gaining and retaining this special status has been a top priority 

for Britain since World War II. Indeed, Winston Churchill established 

this as a principle of British foreign policy even before the United 

States entered the war. In a statement before the House of Commons 

in 1940, he predicted that the two nations “. . . will have to be 

somewhat mixed up together” for the foreseeable future. He went on 

to reassure his colleagues, however, that “I do not view the process 

with any misgivings.”4

 Churchill was, nonetheless, an unsentimental 

realist who understood that if London wanted to be treated by the 

United States as primus inter pares, it would have to provide more 

than sage advice and accumulated wisdom. As a result, all British 

governments since World War II have looked for ways to keep their 

nation militarily strong, not just as a good in itself but also as a means 

of sustaining the special relationship with the United States. The late 
205

Brigadier Kenneth Hunt once described these efforts as a policy of 

“getting a quart out of a pint bottle” in the formulation of successive 

defense budgets.5 For its part, the United States has helped Great 

Britain to manage this difficult task by various forms of bilateral 

defense cooperation, including nuclear-sharing arrangements.6

 No issue better illustrates the costs that both sides have been 

willing to incur in support of the special relationship than the allied 

invasion of Iraq. For Washington, the costs have been primarily 

in the form of foreign policy adjustments. The George W. Bush 

administration agreed to reign in its unilateralist instincts for a time 

and allow its campaign against Saddam Hussein to be tied down in 

the United Nations (UN) in large part out of respect for the advice and 

interests of Prime Minister Tony Blair. Conversely, the British Prime 

Minister was willing to incur severe and foreseeable costs in terms 

of domestic public opinion and British relations with key European 

governments when he opted to support the U.S.-led campaign against 

Iraq. It is very likely that Mr. Blair also understood that by placing 

the UK in the forefront of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), he 

was increasing the risk that his nation would become the target of 

retaliation. This very real threat was confirmed on July 7, 2005 (7/7), 

when coordinated terrorist attacks at four locations in London left 56 

people dead and 700 injured.

 Both governments accepted these costs and risks because they had 

gained a new appreciation of the value of the special relationship in 

the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11). Indeed, 

to the extent that there is a silver lining in such catastrophes, it is this 

tendency to remind us who our friends are and why they deserve our 

friendship. The specific circumstances of the 9/11 attacks were less 

important than the shared recognition in Washington and London 

that the two nations were once again confronting a global threat 

to the survival of democracy. That shared recognition continues to 

guide the foreign policy decisions of both governments. 

 It should come as no surprise that the other nation which 

has most publicly associated itself with the U.S.-led GWOT is 

Australia, which shares a cluster of values with Great Britain and 

the United States. According to James Bennett, values include: “. . . 

individualism, rule of law, honoring contracts and covenants, and 

the elevation of freedom to the first rank of political and cultural 
206

values.”7 Although these liberal values are prevalent among Englishspeaking democracies which can trace their roots back to the Magna 

Carta, they are also celebrated among other nations—including some 

Central European countries whose leaders developed their world 

views in opposition to Soviet rule. That these nations have embraced 

Anglosphere values since the end of the Cold War is testimony both 

to the enduring validity of these principles and to the international 

influence of Britain and the United States.

 Both the U.S.-UK special relationship and the larger and still 

protean Anglosphere community have the potential to endure 

and grow in the 21st century. But both arrangements will require 

cultivation. Several contributors to this volume have identified areas 

for improvement in the Anglo-American relationship. First, there 

is a fair degree of consensus that President Bush must do a much 

better job of helping Prime Minister Blair to make the case that the 

GWOT serves the interests of the entire international community. 

Rhetoric matters in this regard, and the President would be welladvised to carefully study the ways in which Mr. Blair frames his 

public statements. Perhaps the best example of Mr. Blair’s principled 

eloquence is his first statement following the aforementioned terrorist 

attacks of 7/7. Speaking from the G8 summit in Gleneagles, Scotland, 

the Prime Minister noted that all of the participating governments 

“have some experience of the effects of terrorism and all of the 

leaders . . . share our complete resolution to defeat this terrorism.” 

He then went on to place the London attacks in a larger context:

It is particularly barbaric that this has happened on a day when people 

are meeting to try to help the problems of poverty in Africa and the long 

term problems of climate change and the environment.8

Mr. Blair’s statement was more than a tactical device for garnering 

public support. It demonstrated the Prime Minister’s appreciation 

of Andrew Apostolou’s comment that the United States and the 

UK need to “demonstrate leadership across the spectrum of policy 

issues, not just security.” 

 But rhetoric must also be backed up by actions. The Prime Minister 

was on fairly safe ground in this regard, since he had committed 

his nation to a leading role in a 10-year, $25 billion aid initiative 
207

for Africa prior to the G8 summit. Mr. Blair has also given a high 

priority to environmental and climate change issues, as illustrated 

by the fact that the UK economy grew by 36 percent between 1990 

and 2002, while greenhouse gas emissions in the United Kingdom 

were reduced by 15 percent.9

 It remains to be seen whether the Prime 

Minister’s example will convince President Bush to take a more 

proactive position on such issues as Third World debt and climate 

change. Whatever the outcome of these negotiations, however, the 

two leaders are likely to continue to differ fundamentally in their 

approaches to issues of international cooperation. Mr. Blair sees 

international agreements as an indispensable element of British 

foreign policy, while Mr. Bush is inclined to view them as a trap.

 These very different points of view are partly attributable 

to differences in power. But as Douglas Edlin has observed in 

his discussion of the positions of the two nations with regard to 

the International Criminal Court, Great Britain and the United 

States also draw upon very different historical experiences. Most 

importantly, there is no counterpart in American history to the 

British experience of institutionalized cooperation with the North 

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union 

(EU). Britain has had a mixed record in its efforts to manage this 

campaign of institutionalized cooperation. The UK has frequently 

been frustrated in its efforts to play the role of “prefect” to America’s 

“headmaster” within the NATO alliance.10 Successive British 

governments also had to overcome intense resistance, both at 

home and on the continent, before the UK succeeded in joining the 

European Economic Community (EEC). Furthermore, Great Britain 

continues to maintain a conditional relationship with the EU. These 

facts notwithstanding, however, British experiences with NATO and 

the EU have contributed to the conviction that active participation 

in international organizations and submission to international laws 

are essential for the nation’s security and prosperity. The challenge 

for London is to help Washington to realize that it also stands to 

gain more than it will lose by participating in institutionalized and 

contractual forms of cooperation with other governments. The two 

governments will not succeed in convincing the leaders of the world 

community to actively support the GWOT until the United States 

sheds its image as the “chief destabilizer” of international order.11
208

 The EU poses a special challenge for both the United States 

and the UK. As John Hulsman accurately predicted during our 

deliberations, the EU constitution has been rejected by two of the 

founding members of the European Community. This throws the 

entire European experiment into confusion and presents both 

Washington and London with some fundamental choices. For the 

United States, it will be interpreted by some of President Bush’s 

neo-conservative advisers as an opportunity to press forward with 

an offensive designed to ensure that the EU will never acquire the 

capability to pose as an economic or political counterweight to the 

United States. David Frum and Richard Perle make the case for 

just such a strategy in their controversial book, An End to Evil. The 

authors recommend that the U.S. “force European governments 

to choose between Paris and Washington.” A key element in their 

strategy involves prying London away from continental Europe.12

 Timothy Garton Ash also recommends that the UK abandon its 

status as the bridge between Washington and Europe, but he argues 

that Britain should jump in the other direction. He criticizes London 

for continuing to play the role of Jeeves (the wise but undervalued 

butler) to a haughty and insensitive Washington long after the 

benefits of this role have disappeared. Ash concludes that “the 

British tail will never wag the American dog. Europe, however, is 

much more than a tail.” He calls upon the UK to “change tack” by 

actively supporting the construction of an EU which is strong enough 

to say no to the United States and develop its own unique identity 

in the international system. Charles Dick echoes many of these 

arguments in his discussion of British defense policy in Chapter 12. 

The attractions of such a strategy are obvious, particularly at a time 

when the UK holds the Presidency of the EU. Mr. Ash nonetheless 

inadvertently highlights one of the major problems with this policy, 

when he speculates that Great Britain could: 

Give it [the EU] some military muscle. Help it to speak with one voice on 

major foreign policy issues...[and] find ways of concentrating its large 

but still diffuse soft power.13

Absent some major changes in the ways that leading European 

governments approach and conduct international relations, British 

foreign and defense policies are likely to become more constrained, 
209

confused, and overextended if they become entangled in the EU’s 

quest for a common foreign policy and a European security and 

defense identity. 

 There are two circumstances under which London might feel 

increasing pressure to choose between Washington and the EU. 

First, the Bush administration could decide to pursue the divide 

and conquer strategy recommended by Frum and Perle. Second, 

certain West European governments could react to the collapse of 

the EU constitution by attacking London as a “Trojan horse” for 

U.S. domination and as a bastion of “Anglo-Saxon capitalism.” 

But as Michael Calingaert and others have argued in this volume, 

it would be extremely difficult for the UK to turn away from the 

EU, even if the British position within that organization becomes 

much more uncomfortable. It would also be extremely unwise for 

London to abandon the special relationship for an unpredictable 

new relationship with the EU. 

 Most of the authors in this book would agree that there will 

probably be no need for the UK to make such a choice for the 

foreseeable future. Mark Gilbert goes a step further in his chapter, 

describing the currently fluid transatlantic situation as an opportunity 

for imaginative statesmanship on the part of both the United States 

and the United Kingdom. By working together and drawing upon 

shared institutional, cultural, and political resources, the United 

States and the UK can expand the opportunities for U.S.-European 

cooperation, which continues to be an essential precondition for 

international order and global economic progress. 

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 14 

 1. Quoted in Douglas Stuart and William Tow, The Limits of Alliance: NATO 

Out-Of-Area Problems Since 1949, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990, 

p. 61.

 2. Ibid., p. 65. 

 3. Harold Wilson, A Personal Record: The Labour Government, 1964-1970, Boston: 

Little, Brown, 1971, pp. 39, 187. We can bemoan Wilson’s decision to refuse 

this request as a missed opportunity for high theater, which would have been 

irresistible to Francis Ford Coppola.

 4. Tribute to the Royal Air Force, UK House of Commons, August 20, 1940. 

 5. Author’s interview with Hunt, November 1983. 
210

 6. For details regarding the 1962 Nassau Agreement, see Stuart and Tow, 

The Limits of Alliance, pp. 112-121. Critics will be quick to observe, however, that 

these arrangements served U.S. as well as British interests and occurred only after 

Washington passed the 1946 McMahon Act, which terminated U.S.-UK nuclearsharing arrangements. 

 7. “An Anglosphere Primer,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, available at 

http://www.pattern.com. See also, Douglas Stuart, “NATO’s Anglosphere Option,” 

International Journal, Winter, 2004-05, pp. 151-168. 

 8. A transcript of the Prime Minister’s comments is available at http://www.

number-10.gov.uk.

 9. See Blair’s important speech on climate change, reproduced at http://politics.

guardian.co.uk/green/story/0,9061,1305030,00.html . In fairness to Blair’s predecessor, 

the period from 1990 to 1997 was under the Conservative government of John 

Major.

 10. Geoffrey Warner developed this metaphor in “The British Labour 

Government and the Atlantic Alliance, 1949-1951,” in Olav Riste, ed., Western 

Security: The Formative Years, New York: Columbia University Press, 1985, p. 249. 

 11. The phrase is borrowed from John Gaddis, Surprise, Security and the 

American Experience, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004, p. 101.

 12. An End to Evil: How To Win the War on Terror, New York: Random House, 

2003, pp. 247-250. 

 13. “No More Jeeves,” speech in Brighton, September 30, 2004, reprinted at 

http://www.freeworldweb.net. 
211

ABOUT THE CONTRIBUTORS

ANDREW APOSTOLOU is the Assistant Director of Programs at the Saban 

Center for Middle East Policy at the Bookings Institution in Washington, 

D.C. Prior to joining Brookings he served as Vice President, Research, The 

Foundation for the Defense of Democracies. Formerly, he worked for The 

Economist Group’s Economist Intelligence Unit (EIC), covering the former 

Soviet Union. His doctoral research at St. Antony’s College, Oxford, deals 

with his topic, “Bystanders and Collaborators during the Holocaust in 

Northern Greece.” Mr. Apostolou was a freelance researcher on Central 

Asia and the Middle East for the Royal Institute of International Affairs. 

He has worked as a consultant on the Middle East, specializing in Saudi 

Arabia. He has given many lectures and presentations to numerous colleges 

and corporations as well as serving as a consultant and interviewee for 

various topics for various TV/radio outlets such as Fox (O’Reilly Factor, 

Fox and Friends, Your World with Neil Cavuto), as well as CNN, CNN 

International, CNBC, and the BBC domestic television and radio, to name 

a few. Mr. Apostolou received his master’s degree from the London School 

of Economics (Logic & Scientific Method).

MICHAEL CALINGAERT is the Executive Vice President, Council for the 

United States and Italy. The Council is based at the Brookings Institution, 

where he continues his academic/research activities as a Visiting Scholar at 

the Center on the United States and Europe. He is a member of the Political 

Section, Institute of European Studies, Free University of Brussels. Mr. 

Calingaert’s previous positions include director of European Operations for 

the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association; Economic and Commercial 

Minister at the U.S. Embassy, London; Deputy Assistant Secretary for 

International Resources and Food Policy at the U.S. Department of State; 

and Economic Minister at the U.S. Embassy, Rome. Mr. Calingaert wrote The 

1992 Challenge from Europe: Development of the European Community’s Internal 

Market, the first U.S. study of the European community’s single market. 

His most recent book, European Integration Revisited: Progress, Prospects and 

U.S. Interest, was published in 1996. He has also written various articles 

on European developments for Business Economics, California Management 

Review, and the New York Times, to mention a few. Mr. Calingaert graduated 

from Swarthmore College (history) and pursued graduate studies at the 

University of Cologne (history and politics), and at the University of 

California in Berkeley (economics).
212

NICHOLAS CHILDS is the BBC Pentagon Correspondent. He joined 

the BBC in 1982, with extensive previous experience reporting on the 

armed forces of various countries. He has worked as BBC World Affairs 

Correspondent, reporter for BBC World TV, Defense and British Affairs 

Analyst for BBC World Service radio, and briefly as reporter for Jane’s 

Defence Weekly magazine, as well as contributing to various journals on 

defense and international relations issues. Mr. Childs specializes in the 

Middle East, reporting on Israel and the Palestinians, Afghanistan, the 

Balkans, Sierra Leone, and Iraq. As a BBC reporter, he covered the IranIraq War, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, and Operation DESERT STORM. 

Mr. Childs holds a master’s degree in Modern History and Economics 

from St. Catherine’s College, Oxford.

CHARLES DICK is a historian by training and an intelligence officer by 

profession. He served as an associate of the Soviet Studies Research 

Center (SSRC) and in 1989 became the director of the SSRC, now 

renamed the Conflicts Studies Research Centre. He served as a 

director in the UK Higher Command and Staff Course theater war 

game and now acts in a similar capacity for the Allied Rapid Reaction 

Corps. He also worked as a special consultant to the Ministry of 

Defence. Mr. Dick has published extensively in the Royal United 

Services’ Institute Journal, International Defense Review, Military Review, Jane’s 

Intelligence Review, and the Journal of Slavic Military Studies, for which he 

serves as assistant editor. In addition, he has authored numerous 

manuals, operations and tactics documents, and threat assessments 

on defense issues. In 1966, Mr. Dick completed a manual on general 

enemy (Genforce) which was adopted by NATO.

DOUGLAS E. EDLIN is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at 

Dickinson College. His research concentrates on the Anglo-American 

common law tradition, the development of judicial review in the 

United States, and the legal and policy issues surrounding the use 

and regulation of assisted reproductive technology. Professor Edlin 

is editing a collection of essays on the common law tradition and has 

written on the development of extra-constitutional judicial review in 

the United States, the ambiguity precondition in British constitutional 

theory, and the legal paradigms employed by American courts 

when resolving disputes about frozen embryos. Recent publications 

include From Ambiguity to Legality: The Future of English Judicial Review, 

Rule Britannia, and Common Law Theory (Cambridge University Press, 

forthcoming) Professor Edlin holds a Ph.D. from Oxford University 

and a J.D. from Cornell Law School.
213

NILE GARDINER is Fellow in Anglo-American Security Policy at the 

Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, Heritage 

Foundation, in Washington. His key areas of specialization include 

the Anglo-U.S. Special Relationship, the United Nations, postwar Iraq, 

and the role of Great Britain and Europe in the U.S.-led alliance against 

international terrorism and “rogue states.” As a leading authority on 

transatlantic relations, Dr. Gardiner has advised the Executive Branch of 

the United States Government on a range of key issues, from the role of 

international allies in postwar Iraq, to U.S.-British leadership in the war 

on terror. Prior to joining Heritage, he was Foreign Policy Researcher for 

former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. Dr. Gardiner received 

his Ph.D. in History from Yale University in 1998.

MARK GILBERT is an Associate Professor of Contemporary European 

History, University of Trento, Italy, and was Professorial Lecturer, 

Johns Hopkins School for Advanced International Studies, Spring 

2000 and Spring 2005. He served as Assistant Professor of Political 

Science at Dickinson College in Pennsylvania, 1993-96, and lecturer 

in European Studies at the University of Bath from 1997 to 2002. Dr. 

Gilbert’s areas of expertise include the history of European integration 

post-1945, European and transatlantic history, and contemporary 

Italian political history. His published works include The Italian 

Revolution: The End of Politics Italian Style? The Lega Nord and the Northern 

Question in Italian Politics, and Surpassing Realism: The Politics of European 

Integration since 1945, as well as numerous articles in professional 

journals such as the Journal of Contemporary History, Political Quarterly, 

Journal of Modern Italian Studies, Government & Opposition, Modern Italy, and 

World Policy Journal. Dr. Gilbert earned his B.A. with honors in Politics 

from the University of Durham and his Ph.D. from the University of 

Wales.

JOHN C. HULSMAN is Senior Research Fellow at the Heritage Foundation. 

He concentrates on European security and NATO affairs, the European 

Union, U.S.-European trade and economic relations, and the war on terror. 

He is also a frequent commentator on all aspects of transatlantic relations, 

global geopolitics, and international cooperation in fighting terrorism. Dr. 

Hulsman makes regular appearances with major media outlets such as 

ABC, Fox News, CNN, MSNBC, PBS, and the BBC. Prior to assuming his 

current position, he was a fellow in European studies at the Center for 

Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). He also taught world politics 

and U.S. foreign policy at the University of St. Andrews, Scotland, where 

he specialized in American foreign policy during the post-Cold War era, 

and the relationship between NATO and the European Union.
214

JEFFREY D. MCCAUSLAND is the Director of the Leadership in Conflict 

Initiative at Dickinson College and special consultant to CBS News. Dr. 

McCausland has served as Director for Defense Policy and Arms Control 

on the National Security Council and also held research positions at the IISS 

(London), the Center for International Affairs (Harvard University), and 

the Marshall Center (Germany). Following retirement from the position 

of Dean of Academics at the U.S. Army War College, he accepted a chair 

in Leadership at the U.S. Naval Academy (Annapolis). He has written 

extensively on U.S. defense affairs and international security.

LEO MICHEL is a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for National 

Strategic Studies, concentrating on transatlantic security issues. Formerly, 

he was director for NATO Policy within the Office of the Secretary of 

Defense (OSD). He was responsible for policy formulation, support, and 

advice to the Secretary and other senior Defense officials on NATO defense 

and capabilities planning, NATO’s role in war on terrorism, NATO-led 

operations in Bosnia (SFOR), Kosovo (KFOR), NATO enlargement, NATO 

relations with the European Union, Partnership for Peace, and NATORussia and NATO-Ukraine relations.

ERIK R. PETERSON is the William A. Schreyer Chair in Global Analysis, 

Director, Seven Revolutions Initiative, and Senior VP at CSIS. He was 

formerly the director of research at Kissinger Associates. He is a Fellow 

of the World Economic Forum, a board member of the Center for Global 

Business Studies at Penn State University, a member of the Advisory Board 

of the Global Capital Markets Center at Duke University, and a member 

of the Advisory Board of the Center for the Study of the Presidency. Mr. 

Peterson holds an MBA in international finance from the Wharton School 

at the University of Pennsylvania, and an M.A. in international law and 

economics from the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns 

Hopkins University. He also holds the Certificate of Eastern European 

Studies from the University of Fribourg in Switzerland and the Certificate 

in International Legal Studies from the Hague Academy of International 

Law in the Netherlands.

RAY RAYMOND, MBE, FRSA, is the Political Officer, British ConsulGeneral, in New York. He has spent much of his professional career 

facilitating political, financial, and academic dialogue between the United 

States and Great Britain. Dr. Raymond is a expert on both British and 

American diplomatic history and has lectured on the Special Relationship 

at Columbia University.
215

MITCHELL B. REISS is Vice Provost for International Affairs and 

Professor of Law and Professor of Government at the College of William 

and Mary, where he joined the faculty in 1999. Previously he practiced law 

at Covington & Burling in Washington, DC; served as Former Assistant 

Director and Senior Policy Advisor of the Korean Peninsula Energy 

Development Organization; was Guest Scholar at the Woodrow Wilson 

International Center for Scholars; and former White House Fellow serving 

as special assistant to the National Security Council. Dean Reiss was on a 

leave of absence from the Law School and the College from August 2003 

to February 2005. He served as Director of the Office of Policy Planning 

at the U.S. Department of State from July 2003 to February 2005. He was 

appointed in January 2004 by President George W. Bush as Special Envoy 

to the Northern Ireland Peace Process with the rank of Ambassador, 

a position he currently holds. He is the author of Bridled Ambition: Why 

Countries Constrain Their Nuclear Capabilities and Without the Bomb: The 

Politics of Nuclear Non-proliferation; co-editor and author of The Nuclear 

Tipping Point and Nuclear Proliferation after the Cold War; and has published 

numerous articles in leading journals and newspapers in the United States, 

Europe, and Asia. He holds a J.D. from Columbia University; a D.Phil. 

from Oxford University; an M.A.L.D. from the Fletcher School, and a B.A. 

from Williams College.

PHILIP STEPHENS has been the Associate Editor and Senior Commentator 

of the Financial Times since 1983. He is a well-known author, commentator, 

and broadcaster. Before joining the Financial Times, he was a correspondent 

for Reuters in London and Brussels. Mr. Stephens is the author of Politics and 

the Pound, a study of the British Government’s exchange rate management 

and its relations with Europe since 1979; and Tony Blair, a biography of the 

British Prime Minister. He is a Fulbright Fellow and winner of the 2002 

David Watt Prize for Outstanding Political Journalism. Mr. Stephens was 

educated at Wimbledon College and at Oxford University, where he took 

an honors degree in modern history.

DOUGLAS T. STUART is the first holder of the J. William and Helen D. 

Stuart Chair in International Studies at Dickinson College. He is also an 

Adjunct Professor at the U.S. Army War College. Professor Stuart is the 

author or editor of seven books, three monographs, and over 30 published 

articles relating to U.S. national security policy, NATO politics, and AsiaPacific security. He is a former NATO Fellow and a guest scholar at the 

Brookings Institution, the U.S. State Department, and the Elliott School 

of George Washington University. Professor Stuart received his Ph.D. in 

International Relations from the University of Southern California. He 

is a recipient of both the Ganoe Prize for Inspirational Teaching and the 

Distinguished Teaching Award at Dickinson College.