CHINESE ARMY BUILDING

IN THE ERA OF JIANG ZEMIN

Andrew Scobell

August 2000
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ii
FOREWORD

To many in the United States, China looms larg

threatening. What are the national security and na

military goals of China’s leaders? What strategie

Chinese leaders considering in pursuit of these goals? 

is the likelihood that these goals will be attained?

This monograph attempts to answer these que

through an analysis of China’s defense establishment 

the leadership of Jiang Zemin. It assesses the politica

economic determinants of China’s effort to moderni

armed forces. Four possible strategies are outline

“playing the superpower game,” (2) “playing 

strengths,” (3) “changing the rules of the game,”or (4) 

play that game.” The factors that will determin

selection of a strategy are examined. The most 

strategy is identified and its outcome evaluated. Last

implications of the study for the U.S. defense comm

are addressed.

Forthcoming studies by Dr. Andrew Scobell will a

the substance and future of China’s “strategic partne

with Russia and analyze China’s use of force. A 

monograph will examine more broadly trends i

Asia-Pacific region and their policy implications for th

defense community.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR

Director

Strategic Studies Institute

iii
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTH

ANDREW SCOBELL joined the Strategic Studies Ins

(SSI) in August 1999 and is SSI’s expert on Asia. He t

at the University of Louisville, Kentucky, and Ru

University, New Jersey. Since 1988 Dr. Scobel

published articles in such journals as Armed Force

Society, Asian Survey, China Quarterly, Compa

Politics, Journal of Political and Military Soci

Political Science Quarterly, and Problems of 

Communism. Recent articles have focuse

China-Taiwan tensions, the Korean War, and parami

formations. He is currently completing a book about C

use of force since 1949. Dr. Scobell holds a B.A. in H

from Whitman College, an M.A. in International S

from the University of Washington, and a Ph.D. in Po

Science from Columbia University.

iv
CHINESE ARMY BUILDING

IN THE ERA OF JIANG ZEMIN

Mao Zedong enabled Chinese to stand tall;

Deng Xiaoping let the people get rich;

the third generation leadership, with Jiang Zemin

at its core,

will enable China to become a strong country.

-Zhang Wannian (1997)

1

To many in the United States, China looms larg

strategic threat. Some anticipate a threat emerging 

foreseeable future, while others believe that one al

exists. Any rising power, as it seeks to find its place o

global stage, poses challenges to the world community

is merely prudent to consider the possibility that B

might become an adversary.

2

One can point to either positive or negative tren

support polar opposite judgments about China. It c

argued that the country is evolving into a peac

responsible global citizen, or that China is a burgeo

belligerent power. There are positive signs that Ch

becoming increasingly integrated into the world eco

Beijing has a substantial material stake in preserv

peaceful international environment and mainta

cordial relations with Washington. On the negative 

China, already a nuclear power with the world’s la

number of men and women under arms, is actively en

in modernizing its nuclear and conventional systems

some of its leading strategic thinkers consider Washi

an adversary or potential adversary (see below). It i

sensible to ask how China’s military capabilities are 

to change during the early years of the 21st century.

The central challenge that China’s Communist 

leaders face today is how to proceed with mi

modernization in order to ensure a military strong en

1
to be victorious in war without spending the regim

oblivion. In other words, how does the People’s Repu

China (PRC) avoid what might be dubbed the “Soviet 

of economic decline coupled with the emergence 

politically unreliable army? The Soviet collapse 

systemic in origin but precipitated by the policies of M

Gorbachev.

3

 From the Chinese perspective, the collaps

due to excessive military spending.

4

 The triggering 

however, was the military’s abandonment of the comm

party’s paramount leader.

5

 Beijing’s challenge is a

heart of the “conflicting principles” in civil-mi

relations: how to maintain armed forces sufficient to d

successfully a regime from its enemies while at the 

time ensure that the military does not undermin

regime by consuming too many resources.

6

While the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 

million strong and has made significant strid

upgrading its forces, it remains quite backward with li

capabilities.

7

 At the dawn of the 21st century, Beijin

much desires a stronger military able to project force s

beyond its borders in order to defend its territorial cla

the South China Sea and possessing greater conven

and nuclear deterrence.

8

 Moreover, Beijing wants 

capable of projecting force within its current borders t

with ethnic rebellion in frontier regions and work

peasant unrest in China proper without ou

interference. The fear expressed by Chinese leaders 

the potential for the emergence of an “Asian” Ser

Kosovo is a strong indication of this. The level of ala

evident from the bald statement made by one 

researcher in a Hong Kong newspaper in late 1999: “Ta

is not Kosovo.”

9

 Even before Kosovo, however, concer

expressed that China’s efforts to deal with internal e

unrest in the 21st century might be used as the prete

external intervention. Military operations against 

separatists could, for example, prompt the impositio

“no fly zone” by an outside power.

10

2
RICH COUNTRY, STRONG ARMY

However, China’s civilian leaders do not want de

spending to serve as a brake on economic growth

political question of how Beijing can balance the ne

further modernize its military forces with the imperat

continued economic growth and Chinese Communist 

(CCP) rule falls squarely in the realm of political eco

How much (defense spending) is enough? The answ

course depends on where China wants to go. Wha

China’s national security objectives for the medium 

(next 10-15 years)? David Finkelstein has cogently a

that these comprise sovereignty, modernity, and stabi

At a minimum, these translate into full control ove

geographical areas that the PRC currently occu

continued economic growth and prosperity, an

survivability of the communist regime. At a maxi

these mean full control of all territories claimed by Be

and a wealthy, technologically advanced and econom

robust society with a powerful and state-of-the-art se

apparatus.

Chinese leaders and common people have long ye

for a “rich country and strong army” (fuguo qiangbing

aspiration has been articulated during both the 19t

20th centuries. It is instructive to note that in the so-

“Democracy Wall” movement of late 1978 and early 1

recurring desire expressed by the people on the stre

Beijing—at least as frequently as calls for greater fre

and openness—was that China should become prosp

and possess a powerful military.

12

 A similar them

evident in the May 1999 popular protests against th

bombing of China’s embassy in Belgrade.

13

 The 

character mantra was also very much a part of 

Xiaoping’s vocabulary.

14

 More recently this call has 

repeated.

15

Chinese political and military leaders clearly have 

power ambitions.

16

 Beijing is not satisfied with be

regional power—it wants to be a world power. It 

3
surprising then that the yardstick by which China’s le

measure their progress is the United States. And the 

example of superpower failure—to be avoided 

costs—is the Soviet Union.

This monograph analyzes China’s de

establishment under the leadership of Jiang Zemi

assesses the political and economic determinan

Beijing’s effort to modernize its armed forces. First

possible army building strategies are outlined. Secon

domestic and foreign factors that will determin

selection of a strategy are examined. Finally, the most 

outcome is presented and its implications analyzed.

ARMY BUILDING STRATEGIES

What are China’s national military objectives fo

new decade and beyond? David Finkelstein contends 

are to: (1) protect the CCP and safeguard stabilit

defend China’s sovereignty and defeat aggression; a

modernize the military and build the nation.

17

 I

monograph I focus on the first element of the 

dimension: modernizing the military or what mig

called “army building.” As I see it, China can pursue 

four different defense policy or army building strateg

can: (1) “play the superpower game”; (2) “play 

strengths”; (3) “change the rules (of the game)”; or, (4) 

play that game.” While these are analytically di

strategies, in practice, elements of one can very eas

combined with elements of another in any numb

different variations.

Playing the Superpower Game.

The first alternative is to “play the superpower g

What I mean by this is that Beijing strives to attain a

trappings of a late 20th century superpower. The 

example of such a state is, of course, the United State

other obvious example was the Soviet Union. The str

accouterments of a Chinese superpower would include 

4
things as aircraft carriers, an active space program

sizeable nuclear arsenal with adequate delivery sy

(including fleet ballistic missile submarines [SSBNs

intercontinental ballistic missiles [ICBMs]). Accordin

recent RAND study, China is currently pursuin

across-the-board modernization strategy.

18

 This 

option is what June Dreyer labels “fighting high techn

with high technology.”

19

 In the 1990s China geared 

develop a modern, high-technology air force. Mi

leaders appear to believe that the sine qua non 

turn-of-the-century regional power is a capable co

ready air force. The PLA has set its sights on a long

plan to modernize completely its aircraft throu

combination of off-the-shelf purchases, techn

transfers, and pilot training programs mostly from 

Russian Republic. The primary lesson of the Gulf War 

eyes of many PLA leaders is the primacy of airp

particularly the importance of controlling airspace 

least denying it to a hostile power.

20

“Playing the Superpower Game” appeals to conven

military thinking because it involves large concentrati

troops, large formations of heavy armor, hundreds o

performance fighter aircraft, not to mention battle 

and aircraft carriers. This option also plays to 

consumption because it focuses on the acquisition 

development of weaponry and forces that can be r

displayed in National Day parades and military exe

that show well in news footage on national television.

depth of popular desire for higher global status for Ch

evident in such things as the yearning for China to ac

an aircraft carrier.

22

 And the major impetus to C

space program is national prestige. There are, of c

significant commercial applications for this program a

as spin-offs for military technology. Formal planning 

manned space flight began in 1992, and prepara

continue apace. China successfully tested an unma

spacecraft in November 1999, and expectations are 

5
that China will succeed in putting a man in space ea

the 21st century.

23

Playing to Your Strengths.

The second strategy is what might be called sel

development of weapons systems and technologies tha

to China’s existing strengths and areas of gre

potential.

24

 China should avoid the temptation of seek

match its opponent’s strengths and instead build on it

strengths.

25

 As Admiral Liu Huaqing said in 1993:

The mission of our armed forces is to safeguard our inviola

territory... and sea rights and interests. . . . Therefore, 

pursue . . . (a) military modernization (that) serves the need

territorial and offshore defense . . . in order to win a high-t

local and limited war with the available weapons a

equipment.

26

This option is what June Dreyer calls “doing more 

existing equipment.”

27

This army building strategy stresses that China s

pursue a defense policy which makes the most sen

China for several reasons. Financially, it means tha

PLA does not need to fund modernization across the 

but can funnel money into “pockets of excellence.” Sho

can accelerate the process: foreign technology ca

acquired by purchase or through espionage. The 

target for the former is Russia, while the prime targ

the latter is the United States. That China has purc

significant quantities of Russian arms in the 1990s i

That China has targeted the United States as the 

territory for obtaining military technology and ac

sought such intelligence through stealth purchase

spying is also beyond dispute. According to a Chines

manual published in 1991, intelligence gathering i

United States is “necessary to make breakthroughs o

technologies.”

28

 What is in dispute is the degree of su

the Chinese have had. According to the Cox Report, 

6
obtained the plans to the W-88 warhead (better kno

the neutron bomb). China, while it has offi

acknowledged possessing the neutron bomb, has poin

denied achieving this technological breakthrough th

spying.

29

In practical terms, the strategy of playing to 

strengths is simply a continuation of what is being 

now. Particular attention is being given to upgradi

nuclear weapons program to exploit missile technolog

to deploy nuclear warheads not only strategically bu

tactically.

30

 And, as one expert noted, the developm

nukes is “relatively cheap compared to efforts to ach

similar level of deterrence based on developing high

conventional weapon systems.”

31

Changing the Rules.

The third army building strategy is to change some 

fundamental rules and assumptions of convent

(Western) thinking about defense and national se

policy. That is, rather than perceiving defense requirem

as separate and distinct from other national (civ

needs, Beijing would view them as integral and intertw

This, in essence, would mean infrastructure project

economic ventures should be evaluated not only fro

perspective of how they meet peacetime needs, but als

they would contribute to wartime needs.

This ideal was present in Mao’s thinking o

importance of the military contributing to nonmi

projects, and of the armed forces being an organic exte

of the people. Under Mao, Beijing sought to subvert th

of political economy as they relate to defense spendi

making the PLA a productive force and an educative 

in addition to a fighting force. Soldiers could contrib

their own upkeep by, for example, engaging in 

cultivation and animal husbandry. Soldiers could 

assist in economic construction through participat

public works projects. Politically Mao viewed the P

7
ideological shock troops who could lead the mass

example, serving as a “great school” for the entire coun

 This concept of meshing military and civilian sphe

also a logical extension of Deng Xiaoping’s thinking. 

rationalized placing a priority on economic moderniz

over military modernization by emphasizing tha

former made important long-term contributions t

latter.

32

 And under Deng, China sought to circumve

constraints placed on military modernization throug

creative initiatives.

First, the military was given a green light to util

extensive economic holdings, expertise, and other reso

to raise extra-budgetary funds to supplement the m

defense outlays it received from the state budget.

33

 O

one hand, Jiang Zemin’s initiative of the late 1990s to 

the PLA of its business empire represents a reversal o

thinking. On the other hand, this initiative appears 

foundering.

34

 The second initiative was to diversify m

industries so that they could pursue civilian product

phrase widely used in China was “civil-military integr

peacetime-wartime integration” (junmin jiehe, pin

jiehe).

35

 The idea was to facilitate technological tra

from civilian to military use. Thus, the purpose w

upgrade the technological level of military industries

term widely used in English, defense conversion, was 

a misnomer.

36

 The recent stress on giving greater atte

to national projects that will serve peacetime and wa

needs indicates a continuation of this line of thought

Don’t Play That Game.

The goal of the fourth army building strategy is to 

having to play the superpower game altogether. Th

Beijing does not need to get involved in a poten

disastrous full-blown arms race such as that durin

Cold War. According to one source, the West sought to 

China into the trap of increasing military spending s

the Chinese would step into the shoes of the former S

8
Union.”

38

 According to one strategic thinker, the outco

superpower competition between Washington and M

was “one defeated, one wounded” ( yi bai, yi shang). A

Soviet Union and the United States focused on mi

competition, the thinker noted, West Germany and J

were able to concentrate on making themselves into 

economic powers.

39

This army building strategy is geared to w

“asymmetric warfare.”

40

 An oft-quoted phrase—attr

to Mao—is very relevant here: “You fight your kind o

and I’ll fight mine” (ni da ni de, wo da wo de).

4

publication of such works as Unrestricted Warfare in 

by two PLA Air Force colonels points to the conside

thought and discussion this policy has received in C

The book has also received much attention in the U

States.

42

In this alternative, the PLA essentially opts out 

orthodox defense development model. China does no

to build thousands of state-of-the-art tanks, ai

carriers and attendant support ships, a massive nu

arsenal, and pursue a vast array of conventional w

systems. Instead of seeking to match up against the U

States head-to-head in battle space, China will foc

developing capabilities that can indirectly negate 

apparent insurmountable strengths in technology 

numbers. These capabilities would include such thin

ballistic missiles, computer network attacks, and 

information operations, aimed at underminin

economic, transportation, and communications infra

tures of a technologically superior power. Acade

Military Sciences researchers discuss computer wa

forming “network guerilla units” to hack into the Penta

computer systems.

43

A high priority is information warfare.

44

 In

“information warfare” as conceived of by strategi

China is not a means to attain battlefield dominance 

key dimension of asymmetric warfare in its own ri

9
China also attaches a high priority to “counter

operations.” Chinese analysts believe that the PLA s

focus on exploiting a weakness in U.S. intellig

communication, and navigation: excessive dependen

satellites. There is considerable discussion among Ch

strategists about antisatellite warfare.

46

 This effo

China to grasp the Revolution in Military Affairs (RM

not aimed at seeking to match the United States me

for measure but rather asymmetrically with a reg

instead of a global focus.

47

Chinese thinkers urge attention to how concept

principles from “People’s War” can be adapted to fig

modern warfare. In early 1998, for example, Ch

Minister of National Defense Chi Haotian gave a lect

the PLA’s National Defense University titled “People’

Under Modern High Tech Conditions.”

48

 And in the w

the Kosovo campaign, some PLA analysts have sou

highlight the continued relevance of the princip

People’s War in modern warfare.

49

Indeed, “Don’t Play That Game” is an applicat

many of the principles of classical Chinese strategists 

as Sun Zi and concepts of Mao’s People’s War. Essen

this army building strategy addresses the issue of ho

weak might overcome the strong.

50

 It has been sugg

that the Chinese style of strategy may be better sui

dealing with war in the information age than We

styles.

51

DETERMINING FACTORS

The factors likely to determine which army bu

strategy China will pursue in the medium term a

doctrine and warfighting scenarios; (2) domestic eco

and political variables; and, (3) elite perceptions o

international environment.

10
Doctrine and War Fighting Scenarios.

Current doctrine is known as “limited war 

high-tech conditions.” While a “strategic shift” from Pe

War to “Limited War” occurred in the mid-1980

incorporation of a high-tech focus appeared in the 1990

response to the Gulf War, reportedly at the prompt

Jiang Zemin.

52

 It is important to recognize that Ch

strategic thinking is not monolithic, and ther

differences of opinion on military doctrine. Accord

Michael Pillsbury, there are three very distinc

different schools of thought within the PLA concernin

type of future warfare China should be prepared to fig

identifies a “People’s War” school, a “Local (or Lim

War” school, and an “RMA” school.

53

 While Pillsbury 

these schools separate with no overlap, elements of Pe

War and RMA seem readily transferable to Limited 

doctrine.

54

 Indeed, as noted above, Chinese str

thinkers do tend to take concepts from People’s Wa

RMA and apply them to Limited War. And as Pill

notes, limited (or “local”) war “seems to include a 

range of scenarios, almost any war smaller in scale t

global or major nuclear war.”

55

Many Chinese strategic thinkers believe that sm

medium-scale wars are likely and indeed inevitable 

Asia-Pacific region.

56

 While medium-scale wars i

region may or may not involve China, certainly the 

must be ready. According to Dr. Cheng Guangzho

research fellow at the Academy of Military Science

“probability of territorial disputes (in the Asia-P

sparking partial war and armed conflict is very 

Cheng’s October 1999 interview in a leading Ch

newspaper paints a very sobering strategic appraisal 

region.

57

Even leaving aside this trend, the principle of 

defense central to Chinese doctrine increases the odd

China will resort to force when faced with a crisis

ultimate form of “active defense” is a preemptive str

11
This, combined with Chinese attitudes towar

importance of the first offensive strike in future 

replacing the traditional preference for a carefully pre

and timed counterattack, significantly raises the pot

for China to launch a surprise offensive move.

59

Furthermore, the PLA’s primary warfighting scen

and training exercises involve Limited War. And the 

of the prime warfighting scenario, Limited War doc

and National Security goals is Taiwan. Indeed, in the 

of many Chinese strategic thinkers, Taiwan is the d

most likely to drag China to the brink of war i

foreseeable future.

60

Other scenarios for possible rapid military deploy

include the South China Sea, and China’s central 

border regions.

61

 The central Asia scenario might in

operations to counter domestic unrest in Tibet or Xin

or border clashes with India. Beijing is particu

concerned about stability in Tibet and Xinjiang, espe

the emerging insurgency and terrorism campaign 

waged by Uighurs.

62

 To combat the Uighur challeng

China is far more ready to employ military force with

borders than without.”

63

 This concern and fears of 

unrest in China proper have prompted an increase 

size of the paramilitary People’s Armed Police to more 

one million men.

64

Domestic Variables.

The PLA on the one hand is used to being revere

privileged, while on the other hand having to pla

bureaucratic interests second behind the economi

social needs of the country and the political demands 

CCP. Under the leadership of Mao Zedong, the PLA 

expected to play political, economic, social, and in

security roles in addition to being responsible for C

external defense. From the birth of the PLA in 1927 

Mao’s death in 1976, Chinese military leaders were sev

constrained ideologically and technologically as to doc

12
weaponry, and training. Then, during approximat

decades under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping (late 

to mid-1990s), a more restrictive role was delineated

the military was encouraged to focus on de

modernization. The constraints on the PLA durin

period were primarily resource-based as military upgr

took a backseat to overall economic development.

In the era of Jiang Zemin, the defense challeng

become more acute from Beijing’s perspective. Thi

political era, which began in the mid-1990s when 

Xiaoping became too ill to function as paramount lea

coincides with a period of flux in Beijing’s strategic ou

In the aftermath of the Gulf War, the collapse of the S

Union (1991), and the conclusion of the Kosovo cam

(1999), China now sees the global strategic environme

very different light.

66

Economic. Boom or bust, there are likely to be pers

tensions between defense needs and sustaining eco

growth.Economic slowdowns, such as the one followin

1997-98 Asian financial crisis, will swell the ranks 

unemployed. This in turn will increase the potenti

unrest. While official estimates of urban unemployme

low, unofficial estimates are considerably higher—at 

as high as 8 or 9 percent, and perhaps as high 

percent.

67

 China has appeared largely to avoid s

fallout from the 1997-98 financial crisis, but its econo

extremely vulnerable in several ways.

68

 There ar

particularly serious weaknesses. The first is how to r

inefficient state owned enterprises. Most are perennia

makers, and closing them down or even making them 

efficient would mean massive layoffs. The specter of w

unrest is a frightening one for Chinese leaders 

employees as state owned enterprises constitute a

three-quarters of all urban workers.

69

 The second pr

is the “enormous buildup of nonperforming loans”—th

loans have gone unrepayed for longer than 

months—and these comprise more than one-fifth 

outstanding loans of China’s largest banks.

70

 This rais

13
possibility of bank and business failures and a stock m

crash. Such events could also trigger unrest when per

savings and investments are wiped out. This scenario 

so far fetched, judging by the October 1998 collapse 

Guangdong International Trust and Investment C

ation. Foreign investors in this case, however, suffere

overwhelming majority of the losses.

For more than 2 decades China has been able to su

high rates of economic growth. Even the lower growth 

of approximately 7 percent have been sufficient to su

prosperity. Chinese officials seem confident of cont

growth of this order of magnitude for 2001.

71

 As of 

2000, these leaders seem determined to proceed 

market-oriented reforms, especially initiatives aim

revamping China’s financial system and state o

enterprises.

72

While unemployment continues to be a social pr

and of serious concern to Chinese leaders, the matte

proved largely manageable. Although Chinese officia

foreign observers have continued to express concern 

the destabilizing effects of a vast “floating popul

estimated to be as large as 100 million persons, thi

pool of mobile labor, to the contrary, has had a po

impact on social order and economic growth. The tran

provide a ready pool of labor in areas where th

under-supply, thereby sustaining growth in eco

dynamic regions while at the same time moderatin

income inequalities of poorer regions that otherwise 

not benefit from the boom times in other regions.

73

Corruption is another intractable but so far manag

problem. Corruption is endemic, corrosive, and of 

concern to Beijing. The question is what negative imp

has. Corruption is arguably less destructive and de

lizing in China than in other countries.

74

Indeed, in C

case it may actually stimulate economic growth.

75

Overall, China’s leaders can be cautiously opti

about the economic outlook. As of this writing, B

14
seems on course to receive Permanent Normal Tr

Relations status from the U.S. Congress and is on tr

join the World Trade Organization.

Political. Many observers of Jiang Zemin era 

politics point to the growing power and influence 

PLA in foreign and domestic policymaking.

76

 The

differences of scholarly opinion as to the natur

impact of this influence. Some argue it is largely li

only to national security matters and that much 

lobbying is strictly on an individual basis and 

coordinated institutional or bureaucratic l

ing.

77Others insist it is more extensive and 

institutional in nature.

78

I contend that senior military leaders in contemp

China are very influential in national policymakin

course they are more active in some areas 

others—particularly in those that fall withi

parameters of the national security objectives ment

earlier. PLA leaders, however, do not dictate pol

control the agenda. Civil-military relations in the PR

perhaps best characterized as a process of con

bargaining.

79

The Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1995-96 was a wate

in civil-military relations in China.

80

 I argue that 

the first crisis of the post-Deng Xiaoping era.

81

It he

the emergence of a new configuration in military po

It was the last gasp of the dual-role elites prevalent 

Mao era, and in the Deng era at the highest ech

China entered the Jiang era with civilian and m

leaders clearly differentiated. Jiang, unlike Mao or 

has no significant military experience. While the ep

marked a significant change in civil-military rel

and highlighted the growing influence of the PLA, 

probably marked the high water mark of mi

influence. This is because the two key military figu

the crisis, Long Marchers Liu Huaqing and Zhang 

have since retired. The words of subsequent m

15
spokesmen are unlikely to carry the same wei

Nevertheless, the modes by which the PLA influences 

have changed. Rather than make the concerns o

military known only at the highest echelons of 

through informal discussions in smoke-filled rooms, 

Jiang era the PLA also lobbies more publicly in the m

through books, journals, and to political leaders th

letters and visits.

83

 The National People’s Congress wa

a key forum for PLA lobbying in the 1990s.

84

Jiang Zemin has moved adroitly to establis

authority in the PLA. As a consummate bureaucr

quickly grasped the importance of managing the mi

nomenklatura—at the dawn of the 21st century, th

ranks of the PLA are filled with men Jiang has appo

and promoted.

85

 Jiang moved to exercise the power 

purse more slowly. The commercial ventures of the 

were allowed to go unchecked for almost 2 decades, an

negative impact of this became more and more evide

the 1990s progressed. Finally, Jiang acted, prim

nudged by the rampant corruption that he believe

depriving the party-state of much needed reven

Moreover, corruption in the armed forces was of 

greater concern because it is viewed as an “early symp

the erosion of combat readiness and party control.”

87

 A

banning the PLA from commerce, Jiang was mak

one-time commitment of state funds to compensat

military for divestiture and increasing defense outla

the long term.

88 The divestiture has been stymied by f

from the May 1999 Belgrade embassy bombing th

Consequently, it is unlikely that the PLA w

dispossessed fully of its commercial holdings an

soon.

89

Still, grasping the powers of appointment and the 

do not a civilian controlled military make. There i

weak institutional civilian control of the army in Chin

the CCP side, the tripod of party committees, the po

commissar system, and the political work committe

ensure party control of the PLA for the moment.

90

 How

16
if the past is any guide, political officers will tend to 

the military’s perspective instead of representin

party’s interests.

91

 Moreover, political indoctrination 

military in the 1990s takes an instrumental form 

stresses blind loyalty to the party without articula

theoretical underpinning or rationale.

92

 The major 

through which actual party control is exercised 

Central Military Commission (CMC) which, alth

chaired by Jiang, is dominated by soldiers.

And the state apparatus for controlling the milit

very weakly institutionalized. While there is formally 

party and a state CMC, they are one and the same

point is made clearly by the constant reference simply 

Zhongyang Junwei and omitting the prefix “Par

“State” altogether.

93Furthermore, the Ministry of Na

Defense serves purely ceremonial/diplomatic 

coordinating functions—it is a place to greet fo

military delegations, etc.

94

It is significant that in key 

of legislation such as the 1982 Constitution of the Pe

Republic of China and the National Defense Law of 

there is no mention made of the Ministry of Na

Defense or Minister of National Defense.

95

The current PLA leadership owes its political loya

the abstract entity of the CCP and its personal allegia

Jiang Zemin who presently holds the troika of 

President, CCP General Secretary, and CMC Chai

While the personal dimension may be quite firm,

political link is less ironclad (see below). Still, a remar

and significant development is the establishmen

adherence to retirement norms established by the pa

There appears to be an unwritten pact that the 

supports the CCP, and in exchange the CCP gives th

autonomy over military affairs and appropriate lev

funding and guidance.

98Thus Jiang Zemin has stress

high-tech nature of warfighting and sought to provid

PLA with sufficient resources to develop accordingly

there is a sense among soldiers that the CCP leadersh

incurred a substantial debt to the PLA during the r

17
period, and at some point the armed forces will call th

That is, as noted in the introduction, military mo

zation has taken a backseat to national econ

development. The impact of the organizational ch

announced in 1998 remains unclear. The creation of a 

civilian Committee on Science, Technology, and Ind

for National Defense (COSTIND) to replace the 

military CONSTIND and the formation of a Ge

Armament Department (GAD) could be a more coh

and focused PLA research, development, and acqui

effort. According to one analyst, the “most important p

and organizations” from the old CONSTIND shifted 

GAD. And the “biggest organizational winners” i

defense establishment reshuffle are the PLA an

GAD.

99 One analyst aptly characterizes party-mi

relations in post-Deng China as a “bargaining” syst

which the PLA must be consulted on all major 

issues.

100

Increasingly, military sentiment appears to questi

heretofore sacrosanct party-army link. This takes the 

of advocating the statification or nationaliz

(guojiahua) of the army.

101

 The concern over the po

reliability of the PLA that was raised in dramatic fash

1989 continues to be evident from periodic condemna

that appear in the official media of statification 

“depoliticization” of the armed forces. Despite the ma

political campaign launched in the aftermath of June 

Beijing continues to be perturbed by the penetration 

military by Taiwanese intelligence and the Falun Gon

in the late 1990s.

102

Elite Perceptions of the International

Environment. 

While the environment in the Asia-Pacific region i

peaceful, this is considered rather a superficial cond

When a region has such dynamic economic growth, 

kind of military conflict is inevitable even if it is only m

18
according to one scholar from the Academy of Mi

Sciences. Therefore, according to the analyst: “. . 

overall peace(ful) situation can be termed worryin

moreover conflicts and crises are always occurring i

Asia. . . .”

103

In the 1990s China’s military leaders frequently 

been depicted as hardliners—the leading advoca

tough, uncompromising policies toward the United S

Taiwan, and territorial claims in the South China S

PLA leaders are regularly depicted as belligere

bellicose. The most widely read work of the “China Th

school, The Coming Conflict with China, begins w

highly incendiary quotation on page 1 by a senior Ch

military strategist. Lieutenant General Mi Zhen

quoted as saying:

[As for the United States] for a relatively long time it will 

absolutely necessary that we quietly nurse our sense 

vengeance. . . . We must conceal our abilities and bide o

time.

105

This quote is, to put it mildly, very misleading. W

appears that Lieutenant General Mi did indeed write 

the quote is taken out of context for dramatic effect

misleading results. First of all, this is a most inflamm

translation. “Quietly nurse our sense of vengeance”—

phrase—could also be translated “endure hardship in 

to wipe out our national humiliation” (woxin cangd

Second, the quote is portrayed inaccurately as eviden

bellicose PLA. In fact the second key phrase, “conce

abilities and bide our time” (taoguang yanghui), is 

directly from the famous 28-character policy guid

issued some years earlier by Deng Xiaoping. Third

original Chinese text does not explicitly mention the U

States.

107

Chinese military men have also been quoted extens

threatening war against Taiwan and a nuclear 

against the United States. These verbal barrages a

19
warn the U.S. armed forces not to meddle in Taiwan u

they were prepared to risk a major conflict with Chi

The saber rattling in the Taiwan Strait of late 199

early 1996 was interpreted by some as reflecting a mi

takeover of Taiwan policy.

109 The truth of the matter 

more complex. Saber rattling was strongly favored b

PLA, but it was the result of a consensus between Be

political and military leaders.

110

 There is strong sent

for unification with Taiwan at an early date among 

soldiers and civilians.

111

While the anger and outrage expressed by Ch

military leaders during the 1995-96 crisis reflected ge

feelings of frustration, this does not mean the PLA 

itching to go to war over Taiwan.

112

 In fact, the think

Chinese soldiers appears to be quite close to the “mi

mind” outlined by Samuel Huntington more than 40 

ago.

113That is, they appear conservative, pessimisti

wary of initiating hostilities. Indeed, in most cases, Ch

soldiers appear no more eager and often less willing 

their civilian counterparts to resort to war. In shor

seem to react much like their U.S. counterparts.

114

The U.S. Threat to China: “It’s Taiwan, Stupid.

Beijing sees the United States as its principle thre

This is not to say that China sees war with the United S

as imminent, but rather Beijing has believed for th

decade or so that Washington is working to unde

communist rule and to stymie Chinese efforts to dev

more powerful military. Since the mid-1990s, B

concluded that Washington had reversed its “one C

policy and was now actively working to prevent China 

unifying with Taiwan. In fact, Taiwan is now viewe

means by which the United States is actively preve

China from being a “unified, powerful socialist count

According to a group of strategic thinkers led by D

Director Zhu Chenghu of the Institute for Strategic St

of the National Defense University, “After the end 

20
Cold War, Taiwan has been increasingly used by the U

States as an extremely important chess piece to co

China.”

117Researcher Cheng Guangzhong from 

Academy of Military Sciences calls Taiwan an “ace [

game of] containing Mainland China.”

118More

according to Cheng, there is a “. . . sharply increasing d

of Taiwan independence [that] poses a serious thr

China’s internal security.”

119

With the return of Hong Kong in 1997 an

resumption of control over Macao in 1999, Chin

unification with Taiwan high on its agenda. Beij

particularly sensitive to anything it perceives as mo

sabotage efforts at making progress on unification wh

these are seen to come from the island itself or 

elsewhere.

120As a result of this and the deep

frustration over the lack of progress toward po

unification with Taiwan, China issued a White Pap

February 2000 in an attempt to clarify its position. O

the most important of the policy’s new features is a 

justification for the use of force. In addition to a decla

of independence and military intervention by a fo

power, China is now on record as also considering inde

refusal by Taiwan to engage in talks leading to unifi

as grounds for Chinese military action.

121China i

deeply suspicious of the man who was elected as Tai

president in March 2000. Chen Shui-bian has a long h

of advocating Taiwanese independence. While h

publicly rejected pursuing independence, except as 

resort if China attacks, doubts remain in Beijing abo

new Taipei leader’s real intentions. China, howeve

adopted a “wait and see” approach to give Chen some t

reveal his hand. But Chinese leaders appear pessi

about prospects for progress on unification, and 

patience waiting for concessions from Taiwan’s new l

is likely to wear thin before very long.

122

Chinese officials repeatedly insist that any m

action will be targeted at a minority of troublemaker

are encouraged by “foreign forces.”

123 While China’s le

21
were surprised by the forceful response of the United S

in sending two aircraft carriers to the vicinity of T

during the Strait Crisis, there is a firmly held belief in 

circles that the United States does not have the stoma

a war with China over Taiwan.

124

China is concerned about the emergence of th

missile defenses (TMDs) in the region, particularl

proposal for a TMD for Taiwan. Such a move would no

be viewed as serious intervention in China’s int

affairs, but also as a hostile and aggressive act that 

almost certainly prompt military action.

125

 The “

to-state” concept floated by Taiwan President Lee Ten

in mid-1999 and discussion of TMD for the island prom

a barrage of hardline and bellicose rhetoric warning 

prospect of hundreds of Chinese missiles raining dow

Taiwan and U.S. forces.

126

 The new administrat

Taiwan President Chen Shui-bian, while adopt

conciliatory and moderate tone toward China, has 

refused to capitulate completely to Beijing’s po

formula for unification. Taipei’s new defense mi

quickly indicated a desire to rapidly develop a m

defense system for the island.

127

It is possible that at some future date China cou

sufficiently threatened by the United States that it 

seek some kind of military alliance or alignment 

Russia. While China has tended traditionally to 

formal treaty commitments, over the long term 

possibility should be taken seriously. Should Beijin

Moscow become increasingly disenchanted with the 

and find common cause on a number of issues, su

missile defense, a strategic partnership of some kind 

coalesce. Certainly China and Russia have an activ

on-going trade in arms and a program of res

cooperation. Moscow has been particularly enthus

about establishing some kind of alliance with Beijin

Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin is on r

as an avid supporter of a Russia-China axis.

128

 An al

would be all the more inviting if Beijing detected a se

22
effort by Tokyo to beef up its defense capabilities. Ch

acutely sensitive to the specter of a militarized J

Moreover, if the Korean Peninsula formed a single mi

establishment either as a result of the two Korean 

confederating or the North being absorbed by the S

China might feel further threatened. But the 

important triggering factor would be a serious deterio

in Beijing’s relationship with Washington.

On the positive side, a welcome trend in Chinese fo

policy is a new receptivity toward developing a multil

security mechanism in the Asia-Pacific region. This m

significant change in what had been an abiding Ch

preference for bilateralism.

129

 Furthermore, C

paramount interest is in maintaining economic g

through the continued promotion of foreign trad

investment. Beijing has a vested interest in mainta

good relations with its neighbors. At present China h

significant trade surplus and continues to attract fo

investment. Of course, if the terms of trade cha

making China a net importer of goods and/or fo

investors withdrew their funds, this could affect C

security calculus.

CONCLUSION

China is likely to adopt some combination of th

different army building strategies set out above. How

at least in the medium term it should fail to achieve its 

of becoming a military world power. I now focus o

former point before returning to the latter. Althoug

noted earlier, China has, in practice, already adop

patchwork of elements from all four army bu

strategies, the inclination of China’s civilian and mi

leaders will be for China formally to select one.

Army building strategies three and four are least 

because neither offers the prestige and glory to the P

the same way that aircraft carriers, armor, and 

performance fighters do. Strategy four (“Don’t Play 

23
Game”) is highly touted by some Chinese military thi

and some analysts in the West but probably enjoys li

appeal in the Chinese defense establishment as a wh

will also be difficult for civilian leaders to advocat

strategy. Strategy three (“Changing the Rules”) c

largely eliminated—but not completely—becau

inter-service rivalry. The various branches of the PL

likely be competing head-to-head more and more inte

for limited resources.

130

The first and second army building strategies are 

likely. Doctrine and warfighting scenarios, and percep

of the international environment all tend to favo

selection of strategy one (“Playing the Superpower G

and, to an extent, strategy two (“Playing to 

Strengths”). Domestic variables point the same way e

these suggest budget battles will likely lead to strateg

being rejected and strategy two being adopted. Strateg

is more astute budget-wise but probably not polit

viable. Strategy one is the most appealing to C

political and military leaders and to the masses, b

ambitious to implement properly.

Ultimately, probably by default, strategy two w

selected officially, but a combination of the four option

actually be implemented. The powerful appeal of “Pl

the Superpower Game” is likely to win out among C

civilian and military leaders over the attraction of “

Play That Game.” For civilian leaders, the cravin

international respect and the desire for China to be see

bona fide military power will probably win out

prestige, size of budget share, manpower, etc., are all f

that make military leaders desire conventional mi

armaments.

Despite the above forecast, there are still reaso

China’s neighbors and the United States to be concern

is likely that China’s defense establishment will stren

over time. However, rather than obsessively focus o

emergence of a more powerful threatening dragon, 

24
countries should give more attention to the str

implications of a weak China. Indeed, China today is 

powerful or as significant a player as it is often made 

be.

131

 And there is the possibility that China might b

weaker militarily and economically and perhaps evolv

a looser federal system or in a more extreme case, ev

fragment. While the probability may be low, it cann

completely ruled out, and this eventuality must be ser

considered as a future scenario.

132

 The dangers 

contemplating the unthinkable are evident whe

recalls that few analysts in the 1980s anticipated or 

entertained the possibility of a Soviet collapse.

Moreover, China’s prospects for democratization t

be rated as minimal. While the likelihood of China m

rapid strides toward democracy in the short te

virtually nil, long-term trends are more promisi

Recent survey research reveals the presence of att

receptive toward multiparty democracy among Ch

entrepreneurs and local government officials.

134

 Wh

China is making great strides or small steps to

democracy, this does not necessarily mean that Chin

become pacifistic. While a widely-held rule of thumb i

democracies do not fight democracies, research sug

that democratizing states tend to be bellicose.

135

In many ways it can be far easier to deal with a s

centralized great power than a sick or dismembered 

When the Soviet Union existed, one knew that negot

with the regime meant dealing with Moscow. 

agreement was worked out with some kind of verifi

mechanism in place, one could be fairly sure that it wo

implemented. In the post-Soviet era, an agreeme

Moscow is more difficult to achieve, and one ha

confidence that it will be implemented. Even if the prov

tow the line, 14 additional republics must be cons

Today in China, what goes in Beijing does not neces

hold true for Guangzhou or Shanghai.

25
Although I argue that China will not succe

becoming a military world power during the next 

years, this does not mean I believe that China pos

threat to the Asia-Pacific region. Indeed, the widely

conviction that the PLA poses a modest or nuisance t

gives rise to a dangerous tendency to downplay or di

the very real threat China’s military presents.

136 D

assurances that China will be too preoccupied 

domestic matters to have time to get involved in fo

adventures,

137

 it should be remembered that C

leaders seem particularly prone to perceiving fo

threats if the country is beset by domestic uphea

especially if Beijing concludes that there is “collabor

between internal and external hostile forces as in the c

the popular protests of spring 1989.

138 It is precisely at 

moments when Beijing is likely to lash out in ord

demonstrate to its enemies that China remains 

vigilant and prepared.

However, rather than fear a highly capable PLA wi

stunning victories, the militaries of the Asia-Pacific r

should be more concerned about the prospect of specta

failure. The most plausible scenario is Taiwan. Failur

grand scale can come about either if China’s le

mistakenly believe the PLA can win in a specific sce

and so proceed to launch an attack, or if Beijing believe

unlikely to win but has no choice but to go ahead and a

anyway. Either way the results of a failed military 

may be worse than victory, particularly in the case of a

in the Taiwan Strait. This is because where Taiw

involved, China is unlikely to admit defeat and desist. 

PLA is vanquished on the battlefield China is lik

persist in its quest. Beijing will seek to rebuild its mi

might in order to ensure success next time. Thus d

rather than clear the air, will probably prolong 

heighten tensions in the region. It may well spark a se

arms race, as China’s neighbors perceive an increa

threatening security environment and respond.

26
In sum, China’s national military and national se

strategies in the Jiang Zemin era merit careful scrutin

merely in the context of the specific military capab

that the PLA is acquiring or seeking to acquire, but a

terms of China’s aspirations. China’s expressed inten

and goals, as reflected in the statements of top officia

the writings of strategic thinkers, must be cons

monitored.

Implications for the U.S. Defense Community.

The foregoing analysis holds three key implicatio

the U.S. defense community. First, and most immedi

the question of missile defense for Taiwan. As noted a

China is adamantly opposed to a TMD for Taiwan 

point that some Beijing researchers have warned 

deployment would constitute grounds for China to in

hostilities against the island. The sensitivity of TM

China is important for the United States to recognize, 

is foolhardy, indeed dangerous, not to take these Ch

threats seriously.

139

 Having said this, we must take 

opportunity to remind China about the destabilizin

threatening effect of the recent missile buildup i

undertaken in the Taiwan Strait.

140

 China should rec

that it is only natural with such a proximate and gr

threat that Taiwan would want to improve its m

defenses. Moreover, if Beijing wants to prevent Taipe

deploying TMD, it should ask itself what steps China 

take to eliminate or minimize Taiwan’s desire for s

system. In the meantime, in the absence of any constr

moves by China to decrease the missile threat, the U

States should assist Taiwan to develop the comp

elements of a TMD that best suits the island’s se

needs.

Second, China is unlikely to become a peer compet

the United States at least not in the short to medium 

This means that if the U.S. military were to confron

PLA, it should be prepared to wage a limited asymm

27
conflict in which the enemy will use surprise and dece

to exploit U.S. weak points. While a Major Theate

cannot be ruled out, any confrontation with China is 

likely to require “small-scale contingencies” and the a

to repel attacks on U.S. critical infrastructures. 

underscores the wisdom of following through on a s

commitment to “full spectrum dominance.”

141

In a regional conflict between the Chinese and Ame

armed forces, it would likely be primarily a U.S. Nav

the U.S. Air Force fight. However, if the war was prol

and/or escalated, it would also become an Army confli

matter what the duration or scope of a U.S.-China wa

Army would be involved in some shape or form. In the 

of the outbreak of war in the Taiwan Strait, the 

immediate impact on the Army would likely be press

reinforce its forward presence in the region. Indee

United States could expect its friends and allies i

region to request immediate assistance in the form o

force buildups to provide added psychological reassu

The second impact on the Army would be a heightened 

of alert and readiness to deter an attack by another st

nonstate actor seeking to take advantage of the dive

provided by a U.S.-China conflict. Despite the June 

summit between the leaders of the two Koreas, tensio

the peninsula remain. It is conceivable that North 

might launch an attack on the South if Pyongyang be

that with a distraction in the Taiwan Strait, a su

attack would have a good chance of succeeding. A 

impact on the Army could be the order to deploy a fo

Taiwan either after the outbreak of war or followin

cessation of hostilities. While military leaders w

probably not favor such a move, under certain ci

stances the National Command Authority might dir

This may simply be a small military assistance ad

group to provide training for new weapons systems pro

to the Taiwanese military; or it may be a token comba

deployed on the island after the hostilities have subsi

28
serve a tripwire function—one similar to that played b

forces along the 38th Parallel in Korea.

Third, military-to-military relations between the 

armed forces and the PLA are extremely importan

must be rebuilt. The U.S. National Security Stra

stress on engagement and the U.S. National M

Strategy’s emphasis on shaping activities will never be 

critical than in the case of China. Initiatives by the 

branch services should be substantive, noncontrove

and undertaken with a clear roadmap. Military-to-mi

activities should not simply stem from the impulse 

something” but instead spring from a coordinated 

carefully crafted strategic plan that promotes our na

interests. For example, careful thought must be given 

advisability of allowing Chinese military observers to w

U.S. exercises. Any access should be conditional on ba

and reciprocity whereby U.S. personnel can enga

similar activities.

142

 Moreover, any roadmap must fac

presence of “traffic cops” on both sides.

143

 There are po

constraints in both countries that limit the feasibi

certain activities, or completely rule out other typ

events. An example of the former would be the likely r

of China’s political leaders to permit PLA office

participate in a U.S. sponsored “role of the military 

democracy” workshop. An example of the latter would 

American military demonstrating cutting-edge 

high-tech weaponry to PLA leaders. Avoidan

controversial subjects will minimize the likeliho

disruptions to the relationship due to partisan po

squabbles in either country.

While fully cognizant that we cannot expect dram

short-term results, we can engage in a long-term eff

matters of substance to further U.S. national interests

effort should consist of four types of activities, whic

could call the “pillars” of U.S.-China defense diploma

high-level visits, (2) functional exchanges, (3) ro

military confidence-building measures, and (4) integr

China’s defense establishment into multilateral 

29
High-level bilateral exchanges hold not merely sym

importance, but also help develop key personal rel

ships providing continuity for the larger relationsh

develop. 

Functional exchanges provide the greatest potent

substantive interaction and learning but can also b

most controversial. These exchanges should not be li

to educational field trips by U.S. National De

University students. Exchanges and conferences be

research institutes and military education institu

could focus on nonsensitive matters. Possible them

pursue are joint studies of classic military campaig

history, professional military education in the 

countries, and the military’s role in peacekeeping 

humanitarian operations.

Routine military exchanges, such as port visit

valuable for establishing goodwill and as confid

building measures. These kinds of interaction pr

important American values such as the principle of ci

control of the military and increased transparen

defense matters by the Chinese. At the very least, cont

contacts can improve understanding between th

militaries and help decrease tensions. The significa

these outcomes should not be underestimated. A g

appreciation for the differences in areas such as na

culture and service cultures—easy to overloo

extremely important—can minimize the chances of on

misinterpreting the acts of the other side.

Integrating the PLA into multilateral defense f

also highly desirable. It permits the Chinese milita

realize the common challenges and aspirations they 

with their colleagues in other countries. This ki

interaction helps PLA leaders gain a better sense 

characteristics of a modern military beyond crack t

and possession of high-tech weaponry. Furthermore

leaders may come to value the formal and inf

dialogues with their counterparts in other countrie

30
find the interaction useful and professionally rewa

The United States is well-equipped to build this pilla

well-developed multilateral mechanisms already in pl

the Pacific. The PLA should be encouraged to a

regularly the annual Pacific Armies Management Se

(PAMS) typically hosted jointly by the U.S. Army an

land service of another Pacific Rim country. Ch

attendance has been somewhat erratic to date. In add

it would be hoped that the PLA would send a represen

to the recently created Pacific Armies Chiefs Confe

The inaugural session was held in Singapore in 19

conjunction with PAMS. Moreover, Chinese de

professionals should be frequent attendees at sem

hosted by the Pacific Command’s Asia-Pacific Cent

Security Studies in Honolulu.

144

Careful attention to the issue of TMD for Ta

persistence in maintaining capabilities across th

spectrum of military operations, and reconstr

military-to-military relations with China will enab

U.S. military to be truly “persuasive in peace, decis

war, and preeminent in any form of conflict,” as envis

by Joint Vision 2020.

ENDNOTES

1.Cited in Willy Wo-Lap Lam, The Era of Jiang Zemin, Sin

Prentice-Hall, 1999, p. 210.

2. For discussion of Pentagon thinking about China as a p

adversary, see, for example, Robert G. Kaiser, “2025 Vision: A 

Bent On Asian Dominance,” The Washington Post, March 17, 2

A25; Thomas E. Ricks, “For Pentagon, Asia Moving to the For

The Washington Post, May 26, 2000.

3. And the failed coup attempt led by KGB chief V

Kryuchkov. See Jack F. Matlock, Jr., Autopsy on an Empi

American Ambassador’s Account of the Collapse of the Soviet 

New York: Random House, 1995, chap. XXIII.

4. A widely held belief in China is that the Red Army’s quest 

up technologically with the U.S. military directly contributed 

31
collapse of the Soviet Union. See, for example, Qiao Liang an

Xiangsui, Chaoxian zhan (Unrestricted Warfare), Beijing: Jie

Wenyi Chubanshe, February 1999, p. 20. See also Willy Wo-La

“Jiang Stresses Need for High-Tech Growth,” South China M

Post, May 19, 1999.

5. Chinese leaders were very alarmed by the failure of the 

prop up the regime and prevent the collapse of the Soviet Uni

generals lent their support, not to the so-called coup-plotte

sought to oust Gorbachev, but rather to Russian Federation Pr

Boris Yeltsin. See William E. Odom, The Collapse of the Soviet M

New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998, chap. 14.

6. See, for example, Peter D. Feaver, “The Civil-Military P

atique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question of Civilian C

Armed Forces and Society, Vol. 23, No. 2, Winter 1996, pp. 151

7. On the size of PLA, see International Institute for S

Studies, The Military Balance, 1999/2000, London: Oxford Un

Press, 1999, p. 186.

8. On the development and training of rapid reaction for

Andrew N. D. Yang and Colonel Milton Wen-Chung Liao (ret.

Rapid Reaction Forces: Concept, Training, and Prelim

Assessment,” in James C. Mulvenon and Richard H. Yang, ed

People’s Liberation Army in the Information Age, Santa Monica: 

1999, pp. 48-57. On the nuclear program, see You Ji, The Armed 

of China, London: I. B. Taurus, 1999, chap. 4.

9. For the “Taiwan is not Kosovo” quote, see Zhang N

“Further Thoughts Upon Cross-Strait Relations at Turn of Ce

Zhongguo Pinglun, No. 24, December 5, 1999, in Foreign Br

Information Service (hereafter FBIS) January 11, 2000. On an 

Serbia,” see Willy Wo-Lap Lam, “DPRK Eyed as Next NATO Ta

on High-Tech Training,” South China Morning Post (Hong Kon

28, 1999. See also Lawrence, “Doctrine of Deterrence,” p. 26. For 

about Tibet or Xinjiang becoming a Kosovo (i.e., an excuse for 

military intervention), see Ai Yu, “Kosovo Crisis and Stability in 

Tibet and Xinjiang,” Ta Kung Pao (Hong Kong), June 2, 1999 i

June 25, 1999.

10. On concern about a “no fly zone,” see (Zhang Wenmu), “

Issues of International Politics for China in the 21st Century (

Zhongguo guoji zhengzhi jiaodian) in Shi Boke, ed., Zhongguo d

(Megatrends China), Beijing: Hualing Chubanshe, 1996, p. 32. S

Willy Wo-Lap Lam, “DPRK Eyed as Next NATO Target.” 

32
increase in military exercises conducted in Chinese central Asia

table in Dennis J. Blasko, Philip T. Klapakis, and John F. C

“Training Tomorrow’s PLA: A Mixed Bag of Tricks,” The 

Quarterly, No. 146, June 1996, pp. 500-515.

11. David Finkelstein, “China’s National Military Strate

Mulvenon and Yang, eds., The People’s Liberation Army 

Information Age, pp. 103-107.

12. Roger Garside, Coming Alive: China After Mao, New 

Mentor Books, 1982, p. 204.

13. See Peter Gries, “Between Tears and Rage: Popular C

Reactions to the Belgrade Embassy Bombing,” unpub

manuscript, June 2000, p. 18. See also the photograp

demonstration in Wenzhou, China taken on May 8, 1999. Th

appears at www.China.org.cn/ChinaEmbassy/PhotoNews_e/

-76ct.html. The poster reads: “China must become rich and po

(zhongguo yao qiangda).

14. See, for example, Wang Chenyan and Cui Haiming

Xiaoping de junshi sixiang chutan” (“A preliminary exploration 

Xiaoping’s military thinking”), in Pan Shiying, ed., Dangdai Zh

junshi sixiang jingyao (Essence of Contemporary Chinese M

Thought), Beijing: Jiefangjun Chubanshe, 1992, p. 124.

15. Wu Xinbo, “China: Security Practice of a Modernizi

Ascending Power,” in Muthiah Alagappa, ed., Asian Security P

Material and Ideational Influences, Stanford: Stanford Un

Press, 1998, p. 143.

16. See, for example, Annual Report on the Military Powe

People’s Republic of China, Report to Congress Pursuant to F

National Defense Authorization Act accessed on www.defe

mil/news/Jun2000/China06222000.htm; Wu, “China,” p. 1

Susan V. Lawrence, “Yearning to Lead,” Far Eastern Economic 

September 16, 1999, pp, 18-19; Willy Wo-Lap Lam, “PLA Conf

high-tech victory,” South China Morning Post, December 30, 1

17. Finkelstein, “China’s National Military Strategy,” pp. 10

18. Zalmay M. Khalilzad, Abraham N. Shulsky, Daniel L. 

Roger Cliff, David Orletsky, David Shlapak, and Ashley Tel

United States and a Rising China: Strategic and Military Impl

Santa Monica: RAND, 1999, chap. 3.

33
19. June Teufel Dreyer, “The PLA and the Kosovo Camp

Strategic Debate,” Issues and Studies, Vol. 36, No. 1, January/Fe

2000.

20. Qiao and Wang, Chaoxian zhan (Unrestricted Warfa

68-70. See also John W. Lewis and Xue Litai, “China’s Searc

Modern Air Force,” International Security, Vol. 24, No. 1, Summe

pp. 76-94; You Ji, The Armed Forces of China, London: I. B. T

1999, chap. 2.

21. For a report on the military parade in Beijing to comme

the 50th anniversary of the PRC, see John Pomfret, “China Cel

Its 50th: Communists’ Parade Highlights Military, Political, Ec

Might,” The Washington Post, October 1, 1999.

22. Oliver Chou, “Internet Message Spurs Drive for A

Carrier,” South China Morning Post, June 14, 1999.

23. Susan V. Lawrence, “Celestial Reach,” Far Eastern Ec

Review, December 2, 1999, p. 18; You, The Armed Forces of Ch

78-84.

24. Mi Zhenyu, “Zhongguo de jiji fangyu zhanlue fan

(“China’s Strategic Plan of Active Defense”), in Shi Boke, ed., Zh

daqushi, pp. 54-55.

25. Lawrence, “Doctrine of Deterrence.”

26. Cited in Jianxing Bi, “The PRC’s Active Defense Strateg

Wars, Old Concepts,” Issues and Studies, Vol. 31, No. 11, No

1995, p. 77 (emphasis added).

27. Dreyer, “The PLA and the Kosovo Campaign.”

28. Cited in Bruce Gilley, “China’s Spy Guide: A Chinese Es

Manual Details the Means by Which Beijing Gathers Technolo

Weapons Secrets in the United States,” Far Eastern Economic 

December 23, 1999, p. 15.

29. Michael Laris, “China Says It Can Build Neutron Bomb: 

Attempts to Discredit Cox Report on Theft of U.S. Secret

Washington Post, July 15, 1999.

30. Mark A. Stokes, China’s Strategic Modernization: Impl

for the United States, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies In

September 1999, chap. 4; You, The Armed Forces of China, c

Nuclear weaponry and missiles are widely seen as China strengt

34
for example, Khalilzad, et al., The United States and a Rising Ch

39-40, 42-44, 54-55.

31. You, The Armed Forces of China, p. 117.

32. See, for example, Wang and Cui, “Deng Xiaoping junsh

33. Ellis Joffe, “The PLA and the Chinese Economy: The E

Involvement,” Survival, Vol. 37, No. 2, Summer 1995, pp. 

Thomas J. Bickford, “The Business Operations of the Chinese P

Liberation Army,” Problems of Post-Communism, Vol. 46, 

November/December 1999, pp. 28-36; James C. Mulvenon, Sol

Fortune: The Rise and Fall of the Chinese Military Business C

Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, Inc, 2000, forthcoming; Andrew 

Going Out of Business: Divesting the Commercial Interests o

Socialist Soldiers, East-West Center Occasional Papers, Polit

Security Series No. 3, Honolulu: East-West Center, January 20

6-7.

34. Mark Magnier, “Chinese Military Still Embedded 

Economy,” Los Angeles Times, January 9, 2000.

35. Wang and Cui, “Deng Xiaoping de junshi,” p. 125.

36. Mel Gurtov and Byung-Moo Hwang, China’s Securi

Changing Roles of the Military, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1998, 

See also Jorn Brommelhorster and John Frankenstein, eds.

Motives, Uncertain Outcomes: Defense Conversion in China, B

Lynne Rienner, 1997.

37. See, for example, the comments make to National P

Congress delegates by General Ba Zhongtan in March 1996 

Willy Wo-Lap Lam, “Relentless Expansion of Army Power V

South China Morning Post, March 20, 1996.

38. “PLA Must Prepare to Fight a World War,” Singtao J

(Hong Kong), May 28, 1999, in FBIS, June 2, 1999.

39. Mi, “China’s Strategic Plan of Active Defense,” p. 75.

40. This is the thesis of Stokes, China’s Strategic Moderniz

41. Mi, “China’s Strategic Plan of Active Defense,” p. 56.

42. Qiao and Wang, Chaoxian zhan; John Pomfret, “China P

the New Rules of Unrestricted War,” The Washington Post, Au

1999.

35
43. Xiao Yue, “Controversy Concerning People’s War,” p. 36

44. Stokes, China’s Strategic Modernization, chap. 4.

45. James Mulvenon, “Information Warfare,” in Mulven

Yang, eds., The People’s Liberation Army in the Information 

175-186.

46. Stokes, China’s Strategic Modernization, pp. 117-123.

47. See, for example, John Arquilla and Solomon M. K

“Welcome to the Revolution in Chinese Military Affairs,” 

Analysis, Vol. 13, No. 3, December 1997, pp. 255-276.

48. See Xiao Yue, “Controversy Concerning People’s Wa

Mirror, April 1998, cited in Inside Mainland China, June 19

33-35.

49. Dreyer, “The PLA and the Kosovo Campaign.”

50. Mi, “China’s Strategic Plan of Active Defense,” pp. 54-5

51. See, for example, Arquilla and Karmel, “Welcome 

Revolution.”

52. Chu Shulong, “China and Strategy: The PRC Girds for L

High Tech War,” Orbis, Vol. 38, No. 3, Spring 1994, pp. 177-191; 

PRC’s Active Defense Strategy.”

53. For an outline of the three schools, see Michael Pillsbury

Debates the Future Security Environment, Washington, DC: N

Defense University, 2000, chap. 6. It should be noted that P

takes the view that there are sharp differences and no overlaps b

the schools.

54. Author’s interviews with Chinese civilian and m

researchers in Beijing and Shanghai, February-March 2000 (he

“Author’s Interviews”).

55. Pillsbury, China Debates, p. 263.

56. Ibid.

57. Zhao Yiping, “The Current Situation and Trends in Asia

Security—Interview with Dr. Cheng Guangzhong,” Guangming 

October 19, 1999, in FBIS, December 9, 1999.

36
58. Mi, “China’s Strategic Plan of Active Defense,” pp. 53-

also Nan Li, “The PLA’s Evolving Warfighting Doctrine, St

Tactics, 1985-1995: A Chinese Perspective,” The China Quarte

146, June 1996, p. 457.

59. See, for example, Lawrence, “Doctrine of Deterrence,” p

60. Fan Zhenjiang, “China’s Defense Policy into the Twen

Century,” Guofang Daxue Xuebao (National Defense Un

Journal), No. 1, March 10, 1997, p. 6. Another military res

highlights Taiwan as an area of serious conflict potenti

Lieutenant General Mi Zhenyu, “China’s Strategic Plan of 

Defense,” pp. 58-59. According to an influential civilian ac

Taiwan is “East Asia’s greatest potential hot spot.” See Zheng W

“The Main Points of China’s International Political (situation

Twenty-First Century,” in Shi Bike, ed., Zhongguo daqushi

Taiwan is also a central scenario for China’s military forecast

planners as the next war. See, for example, Xiao Bing and Q

Zhongguo jundui neng fou da ying xia yi chang zhanzheng (Will 

army win the next war?), Chongqing: Xinan Shifan Daxue Chu

1993, chap. 4. See also the analysis and excerpts translated in 

Munro, “Eavesdropping on the Chinese Military: Where It 

War—Where It Doesn’t,” Orbis, Vol. 38, No. 3, Summer 19

355-372.

61. “Much of the current doctrinal, equipment, an

development for limited and regional war seems to be toward 

Inner-Asian borders.” Bonnie Glaser, “China’s Security Perce

Interests and Ambitions,” Asian Survey, Vol. 33, No. 3, March 19

62. Ai, “Kosovo Crisis”; John Pomfret, “Separatists Defy C

Crackdown,” The Washington Post, January 26, 2000, p. A17.

63. Eric A. McVadon, “The Chinese Military and the Per

States in the 21st Century: A Security Tour d’Horizon,” in 

Wortzel, ed., The Chinese Armed Forces in the 21st Century, C

Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, December 1999, p. 2

64. Erik Eckholm, “A Secretive Army Grows to Maintain 

New York Times (national edition), March 28, 1999, p. 4.

65. Lu Ning, The Dynamics of Foreign Policy Decisionma

China, Boulder: Westview Press, 1997, p. 9.

66. See, for example, the discussion of the impact of the Gulf 

Qiao and Wang, Chaoxian zhan and You, The Armed Forces of 

37
chap. 2. See the analysis of the impact of the Kosovo campaign 

PLA in Dreyer, “The PLA and the Kosovo Campaign.” See also S

Lawrence, “Doctrine of Deterrence: Beijing Hopes an Ability to 

Casualties Will Discourage U.S. Military Intervention Over T

Far Eastern Economic Review, October 14, 1999, pp. 26-27.

67. William H. Overholt, “China’s Economic Squeeze,” 

Winter 2000, p. 25; John Pomfret, “Pink Slips in the Land of Lit

Books,” The Washington Post, June 20, 1998; Erik Ec

“Joblessness: a perilous curve on China’s Capitalist Road,” Ne

Times (national edition), January 20, 1998.

68. For a good analysis of the impact of the crisis on Ch

Hongying Wang, “The Asian Financial Crisis and Financial Ref

China,” The Pacific Review, Vol. 12, No. 4, 1999, pp. 537-556.

69. Wang, “The Asian Financial Crisis,” p. 546. For accou

analysis of recent worker unrest, see John Pomfret, “Miners’ 

Symbol of China’s New Discontent,”The Washington Post, April 

Susan V. Lawrence, “Mercury Rising: Police Officials Acknow

Growing Problem of Unrest among State Workers,” Far 

Economic Review, April 27, 2000, p. 26; Erik Eckholm, “Unrest G

China’s Old State Plants,” New York Times, Washington editio

17, 2000.

70. Nicholas R. Lardy, “China and the Asian Contagion,” 

Affairs, Vol. 77, No. 4, July/August 1998, pp. 78-88. See also 

China’s Unfinished Economic Revolution, Washington, DC: Br

Institution Press, 1998.

71. Mark Landler, “A Chinese Leader Talks of Growth of Ab

This Year,” New York Times, Washington edition, January 5, 20

a more pessimistic view, see Overholt, “China’s Economic Sque

29.

72. “Jiang Zemin on Financial, Other Issues,” Beijing 

Domestic, January 19, 2000, in FBIS, January 19, 2000; Willy W

Lam, “Make Way for the Market,” South China Morning Post, De

29, 1999.

73. Huang Yasheng, “Why China Will Not Collapse,” 

Policy, No. 99, Summer 1995, pp. 66-67. See also Dorothy J. S

“China’s Transients and the State: A Form of Civil Society?”Poli

Society, Vol. 21, No. 1, March 1993, pp. 91-122.

38
74. See Yan Sun, “Reform, State, and Corruption: Is Cor

Less Destructive in China Than in Russia?,” Comparative Polit

32, No. 1, October 1999, pp. 1-20.

75. Scott Kennedy, “Comrade’s Dilemma: Corruption and Gr

Transition Economies,” Problems of Post-Communism, Vol. 44

March/April 1997, pp. 28-36.

76. Michael D. Swaine, The Role of the Chinese Military in N

Security Policymaking, Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1996; Lam, Th

Jiang Zemin, chap. 4; David Shambaugh, “China’s Comman

Chief: Jiang Zemin and the PLA,” and John W. Garver, “The PL

Interest Group in Chinese Foreign Policy,” in C. Dennison Lan

Weisenbloom, and Dimon Liu, eds., Chinese Military Modern

Washington, DC: AEI Press, 1996, pp. 209-245, 246-281, respe

77. Gerald Segal, “The Military as a Group in Chinese Poli

David S. G. Goodman, ed.,Groups and Politics in the People’s Rep

China, Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1984.

78. Garver, “The PLA as an Interest Group in Chinese 

Policy.”

79. James Mulvenon, “An Uneasy Bargain: Party-M

Relations in the Post-Deng Era,” Draft paper presented to the Wo

on the State and Soldier in Asia, Bangkok, Thailand, April 199

80. You, “Making Sense of the Taiwan Strait.”

81. Andrew Scobell, “Show of Force: Chinese Soldiers, Stat

and the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait Crisis,” Political Science Quarte

115, No. 2, Summer 2000, p. 229.

82. Scobell, “Show of Force,” p. 243.

83. Mel Gurtov and Byung-Moo Hwang, China’s Security: T

Roles of the Military, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1998, pp. 43-44.

84. Lam, The Era of Jiang Zemin, pp. 204-207; Garver, “The 

an Interest Group in Foreign Policy,” pp. 252-254. See als

Wo-Lap Lam, “PLA Fights for Larger Share of Resources,” South 

Morning Post, March 13, 2000.

85. David Shambaugh, “China’s Commander-in-Chief: Jiang 

and the PLA,”in Lane, et al., Chinese Military Modernizat

209-245; Ellis Joffe, “The Military and China’s New Politics: Tre

39
Counter-Trends,” in Mulvenon and Yang, eds., The People’s Lib

Army in the Information Age, pp. 22-47.

86. Bickford, “The Business Operations of the Chinese P

Liberation Army,” p. 34.

87. Scobell, “Going Out of Business,” p. 5.

88.Ibid.

89. Magnier, “Chinese Military Still Embedded in the Econ

90. David Shambaugh, “The Soldier and the State in Chi

Political Work System in the People’s Liberation Army,” The 

Quarterly, No. 127, September 1991, pp. 527-568.

91. Cheng Hsiao-shih, Party-Military Relations in the P

Taiwan: Paradoxes of Control, Boulder: Westview Press, 1990.

92. James C. Mulvenon, The Professionalization of the 

Chinese Officer Corps: Trends and Implications,Santa Monica: 

1997, p. 73.

93. On the Central Military Commission and the Min

National Defense, see the discussion in Jeremy Paltiel, “Civil-M

Relations in China: An Obstacle to Constitutionalism?” Jou

Chinese Law, Vol. 9, No. 1, Spring 1995, pp. 48-50.

94. See, for example, Paltiel, “Civil-Military Relations in Ch

49; Swaine, The Role of the Chinese Military in National S

Policymaking, p. 44, footnote 16.

95. The PRC constitution is widely available. For the N

Defense Law, see “Law of the People’s Republic of China on N

Defense,” adopted at the 5th Session of the Eighth National P

Congress on March 14, 1997.

96. However, this loyalty is not unconditional the way it w

Mao and Deng. Joffe, “The Military and China’s New Politics,” 

97. Mulvenon, The Professionalization of the Senior Chines

Corps, chap. 2.

98. Ellis Joffe, “Concluding Comment: The Political Angl

Phenomena in Party-Army Relations,” in Larry Wortzel, e

Chinese Armed Forces in the 21st Century, p. 327.

40
99. Harlan W. Jencks, “COSTIND is Dead, Long Live COS

Restructuring China’s Defense Scientific Technical and Ind

Sector,” in Mulvenon and Yang, eds., The People’s Liberation A

the Information Age. The first quote is on p. 67, and the second 

71.

100. James C. Mulvenon, “An Uneasy Bargain: Party-M

Relations in the Post-Deng Era,” draft paper presented to the Ea

Center workshop on the State and the Soldier in Asia, Ba

Thailand, April 1999.

101. Shambaugh, “China’s Commander-in-Chief,” pp. 

Andrew Scobell, “After Deng, What: The Prospects for a Dem

Transition in China,”Problems of Post-Communism, Vol. 44, 

September/October 1997, pp. 26-27.

102. For details of the political campaign launched in the PL

1989, see Shambaugh, “The Soldier and the State in Chin

551-568. On the Taiwan spying case, see Reuters, “PLA Pay 

Amid Anger at Spying Case,” South China Morning Post, Septem

1999. On the Falun Gong case, see John Pomfret, “Chin

Penetrated Military and Police,” The Washington Post, August 

and Lorien Holland, “Breaking the Wheel,” Far Eastern Ec

Review, August 5, 1999, pp. 16-17.

103. Cheng cited in Zhao, “The Current Situation.” 

pessimistic views were expressed to the author by civilian and m

researchers in early 2000. “Author’s Interviews.”

104. On the United States, see Garver, “The PLA as an I

Group in Chinese Foreign Policy”; Lo Ping, “Zhu Rongji’s Visi

United States and Internal Struggle Within Top Hierarchy

Hsiang (Hong Kong), April 15, 1999, inFBIS, April 27, 1999; on T

see Garver, Face Off; and Scobell, “Show of Force.” On the South 

Sea, see Ian James Storey, “Creeping Assertiveness: Chi

Philippines and the South China Sea Dispute,” Contem

Southeast Asia, Vol. 21, No. 1, April 1999, pp. 95-118.

105. Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro, The Coming 

with China, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1997, p. 1.

106. It appears that the authors did not examine the actual 

but took the quote verbatim from a translation in Bruce 

“Potboiler Nationalism,” in the Far Eastern Economic Review, 

3, 1996, p. 22.

41
107. Admittedly, the comment was made almost certainly w

United States in mind. For Mi Zhenyu’s irate response, see 

Lies—Commentary on ‘The Coming Conflict with China’,” 

Xinhua domestic, April 17, 1997, in FBIS, April 21, 1997.

108. Scobell, “Show of Force.”

109. Especially by Hong Kong media outlets. See, for examp

Forney, “Man in the Middle,” Far Eastern Economic Review, Ma

1996, pp. 14-16.

110. You Ji, “Making Sense of the War Games in the Taiwan 

Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 6, No. 15, 1997, pp. 2

Scobell, “Show of Force.”

111. Susan V. Lawrence and Julian Baum, “Target T

Reunification with Taiwan Moves Up Beijing’s Political Agenda. 

Next Steps Won’t Be Easy,” Far Eastern Economic Review, De

30, 1999, and January 6, 2000, pp. 10-11.

112. It is important to distinguish between hawkis

bellicosity, and belligerency. The first word indicates a willing

pursue brinkmanship and military actions short of actual conflic

the latter two terms suggest a general warlike nature and eage

resort to war, respectively. PLA leaders, I have suggested elsewh

best described as “hawkish.” See Scobell, “Show of Force.”

113. See David Shambaugh, “China’s Military Views the 

Ambivalent Security,” International Security, Vol. 24, No. 3, 

1999/2000, pp. 52-79; Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and th

The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations, Cam

Belknap Press, 1957, chap. 3.

114. Andrew Scobell, “Explaining China’s Use of Force: Bey

Great Wall and the Long March" (manuscript, 1999); Richard K

Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises, 2nd ed., New York: Co

University Press, 1991.

115. See, for example, Allen S. Whiting, “The PLA and 

Threat Perceptions,” The China Quarterly, No. 146, June 19

607-609; Gurtov and Hwang, China’s Security, pp. 70-73.

116. Mi, “China’s Strategic Plan of Active Defense,” p. 

Author’s Interviews. But Beijing has long suspected that Was

does not want to see Taiwan unify with China. See, for examp

“China,” p. 132. Yet there is also bafflement on the part of some a

42
about the logic behind American support for Taiwan. A

Interviews.

117. Zhu Chenghu, chief editor, Zhongmei guanxi de 

bianhua ji qi qushi (Changing Developments and Trends in Chi

Relations), Nanjing: Jiangsu Renmin Chhbanshe, 1998, p. 194.

118. Cited in Zhao, “The Current Situation.”

119. Zhao, “The Current Situation.”

120. Lawrence and Julian Baum, “Target Taiwan.”

121. “White Paper on Taiwan and Unification Policy,” Febru

2000.

122. See, for example, Lo Ping, “CPC Issues Document on T

New Situation: Jiang Zemin Tells Military to Observe Taiwan’s P

Situation Before Resorting to War,” Cheng Ming, April 1, 2000, i

April 5, 2000; Willy Wo-Lap Lam, “Beidaihe’s triple cocktail dil

South China Morning Post, June 7, 2000.

123. See, for example, “Jiang Zemin’s Eight Point Proposal,” 

Xinhua Domestic Service, January 30, 1995, in FBIS, January 3

pp. 85-86.

124. On the surprise over the dispatch of two aircraft carri

John W. Garver, Face Off: China, the United States and T

Democratization, Seattle: University of Washington Press, 199

10. On the belief that the United States is unlikely to intervene, 

example, Professor Zhuang Zhaozhong, Director of the Scien

Technology Teaching Office of National Defense University, “W

Foreign Country Militarily Intervene in a Taiwan Crisis?” Ch

(Hong Kong), September 1, 1999, inFBIS, September 17, 1999; A

Interviews. By hyping PLA capabilities to inflict casualties, 

hopes to deter the U.S. from intervening. Lawrence, “Doct

Deterrence.” 

125. “Beijing Will Not Hesitate to Go to War if Taiwan Joins 

Tai Yang Pao (Hong Kong), March 18, 1999, in FBIS, March 1

For balanced assessment of the pros and cons of TMD for Taiw

Thomas J. Christensen, “Theater Missile Defense and T

Security,” Orbis, Vol. 44, No. 1, Winter 2000, pp. 79-90.

126. See the PRC analysts and officials quoted in Jim Mann, 

Snarls Again at ‘Paper Tiger’,” Los Angeles Times, January 19, 

43
127. Sofia Wu, “Taiwan to Establish Comprehensive 

Defense System,” Taipei Central News Agency in English, M

2000, in FBIS, May 30, 2000.

128. Stephen Blank, “Strategic Context of Russo-C

Relations,” Issues and Studies, forthcoming, 2000.

129. See Jen Hui-wen, “China’s Multipolarization Concept a

Ideas on Peripheral Diplomacy,” Hsin Pao (Hong Kong), July 9, 

FBIS, July 10, 1999; Cheng in Zhao, “The Present Situation”; Jin

Yuan, Asia-Pacific Security: China’s Conditional Multilateral

Great Power Entente, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies In

January 2000. Beijing very likely views multilateralism as a use

to offset U.S. influence in the Asia-Pacific.

130. Stokes, China’s Strategic Modernization, pp. 14-15.

131. Gerald Segal, “Does China Matter?” Foreign Affairs, 

No. 5, September/October 1999.

132. Recent analyses give this scenario a low probability bu

rule it out. See Pei Minxin, “Will China Become Another Indo

Foreign Policy, No. 116, Fall 1999, pp. 94-108; Khalilzad, et 

United States and a Rising China, pp. 14-16.

133. Andrew Scobell, “After Deng, What?: Reconsider

Prospects for a Democratic Transition in China,” Probl

Post-Communism, Vol. 44, No. 5, September/October 1997, pp. 

134. More than 50 percent of local officials and more than 50 

of entrepreneurs do not think a multiparty system would re

political chaos. While this is not strong evidence of activist dem

beliefs and difficult to interpret conclusively, the implications 

findings are enormous. See Bruce J. Dickson, “Private Entrep

and Political Change in China,” Paper presented to the Annual M

of the Association of Asian Studies, Boston, MA, March 1999, p

table 11. For more on the democratic attitudes and prosp

democracy in China, see the special issue on “Elections and Dem

in Greater China,” The China Quarterly, No. 162, June 2000.

135. Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, “Democratizat

the Danger of War,” International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1, S

1995, pp. 5-38. For a study that applies this idea to China, see 

Face Off.

136. Solomon Karmel, “The Maoist Drag on China’s M

Orbis, Vol. 12, No. 3, Summer 1998, pp. 375-386; Bates Gill and M

44
O’Hanlon, “China’s Hollow Military,” The National Interest, 

Summer 1999, pp. 55-62; Patrick Tyler, “Who’s Afraid of China

York Times Magazine, August 1, 1999, pp. 46-49; Segal, “Does 

Matter?,” pp. 29-32.

137. Tyler, “Who’s Afraid of China?.”

138. Wu, “China,” p. 133. See also Allen Whiting, The 

Calculus of Deterrence: India and Indochina, Ann Arbor: Unive

Michigan Press, 1975.

139. See, for example, Theater Missile Defenses in the Asia

Region: A Working Group Report, Washington, DC: Henry L. S

Center, June 29, 2000.

140. See, for example, Brad Roberts, Robert A. Manning, Ro

Montaperto, “China: The Forgotten Nuclear Power,” Foreign 

Vol. 79, No. 4, July/August 2000, p. 56.

141. On the concept of full spectrum dominance, see, for ex

Joint Vision 2020, Washington, DC: Government Printing Offic

2000.

142. On the promise and perils of military-to-military conta

Kenneth W. Allen and Eric A. McVadon, China’s Foreign M

Relations, Report #32, Washington, DC: Henry L. Stimson 

October 1999, Section VII. See also David Shambaugh, Enh

Sino-American Military Relations, Asia Papers, No. 4, Washingt

Sigur Center for Asian Studies, George Washington Universi

1998.

 143. Lieutenant Colonel Jer Donald Get, What’s W

Relationship Between America’s Army and China’s PL

Examination of the Terms of the U.S. Army Strategic Pea

Engagement with the PLA of the PRC, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S

War College Fellowship Research Project, March 25, 1996, p. 1

144. In talks with Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen 

2000, PLA leaders reportedly agreed to send officers to the Cen

Glenn Scott, “Hawai′ Security Center’s Lobbying of China Pa

Honolulu Advertiser, July 13, 2000.

45
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