COUNTERTERRORISM IN AFRICAN FAILED STATES:

CHALLENGES AND POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS

Thomas Dempsey

April 2006

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FOREWORD

Failed states—states in which government authority has 

collapsed, violence has become endemic, and functional governance 

has ceased—have emerged in the period since the end of the 

Cold War as one of the most difficult challenges confronting the 

international community, especially in the region of Sub-Saharan 

Africa. Transnational terrorist groups use the chaos of failed states 

to shield themselves from effective counterterrorism efforts by the 

international community. The potential nexus of failed state-based 

terrorism and terrorists’ access to Weapons of Mass Destruction 

(WMD), especially nuclear WMD, escalates the risk that such groups 

pose to the United States and to its allies in the Global War on 

Terror.

In this monograph, the author finds that current counterterrorism 

strategies have yielded limited results in addressing the threat posed 

by terrorist groups operating in and from failed states. He argues 

that the uniquely challenging conditions in such states require a new 

approach to counterterrorism. By integrating the law enforcement and 

military instruments of power, U.S. strategists can craft an approach 

to counterterrorism that leverages the core competencies of both the 

military and law enforcement communities. The author concludes 

that the synergies available from an integrated approach promise to 

be more effective in locating, apprehending, and bringing to justice 

terrorists and suspected terrorists in failed states than either the 

military or law enforcement communities operating independently.

The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this monograph 

as part of the ongoing debate on global and regional security and 

stability.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director

Strategic Studies Institute 
iv

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

THOMAS DEMPSEY is the Director of African Studies in the 

Department of National Security and Strategy at the U.S. Army 

War College. Colonel Dempsey is an Infantry officer who has 

held command and staff positions in the 25th Infantry Division 

and the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), and is a veteran of 

Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. He has served 

as a strategic intelligence analyst for Africa at the John F. Kennedy 

Special Warfare Center, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and as Chief of 

Africa Branch for the Defense Intelligence Agency in Washington, 

DC. Prior to his assignment to the U.S. Army War College, Colonel 

Dempsey was the U.S. Defense Attache for Liberia and Sierra Leone, 

stationed in Monrovia, Liberia. He has published articles in Infantry

and Armor Magazine, as well as in Brassey’s Defense Analysis. Colonel 

Dempsey has a B.A. in History from Wichita State University, an 

M.A. in African Area Studies from the University of California at Los 

Angeles, and an M.M.A.S. in Theater Operations from the School 

of Advanced Military Studies at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He is 

currently a Doctoral Candidate in Public Administration at Penn 

State Harrisburg.
v

SUMMARY

Failed states offer attractive venues for terrorist groups seeking 

to evade counterterrorism efforts of the United States and its 

partners in the Global War on Terror (GWOT). State failure entails, 

among its other features, the disintegration and criminalization 

of public security forces, the collapse of the state administrative 

structure responsible for overseeing those forces, and the erosion 

of infrastructure that supports their effective operation. These 

circumstances make identification of terrorist groups operating 

within failed states very difficult, and action against such groups, 

once identified, problematic. 

Terrorist groups that are the focus of the current GWOT display 

the characteristics of a network organization with two very different 

types of cells: terrorist nodes and terrorist hubs.1

 Terrorist nodes are 

small, closely knit local cells that actually commit terrorist acts in the 

areas in which they are active. Terrorist hubs provide ideological 

guidance, financial support, and access to resources enabling node 

attacks. An examination of three failed states in Sub-Saharan Africa—

Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Somalia—reveals the presence of both 

types of cells and furnishes a context for assessing the threat they 

pose to the national interests of the United States and its partners. 

Al Qaeda established terrorist hubs in Liberia and Sierra Leone to 

exploit the illegal diamond trade, laundering money, and building 

connections with organized crime and the illegal arms trade. In 

Somalia, Al Qaeda and Al Ittihad Al Islami established terrorist hubs 

that supported terrorist operations throughout East Africa. A new 

organization led by Aden Hashi ’Ayro recruited terrorist nodes that 

executed a series of attacks on Western nongovernment organization 

(NGO) employees and journalists within Somalia. 

Analysis of these groups suggests that while the terrorist nodes 

in failed states pose little threat to the interests of the United States or 

its GWOT partners, terrorist hubs operating in the same states may 

be highly dangerous. The hubs observed in these three failed states 

were able to operate without attracting the attention or effective 

sanction of the United States or its allies. They funneled substantial 

financial resources, as well as sophisticated weaponry, to terrorist 
vi

nodes operating outside the failed states in which the hubs were 

located. The threat posed by these hubs to U.S. national interests 

and to the interests of its partners is significant, and is made much 

more immediate by the growing risk that nuclear Weapons of Mass 

Destruction (WMD) will fall into terrorist hands.

The burgeoning proliferation of nuclear weapons and the poor 

security of some existing nuclear stockpiles make it more likely that 

terrorist groups like Al Qaeda will gain access to nuclear weapons. 

The accelerating Iranian covert nuclear weapons program, estimated 

to produce a nuclear capability within as little as one year, is 

especially disturbing in this context.2 A failed state terrorist hub that 

secures access to a nuclear weapon could very conceivably place that 

weapon in the hands of a terrorist node in a position to threaten vital 

American national interests. 

The U.S. response to terrorist hubs operating in failed states has 

been less than adequate. Four general approaches are discernable in 

U.S. counterterrorism strategy. Military strikes which target terrorists 

directly have enjoyed few successes in failed states and can legitimate 

terrorist groups by providing them combatant status under the 

Geneva Convention. Law enforcement efforts have likewise enjoyed 

few successes in failed states, as civilian law enforcement lacks the 

capacity to penetrate or to operate effectively in the violent failed state 

environment. Security assistance programs, while enjoying some 

remarkable successes elsewhere on the African continent, require 

partnering with host nation security institutions that are simply not 

present in a failed state. While attempts to address the root causes 

of terrorism may offer an effective counterterrorism strategy, such 

efforts require extended periods of time to show results—time that 

may not be available.

Integrating the U.S. foreign intelligence community, U.S. military 

forces, and U.S. law enforcement offers a more effective strategy 

for countering terrorist hubs operating in failed states. The foreign 

intelligence community is best equipped to identify terrorist hubs 

in failed states that are developing global reach and threatening to 

acquire a nuclear dimension. Once those hubs have been identified, 

a synthesis of expeditionary military forces and law enforcement 

elements will be far more effective in dealing with those hubs than 
vii

either element will be acting independently. The military force 

establishes access to the failed state for law enforcement officers, and 

provides a secure environment for those officers to perform their 

core function of identifying, locating, and apprehending criminal, in 

this case terrorist, suspects. 

Once terrorists have been identified, located, and apprehended, 

military tribunals should screen them individually to confirm that 

they are, indeed, who law enforcement officers believe them to be, 

and that they are, in fact, associated with the activities of the terrorist 

hubs in question. Upon confirmation of their status as participants in 

the operation of the terrorist hub, those tribunals should refer their 

cases to appropriate international tribunals for disposition. This 

strategy avoids legitimizing terrorist activity by treating them as 

military targets, and also addresses the limitations that U.S. criminal 

justice procedures place on prosecuting terrorists apprehended in 

failed states.

ENDNOTES

1. Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks, Philadelphia: University of 

Pennsylvania, 2004.

2. Henry Sokolski and Patrick Clawson, eds., Getting Ready for a Nuclear-Ready 

Iran, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2005.

COUNTERTERRORISM IN AFRICAN FAILED STATES:

CHALLENGES AND POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS

Introduction.

Monrovia, the national capital of Liberia, was a frightening 

place in 1998. Eighteen months after the end of active hostilities 

and 7 months after the inauguration of a democratically elected 

government, Liberia remained a classic example of a failed state. 

Liberian security services remained factionalized, dysfunctional and 

inherently violent, and frequently preyed upon the very civilians 

they were charged with protecting. The criminal justice system was 

nonexistent: courts were, for the most part, not operating at all, and 

extra-judicial killings by Liberian police were common. The only 

forces enjoying any real legitimacy and displaying any genuine 

functionality were the African soldiers of the Economic Community 

of West African States (ECOWAS) peacekeeping forces.

Beyond the limitations of government security forces, conditions 

within Liberia made any effort to assert government authority or 

identify criminal elements problematic. The country was without 

public utilities: no power, no running water, no functioning 

communications system, and no public transport. Road systems were 

primitive at best, with most of the country served by seasonal roads 

that became completely impassable during the two rainy seasons. 

Government administration, whether at the local, county or national 

level, was almost nonexistent. There were no written or electronic 

records of residents, births, deaths, tax compliance, no drivers 

licenses, no government data bases, nothing left of the prewar criminal 

justice record system, and no functioning intelligence system. This 

environment, typical of states which have failed completely during 

extended periods of conflict, makes identifying, apprehending, or 

targeting terrorist actors very difficult.

Such circumstances would appear to make failed states very 

attractive venues for terrorists and terrorist groups seeking to avoid 

the reach of criminal justice systems and of military counterterrorist 

forces. U.S. Department of State Policy Planning Director Stephen 

Krasner and Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization Coordinator 
Carlos Pascual endorsed that view in 2004, when they identified 

failed states as an “acute risk” to U.S. national security, due in 

part to their potential as havens for terrorist groups.1 Other U.S. 

government officials, prominent academics, and independent think 

tanks have echoed Krasner’s and Pascaul’s concerns, asserting that 

U.S. policymakers should be giving more recognition to the threat 

posed by terrorist groups operating in and from failed states.2

This monograph will examine the terrorist threat posed by groups 

and individuals operating from failed states in Sub-Saharan Africa. 

It will assess the nature of that threat and analyze the strategies 

developed by the United States in response to it. In the concluding 

section, alternative approaches will be presented that may prove 

more effective in countering terrorist activities and groups in failed 

states.

Based on case studies of Somalia, Sierra Leone, and Liberia, the 

author will argue that terrorists operating from failed states in SubSaharan Africa pose a real and significant threat to the U.S. homeland. 

Current strategies being pursued by U.S. law enforcement and 

military forces are not likely to be effective, given the challenges posed 

by the failed state environment. Countering this threat within failed 

states will require a cooperative effort by both law enforcement and 

the military instrument of power: the military to secure protected 

access to these areas, and law enforcement to exploit that access for 

the purpose of locating and taking into custody the terrorists posing 

the threat.

Defining State Failure.

In the period since the end of the Cold War, state failure has 

emerged as one of the leading security challenges in the field of 

Public Policy. In a seminal article addressing strategy in the face of 

state collapse, Robin Dorff defined state failure as follows: 

[T]he essential characteristics of the failed or failing state seem clear and 

consistent: the state loses the ability to perform the basic functions of 

governance, and it loses legitimacy . . . the inability of political institutions 

to meet the basic functions of legitimate governance is also accompanied 

by economic collapse . . . this economic collapse is almost everywhere 

present in cases of state failure.3
The above definition is broadly representative of and generally 

accepted in the literature on state failure.4 For purposes of this analysis, loss of government legitimacy, loss of public sector functionality, and economic collapse will constitute the defining characteristics 

of state failure.

Rotberg explored the operative manifestations of state failure 

in the context of counterterrorism in his 2002 article, “Failed 

States in a World of Terror.”5 He catalogues the consequences of 

state dysfunction, loss of legitimacy, and economic collapse for 

counterterrorism efforts, focusing on the collapse of local criminal 

justice systems and the criminalization of state security services. 

While examples of state failure can be found in almost every region of 

the world, the problem has been especially prevalent in economically 

depressed and politically unstable areas of Sub-Saharan Africa. 

Within that region, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Somalia provide 

concrete illustrations of state failure according to Dorff’s definition, 

and of the operating environment reflected in Rotberg’s descriptive 

analysis. 

Case Study Methodology.

Analyzing terrorism in failed states requires both a theoretical 

framework and an empirical foundation. The heuristic framework 

for this monograph is provided by the recent work of several 

authors who have examined terrorism and terrorist groups in the 

context of network analysis.6

 Sageman’s differentiation of terrorist 

network components into “hubs” and “nodes” is especially useful, 

and will provide an organizing concept for the examination of 

specific cases.7 The empirical foundation for the analysis is provided 

by an examination of terrorism and counterterrorism in Sierra 

Leone, Liberia, and Somalia. The analysis is broadened in the 

section on alternative strategies to incorporate an assessment of U.S. 

counterterrorism initiatives across Sub-Saharan Africa and their 

applicability in a failed state environment.

Conditions in failed states present significant challenges to 

research methodology. Endemic violence poses real and 

significant risks to academic researchers. The chaotic conditions, 
poor infrastructure, and limited public services make traditional 

quantitative research methodologies almost unworkable. As a 

result, very little quantitative research is available in the failed state 

literature. Even qualitative approaches are limited by the high levels 

of fear, suspicion, and outright intimidation common to failed states. 

These limitations restrict most researchers to secondary sources and 

qualitative methodologies that do not require extensive data bases 

broadly comparable across multiple cases. 

An exploratory, qualitative case study methodology with limited 

numbers of cases is supported by available secondary sources. That 

is the methodology adopted in this analysis. Creswell and Yin have 

both explored the strengths of a qualitative case study approach 

where the study is exploratory in nature, and quantitative data 

are limited or unavailable.8 For purposes of this monograph, three 

general categories of secondary sources are especially useful to 

a qualitative case study approach: traditional academic research, 

studies by independent public policy “think tanks,” and statements 

by members of the public policy community, both in the United States 

and in the international community as a whole. While the number of 

relevant studies in academic journals is very limited, the other two 

sources offer valuable material on terrorism and counterterrorism in 

Somalia, Liberia and Sierra Leone. 

Generally independent (in terms of not having a partisan political 

affiliation) think tanks on the Rand model have emerged as important 

sources of information where failed states are concerned. Examples 

include the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), the 

U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP), Partnership Africa Canada, and the 

International Crisis Group (ICG). These organizations have leveraged 

their influence with U.S. and other government policymakers to 

obtain access in failed states that is unprecedented and generally 

unavailable to independent academic researchers. 

The series of ICG studies on Somalia is typical. The studies 

include interviews with key players in the most violent failed state 

settings.9 ICG willingness to accord anonymity to sources and its lack 

of direct association with any national government facilitates candid 

exchanges with critical public and private figures within or involved 

with Somalia. Employing the same approach, Partnership Africa 

Canada has enjoyed similar access to sources in Sierra Leone.10 Such 
studies provide the best available access to information on conditions 

and events in genuinely failed states. These sources have limitations, 

however: the very anonymity that guarantees access to sensitive 

sources precludes an independent assessment of reliability or veracity. In addition, while generally nonpartisan, these organizations are 

unquestionably advocacy groups with policy agendas. It is difficult 

for the independent researcher to assess the degree to which such 

agendas are influencing the analysis presented by the studies.

Statements by the official community offer important sources for 

the failed state researcher. U.S. officials, in particular, enjoy access 

to the full range of classified U.S. intelligence on both failed states 

and terrorism. Their assessments of the terrorist threat in failed 

states are thus significant in terms of the information supporting 

those assessments. When former U.S. Ambassador to Sierra Leone 

Joe Melrose testifies before Congress that he believes rebels in Sierra 

Leone have sold illegal diamonds to representatives of Al Qaeda, 

those statements must carry weight with the researcher.11

As is the case with think tanks, statements by former and current 

government officials have limitations. As agents of the state, current 

officials are by definition pursuing political agendas on behalf of their 

respective administrations, and the same is true to a degree of former 

officials testifying before Congress, granting interviews to the press, 

or publishing in academic journals. Independent researchers, lacking 

their own access to the classified intelligence that may be influencing 

the statements of government officials, are not in a position to fully 

assess their assertions and policy statements. As the controversy 

over weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in pre-war Iraq makes 

clear, the veracity of public officials is sometimes problematic.

Networks, Nodes and Hubs: 

A Model for Terrorism in Failed States.

This monograph will employ a two-celled network model of 

terrorist groups pioneered by Raab and Milward in 2003 and fully 

developed by Marc Sageman in his analysis of Al Qaeda published 

in 2004.12 In this network model, centralized organizational elements 

provide ideological context, resources, very limited administrative 

support, and, most importantly, connectivity among decentralized 
6

and geographically distributed groups of terrorist cells. The 

decentralized cells are the executors of terrorist attacks and of related 

actions in the locales in which they are active.

Raab and Milward introduced the two-celled “hollow corporation 

model” in the specific context of Al Qaeda operations. A centralized Al 

Qaeda command and control element handled operational planning, 

finances, strategy, and some administrative support. Decentralized 

and geographically distributed operating cells, similar to “project 

teams” in the business model, utilized the centrally provided 

planning and resources to actually carry out terrorist attacks.13

Marc Sageman developed a two-celled model similar to that of 

Raab and Milward in his study of Al Qaeda and its affiliated elements 

published in 2004. Sageman’s report is based upon a detailed analysis 

of more than 150 terrorists and terrorist suspects, informed by 

Sageman’s own extensive backgrounds in both counterterrorism and 

forensic psychiatry. It is one of the few relatively rigorous empirical 

studies of terrorists and terrorist groups available, although like most 

research in the field, Sageman’s study is qualitative and anecdotal 

rather than quantitative in methology.14

Sageman’s two-celled terrorist model discriminates between 

“hubs” and “nodes” in describing the structure of Al Qaeda and its 

affiliates. Hubs provide centralized direction and communication 

linkages among nodes that are decentralized and largely, if not 

entirely, independent of each other. Sageman describes the function 

of these two distinct elements as follows:

Small-world networks are composed of nodes linked to well-connected 

hubs. Hubs receive the most communications from the more isolated 

nodes. Because of their larger numbers, innovations are more likely in 

the nodes. The nodes link to hubs who, in turn, send the information 

along their numerous other links.15

Sageman viewed the hubs as essential elements in the direction 

of Al Qaeda operations, while the nodes provided local capabilities 

and operational presence in areas of interest to the organization 

as a whole. Sageman described the linkages between centralized 

hubs and distributed nodes as weak and frequently nondirective 

in nature, but his analysis clearly reflected a command and control 

role for network hubs. He asserted that this centralized directive role 
made the distributed Al Qaeda networks especially vulnerable to 

destruction of network hubs.16

The strongest element of Sageman’s argument was found in his 

careful examination of network nodes. His analysis indicated that 

the nodes were typically small groups of individuals, isolated from 

their surrounding communities and from each other. They were 

the product of local free associations rather than of a centralized 

recruiting effort by the hubs. While ties between node and hub were 

weak, ties within the node itself were very strong and quite resistant 

to erosion. Consequently, nodes were extremely difficult to detect 

and monitor even for local law enforcement agencies.17

Other studies of terrorist groups have confirmed the main 

elements of Sageman’s model while noting important new trends in 

the evolution of such groups since the terrorist attacks in the United 

States of September 11, 2001 (9/11). Jessica Stern has noted the 

movement of the Al Qaeda network away from central direction and 

planning towards decentralized, self-directed operations in response 

to the U.S.-led Global War on Terror (GWOT).18 Gunaratna has 

argued in a similar vein that aggressive, proactive counterterrorist 

campaigns have reduced the prominent role played by Al Qaeda as 

a “vanguard” for terrorists, transforming the role of what Sageman 

describes as network hubs from operational direction to ideological 

leadership and material support.19

More recent incidents and studies of terrorist groups confirm 

the evolving relationship of terrorist nodes and hubs suggested by 

Stern and Gunaratna. Mishal and Rosenthal, in their examination 

of Al Qaeda after the American invasion of Afghanistan, describe a 

“Dune organization” in which hubs have largely abandoned their 

role of operational planning and control. Instead, Al Qaeda hubs 

have transitioned to providing ideological guidance and furnishing 

assistance to nodes operating in a quasi-independent fashion. Hubs 

channel “financial aid or guidance” without asserting active control 

or direction; nodes identify targets and initiate terrorist operations 

largely independent of the hubs, but making use of hub resources 

and assistance.20

An important enabler of the new hub role is the electronic 

connectivity that has accompanied globalization. Sageman identified 

internet-based networking as a critical element in the ability of hubs 
to connect with and influence geographically distributed terrorist 

nodes.21 With that connectivity comes the capability to marshal and 

move funds, tap into organized crime activities and illegal arms 

markets, and facilitate the movement of people, ideas, money, and 

other resources to and among network nodes. The U.S. Department of 

State Country Reports on Terrorism 2004 acknowledges the dimensions 

of this capability in its discussion of measures taken by the United 

States and the international community to counter the efforts of 

terrorist hubs in this area.22

Several recent terrorist incidents both confirm the nature of the 

evolving terrorist threat and illustrate the characteristics identified 

in the evolving hub-node model. Bombings in London in July 2005, 

and in Egypt and Indonesia 3 months later, appear to have been 

initiated by small, local groups operating on their own, although with 

assistance, encouragement, and ideological support from terrorist 

hubs.23 The nodes that perpetrate such attacks are very difficult to 

detect in advance of an attack, even in nations with well-developed 

and capable law enforcement systems. The small groups involved 

in these attacks were not, apparently, operating under the control 

or direction of central Al Qaeda hubs, although they all benefited 

in direct or indirect ways from Al Qaeda funding, assistance or 

ideological guidance.

Hubs and nodes in this evolved terrorist paradigm present two 

very different kinds of terrorist threat in a failed state context. Nodes 

represent the threat of direct terrorist attack, either in the country 

in which they are operating, or in other countries to which the 

nodes have direct access. The threat posed by hubs is very different, 

and indirect. It is reflected in the ability of the hub to facilitate the 

operations of preexisting nodes and to enable attacks by those 

nodes on whatever targets the nodes determine are appropriate. The 

different natures of these two threats emerge clearly in the cases of 

Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Somalia. 

Liberia and Sierra Leone: The Diamond-Terror Nexus.

Liberia and Sierra Leone in the 1990s provide classic examples of 

the conditions described by Rotberg as attending state failure. Both 

countries began their descent into chaos with civil wars beginning 
in the 1980s. These wars eventually culminated in what Rotberg 

describes as “state collapse” in both countries in the late 1990s.24

Liberia reached that state with the factional fighting that devastated 

its capital, Monrovia, in April 1996. Sierra Leone collapsed in May 

1997 with the coup that ousted the democratically elected government 

of Tejan Kabbah. 

The emergence of Al Qaeda in Liberia and Sierra Leone occurred 

during the interregnum that followed the collapse of both states. Al 

Qaeda’s appearance was related to the easy availability of gemstonequality diamonds in the Sierra Leone diamond fields, and the black 

marketing of those diamonds in large quantities as governance in 

both countries largely disappeared. While the diamonds actually 

were mined in Sierra Leone, the majority of them were smuggled out 

of the region through Liberia. The details of this illicit diamond trade 

were explored in detail by Partnership Africa Canada in The Heart 

of the Matter and also in the Report of the Panel of Experts appointed 

pursuant to Security Council resolution 1306 (2000), paragraph 19, in 

relation to Sierra Leone.

25

The Al Qaeda connection to the Sierra Leone diamond trade was 

first alleged by journalist Douglas Farrah in a series of articles in the 

Washington Post.

26 Farrah described a sophisticated Al Qaeda operation in which Al Qaeda operatives participated in the illicit diamond 

trade in Liberia and Sierra Leone. The trade in illicit diamonds not 

only generated direct profits to support the organization’s activities, 

it permitted Al Qaeda to launder money in a venue which made 

identifying and freezing Al Qaeda assets very difficult for Western 

counterterrorism experts. Participation in the trade also furnished Al 

Qaeda access to the booming illegal arms market that was associated 

with the illicit diamond trade and with the ongoing violent conflicts 

in Liberia and Sierra Leone.

The allegations in the Post were subsequently corroborated 

by several other sources. Testimony in the trials of the terrorists 

responsible for the bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania 

in 1998 claimed that Al Qaeda was using proceeds from the illicit 

diamond trade to finance its terrorist operations.27 Further support 

for Farrah’s allegations emerged during U.S. congressional hearings 

on the connection between illicit diamond trade and terrorism. 
10

During the hearings, former U.S. Ambassador to Sierra Leone Joe 

Melrose testified that he believed the Revolutionary United Front 

(RUF) rebels in Sierra Leone were selling conflict diamonds to Al 

Qaeda, based on his own interviews with RUF leaders during his 

tenure as Ambassador.28 Also testifying were Alan Eastham, Special 

Negotiator for Conflict Diamonds in the U.S. Department of State, 

and Timothy Skud of the enforcement arm in the U.S. Department of 

Treasury, as well as Loren Yager from the General Accounting Office. 

All three noted the lack of transparency characterizing financial 

transactions in failed states, and the opportunities extant in such 

states for terrorist groups like Al Qaeda to launder money, profit 

from illicit trade, and acquire arms and other resources to support 

their operations.29

More recent evidence supporting Al Qaeda presence and 

operations in Sierra Leone and Liberia was provided by David 

Crane, Chief Prosecutor for the Special Court for Sierra Leone, in 

October 2004. Crane, responsible for interviewing and prosecuting 

rebels accused of war crimes during the fighting in Sierra Leone, 

has had unique and generally unfettered access to the key players in 

Sierra Leone’s illicit trade in diamonds and guns. He has confirmed 

Al Qaeda’s involvement in this trade, describing a process in which 

rebels and terrorist organizations, including Al Qaeda, were “taking 

blood diamonds from the mines of eastern Sierra Leone and trading 

them for cash to buy weapons to sustain the conflicts throughout the 

region or international terrorism.”30

The Al Qaeda cells operating in Liberia and Sierra Leone do not 

resemble the nodes that Sageman, Stern, Mishal, and Rosenthal 

describe in their models of terrorist networks. The small, close-knit, 

locally spawned clusters of angry young men that characterize the Al 

Qaeda nodes in Sageman’s model do not appear to have emerged at 

all in Liberia or Sierra Leone. The U.S. Department of State, reporting 

on terrorism over the past 5 years, does not mention direct attacks 

perpetrated or sponsored by Al Qaeda in Liberia or Sierra Leone, 

although the 2001 Report does mention Al Qaeda participation in 

the conflict diamond trade.31

In contrast, the Al Qaeda cells in Liberia and Sierra Leone fit 

perfectly the description of an evolving terrorist hub in the huband-node model. Al Qaeda was able to use the cover of violently 
11

chaotic conditions in both countries to evade effective surveillance or 

sanction by the international community or by U.S. counterterrorism 

forces. That same chaos did not, however, prevent the Al Qaeda cells 

from laundering money, participating in the illicit diamond trade, 

or from exploiting the extensive network of illegal arms dealers that 

proliferate in failed states. All of these activities are hallmarks of the 

evolving terrorist hub.

The detailed descriptions provided by the United Nations (UN) 

report of arms smuggling networks in Sierra Leone and Liberia is 

especially relevant to the operation of hubs in these two countries. 

The extent of the networks and their ability to procure almost any 

weapon desired by RUF buyers is well-documented in the UN 

report.32 It seems very likely, in view of what has already occurred 

in the region, that terrorist hubs operating in Sierra Leone or Liberia 

could gain access to highly sophisticated weaponry of almost every 

sort, as well as the expertise to employ it. 

While the lack of infrastructure and collapse of government 

services may restrict some operations by terrorist groups, they do 

not appear to limit the electronic connectivity that permits hubs 

to interact with geographically distributed nodes. Satellite-based 

internet access does not depend upon sophisticated infrastructural 

networks on the ground. Internet access is already penetrating 

even the most violence-prone areas of Sub-Saharan Africa: by 2002, 

every country in Africa enjoyed some level of internet connectivity, 

including several countries that were clearly failed states.33

It is the nexus of electronic connectivity—virtual networking—

with the dramatic expansion of the illegal arms trade following the 

end of the Cold War that lends terrorist hubs operating from failed 

states their truly threatening character. Al Qaeda or other terrorists 

groups that operate hubs from Sierra Leone or Liberia may be able to 

exploit failed state-based finances to tap into the global arms market. 

Such groups may be able to establish a virtual network that connects 

arms smugglers with geographically distributed terrorist nodes, and 

provides necessary financial resources to facilitate the acquisition 

and delivery of weapons by those nodes. Depending on the nature of 

the weapons that the hubs are able to gain access to, as noted in the 

subsequent section on the nuclear dimension of the terrorist threat, 
12

the danger from terrorist hubs operating in failed states like Liberia 

or Sierra Leone may be significant.

Somalia: Nodes and Hubs since 9/11.

Somalia is frequently cited by the failed state literature as 

an example of a failed state that has suffered complete collapse. 

Zartman identified Somalia as one of two cases of “clear collapse” 

in Sub-Saharan Africa in the early 1990s, while Robin Dorff treats it 

as the definitive case in his 1999 study of strategies for coping with 

state failure.34 In 2002 Rotberg noted that “Somalia is the model of 

a collapsed state: a geographical expression only, with borders but 

with no effective way to exert authority within those borders.”35

Conditions of state failure persist in Somalia today. The latest 

Department of State reporting on terrorism notes the continuing 

absence of effective governance and the prevalence of violent 

instability in Somalia.36 Menkhaus, in his 2004 study of terrorism 

in Somalia, describes a collapsed state in which conditions are so 

chaotic and violent that even terrorist groups find it a difficult venue 

in which to operate.37 The most recent International Crisis Group 

(ICG) study of Somalia describes an area in which state collapse is 

endemic and persistent, observing “its lack of a functioning central 

government” and “the absence of functioning police, immigration, 

customs, and intelligence agencies.”38

Various terrorist groups have operated in Somalia since it 

experienced state collapse in the early 1990s. The most prominent 

of these groups include Al-Ittihad al-Islamiyyaa (AIAI), Al Qaeda 

itself, and a small, recently emerged, extremely violent jihadist cell 

led by Aden Hashi ‘Ayro. AIAI seems to have acted as a terrorist 

hub for other groups active in Ethiopia, while the ‘Ayro group has 

operated as a terrorist node in the evolved two-celled network model. 

Al Qaeda has demonstrated and suspected links to AIAI and ‘Ayro, 

and appears to have developed Somalia as a key hub for attacks 

throughout East Africa. 

Ken Menkhaus provides the most detailed study of AIAI. He 

describes a fairly sophisticated organization with political, religious, 

social, and economic elements. Like Hezballah in Lebanon and 

Hamas in the Gaza Strip, AIAI emerged in the 1990s as a legitimate 
13

political actor inside Somalia. Its involvement with terrorism 

emerged through its support of a series of terrorist attacks in Addis 

Ababa, Ethiopia, during the mid-1990s. AIAI appears to have acted 

in classic hub fashion, providing financial assistance, planning, and 

ideological encouragement to terrorist attacks in Ethiopia by Somali 

irredentists seeking the return to Somali rule of Ethiopia’s Ogaden 

Desert.39

The Ethiopians regarded AIAI as a significant terrorist threat. 

An Ethiopian military response, targeting the center of AIAI 

administration and influence in the Somali town of Luuq in 1996, 

significantly damaged the movement. In response to the Ethiopian 

attacks, AIAI decentralized its operations, distanced itself from 

further terrorist attacks, and moved back into the Somali political 

mainstream.40 Since that time, while AIAI has continued to be a focus 

of attention for U.S. counterterrorist analysts, there is little evidence 

of active AIAI participation in terrorist attacks.41

The AIAI support for terrorist attacks in Ethiopia illustrates the 

potential for terrorist hubs, even in an environment as violent and 

chaotic as Somalia, to marshal effective support for terrorist attacks 

by geographically distributed terrorist nodes. The AIAI example 

also illustrates some limitations of that support. AIAI influence 

was a function of a porous contiguous border with Ethiopia. It 

also depended upon the presence in Ethiopia of an ethnic Somali 

population sympathetic to Somali irredentist ideological appeals. 

Both factors suggest that AIAI ability to act as a terrorist hub in the 

context of the two-celled network model is extremely limited beyond 

the immediate region surrounding Somalia.

The Jihadist group led by Aden Hashi ‘Ayro may be one of 

the best current examples of an evolved terrorist node. Little is 

known about this shadowy group. The best (and one of the only) 

studies describing its operations is the ICG July 2005 study, which 

is notable for the level of access it achieved to sources within the 

U.S. counterterrorism community and within Somalia itself. The 

ICG report describes a sophisticated, tightly organized, and highly 

secretive group which has initiated numerous terrorist attacks 

against Westerners in Somalia over the past 3 years.42

The ’Ayro group appears to have developed independently of 

both AIAI and Al Qaeda, and to operate without direction from 
14

either, although ties to Al Qaeda, in particular, are suspected. Since 

2003, it has succeeded in killing an Italian nurse, two British teachers, 

a German aid worker, and a prominent BBC journalist. While a few 

members of the group have been arrested by local security forces 

operating in Somaliland, the leadership remains at large. By January 

2005, the group had established itself openly in Mogadishu. It 

continues to be of great concern to local Somali clans as well as to 

regional, U.S., and international counterterrorism efforts.43

The ’Ayro group provides important insights into the threat posed 

by evolved terrorist nodes operating in a failed state. Such nodes are 

extremely difficult to locate and neutralize, supporting the idea that 

failed states offer shelter, concealment, and protection to terrorist 

organizations. On the other hand, the victims of ’Ayro group attacks 

demonstrate the greatest drawback facing terrorist nodes in such 

environments: few targets of significance to international terrorist 

groups are available in failed states. Even when attacks succeed in 

killing a prominent western journalist, as the group did in February 

2005, the lack of media presence and the endemic violence associated 

with the Somali environment reduce the psychological impact of 

such attacks. Most of the ’Ayro group’s attacks have received little or 

no attention outside Somalia. They appear to have had little impact 

with other than purely local audiences.

Al Qaeda presence in Somalia has been much more extensive, 

much more persistent, and much more pervasive in terms of 

terrorism and support for terrorism than that of either AIAI or the 

’Ayro group. Al Qaeda activity in Somalia has been explored by 

Menkhaus, and is described in far greater detail by the July 2005 ICG 

report. Al Qaeda activity manifested itself in four separate terrorist 

incidents: the bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 

1998; the bombing of a hotel in Mombasa, Kenya in 2002; attacks on 

an Israeli airliner in Kenya using SA-7 Strella surface-to-air missiles, 

also in 2002; and an attempted attack on the U.S. embassy in Nairobi 

employing light aircraft which was foiled by Kenyan authorities in 

2003.44

Al Qaeda cells located in and operating from Somalia participated 

in all four incidents. Their roles differed slightly in each case, but 

included marshalling funding for the attacks, facilitating planning 
15

and preparation by local terrorist nodes in Tanzania and Kenya, 

providing expertise to the attackers, procuring sophisticated weapons 

for the attacks, and acting as a source of ideological inspiration for 

the attackers. Somalia provided a secure location from which the 

Al Qaeda hub was able to furnish this support, being practically 

opaque to Western and regional security forces. Somalia provided 

connections to the illicit arms trade which flourished in the region, 

and to sources of funding from Islamic charities which Al Qaeda 

was able to tap into. There is evidence to suggest that an Al QaedaAIAI connection provided a means of channeling funds from AIAIaffiliated Islamic charities through Al Qaeda to terrorist nodes in the 

region.45

It is important not to overstate the significance of the direct 

participation by Somali Al Qaeda cells in the series of attacks in 

Kenya. That direct participation—Al Qaeda cells operating as nodes 

rather than hubs—was a function of porous contiguous borders 

between Kenya and Somalia that facilitated easy and clandestine 

movement of groups and individuals between the two countries. 

It was also a function of local (Kenyan) ethnic Somali populations 

sympathetic to the agendas of groups inside Somalia that Al Qaeda 

had links to and an ideological agenda in common with. The ability 

of Somali-based Al Qaeda cells to operate as terrorist nodes in areas 

outside this immediate region is highly suspect. 

On the other hand, the level of support provided to the attacks 

by Somali-based Al Qaeda cells functioning in their role as terrorist 

hubs is far more significant. Al Qaeda operatives were able to move 

freely into, out of, and within Somalia with little or no visibility by 

external security and intelligence agencies. Al Qaeda cells moved 

financial resources, acquired sophisticated weapons, and actively 

encouraged the preparation and launching of the attacks, and did so 

without coming to the attention of or provoking effective retaliation 

by regional, U.S., or other national or international counterterrorist 

efforts. 

The case of Somalia suggests that failed states do, in fact, offer 

an effective venue for operations by evolved terrorist hubs. The 

environment in such states can provide what may be the greatest 

level of protection available to terrorist organizations from 

counterterrorism operations by military forces or law enforcement 
16

agencies. The case of Somalia also suggests that the violent and 

chaotic conditions within failed states may reduce dramatically 

the impact of local attacks by terrorist nodes, but will not preclude 

terrorist hubs from operating in their new, evolved mode to inspire 

ideologically or assist financially or materially the operations of 

geographically distributed nodes.

The electronic connectivity provided by satellite-based internet 

access will probably enable failed state-based terrorist hubs to 

extend their connectivity beyond the immediate region of the failed 

state. This was certainly the case with the diamond-trading Al Qaeda 

hubs in Liberia and Sierra Leone, and it seems likely that similar 

opportunities exist for Al Qaeda hubs operating from Somalia. 

The potential threat that such hubs present to the international 

community is real, and not geographically bounded. The magnitude 

of that threat is limited by the means available to the evolved hubs. 

In this context, recent developments in the control and proliferation 

of WMD are not reassuring.

Raising the Stakes: 

The Nuclear Dimension of the Terrorist Threat.

The threat that terrorist hubs based in failed states pose to the 

United States and to its allies escalates dramatically if those hubs 

can obtain access to nuclear weapons. The risk that such weapons 

will find their way into terrorist hands is increasing significantly as 

a result of three interrelated factors. The end of the Cold War has 

witnessed an alarming erosion of control and security of Russian 

nuclear technology and weaponry. It has also witnessed increasing 

nuclear proliferation among non-nuclear states. The circumstances 

surrounding that proliferation—primarily its clandestine and covert 

nature—make it far more likely for nuclear weapons to find their 

way from state proliferators into the hands of terrorist groups. 

The problematic issue of accounting for and controlling Sovietera nuclear weapons and technology has been explored thoroughly 

by Jessica Stern in her 1999 study of terrorism and WMD. Stern 

described a Soviet-era military that was melting down, unpaid, and 

rife with corruption. Loss of accountability for fissionable materials, 

poor controls on the technology of nuclear weapons production, 
17

and poor supervision of Russia’s militarized scientific community 

characterized the post-Cold War Russian nuclear sector. Lapses may 

have even included loss of operational nuclear devices.46

More recent reporting on the situation is hardly more encouraging. 

A survey in 2002 of 602 Russian scientists working in the Russian 

WMD sector revealed that roughly 20 percent of the Russian scientists 

interviewed expressed a willingness to work for nations identified 

as WMD proliferators: Iran, North Korea or Syria.47 Most recently, 

Busch and Holmes have catalogued the efforts of rogue states 

and of Al Qaeda to acquire nuclear weapons capability from the 

inadequately controlled Russian nuclear sector, and have identified 

the human element of that sector as being especially vulnerable.48

When viewed in combination with the growing influence and reach 

of Russian organized crime, the lack of security in the Russian 

weaponized nuclear technology sector represents a significant risk 

of nuclear capability finding its way into the hands of terrorist hubs. 

Exacerbating this risk are the efforts of non-nuclear states that are 

seeking to develop a nuclear strike capability.

While North Korea frequently is cited as the best example of this 

sort of nuclear proliferation, in the context of terrorist access to WMD, 

Iran may prove to be far more dangerous. The clandestine Iranian 

nuclear weapons program is reportedly well-advanced. A recent 

study of the Iranian nuclear program published by the U.S. Army War 

College considers Iranian fielding of operational nuclear weapons 

to be inevitable and estimates the time frame for such a fielding to 

be 12 to 48 months.49 Given Iran’s well-established relationship with 

Hezballah in Lebanon and its increasingly problematic, even hostile, 

relationship with the United States, the Iranian nuclear weapons 

program would seem to offer a tempting opportunity to Al Qaeda 

elements seeking clandestine access to nuclear technology. Even 

if the Iranian leadership does not regard sharing nuclear secrets 

with terrorist groups as a wise policy, elements within the Iranian 

government or participants in its nuclear weapons program may 

be willing to do so for their own reasons. The nature of clandestine 

nuclear weapons programs makes them especially vulnerable to 

compromise, as the Pakistani experience has demonstrated.

The clandestine nuclear weapons program directed by Dr. Abdul 

Qadeer Khan on behalf of the Pakistani government exemplifies the 
18

risks inherent in such secret undertakings. As the details of Khan’s 

nuclear weapons operation have emerged, it has become increasingly 

evident that he exercised little control over the elements of his 

network operating outside of Pakistan. His non-Pakistani partners 

in acquiring nuclear technology appear to have been motivated 

almost entirely by money, and Khan himself seems to have operated 

with minimal oversight from the Pakistani government.50 Under 

such circumstances, the risk that critical nuclear technology will 

be diverted to groups like Al Qaeda is particularly high, especially 

when those groups have access to significant financial resources, 

and program participants are able to profit from diversion with little 

chance of detection by either the proliferating state or by opponents 

of that proliferation.

While both hubs and nodes exist in failed state terrorist networks 

in Sub-Saharan Africa, only the hubs present a threat of genuinely 

serious proportions to U.S. interests. Escalating nuclear proliferation 

offers terrorist hubs sheltering in failed states the opportunity to 

translate funding into weapons access. If those hubs are successful 

in maintaining even a tenuous connection through their virtual 

network to terrorist nodes existing within the United States or the 

territory of its allies, or in other areas of vital U.S. interest, then the 

risk posed by terrorist groups operating from failed states becomes 

real and immediate. The recent attacks by terrorist nodes in London, 

Cairo, and Madrid suggest that such is the case. 

Developing the nexus between nuclear weapons acquisition, 

delivery to a local terrorist node, and employment in a terrorist attack 

probably will require significant resources and considerable time. 

Evolved terrorist hubs operating in failed states like Sierra Leone, 

Liberia, or Somalia may have both. Identifying those hubs, locating 

their members, and entering the failed state in which they are located 

to apprehend or destroy them will be a complex and difficult task. 

The U.S. Response: Current Strategies and Their Limitations.

U.S. strategies in response to terrorist hubs and nodes operating 

in Sub-Saharan Africa can be divided into four broad categories. 

Military operations target terrorist hubs, seeking to destroy them 

with direct military strikes. Security assistance programs focus on 
19

building local state capacity to combat terrorists within individual 

nation states, cultivating local and regional partners who can obviate 

the requirement for direct U.S. intervention. The U.S. Department 

of Justice exploits extradition agreements and partnerships with 

host nation law enforcement agencies and internal security forces to 

identify, apprehend, and bring to justice terrorist suspects operating 

or taking refuge in foreign countries, and works with host nations 

and international organizations to restrict the ability of terrorist 

groups to operate in the global commons. Finally, in a much broader 

context, the United States has endorsed strategies to address the root 

causes of terrorism and the conditions that foster it. While all four of 

these approaches have enjoyed some success in the GWOT, none of 

them are likely to prove effective in a failed state environment.

Direct military action targeting identified terrorist cells has been 

the predominant U.S. approach. Examples include the bombing of 

Libya in 1986 by the Reagan administration in response to Libyansponsored terrorist attacks against U.S. targets in Europe; the U.S. 

cruise missile attacks on targets in The Sudan and in Afghanistan 

in 1998 in response to the Al Qaeda bombings of U.S. embassies in 

Kenya and Tanzania; the invasion and occupation of Afghanistan 

in 2002 in response to the 9/11 attacks; and ongoing U.S. military 

operations to locate and destroy Al Qaeda cells still operating in 

eastern Afghanistan. The strategy has enjoyed some remarkable 

successes, including the decision by Libya to publicly renounce its 

support for terrorist organizations and attacks, the recruitment of The 

Sudan as a supporter of the GWOT, and the elimination of Al Qaedarun, Taliban-supported terrorist training camps in Afghanistan. 

Direct military action has been much less successful in addressing 

terrorist cells operating in failed states.

The limitations of military power in a failed state environment 

became starkly evident during U.S. efforts to neutralize Mohammed 

Farah Aideed and his subordinate leaders in Somalia in 1993. 

Kenneth Allard has described the challenges posed by state failure 

in Somalia to U.S. military operations, noting the endemic violence, 

lack of infrastructure, and the complete absence of state security or 

criminal justice systems.51

The best examination of those challenges is found in Mark 

Bowden’s Black Hawk Down, which describes in detail both the failed 
20

state environment in Somalia and the impact of that environment on 

the U.S. Army Rangers and Delta Force Commandos trying to locate 

and neutralize Aideed and his militia leaders.52 In a similar vein, 

Mark Huband has described the environment in Liberia following 

its collapse in 1990 and the impact of that environment on U.S. and 

regional military operations.53 The lessons of these experiences do not 

support strategies that depend on direct military action to address 

terrorist groups operating in and from failed states.

Direct military action against terrorist targets requires accurate, 

timely intelligence. Such intelligence is typically not available in 

a failed state environment. U.S. technical intelligence capabilities 

are marginally effective where communications infrastructure is 

primitive at best and where most communication is face-to-face 

or by messenger. Human intelligence—HUMINT, as it is called in 

U.S. intelligence circles—is equally poor. U.S. intelligence agencies 

typically have no presence on the ground in failed states, and 

even where they do, the ability of human intelligence collectors 

to operate effectively is constrained by lack of security, ignorance 

of local customs and languages, and the practical difficulties of 

operating in areas with poor to no communications or transportation 

infrastructure or services. The failure of U.S. forces in Somalia to 

recruit effective agent networks in support of U.S. military operations 

is described thoroughly by Bowden, and is a function of conditions 

and circumstances common to failed states.54

Even where accurate intelligence is available, military strikes 

confront severe limitations in failed states. Poor infrastructure limits 

the deployment and maneuver of military forces in the same way 

that it limits the effectiveness of humanitarian NGOs. The high levels 

of violence prevalent in failed states require inordinate amounts of 

military capability simply to protect the force, significantly reducing 

its capability to pursue its operational missions. Counterterrorism 

missions require personal interaction between military forces and 

local communities. Such interaction is a necessity if military forces 

are to locate small numbers of terrorists who have been identified 

by intelligence sources, but who are not easily distinguishable from 

the surrounding population. In a failed state, such interaction entails 

serious risks for soldiers and civilians alike, and is not likely to yield 

much in the way of cooperation from local communities immersed 
21

in the criminal violence and social disintegration that accompany 

state failure.

A final problem with direct military action involves the status 

that it confers on the terrorists who become military targets. Treating 

the terrorists as belligerents and applying the international law of 

war to their pursuit and destruction legitimizes, in a very real and 

concrete way, their status under international law and in the eyes of 

the international community. Even labeling terrorists as “unlawful 

combatants” under the provisions of the Geneva Convention, as the 

Bush administration has consistently sought to do, invites them to 

argue that the targets of the 9/11 attacks were legitimate military 

targets and that the loss of civilian life was incidental to the military 

objectives of the attacks. 

Removing acts of terrorism from the context of national criminal 

justice systems foregoes the delegitimizing process that the 

arraignment and conviction of terrorists in criminal courts provides. 

Michael German, a veteran U.S. law enforcement officer with 

extensive counterterrorism experience in both the military and law 

enforcement communities, has made this very point in the context of 

counterterrorism strategy: 

By treating terrorists like criminals, we stigmatize them in their 

community, while simultaneously validating our own authority. Open 

and public trials allow the community to see the terrorist for the criminal 

he is, and successful prosecutions give them faith that the government is 

protecting them . . .55

In this context, employment of direct military action in failed states 

is especially problematic. Coercive force, especially lethal coercive 

force, already has been delegitimized in failed states by the endemic, 

illegitimate violence that permeates the failed state environment. 

Military action against terrorist targets in such circumstances runs 

the risk of being seen as simply one more manifestation of that 

violence.

Building local state capacity to combat terrorists within 

individual nation-states has emerged since the 9/11 attacks as a 

critical component of U.S. counterterrorism strategy. This element 

of U.S. strategy has been particularly important in areas of the 

world characterized by weak or failing states and by less than fully 
22

capable state security forces, both of which characterize much of 

Sub-Saharan Africa. The Pan Sahel Initiative (PSI) and Trans-Sahel 

Counterterrorism Initiative (TSCTI) are excellent examples of this 

approach, as are the East Africa Counterterrorism Initiative (EACTI) 

and the establishment of Joint Task Force Horn of Africa (JTF HOA) 

in Djibouti. 

PSI was initiated in 2002 to help countries in the Sahel region 

of northern Africa improve border security and enhance counterterrorism capabilities. The intent of the program was to enhance 

the ability of U.S. partners in Africa to deny use of their territory 

to terrorist groups.56 TSCTI, the follow-on initiative, has provided 

additional funding and sought to foster regional cooperation 

among Sahelian states in addressing the regional terrorist threat.57

Kraxenberger implies that the effort has contributed directly to 

successful counterterrorist operations by PSI partners, a assessment 

that was shared by Stephen Ellis in a 2004 analysis of PSI.58

Operations by JTF HOA and the EACTI pursue similar objectives 

with similar programs in the Horn of Africa. David Shinn, a veteran 

Foreign Service officer with extensive experience in the sub-region, 

has described both JTF HOA and EACTI in a broader treatment of 

counterterrorism initiatives in the Horn. Shinn notes the successes of 

both activities in building capacity and fostering effective engagement with key partners in East Africa. He notes, however, that neither 

program has had much effect in Somalia, observing that “the country 

[Somalia] is still a failed state where terrorist elements can move 

with impunity.”59 The failure of JTF HOA and EACTI to penetrate or 

influence the environment in Somalia, despite continuing evidence 

of Al Qaeda presence there, illustrates the inability of this approach 

to address terrorist cells in failed states effectively.

The PSI, TSCTI, EACTI and JTF HOA security assistance efforts 

partnered with governments that, while weak, still enjoyed legitimacy and some minimal level of functionality. Neither condition is 

extant in truly failed states like Somalia, Liberia, and Sierra Leone. 

In the complete absence of a functioning security sector, failed 

states offer little venue for absorbing capacity-building efforts by 

external players. Even if such efforts enjoy some limited success, that 

outcome can actually be counterproductive in environments where 
23

the receiving agencies are ineffective, corrupt, and possibly already 

infiltrated by the very terrorist groups that Western assistance efforts 

are focused against. 

The political costs of providing assistance to indigenous security 

forces in a failed state also can be extremely high. In a failed state, 

any organized group employing armed force is likely to have been 

involved with criminal activities or to have members that have 

perpetrated, or are perpetrating, atrocities and violence against 

civilians. Initiatives like PSI, if pursued in failed states like Somalia, 

risk political repercussions if the United States is seen as complicit 

in the criminal activities and violence of local warlords and their 

militias. In such circumstances, U.S. assistance and training almost 

certainly will be exploited by those warlords to further their own 

narrow agendas. They will also be exploited by individual militia 

members for personal aggrandizement. In either case, the impact of 

such assistance in the best case is likely to be minimal, and in the worst 

case may actually make the problem of finding and apprehending 

terrorist groups more difficult. 

Counterterrorism efforts by the U.S. Department of Justice and 

other U.S. agencies involved in law enforcement have enjoyed 

some remarkable successes since 9/11. Justice and Treasury have 

posted major accomplishments in restricting the ability of terrorist 

groups to operate in the global commons. General Accounting Office 

officials testifying before Congress in 2004 noted striking successes in 

combating money laundering and in restricting financial operations 

by terrorist organizations. Those same officials also noted, however, 

that when terrorist organizations use “alternative financing 

mechanisms to earn, move, and store their assets,” enforcement is 

much more difficult and progress much harder to gauge.60 Since 

alternative mechanisms are the norm in failed states, terrorist 

organizations are able to avoid most of the scrutiny by Justice and 

Treasury, and by their host nation and international partners. 

The U.S. Department of Justice also has enjoyed some remarkable 

successes partnering with host nation law enforcement agencies to 

identify, apprehend, and bring to justice terrorist suspects operating 

or seeking refuge in foreign countries. The primary means for affecting 

this partnership are the 23 Legal Attache Offices maintained by the 
24

U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation in U.S. embassies around the 

world.61 Unfortunately, none of these offices are located in failed states, 

which typically do not possess functioning American embassies. As 

an example, the U.S. Legal Attache stationed in Nairobi, Kenya, has 

responsibility for Somalia. The embassy in Nairobi, however, has no 

means of exercising embassy functions in the dangerous and volatile 

streets of Mogadishu, where even the most routine activities require 

that U.S. personnel be accompanied by robust U.S. security forces. 

The limited capabilities of U.S. Legal Attache offices accentuate 

another limitation of the U.S. law enforcement community: it lacks 

an “expeditionary capability.” Conditions in failed states, as already 

mentioned, require both robust security capabilities to provide 

for protection of deployed personnel, as well as the capacity to 

bring whatever materials, communications, and logistics support 

are necessary for operations on the ground. U.S. law enforcement 

does not have the self-sufficient “fly-away packages” of personnel, 

equipment, and logistics support that characterize the expeditionary 

forces of the U.S. military. It also lacks robust security forces to 

establish secure areas of operations in failed states, and to escort law 

enforcement officers into and out of highly volatile neighborhoods 

where fire fights are common and where criminal gangs sport heavy 

machine guns, mortars, and rocket-propelled grenades. Even if 

access were possible, the conditions in failed states pose daunting 

obstacles to law enforcement officers.

In the absence of any functioning local criminal justice or judicial 

system, certain characteristics of the U.S. criminal justice system 

become problematic. U.S. constitutional requirements for warranted 

searches and seizures presuppose a legitimate court system able to 

rule on requests for warrants by law enforcement officers. Chains of 

custody for evidence, sworn affidavits from witnesses, and right to 

legal counsel for criminal suspects are hardly practical in the chaotic 

and violent conditions prevalent in failed states. As a practical 

matter, law enforcement officers, whether local, regional, U.S., or 

international, have no means of conducting a normal investigation 

to apprehend and bring to trial suspected terrorists in a failed 

state. These limitations preclude current U.S. law enforcementbased strategies from enjoying much success against terrorist hubs 

operating in failed states. 
25

The final counterterrorism strategy, and one that is generating 

growing attention in policy communities and academic circles alike, 

is that of addressing the root causes of terrorism. Sageman identifies 

addressing the underlying issues that provoke young Muslim men to 

seek out the salafi jihad as a critical requirement of counterterrorism 

strategies.62 Lyman and Morrison assert that the Bush administration 

must “deal with the . . . fundamental problems—economic distress, 

ethnic and religious fissures, fragile governance, weak democracy, 

and rampant human rights abuses—that create an environment in 

which terrorists thrive.”63 President Bush himself identified the task 

of reducing conditions that can be exploited by terrorists as a goal of 

his 2003 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism.

64

Efforts to implement a root causes approach in countering 

terrorism confront several challenges in failed states. The ability of 

U.S. strategists to influence terrorists or potential terrorists in failed 

states is limited by the same conditions that limit law enforcement 

efforts and military strikes. Whatever efforts the United States is able 

to pursue globally to diminish the propensity of potential recruits to 

join Al Qaeda cells or to discourage existing members from initiating 

attacks are not likely to penetrate the violent and chaotic environment 

that permeates collapsed states like Somalia and Sierra Leone. 

Several researchers and policymakers have suggested that the 

United States and its allies should focus on promoting failed state 

recovery. Addressing the conditions of state failure itself, these 

authors suggest, will remove the situation that furnishes sanctuary 

and cover to terrorist cells.65 The historical record is not encouraging 

in this regard. 

Somalia remains a failed state despite successive interventions 

by large and very capable U.S., coalition, and UN peacekeeping 

forces. Sierra Leone and Liberia likewise do not show evidence of 

genuine state recovery despite the efforts of successive Economic 

Community of West African States interventions and of the largest 

UN peacekeeping mission in the history of the organization. Even 

where some progress in state recovery appears to be underway, as 

in Kosovo, the effort requires years of effort at tremendous cost. The 

threat that evolved terrorist hubs in failed states will obtain access 

to nuclear weaponry and deliver that weaponry into the hands of 
26

terrorist nodes in a position to threaten vital U.S. interests may not 

accommodate the timelines required by root cause approaches. 

Finding Synergy in Military and Law Enforcement Efforts: 

An Alternative Approach.

The limitations of current counterterrorism strategies in failed 

states argue for an entirely new approach to the problem. The 

military and law enforcement communities bring very different 

core competencies to the table. Neither community, by itself, has 

the skill set to implement counterterrorism strategies in failed states 

effectively. Both communities working in tandem, however, offer 

capabilities that may prove effective in dealing with the complex 

failed state problem set. 

U.S. military forces may not be ideally suited to apprehending 

individual terrorists, but they are superb at carving out a secure 

area of operations in difficult and violent environments. Marine 

Expeditionary Forces and U.S. Army Brigade Task Forces, supported 

by Air Expeditionary Wings and Naval Amphibious Task Forces, 

are not only capable of establishing secure bases in the midst of the 

most violent and chaotic failed state, but they also are capable of 

projecting a secure presence into the most difficult and problematic 

areas of that state. Despite their failure, ultimately, to locate and take 

Mohammed Farrah Aideed into custody, the Army Rangers and 

Delta Force commandos of Black Hawk Down were able to penetrate 

into, and sustain themselves for an extended period of time within, 

the most dangerous area in all of Somalia.

While the U.S. foreign intelligence community has not enjoyed 

much success in locating individual terrorists in failed states, it can 

identify terrorist hubs operating from failed states that are developing 

and exercising global reach. It is in exercising their connections 

with geographically distributed nodes that terrorist hubs will make 

themselves most vulnerable, as Sageman has pointed out. Those 

hubs that are close to achieving access to WMD will have the highest 

profile. 

Those organizations making up the U.S. foreign intelligence 

community are the agencies most likely to detect terrorist hubs 
27

developing global reach and WMD capability, and to identify the 

failed states that they are operating from. Having done so and 

having provided the basis for launching a military operation to 

obtain access to the failed state in question, the challenge of locating 

and apprehending individual terrorists on the ground remains. In 

confronting this challenge, the U.S. law enforcement community can 

make its greatest contribution.

Locating, positively identifying, and apprehending dangerous 

individuals in the midst of a civilian community is a core competency 

of U.S. law enforcement. More specifically, it is a core competency 

of American law enforcement at the local, and particularly at the 

municipal, level. American law enforcement officers are among the 

best trained, best equipped, and most professional in the world. 

The level of sophistication and capability routinely present in larger 

metropolitan police departments in the United States exceeds the 

capabilities of most nation-states. Two strategic approaches to law 

enforcement, one pioneered by American police forces and one 

developed in the United Kingdom, can provide a framework for 

effectively locating and apprehending terrorist suspects in failed 

states. Those approaches are community policing and intelligenceled policing. 

Community policing developed in the United States in the early 

1970s as an alternative to traditional law enforcement strategies. 

Traditional law enforcement focused on apprehending criminals 

following the commission of a crime and emphasized centralized 

control, efficiency, and shifting resources to meet requirements, 

largely through the use of vehicular patrols. Community policing, 

in contrast, emphasizes dismounted patrols, and partnership 

between patrolmen and community residents. It also emphasizes 

problem solving as opposed to arrest rates, developing empathy 

on the part of patrolmen for the neighborhoods that they police, 

and establishing a common identity between police officers and 

community members.66

The skill set fostered by community policing is precisely the 

skill set necessary to establish rapport with the violence-ridden and 

chaotic communities in a failed state. Particularly relevant here is 

the fact that failed states spawn significant expatriate, immigrant 
28

communities living in large American urban areas. The police forces 

in these American cities, all of which have adopted community 

policing as a foundational neighborhood policing technique, deal 

routinely with immigrant communities from the same failed states 

that furnish sanctuaries for terrorist hubs. 

Large Somali, Liberian, and Sierra Leonean immigrant communities currently live in metropolitan areas throughout the eastern 

United States. Police officers who are familiar with those communities, 

and who have patrolled in them and developed relationships with 

their members, should be highly effective in the failed state from 

which those communities immigrated. 

Members of immigrant communities from failed states typically 

remain in close touch with families in their country of origin. They 

may very well provide information of value to police officers 

deploying to those countries in support of counterterrorism efforts. 

The communities also can provide a source of interpreter-translators 

whose reliability is already known to law enforcement, and who 

will probably regard favorably the opportunity for lucrative 

employment with U.S. Government agencies. This aspect by itself 

will be immensely valuable to U.S. counterterrorism expeditionary 

forces that are reluctant to employ or trust local interpreters whose 

loyalties and credibility are highly suspect. 

Intelligence-led policing is a concept that emerged in the United 

Kingdom during the 1990s. Blair Alexander, a veteran Oakland, 

California, police officer with extensive counterterrorism experience 

as a U.S. Army Reserve Military Police officer, described the concept 

in a study of local policing techniques and counterterrorism.67

Intelligence-led policing focuses on the development of overt and 

covert intelligence collection in a targeted fashion against individuals 

of interest to the police. Modern electronic filing systems and 

sophisticated analytical techniques pioneered by foreign intelligence 

communities are employed to correlate data, identify and analyze 

networks, and establish relationships between individuals and 

groups. The intelligence products developed through this process 

are then utilized to shape law enforcement operations by identifying 

and focusing on the most serious offenders.68

Colonel Alexander ultimately assessed intelligence-led policing as unsuitable for use within the United States in view of 
29

constitutional constraints in the American criminal justice system, 

and the likely public distaste for the invasion of privacy that the 

technique seems to require. Intelligence-led policing techniques 

may, however, be appropriate and well-suited to identifying, 

locating, and apprehending terrorist suspects in a failed state. This is 

especially so if police intelligence units can be established to operate 

in tandem with the all-source, National Intelligence Support Team 

(NIST) that typically accompanies U.S. military expeditionary forces 

deploying into a failed state. The potential synergies of combining 

foreign intelligence and law enforcement expertise in the information 

collection and analysis process offers significant improvements in an 

area that has been especially problematic in failed states.

An alternative approach to counterterrorism in failed states 

would consist of four elements. The foreign intelligence community 

would identify failed states harboring terrorist hubs that are 

developing global reach and threaten access to WMD technology. A 

military expeditionary force would insert itself into the failed state. 

A NIST, including a civilian law enforcement element and using 

intelligence-led policing, would identify those areas of the failed 

state in which the terrorists are operating, and provide information 

to facilitate their identification. The military expeditionary force 

would then provide protected access to that area for teams of U.S. 

law enforcement officers with extensive and culturally relevant 

community policing experience. Those teams of law enforcement 

officers would make final identifications and actually apprehend 

the terrorists. Teams of veteran law enforcement officers with community policing experience, inserted and protected in failed states 

by robust military expeditionary forces, and guided by a synthesis 

of foreign intelligence and intelligence-led policing, will prove 

significantly more effective at locating and apprehending terrorist 

hubs than either military forces or law enforcement acting alone.

Once members of a terrorist hub have been taken into custody, 

their subsequent disposition remains an issue. Involving veteran 

law enforcement officers in their apprehension will not remove the 

problems posed by conditions in a failed state for American criminal 

justice procedures. Nor will it address the legitimacy issues that 

treating terrorists as combatants and military targets creates. 
30

Convening a conventional grand jury followed by a formal 

arraignment by the U.S. criminal justice system is one alternative for 

disposing of apprehended terrorists. Such an approach is limited by 

the previously mentioned conditions in failed states, which make it 

very difficult to apply the procedural standards required of the U.S. 

criminal justice system. A possible solution to these problems could 

be provided by leveraging the robust U.S. military justice system 

and international fora like the International Criminal Court. 

The U.S. military possesses a robust and sophisticated criminal 

justice system that operates independently of civil law enforcement, 

but with oversight from the federal judiciary. Constituting military 

tribunals to review the status of terrorists identified and apprehended 

by civil law enforcement elements could bolster the legitimacy of the 

entire process and ameliorate problems with criminal procedures 

that are not consistent with normal U.S. practice. The U.S. military 

has extensive experience with such tribunals, and includes a core 

of experienced military prosecutors, military defense counsels, and 

military judges. 

Establishing an oversight body that is independent of 

apprehending law enforcement agencies provides a process by which 

the decisions of those agencies to apprehend a particular individual 

can be reviewed by parties without a direct, vested interest in the 

outcome of the proceedings. The U.S. military justice system is 

accustomed to dealing with battlefield environments where normal 

criminal procedures are problematic, and has developed a robust 

system of prosecutorial practices and military jurisprudence to cope 

with that environment. Including military tribunals as a check on the 

activities of expeditionary law enforcement can address domestic 

U.S. concerns with lack of due process and can also provide a hedge 

against mistakes or misconduct by those agents who actually identify 

terrorists and take them into custody.

Once terrorists have been apprehended by expeditionary law 

enforcement and their cases processed by military tribunals, they can 

be referred to international venues for final disposition. The record 

of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugsolavia 

has demonstrated the ability of such tribunals to effectively 

prosecute cases referred from chaotic and violent environments.69
31

The International Criminal Court is in the process of establishing a 

similar record, a development which may argue for reconsideration 

by the United States of its position on the Court.70 David Crane, 

Chief Prosecutor for the Special Court for Sierra Leone, has shown 

that international tribunals can prosecute cases from even the most 

violent of failed states effectively.71

Referral of cases to an international tribunal for disposition can 

help address both of the legitimacy issues associated with current 

U.S. strategies. Trial of terrorist suspects before an international 

criminal tribunal avoids the pitfall of legitimizing terrorist actors 

by conferring belligerent status upon them as combatants under 

international law. It also accommodates the limitations inherent to 

U.S. criminal justice procedures: such tribunals are not bound by 

U.S. constitutional law, nor by the procedural constraints which 

have developed over many years as part of the American system 

of checks and balances between executive branch investigators and 

prosecutors, on the one hand, and judicial branch adjudicators on 

the other. 

Conclusion.

Terrorist hubs operating in African failed states threaten to 

make the connection between WMD capabilities and terrorist nodes 

a reality. The nexus of terrorist hubs operating from failed states, 

terrorist nodes located in or with access to areas of vital interest to 

the United States, and nuclear weapons technology or devices is one 

that demands strategies that will be effective immediately. Current 

strategies being pursued by the United States in the GWOT are not 

likely to be effective in identifying and neutralizing terrorist hubs 

operating from failed states.

The foreign intelligence community is best equipped to identify 

terrorist hubs in failed states that are developing global reach and 

threatening to acquire a nuclear dimension. Once those hubs have 

been identified, a synthesis of expeditionary military forces and 

law enforcement elements will be far more effective in dealing with 

those hubs than either element will be acting independently. The 

synergies created by integrating the military instrument of power 
32

with American law enforcement core competencies can be exploited 

most effectively if they are supported by an intelligence capability 

that blends traditional foreign intelligence collection and analysis 

with intelligence-led policing practices from the criminal justice 

sector. 

Once terrorists have been identified, located, and apprehended, 

military tribunals should screen them individually to confirm that 

they are, indeed, who law enforcement officers believe them to be 

and that they are, in fact, associated with the activities of the terrorist 

hubs in question. Upon confirmation of their status as participants in 

the operation of the terrorist hub, those tribunals should refer their 

cases to appropriate international tribunals for disposition.

ENDNOTES

1. Stephen D. Krasner and Carlos Pascual, “Addressing State Failure,” Foreign 

Affairs, Vol. 84, No. 4, July/August 2005, p. 153.

2. Joseph Melrose, “Testimony of Hon. Joseph Melrose, Former U.S. Ambassador 

to Sierra Leone,” Illicit Diamonds, Conflict and Terrorism: The Role of U.S. Agencies in 

Fighting the Conflict Diamond Trade, Hearing before the Oversight of Government 

Management, Restructuring, and the District of Columbia Subcommittee of the 

Committee on Governmental Affairs. Washington, DC: U.S. Senate, February 13, 

2002; John J. Hamre and Gordon R. Sullivan, “Toward Postconflict Reconstruction,” 

The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 4, Autumn, 2002, pp. 85-96; Princeton N. 

Lyman and J. Stephen Morrison, “The Terrorist Threat in Africa,” Foreign Affairs, 

Vol. 83, No. 1, January/February, 2004, p. 75; Brennan M. Kraxberger, “The United 

States and Africa: Shifting Geopolitics in an ‘Age of Terror’,” Africa Today, Vol. 52, 

No. 1, Fall 2005, pp. 46-68.

3. Robert H. Dorff, “Responding to the Failed State: The Need for Strategy,” 

Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol. 10, No. 3, 1999, pp. 63-64.

4. Gerald Helman and Stephen Ratner, “Saving Failed States,” Foreign Policy, 

Vol. 89, Winter 1992, pp. 3-20; I. William Zartman, ed., Collapsed States: The 

Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority, Boulder: Lynne Rienner 

Publishers, Inc., 1995; Tonya Langford, “Things Fall Apart: State Failure and the 

Politics of Intervention,” International Studies Review, Vol. 1, No. 1. Spring 2002, pp. 

59-79; Robert I. Rotberg, ed., When States Fail: Causes and Consequences, Princeton: 

Princeton University Press, 2004.

5. Dorff, pp. 63-64.

6. Jorg Raab and H. Brinton Milward, “Dark Networks as Problems,” Journal of 

Public Administration and Theory, Vol. 13, No. 4, 2003, pp. 413-439; and Sageman.

7. Sageman, p. 164.
33

8. John W. Creswell, Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative and Mixed Methods 

Approaches, 2nd Ed., Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications 2003, p. 179; and Robert 

K. Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods, 3rd Ed., Thousand Oaks: Sage 

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9. See, for example, “Somalia: Countering Terrorism in a Failed State,” ICG Africa 

Report, No. 45, International Crisis Group, May 23, 2002; “Somalia: Continuation 

of War by Other Means?” ICG Africa, Report No. 88, International Crisis Group, 

December 21, 2004; “Counter-Terrorism in Somalia: Losing Hearts and Minds.” 

ICG Africa, Report No. 95, International Crisis Group, July 11, 2005.

10. Lansana Gberie, “War and Peace in Sierra Leone: Diamonds, Corruption 

and the Lebanese Connection,” Partnership Africa Canada Occasional Paper No. 6,

November 2002.

11. Melrose, p. 13.

12. Raab and Milward; Sageman.

13. Raab and Milward, p. 423.

14. Sageman, p. 64.

15. Ibid., p. 164.

16. Ibid., p. 141.

17. Ibid., p. 157.

18. Jessica Stern, The Ultimate Terrorists, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 

1999.

19. Rohan Gunaratna, “The Post-Madrid Face of Al Qaeda,” Washington 

Quarterly, Vol. 27, No. 3, Summer 2004, p. 99.

20. Shaul Mishal and Maoz Rosenthal, “Al Qaeda as a Dune Organization: 

Toward a Typology of Islamic Terrorist Organizations,” Studies in Conflict and 

Terrorism, Vol. 28, No. 4, July/August 2005, p. 282.

21. Sageman, p. 158.

22. U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2004, Washington, 

DC: Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, April 2005, p. 12.

23. Daniel Williams, “Egypt Gets Tough in Sinai in Wake of Resort Attacks,” 

Washington Post, October 2, 2005, p. A24; Ellen Nakashima and Alan Sipress, 

“Police Say Attacks in Bali Were Suicide Bombings,” Washington Post, October 3, 

2005, p. A09; Elaine Sciolino and Helene Fouquet, “Europe Confronts Changing 

Face of Terrorism,” New York Times, August 1, 2005, p. 1.

24. Rotberg, p. 9.

25. Ian Smillie, Lansan Gberie, and Ralph Hazelton, The Heart of the Matter: Sierra 

Leone, Diamonds, and Human Security, Ontario: Partnership Africa Canada, 2000; 

United Nations Panel of Experts, Report of the Panel of Experts appointed pursuant to 

Security Council resolution 1306, paragraph 19, in relation to Sierra Leone, New York: 

The Security Council S/2000/1195, December 20, 2000.
34

26. Douglas Farrah, “Al Qaeda Cash Tied to Diamond Trade,” Washington Post, 

November 2, 2001, p. A01; Douglas Farrah, “Report Says Africans Harbored Al 

Qaeda,” Washington Post, December 29, 2002, p. A01.

27. Nicolas Cook, CRS Report for Congress: Diamonds and Conflict: Background, 

Policy, and Legislation, Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Updated 

July 16, 2003, p. 7.

28. Melrose, p. 13.

29. Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, “Illicit Diamonds, Conflict and 

Terrorism: The Role of U.S. Agencies in Fighting the Conflict Diamond Trade,” 

Hearing Before the Oversight of Government Management, Restructuring, and the District 

of Columbia Subcommittee of the Committee on Governmental Affairs, 107th Congress,

Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, February 13, 2002.

30. David M. Crane, “Dancing with the Devil: Prosecuting West Africa’s 

Warlords: Building Initial Prosecutorial Strategy for an International Tribunal 

after Third World Armed Conflicts,” Case Western Reserve Journal of International 

Law, Vol. 37, No. 1, p. 2.

31. U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2001, Washington, DC: 

Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, May 2002, p. 2.

32. United Nations Panel of Experts.

33. Mike Jensen, “African Internet Connectivity,” Port St Johns, South Africa, 

available at http://www3.sn.apc.org/africa/index.html, accessed June 12, 2005.

34. Zartman, p. 3; Dorff.

35. Rotberg, p. 131. 

36. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2004, p. 31.

37. Ken Menkhaus, “Somalia: State Collapse and the Threat of Terrorism,” 

Adelphi Papers, Vol. 364, No. 1, March 2004, p. 71.

38. International Crisis Group, 2005, p. 1.

39. Menkhaus, p. 60; Alex de Waal, “Chasing Ghosts: The Rise and Fall of 

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August 18, 2005.

40. Ibid.

41. Menkhaus, p. 63; U.S. Department of State, 2002, 2005.

42. International Crisis Group, 2005, p. 5.

43. Ibid., p. 7; Kurt Shillinger, “Recognizing Somaliland: Forward Step in 

Countering Terror?” RUSI Journal, Vol. 150, No. 2, April 2005, pp. 46-51.

44. Menkhaus, p. 70; International Crisis Group, 2005, p. 9.

45. International Crisis Group, 2005, p. 8.
35

46. Jessica Stern, The Ultimate Terrorists, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 

1999, pp. 88-90.

47. Deborah Yarsike Ball and Theodore P. Gerber, “Russian Scientists and Rogue 

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Security, Vol. 29, No. 4, Spring 2005, p. 50.

48. Nathan E. Busch and James R. Holmes, “The ‘Human Factor’ and the 

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49. Sokolski and Clawson, p. 1.

50. Christopher Clary, “Dr. Khan’s Nuclear WalMart,” Disarmament Diplomacy, 

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51. Kenneth Allard, Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned, Fort McNair: National 

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53. Mark Huband, The Liberian Civil War, London: Frank Cass Publishers,

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54. Bowden, p. 23.

55. Michael German, “Squaring the Error,” in Law vs. War: Competing Approaches 

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56. Kraxberger, p. 59.

57. Andrew Koch, “US to Bolster Counter-Terrorism Assistance to Africa,” 

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58. Kraxberger, p. 59; Stephen Ellis, “Briefing: The Pan-Sahel Initiative,” African 

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59. David H. Shinn, “Fighting Terrorism in East Africa and the Horn,” Foreign 

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61. “Legal Attache Offices,” Washington, DC: Federal Bureau of Investigation, 

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62. Sageman, p. 182.
36

63. Lyman and Morrison, p. 2.

64. George W. Bush, National Strategy for Combating Terrorism. Washington, DC: 

The White House, 2003, p. 22.

65. Chester Crocker, “Bridges, Bombs or Bluster?” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 82, No. 

5, September/October 2003, p. 32; Rotberg, 2005.

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70. Jason Ralph, “International Society, the International Criminal Court and 

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71. Crane.