UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff - Appellee, 

v. 

COREY SHAMON MCKINNEY, a/k/a 

Corey Shannon McKinney, 

Defendant - Appellant. 

No. 21-5074 

(D.C. No. 4:20-CR-00019-CVE-1) 

(N.D. Okla.) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

Before MORITZ, SEYMOUR, and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

Defendant Corey Shamon McKinney was charged with federal firearm and drug 

offenses. He moved to suppress evidence recovered during two searches at his residence. 

The related search warrants were supported by officer affidavits that included 

information obtained from a reliable confidential informant (“RCI”). After the district 

court denied his motion to suppress, he was convicted and sentenced to one hundred 

thirty-seven months in prison. On appeal, defendant asserts a claim under Franks v. 

Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), contending that the affidavits are contradicted by the 

 * This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of 

law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the 

citation of orders and judgments. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value 

consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

January 5, 2023

Christopher M. Wolpert 

Clerk of Court

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officer’s testimony at trial and that the evidence recovered from the searches should be 

suppressed. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm. 

Background 

In November of 2019, Officer Mike Cawiezell of the Tulsa Police Department 

(“TPD”) filed an affidavit seeking a search warrant for defendant’s residence in Tulsa, 

Oklahoma based on information he received from an RCI. A warrant was issued by a 

Tulsa County judge and executed on November 24, 2019. During the search, law 

enforcement recovered methamphetamine, marijuana, heroin, two firearms, ammunition, 

and body armor from the residence. They also recovered almost six thousand dollars 

from defendant’s person. He was arrested but later released on bond. 

Following a search of a trash container located in front of defendant’s home, 

Officer Cawiezell sought a second warrant to search the residence. Another warrant was 

issued by a Tulsa County judge and a second search was conducted on January 9, 2020. 

During this search, law enforcement recovered what appeared to be a firearm silencer and 

marijuana. 

Defendant was indicted in federal court on eight counts, including charges for 

being a felon in possession; possessing an unregistered silencer; possessing heroin, 

methamphetamine, and marijuana with intent to distribute; maintaining a drug-involved 

premises; and possessing a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking crimes. He sought 

to suppress the evidence obtained from both searches, challenging the reliability of the 

RCI. Without holding an evidentiary hearing, the district court found that Officer 

Cawiezell’s affidavits established probable cause and denied defendant’s motion to 

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suppress. He opted to go to trial, and the jury found him guilty on all eight counts. He 

was sentenced to a total of one hundred thirty-seven months in prison followed by three 

years of supervised release. 

Search Warrant Affidavits 

Officer Cawiezell prepared sworn affidavits in support of both search warrants. The 

first affidavit stated that Officer Cawiezell was contacted by the RCI concerning an 

individual, later identified as defendant, who was “selling a large amount of 

methamphetamine and possessing firearms in the Tulsa County area.” Rec., vol. I at 156. 

Officer Cawiezell stated that the RCI “informed [him] that Corey McKinney was in 

possession of methamphetamine, heroin, and a firearm” at his residence. Id. at 157. He 

also stated that the RCI “informed [him] that Corey McKinney had recently within the past 

72 hours acquired a large amount of methamphetamine, and that it was currently being 

stored at his residence.” Id. Officer Cawiezell represented that this RCI had provided 

reliable information to the TPD on more than three prior occasions, including information 

that led to arrests for drug offenses and seizures of firearms. 

The second affidavit included much of the information from the first affidavit. In 

addition, it detailed the first search and the contraband recovered. Officer Cawiezell 

described the trash search which led to the discovery of two items, one with trace amounts 

of marijuana and another “consistent with packaging narcotics.” Id. at 159. He also stated 

that, after this evidence was taken back to the police department, a K9 “gave a positive alert 

to the presence of narcotics.” Id. 

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Officer Cawiezell’s Trial Testimony 

 At trial, defense counsel cross-examined Officer Cawiezell. Counsel asked about 

the two firearms, a rifle and a pistol, recovered from defendant’s residence: 

Q. You never saw him with that rifle, did you? 

A. Correct. 

Q. No one ever told you they saw with him that rifle; correct? 

A. Correct. 

. . . . 

Q. You never saw him with the pistol, did you? 

A. I did not. 

Q. No one has ever told you they saw him with the pistol either, have 

they? 

A. They have not. 

Rec., vol. III at 129–30. Defense counsel also asked the officer questions about the 

methamphetamine recovered during the search: 

Q. And you don’t know whether the methamphetamine was in the 

residence before Mr. McKinney was there, do you? 

A. I do not. 

. . . . 

Q. You’ve never seen him with any methamphetamine, have you? 

A. I have not. 

Q. He had none on his body when you arrested him, did he? 

A. He did not. 

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Q. You’ve never seen any photographs of Mr. McKinney with any 

methamphetamine, have you? 

A. I have not. 

Q. So you don’t know if Mr. McKinney ever laid eyes on that 

methamphetamine, do you? 

A. I do not. 

Id. at 131–32. Defense counsel asked the officer similar questions about the heroin 

recovered from defendant’s residence: 

Q. And you never saw him with the heroin, did you? 

A. Correct. 

Q. And no one has ever told you that they ever saw him with any 

heroin, have they? 

A. No. 

Id. at 138. Officer Cawiezell was not questioned, and did not testify, about the RCI 

or the affidavits. 

Standard of Review 

Defendant did not assert a Franks claim in district court. However, the parties agree 

that his claim is not waived under Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b) because it is based on Officer 

Cawiezell’s trial testimony and was not “reasonably available” before trial. See Fed. R. 

Crim. P. 12(b)(3). Accordingly, we review his claim for plain error. See United States v. 

Iiland, 254 F.3d 1264, 1267 n.1 (10th Cir. 2001). 

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Discussion 

On appeal, defendant alleges a Fourth Amendment violation under Franks. A 

Franks violation occurs if “(1) an officer’s affidavit supporting a search warrant 

application contains a reckless misstatement or omission that (2) is material because, but 

for it, the warrant could not have lawfully issued.” United States v. Herrera, 782 F.3d 

571, 573 (10th Cir. 2015). The defendant must prove both recklessness and materiality to 

obtain relief. United States v. Moses, 965 F.3d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 2020). 

A defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing if he makes a “substantial 

preliminary showing” that a violation has occurred. Id. (quoting Franks, 438 U.S. at 

155). To make the requisite showing of recklessness, a defendant must furnish evidence 

“that the officer in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his allegations.” 

United States v. Xiang, 12 F.4th 1176, 1182–83 (10th Cir. 2021) (internal quotation 

marks and citation omitted). In other words, a defendant must show that the officer acted 

with “deliberate falsehood or [] reckless disregard for the truth.” Franks, 438 U.S. at 

171. “Allegations of negligence or innocent mistake are insufficient.” Id. 

A. Suppression of the Evidence 

Defendant argues that the evidence recovered during both searches should be 

suppressed because Officer Cawiezell’s trial testimony is inconsistent with statements 

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made in his affidavits.1

 According to defendant, the testimony shows that Officer 

Cawiezell made material and reckless misstatements in the affidavits. 

Specifically, defendant highlights three statements from Officer Cawiezell’s 

testimony: (1) no one told him they saw defendant with the rifle or pistol recovered 

during the first search; (2) no one told him they saw defendant with “any heroin”; and 

(3) he did not know whether the methamphetamine recovered in the search was at the 

residence before defendant was there or if defendant had ever seen that

methamphetamine. Defendant argues this testimony contradicts affidavit statements 

about what the RCI told Officer Cawiezell, particularly that: (1) defendant was in 

possession of a firearm; (2) defendant was in possession of heroin; and (3) defendant had 

recently acquired a large amount of methamphetamine and was storing it at his residence. 

These arguments fail because the trial testimony does not contradict the affidavit 

statements. First, the affidavits do not state that the RCI saw defendant with a firearm, 

the methamphetamine, or the heroin. It can be true that the RCI told Officer Cawiezell 

that defendant was in possession of a firearm and drugs without saying he or she saw 

defendant with these items. For example, the RCI may have been told by defendant or a 

1

 Defendant primarily challenges the first affidavit. While he acknowledges that the 

second affidavit includes relevant information not supplied by the RCI, he argues that 

information would not have been available but for the illegal first search. He thus asserts 

that evidence found in the second search is fruit of the poisonous tree. He also argues 

that the good-faith exception under United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), does not 

apply. Because we conclude that defendant has failed to demonstrate a Fourth 

Amendment violation, we need not reach these issues.

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third party that defendant had possession of them. It is also possible that the RCI did not 

disclose the source of the information to Officer Cawiezell at all. 

Moreover, the affidavits only state that Officer Cawiezell was informed defendant 

was in possession of “a firearm,” not the specific firearms recovered in the search. 

Similarly, the questioning at trial concerned the specific methamphetamine recovered 

during the search whereas the affidavits referenced undefined methamphetamine. 

Importantly, the RCI provided Officer Cawiezell with information before the searches 

were conducted. It would have been difficult, if not impossible, for Officer Cawiezell to 

know with certainty whether the contraband recovered from defendant’s home was the 

same contraband that the RCI informed him of. 

Finally, it can be simultaneously true that: (1) the RCI told Officer Cawiezell 

defendant had recently acquired methamphetamine; and (2) Officer Cawiezell did not 

know when the methamphetamine entered the home or whether defendant had seen it. 

Whether the methamphetamine was at the residence before defendant arrived there or 

whether defendant saw the methamphetamine is not dispositive of whether he had actual 

or constructive possession of it. 

In his reply brief, defendant argues that if the RCI did not see him with the 

firearms or drugs then Officer Cawiezell recklessly omitted that information from the 

affidavits. Because he did not raise this argument in his opening brief, it is forfeited. See 

United States v. Leffler, 942 F.3d 1192, 1197 (10th Cir. 2019). In any event, this 

argument is unpersuasive because the affidavit is facially ambiguous as to the basis of the 

RCI’s knowledge. 

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Furthermore, probable cause may properly be supported by hearsay or information 

supplied by an informant. See Franks, 438 U.S. at 165. Courts take a “totality of the 

circumstances” approach when making a probable cause determination based on an 

informant’s tip. United States v. Hendrix, 664 F.3d 1334, 1338 (10th Cir. 2011). 

Relevant factors include “the informant’s veracity, reliability, and basis of knowledge.” 

Id. “[A] deficiency in one factor may be compensated for by a strong showing of another 

or by other indicia of reliability.” United States v. Quezada-Enriquez, 567 F.3d 1228, 

1233 (10th Cir. 2009). Here, even if the basis of the RCI’s information was not clear or 

was in some way lacking, it was bolstered by the RCI’s documented history of providing 

the TPD with reliable information.2

To the extent any tension could be found between the testimony and the affidavits, 

defendant has not provided any evidence to prove that the sworn affidavits, rather than 

the sworn testimony, were false. He has also not offered any evidence that Officer 

Cawiezell “entertained serious doubts,” see Xiang, 12 F.4th at 1182–83, or acted with 

“deliberate falsehood or [] reckless disregard for the truth,” see Franks, 438 U.S. at 171. 

Defendant merely assumes Officer Cawiezell’s sworn trial testimony is true and 

concludes that the officer was “either lying or recklessly mischaracterizing the supposed 

interactions that he had with the informant in his affidavits.” Aplt. Br. at 12. Such 

conclusory allegations are insufficient because search warrant affidavits are presumed to 

be valid. See Franks, 438 U.S. at 171. 

2

 The district court rejected the challenges made to the RCI’s reliability in defendant’s 

motion to suppress. Those findings have not been appealed and are not before this court. 

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In his reply, defendant argues that the importance of the RCI’s information in 

establishing probable cause, the depth of Officer Cawiezell’s involvement in the 

investigation, and “the degree of inconsistency” between the statements demonstrate 

recklessness or intent. Reply Br. at 6–7. These arguments are forfeited, but in any event 

we find them unpersuasive, particularly because we could not find any inconsistency 

among the statements, much less a significant one. 

Finally, it bears noting that Officer Cawiezell was not asked about the RCI or the 

affidavits at trial. Rather, the challenged testimony was given in the context of 

determining whether defendant had exclusive or actual control over the contraband seized 

during the searches. Even if the alleged inconsistencies existed, it would not make sense 

to credit the trial testimony over direct and sworn statements made about the RCI in the 

affidavits. Any inconsistency would be more readily explained by a negligent or 

innocent error made at trial than by a choice to submit an affidavit despite serious doubts 

about its truthfulness. 

B. Franks Hearing 

In the alternative, defendant argues he is entitled to a hearing to determine whether 

there has been a Franks violation even though he did not request a hearing in district 

court. The parties dispute whether the failure of a district court to hold a Franks hearing 

sua sponte could be plain error. Compare Franks, 438 U.S. at 168 (contemplating “an 

instance of deliberate falsity” exposed at trial), and United States v. White, 850 F.3d 667, 

673 (4th Cir. 2017) (holding that a defendant may seek a Franks hearing based on 

inconsistencies between an affidavit and the affiant’s trial testimony), with United States 

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v. Rusnak, 981 F.3d 697, 705 (9th Cir. 2020) (holding error could not be plain due to a 

lack of caselaw applying Franks in this context). But we need not reach this question 

because defendant is not entitled to a hearing. 

As described above, defendant has failed to allege that actual inconsistencies 

between Officer Cawiezell’s trial testimony and his affidavits exist. To the extent that 

the relevant statements are in tension, defendant has failed to provide any evidence that 

Officer Cawiezell intentionally or recklessly filed untruthful or incomplete affidavits. At 

most, defendant has demonstrated that Officer Cawiezell’s testimony should have been 

clarified at trial. 

Conclusion 

Based on the foregoing, we are not persuaded that defendant’s Fourth Amendment 

rights have been violated or that he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing under Franks. 

Accordingly, we affirm. 

        Entered for the Court 

 Stephanie K. Seymour 

Circuit Judge 

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