### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-0 7 -00 669 -CR

Wil lia m Edwar d Hug he s , A ppe lla nt

v . The State of Texas, App ellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF B LANCO COUNTY , 424TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

NO. CR952 , HO NORAB LE DANIEL H. M ILLS , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N A j ur y fo un d a pp e ll a nt W i l l i a m E d w a r d H ug he s g uil ty of fo ur c ounts of se xua l a ssa

ult of a c hild. See Tex. Penal C ode Ann. § 22.011 (West Supp. 2009). The jury assessed punishment for e ach c ount at twenty

y ear s in prison and a $10,000 fine, and the t rial court order ed the se ntence s to r un c on se c uti ve ly . App e lla

nt c on te nd s th a t th e tr ia l c ourt reversi bl y erre d b y

ov e rr uli nghis motion to di smiss t wo counts of the i n d i ct m en t as barr ed by the statute of limitations and by pe rm itt ingthe State to a

me nd the ind ic tme nt. He a lso c on te nd s th a t th e e vid e nc e is i ns uf fi c ie nt t o
su sta in t he c on vic tio ns . We ov e rr ule the se c on te nti on s a

nd a ff ir m th e c on vic tio ns .“A1” is a pseudony m chosen by

the complainant. SeeTex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 57.02 1 (West Supp. 2009). 2 LIMITATIONS Ap pe lla nt move d to dis mis s c ounts on e and tw o o f t

he ind ic tme nt b e c a

us e prosec ution of those counts wa s b ar re d by limit ations. Count one alleg ed that on or a bout J uly 25, 1994, appellant “ intentionally or knowing ly

cause [d] the pene tration of the mouth of A1, a child who wa s . . . y oung er tha n 17 y ear s of ag e and not the spouse of the defe ndant, by defe ndant’s sexual orga

n.” Se e id . § 22.0 1 1 (a )(2)(B ). Count two alleg ed that on or a bout J uly 25, 1994, 1 appellant “ intentionally

or knowing ly cause [d] the mouth of A1, a c hild who was . . . y oung er tha n 17 y ear s of ag e and not the spouse of the de fenda nt, to contact the se x ual org an of the defe ndant.” Se e id . § 22.011(a) (2)( E).

The limit ations periods for felonies are found in c ode of criminal p ro cedur e article 12.01. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 12.01 (West Supp. 2009). I n 1994, the limitations period for sexual assau l t o f a chil d was ten year s from the date of the c ommissi on of the off ense. Act of Ma

y 23, 1991, 72nd L eg ., R.S., ch. 565, § 6, 1991 Tex. Gen. L aws 2003, 2004. In 1997, the limit ations period was chang ed to te n y ear s from the eig hteenth birthday of the victim of the of

fense
. Act of Ma

y 24, 1997, 75th L eg ., R.S., ch. 740, § 1, 1997 Tex. Gen. L aws 2403. Absent leg islative intent to the contrar

y , a statute e x tending the limitations period applies to all offe nses not barr ed at the time the ac t goe s into effe ct, so that the prose cution may be commenc ed at a

ny time within the newly established per iod. Ro se v . S tate , 716 S.W .2d 162, 165 (Tex. A pp.—Dallas 1986, pet. re f’d)
. A1 was bor

n on J uly 25, 1978. There fore , absent any tolling of the l imitations period, a n indictmentEffe ctive September 1, 2007, article 12.01 was amended to provide that there is no lim itations 2 period for sexual assault of a child. Te x . Code Crim. Proc. Ann. ar t. 12.01(1)(B ) (West Supp. 2009). This chang e did not apply to an offe nse bar

red by limit ations befor e the e ffe ctive date of the amendment. Ac t of May

18, 2007, 80th L eg ., R.S., ch. 593, § 4.01(c) , 2007 Tex. Gen. L aws 1120, 1148. The limitations period for org anized criminal ac tiv i t y i s t h e same as that of the most ser ious 3 offe nse that is the object of that activity . Tex. Code Crim. P roc. A nn. art. 12.03(b) (West 2005).

3 for the offe nses alleg ed in c ounts one and two had to be pr esente d no later tha n J uly 25, 2006, A1’s twenty -eig hth birthday . The indictment wa s filed on Octobe r 3, 2007. 2

At the hea

ring on appellant’ s motion, t he State urg ed that the r unning of

the limit ations period had be en tolled by the pende ncy

of the indictment in a prior cause , number CR904. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 12.05( b) (West 2005) (time duringpendenc y of indictment not
c omp ute d in

pe ri od of lim itatio ns ); Va sq ue

z v . S tate , 557 S.W .2d 779, 784 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (interpr eting statute). Count one of the indictment in CR904 alleg ed that appellant pe netrated A1’s mouth with appellant’s sexual org an on or about J uly 25, 1994. Count two of that indictment alleg ed that appellant e ng ag ed in org anized criminal ac tivity by causingA1’s sexual o rgan to contact appell an t ’s m outh with the intent to establish, maintain, or participate in a combination or in the profits of a c ombination. SeeTex. P enal Code A nn. § 71.02(a) (1) (W es t S u p p . 2 0 09). The indictment in CR 904 was filed on July 24, 2006, one day befor e the limitations period expired. That 3 ind ic tme nt w a s p e nd inga t th e tim e of a pp e lla nt’ s tria l in th is c a

us e , a nd it w a s n ot d ism iss e d unti l afte r appe llant was convic ted.

Unde r ar ticle 12.05(b), a

prior indictment tolls the statute of limit ations for a
su bs e qu e nt i nd ic tme nt whe n b oth ind ic tme nts a lle g e the same c on du c t, a c t, o r t ra ns a c tio n, e ve n if the t wo i ndictments do not alleg e the same statutory offe nse. He rn an de

z v . S tate , 127 S.W .3d 768,4

77 4 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 04 ). Th e tw o c ounts of the ind ic tme nt i n c a

us e numbe r C R90 4 an d c ounts
one and two of the pre sent indictment alleg e the same conduc t, acts, or tra nsactions. Ther efor e, the pendenc y of the indictment in CR904 tol led the runningof the limitations p eriod for the offe nses
a lle g e d in c ounts on e and

tw o o f t he pr e se nt i nd ic tme nt. To that e xten t, t he State ’s op po sit ion to appellant’ s motion t o dismiss was we ll-taken.

Th e pr e se nt i nd ic tme nt d id n ot, ho we ve r, a lle g e the pe nd e nc y of the in di c tme nt i n
c a us e numbe r C R90 4. Cod e of c ri min a l pr oc e dure art ic le 21 .0 2 re qu ir e s that an ind ic tme nt i nd ic a te
on its fa c e that a pr os e c uti on the re un de r is no t ba rr e d by the statut e of

lim itatio ns . T e x. Cod e Cr im. Pr oc . Ann . ar

t. 2 1. 02 (6 ) ( Wes t 20 09 ); Tita v . S tate , 2 6 7 S
. W
. 3 d

3 3 , 3 7 ( T e x . C r i m . Ap p . 2 0 0 8 )
. If the State wi sh e s to re ly on the tol lin g pr ov isi on of art ic le 12 .0 5( b) , it

mus t pl e a d th a t to lli ngfa c t in the indictment. Tita , 267 S.W .3d at 37-38. B eca use the State fa iled to do so, the trial court e rre d by overr uling a ppellant’s motion to dism iss counts one and two. Id . at 38. The trial court’s err or is subject to harmless e rror revie w under

rule 44.2(b)
. Se e id
. a t 39 . U nd e r t

his sta nd ard , th e e rr or

mus t be dis re g ard e d if

it d id n ot a ff

e c t a su bs tanti a l r ig ht. Tex. R. App. P . 44.2(b)

Appellant does not a ssert any prejudice arising from the tria l court’s fa ilure to g rant the m otion to dismiss , nor do we find any . As we ha ve discussed, the pendenc y of the indictment in cause number CR904 tolled the running of the limitations period, and appellant wa s not convicted of a limitations-barr ed off ense. The absenc e of a

tolling par ag raph in the indictment did not deprive
a pp e lla nt o f not ic e of the c on du c t or of fe ns e fo r wh ic h he wa s bei ngpr os e c ute d o r i mpa ir his a bil ity to prepa re a n adequa te def en s e. Ha d the motion to dis miss been g rante d, the State could have amende d the indictment to a dd the require d tolling fac t, a nd the prosec ution could have c ontinued5

under the amende d indictment. Se e Tita , 267 S.W .3d at 38 n.6 (c iting Te x . Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 28.09 (West 2006)) . Havingconclude d that the er ror wa s harmless, we overr ule issue two.
AMENDM ENT Ap pe lla nt c on te nd s that the tr ia l court e rr e d by pe rm itt ing the State to a me nd c ounts three and four

of the indictment, a

nd that the court further err ed by ref using his re quest for a

ten-da y continuance afte r per

mitti ng the amendme nt. As orig inally filed, count thre e alleg ed that on or a bout Ju ly 2 5 , 1 9 9 4 , a

p p e ll an t “ inte n ti o n a ll y

o r k n o w in g ly c a u s e [d ] th e p e n e tr a ti o n o f

th e mo u th

o f [JW] , a child who was . . . y oung er than 17 y ear s of ag e and not the spouse of the defe ndant, by defe ndant’s sexual orga

n.” Count four a lleg ed that on or a bout J uly 25, 1994, appellant “ intentionally or knowing ly

cause [d] the mouth of [J W] a child who wa s . . . y oung er than 17 y ear s of ag e and not the spouse of the de fenda

nt, to contact the se x ual org an of the defe ndant.” On Octobe r 22, 2007, bef

ore jury selec tion be g an and over a ppellant’s objec tion, the trial court g rante d the State’s motion to amend counts t hree and four to chang e the a lleg ed date of the offe nses to Dec ember 2 4 , 1998. The c ourt interlineate d the cha ng ed date s on the fac e of the indictment on file, but that a ltered indictment doe s not appea r in the re cord. A

ppellant re quested a ten-da y continuance but the court did not rule. The following day , befor e the indictment was re ad
and a pp e lla nt e nte re d h is p le a s b e fo re the jur y , th e State ann ou nce d th a t it wa s w ith dr awi ngits motion to amend and aske d to go f orwa rd on the orig inal indictment. Over a ppellant’s objec tion, the trial cour

t gr anted the State’ s reque st and place d in the rec ord a c opy of the orig inal, unmodified indictment as a substitute for the indictment alter ed the pr evious day . The c ourt explained, “[S] ince the tr ia l ha d n ot c omm e nc e d, the jur y ha s n ot s e e n th e ind ic tme nt, the c ourt bas ically vie ws thi sI n Sodipo , the cour t st at es t h at v i o l at ions of article 28.10 are not subject to harmless er ror 4 analy sis, but that is no longe r t he law. Se e W rig ht v . S tate , 28 S.W .3d 526, 531-32 (Te x . Crim. App. 20 00 ); se e als o 41 Geor g e E. Dix & Robert O. D awson, Texas Practice : Criminal Practice and Pr oc e du re § 21.74 (2d ed. 2004)
. 6 chang ing this bac k to the way Counts Thre e and Four wer e at the beg inning of the da y y esterda y . . . the Court doesn’t view this as a n amendment, but just a reconsider ation of i ts ear lier rulingand the Court withdraws its ear lier ruling and re turns the indictment to the state that we beg an on y esterda y . . . .” Appe llant’s motion for a ten- day continuance was de nied. A p p e l l an tar g u e s t h a tt h e t r i a l c o u rt ’ s O c t o b e r 2 3 r u l i n g w a s n o tm e r e l y a
re c on sid e ratio n o f i ts p re vio us da y ’s ru lin g , b ut ano the r a me ndme nt o f t he ind ic tme nt. Th e statut e g overningamendments to cha rg ing instruments does not pe rmit a mendments on the day of, but prior to, commence ment of trial on the mer its. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc
. Ann. art. 28.10(c) (West 2006); So dip o v. Sta te , 815 S.W .2d 551, 556 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (op. on re h’g ). Whether the tr ial court’s rulings are considered as a gra nt of t he S tate’s moti on to amend f ollowed by

a withdra wal of that ruling , or as two separ ate but offse tting amendments to the i ndictment, no harm to appe llant is shown. 4 An indictment may not be amende d over the def endant’ s objection if the ef fec t of the amendment is to cha

rg e the de fenda

nt with an additional or d i ff er en t offense , or if the substantial rig hts of the def

endant a re pr ejudiced by

the amendme nt. Tex. C ode Crim. Proc. Ann. ar t. 28.10(c);

se e als o Tex. R. App. P . 44.2(b) ( err or that does not affe ct substantial rig hts must be disreg arde d); W rig ht v . S tate , 2 8 S. W.3 d 5 26 , 5 31 -3 2 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 00 ) ( a pp lyingha

rm le ss e rr or

ru le to article 28.10 violation). Appellant conte nds that his su b s t an t ial rig hts were violated bec ause “ the indictment date wa s o u t s i d e t he statute of limitations in at least two counts” a nd “[p] art ofAs we have dis c us se d with re g ard to co un ts one and tw o, the lim itatio ns pe ri od in e ff e c t on July 5 25 , 1 99 4, wa s te n y e ars . T his pe ri od wa s e xten de d in

19 97 to t e n y e ars a ft e r t

he vic tim ’s e ig hte e nth birthday
. J W was born on Dec ember 25, 1981. He was twenty -five year s old when the indictment was filed on O ctober 3, 2007, well wit hin the l imitations period. Chang ing the date of the alleg ed offe nses to Dec ember

24, 1998, would not have c hang ed the limitations deadline. 7 Ap pe lla nt’ s d e fe ns e ha d b e e n p re pa re d fo r thi s iss ue .” Th is a rgume nt f a ils fo r t wo re a so ns . F ir st, there was no limitations is sue with respe ct to counts three and four and, in any event, c hang ing the date of the offe nses alleg ed in t hose counts would have had no eff ect on the a

pplicable limitations period. Second, the e nd result of the tria l court’s c halleng ed Oc tober 22 a nd 23 ruling s was to leave 5 the orig in a l in d ic tm e n t u n c h an g e d
. Ap p e ll an t r e c e iv e d o n O c to b e r 2 3 w h a t h e h a d in s is te d he wanted on October 22: trial on the orig inal indictment. Any defe nse appe llant might have prepa red based on the orig inal wordingof the indictment re mained viable. See W right , 28 S.W .3d at 532. For the s ame reason, appellant’s subst antial rights wer e not pre judiced by

the denial of

the ten-da

y continuance . I ssue one is over ruled.
SUF F ICIENCY OF EVIDENCE Ap pe lla nt c on te nd s that

the e vid e nc e is l e g a lly

and fa c tua lly ins uf fi c ie nt t o s us ta in his convictions. His entire ar g ument in support of this contention i s as follows: “In the ca se at ba r, there was no e vidence or fa ctually insu ff icient evidenc e to sustain a findingof guilt, because the char g ing instrument wa s bey ond the statute of limitations as to one of the complaining witnesses.”

Appellant did not reque st a jury instruction on the statute of limitations defense, a nd the State was the ref

ore not o b l i gat ed t o prove that these prose cutions were not barre d. Tita , 267 S.W .3d at 39. Fur

ther, the rec ord shows that the prosec utions unde r counts one a nd two wer e not b ar r e d b e c a u s e th e r u n n in g o f th e li mi tati o n s p e r io d w a s to ll e d b y a p r io r in d ic tm ent, and the8

prosec utions under counts t hree and four wer e not bar

red be cause the statutory

limit ations period had not expi red w hen the indictment wa s filed.

When there is a c halleng e to the suff iciency of the e viden ce to sustain a criminal conviction, the question prese nted i s whether a rational trier of f act c ould have f

ound the essential elements of the offe nse beyond a rea sonable doubt. J ac k so n v . V irg ini a , 443 U.S. 307, 324 (1979) (l e g a l su ff

ic ie nc y ); Cla y ton v . S tate , 235 S
. W
. 3 d 7 7 2 , 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (leg al
su ff ic ie nc y ); J oh ns on v . S

tate , 23 S.W .3d 1, 11 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (fa ctual suff iciency ). In a le g a l su ff ic ie nc y re vie w, a ll the e vid e nc e is re vie we d in the lig ht mos t fa vo ra ble to t he ve rd ic t; i t is
assum ed that the trie r of f act r esolved c onflicts in the testimony , weig hed the e vidence , and dre w
rea sonable infe renc es in a manne r that supports the ver d i ct. Clayton , 234 S.W .3d at 778. In a fa c tua l su ff

ic ie nc y re vie w, a ll the e vid e nc e is co ns ide re d eq ua lly , in c lud ingthe te sti mony of de fe ns e witnesses and the ex istence of alternative hy potheses. Cle wis v . S

tate , 9 2 2 S. W. 2 d 1 2 6 , 1 2 9 ( T e x. C r i m . A p p . 1 9 96 ); Or on a v. S tate , 836 S.W .2d 319, 321 (Tex. App.—Austin 1992, no pet.). Al thoug h d

ue de fe re nc e sti ll mus t be a c c or de d th e fa c t f ind e r’ s d e te rm inatio ns , p art ic ula rl y tho se
conce rning the weig ht and cr edibility of the e v i d en ce , t he re viewingcourt may disag ree with the
r e s u lt in o r d e r to p r e v e n t a ma n if e s t injustice. Jo hnson , 23 S.W .3d 1, 9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); Cai n v. Sta te , 95 8 S.W. 2d 40 4, 40 7 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 97 ). Th e e vid e nc e wi ll b e de e me d f a c tua lly ins uf fi c ie nt i f t he e vid e nc e su

pp or tin g the ve rd ic t is so we a k a s to make the fi nd ing of g uil t c le arl y wrongor m an i fe s tly

unjust, or if the verdic t is ag ainst the g rea t weig ht and pre pondera

nce of the available evidenc e. W

ats on v . S tate , 2 04 S.W. 3d

40 4, 41 4- 15 (T e x. Cr im
. App . 2 00 6) ; Johnson , 23 S.W .3d at 11.9 The e vents in question occur red at a monastery

in Bla n c o Co u nty wh e r e appellant wa s a monk. A1 testified that he ent ered the monaster y as a novitiate when he w as fifte en y ear s old. With in tw o or thr e e months of e nte ri ng the mon a ste ry , A1 ha d his fi rs t se xua l en cou nt er wi th
a pp e lla nt. A1 te sti fi ed th at a

pp e lla nt p la c e d h is p e nis in A 1’ s mo uth , o r A 1 p la c e d h is p e nis in appellant’ s mouth, “on aver ag e twice a month.” J W’s testimony was similar. He , too, entere d the
mon a ste ry

a s a no vit iate wh e n h e wa s f if te e n y e ars old . Wit

hin months , h e wa s a lso re g ula rl y eng ag ing in or al sex acts with appellant. The S tate’s only other witness was a sher iff’s investig ator. Th e de fe ns e c a lle d n o w itn e sse s.

Viewingthe evidenc e in the lig ht most favorable to the j ury ’s verdicts, we hold that
a rational trier of f

act could have found that all the elements of the offe nses wer e prove d bey ond a
rea sonable doubt. Viewe d in a neutral light, the evidenc e supporting t he verdicts is not so weak as to make the f

indings of guilt clearly

wrongor manife stly

unjust, nor a

re the verdic ts ag ainst the g reat weig ht and pre pondera

nce of the ava ilable evidenc e. I ssue three is overrule d. The judg ments of conviction ar e af firmed.

__________________________________________ J an P. Patterson, J ustice Be fore J ustices Patterson, Pury ear and Pember

ton Affir med Filed: Oc tober 30, 2009 Do No t Pu

bli sh