CSI REPRINT

CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ:

TWO LETTERS ON STRATEGY

Edited and translated by

Peter Paret and Daniel Moran

x A T A TY

50th Anniversarv

V v v i
CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ
CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ
CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ:

TWO LETTERS ON STRATEGY

Edited and translated by

Peter Paret and Daniel Moran

U.S. Army Command and General Staff College

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027-6900
NOTE: The original edited and translated version of Carl von Clausewitz:

Two Letters on Strategy was published earlier by the U.S. Army War College

Art of War Colloquium in November 1984. This edition has retained the

editing style of the original. The present text, however, rejoins the original

letters into whole documents, contradicting what the translators indicate as

their intentions in paragraph 3, "A Note on the Text," page 7. Professor Paret

has granted his kind permission to allow us to revise the first pages of

Clausewitz's text in accordance with the translation found in Peter Paret,

Understanding War: Essays on Clausewitz and the History of Military Power

(Princeton, 1992).

The portrait of Clausewitz is taken from a lithograph in the possession

of Peter Paret. The portrait of Roeder was originally published in the fifth

volume of Kurt von Priesdorff, Soldatisches Fuhrertum, [1938?]. The page of

Clausewitz's letter of 22 December 1827 was first published as an example

of Clausewitz's handwriting in Rudolf von Caemmerer, Clausewitz, Berlin,

1905.

iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

M aps ............................................ vii

Preface .......................................... ix

Introduction (essay by Peter Paret) .................. 1

A Note on the Text ............................... 7

1. The First Problem .............................. 9

2. M s Solution ................................... 11

3. Roeder's Solution .............................. 17

4. Clausewitz to Roeder (22 December 1827) ........ 21

5. The Second Problem ............ ...... . . 45

6. Roeder's Solution ............................ . 47

7. Clausewitz to Roeder (24 December 1827) ........ 51

Copyright © 1984 by Army War College Foundation, Inc.

The introduction, copyright © by Peter Paret, 1984.

v

MAPS

Page

1. The first problem .................. ............ 10

2. M's and Roeder's solutions ..................... 13

3. The second problem ............................ 46

vii
I
PREFACE

This edition of Carl von Clausewitz's Two Letters on

Strategy was made possible by the Army War College

Foundation and by the Art of War Colloquium of the Army

War College, which sponsors the volume as part of its program

of republishing military classics for the professional

development of the officer corps. The Army War College

wishes to express its gratitude to the co-editors and translators,

Professor Peter Paret, Spruance Professor of International

History at Stanford University, and Dr. Daniel Moran.

In recent years, Carl von Clausewitz's On War has attracted

many new readers in this country, stimulated in large part by

the publication in 1976 of a new translation and edition of the

work by Professors Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Generally

readers have concentrated on Clausewitz's philosophy, theory,

and strategic concepts, as developed in Books One, Two, Three,

and Eight of On War. His views on operations, on the other

hand, have been largely neglected. The present work provides

us with an opportunity to study Clausewitz's thinking on

operational issues in a specific strategic context.

Two Letters on Strategy deals with the planning and conduct

of a campaign, based on problems set by the Chief of Prussian

General Staff in 1827. In reading Clausewitz's discussion, we

must remember that he generally used the term "strategy" in its

normal 19th-century connotation, which he himself was

instrumental in establishing-that is the conduct of major

operations and not the more comprehensive definition found in

the Army's Field Manual 100-5.1 Three levels of war are

defined in FM 100-5:

Strategic, operational, and tactical levels are the broad

divisions of activity in preparing for and conducting war.

ix
Military strategy employs the armed forces of a nation to

secure the objectives of national policy by applying force or the

threat of force. Military strategy sets the fundamental conditions

for operations.

The operational level of war uses available military resources to

attain strategic goals within a theater of war. Most simply, it is the

theory of larger unit operations. It also involves planning and

conducting campaigns.2

Clausewitz discusses the operational level of war in Book

Five, Chapter Two of On War, where he relates the factors of

space, mass, and time to theater of operations, the army, and

the campaign.3 He makes the distinction between levels of

military action when he relates them to time and space. He

states, "the concepts characteristic of time -war, campaign and

battle-are parallel to those of space-country, theater of

operations and position... ."4 Clausewitz also says: "Tactically,

every engagement . . . at the strategic level the campaign

replaces the engagement and the theater of operations takes

the place of the position. At the next stage, the war as a whole

replaces the campaign, and the whole country the theater of

operations." 5 Clausewitz, although recognizing the three levels

of war, generally uses the term strategy to describe the

operational level. An outline of his concept of the levels of war

follows:

Classification Time Space

referred to as the the war the country

next stage (strategy)

strategy (operations) the campaign the theater of

operations

tactics (tactics) the battle the position

The terms in parenthesis are used today to describe these

levels.

x
In Book Three, Chapter Two of On War, Clausewitz lists

the elements of strategy: moral, physical, mathematical,

geographical and statistical (logistics). In Book Four, Chapter

One, he calls them the operative elements in war.7 He states

that strategy "presents extraordinary difficulties, and it is fair to

say that very few people have clear ideas about its details." 8

Clausewitz then goes on to list some of the obvious facts about

strategy: "that success is always greatest at the point where the

victory was gained, and that consequently changing from one

line of operations, one direction, to another can best be

regarded as a necessary evil, that a turning movement can only

be justified by general superiority or by having better lines

of communications or retreat than the enemy's; that

flank-positions are governed by the same consideration; that

every attack loses impetus as it progresses." 9 Books Six and

Seven of On War cover the conduct of operations within a

theater, discussing such concepts as base of operations, lines of

communications, and turning movements. Two Letters on

Strategy relates these concepts to a particular campaign plan.

Two Letters on Strategy expands on many of the ideas

expressed in On War, particularly those that deal with campaign

plans. For this reason, Two Letters on Strategy should be of

value to the US Army in its effort to study large unit operations.

This work deals with the positioning and maneuver of corps as

well as the evaluation of campaign plans. Although written for a

hypothetical situation in 1827, the principles discussed are as

timeless as those covered by Clausewitz in On War. The serious

reader must follow the text on the maps at the back of the

volume in order to understand the arguments put forward by

Roeder and Clausewitz. The relationship of time, distance, and

mass in these problems and solutions can only be appreciated

through a knowledge of the geography of this theater of

operation.

xi
References to On War in the introductory material and in

the endnotes are to the revised and expanded edition by

Michael Howard and Peter Paret, published by Princeton

University Press in 1984.

Wallace P. Franz

Colonel, Infantry

US Army War College

May 1984

xii
ENDNOTES

1. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, rev. ed., edited and

translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Princeton

University Press, 1984, p. 70.

2. Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations, Department of

the Army, Washington, D.C., 20 August 1982, p. 2-3.

General Hugo von Freytag-Loringhoven discusses the

levels of war as understood in the German Army at the end of

World War I:

In the German Army, then, starting in the general staff,

the employment of the term 'strategisch' (strategical) has

fallen more and more into disuse. We replace it, as a rule, by

the term 'operativ' pertaining to operations and thereby

define more simply and clearly the difference from

everything that is referred to as 'taktisch' (tactical). All that

pertains to operations as such takes place, on the whole,

independently of actual combat, whereas in the term

'strategisch' (strategical) things become easily confused, as

has been proved by the example of our enemies who are

wont to speak of strategical conditions when it is merely a

question of purely local matters. At any rate, the term

'strategy' ought to be confined to the most important

measures of high command.

Baron von Freytag-Loringhoven, Generalship in the

World War, translated by the Army War College, Washington,

D.C., 1934, p. 34.

3. Ibid., pp. 280-281.

4. Ibid., p. 379.

5. Ibid., p. 358.

xii
6. Ibid.,p.183.

7. Ibid.,p.225.

8. Ibid.,p.70.

9. Ibid., p. 71.

xiv
INTRODUCTION

In 1827 the Prussian general-staff officer, Major von

Roeder, requested Clausewitz's comments on solutions of two

operational problems that had been set by his superior,

Lieutenant-General von Miffling, Chief of the General Staff.

Muffling, best known for his service as Prussian liaison officer

in Wellington's headquarters during the Waterloo campaign,

never freed himself from the cautious strategic concepts current

in the Prussian Army before 1806. Position warfare and the

occupation of territory dominated his thinking, rather than the

defeat of the enemy's forces. But he was an efficient peacetime

chief of staff, who took the training of his officers seriously, and

whose operational exercises, war games on the map and on the

ground, and innovations in communications and map-making,

contributed to the growing professionalization of the general

staff.

At the time, the general staff was still far from the army's

central planning and, in effect, executive organ it became some

forty years later under Moltke. In 1821 it had been detached

from the Ministry of War; but the Chief of Staff continued to

report to the minister on all major business, and his right to

report directly to the monarch was severely circumscribed; he

was still an advisor, who responded rather than initiated. The

staff itself was small for a major power with a peacetime army

of some 127,000 officers and men, which could be expanded to

over 400,000 if the reserves were called up. The central body, or

Great General Staff, in Berlin numbered 19 officers, including

the chief; 27 officers served with the guards, the eight army

corps, and the artillery inspectorate general. Five officers

holding other assignments were attached to the staff and kept

informed of its work, though they participated in it only when

their special expertise was needed. The senior in this group was

Clausewitz, since 1818 Director of the War Academy.

1
Trigonometric and topographic sections, an archive, and a

duplicating office completed the organization.1

Roeder was the head of the General Staffs "Central

Theater of War," the section that dealt with operations against

Austria. Born in 1787, seven years younger than Clausewitz, he

had been Scharnhorst's student at the Academy for Young

Officers in 1804 and 1805, during which time he first met

Clausewitz. After serving in the War of 1806 he resigned his

commission and studied at the Universities of Berlin and

Heidelberg, before re-entering the Prussian Army as a second

lieutenant at the beginning of the Wars of Liberation in 1813.

In the battle of Grossgorschen he was severely wounded, but

recovered to participate in the fighting that autumn and in the

campaign of 1814. During the Hundred Days, Roeder, by then a

captain on the general staff, was assigned to one of the brigades

in III Corps, whose chief of staff was Clausewitz. He fought in

the battles of Ligny and Wavre, in which the corps, by tying

down Grouchy's far stronger force, helped make the victory of

Waterloo possible. After the war Roeder continued to serve as

a general staff officer and royal adjutant until he retired with

the rank of major-general in 1841. Six years later he was

promoted to the nominal rank of lieutenant-general. 2

While not a man of striking originality, Roeder was an

intelligent officer, broadly experienced as a planner and in the

field. His early association with Scharnhorst and other members

of the reform movement left a permanent mark on his ideas

and attitudes. He was one of the men who carried a hint of the

reform era's idealism and independence of judgment to the

army's peacetime routine in the sluggish, conservative decades

after 1815. His memoirs indicate that he looked up to

Clausewitz, who in turn liked him and - as the following letters

show-trusted him sufficiently to express his opinions at length

and frankly, to the point of openly criticizing Miiffling's

operational and strategic views.

2
The problems Muffling assigned to Roeder and others on

the staff toward the end of 1827 were, like the majority of his

exercises, defensive in nature. Prussia had become a major

power, her territory now stretching from the Niemen and the

Republic of Cracow in the east to the Rhine and beyond in the

west; but larger, richer, better armed neighbors lay on her

borders. Neither a preventive strike nor an offensively waged

defensive were part of Miffling's thinking. In any future war, he

expected "an enemy to invade Prussia from west, east, or south.

Political weakness [would] compel Prussia to fight on the

defensive on her own territory."3 Within these constraints,

Roeder worked out his answers, and then forwarded Muffling's

exercises to Clausewitz, together with his solutions and a

solution to the first problem by another officer, who signed

himself merely with the initial M-possibly First-Lieutenant

Count Monts of the Great General Staff.

In a first reply, dated 22 December, Clausewitz critically

discussed the terms of Muffling's problem and then turned to

the solutions by M and Roeder. In a further letter two days

later, he analyzed Miiffling's second exercise and Roeder's

solution. Together the two letters were well over 8,000 words in

length. Clausewitz never found it difficult to express his

thoughts in writing, but the timing of Roeder's request may

have contributed to the extensiveness and thoroughness of his

response. Only a few months earlier he had decided that the

manuscript of On War, which had occupied him for nearly a

decade, should be "thoroughly reworked once more." The

revisions he had in mind, would, he hoped, "bring out the two

types of war with greater clarity at every point." By this he

meant, on the one hand, wars waged for major objectives, which

can be achieved only by the far-reaching destruction of the

enemy's powers and will of resistance; and, on the other,

limited wars waged for limited ends. He also wanted his

revisions to develop more fully another, related point: "that war

is nothing but the continuation of policy with other means."4

Roeder's request thus reached Clausewitz during a period of

3
intense intellectual reappraisal, and he seems to have

welcomed the opportunity to apply his ideas on fundamental

issues of war to specific operational situations. 5

The opening paragraphs of Clausewitz's letter of the 22nd

criticize Miiffling's first problem for its failure to indicate the

political purposes of the antagonists, and to establish the level

of significance the military operations possessed for the

opposing governments. Without this information, sensible

strategic and operational planning was out of the question. That

this was not mere pedantry on Clausewitz's part, that a limited

conflict between Prussia and Austria lay as much in the realm

of the possible as the desperate struggles of the Silesian and

Seven Years Wars, is shown by the Campaign of 1778, the

so-called "Potato War," between the two powers, which

consisted primarily in feints and armed demonstrations while a

diplomatic settlement was worked out. Then, and at all

times, political interest largely determined-or should

determine-the scale and type of military effort. In the rather

casual context of a private letter to a younger comrade,

Clausewitz tests and applies hypotheses that eventually receive

their ultimate formulation in the polished, compact prose of the

revised opening chapter of Book I of On War.

Since Clausewitz wrote in reaction to Muffling's exercises,

his letters focus on problems of defense, a circumstance that led

the German editor, when the letters were published in Berlin in

1937, to give his edition the subtitle Thoughts on Defense.

Actually, their scope is far broader. Among important

themes-besides the political nature of war-are Clausewitz's

arguments for the need for flexible planning, balancing the

geographic, economic, and social givens with the constantly

changing political situation, the strengths and weaknesses of the

political and military leadership, and other imponderables; his

thesis of the reciprocal relationship of attack and defense; his

rejection of Miffling's static doctrine in favor of an aggressive,

active defense. Another recurring theme is the dismissal of pet

4
phrases such as "freedom of action" or "mobile operations,"

which he feared were too often substitutes for hard thinking

about the realities of specific situations.

Today, over a century-and-a-half since the exchange

between Clausewitz and Roeder, we recognize the two letters

as a valuable gloss on major themes of On War. That On War

does not, and should not, contain the kind of extensive,

systematic analysis of a particular operational problem that is

developed in the letters, further increases their significance.

Certainly, in many respects war has changed almost beyond

recognition. But the reader who takes the trouble to imagine

the realities of war at the beginning of the industrial revolution,

will find Clausewitz's analysis interesting in its own terms.

Beyond that, the two letters suggest how Clausewitz might have

dealt with the different and yet related problems of war today

and in the future. If we take account of the technological and

tactical conditions of the 1820s, and think or play through the

strategic and operational solutions Clausewitz proposes to

Roeder, we will find ourselves face to face with the theorist in

his workshop. In new form we encounter, and perhaps come to

understand better, the interaction of practical knowledge,

political and psychological insights, and the ability to abstract

and generalize without ever departing from the hard facts, that

lies at the core of Clausewitz's unique and lasting achievement.

5
ENDNOTES

1. The figures, which do not precisely coincide with the

number of positions authorized at the time, are taken from the

Army List for 1827: Rang- und Quartier-Liste der K6niglich

Preussischen Armee, Berlin, 1827.

2. Roeder's memoirs, Far Euch, meine Kinder!, published

posthumously in Berlin in 1861, are an interesting source for

the conduct of operations in the Prussian army from the

perspective of a junior staff officer. They repeatedly mention

Clausewitz; see, for instance, pp. 56, 305, 306, 314, 315, and 319.

3. Herbert von Bockmann, "Das geistige Erbe der

Befreiungskriege," in Von Scharhorst zu Schlieffen, ed.

Friedrich von Cochenhausen, Berlin, 1933, p. 122. Bockmann's

essay contains a good analysis of Muffling's ideas. See also "C.

v. W." [i.e. Philipp Friedrich Karl von Muffling], Betrachtungen

iiber die grossen Operationen und Schlachten der Feldziige von

1813 und 1814, Berlin and Posen, 1825; and the discussion of

Muffling as Chief of Staff in Kurt von Priesdorff, Soldatisches

Filhrertum, IV, Hamburg, [1937?], pp. 313-18.

4. Carl von Clausewitz, "Note of 10 July 1827," On War,

rev. ed., edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter

Paret, Princeton, 1984, p. 69.

5. For a more extensive discussion of Clausewitz's thinking

at the time he received Roeder's letter, see Peter Paret,

Clausewitz and the State, Oxford and New York, 1976,

pp. 378-81.

6
A NOTE ON THE TEXT

Our edition is based on Zwei Briefe des Generals von

Clausewitz: Gedanken zur Abwehr, a special issue of the

Militnrwissenschaftliche Rundschau, a periodical published by

the Ministry of War and the General Staff of the Army, Berlin,

1937. The editor of the issue was not identified. The originals of

Clausewitz's letters were in the possession of the General

Staff archives (Kriegsarchiv des Grossen Generalstabes,

Manuskripte, Kap. IV, Nr. 243), and disappeared or were

destroyed during the Second World War.

The German edition printed Clausewitz's letters verbatim,

but modernized his orthography and made a few changes in his

punctuation. Miiffling's problems and the solutions by Roeder

and M were partly quoted, partly paraphrased. We have

translated all quoted material, but have restated the

paraphrased passages in our own words.

With some adjustments, we have adopted the German

editor's practice of printing Clausewitz's letters in sections,

each part after the text by Muffling, Roeder, and M to which it

refers.* The arrangement involves neither deletions of, nor

changes in, Clausewitz's wording, but should assist the reader in

following his argument.

Clausewitz's German, though precise and supple, is

sufficiently complex to demand a relatively free translation. He

wrote in the sophisticated idiom of the Goethe period, many of

whose terms and expressions have undergone some change in

meaning in the intervening century-and-a-half, and should not

be translated literally. To convey the logical and rhetorical links

between sentences, which reflect Clausewitz's dialectic, often

*See note on page iv.

7
calls for the substitution of words or the rephrasing of

sentences. In a very few instances, which we mark, we were

unable to resolve an ambiguity of meaning. Occasionally, to

clarify an antecedent or the meaning of a term, we have added

an explanatory word or two in brackets. Several footnotes were

taken over from the 1937 German edition, and identified as

such. The remaining notes, signed "Eds.," are by the present

editors. Italicized words and phrases are Clausewitz's own.

Brief passages from the opening part of Clausewitz's first

letter are quoted in Peter Paret, Clausewitz and the State,

Oxford and New York, 1976, pp. 379-80; and in the same

author's "The Genesis of On War," in Carl von Clausewitz, On

War, rev., ed., edited and translated by Michael Howard and

Peter Paret, Princeton, 1984, p. 7. A longer segment from the

same letter is printed as an appendix in Alexander Atkinson;

Social Order and the General Theory of Strategy, London, 1981,

pp. 284-92, a version that is close to a literal translation and

consequently contains numerous errors and infelicities. These

segments aside, the present edition, to the best of our

knowledge, is the first publication of the material in English.

8
1. THE FIRST PROBLEM

The following conditions should be assumed [map 1]:

Relations between Austria and Prussia are strained.

Saxony is allied to Austria.

Austria has assembled her forces in Bohemia, Moravia,

and her German territories, and established magazines in

Komotau, Aussig, Gabel, Arnau, and Jung-Bunzlau.

Prussia has mobilized the Guards; the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and

6th Army Corps; and the Silesian Division of the 5th Corps. 1

The fortresses at Erfurt, Magdeburg, Wittenberg, Torgau,

Kiistrin, Glogau, Schweidnitz, Silberberg, Neisse, and Kosel are

supplied for six months.

On June 1 news arrives that the Austrian forces on the

Danube have set out for Bohemia. It is certain that Austria will

take the offensive once these units have reached their

destinations. Austrian strength is assumed to be 130,000 men;

Saxon strength, 20,000.

Prussia can put five corps (150,000 men) in the field. An

additional half a corps and some reserve formations will

garrison these fortresses that are threatened.

Prepare a memorandum discussing the following:

a) Possible operations by Austria and her ally.

b) Analysis of these in time and space.

c) Which operation is most dangerous to Prussia?

d) The overall disposition of Prussian forces, from which

each of the Austrian moves can be countered.

e) A detailed assessment of each possible operation,

paying particular attention to the one deemed most dangerous.

9
Ar1

I

o0

10
2. M'S SOLUTION

The Austrians can advance 1. through Silesia; 2. between

the Oder and the Elbe, along the shortest route to Berlin; or 3.

along the left bank of the Elbe. Inferior to these three main

options "are all others, which seek to achieve their purpose by

[dividing the army into] a main and a subsidiary force."

The first option is improbable because it compels Austria

to reveal her intentions sooner, (1)2 lose "all advantages of the

initiative," (2), and concede the occupation of Saxony, and

perhaps also of parts of Bohemia, in exchange for Silesia.

The second option is the most likely, because if Prussia

places great value on protecting Berlin, she is forced into "the

most disadvantageous defensive" (3).

The Third option is "totally unthinkable," because the

enemy advancing along the left bank of the Elbe below Torgau

lacks an operational objective.

The following are estimates of the distances and times

required for these operations:

An Austrian advance from Vienna through Silesia covers

678 kilometers. After the Austrians cross the Silesian border,

their further intentions would become known in Berlin on

about the 15th day of the operation.

An advance between Oder and Elbe covers 542 kilometers.

The Austrians leave Bohemia on the 14th day, and enter

Prussian territory on the 19th. Their further intentions would

become known in Berlin on the 20th day.

In the third case, an offensive along the left bank of the

Elbe covers 633 kilometers. If the enemy advances over

Leipzig, and intends to cross the Elbe at Dessau, he will reach

11
Bitterfeld, halfway between the Prussian frontier and Dessau,

on the 22nd day (4).

The course of the Elbe from Bohemia to Wittenberg is

nearly the same as the route to Berlin. Torgau lies 113

kilometers from the point where the Elbe crosses the

Bohemian-Saxon border, and 113 kilometers from Berlin. The

Austrians can move a siege train by barge to Torgau, a very

considerable advantage for them. If they base their operations

on this possibility, this is the plan that poses the greatest threat

to Prussia (5).

The Austrian columns could advance on both banks of the

Elbe, with pontoon bridges between them, until they combine

at the Prussian border and operate jointly, something "the

defensive system" (6) cannot prevent. It follows from this a)

that the Prussian army cannot take up positions far from Torgau

(7), and b) that it should not be pushed forward to the Saxon

border, so that "under all circumstances it retains its freedom of

action"(8).

The general deployment of the Prussian army should be as

follows [map 2]: the 4th Corps at Eilenburg, the 3rd Corps at

Torgau, the 2nd Corps at Herzberg, the available units of the

5th Corps at Schlieben, the Guards at Zossen, one half of the

6th Corps at Dobrilugk, the other half of the 6th Corps will

garrison the Silesian fortresses, and initially is stationed at

Neisse [the Silesian town (see map 1), not the river of the same

name. Eds.].

If the Austrians enter Silesia (1st option), the Prussian

right wing is given the mission to occupy Saxony, while the main

body of the army moves east to the Bober River, and for the

time being remains on the defensive. After Saxony has been

overcome, an offensive can be launched against the Austrian

advance in Silesia.

12
13
In the second case, an Austrian advance between Oder and

Elbe, the Prussian army concentrates between Torgau and

Herzberg. If the enemy bypasses it as he advances on Berlin,

which would be unlikely, the Prussian army remains based on

the Elbe (9), and attacks his rear.

In the third case, an Austrian advance on the left bank of

the Elbe, the Prussian army assembles on the right bank, its

right flank at Wittenberg, its left at Torgau. In this impregnable

position, with a bridgehead at each wing, the commanding

general would be free to seize the initiative as soon as he

deemed it appropriate (10). If, however, the enemy advances on

both banks of the Elbe, the best area of concentration for the

Prussian army would be at Herzberg. If the Austrians remain

divided, the advance on the right bank should be attacked, since

it presents the greater threat. If the Austrians unite on the right

bank, the fortresses at Torgau and Wittenberg, as well as the

Elbe and Elster rivers, offer ample opportunity for mobile

operations, until the time has come to offer battle.

These recommendations presuppose that the loss of Berlin

would have no impact on the outcome of the war, and if

necessary could be tolerated by Prussia. If the Prussian army

were ordered to cover Berlin, which would mean withdrawing

from the advantageous position on the Elbe, its situation would

become critical. For instance, a position at Luckau, with the left

wing on the Spreewald, would leave the right wing dangling

(11). The enemy could deny the Prussian army all freedom of

movement (12), or compel it "to resort without hesitation to

battle" (13). A general who wished to risk nothing could

withdraw behind the Nuthe and Notte rivers, but would then be

thrown so completely on the defensive that the enemy could

immobilize him there, while laying siege to Torgau (14). It

would be very difficult to relieve the fortress.

In conclusion, if the army withdraws from the Elbe, it

would not be possible to devise any truly promising defensive

14
strategy for it. If, on the other hand, the commanding general

understands how to exploit the river position, Austria "can

achieve lasting advantages only by winning a major battle" (15).

15

3. ROEDER'S SOLUTION

The Austrian army can advance 1. on the right bank of the

Elbe, over Rumburg and Zittau through Lusatia toward Berlin;

2. over the Erz Mountains on the left bank of the Elbe into

Saxony; or 3. through Silesia. The Saxon army will probably

assemble at Dresden, or, if the Prussians enter the country

before the Austrians, withdraw into or behind the Erz

Mountains, or entrench itself around Dresden. In all

circumstances it seems advantageous for the Austrians to join

up with the Saxons as soon as possible, and either the first or

the second option would bring about an early junction.

Of these two options, the advance on the right bank of the

Elbe through Lusatia appears the more decisive (1), 3 since it is

the shortest route to Berlin, and is free of Prussian fortresses,

which would be difficult to bypass or whose investment would

require detaching troops from the advance.

The second option lacks a definite objective. The Austrians

would probably choose it only if they wish to avoid battle at the

beginning of the campaign, and find it sufficient to control

Saxony and the left bank of the Elbe, and possibly to invest

Erfurt (2).

In the third option, the Austrian objective could only be to

invest some of the Silesian fortresses. In that case, the Prussians

will certainly advance and force a battle. Even were the

Austrians to win this battle, they would still not gain the

advantages they might derive from the first option (3).

As to the time required for these operations: In the first

case (a march through Lusatia), the enemy could reach

Hoyerswerda on the 21st day after leaving the Danube. In the

second case (an advance on the left bank of the Elbe), he would

reach the Erz Mountains before Dresden on the 20th day. In

17
the third case (an attack on Silesia), if the enemy were to move

through Trautenau, he would reach Landeshut on the 17th day.

These estimates make no allowance for opposition. The

situation would be different if even weak Prussian detachments

were to occupy the mountains, and harass the enemy along his

frontier or on the march.

"It must be apparent that the attack on Berlin through

Lusatia presents the greatest danger to Prussia, since, as

mentioned above, it takes the shortest route to the capital,

through an area without fortresses"(4).

In considering how Prussia might best counter each of

these threats, we must leave out of account the possibility that

Prussian units stationed near the border enter Saxony and

occupy the mountains before the Austrians. A preventive

strategy is excluded by the nature of the exercise, which

stipulates that Prussia must await the Austrian offensive.

Consequently it is proposed that the main Prussian force (the

Guards and the 2nd and 3rd corps) deploys between

Hoyerswerda, Senftenberg, Spremberg, and Kalau [map 2]. The

2nd Corps, particularly its Landwehr units, would of course

arrive later than the others.4 The 4th Corps assembles between

Elsterwerda and Miickenberg behind the Black Elster River,

the Silesian Division of the 5th Corps at Gorlitz. The line units

of the 12th Division (6th Corps) march to Landeshut, while its

Landwehr units garrison the Silesian fortresses [off map 2,

south- east of Gorlitz].

Should the Austrians advance through Lusatia, the

Prussian commander-in-chief would learn on the evening of the

18th day after the enemy had left the Danube that the

Bohemian-Saxon border had been crossed. He would then issue

the following orders:

1. The division stationed at Hoyerswerda will send out a

strong cavalry reconnaissance toward Bautzen, which takes up

18
positions approximately halfway to the town. It is not to become

involved in a decisive action, but return to Hoyerswerda if it

encounters superior forces (6).

2. Reconnaissance detachments will be sent out from

Senftenberg, Miickenberg, and Elsterwerda.

3. The division at Senftenberg will deploy east behind

Hoyerswerda.

4. The 4th Corps, stationed between Elsterwerda and

Miickenberg, will deploy east between Miickenberg and

Senftenberg, while continuing to hold the river-crossing at

Elsterwerda.

5. The line units of the 2nd Corps, having in the

meantime arrived at Luckau, will continue south to Alt-Bobern,

and join forces with the Guards.

6. The corps at Gorlitz is ordered to engage weaker

enemy forces, avoid stronger formations, and keep open its line

of retreat into Silesia (7).

If the Austrians press their offensive toward Berlin, they

will be met by three-and-a-half corps (the Guards, 3rd and 4th

corps and the line units of the 2nd Corps), while the Gorlitz

corps operates on their right flank. The terrain will determine

where the main Prussian army gives battle, and circumstances

will dictate whether it is opportune to await the arrival of the

Landwehr of the 2nd Corps. If that seems necessary, the battle

could be fought between the Nuthe and Notte rivers, or

perhaps already at Luckau.

Should the Austrians choose the second option (an

advance on the left bank of the Elbe), they might cross the Elbe

at Dresden. The main Prussian army would then block their way

behind the Black Elster River, and the G6rlitz corps would

19
operate against their right flank. If, on the other hand, the

enemy proceeds further along the left bank, the 4th Corps

stands ready at Torgau, the rest of the main army withdraws to

the area around Torgau-Herzberg, with the G6rlitz corps at

Elsterwerda. If the Austrians were then to cross the Elbe above

Dresden, which is unlikely, they should be attacked. If they do

not cross, the Prussian forces on the right bank must follow the

enemy's movement on the left until the Landwehr of the 2nd

Corps arrives, and then take the offensive.

In the event the Austrians proceed over Trautenau to

Landeshut (the third option), their objective would be to lay

siege to the Silesian fortresses. To cover the siege, they would

probably deploy along the Katzback River [map 1]. The

Prussians respond as follows: The units of the 12th Division at

Landeshut withdraw to Schweidnitz, to obstruct the enemy

advance as much as possible. "Depending on circumstances,"

they would then "reinforce the threatened fortresses, and

conduct mobile operations among them" (8). The G6rlitz corps

confronts the enemy between the Bober and Katzback rivers,

while the main army moves east to join it (9). In the event that a

secondary enemy column is pushed through Zittau, all or part

of the Gorlitz corps remains in place against it. An advance

between the Oder and Bober rivers is unlikely, nor would it be

dangerous, since its left flank would be exposed to

counterattacks.

Whether a battle should be fought before the Landwehr of

the 2nd Corps arrives from the north by way of Guben, or

whether battle should be avoided until their arrival, depends on

circumstances that cannot be determined in advance (10).

20
4. CLAUSEWITZ TO ROEDER

December 22, 1827

You have asked me, dear friend, to give you my opinion of

the strategic problems and the two solutions you have sent me.

I do so with the understanding that you will treat my

communication, which is madpe purely in the interest of

scholarship,as entirely confidential.

Forgive me if I start at the very beginning; but nowhere is a

basic understanding, the true and unambiguous recognition of

inescapable facts, so lacking as in the so-called science of

strategy.5

War is not an independent phenomenon, but the

continuation of politics by different means. Consequently, the

main lines of every major strategic plan are largely political in

nature, and their political character increases the more the plan

encompasses the entire war and the entire state. The plan for

the war results directly from the political conditions of the two

belligerent states, as well as from their relations to other

powers. The plan of campaign results from the war plan, and

frequently-if there is only one theater of operations-may

even be identical with it. But the political element even extends

to the separate components of a campaign; rarely will it be

without influence on such major episodes of warfare as a battle,

etc. According to this point of view, there can be no question of

a purely military evaluation of a great strategic issue, nor of a

purely military scheme to solve it. That it is essential to see the

matter in this way, that the point of view is almost self-evident if

we only keep the history of war in mind, scarcely needs proof.

Nevertheless, it has not yet been fully accepted, as is shown by

the fact that people still like to separate the purely military

elements of a major strategic plan from its political aspects, and

treat the latter as if they were somehow extraneous. War is

21
nothing but the continuation ofpolitical efforts by other means. In

my view all of strategy rests on this idea, and I believe that

whoever refuses to recognize that this must be so does not yet

fully understand what really matters. It is this principle that

makes the entire history of war comprehensible, which in its

absence remains full of the greatest absurdities.

How then is it possible to plan a campaign, whether for

one theater of war or several, without indicating the political

condition of the belligerents, and the politics of their

relationship to each other?

Every major war plan grows out of so many individual

circumstances, which determine its features, that it is

impossible to devise a hypothetical case with such specificity

that it could be taken as real. We are not referring simply to

trivialities, but to the most important issues, which nevertheless

have almost always been ignored. For instance, Bonaparte and

Frederick the Great are often compared, sometimes without

keeping in mind that one man ruled 40 million subjects, the

other 5. But let me call attention to another, less noticeable and

yet very significant distinction: Bonaparte was a usurper, who

had won his immense power in a kind of perpetual game of

chance, and who, for the greater part of his perilous career, did

not even possess an heir; while Frederick the Great disposed of

a true patrimony. Had nature given both men identical

psychological qualities, would they have acted in the same

manner? Certainly not, and that alone makes it impossible for

us to measure them by the same standard. In short, it is

impossible to construct a hypothetical case in such a way that

we can say that what was left out was not essential. We can of

course think of many characteristics of the opposing armies and

states that are identical, and have the effect of canceling each

other out; but solving such problems would be no more than a

useful exercise. Our best solutions could not be applied to real

conflicts.

22
VON ROEDER

23
If, therefore, such exercises allow us to leave many things

out of consideration because we believe they neutralize each

other, we still cannot ignore those conditions that have brought

about the war and that determine its political purpose. The

political purpose and the means available to achieve it give rise

to the military objective. This ultimate goal of the entire

belligerent act, or of the particular campaign if the two are

identical, is therefore the first and most important issue that the

strategist must address, for the main lines of the strategic plan

run toward this goal, or at least are guided by it. It is one thing

to intend to crush my opponent if I have the means to do so, to

make him defenseless and force him to accept my peace terms.

It is obviously something different to be content with gaining

some advantage by conquering a strip of land, occupying a

fortress, etc., which I can retain or use in negotiations when the

fighting stops. The exceptional circumstances in which

Bonaparte and France found themselves since the Wars of the

Revolution, allowed him to achieve major victories on almost

every occasion, and people began to assume that the plans and

actions created by those circumstances were universal norms.

But such a view would summarily reject all of the earlier history

of war, which is absurd. If we wish to derive an art of war from

the history of war-and that is undoubtedly the only possible

way-we must not minimize the testimony of history. Suppose

we find that out of fifty wars forty-nine have been of the second

kind-that is, wars with limited objectives, not directed at the

total defeat of the enemy-then we would have to believe that

these limitations reside in the nature of war itself, instead of

being in every case brought about by wrong ideas, lack of

energy, or whatever. We must not allow ourselves to be misled

into regarding war as a pure act of force and of destruction, and

from this simplistic concept logically deduce a string of

conclusions that no longer have anything to do with the real

world. Instead we must recognize that war is a political act that

is not wholly autonomous; a true political instrument that does

24
not function on its own but is controlled by something else, by

the hand of policy.

The greater the extent to which policy is motivated by

comprehensive interests, affecting the very existence of the

state, and the greater the extent to which the issue is cast in

terms of survival or extinction, the more policy and hostile

feelings coincide. As policy dissolves into hostility, war becomes

simpler; it proceeds according to the pure concept of force and

destruction, and satisfies whatever demands can be logically

developed from this concept, until all its component parts come

to possess the coherence of a simple necessity. Such a war may

seem entirely apolitical, and on that account has been

considered the norm. But obviously the political element exists

here no less than it does in other kinds of war. It merely

coincides so completely with the concept of force and

destruction that it vanishes from sight.6

In light of this discussion, I have no need to prove that wars

exist in which the objective is even more circumscribed - a bare

threat, armed negotiations, or in the case of alliances, the mere

pretext of action [by one of the allies]. It would be unreasonable

to maintain that such wars are beneath the art of war. As soon

as we concede that logically some wars may not call for extreme

goals, the utter destruction of the enemy, we must expand the

art of war to include all gradations of military means by which

policy can be advanced. War in its relation to policy has above

all the obligation and the right to prevent policy from making

demands that are contrary to the nature of war, to save it from

misusing the military instrument from a failure to understand

what it can and cannot do.

Consequently I must insist that the military goals of both

sides are stated whenever a strategic plan is drawn up. For the

most part these goals arise out of the political relations of the

two antagonists to each other, and to other states that may be

25
involved. Unless these relations are outlined, a plan can be

nothing more than a combination of temporal and spatial

relationships, directed toward some arbitrary goal-a battle,

siege, etc. To the extent that this goal cannot be shown as

necessary or superior to others, it can be challenged and

contradicted by other projects, without these coming any nearer

the absolute truth than did the first plan. That is, indeed, the

history of all strategic discussions until today. Everyone rotates

within some arbitrary circle. No one tries to push his argument

back to the origins of the war that is to be fought, to its true

motive, to the one and only point where the logical

development and conclusion of the military operations can

alone originate. Whatever correct and effective strategic

decisions are made, result from the instinctive tact of talented

commanders, who with a glance penetrate and assess a mass of

circumstances. This instinct suffices for action, but obviously

not for analysis, even though action is something far greater

than the laborious unfolding and laying bare of facts.

You see from this, dear friend, how little I can make of

your assignment.7 Above all, I must ask: do the Austrians

intend, or could they intend, to defeat and disarm Prussia with

150,000 men, or would they be satisfied with a limited

objective? In the Seven Years War they were unquestionably in

a position to achieve the former; their primary means would

have been an advance through Saxony and Lusatia on Berlin.

They failed to do so, and this failure was rightly counted as a

great error on their part, just as it was considered an error that

they directed their operations more toward Silesia than Lusatia.

But if circumstances are such that the total defeat of the

Prussian military monarchy is not possible, then an advance

through Lusatia toward Berlin would no longer be the most

suitable operation and consequently no longer present the

greatest danger to Prussia.8

26
You will agree, of course, that in circumstances in which

Austria has only enough power to seize some territory with one

or a few fortresses, and in which only a modest plan promises

success, while a more ambitious one promises none because it

disregards the means available, the modest Austrian plan would

carry the greatest threat to Prussia. You can see that the

question as to which operation is the most dangerous assumes

an aura of universality, in this problem as well as in both

solutions, that it does not really possess, an error that recurs

constantly in a strategic discussion, with the result that general

strategic arguments nearly always prove inapplicable to reality.

The greatest threat for Prussia can only be determined if we

know what the Austrian objective can be or will be. In the

present instance this objective must either result from a

definition of the overall political situation, or it must be

arbitrarily specified as a given of the exercise. Both the problem

as well as the solutions ascribe an obscure (that is,

unarticulated) importance to the capital city, which in reality

Berlin cannot possess. The Seven Years War demonstrated this

clearly enough. 9 Equally obscure is the notion, involved in the

first assumption, that an Austrian thrust through Lusatia would,

so to speak, split the Prussian monarchy into two parts, because

if our army were defeated and relentlessly pursued, it would

have to decide whether to withdraw behind the Oder or escape

across the lower Elbe. This would be a serious crisis -but only

in the face of an enemy able to cary out such a great project. It

can hardly be doubted that for the Austrians such an operation,

flanked from Bohemia by Silesia on the right, and on the left by

the Elbe fortresses, would be very difficult. It could only succeed

if the difficulties were offset by a great preponderance of force.

Of this preponderance the problem has nothing to say; it

appears on the contrary to assume a kind of equilibrium of

strength.

Furthermore it seems to me that this problem assigns

undue significance to the question as to which Austrian

27
operation poses the greatest threat. Attack and defense

determine their measures reciprocally. But surely in

theory-that is, for the purposes of general analysis-the

sequence of ideas arising from this interaction must start

somewhere? Quite so. The sequence begins, I am convinced,

with the defensive, in part because peacetime military

arrangements are directed primarily toward defense, which thus

precedes the offensive; in part because offensive plans depend

on the disposition of the defense, without which they would

have no factual basis. The defensive, on the other hand, does

not lack the necessary data in the absence of an attack, because

these reside in the overall character and circumstances of the

country. At the general level, then, the main characteristics of

defensive operations develop directly out of existing conditions.

In specific cases, however, this is by no means always necessary,

but only if one cannot discover the enemy's intentions early

enough to take the required countermeasures. This certainly

does not seem to be the case here. From the direction of their

advance, the location of their magazines, the mobilization of

their transport, and other information, one would soon learn

whether the Austrians were directing their main force toward

Silesia or Saxony. Whether they intend to advance along one

bank of the Elbe or the other, they might perhaps conceal until

the last moment. But this would make very little difference to

us since the slightest movement right or left on our part would

Compensate for it. If, as is most natural with respect to our

peacetime deployment, we assemble our three Silesian

divisions at Neisse, Liegnitz, and Sprottau respectively, the

Second and Third Corps and the Guards in Lower Lusatia, and

the Fourth Corps on the right bank of the Elbe at Torgau, we

can await information that we would certainly receive on the

direction of the enemy's main force, and then lead our main

force against it. For this reason it seems to me that this

particular exercise ranges quite unnecessarily into the realm of

speculative reflection. Wherever concrete conditions are

decisive, such speculations, which all too often degenerate into

28
hair-splitting, are no longer of interest. If the question of

Prussia's greatest military weakness is to be raised, the problem

would have to be totally recast.

Having now shown that the exercise is too incomplete to

permit a solution that is not totally arbitrary, and furthermore

that the particular issue that is supposed to be the key to a

solution- namely the question as to the most dangerous line of

advance -would in practice never form a basis for our actions. I

shall proceed to the individual points of the second [M's]

solution. I shall analyze these points historically, since the

solution is too illogical to permit a strictly logical rebuttal.10

Critique of M's Solution

1. Why would an attack on Silesia reveal Austrian

intentions sooner than attacks elsewhere? Because the border

is somewhat farther from Berlin? That is too petty and

insignificant a consideration to influence the choice of

operational lines. If the Austrians set out from Vienna and the

Danube toward our border, we will certainly grasp that we are

their target, and prepare ourselves to be in the right place at the

right time. We would not delay our measures until the

Austrians had crossed the frontier.

2. The advantage of initiative here means the advantage of

surprise. Only when surprise is present does the initiative

confer an advantage; otherwise, in war as in card games, it is a

disadvantage.1 This inheres in the nature of things, but for want

of space cannot be discussed here. If Berlin is to be surprised,

this can certainly be achieved more easily by way of Saxony; if it

should be Silesia, that would not be the case. Obviously the

Austrians can attack us much earlier in southern Silesia than in

the Mark Brandenburg.

29
3. The reason for the Austrians to prefer an advance on

Berlin is that if Prussia places a high value on protecting her

capital she will be forced into a most disadvantageous defensive.

On the mere possibility that Prussia would make this mistake,

the Austrians are supposed to base their line of advance. Again,

this consideration is far too insignificant. And why should

Prussia's defensive be most disadvantageous? What an empty

phrase! A strong position behind the Notte and Nuthe rivers,

two fortresses on the enemy's left flank [Torgau and

Wittenberg], an entire province [Silesia] on his right -how can

anyone call that disadvantageous? I do not say that this is where

we should make a stand; I merely want to show that the reason

given here itself needs justification.

4. What is the purpose of indicating the three distances

from Vienna to Berlin and to two points on the Prussian

frontier? At most the figures might be used to determine how

far forward we could assemble our forces. But the author does

not use them for this purpose, to which, in any case, the

distance from Vienna to Berlin would be irrelevant. It seems as

though this distance is meant to demonstrate the danger for

Prussia of the second option. But the author does not draw this

conclusion; rather he believes the danger to derive from

something else-the Elbe and Torgau.' 2 In the end, however,

that maneuver [the siege of Torgau] leaves the importance of

Berlin quite out of the account. If Berlin really were

the keypoint of Prussia's entire defensive system, its

distance from Vienna would not matter very much, since

this situation-unlike some other subordinate strategic

options - demands more than a mere race. 13 That Prussia would

not learn the direction of the Austrian offensive until her

frontier had been crossed, is an arbitrary, improbable

assumption, totally unsuited to provide a premise for strategic

analysis.

30
I confess, then, that I find these calculations of time and

space unnecessary on the one hand, and without practical value

on the other.

5. The fact that Austria can move a siege train by water to

Torgau is relevant only to a siege of Torgau. Why it should pose

the greatest danger to the Prussian state would first have to be

demonstrated. Again this is merely an unsupported assertion.

There may be cases when a siege of Torgau would be more

dangerous to the Prussian state than a siege of Glatz, but the

opposite could also be true. If Torgau is invested without great

superiority of force, success would hardly be conceivable. The

siege then becomes the best means for Prussia to gain a general

strategic victory. So long as the relationship between the two

sides is not more fully specified, we cannot really think about

these issues in a practical way. My analysis merely tries to show

that the proposition on which the author's reasoning rests is, as

so very often in strategic theorizing, an entirely unproven thesis,

a mere phrase.

6. The Austrians are supposed to be able to proceed

safely on both banks of the Elbe until they reach the vicinity of

Dresden. 14 This is inferred from the defensive system of Prussia.

If by this term the author means the Prussian intention to fight

the campaign on the strategic defensive, then his inference is

false. If circumstances were as described, nothing would be

more compatible with this intention than to attack one of the

Austrian columns before the two could unite. If the author

means a specific defensive system, which might perhaps consist

in a deliberate withdrawal, we would have to assume that this

system, which incidentally is not mentioned in the assignment,

had been betrayed to the Austrians. Otherwise they would

always have to accept the possibility of having to pay a price for

separating their forces. If we consider that while the Austrians

are assembling their army on the Eger, the Prussians assemble

theirs on the Elster, it is hard to predict with certainty who

31
would arrive first in the vicinity of Dresden. And I doubt that

the Austrian commander would risk an advance in two columns

on both banks of the Elbe. Instead of envisioning the situation

of both armies shortly before the campaign begins, and asking

what the most advisable course of action for each would be, a

general concept, namely the concept of the defensive, once again

is taken as the basis for a conclusion that is not only without

practical value, but also inherently wrong.

7. The conclusion the author now draws, that the

Prussians should place themselves near Torgau, again seems

entirely illogical to me. It is not clear why the Prussians could

not occupy more advanced positions and withdraw from them

in time to concentrate on Torgau. Besides, the conclusion

assumes an intention that must at least be discussed, since it is

by no means inevitable -I mean the intention of the Prussian

commander to cover Torgau and prevent a siege. Far from

being a universal necessity, this intention is fundamentally

contrary to the nature of things. Fortresses exist to be besieged.

A siege weakens the enemy, and hastens the moment when we

can defeat him more easily. This is a natural sequence in theory,

and in all wars fought over major issues it is also the natural

course of events. On the other hand, in limited wars, the play of

balanced forces frequently causes armies to cover fortresses.

The history of war is full of examples. It would take me too far

afield to disentangle this seeming anomaly here, and to show

that it is entirely natural and justified. I only assert that in the

present case this intention [of preventing a siege of Torgau] is

not justified, and cannot be conceded as a general, self-evident

necessity.

8. What does it mean to say that the Prussian army should

retain its freedom of action? Obviously the farther forward its

position, the greater its freedom of action, since by advancing it

will increase the number of possible lines of retreat in its rear.

The phrase "freedom of action" is among the most pernicious

32
of all strategic cliches, because it is used more often than any

other, and no one feels obliged to define its actual meaning.

In general, then, the author concludes that the best

position for the Prussian army lies between Herzberg and

Torgau, where, in one way or another, it can offer the most

effective resistance. I have no wish to criticize this conclusion in

and of itself, only to point out that it bears little or no relation

to the author's construct of strategic theorizing and calculations

of time and space. The Prussian army is strong in this position

because of the Elbe, the three fortresses, the sheltered

character of the whole deployment, and because the Silesian

border runs parallel to the enemy's lines of communication.

These things can be said in a few words, sound common sense

will accept them, and require no ingenious, long drawn-out

strategic deduction.

9. Since so few facts are given [in the problem], it is

impossible to determine whether a flanking position with our

back to the Elbe would be superior to any other. The Prussian

army appears to find itself in such an excellent strategic position

here that it can evade an attack in three directions toward the

Elbe, toward Berlin, and toward Silesia-and still retain the

advantage of posing a strategic threat to the enemy, either on

his two flanks or in his rear. Nevertheless, the army's main line

of retreat should certainly be determined, that is, the line to be

used in case of extreme misfortune, with which all other

operational decisions ought to be correlated. The fact that at

Vilna [in 1812] the Russians were still undecided whether to

withdraw their main force toward St. Petersburg or toward

Moscow nearly led to the disaster of the army's surrender in the

open field.

If it were considered absolutely necessary to cover Berlin,

a flanking position so near the city would not be appropriate. I

believe, however, that protecting Berlin is not an essential

33
element of the Prussian defense; consequently in a great many

cases, which need of course to be studied in detail, a flanking

position would prove highly advantageous.

10. A position behind the Elbe, just as behind any large

river, is tactically unassailable. The strength of the position does

not depend on the two fortresses. But we do not gain a

favorable battlefield by deploying behind the Elbe, because we

force the enemy to by-pass us. It is only from this compulsion

that our advantages must come.

11. In how many positions do both wings rest on major

strategic strong points? To have one such point is already worth

a great deal. Once again, the reason why we should not deploy

at Luckau, the lack of support for the right wing, is one of those

strategic terms that cannot bear close inspection. Whether we

might not find some tactical support for the right wing [e.g.,

some farm buildings, a small rise in the ground, a swamp. Eds.]

would have to be discovered on the spot. How many battles are

fought in which only one wing of the defender's position is

secure!

12. The enemy could no more determine the movement of

the Prussian army at Luckau than anywhere else. This is one of

the most abominable strategic cliches. Basically it says

absolutely nothing, since, after all, the actions and movements

of one commander do always strongly influence the conduct

and movement of the other. If the statement means anything at

all, it can only be that one general can compel the other to

follow him everywhere, to submit to him wholly, to deprive him

even of the possibility of indirect resistance by means of

retaliatory countermovements. This does not in any sense seem

to me to hold true for a Prussian army at Luckau, and we may

assume that had the author developed his ideas in greater

detail, their inadequacy and one-sidedness would have become

obvious.

34
13. Battle is here presented as something evil, at least that

battle that is resorted to without hesitation. Here we enter the

morass of muddled concepts that made up the general-staff

science of the Old Regime. Against a determined enemy, who

does not shy away from fighting, battle is the only effective

means of resistance. We may fight him under the most

advantageous circumstances possible, but we must be resolved

to fight. In such cases there is no substitute for battle. If the

defender has occupied an exceptionally strong position, he will

force the attacker to bypass him. If this position is well-placed

strategically, to be bypassed offers an advantage to the defense.

But the advantage becomes reality only if it catches the attacker

in the process, en flagrant delit, as Bonaparte would say. In

short, a battle is inevitable: either a battle in the tactical

defensive, if the attacker finds bypassing too dangerous, and

therefore proceeds to attack our position; or an offensive battle,

if the attacker pursues his [original] objective and risks

bypassing our position. If the tactical features and strategic

location of the defender's position are so strong that the enemy

dares to do neither and gives up his advance entirely, then this

success without battle arises only from the strictly necessary

presupposition that the defender was in fact prepared to fight.

If the attacking army does not advance resolutely, if it does

not plan an energetic offensive, if it has taken the field merely

to await some favorable opportunity, and will only attempt

something should this opportunity arise, then the defense can

certainly do likewise. Against such an opponent, the defense

may make it its business to avoid battle entirely, to regard it as an

evil, and to direct all actions and movements toward ensuring

that the advantageous conditions for battle that the enemy

seeks will not occur.

It is important not to confuse the two cases. To expect

favorable results from passive resistance against a determined

opponent goes against the nature of things. On the contrary,

35
nothing is so certain as that such an approach would lead to

half-measures, wasted time, confusion, and-following this

splendid purgatory - to the most complete defeat.

All this being said, the advance on Luckau and Herzberg

surely suggests that the Austrians are seeking a decisive battle.

14. If the Prussian commander retreats north over Torgau

simply to bring this fortress into play, obliging the Austrians to

besiege it, and then, after they have been weakened by the

siege, to attack them, I would find this most sensible. In that

case, however, the Prussian commander has no need to

withdraw behind the Nuthe River. Rather he will try to halt

behind the Elster. Should the Austrians want to drive him off

and force him either to withdraw behind the Nuthe or to give

battle, the Prussian commander may prefer to accept battle,

even if the enemy had not weakened himself significantly by

laying siege to Torgau. In light of the general circumstances

there seems to be no reason to shrink from this battle, while a

retreat to the vicinity of Berlin would be undertaken only on

the most pressing grounds.

But even supposing such grounds were present, I would

not find the retreat as disadvantageous as the author does. He

says that the Prussian commander would be thrown back on the

most disadvantageous defensive, a well known, ready-made

figure of speech from the strategist's workshop.15 If the

expression disadvantageous refers to the defense itself, the

statement is clearly wrong, for a defensive position behind such

a line of marshes as exists along the Nuthe cannot possibly be

considered a disadvantage. Should the expression refer to the

fact that if the enemy lays siege to Torgau, defensive operations

would no longer be appropriate, and would therefore be

detrimental, then I cannot persuade myself that our army would

find it all that difficult to advance from this position by one

route or another to relieve Torgau.

36
15. Here we must first ask, what is the meaning of leaving

the Elbe? Does the author mean, evacuate the entire area, and

let the Austrians take Torgau at leisure; or is he merely

referring to a situation in which one wing of the army is not at

all times covered by the river? Again, unfortunately, we are

dealing with jargon, which, as usual, bears only a faint

resemblance to well defined, specific concepts. Even a retreat

behind the Nuthe would make the subsequent relief of Torgau

neither impossible nor very difficult, as anyone will agree who

thinks of the numerous ways for doing this that are open to the

Prussian army. Only if the Prussians were to take no steps to

relieve the fortress, could the Austrians occupy Torgau without

a battle and so acquire an enduring advantage. But this is an

empty supposition. If, on the other hand, the author means that

as long as we retreat at least one day's march from the Elbe, the

Austrians would succeed in taking Torgau, he lacks all basis in

fact. After all, we can advance from any point to attack them.

In general, it is not clear how an attacking army can

achieve a permanent advantage over a defending force that is

its equal physically and in morale, without defeating it in battle.

If such a victory is necessary to the success of the Austrian

campaign, this necessity is not a consequence of any particular

strategic combination on the part of the Prussians, but follows

quite simply from the nature of things. That the author again

regards battle as an evil, an incongruity, reflects the same

confusion that we have discussed under point 13, above.

With this I conclude my remarks on Solution M. I feel only

too keenly how cursory they are, and how much they may leave

unclear. But to make good these failings, I would need a great

deal more time.

You see, my dear friend, I have scarcely left any

propositions unchallenged that are meant to yield a solution to

the problem. It is not so much the solution as this type of

37
arguing that I should feel obliged to attack, were I competent to

do so. 6 I hate the sort of technical language that leads us to

believe we can reduce the individual case to a universal, to the

inevitable. Strategists manipulate these terminologies as if they

were algebraic formulae, whose accuracy has long been

established, brief formulae that may be used as substitutes for

the original reality. But these phrases do not even represent

clear and definite principles. Rather they are nebulous,

ambiguous expressions, whose true meaning remains open to

question. This is no accident. Their vagueness is intended,

because they did not derive from what is essential and could be

presented as universal truth. Consequently the inventors of

these terms found it natural to allow a certain latitude in their

meaning.

I recognize that my finding fault with more or less

everything in Solution M conveys a strong impression of a mind

already made up. But I am convinced that I do not hold

preconceived opinions, nor could I, because I do not follow a

particular [strategic] system, and demand nothing but the plain,

straightforward truth, the simple linking of cause and effect. I

hope you will not suspect that mere contrariness or, worse,

personal antipathy are involved. Pointless contradiction is

utterly repugnant to me; and with respect to the author, I am

truly sorry not to find him farther along the road toward a

natural view of strategic issues, a road I have pursued for many

years with the greatest enthusiasm, because despite everything I

agree with his practical judgments more often perhaps than

with anyone else's.l7

Critique of Roeder's Solution

After all this, my analysis of your solution will require far

less time, I fully approve of its simplicity and realism. You set

up no scaffolding of superfluous circumstances; your reasoning

38
is not based on mere cliches. But let me be more specific about

particular issues.

1. You are right to characterize the operation through

Lusatia as the most decisive. This is the way to put it. The most

decisive operation, however, is not always the one that best

suits the enemy's circumstances. Of course, the exercise

demands that in planning the preliminary concentration of the

[Prussian] army, you determine [in the abstract] what attack

would be the most decisive. But, as I have already noted, this

would not be necessary in practice.18

2. Your description of this option is accurate. It proves

the soundness of your point of view that you characterize the

option as a possibility and not simply as an outright error, as

does Solution M.

3. This also holds true for the third operational option.

But your assertion that for the Austrians a victorious battle

would be more advantageous in Lower Lusatia than at the foot

of the Silesian mountains is based on the one-sided assumption

that the Austrians are in the position to fight a war aiming at

major decisions.

4. I have already indicated my objections and

qualifications to this assertion.

5. Your calculations of times are simple and sound,

without the false implications of the other solution. Such

calculations are, of course, always necessary; but in this case

they lack the great significance that the problem seems to

attribute to them. Nothing is less likely than that the Austrians

would march from the Danube to our border in one fell swoop.

Therefore we should not be concerned that the Landwehr units

of the 2nd Corps would not be available. But that you have

emphasized- or rather, mentioned- this possibility makes your

calculations superior to those of the other solution, since it is

39
only on account of such possibilities that these calculations are

necessary at all.

6. I have nothing to say against the details of our

disposition given here, except that such specifics cannot

reasonably be required or given in advance. With the

information that the enemy has crossed our border will

naturally come much other news about the number and

strength of his columns. Only then will we decide the details of

our disposition.

7. I consider this eccentric deployment the one true fault

of your answer. 19 In such a confined space, at a moment when a

great battle may be expected, a divided deployment is always an

error, unless it is justified by a preponderance offorce. Nothing

can protect such a deployment from the danger that the enemy,

with one and the same army, may defeat the separate parts one

after another, as the famous campaign of 1796 [Napoleon's, in

Italy] with its five distinct phases has shown. Over longer

distances such an enveloping form of attack or defense becomes

less dangerous, and if distances are really great, as in Russia in

1812, a division of forces may cease to be dangerous at all, and

its special characteristic will then naturally become

advantageous. In 1813 the distances were fairly large, and yet

there was always the greatest danger that Blucher would be

overwhelmed by the main enemy army, which, in fact, did

defeat Schwarzenberg at Dresden. The enveloping form of

attack is always the more decisive, the one that leads to greatest

success, but for that reason also the riskier, in which success is

less certain. Success and danger always stand side by side, and

form the dynamic law of war. If we wish to increase the first, the

second rises as well, and it then becomes a question of whether

or not this is in accord with the needs and particular

characteristics of our situation. Thus, if our circumstances do

not allow us to take great risks, we can increase our success only

when danger itself is not great, that is, when we possess a

40
preponderance of physical and moral force. This utterly simple

principle, grounded directly in the concepts [of success and

danger] themselves, allows for clear and definite solutions in a

great variety of strategic questions, over which, in the usual way,

people argue fruitlessly.

It is very tempting, if one of our territories lies to one side

or behind the enemy advance, to base a considerable force

there. This idea has seduced you, but one must resist. That is

not to say that we must give up the advantage of this

circumstance entirely. Rather we ought to detach a few small

units of rangers, whose combined strength is not so essential to

the whole that it could not be spared in a decisive battle. 20 In an

army of 120,000 men, for instance, 5,000 men would not be

missed. But these 5,000, in combination with the forces in the

area that they could bring into action-Landwehr units,

garrison troops, reservists, etc. - can act very effectively against

the enemy's lines of operation. This type of operation against an

attacker's lines of communication, which arises, in a sense,

automatically as he advances, leaving territory to his left and

right that he cannot occupy, is the only kind that offers an

absolute advantage. It is a unique advantage of the strategic

defensive, but it cannot be achieved by detaching significant

forces to act against the enemy's flanks, since those who fight

on his flank cannot fight on his front.

8. The division's war of maneuver is one of those

miserable catchphrases. You will forgive me if I say that you did

not form a clear conception of what this would mean.

9. I believe I have already said that if the Austrians were

to advance on Silesia rather than Saxony, we would discover it

early enough to assemble our main army in Silesia itself, rather

than first in Lower Lusatia. The problem is at fault here.

10. Your conclusion is very sensible, and shows that you

regard the major battle from the correct point of view.

41
CLAUSEWITZ'S HANDWRITING

42
And now, enough. Perhaps I have already worn you out. If

I have now and again failed to make myself understood, or if I

have not been able to convince you on every point, we can

certainly continue our discussion in person.

Your friend,

von Clausewitz.

43
I
5. THE SECOND PROBLEM

For the purposes of this exercise, the conditions described

in the first problem are modified in several respects. First, it is

assumed that the Prussian troops will not cross the Saxon

border, but must await the Austrian attack on their own soil.

They must therefore forego all offensive operations at the start

of the campaign, even though, if time permitted, these might

prove most advantageous. Furthermore, it is assumed that the

entire Austrian force will advance between the Elbe and Spree

rivers.

Analyze two possible deployments for the Prussian army,

which consists of five corps of 30,000 men each [map 3]:

a) Four army corps are stationed between Senftenberg

and Spremberg, with the fifth corps at Gorlitz;

or

b) all five corps assemble along the Elbe near Torgau:

One corps on the left bank, one corps at Torgau, and three

corps on the right bank between the Elbe and Black Elster

rivers.

Compare these two deployments.

45
Ae

<,.., POSITION A

<> POSITION B

1:1,000,000

0 5 10 20 30 40 KM I . I

46
6. ROEDER'S SOLUTION

Roeder addressed the problem by first analyzing the

specific steps taken at the beginning of the campaign in each of

the two cases; then by comparing the two opening stages of the

campaign; and finally by drawing a conclusion from his

comparison.

If, Roeder argued, the Austrians were faced with the

Prussian deployment given in the first case (four corps between

Senftenberg and Spremberg, the fifth at Gorlitz), they would

have to leave a significant covering force at G6rlitz, perhaps as

much as one-and-a-half corps, since the Prussians there

threaten the Austrian line of retreat. If the Austrians were to

lose a battle, this threat could become particularly dangerous. It

would probably be impossible to defeat the Prussians at Gorlitz,

who would avoid engaging a superior force. (1)21 After

detaching the covering force, the Austrians would retain

three-and-a-half corps for their offensive. How should they be

employed? To bypass the left wing of the main Prussian force

with an advance between the Spree and Neisse rivers is out of

the question. (2) If they bypass the right wing, the Austrians

could cross the Black Elster between Elsterwerda and

Senftenberg. But the terrain would be difficult for them, and we

could attack them under favorable conditions. If they cross

below Elsterwerda, they would have the Elbe and Torgau to

their rear, and a battle would probably be fought between

Senftenberg and Spremberg.

Should the Prussian army lose this battle, it would

probably have to retreat to Berlin. A good position can be taken

up on the heights near the city; if we did not feel strong enough

to accept battle there, we would have to withdraw behind the

Havel River. (3) If in the meantime the enemy lays siege to

47
Torgau with half a corps, and we bring up reinforcements, we

would outnumber him and could take the offensive.

If the entire Prussian army deploys on the Elbe (the

second case), an Austrian advance on the left bank of the river

is unlikely. If, on the other hand, the Austrians cross the Black

Elster and advance on its right bank, they would lose direct

communications with their country, and it isn't clear what they

would gain. Consequently this move is also unlikely. (4) An

Austrian advance between the Elbe and the Black Elster is

their most likely move. How should we respond? We can

deploy either between the Elbe and the Black Elster, (5) or

before the bridgehead at Torgau. (6) We might also cross to the

left bank of the Elbe, and take up a position near Torgau. In

this case the enemy could bridge the Elbe at Miihlenberg, cross

to the left bank, and advance. The Prussians, however, would

still have the option to avoid battle. If they accept battle and

lose, they might cross to the right bank at Torgau, and retreat to

Wittenberg. (7)

These two defensive plans are comparable in several

respects. In either case the enemy must win a battle before he

can besiege Torgau. In both cases a Prussian victory would

seem to lead to similar results. A Prussian defeat between

Senftenberg and Spremberg would take the army further from

Torgau, because it would have to withdraw to Berlin. But the

retreat would leave the army in touch with the main part of its

homeland, and thus with its reinforcements. Stationing one

corps at Gorlitz seems advisable, because it would threaten the

Austrian flank. The force should, however, be commanded by a

skillful, energetic general. If such a man is not available, it

would be preferable not to detach the corps.

It would help us to choose between the two plans, if we

knew the exact lay of the land where battles are likely to occur.

One would also like to know more about the environment of

48
the fortresses at Torgau and Wittenberg, before deciding

whether our forces should be deployed there. (8)

In conclusion, if G6rlitz were fortified it would offer a

position that combines the advantages of both plans. We would

threaten the enemy flank, whatever he might do; we would

retain contact with the main mass of Prussian territory; and we

would remain free to turn toward Silesia. (9) Of course, we

would not benefit to the same extent from the advantages of the

Elbe with its two fortresses. The choice of our deployment

would also depend on whether we could expect to be reinforced

by the 1st Corps from East Prussia, and the 7th and 8th corps

from the Rhine.

49
I
7. CLAUSEWITZ TO ROEDER

24 December 1827

Dear Friend:

Believing that I had discharged my debt to our friendship

by the lengthiness of my remarks if by nothing else, I now see

that you call on me for a further exercise. I shall take up pen

again, not without the fear that your patience has already been

exhausted by my first letter.

In that letter I pointed out the extent to which the first

problem lacks the specific information that alone would permit

a solution that is not wholly arbitrary. 22 The second problem is

an extension of the first. Admittedly, it is more detailed, not as

generalized; nevertheless its terms are such that the specifics I

missed in the first exercise would also be very significant here.

On the other hand, we see that as the conditions of the exercise

are presented in greater detail, the specific arrangements of the

enemy assume increasing importance. Since it is impossible to

generate all essential facts in a hypothetical exercise, it is

evident that the more detailed our account, the more illusory it

becomes. We make any number of tacit assumptions, and

develop an analysis that in the end might not be relevant to one

case in a hundred. Reasoning of this kind may still be useful to

train our judgment, of course. But it is clear that such an

analysis can never be satisfactorily refuted by equally arbitrary

arguments. If we are contentious we won't be able to reach

agreement; if we honestly seek a solution we will eventually fall

into a disagreeable state of perplexity, in which we might almost

despair of the validity of any theory whatever.

By positing two different means of execution, and asking

you to choose between them, the second exercise expects you to

51
criticize each by means of the other. This seems to me

particularly inappropriate since the two approaches differ only

in one unimportant point. In any strategic problem, but most

especially in those that pose alternatives and ask us to choose

between them, I feel the need to reduce the issue to general

principles, that is to reveal the relationship between one or the

other option and the facts that inevitably result from the nature

of the situation. In this way, at least, we can recognize the

nature of each measure, and its unique characteristics. In the

event that we must execute one scheme or the other in real life,

we can then decide for ourselves whether the characteristics of

one or the other are better suited to our requirements and

circumstances. In short, when we evaluate hypothetical plans,

we must suspend final judgment on many points, while on

others we can be conclusive, because they violate conditions

that are set down clearly enough in the problem. I shall now

offer such comments on the various aspects of your analysis.

You say that a superior enemy force could not defeat the

Prussian corps at Gorlitz, or rather, you assume it, and indeed it

is no more than an assumption. Both experience and the nature

[or logic] of the situation teach us that it is very difficult to avoid

a developing battle if we are to maintain contact with the

enemy and miss no favorable opportunities. An enveloping

attack (what Jomini calls operating on exterior lines) is

therefore always very dangerous, and is warranted only by a

preponderance of force or the knowledge that the enemy is not

seeking a decisive action. Nor can you be certain that the enemy

will always keep one-and-a-half corps against your corps at

Gorlitz. When he is about to attack your main force, he may

leave only half a corps there. In any case, the force at Gorlitz

does not present all that much of a danger for him, since in an

emergency he can withdraw to the Elbe and by means of a

pontoon bridge cross the river below Dresden as well. The

calculations pertaining to the corps at Gorlitz are thus

52
extremely uncertain; it would be a mistake to trust them rather

than the far safer method of maintaining a unified force.

In strategy we must distinguish between outflanking and

bypassing a position. It is one thing to envelop a position with

individual corps or even with the whole army, and attack it from

the flank or rear. It is obviously something quite different to

bypass the position in order to pursue the object of the attack,

without regard to the enemy being left behind. In the first case,

the position retains its strategic effectiveness; indeed, the attack

demonstrates that it cannot be ignored, and it only remains for

the tactical features of the position to prove their strength. In

the other case, the position has lost its strategic effectiveness. It

is extremely rare that an attacker can bypass a position that isn't

very badly situated. But it is equally rare that a position cannot

be outflanked. In most cases the defender must be prepared for

this eventuality, and make his arrangements accordingly. A

position that is given up because it is being enveloped, is hardly

worth taking in the first place. I do not think the Austrians

could bypass your position either on the right or the left. They

could certainly envelop it more easily on the right than on the

left; but you cannot assert that enveloping it on the left would

be out of the question.

3. A retreat behind the Havel River would indicate that

we intend to base ourselves on the western part of the

monarchy. If that were not the case, the move would be entirely

inappropriate.

4. Presumably the real question is whether the Austrians,

if they want to carry out their offensive, can do anything other

than fight a battle. My answer is that they can't. First, because

they are not stronger than we are; secondly, because they are

entirely surrounded by our territories, and thus clearly at a

disadvantage. Their ability to force us to withdraw and then to

besiege and capture Torgau is reduced by these two

53
circumstances to such an extent that it would make little sense

for them to base their plans on this possibility. If they want to

fight, they must cross to the right bank of the Elbe where we

are, and naturally they would prefer to cross somewhere out of

our reach. But it is obviously wrong to hold that they could not

seek battle by advancing on the right bank with part or all of

their army. Crossing the river would complicate their

communications; but, as I have just indicated, they can hardly

bypass us or force us back [on the left bank].2 3

5. If we deploy between the Elbe and the Elster, it would

have to be south of Torgau. Hemmed in between two rivers that

present real obstacles to movement, the one because of its size,

the other by the nature of its banks, places us in a situation in

which our lines of retreat are exceptionally limited, a fact that

exerts a very undesirable influence on the conduct of battle. If,

to take advantage of a [tactically] strong position, we choose to

fight in this area, we should at least keep open a line of retreat

in Torgau itself. That demands that we deploy south of the

town, and not too near to it.

6. Deploying before Torgau, with our backs against the

town, like a bridgehead of flesh and blood, would mean

needlessly resorting to a measure of despair. Such a position,

benefitting from two protected flanks, but with a front

that-being convex-is very weak, and which in general

restricts the defender to extreme passivity, is suitable only to a

force that because of its weakness can no longer stay in the

field. It has been driven into a corner; its back is against the

wall because it is on the verge of giving way before the superior

strength of the enemy.

7. A large river, flowing in such a direction that the

defense can maintain its lines of communication for several

days' march on both banks, certainly offers the defense some

favorable opportunities. This is even more true when a fortress

54
with a bridgehead protects his movement from one bank to the

other, as Torgau does, and when another fortress, as

Wittenberg, some distance to his rear, multiplies the number of

options. It seems, indeed, that, at the moment the enemy

advances, the defender can avoid battle by crossing to the other

side of the river, without ceasing to cover the area through the

overall strategic effectiveness of his position. At first glance it is

not obvious why this game could not be repeated indefinitely.

But, first of all, it must be said that in most cases the strategic

value of a position declines markedly when a large river

separates the defense from the attacker, since this allows the

attacker to divide and maneuver his forces in ways that would

not be possible without this barrier. Secondly, it is rare that the

lines of communication on both banks of the river are of equal

value to the defense, and that either one could be given up at

any moment. Thirdly, the retreat of a large army over a bridge

across a river is not a trivial act; on the contrary, in the presence

of the enemy it is barely possible. Fourth, to break out on the

enemy's side of the river, should this become necessary, is no

simple matter, even in the vicinity of a friendly fortress. Fifth,

and finally, it would be very difficult repeatedly to shift all those

elements that constitute the rear of the army into their

appropriate positions. For all these reasons, a defender could

scarcely cross the river more than a couple of times, even under

the most favorable conditions, before, in his effort to counter

the movements and actions of the enemy, a part or the whole of

his army would suddenly find itself on the same bank as the

attacker.

If we apply these considerations to the Prussian army at

Torgau, we must agree that advantages could indeed be

obtained by skillful use of the Elbe in combination with the two

fortresses, whether to avoid battle for a time, or to give it under

favorable circumstances. But we cannot say in advance exactly

how this might be done, because no hypothetical case can

specify all the unique, momentary conditions that give rise to

55
opportunity. It must also be added that we ought not exaggerate

the absolute value of these favorable conditions; they merely

provide the opportunity for auspicious courses of action. If the

Prussian commander does not seize this opportunity with great

skill, the advantages of his position would soon disappear.

8. As you have correctly remarked, the position on the

Elbe presupposes that the army will base itself on the western

part of the monarchy, and give up its connection with the east.

Should this not be in accord with the general [political and

strategic] circumstances, the position would be unnatural and of

doubtful value.

It seems to me that overall the difference between

deploying behind the Black Elster and at Torgau is not great. If

we want to remain realistic, we would have to say that in the

event of a major battle, this particular difference would be only

a minute factor in the final result. The degree to which both

commanders have united their forces for combat, the good

planning and skillful conduct of the battle, the perseverance of

the commanders, the courage of the troops, their confidence in

their leader, the obedience of the subordinate generals-are

these not all factors that have greater significance and that

affect the outcome more directly?

Whether the Russians in 1812 withdrew from Moscow to

Vladimir or turned south to Kaluga -this one basic alternative,

while not primarily determining the direction of the French

retreat, as is sometimes claimed, was nevertheless a matter of

extraordinary importance.24 There can be no doubt that the

change of a single strategic line may have decisive influence.

But we ought not to suppose that it is therefore important

whether the Prussians fight at Senftenberg or at Torgau, unless

we wish to impute strategic value to things that have nothing to

do with strategy.

56
9. Deploying the main army at Gorlitz (assuming the

place is fortified), which is your ultimate conclusion, would put

the army in a flanking position. Naturally the territory that

flanking positions are supposed to cover does not lie directly

behind them. Such positions can therefore be adopted only if

the army has a very broad base of operations, so that the

flanking force retains a line of retreat. That is the case here. But

this line of retreat will always be rather constricted, sometimes

more so, sometimes less. The danger that the army will be

forced into an eccentric line of retreat, away from the main part

of its home territory, from the center of gravity of the entire

military base, constitutes a grave disadvantage of positions of

this kind. The position must make up for this flaw by its very

great tactical strength, so that the enemy either cannot attack it

at all, being immobilized as it were by its strategic power, or is

unlikely to succeed if he does attack. This justifies the flanking

position, but we still lack the real reason for it: its strategic

effectiveness. If you consider the present case with these points

in mind, you will agree that if the army at Gorlitz were

defeated, it would have to retreat on the highway to Breslau,

and would therefore be in danger of being driven south to

Silesia. A strategist of the old school would say: in that case the

army is lost. I won't, because it would be an entirely unjustified

assertion. But you will concede that a thousand serious

disadvantages would result from such a retreat. Finally, a strong

tactical position has not yet been located in the area around

Gorlitz, and its strategic effectiveness would not be very great in

any case, since the Austrians could base themselves on the

Elbe.

Your third study meets my entire approval [Roeder had

also sent Clausewitz a brief memorandum, which treated the

following: a) two armies of equal strength meet, each with a

vertical line of retreat; b) the same armies meet, one with a

vertical line of retreat, the other with a line of retreat that is an

extension of one of its wings. What are their respective

57
advantages and disadvantages?] I would only add that it is

difficult to provide a strategic cover for oblique lines of

communication.25

von Clausewitz

58
ENDNOTES

1. A Prussian corps at war-strength consisted of two

divisions, one artillery brigade, one Jdger detachment of two

companies, and one engineer detachment. A reserve infantry

regiment, a reserve Landwehr [second line] infantry battalion,

and a reserve Landwehr squadron might also be added.

The division consisted of a line infantry brigade and a

Landwehr infantry brigade of two regiments each, and of a

cavalry brigade. Besides the two regular cavalry regiments, the

cavalry brigade probably also included a Landwehr cavalry

regiment; at any rate, a corps had a total of four line and two

Landwehr cavalry regiments.

The artillery consisted of nine heavy artillery batteries, and

of three light- or horse-artillery batteries. Ed. of the 1937

German text.

2. Numerals in parenthesis in M's text were added by

Clausewitz. His comments are similarly identified, and refer to

the numerals in the text. Eds.

3. Numerals in parenthesis in Roeder's text were added

by Clausewitz. His respective comments are similarly identified.

Eds.

4. In peacetime, the 2nd Corps was stationed on the

Baltic, several hundred kilometers further away from the

theater of operations than the Guards and the 3rd, 4th, 5th, and

6th corps. Eds.

5. Clausewitz writes "wie die sogennannte Strategie,"

which, taken literally, would make little sense. The rest of the

sentence makes it apparent that he is referring to the "science"

or "discipline" of strategy. Eds.

59
6. Compare On War, Book I, ch. 1, sections 25 and 26

(pp. 87-88). Eds.

7. "Zwei Briefe des Generals von Clausewitz: Gedanken

zur Abwehr," special issue of the Militarwissenschaftliche

Rundschau, March 1937,5-9.

8. The editor of the German text points out that it is

Roeder who calls an Austrian advance through Lusatia on

Berlin the most dangerous threat to Prussia. See p. 22. Eds.

9. During the Seven Years War Berlin was briefly

occupied, once by the Austrians, once by the Russians. Eds.

10. As will be seen, Clausewitz does not mean he will test

MAs solution against historical examples, though his discussion

does occasionally refer to incidents in the past. He is here using

"historical" in opposition to "a strictly logical," i.e., theoretical,

refutation, to signify a realistic, concrete analysis of Mfs

"individual points." For Clausewitz's belief that history, as the

reflection of reality, is the only valid basis for a theory of war,

see the statement in his letter to Roeder above, p. 8, and many

passages in On War, for example Book II, ch. 6 (pp. 170-74).

Eds.

11. The comparison with games points to the belief that

the cardplayer tends not to play his best cards at once, but

gradually in the course of the game. Ed. of the German text.

See also the discussion of Clausewitz's essay "On Progression

and Pause in Military Activity," which compares gambling and

war, in Peter Paret, Clausewitz and the State, pp. 361-62. Eds.

12. The reference is to the danger that according to M a

siege of Torgau constituted for Prussia. Ed. of the German text.

13. This seems to refer to those cases in which it was

important to occupy a significant area and establish defensive

60
positions there before the enemy could do so. Ed. of the

German text.

14. M wrote "at the Prussian border." Major von Roeder's

solution (p. 15) counted on the possibility that the enemy would

cross the Elbe in the vicinity of Dresden. Ed. of the German

text.

15. In this passage M did not refer to "the most

disadvantageous defensive," but to Prussia being "thrown ...

completely on the defensive" (p. 18). That difference does not,

however, affect the sense of Clausewitz's argument. Ed. of the

German text.

16. Clausewitz writes "venn ich dazu berufen ware"-

which means either "were I competent to do so," or "were I

called upon to do so." Both versions are possible, though the

latter seems close to a tautology: "I should feel obliged to

attack [the argument] were I called upon to do so." It seems

preferable to interpret the statement as an expression of

Clausewitz's habitual courteous self-depreciation. Eds.

17. That Clausewitz, having demolished MAs solution, can

claim he agrees with him perhaps more than with anyone else,

may seem strange. In part, the statement is a further expression

of the polite, unassertive manner that he habitually assumed

toward his subordinates. But his overt tolerance covers a good

measure of sarcasm, and probably also a rejection of the

conventional military judgment of the day, which Clausewitz

considers so inadequate that even an M might not be the most

competent strategic analyst. Eds.

18. Apparently Clausewitz is again referring to the absence

of specific information on the political situation, which alone

would determine whether an advance through Lusatia would be

appropriate. Ed. of the German text.

61
19. Roeder makes no provision for uniting the Gorlitz

corps with the main Prussian Army concentrated northeast of

Hoyerswerda, rather this corps would be forced northeast into

Silesia. Eccentric deployment is the same as divergent

deployment, i.e., away from the center. See On War, pages

367-369. Eds.

20. Clausewitz writes "Parteiganger," who might be either

elite regulars-Jager (rangers) or Schatzen (sharpshooters)-

trained in detached, small unit operations, or regular line

infantry and light cavalry used for this purpose, or irregulars.

Eds.

21. Numerals in parenthesis in Roeder's text were added

by Clausewitz. His respective comments are similarly identified.

Eds.

22. This sentence introduces a characteristic example of

Clausewitz's dialectic method of analysis. Eds.

23. To convey Clausewitz's meaning in this paragraph, a

very free translation of the final sentence seems necessary. The

German reads: "Der Grund, dass sie dann ihre

Kommunikationen aufgeben wurden, bezieht sich auf das

Vorbeigehen oder Herausmanovrieren, welches ich eben als

untuhlich gezeight habe." Eds.

24. Vladimir is about 150 miles east of Moscow on the road

to Gorki while Kaluga is about 100 miles southwest of Moscow.

By placing his army at Kaluga, Kutusov was in a position to

threaten Napoleon's line of retreat from Moscow. This

maneuver also tended to concentrate Kutusov's army with

Russian forces operating south of the Konigsberg-VilnaSmolensk-Moscow line, a move to Vladimir would have

continued to drive major Russian armies apart. Eds.

62
25. See On War Book Six, Ch. Four, page 462 for

Clausewitz's discussion of lines of communication.

See also Erich von Manstein's Lost Victories,

Henry Regnery Co., 1958, for WW II examples

of divergent lines of operation; p. 291, pp.

368-369.

and

pp. 369-370 for an example of oblique lines of

communication for German forces in southern

Russia. Eds.

' U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1994-555-001/82122

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