RUSSIA, IRAN AND THE NUCLEAR QUESTION:

THE PUTIN RECORD

Robert O. Freedman

November 2006

This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined 

in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. As such, it is in the 

public domain, and under the provisions of Title 17, United States 

Code, Section 105, it may not be copyrighted.

Visit our website for other free publication downloads

http://www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/

To rate this publication click here.
ii

*****

The views expressed in this report are those of the author 

and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the 

Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. 

Government. This report is cleared for public release; distribution 

is unlimited.

*****

Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be 

forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War 

College, 122 Forbes Ave, Carlisle, PA 17013-5244. 

*****

All Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) publications are available 

on the SSI homepage for electronic dissemination. Hard copies 

of this report also may be ordered from our homepage. SSI’s 

homepage address is: www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil.

*****

The Strategic Studies Institute publishes a monthly e-mail 

newsletter to update the national security community on the 

research of our analysts, recent and forthcoming publications, and 

upcoming conferences sponsored by the Institute. Each newsletter 

also provides a strategic commentary by one of our research 

analysts. If you are interested in receiving this newsletter, please 

subscribe on our homepage at www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.

mil/newsletter/.

ISBN 1-58487-256-X
iii

FOREWORD

This monograph is another in the series of papers 

from the conference entitled “The U.S. and Russia: 

Regional Security Issues and Interests,” conducted 

sponsored jointly by the Strategic Studies Institute 

(SSI) of the U.S. Army War College; the Ellison Center 

for Russian, East European, and Central Asian Studies 

at the Jackson School of International Studies at the 

University of Washington; the Pacific Northwest 

National Laboratory’s Pacific Northwest Center for 

Global Studies; and Dr. Robert Freedman’s monograph 

analyzes the Russo-Iranian relationship through the 

spring of 2006. This issue, of course, is vitally important 

in U.S. foreign policy, not just as it relates to Iran and 

the overall issue of nonproliferation, especially in the 

Middle East, but also as U.S. foreign policy pertains to 

relations with Moscow.

Thus this monograph should also be read in light 

of the current crisis with Iran and bearing in mind 

the dimensions of Iranian proliferation and the issues 

surrounding it. At the same time, the numerous 

challenges to regional security in the Middle East, and 

the addition of great power rivalry to that list, further 

aggravate Middle East instability and make the search 

for peace that much more difficult. Consequently, the 

Russo-American dimension of the Iranian crisis adds 

to the complexity of the myriad issues and regional 

challenges to security, and the enduring difficulties in 

the Russo-American relationship.

Given the gravity of these issues, we are pleased 

to provide our readers with this well-informed and 
iv

expert analysis of some of the most urgent challenges 

to security in today’s world.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director

Strategic Studies Institute 
v

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

ROBERT O. FREEDMAN is Peggy Meyerhoff 

Pearlstone Professor of Political Science at Baltimore 

Hebrew University and Visiting Professor of Political 

Science at Johns Hopkins University. A past president 

of the Association for Israel Studies, he has served as a 

commentator on National Public Radio, the BBC, and 

the Voice of America, and is a consultant to the U.S. 

State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency. 

He has also been a member of U.S. Government 

delegations that went to Moscow and Beijing for 

discussions with Russian and Chinese scholars and 

government officials on the Middle East, and led a U.S. 

mission to Uzbekistan to discuss the establishment of 

U.S.-Uzbek cultural relations. In 1989, Dr. Freedman 

was a member of a Brookings Institution delegation that 

went to Tunis for discussions with Palestinian leaders 

about the peace process. Following the September 11, 

2001, terrorist attacks, he participated, as the American 

representative, in three conferences in Europe with 

European political leaders and scholars who dealt with 

the problem of improving U.S.-European cooperation 

in the Middle East. Dr. Freedman has lectured to 

the Israeli Defense Ministry and the Israeli Foreign 

Ministry, and recently appeared on the London-based 

Arab TV station, al-Mustakillah, where he discussed 

U.S. policy in the Middle East and the prospects for 

democratization in the Arab world with callers from 

Syria, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Iraq, Jordan, and Tunisia. 

He also has held talks with Palestinian Authority 

Presidents Yasser Arafat and Mahmoud Abbas, Israeli 

Prime Ministers Yitzhak Rabin and Ariel Sharon, and 

Israeli Foreign Minister Tsippy Livny. Dr. Freedman 
vi

is the author of four books on Soviet foreign policy, 

including Soviet Policy Toward the Middle East Since 

1970 (3rd edition, Praeger Press, 1982), Moscow and the 

Middle East: Soviet Policy Since the Invasion of Afganistan

(Cambridge University Press, 1991), and Soviet-Israeli 

Relations Under Gorbachev (Praeger, 1991). He is also 

the editor of 14 books on Israel and the Middle East, 

including Israel in the Begin Era (1982), Israel Under 

Rabin (1995), The Middle East and the Peace Process

(1998), Israel’s First Fifty Years (2000), and The Middle 

East Enters the 21st Century (2002).
vii

SUMMARY

Vladimir Putin inherited a strong Russian-Iranian 

relationship from his predecessor, Boris Yeltsin. Russia 

made major arms agreements with Iran under Yeltsin, 

selling Tehran jet planes, tanks, and submarines, 

and also began building a nuclear reactor for Iran at 

Bushehr. The two countries also cooperated on regional 

issues such as Tajikistan and Afghanistan, and Yeltsin 

valued the low Iranian profile during the first Chechen 

war (1994-96).

Putin strengthened the relationship further, 

beginning his rule by abrogating the Gore-Chenonymdin 

agreement under which Russia was to cease selling 

arms to Iran by 2000. While Putin and Iran were to 

have some problems over Chechnya and the optimal 

exit route for Caspian Sea oil and natural gas, these 

were overcome by 2005 when Iran emerged—despite 

its clandestine nuclear program—as Putin’s most 

important ally in the Middle East, as Russia sought to 

reemerge as a major power there. Moscow increasingly 

became Iran’s protector against the sanctions that first 

the United States and then the European Union sought 

to impose because of Iran’s violation of international 

agreements. Putin’s policy on Iran, however, contained 

some serious risks for Moscow, including a sharply 

deteriorating relationship with the United States and 

the possibility that newly-elected Iranian President 

Mahmud Ahmadinezhad, an Islamic fundamentalist, 

might one day challenge Russia over its policy in 

Chechyna.

1

RUSSIA, IRAN AND THE NUCLEAR QUESTION:

THE PUTIN RECORD

The construction of the Bushehr nuclear power station 

is nearing completion, and we are ready to continue 

collaboration with Iran in the sphere of nuclear power 

engineering, taking into consideration our international 

nonproliferation obligations, and to look for mutually 

acceptable political solutions in this area.

Vladimir Putin, in a message to the new 

Iranian President, Mahmud Ahmadinezhad1

INTRODUCTION

Of all the nations of the Middle East, Russia’s closest 

relationship is with the Islamic Republic of Iran. While 

Russia’s sale of the Bushehr nuclear power station is 

central to Iranian-Russian relations, a number of other 

facets of the relationship are of almost equal importance. 

These include trade, which by 2005 reached the level of 

$2 billion per year,2 Russian arms sales to Iran which 

include jet fighters and submarines, and diplomatic 

cooperation in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Both 

countries also have sought to prevent U.S. hegemony 

in the world. While several areas of conflict in the 

relationship remain, the most important of which is 

the legal status of the Caspian Sea, by February 2005 

when Moscow and Iran signed an agreement for the 

supply of Russian uranium to the Bushehr reactor, the 

two countries can be said to have reached the level of a 

tactical, if not yet a strategic alliance.

After assessing Putin’s domestic and foreign policies 

and briefly reviewing Russian-Iranian relations in the 

Yeltsin era, this mongraph will analyze Putin’s policy 

toward Iran, especially in regard to the nuclear issue.
2

PUTIN’S DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN POLICIES

One of the most striking aspects of the Putin 

presidency has been his ability to bring the quasiindependent players in Russian domestic and 

foreign policy of the Yeltsin era under much tighter 

centralized control. Putin has all but eliminated the 

political influence of oligarchs Boris Berezovsky, 

Vladimir Gusinsky, and Mikhail Khodorkovsky, and 

taken over their news media outlets. He has replaced 

Yevgeny Adamov, head of the Ministry of Atomic 

Energy (Minatom, now Rosatom), who had a habit of 

trying to make nuclear deals with Iran not approved 

of by the Kremlin, with Alexander Rumyantsev, who 

in November 2005 was, in turn, replaced by Sergei 

Kiriyenko.3

The powerful gas monopoly, GAZPROM, heavily 

involved in Turkey and Central Asia, had its director, 

Ram Vekhirev, replaced by Alexei Miller, while the 

Defense Ministry had its leader, Defense Minister Igor 

Sergeev, replaced by Secretary of the National Security 

Council Sergei Ivanov. Two other holdovers from the 

Yeltsin era also were removed: Russia’s Prime Minister, 

Mikhail Khazyanov, has been replaced by Mikhail 

Fradkov, and Russia’s Foreign Minister, Igor Ivanov, 

was replaced by Sergei Lavrov.

Putin also changed interior ministers, set up 

plenipotentiaries to oversee Russia’s 89 regions, 

and consolidated Russia’s arms sales agencies into 

Rosoboronoexport in an effort to gain greater control 

over a major source of foreign exchange. Putin has 

greatly emphasized improving Russia’s economy, 

not only through the sale of arms, oil, and natural 

gas (the Russian economy has been blessed with high 

oil and natural gas prices during most of his years 
3

in office) but also by selling high tech goods such as 

nuclear reactors and by expanding Russia’s business 

ties abroad. Indeed, business interests have played an 

increasingly significant role in Putin’s foreign policy.

The support Putin received from the Duma, 

especially from his Edinstvo (Unity) party—now the 

enlarged United Russia Party—has made his task easier, 

in contrast to the hostile relations Yeltsin had with 

the Duma from 1993 until his resignation as Russia’s 

President in December 1999. Indeed, in the Duma 

elections of December 2003, Putin greatly increased his 

support, weakening both the communist and liberal 

parties which were his main opponents, and scored 

an overwhelming victory in the 2004 presidential 

elections.

Overall, Putin’s central foreign policy aim has been 

to strengthen the Russian economy in the hope that, in 

the not too distant future, the country might regain its 

status as a great power. In the interim, he has sought 

to create an “arc of stability” on Russia’s frontiers so 

that economic development can proceed as rapidly as 

possible. This was one of the reasons Putin embraced 

an improved relationship with Turkey and ended 

Russian opposition to the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline. In 

theory at least, Putin’s goal would appear to require a 

policy of increased cooperation with the economically 

advanced West led by the United States.

At the same time, however, Putin is mindful of 

voices in the Duma—now represented most strongly 

by the Rodina (Motherland) party that had been created 

by the Kremlin to weaken the Russian Communist 

party—as well as in the security apparatus and the 

Russian foreign ministry unhappy at Moscow’s 

appearing to play “second fiddle” to the United States 

after September 11, 2001 (9/11). He has from time-
4

to-time asserted an independent position for Russia, 

as Moscow’s behavior during the recent war in Iraq 

and the more assertive Russian policy in 2005 and 

2006 indicated. Indeed, increasingly Russian foreign 

policy looks like it is seeking to create the “multipolar 

world” advocated by former Russian Foreign Minister 

and Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov, who is now a 

Putin adviser. As will be shown, the tension between 

these two alternative thrusts of Russian foreign 

policy, cooperating with the United States but also 

competing with it, clearly impacts the Russian-Iranian 

relationship.

This tension became increasingly evident following 

a series of reversals encountered by Putin in 2004. 

Following the replacement of Edvard Shevardnadze 

in December 2003 by the much more pro-Western 

Mikhail Saakashivili, Putin suffered an embarrassing 

failure in the Ukraine in November and December 

2004. Following the mass demonstrations of the 

“Orange Revolution,” pro-Western candidate Viktor 

Yushchenko defeated pro-Russian candidate Victor 

Yanukovich in a presidential reelection which Putin 

had opposed publicly. Making matters worse for Putin 

was the debacle at Beslan, Russia, in September 2004 

when a Chechen rebel attack on a school led to the loss 

of more than 300 Russian lives following a bungled 

rescue mission. While Putin sought to capitalize on the 

incident by tightening control over Russia’s governors 

(he would now appoint them) and political parties, 

as well as by blaming outside powers for wanting 

to dismantle Russia, the Beslan incident underlined 

Putin’s major failure—his inability to bring the Chechen 

rebellion under control. Domestically, Putin also had 

problems in 2005. His efforts to transform “payments 

in kind” to cash payments stirred up opposition 
5

from Russian pensioners, while his heavy-handed 

prosecution of oligarch Mikhail Khodorkovsky led to 

renewed capital flight from Russia and a chilling of the 

atmosphere for foreign investment.

As we shall see, these events which put Putin on 

the defensive and challenged the image he wanted of a 

strong leader of a strong state were to play a major role 

in his decision to proceed with the supply of nuclear 

fuel to the Bushehr reactor in February 2005, despite 

serious American objections.

RUSSIAN AND IRAN: THE YELTSIN LEGACY

The rapid development of Russian-Iranian relations 

under Yeltsin had its origins in the latter part of the 

Gorbachev era. After alternately supporting first 

Iran and then Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war, by the 

end of the war Gorbachev clearly had tilted toward 

Iran.4 The relationship between the two countries was 

solidified in June 1989 with Hashemi Rafsanjani’s visit 

to Moscow, where a number of major agreements, 

including one on military cooperation, were signed. 

The military agreement permitted Iran to purchase 

highly sophisticated military aircraft from Moscow 

including MIG-29s and SU-24s. At a time when its own 

air force had been eroded badly by the 8-year-long 

Iran-Iraq war and by the U.S. refusal to supply spare 

parts, let alone new planes to replace losses in the F-14s 

and other aircraft which the United States had sold to 

the Shah’s regime, the Soviet military equipment was 

needed badly.

Iran’s military dependence on Moscow grew as 

a result of the 1990-91 Gulf War. Not only did the 

United States, which had now become Iran’s primary 

enemy, become the dominant military power in 
6

the Persian Gulf, with defensive agreements with a 

number of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states 

(which included prepositioning arrangements for U.S. 

military equipment) but Saudi Arabia, Iran’s most 

important Islamic challenger, also acquired massive 

amounts of U.S. weaponry. Given Iran’s need for 

sophisticated arms, the pragmatic Iranian leader, 

Hashemi Rafsanjani, was careful not to alienate either 

the Soviet Union or Russia. Thus, when Azerbaidzhan 

declared its independence from the Soviet Union in 

November 1991, Iran, unlike Turkey, did not recognize 

its independence until after the Union of Soviet 

Socialist Republics (USSR) collapsed. Similarly, despite 

occasional rhetoric from Iranian officials, Rafsanjani 

ensured that Iran kept a relatively low profile in 

Azerbaidzhan and the newly independent states of 

Central Asia, emphasizing cultural and economic ties 

rather than Islam as the centerpiece of their relations. 

This was due in part to the fact that after more than 70 

years of Soviet rule, Islam was in a weakened state in 

the countries of the former Soviet Union; the leaders of 

the Muslim successor states were all secular Muslims; 

and the chances for an Iranian-style Islamic revolution 

were very low. Indeed, some skeptics argued that 

Iran was simply waiting for mosques to be built and 

Islam to mature before trying to bring about Islamic 

revolutions. Nonetheless, the Russian leadership 

basically saw Iran as acting very responsibly in Central 

Asia and Transcaucasia, and this was one of the factors 

which encouraged it to continue supplying Iran with 

modern weaponry—including submarines—despite 

strong protests from the United States.

The Russian supply of weapons to Iran became an 

issue of increasing U.S. concern, and in 1995 U.S. Vice 

President Al Gore and Russian Prime Minister Viktor 
7

Chernomydin signed an agreement under which 

Moscow would cease supplying Iran with weapons, 

once existing contracts were fulfilled in 1999.5 At the 

same time, Yeltsin promised American President Bill 

Clinton that Russia, which had agreed to sell Iran an 

atomic reactor, would not build a nuclear centrifuge 

plant for Iran.

During Andrei Kozyrev’s period as Russia’s foreign 

minister (1991-95) Russian-Iranian relations developed 

rapidly. Russia was selling Iran not only arms, but also 

nuclear reactors and other industrial equipment. Yet 

economic gain was only one of Russia’s many interests 

in Iran. As in the case of Russian-Iraqi relations, Yeltsin 

could use the close Russian-Iranian relationship to 

demonstrate to the nationalists in his Duma that he 

was independent of the United States. 

Oil and natural gas development was a third major 

Russian interest in Iran. Again, despite U.S. objections, 

in 1997, GAZPROM—along with the French company, 

Total—signed a major agreement with Iran to develop 

the South Pars gas field. Finally, a greatly weakened 

Russia had found Iran a useful ally in dealing with a 

number of very sensitive Middle Eastern, Caucasian, 

Transcaucasian, and Central and Southwest Asian 

political hot spots. During the Yeltsin era, these 

included Chechnya, where Iran kept a very low profile 

in the first Chechen war despite the use of Islamic 

themes by the Chechen rebels in their conflict with 

Russia; Tajikistan, where Iran helped Russia achieve 

a political settlement, albeit a shaky one; Afghanistan, 

where both Russia and Iran stood together against 

Taliban efforts to seize control over the entire country; 

and Azerbaidzhan, which neither Iran, with a sizeable 

Azeri population of its own, nor Russia under Yeltsin 

wished to see emerge as a significant economic and 
8

military power. In addition, as the North Atlantic 

Treaty Organization (NATO) expanded eastward, 

many Russian nationalists called for a closer RussianIranian relationship as a counterbalance, especially 

as Turkey was seen by some Russians as cooperating 

closely with its NATO allies in expanding its influence 

in both Transcaucasia and Central Asia.6 Indeed, an 

article in the newspaper, Segodnia, in late May 1995 

noted:

Cooperation with Iran is more than just a question 

of money and orders for the Russian atomic industry. 

Today a hostile Tehran could cause a great deal of 

unpleasantness for Russia in the North Caucasus and in 

Tajikistan if it were really to set its mind to supporting 

the Muslim insurgents with weapons, money, and 

volunteers. On the other hand, a friendly Iran could 

become an important strategic ally in the future.

NATO’s expansion eastward is making Russia look 

around hurriedly for at least some kind of strategic allies. 

In this situation, the anti-Western and anti-American 

regime in Iran would be a natural and very important 

partner.7

These interests and policies already were in place 

when Yevgeny Primakov became Foreign Minister 

in January 1996, and he sought to further deepen the 

relationship. Nonetheless, he also had to cope with 

increasing frictions in Russian-Iranian relations. First, 

in December 1996, then Russian Defense Minister 

Igor Rodionov—while Primakov was in Tehran—

described Iran as a possible military threat to Russia, 

given Russia’s weakened position.8 Second, because 

of Iran’s economic problems, it did not have enough 

hard currency to pay for the weapons and industrial 

equipment it wanted to import from Russia. Indeed, 

despite predictions of several billions of dollars in 
9

trade, Russian-Iranian trade was only $415 million 

in 1996, less than Russia’s trade with Israel.9 Third, 

Russian supplies of missile technology to Iran caused 

increasing conflict with the United States (and Israel). 

Although Russia in late 1997 very publicly expelled 

an Iranian diplomat for trying to smuggle missile 

technology and in January 1998 promised to stop 

selling “dual use” equipment to Tehran, by 1999 

the issue had become a serious irritant in RussianAmerican relations, with particularly sharp criticism 

of Moscow coming from the U.S. Congress.10 Fourth, 

since 1995, Iran increasingly has thrust itself forward 

as an alternative export route for Central Asian oil and 

natural gas. This came into direct conflict with the efforts 

of the hardliners in the Russian government to control 

the oil and gas exports of Azerbaidzhan, Uzbekistan, 

Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan, so as to limit their 

freedom as Yeltsin sought to dominate the states of the 

Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). While 

Iran, which remained dependent on Russian exports 

of military equipment sought to defuse this problem 

by trying to organize tripartite projects with Russia 

and the Central Asian states, Iranian availability as 

an alternate export route was a concern for Moscow. 

This concern threatened to become even more severe if 

there were a rapprochement between the United States 

and Iran, which might lead to the termination of U.S. 

efforts to prevent foreign investments in Iran’s oil and 

natural gas pipelines and well infrastructure.11 Finally, 

the two countries disputed the division of the Caspian 

Sea. Iran, with little oil of its own in its Caspian coastal 

shelf, had opposed the Russian-Kazakh agreement 

of July 1998, which partially divided the Caspian Sea 

and continued to call for an equal sharing of the sea’s 

resources, with Iran getting a 20 percent share, rather 
10

than the 12-13 percent its length of coastline would 

have qualified it for.12

In addition, the May 1997 election of Mohammed 

Khatami as Iran’s President gave rise to possible 

rapprochement with the United States, although it 

was aborted quickly. Following his election, Khatami 

began to promote a policy of domestic reform and 

liberalization along with a similar policy toward the 

Arab world and Europe. While conservative forces in 

Iran did not strongly oppose the rapprochements with 

the Arab world and Europe, as both were aimed at 

strengthening Iran’s diplomatic position, they did take 

exception to Khatami’s policy of domestic liberalization 

and to his efforts to approach the United States, 

which held out the possibility of lifting U.S. sanctions 

against Iran under the 1996 Iran-Libya Sanctions 

Act. Unfortunately for Khatami and the possibility 

of improved U.S.-Iranian relations, a conservative 

counterattack in the summer of 1998 forced an end to 

his efforts toward rapprochement with Washington. 

Meanwhile, a successful Iranian missile test 

strengthened the position of those in the United 

States who called for the sanctioning of Russian 

companies which provided Iran with missile help. 

With the collapse of the Russian economy in August 

1998, Russia’s government was hard put to resist U.S. 

pressure and indeed promised it would do its utmost to 

prevent the transmission of missile technology to Iran. 

A further complication to the U.S.-Russian relationship 

came with what proved to be a temporary elevation of 

Primakov to the position of Russian Prime Minister in 

September 1998, following the economic crisis and the 

ouster of Prime Minister Sergei Kiriyenko. Primakov, 

and the communist forces in the Duma who supported 

him, wanted a tougher line toward the United States, 
11

and their advocacy became more shrill following the 

U.S. bombing of Iraq in December 1998 and of Serbia 

in the spring of 1999.

At the same time, Yevgeny Adamov, then head of 

Russia’s Atomic Energy Ministry, continued to press 

for the sale of additional nuclear reactors to Iran, 

something the United States strongly opposed. In 

November 1998, Adamov visited Tehran and, to spur the 

lagging Bushehr nuclear reactor construction project, 

signed an agreement which transformed Bushehr 

into a turnkey project in which Russian technicians, 

not Iranians, would build the project, whose target 

date for completion was set for May 2003.13 However, 

Russian-Iranian relations then were complicated by the 

Kosovo crisis, where Iran championed the Albanian 

Kosovars and Russia the Serbs, and even more so by 

Russia’s decision to invade Chechnya in August 1999, 

leading to the killing of numerous Muslim Chechens, 

something which Iran, which was now head of the 

Islamic Conference, had to protest, albeit mildly.

PUTIN AND IRAN

Policy before 9/11.

Chechnya was only one of the problems in RussianIranian relations facing Putin when he became Russia’s 

President in January 2000 after Yeltsin abruptly stepped 

down. The second was the overwhelming victory 

of the moderates in Iran’s Majlis (Parliamentary) 

elections in February 2000. This had to be a concern 

to Moscow because, for many of the reformers who 

were elected, an improvement in U.S.-Iranian relations 

(and the subsequent hoped-for improvement of 

the Iranian economy which would result once the 
12

United States removed economic sanctions) was an 

important policy goal.14 Yet the moderate Parliament 

found itself checkmated by the conservative forces in 

the government and by the Iranian supreme religious 

authority, Ayatollah Khameini, who opposed their 

reform efforts, and Iranian President Khatami was 

not able to overcome them.15 Indeed in a speech at 

the United Nations (UN) in September 2000, Khatami 

berated the United States for its condemnation of Iran 

for the arrest and conviction of a group of ten Iranian 

Jews as spies—a development which had further 

strained U.S.-Iranian relations. The Iranian President, 

who had met Russian President Putin the previous day, 

also stated that he hoped to forge a closer relationship 

with Russia:

We share a lot of interests with Russia. We both live in 

one of the most sensitive areas of the world. I believe 

the two countries can engage in a viable and strong 

relationship. Russia needs a powerful and stable Iran. 

A stronger relationship would allow both countries to 

marginalize external powers that are seeking destructive 

ends and which do not belong in the region.16

The Khatami statement seemed to put aside, at 

least in the short run, the possibilities of a U.S.-Iranian 

rapprochement. Together with Iran’s low profile in 

the rapidly escalating Chechen war, it may have led 

Putin to abrogate unilaterally the Gore-Chernomyrdin 

agreement of June 30, 1995, under which Russia was to 

have ended all military sales to Tehran by December 

31, 1999, once existing arms sales contracts had been 

completed. This decision risked U.S. sanctions, ranging 

from a ban on the use of Russian rockets for satellite 

launches to the discouragement of U.S. investments 

in Russia, to U.S. pressure on the International 
13

Monetary Fund (IMF) not to reschedule Russian 

debts. While improving Russian-Iranian relations and 

clearly benefitting Rosoboronoexport, Putin’s new 

consolidated arms sales agency, the decision to abrogate 

the Gore-Chenomyrdin agreement was clearly a blow 

to U.S.-Russian relations.17 On the other hand, Putin’s 

decision set the stage for Khatami’s visit to Moscow in 

March 2001.

The Caspian Sea dispute, along with military 

cooperation, were high on the visit’s agenda. Iranian 

ambassador to Moscow Mehdi Safari, in an apparent 

attempt to solicit support from Rosoboronoexport, 

dangled the prospect of $7 billion in arms sales to Iran 

prior to the visit.18 This followed an estimate of up 

to $300 million in annual sales by Rosoboronoexport 

director Viktor Komardin.19

Meanwhile, U.S.-Russian relations had deteriorated 

sharply as the new Bush administration had called for 

the abrogation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty 

and for the expansion of NATO into the Baltic states. 

Making matters worse, soon after taking office, the 

administration had angered Moscow by bombing Iraqi 

anti-aircraft installations and by expelling a number 

of alleged Russian spies. Given this background of 

deteriorating relations, one might have expected more 

to come out of the Putin-Khatami summit than actually 

happened. To be sure, Putin formally announced the 

resumption of arms sales, Khatami was awarded an 

honorary degree in philosophy from Moscow State 

University, and the Iranian President was invited to 

tour Moscow’s contribution to the international space 

station. Former Russian Foreign Minister and Prime 

Minister Yevgeny Primakov waxed eloquent over 

the Khatami visit, calling it the biggest event in the 

history of relations between Tehran and Moscow.20
14

Yet the treaty which emerged from the meeting (“The 

Treaty on Foundations of Relations and Principles of 

Cooperation”) merely stated that “if one of the sides 

will be exposed to an aggression of some state, the other 

side must not give any help to the aggressor.”21 This was 

far from a mutual defense treaty, and something that 

would allow Moscow to stand aside should the United 

States one day attack Iran. No specific mention was 

made of any military agreements during the summit, 

and Russian Deputy Defense Minister Alexander 

Lushkov, possibly in a gesture to the United States, 

stated, “The planned treaty will not make Russia and 

Iran strategic partners, but will further strengthen 

partnerlike, neighborly relations.”22

As far as the Bushehr nuclear reactor issue was 

concerned, despite U.S. protests, Putin (who, as noted 

above, was anxious to sell Russian nuclear reactors 

abroad) and Khatami stated that Russia would finish 

work on the complex. Director of the Izhorskie 

Machine Works Yevgeny Sergeyev stated that the first 

reactor unit would be completed in early 2004, and, “as 

soon as the equipment for the first reactor leaves the 

factory, a contract for the second nuclear reactor will 

be signed.”23

Following the Khatami visit to Moscow, the Caspian 

Sea issue again generated problems for Russian-Iranian 

relations. On July 23, 2001, Iranian gunboats with fighter 

escorts harassed a British Petroleum (BP) research ship, 

forcing BP to suspend its activities in the region, which 

was located within the sea boundary of Azerbaidzhan 

according to a Russian-Azeri agreement, but according 

to Tehran lay in the 20 percent share of the Caspian that 

it unilaterally claimed.24 That Turkey subsequently sent 

combat aircraft to Baku (the arrangement to send the 

aircraft, however, predated the Caspian Sea incident) 
15

complicated matters for Moscow, as the last thing 

Moscow wanted was for a conflict to arise between 

Turkey and Iran, both of which Putin was cultivating. 

(Moscow also did not and does not want any other 

military power to be able to act unilaterally in the 

Caspian, particularly if it threatened another member 

of the CIS.) Not only did this heighten tensions in the 

Caspian basin, it also undermined Russian pretensions 

to a sphere of influence whereby it alone acted as 

security manager there; Iran’s threats gave Turkey and 

the United States a pretext for enhancing their strategic 

presence in the Caspian. 

The Impact of 9/11.

Putin’s decision to draw closer to the United 

States after 9/11, particularly his acquiescence in the 

deployment of U.S. troops in Central Asia, was viewed 

very dimly by Tehran. Iranian radio noted on December 

18, following the U.S. military victory in Afghanistan, 

“some political observers say that the aim of the U.S. 

diplomatic activities in the region is to carry out certain 

parts of U.S. foreign policy, so as to expand its sphere 

of influence in Central Asia and the Caucasus, and 

this is to lessen Russia’s traditional influence in the 

region.”25

A second problem in post-9/11 Russian-Iranian 

relations dealt with the Caspian Sea. When, again due 

to Iranian obstinacy, the April 2002 Caspian summit 

failed, Putin moved to assert Russian authority in 

the Caspian. This took three forms. First was a May 

2002 agreement with Kazakhstan to develop jointly 

the oil fields lying in disputed waters between them; 

second, a major Russian naval exercise took place in 

the Caspian in early August 2002 with 60 ships and 
16

10,000 troops and was witnessed by Russian defense 

minister Sergei Ivanov. The exercises took place on the 

280th anniversary of Peter the Great’s naval campaign 

in the Caspian, both Kazakhstan and Azerbaizhan 

participated, and Putin called the purpose of the 

exercise ”part of the war against terrorism.”26 Third, in 

September 2002 Putin and Azeri leader Gaidar Aliev 

signed an agreement dividing the seabed between 

them but holding the water in common.27

Iran, however, sought to demonstrate that it 

would not be cowed by the Russian military move, 

and in September 2003, while Iranian foreign ministry 

spokesman Hamid-Reza Asefi was stressing that the 

militarization of the Caspian Sea would never ensure 

the security of littoral states, Iran launched its “Paykan” 

missile boat into the Caspian “to protect the interests 

of the Iranian nation.”28

Nuclear Issues Take Center Stage 

in the Relationship—2002-05. 

Interestingly enough, while Russian-Iranian tension rose over the Caspian, Russian nuclear reactor 

sales and arms sales continued. In July 2002, just a 

few weeks before the major military exercises on the 

Caspian, Moscow announced that not only would 

it finish Bushehr (despite U.S. opposition), but also 

stated that it had begun discussions on the building of 

five additional reactors for Iran.29 It remained unclear 

at the time, however, whether the spent fuel would be 

sent back to Russia so that it could not be made into 

nuclear weapons.

As Moscow stepped up its nuclear sales to Tehran, 

the United States sought to dissuade Russia through 

both a carrot-and-stick approach, threatening on the one 
17

hand to withhold $20 billion in aid for the dismantling 

of the old Soviet military arsenal, while also promising 

$10 billion in additional aid for Moscow.30 Meanwhile, 

support for the Chechens (who had seized a theater 

in Moscow in October 2002) by Iranian newspapers, 

including those close to Khameini, raised questions 

in the minds of at least some Russians as to whether 

Moscow was backing the wrong side in the U.S.-Iranian 

dispute over the Iranian nuclear program.31

There appear to be four central reasons for Moscow’s 

unwillingness to cooperate with Washington on the 

nuclear issue. First, the sale of the reactor earns hard 

currency for Russia, and Putin cannot be sure that, 

even if President Bush promised large sums of money 

to Russia, the U.S. Congress would allocate them in a 

time of escalating U.S. deficits. Second, once the first 

reactor begins operating, Iran has hinted repeatedly to 

Moscow that it will purchase a number of additional 

reactors. Third, the Bushehr reactor, and the factories 

in Russia which supply it, employ a large number of 

Russian engineers and technicians and thus help keep 

Russia’s nuclear industry alive—something Putin 

hopes will help not only earn Russia much needed hard 

currency, but also help in the high tech development 

of the Russian economy. Fourth, by standing firm 

on Bushehr, Putin could demonstrate to domestic 

audiences Russia’s independent policy vis-à-vis the 

United States, as both the Duma and presidential 

elections neared.

Yet such a policy held dangers for Moscow. 

First, as noted above, it served to alienate the United 

States, despite constant Russian protestations that 

the Bushehr reactor would only be used for peaceful 

purposes. Second, especially as revelations emerged 

about the extent of the Iranian nuclear program, 
18

Moscow ran the danger that either the United States or 

Israel might attack the Bushehr reactor. The problem 

became especially serious for Russia in December 

2002 when a series of satellite photographs revealed 

that, in addition to Bushehr, Iran was building two 

new nuclear facilities, one a centrifuge plant near the 

city of Natanz and the other a heavy water plant near 

the city of Arak.32 Initially Russia downplayed the 

development, with Director of Minatom Alexander 

Rumantsev stating that the photos were not sufficient 

to determine the plants’ nature, and, in any case, the 

Russians had nothing to do with the two plants. Other 

representatives of Minatom said Russia was ready to 

supply the long-awaited nuclear fuel to Tehran—but 

only if the Iranians guaranteed the return of the spent 

fuel to Moscow. Rumyantsev, however, said Russia 

was ready, without conditions, to supply nuclear 

fuel.33

By February 2003, however, Rumyantsev was 

hedging his position, noting “at this moment in time 

Iran did not have the capability to build nuclear 

weapons.”34 By March 2003, with an UN International 

Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) team visiting the two 

plants, Rumyantsev had changed his position further 

and asserted that Russia could not tell whether Iran was 

developing nuclear weapons secretly: “While Russia 

is helping Iran build its nuclear plant (at Bushehr), it 

is not being informed by Iran on all the other projects 

currently underway.”35 Following its initial successes 

in the Iraq war, the United States stepped up its 

pressure on Russia to halt the Iranian nuclear weapons 

program. In response, Russian Foreign Minister Igor 

Ivanov noted in an Interfax interview at the end of 

May 2003 that Russia wanted all Iranian nuclear 

programs to be under the supervision of the IAEA.36 
19

Then, following the Bush-Putin talks in St. Petersburg 

in early June 2003 when President Bush was at the 

height of his international influence following the fall 

of Baghdad, Putin asserted that the positions of Russia 

and the United States on Iran were closer than people 

thought. However, he added that “the pretext of an 

Iranian nuclear weapons program (could be used) as 

an instrument of unfair competition against Russian 

companies.”37

By early June 2003, it appeared that the United 

States was making two demands on Russia, vis-à-vis 

the Bushehr reactor. First, while the United States 

wanted Russia to end all support for Bushehr, at the 

minimum, it argued that Moscow should not supply 

any nuclear fuel to the Bushehr reactor unless Iran 

agreed to send all used fuel back to Moscow. Second, 

Moscow should also withhold the nuclear fuel until 

Iran signed an additional protocol with the IAEA 

permitting that agency unannounced visits to all Iranian 

nuclear facilities. On the latter issue, both the G-8 (of 

which Russia is a member) and the EU also pressured 

Iran. Indeed, the G-8 statement issued in early June 

noted: “We urge Iran to sign and implement the IAEA 

Additional Protocol without delay or conditions. We 

offer our strongest support to comprehensive IAEA 

examination of this country’s nuclear program.”38

The question, of course, was not only how far Iran 

would go to comply, but how far Russia would go to 

pressure Iran. In this, there appeared to be some initial 

confusion in Moscow. While British Prime Minister 

Tony Blair asserted that Moscow had agreed not to 

deliver nuclear fuel until Iran signed the IAEA protocol, 

Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman Alexander 

Yakovenko stated that Moscow would only freeze 

construction on the Bushehr plant if Iran refused to 
20

agree to return all spent nuclear fuel to Russia, and that 

Iran was not required to sign the protocol because “the 

protocol is an agreement that is signed on a voluntary 

basis.”39

Meanwhile, perhaps to deflect some of the U.S. 

pressure, Minatom Minister Alexander Rumyanstev 

announced on June 3, 2003, that the Bushehr reactor 

would be completed in 2005, not 2004 as originally 

planned. While he blamed the delay on the need to 

replace the reactor’s original German parts, it could 

well be that this was an important gesture to the 

United States.40 Then on September 12, 2003, the IAEA, 

of which Russia is a member, gave Tehran a deadline 

of October 31 to provide full information about its 

nuclear program to show that it was not building 

nuclear weapons secretly, and furthermore urged Iran 

to freeze its uranium enrichment program. While the 

tough wording of the message prompted the walkout 

of the Iranian delegation from the Vienna IAEA 

meeting, the question now became how Russia would 

react to the situation. Interestingly enough, at the time, 

Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Kislyak tried 

to soft pedal the IAEA report by saying Iran should 

not see the October 31 deadline as “an ultimatum.”41

However, in September a dispute between Russia 

and Iran had broken out over who would pay for the 

return of the spent fuel from the reactor, with Iran 

demanding that Russia pay for it and Moscow refusing. 

Complicating matters further for Putin on the eve of 

his visit to the United States in late September, was 

the U.S. sanctioning of a Russian arms firm (The Tula 

Instrument Design Bureau) for selling laser-guided 

artillery shells to Iran.

Fortunately for Putin, President Bush’s position 

at the time of the summit was weaker than it had 
21

been when the two leaders last met in June. Guerrilla 

warfare had erupted in Iraq, and the United States 

was beginning to have trouble dealing with it. Indeed, 

Washington had turned to other governments as well 

as to the UN in an effort to get additional troops, along 

with monetary aid, to rebuild Iraq. Together with the 

sputtering American economy, Iraq had become a major 

issue in U.S. politics, as Bush’s standing in the U.S. polls 

had begun to drop. Consequently, while Bush raised 

the issue of Iran with Putin, the most he could extract 

from the Russian leader was the somewhat vague 

statement that “It is our conviction that we shall give a 

clear but respectful signal to Iran about the necessity to 

continue and expand its cooperation with the IAEA.”42

In addition, Bush proved unable to get Putin to agree 

to cease construction on the Bushehr reactor.

The ball, however, was taken out of Moscow’s 

hands by the EU, which sent a delegation to Tehran 

in late October 2003. The delegation succeeded in 

extracting from Iran (which at the time may have still 

feared a U.S. attack), in return for a promise of high-tech 

cooperation, an agreement to stop enriching uranium 

temporarily and to sign the additional protocol, as 

well as to inform the IAEA of its past nuclear activities. 

Moscow hailed the Iranian action, and the head of the 

Iranian Security Council, Hassan Rowhani, came to 

Moscow on November 11 to announce formally that 

Tehran was temporarily suspending the enrichment of 

uranium and was sending that day a letter to the IAEA 

agreeing to the additional protocol.43 Moscow exploited 

the visit, saying that Iran was now in full compliance 

with the IAEA, and Putin said that now Russia and Iran 

would continue their nuclear cooperation.44 Indeed, 

Foreign Ministry spokesman Alexander Yakovenko, 

eyeing the possibility of the sale of additional reactors 
22

to Tehran (something discussed during the Iranian 

delegation’s visit), said Russia would now “do its 

utmost to expedite the completion of Bushehr.”45

In part because of Russian (and EU) pressure, the 

Board of Governors of the IAEA in November 2003 

decided not to refer Iran’s nuclear program to the 

UN Security Council. Nonetheless, it did warn Iran 

against developing nuclear weapons and threatened 

to consider “all options available” if Iran continued 

to conceal information about its nuclear facilities.46

The United States took a tougher stance with John 

Bolton, then Undersecretary of State for Arms Control 

and International Security, warning that the United 

States was ready to use all options against rogue states 

believed to be developing weapons of mass destruction. 

Bolton also voiced skepticism that Iran would abide by 

its commitments to the IAEA.47

Bolton’s skepticism soon proved to be well-taken 

because, less than 2 months later, revelations about 

Pakistan’s nuclear proliferation policies, including to 

Iran, led IAEA Chief Mohammed ElBaradei to warn 

about the collapse of the nonproliferation system. The 

United States then called for closing a loophole in the 

nuclear nonproliferation treaty to prevent countries, 

such as Iran, from acquiring materials for their national 

atomic energy programs that could be used to build 

nuclear weapons.48 In addition, IAEA inspectors found 

that Iran had hidden (and not told the IAEA about), 

among other things, an advanced P-2 centrifuge system 

that could be used for enriching uranium, along with a 

program for producing polonium 210 which could be 

used as a neutron initiator for nuclear weapons.49

Meanwhile, as these revelations emerged, Moscow 

seemed confused on how to react. Minatom’s Deputy 

Minister, Valery Govorukhin, played down ElBaradei’s 
23

warning of the possible collapse of the international 

nuclear non-proliferation system, and hailed Iran’s 

cooperation with the IAEA.50 By contrast, however, his 

superior Alexander Rumyantsev, supported ElBaradei, 

calling the situation ”extremely unpleasant” and went 

so far as to say that Russia, along with other countries, 

was going to give “active consideration as to whether 

work on the establishment of national fuel cycles should 

be terminated in non-nuclear countries”51—something 

that would strike a serious blow against Iran’s nuclear 

aspirations.

Consequently, the central factor in Russian-Iranian 

relations in 2004 was the question as to when Russia 

would complete the Bushehr nuclear reactor. While 

there was progress on coordinating electricity grids 

via Azerbaidzhan, trade increased to $2 billion per 

year, and Tehran and Moscow negotiated on further 

arms and civilian plane sales, as well as on the Russian 

launch of an Iranian satellite,52 Bushehr dominated the 

discourse as Iran increasingly clashed with IAEA. Even 

the division of the Caspian Sea, the other “hot button” 

issue in the Russian-Iranian relationship, seemed to be 

put on hold during this period, with Russian Foreign 

Minister Sergei Lavrov noting in October 2004 that the 

Caspian Sea littoral states had only agreed on parts of 

8 of the 33 articles of the proposed Caspian Sea Legal 

Regime.53

Moscow’s dilemma was basically two-fold. 

Throughout 2004, either the IAEA continued to find 

that Iran was hiding information about its nuclear 

activities, or Iran was reneging on agreements it already 

had made with the IAEA and/or the EU-3 (Germany, 

France, and England). This, in turn, brought heavy 

U.S. pressure on Russia to hold off supplying nuclear 

fuel to the Bushehr reactor project, lest Iranian efforts 
24

to develop a nuclear bomb be enhanced. Increasingly, 

as 2004 wore on, the Russian leaders appeared to be at 

least somewhat persuaded by the U.S. argument and 

their criticism of Tehran mounted.

In April Iran informed the IAEA that it intended 

to begin testing at its uranium conversion facility of 

Isfahan, after which it began to convert small amounts 

of natural uranium into uranium hexaflouride, the 

feed material used in centrifuges—an action that was 

a clear violation of the agreement signed with the EU3 in October 2003.54 Despite being criticized for this 

at the IAEA June 2004 Board of Governors meeting, 

Iran then notified the IAEA that it intended to resume 

manufacture of centrifuge components as well as to 

test and assemble centrifuges. This led the IAEA in 

September to threaten to refer Iran to the UN Security 

Council if Tehran did not restore full suspension of its 

enrichment programs, as well as grant IAEA inspectors 

access to Iranian nuclear facilities, and explain to the 

IAEA the extent and nature of Iran’s uranium enrichment processing, specifically the role of P-2 centrifuges. What happened next was almost a repeat of 

the events in the Fall of 2003 when the IAEA urged 

Iran to freeze its enrichment program and allow IAEA 

inspections, and the EU-3 followed up with negotiations 

that led to an apparent agreement with Tehran to 

promise to stop enriching uranium temporarily in 

return for a promise of trade cooperation. Thus on 

November 15, 2004, a preliminary agreement was 

reached to this effect, only to have Iran attempt to back 

off from it by asserting its right to keep 20 centrifuges 

for research. 

At the end of November, however, Iran dropped 

this demand and signed an agreement with the EU3 to suspend all enrichment related and reprocessing 
25

activities “on a voluntary basis,” which included 1) the 

manufacture and import of gas centrifuges and their 

components; 2) the assembly, installation, testing, or 

operation of gas centrifuges; and 3) undertaking any 

plutonium separation, or the construction or operation 

of any plutonium separation installation, as well as 

all tests or production at any conversion installation. 

According to the agreement, Iran’s suspension “will 

be sustained while negotiations (with the EU-3) 

proceed on a mutually acceptable agreement on longterm arrangements.” In return, the EU set up working 

groups with Iran on 1) political and security issues; 

2) technology and cooperation; and 3) nuclear issues, 

with all working groups to report by March 15, 2005. 

The goal of the EU-3 was to have Iran permanently 

suspend its enrichment activities and end its nuclear 

fuel cycle program, and the EU was prepared to offer 

Iran guarantees of fuel supply and management for 

Iran’s nuclear power program and also to help Iran 

acquire a light-water research reactor if Iran cancelled 

its plans to build a heavy-water research reactor.55

Almost immediately, however, Iran seemed to back 

off from the agreement, with Hassan Rowhani, Iran’s 

chief negotiator, saying at a news conference, “The 

length of the suspension will only be for the length of 

the negotiations with the Europeans and . . . must be 

rational and not too long. We’re talking about months, 

not years.”56

As these events unfolded, Russia was presented 

with a dilemma. On the one hand, as in 2003, the EU3 deflected pressure from Russia and helped prevent 

not only a referral of Iran’s nuclear program to the UN 

Security Council, but also possible U.S. and/or Israeli 

military action against Iran’s nuclear installations. 

Indeed, Moscow could only welcome United Kingdom 
26

(UK) Foreign Minister Jack Straw’s comments that 

force should not be used against Iran under any 

circumstances.57 On the other hand, Moscow faced the 

possibility that, despite Iran’s constant backsliding, 

the EU-3 Iran agreement of November 30, 2004, might 

actually take hold and, if so, the EU states could become 

competitors in Iran’s nuclear market.58

In any case, what was clear was that, as Iran 

throughout 2004 was seeking to wiggle out of its 

commitments to the IAEA and EU-3, Moscow 

appeared to take an increasingly tough tone with 

Tehran on nuclear issues. Thus Putin, in June 2004, 

threatened that “Russia will halt its work at Bushehr 

if Iran refuses to behave in an open manner and fails 

to comply with the IAEA’s demands.”59 Similarly, 

when meeting with French leader Jacques Chirac and 

German leader Gerhard Schroeder in September, Putin 

stated Russia’s opposition to an “expansion of the club 

of nuclear powers, notably through the addition of 

Iran.”60 Then, in commenting on the tough September 

IAEA resolution, Rumyantsev stated, “It is balanced 

and serves the interests of all parties.”61

While Russia proved supportive of the EU-3 

negotiations with Iran, it reportedly opposed Iranian 

efforts to get the 20 centrifuges excluded from the 

agreement, something that was reported negatively 

by the Iranian news agency, Mehr.62 Putin himself, 

as the final negotiations with the EU-3 wound down, 

made a not-so-veiled warning to Iran, stating “We are 

engaged in bilateral negotiations with Iran. We are 

helping it use nuclear power for peaceful purposes. 

If final agreements are achieved, we will continue 

this cooperation.”63 Then, when the agreement was 

reached at the end of November and the subsequent 

IAEA report took a relatively tough stand against Iran, 
27

Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Kislyak told Interfax 

that not only did Russia praise the IAEA resolution as 

“well balanced,” but “we also temporarily welcome 

Iran’s decision to freeze all uranium enrichment 

programs. This is a voluntary, trust building measure. 

We hope this decision will be reliably fulfilled.”64 The 

Russian Foreign Ministry, in a statement issued after 

the IAEA resolution, reinforced Kislak’s words, noting: 

“a full and sustained fulfillment of this voluntary 

undertaking, with due monitoring on the part of the 

IAEA essential for the settlement of remaining issues 

regarding Iran’s nuclear program.”65

Moscow’s Changed Position—2005-06. 

Moscow’s sharp rhetoric vis-à-vis Tehran began 

to fade in 2005. As mentioned above, in the latter part 

of 2004, Putin had suffered a number of embarassing 

failures, both internally and externally. The debacle 

in Beslan demonstrated just how far Putin was from 

“normalizing” the situation in Chechnya, and the 

pro-Western “Orange Revolution” in the Ukraine, 

apparently indicating the defection of Russia’s most 

important CIS neighbor, underscored the weaknesses 

of Russian foreign policy. Consequently, Putin seems 

to have decided that he had to demonstrate both his 

own, and Russia’s, continuing importance in world 

affairs; asserting Russia’s role in the Middle East and 

reinforcing his alliance with Iran were ways to do 

this.66 In the case of Iran, the process included inviting 

Iran to join the Shanghai Cooperation Organization 

as an observer, and also inviting it to join the planned 

Caspian Sea security organization. (Iran, under heavy 

pressure both from the United States and the European 

Union eagerly accepted both invitations.) The two 
28

countries also stepped up their planning for a NorthSouth transportation corridor through Azerbaidzhan. 

In addition, Moscow launched a satellite for Iran and 

discussed the possibility of the sale of submarinelaunched missiles with a range of 200 kilometers to 

be fitted on the submarines Russia had sold to Iran.67

Should the sale go through, it would complicate greatly 

the activities of the U.S. fleet in the Persian Gulf and 

the Indian Ocean, and be a major blow to U.S.-Russian 

relations.

While all these developments demonstrated a 

reinforced Russian-Iranian tie, the nuclear issue 

continued to occupy first place in the relationship. In 

early 2005, however, Iran increasingly was becoming 

critical of the delay in Russia’s completion of the 

reactor. Indeed, a Keyhan commentary by Mehdi 

Mohammadi in early January 2005 asserted that 

“the breaches of promise, subterfuge, and mischiefmaking of the Russians in the field of peaceful nuclear 

cooperation with the Islamic Republic of Iran is now a 

repeated saga.”68 Whether or not the Iranian criticism 

was an important factor in Putin’s decisionmaking 

is not yet known. However, Putin did realize that 

to cement the relationship with Iran (which he saw 

as a foreign policy priority for reasons mentioned 

above) he had to finalize the nuclear fuel agreement. 

Consequently, in late February 2005, Russia signed 

the final agreement for the supply of nuclear fuel to 

the Bushehr reactor.69 Under the agreement, all spent 

fuel was to be returned to Russia, thus, in theory at 

least, preventing its diversion into atomic weapons. 

The agreement came after a Bush-Putin summit in 

which the United States and Russia pledged to work 

together against nuclear proliferation,70 and, as might 

be expected, the United States took a dim view of the 
29

Russian-Iranian agreement. Perhaps emboldened by 

the agreement with Russia, Iran’s then chief nuclear 

negotiator, Hassan Rowhani, warned that Iran would 

never cease enriching uranium permanently, and if 

the United States sought sanctions at the UN Security 

Council, “The security and stability of the region would 

become a problem.” Rowhani also stated that Iran was 

not happy with the pace of negotiations with the EU-3, 

and threatened to end them if there was no progress.71

Meanwhile, as the United States increasingly 

became bogged down in Iraq, it appeared to back off 

somewhat from its confrontation with Iran over the 

nuclear issue. Thus in mid-March 2005, the United 

States agreed to join the EU in offering economic 

incentives to Iran if it gave up its nuclear program.72

At the same time, however, an Iranian presidential 

campaign was underway. While both the United States 

and the EU-3 hoped that the victor would be former 

Iranian President Hashemi Rafsanjani, whom they felt 

they could make a deal with, to their surprise an Islamic 

hard-liner, Mahmud Ahmadinezhad, the Mayor of 

Tehran, was elected president. Consequently when 

the EU-3 presented its proposal to Ahmadinizhad’s 

government on August 5, 2005, it was contemptuously 

rejected as a “joke.”73 The proposal called for a longterm EU-Iranian relationship which combined security 

and economic incentives, including giving Iran access 

to international technologies for light-water reactors, 

in return for Iran agreeing not to withdraw from the 

nuclear nonproliferation treaty and keeping all Iranian 

nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards.74 The Iranian 

rejection may have been encouraged by a leaked U.S. 

intelligence report in the Washington Post on August 

2, 2005, which asserted that Iran was 10 years away 

from acquiring a nuclear weapon.75 The Iranians 
30

may well have seen the leak as an effort by the Bush 

administration to deflect public pressure to take action 

against Iran by demonstrating that Iran would not have 

the bomb for a decade. In any case, an emboldened 

Iran, led by its hard-line president who appeared to 

have the support of Iran’s supreme religious leader, 

the Ayatollah Khamenei, not only rejected the EU 

proposal but also announced it was resuming work 

at the uranium conversion plant at Isfahan, where 

it would transform uranium into nuclear fuel.76 An 

angered EU-3 then cancelled further talks with Iran, 

and the issue was referred to the IAEA.77

As these events were transpiring, Russia sought to 

defuse the crisis, with the Russian Foreign Ministry 

issuing a statement on August 9 which asserted that 

“it would be a wise decision on the part of Iran to 

stop enriching uranium and renew cooperation with 

the IAEA.”78 Iran did not heed the Russian request, 

however, and international pressure on Iran grew 

at the end of August, with French President Jacques 

Chirac warning that Iran would face censure by the 

UN Security Council if it did not reinstate a freeze on 

sensitive nuclear activities.79 Russia, however, was 

now in a protective mode vis-à-vis Iran and chose not 

to go beyond its verbal call for Iran to stop enriching 

uranium. Thus on September 5, 2005, the Russian 

Foreign Ministry stated it was opposed to reporting 

Iran to the UN Security Council.80

However, Russia was discomfitted by the speech 

Ahmadinezhad gave at the UN in mid-September. 

Instead of diplomatically trying to assuage the 

opponents of Iran’s nuclear program, he delivered a 

fiery attack on the United States and Israel, going so 

far as to claim that the United States was poisoning its 

own troops in Iraq, while at the same time asserting 
31

that Iran would never give up its plans to enrich 

uranium.81 This speech placed Iran on the defensive 

as the members of the IAEA met in late September to 

decide what to do about its nuclear program. At the 

beginning of the meeting, Russia again asserted its 

opposition to referring Iran’s nuclear program to the 

UN Security Council, with the Russian Foreign Ministry 

issuing a statement that it considered proposals that 

Iran’s nuclear programs be referred to the council 

to be “counterproductive and nonconducive to the 

search for a solution to the problem by political and 

diplomatic methods.”82 Nonetheless, following a 

heated debate, Russia (along with 11 other countries) 

chose to abstain on an IAEA resolution, which passed 

22-1 that found that Iran’s “failures and breaches . . . 

constitute noncompliance with Iran’s agreement to let 

the international body verify that its nuclear program 

is purely peaceful.” The resolution went on to state 

that the “absence of confidence that Iran’s nuclear 

program is exclusively for peaceful purposes has given 

rise to questions that are within the competence of the 

Security Council.” The resolution further called on 

Iran to resuspend conversion of uranium at its Isfahan 

plant and asked Tehran to return to negotiations with 

the EU-3.83

Russian behavior at the IAEA meeting illustrated 

Moscow’s ongoing dilemma in dealing with Iran. 

While Moscow did not want Iran to acquire nuclear 

weapons, it also did not want sanctions brought 

against one of its closest allies, who was also a very 

good customer, buying not only the Bushehr nuclear 

reactor (and possibly more in the future), but military 

equipment as well. Consequently, since the IAEA 

resolution did not call for sanctions explicitly, Moscow 

could perhaps claim a victory, while at the same time 
32

it did not alienate the EU-3, with which it was seeking 

increased economic and political cooperation, or the 

United States. Nonetheless, by this time the United 

States was again seeking action against Iran, and U.S. 

Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice traveled to Russia 

in mid-October 2005 to try to gain Russian support for 

sanctions. However, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei 

Lavrov stated that Russia wanted to pursue negotiations 

in the IAEA rather than go to the UN Security Council, 

noting “We think that the current situation permits us 

to develop this issue and do everything possible within 

the means of this organization [the IAEA] without 

referring this issue to other organizations, so far.”84

Putin echoed Lavrov’s position in a telephone call to 

Ahmadinezhad in which he reportedly stated: 

The need was stressed for decisions on all relevant 

issues to be made using political methods within the 

legal framework of the IAEA. In connection to this, the 

Russian President advocated the further development 

of Iran’s cooperation with the IAEA, including with the 

aim of renewing the negotiations process.85

With these statements, Russia had come down 

strongly on the side of Iran in its conflict with the EU3 and the United States; because without the threat 

of sanctions, there would be little incentive for Iran 

to change its policy. Nonetheless, Iran was to prove a 

difficult ally for Russia. With Russian Foreign Minister 

Lavrov on a visit to Israel as part of his post-Israeli Gaza 

disengagement trip to the Middle East, Ahmadinezhad, 

in a speech to Iranian students on October 26 at a 

program called “A world without Zionism,” stated not 

only that Israel “must be wiped off the map,” but also 

that any country which recognizes Israel (presumably 

including Russia) “will burn in the fire of the Islamic 

nation’s fury.”86
33

A discomfitted Lavrov stated: “What I saw on CNN 

is unacceptable. We will convey our standpoint to the 

Iranian side. We’re inviting the Iranian ambassador 

to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and will ask him to 

explain the motives behind this kind of statement.” 

He also noted that these kinds of statements “do not 

facilitate the efforts of those who want to normalize the 

situation surrounding Iran.”87

Two days later, however, while in Jordan, Lavrov 

changed his tone, stating “our position on Iran remains 

unchanged. We favor cooperation through the IAEA 

in dealing with problems related to the Iranian nuclear 

program.”88

In the period between the two IAEA conferences, the 

Iranian record of compliance with IAEA directives was 

mixed. On the one hand, Iran, in addition to offering to 

resume negotiations with the EU-3, made a gesture to 

the IAEA by giving it access to a building at Parchin that 

the IAEA inspectors had wanted to enter. In addition, 

the IAEA was allowed to interview Iranian specialists, 

and Iran also handed over additional documents to 

the IAEA.89 However, in one of the documents it was 

revealed that rogue Pakistani nuclear scientist, Abdul 

Khan, had provided Iran technical data to enable it to 

cast “enriched, natural, and depleted uranium metal 

into hemispheric forms” that would help Iran fit a 

nuclear warhead onto its missiles. In commenting on 

this development, former nuclear inspector David 

Albright said the design is “part of what you need . . . to 

build a nuclear weapon. Although it’s not a ‘smoking 

gun’ proving Iran was developing nuclear weapons, 

the find cast doubts on previous Iranian assertions that 

it had no documents on making such arms.”90

Tehran’s decision to reprocess another batch 

of uranium at its Isfahan nuclear facility further 
34

complicated Iran’s position as the IAEA meeting 

neared. This brought a negative reaction from the 

French Foreign Ministry whose spokesman stated: 

“We consider that this is a decision which does not 

go in the right direction. It does not contribute to 

creating a climate of confidence between Iran and the 

international community.”91 The Iranian Parliament 

then escalated the tension by voting 183 to 14 to stop 

IAEA inspection of its nuclear facilities if Iran were 

referred to the UN Security Council by the IAEA.92

As this situation developed, Moscow continued 

to oppose referring Iran to the UN Security Council, 

although holding out the possibility it could happen. 

Three days before the start of the IAEA meeting, 

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stated, “I do 

not rule out the possibility that the Iranian question 

might be sent to the Security Council if a real threat 

of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 

above all nuclear weapons arises. At the moment we 

do not see such a threat.”93 Moscow also sought to 

defuse the crisis by working out a proposal with the 

EU-3 which would enable Iran to convert uranium 

domestically into uranium hexaflouride gas that 

is the precursor to making enriched uranium. The 

enrichment itself, however, would be done in Russia.94

While the compromise defused the situation so that the 

November 24 IAEA meeting did not refer Iran to the 

UN Security Council, how long Iran would enjoy its 

respite was an open question. First, at the time of the 

IAEA meeting Iran not only did not accept the EU3-Russia compromise agreement, but many Iranian 

officials continued to demand the right to develop a 

full fuel cycle.95 Second, members of the EU warned 

Iran that its time was not unlimited to accept the 

compromise as Peter Jenkins, Britain’s IAEA delegate 
35

stated, “Iran should not conclude that this window 

of opportunity will remain open in all circumstances. 

It won’t be open for a great deal longer.”96 Finally, in 

his report to the IAEA, Director General Mohamed 

ElBaradei, who had just been awarded a Nobel prize, 

urged Iran:

To respond positively and without delay to the Agency’s 

remaining questions related to uranium enrichment, 

and to the additional transparency measures we have 

requested. As I have stated before, these transparency 

measures are indispensable for the Agency to be able to 

clarify remaining outstanding issues—in particular, the 

scope and chronology of Iran’s centrifuge enrichment 

programs. Clarification of these issues is overdue after 

three years of intensive verification efforts.97

Following the IAEA meeting, Russia moved 

much closer to Iran by signing a $1 billion arms deal 

with it, which included $700 million for surface-toair missiles that could be deployed to protect Iran’s 

nuclear installations.98 Such an air defense system, 

once installed, seriously could inhibit a possible U.S. 

or Israeli attack. By moving to help Iran to protect its 

nuclear installations, Moscow sent a clear signal that it 

would stand by Iran, whatever its nuclear policies.

Iran prepared for renewed talks with the EU-3 in 

the aftermath of the Russian arms deal, which clearly 

strengthened Iran’s position and, as noted above, 

appeared to reinforce the Russian commitment to Iran. 

Prior to the meeting, however, Ahmadinezhad once 

again made a highly provocative statement, especially 

for the Europeans, by asserting that the Holocaust was 

a “myth.” Not only the Europeans, but also Moscow 

repudiated the Ahmadinezhad statement.99 To what 

degree the Iranian President’s comments on the 

Holocaust negatively influenced Iran’s negotiations 
36

with the EU-3 is an open question. However, clearly 

Iran’s announcement that it would enrich additional 

uranium in mid-January 2006 effectively ended the 

talks, and the EU-3, drawing increasingly close to the 

United States, called on the Security Council to take 

action against Iran.100

As tensions between Iran and NATO rose, the 

IAEA met in early February 2006, and, noting Iran’s 

unwillingness to provide inspectors with the necessary 

information about its nuclear program, voted 27-3 (with 

5 abstentions) to refer Iran to the UN Security Council 

in March if Tehran failed to “restore the international 

community’s confidence in its nuclear program.”101

While Russia voted for the resolution, the additional 

month before referral to the Security Council was 

aimed at giving Moscow time to win Iran over to its 

plan to enrich Iranian uranium in Russia. Meanwhile, 

Putin, seeking to build-up Russia’s technological base, 

and perhaps also to persuade Iran that it was not 

being singled out for special treatment by the Russian 

proposal, announced a program to make Russia a 

world center for uranium enrichment.102

While Russia was seeking to entice Iran to agree to 

its nuclear enrichment plan, Iran was taking a hard line. 

In response to the IAEA decision to refer Tehran to the 

UN Security Council, Iranian President Ahmadinezhad 

ordered industrial level nuclear enrichment, halted 

surprise visits by the IAEA to its nuclear installations, 

and ordered the IAEA to remove seals and surveillance 

equipment on some of the Iranian nuclear facilities.103

In this chilly atmosphere, Russian-Iranian talks 

began in mid-February. Putin himself noted on 

February 22nd that “the talks are not going easily”104

but expressed optimism that they would be successful. 

Unfortunately, Putin’s optimism proved unfounded as 

the talks collapsed in early March, primarily because 
37

Iran continued to demand the right to enrich uranium 

domestically.105 The failure of the talks placed Iran 

in further diplomatic isolation, and, perhaps for this 

reason, Iran tried once again to negotiate with the EU3. Those negotiations, however, like the previous ones, 

failed, again because Iran refused to stop enriching 

uranium.106

Under these circumstances, it appeared that 

following the March meeting the UN Security 

Council would take up Iran’s nuclear program. While 

ElBaradei’s report to the IAEA did not state conclusively 

that Iran was pursuing a nuclear weapons program, he 

did state: 

Regrettably, however, after three years of intensive 

verification, there remain uncertainties with regard to 

both the scope and the nature of Iran’s nuclear program. 

. . . For confidence to be built in the peaceful nature of 

Iran’s program, Iran should do its utmost to provide 

maximum transparency and build confidence.107

As the time for UN Security Council deliberations 

on Iran neared, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov 

floated the idea of letting Iran do a limited amount 

of nuclear enrichment domestically, while the bulk of 

the enrichment would be done in Russia. While this 

idea appeared to have the endorsement of IAEA Chief 

ElBaradei, U.S. opposition killed it.108

As the issue began to be discussed in the UN Security 

Council, Iran, seeing itself in deepening international 

isolation, tried yet another ploy. This was to offer 

to engage the United States in talks on the rapidly 

deteriorating security situation in Iraq.109 It is possible 

that, by demonstrating flexibility in this area, Iran 

hoped it could delay action against it in the Security 

Council and give Russia diplomatic ammunition to 

use to postpone any sanctions. 
38

Meanwhile, Russia reverted to its traditional policy 

of being willing to criticize Iran publicly for its actions, 

but also being unwilling to support serious action 

against Tehran. Thus on the eve of the UN Security 

Council debate, Lavrov was sharply critical of Iranian 

behavior during its talks with Russia: “We are extremely 

disappointed with Tehran’s conduct during these 

talks. Iran is absolutely failing to help those [parties] 

who are seeking peaceful ways to resolve this problem. 

Contradictory signals are coming from Tehran. One 

day they reject it, the next day they don’t.”110

Despite the criticism, Russia took a strong stand 

against the possible imposition of sanctions against 

Iran during the Security Council talks. The end result 

was a non-binding resolution which, while frequently 

expressing “serious concern” about Iran’s actions (such 

as its resumption of nuclear enrichment and its failure 

to provide the IAEA with requested information) and 

calling for Iran to suspend all nuclear enrichment 

activities, did not contain any threats of sanctions and 

only asked for ElBaradei to report back on Iranian 

compliance in 30 days.111 Indeed, in a follow-up meeting 

in Berlin, Lavrov reiterated the Russian position, stating 

that sanctions could not be used “to solve” the Iranian 

nuclear dispute and asserting that the IAEA had yet to 

provide “decisive evidence” that Iran was developing 

a nuclear weapons program.112

So matters stood until the surprise announcement 

by Ahmadinezhad, on the eve of a visit by ElBaradei 

to Iran to ascertain Iran’s compliance with the 

Security Council resolution, that Iran had succeeded 

in enriching uranium, and “joined the club of nuclear 

countries” by putting into successful operation a 

cascade of 164 centrifuges.113 While this number was 

too small to provide sufficient enriched uranium for a 
39

nuclear weapon, Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization’s 

Deputy Director, Mohamed Saeedi, said that within 

a year the number of centrifuges in operation would 

be 3,000—(in the opinion of most observers, enough 

for a nuclear weapon, if the centrifuges were managed 

competently)—and in the future Iran would bring 

54,000 centrifuges on line.114 Iran also contemptuously 

rejected ElBaradei’s call for Iran to stop its enrichment 

efforts, with Ahmadinezhad asserting that Iran would 

not retreat “one iota” on nuclear enrichment, and 

Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator, Ali Larijani, asserting 

that the UN Security Council proposals were “not very 

important ones.”115 Then, as if to make the situation 

even more tense, Iran announced it was testing the 

sophisticated P-2 centrifuge.116 If successful, the use 

of P-2 centrifuges would enhance Iran’s enrichment 

capability significantly.

These developments once again put pressure on 

Russia to react. A number of Russian officials, such 

as Russia’s Atomic Energy head Sergei Kiriyenko, 

downplayed Iran’s ability to create a nuclear bomb,117

and the Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov called Iran’s 

announcement “a step in the wrong direction.”118

Moscow continued to promote a diplomatic solution 

and oppose sanctions, with Lavrov asserting, “We are 

convinced that neither sanctions nor the use of force 

will lead to a solution of this problem.”119

U.S. patience with Russian policy on Iran, however, 

now appeared to be running out. U.S. Deputy Secretary 

of State Nicholas Burns on April 21 called for Russia to 

stop providing weapons to Iran and to end assistance 

to the Bushehr nuclear project. These demands were 

rejected immediately by Russian officials who stated 

the projects would go on unless the UN Security 

Council imposed sanctions—an unlikely possibility 

given Russian opposition to sanctions.120
40

When the IAEA report came out on April 28, 2006, it 

was highly critical of Iran. The report made five central 

points.

1. During the 30-day period after the UN Security 

Council asked Iran to suspend enrichment, 

Iran built a cascade of 164 centrifuges with an 

enrichment capability of 3.6 percent.

2. Iran was building two additional cascades of 

164 centrifuges each.

3. Iran refused to provide documents about the 

nuclear black market run by A. Q. Khan as they 

related to centrifuges and the building of the 

core of a nuclear weapon.

4. Iran refused to answer questions about the 

experiments it was doing with small amounts 

of plutonium.

5. Iran refused to explain the research it was doing 

on P-2 centrifuges.

The IAEA report concluded that, because of these gaps 

in information “including the role of the military in 

Iran’s nuclear program, the agency is unable to make 

progress in its efforts to provide assurance about the 

absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities 

in Iran.”121

Following the report, the United States and its 

European allies pushed for sanctions against Iran. 

And, as in the past, while calling for Iran to provide 

the necessary information to the IAEA, Russia 

continued to resist sanctions while also opposing any 

kind of military action against Iran. Russia’s new UN 

representative Vitaly Churkin made this point clearly 

following a debate on policy toward Iran at the UN 

Security Council several days after the IAEA report. 
41

He stated, “We are convinced that there is no military 

solution to the problem. However, complicated and 

difficult it may be, a political and diplomatic solution to 

this problem needs to be sought.”122 Meanwhile, in an 

effort to persuade Russia not to support the sanctions 

resolution, Iran dangled a major economic incentive—

the chance to be the preferred bidder on two additional 

nuclear reactors,123 a development that would not only 

earn Russia valuable hard currency, but would also fit 

nicely into Putin’s high-tech economic program. In any 

case, the IAEA report of April 28, 2006, and the Russian 

reaction to it, provide a useful point of departure 

for drawing some conclusions about Russian policy 

toward Iran’s nuclear program under Putin.

CONCLUSIONS

One central conclusion can be drawn from this 

study of Putin’s policy via-à-vis Iran’s nuclear 

program. It is that Moscow, through most of Putin’s 

presidency, has been badly torn between its desire to 

maintain good relations with Iran, on the one hand 

Russia’s diplomatic ally in many sensitive areas of 

Eurasia and a major purchaser of Russian arms (a $1 

billion arms deal was signed just after the November 

2005 IAEA meeting) and nuclear equipment. On the 

other hand, Russia is feeling increasing pressure 

from the international community, especially the EU 

and the United States to prevent Iran from acquiring 

nuclear weapons. Moscow has been on the horns of a 

dilemma on the Iranian nuclear issue because it does 

not want to alienate Iran, but neither does it want to 

alienate the EU or the United States, nor does it wish 

Iran to acquire nuclear weapons as Russian President 

Putin has said on numerous occasions. For this reason, 
42

Russia, until February 2005, sought to chart a middle 

course between Iran and the West seeking to minimize 

the damage to its relations with Iran, while at the same 

time seeking to respond to pressure from the United 

States and EU.

The pressure on Russia came in two forms. First, 

although the United States in particular was unhappy 

with Russia’s decision to construct a nuclear reactor 

for Iran at Bushehr, at the minimum it called for the 

repatriation of the reactor’s spent fuel to Russia, so 

that it could not be diverted into nuclear weapons. 

Russia complied with this request—despite Iranian 

opposition—and an agreement to this effect was 

signed in February 2005. It should also be noted that 

completion of the reactor was delayed repeatedly, 

although to what degree this was due to “technical 

difficulties” or to Russian pressure on Iran to sign the 

fuel repatriation agreement is not yet known. Even 

though the agreement has been signed—in the face of 

U.S. protests—it will be important to monitor closely 

how both Russia and Iran adhere to it given that the 

reactor is now due to become operational in late 2007, 

and that Putin clearly has drawn closer to Iran since 

February 2005 to compensate for his losses in Georgia, 

Ukraine, and Beslan. 

A second area of pressure from the EU and the 

United States has related to Iranian efforts to hide 

parts of its nuclear program, something that became 

evident in December 2002. In the face of U.S. calls to 

impose UN sanctions on Iran, Russia joined with the 

EU to get Iranian acceptance of the additional protocol 

to the nuclear nonproliferation treaty which allows 

the IAEA to make unannounced inspection visits to 

Iranian nuclear installations.

Nonetheless, as negotiations between the EU-3 and 

Iran faltered in 2005 over a comprehensive agreement 
43

to give Iran economic and security benefits in return 

for abandoning its plans for a full nuclear cycle, there 

were new revelations about Iran hiding parts of its 

nuclear program, and calls were renewed for UN 

sanctions against Iran. Two new developments that 

had coalesced by the Fall of 2005 complicated matters 

for Moscow and exacerbated its problem of choice. The 

first was a marked increase in the level of cooperation 

between the EU-3 and the United States over Iran, along 

with the electoral defeat of German Prime Minister 

Gerhard Schroeder who had opposed U.S. policy on 

Iran. Thus Moscow, for the first time, had to deal with 

a U.S.-EU alignment on Iran. The second factor was 

the election of a hard-line Islamic leader, Mahmud 

Ahmadinezhad, as President of Iran, who not only 

contemptuously rejected the EU-3 plan presented in 

August 2005, but, by threatening to wipe Israel off the 

face of the map and asserting that the Holocaust was 

a “myth,” raised serious questions about what Iranian 

leaders proclaimed were the “peaceful” intentions of 

their nuclear program. The end result was an IAEA 

Board of Governors statement in September 2005 that 

threatened Iran with the possibility of sanctions, a 

statement on which Russia abstained. 

While Russia was able to defer a possible sanctions 

effort against Iran at the November 2005 IAEA meeting 

by negotiating a compromise offer to Iran with the EU3—supported by the United States—which allowed 

Tehran to have its fuel enriched in Russia in return 

for abandoning its plans for a full nuclear cycle, Iran 

has refused to accept the offer, and should it not do 

so, perhaps counting on a U.S. unwillingness to use 

military force against Iran at a time of record high oil 

prices, or hoping for a Russian (or Chinese) veto of a 

UN Security Council sanctions resolution, Russia will 
44

be hard put to decide what to do. While it had sought to 

put that day of decision off as long as possible, the time 

may be coming sooner rather than later when Moscow 

will have to choose between Iran and the West. Indeed, 

Moscow’s behavior before and during the UN Security 

Council’s debate on Iran in March 2006—criticizing Iran 

but opposing sanctions would appear to demonstrate 

that Moscow, while trying to put off a decision as long 

as possible, has now tilted to Iran. Exacerbating the 

situation has been Iran’s mid-April 2006 announcement 

that it is now a nuclear power because it successfully 

enriched uranium by means of a centrifuge cascade, 

and its prohibition on the IAEA from making surprise 

inspections, thus breaking a series of agreements it had 

made with the EU-3, which Russia had supported.

If one looks at Russia’s behavior from the time it 

finally agreed to provide nuclear fuel to the Bushehr 

reactor in February 2005 through its opposing 

sanctions when Iran broke its agreement with the 

EU-3 in August 2005, and later resumed nuclear 

enrichment, along with Moscow’s decision to supply 

sophisticated surface-to-air missiles to protect Iran’s 

nuclear installations in November 2005, it would 

appear that Moscow, despite its rhetoric, has decided 

to acquiesce in Iran’s nuclear program, most probably 

because of Putin’s policy of enhancing Russian prestige 

in the Middle East and elsewhere in the world, at the 

expense of the United States. Russia’s policy, however, 

of dragging out negotiations as long as possible, while 

protecting Iran from sanctions, contains both benefits 

and risks for Moscow. On the benefit side, it certainly 

strengthens Moscow’s relations with Iran, while at the 

same time, by keeping oil prices high, it clearly helps 

the Russian economy. On the negative side, the policy 

carries a number of risks for Putin. First, Iran’s new 
45

President is an Islamic “true-believer.” Unlike his 

predecessors, who were willing to tolerate Russian 

policy in Chechnya where Russian soldiers have killed 

thousands of Muslim Chechens, Ahmadinizhad may 

one day decide that his Islamic beliefs obligate him to 

confront Russia on this issue. Were Iran to be armed 

with nuclear weapons during this confrontation, 

Moscow may wish it had supported sanctions against 

Iran when it had the opportunity. Second, and a more 

immediate concern for Moscow, is that, as Iran draws 

closer to a nuclear weapons capability, the possibility 

of a U.S. (or Israeli) strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities 

increases. Moscow, therefore, soon may be faced 

with the choice of agreeing to limited sanctions or 

acquiescing in another U.S. attack on one of its allies. 

Whether Putin would be able to finesse such a choice 

is a very open question.

ENDNOTES

1. Interfax, “Russian Presidential Service Says [Russia is] Ready 

for Nuclear Cooperation with Iran,” October 25, 2005, Foreign 

Broadcast Information Service (FBIS)-Russia, October 26, 2005. 

2. Ibid.

3. Anatoly Medetsky, “Kiriyenko Tapped to Run Rosatom,” 

Moscow News, November 16, 2005.

4. For a study of Soviet policy toward the Iran-Iraq war, see 

Robert O. Freedman, Moscow and the Middle East: Soviet Policy Since 

the Invasion of Afghanistan, Cambridge: Cambridge University 

Press, 1991.

5. The Russian pledge and its later repudiation by Putin are 

discussed in James M. Goldgeier and Michael McFaul, Power and 

Purpose: U.S. Policy Toward Russia After the Cold War, Washington, 

DC: Brookings, 2003.

6. For a detailed discussion of these issues, see Robert O. 

Freedman, Russian Policy Toward the Middle East Since the Collapse 

of the Soviet Union: The Yeltsin Legacy and the Challenge for Putin, 
46

Seattle: Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies, 

University of Washington, 2001.

7. Pavel Felgenauer, “Russia and Iran,” Segodnia, Current 

Digest of the Post Soviet Press (CDSP), Vol. 47, No. 21, May 26, 1995, 

p. 3.

8. Robert O. Freedman, “Russia and Iran: A Tactical Alliance,” 

School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) Review, Vol. 17, No. 

2, Summer-Fall 1997, p. 99.

9. Robert O. Freedman, “Russian-Iranian Relations Under 

Yeltsin,” The Soviet and Post-Soviet Review, Vol. 25, No. 3, 1999, p. 

284.

10. See New York Times, November 18, 1997; and Kommersant 

Daily, January 22, 1998, CDSP, Vol. 50, No. 4, 1998, p. 22.

11. For a study of U.S.-Iranian relations at this time, see 

Robert O. Freedman, “American Policy Toward the Middle East 

in Clinton’s Second Term,” in Stephen J. Blank, ed., Mediterranean 

Security in the Coming Millenium, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic 

Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1999, pp. 371-416.

12. See Yuri Mezliakov, “Legal Status of the Caspian Sea,” 

International Affairs, Moscow, Vol. 45, No. 1, January 1999, p. 37.

13. Viktor Vishniakov, “Russian-Iranian Relations and 

Regional Stability,” International Affairs, Moscow, Vol. 45, No. 1, 

January 1999, p. 152.

14. This was clearly a concern of some of Russia’s Iranian 

specialists. See N. M. Mamedova, “Novii Etap Politichesko Zhizni 

Irana” (“New Stage in the Political Life of Iran”), in Vladimir Isaev, 

ed., Blizhnii Vostok i Sovremennost (The Near East and Modernity), 

Moscow: Institute for the Study of Israel and the Near East, 2000, 

p. 132.

15. For an excellent study of Iranian politics at this time, 

see Shaul Bakhash, “Iran: Slouching Toward the Twenty-first 

Century,” in Robert O. Freedman, ed., The Middle East Enters the 

Twenty-first Century, Miami: University of Florida Press, 2002, pp. 

46-49.

16. Cited in Washington Times, September 8, 2000. For his part, 

Putin had singled out Iran for special mention in his new foreign 

policy doctrine.

17. See Goldgeier and McFaul, p. 302.
47

18. Cited in AFP, February 22, 2001, “Russia Could Earn 7 

Billion Dollars from Arms Sales to Iran,” Russia Today On-line 

News Service, February 23, 2001.

19. Reuters, “Russia May Sign Iran Arms Deal in 2001,” Russia 

Today On-line News Service, February 11, 2001.

20. See Ettela’at, Tehran, “Iran-Russia Discuss Bilateral 

Relations, Regional Cooperation,” March 13, 2001.

21. Itar-Tass, cited in FBIS-Russia, March 12, 2001.

22. Cited in Simon Saradzhyan, “Visiting Khatami to Deal for 

Arms,” Moscow Times, March 12, 2001.

23. Cited in Patrick Tyler, “Russians Question Their Coziness 

with Iran,” New York Times, March 16, 2001.

24. Arif Useinov, “Iranian Gunboat Diplomacy: Tehran Is 

Scaring Investors Away from the Caspian,” Vremia Novostei (News 

of the Times), July 25, 2001, CDSP, Vol. 53, No. 30, pp. 19-20.

25. Radio Iran, “U.S. Military Presence in Central Asia to 

Lessen Russian Influence, December 10, 2001, FBIS-MESA, 

December 18, 2001.

26. Alexander Reutov, “Russia Conclusively Defines Its 

Borders on the Caspian,” Kommersant, September 24, 2002, CDSP, 

Vol. 54, No. 39, p. 17.

27. Ibid, p. 18.

28. Ambo News, September 29, 2003, “Paykan Missile Boat 

Floats in Caspian.”

29. Cited in article by Sergei Leskov, Izvestia, August 1, 2002, 

CDSP, Vol. 54, No. 31, p. 17-18.

30. Ibid, p. 18.

31. Maxim Yugin, “Ayatollahs Support Terrorists,” Izvestia, 

October 31, 2002, CDSP, Vol. 54, No. 44, p. 23.

32. For a useful survey of the Iranian nuclear installations, 

see Joseph Cirincione, et al., Deadly Arsenals: Nuclear, Biological 

and Chemical Threats, second edition, Washington, DC: Carnegie 

Endowment, 2005, ch. 15. See also William Broad and David 

Sanger, “Relying on Computer, U.S. Seeks to Prove Iran’s Nuclear 

Aims,” New York Times, November 13, 2005.

33. See Guy Dinmore, “Russia Ready To Supply N-Fuel to 

Iran,” Financial Times, December 24, 2002.
48

34. Guy Dinmore, “U.S. Raises Fears Over Iran’s Nuclear 

Policy,” Financial Times, February 24, 2003.

35. Cited in Ali Akbar Dareini, “Iran’s First Nuclear Power 

Plant 70 Percent Constructed,” AP report, Washington Times, 

March 12, 2003.

36. Interfax, May 28, 2003, “Moscow-Tehran Cooperation 

Gives No Grounds for Criticism—Russian Foreign Minister,” 

FBIS-Russia Diplomatic Panorama, May 28, 2003.

37. Simon Saradzhyan, “Russia Needs Iran Proof Or 

Incentives,” Moscow Times, June 3, 2003.

38. Cited in New York Times, June 3, 2003, “Primary Points from 

the Statements of the Group of 8.” See also Judy Dempsey, “EU 

Presses Iran on Nuclear Arms,” Financial Times, May 27, 2003.

39. Cited in Vladimir Isachenko, “Russia Will Ship Nuclear 

Fuel to Iran,” Washington Post, June 5, 2003.

40. Ibid.

41. Cited in “World Scene,” Washington Times, September 14, 

2003.

42. Cited in Dana Milbank, “Putin Agrees in Spirit but Little 

Else,” Washington Post, September 28, 2003.

43. Seth Mydans, “Russia Ready to Help Iran with A-plant,” 

New York Times, November 11, 2003.

44. Ibid.

45. Cited in Tehran IRNA, November 13, 2003, “Russian 

Spokesman Calls Meetings with Rowhani ‘Constructive’,” FBISMESA, November 13, 2003.

46. Cited in Judy Dempsey and Guy Dinmore, “Nuclear 

Monitor Compromises on Iran,” Financial Times, November 27, 

2003.

47. Cited in Guy Dinmore, “All Options Are Open, U.S. Warns 

Five ‘Rogue’ Countries,” Financial Times, December 3, 2003.

48. “Stronger non-proliferation treaty sought by U.S.,” 

Financial Times, January 26, 2004.

49. See Scott Peterson, “Evidence of Possible Work on Nukes 

Tests Iran’s Credibility,” Christian Science Monitor, February 26, 

2004; and Carla Anne Robbins, “UN Report Ties Nuclear Program 

to Iran’s Military,” Wall Street Journal, February 25, 2004.
49

50. Cited in Itar-Tass Report, January 27, 2004, “Russian 

Minister Plays Down IAEA’s Nuclear Security Fears,” FBISRussia, January 27, 2004.

51. Cited in Itar-Tass report, February 5, 2004, “Atomic 

Energy Minister Fears Non-Proliferation Safeguards May Fail,” 

FBIS-Russia, February 5, 2004.

52. See Andrey Kioloskov, “Who Is Lighting Up Iran? Energy 

Systems Expand In Synch,” Rossiskaya Gazetza, December 17, 

2004, FBIS-Russia, December 17, 2004, and Tehran IRNA, “Iran 

to Purchase Russian Topolev Passenger Planes,” November 26, 

2004, FBIS-MESA, November 26, 2004. 

53. Cited on Tehran TV, Vision of the Islamic Republic Report, 

October 26, 2004, FBIS-MESA, October 26, 2004.

54. Cited in Paul Hughes, “Iran Says Nuclear Freeze Won’t 

Last Long,” Reuters, November 30, 2004. For an excellent review of 

Iran’s violations, see International Institute for Strategic Studies, 

II Strategic Comments, “Iran’s Nuclear Program: Suspended 

Animation,” Vol. 10, No. 9, November 2004.

55. Ibid.

56. For a Russian view of this possibility, see Arthur Blinov 

and Andrey Vaganov, “Iran-Iraq Slap in Moscow’s Face: Russia 

Sidelined When Questions of Freezing Tehran’s Nuclear Program 

and Writing Off Baghdad’s Debt are Tackled,” Nezavisimaya 

Gazeta, November 23, 2004, FBIS-Russia, November 24, 2004.

57. Straw’s reported comments were: “The prospect of it, war 

against Iran, is inconceivable . . . I don’t see any circumstances in 

which military action would be justified against Iran, full stop.” 

Cited in “Sigh of Relief,” Jordan Times, November 7, 2004.

58. Cited in Dmitry Suslov, “Iranian Draw,” Russky Kuryer, 

June 13, 2004, CDSP, Vol. 56, No. 24, p. 15.

59. Ibid.

60. Cited in Alexei Andreyev, “Sochi Three,” Russky Kuryer, 

September 1, 2004, CDSP, Vol. 56, No. 35, p. 19.

61. Cited in Andrei Zlobin, “Iran Could Face Sanctions,” 

Vremya Novostei, September 20, 2004, CDSP, Vol. 56, No. 38, p. 

22.

62. Mehr News Agency, Tehran, “Russia’s ‘Secret’ Moves 

Against Iran at IAEA Revealed,” November 29, 2004, FBIS-MESA, 

November 29, 2004.
50

63. Interfax, “Putin Says [He] Applauds Iran’s Decision to 

Suspend Uranium Enrichment Programs,” November 25, 2004, 

FBIS-Russia, November 25, 2004.

64. Interfax, “Russian Foreign Ministry Welcomes [Wellbalanced] IAEA Resolution on Iran,” November 30, 2004, FBISRussia, November 30, 2004.

65. Itar Tass, “Russia Hopes Iran to Continue Cooperation with 

IAEA,” November 30, 2004, FBIS-Russia, November 30, 2004.

66. During the early part of 2005, Putin decided to sell surfaceto-air missiles to Syria, and he also visited Egypt, Israel, and the 

Palestinian Authority in April. Russia also protected Syria from 

sanctions because of its behavior in Lebanon, and in 2006, Putin 

invited a Hamas delegation to Moscow—in direct opposition to 

U.S. policy.

67. Kommersant, “Russia Will Equip Iranian Subs with 

Missiles,” July 5, 2005. Cited in Habalar Report, July 6, 2005. See 

also Agenstvo Voyennykh Novostey, “Russian Shipyard Plans to 

Upgrade Iranian Submarines with 200 km Club-5 Missile, FBISRussia, July 6, 2005. The talks continued into 2006.

68. Mehdi Mohammadi, “Gone with the Wind,” Keyhan, 

January 2005, FBIS-MESA, January 9, 2005.

69. Scott Peterson, “Russia Fuels Iran’s Atomic Bid,” Christian 

Science Monitor, February 28, 2005.

70. Peter Baker, “U.S.-Russian Pact Aimed at Nuclear 

Terrorism,” Washington Post, February 24, 2005.

71. Cited in Nazila Fathi, “Iran Says It Won’t Give Up Program 

to Enrich Uranium,” New York Times, March 6, 2005.

72. David Sanger, “U.S. and European Allies Agree on Steps 

in Iranian Dispute,” New York Times, March 11, 2005.

73. Vison of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Tehran, “Iran Foreign 

Ministry Spokesman Dismisses EU Proposal as a ‘Joke’; Notes 

Three ‘Flaws’,” August 7, 2005, FBIS-MESA, August 8, 2005.

74. For the text of the EU proposals, see Mehr News Agency, 

“Full Text of EU Nuclear Proposals,” August 5, 2005, FBIS-MESA, 

August 6, 2005.

75. Cited in Dafna Linzer, “Iran Is Judged 10 Years From 

Bomb,” Washington Post, August 2, 2005.
51

76. Cited in Dafna Linzer, “Iran Resumes Uranium Work, 

Ignores Warning,” Washington Post, August 9, 2005.

77. Kathrin Benhold, “Europeans Call Off Talks as Iran Balks 

on Nuclear Issue,” New York Times, August 24, 2005.

78. RIA, “Russian Foreign Ministry Urges Iran to Stop 

Uranium Conversion Without Delay,” Moscow Times, August 10, 

2005.

79. Elaine Sciolino, “Chirac warns Iran of penalty if it continues 

nuclear work,” New York Times, August 30, 2005.

80. “Russia Opposes Reporting Iran to UNSC,” New York 

Times, September 5, 2005.

81. Cited in Dafna Linzer, “Iran’s President Does What U.S. 

Diplomacy Could Not,” Washington Post, September 19, 2005.

82. Itar Tass, “Russia Opposes Referral of Iran to UN Security 

Council,” September 22, 2005, FBIS-Russia, September 23, 2005.

83. For the full text of the IAEA resolution, see IAEA website, 

“Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic 

Republic of Iran,” Resolution adopted on September 24, 2005.

84. Robin Wright, “Rice is Rebuffed by Russia on Iran,” 

Washington Post, October 16, 2005.

85. Interfax, “Russia: Putin Advocates Iran Developing 

Cooperation with the IAEA, Renewing Talks,” October 25, 2005, 

FBIS-Russia, October 26, 2005.

86. Cited in Nazila Fathi, “Iran’s New President Says Israel 

Must Be Wiped Off the Map,” New York Times, October 27, 2005.

87. Cited in Ivan Groshkov, “Iranian President’s Anti-Israeli 

Remarks Viewed; Deemed Dirty Trick on Lavrov,” Nezavisimaya 

Gazeta, October 30, 2005, FBIS-Russia, November 1, 2005.

88. Cited in Interfax, “Moscow’s Position on Iran Not 

Influenced by Tehran’s Statement,” October 27, 2005, FBIS-Russia, 

October 28, 2005.

89. Statement to the Board of Directors by IAEA Director 

General Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, November 24, 2005, IAEA 

website; and IRNA, “Full text of Iranian Representative’s Address 

to the IAEA Board,” November 25, 2005, FBIS-MESA, November 

27, 2005.

90. Cited in AP Report, “Iran Got Black Market Warhead 

Design—IAEA,” Jordan Times, November 20, 2000. See also 
52

Daphna Linzer, “U.S. Backs Russian Plan to Resolve Iran Crisis,” 

Washington Post, November 19, 2005.

91. Cited in Parisa Hafezi, “Iran Signals Defiance Ahead of 

IAEA Meeting,” Reuters, November 15, 2005. See also Richard 

Bernstein, “Iran Has Resumed Reprocessing Uranium, Diplomat 

Said,” New York Times, November 17, 2005.

92. AP, “Parliament Approves Bill to Block UN Nuclear 

Agency Inspections,” Jordan Times, November 20, 2005.

93. Itar-Tass, “Russia Sees ‘No Reason’ To Refer Iran to UN 

Security Council,” November 21, 2005, FBIS-Russia, November 

22, 2005.

94. Rohan Sullivan, “Bush Backs Putin’s Iran Uranium Plan,” 

AP Report, Moscow Times, November 21, 2005. See also Roula 

Khalaf, “EU-3 Willing to Explore New Iran Nuclear Talks,” 

Financial Times, November 23, 2005.

95. Fars News Agency, “Iran: MP Says Country Must Reject 

Production of Nuclear Fuel in Russia,” November 25, 2005, FBISMESA, November 26, 2005.

96. Cited in George Jahn, “EU Accuses Iran, Warns of 

Sanctions,” AP Report, Washington Times, November 25, 2005.

97. Cited in statement to the Board of Governors by IAEA 

Director General Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, November 24, 2005, 

IAEA website.

98. See Andrew Kramer, “Russia to Sell Anti-Aircraft Missiles 

to Iran in Billion Dollar Deal,” New York Times, December 3, 2005. 

See also Lyuba Pronina, “Moscow Inks Arms Deal with Tehran,” 

Moscow Times, December 5, 2005; and Ria-Novosti “Russian 

Official Says Sales of Tor-MI Missile Systems to Iran to Continue,” 

December 15, 2005, FBIS-Russia, December 16, 2005.

99. Itar-Tass, “Russia: Foreign Ministry Says Iran’s Attempts to 

Revise Holocaust Facts Unacceptable,” December 15, 2005, FBISRussia, December 16, 2005. In denouncing the Admadinezhad 

statement, President of the EU’s Administrative Council Jose 

Manuel Barrosco stated that Iranians “do not have the president, or 

the regime, they deserve. It calls our attention to the real danger of 

that regime having an atomic bomb.” Cited in Ali Akbar Dareini, 

“Iranian President Calls Holocaust a ‘Myth’,” AP/Washington Post, 

December 14, 2005.
53

100. Elaine Sciolino, “Iran Proposes New Talks with Europeans 

Who Are Mostly Dismissive,” New York Times, January 18, 2006.

101. Cited in Artur Blinov, “Tehran Agrees to Talks with 

Moscow,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta, February 6, 2006, CDSP, Vol. 58, 

No. 6, p. 18. See also Michael Adler, “Iran Nuclear Issue to be 

Reported to UN Security Council,” AFP, February 5, 2006, FBIS: 

MESIA, February 6, 2006.

102. Itar-Tass, “Russian Atomic Chief Hopes Iran to be First to 

Join Enrichment Center,” Februry 8, 2006, FBIS-Russia, February 

9, 2006.

103. Blinov; and Ali Akbar Dareini, “Nuclear Inspections are 

Curbed by Iran,” AP/Washington Post, February 6, 2006; and Alissa 

Rubin, “Rejecting Cooperation, Iran Asks IAEA to Remove Seals, 

Cameras,” Los Angeles Times, on-line edition, February 7, 2006.

104. Cited in AP report, “Russia’s Nuke Talks with Iran ‘Not 

Easy’,” Jordan Times, on-line edition, February 23, 2006.

105. Oliver Bullough, “No Nuclear Breakthrough as Iran 

Stands Fast,” AP/Moscow Times, March 2, 2006.

106. Elaine Sciolino, “Iran Softens Tone, But Talks with 

Europeans on Nuclear Program End in Bitterness,” New York 

Times, March 4, 2006.

107. “Introductory Statement to the Board of Governors by 

IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei,” March 6, 2006, 

IAEA website.

108. Elaine Sciolino, “Russia and West Split on Iran Nuclear 

Issue,” New York Times, March 7, 2006; and AFP North European 

Service, “IAEA’s ElBaradei Favors Iran ‘Small-scale’ Nuclear 

Program,” February 16, 2006, FBIS-Russia, February 18, 2006.

109. Michael Slackman and David Sanger, “U.S. and Iranians 

Agree to Discuss Violence in Iraq,” New York Times, March 17, 

2006. Ahmadinizhad’s letter to Bush in early May 2006 may have 

had the same goal.

110. Cited in Neil Buckley, et al., “Moscow May Be Losing 

Patience with Tehran Stance in Nuclear Stand-off,” Financial 

Times, March 14, 2006.

111. The text of the March 29, 2006, statement was published 

in the Washington Post, on-line edition, March 30, 2006.
54

112. Cited in “Big Powers Fail to Agree [on] Iran Strategy,” 

Financial Times, March 31, 2006.

113. Cited in Moscow Times, April 12, 2006.

114. Cited in Mehr News Agency, “Official says Iran Informed 

IAEA of Plan to Complete Natanz Site, 3,000 Centrifuges,” April 

12, 2006, FBIS-MESA, April 13, 2006. See also Henry Mayer, “Iran 

Vows to Boost Uranium Program,” AP/Moscow Times, April 13, 

2006.

115. Cited in AP report, “Iran Rejects UN Request to Halt Its 

Nuclear Activity,” Los Angeles Times, On-line edition, April 14, 

2006. Ahmadinezhad reportedly said, “Our answer to those who 

are angry about Iran achieving the full nuclear cycle is just one 

phrase. We say ‘Be angry at us and die of this anger’.”

116. Cited in Mehr News Agency, “Iran President 

Ahmadinezhad Reveals P-2 Testing by Iranian Scientists,” April 

18, 2006, FBIS-MESA, April 19, 2006.

117. ITAR-TASS, “Russian Atomic Head Says Iran Nuclear 

Problem May Have Diplomatic Solution,” April 14, 2006, FBISRussia, April 15, 2006.

118. Cited in AFP/Reuters report, “World United in Alarm 

Over Iran Nuclear Advance,” Turkish Times, On-line edition, April 

13, 2006.

119. Cited in Simon Saradzhyan, “Russia Seeks Iran 

Diplomacy,” Moscow Times, April 19, 2006.

120. Paul Richter and Kim Murphy, “U.S. Wants Embargo on 

Arms to Iran,” Los Angeles Times, On-line edition, April 22, 2006.

121. Cited in Maggie Farley and Alissa J. Rubin, “UN Nuclear 

Agency Takes Steps Toward Sanctions on Iran,” Los Angeles 

Times, On-line edition, April 29, 2006. See also Elaine Sciolino, 

“UN Agency Says Iran Falls Short on Nuclear Data: Enrichment 

Is Confirmed,” New York Times, April 29, 2006.

122. Cited in ITAR-TASS, “Russia’s UN Envoy Rules Out 

Threat of Force in Iran Resolution,” May 3, 2006, FBIS-Russia, May 

4, 2006.

123. ITAR-TASS, “Russia Ready to Bid for New Iranian 

Nuclear Contracts,” May 2, 2006, FBIS-Russia, May 4, 2006. See 

also Interfax, “Iranian Envoy Says Russian Bid for New Nuclear 

Contracts to be Viewed Favorably,” FBIS-Russia, April 23, 2006.