*Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

_______________________

No. 93-4973

_______________________

MIGUEL ANGEL MARROQUIN-PONCE,

Petitioner,

versus

IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE,

Respondent.

_________________________________________________________________

Petition for Review of an Order of the

Immigration and Naturalization Service

(A27 606 861)

_________________________________________________________________

August 4, 1997

Before JONES, EMILIO M. GARZA, and PARKER, Circuit Judges.*

PER CURIAM:

Appellant Marroquin-Ponce challenges the decision of the

Board of Immigration Appeals to deny his motion to reopen the

petition to reopen deportation proceedings so that he could apply

for suspension of deportation. The government, aside from

defending the merits of the BIA’s decision, contends that a newly
2

enacted provision of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant

Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Pub. L. 104-208, 110 Stat. 

3009 (1996), renders Marroquin-Ponce ineligible for this relief.

We need not construe the new statute, because even if MarroquinPonce is still eligible for suspension of deportation, the Board

did not abuse its discretion by refusing to reopen.

Marroquin-Ponce entered the United States from El

Salvador thirteen years ago. He allegedly fled that country

because he feared persecution from the rebels on account of his

service in the Salvadoran army. Ponce has numerous relatives

remaining in El Salvador. He was served with a notice of

deportation in 1987, but the proceedings have been delayed for

various reasons. Appellant is married, has children ages

approximately five and eight, owns a home and a van and is

gainfully employed.

Having sought suspension of deportation shortly after his

children were born, appellant contends his deportation would cause

“extreme hardship” to him and his family. The sources of hardship

allegedly include his oldest child’s involvement in the American

educational system, the family breakup that might be caused by his

deportation, and financial hardship that would be caused by the

loss of his assets in the United States and his return to a very

poor country. Marroquin-Ponce asserts that he was entitled to a

hearing in which he could offer further proof of these assertions.
3

The Board was, however, entitled to and did find that

Marroquin failed to establish his prima facie eligibility for

suspension of deportation. See INS v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 314, 323,

112 S.Ct. 719, 725 (1992). This court reviews BIA decisions

denying reopening for an abuse of discretion. Id. at 323-324, 112

S. Ct. at 725; Pritchett v. INS, 993 F.2d 80, 83 (5th Cir.), cert.

denied, 510 U.S. 932, 114 S.Ct. 345 (1993). Viewed according to

the stringent standard for abuse of discretion, see Pritchett, 980

F.2d at 83, we cannot say that the BIA abused its discretion in

concluding that Marroquin did not state a prima facie case for

suspension of deportation.

The BIA decision speaks well enough for itself. The BIA

considered all of the grounds alleged by Marroquin in support of

suspension and cited relevant authorities that indicate the

insufficiency of Marroquin’s contentions. Because appellant could

not make out a prima facie case for eligibility, it was unnecessary

for the BIA to order a further hearing.

In sum, there is little doubt that whether appellant

departs this country with or without his family, he will suffer

hardship. But the level of hardship clearly fails to rise to the

extremity required to demonstrate that the BIA abused its

considerable discretion in denying him reopening to consider a
4

suspension of deportation. The judgment of the BIA is AFFIRMED;

the petitioner’s motion for review is DENIED.