Assessing Revolutionary and Insurgent Strategies

UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE CASE STUDY: 

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN IRAN 

AND LEBANESE HIZBOLLAH

United States Army Special Operations Command

Assessing Revolutionary and Insurgent Strategies

UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE CASE STUDY: 

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN IRAN 

AND LEBANESE HIZBOLLAH

Paul J. Tompkins Jr., USASOC Project Lead

Guillermo Pinczuk and Theodore Plettner, Authors

United States Army Special Operations Command

and

The Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory

National Security Analysis Department
This publication is a work of the United States Government in accordance with Title 17, United States Code, sections 101 and 105.

Published by:

The United States Army Special Operations Command

Fort Bragg, North Carolina

Reproduction in whole or in part is permitted for any purpose of 

the United States government. Nonmateriel research on special warfare is performed in support of the requirements stated by the United 

States Army Special Operations Command, Department of the Army. 

This research is accomplished at the Johns Hopkins University Applied 

Physics Laboratory by the National Security Analysis Department, a 

nongovernmental agency operating under the supervision of the USASOC

Sensitive Activities Division, Department of the Army.

The analysis and the opinions expressed within this document 

are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the positions of the US Army or the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics 

Laboratory.

Comments correcting errors of fact and opinion, filling or indicating gaps of information, and suggesting other changes that may be 

appropriate should be addressed to:

United States Army Special Operations Command

G-3X, Sensitive Activities Division

2929 Desert Storm Drive

Fort Bragg, NC 28310

All ARIS products are available from USASOC at www.soc.mil 

under the ARIS link.
ASSESSING REVOLUTIONARY AND 

INSURGENT STRATEGIES

The Assessing Revolutionary and Insurgent Strategies (ARIS) series consists of a set of case studies and research conducted for the US Army Special 

Operations Command by the National Security Analysis Department of the 

Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory.

The purpose of the ARIS series is to produce a collection of academically rigorous yet operationally relevant research materials to develop and 

illustrate a common understanding of insurgency and revolution. This 

research, intended to form a bedrock body of knowledge for members of 

the Special Forces, will allow users to distill vast amounts of material from a 

wide array of campaigns and extract relevant lessons, thereby enabling the 

development of future doctrine, professional education, and training.

From its inception, ARIS has been focused on exploring historical and 

current revolutions and insurgencies for the purpose of identifying emerging trends in operational designs and patterns. ARIS encompasses research 

and studies on the general characteristics of revolutionary movements and 

insurgencies and examines unique adaptations by specific organizations or 

groups to overcome various environmental and contextual challenges.

The ARIS series follows in the tradition of research conducted by the 

Special Operations Research Office (SORO) of American University in the 

1950s and 1960s, by adding new research to that body of work and in several 

instances releasing updated editions of original SORO studies.

VOLUMES IN THE ARIS SERIES

Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare, Volume I: 1927–1962 (Rev. Ed.)

Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare, Volume II: 1962–2009

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Colombia (1964–2009)

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare: Cuba 1953–1959 (pub. 1963)

Case Study in Guerrilla War: Greece During World War II (pub. 1961)

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare: Guatemala 1944–1954 (pub. 1964)

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Palestine Series

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare—Sri Lanka (1976–2009)

Unconventional Warfare Case Study: The Relationship between Iran and Lebanese Hizbollah

Unconventional Warfare Case Study: The Rhodesian Insurgency and the Role of External 

Support: 1961–1979

Human Factors Considerations of Undergrounds in Insurgencies (2nd Ed.)

Irregular Warfare Annotated Bibliography

Legal Implications of the Status of Persons in Resistance

Narratives and Competing Messages

Special Topics in Irregular Warfare: Understanding Resistance

Threshold of Violence

Undergrounds in Insurgent, Revolutionary, and Resistance Warfare (2nd Ed.)

SORO STUDIES

Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare: Vietnam 1941–1954 (pub. 1964)

v

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION ..........................................................1

CHAPTER 2. EXTERNAL SUPPORTER ............................................7

Description/Background ...................................................................9

Strategic Goals and Interest in Resistance Movement....................18

Resistance Movement Selection .......................................................25

CHAPTER 3. HISTORICAL CONTEXT...........................................39

Physical Environment .......................................................................41

Sociocultural Environment..............................................................44

Description of the Economy.........................................................46

Nexus of Socioeconomic Conditions and 

Creation of Vulnerabilities.................................................48

Governing Environment...............................................................53

CHAPTER 4. THE RESISTANCE MOVEMENT ..............................59

Nature of the Resistance Movement................................................61

Strategies and Supporting Narratives..........................................65

Structure and Dynamics of the Resistance Movement...............69

Leadership.....................................................................................69

Organizational Structure ............................................................. 70

Command, Control, Communications, and Computers............ 75

Resources and External Support ................................................. 77

Political Activities.......................................................................... 78

Methods of Warfare ......................................................................80

Popular Support for the Resistance Movement or Insurgency... 85

CHAPTER 5. EXTERNAL SUPPORT ............................................... 91

Type of Actor Providing Support.....................................................93

Motivations for External Support ....................................................99

Forms and Methods Used to Provide Support..............................104

CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION........................................................... 113

BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................................... 121

INDEX ................................................................................................129
vi

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Figure 3-1. Map of Lebanon................................................................42

Figure 3-2. Distribution of religious groups in Lebanon in 1983 .....45

Credits:

Figure 3-1. Map of Lebanon. Map courtesy of the University of Texas Libraries, 

The University of Texas at Austin Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection, 

“Lebanon (Political) 2002,” The University of Texas at Austin, http://www.lib.

utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/lebanon_pol_2002.jpg. Globe derived 

from Map Resources © 2014, Map Resources, Lambertville, NJ 08530, www.

mapresources.com.

Figure 3-2. Distribution of religious groups in Lebanon in 1983. Redrawn 

from a map courtesy of the University of Texas Libraries, The University of Texas 

at Austin Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection, “Lebanon—Distribution of 

Religious Groups 1983,” The University of Texas at Austin, http://www.lib.utexas.

edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/lebanon_religions_83.jpg.
CHAPTER 1.

INTRODUCTION

3

International relations scholars of a realist persuasion emphasize 

that conflict is an inherent and chronic condition of an international 

system featuring a multiplicity of self-interested actors, with international politics essentially boiling down to a struggle for power among 

nations with competing interests. Implicit within this perspective is 

the idea that all nations will seek out all available means and power 

resources to improve their relative positions within regional and global 

distributions of power. One such potential tool for doing so is sponsorship of proxy groups to advance the interests of a state. States often use 

proxy groups to wage unconventional warfare against another state, 

including against a state that the sponsoring state ostensibly would like 

to at least maintain amicable relations with.

The literature on outside sponsorship of proxy groups, and in particular the actual mechanics of sponsorship, is relatively sparse. This 

perhaps should not come as a surprise, as recent information is likely 

to be highly classified; additionally, countries may be hesitant to discuss 

their dealings with outside groups even if collaboration occurred in the 

past. This report fills this lacuna by detailing one of the most interesting and effective partnerships between a sponsoring state and a proxy 

group, that between Iran and Lebanese Hizbollah.

In the early 1980s, Iran organized a group of angry Lebanese clerics, who were simultaneously enraged by Israel’s 1982 invasion of Lebanon and inspired by Iran’s 1979 revolution that overthrew the hated 

Shah. These clerics formed the vanguard of what was to become Hizbollah, the “Party of God.” In due course, Hizbollah eventually forced 

Israel to withdraw from Lebanon in 2000, allowing the group to claim 

that it was the first Arab force to inflict a defeat on the Jewish state. 

This achievement was not lost upon Tehran. As related by Robert Baer 

in the book The Devil We Know:

In October 2000, Ayatollah Khamenei, Ayatollah 

Khomeini’s successor as supreme leader—the only 

real executive power in Iran—made it clear what 

the victory in Lebanon meant for Iran. It was during 

a secret address to Iran’s National Security Council. 

After the usual long preamble, larded with quotations 

from the Koran, Khamenei put both his hands on the 

conference table. He looked around the room to make 

sure everyone was listening. “Lebanon,” he said, pointedly using the Arabic pronunciation Lubnan, “is Iran’s 

greatest foreign policy success. We will repeat it across 

Dar al-Islam (the Islamic world) until all of Islam is 

liberated.”1
4

Unconventional Warfare Case Study: Iran and Lebanese Hizbollah

This report details Iran’s motivation for sponsoring Hizbollah and, 

as much as possible, describes the mechanics of its support. The substantial overlap in terms of ideology and interests between the two parties is perhaps not quite as close as between “lips and teeth,” a phrase 

once used to describe the closeness of the relationship between North 

Korea and China, but in general the partnership was (and is) characterized by a substantial mutuality of interests and ideological affinity. 

The relationship was initially borne out of Iran’s desire to check Israeli 

expansion into Lebanon and even to “liberate” Jerusalem, as well as to 

export its revolution and Islamic form of government, first to Lebanon 

and then to lands beyond.

Although the latter goal has since been moderated, nonetheless 

the partnership has thrived as a result of Hizbollah’s acceptance of 

the uniquely Iranian concept of velayat-e faqih, or The Governorship 

of the Jurisprudent, a theory of Islamic governance developed by Ayatollah Khomeini to justify clerical rule. As described in subsequent 

pages, Hizbollah’s acceptance of this notion formed the bedrock of its 

relationship with Iran, and indeed the close ideological and theological relationship it promoted between the two parties is one of the distinctive features of this example of a state’s sponsorship of an outside 

proxy actor.

This case study is organized as follows. Chapter 2 discusses the external sponsor and in particular details Iran’s varied motivations for sponsoring Hizbollah and the evolving intellectual milieu in Iran before the 

1979 revolution. The fervent cross-fertilization of ideas among secular, 

anti-Western intellectuals and Shia theologians led to a dramatic reinterpretation of the Shia faith, which in turn fueled the Iranian revolution and provided the intellectual foundation for Hizbollah’s initial 

desire to replace the Lebanese political system with an Islamic regime 

patterned on the Iranian model.

Chapter 3 addresses Lebanon itself, with a focus on the socioeconomic and political vulnerabilities that provided Iran with exploitable 

entryways into the country. The history of Shia grievances, combined 

with their dramatic population growth in Lebanon during the twentieth century, the collapse of the Lebanese state during the civil war, and 

Israel’s 1982 invasion, provided Iran with an opening to help shape the 

political trajectory of Lebanon’s Shia community, which, at the commencement of Iran’s sponsorship of Hizbollah, was only just beginning 

to mobilize into politics on a mass basis.

Chapter 4 turns to the proxy itself, focusing on its organizational 

structure, its methods of warfare and political activities, and its evolving 

narrative. Hizbollah’s acceptance of the Lebanese political system after 

the Taif agreement of 1989 forced it to temporarily set aside the goal 
Chapter 1. Introduction

5

of establishing an Islamic state in Lebanon. However, its insistence on 

eliminating Israel (which it sometimes refers to as the “Zionist entity”) 

remained a constant.

Chapter 5 discusses the mechanics of Iranian assistance to Hizbollah, including aid (military and financial) and training, and the various Iranian ministries involved in providing support to the proxy force. 

In the early years of sponsorship, the Iranian embassy in Damascus 

played a critical role in providing and coordinating assistance to the 

group. This chapter also details Iran’s collaboration with Hizbollah in 

the July 1994 attack on the Asociación Mutual Israelita Argentina headquarters in Buenos Aires, as Argentine authorities have pieced together 

a highly detailed report that provides a fascinating glimpse of the collaboration between sponsor and proxy in an external operation. The 

study concludes with an evaluation of the effectiveness of Iran’s sponsorship of Hizbollah.

NOTE

1 Robert Baer, The Devil We Know: Dealing with the New Iranian Superpower (New York: Crown 

Publishers, 2008), 55.

CHAPTER 2.

EXTERNAL SUPPORTER

9

DESCRIPTION/BACKGROUND

Any understanding of Iran’s relationship with Hizbollah must 

account for the dramatic reinterpretation of the Shia faith that occurred 

in Iran in the two decades leading up to the 1979 revolution. This reinterpretation was an outgrowth of the crisis of legitimacy of the Pahlavi 

monarchy, combined with the profound socioeconomic changes and 

dislocations brought about through the early and mid-twentieth century modernization efforts initiated by Reza Shah and his son, Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi. Iran in 1900 was described by one observer as

a fairly primitive, almost isolated state, barely distinguishable as an economic entity. About one-fifth of the 

population of about 10  million lived in small towns; 

another quarter consisted of nomadic tribes; while the 

rest eked out an existence in poor villages. Agriculture 

was the primary occupation, and the almost complete 

lack of roads, railways or other transport facilities 

made it essential for each geographic region to be selfsufficient in foodstuffs. Industrial activity was sparse, 

with no serious attempts having been made to explore 

or exploit a potentially vast array of natural resources.1

Another observer noted:

Families were large; women had no rights; men could 

have as many as four wives; and male children were 

strongly preferred. In order to keep the peasants ignorant and poor, the landowners opposed the establishment of schools or clinics.2

More than 95 percent of the population was illiterate, and education 

largely entailed mullahs instructing boys in reading and writing; calligraphy; Arabic grammar; and the memorization of Koranic passages, 

verses of poetry, and Shia catechism.3 Additionally, land ownership was 

highly skewed, with 1 percent of the population owning 56 percent of 

the land in the early 1960s.4

Such underdevelopment posed a threat to Iran’s independent existence, as it translated to a lack of capacity and power resources to withstand Russian and British domination. Similar to Meiji Japan in the 

mid-nineteenth century and Turkey under Ataturk, Iran found that it 

was imperative to modernize lest it face a future of vassalage to outside 

powers. Indeed, the comparison with Turkey is perhaps more apt, as 

both countries had to deal with elements opposed to modernization in 

the form of traditionalist landowners and a religious establishment hostile to secularism.5

 Hence, after Reza Khan’s successful coup deposing 
10

Unconventional Warfare Case Study: Iran and Lebanese Hizbollah

the decrepit Qajar dynasty in 1921 and his accession to the throne (as 

Reza Shah) in 1925, the new king commenced a modernization program that was continued by his son. Over time, this effort generated 

the seeds of the monarchy’s destruction as it led to the disenchantment 

of the religious class and the establishment of a middle class and intelligentsia frustrated with the centralization of power under the monarchy.

Various reforms proposed by the new king promoted the expansion of the secular state into matters hitherto monopolized by the clerical establishment. Reforms in education, law, and the status of women 

represented an encroachment of a modernizing state into society and 

formed the basis for state–society tensions. In education, Reza Shah 

established a state education system featuring six  years each for elementary and secondary instruction based on a modern curriculum, 

a policy that diminished the authority of the religious establishment, 

which had previously maintained a monopoly on educational instruction.6

 Additionally, in 1932 secularization was introduced into the 

judiciary when a law was enacted that required the registration of documents and property to be handled solely by secular courts (as opposed 

to sharia courts).7

 Religious officials who had previously derived a significant portion of their income administering these activities suffered 

a further blow in 1936 when new legislation required that judges hold a 

degree either from the Tehran Faculty of Law or from a foreign university. Both reforms led many religious officials to abandon the judiciary.

Another key reform effort involved the uplift of women. The educational reforms mentioned above involved the compulsory education 

of girls as well as boys, and in 1934 women were admitted to the law 

school and school of medicine in Tehran.8

 The February 1936 law that 

restricted women’s use of the all-encompassing and funereal chador 

was particularly noteworthy; in 1928 demonstrations broke out in 

Tabriz against the unveiling of women.9

Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi continued his father’s modernization drive with his so-called White Revolution, his government’s signature effort to modernize Iran’s social and economic systems. The 

establishment of universal (and in particular female) suffrage was one 

component of this effort, as was land reform. Reza Shah’s effort at 

land reform, the 1937 Land Development Act, which sought to encourage the optimum use of land by both landlords and peasants, failed 

because its implementation was left to landlords.10 In the early 1960s 

his son enacted legislation to reduce the size of large estates. Given that 

many members of the legislature were large landowners, to achieve 

land reform he found it necessary to dissolve the legislative branch for 

a period of time and rule by decree (the Six-Point Reform Program, the 

main policy initiative of the White Revolution approved in a national 
Chapter 2. External Supporter

11

referendum in January  1963, promoted land reform).11 Land reform 

also drew the resistance of the ulama,a as many mullahs themselves 

were also large landowners, especially in the provinces of Azerbaijan, 

Kerman, and Isfahan.12 In February 1960, Ayatollah Borujerdi, the leading mojtahed (jurisprudent) at the time, issued a statement indicating 

that any effort to limit the size of landed estates was contrary to Islam.13

Such reforms contributed to a crisis of state legitimacy that was further compounded by Mohammad Reza’s foreign policy and in particular his pro-Israel and pro-US orientation, especially his acquiescence to 

the instrumental use of Iran as a frontline state against the expansion 

of Soviet influence in the Persian Gulf and Middle East.14 The latter 

implied inclusion within the American orbit and a measure of subservience to the interests of the United States, which the clergy saw as inimical to the national-religious identity of the country.15

The modernization drive under the Pahlavis led to the mobilization 

of the religious establishment. In January 1963 the ulama organized 

a violent demonstration to obstruct the national referendum on the 

Six-Point Reform Program.16 This demonstration was followed up in 

March  1963 by violent clashes between the Shah’s secret police and 

oppositional clerics and religious students.17 And on the tenth day of 

Muharram (June 2), which commemorates the martyrdom of Husayn, 

the grandson of the Prophet Muhammad, Ayatollah Ruhollah  Khomeini was arrested after giving an inflammatory sermon in which he 

labeled the Shah as the living “Yazid of our time.”18,b The arrest of 

Khomeini and his followers led to clashes in Tehran, and resentment 

against the Shah grew considerably in Qom and other important religious cities, such as Mashhad and Yazd.19

The clergy’s grievances concerning the modernization and secularization of society under the Shah and their reduced social and economic status within the new order combined with those of liberals 

and Marxists opposed to the concentration of state power under the 

monarchy, leading to the establishment of a somewhat uneasy clerical–

secular opposition to Mohammad Reza. Leading thinkers from both 

of these camps, with members of the liberal and Marxist intelligentsia either educated abroad in Europe or America or espousing foreign 

ideas, contributed to a combustible intellectual milieu characterized 

a Ulama are Muslim religious scholars with experience in Islamic jurisprudence, 

which in turn endows them with the ability to pronounce on matters related to sharia, or 

Islamic, law.

b Husayn, the revered and canonical third imam within the Shia pantheon of imams, 

refused to swear allegiance to Yazid I, the Ummayad caliph, because he considered the 

rule of the Ummayads unjust. Yazid’s army intercepted Husayn in Karbala, Iraq, where he 

was beheaded in the Battle of Karbala in 680 AD.
12

Unconventional Warfare Case Study: Iran and Lebanese Hizbollah

by Marxist-populist, anticolonial themes and the cross-fertilization and 

hybridization of ideas. This intellectual ferment led to the reinterpretation of Shia doctrine and contributed, after more than a millennium of 

“quietism,” to the emergence of revolutionary Shiism.

One such thinker was Ahmad Fardid, a leading scholar of German 

philosophy and in particular the work of Martin  Heidegger. Fardid 

coined the highly influential term gharbzadegi, or “Weststruckness,” 

meaning a state of infliction by a corruptible force identified as gharb, 

or West.20 Fardid saw Iranian national culture as an organic entity with 

Westernization impairing rational disposition and depriving Iranians 

of natural, moral, and authentic existence.21 The notion of gharbzadegi was picked up by Jalal al-Ahmad, who made it the title of a 1962 

book. Al-Ahmad saw Westernization as obliterating authentic existence 

and the key aspects of Western modernization, such as urbanization, 

industrialization, and female liberation, as examples of the exploitative nature of Western modernity that deprived countries in the Third 

World of their native culture.22 Most importantly, al-Ahmad saw religion as a force of cultural renewal, capable of liberating Iranians from 

their mental and material dependence on the West. Al-Ahmad’s ideas 

contributed to the notion of dynamic Shiism, as he advocated a revolutionary role for members of the clerical establishment who, in conjunction with non-Westernized intellectuals, were called on to resist 

colonialism and Westernization. Rahimi23 noted that al-Ahmad’s ideas 

provided the inspiration for his religious readers, such as Khomeini, 

to reinterpret Shia ideas such as martyrdom and justice in terms of a 

nativist and anticolonialist discourse.

Another key intellectual at this time was Dr. Ali Shariati, an Iranian 

sociologist educated at the University of Mashhad. Shariati completed 

his graduate studies at the Sorbonne in Paris in 1963, where he studied the works of Jean-Paul Sartre and other existentialist thinkers and 

participated in anticolonial circles during the Algerian struggle against 

metropolitan France.24 Rahimi noted that “while Al-Ahmad was keen 

on consciousness raising about the effects of Weststruckness, Shariati 

was eager to bring about a new consciousness transformation of a revolutionary type that would develop out of a new understanding of Shiism,” and specifically one that was inherently antiestablishment.25 More 

specifically, he contrasted the institutionalized quietist version of Shiism, which he labeled “Safavid Shiism,” with “Alid Shiism,” a dynamic 

variant that he argued represented the original spirit of Islam and 

called on believers to take positive action to fight injustice on earth.26

Through an exegesis that distinguished jihad from shahadat, or martyrdom, Shariati was perhaps the one most responsible for engendering a cultic devotion to martyrdom and an interest in its instrumental 
Chapter 2. External Supporter

13

use among Iran’s revolutionary generation of leaders. In a speech titled 

“Jihad and Shahadat,” Shariati noted that a shahid is one who “negates 

his whole existence” for a sacred ideal.27 The canonical example is provided by the martyrdom of Husayn, who “consciously welcomed death”28

by choosing to fight the forces of Yazid, the Umayyad caliph whom 

Husayn regarded as an illegitimate ruler. Shariati argued that Husayn 

chose to engage in battle knowing it would lead to his demise “so that 

[the consequences] of his act might be widely spread and the cause for 

which he gives his life might be realized sooner. Husayn chooses shahadat as an end or as a means for the affirmation of what is being negated 

and mutilated by the political apparatus.”29

It is noteworthy that a shahid chooses self-obliteration not only 

because of the propagandist value of the deed itself but also because 

it represents a choice of death over dishonor. In contrast, a mujahid

(i.e., a person engaged in jihad) is a sincere warrior who may die in the 

line of fire as an unintended outcome of fighting for his or her faith 

but who does not consciously choose shahadat.

30 Thus, “shahadat is an 

invitation to all generations, in all ages, if you cannot kill your oppressor, then die.”31 Shariati called on Muslims to resist the corruption of 

society through shahadat, by seeking the “red death of martyrs” rather 

than dying the “black death” of cowards.32

Indeed, Shariati’s ideas were influential among Iran’s revolutionary leaders, who believed that the true tenets of Islam required the 

Shia to abandon the quietist tradition that had dominated Shiism for 

more than one thousand years in favor of a more activist interpretation that sought to reverse the years of misfortune and subjugation suffered by Shia. For instance, Hojjat al-Islam Muhammad Mohammedi 

Reyshahri, the first minister of intelligence for the Islamic Republic, 

once criticized conservative or “court” ulamac

 for tampering with “the 

hadithd found in the books of both the Shi’is and the Sunnis” in order 

to “invite Muslims into submission and quiescence toward oppressive 

and tyrannical rulers.”33 He also stated:

The Koran invites people to rise up against despotic 

governments and oppressive rulers. The hadith we 

attained . . . from the great [scholars] of Islam [call on 

c In the current context the term court ulama is an epithet, similar to, for example, the 

term house negro used during the era of slavery in America. The former term was used to 

deride previous religious scholars who counseled the Shia against interpreting the tenets 

of their faith in a politicized manner.

d The hadith is the written record of the words and deeds of the Prophet Muhammad, his family, and his companions. Unlike the Koran, it is not regarded as the actual 

word of God, and so the Koran takes precedence over the hadith. Nonetheless the hadith 

is considered an important source of law, practice, and doctrine.
14

Unconventional Warfare Case Study: Iran and Lebanese Hizbollah

Muslims] to renounce submission and indifference in 

the face of the rulers’ injustices . . . [and] to rise up in 

revolt for the institution of equality and justice.34

He further noted that the court ulama of the past had rendered service 

to oppressive rulers by concealing the inherently liberating nature of 

Islam, and so “stupefied” the minds of the faithful as to facilitate the 

oppressive rule of tyrannical regimes throughout the umma (Islamic 

community).35

In a February 1980 sermon given during a khutbah, or Friday congregational prayer, Hojjat al-Islam Sayyid ‘Ali Khameneh’i, later to become 

supreme leader of Iran, noted that the 1979 revolution had shown that 

Islam is a “religion and a doctrine capable of awakening thirty-six million people from their centuries of sleep under oppression” and of 

“humiliating” the enemy.36 Additionally, in an October 1979 sermon he 

corrected his audience on the correct meaning of the Arabic word sabr

(patience or self-possession), which is mentioned in Koranic verse 103:3: 

“Enjoin on each other sabr.” He cautioned that those unfamiliar with 

Arabic might be forgiven for thinking that sabr might justify quietism 

by signifying the following:

Sit down in [the] corner and be indifferent to all events, 

difficulties and issues. [Even] if they inflict a blow on 

your head, don’t say “Ouch!” Be patient (sabr kun). 

They plundered your possessions, they squandered 

[your] resources, wealth . . . and culture—sit down, be 

patient; God willing, the Hidden Imam will arrive and 

rectify everything. Be patient, sir, be patient.37

Rather, Khameneh’i informed his listeners that sabr means to be constantly in a position of struggle, facing hardships and afflictions and 

never giving respite to the enemy.38 Specifically, it denotes “struggle 

and jihad against imperialism and global Zionism.” Furthermore 

Khameneh’i noted that only Islam is capable of motivating people “to 

struggle . . . to jihad, to martyrdom (shahadat),” while other philosophies leave them “blind and deaf, without a will  .  .  .  fatalistic and 

submissive.”39

For Iran’s radical generation of clerics, the revolutionary potential 

of Islam compared favorably with that of various Western ideologies. In 

Friday sermons in September 1981, Hojjat al-Islam ‘Ali Akbar Hashemi 

Rafsanjani, a one-time president of Iran and member of the Assembly 

of Experts of the Islamic Republic, criticized “the school of thought of 

Marx and Lenin” for viewing Islam and religion in general as an opiate 

that kept the masses subdued. For Rafsanjani, the Islamic Revolution 

of 1979 revealed the falsity of such charges because it demonstrated 
Chapter 2. External Supporter

15

that religion was “the greatest stimulant of the masses” and that Islam 

was the most effective ideology of revolution.40 In 1988, Khameneh’i 

noted that, as opposed to “materialist” ideologies (such as communism 

and capitalism) that view individual will as determined and thus not 

autonomous, Islam teaches that human beings possess free will and are 

autonomous with respect to their social action and choices.41 To support this revolutionary conception of Shia Islam, prayer leaders often 

cited Koranic verse 13:11, “Surely, Allah does not change the condition 

of a people until they change their own condition,” and based on it, 

Rafsanjani, in a February 1982 sermon, argued that “humanity is not a 

deterministic movement, but rather a voluntary movement that should 

be initiated by society, by the people themselves.”42 Thus, according to 

this interpretation of Islam, “the basis of revolution and the condition 

for the progression of a revolution . . . is man.”43

Another key concept is that of entezar, or the messianic expectation 

of the return of the Hidden Imam, and Ram noted that the exportation 

of the Islamic revolution is deeply rooted in a dynamic reinterpretation 

of this concept first articulated by Shariati in the late 1960s.44 Given 

failures by the Shia to regain what they regarded as their usurped and 

rightful leadership of the Islamic community, a passive notion of entezar emerged in 873–874 AD concerning the occultation of the twelfth 

imam. This conception called on the Shia to patiently wait for the 

return of the hidden imam, conceived as the Messiah (Mahdi) who 

would appear at the end of time, without taking any actions to change 

their state of existence.45

Shariati rejected this passive conception of entezar. Somewhat similar to Christian Zionists who support the modern state of Israel in the 

belief that doing so will hasten the second coming of Jesus, Shariati 

conceived of a greater role for human agency in effectuating divine 

prophecy, arguing that “true” entezar required Muslims to take positive 

actions to encourage the return of the hidden imam from occultation 

and thereby bring forward the time of their final and eternal salvation.46 While the elimination of injustice and oppression could occur 

only with the return of the imam, in the meantime the faithful can 

lay the conditions for the imam’s revolution not with “prayers . . . but 

with a banner and a sword, with true holy war involving all responsible 

believers.”47 For Shariati, human intervention in the form of revolutionary action to eliminate oppression and promote universal justice was 

actually necessary to create favorable conditions for the return of the 

Mahdi, because the hidden imam would otherwise not return.

For Iran’s revolutionary leaders, particularly in the immediate 

period after the revolution, when the establishment and link with Hizbollah was effected, such action was not to be limited to Iran. As noted 
16

Unconventional Warfare Case Study: Iran and Lebanese Hizbollah

by Khameneh’i in June 1980, setting the conditions for the return of 

the Mahdi required the following steps:

First, on the elimination and eradication of the roots of 

injustice and overflowing tyranny (toghyan). I mean, in 

the society . . . [of] the vali-ye ‘asr [the Lord of the Time; 

the Hidden Imam] there should be no oppression and 

injustice; not only in Iran . . . in the entire world [emphasis added]. There should be no economic oppression, 

no political oppression, no cultural oppression, not 

any kind of oppression  .  .  . exploitation, inequality, 

unreasonable demands, and hooliganism . . . must be 

eradicated.48

Khameneh’i also noted in June 1980 the important world-historical 

role played by the Iranian people in launching a revolution that in turn 

would hasten the return of the Mahdi:

We, the nation of Iran, have . . . made a revolution. 

Our revolution was the necessary prelude and a great 

step in the path of that goal which the Imam of the 

Age (emam-e zaman) was sent . . . to accomplish. If we 

had not taken this great step, surely the appearance 

of the vali-ye ‘asr would be postponed. You, the people 

of Iran . . . [are] the cause of the advancement of the 

great human movement towards [its] destination in 

history, and the cause of hastening (tasri’) the appearance of the vali-ye ‘asr.

49

Yet the Islamic revolution was only the first step, “a drop of water 

in the vast ocean of the Mahdi,”50 noted Rafsanjani. It was Iran’s manifest destiny, noted Khameneh’i in a Friday congregational sermon in 

March 1980, to pursue dynamic entezar to the four corners of the earth:

We must . . . strive to export our revolution throughout the world . . . The Qur’an is not confined to the 

town of Mecca, it is not limited to the Quraysh infidels. 

[The Qur’an] is not satisfied with . . . guiding the people of one town or one country to happiness and salvation. It is for the inhabitants of the world (‘alamin), 

for [all] people and for mankind . . . [T]he message of 

Islam must hasten to deliver the people wherever there 

is poverty, wherever there is discrimination, wherever 

there is oppression.51

Another key intellectual and theological cornerstone of the Islamic 

revolution, and one that played a critical role in the relationship 
Chapter 2. External Supporter

17

between Hizbollah and Iran, is velayat-e faqih, or The Governorship of 

the Jurisprudent. Although this concept is most often associated with 

Khomeini, particularly because he authored a publication in 1971 of 

the same title, it was Husayn Ali Montazeri who first made the most 

extended defense of this concept with the 1964 publication of a fourvolume work in Arabic titled Legal Foundations of the Islamic Government.

52

In this work, Montazeri justified the temporal rule of the most senior 

Shia cleric, who as the most legitimate representative of the Mahdi possessed the requisite legitimacy and qualifications to wield spiritual and 

political authority during the era of occultation.53 Any other form of 

government was bound to be either corrupt or tyrannical.

The Koranic verse on which velayat-e faqih is based is the so-called 

“authority verse” (Koran, IV:59): “Obey God, His Prophet, and those 

who command authority.”54 Shia catechism instructs that the Prophet 

and the twelve imams are infallible and capable of revealing divine 

truth and therefore have the right to guide humanity, which is structurally fallible and lacks the intellectual and moral capacity to understand 

the esoteric meaning of the Koran, the Prophet’s Sunnah (traditions), 

or the traditions of the imams.55 Hence, during the period of occultation, the mojtaheds, by virtue of their religious training and knowledge, 

should assume the responsibility of guiding fallible humanity.56

Traditionally the Shia regarded the clerical assumption of political authority as theologically problematic, because the establishment of 

the Islamic order can occur only with the return of the hidden imam.57

Such thinking was the basis for quietism, and indeed in the 1950s Khomeini ascribed to the teachings of Ayatollah  Borujerdi, the leading 

mojtahed at the time, who rejected clerical involvement in politics.58 In 

the 1940s book Kashf al-Asrar (Revealing of the Secrets), he stated “We do 

not claim that the government (hokumat) should be in the hands of 

the theologian (faqih),” but that the government should act “according 

to . . . divine law.” Therefore, clerics should have nezarat (supervision) 

of “the legislative and the executive branches of the Islamic state.”59

Additionally, as late as April 1964, Khomeini stated “We say the government should stay. But it should respect the laws of Islam, or at least 

the constitution.”60

Yet by the late 1960s and early 1970s Khomeini’s view of the relationship between religious and political authority began to change. In 

his 1971 work Velayat-e Faqih Khomeini denounced nationalism as an 

imperialist conspiracy meant to divide Muslims. More specifically, he 

argued that after World War I imperialist powers imposed unfavorable 

structural change by dividing the “Islamic homeland” into “peoples 

and petty states” and placed stooges in these territories to safeguard 

their political and economic interests.61 For Khomeini, it was imperative 
18

Unconventional Warfare Case Study: Iran and Lebanese Hizbollah

that Muslims unite under the banner of Islam to resist imperialism 

(and Zionism).62

Who should lead the umma against the rapacious and conniving 

West? Khomeini’s theory of velayat-e faqih argued that the imams’ right 

to rule devolved onto religious jurists and that if one of them succeeded 

in establishing a government, the other jurists were required to follow 

him.63 More specifically, society should be ruled by the most knowledgeable and morally upright mojtahed.

64 This individual, Khomeini 

conceded, does not possess a personal covenant with Allah, as do the 

Prophet and the imams, nor does he possess the imams’ personal infallibility. However, Khomeini bestowed “functional velayat” on the jurisconsult, which signified that the jurisconsult has sacred knowledge to 

determine the hidden meaning of the Koran and therefore participate 

in the final revelation of the word of God.65

In pledging allegiance to Khomeini upon its founding, Hizbollah 

ascribed to this conception of velayat-e faqih. Indeed, Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah has stated that “the decision of peace and war is in the hands of 

the jurisconsult, not in the hands of the intellectuals, researchers, scientists, and regular politicians.”66 Additionally, he stated “Where is the 

force in us? What is Hizbollah’s secret? The power is in the obedience 

to Khamenei’s velayat. The secret of our strength, growth, unity, struggle, and martyrdom is velayat-e faqih, the spinal cord of Hizbollah.”67

STRATEGIC GOALS AND INTEREST IN 

RESISTANCE MOVEMENT

Iranian foreign policy as it relates to Hizbollah can be seen both 

from a broad perspective involving timeless, transcendent, and at times 

noble concerns related to geography, geopolitics, Islamism, and the concern for the weak and powerless, and from a narrow, base perspective 

involving realpolitik, power projection, and regime security. Regarding 

the former, and in particular geopolitics, Iran’s resource endowment 

and strategic location have conspired to ensure that the country draws 

the attention of major international and extraregional powers. For 

instance, in 1920 Soviet troops entered Iran and sponsored the communist Republic of Gilan in northern Iran, although Moscow withdrew its 

troops after Reza Khan’s February 1921 coup.68 Additionally, the British 

had acquired control of the oil-rich province of Khuzestan, although 

Reza Shah eventually reimposed central control over the region.69

During World War II the country was invaded in August 1941 by 

both Britain and the Soviet Union and subsequently occupied, as it was 

feared that Iran’s policy of neutrality would prevent the supply of muchneeded war matériel to the USSR after Hitler’s invasion of the Soviet 
Chapter 2. External Supporter

19

Union.70 More specifically, the British and Russians were interested in 

securing the Trans-Iranian Railway, which linked the Caspian port of 

Bandar Shah with the Persian Gulf port of Bandar Shahpur and represented the most effective means of transporting US supplies to the 

Soviet Union.71 However, the history of British and Soviet domination 

of the country prevented Reza Shah from giving these two powers the 

extraterritorial control they sought over the railway.72 To preserve the 

dynasty, Reza Shah abdicated and was exiled to South Africa.e

Fears of external domination persisted after the end of the war. 

The country’s resource endowment had previously drawn the interest 

of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, and concerns over excessive foreign 

control of the oil sector resulted in demands, led by parliamentarian 

and later Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddeq, for the nationalization of the oil sector, which was accomplished in March 1951. Unwilling to accept this setback, the British teamed up with the US Central 

Intelligence Agency to unseat Mosaddeq in a 1953 coup, as the United 

States was concerned that Mosaddeq’s brand of populism and cooperation with the communist Tudeh (Masses) party would open the door to 

Soviet influence in the country, perhaps even a communist takeover.f

Fears of outside domination and the blocking of Iran’s external 

ambitions by foreign powers were major concerns, regardless of who 

was in power in Tehran. Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, the main 

beneficiary of the 1953 coup, believed that by virtue of being an old 

and territorially established civilization, Iran should exert influence 

beyond its borders, particularly within the Persian Gulf region. Yet the 

Palavis were also concerned that outside powers would conspire to prevent Iran from assuming its natural role.76 Similar geopolitically based 

fears surrounding sovereignty and national greatness motivated the 

Islamic revolutionaries who took power in 1979, as they feared that outside “satanic” powers were trying to destroy Iran’s unique revolution.77

Indeed, concern with sovereignty and independence was reflected in 

e More specifically, the British issued the following understated threat to Reza Shah: 

“Would His Highness kindly abdicate in favour of his son, the heir to the throne? We have 

a high opinion of him and will ensure his position. But His Highness should not think 

there is any other solution.”73

Additionally, in a repeat of 1920–1921, by 1945 the Soviets had set up puppet regimes 

in the Iranian provinces of Azerbaijan and Kurdistan, although Iran was able to convince 

the Soviets to evacuate its troops by offering Moscow major oil concessions.74

f Griffith75 argued that Mosaddeq was in favor of neutrality or “negative equilibrium,” 

in contrast to the Shah, who believed that Iran was too weak to remain neutral within a 

bipolar international system and therefore had to align with the United States to contain 

what he perceived as a Soviet threat to Iran’s independence and territorial integrity. However, political polarization pushed Mosaddeq toward the Soviets and the Tudeh party, who 

were willing to work with the prime minister to first remove the Shah and then Mosaddeq 

himself.
20

Unconventional Warfare Case Study: Iran and Lebanese Hizbollah

one of the main battle cries of the revolutionaries in 1978–1979: “Azadi, 

Esteqlal: Jomhouri Eslami” (Freedom, Independence: Islamic Republic).78

Lord Palmerston’s observation that nations have no permanent 

friends or allies, only permanent interests, was illustrated by Iran’s longstanding concern with sovereignty, exceptionalism, and regional influence regardless of the nature of the regime in Tehran. These interests 

caused Iran to turn from friendliness toward the West and Israel under 

the Shah to violent hostility after the Islamic Revolution in 1979. From 

this perspective, Iran’s sponsorship of Hizbollah reflects a persistent 

theme in Iranian foreign policy, as it provides the country with an 

asymmetric strategic deterrent against hostile regional (Israel)g

 and 

extraregional (United States) powers, representing (from the Iranian 

perspective) a Western and colonial implant (Israel) and an interloper 

and interventionist (the United States), both seeking to limit Iranian 

power and ambitions in the Middle East. Such a deterrent assumes 

greater importance when one considers that Iran still lacks a nuclear 

deterrent against the large, sophisticated nuclear arsenals of the United 

States and Israel and that Iran’s conventional capabilities are no match 

for those that American forces can bring to bear in the Gulf region.

Iran’s support for Hizbollah is also motivated by sentimental factors related to Islamic ecumenism and the spread of Islam along with 

a socially constructed conception of Iran’s role as the defender of the 

world’s downtrodden and oppressed. Regarding the former, in the last 

section it was noted how a dynamic notion of entezar was fostered by 

Iran’s revolutionary generation, which called for the spreading of the 

revolution to other lands to pave the way for the return of the Mahdi. 

After the revolution there were numerous statements by top Iranian 

officials regarding the need to export the revolution, particularly to 

the Muslim world, as a way of fostering Islamic universalism. Indeed 

this notion was given a constitutional mandate through Article 11 of 

the Islamic Republic’s constitution, which states:

In accordance with the sacred verse of the Koran 

(“This your community is a single community, and I 

am your Lord, so worship Me” [21:92]), all Muslims 

form a single nation, and the government of the 

Islamic Republic has the duty of formulating its general policies with a view to merging and union of all 

Muslim peoples, and it must constantly strive to bring 

g Bergman79 reports that in one 2006 meeting in London with Western diplomats, an 

Iranian diplomat is quoted as saying that Hizbollah is “one of the foundations of our strategic security. It serves as the first Iranian defensive line against Israel. We do not accept 

that it must be disarmed.”
Chapter 2. External Supporter

21

about the political, economic and cultural unity of the 

Islamic world.80

Additionally, Article 3 notes that the Islamic Republic has the 

responsibility to seek the “expansion and strengthening of Islamic 

brotherhood and public cooperation among all the people” and to 

frame “the foreign policy of the country on the basis of Islamic criteria, 

fraternal commitment to all Muslims, and unsparing support to the 

mustad’afiin (oppressed) of the world.”81

The constitution also directly addresses the role to be played by the 

IRGC. Article 150 states:

The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, organized in 

the early days of the triumph of the Revolution, is to be 

maintained so that it may continue in its role of guarding the Revolution and its achievements. The scope of 

the duties of this Corps, and its areas of responsibility, 

in relation to the duties and areas of responsibility of 

the other armed forces, are to be determined by law, 

with emphasis on brotherly cooperation and harmony 

among them.82

Furthermore, the preamble assigns an expeditionary role to the IRGC:

In the organization and equipping of the country’s 

defense forces, there must be regard for faith and religion as their basis and rules. And so the Islamic Republic’s army, and the corps of Revolutionary Guards must 

be organized in accordance with this aim. They have 

responsibility not only for the safeguarding of the 

frontiers, but also for a religious mission, which is Holy 

War along the way of God, and the struggle to extend 

the supremacy of God’s Law in the world.83

Thus, the IRGC has been given a constitutional mandate to spread 

Islam abroad. Interestingly, Iranian officials, in an effort to broaden 

the appeal of the revolution, are often at pains to downplay the Shiite 

nature of the revolution and instead emphasize their ecumenism. For 

instance, in September 1984 Khameneh’i stated:

We have no intention of bringing the Sunni brothers to Shi’ism or the Shi’i to Sunnism. Rather, the 

unity . . . of Muslim brothers should evolve around a 

common axis and common bases . . . Experience has 

shown . . . that diversity of beliefs never prevented two 

brothers from praying [together], from launching 

Holy War, from performing the annual pilgrimage to 
22

Unconventional Warfare Case Study: Iran and Lebanese Hizbollah

Mecca (hajj), or from issuing collective declarations on 

Islamic issues. What is important is unity of purpose 

and unity of principles, and this exists between the 

Shi’i and Sunni brothers in all the Muslim lands. The 

best axis for the unity of the Islamic community is the 

[Prophet Muhammad] . . . [A]ll the Muslim countries 

should lay aside their [petty] differences and strive 

to establish unity among all Muslim societies by creating one popular movement against the oppressors 

(mostakbarin).84

Yet Bar noted that Khomeini (and Khameneh’i after him) did not 

see himself as the leader solely of Iran or of Shiites, but rather regarded 

the velayat-e faqih as transcending sectarian differences and serving as a 

leader for the entire umma.

85 Notably, Hizbollah regarded the authority of the velayat-e faqih as extending to all Muslims. Naim Qassem, the 

deputy secretary general of Hizbollah, stated:

The Jurist-Theologian’s native land has no relation to 

the scope of his dominion. The same is true of the 

spiritual authority and the geographical scope of such 

authority. He could be Iranian or Iraqi, Lebanese 

or Kuwaiti, or any other. His nationality is thus not 

related to his qualifications, for he carries the toll of 

Islam . . . As guardian of Muslims, Imam Khomeini 

governed the Islamic state in Iran as a guide, leader, 

and supervisor of the Islamic system on that territory, but defined the general political commandments 

for all Muslims anywhere they lived in the context of 

preservation of the resources of Muslim states; enmity 

towards hegemony; protection of independence from 

domination and subjugation; work towards unity, especially on fateful and common issues; confrontation of 

the cancer implanted forcefully in Palestine as represented by the Israeli entity  .  .  . His successor, Imam 

Khameneh’i, assumes the same role and authorities.86

Additionally, as alluded to previously, Iran’s revolutionaries conceived of the Islamic Republic as a defender of the world’s downtrodden, and indeed in their idealistic enthusiasm they regarded the welfare 

of the world as an important concern of the new republic. As noted in 

Article 154:

The Islamic Republic of Iran has as its ideal human 

felicity throughout human society, and considers the 

attainment of independence, freedom, and rule of 
Chapter 2. External Supporter

23

justice and truth to be the right of all people of the 

world. Accordingly, while scrupulously refraining from 

all forms of interference in the internal affairs of other 

nations, it supports the just struggles of the mustad’afun

(oppressed) against the mustakbirun (oppressors) in 

every corner of the globe.87,h

Despite the pledge of forbearance in Article  154, it is apparent 

that the Iranian constitution, in requiring the government to spread 

Islam, foster Islamic universalism, and champion the cause of groups 

and countries it regards as oppressed, provides the IRGC, and in particular the Qods Force, with wide legal latitude to intervene abroad. 

From Iran’s perspective, the sponsorship of Hizbollah addresses several 

of these themes, given the historical persecution of and deprivation 

suffered by the Shia in Lebanon. The 1982 Israeli invasion of southern Lebanon provided Iran with an opportunity to seize the mantle of 

Islamic resistance against the Jewish state in particular and Zionism in 

general and spearhead the “liberation” of Jerusalem. In turn, Hizbollah’s successful resistance against Israel promotes a version of Islamic 

universalism, with Iran as leader of the Islamic world to the detriment 

of Saudi Arabia which, as guardian of the two holiest sites of Islam 

in Mecca and Medina, is typically regarded as the natural leader of 

the umma.

However, various authors have stressed that there are limits on 

the degree to which Iran has sought to Islamize its foreign policy. 

Ehteshami and Hinnebusch noted that by the late 1980s, owing to war 

fatigue and the death of Khomeini, Iranian foreign policy entered a 

more pragmatic phase.89 Additionally, Bar noted a number of cases 

where Iran set aside Islamism and support for Islamic causes and opted 

instead to work to establish or maintain good relations with countries 

that were battling various Islamist movements, including India (despite 

Kashmir), Armenia (despite Nagorno-Karabach), China (despite 

the oppression of the Uighur Muslims in western China), and Russia 

(despite Chechnya).90 Bar also related a candid admission by Rafsanjani, who in 2003 noted that had Iran’s constitution been rewritten, it 

would have been more ambiguous regarding the country’s mission to 

combat the oppression of Muslims everywhere. Such passages would 

have been rewritten in a “more relative and limited” fashion, and more 

h Interestingly, Rajaee88 noted that there was unanimous support for this article when 

it was debated by the Assembly of Experts when this body reviewed the proposed constitution. As a result, the deputy chairman of the assembly noted: “This consensus is a proof 

that our revolution . . . is a universal one and contrary to what some may say it will not be 

limited within the boundaries [of Iran], provided we make a model society out of our own 

country.” Such sentiment led Rajaee to conclude that the universality of the revolution and 

its ideology were taken for granted by Iran’s revolutionary generation.
24

Unconventional Warfare Case Study: Iran and Lebanese Hizbollah

emphasis would have been given to maintaining Iran’s independence 

rather than fighting oppression.91

In view of the element of pragmatism that eventually emerged in 

Iran’s foreign policy, it is important to note that sponsorship of Hizbollah 

furthered less glorious and more vulgar interests related to raison d’état. 

It has already been noted that Hizbollah provides Iran with a powerprojection capability that enables it to carry out a version of extended 

deterrence, extended meaning farther away from Iran’s borders. More 

specifically, in the 1980s the sponsorship of Hizbollah allowed Iran 

to leapfrog the containment imposed by war with Iraq to appeal to a 

broader constituency in the Middle East, and afterward, as noted by 

Byman and Kreps, Iran’s relationship with Hizbollah allowed it to more 

credibly deter Israel. As the authors noted, absent the capability and 

reach provided by Hizbollah, Iran could not hope to respond militarily to every perceived Israeli transgression, given the relative weakness 

of Iran’s conventional forces and its desire to avoid interstate conflict. 

Working through Hizbollah allowed Iran to more credibly commit to 

acting against Israel because Israel would find it politically difficult to 

retaliate against Iran for actions undertaken by the movement, even if 

it is believed that those actions were taken at Iran’s behest.92

Lastly, one could perhaps argue that Iranian sponsorship of Hizbollah (and similar groups) shortly after the revolution was motivated in 

part by defensive concerns, and in particular by the need to safeguard 

regime security. One empirical study noted that states undergoing a 

revolutionary regime change are almost twice as likely to be involved in 

war as are states that emerge from a more evolutionary process of political development,93 and one such motivating factor (as was the case with 

revolutionary France after the fall of Louis XVI) is the belief that a revolution must be exported in order to protect it at home. Ehteshami and 

Hinnebusch noted that by 1987 Iran was at odds with many regional 

countries,94 and in particular it considered the Gulf monarchies, 

including Saudi Arabia, “un-Islamic” (owing to their monarchical form 

of government), and therefore illegitimate, and puppets of the United 

States.95,i Additionally, Iran was fearful that these states, in combination with the United States, would seek to reverse the revolution.98 As 

Khomeini once noted, “If we remain in an enclosed environment we 

shall definitely face defeat.”99

i A 1987 comment by Rafsanjani regarding Saudi Arabia is quite telling. After clashes 

between Iranian pilgrims and Saudi security forces during the 1987 hajj, Rafsanjani proclaimed that Iran must “uproot the Saudi rulers . . . and divest the control of the holy 

shrines from [them].”96 Interestingly, there are strong indications that these clashes were 

organized by Iran, as Khomeini issued an order in 1987 that called for an uprising in that 

year’s pilgrimage to Mecca.97 If this is indeed the case, this staged incident offers evidence 

that Iran was looking for a pretext to overthrow the Saudi dynasty.
Chapter 2. External Supporter

25

Thus, the sponsorship of Hizbollah and other groups to make the 

region more Islamic and radical may be seen as motivated, at least in 

part, by defensive concerns, because revolutionary regimes established 

with Iran’s help may have been friendlier to the Islamic Republic. Of 

course, as Walt noted, Iranian leaders did not appear to recognize how 

their own actions and calls for exporting the revolution generated 

insecurity in neighboring countries. Instead, Iran interpreted regional 

opposition as evidence of an inherent hostility brought about by internal corruption, dependence on the United States, and the un-Islamic 

nature of countries in the Gulf and Middle East. Hence, to the extent 

that Iranian sponsorship of Hizbollah was motivated by defensive concerns related to the safeguarding of the revolution at home, such threat 

perceptions were likely exaggerated.100

RESISTANCE MOVEMENT SELECTION

In the early 1980s Iran decided it was preferable to establish a 

new Shiite-based organization to mobilize Lebanon’s Shia community 

rather than rely on Amal, an existing Shia organization established 

in the mid-1970s by a charismatic theologian, Imam Musa al-Sadr. AlSadr, the son of an influential Lebanese Shiite scholar, was born in the 

Iranian religious city of Qom in 1928 and made his way to Lebanon 

in the late 1950s. Social scientists argue that the creation of Hizbollah minimized potential “principal–agent” issues that may have arisen 

had Iran partnered with a less Islamized organization, such as Amal.101

But before specifically addressing such issues, as a backdrop we present a brief history of the formation of Amal and its subsequent split 

with Hizbollah.

The Shia community in Lebanon is widely regarded as originating 

in the seventh  century, when Abu  Dhar  al-Ghafari, a companion of 

the Prophet Muhammad, was expelled to Jabal Amil in south Lebanon for his sympathy for Ali.j

 Over time the Shia settled in Jabal Amil, 

the Bekaa Valley, and Kiswaran, although their villages were subjected 

to raids by the Mamluks. The Shia were viewed with suspicion by the 

Mamluks and by the Ottomans, both Sunni rulers.103 A link with Iran 

was established during the Safavid era, as the Ottomans viewed Lebanese Shia as potential fifth-columnists and so proceeded to expel many 

to Persia.104,k

 Owing to the tradition of quietism, for more than a millennium the Shia largely suffered in silence as they waited patiently 

j Other scholars locate the temporal origin of Lebanon’s Shia community in the 

eleventh century.102

k The Safavid Dynasty ruled Persia from 1501 to 1736 and in the first year of their 

rule introduced Twelver Shiism to Persia by making it the state religion.
26

Unconventional Warfare Case Study: Iran and Lebanese Hizbollah

for their final redemption with the arrival of the Mahdi. Compared 

with Lebanon’s other sectarian groups, by the twentieth century the 

Shia were at the bottom of all socioeconomic indicators, a reality 

made visible to them when urbanization made them conscious of their 

unenviable lot.105,l Additionally, quietism contributed to their political 

marginalization.106

The history of Lebanon’s Shia community advanced along a new 

trajectory with the arrival of al-Sadr in the mid-twentieth  century. 

Before al-Sadr initiated a process of ethnic mobilization, political and 

economic ideology, and particularly leftist ideology, had formed the 

basis of Shia mobilization in Lebanon, as disaffected youth coalesced 

around the Lebanese Communist Party, the Lebanese Baath Party, 

Nasserite groups, and the Syria Social Nationalist Party.107 However, alSadr’s efforts led to the establishment in 1969 of the Supreme Islamic 

Shiite Council, the first institutional body in Lebanon’s history to represent the interests of the country’s Shiites.108 This body was established 

after widespread Israeli bombing of Palestinian bases in south Lebanon, and was intended to be primarily a forum for the emerging Shiite 

bourgeoisie in Lebanon, whose path to political power was blocked by 

the traditional Shiite leadership and landowning class (zuama).109

Like various contemporaries at the time, al-Sadr rejected quietism 

in favor of a more dynamic and activist Shiism, and so he sought to 

establish a mass Shiite movement that would campaign for social justice. He conceived a nonviolent organization, although he taught that 

martyrdom for the sake of establishing a just society may require a violent revolution.110

This movement found expression in 1974 with the establishment of 

the Movement of the Deprived (Harakat al-Mahrumin), and in 1975 

this movement established a militia, Amal (Afwaj al-Muqawamah alLubnaniyyah, or Battalions of the Lebanese Resistance), which means 

“hope” in Arabic, to represent the Shia in Lebanon’s looming civil war. 

Although founded as a militia, Amal would sprout a political organization whose base went beyond the frustrated bourgeoisie that backed 

the Supreme Islamic Shiite Council to also include the peasantry and 

poor urban migrants. Through Amal, al-Sadr pressed for protection 

from Israeli raids in the south, improved living conditions in southern 

Lebanon, and a greater share of political representation, development 

expenditures, and government jobs for Lebanon’s Shia.111

As noted by Chehabi, Amal was not a tightly integrated and homogenous organization.112 It attracted members from Beirut, the Bekaa 

l See the section “Historical Context: Nexus of Socioeconomic Conditions and Creation of Vulnerabilities” in Chapter 3 for more information on the historical, social, and 

economic conditions of Lebanon’s Shia community.
Chapter 2. External Supporter

27

Valley, and south Lebanon, with those from south Lebanon being more 

anti-Palestinian than the former two, and ideologically it counted on 

both secular and Islamist members. Additionally, in the late 1970s 

clerical members of the Lebanese Da’wa Party, frustrated by the secretive and underground nature of the organization, joined Amal at the 

behest of Iran.m Many of these Lebanese clerics had established links 

with their Iranian counterparts while completing their religious training in the holy city of Najaf (in Iraq), and Iran encouraged them to 

infiltrate Amal to spread a revolutionary Islamic message to a broader 

audience and to challenge the secular orientation of Amal.114

Amal was initially trained by the Palestine Liberation Organization 

(PLO) and by al-Saiqa, the Syrian-sponsored Palestinian movement, 

and it was also a member of the Lebanese National Movement (which 

was formed by Druze leader Kamal Jumblatt to challenge the ascendancy of the Maronites),115 although it later turned against the movement and supported Syria’s effort to end the civil war. Amal also turned 

against the PLO, as it blamed the group’s cross-border shelling of Israel 

for the devastation visited on Shia villages by Israeli actions in response 

to PLO guerrilla activity.116

The split with the PLO revealed Amal’s overall preference for a less 

hard-line Islamist orientation, as it offered evidence that the group (or 

at least its secular leadership) was willing to at least tolerate Israel’s existence as long as the Jewish state left the Shia in peace. Further evidence 

for the group’s relative moderation was provided in 1981 with the election of Nabih Berri as leader.n Given his aversion to militant Shiism,o

Berri led Amal along a secular path, as the group came to represent the 

interests of middle-class Shia frustrated with the power of the zuama

and other entrenched interests in Lebanon, as well as the interests of 

southern Shia tired of Israeli reprisals against the PLO.120 Additionally, Berri did not seek the dismantlement of Lebanon’s confessional 

m The Iraqi Da’wa Party was founded in Iraq around 1958, and after the Baathist 

coup in 1968, many ulema educated in Najaf were expelled to Iran, Lebanon, and the Gulf. 

Some of the exiles in Lebanon founded the Lebanese Da’wa Party.113

n By this point al-Sadr was no longer involved with Amal. In fact, Musa al-Sadr disappeared on a visit to Libya in August 1978, allegedly as a result of Libyan foul play. The 

disappearance made al-Sadr into a martyr figure, as people were quick to draw an obvious parallel to the hidden imam. The disappearance drew the concern of Khomeini, who 

pressed Libyan officials to look into the whereabouts of al-Sadr.117

o Chehabi118 noted that while Berri viewed the Iranian revolution as a positive event, 

he did not regard it as a panacea for the problems of the Shia in Lebanon, and over time 

he grew disenchanted with the Islamic Republic. This may have been due to the purging 

of pro-Amal members from the revolutionary regime in 1980–1981 and their replacement 

with individuals with pro-Palestinian sentiment. It should be noted that senior Iranian 

revolutionaries had trained in Amal camps in Lebanon, and that Khomeini’s two sons, 

Mustafa and Ahmad, had trained in Amal camps in south Lebanon in the 1970s, as well as 

in PLO camps near Beirut.119
28

Unconventional Warfare Case Study: Iran and Lebanese Hizbollah

system,p and instead supported relatively modest reforms that sought 

to include the Shia within a united and secular Lebanon. For instance, 

Amal supported Syria’s “50-50” proposal made in 1976 for the distribution of legislative seats between Muslims and Christians (it also did not 

challenge Maronite control of the presidency), and it called for civil 

service jobs to be awarded on merit.121

The emergence of Hizbollah from Amal occurred after Israel’s 

1982 invasion of southern Lebanon, a seminal event in the history of 

modern militant Shiism. Between 1969 and 1981, Palestinian militants 

in Lebanon killed 298 Israelis in the northern Galilee, and the Israeli 

invasion was designed to permanently end the Palestinian presence in 

Lebanon.122,q

 Before the invasion, the Islamist elements of Amal were 

growing unhappy with Berri’s rule. In 1981 members such as Husayn alMusawi (who became the official spokesman of Amal and its deputy 

leader in 1981) and Sayyid Subhi al-Tufayli criticized Berri for not being 

supportive of Khomeini and for being insufficiently Islamist, with alMusawi declaring at the fourth Amal congress in April 1982 that Amal 

fighters were ready to retake Jerusalem on Khomeini’s orders.124

The Israeli invasion led to the Islamist break with Amal. Much of 

the initial resistance was led by leftist groups,125 and indeed Amal’s 

leadership in southern Lebanon instructed its fighters not to resist the 

Israelis and even to turn over their weapons if ordered.126, r

 Additionally, 

Berri agreed to be the Shia representative on the five-member Committee of National Salvation, which was to negotiate with the Israelis 

and with Philip Habib, President Ronald Reagan’s appointee to medip For more information regarding Lebanon’s political system, see the section “Historical Context: Governing Environment” in Chapter 3.

A “confessional system” refers to a form of sectarian representation in a government whereby there is a proportional allocation of political seats and governmental billets 

according to religious or ethnic groups.

q Interestingly, Bergman123 noted that Israeli war aims were much broader than simply removing the Palestinian threat from Lebanon. Defense Minister Ariel Sharon wanted 

Israel to conquer southern Lebanon, then link up with the Maronites in Beirut to remove 

the PLO and Syrians from Lebanon. Bashir Jemayal, the leader of the Christian Phalange 

Party, would be installed as the leader of Lebanon. It was hoped that the expelled Palestinians would take over Jordan and remove the Hashemite dynasty that ruled that country 

and in the process give up their claim to the West Bank. The Syrians helped to derail these 

plans by blowing up Jemayal during a meeting at Phalange headquarters in Beirut.

r It should be noted that the Shia in south Lebanon initially welcomed the Israeli 

invasion, indeed with handfuls of thrown rice, as they hoped that Israel would get rid of 

the hated PLO. Yet they turned against Israel once it appeared as if Israel was making 

preparations for a long-term occupation of southern Lebanon. Additionally, Israel’s “iron 

fist” occupation policy alienated many Shia. Shia grievances centered around Israeli reliance on mass detentions, curfews, house searches, roadblocks, and the destruction of 

orchards. Israelis also arrested sheikhs and community leaders, and the Shia were also 

upset with the brutality of the South Lebanese Army (SLA), the Shia militia sponsored by 

Israel.127
Chapter 2. External Supporter

29

ate the conflict. Berri’s participation drew the ire of Iran’s ambassador to Lebanon, who called on Berri to resign from the “American 

committee.”128 Berri subsequently agreed to a peace plan that would 

involve the removal of PLO fighters from Lebanon, a decision opposed 

by Islamist members of Amal. This dispute was brought for arbitration 

to Iran’s influential ambassador to Syria, Ali-Akbar Mohtashemi, who 

ruled in favor of the Islamists. Berri refused to abide by this decision, 

which prompted al-Musawi to head to the Bekaa Valley and announce 

the establishment of a new organization, “Islamic Amal,” as well as proclaim that the Islamic Republic of Iran was the final arbiter on Islamic 

matters (including determining what was and was not Islamic).129

Other militant Shias itching for a more forceful and Islamist 

response to the Israeli invasion also made their way to the Bekaa Valley, including members of student and mosque groups, members of 

committees in support of the Iranian revolution, and Shias who had 

fought with Palestinian organizations. Among such individuals were 

Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah, the current secretary general of Hizbollah, 

and Imad Mugniyah, the terrorist mastermind who would play a prominent role in Hizbollah’s relationship with Iran and in the group’s attacks 

abroad.130 Delegates from each of the various organizations present 

in the Bekaa Valley formed a nine-member committee to establish a 

new organization committed to the concept of velayat-e faqih and the 

struggle against Zionism.s This committee sent Sheikh Subhi al-Tufayli 

and Sayyid Abbas al-Musawi (who would become Hizbollah’s first and 

second secretary generals, respectively) to Iran to ask the Iranian leadership to appoint an arbiter for disagreements to ensure that decisions 

were consistent with Islamic law.132 Iran’s High Defense Council subsequently agreed to the creation of a “Council of Lebanon,” which, once 

back in Lebanon, proceeded to build the organizational structure of 

Hizbollah, and Khomeini also sent a personal representative to the 

country.133,t

At the time of Israel’s invasion the IRGC’s Unit for Liberation 

Movements was hosting a conference on liberation movements from 

around the world on the birthday of the hidden imam, which Iran had 

declared as “World Dispossessed Day.”135 In attendance from Lebanon 

were Sheikh Shamseddin, Sayyid Fadlallah, Raghib Harb, and Subhi alTufayli, who asked for Iranian help. In July 1982, Iran proceeded to 

s Mohtashemi would play an active role in the formation of Hizbollah. At one point 

he requested al-Musawi to provide him with a list of all Amal members who were sympathetic to the Iranian revolution, and he played a leading role in bringing together members of Lebanese Da’wa, the Association of Muslim Students, and Amal into Hizbollah.131

t The name Hizbollah, which means party of God, was inspired by a Koranic verse 

(Surat al-Ma’ida, 5:56): “those who accept the mandate of God, his prophet and those who 

believed, Lo! The Party of God, they are the victorious.”134
30

Unconventional Warfare Case Study: Iran and Lebanese Hizbollah

send its defense minister, the IRGC commander, and the commander 

of the army’s ground forces to Syria to inquire how Iran could provide assistance. Earlier in March, Iran had reached an agreement that 

brought Syria into the Iranian orbit, with Syria receiving cheap Iranian oil while agreeing to close a pipeline carrying oil from Kirkuk, 

in northern Iraq, to Tripoli.136 Given Syria’s realignment toward Iran, 

President Hafez al-Assad could not now turn down the Iranian request 

to send troops to Lebanon.u

Shortly after the invasion, Syria, concerned with the Israeli threat, 

agreed to the establishment of a forward-deployed Iranian headquarters in the border town of Zebdani.138 Among the initial deployment 

of Iranian troops were members of the 27th brigade, named after the 

Prophet Muhammad himself, and a battalion from the regular army’s 

elite 58th  ranger division, with the combined force sent under the 

name “Forces of Muhammad the Prophet of God” (Qova-ye Mohammad Rasul Allah).139 Some commanders of the 27th had fought against 

Kurdish rebels in Iran and therefore had experience in guerrilla warfare, and they had also distinguished themselves in conventional combat 

against Iraq.140, v

 Mohtashemi, the Iranian ambassador to Syria, greeted 

them at the airport, and the Iranian forces were also well received by 

the Syrian populace, some of whom welcomed them by shouting slogans in Persian.142 For Khomeini, this initial deployment allowed for 

the establishment of “a forward strategic position which makes proximity to Jerusalem possible.”143

u Iran had also sought to send troops to Lebanon in 1979 shortly after the revolution. 

In November 1979, Mohammad Montazeri, who once had attended a training camp in 

Lebanon, launched a “Revolutionary Organization of the Masses of the Islamic Republic” and went to a PLO solidarity conference in Portugal. At the conference he promised 

to recruit one hundred thousand Iranian volunteers to fight for the Palestinians, and 

recruits started training at a camp near Tehran. In December 1979, four hundred volunteers arrived in Damascus without prior notification, and one of the slogans they chanted 

was “Today Iran, tomorrow Palestine.” However, as a secular dictator, Assad was not eager 

to introduce an extremist movement into Syria and Lebanon and had the four hundred 

volunteers sent first to a Palestinian refugee camp and then back to Iran (only about forty 

of the first thousand volunteers ever made it to Lebanon). Montazeri had managed to 

make it to Beirut, but Assad ordered his capture and elimination. Fortunately for Montazeri, a phone call from Khomeini to Assad led to his release.137

v Interestingly, DeVore and Stähli noted that, overall, many of the tactics imparted by 

the initial Iranian contingent were not appropriate for the Lebanese theater. Specifically, 

the Iranians stressed their belief in the psychological impact of “human wave” attacks, 

which were employed in combat against Iraq. However, employed against the Israelis, this 

tactic simply resulted in large losses for Hizbollah. The authors quote one United Nations 

observer as stating that “They [Hezbollah] were very amateur, foolhardy in many ways, but 

very brave. They just walked into the line of fire and were cut down very badly. It was just 

like watching the Iranian assaults against Iraq.” Hizbollah eventually changed tactics by 

emphasizing small combat teams and irregular warfare tactics.141
Chapter 2. External Supporter

31

The initial Iranian contingent arrived in Syria on June 11, 1982, six 

days after the start of the Israeli invasion and on the day in which Israel 

proclaimed a cease-fire. Iranian commanders held meetings with Syrians to determine how best to deploy Iranian troops against Israel, but 

it became apparent to Iran that the Syrian government was primarily 

interested in using the Iranians for propaganda purposes.144 Many personnel in this initial deployment were sent back to Iran to fight against 

Iraq, but a contingent of eight hundred Iranian IRGC members did 

make their way to Baalbeck, in Lebanon. This figure was reinforced 

by seven hundred more IRGC personnel, and most of those deployed 

were military instructors and fighters, as well as a “Cultural Unit” consisting of clerics who engaged in intensive religious indoctrination for 

Hizbollah and Islamic Amal members.145 The primary missions of the 

IRGC in Lebanon, at this time and beyond, were religious guidance 

and military training. As noted in 1991 by Hadi Reza Askari, the IRGC 

commander in Lebanon, “the guard is not a militia; our mission is to 

train the people to fight Israel.”146

Over the next two years the IRGC was able to make its presence felt. 

In September 1983 it assisted Hizbollah in seizing the Sheikh Abdullah barracks, the army’s main base in the Baalbeck area.147 The base 

was renamed after Imam Ali, and it served as the headquarters of the 

IRGC in Lebanon, with Askari sending instructors to provide training 

in combat and sabotage. The IRGC deployment also led to the Islamization of social mores, as bars stopped serving alcoholic beverages, 

women began sporting the Iraqi black abaya, the “Voice of the Iranian 

Revolution” radio station began broadcasting eight hours of religious 

programs and sermons, and pictures of Khomeini and exhortations to 

seek martyrdom sprouted up on walls.148,w

The IRGC mission at this time was also supported by significant 

Iranian funding that was used to finance various social services that 

helped build inroads into the local Shia community and facilitate 

recruiting and indoctrination.x

 Funds were used to assist Hizbollah in 

establishing religious schools, clinics, and hospitals, as well as to provide cash subsidies to families below the poverty line.150 Funds were 

w The IRGC did establish some popularity with the Shia populace in the area by 

providing assistance to villages on the weekend and by not exhibiting predatory behavior 

common to other militias.

x The integration of the IRGC into Baalbeck and elsewhere in Lebanon was facilitated by the many leading Hizbollah officials who studied in Najaf and formed relationships with important Iranian officials. For instance, Ibrahim al-Amin, Abbas Musawi, 

Hassan Nasrallah, and Subhi al-Tufayli, each of who is or was a leading figure in Hizbollah, studied in Najaf. Mohtashemi, the Iranian ambassador to Syria who played a critical 

role in the formation of Hizbollah, studied in Najaf under his mentor Khomeini, and he 

established a close relationship with future Hizbollah clerics.149
32

Unconventional Warfare Case Study: Iran and Lebanese Hizbollah

also used to pay recruits $150–$200 per month, which was far more 

than they could have earned from other militias, and by July 1984 the 

IRGC established six military centers in the Bekaa Valley for training 

Hizbollah and Islamic Amal fighters.151 Furthermore, the IRGC, and by 

extension Hizbollah, was able to expand into other parts of Lebanon, 

including Beirut in April 1983 and also into south Lebanon.152

In addition to serving as a forward operating base against Israel, 

the IRGC presence in Lebanon served as a testing ground to assess 

whether the revolution could be exported. Iranian officials were hopeful, envisioning an Islamic version of the domino theory. As noted by 

the former Iranian ambassador to Lebanon, Hojjatoleslam Fakhr Rouhani, Lebanon is “a platform from which different ideas have been 

directed to the rest of the Arab world,” and as a result “an Islamic movement in that country will result in Islamic movements throughout the 

Arab world.”153

These sentiments were shared by Hizbollah officials at the time, 

who espoused the transnational mission of the Iranian revolution. 

For instance, Sheikh Subhi al-Tufayli stated, “We do not work or think 

within the borders of Lebanon . . . this little geometric box, which is 

one of the legacies of imperialism. Rather, we seek to defend Muslims 

throughout the world.”154 On a separate occasion, Husayn al-Musawi 

noted that the establishment of an Islamic state in Lebanon “is not our 

demand”; rather, the aim was the establishment of an “all-encompassing Islamic state” that incorporated Lebanon.155 Additionally, one Hizbollah cleric, a Mahdist, noted that “the divine state of justice realized 

on part of this earth will not remain confined within its geographic 

borders and is the dawn that will lead to the appearance of the Mahdi, 

who will create the state of Islam on earth.”156

The first step, however, was the establishment of the ideal Islamic 

state in Lebanon. In this regard, Iranian officials were of assistance. In 

fall 1982, Hizbollah clerics, under the auspices of Iran’s Office of Liberation Movements, which was controlled by the IRGC, drafted a charter 

and constitution for the establishment of an Islamic region in Lebanon modeled on the Iranian system. Additionally, in December 1982 

Sheikh al-Tufayli was appointed the “President of the Islamic Republic.”157 Yet, as will be discussed later, both Iran and Hizbollah would 

eventually temper their demands, realizing that neither Syria nor the 

other confessional groups in Lebanon would permit the establishment 

of an Islamic regime patterned on the Iranian model within Lebanon.

The preceding discussion makes clear why Iran chose to establish Hizbollah rather than work with Amal. Hizbollah’s acceptance 

of velayat-e faqih, its strong antipathy toward Israel and willingness to 

use violence to eliminate the Jewish state, and its initial enthusiasm to 
Chapter 2. External Supporter

33

spread the Iranian revolution minimized what social scientists refer to 

as “agency losses” within what are known as principal–agent relationships. These types of relationships entail a situation in which an actor, 

the principal, delegates a task to another actor, the agent, who is given 

a “conditional grant of authority” by the principal to act on its behalf.158

By delegating, the principal relinquishes some control over the 

ability to influence outcomes, as some autonomy must be bestowed on 

agents to act on the behalf of the principal. The risk, of course, is that 

the actions taken by an agent may diverge from the preferences of the 

principal, either through incompetence on the part of the agents or, 

more problematically, because the interests of agents and principals 

diverge.159 As noted by Kiewiet and McCubbins, agency losses refer to 

the costs assumed by the principal when agents, motivated by interests 

not entirely consistent with the desires of the principal, engage in undesired actions on the principal’s behalf.160

Within the current context, Iran can be viewed as a principal that 

has delegated authority to Hizbollah, the agent, to act on its behalf. 

The decision to establish Hizbollah, rather than work through Amal, 

was therefore more efficient from the standpoint of principal–agent 

theory given Hizbollah’s acceptance of the doctrine of velayat-e faqih

and the substantial overlap between Iran’s foreign policy goals and 

those of Hizbollah.y

NOTES

1 Julian Bahrier, Economic Development in Iran 1900–1970 (London: Oxford University 

Press, 1971), 20.

2 Charles S. Prigmore, Social Work in Iran since the White Revolution (Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, 1976), vii.

3 Roger M. Savory, “Social Development in Iran during the Pahlavi Era,” in Iran under the 

Pahlavis, ed. George Lenczowski (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1978), 87–88.

4 Ibid., 105.

5 William E. Griffith, “Iran’s Foreign Policy in the Pahlavi Era,” in Iran under the Pahlavis, 

365.

6 Savory, “Social Development in Iran during the Pahlavi Era,” 90.

7 Ibid., 92.

8 Ibid., 97.

9 Ibid., 97–98.

10 Ibid., 96.

11 Ibid., 104.

y As another layer of security to guard against agency losses, Iran maintains two representatives (from the Iranian embassies in Beirut and Damascus) on the Shura Council 

(Majlis Shura al-Qarar), the governing body of the group.161
34

Unconventional Warfare Case Study: Iran and Lebanese Hizbollah

12 Babak Rahimi, “The Rise of Shii Ideology in Pre-Revolutionary Iran,” in Militancy in Shiism: Trends and Patterns, ed. Assaf Moghadam (London and New York: Routledge, 2011), 

30.

13 Savory, “Social Development in Iran during the Pahlavi Era,” 103.

14 Rahimi, “The Rise of Shii Ideology in Pre-Revolutionary Iran,” 30, 32.

15 Ibid., 32.

16 Savory, “Social Development in Iran during the Pahlavi Era,” 115.

17 Rahimi, “The Rise of Shii Ideology in Pre-Revolutionary Iran,” 31.

18 Ibid.

19 Ibid.

20 Ibid., 34.

21 Ibid.

22 Ibid., 35.

23 Ibid.

24 Ibid., 36.

25 Ibid.

26 Ibid.

27 Assaf Moghadam, “Mayhem, Myths and Martyrdom: The Shi’a Conception of Jihad,” Terrorism and Political Violence 19, no. 1 (2007): 133.

28 Ibid., 134.

29 Ibid.

30 Ibid., 133–134.

31 Ibid., 134.

32 Ibid., 133.

33 Haggay Ram, Myth and Mobilization in Revolutionary Iran: The Use of the Friday Congregational Sermon (Washington, DC: American University Press, 1994), 39–40.

34 Ibid., 40.

35 Ibid.

36 Ibid.

37 Ibid., 42–43.

38 Ibid., 43.

39 Ibid., 41.

40 Ibid., 37–38.

41 Ibid., 41.

42 Ibid., 41–42.

43 Ibid., 42.

44 Haggay Ram, “Exporting Iran’s Islamic Revolution: Steering a Path between Pan-Islam 

and Nationalism,” Terrorism and Political Violence 8, no. 2 (1996): 8.

45 Ibid.

46 Ibid., 9.

47 Ibid.

48 Ibid.

49 Ibid., 10.

50 Ibid.

51 Ibid., 11.

52 Rahimi, “The Rise of Shii Ideology in Pre-Revolutionary Iran,” 42.
Chapter 2. External Supporter

35

53 Ibid.

54 David Menashri, “Ayatollah Khomeini and the Velayat-e-Faqih,” in Militancy in Shiism: 

Trends and Patterns, ed. Assaf Moghadam (London and New York: Routledge, 2011), 50.

55 Marvin Zonis and Daniel Brumbert, “Shi’ism as Interpreted by Khomeini: An Ideology of Revolutionary Violence,” in Shiism, Resistance, and Revolution, ed. Martin Kramer 

(Boulder, CO, and London: Westview Press and Mansell Publishing Ltd, 1987), 58; and 

Ahmad Nizar Hamzeh, In the Path of Hizbullah (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 

2004), 31.

56 Zonis and Brumbert, “Shi’ism as Interpreted by Khomeini,” 58.

57 Hamzeh, In the Path of Hizbullah, 31.

58 Menashri, “Ayatollah Khomeini and the Velayat-e-Faqih,” 50.

59 Ibid.

60 Ibid.

61 Ram, “Exporting Iran’s Islamic Revolution,” 12–13.

62 Ibid.

63 Hamzeh, In the Path of Hizbullah, 31.

64 Zonis and Brumbert, “Shi’ism as Interpreted by Khomeini,” 58.

65 Hamzeh, In the Path of Hizbullah, 33.

66 Ibid.

67 Ibid.

68 Griffith, “Iran’s Foreign Policy in the Pahlavi Era,” 369.

69 Ibid., 370.

70 Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress, Iran: A Country Study (Washington, 

DC: Government Printing Office, 1989), 27.

71 Griffith, “Iran’s Foreign Policy in the Pahlavi Era,” 131, 371.

72 Ibid., 371.

73 Ryszard Kapuściński, Shah of Shahs (London: Vintage International, 2006), 25.

74 Griffith, “Iran’s Foreign Policy in the Pahlavi Era,” 372–373.

75 Ibid., 372, 374.

76 Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Raymond A. Hinnebusch, Syria and Iran: Middle Powers in a 

Penetrated Regional System (London and New York: Routledge, 1997), 28.

77 Ibid.

78 Ibid.

79 Ronen Bergman, The Secret War with Iran (New York: Free Press, 2007), 254.

80 “Islamic Republic of Iran Constitution,” http://www.iranonline.com/iran/iran-info/government/constitution.html.

81 Ibid.

82 Ibid.

83 Iran Chamber Society, “The Constitution of Islamic Republic of Iran,” http://www.iranchamber.com/government/laws/constitution.php.

84 Ram, “Exporting Iran’s Islamic Revolution,” 15–16.

85 Shmuel Bar, “Iranian Terrorist Policy and ‘Export of Revolution,’” (working paper 

presented at the 9th Annual Herzliya Conference on the Balance of Israel’s National 

Security and Resilience, Lauder School of Government, Diplomacy and Strategy, Interdisciplinary Center [IDC] Herzliya, February 2–4, 2009), 4, http://www.herzliyaconference.org/_Uploads/2903Iranian.pdf.

86 Naim Qassem, Hizbullah: The Story from Within (London: Saqi, 2005), 55–56.

87 “Islamic Republic of Iran Constitution.”
36

Unconventional Warfare Case Study: Iran and Lebanese Hizbollah

88 Farhang Rajaee, “Iranian Ideology and Worldview: The Cultural Export of Revolution,” 

in The Iranian Revolution: Its Global Impact, ed. John L. Esposito (Miami: Florida International University Press, 1990), 68.

89 Ehteshami and Hinnebusch, Syria and Iran, 43–44.

90 Bar, “Iranian Terrorist Policy and ‘Export of Revolution,’” 3 (fn. 1).

91 Ibid.

92 Daniel Byman and Sarah E. Kreps, “Agents of Destruction? Applying Principal-Agent 

Analysis to State-Sponsored Terrorism,” International Studies Perspectives 11, no. 1 (2010): 

4.

93 Zeev Maoz, “Joining the Club of Nations: Political Development and International Conflict, 1816–1876,” International Studies Quarterly 33, no. 2 (1989): 199–231.

94 Ehteshami and Hinnebusch, Syria and Iran, 42.

95 Stephen M. Walt, Revolution and War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996), 243.

96 Ibid., 245.

97 Reza Kahlili, A Time to Betray (New York: Threshold Editions, 2010), 252–253.

98 Walt, Revolution and War, 258.

99 Ibid.

100 Ibid.

101Byman and Kreps, “Agents of Destruction?,” 5.

102 Yusri Hazran, “The Rise of Politicized Shi’ite Religiosity and the Territorial State in Iraq 

and Lebanon,” The Middle East Journal 64, no. 4 (2010): 525.

103 Ibid.

104Ehteshami and Hinnebusch, Syria and Iran, 123.

105 Ibid., 117.

106Hamzeh, In the Path of Hizbullah, 21.

107Ehteshami and Hinnebusch, Syria and Iran, 117.

108Hamzeh, In the Path of Hizbullah, 20.

109 Ibid.

110 Ibid., 21.

111 Ehteshami and Hinnebusch, Syria and Iran, 118.

112 H. E. Chehabi, “Iran and Lebanon in the Revolutionary Decade,” in Distant Relations: 

Iran and Lebanon in the Last 500 Years, ed. H. E. Chehabi (London: I. B. Taurus & Co., 

2006), 209–210.

113 Ibid., 210; and Magnus Ranstorp, Hizballah in Lebanon: The Politics of the Western Hostage 

Crisis (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1997), 30.

114 Ibid.

115 Hamzeh, In the Path of Hizbullah, 20.

116 Chehabi, “Iran and Lebanon in the Revolutionary Decade,” 119.

117 Hamzeh, In the Path of Hizbullah, 22; Ehteshami and Hinnebusch, Syria and Iran, 119; and 

Chehabi, “Iran and Lebanon in the Revolutionary Decade,” 205.

118Chehabi, “Iran and Lebanon in the Revolutionary Decade,” 210–211. 

119 Bergman, The Secret War with Iran, 53; and Ranstorp, Hizballah in Lebanon, 32.

120Chehabi, “Iran and Lebanon in the Revolutionary Decade,” 120.

121 Ibid., 119–120.

122 Ibid., 211–212.

123Bergman, The Secret War with Iran, 56–57.

124Chehabi, “Iran and Lebanon in the Revolutionary Decade,” 211.
Chapter 2. External Supporter

37

125Ehteshami and Hinnebusch, Syria and Iran, 121.

126Nicholas Blanford, Warriors of God: Inside Hezbollah’s Thirty-Year Struggle against Israel (New 

York: Random House, 2011), 42.

127Ehteshami and Hinnebusch, Syria and Iran, 120–121.

128Chehabi, “Iran and Lebanon in the Revolutionary Decade,” 216.

129 Ibid., 217.

130Hamzeh, In the Path of Hizbullah, 24.

131Ranstorp, Hizballah in Lebanon, 32–33.

132Chehabi, “Iran and Lebanon in the Revolutionary Decade,” 218.

133 Ibid.

134Hamzeh, In the Path of Hizbullah, 25.

135Chehabi, “Iran and Lebanon in the Revolutionary Decade,” 212.

136 Ibid., 213.

137 Ibid., 207; and Bergman, The Secret War with Iran, 54.

138Ranstorp, Hizballah in Lebanon, 34.

139Chehabi, “Iran and Lebanon in the Revolutionary Decade,” 213–214.

140 Ibid., 214.

141 Marc R. DeVore and Armin B. Stähli, “Explaining Hezbollah’s Effectiveness: Internal 

and External Determinants of the Rise of Violent Non-State Actors,” Terrorism and Political Violence 27, no. 2 (2014): 13–15.

142Chehabi, “Iran and Lebanon in the Revolutionary Decade,” 214.

143Bergman, The Secret War with Iran, 59.

144Chehabi, “Iran and Lebanon in the Revolutionary Decade,” 214–215.

145 Ibid., 216; and Ranstorp, Hizballah in Lebanon, 34.

146Ranstorp, Hizballah in Lebanon, 34.

147 Bergman, The Secret War with Iran, 60.

148Chehabi, “Iran and Lebanon in the Revolutionary Decade,” 218.

149Augustus Richard Norton, “Lebanon: The Internal Conflict and the Lebanon Connection,” in The Iranian Revolution: Its Global Impact, ed. John L. Esposito (Miami: Florida 

International University Press, 1990), 125; and Ranstorp, Hizballah in Lebanon, 33.

150Ranstorp, Hizballah in Lebanon, 36.

151 Ibid.

152 Ibid., 37–38.

153Ehteshami and Hinnebusch, Syria and Iran, 123.

154Martin Kramer, “Hizbullah: The Calculus of Jihad,” Bulletin of the American Academy of Arts 

and Sciences 47, no. 8 (1994): 30.

155 Ibid.

156 Ibid.

157Ranstorp, Hizballah in Lebanon, 35.

158Byman and Kreps, “Agents of Destruction?,” 3.

159 Ibid., 6.

160Roderick D. Kiewiet and Matthew McCubbins, The Logic of Delegation: Congressional Parties and the Appropriation Process (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 5, cited in 

Byman and Kreps, “Agents of Destruction?,” 6.

161 Martin Rudner, “Hizbullah: An Organizational and Operational Profile,” International 

Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 23, no. 2 (2010): 227.

CHAPTER 3.

HISTORICAL CONTEXT

41

The preceding chapter presented a detailed account of the intellectual milieu and political developments that gave rise to a virulently 

anti-Western and religiously fundamentalist movement that radically 

transformed Iran’s foreign policy and political and social systems. Concurrent political developments and social tensions in Lebanon provided 

the underlying structural context that presented the Mahdists among 

Iran’s nascent revolutionary leaders with an ideal opportunity to enact 

their manifest destiny of redeeming humanity through the worldwide 

export of the revolution. More specifically, rising Shia population 

totals in Lebanon interacted with key components of the modernization process underway in the country, primarily urbanization and the 

expansion of education, which raised Shia aspirations while concurrently making them aware of their socioeconomic backwardness and 

political marginalization. These developments in turn led to a crisis of 

state legitimacy, as they generated Shia (and broader Muslim) grievances against the confessional system established in 1943 by al-Mithaq 

al-Watani, or the National Pact.

The final addition to this perfect storm was the 1982 Israeli invasion, which, in addition to generating resistance to the Israeli presence 

that was soon led by angry Islamist elements within the Shia community, also highlighted the collapse of the Lebanese state during the civil 

war, which lasted from 1975 to 1990. This vacuum, in turn, was filled 

quite eagerly by Iran’s new revolutionary leaders, who saw an opportunity to mobilize Lebanon’s Shia population under Iran’s direction, and 

in particular to effectuate the “liberation” of Jerusalem and the establishment of an ideal Islamic state in Lebanon as a prelude to its expansion elsewhere in the Islamic world and beyond. Therefore, this chapter 

commences with a discussion of the geographic, socioeconomic, and 

political conditions in Lebanon that provided exploitable entryways for 

the expansion of Iranian influence in the country, beginning with a 

brief discussion of Lebanon’s physical environment and how patterns 

in physical (and human) geography likely impacted the calculations of 

Iranian planners.

PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENTa

Approximately one-third of the land is arable, with one-fifth currently being cultivated.2

 The population is concentrated most densely 

along the coastal areas, especially in the capital city of Beirut and the 

major population centers of Sidon and Tyre to the south and Tripoli to 

a Portions of this section were adapted from the existing Hizbollah case study found 

in Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare Volume II: 1962–2009.

1
42

Unconventional Warfare Case Study: Iran and Lebanese Hizbollah

the north. The Litani River, which flows south from the Bekaa Valley 

before turning sharply westward toward the Mediterranean, is a major 

source of water and also provides for irrigation and hydroelectricity.

Figure 3-1. Map of Lebanon.

Harris suggested that Lebanon’s geography can be divided into 

three strategic zones,3

 and his categorization provides a useful framework for understanding Iran’s initial forays into the country in the early 

1980s. The first zone, which could perhaps be labeled a core, consists of 

the Mount Lebanon region in the north, which, as the name suggests, 

is geographically demarcated by the Mount Lebanon mountain range 
Chapter 3. Historical Context

43

in the north of the country. This area consists of the coastal areas north 

of Beirut as well as the territory up to the Qurnet al-Sauda’ massif in 

the north to the Shuf highlands to the south. The strategic importance 

of this region derives from its proximity to Beirut, as control of the 

Mount Lebanon region allows for control of land communication with 

the capital.4

Harris also noted that the Mount Lebanon region achieved de facto 

autonomy within the Ottoman Empire sometime in the sixteenth century.5

 Once known as “Little Lebanon,” this region traditionally featured a significant Maronite population as well as a noteworthy Druze 

presence.6

 In September 1920 France delimited the geographic extent 

of the modern state of Lebanon by adding the remaining two regions 

of Harris’s categorization to establish Greater Lebanon. The coastal cities of Beirut, Tripoli, and Sidon were agglomerated to Little Lebanon, 

as were the peripheral areas of the south and the Bekaa Valley.7 Iran’s 

initial forays were focused on this latter region, as this was the area 

where Lebanon’s Shia population was concentrated.b

 As Harris appropriately noted:

For Syria and Iran, Shi’is are distributed conveniently 

between a concentration abutting Israel, in southern 

Lebanon, and another population in the central and 

northern Bekaa, well placed for logistics and organization. This situation has been useful for exerting pressure on both Israel and Beirut.10

The phrase “Belt of Misery” describes the southern suburbs of the 

capital, which in the past were inundated with thousands of Shiite and 

Palestinian refugees fleeing the south. The near-constant conflict until 

2006 has meant that standards and regulations for public works and 

buildings are rarely enforced, and the area is best described as a slum. 

South Lebanon, from where Hizbollah draws most of its support, is 

generally considered the area bordered by the Litani River Gorge to 

the north, the Mediterranean to the west, the Bekaa Valley to the east, 

and Israel to the south. Green, hilly, and dotted with deep valleys, the 

terrain is inhospitable to large, armored vehicles.11 Many of the region’s 

b Kramer noted that in the early 1980s Iran initially focused on the Bekaa Valley, as 

the Shia inhabitants of that region had felt excluded from Amal, who drew many of its 

leaders from south Lebanon.8

 Additionally, Wege noted that Iran targeted the Hamiya, 

Musawi, Aqueel, Shahadehs, and Ezzedeens clans.9
44

Unconventional Warfare Case Study: Iran and Lebanese Hizbollah

villages are situated on hilltops, providing Hizbollah fighters with clear 

lines of fire and ample cover against ground attacks.c

With respect to the geographic extent of the resistance movement, 

Hizbollah operates throughout Lebanon; however, its supporters and 

most of its operations are focused in southern Lebanon, the Bekaa Valley, and south Beirut. These three regions represent the areas where 

most Shia live in Lebanon.d South Lebanon, near the border with Israel, 

is the focus of most of Hizbollah’s military preparations and activities, 

while the Bekaa Valley is used for training and other activities, as it is 

considered safer because of its distance from Israel. During the civil 

war, Hizbollah was involved in fighting in Beirut, and while it maintained a security presence in the city, Beirut is no longer the primary 

focus of Hizbollah’s combat operations. Much of Hizbollah’s support 

comes from the sprawling slums of south Beirut where many Shia have 

congregated in recent decades. This is also the area where most of Hizbollah’s social services and other nonmilitary activities are focused.14

SOCIOCULTURAL ENVIRONMENTe

As Hizbollah is primarily a Shia organization, it is important to 

understand the role of sectarian identity in Lebanese society, especially 

since sectarian affiliation represents the most powerful form of cultural identity in modern Lebanon, with the predominant groups falling 

under the two broad categories of either Muslim (Sunni, Shiite, Druze) 

or Christian (Maronite, Greek Orthodox, Catholic).f

 Although recent 

exact population figures are not available, Muslims account for roughly 

54 percent of the overall population of about four million, and Christians account for nearly 41 percent.15 The presence of approximately 

four hundred thousand Palestinian refugees, most of who remain in 

camps, is a further strain on this delicate demographic map.g

 About 

c Exum pointed out that operations on this hilly terrain, which require dismounted 

infantry, are much different than the operations the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) have 

traditionally carried out in other regional campaigns. Additionally, the terrain renders 

Israel’s technological advantage mostly useless.12

d Using information from the Saudi food distribution program in 1988, Faour estimated that approximately 307,000 Shia resided in Beirut’s southern suburbs at the time, 

with 328,000 in the Bekaa and 354,000 in south Lebanon.13

e Portions of this section were adapted from the existing Hizbollah case study found 

in Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare Volume II: 1962–2009.

f Ethnically, the Lebanese state is very homogenous; roughly 95 percent of the population is Arab. Kurds, Alawites, and Ismaelis are also present, as are Armenians (the only 

major non-Arab population) although in smaller numbers.

g Estimate from “Lebanon Camp Profiles,” United Nations Relief and Works Agency 

for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), http://www.unrwa.org/etemplate.

php?id=73.
Chapter 3. Historical Context

45

60 percent of the Muslim population is Shia, with the remainder being 

Sunni and Druze.h Maronites account for roughly 75  percent of the 

Christian population. Of note is the rapid rise of the Shia population 

since the mid-twentieth  century, with Shia population totals tripling 

between 1956 and 1975 from 250,000 to 750,000; by the 1980s it was the 

largest group in Lebanon, at 1.4 million compared to 800,000 each for 

Sunni and Maronite.16

Population shifts caused by the June

1982 Israeli invasion are not depicted.

Maronite

SYRIA

BEIRUT

Sidon

Tripoli

Ba’labakk

Tyre

ISRAEL

(Israeli

occupied)

Golan

Heights

United Nations 

Disengagement

Observer Force Zone

Greek Orthodox

Greek Catholic

Mixed Maronite and 

Greek Catholic

Shia Muslim

Sunni Muslim

Druze

Kilometers

0 20

Mixed Druze and 

Greek Orthodox

Boundary representation is

not necessarily authoritative.

LEBANON

Shuf

Region

Bekaa Valley

Mediterranean

Sea

1949 Armistice Line

Figure 3-2. Distribution of religious groups in Lebanon in 1983.

h Shia and Sunni Muslims consider the Druze a heretical sect and do not recognize 

members as fellow Muslims. Additionally, the Shia were regarded as heretics by Sunni rulers.
46

Unconventional Warfare Case Study: Iran and Lebanese Hizbollah

The country’s sects are distributed largely along geographic lines, a 

phenomenon that was further reinforced by the civil war of 1975–1990. 

The various natural obstacles of Lebanon—mountain ranges, fast-flowing rivers, and climatic extremes—facilitate the isolation of factions on 

the basis of clan, ethnic, and religious ties.i

 The south, which shares 

a border with Israel, is predominantly Shiite, whereas the mountains 

have traditionally been inhabited by Christians in the north and Druze 

in the south. The far north, around Tripoli, has traditionally been a 

Sunni population center.

In addition to the unique nonconformist character of many of the 

groups (including Maronites, who were considered Christian heretics, 

as well as Shiites and Druze) that sought refuge in the area’s mountains, exclusionary identification had been reinforced by decades (if 

not centuries) of communal conflict. The salience of communal differences was only heightened in 1920 as France (with the approval of 

some Maronite elites, such as the Maronite patriarch Ilyas Huwayyik)18

grafted upon the Maronite core of “Little Lebanon” surrounding Sunni 

and Shiite regions. This enlargement of Lebanon to its modern-day 

configuration was achieved within the context of the peace settlement 

between Turkey and the victors of World War I, which also resulted in 

Beirut becoming the capital of the French Mandate for Syria and Lebanon. Additionally, under French sponsorship the Maronite majority 

within Little Lebanon dominated politics and the economy of Greater 

Lebanon, with Sunnis afforded greater decision-making authority than 

would have been the case with the establishment of a “Greater Syria” 

(and with Shias dominated by both Christians and Sunnis).19

Description of the Economyj

Agriculture accounts for approximately 6 percent of gross domestic 

product20 and a majority of rural households engage in agricultural 

activity at least part time. However, agriculture is the sole source of 

i Winslow states: “As a home for ancient coastal settlements; as Phoenician city states; 

entrepôt centers (under Persian, Greek Roman and Byzantine rule); as a haven for dissentients (during the Umayyad and Abbasid periods); and as semi-independent chieftaincies 

(under the Egyptian Mamluk and Ottoman Turkish Sultanates), the mountains and coast 

of Lebanon have often operated politically as separate entities. The mountains, many of 

them tree covered until the late nineteenth century, gave water and protection to their 

inhabitants. Because of them, historical Lebanon has served as a refuge for a great variety of groups, sects, and individuals who have had to flee the larger systems nearby. The 

rawasab (residue) of other peoples and cultures have discovered the independence of the 

mountain and have been stubborn to keep it. The result has been to pack a great deal of 

diversity into a small area.”17

j Portions of this section were adapted from the existing Hizbollah case study found 

in Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare Volume II: 1962–2009.
Chapter 3. Historical Context

47

income for nearly half of the population of south Lebanon, and repeated 

conflicts with Israel on the southern border have been extremely disruptive to the local population.21,k

 The wide variation in topography 

and climate allows for the production of temperate and tropical crops. 

Fruits and vegetables, which require high inputs of labor, capital, and 

water resources, are largely grown along the coast, whereas agriculture 

in the Bekaa Valley is dominated by staples such as potatoes, tomatoes, 

and sugar beets, as well as hashish, which is a major cash crop. Cereals and olives are grown in the north, and wheat, tobacco, and figs are 

cultivated in the south. Unlike many states in the region, minerals are 

scarce in Lebanon and are mined only for domestic consumption, not 

for export.

Throughout most of Lebanon’s history, there was a severe bias in 

favor of the economic center—that is, the Christian and Sunni elite. 

The only real exception to this was under President  Shihab (1958–

1967), a general who embarked on a systematic campaign to deliver 

the social justice he and his technocratic circle of advisers felt was driving the state’s debilitating sectarianism.l

 After the conflict of 1958,m

Shihab instituted significant changes meant to redress socioeconomic 

inequality, including imposition of an equal distribution of high-level 

administrative posts between Christians and Muslims (which resulted 

in a large boost for Muslims) and a dramatic increase in government 

spending. He also founded a central bank to facilitate state regulation 

of the economy and agencies for planning, statistics, development, and 

social security, and dedicated substantial resources to public works 

projects such as roads, schools, and irrigation schemes.

To accomplish these projects, Shihab used the domestic security 

services to weaken the political power of the ruling elite clans, who 

opposed these economic policies because their primary beneficiary 

was the poor Shiite periphery. This socioeconomic experiment came 

to an end roughly a decade later, when the commercial and landed elite 

finally put aside their sectarian differences to pursue their common 

interest in laissez-faire economics. The ensuing programs of economic 

k Farmers not only lose their harvest during conflict but must also wait until unexploded munitions and mines are removed before returning to work; livestock populations 

have also been decimated by repeated conflict, and animal husbandry has most likely 

been in constant decline since the civil war began in 1975.

l This section is based on Harris, Faces of Lebanon: Sects, Wars, and Global Extensions.

22

m In the aftermath of the merger between Egypt and Syria in 1958, which came 

together to form the United Arab Republic (UAR), fighting broke out in Lebanon pitting 

those (primarily Sunnis and Shias) who sought submergence under the UAR and those, 

primarily Christians, who supported the Maronite-led government’s efforts to preserve 

the independence of Lebanon. Harris noted, though, that the conflict was not a full-scale 

sectarian war; there were Muslims who supported the Maronite-led government along with 

Christians who opposed the government.23
48

Unconventional Warfare Case Study: Iran and Lebanese Hizbollah

liberalization eventually earned Lebanon the title of Switzerland of the 

Middle East, especially for its banking secrecy laws and loose financial 

regulations, notably the absence of restrictions on the movement of 

capital. It soon became a regional finance hub where Gulf monarchs, 

socialist dictators, and nervous bourgeoisie spirited away their fortunes. 

Although this inflow was interrupted by the civil war, the rush of liquid 

assets benefited well-connected elites, who used their access to capital 

and their ability to bypass the already weak bureaucracy to construct 

high-end shopping districts and luxury hotels adjacent to the slums and 

bombed-out buildings, thus further underscoring the division between 

Lebanon’s economic elite and those on the periphery.

Nexus of Socioeconomic Conditions and Creation of 

Vulnerabilitiesn

The history of the Shia in Lebanon is suffused with a heritage of 

collective suffering that has a distinct communal character24 yet also 

reflects the grievances of the global Shia community. Centuries of persecution by majority-Sunni empires, as well as the contemporary Shia 

community’s minority status in most of the states where communities 

do exist, create a powerful basis for political mobilization. However, 

as was noted in the preceding chapter, Shia traditions and Shia leaders historically promoted political quiescence, even submission, to perceived tyranny and injustice.

Before the 1979 revolution, the Shia of Lebanon had no powerful 

patron and instead composed the class of “hewers of wood and drawers 

of water.”25 In the great struggle between the (Sunni) Ottoman Empire 

and the (Shia) Safavid Empire, the latter originating in what is modern-day Iran, Lebanon’s Shia had the misfortune of being a religious 

minority in an empire at war with its sectarian brethren. They were 

under near-constant military assault from Ottoman officialdom, the 

ravages of which were partly to blame for the principles of political passivity the community cultivated in the intervening centuries.26

Additionally, during the early and mid-twentieth century the Shia 

community, and the Muslim community more generally, lagged behind 

Christians in various measures of socioeconomic development. As 

noted by el Khazen, rather than reflecting an intention of state policy, 

the Christian community was relatively more effective in mobilizing a 

well-developed private sector and communal institutions that imparted 

educational and social services without state support.27 One former 

n Portions of this section were adapted from the existing Hizbollah case study found 

in Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare Volume II: 1962–2009.
Chapter 3. Historical Context

49

prime minister of Lebanon, Takieddin al-Solh, attributed this deficit 

to a failure to accept Western civilization:

Christian society is more advanced than Muslim in 

almost all spheres, even though the Muslims are catching up. This is chiefly because the Muslims took far 

longer than the Christians to open themselves to Western civilization . . . When some Muslims now accuse 

the Christians of enriching themselves at the expense 

of Muslims and exploiting them, that is false. The 

Christians gained their lead in the time of the Turks, 

through their own work and efforts.28

El  Khazen also noted that the establishment of educational and 

social institutions by the Christian community predated the establishment of the modern state of Lebanon in 1920 and that those that came 

after were more advanced than comparable state institutions.29 This 

head start contributed to uneven communal socioeconomic outcomes 

by mid-century, with Christians surpassing Muslims on many indicators, and Sunnis outpacing Shia within the Muslim community. For 

instance, in the mid-1940s local ownership of banks (as opposed to 

foreign ownership) was entirely in Christian hands, while 87 percent 

of lawyers and doctors and 88 percent of engineers were Christian.30

Meanwhile, in 1932 the illiteracy rate of the Shia community was a staggering 83 percent (among Sunnis it was 66 percent).31

Later on in the twentieth century, as pan-Arab nationalism and leftist political ideologies swept the region, they also influenced Shia youth 

in great numbers. The Baath Party, numerous communist parties, and 

the Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party appealed to the economic and 

social grievances that were dormant in Shia political awareness for 

decades. Yet, in a country so defined by sect, kinship, and clan, ideological parties based on more abstract notions of class were difficult to 

assimilate. As a result, many political platforms based on class grievances were rewritten using the language of sectarian identity, cloaking 

goals such as social justice and equality in a distinctly Shia language. 

Growing rates of urbanization, literacy, and exposure to printed material, as well as large inflows of worker remittances, increased the educational attainment of many Shia, but these changes were not mirrored 

by increasing employment opportunities.32

In addition to these factors, additional phenomena contributed to 

both the sectarian conflict and the rise of Hizbollah. These included 

the post-World War I process of dismantling the Ottoman Empire, the 

establishment of the confessional system of political representation, and 

the huge influxes of Palestinian refugees, which sparked the fifteenyear civil war that lasted from 1975 to 1990. During the dismemberment 
50

Unconventional Warfare Case Study: Iran and Lebanese Hizbollah

of the Ottoman Empire, the victorious European powers divided the 

spoils among themselves, with an eye more toward maintaining equilibrium between their colonial possessions than toward creating viable 

nation-states based on ethnic and religious divisions.

Although the French sheltered and protected the Maronite population in the new state of Lebanon, often violently,o

 the state’s Muslim 

populations identified more with the anti-French and anti-British independence movements sweeping through the rest of the Arab world. 

In this context, the declaration of the Lebanese state’s independence 

(from the French) in 1943 represented an informal accommodation 

reached between Lebanon’s two key internal stakeholders regarding 

the significance of the country’s internal composition and its impact 

on its external orientation. Specifically, the Sunnis realized that the 

acceptance of a Greater Lebanon featuring a large number of Westernleaning Maronites need not inhibit aspirations for Arab unity so long 

as the Maronite leadership accepted Lebanon’s “Arab face.”34 For their 

part, Maronites realized that Lebanon was not sustainable without 

Muslim political participation and a close relationship with other Arab 

states. Yet they required Muslims to accept the uniqueness of Lebanon 

and its relations with the West.35

The confessional system was enshrined in two agreements, the 

National Pact (unwritten) of 1943 and, later, the Taif Accords that 

brought an end to the civil war. The National Pact gave Christians the 

presidency and a guaranteed parliamentary majority while reserving 

the positions of prime minister and speaker of the parliament for the 

Sunnis and Shia, respectively. Later, the Taif Accords redressed the 

fundamental representative inequalities (brought about by rapid Shia 

population growth in the mid- to late-twentieth century) by weakening 

the constitutional powers of the Maronite presidency and granting Muslims and Christians guaranteed equal representation in parliament.p

Although the final Taif agreement provided the technical basis for 

a new government, it did little to address the underlying issues that 

would contribute to future outbreaks of violence; for example, it did 

not include an accurate gauge of the current demographic distribution 

or determine the fate of civil-war-era militant leaders. In most cases 

these leaders—many of whom were responsible for civilian massacres 

o French forces (with Maronite volunteers) bombed Shiite villages and crushed Shiite 

forces. Additionally, the French forced Shia ulama and community leaders to sign a document blaming the Shia for the outbreak of violence.33

p More specifically, the National Pact granted Christians a 6:5 ratio of seats in Parliament, while the Taif Accord shifted this ratio to 5:5 between Christians and Muslims. 

While providing greater equity among the different sectarian groups, the Taif Accord 

essentially ratified the confessional system, as the most important political offices were 

still reserved for specific confessional groups.36
Chapter 3. Historical Context

51

and other crimes—achieved formal amnesty, and they (or their family members and closest affiliates) continued to dominate the political 

scene.

In addition to sectarian tensions, which had simmered since Lebanon’s independence until breaking out into full-scale conflict, the 

country was also a staging ground for continued conflict between Israel 

and the Palestinians. In 1969, the Cairo Agreement, signed by the commander of the Lebanese Army and Yasser Arafat, established the legitimacy of Palestinian guerrilla activity (against Israel) in southeastern 

Lebanon and ensured that the Lebanese government would not act to 

restrain the Palestine Liberation Organization’s (PLO’s) activities. The 

expulsion of the PLO from Jordan in 1971 made the Lebanese arena 

even more crucial to the group, and afterward much of the group’s 

activity was carried out from bases on Lebanese territory. However, the 

weakness of the Lebanese state provoked both Palestinian and Israeli 

retaliation. In 1973, armed clashes between the Lebanese Army and 

Palestinian fighters broke out as the Lebanese government was unable 

(or unwilling) to prevent Israeli retaliation, and five years later, in 1978, 

Israel launched a full-scale invasion of southern Lebanon to end Palestinian incursions into Israeli territory. The Lebanese military proved 

unable to reign in the PLO—even as the PLO’s activities drew increasingly destructive responses from Israel. The demonstrated weakness of 

the state military led many sects and prominent political families to 

intensify their efforts to build up their own militias.37 The scales finally 

tipped toward civil war in 1975 when a spate of (successful and failed) 

political assassinations and large-scale reprisals against unarmed civilians soon turned into generalized fighting. Initially, fighting was largely 

limited to Palestinians and Phalangists (right-wing Christian militias 

controlled by the Maronite Christian politician Bashir Jemayal), but it 

then spread to more general Christian versus Muslim violence.

For the ensuing fifteen years, Lebanon’s confessional communities targeted one another even as Syria, Israel, the United States, and 

the PLO joined the fighting, marked by a dizzying array of temporary 

alliances and broken agreements. Much of the fighting took place in 

Beirut and the Shiite population centers in the south where the PLO 

was launching attacks against Israel. Nearly a quarter of a million were 

believed to have died, nearly one-fourth of the population was injured, 

and the economy collapsed almost completely. Each confessional group 

had at least one militia, although throughout much of the war several 

armed groups claiming to represent their sectarian communities were 

in direct competition with one another, carrying out reprisals against 

their own populations.
52

Unconventional Warfare Case Study: Iran and Lebanese Hizbollah

Hizbollah coalesced several years into the fighting, around 1982, 

as the violence migrated from Beirut into the south and as fighting 

between the PLO and Israel escalated, culminating in a second Israeli 

invasion. Even the 1989 Taif Accords, which brought an end to the 

fighting by guaranteeing Christians and Muslims equal representation 

and making the (Sunni) prime minister and (Shiite) speaker responsible to the legislature rather than the (Maronite) president, did little 

to directly address Shia grievances, which were distinct from those of 

Sunni Muslims. The accords themselves were possible because there 

was no clear victor in the fifteen-year civil war and because the census necessary to provide an objective basis for constructing representative institutions was too dangerous and destabilizing to conduct. Thus, 

although Shiites were given more political power and representation, it 

was still far short of their actual demographic weight.

It was during this time that an influential imam from a notable 

religious family, Musa al-Sadr, traveled to Lebanon from Iran, intent 

on mobilizing the Shia population outside the confines of either the 

leftist (nonreligious) parties or the few dominant feudal families who 

ruled the community in pursuit of their own narrow interests. Congruent with the emerging notion of dynamic Shiism developed by Iranian 

thinkers at the time, al-Sadr turned Shiite history and ceremony from a 

collection of passive ritual lamentations into calls to action, and by the 

mid-1970s, he had succeeded in establishing Amal, a Shiite militia and 

precursor to what Hizbollah would later become.q

Al-Sadr worked hard to lure Shia recruits away from the PLO and 

its secular-leftist Lebanese allies, whom he accused of using the Shia 

as disposable “cannon fodder.”r

 Although he lent rhetorical and ideological support to Palestinian aspirations, al-Sadr insisted that he was 

unwilling to expose the already poor and marginalized Shia of the 

south to additional suffering, and in 1976, when it became clear the 

Shia would bear the full brunt of fighting between the PLO and Israel, 

al-Sadr threw his support behind Syria, which intervened on behalf of 

the Maronite Christians to weaken the PLO and its leftist (and Lebanese nationalist) allies.40 Al-Sadr was also less antagonistic toward the 

Maronite Christians because he believed they were driven to violence 

by an existential fear rooted in their minority status and their own historical experience with persecution.41 Yet he also criticized the Chrisq The following statement is indicative of al-Sadr’s successful use of leftist themes to 

mobilize the formerly passive Shiite population: “Whenever the poor involve themselves in 

a social revolution it is a confirmation that injustice is not predestined.”38

r Indeed, more Shia died in the early stages of the civil war (before Hizbollah was 

founded) than any other sect. The coalition of parties fighting the Christians—the Lebanese National Movement—was led by the Druze Kamal Jumblatt, who al-Sadr accused of a 

willingness to “combat the Christians [down] to the last Shia.”39
Chapter 3. Historical Context

53

tian political establishment for its gross neglect of the southern region 

of Lebanon and for its campaign of repression against poor Shia. This 

neglect in turn created a vacuum that Iran and Hizbollah were able to 

exploit after the Israeli invasion in 1982.

Governing Environments

Although Lebanon was technically a democracy for the thirty years 

before the outbreak of civil war in 1975, political and economic power 

in the state was highly skewed in favor of the Maronite community and, 

to a lesser extent, the Sunni elite. Although independence was granted 

(under French protection) in 1926, the French continued to practice 

de  facto rule through their Maronite Christian allies, principally to 

prevent possible unification into a single state of “greater Syria,” which 

the Christians saw as an existential threat and the French saw as a 

potentially ungovernable state composed of competing demographic 

groups.42 This combined French–Maronite rule proved oppressive and 

led to frequent clashes with the state’s many confessional groups.

Subsequent decades saw attempts to redress what many non-Christians saw as institutional obstacles to their representation (notably the 

National Pact of 1943, which enshrined representation according to the 

outdated 1932 census), as well as conflicts that foreshadowed the bloody 

civil war that would begin in 1975 (mainly the 1958 civil conflict). The 

conflict in 1958, halted in part by direct US intervention, later proved 

to be a sign that the legitimacy of the earlier pact was dissolving. The 

severe underrepresentation of the Shiite community in parliament as 

well as government and civil service jobs, combined with its massive 

population shift in the second half of the twentieth century, required 

more than marginal tinkering within the existing institutional design.

The inflexibility of the confessional system, which did not allow for 

gradual changes in representation in response to demographic realities, created a political powder keg. Resources were also allotted to 

sect-based resource networks, which meant that the much larger Shia 

population received significantly less (per capita) state assistance.43

Meanwhile, the economic growth that did take place was not in the 

agricultural or industrial sectors, which is where most of the Shiite population labored. The fact that the Shia members of parliament came 

overwhelmingly from the landed elite and were completely unbeholden 

to their poor constituents exacerbated these problems.

s Portions of this section were adapted from the existing Hizbollah case study found 

in Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare Volume II: 1962–2009.
54

Unconventional Warfare Case Study: Iran and Lebanese Hizbollah

Syria was also a major player in the Lebanese political scene. Syrian 

influence and control were nearly ubiquitous after 1976, when troops 

entered the country with at least the tacit approval of Lebanon’s Christian leadership, who reluctantly turned to Damascus after appeals for 

a second US intervention (after 1958) went unanswered.44 The Christians, for their part, feared that the combined numerical superiority of 

the Palestinian fighters along with their Shia and Druze allies would 

finally succeed in ending Christian political dominance. The Syrians 

feared the same, although their ultimate concern was that the rise in 

radical (leftist, pro-Palestinian) Muslim opposition would pull Syria 

into a war with Israel, which they would quickly lose.45

During the civil war, Syrian troops fought many parties, Christian 

and Muslim, and the most apparent pattern of alliances among the warring parties was the frequency with which they shifted. This reflected 

Syria’s overall strategy, which was to maintain a rough balance among 

all the warring factions. Preventing the dominance of any single group 

and ensuring a fragmentation of power fostered the impression that 

Syria’s presence was indispensable to stave off anarchy.46 Thus, when 

the Maronites again appeared to be on the cusp of reestablishing their 

dominance (achieved with Israeli assistance) in the late 1980s, Syria 

acted to sabotage their rise by aiding the anti-Maronite opposition.

In May 1991, at the conclusion of the civil war and after the signing of the Taif Accords, the Lebanese and Syrian regimes signed the 

“Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation, and Coordination.” This treaty 

formalized the Syrian presence in Lebanon (considered illegal by 

many) and called for the establishment of a Higher Council consisting of senior officials from both countries, and which would manage 

four permanent interstate committees: for prime ministerial “coordination,” foreign affairs, economic and social policy, and defense and security.47 This agreement was followed by the August  1991 Defense and 

Security Pact, which facilitated greater Syrian penetration of Lebanon’s 

army, intelligence services, security agencies, and Interior Ministry.48

In one notable passage, Lebanon was required to “exchange information related to all security and strategic matters, national and internal, 

to exchange officers . . . including military instructors . . . to achieve 

the highest level of military coordination;” while another required the 

“banning [of] any activity or organization in all military, security, political and information fields that might endanger and cause threats to 

the other country.”49 Not surprisingly, Harris noted that the Lebanese 

government approved this agreement without most ministers having 

seen the actual text.50

Because of the range and depth of interested parties (both domestic sectarian groups and foreign parties), as well as the absence of 
Chapter 3. Historical Context

55

adequate checks and balances, domestic politics in Lebanon resembled a patronage-based system. Consequently, the awarding of political office depended on personal loyalties rather than competence. 

These underlying conditions facilitated the communal politicization that provided the organizational scaffolding on which Hizbollah could be built.51 In this regard, the Shia “awakening” had more 

in common with the politicization of other Lebanese sects than with 

any universal Islamic revival.52 Still, individual actors—both religious 

and secular—played important roles in this mobilization, notably Palestinian activists, leftist groups, and Imam Musa al-Sadr.53 As was noted 

in the preceding chapter, al-Sadr, who came to Lebanon from Iran 

in the late  1950s, founded Amal, which, unlike Hizbollah, appealed 

more to middle-class Shia frustrated with the political elite and who 

railed against the brutality of PLO guerrillas who were engaging in 

their own occupation of the south.t

 The disappearance of al-Sadr in 

1978—and the decision by Amal’s leadership to participate in the Committee of National Salvation—contributed to the establishment of Hizbollah, which took advantage of the leadership vacuum left by al-Sadr’s 

absence and Amal’s apparent collusion with the Maronite Christians.55

The narrative emerging from Hizbollah in the early 1980s called on 

the public to resist the Maronite-dominated Lebanese government.56

Israel’s 1982 invasion, which prompted Iran’s penetration of the Shia 

areas of the country, also directed Shia anger toward the Jewish state.

NOTES

1 Shana Marshall, “Hizbollah: 1982–2009,” in Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare, Volume II: 1962–2009, ed. Chuck Crossett (Fort Bragg, NC: United States Army 

Special Operations Command, 2012), 532–533.

2 EarthTrends: The Environmental Information Portal of the World Resources Institute, 

“Agriculture and Food—Lebanon: EarthTrends Country Profiles,” http://earthtrends.

wri.org/pdf_library/country_profiles/agr_cou_422.pdf; and FAOSTAT, “Commodities 

by Country: Lebanon, 2012,” http://faostat.fao.org/DesktopDefault.aspx?PageID=339&

lang=en&country=121.

3 William W. Harris, Faces of Lebanon: Sects, Wars, and Global Extensions (Princeton, NJ: 

Markus Wiener Publishers, 1996), 53.

4 Ibid., 56.

5 Ibid., 11.

6 Ibid.

7 Ibid., 41, 53.

t Ironically, although Amal was founded by an Iranian-born cleric and its members 

were originally trained by Fatah (PLO), Amal would later be distinguished from Hizbollah 

both by its political distance from Tehran and by its opposition to the PLO’s presence in 

south Lebanon.54
56

Unconventional Warfare Case Study: Iran and Lebanese Hizbollah

8 Martin Kramer, “Hizbullah: The Calculus of Jihad,” Bulletin of the American Academy of Arts 

and Sciences 47, no. 8 (1994): 27.

9 Carl Anthony Wege, “The Hizballah Security Apparatus,” Perspectives on Terrorism 2, no. 7 

(2008): 11, 16 (fn. 6).

10 Harris, Faces of Lebanon, 54.

11 Andrew Exum, “Hizballah at War: A Military Assessment,” Policy Focus 63 

(December 2006): 3, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/

hizballah-at-war-a-military-assessment.

12 Ibid.

13 Mohammad Faour, “The Demography of Lebanon: A Reappraisal,” Middle Eastern Studies

27, no. 4 (1991): 636; and Judith Harik, “Hizballah’s Public and Social Services and Iran,” 

in Distant Relations: Iran and Lebanon in the Last 500 Years, ed. H. E. Chehabi (London: 

I. B. Taurus & Co., 2006), 262 (fn. 7).

14 Augustus Richard Norton, Hezbollah: A Short History (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 

Press, 2007), 51–53.

15 “Lebanon,” CIA World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/

the-world-factbook/geos/le.html.

16 Ahmad Nizar Hamzeh, In the Path of Hizbullah (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 

2004), 13.

17 Charles Winslow, Lebanon: War and Politics in a Fragmented Society (London: Routledge, 

1996), 7.

18 Harris, Faces of Lebanon, 39–41.

19 Ibid, 41–42.

20 “Lebanon,” CIA World Factbook.

21 Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations, “Country Information: Lebanon.”

22 Harris, Faces of Lebanon, 146–149.

23 Ibid., 143–144.

24 Amal Saad-Ghorayeb, Hizbullah: Politics and Religion (Sterling, VA: Pluto Press, 2002), 7.

25 Fouad Ajami, “Lebanon and its Inheritors,” Foreign Affairs 63, no. 4 (1985): 778–799.

26 Ibid.

27 Farid el Khazen, The Breakdown of the State in Lebanon, 1967–1979 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), 70.

28 Ibid., 70–71.

29 Ibid., 70.

30 Ibid., 61.

31 Ibid., 65.

32 Ajami, “Lebanon and its Inheritors”; and Saad-Ghorayeb, Hizbullah: Politics and Religion, 

7–8.

33 Hamzeh, In the Path of Hizbullah, 11.

34 Harris, Faces of Lebanon, 136.

35 Ibid.

36 Joshua L. Gleis and Benedetta Berti, Hezbollah and Hamas: A Comparative Study (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2012), 31.

37 John Keegan, “Shedding Light on Lebanon,” The Atlantic, April 1984.

38 Norton, Hezbollah: A Short History, 18.

39 Karim Pakradouni, La Paix Manquee (Beirut: FMA Editions, 1983), 106, cited in Norton, 

Hezbollah: A Short History, 19.

40 Norton, Hezbollah: A Short History, 19–20.
Chapter 3. Historical Context

57

41 Ibid., 19.

42 Keegan, “Shedding Light on Lebanon,” 4.

43 Laura Deeb, “Hizballah: A Primer,” Middle East Report, July 31, 2006.

44 Simon Haddad, “The Political Transformation of the Maronites of Lebanon: From Dominance to Accommodation,” Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 8, no. 2 (2002): 32.

45 Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Raymond A. Hinnebusch, Syria and Iran: Middle Powers in a 

Penetrated Regional System (London and New York: Routledge, 1997), 72.

46 Ibid, 129.

47 Harris, Faces of Lebanon, 292.

48 Ibid. 

49 Ibid., 293. 

50 Ibid., 292.

51 Saad-Ghorayeb, Hizbullah: Politics and Religion, 9.

52 Ibid.

53 Ibid., 8–9.

54 Norton, Hezbollah: A Short History, 17–22.

55 Saad-Ghorayeb, Hizbullah: Politics and Religion, 14–15.

56 Emmanuel Karagiannis, “Hezbollah as a Social Movement Organization: A Framing 

Approach,” Mediterranean Politics Journal 14, no. 3 (2009): 365–383.

CHAPTER 4.

THE RESISTANCE MOVEMENT

61

NATURE OF THE RESISTANCE MOVEMENT

Chapter 2 noted that Hizbollah was founded on a belief in Islamic 

universalism guided by velayat-e faqih and was also committed to the 

goals of representing the interests of the Shia community along with 

fighting Zionism and what it regarded as oppression. These goals and 

others were announced to the world in 1985 with the organization’s 

“Open Letter” addressed to the “Downtrodden in Lebanon and in the 

World.” Before this time the organization itself could at best be characterized as a loose collection of like-minded individuals with a similar 

set of goals.

Regarding velayat-e faqih, the open letter is quite clear, stating:

We obey the orders of one leader, wise and just, that 

of our tutor and faqih (jurist) who fulfills all the necessary conditions: Ruhollah  Musawi  Khomeini. God 

save him! . . . Our behavior is dictated to us by legal 

principles laid down by the light of an overall political conception defined by the leading jurist (wilayat alfaqih) . . . And when it becomes necessary to carry out 

the Holy War, each of us takes up his assignment in the 

fight in accordance with the injunctions of the Law, 

and that in the framework of the mission carried out 

under the tutelage of the Commanding Jurist.1

The open letter is also quite clear regarding the source of inspiration for the group:

As for our culture, it is based on the Holy Koran, the 

Sunna and the legal rulings of the faqih who is our 

source of imitation (marja’ al-taqlid). Our culture is 

crystal clear. It is not complicated and is accessible 

to all.2

Chapter 2 discussed in detail the intellectual milieu that contributed to the emergence of dynamic Shiism in the 1960s and 1970s, and 

as is to be expected given the timing of the emergence of the group, 

upon its founding Hizbollah accepted Khomeini’s notion of “functional 

velayat,” where in the age of occultation the velayat represents God’s testimony.3

 Hence, as God’s act of revelation to the infallible Prophet and 

the imams endowed them with velayat over the umma, in their absence 

this authority is delegated to the velayat-e faqih, with the implication 

that “anybody who disobeys him or the jurists disobeys God.”4

Additionally, for Hizbollah the necessity of establishing an Islamic 

order was made apparent by God’s revelations to the Prophet Muhammad and his rightful heirs, the Shia imams, who were called on to 
62

Unconventional Warfare Case Study: Iran and Lebanese Hizbollah

guide the Muslims in constructing a just Islamic society.5 Interestingly, 

however, the open letter betrayed a tension between the desire for an 

Islamic state and self-determination on the part of the Lebanese people, as it stated:

Let us put it truthfully: the sons of Hizballah know 

who are their major enemies in the Middle East—the 

Phalanges, Israel, France and the US. The sons of 

our umma are now in a state of growing confrontation with them, and will remain so until the realization of the following three objectives: (a) to expel the 

Americans. the French and their allies definitely from 

Lebanon, putting an end to any colonialist entity on 

our land; (b) to submit the Phalanges to a just power 

and bring them all to justice for the crimes they have 

perpetrated against Muslims and Christians; (c) to permit all the sons of our people to determine their future and to 

choose in all the liberty the form of government they desire. We 

call upon all of them to pick the option of Islamic government 

which, alone, is capable of guaranteeing justice and liberty 

for all. Only an Islamic regime can stop any further tentative 

attempts of imperialistic infiltration into our country [italics 

added].

Hence, in addition to serving as a moral and religious imperative, 

an Islamic government for Hizbollah served an instrumental purpose, 

as it represented the ideal form of social and political organization for 

combating what it regarded as imperialism.

In this regard, various countries were singled out for special attention (as the preceding quote attests), especially the United States:

The US has tried, through its local agents, to persuade 

the people that those who crushed their arrogance in 

Lebanon and frustrated their conspiracy against the 

oppressed (mustad’afin) were nothing but a bunch of 

fanatic terrorists whose sole aim is to dynamite bars 

and destroy slot machines. Such suggestions cannot 

and will not mislead our umma, for the whole world 

knows that whoever wishes to oppose the US, that 

arrogant superpower, cannot indulge in marginal acts 

which may make it deviate from its major objective. 

We combat abomination and we shall tear out its very 

roots, its primary roots, which are the US. All attempts 

made to drive us into marginal actions will fail, especially as our determination to fight the US is solid.
Chapter 4. The Resistance Movement

63

We declare openly and loudly that we are an umma

which fears God only and is by no means ready to tolerate injustice, aggression and humiliation. America, 

its Atlantic Pact allies, and the Zionist entity in the 

holy land of Palestine, attacked us and continue to do 

so without respite. Their aim is to make us eat dust 

continually. This is why we are, more and more, in a 

state of permanent alert in order to repel aggression 

and defend our religion, our existence, our dignity. 

They invaded our country, destroyed our villages, slit 

the throats of our children, violated our sanctuaries 

and appointed masters over our people who committed the worst massacres against our umma. They do 

not cease to give support to these allies of Israel, and 

do not enable us to decide our future according to our 

own wishes.6, a

Norton noted that France was singled out for its support of the 

Maronite community and for arms sales to Iraq.8

 Israel, of course, was 

also the target for invective, as the group refused to acknowledge the 

legitimacy of the Jewish state and rejected all forms of negotiations with 

it. A section of the open letter titled “The Necessity for the Destruction 

of Israel” stated:

We see in Israel the vanguard of the United States in 

our Islamic world. It is the hated enemy that must be 

fought until the hated ones get what they deserve. This 

enemy is the greatest danger to our future generations 

and to the destiny of our lands, particularly as it glorifies the ideas of settlement and expansion, initiated in 

Palestine, and yearning outward to the extension of 

the Great Israel, from the Euphrates to the Nile.

Our primary assumption in our fight against Israel 

states that the Zionist entity is aggressive from its 

inception, and built on lands wrested from their owners, at the expense of the rights of the Muslim people. 

Therefore our struggle will end only when this entity 

a The Soviet Union also did not escape criticism. Norton noted that Hizbollah 

adopted the notion of “neither East nor West,” which was espoused by Iran’s revolutionaries.7

 Additionally, one commentator, writing in the Hizbollah newspaper al-Ahd in 

May 1987, stated, “The Soviets are not one iota different from the Americans in terms of 

political danger, indeed are more dangerous than them in terms of ideological considerations as well, and this requires that light be shed on this fact and that the Soviets be 

assigned their proper place in the forces striving to strike at the interests of the Muslim 

people and arrogate their political present and future.”
64

Unconventional Warfare Case Study: Iran and Lebanese Hizbollah

is obliterated. We recognize no treaty with it, no cease 

fire, and no peace agreements, whether separate or 

consolidated.

We vigorously condemn all plans for negotiation with 

Israel, and regard all negotiators as enemies, for the 

reason that such negotiation is nothing but the recognition of the legitimacy of the Zionist occupation of 

Palestine. Therefore we oppose and reject the Camp 

David Agreements, the proposals of King Fahd, the 

Fez and Reagan plan, Brezhnev’s and the French-Egyptian proposals, and all other programs that include 

the recognition (even the implied recognition) of the 

Zionist entity.9

Twenty-four years passed before Hizbollah released an update. The 

2009 manifesto was developed during the seventh political conference 

of the group and announced during a press conference in Beirut in 

November 2009.10 The group still called for the destruction of Israel 

and the removal of Western influence from the Islamic world, but in 

other respects there are notable contrasts with the 1985 open letter. 

Most importantly, the group dropped its calls for the establishment of 

an Islamic state in Lebanon. Specifically, the 2009 manifesto calls for 

the creation of a “political system that truly represents the will of the 

people and their aspirations for justice, freedom, security, stability, wellbeing, and dignity.”11 In the 1980s the group regarded the Lebanese 

political system as clientelistic and irredeemably corrupt, and while the 

middle-class members of Amal sought to ingratiate themselves within 

the system, Hizbollah sought its overthrow and replacement with an 

ideal-form Islamic government. Gleis and Berti argued that this shift 

reflected a level of pragmatism, as the group realized that an Islamic 

form of government grounded in velayat-e faqih was simply not realistic in Lebanon’s multi-confessional society.12 Additionally, the authors 

argued that this shift reflected perhaps a recognition by Hizbollah that 

it had a stake in Lebanon’s political system, as the group had been 

participating in elections since the early 1990s and, as a result, had 

acquired significant political clout.13,b

b Additionally, Gleis and Berti take a fairly dim view of Hizbollah’s intentions, arguing that the group, in addition to continuing to desire the destruction of Israel, also seeks 

to rebalance the global distribution of power to the detriment of the United States, and its 

participation in the Lebanese government is simply a tactical shift given the group’s realization that force is not a viable option under current conditions. Rather, the authors note 

that the group has called for combatting its enemies “by hand” or, notably, “by tongue” 

depending on circumstances.
Chapter 4. The Resistance Movement

65

Lastly, the group also paid homage to Syria and Iran. It praised 

Syria’s role for leading the resistance against Israel, and the group reaffirmed the importance of the relationship with Iran, stating:

Hezbollah considers Iran as a central state in the 

Islamic world since it is the state that dropped through 

its revolution the Shah’s regime and its AmericanIsraeli projects. It’s also the state that supported the 

resistance movements in our region and stood with 

courage and determination at the side of the Arab and 

Islamic causes on top of which is the Palestinian cause.14

The group also toned down its Islamic universalism, as it dropped 

its call for the establishment of a pan-Islamic state (that was to begin 

with the export of the revolution to Lebanon). It stated:

What we call for today is not a merging unity in the 

Arab or Islamic world. We rather call for the unity 

between Arab and Islamic states which guards these 

states’ and nation’s specifications and sovereignty.15

Strategies and Supporting Narratives

The differences between the 1985 open letter and the 2009 manifesto reflect Hizbollah’s changing strategy (as well as important continuities) in the intervening period. After the Taif agreement Hizbollah 

no longer sought to replace the Lebanese political system with an 

Islamic state, and on the battlefield it focused on the Israeli enemy. 

Consequently it largely adopted irregular techniques in place of terrorist tactics. An interesting perspective through which to analyze the 

changes and continuities of its strategy is by analyzing the discourse 

espoused by the group, and social movement theory (SMT) is one tool 

through which to analyze the group’s narrative.

SMT, and in particular the subfield of SMT that emphasizes the 

notion of a “frame” and the social construction of meaning and “reality,” offers a useful paradigm to deconstruct insurgent narratives and 

understand how they promote collective action. Developed by sociologists to understand the formation and evolution of a variety of social 

movements (such as, for example, the white separatist movement in 

the United States, the environmental movement, the civil rights movement, and the anti-abortion movement, among others), the concepts 

developed by social movement theorists can also be fruitfully applied 

to study various insurgent movements, which can also be seen as 

social movements.
66

Unconventional Warfare Case Study: Iran and Lebanese Hizbollah

A fundamental concept within SMT is that of a “frame.” Goffman 

defined frames as “schemata of interpretation” that enable people 

“to locate, perceive, identify and label” events that they experience 

or become aware of.16 More simply, a frame represents a worldview or 

paradigm through which events and concepts are interpreted, and 

as such it represents a means through which meaning is constructed 

and “reality” is interpreted. Within the context of a social movement 

(or an insurgency), by assigning motives and meanings, a frame can 

help promote collective action. Leaders of social movements can do 

this by developing what Benford and Snow label as a “collective action 

frame,” which consists of “action oriented [italics added] sets of beliefs 

and meanings that inspire and legitimate the activities and campaigns 

of a social movement organization.”17 Thus, collective action frames 

perform an interpretive function by simplifying and condensing the 

“world out there,”18 especially in ways “intended to mobilize potential 

adherents and constituents, to garner bystander support, and to demobilize antagonists.”19 A key aspect of a collective action frame is that it 

is “not merely aggregations of individual attitudes and perceptions but 

also the outcome of negotiating shared meanings [italics added],”20 such 

as, say, through narratives, writings, and the exchange of ideas among 

a community of people.

Benford and Snow noted that collective action frames perform 

three core framing tasks, specifically diagnostic framing, prognostic 

framing, and motivational framing.21 The first involves problem and 

victim identification and the attribution of responsible actors and 

causes of the problem. The second entails the specification of a proposed solution and a strategy for carrying out corrective action. Motivational framing provides a rationale for engaging in remedial collective 

action, including an appropriate vocabulary of motive.22

Each of these concepts can be fruitfully applied to an analysis of the 

evolution of Hizbollah’s narrative over time. Karagiannis noted that 

in the 1980s Hizbollah’s diagnostic frame centered around an “injustice frame,” in which Lebanon’s ills were blamed on the Israeli occupation and on what it regarded as a sectarian and illegitimate political 

system.23 The 1985 open letter noted that “the present regime is the 

product of an arrogance so unjust that no reform or modification can 

remedy it. It should be changed radically.”24

However, Karagiannis noted that after the acceptance of the Taif 

agreement, the group’s diagnostic frame changed from an injustice 

frame to an unfairness frame.25 That is, once Hizbollah set aside the 

goal of overthrowing the political system and, indeed, began to participate in politics, it began to emphasize the unfairness and sectarianism 
Chapter 4. The Resistance Movement

67

of the Lebanese political system. For instance, its election program 

from 1992 noted:

It is now imperative to cooperate with other devoted 

parties in order to complete the necessary steps 

towards . . . the forging of internal peace on the basis 

of political concord that is furthest as could be from 

abominable sectarian biases or narrow confessional 

discriminations.26

Additionally, the group’s election program from 1996 emphasized 

“the unbalanced nature of the Lebanese political system and the wrong 

practices by [the government] led to the deepening of corruption, favoritism . . . besides establishing the sectarian, confessional and regional 

divisions.”27 Of course, there are also notable continuities in Hizbollah’s narrative despite its change in domestic strategy, as the 2009 manifesto also identified Israel as a problem that needed to be eliminated.

A prognostic frame specifies a proposed solution and a strategy for 

implementing the latter. As has been noted, in its early years Hizbollah’s prognostic frame centered on establishing an Iranian-style Islamic 

government in Lebanon. As Nasrallah once stated:

We do not believe in multiple Islamic republics; we do 

believe, however, in a single Islamic world governed by 

a central government, because we consider all borders 

throughout the Muslim world as fake and colonialist, 

and therefore doomed to disappear. We do not believe 

in a nation whose borders are 10,452 square kilometers in Lebanon; our project foresees Lebanon as part 

of the political map of an Islamic world in which specificities would cease to exist, but in which the rights, 

freedom, and dignities of minorities within it are 

guaranteed.28

Yet after the Taif Accords, Hizbollah’s prognostic frame became 

more geographically bounded and territorialized, as the group focused 

on improving conditions in Lebanon. Its 1996 electoral program noted:

Achieving justice and equality among the Lebanese 

is considered one of the main bases for establishing 

a dignified and prosperous country in which all the 

Lebanese engage in the process of construction with 

drive and solidarity under equality of opportunities, 

equality for all, individuals, classes and areas, in rights 

and duties, whether political, economical or social.29
68

Unconventional Warfare Case Study: Iran and Lebanese Hizbollah

Hence, rather than adhering to a prognostic frame centered on the 

motto “Islam is the answer,” the group adopted a frame that Karagiannis described as a prognostic “frame of representative governance,” 

which emphasized the establishment of a pluralistic political system in 

which some notion of justice and fairness prevailed.30

Lastly, despite the evolution of Hizbollah, there is continuity to its 

motivational frame, which, as is the case with all social movements, 

is intended to encourage and incentivize actual participation. Karagiannis noted that the group heavily used Shia religious symbols and narratives to encourage participation in the movement. One such strategy 

involved equating the sacrifices made by Hizbollah leaders with those 

of canonical Shia imams. For instance, after the assassination by Israel 

of Sayyid Abbas al-Musawi, Hizbollah’s secretary general at the time, 

Nasrallah noted that his death “epitomized the events at Karbala” and 

that Musawi “was just like al-Hussein, a body without a head; just like 

al-Abbas, with [his] hands severed; and just like the greatest Ali, with 

[his] torn flesh.”31

Additionally, Karagiannis also noted that the group has consistently 

adopted a “Jerusalem liberation frame,” in which the group framed its 

military actions against Israel as a religious duty for devout Muslims 

to “liberate” Palestine and Jerusalem from infidels.32 Jerusalem, as the 

location where Muslims believe the Prophet Muhammad ascended to 

heaven, typically received special mention. On one occasion Nasrallah 

noted that “Jerusalem is the land of Allah; it constitutes an Islamic cultural dimension not subject to negotiation or compromise.”33 Additionally, a slogan adopted by the group was Kadimoun Ya Quds (“We are 

coming Jerusalem”).

On other occasions, the group’s motivational frame de-emphasized 

religion and instead grounded its resistance against Israel on panArabism and nationalism, with an emphasis on liberating Arab territory from Israel and protecting Lebanon’s independence. For instance, 

after the Israeli release of a long-held Lebanese prisoner, Nasrallah 

linked Hizbollah’s struggle against Israel with the struggles of Palestinian groups by noting that:

the resistance movements in the region and particularly in Lebanon and Palestine are complementary 

continuous movements with cumulating efforts, experiences and sacrifices so that they might accomplish 

the same objectives in liberating the land, people, and 

sacred places.34

On another occasion, Nasrallah painted the group as a defender 

of Lebanon’s independence and territorial integrity, noting that 
Chapter 4. The Resistance Movement

69

“Hizbollah, along with its friends and allies, is the first defender of genuine sovereignty, genuine independence, and genuine freedom—and 

I add to them national dignity, honor, and pride.”35 Hence, the group’s 

motivational frame was flexible enough to appeal to various audiences, 

whether devout Shias motivated by liberating Jerusalem, secular (and 

Sunni) Arabs nursing grievances against Israel, and Lebanese keen on 

maintaining the country’s independence (at least with respect to Israel).

Structure and Dynamics of the Resistance Movementc

Leadership

Hizbollah is headed by a nine-member Shura Council, one member of which is elected as the secretary general. Seven members are 

Lebanese while two members are Iranian, specifically from the embassies in Beirut and Damascus.37 Members are elected to the council for 

three-year terms by the Central Council, an assembly of almost two 

hundred party founders and cadres. Because the members of the Central Council are not necessarily representative of the rank and file of 

the party, Hizbollah does not resemble most Western political partiesd

but instead is similar in structure to the Iranian political system, in 

which the Assembly of Experts elects the Council of Guardians.

The members of the Shura Council have mostly been clerics, 

although there have also been laypersons with needed skills (such as 

in health, social affairs, finance, and information technology) on the 

council. They must however demonstrate faith in Islam and belief in 

velayat-e faqih before being considered for leadership positions. The 

original Shura Council had only one member who was not a cleric; however, after the Taif Accords there was an increase in laity on the council, with the number of non-clerics increasing to three members. This 

was reversed after 2001 among concerns that Hizbollah was straying 

c This section is primarily based on Hamzeh, In the Path of Hizbullah, 44–79.36 Various 

other sources were used, as detailed in the endnotes within this section.

d Abu-Khalil noted that Hizbollah bears the hallmarks of a Leninist revolutionary 

organization. For instance, both Hizbollah and Leninist political organizations stress 

that ideological knowledge is the province of a privileged few, who are responsible for 

uplifting and guiding the ignorant masses. In the case of the Leninist organization, this 

privileged few consisted of a communist elite that interpreted communist doctrine and 

helped develop class consciousness among the toiling masses. Similarly, in the case of Hizbollah the leadership of the party does not believe that the interpretation of religious texts 

should be left to those who are not religious scholars and that it was the responsibility of 

the ulama to foster Islamic consciousness among the masses. And whereas a Leninist party 

is based on the notion of “democratic centralism,” in which all decisions are to be taken 

by the leadership and executed by members, in the case of Hizbollah authority flows from 

the ulama to the entire community.38
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Unconventional Warfare Case Study: Iran and Lebanese Hizbollah

from its core principles, and the council at that time again shifted back 

to only one non-cleric.

The Shura Council elects the secretary general and his deputies and 

the chairmen of the five councils that constitute the executive administrative apparatus. The Shura Council is a highly homogenous group 

and primarily works by consensus, with members finding mutually beneficial arrangements and appointing each other’s preferred candidates 

to important posts.

The Shura Council is in charge of overall administration, planning, 

and policy making. Rulings by the council are considered to be religiously binding on party members. When disagreements arise within 

the council the wali al-faqih (jurisconsult) can be called on to make a 

ruling that is binding on the council. The wali al-faqih at the founding of Hizbollah was Ayatollah Khomeini and is currently Khomeini’s 

successor as supreme leader of Iran, Ayatollah Khameneh’i. Although 

there is no formal rule that Hizbollah is tied to the supreme leader of 

Iran, and in theory Hizbollah could select another religious leader as 

its wali al-faqih, in practice the financial and operational ties between 

Iran and Hizbollah make it likely that this connection will continue 

into the future.

The secretary general at present is Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah, who 

has held the post since 1992, when Sayyid Abbas al-Musawi was assassinated by Israel. The secretary general is supposed to be limited to only 

two terms; however, Ayatollah  Khameneh’i issued a religious ruling 

that Nasrallah may continue beyond this limit, and the Shura Council 

has continued to elect him every three years. While technically subordinate to the Shura Council, Nasrallah has a strong personal following 

and enjoys substantial political support from Iran. The death of his son 

in 2000 in fighting with Israeli troops increased Nasrallah’s support 

among Hizbollah’s membership and was seen as a personal sacrifice 

for the movement.

Organizational Structure

The operations of Hizbollah are split between the executive administrative apparatus and the military and security apparatus. Both organizations are controlled by the Shura Council and secretary general 

but operate separately. The executive administrative apparatus consists of five councils, each headed by one of the members of the Shura 

Council. The Executive Council runs programs in education, health, 

information, construction, finance, and external relations and also 

handles some security issues. The politburo operates as an advisory 

council to the Shura Council. The Parliamentary Council is tasked with 

issues regarding Hizbollah members of parliament and involvement of 
Chapter 4. The Resistance Movement

71

Hizbollah in the Lebanese political system. The Judicial Council functions as Hizbollah’s internal judicial system. During the chaos of the 

civil war, the Judicial Council handled all manner of legal issues in 

Hizbollah areas, but with the growth of the Lebanese state some functions have been transferred to the national courts, although the Judicial Council continues to handle internal matters. The Jihad Council 

analyzes the enemy and identifies the appropriate means to use against 

it. These means can include martyrdom operations and fighting but 

also unarmed methods. For the Jihad Council to advocate the use of 

violence requires approval by the wali al-faqih.

Although the Jihad Council decides on the strategies and tactics 

of jihad, implementation is left to the military and security apparatus, 

whose exact structure is harder to identify and has proven difficult to 

penetrate. The apparatus is technically under the direct control of the 

Shura Council but in reality is under the personal control of the secretary general. It is divided into the Islamic Resistance and the Security Organ.e

 The Islamic Resistance is the military wing of the party 

and is divided into two sections: the enforcement and recruitment section and the combat section. Enforcement and recruitment provides 

religious indoctrination and reinforces belief in wilayat al-faqih, while 

the combat section provides martial training. The outcome of training 

determines which combat role a recruit will fill. The combat section is 

divided into four organs, or units, with the first unit consisting of martyrs, who carry out extremely dangerous missions including, but not 

limited to, suicide missions; the second unit consists of commandos or 

special forces, who represent personnel who have excelled in guerrilla 

warfare; the third unit consists of rocket launchers and other weapons specialists; and the final unit consists of the regular fighters, who 

are trained for combat but whose primary responsibility is surveillance, 

logistics, and medical support.

Hizbollah’s military command structure is divided by region and 

then by sector. It is highly compartmentalized to reduce the risk that 

individuals who are captured or otherwise compromised will be able 

to give away information about the whole organization. Although 

there are clearly operational connections between Hizbollah and the 

e Levitt’s description of Hizbollah’s military apparatus is slightly different from that 

of Hamzeh.39 He locates the Islamic Resistance and units responsible for internal and 

external surveillance and the protection of party leaders under the Jihad Council, which 

in turn reports to the Shura Council. Additionally, he identified another structure, Hizbollah’s external operations wing, known as either the Special Security Apparatus or the 

External Security Organization, as falling under the purview of the Jihad Council. The 

latter was reportedly led by Imad Mugniyah before his death. In any case, in either Levitt’s 

or Hamzeh’s categorization, Hassan Nasrallah would be the dominant authority over the 

Jihad Council and the military and security apparatus.
72

Unconventional Warfare Case Study: Iran and Lebanese Hizbollah

Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the degree of cooperation 

is unclear. There are reports that the members of the IRGC work in 

Hizbollah’s operational headquarters.f

The other branch of the military and security apparatus is the Security Organ. It is divided into two sections, the first known as Party Security and the second as External Security. Party Security is tasked with 

preventing enemies from penetrating the party, and it keeps files on 

all party members and all people who approach the party. Hizbollah 

members are required to report meetings, contacts, and relations with 

all individuals and groups. Reportedly, Israel and the United States 

have made many attempts to penetrate Hizbollah, heightening awareness among Party Security and general membership of the intelligence 

threat.40 The primary function of External Security is counterintelligence, to prevent the organization’s enemies in Lebanon and abroad 

from penetrating the organization. This division may have cells in a 

number of Western countries and potential connections to Iranian 

intelligence, although little is known about the exact structure and 

capabilities of the External Security branch.

The membership of Hizbollah is estimated to be more than two 

hundred thousand. The vast majority of the membership is Shiite, 

although members of other Lebanese sects are allowed to join, and 

some do. Hizbollah is the largest of all Lebanese political parties, 

although the party is controlled by a cadre of elites, the Central Council, which makes leadership decisions. The membership of the party 

does not have any direct influence on leadership decisions. Financing 

for Hizbollah comes from a few wealthy donors and from Iran,g not 

from members, further reducing Hizbollah’s reliance on its members.

Hizbollah is highly selective in whom it recruits as members. After 

the inception of the organization in 1982, Hizbollah relied on mass 

mobilization of members along family and clan lines, depending on 

personal connections to maintain operational security. Given the political situation after the Israeli invasion, finding sufficient numbers of 

recruits was not a problem. Today the situation has changed, and the 

addition of new members relies on a formal process of recruitment. 

Hizbollah is able to be discerning in whom it allows into the organization and has multidimensional criteria for recruits, including religious 

observance, hostility toward Israel, and dedication to promoting justice 

and dignity for the Shia community.41

f See Chapter 5. External Support for more information regarding the links between 

Hizbollah and the IRGC.

g See Chapter 5. External Support for more information regarding Iranian financial 

sponsorship of Hizbollah. See also the section titled Resources and External Support later in 

this chapter for more information on Hizbollah’s sources of financing.
Chapter 4. The Resistance Movement

73

The process of identifying potential members starts with recruiters 

in Shia villages and neighborhoods throughout the country. Hizbollah runs schools, summer camps, and scouting groups and also organizes soccer leagues and other events for young Lebanese in order to 

develop interest in the organization as well as to give recruiters a means 

of identifying prospective future members. Some basic training and 

familiarization with the concepts of guerrilla warfare occurs at young 

ages, but the formal recruitment process does not start until recruits 

are at least eighteen years old. Recruiters look for young men who are 

pious, disciplined, modest, intelligent, healthy, and well behaved. Traits 

seen as moral flaws, such as listening to music, drinking alcohol, driving fast cars, and flirting with girls disqualify young men from being 

recruited.42

After being selected as a possible recruit, the process of joining Hizbollah usually takes two years. The first year is called tahdirat, meaning 

reinforcement or preparation. It consists of training on Hizbollah’s ideology and culture. Recruits must accept the leadership of the party and 

accept the party’s religious views. Many recruits decide during this year 

that they are not willing to accept the requirements and discipline that 

the party demands and drop out of the process, while others are considered unfit by the organization and are not asked to continue.43,h The 

reinforcement process is supposed to strengthen the positive moral 

traits for which the recruits were originally identified. Recruits live in 

an atmosphere of religion and faithfulness, with the purpose of making them love Hizbollah and fully accept the group’s ideology. During 

this first year, prospective members do not receive any military training 

and do not even see a gun.45

The second year of the process is called intizam, meaning ordered 

discipline or commitment. During this part of the process the recruits 

are taught discipline, as well as physical fitness and military training. 

It is during this stage that the recruit’s role in the party is determined. 

This role could be in the military, political, or social branches of the 

party.46 Despite the rigors of the indoctrination process, self-reliance 

and autonomy are encouraged, and members’ personal religious views 

help to determine which roles they play in the organization. Members are allowed to decide for themselves whether they are willing to 

h Berman noted that there is an important logic underlying the sacrifices and hardships that radical religious organizations such as Hizbollah impose on members. By 

requiring members to make costly or painful sacrifices, such organizations weed out what 

economists refer to as “free riders,” or individuals who cheat on their obligations to a 

group but who nonetheless enjoy the benefits of group membership. The identification 

of true believers and those willing to bear any cost makes organizations such as Hizbollah 

extremely deadly and difficult to defeat because those who are accepted as members are 

unlikely to defect and act as informers, as the Israelis have found out.44
74

Unconventional Warfare Case Study: Iran and Lebanese Hizbollah

volunteer for martyrdom missions. Members are expected to progress 

individually through a process known as the “greater jihad,” consisting of developing a personal religious connection with God. This is 

contrasted with the “lesser jihad,” which includes military conflict. 

Although the military jihad is the more visible aspect of Hizbollah from 

an outsider’s perspective, the rigors of the internal religious aspects of 

the organization are more challenging for many members.47

During the 1980s and 1990s, Hizbollah ran training camps in 

the Anti-Lebanon Mountains near the border with Syria. The camps 

were in fixed positions but were assumed to be safe, both because of 

their position far from Israel and because they were covered by Syrian 

air defenses. In 1994, however, the Israeli Air Force attacked one of 

the camps, killing forty recruits in a nighttime raid. This attack precipitated the bombing of the Asociación Mutual Israelita Argentina 

(AMIA) six weeks later, killing eighty-five people.48 Since the Israeli 

attack on its training facilities Hizbollah has avoided fixed locations. 

Even the recruits are not told where they are going. They are loaded 

into vans with covered windows and driven long distances with multiple 

switchbacks to ensure the location of the training sites remains secret.49

The training process involves hauling rocks and heavy equipment 

up mountainsides while instructors launch surprise ambushes on the 

recruits, complete with explosives and live ammunition to teach the 

recruits to operate under fire. Physical deprivations include hiking 

without shoes and sleeping in the open without blankets. Members are 

allowed one canteen of water per day for drinking as well as washing 

before prayers. Recruits are taught how to use AK-47s, rocket-propelled 

grenades, mines, and other explosives. Some individuals are given 

advanced training with other weapons. Everyone receives training with 

communications equipment, and special emphasis is placed on navigation, surveillance, and avoiding detection. Some members are selected 

for more advanced training in Iran, under the supervision of Hizbollah 

trainers at IRGC facilities.50

Acceptance into the party is contingent on passing a security review 

by Party Security. Some members with specialized and needed skills 

can skip the reinforcement and ordered discipline stages, but all members are required to pass the security review.51 Any potential member 

who has lived overseas, as many Lebanese have, receives extra scrutiny. 

Areas where Hizbollah operates are patrolled by internal security officers who observe members’ activities and keep track of any foreigners 

and other outsiders who are in the area.52

Members usually receive little or no pay for the first two or three 

years in Hizbollah. As they progress through the organization there is 

limited pay; however, the organization provides support for housing, 
Chapter 4. The Resistance Movement

75

education, and other needs. The strict moral code that members are 

required to follow prevents them from accepting money or other gifts. 

Although the financial benefits are limited, members know that their 

needs will be taken care of and that if they die their families will be 

provided for.53

Hizbollah, as a particularistic party that represents Shia interests, 

recognizes that it cannot represent all of Lebanon, or all of the Islamic 

community, and as such has created what it calls the Islamic Current to 

improve cooperation with other groups that share similar interests and 

goals. These groups include other Shia groups, such as Islamic Amal 

and Faithful Resistance, as well as non-Shia groups, including Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Hamas, and the Islamic Association of Lebanon.54

An additional form of outreach is conducted through what are 

known as umbrella groups, which cooperate with Hizbollah but to a 

lesser degree than Islamic Current groups. These include the Assembly 

of Muslim Clergy, an organization of Sunni and Shiite clerics working 

to bridge differences within the Islamic community, and the Lebanese 

Resistance Brigades, an organization formed by Hizbollah and consisting of Islamists and non-Islamists who come together to fight Israel. The 

Lebanese Resistance Brigades can be used by Hizbollah to bring more 

fighters under its command without posing an internal security threat 

because these fighters are kept separate from the Islamic Resistance.55

Command, Control, Communications, and Computers

Hizbollah’s media outlets rank among the largest information network of any regional political party and include the satellite channel 

Al-Manar (the beacon) with more than ten million viewers as well as 

four licensed radio stations and five licensed newspapers, all of which 

garnered substantial receipts through advertising sales. Al-Manar, 

available throughout the Arab world via satellite, has a corporate atmosphere with state-of-the-art editing and production equipment as well 

as a team of foreign correspondents located throughout the Middle 

East, Europe, and North America.56 Unlike much of the Western media, 

which has abided by a taboo on depicting grisly images of the dead 

and wounded, Al-Manar has openly shown such images (although it is 

worth noting that many other regional media outlets have done so as 

well). Such material has routinely included maimed and dead children, 

disembodied limbs, and even live feeds (during the 2006 war) of civilians being shelled during Israeli air raids.

Al-Manar’s pioneering use of footage from actual battles with Israeli 

soldiers has been widely credited with helping to reverse regional 

feelings of impotence in the struggle with Israel.57 The channel also 

targeted Israeli audiences with psychological operations aimed at 
76

Unconventional Warfare Case Study: Iran and Lebanese Hizbollah

demoralizing the public; messages were based on Hizbollah’s understanding that Israeli society was incapable of and unwilling to absorb 

large casualties because of its tightly knit social fabric.58 The use of 

Google maps technology in 2006 allowed the station to pinpoint particular locales in northern Israel to target, creating substantial anxiety 

for residents. In addition, the station also launched the “Who’s Next?” 

campaign, which displayed a continuously updated photo gallery of the 

latest Israel Defense Forces (IDF) casualties followed by the image of a 

question mark superimposed over an empty silhouette.59 Its post-2006 

investment in longer-range antennae allowed the station to send its signal as far as Haifa, Israel’s third-largest city. In addition to targeting 

parties directly involved in the conflict, Hizbollah also crafted messages for parties that had influence over regional conflicts, including 

the United States and neighboring Arab countries.

Finally, cyberspace has also become an important arena for Hizbollah’s communication strategy. The organization’s technicians have routinely hijacked servers and websites to transmit their own information, 

while also ensuring that ordinary traffic was not disrupted and that 

their hijacking activities remained unnoticed.60 In addition to using 

the web to transmit information among group members, Hizbollah 

has used it to send information to the media. Because Hizbollah has 

an extensive presence on the web and the information available on 

its websites appears credible, the information has been used by Israeli 

journalists and other correspondents covering the region. When several Israeli teenagers launched a cyber attack on a number of Hizbollah sites (as well as those of Hamas and the Palestinian Authority) in 

2000, the response was intense. Hackers struck the Knesset (the Israeli 

parliament), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and an IDF site and later 

also targeted the Israeli prime minister’s office, the Bank of Israel, and 

the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange.61

Hizbollah’s battlefield communications network was crucial to the 

group’s military successes in the 2006 war with Israel. Official reports 

indicate that the group was successful in rebuffing Israeli efforts to 

jam its communications systems south of the Litani River (jamming 

signals are restricted in range to relatively small areas). In addition, 

reports suggest that the group may have possessed the capability to 

disrupt some Israeli communications.62 Despite a relatively high level of 

technological sophistication, Hizbollah used landlines (primarily copper cable, which is highly susceptible to jamming and tapping). Most 

of these lines were merely laid next to existing utility lines (both public and private), enabling the group to use existing infrastructure and 

link far-flung outposts and offices. Yet, the vulnerability of these lines 

meant that the organization did not rely on them except as a secondary 
Chapter 4. The Resistance Movement

77

or emergency method of communication. Increasingly, the group has 

replaced older copper cable wiring with fiber-optic lines to serve its 

headquarters, television and radio stations, military compounds, and 

mobile rocket-launching facilities, because fiber-optic material is 

immune to many of the deficiencies of copper wiring.i

Mobile communications technology—primarily cell phones, which 

are inexpensive, portable, and lightweight, but also satellite phones—

is the group’s most common method of communication. During the 

2006 conflict, Hizbollah used an elaborate system of radio call signs 

and a closed cellular phone system; the latter was designed to handle 

short message service and e-mail as the primary formats of information 

exchange.64 Because jammers could disrupt the flow of signals only in 

a small area and were also limited by mountainous terrain (the Lebanese theater being both large and mountainous), Hizbollah operatives 

were largely able to evade Israel’s efforts, which were concentrated in a 

few high-value areas, to deny the flow of communication. Hizbollah’s 

Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah underscored the centrality of the 

group’s communication network in 2008 when, as the Western-backed 

Lebanese government declared the organization’s media assets both 

“illegal” and an “attack on Lebanese sovereignty,” he declared these 

assets to be the group’s single most important weapon and stated that 

any disruption to the network perpetrated by government authorities 

would be an act of war.

Resources and External Support

Hizbollah has been able to draw on a wide range of financial sources, 

including funding from Iran, sympathetic donors in Arab countries, 

and the group’s own extensive business interests (both licit and illicit). 

The group has also raised funds in Africa by taking advantage of the 

large expatriate Lebanese community on the continent. Levitt noted 

that most of the funds raised in Africa come from “expatriate donations, Mafia-style shakedowns, front companies, and even blood diamonds and drugs.”65 Israeli officials have identified the Ivory Coast and 

Senegal as important centers of fundraising activity on the continent, 

and the group is suspected of profiting from the trade in “blood diamonds” originating from Angola, Sierra Leone, and the Democratic 

Republic of the Congo.66

Additionally, the sizeable Lebanese expatriate community in 

South America has made the region, in addition to Africa, a hub 

for generating finance, and in 2008 a drug probe found that the 

i VoIP (Voice over Internet Protocol) transmitted by fiber-optic cable would be a particularly secure form of communication available to the group.63
78

Unconventional Warfare Case Study: Iran and Lebanese Hizbollah

Lebanese operator of an enormous cocaine money-laundering operation in Colombia donated a portion of his proceeds to Hizbollah.67

Estimates of Iranian resources flowing to Hizbollah range from a low 

of $100 million per year to a high of $350 million.68 Other forms of 

Iranian assistance have included hardware; training provided for military and “resistance” activities; the services of Iranian engineers, doctors, and other professionals; and financial services designed to help 

the group evade international sanctions. However, most of these funds 

come from private foundations and charitable organizations in Iran 

or from the IRGC.

Financing from Arab donors to Hizbollah was primarily in the form 

of tithes (the portion of income that believers are required to donate to 

charitable causes under Shiite religious law), as well as donations from 

individuals, groups, small businesses, and banks in the Arab world and 

among the Shiite international community.69 Hizbollah also received 

significant income from the group’s domestic business chains, which 

include supermarkets, gas stations, department stores, restaurants, 

construction companies, and travel agencies, as well as offshore companies, banks, and currency exchanges. Most of this money was held 

in Tehrani banks to prevent seizure of the group’s assets; these Iranian 

institutions also operated under the legal strictures of Islamic finance, 

which provided added religious legitimacy.j

 In addition, several Lebanese financial institutions acted as intermediaries between Hizbollah 

and mainstream banks, facilitated by extremely lax transparency and 

oversight of the financial sector.k During the 2006 war, Israel bombed 

as many as twelve banks, including two large ones, Al Baraka and Fransabank, as well as the home of a bank manager.71

Political Activitiesl

At the end of the civil war, Hizbollah made a decision to become 

involved in the Lebanese political system. The decision to make the 

transition from a militant group to a political party was contentious 

within the leadership. Hizbollah’s originally stated purpose was to 

j Islamic law forbids Muslims from earning interest (the proceeds of idle capital), 

which is considered usury by religious scholars. However, in practice, these banks often 

function similarly to non-sharia-compliant banks, merely using some intermediary asset 

to provide a degree of separation so that the interest payment does not pass directly from 

the borrower to the lender. Not surprisingly, Islamic jurists in the Gulf countries, where 

finance is most plentiful and there is the most potential for earning interest, have introduced or approved many of these creative instruments.70

k These include Bayt Al-Mal (House of Money) and the Yousser Company for Finance 

and Investment of Lebanon.

l Portions of this section were adapted from the existing Hizbollah case study in Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare Volume II: 1962–2009.
Chapter 4. The Resistance Movement

79

support the creation of an Islamic state, and while some leaders and 

clerics advocated involvement in politics as a means of promoting this 

goal, others felt that involvement in a secular government was profane 

and therefore illegitimate for an Islamic organization. Sheikh Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah, revered by many Hizbollah members although 

not formally part of the group, supported involvement, swaying the 

opinion of many in Hizbollah. The final decision to become involved 

was made by Ayatollah Ali Khomeini in his capacity as Hizbollah’s 

wali faqih.

72

Hizbollah candidates ran in the 1992 Lebanese election. Since then 

Hizbollah has continued to win about 10 percent of the seats in the 

National Assembly. Although religious issues play a part in Hizbollah’s 

appeal to voters, the organization also appeals to voters using secular 

messages. The history of poverty and disenfranchisement of the Shia 

community has made appeals for justice and development powerful 

electoral issues for Hizbollah. Hizbollah has also made use of practical 

electoral alliances with groups of different ideologies, at times working with Maronite and communist groups that it fought bitterly against 

during the civil war.73

In municipal elections, Hizbollah competes with Amal for support 

in Shia areas. Hizbollah has done well in the southern suburbs of Beirut, but in south Lebanon and Bekaa competition between Hizbollah 

and Amal has been intense, showing that although it is popular, Hizbollah does not have the unconditional support of the Shia community. 

Further evidence that Hizbollah has to respond to the desires of the 

voters, rather than dictate policy to its supporters, was the establishment of the “Revolution of the Hungry,” a breakaway faction started by 

Subhi al-Tufayli, a former secretary general of Hizbollah who left the 

party and ran a separate slate of candidates to protest a perceived lack 

of assistance from Hizbollah for its most needy constituents. Al-Tufayli 

won several seats in 1998, prompting Hizbollah to adopt more populist 

policies to regain the support of the poorest of its constituents.74

Before 2005, Hizbollah’s political participation at the national level 

was restricted to parliament, as the group demurred from joining an 

executive cabinet over concerns that doing so would diminish its credentials as an opposition movement and signal its acceptance of Lebanon’s confessional system.75 However, Gleis and Berti noted that the 

group eventually joined the cabinet in Fouad Siniora’s government over 

concerns that Syria’s control over Lebanon was slipping away in the 

wake of international condemnation over Syria’s suspected role in the 

2005 assassination of Rafik Hariri, which led Hizbollah to fear that its 

political enemies would seek the disarmament of the group.76
80

Unconventional Warfare Case Study: Iran and Lebanese Hizbollah

The group would soon constitute one of the key partners in a political formation known as the March  8 Alliance, whose name derives 

from the date in 2005 of a pro-Syria rally held in Beirut. The coalition ruled Lebanon from June  2011 until March  2013. Interestingly, 

the group shared power with other powerful coalition members who 

did not necessarily share Hizbollah’s political, economic, or religious 

agendas. Hizbollah’s Christian ally Michel  Aoun, leader of the Free 

Patriotic Movement, failed to fully split the vote of his coreligionists in 

the June 2009 election, as many Christians remained with the opposing 

March 14 alliance.77 This failure prevented Hizbollah from expanding 

on previous electoral gains, as the support of the Shia population alone 

could not propel Hizbollah to a parliamentary majority.

A second factor preventing Hizbollah from gaining full control of 

the government is the electoral rules regarding the allotment of both 

parliamentary seats and cabinet positions. The result of these rules 

has been an intensely divided government often paralyzed by gridlock. This division came to a head in November 2006, when Hizbollah and its allies left their cabinet posts in protest over the efforts by 

the March 14-led government to establish an international tribunal to 

investigate the assassination of Hariri, and the departure of the opposition members of the cabinet morphed into a long-running boycott that 

paralyzed the central government.78 In May 2008 this standoff escalated 

into armed confrontation, as the government sought to shut down Hizbollah’s communication network, which was operated separately from 

the rest of the country. This latest outburst of violence featured confrontations among different sectarian groups and saw Hizbollah deploy 

gunmen to seize areas of west Beirut.79

More recently, Hizbollah repeated the tactic of resigning from 

the government in January 2011, this time causing the collapse of the 

government of Saad Hariri (Rafik’s son) over disagreements with the 

March 14-led government regarding Lebanon’s cooperation with the 

United Nations Special Tribunal for Lebanon. This tribunal, which was 

responsible for investigating Rafik’s assassination, was rumored to be 

on the verge of issuing indictments against members of Hizbollah.80,m

Methods of Warfare

The majority of Hizbollah’s military activities centered on its guerrilla campaign against the IDF in southern Lebanon (1982–2000). The 

campaign focused on low-intensity attacks targeting a small number 

of IDF soldiers. Although it was not overwhelmingly successful from a 

m In June 2011 the Special Tribunal wound up issuing indictments and arrest warrants for four members of Hizbollah.
Chapter 4. The Resistance Movement

81

tactical point of view, the campaign did achieve the group’s strategic 

objectives, forcing Israel to increase the number of forces deployed to 

the area, to build additional military installations, and to spend large 

sums of money to supply the South Lebanese Army (SLA). Attacks on 

individual IDF soldiers were not designed to capture land but were an 

end in themselves; they constituted the core of the group’s psychological operations aimed at demoralizing the Israeli occupation forces and 

their SLA collaborators.81 These operations drove Israeli decision makers to abandon their original vision, which focused on building up an 

indigenous SLA force that would police the security belt on Israel’s 

behalf.n Overall, the extended guerrilla campaign was credited with 

ultimately forcing Israel’s unilateral withdrawal from the south.

Hizbollah fighters were also strategic in identifying suitable targets, 

often choosing them on the basis of their political impact rather than 

how they would affect battlefield operations. Early attacks often targeted reservists (as opposed to regular army members) in an effort 

to undermine public support for the occupation. Because Israel conscripts all citizens into military service, the public response to the loss 

of reservists, who are less seasoned than their regular counterparts, 

was particularly acute.83 This eventually forced the Israeli government 

to change its policy to declare that only members of the regular army 

would be stationed in Lebanon. The close-knit character of Israeli society and its history of ransoming prisoners of war made this an especially 

effective strategy for Hizbollah. To this end, Hizbollah also targeted 

officers (as opposed to rank-and-file soldiers) and planted mines as 

close to the Israeli border as possible to increase the visibility of such 

attacks among the Israeli public.84

Hizbollah also took revenge on those Lebanese it accused of collaborating with Israel, often using family connections to put pressure 

on soldiers serving in the SLA.o In addition to producing much of the 

high-quality intelligence that played a key role in the success of Hizbollah’s military operations, it also exacerbated the SLA’s already low 

morale.85 Hizbollah’s ability to collect intelligence was also facilitated 

by the SLA’s high command, which treated rank-and-file recruits (especially Shia recruits) poorly. In addition, the commitment of SLA fighters was also eroded by the popular perception that the SLA served as 

“Israel’s sandbags” because SLA troops manned the frontline outposts 

n The SLA was originally a Christian militia formed to defend specific Christian villages against attack by Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) forces and their Lebanese 

allies. The vast majority of their weapons and training came from the IDF, which saw the 

SLA as a useful source of indigenous manpower.82

o SLA members were mostly Maronite Christians but still included a significant 

minority of Muslim and Druze soldiers that Hizbollah could target.
82

Unconventional Warfare Case Study: Iran and Lebanese Hizbollah

while the Israeli soldiers operated from the better-protected positions 

in the rear.86,p

Although Hizbollah’s successful exploitation of suicide attacks 

contributed to the popular association of militant Islam with suicide 

missions, the vast majority (81 percent) of suicide attacks during the 

Israeli occupation (1982–1986) were carried out by Christians or 

affiliates of secular or leftist parties,89 and only twelve of Hizbollah’s 

attacks involved the intentional death of a party operative.90 Hizbollah 

was credited with inspiring the use of similar attacks by other ethnonationalist groups because its 1983 attacks precipitated the withdrawal 

of both French and American forces.q

 The number of suicide attacks 

dropped off precipitously after the Israeli withdrawal to the “security 

zone” in 1985, and attacks on Western targets largely ended with the 

civil war in 1991.r

 These early tactics of kidnapping Westerners, initiating suicide attacks, and bombing high-profile targets were increasingly 

set aside as the dynamics of the conflict shifted. Subsequent attacks 

largely concentrated on Israeli military targets in the south of Lebanon 

and Katyusha rocket attacks on residential areas in northern Israel.

Mounting losses of Israeli soldiers eroded public support for the 

occupation, and in 1999 Ehud Barak, who was a candidate for prime 

minister at the time, promised to bring the troops home if he was 

elected. Barak won the election, and the IDF withdrew from many of 

its forward military outposts. Hizbollah simultaneously ramped up the 

intensity of attacks (including the assassination of an SLA commander), 

and on the eve of Israel’s May 2000 withdrawal, many of the SLA’s brigades abandoned their posts and fled across the border into Israel.s

Others turned themselves over to Hizbollah or the Lebanese police, 

and many were later tried in military courts on charges of treason.

From 2000 until the onset of the Israel–Lebanon war in 2006, 

military activities between IDF and Hizbollah forces were restricted in 

p The SLA often imprisoned the family members of would-be recruits who initially 

refused to join, holding them as collateral against defection.87 Like other parties to the 

conflict, the SLA committed a wide range of atrocities, including the systematic torture of 

civilians; it also captured militants and detained women and children, primarily at Khiam 

prison. The compensation provided to SLA soldiers was also extremely low, making it easy 

for Hizbollah to provide a superior financial incentive to those willing to defect.88

q These attacks killed 241 Americans and 58 French nationals.

r A US State Department report on terrorism issued in 2001 stated that Hizbollah 

had not attacked any US interests in Lebanon since the conclusion of the civil war ten 

years before.

s Although some SLA members (mostly low-level recruits who had been press-ganged 

into the SLA ranks or joined out of economic necessity) returned to Lebanon after Hizbollah promised them amnesty, about 2,400 remained in Israel, where they received compensation packages (an $8,800 minimum, with bonuses for number of years served) and 

citizenship.91
Chapter 4. The Resistance Movement

83

their intensity and were characterized mostly by tit-for-tat exchanges 

with few casualties.92,t Hizbollah’s military tactics were primarily rocket 

and mortar attacks targeting northern Israel, as well as cross-border 

raids and kidnappings of Israeli soldiers. The International Committee 

of the Red Cross was generally denied access to kidnapped soldiers, 

and Hizbollah party leaders routinely refused to confirm the fate of 

the soldiers.93

Israeli tactics consisted primarily of artillery fire and air strikes in 

southern Lebanon. Israeli forces occasionally targeted large electrical 

and industrial infrastructure or waged strikes against Syrian targets 

(such as radar stations) inside Lebanon. In addition, the IDF allegedly 

assassinated several high-profile militants and Islamist spiritual leaders.u During this period (and after the 2006 war) the IDF remained in 

control of the disputed territory known as the Shebaa Farms, which 

lies along the border between Lebanon and Syria’s occupied Golan 

Heights. The year 2000 also marked the beginning of the second Palestinian intifada (uprising), which saw Israeli Prime Minister Ariel 

Sharon reassert control over occupied West Bank territory that the previous Israeli government had forfeited as part of the Oslo Accords.v

Because the timing of the second intifada largely coincided with Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon, it is difficult to determine what Hizbollah’s behavior after the withdrawal might have been in the absence 

of what many party members considered a direct provocation. Hizbollah intensified its attacks (launching daily rockets against IDF targets) 

after Israel launched Operation Defensive Shield—its largest military 

incursion into the West Bank since 1967. The operation, in retaliation for suicide bombings that killed roughly four hundred Israelis 

over the previous eighteen months (Israeli countermeasures produced 

roughly twelve hundred Palestinian casualties during the same period), 

trapped Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) leader Yasser Arafat 

in his Ramallah compound and laid siege to much of the West Bank. 

t Gleis and Berti noted that the military confrontation between the two sides was 

limited as well during the 1990s, as the conflict was governed by an initially informal and 

unofficial understanding (since 1993) that under no circumstances would civilians be 

attacked, nor would civilian areas be used to launch attacks. This understanding was put 

in writing in 1996, although the rules of engagement comprising this understanding were 

not always observed (by both sides).

u Important examples include Ghalib Awali, a Hizbollah military commander who 

was killed in a car bombing in 2004; Sheikh Ahmad Yassin (the quadriplegic Hamas 

founder and an important spiritual figure for many Hizbollah members) who was killed, 

along with his bodyguard and nine bystanders, by a missile fired from an Israeli gunship 

in 2004; and Mahmoud Al-Majzoub (leader of Palestinian Islamic Jihad), who was killed by 

a car bomb in Sidon, Lebanon, in 2005.

v In addition to Hizbollah’s attacks on Israeli targets, several other Arab governments 

also ramped up hostilities, including oil embargoes and downgrading of diplomatic relations, in response to Israel’s policies in the occupied Palestinian territories.
84

Unconventional Warfare Case Study: Iran and Lebanese Hizbollah

Despite the intensification of artillery attacks, Hizbollah stopped short 

of a large-scale mobilization, which party secretary Hassan Nasrallah 

claimed must be preserved for retaliation in the event that the Israeli 

government attempted to expel the Palestinians from the West Bank 

and Gaza.94

The 2006 Lebanon war, although nominally fought between Hizbollah and Israel, extended well beyond the traditional battleground of 

south Lebanon. During the conflict, Hizbollah used primarily conventional tactics in the context of a war of attrition, presuming that Israeli 

society would not tolerate massive casualties.95 This strategy necessitated 

the maintenance of a constant barrage of rocket fire (averaging 150–

200 rockets per day) to reinforce the perception that the Israeli campaign was ineffective at weakening the group’s offensive capabilities.96

Hizbollah’s arsenal consisted primarily of Katyusha rockets, known for 

their distinctive screeching noise. Because these rockets lacked a guidance system and could be outfitted with only relatively small warheads, 

they were most effective when launched in highly concentrated numbers.97,w Hizbollah launched approximately four thousand rockets into 

Israel during the fighting in 2006, with roughly 25  percent of them 

landing in populated areas, killing forty-three civilians.99

To facilitate these operations, Hizbollah ensured that each unit 

was self-sufficient and prestocked with adequate supplies, making any 

Israeli attack on supply routes or large weapons depots irrelevant.100

However, this approach also resulted in the isolation of each unit, 

which, because of the ubiquitous Israeli air presence, prevented fighters from communicating with or supporting nearby units.101 To provide 

fortified cover and clear lines of sight, Hizbollah located bunkers and 

launch sites, whose size and complexity surprised even IDF intelligence, 

in and around villages (traditionally situated on hilltops in south Lebanon).102 These underground stations, which launched both short- and 

medium-range rockets, used pneumatic lifts to bring launchers up from 

underground and were often so well camouflaged that they were able 

to function from behind IDF lines as ground troops advanced through 

the south.

w Subsequent press reports and internal IDF investigations demonstrate that most 

Israeli military planners dismissed the import of these rockets, and although few of the 

rockets produced any civilian casualties, many urban centers and infrastructure sites in 

northern Israel were paralyzed during the thirty-four-day conflict.98 Although Katyushas 

have a maximum range of only twenty-five kilometers, Hizbollah most likely also possessed several longer-range models, including the Iranian-built Fajr-3, Fajr-5, and Zilzal 

rockets, with ranges of 45, 75, and 125–210 kilometers, respectively. Even though many of 

the group’s long-range launchers were hit in the first few hours of the war, it was able to 

extend its reach into northern Israel, reaching as far as Haifa.
Chapter 4. The Resistance Movement

85

In areas where villages or population centers were sparse, Hizbollah constructed extensive fighting positions with large and sophisticated bunker systems that included electrical wiring and ample 

provisions, often very close to IDF and United Nations Interim Force 

in Lebanon (UNIFIL) positions.103 Hizbollah’s concentration on rocket 

launching sites and underground bunkers, as opposed to infantry or 

mobile anti-tank capabilities, suggested that the group anticipated an 

Israeli response composed primarily of air strikes rather than ground 

attacks.104 Although the conventional Israeli plan for an attack in southern Lebanon focused on a ground invasion force of four army divisions, the military’s chief of staff (the first air force general to be in 

that position) instead emphasized a combination of air power and special forces troops, hoping that strikes on major infrastructure targets 

would erode Hizbollah’s support among the Christian and Sunni population.105,x

 Because the sites were underground, however, Israeli pilots 

were unable to spot them from the air, and pilots lacked the ground 

intelligence necessary to pinpoint the locations of the sites.107

Popular Support for the Resistance Movement or Insurgency

Hizbollah draws its support from the Shia community. Originating in the civil war as a militia designed to fight the Israeli occupation 

and to protect the Shia from both Israel and other Lebanese militias, 

Hizbollah has a uniquely sectarian identity. Among the Shia, Hizbollah 

competes with Amal for support but also cooperates with Amal on many 

issues on the national stage in order to represent the Shia population.

Among the other confessional groups, support has ebbed and 

flowed over time. After the Israeli withdrawal from the buffer zone 

in south Lebanon in 2000, Hizbollah was widely viewed as a national 

liberation force and was widely popular across sectarian divides. The 

withdrawal minimized conflict between Hizbollah and Israel, but some 

fighting did continue, albeit at a lower level. Although some thought 

Hizbollah’s continued militancy was necessary to keep Israel in check, 

many within the other confessional groups in Lebanon feared that Hizbollah’s activities could bring Israel back into Lebanon. In 2006 this 

fear became a reality, and although Hizbollah’s military performance 

against the IDF distinguished it among some Lebanese, the group 

lost support among others.108 More recently, Hizbollah’s popularity 

has weakened considerably since the involvement of the group in the 

Syrian civil war, as its assistance of the Assad government in its fight 

x A report commissioned by the US Air Force concluded that, although air power 

remains the most flexible means for targeting irregular armies, Israel’s indiscriminate and 

excessive bombing of civilian infrastructure sites was counterproductive.106
86

Unconventional Warfare Case Study: Iran and Lebanese Hizbollah

against the Sunni opposition has stoked sectarian tensions in Lebanon 

and dampened the ability of the group to reach across the sectarian 

divide and appeal to Sunnis within Lebanon.y

NOTES

1 “The Hizballah Program: An Open Letter [to the Downtrodden in Lebanon and the 

World],” February 16, 1985, http://www.cfr.org/terrorist-organizations-and-networks/

open-letter-hizballah-program/p30967.

2 Ibid.

3 Ahmad Nizar Hamzeh, In the Path of Hizbullah (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 

2004), 32.

4 Ibid., 32–33.

5 Ibid., 28.

6 “The Hizballah Program: An Open Letter [to the Downtrodden in Lebanon and the 

World].”

7 Augustus Richard Norton, Hezbollah: A Short History (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 

Press, 2007), 36–37.

8 Ibid., 37.

9 “The Hizballah Program: An Open Letter [to the Downtrodden in Lebanon and the 

World].”

10 Joshua L. Gleis and Benedetta Berti, Hezbollah and Hamas: A Comparative Study (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2012), 51.

11 Ibid., 57–58.

12 Ibid., 58.

13 Ibid., 53–54, 59.

14 Quoted in Gleis and Berti, Hezbollah and Hamas: A Comparative Study, 55.

15 Quoted in Gleis and Berti, Hezbollah and Hamas: A Comparative Study, 58.

16 Erving Goffman, Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience (New York: 

Harper Colophon, 1974), 21.

17 Robert D. Benford and David A. Snow, “Framing Processes and Social Movements: An 

Overview and Assessment,” Annual Review of Sociology 26 (2000): 614.

18 Ibid.

19 David A. Snow and Robert D. Benford, “Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant 

Mobilization,” International Social Movement Research 1 (1998): 198.

20 William A. Gamson, Talking Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 111.

21 Benford and Snow, “Framing Processes and Social Movements,” 615.

22 Ibid., 616–617.

23 Emmanuel Karagiannis, “Hezbollah as a Social Movement Organization: A Framing 

Approach,” Mediterranean Politics Journal 14, no. 3 (2009): 370.

24 Ibid., 370–371.

y The aggravation of sectarian tensions caused by the war in Syria and the advances 

of the Islamic State next door in Iraq has also had an impact on Iran’s actions in the 

region, given the latter’s desire to be seen as leader of the umma. As one Iranian analyst 

recently noted, “We are in a dilemma. We are a Shiite country, but trying to be the leaders 

of the entire Muslim world. As a result, we can’t even act in our own backyard.”109
Chapter 4. The Resistance Movement

87

25 Ibid.

26 Ibid., 372.

27 Ibid.

28 Ibid., 373.

29 Ibid., 374.

30 Ibid., 375.

31 Ibid., 376.

32 Ibid.

33 Ibid.

34 Ibid., 377.

35 Ibid.

36 Hamzeh, In the Path of Hizbullah, 44–79.

37 Martin Rudner, “Hizbullah: An Organizational and Operational Profile,” International 

Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 23, no. 2 (2010): 227.

38 As’ad Abu-Khalil, “Ideology and Practice of Hezbollah in Lebanon: Islamization of 

Leninist Organizational Principles,” Middle Eastern Studies 27, no. 5 (July 1991): 393–394.

39 Matthew Levitt, Hezbollah: The Global Footprint of the Party of God (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2013), 14–15.

40 Hamzeh, In The Path of Hizbullah, 73.

41 Nicholas Blanford, “Joining Hezbollah: An Inside Look at How the Shia Group Sustains 

Its War Against Israel,” Cairo Review 3 (2011): 51.

42 Ibid., 52–53.

43 Hamzeh, In the Path of Hizbullah, 48–79.

44 Eli Berman, Radical, Religious and Violent: The New Economics of Terrorism (Cambridge, MA: 

MIT Press, 2009), 1–26.

45 Blanford, “Joining Hezbollah,” 53.

46 Hamzeh, In the Path of Hizbullah, 48–79.

47 Blanford, “Joining Hezbollah,” 53–55.

48 Ibid., 60.

49 Ibid., 60–61.

50 Ibid., 61–65.

51 Hamzeh, In The Path of Hizbullah, 48–79.

52 Blanford, “Joining Hezbollah,” 58–59.

53 Ibid., 58.

54 Hamzeh, In the Path of Hizbullah, 48–79.

55 Ibid.

56 Ibid., 59.

57 Ibid.

58 Amir Kulick, The Next War with Hizbollah: Strategic Assessment (Tel Aviv: The Institute for 

National Security Studies, 2007): 41.

59 Hamzeh, In the Path of Hezbollah, 59.

60 “Lebanon: Hezbollah’s Communication Network,” Stratfor (May 9, 2008), http://intellibriefs.blogspot.com/2008/05/lebanon-hezbollahs-communication.html.

61 Hasan M. Al-Rizzo, “The Undeclared Cyberspace War between Hezbollah and Israel,” 

Contemporary Arab Affairs 1, no. 3 (2008): 393, 399.

62 “Lebanon: Hezbollah’s Communication Network.”

63 Ibid.
88

Unconventional Warfare Case Study: Iran and Lebanese Hizbollah

64 Andrew Exum, “Hizballah at War: A Military Assessment,” Policy Focus 63 

(December 2006): 3, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/

hizballah-at-war-a-military-assessment.

65 Levitt, Hezbollah: The Global Footprint of the Party of God, 255.

66 Ibid., 256, 261–265.

67 Chris Kraul and Sebastian Rotella, “Drug Probe Finds Hezbollah Link,” Los Angeles Times, 

October 22, 2008, http://articles.latimes.com/2008/oct/22/world/fg-cocainering22.

68 Levitt, Hezbollah: The Global Footprint of the Party of God, 12; and Rudner, “Hizbullah: An 

Organizational and Operational Profile,” 232.

69 Hamzeh, In the Path of Hezbollah, 64.

70 Ibid.

71 Adam Ciralsky and Lisa Myers, “Hezbollah Banks under Attack in Lebanon,” NBC News, 

July 25, 2006, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/14015377/.

72 Norton, Hezbollah: A Short History, 98–101.

73 Ibid., 101–102.

74 Ibid., 103–107.

75 Gleis and Berti, Hezbollah and Hamas: A Comparative Study, 48.

76 Ibid.

77 “March 14 Bloc Wins Lebanon Election,” Al Jazeera, June 8, 2009, http://english.aljazeera.

net/news/middleeast/2009/06/20096813424442589.html.

78 Gleis and Berti, Hezbollah and Hamas: A Comparative Study, 48.

79 Ibid.

80 Ibid., 49–50.

81 Ron Schleifer, “Psychological Operations: A New Variation on an Age Old Art: Hezbollah versus Israel,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 29, no. 1 (2006): 6.

82 Ibid.

83 Ibid.

84 Ibid., 8.

85 Schleifer, “Psychological Operations: A New Variation on an Age Old Art: Hezbollah 

versus Israel,” 4.

86 Nicholas Blanford, “The Quandary of an SLA Amnesty,” The Daily Star (Beirut), 

August 16, 2005.

87 Schleifer, “Psychological Operations: A New Variation on an Age Old Art: Hezbollah 

versus Israel,” 5.

88 Ibid., 8.

89 Robert Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism (New York: Random 

House, 2005).

90 Laura Deeb, “Hizballah: A Primer,” Middle East Report, July 31, 2006.

91 Blanford, “The Quandary of an SLA Amnesty.”

92 Gleis and Berti, Hezbollah and Hamas: A Comparative Study, 80.

93 Exum, “Hizballah at War,” 2; and Human Rights Watch, “Why They Died,” http://www.

hrw.org/en/reports/2007/09/05/why-they-died.

94 Paul Wachter, “Hezbollah: Lebanon’s Paper Tiger,” Salon, April 10, 2002, http://www.

salon.com/news/feature/2002/04/10/Lebanon.

95 Kulick, The Next War with Hizbollah, 41–42.

96 Exum, “Hizballah at War.”

97 “Hezbollah’s Rocket Force,” BBC News, July 18, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/5187974.stm.
Chapter 4. The Resistance Movement

89

98 Scott Wilson, “Israeli War Plan Had No Exit Strategy,” Washington Post, October 21, 2006.

99 Uzi Rubin, “Hizballah’s Rocket Campaign against Northern Israel,” Jerusalem Issue Brief

6, no. 10 (August 31, 2006).

100Exum, “Hizballah at War,” 10.

101 Ibid.

102 Ibid., 3.

103 Ibid., 3–4.

104Kulick, The Next War with Hizbollah.

105Wilson, “Israeli War Plan Had No Exit Strategy.”

106William M. Arkin, Divining Victory: Airpower in the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah War (Maxwell Air 

Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 2007).

107Exum, “Hizballah at War,” 4.

108Norton, Hezbollah: A Short History, 152–157.

109Thomas Erdbrink, “As Sunni Militants Threaten Its Allies in Baghdad, Iran Weighs 

Options,” New York Times, June 13, 2014.

CHAPTER 5.

EXTERNAL SUPPORT

93

TYPE OF ACTOR PROVIDING SUPPORT

Chapter 2 detailed how Iranian clerics were eager to export the 

revolution once they assumed power in 1979. Which organizations did 

they establish to effectuate the revolution’s export? As a foundation 

for the rest of this chapter, this section begins by detailing the 

main bureaucratic machinery established by the new regime that, 

at one time or another, played an important role in exporting the 

revolution and, in particular, midwifing the establishment and rise of 

Hizbollah. Also presented are some examples of the Iranian clerics’ 

collaboration with Hizbollah, which will be expanded on later in 

this chapter.

To start, perhaps the most influential Iranian actora

 on matters 

related to Hizbollah is the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), 

which was established shortly after the revolution, and of note is the 

Qods Force, which is the unit within the IRGC with the responsibility 

for exporting the revolution and, in particular, with responsibility 

for the Hizbollah portfolio. Today the Qods Force is led by Major 

General Qassem Suleimani, a man of legendary status who was recently 

described as “the single most powerful operative in the Middle East 

today.”b

 It has separate units focused on intelligence, sabotage, special 

operations, politics, and finance, with a total membership between ten 

and twenty thousand members and with a base at the former US embassy 

in Tehran.3

 The Qods Force was also organized geographically, with 

the First Corps focused on Iraq, the Second Corps focused on Pakistan 

and Iran’s border provinces, the Third Corps devoted to Turkey 

and Kurdish groups, and the Fourth Corps focused on Afghanistan 

and Central Asia.c Additionally, the IRGC maintains a level of autonomy

a Bar1

 noted that there is no single Iranian organization that has overall authority 

over the Hizbollah account. He identified the IRGC, the Ministry of Intelligence and 

Security (MOIS), and the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Propagation (each of which is 

discussed in this section) as the main bodies involved in collaborating with Hizbollah.

b Filkins2

 noted that Suleimani and the Qods Force have played a hands-on role in 

directing Syrian government forces in that country’s civil war. Suleimani works from a 

nondescript building in a heavily fortified command post, where he oversees the heads of 

the Syrian military, a Hizbollah commander, and a coordinator of Iraqi Shiite militias that 

were brought into the fight. Additionally, officers from the Qods Force trained militias, 

coordinated attacks, and set up a system to monitor rebel communications. The number 

of Qods Force members in Syria and Iraqi Shia militia members recruited by the Qods 

Force to fight for Assad is estimated to be in the thousands. 

c Levitt4

 noted that this depiction addressed just the first four regional commands set 

up by the Qods Force. Kahlili5

 noted that by the early to mid-1980s the IRGC had set up 

separate departments for each region of the world and that it had infiltrated countries in 

the Persian Gulf, Asia, Africa, Europe, and Latin America.
94

Unconventional Warfare Case Study: Iran and Lebanese Hizbollah

within the Iranian political system, as the elite within the organization 

are selected by, and therefore answerable to, the supreme leader.6

As detailed in Chapter 2, the IRGC spearheaded the initial deployment into Lebanon after the 1982 Israeli invasion. A first wave of eight 

hundred personnel was deployed to Baalbeck, and another seven hundred were subsequently sent to Baalbeck and to other small villages in 

the eastern Bekaa Valley, including Nabisheet and Brital. These units 

provided military training and religious indoctrination to units that 

eventually made up the sections of the Special Security Apparatus 

(SSA), Hizbollah’s external operations wing.7

Additionally, the IRGC played an important role in building up 

Hizbollah to fight Israel once the Lebanese civil war ended in 1990. 

For instance, IRGC personnel in mobile training camps in the Bekaa 

Valley provided operational advice to members of Hizbollah’s military 

wing, the Islamic Resistance, as it engaged in a guerrilla campaign 

against Israel and the South Lebanese Army (SLA). This training 

was carried out by twenty training officers from the IRGC who were 

specialists in various guerrilla warfare techniques. Specifically, Hizbollah fighters were trained in ambush techniques, the concealment 

and detonation of roadside bombs, mortar attacks, advanced reconnaissance and intelligence, infiltration techniques, and psychological warfare.8

 Interestingly, this training was supervised by a senior 

commander of the Islamic Resistance.9

 This apparent reversal of roles 

in the sponsor–proxy relationship, with members of the proxy force 

overseeing the activity of personnel from the state sponsor, is perhaps 

one of the features that makes this case of a sponsor–proxy relationship distinctive.

Another distinctive form of collaboration that developed between 

the IRGC and Hizbollah is that the IRGC came to rely on Hizbollah to 

enhance an asymmetric military capability, specifically an enhanced 

terrorist capability against Israel facilitated by inroads made by Hizbollah with Palestinian groups in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. As 

noted by Levitt, by the late 1990s Hizbollah began to develop a terrorist 

infrastructure within the West Bank and attempted to infiltrate operatives into Israel to gather intelligence and undertake terrorist attacks.10

This effort was organized by Unit 1800 within Hizbollah and led by 
Chapter 5. External Support

95

Imad Mugniyah,d who reportedly received orders from Tehran to work 

with Hamas 13,e

Another communication from Iran, this time directed toward Palestinian groups, is also quite telling. As detailed in an October 2001 Palestinian intelligence document, officials from Hizbollah, Hamas, and 

Palestinian Islamic Jihad met in Damascus “in an attempt to increase 

the joint activity inside [i.e., in Gaza, the West Bank, and Israel] with 

financial aid from Iran.” This meeting was prompted by an “Iranian 

message which had been transferred to the Hamas and Islamic Jihad 

leaderships, according to which they must not allow a calming down 

[of the situation on the ground] at this period.” The report went on to 

add that Iranian funds were to be transferred to the Palestinian groups 

through Hizbollah.15,f

Chapter 2 also noted the existence of an Iranian government body 

known as the Office of Islamic Liberation Movements, which helped 

provide the framework under which Hizbollah’s initial charter and constitution were developed. The Office of Islamic Liberation Movements 

was originally supervised by Ayatollah Husayn Ali Montazeri and led by 

Mehdi Hashemi, a relative, and the organization started out as a formal 

unit of the IRGC before becoming a semi-independent institution.17 In 

d Mugniyah would come to attain legendary status within Hizbollah, and he was a 

notoriously difficult individual to pin down. Katz and Hendel11 noted that he was Hizbollah’s liaison to the IRGC, and head of Unit 1800, the IRGC’s liaison with Hamas and 

Islamic Jihad. He also led Hizbollah’s military wing in addition to commanding the 

group’s international infrastructure and terror cells. However, Bergman noted that Israeli 

intelligence was never able to determine who his Iranian handler was (if indeed he had 

one). He was killed by a car bomb in January 2008 in Damascus, allegedly by the Israelis. 

Mugniyah was respected and feared by his enemies. David Barkai, a commander in Israeli 

Military Intelligence, in speaking of Mugniyah, noted that “In another time, another place 

or another nation, Imad Mugniyah would have been a start-up entrepreneur...his is one 

of the most creative and brilliant minds I have ever come across. He is a man with deep 

understanding, an excellent technical grasp and leadership ability. Unfortunately, a mixture of personal and geopolitical circumstances led him to channel his outstanding talents 

into the path of blood and destruction and to make him into such a dangerous enemy.”12

e Iran also used Hizbollah to impart bomb-making expertise and technology to Palestinian groups. In the early 1990s Israel deported 415 important Hamas and Islamic Jihad 

activists, who made their way to the Marj al-Zuhur camp in Lebanon, which was established with help from the IRGC. At the camp the 415 activists were taught how to construct car bombs and other explosive devices, and the graduates from this camp unleashed 

a suicide bombing campaign in Israel during the mid-1990s.14

f Levitt16 noted that Iran and Hizbollah teamed up to work with other Islamist groups, 

including various Sunni groups. For instance, in the early 1990s Iran and Hizbollah maintained links with al-Qaeda in Sudan, and this relationship led to al-Qaeda operatives and 

trainers receiving training in explosives in Iran and training in intelligence, explosives, and 

security procedures in Hizbollah camps in Lebanon. Representatives from Iran and Hizbollah also met with operatives from Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ). Reportedly, Mugniyah and 

Osama bin Laden held a meeting, where it was agreed that Hizbollah would provide explosives training to al-Qaeda and EIJ, and Iran was to supply EIJ with weapons.
96

Unconventional Warfare Case Study: Iran and Lebanese Hizbollah

1986 it was transferred to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and its chief 

role was to implement policy directives pertaining to Hizbollah decided 

by the Supreme National Security Council. In turn it delegated tasks 

to the embassies in Damascus and Beirut and also to the IRGC itself.18

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well as particular embassies, especially those in Lebanon and Syria, played an important role in Hizbollah’s operations conducted jointly with Iran. It has already been noted 

that Iran’s ambassadors in Damascus and Beirut have sat on Hizbollah’s Shura Council and that Mohtashemi, the Iranian ambassador to 

Syria in the early 1980s, played a fundamental role in establishing Hizbollah. In fact, the Iranian embassy in Damascus functioned as a nerve 

center at this time, as Mohtashemi oversaw a monthly budget in the 

tens of millions of dollars19 and, along with Ahmad Vahidi, at the time 

the chief intelligence officer of the IRGC, and Mostafa MohammadNajjar, the commander of the IRGC, was responsible for expanding the 

activities of the IRGC in Lebanon.20

Additionally, in the 1980s various personnel in these embassies 

played important roles in coordinating Hizbollah and IRGC activity 

and facilitating the supply of the insurgent group. For instance, in carrying out abductions ordered by the SSA, Hizbollah’s external operations wing, operational personnel maintained close contact with Iran’s 

embassies in Beirutg

 and Damascus as well as with IRGC officials.22 In 

general, to facilitate Hizbollah operations at this time, Iranian diplomatic staff provided intelligence on potential targets while the IRGC 

provided weapons and training.23 Also, Iran’s military attaché in Damascus coordinated activities between the IRGC in Baalbeck and IRGC 

headquarters in the Syrian border village of Zebdani.24 Meanwhile, the 

Iranian military attaché in Beirut was active in supplying members of 

the SSA with training and military equipment and also played a role in 

hostage taking, particularly in the initial acquisition of, interrogation 

of, and housing of foreign hostages.25

Iranian officials also had a role in ordering Shia militant groups 

to engage in terrorism, with IRGC officials playing a supporting 

role. An intercepted message recorded Iranian intelligence officials in Tehran telling Mohtashemi to contact Hussein  Musawi, the 

leader of Islamic Amal, and instructed him “to take spectacular 

action against the United States,” a message that, according to US 

intelligence, culminated with the 1983 attack on the US Marine barracks in Beirut.26 This attack was supported by the IRGC contingent 

g Bergman21 noted that the embassy in Beirut operated the Center for Culture and 

Islamic Studies, which provided Hebrew lessons for Hizbollah fighters. Thus trained, Hizbollah personnel were also trained to monitor Israeli communications networks, pagers, 

and telephones.
Chapter 5. External Support

97

in Lebanon, which had a role in planning and supervising the attack.27

Additionally, Bergman noted that Mohtashemi ordered Mugniyah to 

get Hizbollah more involved in kidnapping, and between late 1982 and 

June 1986, Hizbollah kidnapped fifty-one foreign citizens.28 As will be 

discussed later in this chapter, the involvement of Iranian diplomats 

and facilities to enable terrorist activities by Hizbollah was repeated in 

the 1990s, particularly in Argentina.

Iranian diplomatic facilities were also used to provide cover to Hizbollah and IRGC officials. Ranstorp noted that Mugniyah was believed 

to travel with an Iranian diplomatic passport and that he operated 

under cover at the Iranian embassies in Beirut and Damascus. Additionally, around the time of the July 2006 war with Israel, Mugniyah’s 

deputy traveled to the Iranian embassy in Damascus to receive satellite imagery of Israel from the Syrians.29 More generally, Kahlili noted 

that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs assigned members of the IRGC to 

various Iranian consulates and embassies,30,h and at one point in time 

the director of Arab affairs at the embassy, Hussien Sheikh al-Islam, 

coordinated the effort to place IRGC personnel in diplomatic facilities 

abroad.33

Another important actor is the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance, which has worked with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to establish “cultural centers” in Iranian embassies.34 One such center played 

an important role in providing cover to operatives who organized the 

bombing of the Asociación Mutual Israelita Argentina (AMIA) center 

in Buenos Aires in July 1994. One of the responsibilities of this ministry is “informing the world community about the basis and aspirations of the Islamic Revolution,” and it controls the Culture and Islamic 

Communication Organization, the Islamic Republic News Agency, and 

the Hajj and Pilgrimage Organization. In 2009 it was led by a former 

IRGC general, and the cultural center in the Iranian embassy in Beirut 

sought to gain followers for Hojjat al-Islam Sayyid ‘Ali Khameneh’i, the 

current supreme leader of Iran.35

The Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) played 

a fundamental role in providing intelligence assistance to Hizbollah. 

MOIS was established in 1984, and by 1997 it was one of the largest 

intelligence services in the Middle East, with thirty thousand employees and fifteen departments.36 MOIS is suspected of providing training 

h Iranian officials were also clever in how they used diplomatic facilities to facilitate 

cover. Kahlili31 noted that the limousines owned by the Iranian consulate in Dubai were 

used to transport firearms and explosives, as Iranian officials knew that vehicles displaying Iranian flags and consulate license plates would never be stopped. Levitt32 also noted 

the Iranian consulate in Dubai was used as a regional intelligence hub and that it sent suitcases containing millions of dollars to Hizbollah.
98

Unconventional Warfare Case Study: Iran and Lebanese Hizbollah

to senior SSA members in camps within Iran, and it has also helped 

SSA members avoid detection while traveling and provided aid in the 

procurement of weapons, identities, and funding, as well as local liaison assistance through identifying recruits among the Lebanese diaspora.37 Ranstorp noted that a formal liaison relationship and command 

structure was established between senior SSA members and Iranian 

intelligence, with personnel in Beirut and Damascus receiving instructions from MOIS personnel in Tehran, and with the relationship being 

brokered by the intelligence officer of the IRGC force in Baalbeck.38

MOIS also worked with the SSA in foreign operations. Specifically, 

MOIS, along with Hizbollah personnel and officials from the Iranian 

embassy in France, coordinated a 1986 bombing campaign in Paris.39,i

Additionally, Levitt noted that MOIS and Hizbollah collaborated 

in other operations abroad, such as in Hizbollah’s failed 1994 truck 

bombing of the Israeli embassy in Bangkok. One Hizbollah operative, 

Pandu  Yudhawinata, of Indonesian descent, worked for Iranian intelligence in Malaysia, and his case was managed for several years by the 

MOIS station in Malaysia before he was turned over to Hizbollah.41 Pandu 

went on to serve as a procurer of documents and recruiter for the group, 

and he also played a role in the failed 1994 bombing.42 Furthermore, the 

group and MOIS reportedly collaborated in establishing a base on the 

Iranian shore of the Caspian Sea for the training of Hizbollah personnel 

in operations similar to those performed by US Navy Seals.43

Lastly, other important Iranian actors in the relationship with 

Hizbollah are the Martyrs Foundation and the Foundation of the 

Oppressed. Both provided assistance to the families of those killed during the 1979 revolution and to poorer families in need, and they also 

channeled Iranian financing to Hizbollah to fund a variety of social 

services for the Shia community, including hospitals, religious schools, 

agricultural cooperatives, and construction projects.44 More detail 

regarding the assistance provided by these organizations in Lebanon, 

particularly the Martyrs Foundation, is provided later in this chapter.

Iranian financing also supported the activities of a number of 

committees within Jihad al-Bina’ (Holy Reconstruction Organ), which 

functions as the main institution coordinating the social and financial needs of Hizbollah members and the broader Shia community. 

For instance, Iranian financing enabled the Islamic Health Committee 

to establish major hospitals in Baalbeck and in Beirut’s southern suburbs in 1986, as well as various other medical centers and pharmacies 

i Tensions emerged between Iran and France in the mid-1980s over Iran’s demands 

that France repay a $1 billion loan made in 1974 by the Shah’s government to the French 

Atomic Energy Commission for a uranium separation plant, and for French arms shipments, including the Mirage 2000 aircraft, to Iraq and Persian Gulf states.40
Chapter 5. External Support

99

throughout Lebanon.45 Additionally, in collaboration with the Martyrs 

Foundation, the Financial Aid Committee disbursed $90 million during 1982–1986 to the families of Hizbollah members who had died or 

were wounded, and the committee also extended loans for business 

ventures, marriages, and school expenses.46 Furthermore, as discussed 

later in this chapter, Iranian aid has come to play a prominent role in 

helping various regions in Lebanon recover after damage caused by 

recent fighting between Israel and Hizbollah.

MOTIVATIONS FOR EXTERNAL SUPPORT

Chapter  2 noted in detail the varied ideological and balance-ofpower motivations for Iranian sponsorship of Hizbollah. Sponsorship 

enabled Iran to leapfrog the wall of containment imposed by war with 

Iraq (which was receiving assistance from other Arab regimes fearful of 

the spread of the Islamic revolution), which in turn presented Iran with 

an opportunity to spread the revolution to a potentially fertile territory. 

Additionally, the IRGC’s presence in Lebanon allowed Iran to lead 

the Islamic resistance against Israel and Zionism, thereby supporting 

claims that it, rather than Saudi Arabia, was the rightful ruler of the 

umma. Finally, it allowed Iran to project itself into Arabic and Middle 

Eastern politics and thereby influence developments in the region and 

perhaps expand its overall regional influence (as well as potentially 

enhance the popularity of its Islamic form of government).

However, the relationship between sponsor and proxy was mediated 

by a third party, Syria, which also had its own interests that were at times 

inconsistent with those of the sponsor or proxy. Third-party involvement 

was also a crucial factor in prior examples of relationships between sponsors and proxies, as in the case of American sponsorship of the Afghan 

Mujahideen during the 1980s to oust the Soviet Union from Afghanistan. American involvement in this case was mediated by Pakistan, and 

in particular by Pakistan’s powerful Inter-Services Intelligence agency. 

Future state sponsorship of proxies may also involve the participation 

of other parties, whether state or non-state, and so it may be useful to 

examine how Iran’s support for Hizbollah was influenced by the presence of an influential third party that in effect had a vote regarding the 

modalities of the relationship between sponsor and proxy.

Although in the context of the current civil war in Syria it is 

commonly accepted that the two countries are natural allies,j

 in the 

j Filkins47 notes that Iranian elites have come to view the civil war in Syria in existential terms. He notes that one Iranian cleric stated, “If we lose Syria, we cannot keep 

Tehran.” This sentiment is shared by Hizbollah, as Filkins indicated that one Hizbollah 

commander stated, “If Bashar [al-Assad] goes down, we’re next.”48
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Unconventional Warfare Case Study: Iran and Lebanese Hizbollah

early  1980s Iran and Syria were considered strange bedfellows. As a 

secular Baathist dictatorship, Syria was resolutely opposed to radical 

Islam, having brutally suppressed the (Sunni) Muslim Brotherhood in 

the town of Hama in 1982, and it was equally opposed to the establishment of an Islamic state, whether of Sunni or Shia orientation, in 

Lebanon, a country that many Syrian elites never regarded as a distinct 

entity. For its part, Iran found itself in an alliance with one Baathist 

regime hostile to Islamism while it denounced the other (Iraq) as an 

imperialist stooge.k

 Yet mutual antipathy in the early 1980s toward Iraq, 

Israel, and Western influence in the Levant convinced both of these 

countries to toss aside ideology in favor of pursuit of an alliance,l

 that 

advanced the interests of both states.

Syrian outreach to Iran’s clerics actually preceded the revolution, 

as Syria’s frustration with the Shah’s close relationship with Israel and 

friendly relations with pro-Western Arab states hostile to Syria prompted 

it to establish relations with various Iranian opposition groups, including the emerging Shia movement led by Khomeini.51 An important 

development was Syria’s cultivation of a relationship with Musa al-Sadr, 

who legitimized the Alawite regime in Damascus by issuing a fatwa 

(religious ruling) in 1973 recognizing Alawites as Shia Muslims. This 

ruling enhanced Syria’s position within the Lebanese Shia community 

and led to the development of strong links between Syria and Amal. 

Amal became Syria’s proxy in Lebanon, and links between Syria and 

Iran’s clerical leadership were facilitated by Syria’s close relationship 

with al-Sadr and by the training imparted by Amal to various Iranian 

opposition figures.52

k When Israel invaded Lebanon in June 1982, Saddam Hussein urged Iran to combine its forces with Iraq and the Arabs to fight Israel in Lebanon. This followed a May 

cease-fire offer by Hussein when his troops were under pressure. Khomeini responded 

to the June offer by equating Iraq’s war with Iran with the Israeli attack on Lebanon. He 

referred to Israel and Iraq as the “two illegitimate offsprings” of the United States, and 

he saw the Israeli attack on Lebanon as a tactic by the Americans to divert Iran’s attention 

from Iraq when it seemed to be winning the war.49

l It is also important to mention the impact of alliances and regional alignments 

in the early 1980s on the decisions by Iran and Syria to broaden their partnership. The 

regional order was upended in the late 1970s with the Camp David Accords, which 

removed Egypt from the Arab nationalist core it composed along with Syria and Iraq. 

Egypt’s defection, along with tensions with Iraq, left Syria isolated as a frontline state 

against Israel, and so it welcomed the Iranian revolution because it generated a new antiWestern power as Iran delinked from its alignment with the West and conservative Arab 

forces. Additionally, Syria cautiously welcomed Iranian involvement in Lebanon given 

Syria’s security concerns after Israel’s 1982 invasion. In addition to giving Iran a foothold 

in Lebanon, the alliance with Syria allowed Iran to prevent Iraq from depicting the war 

as a struggle between Arabs and Persians. Furthermore, Syria’s closure of an oil pipeline 

deprived Iraq of half its oil export capacity, and its massing of troops on Iraq’s border 

forced Saddam to withdraw troops from the Iranian front. Syria also acted as a conduit to 

the Soviet Union, thereby allowing Iran to import arms from the Eastern bloc.50
Chapter 5. External Support

101

How has Syria facilitated Iran’s sponsorship of Hizbollah? Or, to put 

it differently, how did Syria interpose itself within the sponsor–proxy 

relationship? To begin with, Syria functioned as a land bridge through 

which Iran sent supplies to Hizbollah and IRGC personnel to Lebanon. 

Arms shipments, including those containing sophisticated weapons, 

were transported by air from Iran to Syria (Hafez al-Assad did not permit the Iranians to fly directly to Beirut),53 where they were unloaded 

at the airport in Damascus or at military-controlled airfields and were 

then shipped over land over the Syrian–Lebanese border. Once in Lebanon they were distributed to protected and hidden arms depots managed by Hizbollah.54 Additionally, Syria controlled the IRGC’s access to 

the Bekaa Valley, as it determined the number and frequency of IRGC 

visits to this region.55

There are other examples of the important role Syria played in the 

Iran–Hizbollah relationship. Kahlili noted that Syrian diplomatic facilities were used to cloak the movement of Iranian arms and personnel. 

For instance, IRGC convoys received Syrian diplomatic license plates, 

which enabled them to operate without interference in Lebanon, while 

at other times IRGC personnel were transported by Syrian diplomatic 

vehicles.56 Syrian intelligence personnel also played an important role. 

For instance, an important contact for Mohtashemi, the Iranian ambassador to Syria in the early 1980s, was Brigadier General Ghazi Kan’an, 

the head of Syrian military intelligence in Lebanon.57 Kan’an also 

managed the relationship with the SSA, as Syrian military intelligence 

actively participated in planning Hizbollah operations before the pullout of multinational forces from Beirut in 1984.58 Additionally, Syrian control of the Bekaa Valley at this time enabled Syrian military 

intelligence to facilitate the transfer of hostages to Beirut, as well as 

their release.59,m

Syria’s control of the flow of Iranian personnel and arms to Hizbollah highlights an important aspect of the potential impact of third 

parties on the dynamics of the relationship between sponsors and proxies. Specifically, Syria’s role as a critical intermediary between Iran and 

Hizbollah provided it with leverage through which to influence the 

relationship, to ensure that both the sponsor and proxy were behaving 

m An important Hizbollah liaison with Syrian military intelligence was Mustafa alDirani, the former head of Amal’s security service who, in late 1998, defected from Amal 

and joined Hizbollah. Interestingly, he coordinated Hizbollah’s security actions against 

Syria when tensions emerged between the two parties.
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Unconventional Warfare Case Study: Iran and Lebanese Hizbollah

in ways that were consistent with Syria’s interests.n Although Syria welcomed Iran’s intervention in Lebanon in 1982 to blunt the impact of 

the Israeli invasion, and assisted with hostage taking before the departure of international forces in 1984, there were limits on the degree to 

which Syria would facilitate the achievement of Iranian foreign policy 

goals. Specifically, Baathist Syria would never have allowed the establishment of an Islamic state in Lebanon guided by velayat-e faqih. Such 

an end-state clashed with the overriding Syrian desire for hegemony in 

Lebanon. Additionally, Syria was not interested in a holy war against 

Israel to “liberate” Jerusalem and eliminate the “Zionist entity.” Unlike 

Iran, which was far removed from a potential battlefront with Israel, 

Syria did not have the luxury to entertain such fantasies, as it would 

undoubtedly pay a high price for a total war against Israel. Rather, Syria 

was interested in using calibrated and controlled violence against Israel 

to achieve specific aims (such as the return of the Golan Heights), and 

so ultimately it was interested, literally, in controlling the shooting 

directed at Israel, rather than seeking Israel’s elimination (a desired 

but ultimately impractical outcome, from the Syrian perspective).

Furthermore, Syria’s support for hostage taking and other forms 

of terrorism ended with the departure of foreign forces in 1984, and 

subsequently Syria developed an interest in stability in Lebanon, both 

as a sign of its hegemony over the country and to mend its relationship 

with the West (which grew in importance as sponsorship from its Soviet 

patron declined in the late  1980s). Nor did it wish to see Hizbollah 

grow too powerful relative to Amal, its proxy. Hence, Syria’s control of 

Iranian access to Hizbollah provided it with access points to influence 

the sponsor–proxy relationship, and in meetings with Iranian officials 

Syrian government representatives were not averse to hinting that the 

IRGC was in Lebanon at Syria’s sufferance, and that Iran’s support for 

Hizbollah against Israel and its efforts to use the conflict to spread the 

revolution and build influence in the Arab and Muslim world could be 

terminated by Syria.62

Through the 1989 Taif agreement and the May 1991 Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation and Coordination between Syria and Lebanon, 

n One of the levers at Syria’s disposal was the ability to restrict the movement of 

IRGC forces by confining them to the Bekaa Valley area. This took place after a June 1987 

abduction of an American, which was likely a joint effort by Iran and Hizbollah. As noted 

by Ranstorp, the abduction was considered a reaction by Iran to the American effort to 

reflag Kuwaiti tankers in the Persian Gulf. Syria, by this time, viewed hostage taking as a 

challenge to its dominant position in Lebanon, and such actions also hampered its efforts 

to build better relations with the West. It should also be noted that Syrian approval was 

required for the deployment of Hizbollah fighters to south Lebanon to take on Israel, as 

well as for the establishment of IRGC command posts in southern Lebanon.60 Another 

form of leverage is a reduction in the flow of weapons through Syria, which, as Bergman61

noted, was used by Hafez al-Assad at one point when he engaged in secret talks with Israel.
Chapter 5. External Support

103

Iran ultimately acceded to Syria’s demand for hegemony in Lebanon 

by forgoing the goal of establishing an Islamic state in Lebanon and 

agreeing to focus on the conflict with Israel. The broader point is that 

although the involvement of a third party may be necessary to effectuate a sponsor–proxy relationship, any initial overlap of interests among 

all three parties may dissipate as a result of regional and international 

developments. Any resulting clash of interests that emerges between, 

on the one hand, the sponsor and proxy and, on the other, the third 

party, must be managed and may result in the abandonment of certain 

interests (e.g., an Islamic state in Lebanon) so that groups may pursue 

arguably more vital interests (e.g., a military effort against Israel) that 

all parties can agree on.

Another interesting lesson of the current example is that proxies 

that arise through outside sponsorship may, as is the case with most 

organizations, develop an interest in their continued existence and 

propagation, which may clash with the desires of outside sponsors or 

third parties to curtail the activities and interests of the proxy. In the 

current case, Hizbollah opposed the Taif agreement not only because 

it entailed abandoning the establishment of an Islamic state in Lebanon but also because it called for the comprehensive disarmament of 

all militias.63 Additionally, Hizbollah was wary of Syrian sponsorship of 

Amal because it was interested in being seen as the main representative 

of Lebanon’s Shia community. And indeed in the late 1980s Lebanon 

witnessed intra-Shiite clashes between Hizbollah and Amal, and even 

clashes between Hizbollah and Syria.o

Hizbollah was ultimately permitted to keep its armsp but Syrian and 

Iranian collaboration at this time offers one more interesting takeaway 

from the current case. Specifically, in the case of the presence of a 

third party, if the interests of the third party and the sponsor coincide, 

o Hizbollah first clashed with Amal in 1985 when it appeared that Nabih Berri was 

ready to make an agreement with the Israelis regarding southern Lebanon.64 Hizbollah 

clashes in the late 1980s with Amal and Syria were sometimes precipitated by Syrian anger 

over abductions carried out by Hizbollah, which, as already indicated, challenged Syrian 

hegemony in Lebanon and obstructed Syrian efforts to mend relations with the West. 

For instance, Syrian forces clashed with Hizbollah fighters after a series of abductions of 

Westerners in January 1987, with the confrontation leading to Hizbollah’s abduction of 

fourteen Syrian soldiers in the Beirut suburb of al-Basta. These tensions resulted in Syrian efforts to restrict Hizbollah’s activities in Beirut as well as to Amal–Hizbollah clashes. 

Clashes also emerged between the two militias after Hizbollah abducted Lt. Col. William 

Higgins in February 1988, a move that was interpreted as an affront to Amal’s control in 

southern Lebanon and to disapproval of the presence of the United Nations Interim Force 

in Lebanon (UNIFIL).65

p Syria decided to allow Hizbollah to remain armed while other militant groups were 

disarmed by April 1991, and IRGC units were permitted to stay in Lebanon in violation of 

the Taif agreement. These measures were taken by Syria to reduce tensions with Iran and 

to find a resolution to the hostage crisis.66
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Unconventional Warfare Case Study: Iran and Lebanese Hizbollah

both can collaborate to control the proxy. By the late 1980s, a relatively 

more pragmatic political leadership emerged in Iran under Rafsanjani, 

who sought to curtail some of the ideological excesses of previous Iranian foreign policy. Additionally, he sought to end the war with Iraq 

and improve Iran’s shattered economy, which required foreign investment and better relations with the West. This desire dovetailed with the 

Syrian desire to improve its standing in Western capitals, and so both 

actors (with Syria threatening military actions) compelled Hizbollah to 

accept a political and military agreement with Amal in January 1989, 

whereby security control of Beirut was granted to Syria and that of 

south Lebanon to Amal. Additional Iranian pressure in the form of 

reduced funding (prompted by the group’s continued warfare with 

Amal and its refusal to release foreign hostages) and the 1989 removal 

of Mohtashemi,q one of Hizbollah’s chief backers, from the position 

of interior minister helped convince the movement to accept the Taif 

agreement and thereby abandon the goal of an Islamic state in the 

Levant and concentrate instead on evicting the Israelis from southern 

Lebanon.68

FORMS AND METHODS USED TO PROVIDE 

SUPPORT

The preceding two sections discussed in some detail both the forms 

of support provided by Iran to Hizbollah, such as military training and 

intelligence collaboration, and the methods used to provide such support, such as the use of Iranian and Syrian diplomatic facilities and 

personnel to transmit sensitive information and coordinate Hizbollah 

and IRGC actions and supplies provided to the insurgent group. In this 

section these themes are expanded, and in particular more detail is provided regarding the provision of Iranian financial and military aid and 

training to Hizbollah. After this discussion we discuss the collaboration 

q Another interesting lesson from this period is that factionalism within the sponsoring state, and in this case, clerical factionalism, can potentially undermine sponsor 

control of the proxy. The Iranian political system at this time featured hard-liners such 

as Mohtashemi committed to a revolutionary foreign policy and (relatively) more moderate pragmatists such as Rafsanjani willing to tone down the ideological content of Iran’s 

foreign policy to pursue more concrete and conventional interests, such as encouraging 

foreign investment to revive a devastated economy. This in turn implies better relations 

with the West and, as a consequence, an end to the hostage crisis. Interestingly, Ranstorp67

noted that Mohtashemi established an outside institution to support Hizbollah, while 

Sheikh Subhi al-Tufayli, Hizbollah’s first secretary general, was more inclined to work with 

more radical elements within Iran’s political system and clerical establishment, rather 

than with Rafsanjani. Not surprisingly, the presence of a relatively more moderate leadership in Iran combined with a more radical leadership atop Hizbollah led the sponsor to 

take actions to compel the proxy to agree to policies in line with the sponsor’s interests.
Chapter 5. External Support

105

between the two parties in carrying out 1994 AMIA bombing. Argentine officials have pieced together a rich report on the attacks,r

 and 

their detailed findings provide an invaluable glimpse into the nature 

of the collaboration between the two parties and the type of support 

offered by the various Iranian government institutions charged with 

exporting the revolution.

Iranian financial aid has played a fundamental role in enabling 

Hizbollah to provide social services to the Shia community and the 

broader population in Lebanon, and such aid proved vital in some 

communities given the collapse of the Lebanese state by the end of 

the civil war. Some estimates suggest that Iran funds Hizbollah to the 

tune of $100 million per year,71 while other estimates place this figure 

as high as $350 million,72 and a sizeable portion of this total funds various public goods provided by Hizbollah to the Lebanese population. 

One important Iranian contributor to Lebanon’s social development 

has been the Imam Khomeini Assistance Committee. This organization opened in Beirut in 1982 and also opened offices in Sidon, Tyre, 

and Baalbeck. As of 2006 it had granted 130,000 scholarships and provided interest-free loans, and it has helped 135,000 families in need.73

A noteworthy contribution to social welfare made possible by funding from the Martyrs Foundation was the construction by Jihad al-Bina’ 

of four-thousand-liter water reservoirs in each district of Beirut’s heavily Shia southern suburbs.74 Each reservoir was filled five times a day 

from continuously circulating tanker trucks and, in the absence of 

state-provided electricity in this area until 1990, generators mounted 

on lorries went to different buildings to provide the electricity required 

to pump water from private cisterns. As of 2006, Jihad al-Bina’ served as 

the main source of drinking water for five hundred thousand people.75

r The October 2006 report was compiled by Marcelo Martinez Burgos and 

Alberto Nisman of the Investigations Unit of the Office of the Attorney General, Buenos 

Aires, Argentina.69 For years after the attacks the investigation led by Argentine authorities 

floundered, leading Argentina’s former president Néstor Kirchner to label the government’s handling of the case “a national disgrace.” In 2004 he nominated Nisman to resuscitate the investigation, which led to the extensive report by Burgos and Nisman and the 

indictment of a number of leading Iranian and Hezbollah officials, including Rafsanjani 

and Mugniyah. In 2007, Interpol issued “red notices” for five Iranian officials, which essentially prevented their international travel, for their suspected roles in the bombing. Yet in 

a tragic turn of events, Nisman was found dead of a gunshot wound to the head in his Buenos Aires apartment in January 2015 shortly before he was to testify before the Argentine 

congress alleging that the Argentine government, in an effort to expand bilateral relations 

with Iran, sought to derail his investigation into the bombing to ensure that Iran was not 

blamed. Officials investigating Nisman’s death suspect either murder or “induced” suicide 

carried out by either pro- or anti-government elements in Argentina, and many believe 

that the mystery of Nisman’s death will never be solved.Interestingly, Filkins70 also noted 

that American officials believe that Venezuela’s late president, Hugo Chávez, granted safe 

haven to IRGC and Hezbollah personnel and that he allowed Iran and Hezbollah to use 

Venezuela as a base for a money-laundering and drug-trafficking network.
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Unconventional Warfare Case Study: Iran and Lebanese Hizbollah

Another service provided by Jihad al-Bina’ is public refuse collection 

for the half-million residents of Dahiya, a southern suburb of Beirut.76

The Martyrs Foundation has also made an important contribution 

to the provision of health care services in Lebanon, principally with the 

construction of the al-Rasul al-Azam hospital in Dahiya.77 All medical 

expenses of injured Hizbollah fighters are paid for at this facility, while 

70 percent of expenses are covered for injured civilians. Interestingly, 

during elections patients and staff at this facility are transported to and 

from the polls by Hizbollah volunteers.78 Another service provided by 

the foundation is the establishment, in Beirut and the Bekaa Valley, of 

vocational schools for the daughters of fallen Hizbollah fighters and 

the funding of subsidized workshops to employ them.79

Jihad al-Bina’ also finances the all-important reconstruction of 

homes destroyed in combat with Israel. Reportedly, one month after 

the 1996 Israeli military campaign Grapes of Wrath, Jihad al-Bina’ rehabilitated more than 2,800 structures damaged by Israel in 106 locations 

in south Lebanon,80 and overall between 1993 and 2006 the organization is estimated to have rebuilt nearly 15,000 homes.81 Hizbollah has 

collaborated with the Martyrs Foundation on reconstruction, with the 

insurgent group determining the validity of families’ housing needs 

and, if necessary, arranging for the required property transactions. 

Financing provided by the Martyrs Foundation is used to acquire land, 

with Jihad al-Bina’ subsequently developing plans and building the 

finalized structures.82 Recent press reports indicate that Iran has spent 

$400 million to rebuild Dahiya after the July 2006 war with Israel.83

Another important component of Iranian assistance is training and 

military aid. The provision of arms by Iran in the 1990s appears to 

have been designed to transition Hizbollah from a group primarily carrying out terrorist acts and abductions into a force capable of taking 

on the Israelis. Bergman pointed out that one US Central Intelligence 

Agency report from 1999 noted that Iranian shipments to Hizbollah 

included Zilzal rockets, with ranges of 125–210 kilometers; Fajr-3 and 

Fajr-5 rockets, with ranges up to 75  kilometers; Nazaat rockets, with 

ranges of 80–140 kilometers; anti-tank missiles produced in Iran; landsea missiles (802 C class) made in China; Ababil drones developed by 

Iran’s domestic aircraft industry; Russian SA-7 and SA-14 anti-aircraft 

missiles; and 250 advanced night-vision kits sent by Britain to Iran in 

2003 as part of a joint effort to stop drug smuggling.84

The IRGC has also reportedly helped build underground installations for Hizbollah, including command-and-control bunkers operated 

by both Hizbollah and IRGC officials.85 The IRGC also built underground storage areas eight meters deep in the Bekaa Valley that are 

used to store missiles and ammunition.86 The Bekaa Valley also houses 
Chapter 5. External Support

107

a central operations room operated by four personnel each from the 

IRGC and Hizbollah.87

As discussed, IRGC personnel provided training to Hizbollah fighters in Lebanon. Training was also undertaken in Iran itself. The two 

main camps used by the Qods Force to train foreign militants are the 

Imam Ali base in Tehran and the Bahonar base in Karaj, north of Tehran.88 Additionally, Hizbollah personnel participated in special training courses at IRGC bases in Tehran, Isfahan, Mashad, and Ahvaz, 

and Hizbollah missile units, including two hundred technicians and 

experts, received training in Iran.89,s Furthermore, Katz and Hendel 

noted that Israeli intelligence believes that at a base near Tehran, the 

IRGC trains militants from Hizbollah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and other 

groups in explosives, shooting, communications, reconnaissance, mortar firing, and psychological warfare.91

Let us now turn to a discussion of Iran and Hizbollah’s collaboration in carrying out the July 1994 AMIA attack in Buenos Aires.t

 As 

already indicated, a fairly detailed report has been made available by 

Argentine authorities and, based on what is known about this operation, what is apparent is that the preparations undertaken by Hizbollah and Iranian officials appear to have proceeded on separate tracks, 

with a select number of officials serving as touch points between the 

two parties.

The decision to carry out the attack was apparently made by Iran’s 

Supreme National Security Council during a meeting held by a subgroup, the Committee for Special Operations. Participants in this 

meeting included the Supreme Leader of Iran Sayyid ‘Ali Khameneh’i, 

President Rafsanjani, Minister of Intelligence Ali Fallahian, and Foreign Minister Ali  Velayati. Also present were Ahmad  Asghari, a suspected IRGC official at the Iranian embassy in Buenos Aires (and whose 

real name was Mohsen Randjbaran), and Mohsen Rabbani, the attack’s 

lead Iranian organizer in Argentina. Once the committee agreed on 

the operation, Khameneh’i issued a fatwa legitimizing the operation, 

with Fallahian instructing Mugniyah to form an operational group to 

take charge of the attack. Rabbani was made responsible for the logistics of the attack, including purchasing and arming the van to be used 

in the bombing, and with liaising with Hizbollah operatives in Buenos 

s One captured Hizbollah fighter noted that to conceal the fact that he and other 

militants underwent training in Iran, their passports were not stamped in either Syria or 

Iran.90

t The information presented on this operation is based on the careful review of the 

report by Argentine authorities presented in Chapter 4 of Hezbollah: The Global Footprint of 

the Party of God.92
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Unconventional Warfare Case Study: Iran and Lebanese Hizbollah

Aires and in the somewhat lawless tri-border region where Argentina, 

Brazil, and Paraguay meet.

Mohsen Rabbani arrived in Argentina in 1983 to head the al-Tauhid 

mosque in Buenos Aires and to allegedly work for the Iranian Ministry 

of Agriculture, which was responsible for testing meat exported to Iran. 

Rabbani soon developed a network of informers that collected information for Iran. One such individual was Mohammad Reza Javadi-Nia, 

an intelligence agent who was provided cover through the Ministry of 

Islamic Culture and Guidance. To get a better lay of the land, JavadiNia (as well as other informers) worked as a taxi driver in Argentina. 

He also served as the cultural attaché in the embassy from 1988 to 

1993, a position that was assumed by Rabbani in 1994. Rabbani himself 

was named an official Iranian diplomat (entailing diplomatic immunity) several months before the attack.

Hizbollah began planting agents and establishing cells in the triborder area during the peak years of the civil war,u and by mid-2000 

there were an estimated several hundred Hizbollah operatives in the 

tri-border region. Rabbani dealt extensively with Piloto Turismo, a 

travel agency in the tri-border area that was actually started with Hizbollah funds and in fact served as a front company.v

 Piloto Turismo also 

provided a number of illicit services, such as obtaining fake passports 

and residency documents, useful for placing operatives in the tri-border region and in Argentina. One of the co-owners of Piloto Turismo, 

Mohammad Youssef Abdallah, served as the primary leader of Hizbollah in the region, while the other co-owner, Farouk  Abdul  Omairi, 

was the regional coordinator for Hizbollah. Hizbollah members in the 

tri-border region played an important coordinating role in the attack; 

investigators eventually uncovered phone calls between the Iranian 

embassy in Buenos Aires and suspected Hizbollah personnel operating 

out of a travel agency and a mosque in the region.

Activity by Iranian ministers and regional ambassadors picked up in 

the month or so before the attack. Ahmad Alamolhoda, the director of 

the Cultural Department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, arrived in 

u The first wave of Lebanese immigration to South America, especially Brazil and 

Argentina, occurred in the 1880s during the Ottoman era. Eighty thousand immigrants 

from Arab-speaking countries settled in Argentina between 1882 and 1925, and the period 

of the Lebanese civil war (1975–1990) also saw a wave of Lebanese immigration to South 

America.93

v Another front company used by Hizbollah was Casa Apollo, a wholesale electronics store located in a shopping center in Cuidad del Este, in the Paraguay portion of the 

tri-border area. Casa Apollo engaged in fundraising for Hizbollah and helped transfer 

information to and from Hizbollah operatives. Additionally, the Galeria Page shopping 

center where Casa Apollo was located served as Hizbollah’s central headquarters in the 

tri-border region, according to Argentine and American officials.94
Chapter 5. External Support

109

Argentina in June but departed a few days later for Madrid, where MOIS 

maintained a regional office that oversaw activities in Latin America. 

Iran’s ambassador to Uruguay, a suspected MOIS operative, and at least 

four other Iranian officials visited Argentina in June. Interestingly, a 

number of regional Iranian ambassadors, including the ambassadors 

to Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay, all left the region in late June and 

early July, while Hizbollah operatives entered the region.

Iran used both official and unofficial cover to carry out this operation. The official cover was used for a Hizbollah operative in the 

tri-border region, Sheikh Bilal Mohsen Wehbi, a close contact of Mugniyah who reported to the Iranian Cultural Affairs Ministry. Regarding 

unofficial cover, one Iranian operative in Argentina was assigned to the 

Iranian government-owned Government Trade Corporation, which 

served as a front for Iranian intelligence. Once in Buenos Aires, this 

operative placed calls to the Ministry of Reconstruction, which itself 

was a front for the Qods Force.w

While Rabbani handled logistics in Buenos Aires, a Colombianborn Hizbollah member, Samuel  el-Reda, coordinated Hizbollah 

operations in Buenos Aires, including arranging the arrival of the Hizbollah operational team in the country before the attack and the logistics of their stay as well as overseeing their departure on a flight to the 

tri-border region two hours before the attack. Meanwhile he kept coordinators in the tri-border region informed of the progress of the Hizbollah team in Buenos Aires. Rabbani also coordinated with Hizbollah 

operatives in the tri-border region, including with Piloto Turismo personnel. The travel agency would also place calls to Iran, and Nasrallah 

himself instructed Omairi to provide Hizbollah operatives everything 

they needed to carry out the attack. In turn Omairi provided operatives with forged passports and identity cards, money, maps of Buenos 

Aires, and information on persons to contact in the Argentine capital, 

including at least one individual at the Iranian embassy.

The bombing itself was carried out by Ibrahim Berro, a Lebanese 

citizen who entered Argentina through the tri-border region using a 

fake European passport. The C4 explosive used in the bombing was 

smuggled into the country through an Iranian diplomatic pouch, and 

it was assembled into a bomb in the tri-border region before being 

sent to Buenos Aires. Overall it appears that the AMIA bombing was 

a meticulously planned and coordinated operation, with Rabbani and 

w Levitt95 also noted that Iran established what it thought was a secure network to 

facilitate communication between agents at diplomatic posts and MOIS in Tehran. Calls 

from the Iranian embassy in Buenos Aires were transmitted to Department 240, a separate 

organization established to liaise with the Iranian Foreign Ministry and MOIS. Their communication was run through an Iranian military switchboard to avoid detection.
110

Unconventional Warfare Case Study: Iran and Lebanese Hizbollah

perhaps a few others serving as the key touch points in parallel tracks 

of activity performed by Iran and Hizbollah.

NOTES

1 Shmuel Bar, “Iranian Terrorist Policy and ‘Export of Revolution,’” (working paper 

presented at the 9th Annual Herzliya Conference on the Balance of Israel’s National 

Security and Resilience, Lauder School of Government, Diplomacy and Strategy, Interdisciplinary Center [IDC] Herzliya, February 2–4, 2009), 17, http://www.herzliyaconference.org/_Uploads/2903Iranian.pdf.

2 Dexter Filkins, “The Shadow Commander: A Reporter at Large,” The New Yorker, September 30, 2013.

3 Ibid.

4 Matthew Levitt, Hezbollah: The Global Footprint of the Party of God (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2013), 292.

5 Reza Kahlili, A Time to Betray (New York: Threshold Editions, 2010), 175, 242.

6 Bar, “Iranian Terrorist Policy and ‘Export of Revolution,’” 13.

7 Magnus Ranstorp, “The Hizballah Training Camps of Lebanon,” in The Making of a Terrorist: Recruitment, Training and Root Causes, ed. James J. F. Forest, vol. 2 (Westport, CT: 

Praeger, 2005), 244.

8 Ibid., 246, 255.

9 Ibid.

10 Levitt, Hezbollah: The Global Footprint of the Party of God, 208.

11 Yaakov Katz and Yoaz Hendel, Israel vs. Iran: The Shadow War (Washington, DC: Potomac 

Books, 2012), 32.

12 Ronen Bergman, The Secret War with Iran (New York: Free Press, 2007), 66–67, 96.

13 Levitt, Hezbollah: The Global Footprint of the Party of God, 209.

14 Bergman, The Secret War with Iran, 248–250.

15 Levitt, Hezbollah: The Global Footprint of the Party of God, 208.

16 Ibid., 269–271.

17 Magnus Ranstorp, Hizballah in Lebanon: The Politics of the Western Hostage Crisis (New York: 

Palgrave Macmillan, 1997), 80–81.

18 Ibid., 85.

19 Bergman, The Secret War with Iran, 70.

20 Kahlili, A Time to Betray, 160.

21 Bergman, The Secret War with Iran, 258.

22 Ranstorp, Hizballah in Lebanon, 70.

23 Ibid.

24 Ibid.

25 Ibid.

26 Ranstorp, “The Hizballah Training Camps of Lebanon,” 248.

27 Ranstorp, Hizballah in Lebanon, 70.

28 Bergman, The Secret War with Iran, 91, 93.

29 Ibid., 374–375.

30 Kahlili, A Time to Betray, 164.

31 Ibid., 174.
Chapter 5. External Support

111

32 Levitt, Hezbollah: The Global Footprint of the Party of God, 288.

33 Ranstorp, Hizballah in Lebanon, 82.

34 Bar, “Iranian Terrorist Policy and ‘Export of Revolution,’” 14.

35 Ibid.

36 William Buchta, “Iran’s Security Sector: An Overview.” Working Paper No. 146, Geneva 

Center for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, Geneva, 2004, 13.

37 Ranstorp, “The Hizballah Training Camps of Lebanon,” 246, 253.

38 Ibid., 253.

39 Ibid.

40 Ranstorp, Hizballah in Lebanon, 119.

41 Levitt, Hezbollah: The Global Footprint of the Party of God, 119, 123.

42 Ibid., 121.

43 Jeffrey Goldberg, “In the Party of God: Hezbollah Sets up Operations in South America 

and the United States,” The New Yorker, October 28, 2002.

44 Ranstorp, Hizballah in Lebanon, 82.

45 Ibid.

46 Ibid., 83.

47 Filkins, “The Shadow Commander.”

48 Dexter Filkins, “After Syria: A Reporter at Large,” The New Yorker, February 25, 2013.

49 H. E. Chehabi, “Iran and Lebanon in the Revolutionary Decade,” in Distant Relations: 

Iran and Lebanon in the Last 500 Years, ed. H. E. Chehabi (London: I. B. Taurus & Co., 

2006), 213.

50 Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Raymond A. Hinnebusch, Syria and Iran: Middle Powers in a 

Penetrated Regional System (London and New York: Routledge, 1997), 88–95.

51 Ranstorp, Hizballah in Lebanon, 111.

52 Ibid., 111–112.

53 Bergman, The Secret War with Iran, 255.

54 Ranstorp, “The Hizballah Training Camps of Lebanon,” 254.

55 Ranstorp, Hizballah in Lebanon, 115.

56 Kahlili, A Time to Betray, 126.

57 Abbas William Samii, “A Stable Structure on Shifting Sands: Assessing the HizbullahIran-Syria Relationship,” Middle East Journal 62, no. 1 (2008): 38.

58 Ranstorp, Hizballah in Lebanon, 71.

59 Ibid.

60 Ibid., 121, 122.

61 Bergman, The Secret War with Iran, 255.

62 Robert Baer, The Devil We Know: Dealing with the New Iranian Superpower (New York: Crown 

Publishers, 2008), 186–190.

63 Ranstorp, Hizballah in Lebanon, 127.

64 Judith Harik, “Hizballah’s Public and Social Services and Iran,” in Distant Relations: Iran 

and Lebanon in the Last 500 Years, ed. H. E. Chehabi (London: I. B. Taurus & Co., 2006), 

271.

65 Ranstorp, Hizballah in Lebanon, 121, 124.

66 Ibid., 128.

67 Ibid., 81, 126.

68 Ibid., 126–127.
112

Unconventional Warfare Case Study: Iran and Lebanese Hizbollah

69 Marcelo Martinez Burgos and Alberto Nisman, (Buenos Aires: Investigations Unit of the 

Office of the Attorney General, 2006), http://www.peaceandtolerance.org/2015/02/04/

apt-releases-alberto-nisman-report-iranian-bombing/.

70 Dexter Filkins, “Death of a Prosecutor,” The New Yorker, July 20, 2015.

71 Martin Rudner, “Hizbullah: An Organizational and Operational Profile,” International 

Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 23, no. 2 (2010): 227.

72 Levitt, Hezbollah: The Global Footprint of the Party of God, 12.

73 Harik, “Hizballah’s Public and Social Services and Iran,” 273.

74 Ibid.

75 Ibid.

76 Ibid.

77 Ibid., 275.

78 Ibid.

79 Ibid., 275–276.

80 Ibid., 278.

81 Marc R. DeVore, “Exploring the Iran-Hezbollah Relationship: A Case Study of How State 

Sponsorship Affects Terrorist Group Decision-Making,” Perspectives on Terrorism 6, no. 

4–5 (2012): 94.

82 Harik, “Hizballah’s Public and Social Services and Iran,” 282.

83 “Hezbollah Heartlands Recover with Iran’s Help,” BBC News, June 12, 2013, http://www.

bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-22878198.

84 Bergman, The Secret War with Iran, 255.

85 Ibid., 257.

86 Ibid.

87 Ibid.

88 Ibid., 256.

89 Ibid., 256–257.

90 Ibid., 256.

91 Katz and Hendel, Israel vs. Iran: The Shadow War, 129.

92 Levitt, Hezbollah: The Global Footprint of the Party of God, 75–116.

93 Ibid., 78–79.

94 Ibid., 82, 85.

95 Ibid., 92.
CHAPTER 6.

CONCLUSION

115

Has Iran’s sponsorship of Hizbollah been successful ever since the 

enterprise commenced in 1982? Clearly, as the quote by Khameneh’i in 

the introduction attests, the partnership has been successful in terms 

of forcing Israel from Lebanon and in enhancing the credibility of 

Iran’s deterrent capability against both Israel and the United States. 

Furthermore, one can perhaps claim that Hizbollah in some sense has 

“graduated,” since Iran used the group to train Iraqi militias after the 

deposing of Saddam Hussein in 2003. In fact, Hizbollah developed a 

dedicated division for this purpose, Unit 3800, and Levitt noted that in 

addition to offering a basic training course covering paramilitary skills 

and basic weapons training, Hizbollah, along with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), also offered a master trainer program 

and an elite Special Forces course for elite Iraqi recruits.1 This is a far 

cry from the 1980s, when the IRGC managed Hizbollah’s intelligence 

planning section.2

 Indeed, Iran appeared to be using Hizbollah in Iraq 

as part of an effort to repeat the success it had in Lebanon, since in 

October 2003 Israeli intelligence noted that Hizbollah intended to replicate itself in Iraqi soil by attempting (at Iranian instruction) to build 

up an organization in its own image.3

As noted in the report, a key factor underlying the success of the 

partnership is the high degree of ideological affinity between the 

two parties, as evidenced by Hizbollah’s acceptance of the notion of 

velayat-e faqih. This ideological closeness has even led to close collaboration between the two in enhancing Hizbollah’s soft power abroad, 

as an October 2010 study commissioned by the United States military 

noted that Iran has offered scholarships to African students as part of a 

“greater diplomatic effort to simultaneously promote the broader Hizbollah agenda in Africa and undermine Western influence and credibility across the continent.”4

Nonetheless, despite the close ties facilitated by a common ideology, the relationship has at times experienced various “principal–

agent” issues. Recall that this type of relationship is one in which one 

actor, the principal (in this case Iran), delegates a task to another actor, 

the agent (i.e., Hizbollah), which is given some authority by the principal to act on its behalf. The task delegated by Iran to Hizbollah was 

to challenge Israeli and American interests in the Middle East and 

raise Iran’s profile among Arab countries in the region. Additionally, 

it sought to achieve these goals while maintaining plausible deniability. One 1996 report by Israeli military intelligence noted that “Iran 

uses terror against Israel rarely and rationally, out of an awareness of 

the grave diplomatic damage which it could cause itself if its role were 

to be exposed,” and that it usually attacked Israel indirectly, through 

Imad Mugniyah (and, by extension, Hizbollah).5
116

Unconventional Warfare Case Study: Iran and Lebanese Hizbollah

Iran certainly collaborated quite closely with Mugniyah. As one 

Israeli military intelligence document from 1995 noted:

Iran is aided by Hizballah’s operational infrastructure 

abroad, which is based mainly on Shi’ite expatriates 

through the Islamic Jihad apparatus of Imad Mugniyah, for the purpose of attacks. It is to be noted that 

recently links have been tightened between Iranian 

intelligence and Mugniyah’s apparatus, which helps 

Iran locate candidates from Islamic and Palestinian organizations for training in Iran or Lebanon. It 

appears that Imad Mugniyah has a role in the organization of this training.6

But tensions in the relationship between sponsor and proxy centered on the status of Mugniyah, as there are indications that the Iranians believed that Mugniyah wielded too much power, which led them 

to divide his responsibilities among several individuals after his death.7

This power was evident during the later stages of the hostage crisis, as 

the US Central Intelligence Agency concluded that the Iranians had 

to bargain with Mugniyah to secure the release of certain hostages.8

Additionally, Baer indicated that the Iranians were frustrated with 

Mugniyah’s penchant for “freelancing,” or conducting operations without prior approval from Tehran.9

 This frustration appears to have been 

mutual, as Levitt noted that Mugniyah sought to establish a degree of 

independence from Iran and that one Israeli intelligence official noted 

in mid-2008 (after the death of Mugniyah) that “Hezbollah does not 

always do what Iran wants.”10

At other times Iran has been frustrated with Nasrallah. Katz and 

Hendel noted Iranian discontent with Nasrallah after the 2006 war 

with Israel, which led Iran to make a number of (unspecified) structural changes to the group, after which Nasrallah had to seek Iranian 

permission to undertake certain operations.11 This frustration appears 

to have been related to Hizbollah’s overreliance on Iranian-supplied 

missiles in the 2006 war, which led to the depletion of Hizbollah’s stock 

of missiles and to a greater Iranian desire to determine how its weapons 

are used by the group (to avoid the depletion of the arsenal) (Dr. Matthew Levitt, personal communication). The changes instituted by Iran 

appear to have restricted the group’s room to maneuver, as one Israel 

Defense Forces official in 2009 noted that “Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah’s 

authority is somewhat restricted, and whenever he pops his head out 
Chapter 6. Conclusion

117

of a bunker he sees an Iranian on top of him...nowadays, most of the 

control over the group is from Iran.”12, a

Another manifestation of principal–agent issues is the reported 

failures of the two parties to deconflict operations. Levitt noted that 

as Hizbollah operatives were preparing for a bombing in Bangkok in 

late 2011 and early 2012, they were not aware that the Qods Force was 

preparing an operation there, and the latter was apparently unaware 

that Hizbollah was using the Thai capital as an explosives distribution 

hub.14 Additionally, the Iranians were apparently unaware that Hizbollah was planning to carry out an attack, which was ultimately successful, against Israeli tourists in Bulgaria in July 2012, with Suleimani 

reportedly asking his subordinates “Does anyone know about this?”,15 to 

which the answer was no.

Interestingly, the choice to attack Israeli tourists in Bulgaria appears 

to have been the outcome of a reevaluation of Hizbollah’s role in Iran’s 

shadow war against Israeli, American, British, and Gulf interests and a 

strategic overhaul of Hizbollah’s external operations wing in early 2010 

after a string of failed international operations by the group.16 Juxtaposed against successful Israeli efforts to disrupt Iran’s nuclear 

program at this time (which included successful cyber attacks and 

assassinations of Iranian scientists involved in Iran’s nuclear program), 

Iranian officials concluded that Hizbollah needed to reinvigorate its 

external operations wing (which had been deemphasized after the September 11 attacks to avoid being targeted by the United States),17 with 

the group being assigned the role of attacking soft targets, specifically 

Israeli tourists, while the Qods Force was assigned the task of attacking 

American, Israeli, British, and Gulf states’ interests.18

Undoubtedly, the assignment of more difficult targets to the Qods 

Force is an indication that, despite Hizbollah’s noticeable progression 

since its founding, the recent string of failures (such as botched efforts 

in Turkey in September 2009 and Jordan in 2010) has consigned the 

group to a secondary role in the partnership, at least until the group 

restores the capability of its international operations wing. These 

changes are likely to have motivated the comments of the US Director 

of National Intelligence James Clapper, who indicated in February 2012 

that the partnership between Iran and Hizbollah was “a partnership 

arrangement...with the Iranians as the senior partner.”19

a Iran has always had a measure of control over Hizbollah’s targeting and the launching of operations. Quoting a US Federal Bureau of Investigation official who served as the 

chief of the agency’s Iran–Hizbollah unit, Levitt noted that Hizbollah attacks abroad have 

to be sanctioned, ordered, and approved by Tehran. Additionally, Levitt noted that Mugniyah had to seek Iranian approval to attack US interests.13
118

Unconventional Warfare Case Study: Iran and Lebanese Hizbollah

Overall, from an Iranian perspective Hizbollah has clearly had 

a positive impact, as it enhances Iran’s ability to credibly deter Israel 

through actions that fall short of a critical threshold that would draw a 

conventional response from Israel. Yet one must be careful in drawing 

conclusions regarding the utility of sponsoring proxy groups. Success 

must be judged relative to the goals for which groups are established. 

While Hizbollah’s deterrence of Israel is notable and its success in 

evicting the Israelis from Lebanon is noteworthy, both of these achievements represent goals that are, relatively speaking, achievable. As the 

Soviets in Afghanistan, the Americans in Vietnam, and the Indians in 

Sri Lanka came to realize, conducting a counterinsurgency campaign 

in a foreign land is a very difficult undertaking and often leads to failure. In retrospect, such conflicts (particularly the first two) arguably 

did not involve truly vital national interests that reached the level of, 

say, existential concerns.

However, the existence of Israel is at stake to the extent to which 

Hizbollah, with Iranian backing, does indeed attempt to “liberate” Palestine and march on Jerusalem. Similarly, within a domestic context, 

the secular nature of the Lebanese political system was at stake to the 

degree to which Hizbollah sought to overthrow the existing political 

order and establish a clerical regime in Lebanon. Hence, the sponsorship of proxy groups may be less successful in terms of achieving desired 

outcomes if the goals of the partnership necessarily infringe upon the 

vital interests of opposing parties, such as the existence of targeted 

groups and countries or the very nature of political and social systems.

NOTES

1 Matthew Levitt, Hezbollah: The Global Footprint of the Party of God (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2013), 302.

2 Ibid., 30.

3 Ibid., 298.

4 Ibid., 266.

5 Ronen Bergman, The Secret War with Iran (New York: Free Press, 2007), 67.

6 Ibid., 241.

7 Yaakov Katz and Yoaz Hendel, Israel vs. Iran: The Shadow War (Washington, DC: Potomac 

Books, 2012), 32.

8 Levitt, Hezbollah: The Global Footprint of the Party of God, 35.

9 Robert Baer, The Devil We Know: Dealing with the New Iranian Superpower (New York: Crown 

Publishers, 2008), 162.

10 Matthew Levitt, “Hizballah and the Qods Force in Iran’s Shadow War with the West,” 

Policy Focus 123 (January 2013), 2.

11 Katz and Hendel, Israel vs. Iran: The Shadow War, 31.

12 Ibid., 31–32.
Chapter 6. Conclusion

119

13 Levitt, Hezbollah: The Global Footprint of the Party of God, 30, 188.

14 Ibid., 368.

15 Dexter Filkins, “The Shadow Commander: A Reporter at Large,” The New Yorker, September 30, 2013.

16 Levitt, Hezbollah: The Global Footprint of the Party of God, 360–361.

17 Ibid., 359.

18 Ibid., 361.

19 Ibid.

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INDEX

131

A

Abdallah, Mohammad Youssef, 108

Abductions; See Kidnappings

Afghan Mujahideen, 99

Africa

Hizbollah funding from, 77

Iran’s scholarships to students in, 

115

Agriculture, 46–47

Al-Ahmad, Jalal, 12

Alamolhoda, Ahmad, 108–109

Al-Assad, Hafez, 30

Al-Dirani, Mustafa, 101n.m

Al-Ghafari, Abu Dhar, 25

Alid Shiism, 12

Al-Islam, Hussien Sheikh, 97

Alliances, 100n.l

Al-Majzoub, Mahmoud, 83n.u

Al-Manar, 75–76

Al-Musawi, Husayn, 28, 29, 32

Al-Musawi, Sayyid Abbas, 29, 68, 70

Al-Qaeda, 95n.f

Al-Sadr, Musa, 25, 26, 27n.n, 52–53, 55

Al-Saiqa, Amal training by, 27

Al-Solh, Takieddin, 49

Al-Tufayli, Subhi, 28, 29, 32, 79

Al-Watani, al-Mithaq, 41

Amal (Afwaj al-Muqawamah alLubnaniyyah; Battalions of the 

Lebanese Resistance), 25–29, 52, 

55, 79, 85, 103, 104

AMIA (Asociación Mutual Israelita 

Argentina) attack, 97, 107–110

Aoun, Michel, 80

Arab donors (Hizbollah), 78

Arafat, Yasser, 51, 83

Asghari, Ahmad (Mohsen 

Randjbaran), 107

Askari, Hadi Reza, 31

Asociación Mutual Israelita Argentina 

(AMIA) attack, 97, 107–110

Assembly of Experts, 69

Assembly of Muslim clergy, 75

Awali, Ghalib, 83n.u

B

Baath Party, 49

Baer, Robert, 3, 116

Bar, Shmuel, 22, 23

Barak, Ehud, 82

Battlefield communications network 

(Hizbollah), 76–77

Beirut US Marine barracks attack, 

96–97

“Belt of Misery,” 43

Benford, Robert D., 66

Bergman, Ronen, 97, 106

Berri, Nabih, 27–29

Berro, Ibrahim, 109

Berti, Benedetta, 64, 79

Bomb construction, 95n.e

Borujerdi, Ayatollah, 11, 17

Buenos Aires ministry attack, 97, 

107–110

Bulgaria, 117

Byman, Daniel, 24

C

Cairo Agreement (1969), 51

Camp David Accords, 100n.l

Casa Apollo, 108n.v

Central Council (Hizbollah), 69, 72

Chehabi, H. E., 26

Christians, in Lebanon, 44–50, 52–54, 

85

Clapper, James, 117

Class, in Lebanon, 49

Clerical factionalism, 104n.q

Collective action frames, 66

Command, control, communications, 

and computers (Hizbollah), 

75–77

Committee of National Salvation, 55

Communist parties, 49

Confessional system (Lebanon), 27–28, 

41, 49–51, 53
132

Unconventional Warfare Case Study: Iran and Lebanese Hizbollah

Constitution of Islamic Republic of 

Iran, 20–21, 23

Council of Guardians, 69

Council of Lebanon, 29

Court ulama, 13–14

Crisis of state legitimacy

in Iran, 11

in Lebanon, 41

Cyberspace, Hizbollah’s use of, 76

D

Deconflicting operations, failures in, 

117

Defense and Security Pact (1991), 54

The Devil We Know (Baer), 3

Diagnostic framing, 66–67

Druze, in Lebanon, 44–46, 54

Dynamic Shiism, 12, 52, 61

E

Economy (Lebanon), 46–48

Education

in Iran, 9, 10

in Lebanon, 41, 49

Egypt, 47n.m

Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ), 95n.f

Ehteshami, Anoushiravan, 23, 24

El Khazen, Farid, 48–49

El-Reda, Samuel, 109

Entezar, 15, 20

Ethnic groups, in Lebanon, 44n.f

Executive Council (Hizbollah), 70

Explosives training, 95n.e

External Security (Hizbollah), 71

External support (Hizbollah), 77–78, 

93–119

forms and methods of, 104–110

from Foundation of the Oppressed, 

98

from Iranian diplomatic facilities, 

97

from Iranian embassies, 96

from Iranian Ministry of Culture 

and Islamic Guidance, 97

from Iranian Ministry of Foreign 

Affairs, 96

from Iranian Ministry of 

Intelligence and Security 

(MOIS), 97–98

from Islamic Revolutionary Guards 

Corps, 93–97

from Martyrs Foundation, 98

motivations for, 99–104

from Office of Islamic Liberation 

Movements, 95–96

F

Fadlallah, Sayyid, 29

Fadlallah, Sheikh Muhammad 

Hussein, 79

Faithful Resistance, 75

Fallahian, Ali, 107

Fardid, Ahmad, 12

Finance hub, Lebanon as, 48

Financing (Hizbollah), 77–78, 105–106

Foreign policy of Iran, 18–20, 23–24

Foundation of the Oppressed, 98–99

Framing, 65–69

France, 43

and “greater Syria” proposal, 53

Lebanon’s independence from, 50

and Maronites in Little Lebanon, 

46

Paris bombing campaign (1986), 98

as target of Hizbollah, 63

Free Patriotic Movement, 80

Functional velayat concept, 61

G

Gharbzadegi (Weststruckness), 12

Gleis, Joshua L., 64, 79

Goffman, Erving, 66

Governing environment (Lebanon), 

53–55
Index

133

The Governorship of the Jurisprudent; 

See Velayat-e faqih

Greater Lebanon, 43, 50

Guerrilla campaign against IDF (1982-

2000), 80–82, 94

H

Habib, Philip, 28–29

Hamas, 75, 95

Harakat al-Mahrumin (Movement of 

the Deprived), 26

Harb, Raghib, 29

Hariri, Rafik, 79, 80

Hariri, Saad, 80

Harris, William W., 42–43, 54

Hendel, Yoaz, 107, 116

Hidden Imam (Mahdi), 15, 32

Hinnebusch, Raymond A., 23, 24

Hizbollah, 61–86

allegiance pledged to Khomeini, 18

Asociación Mutual Israelita 

Argentina attack, 97, 107–110

as asymmetric strategic deterrent, 

20

and authority of velayat-e faqih, 22

during civil war, 44

command, control, 

communications, and computers 

of, 75–77

and constitutional provisions for 

IRGC, 23

and construction of a just Islamic 

society, 61–62

domestic business chains of, 78

emergence from Amal, 28

and exporting of revolution, 32

factors in rise of, 49–50, 55

formation of, 3

France as target of, 63

geographic extent of operations, 44

hallmarks of Leninist revolutionary 

organization in, 69n.d

Iran’s goal in sponsoring, 3, 115

Iran’s principal–agent problem 

with, 115–117

Iran’s reasons for sponsoring, 18–

25, 32–33

Islamic Current, 75

Israel as target of, 63–64

joining, process for, 73–74

leadership of, 69–70

in Lebanon civil war, 52

in Lebanon war (2006), 84–85

manifesto of 2009, 64–65

membership of, 72

methods of warfare used by, 80–85

military aid for, 106–107

name of, 29n.t

“Open Letter” of, 61–64

organizational structure of, 70–75

original tactics of, 30n.v

pay for members of, 74–75

political activities of, 78–85

popular support for, 85–86

power-projection capability with, 24

recruitment by, 72–73

resources and external support for, 

77–78

seizure of Sheikh Abdullah 

barracks, 31

strategies and supporting narratives 

used by, 65–69

structure and dynamics of, 69–78

success of Iran’s sponsorship of, 

115, 118

in Syrian civil war, 85–86

training for, 74, 106–107

training of Iraqi militias by, 115

United States as target of, 62–63

velayat-e faqih as founding belief of, 

61, 115

Hostages, 96, 102, 116

Husayn, 11, 13

Hussein, Saddam, 100n.k
134

Unconventional Warfare Case Study: Iran and Lebanese Hizbollah

I

Ideological affinity, 115

IDF; See Israel Defense Forces

Imam Khomeini Assistance 

Committee, 105

Intelligence

for AMIA attack, 108, 109

under Defense and Security Pact, 

54

Hizbollah, 72, 81, 93–95, 115

from Iranian diplomatic staff, 96

Israeli, 85

from Ministry of Intelligence and 

Security, 97–98

Qods Force, 93

Syrian, 101

International Committee of the Red 

Cross, 83

Iran, 9–33

Amal’s link with, 25, 27

Asociación Mutual Israelita 

Argentina attack, 97, 107–110

clerical factionalism in, 104n.q

conditions in 1900, 9

crisis of state legitimacy in, 11

as defender of world’s 

downtrodden, 20, 22–23

and formation of Hizbollah, 3

goal in sponsoring Hizbollah, 3, 115

Hizbollah funding and assistance 

from, 78 (See also External 

support [Hizbollah])

in Hizbollah’s manifesto, 65

hostility toward West in, 20

Islamic Revolution of 1979, 14–16

as leader of Islamic world, 23

in Little Lebanon, 43

modernization and secularization 

of society, 9–12

and principal–agent problem with 

Hizbollah, 115–117

reasons for sponsoring Hizbollah, 

18–25

regional opposition to, 25

and reinterpretation of Shia faith, 

9–18

resistance movement selection by, 

25–33

resource endowment and strategic 

location of, 18

social services to Lebanese Shia 

community from, 31–32

and success of Hizbollah 

sponsorship, 115, 118

use of Hizbollah in Iraq by, 115

Iranian clerics

assumption of political authority, 17

Islamic Revolution of 1979, 14–16

mobilization in response to 

modernization, 11

revolutionary role for, 12

Iranian diplomatic facilities, 97

Iranian embassies, 96

Iranian Ministry of Culture and 

Islamic Guidance, 97

Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 

96, 97

Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and 

Security (MOIS), 97–98

Iraq, 99, 100, 115

Iraqi Da’wa Party, 27n.m

Iraqi militias, training of, 115

IRGC; See Islamic Revolutionary 

Guards Corps

Islam

construction of a just Islamic 

society, 61–62, 64

responsibility for spread of, 20–22, 

65

Islamic Amal, 29, 75

Islamic Association of Lebanon, 75

Islamic Current, 75

Islamic Resistance (Hizbollah), 71, 94

Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps 

(IRGC)

collaboration with Hizbollah, 93–97

constitutional latitude for, 23
Index

135

establishment of, 93

Hizbollah funding from, 78

Hizbollah support from, 93–97

and Islamization of Lebanon, 31–32

and Israel’s invasion of Lebanon, 

29–32

military aid from, 106–107

operational connections between 

Hizbollah and, 72

roles of, 21

Syria’s restriction on movement of, 

102n.n

training of Iraqi militias by, 115

Islamic Revolution of 1979, 14–16, 

19–20

Israel, 118

Al-Manar’s targeting of audiences 

in, 75–76

Amal’s toleration of, 27

banks bombed by, 78

Cairo Agreement, 51

credibility of Iran’s deterrent 

capability against, 18, 115

cyberattacks on, 76

efforts to disrupt Iran’s nuclear 

program, 117

Hizbollah as deterrent against, 20

Hizbollah’s strategy against, 65

and Hizbollah terrorist 

infrastructure, 94–95

invasion of Lebanon (1982), 23, 

28–32, 41

in Lebanon civil war, 51, 52

and Lebanon war (2006), 84–85

retaliation for Hizbollah actions, 24

Syria and war against, 102

tactics against Hizbollah, 83

as target of Hizbollah, 63–64

Israel Defense Forces (IDF)

assassinations by, 83

guerrilla campaign against (1982-

2000), 80–82

in Lebanon war (2006), 84–85

Israeli embassy (Bangkok) attempted 

bombing, 98

J

Javadi-Nia, Mohammad Reza, 108

Jerusalem, 41, 68

“Jerusalem liberation frame,” 68

Jihad, shahadat distinguished from, 

12–13

Jihad al-Bina’ (Holy Reconstruction 

Organ), 98, 105–106

Jihad Council (Hizbollah), 71

Joining Hizbollah, 73–74

Jordan, 117

Judicial Council (Hizbollah), 71

Judiciary, reform of, 10

Jumblatt, Kamal, 27

Jurisconsult (wali al-faqih), 70

K

Kahlili, Reza, 97, 101

Kan’an, Ghazi, 101

Karagiannis, Emmanuel, 66, 68

Katz, Yaakov, 107, 116

Khameneh’i, Sayyid 'Ali, 14, 16, 21–22, 

70, 97, 107

Khamenei, Ayatollah, 3

Khomeini, Ayatollah Ali, 79

Khomeini, Ayatollah Ruhollah

arrest following sermon, 11

on enclosed environment, 24

Hizbollah’s allegiance pledged to, 

18

Israel’s invasion of Lebanon, 30

as jurisconsult, 70

as leader for entire umma, 22

personal representative to Lebanon, 

29

on religious and political authority, 

17–18

and velayat-e faqih, 3

Kidnappings (abductions), 82, 83, 96

Kiewiet, Roderick D., 33
136

Unconventional Warfare Case Study: Iran and Lebanese Hizbollah

Kreps, Sarah E., 24

L

Land reform, 10–11

Leadership (Hizbollah), 69–70

Lebanese Army, 51

Lebanese Baath Party, 26

Lebanese Communist Party, 26

Lebanese Da’wa Party, 27

Lebanese National Movement, 27

Lebanese Resistance Brigades, 75

Lebanon, 41–55, 118

Amal in, 25–29

civil conflict (1958), 53

civil war (1975-1990), 41, 44, 50–54

and creation of vulnerabilities, 

48–53

Defense and Security Pact, 54

economy of, 46–48

establishment of ideal Islamic state 

in, 41, 64

as finance hub, 48

geography of, 42–43

governing environment in, 53–55

independence from France, 50

Islamic region in, 32

Islamization of, 31–32

Israel-Palestinian conflict in, 51

Israel’s 1982 invasion of, 23, 28–32, 

41

map of, 42

physical environment of, 41–44

population centers in, 41–42

sectarian identity in, 44–46

Shia community in, 25–26

Shia’s suffering in, 23

sociocultural environment of, 

44–55

Supreme Islamic Shiite Council in, 

26

Treaty of Brotherhood, 

Cooperation, and Coordination, 

54, 102–103

Lebanon war (2006), 84–85

Legal Foundations of the Islamic 

Government (Montazeri), 17

Leninist revolutionary organizations, 

69n.d

Levitt, Matthew, 77, 115–117

Little Lebanon, 43, 46

M

Mahdi (Hidden Imam), 15, 32

Manifesto of 2009 (Hizbollah), 64–65

March 8 Alliance, 80

Maronites, in Lebanon, 44–46, 50, 

52–55

Martyrdom, cultic devotion to, 12–13

Martyrs Foundation, 98, 99, 105, 106

McCubbins, Matthew, 33

Media outlets (Hizbollah), 75–76

Membership of Hizbollah, 72

Military (Hizbollah)

command structure, 71–72

methods of warfare, 80–85

Military aid, 106–107

Mobile communications (Hizbollah), 

77

Modernization and secularization 

program (Iran), 9–12

Mohammad-Najjar, Mostafa, 96

Mohtashemi, Ali-Akbar, 29, 30, 96, 101, 

104

MOIS (Iranian Ministry of Intelligence 

and Security), 97–98

Montazeri, Husayn Ali, 17

Montazeri, Mohammad, 30n.u

Mossaddeq, Mohammad, 19

Motivational framing, 66, 68–69

Mount Lebanon region, 42–43

Movement of the Deprived (Harakat 

al-Mahrumin), 26

Mugniyah, Imad, 29, 95, 97, 107, 109, 

115–116

Mujahid, 13

Municipal elections, 79
Index

137

Musawi, Hussein, 96

Muslims

Khameneh’i on unity of, 21–22

in Lebanon, 44–50, 52, 54

N

Narratives of Hizbollah, 65–69

Nasrallah, Hassan, 18, 29, 67, 68, 70, 

77, 84, 116–117

Nasserite groups, 26

Nationalism, 68–69

Nationalization of oil sector, 19

National Pact (1943), 41, 50, 53

Norton, Augustus, 63

O

Office of Islamic Liberation 

Movements, 32, 95–96

Oil sector, nationalization of, 19

Omairi, Farouk Abdul, 108, 109

“Open Letter” (1985, Hizbollah), 

61–64

Operation Defensive Shield, 83

Organizational structure (Hizbollah), 

70–75

Ottoman Empire, 25, 43, 48–50

P

Pahlavi, Mohammad Reza Shah, 9, 

10–11, 19–20

Pahlavi, Reza Shah, 9–10, 18–19

Pakistan, 99

Palestine, 51, 52

Palestine Liberation Organization 

(PLO), 27, 29, 51, 52

Palestinian intifada, second, 83

Palestinian Islamic Jihad, 75, 95

Palestinian refugees, in Lebanon, 44, 

49

Palmerston, Lord, 20

Pan-Arabism, 68

Parliamentary Council (Hizbollah), 

70–71

Party Security (Hizbollah), 71, 74

Physical environment, of Lebanon, 

41–44

Piloto Turismo, 108, 109

PLO; See Palestine Liberation 

Organization

Politburo (Hizbollah), 70

Political activities, of Hizbollah, 78–85

Popular support for Hizbollah, 85–86

Principal–agent problem, 115–117

Prognostic framing, 66–68

Proxy groups, 3, 32

Q

Qassem, Naim, 22

Qods Force, 23, 93, 107, 117

Quietist Shia, 12, 13, 17, 25–26

R

Rabbani, Mohsen, 107–109

Rafsanjani, Ali Akbar Hashemi, 14–15, 

23–24, 104, 107

Rahimi, Babak, 12

Ram, Haggay, 15

Ranstorp, Magnus, 98

Recruitment by Hizbollah, 72–73

Regional alignments, 100n.l

Religious groups, in Lebanon, 44–46

Resources (Hizbollah), 77–78

Revealing of the Secrets (Khomeini), 17

Revolution of the Hungry, 79

Reyshahri, Hojjat al-Islam Muhammad 

Mohammedi, 13–14

Rouhani, Hojjatoleslam Fakhr, 32

S

Sabr, 14

Safavid Empire, 48

Safavid Shiism, 12

Saudi Arabia, 23, 24n.i

Security, as motivation for sponsoring 

proxy groups, 24
138

Unconventional Warfare Case Study: Iran and Lebanese Hizbollah

Security Organ (Hizbollah), 71

Shahadat, jihad distinguished from, 

12–13

Shamseddin, Sheikh, 29

Shared meanings, 66

Shariati, Ali, 12–13, 15

Sharon, Ariel, 83

Shia faith

Hizbollah’s use of symbols and 

narratives from, 68

reinterpretation of, 9–18 (See also

Islamic Revolution of 1979)

Shia population in Lebanon, 25–26, 

44–46

al-Sadr’s attempt to mobilize, 52–53

“awakening” of, 55

in government, 53

history of, 48–49

Hizbollah’s commitment to 

representing interests of, 61

Hizbollah support from, 85

Iran’s financing of social services 

to, 31–32

and Israel’s 1982 invasion, 28–29

in Little Lebanon, 43

and modernization process, 41

and political activities of Hizbollah, 

79

regions of, 44

socioeconomic inequality for, 47–48

and Taif Accords, 52

Shihab, Fouad, 47

Shura Council, 69–71, 96

Siniora, Fouad, 79

Six-Point Reform Program, 10–11

SLA (South Lebanese Army), 81–82, 94

SMT (social movement theory), 65–66

Snow, David A., 66

Social movement theory (SMT), 65–66

Social services aid, from Iran, 98–99, 

105–106

Sociocultural environment (Lebanon), 

44–55

and creation of vulnerabilities, 

48–53

economy, 46–48

governing environment, 53–55

South America, Hizbollah funding 

from, 77–78

South Lebanese Army (SLA), 81–82, 

94

South Lebanon, 43–44

Soviet Union, 18–19, 63

Special Security Apparatus (SSA), 94, 

96, 98, 101

Sponsorship of proxy groups, 3, 32, 

99, 118; See also External support 

(Hizbollah)

SSA; See Special Security Apparatus

State legitimacy; See Crisis of state 

legitimacy

Strategies and supporting narratives, 

used by Hizbollah, 65–69

Structure and dynamics, of Hizbollah, 

69–78

Suffrage, 10

Suicide attacks (Hizbollah), 82

Suleimani, Qassem, 93, 117

Sunnis, in Lebanon, 44–50, 52, 53, 85, 

86

Supreme Islamic Shiite Council, 26

Syria

al-Sadr’s support for, 52

civil war in, 93n.b, 99

Defense and Security Pact, 54

50-50 proposal of, 28

in Hizbollah’s manifesto, 65

and Israeli invasion of Lebanon, 

30–31

in Lebanese politics, 54

in Lebanon civil war, 51

merger between Egypt and, 47n.m

third-party involvement of, 99–104

Treaty of Brotherhood, 

Cooperation, and Coordination, 

54, 102–103

Syrian diplomatic facilities, 101
Index

139

Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party, 26, 

49

T

Taif Accords (1989), 50, 52, 102–103

Terrorism

Hizbollah infrastructure in West 

Bank, 94–95

Iranian support for, 96–97

Syria’s support for, 102

Training (Hizbollah), 74, 94, 106–107

Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation, 

and Coordination (1991), 54, 

102–103

Turkey, 9, 46, 117

U

UAR (United Arab Republic), 47n.m

Ulama, 11n.a.

Umbrella groups (Hizbollah), 75

UNIFIL (United Nations Interim Force 

in Lebanon), 85

United Arab Republic (UAR), 47n.m

United Kingdom, 18–19

United Nations Interim Force in 

Lebanon (UNIFIL), 85

United Nations Special Tribunal for 

Lebanon, 80

United States

Afghan Mujahideen sponsored by, 

99

appeals for intervention (1976), 54

credibility of Iran’s deterrent 

capability against, 115

Hizbollah as deterrent against, 20

and Iran as frontline against Soviet 

expansion, 11

and Lebanese civil conflict (1958), 

53

in Lebanon civil war, 51

as target of Hizbollah, 62–63

and unseating of Mossaddeq, 19

V

Vahidi, Ahmad, 96

Velayat-e faqih, 3, 17–18

authority of, 22

as founding belief of Hizbollah, 61, 

115

functional notion of, 61

Velayat-e Faqih (Khomeini), 17

Velayati, Ali, 107

W

Wali al-faqih (jurisconsult), 70

Walt, Stephen M., 25

Warfare, methods of (Hizbollah), 

80–85

Wehbi, Sheikh Bilal Mohsen, 109

West Bank, 83–84, 94–95

Weststruckness (gharbzadegi), 12

White Revolution, 10

Women, Iran’s reforms related to, 10

World War II, 18–19

Y

Yassin, Sheikh Ahmad, 83n.u

Yudhawinata, Pandu, 98

Z

Zionism, 61