Modified and Affirmed and Opinion Filed May 3, 2023

In The

Court of Appeals

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

No. 05-22-00360-CR

ARMANDO RICARDO NAVARRO, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 292nd Judicial District Court

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. F19-45714-V

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Reichek, Nowell, and Garcia

Opinion by Justice Nowell

A jury found appellant Armando Ricardo Navarro guilty of capital murder, 

and the trial court sentenced him to life imprisonment. On appeal, appellant 

challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction and requests 

modification of several errors in the judgment. The State raises a cross-point also 

seeking modification of an error in the judgment. As modified, we affirm the trial 

court’s judgment.
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Background

Arturo Negrete worked for a company responsible for setting up displays in 

grocery stores. On the morning of August 6, 2019, Negrete drove his black Nissan 

Altima to a Kroger in Richardson, Texas to set up wine displays. 

Around 9 a.m., Juan Hernandez went to the same Kroger during his work 

break. As he approached the main door, a man in construction gear, later identified 

as appellant, asked him for a cigarette. Hernandez said he did not smoke and kept 

walking. Appellant continued towards him and repeated his request for a cigarette. 

Hernandez again said no and walked away. Hernandez then heard a “strong yell” 

and felt a punch from behind on the right side of his neck. Hernandez realized 

appellant stabbed him. 

Although no one witnessed what happened next, the police investigation 

determined appellant approached Negrete in the Kroger parking lot and stabbed him 

multiple times in his head, chest, stomach, and legs. One stab wound transected the 

popliteal artery, a large artery that runs behind the knee. It resulted in a huge loss of 

blood. The medical examiner determined Negrete died by homicide caused by 

hemorrhagic shock from multiple sharp force injuries. 

Officer Stephanie Trice, a criminalist with the Richardson Police Department, 

responded to the Kroger crime scene. She discovered a large blood stain, 

approximately twelve feet by two feet, near a parking space. An orange safety vest 
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and a torn piece of black cloth, both with a large amount of blood, were in the parking 

space. She noted approximately twenty bloody footprints walking through the 

parking lot that led to another area of large blood. There was also a trail of blood 

that led to a tree in the parking lot where she found a black shirt. She believed the 

attack began in the middle of the parking lot based on the blood and shoe print 

evidence. 

Detective Sarah Yee acted as lead detective. She spoke to numerous people, 

but no one saw appellant stab Hernandez or Negrete. Surveillance videos from the 

Kroger and nearby businesses did not capture the events. Without any concrete 

leads, officers decided to approach a nearby construction crew because investigators 

found a construction vest and hard hat left at the scene. The officers learned a 

member of the construction crew was missing and began searching for the missing 

man as a potential suspect. 

Around 9:30 a.m., Christopher Boykins was riding in the passenger side of 

his company’s delivery truck when he felt a “big boom” at the back of the truck. He

realized someone hit him. When he looked back, he saw appellant reverse a black

Altima, pull around the truck, and drive away. Boykins decided to follow the car

because he considered the collision a hit and run. When appellant drove passed, 

Boykins noticed he was “kind of bloody looking.” Appellant hit several other cars 

as he tried to get away. 
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Appellant eventually got out of the car, ran into a neighborhood, and tried to 

find an open house. Boykins next saw appellant leaving a home with a knife and

called the police. When appellant saw the police, he dropped the knife along with a 

shirt. After appellant was arrested, Boykins showed officers where appellant 

dropped the knife and shirt. DNA testing confirmed the knife was the murder 

weapon. 

Investigators confirmed the black Altima belonged to Negrete. Although they 

did not know for sure where the car was parked during the attack, given the location 

of the large blood stain and Negrete’s blood on the car in a “spray fashion,” 

investigators believed Negrete was standing near the car, which meant the car was 

parked near the large blood stain. The medical examiner’s testimony supported the 

investigators’ theory of events because Negrete’s transected popliteal artery would 

not have caused immediate unconsciousness. Instead, he likely staggered for a short 

period of time with the arterial bleeding causing a large amount of spray.

 The medical examiner found Negrete’s car key in his possession during the 

autopsy. Detective Yee explained the Altima had a push button start so if it was

running, it would continue to run even if the key was not in it. This indicated 

appellant took the car while it was running. Detective Yee considered it significant 

because “the fact that it’s running and then it was taken, . . . that indicates that, to 

me, that that’s what [appellant] was after.” In her experience, a person trying to 

carjack someone usually injured the person to steal the car and leave the crime scene. 
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She believed appellant committed the first crime when he stabbed Hernandez and 

then tried to get away by stabbing Negrete and stealing the Altima. She described 

his shedding of clothes, crashing into numerous cars, running through a 

neighborhood, and dropping evidence “all one continuous spree.” Although the 

State could have indicted appellant for murder, Detective Yee believed capital 

murder was appropriate because appellant murdered Negrete in the course of 

committing a robbery. 

Defense counsel tried to discredit Detective Yee’s carjacking theory because 

appellant’s shirt with Negrete’s blood on it, along with other blood droplets, were 

found farther out in the parking lot away from the parking spot where Negrete likely 

bled out. A witness also saw appellant wearing a black shirt near the trees.

1

 Defense 

counsel urged this evidence indicated appellant killed Negrete and walked away 

from the car; therefore, appellant did not murder Negrete in the course of committing 

a robbery. Rather, appellant walked back some time later and took the car. 

Detective Yee explained it was possible appellant walked towards the tree 

area leaving blood from his attack on Hernandez and then decided it was better to 

steal a car than continue walking. He then saw Negrete, decided to attack him, and 

 

1 This witness, who allegedly saw appellant take off the shirt, did not testify at trial. The record contains 

no further information about the witness other than the brief references made by defense counsel during his 

cross-examination of Detective Yee. 
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steal his car. She acknowledged Negrete’s blood was on the black shirt, but it was 

possible appellant threw it out the window as he drove away. 

The jury believed the State’s theory of events and found appellant guilty of 

capital murder as charged in the indictment. This appeal followed.

Sufficiency of the Evidence

The State indicted appellant for the offense of capital murder by intentionally 

causing Negrete’s death by stabbing him with a knife while in the course of 

committing and attempting to commit robbery. Appellant challenges the sufficiency 

of the evidence to support his capital murder conviction because the State’s 

carjacking theory was based on pure speculation, and the physical evidence 

supported the defensive theory that Negrete’s murder and theft of his Altima were 

unrelated events. The State responds the evidence proved appellant stabbed Negrete 

to death and then used his car to flee the scene; therefore, a rational jury could infer

from the evidence appellant intended to rob Negrete when he killed him. 

Appellant does not dispute he murdered and robbed Negrete. He concedes he 

did both; however, he argues his intent to rob Negrete formed after the murder. 

Accordingly, our analysis focuses on whether the evidence is legally sufficient to 

establish appellant intended to rob Negrete when he murdered him. 

We review an appellant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence under 

the standard enunciated in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). See Brooks v. 

State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 895 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). We examine all the evidence 
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in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict to determine whether “any rational 

trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable 

doubt.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318–19; Merritt v. State, 368 S.W.3d 516, 525 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2012). Our review includes all of the evidence introduced, whether it 

was admissible or inadmissible. See Winfrey v. State, 393 S.W.3d 763, 767 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2013).

The jury is the sole judge of witness credibility and the weight to be given 

their testimony. Merritt, 368 S.W.3d at 525 (citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319). As 

the sole factfinder, the jury may reasonably infer facts from the evidence presented, 

credit the witnesses it chooses, disbelieve any or all of the evidence or testimony 

proffered, and weigh the evidence as it sees fit. Canfield v. State, 429 S.W.3d 54, 

65 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, pet. ref’d). We afford almost complete 

deference to the jury’s determinations of credibility. Id. In the event of conflicting 

evidence, we presume the jury resolved conflicts in favor of the verdict and defer to 

that determination. Isassi v. State, 330 S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). 

Circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence in establishing guilt, and 

circumstantial evidence, alone, can be sufficient. See Jenkins v. State, 493 S.W.3d 

583, 599 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016).

A person commits the offense of capital murder, as charged in the instant case, 

if he intentionally commits murder in the course of committing or attempting to 

commit robbery. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.03(a)(2). A person commits 
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robbery if, in the course of committing theft and with the intent to obtain or maintain 

control of the property, he “intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily 

injury to another.” Id. § 29.02(a). As used in section 19.03(a)(2), “in the course of 

committing” the offense means “conduct occurring in an attempt to commit, during 

the commission, or in the immediate flight after the attempt or commission of the 

offense.” Dawkins v. State, 495 S.W.3d 890, 895 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 

2016, no pet.) (quoting Robertson v. State, 871 S.W.2d 701, 705 (Tex. Crim. App. 

1993)).

The defendant’s requisite intent to commit the offense may be inferred from 

his actions or conduct. Robertson, 871 S.W.2d at 705. For a murder to qualify as 

capital murder in this context, the intent to rob must be formed prior to or concurrent 

with the murder. Id. Proof that the robbery was committed as an afterthought and 

unrelated to the murder is not sufficient. Herrin v. State, 125 S.W.3d 436, 441 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2002). But, a robbery occurring immediately after a murder will support 

an inference that the murder was intended to facilitate the robbery. Padilla v. State, 

326 S.W.3d 195, 200 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); McGee v. State, 774 S.W.2d 229, 234 

(Tex. Crim. App. 1989) (en banc) (“We have held numerous times that this 

aggravating element [murder in the course of committing robbery] is sufficiently 

proven if the State proves the robbery occurred immediately after the commission 

of the murder.”).
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Here, the jury could reasonably infer appellant murdered Negrete in the course 

of stealing his car and disbelieve evidence to the contrary. Canfield, 429 S.W.3d at

65. Officer Trice testified the location of the large blood stain in the parking lot was

consistent with someone standing by a car and getting stabbed. Detective Yee 

explained blood spray was visible outside the vehicle, on the inside and outside of 

the doors, and on the center console, further indicating the attack happened near the 

car. 

Although no one knows if Negrete was inside or outside the car when the 

murder occurred, it is clear Negrete somehow exited the car without time to turn off 

the engine. Because Negrete’s key was found in his pocket, not in the car, appellant 

could only have taken the car while it was still running. A jury may infer from a 

theft committed immediately after a murder that the murder was intended to facilitate 

a robbery. See, e.g., Russo, 228 S.W.3d at 793 (citing Cooper v. State, 67 S.W.3d 

221, 224 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002)). Thus, it was reasonable for the jury to infer that 

by taking the car while it was still running, appellant murdered Negrete for the 

purpose of stealing it. Id. 

The jury’s conclusion was further supported by appellant stabbing Hernandez 

prior to attacking Negrete. Although the State was not required to prove motive, 

such evidence was admissible as a circumstance tending to prove guilt. Id. 

Detective Yee believed that after appellant stabbed Hernandez, he needed to flee the 
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scene. Appellant’s attack on Hernandez, Negrete’s murder, and the car robbery were

“one continuous spree.” 

To the extent the physical evidence indicated appellant briefly walked away 

from the car to dispose of his bloody shirt before stealing Negrete’s car, we presume 

the jury resolved such conflicts in favor of the verdict. Isassi, 330 S.W.3d at 638. 

The jury was free to ignore the brief reference to a witness who claimed to have seen 

appellant wearing the shirt near the trees in the parking lot and instead believe

Detective Yee’s scenario in which appellant could have thrown the shirt out the 

window as he drove away. Moreover, appellant’s actions in trying to dispose of the 

bloody shirt to hide evidence of his crime reinforces the jury’s conclusion he 

murdered Negrete to steal his car, flee the scene, and avoid prosecution. See Clayton 

v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 789 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (recognizing factfinder may 

draw an inference of guilt from an accused fleeing the scene); see also Greenwood 

v. State, No. 04-21-00313-CR, 2023 WL 2396799, at *5 n.8 (Tex. App.—San 

Antonio Mar. 8, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (noting 

jury could reasonably infer guilt based on evidence of flight and disposing of murder 

weapon). 

After considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we 

conclude a rational jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt all the essential 

elements of capital murder, including the timely formed intent of the aggravating 

element of robbery. We overrule appellant’s first issue.
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Modification of the Judgment

In his second and third issues, appellant requests modification of the judgment 

to reflect he pleaded not guilty to the offense and to change the deadly weapon 

finding from a firearm to a knife. The State agrees with the requested modifications 

and further asks we modify the judgment to reflect that appellant was convicted of 

“capital murder in the course of a robbery,” not “capital murder by terroristic threat.” 

We have the power to modify a judgment to speak the truth when we have the 

necessary information to do so. TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(b); Bigley v. State, 865 S.W.2d 

26, 27–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (en banc); Asberry v. State, 813 S.W.2d 526, 529 

(Tex. App.—Dallas 1991, pet. ref’d) (en banc). The record supports the requested 

modifications; therefore, we agree with appellant and the State that the judgment 

should be corrected. See Blais v. State, No. 05-20-00556-CR, 2021 WL 2010269, 

at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 20, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for 

publication). Accordingly, we sustain appellant’s first issue and modify the 

judgment to reflect he pleaded not guilty to the charged offense. See, e.g., Zamarron 

v. State, No. 05-19-00632-CR, 2020 WL 6280869, at *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas Oct. 

27, 2020, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (modifying judgment 

to reflect not guilty plea). We likewise sustain appellant’s second issue and modify 

the judgment to indicate the deadly weapon used was a knife, not a firearm. See, 

e.g., Davidson v. State, No. 05-20-00181-CR, 2021 WL 1438305, at *2 (Tex. App.—

Dallas Apr. 16, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op., not designed for publication) (modifying 
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judgment to reflect correct deadly weapon used in offense). Finally, we sustain the 

State’s cross-point and modify the judgment to reflect that appellant was convicted 

of “capital murder in the course of a robbery,” and not “capital murder by terroristic

threat.” See, e.g., Williams v. State, No. 05-20-00939-CR, 2022 WL 354587, at *2 

(Tex. App.—Dallas Feb. 7, 2022, no pet., not designated for publication) (mem. op.)

(modifying judgment to reflect correct offense).

Conclusion

As modified, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. 

220360f.u05

Do Not Publish

TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b)

/Erin A. Nowell//

ERIN A. NOWELL

JUSTICE
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Court of Appeals

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

JUDGMENT

ARMANDO RICARDO 

NAVARRO, Appellant

No. 05-22-00360-CR V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 292nd Judicial 

District Court, Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. F19-45714-V.

Opinion delivered by Justice Nowell. 

Justices Reichek and Garcia 

participating.

Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is 

MODIFIED as follows:

Under “Offense for which Defendant Convicted:,” we REMOVE “CAPITAL 

MURDER BY TERRORISTIC THREAT” and REPLACE with “CAPITAL 

MURDER IN THE COURSE OF COMMITTING ROBBERY.”

Under “Plea to the Offense:,” we REMOVE “GUILTY” and REPLACE

with “NOT GUILTY.”

Under “Findings on Deadly Weapon:,” we REMOVE “YES, A FIREARM” 

and REPLACE with “YES, A KNIFE.” We further REMOVE “FIREARM” under 

the “special findings and orders” and REPLACE with “KNIFE.”

As REFORMED, the judgment is AFFIRMED. 

Judgment entered this 3rd day of May, 2023.