IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-60326

Summary Calendar

CHARLES L STRINGER,

Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE,

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY

Defendant - Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Southern District of Mississippi

USDC No. 3:08-CV-730

Before DENNIS, CLEMENT, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Charles Stringer appeals the denial of his application to the

Commissioner of Social Security for disability benefits. Upon review of the

Commissioner’s final decision, the district court entered judgment in the

Commissioner’s favor. We AFFIRM the district court’s judgment. 

BACKGROUND

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

March 22, 2012

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should

not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in

5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

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Stringer filed his initial application for disability benefits, pursuant to

20 C.F.R. § 404.350(a). An applicant is eligible for such benefits, called

“child’s benefits,” which the parties refer to as “disabled adult child’s

benefits,” if several criteria are met. Id. § 404.350(a)(1)-(5). As relevant here,

if the applicant is over 18, the applicant must “have a disability that began

before [he] became 22 years old.” Id. § 404.350(a)(5). 

20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4) lays out the Social Security Administration’s

(SSA) “five-step sequential evaluation process” for determining whether an

individual is disabled. The first three steps involve evaluating: (1) whether

the claimant is engaging in work that constitutes substantial gainful activity;

(2) the severity of the claimant’s impairment; (3) and whether the impairment

meets or equals an impairment listed impairment in Appendix 1, Subpart P

of 20 C.F.R. § 404. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(iii). Only if a claimant’s

impairment does not meet or equal a listed impairment does the SSA move on

to steps four and five. Id. § 404.1520(e). Those steps involve evaluating: (4)

whether the impairment prevents the claimant from returning to past

relevant work; and (5) whether the claimant is able to perform other work. 

Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv)-(v).

Stringer’s application was rejected on the ground that his disability did

not begin before April 1, 1985, the date on which Stringer turned 22 years old. 

Stringer was granted a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on

the issue. Subsequently, the ALJ issued a decision concluding that Stringer

was not disabled before the age of 22. In support of that decision, the ALJ

made several findings regarding Stringer’s impairments and ability to work:

(1) that prior to the age of 22, Stringer had engaged in work constituting

substantial gainful activity in 1981, 1982, and 1985; (2) that Stringer suffered

from some severe impairments prior to the age of 22: a learning disorder,

conduct disorder, and depressive symptoms; (3) but that whether considered

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individually or together, Stringer’s impairments met or equaled the listed

impairments; (3) that Stringer was able to perform semi-skilled work activity

and physical activity at all levels of exertion prior to the age of 22; and (4)

that Stringer was not prevented by his impairments from working at his past

relevant work as a utility handler in manufacturing. Stringer subsequently

submitted a request for review to the Appeals Council, which was denied. 

Stringer then filed a petition for judicial review in district court.1

Stringer filed a motion for summary judgment, and the Commissioner filed a

motion to affirm the decision below. The district court referred these motions

to a magistrate, who issued a report and recommendation. The magistrate’s

report recommended denying Stringer’s motion, granting the Commissioner’s,

dismissing Stringer’s complaint, and entering judgment in the

Commissioner’s favor. The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s

report and recommendation over Stringer’s objections, and entered judgment

in the Commissioner’s favor. Stringer then submitted a motion to alter or

amend the judgment, which was denied. Stringer timely appealed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

In an appeal from a decision by the Commissioner, “this court reviews

the record under the same standard as the district court.” Dominigue v.

Barnhart, 388 F.3d 462, 463 (5th Cir. 2004). In Social Security disability

cases, “appellate review is limited to (1) whether the Commissioner applied

the proper legal standard; and (2) whether the Commissioner’s decision is

supported by substantial evidence.” Waters v. Barnhart, 276 F.3d 716, 718

(5th Cir. 2002). “‘Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a

responsible mind might accept to support a conclusion. It is more than a

mere scintilla and less than a preponderance. A finding of no substantial

42 U.S.C. § 405(g) permits claimants to obtain judicial review of final decisions by the 1

Commissioner, issued after a hearing in which they took part.

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evidence is appropriate only if no credible evidentiary choices or medical

findings support the decision. In applying this standard, we may not

re-weigh the evidence or substitute our judgment for that of the

Commissioner.’” Boyd v. Apfel, 239 F.3d 698, 704 (5th Cir. 2001) (quoting

Harris v. Apfel, 209 F.3d 413, 417 (5th Cir. 2000)).

ANALYSIS

Stringer raises eight arguments on appeal. He claims that: (1) the

district court erred in allowing a magistrate judge to rule on his motion for

summary judgment; (2) the district court erred in not addressing his 42

U.S.C. § 1983 claim; (3) if Stringer was found disabled for the purposes of

receiving Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits, then he should also

have been found to be disabled for the purposes of receiving child’s benefits;

(4) the ALJ erred in failing to find that the onset of his bipolar disease or

manic depression occurred before he turned 22; (5) the district court erred by

not ruling on his motions to correct the record and transcript as well as to

supplement the record; (6) the district court erred in dismissing Stringer’s

complaint with prejudice; (7) the magistrate judge should have recused

herself from Stringer’s case; and (8) the district court judge should have

recused himself from Stringer’s case. We address each argument in turn. 

A.

First, Stringer argues that the district court erred in allowing a

magistrate judge to decide his motion for summary judgment. But the

magistrate judge did not decide the motion. Rather, she prepared a report

and recommendation, which the district court adopted in its decision to deny

Stringer’s motion. The magistrate judge and district court judge proceeded in

accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3), which “allows a district judge to

delegate discrete tasks to a magistrate judge, but retain the last word

through deciding whether to accept the resulting magistrate judge’s report

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and recommendation.” United States v. Underwood, 597 F.3d 661, 669 (5th

Cir. 2010). Stringer had the opportunity to submit objections to the

magistrate judge’s report, which he did. The district court considered those

objections and rejected them. Accordingly, Stringer’s argument that the

district court should not have permitted the magistrate judge to decide his

motion for summary judgment is unavailing.

B.

Second, Stringer contends that the district court erred by not

addressing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim. Stringer argues that he has suffered a

violation of his civil rights, and offers in support a claim that he can produce

a witness who has “not work[ed] as much as” Stringer and yet received Social

Security benefits. We find this argument to be unpersuasive. In his

appellate brief, Stringer cites no evidence regarding this witness, or any

relevant authority supporting his argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(9)(A)

(appellate briefs must contain “contentions and the reasons for them, with

citations to the authorities and parts of the record on which the appellant

relies”); Rui Yang v. Holder, 664 F.3d 580, 589 (5th Cir. 2011) (“While we

‘liberally construe briefs of pro se litigants and apply less stringent standards

to parties proceeding pro se than to parties represented by counsel, pro se

parties must still brief the issues and reasonably comply with the standards

of Rule 28.’” (quoting Grant v. Cuellar, 59 F.3d 523, 524 (5th Cir. 1995)

(citation omitted)). 

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C.

Stringer also claims for the first time on appeal that employees of the Social Security

2

Administration hindered him in applying for benefits because they knew that he had

previously been incarcerated. However, “arguments not raised before the district court are

waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.” Martco Ltd. P’ship v. Wellons, Inc.,

588 F.3d 864, 877 (5th Cir. 2009). Moreover, Stringer cites no evidentiary support for his

claim.

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Third, Stringer claims that, because he was found disabled for the

purposes of receiving SSI benefits in October 1997, he should also have been

found disabled for the purposes of receiving disabled adult child’s benefits.

However, the relevant date for determining whether a claimant is disabled,

and thus eligible to receive SSI benefits, is the filing date of his application. 

See Social Security Ruling 83-20, 1983 WL 31249, at *7 (explaining that for

successful SSI benefits claimants, “[o]nset will be established as of the date of

filing provided the individual was disabled on that date”). Accordingly, a 3

finding that Stringer was disabled in October 1997 does not indicate that he

was disabled before April 1, 1985, the date on which he turned 22.

D.

Stringer’s fourth argument is that the ALJ erred in finding that his

bipolar disorder/manic depression did not onset before he turned 22. Because

the ALJ found that, before the age of 22, Stringer had severe impairments

consisting of a learning disorder, conduct disorder, and depressive symptoms,

Stringer contends that the ALJ should also have concluded that these were

symptoms of bipolar disorder. However, Stringer cites no evidence or

authority for this assertion. Moreover, as Stringer himself admits, although

he turned 22 in 1985, he was not diagnosed with bipolar disorder until 1997. 

Even if Stringer had bipolar disorder before the age of 22, he has not

shown that the ALJ should thus have concluded that he was disabled. The

ALJ’s finding that Stringer performed work before the age of 22 that

constituted substantial gainful activity was sufficient to conclude that he was

not disabled. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i) (“If . . . the work you are doing

is substantial gainful activity, we will find that you are not disabled . . . .”). 

 There are certain limited instances in which the Commissioner may look before the 3

date of filing: applications involving “certain aliens” or applications “where duration is at

issue.” See id. at *8. Stringer does not contend that either of these instances applies here.

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Stringer asserts that prior to the age of 22, he was not able to obtain

promotions at work and was twice fired from his job. But this does not mean

that he was not able to engage in substantial gainful activity. The record

shows that Stringer obtained his general equivalency diploma (GED) by the

age of 19. Additionally, Stringer testified before the ALJ that between the

ages of 18 and 21, he worked at a plastics company two times: the first time

he worked there for approximately a year and a half, and the second time he

worked there for approximately a year. Nor does Stringer dispute the ALJ’s

finding that his earnings records for 1981, 1982, and 1985 were “at or above

the substantial gainful activity level.” Thus, there is substantial evidence

supporting the ALJ’s conclusion that Stringer engaged in substantial gainful

activity before the age of 22. 

E.

Fifth, Stringer argues that the district court erred by not ruling on his

motions to correct the sealed court transcript, correct sealed court records,

and to supplement court records. But, as shown on the docket sheet, the

magistrate judge did rule on Stringer’s motions, as she was permitted to do. 

See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) (stating that “a judge may designate a magistrate

judge to hear and determine any pretrial matter pending before the court,”

with certain exceptions that are inapplicable here). Stringer also alleges that

the magistrate judge altered the docket sheet to make it appear that she

ruled on his motions before the district court adopted her report and

recommendation. Stringer cites no evidence to support this allegation, and

we find it to be without merit. Stringer also argues that because the

Commissioner never filed a response to these motions, the records should not

be taken as true and correct; he cites no authority for this proposition.4

Stringer appears to dispute the merits of the rulings on his motions in his reply brief. 4

Insofar as he has raised such an argument, “[w]e need not address [it], as it is raised for the

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F.

Stringer’s sixth argument is that the district court erred in dismissing

his case with prejudice, instead of without prejudice. Stringer cites Thomas

v. Phillips, 83 F. App’x 661 (5th Cir. 2003) (unpublished), but that case is

inapposite. The plaintiff in Thomas filed a voluntary petition for dismissal

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41, and the defendant had not filed an

answer to the plaintiff’s complaint. Id. at 661-62. Rule 41 is not at issue in

this case; thus, the district court did not err in dismissing Stringer’s

complaint with prejudice. 

G. 

Seventh, Stringer claims that the magistrate judge should have recused

herself from the instant case because she is a former United States Attorney

and such attorneys are currently representing the Commissioner. Relatedly,

he also refers to and critiques her past employment as a district attorney. 

While a judge should recuse herself if “[s]he has served in governmental

employment and in such capacity participated as counsel, adviser, or material

witness concerning the proceeding or expressed an opinion concerning the

merits of the particular case in controversy,” 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(3), that is not

the case here. There is no evidence that the magistrate judge has done any of

the above. Therefore, Stringer’s claim that the magistrate judge should have

recused herself from his case lacks merit. 

H. 

Finally, Stringer contends that the district court judge should have

recused himself from Stringer’s case as well. In support of this argument,

Stringer claims that the district judge “dressed as a woman” so he could pose

as a clerk of the court in order to “sabotage” Stringer’s case; was biased

first time in a reply brief.” Medina Cnty Env’tl Action Ass’n v. Surface Transp. Bd., 602 F.3d

687, 702 (5th Cir. 2010). 

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because he agreed with the recommendation of the magistrate judge; and has

used his positions as a judge and as a district attorney for “personal [and]

financial gain.” And, as with the magistrate judge, Stringer critiques the

district court judge’s past employment as a district attorney. Stringer cites

no evidence to support his allegations. Thus, he has not shown that the

district court judge should have recused himself from the instant case. See 28

U.S.C. § 455(a)-(b) (listing circumstances under which judges should recuse

themselves from proceedings). 

CONCLUSION

For the above reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment. 

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