Prospects for Peace in South Asia

Compiled by

Dr. W. Andrew Terrill

On January 21-22, 2003, the U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute and Stanford

University’s Asia Pacific Research Center cosponsored a conference on “Prospects for Peace in South

Asia.” This event brought together a number of well-known scholars, diplomats, and senior military

officers with wide experience in the region. Panels considered a variety of topics related to the role of

religion in conflict, the nature of past South Asian conflicts, Kashmir, the war on terrorism, and outsider

policy interests.

The role of religion in South Asian politics was one of first topics the conference addressed. Several

scholars on the first panel asserted that a hardline view of the Kashmir issue may be becoming ingrained

increasingly in the religious as well as the political identity of Pakistani Muslims. The rise in “Hindu

First” nationalism sometimes associated with the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in India also was

considered. Although the Indian Constitution guarantees freedom of religion, the widespread Hindu view

of Muslims as “the other” was commented upon. BJP willingness to advocate moderation in the aftermath

of sectarian violence was noted. Indian Deputy Prime Minister Advani’s statement that the BJP’s Hindu

nationalism is only cultural, and not political, was mentioned as a sign of moderation. It remains unclear

if India is to be dominated by a “soft” Hindu nationalism focused on culture or a “hard” Hindu nationalism

that is highly political.

Key Insights:

• Serious prospects of nuclear war continue to exist in South Asia due to ongoing strategies of

brinkmanship.

• U.S. effort and energy are vital to helping manage ongoing South Asian tensions. Appointing a

special envoy to the region, along the lines of those appointed to the Middle East peace

negotiations, may be useful.

• The Pakistani military considers the Kashmiri insurgent organizations to be a key asset, which

they will not want to surrender.

• A major problem is that Pakistan may lose control over Kashmiri militant groups it supports.

• The United States has a number of key interests in South Asia, including the avoidance of a

radicalized Pakistan.

• The United States may consider working more extensively with India as it emerges as a regional

superpower.

Stanford University

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Conference members commented about

the Muslim community in India, noting that

it is a huge group, which, for the most part, is

not talking about explicitly religious issues.

The Muslims are not a part of the international jihadi circuit. According to the

analysis given at the conference, most Indian

Muslims primarily are concerned with local

issues rather than Islamic World issues.

Participants then turned to discussion of

past conflicts in South Asia, with a special

emphasis on the role of Kashmir in feeding

Indo-Pakistani tensions. The question of

how Indian-Pakistani tensions may be

expressed in a nuclear age was particularly

important. Scholars considering this issue

were described as fitting into two broad

categories—“deterrence optimists” or “deterrence pessimists.” Deterrence optimists

believe that conflict between the two states

can exist at lower levels indefinitely without

much danger that such tensions will escalate

into nuclear war. Many deterrence optimists

suggest that third party intervention will

always occur during a crisis and is

consequently a major factor that will prevent

escalation from getting out of hand.

Deterrence pessimists fear that a variety

of scenarios exist under which nuclear attack

may appear as a serious policy option to

either or both states. They have observed

that brinkmanship is ongoing in South Asia

and that every Indo-Pakistani war came as a

surprise to one of the countries. Moreover,

both sides have embraced some form of

massive retaliation approach to nuclear

warfare, suggesting that limited nuclear war

will be difficult, if not impossible, to wage

without prompting a cycle of escalation.

Conference members also discussed the

role of the military in South Asia, noting that

neither the Pakistani or Indian forces have

conducted lessons learned studies based on

the 2001-02 brink of war experience.

Participants commented that during the

Kargil crisis a very small number of

Pakistani officers decided to move forward

with operations in Kashmir. Pakistan’s

military, therefore, moved to escalate the

conflict with India without informing the

civilian leadership of the country.

Following a discussion of the South Asian

militaries, the conference considered the

history and current status of Kashmir.

Pakistani President Musharraf is under

pressure to show some progress on Kashmir,

and the Pakistanis strongly maintain that it

is unfair to pressure them twice on major

issues (Afghanistan and Kashmir). The

United States, conversely, strongly maintains that Pakistani support of insurgents in

Kashmir is not compatible with a good

relationship with the United States.

The conference participants further

noted the fundamental differences between

the Indians and Pakistanis over Kashmir. To

India, Kashmir represents the secular

identity of the Indians within a multi-party

democracy. Some Indians have, in candid

moments, expressed fears about the unraveling of India should Kashmir be abandoned

on the grounds of religion. Conversely,

Pakistan’s existence is predicated on the

need for a separate state for Muslims. If

Kashmir is allowed to remain outside of

Pakistan, this rationale rings hollow. Some

Indians also maintain that the rationale for a

separate Muslim state in the subcontinent

was undermined by the secession of East

Pakistan and the formation of Bangladesh.

Conference members also discussed the

activities of the Kashmir Study Group. This

organization is a private forum considering

issues surrounding the current impasse in

Kashmir. The latest accomplishment of the

study group has been to generate the

Livingston Proposal, “Kashmir: A Way Forward.” This private set of proposals has been

put before the representatives of both India

and Pakistan and seeks to help establish a

compromise solution for the problem of

Kashmir based on a subnational form of

Kashmiri sovereignty. The full proposal can

be found on the internet at

www.kashmirstudygroup.net.

On the second day of the conference, a

panel examined factors influencing current

South Asian tensions. Indian domestic issues

were discussed, including remaining debates

from India’s formation. While freedom of

religion is guaranteed in India, freedom to

propagate Islam and Christianity remains

subject to bitter debate. The panel then

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considered Pakistani political and constitutional problems, with one individual

noting that the military over time has

developed a comprehensive strategy for

undermining civilian leadership and consolidating power once a coup takes place. This

involves a multistage paradigm of coopting a

variety of Pakistani institutions whose

acquiescence is necessary to administer the

country.

Participants also discussed Islamic

extremism as a factor contributing to current

tensions. In the early 1980s, Iran and Saudi

Arabia competed fiercely for influence among

South Asian Muslims, prompting the Saudis

to sponsor a number of Pakistani madrassas

where hardline Wahabi values were taught.

One scholar commented that the rise of

militant Islam in Pakistan and Afghanistan

occurred with U.S. support because this was

the form of Islam that could withstand a

Soviet assault. The need to resist the Soviet

invasion of Afghanistan could not be

addressed by supporting moderate Islam.

Participants observed that large numbers of secular Pakistani officers work with

Kashmiri militants because they can be a

useful tool, but not because they consider

them to be ideological soul mates with whom

they identify. These officers use the militants without becoming infected by their

Islamic extremism. Having created this tool

for pressuring the Indians, Pakistanis are

loath to destroy it due to its ongoing utility.

Nevertheless, the danger of a loss of military

control over militants remains serious.

The conference then moved to the issues

of U.S. military perspectives on the War on

Terrorism in South and Central Asia.

Participants noted that a number of positive

signs exist about future stability in Afghanistan, including the return of refugees, the

development of secular schools, and a

possible general war-wariness. Some

suggested that the United States must

engage in nation-building in Afghanistan,

and that, with U.S. support, Afghanistan has

a chance of developing into a stable and

secure country.

The importance for the United States of

development and democracy issues throughout South Asia has expanded since

September 11, 2001. These changes have

influenced the U.S. military with regard to

such efforts as military-to-military contacts

and joint efforts at counterterrorism. The

United States has also become interested in

insurgency problems in places such as Nepal

and Sri Lanka, which were previously of

little interest.

The role of outside nations in influencing

the prospects for peace in South Asia was

then addressed. Nations that were reviewed

included the United States, Russia, China,

and the Islamic states outside the region.

When considering U.S. interests in the

region, several factors were mentioned as

being key. One of the most important was

avoiding the conditions under which a

militant Islamic regime could take over

Pakistan.

Both Russia and China view the region

as important to their national interests.

Russia has great experience interacting with

South Asian states, China less so. South

Asia is a logical place for the Russians to

assert their interest in a great power role.

Putin seeks more trade and investment with

South Asia and a special relationship with

India. He has paid much more attention to

South Asia than his predecessors.

China views itself as the rightful hegemon since this area constitutes its “backyard.” Concerned about terrorist separatism

and Islamic extremism in South Asia, China

seeks to continue its strong relations with

Pakistan. Another worry is possible Indian

efforts to undermine Chinese control of Tibet.

China, like Russia, would like to see a

decrease in tensions between India and

Pakistan.

Both Russia and China saw serious

limits to their influence in South Asia when

the United States became interested in

South Asia after September 11. The U.S.

relationship with Pakistan improved dramatically, and the United States appeared to

replace China as Pakistan’s most important

ally. The U.S. ability to become the

predominant outside power in South Asia,

almost at will, was a “reality check” for

Moscow and Beijing.

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A number of states in the Islamic World

also have concerns about South Asia. While

South Asia is not the heart of Islam, it has at

times been something of an ideological

battlefield for different versions of political

Islam such as those forms advocated by the

Iranians and the Saudi Arabians.

Conclusion.

At the end of the conference, participants agreed that South Asia is an area of

great importance to the United States, but it

remains uncertain if it will be treated as

such. The strong terrorist presence in

Pakistan presents the possibility that

terrorists could seize a nuclear weapon,

especially at a time of crisis, while the

weapons were being deployed or relocated.

The possibility of a coup in Pakistan leading

to a Taliban-type regime with nuclear

weapons is especially ominous.

Considering the importance of current

South Asian problems, it may be helpful for

the United States to appoint a special envoy

to South Asia along the lines of those

appointed to the Middle East Peace negotiations. This appointment would be an

improvement over the more ad hoc form of

involvement where the United States only

pays serious attention to the area when a

crisis is under way. In addition, continuing

and expanding U.S.-South Asian military-tomilitary contacts and informal U.S.-

sponsored “Track 2” meetings of Indians,

Pakistanis, and other South Asians would be

valuable.

The conference members agreed that the

Livingston proposal of the Kashmir Study

Group displayed some potential that was

worth consideration. Some asserted that

dialogue is not appeasement and that the

Livingston Proposals were at least a basis for

dialogue.

The views expressed in this conference brief are those

of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official

policy or position of the Department of the Army, the

Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. This

conference brief is cleared for public release; distribution is

unlimited.

More information on the Strategic Studies

Institute’s programs may be found on the Institute’s

Homepage at http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usassi/

welcome.htm or by calling (717) 245- 4212.

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