STABILITY OPERATIONS IN EAST TIMOR

1999-2000: A CASE STUDY

Andrew H. Fowler 

Carlisle Barracks, PA and

UNITED STATES 

ARMY WAR COLLEGE

PRESS
Stability Operations in East Timor 1999-2000:

A Case Study

Andrew H, Fowler

Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army (Retired)

U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations 

Institute

April 11, 2016

Raymond A. Millen

Senior Editor

The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and 

do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. 

Government. Authors of Peacekeeping and Stability Operations 

Institute (PKSOI) publications enjoy full academic freedom, provided they do not disclose classified information, jeopardize 

operations security, or misrepresent official U.S. policy. Such 

academic freedom empowers them to offer new and sometimes 

controversial perspectives in the interest of furthering debate on 

key issues. This report is cleared for public release; distribution 

is unlimited.

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This publication is subject to Title 17, United States Code, Sections 101 and 105. It is in the public domain and may not be copyrighted.
ii

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Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should 

be forwarded to: Director, Peacekeeping and Stability Operations 

Institute, U.S. Army War College, 22 Ashburn Drive, Carlisle, PA 

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forthcoming publications and upcoming conferences sponsored 

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ISBN: 978-0-9981473-0-7
iii

Table of Contents

Foreword.......................................................................vi

About the Author.......................................................viii

Introduction....................................................................1

Background and Strategic Conditions 

for the Operation............................................................3

Portuguese Rule .............................................................4

Independence and the Indonesian Invasion..............6

Indonesian Rule and East Timorese Resistance.........8

International Reaction.................................................10

Changing Political Currents .......................................11

UNAMET......................................................................13

U.S. Strategic Moves....................................................14

Consultation Results and Operation SPITFIRE.......15

Establishing INTERFET..............................................16

Operational Environment...........................................18

Geography....................................................................20

Economy........................................................................20

Social Factors ................................................................21

Infrastructure................................................................21

Military Threats............................................................22

Friendly Forces.............................................................25

Strategic Guidance.......................................................26

U.S. Interests in Indonesia ..........................................26

U.S. Relations with Australia .....................................27

U.S. Interests in East Timor........................................28

U.S. Commitments.......................................................29

Changing U.S. Position...............................................29
iv

The U.S. Decision to Support INERFET....................30

Design and Planning for the Operation....................31

Initial Contingency Planning......................................31

Crisis Action Planning................................................32

USFI Planning...............................................................36

Mission..........................................................................38

USFI Organization.......................................................39

Deployment and Support...........................................43

Operation STABILISE Campaign Plan......................43

Initial Deployments and Support..............................45

The Second Wave.........................................................48

The Final Deployments ...............................................50

United States Government Support to

INTERFET.....................................................................52

Transition and Redeployment....................................54

U.S. Support Group East Timor.................................58

Assessment and Insights on Joint Planning 

and Operations.............................................................59

Conclusion....................................................................74

Operation STABILISE: Best Practices for 

Peace Enforcement.......................................................78

Appendix A: Glossary of Terms and 

Abbreviations...............................................................82

Appendix B: .................................................................88

Appendix C: Chronology..........................................103

Appendix D: Key Leaders and Organizations ......108

Appendix E: United Nations General Assembly 

Question of East Timor: Report of the Secretary 

General (May 5, 1999)................................................116
v

Appendix F: United Nations Security Council 

Resolution 1246 (June 11, 1999)................................150

Appendix G: United Nations Security Council 

Resolution 1264 (September 15, 1999)......................155

Appendix H: United Nations Security Council 

Resolution 1272 (October 25, 1999)..........................160

Appendix I: Charter of the United Nations, 

Chapter VII (Articles 39-51). .....................................166

Appendix J: List of Units Assigned to USFI...........171

End Notes ....................................................................173
vi

FOREWORD

This stability operations case study project emerged 

from a Joint Requirements Oversight Council task to 

examine how Joint Professional Military Education 

(JPME) institutions teach operational planning for 

steady-state peacekeeping and stability operations. 

The Joint Staff J-7 requested the U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI), as the 

Joint Proponent for Peace and Stability Operations, to 

accomplish a number of tasks to improve JPME curricula. As part of this effort, PKSOI is developing a 

series of professionally focused, historical case studies 

of successful joint peacekeeping and stability operations. The purpose of these case studies is to provide 

balanced analyses of the strategic conditions and 

guidance underlying each selected operation, and describe how military leaders successfully interpreted 

and implemented this guidance during the conduct 

of joint operations. The case studies provide current 

and future military leaders with insights into the principles and challenges of stability operations, and describe practical approaches for designing, planning, 

and conducting joint operations in a complex environment, particularly in situations when the Department 

of Defense does not lead the U.S. Government effort. 

Each case study focuses on answering the question: 

“Did the joint force commander and staff effectively design, 

plan, and establish the mission in a way that provided for 
vii

initial operational success, while establishing the basis for 

long-term operational and strategic success?”

Gregory P. Dewitt

Colonel, U.S. Army

Director

Peacekeeping and Stability

 Operations Institute
viii

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Lieutenant Colonel Andrew Fowler is a retired 

Army Armor officer who works as a defense consultant. He specializes in the field of reconnaissance and 

security operations supporting the Training and Doctrine Command Capability Manager Armor Brigade 

Combat Team – Reconnaissance (TCM ABCT-Recon). 

His last active duty assignment was Chief, Special 

Doctrine Division, Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Other assignments 

included Commander, 3rd Squadron, 7th Cavalry; Executive Officer, 1st Battalion, 12th Cavalry; Operations 

Officer, 1st Squadron, 7th Cavalry; and Ground Planner, J-3, United States Central Command.

Lieutenant Colonel Fowler is a graduate of the 

United States Army Command and General Staff 

College. He has a B.S. in Civil Engineering from the 

United States Military Academy and an M.S. in Administration from Central Michigan University. He 

has co-authored one Army field manual, one Army 

training publication, and numerous organizational 

and operational concept papers.
1

INTRODUCTION

The stability operation in East Timor from September 20, 1999 to February 23, 2000, demonstrated how 

the United States can support the leadership of a wellrespected and capable regional partner to strengthen 

the legitimacy of international efforts and encourage 

burden sharing at a time of competing Joint Force demands.1

 The East Timor action, known as Operation 

STABILISE, was a United Nations (U.N.) sanctioned, 

Australian-led, multinational peace enforcement operation.2

 Its objective was to end the violence in East 

Timor, establish security, and set conditions for the 

transition to a U.N. peacekeeping force in what was 

then a province of Indonesia.

As the lead nation for Operation STABILISE, Australia was responsible for building the coalition, planning the operation, and providing the majority of the 

combat forces involved in the effort. The strong reputation of the Australian military and the participation 

of over 20 nations, especially from Asia, gave credibility to the international effort. The Joint Force played 

an unusual supporting role within the International 

Force East Timor (INTERFET). In the aftermath of the 

Cold War, U.S. forces had led peacekeeping and peace 

enforcement operations in Somalia, Haiti, BosniaHerzegovina, and most recently Kosovo. Competing 

demands on U.S. military capabilities incentivized 

U.S. policymakers to support the Australian leadership role in East Timor. As differences arose between 

the U.S. and Australian contingents on the ground—

as they inevitably do even amongst the closest of allies—military commanders resolved each issue with 

skill and professionalism. Dialogue was essential on a 

range of subjects, from intelligence sharing and force 
2

protection, to the termination criteria for various activities. 

In addition to the Australian lead role, the East 

Timor operation had several other distinguishing 

features. Policymakers in Washington were keen on 

preserving U.S. relations with Indonesia, even as they 

pressed leaders in Jakarta to collaborate with international stabilization efforts. The East Timor intervention showed how commanders can deploy robust 

combat power and seize key terrain to deter threats 

during stability operations. The effort also illustrates 

how the Joint Force can provide security and logistical capabilities to enable international relief entities, 

nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and nonDefense U.S. Government departments and agencies 

to address the needs of the local population. 

This case study includes eight sections. “Background and Strategic Conditions” describes the legacy 

of colonial rule in East Timor, the Japanese occupation 

during World War II, and Indonesia’s annexation of 

the territory following the departure of the Portuguese. These circumstances set the stage for a protracted struggle between pro-independence groups 

and the Indonesian security forces, which eventually 

necessitated the international action that is the focus of 

this case study. “Operational Environment” describes 

conditions in East Timor, including the local geography, economy, and society. This section introduces 

the principal protagonists to the conflict. “Strategic 

Guidance” provides an overview of U.S. interests and 

evolving U.S. policies, which shaped the operational 

direction given to commanders. “Design and Planning for the Operation” examines various concurrent 

planning efforts, culminating in the establishment of 

U.S. Forces INTERFET (USFI).3 This section outlines 
3

the initial USFI mission, task organization, and end 

state for the operation. “Deployment and Intervention” describes the unfolding of events, from the initial arrival of international forces to the redeployment 

of the U.S. contingent. This section outlines USFI 

support to INTERFET and identifies key Joint Force 

partners in the area of operations. “Assessment and 

Insights on Joint Planning and Operations” examines 

Operation STABILISE through the prism of the fifteen 

fundamentals of peace operations. The “Conclusion” 

provides overarching observations and distills a series 

of best practices derived from this study. The case 

study includes ten appendices with primary source 

documents and other supplemental materials to aid in 

a more detailed study of the operation.

The examination of Operation STABILISE is important to the education of military and civilian national 

security leaders because it highlights the challenges 

and opportunities of supporting a regional partner in 

the role of lead nation during the conduct of stability operations. In the end, the United States applied 

persuasion and pressure successfully to enable a “coalition of the willing,” while contributing Joint Force 

capabilities selectively and in a manner that had the 

greatest impact.

Background and Strategic Conditions 

for the Operation

On August 31, 1999 the people of East Timor participated in a “popular consultation” to determine 

whether they would have autonomy within or independence from Indonesia.4

 When officials announced 

the pro-independence results on September 4, 1999, 

pro-integration militias, with support from the In-
4

donesian National Armed Forces (Tentara Nasional 

Indonesia, TNI), began a rampage of terror that drew 

international condemnation. In response to the violence and under Australian leadership, INTERFET 

initiated operations in East Timor on September 20, 

1999, to establish order and security. A review of the 

East Timorese historical and political context leading 

up to the intervention is necessary to understand the 

complex environment INTERFET faced.

Portuguese Rule

Portuguese interest in Southeast Asia dates to the 

late 1400s with Vasco de Gama’s voyage around the 

Horn of Africa and into the Indian Ocean. His expedition opened a new route in the lucrative spice trade, 

bypassing the Muslim and Venetian traders that dominated the Eastern Mediterranean. As exploration in 

Southeast Asia expanded, the Pope charged the Portuguese with converting the inhabitants of the newly 

colonized regions to Christianity. In 1561, the Portuguese established their first settlement on the island of 

Timor, which included a number of Dominican friars. 

The Portuguese founded their first permanent outpost 

in East Timor in 1633. At the same time, the Netherlands expanded its influence in the area. By 1637, the 

Dutch had taken control of the western half of Timor. 

The proximity between the Dutch and Portuguese on 

the island contributed to a number of disputes, which 

they eventually resolved in a 1661 treaty that divided 

Timor between them. When the two countries signed 

a convention at The Hague, international recognition 

of the division between East and West Timor soon followed.5
5

The Portuguese centralized their control of East 

Timor by appointing the first governor, António Coelho Guerreiro, in 1701. This began nearly three centuries of Portuguese exploitation of the people of East 

Timor. The Portuguese administration remained distant from the general population and used tribal chiefs 

to control the local inhabitants. This included efforts 

to take advantage of tribal rivalries, often using one 

group to quell the insurrections of another. Initially, 

East Timor was a key source of valuable sandalwood, 

slaves, and horses. As the supply of sandalwood diminished, the Portuguese instituted coffee growing in 

an attempt to increase revenues from the small island. 

Despite these attempts to increase the profitability of 

colonial rule, East Timor remained “little more than 

trading post” for the Portuguese.6 They did little to 

develop the local infrastructure or improve the welfare of the population. During the seventeenth and 

eighteenth centuries, there were a series of rebellions 

culminating in two major revolts in 1910 and 1912.7

After 1913, the Portuguese reestablished dominion 

over the island until the Japanese seized control during World War II.

The rise of imperial Japan and its territorial expansion, embodied in the Greater East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere, soon brought war to isolated East Timor. 

Japan relied on raw materials, including oil from the 

Dutch East Indies (Indonesia), to sustain its war machine. Fearing a potential Japanese invasion, Australia occupied East Timor despite Portuguese neutrality.8

 In 1942, the Japanese invaded Timor to establish 

an outpost from which to protect the resources in the 

Dutch East Indies. Australian troops, fighting with local support, conducted a year-long guerilla campaign 

against the Japanese. However, the Japanese even-
6

tually forced the Australians to withdraw from East 

Timor in 1943. In subsequent reprisals against the 

inhabitants, the Japanese killed 40,000 to 70,000 East 

Timorese.9

Following World War II, many European countries 

began to decolonize their former possessions in East 

Asia. Immediately after the war, The Netherlands 

gave self-rule to the Dutch East Indies, resulting in the 

birth of Indonesia. At the same time, Portugal’s African colonies began a series of bloody rebellions, which 

eventually led to their independence. The Portuguese, 

however, retained control of East Timor. While Portugal attempted to institute reforms in its colonial system and increase its financial support to the territory, 

there was a growing desire for independence amongst 

the local population. By 1974, the East Timorese had 

developed a true separatist movement. 

Independence and the Indonesian Invasion

The first real chance to achieve East Timorese independence came in 1974 as a result of political changes 

in Portugal. The Carnation Revolution in Lisbon led to 

a military coup d’état, seeking “democracy and decolonization following the painful conflicts in Africa.”10

The East Timorese seized the opportunity to gain their 

freedom and quickly formed three political parties 

with the intent of achieving statehood: the Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (Frente 

Revolucionária de Timor-Leste Independente, FRETILIN), 

the Timorese Democratic Union (União Democrática

Timorese, UDT), and the Timorese Popular Democratic 

Association (Associação Popular Democrática Timorense, APODETI).11 FRETILIN called for immediate 

independence from Portugal. The UDT initially ad-
7

vocated for a gradual transition towards statehood to 

allow for the development of political and economic 

structures. APODETI, the smallest party, argued for 

integration into Indonesia.12 Many observers believed 

that APODETI was a surrogate of the Indonesian Intelligence Service, which sought to influence events in 

East Timor.

During this period, former army General Haji 

Mohammad Suharto, a staunch anticommunist, was 

president of Indonesia. He had come to power a decade earlier after blocking an attempted coup d’état 

by pro-communist forces in Jakarta. Under Suharto, 

the TNI dominated the Indonesian government. As 

events unfolded following the Carnation Revolution, 

the TNI worked behind the scenes to influence developments in East Timor. The TNI instituted Operation 

KOMODO in 1974 using a combination of propaganda and special forces (Komando Pasukan Khusus, KOPASSUS) to create instability and set the conditions 

for East Timor’s integration into Indonesia. The TNI 

information campaign depicted the FRETILIN as a 

communist party. Within a Cold War context, including the recent fall of South Vietnam, and in light of 

Suharto’s anticommunist stance, Indonesia would 

not tolerate a communist controlled country on its 

periphery. 

In January 1975, the FRETILIN and UDT formed a 

political alliance to achieve political change. By August, suspicious of the FRETILIN’s growing popularity 

and influenced by Operation KOMODO, the UDT attempted to overthrow the Portuguese administration 

in Dili. Fighting soon broke out between FRETILIN 

and the UDT, resulting in the Portuguese Governor’s 

departure. Lisbon effectively abandoned the local inhabitants to their own fate. After several weeks of un-
8

rest and with the support of the local armed forces, the 

FRETILIN consolidated its control over the territory. 

In November 1975, the FRETILIN declared East Timor 

independent from Portugal.

The FRETILIN declaration of independence provided the pretext for the Indonesian invasion of East 

Timor on December 7, 1975. Fearing the spread of communism in the region, the United States and Australia 

gave tacit support to the Indonesian annexation. Despite strong resistance from FRETILIN’s armed-wing, 

the Armed Forces for the National Liberation of East 

Timor (Forças Armada de Libertação Nacional de TimorLeste, FALINTIL), Indonesia successfully annexed East 

Timor. Jakarta designated East Timor as Indonesia’s 

27th province in July 1976, but the FALINTIL committed itself to an extended insurgency.13

Indonesian Rule and East Timorese Resistance

The TNI conducted a brutal counterinsurgency 

campaign against FALINTIL from 1975 through 1983, 

which often included the summary execution of suspected FALINTIL supporters. The fighting contributed to widespread food shortages and the outbreak of 

disease. As a result, by 1980 an estimated 200,000 East 

Timorese had died as either a direct or indirect consequence of the conflict.14 The FALANTIL sustained 

severe losses at the hands of the TNI, resulting in a 

reduction of its fighting strength from approximately 

27,000 to 5,000 by 1978. 15 These reverses and the death 

of its first commander, Nicolau Lobarto, effectively 

neutralized the FALINTIL for a number of years. 

With the perceived defeat of FALINTIL, the Indonesian Government changed its approach to governing East Timor. Unlike its Portuguese predecessor, the 
9

Government of Indonesia sought to control the populace in East Timor directly and bypass the traditional 

tribal leadership. During the 1980s, Jakarta provided 

substantial financial support to the province, administering a variety of economic and social development 

programs. These efforts contributed to a reduction in 

the level of violence for most of the decade, but simmering resistance continued.

After the death of Lobarto, José Alexandre “Xanana” Gusmão rose to lead both the FRETILIN and 

FALINTIL in 1981.16 Under his leadership, the 

FALINTIL became a more traditional guerilla force 

and gained the backing of the local population. A network of groups, collectively known as the Clandestine 

Front (Rede Clandestina), publicly exposed Indonesian 

despotism in East Timor to the outside world, raising 

international awareness and funding for the independence movement.17 Gusmão also instituted political changes within the FRETILIN. He eliminated the 

“leftist rhetoric of previous years” and established the 

National Council of Maubere Resistance (Conselho Nacional Resistência Maubere, CNRM).18 Jose Ramos-Horta became the Permanent Representative of FRELITIN 

to the U.N. and worked incessantly to focus international attention on East Timor. In 1998, the CNRM 

reconstituted as the National Council of Timorese Resistance (Conselho Nacional Resistência Timor, CNRT) 

with the FALINTIL as its armed force.19 The CNRT 

established a united political and military resistance 

movement for the first time. The change in approach 

and subsequent increase in political support sustained 

the struggle for independence from Indonesia. 
10

International Reaction

After the 1975 Indonesian invasion, the initial international reaction was mixed. There was no outcry 

against the violence and human rights violations, nor 

was there any effort to invoke East Timor’s right to 

self-determination. Due to concerns of a communist 

domino effect, the United States naturally aligned 

with anticommunist governments to stem the spread 

of Marxist influence. After the fall of South Vietnam 

(1975) to the communists, the United States was keen 

to reassure regional partners of its reliability. The 

day prior to Indonesia’s invasion, U.S. President Gerald Ford and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger met 

with President Suharto in Jakarta. The outcome was 

the U.S. administration’s effective support for the invasion to prevent the establishment of a communist 

state on Indonesia’s periphery.20 Subsequent U.S. administrations continued to provide military hardware 

and training to Indonesia until the 1999 international 

intervention.

Australia, like the United States, also sought strong 

political and military relations with Indonesia. The 

Australian Government’s interest in Indonesia’s stability led to the establishment of close military relations, which included participation in combined training and exercises. In the economic sphere, Australia 

signed the Timor Gap Treaty with Indonesia to extract 

oil from East Timorese territorial waters. Accordingly, Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs Andrew 

Peacock remarked on January 20, 1978 that the “Government has decided to accept East Timor as part of 

Indonesia.”21 Thus Australia gave recognition to the 

Indonesian government’s annexation.
11

In contrast to U.S. and Australian policies regarding the occupation, the U.N. never recognized Indonesian sovereignty over East Timor. It continued to view 

Portugal as the administering power for the restive 

territory. In response to the invasion, Portugal sponsored U.N. Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 384, 

which recognized the right of East Timor to self-determination, deplored the Indonesian military intervention, and called for the withdrawal of the TNI.22 While 

the U.N. passed eight subsequent General Assembly 

resolutions between 1975 and 1982 on the East Timor 

situation, it became evident that UN member support 

was waning with each resolution.23 After 1982, there 

was scant international interest in East Timor until the 

Santa Cruz Cemetery massacre sparked international 

outrage on November 12, 1991. 24 Thereafter, international interest in East Timor increased and remained 

high throughout the 1990s. Key developments kept 

the spotlight on the conflict, including the arrest and 

trial of Xanana Gusmão from 1991 through 1992, and 

the selection of two East Timorese for the Nobel Peace 

Prize in 1996.25 The renewed focus on East Timor 

brought increased scrutiny of the Indonesian Government and the TNI. Unfortunately, international attention did not stop TNI efforts to crush East Timorese 

resistance, as human rights violations continued unabated. In 1998, East Timor gained its next opportunity for independence.

Changing Political Currents

Indonesia experienced significant changes in 1998. 

The Asian financial crisis caused widespread protests 

throughout Indonesia and forced President Suharto 

to resign after more than 30 years in power. The fi-
12

nancial crisis also made Indonesia more dependent 

on economic aid, particularly from the International 

Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. This reliance on the outside world would increase the international leverage in shaping the events to come.

Suharto’s successor, B. J. Habibie had to contend 

with a disgruntled Indonesian population, calling for 

increased democracy and questioning the TNI dominance over the government. To demonstrate his commitment to democratization, Habibie announced his 

willingness to grant East Timor a measure of autonomy within Indonesia. This announcement provided a 

new impetus to U.N.-sponsored talks between Indonesia and Portugal. In October 1998, the negotiations 

led to a proposal to grant East Timor autonomy within 

a broad framework of Indonesian rule. The proposal 

established a basis for continued talks, despite differences of opinion regarding what “autonomy” constituted. Political progress did not diminish violence 

in the province though. The FALINTIL continued 

its guerilla campaign against the TNI, and popular 

independence demonstrations were often met with 

military force, resulting in the death of unarmed protestors. Elements within the TNI, concerned with the 

direction of the talks and the continuing FALINTIL 

guerilla campaign, began to mobilize militia groups 

to counter the pro-independence movement.

As a result of developments in East Timor, Australia’s policy towards Indonesia began to change. 

Australian leaders viewed Indonesia’s political and 

economic stability as crucial to their country’s security. They saw the situation in East Timor as a destabilizing factor that could isolate Indonesia from the 

international community. As a result, in December 

1998, Australian Prime Minister John Howard wrote 
13

a letter to President Habibie, proposing eventual selfdetermination for East Timor, with Indonesia granting 

increased autonomy over a period of years.26 President Habibie surprised the international community, 

the members of his government, and especially the 

TNI when on January 27, 1999, he offered East Timor 

the chance to accept or reject autonomy within Indonesia. If East Timor rejected autonomy, then “Indonesia would withdraw and East Timor would be on its 

own.”27

The U.N. negotiations between Portugal and Indonesia now gained momentum. On May 5, 1999, 

the three parties signed what is known as the May 5 

Agreement (see Appendix E). This accord established 

that the East Timorese would accept or reject autonomy within Indonesia through a direct vote called a 

“popular consultation.”28 It was clear that rejection of 

increased autonomy would lead to immediate independence. The agreement assigned the U.N. responsibility for the organization and conduct of the popular 

consultation. It also made Indonesia responsible for 

providing a “secure environment devoid of violence 

or other forms of intimidation” during the popular 

consultation process.29 

UNAMET

On June 11, 1999, the UNSCR 1246 established the 

U.N. Mission in East Timor (UNAMET). UNAMET 

had the responsibility of planning, preparing, and 

overseeing the popular consultation. The UNAMET 

organization included staff to register voters, monitor 

the campaign, and conduct the popular consultation. 

It also included approximately 300 civilian law enforcement personnel to provide assistance and advice 

to the Indonesian police force responsible for main-
14

taining security. UNAMET established its headquarters in Dili, East Timor, and immediately developed 

a plan of execution. UNAMET envisioned a 20-day 

voter registration process and a two week campaign, 

followed by the actual balloting on August 6, 1999. 

Due to the pro-integration militia’s ongoing campaign 

of violence and intimidation, the U.N. delayed the 

registration process for three weeks and eventually 

rescheduled the vote for August 31, 1999. Despite the 

violence, UNAMET registered 466,666 voters. It oversaw the popular consultation, and an impressive 98.6 

percent of registered voters cast their ballots. Overwhelmingly, the populace rejected autonomy and 

chose independence.

U.S. Strategic Moves

U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) military engagement and security cooperation during the period 

prior to Operation STABILISE, shaped conditions that 

enabled the command to respond to the situation on 

the Indonesian archipelago. Prior to the intervention, 

USPACOM was preparing for Exercise CROCODILE 

’99, an amphibious training exercise with Australia. 

Although USPACOM planned this operation prior to 

the May 5 Agreement, Exercise CROCODILE ‘99 had 

the fortuitous benefit of prepositioning forces in the 

vicinity of East Timor. Previous combined education, 

training, and exercise venues assisted in building trust 

between many Australian and U.S. military leaders 

involved in the East Timor operation. These engagements also enhanced U.S. and Australian interoperability, notably with regards to communications. Over 

time, USPACOM leaders developed direct access and 

communications with key Indonesian military leaders.
15

Diplomacy was crucial to getting Indonesia to request and collaborate with the multinational force. 

The United States made use of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in early September to assist Australia in its efforts to build a broad 

coalition. The U.S. Congress also passed legislation 

that cut funding for all military cooperation initiatives 

with the TNI, ramping up pressure on Jakarta. General Henry Shelton, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

(CJCS), and Admiral Dennis Blair, Commander (CDR) 

USPACOM, made direct contact with the Indonesian 

Defense Minister and head of the TNI, General Wiranto.30 Most important, the U.S. administration threatened to delay IMF economic assistance to Jakarta. 

The diplomatic efforts led to President Habibie’s reluctant request on September 13 for a U.N.-sponsored 

peacekeeping force in East Timor. Two days later, 

the U.N. passed UNSCR 1264, which authorized the 

multinational force. The Indonesian request and the 

UNSCR were key preconditions for Australia to lead 

INTERFET.

Consultation Results and Operation SPITFIRE

UNAMET announced the popular consultation 

results on September 4, 1999. Almost immediately, 

pro-integration militias, with direct and indirect TNI 

support, began a reign of terror that systematically destroyed over 70 percent of East Timor’s infrastructure 

and caused widespread damage to government administrative buildings and businesses. The violence 

resulted in an estimated 900 deaths and displaced 

more than 400,000 East Timorese. At least 250,000 inhabitants either fled or were forcibly moved to West 

Timor.
16

Aside from attacks on East Timorese communities, 

assailants intimidated UNAMET personnel and on 

occasion attacked local nationals working on the UNAMET staff. As the violence escalated, UNAMET relocated personnel to the main U.N. compound in Dili. 

By September 8, 1999, there were over 2000 UNAMET 

staff and local civilians in the U.N. facility. While the 

TNI claimed it was attempting to restore security and 

declared martial law on September 7, its surrogate militias laid siege to the U.N. compound.31

Anticipating potential trouble in East Timor, the 

Australian Government had earlier increased the 

readiness of the 1st Brigade, 1st Australian Division. 

Major General Peter Cosgrove commanded the 1st

Division, and the unit’s headquarters served as the 

Australian Deployable Joint Force Headquarters 

(DJFHQ).32 By mid-1999, Major General Cosgrove had 

directed his staff to prepare a variety of contingency 

plans for East Timor, including an evacuation of U.N. 

and Australian personnel. The plan, code named Operation SPITFIRE, employed a limited number of Australian troops to extricate personnel through the Dili 

and Baucau airfields. On September 6, at the request 

of the U.N. and in coordination with Indonesian officials, Major General Cosgrove executed Operation 

SPITFIRE. Over the next few days, Australian aircraft 

and troops completed the evacuation successfully.33

Establishing INTERFET

The Indonesian decision to request international 

assistance to stem the violence in East Timor resulted 

in quick U.N. action. On September 15, 1999, the U.N. 

Security Council passed UNSCR 1264 (Appendix G), 

under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter (Appendix I). 
17

The resolution authorized “the multinational force to 

take all necessary measures to fulfill (its) mandate.”34

It was among the most strongly worded U.N. resolutions ever given and provided INTERFET with the 

authority to accomplish its tasks fully.35 Specifically, 

UNSCR 1264 authorized the establishment of a multinational force to:

• Restore peace and security in East Timor

• Protect and support UNAMET in carrying out 

its tasks

• Facilitate humanitarian assistance operations

The mandate did not task INTERFET with providing transitional governance. Jakarta remained 

responsible for governing East Timor and for facilitating a “peaceful and orderly transfer of authority” to 

the United Nations. A United Nations peacekeeping 

contingent would replace INTERFET and provide the 

needed transitional governance once Indonesia relinquished control.36 

After previous consultations, and despite initial Indonesian objections, the U.N. invited Australia to assume the role of lead nation for Operation STABILISE. 

Australia was a logical choice. Due to its proximity to 

East Timor and ties to Indonesia, Australia had important interests at stake. The Australian military had a 

solid reputation, and the armed forces of other countries would likely accept an Australian leadership 

role. The fact that Australia was a regional power, and 

a former colonial possession with no prior history of 

imperialism, would contribute to the legitimacy of the 

operation. With the Indonesian request for assistance 

and the passage of the UNSCR 1264, Canberra would 

be confident that the intervention would conform to 
18

international norms. As a result, Australia accepted 

the lead for Operation STABILISE.

Operational Environment

The operational environment in East Timor that 

awaited INTERFET was complex and continuously 

evolving. This section looks at the physical factors 

in the various domains and identifies select PMESII37

variables that impacted the planning of the international effort.

Geography

The island of Timor lies in the Southwest Pacific 

Ocean at the eastern end of the Lesser Sunda Archipelago. It is approximately 644 kilometers north of Darwin, Australia. East Timor includes the eastern half of 

Timor Island, Pulau Atauro Island off the north coast, 

and the Oecussi Enclave approximately 70 kilometers 

west of the East Timor border on the northwest coast 

of West Timor. East Timor is bounded by the Wetar 

Strait to the north, the Timor Sea in the south, and 

has a common border with West Timor (Indonesia) to 

the west. East Timor is approximately 245 kilometers 

long and 110 kilometers wide. It covers an estimated 

19,000 square kilometers or an area roughly the size of 

New Jersey. The central region is mountainous. The 

highlands extend to the northern shore in some areas, 

creating a steep coastline. There are coastal plains in 

the south, and East Timor’s surface ranges from dry 

and rocky with sparse vegetation to thick rain forests. 

Approximately ten percent of the land is arable. The 

climate is tropical with consistently hot and humid 

temperatures throughout the year. In the mountains, 
19

temperatures are milder than on the coastal plains, 

especially at night. There are distinct wet and dry 

seasons. East Timor has an abundant population of 

airborne insects, which carry diseases such as malaria 

and dengue fever. The wet season lasts from December through April, during which there are heavy monsoon rains. The dry season lasts from May through 

November and can result in extremely dusty conditions.

Due to conditions in area of operations, international forces could only access East Timor and the 

Oecussi Enclave by sea or air during Operation STABILISE (Figure 1). The border between East and West 

Timor offered numerous challenges. First, West Timor 

was a major source of resupply for the TNI and the 

militias in East Timor. Second, the area across the inter-Timor border had the potential for offering a sanctuary to militias seeking to operate within East Timor. 

Controlling the border, preferably in cooperation with 

the TNI, would be essential for establishing security. 

The distance between Australia and East Timor, and 

the mountainous terrain within the province, complicated signals communications. The difficult topography and forested landscape, in combination with the 

limited road network, and the impending arrival of 

the wet season, would constrain ground mobility and 

access to some rural areas. In fact, the monsoon rains 

had the potential to severely limit both ground and air 

mobility. Joint planners weighed these facts as they 

considered the conduct of amphibious and airborne 

or air assault operations to get troops and supplies on 

the ground. They also recognized the need to protect 

air and sea lines of communications.
20

Figure 1: East Timor (Source: Department of 

Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations Geospatial Section, “Regions of Timor-Leste,” United Nations Map No. 4117, Rev. 6, March 2007)

Economy

In 1999, East Timor was one of the poorest provinces within Indonesia. Its annual per capita income 

was approximately $400 dollars or about half of the 

Indonesian average. There was little manufacturing 

capability, and non-Timorese persons dominated most 

of the lucrative businesses, such as the coffee industry, 

as well as most of the professional civil servant occupations. Much of the local population relied on subsistence farming and received limited benefit from the 

exploitation of the province’s natural resources.38 The 
21

forced displacement of large portions of the population during the period of instability resulted in the collapse of much of East Timor’s economy. The marginal 

transportation system used to support the import and 

distribution of food and supplies ceased to function. 

The ongoing violence and displacement of civilians 

halted much of the local food production. As a result, 

the population had little access to basic necessities and 

was at risk of malnutrition or starvation.

Social Factors

The East Timorese population consists of a number 

of Malayo-Polynesian ethnic groups as well as a small 

Chinese minority. In 1999, the population was estimated at 850,000. Most of the people were illiterate, 

and 90 percent lived in rural areas. The extended family was the basis for social organization and identity, 

but individuals also belonged to a number of clans. 

The East Timorese social structure included various 

tribal chiefs and a royal class that had its roots in the 

kingdoms that preexisted the Portuguese.39 The population was approximately 90 percent Catholic, and 

the Catholic Church had significant influence over the 

people.

Infrastructure

The two largest cities in East Timor were the provincial capital, Dili, with a population of approximately 100,000, and Baucau, which had a population 

of about 25,000. Both cities were on the north coast. 

The governments of Portugal and Indonesia had done 

little in the way of infrastructure development. There 

were few paved roads, and most were built to support 
22

the Indonesian counterinsurgency campaign. In 1999, 

the road network was not well maintained and washouts were common during the rainy season, which 

restricted ground access to many areas. There was 

electrical power within the major urban areas, but no 

national level power grid existed. The telecommunication system was poor in the urban areas and almost 

nonexistent in rural parts. The sea and air transportation systems were also limited. The primary port, 

located in Dili, could only handle two ships at a time. 

The port at Baucau was even smaller. There were two 

major airfields at Dili and Baucau, with several smaller dirt strips throughout the country. The airfield at 

Baucau was the largest, with a runway long enough to 

handle large commercial airliners.40 The Dili strip was 

shorter and could accommodate C-130 and smaller 

aircraft.

The militia rampage, after the popular consultation results were announced, destroyed upwards of 

70 percent of East Timor’s infrastructure. Although 

the airfields and ports were left relatively unscathed, 

the destruction to the power and telecommunications 

systems, administrative buildings, local businesses, 

and transportation network meant that any incoming 

force would require a high degree of self-sufficiency.

Military Threats

There were three potential military threats facing 

INTERFET. These consisted of the TNI, pro-integration militias, and the FALINTIL.

The TNI was the most dangerous and capable potential threat. TNI officers and men had suffered significant casualties over 25 years of counterinsurgency 

operations. In addition, many TNI leaders were con-
23

cerned that losing East Timor might encourage other 

separatist regions within Indonesia to seek independence. The TNI had large and capable ground, air, and 

naval forces, including advanced fighters and submarines. It had over 25,000 army and police personnel in 

East Timor with the potential for reinforcement from 

West Timor. TNI troops were well equipped with 

modern weaponry. Not even President Habibie was 

entirely sure how the TNI would react to INTERFET’s 

arrival in East Timor. It was critical for INTERFET 

to monitor TNI forces and counter any aggressive actions. The potential for an inadvertent clash with TNI 

forces was real. Establishing effective communications and coordination between the TNI and INTERFET, and developing a thorough understanding of 

each other’s operations, were essential. 

The TNI-supported pro-integration militias were 

the most likely threat to INTERFET. There were at 

least 20 active militia groups by September 1999, ranging in size from less than 100 members to over 1500 

personnel each.41 The TNI originally organized and 

armed these militias in the late 1970s as part of the 

counterinsurgency campaign to fight FALINTIL. Although many militias demobilized during the 1990s, 

the TNI began to reconstitute them in late 1998 to 

counter any movement towards East Timorese independence. In some cases, TNI members, primarily 

from the KOPASSUS, led individual militia groups. 

The militias had a mixture of modern assault rifles, 

older rifles, grenades, shotguns, and machetes. They 

did not have any heavy weapons and were not capable of winning an outright fight with coalition forces, 

but were still dangerous. In early 1999, the nature of 

the relationship between the militias and the TNI was 

largely unclear to coalition forces. As late as Septem-
24

ber 1999, TNI leaders claimed the militias were an 

indigenous and spontaneous response to the independence movement and the popular consultation; 

TNI officers asserted that the militia groups might 

count on the backing of not more than a few rogue 

TNI personnel. However, intelligence intercepts, the 

sustained high-level of violence and tempo of operations, the sophisticated intimidation tactics used 

across the province, and the systematic destruction of 

property and displacement of civilians indicated the 

militias benefitted from well-organized TNI support. 

The lack of response to, and in some cases, the active 

participation in, militia violence on the part of the TNI 

and the Indonesian police provided further evidence 

of a concerted effort. Indications soon arose that the 

TNI actively coordinated and controlled some of the 

militias. The paucity of pro-integration violence during the visits of international dignitaries to East Timor 

also suggested a level of collusion. President Clinton 

acknowledged a measure of concern over TNI support 

to the militias on September 10, 1999, when he stated, 

“It is now clear that the Indonesian military is aiding 

and abetting the militia violence.”42 Separating the 

militias from their TNI supporters and logistical bases 

in West Timor was critical to establishing security.

The least likely threat to coalition forces and the 

success of their operations was the FALINTIL. Armed 

mostly with automatic weapons, FALINTIL members 

were relatively well disciplined. A real possibility 

existed that they might fight the pro-integration militias to protect the local population. Still, FALINTIL 

attacks on the militia could complicate security efforts 

and lead inadvertently to a clash with INTERFET forces. Accordingly, Gusmão and other FALINTIL leaders 

recognized the potential for conflict, and before the 
25

consultation, ordered all FALINTIL forces to move 

to and remain in four cantonment areas. FALINTIL 

commanders resisted calls to fight the militias, even 

when the rampage began after officials announced the 

consultation results. 

Friendly Forces

INTERFET would grow to include forces from over 

20 different countries, including the United States, the 

Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), 

Europe, and the Middle East. The capabilities of each 

country’s forces and their level of contribution varied 

widely. 

As the lead nation, Australia provided the bulk of 

the military forces during Operation STABILISE. The 

Australian military was a small, yet modern and very 

professional force. It generally maintained one combat brigade at a high state of readiness for national 

defense and crisis response. In March 1999, the Government of Australia directed the Australian Defense 

Force (ADF) to bring a second brigade to a high state 

of readiness. This was seen by many within the ADF 

as a response to the developing crisis in East Timor. 

The Australians had never been the lead nation for 

such a large peace operation, although they had led 

smaller efforts. Recognizing that the United States 

had experience in assembling and leading large coalition operations in the past, Australia requested U.S. 

planning assistance. 

Military leaders had to ensure effective communications and the ability to share information between 

each national contingent of the coalition and the Commander INTERFET (COMINTERFET). Given the 

varying modernization levels within the coalition, a 
26

flexible network was necessary to enable communications.

Some of the contributing countries had limited 

strategic mobility or had never deployed beyond their 

own shores. As a result, there was a need to provide 

strategic airlift to transport national contingents from 

their respective home countries to Australia and then 

inter-theater lift for movement from Australia to East 

Timor. Finally, some coalition personnel would be 

unaccustomed to East Timor’s climate. This would 

require a period of acclimatization in Australia, which 

would delay their arrival to East Timor.

Strategic Guidance

U.S. Interests in Indonesia

The United States took an active role in setting the 

conditions for and enabling INTERFET’s success in 

East Timor. There were numerous considerations that 

shaped the U.S. involvement in the operation. As part 

of its strategic assessment, the Clinton Administration 

weighed the U.S. relationships with Indonesia and 

Australia, Washington’s preexisting global commitments, and the limited significance of East Timor to 

U.S. national interests.

The United States viewed Indonesia as an important contributor to stability and security in Southeast 

Asia. During the Cold War, U.S. policy supported 

Indonesia as a key bulwark against communist influence in the region. After the Cold War, U.S. leaders 

continued to see Indonesia as “a useful counterweight 

to China’s expanding influence in the Asia-Pacific 

region.”43 
27

Indonesia was also important because of its location astride the strategic Malacca Straits, which are 

critical to the world economy and U.S. military strategy. An unstable or hostile Indonesia could threaten 

maritime commerce that transits the straits daily. It 

could also pose a risk to U.S. naval forces traveling 

from the western Pacific to the Indian Ocean and the 

Middle East. Both scenarios represented an unacceptable risk to vital U.S. interests. 

Indonesia was also a critical contributor to the 

world’s economy. It was the fourth most populous 

country in the world and had vast mineral resources, 

including oil. Washington had an interest in ensuring 

the political and economic stability of Indonesia and 

was keen to maintain good relations with Jakarta.

U.S. Relations with Australia

The United States had strong relations with Australia going back at least to World War II. Australia 

participated in the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and 

even provided naval support during Desert Storm. 

In reaction to Habibie’s January 1999 announcement 

regarding the East Timor consultation, the United 

States and Australia began a dialogue on the potential 

consequences. As early as February 25, 1999, the U.S. 

Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific 

Affairs Stanley Roth and Australian Foreign Ministry 

official Ashton Calvert, held discussions that included 

the topic of East Timor.44 Consultations between the 

United States and Australia continued throughout the 

summer of 1999.45 Washington’s desire to maintain 

a strong relationship with Australia had a significant 

impact on the U.S. decision to support and participate 

in the INTERFET mission. Although the United States 
28

initially was against providing any forces to INTERFET, consistent pressure from Australia and the U.S. 

desire to demonstrate support for a key ally were key 

factors in President Clinton’s decision to participate in 

the coalition’s military effort.

U.S. Interests in East Timor

The United States did not have any vital interests 

at stake in East Timor itself. Washington’s top concern 

was the stability of Indonesia. According to a New 

York Times report “The [Clinton] Administration . . . 

has made the calculation that the United States must 

put its relationship with Indonesia, a mineral-rich nation of more than 200 million people, ahead of its concerns over the political fate of East Timor.”46 Both the 

United States and Australia understood that Jakarta 

would see the situation in East Timor as an internal 

Indonesian affair. The allies wanted to avoid a deterioration of relations with Indonesia and thought it 

was necessary for Jakarta to request international assistance before sending a multinational force to East 

Timor. Both the United States and Australia wanted 

to highlight that Indonesia was acting as a cooperative host country for the operation. A number of U.S. 

Administration statements prior to September 9, 1999 

reinforced the “Indonesia first” policy. The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), for its part, did not support a leading U.S. military role, citing an overextension of U.S. forces worldwide and the lack of clear U.S. 

national security interests in East Timor.47
29

U.S. Commitments

Enduring U.S. military commitments around the 

globe constrained the level of support the United 

States could render to INTERFET. Aside from its security obligations to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Korea, and Japan, the United States 

had significant military contingents in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Kuwait. As such, the Pentagon 

recommended only limited support of the UN mission 

in East Timor. 

Changing U.S. Position

Initially, the Clinton Administration advocated 

for Indonesia and the TNI to maintain security in East 

Timor prior to and after the popular consultation, in accordance with the May 5 Agreement. Statements prior 

to September 8 by numerous U.S. officials, including 

Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, outlined the 

U.S. position.48 By September 9, the U.S. perspective 

began to change for two major reasons. First, despite 

Jakarta’s perceived efforts to restore order by imposing martial law and sending in additional troops, the 

violence in East Timor continued unabated.49 Second, 

Australian pressure on the United States, to make a 

diplomatic and military commitment in support of 

Canberra and the multinational force, changed U.S. 

priorities. The need to maintain solidarity with Australia grew in importance. In a press conference prior 

to his departure for the APEC summit on September 

9, President Clinton articulated the administration’s 

changing position. He emphasized the importance of 

Indonesia’s future and the need for Jakarta to end the 

violence or request international assistance to do so. 
30

He also outlined diplomatic and economic initiatives 

to encourage favorable action on the part of Indonesia. 

Finally, President Clinton stated, “The United States 

is prepared to provide support to this Australian-led 

effort.”50

The U.S. Decision to Support INERFET

By September 10, 1999, the United States made 

the decision to support Australia and a multinational 

force in East Timor with military capabilities. Diplomatic and economic pressure on Indonesia finally 

yielded results on September 12, 1999, when President 

Habibie requested U.N. assistance to halt the violence 

in East Timor. On September 16, 1999, President Clinton announced the decision to participate in Operation STABILISE with U.S. military forces:

After consulting closely with Congress and with 

the Government of Australia on the best way for the 

United States to support this operation, and on the 

recommendation of Secretary Cohen and my national 

security team, I have decided to contribute to the force 

in a limited but essential way, including communications and logistical aid, intelligence, air lifts of personnel and material, and coordination of the humanitarian response to the tragedy. We will deploy about 200 

people, about half of whom will serve on the ground 

in East Timor. In addition, elements of the Pacific Fleet 

will provide support.51

The Pentagon directed USPACOM to provide key 

enabling capabilities in support of the multinational 

force, as requested by the Australians. While Washington wanted to ensure Australian success, U.S. policymakers also sought to minimize the U.S. footprint 
31

in East Timor. The U.S. military would not provide 

any forces to conduct direct peacekeeping or peace 

enforcement operations on the ground. President 

Clinton’s strategic guidance limited the size of the 

U.S. force that would deploy to East Timor. A U.S. 

National Security Council briefing identified a preliminary requirement for 250 personnel. This figure 

became the initial limit or “force cap” for the U.S. force 

in East Timor.52

Design and Planning for the Operation

Initial U.S. military efforts to design and plan 

Operation STABILISE occurred in parallel with the 

diplomatic discussions and the development of strategic guidance discussed above. USPACOM began 

assessments and contingency planning for a potential 

intervention in East Timor as early as February 1999. 

As the situation developed and the role of U.S. joint 

forces became clearer, USPACOM shifted its focus to 

crisis action planning.

Initial Contingency Planning

USPACOM leaders quickly recognized the significance of President Habibie’s announcement of a popular consultation in East Timor and acted accordingly. 

On February 1, 1999, Admiral Blair, CDRUSPACOM, 

directed Marine Forces Pacific (MARFORPAC) to 

begin planning for possible peacekeeping and peace 

enforcement operations in East Timor.53 Preparatory 

activities included the conduct area assessments and 

contingency planning for the potential evacuation of 

U.S. civilians in the conflict area. Military planners 

initially prepared for a possible peace enforcement 
32

operation, which U.S. forces would conduct unilaterally or as part of a coalition, with or without U.N. 

sanction.54 However, by July 1999, there were indications that Australia, not the United States, would lead 

the international force in East Timor as part of a U.N.-

sanctioned effort. Subsequent USPACOM planning 

focused on examining contingency scenarios, developing intelligence, studying the East Timor geography, and preparing estimates for supporting the Australians.55 In addition to MARFORPAC, U.S. Army 

Pacific (USARPAC) began to conduct daily planning 

sessions to determine the availability of resources and 

the feasibility of providing specific enabling capabilities.56 

Crisis Action Planning

As the situation in East Timor worsened and the 

militias began their systematic campaign of terror in 

early September, USPACOM transitioned to crisis action planning to develop and gain approval of an operational plan.57 In order to facilitate the effort, Admiral Blair issued the following planning guidance that 

incorporated his understanding of the situation and 

strategic guidance:58

• Ensure Australian success

• Provide U.S. unique capabilities

• Keep the footprint small

• Think transition . . . from the very beginning

MARFORPAC retained the planning lead with 

support from USARPAC and the other USPACOM 

components. The III Marine Expeditionary Force (III 

MEF) conducted parallel planning until the establish-
33

ment of USFI. Translating Admiral Blair’s guidance 

into action required several steps: understanding 

Australian support requirements, identifying where 

the U.S. capabilities would come from, and deciding 

whether to establish a joint task force. 

Australia, as the lead nation, developed the concept of operations to accomplish the tasks in UNSCR 

1264. U.S. joint planners needed to understand the 

Australian plan and the required U.S. capabilities to 

support it. Admiral Blair directed the deployment 

of the USPACOM Deployable Joint Task Force Augmentation Cell (DJTFAC) to Australia on September 

11, 1999. The DJTFAC integrated into all three levels 

of the Australian command structure: the ADF, the 

Headquarters Australian Theater, and the DJFHQ. 

The DJTFAC assisted Australian planning, identified 

ways that unique U.S. capabilities could contribute to 

the operation, and provided information back to USPACOM planners on Australian requirements.59 In 

addition to the DJTFAC, Admiral Blair used other avenues to identify what was needed. Sometime in early 

September, he met with the USPACOM component 

commanders. Blair directed them to visualize what 

the United States would need if it were the lead nation 

and then to coordinate to provide these capabilities to 

support their Australian counterparts.60 

As U.S. planners studied what capabilities the Australians needed to support the operation, USPACOM 

initiated efforts to resource the requirements. For this, 

Admiral Blair again turned to the USPACOM components. Each of the components had to conduct an 

analysis, which considered: the availability of forces 

within the USPACOM area of responsibility (AOR), 

the feasibility of providing the required capabilities, 

and an assessment of how quickly the United States 
34

military could provide what was needed. Resourcing the capabilities with USPACOM-assigned forces 

would reduce the time needed to deploy material and 

personnel to the area of operations. If the needed capabilities were not available within the AOR, then USPACOM would request forces through the Joint Staff. 

The scheduled Exercise CROCODILE ’99 with Australia proved fortuitous in this case. Naval and Marine 

forces were already preparing for the exercise and, in 

some cases, were already forward deployed. A case 

in point was the positioning of the USS Mobile Bay 

and the USNS Kilauea. These ships were en route to 

Australia to support the exercise. The USS Mobile Bay 

was a Ticonderoga-class Aegis guided missile cruiser, 

which could provide command and control afloat and 

a robust counter-air capability. The ship could serve 

as a visible symbol of the U.S. commitment to the coalition and in particular to the Australians. On September 10, 1999, Admiral Blair redirected these ships 

to support the Australian forces with the mission to 

“escort commercial and military transports in the vicinity of East Timor and to be prepared to serve as ‘lily 

pads’ for helicopters transiting between Australia and 

East Timor.”61 Admiral Blair designated the ships as 

Joint Task Force, Timor Sea Operations (JTF TSO).

One of the largest challenges in identifying U.S. 

capabilities for the operation centered on the need to 

ensure reliable communications. In this regards, USARPAC and the Army played a key role. The U.S. 

25th Infantry Division (25th ID) had an organic signal 

battalion capable of addressing many of the communications requirements. As USARPAC planners studied the operational needs, they identified a readiness 

issue. If the 25th ID deployed a portion of its signal 

battalion, the entire division’s readiness level would 
35

decline, and it would be unable to take on other missions.62 As a result, USPACOM put a request forward 

to the Joint Staff to fill the communications requirement. In the end, the Army Signal Command filled 

the request with a reinforced company, designated 

Task Force (TF) Thunderbird, from the 86th Signal Battalion, 11th Signal Brigade out of Fort Huachuca, AZ. 

Ultimately, the only forces sourced from outside of 

USPACOM were TF Thunderbird and a civil affairs 

detachment from the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion, U.S. 

Army Special Operations Command. (For a full list 

of the units assigned to USFI, see Appendix J). By the 

time INTERFET commenced operations, USPACOM 

had identified all of the participating U.S. forces, 

which were either already on station or preparing to 

move to the theater.63

Prior to Operation STABILISE and as a general 

practice, U.S. military commanders would designate 

any U.S. force that included units from two or more 

services deploying in support of contingency operations as a joint task force (JTF). Joint doctrine clearly 

defines a JTF as:

A joint force that is constituted and so designated by 

a JTF establishing authority (i.e., the Secretary of Defense, a combatant commander [CCDR], a subordinate 

unified commander, or an existing commander, joint 

task force [CJTF]) to conduct military operations or 

support to a specific situation.64

Doctrinally, USPACOM should have designated 

USFI as a JTF. Admiral Blair made a deliberate decision not to do so, based on three considerations. First, 

Operation STABILSE was not a U.S.-led effort. Since 

the United States had frequently designated JTFs during U.S.-led operations, he was concerned that it would 
36

send the wrong strategic message of U.S. intent in East 

Timor. Second, past JTFs were large organizations, 

which typically consisted of more troops than the 250 

personnel force cap briefed to the U.S. National Security Council. Third, the East Timor operation was in 

many respects unprecedented, and Admiral Blair did 

not want to suggest any comparisons with past U.S. 

peacekeeping operations, which a customary organizational arrangement might suggest.65 While the lack 

of a JTF designation did not prevent USFI from accomplishing its mission, it did create some issues. Some 

of these challenges were internal to USFI and others 

affected the interactions with external organizations. 

Military leaders wrestled with how to organize USFI 

internally, and questions arose regarding command 

relationships and legal responsibilities for personnel and units assigned to the organization. The USFI 

headquarters team, with time, worked through these 

issues. The USFI external challenges dealt primarily 

with USFI interactions with higher headquarters and 

supporting agencies. These outside entities were accustomed to working with JTFs. In some cases, the 

lack of a JTF designation appears to have resulted in 

delays in obtaining necessary support. Again, these 

issues were resolved over time and with USPACOM 

support.66

USFI Planning

Prior to the conduct of Operation STABILISE, USFI 

developed an entry strategy. The USFI approach centered on developing a comprehensive force protection 

plan, establishing a minimal footprint in East Timor itself, rapidly introducing unique U.S. capabilities, and 

reinforcing the message that the Australians were in 

charge.67 
37

Transition Planning and Exit Criteria

The initial plan identified the required capabilities 

and stated in broad terms that U.S. forces would redeploy upon completion of assigned tasks. Unfortunately, the initial planning did not define successful 

completion criteria. Shortly after deployment, USFI 

began to develop its exit criteria in greater detail. 

USFI leaders determined that their mission would be 

accomplished when one or more of the following was 

true for each mission task:68

• Commercial alternatives were in place.

• Replacement forces were trained.

• Assets were no longer required.

• Operation STABILISE terminated.

Critical tasks that were part of the drawdown plan 

included scheduling units for redeployment, preparing for redeployment, and the actual redeployment itself. Once USFI had developed its exit methodology, 

U.S. military leaders briefed their approach and timelines to COMINTERFET. The USFI exit methodology, 

with three mission task examples, is shown below.
38

Figure 2: USFI Exit Strategy (Source: USFI Final 

Redeployment Brief)

Mission

Admiral Blair established USFI on September 15, 

1999. He designated Brigadier General John G. Castellaw, United States Marine Corps (USMC), as CDR 

USFI and issued the following mission: “When directed, COMUSFORINTERFET will provide unique 

U.S. capabilities to COMINTERFET in order to facilitate INTERFET operations to restore peace in East 

Timor.”69 In addition to the mission statement, Admiral Blair issued terms of reference (TOR) to define the 

boundaries clearly within which USFI could operate:70

• Exercise national command of all U.S. forces assigned to INTERFET.

• Establish a small headquarters in Darwin.

• No U.S. forces will engage in active peace keeping/enforcement activities in the field.
39

• Provide unique U.S. capabilities in support of 

INTERFET.

• CDRUSPACOM approval is required for:

• COMINTERFET requests for forces/resources.

• Transfer of tactical control of U.S. forces to 

COMINTERFET.

• All requests for support from contributing nations must be validated by COMINTERFET.

USFI Organization

Brigadier General Castellaw was the Deputy Commander III MEF and the Commander of the 3rd Marine 

Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) prior to his designation 

as CDR USFI. With limited time to finalize planning 

and form the USFI headquarters, he drew his staff 

members primarily from III MEF, with the exception 

of the J-3, operations officer, who was a colonel from 

the Pacific Air Force (PACAF).71 The USFI staff consisted of 35 personnel, and the element adopted a doctrinal joint structure.

Initially, USFI organized geographically, with 

commands established in Sydney, Darwin, Tindal, 

and Dili. Military leaders quickly realized that this 

was inefficient, and Castellaw reorganized USFI by 

components, with the exception of the forces in East 

Timor itself as shown in figure 3 below (see Appendix 

J for a complete list of units and their commanders).
40

Figure 3: U.S. Forces INTERFET Organization 

(Source: East Timor: USARPAC OPD Briefing)

Air Force Forces, USFI

The U.S. Air Force Forces (AFFOR) component of 

USFI centered on the 613th Air Expeditionary Group 

(AEG). The Group included three C-130 transport 

aircraft and crews, a Marine C-12 detachment, an 

EP-3 detachment, and a Tanker Airlift Control Element (TALCE). AFFOR’s primary missions were to 

provide intra-theater lift between Australia and East 

Timor, support the delivery of humanitarian assistance, facilitate the return of displaced persons, enable 

command and control for airlift missions, and provide 

movement support for distinguished visitors.72
41

Marine Forces, USFI

The U.S. Marine Forces (MARFOR) initially consisted of the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), 

which was embarked on the USS Belleau Wood. The 

31st MEU included CH-53 and CH-46 helicopters and 

the MSQ-126 JTF Enabler communications package. 

The 11th MEU (Special Operations Capable [SOC]) 

eventually relieved the 31st MEU. The 11th MEU was 

embarked on the USS Peleliu and was also equipped 

with heavy lift helicopters. The MARFOR missions 

consisted of resupplying USFI and INTERFET forces 

in East Timor, providing ship to shore transport, supporting the delivery of humanitarian assistance, and 

exercising command and control of assigned forces. 

Initially, the Marine combat forces remained on their 

respective ships. As the mission in East Timor progressed, MARFOR sent limited numbers of Marines 

ashore to provide force protection to USFET.73

Naval Forces, USFI

The U.S. Naval Forces (NAVFOR) consisted initially of the USS Belleau Wood (LHA) with landing 

craft air cushioned (LCAC) and landing craft utility 

(LCU). Its primary missions were to establish a military presence, provide a platform and lift support for 

the Oecussi Enclave and Atauro Island operations, 

and support humanitarian assistance efforts. JTF 

Timor Sea Operations was a separate task force until 

its departure on October 5, 1999. It consisted of the 

USS Mobile Bay (CG-53) and the support ships USNS 

Kilauea and USNS San Jose.74
42

USFET

Brigadier General Castellaw designated the forces 

in Dili as the U.S. Forces East Timor (USFET) under 

Colonel Randolph Strong, U.S. Army. Colonel Strong 

also served as the Deputy Commander USFI and the 

Army Forces (ARFOR) commander. The USFET was 

a geographical joint command. Its mission was to 

“deploy to East Timor, and provide communications, 

intelligence, civil military operations and heavy lift 

helicopter support to INTERFET.”75 USFET consisted 

of a joint headquarters, TF Thunderbird (communications element), an intelligence augmentation team, 

a civil military operations center (CMOC) support 

team, and an Air Force chaplain. In December 1999, 

the Logistics Civilian Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) contracted four heavy lift helicopters to replace 

the MARFOR capability. These helicopters, under 

USFET control, provided heavy lift support to USFI, 

INTERFET, the U.N., and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). TF Thunderbird had the mission 

to provide communications and automation support 

to INTERFET forces. The intelligence augmentation 

team included two Trojan Spirit intelligence terminals 

from the USARPAC Intelligence Brigade and a counterintelligence (CI), human intelligence (HUMINT), 

and intelligence analysis capability from the 205th Military Intelligence Battalion. The 96th Civil Affairs (CA) 

Battalion initially provided twelve soldiers to support 

the INTERFET CMOC, which were later replaced by 

12 reserve soldiers from the 322nd CA Brigade. Their 

missions included establishing the INTERFET CMOC, 

under an Australian lead, and providing a link between INTERFET, U.N. relief agencies, NGOs, and the 

local populace.76 
43

Deployment and Support

From September 17 to October 20, 1999, there was 

an almost continuous flow of USFI personnel first into 

Australia and then to Dili. USFI assets supported INTERFET from the first day of Operation STABILISE. 

As USFI capabilities grew, so did the support they 

provided. In general, there were no unanticipated 

complications with the deployment of forces to Australia. However, as discussed later in this section, 

force protection concerns initially slowed or otherwise 

complicated the flow of USFI personnel and equipment into East Timor proper. 

Operation STABILISE Campaign Plan

The structure of INTERFET facilitated the execution of operations and enabled unity of effort. Each 

country retained command authority over its national 

contingents. COMINTERFET had operational control 

of all forces, allowing Major General Cosgrove to plan 

and direct the military operations of each national 

contingent. 
44

Figure 4: INTERFET Command Structure (Source: 

USFI, Operation STABILISE: An Economy of Force 

Operation. Briefing)

Major General Cosgrove developed a four phase 

campaign plan to accomplish INTERFET’s mission 

under UNSCR 1264. The plan made use of the socalled ink spot strategy, securing key locations first 

and then gradually spreading out—establishing order 

across much of East Timor. The four phases of the 

operation were:77

• Phase 1 – Control (secure point of entry into 

East Timor and lodge the force to take control 

of Dili); 
45

• Phase 2 – Consolidation (extend INTERFET’s 

influences across East Timor); 

• Phase 3 – Transition (hand-over of responsibility for providing security in East Timor to a 

U.N. peacekeeping force);

• Phase 4 – Redeployment of INTERFET following successful transition. 

The following paragraphs provide a sequential 

narrative of U.S. deployments, support, and key INTERFET decisions during Operation STABILISE. 

Initial Deployments and Support

Shortly after USFI’s establishment, Brigadier General Castellaw flew to Darwin on September 17, 1999, 

to conduct coordination and prepare for operations. 

Two days later, Australian Prime Minister Downer 

announced the appointment of Major General Cosgrove as COMINTERFET. On that same day, Major 

General Cosgrove made a decision that proved pivotal to the course of Operation STABLISE. He flew to 

Dili with the Deputy INTERFET commander, Major 

General Songkitti of Thailand, to meet with the Indonesian commander in East Timor, Major General Kiki 

Syahnakri. The purpose of the meeting was to gain 

TNI cooperation and prepare for the arrival of INTERFET forces the next day.78 Major General Cosgrove described his plan to land over 1000 troops with combat 

vehicles at Komoro airfield in Dili. The meeting with 

Major General Syahnakri set the conditions for continuing cooperation between INTERFET and the TNI 

until Indonesia’s final departure in October. 

On September 19, three U.S. C-130 cargo planes 

and a KC-130 tanker, part of the 623rd AEG, arrived 
46

at the Royal Australian Air Force Base at Tindal. The 

aircraft had supported President Clinton’s visit to the 

APEC Summit in New Zealand, and USPACOM diverted them to assist USFI.79 The following day, as the 

first INTERFET troops landed at Dili, the KC-130 assisted in delivering personnel to East Timor, including 

USFI liaison officers to the INTERFET Headquarters.80

The 623rd AEG formed a portion of the air bridge that 

moved multinational troops, supplies, and returning displaced persons to East Timor, with operations 

beginning in earnest on September 21. At about the 

same time, an EP-3 detachment arrived from Misawa, 

Japan, to provide airborne intelligence collection. It 

initiated operations on September 21.81 Also on September 20, Brigadier General Castellaw’s staff arrived 

in Australia to assist in planning and directing USFI 

missions. 

As INTERFET began conducting operations, a 

request came to USFI for support in conducting port 

surveys. The surveys would provide important intelligence on the facilities and certify the port installations for future operations. USFI requested support 

from the 599th Transportation Group, which was already in Australia supporting Exercise CROCODILE 

’99. The 599th responded with a deployment support 

team (DST), which successfully conducted surveys of 

the ports at Karabela (Baucau) on September 26 and 

Dili on October 1. During each of these surveys, INTERFET provided force protection for USFI personnel 

with either New Zealand special forces or Australian 

troops.82

The force protection of USFI personnel in East 

Timor became a major concern during the opening 

phase of the operations. Since USFI was in a supporting role, the U.S. military relied on Australian and 
47

other international combat units for force protection. 

Many coalition countries did not have the same force 

protection standards as USFI. During the initial stages of Operation STABILSE, Commander (CDR) USFI 

would not allow any personnel to remain ashore in 

East Timor until facilities with the proper force protection measures were in place. This caused delays in 

the deployment of some U.S. forces and disrupted the 

operational timetable. Major General Cosgrove and 

Brigadier General Castellaw, as well as their staffs, 

demonstrated professionalism in working through this 

challenge and developing a methodology for ensuring 

adequate force protection. The approach consisted of 

first conducting surveys to identify potential locations 

and facilities for USFI units and then determining 

the force protection requirements for each site. Next, 

force protection personnel worked with the respective 

multinational force leadership that had responsibility 

for the site to ensure that adequate measures were in 

place. Once standards were met, unit personnel deployed to East Timor to begin operations. USFI continued to assess site force protection measures on an 

ongoing basis to ensure they remained adequate. 

As operations progressed, USFI did not always follow the doctrinal pattern of U.S. joint operations. The 

limitations on personnel meant the USFI staff members bore responsibilities across several functions, 

with many individuals wearing “multiple hats.” As 

Brigadier General Castellaw stated, “The same folks 

who did the planning as J5 types traded hats and became J3 executors. No union rules, we all did the particular job that needed doing.”83 Instead of producing 

detailed operations orders, the staff either produced 

fragmentary orders or provided direction over secure 

phone or by e-mail. Much of the USFI support provid-
48

ed to COMINTEFET “was the result of a handshake 

with Cosgrove rather than a formal document.”84 This 

informal process worked because of the limited nature 

of operations and the professionalism of the forces involved in the effort.

The Second Wave

As USFI forces continued to arrive at Darwin, the 

TNI began to pull out of East Timor on September 25. 

Within a matter of days, the TNI reduced its forces 

from 25,000 to 1,500.85 Despite the TNI withdrawal, 

the militias were still active, and there were periodic 

clashes with INTERFET. With force protection still a 

concern, Brigadier General Castellaw flew to Dili and 

selected the location for the USFI Headquarters Forward. Military personnel soon began the process of 

preparing the compound to support the U.S. mission 

in Dili.

On October 5, the USS Belleau Wood arrived off the 

shores of East Timor carrying the 31st MEU and four 

heavy lift helicopters. Although the Marines were not 

allowed to conduct combat operations, their presence 

had a psychological impact on the TNI and the militias. The MEU had significant combat potential and 

provided a visible sign of the U.S. commitment to the 

success of INTERFET. Major General Cosgrove took 

advantage of this psychological deterrent by making 

another crucial decision that would alter the course of 

the campaign. As the TNI withdrew from East Timor, 

Major General Cosgrove realized that the militias’ only 

remaining source of support would be in West Timor. 

If he secured the western border early, he could cut off 

the militia supplies and force them to retreat into West 

Timor. He decided to move one third of his combat 
49

force from Dili to secure the western border on October 10, a full three weeks ahead of schedule. This bold 

move forced the militias to retreat to West Timor and 

essentially eliminated the militia threat in most areas 

of East Timor. The operation had the desired effect; 

it significantly reduced the militia threat and accelerated efforts to establish security.86 While the employment of the 31st MEU in combat would have required 

approval from Washington D.C., its use as a deterrent 

achieved the desired effect.87 

In addition to its psychological impact on the TNI 

and the militias, the MEU contributed badly needed 

capabilities to the operation. Four Marine CH-53 helicopters provided support to both INTERFET and the 

relief agencies operating in East Timor. The helicopters quickly moved personnel and supplies, bypassing potential threats on the ground and saving valuable time—particularly when compared to the days 

of travel required to traverse the severely impaired 

roads. Besides helicopters, the MEU’s MSQ-126 JTF 

Enabler communications package provided non-secure and secure internet access and phone service to 

coalition forces in Dili. Additionally, the USS Belleau 

Wood provided hospital services and other facilities 

to USFET personnel.

Soldiers from the 96th CA Battalion arrived in 

Australia and began operations in Dili on October 8. 

A portion of their unit had to wait in Australia until adequate force protection measures were in place. 

Upon arrival in Dili, the 96th CA Battalion personnel 

assisted in establishing and running the Australianled INTERFET CMOC.88 The Australian civil affairs 

personnel performed their responsibilities as an additional duty and had limited training in comparison 

to their specialized U.S. counterparts. As a result, 
50

INTERFET leaders highly valued the experience and 

training of the U.S. CA personnel. The CMOC was 

critical to coordinating efforts among INTERFET, the 

U.N. agencies, and the NGOs. One major function 

was coordinating heavy lift helicopter support from 

the Marines, because the demands of both INTERFET 

and the relief agencies often exceeded the available air 

transport capacity.

On October 8, the two Trojan Spirits and the intelligence augmentation team arrived in Australia, and 

shortly thereafter moved on to Dili. The Trojan Spirits 

provided an important link to the worldwide intelligence resources of the U.S. military, enabling USFI 

to receive the information collected through the EP-3 

and providing a reach-back capability to USPACOM. 

The intelligence augmentation team provided analytical support to the INTERFET C2 (Intelligence) staff 

and facilitated counterintelligence support to enable 

operations in East Timor. However, force protection 

concerns limited the ability of these personnel to conduct activities beyond the confines of Dili.

The Final Deployments

One of the unique capabilities the United States 

employed during Operation STABILISE was its strategic airlift. There were over 20 countries contributing forces to the coalition. Some had limited resources 

to move their national contingents or could not move 

them quickly. These countries often benefitted from 

U.S. support. One case in point was the movement of 

1300 military personnel from Thailand, which was an 

important contributor to INTERFET. On October 1, 

the Thai prime minister requested assistance to move 

his forces. Within a week, Strategic Airlift Command 
51

provided the aircraft to move them to Australia.89 Soon 

thereafter, the Thai forces were on the ground helping 

to secure Baucau. In addition to the coalition contingents, strategic airlift was essential to the deployment 

of TF Thunderbird. This unit required twelve C-5 and 

one C-17 sorties in October to move from its base in 

Fort Huachuca, AZ to the intermediate staging base in 

Australia. 90 

The situation began to evolve rapidly after October 

10. The militia threat was significantly reduced, and 

Major General Cosgrove aggressively executed his 

ink spot strategy. As units and personnel spread out 

across East Timor, the need for up-to-date information at INTERFET headquarters and the headquarters 

in Darwin increased. INTERFET relied on a robust, 

long-range communications network to connect with 

each of the national contingents. TF Thunderbird personnel had conducted a thorough mission analysis 

before deploying and were prepared to support all 

20 INTERFET national contingents, notwithstanding 

their non-compatible systems. In order to ensure access to the network, TF Thunderbird purchased 100 

computers for the various national contingents.91 Unit 

personnel also provided satellite communications 

support to the Thai forces based at Baucau. This freed 

Australian satellite communications to support their 

own forces along the western border.

In late October, the USS Peleliu with the 11th MEU 

(SOC) replaced the USS Belleau Wood and the 31st

MEU. The newly arrived forces continued the air and 

sea transport support for the INTERFET forces and delivered supplies during the final phases of Operation 

STABILISE, while also helping to secure the Oecussi 

Enclave and Atauro Island. The 11th MEU also assisted in the return of displaced persons.
52

United States Government Support to INTERFET

In addition to DoD personnel under USFI, other 

U.S. government officials supported Operation STABILISE and the East Timorese people. The U.S. Department of State took the lead in coordinating efforts 

amongst U.S. government departments and agencies. 

U.S. officials undertook diplomatic efforts to facilitate 

the delivery of humanitarian assistance, ensure continued cooperation from Jakarta, and obtain the approval of U.N. Security Council resolutions dealing 

with the East Timor crisis. 

In September 1999, U.S. Secretary of Defense William Cohen met with President Habibie in Jakarta. 

Secretary Cohen expressed support for the Indonesian 

elections scheduled for November 1999. He also challenged the government and the TNI to assist in stopping the violence and furthering the peaceful transition of East Timor. Cohen stressed the need to disarm 

the pro-integration militias and cooperate with the 

investigation and punishment of the perpetrators of 

the violence.92 

Shortly after INTERFET began operations, Assistant Secretary of State Julia Taft from the Bureau 

of Population, Refugees, and Migration organized 

and led a multinational humanitarian mission to East 

and West Timor.93 The mission assessed the status of 

refugees and internally displaced civilians, and determined humanitarian relief needs. The group met 

with Indonesian government representatives to press 

for greater security and access to the camps with displaced persons in West Timor. The mission also discussed Jakarta’s support for the return of civilians to 

East Timor. 
53

One of the most critical tasks on the diplomatic 

front was the development and passage of UNSCR 

1272, which established the U.N. Transitional Administration for East Timor (UNTAET). It set the conditions for the eventual termination of Operation STABILISE. These continued diplomatic efforts contributed 

to Indonesia’s eventual acceptance of East Timor as an 

independent nation.

U.S. diplomatic support had direct effects on operations in East Timor. The Australian battalion on 

the West Timor frontier conducted armed patrols to 

secure the poorly defined border. Coalition troops 

had a series of incidents with the TNI forces operating in the area. On November 22, U.S. Ambassador 

to the U.N. Richard Holbrooke sponsored a meeting 

between the TNI and INTERFET to discuss the issue. The resulting “Memorandum of Technical Understanding” established coordination mechanisms 

between the two parties to control the border.94 The 

arrangements reduced the potential for incidents and 

helped to curtail pro-integration militia activity emanating from West Timor.

On the humanitarian front, the United States 

Agency for International Development (USAID) sent 

an assessment team to East Timor shortly after Operation STABILISE began. In part, this resulted in U.S. 

Ambassador to Indonesia Robert Gelbard re-issuing 

a disaster declaration for the region on October 4, 

1999.95 The declaration opened the door for additional 

humanitarian funding from the United States. Following the assessment, USAID provided funding for 

humanitarian relief operations in East Timor. The assistance included the purchase of food, blankets, and 

water containers—and funding for the transportation 

and distribution of relief supplies. USAID provided 
54

most of the financial support, supplies, and distribution of aid through local and international humanitarian partners that were already in East Timor.96 In October, USAID hired local staff to establish an office in 

Dili. Through this office, USAID provided micro-loans 

to local businesses to begin the process of rebuilding 

the economy. After the transition to UNTAET, the 

agency remained active in East Timor. On June 6, 

2000, it published an 18-month planning framework 

to support the East Timor transition to independence. 

The framework outlined several objectives for fiscal 

years 2000 and 2001, which included: 1) revitalizing 

the local economy, 2) strengthening democratic development, and 3) improving relations with Indonesia.97

Transition and Redeployment

As the pace of military operations intensified, political events began to pick up as well. On October 

19, the Government of Indonesia recognized East 

Timor’s independence. The following day, Indonesia’s National Assembly officially revoked the decree 

that incorporated East Timor into Indonesia. At the 

international level, the UNAMET mission ended on 

October 25, 1999, as the U.N. Security Council passed 

UNSCR 1272 (see Appendix H). This new resolution 

established UNTAET with a governance and administration structure, an international police element, and 

a humanitarian assistance and rehabilitation component. The resolution was a critical next step in the 

peace process because it created a framework for transitional governance. By October 31, the TNI, Indonesian police, and government officials had departed 

East Timor. Since the East Timorese had no role in 

the local administration up to this point, the former 
55

province was left with no governing body or ability 

to address civic needs. In a series of reports to the 

U.N. Secretary General, the Government of Australia emphasized the fact that INTERFET did not have 

the capability or capacity to provide the necessary 

transitional governance. There was an urgent need 

to introduce such a capability.98 UNSCR 1272 would 

help address this requirement. Of equal importance 

to INTERFET, the resolution established a U.N. military component to maintain security within the new 

country. As the U.N. assumed responsibility in East 

Timor, most of the INTERFET military forces would 

transition to UNTAET.

Admiral Blair’s planning guidance understood the 

importance of developing an exit strategy from the 

start. The basic concept was for USFI to work itself out 

of a job by either concluding lines of effort or finding 

a workable replacement to carry on critical activities. 

In mid-October, USFI developed a detailed transition 

and redeployment plan for each of its capability areas. 

USFI briefed and gained approval of the plan from 

Major General Cosgrove.

Helicopter Support

As mentioned earlier, in October, the U.S. Navy 

was looking for a means to replace the Marine heavy 

lift helicopters that were supporting operations. The 

USPACOM J-4 (Logistics) turned to the Army Material Command and LOGCAP, which provided civilian 

contracts to support U.S. forces. LOGCAP worked 

through a civilian contractor, DynCorp, to provide 

heavy lift helicopters. DynCorp provided four Russian-made helicopters (two Mi-8s and two Mi-26s), 

their crews, and support.99 In addition, DynCorp 
56

worked with its engineering partner, Flour-Daniels 

Federal Services, to build helipads at the Komoro 

airfield. By November 23, two aircraft were on station and providing support, and in early December, 

all four contracted helicopters were fully operational. 

This allowed the USS Peleliu to depart East Timor by 

November 28.

Tactical Airlift

The 613th AEG’s exit criteria from the East Timor 

Theater was the transition to a primarily sea-based 

flow of personnel and supplies.100 By the middle of 

November, the arrival of most of the international 

forces to East Timor and the increased stability in the 

former province reduced the requirement for tactical 

airlift and enabled a reliance on sea-borne transportation. With this transition completed, the 613th AEG 

began redeployment.

CMOC Support

Initially, the 96th CA Battalion personnel were replaced by Army Reserve soldiers from the 322nd CA 

Battalion out of Hawaii. The plan was to train INTERFET personnel to take over responsibilities completely as soon as possible. The training program began 

shortly after coalition forces established the CMOC. 

Non-U.S. INTERFET personnel finalized their training by the end of November and completely assumed 

CMOC responsibilities by December 5, 1999.101
57

Intelligence Support

The transition of the intelligence support functions 

had two parts. First, the Australians deployed their 

Joint Intelligence Support System (JISS), and by early 

November, the system was operational. However, 

to ensure a complete transition, the JISS underwent a 

14-day reliability test. By November 15, the JISS was 

certified and completely replaced the Trojan Spirit 

systems.

Simultaneously, the U.S. intelligence augmentation team provided training to their Australian counterparts. While the Australians had the technical expertise in counterintelligence and human intelligence, 

the U.S. team provided training in collection and request for information (RFI) management.102 By November 30, the Australian personnel had completed 

their training program and assumed all intelligence 

functions. Shortly thereafter, both the Trojan Spirit 

systems and the intelligence augmentation team redeployed, with the exception of a small intelligence cell 

that remained at the USFI headquarters. 

Communication Support

Ensuring the continuation of communications 

support was one of the most difficult aspects of the 

transition plan. The militia rampage had completely 

destroyed the limited East Timor communications infrastructure. The Australians took the lead in facilitating the transition of communications by contracting a 

commercial vendor to provide a phone and data communications network. Although this new system did 

not have the capability to replace the entire East Timor 

network, it was adequate for the needs of INTERFET. 
58

As the vendor built critical commercial nodes, they 

replaced the U.S. systems that had facilitated communications up to this point.103 By December 15, the commercial communications were sufficiently capable to 

replace the TF Thunderbird network. In addition, 

TF Thunderbird provided technical training during 

the period of transition. By January 12, 2000, all TF 

Thunderbird equipment had departed the theater by 

aircraft and ship.

USFET and USFI Headquarters

As other capabilities transitioned or were no longer 

required, the USFET headquarters began to redeploy 

personnel. By mid- December, the Dili headquarters 

was no longer required and shutdown on December 

17.104 As of December 18, military leaders had reduced 

the number of personnel on the USFI staff, leaving in 

place the necessary individuals to oversee the remaining support operations and the redeployment of USFI 

members. At the end of January 2000, USFI began 

the transition with its replacement, the U.S. Support 

Group East Timor (USGET). On February 1, 2000, 

USFI was officially disestablished. On February 23, 

UNTAET assumed responsibility from INTERFET.

U.S. Support Group East Timor

Establishing stability in East Timor was a long 

term program. Under UNSCR 1272, the concept was 

to transition from INTERFET, centered on immediate 

stability and security needs, to UNTAET, which would 

focus on longer-term efforts to assist the fledgling East 

Timorese nation with its development, institution 

building, and security needs. USPACOM understood 
59

that the United States did not want the responsibility of rebuilding East Timor, but a U.S. presence and 

commitment were still important. As a result, Admiral Blair established USGET to provide “command, 

control and liaison functions” for any U.S. support 

provided to UNTAET. 105 USGET was a separate entity from UNTAET and fell under the direct control of 

USPACOM. On February 1, 2000, USGET assumed 

responsibilities for providing U.S. support. Over the 

next two years, USGET coordinated deployments by 

U.S. forces that provided support to reconstruction 

and humanitarian relief operations.

Assessment and Insights on Joint Planning and 

Operations

Joint Publication 3-07.3, Peace Operations, describes 

the fifteen fundamentals of peace operations. This 

section utilizes these fifteen fundamentals to assess 

the conduct of Joint Force operations during Operation STABILISE.

Consent: Under Article 42, Chapter VII of the 

U.N. Charter, consent of the host nation is not a requirement for the conduct of peace enforcement operations.106 However, strategic considerations made 

Indonesian consent to INTERFET a prerequisite before Australia would accept the role of lead-nation. It 

is also clear that Washington prioritized its relations 

with Jakarta and did not want to see adverse impacts 

from the INTERFET operation. The use of diplomatic 

and economic tools, as well as military-to-military engagement, on the part of the United States were part 

of a whole of government effort to obtain Indonesia’s 

consent for Operation STABILISE. U.S. influence was 

critical in persuading the Government of Indonesia to 

request international assistance.
60

At the operational level, Major General Cosgrove’s 

visit with General Syahnakri in Dili was key to obtaining the consent and cooperation of the TNI in East 

Timor. Although it did not immediately end the violence, the visit did improve communications between 

INTERFET and the TNI, which assisted in avoiding 

potential confrontations.

The CMOC also played a role in gaining the consent 

and collaboration of relief organizations, NGOs, and 

the local population. USFI provided expertise, which 

was generally lacking among INTERFET partners, to 

establish and support the CMOC.107 CMOC coordination efforts ensured military support to humanitarian 

relief efforts and helped gain the cooperation of the 

East Timorese people. However, force protection constraints often limited the ability of CMOC personnel 

to actively collect information regarding civil needs.108

This required the CMOC to gather information from 

other organizations, which can sometimes lead to 

concerns among NGOs that they are being used for 

information collection to support combat operations. 

USFI could have provided a dedicated force protection element throughout the entire operation to help 

the CMOC fully identify the needs of the population.

Once actors give their consent to peace operations, 

the Joint Force needs to foster continued good relations from the national down to the lowest level. A 

key USFI contribution came in the form of its deterrent 

capability. The arrival of USS Belleau Wood and the 

31st MEU had a psychological impact on the militias 

and the local TNI, making their consent more likely. 

Public affairs officers used a variety of information 

channels to make sure various audiences understood 

the combat potential of the 31st MEU. The effect was 

to assist in deterring potential aggressive actions. The 
61

visible presence of the USS Belleau Wood and the 31st

MEU demonstrated to TNI commanders the high level 

of U.S. commitment to establishing security.

Impartiality: Peace operations require that the 

Joint Force “act on behalf of the peace process and 

mandate, and not show preference for any faction 

or group over another.”109 The use of force can often 

have unanticipated consequences; many people may 

perceive that the Joint Force and its partners are not 

impartial if they apply force against one particular 

party. Therefore, the friendly forces communications 

strategy should focus on developing themes and messages to counter these perceptions.

The mere presence of INTERFET in East Timor 

benefited the pro-independence forces and worked 

against the parties that favored integration with Indonesia. While INTERFET sought security for all 

parties on the ground, its presence was not entirely 

impartial—since it enabled the movement towards independence. In this regards, the strong pro-independence sentiment among the East Timorese population 

favored INTERFET. Had public sentiment been different, INTERFET might have encountered stronger 

opposition on the ground. The low level of popular 

support for integration is confirmed by the fact that 

the militias were heavily dependent on sustainment 

from the TNI and West Timor. INTERFET established 

an information campaign to ensure all parties fully 

understood its purpose and intent to establish stability and security for all inhabitants. However, there 

is no doubt that actors in the environment saw the 

INTERFET presence as favoring the movement towards East Timor’s independence. This fact is evident 

in FALINTIL’s decision to continue its self-imposed 

confinement in cantonment areas, even during the pe-
62

riod of the militia rampage against local inhabitants. 

FALINTIL understood that the international presence 

would further the group’s political objectives. While 

INTERFET sought to promote stability and security 

for all inhabitants, it is possible that efforts to ensure 

the safety of pro-integration supporters might have 

been especially important—perhaps allowing these 

persons to feel that they could have a stake in an independent East Timor. The protection and reintegration 

of pro-Indonesia supporters, especially former militia 

members, was an important challenge for UNTAET in 

the aftermath of Operation STABILSE. While political 

neutrality was not possible, the coalition could, however, apply an even hand while protecting all citizens 

from acts of violence, even those who were part of the 

minority that favored integration with Indonesia. 

Transparency: The Joint Force, during the conduct 

of peace operations, “should make the parties and the 

populace aware of the operational mandate, mission, 

intentions, and techniques used to enforce compliance.” 110 Transparency serves to reinforce legitimacy 

and impartiality.

The INTERFET headquarters played a key role in 

shaping information operations (IO) during Operation 

STABILISE. It helped to inform the local population, 

the TNI, the militias, and the international community 

regarding INTERFET’s mission, activities, capabilities, 

and determination to counter aggression and restore 

security. The IO campaign utilized a variety of media 

to inform target audiences. These included radio, leaflets, loud speakers, publication of the New East Timor

newspaper, and regular news conferences.111

The USFI contribution to transparency was through 

a combination of public affairs and CMOC efforts. 

The USFI public affairs officer, in coordination with 
63

Brigadier General Castellaw, briefed reporters on U.S. 

activities and, in one noteworthy instance, coordinated a press tour of the USS Belleau Wood.112 These activities demonstrated U.S. capabilities and support for 

the operation. They were done in a manner that did 

not overshadow the Australian leadership role or the 

contributions of other countries. The USFI-supported 

CMOC kept NGOs and U.N. agencies informed of the 

security situation around the country. These organizations, for their part, provided a means of communicating the INTERFET capability and intent to the 

population, during the course of frequent interactions.

Credibility: The Joint Force and its partners must 

preserve their credibility to ensure relevant actors 

in the environment cooperate during the conduct of 

peace operations. The Joint Forces must ensure that 

parties on the ground understand that actions have 

consequences. Key to promoting credibility is to ensure friendly forces align “words, deeds and images.” 

One way that INTERFET sustained its credibility 

was by continuously demonstrating its capabilities to 

provide assistance or impose cost on parties in the environment. INTERFET demonstrated its capabilities, 

beginning with the establishment of its lodgment. On 

September 20, 1999, through a combination of air assault and airlift operations, INTERFET inserted more 

than 1,000 troops into Dili. The continuous flow of aircraft and the appearance of helicopters on the first day 

of operations sent an immediate signal to potential 

adversaries and the population that INTERFET was 

a capable force that could carry out its commitments.

USFI enhanced INTERFET’s credibility in numerous ways. The presence of the Aegis cruiser, USS 

Mobile Bay, strengthened INTERFET naval forces in 

securing the sea and air lines of communication. The 
64

employment of U.S. Navy amphibious assault ships 

and the Marines provided a deterrent effect; enhanced 

INTERFET’s capability to secure Dili, the Oecussi Enclave, and Atauro Island; and demonstrated a commitment to ensuring the success of humanitarian relief operations. The CMOC assisted in coordinating 

humanitarian assistance operations, promising and 

then delivering on efforts to support NGOs and relief 

organizations. Finally, TF Thunderbird enabled the 

continued expansion of INTERFET across East Timor 

as part of Major General Cosgrove’s ink spot strategy. 

In each case, INTERFET preserved its credibility by 

carrying through on commitments with a robust set of 

military capabilities.

Freedom of Movement: The success of peace 

operations will often hinge on the Joint Force and its 

partners being at the right place and time to create desired effects. For this reason, freedom of movement 

is essential. Establishing freedom of movement for 

relief organizations and the civilian population provides a measure of the success of peace and stability 

operations. There were several limiting factors that 

constrained freedom of movement in East Timor, including the overall geography and weather, the local 

terrain, the poor roads and transportation infrastructure, and the threat. INTERFET leaders were frequently concerned with ensuring the security of the 

sea and air lines of communications and access to the 

Oecussi Enclave and Pulau Atauro Island. 

USFI support was essential to retaining freedom 

of movement throughout the conduct of Operation 

STABILISE. During the early stages of the operation, 

INTERFET transportation enabled a range of coalition 

partners, NGOs, and relief organizations to be at the 

right place and time to carry out their missions. Im-
65

proved security enabled the return of displaced civilians with support from U.S. airlift and sealift. USFI’s 

heavy lift helicopters assisted in the distribution of 

humanitarian relief supplies, which, through the conduct of information operations, further encouraged 

the return of displaced persons. Finally, USFI LCACs 

and LCUs enabled operations in the Oecussi Enclave 

and Palau Atauro Island. The ability to demonstrate 

unhindered freedom of movement made it clear to potential adversaries that INTERFET could react quickly 

to any hostile actions.

Flexibility and Adaptability: In order to demonstrate flexibility and adaptability, the Joint Force and 

its partners must have a measure of situational understanding and the means to adapt quickly to changing circumstances. Military forces will frequently 

develop their situational understanding by drawing 

on firsthand knowledge, intelligence assessments, 

and information from local partners, adjacent units, 

and higher headquarters. USFI provided airborne 

collection, counterintelligence, human and signals intelligence, and multidisciplinary analysis to assist in 

building the situational awareness and understanding 

of commanders. The Trojan Spirit provided a reachback capability to U.S. national intelligence assets and 

enabled the flow of classified information to those that 

needed it. There were challenges with the distribution 

of classified information. Some coalition force members did not have access to sensitive U.S. intelligence. 

This did not prevent the success of the mission, but it 

did complicate some interactions with coalition partners. Developing information sharing arrangements 

among members of the coalition, including procedures 

for declassifying critical information, is essential to 

build trust with coalition partners and develop a common understanding across the area of operations.
66

USFI provided key communications nodes that enabled the sharing of information, maximizing the flexibility and adaptability of the coalition. The communications network allowed Major General Cosgrove to 

talk with coalition partners and his national headquarters on an ongoing basis. This dialogue facilitated the 

development of a common operational picture and assisted in maintaining unity of effort across INTERFET.

Trust engenders flexibility and adaptability. As 

commanders gain trust in their subordinates, they 

provide mission orders and articulate intent instead 

of highly detailed and restrictive instructions. Commanders tell subordinates what to do, not how to do 

it. USFI benefited from a positive command relationship with INTERFET and with units internal to the 

U.S. contingent. These relationships allowed USFI to 

react quickly, plan operations effectively, and provide 

needed support in response to little more than a phone 

call or e-mail.

Civil-Military Harmonization and Cooperation: 

A central feature of peace operations is civil-military 

harmonization and cooperation, which helps to enhance the credibility of the Joint Force and its partners. Civil-military cooperation persuades actors to 

consent with peace operations, strengthens the legitimacy of friendly forces, and encourages the parties 

to the conflict to work toward a peaceful settlement, 

thereby facilitating the transition to civil control and 

governance.113 

Civil-military cooperation among U.S. Government departments and agencies was evident even before the actual start of Operation STABILISE. At the 

strategic level, the National Security Council system 

provided an effective venue for civil-military deliberations, allowing the Pentagon to articulate its res-
67

ervations with assuming a leading role in East Timor, 

given the high level of U.S. commitments worldwide. 

Collaboration was especially evident in gaining Indonesia’s acquiescence and international support for 

Operation STABILISE. From U.S. congressional action 

to cut military cooperation with the TNI, to the Chairman of the JCS and CDRUSPACOM dialogue with the 

Indonesian Defense Ministry, to President Clinton’s 

engagement at the APEC summit, it is clear that there 

was unity across the U.S. Government in support of 

a clearly articulated national policy towards the East 

Timor situation. This collaboration carried through 

when departments and agencies undertook activities 

on the ground.

At the tactical level, USFI operations were in synch 

with USAID’s efforts to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid, revitalize the local economy, and enable democratic development. USFI provided a team 

of twelve trained and experienced civil affairs personnel, led by a lieutenant colonel, to support Operations 

STABILISE. The team played an important role, as 

part of the Australian-led CMOC, in sharing information and coordinating INTERFET (and USFI) support 

for U.N. agencies and NGOs. These actions contributed to a shared understanding of the security situation and provided much needed help to the relief organizations in their efforts to support the population. 

Without the cooperation engendered by the CMOC, 

there is a possibility that military operations and relief 

efforts might have conflicted and hindered each other. 

Restraint and Minimum Force: A misuse of force 

can have a negative impact upon the legitimacy of the 

peace operation. On the other hand, the appropriate 

use of force to prevent disruption of the peace process 

and promote security can strengthen the consent of 

various actors in the environment. 
68

USFI was never directly involved in any incidents 

that required the use of force in East Timor. However, a contributing factor to the success of Operation 

STABILISE was the discipline and restraint of the INTERFET forces that took part in the effort. There were 

a number of incidents involving the TNI forces and 

the militias, which had the potential to escalate into 

international crises. INTERFET forces were successful during efforts to deescalate situations involving 

the TNI. Coalition forces adhered to their commander’s intent and understood the tactical and strategic 

impacts associated with a violent exchange. Alternatively, confrontations with the militias, involving the 

effective and disciplined use of force, served notice 

that INTERFET was willing to take necessary action to 

achieve security and facilitate the peace process. 

U.S. joint forces, down to the lowest level, must be 

well trained and disciplined—and fully understand 

the potential adverse impact on operational and strategic goals that may result from an inappropriate use 

of force. Commanders and their staffs should pay 

extraordinary attention to the rules of engagement 

(ROE), ensuring that they do not hinder the ability of 

military personnel to act. Commanders should provide guidance to enable leaders and service members 

to make informed decisions that are appropriate to the 

situation. The ROE requires constant review, given 

the continuously changing operational environment.

Objective/End State: The Joint Force and its partners should direct every operation toward clearly 

defined, decisive, and achievable objectives and the 

desired end state. The INTERFET and USFI objectives and end state were clear from the start of Operation STABILISE. Establishing security was paramount. USFI was focused on ensuring the success of 
69

the Australian-led effort, furthering the peace process, and avoiding a confrontation with the TNI and 

a deterioration of U.S. relations with Indonesia. A 

question arose during the operation regarding who 

would decide when USFI had achieved its end state. 

Although it had a direct U.S. chain of command, USFI 

was under the operational control of INTERFET. As 

a result, the final decision rested with Major General 

Cosgrove. USFI planners developed a methodology 

that clearly defined the end state conditions, identified the means to achieve them, and outlined the criteria for determining when various elements of the force 

had attained their transition objectives and standards. 

The USFI staff briefed Major General Cosgrove on the 

exit criteria and gained his approval for the transition 

plan. This identified a clear end to USFI responsibilities in East Timor and ensured continuity with followon efforts.

Perseverance: The Joint Force and its partners 

should prepare for the measured and protracted employment of capabilities in support of the peace operation’s mandate and directive.114 Implementation of a 

peace process will require a sustained effort employing all instruments of national power.

Military leaders did not envision Operation STABILISE as a long term effort. The intent was to quickly 

establish security and then transition to UNTAET. 

There was strong support for the operation within the 

U.S. Congress and among the public given the level 

of violence against civilians in East Timor. It is difficult to assess the possible consequences if the militias had conducted a protracted guerrilla campaign or 

USFI had sustained casualties. However, as INTERFET transitioned to UNTAET, USPACOM established 

USGET to coordinate continued access to U.S. capa-
70

bilities to support international efforts in East Timor. 

USGET demonstrated U.S. resolve and perseverance 

in providing continued U.S. support. While the end 

state for the U.S. involvement in peacekeeping operations should be well defined, the United States may 

find it necessary to plan for follow-on operations and 

initiatives to provide continued support.

Unity of Effort: The Joint Force and its partners 

must continuously emphasize the need for ensuring 

that all means are directed to a common purpose. 

While the chain of command for U.S. military forces 

remains inviolate, command arrangements among 

multinational partners may be less well-defined or 

may not include full command authority.115

Major General Cosgrove had operational control 

of all national contingents. He assigned specific areas 

of operations for each nation’s combat forces. Command and control arrangements enabled him to direct operations across the various areas of operation 

and with the different national contingents towards 

a common goal. USFI was not assigned its own area 

of operations. Instead, it received direction from COMINTERFET to execute support operations and enable the various national contingents when and where 

necessary. The United States played a key supporting 

role during Operation STABILISE, providing capabilities based on the needs of the coalition partners. 

Although U.S. forces generally have a clear chain of 

command to the U.S. President, peace operations and 

other integrated efforts with international partners 

and non-Defense U.S. Government departments and 

agencies will require collaboration with individuals 

and groups outside of the military command structure. Unity of effort is necessary, even in situations 

when unity of command does not exist. A good exam-
71

ple of this collaboration was the INTERFET support 

for the NGOs and multinational relief organizations 

focused on providing aid to needy and often isolated 

communities. 

Legitimacy: Interested audiences perceive legitimacy as the legality, morality, appropriateness, or 

fairness of actions and the actors responsible for them. 

During the conduct of Joint Force operations, key audiences may include the U.S. public, the U.N., foreign 

nations, civil populations in the operational area, and 

other forces participating in the effort. If relevant actors perceive a peace operation as legitimate, it will 

have a better chance of long-term success.116

The legitimacy of Operation STABILISE had several underpinnings: the decision by President Habibie 

and the Indonesian Congress to allow a popular consultation in East Timor, the conduct of the subsequent 

referendum that permitted the people of East Timor to 

choose independence, a series of U.N. resolutions that 

provided international support to the peace process, 

and the multinational character of the intervention 

force—all contributed to the legitimacy of the undertaking. The high standards of conduct and impartiality of the security forces on the ground and the provision of badly needed relief supplies to the population, 

in collaboration with NGOs and multinational relief 

organizations, further contributed to legitimacy. 

Security: The Joint Force and its partners need to 

establish and maintain protective measures that ensure a state of inviolability from hostile acts or influences. The security of the population is often a critical 

consideration during peace operations. 

While USFI forces did not directly participate in 

security operations on the ground in East Timor, they 

did enable other INTERFET contingents to do so. The 
72

USFI logistic, air and sea transportation, communications, and intelligence support played a key role assisting coalition forces to establish security during 

Operation STABILISE. The presence of overwhelming U.S. combat power, as demonstrated by the arrival 

of the USS Belleau Wood and the 31st MEU, deterred 

threats and contributed to coalition efforts to establish 

security. 

U.S. force protection in East Timor was initially an 

issue. INTERFET had overall responsibility for the 

security of USFI and other coalition forces. Differing 

views on what constituted proper force protection resulted in delays in the deployment of USFI personnel. 

As INTERFET helped to meet USFI force protection 

requirements, the issue was resolved. In part, the limited number of personnel that Washington allowed on 

the ground and the prohibition on a U.S. combat role 

in East Timor, contributed to the force protection challenge during the early stages of the operation. Eventually, CDRUSPACOM authorized USFI to deploy a 

limited number of Marines ashore to assist with force 

protection. A decision from the start to provide limited combat forces for the purpose of force protection 

could have ameliorated some of the delays. The earlier provision of a force protection element would have 

enhanced counterintelligence, HUMINT, and CMOC 

activities during the initial stages of Operation STABILISE.

Mutual Respect and Cultural Awareness: The 

Joint Force must develop trust and mutual respect with 

mission partners and demonstrate cultural awareness 

during interactions with local actors in the environment. These efforts often take time, patience, and the 

concerted efforts of leaders at all levels of command. 

High standards of professional conduct, particularly 
73

during interactions with the local population, are critical.

Many of the senior military leaders during Operation STABILISE had preexisting relationships with 

each other and with TNI officers, developed during 

military engagement and security cooperation activities in the years leading up to the intervention. USPACOM conducted numerous joint and combined 

exercises throughout its AOR on an annual basis. 

There were officer exchange programs in place with 

a number of countries in the region, and officers from 

around the AOR habitually attended U.S. military 

schools. These programs began the process of establishing the relationships and mutual respect necessary 

for successful coalition operations.

USFI had limited contacts within East Timor at 

the start of the operation. However, USFI personnel 

worked diligently to establish rapport with relevant 

actors in the environment. INTERFET, as a whole, 

exhibited discipline and respect for the local population—and was openly welcomed by the inhabitants of 

East Timor.

Current and Sufficient Intelligence: Intelligence 

is critical to the conduct of Joint Force operations. Intelligence assessments inform strategic through tactical decisions, the formulation of guidance, and the development and execution of plans. Intelligence plays 

a key role in determining what Joint Force capabilities 

to deploy and how to employ them. 

USFI’s unique intelligence capabilities—like the 

Trojan Spirit terminals and the EP-3 surveillance aircraft—made an important contribution to the success 

of Operation STABILISE. USFI supported the collection, analysis, and distribution of intelligence within 

INTERFET, enabling decision-making and operations. 
74

Intelligence professionals during Operation STABILISE had to continually assess the motivations and 

potential actions of the TNI, the pro-integration militias, the pro-independence FALINTIL, and a range of 

civil leaders and communities across East Timor. One 

challenge that arose during the operation centered on 

the U.S. ability to share classified intelligence with all 

members of the coalition. It is critical that military 

leaders develop intelligence sharing arrangements 

prior to the conduct of joint or combined operations. 

While intelligence efforts often prioritize collection regarding an adversary’s order of battle and 

intentions, peace and stability operations demand 

insight into the motivations, priorities, and interests 

of a range of relevant actors in the environment. The 

Joint Force must analyze and understand the social, 

cultural, physical, informational, and psychological 

elements that influence behavior. Intelligence plays a 

key role during efforts to identify and evaluate relevant 

actors and anticipate and influence their decisions and 

behavior.

Conclusion

Operation STABILISE was a success. INTERFET 

worked with a range of partners to establish security, 

address the humanitarian needs of the population, 

and enable the necessary political actions that were 

part of the peace process. Coalition forces facilitated 

the secure environment necessary for the successful 

transition to UNTAET and to begin the process of establishing a new political system within East Timor. 

This process would later result in the founding of 

Timor Leste as an independent country.
75

The U.S. contribution to Operation STABILISE 

played a key role in the overall success of the undertaking. The United States helped establish the political conditions necessary for the largely unopposed international effort in East Timor and aided Australia in 

building a “coalition of the willing” in support of the 

operation. In terms of the U.S. military contribution, 

USFI: 1) provided critical capabilities that were not 

available within the forces of the other contributing 

countries, and 2) furnished additional capacity, beyond what was made available by others, to meet mission requirements. After the termination of Operation 

STABILISE, the United States continued to provide 

political, economic, and military support to international assistance in East Timor. USGET coordinated 

for the periodic deployment of Joint Force capabilities 

that enabled humanitarian relief, aided in reconstruction efforts to repair damaged infrastructure, and provided a visible presence to demonstrate U.S. commitment and resolve.

The U.S. experience during Operation STABILISE 

reinforces the need for a whole of government approach to create the necessary conditions in the environment that will accomplish policy goals and create enduring effects. The United States employed the 

range of instruments of national power to address the 

humanitarian crisis in East Timor, preserve its strategic partnership with Indonesia, and limit the commitment of U.S. troops at a time when other global 

obligation weighed heavily on U.S. policymakers. 

At the strategic level, U.S. national interests in East 

Timor were limited. However, leaders in Washington 

had significant interests in Indonesia and Australia. 

Concurrently with participating in the international 

operation in East Timor, the United States continued 
76

its support for the Indonesian democratization process, in the aftermath of Suharto’s rule, and economic 

recovery, following the recent global financial crisis. 

Despite the fact that Washington did not contribute 

forces in a combat role, as Australia at one point wanted, the United States demonstrated its support for the 

coalition by providing key enabling capabilities.

Shaping the operational environment is critical 

prior to and during joint operations. USPACOM exercises and military-to-military engagements, leading 

up to the East Timor intervention, enhanced the U.S. 

ability to understand and work with key leaders in 

the TNI and among the armed forces of the coalition 

members. Participation in joint and combined exercises and military exchange programs, allowed U.S. and 

regional military officers to develop trust and a shared 

understanding of developments in the environment. 

Security cooperation and military engagement activities also enabled some level of interoperability, especially with Australia. In addition to trust, USPACOM 

activities assisted in providing access within the area 

of operations; this was the case when CDRUSPACOM 

re-tasked forces that were about to participate in Exercise CROCODILE ’99.

Operation STABILISE demonstrated that the 

United States does not need to take the lead in all operations. Regional partners with the requisite desire, 

leadership, and military capability provide other options. Australia was and is a respected U.S. ally. Frequent interactions between U.S. and Australian forces, 

during the conduct of combined training exercises, 

played a key part in developing the foundational partnership for the East Timor operation. The ability of a 

competent partner to assume the lead role enabled the 

United States to avoid over committing its military, at 
77

a time when a range of global obligations were also 

demanding U.S. attention. 

Leaders must have a clear understanding of joint 

capabilities across the services. During Operation 

STABILISE, USPACOM made use of assigned forces 

in theater and reach-back capabilities in the United 

States, which became available as part of Global Force 

Management and the Secretary of Defense orders process. Military leaders need to understand the impact 

of drawing small force packages from larger, individual units. This challenge became apparent when 

the potential deployment of a key enabling capability threatened to degrade the readiness of the entire 

25th ID. The employment of a portion of the division’s 

signal battalion could have resulted in an inability to 

react to other major contingencies. 

The study of Operation STABILISE provides an 

opportunity to examine a Joint Force operation as part 

of a small-scale contingency, with an ally fulfilling the 

role of lead nation. No two operations are entirely the 

same. However, Operation STABILISE provides insights into many of the challenges of peace and stability operations that may recur as part of future efforts. 

The Joint Force experience in East Timor provides a 

variety of insights that may assist military leaders 

and planners in overcoming challenges in the future. 

Above all, Operation STABILISE demonstrates the 

flexibility and adaptability of the Joint Force to meet 

demands and challenges in a complex operating environment.
78

Operation STABILISE: Best Practices for Peace 

Enforcement

The best practices listed below are from the perspective of a small scale contingency operation. In 

most cases, they apply to all peacekeeping or peace 

enforcement operations, whether the United States is 

the lead nation or a regional partner fulfills this role.

Strategic Guidance

• Conduct peace enforcement operations with international support under a U.N. or comparable mandate and with regional/multinational 

partners to ensure the legitimacy of the operation.

• Ensure the U.N. mandate provides strong wording 

that gives the military commander the necessary 

authority to accomplish assigned tasks, while 

minimizing risk to the joint or multinational 

force.

• Advise U.S. civilian leaders to articulate clearly 

the strategic objective and desired strategic effects.

• Coordinate with all relevant elements of the 

U.S. Government and with coalition partners to 

develop a strategic approach that sets the political and military conditions for a successful 

intervention.

• Clearly state the mission, intent, military and 

political objectives, and the end state of the operation, contributing to unity of effort and creating enduring outcomes.

• Provide detailed guidance on the conditions 

necessary to meet the end state and drawdown 
79

U.S. forces, while enabling post-intervention 

follow-through efforts.

• Avoid placing unnecessary constraints on the 

Joint Force commander that limit freedom of 

action. The Joint Force or multinational commander requires the flexibility to identify and 

employ all necessary capabilities to accomplish 

the mission.

• Maintain situational awareness of possible 

conflict areas and provide or obtain planning 

guidance to assist in the development of contingency plans.

Planning and Preparation

• Establish the Joint Force around a standing, 

combat-capable, service-provided headquarters and provide augmentation as necessary 

from other units and services.

• Conduct contingency planning for potential 

conflict areas to provide multiple options for 

U.S. and coalition leaders. 

• Conduct parallel planning among the anticipated or designated Joint Force headquarters 

and units as early as possible during the premission process.

• When the United States is not the lead nation, 

employ joint planning cells and liaison officers 

to facilitate the lead-nation planning efforts, 

provide information on U.S. Joint Force capabilities and how to best employ them, and identify requirements.

• In small scale contingencies, identify the capabilities required, the impact of tasking specialized capabilities from larger formations, and 
80

limit, to the extent possible, the reduction in 

readiness to the parent organization.

• Incorporate force protection in all planning efforts to facilitate freedom of action. Provide all 

necessary capabilities and resources, to include 

combat elements, services, and supplies to meet 

U.S. force protection requirements. When the 

United States is not the lead nation, coordinate 

with the lead nation to ensure a clear understanding of Joint Force requirements.

• Educate and train deploying forces on cultural 

awareness, rules of engagement, the objectives 

of the parties involved in the conflict, and how 

to interact with the various actors in the environment.

Operational Employment

• Establish the lodgment rapidly and with overwhelming combat power to maximize the credibility of the intervening force, gain a psychological advantage over potential adversaries, 

and reassure the population. 

• Incorporate information operations as part of 

all operations to inform and gain the consent 

of the local population and the international 

community, and to influence the actions of potential adversaries, neutral parties, and international partners.

• Take actions based on a thorough understanding of the situation to affect or defeat the adversary’s center of gravity.

• Establish security and protect the population, 

while employing force for maximum psychological effect and to ensure compliance with the 
81

peace process.

• Treat all parties with dignity, respect, and impartiality during peace operations.

• Ensure leaders, down to the lowest level, understand the rules of engagement, the commander’s intent, and the potential impact of 

their actions on local, regional, and international audiences and stakeholders.

• Issue mission type orders and allow leaders to 

develop plans and execute operations based 

on the commander’s intent and the operational 

situation and environment.

• Establish a CMOC to coordinate humanitarian 

relief information, requirements, activities, and 

support with NGOs and other relief organizations.

Transition

• Plan for a deliberate and event-driven transfer 

of responsibility for the area of operations to a 

legitimate and competent authority.

• Sequence the departure of units and staff members to preserve situational awareness and the 

continuity of operations.

• Do not transfer responsibility until the new authority is fully capable of performing the mission.
82

Appendix A: Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations

Terms

Joint Task Force – A joint force that is constituted 

and so designated by the Secretary of Defense, a combatant commander, a subunified commander, or an 

existing joint task force commander. (JP 1-02)

Multinational force – A force composed of military elements of nations who have formed an alliance 

or coalition for some specific purpose. (JP 1-02)

Operational control – The authority to perform 

those functions of command over subordinate forces 

involving organizing and employing commands and 

forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and 

giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish 

the mission. (JP 1-02)

Peacebuilding – Stability actions, predominately 

diplomatic and economic, that strengthen and rebuild 

governmental infrastructure and institutions in order 

to avoid a relapse into conflict. (JP 1-02)

Peace enforcement – Application of military force, 

or the threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore 

peace and order. (JP 1-02)

Peacekeeping – Military operations undertaken 

with the consent of all major parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an 

agreement (ceasefire, truce, or other such agreement) 

and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term 

political settlement. (JP 1-02)

Tactical control – The authority over forces that is 

limited to the detailed direction and control of move-
83

ments or maneuvers within the operational area necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. (JP 

1-02)

Stability operations – An overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities 

conducted outside the United States in coordination 

with other instruments of national power to maintain 

or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide 

essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. (JP 

1-02)
84

Abbreviations

25th ID 25th Infantry Division

ADF Australian Defense Force

AEG Air Expeditionary Group

AFFOR Air Force Forces

AOR Area of Operational Responsibility

APEC Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation

APODETI Timorese Popular Democratic 

Association (Associação Popular 

Democrática Timorense)

ARFOR Army Forces

ASDT Association of Timorese Social 

Democrats (Associação Social 

Democrática Timor)

ASEAN Association of South East Asian 

Nations

CA Civil Affairs

CCDR Combatant Commander

CCMD Combatant Commander

CDR Commander

CG Guided Missile Cruiser

CI Counterintelligence

CJCS Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff

CJTF Commander, Joint Task Force

CMOC Civil Military Operations Center

CNRM National Council of Maubere 

Resistance (Conselho Nacional 

Resistência Maubere)

CNRT National Council of Timorese 

Resistance (Conselho Nacional 

Resistência Timor)
85

COMINTERFET Commander INTERFET

DJFHQ Deployable Joint Force 

Headquarters

DJTFAC Deployable Joint Task Force 

Augmentation Cell

DoD Department of Defense

DST Deployment Support Team

FALINTIL Armed Forces for the National 

Liberation of East Timor (Forças 

Armada de Libertação Nacional de 

Timor-Leste)

FRETILIN Revolutionary Front for an 

Independent East Timor (Frente 

Revolucionária de Timor-Leste 

Independente)

HUMINT Human Intelligence

ICRC International Committee of the 

Red Cross

IDP Internally Displaced Civilians

III MEF III Marine Expeditionary Force

IMF International Monetary Fund 

INTERFET International Forces East Timor

IO Information Operations

JICPAC Joint Intelligence Center, Pacific

JISS Joint Intelligence Support System

JP Joint Publication

JPME Joint Professional Military 

Education

JTF Joint Task Force

JTF TSO Joint Task Force Timor Sea 

Operations
86

KOPASSUS Indonesian Special Forces 

(Komando Pasukan Khusus)

LCAC Landing Craft Air Cushioned

LCU Landing Craft Utility

LHA Amphibious Assault Ship (General 

Purpose)

LNO Liaison Officer

LOGCAP Logistics Civilian Augmentation 

Program

MARFOR Marine Forces

MARFORPAC Marine Forces PACOM

MEB Marine Expeditionary Brigade

MEU Marine Expeditionary Unit

NATO North Atlantic Treaty 

Organization

NAVFOR Naval Forces

NGO Nongovernmental Organizations

PACAF Pacific Air Force

PKSOI Peacekeeping and Stability 

Operations Institute

PMESII Political, Military, Economic, 

Social, Information, Infrastructure

RFI Request for information

ROE Rules of Engagement

SOC Special Operations Capable

SRSG Special Representative to the 

Secretary General

TALCE Tanker Airlift Control Element

TF Task Force

TNI Indonesian National Armed Forces 

(Tentara Nasional Indonesia)

TOR Terms of Reference
87

UDT Timorese Democratic Union (União 

Democrática Timorese)

U.N. United Nations

UNAMET United Nations Mission in East 

Timor

UNHCR United Nations High Commission 

for Refugees

UNSCR United Nations Security Council 

Resolution

UNTAET United Nations Transitional 

Administration in East Timor

U.S. United States

USA United States Army

USAID United States Agency for 

International Development

USARPAC United States Army Pacific

USFET United States Forces East Timor

USFI United States Forces International 

Forces East Timor

USGET United States Support Group East 

Timor

USMC United States Marine Corps

USNS United States Naval Ship

USPACOM United States Pacific Command

USS United States Ship
88

Appendix B: References

Books

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Australian Defence Force Participation in the International Force East Timor (INTERFET), Crows Nest, N.S.W., 

Australia: Allen and Unwin, 2000.

Cosgrove, Peter, My Story, Prymble, N.S.W., Australia: Harper Collins Publishers, 2006.

Krieger, Heike K., editor, East Timor and the International Community: Basic Documents, New York, NY: 

Cambridge University Press, 1997.

Robinson, Geoffrey, If You Leave Us Here, We Will 

Die: How Genocide Was Stopped in East Timor, Princeton: 

Princeton University Press, 2011.

Smith, Michael G. and Moreen Dee, Peacekeeping 

in East Timor: The Path to Independence, Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2003.

Taylor, John G., East Timor: The Price of Freedom, 

Annadale, Australia: Pluto Press, 1999.

Taylor, John G., Indonesia’s Forgotten War: The Hidden History of East Timor, Leichhardt, Australia: Pluto 

Press, 1991.
89

Reports

Australian Department of Defence, Management 

of Australian Defence Force Deployments to East Timor, 

Australian National Audit Office, Commonwealth of 

Australia, March 19 2002.

Beasley, Major Kent, Australian Defence Forces, 

Information Operations during Operation Stabilise in East 

Timor, Duntroon ACT, Australia: Land Warfare Studies Centre, 2002.

Blaxland, John Charles, Information-era Maneuver: 

The Australian-led Mission to East Timor, Duntroon 

ACT, Australia: Land Warfare Studies Centre, 2002.

Bureau for Humanitarian Response, U.S. Agency 

for International Development, “Indonesia: Complex 

Emergency,” Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance, 

Annual Report 2000, available from http://pdf.usaid.

gov/pdf_docs/pdabt656.pdf, accessed on December 

15, 2015, pp. 55-57.

Elmquist, Michael, “CIMIC in East Timor: An account of civil-military cooperation, coordination and 

collaboration in the early phases of the East Timor 

Relief operation,” UN Office for the Coordination of 

Humanitarian Affairs, Geneva, 2011, available from 

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2015

Glenn, Russel W., Band of Brothers or Dysfunctional 

Family: A Military Perspective of Coalition Challenges 

During Stability Operations, Santa Monica, California: 

Rand National Research Institute, 2011.
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H.R. Exec. Doc. No. 106th-House Document 106-288, 

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Stevens, David, Strength Through Diversity: The 

Combined Naval Role in Operation Stabilise, Working 

Paper No. 20, Canberra, Australia, Sea Power Centre, 

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54, No. 8, April 2000, pp. 44-45.

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and Sarah Guise, “UNTAC and INTERFET – A Comparative Analysis,” Australian Defence Force Journal, 

No. 150, September / October 2001, pp. 47-56.

Ball, Desmond, “Silent Witness: Australian Intelligence and East Timor,” The Pacific Review, Vol. 14, 

No. 1, pp. 35-62.

Becker, Elizabeth and Philip Shenon, “With Other 

Goals in Indonesia, U.S. Moves gently on East Timor,” 

New York Times, September 9, 1999, www.nytimes.

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on January 7, 2016.

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Names,” Army Logistician, Vol. 32, No. 4, July – August 2000, pp. 35-37.

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No. 18, 3 May 2000, pp. 22-27.

Candio, Patrick and Roland Blieker, “Peacebuilding in East Timor,” The Pacific Review, Vol. 14, No. 1, 

2001, pp. 63-84.

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New Way to Wage Peace: U.S. Support to Operation 

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February 2001, No.1, pp. 2-9.
93

Cotton, James, “Against the Grain: The East Timor 

Intervention,” Survival, Vol. 43, No. 1, Spring 2001, pp. 

127-142.

Cotton, James, “Australia’s Commitment in East 

Timor: A Review Article,” Contemporary Southeast 

Asia, Vol. 23, No. 3, December 2001, pp. 552-568.

Cook, Christopher R., “East Timor and the Power 

of International Commitments in the American Decision Making Process,” Asia Pacific: Perspectives, an 

electronic journal, Vol. IX, No. 2, June 2010, pp. 43-52, 

www.pacificrim.usfca.edu/research/perspectives, 

accessed on November 19, 2015.

Cross, COL Lyle M., USMC with COL Randy P. 

Strong, USA, Lt. Col. Clinton D. Wadsworth, USMC, 

and Dave Delaunay, “East Timor: A Case Study in C4I 

Innovation,” CHIPS Magazine, Vol. XXI, No. 1, Winter 

2003, pp. 29-31.

Daley, Paul, “US Marines Set for Dili,” Melbourne 

Age, August 10, 1999, www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/183-east-timor/34219.html, accessed on January 14, 2016.

Dee, Moreen, “Coalitions of the Willing and Humanitarian Intervention: Australia’s Involvement 

with INTERFET,” International Peacekeeping, Vol. 8, 

No. 3, 2001, pp. _____.

Dickens, David, “Can East Timor be a Blueprint for 

Burden Sharing?,” Washington Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 

3, Summer 2002, pp. 29-40.

Dickens, David, “The United Nations in East 

Timor: Intervention at the Military Operational Level,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol 23, No. 2, August 

2001, pp. 213-232.
94

Field, Major Chris, Australian Defense Force, “Military Operations Other Than War Analytical Paper,” 

Duty First, Vol. 3, No. 5, Spring 2001, pp. 5-15.

Folk, James and Lieutenant Colonel Andy Smith, 

United States Army Reserve, “A LOGCAP Success in 

East Timor,” Army Logistician, Vol. 32, No. 4, July – 

August 2000, pp. 38-42.

Gillert, Douglas J., “Cohen Issues Blunt Warnings 

on East Timor, Indonesian Democracy,” DoD News, 

October 1, 1999, http://archive.defense.gov/news/

newsarticle.aspx?id=42195, accessed on February 11, 

2016.

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to Thai East Timor Forces,” DoD News, October 1, 

1999, http://archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.

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of Military Studies, United States Marine Corps Command and Staff College: Quantico, Virginia, April 20, 

2001.

Goldstone, Anthony, “UNTAET with Hindsight: 

The Peculiarities of Politics in an Incomplete State,” 

Global Governance, Vol. 10, No. 1, January – March 

2004, pp. 83-98.

Gorjao, Paulo, “The Legacy and Lessons of the 

United Nations Transitional Administration in East 

Timor,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 24, No. 2, 

August 2002, pp. 313-336.

Harmer, Andrew and Robert Frith, “ “Walking Together” Toward Independence?: A Civil Society Per-
95

spective on the United Nations Administration in East 

Timor, 1999-2002,” Global Governance, Vol 15, 2009, pp. 

239-258.

Henry, Iain, “Playing Second Fiddle on the Road 

to INTERFET: Australia’s East Timor Policy Throughout 1999,” Security Challenges, Vol. 9, No. 1, 2013, pp. 

87-111.

Jago, Marianne, “INTERFET: An Account of Intervention with Consent in East Timor,” International 

Peacekeeping, Vol. 17, No. 3, 2010, pp. 377-394.

Keller, Captain Steven J., United States Army, 

“Aviation Support to East Timor,” Army Logistician, 

Vol. 32, No. 4, July – August 2000, pp. 43-45.

Leaver, Richard, “Introduction: Australia, East 

Timor and Indonesia,” The Pacific Review, Vol. 14, No. 

1, 2001, pp. 1-14.

Leaver, Richard, “The Meanings, Origins and Implications of the ‘Howard Doctrine’,” The Pacific Review, Vol. 14, No. 1, pp. 15-34.

Macdonald, Doug, “East Timor – Operation Stabilise: The Logistics Support Components from a Disaster Relief Viewpoint,” National Emergency Response, 

Vol. 15, No. 1, March 2000, pp. 11-25.

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Army, and Lieutenant Colonel William A. Guinn, 

United States Army, “Contingency Contracting in 

East Timor,” Army Logistician, Vol. 32, No. 4, July – 

August 2000, pp. 30-34.

McDougall, Derek, “Australia’s Peacekeeping 

Role in the Post-Cold War Era,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol.24, No. 3, December 2002, pp. 590-608.
96

Oliver, George F., “The Other Side of Peacekeeping: Peace Enforcement and Who Should Do It?,” International Peacekeeping: The Yearbook of international 

Peace Operations, Vol. 8, 2002, pp. 99-117.

Orr, Robert C., “Making East Timor Work: The 

United States as a Junior Partner,” National Security 

Studies Quarterly, Vol. VII, No. 3, Summer 2001, pp. 

133-140.

Ryan, Allen, “The Strong Lead-Nation Model in an 

Ad-hoc Coalition of the Willing: Operation Stabilize 

in East Timor,” International Peacekeeping, Vol. 9, No. 

1, Spring 2002, pp. 23-44.

Schulze, Kursten E., “The East Timor Referendum 

Crisis and Its Impact on Indonesian Politics,” Studies 

in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol. 24, 2001, pp. 77-82.

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East Timor Crisis: A Test Case for Humanitarian Intervention,” Southeast Asian Affairs, 2000, Institute of 

Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS), pp. 64-83, available 

from www.jstor.org/stable/27912244, accessed on 

December 14, 2015.

Thompson, Alistair, “Pacific Commander Talks US 

Relations with the TNI,” Scoop Independent News, September 28, 1999, available from http://www.scoop.

co.nz/stories/HL9909/ S00223.htm, accessed on December 28, 2015.

Wheeler, Nicholas J. and Tim Dunne, “East Timor 

and the New Humanitarian Interventionism,” International Affairs, Vol. 77, No. 4, October 2001, pp. 805-827.

White, Hugh, “The Road to INTERFET: Reflections 

on Australian Strategic Decisions Concerning East 
97

Timor, December 1998 – September 1999,” Security 

Challenges, Vol. 4, No. 1, Autumn 2008, pp. 69-87.

Interviews

ADM (ret) Dennis C. Blair, USN, former Commander, United States Pacific Command, Telephonic 

Interview with author on December 21, 2015.

LTG (ret) Edmond Smith, USA, former Commander, United States Army Pacific, Telephonic Interview 

with author on November 9, 2015.

LtGen (ret) John Castellaw, USMC, former Commander, United States Forces International Forces 

East Timor, Telephonic Interview with author on November 13, 2015.

MG (ret) Randolph P. Strong, USA, former Commander, United States Forces East Timor, Telephonic 

Interview with author on November 9, 2015.

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on the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Summit and Exchange with Reporters, September 9, 1999, www.gpo.

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the East Timor Crisis of 1999, Canberra ACT, Australia: 

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Dinger, Larry. East Timor and U.S. Foreign Policy: 

Making Sausage. Washington, DC: National Defense 

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on December 28, 2015.

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with COL Randolph Strong, commander of U.S. Forces 

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103

Appendix C: Chronology

April 25, 1974 Carnation Revolution in Lisbon, Portugal

January 1975 UDT and FRETILIN form political alliance

August 11, 1975 UDT attempted coup d’état in Dili; leads 

to fighting with FRETILIN; Portuguese 

Governor flees Dili

September 24, 1975 UDT forces withdraw from East Timor 

into West Timor; FRETILIN effectively 

controls East Timor

November 28, 1975 FRETILIN unilaterally declares East Timor 

independence

December 7, 1975 Indonesia invades East Timor

July 17, 1976 Indonesia incorporates East Timor as its 

27th province

January 20, 1978 Australia recognizes Indonesian 

sovereignty over East Timor

November 12, 1991 Santa Cruz Cemetery massacre 

reestablishes international interest in the 

plight of East Timor

May 21, 1998 Indonesian President Suharto resigns as a 

result of protests stemming from the 1997 

Asian Financial Crisis; he is succeeded by 

President B.J. Habibie 

December 19, 1998 Australian Prime Minister Howard sends a 

letter to President Habibie recommending 

East Timor independence after a period of 

autonomy under Indonesia

January 27, 1999 Habibie offers a Timorese referendum 

February 1, 1999 MARFORPAC directed to begin planning 

contingency operations for East Timor

May 5, 1999 Agreement between Indonesia, Portugal, 

and the U.N. to conduct popular 

consultation in August 1999 

June 11, 1999 UNSCR 1246 establishes UNAMET 

July 9, 1999 III MEF CONOPS brief to CDRUSPACOM

August 31, 1999 •	 East Timorese reject autonomy via democratic election (popular consultation)

•	 USFI liaison officers deploy to Brisbane
104

September 4, 1999 •	 UNAMET announces popular consultation results

•	 Pro-integration militias begin campaign 

of violence in East Timor

September 6, 1999 Australia executes Operation SPITFIRE 

and begins evacuation of UNAMET from 

Dili

September 10, 1999 CJTF TSO on station 

September 11, 1999 USPACOM DJTFAC deploys to Brisbane 

September 13, 1999 Indonesian President Habibie requests 

international peacekeepers 

September 12-13, 1999 APEC Summit takes place in Auckland, 

New Zealand

September 13-22, 1999 USPACOM conducts Exercise TEMPO 

BRAVE, Okinawa, Japan 

September 15, 1999 •	 UN Security Council approves UNSCR 

1264 establishing INTERFET 

•	 USPACOM establishes USFI

September 16, 1999 U.S. President Clinton announces decision 

to provide military support to INTERFET

September 17, 1999 Brigadier General Castellaw arrives in 

Sydney 

September 18, 1999 USFI Darwin and Sydney headquarters 

established 

September 19, 1999

•	 Major General Cosgrove appointed as 

COMINTERFET

•	 COMINTERFET Major General Cosgrove travels to Dili to meet with TNI 

Major General Syahnakri

•	 MSQ-126 arrives in theater 

•	 EP-3 arrives in theater

•	 613th AEG arrives in theater
105

September 20, 1999

•	 INTERFET begins landing in Dili

•	 LNOs from USFI land in Dili with deploying forces on D-Day 

•	 USFI staff arrives in Darwin, Australia 

September 21, 1999 613th AEG and EP-3 begin support 

operations

September 22, 1999 INTERFET secures Baucau airfield

September 25, 1999 TNI begins withdrawal from East Timor

September 27, 1999 USFI Dili HQ established 

September 28, 1999 UNAMET reestablishes its headquarters 

in Dili

October 3, 1999 INTERFET expands operations outside 

Dili

October 5, 1999 •	 USS Belleau Wood/31st MEU arrive in 

East Timor

•	 JTF TSO departs

October 8, 1999 •	 Trojan Spirit arrives in theater 

•	 Intelligence Augmentation Team arrives 

in theater

•	 CMOC arrives in Dili, East Timor

October 10, 1999 INTERFET moves to Inter-Timor Border 

(ITB) 

October 13, 1999 EP-3 departs RAAF Tindal

October 19, 1999 Government of Indonesia recognizes East 

Timor’s independence

October 20, 1999 •	 Indonesian Presidential and Vice Presidential elections held

•	 Indonesia’s National Assembly revokes 

1978 decree incorporating East Timor into 

Indonesia

•	 Final USFI unit (TF Thunderbird) deploys 

to East Timor; staff commences development of retrograde plan 
106

October 21, 1999 •	 Xanana Gusmão returns to East Timor 

•	 USFET established

October 22, 1999 INTERFET forces deploy to Oecussi 

Enclave 

October 25, 1999 U.N. passes UNSCR 1272 ending the 

UNAMET mission and establishing 

UNTAET

October 26, 1999 USS Peleliu/11th (SOC) MEU arrives 

in theater replacing the USS Belleau 

Wood/31st MEU

October 31, 1999 TNI completes withdrawal from East 

Timor 

November 2, 1999 U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia visits East 

Timor

November 15, 1999 Australian JISS replaces Trojan Spirit 

systems

November 16, 1999 Special Representative to the Secretary 

General (SRSG) Sergio de Mello arrives in 

Dili, East Timor

November 21, 1999 INTERFET secures Atauro Island

November 22, 1999 •	 Air Component and USAF C-130s retrograde to home stations

•	 U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., COMINTERFET, SRSG De Mello and staff meet 

with senior TNI representatives and sign 

‘Memorandum of Technical Understanding’ at Motaain on control of the InterTimor Border

November 23, 1999 LOGCAP contract helicopters begin 

providing support

November 28, 1999 •	 USS Peleliu/11th MEU (SOC) departs

•	 U.S. contracted helicopters arrive and begin executing missions in Dili

December 1, 1999 General Shelton Chairman, Joint Chiefs of 

Staff visits Darwin and East Timor

December 5, 1999 INTERFET assumes full responsibility for 

CMOC activities
107

December 7, 1999 •	 COMINTERFET, COMWESTFOR, 

Chief UNMO and Mr. Gusmão meet with 

West Timor officials at Batugade to discuss border issues

•	 Intelligence Augmentation Team leaves 

Dili

December 15, 1999 •	 Australian contracted commercial network 

replaces the TF Thunderbird network

•	 CMOC and TF Thunderbird depart from 

Dili

December 17, 1999 Disestablishment of U.S. Compound in 

Dili, East Timor

December 18, 1999 USFI staff of 52 remain behind in Darwin/

Dili

January 1, 2000 Shit to commercial vendor for 

communications complete

January 26, 2000 Transition of USFI to USGET begins

January 26-31, 2000 USS Juneau supports operations off 

Oecussi enclave

February 1, 2000 •	 USGET assumes responsibility to support UNTAET

•	 USFI disestablished

February 23, 2000 INTERFET transitions authority to 

UNTAET
108

Appendix D: Key Leaders and Organizations

United States

President Bill Clinton: As the President of the 

United States since 1992, Bill Clinton had directed numerous peacekeeping efforts including Somalia, Haiti, 

Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Kosovo. On May 3, 1994 he 

ordered the publication of Presidential Decision Directive 25, which outlined the role of peace operations 

in U.S. policy. The directive stated that the United 

States would participate in international peacekeeping efforts when it advanced U.S. interests, the objectives were clear, there was a well-defined end state for 

U.S. forces, and U.S. participation was necessary for 

the success of the operation. His assessment that Indonesian efforts were insufficient to stop the violence 

in East Timor and decision to support Australia, set in 

motion U.S. support for Operation STABILISE.

U.S. Department of State: As the diplomatic component of the U.S. Government, the Department of 

State coordinated and led the efforts to pressure Indonesia to live up to its responsibilities under the May 

5 Agreement. Once it became evident Jakarta would 

not or could not end the violence, the Department of 

State led the drive to encourage Indonesia to request 

international assistance. The department conducted 

continuous diplomatic engagement throughout Operation STABILISE, working with Australia and other 

international partners to build the coalition, pass UNSCR 1264 and 1272, and urge Indonesian leaders to 

continue the post-Suharto transition to democracy 

and support INTERFET operations in East Timor. 
109

Admiral Dennis C. Blair: As the Commander 

of USPACOM, Admiral Blair established USFI and 

designated Brigadier General Castellaw as the commander. Admiral Blair was in favor of limiting the 

U.S. forces committed to Operation STABILISE and 

allowing the Australians to lead the effort. His previous relationship enabled access to the Indonesian Defense Minister and Commander of the TNI, General 

Wiranto. This access enabled Admiral Blair to assist 

in diplomatic efforts to pressure Indonesia to accept a 

multinational force in East Timor.

US Forces INTERFET (USFI): A designated Joint 

Force, which included the U.S. military component 

of INTERFET. USFI provided logistical, communications, transportation, and intelligence support during 

Operation STABILISE. It included elements from III 

MEF, 613th AEG, the 11th Signal Brigade, the 31st MEU, 

the 11th MEU (SOC), the 96th CA Brigade, and several 

U.S. naval vessels. 

Brigadier General John G. Castellaw: Prior to 

Operation STABILISE, Brigadier General Castellaw 

(USMC) was the Deputy Commander of III MEF and 

the Commander, 3rd MEB. Admiral Blair selected Castellaw as Commander, USFI on September 15, 1999. 

Castellaw formed the USFI staff, drawing personnel 

from the III MEF. He recognized he had limited time 

available to form the USFI staff and needed a team of 

individuals he knew and trusted. His preexisting relationship with Major General Cosgrove—and efforts to 

maintain the trust of COMINTERFET—allowed USFI 

to work effectively with minimal guidance.

Colonel Randolph P. Strong: Prior to the start 

of Operation STABILISE, Colonel Strong (USA) was 

the newly assigned Commander, 516th Signal Brigade 

under USARPAC. Upon deployment with USFI, he 
110

was triple hatted as the Deputy Commander USFI, 

Commander USFET, and Commander ARFOR. His 

appointment was unusual given his background as an 

Army signals officer. However, his past experience 

in peacekeeping operations and his technical expertise 

proved fortuitous, given the key role of TF Thunderbird in providing communications support for INTERFET.

USGET: USGET assumed responsibility for providing continued U.S. support to UNTAET after the 

disestablishment of USFI. USGET operated under 

U.S. command, separate from the U.N. peacekeeping 

force. USGET coordinated deployments by U.S. military units to support stability and reconstruction efforts until East Timor’s official independence in 2001. 

East Timor

Jose Alexandre Xanana Gusmão: Rose to lead 

FRETILIN and FALINTIL in the early 1980s. His efforts to reform FRETILIN’s political agenda and reshape the FALINTIL into a true guerilla force, supported by the East Timorese population, were critical 

to the continuation of the independence movement. 

His reforms eventually led to the development of a 

unified political front to oppose the Indonesian occupation of East Timor. His arrest, trial, and detention 

in 1992 drew international attention and highlighted 

the plight of the East Timorese people. Mr. Gusmão 

proved an able partner to UNTAET in helping to stand 

up an East Timorese government. He was elected the 

first president of East Timor in 2001. 

Revolutionary Front for an Independent East 

Timor (FRETILIN): An East Timorese party that espoused Democratic Socialism. It was driven under-
111

ground during the Indonesian occupation and eventually was led by Xanana Gusmão. In 2001, the group 

won a plurality of seats within the East Timorese parliament, during the country’s first free election. The 

FRETILIN’s armed wing was the FALINTIL.

FALINTIL: The most prominent armed resistance 

group in East Timor from 1975 through 1999 and the 

armed wing of FRETILIN. During the popular consultation and Operation STABILISE, the FALANTIL 

remained in cantonment areas during the pro-integration militias’ campaign of violence. After East Timor 

gained its independence, the FALINTIL became the 

basis for the country’s security forces. 

Pro-Indonesian militias: A collection of East Timorese groups, supported and in some cases led by 

the TNI, who violently opposed an independent East 

Timor. They were originally established in the late 

1970s and early 1980s as part of the TNI approach to 

counterinsurgency. Most militias disbanded during 

the 1990s. In response to President Habibie’s proposed independence vote, the TNI reestablished the 

militias. Prior to and after the popular consultation, 

the militias were responsible for much of the violence 

against the East Timorese population. 

Indonesia

President Suharto: The president of Indonesia 

from 1967 to 1998. He resigned as a result of pro-democracy protests in Jakarta during the Asian financial 

crisis. He directed the invasion and annexation of East 

Timor, ostensibly to counter any possible communist 

expansion within Indonesia’s sphere of interest. 

President B. J. Habibie: He succeeded to the presidency of Indonesia after President Suharto’s resigna-
112

tion. In January 1999, following a letter from Australian Prime Minister Howard, Habibie surprised the 

international community and members of his own 

government by offering the East Timorese either autonomy or independence. After the announcement 

of the popular consultation results, he reluctantly 

agreed, under international pressure, to the deployment of a multinational force in East Timor to help 

end the violence and establish security. 

TNI: The Indonesian military forces that invaded 

and occupied East Timor in 1975 to prevent a possible communist takeover. Over the next 30-years, the 

TNI conducted a brutal counterinsurgency campaign, 

which garnered significant international condemnation. In 1998, the TNI reestablished and supported 

the pro-integration militias, who were responsible for 

much of the pre- and post-popular consultation violence. There are some reports that postulate the postconsultation violence was part of a preconceived plan 

by the TNI; the objective of the campaign was to deter 

other groups that might consider seeking autonomy 

from Indonesia. The TNI did not interfere significantly with INTERFET during operations and withdrew 

from East Timor by the end of October 1999.

KOPASSUS: The Indonesian Special Forces command responsible for some of the more violent acts of 

repression against the East Timorese. Allegedly, the 

KOPASSUS trained the pro-Indonesian East Timorese 

militias. The KOPASSUS played a significant role in 

Operation KOMODO, which established conditions 

for the Indonesian invasion of East Timor.
113

United Nations

UNAMET: Established under UNSCR 1246 on 

June 11, 1999. It was responsible for planning and 

executing the popular consultation in East Timor. Although it registered over 460,000 voters and successfully conducted the popular consultation, it proved 

unable to halt the violence by pro-integration groups. 

In early September 1999, UNAMET evacuated East 

Timor under Operation SPITFIRE, but returned after 

INTERFET reestablished security. UNAMET’s mission ended on October 25, 1999 with the establishment 

of UNTAET.

Secretary General Kofi Annan: A key negotiator 

during the lead up to the May 5 Agreement, which set 

East Timor on the path towards independence. He led 

efforts in the U.N. Security Council to gain approval 

for INTERFET and UNTAET. 

UNTAET: Established under UNSCR 1272, UNTAET was responsible for establishing the transitional 

administration in East Timor, leading reconstruction 

efforts following the pro-integration militia violence, 

and maintaining security following the departure 

of INTERFET. UNTAET successfully established a 

transitional authority, which led to elections and the 

emergence of Timor Leste as an independent country 

in 2001.

International Partners

INTERFET: The U.N. sponsored, Australian-led 

peace enforcement mission that established security 

in East Timor following the pro-integration militia’s 

campaign of violence. INTERFET consisted primarily of Australian troops with contingents from Thai-
114

land, New Zealand, South Korea, the Philippines, the 

United Kingdom, Jordan, the United States, and at 

least 12 other countries. It arrived in Dili on September 20, 1999, and, using what was known as an inkspot strategy, eventually spread out to secure the rest 

of East Timor. INTERFET ended its operations and 

transitioned authority to UNTAET on February 23, 

2000. Most of the international troops that supported 

INTERFET became part of the peacekeeping forces 

under UNTAET.

Australian Prime Minister John Howard: In December 1998, Prime Minister Howard sent a letter to 

Indonesian President Habibie suggesting a period of 

autonomy, leading to East Timorese self-determination. In July and August 1999, Howard signaled Australia’s willingness to lead a multinational force into 

East Timor, if the Government of Indonesia requested 

it and the U.N. provided a mandate. In March 1999, 

Howard directed the ADF to bring a second brigade 

to a high state of readiness in preparations for what 

many saw as actions in East Timor.

Major General Peter Cosgrove: The Commander, 

1st Australian Division and the DJFHQ, which was 

Australia’s contingency force. He directed his staff 

to plan contingency operations for the evacuation of 

Australian and UNAMET personnel and potential 

peacekeeping operations in East Timor. Cosgrove 

was appointed Commander INTERFET on September 

19, 1999. During Operation STABILISE, he undertook 

two actions that ultimately led to its success. He met 

with the TNI commander in East Timor prior to the 

arrival of coalition troops to ensure Indonesian forces 

would not impede operations. Cosgrove also secured 

the East Timor border with West Timor. After Operation STABILISE, Major General Cosgrove became 
115

a national hero. He rose to command the ADF and 

eventually became Governor General of Australia.

ASEAN Countries: The ASEAN countries provided almost half of all forces to INTERFET. This 

contribution was significant considering their general 

policy of staying out of member country’s internal affairs. In addition, the ASEAN commitment was key to 

providing legitimacy to INTERFET.
116

Appendix E: United Nations General Assembly 

Question of East Timor: Report of the Secretary 

General (May 5, 1999)

Question of East Timor

Report of the Secretary-General

1. The Security Council will be aware of the efforts which, since 1983, the Governments of Indonesia and Portugal have undertaken through my good 

offices to find a just, comprehensive and internationally acceptable solution to the question of East Timor. 

These efforts have culminated with the signature, on 

5 May 1999, of an overall Agreement, attached herewith (annex I), between the two Governments entrusting me with the organization and conduct of a popular 

consultation for the purpose of ascertaining whether 

the East Timorese people, both inside and outside the 

Territory, accept or reject a proposed constitutional 

framework providing for a special autonomy for East 

Timor within the unitary Republic of Indonesia, which 

is appended to the Agreement. The Agreement requests me to establish immediately a United Nations 

mission in East Timor for the purpose of conducting 

the popular consultation. 

2. The Council will note that, under article 5 of 

the Agreement, in the event of the popular consultation resulting in the approval of the proposed special 

autonomy by a majority of the East Timorese people, 

the Government of Indonesia would initiate the constitutional measures required for the implementation 

of the autonomy framework, and the Government of 

Portugal would initiate within the United Nations the 

procedures necessary for the removal of East Timor 
117

from the list of Non-Self-Governing Territories of the 

General Assembly and the deletion of the question of 

East Timor from the agendas of the Security Council 

and the General Assembly. Article 6 of the Agreement 

provides in parallel that, should the popular consultation result in a majority of the East Timorese people 

rejecting the proposed special autonomy, the Government of Indonesia would take the constitutional steps 

necessary to terminate Indonesia’s links with East 

Timor, thus restoring under Indonesian law the status 

that East Timor held prior to 17 July 1976, and that 

the Governments of Indonesia and Portugal would 

agree with the Secretary-General on arrangements for 

a peaceful and orderly transfer of authority in East 

Timor to the United Nations, which would then initiate a process enabling East Timor to begin a transition 

towards independence. 

3. I should further point out that, under article 7 of 

the Agreement, it is foreseen that the United Nations 

will maintain an adequate presence in East Timor during the interim period between the conclusion of the 

popular consultation and the start of the implementation of either the special autonomy or the assumption 

of authority by the United Nations. Also, in the event 

that the East Timorese people approve the special autonomy framework, I am authorized under article 56 

of the framework to establish in East Timor such offices as I may deem necessary in order to carry out my 

responsibility to monitor and verify compliance with 

its provisions. 

4. The Governments of Indonesia and Portugal 

have also signed, on 5 May 1999, the two attached supplementary agreements, on the modalities for the popular consultation of the East Timorese through a direct 

ballot (annex II) and on security arrangements (annex 
118

III), which, inter alia, stipulate that 8 August 1999 will 

be the date for the ballot to take place, both inside and 

outside East Timor, that a secure environment devoid 

of violence or other forms of intimidation is a prerequisite for the holding of a free and fair popular consultation, that the appropriate Indonesian authorities 

have the responsibility to ensure such an environment 

as well as for the maintenance of law and order, and 

that the United Nations will ascertain whether the 

necessary security exists for the peaceful implementation of the consultation process. 

5. Under the terms of the supplementary agreements, I have been requested by the two parties to 

deploy, immediately upon signature, United Nations 

personnel adequate for the execution of the various 

phases of the consultation process. I have also been 

requested, in paragraph 4 of the Agreement regarding 

security, to make available a number of civilian police 

officers to act as advisers to the Indonesian police in 

the discharge of their duties and, at the time of the 

consultation, to supervise the escort of ballot papers 

and boxes to and from the polling sites. 

6. I do not wish to minimize the logistical and other problems that the United Nations will face in carrying out the consultation in such a short time-frame. 

The Security Council will be aware of the high level of 

tension and serious incidents of political violence that 

have recently occurred coupled with the reported opposition to the proposed consultation by some political elements in East Timor. I have emphasized to the 

parties the main elements that will need to be in place 

in order to enable me to determine that the necessary 

security conditions exist for the start of the operational 

phases of the consultation process. These include the 

bringing of armed civilian groups under strict control 
119

and the prompt arrest and prosecution of those who 

incite or threaten to use violence, a ban on rallies by 

armed groups while ensuring the freedom of association and expression of all political forces and tendencies, the redeployment of Indonesian military forces 

and the immediate institution of a process of laying 

down of arms by all armed groups to be completed 

well in advance of the holding of the ballot. I intend to 

report to the Security Council periodically on the evolution of the situation, the status of the United Nations 

presence and other matters regarding the implementation of the Agreements. 

7. Given the limited period of time between the 

signature of these Agreements and the date of the ballot, I have opened a trust fund to which Member States 

may channel voluntary contributions, which would 

enable me, without waiting for the assessed budgetary process, to proceed as soon as possible with the 

establishment of a United Nations presence in East 

Timor. 

8. Once the logistical and personnel requirements 

of the mission have been identified, I shall report them 

to the Security Council and to the General Assembly. I 

shall also be presenting to the Council, for its approval, my recommendations regarding the deployment of 

civilian police personnel. 
120

Annex I

Agreement between the Republic of Indonesia 

and the Portuguese Republic on the question 

of East Timor

The Governments of Indonesia and Portugal,

Recalling General Assembly resolutions 1514 (XV), 

1541 (XV), 2625 (XXV) and the relevant resolutions 

and decisions adopted by the Security Council and the 

General Assembly on the question of East Timor;

Bearing in mind the sustained efforts of the Governments of Indonesia and Portugal since July 1983, 

through the good offices of the Secretary-General, to 

find a just, comprehensive and internationally acceptable solution to the question of East Timor;

Recalling the agreement of 5 August 1998 to undertake, under the auspices of the SecretaryGeneral, negotiations on a special status based 

on a wide-ranging autonomy for East Timor without 

prejudice to the positions of principle of the respective 

Governments on the final status of East Timor;

Having discussed a constitutional framework for 

an autonomy for East Timor on the basis of a draft 

presented by the United Nations, as amended by the 

Indonesian Government;

Noting the position of the Government of Indonesia that the proposed special autonomy should be 

implemented only as an end solution to the question 

of East Timor with full recognition of Indonesian sovereignty over East Timor;

Noting the position of the Government of Portugal 

that an autonomy regime should be transitional, not 
121

requiring recognition of Indonesian sovereignty over 

East Timor or the removal of East Timor from the of 

list of Non-Self-Governing Territories of the General 

Assembly, pending a final decision on the status of 

East Timor by the East Timorese people through an 

act of self-determination under United Nations auspices;

Taking into account that, although the Governments of Indonesia and Portugal each have their positions of principle on the prepared proposal for special 

autonomy, both agree that it is essential to move the 

peace process forward, and that therefore, the Governments of Indonesia and Portugal agree that the 

Secretary-General should consult the East Timorese 

people on the constitutional framework for autonomy 

attached hereto as an annex;

Bearing in mind that the Governments of Indonesia and Portugal requested the Secretary-General 

to devise the method and procedures for the popular consultation through a direct, secret and universal 

ballot;
122

Agree as follows:

Article 1

Request the Secretary-General to put the attached 

proposed constitutional framework providing for a 

special autonomy for East Timor within the unitary 

Republic of Indonesia to the East Timorese people, 

both inside and outside East Timor, for their consideration and acceptance or rejection through a popular 

consultation on the basis of a direct, secret and universal ballot.

Article 2

Request the Secretary-General to establish, immediately after the signing of this Agreement, an appropriate United Nations mission in East Timor to enable 

him to effectively carry out the popular consultation.

Article 3

The Government of Indonesia will be responsible 

for maintaining peace and security in East Timor in 

order to ensure that the popular consultation is carried out in a fair and peaceful way in an atmosphere 

free of intimidation, violence or interference from any 

side.

Article 4

Request the Secretary-general to report the result 

of the popular consultation to the Security Council 

and the General Assembly, as well as to inform the 

Governments of Indonesia and Portugal and the East 

Timorese people.

Article 5

If the Secretary-General determines, on the basis 

of the result of the popular consultation and in accordance with this Agreement, that, the proposed 

constitutional framework for special autonomy is acceptable to the East Timorese people, the Government 
123

of Indonesia shall initiate the constitutional measures 

necessary for the implementation of the constitutional 

framework, and the Government of Portugal shall 

initiate within the United Nations the procedures 

necessary for the removal of East Timor from the list 

of Non-Self-Governing Territories of the General Assembly and the deletion of the question of East Timor 

from the agendas of the Security Council and the General Assembly.

Article 6

If the Secretary-General determines, on the basis 

of the result of the popular consultation and in accordance with this Agreement, that the proposed 

constitutional framework for special autonomy is not 

acceptable to the East Timorese people, the Government of Indonesia shall take the constitutional steps 

necessary to terminate its links with East Timor thus 

restoring under Indonesian law the status East Timor 

held prior to 17 July 1976, and the Governments of Indonesia and Portugal and the Secretary-General shall 

agree on arrangements for a peaceful and orderly 

transfer of authority in East Timor to the United Nations. The Secretary-General shall, subject to the appropriate legislative mandate, initiate the procedure 

enabling East Timor to begin a process of transition 

towards independence.

Article 7

During the interim period between the conclusion of the popular consultation and the start of the 

implementation of either option, the parties request 

the Secretary-General to maintain an adequate United 

Nations presence in East Timor.

DONE in New York, on this 5th day of May, 1999.
124

For the Government of Indonesia

/s/

Ali Alatas

Minister for Foreign Affairs

For the Government of Portugal

/s/

Jaime Gama

Minister for Foreign Affairs

Witnessed :

/s/

Kofi A. Annan

Secretary-General

United Nations
125

Appendix

A constitutional framework for a

special autonomy for East Timor

PART ONE

RESPECTIVE AREAS OF COMPETENCE

Chapter I

The Indonesian (Central) Government

Section A: Foreign Relations

Article 1

The Indonesian Government, hereinafter, referred 

to as the Central Government, shall have responsibility for and competence over the foreign affairs of the 

Special Autonomous Region of East Timor (SARET). 

It shall consult the Government of the SARET for 

the purpose of taking into account the views of the 

Government of the SARET on issues of particular relevance to the SARET.

Section B: Defence

Article 2

The Central Government shall have responsibility 

for and competence over the external defence of the 

SARET, as part of the territory of the unitary state of 

the Republic of Indonesia.

Article 3

For such purpose, the Indonesian armed forces 

(Tentara Nasional Indonesia ñ TNI) shall maintain a 

military presence in the SARET in the context of defending and safeguarding the external security of the 

SARET.
126

Article 4

In the event of an external armed attack, or an imminent threat of such an attack, the Indonesian armed 

forces (TNI) may be deployed outside their bases or 

normal areas of operation in the exercise of its duty to 

defend the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the 

unitary state of the Republic of Indonesia.

Section C: Economic and Fiscal Policies

Article 5

The SARET shall be a part of the Indonesian monetary and customs unit subject to those national monetary and fiscal policies, and laws and regulations of 

Indonesia which are consistent with this Agreement.

Article 6

The Central Government will continue its assistance to the development of the SARET.

Article 7

The Central Government shall have exclusive competence over national taxation and the Government of 

the SARET shall have exclusive competence over local taxation, in conformity with the relevant laws and 

regulations.

Article 8

Natural resources in the SARET, except those considered to be strategic or vital under national laws, 

shall be under the control of the Government of the 

SARET. In the exploitation of all natural resources, 

the Central Government and the Government of the 

SARET may establish cooperative or joint undertakings.

Article 9

For the purposes of its overall development, the 
127

Government of the SARET may receive foreign assistance which is to be channeled through the Central 

Government.

Article 10

The Government of the SARET can enter into domestic loans to finance part of its budget, with the consent of the Regional Council of People’s Representatives of the SARET.

Section D: Continuity of Indonesian Laws

Article 11

Indonesian laws in force upon the date of the entry 

into force of this Agreement that fall within the competence of the Central Government, as defined in this 

Chapter, shall remain in force for the SARET.

Chapter II

The Government of the Special Autonomous Region 

of East Timor

Article 12

All matters, other than those listed within Chapter I of Part One, and as provided in other relevant 

provisions of this Agreement, shall be within the responsibility and competence of the Government of the 

SARET.

Article 13

The powers of the Government of the SARET shall 

be exercised in accordance with the provisions of this 

Agreement, and also in accordance with the Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia.

Article 14

The Government of the SARET shall not:

a. restrict the rights of workers as recognized by 

law; and

b. reserve any occupation or public office solely to 

persons with East Timorese identity.
128

Chapter III

Jurisdictions of the Central Government and the 

Government of the SARET

Article 15

The Government of the SARET shall have jurisdiction over crimes committed in the SARET with the 

exception of those related to treason and terrorism, 

narcotics and other international crimes, over which 

Indonesian laws and jurisdiction shall prevail.

PART TWO

EAST TIMORESE IDENTITY, RESIDENCE AND 

IMMIGRATION

Chapter I

Definition

Article 16

Any person,

a. who was a lawful resident of East Timor prior to 

or in December 1975,

b. whose father, mother, grandfather, or grandmother was a lawful resident of East Timor prior to or 

in December 1975, or

c. who has permanently resided in East Timor for a 

period of at least five years at the time of the entry into 

force of this Agreement,

 shall be considered to have East Timorese identity, irrespective of nationality, and have the right to 

permanent domicile in East Timor.
129

Chapter II

Acquisition of Identity, Residence and Immigration

Article 17

The Government of the SARET shall have the exclusive right to establish the rules and procedures 

under which persons who do not have East Timorese 

identity may acquire such identity.

Article 18

The Central Government shall have the power 

to apply immigration controls on entry into and departure from the SARET of persons who are neither 

citizens of Indonesia nor have East Timorese identity, 

pursuant to its authority under Article 1 of this Agreement.

Article 19

The SARET shall have the authority to issue documents to individuals in order to identify those who 

East Timorese identity.

Chapter III

Symbols of Identity

Article 20

The SARET may adopt its own coat of arms. The 

Indonesian national flag and Indonesian national anthem Indonesian Rayaî shall be flown and performed 

at such places and occasions as required by the existing laws and practices.

Article 21

The SARET may participate under its own name, 

with the concurrence of the Central Government, in 

international cultural and sports events in which other 

non-state entities participate.
130

PART THREE

POWERS AND INSTITUTIONS OF THE SARET

Chapter 1

Legislative Powers and Institutions of the SARET

Article 22

The legislative power of the SARET shall extend 

to all matters not within the jurisdiction of the Central Government, as defined in Chapter I of Part One. 

This power shall include, the establishment of political, economic, and social policies in the SARET; cultural and educational matters; designation of a second 

language or languages in addition to the official language, Bahasa Indonesia; the establishment of courts 

of first instance pursuant to Article 40; rules of family 

law and succession; and public order, including the 

creation of an East Timor police force that shall be responsible for enforcement of all laws and regulations 

in the SARET, in accordance with the laws and regulations of the Republic of Indonesia.

Article 23

The SARET may adopt legislations regulating or 

restricting the ownership of property by persons who 

do not have East Timorese identity without contravening legitimately acquired rights.

Article 24

The SARET shall have the authority to establish a 

Land Claims Commission, whose members shall be 

selected in accordance with the manner prescribed for 

the selection of judges in Article 42, which shall make 

recommendations in order to decide on all disputed 

claims to title over real property through the court.

Article 25
131

The Regional Council of People’s Representatives of the SARET

1. The legislative power of the SARET shall be 

vested in and exercised by the Regional Council of 

People’s Representatives of the SARET, elected by 

persons of East Timorese identity as defined in Part 

Two, on the basis of universal adult suffrage. The 

implementation of elections for the Regional Council 

of People’s Representatives of the SARET shall be further determined by the SARET and need not coincide 

with national elections.

2. Members of the Regional Council of People’s 

Representatives of the SARET shall be persons who 

fulfill the eligibility requirements for membership. No 

racial, ethnic, religious, nationality, or other requirement unrelated to the exercised of the functions of a 

member of the Council shall be imposed.

3. Members of the Regional Council of People’s 

Representatives of the SARET shall be immune from 

legal action in respect of their oral or written statements or actions relating to the business of the Council, or made or taken in their capacity as members of 

the Council.

Chapter II

Executive Powers and Institutions of the Government of the SARET

Article 26

The executive power of the Government of the 

SARET shall be exercised by a Governor who will be 

assisted by an Advisory Board whose members shall 

be appointed by the Governor upon the recommendation of the Regional Council of People’s Representatives of the SARET.
132

Article 27

The Government of the SARET shall have the competence to design, guide and implement policies, and 

programmes and issue executive decrees and regulations within the scope of the laws of the SARET. It 

shall also be responsible for ensuring that all laws and 

regulations applicable in East Timor are faithfully administered and enforced.

Article 28

The Governor of SARET shall be elected by a majority of the members of the Regional Council of People’s Representatives of the SARET and responsible to 

it. The list of candidates for the post of Governor of the 

SARET shall first be consulted with and approved by 

the President of the Republic of Indonesia.

Article 29

The Governor-elect shall be formally confirmed to 

the post by the President of the Republic of Indonesia and shall be formally invested before the Regional 

Council of People’s Representatives of the SARET.

Article 30

The Governor shall designate officials who shall be 

in charge of the executive services and other bodies of 

the SARET.

Article 31

The Government of the SARET shall have responsibility for the maintenance of public order in East 

Timor and for the administration and enforcement of 

all laws and regulations within the SARET.

Article 32

There shall be a Police Force of the SARET which 

shall be organized in accordance with regional laws.

Article 33

The Police Force of the SARET shall be subject to 

the authority and control of the Government of the 
133

SARET.

Article 34

Members of the Police Force of the SARET shall be 

recruited, without discrimination on racial, ethnic, or 

religious grounds.

Article 35

The primary functions of the Police Force of the 

SARET shall be:

a. To preserve internal peace and good order in 

East Timor; and

b. To maintain and, as necessary, enforce the law 

in an impartial and objective manner.

Chapter III

Judicial Powers and Institutions of the SARET

Article 36

The judicial power of the SARET shall be vested in 

and exercised by an independent judiciary.

Article 37

The judiciary of the SARET shall have jurisdiction 

over all civil, criminal, administrative and other matters that fall within the competence of the SARET.

Article 38

In any civil suit, with the consent of all of the parties to such suit, the judiciary can apply any customary 

law applicable between such parties and recognized 

as such by the judiciary of the SARET.

Article 39

The judiciary of the SARET shall consist of such 

Courts of First Instance as may be established by regulations of the SARET, a Court of Appeal, a Court of 

Final Appeal and a Public Prosecutor.
134

Article 40

Courts of First Instance

1. There shall be Courts of First Instance in the 

SARET for the administration of justice. Such courts 

shall have such original civil, criminal and administrative jurisdiction as may be necessary to administer 

the laws in force in the SARET.

2. The Courts of First Instance shall consist of such 

judges as may be required for the proper administration of justice.

Article 41

The Court of Appeal

1. There shall be a Court of Appeal, consisting of 

a President and as many other judges as may be required, which shall have appellate jurisdiction from 

judgments of the Courts of First Instance.

2. The Court of Appeal also shall have original 

and appellate jurisdiction over all cases that concern 

the interpretation of Indonesian laws applicable to the 

SARET or the interpretation of Parts One, Five and Six 

of this Agreement.

3. The President of the Court of Appeal shall be 

appointed by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of 

the Republic of Indonesia, upon the recommendation 

of an independent Judicial Commission, which will be 

established in accordance with procedures adopted 

by the Regional Council of People’s Representatives 

of the SARET.

Article 42

Judges of the Courts of First Instance of the Court 

of Appeal shall be selected by the Judicial Commission.

Article 43

The Judicial Commission also shall be responsible 

for disciplinary and other issues related to judicial 
135

performance, as specified by the Regional Council of 

People’s Representatives of the SARET.

Article 44

Court of Final Appeal

1. The court of final appeal of the SARET shall be 

the Supreme Court of Indonesia.

2. An appeal shall lie from decisions of the Court 

of Appeal to the Supreme Court of Indonesia which is 

the right of the disputing parties:

a. in all cases concerning laws and regulations of 

Indonesia applicable in the SARET;

b. in all cases concerning the interpretation of this 

Agreement, provided that the Supreme Court shall establish a special chamber to hear such cases composed 

of an odd number of judges drawn from the Supreme 

Court of Indonesia and ad hoc judges drawn from the 

Supreme Court of Indonesia and ad hoc judges drawn 

from the East Timor Court of Appeal of the SARET.

3. An appeal shall lie from decisions of the Court 

of Appeal to the Supreme Court of Indonesia with the 

leave of the Court of Appeal :

a. in all cases concerning the interpretation of the 

regional laws and regulations of the SARET;

b. on questions of law arising in criminal and civil 

cases.

Article 45

The Public Prosecutor shall be appointed, and 

shall have such duties, as provided for the regional 

laws and regulations of the SARET.
136

PART FOUR

PROMOTION AND PROTECTION OF HUMAN 

RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS

Article 46

The Central Government and the Government of 

the SARET shall promote, protect and respect human 

rights and fundamental freedoms without discrimination of any kind, as set forth, inter alia, in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 1993 Vienna 

Declaration on Human Rights and the Decree of the 

People’s Consultative Assembly No. XVII/MPR/1998 

Concerning Human Rights. These rights and fundamental freedoms include:

a. freedom of thought, conscience, and religion;

b. the right to life, liberty, and security of person;

c. freedom from torture, arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile;

d. the right to a full and fair hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal in the determination of 

any civil rights or obligations or any criminal charge;

e. freedom of expression in all its forms, association, and peaceful assembly;

f. the right to form political parties specific to East 

Timor without restrictions of any kind and subject to 

the provision of Article 57;

g. the right to participate in government without 

discrimination, through free periodic elections and 

non-discriminatory access to public service, subject to 

the provisions of Article 25;

h. the right to participate in Indonesian national 

political life, including the right to vote in general 

elections and to be elected as a member of the Indonesian national Parliament or be appointed as a member 

of the People’s Consultative Assembly.
137

i. the right to participate in Indonesian public and 

administrative services without discrimination on any 

grounds;

j. freedom of movement throughout the territory 

of the Republic of Indonesia;

k. the right of everyone to enjoy and participate in 

his or her culture;

l. the right to own property and not to be arbitrary deprived of it;

m. the right to protection for family life, privacy, 

home and correspondence;

n. the right to education, including, as a minimum, the right to a free primary education for all;

o. the right to an adequate standard of living, subject to available resources and capabilities;

p. the right of women to full and equal participation in political, civil, economic, social, and cultural 

life;

q. the rights of the child, without discrimination 

of any kind, as set fourth in the UN Convention on the 

Rights of the Child.

PART FIVE

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE CENTRAL

GOVERNMENT AND THE GOVERNMENT OF 

THE SARET

Article 47

The Central Government shall take into account 

the views of the Government of the SARET in the 

adoption of laws, regulations and policies within the 

competence of the Central Government that may have 

a direct effect in the SARET.

Article 48
138

In the implementation of those laws, regulations or 

policies of the Central Government that are applicable 

in the SARET, as set forth in Chapter I of Part One, the 

Government of the SARET shall coordinate, with the 

relevant offices of the Central Government. 

Article 49

The Central Government shall appoint a senior official, who shall reside in Dili, to exercise the competences of the Central Government in the SARET, and 

to coordinate and supervise such Central Government 

officials the SARET as may be necessary to assist the 

Government of the SARET in the implementation of 

laws, regulations and policies within the competence 

of the Central Government, as set forth in Chapter I of 

Part One, and to perform the functions provided for in 

Article 50 below.

Article 50

The Central Government and the Government of 

the SARET may create bodies or other arrangements 

to facilitate consultation, cooperation and coordination on such matters as police matters, tourism, transportation, telecommunications, education, health and 

the environment.

Article 51

In the performance of its duties, the Police Force of 

the SARET shall consult and cooperate with the Central Government authorities with respect to the enforcement of Indonesian national laws in the SARET.

Article 52

The Police Force of the SARET shall take the necessary action, at the request of the Indonesian National 

Police to apprehend persons in the SARET accused of 

having committed crimes outside the SARET.

Article 53

The Indonesian National Police shall take the nec-
139

essary action, in cooperation with the Police Force of 

the SARET, to apprehend persons outside the SARET 

accused of having committed crimes in the SARET.

Article 54

In exceptional cases the Indonesian National Police will assist the Police Force of the SARET in the 

performance of its functions.

PART SIX

RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE SPECIAL 

AUTONOMOUS OF EAST

TIMOR AND OTHER ENTITIES

Article 55

Without prejudice to the responsibility and competence of the Central Government, as set forth in Article 1,

the Government of the SARET may, with the consent of the Central Government enter into agreements 

and engage in cultural, economic, trade, environmental, transportation, scientific, technical, tourism, and 

sports activities with regional governments/cities of 

foreign countries and international organizations; 

the Government of the SARET may seek and obtain international development assistance with the 

consent of the Central Government;

foreign governments may open, with the consent 

of the Central Government, nondiplomatic representative offices in the SARET.
140

PART SEVEN

THE UNITED NATIONS

Article 56

The United Nations Secretary-General shall have 

the responsibility and authority to monitor and verify compliance with this Agreement. This authority 

includes monitoring the election of members of the 

Regional Council of People’s Representatives of the 

SARET and verifying that such elections are free and 

fair. For this purpose, the United Nations SecretaryGeneral may establish in the SARET such offices as he 

deems necessary which would operate within a specific time-frame to be further agreed upon between 

the United Nations and the Indonesian Government.

PART EIGHT

GENERAL PROVISIONS

Article 57

The special autonomy for East Timor as provided 

in this Agreement is granted within the framework of 

the Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia.

PART NINE

BASIC LAW OF THE SARET

Article 58

The SARET shall be governed by a basic law, enacted by the first elected Regional Council of People’s 

Representatives of the SARET and which shall be in 

accordance with the provisions of this Agreement.
141

PART TEN

TRANSITIONAL PROVISIONS

Article 59

The following provisions shall be in effect during 

the time between the entry into force of this agreement and the election and assumption of office by the 

Regional Council of People’s Representatives of the 

SARET and the Executive Council of the SARET:

There shall be a broadly representative Transitional 

Council, composed of no more than 25 persons of East 

Timorese identity, whose members shall be appointed 

by the United Nations Secretary-General in consultation with relevant individuals and groups within the 

SARET and with the Government of Indonesia.

The Transitional Council can enact the regional 

laws and regulations for the election of the first Regional Council of People’s Representatives of the 

SARET and for such subjects as may be agreed upon 

by the parties to this Agreement, in accordance with 

existing laws, while maintaining the smooth functioning of the general administration, public services and 

public order.

The Secretary-General of the United Nations, the 

Governments of Indonesia and Portugal and the Transitional Council shall engage in consultations to ensure the effective implementation of this Agreement, 

and the smooth and peaceful process of transition in 

the SARET.

The Secretary-General of the United Nations, the 

Governments of Indonesia and the Transitional Council shall establish as working group that will address 

transitional security arrangements.
142

ANNEX II

Agreement regarding the modalities for the popular 

consultation of the East Timorese through a direct 

ballot

The Governments of Indonesia and Portugal and 

the Secretary-General of the United Nations, 

Agree as follows:

Immediately following the conclusion of the agreement between the two Governments requesting the 

Secretary-General to consult the East Timorese people 

on whether they would accept or reject the proposed 

constitutional framework for autonomy, the Secretary-General will, subject to the appropriate legislative mandate, begin preparations for the popular consultation by deploying in East Timor such personnel 

as will be adequate for the purpose of executing the 

various phases of the consultation process. Preparations for the vote outside East Timor will also begin 

at locations of major East Timorese concentration outside East Timor.

A. Date for consultation

The ballot will take place on Sunday, 8 August 1999, 

both inside and outside East Timor.

B. Question to be put before the voters

The question that the Secretary-General will put to the 

voters is: 

“Do you accept the proposed special autonomy 

for East Timor within the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia?
143

OR

“Do you reject the proposed special autonomy 

for East Timor, leading to East Timor’s separation 

from Indonesia?”

The United Nations logo will appear on the ballot papers. The ballot papers will include symbols to facilitate voting by illiterate persons.

C. Entitlement to vote

The following persons, aged 17 years or above, 

shall be eligible to vote in the popular consultation:

(a) persons born in East Timor,

(b) persons born outside East Timor but with at 

least one parent having been born in East Timor, and

(c) persons whose spouses fall under either of the 

two categories above.

D. Schedule of the consultation process (in overlapping time periods)

The schedule for the operational stages of the consultation process will be approximately as follows:

Operational planning/Deployment 

10 May-15 June

Public information programme/ 

10 May - 5 August

Voter education

Preparation and Registration 

13 June - 17 July

Exhibition of lists and challenges/ 
144

18 July - 23 July

Decisions on challenges and complaints

Political Campaign 

20 July - 5 August*

Cooling off period 

6 August-7 August

Polling Day 

8 August

*Subject to revision

E. Operational Phases

a) Information Campaign

The United Nations will make available the text of 

the main Agreement and the autonomy document to 

be voted on in the following languages: Tetun, Bahasa 

Indonesia, Portuguese and English. 

The United Nations will disseminate and explain 

the content of the main Agreement and the autonomy 

document in an impartial and factual manner inside 

and outside East Timor. 

The United Nations will explain to voters the process and procedure of the vote, and the implications of 

an ‘accept’ or ‘reject’ vote.

The radio stations and the newspapers in East 

Timor as well as other Indonesian and Portuguese media outlets will be utilized in the dissemination of this 

information. Other appropriate means of dissemination will be made use of as required. 

b) Registration

Registration inside and outside East Timor will 
145

take place for a continuous period of 20 days.

Two hundred registration centres will be opened 

in East Timor for this purpose.

Outside East Timor, special registration centres 

will be opened in Jakarta, Yogyakarta, Surabaya, 

Denpasar, Ujung Pandang, Sydney, Darwin, Perth, 

Melbourne, Lisbon, Maputo, Macau, New York with 

adjustments to be made as appropriate. The United 

Nations may utilize the services of the Australian Electoral Commission for the balloting in Australia and of 

the International Organization for Migration (IOM) in 

Portugal and elsewhere. 

The registration lists will be exhibited for five days 

at the end of the registration period at the respective 

registration centres, regional offices and at Dili headquarters. Challenges to the lists shall be submitted to 

the regional offices for a final decision by the Electoral 

Commission prior to polling day. 

c) Campaign

Supporters and opponents of the autonomy proposal will campaign ahead of the vote in a peaceful 

and democratic manner during the period designated 

for this purpose.

There will be a Code of Conduct for the campaign, 

to be proposed by the United Nations and discussed 

with the supporters and opponents of the autonomy 

proposal.

The United Nations will devise the means to provide equal opportunity for the two sides to disseminate their views to the public.

Officials of the Governments of Indonesia and Portugal will not participate in the campaign in support 

of either option. 
146

East Timorese government officials may campaign 

in their personal capacity. All such campaigning will 

be carried out strictly according to the Code of Conduct without use of public funds and government resources or recourse to pressure of office.

d) Balloting in East Timor

Voting in East Timor will take place in approximately 700 registration/polling stations located in 200 

polling centres.

e) Balloting outside East Timor

Voting will take place in polling stations set up 

in the same locations as the registration centres mentioned above.

f) Observers

Indonesia and Portugal shall be entitled to send 

an equal number of representatives to observe all the 

operational phases of the consultation process both 

inside and outside East Timor. 

International observers will be able to observe the 

consultation process under terms to be developed by 

the United Nations to regulate their presence.

F. Funding

The Secretary-General will seek the approval of the 

Security Council for the operation in order to ensure 

assessed budgetary funding. Voluntary contributions 

will be channeled through a Trust Fund established 

for this purpose.
147

G. Security

The Indonesian authorities will ensure a secure 

environment for a free and fair popular consultation 

process and will be responsible for the security of 

United Nations personnel. A number of United Nations security guards will be deployed to ensure the 

security and safety of United Nations personnel and 

property. A number of international civilian police 

will be available in East Timor to advise the Indonesian Police during the operational phases of the popular consultation and, at the time of the consultation, to 

supervise the escort of ballot papers and boxes to and 

from polling sites.

DONE in New York on this 5th day of May, 1999.

For the Government of Indonesia 

/s/

Ali Alatas

Minister for Foreign Affairs

For the United Nations

/s/

Kofi A. Annan

Secretary-General 

For the Government of Portugal

/s/

Jaime Gama

Minister for Foreign Affairs
148

Annex III

East Timor popular consultation

The Government of Indonesia and Portugal and 

the Secretary General of the United Nations,

Agree as follows:

1. A secure environment devoid of violence or 

other forms of intimidation is a prerequisite for the 

holding of a free and fair ballot in East Timor. Responsibility to ensure such an environment as well as for 

the general maintenance of law and order rests with 

the appropriate Indonesian security authorities. The 

absolute neutrality of the TNI (Indonesian Armed 

Forces) and the Indonesian Police is essential in this 

regard.

2. The Commission on Peace and Stability established in Dili on 21 April 1999 should become operational without delay. The Commission, in cooperation 

with the United Nations, will elaborate a code of conduct, by which all parties should abide, for the period 

prior to and following the consultation, ensure the 

laying down of arms and take the necessary steps to 

achieve disarmament.

3. Prior to the start of the registration, the Secretary-General shall ascertain, based on the objective 

evaluation of the UN mission, that the necessary security situation exists for the peaceful implementation of 

the consultation process.

4. The police will be solely responsible for the 

maintenance of law and order. The Secretary-General, after obtaining the necessary mandate, will make 

available a number of civilian police officers to act as 

advisers to the Indonesian Police in the discharge of 

their duties and, at the time of the consultation, to su-
149

pervise the escort of ballot papers and boxes to and 

from the polling sites.

DONE in New York on this 5th day of May 1999 

For the Government of Portugal

/s/

Jaime Gama

Minister for Foreign Affairs 

Portugal

For the United Nations

/s/

Kofi A. Annan

Secretary-General

United Nations

For the Government of Indonesia

/s/

Ali Alatas

Minister for Foreign Affairs

Indonesia
150

Appendix F: United Nations Security Council Resolution 1246 (June 11, 1999)

RESOLUTION 1246 (1999)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 4013th 

meeting, on 11 June 1999

The Security Council,

Recalling its previous resolutions on the situation 

in East Timor, in particular resolution 1236 (1999) of 7 

May 1999,

Recalling the Agreement between Indonesia and 

Portugal on the question of East Timor of 5 May 1999 

(the General Agreement) and the Agreements between the United Nations and the Governments of Indonesia and Portugal of the same date regarding the 

modalities for the popular consultation of the East Timorese through a direct ballot and regarding security 

arrangements (the Security Agreement) (S/1999/513, 

annexes I-III),

Welcoming the report of the Secretary-General on the Question of East Timor of 22 May 1999 

(S/1999/595),

Noting with concern the assessment of the Secretary-General contained in that report that the security 

situation in East Timor remains “extremely tense and 

volatile”,

Taking note of the pressing need for reconciliation 

between the various competing factions within East 

Timor,

Welcoming the fruitful cooperation of the Government of Indonesia and the local authorities in East 

Timor with the United Nations,

Taking note of the letter from the Permanent 

Representative of Portugal to the United Nations to 
151

the President of the Security Council of 7 June 1999 

(S/1999/652),

Welcoming the conclusion of consultations between the Government of Indonesia and the United 

Nations on the deployment of military liaison officers 

within the mission established by this resolution,

Bearing in mind the sustained efforts of the Governments of Indonesia and Portugal since July 1983, 

through the good offices of the Secretary-General, to 

find a just, comprehensive and internationally acceptable solution to the question of East Timor,

Welcoming the appointment of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the East Timor 

Popular Consultation, and reiterating its support for 

the efforts of the Personal Representative of the Secretary-General for East Timor,

1. Decides to establish until 31 August 1999 the 

United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) to 

organize and conduct a popular consultation, scheduled for 8 August 1999, on the basis of a direct, secret 

and universal ballot, in order to ascertain whether the 

East Timorese people accept the proposed constitutional framework providing for a special autonomy for 

East Timor within the unitary Republic of Indonesia or 

reject the proposed special autonomy for East Timor, 

leading to East Timor’s separation from Indonesia, in 

accordance with the General Agreement and to enable 

the Secretary-General to discharge his responsibility 

under paragraph 3 of the Security Agreement;

2. Authorizes until 31 August 1999 the deployment within UNAMET of up to 280 civilian police 

officers to act as advisers to the Indonesian Police in 

the discharge of their duties and, at the time of the 

consultation, to supervise the escort of ballot papers 

and boxes to and from the polling sites;
152

3. Authorizes until 31 August 1999 the deployment within UNAMET of 50 military liaison officers 

to maintain contact with the Indonesian Armed Forces 

in order to allow the Secretary-General to discharge 

his responsibilities under the General Agreement and 

the Security Agreement;

4. Endorses the Secretary-General’s proposal that 

UNAMET should also incorporate the following components:

(a) a political component responsible for monitoring the fairness of the political environment, for 

ensuring the freedom of all political and other nongovernmental organizations to carry out their activities freely and for monitoring and advising the Special 

Representative on all matters with political implications,

(b) an electoral component responsible for all activities related to registration and voting,

(c) an information component responsible for explaining to the East Timorese people, in an objective 

and impartial manner without prejudice to any position or outcome, the terms of the General Agreement 

and the proposed autonomy framework, for providing information on the process and procedure of the 

vote and for explaining the implications of a vote in 

favour or against the proposal;

5. Notes the intention of the Governments of Indonesia and Portugal to send an equal number of representatives to observe all the operational phases of 

the consultation process both inside and outside East 

Timor;

6. Welcomes the intention of the Secretary-General to conclude with the Government of Indonesia, as 

soon as possible, a status-of-mission agreement and 

urges the early conclusion of negotiations with a view 
153

to the full and timely deployment of UNAMET;

7. Calls upon all parties to cooperate with UNAMET in the implementation of its mandate, and to 

ensure the security and freedom of movement of its 

staff in carrying out that mandate in all areas of East 

Timor;

8. Approves the modalities for the implementation of the popular consultation process scheduled for 

8 August 1999 as set out in paragraphs 15 to 18 of the 

report of the Secretary-General of 22 May 1999;

9. Stresses once again the responsibility of the 

Government of Indonesia to maintain peace and security in East Timor, in particular in the present security 

situation referred to in the report of the SecretaryGeneral, in order to ensure that the popular consultation is carried out in a fair and peaceful way and in an 

atmosphere free of intimidation, violence or interference from any side and to ensure the safety and security of United Nations and other international staff 

and observers in East Timor;

10. Welcomes in this regard the decision taken by 

the Government of Indonesia to establish a ministerial 

team to monitor and ensure the security of the popular consultation in accordance with Article 3 of the 

General Agreement and paragraph 1 of the Security 

Agreement;

11. Condemns all acts of violence from whatever 

quarter and calls for an end to such acts and the laying down of arms by all armed groups in East Timor, 

for the necessary steps to achieve disarmament and 

for further steps in order to ensure a secure environment devoid of violence or other forms of intimidation, which is a prerequisite for the holding of a free 

and fair ballot in East Timor;

12. Requests all parties to ensure that conditions 
154

exist for the comprehensive implementation of the 

popular consultation, with the full participation of the 

East Timorese people;

13. Urges that every effort be made to make the 

Commission on Peace and Stability operative, and 

in particular stresses the need for the Indonesian authorities to provide security and personal protection 

for members of the Commission in cooperation with 

UNAMET;

14. Reiterates its request to the Secretary-General 

to keep the Security Council closely informed of the 

situation, and to continue to report to it every fourteen 

days on the implementation of its resolutions and of 

the Tripartite Agreements and on the security situation in East Timor;

15. Decides to remain seized of the matter.
155

Appendix G: United Nations Security Council Resolution 1264 (September 15, 1999)

RESOLUTION 1246 (1999)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 4013th

 meeting, on 11 June 1999

The Security Council,

Recalling its previous resolutions on the situation 

in East Timor, in particular resolution 1236 (1999) of 7 

May 1999,

Recalling the Agreement between Indonesia and 

Portugal on the question of East Timor of 5 May 1999 

(the General Agreement) and the Agreements between the United Nations and the Governments of Indonesia and Portugal of the same date regarding the 

modalities for the popular consultation of the East Timorese through a direct ballot and regarding security 

arrangements (the Security Agreement) (S/1999/513, 

annexes I-III),

Welcoming the report of the Secretary-General on the Question of East Timor of 22 May 1999 

(S/1999/595),

Noting with concern the assessment of the Secretary-General contained in that report that the security 

situation in East Timor remains “extremely tense and 

volatile”,

Taking note of the pressing need for reconciliation 

between the various competing factions within East 

Timor,

Welcoming the fruitful cooperation of the Government of Indonesia and the local authorities in East 

Timor with the United Nations,

Taking note of the letter from the Permanent 

Representative of Portugal to the United Nations to 

the President of the Security Council of 7 June 1999 
156

(S/1999/652),

Welcoming the conclusion of consultations between the Government of Indonesia and the United 

Nations on the deployment of military liaison officers 

within the mission established by this resolution,

Bearing in mind the sustained efforts of the Governments of Indonesia and Portugal since July 1983, 

through the good offices of the Secretary-General, to 

find a just, comprehensive and internationally acceptable solution to the question of East Timor,

Welcoming the appointment of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the East Timor 

Popular Consultation, and reiterating its support for 

the efforts of the Personal Representative of the Secretary-General for East Timor,

1. Decides to establish until 31 August 1999 the 

United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) to 

organize and conduct a popular consultation, scheduled for 8 August 1999, on the basis of a direct, secret 

and universal ballot, in order to ascertain whether the 

East Timorese people accept the proposed constitutional framework providing for a special autonomy for 

East Timor within the unitary Republic of Indonesia or 

reject the proposed special autonomy for East Timor, 

leading to East Timor’s separation from Indonesia, in 

accordance with the General Agreement and to enable 

the Secretary-General to discharge his responsibility 

under paragraph 3 of the Security Agreement;

2. Authorizes until 31 August 1999 the deployment within UNAMET of up to 280 civilian police 

officers to act as advisers to the Indonesian Police in 

the discharge of their duties and, at the time of the 

consultation, to supervise the escort of ballot papers 

and boxes to and from the polling sites;

3. Authorizes until 31 August 1999 the deploy-
157

ment within UNAMET of 50 military liaison officers 

to maintain contact with the Indonesian Armed Forces 

in order to allow the Secretary-General to discharge 

his responsibilities under the General Agreement and 

the Security Agreement;

4. Endorses the Secretary-General’s proposal that 

UNAMET should also incorporate the following components:

(a) a political component responsible for monitoring the fairness of the political environment, for 

ensuring the freedom of all political and other nongovernmental organizations to carry out their activities freely and for monitoring and advising the Special 

Representative on all matters with political implications,

(b) an electoral component responsible for all activities related to registration and voting,

(c) an information component responsible for explaining to the East Timorese people, in an objective 

and impartial manner without prejudice to any position or outcome, the terms of the General Agreement 

and the proposed autonomy framework, for providing information on the process and procedure of the 

vote and for explaining the implications of a vote in 

favour or against the proposal;

5. Notes the intention of the Governments of Indonesia and Portugal to send an equal number of representatives to observe all the operational phases of 

the consultation process both inside and outside East 

Timor;

6. Welcomes the intention of the Secretary-General to conclude with the Government of Indonesia, as 

soon as possible, a status-of-mission agreement and 

urges the early conclusion of negotiations with a view 

to the full and timely deployment of UNAMET;
158

7. Calls upon all parties to cooperate with UNAMET in the implementation of its mandate, and to 

ensure the security and freedom of movement of its 

staff in carrying out that mandate in all areas of East 

Timor;

8. Approves the modalities for the implementation of the popular consultation process scheduled for 

8 August 1999 as set out in paragraphs 15 to 18 of the 

report of the Secretary-General of 22 May 1999;

9. Stresses once again the responsibility of the 

Government of Indonesia to maintain peace and security in East Timor, in particular in the present security 

situation referred to in the report of the SecretaryGeneral, in order to ensure that the popular consultation is carried out in a fair and peaceful way and in an 

atmosphere free of intimidation, violence or interference from any side and to ensure the safety and security of United Nations and other international staff 

and observers in East Timor;

10. Welcomes in this regard the decision taken by 

the Government of Indonesia to establish a ministerial 

team to monitor and ensure the security of the popular consultation in accordance with Article 3 of the 

General Agreement and paragraph 1 of the Security 

Agreement;

11. Condemns all acts of violence from whatever 

quarter and calls for an end to such acts and the laying down of arms by all armed groups in East Timor, 

for the necessary steps to achieve disarmament and 

for further steps in order to ensure a secure environment devoid of violence or other forms of intimidation, which is a prerequisite for the holding of a free 

and fair ballot in East Timor;

12. Requests all parties to ensure that conditions 

exist for the comprehensive implementation of the 
159

popular consultation, with the full participation of the 

East Timorese people;

13. Urges that every effort be made to make the 

Commission on Peace and Stability operative, and 

in particular stresses the need for the Indonesian authorities to provide security and personal protection 

for members of the Commission in cooperation with 

UNAMET;

14. Reiterates its request to the Secretary-General 

to keep the Security Council closely informed of the 

situation, and to continue to report to it every fourteen 

days on the implementation of its resolutions and of 

the Tripartite Agreements and on the security situation in East Timor;

15. Decides to remain seized of the matter.
160

Appendix H: United Nations Security Council Resolution 1272 (October 25, 1999)

RESOLUTION 1272 (1999)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 

4057th meeting, on 25 October 1999

The Security Council,

Recalling its previous resolutions and the statements of its President on the situation in East Timor, in 

particular resolutions 384 (1975) of 22 December 1975, 

389 (1976) of 22 April 1976, 1236 (1999) of 7 May 1999, 

1246 (1999) of 11 June 1999, 1262 (1999) of 27 August 

1999 and 1264 (1999) of 15 September 1999,

Recalling also the Agreement between Indonesia 

and Portugal on the question of East Timor of 5 May 

1999 and the Agreements between the United Nations 

and the Governments of Indonesia and Portugal of the 

same date regarding the modalities for the popular 

consultation of the East Timorese through a direct ballot and security arrangements (S/1999/513, annexes I 

to III),

Reiterating its welcome for the successful conduct 

of the popular consultation of the East Timorese people of 30 August 1999, and taking note of its outcome 

through which the East Timorese people expressed 

their clear wish to begin a process of transition under 

the authority of the United Nations towards independence, which it regards as an accurate reflection of the 

views of the East Timorese people,

Welcoming the decision of the Indonesian People’s 

Consultative Assembly on 19 October 1999 concerning East Timor,

Stressing the importance of reconciliation among 

the East Timorese people,
161

Commending the United Nations Mission in East 

Timor (UNAMET) for the admirable courage and determination shown in the implementation of its mandate,

Welcoming the deployment of a multinational 

force to East Timor pursuant to resolution 1264 (1999), 

and recognizing the importance of continued cooperation between the Government of Indonesia and the 

multinational force in this regard,

Noting the report of the Secretary-General of 4 October 1999 (S/1999/1024),

Noting with satisfaction the successful outcome of 

the trilateral meeting held on 28 September 1999, as 

outlined in the report of the Secretary-General,

Deeply concerned by the grave humanitarian situation resulting from violence in East Timor and the 

large-scale displacement and relocation of East Timorese civilians, including large numbers of women 

and children,

Reaffirming the need for all parties to ensure that 

the rights of refugees and displaced persons are protected, and that they are able to return voluntarily in 

safety and security to their homes,

Reaffirming respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Indonesia,

Noting the importance of ensuring the security of 

the boundaries of East Timor, and noting in this regard 

the expressed intention of the Indonesian authorities 

to cooperate with the multinational force deployed 

pursuant to resolution 1264 (1999) and with the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor,

Expressing its concern at reports indicating that 

systematic, widespread and flagrant violations of international humanitarian and human rights law have 

been committed in East Timor, stressing that persons 
162

committing such violations bear individual responsibility, and calling on all parties to cooperate with investigations into these reports,

Recalling the relevant principles contained in the 

Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel adopted on 9 December 1994,

Determining that the continuing situation in East 

Timor constitutes a threat to peace and security,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the 

United Nations,

1. Decides to establish, in accordance with the report of the Secretary-General, a United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), 

which will be endowed with overall responsibility for 

the administration of East Timor and will be empowered to exercise all legislative and executive authority, 

including the administration of justice;

2. Decides also that the mandate of UNTAET shall 

consist of the following elements:

(a) To provide security and maintain law and order throughout the territory of East Timor;

(b) To establish an effective administration;

(c) To assist in the development of civil and social 

services;

(d) To ensure the coordination and delivery of 

humanitarian assistance, rehabilitation and development assistance;

(e) To support capacity-building for self-government;

(f) To assist in the establishment of conditions for 

sustainable development;

3. Decides further that UNTAET will have objectives and a structure along the lines set out in part IV 

of the report of the Secretary-General, and in particular that its main components will be:
163

(a) A governance and public administration component, including an international police element with 

a strength of up to 1,640 officers;

(b) A humanitarian assistance and emergency rehabilitation component;

(c) A military component, with a strength of up to 

8,950 troops and up to 200 military observers;

4. Authorizes UNTAET to take all necessary measures to fulfil its mandate;

5. Recognizes that, in developing and performing 

its functions under its mandate, UNTAET will need to 

draw on the expertise and capacity of Member States, 

United Nations agencies and other international organizations, including the international financial institutions;

6. Welcomes the intention of the Secretary-General to appoint a Special Representative who, as the 

Transitional Administrator, will be responsible for all 

aspects of the United Nations work in East Timor and 

will have the power to enact new laws and regulations 

and to amend, suspend or repeal existing ones;

7. Stresses the importance of cooperation between 

Indonesia, Portugal and UNTAET in the implementation of this resolution;

8. Stresses the need for UNTAET to consult and 

cooperate closely with the East Timorese people in order to carry out its mandate effectively with a view to 

the development of local democratic institutions, including an independent East Timorese human rights 

institution, and the transfer to these institutions of its 

administrative and public service functions;

9. Requests UNTAET and the multinational force 

deployed pursuant to resolution 1264 (1999) to cooperate closely with each other, with a view also to the 

replacement as soon as possible of the multinational 
164

force by the military component of UNTAET, as notified by the Secretary-General having consulted the 

leadership of the multinational force, taking into account conditions on the ground;

10. Reiterates the urgent need for coordinated humanitarian and reconstruction assistance, and calls 

upon all parties to cooperate with humanitarian and 

human rights organizations so as to ensure their safety, the protection of civilians, in particular children, 

the safe return of refugees and displaced persons and 

the effective delivery of humanitarian aid;

11. Welcomes the commitment of the Indonesian 

authorities to allow the refugees and displaced persons in West Timor and elsewhere in Indonesia to 

choose whether to return to East Timor, remain where 

they are or be resettled in other parts of Indonesia, 

and stresses the importance of allowing full, safe and 

unimpeded access by humanitarian organizations in 

carrying out their work;

12. Stresses that it is the responsibility of the Indonesian authorities to take immediate and effective 

measures to ensure the safe return of refugees in West 

Timor and other parts of Indonesia to East Timor, the 

security of refugees, and the civilian and humanitarian character of refugee camps and settlements, in 

particular by curbing the violent and intimidatory activities of the militias there;

13. Welcomes the intention of the Secretary-General to establish a Trust Fund available for, inter alia, 

the rehabilitation of essential infrastructure, including 

the building of basic institutions, the functioning of 

public services and utilities, and the salaries of local 

civil servants;

14. Encourages Member States and international 

agencies and organizations to provide personnel, 
165

equipment and other resources to UNTAET as requested by the Secretary-General, including for the 

building of basic institutions and capacity, and stresses the need for the closest possible coordination of 

these efforts;

15. Underlines the importance of including in UNTAET personnel with appropriate training in international humanitarian, human rights and refugee law, 

including child and gender-related provisions, negotiation and communication skills, cultural awareness 

and civilian-military coordination;

16. Condemns all violence and acts in support of 

violence in East Timor, calls for their immediate end, 

and demands that those responsible for such violence 

be brought to justice;

17. Decides to establish UNTAET for an initial period until 31 January 2001;

18. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the 

Council closely and regularly informed of progress 

towards the implementation of this resolution, including, in particular, with regard to the deployment of 

UNTAET and possible future reductions of its military 

component if the situation in East Timor improves, 

and to submit a report within three months of the date 

of adoption of this resolution and every six months 

thereafter;

19. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.
166

Appendix I: Charter of the United Nations, 

Chapter VII (Articles 39-51)

CHAPTER VII: ACTION WITH RESPECT TO 

THREATS TO THE PEACE, BREACHES OF THE 

PEACE, AND ACTS OF AGGRESSION

Article 39

The Security Council shall determine the existence 

of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of 

aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with 

Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international 

peace and security.

Article 40

In order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, 

the Security Council may, before making the recommendations or deciding upon the measures provided 

for in Article 39, call upon the parties concerned to 

comply with such provisional measures as it deems 

necessary or desirable. Such provisional measures 

shall be without prejudice to the rights, claims, or position of the parties concerned. The Security Council 

shall duly take account of failure to comply with such 

provisional measures.

Article 41

The Security Council may decide what measures 

not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call 

upon the Members of the United Nations to apply 

such measures. These may include complete or partial 

interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, 

postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.
167

Article 42

Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate 

or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to 

maintain or restore international peace and security. 

Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, 

and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of 

Members of the United Nations.

Article 43

1. All Members of the United Nations, in order to 

contribute to the maintenance of international 

peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in 

accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, 

including rights of passage, necessary for the 

purpose of maintaining international peace 

and security.

2. Such agreement or agreements shall govern the 

numbers and types of forces, their degree of 

readiness and general location, and the nature 

of the facilities and assistance to be provided.

3. The agreement or agreements shall be negotiated as soon as possible on the initiative of the 

Security Council. They shall be concluded between the Security Council and Members or 

between the Security Council and groups of 

Members and shall be subject to ratification by 

the signatory states in accordance with their respective constitutional processes.
168

Article 44

When the Security Council has decided to use 

force it shall, before calling upon a Member not represented on it to provide armed forces in fulfilment of 

the obligations assumed under Article 43, invite that 

Member, if the Member so desires, to participate in 

the decisions of the Security Council concerning the 

employment of contingents of that Member’s armed 

forces.

Article 45

In order to enable the United Nations to take urgent military measures, Members shall hold immediately available national air-force contingents for combined international enforcement action. The strength 

and degree of readiness of these contingents and plans 

for their combined action shall be determined within 

the limits laid down in the special agreement or agreements referred to in Article 43, by the Security Council 

with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee.

Article 46

Plans for the application of armed force shall be 

made by the Security Council with the assistance of 

the Military Staff Committee.

Article 47

1. There shall be established a Military Staff Committee to advise and assist the Security Council 

on all questions relating to the Security Council’s military requirements for the maintenance 

of international peace and security, the employment and command of forces placed at 

its disposal, the regulation of armaments, and 

possible disarmament.
169

2. The Military Staff Committee shall consist of 

the Chiefs of Staff of the permanent members 

of the Security Council or their representatives. 

Any Member of the United Nations not permanently represented on the Committee shall be 

invited by the Committee to be associated with 

it when the efficient discharge of the Committee’s responsibilities requires the participation 

of that Member in its work.

3. The Military Staff Committee shall be responsible under the Security Council for the strategic direction of any armed forces placed at the 

disposal of the Security Council. Questions relating to the command of such forces shall be 

worked out subsequently.

4. The Military Staff Committee, with the authorization of the Security Council and after consultation with appropriate regional agencies, may 

establish regional sub-committees.

Article 48

1. The action required to carry out the decisions 

of the Security Council for the maintenance of 

international peace and security shall be taken 

by all the Members of the United Nations or by 

some of them, as the Security Council may determine.

2. Such decisions shall be carried out by the Members of the United Nations directly and through 

their action in the appropriate international 

agencies of which they are members.

Article 49

The Members of the United Nations shall join in 

affording mutual assistance in carrying out the measures decided upon by the Security Council.
170

Article 50

If preventive or enforcement measures against 

any state are taken by the Security Council, any other 

state, whether a Member of the United Nations or 

not, which finds itself confronted with special economic problems arising from the carrying out of those 

measures shall have the right to consult the Security 

Council with regard to a solution of those problems.

Article 51

Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the 

inherent right of individual or collective self-defence 

if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the 

United Nations, until the Security Council has taken 

measures necessary to maintain international peace 

and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately 

reported to the Security Council and shall not in any 

way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at 

any time such action as it deems necessary in order to 

maintain or restore international peace and security.
171

Appendix J: List of Units Assigned to USFI

• JTF Timor Sea Operations, 7th Fleet, Pacific Fleet

• USS Mobile Bay, CJTF TSO (CAPT Edward 

Rogers, USN)

• USNS Kilauea

• USNS San Jose

• EP-3 Detachment

• CINCPAC Planning Team

• USF Australian Logistics Planning Staff, Brisbane and Sydney (Colonel George Borowsky, 

USA and later Colonel Mark Dean, USA)

• Civil-Military Affairs Operation Center, 96th 

Civil Affairs Battalion, US Army Special Operations Command (Lieutenant Colonel Jose 

Uson, USA)

• MSQ-126, Pacific Fleet (Chief Warrant Officer 

Scott Griffin, USN/Major Charles Peabody,

• USMC)

• 613th Air Expeditionary Group, 13th Air Force, 

Pacific Air Forces (Colonel Robert Sheekly, 

USAF)

• Trojan Spirit II, Intelligence Brigade, US Army 

Pacific (1st Lieutenant Jason Farrell, USA)

• USS Belleau Wood Task Element, Amphibious 

Squadron Eleven, Amphibious Group One, 7th 

Fleet, Pacific Fleet (Captain Lee Touchberry, 

USN)

• USS Belleau Wood, Amphibious Group One, 

7th Fleet, Pacific Fleet (Captain Thomas Parker, USN)

• 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit, III MEF, Marine 

Forces Pacific (Colonel David Fulton, USMC)

• USS Peleliu Task Element, Amphibious Squadron One, Amphibious Group Three, 3rd Fleet, 
172

Pacific Fleet (Captain William Hopper, USN)

• USS Peleliu, Amphibious Group Three, 3rd 

Fleet, Pacific Fleet (Captain Larry Watson, 

USN)

• 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit, I MEF, Marine 

Forces Pacific (Colonel Thomas Moore, USMC)

• C-12 Detachment, Marine Corps Bases Japan 

(Lieutenant Colonel Bruce Houser/Lieutenant 

Colonel William Grace/Lieutenant Colonel 

Sam Collins)

• Task Force Thunderbird, 11th Signal Bde, Army 

Signal Command (Lieutenant Colonel Michael 

Yarmie, USA)

• USS Juneau, Amphibious Squadron Eleven, 

Amphibious Group One, 7th Fleet, Pacific Fleet 

(Captain Joseph Miller, USN)
173

End Notes

1. Because of the International Date Line the exact dates of 

events vary among different sources based on their country of 

origin.

2. There is debate about whether Operation STABILISE should 

be considered a peacekeeping operation or a peace enforcement 

operation. An agreement was in place to end the dispute. Indonesia and the majority of the East Timorese population consented 

to the employment of INTERFET. However, the pro-integration 

militias, supported by elements of the Indonesian military, created a situation in which the application or threat of military force 

was necessary to implement the agreement. As such, Operation STABILISE is referred to as a peace enforcement operation 

throughout this document.

3. The acronym for United States Forces INTERFET varies significantly between sources. USFI is used throughout this document based on its use in the United States Forces INTERFET After 

Action Report.

4. A “popular consultation” is the equivalent of a plebiscite. 

As part of an accord signed on May 5, 1999 between Indonesia, 

Portugal, and the U.N., the Government of Indonesia would not 

agree to the term plebiscite, referendum or independence vote 

and the language was settled as a popular consultation. 

5. Ballard, John R., Triumph of Self-Determination: Operation 

Stabilise and United Nations Peacekeeping in East Timor, Westport, 

Conn.: Praeger Security International, 2008 (hereafter Ballard). p. 

1-2.

6. Taylor, John G., Indonesia’s Forgotten War: The Hidden History 

of East Timor, Leichhardt, Australia: Pluto Press, 1991 (hereafter 

Taylor), p. 10.

7. Ballard, p. 4-5.

8. A contingent of 400 Dutch and Australian commandos 

occupied East Timor on December 17, 1941, initially landing at 

Dili. During the ensuing guerilla campaign over 1500 Japanese 

soldiers were killed.
174

9. Ballard, p. 5-6

10. Ballard, p. 7

11. FRETILIN was originally founded as the Association of 

Timorese Social Democrats (Associacao Social Democratica Timor, 

ASDT).

12. Robinson, Geoffrey, East Timor 1999 Crimes Against Humanity: A Report Commissioned by the United Nations Office of the High 

Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), University of California, 

Los Angeles, July 2003 (hereafter Robinson), p. 14-15.

13. Robinson, p. 16.

14. Ballard, p. 9

15. Ballard, p. 10.

16. Robinson, p. 17.

17. Robinson, p. 17.

18. Robinson, p. 18.

19. Robinson, p. 18.

20. Robinson, p. 19.

21 Krieger, Heike K., editor, East Timor and the International 

Community: Basic Documents, New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1997 (hereafter Krieger), p.333

22. Krieger, p. 53.

23. Krieger, p. xxii.

24. On November 12, 1991 Indonesian troops opened fire on 

unarmed civilians at the Santa Cruz Cemetery. The massacre was 

videotaped and distributed worldwide which prevented the Indonesian Government from completely dismissing the incident. 

Official Indonesian figures indicate 85 individuals were killed. 

Non-governmental organizations reported more than 600 killed.
175

25. In 1996 the FRETILIN permanent Representative to the 

U.N. Ramos-Horta and the Bishop of Dili Monsignor Carlos Filipe 

Ximenes Belo were jointly awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for their 

efforts towards a peaceful resolution of the East Timor situation.

26. Robinson, p. 21.

27. Robinson, p. 21.

28. The popular consultation put two questions before the 

East Timorese: 1. “Do you accept the proposed special autonomy 

for East Timor within the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia?” 2) “Do you reject the proposed special autonomy for East 

Timor, leading to East Timor’s separation from Indonesia?”

29. UN General Assembly, Question of East Timor, Report of the 

Secretary General, Document A/53/951, May 5, 1999, available from 

www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/etimor/docs/ 

UntaetDr.htm, accessed on December 28, 2015, p. 2.

30. In 1999 combatant commanders were referred to as commanders in chief of their respective commands. In 2002, U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld changed the designation to 

commander. Throughout this document the U.S. Commander in 

Chief Pacific (USCINCPAC) is referred to as the Commander U.S. 

Pacific Command (CDR USPACOM).

31. Robinson, p. 46.

32. Cosgrove, Peter, My Story, Prymble, N.S.W., Australia: Harper 

Collins Publishers, 2006 (hereafter Cosgrove), p. 154-155.

33. Cosgrove, p. 160.

34. United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1264 (1999), S/

RES/1264, September 15, 1999, available from www.un.org/Docs/

scres/1999/sc99.htm, accessed on December 28, 2015, (hereafter 

UNSCR 1264).

35. Ryan, Alan, Land Warfare Study Paper No. 304, Primary Responsibilities and Primary Risks: Australian Defence Force Participation in the International Force East Timor, Duntroon, Australia: Land 

Warfare Studies Centre, 2000 (hereafter Ryan), p. 24.
176

36. UNSCR 1264

37. PMESII: political, military, economic, social, information, 

and infrastructure.

38. Sebastian, Leonard C. and Anthony L. Smith, “The East 

Timor Crisis: A Test Case for Humanitarian Intervention,” Southeast Asian Affairs, 2000, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS), pp. 64-83, available from www.jstor.org/stable/27912244, 

accessed on December 14, 2015 (hereafter Sebastian and Smith), 

39. Taylor, p. 6-7.

40. Smith, Michael G. and Moreen Dee, Peacekeeping in East 

Timor: The Path to Independence, Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner 

Publishers, Inc., 2003, p. 35.

41. Geoffrey, p. 31.

42. Office of the White House, Statement of the Situation in East 

Timor, www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/wcpd-1999-09-13/pdf/wcpd-1999-03-

13-pg1722.pdf, accessed on December 15, 2015.

43. Weitz, Richard, Ph.D., editor, Project on National Security Reform: Case Studies Working Group, Volume II, U.S. Army War College, 

Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, March 2012 (hereafter 

Weitz), p. 752.

44. Weitz, p. 756.

45. Australian Foreign Minister Downer and U.S. Secretary of 

State Albright met in July 1999. Prime Minister Howard met with 

President Clinton in July 1999.

46. Becker, Elizabeth and Philip Shenon, “With Other Goals in Indonesia, U.S. Moves gently on East Timor,” New York Times, September 

9, 1999, www.nytimes.com/1999/09/09/world/with-other-goals-in-indonesia-us-moves-gently-on-east-timor.html, accessed on January 7, 2016.

47. Weitz, p. 778.
177

48. United States Department of State, Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, Statement on Voting in East Timor, Washington, 

D.C., August 12, 1999, http://19997-2001.state.gov/www/statements/1999/990812.html, accessed on January 7, 1999, and United States Department of State, Office of the Spokesman, Statement 

by Philip T. Reeker, Acting Spokesman, Continuing Militia Violence in 

East Timor, September 1, 1999, http://1997-2001.state.gov/www/

regions/eap/ps-indonesia_990901.html, accessed on January 7, 

1999.

49. Weitz, p. 780.

50. Administration of William J. Clinton, 1999, Remarks on the 

Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Summit and Exchange with Reporters, September 9, 1999, www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-1999-book2/pdf/

PPP-book2-doc-pg1511.pdf, accessed on December 15, 1999.

51. William J. Clinton: “Remarks on East Timor and the 

Shootings at Wedgewood Baptist Church and an Exchange With 

Reporters,” September 16, 1999, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/

ws/?pid=56518, accessed on January 7, 1999.

52. Glynn, MAJ James F., USMC, OPERATION STABILISE: U.S. 

Joint Force Operations in East Timor, Masters of Military Studies, 

United States Marine Corps Command and Staff College: Quantico, Virginia, April 20, 2001 (hereafter Glynn), p. 12-13

53. United States Pacific Command, INTERFET Peacekeeping Operation: USCINCPAC Perspective 15 Sep 99 – 23 Feb 2000. Briefing 

provided by the Office of the U.S. Pacific Command Historian (hereafter 

USCINCPAC Perspective), slide 2.

54. Ballard, p. 57.

55. United States Forces International Forces East Timor (USFI), 

Operation Stabilize After Action Report: Part I Executive Summary, 

February 11, 2000 (hereafter USFI AAR), p. 2.

56. MG (ret) Randolph P. Strong, USA, former Commander, 

United States Forces East Timor, Telephonic Interview with author on November 9, 2015 (hereafter Strong).
178

57. Glynn, p. 18.

58. USCINCPAC Perspective, p. 3.

59. USCINCPAC Perspective, p. 4.

60. LTG (ret) Edmond Smith, USA, former Commander, United 

States Army Pacific, Telephonic Interview with author on November 9, 

2015.

61. USFI AAR, p. 3.

62. Strong.

63. Strong.

64. Joint Publication 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters, February 16, 2007, p. I-1.

65. USCINCPAC Perspective, slide 4.

66. USFI AAR, p. 17.

67. United States Forces International Forces East Timor, USFORINTERFET, Peace and Security, March 3, 2004, p. 8.

68. United States Army Pacific, East Timor – USARPAC Officer 

Professional Development Briefing, provided by MG (ret) Randolph 

P. Strong USA, November 30, 2015 (hereafter UASARPAC OPD), 

p. 21.

69. Glynn, p. 13, as annotated in John G. Castellaw, BGen, USMC, 

“East Timor: Breaking New Ground,” unpublished article for Joint Forces Quarterly, 7 June 2000, 5.

70. UASARPAC OPD, p. 29.

71. Glynn, p. 19.

72. UASARPAC OPD, p. 9.

73. USARPAC OPD, p. 11
179

74. USARPAC OPD, p. 10

75. United States Forces East Timor, Final Redeployment Brief, 

provided by MG (ret) Randolph P. Strong, USA, November 30, 

2015 (hereafter Final Redeployment Brief), p. 2.

76. USARPAC OPD, p. 14-16

77. Australian Department of Defence, Management of Australian Defence Force Deployments to East Timor, Australian National 

Audit Office, Commonwealth of Australia, March 19 2002, p. 33.

78. Cosgrove, p. 179.

79. USFI AAR, p. 5.

80. USFI AAR, p. 4.

81. USFI AAR, p. 5.

82. Bonfiglio, Joseph, “Where the Streets Have No Names,” 

Army Logistician, Vol. 32, No. 4, July – August 2000.

83. LtGen (ret) John Castellaw, USMC, former Commander, 

United States Forces International Forces East Timor, Telephonic 

Interview with author on November 13, 2015 (hereafter Castellaw).

84. Castellaw.

85. USFI AAR, p. 5.

86. USFI AAR, p. 7. 

87. Castellaw

88. USFI AAR, p. 7.

89. Gillert, Douglas J., “Cohen Pledges U.S. Assistance to Thai East 

Timor Forces,” DoD News, October 1, 1999, http://archive.defense.gov/

news/newsarticle.aspx?id=42193, accessed on January 13, 1999.
180

90. Collier, Major Craig A., United States Army, “A New Way 

to Wage Peace: U.S. Support to Operation Stabilise,” Military Review, Volume LXXXI, January – February 2001, No.1, p. 4.

91. McPherson, Bill, The ‘East Timor Tapes’: Interview with COL 

Randolph Strong, commander of U.S. Forces East Timor, provided by 

the USPACOM Historian, p. 3.

92. Gillert, Douglas J., “Cohen Issues Blunt Warnings on 

East Timor, Indonesian Democracy,” DoD News, October 1, 1999, 

http://archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=42195, 

accessed on February 11, 2016.

93. United States Department of State, Julia V. Taft, Assistant 

Secretary of State, Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, Testimony, Subcommittee on International Operations and Human 

Rights, House International Relations Committee, Washington, DC, 

September 30 1999, available from http://1997-2001.state.gov/

www/policy_remarks/1999/990930_taft_timor.html, accessed 

on January 7, 2016.

94. Ryan, p. 75.

95. The original disaster declaration was issued in May 1999 

and included various regions in Indonesia to include East Timor.

96. United States Agency for International Development, East 

Timor Crisis Fact Sheet #11, FY 2000, October 18, 1999, available 

from http://reliefweb.int/report/timor-leste/east-timor-crisis-fact-sheet11-fy-2000, accessed on January 7, 2016.

97. United States Agency for International Development, East Timor 

Planning Framework: Transition to Independence, June 6, 2000, available at pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDABS759.pdf, accessed on December 

29, 2015.

98. United Nations Security Council, Letter Dated 4 October 1999 

from The Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security 

Council, S/1999/1025, October 4, 1999, available from http://www.

un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/1999/1025, accessed on December 16, 2015.
181

Additional letters from the Government of Australia were 

dated October 15, 1999, October 29, 1999, November 12, 1999, and 

December 14, 1999.

99. Folk, James and Lieutenant Colonel Andy Smith, United 

States Army Reserve, “A LOGCAP Success in East Timor,” Army 

Logistician, Vol. 32, No. 4, July – August 2000, pp. 38-42.

100. Final Redeployment Brief, p. 4.

101. Final Redeployment Brief, p. 9.

102. Final Redeployment Brief, p. 11.

103. Final Redeployment Brief, p. 13.

104. USFI AAR, p. 11.

105. USFI AAR, p. 11.

106. United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, Chapter VII 

(Articles 39-51), available from http://www.un.org/en/sections/uncharter/chapter-vii/index.html, accessed on 30 December 2015.

107. Ryan, p. 110.

108. Glynn, p. 28.

109. Joint Publication 3-07.3, Peace Operations, 1 August 2012 

(hereafter JP 3-07.3), p. I-4.

110. JP 3-07.3, p, I-4.

111. Beasley, Major Kent, Australian Defence Forces, Information Operations during Operation Stabilise in East Timor, Duntroon 

ACT, Australia: Land Warfare Studies Centre, 2002, p. 42.

112. USFI AAR, p. 14.

113. JP 3-07.3, p. I-4.

114. JP 3-07.3, p. I-5.
182

115. JP 3-07.3, p. I-5.

116. JP 3-07.3, p. I-6
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