THE IMPACT OF MISSILE THREATS 

ON THE RELIABILITY OF U.S. OVERSEAS BASES:

A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS

Joel Wuthnow

January 2005

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interviews.

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iii

FOREWORD

 Despite changes in the global security environment stemming 

from the end of the Cold War, U.S. overseas bases remain vulnerable 

to ballistic and cruise missiles. This monograph, by Joel Wuthnow, 

explains how technical, strategic, and political factors will pose 

complex and discrete concerns, and makes a series of policy 

recommendations for how best to diminish the threat.

 The monograph is being published under the Strategic Studies 

Institute’s External Research Associates Program. We are publishing 

it as a contribution to the continuing dialogue on the U.S. military’s 

strategy of engagement.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director

Strategic Studies Institute 

v

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

JOEL WUTHNOW is a graduate student at Oxford University, 

focusing on Chinese foreign policy and international security. He 

is currently based in Beijing, conducting research on China’s crisis 

management behavior. Mr. Wuthnow is a summa cum laude 

graduate of Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson School of 

Public and International Affairs. 

vii

SUMMARY

 Although the United States will continue to utilize overseas 

military bases in the next decade, the acquisition and improvement 

of long-range missiles by several potential aggressors will pose new 

operational and strategic problems for U.S. forces. Several states will 

likely attain a credible capability to threaten U.S. bases within their 

respective regions, despite the sophistication of U.S. missile defenses. 

Strategically, there are uncertainties about whether the United States 

can deter some of these new missile-capable actors. Deterrence 

problems will create new risks to U.S. deployed forces: If deterrence 

fails, U.S. troops will be at a higher level of exposure. Alternately, 

missiles will grant states some leverage to dissuade the United States 

from actually using overseas forces, as well as a means to coerce host 

states into denying access to the United States. Though several factors 

will mitigate these concerns, the question remains: How reliable will 

alliance-derived “tripwires” and other deployments be in the overall 

U.S. strategy of engagement? Alterations in force structure, tailored 

to these threats, will likely be needed. 

1

THE IMPACT OF MISSILE THREATS 

ON THE RELIABILITY OF U.S. OVERSEAS BASES:

A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS

SECTION I. INTRODUCTION

 U.S. national security strategy requires access to overseas military 

bases, but in the coming decade, that access will be threatened both 

politically and militarily. U.S. strategy demands continued reliance on 

bases for two basic reasons. First, in peacetime, U.S. forces stationed 

overseas provide evidence of a commitment to defending U.S. and 

allied interests. The 2004 NationalMilitary Strategy explained: 

Overseas, U.S. forces permanently based in strategically important areas, 

rotationally deployed forward in support of regional objectives, and 

temporarily deployed during contingencies convey a credible message 

that the United States remains committed to preventing conflict. These 

forces also clearly demonstrate that the United States will react forcefully 

should an adversary threaten the United States, its interests, allies, and 

partners.1

Despite significant base closures, particularly in Western Europe 

and with more on the horizon (particularly in Germany and South 

Korea), the United States continues to operate 35 large or mediumsized installations abroad.2

 These include air bases, naval facilities, 

and U.S. Army barracks. These facilities are mostly located in allied 

territory, specifically North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 

Europe, Turkey, Japan, and Korea. 

 Second, in times of conflict, overseas bases provide operational 

benefits for U.S. combat forces. With the exception of a limited 

number of long-range bombers and certain naval vessels, the United 

States cannot project combat power without access to bases in the 

area of operations. Ground forces require supply centers and seaor airports through which to deploy, except in instances in which 

long-range forced entry operations may be effectively conducted. 

Most ships require repair and maintenance facilities, though not 

exclusively outside the continental United States. Likewise, most 

low-quantity, high-value aircraft (e.g., stealth fighters and airborne 
2

warning and control systems [AWACS] early warning aircraft) 

require theater land basing. In some circumstances, combat forces 

may be generated and sustained from bases in allied territory, 

while in others (e.g., a conflict in the Middle East or Central Asia), 

temporary access agreements will have to be negotiated. 

 With the exception of Guam, all U.S. overseas bases are located on 

foreign soil, and all temporarily used bases will be located in foreign 

countries. Hence, both types of bases are subject to the willingness of 

foreign governments to grant access to the United States. Regarding 

permanent bases, states may request a withdrawal of U.S. forces. For 

instance, in 1991 nationalist opposition in the Philippines led to the 

end of a century-long U.S. military presence there. More commonly, 

states may disallow U.S. use of facilities for particular operations. In 

2003, for example, Turkey refused to permit U.S. forces to use the 

NATO air base at Incirlik in support of the war on Iraq. Regarding 

temporary access, states may simply refuse to permit U.S. entry, 

or may strictly delineate the acceptable uses of their facilities. For 

instance, most Persian Gulf states denied the U.S. access during 

strikes on Iraq in 1998. 

 External military threats compose a second broad category of 

vulnerabilities to U.S. overseas bases. As early as the 1960s, all U.S. 

bases were within reach of Soviet ballistic missiles; the threat of a 

Soviet invasion was also a perennial concern during the Cold War. 

Today, the Department of Defense (DoD) identifies three “levels” 

of military threats against its overseas installations. Level I includes 

terrorism, sabotage, and civil unrest; Level II includes guerilla and 

special operations attacks; and Level III includes conventional 

attack and missile strikes, including missiles tipped with nuclear, 

chemical, or biological warheads.3

 Moreover, military threats are 

linked to political vulnerability. As the National Defense Panel has 

noted, “For political reasons, allies might be coerced not to grant the 

United States access to their sovereign territory. Hostile forces might 

threaten punitive strikes against nations considering an alliance or 

coalition with the United States.”4

 Thus, an overall assessment of the reliability of overseas basing 

must take into account both political and military factors. This is a 

difficult task, because it demands an analysis of the domestic politics 

of every state in which the United States currently possesses bases or 
3

is likely to desire to deploy troops. As suggested, decisions to deny 

access can result from circumstances particular to individual states 

or regions. An overall assessment also demands a review of each 

type of military threat listed above, including both the capabilities 

of all possible enemies and the resolve of those states actually to use 

force. As indicated by the current war on terrorism, the motives and 

resources of nonstate organizations must also be factored into any 

general risk analysis. Finally, analysts must attempt to understand 

the relationship between external threats and the domestic politics 

of host nations. 

 This monograph does not seek to make an overall assessment of 

reliability, but focuses on the “Level III” problem of missile threats. 

Three factors suggest that the threat will be at least as significant in 

the coming decade as it was during the Cold War. First, several new 

actors are developing the means to target effectively and destroy 

fixed land locations―those states may lack the aggregate firepower 

of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), but may 

still develop missiles and missile warheads of sufficient caliber to 

threaten the United States at a regional level. Second, new missilecapable states may not exercise restraint in using missiles, as it 

was believed the Soviet Union did. The answer to the question of 

whether certain states, especially those labeled “rogue states,” can 

be deterred is not clearly “yes.” Third, missiles will provide old and 

newly capable states a uniquely powerful instrument to coerce host 

nations into denying access to the United States. This is a particular 

concern in the post-Cold War period because the United States will 

likely wish to operate in theaters such as the Middle East and Central 

Asia, in which it lacks formal allies and in which new missile states 

are appearing. 

 Nevertheless, emerging missile threats do not obviously spell 

an end of the reliability of overseas bases. Some factors may, 

indeed, work in the opposite direction. First, the United States has 

a lead in military technology which may be leveraged to provide 

for defense against missile attack; defensive capabilities may be 

especially effective against states on the lower end of the capabilities 

spectrum. Second, deterrence is not necessarily implausible. All state 

decisionmakers are interested in their own survival, and so must 

consider the possibility that any use of missiles will compromise the 
4

survival of their regime. Third, missile threats may actually make 

current and potential host nations more accepting of U.S. military 

presence; in the absence of sustained military cooperation with the 

United States, those same states may only be more vulnerable to 

increasing external threats.5

 Some U.S. government reports in the past few years have begun 

to recognize the significance of missile threats on basing reliability. 

In 1997, the National Defense Panel wrote that, based on this threat, 

“the days of the 6-month build-up and secure, large, rear-area bases 

are almost certainly gone forever.”6

 In 2001, the DoD’s Quadrennial 

Defense Review noted that “Saturation attacks with ballistic and cruise 

missiles could deny or delay U.S. access to overseas bases, airfields, 

and ports.”7 The few papers offering more detailed analysis of the 

problem have been, on the whole, technically-oriented. Meanwhile, 

sources that consider the higher-level subjects of coercion diplomacy 

and political decisionmaking have not dealt with the possible 

consequences for overseas basing.8

 Thus, this monograph assesses the countervailing factors that 

will determine the impact of missile threats on basing reliability in 

the next decade. I will address this problem at three levels. Section II 

considers the balance of capabilities, covering the strategic reasons 

and proliferation environment that are driving states to acquire 

missiles, the quantitative and qualitative aspects of the offensive 

threat, and defenses available to the United States. Section III assesses 

the missile threat at the strategic level. The analysis attempts to 

estimate the effectiveness of deterrence as a strategy through which 

the United States will seek to prevent attacks on its overseas bases. 

Section IV analyzes the threat at a political level. The idea is that 

missiles may be used to coerce U.S. leaders to withdraw or fail to use 

overseas forces, or to coerce host nations into denying access to the 

United States. Section V draws these analyses together and concludes 

that missile threats will pose new and complex risks to overseas 

basing reliability at all three levels, but the impact is complicated 

by disparities and uncertainties. The remainder of the conclusion 

describes five methods of reducing the risk. 

 The anticipated contribution of this assessment is twofold: first, 

as a broad and comprehensive study of how missile threats will 

impact basing reliability. Given the state of the current literature, 
5

the concept of exploring this issue at three separate, but interlinked, 

levels represents a unique offering. Second, the assessment serves 

as a model for how to think about the impact of external military 

threats on U.S. force structure. To the extent that the assessment does 

not, and cannot, provide sufficient consideration of particular topics, 

the organization of the document is flexible so as to allow for the 

incorporation of additional information. While the conclusion may 

change according to those inputs, the way of reaching that conclusion 

remains constant. 

SECTION II. THE OFFENSE-DEFENSE BALANCE

 Foreign militaries are developing missile systems as a relatively 

inexpensive way to defeat U.S. forces before they are employed 

in combat. Indeed, for most states, a doctrine of challenging the 

United States with conventional arms, such as fighter jets, tanks, and 

aircraft carriers, will be untenable for the foreseeable future.9

 The 

only possible exceptions will be China and Russia, but China will 

remain at least a generation behind the state of the technological art 

and will lack the capability to sustain forces far from its borders.10

The Russian military has suffered a significant decline since the mid1980s, and a massive spending increase would be needed to restore 

conventional parity between Russia and an expanded NATO.11

Therefore, the United States will probably not face a peer military 

competitor within the next 15 years.

 Given this gap between “the West and the rest,” potential 

adversaries must focus on exploiting areas of relative U.S. 

vulnerability. Such asymmetric strategies may include political 

warfare aimed at swaying world opinion against the United States; 

nontraditional modes of fighting, including urban and guerilla 

warfare, in which U.S. technological advantages are limited; targeting 

critical systems, such as computer and communications networks, 

that enable U.S. forces to “see” and “listen”;12 developing surfaceto-air missiles and mines that deny U.S. forces the ability to enter 

a combat zone; or targeting sites in the rear area―logistics points, 

airbases, naval facilities, and headquarters―which are vital both to 

generate combat forces and to sustain troops on the front lines.13
6

 The strategy of targeting U.S. overseas bases is particularly 

appropriate to states seeking to match their strength with U.S. 

weakness. Indian Brigadier General Vijai Nair has studied the 1990-

91 Gulf War, in which the United States exhibited reliance on a 

network of bases across the Persian Gulf. Thus, he observes, 

When conducting offensive operations, modern armed forces are most 

vulnerable when they are mobilizing, moving to their forward assembly 

areas, beyond the reach of their logistics tail, and while they are regrouping to continue the offensive. With a limited effort at the right place 

and time, he can inflict disproportionate damage to the attackers design of 

battle and force cohesion.14

With specific reference to the United States, Nair goes on to 

suggest that developing militaries find ways to inflict damage on the 

U.S. rear area. As he argues, 

Management of host country facilities is, by far, the trickiest part of the 

American operational problem. This is the proverbial “Achilles heel.” 

India needs to study the vulnerabilities and create covert and overt bodies 

to develop plans and execute operations to degrade these facilities in the 

run up to and after commencement of hostilities. Scope exists for low cost 

options to significantly reduce the combat potential of forces operating 

from these facilities.15

As another example of this mode of thinking, Russian Defense 

Minister Igor Sergeyev has written that the Russian armed forces 

should selectively attack “the most vulnerable functional elements 

of the main systems and key targets of the enemy’s infrastructure, 

and in this way significantly [devalue] their superiority.”16

 Acquisition of ballistic and cruise missiles is a means by which 

states can pursue this asymmetric strategy.17 The basic reason is that 

both of these weapons can deliver a payload of either conventional 

munitions or weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to locations of 

strategic significance behind the opposing force’s front lines. Ballistic 

missiles can deliver a warhead to a fixed point at a distance ranging 

from a few hundred to several thousand kilometers, depending on 

design and payload.18 The precise amount of damage any one ballistic 

missile is capable of inflicting on a land location is subject to several 

factors, such as accuracy, the type of warhead, and ability to survive 
7

defenses. As an example of the possible effects, however, RAND 

has estimated that a single ballistic missile carrying an 1,100-pound 

bomb could have a “lethal area” of 825 by 1,250 feet―wide enough 

to encompass an entire air wing (96 F-15-sized aircraft) parked in the 

open.19

 According to one senior U.S. Air Force general, this capability 

could fix high costs on future U.S. military interventions. Former 

U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff Ronald Fogleman has said,

Saturation ballistic missile attacks against littoral forces, ports, storage 

facilities, and staging areas could make it extremely costly to project U.S. 

forces into a disputed theater, much less carry out operations to defeat a 

well-armed aggressor. Simply the threat of such enemy missile attacks 

might deter U.S. and coalition partners from responding to aggression in 

the first instance.20

 Despite the possible damage to fixed land locations, ballistic 

missile systems have several drawbacks for a developing military. 

First, an international agreement known as the Missile Technology 

Control Regime (MTCR) limits the proliferation of the complex 

technological items necessary to construct a ballistic missile. 

However, as discussed in more detail below, several missile-capable 

states, such as North Korea and Iran, are not members of the MTCR. 

Second, domestic development programs can be difficult because 

of the cost, technological complexity, and ability of U.S. intelligence 

to monitor missile testing.21 Third, ballistic missiles can pose certain 

operational problems―their considerable weight requires a large 

and vulnerable launch platform, such as a truck or a fixed launch 

site. Moreover, the flight path of a given missile can be predicted at 

launch so as to give the target some degree of warning.22

 For these reasons, many states have opted to invest in cruise 

missiles. Cruise missiles are low-flying unmanned aerial vehicles 

(UAVs) that, when used against land targets, can deliver a warhead to 

a typical distance of between 50 and 500 kilometers.23 Procurement of 

cruise missiles is manageable because the core components (guidance 

systems, propulsion, airframe) involve “dual-use” technologies that 

are not prohibited under international agreements.24 Similarly, cruise 

missiles are relatively inexpensive. The U.S. Army estimates that for 

an investment of $50 million, a Third World country could purchase 
8

at least 100 land attack cruise missiles (LACMs, used for reaching 

targets on land), but only 15 tactical ballistic missiles.25 To be sure, 

several conventionally armed cruise missiles would be needed to 

inflict the damage of a typical ballistic missile.26 Given the low cost of 

procurement, however, this may not be a prohibitive requirement. 

 In the case of both types of missiles, states pursuing asymmetric 

strategies will benefit from a robust proliferation environment―there 

is no question that proliferation of ballistic and cruise missiles will 

continue in the next decade.27 Russia and China are key proliferators 

of concern.28 Other missile-capable states, such as Iran, North Korea, 

and Syria, may engage in “secondary proliferation” of items that 

were themselves imported.29 Transfers from any of these states would 

allow a third country to accelerate a domestic production program.30

In addition, the number of producers of LACMs will likely increase 

from 2 to 9 in the next decade, and 22 states have the technologies 

necessary for a domestic manufacturing capacity of cruise missiles 

of all types.31 Technical expertise and material needed to construct 

missiles also are widely available on the world market. 

 The primary international agreement aimed at curbing missile 

proliferation is the MTCR. Established in 1987, the MTCR contains 

two categories of proscribed items. Category I bans the sale of 

complete missile systems that are capable of delivering 500-kilogram 

payloads to a range of over 300 kilometers. Category II includes 

a variety of subsystems and enhancements for missile systems, 

such as avionics, navigation equipment, and stealth technology.32

Twenty-five nations are signatories to the MTCR, although most are 

U.S. allies in NATO Europe and East Asia.33 Missile systems with 

ranges below 300 kilometers and payloads below 500 kilograms 

are subject to the Wassenaar Agreement.34 In operation since 1996, 

Wassenaar aims to reduce the prevalence of dual-use technologies 

that can be incorporated in cruise missiles, such as advanced 

materials, navigation systems, sensors, and certain electronics. As 

with the MTCR, with the exception of Russia and a few other states, 

the signatories of Wassenaar are mostly U.S. allies. 

 Both regimes suffer from similar weaknesses. Several producers 

of missile technology have not pledged to abide by either agreement: 

of the current manufacturers of cruise missiles, only half are 

members of Wassenaar,35 and only one of the other half (South 
9

Africa) has joined the MTCR. Likewise, some signatories have 

bent the rules in the pursuit of profit. Though China promised to 

abide by the MTCR’s Category I provisions, Chinese firms have 

transferred dual-use technology to a number of states (including 

Iran, North Korea, and Libya), and assisted Pakistan in its attempt 

to develop a medium-range ballistic missile.36 The agreements also 

do not prevent the proliferation of technical experts, which applies 

to scientists from Russia, China, India, and elsewhere.37 To be sure, 

some steps can be taken to retard the spread of missile systems and 

related technology.38 However, these steps will not eliminate the 

objective of states to develop the capabilities to challenge U.S. forces 

militarily, nor will it eliminate the leverage accrued by the suppliers 

of such technology.39 As a result, acquisition of missiles and related 

technology will continue. 

 In short, ballistic and cruise missiles will provide foreign militaries 

the capability to credibly threaten U.S. forces in their staging areas. 

Proliferation of such weapons is a particularly acute concern in light 

of U.S. deployments to bases in Central Asia following the September 

11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the U.S. homeland, and as U.S. forces 

deployed to bases in the Persian Gulf in preparation for the war 

against Iraq in the winter of 2002-03.40 Nevertheless, the character 

of the threat will be regulated by several factors: the number of 

missiles and missile-capable states; the quality of those arsenals; and 

the extent to which the United States can provide adequate theater 

defenses. 

Quantitative Determinants.

 Due primarily to strategic arms reduction, treaties, and the 

retirement of Cold War-era weapons, the aggregate number of 

ballistic missiles has been declining since the mid-1980s and will likely 

continue to fall.41 Likewise, the total number of states that possess 

ballistic missiles is not likely to increase substantially―it may, in fact, 

decline.42 Of the 35 states currently possessing some type of ballistic 

missile, the vast majority only possess small numbers (under 50) of 

Soviet-derived surface-to-surface missile systems (SCUDs), which 

typically lack both the range and accuracy to pose a serious threat 

to U.S. bases.43 Moreover, as these SCUD weapons age, some poor 

missile-capable states may not be able to maintain their arsenals. 
10

 However, these indicators obscure specific changes in some

inventories that pose new or evolving concerns for the United States. 

That is, certain hostile countries may establish a capability to target 

U.S. forces, or increase their ability to do so. The range necessary 

for an offensive actor to target any given U.S. facility is dictated by 

circumstance. For most potential aggressors, a short-range ballistic 

missile (SRBM, range <1,000 km) would be insufficient to target any 

U.S. land base. But there are exceptions. With 300-km range SCUD-B 

weapons, Syria can target the U.S. air base at Incirlik, Turkey, and 

North Korea can target U.S. Army garrisons and air bases in the 

northern part of South Korea. With 550-km range SCUD-C weapons, 

Iran can target U.S. locations on the east coast of the Arabian 

Peninsula, Syria can reach most of southeastern Turkey, and North 

Korea can target the entire South. In addition, Syria is developing a 

750-km range SCUD-D weapon that would allow it to hit targets in 

northern Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the southern Caucasus.

 More complex is the problem of specific increases in the 

number of longer-range missiles and inventories. Due to the 1987 

Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, medium- and 

intermediate-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs and IRBMs, ranges of 

1,000-3,000 and 3,000-5,500 km, respectively) were eliminated from 

U.S. and Soviet arsenals, leading to a 97 percent reduction of IRBMs 

and a 36-58 percent reduction of MRBMs. However, several other 

potentially hostile countries now possess MRBM-range weapons or 

are developing such a capability:

 • North Korea possesses an unknown number of No Dong-1

missiles (1,300-km) and is in the process of developing the No 

Dong-2 (1,500-km) and Taepo Dong-1 (2,000-km) MRBMs, and 

Taepo Dong-2 (5,000-6,000-km) IRBM.

 • China has built about 50 CSS-5 (1,800 km) MRBMs and a 

similar number of CSS-2 (3,000-4,000-km) IRBMs.

 • In South Asia, India has produced about 20 2,500-km range 

Agni-2 MRBMs, and Pakistan has countered with the 1,500-km 

range Ghauri-1 MRBM (a derivative of the No Dong-1). India 

is developing the Agni-3 (3,000-km) IRBM, while Pakistan is 

working on the Shaheen-2 (2,500-km) and Ghauri-2 (2,300-km) 

MRBMs and has engine tested a Ghauri-3 (3,000-km) IRBM.
11

 • In the Middle East, Iran has tested the Shahab-3 (1,300-km), 

and is developing the Shahab-4 (2,000 km) MRBMs. 

 • Iraq, according to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), was 

likely to flight test an MRBM by the year 2010 (prior to the 

2003 war).44

 • Syria is not projected to attain a domestic production capacity, 

but may attempt to purchase mid-range ballistic missiles on 

the world market. 

 • In December 2003, Libya promised to ban ballistic missiles 

with ranges over 300 km (thus keeping its SCUD-B arsenal 

intact), but concerns remain about noncompliance and 

recidivism.45

The CIA is agnostic on the precise number of missiles that will 

be fielded, but (excluding China and North Korea) one independent 

analyst has suggested that the other states may be able to launch 

between 1-5 MRBMs within 5 years.46

 Mid-range ballistic missile development and proliferation would 

endanger U.S. forces operating on three continents: 

 • North Korea’s No Dong-1 MRBM is capable of hitting U.S. 

forces in South Korea and all of Japan except for those Marines 

stationed on Okinawa, while its Taepo Dong missiles would be 

able to reach the U.S. base on Guam, as well as forces south to 

Australia.

 • China’s CSS-5s could reach U.S. targets in South Korea, Japan, 

eastern Central Asia, and, in the case of its CSS-2 IRBMs, 

Guam, the Caspian Basin, and even the eastern edge of the 

Arabian Peninsula.

 • India’s 2,500-km range Agni-II can target the strategic U.S. 

naval base on Diego Garcia, as well as the eastern Arabian 

Peninsula and much of Central Asia. Pakistan’s 1,500-km 

range Ghauri-1 can also threaten U.S. forces in the Persian 

Gulf and Central Asia.47

 • Iran’s Shahab-4 MRBM could reach U.S. bases in Oman, Qatar, 

Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia. An Iraqi MRBM, depending on 

specifications, would have placed many or all of the U.S. 
12

bases and staging points in the Persian Gulf within striking 

distance.

 • From Libya, a No Dong-range weapon could reach eastern 

Turkey (including Incirlik Air Base), most of the Mediterranean, 

and U.S. naval facilities in southern Italy. From Syria, such a 

missile could hit U.S. forces in Turkey, the Caucasus, Kuwait, 

Bahrain, and most of Saudi Arabia.

 Intercontinental-range ballistic missiles (ICBMs, range >5,500 

km) will continue to pose dangers to U.S. locations on a global scale. 

To be sure, the total number of ICBMs in the world has shrunk by 47 

percent since 1987 (2,131 versus 4,040). On account of strategic arms 

reduction treaties, the number of missiles and warheads will likely 

continue to drop in the next decade. Barring a major increase in 

defense spending, Russia’s number of ICBM warheads is projected 

to drop below 2,000 by 2015, but will still be large enough to credibly 

threaten virtually any U.S. land location. China possesses a small 

deterrent force of CSS-3 and CSS-4 ICBMs, and will produce more 

sophisticated models by the end of the decade. Elsewhere, at least 

three states (India, Iran, and North Korea) are in various stages of 

developing ICBMs. However, in terms of the direct impact on U.S. 

bases, the ICBM threat is less significant than the mid-range threat, 

since ICBMs are designed to threaten the U.S. homeland, and not 

overseas military sites.48

 Cruise missiles involve at least as many complexities as ballistic 

missiles. Currently about 75,000 cruise missiles are in existence, 

though the vast majority of these are anti-ship cruise missiles 

(ASCMs). A state would require a more complex LACM to consider 

striking at a U.S. land base. Currently, Russia holds a large number 

of Cold War-era LACMs (including 1,293 declared AS-15 LACMs); 

China holds an unknown number of domestically produced HN-1 

and HN-2 LACMs; India produces the Lakshya missile. However, the 

CIA projects that, by 2015 as many as 24 states will attain a LACM 

capability. Though the CIA does not specify which states, we can 

assume that states such as Pakistan, Iran, North Korea, Libya, and 

Syria could acquire these weapons. The reason is that multiple 

acquisition pathways are available: indigenous development; the 
13

conversion of ASCMs to land-attack versions; and purchase of 

LACMs or related technologies on the world market.49 Again, the 

CIA does not attempt to predict the precise number of cruise missiles, 

but, given the missiles’ relatively low cost, an average consumer may 

be able to acquire several hundred units of varying quality. 

 LACM proliferation would have strategic consequences for U.S. 

bases in each of the theaters in which they operate. The most common 

variety of LACMs50 will have ranges of several hundred kilometers, 

thus endangering forward operation locations (see discussion of 

SRBMs).51 Another challenge is that, in contrast to ballistic missiles, 

cruise missiles can be effectively launched from ships. Michael E. 

Dickey of the U.S. Air War College has hypothesized scenarios 

in which states may use forward-launched LACMs against U.S. 

locations. In one case, an asserting state contracts three or four 

merchant freighter ships to sail to a point in international waters 

from which locations at a range of several hundred kilometers could 

be targeted. The added benefit is that, in such a scheme, the attacking 

state may be difficult to identify.52 In this manner, U.S. facilities in 

littoral regions such as the Persian Gulf, Northeast Asia, Turkey, and 

southern Europe may be targeted by LACM-capable states. Inland 

locations, such as Central Asia or Northern Europe, however, would 

be safe from short-range forward-launched LACMs. 

 The problem of proliferation is summarized in Table 1. 

Principal sources: Foreign Missile 

Developments and the Ballistic Missile 

Threat Through 2015, Unclassified 

Summary of a National Intelligence 

Estimate, December 2001; Report of 

the Commission to Assess the Ballistic 

Missile Threat to the United States

(Rumsfeld Commission), Executive 

Summary, July 1998; Ballistic and Cruise 

Missile Threat, National Air Intelligence 

Center, NAIC-1031-0985-98; Unclassified 

Report to Congress on the Acquisition of 

Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass 

Destruction and Conventional Munitions, 

CIA report, 2003. 

Table 1. Current/Developing or Potential Acquisition, through 2010.

China

DPRK53

India

Pakistan

Iran

Iraq54

Syria

Libya55

Russia

ICBM SRBM MRBM IRBM SLBM LACM

IRBM

Current = Developing =
14

Qualitative Determinants.

 The problem of growing missile inventories is compounded by 

the prospect that users of those weapons will be able to effectively 

locate, target, and destroy U.S. sites of military significance.56 Both 

types of enhancement will affect those states’ battlefield capability, 

as well as their ability to engage in coercive diplomacy with the 

United States or its partners, as will be further discussed below. 

 The problem of location will be aided by a rising availability 

of high-resolution commercial satellite imagery. High-resolution 

imaging would provide a state the capability to pinpoint the 

coordinates of bases and other troop deployments. Currently, only the 

U.S. firm, Space Imaging, Inc., which operates the IKONOS satellite, 

offers high resolution products to private buyers, but companies in 

France, Israel, India, Pakistan, China, Russia, and elsewhere will 

enter the market in future years.57 Whereas, during the 2001 conflict 

in Afghanistan, DoD was able to purchase IKONOS images of U.S. 

troop deployments, and thus deny this intelligence to other parties, 

such an option may not obtain in the future if high-resolution imagery 

becomes available on the global market, as appears likely. 

 Precise coordinates are of little use without the ability to accurately 

hit that exact latitude and longitude. At present, most missile-capable 

states that are not U.S. allies possess highly inaccurate derivatives of 

Soviet ballistic missiles.58 Lacking the ability to make en-route course 

corrections, simple ballistic missiles can drift several kilometers from 

the intended target.59 Stanford’s Itzhak Ravid estimates the Circular 

Error Probable (CEP) values for several types of ballistic missiles as 

such: 2 kilometers for a SCUD-B, 5 km for a SCUD-C, and 10 km for 

a No Dong.

60 Of course, such inaccuracy would severely reduce the 

efficacy of any enemy missile strike on U.S. bases. 

 However, advances in guidance technology over the next decade 

will allow states to improve ballistic missile accuracy. Large and 

wealthy states may be able to develop or purchase guidance systems 

that greatly reduce CEP. For instance, China is developing a terminal 

guidance system, similar to that employed by the U.S. Pershing-II

missiles, which would enable China’s MRBM force a CEP of roughly 

160 feet.61 Lower-end militaries will also profit from advances in 

guidance technology, but to a lesser degree. In particular, these 
15

states may be able to equip their missile forces with commercial 

navigation aids such as the U.S. Global Positioning System (GPS) 

or the equivalent Russian GLONASS system. These systems are 

essentially satellite constellations that can vector exact latitude and 

longitude values to receivers on the ground. When incorporated into 

the crudest ballistic missile, a GPS receiver could improve accuracy 

by 20 percent.62 For states such as Iran and North Korea, this gain 

may be sufficient to incur a marginal increase in the overall capacity 

to damage U.S. bases. 

 The more worrisome applications of advanced guidance technology may be in LACMs.63 The reason is that, unlike typical ballistic 

missiles, cruise missile propulsion allows for course modifications 

from launch to impact. GPS data would allow LACMs to eliminate 

any accrued error and, according to one analyst, achieve, “pinpoint 

accuracy.”64 Regarding both types of missiles, however, the principal 

drawback to reliance on GPS navigation is the potential ability to 

block signals in a given geographic area during a crisis situation. In 

the future, though, LACM operators may be able to overcome this 

challenge by incorporating multiple types of navigation systems. 

Accompanied by the basic inertial navigation system and GPS, for 

instance, LACMs may be outfitted with terrain matching technology 

(such as the TERCOM system employed by U.S. Tomahawk cruise 

missiles). Russia, China, and other states are currently developing 

this technology, although the proliferation consequences are, as yet, 

unknown.65

 The third qualitative determinant is improvement in the lethality 

of ballistic and cruise missile warheads. Warheads can be divided 

into two basic types: conventional and unconventional (meaning 

chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear). Conventional warheads 

use chemical explosives such as TNT to cause a “kill mechanism” 

to detonate and spew metal fragments over a wide area.66 The key 

operational concern is that conventional warheads will be equipped 

with “submunitions,” several hundred small bombs that can inflict 

damage over a wider area than a standard “unitary” warhead.67

This is particularly relevant to bases in which militarily valuable but 

“soft-skinned” targets (e.g., vehicles, power systems, personnel) are 

dispersed over a wide range.68 Currently, states including China and 

Russia already possess this technology, and, within the next decade, 
16

any other state “powerful enough to contemplate a conventional 

military campaign against U.S. interests . . .” will likely be able to 

acquire it.69

 Some states may also attempt to improve the lethality of their 

missiles by using warheads that contain WMD.70 Nuclear-tipped 

missiles offer the greatest potential damage, as even a first-generation 

bomb (of the variety that might be developed in a state such as North 

Korea or Iran) could achieve a yield more than a thousand times 

greater than a warhead filled with conventional high explosives.71

Moreover, a nuclear option may be preferable over chemical and 

biological weapons because of the certainty that a nuclear weapon 

will detonate within a predictable area, and under all meteorological 

conditions.72 At present, several potential foes (India, Pakistan, 

Russia, China, and North Korea) possess a nuclear capability, and 

others could acquire one within the next decade.73

 Chemical and biological weapons offer the possibility of largescale damage without the cost, acquisition, or maintenance difficulties 

associated with nuclear weapons, and are also less difficult to 

conceal.74 The amount of damage yielded by a chemical warhead 

would depend on weather conditions, amount, type, and the defenses 

undertaken by base personnel, though contamination effects may be 

present at a distance of more than half a mile from the impact point.75

Biological weapons are subject to similar use restrictions, and the 

potential damage may also be limited by preparedness. In addition, 

vaccines for some known pathogens (such as anthrax) are available, 

even though genetic modification tactics may obviate these specific 

immunities.76 Several countries, including China, Russia, North 

Korea, Pakistan, India, Iran, Syria, Libya, and Sudan, currently 

possess chemical and/or biological weapons, in some cases in great 

amounts.77 Moreover, growth in the amount and complexity of these 

weapons, especially among poorer states, will proceed in the coming 

decade.78

Damage Limitation.

 DoD has enumerated four basic methods of limiting the damage of 

theater missile attacks: passive defense, active defense, counterattack, 

and C4

I.79 Passive defense refers to a range of activities designed 
17

to fortify troops and locations prior to an attack, including the 

duplication of certain critical capabilities, development of recovery 

and reconstitution plans, dispersal of assets, and hardening vital 

areas within a base complex. However, passive defense efforts suffer 

the drawbacks of time and cost.80 Time is a concern with respect to 

bases leased on a short-term basis or those in regions in which the 

United States has not had a long-standing presence. For instance, 

certain airports in the former Soviet republics, contracted to support 

Operation ENDURING FREEDOM in 2001, lacked the required 

infrastructure―at some sites, engineers estimated a minimum of 4 

months to achieve a minimum standard.81 New or underdeveloped 

bases also require a large cost investment. RAND estimates the cost 

of constructing one new reinforced hangar sized to fit a single fighter 

aircraft at $4 million.82 Older, Cold War-vintage bases may incur 

high upgrade costs as they prepare to meet a more complex set of 

challenges.83

 Active defenses encompass cruise and ballistic missile defense 

systems intended to detect, track, and engage inbound enemy 

missiles. For several reasons, cruise missiles present particular 

problems in the first two stages.84 First, since they fly low to the 

earth’s surface, cruise missiles are difficult or, under heavy cover, 

impossible to detect with currently existing space-based sensors.85

Second, LACMs present a small radar cross section (RCS) which may 

be difficult to differentiate from “ground clutter,” such as vehicles. 

Third, advanced designs may incorporate “radar absorbing” 

materials to further reduce the RCS, as well as countermeasures such 

as chaff and decoys.86

 In response, DoD is developing several concepts to improve and 

integrate sensor capabilities. These include upgrades to existing 

systems, such as AWACS and joint surveillance, target attack radar 

system (JSTARS) aircraft, which were designed to track thousands 

of slow-moving targets;87 the Space-Based Radar, which is being 

engineered to “track mobile targets over wide areas at strategic 

depths,” but is unlikely to be deployed until after 2010;88 and the 

Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensor 

System (JLENS) program,89 which would provide a 250-kilometerwide detection system, but is also still in the early development 
18

stage.90 Nevertheless, several analysts suggest that such defenses, 

even if they do come on-line, will probably not be able to protect 

forward bases from massed attacks.91

 Traveling in a high arc, ballistic missiles are easier to track than 

cruise missiles, though, because of their velocity, they are relatively 

difficult to intercept. The DoD response plan is layered, concentrating 

on systems designed to attack incoming missiles in their three 

phases of flight: boost phase, mid-course-phase, and terminalphase. Current boost phase programs include the Space-based Laser 

and the Airborne Laser.92 The Sea-Based Midcourse Defense is the 

prime mid-course element oriented toward ballistic missile threats 

to overseas assets.93 The PAC-3 and Theater High-Altitude Area 

Defense (THAAD) programs provide terminal-phase protection. 

PAC-3 is aimed at short-range weapons,94 while THAAD, deployed 

in batteries of 150 missiles, is designed to engage both SRBMs and 

MRBMs.95 Despite this layered approach, analysts are decidedly 

mixed in estimating how well ballistic missile defense will perform 

against incoming missiles.96

 In general, active defenses are likely to suffer at least three 

drawbacks. First, since cruise and ballistic missiles may be used as 

part of a strategic strike against U.S. forces, active defenses must 

be on a constant state of alert. Systems designed to defend forward 

operating bases and those in littoral areas may be particularly taxed, 

since those locations are susceptible to a broader range of offensive 

weapons than those situated in the extreme rear area.97 Second is the 

concern that enhancements to offensive weapons are easier to effect 

than corresponding upgrades in deployed defenses. For instance, 

future missile forces may feature chaff or decoy countermeasures, 

and may be coated with radar-absorbing materials.98 Third, regardless 

of the sophistication of a defense, an adversary armed with a given 

“threshold” number of missiles will possess the capability to 

overwhelm those defenses―a concern exacerbated by the growing 

lethality of individual warheads. Though future active defenses may 

not constitute a hapless and misleading “American Maginot Line,”99

the emerging threat will significantly “stress air defenses.”100

 The third pillar of the DoD response is “counterattack” against 

enemy missile infrastructure (launch sites and command-and-control 
19

facilities) before, during, and after a strike. Two conditions are 

necessary for the success of a counterattack strategy. First, following 

an initial attack, the United States must retain the required firepower 

to respond at a level that would significantly damage or destroy the 

enemy’s offensive capabilities. This may not be assumed if the use of 

aircraft carriers and long-range bombers were ruled out as alternative 

sources of fire, though RAND considers that highly improbable.101

Stealthy long-range bombers may be the most effective option, but, 

with only 16 B-2s in service and no follow-ons on the acquisition 

agenda, the bomber force may not be strong enough to “kick down 

the door.”102

 Second, effective counterattack must be able to target the enemy’s 

missile systems. This requirement is problematic because states may 

conceal or move their forces. For instance, during the Gulf War, 

Iraqi SCUD forces “used deception and camouflage extensively, 

conducted continual exercises to minimize launch preparation 

times, [and] developed secure communications.”103 Nevertheless, 

the advent of the Space-Based Radar after 2010 may significantly 

improve U.S. detection capabilities, and long-range UAVs will 

provide an advanced intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 

platform.104

 The final component of the DoD response concerns C4

I activities. 

C4I is not a stand-alone answer to a missile threat, but supports 

and ties together the other three parts of the response strategy. In 

particular, it is intended to provide information to decisionmakers, 

including targeting data, damage assessment, and tactical warning 

of an impending attack―what former Admiral William Owens has 

labeled “comprehensive battlefield awareness.” 105 Such information, 

in turn, would be used to coordinate passive defenses, facilitate 

active defenses, and add precision to counterforce operations. 

Given the advancing state of reconnaissance, surveillance, and 

signals intelligence in the United States, as well as the advent of 

networks created to integrate these systems, C4I will contribute to 

the robustness of U.S. defenses. However, this gain may be offset 

by factors such as the spread of sensor-evading technology, enemy 

concealment activities, short launch times for ballistic missiles, and 

the strain of constant alert. 
20

Recap.

 This section has developed a picture of emerging ballistic and 

cruise missile capabilities among several states, as well as the major 

components of the DoD response. The picture contains several 

disparities. Richer, more developed states will possess larger and 

better missile forces than “rogue states,” although the latter type of 

state will benefit from proliferation. Moreover, the possible damage 

runs across a spectrum, beginning with limited conventional strikes 

with inaccurate ballistic missiles to massed strikes with a mix of 

cruise and ballistic missiles armed with WMD. The picture also 

contains several critical uncertainties, such as the pace of proliferation 

(especially with respect to LACMs) and the effectiveness of defense. 

An estimate that errs on the side of caution would assume that several 

states (these being Russia, China, India, Pakistan, Iran, North Korea, 

Syria, and Libya) could maintain or gain a credible capability to 

threaten U.S. bases, either within their region or across continents. 

 

SECTION II. DETERRING AGGRESSION: 

DEFENSE AT THE STRATEGIC LEVEL

 The United States may forestall missile attacks against its overseas 

bases through two basic strategies: preemption and deterrence. 

As in the 2003 Iraq war, preemption is likely to be used when 

U.S. leaders decide that deterrence is not a viable option. “Rogue 

states” are particularly likely to be perceived by U.S. leaders as 

“undeterrable.”106 Because of the enormous material, human, and 

political costs inherent in any preemptive war, this course of action 

will be used only when deterrence fails or is considered likely to fail. 

In order to decide how best to defend U.S. bases at the strategic level, 

then, we must consider the risk that adversaries will reject the U.S. 

deterrent threat. 

Threat of Retaliation. 

 During the Cold War, effective deterrence of a Soviet attack 

rested on a credible threat of retaliation. In short, the U.S. leveraged 

sufficient military force that the costs of a strike exceeded the benefits 
21

of doing so, and demonstrated intent to make good on its threat. 

Changes in the post-Cold War security environment produced the 

need to reconsider how best to deter enemy aggression.107 Nuclear 

retaliation, and even retaliation itself, was questioned as the best 

method of deterring lower-level WMD and conventional attacks 

by a wider array of actors. Current DoD strategy has modified the 

threat of retaliation to include conventional strike alongside nuclear 

strike. It also seeks to dissuade conflict through active and passive 

defense (i.e., “deterrence by denial”) and by bolstering the defense 

infrastructure, including “command and control, intelligence and 

planning” capabilities. These three approaches constitute a “new 

triad.”108

 In the context of missile threats against U.S. military installations 

overseas, defenses may help to dissuade adversaries, especially 

those on the lower end of the capabilities spectrum. Defense may 

also affect the underlying purpose of building such arsenals, and 

thus aid in nonproliferation efforts.109 However, fluctuations in the 

offense-defense balance render such an assumption tenuous. The 

uncertainty of defense necessitates an initial retaliatory capability 

that provides adequate firepower to deter an attack. According to the 

2002 Nuclear Posture Review, that capability will include both nuclear 

and conventional strike options. In the first case, the United States will 

continue to sustain the traditional strategic triad composed of ICBMs, 

fleet ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), and heavy bombers.110 The 

destructive capacity of strategic warheads is considerable, although 

it is improbable that a U.S. leader would choose to employ such 

weapons in any circumstance other than retaliation for a nuclear 

strike on U.S. or allied territory. Political commitment to strategic 

retaliation in the face of conventional, or even limited WMD, missile 

strikes on U.S. forces overseas would probably be untenable.111

 In contrast, the problem with conventional deterrence centers 

on capabilities. There is little question that the United States 

possesses formidable conventional weapons. The drawback is that 

the firepower available under such an option would not approach 

the “swift and apocalyptic consequences” associated with a nuclear 

weapon.112 Precision-guided munitions (PGMs) can target the “core 

assets” of a regime, including its leadership, military headquarters, 
22

principal fighting units, etc.,113 but PGM use alone may leave a regime 

intact, able to recover, and willing either to continue the fight or to 

negotiate a capitulation. Evasion tactics, such as those employed 

by Iraqi missile forces in the Gulf War, further complicate the tasks 

of establishing a credible conventional deterrent. Moreover, while 

political commitment to an initial response would be virtually 

assured, long-term commitment to a ground war, i.e., the only 

reliable means through which to evict a regime and control territory, 

is less certain. That enemy missile forces may be able to inflict heavy 

casualties on U.S. ground troops only further complicates the chances 

of long-term commitment.114 Thus, while conventional forces will 

maintain a role in compelling adversary behavior in a war, their role 

in deterrence is inherently limited.

 Despite the limitations of each, reliance on both nuclear and 

conventional strike adds the benefit of flexibility.115 When confronted 

with limited threats against U.S. forces, a president would probably 

decide to employ conventional forces, but would not have to explicitly 

rule out the use of nuclear weapons. To an adversary, even a negligible 

chance of nuclear war may affect the cost-benefit calculation against 

action. Likewise, under a severe (biological or nuclear) attack against 

U.S. forces, a president may well order a nuclear strike, but would 

like to retain the option of employing conventional forces. Thus an 

adversary doubting the credibility of the nuclear deterrent would 

still have to factor in the consequences of a non-nuclear response. 

 The final component of establishing a retaliatory threat involves 

effectively communicating the threat to the target state. This may occur 

through several channels―formal declaratory policy, diplomatic 

forums, third parties, and “signals” such as deployments, alerts, 

mutual defense pacts with regional allies, and military exercises.116

Selecting the appropriate mix of communicative methods is entirely 

context-dependent. Explicit warnings may adequately present the 

U.S. deterrent, but those warnings might either be ambivalent, 

badly worded, or offensive to the receiving state. Ambiguous 

communication may force adversaries to assume that all possible 

responses are still “on the table,” but may obscure U.S. intention 

to follow through. “Signals” must also be selected cautiously, as a 

miscalculation in the timing or nature of the demonstration could 
23

fail to produce evidence of U.S. intent, or may provoke a hostile state 

into using force as a supposed last resort.117 In short, the message 

must be tailored on a case-by-case basis with a view of its likely 

interpretation. 

Coercion of Potential Aggressors.

 Given the U.S. threat of retaliation, the question is whether leaders 

of missile-capable states will consider using missiles against U.S. 

bases in a crisis or some other situation. Cold War models of Soviet 

decisionmaking posited that leaders contemplating missile strikes 

against the United States would examine American capabilities and 

commitment to respond to such aggression and decide whether this 

course of action posed an acceptable risk or not. Since the United 

States constructed and conveyed the threat of nuclear retaliation, the 

prevailing notion in deterrence during the Cold War was that, as 

a “rational,” “informed,” and generally predictable actor, the USSR 

would not risk a war with the United States.118

 Today, several conditions underlying this analysis may obtain 

in some states. The first involves strategic culture.119 Like the USSR, 

states with long-standing and “coherent” deterrence theories may 

view missiles as tools to be used to deter aggression, rather than as 

instruments of war.120 Thus, states that recognize missiles as waravoidance mechanisms may be amenable to negotiation and making 

specific “concessions” without the fear of “jeopardizing” major 

security goals.121 A second factor is history. In regions in which the 

United States has had a standing presence (e.g., Western Europe 

and Northeast Asia) or has routinely deployed combat forces, 

local antagonists may attribute a higher commitment value to U.S. 

deterrent statements or signals than those in which there has been 

less first-hand experience.122 Third is regime type. Decisionmakers 

backed by professional militaries and bureaucracies (such as Russia, 

China, and India) are more likely to perceive correctly incoming 

information and consider a full range of response options than those 

that are not.123

 However, missiles have proliferated to states in which such 

reassuring conditions are not present. With regard to strategic 
24

culture, missiles in “rogue states” may be acquired as an instrument 

of war, rather than as a defensive means to provide for security. 

Even in China, a state that has been thought to follow a “limited 

deterrence” strategy, some strands of thought consider long-range 

missiles primarily as warfighting tools. One analyst has suggested 

that China’s “first strategic surprise attack,” should take place within 

the first day or two of a crisis.124 Historically, some new missile states 

have had limited contact with the United States and might not be able 

to accurately assess the U.S. commitment to respond to aggression. 

Regime type also matters. In authoritarian states, decisions are more 

likely to be affected by groupthink, over-optimism, and a lack of 

consideration of evidence, all of which may contribute to risk-taking 

behavior.125 Moreover, smaller and less well-organized regimes 

are less likely to possess intelligence services that can provide an 

accurate representation of enemy threats.

 The importance of individual decisionmakers in authoritarian 

states is also worth noting. Because of the structure of government, 

leaders in such states are likely to have greater freedom in choosing 

how to act in a crisis scenario. Moreover, by overstating their ability 

to resist U.S. retaliation in the event of a crisis, leaders in these states 

may be able to build domestic support for responses that would be 

untenable elsewhere. Such leaders also tend to be risk-takers. Selfconfident egoism (a key trait of the “authoritarian personality”) 

“leads to both a sense of omnipotence and a feeling of invulnerability 

that they cannot go wrong.”126 Certain cognitive activities may 

contribute to misinterpretation of risk or flawed responses. In a 

denial mechanism, an individual may only accept positive evidence 

for a certain choice and disregard other data. In a bolstering process, 

leaders may overstate the merits of a decision and downplay the 

potential repercussions.127

 These factors notwithstanding, any leader interested in personal 

and regime survival will have to conduct some risk calculation in 

determining whether to attack U.S. forces. Moreover, the nature and 

results of these assessments will vary according to circumstance―

each situation is different. The following paragraphs estimate 

decisionmaking factors in states identified in Section II as potentially 

capable of hitting U.S. overseas bases: Russia, China, North Korea, 
25

India, Pakistan, Libya, Syria, Iran, and pre-war Iraq. While these 

balance sheets are quite general, we can begin to discern certain 

types of situations in which the U.S. deterrent fails. 

 Although Russia will pose the most serious capabilities challenge 

to U.S. forces, only the most imaginative scenarios would feature 

a breakdown in the nuclear deterrent relationship between Russia 

and the West. In the near future, NATO deployments in the Baltic 

states will further close the gap between the West and the Russian 

homeland. This will likely be viewed with apprehension, because of 

the long history of Russian vulnerability to land invasions.128 Such 

expansion may create a security dilemma in the sense of inviting a 

Russian military buildup in Kaliningrad, which forms a “geostrategic 

bridgehead” with the Baltic region. This is a dangerous possibility, 

because Kaliningrad is severed from the main part of Russia. In a crisis, 

faulty communication to Moscow could precipitate an unnecessary 

escalation of tensions and ultimately produce a decision by Russia 

to strike against NATO.129 Elsewhere, there is a low probability that 

some conflict could arise between Russia and U.S. forces stationed 

on its southern border, or throughout Central Asia.130

 However, several factors will virtually guarantee that Russian 

missiles are never employed against U.S. targets.131 First are common 

interests in democracy and the prevention of war, and the common 

threats of international terrorism, extremism, and the proliferation 

of WMD. Second, the rising generation of Russian military officers 

seems to hold a worldview in which the collapse of the Soviet Union 

is increasingly unimportant.132 Third, despite reductions in the 

Russian strategic arsenal, nuclear deterrence is numerically viable 

for the foreseeable future―as long as U.S. national missile defense 

plans are not capable of eliminating the Russian first strike option.133

Fourth, although questions remain to be answered about the state 

of Russia’s early warning satellites,134 Russia retains intelligence 

services that are “hard wired into virtually all the major capitals in 

Europe,” and thus probably is able to discern NATO intentions.135

 With a large and sophisticated missile inventory, China poses the 

next most serious capabilities threat against U.S. forces. On one hand, 

some observers believe that China is pursuing these capabilities to 

constrain U.S. policy choices―not in preparation for a warfighting 
26

mission.136 Specifically, China may be pursuing a “three-tiered” 

deterrent strategy, which includes a minimum nuclear deterrent 

capability against the United States, a “limited, nuclear-capable 

counterforce capability” at the regional level, and an offensive 

conventional posture at the theater level.137 Moreover, the People’s 

Republic of China (PRC) has a robust intelligence presence in the 

United States, and would likely be able to gauge effectively U.S. 

capabilities to stage a conventional or nuclear retaliatory strike. 

Given these factors, and growing economic interdependence in the 

global economy, a State Department official estimates that “there is 

a reasonable prospect that [U.S.] deterrence would be effective.”138

 On the other hand, the prolongation of an authoritarian and 

nationalistic China may create situations in which international 

economic or military coercion is untenable.139 In particular, 

the resolution of the “Taiwan issue involves the possibility of 

confrontation.”140 According to Princeton’s Thomas Christensen, 

the PRC may be “fully undeterrable” in the scenario of a Taiwanese 

formal declaration of independence.141 The reasons may be strategic 

or political; strategic in the sense that China considers territorial 

self-defense as the preeminent vital national interest;142 political in 

the sense of adding legitimacy to a regime based on nationalism.143

Although China may attempt to create a fait accompli through an 

initial “shock” followed by a negotiated settlement, it is likely that 

the ROC would resist a Chinese incursion.144 U.S. policy toward 

the defense of Taiwan is ambiguous, although a U.S. intervention 

in a Straits’ crisis could lead to Chinese missile strikes against U.S. 

bases throughout the Asia-Pacific region. As suggested, China may 

launch a “strategic strike” against U.S. forces in the opening period 

of conflict in order to neutralize U.S. participation. 

 Despite its burgeoning conventional and nuclear forces, India is 

unlikely to pose a major threat to the United States in the coming 

decade. Several common interests will bind the United States and 

India: democracy; economic growth; avoidance of an India-Pakistan 

conflict; creation of safe border; and finding solutions to the problems 

of religious extremism, drug trafficking, and terrorism.145 India also 

probably will not face major threats to regime stability, owing to a 

strong (though factionalized) party system, and several competitive 
27

advantages in the global economy.146 But a possible source of tension 

may be the long-term emergence of a “nationalist India”; a “highly 

bellicose” state that may conceivably demand that the United 

States withdraw its naval presence from the Indian Ocean and, 

more specifically, its strategic base on Diego Garcia.147 Following 

some unpredictable set of events, there is a nominal chance of a 

confrontation, but it is far more likely that the United States will 

successfully deter any Indian aggression. 

 Pakistan represents more of an open-ended case than either 

Russia or India. In the near-term, U.S.-Pakistan relations will remain 

cordial, buttressed by cooperation in the war on terrorism. To solidify 

the partnership, in 2001-02 the United States granted Pakistan $1 

billion in direct aid, as well as over $200 million in military sales. 

Moreover, reflecting a history of cooperation in the Cold War, the 

two nations have resumed high-level defense talks on military 

cooperation and anti-terrorism matters.148 The concern is that factors 

such as poor economic policy, corruption, ethnic turmoil, and the 

lack of a rule of law may facilitate anti-Americanism.149 In this case, 

strong U.S. ties to India may be viewed as a threat.150 Should the 

United States intervene in a conflict in South Asia and Pakistan’s 

survival is threatened, deterrence may fail.151 However, the United 

States would almost certainly abstain from intervention in a fourth 

Pakistan-India war. 

 North Korea will pose more significant deterrence challenges 

for the United States than any of the aforementioned states. The 

most troublesome scenarios include an attack on the South as a 

method to ensure regime stability, or a domestic conflict in which 

government control over the military is reduced.152 On one hand, the 

probability of a crisis developing is lessened by engagement―aid, 

investment, personal contacts―and political pressure from Russia 

and China.153 Should the regime accept engagement, the chance of a 

peaceful resolution increases. On the other are factors such as food 

shortages, an economy in decline, and a long-standing “strategy of 

communizing the South by force.”154 In either scenario, U.S. forces 

stationed in the South (or elsewhere in Northeast Asia) would be at 

high risk of exposure. Indeed, reports from defectors indicate that 

the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) may launch a 
28

preemptive strike on U.S. bases in the hopes that sudden mass 

casualties “would lead to antiwar sentiments among U.S. citizens 

and then to the withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea.”155

 Deterrence failure resulting from political instability is also a 

concern for Iran. At present, Iranian security policy is dictated by 

theocrats in conjunction with the military. If these elements were 

destabilized by internal unrest, they may attribute the situation to 

the United States―plausible because of the history of U.S. covert 

action in Iran.156 As in the DPRK, a revolt may occur on account of 

economic decline.157 In any other circumstance, however, an attack 

on U.S. forces is less likely. Through the lens of the Gulf War, Iranian 

decisionmakers have witnessed the severe consequences of a war 

with the United States and the resulting sanctions.158 They must also 

recognize that, since all Iranian oil exports flow through a single, 

vulnerable terminal in the Gulf, a confrontation with the U.S. Navy 

could be “suicidal to the country’s economy.”159 Nevertheless, a 

miscalculation of intentions is always possible, and the response of 

the mullahs may be erratic. The most promising, but as yet uncertain, 

future would involve a slow, but steady reform program and a 

deepening of ties in the international system.160

 Iraq is an exceptional case because U.S. deterrence arguably 

failed in both the 1991 Gulf War and in the 2003 conflict. But the 

two conflicts are substantively different. In the first war, there was 

a certain level of “intra-war deterrence,”161 since Hussein used 

SCUD missiles against U.S. forces, but abstained from tipping those 

missiles with WMD. After the Gulf War, U.S. and Israeli intelligence 

agencies concluded that, if Hussein felt that his regime was on the 

“brink of collapse,” he would not abstain from using unconventional 

warheads against the United States.162 In 2003, the intra-war costs of 

employing missiles and WMD against U.S. forces were insignificant 

for the Iraqi leadership, since the United States had already stated 

regime change as its objective.163 The only plausible “deterrent,” in 

the sense of dissuasion at the tactical level, was against individual 

Iraqi commanders and soldiers who, presumably, had more to 

lose than the senior leadership.164 In the longer-term, the nature of 

deterrence in a post-Hussein Iraq is unclear. A reconstituted state 

may be stable or highly unstable, depending on the nature of the 

United Nations (UN) effort.165
29

 Under the leadership of Hafez Al-Asad, the Ba’ath party in Syria 

demonstrated “pragmatism” and will likely continue to do so under 

his son, Bashar.166 Syria’s principal international antagonist is Israel, 

although Asad would probably only choose to use force if he felt his 

regime was threatened. Indeed, Syria has a major stake in the Middle 

East peace process: a crisis would decrease investment, foreign aid, 

and place heavy burdens on the state’s resources.167 Domestically, 

the regime will likely remain intact, because the government enjoys 

popular support and because the main (Islamic) opposition does not 

have a significant presence within Syria.168 But the future is uncertain, 

since a number of social and economic problems are unresolved and, 

as in Iran and elsewhere, demographic changes may exacerbate these 

concerns.169 This could provide an opening for a transition to a more 

fundamentalist regime that, in turn, could interpret the risk of Israeli 

and U.S. presence in the region differently. 

 Further West, Libya remains the fiefdom of Colonel Muammar 

Qadhafi. Libya’s relations with the West moderated in the 1990s, 

culminating in 2003 as Libya promised to halt its WMD and longerrange ballistic missile programs.170 This agreement may foreshadow 

more normalized relations between Libya and the United States. 

To be sure, skeptics have noted that“we should not assume that 

Qadhafi has changed his anti-Western” views and would not reorient 

Libya’s foreign policy if the geopolitical situation was to change.171

A different problem is that, despite apparent political control, 

Qadhafi must contend with several potential challengers: disgruntled military officers, pro-Islamic radicals, and nonstate 

guerillas.172 Since “corruption, mismanagement, and unemployment 

have eroded support for the [current] regime,”173 any of these groups 

could plausibly push for a termination of Qadhafi’s diplomatic 

approach and reignite political-military tensions with the West.

 In the context of missile strikes on U.S. bases, U.S. deterrent 

capacity is reduced or eliminated in two types of situations. First, 

when the core interests of a state (i.e., regime survival, territorial 

integrity) are endangered. A crisis in which these interests are at risk 

can result from domestic or international instability. Although the 

nine states surveyed above may each contend with either or both 

sources of crisis in the next decade, regime collapse is most highly 

probable among the “rogue states” (Iran and North Korea; possibly 
30

Libya and Syria) and, to lesser degrees, Pakistan and China. In a 

domestic crisis, the leadership may view missile capabilities as a 

way to “divert public attention” and rally support around war with 

the United States. In an international crisis, a leader may conclude 

that a missile attack (perhaps including WMD) is the last, best, hope 

for survival. 

 The second type of situation involves a calculated decision 

at the beginning of an international crisis to deliver a “strategic 

blow” against U.S. forces, usually with the aim of undermining U.S. 

political resolve to intervene.174 Examples include Chinese strikes at 

the outset of a Taiwan Straits war and a North Korean surprise attack 

against U.S. forces in the Republic of Korea (ROK). In both types of 

deterrence failure, the advent of new modes of fighting (including 

missile strikes) may themselves be important determinants of 

decisionmaking in terms of altering perceptions of the balances of 

forces and chances of success. However, as suggested, states will 

invariably consider a much wider range of factors when assessing 

the risks of breaking deterrence. For states with much to lose and 

little to gain by doing so, missile capabilities may have marginal or 

no effects.

Recap.

 In the first phase of the deterrence dynamic, the United States will 

rely on defenses and a flexible, though limited, range of nuclear and 

conventional strike options. Potential aggressors, affected by factors 

such as strategic culture, history, and regime type, will calculate the 

risks and gains of defying the U.S. preference that force not be used. 

Here, the risks will normally outweigh the benefits of employing 

missiles, but in certain types of situations, the reverse may be true. Of 

course, the United States can take steps to increase the effectiveness 

of deterrence. The mix and type of deterrent must be tailored to 

individual circumstances―a nuclear, counterforce strategy may be 

the best method for deterring Russia, but may be ineffective against 

a smaller adversary threatening a limited conventional (or even a 

chemical) strike. Moreover, U.S. decisionmakers must take stateto-state variances into account when communicating the proposed 

retaliatory threat. This requires that U.S. leaders educate themselves 
31

on the inconsistencies and supposed “irrationalities” of their 

opponents. 

SECTION III. COERCION AND POLITICAL DENIAL

 Enemy missiles do not need to be aimed exclusively at U.S. bases 

in order to render those sites ineffective. Adversaries may attempt 

to use missiles as coercive tools designed to compel or deter the 

United States into withdrawing its troops prior to the beginning of 

a conflict or opting to abstain from military intervention. The last 

section pointed out that one use of missiles against bases is to create 

a “strategic blow,” but such an effect may also accrue from the use or 

threat of use of missiles on other overseas U.S. targets or, especially, 

on the U.S. homeland. Likewise, missiles may be used to strike, or 

threaten to strike, nations which host U.S. forces or provide other 

access rights, thereby prompting those nations to deny the United 

States the use of their territory when those usage rights are most 

needed. 

Threat Assertion.

As in U.S. deterrence, enemy coercive strategies begin with 

the presentation of a threat defined in terms of capabilities and 

commitment. The capabilities must raise the cost of a foreign 

policy decision so high that the target leadership opts to refrain 

from choosing that course of action. Against the United States or 

U.S. regional partners, missiles are attractive coercive tools for 

two reasons. First, missiles can affect U.S. political decisions by 

threatening, or actually creating, mass casualties abroad or (in the 

case of ICBMs or ship-launched LACMs) in the homeland. The idea 

is that domestic pressures to avoid or minimize losses would cause 

a U.S. president to rethink whether to employ force. Second, missiles 

can be leveraged against states that host U.S. troops or states that are 

considering whether to grant the United States access. Host nations 

may be coerced through the threat or reality of casualties and/or 

economic damage.175

 Global missile trends will exacerbate these utilities. Section II 

pointed out that a growing number of potential U.S. adversaries are 
32

developing more and better missile forces. Relatively large, accurate, 

lethal, and long-range missiles provide asserting states the ability 

to threaten a costly military action in response to a failure of the 

United States to accept its, the asserting state’s, preferences. Second, 

when combined with efforts to develop WMD, world missile stocks 

increasingly are able to inflict large numbers of military or civilian 

casualties. That several states either currently possess, or are seeking 

to acquire, ICBM-range ballistic missiles offers a particularly potent 

capability to sway U.S. political leaders. Third, proliferation and 

development will increase the number of targetable host nations 

and the severity of the proposed strike. As in the second category, 

concurrent production of WMD will further complicate the cohesion 

of alliances and partnerships. 

 On one hand, the damage potential of these capabilities may be 

decreased by missile defenses. Regional base protection, to reiterate, 

rests on the pillars of passive and active defense, counterforce 

operations, and advanced C4I. However, the effectiveness of these 

defenses is uncertain. Theater missile defenses (TMD) may also 

be ineffective in protecting regional allies and partners from some 

enemy missile threats. National missile defense (NMD) is nearing 

an initial operational capability, with interceptors already in place 

at Fort Greely, Alaska.176 NMD architecture is designed to confront a 

limited number of incoming ICBMs, sufficient to deny any adversary 

except Russia and China.177 On the other hand, missile defense at 

any level will invite offensive upgrades, which may be easier to 

effect than corresponding changes in deployed defenses. Moreover, 

some allies have resisted acquisition of TMD out of the concern that 

that would spark regional arms races.178 Finally, the actual balance 

of forces may be irrelevant in a deterrent-based coercive strategy. 

With reference to ICBMs, U.S. intelligence official Robert Walpole 

has argued:

Acquiring long-range ballistic missiles armed with weapons of mass 

destruction will increase the possibility that weaker countries could 

deter, constrain, and harm the United States. The missiles need not be 

deployed in large numbers. They need not be highly accurate or reliable; 

their strategic value is derived from the threat of their use, not the near 

certain outcome of such use. Some may be intended for political impact; 

others may be built to perform more specific military missions―facing the 
33

United States with a spectrum of motivations, development timelines, and 

hostile capabilities. In many ways, they are not envisioned at the outset as 

operational weapons of war, but as strategic weapons of deterrence and 

coercive diplomacy.179

If these weapons are intended for actual use, factors such as reliability 

or accuracy would be more significant, but even an inaccurate 

ICBM strike against the U.S. homeland would have a powerful 

psychological effect.

 The level of commitment attached to the threat depends on 

perceptions of the interests at stake, predictions of the chances of 

success, and domestic political variables. First, leaders are more 

likely to commit to a coercive strategy if the policy action in the 

target state is interpreted to significantly endanger the vital interests 

of the regime. U.S. military intervention, or simply the presence of 

U.S. troops in the region, may give rise to a view that, as long as 

those forces remain, the regime’s survival is at stake.180 In such a 

case, leaders may decide that a failure of the United States to accept 

the opposing state’s demands warrants the use of the coercive 

instrument. Interests below the level of state survival may also 

create a strong will to follow through with the promise of military 

action. For instance, China’s interest in the control of Taiwan may 

generate domestic support for the use of China’s missile forces if the 

United States opted to intervene. Nevertheless, the putative benefits 

of protecting interests that do not involve regime survival would 

be less likely to overcome the costs of war than those that do, thus 

lowering commitment. 

 However, leaders may still commit if the chances of success in 

battle are deemed acceptably high. As noted in Section II, cultural, 

historical, and regime type-related factors may cause leaders to 

overestimate the effectiveness of their asymmetric warfighting 

advantages and commit to imprudently risky decisions. This effect 

may be even more skewed with respect to U.S. regional partners, 

which (if unaided by the United States) lack the same level of 

retaliatory capabilities. But even decisionmakers that correctly 

interpret the U.S. threat of retaliation could conclude that, irrespective 

of the balance of forces, the balance of willpower favors them.181

The reason is that, in the view of the asserting state, the U.S. public 
34

would eschew a drawn out war that did not engage vital interests.182

Asymmetries contribute to a belief in success, and thus commitment. 

Still, the asserting state may also recognize that any actual attack on 

U.S. sites or allies would result in an increase in target state resolve 

to pursue the end-state of their regime. 

 Domestic political variables also have a role in conditioning the 

commitment to a coercive strategy. These variables are identical to 

those that affect how a state interprets the U.S. deterrent, because 

both influence the risk-taking propensity of decisionmakers. For 

instance, authoritarian states that do not confront any major internal 

challenges would be less politically vulnerable to negative results of 

using force against the United States if the coercive strategy fails, and 

would be more likely to secure public support for any such effort via 

control of information. The possession of a means of targeting U.S. 

vulnerabilities would embolden risktakers, but in the general case of 

risk avoiders may not add much or any value to commitment. 

 Communication is a final component of coercion when the 

strategy is to state a threat. Communications will be either direct (e.g., 

pronouncements and diplomacy) or indirect (e.g., missile tests, war 

games, and public rallies). States, whose capabilities and commitment 

level cannot be accurately interpreted through U.S. intelligence 

means, especially closed societies with opaque decisionmaking 

practices, may also seek to infuse their communication strategies with 

misleading or invented claims. The most famous case of a strategic 

bluff occurred in 1955, when the Soviet Air Force convinced a U.S. 

military attaché that it possessed twice as many Bison heavy bombers 

as it did by simply flying the same bombers over the attaché’s head 

again and again.183 However, the dangers inherent in this tactic 

include losing credibility in future communications and sparking a 

large U.S. buildup as a countermeasure.184

Coercion of the United States.

 Compellent strategies against the United States would fail when 

missiles are actually used against U.S. targets overseas or at home.185

Ballistic missile launches can be tracked through current U.S. 

intelligence means and would allow leaders to identify the perpetrator 
35

and organize a response. The origins of ship-launched cruise missiles 

may be harder to trace initially, but (as in the campaign against the 

Taliban) any state sponsors eventually would be identified and 

retaliated against. Presidents would not encounter major domestic 

opposition in reacting to aggression against U.S. forces or civilians 

at home. The question is not whether, but what form the response 

would take. The “new triad” would allow a president flexibility to 

select either a conventional or nuclear strike. 

 Deterrent coercion requires a closer analysis of the U.S. 

interpretation and response. As with U.S. deterrence of potential 

aggressors, aggressor deterrence of the United States will be affected 

by several domestic-level factors. In terms of strategic culture, 

“mirror imaging” in the American experience has created a sense 

that antagonists tend to think and act according to U.S. norms.186 For 

instance, U.S. views of the nonutility of nuclear war may contribute 

to the belief that others would not commit to nuclear weapons use, 

when, in fact, other strategic cultures have different views on the 

purposes of WMD. Some of these attitudes derived from the Cold 

War. As noted, U.S. deterrence of the USSR assumed a rational 

and predictable actor; such assumptions may lead U.S. leaders to 

misunderstand adversary behavior. 

 Institutional factors will also be significant in affecting U.S. 

perceptions. With regard to intelligence, the U.S. intelligence 

apparatus is professional, diversified, and technically apt.187

However, several sources of error exist: signals intelligence may be 

overwhelmed by the volume and complexity of transmissions;188

human intelligence sources are, and will likely continue to be, 

constrained in the extent to which they can penetrate foreign 

governments and discern enemy threats; and analysis may suffer 

an “institutional predisposition” to inflate or deflate estimates, 

though the main examples involved a devaluation.189 Concerning 

decisionmaking processes, several participating entities (DoD, the 

State Department, the CIA, nongovernmental agents, etc.) will ensure 

that competing opinions and data are provided. The concern is that 

a president might rely on a single body or clique. This has happened 

at several points in modern U.S. history, and may reoccur in a fastmoving crisis situation.190
36

 Although supported by these actors, presidents themselves 

may inaccurately interpret the actions of missile-capable states. For 

instance, presidents with a relatively benign view of a given state 

may cognitively reduce the importance of missiles in a given state’s 

arsenal (and, of course, the reverse is valid).191 A further concern 

is that the human brain is poorly wired to deal with ambiguous 

information―uncertainty often produces over-simplification. In a 

situation in which new or dissonant intelligence is received, leaders 

may be confused or fall back on initial data and impressions. Finally, 

the president doubtfully will be able to understand fully the behavior 

of hostile actors. If U.S. leaders were “almost heroically ill-equipped” 

to understand Soviet behavior, 192 understanding of new actors in the 

current period is even less likely, and such ignorance could produce 

faulty responses. 

 Affected by these factors, U.S. leaders will conduct a risk 

calculation in determining whether to resist or accept coercion. 

The answer goes to the question of whether states can successfully 

leverage missiles to constrain the use of overseas bases in a crisis and 

thus defeat the United States before war has begun. History suggests 

that U.S. leaders will be least likely to accept coercive threats when 

“broadly recognized national interests” are at stake.193 In cases in 

which this provision has not held, the general public tends to be 

casualty averse. Ohio State’s John Mueller argues that: 

When the value of the stakes does not seem to be worth additional American 

lives, the public has shown a willingness to abandon an overextended 

or untenable position with little concern about saving face. However, if 

they are not being killed, American troops can remain in peacekeeping or 

nation-building ventures virtually indefinitely . . .194

Elites (defined here as a mix of U.S. Government, business, higher 

education, and media leaders with expertise in foreign affairs) also 

incorporate perceived interests into their risk assessments.195 For 

instance, in 2002, 82 percent of elites say they favored intervention if 

North Korea invaded the South. A bare majority (52 percent) would 

support military action in a Taiwan Straits crisis, with even less 

support for threats to even less obvious interests.196 Nevertheless, 

despite potential public casualty aversion, a president may still reject 

coercion on the basis of his/her own interpretation of the interests 

at stake. 
37

 Although a matter of perception, interests can be categorized 

in a hierarchy ranging from “vital” to other, secondary concerns.197

“Vital” interests are those required to “preserve the United States as 

a free nation with our fundamental values and institutions intact.”198

Lesser interests include those that are important but which do not 

threaten national survival and safety. In this framework, U.S. leaders 

will be more likely to risk casualties in defense of higher interests than 

those that are more peripheral. Thus, the benefits of safeguarding 

“vital” interests would be likely to outweigh the prospective costs 

of war―but the costs of casualties may outweigh the benefits of 

protecting lower ordered interests. 

 Not coincidentally, U.S. leaders are most likely to see “vital” 

interests in the regions in which it is most likely to base troops: 

Europe, East Asia, and the Middle East. These three regions contain 

the “overwhelming predominance” of global wealth; contain most 

U.S. allies and a large percentage of U.S. economic interests; and 

sit astride potential strategic competitors of the United States.199

Specifically, “vital” interests in East Asia have been defined as 

“productive” relations with China and the survival of Japan and South 

Korea; in Europe, the survival of European allies and the Atlantic 

Alliance; in the Middle East, the survival of Israel, access to energy, 

and nonproliferation of WMD.200 Over time, U.S. decisionmakers 

may also perceive “vital” interests at stake in Central Asia.201 The 

United States may not, then, accept coercion to withdraw militarily 

from these regions or to refuse to project power there if its “vital” 

interests are endangered. 

 In sum, missile-based deterrent coercion may have a limited 

effect on U.S. decisionmaking under certain circumstances. 

Adversary capabilities and commitment would have to be perceived 

so pessimistically that the estimated costs of resistance outweigh 

the estimated value of doing so. The missile threat will have some 

effect on a president’s ability to marshal domestic consensus for 

accepting the risks of engagement, although elites, and perhaps the 

general public, seem to be willing to tolerate some loss for the sake 

of ensuring national interests. The level of that support, however, 

is uncertain and could deteriorate if the adversary is able to find 

an effective method of communicating an unacceptable threat. But 

the chance of a failure to intervene, or an ex ante withdrawal, in a 
38

situation in which perceived vital interests are at stake would rest on 

the improbable decision of a president to pursue an option that may 

be even riskier―backing down.

Political Denial.

 The second major coercive utility of missiles is to divide the 

United States from countries which either host U.S. forces or must 

decide whether to provide temporary basing for U.S. troops in the 

event of a conflict. In contrast to the United States, the consequences 

of compellent strikes against other nations are not obvious. There 

is a chance that, following an attack on a host nation, the asserting 

state could plausibly assign blame to the United States and thus 

cause the public to demand an ejection of U.S. forces for fear of 

further reprisals. But the stakes of such a gamble are much higher 

than, at least initially, coercive diplomacy, because an actual attack 

would probably result in immediate retaliation. Regarding U.S. 

allies, attack would be tantamount to strikes against U.S. territory 

and would invite U.S. conventional or nuclear reaction. TMD may 

also reduce the benefits of such a strategy, while keeping the costs 

constant. For these reasons, threats have more often been the subject 

of analysis.202

 Assessment of target state response can be divided between 

allies and nonalliance “partners.”203 This distinction is based on the 

premise that ally risk analyses are substantively different from those 

performed by others.204 Alliance relationships are defined by a formal 

agreement of mutual defense; U.S. forces permanently stationed 

in these states provide credibility to the obligation by serving as a 

“tripwire” that, if crossed by an adversary, would automatically draw 

the United States into the conflict.205 When deciding whether to deny 

the U.S. access rights, allies must weigh the costs of jeopardizing the 

defense pact against the presumed value of acceding to the coercive 

threats of regional aggressors.206 Nonalliance partners, by definition, 

lack a long-term security guarantee from the United States, and do 

not usually host the U.S. military on a long-term basis. The risks of a 

denial, then, will not include consideration of damage to a security 

treaty, but may still include costs to productive political and military 

relations with the United States. Despite this generalization, the risk 
39

assessments will vary across major alliances (Turkey, NATO Europe, 

Japan, Korea, Australia) and partnerships (especially in the Persian 

Gulf and Central Asia). 

 The significance of Turkey draws, in a major way, from access to 

the air base at Incirlik. As noted above, missiles from Russia, Syria, 

Iran, and Libya are now or will likely be able to target all or most of 

Turkey, raising the possibility of coercion to deny the United States 

the use of Incirlik. However, a move by any of those states to an 

aggressive posture toward Turkey would almost certainly increase 

the cohesion of Turkish-U.S. relations―without U.S. presence, the 

same states would be in a better position to seek future concessions.207 

Denial would also threaten common interests, such as prevention 

of Russian influence in Central Asia, business cooperation, and 

nonproliferation of WMD in the region.208 The major reasons why 

Turkey would eject the United States from Incirlik stem not from 

missile proliferation, but from other considerations―long-standing 

fears that the United States wants to “carve up” Turkey, concern that 

U.S. action may motivate Kurdish nationalists to seek independence 

from Turkey,209 and the lack of public willingness to support the 

basing of U.S. forces.210

 U.S. access interests in European NATO include over-flight 

rights and forward basing of personnel and equipment (largely in 

the United Kingdom (UK), Germany, and Italy). Europe is currently 

safe from all but Chinese and Russian ICBMs, but acquisition of 

IRBMs in the Middle East and North Africa would allow coercion 

from several new actors. Coercion for the purpose of causing a 

general U.S. withdrawal from Europe is unlikely. Despite efforts by 

the European Union (EU) to develop defense capabilities separate 

from NATO,Europe is still reliant on the United States as a security 

provider; the transatlantic gap in military technology is widening, 

and Europe lacks a strong defense industrial base. 211 Finally, some 

analysts argue that the point of an independent capability is not to 

create the option to reject U.S. presence, but rather to ensure that the 

United States stays.”212 Proliferation would likely only underscore 

Europe’s vulnerability and strengthen NATO.213

 In both Turkey and Western Europe, the major concern is not 

that the leadership will demand a U.S. withdrawal, but that, under 

certain circumstances, the threat of missile attack will cause a political 
40

decision to deny the United States the use of facilities or the rights 

to use airspace to transport troops to a combat zone. For instance, 

during the Gulf War, Iraqi long-range missiles would have been able 

to threaten mass casualties in Europe or Turkey, thus endangering the 

cohesion of the alliance.214 The problem may be acute if a host nation 

does not believe that its “vital” interests warrant U.S. use of force.215

However, such a decision would still have to take into account the 

possible negative long-term effects on the alliance, including a U.S. 

decision to withhold economic aid or, in the worst case, to reassign 

its forces to a more willing host. 

 In East Asia, the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps have a substantial 

presence in Japan, able to respond to a spectrum of regional crises. 

Russia, China, and North Korea will be able to threaten reprisal for 

Japanese basing agreements. However, Japan is unlikely to expel 

U.S. forces on the grounds of growing missile threats; indeed, the 

opposite is true. The reason is that Japan has fundamental concerns 

about the motives of its three regional antagonists, and a significant 

reduction of U.S. presence would weaken the ability of Japan to 

provide defense.216 The added benefits of the defense pact include 

the ability to avoid a “costly and destabilizing military buildup,” 

access to U.S. technology, and symbolism of Japan’s commitment to 

peace and nonaggression under civilian rule.217

 Similar to NATO, the danger of reliance on forces in Japan is that 

the Japanese government will deny the United States the ability to 

employ those forces in a crisis. One scenario in which this may hold 

true is a Chinese action against Taiwan in which the United States 

seeks to utilize its Japan-based assets but, given a calculation that 

the risks of a Chinese missile strike outweigh the benefits of a U.S. 

intervention, is denied that right. But in contrast to Europe, Japan is 

likely to correlate its “vital” interests with the United States in any 

instance of aggression by a regional enemy and thus permit use. 

Japan is also unlikely to choose an option that threatens the longterm solvency of the alliance, owing to internal restrictions on its 

self-defense forces. Nevertheless, public pressure to deny U.S. access 

may be significant in an extreme instance of coercion. 

 South Korea hosts a contingent of the U.S. Army, whose current 

purpose is to stabilize the peninsula. As with Japan, U.S. forces serve 

to balance the ambitions of other regional powers―in the case of 
41

Korea, China, Russia, and, possibly, a resurgent Japan.218 Specifically, 

as long as the North Korean threat remains, South Koreans are not 

likely to demand a U.S. withdrawal. The future beyond reunification, 

however, is less certain. In a unified, but weak, Korea, China may 

be able to put sufficient pressure on the new regime to scuttle the 

U.S.-Korea treaty.219 Still, some liberal ROK thinkers seem to view 

post-reunification China relations as a supplement to the U.S.-Korea 

alliance, rather than as an alternative.220 A separate concern is that, 

with the resolution of the DPRK threat, the purpose of U.S. troops 

in Korea will transition to a regional role. For instance, U.S. presence 

may be more oriented toward “periodic deployments” of air and sea 

assets that are, regionally, more flexible than the U.S. Army.221 Given 

a continuation of coercion from the PRC, Korea’s leadership may 

be reluctant to allow U.S. forces to engage in operations that do not 

have a direct bearing on the stability of the peninsula.222

 A third East Asian alliance is Australia. Although the United 

States currently has no major deployments on the continent, it 

does operate a joint intelligence center, and Australia may rise in 

significance both as a training area for the United States and as a 

“hedge” against the loss of access to Japan.223 The proliferation 

concern is that Australia will be in range of Chinese, Russian, and 

North Korean long-range missiles. However, Australia’s leaders 

have expressed strong support for the presence of U.S. troops.224

The reason is that, with a relatively small population occupying a 

large landmass, Australia requires an external security guarantor in 

the face of ambitious regional actors.225 Commonly shared “vital” 

interests between the two allies (such as nonproliferation of WMD 

and free trade in Southeast Asia), also reduce the chance that missile 

coercion will be effective. 

 Partnerships in the Persian Gulf allow the United States staging 

points for military action in the Middle East. With continual U.S. 

deployments in the region following 1991, relations have begun to 

assume some qualities of alliance―a deterrence function against 

Iran and Iraq; the “necessity” that the United States would be 

immediately drawn into any act of aggression; and benefits accruing 

to Gulf States through extensive military-to-military contacts with 

the United States.226 Such interaction boosts the credibility of the U.S. 

partnership and reduces the chance of exclusion from the area.227
42

 However, assumptions of reliable access remain tenuous. Many 

of the reasons are not related to external threats; these include the 

concern that identification with the United States in a conflict against 

Muslims could incite domestic instability and fears that cooperation 

with the United States could damage relations with other countries.228

But outside pressure is also a concern, given the relatively recent 

nature of U.S. involvement in the region and the lack of a mutual 

defense treaty. For instance, partly due to the fear of retribution 

from Saddam Hussein, all Gulf States except Kuwait denied the 

United States use of facilities during strikes on Iraq in 1998.229

Missile proliferation in states such as Iran and Syria compounds the 

concern that the same states will hedge against granting the United 

States access in any crisis short of an actual military action against 

them. 

 As indicted by deployments during the campaign against 

Afghanistan in 2001-02, Central Asia may assume a greater role in the 

temporary basing of U.S. forces in the next decade. Regional powers 

such as China, Iran, and Russia would be skeptical of U.S. motives 

and may seek to leverage arms to retain influence.230 In general, U.S. 

access to the region will be difficult in any case in which local states 

and regional powers do associate their own interests. The reason is 

that, in the absence of solid commitments by the United States to act 

as a guardian of the potential host states’ security, those states will 

either turn to other powers as guarantors or will be easily coercible 

by the threat of force.231 Iranian, Russian, or Chinese missiles may 

be an exceptionally powerful means to extract favorable political 

decisions in this region. However, should the United States find a 

way to convince Central Asian states that U.S. partnership―even if 

it does not constitute an alliance―is the best way to avoid Russian or 

Chinese “imperialist ambitions,” the chances of access improve.232

 In sum, the use of missiles as political tools may affect the ability 

of the United States to ensure political access to both allied states and 

those with which it does not have a formal security treaty. Among 

allies, there is a minimal chance that the U.S. military will be asked 

to leave on account of foreign threats, but rights to use facilities 

or airspace may be withheld in cases in which the ally does not 

directly link its interests with the United States. Improvements in 

the capabilities of adversary coercive instruments may make such 
43

denials more frequent. Reliability of access to partner state territory 

is problematic because the security benefits of granting access are 

less clearly defined than in the case of an alliance. Unless the United 

States can convince its partners that it intends to provide protection 

against foreign threats, adversaries will be in a strong position to 

demand that those states refuse to give the United States sanctuary. 

Recap.

 Missile development and acquisition will lead to capabilities to 

coerce, while commitment to such a strategy may be strong when 

the asserting state’s security goals are at risk. U.S. response to 

compellance would be immediate retaliation, and the United States 

is unlikely to accept deterrent coercion when a case can be made 

that “vital” interests would otherwise be sacrificed. The responses of 

host nations will be disparate and unpredictable when their interests 

are not threatened. But, as U.S. General John Jumper concludes, 

“Access is an issue until you begin to involve the vital interests of 

the nation that you want and need as a host. Then access is rarely 

an issue.”233 Nevertheless, given the growing lethality of adversary 

strike capabilities (as well as various domestic political factors not 

reviewed here), questions remain about the reliability of host nations. 

The United States must assume that its allies could be induced into 

denying the rights to use their territory during a crisis in which its, 

the allies’, core interests are not directly and explicitly at risk.

SECTION IV. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 

 Missile threats will pose new and complex risks to overseas 

basing reliability on three levels, although that impact is obscured 

by several disparities and uncertainties. At an operational level, 

several new actors are acquiring, fairly rapidly, the means to target 

effectively and destroy fixed land locations, such as ports, command 

centers, logistics facilities, and air bases. Actors, old and new, are 

also finding ways to improve the quality of their missile forces visà-vis U.S. defenses. Across a broad capabilities spectrum, potential 

aggressors will be able to threaten the United States in each of the 

major theaters in which it is likely to operate in the next decade 
44

(Europe, East Asia, the Middle East, and Central Asia). To be sure, 

U.S. defenses will reduce the potential damage, but the extent of that 

protection, especially against massed volleys of accurate cruise and 

ballistic missiles, is uncertain. 

 At the strategic level, the United States will seek to deter its 

adversaries from employing force by threatening, at varying degrees 

of credibility, a nuclear or conventional response. The hope is that 

any state weighing the costs and benefits of such an action will 

choose against it, but international or domestic instability in one or 

more of these missile-capable states could lead to situations in which 

one might view preemptive strike as an optimal choice. This is a 

particular concern when a regime is on the verge of a collapse, or if a 

leader is convinced that a decisive victory can be achieved through a 

surprise attack on U.S. forces. More discretely, intra-war deterrence, 

in terms of preventing escalation to the use of WMD during a conflict, 

may also be threatened when the costs of such actions are very low, 

especially in the late phases of regime collapse. 

 U.S. forces deployed or deploying overseas are also at risk of 

missile coercion directed against U.S. leaders and political decisions 

in host nations in order to compel denial of access. Missiles are 

exceptionally powerful coercive tools because they are able to inflict 

large amounts of damage against military sites or population centers 

in small periods of time. Acquisition and improvements to missile 

arsenals only compound the problem. Responses will vary based on 

the consequences of accepting or rejecting coercion; target states will 

probably reject coercion when their vital interests are threatened, yet 

even then it is difficult to assume reliable access. 

 Geographical disparity adds one layer of variance. Bases further 

away from the source of conflict are typically less vulnerable than 

those within closer range. SRBMs and most LACMs cannot hit 

targets beyond several hundred kilometers, even though midrange ballistic missile proliferation and advances to cruise missiles 

will permit adversaries to strike over longer distances. Still, those 

weapons are more expensive than their short-range counterparts, 

are fewer in number, take longer to travel, and are thus somewhat 

easier to intercept. Rear area bases are also likely to have stronger 

and more effective infrastructure to limit damage. In addition, such 

bases are likely to be situated in territories or countries that have 
45

solid relations with the United States. Bases on Diego Garcia, Guam, 

and in the United Kingdom are not likely to be seriously threatened 

in a political sense. Close-in bases, such as those in Japan or Kuwait, 

may also be insulated from coercion. In addition, forward bases may 

have more effective defenses than those areas for which the day-today threat level is considered much lower. 

 Reliability will also vary on a regional basis. Western Europe is 

relatively secure because of Article V NATO guarantees, the distance 

to most potential enemies, stable transatlantic ties, and continuing 

strategic dependency.234 Yet access is still uncertain when perceived 

security interests are not threatened. Central Asia is situated between 

two latent aggressors (Russia and China), and a lack of formal security 

guarantees could pose difficulties for U.S. access. A breakdown of 

deterrence in this region does not seem likely, but a prolonged U.S. 

military presence itself could produce attempts at coercion or, in a 

worst-case, open hostilities. East Asian allies are close to possible 

sources of conflict and thus have an incentive to retain U.S. forces, 

but are also in range of unstable regimes and states that may have 

both the capabilities and will to pursue coercive strategies. Troops in 

Japan and the ROK, and to a lesser extent Australia, may be at risk of 

attack or denial, although that risk will be reduced by alliances and 

robust defenses. Middle East states have been increasingly willing 

to host U.S. forces, as relations assume qualities of alliance, and as 

the capabilities of local antagonists increase. Yet basing is tenuous 

there because of the lack of formal guarantees, and because of the 

proximity to potentially unstable or hostile regimes (including Iran, 

Iraq, Syria, and Libya).235

 Similarly, vulnerability will differ at the country level. Part of 

the variance is due to geography, as described above. Some host 

nations are simply much closer to missile-equipped aggressors than 

others. Moreover, individual states have differing histories and 

relationships with the United States, decisionmaking processes, 

cultures, and domestic politics, each of which will affect how those 

states behave under conditions of high risk. The generalization that 

allies are reliable hosts may not always apply. While not a product 

of coercion, Turkey’s decision to deny U.S. forces access in the 2003 

Iraq war is an example of the questionable dependability of allies.236
46

Nonallied states lack formal security guarantees from the United 

States, but may still be reliable hosts when their perceived interests 

demand such a course of action. That several Gulf States provided 

U.S. access rights in 2003 when Turkey did not provides evidence 

against the rule that nonallies are less dependable than allies. 

 Linked to regional and country differences, the nature of U.S. 

basing agreements adds another layer of complexity to the impact. 

Permanent bases bolster deterrence by serving as a “tripwire” and 

solidifying U.S. alliances, but, due to their long-term function, may 

create a security dilemma. This is a particular problem in East Asia, 

in which U.S. forces permanently deployed in Japan and South Korea 

may be seen as threatening to the security of China and North Korea. 

NATO bases in the Baltic region or, less plausibly, in the Caucasus, 

may similarly provoke Russia. 

 Temporary bases pose a separate set of concerns. When used 

for certain purposes, such as performing humanitarian missions or 

eliminating a common adversary, short-term bases may not have 

any negative consequences at the strategic level. However, when 

such locations serve (or are seen) as staging grounds for military 

action against a missile-capable state, they may invite preemption 

or coercion. Yet unlike permanent bases, these facilities may lack 

significant infrastructure to protect high-value assets. 

 Uncertainties, even in a modest effort to project 10 years into the 

future, further obscure the impact. This is, in part, due to research 

limitations on this assessment, but uncertainty is also an integral 

and unavoidable problem of making estimates. Questions remain 

about exactly how far proliferation will proceed, especially in terms 

of cruise missile acquisition and dual-use technologies that may add 

value to the missile arsenals of even “rogue states.” The efficacy of 

deterrence is hard to judge because the decisionmaking of closed 

societies is unclear and because states that appear strong today could 

destabilize with little warning. Assessments of the coercive utility of 

missiles also depend on ambiguous capabilities and obscure enemy 

risk calculations. Moreover, as already noted, U.S. and partner state 

decisions may not always conform to the rule that coercion will be 

rejected when significant interests are at stake; the definition and 

perception of “vital” interests itself is liable to vary over time.
47

Policy Implications.

 The United States can hedge against risks at all three levels 

through several methods, while continuing to place some reliance on 

overseas basing. These include: finding effective routes to deterrence 

while retaining the option of shifting to a preemptive strategy; 

strengthening alliances and partnerships; reducing over-reliance on 

any single base through dispersion and moving critical assets to the 

rear area; building effective counterattack forces; and developing 

advanced active and passive defenses. 

 Deterrence will remain the principal strategy through which the 

United States seeks to defend both its homeland and its overseas 

interests from attack. Deterrence is most likely to fail when adversary 

leaders calculate that a first strike will fulfill major security objectives 

and during periods of regime collapse. Avoidance of the first type of 

breakdown may be achieved through state-by-state adjustments to 

the threat the United States promises if its interests come under attack. 

U.S. targeting policies must account for assets valued most highly 

by the receiving state; these will vary from country to country. U.S. 

leaders must also find methods of communicating the threat that will 

be most effective given different cultures, decisionmaking processes, 

and other domestic level variables. For instance, declaratory policy 

that WMD use will result in forced regime change may be effective 

against some states. 

 Regarding the second type of breakdown (states on the brink of 

collapse), the United States may not be able to propose any cost that 

outweighs the target state’s estimated benefits of missile use. If there 

is clear and compelling evidence that deterrence failure is imminent, 

the only available option for U.S. leaders may be a preemptive 

strike. Discrete planning for such an eventuality must, of course, 

begin well in advance of the actual operation―this requires that 

the United States reliably identify and track enemy missile forces, 

WMD facilities, command and control infrastructure, etc., so that the 

risk of a retaliation is mitigated. If the United States cannot do so, a 

preemptive strike may well “trigger the very attack it was intended 

to prevent.”237 In another sense, the United States must maintain 

adequate long-range offensive strike forces to perform such missions 

(details on this criterion are discussed in the section on counterattack 

below). 
48

 Second, relations with current or potential host nations can 

be strengthened. At the policy level, the United States can offer 

security guarantees to countries that are not currently allies. For 

domestic political reasons, this need not be a public activity, but 

frank and carefully worded messages to partner leaderships may 

have some effect in sustaining cooperation. Peacetime military-tomilitary contact, in the form of training and exchanges, is also useful 

in informing host nations of the capabilities and will of the U.S. 

Government.238 Another type of initiative, which may or may not 

best be handled publicly, involves civil defense. U.S. shared expertise 

(to the extent that it exists) in how to manage a crisis may enhance 

the confidence of leaders in times of risk, thereby increasing the 

probability that coercion will be rejected.239 Finally, missile defenses 

offer a means of reassuring allies, but allies may have technical, 

economic, and strategic concerns about cooperation in this area. 

Decisions to deploy TMD in foreign territory ought to be made in 

the context of consistent dialogue with the relevant governments.240

 Third, force structure changes can reduce over-reliance on any 

single base. Dispersing assets to numerous locations in a theater―

as opposed to consolidating those assets in one, or very few sites―

would place a higher burden on any attacker seeking to deal a 

decisive blow. Dispersal to many host nations would also minimize 

the effects of any given denial. However, this tactic would entail 

relatively high infrastructure development and personnel costs.241

A possible way to achieve dispersion without accruing these added 

costs would be to negotiate options to deploy to pre-existing sites 

during wartime (known as securing “places without bases”). An 

example is the Changi Naval Base in Singapore, which is a “place” 

to which U.S. carriers can deploy without actually maintaining 

a permanent “base,” and which provides insurance against a loss 

of carrier basing in Japan. A variation would involve moving prepositioned and high-value equipment from vulnerable forward bases 

to power projection “hubs” in the rear area, including Guam, Diego 

Garcia, or in the UK.242 Once the missile threat has been neutralized, 

material at these sites could be lifted to close-in bases. 

 The fourth approach to reducing risk involves counterattack. A 

capability to locate and destroy enemy missile forces before they are 

employed is an integral part of strategies of preemption and would also 
49

contribute to deterrence and nonproliferation. Counterattack places 

specific burdens on the Navy and Air Force to develop precision, deep 

strike forces, including long-range bombers and cruise missiles. The 

current Air Force concept for achieving this type of capability is the 

Global Strike Task Force (GSTF). GSTF is centered on early insertion 

of B-2 bombers equipped with conventional bombs, supported by 

F-22 escorts and advanced ISR to identify enemy fixed and mobile 

targets.243 However, the active B-2 fleet stands at only 16, with no 

new stealthy bombers on the acquisition agenda―this is probably 

not sufficient to achieve the GSTF’s goal.244 The B-2 production 

line may have to be reopened to achieve a plausible counterattack 

capability, notably against states with higher end capabilities.245

Regarding the Navy, part of the Trident SSBN fleet may transition 

to a role in delivering conventional cruise missiles. Plans to rechristen these ballistic missile submarines as SSGNs are underway, 

and may complement the GSTF program well.246 However, enemy 

concealment activities will continue to pose significant problems for 

the development of effective counterattack.247

 Active and passive defenses compose a final way to decrease 

vulnerability. The TMD programs currently under development 

were discussed in Section II; such efforts, even if realized, might 

not be able to engage reliably incoming ballistic or cruise missiles. 

However, longer-term, advanced concepts may offer more complete 

and reliable protection for theater bases. Space-based directed energy 

weapons, able to kill ballistic missiles in their boost phase, have been 

cited as one potentially transformational approach to ballistic missile 

defense.248 Regarding cruise missiles, the Space-Based Radar and 

long-range, unmanned aerial reconnaissance vehicles could provide 

significantly better tracking data. Passive defenses have suffered 

from the drawbacks of time and cost. However, RAND has proposed 

a new approach to infrastructure development, called “flex-basing,” 

which may mitigate these concerns. The idea is that defensive 

materials can be pre-positioned at power-projection “hubs” around 

the world, and rapidly transferred to forward locations in times 

when those resources are most needed.249 Sustained research, testing, 

and evaluation are obviously necessary if these types of concepts are 

ever to come to fruition.
50

*****

 These five types of risk reduction approaches are logical 

responses to the missile threat as interpreted in this monograph. In 

combination, they will increase the reliability of overseas bases over 

the course of the next decade. No combination, however, will be able 

to eliminate the risks that accrue from enemy missile acquisition and 

development, not to mention other types of threats not considered 

here (terrorism, guerrilla attacks, political denial not resulting from 

external threats, etc.). The residual risk is a cost of the pursuit of 

global engagement, and it will fall to future leaders to decide whether 

that cost is worth the benefit of continuing to be militarily engaged 

overseas. 

ENDNOTES

 1. Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategy of the United States of America, 

Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2004. 

 2. That is, bases that are valued at over $800 million. For a complete list, see 

Office of the Deputy Undersecretary of Defense, Base Structure Report, Fiscal Year 

2002 Baseline.

 3. U.S. Joint Staff, Joint Publication 3-10: Joint Doctrine for Rear Area Operations,” 

Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, May 28, 1996, section I-5.

 4. National Defense Panel, “Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st 

Century,” Report of the National Defense Panel, December 1997, p. 12.

 5. Samuel J. Tangredi, All Possible Wars? Toward a Consensus View of the Future 

Security Environment, 2001-2025, Washington, DC: Institute for National Strategic 

Studies, 2000, p. 110.

 6. Ibid., p. 42.

 7. Quadrennial Defense Review Report, September 30, 2001; available online at 

www.defenselink.mil/pubs/qdr2001.pdf.

 8. For technical analysis, see John Stillion, Airbase Vulnerability to Conventional 

Cruise Missile and Ballistic-Missile Attacks, Santa Monica: RAND, 1999; Christopher 

J. Bowie, The Anti-Access Threat and Theater Air Bases, Washington, DC: Center for 

Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2002; and David A. Shlapak and Alan Vick, 

Check Six Begins on the Ground: Responding to the Evolving Ground Threat to US Air Force 

Bases, Santa Monica: RAND, 1995. On post-Cold War deterrence and coercion issues, 

see Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman, The Dynamics of Coercion: American Foreign 

Policy and the Limits of Military Might, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002; 

Stephen J. Cimbala, Deterrence and Nuclear Proliferation in the Twenty-First Century, 

Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2001; Naval Studies Board, Post-Cold War Conflict 
51

Deterrence, Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1997; Keith B. Payne, Deterrence 

in the Second Nuclear Age, Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1996; DFI 

International/SPARTA, Inc., US Coercion in a World of Proliferating and Varied WMD 

Capabilities: Final Report for the Project on Deterrence and Cooperation in a Multi-Tired 

Nuclear World, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, February 2001; Michele Flournoy 

and Clark Murdock, Revitalizing the US Nuclear Deterrent, Center for Strategic and 

International Studies (CSIS) paper, July 2002. On political mechanics, see Irving L. 

Janis, Crucial Decisions: Leadership in Policymaking and Crisis Management, New York: 

The Free Press, 1989; and Yaacov I. Vertzberger, Risk Taking and Decisionmaking: 

Foreign Military Interventional Decisions, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998. 

Other country-specific citations appear below. 

 9. Ahmed S. Hashim, “The Revolution in Military Affairs Outside the West,” 

Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 51, No. 2, Spring 1998, pp. 7-8; and Carl Conetta 

and Charles Knight, “Defense Sufficiency and Cooperation,” Project on Defense 

Alternatives, March 12, 1998.

 10. Annual Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, DoD 

Report, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002, pp. 15-16.

 11. “Conventional” refers specifically to tanks and combat aircraft, in which 

NATO will enjoy large numerical advantages. Alexei Arbatov, Karl Kaiser, and 

Robert Legvold, eds., Russia and the West: The 21st Century Security Environment, 

Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1999, pp. 49-50.

 12. See, for example, Cimbala, Deterrence and Nuclear Proliferation in the TwentyFirst Century, p. 111; Andrew Krepinevich, “The First War of a New Century: A First 

Blush Assessment,” CSBA Backgrounder, September 2001.

 13. Paul Bracken, Fire in the East, New York: HarperCollins, 1999, pp. 42-

43; William R. Schilling, ed., Nontraditional Warfare: Twenty-First Century Threats 

and Responses, Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 2002, p. 3; National Defense Panel, 

“Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century,” Report of the 

National Defense Panel, December 1997, pp. 11-17.

 14. Brigadier V. K. Nair, War in the Gulf: Lessons for the Third World, New Delhi: 

Lancer International, 1991, p. 227.

 15. Ibid., p. 230.

 16. Stephen J. Cimbala, ed., The Russian Military Into the Twenty-First Century, 

London: Frank Cass, 2001, pp. 104-105.

 17. National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2015: A Dialogue About the 

Future with Nongovernment Experts, Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 

December 2000, pp. 58-60; National Air Intelligence Center, “Ballistic and Cruise 

Missile Threat,” NAIC-1031-0985-98.

 18. An overview of ballistic missiles is provided by the Federation of American 

Scientists (FAS) at http://www.fas.org/nuke/intro/missile/basics.htm.

 19. Specifically, the analysis covers an 1,100-pound bomb with a conventional 

warhead, equipped with 825 one-pound submunitions and guided to its target by 

Global Positioning System (GPS) technology. Stillion, pp. 11-15.
52

 20. Andrew Krepinevich, “Emerging Threats, Revolutionary Capabilities, and 

Military Transformation,” Testimony to Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on 

Emerging Threats and Capabilities, March 5, 1999.

 21. Michael E. Dickey, “Biocruise: A Contemporary Threat,” Counterproliferation 

Paper No. 7, USAF Counterproliferation Center, Air War College, September 2000, 

pp. 15-18.

 22. Ibid.

 23. As opposed to anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), the far more common 

variety. An overview of cruise missiles is provided by FAS at http://www.fas.org/nuke/

intro/cm/.

 24. David Tanks, “Assessing the Cruise Missile Puzzle: How Great a Defense 

Challenge?” Washington, DC: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis report, April 

2001, pp. 8-10.

 25. Dennis M. Gormley and K. Scott McMahon, “Proliferation of Land-Attack 

Cruise Missiles: Prospects and Policy Implications,” in Henry Sokolski, ed., Fighting 

Proliferation: New Concerns for the Nineties, Maxwell AFB: Air University Press, 1996.

 26. For instance, RAND estimates that, compared to one ballistic missile, perhaps 

a dozen cruise missiles would be needed to “severely damage” a fighter wing parked 

in the open. This assumes conventional munitions and GPS guidance. Stillion, pp. 

11-15.

 27. National Intelligence Council, pp. 58-60.

 28. See data from the Carnegie Endowment: http://www.ceip.org/files/projects/npp/

resources/ballisticmissilechart.htm.

 29. See “Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology 

Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions,” 

CIA, January 2002.

 30. See Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat Through 2015, 

Unclassified Summary of a National Intelligence Estimate, December 2001.

 31. Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat, National Air Intelligence Center, NAIC1031-0985-98.

 32. The full text and annexes of the MTCR are available from FAS, at http://www.

fas.org/nuke/control/mtcr/text/index.html.

 33. However, Russia has been a member since 1995, and China, though not a 

member, has pledged not to sell Category I restricted items.

 34. This is relevant to ship-launched LACMS, as described below. An overview 

is available at http://www.wassenaar.org/docs/talkpts.html.

 35. Excluding the following countries: Brazil, China, India, Iran, Iraq, Israel, 

North Korea, South Africa, and Taiwan.

 36. The Shaheen-II MRBM. See “Unclassified Report to Congress on the 

Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced 

Conventional Munitions,” CIA, January 2002.
53

 37. Ibid.

 38. The technical annexes of the MTCR might be revised so that more subsystems, 

such as stealth technology, are Category I proscribed items. The United States might 

make more of an effort to track the end use of dual-use products and inform its allies 

of those consequences. Demand-side initiatives, sanctions, economic aid packages, 

regional confidence building measures, and so forth may also dull the impact 

of proliferation, and may grant the United States time to develop more effective 

defenses.

 39. For instance, Jacquelyn Davis and Michael Sweeney note that Russia’s power 

will continue to flow partially from its sale of advanced military technology―this 

gives it leverage over other regional powers, such as Iran. Jacquelyn Davis and 

Michael J. Sweeney, Strategic Paradigms 2025: US Security Planning for a New Era, 

Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 1999, p. 69. Bracken, p. 114, notes that some secondrate powers, such as North Korea and Pakistan, have little else to sell besides arms. 

Nevertheless, as suggested above, such transactions would have to contend with 

international pressures on the DPRK not to transfer MRBM weapons or related 

technology. For instance, Joseph Cirincione has written that, “North Korea, 

increasingly eager to open normal trade relations with the West, seems to be willing 

to suspend a [technically] dubious [missile] program for real material gain.” Joseph 

Cirincione, “The Declining Ballistic Missile Threat,” paper presented to the American 

Association for the Advancement of Science, February 18, 2002. However, North 

Korea restarted its defunct nuclear program in late 2002 and may threaten MRBM 

range missile transfers (or actually do so) as further blackmail of the international 

community. 

 40. Iraq did fire four short-range missiles at U.S. bases in Kuwait at the start of 

the latest war, but U.S. Patriot batteries destroyed all four.

 41. Cirincione.

 42. Ibid. In addition, Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat 

Through 2015 notes: “The trend in ballistic missile development worldwide is toward 

a maturation process among existing ballistic missile programs rather than toward a 

large increase in the number of countries possessing ballistic missiles.” 

 43. For instance, Iraq fired several low-quality, short-range ballistic missiles at 

U.S. bases in Kuwait at the start of the 2003 war on Iraq, but Patriot missile batteries 

easily destroyed each of them. 

 44. Information taken from CIA’s Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic 

Missile Threat Through 2015 and Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat 

and Response, January 2001.

 45. Thomas Donnelly and Vance Serchuk, “Beware the Libyan Model,” AEI 

National Security Outlook, February 27, 2004.

 46. Cirincione is a skeptic about the ballistic missile threat, but concedes that 

“the most significant proliferation threat comes from the slow but steady increase in 

the number of states possessing medium-range ballistic missiles, even as Russia and 

the United States eliminated their arsenals.” Cirincione, p. 7. 
54

 47. Pakistan is also developing the Shaheen-2 MRBM (2,500 km, 1,000 kg) and 

Ghauri-2 MRBM (2,300 km, 700 kg). Its IRBM project is Ghauri-3 (3,000 km, ? kg).

 48. The ICBM threat is significant to U.S. overseas military forces for a more 

obscure reason; namely, the ability to undermine domestic political resolve to 

actually use those forces in the event of a conflict. This is considered in Section IV. 

 49. Dennis Gormley states that modifications to China’s HY-4 Silkworm ASCM, 

which is available on the world market, could lead to a LACM with a range of 500-

700 km. This would be tantamount to SRBM range capability and would certainly 

compound the gathering local anti-access challenge, but is less relevant for U.S. 

rear area bases―unless launched from a forward platform, as discussed below. 

Dennis Gormley, “Transfer Pathways for Cruise Missiles,” annex to the Rumsfeld 

Commission report. 

 50. Upgraded versions of the Russian Silkworm. 

 51. Over the longer term, new LACMs with ranges of up to 2,000 km will enter 

the market, putting bases farther in the rear area at risk. See discussion of MRBMs. 

 52. Launching a ballistic missile from a shipboard location is technically possible 

but would result in severe inaccuracy owing to wave fluctuations; ballistic missiles 

are also considerably larger, making detection a more serious concern. Dickey, pp. 

22-26.

 53. CIA Director George Tenet recently claimed that North Korea possesses an 

ICBM capable of hitting the West Coast of the United States, though that weapon 

remains untested. http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/asiapcf/east/02/12/us.nkorea/index

.html.

 54. Data is prior to the 2003 war. 

 55. Under promises made in December 2003, Libya promised to ban ballistic 

missiles with ranges over 300 km. 

 56. Opening sections, Owen R. Cote, “Assuring Access and Projecting Power: The 

Navy in the New Security Environment,” MIT Security Studies Program research, 

2001.

 57. Bowie, The Anti-Access Threat and Theater Air Bases, p. 42; also see Krepinevich, 

“Emerging Threats, Revolutionary Capabilities, and Military Transformation.”

 58. Inaccuracy results from several potential sources of error: those based on 

launch platform misalignments, errors that stem from imprecise engine cutoffs in 

the mid-course phase, and terminal-phase errors that occur because of natural forces 

such as wind.

 59. For instance, during the Iraqi missile strike on Tel Aviv in the 1990-91 Gulf 

War, only 50 percent of Iraqi Al-Hussein missiles landed within the Israeli capital or 

its immediate suburbs.

 60. The definition of CEP is the circular area within which 50 percent of incoming 

missiles will fall. Thus if the CEP is 2 kilometers, we would expect 50 percent of 

the incoming missiles to fall within 2 km of the target. For instance, only about 50 
55

percent of the Iraqi al-Hussein SRBMs used on Tel Aviv during the Gulf War actually 

landed in the city or its surrounding towns. Itzhak Ravid, “Theater Ballistic Missiles 

and Asymmetric War,” Unpublished paper, Center for International Security and 

Cooperation, Stanford University, June 28, 2002, p. 14.

 61. Mark Stokes, former China analyst at the Pentagon, says, “Breakthroughs in 

ballistic missile terminal guidance over the next five to 10 years could be devastating 

not only for the PRC’s neighbors, but also for U.S. forces operating in the Pacific.” 

Bowie, The Anti-Access Threat and Theater Air Bases, p. 40.

 62. The reason for a 20 percent increase is that GPS cannot correct fundamental 

engine problems that lead to wide CEPs. However, more sophisticated missiles, 

such as China’s M-9 SRBM, can attain a CEP of 150-200 meters using a GPS receiver. 

Stillion, pp. 8-9.

 63. A more comprehensive discussion can be found in Gerald Frost and Irving 

Lachow, Satellite Navigation-Aiding for Ballistic and Cruise Missiles, Santa Monica: 

RAND, 1996.

 64. Stillion, pp. 10-11.

 65. Tanks, pp. A4-A5.

 66. Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat, National Air Intelligence Center, NAIC1031-0985-98.

 67. According to Ravid, a unitary high explosive would inflict “severe damage” 

within a radius of 20 or 30 meters, depending on weight. An 800 kg bomb, for 

instance, would have an impact radius of 30 m. Ravid, p. 18.

 68. Recall that Stillion’s analysis, cited above, assumed that future enemies 

would employ conventional submunitions against U.S. forward airbases. Stillion, 

pp. 11-15.

 69. Ibid., pp. 12-13, n6. 

 70. This is not only a problem of increasing lethality, but also of increasing the 

coercive capacity of missile forces. As noted in section IV, missiles tipped with WMD 

raise the stakes for the United States or host nations to reject enemy coercion. 

 71. Ravid, p. 21.

 72. Biological weapons may spread farther than intended, while chemical 

weapons are subject to various weather restrictions to be effective. Walter Laquer, 

The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction, Oxford: Oxford 

University Press, 1999, p. 255.

 73. Thomas R. Wilson, Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, “Global 

Threats and Challenges,” Testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee, March 

19, 2002, p. 16. Given proliferation or technical constraints, however, an alternative 

might be the use of radiological weapons. Certain radioactive materials, such as 

Cobalt-60 or Cesium-137 (also used in hospitals, research laboratories, nuclear 

power plants, and elsewhere), could be acquired and used to irradiate personnel 

and infrastructure. Laquer, p. 73. Nevertheless, important questions regarding the 
56

technical feasibility and potential impact of such weapons remain to be answered. 

See Anthony H. Cordesman, “Radiological Weapons as Means of Attack,” Center for 

Strategic and International Studies paper, pp. 4-7.

 74. Schilling, ed., pp. 4-5; Wilson p. 16. On the technical side, Schilling, p. 

65, estimates that approximately five specialists, including a pathologist and 

pharmacologist, would be needed to sustain a biological weapons program―clearly 

not a great hurdle for any state that would possess a ballistic or cruise missile. 

 75. Ibid. Schilling estimates that 2,000 pounds of VX gas could achieve 50 percent 

casualties within a half-mile radius, though Ravid (p. 23) warns that highly favorable 

wind velocities and trajectories would be needed to maximize damage. 

 76. Ibid., p. 49.

 77. More specific data are located in Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: 

Threat and Response, January 2001. 

 78. Ibid., pp. 3-4.

 79. Command, control, computers, communications and intelligence. U.S. Joint 

Staff, Joint Pub 3-01.5: Doctrine for Joint Theater Missile Defense, February 22, 1996.

 80. A third problem is that the efficacy of passive defenses against missiles and 

WMD is unknown. Given changes in the offense-defense balance, Robert Martinage 

of CSBA says, “Who knows what you can do?” with passive defenses. Interview 

with Robert Martinage, Senior Defense Analyst, Center for Strategic and Budgetary 

Assessments, March 18, 2003. 

 81. Necessitating a primary use of carrier-based aircraft during the initial months 

of the campaign. As another example, development of adequate passive defenses 

in the Vietnam War challenged engineers―infrastructure to accommodate aircraft 

at the Tuy Hoa base required 1,300 engineers a year to construct. Bowie, The AntiAccess Threat and Theater Air Bases, p. 54.

 82. RAND also notes that similar facilities would be needed to house critical 

support activities such as power generation, spare parts, and flight operations. 

Another specific drawback for air bases is that some large, but important, aircraft 

models (such as the AWACS) would require enormous reinforced hangars. Stillion 

goes on to discuss the possibility of “deployable shelters” that can be used to 

deliberately defend infrastructure-weak airbases, but notes that such a plan would 

require dozens of transport sorties, do not cover other critical assets, and cannot 

survive an impact within 100 feet or so of the hangar. Stillion, pp. 30-35.

 83. But some interesting concepts may lay beyond the horizon. The USAF has 

commissioned studies looking at how to defend airbases around 2025, and at least 

one analyst has discussed the possibility of holographic projection of false targets, 

energy force fields, and nano-technology applications. M. Scott Mayes, et al., Aerospace 

Sanctuary in 2025: Shrinking the Bull’s Eye, U.S. Air Force: unpublished manuscript, 

1996, pp. 25-37.

 84. Once tracking functions are accomplished, engagement is a relatively simple 

matter of air defense. This can be incorporated by the PAC-3 or similar systems. 
57

Interview with Baker Spring, Research Fellow, Heritage Foundation, March 18, 

2003. 

 85. Technical experts claim that 30 years will be needed before space-based 

sensors can effectively detect and track low-flying cruise missiles. Tanks, p. 19.

 86. Ibid., p. 20; and Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat, National Air Intelligence 

Center, NAIC-1031-0985-98. Also, Chinese LACMs slated for deployment after 2005 

will likely feature “first generation” stealth technology. See Michael Vickers and 

Robert Martinage, “The Revolution in War,” CSBA report, December 2002, p. 31.

 87. Stillion, pp. 46-47; and Tanks, pp. 23-25.

 88. Interview with Robert Martinage, Senior Defense Analyst, CSBA, March 

18, 2003; and Michael Vickers, “The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review,” CSBA 

backgrounder, June 19, 2002, p. 5.

 89. Joint Land-Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated, Netted Sensor System. 

Tanks, pp. 25-28.

 90. Sensing incoming missiles is also a topic of the USAF long-term analysis 

program. Mayes, pp. 17, 21, 35, in describing the “aerospace base” of 2025, predicts 

further sensor integration and the novel use of artificial intelligence and “neural 

networks” to enhance the utility of electromagnetic sensors.

 91. For instance, Jack Spencer of Heritage says that “cruise missile defense is 

a huge problem,” even more so than BMD. Interview with Jack Spencer, Senior 

Analyst, Heritage Foundation, March 17, 2003. Michael Vickers of CSBA doubts that 

defenses will be able to withstand “barrage attacks.” Interview with Vickers, March 

18, 2003.

 92. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, January 

2001, pp. 101-102.

 93. Slated for deployment in the 2004-2006 timeframe, this system involves 

sensors and surface-to-air missiles carried by forward-based AEGIS cruisers and 

destroyers. See Missile Defense Agency Fact Sheet on the Sea-Based Midcourse 

Defense at http://www.acq.osd.mil/bmdo/bmdolink/pdf/seabased.pdf.

 94. Ibid.

 95. See Fact Sheets at http://www.acq.osd.mil/bmdo/bmdolink/pdf/thaad.pdf and 

http://www.acq.osd.mil/bmdo/bmdolink/pdf/pac3.pdf.

 96. Jack Spencer of Heritage is optimistic that BMD will “decrease vulnerability 

significantly,” but Robert Martinage of CSBA states that, by the end of the decade, 

“we won’t have much,” even though a rapid advance in directed energy technology 

could help. Interviews with Jack Spencer, Senior Analyst, the Heritage Foundation, 

March 17, 2003; and Robert Martinage. 

 97. Bowie, The Anti-Access Threat and Theater Air Bases, pp. 62-63; Ballistic and 

Cruise Missile Threat, National Air Intelligence Center, NAIC-1031-0985-98.

 98. Ibid. However, Baker Spring is skeptical about this threat, arguing that there 

has been “too much overstatement on countermeasures.” Interview with Baker 

Spring. 
58

 99. Bracken, p. 64.

 100. Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat, National Air Intelligence Center, NAIC1031-0985-98.

 101. Paul K. Davis, Jimmie McEver, and Barry Wilson, Measuring Interdiction 

Capabilities in the Presence of Anti-Access Strategies, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2002, 

p. 132. Still, aircraft carriers must contend with numerous “emerging anti-navy 

capabilities,” such as anti-ship cruise missiles, “very quiet” attack submarines, and 

“sophisticated” sea mines. See Vickers and Martinage, pp. 33-38.

 102. Interview with Robert Martinage. 

 103. Quote of Iraqi Lieutenant General Hazim ‘Abl-al Rassq. Christopher J. 

Bowie, “Destroying Mobile Ground Targets in an Anti-Access Environment,” 

Northrop Grummon Analysis Center Papers, December 2001, p. 3.

 104. Interview with Robert Martinage. 

 105. Discussed with respect to counterforce operation in Dennis M. Gormley and 

K. Scott McMahon, “Counterforce: the Neglected Pillar of Theater Missile Defense,” 

online paper at http://www.cdiss.org/colsep1.htm.

 106. Interview with Colonel Lee Blank, USAF, Ret., Senior Fellow, National 

Strategic Gaming Center, National Defense University, March 19, 2003. 

 107. Flournoy and Murdock, pp. 28-29.

 108. As explicated in the DoD’s 2002 Nuclear Posture Review. Kurt Guthe, The 

Nuclear Posture Review: How is the ‘New Triad’ New? CSBA monograph, 2002, pp. 3-6. 

Defense infrastructure supports the other two legs and is not discussed in this paper. 

See Guthe for more details. 

 109. DoD, Nuclear Posture Review, unclassified foreword, January 2002, p. 2; also 

Payne, p. 144. 

 110. Nuclear Posture Review; Information from FAS, available at http://www.fas.

org/nuke/guide/usa/forces.htm.

 111. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld noted in 2001 that strategic weapons 

would not deter Saddam Hussein, because “he knows a U.S. president would not 

drop a 100-kiloton bomb on Baghdad.” Julian Borger, “Bunker Bomb Will Bust Test 

Ban Buster Buster,” The Guardian, London, March 11, 2002, p. 12. An alternative form 

of nuclear deterrence may rest on tactical warheads, or “mini-nukes,” i.e., those 

with yields under 5 kilotons or so, which can be used on the battlefield in isolated, 

narrowly defined instances. Such a strategy may be more credible than one based 

on strategic retaliation, but would still have to overcome a 60-year taboo against 

nuclear weapons use that runs deep in the minds of U.S. leaders. Moreover, the 

political costs of breaking the nuclear taboo mediate against use, as does the longterm consequence of a blurring of the line between nuclear and conventional war.

 112. See William S. Huggins, “Deterrence After the Cold War: Conventional 

Arms and the Prevention of War,” Airpower Journal, Summer 1993.

 113. DFI report, p. 28.
59

 114. For example, Saddam Hussein warned April Glaspie, the U.S. ambassador 

in Baghdad, “Yours is a society which cannot accept 10,000 dead in one battle.” 

Byman and Waxman, p. 143.

 115. Jack Spencer likens this approach to the “flexible response” doctrine 

promulgated in the 1960s. Since massive retaliation was no longer credible against 

lower-end conflict, strategists decided that a broader range of options was needed 

to preserve credibility. Interview with Jack Spencer, Senior Analyst, Heritage 

Foundation, March 17, 2003. 

 116. DFI report, p. 11.

 117. Naval Studies Board, Post-Cold War Conflict Deterrence; and Payne, p. 124.

 118. Payne, pp. 74-75. However, Payne (p. 38) hypothesizes that “Soviet restraint” 

may actually have been the product of a number of other considerations: pessimism 

regarding Soviet forces, “little desire” to directly challenge the United States, or a 

“general cautiousness” about war following the destruction of World War II. 

 119. Strategic culture comprises value systems and notions about which 

“strategic options” are appropriate in dealing with external threats. Alastair Iain 

Johnston, “Thinking About Strategic Culture,” International Security, Vol. 19, Spring 

1995, pp. 46-47.

 120. DFI report, pp. 18-19. 

 121. Ibid.

 122. Ibid., p. 13.

 123. Ibid., pp. 13-14. Thus deterrence practices during the Cold War discounted 

many variables (ignorance, irrationality, miscalculation) that are more relevant 

considerations in a multipolar world. Payne, p. 157.

 124. Alastair Iain Johnston, “China’s New ‘Old Thinking’: The Concept of 

Limited Deterrence,” International Security, Vol. 20, No. 3, Winter 1995, p. 22.

 125. Vertzberger, pp. 89-99.

 126. Ibid., pp. 77-79.

 127. Payne, pp. 104-105.

 128. Stephen J. Cimbala, Russia and Armed Persuasion, Lanham, MD: Rowman & 

Littlefield, 2001, p. 190.

 129. Arbatov, Kaiser, and Legvold, eds., p. 64.

 130. Hooman Peimani, Failed Transition, Bleak Future? War and Instability in 

Central Asia and the Caucasus, Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002, p. 124.

 131. Indeed, Russia is included primarily on the basis of its capabilities. Flournoy 

and Murdock (p. 33) argue that “from a policy perspective, Russia is no longer ‘an 

enemy’ and may not need to be deterred.” 

 132. Davis and Sweeney, p. 69.
60

 133. Thus, “Even skeptical but sensible Russians would agree they are safe from 

West.” James Goodby, Petrus Buwalda, and Dmitri Trenin, A Strategy for Stable Peace, 

Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 2002, p. 41.

 134. See Geoffrey Forden, Pavel Podvig, and Theodore Postol, “False Alarm, 

Nuclear Danger,” IEEE Spectrum, Vol. 37, No. 3, March 2000.

 135. Cimbala, The Russian Military Into the Twenty-First Century, p. 192.

 136. Counter-coercion of the United States is the subject of the next section.

 137. Jason D. Ellis and Todd M. Koca, “China Rising: New Challenges to the U.S. 

Security Posture,” Strategic Forum, Vol. 175, October 2000, p. 3.

 138. Ibid., pp. 3-4.

 139. One of four scenarios posited in Patrick M. Cronin, ed., 2015: Power and 

Progress, Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1996, pp. 35-39.

 140. Evan A. Feigenbaum, “China’s Challenge to Pax Americana,” Washington 

Quarterly, Vol. 24, No. 3, Summer 2001, pp. 31-32.

 141. Thomas J. Christensen, “Posing Problems without Catching Up,” International 

Security, Vol. 25, No. 4, Spring 2001, pp. 36-37.

 142. Feigenbaum, pp. 34-35.

 143. See the conclusion of Gordon Chang, The Coming Collapse of China, New 

York: Random House, 2001. 

 144. Whiting, p. 125.

 145. Ramesh Thakur, “India and the United States: A Triumph of Hope over 

Experience?” Asian Survey, Vol. 36, No. 6, June 1996, p. 577.

 146. National Intelligence Council.

 147. Cronin, pp. 25-28.

 148. K. Alan Kronstadt, “Pakistan-US Relations,” Congressional Research Service 

Issue Brief, December 11, 2002, pp. 6, 11.

 149. NIC report, p. 66. For instance, the International Institute for Strategic 

Studies (IISS) warns that the assassination of General Musharaff in the near term 

would probably lead to a government with an “anti-American posture.” IISS, 

Strategic Survey 2001/2002, London: Oxford University Press, 2002, p. 263.

 150. Thus the United States should pursue confidence-building measures and, 

in the long-term, democratic development in Pakistan. Husain Haqqani, “America’s 

New Alliance with Pakistan: Avoiding the Traps of the Past,” CEIP Policy Brief, 

October 19, 2002, p. 7.

 151. Interview with Michele Flournoy, Senior Advisor, CSIS, March 17, 2003. 

 152. Davis, pp. 105-106.

 153. Nick Eberstadt, Korea’s Future and the Great Powers, Seattle: University of 

Washington Press, 2001, p. 324.
61

 154. See Jae Won Park, “Possibility of North Korean Collapse,” Marine Corps 

University Command and Staff College report, Quantico, VA: Marine Corps 

University Command and Staff College, 1997.

 155. Report from Colonel Choe Chu-Hwal, the highest-ranking DPRK defector. 

Avigdor Haselkorn, The Continuing Storm: Iraq, Poisonous Weapons, and Deterrence, 

New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999, p. 224. Also see Barry Rubin and Thomas 

Keaney, eds., US Allies in a Changing World, London: Frank Cass, 2001, pp. 210-212.

 156. David Long and Christian Koch, eds., Gulf Security in the Twenty-First 

Century, Abu Dhabi: Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, 1997, pp. 

64-65.

 157. Evidence: only 14 million of 64 million Iranians are actively employed, 

with 15 million slated to enter the workforce in the next decade. Thus, “if economic 

reform does not take hold soon, Iran may confront a new revolution; deterioration 

could lead to domestic discontent, spilling over into process of foreign policy.” Bjorn 

Moller, Oil and Water: Cooperative Security in the Persian Gulf, London: I. B. Tauris, 

2001, p. 102.

 158. Michael Eisenstadt, Iranian Military Power: Capabilities and Intentions, 

Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1996, p. xviii. 

 159. Gawdat Bahgat, The Persian Gulf at the Dawn of the New Millennium, Commack, 

NY: Nova Science Publishers, 1999, p. 122.

 160. Ibid., p. 110.

 161. The idea is that, during a conflict, the United States may not be able to deter 

certain types of behavior (e.g., Iraqi SCUD strikes on coalition forces) and yet may 

retain some capacity to deter other types of action (e.g., Iraqi use of WMD). As the 

discussion of the U.S. deterrent makes clear, there are different levels of response 

for different types of behavior. Whereas Iraq was willing to accept one response 

(conventional war stopping short of regime removal), it was not willing to risk the 

more serious consequence it estimated would occur if WMD were used. Interview 

with Vickers, Director of Strategic Studies, CSBA, March 18, 2003.

 162. See Haselkorn, pp. 59-71.

 163. This may be a reason why the Iraqi leadership was the initial target of U.S. 

strikes. 

 164. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, in his address to the media after the 

initial strike, attempted to dissuade Iraqi units from using WMD through the threat 

of prosecution for war crimes. 

 165. Civil war scenario: Bahgat, pp. 93-94; recidivist future: Long, p. 64.

 166. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, January 

2001, p. 43.

 167. Eyal Zisser and Paul Rivlin, “Syria: Domestic Political Stress and 

Globalization,” Tel Aviv, Israel: Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African 

Studies, June 1999, pp. 21-24.
62

 168. Eyal Zisser, Asad’s Legacy: Syria in Transition, London: Hurst and Company, 

2001, p. 175.

 169. Syria has one of the highest “levels of natural increase” in the world at 3.3 

percent to 3.5 percent. Economic issues include stagnation and shortages of water 

and electricity. Zisser and Rivlin, pp. 21-24.

 170. William Lewis, “U.S.-Libya Relations: A New Chapter?” Washington, DC: 

Atlantic Council of the United States, May 2001, p. 4.

 171. Craig R. Black, “Deterring Libya: The Strategic Culture of Muammar 

Qadhafi,” Counterproliferation paper, Maxwell Air force Base, AL: Air War College, 

USAF Counterproliferation Center, October 2000, pg. 22.

 172. Ibid.

 173. Thomas Donnelly and Vance Serchuk, “Beware the Libyan Model,” AEI 

National Security outlook, February 27, 2004.

 174. Michele Flournoy, who served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense 

for Strategy, states that, in internal DoD war games, these are the two primary 

archetypical situations in which states use missiles (specifically, tipped with WMD) 

against U.S. bases. Interview with Michele Flournoy, Senior Advisor, CSIS, March 

17, 2003. Also the view of Jack Spencer; interview with Jack Spencer. 

 175. In this sense, coalition unity is a vulnerable center of gravity. Robert M. 

Soofer, “Joint Theater Missile Defense Strategy,” Joint Forces Quarterly, Autumn 

1995, p. 73; and Byman and Waxman, p. 171. Regarding the economic damage, 

Moshe Arens has described the effects of the Iraqi missile threat on Israel during the 

Gulf War: “As long as the missile threat hangs over Israel, our entire economy is in 

low gear. We must return to normalcy and put away the gas masks.” Moshe Arens, 

Broken Covenant: American Foreign Policy and the Crisis Between the US and Israel, New 

York: Simon and Schuster, 1995, p. 212.

 176. Ian Sample, “Star Wars: The next generation: The world’s most controversial 

weapons system is loaded and ready to fire. But will it work?” The Guardian, London, 

August 12, 2004, p. 6.

 177. See Center for Defense Information, “National Missile Defense: What Does it 

all Mean?” CDI issue brief, first published September 2000, updated in April 2002. 

 178. See Evan Medeiros, “Theater Missile Defense and Northeast Asian Security,” 

Center for Nonproliferation Studies issue brief, August 2001, reviewed January 

2003.

 179. Robert Walpole, “The Iranian Ballistic Missile and WMD Threat to the United 

States Through 2015,” Statement to the Senate Government Affairs Committee, 

September 21, 2000.

 180. Ivan Arreguin-Toft, “How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric 

Conflict,” International Security, Vol. 26, No. 1, Summer 2001, pp. 96-98.

 181. See Stephen Metz, “Strategic Asymmetry,” Military Review, July-August 

2001.
63

 182. Arreguin-Toft, p. 105.

 183. James F. Diehl, “The Art of the Bluff with Weapons of Mass Destruction,” 

Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF) paper, Washington, DC: ICAF, 1997, 

pp. 11-12.

 184. Ibid. The 1955 Soviet rouse created fears of a “bomber gap” that led to a 

large increase in U.S. defense spending on strategic systems. 

 185. Other forms of asymmetric compellance fall outside the scope of this 

monograph, but may be more effective. The most important form involves active 

nonmilitary means of compelling U.S. behavior, such as political warfare aimed at 

shaping U.S. public opinion. Arguably, Iraq engaged in a public relations campaign 

to sway U.S. domestic opinion prior to the commencement of hostilities in 2003. 

 186. Colin S. Gray, “National Style in Strategy: The American Example,” 

International Security, Vol. 6, No. 2, pp. 21-47.

 187. William E. Odom, Fixing Intelligence: For a More Secure America, New Haven: 

Yale University Press, 2003, p. 185.

 188. “The Intelligence Community in the 21st Century,” Staff Study by the 

Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Executive Summary of Part V on 

Signals Intelligence, 1996.

 189. The famous example is the supposed failure of the CIA to predict Soviet 

missile production in the mid-1970s. See John Prados, The Soviet Estimate: US 

Intelligence and Russian Military Strength, New York: Dial Press, 1982. The more recent 

example occurred in the summer of 2001, when Congress ordered an investigation 

into supposedly over-optimistic CIA analyses of China. Bill Gertz, “Panel Finds CIA 

Soft on China,” Washington Times, July 6, 2001.

 190. Janis, pp. 56-63. Janis cites many familiar cases, including Truman’s advisory 

body, which uniformly encouraged escalation in Korea in 1950; and Kennedy’s 

group of experts that urged an invasion of Cuba in 1961. 

 191. In addition to sources in Section III, see Richard J. Heuer, Psychology of 

Intelligence Analysis, Washington, DC: CIA, Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1999, 

Chapter 2.

 192. Elaine Bunn states that the Soviet experience still affects how people think 

about foreign threat, but that there has been some “movement” in the past decade 

toward appreciating the nature of post-Cold War period threats. Interview with 

Elaine Bunn, Distinguished Research Fellow, National Defense University, March 

17, 2003. 

 193. Eric V. Larson, Casualties and Consensus: The Historical Role of Casualties on 

Domestic Support for US Military Operations, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1996, p. 100. 

 194. John Mueller, “American Public Opinion and Military Ventures Abroad,” 

Paper presented to the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia, August 

13, 2003. 

 195. Worldviews 2002: US Leaders Topline Report, Chicago Council on Foreign 

Relations/German Marshall Fund of the United States, October 2002, Chapter 8.
64

 196. For example, 68 percent of elites oppose the use of force to fight drug lords 

in Colombia. Survey data taken from Ibid.

 197. America’s National Interests, Report of the Commission on America’s National 

Interests, July 2000, pp. 13-18 (a bipartisan panel of experts commissioned through 

the Nixon Center).

 198. Ibid., p. 15. Another way leaders may perceive vital interests is through 

“domino rationales” in which “a series of individually insignificant interests” are 

“linked so that their cumulative loss constitutes a material threat to survival.” 

Larson, pp. 98-99.

 199. Daniel Goure, “The Tyranny of Forward Presence,” Naval War College 

Review, Summer 2001.

 200. America’s National Interests, pp. 24-26, 29-34. Other regions containing “vital” 

interests are Russia and the Western Hemisphere. 

 201. This region is not only situated between several potential competitors 

(Russia, China, Iran) but also contains significant energy reserves. Hooman Peimani, 

Failed Transition, Bleak Future? War and Instability in Central Asia and the Caucasus, p. 

112. In the Caspian Basin alone, estimates indicate 20 billion barrels of untapped oil, 

which is much less than the Persian Gulf. The putative results of exploration may 

yield about 3-4 million barrels a day, which is equivalent to current Saudi exports. 

However, the Department of Energy has predicted a significant reliance on Middle 

East oil by 2020, and a Caspian route may therefore constitute a “vital” or at least 

“very important” interest. Hooman Peimani, The Caspian Pipeline Dilemma: Political 

Games and Economic Losses, Westport, CT: Praeger, 2001, pp. 24-26.

 202. See Vickers and Martinage, pp. 64-67; and Christopher J. Bowie, The AntiAccess Threat and Theater Air Bases, pp. 31-36, which also focuses on the domestic 

politics of denial.

 203. This is really the “third phase.” The coercion dynamic is similar to that 

experienced by the United States―threats will be interpreted through domesticlevel filters, and a risk analysis will be conducted on the relative merits of resisting 

the threat. Interpretation of the message will be determined by a familiar set of 

variables―culture, history, and structure. I do not attempt to perform a case-by-case 

analysis of this process, however, and must rely on the assumption that these states 

will evaluate the threat reasonably accurately.

 204. Elaine Bunn observes that this generalization did not hold in the 2003 Iraq 

conflict in which Turkey (a NATO ally) refused to grant the United States access while 

Saudi Arabia (not an ally) granted the United States permission to use its territory. 

Interview with Elaine Bunn, Distinguished Research Fellow, National Defense 

University, March 17, 2003. As with any generalizations, there will be exceptions. 

But dividing states along these lines is useful in considering the differences in risk 

calculation. 

 205. George Stambuk, “Foreign Policy and the Stationing of American Forces 

Abroad,” The Journal of Politics, Vol. 25, No. 3, August 1963, p. 482.
65

 206. Or other benefits which are not considered in this study―domestic political 

pressure unrelated to missile threats, anti-nuclear sentiment and environmental 

costs of military bases; strategic gambits for greater “independence” from the United 

States, etc. Adam B. Siegel, “Base Access Constraints and Crisis Response,” Airpower 

Journal, Spring 1996.

 207. Barry Rubin and Thomas Keaney, eds., US Allies in a Changing World, 

London: Frank Cass, 2001, p. 132.

 208. Zalmay Khalilzad, Ian Lesser, and F. Stephen Larrabee, The Future of TurkishWestern Relations: Toward a Strategic Plan, Santa Monica: RAND, 2000, p. 46.

 209. This has also been a historical concern in Turkish thought. During the 

founding of modern Turkey, between 1924-38, there were 16 Kurdish-led rebellions 

against Turkey. Bjorn Moller, Oil and Water: Cooperative Security in the Persian Gulf, 

London: I. B. Tauris, 2001, pp. 146-147.

 210. Khalilzad, et al., p. 12.

 211. Peter W. Rodman, “European Common Foreign, Security, and Defense 

Policies―Implications for the United States and the Atlantic Alliance,” Statement 

for House International Relations Committee, November 10, 1999, p. 3; Michael 

Quinlan, European Defense Cooperation: Asset or Threat to NATO, Washington, DC: 

Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2001, pp. 59-61.

 212. The motives of Germany and others may be to “relieve the United States of 

enough of its burden in Europe to prevent an isolationist Congress from someday 

yanking U.S. troops home in disgust.” Butler, p. 4. This does not speak to the motives 

of all NATO allies―French motives may be to “enhance Europe’s autonomy from 

the United States.” Rodman, p. 2.

 213. Moreover, NDU’s Kimberly Nastasi points out that Europe’s “strategic 

culture” is centered around NATO and that “people have underestimated” the 

strength of the alliance. Interview with Kimberely Nastasi, Research Analyst, 

National Strategic Gaming Center, National Defense University, March 19, 2003.

 214. Soofer, p. 73. Another point is that any threat against NATO member states 

would immediately invoke Article IV of the North Atlantic Treaty, facilitating 

discussion and coordination. 

 215. Khalilzad, p. 48, writes that it is unlikely that “Turkey will allow the United 

States to use Turkish facilities in Middle East contingencies except if Turkish national 

interests are directly threatened.” 

 216. Young-sun Song, “Prospect for U.S.-Japan Security Cooperation,” Asian 

Survey, Vol. 35, No. 12, December 1995, p. 1091; Garrett Banning and Bonnie Glaser, 

“Chinese Apprehensions about Revitalization of the U.S.-Japan Alliance,” Asian 

Survey, Vol. 37, No. 4, April 1997, p. 386.

 217. Robert D. Blackwill and Paul Dibb, America’s Asian Alliances, Cambridge, 

MA: MIT Press, 2000, pp. 53-54. The two main causes of a forced withdrawal are 

not directly linked to regional missile proliferation. First, the annual cost to Japan of 

subsidizing the United States (~$4 billion) has produced resentment, but heightened 
66

security concerns are likely only to justify this cost. Second is ambivalence among the 

Japanese public of the value of permanently hosting U.S. forces. For instance, a 1996 

survey in Asahi Shimbun found that 70 percent of Japanese supported the alliance, 

but that 67 percent favored a reduction of forces. Morihiro Hosokawa, “Are U.S. 

Troops in Japan Needed?” Foreign Affairs, July/August 1998, pp. 2-5. However, the 

efficacy of such voices is inversely―not positively―related to perceptions of threats 

in East Asia. For instance, a solution to the problem on the Korean peninsula would 

fuel public opposition out of the feeling that U.S. troops are no longer necessary for 

security. Robert Dujarric, Korean Unification and After: The Challenge for US Strategy, 

Indianapolis: Hudson Institute, 2000, p. 59.

 218. Dujarric, p. 24.

 219. Davis and Sweeney, pp. 107-108.

 220. Cossa, pp. 36-37.

 221. Davis, pp. 106-107.

 222. Dujarric, pp. 61-62.

 223. Paul N. Nagy, “Access is Key to Power Projection,” Proceedings, February 

1999.

 224. A 1996 joint declaration, “Australia-U.S. Joint Security Declaration: A 

Strategic Partnership for the 21st Century,” stated: 

Both governments reaffirm their commitment to that presence through 

forward-deployed U.S. forces, access arrangements, and exercises. We 

both attach importance to continuing Australian access to United States 

technology, close cooperation in intelligence matters, the assurance of 

resupply and logistics support in a crisis, and combined exercises and 

training to promote interoperability.

Cossa, p. 143.

 225. Dibb, pp. 93-96.

 226. David Long and Christian Koch, eds., Gulf Security in the Twenty-First 

Century, Abu Dhabi: Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, 1997, p. 

70.

 227. In addition, Michele Flournoy suggests that formal allies status would exist 

if not for the negative domestic political consequences of overtly strong military ties 

to the United States. Interview with Michele Flournoy. 

 228. Krepinevich, “The First War of a New Century: A First Blush Assessment”; 

Long, et al., pp. 130-131.

 229. Rubin, p. 135.

 230. For example, Russia has “enormous” financial stakes in development of 

Central Asia; U.S. designs to “bypass” Russian oil and gas pipelines in favor of 

Central Asia would net a large economic loss to Russia. Jan S. Adams, “The U.S.-

Russian Face-Off in the Caspian Basin,” Problems in Post-Communism, Vol. 47, No. 

1, January-February 2000, pp. 53-57. On coercion, Georgia has chosen not to apply 
67

for NATO membership because of the concern that Western presence on Russia’s 

southern border would invite Russian coercion. Peimani, pp. 125-126. On the other 

hand, Azerbaijan has indicated it may be interested in allowing the United States to 

establish a base on the Apsheron Peninsula as a strategic counter to Russian bases 

in Armenia. Thus, calculations for permanent U.S. presence are not always clear cut. 

Adams, p. 52.

 231. See Michael Denison, “Central Asia’s New Romance with the West: A Match 

Made in Heavan?” Central Asia-Caucasus Institute biweekly analysis, January 16, 

2002.

 232. Quote of Ariel Cohen. Paul Basken, “China, Russia Voice Concern over US 

Bases in Central Asia,” Bloomberg News, January 11, 2002.

 233. Bowie, The Anti-Access Threat and Theater Air Bases, p. 32.

 234. ESDP will provide a rapid-reaction force of 60,000 troops, but is oriented 

towards small-scale contingencies and military operations other than war. The 

ability of the EU to provide for territorial defense and to act in major theater wars 

will continue to be limited until such time as EU member states heavily reinvest in 

defense. 

 235. The future of Iraq is uncertain, but the ascension of a hostile and/or unstable 

regime in post-Hussein Iraq cannot be ruled out. 

 236. Some of the variance will result from domestic political issues that have 

nothing to do with missile threats and were thus not considered in this document. 

As noted in the introduction, political denial resulting from domestic pressure is a 

second major problem for reliability and must be assessed on a case-by-case basis. 

 237. James Lindsey and Michael O’Hanlon, “Correspondance: Limited National 

and Allied Missile Defense,” International Security, Vol. 26, No. 4, Spring 2002, p. 

195.

 238. See Bowie, The Anti-Access Threat and Theater Air Bases, p. 53.

 239. Idea offered by Mike Vickers. Interview with Vickers, Director of Strategic 

Studies, CSBA, March 18, 2003. 

 240. See Wu Chunsi “Tactical Missile Defense, Sino-US-Japanese Relationship 

and East Asian Security,” International Network of Engineers and Scientists paper, 

online at http://www.inesap.org/bulletin16/bul16art09.htm.

 241. Bowie, The Anti-Access Threat and Theater Air Bases, pp. 56-58.

 242. Interview with Dr. Clark Murdock, Senior Fellow, CSIS, March 18, 2003. 

Also see Stillion, Chapter 5, for a full analysis of short-term and long-term standoff 

basing options. 

 243. See John Jumper, “Global Strike Task Force: A Transforming Concept, 

Forged by Experience,” Aerospace Power Chronicles, April 2001.

 244. According to Jack Spencer, the USAF modernization budget is heavily 

geared towards tactical aircraft, by a ratio of 26:1 (fighter versus long-range bombers). 

He attributes this, in part, to a fighter-centric USAF culture. Interview with Jack 

Spencer. 
68

 245. Clark Murdock also points out that reconnaissance is a significant problem 

for counterforce operations; he suggests that a new fleet of stealthy unmanned aerial 

vehicles may be necessary to gather intelligence on the location of enemy missiles. 

Interview with Dr. Clark Murdock, Senior Fellow, CSIS, March 18, 2003. 

 246. In January 2003, Northrop Grumman received a $34 million contract to 

develop a method of converting SSBN missile tubes to accommodate Tomahawk 

LACMs. See Northrop Grumman press release “Northrop Grumman Awarded $34 

Million Contract for Missile Canister Conversion On SSGN Submarine Program,” 

January 17, 2003. 

 247. See Bowie, The Anti-Access Threat and Theater Air Bases, p. 59.

 248. Ibid., pp. 62-63; but Bowie says that directed-energy weapons are “decades” 

away from deployment. 

 249. See Paul S. Killingsworth, Flexbasing: Achieving Global Presence for 

Expeditionary Aerospace Forces, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2000.