THE TROUBLED PATH TO THE PENTAGON'S RULES

ON MEDIA ACCESS TO THE BATTLEFIELD:

GRENADA TO TODAY

Pascale Combelles-Siegel

May 15, 1996
*******

This monograph presents preliminary findings of a study on

the process towards a new DoD doctrine on Public Affairs and the

implications of this doctrine for military-media relations on the

battlefield. The John T. and Catherine D. MacArthur Foundation

graciously funded this study.

*******

The views expressed in this report are those of the author

and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of

the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the

U.S. Government. This report is cleared for public release;

distribution is unlimited.

*******

Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be

forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army

War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050. Copies of this

report may be obtained from the Publications and Production

Office by calling commercial (717) 245-4133, DSN 242-4133, FAX

(717) 245-3820, or via the Internet at rummelr@carlisleemh2.army.mil.

*******

All 1995 and later Strategic Studies Institute (SSI)

monographs are available on the SSI Homepage for electronic

dissemination. SSI's Homepage address is: http://carlislewww.army.mil/usassi/.
FOREWORD

Relations between the United States military and the

American press soured during the Vietnam War. Many factors

contributed to the mistrust that grew between the armed forces

and the press, and blame can be laid on many doorsteps.

Since the Vietnam era, military-media relations have evolved

to a far less hostile state. Today, perhaps chiefly as a result

of successful operations since Vietnam, there is much greater

mutual respect. Yet, an undertone of wariness lies just beneath

the surface.

In the following monograph, Ms. Pascale Combelles-Siegel

examines the difficult road traveled by the press and the

military since Operation URGENT FURY in 1983. She focuses on the

development of the 1992 Joint Doctrine for Public Affairs as a

practical tool for reducing tension and providing press access to

the battlefield. Her analysis reflects the duality of the

relationship and the efforts of both communities to find a modus

vivendi.

In the Information Age, media-military relations will become

even more complex, and their impact on U.S. strategy, doctrine,

and operations will grow. For that reason, the Strategic Studies

Institute urges careful consideration of this monograph.

RICHARD H. WITHERSPOON

Colonel, U.S. Army

Director, Strategic Studies Institute
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

PASCALE COMBELLES-SIEGEL is an associate with the Centre d'Etudes

et de Recherches Sur l'Armee at the Institut d'Etudes Politiques

de Toulouse and a visiting researcher at the Center for

International Security Studies at the University of Maryland at

College Park. In February 1995, she received a grant from the

MacArthur Foundation for the research behind this paper, which

was presented in an earlier form at the Inter-University Seminar

on Armed Forces and Society, Baltimore, Maryland, October 22,

1995. She is currently completing her Ph.D. dissertation which

examines U.S. military-media relations since Vietnam. Ms.

Combelles-Siegel has published articles in both Europe and the

United States (most recently an article on media-military

relations during Just Cause in the May-June 1995 Military

Review). In addition, she has presented papers at numerous

conferences on both sides of the ocean. She holds a bachelor's

degree in history from Universite de Toulouse and a bachelor's

degree in political science from the Institut d'Etudes Politiques

de Toulouse, as well as a master's degree in political science

from the Universite de Toulouse.
SUMMARY

Since Grenada, the question of media access to the

battlefield has regularly generated some form of controversy

between the press and the military, as journalists and editors

regularly complained about military control over information.

After each major operation, the Pentagon conducted a review of

military-media relations and tried to institutionalize (then to

improve) a viable system for granting access to the battlefield:

the Department of Defense News Media Pool (DoDNMP).

This arrangement, however, has not satisfied the media.

First, the DoDNMP appeared to journalists as a convenient means

to limit (rather than grant) media access to the battlefield.

Second, the pool concept has proved to be cumbersome in terms of

logistics and has limited journalists' ability to react to

events. These drawbacks were particularly evident in the Gulf

War. CENTCOM used the pool system to control the large number of

journalists but did not provide adequate logistical support to

ensure timely transmission of pool products. After the war, and

for the first time, the media--as an institution--demanded to be

part of a review process. Beginning in September 1991, a group of

five media representatives and the Assistant Secretary of Defense

for Public Affairs (Pete Williams) began to meet to elaborate new

and common ground rules for media coverage of combat operations.

In May 1992, after 8 months of negotiations, the Pentagon

announced the first "agreement on war coverage guidelines." The

agreement soon became a DoD regulation and is now the basis for

drafting the first Joint Doctrine for Public Affairs.

Both the military and the media greeted the 1992 rules as

opening a new era in military-media relations. Written to avoid

the problems that emerged in the Gulf War, the 1992 agreement and

the draft directive propose some important changes to the

procedures implemented in the past decade. The two main

achievements of these new rules consist in abolishing the

principle of exclusive pool coverage as a standard means for

granting access and in replacing the process of security review

by the process of security at the source to protect operational

security. Without diminishing the value of those improvements,

the rules and the draft policy have serious shortcomings. These

include several important questions, such as numerical limitation

on reporters assigned to cover military operations; live coverage

of battlefield operations; multinational media access to U.S.

military operations; and media access to multinational

operations. Failure to address these issues might invalidate the

progress contained in the 1992 agreement and to be promulgated in

the draft DoD directive.
THE TROUBLED PATH TO THE PENTAGON'S RULES

ON MEDIA ACCESS TO THE BATTLEFIELD:

GRENADA TO TODAY

The question of media access to the battlefield exploded

like a bomb on Operation URGENT FURY in Grenada in October 1983.

As U.S. forces invaded the small Caribbean island to overthrow

the revolutionary government and protect U.S. citizens, no

journalists were able to deliver first-hand reports until 2 1/2

days after the operation had begun. But if the fighting was not

covered live, the battle over restrictions on the press was

played out in real-time--on editorial pages and talk shows all

across America.

For the next 10 years, controversy over military

restrictions on press access to military operations regularly

erupted. During this period, various attempts to define viable

and mutually satisfactory rules on media access to military

operations failed. Most of these efforts concentrated on how to

accommodate growing numbers of journalists during combat

operations, as the military is reluctant to grant journalists

unlimited access to the battlefield.1 In 1992, after 8 months of

negotiations, the Department of Defense and representatives from

five major media organizations signed a formal agreement on media

access to the battlefield.

This monograph first frames the debate by reviewing the

demands and desires of both sides (the military and the media2)

that led them to engage in the process of making rules on media

access. The next section reviews the abortive attempts through

the 1980s to institutionalize a viable system for granting media

access to operations. This review serves as the background to an

explanation as to why these various attempts have largely failed

(for combat military operations at least). The highly-publicized

failures during DESERT STORM led to a concerted media effort to

change the situation, which resulted in the 1992 agreement

between the Department of Defense (DoD) and media

representatives. Based, in part, on the contents of this

agreement, the Department of Defense has been developing a

doctrine on public affairs. Three years later, this doctrine and

related DoD directrives remain in draft form. Sadly, these drafts

show many of the same weaknesses of the 1992 agreement. In

conclusion, this paper highlights these problems and suggests

some recommendations for reform that will improve media coverage

of the battlefield.

Framing the Debate.

Press Principles: From Dreams to Reality. In the aftermath
of Grenada, the major U.S. media and professional associations3

demanded that the U.S. Government (and, more specifically, the

military) accommodate the press in 'wartime' situations. Their

rationale was twofold. They first claimed that the press had

always been present whenever U.S. troops had been involved in

combat operations around the world, even when high stakes and

great danger were involved. In the "Statement of Principles on

Press Access to Military Operations" adopted in January 1984,

they asserted: "Since the Revolutionary War, American journalists

have always been allowed to cover U.S. troops in action."4 Many

of the articles and reports on the journalists' inability to

cover URGENT FURY referred to the 27 journalists who accompanied

the first wave of soldiers landing on the Normandy beaches on

June 6, 1944.5

Second, the press argued that the tradition of journalists

accompanying soldiers on the battlefield was a key pillar of

American democracy--media presence serves the people's right to

know. The essence of this argument is that the tradition of free

press had made the United States of America one of the strongest

nations in the world, and there was no need to change it.6

 As

time went by and severe limitations on access replaced exclusion,

as in Panama or in the Gulf War, the press shifted its focus from

the first argument (tradition) to the second (democratic values)

to compel the DoD toward more openness. For example, in a letter

of protest sent to Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney in April

1991, major news organizations argued:

Our sense is that virtually all major news

organizations agree that the flow of information to the

public was blocked, impeded or diminished by the

policies and practices of the DoD. Pools did not work.

Stories and pictures were late or lost. Access to the

men and women in the field was interfered with by a

needless system of military escorts and security

review. These conditions meant that we could not tell

the public the full story of those who fought the

nation's battle.7

During this decade, a small minority of press activists

argued that military restrictions on press access violated the

First Amendment.8 Those activists, generally leaning to the left

of the political spectrum, sued the DoD in two cases. In 1984,

publisher Larry Flynt challenged the constitutionality of the

press's ban. He argued that the Defense Department had violated

his First Amendment rights when it prevented his reporters from

traveling to Grenada for the purpose of gathering news.9 The suit

occurred well after the operation was over, and the judge decided

the case was moot and refused to make a ruling. In February 1991,

a group of 10 magazines led by The Nation also sued the DoD. The

plaintiffs claimed that "the press has a First Amendment right to
unlimited access to a foreign arena in which American military

forces are engaged. Plaintiffs urge that the DoD 'pooling'

regulations, which limit access to the battlefield to a specified

number of press representatives and subject them to certain

restrictions, infringe on news gathering privileges accorded by

the First Amendment."10 As in the previous case, the judge decided

in March that the case was no longer valid because the war had

ended.

 These two arguments, however, do not stand up to scrutiny.

In terms of tradition, the press must have examined history with

rose-colored glasses, as bans and exclusions have existed all

along. During World War I, General John Pershing initially

limited the number of accredited reporters to 31 and barred them

from traveling to the front lines.11 During World War II,

journalists did not observe first-hand many important battles,

including the Battle of Midway, the defense of Bastogne during

the Bulge campaign, or the dropping of the first atomic bomb on

Hiroshima.12 Even in Vietnam, so dear to the memory of

journalists, certain actions and zones were regularly off-limits

to journalists (there was for example, a general ban on reporters

on Thai bases).13 What made the issue more sensitive in Grenada is

that the exclusion from a battle meant exclusion from the whole

war.

The credibility of the media's argument was also shaken when

the public, which the press claims to serve, did not show strong

support for the battle against the administration's media policy

in Grenada. As various polls indicated soon after the operation,

52 percent approved the limitations on press access to Grenada;

64 percent believed the justifications given by the

administration (troop security) and only 25 percent believed

press restrictions occurred because the Reagan administration

wanted to manipulate the public;14 and 47 percent approved of

excluding the press until the mission was achieved (as actually

happened).15 At the time, the support for Reagan's policy in the

particular context of Grenada appeared to be a vote of noconfidence for the press.16 However, most Americans still approved

of the general principles of media access to the battlefield,

with 76 percent considering that media presence on the

battlefield benefits the nation.17 Even more impressively, 83

percent considered that in a free country like the United States,

one of the most important liberties is to be informed of events,

especially when soldiers' lives are at stake.18

Military Realism. The military, on the other hand, chose the

path of realism for dealing with the controversy. Despite the

absence of a successful legal challenge and with clear public

support for both the military intervention and the ban on the

press, the military nonetheless chose to negotiate with the

press. General John Vessey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, had two principal motivations for taking this path.

First, in the wake of the Grenada controversy, the DoD

recognized as one of its prime responsibilities the necessity "to

make timely and accurate information" available to the public,

Congress, and the news media.19 Second, the military believed that

URGENT FURY had received bad (i.e., negative) coverage from the

press and attributed this to the exclusion of the press during

the combat phase of the operation. Vice Admiral Joseph Metcalf,

who commanded the operation, believes the press ban was

counterproductive because, as a result, "the media expended more

column inches and time defending their prerogatives than in

reporting the story."20 He believes that, due to this, the public

was deprived of the story of the part that American

pride, ingenuity, training in fighting fundamentals,

and luck played in the success of the Grenada rescue

operation . . . Actually all the public really cares in

the long-term is that we won. Nevertheless, pundits and

anchor-men still talk about Grenada in terms of

failure. There is an ethos that surrounds 'Urgent Fury'

which denies that in both a military and strategic

sense all objectives were realized.

Michael Burch, then Assistant Secretary of Defense for

Public Affairs (ASD(PA)), also considers the press's exclusion as

a mistake: "A combination of mistrust, poor planning, and poor

execution on the part of the commander who did not realize that

it would have helped the image of the operation and helped gather

international support for the operation."21 Navy Captain Robert

Sims, then a spokesman for the National Security Council, also

views the press ban as responsible for the perceived bad press

the operation received. "Because the press was excluded, the

operation received unfavorable reporting, even though it was a

staunch success."22

A Series of Abortive Attempts to Find Compromise.

During the 9 years from Grenada (1983) to 1992, the Pentagon

engaged in negotiations and unilateral actions to try to improve

media access to the battlefield. All the attempts, however, fell

short of creating a system satisfactory to all concerned.

The first attempt came in the aftermath of the Grenada

controversy, when General Vessey convened a bipartisan commission

presided over by Retired U.S. Army Major General Winant Sidle.

General Vessey tasked the Sidle Military-Media Relations Panel to

answer the following question: "How do we conduct military

operations in a manner that safeguards the lives of our military

and protects the security of the operations while keeping the
American public informed through the media?"23 The commission made

the first attempt to define rules that would ensure a media

presence on the battlefield, declaring: "It is essential that the

U.S. news media cover U.S. military operations to the maximum

degree possible consistent with mission security and the safety

of U.S. forces."24 This introductory statement went far beyond the

mandate of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as it set

into principle that the presence of the media was essential to

the dissemination of information. This change of focus shifted

the debate from how to make information available, to the

question of how to accommodate press presence. (Today the debate

is still framed in these terms.) To implement this principle, the

commission made the following recommendations:

! Public affairs planning should begin as soon as

operational planning begins.

! When it appears that news media pooling is the only way

of granting access to the early phase of an operation, a pool

should be used until full coverage is possible.

! The Secretary of Defense should study the possibility of a

pre-established and constantly updated accreditation list of

correspondents in case of a military operation for which a pool

is required.

! The basic principle governing media access should be

compliance with predetermined ground rules issued by the

military.

! Public Affairs should plan for adequate logistical

support, including communications and transport.25

After the report's release, the DoD began implementing some

of the recommendations. The Department first instructed the

Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs) to begin planning public affairs when

they began operational planning. Then, the Department continued

to work on its proposal of creating a national pool to avoid

repeating Grenada-like situations.26 In September 1984, ASD(PA)

Michael Burch announced to 10 media organizations, much to their

amazement, that they were part of the newly-created DoD National

News Media Pool (DoDNMP).

 The DoDNMP is designed to ensure media coverage of the

early phases of a U.S. military operation in a remote place where

no journalists are present (as was the case during Grenada) while

maintaining operational security and troop safety. The military

is willing to use pools as long as operational security is not

threatened. And the press is willing to participate if the pool

ensures media presence and first-hand reporting from the
battlefield. The national media pool functions according to the

following principles:

! It is a noncompetitive pool. News organizations

participating in the pool agree to share all information and

products with the rest of the media industry.

! Reporters must obey escorts' orders. They cannot break

away from the pool.

! They cannot directly communicate with their organizations

and can only file via military equipment.

! They must follow ground rules and guidelines.27

! They are subject to security review.

! They are expected to ask for media opportunities.28

Over the next years, the Department regularly exercised the

pool. The exercises had a rocky start. For example, during

exercise UNIVERSAL TREK in Honduras (April 1985), which featured

an amphibious landing and a simulated strike against a guerrilla

force, word of the exercise leaked within hours after the pool's

activation.29 During Operation JUST CAUSE in Panama (December

1989), the Time Magazine bureau chief violated security

guidelines when he discussed with reporters the decision as to

who would go on the pool assignment at a Christmas Party.30 In the

first exercise (UNIVERSAL TREK), the military did not have

adequate communication facilities to file pool products back to

Washington in a timely manner, and reporters had to wait 2 days

to file their copy. During later exercises, the military

established a routine that enabled three 600-word messages to be

transmitted within 2 hours of the pool's arrival.31 However, this

arrangement proved too limited for actual operations. Finally,

reporters soon felt these exercises were not newsworthy enough.

In a meeting between DoD officials and media representatives, the

reporters explained that their organizations were investing

enormous amounts of money in the pool (ranging from overtime

salaries to new, light-weight equipment) and that they desired

that the exercises would be newsworthy in themselves.32 This

complaint highlights one other major difference between the

military and the media. The military prepares for actual use

through frequent and repetitive training. It devotes large

resources for this purpose. This is not the case, however, for

the media. For the most part, a journalist's conception of

training is learning on the beat. The idea of devoting time,

personnel and money just to train is a luxury most media outlets

don't believe they can afford. However, media organizations

continued training coverage and, after a while, both the military
and the media on the pool's roster grew accustomed to each other

and relations improved as exercises continued.

The national pool was first used in an actual operation

during EARNEST WILL in 1987-88.33 The operation was designed to

register certain Kuwaiti ships (mainly tankers) under the

American flag and have them escorted from the Strait of Hormuz to

Kuwait by the U.S. Navy. The goal was to protect the freedom of

the seas by deterring Iran from attacking nonbelligerents'

tankers in the Persian Gulf and deter further Soviet involvement

in the region. The Secretary of Defense decided to activate the

national media pool to cover the first escort mission which began

on July 24, 1987. Commander Middle East Forces, Rear Admiral

Harold Bernsen, USN, in charge of the operation, only reluctantly

agreed to the arrangement.34 When the Bridgeton, one of the two

Kuwaiti ships escorted in this first mission, hit a mine on July

25, 1987, "the first account to arrive at the Pentagon was

Associated Press reporter Richard Pyle's. The arrangement was a

resounding success for everybody."35 From that point, regional

pools were regularly brought to U.S. Navy ships. The main

success, however, was to put a pool aboard the ships involved in

the attack of two Iranian frigates during Operation PRAYING

MANTIS on April 18, 1988.36 Dan Howard, then ASD(PA), recalled

that it was very difficult to convince the military leadership to

put a press pool on the U.S. ships scheduled to engage the

Iranian frigates.

We spent several hours with Admiral Crowe (CJCS),

discussing this matter. On Saturday [April 16, 1988], I

was called again by Carlucci; Crowe and others were at

Carlucci's house. Again we discussed the issue. Again I

made my point. Carlucci confirmed my decision to have a

press pool on board. But the military's plan was to put

the pool on a lower-risk operation (on the ship that

would attack an oil-platform). But, I insisted on

having the pool on the ship that would engage the

Iranian frigates in real combat--the most dangerous

situation. Admiral Crowe and Secretary Carlucci made

the courageous decision to support putting the pool in

the most dangerous situation.37

Overall, the use of the press pool during EARNEST WILL proved

mutually satisfactory.

The next operational use of the pool system came in December

1989 with the invasion of Panama (Operation JUST CAUSE).38 But in

this case, it failed miserably, as pool members arrived too late

to witness the actual combat operations while independent

journalists were detained on Howard Air Force Base to protect the

privileges of a pool which could not accomplish its mission.

Instead of being taken to the fighting, the pool received a
series of briefings from U.S. Embassy personnel, who did not have

any up-to-date military information. For the first day, during

which all the major fighting occurred, SOUTHCOM consistently took

the pool away from the action. SOUTHCOM had made no provisions to

link the pool with combat units prior to the assault. When the

pool arrived in Panama, military personnel refused to take

reporters into the combat zone.39 Moreover, because the media

center was poorly equipped, the pool could not file adequately

nor in a timely manner with their news organizations. It took the

entire first day to fax print reports to Washington because of a

faulty fax machine at the Pentagon. Photographic products arrived

in Washington 4 days after the initial assault.

The renewed controversy led Pete Williams, ASD(PA), to

charge Fred Hoffman40 to conduct a review of the Panama pool's

failure. Hoffman put much of the blame on Secretary of Defense

Cheney for his excessive concern over secrecy and made 17

recommendations to avoid repeating the failure. Hoffman first

insisted on the importance of adequate planning for the pool. He

recommended that Public Affairs Annex to Operational Planning

(Annex F) actually be written and that a "Deputy Assistant

Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs should closely monitor

development of operation-related public affairs plans to assure

they fulfill all requirements for pool coverage."41 He also

advised that Public Affairs personnel as well as personnel from

policy offices be involved in the planning process at the very

earliest stages. He stated that they needed to weigh in

aggressively with the Secretary of Defense and the CJCS to argue

against secrecy and in favor of the pool. He also recommended

some inner changes in the pool procedures: training sessions with

units most likely to be sent on emergency contingency operations;

dividing the 12-member pool into sub-groups to cover a wide range

of operations; briefings on the military situation; and adequate

communication outlets.

On March 30, 1990, the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued new

planning guidance for Public Affairs which determined the

relationship between the CINC and OASD(PA) as well as the CINC's

responsibilities in terms of public affairs. JCS Pub 5-02.2, "Annex F, Public Affairs Guidance," instructs the CINCs to

coordinate all public affairs activities with ASD(PA) to ensure

that they will provide a maximum flow of information to the

public. This directive sets a chain of communication for

direction and guidance between ASD (PA) and the CINCs. Under this

directive, the CINCs were delegated authority to issue the

appropriate public affairs instructions, provide policy guidance

for all public affairs activities, prepare adequate communication

and transport support "unless unavoidable military necessity,

with respect to the mission and/or safety of the U.S. Armed

Forces, requires all available assets," and ensure the

implementation of all DoD public affairs policy and programs.42
Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait 5 months later, on

August 2, 1990, and the massive U.S. response (Operation DESERT

SHIELD) provided a real test for the new guidance. Sadly, the

process mainly failed the test and reinvigorated the debates over

media access to U.S. military operations. After Saddam Hussein

invaded Kuwait, DoD activated the national pool to cover the

opening phase of Operation DESERT SHIELD. For the first 3 weeks,

the pool's operation satisfied both the military and the media.

The media gained access to a situation it could not otherwise

cover (no western reporters were in Saudi Arabia). The military

was able to ensure positive coverage of operations in Saudi

Arabia--without hinting at the weaknesses of the military

deployments. Things began to go awry when operations went on and

moved from a defensive posture to an offensive one. The system

for granting access to these operations resulted in a litany of

press complaints.

Two main problems stirred controversy with the press. First,

only about 10 percent of the reporters enrolled on the Joint

Information Bureau (JIB) rosters in Dhahran, Riyadh and Jubail

ever made it to the front lines.43 Moreover, those few 'elected'

members of the press did not choose what they wanted to cover,

but the military put them where slots were available. Many in the

press felt that the military acted as a 'super editor,' attacking

them in the essence of their job: their ability to select the

story. With CENTCOM's approach, reporters were assigned to units

they did not want to cover and missed opportunities they would

have liked to cover. "While the pool has been used very

successfully to provide coverage of key events that would go

uncovered if it were not for the military transporting pools to

the appropriate location at the correct time, the control of

access in all areas creates the impression that the military has

something to hide."44

In all fairness, it needs to be said that Colonel William

Mulvey (USA), Director of the JIB in Dhahran, was hardly in a

position to 'select' the news for the press. Under constant

pressure from the numerous journalists roaming the international

hotel, he spent most of his time trying to convince military

units to take more journalists in. Moreover, the logistical job

of providing to the press enough "newsworthy spots" with

regularity was almost impossible to fulfill. The military will

never be able to match the press's ability to pick newsworthy

events, go from one to the next, and leave an unworthy spot in

time to go to a newsworthy one.

The second main problem was the lack of dedicated transport

and logistic support for filing the stories back to Dhahran in a

timely manner. During the 4-day ground war, the military relied

on a "pony-express"45 system for communicating the pool products
back from the battlefield to the rear headquarters in Dhahran. In

theory, pool products were to be sent via military transport

(essentially vehicles or helicopters) from the battlefield to

Dhahran, and then back to the United States. In practice,

military transport proved extremely unreliable. Examples of

faulty transmission abound. "One reporter's copy took as long as

two weeks to make the eight hour drive from the battlefield to

Dhahran. A news photographer's film took thirty-six days. A

television correspondent's videotape of two stories never made it

back."46 Overall, the Pentagon recognized the slowness of its

system. According to Title V, the DoD's report to Capitol Hill,

only 21 percent of the pool products arrived at Dhahran in less

than 12 hours during the ground war, while 69 percent arrived in

less than 2 days. Thus, much of it arrived after the ground

offensive was over and was never used in news accounts.47

Explaining the Pool's Failure.

Over the past decade, the DoD has developed a procedure to

ensure that the media would be granted access to combat

operations: the pool. However, the results from its use in combat

operations have shown only mixed results. The concept worked

during EARNEST WILL and essentially during the first weeks of

DESERT SHIELD, but failed in the two major and most newsworthy

events of the decade: JUST CAUSE and DESERT STORM.

The creation of the national pool in 1985 has led the DoD to

overuse and misuse the pooling concept for coverage of combat

operations. The national pool was correctly used for the first

escort mission of EARNEST WILL. At that time, no media was in the

region to cover the operation. Journalists could not make it to

the scene on their own, and the military operations (aboard ship)

physically could not handle numerous journalists. For the same

reason, DoD correctly activated the national pool at the

beginning of DESERT SHIELD. However, during the decade, the pool

concept was overused in circumstances unacceptable to the press.

For example, DoD sent the national pool during Operation NIMROD

DANCER (the movement of military reinforcements to Panama after

Noriega fraudulently annulled the presidential election results

in May 1989) to send a signal of conciliation to the media

community, whereas many reporters were already in Panama.48 The

national pool was also misused during Operation JUST CAUSE,

because reporters were already located in Panama and should have

been gathered in a local pool or left to report unilaterally on

the situation.49 Finally, CENTCOM created a pooling system to

cover all the phases of Operation DESERT STORM as a means of

controling a swarm of journalists. This abusive employment of the

pool aggravated media-military tensions.

For the press, the pool is only a poor alternative to no
coverage at all.50 The press generally has accepted being part of

a pool (whether national or regional51) when it did not have ready

access to the theater of operations, as was the case during

EARNEST WILL and in the first three weeks of DESERT SHIELD. Some

in the military, on the other hand, have viewed the pool as the

perfect way to limit the number of journalists in theater. The

military has never accepted a large number of reporters in

theater for various reasons, ranging from operational security to

political concerns to availability of resources (space and

accommodations). But resorting to pools to limit the number of

journalists creates controversy because it derails the pool

concept from its original mission to implement one that is

unacceptable to the press. Each time the Pentagon has used the

pool in instances other than the minimal circumstances accepted

by the press, journalists have angrily complained. Obviously, the

military cannot go on using the 'pool concept' as a way to limit

the numbers of journalists on the battlefield in combat

operations, unless it is willing to take the heat. This issue

needs to be worked out with the press.

The pool concept, as developed and implemented so far,

mostly addresses military concerns and not the media's. DoD

established the national pool to meet three objectives:

! To make sure that it was possible to activate a small

group of journalists without endangering operational security. To

achieve this objective, DoD has established a series of

guidelines to enable secret activation of the pool. It has also

imposed a system of security review applicable to all pool

material, so that journalists would not improperly write about

forbidden information.

! To make sure that the pool was transported to an event.

! To make sure that communication facilities were available

to file pool products in a timely manner.52

These objectives, however, fail to address the major press

concern: satisfactory access to operations. Indeed, obtaining

access to real combat operations through pools has been a

challenge. This requires that journalists be attached to combat

units prior to the beginning of operations. In turn, this

requires that a long and successful planning process take public

affairs into account. This is not a condition easy to fulfill. In

Panama, the planning process was so haphazard that pool members

were not hooked-up with units. As a result, they did not witness

any combat operations. During DESERT STORM, some of the combat

units of the air war (the B-52 bombers) did not receive a single

journalist. And during the ground war, many of the Army units

(mostly in the VII Corps) did not have any reporters with them.
 In general, the DoD national pool system has been unable to

solve these problems. More dramatically, it may have made them

worse. Whether pools exist or not, commanders will always have

the prerogative to expel or discourage journalists from covering

their units. The military may deny journalists access to units

for a variety of reasons ranging from operational security to

dislike of the press to outright political objectives.53 But, the

pooling system creates a process which insulates journalists from

commanders--therefore reducing the pressure media personnel can

put on the military. Moreover, the system also gives the military

an opportunity to (try to) direct media coverage. Indeed, when

left to define media opportunities for the press, the military

can choose, and has chosen, angles that favor the official

version of events. During URGENT FURY, the military tailored the

press visits to show them the involvement of the Soviets on

Grenada. During JUST CAUSE, SOUTHCOM created media opportunities

that had little informative value or that showed Noriega's evil

side. During DESERT STORM, the military created slots among the

units which accepted journalists. As a result, some journalists

sat (almost idly) with units where nothing interesting was

happening, while some units whose commanders had refused any

media presence did not receive any coverage. The military is a

bad editor and such a job should be left to those who do it best:

the media.

In addition, the pool concept is cumbersome and limits

improvisation. It is cumbersome because it requires enormous

logistical support--in terms of personnel, transport,

accommodations, and communications. Experience has shown that the

military cannot easily meet those requirements. Indeed, public

affairs logistics derives from operational logistics. In the

priorities of a commander, public affairs always are a lower

priority than operations. Moreover, logistical support can only

be devoted to public affairs if planning has occurred soon enough

and has developed without problems. Those two requirements have

not always been met. For example, in Panama the national pool's

activation was announced so late that no adequate logistical

support could be diverted from the operation.54 During DESERT

SHIELD, General Schwarzkopf made it clear that public affairs was

not his priority. Navy Captain Mike Sherman, who established the

JIB in Dhahran from scratch, said he was provided no equipment

and little manpower. He also stated that it was 4-6 weeks before

CENTCOM issued a message to the field directing units to

cooperate with and support the JIB. Reflecting on his

establishment of the JIB, he concluded: "We were the bastard

children of the operation."55

The system is so cumbersome that it also largely freezes

improvisation. Indeed, when a sudden newsworthy event occurs, the

pool is rarely prepared and equipped to move quickly to the site
of the event. The battle of Khafji, during the Gulf War, offers a

typical example of how difficult it can be to manage the pool

system. The battle, which occurred at the end of January, was an

Iraqi attempt to force the U.S. military to engage in a bloody

ground battle. A few hours after the battle began, some

independent reporters, called "unilaterals" in the Gulf War, were

on the scene, trying to figure out what was happening. Back in

Dhahran, news broke that "something" was going on and that

"unilaterals" were on the scene. Journalists assailed Colonel

Mulvey, head of the Dhrahan JIB, with requests to form a pool to

go. By the time the military was prepared to send a pool, the

battle was essentially over. The incident suggests two

hindsights. First, the public affairs community's ability to move

journalists quickly to respond to this type of breaking news is

low. Second, under such circumstances, the military public

affairs system cannot compete with the media in responsiveness.

Finally, the resort to an exclusive, all-pool system to

cover combat operations has exacerbated planning and coordination

problems. And when pooling activities did not go as planned or

expected, it left little room for improvement. In spite of

recommendations by both Sidle and Hoffman, public affairs

planning has not been effective.

The first problem lies in compartmented planning.

"Compartmentalization" means that only people who "need to know"

are brought into the planning process. Public affairs officers

are generally not part of those considered by senior leaders and

key staff officers and planners to be essential for operational

planning. They too often are perceived as not having a "need to

know." Until Grenada, it was very common during the planning

process to leave the public affairs annex (Annex F) essentially

blank, with the line "to be provided"--but it rarely was. Both

the Sidle commission and the Hoffman report recommended that

public affairs planning begin at the onset of operational

planning. And after Panama, a DoD directive made the

recommendation the policy. But public affairs continued to be

considered a low priority for operational commanders. Almost no

public affairs planning accompanied DESERT SHIELD. And during

DESERT STORM, the low priority given to public affairs translated

into chaos.

Second, the resort to the pool concept has created some

antagonistic relations between the Office of the Assistant

Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (OASD-PA) and commanders

who are responsible for public affairs activities in their area

of responsibility (AOR). Over the decade, OASD-PA has seemed to

be receptive to the media's concerns over access. However, this

office has rarely been able to impose its views on commanders.56

The problem stems from the fact that OASD-PA is not part of the

chain of command. It therefore cannot order a commander to take
more reporters or allow a unit to be cooperative to the press. It

gives guidance, not orders. Unless the Secretary of Defense takes

public affairs seriously and backs his assistant for public

affairs, OASD-PA has little authority over what happens in the

real world.

The Post-Gulf War Measures.

The heated controversy between the military and the press 

that accompanied the Gulf War led to the first attempt to define

and negotiate rules of coverage of military operations. These

rules became official policy in 1992 and are now in the process

of being translated into a DoD instruction and a joint public

affairs doctrine.

The Statement of DoD Principles for News Media Coverage of

DoD Operations. On April 15, 1991, George Watson, then Vice

President of ABC News Washington bureau, organized a meeting of

Washington bureau chiefs to discuss media coverage guidelines

during the Gulf War. The group involved 15 Washington bureau

chiefs concerned that "the flow of information to the public was

blocked, impeded or diminished by the policies and practices of

the DoD," and expressed apprehension that "the virtual total

control that your Department exercised over the American press

will become a model for the future."57

Meanwhile, the large group of news organizations designated

a working group of five media representatives: Michael Getler

(The Washington Post), Jonathan Wolman (Associated Press), George

Watson (ABC News), later replaced by Barbara Cohen (CBS News),

Clark Hoyt (Knight-Ridder Newspapers) and Stanley Cloud (Time

Magazine). The working group was tasked with writing an

assessment of what went wrong in the coverage and media

procedures during DESERT STORM. The report concluded: "In the

end, the combination of security review and the use of the pool

system as a form of censorship made the Gulf War the most

undercovered major conflict in modern American history. In a free

society, there is simply no place for such overwhelming control

by the government."58 The media group attached a list of ten

principles, designed to improve combat coverage, to the report.

The following are the key points:

! Open and independent coverage will be the principal means

of coverage of U.S. military operations.

! Pools will be used to ensure coverage of the first stages

of any military operation and will be disbanded after 24 or 36

hours.

! Reporters should be granted access to all major units.
! The military should provide transport and communication

assistance to the pool as well as to independent reporters.

! Security review should be abandoned.59

On September 12, 1991, the group met with Secretary Cheney

to discuss the pitfalls of the Gulf War public affairs

procedures. According to Associated Press's Wolman, the Secretary

was very receptive to the media's complaints and immediately

agreed to open negotiations.60 During the following 8 months, the

media working group met regularly with ASD (PA) Williams and his

staff to work out new arrangements. The process was long and

uneasy. AP's Jonathan Wolman describes the negotiating process:

"We would have a meeting and some issues were raised. Then we

would have to go back to the larger group of media organizations.

The military leadership would have to go back and discuss some 

of the issues with the civilian leadership and the CINCs."61

Overall, they spent a lot of time settling on phrasing, choosing

the word that would satisfy both parties, and trying to 'remove

the brackets around controversial expressions.' Both parties

discussed several issues at length. On the most controversial--

security review--they finally agreed to disagree.

On May 21, 1992, the Pentagon announced it had adopted new

combat coverage principles. The following summarizes the agreedupon principles:

! Open and independent coverage will be the principal means

of covering U.S. military operations.

! Pools will be used when they provide the only feasible

means of access to a military operation, when space is limited or

for specific events. The arrival of a pool will not cancel

independent coverage from journalists already in the area.

! Journalists will be credentialed and required to abide by

security ground rules. Non-observance of the rules will result in

loss of accreditation. News organizations will make efforts to

assign experienced journalists to cover military operations.

! Journalists will be provided access to all major units.

Special operations units may have some limitations.

! Public affairs officers will not interfere with reporting.

! The military will be responsible for providing transport

and communication facilities for pool journalists. The military

will allow independent reporters to ride military vehicles and
use communication assets. Commanders will not ban communication

systems operated by the media from the battlefield, but will be

able to limit their use under certain circumstances.

! The principles apply to the national media pool.

! Both parties agreed to disagree on the issue of security

review. The DoD considered it must retain the possibility to

review all material prior to release in order to maintain tight

operational security. The press considered it could not submit to

any form of review prior to publication.

The press expressed great satisfaction at the announcement.

Speaking for the media group, Louis Boccardi, CEO of Associated

Press, said: "It is the consensus of our group that the

guidelines offer the promise of the kind of coverage the citizens

of a democracy are entitled to have."62 Stanley Cloud, one of the

negotiators, added that the new policy, in general, made "a vast

improvement over the system that existed prior to the Gulf war."63

The Elaboration of a DoD Directive for Joint Public Affairs.

In the aftermath of the negotiated agreement between the Pentagon

and the media, ASD (PA) Pete Williams decided that the

elaboration of a DoD directive and a Joint public affairs

doctrine were necessary steps to avoid the pitfalls of the Gulf

War. For that purpose, Pete Williams arranged the transfer of

U.S. Army Lieutenant Colonel Charles Ricks to the Pentagon to

work on media policy. Ricks was transferred from NATO

headquarters where he had been developing public affairs

procedures. Charles Ricks (and, since his retirement, Brian

Kilgallen [a civilian in the OASD-PA/OATSD-PA])64 wrote and

coordinated the two documents. Both documents are designed for

the combatant commanders. The DoD directive sets policy. It

documents the tasks to be performed by the various echelons (ASDPA, JCS, Commanders and military departments) for accommodating

reporters during operations and releasing relevant information to

the public. A DoD instruction is a longer and more detailed

version of a directive. It states the same policy standards.

Joint doctrine should derive from the directive and instruction

for commanders on how to implement the tasks determined in the

directive. The directive and instruction are in a draft form and

have not yet been signed by the Secretary of Defense. The joint

doctrine seems to be in the second coordination process.

According to Kilgallen, in charge of coordination, the joint

doctrine should be approved before the end of 1996.

The current draft of the instruction has taken into account

many of the principles that resulted from the 1991-92

negotiations. For example, the instruction stresses that "the

primary means of covering U.S. military operations shall be open
and independent coverage by properly credentialed news media."65

Responding to criticism that emerged during and after the war

about public affairs officers impeding reporting, the directive

sets the new goal as "to treat the news media as members of

units, allowing them to accompany the organizations during the

conduct of their mission."66 The instruction insists that CINCs

grant the maximum access possible to operations, including combat

ones. It also seeks to answer some of the media's concerns about

transport and communications assistance. It requires that CINCs

"ensure adequate, immediately available dedicated personnel,

equipment, transportation, and communications resources to meet

the demands for information."67 Finally, the instruction sets a

new review process for ensuring operational security. In

accordance with the agreement, it acknowledges that "formal

security review of news media products may be necessary," but it

also institutes another process called "security at the source."

"Under that concept, those meeting with the news media shall

ensure that classified information is not revealed."68

The draft instruction also addresses concerns that were not

raised during the negotiations, but appeared as major problems

during the Gulf War, most notably the planning process and the

tasks of various components during this process. Noting that

overall success "relies on the coordinated responses of

supporting combatant commands, the Military Departments, the

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and OATSD-PA," the draft

instruction clarifies the role of various components in the

process. For example, ASD (PA) is now tasked with "reviewing,

coordinating, approving, and disseminating PAG [public affairs

guidance], public affairs plans, and public affairs annexes." In

the meantime, JCS is tasked with ensuring "that existing

operational public affairs plans comply with published joint

public affairs doctrine and guidance."69 The CINCs receive a much

more detailed tasking, under this directive, as they have to

"include in operations plans an annex that establishes responsive

public affairs organizations and structures and shall provide

dedicated personnel, facilities, equipment and transportation,

and communications assets to the public affairs mission."70

Looking Forward: Appraising the Nature and Degree of Policy

Changes.

It is impossible to definitively state how these policy

changes will affect future media coverage of combat operations.

Past experience and consideration of future trends suggest

reasons for both optimism and pessimism.

The Regulation of Access. Both the agreed-on principles and

the draft public affairs instruction establish "open and

independent coverage" as the principal means of coverage of U.S.
military operations. Though recommended twice in the past by the

Sidle commission (1984) and the Hoffman report (1989), the

Pentagon did not endorse this principle until 1992. However,

neither the 1992 agreement nor DoD draft instruction provide a

satisfactory definition of what "open and independent coverage"

precisely means. For most reporters, coverage is open and

independent when they can go when they want, where they want and

report on what they choose. When asked to define "open and

independent coverage," ABC's Watson answered: "Vietnam is the

best possible in history example that anybody can remember. The

country was accessible to news organizations who operated

competitively and independently of each other and there were few

restrictions on access to any place that one wished to go."71 It

seems unlikely that anyone in the military shares Watson's

definition, for the simple reason that such open coverage

directly conflicts with the military's desire to attain control

of the battlefield. Kilgallen, OATSD-PA, gave the following

definition of the principle: "That's one of the questions that

still has not been resolved. I am not sure we resolved it yet or

that we will to somebody's satisfaction."72 It seems extremely

naive to think that military would just relinquish this objective

to satisfy the press's appetite for battlefield news. Moreover,

experience shows that most of the military is not enthusiastic

about media presence and, left to its discretion, it would rather

exclude than include journalists. The lack of a clear definition

for "open and independent coverage" just "postpones the dispute

and confusion until the next military operation, which is the

least desirable time to pursue resolution."73

To reinforce the first principle, both documents stress the

military's obligation to grant access to units involved in

operations. Both the agreement and the draft instruction direct

that access to all major units and personnel be granted. The DoD

draft instruction reads:

Commanders shall ensure that reporters are granted all

possible access to all unclassified activities,

including combat operations (and) assist news media in

gaining access to the full spectrum of U.S. military

units and personnel conducting joint and unilateral

operations, subject to special operations restrictions.

Access includes commanders, staffs, officers and

enlisted personnel directly involved with combat and

sustainment operations.74

For the first time, CINCs are instructed on the extent of

access they should provide reporters. This is a major step

forward. However, the instruction leaves room for restrictive

interpretation. During DESERT STORM, the military felt it had

granted access to "all major units" involved. However,

journalists, on the other hand, felt that the arrangements for
access to units were extremely unsatisfactory. In their post-war

assessment, press representatives stated that "there were no

pools with the 3rd Armored, 24th Infantry, 101st Airborne, and

1st Infantry division and several other major ground units until

just before the ground war."75 Moreover, the military's standard

operating procedure leaves the decision on media access to units

up to the commander. In last resort, access depends on the

commander's attitude.

Re-working the Pool Issue. Both the 1992 agreement and the

DoD instruction address the issue of pools. Back in 1984, the

Sidle commission suggested the following standards for resorting

to pools: "When it becomes apparent during operational planning

that news media pooling provides the only feasible means for

furnishing the media with early access to an operation, planning

should provide for the largest press pool that is practical and

minimize the length of time the pool will be necessary before

'full coverage' is feasible."76 For the first time, the 1992

agreement recommended that this principle become policy.

At the request of the media representatives, the 1992

agreement states that pools will not serve as the standard means

of covering U.S. military operations. It suggests that pools

should be as large as possible and disbanded within a time limit

of 24 to 36 hours. In its current version, the DoD draft

instruction is far less precise on the conditions for using

pools. It simply states that "the primary means of covering U.S.

military operations shall be open and independent coverage by

properly credentialed news media. There will be situations,

especially in the deployment of joint forces or in support of

specific missions, in which the formation of a news media pool

shall be the most appropriate public affairs course of action."77

Unlike the provision of the 1992 agreement, the draft instruction

does not set any duration or circumstances limitation on the use

of pools. The instruction does not really set any new standards,

except the subordination of pool coverage to independent

coverage. Although it is not covered in the draft DoD directive,

Brian Kilgallen (Plans Officer, OATSD(PA)) insisted that the

provisions of the 1992 agreement shape current DoD policy. He

stated that, "Pools should be used for a short period of time or

for specific actions taking place in remote locations. They are

designed to provide coverage that may not otherwise be

provided."78 According to Kilgallen, these details will be in the

joint doctrine.

Finally, the 1992 agreement states that "the arrival of

early access pools will not cancel the principle of independent

coverage for journalists already in the area."79 This principle

establishes that pool coverage and independent coverage are

compatible. It sharply departs from past Pentagon policy. From

Grenada to DESERT STORM, DoD constantly granted 'exclusive
access' to pool reporters. But, this language raises some

questions. When obligated to join a pool, reporters are extremely

sensitive to the (unfair) competition from independent reporters.

Michael Getler considers that when you have both pool and

independent reporters on the same scene, "that's when you get

into trouble. That's why we don't want pools in those situations.

The kind of situation when you have ten people in a pool and

twenty others who aren't in a pool, that says you don't need a

pool."80 The principle is only valid if it means that pools will

be activated to cover parts of the operation inaccessible to

independent reporters, while unilaterals will cover other parts.

Kilgallen agrees with Getler's interpretation. When asked if

pool and independent coverage were compatible, he answered:

"Sure. It should be. If it's not, then we have a problem. The

doctrine does not state that, but it's implied, because pools are

designed to take people to places where other media aren't." He

illustrated his point using the following example: "Let's say we

are six weeks into an operation, God forbid, there is a certain

aspect of that operation where there are no reporters, there is

nobody else except military people, then the way to go out there

. . . you can't get five hundred or fifteen hundred or three

thousand reporters there, but you can take fourteen to represent

television, radio, wire services, magazines, newspapers and photo

services."81

These changes are of the utmost importance. First, the

Pentagon now accepts, as a matter of policy, that pools will not

serve as the standard means of covering U.S. military operations

any longer. This represents a true step forward. The new policy

not only subordinates pools to the principle of open and

independent coverage, but also tries to discourage commanders

from using pools. Kilgallen noted that pools require significant

logistics support and, as well, directly cost DoD money because

not all expenditures are reimbursable. Second, the Pentagon and

the media agree that pooling should not cancel independent

coverage. For once, they share the same interpretation of what is

and is not compatible. Both parties agree that compatibility

means allowing pools to cover parts of operations where

independent reporters are not present and can not get to. Both

also agree that having pools and independent reporters covering

the same action from the same vantage point can create problems.

To ensure that commanders fully understand the nature of this

change in concept, the DoD draft instruction should be revised to

clarify this interpretation--that use of pools and unilaterals to

cover the same activity is a less than optimal approach. The

issue needs clarification before a large-scale operation makes

the problem a front-page item. Provisions should be added in the

instruction and the doctrine to provide commanders with guidance

on appropriate limits to pool usage.
The applicability of these changes raises some questions.

Technically, the draft instruction allows a commander to use

pools for coverage of major combat operations without accepting

open and independent coverage, on the grounds that pools

constitute "the most appropriate means of coverage" but not,

necessarily, the only appropriate means of coverage. To rely on

pools when independent coverage could work would seem contrary to

the policymakers's intent. However, it could occur and might even

be likely, since pools are the only readily available means to

limit numbers of reporters. Suppressing the pools as a means of

limiting the number of journalists assigned to an operation

exposes the U.S. military to the possibility of having to deal

with essentially unlimited numbers (hundreds) of reporters in the

battlefield environment. As any military commander hopes to

minimize the number of uncontrolled variables on the battlefield

to limit the extent to which the Clausewitzian concept of

friction can affect operations, allowing reporters onto

battlefields without any control over numbers or activities is a

sub-optimum (at best) choice from a military perspective.

No military has ever granted such access and the U.S.

military has always limited the number of reporters allowed to

cover combat operations. For example, the American Expeditionary

Force (AEF) during World War I initially accredited only 31

reporters. After journalists bitterly complained to General

Pershing, the number of credentialed reporters rose to 60. During

World War II, more than 400 reporters were accredited to General

Eisenhower's headquarters in London. However, only 27 reporters

accompanied the first wave of 500,000 soldiers on D-Day. In

comparison, CENTCOM allowed 167 pool reporters to cover the

ground offensive (out of over 1,000 present in theater). In the

past decade, the U.S. military has used pools to limit the number

of reporters on the battlefield. The military has consistently

argued that it cannot reasonably deal with the swarm of reporters

who want to take a trip to war. In a 1991 statement to the Senate

Committee on Government Affairs, ASD(PA) Pete Williams justified

the use of pools to cover the war:

As the number of troops in the desert has grown, so has

the number of reporters there to cover them. The U.S.

and international press corps has gone from zero on

August 2 to 17 on the first pool, raising to 800 by

mid-December, and it is over 1,400 now. Obviously, most

of those reporters, the good ones, want to be out with

the troops. They want to be where the action is, just

as they have done in previous conflicts. But with the

hundreds of fiercely independent reporters seeking to

join up with combat units, we concluded that when the

combat started we would have to rely on pools.82

As long as no limit is placed on the number of reporters assigned
to cover military operations, pools will remain the only sensible

means to limit access to combat operations. Consequently, there

is little hope that the military will commit itself to a

definitive limitation on the pools' use in combat-like

situations.

A Troubling Issue: "Security Review" v. "Security at the

Source." For the past 10 years, public affairs officers have

reviewed pool material during military combat operations to make

sure the reports did not violate operational security ground

rules.83 The process worked as follows: journalists wrote their

reports, shot their video and photographs, and handed them to

their escorts for review. The escorts then sent the reports to

rear headquarters for dispatch or for further review if the

escorts believed they contained a security violation. If no

agreement was reached in rear headquarters, the material was sent

back to the Pentagon for final adjudication. In last resort, the

media decided whether the report should be published or not.

Although only five cases ever made it back to the Pentagon during

DESERT STORM, and DoD cleared four of them,84 the security ground

rules were not the problem, the process was. Media organizations

bitterly complained that the process amounted to censorship by

delay. Remembering the experience of the ground war during DESERT

STORM, the Post's Getler said: "The time delays in the security

review process virtually ensured that whatever they were doing

would be done before anybody read about it."85

During the negotiation process, the parties could not reach

an agreement on the issue of security review. The military felt

it had to retain the right to impose security review when

circumstances required it, whereas the media negotiators refused

to compromise in their stance that news material should not be

subject to prior military security review. Media negotiators

considered the Pentagon's stance progress, since in "the DoD

statement on security review, they went quite a bit further than

the way it was defined in the Gulf war. This in itself was

progress."86 DoD's current draft instruction goes even further

than the 1992 agreement. It states: "While there may be

situations when a formal security review of the news media

products may be necessary, the more usual case shall involve the

disciplined practice of security at the source."87

According to OATSD (PA) Kilgallen, this concept is radically

opposed to security review as implemented in the Gulf War.

Echoing some of the media's concerns, he considered that security

review "is burdensome and almost totalitarian. We are not; we

should not be in the business of censoring the news." He then

defines how security at the source is radically different. "The

person who is briefing the media . . . it is up to this person to

make sure that I am not telling the journalist any classified

information." This process entrusts military personnel not to
divulge classified information that could jeopardize operational

security. When asked if security review would no longer be

implemented, Kilgallen answered: "That's correct."88

If Kilgallen's opinion reflects the general DoD

interpretation, this is a true step forward with which the media

should be satisfied. However, the distinction between security

review and security at the source does not appear so wellunderstood within the military community. This potential

confusion raises some concerns. The concern stems from the fact

that CENTCOM's guidance called the security review process during

DESERT STORM, "security at the source." The January 7, 1991,

CENTCOM guidelines for the news media stated: "Security at the

source will be the policy. In the event of hostilities, pool

products will be subject to security review prior to release to

determine if they contain information that would jeopardize an

operation or the security of U.S. and coalition forces."89 Though

the mention of "security at the source" disappeared in the

January 14 version of the rules, Joint Universal Lessons Learned

(JULL) from the war indicated that some public affairs officers

considered it policy. For example, one JULL stated that "CENTCOM

and command PAOs could not pass CINCCENT guidance and

instructions to media escorts and commanders quickly enough to

ensure effective use of the security at the source concept."90

This confusion raises some obvious concerns. Because it does

not explain how security at the source and security review are

different concepts, the draft instruction does not guarantee that

commanders will choose to resort to the first one instead of the

other. Over the past decade, the military has felt much more

comfortable with the process of reviewing media products to make

sure that, indeed, journalists were not violating operational

security. However, even with security review, many officers are

not satisfied with the end result. For example, in a Joint

Lessons Learned from DESERT STORM, U.S. CENTCOM Public Affairs

Captain Ron Wildermuth, USN, argued: "Under the system of

security review that was in place, OPSEC violations, i.e., unit

locations, readiness of units, capabilities of units were

divulged . . . ground rules could not be enforced and the

military had no recourse against violators."91 The draft

instruction needs not only to clearly define security at the

source v. security review, but also to instruct commanders and

public affairs officers as to what the policy is for different

types of circumstances. Indeed, in some situations, such as a

humanitarian assistance operation or an operation against a

relatively unsophisticated foe (Somalia or Haiti), the military

should not attempt to restrict media use of their own

transmission devices. But, in a conflict where electronic warfare

matters (such as Iraq or in Korea), the military might resort to

security review and restrict or ban media transmission devices on

operational security grounds.
In considering this issue, several developments must be

taken into account. First, with the growing sophistication and

miniaturization of satellite communication devices, the media

increasingly have the technical ability to transmit on their own.

This development will make it harder for the military to impose

security review, because it cannot control the transmission of

reports. However, it is my belief, based on past media behavior,

that essentially all the media would comply with a security

review process if the military established one. Second, and maybe

more importantly, the military, itself, may not want to institute

security review. Running a large scale security review process

(as in DESERT STORM) is extremely time and resource consuming for

the military. The security review caused long delays in the

delivery of news. It is not clear how, in the future, commanders

will be able (or even willing) to dedicate a substantial part of

their assets to a mission that will hurt military-media

relations.

The Question of Assets. The dedication of sufficient assets

to support public affairs operations has always been a problem.

In the past decade, military commanders sought to provide all

assets while restricting (if not forbidding) the use of mediaowned capabilities for transport and communications. During

Operation JUST CAUSE in Panama, the Pentagon did not dedicate

enough communication assets to enable timely transmission of pool

material. During DESERT STORM, the system for transporting and

transmitting pool products worked so poorly that, according to

the Post's Getler, almost none of the pool stories made it back

to the newspaper in time for publication.92

The 1992 agreement sought a remedy to those problems. The

eighth principle reads:

Consistent with its capabilities, the military will

supply PAOs with facilities to enable timely, secure,

compatible transmission of pool material and will make

these facilities available whenever possible for filing

independent coverage. In cases when government

facilities are unavailable, journalists wi<P10>ll, as

always, file by any other means available. Th<P255>e

military will not ban communication systems operated by

news organizations, but electromagnetic operational

security in battlefield situations may require limited

restrictions on the use of such systems.93

This provision represents a major victory for the media. For

example, during the Gulf War, journalists could not take their

own communication devices when they went to visit the troops. The

same conditions applied to those who were in pools covering the

ground offensive.
But, the draft instruction does not seem to subscribe to

such an approach. In the vein of earlier policy, the directive

tasks the CINCs with "providing all necessary assets" (personnel,

facilities, equipment, transportation, and communications) to

support public affairs activities.94 Although recognizing past

problems, the directive seeks to resolve them in a traditional

way: i.e., by increasing military logistic support to the media.

But in a seeming contradiction with the 1992 agreement, the draft

instruction does not cover media use of independent

communications facilities. However, Kilgallen stated that the

joint doctrine will explicitly include this provision, because it

is absolutely necessary. Charles Ricks, who wrote the original

draft of the DoD directive, argued: "The instinctive military

need for control is irrelevant in the face of an institution

which can field, depending on the size of the operation,

thousands of reporters who are equipped with instantaneous

communications capabilities."95 The goal of the new policy is to

encourage commanders to accept those independent means of

communication and to teach them to manage their utilization on

the battlefield.

Just how well those requirements will improve asset

dedication is unclear. Two conditions might prove helpful. First,

if planners can anticipate a reasonable and limited number of

reporters, they will be more successful in planning adequate

support.96 Second, allowing media representatives to operate their

own communication devices will alleviate the military's burden

for hosting reporters: notably the work load, dedication of

personnel and financial costs. Moreover, when the military does

not have enough assets to support journalist demands, access to

and freedom to use their own means to file stories and move

around the battlefield will reduce media criticism and anger. The

directive and the doctrine need to provide guidance concerning

instances when radio (and other electronic) signals are of

serious concern, such as in DESERT STORM, and, on the other hand,

to establish under which circumstances the media will be allowed

to use their own communication devices.

Improving the Planning and Coordination Process for a Better

Success. The main lesson Pete Williams drew from the Gulf War

deals with the utmost importance of having a good plan. "If I had

one lesson to draw from the Gulf War, I would say: planning.

Planning is essential, absolutely critical to the success of

public affairs operations. Most of our problems during the Gulf

War occured because of planning shortcomings."97

The current draft provision does not affect the procedure

according to which CINCs are the only relevant authority to

decide whether and how to accommodate reporters unless the CINC

receives a direct order from the Secretary of Defense (or the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff backed by the Secretary of

Defense). But the draft instruction defines under which

conditions planning is likely to lead to a successful public

affairs campaign. First, public affairs planning should occur in

parallel with operational planning; the two should occur in

concert. The potential benefits may seem obvious. Public affairs

officers would be better equipped to advise their commanders and

to plan for real media opportunities. But practice has regularly

showed that this parallel planning is not easy to achieve, mainly

because few commanders include public affairs officers in the

compartmented planning process.

The draft instruction tasks the CINCs with a

multidimensional public affairs planning effort: most

importantly, plans should include an assessment of media

requirements (including a forecast of potential surges in media

activities) and planning for adequate resources (including

options to meet unforeseen requirements). The draft instruction

reads: "Commanders shall ensure that the operations planning

process includes public affairs assessments that precisely

identify the resource requirement."98 Therefore CINCs are tasked

with assessing as precisely as possible the number of journalists

likely to cover their operation. An accurate prediction should

enable the military to plan for adequate transport, communication

and personnel support. In this regard, the draft instruction

reads: "News media interest will vary, and military support

packages must be able to accommodate surges in news media

activities. The goal is to anticipate and respond to fluctuating

coverage and to tailor resources to ensure no loss of

efficiency."99

The draft instruction also deals with the sensitive issue of

the coordination process between CINCs and the ATSD (PA), who is

not in the chain of command and is unlikely to ever be so.

However, ATSD (PA) is supposed to be in the chain of

communication. And the draft instruction reasserts this point.

Since 1990, CINCs have been obligated to coordinate with ATSD

(PA) and seek approval for "all public affairs activities."100

This obligation, however, did not preclude recurring problems

between CENTCOM in Riyadh and Pete Williams's office during the

Gulf War. In most cases, ASD (PA) Williams was unable to assert

any real authority over CENTCOM. The most Williams's office ever

gained was a few more pool slots for journalists. The draft

instruction slightly modifies the current situation. It strongly

reasserts that ATSD (PA) is part of the chain of communication

when stating "ATSD (PA) shall review, coordinate, approve and

disseminate public affairs guidance, public affairs plans and

public affairs annexes."101 It imposes new policy standards on the

CINCs (the principle of open and independent coverage, for

example). It is unclear that this provision will alter the

balance of power between the CINCs (and uniformed military) and
the ATSD (PA), especially if a commander does not follow the

policy.

A Discussion of the Applicability of the New Principles.

Even if the draft DoD instruction is unsigned and the joint

doctrine is still in the coordination process, the pillars of

this new policy have already been used in two small-scale

operations, during Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY (designed to

restore President Jean-Bertrand Aristide to office in Haiti,

September 1994) and during Operation UNITED SHIELD (the 

evacuation of U.N. personel from Somalia in March 1995).

Lessons Learned. The lessons learned from these two military

operations give some reasons for optimism. In both cases, public

affairs plans implemented some of the draft instruction

principles, most notably in terms of media access to the

battlefield, operational security, and logistical support of

public affairs operations.

The Annex F of UPHOLD DEMOCRACY (the canceled invasion of

Haiti) called for several pools of reporters to be assigned to

the invading forces while many other independent reporters were

waiting in Port-au-Prince for the U.S. invasion. The plan had

provisions so that pool and independent reporters would not cover

the same actions.102 Pool reporters got unique access (pools were

included in the first five aircraft to assault the presidential

palace) and received classified briefings from the Joint Task

Force (JTF) commanding officer, U.S. Army Lieutenant General Hugh

Shelton. Independent reporters did not have access to these

briefings and were only scheduled to go in with the third wave of

invading forces. Public Affairs Officer U.S. Army Lieutenant

Colonel Michael Wood viewed this arrangement as highly

successful, mainly because pool reporters were "amazed at the

amount of access they got."103 In at least one case, aboard the

amphibious assault ship Wasp (LHD-1), pool and independent

reporters were co-located and it is unclear just how different

their access to the battlefield would have been. Even the

independent reporters received classified briefings on the

planned invasion the night before the assault was to occur.104

During Operation UNITED SHIELD, U.S. Marine Corps Lieutenant

General Anthony Zinni accommodated a pool of about 20 reporters

aboard the JTF's ships (in addition to journalists aboard

coalition ships, such as the Italians and French) while many

independent reporters were waiting for its forces on the beaches

of Mogadishu. Though some pool reporters complained that they did

not receive enough preferential treatment, Zinni concluded that

the dual arrangement worked well.105

Both operations also provided a test of applicability for
the principle of security at the source to protect operational

security. During UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, the pool (and some

independents) received classified briefings prior to the invasion

that was halted at the last moment. The military did not apply a

security review process to make sure that reporters would not

reveal classified details. Instead, they submitted the

journalists to a temporary embargo on reporting information.

Jacqueline Sharkey, a sharp critic of the security review

process, wrote positively about the Haiti experience. As she

noted, "The pool was given classified information by high-ranking

officials, including LTG Henry Hugh Shelton, commander of the

operation. Other than an embargo until the start of the invasion,

there were no restrictions on what we could report or how we

could report it."106 General Zinni also applied the principle of

security at the source during UNITED SHIELD. This choice

constitutes a major step forward. In the past decade, the

Pentagon did not hesitate to use security review even when it did

not need it to protect operational security.107 These two

experiences reassured the media. Journalists considered both

experiences as an example of the Pentagon's good faith on the

issue of operational security. AP's Jonathan Wolman, for example,

considered that the Pentagon acted in comformity with the 1992

agreement. "They [the military] did not abuse the security review

in any respect and, in several instances, they did not do

security review."108

Finally in both cases, public affairs plans authorized

reporters, both pools and independent, to use their own

communication systems to transmit their material. In the case of

UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, public affairs officers also had their own

sophisticated devices, such as portable computers, modems, faxes,

telephones, and satellite dishes. All journalists could use them.

The combination of military and civil communication devices

enabled the timely transmission of copy, videos, and photographs

from Haiti to the United States. In the case of UNITED SHIELD,

the situation was more complex. The operation took place in a

remote location. Local logistical capacity to support reporters

was minimal and fragile. Reporters assigned to cover the

operation could not carry a lot of equipment because of space

limitations. General Zinni, though, agreed that journalists could

bring a satellite dish ashore with them because "reporters live

to file their stories."109 In both cases, journalists were

satisfied with the arrangements.

The Limits of These Experiences. UPHOLD DEMOCRACY and UNITED

SHIELD provide encouraging tests of military-media relations on

the battlefield and the draft DoD policy. On at least three major

issues, public affairs plans took into account the new trends in

the 1992 agreement and the draft instruction. This is quite an

achievement. During the Panama invasion (1989), which, by the

objectives and the adversary's capabilities, was not too
dissimilar to the (planned) invasion of Haiti, the public affairs

plan imposed very strict restrictions on the media. One can say

that after the bilateral negotiations of 1992, a new era of

military-media relations has begun.110

These experiences, however, were too limited in time and

scope to draw any definitive conclusions for a more intense

battlefield environment. First, these operations were very short.

While UPHOLD DEMOCRACY lasted 6 months, the tense, nearbattlefield environment lasted perhaps a week, and UNITED SHIELD

had U.S. troops ashore in Somalia also for just a few days.

Therefore, it is difficult to determine whether and how these

provisions would have worked over the long term. Second, in

UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, some of these provisions could not really be

tested as the overall operation changed at the very last minute

from a combat to a permissive, noncombat operation. In

consequence, USACOM released the pool 2 hours before the H-Hour,

and pool and independent reporters were mixed in actual coverage.

Though public affairs officers in charge of the operation were

optimistic, 111 it is difficult to assess how the dual system of

pool/independent reporters would have worked. Finally in both

cases, the "enemy" could not seriously challenge the U.S.

military. Such overwhelming force in the face of a weak enemy

allows the U.S. military more latitude to organize media

relations and "experiment" with new, more liberal approaches.

That this frame of mind will remain in the face of a more

sophisticated enemy or during a politically controversial

operation remains to be seen.

Conclusions and Recommendations.

The 1992 agreement and the current draft instruction have

already produced significant results. For the first time, media

organizations have worked together to defend what they view as

their collective rights and presented a set of standards that

many believe should govern coverage of U.S. military operations.

Until 1992, the media had been unwilling and/or unable to take

such a step. As AP's Wolman noted, the media has a deep-rooted

reluctance for acting together: "We are all competitors and we

don't meet in committee as a natural state of affairs. That group

came together literally in crisis over the outrageous combat

coverage conditions set in the Gulf War, but we don't pretend to

be an everyday committee. Most of our organizations are proud and

insistent to stand up for themselves under most circumstances."112

For once, the various organizations spoke with one voice. For the

first time, the media and the military have agreed on a general

set of principles. Both parties now have at their disposal a tool

to judge and measure the other's actions: its commitment to the

rules agreed upon or its failure to abide by them. For the first

time, finally, the military-media controversy has led to the
development of a comprehensive policy on media access to the

battlefield. Long-time observers of the controversy will note

that the principles agreed upon in 1992 were not so different

from the principles proposed about 10 years ago by the Sidle

commission. Ten years of recurring controversy and three major

conflicts (Grenada, Panama and the Gulf War) have been needed to

move these from recommendations to policy statement. This should

be viewed as a first positive step. It should not be considered

an achievement, as the only policy documents that will ultimately

matter for the future are the draft instruction and the joint

public affairs doctrine that should be promulgated sometime in

1996.

Some gray areas remain, as the draft instruction departs

from the 1992 agreement between the Pentagon and the media, at

least in two areas. First, the current draft instruction does not

set any limitations on the use of pools and leaves it to the

CINCs to decide whether circumstances are appropriate or not to

resort to pools. But the draft instruction provisions leave the

door largely open to using pools as a way to limit and not to

grant access. It leaves the commander with only the pool option

to limit press access if too many reporters want to take a trip

to war. In the current environment, however, commanders have not

set up pools to restrict access, but either to grant access to

activities that the press would not otherwise witness (the

planned invasion of Haiti in 1994 and UNITED SHIELD in March

1995) or to ensure protection of journalists at the request of

the press (Somalia, October 1993). Those experiences, though

limited in time and scope, could help shape a new attitude among

commanders regarding the use of pools, even in large-scale combat

operations. However, the draft doctrine leaves the door open for

far more restrictive arrangements. Second, the current draft

instruction neither subscribes to nor rejects the possibility of

media people carrying and operating their own communication

devices on the battlefield. In the current environment, this is

already done. In Haiti and in Somalia, media organizations

operated their own devices. However, it is unclear that

commanders would agree to let the press use them in situations

where electromagnetic signals matter (such as in the Gulf War.)

Finally, neither the 1992 agreement nor the draft

instruction take into account some very important issues that

need at least to be explored as possible alternate remedies to

the recurrent problems.

Numerical Limitation. The military and the media should

agree on a numerical limitation on reporters assigned to cover

combat operations. Such a limitation will serve both the military

and the media's interests. It will enable the military to make

more accurate predictions over what kind of accommodations it

needs to plan for. To be able to provide accommodations and
logistical support for the press, the military needs to know what

to expect in advance and to plan for media requirements so the

necessary assets can be allocated.

Working with a limited number of press representatives will

definitively eliminate the issue of limiting access by pooling--

which has been the media's goal for nearly a decade. The military

can hardly accommodate hundreds of reporters who want to cover an

operation. As long as a limit is not agreed upon, pools will be

used and remain the only available tool to limit access.

A New Accreditation System. Limiting numbers could occur

through a simple accreditation process which would take into

account the reporter's proficiency. Today, all a reporter

requires for accreditation is association with a U.S. media

outlet. Both the military and the press have a common interest in

a better accreditation system. The military could be more

confident that reporters covering a military operation possessed

adequate knowledge to do so professionally. For the press, a new

accreditation system would ensure that better qualified reporters

would be first in the area to witness operations; these reporters

would likely provide a better informed picture of what is going

on. This would avoid the type of situation that occurred in the

Gulf War when a reporter from Mirabella (a fashion magazine) went

into the pool while reporters from The New York Times and the

Wall Street Journal were stuck in Dhahran.

Communication Assets. The presence of sophisticated

communication devices on or near the battlefield is a foreseeable

cause of problems. Currently, the draft instruction does not

address this issue. The DoD should expand efforts to develop

appropriate and realistic policy and procedures on these

communication devices.

Multinational Operations. U.S. military operations are

increasingly multinational in nature, and frequently involve the

U.N. Just as with every other aspect of military activity, this

"combined" nature of operations adds complexity to the militarymedia relationship. Specific problems due to multinational

operations thus need addressing. One of the most important

questions concerns the accreditation process of coalition

members' reporters to cover U.S. forces and activities. So far,

except in the case of UNITED SHIELD, the U.S. military has made

no efforts to grant access to foreign (especially non-English

speaking) reporters. This policy needs to change.

The DoD draft instruction also does not address how the

public affairs community should handle differences between U.S.,

allied, and U.N. approaches to the media in terms of media access

to operations and release of information. Do U.S. units assigned

to U.N. operations follow U.N. public affairs guidance (likely to
reduce access to operations) or follow U.S. public affairs

guidance (at the risk of antagonizing allies)?

The draft instruction and the draft joint public affairs

doctrine represent a step forward in the DoD approach to

military-media relations. But significant shortfalls exist in

these drafts that hopefully will be addressed in the process of

final coordination. Finally, there is the simple fact that these

key documents remain at the draft stage 3 years after the

conclusion of the DoD-media negotiations. It is time to bring

them to completion.

ENDNOTES

1. This monograph focuses primarily on the question of press

access to combat operations. Press access to humanitarian

assistance and other non-combat operations has not created, in

general, the same tension since both the military and the press

generally agree over the rules: unlimited press access, a simple

accreditation system, and access to units based on a firstarrived, first-served basis. Even in humanitarian assistance

operations, however, military-media crises can erupt. The opening

days of Operation RESTORE HOPE in Somalia created a storm of

criticism when journalists met Marines and U.S. Navy SEALs with

bright lights on the beach in the middle of the night. For the

author's thoughts on this incident, see: "The Military and the

Media in Restore Hope," American Sentinel, February 21, 1993, p.

6.

2. The author is well aware that these terms distort

reality, as there hardly are such unitary entities as "the

military" and "the press." Especially the latter is heavily

divided, but even within the military there are major

differences between services and branches of services on top of

differences between individuals' perceptions of the press.

However, for the purpose of clarifying, I will use these terms

and hope that the reader understands how broad-brush they are.

3. The following organizations repeatedly demanded

negotiations with the Reagan administration: American Newspapers

Publishers Association (ANPA), American Society of Magazine

Editors (ASME), American Society of Newspapers Editors (ASNE),

Associated Press Managing Editors (APME), Associated Press (AP)

and United Press International (UPI), Reporters Committee on

Freedom of the Press, Society of Professional Journalists, Sigma

Delta Chi, National Association of Broadcasters (NAB), and RadioTelevision News Directors Association. Those organizations also

co-authored the "Statement of Principles on Press Access to

Military Operations," Washington, DC: January 1984.

4. "Media Organizations Take a Stand," Editor and Publisher,
January 14, 1984, p. 18.

5. See, for example, Drew Middleton, "Barring Reporters from

the Battlefield," The New York Times Magazine, February 5, 1984,

p. 37; Peter Braestrup, Battle Lines, Report of the Twentieth

Century Fund Task Force on the Military and the Media, New York:

Priority Press, 1985; Saul Friedman, "White House Let Pentagon

Cut Off News of Invasion," The Philadelphia Inquirer, October 28,

1983, p. 14; Dan Rather, "The Press and Grenada," Dan Rather

Commentary, CBS Radio Network, October 28, 1983; Robert Timberg,

"Reagan Press Policy on Grenada Criticized," Baltimore Sun,

October 29, 1983, p. 3; "Editors Protest to Pentagon," The New

York Times, November 1, 1983, p. 16; Felix McKnight, "War and

Journalists," Journal of Commerce, November 2, 1983, p. 4; Abe

Mellinkoff, "Military and Press Relations," The San Francisco

Chronicle, November 4, 1983, p. 60; Jerry Friedheim, "Censor

Journalists Covering Wars?", U.S. News and World Report, November

14, 1983, p. 33; Jessica Cato, "Publisher's Note," Washington

Journalism Review, October 1983, p. 4.

6. Many articles referred to the superiority of American

democracy, portrayed as the most accomplished in the world. See

for example, "Grenada: Free the Press," Baltimore Sun, November

2, 1983; James Reston, "Reagan and the Press," The New York

Times, November 2, 1983, p. 31; "Media Censorship In Grenada,"

NBC Nightly News, October 31, 1983; "Censoring Confidence," The

Los Angeles Times, October 30, 1983; Henry Catto Jr., "Dateline

Grenada: The Media and the Military Go at It," The Washington

Post, October 30, 1983, p. C7. Some articles commented ironically

on the exclusion of the press by the U.S. military while

pretending to restore democracy on a previously Marxist island.

See for example, Sandy Grady, "Covering the Battle with Pentagon

Handouts," The Denver Post, October 28, 1983; "In War, the People

Must Be Informed," U.S.A Today, November 2, 1983. See also 

cartoons in Kansas City Times, November 3, 1983.

7. Letter to the Secretary of Defense, April 29, 1991,

reprinted in Hedrick Smith, ed., The Media and the Gulf War: The

Press and Democracy in Wartime, Washington: Seven Locks Press,

1991, p. 378.

8. The mainstream media considered the option of the

constitutional argument, but finally decided against it. Only

Larry Flynt went to court in 1984, challenging the

constitutionality of the ban. A few other left-wing journals

agreed with the argument.

9. "The Plaintiffs seek an injunction prohibiting Defendants

from preventing or otherwise hindering Plaintiffs from sending

reporters to the sovereign nation of Grenada to gather news . . .

and they seek a declaration that the course of conduct engaged in
by the Defendants . . . in preventing Plaintiffs, or otherwise

hindering Plaintiff's efforts to send reporters to the sovereign

nation of Grenada for the purpose of gathering news is in

violation of the Constitution (sic) laws and treaties of the

United States," in Flynt v. Weinberger, 588 F. Supp., June 21,

1984, p. 58.

10. The Nation, et al. v. the United States DoD, 762 F.

Supp., April 16, 1991, p. 1561.

11. William Hammond, "The News Media and the Military," in

John E. Jessup and Louise B. Ketz, ed., Encyclopedia of the

American Military, Vol. III, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons,

1994, p. 2095.

12. Peter Braestrup, Battle Lines, p. 27.

13. Clarence R. Wyatt, Paper Soldiers: The American Press

and the Vietnam War, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,

1995, p. 200.

14. Survey by The Los Angeles Times, November 12-17, 1983.

Data provided by the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research,

University of Connecticut, Storrs.

15. Survey by Roper Organization, December 3-10, 1983. Data

provided by the Roper Center.

16. See Carl Session Stepp, "In the Wake of Grenada," The

Quill, March 1984, pp. 12-15; and David Gergen, "The Message to

the Media," Public Opinion, April-May 1984, pp. 5-8.

17. Survey by The Los Angeles Times, November 12-17, 1983.

Data provided by the Roper Center.

18. Survey by ABC News, December 8, 1983. Data provided by

he Roper Center.

19. Caspar Weinberger, Secretary of Defense, Principles of

Information, DoD, December 1, 1983.

20. Vice-Admiral Joseph Metcalf, USN (Ret.), "The Press and

Grenada: 1983," in Peter Young, ed., "Defence and the Media in

Time of Limited War," Small Wars and Insurgencies, December 1991,

pp. 169-170.

21. Michael Burch, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for

Public Affairs (1983-85), interview with the author, Washington,

October 11, 1993.

22. Robert Sims, former spokesman for the National Security
Council, then Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs,

interview with the author, Washington, March 19, 1992.

23. "Report to CJCS Military-Media Relations Panel (Sidle

Panel)," in Peter Braestrup, Battle Lines, p. 163.

24. Ibid., p. 165.

25. Ibid., pp. 166-168.

26. Colonel Robert O'Brien, ASD (PA), included in his

testimony to the Sidle panel the idea of creating a preestablished pool (i.e., a group of media people selected to

accompany the military on operations). The media representatives

were extremely reluctant and voiced concern, but all agreed that

it could be a good last-resort opportunity when no other way of

obtained access is feasible. See "Media-Military Hindsight on

Grenada," Broadcasting, February 13, 1984, p. 79.

27. Ground rules describe what information reporters

covering military operations should not release. Guidelines

describe the general conditions under which media ought to

operate on the battlefield.

28. "DoD National Pool Ground Rules," DoD National Media

Pool Deployers' Information Package, DoD handout for reporters

participating in the national media pool in the October-December

1993 rotation.

29. See William G. Ackerly, Analysis of the Pentagon's Press

Pool Tests, MA Thesis, University of Kansas, 1987, pp. 40-41.

30. See Fred Hoffman, "Review of the Panama Pool Deployment:

December 1990," in Jacqueline Sharkey, Under Fire: U.S. Military

Restrictions on the Media from Grenada to the Persian Gulf,

Washington: The Center for Public Integrity, 1991, Appendix C, p.

4.

31. See Lieutenant Commander Gregory Hartung, USN, Now Is

Time to Plan for Media Pools, Individual Study Project, Newport,

RI: Naval War College, 1989, p. 10.

32. William G. Ackerly, Analysis of the Pentagon's Press

Pool Tests, p. 26.

33. Michael A. Palmer, On Course to Desert Storm: The United

States Navy and the Persian Gulf, Washington: Naval Historical

Center, 1992, especially Chapter 11, "Not While This President

Serves: The Reflagging Decision," pp. 103-119; and Chapter 12,

"The Tanker War," pp. 120-134. See also Barry Rubin, "Drowning in

the Gulf," Foreign Policy, Winter 1987-1988, pp. 120-134; and
George Stewart, Scott M. Fabbri, and Adam B. Siegel, JTF

Operations Since 1983, CRM 94-42, Alexandria, VA: Center for

Naval Analysis, July 1994.

34. Admiral Harold Bernsen, Commander Middle East Forces,

interview with the author, Alexandria, VA, August 26, 1993.

35. Fred Hoffman, a former Associated Press Pentagon

correspondent for 22 years, was then Deputy ASD (PA). Interview

with the author, Washington, March 17, 1993.

36. Operation PRAYING MANTIS was an operation within

EARNEST WILL, commanded by the same Joint Task Force, in

retaliation for damages caused by Iranian mines to a U.S. frigate

(Samuel Roberts) on April 14. See Hans S. Pawlisch, "Operation

Praying Mantis," Appendix A, in Palmer, On Course to Desert

Storm, pp. 141-146; Bud Langston and Don Bringle, "Operation

Praying Mantis: The Air View," U.S.N.I. Proceedings, May 1989,

pp. 54-65; J. B. Perkins III, "Operation Praying Mantis: The

Surface View," pp. 66-70; John H. Admire, "A Report on the Gulf,"

Marine Corps Gazette, December 1988, pp. 56-61; and William M.

Rakow, "Marines in the Gulf--1988," pp. 62-68.

37. Dan Howard, interview with the author, Washington, April

15, 1993. The anecdote was confirmed in later interview with

former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral William

Crowe, interview with the author, Washington,, August 17, 1993.

38. For a more detailed examination by this author of

military-media relations during JUST CAUSE, see Pascale M.

Combelles, "Operation Just Cause: A Military-Media Fiasco,"

Military Review, May-June 1995, pp. 77-85.

39. This is standard operating procedure. The military does

not typically send personnel into combat situations without an

operational reason. Escorting journalists is not an operational

necessity that would compel media escorts and other personnel to

risk exposure to combat situations.

40. Fred Hoffman had been the Associated Press Pentagon

correspondent for 22 years, before becoming a Deputy ASD (PA)

between 1987 and 1989. His long experience with the military, his

knowledge of the media and of the national pool--which he had

helped put into fact--made him a perfect reviewer.

41. Fred Hoffman, "Review of Panama Pool Deployment:

December 1989," in Jacqueline Sharkey, Under Fire, p. 17.

42. "Annex F, Planning Guidance--Public Affairs," in JCS Pub

5-02.2, March 30, 1990, in U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on

Governmental Affairs, Pentagon Rules on Media Access to the
Persian Gulf War, Washington: Government Printing Office, 1991,

p. 246.

43. Using those rosters, the military came up with the

figure of about 1,600 journalists accredited to the Saudi Arabian

theater of operations. However, the accounting procedure raises

some questions for two reasons. First, those rosters included the

names of every person in a media team, so each name did not

represent a journalist. Second, many journalists registered at

multiple JIBs at the same time to be granted access to all

briefings and media opportunities. The 1,600 figure is therefore

probably inflated.

44. Captain James B. Brown, USA, "Media Access to the

Battlefield," Military Review, July 1992, p. 16.

45. John Fialka, a Wall Street Journal correspondent among

the few ten percent of reporters allowed in the pools during the

Gulf War, wrote that the military courier system was "aptly

dubbed the "pony express," in Hotel Warriors: Covering the Gulf

War, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991, p. 5.

46. Fialka, Hotel Warriors, p. 5.

47. DoD, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, Final Report to

Congress, Washington: Government Printing Office, April 1992, p.

S-4.

48. According to a memo by the Department of the Army, the

pool should not have been deployed at this point since more than

a hundred reporters were in Panama covering the operations. But

"the deployment shows Secretary Cheney's support for the pool

concept," Department of the Army, Deployment of the DoD Media

Pool on Nimrod Dancer--Information Memorandum, May 12, 1989. Copy

provided to the author.

49. See Fred Hoffman, "Review of the Panama Pool Deployment:

December 1989," reprinted in Jacqueline Sharkey, Under Fire, p.

7-9.

50. In a letter of protest to Secretary of Defense Cheney,

several media organizations wrote: "Our cooperation in Pentagon

pool arrangements since the Sidle commission has been based on an

understanding that pools would provide emergency coverage of

short duration. Clearly, in Desert Storm, the military

establishment embraced pools as a long-term way of life. The pool

system was used in the Persian Gulf War not to facilitate

coverage but to control it." Reprinted in Hedrick Smith, ed., The

Media and the Gulf War, p. 378.

51. The term national pool refers to the standing DoD
national news media pool, as created in 1985. The term 'regional

pool' designates pools (groups of journalists) set up locally to

cover operations.

52. The military resorted to these same features for the

media arrangements of operations like DESERT STORM or EARNEST

WILL. In addition, the Defense Department has developed the

practice of granting exclusive priority to the pool over

independent reporters. During Operation JUST CAUSE in Panama, the

military protected the pool against hundreds of journalists

flying in the country. Incoming reporters were kept on a military

base because there were not enough public affairs personnel to

provide escorts and opportunities. During DESERT STORM, the

military arrested and detained independent reporters who did not

follow pool rules.

53. The case of the B-52 units during the Gulf War perfectly

illustrates the last point. The units were located in England,

Diego Garcia (British island), Spain, Saudi Arabia and the United

States. In all cases, no reporters were allowed near the bases.

The U.S. base on Diego Garcia had a long standing no-press

policy. The Saudis did not want any publicity, for "strategic

bombers" inevitably were linked to nuclear warfare in their

minds. The Spaniards did not want to aggravate the anti-American

 sentiment in the country. And the United States feared that

coverage of the B-52 would bring back memories of Vietnam.

54. Pascale M. Combelles, "Operation Just Cause: A MilitaryMedia Fiasco."

55. Major Kenneth S. Plato, USMC, Military-Media Relations:

First Impressions of Operation Desert Shield, Individual Study

Project, Newport, RI: Naval War College, February 11, 1995, p.

12.

56. In this regard, Operation PRAYING MANTIS was quite an

achievement for the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public

Affairs. See earlier discussion of Operation EARNEST WILL.

57. Letter to the Honorable Dick Cheney, April 29, 1991,

reprinted in Hedrick Smith, The Media and the Gulf War, p. 378.

 The ad-hoc group involved Washington bureau chiefs concerned

that CENTCOM media policy would become standard operating

procedure for the next war. The group included the Washington

bureau chiefs of Chicago Tribune (Richard Harrock), The News York

Times (Howell Raines), The Washington Post (Michael Getler), The

Wall Street Journal (Albert R. Hunt), The Los Angeles Times (Jack

Nelson), Cox Newspapers (Andrew Glass), Knight-Ridder (Clark

Hoyt), Hearst Newspapers (Charles Lewis), Newsweek (Even Thomas),

Time (Stanley Cloud), CBS News (Barbara Cohen), NBC News (Timothy

J. Russert), ABC News (George Watson), CNN (William Headline),
and Associated Press (Jonathan Wolman).

58. Covering the Persian Gulf, unpublished report to

Secretary Cheney, June 1991, p. 10.

59. Statement of Principles, unpublished media proposal for

combat coverage guidelines.

60. Jonathan Wolman, Associated Press Washington bureau

chief, interview with the author, Washington: September 28, 1995.

61. Jonathan Wolman, Associated Press, interview, September

28, 1995.

62. Agreement on War Coverage Guidelines, Associated Press

News Release, May 21, 1992.

63. See Robert Pear, "Military Revises Rules to Assure

Reporters Access to Battle Areas," The New York Times, May 22,

1992, p. A8.

64. When he took office, Les Aspin downgraded (at least

bureaucratically) the status of public affairs in DoD. He changed

the ASD (PA) to ATSD (PA). The roles, missions and

responsibilities have essentially remained the same. In addition

to the bureaucratic downgrading, the personal tie between the

Secretary of Defense and his Assistant for Public Affairs has

also weakened. While Pete Williams had a long-term relationship

with and direct access to Secretary Cheney, the Clinton

administration DoD has had four ATSD (PA) and two Secretaries of

Defense in 3 years. It is not hard to conclude from the

combination of the lower bureaucratic and personal status, that

PA has a lower priority in today's DoD.

65. DoD draft instruction, "Procedures for Joint Public

Affairs Operations," undated, p. 7.

66. Ibid., p. 4.

67. Ibid., p. 5.

68. Ibid., p. 7.

69. Ibid., p. 4.

70. Ibid.

71. George Watson, ABC News, interview with the author,

Washington, October 2, 1995.

72. Brian Kilgallen, ATSD (PA) Plans Officer. He was not
directly involved in the 1991-92 negotiations with the media, but

witnessed the process. He is now working on the joint public

affairs doctrine development. Interview with the author, The

Pentagon, October 3, 1995.

73. Ronald L. Shultz, Combat Media Coverage Principles:

Doomed to Failure?, Individual Study Project, Carlisle Barracks,

PA: U.S. Army War College, April 1993, p. 29.

74. DoD Draft instruction, p. 4-5.

75. Covering the Persian Gulf, p. 7.

76. Report by CJCS Media-Military Relations Panel, in Peter

Braestrup, Battle Lines, p. 166.

77. DoD draft instruction, p. 7.

78. Brian Kilgallen, ATSD (PA), Plans Officer, interview

with the author, October 3, 1995.

79. Pentagon Adopts Combat Coverage Principles, DoD News

Release, No. 241-92, May 21, 1992.

80. Michael Getler, The Washington Post, interview with the

author, Washington, October 5, 1995.

81. Brian Kilgallen, ATSD (PA) Plans Officer, interview,

October 3, 1995.

82. "Testimony of Pete Williams, Assistant Secretary of

Defense for Public Affairs, U.S. DoD," in U.S. Congress, Senate,

Committee on Governmental Affairs, Pentagon Rules on Media Access

to the Persian Gulf War, p. 10.

83. Operational security ground rules consist of a list of

categories of information the press should refrain from

publishing. For Operation DESERT STORM, the security ground rules

included: "specific numerical information on troop strength,

aircraft, weapons system, on-hand equipment, or supplies. Unit

size and number of amount of equipment and supplies may be

described in general terms; any information that reveals details

of future plans, operations, or strikes, including postponed or

canceled operations; information, photography, and imagery that

would reveal the specific location of military forces or show the

level of security at military installations or encampments; rules

of engagement details; information on intelligence collection

activities, including targets, methods and results; specific

information on friendly force troop movements, tactical

deployments, and dispositions that would jeopardize operational

security of lives; identification of mission aircraft points of
origin other than as land-or carrier-based; information on the

effectiveness or the ineffectiveness of enemy camouflage, cover,

deception, targeting, fire, intelligence collection and security

measures, specific identifying information on missing or downed

aircraft or ships while search and rescue missions are planned or

underway; Special Operations forces' methods and equipments;

specific operating methods and tactics; information on

operational or support vulnerabilities that could be used against

U.S. forces, such as details of major battle damage or personnel

losses of specific or coalition units until released by CENTCOM,"

in U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Governmental Affairs,

Pentagon Rules on Media Access to the Persian Gulf War, p. 465.

84. In the last case, the news organization agreed with the

Pentagon, that the report violated the ground rules and agreed

not to publish it.

85. Michael Getler, The Washington Post, interview, October

5, 1995.

86. Ibid.

87. DoD Draft instruction, p. 4-5.

88. Brian Kilgallen, ATSD (PA) Plans Officer, interview,

October 3, 1995.

89. "CENTCOM Guidelines for News Media," January 7, 1991, in

U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Governmental Affairs,

Pentagon Rules on Media Access to The Persian Gulf War, p. 328.

90. Joint Universal Lessons Learned System (JULLS), Report

number 51438-46100, "Public Affairs: Communications for Public

Affairs," March 7, 1991. Obtained by Freedom of Information Act

(FOIA) request.

91. JULLS 62170-35010, "Ground Rules Enforcement: Security

Review Process," June 20, 1991. Obtained via FOIA request.

92. Michael Getler, The Washington Post, interview, October

5, 1995.

93. Pentagon Adopts Combat Coverage Principles, DoD News

Release.

94. DoD draft instruction.

95. Charles Ricks, The Military-News Media Relationship:

Thinking Forward, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies

Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1993, p. 2.
96. During the invasion of Panama, COL Sconyers (SOUTHCOM

PA) planned to accommodate about 50 reporters. He based his

estimate on the fact that the international airport of Panama

City was scheduled to be closed for several weeks after the

initial assault. But, confronted with the controversy over

access, the White House decided to allow three charter planes

full of reporters to land in Panama City. Needless to say,

SOUTHCOM did not have adequate support to take care of the

incoming reporters.

97. Pete Williams, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for

Public Affairs (1989-93), interview with the author, Washington:

October 19, 1995.

98. DoD draft instruction, p. 9.

99. Ibid.

100. "Annex F, Planning guidance--Public Affairs," in Joint

Pub. 5-02.2, March 30, 1990, in U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee

on Governmental Affairs, Pentagon Rules on Media Access to the

Persian Gulf War, p. 249.

101. DoD draft instruction, p. 2.

102. The USACOM after-action report comments that "The

public affairs (PA) plan for the operation called for the

deployment of local, regional, and national reporters with

individual units, and members of the Pentagon press corps in the

National Media Pool (NMP). This model should be used in future

operations, and the policy of open and independent media coverage

should be continued." U.S. Atlantic Command, CINCUSACOM Joint

After Action Report (JAAR) on Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, 1995,

p. 68. The JAAR provides an official overview of UPHOLD DEMOCRACY

in addition to extracts from joint lessons learned derived from

the operation.

103. LTC Mike Wood (USA), ATSD (PA) Plans Officer, interview

with the author, The Pentagon, February 17, 1995.

104. Thomas Ricks, Wall Street Journal Pentagon

correspondent, interview with the author, Washington, February 6,

1995. Ricks was aboard Wasp as an independent reporter focusing

on the activities of the Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task

Force (SPMAGTF) CARIB which operated in northern Haiti.

105. LTG Anthony Zinni (USMC), "Media Relations: A

Commander's Perspective," submitted to the Marine Corps Gazette.

106. Jacqueline Sharkey, "The Shallow End of the Pool?"

American Journalism Review, December 1994, p. 44.
107. Indeed, SOUTHCOM maintained the security review process

during the second and third day of the Panama invasion, even

though U.S. troops were no longer in a combat situation.

108. Jonathan Wolman, Associated Press, Washington bureau

chief, interview with author, September 28, 1995.

109. Lieutenant General Zinni, "Media Relations: A

Commander's Perspective."

110. As a recent study noted, "Judging from conflict/crisis

operations since DESERT STORM, the military has finally learned

its lesson with regard to news-media planning. The level of

military/press cooperation in Somalia and Haiti was

unprecedented." Frank Aukofer and VADM. William P. Lawrence, USN

(ret.), America's Team: The Odd Couple: A Report on the

Relationship Between the Media and the Military, Nashville, TN:

The Freedom Forum First Amendment Center, Vanderbilt University,

1995, p. 45. This study, however, seems to read too much into

these two experiences and does not question how the U.S. military

might apply the same lessons in a more intense combat

environment. Moreover, they only provide the viewpoint from

higher headquarters, did not interview those involved on the 

ground, and do not discuss any of the military-media problems

that did occur in these operations.

111. COL Barry Willey, U.S. Army, Joint Task Force 180

spokesman in Haiti, September-October 1994, interview with the

author, Pentagon, March 2, 1995; LTC Michael H. Wood, OATSD (PA),

Deputy Director of Plans, Pentagon, interview with author,

February 17, 1995.

112. Jonathan Wolman, Associated Press, interview, September

28, 1995.
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Richard A. Chilcoat

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director

Colonel Richard H. Witherspoon

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Author

Ms. Pascale Combelles-Siegel

Director of Publications and Production

Ms. Marianne P. Cowling

Secretaries

Mrs. Devona A. Peck

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*****

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Mrs. Mary Jane Semple

Cover Artist

Mr. James E. Kistler