### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT JAC KSON June 7, 200 5 S es sio n
ST A TE OF TE N N ES SE E v
. LO N N IE M
. M A C LI N
Appeal f romthe Cr im inal Cou rt for Shelby Coun ty No. 03-00440 Chris Cr aft, Jud ge

No. W2004-00468-C CA-R 3-CD - F iled October 17, 2005

The Appe llant, L onnie M. Maclin, wa s convicted by a Shelby Countyjury

of first degree felony murder, attempted ag g ravated robbery , misdemeanor rec kless endang erme nt, espec ially ag g ravated kid na pp ing , ag g ra vate d rob be ry , re c kle ss ag g ra vate d ass a ult , a ndtw o c ou nts of a g g ra vate d a ssa

ult

. As a re sult of the s e convictions , Maclin re ceive d an ef fec tive sentenc e of life imprisonment. On appea l, Maclin raise s three issues f or our r eview: (1) whether the indictment was invalid for f ailure t o p ro v i d e “a dequate notice of the offe nses cha rg ed in the indictment, or the c ourt err ed in the instruction to the jury ”; (2) w h et h er t he evide nce is suff icient to support his conviction for fe lony
mur de r; a nd (3 ) wh e the r his c on vic tio n fo r e sp e c ia lly a g g ra vate d kid na ppin g vio la te s State v. A n thony , 817 S.W .2d 299 (Tenn. 1991) . After revie w of the r ecor d, we a ffirm the judg ments of conviction.
Tenn. R. App . P . 3; Judgme nt of th e Cr im inal Cou rt A ff irm ed

D AVI D G. H AYES , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which T H O M A S T. W O O D A LL and A L AN E. G L EN N , J J ., joined.

Claiborne H. F erg uson, Memphis, Tennessee , for the A ppellant, L onnie M. Maclin.

Paul G . Su mme rs , A tto rn e y Ge ne ral and Re po rt e r; Se th P . K e stn e r, As sis ta nt A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; Wil liam L . Gibbons, Dis t ri ct At torney Gene ral; and Tim Hoove r and Miche lle Parks, Assistant District Attorney

Gene rals, for

the Appellee , State of Tenne ssee.

OP IN ION

F ac tu al B ac kgr ound

On the af ternoon of Septe mber 25, 2002, the A ppellant spoke with De re k R o b i n s o n , an admitted drug deale r, about purc hasing some marijuana . After Robinson left the are a, the Appe llant
was ove rhea

rd discussing a “sta ng ,” a te rm which is stree t slang for c ommitt ing a robbery . L ater

that
e ve nin g , at app ro xima te ly 10 :00 p. m., Rob ins on , a lon g wi th L e Ke sh ia Jone s, he r s ist e r, Ka ne sh ia-2-

J ones, and K aneshia ’s infant, went to the home of Kar en Arnold, four or five houses down from the A p p e ll a n t’ s h o me o n A rr e n d a le , to s e ll d ru g s

. T h e Jo n e s s is te r s r e main e d in th e c ar dur ing the tr a ns a c tio n. Rob ins on re turne d to the c ar and, jus t a s h e wa s g e tti ng int o th e c ar, the Ap pe lla nt, dresse d in dark c lothing, appr oache d him. After Robinson informed the A ppellant that he ha d no marij uana to se ll, the Appellant aske d for a ride up the stre et. When Robinson tol d the Appellant that he wa nted to take the Jones sisters h ome first, the Appe llant display ed a g un, pointed it at Rob ins on ’s fa c e , a ndstate d “ bit c h, dr op it all .” Th e Ap pe lla nt the n p a tte d d ow n Ro bin so n’ s p a nts and g rabbe d a ring from Robinson’s hand.
At this point , the Appellant or dere d every o n e out of the c ar, w aving his gun a round as he spoke. The Jones sisters immediately g ot out of t he ca

r. As Robinson attempted to slide out the passeng er sid e d o o r, the Appellant hit Robinson with the gun. The Appellant, now driving Robinson’s 1981 brown Cadillac, proc eede d down the stree t to Robi nson’s home, whe re he parke d in the drive way

. Rob ins on inf orme d the Ap pe lla nt that he wa s not g oin g ins ide his ho me be c a us e his k i d s we re aw ake. T he Appe llant responded, “ who said we ’re g oing to y our house, y ou know what I want.”

Th e Ap pe lla nt t

he n r e mov e d Ro bin so n f

ro m th e c ar ande sc orte d h im n e xt doo r t o th e ho me of Ha shim McFee . After

repe ated knoc king, Mc Fe e opene d the door to find the Appellant pointing a g un at Robinson, whom the Appellant pushed inside whe n the door ope ned. The Appellant repe atedly

asked “ wher e’s the dope ,” continually becomin g m o re a g g ressive. Mc Fe e told the Appellant that the dr

ug s were in a closet, a nd the three of them, with the Appellant stil l display ing the g un, proce eded dow n a hallway towards the ba ck bedr oom. At some p o i n t , M cFee w inked at Robin s o n as if to indicate that he was g oing to do something . I nside the room, McF ee move d towards the c loset as if to ope n it; howe ver, he swung around a nd g rabbe d the Appellant’ s arm. A strug g le ensue d, and two shots wer e fire d in rapid succ ession. McF ee was struck twice and died a s a re sult of the wounds. “In split seconds,” the Appe llant fired a third shot at Robinso n

. The Appellant then f

led the sce ne in Robinson’s Cadillac. The Jones sisters called 911.
At approximately

the same time, L atoy a Ec hols w as standing at the g as pumps of a ne arby Circle K c onvenienc e store. J ust a s she finished pumping the g as, the Appe llant drove throug h the pa rking lot a t a hig h r a te of

sp e e d in Rob ins on ’s c ar andstr uc k Ms. Ec ho ls’ c ar. A M e mph is C ity polic e o f f ic e r w h o w a s s to p p e d a t th e Ci r c le K w it n e s s e d th e e v e n t. T h e A p p e ll a n t, s e e ing the office r, proc eede d to run. The Appellant was eventually appre hended and pl ace d under arre st. No
wea pons, money , or drug s were found whe n the Appellant wa s capture d. Howeve r, the ring taken
earlier fr om Robinson was found in the car

. On J anuary

28, 2003, a Shelby

Countyg rand jury

returne d an eig ht-count indictment char g ing the Appellant with: (1) felony murder of Hashim McF ee; ( 2) attempted a g g ravated robbe ry o f M cFee; ( 3) attempted f irst deg ree murder of

Der ek Robinson; (4) espe cially ag g ravated kid n ap p i n g o f

R o b i n s o n ; ( 5 ) a g g r a v a t e d r o b b e r y o f R o b i n s o n ; ( 6 ) a g g r a v a t e d a s s a u l to f L ak e s h ia J ones; (7) a g g ravated assault of K enisha Jones; and (8) ag g ravated assault of L atoy a Ec hols. After a jury trial, which be g an on January 12, 2004, the Appellant was c onvicted of: (1) first deg ree felony-3-

murder; ( 2) attempted a g g ravated robbe ry ; (3) re ckless endang erme nt; (4) e s p ec i all y ag g ravated kid na pp ing ; ( 5) a g g ra vate d r ob be ry ; ( 6) tw o c ou nt s of a g g ra vate d a ssa ult ; a nd(7 ); re c kle ss ag g ravated assault. The jury sentenc ed the Appellant to life imprisonment f or the first deg ree murder conviction. The tria l court subseque ntly sentenc ed t he Appe llant to three y ear s for attempted ag g ravated robbe ry , eleve n months and twenty -nine da y s for reckless e ndang erme nt, fifteen y ear s for es p ec i ally

ag g ravated kidnapping , eig ht y ear s for a g g ravated robbe ry , three y ear s for e ach ag g ravated assault, and two y ear s for reckle ss ag g ravated assault. All sentenc es we re or dere d to be
serve d concur

rently w it hth eA p p e ll an t’ s s e n te n ce of life imprisonment. Subsequently , the Appellant filed a motion for ne w trial, which was denied by the t rial court on Fe bruary 13, 2004. This appea l followed.

Ana lys is
On appe al, the Appellant has raised three issues for our revie w: (1) whe ther the f irst deg ree felony murder indictment wa s insufficient in that it failed to provide notice that the Appellant wa s char g ed with fe lony

murder in the pe rpet ra t i o n of an attempted robbery , as opposed to the perpe tration of a robbery , and whether the court e rre d in char g ing the jury reg arding felony

murder; (2) whe ther the tria l court err ed in f inding the evidenc e suff

icient to support his conviction for fe lony
mur de r; a nd (3 ) wh e the r his c on vic tio n fo r e sp e c ia lly a g g ra vate d kid na pp in g viola te s State v. Anthony

. I. Su ff iciency of the Ind ictm ent/Jury Charge The Appe llant arg ues that the trial c ourt err ed “i n ch ar gi n g the jury with T.C.A. § 39-13- 2 0 2 (a )( 2 ) i n i t s en t i re t y

ev en t h o u gh t h e Ind i ct m en tre l i ed u p o n t h e ‘ at t em p tt o p erp et ra t e’ l an gu age of the statute[.]” Although the Appe llant frame s the issue as a jury instruction e rror , his arg ument focuse s entirely

upon his assertion that he wa s not provided adequate notice of the offe nse cha rg ed in the indictment. I n support, he arg ues that the indictment c harg ed him with felony murder during the per petration of a robbe ry , while the proof at trial established that the f elony murder oc curr ed d u r i n g t h e p e rp e tr a t i o n o f a n a t t e m p t e d r o b b e r y.
Under both the Unit ed S tates and the Tennessee Const itutions , a cha rg ing instrument, suc h
a s a n in d ic tm e n t, mu s t in f o r m th e a c c u s e d o f “ th e n a tu r e a n d c a u s e o f th e a c c u sation.” See U.S. C ON S T. a me nd . V I ; T EN N. C ON S T. art. I , § 9. I n addition to these constitutional gua rante es, the form of an indictment in Tenne ssee is pre scribed by statute:

The indictment must state the fa cts constituting the of fense in ordinary

and concise lang uag e, without prolix ity or re petition, in suc h a m anner as to ena ble a person of common understanding to know what is intended, and w ith that deg ree of
certainty which will enable the court , o n co nviction, to pronounce the proper judgme nt; . . .
Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 13-202 (2003)

.-4-

Thus, a criminal indictment must include a sufficient de scription of the off ense to e nsure that the defe ndant under stands the nature of the c harg e. J ac k so n v . V irg ini a , 4 43 U. S. 3 07 , 3 14 , 9 9 S. Ct. 2781, 2786 (1979). The e ssential functions of the indictment a re to provide notice of the char g e, en ab l e entry

of a pr oper judg ment upon conviction, and pr otect ag ainst double jeopar dy

. State v. By rd , 8 2 0 S

. W

. 2 d 739, 741 (Tenn. 1991) . I ndictments need not c onform to strict pleading require ments. Sta te v . H ill , 9 54 S.W. 2d72 5, 72 7 (Tenn. 1 99 7) . H ist oric a lly , s tr ic t pl e a din g in indictments w as require d beca use offe nses exis ted at common law which did not have ele ments that
wer e ea silyasce rtainableby ref ere nce to a

statute. Id . at 728. Be cause such common law off enses no longe r ex ist, to hold on to strict pleading require ments would be embracing “tec hnicalities that
are empty and without rea son.” Id

. (q u o t i n g State v. Cornellison , 59 S.W .2d 514, 515 (Tenn. 1933) );
see also State v . Hammonds , 30 S.W .3d 294, 299 (Tenn. 2000). “[W] e now a pproac h ‘attac ks upon indictments, .

. . from the broad and enlig htened standpoint of common sense and rig ht rea son rather than f ro m th e na

rr ow sta nd po int

of pe tty pr e c ios ity , pe tti fo g g ing , te c hn ic a lity or ha ir sp lit tin g fa

ult finding .’” Hi ll , 9 5 4 S

. W

. 2 d at 7 2 8 (q u o t i n g United Sta te s v . P ur

v is , 580 F.2d 853, 857 ( 5 Cir. th 1978)).

I t ha s b e e n h e ld th at an in dic tme nt w hic h r e fe re nc e s th e statut e de fi nin g the of fe ns e is sufficie nt and satisfies the c onstitut ional and statutory require men t s of Hi ll , g iving the a ccuse d sufficie nt notice of the char g ed off ense. See State v. Sledge , 15 S.W. 3d 93 , 95 (T e nn . 2 00 0) ; Sta te v. Carter , 9 88 S.W. 2d14 5, 14 9 ( Te nn . 1 999); Ru ff v . S tat e , 978 S.W .2d 95, 100 (Tenn. 1998)

. Additionally , an indi ctment need not alleg e the specific theory or mea ns by which the State intends to prove e ach e lement of a n offe nse. See H ammonds , 30 S. W.3 d a t 30 2; W y att v . S tat e , 24 S.W .3d 3 1 9 , 3 2 4 ( T e n n

. 2 0 0 0 ); S t a t e v
. Lemack s , 996 S.W .2d 166, 172-73 (Te nn. 1999). I ndeed, indictments which ac hieve the ove rriding purpose of n otice to the ac cused w ill be considere d sufficie nt to satisfy

both constituti onal and statutory require ments. Hammonds , 30 S.W .3d at 300.

Th e ind ic tme nt i n th is c a se c ha rg e d th a t th e Ap pe lla nt:

on Se pte mbe r 2 5, 20 02 , in She lby Cou nty , Te nn e sse e , an d be fo re the fi nd ing of thi s i n d i c t m e n t , d i d u n l a w f

u l l y a n d w i t h t h e i n t e n tt o c o m m i tR o b b e r y k i l l H A S H IM MCFEE during the per

petration of Ro bbery , in violation of T.C.A. 39-13-202, ag ainst the pea ce and dignity of the State of T ennesse e. Apply ing the applicable law to this case, w e conc lude that the lang uag e of the indictment provided the Appellant with ample notice of the offe nse char g ed, including felony m u rd er d u ri ng the pe rp e tr a tio n o f an atte mpt e d r ob be ry . T he ind ic tme nt c on ta ine d a sp e c if ic re fe re nc e to the statut e alleg edly violated. Moreove r, Count 2 of this indictment char g ed the Appellant with t he attempted
ro bb e ry of Mc F e e on the date in q ue sti on . In o ur vie w, the c on te nt o f the in di ctm ent su ff ic ie ntl y apprised the Appellant of the nature of the c harg es ag ainst him so as to enable the e ntry of prope r judgme nts a nd to pr otect ag ainst double jeopar dy

. Moreove r, with r eg ard to t h e A p p ell ant’s arg ument that the trial court e rre d in its instruction of felony murder, the rec ord demonstrates thatT he t rial co urt p ro p erly i nstructed t he jury wit h re ga rd t o t he o f fen se o f f elo ny m urd er a s fo l l o w s: 1

(1) T hat t he d efend ant unl awf ul l y ki l l ed H ashi m M cF ee; and
(2 ) T h a t t h e killing w a s c o m m itt e d in the p e rp e tra tio n o f o r th e a ttem p t t o p e rp e tra te t he al l ege d robbery ; t hat i s that t he ki l l i ng was cl ose l y conn ect ed t o t he al l ege d rob b ery and wasn’ t a s ep arat e and dis t i nct and i nd ep end ent event ; and
(3 ) T h a t t h e d e fen d a n t i n te n d e d to c o m m it the a lleg e d ro b b e ry.

T he i nt ent t o co m m i t t he und erl y i ng rob b e ry m u st e x ist pri o r t o or at t he same ti m e as t he

co m m i ss i o n of t he act or act s causi ng t he d eat h of t he vi ct i m

. P ro o f th a t su c h in te nt t o co m m i t t he

u n der l y i n g r obber y e x i s t ed bef or e, or at t h e s ame t i me as , t h e ac t of k i l l i n g i s a qu es t i on of f ac t t o be d e c id e d b y the ju ry a fter c o n sid e ra tio n o f all the fac ts a n d c irc u m sta n c e s.
-5- no err or occ urre d. The jury was prope rly

instructed that in orde r to convict of f elony murder, the 1 Sta te wa s re qu ir e d to pr ov e that the “ kil lin g wa s c omm itt e d in the pe rp e tr a tio n o f o r the a tte mpt to p e rp e tr a te th e a ll e g e d r o b b e r y

. ” B e c a u s e th e in s tr u c ti o n d o e s n o t in f

r in g e u p o n th e ju r y ’ s fac t finding role of a

contested issue at trial, no err or is prese nted. See Neder v. United States , 5 27 U. S. 1, 18, 119 S. Ct . 1827, 1838 (1999).

II. Su ff iciency of the Evid ence The Appe llant arg ues that the e vidence is insufficient t o s u p p ort his conviction for f elony murder, a sserting that the evidenc e pre sented supports , at b es t , only a convic tion for voluntary manslaug hter. I n considering this issue, we apply the rule that where the suffic iency of the e vidence is challeng ed, the r eleva nt question for the re viewing court is “whe ther, after vie wing the evidenc e in the light most favor able to the [State], any rational trier of fa ct could have foun d the essential elements of the crime bey ond a re asonable doubt.” J ac k so n v . V irg ini a , 4 43 U. S. at 31 9, 99 S. Ct

. a t 27 89 ; se e als o Te nn . R. App . P. 13 (e ). Mo re ov e r, the Sta te is e nti tle d to the str on g e st l e g iti ma te view of the evidenc e and a ll reasona ble infer ence s which may be draw n there from. Sta te v . H ar ris , 839 S.W .2d 54, 75 (Tenn. 1992) . All questions involvi ng the cr edibilityof witnesses, the w eig ht and value to be g iven the evide nce, an d all fac tual issues are resolved by the trier of

fac t. State v. Pappas , 7 54 S.W. 2d62 0, 62 3 ( Te nn . Crim. Ap p. 19 87 ). Th is c ou rt wi ll n ot r e we ig h o r r e e va luate the evidenc e pre sented. State v. Cabbage , 571 S.W .2d 832, 835 (Tenn. 1978)

. “A g u il ty v e r d ic t b y th e ju r y , ap p r o v e d b y th e tria l ju d g e , a c c r e d it s th e te s ti mo n yof the witnesses for

the State and r esolves all conf licts in favor of the theory of t he State.” State v. Grac e , 49 3 S. W.2 d 4 74 , 4 76 (T e nn

. 19 73 ). A j ury c on vic tio n r e mov e s th e pr e su mpt ion of inn oc e nc e wi th which a de fenda nt is ini tially cloake d and repla ces it with one of g uilt, so t hat on appe al, a c onvicted defe ndant has the bur den of de m o n s t rating that the e vidence is insufficient. Sta te v . Tu gg le , 639 S.W .2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1982)

. The Appe llant was convic ted of fir st deg ree felony murder, w hich is defined in pe rtinent part by Te nn e sse e Cod e An no ta te d s e c tio n 3 9- 13 -2 02 (a )( 2) (2 00 3) a s a “ki lli ng of a no the r c omm itt e d in-6-

the pe rp e tr a tio n o f o r atte mpt to p e rp e tr a te a ny

. . . r ob be ry .” Un der t he fel on y mur de r r ule , it is immaterial whe ther the killing of the victim by the def endant wa s intentional or acc idental, as the requisite intent f

or felony murder is the defe ndant’s intent to commit the underlying f elony . Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-202( b). Robbery is de fined as “the intentional or knowing theft of prope rty from the per son of another

by violence or

putting the pe rson in fea r.” Te nn. Co d e An n

. § 39-13-401 (2003).

Wit hin his sufficiency

arg ument, the Appellant a lso assert s t h at there was no e vidence prese nted which e stablishes that the victim was kil led during t he perpetration of a robbery , as it was not shown that anything wa s taken. Thus, he asserts that a rational juror could not have conclude d that a robbe ry

had occ urre d. As discussed inf ra , we conclude that the trial co u rt ’s i n s truction proper ly submitt ed to the jury

the fa ctual issue of w hether “the killing w as commi t t ed in the pe rp e tr a tio n o f o r the a tte mpt to pe rp e tr a te the a lle g e d r ob be ry .” Th us , in or de r t o c on vic t of fi rs t deg ree felony

murder, the jury

was not r eq uired to find that the victim was killed during the perpe tration of a r obbery

. Cle arl y , p ro bativ e e vid e nc e wa s p re se nte d a t tria l w hic h w ou ld p e rm it a ratio na l ju ro r t o conclude that the Appellant killed McF ee during the perpetration of an attempted r obbery . Viewing the evidenc e in the lig ht most favorable to the S tate, the proof established that the A ppellant, armed with a weapon, ente red the home of Ha shim McFee demanding the drug s which he be lieved to be kept in the house. The Appellant, still poin t i ng the loaded w eapon at both McFe e and Robinson,
or de re d th e m do wn a

ha ll t o th e ba c k b e dr oo m to ob ta in the dr ug s. Whe n M c F e e a tte mpt e d to re sis t the Appellant, shots wer e fire d, and McF ee died. Reg ardle ss of whethe r the Appe llant actually took
a nythi ng fr om the ho me , o bv iou sly Mc fe e wa s k ill e d d uring the Ap pe lla nt’ s a tte mpt to p e rp e tr a te an ag g ravated robbe ry . This issue is without merit.

III. Sta te v . Ant

hony

L a st, the Ap pel la nt a

rg ue s th a t th e tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d in faili ng to d ism iss the e sp e c ia lly ag g ravated kidnapping conviction pursuant to State v. Anthony becau se the c ri me wa s e sse nti a lly incidental to the ag g ravated robbe ry offe nse. The A ppellant asserts that “the movement of D ere k Rob ins on to h is ho us e wh e re the mari juana wa s th ou g ht t o b e sto re d w a s n e c e ssa ry to c on su mmate the crime of Ag g ravated Robbery .”

I n Anthony , our supre me court addre ssed the issue of w hether dual convictions for

arme d robbery and agg ravated ki dnapping violated t he due proce ss gua rante es of Article I , section eig ht of the Tenne ssee Constitution. The c ourt conc luded that when a confine ment, movement, or de tention is “ e sse nti a lly inc ide nta l” to an a c c omp a nying fe lon y , suc h as ro bb e ry or ra pe , it is n ot s uf

fi c ie nt t o support a separate conviction for kidna pping. Anthony , 817 S.W .2d at 306. I n other wor ds, befor e a def end ant may

be convic ted of a

kidnapping char g e, the tria l court must determine w hether the
c o n finement, moveme nt, or detention wa s essentially incidental to the ac companying f elony and wa s not, theref

ore, suf ficient to support a se parate conviction for kidnapping , or whe ther it was signific ant enoug h, in and of itself, to wa rra nt independent prosecution and was, there fore , sufficie nt-7-

to support such a c onviction. Id . T he c ou rt no te d th a t “ e ve ry

ro bb e ry , b y

de fi nit ion , in vo lve s so me detention ag ainst the will of the victim, if only long e noug h to take g oods or money from the pe rson o f t h e v i ct im.” Id

. “ [O ]n e me th o d o f r e s o lv in g th is q u e s ti o n is to a s k w h e th e r th e d e f e n dant’s conduct ‘ substantially

incre ased [the] risk of harm over and above that nece ssaril y prese nt in the crime . . . itself.’ ” Id

. (q u o t i n g State v. Rollins , 605 S.W .2d 828, 830 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1980) ).

I n State v. Dixon , 957 S.W .2d 532 (Tenn. 1997) , the court revisited the Anthony issue and held t hat t he decision should only preve nt the i njustice which would oc cur if a defe ndant could be convicted of

kidnapping wher e the only restra int util ized was that nece ssary to complete the intende d crime. Acc ording ly , any restra int in addition t o that which is nec essary to consummate the intende d crime may support a sepa

rate conviction for kidna

pping. Id . at 535. I n Dixon , the court established
a tw o p ro ng te st f

or de te rm ini ng wh e the r a

se pa rate c on vic tio n f

or kid na pp ing vio la te s d ue pr oc e ss. First, the tria l court must determine w het h er t h e movement or confine ment was be y ond that
nece ssary to c ommit t he ac companying f elony

. Id . I f so, the court must t hen asc erta in whether the additional movement or c onfinement: (1) preve nted the victim f rom summoning help; (2) lessened the def endant’ s risk of detec tion; or (3) created a significa nt dang er or incre ased the victim’s risk of harm. Id

. After revie w, we conclude that the detention of R obinson was not mere ly incidental to the robbery . The indictment for ag g ravated robbe ry

char g ed the Appe llant with the ta king of Robinson’s
c ar andhis ri ng . T he tr ia l c ou rt fo un d th a t:
. . . in this case, the a g g ravated robbe ry was the r obbery

of his ca r. An d af

t er the
ro bb e ry wa s c omp le te a ndhe ha d h im i n th e c ar, he c on tin ue d to pu t a gun on his head and take him to someone e lse’s house to commit another cr i m e. Be cause of that, the ag g ravated robbery and the e specia lly ag g ravated kidnapping are not based
on the sa me e ve nts

. The facts establish that the Appellant walked up to Robinson’s car, whic h was oc cupied by Robinson and the Jones sisters. After a brief c onversation, the Appellant display ed a gun, took possession of Robinson’s vehicle, and pr ocee ded to take a ring fro m R obinson’s fing er. A t this poi nt, the ag g ravated robbe ry

was c omplete. Howeve r, as Robinson attempted to leave , the Appellant pulled Robinson back into the car , hit him wit h the g un, and proc eede d to drive him down the street whe re he wa s forc ed to enter McF ee’ s house. Thus, the confine ment in this case was bey ond that nece ssary to commit the accompa ny ing f elony of ag g ravated robbe ry

. Se e Sta te v . R as he Mo ore , No. W2002- 01195-CCA-R3-CD (Tenn. Crim. App. at J ackson, D ec. 3, 2003) , perm. to appeal denied , (Tenn. Apr. 5, 2004) ( concluding that wher e the r obberie s occurred before the victims were moved and
c on fi ne d in the kit c he n, the c on vic tio ns fo r e sp e c ia lly a g g ra vate d kidn app ing we re no t in c ide nta l to the ac companying f

elonies).
Turning to the second pr ong of the a naly sis, we conclude that the conf inement of Robinson did in fact hinder

him in summoning help; thus, the Appellant’s risk of appr ehension wa s lowere d. I t was not u n til after the A ppellant left McF ee’ s home that Robinson was able to conta ct police. Mo re ov e r, the c on tin ue d mo ve me nt andc on fi ne me nt o f R ob ins on c le arl y inc re a se d his ris k o f h arm

.-8-

Ac c or din g ly , w e c on c lud e that th e Ap pe lla nt’ s c on vic tio n f or e sp e c ia lly

a g g ra vate d kidn app ing did not violate due proc ess. This issue is without m erit.

CO NC LU SION

Ba sed upon the for eg oing, the judgme nt of the Shelby County Criminal Court is affirme d.

___________________________________ DAVID G. HAY ES, J UDGE