PROFESSIONALIZING 

MINISTERIAL ADVISING

Raymond A. Millen

Carlisle Barracks, PA and

UNITED STATES 

ARMY WAR COLLEGE

PRESS
PKSOI PAPER

PROFESSIONALIZING 

MINISTERIAL ADVISING

Raymond A. Millen

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iii

FOREWORD

In this study, Professor Raymond Millen has identified a persistent challenge in U.S. efforts to provide 

effective security cooperation and capacity building 

with fragile and failing states—the realm of ministerial 

advising. From his research and analysis, he has concluded the United States has an opportunity to close 

the gap between U.S. good intentions and outcomes 

by recommending the establishment of a professional 

ministerial corps.

His approach is innovative in the sense that it 

draws on one of the United States’ greatest strengths—

the ability to enhance efficiency and effectiveness 

through organization. In this respect, the establishment of a ministerial advisory academy seeks efficiencies by consolidating the diverse government agency 

advisory programs into one facility, thereby eliminating redundancies through a unified faculty, budget, 

and administration.

As a break from past U.S. practices with advising, 

this peacetime program would create a large pool of 

professional advisors for contingency missions and 

normal security cooperation engagements. Thus, the 

United States would ameliorate the frustrations associated with ministerial advising in exigent circumstances.

Professor Millen has also rendered a great service 

to the praxis of ministerial advising with a guidepost 

of best practices. Gleaning the existing literature on 

advising, he addresses the common themes of building rapport, exuding professionalism, and exercising 

patience. He identifies available resources to increase 

advisory competencies and provides insightful ways 

to enhance the working relationship with interpreters. 
Lastly, he discusses those personality traits and attributes to which all advisors should aspire. Together, 

best practices would form the core components of the 

academy curriculum in addition to serving as a handy 

reference for advisors.

Professionalizing Ministerial Advising contributes 

to the broader advising community through its innovative proposals and delineated best practices. The 

Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute expects Millen’s study to have a substantial impact on 

the greater dialogue of ministerial advising.

Daniel A. Pinnell

COL, U.S. Army

Director

Peacekeeping and Stability 

 Operations Institute

iv
v

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Professor Raymond Millen is a retired Army officer with three tours in Afghanistan, the last as a senior 

mentor to the Chief of Strategic Plans department in 

the Ministry of Defense. While on active duty, Professor Millen served as an infantry officer and foreign 

area officer for Western Europe. From 2001 to 2008, 

he was the Director of European Security Affairs at 

the Strategic Studies Institute. Professor Millen is 

currently the Professor of Security Sector Reform at 

the Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, 

Carlisle, PA. He is the author of the books Command 

Legacy: a Tactical Primer for Junior Leaders and Burden 

of Command, as well as numerous articles and monographs on NATO, counterinsurgency, Afghanistan, 

and Security Sector Reform issues.
vi
1

INTRODUCTION

Since 2003, the United States government has manifested a renewed interest in ministerial advising. The 

interest is limited though and by no means assured. 

In the past, the lion’s share of advising was limited to 

combat advisors during times of conflict, with Korea, 

Vietnam, and El Salvador setting a doctrinal example 

for the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. But with 

the renaissance in interest for state-building, formal 

ministerial advising has assumed greater import. Of 

course, as with any new program, ministerial advising 

has had its share of problems and errors, resulting in 

a fair amount of literature on advisory best practices. 

But, if history is any indicator of future behavior, in 

all likelihood, once the United States loses interest in 

ministerial advising, the collective memory will fade. 

Thus, the intent of this study is to make the case for an 

association of professional ministerial advisors as well 

as enumerating advisory best practices.

It is ironic that despite a host of military expeditions and occupations, the United States has yet to 

perfect ministerial advising. To be sure, some aspects 

of ministerial advising occurred in conjunction with 

occupation duties, but these were generally informal: Mexico (1847-1848), The Philippines (1899-1902), 

Puerto Rico and Cuba (to a limited extent), Veracruz 

(1914), Rhineland (1919-1923), Haiti (1915-1934), 

the Dominican Republic (1916-1924), and Nicaragua (1927-1933). Incidentally, during his tour in The 

Philippines (1935-1939), Lieutenant Colonel Dwight 

D. Eisenhower became the informal advisor to Filipino President Manuel Quezon in the late 1930s for 

the fledgling Filipino defense forces. As Eisenhower 

later recalled, his advising duties included the “orga-
2

nization of forces, training, finances, [and] personnel. 

As always, I stressed morale.” Their discussions also 

touched on “taxes, education, honesty in government, 

and other subjects.”1 Eisenhower valued his advisory 

experience since it broadened his strategic perspective 

and made him a more effective Supreme Allied Commander and President.

The occupations of Germany and Japan (1945-

1952), on the other hand, were concerted efforts, linked 

to military government, but with a substantial amount 

of advising dedicated to governance, economic and 

military reform, and public administration. The formation of NATO in the early 1950s as well as NATO’s 

Membership Action Plan (MAP) in the 1990s, also involved a fair amount of advising on political, military, 

and economic reforms. Yet, despite these collective 

experiences, the United States never collated these advisory best practices for later reference. Hence, when 

it comes to advising, the United States suffers from 

institutional amnesia—starting anew with each iteration. 

The history of combat advisory missions provides a 

recurrent pattern of prevalent missteps and blunders. 

While the skill sets required for combat advising differ from ministerial advising, they do share common 

features. For instance, the U.S. experience with combat 

advisors in Korea, Vietnam, and El Salvador reveals a 

pattern of improvisation due to the U.S. Army’s organizational culture—that is, an under-appreciation of 

the art and science of advising.

In Korea, advisors were junior in rank (a key 

sensitivity to Korean officers), less experienced, and 

tended to be patronizing towards their counterparts. 

Advising offered “little prestige, promotion, or hope 

of glory,” so the majority of advisors were “cast-offs” 
3

who served only for a short time (i.e., six months to a 

year). Advisors received no training or preparation for 

their advisory positions, nor did they know what was 

expected of them. At best they received a briefing or 

an orientation but “little information on their mission 

or duties, much less the conditions under which they 

worked.” Hence, the mission was plagued by “chronic 

shortages and frequent turnover.” Advisors did not 

understand the culture, particularly the significance 

of face. Koreans placed great importance on “respect, 

proper behavior, authority, and on a unit commander,” which differed substantially from U.S. values. 

“Cultural understanding required not only empathy 

with Koreans, but also self-knowledge—understanding American cultural strengths and weaknesses.” 

Advisors received no language training, which put the 

onus of learning English on the Koreans (i.e., counterparts and interpreters). While Americans recognized 

the need to build rapport, the aforementioned barriers 

were often too great to overcome.2 The U.S. Army attempted to improve the effectiveness of advisors with 

the publication of advisory manuals in 1953 and 1957, 

which although useful and informative, did not appear to have much impact on the advisory effort.3

The early advisory effort in Vietnam suffered from 

the same defects. As historian Ronald Spector noted, 

“Not only were most American military advisors unfamiliar with the society, culture and language of South 

Vietnam, but the advisory role itself was unfamiliar.”

4

 According to a 1964 RAND study by Gerry Hickey, 

relations between U.S. advisors and their counterparts 

were neither that close nor productive. Aside from 

professional competence, success depended on the 

ability of the advisor to establish rapport, the amount 

of time spent with the counterpart, and the willing-
4

ness to become involved in the counterpart’s daily 

routine. Hickey recommended the vetting of candidates for “aptitude in working with foreigners” as 

well as providing language training and instruction 

on culture and customs, the structure of the South 

Vietnamese army, and civic action. Furthermore, he 

recommended extending advisory tours beyond six 

months, minimizing the number of progress reports 

required of them, and “instituting continuity, with departing advisors briefing incoming advisors and leaving behind records about their counterparts and the 

advice that had been given and rejected so that their 

successors would avoid repeating mistakes and not 

waste time learning through trial and error.”5

As U.S. intervention in Vietnam increased, the 

number of combat advisors rose in proportion (11,596 

by 1968). Advisory tours with Vietnamese combat 

units remained at six months, a time period far too 

short for advisors to learn the language and culture, 

much less understand the strategic vision of the advisory mission. Again, advisors were junior in rank to 

their counterparts, and few had much military experience and specialization in their fields. Worse, due to 

the lack of a transition period between predecessors 

and successors, Vietnamese counterparts would hear 

the same formulas over and over again, and hence 

tended to ignore their advisors.6

This state of affairs is a bit perplexing since the U.S. 

Army had established The Military Assistance Training Advisory (MATA) course at Fort Bragg in February 1962. The six-week course included area studies, 

cultural and language familiarization, counterinsurgency operations, and tactical infantry skills among 

other fields. From their experiences, “most advisors 

came to realize that ‘determination, patience, and per­
5

severance were the most important virtues demanded 

of advisors . . . more important than the ability to face 

danger with confidence and resolution’ when working through the daily frustrations and inevitable 

misunderstandings.”7 To supplement advisory training, the Army published the MATA Handbook for Vietnam (ST 31-179) in 1966, followed by Advisor Handbook 

for Stability Operations (FM 31-73).8

By 1970, the U.S. Army had instituted incentives 

to attract quality advisors. For example, qualifications 

for a district senior advisor (DSA) were the 

rank of major; combat arms . . . [Command and General Staff College] CGSC graduate; prior Vietnam 

service; suitable personality and temperament; ability 

or aptitude to speak Vietnamese; and prior company 

command. Additional incentives for a 12-month tour 

included a $50 monthly special pay allowance and consideration for advanced civil schooling. An 18-month 

tour included similar incentives to the PSA [province 

senior advisors] program plus guaranteed secondary 

zone consideration for promotion, no involuntary unaccompanied tours for 5 years, and an invitation to 

join the Military Assistance Officer Program (MAOP).9

Nevertheless, in the aftermath of the Vietnam War 

and as a result of the bitter experiences, the responsibility of advising shifted to the domain of the Special 

Forces, and the conventional Army quietly dropped it 

as a skillset.

Despite Special Forces specialization with advising, the 1983 training and advisory effort in El Salvador still experienced difficulties, predominately due 

to congressionally imposed limitations and restrictions. The initial 55-man MILGROUP training team 

adhered to one guiding principle for training: “Keep it 
6

simple, sustainable, small, and Salvadoran.” The overarching goal was to professionalize the El Salvadoran 

Armed Forces (ESAF), through advising so as to alter its tradition of human rights abuses. Beginning in 

1984, the MILGROUP organized the training and advisory effort into three teams: Operations, Planning, 

and Training.10 While the advisory mission eventually 

succeeded, the effort took years before fruition.

As opposed to combat advising, the practice of 

ministerial advising, with some exceptions, lay dormant for years. With some exceptions, the practice of 

ministerial advising lay dormant for years. And as 

with similar, past advisory efforts, ministerial advising in Iraq and Afghanistan had an inauspicious start, 

with assigned advisors receiving little or no training 

or preparation for the mission. Advisors were often 

very junior in rank to their counterparts, received no 

language or cultural training, and were not vetted for 

their personality traits. While these advisors performed 

their duties in an admirable fashion, often under difficult circumstances, successful advising became hit or 

miss. As this study underscores, not everyone, regardless of education, experience, and intelligence, is cut 

out to be an effective ministerial advisor. Ministerial 

advisors require prior training and education in their 

advisory field in order to enhance their effectiveness.

To rectify this shortfall, beginning in 2010, the Department of Defense instituted the Ministry of Defense 

(and Ministry of Interior) Advisors (MODA) Training 

Program, which according to OSD Director of Force 

Readiness and Training Frank DiGiovanni, 

has prepared senior-level DoD civilian employees to 

deploy to Kabul to work with Afghan counterparts 

in developing the capabilities of the Afghan security 
7

ministries. The program has grown and evolved over 

the years, incorporating lessons learned, responding 

to new threats in the environment, and anticipating 

future challenges as responsibility for internal security has transitioned to Afghan control. As the training 

program has changed and expanded to prepare ministerial advisors for the changing mission in Afghanistan 

and now for deployment to partner nations across the 

globe, the emphasis on relationship-building, humility, empathy, and respect has remained constant.11

As the MODA Training Program in Afghanistan 

demonstrates, trained ministerial advisors signal the 

U.S. commitment to assist fragile governments as 

part of building Partner Capacity and Security Cooperation, to include Security Sector Assistance, Security 

Force Assistance, and Foreign Internal Defense; so, 

host nation ministries should view the effort as beneficial and not the cost of doing business with the United 

States.12 As past experience shows, ministerial advisors must possess a diverse host of knowledge which 

marks them as professionals.

If past behavior is any indicator of future actions, 

budget cuts to current advisory programs are likely 

to occur once Afghanistan fades from the U.S. foreign 

policy scene. Thus, the U.S. government will, once 

again, be caught unprepared whenever a large pool of 

ministerial advisors is needed posthaste. A fresh approach is needed, one in which ministerial advisors 

form an integral part of U.S. foreign policy in peacetime.

This study is organized into two parts. First, it proposes a U.S. interagency education system, which not 

only produces professional advisors, but also creates a 

large pool of advisors who can deploy to a number of 

countries quickly. Second, it synthesizes the best practices of advising from available literature, which can 
8

serve as a framework for the education curriculum. 

The end-product would be a professional ministerial 

advisory corps, comprising thousands of well-trained 

and deployable advisors.

Several aspects of this proposal bear emphasis: 

first, to be effective, training and education must occur in peacetime. Too often in the past, the provision 

of advisors has been in response to a conflict or in its 

aftermath as part of stability operations. Consequently, the exigencies of the moment have resulted in ad 

hoc solutions, with formal training courses cropping 

up years into the effort. Second, the interagency approach seeks to consolidate the current advisory training from various U.S. agencies, seeking efficiencies in 

terms of funding, facilities, faculty, and administration. The idea is not so much to replace current training programs, but to incorporate them into a larger 

educational framework so as to optimize existing capabilities. Third, advisory tours must be of sufficient 

length to preserve continuity of effort. Obviously, 

one-year tours are insufficient, so a two-year tour 

should be the baseline. By this approach, the advisory 

mission fosters advisor-counterpart rapport, permits 

advisors to take a long-term view of reform, and mitigates the turmoil associated with frequent turn-overs. 

Fourth, to attract motivated high quality advisors, 

incentives are imperative. The opportunity for higher 

education and career enhancement are certainly factors. Adequate salaries, supplemented by hardship 

pay, when on mission are also essential. Accordingly, 

as with other foreign policy and defense professions, 

the ministerial advisory corps would serve to promote 

U.S. national interests.
9

CONSIDERATIONS FOR A PROFESSIONAL 

MINISTERIAL ADVISORY CORPS

Due to the advantages for U.S. national security 

strategy, the President should establish a National 

Security Council (NSC) study committee to consider 

the creation of a ministerial advisory corps. At a minimum, the committee would study the need, purpose, 

and scope of such an advisory pool as an integral part 

of U.S. Security Cooperation not only in the aftermath 

of a conflict, but also as a peacetime engagement for 

interested countries. As such, the ministerial advisory 

corps must be of sufficient size to meet multiple missions over extended periods. Thereafter, congressional 

hearings on the proposal would explore the efficacy of 

a professional ministerial advisory corps, identify the 

shareholders, and give it legislative authority.

As a break from past practices, the establishment 

of a professional ministerial advisory corps would 

permit the United States to engage and influence willing host nations on capacity-building programs (i.e., 

Security Sector Reform, governance, and essential services), relying on professional subject matter experts. 

As important, host nation counterparts are more likely 

to see the value of the reform programs, the advisory 

mission, and the partnership with the United States.

The ministerial advisory corps requires an expeditionary character, ready for deployment upon call-up. 

The NSC study committee would need to determine 

the critical positions in a typical host-nation government for advisory match-up—viz. the Cabinet, the 

National Security Council, Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Interior, and so forth. 
10

Professionalizing the ministerial advisory corps 

requires a formal education through an established 

academy. Currently, various U.S. agencies conduct 

separate advisory training in support of capacitybuilding missions.13 While each provides superb advisory training, there is a danger these training programs will suffer from budget cuts during periods 

of austerity. Additionally, because these are separate 

training programs, duplication of effort is inevitable. 

To compensate for the shortfalls, seek efficiencies, and 

create unity of effort, the NSC study committee should 

identify a lead department to organize the education 

program. Conceptually, training would comprise 

three phases: basic, specialized, and pre-deployment. 

The modern precedence for a corps of trained 

professionals dates back to the Second World War, 

in which the U.S. Army’s Military Government Division established a School of Military Government at 

the University of Virginia.14 More than 6,000 trained 

technicians and advisors were earmarked for military 

governance duties.15 The specialists included 2,500 

commissioned civilians, who attended military and 

basic military government training at Fort Custer, 

Michigan, followed by three month’s intensive study 

at one of ten universities. Half of the studies was devoted to foreign language and foreign area issues. 

Upon graduation, the civilians returned to their vocations, subject to recall when needed.16

Similar to the efforts during World War II, the creation of a professional advisory corps requires formal 

training and education in order to foster knowledge 

and skills. To this end, this study advocates a basic 

advisory course, advanced degree completion, and a 

pre-deployment training course.
11

The Basic Advisory Course

The basic advisory course would constitute a generic advisory curriculum for six weeks or so in order 

to expose candidates to the rudiments and best practices of advising. For the purpose of structure, this 

study references the Department of Defense’s Ministry of Defense Advisors Program (MODA) as a curriculum framework. As mentioned above, the MODA 

program, administered by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency and conducted by the McKellar Corporation, has trained federal civilians for ministerial 

advising for the MOD and MOI in Afghanistan since 

2010 and is in the process of expanding the program 

globally.17 Because MODA provides both basic and 

deployment training in one seven-week course, this 

study addresses these features in the appropriate 

training phases.

While this study uses the MODA program as a 

model of training, it does not suggest the other programs in use by other prominent agencies—viz., the 

Office of Technical Assistance (OTA); US Department of the Treasury (DOT); International Criminal 

Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP); 

US Department of Justice (DOJ); Human Rights and 

Governance (DRG Center), USAID; US Department of 

State (DOS) Bureau of Counterterrorism; and Office of 

Criminal Justice and Assistance Partnerships (INL/

CAP), DOS—are deficient. Each trains its advisors 

properly for the mission. The intent is to describe one 

program, assuming the other programs are similarly 

structured.18

MODA is demonstrably a learning organization, 

with coursework focusing on the art and science of 

advising. Coursework is enhanced by guest lecturers, 
12

which include “former U.S. Ambassadors, Afghan officials, Department of State officials, retired military 

officers, and leading think-tank academics.” The program brings in senior facilitators, who assist with student discussions and assimilation of daily coursework. 

Additionally, the program regularly seeks improvements to the curriculum, eliciting feedback directly 

from the field and from former ministerial advisers.19

By teaching the art and science of advising, the 

MODA program seeks to create well-rounded advisors. To strategic theorist Harry Yarger, the overarching goal is to learn how to think strategically about 

strategy formulation: “developing and using the political, economic, socio-psychological, and military 

powers of the state in accordance with policy guidance to create effects and set conditions that protect 

or advance national interests relative to other states, 

actors, or circumstance.” The ability to think in terms 

of “objectives, concepts, and resources [serves] to increase the probability of policy success and the favorable consequences that follow from that success.”20

The program encapsulates the art of advising 

in a set of guiding principles, titled “The Code of 

Conduct,” designed to “support U.S. missions and 

overseas contingencies . . . strengthen the security 

ministries of partner states . . . [and] forge long-term 

relationships” with counterparts (covered in the principles and guidelines section).21

MODA instruction on knowledge and skills constitutes the science of advising: providing advisors with 

the “tools necessary for an advisor to advise effectively;” transforming “their professional competencies 

into advisory competencies;” and thereby producing 

“reflective practitioners and effective, successful advisors.” Accordingly, knowledge and skills form the 
13

course objectives in the following training modules: 

personal security; advisor knowledge and skills; and 

team performance. Taken together, the MODA program of instruction takes care to align knowledge 

and skills with the applicable guiding principles so 

as to produce well-balanced advisors.22 Incidentally, 

the MODA program vets candidates for appropriate 

personality traits and attributes in an effort to provide 

counterparts with compatible advisors.

In the proposed academy basic course, a specific 

region or host nation is not addressed, so instruction 

on the structure and missions of U.S. agencies, departments, and bureaus involved in advising as well as 

on the combatant commands would provide the comprehensive framework for a generic advisory effort. In 

addition, instruction on the U.S. political system, culture, civics, and history would enhance cultural selfawareness as an integral part of appreciating the complexities of other cultures. Moreover, advisors would 

be better equipped to explain American attitudes and 

cultural idiosyncrasies to their counterparts. Instruction on corruption is essential since every society suffers from it. To avoid misperceptions, the instruction 

must provide a definition (i.e., using one’s position of 

power for personal gain) and how it differs from culturally accepted patronage and nepotism. Scenarios 

on ethical dilemmas would be beneficial as well. Similarly, advisors need instruction on the Geneva Convention, Law of Land Warfare, and protocols, as well 

as their obligations if they learn of violations.

The basic course should introduce students to assessment processes, such as the Interagency Conflict 

Assessment Framework (ICAF), strategic thinking, 

systems thinking, the Deliberate Decision Making 

Process, and Measuring Progress in Conflict Environ-
14

ments (MPICE). Additionally, instruction on writing 

concise reports and giving briefings is of particular 

use.

An important adjunct to the MODA course material is the basic “Advisor’s Toolkit,” which is a collection of practical suggestions and information for 

study:23

•	 Personal Security: Stress Resilience, Predictive 

Threat Profiling, and Personal Security and Observation Skills.

•	 Advisor Skills: Innovative Skills Preference 

Inventory (ISPI),The Role of the Advisor, The 

Art of Asking Questions, Metacognition and 

the Reflective Practitioner, Institution Building 

Tools, Cross-Cultural Adaptability, Working 

With Interpreters, Mediation and Negotiation, 

Principles of Good Governance and Comparative Government, Risk Communication, Engaging Your Counterpart, and Measuring Progress.

The toolkit reinforces the course instruction, serving as a quick reference. Advisors can also supplement 

and personalize their toolkit with useful planning 

formats, checklists, and tips as a result of additional 

research.

Aside from the instruction, the basic course serves 

an administrative purpose as well. Apart from the collection of personal data to build advisor files, a health 

evaluation and a personality traits appraisal are necessary. Advisors are an investment for the government, 

so they need to be healthy enough to serve abroad for 

an extended time period. Scrutinizing an advisor’s 

personality traits is imperative due to the importance 

of building rapport (see Best Practices section on Es-
15

sential Personality Traits and Attributes). While technical competence, education and experience are important considerations, they cannot compensate for an 

incompatible personality. Not everyone is suitable as an 

advisor. It is far better to identify pernicious idiosyncrasies early in the process than to discover them after 

the advisor is deployed. Again, the MODA program 

relies on facilitator and peer assessments of students 

in making the determination to retain students for the 

program.

Conceptually, unless deployed for an immediate 

advisory mission, graduates from the basic course 

would return to their civilian or federal vocations 

until called-up for service and deployment training. 

This practice would have several advantages. Principally, it saves the government program money, with 

the parent organizations of candidates providing the 

travel and subsistence allowances for the basic course. 

Ministerial Advisory Corps funding would be limited 

to maintenance and operational costs for the academy, 

advanced schooling tuition, travel and subsistence for 

deployment training, and deployment salaries. Second, basic course graduates would serve as informal 

recruiters with greater outreach as they relate their experiences with friends, family, and colleagues. Third, 

basic course graduates would have the opportunity 

for self-assessment as they consider how their normal 

job responsibilities can be used to enhance their advising skills (i.e., separating the practical from the ideal). 

Last, the basic course experience should inspire graduates to continue their professional development vis-àvis the art and science of advising, through additional 

reading, self-study, and reflection. Altogether, this 

experience fosters a whole of government perspective.
16

The academy could hold periodic refresher training, seminars, and conferences so as to maintain the 

proficiency of graduates as well as introducing new 

advising techniques and knowledge. In this manner, 

the program remains dynamic and innovative.

Partnering with Universities

Aside from serving as an incentive for drawing 

quality advisors, the opportunity to attend specialized 

training at a partner university increases the advisor’s 

competence, and hence, value to an advisory counterpart. Ideally, the advisory program would provide 

tuition assistance for graduate or technical school.

The Ministerial Advisory Corps administration 

would manage the advanced degree program, encouraging interested students to seek degrees in public administration, political science, economics, law, 

and the like. The degree program should also include 

proficiency in prominent languages, such as French, 

Spanish, or Portuguese since these are widely spoken 

in many developing countries.

Pre-deployment Training Course

For advisors slated for a specific advisory mission, 

the pre-deployment training course would provide 

refresher training from the basic course but with special focus on the destination country. Conceptually, 

the course could last six weeks, depending on curriculum objectives. Based on the MODA program, the curriculum would focus on the local language, culture, 

history, political/military/police structures, rule of 

law (political structure and constitution), national security council, as well as the U.S. and host country’s 

missions, policies, and programs. Practical insights 
17

from facilitators and subject matter experts on the host 

nation or region would help fill the knowledge gaps. If 

possible, the program should assign “a cultural partner from the host country” to provide insights and 

advice on building rapport, cultural peculiarities, and 

language assistance. Lastly, like the MODA program, 

the course would culminate with a capstone advisory 

exercise at a training facility, such as the Muscatatuck 

Urban Training Center in Indiana, with ethnic role 

players serving as ministers, staff, and security for realism.24

As with the MODA program, the deployment Advisors Toolkit would provide supplemental information on the host nation and serve as a handy study 

reference:25

•	 Language, Culture, and Country Familiarization: History and Geopolitics, Recent Regimes, 

Religion, Politics and Governance, Business 

Etiquette, Security Forces, and Governing Institutions.

•	 U.S. and Host Country Mission, Polices, and 

Programs: Disarmament, Demobilization, and 

Reintegration program, Rule of Law, Police 

Reform, Defense Reform, Challenges of Transition (if applicable), Insurgency and Counterinsurgency (if applicable), Engaging Women in 

Reform, country team (or combatant command) 

assessments and plans, and an Acronym List.

Since advisors will likely have a counterpart identified, biographical information should be available. 

The program should conduct an assessment of the 

counterpart’s personality and identify potential compatibility friction points. Most importantly, the program should set aside a two-week transition time with 

the advisor’s predecessor for continuity of effort.
18

The course should conduct VTC sessions with relevant U.S. embassy officials and/or the command element of the combined/joint task force if applicable. 

Moreover, advisors should receive current phone 

numbers and emails of relevant U.S. agencies, embassy offices, Combined/Joint staff, UN offices, and other 

organizations. Realistically, maintaining current contact rosters is difficult, so having a dedicated staffer on 

top of this need is worthwhile.

Considerations for the Ministerial Advisory Corps

To draw quality people, the ministerial advisory 

program must provide a competitive salary for the 

training courses and deployment missions. If the mission is in a conflict area or post-conflict area in transition, advisors should receive hazardous duty pay as 

well.

Like the U.S. military reserves, ministerial advisory corps members would remain fully employed 

in their chosen vocations, with the government making arrangements with the employers for the advisors 

to attend training courses and deployment missions. 

Employers gain from this program by having more 

knowledgeable, skilled, and experienced employees, 

who in turn bring fresh perspectives and innovations 

to the workplace.

To be effective advisory tours should be at least 

two years, including the two-week transition time 

between predecessors and successors. This should be 

reflected in the mission-deployment contract, which 

also specifies whether the deployment is in peacetime, 

wartime, or transitional in aftermath of conflict.

A point system should apply to advisors with 

points awarded for training, graduate school, and de-
19

ployments. The point system would apply to federal 

job preference, enhancing career opportunities and 

promotion.

The evaluation system should be designed to enhance the advisor’s career field, so as to remain competitive with peers.

Academy courses should be consolidated in one facility with an established budget, administration, and 

logistics. Conceptually, relevant government agencies 

would contribute faculty and resources to the enterprise.

While some marketing of the ministerial advisory 

corps would be needed initially, veteran advisors can 

increase recruitment through articles, lectures, and 

special events.

Logically, the government agencies most interested in ministerial advising are the State Department, 

Defense Department, Treasury Department, Justice 

Department, and U.S. Agency for International Development. However, the basic course would also prove 

valuable for intended advisors below the ministry 

level, such as civil affairs, police, customs, and subnational government.

Aside from civilian advisors, the military has a 

vested interest in the education program. Certainly, 

civil affairs soldiers and foreign area officers would 

find the basic course useful as background to their 

duties, and many are earmarked for graduate school 

as part of their career track. Senior Service College 

graduates (e.g., colonels) would likewise benefit from 

the basic and deployment courses since they are often 

earmarked as advisors for senior foreign officers as 

part of security cooperation and even for ministers in 

hostile environments. They can also assist general officers, who generally have no time to attend the advi-
20

sory courses, on best practices for advising. Ideally, as 

the education program becomes an institution, some 

of its graduates will likely become general officers, so 

benefits to U.S. foreign policy will accrue. 

BEST PRACTICES FOR ADVISING

Best practices for advising should form the core of 

the advisory program curriculum, pervading classroom instruction, lectures and seminar discussions. 

These are goals the adviser strives to master.

Establishing Rapport and Professional Stature

As recognized from the advisory efforts of past 

conflicts and confirmed again in Iraq and Afghanistan, building rapport with the counterpart is the 

initial and most important goal for the advisor.26 “In 

the end,” counsels Foreign Service Officer Michael 

Metrinko, “establishing personal rapport with a host 

country official is the basis for success as an advisor, 

and the qualities in an advisor’s personality that allow for such a relationship are difficult to quantify.”27

Former Ministerial Advisor John Gillette upholds 

Metrinko’s sentiment: “The key to advising is relationships, relationships, relationships. By this I mean 

the advisor needs to be equally capable at building 

horizontal and vertical relationships within both the 

host nation ministry and the advisor’s command. Relationships established based on mutual respect are 

essential in order to make concrete progress.”28 Former Iraqi Army advisor Joshua Potter’s experience 

corresponds with these judgments. “In order to have 

a positive and measured effect, we are responsible for 

forging a relationship based on professional respect 
21

and personal understanding of each other. This is impossible if we are ethnocentric in our approach. We 

must listen to their perspective and understand their 

systems in order to effectively advise.”29 However, 

advisors must not view the establishment of rapport 

as a discrete event, requiring no further attention. As 

the U.S. Army Research Institute underscores: “Relationship building is an ongoing activity that occurs 

throughout a deployment rather than occurring a few 

times early in a deployment.”30 Building rapport extends beyond personal relationships, albeit important. 

Ultimately, the counterpart must have confidence in 

the assistance programs and in the U.S. partnership; 

the advisor is the link to that trust.

The advisor must be careful not to rush this process. Special Forces officer Mark Grdovic avers that 

building rapport requires patience and time, often 

during informal activities with the counterpart.31 T.E. 

Lawrence (i.e., Lawrence of Arabia) cautioned that the 

advisor should “go easy for the first few weeks. A bad 

start is difficult to atone for, and the Arabs form their 

judgments on externals that we ignore.”32 Vietnam 

War advisors were instructed to “avoid rushing your 

acceptance by your counterpart. Overselling yourself 

will arouse suspicion and delay acceptance. Time 

spent developing a healthy relationship will pay large 

dividends later on.”33 Like Grdovic, T. E. Lawrence 

counselled that fostering rapport is not confined to 

the formal setting; informal activities, such as sharing 

meals, accompanying him on trips, social functions, 

athletic events, and casual conversations are culturally more effective venues for “dropping ideas,”34 In 

a related theme, Nadia Gerspacher and Adrian Shtuni 

of the U.S. Institute of Peace see patience as integral to 

the trust-building process.35
22

Building rapport must be balanced with professionalism. To be both credible and useful to the counterpart, the advisor must safeguard his professional 

standing, by no means an easy achievement. As the 

name implies, a professional is the product of education, self-study, experience, reflection, good judgment, and personal integrity. T.E. Lawrence advised, 

“Your ideal position is when you are present and not 

noticed. Do not be too intimate, too prominent, or 

too earnest. . . . To do your work you must be above 

jealousies, and you lose prestige if you are associated 

with a tribe or clan, and its inevitable feuds.” MODA 

teaches that the advisor is duty bound to “uphold the 

standards of respectability worthy of a representative 

of the United States Government; be a role model of 

public service professionalism.”36 This suggests that 

as a professional, the advisor maintains both a close 

but appropriate relationship with his counterpart so 

as not to be seen as “going native” or compromising 

his professional integrity. Hence, advisors must be 

credible on two fronts: first, they must maintain the 

respect of their own institution; second they must secure the trust of the counterpart and his office.

Because patience and professionalism are essential 

to advising, this study addresses them in further detail in the character traits and attributes section (pages 

35-54).

Gaining Competencies

Education and self-study establish the basic foundation for competency and proficiency. In Metrinko’s 

view, “A good advisor’s skill set includes language 

ability, cross-cultural adaptation and knowledge, and 

a solid foundation in American history and politics, 
23

as well as expertise in his particular military field.”37

Similarly, Grdovic believes that 

advisers need to arrive with a reasonable macro understanding [of the country, culture, and conflict] so 

that they are ready to start developing a micro understanding of their new environment. This region-specific, counterpart-specific, micro-level understanding, 

developed from time spent in country with the counterpart, provides clear signals that the adviser possesses a sincere desire to understand his environment, 

which is a precursor to developing valid opinions and 

rendering any advice.38

While the pre-deployment training course would 

provide the foundation of host nation understanding, 

Metrinko suggests advisors increase their knowledge 

further with books, internet sources, the U.S. embassy 

website, information from relevant government agencies and bureaus, current Department of Defense 

and Department of State policies and Status of Forces Agreements (SOFA), and host nation command 

structures, chain of command and logistical system. 

Reports and continuity files from preceding advisors 

should also prove useful.39 Metrinko encourages the 

advisor to delve even deeper: 

Another asset available to advisors is a plethora of 

country studies and intelligence, both unclassified and 

classified. Information available typically includes 

population studies, ethnographic studies, terrain 

studies, key personnel assessments, and reports from 

military units operating in the area. Other assets include studies about senior foreign officials developed 

by various agencies. This information is especially 

crucial as it may clarify what makes a foreign official 

“tick.” Such reports are difficult to access, but they are 

available and will help the advisor develop an under-
24

standing of the terrain. Information of this nature can 

be obtained from both the military headquarters and 

from the local U.S. Embassy. A wise advisor should 

seek out the military intelligence officer or Defense Attaché at the Embassy, explain his upcoming task, and 

ask for all information that is available.40

Upon arrival in country, the first task of the advisor is the transition meeting with his predecessor to 

review his continuity file. Accordingly, the predecessor addresses existing policies, programs, and strategies. He apprises the successor on the counterpart’s 

ethnicity, religion, education, political connections, 

social standing, familial background, and reputation. His opinion of the counterpart’s leadership and 

executive skills is appropriate, but this is a subjective 

evaluation. The predecessor should address what he 

has accomplished and what remains outstanding, as 

well as what has worked, what has failed, and why. 

He should also highlight the strengths and weakness 

of those systems which impact on the ministry office 

(i.e., budget, supply, administrative, patronage, and 

so forth). In turn, the successor begins his own continuity file, which he will use to brief his successor.41

This transition meeting is essential for continuity of 

effort, so it is incumbent upon the ministerial advisory 

program to ensure it is preserved above all other considerations. 

Once settled in his job, the advisor should seek out 

other available resources. “The advisor,” as Metrinko 

affirms, “is never alone in his new environment, and a 

variety of other players, from the American Embassy 

[including country teams], international organizations, the media, nongovernment agencies, and the 

local populace affect the advisory mission as well. Understanding the roles played by this variety of actors 
25

is essential to the advisor, since they can provide support and cooperation as well as hinder his mission.”42

Advisors should build positive relations with the 

media and cooperate with the embassy public affairs 

office for guidance on media relations. The media can 

provide the advisor with critical information on events 

or on the counterpart and help propagate programs or 

“good news stories” for public consumption.43

If the advisory mission coincides with a U.S.-led 

coalition operation, the advisor should become acquainted with the combined/joint staff (or Office of 

Military Cooperation staff), since it can provide a 

wealth of information on current policies, strategies, 

programs, and other initiatives. The combined/joint 

staff can also verify information (or rumors) the counterpart has shared, or it can render staff assistance 

regarding specific problems plaguing the ministry. 

The advisor should understand that the counterpart 

and his staff may not be familiar with or understand 

the combined/joint staff products. Quite often, these 

products are ignored until the advisor brings them up. 

In view of the limited time between call-up and 

deployment, the advisor should concentrate on 

knowledge central to the assigned ministry. Grdovic 

counsels that advisors should have the experience and 

background commensurate with the counterpart’s 

responsibilities, in addition to possessing thorough 

knowledge on the equipment and weapon systems of 

the host country. Once they prove useful to the counterpart, their credibility, trust, influence, and value 

will increase correspondingly.44

While prevalent in U.S. circles, advisors should 

avoid using the terms “advisor” or “mentor” with host 

nation officials. In Grdovic’s view, “advisor” suggests 

the counterpart is not a professional.45 Metrinko writes 
26

that “mentor” connotes, “a relationship between a superior and someone younger, or inferior in status and 

rank. In the world of strategic partnerships, and in a 

setting where expertise, experience, social status, political rank, and financial resources can be more heavily weighted on the foreign official’s side, ‘mentor’ is a 

misnomer.”46 As a substitute, the advisor should refer 

to himself as a special assistant to the counterpart.

Language Proficiency and Cultivating an

Interpreter/Translator

The literature and expert opinions are unanimous 

regarding the necessity of language proficiency. Grdovic maintains that good language skills increases rapport, and T. E. Lawrence encourages advisors to “to 

speak their dialect.”47 Realistically though, mastering 

a language takes years of study and immersion in the 

culture, and even then, fluency can remain elusive. 

Regardless of the obstacles, the advisor should make a 

dedicated effort to speak conversationally in the local 

language since this accrues a plethora of benefits in 

terms of building rapport and influence.48 In the meantime, the advisor must optimize available resources to 

communicate effectively with the counterpart. One 

potential asset is the interpreter/translator (hereafter 

shortened to interpreter).

Cultivating the interpreter is one of the most important activities for the adviser. Ideally, the interpreter is 

assigned to the adviser for the duration of the mission. 

Thus, building a good working relationship with him 

is imperative.49 The adviser should suffer no illusions 

regarding the proficiency of his interpreter: “Who is 

an ideal interpreter?” Metrinko asks. “It would be 

someone who can accurately and quickly translate nu-
27

anced meaning, be thoroughly versed in both countries’ history, literature, culture, and politics, as well 

as in the technical subjects under discussion, and yet 

not allow his personality to shade the interpretation. 

This paragon does not exist, and if he did, the advisor 

would not be able to afford him.”50 Hence, the advisor 

will need to work with his interpreter so they become 

an effective team.

The initial meeting with the interpreter is dedicated to learning his background. Foremost, the advisor should determine whether he and the interpreter 

are compatible since personality clashes can hinder 

effective communication and prove distracting for 

the counterpart. Identifying skills, such as education, 

vocation, prior jobs, and self-improvement activities, 

helps the adviser assess the interpreter’s level of English proficiency. Identifying the interpreter’s religion, 

ethnicity, political affiliation, family (i.e., social standing), and tribal associations helps the adviser identify 

potential points of friction with the counterpart, but 

are not necessarily disqualifiers for employment per 

se. What will disqualify an interpreter is any indication of “heavy emotional baggage, prejudice, or personal political motivation that conversations will be 

twisted in a way not intended by either advisor or official, leading to distrust and mission failure.”51 Thus, 

the advisor must remain alert to potential telltale 

problems during the interview.

The advisor should ascertain whether the job will 

endanger the interpreter due to his association with 

the United States or the host government. If a threat 

exists due to the location of the interpreter’s home, the 

advisor and interpreter should discuss personal security techniques, such as departing and arriving home 

at different times, frequently changing routes to work, 
28

alterations of appearance during travel, and having a 

cover story if confronted. 

If the advisor inherited the interpreter from his 

predecessor, they should discuss the interpreter’s impression of the counterpart, previous advisory discussions and points of contention, and likely challenges 

the advisor will face. The interpreter’s perspective 

will likely be imperfect, but it does provide the advisor with a baseline of comparison with the previous 

advisor’s viewpoints.

 Perhaps just as important, the adviser establishes 

the ground rules for the interpreter (i.e., what is expected of him). Because the concept of time may suffer from cultural ambivalence, the advisor will need 

to stress the importance of punctuality for job performance. For meetings, the advisor should tell the interpreter to use first person (i.e., “I” not “he”) and adopt 

the advisor’s demeanor and verbal tone. The interpreter is only to translate the advisor’s exact meaning 

without interjecting his own viewpoints. He is never 

to usurp the advisor’s authority by giving orders to 

ministerial officials regardless of the circumstances. 

Last, as an extension of the advisor, he must maintain 

a professional appearance (i.e., tidy and properly attired).

For his part, the adviser must use simple words 

and short, simple sentences. The adviser should develop a rhythm of stopping every couple of sentences 

for translation. Consequently, the adviser must anticipate that meetings will take twice as long due to 

translation time and plan accordingly. Initially, the 

adviser must take care to avoid common translation 

pitfalls, such as the use of acronyms (e.g., JSOC), arcane vocabulary (e.g., arcane), terminology (e.g., mission command), slang/vernacular (e.g., hang tough), 
29

euphemisms (e.g., collateral damage), and difficult 

conceptual terms (e.g., center of gravity). As the advisor and translator cultivate their working relationship, these usages can be introduced once they are 

discussed fully.

As part of the meeting preparations, the adviser 

must review with the interpreter those issues that 

will be discussed during the meeting, including terminology and concepts that the adviser must use. The 

adviser can check interpreter understanding by having him paraphrase key points to be made during the 

meeting.

By their nature, interpreters will not likely admit 

they don’t understand everything said out of fear of 

being fired or reprimanded (i.e., losing face), so they 

will skip over what was said or say what they think the 

adviser meant. The adviser can forestall a lot of confusion by telling his interpreter to speak up whenever 

he does not understand something, even in front of 

the counterpart. Similarly, the adviser should request 

the counterpart ask for clarification if the translation 

is confusing.

The adviser must provide the interpreter with 

a notebook and pen for note-taking . . . and ensure 

he has them for each meeting. Irrespective of the interpreter’s translation skills, a notebook helps him 

capture the salient points as he prepares to translate. 

Also, the notes help the adviser write the subsequent 

memorandum of conversation. The adviser should 

not take notes during the meeting, so as to maintain 

eye contact with the counterpart.

The adviser should develop the skill of looking 

at the counterpart while speaking rather than at the 

translator (a difficult habit to break in practice), so the 

location of the interpreter vis-à-vis the advisor and 
30

counterpart must facilitate eye contact. The adviser 

should cue on the counterpart’s body language (i.e., 

facial expressions and other nonverbal cues) so as to 

alert him of misinterpretations as well as his acceptance or rejection of what is being discussed. Reading 

body language is an important skill for advisers, as 

the U.S. Army Research Institute has noted: “Advisors 

who spent more time interpreting nonverbal behavior 

also tended to report having counterparts who were 

more amenable to guidance.”52 Likewise, the interpreter should be able to observe both the advisor and 

counterpart’s facial expressions. The advisor should 

have a prearranged nonverbal signal for the interpreter to stop talking if the counterpart takes issue with 

anything said. It is imperative for the advisor to control the discussion rather than having the counterpart 

and interpreter arguing over some point made. It is up 

to the advisor to settle the matter, not the interpreter.

The adviser must remain alert to English mispronunciations (e.g., ab road instead of abroad), mixing 

up words (e.g., constructing versus contracting), or 

making nuanced mistakes (e.g., training not education). If a translation does not make complete sense, 

it is likely due to one of these errors. As the advisor 

gains proficiency in the language, he should not hesitate to correct the interpreter for mistranslations in an 

unassuming manner. This has the added benefit of increasing rapport with the counterpart by demonstrating the advisor’s increased language proficiency. 

It would be a grave mistake for the adviser to assume the counterpart speaks little or no English. He 

may not speak English well, but understand plenty. 

This may apply to other officials in the office as well. 

Incidentally, the adviser should query whether the 

counterpart and he have another foreign language 
31

(e.g., French, Spanish, or Portuguese) in common 

and revert to it whenever a translation is not getting 

through.

At the end of a meeting, the advisor, referring to 

the translator’s notes, should repeat what has been 

discussed and what answers or products are expected 

for the next meeting. If new officials are at the meeting, the interpreter should ask for their contact information as well.

Once they have returned from the meeting, the 

advisor and interpreter should conduct a review session, addressing any translation difficulties, perceived 

verbal and nonverbal cues of the counterpart, meeting 

atmospherics, and ways to improve their teamwork. 

The advisor is responsible for developing his interpreter. He should take the time to assist the interpreter hone his English. He should teach the interpreter new vocabulary, concepts, and terminology, 

especially those which are often used in meetings. He 

should loan the interpreter books, magazines, newspapers, and DVD movies to introduce common words 

and modern phrases. The English an interpreter has 

learned may not necessarily be the English which 

Americans speak. For example, he may have learned 

British English to include pronunciations. The interpreter should feel comfortable in asking the advisor 

about words not understood in the reading materials 

or the film. In this regard, the adviser should purchase 

an English-indigenous language dictionary for the interpreter, since it is unlikely he can afford one.

Often, the adviser will assist the counterpart’s office in the production of policy, strategy, and similar 

documents. With all written products, it is prudent to 

write English and the indigenous language in alternating paragraphs. This technique helps when proof-
32

ing and revising documents and helps the counterpart’s staff better understand the substance once they 

become more proficient in English. Ninety percent of 

problems with documents is due to poor translations, 

so the advisor will need to go over each paragraph 

with the interpreter to clear up any potential language 

barriers. The advisor will need to arrange a special 

meeting with the counterpart and his staff to review 

the document in question, which is a time-consuming 

but necessary task.

The advisor should optimize other uses of the interpreter. In the role as an assistant, the interpreter 

should request the telephone numbers and emails of 

key officials at the end of meetings. For the initial meeting with the counterpart, the adviser should arrange 

the regular meeting schedule so the counterpart can 

set aside time for discussions without interruptions. 

In this manner, the interpreter acts as the medium for 

normal or emergency communications. The advisor 

should teach the interpreter time management, basic 

planning, note taking, and other skills as needed for 

the mission. Interpreters are likely to occupy an office 

pool so the adviser should make daily visits to ensure 

the interpreters are gainfully employed. If the adviser 

is not attentive, interpreters may spend the workday 

playing games on the computer or watching TV.

The adviser should use the interpreter as a local 

language teacher (including dialects) for common 

terms, phrases, and idioms. Most important, the adviser should practice pronunciations with the interpreter so as to develop a native patois. The instruction 

should include reading the local newspaper together 

for reading comprehension as well as reading articles 

aloud to practice pronunciation.
33

The interpreter should serve to alert the advisor 

of special events (e.g., holidays), significant incidents 

(e.g., death of a family member), cultural norms or 

taboos, religious events (i.e., Eid and Ramadan), ministry work hours, and political sensitivities. The interpreter can prove invaluable in assisting the advisor 

with the appropriate courtesies as well as table and 

social etiquette. Moreover, the interpreter should alert 

the advisor of the latest rumors, conspiracy theories, 

and breaking news stories circulating in the society. 

The interpreter should advise on how specific religious practices, such as fasting during Ramadan, impact on the people’s temperament, sleep, and energy. 

Hence, Ramadan is not a period for productive activities nor should the adviser eat, drink, smoke, etc. in 

front of observers.

The interpreter should advise on the propriety of 

gifts to the counterpart for special holidays, departures, family events, and other occasions. The interpreter must be prepared to explain to the counterpart 

the reason for the gift. Similarly, whenever the counterpart provides a gift, the interpreter must explain to 

the advisor the reason for the gift and the appropriate 

response beyond a mere thank you. For a more delicate matter, the advisor should discuss appropriate 

ways to refuse counterpart requests for favors (i.e., 

TVs, stereos, Visas, etc.) or offers of inappropriate 

gifts. While a firm, polite refusal is the correct course, 

the interpreter can provide advice on how to do so 

without embarrassing the counterpart or without the 

advisor losing face, particularly if others are present.

The adviser should discuss with the interpreter the 

connotations regarding religion, justice, culture, as 

well as the country’s historical narrative, all of which 

will differ from the American context. For example, 
34

the understanding of what constitutes a criminal act 

or corruption may not be viewed as such in the local 

society.

The interpreter should assist in route planning 

for trips to other locales in order to avoid dangerous 

places. Additionally, the interpreter should alert the 

advisor of any anomalies in local settings which might 

pose a danger. It is not an understatement to view 

the interpreter as the adviser’s barometer for danger. 

Ultimately however, the advisor is responsible for 

his own personal security. He must remain vigilant 

of operational security and take notice whenever an 

interpreter makes queries on security issues beyond 

his need to know or attempts to access classified or 

confidential information. If the interpreter persists in 

this behavior after being warned, the advisor should 

inform the security office and dismiss him.53

Although never explicitly addressed in the literature, advisers should conduct counseling sessions for 

both bad and good performance. The advisor must 

point out poor performance and expected corrective 

measures. If the adviser needs to fire the interpreter 

later, written counseling sessions with specific instances and dates make it easier to justify termination. 

In regards to incentives, interpreters treasure certificates of appreciation and of training since they often 

serve to pad the interpreter’s portfolio/resume. Moreover, certificates are an excellent way to gain loyalty.
35

Essential Advisor Personality Traits and Attributes

As the U.S. Army Research Institute notes, “The 

heart of the advisor mission is to teach, coach, mentor, 

train, and guide counterparts to better performance 

and self-reliance.”54 As previously noted, not everyone, no matter how intelligent and accomplished, is 

suitable for advising. It bears emphasizing that a poor 

adviser is worse than no adviser at all, so the following passages are designed to underscore those traits 

an advisor should try to master. These traits are mutually reinforcing, serving to establish the advisor as a 

valuable partner for the counterpart and the advisory 

mission. Accordingly, the basic course should embed 

these attributes in the curriculum.

Patience. A critical component for building rapport, 

patience is a trait consistently identified in advising 

literature.55 T.E. Lawrence suggested patience was a 

strategy: “Have the patience to bear with them. The 
36

less apparent your interferences the more your influence. They are willing to follow your advice and do 

what you wish, but they do not mean you or anyone 

else to be aware of that. It is only after the end of all 

annoyances that you find at bottom their real fund 

of goodwill.”56 Metrinko cautions that host nation 

officials are not compelled to complete tasks on the 

same timeline as newly assigned advisers (who usually have one-year tours). They do not share the same 

sense of urgency and action as advisers. In short, the 

counterpart will not change his work habits to suit the 

adviser.57 Thus, the advisor must allow time for his 

recommendations to germinate, allowing the counterpart to consider the advice at his own pace. Except in 

extreme cases, patient counsel gives the counterpart 

the freedom to fail, underscoring that failure is often 

the best teacher. As T. E. Lawrence pointed out, “Do 

not try to do too much with your own hands. Better 

the Arabs do it tolerably than that you do it perfectly. 

It is their war, and you are to help them, not to win 

it for them. Actually, also, under the very odd conditions of Arabia, your practical work will not be as 

good as, perhaps, you think it is.”58

Perseverance. As a complement to patience, persistence helps nurture the relationship with the counterpart. It forms the foundation of negotiation, serving to 

engage the counterpart in a dialogue regarding acute 

policy challenges and decisions. No advisor should allow a decision to stand which he believes is detrimental to essential goals and strategy. Naturally, patience, 

tact, and respect must accompany persistence to have 

the desired effect.59 During the Vietnam War, advisors 

were instructed: 

If a problem area is discovered, continue efforts to 

solve it, recommend appropriate measures to be 
37

taken, and then follow through; again, remembering 

that patience is of utmost importance. But, the matter 

must be continually brought to your counterpart’s attention until he is sold on taking the measures necessary to solve the problem or correct the deficiency as 

the case may be. The ultimate in good advising is to 

advise your counterpart in such a way that he takes 

the desired action feeling that it was through his own 

initiative rather than yours.60

Vietnam advisors were encouraged to take frustration in stride: “Don’t become discouraged. All of your 

advice won’t be accepted. Some of it will be implemented at a later date.”61

Tact. Having two meanings, tact is the faculty to 

speak appropriately for the occasion, as well as the 

ability to use good judgment when faced with complex situations. Like patience, tact is regarded as an 

essential trait in advising literature.62 Gerspacher and 

Shtuni note that “an effective advisor must be tactful 

and able to turn a hostile situation into one in which 

all parties come out with a degree of satisfaction. 

While it may not be a win-win outcome, it should allow everyone to move forward without acrimony or 

losing face.”63 Certainly, the interpreter can provide 

some guidelines regarding appropriate expressions, 

but for the most part, the advisor should try to anticipate trouble ahead. For example, the MODA program 

strives to inculcate “humility, empathy and respect” 

in its students, particularly during the capstone exercise. One of the scenarios involves a meeting with a 

minister, whose relative, unbeknownst to the student, 

has been killed in a U.S. airstrike. The minister lashes 

out at the student, who is evaluated on how tactfully 

he/she handles the situation.
38

Professionalism. While building rapport is essential 

for building a relationship with the counterpart, professionalism creates the balance to sustain it. As professionals, advisors must remember that success is the 

domain of the host nation, but the advisors are always 

held accountable for failure.64 Nevertheless, while the 

advisor wants his counterpart to succeed, it cannot be 

at all cost. Professionalism acts as a necessary buffer 

to protect the advisor from charges of “going native” 

or sycophancy. The advisor should keep in mind that 

the counterpart may leave his position as a result of 

promotion, relief, or retirement, so the advisor should 

not be perceived as being so close to his counterpart 

that his successor views him with mistrust.

The advisor sets a personal example, comporting 

himself with integrity, presenting a groomed and appropriately dressed appearance, and maintaining both 

physical and mental fitness. He practices “military 

courtesy and protocol appropriate to the counterpart’s 

rank and the advisor’s level of operation as a member 

of the counterpart’s personal staff.” He knows his job 

and the job of his counterpart, to include the organization, personnel, and equipment (i.e., property book), 

as well as higher strategies and policies. He demonstrates empathy for his counterpart’s concerns and 

takes the time to discuss them in private.65

The advisor, as Metrinko observes, is always in the 

spotlight: “Remember that a foreign advisor is always 

under observation, from servants, other guests, and 

the eyes of scores of nameless security guards, drivers, 

other staff, and even the beggars sitting outside along 

the road (who may be reporting his activities to the 

local security service). His reputation and his actions 

will be discussed and analyzed in circles of whose 

existence he is not even aware. He will be tested re-
39

peatedly to gauge his reactions and standards, and 

his character and professionalism judged accordingly. 

People he has never met will judge him from afar, and 

be ready to deal with him or refuse him access based 

on word on the street about his behavior.”66

The advisor will likely be confronted with an ethical dilemma, with perceived corruption heading the 

list.67 Metrinko warns that American perceptions of 

corruption may clash with accepted local practices. 

Advisors must understand the difference between 

corruption in Western parlance and cultural norms 

in society. Fees for service may be socially acceptable. 

Since officials may be supporting family members 

(and extended family members), the extra income is 

needed to supplement a meager salary. Also, government organizations may not have retirement benefits 

and the like.68 If the advisor does discover real corruption (i.e., “the misuse of power for personal gain”), 

it becomes a test of his professionalism. The adviser 

must remain an ethical role model, leveraging his 

rapport, persuasion, and quiet counsel regarding the 

potential consequences to the counterpart’s country, 

his family, and his reputation. Using analogies and 

conversational subtleties rooted on honor, integrity, 

and justice will likely be more effective than a direct 

approach.69 

The advisor should suffer under no illusion that 

he will change centuries of corruption, and a confrontation with the counterpart might result in marginalization or dismissal, so the advisor must weigh the 

severity of the activities with mission success—without rationalizing away the problem. Nevertheless, 

if the corruption is egregious, the advisor must not 

shy away from the final recourse, which is to inform 

his superiors of the evidence. Even so, the counter-
40

part may still retain his position, so the advisor and 

his superior may need to consider the next step. As 

Metrinko notes, “it is counterproductive to remain 

in a relationship which is so sour that the American 

advisor is ignored, disregarded, or seriously misused. 

Breaking the relationship with U.S. mission concurrence is not a sign of failure on the advisor’s part, but 

a sign of good sense.”70 Regardless of the outcome, the 

advisor retains his professional standing within the 

ministry. On the extreme end of the spectrum, if the 

advisor learns of any atrocities and other violations 

of the Geneva Convention, he informs the counterpart 

immediately that both he and the counterpart are obligated to report them to their superiors respectively.

Knowledge of the Human Terrain. Viewed as a vital 

trait, Metrinko suggests advisors must seek proficiency in the culture, linguistics, social customs, and beliefs 

of the society in which they are immersed. “The advisor will rarely have had the luxury of years of study 

about the country, and so the process of knowing in 

itself becomes important. He should strive to learn as 

much as he can, and show interest, enthusiasm, and 

commitment to the learning process, because knowledge of the local human terrain will determine the 

nature of his advice, the way it is presented, and the 

likelihood that it will be received and implemented. It 

will impact directly on the relationship between the 

advisor and the foreign official, and make all the difference between success and failure in his mission.”71

On a related note, an understanding of organizational 

cultures will help the advisor anticipate occurrences 

of interagency parochialism, unhealthy competition, 

and jealousies, which explains resistance to reforms, 

policies, and initiatives. Alerting the counterpart of 

these common organizational behaviors will serve to 
41

mitigate frustration and to help him devise stratagems 

to overcome obstacles. 

Self-Reliance. As the second vital trait to Metrinko, 

advisors must demonstrate the ability to function in 

a foreign environment without a great deal of supervision.72 Advisors must feel comfortable dealing with 

uncertainty and independence. “Advisors should understand all situations will not be black and white,” as 

current U.S. doctrine notes. “They are caught between 

two cultures, systems, and narratives. They must live 

in the proverbial gray area while maintaining legal, 

moral, and ethical standards. Advisors will likely 

find themselves isolated with great autonomy and no 

supervision. Under these conditions, they will face 

moral and ethical dilemmas on a daily basis. Advisors 

will have to grow mentally to be comfortable in this 

environment. . . . An honest self-assessment should be 

encouraged. Thus, the advisor mission calls for leaders of enormous character, moral courage, and sharp 

intellect.”73

Advisors must feel comfortable resolving problems at their level without the need to check with superiors beforehand. Such delegation of authority requires good judgment so the advisor is not perceived 

as a rogue operator. Good judgment requires intimate 

knowledge of policies, strategies, and agreements, 

which set the parameters of advisory activities. The 

advisor is duty-bound to inform his superiors of his 

decisions and the rationale behind them. The superiors in turn are obligated to act as a firewall against 

impulsive criticism from higher agencies.

Ability to Negotiate. Metrinko considers the ability 

to negotiate as the last vital trait because much of what 

the advisor does is rooted in persuasion, deliberation, 

and logic in a patient but firm manner.74 If a topic is 
42

likely to encounter resistance, the advisor must have 

a strategy, outlining background, pertinent facts, the 

likely multi-ordered effects of each option, and the 

benefits afforded to the counterpart.75 The advisor 

should explain an issue from differing angles, using 

different words to help the counterpart understand it 

fully. The counterpart will not admit he does not understand something, so it is incumbent on the advisor 

to explain the issue without sounding patronizing. At 

some point, the advisor will need to assess the counterpart’s capacity because he needs to understand his 

limitations and no amount of negotiations will overcome that.

Regardless, discussions are never one-sided. The 

advisor must conscientiously engage his counterpart 

in private when possible, asking for his thoughts and 

advice, listening actively and showing through verbal 

cues and body language that his input is valuable. As 

T.E. Lawrence counseled, 

Strengthen his prestige at your expense before others 

when you can. Never refuse or quash schemes he may 

put forward; but ensure that they are put forward in 

the first instance privately to you. Always approve 

them, and after praise modify them insensibly, causing the suggestions to come from him, until they are in 

accord with your own opinion. When you attain this 

point, hold him to it, keep a tight grip of his ideas, and 

push them forward as firmly as possibly, but secretly, 

so that to one but himself (and he not too clearly) is 

aware of your pressure.76

The counterpart is not obligated to accept the advice, either immediately or ever.77 The political climate 

or timing may not be right for a policy recommendation or initiative, so the advisor should try to infer the 
43

reasons for the counterpart’s rebuff and explain this 

to his superiors. As Metrinko notes, “If the foreign official is personally sensitive to his country’s weakened 

status or to the implication that the U.S. advisor is a 

‘watchdog’ or a ‘spy’ with authority over the official’s 

activities, he will resent the American’s presence, and 

others in the office will be certain to feed the official’s 

paranoia by slanted reports of what the American is 

doing and who he is seeing.”78 As an alternative, the 

advisor can float ideas to the counterpart to gauge receptivity but without the risk of rejection.

During meetings, the advisor should limit the 

number of issues, perhaps to three, for discussion, nor 

should they prolong undue discussion on one topic. 

If it is important, it can be discussed further in other 

meetings, allowing the counterpart to digest the various points.79 Moreover, the advisor should not present 

advice requiring an immediate decision. “Leave sufficient room for your counterpart to exercise his prerogative. One of his greatest fears is that he will appear 

dependent upon his advisor to his [subordinates].”80

Preservation of Value to Counterpart. Perceived value is an amalgam of partnership, pleasant personality, and the benefit to the counterpart. Mark Grdovic 

avers that closely shared and aligned goals are integral to maintaining value. Because the environment 

and norms in the host nations are unique from the 

American experience, the advisor must adapt, demonstrating a “greater degree of flexibility, adaptability 

and initiative.”81 For Vietnam War advisors, comportment was integral to preserving value: “to sell 

one’s self, you must prove your values—an advisor 

must present a favorable personality in the eyes of 

his counterpart. This can be accomplished in due 

time by a gradual demonstration of your ca-
44

pabilities in an unassuming but firm manner. Be 

positive but not dogmatic in your approach to any

subject; however, if you are not sure of the subject matter, it is better to say so and take timely 

measures to obtain the correct information. To 

attempt to bluff through a problem will only result in irreparable loss of prestige.”82

Metrinko takes a more utilitarian view: “The advisor must show that he has qualifications that complement the official’s skill set, and that he can add value 

to the official’s performance and provide useful advice and assistance. If he cannot show he is of value, 

he will be ignored, relegated to the role of foreign staff 

aide, or at best be only a liaison between the official’s 

office and the local U.S. military bureaucracy.”83

To Grdovic, the bottom-line is influence: “The 

amount of influence an adviser attains will be directly 

proportional to the sum of three factors: the rapport 

between the adviser and the host-nation commander 

or counterpart; the credibility of the individual adviser; and the perception by host-nation forces of 

the continued value of the relationship.”84 The U.S. 

Army Research Institute characterizes this approach 

as impression management: “Advisors may engage 

in activities to promote their credibility and competence, such as role modeling and explicitly informing 

counterparts of their expertise and experience. Once 

a counterpart views an advisor as someone with expertise, it increases the likelihood a counterpart will 

accept an advisor’s guidance and mentorship.”85

Affability. Because building relationships is pivotal 

to success, the advisor must have a pleasant personality, stressing the importance of teamwork. Since advisors are not commanders or even remotely in charge 

of the ministry offices they are advising, their person-
45

alities become a critical component for success.86 The 

advisor must be everyone’s respected associate—not 

solely the counterpart’s special assistant. He should 

show consideration and respect to junior officials, office workers, even the janitors and tea servers, because 

they may be relatives of the counterpart and they most 

definitely will report on how the adviser treats them 

when out of earshot from the counterpart.87

Cultivating this image is a demanding task, with 

the advisor anticipating how he will interact with others in any given situation. Metrinko warns that “the 

advisor must look at himself through local eyes and 

the local culture. If the American officer’s ‘can do’ attitude is too highly developed, he may just seem illmannered and abrasive to the official and his staff, 

who often operate at a different tempo than that in 

U.S. military circles. If he appears to be too young and 

lacking in authority, the American may be regarded 

simply as a decorative foreign staff aide who tags 

along to add luster to the official’s entourage.”88

A sense of humor is essential, and selective selfeffacement has a way of disarming captious people. 

Accordingly, Vietnam War Advisors were urged to 

“study your counterpart to determine his personality and background, exert every effort to establish 

and maintain friendly relationships. Learn something 

about the personal life of the Vietnamese with whom 

you work and demonstrate this interest.”89 T. E. Lawrence advised, “Cling tight to your sense of humour. 

You will need it every day. A dry irony is the most 

useful type, and repartee of a personal and not too 

broad character will double your influence with the 

chiefs. Reproof, if wrapped up in some smiling form, 

will carry further and last longer than the most violent 

speech. The power of mimicry or parody is valuable, 
46

but use it sparingly, for wit is more dignified than humour.”90

Vietnam advisors were urged to limit criticism 

when first assuming their duties. “If there is criticism, 

it should be couched tactfully, but the advisor must 

not be reluctant to criticize when criticism is in order. 

Failure to do so may leave the counterpart with the 

impression that the advisor does not know or care. 

Appropriate, timely, and tactful criticism can engender respect. If it is necessary to make a recommendation which might imply criticism of HC [host country] 

policy, advisors should do so in private.”91

Intellectual Curiosity. As the section on gaining capabilities specifies, an advisor must arrive on the job 

with diverse expertise, over and above that required 

for the advisory position. Metrinko contends that 

the advisor must have a thorough understanding of 

U.S. history, civics, and political structures in order to 

correct misunderstandings or interpret U.S. actions/

statements.92 Furthermore, “the advisor must understand American policy, and know the limits of what 

he can and cannot say or do. He cannot exceed the 

parameters established by his commander or the Ambassador. Exceeding his authority may leave the advisor in a position where his credibility disappears, and 

thus he will no longer be able to perform his duties.”93

A demonstrated enthusiasm to learn about the host 

nation’s history, language, and culture, as well as its 

political, legal, military, police, and logistical systems 

will impress the counterpart and his staff, as long as 

the advisor does not appear to be lecturing. At times, 

the counterpart may not be familiar with certain policies, systems, strategies, and directives, so the advisor 

must devise methods to enlighten him without embarrassment.94
47

T. E. Lawrence’s guidance is still applicable: “The 

beginning and ending of the secret of handling Arabs 

is unremitting study of them. Keep always on your 

guard; never say an unnecessary thing: watch yourself 

and your companions all the time: hear all that passes, 

search out what is going on beneath the surface, read 

their characters, discover their tastes and their weaknesses and keep everything you find out to yourself. 

Bury yourself in Arab circles, have no interests and 

no ideas except the work in hand, so that your brain 

is saturated with one thing only, and you realize your 

part deeply enough to avoid the little slips that would 

counteract the painful work of weeks. Your success 

will be proportioned to the amount of mental effort 

you devote to it.”95

Cultural Astuteness. MODA defines culture as “socially transmitted knowledge, behavioral patterns, 

values, beliefs, norms, and lifestyles of a particular 

group that guides their world view and decision making.” Achieving cultural competence is a multiple 

stage process: 1) cultural awareness—“understanding 

your own cultural identity, its influence on your beliefs and practices, and your own stereotypes and 

biases;” 2) cultural knowledge—“understanding similarities and differences between your culture and others’;” 3) cultural sensitivity—“demonstrating empathy, respect, and acceptance of others’ cultures;” and 

4) cultural competence—“a synthesis of the previous 

stages. It also includes continuous self-monitoring, 

adaptation, and the active avoidance of discrimination and prejudice.” Paradoxically, as linguistic expert 

Amy Heaton discovered, language proficiency is not 

nearly as important as making the attempt, struggling 

even, because it demonstrates humility.96 The U.S. 

Army Research Institute concludes that “advisors 
48

who invested more effort in understanding the counterpart’s perspective, suppressing cultural biases, and 

comparing cultures also tended to have counterparts 

more willing to accept their advice.”97 In this regard, 

the advisor will often need to serve as an interagent, 

reconciling U.S. policies, programs, and systems with 

the host nation’s traditional practices and procedures. 

To make the merge work, the advisor must identify 

the disconnects and explain the reasons to each party.

On a practical level, Metrinko explains that the 

advisor should be acutely aware of cultural norms 

regarding time (i.e., inshallah), timeliness (e.g., appointments, meetings), holidays, and religious practices. Additionally, decisions may be made informally 

rather than in formal meetings. “Everything takes 

time.” Relaxed expectations of time-based milestones 

and patience are called for.98 Metrinko contends that 

achieving cultural competence requires hands-on experience:

The American advisor should seek local guidance on 

cultural and social custom and etiquette, watch others 

around him, and ask questions about proper norms of 

behavior from local sources . . . . Every country has its 

own set of “do’s and don’ts,” and various practices or 

prohibitions may even change from town to town. Differences between foreign and American etiquette are 

endless, and ignorance of local customs will harm the 

advisor’s effectiveness. No one can possibly know everything about a foreign culture—or even his own culture—but some basic humility, an open mind, intellectual curiosity, and the ability to laugh at himself will 

carry the advisor a very long way. He must be aware 

of what is merely permissible, what is recommended, 

and what is prohibited in the local environment, because if local norms are not respected, the advisor’s 

best efforts to present ideas and influence foreign offi-
49

cials will be frustrated or even counterproductive. The 

learning process can be a lengthy one, and everyone 

makes mistakes along the road, but the more an advisor is versed and feels comfortable in the foreign social 

setting, the more effective his presentation of advice 

will be. Some social settings may be difficult for the 

advisor, but he will adapt quickly if he wants to be 

successful. After all, decisionmaking is a continuous 

process, and final decisions are often made far from 

the office setting.99

While cultural empathy helps insulate the advisor 

from being labeled as an “Ugly American,” advisors 

must also acknowledge their limitations regarding 

any mastery of culture. They must be careful not to 

over-generalize culture as representative of the country as a whole since regions and even small villages 

will have distinct cultures and traditions which differ 

nationally.

Conduit for Resources. By his position, the advisor 

often serves as a conduit for funding, equipment, and 

supplies. Metrinko does not believe this service is necessarily harmful: “He can reach back to the U.S. government on the official’s behalf to harness and help 

direct resources—in training, material, and financial 

terms—that will have great impact on the country’s 

stability and prosperity.”100 However, the counterpart 

must not perceive that this is the advisor’s main function or sole source of value. As T. E. Lawrence warned, 

“Do not let them ask you for things, since their greed 

will then make them look upon you only as a cow to 

milk.”101 This perception is particularly acute for U.S. 

advisors as Metrinko counsels: “The American advisor must take care not to let himself be regarded as 

just another person who has come to pass out gifts in 

order to curry favor. He must not be regarded as sim-
50

ply a source of material assistance, supplies, high tech 

presents, and trips abroad under the rubric of training.”102

Often, the advisor might be less guilty of this than 

senior U.S. officials who succumb to the pleas of host 

nation officials for ever more funding, equipment, and 

supplies—all of which are outside of the established 

supply procedures and often not on ministry office 

property books. Should this pernicious practice occur, 

advisors must voice their opposition to their superiors. The practice creates an unhealthy dependency on 

the largess of the United States; it encourages the host 

nation officials to ignore their own established supply 

system; and it damages the advisory relationship once 

the counterpart learns other ministerial offices are receiving off-the-books goods and services. Advisors 

must point out that flooding a country with money 

and resources often contributes to inflation, the black 

market, kleptocracy, and political corruption. Moreover, when the funding source dries up, as it inevitably does, the country lacks the revenue to sustain 

well-meaning but expensive programs.

Health Consciousness. Working in a foreign culture is often disconcerting and stressful, so the advisor must have the temperament to adapt.103 MODA 

counsels that health fitness is an essential trait: “Expert advisors are reflective practitioners who attend 

to their own mental, emotional, and physical health 

and continuously endeavor to improve themselves by 

monitoring their own progress and reflecting on their 

motivations, thoughts, behaviors, and goals.”104

A MODA program goal is to train a professional 

advisor who “develops habits and practices for effectively operating in a foreign, stressful, austere, and 

complex environment, including adaptability, resil-
51

ience, self-reflection, and healthy lifestyle behaviors. 

Stays aware and maintains personal safety and security while deployed; actively prevents espionage, malicious elicitation of information, and surveillance.”105

Taking a holistic approach to “mental, emotional, and 

physical well-being,” MODA counsels advisors to 

practice total fitness through eight areas: psychological, behavioral, social, spiritual, physical, nutritional, 

medical, and environmental.106

Accordingly, the MODA course instructs advisors 

to recognize the signs of stress:107

• Difficulty falling asleep or staying asleep.

• Unusual fatigue.

• Difficulty concentrating.

• Unexplained physical illness.

• Apathy or carelessness.

• Unusual irritability or anger, sometimes with 

little provocation.

• Repeated disturbing dreams.

• Pounding heart, sweating or shortness of breath 

for no reason.

• Isolation from other people.

• Feeling or appearing sad or angry much of the 

time.

• Lost interest in hobbies or work.

• Neglecting personal hygiene. 

Advisors are encouraged to watch over each when 

deployed. If left unattended, the effects of stress become more pernicious:108

• Revenge fantasies or dehumanizing comments 

or behaviors.

• Acting recklessly or engaging in risky behaviors.
52

• Sudden changes in behavior—acting out of 

character.

• Fighting.

• Disobeying orders.

• Any cruelty.

• Unusual weight loss.

• Lack of basic hygiene.

• Giving away property or comments about 

wanting to die.

• Panic attacks.

• Flashbacks that do not seem to be related to reality. 

These aberrant behaviors require immediate attention, either with support groups, doctors, religious 

figures, or mental health officials. Again, once deployed, this responsibility will fall on advisor peers, 

so maintaining vigilance is a necessity.

Naturally, the advisor can take positive action to 

counter stress. The resilience mechanisms and strategies are separated into four categories.109

Cognitive Resilience Factors:

• Adaptability.

• Spirituality and/or religion. 

• Confidence, self-esteem.

• Strong decision making abilities.

• Sense of humor

• Insight

• Positive attitude, control over negative 

thoughts. 
53

Tips for Cognitive Factors:

• Lifestyle (eating, alcohol, smoking, etc.).

• Get adequate sleep.

• Maintain a schedule.

• Take positive action to resolve stressors or feel 

less stressed.

• Professional cognitive behavioral therapy.

• Maintaining control of personal decisions. 

Lifestyle Factors:

• Exercise.

• Lifestyle (down time, sleep, eating, alcohol, 

smoking, etc.).

• Reaching out for social support.

• Being a “good shepherd” to your peers who are 

stressed.

• Professional inoculation training.

• Unit cohesiveness.

• Education about stress and about deployment 

environment – Those who are forewarned are also 

forearmed.

• Stress management skillset. 

Tips for Lifestyle Factors

• Find exercise you like.

• Strengthen support system.

• Perform good deeds; be reliable and supportive to peers.

• Participate in structured resilience training 

programs.

• Communicate positively with peers.

• Educate with the news, books, TED talks, YouTube videos.
54

• Build stress management tactics; try different 

approaches.

• Recognize areas for improvement. 

On a related issue, MODA students learn to conduct predictive threat profiling so as to raise situational awareness. Here, instruction on reading body language achieves a dual purpose. This training achieves 

two results—the advisor becomes more attuned to the 

immediate environment, spotting things out of place; 

and the advisor feels more in control of the situation, 

which fosters greater self-confidence.110

Maintaining one’s health is usually the first casualty of the advisory mission because of the pace of the 

mission and pressures accumulate. The advisor is his 

own best physician, so taking time to exercise, sleep, 

socialize, and relax is essential. Advising is a marathon, not a sprint. An advisor who implodes during 

the mission is of no use to anyone, especially the counterpart.

Principles and Guidelines

The MODA program encapsulates the art of advising in a set of guiding principles, titled “The Code 

of Conduct,” designed to “support U.S. missions and 

overseas contingencies . . . strengthen the security 

ministries of partner states . . . [and] forge long-term 

relationships” with counterparts. Together, these tenets (left column) provide the guideposts for advisers 

navigating through the shoals of their mission, linking 

them to the broader purpose (right column).111
55

Complementing the MODA principles, Metrinko 

offers seven general guidelines for advisors: “Although Muslim countries and cultures differ from 

one another, and methods of approach will change 

depending on locale, there are certain generalities that 

define the relationship of an advisor to foreign officials in this world:

1. The advisor can assist and consult, but he cannot 

command. It is, after all, not his house and not his own 

country. He is a counselor, not a colonial administrator.

Tenets Broader Purpose

“Provide competent advice, with humility, empathy 

and respect for their host-nation counterparts and 

institutions.”

“Personal Conduct for Relationship 

Building” “Uphold the highest standards of professionalism

worthy of a Representative of the United States 

Government.”

“Promote local ownership and pursue inclusive 

policies that place host-nation partners in the lead.”

“Capacity Building”

“Emphasize sustainability when building partner 

capacity, and prioritize actions that produce 

enduring benefits.”

“Do no harm, by actively coordinating development 

activities, considering their potential effects on 

power dynamics, and anticipating unintended 

consequences.”

“Pay due regard to their mental and physical health, 

and take personal responsibility for their conduct 

and security within the terms expressed by the 

relevant authorities.”

“Personal Responsibility”
56

2. The advisor should have expertise, but he does not 

have the last word. Policy direction and limits are set by his 

commander and by the American Ambassador, and policy 

will shift to conform to political shifts within the United 

States, the local population, and among local elected officials. Final decisionmaking is in the foreign official’s hands.

3. The advisor must cooperate with other players, both 

foreign and American. Working alone does not mean being alone. The other players can enhance—or dilute—the 

officer’s influence.

4. The advisor must be a true American, but not an 

Ugly American. Whatever his own religious and political 

convictions, the advisor must show respect for local culture 

and tradition to be successful. He is not a judge.

5. The advisor should not be a hypocrite. If he is not 

prepared to live by his own advice, he should not expect 

others to follow it.

6. The advisor should be humble. He should always remember that his audience may not have his resources, his 

background of living in a peaceful, orderly society, or his 

confidence in a good future and a guaranteed pension following retirement.

7. And finally, the advisor must be helpful, but also credible. He should never promise what he cannot deliver.”112

Advisors should keep these principles and guidelines for quick reference (i.e., above their desk and 

in their toolkit notebook), particularly when making 

difficult decisions or when under stress. They will 

help keep the advisor centered and focused on the essentials of advising. Over time, the advisor can add 

to these principles and guidelines as he develops a 

deeper appreciation of the local culture, perhaps adding them to his continuity file.
57

Conclusions

In view of the evolving security environment and 

commitments, the United States will find an investment in professional advisors will reap benefits exponentially above the costs. The investment requires 

organization, planning, and leadership however. The 

old ways of creating advisors in the midst of a conflict 

reveals a history of too much misunderstanding, irrelevance, and missed opportunities, resulting in excessive expenditures, waste, redundancy, and ultimately 

suboptimal results.

The initiation of such a program requires the attention of the National Security Council, because the 

requisite interagency cooperation, consensus, and 

coordination will not occur without presidential authority. For the President, the creation of a ministerial advisory corps would prove an enduring legacy. 

In order to establish the needed authorities, Congress 

will need to provide the legislation to preserve the 

advisory institution through successive presidential 

administrations.

The creation of a ministerial advisory corps is an 

investment in human capital, but without extraordinary expense. The consolidation of the training programs into one facility along with faculty, equipment, 

and administration would reduce redundancies, 

streamline operations, and produce uniform training 

standards. The basic course provides the fundamentals of advising not only for ministerial advisors, but 

also for those involved in security sector reform and 

security force assistance. Since basic course graduates 

return to their normal jobs, they would remain gainfully employed until mobilized, thereby making the 

program both cost effective, dynamic, and sufficiently 
58

large to sustain a number of advisory missions simultaneously.

Professionalization of the advisory corps occurs as 

a result of advance degrees, the deployment course, 

and advisory experience. These professionals could 

serve as training course instructors, facilitators, and 

lecturers. They could also participate in outreach by 

lecturing at Senior Service Colleges and interested institutes. They could contribute articles to professional 

journals as well as studies to think tanks. These activities would serve to inspire service in the ministerial 

advisory corps from college students, federal, state, 

and city civil servants, and the military.

In order to attract quality advisors, the ministerial 

advisory corps must offer salary and career enhancing 

incentives. At the same time, the vetting of advisory 

candidates is essential to ensure they are suitable for 

service. For continuity of effort, advisory tours should 

be at least two years since the historical evidence suggests one-year or shorter tours do not achieve the desired effect.

The use of best practices captures those skills, character traits, and attributes which produce outstanding 

ministerial advisors. Past literature on advising often 

laid these out as a laundry list with little explanation. 

Internalization of these skills and traits requires explanation, illustrations, and discussion. Without this 

teaching method, learning becomes too passive and 

without due self-reflection and understanding.

It should be noted that best practices skills and 

character traits are difficult to master, so advisors will 

make mistakes as part of the learning process. Humility, respect, and a sense of humor will help advisors 

weather mistakes without alienating their counterparts.
59

In the long term, an investment in the ministerial 

advisory corps increases the prospect for fragile states 

to adopt needed reforms, which in turn increase stability. In this manner, effective advising serves as a 

preventative measure, mitigating the root causes of 

instability and conflict. To this end, it is more beneficial for the United States to deploy an advisory corps 

than an Army corps. 

Endnotes

1. Eisenhower wrote the Filipino defense plan, and after 

gaining permission, personally visited U.S. depots and armories for equipment, weapons, and munitions for the army. As his 

last duty upon returning to the United States in December 1939, 

Eisenhower rendered a report to Quezon on the defense of The 

Philippines should Japan invade. His advice was that a strong defense of the beaches was the best chance of defeating a Japanese 

invasion. Dwight D. Eisenhower, At Ease: Stories I Tell to Friends 

(Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company INC., 1967), 

221, 228-229, 246-247.

2. Robert D. Ramsey III, Advising Indigenous Forces: American Advisors in Korea, Vietnam, and El Salvador, Global War on 

Terrorism Occasional Paper 18 (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2006), 11-17. 

3. The Korea Military Assistance Group (KMAG) published 

the Advisor’s Procedure Guide in 1953. Ramsey, 13. As a result 

of the experiences in Korea, the U.S. Army commissioned a more 

comprehensive advisory manual in 1957, perhaps as the advisory 

mission in Vietnam assumed a greater role. Alfred H. Hausrath, 

The KMAG Advisor: Role and Problems of the Military Advisor 

in Developing an Indigenous Army for Combat Operations in Korea (Chevy Chase, Maryland: The Johns Hopkins University Operations Research Office, February 1957), accessed on the website 

of the Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability at http://

nautilus.org/foia-document/the-kmag-advisor-role-and-problems-ofthe-military-advisor-in-developing-indigenous-army-for-combat-operations-in-korea/, 30 January 2015.
60

4. Ronald H. Spector, Advice and Support: The Early Years, 

1941–1960 (Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military History, 

1983), 346.

5. Mai Elliott, RAND in Southeast Asia: A History of the Vietnam War (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2010), 81-82.

6. Ramsey, 30, 37-38.

7. Ramsey, 40-41, 51.

8. U.S. Departments of the Army, MATA Handbook for Vietnam, ST 31-179 (Fort Bragg, NC: Special Warfare School, January 1966 [revised]), accessed on the website Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library at http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/

ref/collection/p4013coll11/id/1459, 4 March 2015; U.S. Departments 

of the Army, Advisor Handbook for Stability Operations, Field 

Manual 31-73 (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 

18 October 1967), accessed on the website The Virtual Vietnam 

Archive, Texas Tech University at http://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/virtualarchive/, 24 February 2015.

9. Ramsey, 39.

10. Ramsey, 85.

11. Foreword in MODA Advisor Tradecraft: Handbook of 

Cross-Cultural Advising for Transitional Environments, ed. 

MESH Solutions (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing 

Office, 2014).

12. National Security Strategy (February 2015), 20, 26; The 

National Military Strategy of the United States of America: 2011 

Redefining America’s Military Leadership (08 February 2011), 6, 

10-12, 15-16; Quadrennial Defense Review 2014 (March 4, 2014), 

v-vi, 5, 9, 11-12, 17-19; Department of the Army, Stability, Filed 

Manual 3-07 (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 

June 2014), 1-3, 1-6—1-7, 1-22, 2-4—2-5, 3-22, 3-23—3-24.

13. Specifically, the Office of Technical Assistance (OTA), US 

Department of the Treasury (DOT); International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP), US Department 
61

of Justice (DOJ); Human Rights and Governance (DRG Center), 

USAID; Ministry of Defense Advisors Program (MODA), US 

Department of Defense (DOD); US Department of State (DOS) 

Bureau of Counterterrorism; Office of Criminal Justice and Assistance Partnerships (INL/CAP), DOS; and MODA Program, 

Defense Security Cooperation Agency. USIP Advisory Roundtable: “The Future of USG Advising Missions,” U.S. Institute of 

Peace, Washington D.C., 20037, 15 January 2015.

14. Harry L. Coles and Albert K. Weinberg, Civil Affairs: 

Soldiers Become Governors, U.S. Army in World War II Center 

of Military History, United States Army (Washington D.C.: U.S. 

Government Printing Office, 1964), 11, 16-17.

15. 6,000 additional specialists from tactical unites were also 

trained to assume occupational duties as well. Earl F. Ziemke, 

The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany, 1944-1946, Army 

Historical Series, Center of Military History, United States Army 

(Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975), 8, 17; 

Coles and Weinberg, 17.

16. The universities were Yale, Harvard, Pittsburgh, Chicago, 

Michigan, Stanford, Northwestern, Boston, Wisconsin, and Western Reserve. Ziemke, 18-20, n 63, n70; Coles and Weinberg, 14-15, 

17.

17. The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy initiated the MODA program in 2009. I would like to thank George 

Dryden of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency as well as 

Jim McKellar and Andy Kostrub of the McKellar Corporation for 

sharing the details of the MODA program.

18. Each of these agencies provided substantive descriptions 

of its advisory program at the USIP Advisory Roundtable: “The 

Future of USG Advising Missions,” Washington D.C., 15 January 

2015.

19. MODA Program Course Overview, 12.

20. Harry R. Yarger, Strategy and the National Security Professional: Strategic Thinking and Strategy Formulation in the 21st

Century (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Security International, 

2008), 3-4.
62

21. MODA Program Course Overview, 4.

22. MODA Program Course Overview, 5-6.

23. MODA Program Adviser’s Toolkit.

24. MODA Program Course Overview, 10-14.

25. MODA Program Adviser’s Toolkit.

26. Ramsey, 20, 47, 93, 43-144, 161; See also Hausrath, The 

KMAG Advisor, 3; U.S. Departments of the Army, Advisor Handbook for Stability Operations, Field Manual 31-73 (Washington 

DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 18 October 1967), accessed 

on the website The Virtual Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University at http://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/virtualarchive/, 24 February 2015; 

Michelle Ramsden Zbylut, Kimberly A. Metcalf, and Jason Brunner, Advising Foreign Security Forces: Critical Incidents Describing the Work of Advisors, U.S. Army Research Institute for the 

Behavioral and Social Sciences, Research Report 1951 (U.S. Army 

Research Institute, October 2011), 4; U.S. Departments of the 

Army, Air Force, and Navy, Advising Foreign Security Forces: 

Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Advising 

Foreign Security Forces, ATP 3-07.10 (FM 3-07.10), MCRP 3-33.8A 

17, NTTP 3-07.5 18, AFTTP 3-2.76 (MTTP) (Fort Monroe, VA: Air 

Land Sea Application Center, November 2014), 34; Joshua J. Potter, American Advisors: Security Force Assistance Model in a 

Long War (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute 

Press, 2011), 7.

27. Michael J. Metrinko, The American Military Advisor: 

Dealing With Senior Foreign Officials In The Islamic World (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Peacekeeping And Stability Operations Institute and Strategic Studies Institute, August 

2008), xi.

28. Cited in MODA Advisor Tradecraft Handbook, 6.

29. Potter, 34

30. Zbylut, Metcalf, and Brunner, 4.
63

31. Mark Grdovic, “The Advisory Challenge,” in Special Warfare, vol. 21, issue 1 (January-February 2008), 23-24.

32. T.E. Lawrence, 27 Articles (The Arab Bulletin, 20 August 

1917), accessed on the website the World War I Document Archive, Bingham Young University Library at http://wwi.lib.byu.

edu/index.php/The_27_Articles_of_T.E._Lawrence, 1 December 2014.

33. U.S. Departments of the Army, MATA Handbook for Vietnam, ST 31-179 (Fort Bragg, NC: Special Warfare School, January 

1966 [revised]), accessed on the website Combined Arms Research 

Library Digital Library at http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/p4013coll11/id/1459, 4 March 2015, 212; See also Hausrath, The 

KMAG Adviser, 3; FM 31-73, 51-54; MATA Handbook, 213; Potter, 8.

34. T.E. Lawrence, 27 Articles.

35. Nadia Gerspacher and Adrian Shtuni, “Lessons from 

MoDA: Continuing the Conversation on How to Advise Institution-building,” PRISM 3, no. 3 (6 June 2012), 79.

36. MODA Advisor Tradecraft Handbook, 5.

37. Metrinko, xii.

38. Grdovic, 24.

39. Metrinko, 77-78.

40. Metrinko, 72-73.

41. MATA Handbook, 213; FM 31-73, 51-54; Metrinko, 52-53.

42. Metrinko, xii, 65.

43. Metrinko, 68-69.

44. Grdovic, 25-26.

45. Grdovic, 25-26.

46. Metrinko, 2.
64

47. Metrinko, xii, 22; Hausrath, 3-4; Ramsey, 22, 46, 93; Lawrence; Grdovic also believes adopting some of the appearances of 

the indigenous forces/people (i.e., grooming, dress, and accessories), demonstrates a greater appreciation of the culture and customs. Grdovic, 24-25.

48. Zbylut, Metcalf, and Brunner, 5.

49. Metrinko, xii.

50. Metrinko, 41.

51. Metrinko, 41-42.

52. Zbylut, Metcalf, and Brunner, 6.

53. Most of these techniques and procedures emanated from 

the author’s time as an advisor in Afghanistan; Others sources 

include Metrinko, 41-51; Ramsey, 147; MODA Advisor Tradecraft 

Handbook, 56-57; Zbylut, Metcalf, and Brunner, 6; Advising Foreign Security Forces, MTTP, 91-100; Potter, 8; Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) Advisor Guide (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Joint 

Center for International Security Force Assistance, May 2014), 

6-4—6-5.

54. Zbylut, Metcalf, and Brunner, 3.

55. Hausrath, The KMAG Adviser, 3-4; MATA Handbook, 

215; Ramsey, 16, 18, 20, 22, 27, 51, 111, 137, 148, 157, 159, 160, 166., 

175.

56. T.E. Lawrence, 27 Articles.

57. Metrinko, 12-13.

58. T.E. Lawrence, 27 Articles.

59. Ramsey, 159-160; Gerspacher and Shtuni, 79; MATA 

Handbook, 215.

60. MATA Handbook, 216.
65

61. MATA Handbook, 213.

62. T.E. Lawrence, 27 Articles; Hausrath, The KMAG Adviser, 

3; MATA Handbook, 215; Ramsey, 18, 20, 159.

63. Gerspacher and Shtuni, 82.

64. Hausrath, The KMAG Adviser, 15-16; Advising Foreign 

Security Forces, MTTP, 34.

65. Hausrath, The KMAG Adviser, 3; MATA Handbook, 

214-215.

66. Metrinko, 32-33.

67. According to the U.S. Army Research Institute, “contending with ethical dilemmas and challenges are a pervasive component of the performance context in which advisors operate.” 

Zbylut, Metcalf, and Brunner, 7.

68. Metrinko, 55-57.

69. MODA instructs that all societies have corruption. “Forms 

of corruption vary but may include bribery, extortion, cronyism, 

nepotism, patronage, graft, and embezzlement.” MODA Advisor 

Tradecraft Handbook, 34-35; ANSF Advisor Guide, 6-7—6-8.

70. Metrinko, 61-62.

71. Metrinko, 17, 35.

72. Metrinko, 17.

73. Advising Foreign Security Forces, MTTP, 35.

74. Metrinko, 17; Also noted in FM 31-73, 51-54.

75. The U.S. Army Research Institute identifies this type of negotiating as proactive influence tactics. “The most used proactive 

influence tactics were offering support, rational persuasion, and 

apprising counterparts of the benefits of taking action.” Zbylut, 

Metcalf, and Brunner, 5.
66

76. T.E. Lawrence, 27 Articles; MATA Handbook, 212-213; 

Hausrath, The KMAG Adviser, 3; FM 31-73, 51-54.

77. Zbylut, Metcalf, and Brunner, 4.

78. Metrinko, 8-9.

79. MATA Handbook, 212; FM 31-73, 51-54.

80. MATA Handbook, 212.

81. Grdovic, 26-27.

82. MATA Handbook, 216.

83. Metrinko, 26.

84. Grdovic, 23.

85. Zbylut, Metcalf, and Brunner, 5.

86. Metrinko, 5; Hausrath, The KMAG Adviser, 15; Ramsey, 

11; FM 31-73, 51; Zbylut, Metcalf, and Brunner, 4; Advising Foreign Security Forces, MTTP, 35.

87. Metrinko, 53-54.

88. Metrinko, 10.

89. Ramsey, 18, 159; MATA Handbook, 213.

90. T.E. Lawrence, 27 Articles.

91. FM 31-73, 51-54.

92. Metrinko, 34-35.

93. Metrinko, 36-37.

94. Ramsey, 160. MATA Handbook, 216.

95. T.E. Lawrence, 27 Articles.
67

96. MODA Advisor Tradecraft Handbook, 12-13; Current U.S. 

doctrine calls this cross-cultural competence. Advising Foreign 

Security Forces, MTTP, 79.

97. Zbylut, Metcalf, and Brunner, 6.

98. Metrinko, 11-12.

99. Metrinko, 28- 29.

100. Metrinko, 7.

101. T.E. Lawrence, 27 Articles.

102. Metrinko, 10.

103. Hausrath, The KMAG Adviser, 3-4; Ramsey, 18, 20; 

MODA Advisor Tradecraft Handbook, 61.

104. MODA Advisor Tradecraft Handbook, 4.

105. MODA Advisor Tradecraft Handbook, 7.

106. MODA Advisor Tradecraft Handbook, 62-65.

107. MODA Program Adviser’s Toolkit, PS-1; MODA Advisor Tradecraft Handbook, 76-77.

108. MODA Program Adviser’s Toolkit, PS-1; MODA Advisor Tradecraft Handbook, 77.

109. MODA Program Adviser’s Toolkit, PS-1; MODA Advisor Tradecraft Handbook, 78-79.

110. MODA Program Adviser’s Toolkit, PS-2; MODA Advisor Tradecraft Handbook, 66-69.

111. MODA Program Course Overview, 4; MODA Advisor 

Tradecraft Handbook, 5.

112. Metrinko, 5.
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