I Foresight nsight, Hindsight,

Thinking About Security in the Indo-Pacific

DANIEL K. INOUYE ASIA-PACIFIC CENTER FOR SECURITY STUDIES

EDITED BY

ALEXANDER L. VUVING
HINDSIGHT, 

INSIGHT,

FORESIGHT

HINDSIGHT, 

INSIGHT,

FORESIGHT

Thinking About Security in 

the Indo-Pacific

Edited by

Alexander L. Vuving

Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies
Hindsight, Insight, Foresight:

Thinking About Security in the Indo-Pacific

Published in September 2020 by the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center 

for Security Studies, 2058 Maluhia Rd, Honolulu, HI 96815 

(www.apcss.org)

For reprint permissions, contact the editors via pao@apcss.org 

Printed in the United States of America 

Cover Design by Nelson Gaspar and Debra Castro

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data 

Name: Alexander L. Vuving, editor 

Title: Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking About Security in the Indo-Pacific / 

Vuving, Alexander L., editor

Subjects: International Relations; Security, International---Indo-Pacific Region;

Geopolitics---Indo-Pacific Region; Indo-Pacific Region 

JZ1242 .H563 2020

ISBN: 978-0-9773246-6-8

The Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies is a U.S. Department of Defense executive education institution that addresses regional and 

global security issues, inviting military and civilian representatives of the United 

States and Indo-Pacific nations to its comprehensive program of resident courses 

and workshops, both in Hawaii and throughout the Indo-Pacific region. Through 

these events the Center provides a focal point where military, policy-makers, and 

civil society can gather to educate each other on regional issues, connect with a 

network of committed individuals, and empower themselves to enact cooperative 

solutions to the region’s security challenges. 

The views expressed in these chapters are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the 

opinions of the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, the 

U.S. Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.
Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: 

Thinking About Security in the Indo-Pacific

CONTENTS

Acknowledgements viii

Foreword ix

Peter A. Gumataotao

Introduction xi

Alexander L. Vuving

Part I: Understanding the Big Picture

1. Philosophy and Policy: 

Why Ideas Will Drive the Indo-Pacific 3

Scott D. McDonald

2. Great Power Competition: Lessons from the Past, 

Implications for the Future 13

Alexander L. Vuving

3. The Fourth Industrial Revolution and Its Discontents: 

Governance, Big Tech, and the Digitization of 

Geopolitics 37

Virginia Bacay Watson

4. Surveillance Technology Challenges Political Culture of 

Democratic States 49

Inez Miyamoto

5. Societal Violence against Women and National Insecurity: 

The Need for Gendered Security 67

James M. Minnich
Part II: The Changing Faces of Regional Security

6. Political Violence in South Asia, 1995-2020 91

Shyam Tekwani

7. Twenty Five Years of Terrorism and Insurgency in 

Southeast Asia 111

Sam Mullins

8. Inclusive Governance: Lessons from History Inclusive Governance: Lessons from History 129

Saira Yamin

9. The Evolution of the U.S. Alliance System in the Indo-Pacific 

since the Cold War’s End 145

John Hemmings

10. South Asia and China’s Belt and Road Initiative: Security 

Implications and Ways Forward 161

Anu Anwar

11. From the Blue Dot Network to the Blue Dot Marketplace: 

A Way to Cooperate in Strategic Competition 179

Jerre V. Hansbrough

12. Underwater Competition in the Indo-Pacific 191

Mizuho Kajiwara

13. Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing and the 

Impacts on Maritime Security 209

Ben Crowell and Wade Turvold

14. Security Implications of a State-Driven Approach to 

Science and Technology Innovation 217

Ethan Allen

15. One Hundred Seconds to Midnight 229

Bill Wieninger
Part III: Local Dynamics of Regional Security

16. Russia in the Pacific: Strategic Opportunity in the 

Far East 239

Wade Turvold

17. The Future of the Republic of Korea and United States 

Alliance: Fix It or Lose It 253

James M. Minnich

18. The Fang-Shou Cycle in Chinese Politics 269

Sungmin Cho

19. Are India and China Destined for War? Three Future 

Scenarios 283

Srini Sitaraman

20. Has Myanmar Become China’s Back Door to 

the Indian Ocean? 307

Miemie Winn Byrd

21. Taiwan’s Fight for International Space 317

Michael C. Burgoyne

About the Authors 331

Index 339
Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 

This book would not have been possible without the hard work and innovative ideas of many people. The theme of the book emerged from 

discussion within the faculty floor of the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific 

Center for Security Studies. Like most edited volumes, the book relies on 

the volunteer work of its authors. The editor received numerous useful insights from Mike Burgoyne and Scott McDonald, the editors of the most 

recent DKI APCSS book, China’s Global Influence. The authors worked 

closely with the editor, Dean Carleton Cramer of the College of Security 

Studies, and Mary Markovinovic to enhance the quality of their chapters. 

Mary was also the chief producer of the book, with all the troubles—and 

joy—of this job. Tami Rosado did the meticulous work of copyediting. 

Our interns Joshua Turner helped with copyediting, proofreading, and indexing; Elizeh Basim and Cidney Hopkins with indexing and proofreading; and Mahogany Rasmussen with copyediting. The front and back covers of the book are the creative work of Nelson Gaspar and Debra Castro. 

Associate Dean Gene Richards, Darren Adams, Toni Difante, Debbie 

Fikac, Flo Rapozo, Armenio Salaguinto, and Robin Taylor supported in 

various capacities. The idea of a publication for the 25th anniversary of 

DKI APCSS was born three years before this book. It was Director Pete 

Gumataotao who turned it into a reality.

viii
FOREWORD

Rear Admiral Peter A. Gumataotao, USN (Ret)

Director, Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center 

for Security Studies

An anniversary is a time for reflection, to appreciate our past, embrace 

opportunities of the present, and encourage innovation and creative ideas 

for the future. As the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security 

Studies (DKI APCSS) celebrates its 25th anniversary, our faculty members reflect on the past, weigh the opportunities and challenges of today, 

and contemplate scenarios for the future. “Hindsight, Insight, Foresight” is the 

theme of our Center’s 25th anniversary. It also is the title of this book, 

which is authored by 20 current and former members of DKI APCSS.

Knowledge is power and knowledge shared has advanced our 

mission since the inception of DKI APCSS 25 years ago. Our executive 

education program, including lectures and seminars from our in-resident 

courses, as well as our workshop discussions, is enhanced immensely from 

diverse perspectives. Such collaboration, fostered in a non-attribution environment built on transparency, mutual respect, and inclusion, has produced invaluable foresight for ongoing alliances that further our mission. 

This book illustrates the agility of the Center to innovatively advance its 

educational mission toward the future. It also offers an evolutionary perspective to look at enduring transnational challenges including strategic 

competition, the rise of China, terrorism, governance, and technology.

As Winston Churchill noted, “The longer you can look back, the 

farther you can look forward.”1 Essentially, hindsight and insight enable 

foresight. Equipped with this perspective, the book sheds light on how 

different aspects of security have evolved through history and how it may 

also evolve in the future. Most importantly, it adds an important dimension to better understand the complexity of our security environment and 

the potential opportunities to develop mutual solutions. I hope you enjoy 

reading it as much as the Center has enjoyed creating it. 

1 Speech, March 1944, quoted in “Winston Churchill (1874 – 1965),” in Oxford Es- sential Quotations, ed. Susan Ratcliff (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), https:// www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780191826719.001.0001/q-oroed4-00002969

ix

xi

INTRODUCTION

Alexander L. Vuving

Teaching executive courses at the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center 

for Security Studies is a wonderful way to live two worlds at the same time. 

The courses must be most relevant to policymakers and they must offer 

something that the policymakers routinely miss in their everyday work. 

This something is, as many of our course participants told me, a “10,000 

miles above the ground” that permits one to see both the big patterns 

and the deep structures of the landscape. This dual requirement and the 

engagement with the course participants, who are security practitioners 

from around 40 countries in the Indo-Pacific region, place the teaching 

at DKI APCSS in the interface between the practitioner’s world and the 

analyst’s world.

This book is part of this interface. It provides both an overview of 

the strategic landscape and insights into the currents that shape this landscape; it addresses security aspects that are important to the practitioners; 

and it answers the “so what” question central to the practitioner’s job. To 

this end, one theme underlies every chapter of this book—the complexity of the real world. As the chapters of this book attest, this complexity 

manifests itself in various ways. One face of the complexity of the social 

world is embedded in the structure of a situation, which often remains invisible to the participants and defies linear thinking. The complexity of our 

world affects every action, choice, and decision we make by giving them 

multiple orders of effects, many of which may go beyond, even against, 

our purposes. 
Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific

The book’s 21 chapters discuss a wide spectrum of topics:

- the rise of China;

- the strategic competition among the great powers;

- the nexus between security and science and technology; 

- the quest of individuals, groups, and nations for resources, rights, 

power, and places in the international arena;

- the question of war and peace; 

- the architecture of regional security; 

- issues of governance in response to the challenges and opportunities of the 21st century.

Although DKI APCSS is a U.S. organization, several of our authors 

are non-U.S. nationals and, more importantly, this book deliberately avoids 

U.S.-centrism. The authors have been encouraged to take a broad regional 

or global perspective that would allow them to make their discssion relevant to as many security practitioners and analysts in the contemporary 

world as possible. For example, the discussion of China’s rise and great 

What drives an individual, an organization, a nation to fight? 

“This age-old question warrants a high level of critical thinking due to the unintended consequences of decisions. For some, it comes down to believing there’s 

a threat to their nation’s interests or territorial integrity. For others, it may be 

deeper than just that ... citizens may voluntarily support, even sacrifice, if the 

“cause” is deemed fundamental beyond material worth. I would offer this idea: a 

cause that resonates with values, identity, beliefs, and aspirations can be compelling enough for people to act. Nationalism played a defining role in both World 

War I and World War II. The Cold War is known both as an ideological and existential clash. In this prolonged contest, Americans were buoyed by the fundamental 

creed of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, defining elements of American 

identity, while the Soviet Union embraced an authoritarian approach where more 

emphasis was placed on control and order than to free thinking. Although some 

might find parallel themes in the current Strategic Competition discussion, it is 

worth mentioning that the complexity and the interconnectedness of our world 

and societies warrant a deeper understanding of consequences and opportunities. Unintended consequences may lead to instability, whereas cooperation and 

collaboration may reveal opportunities for countries to enjoy more prosperity in 

a secure and stable world.”

Pete Gumataotao, DKI APCSS Director

xii
Introduction

power competition in this book is not a response to some uniquely American concerns, but it addresses a common interest shared by an increasing 

number of people in the region and the world. In this context, it is worth 

quoting at length some thoughts by Director Pete Gumataotao of DKI 

APCSS:

I wanted to insert an important viewpoint in this discussion on 

Strategic Competition that is raised not just by the United States 

but by many of our Allies and Partners in the region, namely, a 

Free and Open Indo-Pacific. This concept has been highlighted 

by countries such as Japan and India years before the United 

States formally put it in the strategic discourse. For decades, 

countries in the region have made the fundamental connection 

that economic security is national security. Simply stated, many 

countries in the region have benefitted economically from stability in the region: open access to international waters, airways, 

cyber and space domains; open and transparent investment and 

financial transactions. I would offer that the prosperity we enjoy 

today goes beyond monetary value. It is grounded by fundamental principles of respecting individual rights and liberties and, at 

the national level, freedom from coercion by other countries and 

adherence to the international standards where all benefit regardless of size or ambitions. I do believe the sky is the limit if we 

work collaboratively to continue to promote this time-tested concept of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific.

A major part of security studies involves the phenomenon of violence. True to its comprehensive character, this book discusses not only 

war and terrorist attacks, but it also dedicates more than one chapter on 

structural violence, cultural violence, and sectarian violence, as well as different shades of coercion. These chapters do not end at the analysis of 

violence and coercion; rather, the analysis serves as the foundation for a 

solution of the issue, which the chapters will offer.

Taking the evolutionary perspective, each chapter of the book situates the topic of its study in the grand scale of time in order to mine 

lessons from the past and draw implications for the future. These hindsight and insights, then, enable the authors to look far into the future and 

make policy recommendations for the security practitioners of today. The 

book’s substantive chapters are organized into three parts: Part I discusses 

the contours of the big picture, Part II examines the changing faces of regional security, and Part III exhibits the local dynamics of regional security.

xiii
Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific

Part I starts with a discussion, in Chapter 1 by Scott McDonald, about 

how to decipher the actions and decisions of China, the weightiest and 

highly enigmatic actor in Asia. The author argues that ideas will drive the 

Indo-Pacific and shows specifically why Chinese philosophy can help us 

make sense of China’s strategic behavior. Philosophy, as the author notes, 

is often marked by cultural norms and provides the context within which 

policy options are deemed ethical and efficacious by policymakers. Chapter 

2 by Alexander Vuving turns to great power competition, a phenomenon 

that profoundly shapes the strategic environment at the international level. 

Benefiting from the hindsight of millennia of great power history, the 

chapter identifies the major structures and dynamics that give each case 

of great power competition a distinctive form. Accordingly, the strategic 

structure of the U.S.-China rivalry in the 21st century is markedly different 

from that of the hegemonic contest between Athens and Sparta in the 5th 

century BC and the Thucydides Trap that made war inevitable between 

Athens and Sparta does not exist in the U.S.-China strategic competition. 

The contest’s strategic and configurative structures render some outcomes 

more likely than others and some strategies more viable than others. The 

chapter also suggests the strategic imperatives that the contestants must 

heed if they want to win.

Intertwined with, but distinct from, the Sino-U.S. strategic competition, the Fourth Industrial Revolution is another paramount development 

that defines the first half of the 21st century. In Chapter 3, Virginia Watson examines the impact of this paradigm-shifting revolution on society, 

governance, and geopolitics. The chapter outlines the challenges and opportunities in governing the emerging technologies as well as the “big 

tech” companies that are driving this revolution. While Chapter 2 argues 

that conflicts in the “gray zone” between peace and war will abound given 

the strategic structure of the current great power competition, Chapter 3 

adds the digitization of geopolitics and war as a key driver of gray zone 

conflicts. Both chapters highlight the role of “big tech” companies as a 

major disruptive force that is changing the international system based on 

their position as the gatekeepers of the virtual world. In Chapter 4, Inez 

Miyamoto focuses on an important nexus between technology and security. For millennia, surveillance has been a central technique of government and security. Now enhanced tremendously by artificial intelligence, 

surveillance technologies are posing enormous challenges to the political 

culture of democratic states because, as the author argues, they conflict 

with the agreement between democratic governments and their citizens 

for privacy and civil liberty protections. Based on case studies and a disxiv
Introduction

cussion of the roles of the private sector and the state, the author suggests several recommendations that states should take to resolve these new 

challenges. Chapter 5 by James Minnich concludes Part I by discussing 

a security aspect that affects the entire humanity but has largely evaded 

traditional security studies. The chapter examines global manifestations of 

societal violence against women in peace as well as in conflict and makes 

a strong case for gendered security. It also provides a detailed “gendered 

security analysis tool” for assessing comprehensively the multidimensional 

operational environment.

Zooming in the Indo-Pacific, the 10 chapters of Part II shed light on 

major security dynamics that are shaping the face of the region. Tracing 

the evolution of political violence, particularly terrorism in South Asia and 

terrorism and insurgency in Southeast Asia, Chapters 6 and 7 by Shyam 

Tekwani and Sam Mullins, respectively, provide an historical overview of 

these issues and identify their political and social wellsprings, along with 

current and emerging threats that may shape the nature of terrorism in 

the decades to come. Both chapters draw several lessons learned from 

history to help minimize future violence. Political and societal violence 

also results from exclusionary politics and religious nationalism. Chapter 8 

by Saira Yamin argues that government restrictions on religious freedoms 

combined with rising religious nationalism are increasing insecurity and 

instability in the region. Through case studies of the efforts of “Sinicization” and mass detention camps in Xinjiang against Uyghurs and other 

Muslims and religious nationalism against Muslims in India and Myanmar, 

the author detects a regional contagion effect of exclusionary state policies 

that is reinforced by China’s norm-recasting power. For a solution to this 

challenge, the author offers the example of the Mongol empire with its 

model of inclusive governance, a secular policy that champions religious 

coexistence and multiculturalism.

Turning to regional architecture, Chapter 9 by John Hemmings traces the evolution of the U.S. alliance system in the Indo-Pacific, the most 

enduring feature of the regional security architecture, and highlights the 

growing minilateralism both within the alliance system and with non-allies 

as exemplified by several trilateral mechanisms and the “Quad.” The author argues that this alliance system will continue to exist in the coming 

decades but its original “hub and spokes” structure will be transformed to 

meet the challenges of a new era and the needs of its members. As evident 

in most chapters of this book, the new era is characterized by the rise of 

China and the responses of others to China’s growing power. Chapter 10 

xv
Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific

by Anu Anwar examines One Belt One Road (OBOR), China’s epochshaping effort to expand its influence, in the context of South Asia. As the 

author notes, OBOR is an essential component of China’s grand strategy, 

with the potential to reshape South Asia’s security architecture and alter 

the balance of power in the entire Indian Ocean region in Beijing’s favor. 

Highlighting the significance of OBOR for South Asia and of South Asia 

for OBOR as well as China’s unique approach to South Asia, the chapter 

delineates the security risks posed by OBOR in each of its subregional 

frameworks and the way forward for South Asia to mitigate these risks. 

The fulcrum of OBOR is infrastructure investment but it is not living up 

to expectations. The United States and its like-minded partners have introduced the Blue Dot Network to promote transparent, sustainable, and 

quality infrastructure investment, an initiative seen as a counter to OBOR. 

In Chapter 11, Jerre Hansbrough proposes to further develop the Blue 

Dot Network into the Blue Dot Marketplace as a platform to bring together numerous construction and financial vendors to increase the quality and quantity of global infrastructure investment. Undergirded by an 

inclusive governing architecture detailed by the author, the Blue Dot Marketplace could serve as a way to cooperate amid the strategic competition.

A look at the map reveals that the Indo-Pacific region is dominated 

by the maritime domain—the Indian and the Pacific Oceans. Not only 

does it cover most of the region’s area, but it also supplies most of the 

hydrocarbons and much of the protein consumed by the region. The best 

way to trade between China and India, the world’s two most populous 

countries, is to ship goods through the sea lines of communication that 

hug the southern and eastern coast of the Asian continent, not by crossing 

the Himalayas, which form the land border between the two. The main 

conduit of regional trade, the East and South Asia seas are also the central 

arena of strategic competition. Chapter 12 by Mizuho Kajiwara brings 

us to the undersea domain, where the strategic competition is crucial to 

the global balance of military power. Surveying the history of underwater 

competition between major powers, the chapter draws numerous lessons 

on this “cat and mouse” game and the game-changers. It also discusses the 

recent developments in the Indo-Pacific and suggests specific measures 

that Japan, a key player in the region, should take to meet the challenges 

in this domain. Based on these hindsight and insights, the author predicts 

that new detecting or tracking systems for unmanned underwater vehicles 

(UUVs) could be a game-changing technology and help establish supremacy in the undersea domain. Chapter 13 by Ben Crowell and Wade Turvold discusses a major issue in the maritime domain—illegal, unreported, 

xvi
Introduction

and unregulated (IUU) fishing—and its impacts on maritime security. The 

chapter’s global survey of the activity shows that IUU fishing is involved 

in a wide range of threats including environmental destruction, human 

slavery and trafficking, smuggling of drugs and weapons, piracy, armed 

robbery, and the “gray zone” tactic of some nation-states, most notably 

China. With hindsight and insights gleaned from this survey, the authors 

make several recommendations for addressing these threats.

In the industrial age, the strengths of the major powers and the security of the international communities hang heavily on the science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) capacities and nuclear 

weapons arsenals of those powers. Surveying the way China is boosting 

its STEM capacity, Chapter 14 by Ethan Allen argues that Beijing’s statedriven approach to STEM innovation is itself a security concern because 

it encourages the acquisition of STEM capacities via illegal methods, the 

violation of widely accepted norms and ethical standards, and the destruction of the environment. Contrasting this state-driven approach with the 

scientist-driven model, the chapter draws several implications for STEM 

governance and the relationship between STEM and security. Concluding Part II, Chapter 15 by Bill Wieninger notes that six of the nine global 

nuclear powers contest in the Indo-Pacific region and the world’s three 

new nuclear-armed states since 1995 all come from the region. It argues 

that the danger of a nuclear holocaust is larger today than it was 25 years 

ago because these nuclear powers pursue their self-interest without considerations for the others’ security needs. Stuck in this security dilemma, 

the security of these nuclear powers—and with them that of the whole 

world—will not improve however much they spend on their own defense. 

While making predictions on the state of nuclear weapons, the chapter 

also offers some insights on new risks stemming from new technologies 

and new doctrines as well as how to mitigate the risks of Armageddon.

Part III runs a tour of the region through some important locations 

to capture the local dynamics of regional security. It dwells on Russia, 

China, and India, the three major nuclear-armed powers on the Asian continent, and South Korea, Myanmar, and Taiwan, which represent different 

kinds of gateways linking the land and maritime domains of the region. 

Chapter 16 by Wade Turvold argues that Russia’s interests and historical 

experience in the Indo-Pacific are significantly different from its interests 

and experience in Europe, thus, Moscow can behave very differently in 

the two theaters. The chapter catalogues the overlaps of long-term interests between Russia and many other states in the Indo-Pacific region, 

xvii
Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific

including the United States and its allies, and makes recommendations for 

grasping these opportunities for cooperation. Chapter 17 by James Minnich examines the military alliance between South Korea and America, 

the only mutual defense pact currently existing between a country on the 

continent side of the Indo-Pacific and an offshore power. Surveying the 

major challenges and key values of the alliance, the author suggests that a 

strong rationale for the alliance in the future can be established if it evolves 

from a security partnership into a comprehensive strategic alliance with 

strategic flexibility of forward-stationed U.S. forces in Korea and embedded in a networked security architecture that involves many other allies 

and partners.

Looking inside China and looking back decades of its “reform and 

opening” era, Chapter 18 by Sungmin Cho suggests that a cycle of relaxing and tightening (fang-shou) can help us decipher the future of Chinese 

politics. This cycle results from the wax and wane of major factions within 

the Chinese Communist Party as they respond differently to domestic and 

international challenges. If this mechanism continues, the author argues, 

we should expect a period of liberalization—but not necessarily democratization—of Chinese politics in the decades ahead. Chapter 19 by Srini 

Sitaraman focuses on the military conflict between the two most populous 

countries in the world—China and India. Placing this conflict in the historical context of the Sino-Indian territorial disputes, the regional context 

of their relations with Tibet and Pakistan, their external and internal balancing efforts, and other international and domestic factors, the chapter 

examines the prospects and implications of three scenarios—status quo, 

grand bargain, and hot war—in the short, medium, and long terms. 

Strategic primacy in Asia hinges on access to both the Pacific and the 

Indian Oceans. China’s dream of “restoring” its top position at the apex 

of the hierarchy of nations in Asia is thus contingent to a considerable extent on Beijing’s influence in countries like Pakistan, Myanmar, Indonesia, 

and, if the Kra Canal is built, also Thailand, which control the gateways 

to the Indian Ocean from China and the South China Sea. With Pakistan 

firmly entrenched as a Chinese ally, Indonesia vigilantly guarding its independence, and the Kra Canal not built, Myanmar is the softest of the 

major spots of the strategic competition in Asia. Has Myanmar become 

China’s back door to the Indian Ocean? Chapter 20 by Miemie Byrd poses 

this question after examining the history of U.S.-Myanmar relations and 

recent vital gains China has reaped in Myanmar when the United States 

imposed sanctions on Myanmar’s top military leaders against their human 

xviii
Introduction

rights abuses. The author argues that a strategy of engagement with Myanmar can meet U.S. objectives regarding both its strategic competition with 

China and its promotion of human rights, a long-term process that the 

American engagement with South Korea can attest. Concluding Part III 

and the book, Chapter 21 by Michael Burgoyne turns the spotlight to Taiwan, which is situated at the double gateway between the East China Sea 

and the South China Sea and between China and the open oceans. Taiwan 

lost the China seat in the United Nations to Beijing in 1971 and since then 

has been fighting a continuous struggle for international space in international organizations and relations with individual states. This fight is not 

only an existential struggle for Taiwan, but it is also a major way for China 

to enlarge and deepen its worldwide influence. After briefly surveying this 

struggle, the chapter argues that fateful decisions by Beijing and Taipei 

related to the 2020 presidential election in Taiwan, the COVID-19 pandemic, and the governance of Hong Kong have the potential to reverse 

the long-term trend in this fight between Taiwan and China.

Even with 21 chapters, this book still does not exhaust the list of security issues in the Indo-Pacific region. Several important topics and places 

such as natural and man-made disasters, the water-food-security nexus, the 

impact of demography on security, the space domain, Oceania, the Arctic, 

Antartica, the Mekong subregion, to name just a few, are left for our future 

publications to address at length. This book does, however, provide a tour 

d’horizon of the most consequential issues that are defining the global and 

regional security landscape. With hindsight, insight, and foresight in each 

of its chapters, the book offers a perspective to see this landscape in its 

dynamic making and re-making. 

xix
Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific

xx
Part I: Understanding the Big Picture

3

1

PHILOSOPHY AND POLICY: 

WHY IDEAS WILL DRIVE THE INDO-PACIFIC 

Scott D. McDonald

When immersed in the daily cycle of meetings and position papers, it is 

easy for the security practitioner to become focused on the minutiae of 

the crisis of the day. Even when one has time to step back and look at strategic trends more broadly, it is too easy to assume one grasps a state’s strategy and intended security policy by tracing the trails of individual decisions 

and positions. In hindsight, events appear to have a logic of their own and 

it is tempting to extrapolate from one’s own experience to hypothesize why

leaders of a state behaved a certain way, rather than attempting to understand their intellectual context.

However, the study of international security policy entails the study 

of the human animal. Humans make decisions within a context. The various schools of international relations theory have offered the international 

system, institutions, and culture as candidates for placing policy within an 

understandable context. However, if decision-makers matter—and the 

Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (DKI APCSS) 

invests a lot of time and effort on the assumption that they do—then we 

need to understand the context brought to the problem by the individual 

decision-makers that ultimately drive policy. 

 Throughout human history, ideas have driven the development and 

orientation of civilization. Our unique means of survival—the rational 

faculty—demands we make judgments about the world around us to act, 

survive, and prosper. To accomplish this, each individual accepts a set of 

assumptions about the way the world works and their individual relationship to it. These assumptions form the basis of the individual’s philosophy. 
Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific

Philosophy is the science devoted to understanding the fundamental 

nature of existence, knowledge, and choice. It is the tool-kit for assisting individuals in making sense of their world and acting within it. As 

American philosopher Ayn Rand summarized for the West Point graduating class of 1974, an individual’s philosophy provides answers to the basic 

questions of a human’s life: “Where am I, how do I know it, and what 

should I do?”1 The answers to these questions reflect an individual’s fundamental philosophic orientation regarding the three primary branches of 

philosophy: metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics. Whether these questions are answered explicitly, through a process of study and analysis, or 

implicitly, as the received wisdom of those who influenced one’s education 

and moral development, individuals use the fundamental outlook provided by these assumptions to guide them as they attempt to understand the 

world and succeed within it.

Hindsight

With the aid of hindsight, it seems obvious that an individual’s ideas are 

important in policy creation. However, the individual decision-maker in 

general, and ideas specifically, have been underemphasized in the international relations field in the search for parsimonious theories. Ideas are 

hard to measure and track, while individuals retain volition—the ability to 

choose—and are resistant to prediction. Conversely, looking across the 

span of human history, we see how general trends in fundamental ideas 

about the world have shaped the organization of society and the interaction of political units.

In Europe, Catholicism, its understanding of the world, knowledge, 

and ethics, shaped society and politics for a thousand years—from the 

fall of Rome to the Enlightenment. The individualist philosophy of the 

Enlightenment then changed our understanding of those fundamentals, 

leading not only to revolts across Europe and the birth of the United 

States, but to changes in the way those polities interacted with one another. 

Similarly, in Southwest Asia, the rise of Islam not only shaped individual 

lives, but influenced the expansion of the spice trade and complex networks stretching across the seas and into Southeast Asia. In East Asia, the 

Confucian philosophy shaped China, the imperial system, and the way it 

attempted to order its relations with those along its periphery. With hindsight, it is clear that all these thought systems—and many others—led directly to different norms of human interaction within the societies that 

held them. 

4
Philosophy and Policy

Insight

Early in my career, the Marine Corps trained me as a Foreign Area Officer 

(FAO) and educated me in the history, culture, politics, and economics of 

China. As a FAO, my mission was to bring an understanding of this broad 

and rich topic to my commanders and fellow Marines. In doing so, I was 

always looking for an overriding theme that could tie everything I had 

learned about China together and concisely communicate it to various audiences in a manner that was useful. A tour on the faculty at DKI APCSS 

gave me the opportunity to explore these ideas in an academic setting and 

apply them to security policy.

The key insight from this research is that an understanding of traditional Chinese philosophy brings order and coherence to the policies and 

operations being pursued by the People’s Republic of China (PRC). In 

short, to better understand what General Secretary Xi Jinping is doing, 

one should consult Confucius and Laozi. As a FAO, I was supposed to 

provide the perspective of those I studied. Philosophy allowed me to get 

behind the policies and explain how decision-makers in the PRC view the 

world and understand it. Moreover, it provided insight into what sort of 

policy options would seem ethical and efficacious to those operating within the context of Chinese philosophy. As I distilled my new knowledge, I 

was able to derive philosophy-based strategic tenets that helped me understand and explain a Chinese philosophical approach to strategic thought.

Though I find a lot of value in this approach, attempting to employ 

it highlights the difficulty of discerning an individual’s philosophy. Many 

people have not taken the time to explicitly define their philosophy and 

fewer have committed it to writing. With politicians the problem is often 

mitigated with speeches and policy statements that provide insight, but 

these are unlikely to include an explicitly stated philosophy. However, an 

individual’s answers to those three basic questions—where am I, how do 

I know it, and what should I do?—are central to how they think and act. 

Therefore, in analyzing a leader’s philosophy one must often use proxies. 

The most obvious, which is already explored within the international relations field is culture. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, culture is 

composed of “distinctive ideas, customs, social behavior, products, or way 

of life of a particular nation, society, people, or period.”2 While the fields 

of sociology, anthropology, and political science all have extensive literatures arguing over the definition of culture, the key point for this discussion is that embedded within the way individuals within a culture act, one 

can find evidence of the ideas that drive those customs, social behaviors, 

5
Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific

and other outward manifestations of a culture. In studying philosophy, the 

goal of using culture is to understand what ideas about the world, knowledge, and ethics influence security policy decision-making.

In contemporary international relations literature, culture is usually 

discussed in association with the Constructivist School. However, this 

body of literature tends to treat “cultures” and “societies” as black boxes 

that determine behavior, rather than ideas that influence choices. The leading 

scholar of this school, Alexander Wendt, argues that cultures are given 

“meaning by the ideas they share with other states—that cognition depends 

on states systemic culture.”3 Although Wendt is speaking at a systemic 

level, constructivists in general agree that norms are created through an 

“inter-subjective consensus” within a society. While some, such as Martha 

Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, make a case for norm entrepreneurs affecting change, it is only to establish a new consensus, which is then used 

to explain the population under study.4 In short, constructivists’ use of 

culture actually focuses on collectives, discounts the individual as agent, 

and transfers the level-of-analysis back to the state- or system-level and the 

ideas that shapes a consensus there.

If the individual decision-maker is important in understanding security policy, a cultural analysis should focus on providing insight into the 

philosophy that guides individual action. Culture aids this by providing a 

baseline of understanding on general norms that are operative within a 

society, as depicted in Table 1.1.

Cultural Norms as Markers of the Answers to 

Philosophical Foundations

Metaphysics:

Where am I?

What is the nature of existence?

Is existence stable, changing predictably, or utter chaos?

Is existence real, or is it a figment of my imagination?

Epistemology:

How do I know?

Is that world knowable through my senses or am I doomed 

to watch shadows on a cave wall as Plato surmised? 

Is knowledge discovered through reason, faith, or tradition?

Ethics:

What should I do?

What is moral?

How should I treat others?

Politics: How should society be governed? 

Aesthetics: What is beauty?

Table 1.1: Cultural Norms as Markers of the Answers to Philosophical Foundations

6
Philosophy and Policy

As one starts digging into a culture with a philosophic mindset, trends 

in assumptions about metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics become apparent. Insights into individual thinking provided by these cultural cues 

enable one to better understand others, predict how they might act, and 

communicate more effectively. In fact, though it is not labeled a philosophical exercise, security practitioners at DKI APCSS are already practicing this when they learn to identify, understand, and respond to norms 

when conducting cross-cultural communication.

Analysis of the philosophical ideas resident in a populace can provide 

similar insight into these tendencies. For example, since its founding in 

1949, the PRC has alternately turned its back on and embraced traditional 

Chinese philosophy. In order to establish whether it still plays a role in 

establishing and reinforcing norms within a society, one can look to the 

contemporary culture to see that the basic underlying foundations of society continue to conform to the metaphysical, epistemological, and ethical 

prescriptions of classical philosophy. However, understanding how policy-makers use philosophy is more difficult than mapping general cultural 

trends, because each individual retains volition and the ability to go against 

cultural norms. Therefore, cultural analysis must be cross-checked with 

authoritative sources, such as government press releases, personal writings, and biographies to discern the intellectual influences that may have 

shaped that particular individual’s philosophy. For example, growing up as 

the son of a prominent Chinese Communist Party (CCP) official, then being subjected to the Cultural Revolution, Xi Jinping experienced an array 

of cultural influences. Even if the evidence of classical Chinese philosophy is prominent in the populace, additional verification must be used to 

verify it is operative in Xi Jinping’s decision-making. For confirmation, one 

can look to his own writings, speeches, and policies to examine the extent 

to which he uses these ideas and test their ability to correctly describe his 

policy choices. These sources suggest he continues to be influenced by 

Chinese philosophy, not only in the terms he uses, but in the policies he is 

pursuing. Thus, by combining cultural analysis and research into individual 

thought and actions, the security practitioner can gain key insights into 

the fundamental ideas and assumptions regional decision-makers use to 

define, understand, and interact with their world.

Foresight

If philosophy provides insights into how decision-makers act, then security practitioners would benefit from understanding the philosophical sys7
Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific

tems that influence regional leaders. In conducting exercises and thought 

experiments with DKI APCSS Fellows, I always found it important to 

get into the decision-makers’ heads and attempt to see the world through 

their eyes. Of course, this is not new, but the rigor of breaking down an 

individual’s approach to the world that is encapsulated in philosophy goes 

beyond understanding what type of interests or policies they may advocate, focusing instead on the assumptions that make those possible so that 

one may confidently apply those principles to other situations. Given the 

diversity of thought systems held in the Indo-Pacific, it is understandable 

that the assumptions upon which policy is built vary across the region as 

well. Consequently, to improve our foresight regarding the Indo-Pacific 

order, we must look to the philosophies held by regional decision-makers.

What does philosophy tell us about the future of the Indo-Pacific? 

What ideas are driving regional leaders and how will it shape their interaction with the region? My research is focused on the PRC. Here, the philosophic traditions of Confucianism, Daoism, and Buddhism competed and 

mixed over the centuries into a syncretic philosophy that still influences 

the population today. Some have argued the legacy of Marxism-Leninism, 

or Mao Zedong Thought are equally important, but cultural and historical 

analysis suggests otherwise. The CCP certainly began with an attraction 

to Marxism-Leninism, and Maoism had a dramatic impact in the revolution and Cultural Revolution. However, neither of these thought systems 

managed to supplant the norms of traditional Chinese society and philosophy. Though they were certainly driven underground during the Great 

Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution, once government sanction was 

removed, traditional values quickly took hold. This is evident in the manner in which the PRC implements policy, its official pronouncements, and 

in the way the average subject of the PRC lives their life and interacts with 

others.

Consequently, when attempting to understand the foundational ideas 

behind PRC policy, it is not Marx, Lenin, or Mao that one must turn to, but 

Confucius and Laozi. This is not to say there are not many influences in 

PRC society today, but that the ideas advocated by the intellectual schools 

inspired by these philosophers form the basis of the philosophy that 

guides General Secretary Xi today. This philosophy’s foundational views 

of metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics can aid security practitioners exercising strategic foresight to understand the future trajectory of the PRC. 

Metaphysically, Chinese philosophy teaches the cosmological centrality of China (中國; zhōngguó or Central Kingdom) and the primacy of the 

8
Philosophy and Policy

family as the basis for society. Consequently, the emperor sits atop a world 

family.5 Daoist metaphysics suggests that PRC leaders see the world as 

constantly changing, by nature, in a cycle where power ebbs and flows in a 

zero-sum system.6 To act in this context, one must understand the concept 

勢 (shì; situational potential)7 and leverage the opportunity of change to 

steer the natural development of history in one’s desired direction, but do 

so by 無為 (wúwéi; non-action), better understood as minimal disruption 

of the natural order of things.8

Epistemologically, Confucius teaches that knowledge is gained primarily from the ancients9

 and can be manipulated through the power of a 

name.10 Meanwhile Laozi offers that you never can truly know reality and 

that enlightenment comes to the one who sits alone, detached from the 

world in contemplation.11

In ethics, Daoists refer back to wúwéi and argue one should act in accordance with nature and disturb its course as minimally as possible.12 The 

Confucians agree, noting that nature is built on the family and hierarchical 

relations that give order to society.13 This structure assigns each individual 

a place in relation to others and an individual acts morally by fulfilling one’s 

assigned role.

Politics, which is a subbranch of ethics, asks how a society should 

be governed. For Confucius, this remains a question of proper roles and 

hierarchy: “the ruler is the ruler; the minister is minister; the father is father; and the son is son. That is government.”14 Moreover, according to 

the concept of “all under heaven” (天下; tīanxìa), that hierarchy properly 

encompasses the entire world and the emperor sits at the apex of the 

world family. 15

Taken together, one can see that a leader in Beijing who accepts these 

premises would seek to take advantage of U.S. retrenchment and reestablish a hierarchical order with the PRC at its apex. Not surprising, perhaps, 

but knowing that this is founded on a belief in the metaphysical centrality of China and the natural potential of a situation helps to explain why 

General Secretary Xi and the CCP think this is not only morally right, but 

a fact of existence. Understanding the important role of a name in epistemology helps to explain why the PRC insists on odd terminology and 

sees certain language as an existential assault. In short, the foundational 

principles behind these policy positions suggest why some things are more 

important than others, why some can be traded away and others are sacrosanct. Philosophy may not provide an answer for every concrete policy, 

but it provides the context in which those decisions are made.

9
Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific

Additionally, appreciation for regional philosophical systems may provide a better explanation for the emergence of international norms, as 

well as provide tools for crafting and refining them. These are inherently 

questions of ethics. Each nation, each leader, will approach international 

norms based on their own concept of morality. Understanding this, the 

security practitioner can look to philosophy to understand what norms are 

valued by various leaders and be better prepared to search for common 

ground. Thus, understanding philosophy can aid in establishing agreed 

upon norms of behavior that are likely to be more durable because they 

rest not on transient interests, but the foundational morality of all involved.

The opposite side of that coin involves recognizing where two philosophies will necessarily find themselves in opposition. Even this is valuable 

as security practitioners look for ways to identify points of contention and 

establish mechanisms to mitigate or prevent conflict. If a leader’s philosophy is understood, it is easier to understand why they hold the positions 

they do and devise policy options that make cooperation more palatable, 

because proposals can be crafted that move towards common objectives 

without undermining the core principles of those with whom one disagrees.

Conclusion

The very word “philosophy” too often frightens security practitioners, 

who tend to be unaccustomed to dealing with abstract concepts and feel 

more at home in the concrete details of daily foreign and security policy. 

However, exploring philosophy need not be frightening, rather, it is part 

of good cross-cultural preparation that many practitioners are already 

incorporating into their tool-kit. Philosophy provides the foundational 

framework for incorporating that knowledge and using it to understand 

how individual decision-makers will relate to the world, and the pressing 

issues that are faced every day by legions of mid-career diplomats, military 

officers, and civil servants across the Indo-Pacific region. 

By the 50th anniversary of DKI APCSS, staffs may sit down with 

their policy-makers to prepare for international fora and begin, not with 

the problems faced in the upcoming multilateral meeting, but with philosophy. Perhaps evaluations of other leaders will begin not with “what does 

Xi Jinping want,” but with “what are his metaphysics?” A stretch perhaps, 

but at a minimum, security practitioners should learn to understand the 

powerful impact of the foundational assumptions that each of us carries 

into every interaction.

10
Philosophy and Policy

Philosophy is too important to leave only to the academics in ivy-covered buildings. As the philosopher told the future leaders of the U.S. Army, 

philosophy exists to help us understand and resolve “concrete, particular, 

real-life problems—i.e., in order to be able to live on earth.”16

Notes

1 Ayn Rand, “Philosophy: Who Needs It?” Philosophy: Who Needs It? (New York, NY: Signet, 1982), 2.

2 The Oxford English Dictionary, accessed 26 February 2020, https://www.oed.com. 

3 Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 372. Emphasis in the original.

4 Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” International Organization 52, no. 4 (Autumn 1998).

5 Fan Ruiping, “A Confucian Notion of the Common Good for Contemporary China,” in David Solomon and Luo Bingxiang, eds. The Common Good: Chinese and 

American Perspectives (Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2014), 202.

6 Laozi, Daodejing, James Legge, trans, available at https://ctext.org/dao-de-jing. 36.

7 For a discussion on the translation of shi (勢) see Scott D. McDonald, Brock Jones, and Jason M. Frazee, “Phase Zero: How China Exploits It, Why the United 

States Does Not,” Naval War College Review 65, no. 2 (Summer 2012): 124. Though I ultimately disagree with his translation, Sawyer provides an excellent discussion of 

the concept and its translation in Ralph D. Sawyer, ed., The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1993), 429, note 37.

8 Laozi, Daodejing, 2. See also explanation in Chan Wing-Tsit, A Source Book in 

Chinese Philosophy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963), 136. By wúwéi

it “is not meant literally ‘inactivity’ but rather ‘taking no action that is contrary to 

Nature’—in other words, letting Nature take its own course.”

9 Confucius, Analects, James Legge, trans., available at https://ctext.org/analects, III: 14, VII:1, VII: 5.

10 Analects, XIII:3.

11 Daodejing, 47. See also 14. The importance of pursuing development through contemplation and reflection is also reflected in Confucianism. See Analects, XIV:42; 

Mencius, Book of Mencius, XIII: 1 and XIV:78, James Legge, trasn., available at https://ctext.org/mengzi.

12 Daodejing, 2. See also Chan Wing-Tsit, 137. “Man is to follow Nature but in doing so he is not eliminated; instead, his nature is fulfilled.”

13 Analects, XVIII:10. See Also The Book of Rites [Liji], IX (Li Yun):31, James Legge, trans., available at https:// https://ctext.org/liji/li-yun.

14 Analects, XII:11. Author’s translation.

15 Analects. In III:11 and IV:10 one sees how tīanxìa is used interchangeably for the entire world and the area which is ruled.

16 Rand, 4.

11

13

2

GREAT POWER COMPETITION:

LESSONS FROM THE PAST, IMPLICATIONS FOR 

THE FUTURE

Alexander L. Vuving

When we march into the future, the road is foggy and obscured. Our only 

light is the past which illuminates fragments of the paths we may take. 

The future is filled with countless possibilities, but not all are created equal. 

Some possibilities are more likely than others due to the structure of the 

field of possibilities. It is through the past that we can discern how the 

field of possibilities is structured.

This essay will mine the past for lessons about great power competition by examining the impact of human dynamics, technology, and geography on the rise and fall of the great powers, the balance of power 

among them, and the character of their relations. The history of great 

power competition dates back to the late 4th millennium BC, when the 

most powerful of the earliest states in the world vied for supremacy in 

Egypt and Mesopotamia, the world’s most productive areas at that time.1

In the 52 centuries that followed, numerous factors have shaped the interaction among great powers, but the most consequential, and most permanent, are human dynamics, technology, and geography. This essay revolves around a number of key questions: What tips the balance of power 

among the great powers? Apart from the general balance of power, what 

are the key structures of great power relations? What shapes and changes 

these structures, and why?

The first three sections of this paper will discuss the impact of human dynamics, technology, and geography on great power competition. 

The lessons drawn from this discussion will inform the implications for 

the future, which will be addressed in the latter part of the paper. In this 
Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific

future-oriented part, I will focus on these major questions: Will great power competition continue in the future? What will perpetuate it, and what 

will arrest it? How do the key structures of great power relations shape 

the hegemonic contest of our time? What strategies are critical to winning 

that contest? Apart from the great powers, what emerging actors can cause 

profound changes and disrupt the balance of global power in the coming 

decades? I hope the discussion in this paper will light the path of great 

power competition for decades to come.

Impact of Human Dynamics

As with any human community, the fate of great powers hangs in significant part on the decisions made by its members, individually or collectively. 

Although great powers are highly complex organizations, the major decisions to steer their course have often been concentrated in the hands of 

a few people, much of the time even a single individual. As power was 

concentrated on a few people, their beliefs, personalities, preferences, and 

relationships disproportionately affected the course of the state they ruled. 

The personal ambition of an empire’s founder invariably lay at the root of 

the empire’s rise and expansion, which was also contingent on his talent, 

leadership skills, and vision. These personal factors of his successors, the 

influence of their advisors, family members, and friends, and the relations 

among the ruling factions would continue to play a large role in the life—

and death—of the empire.

The concentration of power on a few is itself a universal human dynamic. Sometimes it reflects the attraction of leadership and the practice 

of followership; sometimes it results from the coercive force of a few over 

the many; sometimes it is maintained by a “social contract” in which the 

rulers get more wealth and freedom in exchange for providing the ruled 

with security and prosperity; oftentimes it is a confluence of all three. The 

phenomenon of the great powers is itself the manifestation of this human 

dynamic at the international level. The more power is concentrated, the 

more it reflects the beliefs and desires, as well as the whims and caprices, 

of the powerful.

14
Great Power Competition

The belief that a country is the property of its ruler, although widespread, was a specific case among the different beliefs about the right to 

own a land and the right to rule a people. These and other belief systems, 

which we call ideology, religion, superstition, or science, were indispensable and impactful in guiding the thoughts of people—rulers and ruled 

alike—on almost everything. Apart from its thought-guiding function, 

ideology (called religion when tied to one or more gods) always played an 

important role in beefing up and breaking up the cohesion and strength 

of the states in general and the great powers in particular. When the Arabs defeated both great powers of their time, the Persian empire of the 

Sassanids and the Byzantine empire, and created a new great power, the 

Rashidun Caliphate, they relied not only on the superiority of their military 

tactics and the talent of their generals, but also on the religious fervor of 

their combatants, the religious difference between the rulers and the populace of the Persian empire, and the religious oppression of the Byzantine 

empire against many of its citizens in the Levant and Egypt.2

The Arabs provide a glaring example not only of the impact of ideology but also of who I will call “system-changers.” Examples of systemchangers abound throughout the history of the great powers.3

Many countries in the past were regarded as the real estates of their rulers or 

the families of their rulers. As most people wanted to enlarge their own real 

estates, so did these rulers and their families. Sometimes, the cohesion and 

strength of a great power diminished significantly because it was divided up 

among the sons of its ruler after his death. This was the case, most glaringly, 

with the Carolingian empire and the Mongol empire. Sometimes, several 

countries were merged into a larger one through the marriage of their rulers. The emergence of Spain as a great power has its root in the marriage of 

Queen Isabella I of Castile and King Ferdinand II of Aragon (1469). A marriage 

of their rulers also united the Spanish and Portuguese empires in the Iberian 

Union (1580 – 1640). Marriage was the main way through which the House 

of Habsburg expanded their holdings and knit together the largest power in 

Europe during the 15th and 16th centuries.

15
Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific

System-Changers

The Amorites, the Hurrians, the Kassites, the Phrygians, and the Aramaeans 

(21st – 11th centuries BC). Their nomadic lifestyle and tribal structures made 

them superior in terms of mobility and flexibility to the great powers of their 

time. Their migrations, infiltrations, and invasions led to the collapse of those 

great powers, but most adopted the civilizations of their adversaries afterward. 

The Amorites and the Hurrians later founded the ruling dynasties of three great 

powers: Assyria, Babylon, and Mittani. The language and alphabet of the Aramaeans became the common tongue of the Middle East by 500 BC.

The Yuezhi (Tokharians) and the Sakas (which meant “nomads” in Iranian). 

When these Indo-Iranian steppe peoples fled westward and southward in the 

2nd and 1st centuries BC, they effectively merged the two hitherto independent 

systems of states, one in the Mediterranean, the Middle East, and the Indian 

subcontinent and another in East Asia, into a single system that included all 

states in the world at that time. The expansion of the Xiongnu drove the Yuezhi 

westward, who in turn pushed the Sakas southward. A branch of the Yuezhi settled in Bactria and founded the Kushan empire, which in its heyday in the 2nd 

century AD stretched from the Aral Sea to the Indian Ocean and was one of the 

four great powers of that time, together with the Roman Empire, the Parthian 

empire, and the Han empire.

The Germanic peoples, most notably the Visigoths and the Vandals (4th – 5th 

centuries). Their rebellions and invasions contributed heavily to the collapse of 

the Western Roman Empire. Many of these people had been embedded in the 

Roman Empire as foederati (treaty-bound allied people), though their loyalty 

ultimately lay with their kings and nobles. Treated unfairly by the Romans, they 

revolted, led by the Germanic elements of the Roman Army, and founded new 

Germano-Roman states on the soil of the Roman Empire.

The Vikings and the Normans (9th – 12th centuries). These Nordic peoples excelled in mobility as sailors and founded several kingdoms scattered from the 

Atlantic to the Mediterranean. Their migrations were generally led by a coalition 

of warlords and individuals seeking opportunities for themselves and their followers. It was rare for a Norse or Norman head of state to lead an invasion, such 

as the case of William the Conqueror’s invasion of England. This flexibility in 

leadership, combined with a nearly unmatched naval ability, allowed the Nordic 

peoples to severely hinder both the Byzantine and Carolingian empires, displace 

the Khazars as the dominant traders in the Pontic steppes, and establish numerous colonies from Greenland to Antioch.

Various Turkic groups such as the Pechenegs, the Oghuz, and the Karluks (10th 

– 11th centuries). Their migrations, military campaigns, and involvement in political affairs of the states they served massively disrupted the balance of power 

in the Middle East, Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and the Indian subcontinent. 

Among their exploits was driving the Byzantines out of Anatolia, embedding 

themselves in the Caucasus, toppling Persian powers such as the Samanids and 

Abbasids, and introducing Islam into Northern India. Their success can be attributed to their mobility and military excellence. Another advantage was the 

prevalence of Turkish mamluks in military positions, which allowed them to 

stage coups and revolts such as the Ghaznavid takeover of the Samanid empire.

16
Great Power Competition

What these diverse communities, movements, and organizations have 

in common is that more than the secondary states in the international 

system, which have to take the system as it is, they are able to change the system, thanks largely to the extraordinary dynamism of their quest for opportunities, but less than the great powers, they are, for the moment, still 

unable to make the system, i.e., to stabilize it. Some, such as the Kushans 

and the Arabs, quickly crossed the threshold to become system-makers 

by building empires or influential states of their own. Others, such as the 

conquistadors, the Russian pioneers, and the British East India Company, 

engaged in a close relationship with a sovereign state to obtain government sanction and support. While they maintained a considerable room 

for independent actions, they were often the frontier forces that expanded 

the sphere of influence, even the territory, of their sovereign. Still others, 

such as the Amorites and the Kassites, captured existing states, replaced 

their ruling elite, and changed the character of these states.

In the post-Cold War period, when the United States remained the 

world’s sole superpower, a debate broke out among scholars of international relations about the longevity of this unipolarity. Skeptics argued that 

System-Changers (continued)

The European adventurers, most notably the Spanish conquistadors, the Portuguese traders, and the Russian pioneers (merchants, Cossacks, peasants), in 

the 16th – 17th centuries. While seeking fortune for themselves, they acquired 

territory in service of their state. Although many adventurers held strong ties to 

their sovereign, the limited communication between the two parties gave the 

adventurers significant leeway in their actions. The Portuguese displaced the 

Arabs as the dominant traders in the Indian Ocean and fundamentally changed 

warfare and politics in Japan during the critical Sengoku period. The conquistadors toppled both the powerful Aztec and Incan empires, while the Cossacks 

pushed Russian sovereignty as far as Kamchatka and warred with the Qing empire and various Mongol successor states.

The British East India Company, a joint-stock company with close ties to the 

British government. The company’s private army in the 18th century played a 

large role in conquering India, thus securing monopoly trade rights for the company. The company governed the conquered territories until the Regulating Act 

of 1773. In the mid-19th century, the company was a driving force behind the 

two Opium Wars that marked the beginning of what the Chinese later called 

their “century of humiliation.”

The Islamic fundamentalists in the late 20th and early 21st century (to be addressed below).

17
Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific

it would not last long because sooner rather than later other major powers 

would gang up against the hegemon.4 Believers contended that America’s 

global hegemony was there to stay because the immense power gap between the United States and the next biggest powers would both discourage and thwart any attempts at balancing it.5

 As it turned out, the skeptics 

were somewhat right in their conclusion—U.S. unipolarity did not last longer than a quarter of a century—but wrong in their reasoning—the only 

weighty anti-American coalition was that of China and Russia, but this arrived late toward the end of the unipolar period.6

 Both sides of the debate 

missed the mark because they ignored the role of the system-changers. 

The September 11, 2001 attacks on the Twin Towers in New York and 

the Pentagon by Islamic fundamentalists changed the world in an enormous way. The Bush administration immediately turned to a “global war 

on terror,” which would consume much of Washington’s foreign policy 

attention, energy, and spending for more than a decade. In the 15 years 

from 2001 to 2016, China, which presidential candidate Bush characterized as early as 1999 as the “strategic competitor” of the United States,7

enjoyed what its leaders recognized as a prolonged “strategic opportunity” 

during which it was able to quadruple its economic output, catapult from 

the sixth-largest to the second-largest economy in the world, and turn the 

South China Sea into a chokepoint it can control by building several large 

artificial islands on disputed reefs in the middle of the sea.8

Human dynamics that are highly consequential to great power competition often come in three forms. First, some actors that have previously 

been at the margins of the system or not even existed—the “new kids on 

the block”—now bring in enormous new energy created by their superior 

mobility, ideological fervor, or economic resources. Second, some actors 

get ahead of others due to major innovation in military technology and 

governance organization. Third, some actors acquire a vast amount of 

knowledge and skills by learning from the most advanced and from experiences of the past, and by integrating aspects of other cultures, which are 

beneficial, into their own. These new energies, innovations, learning, and 

integration invariably lie at the root of the rise of new great powers. On 

the other hand, great powers that lose energy, lack major innovations, and 

fail to learn from others and integrate new cultures are bound to diminish.

Impact of Technology

Technology has two chief structural effects on great power competition: 

it can tip the balance of power and it can change the structure of the 

18
Great Power Competition

strategic game among the great powers. Technology is one of the few underlying factors that distinguish great powers from lesser states. Without 

superior technology, no actor can become a great power. However, rarely 

has the edge in a single technology tipped the balance among the great 

powers. One reason for this is the rapid diffusion of technology. When 

great powers are in intense competition with one another, a newly innovated and applied technology is quickly learned once it demonstrates some 

advantage. As a result, being the innovator of a major technology does not 

guarantee superiority; sometimes a quick learner who adds smaller innovations in accessories can beat the first innovator.

When technology tips the balance among great powers, what makes 

the difference is often one or more clusters of related technologies supported by socioeconomic and organizational factors. As warfare has often 

been the ultimate arbiter of success in international relations, besides the 

more general issues such as morale, communication, and logistics, great 

powers usually had to compete for higher mobility, firepower, and defense 

of military forces. The chariot, the sling, the composite bow, the horse 

saddle, the saddle stirrup, and the various types of armor had greatly enhanced these abilities in the agricultural age. So did their successors in the 

industrial age: the nuclear warhead, the cruise missile, the ballistic missile, 

the combustion engine, the submarine, and the missile defense system. 

Missile superiority can sometimes shift the balance between great powers, 

but what constitutes missile superiority is a combination of technological 

innovation, a robust economic base, and organizational prowess.

Perhaps the largest impact of technology on great power competition 

is that of nuclear weapons. They can change the structure of the strategic 

game between states and with it, the best strategies for the players and the 

stable outcomes of the game. Nuclear weapons do so by helping people 

to exceed the “overkill” threshold.

Prior to the nuclear age, most great powers saw their own predominance as the best option, their own subordination as the worst, a division 

of power as the second-best, and war as the second-worst, or third-best, 

option. We can express this preference order as P>D>W>S, where P 

stands for predominance, D for division of power, W for war, and S for 

subordination. When two players having this preference order engage in 

a strategic competition, they are locked in a situation called “prisoner’s 

dilemma.” This situation has a distinctive structure that renders the best 

strategy for each player invariably to “defect”—to pursue its self-interest 

regardless of whether the opponent will cooperate or not. This strategy 

19
Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific

corresponds with the stable outcome of the game, called “Nash equilibrium” after the mathematician John Nash, who has shown mathematically how the structure of a strategic game dictates the best strategies for 

the players and determines the stable outcomes of their game (Nash was 

awarded a Nobel Prize in economics 40 years later for this work). The 

stable outcome of the prisoner’s dilemma, its only Nash equilibrium, is 

war when the players are competing great powers. The Greek historian 

Thucydides’s comment on the war between the hegemonic contenders of 

his time and place, “It was the rise of Athens and the fear that this inspired 

in Sparta that made war inevitable,” was a 5th-century BC statement of the 

prisoner’s dilemma’s Nash equilibrium.9

The structure of the prisoner’s dilemma hinges on a key perception: 

nothing, including war, is worse than subordination. This perception was 

prevalent among the great powers of the past; indeed, the subordinated 

was guaranteed to lose everything most valued in life: honor, wealth, independence, freedom. Nuclear weapons upend this perception. Because 

of its “overkill” effect, war between nuclear-armed states can be worse 

than subordination. An all-out nuclear war between two great powers can 

destroy both. This perception structurally transforms a hegemonic contest 

from a “prisoner’s dilemma” to a “chicken game.”

In a great power competition structured as a chicken game, the best 

option for the players remains their own predominance and the secondbest option a sharing or division of power, but the worst option is war and 

the second-worst, or third-best, option is subordination (P>D>S>W). 

With the structure of the game transformed, the best strategy and stable 

outcome of the game are also changed. The most striking difference between the prisoner’s dilemma and the game of chicken is the reverse of 

their stable outcomes. If war is inevitable in a great power competition 

structured as a prisoner’s dilemma, peace is equally attainable in a great 

power competition structured as a game of chicken. There are three Nash 

equilibria in the game of chicken, corresponding to three stable outcomes 

and three sets of best strategies for the players.10 A game of chicken between two hegemonic contenders may result in either a division of power 

that both contenders more or less honor or the predominance of one of 

the contenders. The first hegemonic contest of the nuclear age, the “Cold 

War” between the Soviet Union and the United States, was so dubbed because it did not involve open warfare between the two great powers. Conforming with the Nash equilibria of the chicken game, the Cold War took 

the form of an extremely tense but relatively stable division of Europe, its 

20
Great Power Competition

central theater of contest, throughout the conflict and eventually resulted 

in U.S. hegemony when the Soviet Union imploded.

Recently, Professor Graham Allison of Harvard invoked Thucydides 

and coined the term “Thucydides Trap” to describe the inclination to war 

of great power competition. He raised the specter of war between the 

two hegemonic contenders of today and asked, “Can America and China 

escape Thucydides’s trap?” But his thesis is misplaced at best because it 

is based on a fundamentally flawed assumption. It assumes that all cases of great power competition share a similar structure as illustrated by 

Thucydides’s famous quote about the inevitability of war between Athens 

and Sparta. Hence it posits the existence of the Thucydides Trap where 

this does not exist: in games of chicken (P>D>S>W) such as the strategic 

rivalries between Portugal and Spain in the late 15th century and between 

the United States and the Soviet Union in the 20th century, in the “called 

bluff ” game (a combination of the game of chicken and the prisoner’s 

dilemma) between Britain and the United States in the early 20th century, 

and in the “concord” game (D>P>S>W) between Britain/France and 

Germany in the 1990s.11 Yet, these “peace” cases are treated as anomalies in the Thucydides Trap thesis, while the “war” cases are regarded as 

normal.12 In light of the strategic game structure, however, the “no war” 

outcomes of these rivalries are predicted perfectly by their Nash equilibria. 

The risks of war still exist in the games of chicken, but they lie in human errors, machinery defects, or other non-structural factors, not in the 

Thucydides Trap.

Figure 2.1. Strategy and Outcome of Great Power Competition

Escalation

Escalation

Escalation

Escalation

Prisoner’s Dilemma

P > D > W > S

Game of Chicken

P > D > S > W

Nash 

Equilibrium

Thucydides 

Trap

Athens

Sparta

U.S.S.R..

U.S.A..

21
Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific

Impact of Geography

Nuclear weapons are not the only factor that can transform a prisoner’s 

dilemma into a game of chicken. A contested region far from the core 

area of a great power can make this contender perceive the cost of subordination in that region smaller than the cost of war, especially if war can 

reach the core area. This perception—that war is worse than subordination—renders the competition over a remote region a game of chicken 

(P>D>S>W), not a prisoner’s dilemma (P>D>W>S). The hegemonic 

contest between Portugal and Spain over the non-Christian world in the 

late 15th and early 16th centuries was a game of chicken because both 

great powers competed for areas far from their home territories and still 

largely unknown to them. The competition between the United States and 

the United Kingdom for supremacy in the Western Hemisphere in the 

late 19th and early 20th centuries was an asymmetric game, named “called 

bluff ” by game theorists, in which Britain played chicken because the 

contested site lay far from its home while America played the prisoner’s 

dilemma because Washington was ready to wage war to assert its primacy. 

Predicted by their Nash equilibria, both rivalries resulted in agreements on 

spheres of influence.

Like technology, geography can elevate a state into great power status, tip the balance of competition, and change the structure of the game 

among great powers. But if technology can be a great equalizer, geography 

is a great un-equalizer. In the geography of Earth, all places are created 

unequal given their different climates, terrains, resources, and locations. 

Throughout history, a few places were privileged by these and other factors such as human dynamics, technology, and timing to become the seats 

of great powers. Uruk, Tjeni, and Magadha, the first great power in Mesopotamia, Egypt, and India respectively, each combined a fertile hinterland 

and a strategic crossroads of important trade routes. Macedon, Qin, and 

later, Britain and America shared a similar characteristic: they were supported by a relatively large and resource-rich region and, at the same time, 

protected by relatively insurmountable geographic barriers—distance, sea, 

or mountains.

On a larger scale, the Eurasian continent and its adjacent regions in 

the North Atlantic, North Africa, the Indian Ocean, and the Western Pacific are geopolitically privileged over Earth’s other landmasses. Its big size 

and the diversity of its terrains and climate zones, amplified by its eastwest orientation, have endowed its inhabitants with more resources, great22
Great Power Competition

er immunity to pathogens, and better chances of development, as Jared 

Diamond has vividly described in his book Guns, Germs, and Steel.

13 The 

largest among the areas of intense human interaction on Earth, Greater 

Eurasia was the seat of all great powers throughout history until the rise 

of the United States at the turn of the 20th century.

From a geopolitical perspective, Greater Eurasia consists of a heartland

at its continental core, a rimland that stretches along its western, southern, 

and eastern seaboards, and some offshore islands such as Britain, Japan, and 

Java. The primary strategic edge of the Heartland was the superior mobility provided by its steppes and the horse native to this area. However, the 

Heartland lacked the fertile alluvial soil and the right climatic conditions 

that made a few Rimland regions—the valleys of the Nile, Euphrates, Tigris, Indus, Ganges, and Yellow River—the birthplaces of the first civilizations and great powers. Throughout history, the Rimland boasts the largest 

number of inhabitants, production centers, and major powers on Earth. 

One reason for the productivity of the Rimland is that it has enough water 

to support life on a very large scale. The productive areas of the Rimland 

have repeatedly given rise to great powers—Egypt, Assyria, Persia, Rome, 

India, and China, to name a few—but each remained the hegemon in its 

own region and never became a global hegemon. 

In order to dominate all of the Rimland, one must gain direct access 

to each of its productive areas, to Europe, the Middle East, India, and 

China. This geographical imperative gives the hegemonic power of the 

steppe zone that spans the south of the Heartland from east to west and 

the hegemonic power of the world’s oceans a clear edge over any regional 

hegemon in the Rimland. The largest contiguous state ever known was the 

Mongol empire, a great power based in the Heartland which achieved its 

partial hegemony over Eurasia thanks partly to its central geographic position and the mobility and formidability of its military, both enabled by the 

Heartland. But the largest state by land area the world has ever had was the 

British Empire. Based on a large offshore island of Europe, it controlled 

most of the world’s maritime trade routes and dominated the world’s 

oceans, which served as the backbone of its global empire. The Cold War 

between the Soviet Union and the United States was a direct match of full 

strength between the hegemon of the Heartland and the hegemon of the 

maritime domain. The United States emerged victorious from this contest 

not least because of its favorable geography, which endowed it with a better climate, better protection, and better access to the sea. With direct access to and protection by both the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, the United 

23
Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific

States was “the most favored state in the world from the point of view of 

location,” as Nicholas Spykman noted on the eve of World War II.14 Spykman had refined Halford Mackinder’s original idea about the configuration 

of Earth and developed the concept of the Rimland in conjunction with 

those of the Heartland and the Offshore. His insights, succinctly summarized in the dictum, “Who controls the Rimland rules Eurasia; who rules 

Eurasia controls the destinies of the world,” would inform much of the 

U.S. grand strategy in the Cold War, the “containment” strategy.15

Offshore powers draw their advantage from the ocean: it provides superior protection and, since the invention of ocean-going ships, supreme 

connectivity. Like a unified network of gigantic rivers that connects the 

world’s most productive areas, the world’s oceans created, before the ages 

of airplanes and the Internet, the global system of transportation and is 

still the backbone of this system even when the transportation of goods 

and data can take place in the air, space, and cyber domains. This advantage of the maritime domain was graphically captured by Alfred Mahan, 

the author of The Influence of Sea Power upon History 1660-1783, in an early 

20th-century debate with Halford Mackinder, the originator of the idea 

that the “geographical pivot of history” was the Heartland: “As a highway, 

a railroad competes in vain with a river—the greater speed cannot compensate for the smaller carriage.”16

 The geographic configuration of planet Earth has a profound impact 

on almost everything in the biosphere. It dictates the distribution of habitats for animals and plants and constrains the chance of development for 

nations.17 At the geopolitical level, it suggests the seats of great powers and 

shapes the propensity of great power competition. The specific configuration of land and sea on Earth implies that global hegemony presupposes 

supremacy in the maritime domain and that among all great powers the 

biggest Offshore power has the largest chance to obtain this.

Implications for the Future

A Recurrent Theme

Great power competition has been a recurrent theme in history since the 

emergence of the phenomenon in the late 4th millennium BC. Whenever 

there was more than one great power in a system of states, there was 

great power competition. In periods of unipolarity, it disappeared from 

the surface but remained active in various forms of non-peer competition. However, its repeated occurrence, even continuous existence, in the 

24
Great Power Competition

past does not guarantee its recurrence in the future. Competition between 

great powers is unlikely if the expected costs of competition outweigh the 

expected benefits of predomination.

Nuclear weapons, or more precisely, a large number of nuclear warheads, have rendered an all-out nuclear war prohibitively costly. Nevertheless, great power competition continues to exist in the forms of arms 

races, proxy wars, and “wars by other means,” as we have witnessed since 

the advent of the nuclear age. Some new technologies in the future—autonomous weapons being one of the candidates—may prove so destructive that they further inhibit war between the great powers, but no technology can eliminate all forms of great power completion. Human ambitions 

and human ingenuity will find ways for great powers to pursue “low-cost 

competition” such as indirect warfare, psychological warfare, economic 

warfare, and other forms of “war by other means.”

The geographic configuration of Earth also places a limit on great 

power competition. Heartland and Rimland powers are heavily disadvantaged against Offshore powers in competition for the dominance of the 

maritime domain, a sine qua non of global hegemony. But this geographic 

impediment does not raise the costs of the competition prohibitively high. 

Thus we will continue to see Rimland and Heartland powers compete 

with each other and with Offshore powers for mastery over the world’s 

oceans.

Great power competition is nearly identical to hegemonic contest. 

This is because most great powers prefer their own predominance over a 

division or sharing of power with competitors. Historical experience can 

upend this preference and remove the hegemonic contest from a great 

power competition. The rivalry among Germany, Britain, and France in 

post-Cold War Europe is a case in point, albeit at the regional level. Leaders and elites of these countries, especially Germany and France, have 

deeply learned the bloody lessons of World War II, World War I, and 

the many wars that ravaged Europe in the preceding centuries. This deep 

historical learning, combined with the fear of a nuclear war, has changed 

their preference order to D>P>S>W, rendering their power competition 

a game called “concord,” whose only Nash equilibrium is a division of 

power. When the United Kingdom left the European Union following a 

referendum in 2016, it did not seek supremacy in Europe, but continued 

to be committed to a division of power in the region. 

25
Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific

Historical experience is unique to each nation and each region. West 

Europeans’ preference for a division of power over regional hegemony 

has evolved from their experience with the repeated failure of bids for 

hegemony, by Habsburg Spain, France, and Germany, and the destructive 

force of hegemonic wars in the last 500 years. East Asia, the cockpit of 

the hegemonic contest in the early 21st century, has a different historical 

experience. For most of the last 500 years, China was the hegemon in 

this region with a very few wars waged against Vietnam, Myanmar, and 

Japan in the south and the east, in part because the Middle Kingdom was 

focused on conflicts in the north and the west with Inner Asian powers. 

Perceiving itself as the legitimate overlord of the region, China is dreaming of redressing the “century of humiliation” it suffered at the hands of 

foreign powers in the 19th and early 20th century and restoring its “rightful” place at the top of the hierarchy of nations.18 Hegemonic contest, and 

not simply great power competition, will stay with us for a long time.

A Game of Chicken

The “overkill” effect of nuclear weapons requires that a great power in 

the nuclear age must be a nuclear-armed state. At the same time, it makes 

direct warfare between great powers more appalling than their own subordination. This change in preference has drastically reduced the number of 

possible strategic structures for hegemonic contest from nine to two.19 A 

hegemonic contest in the nuclear age can take one of two forms: the symmetric game of chicken and an asymmetric game in which a hegemonic 

contender plays chicken (P>D>S>W) and the major counter-hegemonic 

powers play concord (D>P>S>W). Lacking a common name by game 

theorists, I will call this latter game “peace-lover’s dilemma” (to be explained below).

The hegemonic contest of our time is centrally between the United 

States and China. Russia and Islamic fundamentalists are also major global 

challengers of America but Russia’s hegemonic ambition is regional, not 

global, and the Islamic fundamentalists are not a great power. These “new 

kids on the block” are a social movement and militant groups seeking to 

capture the state in countries that have a Muslim majority. The strategic 

competition between China and the United States is most intense in the 

Indo-Pacific, where both countries have a part or whole of their territory. 

The system-makers of this region include America, China, and to a lesser 

extent, India and Japan.

26
Great Power Competition

As seen in the previous sections, different preference orders of the 

players create different structures of their strategic game, which profoundly affects the best strategies they can pursue and the stable outcomes of 

their game. The sense of entitlement for supremacy is deeply ingrained in 

the Chinese psyche and finds its policy expression in the “China Dream”—

rejuvenation of the Chinese nation and restoration of China’s supreme 

position in the international system. This dual goal has been embraced and 

pursued by successive generations of Chinese leaders regardless of their 

political orientation for more than a hundred years, from Sun Yat-sen to 

Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Zedong, to Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, Hu 

Jintao, and now Xi Jinping.20

With regard to nuclear weapons, after a brief period thinking that 

China’s massive population could help the country survive major nuclear 

attacks, Chinese leaders realized that with a sufficient nuclear arsenal, a 

country can deter major attacks from its nuclear-armed enemies.21 China’s 

preference order in its hegemonic contest is, therefore, that of a chicken 

game player (P>D>S>W); indeed, China has played the game of chicken 

masterfully.22

The nuclear taboo—the thinking that nuclear war is morally unthinkable—is even more entrenched in the United States.23 But America is less 

determined than China in pursuing international primacy. The United 

States has fundamentally two strategic choices. If it prefers its predominance over a division or sharing of power with China, its preference order 

will be that of a chicken game player, and the game it plays with China will 

be the symmetric game of chicken. But if it prefers a division or sharing 

of power with China over its own supremacy, its preference order will be 

that of a concord game player (D>P>S>W) and the game it plays with 

China will be the asymmetric game I call “peace-lover’s dilemma.” It is 

a dilemma for the game’s peace-loving players because the game’s only 

Nash equilibrium—its stable outcome—is the dominance of the more 

aggressive (the chicken game player) over the less aggressive (the concord 

game player).24 The less aggressive strategy of the concord game player 

has eliminated two of the three Nash equilibria of the symmetric game of 

chicken, leaving only one stable outcome for the asymmetric game. As this 

game is ultimately unfavorable to the United States, Washington is—after 

learning it the hard way—behaving more like a chicken game player than 

a concord game player. Indeed, the strategic imperative of the hegemonic 

contest with China is that America prefers its own supremacy over sharing 

power with China.

27
Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific

According to the logic of the chicken game, World War III is unlikely 

to occur, although high tensions and dangerous crises will abound and 

localized, conventional conflicts are possible. The structure of the game 

entails that none of its three Nash equilibria is a Thucydides trap. If both 

players in the prisoner’s dilemma are bound to clash, they are bound to 

avoid their clash in the game of chicken. With regard to strategy, if one 

side escalates and the other side de-escalates, the more aggressive side will 

gain and the gains tend to be frozen into the status quo. But if both sides 

escalate, they will eventually reach some sort of agreement, expressly or 

tacitly. Knit together, these agreements will form a division of power between the main contenders, creating their spheres of influence in the major domains of the contest.

How should the United States behave when China is assertive and 

escalating? One option, as many have advocated, is to concede to China 

what it claims to be its core interests, avoid confrontation with Beijing, and 

if push comes to shove, share power with China or simply abandon the 

pursuit of Pax Americana.25 This strategic choice will effectively turn the 

symmetric game of chicken into the asymmetric peace-lover’s dilemma. It 

remains a sensible strategy for one of the chicken game’s three Nash equilibria—but the worst of the three for America. A better strategy that can 

prevent both war and Chinese dominance is holding the line when China 

is testing your resolve and matching its escalation with your own while 

maintaining a channel for talks.

Assertiveness pays off in the game of chicken. As China has brilliantly shown in practice, this “aggressive but not very aggressive” kind 

of action operates in the gray zone between war and peace. Gray zone 

approaches play on the gap between the fluid nature of reality and the 

rigid character of rules, norms, and conventions. This gray zone has three 

dimensions, and a master player of the game of chicken must leverage all 

three dimensions of the gray zone, in tactics such as fait accompli, salamislicing, and “cabbage”—surrounding a target like a cabbage wrapping itself with layers of non-military forces on the front and paramilitary forces 

in the middle, supported by military forces over the horizon. Based on the 

principles of deniability, camouflage, stealth, indirection, gradualism, and 

fait accompli, these tactics and others that will be invented or reinvented 

will gain strategic importance in the coming decades.

As kinetic war becomes too risky in the nuclear age, war by other 

means, such as political warfare, information warfare, psychological warfare, economic warfare, “lawfare” (the use of law as a weapon of conflict), 

28
Great Power Competition

and the weaponization of the non-military—the media, tourists, universities, relationships, international organizations, to name just a few—will be 

critical to future power competition.26 An effective tactic in the game of 

chicken is “riskfare,” as exemplified by China in its recent “assertiveness.”27

Riskfare is the deliberate use of risks that plays on the opponent’s fear of 

escalation. As the fear of escalation tends to spread more freely and more 

quickly in open societies and smaller countries, China has a strong edge in 

weaponizing risks to achieve its objectives without the use of kinetic force.

The Winning Geography

The symmetry of the game of chicken or the prisoner’s dilemma refers 

to the symmetry of the players’ preference orders, not that of their capacities. Although states can reach parity in economic output or weapons 

arsenals, they remain unequal with respect to location. As we have seen 

in a previous section, a significant part of a state’s capacity comes from 

its position in the configuration of Earth. The U.S.-China competition 

shares its strategic structure—the chicken game—with the Cold War, but 

it is unprecedented regarding its configurative structure. While the Soviet 

Union was a Heartland power, China is a Rimland power. As Offshore 

vs. Rimland struggles, the Britain vs. France competition of the late 18th 

and early 19th centuries and the Britain vs. Germany rivalry in the early 

20th century are nearer to the Sino-U.S. contest in this respect. But the 

geography of Europe is radically different from that of Asia. In terms of 

configurative structure, the nearest precedent to the present great power 

competition in Asia is the concurrent rivalry between Japan and China and 

between Japan and Russia in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. But if 

Japan, an Offshore power, was the rising power at that time, it is China, a 

Rimland power, that is rising this time.

Today the lifeline of Asia, which carries more than half of the region’s 

trade, is the waterways that run through the East China Sea, the South 

China Sea, and the northeastern section of the Indian Ocean. About 

90% of the crude oil imported by China, Japan, and South Korea, nearly 

two-thirds of South Korea’s energy supplies, around 60% of Japan’s and 

Taiwan’s energy supplies, and four-fifths of Southeast Asia’s international 

trade are shipped through the South China Sea alone.28 As the world’s 

economic center of gravity is shifting to Asia, where 60% of the world’s 

population lives, to paraphrase Spykman, who controls the Western Pacific and the Eastern Indian Ocean rules Asia; who rules Asia controls 

29
Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific

the destinies of the world. A number of places are critical to the control of these waterways because they dominate the chokepoints of these 

sea lines of communication. They are—from northeast to southwest—

Japan, South Korea, China, Taiwan, the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, 

Singapore, Indonesia, Australia, India, Sri Lanka, the Maldives, and the 

Chagos Archipelago (the British Indian Ocean Territory). Among these 

places, Japan, India, Taiwan, and Indonesia, given their locations and their 

resources, hold the key to the balance of power between China and the 

United States. If China expands its sphere of influence to the rest of Asia 

but these four stay closer to the United States, then the world balance of 

power can still tilt toward the latter. A principal imperative for the United 

States as well as for China in their strategic contest is to gain influence in 

and access to these places.

New Kids on the Block

In the last 500 years at least, technological and economic changes advanced 

in waves and were in close relationship with the cycle of hegemonic conflict.29 Each of the past waves of the Industrial Revolution was accompanied by a hegemonic struggle: the First, by the Napoleonic Wars; the Second, by World Wars I and II; and the Third, by the Cold War. Starting after 

the Cold War, the Fourth Industrial Revolution is now also accompanied 

by the hegemonic contest between China and the United States. Since the 

Second Industrial Revolution, each wave of the Industrial Revolution has 

made a new domain available to human activities: the Second added the air 

domain to the land and maritime domains, the Third opened up the space 

domain, the Fourth created the cyber domain. 

Already indispensable for human life and a critical domain of human 

activities, the cyber domain has become a lifeline during the COVID-19 

pandemic, carrying much of human communications and social activities—tens of millions of people depend on it when working from home 

or in lockdown. The Fourth Industrial Revolution, with its reliance on 

mobile networks and the Internet of Things, is making the cyber domain 

essential for economics, politics, and security. In some respects, it has become more important than the air and space domains because it carries 

information that everyone relies on. Human communications and social 

activities are present in the form of data in the cyber domain. These data 

can be collected, controlled, and manipulated by those that provide the 

applications, devices, physical networks, and virtual platforms for the com30
Great Power Competition

munications and activities to take place. As it stands today, a small number 

of “Big Tech” companies dominate the markets for these goods and services. Their access to data and devices and their control of networks and 

platforms make them critical actors in the geopolitical system. These “new 

kids on the block” have the power to change the system, though the power 

to make the system still lies in the hands of great powers.

Together with the maritime domain, the cyber domain provides a central theater of contest for the hegemonic contenders of our time. Today, 

the division of the cyber domain into a Chinese sphere of influence and 

a U.S. sphere of influence is well underway, with Huawei, the world’s largest producer of 5G equipment, leading the effort to enlarge the Chinese 

sphere of influence. Like the British East India Company, Huawei is a 

private company that expands the power of its sovereign by conquering 

vast and critical areas, this time in the physical layer of the cyber domain. 

Nonexistent before the 1990s, the cyber domain is virtual but not nonphysical because it has a physical layer upon which the networks are built. 

Spheres of influence in this physical layer often reflect and reinforce those 

in the land domain. Once established, they are far harder to change than 

spheres of influence in the maritime domain and the virtual space of the 

cyber domain.

Conclusion

Great power competition is inherent in the phenomenon of great powers—as long as there are great powers in a system of states, there is competition between them. Underlying this phenomenon are human dynamics such as the concentration of power and the ambitions of individuals. 

Although great powers are the makers of the international systems, their 

rise and fall and the balance of power among them are heavily affected by 

the system-changers, who are not necessarily state actors but gain their advantage from the extraordinary dynamism of their quest of opportunities, 

which sometimes manifests in their superior mobility, their organizational 

flexibility, or their frontier position in a critical domain.

There are three major kinds of structures that shape the relations between great powers. The first includes the belief systems of the elite and 

the populace. They mold their thought and guide their action, thus directly 

impact the course and the strength of the state. In the form of historical experience and ideology, beliefs can profoundly shape and change the 

character of great power relations. The second is the strategic structure 

31
Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific

that emerges from the interaction of the preference orders of the great 

powers involved. This strategic structure ensures that some outcomes 

of the competition are more stable than others and some strategies of 

the contenders are more viable than others. Understanding the strategic 

structure of great power competition will help us answer key questions 

related to war and peace and strategy. Thirdly, great power competition 

is also structured by geography. The configuration of land, sea, and terrain on Earth gives the arena of great power competition a distinctive 

form. Reflecting the locations of the great powers, the production centers, 

the transportation routes, and the geographical barriers, the configurative 

structure of great power competition also restricts—and enables—the capabilities and strategies of the great powers. It suggests that, more than 

any great power in the Heartland and Rimland of Eurasia, the biggest 

Offshore power has the best chance to achieve global primacy.

The advent of nuclear weapons has required that a great power be 

a nuclear-armed state. This frightening fact has eliminated the structural 

cause of war between the great powers—a “trap” famously noted by the 

5th-century BC Greek historian Thucydides in his comment on the inevitability of war between the hegemonic contenders of his time and place. 

However, the risk of war still exists in human errors, machinery defects, 

and some idiosyncratic factors. Beliefs—the first kind of structures mentioned above—can help humanity to minimize the risks of a nuclear holocaust.

Acknowledgment:

I am grateful to Long Vuving for his research assistance and insights, 

which have broadened my horizons and helped to refine my arguments. 

I also wish to thank Carleton Cramer, Mary Markovinovic, and Tami Rosado for their valuable comments on an earlier draft of this paper.

32
Great Power Competition

Notes

1 Toby Wilkinson, The Rise and Fall of Ancient Egypt (London: Bloomsbury, 2010). Harriet Crawford, ed., The Sumerian World (New York: Routledge, 2016).

2 Gérard Chaliand, A Global History of War: From Assyria to the Twenty-First Century, trans. Michèle Mangin-Woods and David Woods (Oakland, CA: University of Cali- fornia Press, 2014), 100-107.

3 See boxes for some examples of system-changers and John Haywood, ed., Atlas 

of World History (New York: Fall River Press, 2009) for brief discussions of these groups in the context of world history.

4 For example, Christopher Layne, “The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Pow- ers Will Rise,” International Security 17, no. 4 (Spring 1993): 5-51; Kenneth N. Waltz, “The Emerging Structure of International Politics,” International Security 18, no. 2 (Fall 1994): 44-79; Christopher Layne, “The Unipolar Illusion Revisited: The Coming End 

of the United States’ Unipolar Moment,” International Security 31, no. 2 (Fall 2006): 7-41.

5 For example, William C. Wohlforth, “The Stability of a Unipolar World,” Interna- tional Security 24, no. 1 (Summer 1999): 5-41.

6 A number of events between 2008 and 2016 marked the end of the unipolar period and the beginning of a U.S.-China bipolar era. Shortly after the 2008 financial crisis, China overtook the United States as a leading trade partner of most countries, 

including many U.S. allies such as Japan, South Korea, and Australia. See Alyssa Leng and Roland Rajah, “Chart of the Week: Global Trade through a US-China Lens,” The 

Interpreter, Lowy Institute, December 18, 2019, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the- interpreter/chart-week-global-trade-through-us-china-lens. When China set up the 

Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank in 2015, several U.S. allies, including Australia, 

South Korea, the United Kingdom, Germany, and France, applied to join it despite U.S. opposition. China and Russia formally declared a “comprehensive strategic and cooperative partnership” in 2011. The same designation had been awarded to China’s 

relationship with Vietnam in 2008, Laos in 2009, Cambodia in 2010, and Myanmar 

in 2011. Beijing and Moscow formally upgraded their relations to “comprehensive strategic and cooperative partnership for a new era” in 2019.

7 For George W. Bush’s view of China as a “strategic competitor,” see his cam- paign remarks in 1999 and 2000: George W. Bush, “A Distinctly American Interna- tionalism,” speech at the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Simi Valley, California, 

November 19, 1999, https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/bush/wspeech.htm; 

and George W. Bush in CNN, Larry King Live Show, South Carolina Republican 

Debate, aired on February 15, 2000, transcript at http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRAN- SCRIPTS/0002/15/lkl.00.html. Hinting at China, the Quadrennial Defense Review Report (QDR) of the U.S. Department of Defense, dated September 30, 2001, noted, “The 

possibility exists that a military competitor with a formidable resource base will 

emerge in the region. The East Asian littoral - from the Bay of Bengal to the Sea of 

Japan - represents a particularly challenging area” (p. 4). The QDR identified “[p]re- cluding hostile domination of critical areas, particularly Europe, Northeast Asia, the East Asian littoral, and the Middle East and Southwest Asia” as one of the “endur- ing national interests” of the United States (p. 2), https://archive.defense.gov/pubs/

qdr2001.pdf. A year later, the National Security Strategy of the United States of America (NSS) issued by the Bush administration in September 2002 directed the focus on 

the “war on terror” and emphasized “strengthen[ing] alliances to defeat global terror- ism” and “develop[ing] agendas for cooperative action with other main centers of 

world power” (pp 1-2). On China, the NSS stated, “We welcome the emergence of 

a strong, peaceful, and prosperous China” and “The United States seeks a construc- tive relationship with a changing China” (p. 27), https://2009-2017.state.gov/docu- ments/organization/63562.pdf.

8 Chinese President Jiang Zemin stated in 2002 that the following 20 years would be a “period of strategic opportunity” for China to develop its comprehensive 

33
Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific

national strength, international competitiveness, and global influence due to a 

favorable strategic environment. See Jiang Zemin, “Build a Well-off Society in an 

All-Round Way and Create a New Situation in Building Socialism with Chinese 

Characteristics,” report delivered at the 16th National Congress of the Communist 

Party of China, Beijing, November 8, 2002, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/

topics_665678/3698_665962/t18872.shtml and Xu Jian, “Rethinking China’s 

Period of Strategic Opportunity,” China International Studies (March/April 2014): 52. China’s gross domestic product in 2001 is estimated at US$ 2.418 trillion, while 

the figure for 2016 is US$ 9.524 trillion; both are in constant 2010 US$, according 

to the World Bank’s data: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP. KD?locations=CN.

9 Thucydides, The History of the Peloponnesian War, translated by Richard Crawley, https://www.gutenberg.org/files/7142/7142-h/7142-h.htm.

10 Andrew M. Colman, Game Theory and Its Applications: In the Social and Biological Sci- ences (New York: Routledge, 2017).

11 For names of games and their preference orders, see the “periodic table” of stra- tegic games in Bryan Randolph Bruns, “Names for Games: Locating 2x2 Games,” 

Games no. 6 (2015): 495-520.

12 The fullest statement of the Thucydides Trap thesis is Graham Allison, Destined 

for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap? (Boston: Houghton Mif- flin Harcourt, 2017). Allison explains the four “no-war” anomalies by recourse to a 

plethora of ad hoc factors ranging from the Pope’s authority, to economic, political, 

and security institutions, to the role of statesmen, timing, cultural commonalities, to 

nuclear weapons and economic interdependence (pp. 187-286). From the perspective 

of Occam’s razor, Allison’s explanations are clearly inferior to an explanation based 

on the strategic structure of hegemonic contest.

13 Jared Diamond, Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fate of Human Societies (New York: W.W. Norton, 1999).

14 Nicholas J. Spykman, “Geography and Foreign Policy, I,” American Political Science 

Review 32, no. 1 (February 1938): 43.

15 Antero Holmila, “Re-thinking Nicholas J. Spykman: From Historical Sociology to Balance of Power,” The International Historical Review, 2019, https://www.tandfon- line.com/doi/full/10.1080/07075332.2019.1655469. The quote is in Nicholas John 

Spykman, The Geography of the Peace (New York: Harcourt, 1944), 43.

16 A.T. Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783 (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1898). H.J. Mackinder, “The Geographic Pivot of History,” 

The Geographical Journal 23, no. 4 (April 1904): 421-444. The quote is in A.T. Mahan, The Problem of Asia and Its Effect upon International Policies (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1900), 38.

17 Diamond, Guns, Germs, and Steel.

18 Howard W. French, Everything Under the Heavens: How the Past Helps Shape China’s Push for Global Power (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2017).

19 The nine strategic structures of hegemonic contest include the three symmetric games of deadlock, chicken, and the prisoner’s dilemma, the three asymmetric com- binations of these three, and the three asymmetric variants of the “stag hunt” pairing 

with either the prisoner’s dilemma, deadlock, or chicken.

20 Orville Schell and John Delury, Wealth and Power: China’s Long March to the Twenty- First Century (New York: Random House, 2013). Friso M.S. Stevens, “China’s Long March to National Rejuvenation: Toward a Neo-Imperial Order in East Asia?” Asian 

Security (2020), https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14799855.2020.1739 651.

34
Great Power Competition

21 Xu Weidi, “China’s Security Environment and the Role of Nuclear Weapons,” in Understanding Chinese Nuclear Thinking, eds. Li Bin and Tong Zhao (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2016). M. Taylor Fravel and Evan 

S. Medeiros, “China’s Search for Assured Retaliation,” International Security 35, no. 2 

(2010): 48-87.

22 Alexander L. Vuving, “The Strategic Environment of the US-Australia Alliance 

in the Indo-Pacific Era,” in The Future of the US-Australia Alliance: Evolving Security Strategy in the Indo-Pacific, eds. Andrew T. H. Tan and Scott D. McDonald (London: Routledge, 2021).

23 Nina Tannenwald, The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons Since 1945 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

24 Bruns, “Names for Games,” 499.

25 For example, Allison, Destined for War, 235-238; Hugh White, The China Choice: 

Why America Should Share Power (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).

26 Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare (Beijing: PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House, 1999), translated by FBIS, https://www.c4i.org/unrestricted.

pdf. Alexander L. Vuving, “China’s Strategic Messaging: What It Is, How It Works, 

and How to Respond to It,” in China’s Global Influence: Perspectives and Recommendations, eds. Scott D. McDonald and Michael C. Burgoyne (Honolulu: Daniel K. Inouye 

Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, 2019), https://apcss.org/wp-content/

uploads/2019/09/10-Chinas_strategic_messaging-vuving.pdf. Robert D. Blackwill 

and Jennifer M. Harris, War by Other Means: Geoeconomics and Statecraft (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2016).

27 Jonathan G. Odom, “China’s ‘Riskfare,’” Proceedings (of the United States Naval Institute) 145, no. 3 (March 2019): 1,393.

28 China Power Team, “How Much Trade Transits the South China Sea?” China

Power, August 2, 2017, updated October 10, 2019, https://chinapower.csis.org/ much-trade-transits-south-china-sea/. Robert D. Kaplan, Asia’s Cauldron: The South 

China Sea and the End of a Stable Pacific (New York: Random House, 2014), 9. U.S. Energy Information Administration, “More than 30% of Global Maritime Crude 

Oil Trade Moves through the South China Sea,” Today in Energy, August 27, 2018, https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=36952.

29 Joshua S. Goldstein, Long Cycles: Prosperity and War in the Modern Age (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988).

35

37

3

THE FOURTH INDUSTRIAL 

REVOLUTION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: 

GOVERNANCE, BIG TECH, AND THE 

DIGITIZATION OF GEOPOLITICS

Virginia Bacay Watson

Introduction

In 2016, World Economic Forum founder and Executive Chairman Klaus 

Schwab published a book, The Fourth Industrial Revolution,

1

 a concept that 

has since held currency as the umbrella term to frame and examine the 

impact of emerging technologies on all aspects of society in the early 21st

century. Artificial intelligence (AI), fifth generation mobile networks (5G), 

three-dimensional (3D) printing, cloud computing, robotics, drones, virtual reality (VR) and augmented reality (AR), the Internet of Things (IoT), 

genomics, biometrics, and blockchain are commonly included in the list of 

present-day emerging technologies anticipated to provide human societies 

with the means to overcome global challenges like disease, poverty, and 

ignorance.

The Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR) is distinct from prior revolutions in at least three ways. First, building upon the legacy of digital networks from the Third Industrial Revolution, the speed, scope, and scale 

of technological advance and diffusion in 4IR is quite unlike the world 

has ever seen before. It is evolving at an exponential rate and transforming virtually every industry in every country and all aspects of societal life. 

Second, it is about the dynamic fusion of digital, physical, and biological technologies. This merging is producing innovations that are issuing 

paradigm-shifting norms and upending existing ones. And third, many of 

the emerging technologies are personalized in nature that, while facilitating rapid societal integration, also create new normative challenges that 
Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific

require major changes in the foundations of existing technology governance institutions.

All told, these features of 4IR animate disruptions in all aspects of 

society. The disruptions go beyond connecting smart, advanced machines 

and systems and the growing harmonization and integration of multiple 

disciplines and inventions: these developments are spurring conceptual 

breakaways and breakthroughs, forcing functions that are altering our 

ways of being, doing, perceiving, and thinking. Three factors will figure 

significantly in this revolution: technology governance, the role of Big 

Tech and platform companies, and the digitization of geopolitics.

Emerging Technologies, New Governance

Although still in its nascent period, 4IR is already marked by an inundation 

of innovations that are generating benefits and opportunities for people 

all over the world. However, not unlike all technological advancements, 

societal gains accruing from 4IR inventions are matched by negative disruptions and challenges. Laying the foundations for a different future virtually unchecked and in rapid fashion, the potential harm and risks associated with 4IR technologies are—at least in the West—causing great 

concern among various stakeholders, including governments, members of 

the science and technology (S&T) community, the private sector, nongovernmental organizations, ethicists, and a whole array of citizens’ groups.

At the core of this concern are two interrelated issues—the ethical 

and legal dimensions of the innovations, and oversight over the direction 

and future development of emerging technologies to ensure that benefits 

are maximized while costs and risks are minimized. As a World Economic 

Forum White Paper on technology governance puts it:

The speed with which new technologies converge, resulting in 

new applications and new technological combinations, increases 

the rate of obstacles and dilemmas for institutions and societies. 

At all levels—global, national, municipal, organizational and even 

familial—we are struggling to develop and enforce new sets of 

rules and behaviors at an equivalent speed in order to get the 

most out of emerging technologies while managing their risks 

. . . At this stage of the Fourth Industrial Revolution . . . there 

is no central point of reference for technology governance, and 

relatively few “leading practices.”2

38
The Fourth Industrial Revolution and Its Discontents

How can we ensure that innovations in AI, robotics, and gene-splicing 

do not violate human dignity and the core values of being human? What 

principles and rules should govern the conduct of cyberwar and drone 

use? What might an ethics of surveillance look like? Who should assess 

the risks and benefits of innovation? How do we guarantee responsible 

and ethical innovation in an unequal world? What are the universal design 

principles and values that should guide our thinking, design, and development of technology?3

 

These questions illustrate the kinds of dilemmas and conditions that 

must inform multi-stakeholder technology governance discussions. They 

point to two overarching imperatives. First, the need to know and understand the values of the inventors. Technological innovations do not happen in a vacuum: the disruptive nature of emerging technologies stems 

from the offer of new normative, organic (i.e., “still-in-the-making”) 

criteria derived from the intent of the creators and users. And second, 

the need to create the world’s future in a principled manner.4 Moving the 

global governance discourse forward requires a “whole-of-world,” multistakeholder effort that treats technology-making and technology futures 

as dynamic, governable spaces that humankind can shape.

Current efforts to improve global technology governance face serious 

gaps and challenges. First, governance approaches around the world are 

diverse in terms of institutions, processes, and priorities depending on 

the countries’ levels of technological and economic development. Second, 

countries have different national interests, and national governance strategies reflect to protect these differences. Third, there is a dearth of governance bodies that function in the fashion of 4IR and emerging technology 

dynamics, ie., multi-stakeholder, multi- and cross-disciplinary, multi-domain, multilevel (domestic-regional-global), innovative, and adaptable.5

Fourth, governance initiatives that do exist have a short shelf life, quickly 

becoming ineffective when pitted against the normative requirements of 

new and rapidly evolving innovations. And fifth, stakeholders may prefer 

the absence of technology governance mechanisms in order to have a 

wider range of strategic options insofar as the use of particular emerging 

technologies is concerned to protect national interests.6

There is great opportunity to define the as yet sparsely populated 

space of emerging technology governance to parallel the development of 

the cyber domain as human territory. The gaps and challenges mentioned 

in brief here are lessons from past revolutions, submitting that if the gov39
Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific

ernance of emerging technologies is to work, its tenets should be as disruptive as the intent and consequences of the technologies themselves.

Big Tech: Bigger Than Ever

In 1995, 25 years ago, the Internet started with 16 million users, or 0.04% 

of the world’s population of around 5.7 billion. Today the number of users is at 4.7 billion (58.7% of the world population), just one billion over 

the 1995 population.7 Whether information is like oil or “sunlight,”8 it is 

becoming, in this nascent period of the Fourth Industrial Revolution, the 

most valuable, strategic, and contested resource in the world.9 One of the 

most dominant themes of the discourse on the Information Revolution 

is the growing importance of data in all aspects of human society: as centerpiece of the 21st century economy, driver of socio-ethical change, and 

lynchpin of geopolitical and security dynamics.

Controlled by the very few in Silicon Valley at the outset, the emergence of information as a new resource created a technology oligarchy 

of immense wealth, power, and influence. The economic weight of Big 

Tech10—as they are known today—dominates global trade and investment. Four of America’s top five tech firms (Alphabet, Amazon, Apple, 

and Microsoft) are each worth over $1 trillion each. The combined value 

of the five—including Facebook (#7 in revenue)—is around $2 trillion, 

roughly equivalent to Germany’s entire stock market,11 the ninth largest 

in the world. Alibaba, Baidu, Huawei, JD.com, and Tencent hold similar 

rankings in China’s tech industry, and together with America’s five, round 

out the list of the world’s top 10 tech revenue earners. Seven of these 

firms (America’s five plus Alibaba and Tencent) are among the world’s 

top 10 most valuable companies.12 Combined, the firms’ value, earnings, 

resources, scope, and reach of investments and influence put them in the 

leading position to continue informing the techno-economic agenda of 

4IR. 

Attendant to its tremendous economic value is Big Tech’s role in 

framing the socio-ethical debates pertaining to privacy and emerging technologies such as AI. While the Third Industrial Revolution paved the way 

for universal access to information and individual empowerment through 

the Internet, it also gave the tech oligarchs a new kind of unregulated 

power to control virtual information and to manipulate and shape human behavior with the help of AI-based innovations. The construct of 

this discourse, however, is quite different between America’s Big Tech and 

40
The Fourth Industrial Revolution and Its Discontents

China’s tech titans owing to the profound differences between the two 

countries’ political systems.

In the United States up until recently, the tech giants were on the receiving end of a “techlash”—public criticism, among other issues, for their 

alleged disregard of individual rights to privacy in the digital domain13 and 

for failing to incorporate environmental, social, and governance (ESG) 

criteria into their business strategy and decisions.14 Of late however, the 

idea that firms “with a sense of purpose” could address issues like social 

injustice, climate change, and inequality is sweeping across sectors of the 

business community.15 This proposition proceeds from the notion that 

the firms’ increased power imposes new demands on them. Per Microsoft 

CEO Satya Nadella, the combination of having a sense of purpose with 

a mission that is “aligned with what the world needs” is a powerful way to 

win public trust. And because trust matters, the core of Microsoft’s business model is purpose. He goes on to say that:

As technology becomes so pervasive in our lives and society, 

we as platform companies have more responsibility, whether it’s 

ethics around artificial intelligence, cyber-security or privacy . . . 

There is moral obligation.

16 [emphasis added]

Today, this vision recalibration finds a more visible presence of American Big Tech and other Western firms in multilateral deliberations that 

address the impact of emerging technologies on societies. International 

fora such as the World Economic Forum have become important venues 

for them to articulate their techno-social responsibility policies and plans 

on issues like privacy, ethics, and AI. This normative space will likely continue to expand for the private sector not only because they have extensive 

resources, but also because state capacity to wrestle with technology-based 

legal/ethical dilemmas is simply outmatched by the speed of technological 

invention and diffusion. Making themselves a part of the discussion will 

further enhance the private sector’s influence in the broader process of 

“norm-shaping” moving forward.

On the other side of the world in China, the world’s other five Big 

Tech firms inform the digital information discourse in a significantly different way. Unlike their Western counterparts, China’s Big Tech is under 

the authoritarian state’s tacit control, and the power and authority that undergirds the ownership and use of citizens’ personal data is exclusively 

41
Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific

exercised by the state—i.e., the Chinese Communist Party. Domestically, 

Big Tech’s development of 4IR technologies including AI-powered surveillance devices and systems have become a critical feature of the state’s 

strategy to further enhance and assert its power and repressive capacity. 

The government’s relentless and systematic use of advanced and invasive 

surveillance in its crackdown on the minority Uyghur population in Xinjiang and the million or so in detention camps is cited as the prime example 

of how technology can be used to establish complete population control.

This Chinese model of digital authoritarianism has caught the attention of other autocracies.17 Its tech giants and data platform companies 

have been instrumental not only in selling digital technologies to these 

countries, but in the process of doing so, also exporting the Chinese model of “cyberspace management.” Studies show that the transfer of China’s 

authoritarian DNA to existing repressive regimes have transformed the 

latter into “durable digital autocracies,”18 with the imported technology 

platforms providing the wherewithal to support repressive cultures. Arguably, this group of “early adaptor” countries could serve as important 

allies to China in its global drive to promote an alternate vision of international order.

Seen in this light, Big Tech serves at the forefront as “vectors”19 of 

China’s geopolitical agenda, supporting the strategic objectives of the state 

in the domestic and international fronts. While their counterparts in the 

West are wrestling with trying to strike a balance between their technoeconomic interests and their social and ethical responsibilities, China’s tech 

giants are inventing, using, and diffusing new technologies that promote 

and support the values of state authoritarianism. 

Competition among the world’s top 10 tech firms (five each from 

the United States and China) for technological leadership in the virtual 

domain is thus platformed on two fundamentally different propositions 

of the digital future and cyberspace reality—one grounded on the principles of liberal democracy, and the other on the tenets of authoritarianism. Working through the governance of the digital world as it is will be 

a daunting task but will be even more so if the power players proceed 

by defaulting to their respective normative corners. There are indications 

that cyberspace currents are already headed that way (see next section). In 

concert with a central geopolitical motif, technology rivalry and normative 

power have the United States, China, and their respective tech and data 

platform companies as the most prominent players.

42
The Fourth Industrial Revolution and Its Discontents

Geopolitics in the State of the Cloud

The digitization of geopolitics is the process--currently in its early phases—that transfers the scope of political reality into the virtual domain. 

However, digital geopolitics should not only be seen as “a layer superimposed on conventional geopolitics, but as a major geopolitical force itself 

that will create its own new alignments among new actors, and not only 

states.”20 The process of migration itself generates new sources of geopolitical currents. The previous section examined the pivotal role of the 

tech giants in shaping the cyber domain discourse. The choice of platform 

company matters because it is linked to regime type. Under the rubric of 

U.S.-China strategic competition, the ongoing debates about the risks and 

benefits of using Huawei’s 5G to upgrade national telecommunications 

infrastructures are no longer just matters of economic or technology policy, but one of national security and the future of the international order. 

As a British study of Huawei and 5G puts it:

. . . we should remind ourselves that China’s military strategists 

perceive a world in which the military and the civilian will be 

fused into a single plane of conflict. The ability to control communications and the data that flows through its channels will be 

the route to exercise power over societies and other nations.21

From this vantage point, the decision of traditional American allies, 

Thailand and the Philippines, to opt for Huawei 5G and/or other Chinese 

data platform companies is unsettling one of the cornerstones of postWorld War II international security architecture. These deviations suggest 

that variations exist among allies’ views on the global role of China, and 

that the strategic value of the ally’s relations with China has risen to rival the alliance agenda, alongside changes in its bilateral relations with the 

United States. 

Absent emerging technology governance on the global level, the expectation is the emergence of a wider spread of new regulatory or governance regimes as countries and/or regions attempt to manage the impact 

of technological advancements. For instance, the digital overlay on the 

“conventional” geopolitical map suggests an emerging “new technological 

global divide” between the United States and Europe based on differing 

43
Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific

views of technology as a strategic instrument.22 Consequently, whereas the 

European Union (EU) has established an “extensive regime around data, 

data privacy and human rights,” the United States has been focused on 

technology-building complemented by “light-touch regulations” that put 

the onus of managing the consequences of technology use to companies 

and societal groups.23

The EU’s preoccupation with data and data privacy is not excessive. 

The strategic, economic, and monetary value of digital information has 

given rise to cybercrime. Cyber criminals are taking advantage of weak, diverse, or absent, cyber governance laws to operate globally, anonymously, 

and with impunity. Their activities can be politically consequential: they 

can be hired to undermine political rivals or enemies, destabilize a country 

by damaging critical infrastructure, paralyze business operations that can 

cause societal panic, steal state secrets for ransom, and so forth. They present serious political, diplomatic, legal and security challenges to all states, 

and for as long as cybersecurity is not collectively addressed, cyber criminals will continue to occupy dangerous and unregulated territory in the 

cyber domain.

The Planet and the Cloud

The coexistence of the virtual and the real has spurred the introduction 

of new concepts, connotations, and constructs in the language of geopolitics. The digitization of war—cyberwar—not only extends warfighting into the virtual; writing on the state of military art today, professor of 

war studies Lawrence Freedman finds that the common theme

. . . was of the blurring of boundaries—between peace and 

war, the military and the civilian, the conventional and unconventional, the regular and the irregular, the domestic and the international, and the state and the non-state, the legitimate and the 

criminal.24

He also examines “gray zone” conflicts, located “somewhere between 

peace and war, where the action chosen was deliberately kept below the 

threshold that would spark major war.”25

These states of “blur and between-ness” essay the role of advanced 

digital and emerging technologies in a complex geopolitical landscape of 

44
The Fourth Industrial Revolution and Its Discontents

two spaces (virtual and real). They expose the inadequacy of traditional 

concepts and tools of statecraft to explain and address the changes attendant to the process of digitization.

Both Russia and China are proving to be highly successful operators 

in this dual environment. The seminal work on “sharp power” specifically 

refers to Russia and China as authoritarian states who use “aggressive and 

subversive” policies to project state power in democratic countries with 

the intention to “manipulate their targeted audience by distorting the information that reaches them.”26 Indeed, Russia’s preferred gray zone tactic 

is using disinformation campaigns (such as in the U.S. 2016 presidential 

elections) to undermine political institutions, while China uses a more 

“materially threatening form” in its conduct of gray zone operations.27

Operating along blurred conceptual lines and in gray zones are pivotal venues in the contest of global narratives and power projection. Thus 

far, the United States and its allies have yet to come up with a strategy to 

address rapidly emerging gray zone challenges in a timely, responsive manner.28 In order for the United States to enhance its strategic advantage over 

Russia and China, it needs to be present in these new areas of contested 

spaces. Whoever assumes control over the levers of power in the real and 

digital arenas will be in a position of global leadership.

In the virtual world thus, we see a distinct architecture of interconnectivity that features a more prominent role for Big Tech and platform 

companies and other non-state actors (to include terrorists, underworld 

criminal organizations, individuals, and citizens’ groups). We also detect 

the emergence of new divides among states, the resurgence of Russia as a 

potential cyber power, weakening and/or shifting alliances, and potential 

nation-based coalitions organized along techno-authoritarian lines. The 

digitization of geopolitics is reshaping the strategic layout of international 

relations, accompanied by new concepts and constructs that capture the 

dynamics of change from the real to the virtual domain.

Conclusion

This chapter explores three issues that figure importantly in understanding the dynamics of the Fourth Industrial Revolution. Technology governance, the role of Big Tech, and the digitization of geopolitics inform 

the disruptions in the revolution. The persistence of technology governance ideas that affirm the supremacy of the Westphalian order is a negative disruption that inhibits the construction of a governance regime that 

45
Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific

Notes

1 Klaus Schwab, The Fourth Industrial Revolution (New York: Currency Books, 2016).

2 “Global Technology Governance: A Multistakeholder Approach,” World Eco- nomic Forum, October 2019, 5, http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_Global_ Technology_Governance.pdf.

3 This last question from: Satya Nadella, “The Partnership of the Future,” Slate, June 28, 2016, https://slate.com/technology/2016/06/microsoft-ceo-satya-nadella- humans-and-a-i-can-work-together-to-solve-societys-challenges.html.

4 Ibid. Nadella citing computer pioneer Alan Kay, who was quoted as saying, “The best way to predict the future is to invent it.” Also see: Tony Prophet, “Ethics and 

Technology in the Fourth Industrial Revolution,” World Economic Forum, January 21, 2019, https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/01/ethics-and-technology-in- the-fourth-industrial-revolution/.

5 “Global Technology Governance,” World Economic Forum, 4.

6 Virginia B. Watson, “Offsetting the Impacts of Emerging Critical Technologies,” in Emerging Critical Technologies and Security in the Asia-Pacific, ed. Richard Bitzinger (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 70-71.

function in the fashion of 4IR and emerging technology dynamics: multistakeholder, multi- and cross-disciplinary, multi-domain and multilevel 

(domestic-regional-global), innovative and adaptable.

The rise of Big Tech is in and of itself a disruptive force. Together 

with data platform companies, they have had the primary charter of transfer to digitize geopolitics. As principal players in cyberspace, they are the 

gatekeepers to the universal adoption of “everything and anything digital” 

that is now materializing into a new strategic space for the conduct of 

societal affairs—cyber domain—“a technology-enabled domain for humans and machines to live and interact, a hypostatic abstraction, a political 

reality.”29 

The political theorist Langdon Winner famously proposed that “artifacts have politics.”30 The digitization of geopolitics is not a mechanical process. The migration of “conventional” geopolitics to the virtual 

domain is a disruptive process that is rife with social, ethical, and legal 

conversations. The proliferation of conceptual and contested blurred lines 

and the inherent ambiguity of gray zones indicate that we are still in the 

early phases of transfer, and that the normative structure that will define 

the beginnings of the Fifth Industrial Revolution is still far off on the 

distant horizon.

46
The Fourth Industrial Revolution and Its Discontents

7 “Internet Growth Statistics,” Internet World Stats, https://www.internetworld- stats.com/emarketing.htm; “Population Pyramids of the World,” https://www. populationpyramid.net/world/1995/.

8 “Digital Plurality,” Economist 434, no. 9182 (February 20, 2020): 4.

9 “The World’s Most Valuable Resource is No Longer Oil, But Data,” Economist

423, no. 9039 (May 6, 2017), https://www.economist.com/leaders/2017/05/06/the- worlds-most-valuable-resource-is-no-longer-oil-but-data.

10 “Big Tech” became part of mainstream language in 2013, but the turning point for using it as a label ascribed to the largest U.S. Internet companies occurred in 

2017. The list includes U.S. companies like Alphabet, Amazon (also the world’s larg- est retailer), Apple, Facebook, Microsoft (aka ‘Big Five’). From Asia, the list would 

include Alibaba (PRC), Baidu (PRC), Fuji (Japan), Huawei (PRC), JD.com (PRC), 

Samsung (ROK), Tata (India), Tencent (PRC). It was during this period when Presi- dent Trump accused Amazon of being a monopoly, making it a target for antitrust 

action. There were questions on the extent of Big Tech’s role in spreading misin- formation and facilitating foreign interference in the 2016 U.S. elections. And it was 

also during this time when Congress summoned some of these companies to take 

part in hearings that sought to clarify their role in Russia’s U.S. election meddling. Will Oremus, “Big Tobacco. Big Pharma. Big Tech?” Slate, November 17, 2017, 

https://slate.com/technology/2017/11/how-silicon-valley-became-big-tech.html.

11 “Big Tech’s $2Trn Bull Run,” Economist 434, no. 9182, February 22, 2020: 9.

12 “Most Valuable Companies in the World: 2020,” FXSSI, May 23, 2020, https:// fxssi.com/top-10-most-valuable-companies-in-the-world.

13 Another major reason for the ‘techlash’ was public concern over the tech com- panies’ lackluster efforts to stop ISIS and other terrorist groups from working their 

messages online. See Google/Facebook response in Joseph Menn and Dustin Volz, 

“Exclusive: Google, Facebook Quietly Move toward Automatic Blocking of Extrem- ist Video,” Reuters, June 24, 2016, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-internet- extremism-video-exclusive-idUSKCN0ZB00M.

14 “I’m from a Company, and I’m Here to Help,” Economist 432, no. 9157, August 24, 2019: 14.

15 Ibid.

16 Ibid., 15.

17 Huawei, for example, is reported to have deployed its digital surveillance technol- ogy to at least a dozen authoritarian regimes. Andrea Kendall-Taylor, Erica Frantz, and Joseph Wright, “The Digital Dictators: How Technology Strengthens Autoc- racy,” Foreign Affairs 99, no. 2 (March/April 2020): 103-115; Steven Feldstein, “The 

Road to Digital Unfreedom: How Artificial Intelligence Is Changing Repression,” 

Journal of Democracy 30, no. 1 (January 2019): 40-52.

18 Kendall-Taylor et al., “Digital Dictators,” 112.

19 Paul Triolo, of Eurasia Group, quoted in “The Challenger,” Economist 426, no. 9083 (March 17, 2018): 19-22.

20 Steven Weber and Gabriel Nicholas, “Data, Rivalry, and Government Power: Machine Learning Is Changing Everything,” Global Asia 14, no. 1 (March 2019): 22- 29.

21 Bob Seely, Peter Varnish, and John Hemmings, “Defending Our Data: Huawei, 5G, and the Five Eyes,” Henry Jackson Society, May 16, 2019, 3, https://henryjack- sonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/HJS-Huawei-Report-A1.pdf.

47
Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific

22 Ibid. Also, Lesley Seebeck, “The New Global Technology Divide,” Australian Strategic Policy Institute, July 11, 2019, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/the-new- global-technological-divide/. 

23 Ibid.

24 Lawrence Freedman, The Future of War: A History (New York: Public Affairs, 2017), 284-285.

25 Ibid., 285.

26 Juan Pablo Cardenal et al., “Sharp Power: Rising Authoritarian Influence,” Na- tional Endowment for Democracy, December 5, 2017, https://www.ned.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/12/Sharp-Power-Rising-Authoritarian-Influence-Full-Report.

pdf. 

27 Lyle J. Morris et al., Gaining Competitive Advantage in the Gray Zone (California: RAND Corporation, 2019), xi, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/ research_reports/RR2900/RR2942/RAND_RR2942.pdf.

28 Ibid., xiii.

29 William Gibson, “A consensual hallucination experienced daily by billions of legit- imate operators,” Neuromancer (1984), cited in Fabio Rugge, “Emerging Disruptive 

Technologies and International Stability,” The Global Race for Technological Superiority, ed. Fabio Rugge (Italy: Italian Institute for International Political Studies, 2019), 20, 

https://www.ispionline.it/sites/default/files/pubblicazioni/ispi_cybsec_2019_web2.

pdf.

30 Langdon Winner, “Do Artifacts Have Politics?” Daedalus 109, no. 1 (Winter 1980): 121-136, https://www.jstor.org/stable/20024652.

48
49

 4

SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGY 

CHALLENGES POLITICAL CULTURE OF 

DEMOCRATIC STATES

Inez Miyamoto

The debate about the adoption of surveillance technologies by different 

systems of government is already over: both autocratic and democratic 

states use surveillance technologies. Autocratic states, such as China, Russia, and Saudi Arabia, embrace surveillance technologies to control their 

citizens.1 They find the surveillance technologies to be effective because 

once citizens know that their communications and movements are being 

monitored, they change their behavior without any government intervention.2

 In contrast, democratic states use surveillance technologies to improve public safety and national security but struggle with balancing state 

and citizen interests. Accordingly, this article centers on the use of surveillance technologies by democratic states against their citizens. The use of 

surveillance technologies against citizens challenges the existing political 

culture of democratic states—the fundamental beliefs, values, and norms 

that have long defined them. In other words, surveillance technologies 

conflict with the agreement between democratic governments and their 

citizens for privacy and civil liberty protections. Democratic states must 

act now to resolve this debate because the unprecedented speed of technological change is generating a gap between how these states and their 

citizens understand their own political culture.

Democratic states use surveillance technologies to facilitate governance through social control. Torin Monahan explains democratic surveillance as “intentionally harnessing the control functions of surveillance for 

social ends of fairness, justice, and equality.”3 In theory, democratic states 
Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific

counterbalance social control through citizen participation and democratic controls (e.g., oversight, transparency, and public accountability). In 

practice, citizen participation and democratic controls can be effective in 

counteracting privacy-invasive surveillance, but they tend to be reactive 

and slow to respond. Meanwhile, recent advancements in surveillance 

technologies provide democratic states with unprecedented power to 

identify, track, and analyze their citizens in real-time. In other words, digital 

mass surveillance can become the norm for democratic states if allowed 

to go unchecked.

This chapter examines the struggle that democratic states are having 

to resolve the tension between political culture and surveillance technologies; tension often displayed in differences between policymakers, security 

practitioners and civil society members. The first section examines three 

U.S. case studies to show how surveillance technology is creating friction 

between the government and civil society. The second section analyzes the 

roles of the private sector and the state to identify the drivers contributing to the tension with political culture. The third section imagines future 

technologies and their impact on the current debate. The final section 

concludes with recommendations for resolving the political culture gap 

between governments and their citizens.

Debating Aspects of Surveillance Through Case Studies

This section examines three U.S. case studies to understand how surveillance technologies can undermine democratic political culture. Each of 

the case studies illuminates how free media and civic groups play an important role in identifying violations of civil liberties and ensuring public 

accountability. 

Social Media and Facial Recognition

In 2016, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) of Northern California sounded the alarm that law enforcement was accessing social media 

intelligence to monitor social protests. By seeking public records to determine how law enforcement was using social media monitoring, the ACLU 

obtained the marketing materials of the social media monitoring company 

Geofeedia, which touted the Baltimore Police Department’s successful 

use of its product.4 Specifically, after using Geofeedia’s product to obtain 

50
 Surveillance Technology Challenges Democratic Culture

Facial recognition technology is used to identify people using biometrics 

through biological or behavioral characteristics and consists of two processes. 

First, in the enrollment process, a person’s facial features are mathematically 

mapped as facial landmarks into a template and saved in a database of known 

individuals. Second, in the matching process, a photo of an unknown person is 

processed using facial technology and compared against a database of known 

individuals. Factors affecting the accuracy of matches include the technology 

(e.g., the way facial landmarks are calculated) and the quality of a photo image. 

social media photos of protesters, the Baltimore Police Department ran 

the photos through facial recognition technology to identify and arrest 

individuals with outstanding warrants.5

Upon learning how Geofeedia was using the social media feeds, social media companies (i.e., Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter) suspended 

Geofeedia’s access citing policies prohibiting their data from being used 

for surveillance activities. Without the social media feeds, Geofeedia could 

not manually collect social media posts to provide a real-time view of multiple social media feeds. The impact on Geofeedia was significant, causing 

layoffs and a business model shift to social media marketing and management.6

This is not an issue of law enforcement using social media platforms, 

which is publicly available information. When individuals post a public 

comment or picture on a social media platform, they want the public to 

see their content and are explicitly giving up their right to privacy. Since 

the comment or photo is open for the world to see, law enforcement is 

permitted to view and use public content. To prevent public access, individuals can increase their privacy settings so that only their followers can 

see their posts and photos. In this instance, law enforcement is required to 

obtain a court order to access the individuals’ information.

Instead, the key issue here was law enforcement using a social media 

monitoring tool without a clear investigative purpose. Since individuals 

had a right to participate in a social protest, law enforcement had no investigative predication to identify individuals, let alone to check for outstanding warrants. Had there been a crime committed during the protest, then 

law enforcement could have justification to use facial recognition software 

in order to identify a suspect. 

The underlying problem with Baltimore Police Department’s use of 

Geofeedia’s tool was its lack of transparency. When the department’s use 

51
Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific

Web scraping is the process of 

collecting data from websites. 

The process is automated by using 

web crawlers, which are programs 

or scripts designed to browse and 

lift information from the World 

Wide Web. Other terms for web 

scraping include web data extraction and web harvesting.

of the tool was revealed, it eroded public trust already strained by the 

police brutality incident which had sparked the protest. By being open 

about the social media tool and having clear policies on use of surveillance 

technologies, the Baltimore Police Department could have eased public 

concerns.

Website Scraping and Facial Recognition

In January 2020, the New York Times published a report about Clearview AI’s invasive facial recognition product, which was being used by law 

enforcement to identify individuals. Clearview AI sells access to a platform 

which identifies an individual by using a facial recognition search against a 

database containing three billion images. After the news article was published, private technology companies (e.g., Facebook, Twitter, Venmo, and 

Google) issued cease and desist letters to Clearview AI citing violations to 

their terms of service.7 In response to the letters, Clearview AI claimed 

it had a right to publicly available information, likening its business to a 

search engine pulling information from different websites.8

In order to create a database of three billion images, Clearview AI 

extracted images from open websites using a process called website scraping, which is legal. In September 2019, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 

9th Circuit ruled that it is not illegal to scrape publicly accessible websites.9

This ruling is currently being appealed; if the ruling is overturned, it could 

widen Clearview AI’s legal troubles beyond the lawsuits it is facing in California, Illinois, and Vermont.

In February 2020, Clearview AI disclosed that an intruder stole its 

client list along with details about each client.10 At the same time, BuzzFeed 

News revealed that it obtained internal Clearview AI documents from an 

undisclosed source, which included Clearview AI’s client list of 2,228 organizations and individuals. The size 

of the client list is somewhat misleading as a majority of the clients were 

using free-trial licenses rather than a 

paid subscription. Clients with paid 

subscriptions included many federal 

government agencies (e.g., U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 

52
 Surveillance Technology Challenges Democratic Culture

Biometric technology is used to 

identify or authenticate by using 

the biological attributes of individuals. Individuals can be identified using physiological biometrics 

(e.g., retina, vein, or fingerprint) 

or behavioral biometrics (e.g., 

gait, signature, or keystrokes). 

Facial recognition and fingerprint 

recognition are examples of biometrics.

tabases. Clearview AI’s technology provided an alternative for identifying 

individuals through open-source images. According to Clearview AI, law 

enforcement’s use of its product does not violate any federal and state privacy or biometrics laws if it is used for its intended purpose and is not the 

sole basis for an arrest.12 However, Clearview AI’s database was controversial because the company violated individuals’ rights: it never received 

the informed consent of the individuals owning the images or allowed 

individuals to opt out of its database. 

Video Surveillance 

There are two types of video surveillance commonly used: stationary and 

aerial video surveillance cameras. The first type involves the use of stationary cameras mounted at key locations. The second type involves the use of 

aerial craft mounted with cameras, which can be manned or unmanned. 

As an illustration, the military developed wide-area surveillance technology for use on a battlefield, but now law enforcement is using it for policing, border control, and wildlife protection. 

In 2016 the Baltimore Police Department contracted with a widearea surveillance company called Persistent Surveillance Systems. Over a 

period of several months, the company collected over 300 hours of surveillance video using aerial craft. After the plane downloaded the images 

onto a server hard drive, police could access the imagery to solve crimes. 

The video resolution did not allow for the identification of individuals or 

vehicles, but it was good enough to follow objects over time.13

After the program ended, Bloomberg News published an article revealing the Baltimore Police Department’s use of wide-area surveillance techand U.S. Secret Service) and local law 

enforcement agencies.11

In this case study, law enforcement used a private-sector database 

to identify individuals, whereas in 

the Geofeedia case law enforcement 

used a government database. Law 

enforcement agencies traditionally 

rely on government databases for 

criminal identification, but an individual may not be in government da53
Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific

nology. Public officials had no idea of the existence of the program because normal public spending oversight mechanisms were circumvented. 

Instead of using public funding, the police used a private donation from 

the Laura and John Arnold Foundation. The Foundation, which supports 

evidence-based policing solutions, had a prior agreement with Persistent 

Surveillance Systems to fund the project if the company could find a police department to use the technology.14

The Baltimore Police Department did not violate the law because U.S. 

laws allow for aerial surveillance without a warrant as long as the technology is publicly accessible.15 The police wanted the technology because 

most of Baltimore’s homicides occur in outdoor public spaces.16 Since the 

camera resolution does not allow for visual identification of individuals 

or vehicles, there is even less of an invasion of privacy. Nevertheless, the 

department lost the public’s trust because it was not transparent: it did not 

provide public notification, go through the normal procurement review, or 

publish its wide-area surveillance policy.

Despite all of the controversy, in 2019, Persistent Surveillance Systems solicited the Baltimore Police Department for a long-term contract. 

The three-year contract for US$6.6 million, which was funded again by the 

Laura and John Arnold Foundation, involved three planes, and covered 

32-square miles. Persistent Surveillance Systems also disclosed its privacy 

program, limiting the resolution of images to prevent the identification 

of individuals.17 Since the Baltimore Police Department was transparent 

and involved the public, in April 2020, the city of Baltimore approved the 

contract.

The Roles of the Private Sector and the State

Although the surveillance technologies used in the case studies were not 

illegal, they undermined democratic political culture because they went 

against the beliefs, values, and norms of what citizens expected of their 

government. Two insights emerge from the case studies. First, governments are highly reliant on private-sector surveillance technology because 

they do not organically possess these technologies or skills. Second, there 

is a lack of legal and policy frameworks at the national level to guide local governments in balancing citizen privacy and government surveillance. 

This section analyzes the roles of the private sector and state in surveillance technology use and explains the drivers contributing to the tension 

in democratic states’ political culture.

54
 Surveillance Technology Challenges Democratic Culture

Artificial intelligence (AI) is the simulation of human intelligence in machines 

by using software. There are three general types of AI: artificial narrow intelligence, artificial general intelligence, artificial super intelligence. Artificial 

narrow intelligence involves systems performing defined tasks and is found 

in commercialized applications, such as Siri or facial recognition technology. 

Researchers are striving to achieve artificial general intelligence, which occurs 

when systems perform human-like thinking, and artificial super intelligence, 

which occurs when systems become more capable than humans. 

Role of the Private Sector

Surveillance technology growth is now being driven by the private sector. 

The United Nations (UN) concluded: “Digital surveillance is no longer 

the preserve of countries that enjoy the resources to conduct mass and 

targeted surveillance based on in-house tools. Private industry has stepped 

in, unsupervised and with something close to impunity.”18 The private sector, in its pursuit for profit, indiscriminately sells surveillance tools around 

the world. For example, although Chinese companies are the largest global 

suppliers of surveillance technologies empowered by artificial intelligence 

(AI), private companies from democratic states, such as the United States, 

France, Germany, Israel, South Korea, United Kingdom, and Japan, are 

also selling surveillance technologies to both democracies and autocracies.19

International organizations are calling for regulations to monitor and 

control the export of surveillance technologies, since repressive governments use them to facilitate human rights abuses. For example, in 2014 the 

European Union (EU) banned the export of information communication 

and technology (ICT) to governments censoring information or conducting mass surveillance. And, in 2016, the European Commission specified 

the ICT for export control so that EU sales and exports of these technologies could be monitored.20 In spite of having regulations, export-control 

laws are ineffective because they lack enforcement measures to address 

human rights violations and do not stop the use of the technologies.21

Furthermore, since surveillance technologies are now widely available in 

many products, it would be impossible to regulate all of the technologies.

There is also a growing problem with the private sector’s involvement 

in surveillance technologies: the surveillance limitations placed on the 

government do not always apply to the private sector. When the private 

sector closely works with government, the boundaries become unclear.22

As discussed in the case studies, law enforcement leverages private sector 

55
Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific

technology to fight crime. In the future as more data becomes available, 

law enforcement may need to outsource the digital analysis and investigation to the private sector; thereby, the private sector becomes an extension 

of the government. This could be problematic if a private company were 

to sell a service to law enforcement and then unknowingly sell the same 

service to a criminal organization, or if the private company were to use 

the insider policing information for profit. 

Private companies can also use surveillance technologies to monitor 

their customers without transparency or individual consent (i.e., in states 

without comprehensive privacy and security laws). While the biometric 

data compiled from facial, voice, and body-language analysis support the 

marketing and/or product sales of private companies, the data is extremely invasive (e.g., some data can be used to determine health, disease, or 

personality) and raises ethical and privacy concerns.23 Another problem 

with surveillance data is the data retention period. Unless there are regulations or laws, the private sector is not required to follow the beliefs, values, 

or norms of a democratic state. 

As the driver of surveillance technology growth, the private sector 

can increase trust with the government and civil society by self-regulating 

their use and sales of surveillance technology. Specifically, private companies that sell surveillance technologies can promote governance policies to address ethical and privacy concerns, establish an ethics board, and 

provide an annual transparency report. The private sector can also engage 

with civil society organizations to address the ethical problems raised by 

surveillance technologies. As an illustration, the Partnership on AI is one 

such organization working to increase AI dialogue among for-profit companies and academic and research institutions.24

Role of the State

At the international level, states should engage in multilateral discourse 

to avert the potentially dangerous side effects of surveillance technologies to democratic political culture. In reality, states will find it difficult to 

reach consensus and to establish international norms and standards for 

two reasons. Firstly, surveillance technologies are dual-use—having both 

civilian and defense applications—so they are the sources of geopolitical 

competition. States are unwilling to restrict their development of dualuse technologies because they are accelerators of economic growth and 

national defense advantage.25 Secondly, technological innovation is accel56
 Surveillance Technology Challenges Democratic Culture

erating faster than global governance. According to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “technological change will continue to far 

outpace the ability of states, agencies and international organizations to set 

standards, policies, regulations, and norms.”26 Under those circumstances, 

the gap between technology and governance will only widen.

Nevertheless, there are other ways states can work collaboratively toward global norms and standards in areas such as human rights, ethics, and 

safety. International organizations, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and International Committee of the Red Cross, provide 

opportunities to identify common values and approaches for increasing 

trust in surveillance technologies. In a like manner, while the Organisation 

for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Principles on AI 

are non-binding, they establish political commitment to promote AI that 

is trustworthy and respects human rights and democratic values.27 Additionally, the World Economic Forum has an initiative to bringing private 

and public stakeholders together to design and test policy frameworks for 

technologies such as AI, machine learning, and facial recognition.28 These 

types of initiatives are the first steps toward global cooperation. 

At the domestic level, states should consider establishing comprehensive security and privacy laws and engaging in dialogue with their citizens 

about surveillance technologies. First, the EU’s General Data Protection 

Regulation (GDPR) is considered to be one of the strictest and most 

comprehensive laws for privacy and security.29 The regulation was passed 

in 2014 when surveillance technologies were not as advanced as they are 

today. Consequently, critics are calling for GDPR regulatory reforms because it hinders the development and use of AI by placing limitations on 

the collection and sharing of personal data.30 In addition, although the 

GDPR limits live facial recognition by mandating individual consent, it 

also specifies exceptions for law enforcement use, personal use, and situations where a person cannot be identified.31 Therefore, while the GDPR 

is a proven framework that can be used to build a comprehensive privacy 

and security law, the GDPR should be expanded to include emerging technologies and their impacts on privacy and security.

Second, the public and private sector will need more dialogue on 

future surveillance technologies. Michelle Cayford, Wolter Pieters, and 

P.H.A.J.M. van Gelder found that when it comes to surveillance technology, the public wants both security and privacy with no tradeoffs.32 For 

this reason, states need to engage with their citizens to take the discussion 

beyond the balance between security and civil liberty. Specifically, Cayford 

57
Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific

and Pieters concluded, “Rather than just speaking of providing ‘security,’ 

the debate should be sharpened to discuss the effectiveness of the surveillance technology in achieving the security goal.”33 Additionally, states 

need to articulate that surveillance-technology effectiveness cannot be 

measured by using traditional crime or security statistics. To illustrate, the 

public expects to see an inverse correlation between surveillance technology use and crime or security threats, so when the expected pattern is not 

seen, the public concludes the surveillance technology is ineffective.34 In 

reality, states measure surveillance-technology effectiveness by looking at 

the overall value in achieving outcomes (e.g., disruptions of threats and intelligence validation).35 There is a need for states and the public to develop 

a common language to determine acceptable measures of effectiveness. 

Future Challenges

Technology is constantly evolving and providing states with more powerful surveillance capabilities. Advancements in real-time connectivity and 

data analytics, in particular, elevate the privacy threat from omnipresent 

surveillance. In this section, two technological drivers of change are examined in understanding the future environment: 5th Generation (5G) and 

6th Generation (6G) connectivity and AI analytics advancement.

First, 5G-cellular technology is the catalyst launching the world into 

the Fourth Industrial Revolution with speeds of up to 100 times faster 

than current cellular networks. 5G is an enabling technology for the Internet of Things (IoT), which is a network of devices and objects with 

built-in sensors for connectivity and communication. The IoT needs 5G’s 

speed and low latency to move data to and from a massive number of 

devices and sensors. Many of the IoT connections involve machine-tomachine (M2M) applications in which communication between devices 

and sensors occur without human intervention. The convergence of 5G 

and IoT provides the means to create smart cities, smart manufacturing, 

and autonomous cars, all of which run M2M applications. 

In the future, many aspects of life will be monitored by billions of 

IoT sensors and devices. By 2023, Cisco expects there will be 3.9 billion 

Internet users and 29.3 billion connected devices, of which half (14.7 billion devices) are for M2M applications.36 By 2030, not only will the number of connected devices grow to 500 billion,37 but connectivity speed is 

also expected to increase with the deployment of 6G-mobile technology.38

It is important to realize that this vast network of devices and sensors will 

58
 Surveillance Technology Challenges Democratic Culture

be distributed without centralized control or governance.39 Furthermore, 

each IoT sensor and device will generate digital data, which can be collected into massive datasets. 

Second, AI will be used to interpret the massive datasets generated 

from IoT devices and sensors. It is through the AI-generated intelligence 

that an individual can be tracked by facial recognition, smart payment, 

and smart phones, or that pattern anomalies can be identified as threats. 

Eventually, AI systems will be integrated so that they can communicate 

with each other, without human intervention. For instance, autonomous 

surveillance systems will use AI-enabled camera systems to decide what 

qualifies as a threat.40

Furthermore, the power from other technologies, such as quantum 

computing and nanotechnology, will be harnessed to make AI even more 

powerful. Futurists expect that in the next 10 years artificial general intelligence, which is when machines will think like humans, will be achieved.41

At that time, the digital world will be highly interconnected with over 500 

billion devices and sensors, which means cyber attackers have more ways 

to compromise the security and privacy of individuals. At some time between 2030 and 2050, futurists predict technological singularity, which is 

the point when AI in machines exceed human intellect, will be achieved.42

As AI races toward technological singularity, there will be transnational 

challenges for which the world will be unprepared: they include combat 

robots, precision biometric attacks, and new types of information warfare. 

For this reason, futurists also predict that a global AI arms race will ensue.43

AI applications will continue to raise ethical concerns, surpassing the 

current debate on biases. These concerns will be difficult to resolve because there is a lack of transparency with AI algorithms, which are considered intellectual property.44 In addition, as AI systems are given more 

decision-making capability, AI algorithm liability, when a machine makes a 

decision leading to human harm, comes into question. For example, if an 

autonomous car is involved in an accident, it is unclear if the owner of the 

system, programmer, or manufacturer is responsible. 

When fully deployed, 6G and AI will change every aspect of modern 

life. These technologies will greatly improve the quality of life of individuals, as they bring advancements to healthcare, transportation, and manufacturing. At the same time, they also will create tremendous challenges 

and risks, for which societies are unprepared. Since the speed of technological change cannot be slowed, democratic states must take action now 

59
Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific

to build strategies and mechanisms to protect civil society while promoting 

their strategic competitiveness.

The Way Ahead and Conclusion

Although the challenges posed by AI and AI-enabled surveillance technology to democratic values and norms are huge, they are not insurmountable. Rather than provide an exhaustive list of recommendations, this section will suggest foundational steps to take now, so that states can begin to 

resolve these new challenges to democratic political culture. 

Recommendation #1: National AI Strategy

Democratic states should create a national AI strategy because AI is the 

enabler for the other surveillance technologies. The Atlantic Council recommended using anticipatory governance in developing a national AI 

strategy to not only define national objectives but also delineate ethical or 

societal limitations.45 According to Eleonore Pauwels, anticipatory governance can be used to understand “plausible scenarios related to AI convergence” to imagine hybrid-security threats.46 Creating a national AI strategy will be challenging for policymakers: they will need to harmonize the 

conflicting demands of many stakeholders, given the dual-use nature of 

the technologies, and to consider the impact of associated-emerging technologies (e.g., quantum computing and nanotechnology). Finally, in order 

for the strategy to succeed, policymakers will also need an implementation 

plan, with sufficient resources and supporting institutions.47

Recommendation #2: Privacy and Security Task Force 

Democratic states should create a “privacy and security task force” comprised of government and private sector representatives to ensure that 

democratic belief, values, and norms are maintained and protected. The 

first effort of the task force is to ensure that there is a comprehensive 

privacy and security law, which could be modeled after the EU GDPR 

and include the other impacts of emerging technologies. The second undertaking of the task force would be to develop a framework to evaluate 

the social, economic, and human risks and harms created by surveillance 

and emerging technologies. This will not be an easy undertaking because 

emerging technologies cross multiple domains, each with differing im60
 Surveillance Technology Challenges Democratic Culture

pacts. The third effort of the task force is to use the framework to examine risks, gaps, and opportunities, to develop policies, and to recommend 

regulations and laws. The fourth effort of the task force is to regularly 

monitor the progress of the government toward achieving task force objectives using annual reports, to update the framework, and to proactively 

respond with policy or regulatory recommendations. 

Recommendation #3: Import Control

Democratic states should penalize private companies selling technologies 

to governments censoring information or conducting mass surveillance 

by banning their future business interactions with that state. In essence, 

this recommendation is the inverse of the EU’s 2014 ban on the export of 

technology to governments conducting human rights abuses from surveillance technologies. For example, if U.S. companies were to sell technology to repressive governments, a state could put these companies on a 

banned-from-importing list, thereby disallowing these companies access 

to markets in that particular state. This unconventional strategy could 

prove to be more effective in curbing the behavior of the private sector 

than export controls because it has a broader impact on global companies 

by affecting their profits and market access. 

In conclusion, surveillance technologies can conflict with the political 

culture of democratic states by violating the agreement between governments and their citizens for privacy and civil liberty protections. The good 

news is that by acting now to resolve the political culture debate, democratic states will be in a better position to deal with emerging technologies, 

which will pose even more ethical and democratic value challenges. Moreover, although the future will bring an accelerated growth of surveillancedriven technology, democratic states will have the strategies, policies, and 

laws in place to keep pace and maintain the democratic promise to their 

citizens.

61
Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific

Notes

1 Steven Feldstein, “The Global Expansion of AI Surveillance,” Carnegie Endow- ment for International Peace, September 17, 2019, https://carnegieendowment.

org/2019/09/17/global-expansion-of-ai-surveillance-pub-79847.

2 Andrea Kendall-Taylor, Erica Franz, and Joseph Wright, “The Digital Dictators: How Technology Strengthens Autocracy,” Foreign Affairs 99, no. 2 (March/April 2020): 103, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2020-02-06/digital-dicta- tors.

3 Torin Monahan, “Surveillance as Governance: Social Inequality and the Pursuit of Democratic Surveillance,” in Surveillance and Democracy, ed. Kevin D. Haggerty and Minas Samatas (New York: Routledge, 2010), 91-110, http://publicsurveillance.com/

papers/Monahan_Surv_Democracy.pdf.

4 Nichole Ozer, “Police Use of Social Media Surveillance Software Is Escalat- ing, and Activists Are in the Digital Crosshairs,” American Civil Liberties Union, 

September 22, 2016, https://www.aclu.org/blog/privacy-technology/surveillancetechnologies/police-use-social-media-surveillance-software.

5 U.S. Congress, House, Committee Hearing on Oversight and Reform, Facial 

Recognition Technology (Part I): Its Impact on Our Civil Rights and Liberties, 116th Cong., 1st sess., 2019, https://docs.house.gov/meetings/GO/GO00/20190522/109521/

HHRG-116-GO00-20190522-SD012.pdf.

6 “Map: Social Media Monitoring by Police Departments, Cities, and Counties,” Brennan Center for Justice, July 10, 2019, https://www.brennancenter.org/ourwork/research-reports/map-social-media-monitoring-police-departments-cities-andcounties.

7 Rebecca Heilweil, “The World’s Scariest Facial Recognition Company, Ex- plained,” Vox, May 8, 2020, https://www.vox.com/recode/2020/2/11/21131991/ clearview-ai-facial-recognition-database-law-enforcement.

8 “Google, YouTube, Venmo and LinkedIn Send Cease-and-Desist Letters to Fa- cial Recognition App That Helps Law Enforcement,” CBS News, February 5, 2020, 

https://www.cbsnews.com/news/clearview-ai-google-youtube-send-cease-anddesist-letter-to-facial-recognition-app/.

9 HiQ Labs, Inc., v. LinkedIn Corporation, 938 F.3d 985 (9th Cir. 2019), http:// cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2019/09/09/17-16783.pdf.

10 Betsy Swan, “Facial-Recognition Company That Works with Law Enforcement Says Entire Client List Was Stolen,” Daily Beast, February 26, 2020, https://www.

thedailybeast.com/clearview-ai-facial-recognition-company-that-works-with-lawenforcement-says-entire-client-list-was-stolen.

11 Ryan Mac, Caroline Haskins, and Logan McDonald, “Clearview’s Facial Recogni- tion App Has Been Used by the Justice Department, ICE, Macy’s, Walmart, and the 

NBA,” Buzzfeed News, February 27, 2020, https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/

ryanmac/clearview-ai-fbi-ice-global-law-enforcement.

12 Kashmir Hill, “The Secretive Company That Might End Privacy as We Know It,” New York Times, January 18, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/18/technol- ogy/clearview-privacy-facial-recognition.html.

13 Monte Reel, “Secret Cameras Record Baltimore’s Every Move from Above,” Bloomberg Businessweek, August 23 2016, https://www.bloomberg.com/features/2016- baltimore-secret-surveillance/.

14 Connor Friedersdorf, “The Sneaky Program to Spy on Baltimore from Above,” The Atlantic, August 26, 2016, https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/ar62
 Surveillance Technology Challenges Democratic Culture

chive/2016/08/the-sneaky-program-to-spy-on-baltimore-from-above/497588/.

15 Arthur Holland Michel, “The Military-Style Surveillance Technology Being Test- ed in American Cities,” The Atlantic, August 3, 2019, https://www.theatlantic.com/ technology/archive/2019/08/military-style-surveillance-air-often-legal/595063/.

16 Baynard Woods, “Baltimore’s Newly Revealed Surveillance Program Raises Legal Questions,” The Guardian, August 26, 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/us- news/2016/aug/26/baltimore-police-surveillance-legal-questions.

17 Kevin Rector, “Baltimore Officials Pitched on Putting Three Surveillance Planes in the Sky at Once, Covering Most of City,” Baltimore Sun, September 19, 2019, https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/crime/bs-md-ci-cr-surveillance-pitch20190919-dkurugpjdretrjzcevzlc7eabu-story.html.

18 United Nations Human Rights Council, Forty-first session, “Surveillance and Hu- man Rights: Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of 

the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression,” A/HRC/41/35, May 28, 2019, 

accessed April 1, 2020, https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/RegularSes- sions/Session41/Pages/ListReports.aspx.

19 Feldstein, “The Global Expansion.”

20 Arkaitz Gamino Garcia et al., Mass Surveillance: Part 1—Risks, Opportunities and Mitigation Strategies, (Brussels: European Union, 2015), https://www.europarl.europa. eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2015/527409/EPRS_STU%282015%29527409_

REV1_EN.pdf.

21 United Nations Human Rights Commission, “The 2019 Report on the Surveil- lance Industry,” United Nations, accessed April 1, 2020, https://www.ohchr.org/

EN/Issues/FreedomOpinion/Pages/SR2019ReporttoHRC.aspx.

22 Elise Thomas, “New Surveillance Tech Means You’ll Never Be Anonymous Again,” Wired, September 16, 2019, https://www.wired.co.uk/article/surveillance- technology-biometrics.

23 Jay Stanley, “The Dawn of Robot Surveillance: AI, Video Analytics, and Privacy,” American Civil Liberties Union, June 2019, https://www.aclu.org/report/dawnrobot-surveillance.

24 “About,” Partnership on AI, accessed April 12, 2020, https://www.partnershipo- nai.org/about/.

25 Camino Kavanagh, “New Tech, New Threats, and New Governance Challenges: Opportunity to Craft Smarter Responses?” Carnegie Endowment for International 

Peace, August 28, 2019, https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/08/28/new-technew-threats-and-new-governance-challenges-opportunity-to-craft-smarter-responses- pub-79736.

26 U.S. National Intelligence Council, Global Trends: Paradox of Progress (Washington: National Intelligence Council, 2017), accessed April 1, 2020, https://www.dni.gov/

index.php/key-global-trends/how-people-govern.

27 “Recommendation of the Council on Artificial Intelligence,” Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, May 2019, http://www.oecd.org/goingdigital/ai/principles/.

28 “Shaping the Future of Technology Governance: Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning,” World Economic Forum, accessed April 1, 2020, https://www.

weforum.org/platforms/shaping-the-future-of-technology-governance-artificial- intelligence-and-machine-learning/.

29 Ben Wolford, “What Is GDPR, the EU’s New Data Protection Law?” GDPR.

EU, accessed April 1, 2020. https://gdpr.eu/what-is-gdpr/.

63
Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific

30 Eline Chivot and Daniel Castro, “The EU Needs to Reform the GDPR to 

Remain Competitive in the Algorithmic Economy,” Center for Data Innovation, May 

13, 2019, https://www.datainnovation.org/2019/05/the-eu-needs-to-reform-thegdpr-to-remain-competitive-in-the-algorithmic-economy/.

31 “Guidelines 3/2019 on Processing of Personal Data through Video Devices,” European Data Protection Board, July 10, 2019, https://edpb.europa.eu/sites/edpb/

files/consultation/edpb_guidelines_201903_videosurveillance.pdf.

32 Michelle Cayford, Wolter Pieters, and P.H.A.J.M. van Gelder, “Wanting It All— Public Perceptions of the Effectiveness, Cost, and Privacy of Surveillance Technol- ogy,” Journal of Information, Communication and Ethics in Society 18, no.1 (2019), https:// www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/JICES-11-2018-0087/full/html.

33 Michelle Cayford and Wolter Pieters, “The Effectiveness of Surveillance Technol- ogy: What Intelligence Officials Are Saying,” The Information Society 34, no. 2 (2018), https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01972243.2017.1414721.

34 Max Bauer, “Review of Studies on Surveillance Camera Effectiveness,” American 

Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts, accessed April 1, 2020, https://privacysos.

org/camera_studies/.

35 Michelle Cayford, Wolter Pieters, and Constant Hijzen, “Plots, Murders, and Money: Oversight Bodies Evaluating the Effectiveness of Surveillance Technology,” 

Intelligence and National Security 33, no. 7 (2018), https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pd f/10.1080/02684527.2018.1487159.

36 “Cisco Annual Internet Report (2018–2023),” Cisco, 2020, accessed April 2, 2020, https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/solutions/collateral/executive-perspectives/

annual-internet-report/white-paper-c11-741490.pdf.

37 Fastco Works, “What Will Happen When 28 Billion Devices Are Connected Online?” Fast Company, July 24, 2019, https://www.fastcompany.com/90380201/

what-will-happen-when-28-billion-devices-are-connected-online.

38 “5G Evolution and 6G,” NTT Docomo, Inc., 2020, https://www.nttdocomo. co.jp/english/binary/pdf/corporate/technology/whitepaper_6g/DOCOMO_6G_

White_PaperEN_20200124.pdf.

39 “Strategic Foresight Analysis,” NATO, 2017, accessed April 2, 2020, https:// www.act.nato.int/images/stories/media/doclibrary/171004_sfa_2017_report_hr.pdf.

40 Zach Doffman, “Smarter Cities: Will Autonomous AI Surveillance and IoT Now 

Automate Law Enforcement?” Forbes, December 15, 2018, https://www.forbes.com/ sites/zakdoffman/2018/12/15/smarter-cities-will-autonomous-ai-surveillance-andiot-now-automate-law-enforcement/.

41 Christianna Reedy, “Kurzweil Claims That the Singularity Will Happen by 2045,” Futurism, October 5, 2017, https://futurism.com/kurzweil-claims-that-the-singulari- ty-will-happen-by-2045.

42 Dom Galeon, “Separating Science Fact from Science Hype: How Far Off Is the Singularity?” Futurism, January 30, 2018, https://futurism.com/separating-sciencefact-science-hype-how-far-off-singularity.

43 “Autonomous Weapons: An Open Letter from AI and Robotics Researchers,” Future of Life Institute, accessed April 1, 2020, https://futureoflife.org/open-letterautonomous-weapons/.

44 Jonathan Shaw, “Artificial Intelligence and Ethics,” Harvard Magazine, January- February 2019, https://harvardmagazine.com/2019/01/artificial-intelligence-limita- tions.

64
 Surveillance Technology Challenges Democratic Culture

45 Peter Engelke, “AI, Society, and Governance: An Introduction,” Atlantic Council, March 2020, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/

FINAL-AI-POLICY-PRIMER-0220.pdf.

46 Eleonore Pauwels, “The New Geopolitics of Converging Risks: The UN and Prevention in the Era of AI,” United Nations University, May 2, 2019, https://cpr.

unu.edu/the-new-geopolitics-of-converging-risks-the-un-and-prevention-in-the-eraof-ai.html.

47 Engelke, “AI.”

65

67

5

SOCIETAL VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN & 

NATIONAL INSECURITY: 

THE NEED FOR GENDERED SECURITY

James M. Minnich

Societal violence against women in peace and conflict is an assault upon 

humanity, communities, and countries as it causes national insecurity.1 In 

other words, a society’s peace, prosperity and stability are conditional to the 

treatment of its women, men, girls, and boys.2 The purpose of this chapter is twofold. First, it examines global manifestations of societal violence 

against women in peace and conflict through an analysis of violations of 

bodily integrity, inequalities in family law, and disparities in decision-making councils.3

 Second, it argues that security practitioners who are educated 

in gendered security can affirmatively counter the endangerment and exclusion of women in peace and conflict as identifiable in wellsprings of 

societal violence, which promotes domestic and transnational insecurities.

In a U.S. Defense Department-funded study, female empowerment 

and subordination were identified as determinants to national security 

that directly affects the security dimensions of political stability and governance, security and conflict, economic performance, health and wellbeing, demographic security, public education, environmental protection 

and social progress.4

Triple Wellsprings of Societal Violence

Building upon the works of political scientists Johan Galtung, Ted Gurr, 

Gregory Raymond, and Charles Tilly,5 American political scientist Mary 

Caprioli postulated that cultural and social norms of intolerance and inequality perpetuate violence to resolve conflict.6
Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific

Former United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan’s address to world leaders is quintessential in understanding the ramifications of gender inequalities 

in peace and conflict. Said he, “The world is starting to grasp that there is 

no policy for progress more effective than the empowerment of women and 

girls. And ... no policy is more important in preventing conflict, or in achieving 

reconciliation after a conflict has ended.”

Norwegian scholar Johan Galtung, a founder of the discipline of 

peace and conflict studies, postulated a trifurcated societal violence that is 

shaped by direct violence, structural violence, and cultural violence.7 Direct violence is incident oriented and actor (individual, group, state) perpetrated; structural violence is an institutionalized process of discrimination 

and exclusion; and cultural violence is an invariant that makes structural 

violence acceptable, or at least tolerated.8 In view of Galtung’s typology, 

societal violence against women could be defined as direct when a woman is 

assaulted, which manifests in violations of bodily integrity; structural when 

thousands of women are kept in dependency, which presents through 

inequalities in family law; and cultural when the subservience of women 

is perpetrated in religion, language, norms, and symbols, and persists in 

gender disparities such as decision-making councils.

Violations of Bodily Integrity

Direct violence against women is the nadir of unequal gender manifestations as it dehumanizes women, and tears at social unity.9

 The United Nations General Assembly defined violence against women as “violence that 

results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual or psychological harm or 

suffering to women,” and stipulated violence against women as a leading 

social mechanism by men to subordinate women.10 Bodily integrity is an 

inalienable right of self-autonomy over one’s own body.11

In Peace. Subordination of women is universal among all nation-states 

as all share ideologies and constructs of male dominance, and is globally manifested irrespective of social variances or forms of governance.12

Women suffering, although global in occurrence, is not universal in its 

uniformity.13

Papua New Guinea is an independent state in Oceania and ranks very 

high in women’s inequality. Women’s inequality, as measured by incidents 

of sexual and physical abuse, is estimated to have been inflicted on two68
Gendered Security

American anthropologist Peggy Reeves Sanday correlated male dominance 

with group insecurity and instability. American professor of gender and violence Gwen Hunnicutt ascribed male violence toward women as an outgrowth 

of patriarchal systems. The late American anthropologist and prolific writer 

Marvin Harris postulated that male dominance originated in warfare from a 

monopoly of weapons, but discounted genetics or convention as its source.

Rape as a tactic of war was perpetrated in the 8-year French Indochina War 

from 1946, India’s 1948 operation to subdue Hyderabad, the 3-year Korean 

War from 1950, America’s 10-year Vietnam War from 1964, and the Bangladesh Liberation War of 1971 that witnessed the rape of as many as 200,000 

Bengali women in just nine months of fighting.

thirds of all females in Papua New Guinea, which is higher than reported 

global averages of one in three women.14 In Papua New Guinea, 59% of 

surveyed men admitted to raping a sexual partner.15 In a United Nations 

Development Programme survey of 10,000 men in nine Indo-Pacific 

states, half who admitted perpetrating rape claimed to have first raped as 

a teenager, of whom upward of 97% claimed to have never been indicted 

for their crimes.16 Overwhelmingly, all nine surveyed sites identified sexual 

entitlement—the right of sex irrespective of consent—as the principal 

motivation for rape.17 This United Nations study concluded that violence 

against women is a manifestation of gender inequalities and subordination 

of women in domestic and public domains. Galtung would ascribe the 

abuse of one woman as direct violence, and the abuse of two-thirds of all 

females in a society as both structural and cultural violence.18

In Conflict. For centuries, rape as a form of violence against women 

was generally accepted by many as the cost of war, and largely overlooked 

as a crime against humanity.19 Neither the Nuremberg trials of 1945-46 

nor the Tokyo trials of 1946-48 convicted a single person solely on the 

charge of sexual violence against women, despite well over one million 

women raped during World War II.20

With past as prologue, the international community remained silent 

as mass incidents of rape persisted in military conflicts over the 50 years 

following World War II. As the Soviet Union collapsed in December 1991, 

former Yugoslavia reft in a series of ethnic wars and insurgencies that witnessed Europe’s most brutal conflict since 1945. In April 1992, the Bosnian War erupted in a torrent of ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity, which promulgated the systematic rape and sexual enslavement of 

69
Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific

as many as 50,000 women and girls before the war’s end 44-months later.21

As the Bosnian War raged in Europe, the Hutu government in Rwanda led 

a 100-day genocidal war against its Tutsi population, which included the 

deliberate rape of some one half million women and girls.22

To prosecute war crimes from these two horrific wars, the United 

Nations established the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 

Yugoslavia (ICTY) in May 1993,23 and the International Criminal Tribunal 

for Rwanda (ICTR) in November 1994.24 The charter for both these judicial bodies included the charge of rape as a crime against humanity, the 

first time in history the international community classified rape as a crime 

of war.25 Classifying rape as a crime against humanity was the first step. 

Convicting war criminals of rape would prove to be the court’s true test.

Since its inception, ICTR has indicted 93 people for genocide and 

other serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in 

Rwanda in 1994;26 of those, 17 were convicted for crimes against humanity for rape.27 In September 1998, Mr. Jean Paul Akayesu, former mayor of 

Taba, was the first person ever convicted internationally of crimes against 

humanity for rape.28 This conviction was anything but proforma, as Judge 

Navanethem Pillay, the only female judge on the ICTR bench, is reported 

to have refocused the line of questioning about evidence toward sexual 

violence, which eventually brought an amended indictment for charges of 

sexual violence by Akayesu.29 In a statement after the verdict, Judge Pillay 

offered these remarks: “From time immemorial, rape has been regarded as 

spoils of war. Now it will be considered a war crime. We want to send out 

a strong message that rape is no longer a trophy of war.”30

Twenty-nine months following the ICTR conviction of Akayesu in 

Rwanda, ICTY issued its first convictions for crimes against humanity for 

rape. In the verdict read by Presiding Judge Florence Mumba, she stated 

that Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovac, Zoran Vukovic, as well as other 

Bosnian Serb troops in Foca, used rape as “an instrument of terror,”31

during the Bosnian War. In the prosecution of war crimes in Rwanda 

and Bosnia, ICTR and ICTY collectively convicted nearly 70 perpetrators 

of crimes against humanity for rape.32 While these are landmark convictions, given the systematic approach to rape brutally some one-half million women on two continents, the conviction of a mere 70 people rings 

hollow.

Spurred by the horrors of the Bosnian War, the United Nations General Assembly promulgated Resolution 48/104 in December 1993, which 

70
Gendered Security

called upon states to condemn, prevent, and punish violence against women. American lawyer Tamara Tompkins postulated that rape is fixed in the 

male domination of women, and is manifested in aggression, discrimination, inequality, and misogyny.33 American feminist author Susan Brownmiller suggested that rape is a male method of social control through “a 

conscious process of intimidation by which all men keep all women in a state 

of fear” [emphasis in original].34 The nature of warfare in the 21st century 

has shifted from nationalist to ethnoreligious, with its deeply conservative and reactionary treatment of women and their rights.35 Consequently, 

widespread disregard for bodily integrity in today’s conflicts has subjected 

millions of women and girls to horrible direct, structural, and cultural violence.36 While violations of bodily integrity scream injustice and demand 

accountability, inequalities in family law silently sow seeds of societal violence against women.

Inequalities in Family Law

Family or matrimonial law is based on customs and codified by statutes 

to govern family relationships, rights, duties, and finances. Customary and 

statutory laws are often underpinned by social and religious practices.37

American professors Valerie M. Hudson, Donna Lee Bowen, and Perpetua Lynn Nielsen ascribed statutory or customary family laws that preference male over female as the source of structural violence against women, 

which in conflict tends toward its meanest manifestations.38

In Peace. Family, societies’ primordial unit, has universally advantaged 

men over women and boys over girls.39 Despite worldwide promulgation 

of women’s suffrage, anachronistic family law across the globe continue to 

bias women and preference males.40 Whereas social inequalities manifest 

worldwide, they are glaringly obvious in family laws. Family law addresses 

issues of marriage, divorce, custody, and inheritance, but reflects societal 

devaluation of women by its inequalities. Gender inequalities are self-evidenced when males are held superior to females; girls are married younger 

than boys; polygyny is embraced; marital rape is non-criminalized; female 

infanticide is accepted; men divorce more easily than women; and men are 

advantaged over women in rights of property and inheritance.41

Male dominance is a condition where men retain most of the power 

and influence; or more precisely, a structural and ideological system of 

male domination and female subordination.42 Hoy suggested three defining characteristics of male dominance: authoritarian aggression by men 

71
Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific

American anthropologist Peggy Sanday suggested that there are two social 

orders: diarchy and patriarchy (male dominance). Her adaption of the term 

diarchy, as defined by American anthropologist Janet Hoskins, described a 

male-female political system of shared authorities that fluctuates in control, 

and is formalized by principles of interdependence and mutuality. Of these 

two social orders, male dominance prevails globally, which is viewed by many 

to be deleterious to state security, stability, and prosperity.

against women, authoritarian submission of women to men, and a hierarchical social structure where men overwhelmingly control political power.43

Male dominance and patriarchy are synonymous terms. Macro-patriarchy 

occurs in governments, bureaucracies, markets, academia, and religion; 

and micro-patriarchy occurs in families, relations, social interactions, and 

organizations. Sanday asserted that male dominance is either authentic or 

imposed, but either way, it is evidenced by a litany of social ills.44 An enumeration of such ills includes the valuation of fear, conflict, and warfare; 

the preference for sons over daughters; the pervasiveness of domestic 

violence; the diminution of women in public life; the bias toward gender 

segregation; the perpetuation of creation myths that impute women as a 

source of evil; the acceptance of polygyny; and the convention of brideprice or dowry that consigns women as chattel and economic liabilities.

Caprioli affirmed that states enlarge their probability of internal 

conflict through such practices of gender inequality, which she assessed 

through an analysis of reproductive health, empowerment, and labor 

force.45 The United Nations Development Programme defined and measured the societal impact of each of these three indicators.46 Reproductive 

health can be quantified using the rates of maternal death and adolescent 

pregnancy, which at high rates manifests societies’ devaluation of women. 

When broadly considered, reproductive health is more precisely viewed 

as a distillation of inequalities that transcends rates of maternal death and 

adolescent pregnancy to affect opportunities for education, employment, 

and decision-making authority.47 Empowerment can be measured using 

the percentage of women in parliament, with a recognition that political 

access enables decision-making over life.48 A labor force analysis measures 

gender diversity in labor markets, and denotes gender inequalities, discrimination, and structural violence.49 Compelling empirics indicate that 38.3% 

of all nations embrace structural violence-based family laws that tend between high and very high in women’s inequality, which strongly correlates 

with states that are less peaceful and more fragile.50

72
Gendered Security

American anthropologists William Divale and Marvin Harris correlated occurrences of war and male supremacy; American anthropologist Keith Otterbein 

drew relationships between incidence of war and societal norms of patrilocality, patrilineality, and polygyny; American anthropologists Peggy Sanday 

strongly associated frequency of war with a society’s incidence of female rape; 

and American political scientist Marc Ross identified prevalence of war with 

exclusion of women from public leadership.

In Conflict. Linkages between sexism (male-dominant societies) and 

militarism are well-researched.51 In a demographic analysis of 112 societies, Divale and Harris considered tribal warfare as the chief cause of 

institutional and ideological supremacy of males.52 Male supremacy or 

dominance is inherent to gender-based divisions of labor; is manifest in 

gender-based asymmetry of political, economic, military, police, and religious institutions; and is ascribed to the sexual dimorphism that engenders 

males with greater stature, weight, and hormones that are useful in dominance that propagates structural violence.53

While violations of bodily integrity scream injustice and demand accountability, and inequalities in family law silently sow seeds of societal 

violence against women, it is disparities in decision-making councils that 

perpetuate disdain for women while meting cultural violence against one 

half of the global population.

Disparities in Decision-making Councils 

Decision-making is the power to influence private and public life.54 Patriarchy, however, proscribes women from ascending to decision-making 

councils, particularly councils with mandates extending beyond issues that 

affect women and children. O’Neil and Domingo suggested that institutions (norms and rules), structures (social, economic, and political endowments), and capabilities (education, class, and profession) are chief 

determinants in women’s ascent to political power.55 Discriminatory sociocultural institutions and structures, however, delimit women’s opportunities to develop requisite capabilities that improve access to professional organizations, labor markets, and decision-making councils.56 Consequently, 

it is hoary gender roles in peace and conflict that perpetuate bad policies 

of cultural and structural violence, which persistently broadens the gender 

gap.57

73
Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific

In Peace. The United Nations leads international advancement of 

women’s rights through reform advocacy of gender discriminatory practices, policies, and structures. In 1979, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women as an international bill of rights for women, which 

is legally binding in 189 states that ratified it (UN, 1979). The Convention 

specifically prohibits gender-based discrimination in all fields to include 

political, economic, social, cultural, and civil; and calls upon the ratifying 

states to take all measures, including legislation, for the advancement of 

women on a “basis of equality with men” (Article 1). Women’s rights of 

marriage and family life are codified in Article 16 of the Convention; and 

if signatory states would adhere to the injunctions, family law discriminations would end. Absent an enforcement mechanism, however, the 1979 

Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 

Women remains more aspirational than foundational.

Gender inclusion, a half-step toward gender equality, is an affirmative approach to include female presence and perspectives in this maledominated sphere.58 Gender inclusion is not tokenism, but a deliberate 

international policy approach to achieve universal gender equality in political, economic, and societal spheres by adopting policies and programs 

that further equality and arrest inequality.59 The United Nations General 

Assembly termed gender inclusion as gender mainstreaming, which it formally adopted as a policy approach at the Fourth World Conference on 

Women in 1995.60

As the twenty-first century dawned, the international community 

proffered hope for greater gender inclusivity in peace and conflict, with 

the promulgation of United Nations Security Council resolution (UNSCR) 1325 on Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) in 2000; a landmark global 

resolution that affirmed women’s essential participatory and decisionmaking roles in conflict prevention and resolution, and the importance of 

women’s equal involvement in the advancement and preservation of peace 

and security. Since implementation of resolution 1325, only nine IndoPacific countries have promulgated WPS National Action Plans (NAP). 

These nine countries with a WPS NAP represent less than 11% of the 

84 UN member states with an enacted WPS NAP, or 4% of the 193 total 

UN member states who as signatories are legally bound to implement a 

WPS NAP.61 Equally illustrative of state inaction in advancing real reform 

for women in peace and conflict, is the reality that only 17 UN member 

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states with a WPS NAP have allocated a budget to implement their legal 

obligations under UNSC resolution 1325 on WPS.62

In 2010, the United Nations General Assembly established UN 

Women, the UN Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of 

Women, to advance needs of women.63 However, as advocate and bellwether for gender mainstreaming, the United Nations stands in stark contrast to the ideal with only 8% of its senior staff appointments being filled 

by women.64 This degree of gender disparity is equally manifest at lower 

operational levels where women account for fewer than 4% of military 

and 10% of police deployed on 36 UN peace operations.65 American political scientist Helene Silverberg cautioned against an “add women and 

stir” approach to gender mainstreaming, observing that this practice tends 

toward polarization not amalgamation, and wrongly ascribes gender issues as being germane only when women are included in decision-making 

councils.66 

An aversion to gender integration in decision-making councils is evidenced when measured globally by the low percentage of women who 

have attained seats in national parliaments. In July 2018, only 24.2% of 

national parliamentarians were women, which increased from 17.9% in 

July 2009 and from 11.7% in July 1999.67 Obstructed pathways to attain 

national power for women perpetuates patriarchy and is emblematic of 

cultural violence through gender exclusion.68 Gender exclusion is a promulgation of the offensive maxim that women should be seen and not 

heard.69 This hoary adage was a national refrain carried in the press when 

Jeannette Pickering Rankin (1880-1973) was elected a U.S. congresswoman in 1916.70 Despite more than 100 years having transpired since Rankin 

became the first woman to hold U.S. federal office, the press continues a 

hostile policy toward women seeking public office,71 as it trivializes them 

as being more decorative than substantive.72 For women who persevere a 

biased press to become elected, many must then endure overt sexism that 

emanates from within parliament.73

In Conflict. Practices of discrimination, patriarchal structures, and exclusion perpetuates women as superfluous as it delimits them from being 

agents of a better peace and security.74 Women are societies’ most vulnerable group in peace and conflict, making them susceptible to violence, displacement, and exclusion.75 Despite international opprobrium for gender 

inequality and violence, recent publications76 and datasets77 elucidate that 

nation-states have taken little more than a façade of substantive actions 

to affirmatively advance gender mainstreaming, and end societal violence 

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Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific

against women with its deleterious effects on national and transnational 

security. 

Problems associated with underrepresentation of women in decisionmaking councils are manifested in violence against women in peace and 

conflict,78 and undervaluation of gender-perspectives in peace and peacebuilding.79 While formal or tacit agreements terminate war, successful war 

termination is measured by five or more years of conflict cessation permanency.80 American international relations scholar Michael Doyle and 

political scientist Nicholas Sambanis compiled a dataset of war terminations since 1944 to 1996 and noted that 65% of 124 civil wars relapsed 

into fighting within five years of war termination.81 Despite evidence that 

women’s participation in peace negotiations yields greater success in war 

termination, women continue to be excluded in large part from negotiating peace agreements.82 American researcher Laurel Stone studied 182 

peace agreements signed between 1989 and 2011 and determined that 

peace processes, which included women as witnesses, signatories, mediators, or negotiators demonstrated a 20% increase in the probability of a 

peace agreement lasting at least two years, with 35% of those agreements 

lasting at least 15 years.83 Canadian professor Fen Osler Hampson identified the necessity of addressing women’s needs as one of seven essential 

factors in realizing a durable peace settlement,84 which underscores Stone’s 

findings that women peacemakers achieved a more durable peace as they 

routinely promoted peace settlement provisions that advanced women’s 

rights and equality.85

If gender mainstreaming in peace and conflict can be approached or 

achieved, it will require nation-states to denounce all violations of bodily 

integrity as direct violence against women; dismantle inequitable family 

laws that perpetuate structural violence against women; and transform 

gender culture, which trivializes women’s voices, weakens their presence in 

decision-making councils, and propagates cultural violence against women.86

Implementing Gendered Security to Improve National 

Security

Coalesced around the principles of protection, prevention, participation, 

relief and recovery, the UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace and Security 

(WPS) charged global leaders to protect women and their rights in peace, 

peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peacebuilding.87 The dissonance between 

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Gendered Security

government inaction and legal obligations toward implementing WPS 

suggests that states may not intuitively correlate societal violence against 

women with insecurity in peace and conflict.88

Two factors—traditional concepts of security and male-masculine 

dominance of security sectors—feature prominent in inert approaches 

toward this exigent problem of practice.89 The WPS mandate confronts 

the cultural model of the male-dominated security sector by directing all 

nations to address and resolve issues of women’s roles in peace and security. Security sectors, or the public, national, and collective safety and security institutions that provide for security, are soundly representative of the 

male domain and their interests, which well aligns to traditional security 

issues that scarcely consider vulnerable populations fundamentally or the 

women’s security issue expressly.90 Traditional security issues imply threats 

against a sovereign state’s citizenry, territory, polity, economy, and interests, 

and views the coherence of this juridical entity as the referent of security 

while often discounting individual welfare or gendered security.91 By shifting the security referent from the polity to the people, policymakers and 

practitioners alike can more distinctly discern security threats and aptly 

adopt policy priorities to sensibly focus security resources.92

The WPS mandate is the global framework that gives rise to a theory 

on gendered security. Gendered security is a methodology to strengthen solutions to state and human security issues through an approach that frames 

individuals as the security focus while accounting for gender-based needs 

and interests of women, men, girls, and boys in all security situations.93

Frames are mental models for making sense, and reframing is a technique 

for seeing issues anew, or from alternative perspectives.94 Applying a gendered security frame, or gendered security perspective to security issues of 

peace and conflict offers security practitioners a means to examine crises 

beyond a traditional security frame as they consider gender-nuanced collective interests. Adeptly selecting security frames comes from familiarity of various approaches and perspectives, and experience in application. 

Frames are akin to a manual transmission: the more experienced the user 

at shifting gears, the more effortless and smooth the ride. Like transmission gears, frames have unique functions and are applied based on needs.

Security practitioners can learn a gendered security frame and its application value in peace and conflict by considering gendered security principles of gendered security perspective, prevention, protection, and participation in the analysis and implementation of security missions. While 

77
Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific

gender analyses of operational environments may vary, an effective technique is to crosswalk the eight operational variables of political, military, 

economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and 

time (PMESII-PT) with the four gendered security principles of gendered 

security perspective, prevention, protection, and participation (Gendered 

Security Principles Four, or GSP4).95

To analyze the security environment through a gendered security perspective is fundamental to understanding security’s broader contexts, and its 

implications toward a gendered inclusive security that responds to the diverse security needs of all. Gendered security prevention is substantially more 

than the absence of conflict as it confronts cultural and structural catalysts 

that divide, devalue, demean, and degrade people across a gendered social 

hierarchy. Gendered security protection opposes a trifurcated societal violence 

of direct violence, structural violence, and cultural violence in times of 

peace and conflict as it protects access, engagement and participation in all 

aspects of society. Gendered security participation empowers the diverse and 

inclusive meaningful involvement of all genders in all areas, at all levels, 

and at all times.

Weakened approaches toward implementing gendered security include those that view women’s perspectives and participation as an additive to conventional security methods. Equally delimiting to the value of a 

gendered security approach is its detachment as a peripheral consideration 

or afterthought from security discussions, plans, and operations. This is 

evidenced as security practitioners outsource to their nominal members 

the gender analysis task for purposes of additively applying gender considerations to conventional security. A gendered security perspective is so 

much more than the practice of soliciting women’s views on security matters predicated on the prospect that men and women perceive differently. 

Such limited efforts are incredibly circumscribed and forfeit opportunity for a gendered security approach that considers the complex security 

needs of a community in an effort to create a better security for all.

The premise of gendered security is that implementation of its principles by security practitioners in peace, peacekeeping, peacemaking, and 

peacebuilding will advance the security, stability, and prosperity that improves the collective security of societies, nations, and regions. This is 

evidenced when security practitioners counter society’s power relations of 

gender to advance each genders engagement as equals in areas of influence, representation, and perspective in family, society, culture, religion, 

law, civic-life, decision-making, conflict resolution, resource distribution, 

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Gendered Security

Figure 5.1: PMESII-PT/GSP4 Gendered Security Analysis Tool (GSAT)

79
Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific

economics, livelihood, health, well-being, and more. Factors of equal engagement are the essence of the gendered security perspective principle. 

Each genders equal engagement is contingent on equal access to justice, 

education, employment, resources, institutions, and the power to influence private and public life; these too must be safeguarded by security 

practitioners in every domain. Factors of equal access are the essence of 

the gendered security prevention principle. Absent equal protection from 

direct, structural, and cultural violence and protection for equal access, engagement, and participation in all aspects of society and in the application 

of its laws, rules, and regulations, security does not exist. Factors of equal 

protection are the essence of the gendered security protection principle. 

Structural and cultural exclusion from equal participation in families, societies, cultures, and religions perpetuates structural and cultural violence 

upon society’s vulnerable genders as it proscribes meaningful participation 

in elections, governments, councils, and meetings, which denies power or 

capacity to change policies, practices, and institutions that advance a better 

security for all. Factors of equal participation are the essence of the gendered security participation principle.

A gender analysis tool is an analytical framework that aids thinking 

toward the identification of gender-based vulnerabilities, risks, and needs 

from impacts of peace, crisis, and conflict upon each gender. Figure 5.1 is 

the PMESII-PT/GSP4 Gendered Security Analysis Tool (GSAT), which 

defines 32 aspects of gendered security in an operational environment 

through a crosswalk of the operational variables and gendered security 

principles. The PMESII-PT/GSP4 GSAT (or GSAT) is both comprehensively descriptive and sectorally specific for use in gendered security 

analyses of operational environments that are either large-and-complex 

or small-and-simple. Viewed horizontally, the GSAT comprehensively describes the application of a single gendered security principle across all 

operational variables. Viewed vertically, the GSAT sectorally describes the 

application of all gendered security principles within a single operational 

variable of an operational environment. The GSAT holistically defines a 

standard of applied gendered security throughout a notional operational 

environment. Using the GSAT as an implemented standard for gendered 

security, analysts can benchmark to assess the gender-based vulnerabilities, 

risks, and needs of an assessed operational environment. 

Militaries use PMESII-PT operational variables to conduct analysis of 

operational environments. The PMESII-PT/GSP4 GSAT was developed 

to meet security practitioners’ pressing need to describe and analyze an 

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Gendered Security

operational environment through a gendered security lens or framework. 

The GSAT will be taught to security practitioners for their considered application. The author will also institute feedback and data collection mechanisms to better help security practitioners understand and implement 

gendered security principles. The Figure 5.1 PMESII-PT/GSP4 GSAT 

concisely defines the operational variables, gendered security principles, 

and 32 aspects of gendered security in an operational environment. 

Using the GSAT, consider the PMESII-PT/GSP4 factors to understand the gendered security aspects of an operational environment. For a 

gendered security perspective of political structures, consider each gender’s engagement as equals in influence, representation, and perspective in 

law, civic life, decision-making, conflict resolution, and resource distribution. For gendered security prevention by the military and police, consider 

each gender’s equal access to military and police institutions with established norms, rules, and jobs that uniformly engage people. For gendered 

security protection in economic areas, consider each gender’s equal protection as consumers and merchants in bazaars, markets, and businesses. 

For gendered security in social participation, consider each gender’s equal 

participation in social organizations of families, communities, schools, 

and places of worship. For a gendered security perspective of infrastructure, consider each gender’s engagement as equals in areas of influence, 

representation, and perspective in infrastructures that provide for health, 

well-being, and care of common resources. For gendered security prevention in information, consider each gender’s equal access to literacy, information, knowledge, print media, TV, radio, Internet, telecommunication 

and gender sensitive information that includes early warning alerts. For 

gendered security protection in the physical environment, consider each 

gender’s equal protection in the use of ecosystems and equal protection 

from diseases, and climate impacts on health and well-being. For gendered 

security participation in time, consider each gender’s equal participation in 

paid productive time and unpaid reproductive time to maintain domestic 

life and to bear and rear children.

 Sixty years ago, French counterinsurgent theorist David Galula asserted that in conflict people are the prize, an axiom that military leaders 

have repeatedly ignored by acting as if people were either the problem 

or the playing field.96 This article proffers that gendered security esteems 

people as the priority and considers that security practitioners share duty 

and necessity to enlarge peace, prosperity, and stability by opposing so81
Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific

cietal violence against women in peace and conflict. Obliged to uphold 

UNSCR 1325 on WPS, countries should seek to enlarge their national 

peace, prosperity, and stability by adopting a gendered security approach 

and implementing their own WPS national action plan.

Notes

1 Mary Caprioli, “Primed for Violence: The Role of Gender Inequality in Predict- ing Internal Conflict,” International Studies Quarterly 49, no. 2 (June 2005): 161-178. Heidi Hudson, “Peace Building Through a Gender Lens and the Challenges of 

Implementation in Rwanda and Côte d’Ivoire,” in Gender and International Security: Feminist Perspectives, ed. Laura Sjoberg (New York: Routledge, 2010), 256-279. Valerie M. Hudson, Bonnie Ballif-Spanvill, Mary Caprioli, and Chad F. Emmett, Sex and 

World Peace (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012).

2 Valerie M. Hudson, “What You Do to Your Women, You Do to Your Nation,” 

New York Times, March 6, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/06/opinion/ global-womens-rights.html. UN Women, “The United Nations Fourth World 

Conference on Women,” September 1995, https://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/

beijing/platform/plat1.htm.

3 Hudson et al., Sex and World Peace, 19.

4 Valerie M. Hudson, Donna Lee Bowen, and Perpetua Lynne Nielsen, The First 

Political Order: How Sex Shapes Governance and National Security Worldwide (New York: Columbia University Press, 2020), 7.

5 Johan Galtung, “Violence, Peace, and Peace Research,” Journal of Peace Research 6, 

no. 3 (1969), 167-191. Johan Galtung, “Cultural Violence,” Journal of Peace Research 27, 

no. 3 (1990): 291-305. Ted R. Gurr, “Peoples against States: Ethnopolitical Conflict 

and the Changing World System: 1994 Presidential Address,” International Studies 

Quarterly 38, no. 3 (1994), 347–377. Gregory A. Raymond, “International Norms: Normative Orders and Peace,” in What Do We Know about War? ed. John A. Vasquez (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000), 281-297.

6 Caprioli, “Primed for Violence,” 161.

7 Johan Galtung and Dietrich Fischer, “Violence: Direct, Structural and Cultural,” Johan Galtung Springer Briefs on Pioneers in Science and Practice 5 (2013), 35-40, https://doi. org/10.1007/978-3-642-32481-9_3.

8 Galtung, “Cultural Violence,” 294.

9 Hudson et al., The First Political Order, 108. Susan Hawthorne, “Radical Femi- nism,” in Gender Inequality: Feminist Theories and Politics, ed. Judith Lorber (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 127-150.

10 United Nations General Assembly, “Resolution 48/104: Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women,” article 1, December 20, 1993, https://un- docs.org/A/RES/48/104.

11 Pratt v. Davis, 118 Ill. App. 161, 166 (1905), affirmed 224 Ill. 30, 79 (1906).

12 Simone de Beauvoir, Constance Borde, and Sheila Malovany-Chevallier, The Sec- ond Sex, (New York: Vintage, 2011), 152. Hudson et al., The First Political Order, 21-22, 

38. Laura Nader, “The Subordination of Women in Comparative Perspective,” Urban 

Anthropology and Studies of Cultural Systems and World Economic Development 15, no. 3/4 

(1986): 382.

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13 “Toward Gender Equality in East Asia and the Pacific: A Companion to the World Development Report,” World Bank (2012), 3, https://openknowledge.world- bank.org/handle/10986/12598. 

14 Charlotte Alfred, “The Shocking Reality of the Sexual Violence Epidemic in Papua New Guinea,” The WorldPost, March 5, 2016, https://www.huffingtonpost. com/entry/papua-new-guinea-sexual-violence_us_56d9fca1e4b0ffe6f8e974f2. 

World Health Organization, “Violence against Women: Intimate Partner and Sexual 

Violence against Women,” November 2016, http://www.who.int/mediacentre/fact- sheets/fs239/en/.

15 Katelyn Fossett, “How Does a Country Develop a 60 Percent Rape Rate?” Foreign Policy, September 11, 2013, http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/09/11/how-does-a- country-develop-a-60-percent-rape-rate/#. Rachel Jewkes, Emma Fulu, Tim Roselli, 

and Claudia Garcia-Moreno, “Prevalence of and Factors Associated with Nonpartner Rape Perpetration: Findings from the UN Multi-country Cross-sectional 

Study on Men and Violence in Asia and the Pacific,” The Lancet Global Health 1, no. 4 

(2013): 208-218.

16 United Nations Development Programme, “UN Survey of 10,000 Men in Asia and the Pacific Reveals Why Some Men Use Violence against Women and Girls,” 

September 10, 2013, http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/presscenter/

pressreleases/2013/09/10/un-survey-of-10-000-men-in-asia-and-the-pacific-revealswhy-some-men-use-violence-against-women-and-girls-.html.

17 Jewkes et al., “Rape Perpetration,” 208. UNDP, “UN Survey of 10,000 Men.”

18 Galtung, “Violence, Peace,” 171.

19 Kate Nahapetian, “Selective Justice: Prosecuting Rape in the International Crimi- nal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda,” Berkeley Women’s Law Journal 14, no. 1 (2013): 128.

20 Cassidy L. Chiasson, “Silenced Voices: Sexual Violence during and after World War II” (Honor Theses Paper 340, University of Southern Mississippi, 2015), 

https://aquila.usm.edu/honors_theses/340/. Nahapetian, “Selective Justice,” 127.

21 Wendy S. Hesford, “Documenting Violations: Rhetorical Witnessing and the Spectacle of Distant Suffering,” Biography 27, no. 1 (2004): 137. 

22 Binaifer Nowrojee and Human Rights Watch/Africa, Shattered Lives: Sexual Vio- lence during the Rwandan Genocide and Its Aftermath (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1996), 16, https://www.hrw.org/reports/1996/Rwanda.htm.

23 United Nations Security Council, “Resolution 827 (1993) [establishing Interna- tional Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia] (S/RES/827),” May 25, 1993, 

https://undocs.org/S/RES/827(1993). 

24 United Nations Security Council, “Resolution 955 (1994) [establishing Interna- tional Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda] (S/RES/955),” November 8, 1994, https://

undocs.org/S/RES/955(1994).

25 United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Division for the Advancement of Women, “Women2000: Sexual Violence and Armed Conflict: 

United Nations Response,” April 1998, https://www.unwomen.org/en/digital-li- brary/publications/1998/4/women2000-sexual-violence-and-armed-conflict-unitednations-response.

26 James Karuhanga, “UN Urges World to Arrest ICTR-indicted Genocide Fugitives,” New Times, January 2, 2016, http://www.newtimes.co.rw/section/ read/195778/.

27 Lauren Wolfe, “The Index: Justice for Rape in War,” Women’s Media Center, May 2, 2014, http://www.womensmediacenter.com/women-under-siege/the-indexjustice-for-crimes-of-rape-in-war.

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28 UN DESA, “Women2000.”

29 Nienke Grossman, “Sex on the Bench: Do Women Judges Matter to the Legiti- macy of International Courts?” Chicago Journal of International Law 12, no. 2 (2012): 656.

30 G.S. Venumadhava, “Violent Crimes against Women,” Reviews of Progress 1, no. 6 

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31 “Historic War Crime Verdict Vindicates Women,” CNNfyi.com, February 23, 2001, http://www.cnn.com/2001/fyi/news/02/23/war.crime.verdict/.

32 Wolfe, “The Index.”

33 Tamara L. Tompkins, “Prosecuting Rape as a War Crime: Speaking the Unspeak- able,” Notre Dame Law Review 70, no. 4 (1999): 850-851.

34 Susan Brownmiller, Against Our Will: Men, Women, and Rape (New York: Random House, 1975), 15.

35 United Nations Women, “Preventing Conflict, Transforming Justice, Securing the Peace: A Global Study on the Implementation of the United Nations Security 

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36 Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, “International Peacebuilding: A Theo- retical and Quantitative Analysis,” American Political Science Review 94, no. 4 (December 2000): 779-801. Galtung and Fischer, “Violence: Direct,” 35-40.

37 Rosa Kim, “The Legacy of Institutionalized Gender Inequality in South Korea: The Family Law,” Boston College Third World Law Journal 14, no. 1 (1994), 146. Abdul- wahed Zia Moballegh, “Family Law in Afghanistan: Past Experiences and Future 

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38 Valerie M. Hudson, Donna Lee Bowen and Perpetua Lynne Nielsen, “We Are Not Helpless: Addressing Structural Gender Inequality in Post-conflict Societies,” 

PRISM: A Journal of the Center for Complex Operations 6, no. 1 (2016): 127.

39 Laura A. McCloskey and Riane Eisler, “Family Structure and Family Violence and Nonviolence,” in Encyclopedia of Violence, Peace, and Conflict, vol. 2, eds. Lester Kurtz 

and Jennifer Turpin (San Francisco, CA: Academic Press, 1999), 1-11.

40 Hudson, Bowen and Nielsen, “We Are Not Helpless,” 127.

41 Hudson, Bowen and Nielsen, “We Are Not Helpless,” 123-137. McCloskey and Eisler, “Family Structure,” 1-11.

42 Gwen Hunnicutt, “Varieties of Patriarchy and Violence against Women: Resur- recting ‘Patriarchy’ as a Theoretical Tool,” Violence against Women 15, no. 5 (May 2009): 553-573.

43 Andrew R. Hoy, “The Relationship between Male Dominance and Militarism: Quantitative Tests of Several Theories,” World Cultures 8, no. 2 (1994): 40-57.

44 Peggy Reeves Sanday, “Socio-cultural Context of Rape: A Cross-cultural Study,” Journal of Social Issues 37, no. 4 (1981): 5-27.

45 Caprioli, “Primed for Violence,”171.

46 United Nations Development Programme, “Human Development Report 2016: Human Development for Everyone,” 2016, http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/

human-development-report-2016-human-development-everyone.

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47 “Toward Gender Equality,” World Bank, 1.

48 Tam O’Neil and Pilar Domingo, The Power to Decide: Women, Decision-making and Gender Equality (London: Overseas Development Institute, April 2015), 4, https:// www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/9848.pdf.

49 Caprioli, “Primed for Violence,” 161. Galtung and Fischer, “Violence: Direct,” 35-40.

50 Hudson, Bowen and Nielsen, “We Are Not Helpless,” 127. WomanStats, “Wom- anStats Database Codebook,” 2014, http://www.womanstats.org/CodebookCurrent. htm. World Bank, “Proportion of Seats Held by Women in National Parliaments (%),” 2016, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SG.GEN.PARL.ZS.

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52 Divale and Harris, “Population, Warfare,” 524.

53 Divale and Harris, “Population, Warfare,” 526.

54 O’Neil and Domingo, The Power to Decide, 1.

55 O’Neil and Domingo, The Power to Decide, 2-3.

56 Pilar Domingo et al. Women’s Voice and Leadership in Decision-Making: Assessing the Evidence. (London: Overseas Department Institute, April 2015), 4, https://www.odi. org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/9627.pdf.

57 Galtung and Fischer, “Violence: Direct,” 35-40.

58 United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Office of the Spe- cial Adviser on Gender Issues and Advancement of Women, Gender Mainstreaming: An Overview (New York: United Nations, 2002), 1.

59 United Nations General Assembly, “Report of the Economic and Social Council for 1997 (A/52/3),” September 18, 1997, 27-35, https://undocs.org/A/52/3.

60 UNGA, “Economic and Social Council,” 28.

61 Peacewomen, “National Actions Plans for the Implementation of UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace, and Security,” 2019, http://www.peacewomen.org/memberstates.

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64 Melissa Labonte and Gaynel Curry, “Women, Peace, and Security: Are We There Yet?” Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations 22, no. 

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66 Helene Silverberg, “Organizing a Course that Is Attentive to Issues of Racial and Sexual Difference,” PS: Political Science & Politics 27, no. 4 (December 1994): 718-719.

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68 Galtung and Fischer, “Violence: Direct, Structural and Cultural,” 35-40.

69 Martha J. Cutter, Unruly Tongue: Identity and Voice in American Women’s Writing, 1850-

1930 (Jackson, MS: University Press of Mississippi, 1999).

70 Teri Finneman, Press Portrayals of Women Politicians, 1870s-2000s: From “Lunatic” Woodhull to “Polarizing” Palin (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2015), 43-78.

71 Elizabeth Rigby, “Hostile Press Blamed for Lack of Women MPs,” Financial 

Times, April 25, 2014, https://www.ft.com/content/bfd14ab2-cc51-11e3-9b5f- 00144feabdc0.

72 Julia Baird, “Palin and Being ‘Palinized,’” Newsweek, November 20, 2009, http:// www.newsweek.com/palin-and-being-palinized-76663.

73 Barbara Castle, “Analysis of the Political, Social and Economic Progress of Women,” in Women of the Revolution: Forty Years of Feminism, ed. Kira Cochrane (Lon- don: Guardian Books, 2010), 105-108. Deirdre O’Neill, Heather Savigny, and Victo- ria Cann, “Women Politicians in the UK Press: Not Seen and Not Heard?” Feminist 

Media Studies 16, no. 2 (2015): 293-307. Nicholas Watt, “Westminster for Women: Neanderthal Leering and Unwanted Advances,” The Guardian, February 25, 2013, https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2013/feb/25/westminster-politics-sexismwomen-work. 

74 Robert Egnell, “Gender Perspectives and Military Effectiveness: Implement- ing UNSCR 1325 and the National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security,” 

PRISM: A Journal of the Center for Complex Operations 6, no. 1 (2016): 72-89.

75 United States Agency for International Development, “Women and Conflict: An Introductory Guide for Programming” (2007), 7, http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/

Pnadj133.pdf.

76 Mary Caprioli, “Gender Equality and Civil Wars. Social Development Pa- pers. Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Series (CPR Working Paper No. 8). 

(Washington, DC: World Bank, 2013, September), http://documents.worldbank.

org/curated/en/989601468762305507/pdf/270910Gender0e1PR0Wp0no10801p

ublic1.pdf. Hudson et al., Sex and World Peace. Jewkes et al., “Rape Perpetration,” 

208-218. Labonte and Curry, “Are We There Yet?” 311-320. O’Neil and Domingo, 

The Power to Decide. Laurel Stone, “Annex II: Quantitative Analysis of Women’s Par- ticipation in Peace Processes” in Reimaging Peacemaking: Women’s Role in Peace Processes, eds. Marie O’Reilly, Andrea Ó. Súilleabháin, and Thania Paffenholz (New York: 

International Peace Institute, 2015), 34-35, https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/up- loads/2015/06/IPI-E-pub-Reimagining-Peacemaking.pdf. Wolfe, “The Index.”

77 Roberts, “UN Peacekeeping.” World Bank, “Proportion of Seats.” “Women in National Parliaments,” Inter-Parliamentary Union. “Women, Peace, and Security 

Index,” GIWPS.

78 Hudson, Bowen and Nielsen, “We Are Not Helpless,” 129.

79 Sarah Taylor, “A Better Peace? Including Women in Conflict Negotiations” (PhD diss., The New School, 2015).

80 J. Joseph Hewitt, Jonathan Wilkenfeld, and Ted R. Gurr, Peace and Conflict 2010 (New York: Paradigm, 2010).

81 Doyle and Sambanis, “International Peacebuilding,” 779-801.

86
Gendered Security

82 United Nations Women, “UN Creates New Structure.” United Nations, Depart- ment of Political Affairs, “DPA Gender Factsheet,” April 2016, https://peacemaker.

un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/GenderFactsheet-US-Format_April%202016.

pdf.

83 Stone, “Annex II,” 34-35.

84 Fen O. Hampson, “Peace Agreements,” in Encyclopedia of Violence, Peace, and Con- flict, vol. 2, eds. Lester Kurtz and Jennifer Turpin (San Francisco, CA: Academic Press 1999), 618-619.

85 Stone, “Annex II,” 34-35.

86 Hudson, Bowen, and Nielsen, “We Are Not Helpless,” 123-137. Kim, “The Legacy,” 145-162. Moballegh, “Family Law in Afghanistan,” 1-7.

87 UN DPA, “DPA Gender Factsheet.”

88 United Nations Women, “UN Creates New Structure.” 

89 Jennifer K. Lobasz, “Beyond Border Security: Feminist Approaches to Human Trafficking,” in Gender and International Security: Feminist Perspectives, ed. Laura Sjoberg (New York: Routledge, 2010), 214-234. J. Ann Tickner, “Feminist Security Studies: 

Celebrating an Emerging Field,” Politics & Gender 7, no. 4 (December 2011): 576-581.

90 Eric M. Blanchard, “Gender, International Relations, and the Development of Feminist Security Theory,” Signs 28, no. 4 (Summer 2003): 1289-1312, https://doi. org/10.1086/368328. United Nations Security Council, “Resolution 1325 (2000) 

[on Women, Peace, and Security] (S/RES1325),” October 31, 2000, https://undocs.

org/S/RES/1325(2000).

91 Clara Eroukhmanoff, “Securitisation Theory,” in International Relations Theory, eds. 

Stephen McGlinchey, Rosie Walters, and Christian Sheinpflug, (E-International Rela- tions Publishing, 2017), 109, http://eprints.uwe.ac.uk/34087.

92 Lobasz, “Beyond Border Security,” 215.

93 Jill Steans, Gender and International Relations: An Introduction (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1998), 5. Laura Sjoberg, “Introduction,” in Gender and Inter- national Security: Feminist Perspectives, ed. Laura Sjoberg (New York: Routledge, 2010), 1-14.

94 Lee G. Bolman and Terrence E. Deal, Reframing Organizations: Artistry, Choice, and Leadership, 4th ed. (San Francisco: John Wiley & Son, 2008), 11.

95 Army Doctrine Publication 3-0: Operations (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Depart- ment of the Army, July 31, 2019), 1-3.

96 Thomas E. Ricks, “In Iraq, Military Forgot Lessons of Vietnam Early Missteps by U.S. Left Troops Unprepared for Guerrilla Warfare,” Washington Post, July 23, 2006, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2006/07/23/in-iraq-militaryforgot-lessons-of-vietnam-span-classbankheadearly-missteps-by-us-left-troopsunprepared-for-guerrilla-warfare-span/df5a64ff-be7e-4b93-acd0-63ff75f6da32/.

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88
Part II: The Changing Faces of Regional Security

91

 6

POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN SOUTH ASIA, 

1995-2020 

Shyam Tekwani

Years before Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda became household names, 

South Asia had been in the grip of diverse forms of terrorism prevalent 

since the 1940s. With the assassinations of the former Prime Minister of 

India1 and the President of Sri Lanka2 in the first half of the 1990s, Sri 

Lanka’s Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE),3 a group that represented 

the deprived Tamil minority, burst into the international limelight with their 

pioneering methods of suicide bombings, captivating a global audience.

Three terrorist events in 1995, one with far-reaching consequences in 

the subregion, presaged the future of terrorism that continues to preoccupy 

counterterrorism practitioners across the globe today. The first was the Tokyo subway sarin attack4

 by the religious cult Aum Shinrikyo in March 1995, 

which killed 12 and injured thousands, flagging the threat of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) attacks. A month later, in the United States, a U.S. Army veteran parked a rental truck packed full of explosives 

outside a federal office building in Oklahoma City, detonating his bomb just 

as the workday was starting.5 The attack, carried out by a homegrown terrorist motivated by extremist ideologies, killed 168 people and left hundreds 

more injured.6 Among the first messages of condolence after the bombing 

was one from the Tamil Tigers, offering “the American Government and 

the American people their sympathy and sense of distress over the senseless 

bombing incident of April 19 at Oklahoma City.”7 In a parallel development, 

it was in this decade that far-right Hindu groups in India surged into national 

view with the destruction of a 16th-century mosque and prompted the first 

of a series of terror attacks in Mumbai.8
Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific

However, it was the third event, the 1995 arrest of Pakistan-born terrorist Ramzi Yousef in Islamabad after the botched Bojinka plot,9

 which 

foreshadowed the transnational nature of terrorism in the ensuing decades. 

Six years after Yousef’s arrest, al-Qaeda, an outlawed group holed up in Afghanistan, the most battle-scarred nation in South Asia, successfully plotted 

and executed the spectacular attacks of 9/11 to change the face of international terrorism forever. The impact of that attack spilled into the subregion 

and defined the shape of things to come. Among the many mass-casualty attacks the region has experienced since then have been horrific events such as 

the attacks on Mumbai in November 2008,10 Dhaka’s Holey Artisan Bakery 

in 201611 and Sri Lanka’s Bloody Easter in 2019.12 In each of these cases, prevailing sociopolitical conditions have enabled the growth of terrorist groups 

intent on wreaking destruction.

This chapter on significant trends in political violence in South Asia 

over the last quarter-century offers a broad overview of developments in the 

subregion. The following sections trace the evolution of trends and identifies several political and social issues, and emerging threats that could shape 

the face of terrorism in South Asia in the years ahead. The concluding part 

of the paper summarizes the earlier sections to highlight insights that may 

minimize future threats.

Review

After the departure of Britain as a colonial power in 1947 following the Second World War, simmering tensions between communities based on ethnicity, religion, and language that predated this departure erupted into various 

forms of violence across the subcontinent. The swift partition of the Indian 

subcontinent (the division of British India into the two separate states of India and Pakistan) based on these sociocultural divides laid the ground for future violence. Next door, the Afghan tribal revolts led the king to experiment 

with allowing greater political freedom but reversed the policy when it went 

further than expected. Religious and sectarian violence, tribal wars, separatist 

insurgencies, ethno-nationalist struggles and left-wing rebellions erupted almost immediately across the subcontinent. These continue to shape and enable current insurgent and terrorist movements. South Asia remains among 

the most violent regions in the world. From Mahatma Gandhi in 1948 to 

Benazir Bhutto in 2007, the list of high-profile political assassinations in 

the region is a testament to the violent expression that marks all political 

extremism in South Asia. A study documents that 76% of the assassinations 

in South Asia were executed since the mid-1980s, clearly a consequence of 

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Political Violence in South Asia

Assassinations in South Asia

Beginning with the assassination of Mahatma 

Gandhi in January 1948 by a member of the 

Hindu nationalist paramilitary organization, 

Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), each of 

the eight South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) countries has been 

witness to the assassination of about 60 public figures for religious, political, or military 

motives over the past seven decades. 

The methods of assassination have 

ranged from suicide bombings and knifings 

to gunshots with assassins representing all 

shades of violent extremism, religions, and 

vocations including bodyguards, active military personnel, and members of royalty.

the growing instability in the 

region.13

Armed hostilities between India and Pakistan14

over the disputed territory of 

Kashmir continue to be the 

fulcrum of terrorism across 

their borders.15 Following 

the Mumbai attacks of November 2008, Pakistan’s untiring quest for a “friendly” 

government in Kabul amid 

reports of Afghan Taliban 

safe havens on Pakistani soil 

(seen as crucial for the miliMumbai Attacks

The demolition of the 16th century mosque in Ayodhya on December 6, 1992, by 

rampaging Hindu mobs marked a turning point for terrorism in India. A series of 

attacks on Mumbai beginning with 12 coordinated attacks in March 1993 (killing 

317), reached its high point in November 2008, when 10 Pakistani men associated with the terror group Lashkar-e-Tayyiba stormed buildings in Mumbai, killing 

164 people. The lone surviving gunman, Mohammed Ajmal Kasab, was executed 

in November 2012. Another major attack in 2006, involved the use of serial pressure cooker bomb blasts on the city’s crowded local trains, killing 209 people.

tants’ ability to sustain their insurgency inside Afghanistan) is viewed with 

suspicion and alarm across the region.16 The 2019 Easter attacks in Sri Lanka, the 2016 Bakery attack in Bangladesh, and developments in Pakistan, Afghanistan, India, and the Maldives, demonstrate that threats from terrorism 

remain as alive as they did 25 years ago. And increasingly, as is to be expected, 

the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) is stepping forward to claim credit 

and exert its influence in the region.17

Most of the eight countries in South Asia continue to experience 

some form of terrorism or insurgency—separatist, jihadist, or leftwing as a response to a range of governance issues including marginalization, exclusion, and injustices. In some cases, the active involvement of external players (“cross-border terrorism”) defies resolution.

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Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific

Cross-Border Terrorism

Cross-border terrorism threatens Afghanistan, India, and Pakistan. Incriminating Pakistan for its lukewarm efforts to act decisively against all shades of terrorists within its borders—as well as the generally tense Afghan-Pakistan and 

India-Pakistan relationship—remain impediments in any effective cooperation 

that would be necessary to counter such cross-border terror attacks. Existing 

hostilities between Afghanistan and Pakistan sharpened in 1947, when Afghanistan became the only country to vote against the admission of Pakistan 

to the United Nations. Pakistan and India’s contests over the disputed territory 

of Kashmir continue unabated into the seventh decade with no resolution in 

sight.

Afghanistan

The increase in terrorist activity in Afghanistan resulted in a 631% spike in 

deaths in the decade since 2008. Largely because of this, South Asia remains 

the region most impacted by terrorism, with the Taliban replacing ISIS as 

the world’s deadliest terror group.27 The war rages even as the coronavirus 

known as COVID-19 spreads, as militants stormed a crowded Sikh temple 

and housing complex in Kabul on March 25, killing at least 25 people in a 

six-hour siege. The attackers, believed to be Islamic State extremists, struck 

on a day when nationwide cases of the virus nearly doubled from 24 hours.28

The release of 12,000 prisoners, in addition to 10,000 already in the process of being released by the Afghan government, as the pandemic spreads 

Kashmir and Cross-Border Terrorism

By the turn of the century, most of the armed groups that these conflicts had 

spawned were now using terror as part of their strategy to achieve their goals. 

The Taliban’s conquest of Afghanistan in 1996 following the humiliating 

withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan in 1989 led to the creation of 

several different militant groups that took root in Pakistan-controlled Kashmir. The most noticeable of these groups are Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT) and 

Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM),18 populated with many former mujahedeen from the 

Afghan war aiming to wrest all of Kashmir.19 India’s recent actions in Kashmir20 stripping the state of autonomy after seven decades and the persistent 

heavy-handed approach against its citizens21 is set to prolong this decade’s 

long conflict even more.22 This has already triggered a series of attacks,23 revitalized jihadi groups like the Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT) 24, Jaish-e-Mohammad 

(JeM) and Hizbul Mujahideen (HuM),25 and, more ominously, the formation 

of a new grouping, The Resistance Front (TRF).26

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Political Violence in South Asia

Afghanistan: Fighting on several fronts

The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan’s (UNAMA) latest report 

indicates a trend of escalating civilian casualties since the signing of a peace deal 

between the United States and the Taliban. Adding to the chaos is a disputed 

presidential election. With the outbreak of the coronavirus in Iran, thousands 

of Afghans crossed the border into Afghanistan, a country they once fled and 

a country made vulnerable by conditions that preceded the pandemic. Most 

of the men were in their 20s. Misinformation has added another layer of complexity to the embattled country’s coronavirus response. Emboldened by the 

impending departure of the remaining American troops, the Taliban continues 

increasing its attacks across nine provinces, also among the worst hit by the infection. Seizing the opportunity in the deadly mix of war and coronavirus offered 

by official failures, the Taliban has stepped in to play the role of an aid agency.

across the country and prisons remain overcrowded, would set free more 

than 60% of the country’s 36,000 inmates.29 What the repercussions of this 

move would mean remain unclear amidst the war of words between the 

Taliban and the United States following the peace deal,30 and the sustained 

attacks on al-Qaeda by ISIS.31 Meanwhile, even while eulogizing Mullah Mohammed Omar, the founder of the Taliban, on his seventh death anniversary for defending Osama bin Laden after the 9/11 attacks,32 the Taliban, in 

a move to gain legitimacy, reached out to seek the support from the longpersected minority of the Hazara Shias for recruits.33

Separatist Insurgencies

Insurgency in the relatively isolated and ethnically rich northeast of India, 

connected to the mainland by a strip of land as narrow as 14 miles wide, 

involves multiple armed separatist factions operating in India’s strategic region linking South and Southeast Asia. Most of India’s “Seven Sisters,” as 

the northeastern states are known in the country, have experienced varying 

levels of violence since 1945 by groups favoring a separate nation or regional 

autonomy, with some demanding complete independence. While efforts to 

contain some of these insurgencies have paid varying dividends, the conflict 

in Nagaland, India’s longest and bloodiest insurgency, continues to fester and 

threatens a fresh round of violent discord.34 Meanwhile, in Sri Lanka, the 

decades-long violent ethno-nationalist campaign for a separate Tamil state 

ended with the military defeat of the Tamil Tigers by Sri Lankan troops in 

2009. The movement still lives on as a political entity keeping alive the aspirations of a disenfranchised minority. 

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Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific

Left-Wing Extremism

While most left-wing terrorist groups, influenced by various communist and 

socialist currents, that had operated in the developed world disappeared by 

the mid-1990s, two of the three major left-wing insurgent groups in South 

Asia, informed by the “people’s war” strategy of Maoism, succeeded in having a profound impact on the societies of Nepal and India. The triumph of 

Nepal’s Maoists in overthrowing a two-century-old monarchy, in replacing 

a kingdom with a secular republic and winning a fair democratic election to 

assume office at the conclusion of the decades-long insurgency in 2006 was 

in contrast to the brutal defeat of the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (People’s 

Liberation Front or JVP) by 1990 in Sri Lanka. The JVP, after two violent uprisings against Colombo and its subsequent military defeat, refashioned itself 

as an influential player in Sri Lanka’s polity. India’s Naxalites (legatees of the 

Communist Party of India—Maoist faction), emerging in the late 1960s in a 

small corner of eastern India and ruthlessly crushed then, are now operating 

across large parts of the central and eastern neglected and underdeveloped 

regions of India since the turn of the century. Often touted as India’s largest 

internal security threat, the Maoists continue to draw strength from broad 

grass root support for their legitimate grievances, displacement from their 

lands due to big business projects being just one of them.

Religion and Nationalism

Two current, major drivers of terrorist activity in the region are a combination of religion and nationalism. This combination has had devastating effects by nourishing hatred and violence in a fragile, unstable, and ethnically 

diverse region. In large part, across the region, religious nationalism is fueled 

by the surge of Islamophobia.35 Since 2011, Myanmar has seen an upsurge 

in extreme Buddhist nationalism, anti-Muslim hate speech and deadly communal violence, not only in Rakhine state but across the country.36 In 2012, 

an outbreak of violence in Rakhine state encouraged the formation of the 

Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) by a group of Rohingya exiles.

Sri Lanka’s Bodu Bala Sena (Buddhist Power Force or BBS), a Sinhalese 

Buddhist nationalist organization, is seen to be in the forefront of attacks37

and riots against the Muslims, who constitute 10% of the island nations’ 

population.38 Months after the Easter bombings by a small group of Islamic 

State-inspired militants killing more than 250, Muslims faced a significant 

backlash.39

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Political Violence in South Asia

Women and Terrorism

Moreover, women, though numerically less than their male counterparts, 

have been in the forefront in some of these movements, and will continue 

to be key to mobilizing recruits around issues of socioeconomic and political 

exploitation and to taking up arms.40 According to some estimates, 26% of 

Women And Terrorism

The sudden surge of female suicide bombers in Iraq in 2007 and in conflicts 

elsewhere shocked many. However, it was the conflict in Sri Lanka that first 

spawned a generation of women anguished enough to sacrifice themselves. 

Of the several hundred suicide bombings carried out by the Tamil Tigers (LTTE) 

about 50% are thought to have involved female attackers. The assassination by 

a 17-year-old girl of former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in May 1991 remains among the most politically devastating suicide missions ever. Women in 

the insurgencies of northeast India, in Kashmir, and among the Indian Naxalites 

had similar strong social motivations to take up arms from the late 1980s. A 

number of studies estimate that female participation in the Maoist movement 

during the People’s War of Nepal (1996-2006) was about 40%. Grinding poverty, violence against women, fear of atrocities by security forces, and extrajudicial killings of civilians and families of insurgents were the reasons often 

cited to join a “movement” that, in their view, gave them an opportunity to 

fight human rights violence and promote human dignity. 

Holey Artisan Attacks 2016, Bangladesh and Easter Bombings 2019, 

Sri Lanka 

The 2016 Holey Artisan Bakery attack in Dhaka, Bangladesh, and the 2019 Easter attacks in Sri Lanka bear resemblances to each other. The attackers in both 

cases were home grown, young men from affluent families and well educated. 

Both targeted foreigners. While ISIS claimed both attacks, the two countries 

blamed their local groups, the Jama’atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) and a 

little known group in Sri Lanka, the National Thowheed Jamath (NTJ), respectively.

Prevailing socio-political conditions in both countries, growing extremism and marginalization, set the stage for what was to follow. Until 2016, the 

JMB was held responsible for only isolated killings, mostly of religious minorities and bloggers critical of hardline Islam. In ethnically diverse Sri Lanka, with 

Muslims constituting under 10% of the 21 million population, ethnic tensions 

between Buddhists and Muslims were on the rise during the decade prior, with 

a sharp increase in attacks by militant Buddhist groups, primarily the ultranationalist Bodu Bala Sena (Buddhist Power Force).

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Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific

the foreign fighters from the Maldives, one of the top per capita contributors 

of foreign fighters in Syria, include adult women.41

Insight

Several insights are inescapable. Governance that is inclusive of disenfranchised populations, affected communities, and gender is key to effective 

counterterrorism strategies. History is flush with examples of the short-term 

gains and long-term pains of a strategy that is rooted in purely military victories. Yet, this lesson seems to bypass most governments in the region. A 

case in point is Sri Lanka’s approach to the ethnic issue. In its report on Sri 

Lanka, the International Crisis Group, an independent organization that aims 

to build support for good governance and inclusive politics, while sounding the alarm on increasing ethnic and religious tension, also highlights the 

growing risk to the status of Muslims in the country’s politics of Buddhist 

nationalism.42 The Muslim community in Sri Lanka has long been marginalized politically, and often economically too.43 In recent years there has been a 

sharp rise44 in sectarian tensions, mainly a result of the emergence of militant 

Buddhist groups. And as a legacy of 26 years of a brutal civil war,45 Sri Lanka 

has long been a deeply dysfunctional state with its security establishment 

riven by factions and feuds.46

COVID-19 and Counterterrorism

A pandemic, when public attention is focused elsewhere, provides the perfect conditions for states to resort to measures that in other times would be 

deemed questionable by the international community. Additionally, repressive measures creep in when people are distracted by fear and uncertainty, 

the outcome of which, for counterterrorism, has often proven counterproductive.

In India, the pandemic has deepened intolerance and increased the ongoing violence against the country’s Muslim minority.47 A series of actions 

against them—the removal of Kashmir’s special status and its bifurcation, 

discriminatory citizenship laws, the increasing number of lynchings48 with 

covert or overt support of the ruling party,49 are meant to convey to them 

that India is a Hindu nation in which they would be unwelcome citizens.50 An 

outpouring of hateful rhetoric, describing Muslims as “corona villains” or virus spreaders and characterizing COVID-19 as a Muslim conspiracy, as even 

an act of biological terrorism, has intensified anti-Muslim discrimination.51

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Political Violence in South Asia

“Coronajihad”: Islamophobia In India

Already a minority under attack – aided and abetted by powerful sections of mainstream media – the 200 million Muslims of India (dubbed “coronavirus terrorists” 

by sections of the media), in a Hindu-dominated land of 1.3 billion people, are now 

having their businesses boycotted and are facing increased attacks amid false claims 

that they are to blame for the epidemic.

After India’s health ministry repeatedly blamed an Islamic seminary for 

spreading the coronavirus — and governing party officials spoke of “human 

bombs” and “corona jihad” — a spree of anti-Muslim attacks has broken out 

across the country.

The New York Times, April 12, 2020

In Sri Lanka, the fundamental changes by the new administration to 

policies on ethnic relations and the rule of law with intent to dilute commitments52 on post-war reconciliation, accountability and inclusive governance 

made to the United Nations Human Rights Council and to the European 

Union, threatens to increase ethnic and religious tensions. One such move 

was the pardoning and release of a war crime military personnel who was on 

death row for killing eight Tamil civilians, including a five-year-old and two 

teenagers in 2000 during the civil war.53

Since the death of Osama bin Laden in Pakistan in 2011, the fragile 

relationship between Pakistan’s civilian rulers and its military leadership has 

come under the spotlight once again as Prime Minister Imran Khan made 

changes in his cabinet amid growing worries over the spread of the coronavirus pandemic.54 Unsurprisingly, the clergy in Pakistan took the upper 

hand in deciding state policy against the virus, declaring it “a curse of Allah” 

that needed repentance from a nation that was corrupt and lascivious.55 Two 

related developments that went relatively unnoticed during the pandemic 

were the release of the Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl’s convicted 

killer56 and the removal of 1,800 names from its terrorist watch list of 7,600 

people.57 Among the removed names was the suspected leader of the terrorist organization Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and one of the alleged masterminds 

of the Mumbai attacks in 2008 when at least 174 people were killed. And 

across the subcontinent, terrorist groups are making efforts to exploit the 

existing situation and fears to draw more attention to themselves in the form 

of development aid.58

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Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific

The COVID-19 pandemic is unprecedented, involving as it does far 

too many variables. While the international community is slow in dealing 

with countries demonstrating flagrant violations of norms, such as in India, 

Myanmar, Pakistan, or Sri Lanka, that appear, at least on the surface, far 

graver than any military threat in recent decades, what is likely to change 

even more dramatically are certain other aspects relating to political management and security. Both terms are set to gain new meanings.

SAARC, COVID and Counterterrorism

Recognizing that a regional strategy has a better chance of controlling the pandemic than isolated national-level efforts, all SAARC countries responded rapidly to the crisis, contributed to a special SAARC COVID-19 Emergency Fund, and 

joined forces towards countering it. Unfortunately, while ISIS is now a reality for 

South Asian governments and it is clear that regional counterterrorism cooperation needs to be strengthened, the forum remains dormant due to India’s 

concerns over cross-border terrorism emanating from Pakistan-based groups. 

Bilateral cooperation remains the only viable alternative in each country’s policy 

toolkit.

The Threat of ISIS

Analysts suggest that the Sri Lanka attacks may be early evidence that the Islamic State is taking an important and renewed interest in South Asia, following losses in Syria and Iraq.59 The neighboring island nation of the Maldives 

has also become a hotspot for pro-ISIS activities. On a per capita basis, the 

Maldives has provided more recruits to ISIS60 than any other country, with 

up to 450 of its citizens known to have joined.61 ISIS has claimed authorship 

of several terrorism-related incidents in the Maldives since 2014, including 

the destruction of some boats in April 2020.62 Besides, it is easy for local 

groups in the region to potentially pledge allegiance to the Islamic State in 

order to make a quick name for themselves.

In some ways, South Asia would be the most obvious target for an Islamic State-backed attack. The region, with its political tensions often crossing religious lines, as the Islamic State rebrands as a global insurgency, and 

populations vulnerable to radicalization, would be its major fishing ground. 

More than half of the Muslims in the Asia-Pacific region live in South Asia, 

which includes three of the five countries in the world with the largest Muslim populations: Pakistan, India, and Bangladesh. Muslims are expected to 

make up a third of the population of South Asia in 2030.63

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Political Violence in South Asia

Seizing an opportunity, the recently announced “Wilayat al-Hind,” the 

Caliphate’s “Indian Province,” issued a poster that included the viral image of a Muslim man being beaten by a Hindu mob in Delhi in a poster 

justifying retaliatory violence.64 And, as ISIS expands its use of smaller 

regional affiliates to carry out terrorism in its own name, a new set of challenges come into play for the entire region, demanding better intraregional 

cooperation to counter the same.

The Rohingyas

Over the course of the past years, the tension between Buddhist nationalists 

and Muslim minorities, the Rohingya in particular, has grown into a dangerous 

strain of racism and intolerance. Discriminatory policies of Myanmar’s government since the late 1970s have compelled a million Muslim Rohingya to flee 

their homes to neighboring Bangladesh, where conditions in refugee camps are 

a concern for radicalization experts, particularly after ISIS signaled its presence in 

the region, even as the fledgling militant group, Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army 

(ARSA) offers no threat to Myanmar’s military. Analysts at the Center for Strategic and International Studies warn that the repression of the Rohingyas presents 

a potential, transnational flashpoint for jihadi-Salafi organizations, which has 

larger implications for the region grappling with terrorism.

Conclusion

Recent trends across the globe demonstrate the rise of xenophobia and 

that nations are turning inward with a willingness to sacrifice personal 

liberties in favor of greater state control. Yet the problem of terrorism 

is transnational and global. The compulsions of geopolitics and geoeconomics seem to guide the international community’s soft approach to 

countries that shirk their commitment to international norms of accountability and good governance. But this is a strategy that has potential to extract a high price as illustrated by the example of Afghanistan’s mujahedeen

following the exit of Soviet troops. When morals and effective governance 

are subject to the vagaries of the geopolitical environment, whole-of-society counterterrorism strategies become vulnerable to failure.

Nationalism in the name of God would further justify the cause and 

swell the ranks of those that sow terror in the name of God. Multiple 

grievances (alienation, humiliation, demographic shifts, historical wrongs, 

and claims over territory) that drive religious terror and vary from spiritual 

to temporal and from instrumental to ideological, often provide a fertile 

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Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific

environment for recruitment.65 With economies floundering during the COVID crisis, and the loss of millions of jobs across all segments, the potential 

dividends of a youth bulge could instead turn into a dangerous disaster.66

The growing tide of Islamophobia,67 state-sponsored violence against 

minorities, claims of genocide, and the tendency for states to respond with 

brutality, in violation of human rights, and with little regard for international 

norms, further ensures that terrorism will remain an integral part of the 

region’s security concern in the years ahead. With over one million Rohingya 

refugees from Myanmar living in squalid camps in neighboring Bangladesh, 

there is concern among radicalization experts that these camps offer ideal 

conditions to make them potential breeding grounds for extremism.68 AlQaeda was quick to release a statement of support.69 In Pakistan, the Ahmadis, a religious sect that a rights group says suffers widespread persecution, 

continue to be denied a voice, status, and protection in a newly formed commission for minorities.70 Counterterrorism efforts are further confounded by 

the popular practice among states to label as “terrorist” any movement that 

takes up arms to challenge a state’s inability or indifference to the legitimate 

grievances of a particular community. 

The international community is finally noticing the rise of Islamophobia71 that has been simmering for long in India.72 In its annual report of 

2020, the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom 

(IRF) has recommended that the State Department designate India73 as a 

“country of particular concern” saying the country was “engaging in and 

tolerating systematic, ongoing and egregious religious freedom violations.”74

India last received a similar rating from the watchdog in 2004, also a period 

of heightened concern over a Hindu nationalist government’s treatment of 

religious minorities, especially Muslims and Christians. In 2002, more than 

1,000 people, mostly Muslims, were killed in three days of riots in the state 

of Gujarat. The Commission also recommended that the State Department 

redesignate both Pakistan and Myanmar75 as Countries of Particular Concern for the treatment of their minority religious communities and assorted 

Muslim sects.76 The latest report of the U.S. Commission on International 

Religious Freedom is a move in the right direction. While, expectedly, countries being called out brush aside the report, the international community 

should leverage the report’s findings in dealing with them.

The Naxalite movement in India, reincarnated from its crushing defeat 

in the 1960s after the shift of the Indian economy toward a free market 

model and the ensuing takeover by the state of lands that provided shelter to 

the poorest of the poor, indigenous tribes, and the disenfranchised, is firmly 

102
Political Violence in South Asia

entrenched. Only a commitment by the state to uplift the living conditions 

of the dispossessed could provide an opening for a lasting resolution. 

If most terrorism is a local phenomenon that is networked into a bigger regional and global system, so is counterterrorism. Yet, the record of 

the regions’ primary organization, the South Asian Association for Regional 

Cooperation (SAARC), in tackling terrorism, despite an early regional consensus on counterterrorism, remains dismal. With the widening network of 

terrorist groups in the subcontinent and the fates of the eight countries interlinked with one another, the need for regional cooperation has never been 

as dire, and yet, some countries find it difficult “to overcome their proclivity 

to pursue political goals and limited national agendas within the regional 

framework.”77

Given the seemingly insurmountable challenges of governance across 

the region, rising Islamophobia, widening socioeconomic and sectarian divides, SAARC remains a hostage to the India-Pakistan relationship and is 

unable to unite the countries toward the common goal of regional prosperity 

and security. Bilateral cooperation, while mutually beneficial to signatories, 

has limited value to addressing a regional problem. With a population of 

nearly two billion people, South Asia is especially vulnerable to terrorism 

because of its high population density, insufficient government resources, 

and inadequate governing systems. It would require a more responsive system of governance to alleviate the legitimate grievances of the disaffected 

and counter the narratives of groups that are successfully able to exploit the 

situation in pursuit of their violent goals.

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Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific

Notes

1 Steven R. Weisman, “Assassination in India: Rajiv Gandhi,” New York Times, May 22, 1991, https://www.nytimes.com/1991/05/22/obituaries/assassination-in-india-rajiv- gandhi-a-son-who-won-lost-and-tried-a-comeback.html.

2 Julian West and Raymond Whitaker, “Suicide Bomber Murders President of Sri Lanka,” Independent, May 2, 1993, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/suicide-bomb- er-murders-president-of-sri-lanka-2320562.html.

3 Amy Waldman, “Masters of Suicide Bombing: Tamil Guerrillas of Sri Lanka,” New 

York Times, January 14, 2003, https://www.nytimes.com/2003/01/14/world/masters- of-suicide-bombing-tamil-guerrillas-of-sri-lanka.html.

4 Kenneth Pletcher, “Tokyo Subway Attack of 1995,” Encyclopedia Britannica, https:// www.britannica.com/event/Tokyo-subway-attack-of-1995.

5 Neil MacFarquhar, “Oklahoma City Marks 25 Years since America’s Deadli- est Homegrown Attack,” New York Times, April 19, 2020, https://www.nytimes. com/2020/04/19/us/Timothy-McVeigh-Oklahoma-City-Bombing-Coronavirus.html.

6 “Oklahoma City Bombing,” December 16, 2009, Federal Bureau of Investigation, https://www.fbi.gov/history/famous-cases/oklahoma-city-bombing. 

7 John F. Burns, “A Sri Lankan Evokes Pol Pot; Asia’s Latest Master of Terror,” New 

York Times, May 28, 1995, https://www.nytimes.com/1995/05/28/weekinreview/the- world-a-sri-lankan-evokes-pol-pot-asia-s-latest-master-of-terror.html.

8 Bachi Karkaria, “How the 1993 Blasts Changed Mumbai Forever,” BBC News, July 30, 2015, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-33713846. 

9 The Bojinka plot was a large-scale, three-phase attack planned by Ramzi Yousef and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed to assassinate Pope John Paul II, blow up 11 airliners in 

flight from Asia to the United States with the goal of killing approximately 4,000 pas- sengers and shutting down international air travel, and crash a plane into the headquar- ters of the CIA in Fairfax County, Virginia, in January 1995.Despite careful planning, 

the Bojinka plot was disrupted after a chemical fire drew the attention of the Philippine 

National Police—Western Police District (PNP-WPD) on January 6-7, 1995. Yousef 

and Mohammed were unable to stage any of the three attacks. The only fatality resulted 

from a test bomb planted by Yousef on Philippine Airlines Flight 434 which killed one 

person and injured 10 others. 

10 Pamela Constable, “Mumbai Attacks in 2008 Still Divide India and Pakistan,” Wash- ington Post, April 6, 2011, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/mumbai-attacks-in- 2008-still-divide-india-and-pakistan/2011/04/03/AFJjDUoC_story.html. 

11 Chaitanya Chandra Halder, Wasim Bin Habib, and Tuhin Shubhra Adhikary, “NO MERCY for Café Attack Perpetrators,” Daily Star, November 28, 2019, https://www. thedailystar.net/frontpage/no-mercy-dhaka-cafe-attack-perpetrators-1832821. 

12 Anuk Arudpragasam, “A State of Disorientation: Dispatch from Sri Lanka after the Easter Bombings,” Time, May 22, 2019, https://time.com/5593101/dispatch-sri-lanka- easter-bombings/; Ewelina U. Ochab, “Sri Lanka Wakes from the Ashes As the First 

Anniversary of the Easter Attacks Approaches,” Forbes, April 10, 2020, https://www.

forbes.com/sites/ewelinaochab/2020/04/10/sri-lanka-wakes-from-the-ashes-as-thefirst-anniversary-of-the-easter-attacks-approaches/. 

13 Arie Perliger, “The Causes and Impact of Political Assassinations,” CTC Sentinel 8, 

no. 1 (January 2015), https://ctc.usma.edu/the-causes-and-impact-of-political-assassi- nations/.

14 Islamuddin Sajid and Hilal Mir, “Cross border Shelling on the Rise at Kashmir 

104
Political Violence in South Asia

Border,” Anadolu Agency, April 19, 2020, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/ cross-border-shelling-on-the-rise-at-kashmir-border/1810718. 

15 “Kashmir: Why India and Pakistan Fight Over It,” BBC News, August 8, 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/10537286; Manu Pubby, “Pakistan Terror Factories Get Active; Spike in Cross-border Firings,” Economic Times, April 8, 2020, https://economic- times.indiatimes.com/news/defence/pakistan-terror-factories-get-active-spike-in-crossborder-firings/articleshow/75037075.cms.

16 Franz J. Marty, “Afghan-Pakistani Cross-Border Terrorism Cuts Both Ways,” The 

Diplomat, April 9, 2018, https://thediplomat.com/2018/04/afghan-pakistani-cross- border-terrorism-cuts-both-ways/; Mark Mazzetti and Ismail Khan, “From the Afghan Peace Deal, a Weak and Pliable Neighbor for Pakistan,” New York Times, March 5, 2020, 

https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/05/world/asia/afghanistan-pakistan-peace.html.

17 “Pro-ISIS Group Releases Third Edition of India Region Magazine,” Counter 

Extremism Project, April 28, 2020, https://www.counterextremism.com/press/extremist- content-online-pro-isis-propaganda-site-reemerges-one-month-after-takedowns.

18 Yudhijit Bhattacharjee, “The Terrorist Who Got Away,” New York Times, March 19, 

2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/19/magazine/masood-azhar-jaish.html. 

19 “We Trained Kashmiri Terrorists in Pakistan, Mujahideen’s Like Hafiz Saeed & Osama Were Our Heroes: Pervez Musharraf,” Economic Times, November 15, 2019, 

https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/we-trained-kashmiri-terroristsin-pakistan-mujahideens-like-hafiz-saeed-osama-were-our-heroes-pervez-musharraf/

articleshow/72051024.cms.

20 Anand Arni, “Article 370 and the Rough Ride Ahead,” Telegraph, August 12, 2019, https://www.telegraphindia.com/opinion/article-370-and-the-rough-ride-ahead/

cid/1697358. 

21 Praveen Swami, “Kashmir Police Begin Burying Slain Terrorists, Won’t Hand Over Bodies to Kin ‘to Stop Pro-Jihad’ Gatherings,” News18, April 25, 2020, https://www. news18.com/news/india/kashmir-police-begins-burying-slain-terrorists-wont-handover-bodies-to-kin-to-stop-pro-jihad-gatherings-2591933.html.

22 “Article 370: Former Chief Minister Says India Has Betrayed Kashmir,” BBC News, August 5, 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-49231620. 

23 “Dangerous Drift: On Encounter with Terrorists Near Handwara,” The Hindu, May 6, 2020, https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/editorial/dangerous-drift-on-encounter- with-terrorists-near-handwara/article31512624.ece. 

24 Bashaarat Masood, “‘Pakistan Trying to Securalise Kashmir Militancy’: Lashkar Regroups in Valley as The Resistance Front,” Indian Express, May 5, 2020, https:// indianexpress.com/article/india/jammu-kashmir-lashkar-regroups-as-the-resistancefront-6394158/. 

25 Bashaarat Masood, “Who Was Riyaz Naikoo, the Hizbul Mujahideen Commander?” Indian Express, May 6, 2020, https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/who-was- riyaz-ahmad-naikoo-hizbul-mujahideen-6396915/.

26 Naseer Ganai, “Is Kashmir Seeing Birth of a New Militant Outfit? The Signs Look Threatening,” Outlook, April 27, 2020, https://www.outlookindia.com/magazine/story/ india-news-is-kashmir-seeing-birth-of-a-new-militant-outfit-the-signs-look-threaten- ing/303085. 

27 “Global Terrorism Index 2019: Measuring the Impact of Terrorism,” Institute 

for Economics and Peace, November 2019, http://visionofhumanity.org/app/up- loads/2019/11/GTI-2019web.pdf.

28 Mujib Mashal and Fahim Abed, “Terror Attack Strikes Afghan Capital as Another City Is Locked Down for Coronavirus,” New York Times, March 25, 2020, https://www. nytimes.com/2020/03/25/world/asia/afghanistan-sikh-kabul.html; Indrani Bagchi, 

105
Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific

“Pak Mastermind of Kabul Gurdwara Attack Arrested,” Times of India, April 5, 2020, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/74986402.cms.

29 “Afghanistan Is Set to Release 60 Percent of Prisoners as Coronavirus Spreads,” New York Times, April 27, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/27/world/coro- navirus-world-pandemic.html#link-3dec3921.

30 Abdul Qadir Sediqi, “Taliban, U.S. Engage in Twitter Spat amid Rise in Afghani- stan Violence,” Reuters, May 2, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-afghan- istan-taliban/taliban-u-s-engage-in-twitter-spat-amid-rise-in-afghanistan-violenceidUSKBN22E0KR. 

31 Thomas Joscelyn, “The Islamic State’s Ideological Campaign Against al-Qaeda,” Long War Journal, May 4, 2020, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2020/05/ analysis-the-islamic-states-ideological-campaign-against-al-qaeda.php. 

32 Bill Roggio, “Taliban Lauds Mullah Omar for Defending Osama bin Laden after 9/11,” Long War Journal, April 24, 2020, https://www.longwarjournal.org/ar- chives/2020/04/taliban-lauds-mullah-omar-for-defending-osama-bin-laden-after-9-11.

php. 

33 Ruchi Kumar, “Taliban Reaches out to Shias,” The Hindu, May 9, 2020, https:// www.thehindu.com/news/international/taliban-reaches-out-to-shias/article31545562.

ece. 

34 Namrata Biji Ahuja, “Naga Insurgency Threatens to Unsettle Peace Efforts in Northeast after NIA Chargesheet,” The Week, January 28, 2020, https://www.theweek. in/news/india/2020/01/28/naga-insurgency-threatens-to-unsettle-peace-efforts-in- northeast-after-nia-chargesheet.html.

35 Ritika Jain, “How India’s Government Set off a Spiral of Islamophobia,” Article 

14, April 20, 2020, https://www.article-14.com/post/how-india-s-government-set- off-a-spiral-of-islamophobia. 

36 “Buddhism and State Power in Myanmar,” International Crisis Group, Asia Report no. 290, September 5, 2017, https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/290-buddhism- and-state-power-in-myanmar.pdf. 

37 Charles Haviland,“Sri Lanka Hardline Group Calls for Halal Boycott,” BBC News, February 17, 2013, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-21494959. 

38 Iqbal Athas and Tim Hume, “Fear, Shock among Sri Lankan Muslims in Af- termath of Buddhist Mob Violence,” CNN, June 24, 2014, https://edition.cnn. com/2014/06/19/world/asia/sri-lanka-muslim-aluthgama/. 

39 “After Sri Lanka’s Easter Bombings: Reducing Risks of Future Violence,” Interna- tional Crisis Group, Asia Report no. 302, September 27, 2019, https://www.crisisgroup. org/asia/south-asia/sri-lanka/302-after-sri-lankas-easter-bombings-reducing-risksfuture-violence. 

40 “Why Women Join India’s Maoist Groups,” BBC News, November 20, 2013, 

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-24456634.

41 Efraim Benmelech and Esteban F. Kor, “What Explains the Flow of Foreign Fighters to ISIS?” April 2016, https://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/faculty/ben- melech/html/BenmelechPapers/ISIS_April_13_2016_Effi_final.pdf. 

42 “A Dangerous Sea Change in Sri Lanka,” International Crisis Group, January 29, 2020, https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-asia/sri-lanka/dangerous-sea-change- sri-lanka.

43 Nirupama Subramanian, “In Sri Lanka’s Anti-Muslim Violence, an Echo of Post- war Sinhala Triumphalism,” Indian Express, March 7, 2018, http://indianexpress.com/ article/explained/sri-lanka-emergency-s-anti-muslim-violence-an-echo-of-post-war106
Political Violence in South Asia

sinhala-triumphalism-5088617/. 

44 Sudha Ramachandran, “Sri Lanka’s Muslims in the Cross Hairs,” The Diplomat, September 11, 2013, https://thediplomat.com/2013/09/sri-lankas-muslims-in-the- cross-hairs/. 

45 Darini Rajasingham-Senanayake, “Dysfunctional Democracy and the Dirty War in Sri Lanka,” Asia Pacific Issues, no. 52, May 2001 https://www.eastwestcenter.org/ system/tdf/private/api052.pdf?file=1&type=node&id=31797. 

46 “Sri Lanka Terror Attacks: A Dysfunctional Government Puts an Island in Dan- ger,” New Indian Express, April 29, 2019, https://www.newindianexpress.com/opin- ions/editorials/2019/apr/29/sri-lanka-terror-attacks-a-dysfunctional-governmentputs-an-island-in-danger-1970313.html. 

47 Jayshree Bajoria, “CoronaJihad Is Only the Latest Manifestation: Islamophobia in India Has Been Years in the Making,” The Polis Project, May 1, 2020, https://www. thepolisproject.com/coronajihad-is-only-the-latest-manifestation-islamophobia-inindia-has-been-years-in-the-making/.

48 Hannah Ellis-Petersen, “Inside Delhi: Beaten, Lynched and Burnt Alive,” The 

Guardian, March 1, 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/mar/01/india- delhi-after-hindu-mob-riot-religious-hatred-nationalists. 

49 Shweta Desai and Amarnath Amarasingam, “#CoronaJihad: COVID-19, Misinformation, and Anti-Muslim Violence in India,” ISD Strong Cities, May 2020, 

https://strongcitiesnetwork.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/5/2020/05/Corona- Jihad.pdf. 

50 Santosh K. Kiro, “‘Look at Their Clothes’: Modi Plays Communal Card on CAA, Targets Muslim Protestors,” The Wire, December 16, 2019, https://thewire.in/com- munalism/narendra-modi-citizenship-amendment-act-protests-clothes. 

51 Niranjan Sahoo, “India: Infections, Islamophobia, and Intensifying Societal Polar- ization,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, April 28, 2020, https://carn- egieendowment.org/2020/04/28/india-infections-islamophobia-and-intensifying-so- cietal-polarization-pub-81646; Aniruddha Ghosal, Sheikh Saaliq, and Emily Schmall, “Indian Muslims Face Stigma, Blame for Surge in Infections,” Associated Press, April 24, 2020, https://apnews.com/ad2e96f4caa55b817c3d8656bdb2fcbd.

52 Meera Srinivasan, “Sri Lanka Notifies UN about Rights Resolution Withdrawal,” The Hindu, February 26, 2020, https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/sri- lanka-notifies-un-about-rights-resolution-withdrawal/article30924951.ece. 

53 “Presidential Pardon of Ex Army Officer for Killing of Tamil Civilians Is Unacceptable: ICJ,” Sunday Times, March 27, 2020, http://www.sundaytimes.lk/ article/1117563/presidential-pardon-of-ex-army-officer-for-killing-of-tamil-civiliansis-unacceptable-icj; Meera Srinivasan, “Sri Lanka Frees Soldier Who Killed 8 Tamils,” 

The Hindu, March 27, 2020, https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/sri- lanka-frees-soldier-who-killed-8-tamils/article31177308.ece.

54 Stephanie Findlay and Farhan Bokhari, “Pakistan’s Imran Khan Sidelined by Military During Coronavirus Outbreak,” Financial Times, April 24 2020, https://www. ft.com/content/686714d7-ae05-431d-a13d-1966153be151. 

55 Khaled Ahmed, “In Pakistan, Religious Leaders, Not Doctors, Are Setting Covid Policy,” Indian Express, May 2, 2020, https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/col- umns/pakistan-coronavirus-imran-khan-clerics-tariq-jameel-6389435/. 

56 Saeed Shah, “Pakistani Court Overturns Murder Conviction in Killing of Wall Street Journal Reporter Daniel Pearl,” Wall Street Journal, April 2, 2020, https:// www.wsj.com/articles/pakistani-court-overturns-murder-conviction-in-killingofwall-street-journal-reporter-11585805394; Diaa Hadid, “18 Years after Murder 

and Arrests, Convictions in Daniel Pearl Killing Are Reversed,” NPR, April 4, 2020, https://www.npr.org/2020/04/04/827241666/18-years-after-murder-and-arrests107
Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific

convictions-in-daniel-pearl-killing-are-revers; Farahnaz Ispahani, “Pakistani Courts Go Shamefully Easy on Terrorist Who Helped Murder Jewish American Journalist,” 

Washington Examiner, April 6, 2020, https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/ pakistani-courts-go-shamefully-easy-on-terrorist-who-helped-murder-jewish-americanjournalist-daniel-pearl. 

57 Haroon Janjua and Laura Mallene, “Pakistan Quietly Removed Thousands from Its Terrorist Watch List,” Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project, April 24, 

2020, https://www.occrp.org/en/daily/12181-pakistan-quietly-removed-thousands- from-its-terrorist-watch-list; Dylan Tokar, “Pakistan Removes Thousands of Names from Terrorist Watch List,” Wall Street Journal, April 20, 2020, https://www.wsj.com/ articles/pakistan-removes-thousands-of-names-from-terrorist-watch-list-11587393001.

58 Kabir Taneja and Raffaello Pantucci, “Beware of Terrorists Offering COVID19 Aid,” Observer Research Foundation, April 17 2020, https://www.orfonline.org/ expert-speak/beware-of-terrorists-offering-covid19-aid-64731/.

59 Viraj Solanki, “The Increasing Presence of ISIS in South Asia,” International Institute 

for Strategic Studies, June 1, 2019, https://www.iiss.org/blogs/analysis/2019/06/isis- south-asia; Alison Tahmizian Meuse, “ISIS Regrouping for Attacks in South Asia, Europe,” Asia Times, August 5, 2019, https://asiatimes.com/2019/08/isis-regrouping- for-attacks-in-south-asia-europe/. 

60 U.S. Department of State, “Integrated Country Strategy”, April 2, 2019, https:// www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/ICS-Maldives_UNCLASS-508.pdf.

61 Viraj Solanki, “State of Emergency Ends, But the Maldives Is Still in Crisis,” International Institute for Strategic Studies, April 3, 2018, https://www.iiss.org/blogs/analy- sis/2018/04/maldives-still-in-crisis. 

62 Azim Zahir, “Islamic State Terror in the Maldives as COVID-19 Arrives,” The 

Diplomat, April 18, 2020, https://thediplomat.com/2020/04/islamic-state-terror-in- the-maldives-as-covid-19-arrives/. 

63 “The Future Global Muslim Population Projections for 2010-2030,” Pew Research 

Center, January 27, 2011, https://www.pewforum.org/2011/01/27/future-of-the- global-muslim-population-regional-asia/. 

64 Kabir Taneja, “Islamic State Propaganda in India,” Global Network on Extremism and Technology, April 14, 2020, https://gnet-research.org/2020/04/14/islamic-state- propaganda-in-india/; “Delhi Riots: ISIS Uses Pic of Muslim Man Getting Beaten up by Mob to Justify Violence,” Sentinel, February 28, 2020, https://www.sentinelassam. com/national-news/delhi-riots-isis-uses-pic-of-muslim-man-getting-beaten-up-bymob-to-justify-violence/.

65 Jessica Stern, Terror in the Name of God (New York: HarperCollins, 2013); Ain- slie Embree, “Religion, Communalism, and Security in India,” in Routledge Handbook of Religion and Security, ed. Chris Seiple, Denis Hoover, and Pauletta Otis (London: Routledge, 2013).

66 Edith M. Lederer, “UN Chief: Extremists Using COVID-19 to Recruit Online Youths,” Associated Press, April 27, 2020, https://apnews.com/a6cf967c03f7ff00e- 170949a9eaeb11a. 

67 Tim Hume, “‘Fascists’ in Saffron Robes? The Rise of Sri Lanka’s Buddhist Ultranationalists,” CNN, July 17, 2014, https://www.cnn.com/2014/07/17/world/asia/ sri-lanka-bodu-bala-sena-profile/index.html. 

68 Andrew Selth, “The Rohingyas: A New Terrorist Threat?” The Interpreter, Septem- ber 6, 2018, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/rohingyas-new-terrorist- threat. 

69 “Burma Calling,” al-Qaeda statement, September 11, 2017, https://pbs.twimg. com/media/DJii4wDXkAAFcxR.jpg. 

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70 Gibran Naiyyar Peshimam, “Pakistan Excludes Religious Sect from Minority Com- mission,” Reuters, May 7, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-pakistan-minori- ties/pakistan-excludes-religious-sect-from-minority-commission-idUSKBN22J1PU. 

71 Rana Ayyub, “Islamophobia Taints India’s Response to the Coronavirus,” Washington Post, April 6, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/04/06/islamo- phobia-taints-indias-response-coronavirus/.

72 Sameer Yasi and Billy Perrigo, “‘Hate Is Being Preached Openly against Us.’ After Delhi Riots, Muslims in India Fear What’s Next,” Time, March 3, 2020 https://time. com/5794354/delhi-riots-muslims-india/. 

73 Billy Perrigo, “It Was Already Dangerous to Be Muslim in India. Then Came the Coronavirus,” Time, April 3, 2020, https://time.com/5815264/coronavirus-india-islam- ophobia-coronajihad/. 

74 U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, Annual Report 2020, https://www.uscirf.gov/sites/default/files/USCIRF%202020%20Annual%20Re- port_42720_new_0.pdf.

75 Ibid.

76 Isaac Six and Farahnaz Ispahani, “Persecution without Prosecution: The Fate of Minorities in Pakistan,” Foreign Policy, June 10, 2015, https://foreignpolicy. com/2015/06/10/persecution-without-prosecution-the-fate-of-minorities-in-paki- stan/; Isapahani, a former member of the Pakistani Parliament and Media Adviser to the President of Pakistan from 2008-2012, in her 2016 book, Purifying the Land of 

the Pure: Pakistan’s Religious Minorities, charts what she calls the “slow genocide” of 

minorities in the country from Independence in 1947 to the present day.

77 Smruti S. Pattanaik, “Making Sense of Regional Cooperation: SAARC at Twenty,” Strategic Analysis 30, no. 1 (2006), https://idsa.in/system/files/strategicanalysis_spatta- naik_0306.pdf. 

109

111

7

TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF TERRORISM 

AND INSURGENCY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 

Sam Mullins

The Deep Roots of Insurgency in Southeast Asia

Besides ASG, other militant organizations that were in action back in the 1990s included the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the Communist New People’s 

Army (NPA), which had been established in the Philippines in 1969 and 1977 respectively, as well as the Free Papua Movement (OPM; formed in 1965), the Free 

Aceh Movement (GAM; founded in 1976) and Jemaah Islamiyah (JI; established in 

1993) in Indonesia and Malaysia. Muslim-separatist militants, who had been active 

in Southern Thailand since the 1960s, also conducted sporadic attacks during the 

1990s and would soon gather enough strength to mount a fearsome insurgency.

On the morning of April 4, 1995, approximately 200 Islamist militants, believed to be part of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), ransacked the city of Ipil 

in Mindanao, looting banks, setting fire to buildings and killing more than 50 

people, before making off with more than half a billion pesos and numerous hostages.1

 Twenty-two years later, the same group—albeit under different leadership and comprised of a new generation of recruits—laid siege to 

the much larger city of Marawi, located some 300 kilometers east, for a period of five months. By the time security forces finally defeated them, over 

a thousand people had been killed, hundreds of thousands of people had 

been displaced and the city lay in ruins.2 Unfortunately, ASG is just one of 

many armed groups that the region has had to contend with over the years, 

and—like ASG—many have proven to be frustratingly resilient, sometimes 

even resurgent, in the face of formidable efforts to defeat them. 
Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific

By the time of ASG’s assault on Ipil, terrorism and insurgency in Southeast Asia were already well-entrenched and quite diverse. Broadly speaking, they can be divided into three main types: Salafi-jihadists, separatists, 

and communists. This chapter provides an historical overview of the most 

significant terrorist and insurgent threats in Southeast Asia over the last 25 

years. Focusing primarily on those countries which have experienced the 

most attacks (namely, the Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia, and Myanmar), it 

highlights the major jihadist, separatist, and communist groups in the region 

and charts the rising and falling levels of violence in relation to a variety 

of internal and external factors. The following section identifies a number 

of political and social issues, along with current and emerging threats that 

may shape the nature of terrorism in Southeast Asia in years to come. The 

concluding part of the paper draws upon the previous sections to highlight 

lessons learned from history that may help the region in future.

Figure 7.1: Incidents of terrorism in Southeast Asia (including the Philippines,

 Thailand, Indonesia, Myanmar, and Malaysia) from 1995 to 2018.

Looking Back on 25 Years of 

Terrorism and Insurgency

The Early Days of ‘Global Jihad’ in Southeast Asia

As Figure 7.1 above shows, relatively few attacks occurred during the 1990s 

and early 2000s. However, jihadist terrorists, in particular JI and its offshoots, 

became increasingly sophisticated and belligerent during this timeframe, 

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Terrorism and Insurgency in Southeast Asia

chalking up several high-profile successes—most notably the Bali bombing 

of 2002 in which 202 people were killed. Domestically, the fall of the Suharto regime in 1998 had given JI newfound room to act. However, the real key 

to their success was their bond with al-Qaeda, which had been forged in the 

camps in Afghanistan in the 1980s and 1990s and brought with it important 

benefits, including expertise, funding, and logistical support. The attacks of 

September 11, 2001, and the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan, followed by 

that of Iraq, then provided shots of adrenaline to the jihadists’ cause. However, after the links to al-Qaeda were effectively severed through concerted 

law enforcement and military action during the early 2000s, jihadist networks 

in Southeast Asia became increasingly fractured. By the end of the decade 

they were focused more on local concerns (the “near” as opposed to “far 

enemy”).3

Separatist Insurgencies in Indonesia, Thailand, and 

the Philippines

Just as regime change in Indonesia enabled jihadists to act, so it allowed separatists to flourish as well. The Free Aceh Movement (GAM) was able to take 

advantage of this at a time when popular support for the group was at an 

all-time high, thanks to widespread anger at human rights abuses perpetrated 

by security forces, along with frustration at the government’s failure to implement promised reforms.4

 By the time the peace process collapsed in 2003, 

GAM had succeeded in generating significant international support for its 

cause, while simultaneously increasing its membership in Aceh fivefold and 

expanding its influence to control 70-80% of the province.5 Had it not been 

for the tsunami of December 2004, which forced the two sides to work together for the common good and ultimately led to the peace treaty of 2005, 

it is quite likely that insurgency in Aceh would still be alive today.

As depicted in Figure 7.1, the separatist insurgency in Thailand has been 

one of the most significant sources of violence in Southeast Asia. In 1998, 

The Free Papua Movement (OPM)

One of the longest running separatist movements in Southeast Asia today is 

led by the OPM in West Papua, Indonesia. OPM militants have been responsible for numerous acts of sabotage, kidnapping, assassination, and attacks on 

construction workers and security forces, including a number of mass-casualty 

incidents. The independence movement remains strong, however, the insurgency is disorganized and—unlike GAM—has never been able to seriously 

challenge the Indonesian state.

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the militants were on the back foot, thanks to the establishment of stronger 

cooperation between Thailand and Malaysia.6 However, having learned from 

this experience, they mounted a comeback in 2004, upping the tempo, scale 

and sophistication of their operations. As in Aceh, the insurgency has been 

fueled by incidences of excessive use of force by military and police, and 

although there have been numerous rounds of negotiations, little has been 

done to address Malay-Muslim grievances. Thanks to resourcing constraints, 

changes in leadership and continued military pressure, levels of violence are 

currently at about their lowest since the 2004 wave of insurgency began; 

however, the underlying causal conditions remain unchanged.7

In the Philippines, the MILF also varied its use of violence in response 

to government pressure and perceived willingness to engage in meaningful negotiation. For example, when negotiations stalled in 2007, the MILF 

stepped up its operations lasting through 2009.8 However, in contrast to 

Thailand, the government of the Philippines has shown a willingness to listen to militants’ demands and—after more than 20 years—peace talks eventually paid off, culminating in the establishment of the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) in February 2019.9

The Enduring Threat of the New People’s Army

The Philippines has had less success with the NPA, which—having previously downsized since peaking during the 1980s—stepped up its operations 

in 2008.10 By this time, peace talks had been stalled since 2004 and, according 

to Alexander Yano, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) in 2009, the military had become preoccupied with the MILF.11

The surge of 2008 was followed by a relative slump in attacks lasting 

through 2011 as the group experienced difficulties in recruitment and weapons acquisition, as well as a crisis of leadership.12 However, since 2012, when 

yet another round of peace talks ended in deadlock in June, they raised the 

tempo of activity to new heights, averaging more than 270 attacks per year 

from 2013-2018.13 Now into its 51st year of insurgency and with peace talks 

currently suspended, the NPA remains the largest internal security threat in 

the Philippines, with no end in sight.

The Escalation of Violence in Myanmar 

Myanmar has had to deal with a plethora of ethno-nationalist/separatist insurgent groups dating back to the country’s foundation in the late 1940s.14

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The most powerful and durable of these groups were formed in the 1960s 

and are based in Kachin and Shan states in the north and east. However, 

arguably the most consequential group to emerge was established in 2012. 

That year, a new group, initially known as Harakah al-Yaqin (HaY), and 

subsequently rebranded as the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA), 

was formed following deadly, anti-Muslim riots that broke out after three 

Muslims allegedly gang-raped and murdered a Rakhine Buddhist woman in 

July.15 Things escalated even further in August 2017, when ARSA overran 30 

Border Guard Police posts, inviting an indiscriminate crackdown by the Burmese military that led to the displacement of more than 700,000 Rohingya, 

who fled to neighboring Bangladesh. Since then, ARSA has largely been 

subdued, though by no means eliminated, and the Rohingya issue has come 

to define Myanmar’s image on the international stage. At the same time, the 

country is still plagued by a variety of other ethno-nationalist and separatist 

militant groups and there appears to be little prospect of peace. 

The ISIS Effect

The war in Syria and the rise of ISIS have rejuvenated jihadist terrorism in 

the region, beginning around 2012. Close to a thousand people from Southeast Asia traveled to Syria and Iraq, and the most active terrorist groups 

(including ASG and Jemaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD)) all pledged allegiance 

to ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.16 Moreover, although it took some 

time before ISIS officially recognized these pledges, Southeast Asian foreign 

fighters in Syria and Iraq were instrumental in encouraging and facilitating 

attacks back home, as well as providing funds. 

ISIS is also at least partly responsible for the increase in foreign fighters 

in the Philippines as well as the growth of suicide bombing in the country 

since July 2018.17 Nevertheless, as time has gone on, a succession of key 

leaders who served as important points of contact between Asia and the 

Middle East have now been eliminated, similar to what happened with alQaeda in the early 2000s. Most of the recent attacks appear to have been 

ISIS Funding for Terrorism in Southeast Asia

According to Indonesian police, from 2014-2016 ISIS transferred more than 10 

billion rupiah (more than US$700,000) from various overseas sources to Indonesia. The Philippine military reported that ISIS sent “at least” $1.5 million to ASG 

and the Maute Group to help fund the aforementioned siege of Marawi in May 

2017.

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locally organized and counterterrorism (CT) authorities are increasingly 

effective. For example, Malaysia has suffered just one minor attack, while 

thwarting an additional 25 plots and has arrested more than 500 ISIS suspects since 2013.18 In 2019 alone, Indonesia arrested around 275 suspected 

terrorists.19 That same year, they reduced the number of terrorist incidents 

in the country by 58%.20

Militants in the region were quick to pledge allegiance to the new “caliph” after al-Baghdadi was killed in October 2019 and clearly remain committed to ISIS, despite that it has been reduced to a shadow of its former self 

and personal and operational ties to Southeast Asia appear to have been at 

least temporarily weakened. This commitment is also evident in the actions 

of so-called “frustrated foreign fighters” (those who tried but didn’t make it 

to Syria), and other home-grown cells and lone actors with varying organizational affiliations, who continue to plan and sometimes conduct attacks in 

the name of ISIS. Thus, although international linkages have been degraded 

and authorities in the region appear to be gaining the upper hand, there is no 

room for complacency and the road ahead is fraught with challenges. 

Challenges and Trends in the Years Ahead

Having looked at the rises and falls in terrorism and insurgency in Southeast 

Asia over the last 25 years, we now turn to the future. Although trying to 

predict what terrorism might look like in another 25 years would be futile, it 

is useful to highlight existing challenges and developing trends in the political 

and social environment in Southeast Asia, as well as the threat, that are likely 

to shape the militant landscape now and in the immediate future.

Politicization of Religion in Indonesia and Malaysia

In Indonesia and Malaysia, there has been a gradually mounting sense of 

unease over what observers consider to be a potentially dangerous rise in 

more conservative forms of Islam, coupled with increasingly assertive political activism and the willingness of politicians to cater to these movements 

in order to expand their base of supporters. The controversial conviction of 

the former governor of Jakarta on charges of blasphemy in 2017 exemplifies this trend. The fact that Indonesian President Joko Widodo then chose 

a conservative cleric—Ma’ruf Amin, who has supported fatwas restricting 

the rights of religious minorities and homosexuals—as his running mate 

in the 2019 elections is further evidence of the growing religious influence 

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in politics. This can also be seen in Malaysia, where the hardline Parti Islam 

Malaysia (PAS)—which advocates stoning—has grown in strength to the 

point that it is now part of the ruling coalition. 

Although the politicization of religious issues will not directly increase 

the risk of terrorism in either country, it is possible that, over time, it will 

gradually expand the space within which violent extremists are able to operate. As ever more conservative government policies are proposed (whether 

or not they are enacted), the more that extremists are likely to feel emboldened to promote their own agendas. The more politicized that notions of 

religion and identity become, the more polarized society is likely to be, and 

the greater the feelings of marginalization and frustration. These are gifts 

to extremist and terrorist recruiters, who are adept at exploiting such sentiments to generate support and convince new recruits to join their cause. 

Should political maneuvering around the topic of religion intensify in Southeast Asia in the months and years ahead, it is therefore possible that violent 

jihadists will be able to exploit this to their advantage. 

Instability in the Southern Philippines

In the Philippines, optimism resulting from the various gains that have 

been made in Mindanao is constrained by the recognition that the reality on 

the ground is still highly conducive to the potential resurgence of terrorist 

groups in the region. Because of continued delays in the reconstruction of 

Marawi (popularly believed to be the result of corruption), tens of thousands of people are still unable to return home more than two-and-a-half 

years since the siege was brought to an end.21 It has repeatedly been warned 

that terrorists in the area are seeking to capitalize on this growing sense of 

frustration and anger at the government, which may enable ASG and others 

to rebound.22

Compounding this situation is the fact that as the peace process with 

the MILF gradually progresses, there are likely to be hardliners and others 

who become disillusioned and seek a return to violence. In September 2019, 

interim Chief Minister Ahod “Al Haj Murad” Ebrahim of the Bangsamoro 

Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (who also serves as the chair of 

the MILF), admitted that running a government is three times as difficult as 

running a revolution, pointing to budgetary gaps and bureaucratic challenges.23 The Bangsamoro Transition Authority (BTA) which runs the BARMM 

government, has until 2022 to iron out these issues and demonstrate the 

capability to govern in preparation for elections that year. Its ability to do so, 

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and the related outcome of the elections, will greatly impact local support for 

the BARMM. The more that it struggles, the greater support there is likely to 

be for ASG, the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters, or others who seek 

to undermine the peace process. 

The Rohingya Refugee Crisis

There are approximately one million Rohingya refugees still in Bangladesh 

and although ARSA has not been particularly active in Myanmar since 2017, 

reports suggest that it is active inside refugee camps and is using the time to 

regroup in preparation for future attacks.24 Whatever the present strength of 

the organization, there is currently no end in sight to the Rohingya’s predicament and little prospect of them returning home. Citing security concerns, 

the Bangladeshi government has begun implementing tighter measures of 

control, to include restriction of internet access and building of fences.25

Educational and other basic services are also lacking, leaving Islamist groups 

to fill the void.26 Although there is thus far no evidence of collaboration 

between ARSA and transnational jihadists, both al-Qaeda and ISIS have expressed support for the Rohingya’s cause and there has been a handful of 

cases where jihadist individuals have been arrested for attempting to infiltrate 

the area or for plotting attacks against Burmese targets.27

For the time being, the Rohingya issue remains a slow-burning crisis and 

has not transformed into a major rallying point for jihadists. However, the 

longer it goes on, the greater chance that this might happen, either because 

the situation flares up again or because entrepreneuring terrorists are able to 

establish inroads into the region. In the longer term, it is also quite possible 

that the next generation of Rohingya militants (many of whom will now 

be children languishing in refugee camps with memories of atrocities fresh 

in their minds) will grow up to be more radical than the current crop of 

insurgents. 

Returning Foreign Fighters, “Home-Grown” Cells and 

Lone Actors

One of the biggest shared concerns for Southeast Asia in 2020 is the eventual, if not imminent return of foreign fighters and their families from the 

region, who are currently in Syria.

One way or another, at least some of these individuals are thus likely to 

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pled with specialized reintegration programs, some are likely to reoffend.28

Of course this could include planning and conducting attacks, but arguably 

the bigger danger is that returnees will help to expand, reconsolidate and 

reinvigorate jihadist networks in the region. Importantly, this process could 

play out over many years.

Of course, returning foreign fighters and their families cannot be viewed 

in isolation from the broader pool of “home-grown” cells and lone actors, 

who may or may not be affiliated with organizations such as JAD and ASG. 

This includes deportees and others who tried, but were unsuccessful, in their 

bid to get to Syria, along with others still who opt for local courses of action. 

Connections to established groups are not always clear and the offenders 

often rely upon close-knit family relationships instead. This, combined with 

a willingness to sometimes strike opportunistically using readily available 

weapons, means they can be especially difficult to detect before they act. 

Looking ahead, we can expect to see more (semi)autonomous acts of terrorism in Indonesia in particular. Similar cases may emerge in Singapore and 

Malaysia, but there they are more likely to be detected, thanks to tighter security in those countries. In the Philippines, where the environment is more 

permissive, organizations such as ASG will remain the primary threat.

The Syria Detainees

According to the authorities, there are 689 Indonesians and 56 Malaysians detained in Syria, plus unknown (but likely relatively small) numbers from other 

Southeast Asian nations. Although pressure has been mounting for countries to 

repatriate their citizens, they have been slow to act. Malaysian authorities have 

reported that they are still working to bring home those who are willing to do 

so, but have not taken any decisive action. Meanwhile, Indonesia announced 

in February 2020 that after having assessed the risk, Syria detainees would be 

barred from coming home, with the possible exception of some children under 

the age of 10. Nevertheless, it is hard to imagine such large numbers of people—mostly women and children—remaining where they are indefinitely, particularly when the conflict eventually comes to a close. The fact that both Turkey 

and Iraq have begun deporting terrorism suspects and their families shows that 

countries in or near the conflict zone may take the matter into their own hands.

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Women and Children in Terrorism in Southeast Asia

Non-jihadist groups like the NPA have long used women and children in combatant roles. Similarly, the MILF made use of child soldiers for many years. As 

documented by the Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC), women within 

jihadist organizations such as JI historically played key, nonviolent roles, raising 

funds and helping to expand and strengthen networks through marriage but 

were forbidden from fighting. JI also invested a great deal of time indoctrinating 

children in a network of boarding schools that served as recruitment centers and 

“marriage marts.”

Women and Children in Terrorism

As many of the above examples allude to, a defining feature of jihadist terrorism in the age of ISIS has been the increasing involvement of women 

and children, including in acts of violence. 

What has changed is the mobilization and recruitment of women and 

children in greater numbers, and the acceptance and utilization of them in 

more prominent roles—most notably, conducting attacks. This was clearly 

reflected in the large numbers of women and children who traveled from 

Southeast Asia to Syria, beginning around 2012. Among those currently still 

in Syria, it seems that the majority are women and children. For example, of 

the 56 Malaysians who have been identified, 19 are men, 12 are women, 17 

are boys and eight are girls.29 If these proportions turn out to be similar for 

Indonesia, it would mean there are close to 150 women and more than 300 

children from that country still in Syria. In most cases, it will be extremely 

difficult to verify whether they have been involved in violence. However, in 

the current climate, both past and future violent conduct, along with involvement in activities such as proselytizing and fundraising, must be regarded as 

very real possibilities. Of course, this also applies to female extremists and 

their children who never left home. 

The participation of women and children in suicide bomb plots and 

attacks in Indonesia since 2016; the arrest of Malaysia’s first female ISIS 

bomb-plotter in May 2018; and the participation of women in suicide bombings in the Philippines in January and September 2019 are all testimony to 

the severity of this threat. 

Attacks involving minors, while unlikely to become the norm, will probably be emulated in future, if only by a small number of ultra-hardcore extremists. As for the involvement of women in conducting attacks, the genie 

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The Surabaya Bombings

The Surabaya bombings of May 2018 were particularly shocking. Five teenagers 

plus another five children between the ages of seven and 12 were used as suicide bombers, or were present at the bomb-factory in Sidarjo when it exploded 

on the evening of May 13. Analysts have since debated whether this marks the 

beginning of a new phase of violent jihad, where children will be used like this 

on a regular basis. It is worth noting that jihadists themselves are divided on the 

issue. As reported by IPAC, imprisoned JAD leader Aman Abdurrahman issued a 

statement afterwards condemning the use of children, saying the attacks “could 

not have been undertaken by people who understand the teachings of Islam and 

the demands of jihad. They could not come from sane people.” However, others 

vehemently disagreed and a precedent has clearly been set.

appears to be well and truly out of the bottle. At the very least, they can be 

expected to play essential roles in repairing, sustaining and expanding jihadi networks as the movement seeks to recuperate from its recent battering. 

Countries in the region would therefore be wise not to underestimate this 

threat, and to ensure that they are adequately prepared. 

A Possible Comeback for Jemaah Islamiyah

As noted above, JI (which remains pro-al-Qaeda and anti-ISIS), faded into 

obscurity around 2007. In 2008, they appointed a new leader, Para Wijayanto, and made a conscious decision to focus on dawah (proselytizing), which 

they believed would be more productive than amaliyah (armed jihad).30

Following a process of reorganization, they embarked on a fairly extensive campaign to recruit within universities and established a network of 

educational institutions, ranging from kindergartens to high schools.31 Professionals have also been targeted for recruitment. These efforts have been 

complemented by the acquisition of legitimate businesses, including cacao 

and palm oil plantations, in order to generate funds.32

In May 2014, JI’s military wing suffered a severe setback after Densus 

88 raided one of its weapons factories, arresting several key operatives in the 

process.33 In May 2018, police arrested some of JI’s Syria returnees and a year 

later they finally caught up to Wijayanto on terrorism charges dating back to 

his involvement in the Christmas Eve bombings in the year 2000.34 As these 

developments show, Indonesian authorities have not taken their eyes off of 

JI, despite the more immediate threat from JAD and others. The group is 

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Jemaah Islamiyah’s Position on Violence

While JI’s leadership maintains that armed attacks are likely to be counterproductive, given their relative strength compared to the government of Indonesia, they have not abandoned violent jihad entirely, according to IPAC. In 2010, 

they formed a new military wing, which manufactured weapons and provided 

paramilitary training to JI recruits in order to prepare them for eventual, violent 

confrontation in pursuit of an Islamic State. From 2012, JI organized dozens of 

fundraising events for Syria and, though it is unclear how much was raised, the 

bogus charity that they used to handle the funds (Hilal Ahmar Society Indonesia) 

was later designated as a terrorist entity by the UN for sending cash and medical supplies to Ahrar al-Sham and al-Qaeda’s representative in the region, Jabhat 

al-Nusra (JN). Furthermore, as reported by the South China Morning Post, from 

2013 to 2018, JI sent at least 14 of their men to Syria to receive paramilitary 

training. 

tinued interest in acquiring and maintaining militant capabilities. Nevertheless, 

they have been able to rebuild a significant amount of capacity during the last 

decade and reportedly had as many as 2,000 members as of late 2019.35 Moreover, the danger is that some within their ranks become disillusioned with the 

group’s current position on the use of force (not to mention disgruntled at 

the arrest of their leader) and break away to form yet another splinter group 

committed to violence.36 In the event that this occurs, it could present a challenge not only for Indonesia, but for Southeast Asia and beyond. 

Conclusion

The past 25 years in Southeast Asia have been turbulent. We have seen the 

rise and fall of al-Qaeda-driven jihadist terrorism in the early to mid-2000s; 

the dramatic escalation of separatist and communist insurgencies in Thailand and the Philippines, respectively, beginning in the mid-to-late 2000s; the 

even more dramatic impact of the war in Syria and Iraq and the rise of ISIS 

from 2012 onwards; and the emergence of what now looks like a long-term 

humanitarian crisis, triggered by a low-level insurgency and indiscriminate 

government crackdown in Myanmar in 2017. Looking at the graph in Figure 

7.1, it is clear that overall, terrorism has increased during the last two-and-ahalf decades. The number of attacks has been on the decline in the region 

since peaking in 2013 and there have been some notable successes, such 

as the reduced levels of violence in Thailand, the successful peace accords 

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with GAM and the (near) completion of the peace process with the MILF. 

However, the number of incidents recorded in 2018 was almost eight times 

higher than in 1995.37 

What can we learn from this? Clearly, terrorist groups in Southeast Asia 

have varied their activities in response to a complex array of factors, some internal to the region, others external. For jihadists, arguably the primary driving influences have been external: namely, the incidence of conflict and the 

related strength and prominence of foreign terrorist organizations (first in 

Afghanistan, later in Syria). These greatly impacted overall support for their 

cause and provided them with much-needed resources. In between conflicts, these groups have turned their attention to domestic issues, criminality 

and—in the case of JI—nonviolent capacity building, and have struggled 

to maintain relevance. The activities of separatists and communists, on the 

other hand, appear to have varied more in relation to domestic conditions, 

including the willingness of governments to negotiate or make concessions; 

the practical opportunities available to them to organize, recruit and acquire 

materiel; the degree of popular support; and their own internal organizational integrity.38 

In all cases, pressure from the military and law enforcement makes a 

significant difference. It is vital for constraining the activities of terrorists, 

disrupting their operations and degrading their strength. However, heavyhanded tactics have at times undermined the legitimacy of governments in 

the region and contributed to escalations in violence and instability. Just as 

importantly (though it may seem like a cliché), it is clear that “hard” counterterrorism tactics alone are insufficient to bring about a lasting reduction in 

the threat. Specific groups and individuals may come and go, but each type 

of terrorism has proven to be remarkably resilient. This is not to suggest that 

governments of the region should simply capitulate to terrorists’ demands, 

or abandon the use of force in favor of negotiations. However, it must be 

realized that if legitimate grievances and underlying causal conditions are left 

unaddressed, the cycle of violence will continue indefinitely. Currently, there 

is little hope for meaningful peace talks with the region’s two most active insurgencies—the loose conglomeration of groups in southern Thailand and 

the NPA in the Philippines. Not only does this suggest that attacks by these 

groups will once again rise when conditions are ripe. It also means that, 

due to continued instability, the so-called “root causes” of terrorism—poverty, unemployment, political marginalization and corruption—will persist. 

Though they may be fighting for a different cause, these are also conditions 

that violent jihadists routinely exploit. 

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The Impact of the Coronavirus Pandemic

In the short-term, the coronavirus pandemic does not appear to have resulted 

in a significant escalation of terrorism in Southeast Asia. This is despite the fact 

that terrorists are trying to exploit the situation to their advantage in various 

ways, including propaganda, recruitment, fundraising, and conducting attacks 

(most notably so far in the Philippines and Indonesia). The lack of immediate 

escalation of violence is likely due to several reasons. To begin with, temporary ceasefires were declared by different sides in the Philippines, Thailand 

and Myanmar. Meanwhile, in Indonesia, many ISIS supporters believe that the 

pandemic is a great plague foretold in the hadith, or else signifies the coming 

End of Times. In either case, this means they should stay at home and prepare 

themselves, rather than go out and conduct attacks. Perhaps more importantly, 

the closure of borders and enforcement of checkpoints, curfews and lockdowns 

throughout the region has surely made it more difficult for terrorists to move 

around. According to Rommel Banlaoi of the Philippine Institute for Peace, Violence and Terrorism, this has “enormously” reduced the flow of foreign fighters 

to the Philippines. 

Nevertheless, the pandemic may still exacerbate terrorism in the region in 

the medium to long-term. Widespread unemployment and economic hardship, 

combined with already evident rising social and sectarian tensions, are likely 

to result in significant levels of marginalization, desperation and anger, making 

more people potentially susceptible to terrorists’ ongoing recruitment efforts. 

Governments will also come under increasing financial pressure, meaning that 

in future, counterterrorism may be deprioritized in favor of public health and 

economic recovery. The degree to which terrorists are able to take advantage 

of this situation will largely depend on how well governments in the region are 

able to navigate the many challenges ahead, while also maintaining social cohesion and the trust of their citizenry. This will be no easy task.

For the time being, terrorism in Southeast Asia appears to be on a gradual downward trend. However, all of the groups currently in existence are 

likely to remain enduring features of the militant landscape. There are no 

signs of their imminent defeat and, if history is anything to go by, we will see 

a resurgence of violence at some point in the future. As discussed above, this 

may be precipitated by political and social conditions in the region, to include 

politicization of religion and identity; instability in the southern Philippines; 

and the Rohingya refugee crisis. Events outside of the region—especially 

conflicts in which jihadists are involved—may also play an important role. At 

the tactical and operational levels, authorities will have to adapt to changing 

threat dynamics. Specific concerns in the near-term include (returning) foreign fighters; home-grown cells and lone actors; the involvement of women 

and children in terrorism; the possible reemergence of JI; not to mention 

ever-evolving terrorist tactics. On top of all this, the region must also now 

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contend with the coronavirus pandemic, which is likely to complicate, if 

not accelerate, many of these trends.

Whether dealing with separatists, communists, or indeed jihadists, 

governments would do well to identify legitimate grievances and contributing political and social conditions they might be able to address. This 

must be paired with a surgical approach to CT operations that avoids 

excessive use of force and is situated within an overall strategy that is not 

only comprehensive but also long term. Few governments attempt to 

plan much more than four or five years into the future. By comparison, 

during its hiatus from violence, JI came up with a 25-year plan to achieve 

its goals.39 If terrorism in Southeast Asia is to be sustainably reduced to 

“acceptable” levels, it will require a similarly patient approach that is farseeing yet also cognizant of history.

Notes

1 Max V. Soliven, “How Easily We Forget What the Abus and MILF Can Do: Remember Ipil?” Philippine Star, March 6, 2002, https://www.philstar.com/opin- ion/2002/03/06/152845/how-easily-we-forget-what-abus-and-milf-can-do-rememberipil; “World News Briefs; Filipino Troops Corner Rebels After Attack,” New York Times, April 7, 1995, https://www.nytimes.com/1995/04/07/world/world-news-briefs-filipi- no-troops-corner-rebels-after-attack.html.

2 Note that decades earlier, a group calling itself the ‘Mindanao Revolutionary Coun- cil for Independence’ had taken control over Marawi in 1972 from October 21-24 (see 

Alan R. Luga, “Muslim Insurgency in Mindanao, Philippines” (Master’s diss., U.S. Army 

Command and General Staff College, 2002), 39, https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/

u2/a406868.pdf.

3 Sidney Jones, “The Ongoing Extremist Threat in Indonesia,” Southeast Asian Affairs (2011): 91-104, https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/41418639.pdf; Cameron Sumpter, 

“Indonesian Jihadism: Increased Intensity but Familiar Strategy,” Strategist, June 6, 

2017, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/indonesian-jihadism-increased-intensity-famil- iar-strategy/.

4 Kirsten E. Schulze, The Free Aceh Movement (GAM): Anatomy of a Separatist Organiza- tion (Washington DC: East-West Center, 2004), https://www.eastwestcenter.org/publi- cations/free-aceh-movement-gam-anatomy-separatist-organization.

5 Ibid.

6 Peter Chalk, The Malay-Muslim Insurgency in Southern Thailand: Understanding the Conflict’s Evolving Dynamic (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2008), https://www.rand.org/ content/dam/rand/pubs/occasional_papers/2008/RAND_OP198.pdf.

7 Zachary Abuza, “No End in Sight for Thailand’s Deadly Southern Insurgency,” The 

Diplomat, July 18, 2017, https://thediplomat.com/2017/07/no-end-in-sight-for-thai- lands-deadly-southern-insurgency/; Matthew Wheeler, “Behind the Insurgent Attack in 

Southern Thailand,” International Crisis Group, November 8, 2019, https://www.crisis- group.org/asia/south-east-asia/thailand/behind-insurgent-attack-southern-thailand.

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Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific

8 “Hopes for Peace as Filipino Negotiators Break Deadlock,” France 24, July 17, 2008, https://www.france24.com/en/20080717-peace-talks-muslim-deadlock-philippinesMILF-mindanao-filipino; Global Terrorism Database.

9 John Unson, “ARMM Turns over Power to Bangsamoro Authority,” Philippine Star, February 27, 2019, https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2019/02/27/1897169/armmturns-over-power-bangsamoro-authority. 

10 Global Terrorism Database. 

11 Edwin G. Espejo, “The New People’s Army in Mindanao: A Growing or De- clining Force?” ABS CBN News, February 2, 2009, https://news.abs-cbn.com/ features/02/02/09/new-people%E2%80%99s-army-mindanao-growing-or-decliningforce.

12 Peter Chalk, “The Philippines’ Continued Success Against Extremists,” CTC Sentinel

2, no. 8 (August 2009): 1-4, https://ctc.usma.edu/the-philippines-continued-successagainst-extremists/; Francis Domingo, “The Leadership Crisis in the Communist Party 

of the Philippines-New People’s Army,” Small Wars Journal, 2012, https://smallwars- journal.com/jrnl/art/the-leadership-crisis-in-the-communist-party-of-the-philippinesnew-people’s-army.

13 Global Terrorism Database. 

14 “Myanmar: A New Muslim Insurgency in Rakhine State,” International Crisis Group, December 15, 2016, https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/myanmar/283-

myanmar-new-muslim-insurgency-rakhine-state.

15 “Burma Ethnic Violence Escalates as Villagers Flee,” The Guardian, June 12, 2012, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/jun/12/burma-ethnic-violence-escalates; 

“Myanmar’s Rohingya Crisis Enters a Dangerous New Phase,” International Crisis Group, December 7, 2017, https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/myanmar/292-

myanmars-rohingya-crisis-enters-dangerous-new-phase.

16 Desmond Ng, “Islamic State Fighters Heading Home: Is Southeast Asia Ready?” Channel News Asia, July 25, 2019, https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/cnainsider/ isis-fighters-heading-home-is-southeast-asia-ready-terror-threat-11750854.

17 Hannah Beech and Jason Gutierrez, “How ISIS Is Rising in the Philippines as It Dwindles in the Middle East,” New York Times, March 9, 2019, https://www.nytimes. com/2019/03/09/world/asia/isis-philippines-jolo.html.

18 “Malaysia Says Islamic State May Shift Operations to Southeast Asia,” Reuters, No- vember 26, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-malaysia-security/malaysia-saysislamic-state-may-shift-operations-to-southeast-asia-idUSKBN1Y10JV. 

19 Fathiya Wardah and Rika Hussein, “Indonesia Arrests Dozens of People with Alleged IS Ties,” VOA News, November 22, 2019, https://www.voanews.com/extrem- ism-watch/indonesia-arrests-dozens-people-alleged-ties.

20 Ibid.

21 Jeoffrey Maitem and Richel V. Umel, “Philippine NGO: Delays in Rebuilding Marawi Fuel IS Recruitment,” Benar News, February 18, 2020, https://www.benarnews. org/english/news/philippine/philippines-militants-02182020151058.html.

22 Ibid.

23 Carolyn O. Arguillas, “Murad: Running a Government Is Thrice More Difficult than Running a Revolution,” Minda News, September 14, 2019, https://www.mindanews. com/peace-process/2019/09/murad-running-a-government-is-thrice-more-difficultthan-running-a-revolution/.

24 “Building a Better Future for Rohingya Refugees in Bangladesh,” International Crisis 

Group, April 25, 2019, https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/myanmar/

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Terrorism and Insurgency in Southeast Asia

b155-building-better-future-rohingya-refugees-bangladesh; Naomi Conrad, Stefan 

Czimmek, and Arafatul Islam, “Rohingya Militants Active in Bangladeshi Refugee Camps,” Deutsche Welle, September 24, 2019, https://www.dw.com/en/rohingya- militants-active-in-bangladeshi-refugee-camps/a-50490888; Eugene Whong, “Rohingya 

Militants Urged to Halt Atrocities That ‘Mirror the Myanmar Army,’” Radio Free 

Asia, March 14, 2019, https://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/arsa-video-mes- sage-03142019170333.html. 

25 Ruma Paul, “Bangladesh Blocks Internet Services in Rohingya Refugee Camps,” Reuters, September 3, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bangladesh-rohingya/ bangladesh-blocks-internet-services-in-rohingya-refugee-camps-idUSKCN1VO1WQ.

26 “Banned from Bangladesh Schools, Rohingya Children Are Exposed to Extremism in Madrasas,” South China Morning Post, June 18, 2019, https://www.scmp.com/news/ asia/south-asia/article/3015010/banned-bangladesh-schools-rohingya-children-areexposed. 

27 See Sam Mullins, “Terrorism in the Indo-Pacific: The Year Gone By and the Road Ahead,” Security Nexus, January 24, 2020, 13-14, https://apcss.org/wp-content/ uploads/2020/01/Terrorism-in-the-Indo-Pacific-The-Year-Gone-by-and-the-RoadAhead-012420.pdf. 

28 Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, Colin P. Clarke, and Samuel Hodgson, “Foreign Terrorist Fighters from Southeast Asia: What Happens Next?” International Centre for Counter-Ter- rorism, February 17, 2020, https://icct.nl/publication/foreign-terrorist-fighters-from- southeast-asia-what-happens-next/.

29 Nisha David, “Malaysia: IS Extremists Campaigning to Keep Fighters in Syria,” Benar News, January 30, 2020, https://www.benarnews.org/english/news/malaysian/ ideological-campaign-01302020151027.html.

30 “The Re-Emergence of Jemaah Islamiyah,” Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, April 27, 2017, http://file.understandingconflict.org/file/2017/04/IPAC_Report_36.pdf.

31 Amy Chew, “Why a Resurgent Jemaah Islamiah in Indonesia Is Also Bad News for Malaysia and Singapore,” South China Morning Post, July 7, 2019, https://www.scmp. com/week-asia/society/article/3017465/why-resurgent-jemaah-islamiah-indonesiaalso-bad-news-malaysia; “Re-Emergence of Jemaah Islamiyah.”

32 Ibid.

33 “Re-Emergence of Jemaah Islamiyah.”

34 Amy Chew, “Indonesia’s Arrest of Jemaah Islamiah Leader Involved in Bali Bomb- ings Exposes Active Recruitment to Create Caliphate,” South China Morning Post, July 1, 2019, https://www.scmp.com/news/asia/southeast-asia/article/3016833/indonesiasarrest-ji-leader-para-wijayanto-exposes.

35 Ardila Syakriah, “Threats Emerge from Dormant Extremists,” The Jakarta Post, October 11, 2019, https://thejakartapost.com/news/2019/10/11/threats-emergedormant-extremists.html.

36 “Re-Emergence of Jemaah Islamiyah.”

37 Global Terrorism Database.

38 This is not to suggest that these factors are irrelevant to jihadists, or that interna- tional factors do not play a role for separatists and others—merely that they play differ- ent roles, relatively speaking.

39 “Re-Emergence of Jemaah Islamiyah.”

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128
129

8

INCLUSIVE GOVERNANCE: 

LESSONS FROM HISTORY

Saira Yamin

The Case for Inclusive Governance

A few years ago, a survey on global religious diversity by the Pew Research Center revealed that half of the most religiously diverse countries 

are located in the Asia-Pacific region.1 Another study examining changes 

in religious freedoms in the decade between 2007-2017 found that government restrictions around the world are getting worse, including in the 

Asia-Pacific.2 The trend is often accompanied by social hostilities, including violence and harassment of religious minorities by private individuals, 

organizations, or groups.3 In making the case for inclusive governance, this 

chapter sheds light on religious exclusionary policies, in some instances 

combined with social hostilities by hardline religious groups, both drivers 

of political instability. It posits that trends in religious nationalism are also 

on the rise, showing a contagion effect across borders and endangering 

regional stability. It examines the evolving regional order shaped by the 

rise of an authoritarian China and its impact on human rights norms and 

institutions. It contends that China’s regional geostrategic positioning and 

expanding influence is precipitating authoritarian trends and restrictions 

on religious minorities. This complex dynamic in turn is fueling religious 

nationalist movements. In the final analysis, the chapter highlights lessons 

from the Mongolian empire; little remembered is its legacy of secular politics, religious coexistence, and multiculturalism, potentially a way forward 

for the Asia-Pacific region. 
Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific

Exclusionary Policies and Rising Religious Nationalism

Religious restrictions and widespread social hostilities are on the rise, fomenting political violence and instability in a number of states. Sometimes 

they manifest in religious nationalist movements involving polarizing rhetoric: advancing the political legitimacy and primacy of an in-group while 

demonizing minority religious or ethno-religious groups and voices of dissent. Hostile social attitudes and behaviors promoting radical ideologies 

and political extremism pose a direct threat to state stability. Of pressing 

concern is the violation of the human rights of out-groups, often comprising religious minorities.

The impact of religious nationalism as a threat to national security 

is compounded when social discourses delegitimizing a religious identity 

group are condoned or supported by the state, an indicator of systemic 

inequality. This interactive process perpetuates a vicious cycle of discrimination and hostility so intimately intertwined that sometimes it is difficult 

to ascertain how it originated and who instigated it, the state or right-wing 

groups. Exclusionary policies and rhetoric embolden ultranationalist religious groups and exacerbate the societal perception of threat grounded in 

religious differences. 

The South Asian Conundrum

The combination of exclusionary policies and social hostilities undermines good governance. This has been especially the case in South Asia, 

featuring some of the most notable cases in the region.4 In recent decades, 

this postcolonial subregion, navigating a political trajectory checkered by 

authoritarian rule and a relatively new experience with democracy has experienced this complex dynamic in various forms and degrees. The experience of each country has been unique, shaped by its history, culture, politics, economics, and many external influences. Undoubtedly, South Asia 

is amongst the fastest growing economic subregions of the world, yet the 

surge in sectarian politics is holding it back from reaching its full potential. 

Pakistan offers one such case study. While the vast majority of Pakistanis practice a moderate version of Islam, polarizing discourses on the 

place of religion in government, and politically expedient alliances between mullahs (religious clerics) and ruling elites, have over the years, become fertile grounds for religious exclusion. This is partly an outcome of 

flawed national security policies and political misuse of religion. Exclusionary policies include anti-Ahmadi laws (1974) targeting a minority Mus130
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lim sect, and a series of anti-blasphemy laws introduced by General Zia ul 

Haq, Pakistan’s longest-serving dictator, in the 1980s.5 The anti-blasphemy 

laws make the death sentence mandatory for anyone defiling the name 

of Prophet Muhammad and prescribe life imprisonment for defiling the 

Quran. The ambiguous nature of these laws has contributed to the persecution of religious minorities and vulnerable Muslims to settle personal 

scores. The most comprehensive data available, collected between 1987 

and 2016, suggest that at least 1472 people have been charged with blasphemy including 730 Muslims, 501 Ahmadi Muslims, 205 Christians, and 

26 Hindus.6 While no one has been executed under these laws, the policies 

have enabled religious and sectarian violence, terrorism, and a crisis of 

assimilation. 

Contrary to the spirit of religious pluralism envisioned by Pakistan’s 

founding father, M.A. Jinnah, exclusionary policies have significantly impeded societal cohesion and economic development.7

 Efforts by elites to 

undo these laws have led to political assassinations. While there are no 

easy solutions, advancing a whole-of-government and -society approach 

to build a moderate vision for Pakistan may foster a much-needed national 

consensus. 

Bangladesh, widely recognized as a secular nation, has also been 

grappling with the rise of religious nationalism, although the process has 

been relatively insidious. Since independence in 1971, the construction of 

its national identity has been contested by different streams of society. 

While secularism was embraced as one of the foundational principles, it 

has gradually eroded due to the infusion of religion and authoritarianism 

in politics. The country’s secular moorings have partly been undermined 

by long periods of military rule. Consequently, civilian rule tends to be 

authoritarian in character. While the use of religion by Bangladeshi politicians has not been particularly stringent, it has nonetheless emboldened 

religious fundamentalists.8 Bangladeshi society has come under the influence of transnational extremist groups and more than a hundred incidents 

of Islamist terrorism have been recorded during the past decade.9 Since 

2013, an increasing number of religious minorities, secular bloggers, and 

atheists have become victims of extremist violence by religious mobs. To 

quote Lailufar Yasmin, the question central to political and social narratives 

remains, “is it a country of secular Bengalis or Muslim Bangladeshis?”10

Yasmin refers to the competing discourses on religion and nationalism as 

the nation’s “split personality.”11 Going forward, a key challenge for the 

state will be its ability to restrict the space for religious nationalists and 

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steer the country towards its core foundational principles, fostering greater 

inclusion, political stability, and more robust economic growth. 

The island nation of Sri Lanka is one of Asia’s oldest democracies 

and a cultural melting pot. This trajectory, however, is being tested by a resurgence in Sinhalese-Buddhist nationalism. Despite Buddhism’s pacifist 

doctrine, ultraradical Buddhist monks have been at the forefront of hate 

speech, riots, arson, and mob violence targeting minority groups. Their 

narrative holds that the island is exclusively for Sinhala Theravada Buddhists. Hardline Buddhist organizations such as the Bodu Bala Sena have 

been key players in past conflicts between the majority Sinhalese Buddhists and Hindu Tamils. A long history of political disenfranchisement 

among minority Tamils, mostly Hindus, led to nearly three decades of civil 

war ultimately ending in 2009. Despite the government’s best efforts, the 

post-conflict peacebuilding process in the northern province of Jaffna has 

not been easy. In more recent years, the island’s Muslim and Christian minorities have been targeted.12 Media reports suggest that ruling elites may 

have condoned religious nationalism contributing to the surge in attacks 

against minorities.13 In preventing conflict and sustaining its impressive 

economic growth, Sri Lanka may consider both top-down and bottomup approaches to promote greater religious tolerance and harmony in its 

pluralistic landscape. 

Inevitably, in all three cases, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka, 

there is evidence of transnational influences and linkages. Notably however, despite exogenous factors, the threat is primarily rooted in internal 

conditions reflecting the relationship between religious nationalism and 

state legitimacy. Evidence suggests that the greater the mutually reinforcing interactions between religious nationalist groups and ruling elites, the 

greater the likelihood of systematic exclusion. The state response to societal attitudes and behavior toward minority groups may therefore serve 

as a reliable indicator for forecasting the likelihood of political instability. 

Religious freedoms and state responses to social hostilities are an area 

of special concern. Public policy on religious inclusion and tolerance is 

necessary for shaping societal attitudes and promoting national cohesion. 

In the event of hostilities, states must act swiftly to uphold the rule of 

law. The provision and protection of religious freedoms is an indicator 

of commitment to international human rights norms. When international 

norms are violated by a state, they bear the potential for producing a contagion effect. When they are violated by a great power, it is even more likely to have a contagion, especially in neighboring states. It is in this context 

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that China’s policies toward minorities are considered a threat to regional 

peace and are examined below. 

The Chinese Model and Regional Human Rights Norms

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) officially subscribes to state atheism 

and prohibits religious belief among its rank and file. Although freedom 

of religious belief is provided for in Article 36 of the Constitution, such 

affiliations are viewed as political dissidence and are grounds for expulsion 

from the CCP. While religious intolerance has historically been a feature of 

policies adopted by the People’s Republic of China state-sanctioned persecution of religious minorities has intensified in recent decades. Minority 

groups at greatest risk include Christians, Tibetan Buddhists, and Uyghur 

Muslims. Exclusionary practices are evident in the imprisonment of pastors and priests, and demolition of Christian churches and Tibetan Buddhist institutions. Their religious activities have been restricted and placed 

under surveillance.14 The repression of approximately 13 million Muslims, 

native to and—in the case of the Uyghurs—namesake of China’s largest 

province, Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), has been particularly acute and is worth taking a closer look. 

Exclusionary Policies toward Uyghur Muslims

The religious freedoms of Uyghur Muslims have been restricted by increasingly harsh legislation through both covert and overt policies over 

the years. These include regulations and amendments on religious activities in 1994, 1998, 2000, and 2001.15 According to Human Rights Watch, 

the government has restricted the scope of what is deemed “normal” religious activity, application of the “anti-separatist” clause to “all citizens 

who profess a religion,” and clamped down on religious organizations and 

publications with heavier penalties.16 Following the September 11, 2001 

terrorist attacks, China found it opportune to label many of the Uyghurs 

and their mostly non-violent separatist movement as “terrorism,” launching its “Strike Hard, Severe Repression” campaign to detain and imprison 

thousands of Uyghurs.17 Since the late 1990s, thousands more have allegedly been sentenced to death and executed for religious practice or peaceful expressions of dissent.18 Uyghur Muslims are restricted from fasting 

and going to mosques during Ramadan and are generally not authorized 

to travel overseas or outside the province.19 Intrusive policies have ranged 

from the widespread use of facial recognition technologies, restricted ac133
Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific

cess to public spaces including shops, and violations of the sanctity of 

their homes by officials living there.20

Sinicization: The Indigenization of Religion

In 2017, the XUAR government enacted a law to assimilate Uyghurs into 

Han Chinese society under a national policy referred to as “Sinicization.” 

The policy, implemented in various regions including Tibet, is broadly understood as the indigenization of non-Han communities. It is designed to 

minimize the influence of other cultures and religious heritage. Under this 

policy, restrictions have been placed on face veils, beards, and eating halal

food.21 In the same vein, thousands of mosques have been razed, minarets 

have been taken down and onion domes replaced by traditional Chinese 

roofs under a “mosque rectification” campaign.22

Mass Detention Camps

One of the most controversial aspects of Chinese policy toward Uyghur 

minorities is their mass internment in more than 500 detention centers, a 

gross violation of fundamental human rights.23 Tracked via satellite imagery, these centers include suspected concentration camps, prisons, and 

Bingtuan labor camps.24 In documents leaked to the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists, the camps are described as a network 

of high-security prisons involving systematic brainwashing, surveillance, 

strict discipline, and punishment.25 In a new Frontline documentary, a 

Kazakh Muslim woman detained for 17 months, “remembers being surrounded by mesh and barbed wire, cameras everywhere and brutal treatment. Twice she says, she was made to sit on a hard chair for 24 hours. 

She went to the bathroom where she sat.”26 It is estimated that more than 

3 million Uyghurs and Turkic Muslims have been detained in what China 

dubs political “re-education camps” for offenses as minor as sporting a 

beard, speaking to a family member overseas, or observing Ramadan.27

China’s systematic persecution of Uyghur Muslims in tandem with its 

rising economic and political influence in neighboring countries, increases 

its potential to recast regional norms in its own mold. The ensuing discussion sheds light on this problematic situation with reference to state 

behavior toward religious minorities in neighboring India and Myanmar, 

countries demonstrating deteriorating trends. Despite being rich in religious and ethnocultural diversity, recent developments in these two states, 

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one rightfully the world’s largest democracy, and the other earnestly aspiring for the formation of a robust democratic system, do not augur well for 

the plight of religious minorities. The diagram below illustrates that policies and social behavior often tend to have a regional contagion effect with 

the probability increasing when it involves a great power, and particularly 

when countries have contiguous borders.

Regional Contagion: 

The Nexus between State and Society

Rooted in its history, Myanmar has a stunningly diverse religious and ethnic landscape. A visit to the country offers an array of old religious architecture, attesting to the harmonious coexistence of disparate religious 

communities and the freedoms they enjoyed. Symbolic of inclusivity are 

legacies of Buddhist kings, Mindon (1808-1878) and his successor Thibaw 

Min (1859-1916), who gave gifts of land to Muslim minorities to build 

mosques. Since 1962, however, waves of forced displacement of Rohingya Muslims have been triggered by exclusionary policies. Currently, 

Rohingya refugees constitute the second largest group of displaced communities in Asia. They also represent a segment of the global population 

of forcibly displaced people which has doubled in the past two decades. 

In the most recent exodus of Rohingya Muslim refugees beginning 

in August 2017, nearly a million were displaced from the western Rakhine state in “clearance operations” launched by the Tatmadaw, Myanmar’s 

Figure 8.1: Interactive and Dynamic Process of New Norm Setting and Regional 

Contagion of Religious Exclusion

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Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific

military, on the pretext of counterterrorism. The policy rhetoric has been 

similar to the Chinese response to Uyghur Muslims in the post 9/11 landscape. It is important to note that China has a direct economic stake in 

the displacement of Rohingyas as it is building a gas pipeline from the Rakhine state to Kunming in Southwest China. The project also gives China 

significant economic leverage over Myanmar. Of the recently displaced 

Rohingyas, an estimated 900,000 fled to Bangladesh, nearly 100,000 to 

Malaysia, and 40,000 to India.28 Over the decades, Rohingyas have found 

refuge in a number of countries in Southeast Asia, South Asia, the Middle 

East, Australia, Europe, and North America.29

As illustrated in the above diagram, exclusionary policies and ultranationalist religious discourses tend to be interactive and reinforcing. Consider an incidence of mob violence in 2012, when the rape of a Buddhist 

woman allegedly by Muslims sparked massive street protests and violence 

leading to the detention of 140,000 Rohingyas.30 Detention centers for the 

Rohingyas have existed for years, lacking access to basics such as education 

or healthcare.31 Tens of thousands have tried to escape these detention 

camps by boat to find safety in other countries.32 Since the Rohingya boat 

people do not possess documentation, Myanmar has claimed they are not 

its citizens. The disavowal is grounded in a series of actions introduced by 

the military junta who ruled the country for nearly 50 years (1962-2011). 

These include policies introduced by General Ne Win in 1962, requiring 

communities to provide proof of their residence in Myanmar prior to 

1824,33 and the Burma Citizenship Act of 1982, limiting the Rohingyas’ 

rights of citizenship by declaring them illegal immigrants from Bangladesh.34 

Radical Buddhist actors are believed to have had a strong influence 

on the state’s exclusionary policies. Media reports suggest that the military’s clearance operations in Rakhine state were covertly supported by 

“local Rakhine Buddhist militias and vigilantes.”35 For many years now an 

ultranationalist Buddhist campaign has been fanning the flames of antiMuslim sentiment. Organized by the radical Ma Ba Tha, Organization for 

the Protection of Race and Religion, the movement seeks to purify the 

land from Muslims and other religious minorities. It has been particularly 

instrumental in the passage of a 2015 legislation titled “Race and Religion 

Protection Laws” explicitly barring Buddhist women from marrying outside the religion. The law allegedly targets Muslims. 

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Regional Mirroring of Religious Exclusion

While the interactive and dynamic effect of ultranationalist religious discourses and policy is undermining Myanmar’s democratic trajectory, it also 

appears to be spreading regionally, diminishing neighboring India’s secular 

character and global democratic standing. For many centuries, India has 

been home to some of the most diverse ethnic and religious communities 

in the world. In more recent history, its liberal democratic order has been 

defined by its unifying constitutional principles and leaders like Jawaharlal 

Nehru, India’s first Prime Minister who espoused secularism as a strategic 

vision, relevant even today. 

At the time of this writing, however, Delhi, one of the world’s greatest 

capitals, has barely recovered from the worst Hindu mob violence against 

Muslims in decades. It was triggered by the recently passed Citizenship 

Amendment Act of 2019 (CAA), amending an old law to facilitate citizenship for migrants of different faiths with the exception of Muslims.36 It 

has sparked widespread protests across Indian cities involving religious 

minorities as well as a secular civil society pushing back. A few months 

prior to the passage of the CAA, the government rolled out the National 

Register of Citizens (NRC) in the restive northeastern state of Assam. 

The NRC, too, is an exclusionary mechanism, generating a list of people 

identified by the government as bona fide citizens. It “effectively strips”37

nearly two million residents of Assam, mostly Muslim, from citizenship. 

In the meantime, the government is building detention camps for people who are not able to provide supporting evidence while calling other 

states to do the same.38 India’s planned detention of Muslim minorities is 

structurally similar to the exclusionary policies targeting religious minority 

groups in neighboring China and Myanmar. Presumably, once the government begins to haul people into detention camps, tens of thousands, if 

not more, may be forced to flee to other countries particularly if there are 

reports of human rights violations.39

The anti-Muslim posturing in India is often attributed to the rising 

influence of the Hindu nationalist organization Rashtriya Swayamsevak 

Sangh (RSS). The RSS is considered a Hindu supremacist group subscribing to Hindutva, an ideology seeking to establish the hegemony of Hindus 

and the Hindu way of life across all of India. Some Hindu nationalist 

politicians believe that India should be Hindu, not a secular nation. Accordingly, efforts to efface evidence of India’s Islamic history, by changing names of cities, streets, and airports, many of them legacies of 600 

years of Islamic rule, are underway. The campaign is part of a process 

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Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific

called “saffronization,” to remember and glorify India’s Hindu culture and 

heritage, while obliterating remnants of Islamic or Christian history and 

traditions.40 

Inclusive Governance: Lessons from the Mongol Empire

Noted in the annals of history as a fierce Mongol warrior-ruler, Genghis 

Khan (1162-1227), was the founder of the largest contiguous land empire. While mostly remembered as a barbarian, he left behind a legacy of 

secular politics, religious coexistence, multiculturalism, free trade, communication, and international rule of law. Like Janus, the Roman god of new 

beginnings, he was able to look in opposite directions and see both the 

past and the future. On the one hand, he conquered hundreds of cities, 

towns, and villages and is estimated to have killed 40 million men, women, 

and children; accounting for about 11% of the global population at the 

time. On the other, having conquered them, Genghis Khan championed 

religious diversity and inclusion to advance peace and stability across his 

empire. Born Temujin, he was bestowed the title Chenghez Khan, or the 

“Universal Ruler,” by the nomadic Mongol and Central Asian tribes whom 

he brought together under a unified Mongol empire. The honorific title 

was prophetic. At its peak, the Mongol empire stretched across some 12 

million square miles from what is now Mongolia to China and Central 

Asia, and the Middle East. 41 It lasted for more than 150 years (1206-1368). 

One of Genghis Khan’s greatest legacies is Pax Mongolica or Mongol 

Peace, a historiographical reference to the stabilizing effects engendered 

by Mongol influence on the social, cultural, and economic landscapes of 

territories conquered by him. In order to establish his political legitimacy, 

he adapted to local cultures, building on their best practices and encouraging innovation. He advanced Mongol gains in knowledge in newly conquered territories in genuine endeavors to develop them. Thereby he and 

his descendants transformed Eurasian cultures and civilizations in the 

13th and 14th centuries on many levels. Notably, they ushered in an era of 

significantly greater interconnectivity between the East and West through 

free trade (facilitated by their near complete control of the Silk Road), 

technological advances, and enlightened diplomacy. The modern concept 

of diplomatic immunity is traceable to their policy of granting protected 

travel. 

Although Genghis Khan did not subscribe to institutionalized religion he was widely viewed as a great unifier and assimilator of diverse 

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people. He was a visionary who sought to promote societal harmony and 

cohesion as a means to prevent rebellion and stabilize his vast multicultural empire. He upheld the principle of religious tolerance by passing laws 

granting religious freedom to all communities under his rule. Benefiting a 

wide diversity of people including Nestorian Christians, Buddhists, and 

Muslims, it set him apart from his contemporaries and is a reflection of 

both his genius and benevolence. His strategic paradigm was undoubtedly 

imperialistic as well as a win-win approach, helping to expand his influence 

and legitimacy while also eliciting cooperation. Notwithstanding Mongol 

adherence to Shamanism, an animistic belief system with little in common 

with more popular world religions, he accorded respect and complete religious freedom to all his subjects. 

Genghis Khan’s strategy was carried forward by his successors including his grandson Kublai Khan, the first Mongol to rule over China. 

Kublai Khan conquered the Song dynasty in southern China and founded the Yuan dynasty. Far from religious oppression and persecution, the 

Mongols offered tax benefits to leading foreign clerics including Muslims, 

Buddhists, and Christians alike, a tactic to win allies in newly conquered 

territories. Because the Mongols were so visibly inclusive of other faiths 

and ethnicities, it helped them maintain good foreign relations well beyond 

China where these communities wielded influence. This was especially 

true of Mongol relations with Muslims, resulting in increased connectivity 

between Persia and West Asia. The Mongols were cognizant of Islamic 

advances in astronomy, medicine, and financial administration at the time 

and recruited the best minds to run the affairs of government and other 

fields. For example, Kublai Khan appointed many Muslims in administrative positions across the 12 districts of Yuan. According to Iranian historian Rashidud-Din-Fadlullah, eight of the 12 governors of these districts 

and all vice-governors were Muslim.42 Muslims also frequently served as 

tax collectors. Kublai Khan built many mosques in China demonstrating 

his unwavering commitment to religious tolerance and modernity. While 

Genghis Khan himself did not mobilize many resources for the construction of religious spaces, his son Ogedei, the second great Khan of the 

Mongol Empire, and subsequently, Kublai Khan, built many monasteries, 

mosques and churches. 

Karakorum, the old capital of the Mongol empire, one of the most 

important cities in the history of the Silk Road, stands testament. Described thus by the renowned explorer and historian, William of Rubruck, 

the first European to provide an account of his visit to the walled capital 

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Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific

in the 1250s, “There are twelve idol temples belonging to different peoples, two mosques where the religion of Mahomet is proclaimed, and one 

Christian church at the far end of the town.”43 Indeed, Karakorum was 

a most cosmopolitan city with people of different ethnic backgrounds 

including Mongols, steppe tribes, Han Chinese, Persians, Armenians, and 

Europeans living harmoniously.44 Therein are valuable lessons for advancing peace, stability, and socioeconomic development across the rich multicultural landscape in the Asia-Pacific region as elsewhere. 

Conclusion

Government restrictions on religious freedoms combined with rising religious nationalism are contributing to increasing instability in the AsiaPacific region. The interactive effects of this dynamic undermine the relationship between governments and citizens, sharpen preexisting societal 

cleavages and potentially increase the likelihood of civil unrest, conflict, 

and insurgency —evident in a number of states. Policies involving mass 

detention and citizenship-stripping, palpable in a regional contagion effect, 

have been particularly destabilizing. Unchecked, these trends could create 

exponentially more stateless and displaced communities across the world 

for a long time to come. Chronically displaced communities provide fertile 

grounds for human trafficking and radicalization by terrorist groups.45 Additionally, human insecurity associated with forced displacement involves 

disrupted livelihoods, food and health insecurity, and gender-based sexual 

violence, rendering the environment more complex and insecure for the 

victims as well as the region. It must be emphasized that the status of 

religious minorities in the Asia-Pacific is increasingly being threatened by 

China’s rapid rise and its capacity to redefine regional norms based on its 

authoritarian model and vested interests. 

Religious tolerance and inclusive governance are critical and necessary 

for systems based on justice and equality. Governments in plural societies 

should concern themselves with promoting religious inclusion as a strategic approach to advancing political stability and socioeconomic development. Pluralism in both religion and race should be celebrated and viewed 

as a win-win. States in the Asia-Pacific may consider leveraging their minority groups to build international alliances and expand their influence. 

They must also cultivate an awareness of the strengths of religious diversity and harness it as an asset in an increasingly interconnected world. 

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Notes

1 “Global Religious Diversity,” Pew Research Center, April 14, 2014, https://www. pewforum.org/2014/04/04/global-religious-diversity/.

2 Michael Lipka and Samirah Majumdar, “How Religious Restrictions Around the World Have Changed over a Decade,” Pew Research Center, July 16, 2019, https:// www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/07/16/how-religious-restrictions-around-theworld-have-changed-over-a-decade/; Lipka and Majumdar, “Appendix C: Religious Restrictions Index Scores by Region,” 92-93, https://www.pewforum.org/wp-con- tent/uploads/sites/7/2019/07/4-PF_19.07.15_Restrictions2019appendixC.pdf.

3 Lipka and Majumdar, “Appendix B: Social Hostilities Index,” 88-90, https:// www.pewforum.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/7/2019/07/3-PF_19.07.15_Restric- tions2019appendixB.pdf.

4 Ibid. 

5 Saira Yamin, “Religious Minorities in Pakistan,” Daily Times, February 23, 2004; Saira Yamin, “From State to Non-State Actors,” The News on Sunday, June 13, 2010.

6 “A Look at Pakistan’s Blasphemy Law over the Years,” Associated Press, October 

31, 2018, https://apnews.com/e04a5257f7994c35b2f3afe1f5a4413d.

7 Jinnah, in his first presidential address to the Constituent Assembly of Paki- stan on August 11, 1947, famously stated, “You are free; you are free to go to your 

temples. You are free to go to your mosques or to any other places of worship in this 

state of Pakistan. You may belong to any religion, caste or creed—that has nothing 

to do with the business of the state,” quoted in G. Allana, Pakistan Movement Historical 

Documents (Karachi: Department of International Relations, University of Karachi, 1969), 407-411.

8 Smruti S. Pattanaik, “Islamic Extremism and the Terror Network in Bangladesh,” in Religion and Security in South and Central Asia, ed. K. Warikoo (New York: Routledge, 2011), 96-114.

9 C. Christine Fair, Ali Hamza and Rebecca Heller, “Who Supports Suicide Ter- rorism in Bangladesh? What the Data Say,” Politics and Religion 10, no. 3 (September 2017): 622-661. 

10 Lailufar Yasmin, “Religion and After: Bangladeshi Identity Since 1971,” Open De- mocracy, April 19, 2013, https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/opensecurity/religion- and-after-bangladeshi-identity-since-1971/.

11 Ibid. 

12 Scott Neuman, “Sri Lanka Declares Emergency amid Buddhist Attacks on Minority Muslims,” NPR, March 7, 2018, https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo- way/2018/03/07/591468452/sri-lanka-declares-emergency-amid-buddhist-attackson-minority-muslims.

13 Dharisha Bastians and Gardiner Harris, “Buddhist-Muslim Unrest Boils over in 

Sri Lanka,” New York Times, June 16, 2014, https://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/17/ world/asia/deadly-religious-violence-erupts-in-sri-lanka.html; “Sharp Increase in Violence against Christians,” World Watch Monitor, October 29, 2018, https://www.

worldwatchmonitor.org/coe/sri-lanka-sharp-increase-in-violence-against-christians/.

14 “Sharp Increase in Violence against Christians,” World Watch Monitor; Cathy Sun, “Different but the Same: Religious Persecution in China,” Harvard Political Review, April 4, 2019, http://harvardpolitics.com/covers/different-but-the-same/.

15 Julia Meredith Hess, “‘We Are Not Terrorists!’ Uighurs, Tibetans and the ‘Global War on Terror’” in International Migration and Human Rights: The Global Repercussions of 

141
Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific

U.S. Policy, ed. Samuel Martínez (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009), 188.

16 Ibid.

17 Ibid., 186. 

18 Ibid.

19 Tara Francis Chan, “As the U.S. Targets China’s ‘Concentration Camps,’ Xinjiang’s Human Rights Crisis Is Only Getting Worse,” Newsweek, May 22, 2019, https://www. newsweek.com/xinjiang-uyghur-crisis-muslim-china-1398782.

20 Ibid.

21 Thomas Lum, Uyghurs in China, CRS Report No. IF10281 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2020), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/

pdf/IF/IF10281.

22 Ibid.

23 Rosie Perper, “Uighur Activists Say China Is Running Nearly 500 Detention Camps and Prisons in Xinjiang Based on Satellite Images,” Business Insider, November 

13, 2019, https://www.businessinsider.com/uighur-activists-satellite-images-china- 500-camps-prisons-in-xinjiang-2019-11.

24 Ibid.

25 “Data Leak Reveals How China ‘Brainwashes’ Uighurs in Prison Camps,” BBC, November 24, 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-50511063.

26 Patrice Taddonio, “Muslims Held in China’s Detention Camps Speak Out,” PBS Frontline, April 7, 2020, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/muslims-heldin-chinas-detention-camps-speak-out/.

27 Chan, “As the U.S. Targets China’s ‘Concentration Camps.’”

28 Eleanor Albert and Lindsay Maizland, “The Rohingya Crisis,” Council on Foreign Relations, January 23, 2020, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/rohingya-crisis.

29 “The Rohingya,” Harvard Divinity School Religious Literacy Project, accessed April 18, 2020, https://rlp.hds.harvard.edu/faq/rohingya.

30 Krishnadev Calamur, “The Misunderstood Roots of Burma’s Rohingya Crisis,” The Atlantic, September 25, 2017, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/ar- chive/2017/09/rohingyas-burma/540513/.

31 Jason Motlagh, “These Aren’t Refugee Camps, They’re Concentration Camps, and People Are Left to Die in Them,” Time, June 17, 2014, https://time. com/2888864/rohingya-myanmar-burma-camps-sittwe/; Adam B. Ellick, “21st Cen- tury Concentration Camps,” New York Times, June 16, 2014, https://www.nytimes.

com/video/opinion/100000002939059/21st-century-concentration-camps.html.

32 Matt Schiavenza, “Asia’s Looming Refugee Disaster,” The Atlantic, May 17, 2015, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/05/asias-looming-refugeedisaster/393482/. 

33 José María Arraiza and Olivier Vonk, “Report on Citizenship Law: Myanmar,” Global Citizenship Observatory, October 2017, https://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstr

handle/1814/48284/RSCAS_GLOBALCIT_CR_2017_14.pdf.

34 Albert and Maizland, “The Rohingya Crisis.”

35 Andrew Selth, Myanmar’s Armed Forces and the Rohingya Crisis (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2018), 14, https://www.usip.org/sites/default/

files/2018-08/pw140-myanmars-armed-forces-and-the-rohingya-crisis.pdf.

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36 “Citizenship Amendment Act: Court Refuses to Put Controversial Law on Hold,” BBC, January 22, 2020, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-51203104.

37 “Assam NRC: What Next for 1.9 Million ‘Stateless’ Indians,” BBC, August 31, 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-49520593.

38 Bibhudatta Pradhan, “Millions in India Could End up in Modi’s New Detention Camps,” Bloomberg, February 25, 2020, https://www.bloomberg.com/features/2020- modi-india-detention-camps/.

39 Ibid.

40 The efforts centered on India’s saffronization also extend to its education system under the BJP government. See for example, Omar Rashid, “Saffronization of 

Education Good for India, Says Minister,” The Hindu, June 19, 2016, https://www. thehindu.com/news/national/Saffronisation-of-education-good-for-India-says- Minister/article14431919.ece.

41 Erin Blakemore, “Who Were the Mongols?” National Geographic, June 21, 2019, https://www.nationalgeographic.com/culture/people/reference/mongols/.

42 Muzaffar Husain Syed, Syed Saud Akhtar, and B.D. Usmani, A Concise History of Islam (New Delhi: VIJ Books India, Pvt Ltd., 2011), 291.

43 “Karakorum,” UNESCO, accessed April 19, 2020, https://en.unesco.org/silk- road/content/karakorum.

44 Mark Cartwright, “Karakorum,” Ancient History Encyclopedia, September 24, 2019, https://www.ancient.eu/Karakorum/.

45 Alexandra Bro and Mallory Matheson, “Fleeing Home: Refugees and Human Trafficking,” Council on Foreign Relations blog, December 31, 2019, https://www.

cfr.org/blog/fleeing-home-refugees-and-human-trafficking.

143

145

9

THE EVOLUTION OF THE U.S. ALLIANCE 

SYSTEM IN THE INDO-PACIFIC SINCE THE 

COLD WAR’S END

John Hemmings

The development of the U.S. alliance system at the tail end of the 20th 

century in the post-Cold War era has significance as compared to the era 

that came before it. From the inception of the system in the 1950s, it was 

characterized by its “hub-and-spokes” relationship between each U.S. ally 

and Washington. However, from 1994 with the first inter-alliance trilateral 

between the United States, Japan, and the Republic of Korea (ROK), this 

began to change and the rigidity of U.S. alliance managers gave way to an 

informal and incremental evolution towards minilateralism or multilateralism. Although the bilaterals between the “hub” and the “spokes” are 

arguably the mainstay of this system, the development of the trilaterals 

and quadrilateral have been the chief harbingers of change in the system.

At the end of the Cold War, the architecture of what was then called 

the “Asia-Pacific” was characterized by three features: the U.S.-led alliance 

system, regional integration in the form of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the rise of China. Over the last three 

Balance: when one state—perceiving another to be a potential 

threat—does things to counter that 

threat, such as build alliances or develop its defense capabilities.

Bandwagon: when one state—perceiving another to be a potential 

threat—attempts to appease that 

threat by aligning itself with it.

decades, we have seen those three 

structural features interact, play off 

of each other, and react to changes 

in the others in ways that were unforeseen in the middle of that decade. We have seen a resurgence in 

the utility of U.S. alliances, but with 

some loosening ties, as regional 

states have chosen to balance against 
Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific

or bandwagon with an increasingly powerful and increasingly authoritarian 

China. In the case of the Philippines and Thailand, there has been a gradual loosening of ties as the perception of shared interests have fallen by 

the wayside due to changes in domestic politics in each of those countries. 

However, for the alliances with Japan, Australia, and to a lesser extent, 

South Korea, there has been an extraordinary evolution in the way the 

traditionally-bilateral alliances interact and what they consider their remit. 

This chapter seeks to examine those changes since the end of the Cold 

War and highlights the growing minilateralism both within the alliance system and with non-allies, such as India.

When the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies 

(DKI APCSS) was originally established—in September of 1995, only five 

years after the end of the Cold War—there was a debate about whether 

certain regions were “ripe for rivalry”1 or “primed for peace.”2 In 1991, 

the U.S. alliance system in the Pacific—also known as the “San Francisco 

System”—was characterized by 

•	 a network of bilateral alliances between Washington and regional 

states, including Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, 

and, to an ambiguous extent, Taiwan;

•	 an absence of multilateral institutions;3

•	 a deep asymmetry in alliance relations; 

•	 a special place for Japan in the system; and 

•	 liberal access for allies to the U.S. market, as well as economic and 

military assistance.4

U.S. historian John Downer has stated that the Pax Americana that 

sprung from this system also had a further two features: an emphasis on 

maritime power and sea lanes and the forward-deployment of U.S. forces 

on the territory of regional states, in exchange for defense of allied sovereignty against communism.5

Offshore balancing:

when an extra-regional 

state—perceiving a regional state to be a 

threat—uses a third inregion state as a favored 

ally to check the hostility 

of the second.

So what has changed in the system in 

the last 25 years between the Clinton administration and the Trump administration? 

Some would argue not much, and that to all 

extents and purposes, the San Francisco System continues to emphasize maritime security, 

offshore-balancing, and forward-deployment. 

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.	 The Evolution of U.S. Alliance System in the Indo-Pacific

But if one looks at the system in 1995 and the system in 2020, it is clear 

that the nature of the alliances has shifted considerably, in membership, in 

scope, in remit, and in capabilities. In order to understand the changes, it is 

important to also pinpoint and understand the drivers of change. Why did 

alliance managers in Washington, Seoul, Tokyo, Canberra, and Manila direct policy in the direction that they did? And what compelled them to do 

so? We must also track changes in the wider region and in threat perceptions and how those impacted the perceptions of alliance managers across 

the system. For it is only by walking in their shoes can we understand why 

they made the policy choices they ultimately made.

The Clinton Administration (1993-2000)

The Clinton administration came into office in 1993, stressing economic 

growth and a strong desire to reap the “peace dividend,”6 with a bold campaign slogan, “It’s the Economy Stupid.” In 1992, this new emphasis on 

prosperity had seen a Democratic presidential campaign promise that “a 

post-Cold War restructuring of American forces will produce substantial 

savings beyond those promised by the Bush Administration.”7 One Bush 

administration policy that President Clinton adopted with enthusiasm 

was the East Asia Strategy Initiative (EASI), which outlined a major draw 

down of U.S. forces from the region, including the unilateral removal of 

nuclear weapons from South Korea and the closure of U.S. bases in the 

Philippines. In answer to those nervous about creating a power vacuum, 

the administration emphasized the new assumptions that were thought 

more and more to guide the post-Cold War international system, such as 

multilateral institutions, open markets, loose borders, and global supply 

chain economics. These new institutions would lay atop the old alliances, functioning “like overlapping plates of armor, individually providing 

protection and together covering the full body for our common security 

concerns.”8 This attempt to marry the new regional economic institutions 

with security architecture—such as the creation of ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1994—was intended to be inclusive of old Cold War-era 

foes: “we are also prepared to involve China in building this region’s new 

security and economic architectures. We need an involved and engaged 

China, not an isolated China.”9

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Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific

However, three incidents during the Clinton administration 

paused this optimistic project and 

saw a U.S. pause in the withdrawal 

of forces and rethink the utility of 

the alliance system: 1) the 1993-94 

North Korean Nuclear Crisis; 2) 

the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait Crisis; 

and 3) the 1996 East China Sea crisis. As a result of the first crisis, the 

United States, Japan, and South 

Korea began to look at ways to coordinate policy and began meeting 

in a track 1.5 setting in 1994. Engineered by outgoing senior U.S. 

Department of Defense official 

The 1994 Agreed Framework was 

a US-DPRK agreement that set out 

a freeze of all North Korean nuclear 

development at Yongbyun Nuclear 

Scientific Research Center—the site 

of North Korea’s nuclear weapons 

program—in exchange for the building of two light-water civilian-use 

nuclear reactors. 

KEDO: an organization founded in 

1995 by the United States, South Korea, and Japan which sought to deliver the commitments—including the 

two light-water nuclear reactors—in 

North Korea as laid out in the 1994 

Agreed Framework. It ceased to exist in 2006 after the agreement had 

broken down.

Carl Ford as a means of bringing Japan and South Korea closer together, 

the new U.S.-Japan-ROK trilateral initially flourished under the auspices 

of the 1994 Agreed Framework agreement and was even institutionalized 

briefly in the late 1990s by the Perry Process under the name Trilateral Coordination Oversight Group (TCOG).10 For a short time, the U.S.-JapanROK “virtual alliance”11 took on the role of fulfilling the obligations as 

laid out in the 1994 United States-Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 

(DPRK) Agreed Framework in the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO). The Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1995-96 and the 

East China Sea crisis led to ripples of uncertainty across the region. They 

also led to the deployment of two carrier strike groups to the Taiwan Strait 

and a rethink of traditional alliances. In the year after the crises, Australia 

and Japan—increasingly “adrift”12 from the alliance relationships—began 

to again favor the alliance ties with the United States, with the new John 

Howard government taking the U.S. side on Taiwan publicly.13 In 1996, 

the United States and Japan issued the Joint Declaration of Security, which 

opened both the remit and the geographical location of the U.S.-Japan 

alliance, while the United States and Australia jointly issued the Joint Declaration on Security.14

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.	 The Evolution of U.S. Alliance System in the Indo-Pacific

The 1996 U.S.-Japan Joint Declaration of Security led to a new Guidelines for 

U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation. Superseding the 1978 Guidelines, this inserted the language “in areas around Japan” to the previous “attack on Japan” as 

areas where the alliance defense commitments would be activated, indicating 

a desire to make the alliance more regionally focused. It also established the 

2+2 Security Consultative Committee, comprising the defense and foreign ministers of both countries to meet regularly to discuss both the regional security 

environment and U.S. force structure in Japan.

The Bush Administration (2001-2008)

The period during the Bush administration saw the further multilateralization of the San Francisco System and a shift of functionality as the United 

States pressed its regional allies to contribute to the Global War on Terror and to operations that were a part of Operation Enduring Freedom. 

There was a surge in extra-regional military cooperation in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Indian Ocean, and a surge in regional counterterrorism training and operations. It also saw a slight breakdown in relations between the 

United States and Thailand, the oldest U.S. alliance in the region, after the 

Thai military carried out a coup in 2006 against the caretaker government 

of Thaksin Shinawatra. 

However, for the purposes of this chapter, the most strategically 

important development was the growth in Australia-Japanese bilateral 

defense cooperation and the concurrent growth in U.S.-Japan-Australia 

trilateral cooperation that the uptick afforded. Japan and Australia had developed closer ties in several peacekeeping missions in-region in the late 

1990s, and alliance managers on both sides began seeking opportunities 

for furthering and institutionalizing this cooperation. The two institutions 

that comprise the trilateral—the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue (TSD) and 

the Security and Defense Cooperation Forum (SDCF)—came about at 

this time as leaders in Tokyo, Canberra, and Washington began to align 

over a number of common security concerns, including regional extremism, increasing Chinese military power, and the continued nuclear threat 

posed by North Korea. 

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Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific

The initial proposal for a trilateral was actually put by Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer to Japanese colleague Ryozo Kato on 

a 1997 trip to Tokyo. However, there was little movement on the issue 

until 2000 when Richard Armitage became Deputy Secretary of State: as a 

close friend of both Downer and Kato he was more than willing to try the 

new grouping and in the summer of 2002, the first U.S.-Japan-Australia 

trilateral took place after a U.S.-Japan security meeting in Washington.15

This grouping also gave Japan its first taste of real alliance multilateralism, 

and this laid the groundwork for its strategic alignment with India, a state 

outside of the U.S. alliance system, but one that would become intrinsic 

to the wider geopolitical strategies of both the United States and Japan. 

India seemed an unlikely candidate to join a U.S.-led grouping, due to 

its historically acrimonious relationship with Washington over the latter’s 

support for Pakistan and its long tradition of non-alignment. However, 

2004-05 saw this change dramatically as India was invited to be a “core 

group” member,16 joining Australia, the United States, and Japan in the 

humanitarian assistance operations after the Indian Ocean Tsunami. The 

efficacy of cooperation, combined with deft diplomacy on the part of 

Washington to resolve differences with New Delhi in the U.S.-India Nuclear Deal in late 2005 and the New Framework for U.S.-India Defense,17

allowed for further Japanese exploration of a four-way grouping,18 which 

duly occurred in 2007. Promoted by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe with the 

other three leaders, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (also known as 

the Quad) was paralleled by a four-way maritime exercise during Exercise Malabar, the traditionally bilateral U.S.-India exercise. While Chinese 

pressure saw Australia pull out of the Quadrilateral in 2008—under the 

Figure 9.1: The Structure of the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue

150
.	 The Evolution of U.S. Alliance System in the Indo-Pacific

newly-elected Kevin Rudd cabinet—it was revived in 2017 with Japanese 

encouragement and has continued to meet since, including virtually during 

the COVID-19 crisis.

The Obama Administration (2009-2016)

The Obama administration was marked by its “pivot” or “rebalance to 

Asia,” and by continued efforts to manage the increasingly competitive 

U.S.-China relationship. The U.S. alliance system continued to evolve, with 

a number of important events taking place—including the increasing sophistication of the U.S.-Japan alliance, an increase in U.S.-Japan-Australia 

trilateral activity, the breakdown of the U.S.-Japan-ROK trilateral, and 

the election of Rodrigo Duterte in the Philippines. The last event has 

been—similar to the 2006 military coup in Thailand—an event that has 

raised questions as to the long-term survivability of bilateral security ties, 

as Manila-Washington relations deteriorated markedly over human rights 

concerns related to the Philippine president’s “war on drugs.” 

This is also when the U.S.-Japan-Australia trilateral began to eclipse 

the U.S.-Japan-ROK trilateral, a trend which had begun in the Bush administration, and which was accelerated during the Obama presidency. 

Relations between Seoul and Tokyo—always tied to domestic constituents 

and public opinion over historical grievances—began their downward 

spiral in 2010 after a Korean non-government organization established 

the first monument to “comfort women” (sex slaves) outside Korea, in 

Palisades Park, New Jersey.19 By contrast, in that same year, Japan and 

Australia signed an Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA), 

which built on their cooperation in Southern Iraq and created the first 

institutional military-to-military framework for future cooperation. The 

close relationship of the United States that Australia—due to the Five 

Eyes relationship—was both a reassurance to Tokyo and a future model 

for Japanese strategic thinkers, and it is notable that during humanitarian 

operations following the 2011 Tohoku Earthquake and Tsunami, only U.S. 

and Australian military forces were allowed to operate inside Japan,20 with 

the latter lacking any formal treaty provisions to do so.21 The following 

year, 2012, saw the failure of the ROK government to pass the JapanROK General Security of Military Intelligence Agreement (GSOMIA) 

through the South Korean Diet, another sign that the future dynamism 

of the San Francisco System’s evolution increasingly moves southwards 

with Australia and in the Southeast Asian region. In contrast to the hiccups 

151
Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific

The U.S.-Japan alliance, often called “the cornerstone of regional security,” also evolved with great changes taking place in the 2015 new Defense Guidelines. These new guidelines were put into place in the wake of 

increased activity by China in the Japanese exclusive economic zone (EEZ) 

and near the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands group, administered by Japan, but 

claimed by China and Taiwan. The 2010 incident in which Japan arrested 

the crew of a Chinese militia vessel22 that had collided with two Japanese 

Coast Guard vessels and growing willingness of the People’s Republic of 

China (PRC) to utilize “gray zone” operations in the sea led to a reassertion23 by the United States that the islands fell within the remit of the U.S.-

Japan alliance and the development of several U.S.-Japanese mechanisms 

Figure 9.2: The Security and Defense Cooperation Forum

“Gray zone” operations: when 

states use deniable, non-military actors to challenge other 

states in operations below 

the threshold for war—and 

thus below the threshold for 

alliance commitments being 

utilized.

for dealing with gray zone operations.24

The new 2015 Guidelines institutionalized meetings between various U.S. and 

Japanese government departments—including the various defense department, 

coast guard, and other non-military bodies—in a standing working group called 

the Alliance Coordination Mechanism 

experienced by the U.S.-Japan-ROK trilateral, the dynamism of the U.S.-

Japan-Australia Security and Defense Cooperation Forum (SDCF) has 

been apparent in the sheer number and complexity of combined U.S.-Japan-Australia trilateral, war-fighting exercises, including Cope Guam North, 

Southern Jackaroo, and Pacific Bond, which have focused on air-superiority, 

amphibious joint-operations, and anti-submarine warfare, respectively.

152
.	 The Evolution of U.S. Alliance System in the Indo-Pacific

that regularly met to discuss security in the East China Sea and coordinates 

shared information on the islands in the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) sector. In a move that predated the “multi-domain” 

approach of the U.S. Department of Defense, the 2015 Guidelines also 

brought space and cyberspace discussions under the purview of the alliance.25

The Trump Administration (2017-Present)

The Trump administration has been characterized by a similar see-sawing 

in the system that occurred under President Obama. This has occurred as 

China has matched its consolidation of its efforts at de facto control over 

the South China Sea with militarizing the islands under its occupation, 

combined with an adept usage of economic leverage and coercion on 

regional states. In the Philippines, under President Rodrigo Duterte, this 

has seen Manila bandwagoning toward China,26 tacitly accepting Beijing’s 

claims and coming close27 to terminating of the 20-plus-year-old U.S.-

Philippines Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA).28 The Trump administration’s return to the Nixon-era emphasis on burden-sharing29 from those 

allies who have U.S. troops based in their countries has also met a mixed 

response. In Japan, these shifts in U.S. policy have been accommodated, 

but in South Korea—under a progressive-minded Moon Jae-In government—there has been some resistance with Moon also seeking to transfer wartime Operational Control Authority (OPCON) from U.S. Forces 

Korea to the South Korean government.30 Despite this, the Indo-Pacific 

framework, adopted by the administration in November 2017 has seen 

a resurrection of the U.S.-Japan-India-Australia Quadrilateral,31 which 

had dissolved in 2008 when Australia had unilaterally withdrawn citing 

Chinese pressure.32 Under its new guise, the quasi-alliance has tentatively 

developed into a forum for strategic dialogue, strengthened by growing 

US-India ties.33

Conclusion

Twenty-five years after the founding of the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific 

Center for Security Studies, it would appear that the U.S.-led alliance system is in immense flux with a number of significant changes taking place. 

Certainly, the other two features—the regional architecture associated with 

ASEAN and the rise of China—have also heavily influenced this evolution. To some extent, the inability of ASEAN to modify or restrain Chi153
Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific

nese assertiveness in the South China Sea and the continued issues of Taiwan and North Korea, has reduced the 1990s’ optimism over multilateral 

institutions as lead components of regional stabilization and governance. 

Instead, the United States and its allies have continued to maintain—and 

even update—the old Cold War-era alliances, changing them to reflect new 

realities with the PRC acting as a strong determinant for state behaviors 

like balancing and bandwagoning. The traditional security logic of the San 

Francisco System has been complicated by the fact that states in the region 

suffer a “double security dilemma”34—growing threat perceptions around 

China, mixed with increasing trade dependencies on the one hand, and 

increasing perceptions of U.S. abandonment of the region on the other—

meaning that these new minilaterals are less formal than their antecedents. 

Some new partners, like Vietnam35 and India,36 have long histories of nonalignment or antagonism toward the U.S. system, presenting U.S. planners 

with interesting challenges and opportunities. As a result of these drivers, 

the new San Francisco System that we have—as DKI APCSS enters its 

25th year—include the following characteristics:

Evolutionary: First and foremost, the system is no longer static; it is 

evolving. Not only is it evolving, but alliance members on all sides anticipate this evolution and link it to incremental assertiveness on the part 

of the PRC. As China expands its power and influence incrementally—

“salami-slicing”—so too does the system react incrementally by adding 

new hard power tools for deterrence. The system continues to evolve and 

has a certain responsiveness built into it.

Membership: Secondly, it would appear that the alliance system’s membership is changing, with the Philippines on the verge of leaving while 

Vietnam and India beginning to become “virtual” or “quasi” allies. This 

trend can be seen in several ways: First, in the form of the Quad, while India is not a formal ally of any of the other three states, it has signed defense 

cooperation with all three states, most recently with Australia in June 2020, 

with two agreements that will enable greater defense interoperability and 

increasingly complex military engagement.37 Second, there is the “Quad 

Plus,” a sort of unofficial opening up of the Quad to like-minded states 

such as New Zealand, Vietnam, and South Korea, which met in March 

2020 to discuss economic recovery in the wake of the coronavirus-linked 

economic crisis.38 Finally, there are non-regional states such as the United 

Kingdom and France, which both have equities in the region and have 

a traditional Mahanian approach to open sea-lanes as a part of national 

security. France’s mutual basing agreement with India, its burgeoning de154
.	 The Evolution of U.S. Alliance System in the Indo-Pacific

fense relationships with Australia and Japan, and the United Kingdom’s 

rapidly-growing defense ties with Japan, its stake in the Five Powers Defence Arrangements, and regional bases mean that both European powers 

are likely to play a growing role in the Indo-Pacific. Given their vested 

interests in a rules-based trading order, their links to the United States 

through the NATO alliance, we may see them joining the Quad Plus arrangement.

Informal: The chief characteristic of the U.S. alliance system from 

1945 to 1995 was that the alliance defense commitments were formally 

spelled out in treaty documents,39 and however imperfectly they might 

have been, U.S. leaders have tended, by and large, to reassure allies of U.S. 

resolve. However, over the last 20 years, allies such as Japan and Australia 

have developed “alliance-like” or “quasi-alliance” bilateral relationships, 

mixing high levels of defense cooperation, military interoperability, and 

intelligence-sharing, without formalizing their obligations to each other 

in case of attack. This strategic ambiguity has served both Indian and Japanese defense planners well, allowing them to align strategically with the 

United States and others on common security concerns, while hedging 

against abandonment, and maintaining some level of strategic ambiguity. 

So valuable has this informality been that it is unlikely the U.S.-Japan-IndiaAustralia Quadrilateral (the Quad) would have emerged had Washington 

insisted on formal defense obligations.

Capacity: Fourthly, the growing capacity of the alliance system as a 

whole to deal with ongoing challenges and issues relating to the rise of 

Chinese maritime power can be seen through the growing capacity and 

power of Japanese naval forces and through the sophistication of multilateral war-fighting exercises. 

Remit: The roles and functions of the alliance system have grown in 

leaps and bounds, incorporating humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR), capacity-building, as well as the traditional remit of deterrence and the defending of its members’ sovereignty. Most recently, it has 

developed a strong commitment to war-fighting exercises, as seen in the 

electronic warfare exercise Cope North Guam and anti-submarine exercises such as Pacific Bond.40 However, there have been some calls for the 

U.S. military to really push its exercises in a more realistic direction so as to 

act as a deterrent to the PRC or DPRK. Finally, there has been an interesting return to the earliest days of the alliance system with the reemergence 

of economic issues as the Quad Plus’ recent meetings focused on crisis 

management during the Coronavirus era and on economic revival.41

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Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific

Multilateral: Kent Calder famously characterized the alliance system as 

a mostly-bilateral “hub-and-spokes” system between Washington and its 

allies.42 That has gradually developed into what some have termed a “federated set of capabilities,”43 with U.S. allies developing their own security 

relationships with other U.S. allies and building up capabilities that can be 

broadly shared for the common good. The core group that led the way on 

responding to the Indian Ocean Tsunami in 2004 and which became the 

Quadrilateral is one example. The U.S.-Japan-Australia trilateral is another, 

which as this chapter has argued, is one of the most institutionalized of 

the quasi-alliances, and the most capable in war-fighting interoperability. 

The current trend seems to be a loose linking of states to the original alliance system, attaching and aligning as their national interests come into 

conflict with the rising assertions of the PRC.

While it would be correct to say that the San Francisco System is here 

with us to stay, it would also be correct to say that it is steadily evolving to 

meet current-day and future challenges, in a way that continues to meet 

the needs of many of its members. If asked to predict whether it will be 

here in another 25 years, the answer is undoubtedly “yes.” It has provided 

nearly 70 years of peace and prosperity to the region and has endured 

remarkable regional changes and weathered major economic storms. As 

with all alliances, it will strive to serve the interests of its members and 

seek to create peaceful coexistence for one of the world’s most important 

regions.

156
.	 The Evolution of U.S. Alliance System in the Indo-Pacific

Notes

1 Aaron L. Friedberg, “Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in Multipolar Asia,” International Security 18, no. 3 (Winter 1993-94): 5-33. 

2 Stephen Van Evera, “Primed for Peace: Europe after the Cold War,” International 

Security 15, no. 3 (Winter 1990-91): 7-57.

3 Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) did briefly exist, but it was never utilized beyond coordination over the Vietnam War and cultural exchange programs.

4 Kent Calder, “Securing Security through Prosperity: The San Francisco System in Comparative Perspective,” Pacific Review 17, no. 1 (2004): 135-157.

5 John W. Dower, “The San Francisco System: Past, Present, Future in U.S.-Japan- China Relations,” Asia Pacific Journal 12, no. 8 (2014).

6 Hobart Rowen, “Making the ‘Peace Dividend’ a Reality,” Washington Post, Octo- ber 3, 1991.

7 Democratic Party Platform of 1992, “A New Covenant with the American Peo- ple,” American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/273264.

8 William J. Clinton, “Remarks to the Korean National Assembly in Seoul,” 

American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/219670.

9 Ibid.

10 Joel S. Wit, Daniel B. Poneman, and Robert L. Gallucci, Going Critical: The First North Korean Crisis (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2004), 193.

11 Ralph A. Cossa, “US-ROK-Japan: Why a ‘Virtual Alliance’ Makes Sense,” Korean 

Journal of Defense Analysis 12, no. 1 (2000): 67-86.

12 The thesis of “adrift” alliances is drawn from Tomohiko Satake, “The Origin of Trilateralism? The US-Japan-Australia Security Relations in the 1990s,” International 

Relations of the Asia Pacific 11, no. 1 (2011): 87-114.

13 Roy Campbell McDowall, Howard’s Long March: The Strategic Depiction of China in Howard Government Policy, 1996-2006 (Canberra: ANU E Press, 2009), 61-63. 

14 This was also called the Sydney Statement and included among other things, a renewal of the Pine Gap Facility, new combined training exercises, and regional and 

global coordination over “common security interests.”

15 Author’s interviews with: Ryozo Kato in June 2014, and Richard Armitage and Alexander Downer in June 2015 in Washington, Tokyo, and London. 

16 Evans Revere (Japan Desk, Department of State 2003-4), (speech, Maui Confer- ence, Pacific Forum, 2012).

17 “New Framework for the India-U.S. Defence Relationship,” Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, accessed February 27, 2020, https://

idsa.in/resources/documents/Ind-US-Def-Rel-28.06.05.

18 Michael J. Green (Senior Director of Asia, National Security Council 2002- 2004), interview by John Hemmings, April 2015.

19 Maki Kimura, Unfolding the ‘Comfort Women’ Debates: Modernity, Violence, Women’s Voices (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 171.

20 Author’s interview with anonymous senior Japanese Ministry of Defense of- ficial, Tokyo, 2015.

157
Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific

21 Jiji, “Japan and Australia Look to Hammer out Status of Forces Pact in June,” Japan Times, February 24, 2020, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2020/02/24/ national/politics-diplomacy/japan-australia-sofa/.

22 Peter Foster, “Diplomatic Tensions after Japanese Arrest Chinese Fisherman,” The Telegraph, September 8, 2010, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/ asia/japan/7989126/Diplomatic-tensions-after-Japanese-arrest-Chinese-fisherman.

html.

23 “Obama Asia Tour: US-Japan Treaty Covers Disputed Islands,” BBC, April 24, 2014, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-27137272.

24 John Hemmings, “How Will the New U.S.-Japan Defense Guidelines Affect Regional Security?” Center for Strategic and International Studies, May 14, 2015, 

https://www.csis.org/analysis/how-will-new-us-japan-defense-guidelines-affectregional-security.

25 “Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation, April 27, 2015,” Department of Defense Archives, https://archive.defense.gov/pubs/20150427_--_GUIDELINES_ FOR_US-JAPAN_DEFENSE_COOPERATION.pdf

26 Jane Perlez, “Rodrigo Duterte Gets Closer to China, and the Neighbors Notice,” New York Times, October 24, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/25/world/ asia/rodrigo-duterte-philippines-china.html.

27 Brad Lendon, “Philippines Says It Won’t End US Military Access amid South China Sea Tensions,” CNN, June 3, 2020, https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/03/asia/

philippines-us-agreement-south-china-sea-intl-hnk/index.html.

28 “Duterte Pivots Away from the U.S. in South China Sea,” Maritime Executive, February 21, 2020, https://www.maritime-executive.com/editorials/duterte-pivotsaway-from-the-u-s-in-south-china-sea. 

29 Michael Moran, “What Trump Gets Right about Alliances,” Foreign Policy, De- cember 5, 2019, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/12/05/trump-right-alliances-freeriding-american-military-might-nato-japan-south-korea/.

30 David Maxwell, “Burden-Sharing in the US-South Korea Alliance: Finding Bal- ance,” Council on Foreign Relations, February 27, 2020, https://www.cfr.org/blog/

burden-sharing-us-south-korea-alliance-finding-balance.

31 Kiran Stacey and Jamie Smyth, “Diplomatic Initiative Revived to Counter China’s Growing Influence,” Financial Times, November 14, 2017, https://www.ft.com/ content/5355ee2a-c869-11e7-ab18-7a9fb7d6163e.

32 Tanvi Madan, “The Rise, Fall, and Rebirth of the ‘Quad,’” War on the Rocks, November 16, 2017, https://warontherocks.com/2017/11/rise-fall-rebirth-quad/.

33 Brahma Chellaney, “The China Factor behind Trump’s India Visit,” Japan Times, March 6, 2020, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2020/03/06/commentary/

world-commentary/china-factor-behind-trumps-india-visit/.

34 Tomohiko Satake and John Hemmings, “Japan-Australia Security Cooperation in the Bilateral and Multilateral Contexts,” International Affairs 94, no. 4 (July 2018): 815- 834. 

35 Alexander Vuving, “What Vietnam Can Offer America,” National Interest, May 27, 2017, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/what-vietnam-can-offer-america-20874.

36 Chellaney, “The China Factor behind Trump’s India Visit.” 

37 Ewen Levick, “Australia and India Advance Military Ties,” Australian Defence Magazine, June 11, 2020, https://www.australiandefence.com.au/news/australia-and- india-advance-military-ties.

158
.	 The Evolution of U.S. Alliance System in the Indo-Pacific

38 Jagannath Panda, “India and the ‘Quad Plus’ Dialogue,” RUSI, June 12, 2020, https://rusi.org/commentary/india-strategic-quad; Nguyen Quang Dy, “Vietnam May Turn Threats into Opportunity,” YaleGlobal Online, June 2, 2020, https://yale- global.yale.edu/content/vietnam-may-turn-threats-opportunity.

39 Admittedly, Article IV of the U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty and Article IV of the Security Treaty between Australia, New Zealand and the United (ANZUS) 

have been criticized for the ambiguity of the language, as compared to the language 

of Article V in the NATO Treaty, however, it should be noted that the U.S. policy to 

reaffirm and reassure that its commitment to the defense of its allies has been gener- ally consistent. 

40 AnnMarie Annicelli, ”U.S., Japanese and Australian Forces Conclude COPE North 2019 with Air Dominance,” U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, March 8, 2019, 

https://www.pacom.mil/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/1780433/

us-japanese-and-australian-forces-conclude-cope-north-2019-with-air-dominance/; 

Shannon Heavin, “Allied Navies Perform ASW Exercise During Pacific Bond 13,” 

U.S. Navy, June 23, 2013, https://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=74999.

41 Grossman, Derek, “Don’t Get Too Excited, ‘Quad Plus’ Meetings Won’t Cover China,” The Diplomat, April 9, 2020, https://thediplomat.com/2020/04/dont-get- too-excited-quad-plus-meetings-wont-cover-china/.

42 Calder. “Securing Security through Prosperity.”

43 Nina Silove, “The Pivot before the Pivot: U.S. Strategy to Preserve the Power Bal- ance in Asia,” International Security 40, no.4 (Spring 2016): 45-88.

159

161

 10

SOUTH ASIA AND CHINA’S BELT AND 

ROAD INITIATIVE: 

SECURITY IMPLICATIONS AND WAYS FORWARD

Anu Anwar

Introduction

In 2013, Chinese President and Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping initiated the One Belt One Road 一带一路 (yīdài yīlù) project, whose 

English name was quickly changed by China to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). It is primarily a Beijing-financed infrastructure project, which 

aims to bolster China’s connectivity through Central, South, and Southeast 

Asia, all the way into the Middle East, Africa, and Europe1. Xi contrasted this ambitious undertaking with the late Chinese “paramount leader” 

Deng Xiaoping’s “hide and bide” 韬光养晦,有所作为 (Tāo guāng yǎng 

huì, Yǒu suǒ zuò wéi) doctrine,2 which emphasized strengthening domestic capacities and avoiding external involvement. It is Xi’s signature foreign 

policy initiative aimed at transforming China into a global superpower. 

After the 19th Communist Party of China (CPC) National Congress, the 

BRI was enshrined in the party charter, and its offshoot, 人类命运共同

体(Rén lèi mìng yùn gòng tóng tǐ) “a community with a shared destiny 

OBOR or BRI

“One Belt One Road” (一带一路) is still the name used in China and in the Chinese language, but China simplified the English translation of this name to the 

“Belt and Road Initiative” (BRI). While OBOR implied two routes, a maritime 

road through the Indian Ocean and a land belt across central Asia, in reality, 

there are multiple and growing interconnected global networks. In addition, 

the name BRI tries to counter the critical narrative that both routes go only to 

Beijing.
Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific

for humanity” was included in the Constitution of the People’s Republic 

of China (PRC).3 It is a master concept of Chinese foreign policy for the 

foreseeable future, all the way to 2049, the 100th anniversary of the PRC.

The BRI runs from Eurasia to Africa, but its major states lie in South 

Asia,4 the intersection point, where the continental “belt” meets the maritime “road,” and connects three continents—Europe, Africa, and Asia—

via land and the Indian Ocean. With a foothold in South Asia via connectivity, China could reduce its dependency on the vulnerable Malacca 

Strait by constructing alternative overland routes to ensure its access to the 

Indian Ocean and a secure energy supply.5

Nevertheless, the BRI poses a whole gamut of serious security challenges in South Asia, from traditional conflicts centered on territorial 

and border disputes, to potential naval competition with India, to nontraditional religious insurgencies, to environmental unsustainability and 

corruption. China’s growing influence in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) 

challenges India-dominated regional security architecture—as it leverages 

easy-cash and lucrative investment potentials to encourage smaller countries to tilt towards China. 

But China’s poorly regulated loans and financial infusions produce 

corruption and social tensions in South Asian countries.6 In addition to the 

possibility of dual-use (civil-military) of China-built ports from Pakistan 

to Myanmar, the potential for India to lose its strategic edge in the IOR 

to an expanded Chinese naval presence looms large. BRI is an essential 

component of China’s grand strategy, with the potential to reshape this 

sub-regional security architecture and alter the balance of power in the 

entire IOR in China’s favor. The chapter will examine the security risks 

posed by China’s BRI and ways for South Asia to develop economically 

while maintaining the regional security status quo.

The Importance of South Asia for BRI and of BRI for 

South Asia

Although South Asian states possess similarities in language, politics, 

economy, culture, administrative and legal processes, South Asia is far 

from a homogenous region. Thus, in the post-colonial period, each South 

Asian country’s relationship with China has evolved differently, reflecting 

the region’s patterns of international relations, including the India-Pakistan competition, the geostrategic positioning of each country to China, 

the domestic politics within each country, and their differing economic 

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South Asia and China’s Belt and Road Initiative

positions and needs. In South Asia, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Maldives, Nepal, and Afghanistan have extended support to the BRI, with the 

holdouts being India and Bhutan. Indian opposition is due to its confrontational relationship with China, which has been marked by competition 

rather than cooperation.

South Asia is also a region of dichotomies for China. China shares 

borders with all South Asian overland countries except Bangladesh, while 

Sri Lanka and the Maldives are island states located in the middle of the 

Indian Ocean. BRI’s most successful project—the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)—runs through South Asia, and BRI’s most critical country, India, is also located in South Asia. Despite its opposition 

to BRI, India is the largest loan taker from the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). In addition, South Asia accommodates 

one-fourth of the world’s population and has sustained an average annual 

growth rate of 6% over the last two decades.7 This region offers fertile 

territory for the BRI, as South Asian countries have considerable potential 

for economic growth, because of their youthful populations. One-fifth of 

all South Asians are between 14 and 24 years old.8 South Asia’s growing 

market, with its 2.5 billion population, is a lucrative place to invest and 

engage. However, this region is also at a high risk from the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, which could devastate South Asia’s thriving potential 

for the next decade. 

Ethnic and religious insurgencies could also upset China’s ambitious 

plans. China faces growing ethnic tension in its Muslim-majority Xinjiang 

region, while Pakistan and Afghanistan are wracked by ongoing militant 

insurgencies. In addition, India’s nationalist politics is enabling HinduMuslim tension that could result in widespread religious violence and ultimately spill over into neighboring countries—especially, China’s tumultuous Xinjiang province. India and Pakistan are also two nuclear-armed 

countries bordering China, which are locked in a long-term and bitter territorial dispute and historical antagonism. An Indo-Pakistan military conflict could directly jeopardize China’s investment projects. Despite China’s 

active deterrence, its BRI projects have the potential to drag it into an active war. China’s role as Pakistan’s principal military ally and arms supplier 

could also propel it into an Indo-Pakistan conflict.

As China is strategically blocked on its east by two island chains, 

and has a tremendous vulnerability in the Malacca Strait,9 South Asia is 

its potential gateway to ensure Indian Ocean access needed to transport 

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Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific

oil from the Middle East and Africa to China. Economic corridors and 

maritime roads through South Asia could also connect China’s landlocked 

southwestern provinces, such as Yunnan and Sichuan, to the coastal region. Having a stake in strategic South Asian ports could enable China to 

project power beyond its borders and neutralize potential external threats. 

Liu Jinxen, a major proponent of the BCIM-EC (Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor), argues that this can be seen as part of 

a national “bridgehead” strategy of identifying cities or regions occupying 

a strategic position on a logistical and supply chain that can control the 

flow of resources along international trade routes.10

These are not only one-sided interests. Barring India, South Asian 

countries see China’s presence in the region as contributing to their national interest. Pakistan has embraced China as a strategic balancer against 

India, and an alternative to the US economic lifeline.11 While the United 

States has been a long-term economic supporter of Pakistan, this lifeline 

is unlikely to continue as the United States wraps up its “war on terror,” 

and withdraws from Afghanistan. Like Pakistan, the region’s smaller countries have resented Indian regional dominance for years, and are therefore 

tempted to hedge towards China as a new alternative. However, despite 

expected benefits from Chinese economic engagement in this region, its 

countries remain wary. They fear that a too-close embrace with China 

could end sour their relations with India—the regional hegemon and, by 

extension, the United States. Therefore, South Asian states want to extract 

whatever possible benefits they can from China without offending the 

United States and India. Besides, China’s predatory economic practices in 

recent years have created financial risks in Sri Lanka and Pakistan, dampening enthusiasm in other countries contemplating Chinese assistance.

China’s Unique BRI Approach in South Asia

Despite South Asia’s uniform importance for China’s BRI as a region, 

China has taken country-wise customized approaches. China’s historical 

warm relationship with nuclear-armed Pakistan gives BRI a unique advantage to achieve its partial strategic objectives in South Asia. However, 

as the regional de facto leader, India opposes this initiative. This opposition from the regional hegemon could compel China to take a different 

approach to achieve its long-term regional goal. While it touts the BRI as 

a massive infrastructural investment project, China sees BRI as a tool to 

achieve its long-term geopolitical goals.12 Although India has rejected BRI 

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South Asia and China’s Belt and Road Initiative

infrastructure projects, China hopes to enlist Indian cooperation in other 

BRI components. China hopes to convince India that engagement with 

China is in its own self-interest, or at least, that India should refrain from 

opposing China’s regional involvement. Examples of China’s tilting in this 

direction include the facts that India is the largest recipient of a China-led 

AIIB loan of the 78 member states, Xi has increased personal meetings 

with Modi, and China has distanced itself from India-Pakistan brinkmanship. Aiming to bolster public diplomacy, China has increased social and 

cultural engagement with India, increasing the number of scholarships for 

Indian students and artists, for example.

The nature of Chinese engagement with the six smaller South Asian 

countries—specifically Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Maldives, Bhutan 

and Afghanistan—is also very diverse. These countries, each at a different 

stage in its interaction with China, are learning from one another’s experiences.13 Chinese construction of the debt-ridden Sri Lankan Hambantota 

port sounded alarm bells to other countries, and the Bangladeshi government has raised concern14 over excessive Chinese investment. Recognizing 

this concern, China has taken a nuanced approach in Bangladesh, expanding its engagement in other sectors tactfully, ranging from education to 

culture. At the same time, China is Bangladesh’s largest military supplier.15

As a part of the BRI project, China is building the country’s largest bridge, 

Padma, which is 6.4 kilometers long.16

China has adopted a unique approach to Nepal, which contrasts with 

India’s big brother role. Since it cannot build a port in a landlocked country, China has offered Nepal the use of its four major ports to reduce 

Nepal’s disproportionate dependency on India.17 In 2019, Xi Jinping made 

a state visit to Nepal, and promised billions of dollars in investments. 

The Maldives is an island country heavily dependent on tourism. This 

enables China to use tourism to both reward and punish the country,18

sending Chinese tour groups when the Maldives supports Chinese policy. 

Although China claims to adhere to its “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence,” one of which is non-interference in other countries’ internal 

affairs, it blurred the line by sending a navy ship to the Indian Ocean to 

signal its willingness to protect a China-friendly government in the Maldives.19

China may face its most imminent security threat in Afghanistan.20

The recent U.S.-Taliban deal portends the eventual withdrawal of US 

forces. The resulting vacuum may pose a security threat to China’s most 

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Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific

volatile province, Xinjiang. The Taliban sympathize with the Uighurs, 

and could ramp up support to a budding insurgent movement as it gains 

political power and influence in Afghanistan. To tackle potential security 

threats, China is already working on contingency planning. In such contingency plan includes China’s increasing investment through BRI projects, 

aiming at post-conflict reconstruction and development. The discussion 

about the extension of the CPEC via a railway to Kandahar is underway. 

After the withdrawal of US forces, as a part of the stabilization process, 

Beijing may also advocate for multilateral intervention —including UN 

peacekeeping operations.21

BRI’s Security Implications in South Asia

As China increases its presence and engagement in the South Asian region 

through BRI, the potential for regional destabilization looms large, both 

in traditional and non-traditional ways. Both dimensions could be summarized broadly under the BRI’s three main overland projects in South 

Asia (CPEC, BCIM-EC, and the Trans-Himalayan Economic Corridor) 

and the Maritime Silk Road. An examination of these four initiatives helps 

illuminate the security risks posed by the BRI in South Asia.

The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)

The CPEC, a US$62 billion infrastructure project,22 lies at the heart of 

the Silk Economic Belt and Maritime Silk Road. It connects both routes 

through Gwadar port in Pakistan’s Baluchistan Province, utilizing a 

planned 3,000-kilometer network of roads, railways, and pipelines originating in Kashgar in China’s Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region. As 

China pushes forward numerous alternative routes to avoid the vulnerable 

Malacca dilemma, this corridor is a crucial gateway to transport goods 

from China’s western provinces to the Arabian Sea and ensure China’s 

energy supply from the Middle East.

However, the CPEC brings a set of regional security implications for 

South Asia, mainly driven by New Delhi’s three main concerns—territorial 

sovereignty, security, and the deepening China-Pakistan strategic partnership. The CPEC runs through disputed Jammu and Kashmir, where the 

borders of China, India, and Pakistan meet. India views Jammu and Kashmir as its territory, and the China-Pakistan joint project as a violation of 

its territorial sovereignty. As then-Indian Defense Minister A.K. Antony 

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South Asia and China’s Belt and Road Initiative

noted in 2012, “Indian territory under occupation by China in Jammu and 

Kashmir since 1962 is approximately 38,000 square kilometers.”23 Speaking at the 70th session of the UN General Assembly in 2015, the Indian 

representative noted, “India’s reservations about the proposed China-Pakistan Economic Corridor stem from the fact that it passes through Indian 

territory illegally occupied by Pakistan for many years.”24

China’s apparent disregard for territorial sovereignty in India’s border 

region is the principal bone of contention between the two Asian giants 

regarding BRI’s infrastructure and connectivity development programs. In 

conventional international relations discourse, the Jammu and Kashmir 

territorial dispute is between only two parties—India and Pakistan, but 

as CPEC runs through Kashmir, China becomes involved. This new dimension literally brings Asia’s three nuclear powers into head-to-head conflict. China and India went to war in 1962 over a border dispute along the 

Himalayas in northern and eastern India. Even though not a single shot 

has been fired on the China-India border since 1987, there are reports of 

periodic confrontations in Indian’s western and eastern border segments 

in Arunachal Pradesh, which China claims as “South Tibet.”25 In 2017, 

a standoff between Indian and Chinese troops, on the Doklam plateau 

along the Himalayan border, severely strained Sino-Indian relations.26 And 

most recently, on May 10, 2020, both border guards again scuffled along 

the disputed border at Naku La pass in the northeastern Indian state of 

Sikkim.27

India’s other concern about the CPEC is that it could result in an 

increased Chinese military presence in disputed territory, including the 

Pakistan-occupied portion of Kashmir, with serious security implications 

for India. China argues that the deployments are necessary to protect 

Chinese assets in Pakistan. Over 30,000 Chinese nationals are said to be 

employed constructing CPEC-related projects across Pakistan.28 However, 

the continuous attack on Chinese nationals, assets, and symbols sounded a 

powerful reminder of the risks that China faces due to CPEC projects. For 

example, the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA), a militant group advocating 

separatism for the Baloch people, attacked the Chinese consulate in Karachi.29 China is increasingly concerned about the security of its nationals in 

Pakistan, and the Chinese embassy sent a letter expressing these concerns 

and requesting increased security for Chinese companies to the Pakistani 

Interior Ministry in October 2017.30 In response, the Pakistani and provincial governments implemented coordinated measures aimed at protecting 

Chinese investments. A key component of the security architecture put 

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Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific

in place around the economic corridor is the Special Security Division, 

headed by a two-star Pakistan Army general and comprising 15,000 soldiers, including 9,000 military and 6,000 paramilitaries. 

India sees the shift in Beijing’s Kashmir position as emblematic of the 

deepening China-Pakistan strategic partnership. From India’s perspective, 

the CPEC marks the emergence of China as Pakistan’s principal external 

partner, replacing the United States. This comes at a time of deteriorating Sino-U.S. relations, improving India-U.S. ties, and emerging tensions 

between India and China,31 while Kashmir’s emergence as a land bridge 

between China and Pakistan sharpens the traditional geopolitical divide 

between New Delhi and Beijing.

The Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor 

(BCIM-EC)

BCIM-EC predates the BRI by 14 years, as it was first mooted in 1999 by 

China during a sub-regional forum, as a track-II initiative to connect the 

economically backward regions of southwest China and northeast India 

via the infrastructurally deficient countries of Myanmar and Bangladesh.32

Although it has reached the track 1.5 level and intergovernmental discussions have been initiated, there have been no concrete measures to realize 

the project. Indian opposition remains the principal obstacle. However, 

as BRI evolves, Beijing prioritizes BCIM-EC as an important loop to the 

greater sub-regional connectivity plan33 and it is increasingly coupled with 

and compared against other BRI sub-regional projects like the CPEC.

The BCIM-EC, albeit promising massive infrastructural investment 

and greater market connectivity, runs through contentious and insurgency-prone borders and regions. India fears that the measure risks increasing 

China’s geopolitical influence, and is apprehensive that China may, in the 

worst case, abet the separatist aspirations of the many tribes in India’s 

northeast region.34 India’s north-east region,made up of seven provinces 

and separated from central/mainland India by a narrow land border of 14 

miles locally known as the “chicken’s neck corridor,” is extremely insurgency-prone. Separatist aspirations have challenged governance since India’s 

independence from Britain in 1947. The political and economic power 

of the area’s separatist groups have waxed and waned over the years. Although violence has declined, India remains reluctant to let a competing 

geopolitical rival gain access to this sensitive region and potentially undo 

the relative peace achieved by the government in the last decade. 

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Myanmar and Bangladesh, owing to the Rohingya refugee crisis, also 

do not have an easy relationship. Both countries’ participation in BRI is 

complicated by the Rohingya issue. Bangladesh might view the construction of a connectivity corridor, without resolution of this outstanding issue, as providing Rohingyas better access to the country. Although the 

international community is pressuring Myanmar to resolve the Rohingya 

crisis, Myanmar has used Chinese diplomatic and economic cover to harden its stance. Consequently, the Rohingya crisis is deepening—embittering 

Bangladesh-Myanmar relations. In the long run, the persistence of a large 

Rohingya refugee presence in Bangladesh will pose a grave security threat 

to regional stability and prosperity.

The Trans-Himalayan Economic Corridor (THEC)

The Trans-Himalayan Economic Corridor is centered around the not-yetbuilt China-Nepal railway. The plan calls for this railway to connect to the 

Tibetan railway, providing unprecedented Chinese access into South Asia 

via landlocked Nepal,35 which currently has only 18 miles of rail track. 

Both China and India are competing to expand Nepalese rail service. China started planning a Nepal-China railway in 2013 and has included this 

project in its Nepal-China Trans-Himalayan Multidimensional Connectivity Network.

Nepal has been a longtime traditional partner of India, with India 

controlling Nepal’s access to goods via its land borders. Nepal has long 

looked to counterbalance India’s massive strategic influence, by embracing 

Chinese plans to spend millions on improving the country’s much-needed 

energy and transport infrastructure. Although India and Nepal are both 

Hindu-majority countries, Nepal’s longstanding relationship with India 

took a major hit when India imposed an economic blockade in 2015, to 

express its disapproval of changes to Nepal’s constitution. The blockade 

created severe shortfalls in fuel, food, medical goods, and post-earthquake 

relief materials, and the ensuing suffering irked ordinary Nepalis, severely 

souring the Indo-Nepal relationship. The resulting major trust deficit 

provided an opening into Nepal. Prime Minister K.P. Sharma Oli’s proBeijing stance brought him to power in Nepal, as he hoped China could 

temper India’s unbalanced influence.

In aiding Nepal, China has its own greater geopolitical ambitions. China’s broader plan includes connecting the proposed Nepal-China railway 

eventually to Lhasa via Tibet, which is an autonomous region in which 

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China has long wanted to yield greater influence.36 Tibet has always remained a central issue in the Indo-China bitter conflict. Tibet, a historical 

buffer between China and India, has increasingly come under central Chinese control, despite being an autonomous region. China has built strategic infrastructure in Tibet to enable it to rapidly reinforce its military presence. The Trans-Himalayan railway could place Nepal in debt to Chinese 

heavy financing, heightening Indian security concerns.37

The Maritime Silk Road (MSR)

The 21st century MSR was conceived and mooted alongside the “Silk 

Road Economic Belt” as a part of the larger BRI—aiming to strengthen 

China’s maritime connectivity with the IOR, Southeast Asia, and Africa.38

In addition to enhancing regional connectivity, the initiative hopes to revive China’s historical and cultural linkages with countries along ancient 

Silk Road-affiliated sea routes. The MSR encompasses a variety of infrastructure projects, including ports, roads, highways, bridges, airports, and 

underwater oil and gas pipelines.

Hambantota, a port built at the site of a Sri Lankan fishing village—

was the inception project of MSR. Built by China in 2017, the port has 

been leased to a Chinese company for 99 years. On the day of the handover, China’s official news agency Xinhua tweeted triumphantly, “Another 

milestone along the path of #BeltandRoad.”39 Not everyone is celebrating. The majority of Sri Lankans are not entirely happy about the lease, 

which has sparked local protests and accusations that Sri Lanka was selling 

its sovereignty. Sri Lanka, which experienced a decades-long civil war between its Sinhalese majority and Tamil minority, is particularly vulnerable 

to a national crisis involving international players.40 In China’s grand strategy, Hambantota is an important foothold and part of its “String of Pearls 

strategy”41 for the Indo-Pacific. Other “pearls” in South Asia include Pakistan’s Gwadar port and Myanmar’s Kyaukpyu.

Gwadar deep seaport, now under construction, is located close to 

the mouth of the Persian Gulf just below the Straits of Hormuz—and is 

a key element of the greater CPEC. The port is being developed by the 

China Overseas Port Holding Company (COPHC), to which it was leased 

by the Pakistan government for 40 years in April 2017.42 Although Gwadar 

is currently a civilian facility, Delhi suspects it is part of China’s unfolding 

maritime power projection into the Indian Ocean. The prospect of the 

Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy in Gwadar forms another 

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link in China’s efforts to expand its maritime presence in the Indo-Pacific 

region to counterbalance the United States and India. Satellite imagery 

recently detected PLA naval activity in Karachi port.43 In addition, 10 Chinese laborers died in a May 2017 BLA attack near Gwadar.44 To ensure the 

safety of the project, the Pakistan Navy established “Task Force 88” to 

beef up security in Gwadar.45 Reports from the area indicate that the port 

city has been turned into a fortress, with heavy security and frequent police 

and army checkpoints.46 In turn, these measures have caused resentment 

among local populations in both Gwadar and Baluchistan, exacerbating 

existing tensions within Pakistan about unequal allocation of resources 

across the federation.47

China has long hoped to construct another strategic port in Sonadia, 

a gateway to the Bay of Bengal, but has held off, recognizing Bangladesh’s 

concern regarding India’s opposition. China, however, has not completely 

abandoned the proposal. China has doubled down on its engagement 

with Bangladesh in other strategic infrastructure projects such as Payra

Seaport, lending further legitimacy to India’s suspicions of China trying 

to encircle India on the seas.48 As the Sonadia plan slowed down, China 

found a strategically similar alternative—Kyauk Phyu in Myanmar’s Rakhine state—the origin of the Rohingya crisis. Kyauk Phyu’s exclusive economic zone, controlled by a Chinese company, not only includes a port, 

but a 2,806-kilometer-long oil-gas pipeline connecting Kyauk Phyu to the 

landlocked city of Kunming in China’s Yunnan province.49 Chinese control over this port extends its enormous economic interests in Rakhine 

state and beyond.

The tiny climate-vulnerable island nation of the Maldives also holds 

immense strategic importance for China. Both China and India view the 

Maldives as the fulcrum for their strategic aspirations in the Indian Ocean. 

In recent years, the country has partially shed its reliance on India as a 

strategic partner, and inched closer to China. Maldives has also negotiated an agreement with China for the long-term lease of a port. Ousted 

President Abdullah Yameen strongly supported China’s BRI and courted 

Chinese financing to build infrastructure. Yameen’s increased borrowing 

from China and fears of loss of Maldivian sovereignty led to his ouster as 

president in 2018.50

India has long been an important security provider and strategic partner to island nations like the Maldives and Sri Lanka. Although these islands are small, they lie in crucial sea lines of communication that offer a 

significant basis for projecting power and securing and protecting key trad171
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ing routes. Chinese maritime strategy, aimed at a rapid expansion in the 

Indo-Pacific, reflects Alfred Mahan’s sea power hypothesis—“whoever 

controls the Indian Ocean will dominate the whole of Asia.” To this end, 

MSR offers a unique pathway for China to access strategic ports surrounding the IOR, ranging from Gwadar to Kyauk Phyu to Hambantota.

To protect its own interests, India has already begun taking some unilateral steps. For example, the Modi government has intensified efforts to 

develop the port of Chabahar in Iran, widely seen as an attempt to counter 

China’s presence in Gwadar and along the MSR more broadly. India has 

also launched Project Mausam, a cultural initiative to develop a narrative 

about India’s historical links with the Indian Ocean littoral. Many observers see this as an attempt to offset China’s Silk Road claims.51 Delhi has 

also reached out to littoral countries, such as Sri Lanka, Maldives, Mauritius, and Seychelles, with maritime security assistance. As China ratchets 

up its sphere of influence in India’s neighboring countries, it increases the 

competition between the two Asian giants, and ultimately poses a threat to 

regional security and stability.

In 2017, India, the United States, Japan, and Australia revived the informal Quadrilateral Security Dialogues, also known as the Quad, established in 2007 in response to massive Chinese investments in Indo-Pacific 

waters.52 As China continues to extend its strategic outreach into the IOR 

with BRI projects, it may encourage India to drop its earlier reluctance 

and participate in the Quad more actively. India’s recent participation in 

the Quad Plus video conferences to collaborate on combating the COVID-19 pandemic indicates the country’s foreign policy is moving in that 

direction.53 In the long run, India may opt to form a partnership with other 

democratic countries to balance growing Chinese outreach in the IOR but 

such a trend will eventually increase arms competition and make smaller 

countries more vulnerable.

The Way Forward

The above discussion reveals the security threats to South Asia presented 

by China’s BRI. Some threats are existing, and others may come down the 

road. Two sets of policies should be implemented to tackle these security 

challenges, one by South Asian countries acting as a unified region, and the 

other in coordination with extra-regional powers such as the United States, 

Japan, Australia, and the European Union. However, in both cases, India, 

which possesses 68% of the region’s landmass, 75% of its population, 

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and 79% of its economic output, should take the lead role, while ensuring 

equal participation of its smaller neighbors and addressing their concerns.

South Asians should recognize that the region suffers from acute 

deficits in infrastructure financing, giving China a wide entry point and 

strengthening its regional foothold. The Asian Development Bank suggested that to sustain growth and deal with climate change, South Asia 

must invest almost 9% of its gross domestic product on infrastructural development over 2016-2030, higher than most other sub-regions of Asia.54

While this may not be viable, due to other major domestic priorities and 

deficient annual budgets, these countries should, at the very least, significantly increase their infrastructural allocations by reallocating from other 

sectors. This will partially help reduce excessive dependence on Chinese 

loans through the BRI.

The leading regional organization, the South Asian Association for 

Regional Cooperation (SAARC), could organize regional countries’ response to China’s unilateral initiatives in the region. However, the IndoPakistan rivalry has rendered this organization almost moribund. India 

and Pakistan need to realize that their animosity gives China an advantage 

to advance its own regional interest—and therefore runs counter to the 

interests of South Asian countries. The inability of India and Pakistan to 

resolve their differences and learn to cooperate has led the region’s smaller 

nations to question whether these two giants truly want to see South Asia 

prosper. The region’s six smaller nations should exert diplomatic pressure 

on India and Pakistan to set aside their hostility and cooperate in the best 

interest of the region. Regional leaders also need to recognize that any 

alternative initiative to SAARC, such as the Bay of Bengal Initiative for 

Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) and 

Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal Initiative (BBIN), fail to gain much traction––because those initiatives do not include all South Asian countries. 

As the majority of South Asian states are small and economically weak, 

they must recognize that the only way to protect their regional interest is to 

work together as a bloc like the European Union and ASEAN.

However, it is a fact that South Asia’s persistent infrastructural deficit 

could compel countries in the region to request BRI financing. In this 

instance, South Asian states should insist that any BRI financing be fair 

and transparent. The massive debt resulting from the construction of the 

Hambantota port should serve as a cautionary tale for South Asian countries considering taking on excessive loans with poor terms and conditions. 

Pakistan had to seek an International Monetary Fund bailout package to 

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rescue its economy from excessive debts. South Asian countries should 

be vigilant not to follow suit. One way they can do better is to diversify 

their borrowing portfolios. Instead of over-relying on a particular country’s initiative, such as BRI, countries can work with multilateral development banks and other initiatives such as the Free and Open Indo-Pacific 

(FOIP). Unlike BRI projects, which are state-driven initiatives, FOIP 

seems to promote private investment and a wide range of sectoral engagement.55 Such diversified options offer South Asian countries ways to avoid 

being manipulated by lending states.

India, for its part, needs to adopt a proactive strategy, not reactive 

tactics. If India continues to pursue a reactive policy, it will exhaust its 

limited resources chasing China as Beijing’s economic clout is larger. India 

must prioritize strategically; create a sensible, coherent policy framework 

in response; and move toward a burden-sharing model with its partners 

to secure its strategic interests in the region. However, India’s economic 

and technical constraints make it difficult to present a viable alternative 

to BRI’s vision for regional connectivity. One key will be taking a collaborative approach. There is a convergence between Japan’s Partnership for 

Quality Infrastructure, United States’ FOIP, and India’s Act East policy. 

Delhi needs to collaborate actively with the United States, Japan, Australia 

and the region’s smaller countries to construct a sustainable and more viable alternative to a China-led infrastructure funding model.56 This economic cooperation platform could provide a foundation moving forward 

to tackle the security challenges presented by China’s BRI.

The United States should play a leading role as the regional security 

guarantor. However, initiating an overtly anti-China front is unlikely to 

gain significant support in this region. Growing skepticism about BRI provides openings for the United States to offer viable alternatives to Chinese 

loans and projects. The United States should customize FOIP for South 

Asia, emphasizing a nuanced approach that recognizes variations among 

the region’s states. By recognizing the “smaller” countries’ concerns, the 

United States could promote shared values and address common security 

concerns. Maintaining traditional US support for development and liberal 

values will be especially useful in countering trends towards exploitative 

economics and autocratic governance.57

Given the similarity of ideology, size and deepening importance of 

India, the United States should consider India a linchpin of its regional 

security architecture in the IOR. Overcoming past differences and building a strong relationship with India will require nuance and patience. The 

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United States will have to prioritize interests and make some compromises. Over-prioritizing on India may make smaller countries looks less important, which can jeopardize regional objectives. A cautious but comprehensive approach reflecting South Asian needs could be a tipping point.

Notes

1 Although, BRI’s physical connectivity projects runs mainly through these geo- graphical regions but BRI related other projects such as digital silk road, infrastruc- ture investment runs all over the world (138 countries), including Latin America and 

Oceania. https://eng.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/wap/wap.htm

2 【吴建民:“韬光养晦”是中国领导人的大智慧】[Wu Jianmin, “‘Hide and Bide’ Is the Wisdom of Chinese Leaders”], Chinese People’s Political Consul- tative Conference (CPPCC), September 28, 2005, http://cppcc.people.com.cn/ GB/34957/3733028.html.

3 “Belt and Road Incorporated into CPC Constitution,” Xinhua, October 24, 2017, 

http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-10/24/c_136702025.htm

4 【王春丽, “一带一路” 重要节点: 南亚区域市场的投资环境与拓展 对策. 东南学术】, no. 1 (2018): 184-192. [Wang Chunli, “Important Node of the ‘Belt and Road Initiative’: Investment Environment and Expansion Strategy for the 

South Asian Regional Market”] Southeast Academic Journal (2018). http://wap.cnki.net/ touch/web/Journal/Article/DLXS201801021.html

5 James Tunningley, “Special Report: Can China Overcome Malacca Dilemma through OBOR and CPEC?” Global Risk Insight, March 8, 2017. 

6 Saher Baloch, “The Pakistani Brides Being Trafficked to China,” BBC, May 15, 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-48260397.

7 “World Bank in South Asia,” World Bank, April 5, 2019.

8 Ankush Ajay Wagle, “Youth in South and Southeast Asia: A Common Denomi- nator,” Australian Outlook, Australian Institute of International Affairs, April 30, 2018, http://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/youth-in-south-andsoutheast-asia-a-common-denominator/.

9 【许晶岩, & 孙健. (2011). 论马六甲海峡在亚太地区大国战略中的地位与 中国的政策选择. 东南亚之窗】, 2. Xu Jingyan and Sun Jian, [“The Position of the Straits of Malacca in the Strategy of a Major Power in the Asia-Pacific Region 

and China’s Policy Choices” (2011)], Window of Southeast Asia. http://wap.cnki.net/ qikan-DYZC201102002.html

10 Liu Jinxen, “China’s Bridgehead Strategy and Yunnan Province,” East by Southeast, November 16, 2013, http://www.eastbysoutheast.com/chinas-bridgehead-strategyyunnan-province/#comments.

11 John H. Gill, “China and South Asia,” in China’s Global Influence: Perspectives and Recommendations, ed. Scott D. McDonald and Michael C. Burgoyne (Honolulu: Daniel K. Inouye Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies, 2019). 

12 Mingjiang Li, “The Belt and Road Initiative: Geo-economics and Indo-Pacific Security Competition,” International Affairs 96, no. 1 (January 2020): 169-187, https:// doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiz240.

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Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific

13 Nilanthi Samaranayake, “China’s Engagement with Smaller South Asian Countries,” United States Peace Institute (April 2019), https://www.usip.org/sites/

default/files/2019-04/sr_446-chinas_engagement_with_smaller_south_asian_coun- tries.pdf. 

14 “Bangladesh Eyes Alternatives to China’s Belt and Road Loans as It Seeks to Fund Future Development,” South China Morning Post, April 23, 2019, https://www. scmp.com/week-asia/economics/article/3007190/bangladesh-eyes-alternativeschinas-belt-and-road-loans-it.

15 “How Dominant Is China in the Global Arms Trade?” China Power, Center for 

Strategic and International Studies (2018), https://chinapower.csis.org/china-globalarms-trade/.

16 Sundha Ramachandran, “How Bangladesh Learned to Love the Belt and Road,” The Diplomat, July 22, 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2019/07/how-bangladesh- learned-to-love-the-belt-and-road/.

17 Gopal Sharma, “Nepal Says China to Allow Access to Ports, Ending Indian Monopoly in Transit,” Reuters, September 7, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/ us-china-nepal-ports/nepal-says-china-to-allow-access-to-ports-ending-indian-mo- nopoly-on-transit-idUSKCN1LN1KJ.

18 Anu Anwar, “How China Is Using Tourists to Realize its Geopolitical Goals,” East Asia Forum, September 19, 2019, https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2019/09/19/ how-china-is-using-tourists-to-realise-its-geopolitical-goals/.

19 Engen Tham, Ben Blanchard, and Wang Jing, “Chinese Warships Enter East Indian Ocean amid Maldives Tensions,” Reuters, February 20, 2018, https://www. reuters.com/article/us-maldives-politics-china/chinese-warships-enter-east-indianocean-amid-maldives-tensions-idUSKCN1G40V9.

20 【南亚问题专家:不可忽视的中国西部安全局势】[Expert on South Asia: The Security Situation in Western China Cannot Be Ignored], China Youth Daily, December 28, 2012, http://theory.people.com.cn/n/2012/1228/c49150-20043757. html.

21 Yun Sun, “China’s Strategic Assessment of Afghanistan,” War on the Rocks, April 8, 2020 https://warontherocks.com/2020/04/chinas-strategic-assessment-of-af- ghanistan/

22 Khurram Husain, “Exclusive: CPEC Master Plan Revealed,” Dawn, June 21, 2017, https://www.dawn.com/news/1333101.

23 “India Asks China to Cease Activities in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir,” Indian Ex- press, September 3, 2012, http://archive.indianexpress.com/news/india-asks-china- to-cease-activities-in-pakistan-occupied-kashmir/997108/.

24 “Statement by First Secretary, Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations Exercising India’s Right of Reply During the General Debate of 70th Session of UN 

General Assembly,” Indian Ministry of External Affairs, September 30, 2015, http://

mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/25872/Statement_by_First_Secretary_Per- manent_Mission_of_India_to_th.

25 Jansen Tham, “What’s Behind China’s Mining at the Disputed Sino-India Bor- der?” The Diplomat, May 25, 2018, https://thediplomat.com/2018/05/whats-behind- chinas-mining-at-the-disputed-sino-indian-border/.

26 “Recent Developments in Doklam Area,” Indian Ministry of External Affairs, June 30, 2017, http://www.mea.gov.in/pressreleases.htm?dtl/28572/Recent_Devel- opments_in_Doklam_Area; and C. Raja Mohan, “Raja Mandala: India and China—

Rebuild the Trust,” Indian Express,” December 19, 2017, https://indianexpress.

com/article/opinion/columns/india-and-china-rebuild-the-trust-doklam-stand- off-4988820/.

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27 Rajesh Roy, “Indian and Chinese Troops is Scuffle on Disputed Broder”, The 

Wall Street Journal, May 10, 2020 https://www.wsj.com/articles/indian-and-chinese- troops-clash-on-disputed-border-11589120817

28 “CPEC, Other Projects Being Supported by 30,000 Chinese Workers: Ambas- sador Khalid,” Nation (Pakistan), August 24, 2017, https://nation.com.pk/24- Aug-2017/cpec-and-other-projects-being-supported-by-30000-chinese-workersambassador-khalid.

29 Abdul Basit, “Attacks on Chinese Nationals and Interests in Pakistan Are Likely to Continue. Here Is Why,” South China Morning Post, Novermber 27, 2018, https:// www.scmp.com/week-asia/opinion/article/2175238/attacks-chinese-nationals-andinterests-pakistan-are-likely.

30 Naveed Siddiqui, “Chinese Embassy Warns Interior Ministry of Possible ‘Threat’ to Ambassador,” Dawn, October 22, 2017, https://www.dawn.com/news/1365503.

31 Shivshankar Menon, “As China’s Pakistan Ties Deepen, India Needs a Strategy to Mitigate the Fallout,” Wire, July 11, 2016, https://thewire.in/50524/chinas-pakistan- ties-deepen-india-needs-strategy-mitigate-fallout/.

32 Zaara Zain Hussain “The BCIM Regional Cooperation: An Emerging Multilateral Framework in Asia,” Geopolitics, History and International Relations 7, no. 2 (2015).

33 【《CIIS研究报告》第17期:“一带一路”倡议在南亚的机遇与风险_中 国国际问题研究院】[CIIS Research Report No.17: “Opportunities and Risks of the ‘Belt and Road Initiative’ in South Asia,” Chinese Academy of International Studies], 

October 22, 2018, http://www.ciis.org.cn/2018-10/22/content_40543778.html.

34 Alex Waterman, “The Future of Insurgency in Northeast India,” September 25, 2019, speech, https://www.iiss.org/events/2019/09/india-conflict-briefing.

35 【成锡忠(2018)站在新的历史起点上推动跨喜马拉雅区域发展.察哈尔 评论】[Cheng Xizhong, “Standing on a New Historical Starting Point to Promote the Development of the Trans-Himalayan Region”], November 2, 2018, http://

www.charhar.org.cn/newsinfo.aspx?newsid=14060.

36 【蒙克.“南亚龙象之争:中国-尼泊尔跨喜马拉雅铁路,” BBC中文 网,2019年10月31日】[Méng kè, “Battle of the Dragon and Elephant in South Asia: China-Nepal Trans-Himalayan Railway,”] BBC Chinese Network, October 31, 

2019, https://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/simp/chinese-news-50254270.

37 Arun Budhathoki, “China and India Are Fighting over Nepal’s Railways,” Foreign Policy, October 25, 2019, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/10/25/nepal-railways- china-india/.

38 D. Brewster, “China’s One Belt One Road Initiative: Its Strategic Impact in South Asia and the Indian Ocean Region” (Tokyo: The Sasakawa Peace Foundation, 2017).

39 Xinhua, Twitter post, December 9, 2017, 9:09 p.m., https://twitter.com/XH- News/status/939753813115789312/.

40 Tim Fernholz, “China’s ‘Debt Trap’ Is Even Worse Than We Thought,” Quartz, June 28, 2018, https://qz.com/1317234/chinas-debt-trap-in-sri-lanka-is-even-worse- than-we-thought/.

41 The term was first used in a 2005 report titled “Energy Futures in Asia” prepared for the U.S. Secretary of Defense by the private consultants, Booz-Allen-Hamilton, 

and has been most enthusiastically adopted by Indian analysts.

42 “Pakistan’s Gwadar Port Leased to Chinese Company for 40 years,” Indian Ex- press, April 20, 2017, https://indianexpress.com/article/world/pakistan-gwadar-port- leased-to-chinese-company-for-40-years-4621432/.

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43 Shrikant Bedekar, “Chinese Navy, Marine Commandos Detected in Karachi, Pakistan; Should India Be Anxious?” Eurasian Times, April 9, 2020, https://eurasian- times.com/chinese-navy-marine-commandos-detected-in-karachi-pakistan-shouldindia-be-anxious/.

44 Sharif Khan, “BLA Kills 10 Sindhi Labourers in Gwadar,” Nation, May 14, 2017, https://nation.com.pk/14-May-2017/bla-kills-10-sindhi-labourers-in-gwadar.

45 “Pakistan Navy’s Special ‘Task Force-88’ Set Up to Guard Gwadar Port’s Sea Lanes,” Dawn, December 13, 2016, https://www.dawn.com/news/1302102.

46 Syed Raza Hassan, “To Protect Chinese Investment, Pakistan Military Leaves Little to Chance,” Reuters, February 8, 2016, https://www.reuters.com/article/paki- stan-china-security-gwadar/ to-protect-chinese-investment-pakistan-military-leaveslittle-to-chance-idUSKCN0VH06F.

47 Filippo Boni and Katharine Adeney, “China’s BRI in Pakistan—A Poster Child for Success?” University of Nottingham Asia Research Institute, Asia Dialogue, January 29, 2019, http://theasiadialogue.com/2019/01/29/chinas-bri-in-pakistan-aposter-child-for-success.

48 Francine R. Frankel, “The Breakout of China-India Strategic Rivalry in Asia and the Indian Ocean,” Journal of International Affairs 64 no. 2 (Spring/Summer 2011): 1-17, https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/24385531.pdf.

49 Cao Siqi and Shan Jie, “Sino-Myanmar Oil Pipeline Launch a Good Signal: Ex- perts,” from Global Times, 28 March 2017, http://mizzima.com/business-domestic/ sino-myanmar-oil-pipeline-launch-good-signal-experts.

50 Lee Jeong-ho, “Why Are China and India so Interested in the Maldives?” Septem- ber 25, 2018, South China Morning Post, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplo- macy/article/2165597/why-are-china-and-india-so-interested-maldives.

51 Darshana M. Baruah, “India’s Answer to the Belt and Road: A Map for South Asia,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, August 21, 2018, https://carn- egieindia.org/2018/08/21/india-s-answer-to-belt-and-road-road-map-for-south-asiapub-77071.

52 Jesse Barker Gale, “The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue and the Maritime Silk Road Initiative,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, April 2, 2018, 

https://www.csis.org/analysis/quadrilateral-security-dialogue-and-maritime-silkroad-initiative.

53 “India Joins Hands with NZ, Vietnam, S. Korea to Combat Pandemic,” The Times 

of India, March 21, 2020 https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/india-joins- hands-with-nz-vietnam-s-korea-to-combat-pandemic/articleshow/74740424.cms 

54 Shikha Jha and Rosa Mia Arao, “Infrastructure Financing in South Asia,” Asian Development Bank Working Paper-59, September 2018, https://www.adb.org/ publications/infrastructure-financing-south-asia.

55 “President Trump’s Administration Is Advancing a Free and Open Indo-Pacific through Investments and Partnerships in Economics, Security, and Governance,” 

White House, November 18, 2018, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-state- ments/president-trumps-administration-advancing-free-open-indo-pacific-invest- ments-partnerships-economics-security-governance/.

56 Darshana M. Baruah, “Toward Strategic Economic Cooperation between India and Japan,” Carnegie India, December 1, 2016, http://carnegieindia. org/2016/12/01/toward-strategic-economic-cooperation-between-india-and-japanpub-66326.

57 Gill, “China and South Asia.” 

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179

11

FROM THE BLUE DOT NETWORK TO 

THE BLUE DOT MARKETPLACE: 

A WAY TO COOPERATE IN STRATEGIC 

COMPETITION

Jerre V. Hansbrough

The world is in massive need of infrastructure investment. China’s One 

Belt, One Road brought this issue to the forefront of the international 

community but is not living up to expectations. The Blue Dot Network, 

introduced by the United States and like minded partners to promote infrastructure development, is seen as a counter to the Belt and Road. It 

is focused on encouraging quality infrastructure investment by holding 

projects to high standards of transparency and sustainability through a 

certification system. However, the Blue Dot Network does not include 

any funding or means to close the global infrastructure gap. To address 

this issue, this chapter proposes the idea of a Blue Dot Market. If the Blue 

Dot Network were to evolve into the Blue Dot Marketplace over the next 

five to ten years, it could serve as a platform to bring together numerous 

construction and financial vendors to increase the quality and quantity of 

global infrastructure investment.

Collaboration in an Era of Strategic Competition: Enter 

the Blue Dot Marketplace

Since the announcement of China’s One Belt, One Road in 2013, a very 

common question has been, “how will the United States and its partners 

compete with the Belt and Road?” One Belt, One Road did highlight a 

massive need for global infrastructure but attempting to directly “counter” 

this program may not be the best approach. 
Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific

The United States should ask how it can best lead the next global 

infrastructure revolution. Infrastructure is the backbone of society, commerce, and trade. The demand is high as the G20 Global Infrastructure 

Outlook estimated a need for US$ 94 trillion globally by 2040 to support 

economic growth and start to close infrastructure gaps.1 Based on current 

investment trends, the Outlook estimates a US$ 15 trillion gap over the 

same period. If fully realized, China’s commitment of US$ 1 trillion in 

global investment through the Belt and Road would be the largest standalone program to date.

However, the Belt and Road is not without problems. From a simplified geopolitical lens, the Belt and Road is a China-centric program to 

employ China’s excess industrial capacity, better connect and employ the 

Xinjiang province, and secure energy resources. Belt and Road projects 

are a means for China to gain leverage over participating nations and 

expand its power and security.2 Motivations aside, the United States and 

its partners have two primary concerns regarding the Belt and Road as a 

global infrastructure development program: debt sustainability and project 

quality.3 Many of the Belt and Road countries became more economically vulnerable from high amounts of debt due to overly ambitious and 

underperforming infrastructure projects. Belt and Road projects generally 

lack transparency which makes them more prone to corruption and cost 

inflation. Corruption and cost cutting can lead to substandard construction practices which can increase maintenance and operations costs, which 

further increase a nation’s debt insecurity.

In November 2019, the United States, in collaboration with Australia 

and Japan, announced the Blue Dot Network (BDN) to certify major infrastructure projects as “sustainable and not exploitative.”4

 Even while the 

BDN is forming, India joined as part of the Joint Statement for a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in February 2020.5

 This is an encouraging 

sign of a desire for quality infrastructure through regional cooperation. It 

is difficult to obtain balance between competition and cooperation, but the 

Blue Dot Network may provide a framework to make it a reality. If there 

is a way to get China to participate in the Blue Dot Network, many of the 

criticisms of the Belt and Road would be addressed. After all, the Belt and 

Road as described in China’s “Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk 

Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road” (2015) is a 

good program. The “Vision and Actions” include following market rules 

and international norms, seeking mutual benefit, policy coordination, and 

unimpeded trade, among other activities.6 Unfortunately, many Belt and 

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From Blue Dot Network to Blue Dot Marketplace

Road projects have not followed the spirit of the Belt and Road as laid out 

in that vision paper. 

One of the primary criticisms of the Belt and Road from the United 

States is that irresponsible lending can result in national instability.7 The 

inability to sustain debt reduces a nation’s ability to adapt to economic 

distress and increases its vulnerability to coercion. China owns external 

loan debt for seven countries that exceed 25% of their GDP.8 High debt 

and substantial investment in a country gives China significant economic 

coercive power. The watered-down version of a 2016 European Union 

(EU) statement intended to condemn China’s building of artificial islands 

in the South China Sea is one example. The final EU statement did not 

specifically mention Beijing, in part, because Greece and Hungary did not 

want to upset their primary provider of foreign direct investment (FDI).9

Loans and FDI from China come with opaque lending practices that can 

include discretionary credit and terms not disclosed to the general population.10 Even the offer of loans connected with tentative Belt and Road 

projects coerce smaller nations to bend to China’s will. In September 2019, 

the small island nations of Kiribati and the Solomon Islands cut ties with 

Taiwan upon the promise of Belt and Road projects.11 Another example 

is the massive debt Djibouti owes to China. As of 2017, Djibouti owed 

China debt equal to 65% of its GDP and this debt is rising.12 Djibouti is 

also the only location China has a permanent military presence outside of 

its claimed territory, which opened in 2017.

In addition, many of the Belt and Road projects are of a lower quality 

than accepted standards, reducing the ideal lifespan of major infrastructure.13 Over time, it is generally less expensive to build a higher quality project with low operations costs than a less expensive project with frequent 

need for repairs or upgrades.14 The last criticism to address is that many 

Belt and Road projects include a technological component that the host 

nation is unable to operate or maintain. This again brings about a concern 

of dependency on a foreign power to sustain critical infrastructure within 

a nation.

If the United States, China, and the European Union—the three 

major powerhouses on Earth—are able to cooperate for infrastructure 

development, the world would come out ahead. The world needs more infrastructure to sustain growth. This is not just isolated to one region. The 

Asian Development Bank estimates US$ 26.2 trillion is needed in Asia by 

2030 to sustain growth and adapt to climate change.15 The United States 

itself requires US$ 4.5 trillion just to repair existing infrastructure.16 It is 

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Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific

good to have China regionally and globally engaged in infrastructure development. Malcolm Turnbull, the Australian prime minister said, “Global 

infrastructure investment is a good example of where countries should 

work together.”17

The Blue Dot Network

The BDN is primarily a vision of what global infrastructure should look 

like. Certification by the BDN means that a project is high quality and has 

transparent origins, much like the “organic” label for produce. The intent 

of the BDN is not to be a United States counter to the Belt and Road, but 

at least China sees it as such.18 A key difference is that the BDN does not 

include funding for infrastructure projects. The principles of the BDN 

does address two of the major concerns about Belt and Road projects 

through emphasizing quality, transparency, and life-cycle cost. 

The Blue Dot Network is starting to take form by encouraging responsible construction and lending practices by consolidating international norms such as the G20 Principles for Quality Infrastructure Investment, of which China is a signatory member.

19 The Blue Dot Network 

is a means to review infrastructure projects from any private, public, or 

civic sector from any country and highlight quality construction and financing practices. The United States already has a variety of programs 

that fund foreign infrastructure development and encourage investment 

through the U.S. Development Finance Corporation (DFC) and the U.S. 

Trade and Development Agency’s Global Procurement Initiative (GPI). 

Japan’s International Cooperation Agency (JICA), Australia’s Infrastructure Financing Facility for the Pacific (AIFFP), and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) are among the other major infrastructure investors that 

will participate in the Blue Dot Network. 

But what is the future of the Blue Dot Network? Can it increase the 

quality of global infrastructure development? This paper proposes that 

once the BDN establishes standards and successfully certifies projects for 

a few years, it could go a step further to become the “Blue Dot Marketplace.” This venue could be where countries looking to meet specific 

infrastructure investment requirements could meet with vetted financial 

and construction entities to initiate sustainable and “bankable” projects. 

Presently, there are numerous bilateral and multilateral programs to support infrastructure development, but there is no consolidated location for 

a country to evaluate and compare opportunities. 

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From Blue Dot Network to Blue Dot Marketplace

The Blue Dot Marketplace

The Blue Dot Marketplace (BDM) could provide apolitical quality assurance and advice to validate financial and technical aspects of proposed 

projects. The BDM would be a consolidated virtual location for the key 

sectors needed for infrastructure development to interact. The primary 

groups of stakeholders would include: 1) host nations seeking infrastructure investment; 2) construction vendors; 3) finance vendors; and 4) technical consultants. This could be a consolidated location for the countless 

infrastructure development agencies, banks, and technical and construction entities. 

The BDM would need an oversight body to vet financing, construction, and consultant groups by their adherence and past performance relative to the Blue Dot Network standards. This body, the BDM Administration Board, should be made of a mix of G20 or UN infrastructure and 

finance experts, growing as the marketplace expands. This review should 

be open to all construction and financial vendors, to include Chinese stateowned enterprises (SOE) and banks. Finance and construction vendors 

would submit a statement of interest describing the type and scale of financing or construction they are interested in supporting. They would also 

submit evidence demonstrating the ability to support the requested project 

size and type. The documentation would be reviewed by the BDM Administrative Board. The Board would verify, or deny with explanation, the 

financial or construction vendor’s ability to compete in categories based 

on their submission. This vetted set of vendors would then be added to 

the marketplace. Vendors would need to be reevaluated at some interval or 

number of projects to ensure continued transparency.

How Might the Blue Dot Marketplace Operate?

The host nation would submit a request for proposals to the construction 

sector of the marketplace with the confidence that the bids would be from 

reputable groups and include life-cycle cost. All participants in the BDM 

should be part of the Blue Dot Network and support its tenets. See Figure 

12.1: The Blue Dot Marketplace for a graphical representation.

The host nation is responsible to identify its general infrastructure 

needs and developmental goals. It would then sequence related projects 

and prioritize the list based on national need. The client nation would be 

highly engaged throughout the process with a designated lead agency to 

revise the list as conditions change. The nation would select a project bid 

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Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific

from the construction vendors and solicit for funding through the finance 

vendor market. Ideally, the host nation would approach the marketplace 

with a prioritized list of infrastructure needs and a cost rough order of 

magnitude for the projects. It is best if there are projects for a variety of 

sectors (i.e., energy production, port development, customs facility) and 

scale to find a good fit for funding and construction vendors to compete. 

Even though a priority list would exist, it may be most effective to build 

based on fund and asset availability. 

Projects would go to the construction sector of the marketplace to 

get bids and proposals from the construction vendors. The construction 

vendors must be approved to compete in the Blue Dot Marketplace by 

submitting documentation to verify the company’s capability, capacity, and 

adherence to the Blue Dot tenets. If interested in a project listed on the 

marketplace, the construction vendors would produce a project proposal 

to the soliciting nation. 

As the host nation narrows in on a construction vendor, it would 

then solicit for funding, if needed, through the finance sector. The finance 

vendors would evaluate the client nation’s debt capacity and project viability, also known as “bankability,” to offer funding with terms that follow Blue Dot tenets. Grants and loans could be advertised on the finance 

sector and these could be used for construction or consultant services. 

Public-private partnerships (PPP) could be proposed to share costs and 

manage infrastructure operation, but this must also be accounted for in 

the life-cycle cost of a project. If the construction vendor has a relationship with a funding vendor, this could be a combined bid as long as all 

parties adhere to the Blue Dot tenets. An example of this might be a U.S. 

construction company with the U.S. EXIM Bank or a Chinese company 

with the Agriculture Development Bank of China. All bids or proposals 

would include life-cycle cost so that the nation is fully aware of the total 

cost of the project. 

The BDM technical consultants could provide connection with technical assistance teams to develop the priorities with the host country to 

find the most efficient and logical sequence of projects. These teams 

could also provide contract review services such as the U.S. Infrastructure 

Transaction Advisory Network (ITAN) or technical reviews through the 

U.S. Trade and Development Agency (USTDA). Consultants could also 

validate projected economic growth from proposed projects as this can be 

inflated if not done objectively.

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From Blue Dot Network to Blue Dot Marketplace

Project review milestones will be needed to ensure adherence to 

Blue Dot tenets for sustainability and to meet certification; these requirements are currently under development as the Blue Dot Network takes 

shape. 

Example Blue Dot Marketplace Project

Nation A has a severe traffic congestion problem that is outside of their 

ability to resolve internally. Nation A goes to its account manager within 

the Blue Dot Marketplace and describe the problem and a potential solution. The account manager solicits proposals to technical consultants to 

review the problem (if there is not a clear solution) or go straight to soliciting for construction bids. Once funding and construction proposals are 

selected, the project may undergoing a value engineering review to look 

for increased efficiencies and environmental considerations. As the project 

proceeds, it includes an interim review or a final review, depending on the 

timeline and scale of the project. As long as the Blue Dot Network tenets 

are met, the project is certified when construction is complete.

Cooperation and Opportunities

Can the Blue Dot Marketplace serve as a cooperation venue for China 

and the United States? Accusations of poor construction standards and 

environmental stewardship are areas of criticism for Chinese construction 

Figure 11.1: The Blue Dot Marketplace

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Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific

companies. The World Bank has seen that Chinese companies meet high 

standards for World Bank-funded road construction projects.20 However, 

Chinese companies have been disbarred from World Bank projects not by 

poor quality, but due to breaches in procurement guidelines, which could 

be mitigated through increased transparency.21 If Belt and Road projects 

could meet the high standards of the Blue Dot Network, this could build 

legitimacy for Belt and Road projects. Chinese participation in the Blue 

Dot Marketplace would mitigate many geopolitical concerns of economic 

coercion and militarization associated with the Belt and Road, bringing 

focus to actual development. There will always be political reasons to provide support to foreign nations but the Blue Dot Marketplace would give 

the host nation a much greater ability to make informed decisions on their 

infrastructure development. Transparency is a powerful tool to combat 

corruption and ensure fair competition. To encourage China’s participation in the BDM, the United States could join the Asian Infrastructure 

Investment Bank (AIIB) and support Belt and Road projects that meet 

BDN standards. This cooperation could further encourage China to continue infrastructure projects and rebuild its relationship with the United 

States. 

Encouraging sustainability and transparency are primary concerns 

for the BDN.22 Financial sustainability includes reviewing full economic 

impacts of the projects (such as debt sustainability, maintenance and operating costs) and projected economic growth. Technical sustainability can 

include environmental impact, planning for climate change through resilience, maximizing green building design and efficient construction techniques. 

Outside of debt sustainability and transparency, the Blue Dot Marketplace could be a great platform for the pursuit of environmentally 

sustainable infrastructure. Many Belt and Road projects are in the energy 

sector, but Belt and Road power plants outside of China are mostly coal 

fired and use subcritical technology.23 China is very capable in solar and 

hydropower energy technology and would compete well in this sector of 

construction. Green projects could help with carbon footprint reduction, 

global energy security, and grow the sustainable energy market. The Blue 

Dot Marketplace could encourage thorough vulnerability assessments and 

integrate environmental risk mitigation into projects. Vulnerability assessments take into account changes in the environment over time such as 

impacts on food security, water shortages, disasters, and health problems. 

This includes accounting for sea level rise in project design, managing the 

186
From Blue Dot Network to Blue Dot Marketplace

control of invasive species and disease transmission due to increased connectivity, and considering community resilience to these effects.

Conclusion

Competition is at the heart of capitalism, but it is important that competition is fair to maximize innovation. International cooperation can set 

universal standards of excellence to increase fair competition in the infrastructure sector. This increased cooperation can build global security and 

economic development. The Blue Dot Network can help by holding all 

infrastructure construction and financing entities to sustainable and transparent practices. However, if the Blue Dot Network is purely perceived 

as a “counter” to the Belt and Road, a huge opportunity for the infrastructure investment will be missed. Greater cooperation resulting in holding 

companies accountable for good construction and financing practices will 

benefit all. Infrastructure is in great need globally and the Blue Dot Marketplace could be a way to simplify large-scale infrastructure investment. 

Once the Blue Dot Network is established and certifies projects, it could 

evolve into the BDM over the next five to ten years. The BDM could bring 

all the various programs, agencies, and companies together in one location to provide transparent, sustainable, quality infrastructure in a way that 

can responsibly drive innovation and economic growth. The term “Blue 

Dot” is a reference to Carl Sagan’s book Pale Blue Dot, where he challenges 

humanity “to deal more kindly with one another and to preserve and cherish the pale blue dot, the only home we’ve ever known.”24 Earth is a small 

and unique blip in the universe, people must find ways to cooperate in 

competition.

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Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific

Notes

1 “Forecasting Infrastructure Investment Needs and Gaps,” Global Infrastructure Outlook - A G20 Initiative, accessed March 18, 2020, https://outlook.gihub.org/.

2 Peter Cai, “Understanding China’s Belt and Road Initiative,” Lowy Institute, March 22, 2017, 1.

3 John Hurley, Scott Morris, and Gailyn Portelance, “Examining the Debt Implica- tions of the Belt and Road Initiative from a Policy Perspective,” Journal of Infrastruc- ture, Policy and Development 3, no. 1 (2019): 145.

4 Leigh Hartman, “What Is the Blue Dot Network for Infrastructure Financing?” ShareAmerica, January 29, 2020, accessed March 17, 2020, https://share.america. gov/what-is-blue-dot-network-for-infrastructure-financing/. 

5 Tara Kartha, “Counter to BRI? Why India-US’ Thrust on Blue Dot Network Will Make China See Red,” The Print, February 28, 2020, accessed March 10, 2020, https://theprint.in/opinion/counter-to-bri-why-india-us-thrust-on-blue-dot-net- work-will-make-china-see-red/372573/.

6 “Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Cen- tury Maritime Silk Road,” Belt and Road Portal, March 30, 2015, accessed January 16, 

2020, https://eng.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/qwyw/qwfb/1084.htm.

7 Dylan Gerstel, “It’s a (Debt) Trap! Managing China-IMF Cooperation Across the Belt and Road,” New Perspectives in Foreign Policy 16 (Fall 2018): 12, https://www.csis. org/npfp/its-debt-trap-managing-china-imf-cooperation-across-belt-and-road.

8 Sebastian Horn, Carmen M. Reinhart, and Christoph Trebesch, “China’s Over- seas Lending,” Kiel Working Paper no. 2132, Kiel Institute for the World Economy, June 2019, 14, https://www.ifw-kiel.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publica- tions/Christoph_Trebesch/KWP_2132.pdf.

9 Robin Emmott, “EU’s Statement on South China Sea Reflects Divisions,” 

Reuters, July 15, 2016, accessed March 20, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/ us-southchinasea-ruling-eu/eus-statement-on-south-china-sea-reflects-divisionsidUSKCN0ZV1TS. 

10 Jonathan Holslag, The Silk Road Trap: How China’s Trade Ambitions Challenge Europe (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2019), 128.

11 Lidia Kelly, “Kiribati Says National Interest behind Cutting Taiwan Ties in Favor of China,” Reuters, September 21, 2019, accessed March 24, 2020, https://www. reuters.com/article/us-taiwan-diplomacy-kiribati/kiribati-says-national-interestbehind-cutting-taiwan-ties-in-favor-of-china-idUSKBN1W609C. 

12 Nizar Manek, “Djibouti Needed Help, China Had Money, and Now the U.S. and France Are Worried,” Bloomberg, April 15, 2019, accessed March 1, 2020, https:// www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2019-04-06/djibouti-needed-help-china-hadmoney-and-now-the-u-s-and-france-are-worried. 

13 Teddy Ng, “China’s Belt and Road Initiative Criticised for Poor Standards and ‘Wasteful’ Spending,” South China Morning Post, June 12, 2019, accessed March 21, 2020, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3014214/chinas-belt- and-road-initiative-criticised-poor-standards-and. 

14 Eno Center for Transportation, “Maximizing the Value of Investments Using Life Cycle Cost Analysis,” American Society of Civil Engineers, 2014, 1, https://

www.asce.org/uploadedFiles/Issues_and_Advocacy/Our_Initiatives/Infrastructure/

Content_Pieces/asce-eno-life-cycle-report.pdf.

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From Blue Dot Network to Blue Dot Marketplace

15 Rana Hasan, “Meeting Asia’s Infrastructure Needs,” Asian Development Bank, February 2017, 3, https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/227496/

special-report-infrastructure.pdf.

16 “Infrastructure Report Card: A Comprehensive Assessment of America’s Infrastructure,” American Society of Civil Engineers, April 2017, 5, https://www.

infrastructureusa.org/2017-infrastructure-report-card/.

17 Malcolm Turnbull, speech transcript, University of New South Wales, Sydney, August 7, 2018, https://www.malcolmturnbull.com.au/media/speech-at-the-univer- sity-of-new-south-wales-sydney-7-august-2018. 

18 “Blue Dot Network Is Just Washington’s Delusion,” Global Times, December 24, 

2019, accessed March 20, 2020, https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1174681.shtml. 

19 “Blue Dot Network,” U.S. Department of State, accessed March 23, 2020, https://www.state.gov/blue-dot-network/. 

20 Michel Oksenberg and Elizabeth C. Economy, China Joins the World: Progress and Prospects (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1999): 212.

21 “World Bank Group Debars China Railway First Group Co. Ltd.,” World Bank, September 18, 2019, accessed March 25, 2020, https://www.worldbank.org/en/ news/press-release/2019/09/18/world-bank-group-debars-china-railway-firstgroup-co-ltd. 

22 “Blue Dot Network.”

23 Sagatom Saha, “China’s Belt and Road Plan Is Destroying the World,” National 

Interest, August 18, 2019, accessed March 24, 2019, https://nationalinterest.org/ feature/chinas-belt-and-road-plan-destroying-world-74166. 

24 Carl Sagan, Pale Blue Dot: A Vision of the Human Future in Space (New York: Ran- dom House, 1994), 25.

189

191

12

UNDERWATER COMPETITION IN THE 

INDO-PACIFIC

Mizuho Kajiwara

Introduction

The Prussian military philosopher Carl von Clausewitz introduced the 

term “The Fog of War” to describe the uncertainty that exists in military 

operations with respect to one’s own capability, adversary’s intent, and the 

precise understanding of the battlefield. The informational asymmetry 

gives a strategic advantage by blinding one’s enemy. The competition for 

this advantage is more intense in the underwater domain than most of the 

others such as land, air, space, and the sea above water. 

During the Cold War, the United States enjoyed an overwhelming 

advantage after it succeeded in building nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSN) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) and laying 

undersea cables (Sound Surveillance System, or SOSUS) in the Atlantic 

Ocean and the Pacific Ocean to detect and contain the erstwhile Soviet 

Union’s submarines. These networks played a significant role in ending the 

Cold War and entrenching the United States’ supremacy in the underwater 

domain, which continues to date. 

Currently, the underwater competition in the Indo-Pacific region is 

being played out between three great powers, namely the United States, 

China, and Russia, but with increasing involvement by regional powers 

such as Japan, Vietnam, and India. The strength of submarines is that they 

are invisible and thus can be deployed anywhere in the open sea. However, 

they are always at risk of detection. For example, nuclear submarines emit 

noise through nuclear reactors and steam turbines, and similarly conventional submarines emit noise through snorkeling. 
Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific

At a conference in November 2019, U.S. Secretary of Defense Mark 

Esper said, “Advances in AI [artificial intelligence] have the potential to 

change the character of warfare for generations to come. Whichever nation harnesses AI first will have a decisive advantage on the battlefield for 

many, many years. We have to get there first.”1 A “cat and mouse game” 

in the underwater domain—often focused on deploying stealthier submarines and developing detection and tracking technologies in anti-submarine warfare (ASW)—is about to change with AI, which will facilitate the 

execution of more dynamic operations with a minimized risk of losing 

human lives. In this chapter, I will focus on how the underwater domain 

changes over time in the context of strategy and security in the IndoPacific and forecast future scenarios with emerging technologies.

Game Changers in the Underwater Domain: 

Lessons from the History of Submarine Technologies

Nuclear-Powered Submarine

The world’s first nuclear submarine, USS Nautilus (SSN-571), was 

launched in 1954, and it was successfully commissioned in 1955.2 Only 

four years after the U.S. started operating a nuclear submarine, it aborted 

plans for building further conventional submarines and decided to focus 

its resources and budget on nuclear-powered submarines. Compared to 

the conventional type, the nuclear submarine has certain disadvantages in 

that it is noisier, its development and maintenance are expensive, it generates enormous amounts of harmful radiation, which, if leaked, can cause 

harm to both human and marine life, and after retirement the time taken 

to process nuclear reactors and fuel is lengthy. However, nuclear propulsion offers inexhaustible power and frees the submarine from the need to 

surface frequently as it does not require air. The risk of being found by 

the enemy is lower, thereby making it suitable for long-term dives in the 

vast ocean. 

Meanwhile, the Soviet Union continued to develop and maintain 

conventionally-powered submarines. As submarines are very expensive 

and require advanced technology for construction and operation, the Soviets chose the relatively inexpensive and technically stable conventionallypowered submarines to supplement nuclear-powered submarines, partly 

because of the lack of economic power.

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Underwater Competition in the Indo-Pacific

The Manhattan Project

In 1939, the United States confirmed the findings of the occurrence of fission 

in uranium resulted in the immediate release of enormous amounts of energy. 

The United States then carried out the Manhattan Project, in which hundreds 

of scientists and engineers were involved in developing and manufacturing an 

atomic bomb. For the first time in human history, the United States dropped 

atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, demonstrating the destructive power of nuclear weapons to the world. 

However, even before the army-led Manhattan Project was executed, the 

U.S. Navy was studying how power could be derived from nuclear fission and 

utilized as a source of power supply for submarines. The research was led by 

U.S. Naval Research Laboratory physicist Dr. Ross Gunn with the goal of overcoming the disadvantages that submarines faced from having to regularly 

emerge to the surface for fresh air. The Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) proposed that research and development be conducted on using nuclear power to 

propel naval vessels. 

In 1949, Admiral Hyman G. Rickover, who later came to be known as the 

“Father of the Nuclear Navy,” became the Director of the Naval Reactors Branch 

of the Bureau of Ships and was also assigned to the Division of Reactor Development of the AEC. Congress authorized the construction of the nuclear-powered 

submarine, called the Nautilus, in 1951.

Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile and New Missions

During World War II, Germany had developed V1 and V2 rockets to attack Britain. After its defeat, German rocket technology was transferred, 

along with German engineers, when they were moved to the United States 

and the Soviet Union. 

The U.S. Navy succeeded in launching a missile from underwater, but 

amid these circumstances, the launch of the R7 (8,800 kilometer range), 

the world’s first intercontinental ballistic missile, by the Soviet Union in 

1957, had a major impact on U.S. research and development. That same 

year, the Soviets successfully launched the Sputnik rocket and put it into 

orbit.

As a result of the “Sputnik Shock,” the development of Polaris, a 

U.S. Navy-driven SLBM, was pushed ahead of schedule. With solidified 

fuel, which increased safety, the Polaris A-1 (ranging 1,852 kilometers) was 

developed. Two missiles were successfully launched underwater during 

the dive by the first nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine, the USS 

George Washington (SSBN 598) in 1960. The missile was able to carry only 

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one nuclear warhead, but later the Poseidon C-3, which had a greater range 

and increased accuracy, was able to carry multiple nuclear warheads in a 

single missile.

With these developing technologies, U.S. nuclear submarines were 

operated for two different purposes: (1) submarines that were equipped 

with torpedoes and mines to attack enemy submarines or surface ships, 

and (2) strategic submarines that were assigned for strategic nuclear deterrence as part of the U.S. nuclear triad. The emergence of nuclear-powered 

ballistic missile submarines (SSBN), the platform for SLBM, allowed submarines submerged underwater to survive semi-permanently and retaliate 

with nuclear weapons if their country was preemptively attacked. Given 

its “second strike ability,” it plays a decisive role in deterrence even today. 

Sound Surveillance System (SOSUS)

It is generally acknowledged that the United States had overwhelming military power over the Soviet Union during the Cold War and that the Soviet 

Union collapsed due to internal factors such as economic failures under 

the communist system, the burden of increasing military budgets, and the 

independence of member states from the Soviet Union. However, it is 

worth mentioning that a game-changer technology was neither nuclearpowered submarines nor ballistic missile submarines, both of which were 

acquired by the United States and the Soviet Union almost simultaneously, 

but it was submarine-detecting technologies that created the disparity in 

underwater operations and eventually led to the end of the Cold War. 

The theory behind this technology was not new or innovative, but merely 

an extension of the basic technical premise behind the development of 

submarines. 

The combat capabilities of a submarine were not enough to maintain 

supremacy in anti-submarine warfare, but the ability of sonar to keep track 

of Soviet submarines had a greater role to play. Radar cannot detect underwater targets. The propagation of sound waves in the sea depends not 

only on factors such as water depth, salinity, and water temperature, but 

also on the season and weather. Therefore, a technology for determining 

the enemy’s character, position, and distance was required.

The U.S. Navy installed hydrophones on fixed cables laid on the 

seafloor and focused on improving the performance of its SOSUS that 

analyzed submarine sounds received on the ground. As many Soviet submarines were set up at strategic locations around the North Pacific Ocean 

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and North Atlantic Ocean, SOSUS helped keep track of submarines leaving the submarine base. SOSUS became an important system of the U.S. 

Navy. During the 1962 Cuban Crisis, SOSUS demonstrated its effectiveness by detecting a Soviet diesel submarine.3

 By 1970, the area covered by 

SOSUS stretched from the east to the west of the Atlantic Ocean and the 

vast waters of the Norwegian Sea. 

However, aided by the spy activities of former U.S. Navy warrant 

officer John Walker in the mid-1970s, the Soviets became aware of the 

acoustic weakness of its own submarines and rushed to improve quietness. In the following years, Soviet Accra-class submarines and Sierra-class 

submarines succeeded in significantly reducing noise levels.

The U.S. Navy subsequently developed the Surveillance Towed-Array 

Sensor System (SURTASS) as a complement to SOSUS, which was used 

for collecting submarines’ acoustic fingerprint information, detection and 

tracking of submarine contacts at long range, and worked by towing sonar 

from a surface ship. In 1985, the combination of SOSUS and SURTASS 

was recognized as a part of the Integrated Undersea Surveillance System.4

The system reached its Cold War peak with 11 NAVFACs (Naval Facilities)/NOPFs (Naval Ocean Processing Facilities), 14 SURTASS ships, 

two Ocean Systems commands, and manned by approximately 4,000 personnel in the late 1980s.5

This was a “cat and mouse” game. The improved detection capabilities of the U.S. Navy led the Soviet Union to reduce its submarine noise 

levels, which in turn forced the U.S. Navy to make major changes in its 

strategy. Rather than primarily destroying Soviet submarines, deploying attack submarines to the bastion of the Soviet Union—the Barents Sea and 

the Sea of Okhotsk—became a more effective approach. 

The presence of SOSUS made it possible to contain the Soviets in 

NATO’s so-called “GIUK” gap (a strip of ocean between Greenland, Iceland, and the United Kingdom). It was hard for them to pass through the 

GIUK gap to reach open waters without being detected by the SOSUS 

network. The U.S. Navy was able to maximize the effectiveness of the 

strategy by deploying some offensive submarines on the front. This shift 

in the U.S. strategy forced the Soviet to deploy nuclear-powered attack 

submarines (SSNs) in the Soviet naval bastions to protect its own strategic 

nuclear submarines, thereby making it more difficult for the Soviets to 

navigate in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.6

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Sonar

The first attempt to detect underwater targets using underwater acoustic waves 

was made after the Titanic collided with an iceberg and sank in 1912. This event 

led to the advancement of iceberg detection research. During World War I, the 

British developed first underwater acoustic sensor (ASDIC: Anti-Submarine Division-ics) in a battle with U-boats. There are two types of sonar: active sonar, 

which transmits sound waves and measures the position of the enemy vessel, 

based on the time taken for the sound to bounce back from the target, and the 

intensity of the sound: and passive sonar, which detects the sound emitted by 

the opponent.

Commenting on the SOSUS, Edward Whitman, a former senior editor of Undersea Warfare, writes, “the Navy’s pioneering Sound Surveillance 

System—SOSUS—became a key, long-range early-warning asset for protecting the United States against the threat of Soviet ballistic missile submarines and in providing vital cueing information for tactical, deep-ocean, 

anti-submarine warfare. And although subsequent events—most notably 

the end of the Cold War—robbed SOSUS of much of its mission, its history remains an object lesson in how inspired, science-based engineering 

development can lead to extraordinary operational effectiveness.”7

Success in a battle is often measured by metrics such as territory 

gained, or enemies killed. However, John Stillion and Bryan Clark of 

the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments points out that “[i]n 

many cases, disrupting, delaying, or harassing the enemy may be sufficient 

to achieve one’s most important military objectives. In the short-term, the 

side using these approaches may be able to gain a temporary advantage 

toward a larger goal; in the long-term, these approaches may impose significant costs on an enemy in exchange for a relatively small investment.”8

Developments in the Indo-Pacific: 

The Submarine Arms Race

China’s Pivot to the Seas

At present, there are over 120 nations worldwide that have their own navies, of which 41 operate submarines. In total, there are about 460 submarines operating worldwide.9

 Among them, countries such as the United 

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States, Japan, China, Russia, Germany, France, Spain, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Italy, and Sweden have the technology to build 

submarines on their own. There are six countries that possess nuclear submarines: the United States, Russia, China, France, India, and the United 

Kingdom. It is believed that Pakistan is aiming for nuclear submarines. 

In addition, it is reported that South Korea aims at building a 5,000-ton 

nuclear-powered submarine to boost its deterrence capability against a potential North Korea sub-based nuclear attack.10 U.S. Navy submarines are 

all nuclear-powered, and none of the other nations have the same level of 

attack and operational capabilities as the United States; thus, the United 

States continues to maintain its supremacy in the underwater domain. 

However, U.S. supremacy in the underwater domain is being challenged by China in the last few decades, and this has also triggered China’s 

neighbors in the Western Pacific to build up their naval forces. Russia’s 

increased presence in the region is also a matter of concern. According 

to Admiral Philip Davidson, Commander of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM), roughly 75% of the non-U.S. submarines 

in the world reside in the Indo-Pacific region. About 160 of these 300 

submarines belong to China, Russia, and North Korea. While these three 

countries increase their capacity, the United States retires attack submarines (SSNs) faster than they are replaced. He suggests “potential adversary submarine activity has tripled from 2008 levels, which requires at least 

a corresponding increase on the part of the United States to maintain 

superiority.”11

The U.S. Department of Defense’s 2019 Annual Report to Congress 

pointed out that China was accelerating the development of innovative 

technologies such as AI and unmanned systems and that the modernization of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) would be completed by 

2035. China aims to be a prominent nation with a “world-class” military 

by 2049. According to the report, modernization of China’s submarine 

force remains a high priority for the People’s Liberation Army Navy 

(PLAN). PLAN currently operates four nuclear-powered ballistic missile 

submarines (SSBN), six nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSN), and 50 

conventionally-powered attack submarines. The number is expected to be 

between 65 and 70 submarines by 2020.12

China has built artificial islands in the South China Sea, turning them 

into military bases. It is reported that China’s nuclear submarine base at 

Yulin, which is located on the southern coast of Hainan Island, is protected by surface ships and fighters, and an underground tunnel has also 

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been constructed to prevent the submarines from being visible from the 

sea, sky, and space. 

China is also interested in building undersea cable infrastructure. In 

2018, Chinese smartphone maker Huawei Technologies completed a cable 

project, which bridge Brazil and Cameroon.13 Huawei is estimated to be involved in around 30 undersea cable projects. Reportedly, the company has 

a hand in about 60 projects to enhance cable landing stations, for boosting transmission capacity.14 In February 2020, Huawei Marine Networks 

has been awarded the contract to build a new subsea cable to connect the 

Maldives with Sri Lanka.15

In 2009, USNS Impeccable (T-AGOS-23) was harassed by Chinese ships 

in the South China Sea. This incident was an example of the dangerous 

“cat and mouse” game underway. One of the six ocean surveillance ships 

of the same kind (T-AGOS), the Impeccable uses SURTASS equipment to 

gather undersea acoustic data. The ships also carry electronic equipment 

to process and transmit that data via satellite to shore stations for evaluation.16 According to the statement on the incident by the U.S. Department 

of Defense, five Chinese vessels shadowed and aggressively maneuvered 

close to the Impeccable in the South China Sea. She was 70 miles south of 

Hainan Island, conducting routine operations in international waters.17 She 

was monitoring China’s new and functioning SSBN and SSN and collecting data on the submarines and seafloor to improve her ability to detect 

the submarines, in peacetime, and efficiently hunt them during war. There 

was another incident just several days before this incident in which U.S. 

surveillance vessels were “subjected to aggressive behavior, including dozens of fly-bys by Chinese Y-12 maritime surveillance aircraft.”18

Regional Responses to China’s Naval Rise

In response to China’s expanding maritime interest in the Indo-Pacific, 

particularly China’s aggressiveness in the disputed South China Sea, a 

number of countries in the region have been making significant moves to 

modernize their naval forces. There are three ways to acquire a submarine: 

(1) purchase a retired used submarine from a foreign country; (2) import 

the finished product as it is; and (3) acquire a production license and build 

it in your own country with support from abroad. 

In this region, Vietnam is a state that has a clear vision of strategic 

submarine deployment to respond to the threat posed by China. Vietnam 

has purchased six Kilo-class vessels from Russia.19 Due to Vietnam’s mari198
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time claim in the South China Sea, which overlaps with China’s, and also its 

proximity to China’s Yulin naval base along the southern coast of Hainan 

Island, Vietnam is building its capability at an accelerated pace to defend 

from a potential threat. If Vietnamese submarines have the capability to 

detect Chinese submarines when entering or leaving a port, it could be a 

threat to China, which implies that it would be exposing itself to its adversaries. In other words, it would disrupt China’s naval operations to block 

the South China Sea and the Western Pacific. James Holmes, a professor 

of strategy at the U.S. Naval War College, suggests that “Vietnamese access denial could take on an offensive as well as a defensive character.”20

However, according to Alexander Vuving, a professor at the Daniel K. 

Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, “Vietnam’s effort is far 

from affecting the balance of forces in the South China Sea.”21

Another country that is actively trying to utilize submarine force in 

their national security strategy is Indonesia. The Indonesian fleet has made 

a deal to procure three submarines from South Korea. Regarding Indonesia’s objective, Shang-su Wu, a research fellow at Nanyang Technological 

University in Singapore, wrote that “[w]ith several strategically important 

straits connecting the Indian and Pacific Oceans within its borders, Indonesia is unlikely to avoid competition among maritime powers—primarily 

between China and the US” and “the possession of certain naval capabilities is essential for Jakarta to protect its sovereignty and to serve as a 

bargaining chip in realpolitik.”22

Taiwan, which is under pressure from China to accept the “one 

China” policy, has aging submarines (two made in the Netherlands and 

two made in the United States), but the U.S. government’s promise in 

the 1990s to provide eight conventionally-powered submarines did not 

materialize. In addition, there are only 15 countries that have diplomatic 

relations with Taiwan,23 which makes it difficult for Taiwan to procure 

and license technology from other countries. Currently, there are plans to 

build eight vessels indigenously.24 However, the U.S. State Department’s 

Bureau of Political-Military Affairs announced in May 2020 that the State 

Department had approved a possible sale of 18 MK-48 Mod6 Advanced 

Technology Heavyweight Torpedoes and related equipment at a cost of 

US$180 million.25

India, which started operating submarines as early as 1967 after acquiring them from the Soviet Union, currently operates 16 submarines, 

including 14 diesel-electric submarines.26 In 2012, India acquired a nuclearpowered submarine, the Akula-class INS Chakra, on lease from Russia. 

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Its first indigenous ballistic missile and nuclear submarine INS Arihant, 

built with support from Russia, was reported to be in service in 2016. 

India is also building Scorpene-class submarines in cooperation with a 

French shipbuilder. Furthermore, in 2019, India announced its collaborative project with a foreign company to domestically build six conventional 

submarines.27 In November 2018, India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi 

announced that INS Arihant successfully completed its first deterrence patrol.28

In Malaysia, two submarines that were purchased from France in 2009 

and 2010 have been commissioned. Singapore will procure four submarines from Germany.

Although these facts seem to be proof of an arms race in the region, 

three major Southeast Asian claimants in the South China Sea, namely, 

Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam, are not attempting to equal or surpass China. They are not engaging in an arms race with China, but, as 

Vuving put it, their long-term ambition is “minimal deterrence.”29

Some countries purchase submarines from China. Bangladesh commissioned two used submarines, which were imported from China in 

2017. The Bay of Bengal is geopolitically crucial for China’s attempt to 

encircle India. Bangladesh has reinforced its maritime power locally in the 

Indo-Pacific. Thailand decided to own a submarine for the first time after 

purchasing one from China and plans to purchase two more. It is reported 

that Pakistan plans to purchase eight submarines, of which four will be 

built in China and the other four will be built indigenously.30

These developments demonstrate how China’s military power is influencing the political decisions and naval strategies of neighboring countries. 

As of 1990, the Philippines, Vietnam, Thailand, Malaysia, Bangladesh, and 

Singapore had no submarines (at that time, there were two in Indonesia, 

six in Australia, 19 in India, and six in Pakistan).31 The seascape is changing 

quickly.

Russia

Russia has also been focusing on rebuilding its military strength. According to Admiral Mark Ferguson, then-Commander of the U.S. Naval Forces Europe and the Allied Joint Force Command of the North Atlantic 

Treaty Organization, citing public remarks by Russian Navy Commander-in-Chief Admiral Viktor Chirkov, the intensity of Russian submarine 

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patrols had risen in 2015 by almost 50 percent over the previous year.32

The patrols are visible signs of increasing interest in submarine warfare by 

President Vladimir Putin, whose government has pursued new classes of 

quieter and stealthier diesel and nuclear-powered attack submarines.

Furthermore, U.S. and other Western officials have long warned that 

Russian vessels have been active near major undersea fiber-optic cables 

that keep the world’s internet running. In July 2019, a Russian submarine 

caught fire during a mission, killing 14 sailors on board in Russian territorial waters in the Barents Sea. BBC Monitoring quoted U.S. officials as saying that the vessel was the nuclear submarine AS-12, nicknamed Losharik, 

which was designed to tamper with undersea cables.33 Even if the military 

undersea network SOSUS was not compromised, severing the global Internet cables would have caused immediate and catastrophic damage to 

many nations.

The Russian Navy also poses a threat by developing a nuclear-powered, nuclear-tipped torpedo named Poseidon (Status-6) that can traverse 

thousands of miles across oceans autonomously after launching from a 

submarine. In March 2018, Putin publicly unveiled a 3D-animated video 

showing Poseidon attacking a city and a carrier task force. Later, real-life 

footage of a Poseidon launch was released as well. It is reported that U.S. 

intelligence estimates that the Poseidon will complete testing by 2025 and 

commence operational service in 2027.34 Although there is skepticism 

about developing nuclear-powered systems with unmanned capabilities 

for Poseidon before 2027, the “U.S. Nuclear Posture Review,” published 

in 2018, states that Russia is developing at least two new intercontinental 

range systems, one of which is “a new intercontinental, nuclear-armed, 

nuclear-powered, undersea autonomous torpedo,” recognizing such a 

weapon system could become a threat to U.S. national security. 

The Pentagon acknowledged in February 2020 that the United States 

has deployed at least one low-yield nuclear warhead on a U.S. Navy nuclear 

ballistic missile submarine.35 John Rood, then-Under Secretary of Defense 

for Policy, stated that this supplemental capability strengthens deterrence 

and provides the United States a prompt, more survivable low-yield strategic weapon.36

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What Should Japan Do?

Japan made it clear in its “National Defense Program Guidelines for 2019 and 

Beyond” that Maritime Self-Defense Force will retain 22 diesel-type manned 

submarines. 

As the underwater domain becomes more crowded than ever with naval operations in recent years, operations using unmanned undersea vehicles 

(UUVs) to monitor submarines of other nations as well as to ensure the security of submarine cables will be more common in the next few decades due 

to fewer possibilities of risking human lives. Detecting technologies such as 

SOSUS may not be effective since UUVs are much smaller compared with 

manned submarines, which makes it difficult to determine their positions with 

accuracy. 

Unlike the United States, which must dive through the vast Atlantic 

Ocean, Indian Ocean, and Pacific Ocean, Japan is likely to invest in the development of UUVs that could concentrate enough on several choke points around 

the islands for patrol and complement the missions of conventionally powered 

submarines. 

Japan should seek to enhance the system of collecting and monitoring 

information underwater by operating UUVs to patrol efficiently and defend 

effectively. The research and development of UUVs depend upon the private 

sector, even though it is still less attractive for Japan’s defense industry in comparison with building conventional submarines. 

It is recommended that the Japanese government encourage the private 

sector by procuring UUVs at a certain level of volumes to ensure their benefit 

and at the same time support exporting UUVs to Japan’s allies. UUVs will be 

able to replace the shrinking applicant pool for Japan’s Self-Defense Force to 

overcome the diminishing population.

It is desirable that Japan develop UUVs equipped with defense and attack 

capabilities, such as setting and sweeping of mines and firing torpedoes to deter China in the disputed waters, such as East China Sea, other than monitoring 

submarines. 

These operations require advanced communication networks that enable 

contact with their motherships on surface or other UUVs, high level of communication system to integrate into the existing kill chain. The keys to future ASW 

will be innovative technologies for small and lightweight high-performance 

power supply and ultra-low power consumption system for AI and communication to survive independently underwater. 

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Japan

Japan has a long history of operating submarines. The Imperial Japanese 

Navy acquired five Holland-class vessels from the U.S. company Electric 

Boat in 1905. By building its own submarines, Japan came to possess one 

of the world’s most powerful submarine fleets by the beginning of World 

War II. As an ally of the United States during the Cold War, Japan made 

significant contributions in detecting Soviet submarines using various 

equipment, including a fleet of 100 P-3C anti-submarine patrol aircraft. 

For decades, Japan improved its submarine capability and developed what 

later came to be known as the Soryu-class. 

Responding to China’s assertiveness, Japan is not an exception in improving its capabilities in the underwater domain. Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and Kawasaki Shipbuilding Corporation are alternately building 

one submarine per year for Japan. The Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force 

(JMSDF) currently maintains 20 diesel-electric attack submarines (nine 

Oyashio-class and 11 Soryu-class) and plans to increase the number to 22 

by 2021. JMSDF currently operates two flotillas divided into six divisions. 

The first and second submarine flotillas are based in Kure and Yokosuka, 

respectively.

In 2018, Japanese submarines, along with ASW destroyers, conducted 

anti-submarine training in the South China Sea. JMSDF took extraordinary measures to announce this fact, which appears to have been aimed 

at demonstrating the high operational capability of Japanese submarines. 

Japanese submarines have some unique features. JS Oryu, SS-511, the latest 

Soryu-class diesel-electric attack submarine that has been commissioned 

in March 2020, is Japan’s first submarine with lithium-ion batteries, which 

store about double the power of standard batteries.37 It is the world’s largest conventionally-powered boat and can remain fully submerged for longer periods of time. 

Conclusion:

Future Scenarios in the Underwater Domain

History shows that countries which actively incorporated science and technology into their military have enjoyed supremacy. The United States and 

the erstwhile Soviet Union developed similar technologies through World 

War II and the Cold War era in the form of nuclear-powered submarines 

and submarine-launched ballistic missiles, but it was detection technology, 

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SOSUS, that eventually helped the United States maintain its supremacy 

in ASW.

Recent technological developments with more complex networks 

connecting conventional and emerging domains indicate that the state 

of the underwater from the Indian Ocean to the Pacific Ocean has been 

changing dramatically. In the last 10 years, U.S. superiority has gradually 

diminished with the rise of China, Russia, and Asian countries, which have 

entered the submarine arms race. During his nomination hearing before 

the Senate Committee on Armed Forces in 2018, Admiral Philip Davidson, Commander of USINDOPACOM, described the United States’ undersea dominance as “a perishable advantage.” He said, “[t]he U.S. maintains a significant asymmetric advantage in undersea warfare, but the PLA 

is making progress. China has identified undersea warfare as a priority, 

both for increasing their own capabilities as well as challenging ours.”38

One possible scenario that might involve U.S. forces in the Indo-Pacific region is where one country disturbs others by physically cutting off 

submarine cables, including SOSUS, by deploying UUVs. This operation 

leads to disconnection of communication and is likely to isolate a nation, 

or several nations, from receiving necessary information via the Internet. 

Considering that more than 90% of international communications rely 

upon submarine cables, this will have a tremendous impact and confuse 

military operations, including the chain of command.

Such a scenario could be a particularly huge threat to Taiwan, a small 

island under continuous pressure from China’s military presence. The 

U.S. Department of Defense report titled “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2019” suggests that 

China continues to prepare for contingencies in the Taiwan Strait to deter 

and, if necessary, compel Taiwan to abandon its moves toward independence. It also suggests that China is “likely preparing for a contingency to 

unify Taiwan with the mainland by force, while simultaneously deterring, 

delaying, or denying any third-party intervention on Taiwan’s behalf.”39 In 

case of such hostilities, it is unlikely that the United States will not intervene militarily.

Research and development on UUVs are one of the key areas of 

competition between the United States and China. The U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) has succeeded in completing a test cruise of the anti-submarine warfare continuous trail unmanned 

vessel known as Sea Hunter, which covered over thousands of kilometers 

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for months under remote monitoring.40 Boeing’s autonomous extra-large 

unmanned undersea vehicle (XLUUV), the 51-foot-long Echo Voyager,

41

succeeded sea trials off the coast of Southern California in 2017.42 Based 

on this experience, Boeing is now developing four Orca XLUUVs,43 which 

could include capabilities for gathering intelligence, placing or clearing 

naval mines, attacking other ships or submarines, conducting stand-off 

strikes, and more.44 DARPA has also launched the Manta Ray program to 

advance key technologies that will enable the next-generation UUVs to 

operate for extended durations without the need for human-driven logistics support or maintenance. The program aims to overcome the limitations of current UUV designs to allow large payload capacity and longduration missions.45

Another possible scenario might be a cyberattack in combination with 

an underwater strike. In 2018, U.S. media reported that cyberattacks sponsored by the Chinese government targeted a U.S. Navy contractor who 

worked for the Naval Undersea Warfare Center. The information hacked 

included sensitive data about a project called Sea Dragon, which aims to 

develop a supersonic anti-ship missile for use on U.S. submarines.46

From the history of underwater competition between the United 

States and the erstwhile Soviet Union during the Cold War wherein detecting system SOSUS was an important factor for determining victory, 

one can draw the lesson that new detecting or tracking systems for UUVs 

could serve as a breakthrough or game-changing technology in future 

ASW, establishing supremacy in the underwater domain.

Amid the coronavirus pandemic, which engulfs the entire world on a 

historic scale, China continued to exhibit an aggressive stance in the flashpoint South and East China Seas. In April 2020, a China Coast Guard 

vessel collided with and sank a Vietnam fishing vessel in the vicinity of 

the Paracel Islands in the South China Sea. Beijing established two districts 

in the South China Sea to administer islands and reefs to cement its claim 

to sovereignty over the area. In May, China sent Coast Guard vessels into 

Japanese territorial waters near the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea 

for two consecutive days. These are a few examples that indicate China’s 

ambitions for assertive roles in the maritime domain in the post-coronavirus world order. It is essential that the United States and regional powers 

cooperate continuously to build peace and stability looking beyond the 

corona crisis.

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Notes

1 Mark T. Esper, “Remarks by Secretary Esper at National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence Public Conference” (speech, National Security Commission 

on Artifical Intelligence Conference, Washington, DC, November 5, 2019), accessed 

February 3, 2020, https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Transcripts/Transcript/

Article/2011960/remarks-by-secretary-esper-at-national-security-commission-onartificial-intell/.

2 “Nautilus (SSN-571),” Naval History and Heritage Command, accessed April 24, 2020, https://www.history.navy.mil/browse-by-topic/ships/submarines/uss-nautilus.

html.

3 Edward C. Whitman, “SOSUS: The ‘Secret Weapon’ of Undersea Surveillance,” Undersea Warfare, accessed April 24, 2020, https://www.public.navy.mil/subfor/un- derseawarfaremagazine/Issues/Archives/issue_25/sosus.htm.

4 Undersea Warfare: The Official Magazine of the U.S. Submarine Force, accessed Febru- ary 3, 2020, https://www.public.navy.mil/subfor/underseawarfaremagazine/Issues/

Archives/issue_25/sosus2.htm.

5 “The Cold War: History of the SOund SUrveillance System (SOSUS),” Discovery of Sound in the Sea, accessed March 3, 2020, https://dosits.org/people-and-sound/ history-of-underwater-acoustics/the-cold-war-history-of-the-sound-surveillancesystem-sosus/.

6 Bryan Clark, “The Emerging Era in Undersea Warfare,” Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, January 22, 2015, https://csbaonline.org/research/publica- tions/undersea-warfare.

7 Whitman, “SOSUS: The ‘Secret Weapon.’”

8 John Stillion and Bryan Clark, “What It Takes to Win: Succeeding in 21st Century Battle Network Competitions,” National Interest, July 10, 2015, accessed February 3, 2020, https://nationalinterest.org/print/feature/what-it-takes-win-succeeding-21stcentury-battle-network-13304.

9 Isaku Okabe, “World Submarines 2020,” Sekai no Kansen [Ships of the World], no. 921, April 2020 (in Japanese).

10 Jeff Jeong, “South Korea Eyes French Design for Indigenous Nuclear Sub, Sources Say,” Defense News, March 28, 2018, accessed March 3, 2020, https://www. defensenews.com/industry/techwatch/2018/03/28/south-korea-eyes-french-designfor-indigenous-nuclear-sub-sources-say/.

11 U.S. Indo-Pacific Command Posture: Hearing before the Committee on Armed Services, Senate, 116th Cong. 1 (2019), https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/

imo/media/doc/Davidson_02-12-19.pdf.

12 “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2019,” Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2019, 

https://media.defense.gov/2019/May/02/2002127082/-1/-1/1/2019_CHINA_

MILITARY_POWER_REPORT.pdf.

13 “South Atlantic Inter Link Connecting Cameroon to Brazil Fully Connected,” 

Huawei Marine, September 5, 2018, accessed March 3, 2020, http://www.huaweima- rine.com/en/News/2018/press-releases/pr20180905.

14 Hiroyuki Akita, “Undersea cables—Huawei’s Ace in the Hole,” Nikkei Asian

Review, May 28, 2019, accessed March 3, 2020, https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/

Comment/Undersea-cables-Huawei-s-ace-in-the-hole.

206
Underwater Competition in the Indo-Pacific

15 “New International Submarine Cable Connects Maldives to Sri Lanka,” Huawei 

Marine, February 18, 2020, accessed March 3, 2020, http://www.huaweimarine.com/

en/News/2020/press-releases/20200218.

16 “Ocean Surveillance Ships—T-AGOS,” United States Fact File, accessed March 3, 2020, https://www.navy.mil/navydata/fact_display.asp?cid=4500&tid=600&ct=4.

17 Jim Garamone, “Chinese Vessels Shadow, Harass Unarmed U.S. Survey Ship,” DoD News, March 9, 2009, accessed April 24, 2020, https://archive.defense.gov/

news/newsarticle.aspx?id=53401.

18 David Morgan, “U.S. Says Chinese Vessels Harassed Navy Ship,” Reuters, March 

9, 2009, accessed March 3, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-chinanavy/u-s-says-chinese-vessels-harassed-navy-ship-idUSTRE52845A20090309.

19 Lyle J. Goldstein, “China’s Nightmare: Vietnam’s New Killer Submarines,” The 

National Interest, March 29, 2015, accessed February 3, 2020, https://nationalinterest. org/feature/chinas-nightmare-vietnams-new-killer-submarines-12505.

20 James R. Holmes, “Vietnam’s Undersea Anti- Access Fleet,” The Diplomat, No- vember 1, 2012, accessed February 19, 2020, https://thediplomat.com/2012/11/

vietnams-undersea-anti-access-fleet/.

21 Alexander L. Vuving, “Tracking Vietnam’s Force Build-Up in the South China Sea,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, November 3, 2017, accessed 

April 24, 2020, https://amti.csis.org/tracking-vietnams-force-build-south-china-sea/.

22 Shang-su Wu, “What Indonesia’s Submarine Purchase Tells Us about Its Strategic Priorities,” Australian Institute of International Affairs, June 3, 2019, accessed February 19, 2020, http://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/indonesias-sub- marine-purchase/.

23 “Foreign Affairs,” Government Portal of the Republic of China (Taiwan), ac- cessed June 2, 2020, https://www.taiwan.gov.tw/content_5.php.

24 Yawen Tsao, “Taiwan’s Difficult-Yet-Viable Indigenous Submarine Project Needs Cross-Party Support,” The Diplomat, November 20, 2019, accessed February 3, 2020, https://thediplomat.com/2019/11/taiwans-difficult-yet-viable-indigenous-subma- rine-project-needs-cross-party-support/.

25 “Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States (TE- CRO)—MK 48 Mod 6 Advanced Technology (AT) Heavy Weight Torpedo (HWT),” 

Defense Security Corporation Agency, accessed June 2, 2020, https://www.dsca.mil/

major-arms-sales/taipei-economic-and-cultural-representative-office-united-statestecro-mk-48-mod-6.

26 “India Submarine Capabilities,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, October 11, 2019, accessed March 3, 2020, https://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/india-submarinecapabilities/.

27 “Defense of Japan 2019” (Tokyo: Ministry of Defense, 2019), 147, https://www. mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/2019/DOJ2019_Full.pdf.

28 “INS Arihant Successfully Completes First Deterrence Patrol: PM Modi,” Out- look India, November 5, 2018, accessed March 3, 2020, https://www.outlookindia.

com/website/story/ins-arihant-successfully-completes-first-deterrence-patrol-pmmodi/319636.

29 Alexander L. Vuving, “Force Buildup in the South China Sea: The Myth of an Arms Race,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, October 16, 2017, ac- cessed April 24, 2020, https://amti.csis.org/force-buildup-scs-myth/.

30 “Defense of Japan 2019” (Tokyo: Ministry of Defense, 2019), 150, https://www. mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/2019/DOJ2019_Full.pdf.

207
Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific

31 Satoru Nagao, “Submarines in Asia,” Tokyo Foundation for Policy Research, June 17, 2014, accessed March 3, 2020, https://www.tkfd.or.jp/research/detail.

php?id=1928.

32 Christopher P. Cavas, “US: Russia Building ‘Arc of Steel’ From Arctic to Med,” Defense News, October 6, 2015, accessed March 3, 2020, https://www.defensenews. com/naval/2015/10/06/us-russia-building-arc-of-steel-from-arctic-to-med/. 

33 Val Akimenko and Howard Gethin, “Analysis: Can Russian Submarines Cut the West’s Cables?” BBC Monitoring, July 3, 2019, accessed March 3, 2020 https://moni- toring.bbc.co.uk/product/c200xcoj.

34 Sebastien Roblin, “Russia Plans to Build Four Submarines Armed with Nuclear 

Drone-Torpedoes,” The National Interest, June 29, 2019, accessed March 3, 2020, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/russia-plans-build-four-submarines-armednuclear-drone-torpedoes-64776.

35 Ben Werner, “Pentagon Confirms Low-Yield Nuclear Warhead on Ballistic Missile Sub,” U.S. Naval Institute News, February 4, 2020, accessed March 3, 2020, https://news.usni.org/2020/02/04/pentagon-confirms-low-yield-nuclear-warheadon-ballistic-missile-sub.

36 John Rood, “ Statement on the Fielding of the W76-2 Low-Yield Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile Warhead,” Department of Defense, February 4, 2020, 

accessed March 3, 2020, https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Releases/Release/

Article/2073532/statement-on-the-fielding-of-the-w76-2-low-yield-submarinelaunched-ballistic-m/.

37 Xavier Vavasseur, “JMSDF Commissioned Its 1st Li-Ion Battery Submarine SS-511 JS Ōryū,” Naval News, March 5, 2020, accessed April 24, 2020, https://www. navalnews.com/naval-news/2020/03/jmsdf-commissioned-its-1st-li-ion-batterysubmarine-ss-511-js-oryu.

38 “Advance Policy Questions for Admiral Philip Davidson, USN, Expected Nomi- nee for Commander, U.S. Pacific Command,” Committee on Armed Services, Senate, 

115th Cong. 2 (2018), https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/

Davidson_APQs_04-17-18.pdf.

39 Annual Report to Congress.

40 “ACTUV Sea Hunter Prototype Transitions to Office of Naval Research for Fur- ther Development,” Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, January 30, 2018, 

accessed March 3, 2020, https://www.darpa.mil/news-events/2018-01-30a.

41 “Echo Voyager,” Boeing, accessed March 3, 2020, https://www.boeing.com/de- fense/autonomous-systems/echo-voyager/index.page.

42 “Boeing Begins Deep Sea Adventure,” Boeing, June 5, 2017, accessed March 3, 2020, http://www.boeing.com/features/2017/05/echo-voyager-test-05-17.page.

43 Ronald O’Rourke, Navy Large Unmanned Surface and Undersea Vehicles: Background and Issues for Congress, CRS Report No. R45757 (Washington, DC: 

Congressional Research Service, 2020), accessed March 30, 2020, https://fas.org/

sgp/crs/weapons/R45757.pdf.

44 Ben Werner, “Navy Awards Boeing $43 Million to Build Four Orca XLUUVs,” U.S. Naval Institute News, February 13, 2019, accessed March 3, 2020, https://news. usni.org/2019/02/13/41119.

45 Kyle Woerner, “Manta Ray,” Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, ac- cessed March 3, 2020, https://www.darpa.mil/program/manta-ray.

46 Andrew C. Jarocki, “Chinese Hackers Steal Sensitive Navy Program Data,” Defense News, June 8, 2018, accessed March 3, 2020, https://www.defensenews.com/ cyber/2018/06/08/chinese-hackers-steal-sensitive-navy-program-data/.

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 13

ILLEGAL, UNREPORTED, AND 

UNREGULATED FISHING 

AND THE 

IMPACTS ON MARITIME SECURITY

Ben Crowell & Wade Turvold

Introduction

Maritime security is a key component of national sovereignty. The ability 

to govern, regulate, and enforce laws within a country’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) is vital to the environmental, economic, and geopolitical 

security of maritime nations. Unfortunately, these concerns are increasing 

and being strained by some distant water fishing nations (DWFN)1 and artisanal fishermen through the practice of illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing. With global consumption of seafood rising and fish 

stocks continuing to decline, the competition and economic incentive to 

harvest more seafood is creating a slow onset crisis for the environmental 

health of the oceans. Meanwhile, the willful violation of various national 

EEZs creates spikes in rapid onset crisis events for the governments involved in these issues. What can security practitioners in the Indo-Pacific 

region do about this problem? Informed by hindsight, this chapter will 

draw insights into the transnational threat associated with IUU fishing and 

suggest options for countering these issues.

Following the passage of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention (often 

abbreviated as UNCLOS), maritime nations were able to formally claim 

exclusive economic zones out to 200 nautical miles from the baseline (approximate shoreline) for fisheries resources. The establishment of EEZs 

by sovereign maritime nations forced many fishermen to find new fishing 

grounds much farther afield in order to stay in business, as the new national maritime zones forced them to fish further from home ports. These 
Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific

increased transit distances required greater seakeeping ability, fishing tactics, and improved technology to enhance productivity. As these vessels 

moved further out into the oceans, a greater percentage of the world’s 

seas began to be targeted for industrial scale commercial fishing. In the 

1950s, approximately 60% of the world’s oceans were being fished; fast 

forward present, and over 90% of the seas are being targeted for various 

seafood products.2 This increased pressure by both legal and illegal fishing activity has resulted in substantial pressure being placed on maritime 

ecosystems. According to the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), approximately 93% of all globally harvested fish products 

are either at their maximum sustainable levels or being overfished.3 

Understanding the Threat

As fishing stocks are depleted across the globe, distant water fishing fleets 

and artisanal fishermen are putting greater stress on fisheries resources. 

This increased pressure can create scarcity, driving increased prices, thereby 

incentivizing more unlawful fishing activity and predatory behavior. Collectively, these actions can drive a death spiral for the fisheries resources. 

The increased environmental pressure from overfishing and certain types 

of harvesting methods has led to ecological collapse of fishing grounds in 

the South China Sea and along the east and west coasts of Africa. With the 

destruction of natural resources, nations are faced with the twofold impact 

of the loss of the once renewable economic resource and the loss of food 

that was harvested from the sea. For many this is no small issue, according 

to the United Nations, several countries in the developing world obtain 

up to 50% of their protein input from seafood products.4 As fish stocks 

are depleted, individuals, families and communities are under increased 

pressure for basic survival. When faced with the cost-benefit analysis of 

starving to death or engaging in illegal activity to support one’s family or 

village, most people will do what it takes to provide for their community. 

Thus, the loss of environmental habitat and natural resources can create 

economic and food security issues for human populations, which in turn 

can drive maritime crime and piracy.

The quintessential example of fishermen turned criminal is the piracy 

crisis that occurred off the coast of Somalia from 2006 to 2012. The nation 

of Somalia fell into chaos in 1991 after the government was overthrown. 

The loss of central authority created large ungoverned spaces across the 

land and seas surrounding the Horn of Africa. Recognizing a lack of na210
IUU Fishing Impacts on Maritime Security

tional enforcement, distant water fishing fleets moved into Somalia’s EEZ 

and quickly put the local fishermen out of work. With little opportunity 

to earn a living, and ready access to military grade weapons, it wasn’t long 

before piracy became a booming industry in the waters surrounding the 

Horn of Africa. Today the Somali pirate issue has largely been suppressed 

through a significant multi-national naval task force and the widespread 

use of well-armed ship riders. Over the past five years there have only 

been 11 attacks, down from a high of 237 attacks in 2007 alone.5

Today the global piracy hotspots are in Southeast Asia and the Gulf 

of Guinea. According to the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence, there have 

been 417 attacks in Southeast Asia and 544 in the Gulf of Guinea respectively since 2016.6

 The pattern of smaller boats attacking larger, slower 

moving vessels to carry out armed robbery or kidnap for ransom still apparently work well.7

 Whether these are unemployed fishermen conducting 

these most recent attacks remains to be seen. But the access to small boats, 

and the ability to operate them against targets of exploitation, frequently 

far offshore, indicates a level of competency one would gain as an artisanal 

fisherman or professional mariner.

Piracy and armed robbery at sea are crimes that are not to be taken 

lightly. However, the more pressing concern for the Indo-Pacific region is 

arguably the use of IUU fishing as an instrument of national power. The 

People’s Republic of China (PRC) stands out today as the largest user of 

this tactic. In the 15th century China was a great maritime nation with 

very large merchant ships transiting throughout the Indo-Pacific region 

engaging in international trade and exploration. They abandoned their 

maritime quests until after the end of World War II, when the first official 

map of their territorial claims of the South China Sea appeared in 1947.8

Except for some temporary flashes—in 1974, when the PRC seized the 

western group of the Paracel Islands from the dying South Vietnam; in 

1988, when Beijing grabbed six reefs in the Spratly Islands; and in 1995, 

when China stealthily took Mischief Reef—China’s excessive territorial 

claims remained somewhat submerged in the international arena. In the 

late 2000s the PRC Began to more forcefully assert its maritime claims to 

the region through a series of land reclamation and artificial reef building 

activities that continue today.9 After the PRC took de facto control of the 

Scarborough Shoal in 2012, a reef located within the Philippine EEZ, the 

Philippine government brought suit to the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) against China. The Court found that China had engaged in a 

broad spectrum of Illegal fishing activities, construction projects that de211
Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific

graded the marine habitat, and, in general, has “failed to exhibit due regard 

for the Philippines’ sovereign rights with respect to fisheries in its exclusive 

economic zone.”10 This finding perfectly summarizes many of the tactics 

China has employed throughout the region. Despite the clear violations 

of international maritime law, China has taken things a step further by the 

use of their coast guard ships to provide an armed escort for their fishing fleets into neighboring EEZs. It has also used structurally reinforced 

fishing vessels under the state control of the Maritime Militia, to ram, 

attack, and harass vessels throughout the region. In several instances this 

has resulted in the loss of life and the abandonment of mariners adrift at 

sea; again, a major breach of the most timeless principle of seamanship 

—never abandoning a mariner in distress. The good news in all of this is 

that some Southeast Asian nations have tired of these tactics and taken 

active steps to counter this illegal and immoral behavior. 

Another significant concern with IUU fishing is the linkages between 

the vessels—their owners as well as their captains—and general criminal 

activities such as human slavery and trafficking, and the smuggling of 

drugs and weapons. In 2016, the Associated Press published a series of 

articles on slavery within the commercial fishing fleets of Asia.11 In one instance they detailed the tragedy of a man who was repatriated to Myanmar 

after being kept at sea for 22 years without pay and under exceptionally 

poor working and living conditions.12 In addition to forced labor, fishing 

vessels are being used to smuggle people across major bodies of water 

around the world. 

In a 2020 UN report on migration, an estimated 653,000 migrants 

arrived in Europe by sea routes from 2016-2018.13 While the report did 

not specify the type of vessels used, fishing boats clearly had a role to 

play in this movement of peoples from the African continent to Europe. 

Another significant security concern is the linkage between drug trafficking organizations and commercial fishing vessels. Throughout the Eastern 

Pacific Ocean, many of the vessels interdicted by law enforcement agencies are fishing boats that are trafficking drugs or being used as logistics 

support vessels for “go fast” smuggling boats that require fuel resupply. 

A 2011 UN report noted that: “The use of fishing vessels is largely regarded as integral to the modus operandi of illicit traffic in cocaine at sea 

to Mexico and the United States.”14 This is further substantiated by a recent U.S. State Department report that references the movement of drugs 

across the maritime domain via the use of fishing vessels.15 In all of these 

different criminal ventures, it is clear that the use of these boats facilitates 

212
IUU Fishing Impacts on Maritime Security

good operational cover by masking illicit activities under the guise of legal 

maritime commerce.

The Way Ahead

As the future unfolds, IUU fishing vessels, owners, operators, and nations 

are likely to have an outsized impact on the safety and security of the 

maritime domain throughout the Indo-Pacific region. The overexploitation of fisheries resources is likely to continue, resulting in the ecological 

collapse of highly migratory and international fish stocks. The resource 

collapse combined with increased global warming/sea level rise will see 

many Pacific Island and Indian Ocean nations forced to relocate or abandon existing land settlements. As humans move further from established 

areas, these governments will be hard-pressed to enforce and secure the 

surrounding EEZs while they deal with the humanitarian crisis associated 

with sea level rise. The current absence of maritime security throughout 

many EEZs will be greatly exacerbated, thus enabling distant water fishing 

fleets greater freedom of movement and opportunity to illegally harvest 

seafood. As resources collapse, and the opportunity to make money and 

gather food from the seas diminishes, maritime communities will turn to 

other legal or illegal means to ensure their personal and economic security. 

When viewed holistically, all of these factors will serve as great destabilizers of the maritime security environment and drive greater crime and 

piracy at sea. Maritime nations would be wise to plan for the increased 

irregular migration of people, human slavery, and the trafficking of drugs 

and weapons by commercial fishing vessels of all shapes and sizes. 

Within this increasingly competitive environment, state sponsored 

fishing enterprises will continue to use their distant water fishing fleets as a 

“gray zone” tactic to further their national interests. The deliberate deployment of fishing vessels into neighboring and even distant EEZs will continue throughout the Indo-Pacific region and globally as well. These fleets 

will be supported by maritime militia or armed government forces such 

as the coast guard, or perhaps even naval vessels, to harass and intimidate 

lawful national interests in the maritime domain. This tactic will continue 

until it becomes clear that the cost is not worth the reward and the actor is 

dissuaded in this activity across the maritime commons. It is also probable 

that China will employ this against countries where it will be successful, 

and not against nations that are likely to react strongly. Thus, all maritime 

nations should prepare strategic, operational and tactical responses for this 

213
Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific

eventual “probing” and attempted seizure of their EEZs by large, aggressive, distant water fishing nations. 

IUU is by no means just a China problem; effective maritime security 

is a strong combination of law, policy, and a judicial system supported by 

military and police activity to regulate the maritime domain. In order to 

deal with the unconventional threats associated with IUU fishing, maritime nations must rise to the occasion and recognize the multi-pronged 

threat posed by this activity. First and foremost, they must implement and 

develop ways to control and enforce their EEZs. Many nations throughout the South Pacific do not have military forces, let alone any maritime 

patrol assets, yet they possess massive EEZs with little to no means of 

controlling this space. Therefore, there must be an international effort 

to bring governance to these presently ungoverned sea spaces. This enhanced effort must maximize boardings when vessels make port calls and 

while they are at sea. Fishing vessels must be boarded at every opportunity 

to validate the cargo, the health and welfare of the crew, vessel safety, and 

the overall legitimacy/legality of the voyage. This effort should be viewed 

as a combination of law enforcement and intelligence collection. Any information gleaned from these activities should be shared across regional 

security partners through multi-national command centers or intelligence 

fusion centers. Efforts along these lines would go a long way to mitigate 

some of the criminality of this industry. 

The next challenge is to develop, implement, and enforce scientific 

controls and fisheries regulations over the national fish stocks. Less economically advantaged nations frequently do not have the resources to adequately monitor and regulate the health of their EEZs. This can result 

in uninformed decisions, such as selling fishing rights or other national 

interests without truly appreciating the value and volume of resources that 

are being extracted from their EEZ. In order to mitigate this, the international community has a role to support and defend the smaller states 

against unregulated resource extraction. A strong mix of scientificallybased fisheries management, in combination with the law enforcement 

program described above, would serve as force multiplier to counter the 

IUU activity and conserve renewable fisheries resources for future generations, especially in the developing world. 

Lastly, the international community must step up to address and enforce standards on state-sponsored IUU activities. In several countries 

throughout the world, distant water fishing fleets are highly state-subsidized businesses. That is, the government is wholly or partly the owner 

214
IUU Fishing Impacts on Maritime Security

of the business, and/or provides substantial financial grants, loans, tax 

subsidies, etc. to enable an artificial profit margin. This mercantilist model, 

supported by military intervention, is having a substantial environmental 

impact as well as destabilizing the geopolitical environment across Asian 

seas. The European Union has successfully leveraged an IUU fisheries 

customs import regimen informally known as the card system. This has 

been very effective in changing the legal oversight of the fishing industry 

in many countries across Asia such as Taiwan, Thailand, and Sri Lanka. 

The United States has implemented a similar system called the Seafood 

Importation Monitoring Program. Between these two economic giants, 

the use of customs regulations and leveraged import controls has the potential to significantly influence the most belligerent national actors. Additionally, the use of coast guard forces, supported by naval vessels provides 

a clear use of force continuum for countries to ensure the national sovereignty of their EEZs. 

On paper, basic IUU enforcement tactics sound easy, but in practice, they are not. The resource constraints and competing priorities of 

law enforcement agencies frequently make “fisheries enforcement” a secondary or tertiary mission. However, when taken in its totality, IUU fishing is much more than an environmental crime. IUU is a global, strategic 

challenge that must be met with a collaborative, international strategic 

response. When involved in illegal activities, the businesses, vessels, owners and operators, sometimes state-sponsored, are functionally acting as 

transnational criminal organizations. These fishing entities are having an 

outsized impact on the ecological health, economic security, food security, 

and overall maritime security of the world’s oceans. Whether they are in 

port or on the high seas, vessels and nations engaged in IUU fishing must 

have their actions dis-incentivized. Until the cost becomes greater than the 

reward for the countries, owners, and operators of IUU fishing vessels, 

these criminal behaviors will continue across the maritime commons.

215
Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific

Notes

1 Distant water fishing nations are those with significant fishing fleets that operate far away from their home ports, often in the international waters and the EEZs of 

other countries. Examples of DWFNs include China, Taiwan, Thailand, Vietnam, 

and Spain, with China being the largest by far.

2 David Tickler, Jessica J. Meeuwig, Maria-Lourdes Palomares, Daniel Pauly, Dirk Zeller, “Far from Home: Distance Patterns of Global Fishing Fleets,” Science Advances

4, no. 8 (August 1, 2018), https://advances.sciencemag.org/content/4/8/eaar3279.

3 United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture, Meeting the Sustainable Development Goals (Rome: United Nations, 2018), http://www.fao.org/documents/card/en/c/I9540EN.

4 Ibid., 113-114.

5 Office of Naval Intelligence, Gulf of Guinea/Horn of Africa/Southeast Asia: Weekly Piracy Update for 5-11 March 2020 (Washington DC, March 12, 2020), https:// www.oni.navy.mil/Portals/12/Intel%20agencies/piracy/20200312%20Weekly%20 Piracy%20Update.pdf; Mariama Sow, “Africa in Focus, Figures of the Week: Piracy 

and Illegal Fishing in Somalia,” Brookings Institute, April 12, 2017, https://www.

brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2017/04/12/figures-of-the-week-piracy-and- illegal-fishing-in-somalia/.

6 Gulf of Guinea/Horn of Africa/Southeast Asia.

7 Office of Naval Intelligence, Worldwide Threat to Shipping (WTS) Report 7 Febru- ary-11 March 2020 (Washington DC, March 13, 2020), https://www.oni.navy.mil/ Portals/12/Intel%20agencies/piracy/20200312_WTS.pdf.

8 Hannah Beech, “Just Where Exactly Did China Get the South China Sea Nine- Dash Line From?” Time, July 19, 2016, https://time.com/4412191/nine-dash-line- 9-south-china-sea/.

9 Alexander L. Vuving, “South China Sea: Who Occupies What in the Spratlys?” The Diplomat, May 6, 2016, https://thediplomat.com/2016/05/south-china-sea-who- claims-what-in-the-spratlys/. 

10 PCA Case No. 2013-19, “Award in the Matter of the South China Sea Arbitra- tion before an Arbitral Tribunal Constituted under Annex VII to the 1982 United 

Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea between the Republic of the Philippines 

and the People’s Republic of China” (July 12, 2016), https://pcacases.com/web/ sendAttach/2086.

11 “Seafood from Slaves: An AP Investigation Helps Free Slaves in the 21st Cen- tury,” Associated Press, 2016, https://www.ap.org/explore/seafood-from-slaves/.

12 Margie Mason, “Myanmar Fisherman Goes Home after 22 Years as a Slave,” As- sociated Press, July 1, 2015, https://www.ap.org/explore/seafood-from-slaves/myan- mar-fisherman-goes-home-after-22-years-as-a-slave.html; Mason, “Fishing Slaves No More, but Freedom Brings New Struggles,” Associated Press, July 12, 2017, https:// www.ap.org/explore/seafood-from-slaves/fishing-slaves-no-more-but-freedombrings-new-struggles.html.

13 United Nations International Organization for Migration (IOM), World Migration Report 2020 (Geneva: International Organization for Migration, 2019), 67, https:// publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/wmr_2020.pdf.

14 Ibid., 76.

15 United States Department of State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, Volume 1: Drug and Chemical Control (Washington DC, March 2020), https://www.state.gov/wp-content/ uploads/2020/03/Tab-1-INCSR-Vol.-I-Final-for-Printing-2-25-20-508.pdf.

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14

SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF A 

STATE-DRIVEN APPROACH TO

 SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 

INNOVATION

Ethan Allen

Introduction

The key and ever-increasing roles of science, technology, engineering, and 

mathematics (STEM) innovations are evident across the spectrum of security realms.1

 STEM applications in weaponry include a broad range of 

advances in sensor technologies, materials sciences, and artificial intelligence (AI), to name just a few. In the broader arena of human security, 

fields such as satellite technology, energy harvesting and conversions, water treatment, and health/medicine continue to improve and innovate due 

to both greater understanding of the natural world and ever-growing capabilities to meld, merge, and apply diverse areas of scientific knowledge 

into integrated technological systems. 

Almost all technologies have the capacities to be used for good or ill. 

Technologies are value-neutral, and it is the governance choices—how the 

technologies are used—that determine whether technologies are boons or 

burdens to humanity. Many end up being both. 

In virtually all advanced Western nations, and in most countries 

around the world, STEM growth and the direction of scientific and technological progress is primarily based on and directed by practicing scientists and engineers, rather than by central authorities. While governmental 

support of scientific and of technological innovation often is substantial, 

the decisions on what research to pursue are largely left to the professional 

scientists in universities and corporations. Hereafter, these approaches 

will be referred to as scientist-driven systems of science and technology 

governance. In such systems, while scientific misconduct including ethical 
Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific

breaches occur, the self-correcting nature of an observant, honest, and 

skeptical scientific community has resulted in widespread adherence to 

international scientific standards, including the applications of science in 

technological innovations. 

In contrast, in a state-driven scientific enterprise the directions and 

priorities of scientific and technological research are determined by political leaders, rather than by scientists. The most notable example of such a 

state-driven system is that of the People’s Republic of China (PRC).

Using a focused, sustained, government-driven prioritization of 

STEM in service of its Communist Party interests, the PRC’s STEM education, workforce, and productivity capabilities have grown rapidly over 

recent decades. And in contrast to the above-noted intermittent misconduct by individual researchers and/or corporations in scientist-driven systems, the PRC government has systemically engineered the acquisition of 

STEM capacities via illegal methods, has violated norms and standards of 

the scientific enterprise, and has used its STEM capabilities to advance its 

national interests in defiance of international rule of law and to the detriment of its own, its neighbors’, and the world’s environments. 

The dependence of security progress on STEM innovations, combined with these contrasting models of STEM advancement—state- vs. 

scientist-driven—therefore is a topic of considerable concern for security 

practitioners. 

Growing STEM Roles Throughout Security Realms

Science and its application in technologies have deeply shaped both military and broader human security. From the earliest discoveries of ways to 

forge stronger metals, to the development of gunpowder, to the weaponization of microorganisms, increasingly sophisticated STEM understanding has enabled and supported innovations in the use of hard power.

At least equally important from a broad human security perspective, 

STEM innovations have propelled virtually every improvement of humanity’s well-being. Development of the germ theory of disease, for example, 

reduced the burden of a host of communicable illnesses that plagued the 

world for centuries. Understanding of Newtonian physics underlies much 

of our modern architectural and transportation systems; Einsteinian refinements of that knowledge continue to drive astronomy and cosmology. 

Advances in empirical and theoretical chemistry allow the extraction and/

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State-Driven Approach to Science and Technology

or synthesis of compounds central to modern-day life, from concrete, to 

gasoline, to pharmaceuticals. 

In parallel, security issues shape scientific and technological development. Military arms races are perhaps the most obvious example, but 

needs and desires to improve food, water, and health security have engendered scientific innovations.

In advancing human progress, scientists internationally have come to 

agree on certain core scientific values and practices, including skepticism, 

openness of communication, and, most importantly, honesty. Scientists 

recognize that the falsification of data or manipulation of results to present a picture contrary to facts damages the integrity of the entire scientific 

enterprise and undermines the public confidence on which science depends. Actions such as fabrication of data and plagiarism of others’ work 

are intolerable in the scientific community, as they undercut science’s core 

values and the processes that lie at the heart of scientific progress. The 

adherence to theses scientific values, or the failure to do so, has significant 

ramifications across the broad spectrum of security arenas. 

The Scientist-Driven Model

Throughout much of the world, this sort of open, honest STEM has been 

pursued by a broad spectrum of actors, including individual scientists and 

engineers, private organizations, and states. Governments, along with 

philanthropists, corporations, and industry associations, have supported 

scientist-driven STEM education and development. Only intermittently 

in these states have governments attempted to impose particular directions. In the United States, President Kennedy’s push for a manned moon 

landing by the end of the 1960s stands out as one of the few occasions 

of a strong, sustained U.S. governmental directive and commitment to a 

specific technological goal.

This model of scientist-driven STEM arose following World War II. In 

particular, Vannevar Bush, in his Science, The Endless Frontier 1945 report—a 

“brilliantly articulated rationale and blueprint for an implicit social contract between the government and the scientific community”2

—outlined 

an approach to U.S. STEM development that put much of the control and 

direction of science in the hands of the scientists themselves. Bush argued 

persuasively that professional scientists were better positioned than the 

national government to perceive, interpret, and respond to public needs 

and desires for scientific and technological innovations. His suggested ap219
Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific

proach was adopted by the United States and, with some adjustments to 

fit various national contexts, by most other nations. 

While this scientist-driven system has undeniably had myriad positive 

impacts both within individual nations and internationally, the approach 

has also incurred some significant costs. For example, the United States’ 

STEM-based industries make its per capita carbon footprint among the 

largest in the world, and result in it being a leading contributor to humaninduced climate change. And various U.S. STEM-based accidents, oversights, and events, such as Love Canal3

 and the Union Carbide disaster in 

Bhopal, India,4 further illustrate problems associated with this scientistdriven approach to advancing science and technology. 

The State-Driven Model

Science and technology have played critical roles during various phases 

of China’s history.5 For the first half of the twentieth century, however, 

China’s STEM contributions were minimal; the country was essentially a 

non-player on the global stage of STEM accomplishments.

But at least since the 1960s, the PRC government has taken control 

of the scientific enterprise, and used STEM to advance its own priorities. 

In recent decades, the PRC has invested ever-larger amounts of human, 

material, and financial capital into rapidly developing a wide range of scientific, engineering, and technological capacities. This focused, consistent, 

and strategic approach has been carried out to make its economy a “major 

center of innovation by 2020” and “global leader in science and innovation” by 2050.6

 The PRC’s last two five-year plans have emphasized science and technology, along with technological innovation. 

While the cultural revolution shut down universities and sent scientists to be ‘rehabilitated’ through manual labor in the remote countryside, 

the PRC simultaneously (in 1964) launched the “two bombs, one satellite” 

program, supporting and advancing national defense-related science such 

as nuclear, rocket, and satellite research. This sort of specific governmental direction of science explicitly to promote national interests stands in 

stark contrast to the decentralized, democratic approach described above 

that was and is prevalent in much of the rest of the world.

China’s science and technology push has been fueled by governmental encouragement of higher education starting in the 1980s. In 1982, only 

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State-Driven Approach to Science and Technology

0.8% of Chinese aged 25-29 had any post-secondary education. By 1990, 

this rose to 3.3%, by 2000 to 6.7%, and by 2010 had leaped to 20.6%, increasing by over 25 times the 1982 rate in less than 30 years.7

In parallel, in 1986, the establishment of the PRC’s National Natural 

Science Foundation was followed soon after with the 863 Program, the 

State Hi-Tech Development Plan. In 1995, yet another government plan, 

Project 211, began to upgrade the capabilities of almost 100 universities, 

spending an estimated US$2.2 billion over 1996-2000. This push was expanded in 1998 with Project 985, wherein the PRC invested nearly US$300 

million each in enhancing its premier Peking and Tsinghua Universities 

over 1999-2001; such generous governmental support has continued since 

then to build world-class elite universities in China.8

The number of universities more than doubled in China, from 1,022 

in 1998, to 2,263 in 2008; during this same time, virtually all of the pre-existing universities also were upgraded.9

 The quality of PRC universities is 

growing, especially in targeted fields. For 2017, in the field of engineering, 

Tsinghua University was rated10 fourth (MIT was first); in sciences, Beijing 

University was 22nd (Berkeley was first); in computer science, Tsinghua 

University was 25th (Stanford was first); in mathematics, China had four 

universities among the top rated 50.

In 1998, the PRC began the Chanjiang Scholars program, to entice 

Chinese-born scientists living overseas to return for short-term visits to 

the homeland. In 2008, this development was expanded into the Thousand Talents program that offered generous support and incentives to 

bring foreign-residing scientists to live and work in China. By 2012, the 

program had lured more than 2,200 scientists back to work in the PRC, 

including nationally and internationally prominent scientists, members of 

the U.S. National Academy of Sciences, and more.11

These parallel efforts of external recruitment and internal bootstrapping of intellectual talent have been supported and complemented by increasing provision of resources to the science and technology enterprise. 

In 1991, the PRC invested in research and development (R&D) at a rate 

of only about 5% of what the United States spent. By 2010, that rate had 

risen to 44% of the U.S. rate. This 20% per year growth in R&D gross expenditures as a share of the gross domestic product contrasts with the virtually flat rate of spending on R&D over 1991-2010 in the United States.12

These strategic, sustained, and leveraged investments have paid off 

handsomely. The PRC is the fastest growing country in the world in terms 

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Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific

of peer-reviewed STEM journal articles produced; its average annual 

growth rate of 19% over 2003–2013 clearly swamps that of other nations: 

10% for South Korea, 7% for the United States, 5% for the European 

Union, and 1% for Japan.13

The payoff is more than simply academic. In various technologies, 

China now ranks among world leaders. The PRC boasts the world’s fastest bullet train, Fuxing; the largest radio telescope, FAST; and launched its 

first domestic space station, Tiangong-1, in 2011.14

In 2016, the PRC launched 15 “Science and Technology Innovation 

2030 Megaprojects,” and in 2017, added “AI 2.0”—to make the PRC the 

world leader in AI by 2030—as the 16th of these projects. Also in 2017, 

the China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation and the University of Science and Technology of China began collaborating on quantum technologies supporting development of advanced naval mission systems. This 

“significant move to increase investment and promote industrialisation in 

forward-looking and disruptive technologies” will build three laboratories, 

for quantum navigation, quantum communication, and quantum detection.15The PRC’s Baidu now employs more than 2000 researchers, and has 

offices in Seattle and Silicon Valley.16

China’s STEM investments have been accompanied by, and are likely 

a significant factor in, its equally impressive economic growth. China’s 

current economic might relative to the more modest economies of most 

other nations allows it to wield extensive influence throughout the region. 

The PRC has used this economic power, for example, to acquire longterm leases of key port facilities in Sri Lanka and Samoa, to advance its 

national goals in United Nations’ considerations,17 and in other securityrelated manners.

China’s Misuse of STEM: Security Implications 

Beyond the STEM-fueled economic leverage noted above, in a wide range 

of other STEM and security-related areas, the PRC’s nationalistic focus 

costs its Indo-Pacific neighbors. Two examples will suffice.

In the build-up and militarization of Mischief and other nearby coral 

reefs in the Spratly Islands of the South China Sea, the PRC used its technological strengths to quickly turn these unique ecological treasures into 

airstrips and other military equipment installations. While the PRC’s Foreign Ministry claims “necessary defense” as a justification, and refers to 

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State-Driven Approach to Science and Technology

them as “primarily maritime safety and natural disaster support facilities,”18

the United Nations’ Permanent Court of Arbitration ruled in 2016 that 

Mischief Reef is part of the Philippines’ Exclusive Economic Zone and, 

further, that China’s island-building activities had breached multiple articles of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.19 Yet China 

continues its illegal occupation of Mischief Reef and island-building activities. This is a clear example of how the PRC uses its enhanced scientific 

and technological capacities to advance its own interests in defiance of 

the international community, as well as to the detriment of the natural 

environment.

China has used these same scientific and technological capabilities to 

build multiple dams on the Mekong and other regional rivers; through its 

control of Tibet, the PRC now exercises control of the headwaters of 10 

out of the 11 major rivers in southern and eastern Asia. These dams are 

impacting river flow rates, temperature, aquatic and floodplain flora and 

fauna, and the livelihoods of many tens of thousands of Asian residents 

downstream.20 While climate change is undoubtedly a factor, bringing 

more frequent and intense droughts to the lower Mekong, the reality of its 

flow being at its lowest level in 100 years illustrates the “weaponization of 

the Mekong’s waters”21 that further highlights China’s defiance of abiding 

by a rules-based order of international relationships.

Along with other authoritarian regimes, the PRC is considerably less 

concerned with violations of data privacy than is the U.S. government 

and democratic nations. Its much more widespread gathering of personal 

information, with far fewer restrictions on the use of such data has multiple, broad, and obvious security implications, particularly given China’s 

abysmal record regarding United Nations-approved human rights of its 

own citizens.

 Coincident with the recent rises in STEM investment and publication, 

China has displayed a growing rate of plagiarism, scientific fabrication, 

and other scholarly corruption among its researchers and publications.22

The strong governmental control of the country’s scientific enterprise 

combines high status and incentives for scientists and engineers who focus 

on national priorities, and a lax administrative evaluation of scientific and 

technological processes, setting up precisely the conditions for corruption 

and scientific fraud. 

The PRC’s weak regulation of scientific integrity has human security 

consequences. The international scandal in 2008 over China’s melamine223
Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific

contaminated milk that sickened more than 50,000 children23 is a classic 

example how poorly regulated research and development can have disastrous impacts on public health.

In a related vein, it has recently come to light that a number of PRC 

scientists working in sensitive and cutting-edge fields in United States’ 

laboratories have not revealed their sometimes very deep and substantial 

ties to PRC party and quasi-governmental organizations. The PRC has 

taken advantage of the open United States and international systems of 

science to acquire technological capacities via ‘plagiarism’ on a widespread, 

international scale. 

Further, China’s disregard for environmental safeguards24 and existence of multiple ‘superfund’-type sites25 highlight how its state-controlled 

enterprises are dedicated to accomplishing PRC short-term goals while 

ignoring the broader and longer-term concerns of its own and other nations’ peoples. Moreover, China’s poor STEM industry regulation has led 

it to be the world’s leading producer/releaser of atmospheric carbon, contributing more than one quarter of the entire world’s emissions in recent 

years.26

Implications of STEM Governance Systems

The scientist-driven system of STEM tends to ensure that technologies 

are generally employed in manners more or less aligned with the values 

that underlie science—skepticism, openness, and honesty. The applications of state-driven STEM, on the other hand, reflect the political objectives, morals, and ethics of the political entity that drives them. 

The PRC’s STEM advancement, determined and driven centrally by a 

political party, stands in marked contrast to the broadly-adopted approach 

of empowering STEM professionals to largely delineate the path of scientific and technological progress. The meteoric rise of the PRC in STEM 

capabilities over recent decades, in comparison to the slower growth of 

U.S. and other Western countries’ STEM capacities, thus poses a quandary 

for security professionals: Does this rapid growth in the PRC’s STEM 

capabilities indicate the desirability of a stronger role for government 

in determining the directions for STEM advancement? Should Western 

governments adopt a more centralized, focused approach to supporting 

STEM?

More profoundly: What are, and what should be, the relationships between STEM and security? What are the implications, both nationally and 

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State-Driven Approach to Science and Technology

internationally, of centralized governmental control of both STEM and 

the security sector? Going forward, how can and should the international 

community of Indo-Pacific nations respond to the PRC’s continuing use 

of STEM in flaunting scientific norms and disrupting the international 

order?

These are not simple questions to address, nor do they have neat, 

clean answers. Regarding the first, now and going forward, it is clear that 

the STEM and security fields are evermore inexorably linked. STEM 

advances will shape the security arena, and security concerns will drive 

STEM advances. A healthy, vigorous public dialogue about both arenas, 

and the ways that they interact, will be key to the continued success of 

both. Governmental direction, as opposed to government regulation, of 

STEM can lead, as it has in the case of the PRC, to both serious abuses of 

international scientific norms and outright violations of international laws. 

Addressing the second query, while it could be argued that more national governmental control of STEM direction could lead to more rapid 

advances in critical technologies, the downsides of such centralization that 

were raised above for the PRC must be kept in mind. The scientist-driven 

system in the United States enabled it to achieve and maintain dominance 

in STEM for a number of decades; its STEM higher education system is 

still globally admired, and is pursued by many thousands of foreign nationals each year. Such an approach that has proven so successful for such 

a long time should not be changed or abandoned without significant public consideration. The short-term gains of the PRC’s STEM enterprise 

seem impressive, but may come at the cost of decreased public confidence 

in science and technology. The 2019-2020 coronavirus outbreak serves as 

an example of how governmental control of STEM, via such processes 

as surveillance and censorship of scientists, can be detrimental to broader 

human security. Additionally, this outbreak illustrates how state direction 

of the scientific enterprise can undermine the integrity of scientific processes, and potentially destroy both the credibility and productivity of the 

entire STEM undertaking.

The third question is even more problematical than the first two. A 

coordinated, consistent response from a broad coalition of states, at a 

minimum, will be needed to curtail PRC abuse of standards and norms, 

in both the STEM and international relationship realms. How to build 

such a coalition, given the diverse interests of the multiple parties in such 

a grouping, is, of course, a significant challenge; China has established 

deep relationships, including very substantial economic ties, to many Indo225
Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific

Pacific nations, and these alliances make criticism of or push-back against 

the PRC problematical on various levels. This challenge, however, must be 

pursued, or the PRC will surely continue to flaunt, in ever-more flagrant 

ways, the international norms and break the accepted rules, in whatever 

manner it sees to its own advantage. 

If the integrity of the greater scientific enterprise is to be maintained, 

the larger issues of the relationships between STEM and security must be 

continually examined and openly debated among the broadest range of 

stakeholders, especially including professional scientists, rather than determined by political considerations. Only open, democratic dialogue will 

ensure the health and vitality of this enterprise that has nurtured the current state of well-being for humanity.

Conclusions 

The development of science and technology have long both contributed 

to and been impacted by the broad spectrum of security issues. STEM 

advances have played critical roles in warfare and in the rise in living standards during peaceful eras. And this deep interweaving of STEM and security appears only to be increasing as we move into the future. Given 

these trends, changes of any Indo-Pacific power’s STEM capacities will 

inevitably have impacts on myriad aspects of security across other IndoPacific states.

Increasingly and rapidly over recent decades, the PRC has built up 

massive scientific and technological capabilities. Governmentally-directed 

and strategically-focused, these capacities have targeted nationalistic goals 

without regard to the broader global community. The PRC has demonstrated its willingness to ignore both international rule of law and core 

principles of ethical scientific practice. It ineffectively regulates its own internal technology development, and uses its STEM power at the expense 

of broader regional human and environmental well-being. 

A long history of vibrant STEM growth among states that largely 

empower researchers to determine the directions of their investigations 

illustrates the value and power of this scientist-driven system of STEM 

governance to people everywhere. This model has brought a plethora of 

benefits to humanity, while the scientific enterprise’s self-correcting nature 

has ensured a relatively low cost.

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State-Driven Approach to Science and Technology

In contrast, the PRC’s state-driven approach to STEM, wherein a 

single political entity directs the education and applications of science and 

technology for its own ends, illustrates clearly that this approach, while 

enabling rapid growth in STEM capabilities, leads to the misuse of science 

and technology to the detriment of these enterprises themselves, as well as 

to direct harms to both people and the environment at large. 

Going forward, the international community of Indo-Pacific nations 

must work in concert, responding emphatically to the PRC’s continuing 

flaunting of scientific norms, disruption of the international order, and 

damage to our shared environment. Regional security professionals, as 

well as governments and the larger human community, must more closely 

monitor, condemn, and actively push back against the PRC’s misappropriation and misapplication of its STEM capacities. 

Notes

1 This widespread and critical importance of STEM to security is recognized with- in the United States and internationally, by groups such as the U.S. Department of 

Homeland Security (https://www.dhs.gov/science-and-technology/our-work), the 

U.S. Centers for Disease Control (https://www.cdc.gov/about/24-7/), the United 

Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (https://www.un.org/disarmament/top- ics/scienceandtechnology/), and the European Association for the Study of Science 

and Technology (https://easst.net/article/science-technology-and-security-discover- ing-intersections-between-sts-and-security-studies/).

2 Marcia McNutt and Michael M. Crow, “Science Institutions for a Complex, Fast- Paced World,” Issues in Science and Technology 36, no. 2 (Winter 2020): 30-34.

3 Gilbert Cruz, “Love Canal,” Time, May 3, 2010, http://content.time.com/time/ specials/packages/article/0,28804,1986457_1986501_1986441,00.html.

4 Alan Taylor, “Bhopal: The World’s Worst Industrial Disaster, 30 Years Later,” The 

Atlantic, December 2, 2014, https://www.theatlantic.com/photo/2014/12/bhopal- the-worlds-worst-industrial-disaster-30-years-later/100864/.

5 Shellen Wu, “How Science Saved China,” Nature 574, no. 7776 (October 3, 2019): 25-28.

6 State Council, People’s Republic of China, “National Medium- and Long-Term Program for Science and Technology Development (2006-2020): An Outline” 

(2006), https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Cybersecurity/Documents/National_Strate- gies_Repository/China_2006.pdf. 

7 Yu Xie, Chunni Zhang, and Qing Lai, “China’s Rise as a Major Contributor to Science and Technology,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 111, no. 26 

(July 1, 2014): 9437-9442.

8 Ibid.

9 Ibid.

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10 Reinhilde Veugelers, “The challenge of China’s rise as a science and technology powerhouse,” Policy Contribution, no. 19 (July 2017): 1-15.

11 Xie, Zhang, and Lai, “China’s Rise,” 9437-9442.

12 Ibid.

13 Veugelers, “The Challenge,” 1-15.

14 Wen Qing, “Pride and Pledge: The Nation Celebrates the 70th Anniversary of the Founding of the People’s Republic of China,” Beijing Review 62, no. 42 (October 17, 2009): 12-17.

15 Jon Grevatt, “China Looks to Quantum Technologies to Boost Naval Pro- grammes,” Jane’s Defence Industry (November 29, 2019): 1-2.

16 Walter Isaacson, “How America Loses Its Edge,” Time International (South Pacific Edition) 193, no. 1 (January 14, 2019): 15-17. 

17 Ted Piccone, “China’s Long Game on Human Rights at the United Nations,” Foreign Policy at Brookings (September 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2018/09/FP_20181009_china_human_rights.pdf.

18 Steven Stashwick, “China’s South China Sea Militarization Has Peaked,” Foreign Policy (August 19, 2019), https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/08/19/chinas-south-china- sea-militarization-has-peaked/, accessed December 30, 2019.

19 PCA Case No. 2013-19, “Award in the Matter of the South China Sea Arbitra- tion before an Arbitral Tribunal Constituted under Annex VII to the 1982 United 

Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea between the Republic of the Philippines 

and the People’s Republic of China” (July 12, 2016), http://www.pcacases.com/

pcadocs/PH-CN%20-%2020160712%20-%20Award.pdf.

20 Timo A. Räsänen, Paradis Someth, Hannu Lauri, Jorma Koponen, Juha Sark- kula, and Matti Kummua, “Observed River Discharge Changes Due to Hydropower 

Operations in the Upper Mekong Basin,” Journal of Hydrology 545 (February 2017): 28-41.

21 Brahma Chellaney, “Laboring under the Illusion of a Rules-Based Global Order,” Japan Times (December 23, 2019).

22 Xie, Zhang, and Lai, “China’s Rise,” 9437-9442. 

23 Elizabeth Rosenthal, “China’s Milk Scandal Now Seen as Risk in Europe,” New York Times (September 26, 2008), https://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/26/world/

asia/26melamine.html, accessed December 30, 2019.

24 Z. He, J. Shentu, X. Yang, V.C. Baligar, T. Zhang, and P.J. Stoffella, “Heavy Metal Contamination of Soils: Sources, Indicators, and Assessment,” Journal of Environmen- tal Indicators 9 (2015): 17-18.

25 Xin Wei, Bo Gao, Peng Wang, Huaidong Zhou, and Jin Lu, “Pollution Character- istics and Health Risk Assessment of Heavy Metals in Street Dusts from Different 

Functional Areas in Beijing, China,” Ecotoxicology and Environmental Safety 112 (Febru- ary 2015): 186-192.

26 Iman Gosh, “All the World’s Carbon Emissions in One Chart,” May 19, 2019, https://www.visualcapitalist.com/all-the-worlds-carbon-emissions-in-one-chart/.

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15

ONE HUNDRED SECONDS TO 

MIDNIGHT

Bill Wieninger

The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists (BAS) is a non-profit organization created by scientists in the beginning of the nuclear age to educate the general 

public about the dangers of nuclear war, with their most notable creation 

being the famous “Doomsday Clock.” The Doomsday Clock is set at a 

selected number of minutes from midnight to indicate how close we are 

to civilization-ending results of human action. In January 2020 it was reset 

to 100 seconds to midnight, the closest to midnight it has ever been. The 

current factors that lead BAS to do this center on three existential threats 

to civilization: nuclear war, climate change, and deliberate corruption of 

the information ecosphere. As this volume is looking to the past to draw 

insights for the future, I will focus on the risk of nuclear war as this was 

the only criteria the BAS used 25 years ago.

Twenty-five years ago the BAS moved the clock to 14 minutes to 

midnight, 3 minutes closer to midnight than it had been for the previous 

four years in the giddy optimism immediately following the end of the 

Cold War. In a sobering statement, they suggested world leaders should 

take better advantage of the opportunity that the end of the Cold War had 

provided with the warning that “deep thinkers have long noted the human 

propensity to snatch defeat from the jaws of victory.”1

Unfortunately, since 1995 the clock has consistently moved closer to 

midnight until reaching the closest position ever in 2020. Conflict among 

Indo-Pacific powers is one of the key reasons for this as six of nine global 

nuclear powers contest in the region—China, India, Pakistan, North Korea, Russia, and the United States—and the three new global nuclear pow-
Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific

ers since 1995 have all come from the Indo-Pacific—India, Pakistan, and 

North Korea. Examining the dynamics which have driven the Doomsday 

Clock’s regrettable ratcheting closer and closer to midnight may assist us in 

seeing where the future may lead us, and more importantly, suggest action 

we may take now to reach more preferable outcomes in the next 25 years.

Breaking the Security Dilemma

One of the enduring dynamics in international relations is that of an arms 

race driven by what is termed the security dilemma, wherein country A 

strengthens its military to make itself secure but that makes country B feel 

more threatened so that it, in turn, strengthens its military ... which then 

makes country A feel less secure again. The latest manifestation of this 

cycle in the nuclear realm was the February 2020 announcement that the 

United States had fielded the W-76-2 warhead on some of its submarinelaunched ballistic missile force. The W-76-2 is dubbed a “more usable” 

nuclear weapon due to its lower yield (10 kilotons rather than the hundreds 

of kilotons of the standard W-76), which would reduce collateral damage 

in the case it is used. The logic driving the fielding of this weapon is that 

with a significant arsenal of lower-yield “tactical” nuclear weapons and the 

possibility to use one in a conventional conflict against the United States, 

Russia thinks that the United States would be unwilling to respond with 

a “strategic” warhead with a yield of hundreds of kilotons—thus handing Russia victory. This is essentially the same logic that drove the United 

States and the Soviet Union to field tens of thousands of nuclear weapons 

during the Cold War. While this dynamic was very costly, I am aware of 

no studies which indicate the large numbers of weapons made either side 

more secure. Indeed most studies of the Cold War suggest these large 

arsenals and the “tactical” weapons they included, if anything, made the 

situation significantly more dangerous. This is further demonstrated by the 

desire on both sides to reduce arsenals when that became possible with détente in the mid-1970s. Why then is the world going down this path again?

I would argue that we are going down this path again because key 

nations, including the United States, have been making the mistake of focusing on their own security without any consideration for other country’s 

security needs. While blame for falling into the security dilemma is shared 

on all sides, getting out of it will fall more heavily on the shoulders of the 

United States due the huge power asymmetry it has compared to its rivals.2

In order to more clearly understand what the United States can do to get 

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out of this dilemma, it would be useful to look back on some of the key 

developments that got us to where we are today.

One key challenge was the expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty 

Organization (NATO) eastward in 1999, done with too little concern for 

how Russia would view this development at a time when Russia was so 

weak it could do nothing. Unsurprisingly, Russia viewed it as quite alarming given invasions from the west of it had killed tens of millions of Russians in the 20th century. Moreover, the West had demonstrated in Kosovo two weeks after this expansion that it would use military force against 

Russia’s allies when it began the bombing campaign against Serbia despite 

the lack of a United Nations Security Council resolution authorizing the 

military campaign.3 Many believed this bombing campaign a necessity to 

avoid genocide of Kosovar Albanians, but others believed it violated international norms. In Moscow, it was seen as a very aggressive move by 

the West against Russia, undermining trust in the international system and 

driving a sense of a need to re-arm vis-à-vis the West.

Another key policy that produced counter-productive results is the 

United States’ Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) program. Originally it was 

posited as a defense against “rogue” regimes such as North Korea or Iran, 

which may acquire long-range ballistic missiles while being irrational and 

undeterrable in the way the Soviet Union was. However, this BMD program also threatened to undermine the second-strike retaliatory capabilities that Russia and China depend on to deter the United States. A good 

example of this is the People’s Republic of China (PRC), which was estimated to have roughly 20 warheads capable of hitting the continental 

United States when Washington began its serious BMD program over 25 

years ago. Today that number is 136.4 In its effort to defend against a small 

number of nuclear-armed ballistic missiles from “rogue states” such as 

Iran or North Korea, the United States built a system that would also undermine China’s ability to hold at risk a handful of American cities. Thus, 

my assessment is that the PRC is increasing the size of its arsenal to ensure 

it is enough to overcome a potential American first-strike coupled with 

ballistic missile defenses and will continue to do so in response to future 

BMD developments and deployments.

Over the past 25 years, the United States has spent over US $157 

billion on long-range ballistic missile defense according to data from the 

Missile Defense Agency.5 That has given it some chance of shooting down 

an incoming missile (its utility is hotly contested with some critics claiming it has near-zero capability while the staunchest advocates say only that 

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it has “significant ability”).6 However, regardless of which side is correct, 

America will remain vulnerable to a ballistic missile attack from adversaries who will continue to simply build larger arsenals no matter how much 

is spent on BMD. A 1964 Defense Department study found that for 

every $3.20 America spent on defense against Soviet missile attacks, the 

Soviets needed to spend only US$1 to defeat it—damage mitigation was 

“a fairly hopeless strategy.”7 Even if that number were lower today, say 

2-1, it seems inevitable that America’s adversaries will continue to be able 

to spend whatever it takes to ensure they can credibly retaliate against a 

hypothetical attack by the United States. In the case of Russia, it drove 

President Putin to claim in 2018 that Moscow will field entirely new classes of delivery systems, including a nuclear-powered nuclear-tipped cruise 

missile, to overcome U.S. BMD.8

Looking to the Future

Based on the above analysis, I would predict that in 2045, America, and 

indeed all nuclear powers, will remain in a nuclear deterrent relationship 

with all of their current nuclear adversaries regardless of the money 

spent on ballistic missile defense. Moreover, the more spent on BMD, 

the more nuclear weapons and delivery systems potential adversaries will 

build, making everyone less secure because of the increased risk of loss 

of control of nuclear warheads that accompanies larger inventories. I call 

it the large N-problem—the greater the number of nuclear weapons, the 

greater the risk of loss of control. To build a human organization that is 

99.9% successful is an amazing achievement but almost impossible. If a 

state manages to build such an organization while possessing 1000 nuclear 

weapons9—statistically it will lose one. Driving competitors to continue to 

increase their arsenals increases the dangers from a loss of control of one 

or more nuclear weapons.

While it was easy to predict that nuclear powers will remain vulnerable to adversary nuclear arsenals in 2045, the exact size of those arsenals 

is very difficult to predict. Recent history strongly suggests that the United 

States and Russia are on track to repeat the mistakes of the Cold War and 

build larger and larger arsenals and delivery systems, at least in the nearto-mid term. One can hope that some development occurs which leads 

the two nations to reign in nuclear arsenals and work toward crisis stability again. The Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 was such a wakeup call after, 

in the words of former U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, 

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“we lucked out! It was luck that prevented nuclear war.” Hopefully, we 

will avoid such a serious crisis, or get lucky again. Breaking this security 

dilemma will be difficult, but as mentioned above, it seems clear that the 

best path to doing so is bold action by the biggest power. In other words, 

courageous action by the United States will be needed, given the dramatic 

power advantage it has over its rivals.

With regard to smaller nuclear powers, one strategic goal shared by 

most of the world since 1995 is that North Korea not be a nuclear weapons state. Just over 25 years ago, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the United States signed the Agreed Framework under 

which North Korea pledged to give up its nuclear weapons program in 

exchange for security guarantees and assistance in building nuclear power 

reactors. However, the mistrust between the two was very deep-rooted 

and the agreement unraveled in subsequent years. Gallons of ink have 

been spilled in arguments over whether and what could have been done 

differently to prevent a nuclear North Korea, but the reality is that both 

dovish and hawkish approaches by the United States and South Korea 

have all failed, initially, to stop North Korea from acquiring nuclear weapons and, subsequently, from convincing its leaders to give the weapons 

up. There is very little reason to believe that the North will give up the 

weapons and so, barring an unexpected and hard-to-imagine diplomatic 

breakthrough, it is logical to conclude that North Korea will likely remain 

a nuclear power in 2045.

Over 25 years ago, in 1991, in the wake of the end of the Cold War, 

the United States announced the withdrawal of all nuclear weapons from 

the Korean peninsula. Seen as a positive development by all at the time, 

developments over the past several administrations have put us on track 

to see the reintroduction of nuclear weapons into South Korea as a deterrent to North Korea.10 Concerns about the American commitment to provide a nuclear umbrella to South Korea began in earnest with the Prague 

speech by then newly-elected President Obama in 2009 in which he laid 

out a vision of a world without nuclear weapons. These concerns have 

significantly grown with the 2017 demonstration by North Korea of an 

intercontinental ballistic missile capable of hitting much of the continental 

United States, as well as demonstration of a much larger-yield nuclear warhead. This had been compounded by high-level disagreements between 

the United States and the Republic of Korea (ROK) regarding burdensharing.

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Alleviating these concerns in future years will likely lead the deployment of nuclear weapons under dual control, similar to agreements the 

United States has with several European allies. This will be politically challenging for both countries, but it would solidify the credibility of the extended nuclear umbrella. Alternatively, should the U.S.-ROK alliance continue to erode while DPRK nuclear capability grows, at some point the 

pressure for the ROK to develop and deploy its own nuclear deterrent 

capability will likely become impossible to resist. Thus, absent fundamental changes to the U.S.-ROK-DPRK relationship, I would predict nuclear 

arsenals on both sides of the 38th parallel in 2045.

India and Pakistan were both opaque nuclear weapons states in 1995. 

At that time, experts assessed both had the capability to field nuclear weapons, although neither had done a weapon test (India’s nuclear test in 1974 

was dubbed a “peaceful nuclear explosion” while Pakistan was assessed 

to have the capability to field a nuclear weapon from about 1987 forward 

without having tested it). India conducted multiple weapons tests in May 

1998 and Pakistan soon followed suit, confirming for all that they were 

overt nuclear weapons states. Since that time they have experienced three 

major international crises—Kargil in 1999, the terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament in 2002, and the Mumbai terror attack in 2008—as well as 

a less serious crisis in 2019 in which Indian Air Force jets attacked targets 

across the line of control with Pakistan, which reportedly shot down one 

or two Indian fighter aircraft. All this happened while both states gradually 

expanded their nuclear arsenals and delivery systems. Given the continued 

mutual hostility and territorial dispute over Kashmir, future serious crises 

are inevitable during which a miscalculation could lead to an escalation neither side wants. Additionally, as their arsenals grow, the large N-problem 

comes into play again.

The exact situation with regard to nuclear arsenals in South Asia in 

2045 is hard to precisely predict, but barring resolution of the Kashmir 

dispute, it seems certain that both India and Pakistan will have nuclear 

arsenals. Numerically, they seem on track to continue to gradually expand 

their arsenals and delivery systems and both will probably field a triad of 

nuclear systems—nuclear weapons launched from land-based missiles, 

from submarines, and from long-range bombers. India has a nascent missile defense program today and it is easy to imagine that should that capability mature, Pakistan will expand its arsenal and delivery systems to ensure they can continue to hold Indian targets at risk. A few years ago, India 

was reported to have a new doctrine dubbed “Cold Start” which would 

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enable the Indian military to strike swiftly against Pakistan in a future crisis. Pakistan’s reported response to this was to consider the use of tactical 

nuclear weapons to blunt larger Indian conventional military formations. 

Talk of Cold Start and tactical nuclear weapon use seems to have receded 

recently, perhaps suggesting that both countries recognize the peril of 

starting down the path of escalation and de-escalation ladders. This is a 

hopeful sign and consistent with the past 25 years of relatively conservative nuclear doctrines on the subcontinent. Still, the inevitability of future 

serious international crises means the risk of nuclear exchange on the subcontinent will remain a serious concern for the foreseeable future.

One last thought with regard to nuclear weapons in 2045 is command 

and control (C2). Since the beginning of the nuclear age, a decision and 

an action by a human being has been required for the launch of nuclear 

weapons (the “Dead Hand” system of the Soviet Union has sometimes 

been mis-portrayed as autonomous—it was not). Today there is much talk 

of artificial intelligence (AI) algorithms being used to speed decision making and avoid human error, and some have suggested this be utilized in 

the nuclear early warning and possibly C2 roles. More sober strategists 

may want to retain the human in the loop. However, concern that the 

adversary is using AI to make decisions more accurately and rapidly may 

well drive adversaries on all sides to feel compelled to take the human out 

of the loop. This is a very real concern we must face today and I would 

encourage statesmen on all sides to initiate or continue conversations to 

ensure we do not go down that path. While AI may make better decisions 

in some or even many cases, as currently conceived, it is largely a black box 

making decisions that are difficult or impossible to predict or understand 

and it is simply far too dangerous to entrust decisions on nuclear use to 

such systems.

Conclusion

Twenty-five years ago the nuclear weapon age seemed to be on the way 

out with the end of the Cold War and the concomitant decline in American and Russian arsenals. Hope ran high. Regrettably, traditional world 

leaders failed to deliver on those hopes and so in 2020 humanity faces a 

renewed nuclear age which seems to promise more arms races, instability, 

and increasing the risk of Armageddon as we look to 2045. The answer 

to this challenge is for experts and national leaders to look clearly at the 

lessons of the past and recognize that this is the path to insecurity, and not 

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security. Leaders need to consider their national security policies as part of 

an international security policy and recognize that pursuit of national security that comes at the expense of other nuclear weapons states’ security 

does not work. As ever the world leader, the United States is best placed to 

make this happen. Non-nuclear weapon states can afford the wars that all 

too often result from such a narrow focus; the six nuclear powers of the 

Indo-Pacific cannot.

Notes

1 Mike Moore, “On the Scale,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 52, no. 1 (1995): 2, https://thebulletin.org/sites/default/files/1995%20Clock%20Statement.pdf.

2 Michael Beckley, Unrivaled: Why America Will Remain the World’s Sole Superpower (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2018).

3 Michael Krepon, “NATO Expansion and the Great Unraveling of Arms Con- trol,” Arms Control Wonk, February 3, 2020, https://www.armscontrolwonk.com/ archive/1208648/nato-expansion-and-the-great-unraveling-of-arms-control.

4 Hans M. Kristensen and Matt Korda, “Chinese Nuclear Forces 2019,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 75, no. 4 (2019): 171-178.

5 “Historical Funding for MDA FY85-17,” Missile Defense Agency, https://www. mda.mil/global/documents/pdf/FY17_histfunds.pdf.

6 Henry F. Cooper, “Yes, the U.S. Navy Can Shoot Down North Korean ICBMs,” National Review, September 28, 2017, https://www.nationalreview.com/2017/09/ united-states-navy-north-korea-intercontintal-ballistic-missiles-defense-aegis/.

7 Fred Kaplan, Wizards of Armageddon (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983): 321.

8 “Russia’s Putin Reveals ‘Invincible’ Nuclear Weapons,” BBC, March 1, 2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-43239331.

9 Global inventory of nuclear weapon today is roughly 13,000. Hans M. Kris- tensen and Matt Korda, “Status of World Nuclear Forces,” Federation of Atomic 

Scientists, April 2020, https://fas.org/issues/nuclear-weapons/status-world-nucle- ar-forces/.

10 Amy F. Woolf and Emma Chanlett-Avery, Redeploying U.S. Nuclear Weapons to South Korea: Background and Implications in Brief, CRS Report No. R44950 (Washing- ton, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2017), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/

R44950.pdf.

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Part III: Local Dynamics of Regional Security

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16

RUSSIA IN THE PACIFIC: 

STRATEGIC OPPORTUNITY IN THE FAR EAST

Wade Turvold

Russia is a geographically expansive country that occupies most of the 

Eurasian landmass. As such, the country influences and acts in two distinct theaters, in both Europe and Asia. Both Russia and the United States 

have vital national interests in both theaters, and great power relationships 

matter in both regions. But while Russian-U.S. interests are mostly at odds 

in Europe, there is some overlap in Asia, especially when considering the 

wider Indo-Pacific region, and therefore opportunity. This paper will focus on that opportunity. The characterization of Russia as a revanchist 

power is undoubtedly true in Eastern Europe, where Russia is consolidating land grabs in Georgia and the Ukraine and possibly contemplating 

more. But aside from a lingering territorial dispute with Japan over the 

Southern Kuril Islands following World War II, Russia has been mostly 

quiet on the international scene in the Pacific. Russia has no revanchist 

ambition in Asia, and so a different balancing approach is required in this 

region. There are indicators of restive tendencies as displayed by recent 

evolving cooperation with China in military exercises and posturing, but 

these actions do not show a desire for territorial expansion in Asia. Viewing Russia’s differing behavior in Europe and the Pacific in hindsight can 

yield insight into its current global posture, and provide foresight in envisaging future strategic action to engage Russia. 

Understanding Russia’s global actions and countering Russia’s malign 

behavior is possible regionally by implementing a disparate approach toward European Russia and Moscow’s behavior in the Pacific. Comprehending Russia’s simultaneous quiescent and revanchist behaviors will enable the community of Indo-Pacific states to find areas of cooperation 
Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific

and to better influence Russian activity because of the hindsight, insight, 

and foresight produced from assessing these behaviors.

Hindsight to Insight

To understand Russian conduct in the Pacific region it is necessary to understand Russian state behavior in a geopolitical context. Russia’s actions 

are shaped mainly by its historical experience in Europe. Russia’s long history in Eastern Europe as a balancing power to Europe’s Western states 

sets Russia’s current focus on European affairs. The fall of the Soviet 

Union, with Russia at its heart, was a setback in Russia’s ability to balance 

the West. The renascent Russia formed from the chaos after the collapse 

of the Soviet Union, after a failed period of semi-democratic rule in which 

rich oligarchs dominated, ended with Putin as its autocratic leader. The 

resultant strong central government has been intent on recovering what 

it reasonably can of the previous Soviet empire that was lost when Russia 

was weak. While Moscow knows it is not possible to recreate the Soviet 

Union, Russia has been able to reacquire some lost territory that it considers most important, thereby returning to its historical role of balancer 

of the West. Balancing efforts have included forcibly acquiring parts of 

Russian-speaking Georgia, the Crimean peninsula, and parts of Eastern 

Ukraine.1

President Vladimir Putin has been strategically brilliant at using Russia’s limited power in innovative ways to achieve limited objectives, especially in recovering lost territory.2

 Recovering ground is also a way to 

recover influence, especially when it comes to recreating the buffer zone 

that the non-Russian republics of the former Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact provided. Russia is intent on upholding exclusive access to its 

near territories because Russia prefers a buffer zone to safeguard both 

its territorial and cultural integrity consistent in its role as balancer to the 

West. The armies of Napoleon and Hitler attempted invasion from the 

west, and it may appear to Russia that expanding North Atlantic Treaty 

Organization (NATO) membership, rapid when Russia was at its weakest 

but still ongoing today, looks similar but at a slower pace.3 The rationale 

for Russian land grabs is the affinity it feels for ethnic Russian-speaking 

peoples and the belief that Russia must protect them, as is the case currently with territory inhabited by Russian-speaking peoples in Georgia and 

the Ukraine.4

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Russian national interests are defined by its values and history. Russia 

has several vital national interests, those that it sees as affecting the core 

of its identity. The current sovereign, President Vladimir Putin, sees his 

own survival in office as vital. In this regard, he recently forced changes 

to the constitution to ensure his own rule beyond the current 2024 term 

limit.5 Historical Czarist culture appears to be alive and well. Russia is also 

interested in maintaining and recovering its once more expansive sphere 

of influence, as noted earlier.

Recovering lost territory, or more appropriately, recovering control 

over the Russian-speaking peoples in those territories, is also important 

culturally.6 Doing so may, however, come at the cost of continued economic sanctions. The European Union and the United States, along with 

Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, and others, have imposed numerous punitive sanctions on Russia following its invasion of the Ukraine 

in 2014. The United States alone has imposed sanctions for the Ukraine 

invasion, and in 10 other categories, against numerous Russian state and 

non-state actors.7 Sanctions notwithstanding, Russia is seeking to maintain 

its hydrocarbon and arms sales to existing customers both in the West and 

elsewhere.

Insight to Foresight

Three features characterize Russia’s current behavior. They are Russia’s desire to maintain a strong central government, its desire to recover territory 

it considers lost, and its expanding partnership with China. Russia is acting 

consistently with its history and culture, but also acting pragmatically.

The lawlessness and corrupt oligarchy that reigned following the dissolution of the Soviet Union will remain at the forefront of the Russian 

experience with decentralized government, and perpetuate strong national 

leadership. Russia blames the West for the collapse of the Soviet Union 

and the resultant loss of power to balance the actions of the West. Both 

of these factors lead to the conclusion that Russia will continue to maintain its powerful central government headed by Vladimir Putin, who has 

pushed back against Western encroachment in its former sphere of influence. Russia’s preoccupation with the West and its identity as European 

notwithstanding, it sees its growing association with China as expedient in 

many ways, and it is this relationship that offers much insight into current 

Russian strategic actions. Russia’s expanded use of deterrent operations, 

through the many instruments available to it, both conventional and nucle241
Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific

ar, has been effective in countering Western influence globally.8 Russia sees 

recovery of land and influence in Europe as central to its identity, but sees 

pursuing technical, economic, and military relations with China as expedient to its future as a viable state. The relationship with China, then, brings 

Russian focus on its Far East territory into strategic view.

Beyond amending the constitution to perpetuate the regime of Vladimir Putin, Russia sees it as important to recover and reassemble what it can 

of the fallen Soviet Union and will continue to consolidate its land grabs 

in Georgia and the Ukraine as long as it can tolerate or offset economic 

sanctions.9 In fact, initial nationalist euphoria in this regard is waning as 

public opinion polls show increasing dissatisfaction with the second and 

third-order effects of these annexations.10 Russia will remain enmeshed 

in these disputes, its leadership determined to act in revanchist ways as an 

appeal to its populist base, despite any potential domestic repercussions, 

and in finding other often questionable ways to mitigate the impact of 

economic sanctions.

Russia sees adjacent Slavic states and those states formerly aligned 

with it as a buffer. For this reason, the Baltic states of Latvia, Lithuania 

and Estonia, once part of the Soviet Union and with significant Russianspeaking populations, are potentially at risk. Moldova is another opportunity for Russia with similar circumstances. Poland, while not ethnically 

Russian, has historically fallen under Russian influence and is so often at 

the crossroads of Europe’s geopolitical landscape. This will keep NATO 

busy, and Europeans preoccupied with defense issues and the related topic 

of NATO expansion, for another decade. In contrast, no such lost territory or peoples exist for Russia in the Indo-Pacific region. Russia’s revanchist sentiment does not affect the Russian Far East, with Russia having 

consolidated its territory in the Far East more than a century ago and with 

no displaced Russian speaking populations in the region.

Moscow’s neglect has left the Russian Far East mostly free from the 

animosity found in European Russia, and here Russia has an opportunity 

to show itself a responsible partner and to use the region as a catalyst for 

improved behavior worldwide. Aside from losing the 1904-1905 RussoJapanese War, Russia has had a positive experience in the Pacific theater 

and counts itself among the victors in the Pacific theater during World 

War II. Russian interests in the Far East include expanding its economy 

through arms and oil sales, exploiting its relationship with China, establishing dominance in the Arctic region, and showing itself to be an influential 

great power.

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The Indo-Pacific states, in general, would like for Russia in the Far 

East to resolve its territorial dispute with Japan, to assist with eliminating 

North Korean nuclear weapons, to behave in accordance with international norms in the Arctic region, and to show itself to be a responsible 

great power. There is some overlap of interests that provides some scope 

for cooperation. Russia’s historical propensity to balance the West will limit 

what it will be willing to do since the United States will undoubtedly be 

involved, however, and the same is likely true for many Indo-Pacific states 

in reverse.

Oil sales and arms sales are chief among the ways in which Russia is 

offsetting economic sanctions by the West. Russia is seeking additional 

markets for hydrocarbons beyond its current European arrangements. 

Russia’s hydrocarbons help to fuel China, and in greater quantity could fuel 

the advancement of China’s One Belt One Road initiative. Developing 

the Arctic and Far East regions are therefore important to Russia’s future 

economic growth. In addition to hydrocarbons, Russia seeks to maintain 

its arms exports to Vietnam and much of Southeast Asia and South Asia, 

including India. Russia will, therefore, strive to maintain its position as 

primary arms supplier to both India and Vietnam, two states being heavily 

courted by the United States in an effort to sustain a free and open IndoPacific region.11 Russia may, through arms sales, be simultaneously able to 

enhance its economy, maintain its influence at the expense of the West, 

and deepen its strategic association with China. That these markets come 

with influence in states through which China and the United States are 

defining their strategic perimeter may outwardly complicate matters, but 

it also engenders potential political influence over China if needed in the 

future. The Sino-Russian relationship is complex but essentially based in 

common understanding in several key issues.

Russia and China share several interests. Chief among them are ensuring survival of their respective governing regimes, countering Western 

influence, developing and maintaining regional spheres of influence, addressing Western ascendency as it relates to their history, and advancing 

their economies. But despite some overlap in relatively recent Leninist 

ideology, their values differ. Russia is a European power, historically paranoid and long-suffering in a struggle to assert international legitimacy, and 

is currently focused on regaining the Eastern European buffer zone lost 

in the fall of the Soviet Union. China is an Asian power, historically the 

center, geographically and culturally, of tributary states over which China 

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Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific

could exert influence and extract wealth and deference, and is currently 

focused on consolidating territory and power in Asia.

The officially dubbed China-Russia Comprehensive Strategic Partnership of Coordination for a New Era has taken many expressions. China 

and Russia are cooperating in technical research and development. Both 

partners are actively involved in technical dialogues and exchanges, have 

developed and are developing numerous science and technology parks, 

and have established funding mechanisms and academic cooperation. Collaboration is centered on advanced telecommunications, led by Chinese 

technology firm Huawei, and on data collection, robotics, and artificial 

intelligence. The two states are also involved in jointly developing biotechnology, media and digital commerce. But there are signs of historical 

and underlying mutual distrust. The split in relations following World War 

II was due to differences in values and strategic outlook, and these differences will be difficult to overcome in the long term.12 Although the 

current association of China and Russia is driven by the desire to counter 

the West, the core behavior of each state may ultimately drive them apart. 

Russia, increasingly seen as the junior partner, is at great risk of being mistreated by a partner with no long term interest in the wellbeing of Russia.13

A central feature of Russia’s current actions includes its development 

of the Arctic region. Nowhere outside of Eastern Europe has Russia 

been more active and engaged. There are manifold reasons for this. The 

region is a growth area for infrastructure to support eventual shipping 

routes between Asia and Europe that are becoming more navigable as polar ice melts. Shipping lanes with their accompanying ports, cargo transportation capacity including hydrocarbons, icebreaking capability, and repair and maintenance facilities all could portend a huge windfall for Russia.

Foresight to Action

Although the future is difficult to predict, a broad projection of how Russia might act, as well as how it should act, is possible. As Russia acts in 

its interests, internal competition between its behavior in Europe and its 

behavior in the Far East will enable the Indo-Pacific community to potentially anticipate and shape its actions in both theaters. The United States, 

guarantor of freedom in the Indo-Pacific region since the close of World 

War II, could benefit from affirmative Russian activity in the Indo-Pacific 

region. So too could the rest of the Indo-Pacific community, and there is 

scope for all to reasonably obtain the outcomes they desire. Thoughtful 

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crafting of strategic approach in five prominent areas will enable longterm success: Japan, hydrocarbons, the Arctic Sea, Sino-Russian relations, 

and North Korea. These areas are those in which interests overlap or that 

present realistic opportunity to obtain collaborative accomplishment.

Japan

U.S. ally Japan would see its stability enhanced if it and Russia were finally 

able to settle the World War II-era dispute over the Kuril Islands. The 

Soviet Union occupied the southern Kuril Islands in 1945 and then annexed them outright, explaining its actions as an “outcome” of World War 

II. This has resulted in neither side signing a peace treaty following the 

war. The governments of both Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and President 

Vladimir Putin have recently made efforts to resolve this dispute and to 

finally settle the longstanding disagreement,14 albeit to popular protests in 

both countries. Resolution of this conflict would be a positive development for all involved, and Russia would see benefits and perhaps open 

new markets for its oil, which is much needed in the region. Growing 

Sino-Russian cooperation may actually influence a near-term settlement. 

China’s deepening involvement with Russia may increase pressure on Japan to negotiate a suboptimal conclusion in the near term rather than 

waiting for a more formal alliance to add even more pressure, forcing Japan to obtain even less favorable terms. But Japan needs oil, and improved 

Russo-Japanese relations that would result from a dispute settlement could 

provide a market for Russian resources, oil and otherwise. Likewise, Japanese technology and manufacturing proficiency would benefit Russia in 

many ways. This outcome is not realistic anytime soon, but is possible in 

the long term.

Hydrocarbons

Russia’s enhanced ability to bring its oil to the Indo-Pacific market more 

cheaply and efficiently, with resulting stabilizing effect on the Middle East, 

will benefit Russia, the region, and possibly the United States. This would 

necessarily entail Russia acting responsibly and enduringly to price its oil 

and regulate production, something it has not often shown desire to do. 

Responsible action in this regard could be a powerful attraction if Russia 

is simultaneously able to serve as a bridge to Central Asia, also rich with 

hydrocarbons.15 Improved market access and transshipment methods due 

to melting Arctic ice will be useful for Russia and its oil.

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Arctic Sea

Russia has much to gain from melting sea ice, and Moscow’s management 

of its Arctic region could benefit both Russia and the international community. Arctic shipping lanes connect Asia to Europe in a more geographically direct way and reduce transit time for traded goods to reach their 

destinations. Russian shipping companies and the related service industry 

will have the first share of new market access, making them potentially 

very profitable. Moreover, access to the Arctic sea will provide quicker 

routes for Russian hydrocarbons to reach European and Asian customers. 

The same is true for Russian Far East exports like timber and fish. Environmental restrictions notwithstanding, the Arctic is a potential source for 

additional hydrocarbon deposits and fishing zones.

The Arctic is an important link to the Indo-Pacific and provides Russia the opportunity to further integrate into the Indo-Pacific economy, and 

makes available much needed commercial expansion, if it can relieve itself 

of economic sanctions. Russia would improve its international standing, 

and enable much more economic growth, if it were to behave in accordance with international norms in the Arctic, unlike China does in the 

South China Sea. Russia has shown that it can cooperate in the Arctic 

Council by recently agreeing with the United States on Bering Strait navigation routes.16 Responsible behavior by Russia in resolving its maritime 

dispute over the Lomonosov Ridge, contested by Canada and Denmark, 

like Russia did in agreeing to the Bering Strait navigation routes, would 

likely garner it geopolitical rewards.17 The international community, and 

the Indo-Pacific states in this context, should reward Russia’s actions as a 

responsible actor when deserved, and encourage more positive behavior.

Sino-Russian Relations

Increasing Russian and Chinese cooperation in the technical and militarytechnical fields will also feature prominently in the future of both states, 

as noted. The rapid progress of technology sharing agreements, academic 

collaboration, and telecommunications partnership is remarkable.18 But 

existing underlying distrust on both sides is for good reason. Both states 

are independent in thought and action, historically cynical of partnership, 

and neither is likely to be tied down for long being wedded to the interests 

of the other. China’s longstanding practice of acquiring Russian technology to produce indigenously-made products is a solid indicator of what 

is to come. China’s ongoing and aggressive theft of intellectual property, 

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coupled with the penetration of Russia’s communications systems through 

Huawei 5G technology, will end badly for Russia. Russia may accept this 

risk if it sees China as a market for its hydrocarbons, but the long-term 

relationship will not be a positive one for Russia, and the relationship will 

likely end within a generation.

The United States and the West also factor into this association. Russian and Chinese cooperation is driving the creation of innovative technology where it was once obtained from the West. The West is increasingly 

countering the underlying source of much of this innovation by curtailing Chinese intellectual property theft through diligent policing, and by 

stymieing Russian invention through sanctions. This will negatively affect 

the Sino-Russian relationship in the long term. For its part, the United 

States will be progressively more competitive in this regard as its technical 

research and development budgets are increasing.19

North Korea

A revanchist Russia in Europe will not preclude a Russia that meaningfully 

participates in the international community in the Indo-Pacific region. 

One way Russia can contribute is through its relationship with the two 

Koreas, where it has already shown interest as a participant and contributor to the Six Party Talks from 2003-2009. Russia, as an established nuclear 

power with little desire for either North Korea or anyone else to acquire 

nuclear weapons, and flush with hydrocarbons that a developing North 

Korea would need, is in position to have positive influence in an eventual 

solution to the Korean peninsula. With the U.S. efforts to directly engage 

North Korea’s Chairman Kim Jong Un at an impasse over demands that 

the other reverse policy first, Russia could be very useful in breaking the 

stalemate. Doing so would enhance Russia’s prestige in the region, and indeed globally. South Korea, which would also benefit from a nearer source 

of oil, is a potential origin of the technology Russia desires to maintain 

its technical competence, and a market for quality consumer goods of all 

types.

Balancing and Risk

Russia may also desire to be a balancer in the Indo-Pacific region commensurate with its aspiration to show itself as a great power globally. Beyond its already extensive arms sales in the region, competing with those 

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of Western suppliers, there is more opportunity. Russia may see it is possible to balance the influence of China and the United States in Southeast 

Asia.20 China, India, Japan, and the United States all provide extensive aid 

and investment to the region, and while there is seemingly no room for 

more great power involvement, Russia could bring some unique and desirable commodities. These include defense articles, hydrocarbons, fish and 

timber, and access to the Arctic Sea shipping routes. Expanding market access would seemingly be a win for Russia and the region. China would also 

likely not protest such a move as it would take some attention away from 

its own initiatives in the region, namely the One Belt One Road enterprise, 

and its continued unlawful activities in the South China Sea.

There are risks involved for Russia. Russia will be challenged to further expand into the greater Indo-Pacific region and, for many reasons, 

could fail to act positively, preferring instead to act along historically antagonistic European ways in the Indo-Pacific. Demographics, as they say, 

is destiny. Russia’s current population of 141 million will decline in the 

future, and the small population of the Russian Far East, some 6 million 

citizens, is likewise declining. Despite Moscow’s economic development 

efforts in the region, they may not be overly effective with fewer citizens 

to sustain an enhanced economy. Immigration from China, once thought 

possible to offset Russian population loss, seems less likely now as China 

faces its own population decline.21 Nonetheless, Beijing may force the issue with Moscow if it decides it can exert more political control in the 

region by doing so, and Moscow may be unable to prevent it.

Politically, many had hoped that President Vladimir Putin’s grip on 

power and constitutional meddling would end in the year 2024 upon completion of his current term, but it appears increasingly likely that he will 

remain in power for life.22 Putin’s adventurism in Europe is backfiring, and 

will continue to bring more discredit and economic hardship to the entire country—the Russian Far East included—his populist approval notwithstanding. Moreover, Russia’s increasing interdependence with China 

in technical and military affairs will leave Russia vulnerable in both those 

areas.23

Russia needs to diversify its state-driven hydrocarbon-based economy, 

and the Far East region with proximity to the world’s economic engine, 

Asia, and access to the Arctic Sea, present it diverse opportunity. But Russia’s challenges, and preoccupation with European affairs, may result in a 

situation in which its shared interests with the United States don’t translate 

to positive outcomes in the Russian Far East for either party.

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Russia in the Pacific

There are potential rewards despite the risks. Enhanced Russian presence and activity in the Indo-Pacific region could gently counter President 

Xi Jinping’s “Asia for Asians” messaging. The Indo-Pacific community can 

encourage a responsible Russia that could balance against China and thereby offset China’s desire to balance the West in the Indo-Pacific. Despite 

a dwindling population, Russia has many instruments available to balance 

against China. Russia’s abundant oil and gas reserves, access to the Arctic 

Sea, ongoing arms sales, huge nuclear arsenal, and benign feelings for it in 

most parts of the region lend it outsized political influence on a scale that 

can potentially enable it to act the part of responsible great power in the 

Pacific region. China’s aggressive expansionism in the region is beginning 

to cause a backlash as many states now see China’s true colors. Russia can 

play a positive role, but one contrasting that of China in this environment.

Recommendations and Conclusions

There is opportunity for the community of Indo-Pacific states to act together and show leadership in the region, and globally, in creating a more 

stable international order for all, Russia included. This is a potentially 

troubled proposition as many states find themselves increasingly inwardly 

focused as the world grapples with responses to globalization. But the likeminded states of the Indo-Pacific have the opportunity to engage Russia where interests overlap and to balance the Indo-Pacific region toward 

more positive outcomes for the majority of its inhabitants.

Encouraging Russia to settle the Kuril Islands dispute with Japan, to 

cooperate in de-nuclearizing North Korea, and to continue responsible 

action in the Arctic would improve the regional geopolitical climate. The 

benefits outweigh the costs if Russia and its Indo-Pacific neighbors can 

exploit opportunities for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, Russia’s bad behavior in Europe notwithstanding. All members of the Indo-Pacific region 

would benefit if Russia and the United States, and indeed the larger IndoPacific community, would pursue their common interests in the region 

with the goal of developing those positive aspects of Russia’s potential 

behavior noted herein, most especially as a constructive balance to China 

in Asia. The Indo-Pacific community can show Russia the advantage of 

joining the partnership of responsible stakeholders through economic integration.

The resultant technical partnerships that Russia could undertake with 

Japan, South Korea, and others, will surely prove more beneficial in the 

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Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific

long term that those currently ongoing with China. Not only can Russia 

play a balancing role to China in the future, but reformed and modernized 

behavior will benefit Russia and the rest of the region. Russia need not 

limit itself to being a troublesome European power looking to spoil the 

gains of the West. By understanding the opportunity presented by its own 

Far East region, Russia and the Indo-Pacific community can take a more 

proactive path. Recognizing the reality of Russia’s present state, and that 

Russia’s current autocratic leadership will not likely cooperate in the nearterm, the Indo-Pacific community can prudently think in the long-term, 

to continue to set the conditions, and to cooperate with Russia where possible toward the goal of ultimately bringing about this reality.

Insight into Russian interests and their potential overlap with likeminded states in the Indo-Pacific shows that Russia can play a positive role 

in the region. The community of like-minded states can seize upon the 

opportunity to engage Russia where appropriate, in this theater and where 

interests align, to start the slow work of inviting Russia into the community of responsible Indo-Pacific stakeholders.

Notes

1 Jeremy W. Lamoreaux, “The Three Motivations for an Assertive Russian Grand Strategy,” in Russian Strategic Intentions: A Strategic Multilayer Assessment White Paper, ed. 

Nicole Peterson (Boston: NSI, Inc., 2019), 1-6, https://nsiteam.com/social/wpcontent/uploads/2019/05/SMA-Russian-Strategic-Intentions-White-Paper-PDFcompressed.pdf.

2 Marlene Laruelle, “Russian Activities in Central Asia,” in Russian Strategic Intentions: A Strategic Multilayer Assessment White Paper, ed. Nicole Peterson (Boston: NSI, Inc., 2019), 53-56, https://nsiteam.com/social/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/SMARussian-Strategic-Intentions-White-Paper-PDF-compressed.pdf.

3 Ibid.

4 Lamoreaux, “The Three Motivations.”

5 Chris Cheang, “Putin’s 2020 State-of-the-Nation Address: More Power?” RSIS 

Commentaries No. 13/2020, January 21, 2020, 1-3, https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsispublication/rsis/putins-2020-state-of-the-nation-address-more-power/#.XtbP3E- F7lf8.

6 Lamoreaux, “The Three Motivations.”

7 Dianne E. Rennack and Cory Welt, U.S. Sanctions on Russia: An Overview, CRS 

Report No. IF10779 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2020), 1-2, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/IF10779.pdf.

8 Daniel Flynn, “Russia’s Evolving Approach to Deterrence,” in Russian Strategic Intentions: A Strategic Multilayer Assessment White Paper, ed. Nicole Peterson (Boston: NSI Inc., 2019), 37-42, https://nsiteam.com/social/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/

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SMA-Russian-Strategic-Intentions-White-Paper-PDF-compressed.pdf.

9 Robert D. Person, “Russian Grand Strategy in the 21st Century,” in Russian Strate- gic Intentions: A Strategic Multilayer Assessment White Paper, ed. Nicole Peterson (Boston: NSI, Inc., 2019), 7-13, https://nsiteam.com/social/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/

SMA-Russian-Strategic-Intentions-White-Paper-PDF-compressed.pdf.

10 Thomas Sherlock, “Russian Public Opinion as a Potential Obstacle to Aggressive External Behavior by the Kremlin,” in Russian Strategic Intentions: A Strategic Multilayer Assessment White Paper, ed. Nicole Peterson (Boston: NSI, Inc., 2019), 14-20, https:// nsiteam.com/social/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/SMA-Russian-Strategic-Inten- tions-White-Paper-PDF-compressed.pdf.

11 Chris Cheang, “Russian Foreign Policy: Balance Sheet 2019,” RSIS Commentaries No. 255/2019, December 30, 2019, https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/rsis/

russian-foreign-policy-balance-sheet-2019/#.XtbTrUF7lf8.

12 Samuel Bendett and Elsa Kania, “A New Sino-Russian High-Tech Partnership,” Australian Strategic Policy Institute, October 29, 2019, 2-9, https://www.aspi.org.au/

report/new-sino-russian-high-tech-partnership.

13 Thomas Sherlock and John Gregory, “A Sino-Russian Alliance? Don’t Bet on It,” Wall Street Journal, September 15, 2019, https://www.wsj.com/articles/a-sino-russian- alliance-dont-bet-on-it-11568577151.

14 Cheang, “Russian Foreign Policy.”

15 Laruelle, “Russian Activities in Central Asia.”

16 Malte Humpert, “IMO Approves New Shipping Corridors in Bering Sea to Im- prove Safety,” High North News, May 28, 2018, https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/ imo-approves-new-shipping-corridors-bering-sea-improve-safety.

17 Joanna Hosa, “Has Russia Already Won the Scramble for the Arctic?” Maritime 

Executive, October 28, 2018, https://www.maritime-executive.com/editorials/has- russia-already-won-the-scramble-for-the-arctic.

18 John F. Sargent, Jr., U.S. Research and Development Funding and Performance: Fact Sheet, CRS Report No. R44307 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research 

Service, 2020), 1-5, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44307.pdf.

19 Ibid.

20 Cheang, “Russian Foreign Policy.”

21 Artyom Lukin and Tamara Troyakova, “The Russian Far East and the Asia- Pacific: State-Managed Integration,” in From APEC 2011 to APEC 2012: American 

and Russian Perspectives on Security and Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific, ed. Rouben Azizian 

and Artyom Lukin (Honolulu, Hawaii; Vladivostok, Russia: Asia-Pacific Center for 

Security Studies; Far Eastern Federal University, 2012), 189-203, https://apcss.org/

wp-content/uploads/2012/09/APCSS-FEFU-10Aug12.pdf.

22 Daria Litvinova, “Russian Lawmakers Move to Keep Putin in Power Past 2024,” AP News, March 11, 2020, https://apnews.com/1bc1532d515550bb40df29ff965 2e264.

23 Stephen Blank, “China and Russia: A Burgeoning Alliance,” U.S. Naval Institute 

Proceedings 146, no. 3, March 2020, 62-66, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceed- ings/2020/march/china-and-russia-burgeoning-alliance.

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17

THE FUTURE OF THE REPUBLIC OF 

KOREA AND UNITED STATES 

ALLIANCE: FIX IT OR LOSE IT

James M. Minnich

“If you want to go fast, go alone; but if you want to go far, go together”1

is a proverb that well evinces the Republic of Korea and United States 

(ROK-U.S.) alliance whose origins trace back 75 years when U.S. forces 

landed in Incheon to end Japan’s 35-year annexation of the Korean Peninsula. Washington, however, remained circumspect of developing a strategic relationship with Seoul until the U.S. commitment to lead the international defense of South Korea against the North Korean attack of June 

1950. It was, moreover, the shared experiences of the three year Korean 

War that cemented Washington’s relationship with Seoul and led to the 

October 1953 ROK-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty.

Reciprocal strategic worth and interests have since preserved the 

ROK-U.S. alliance as the linchpin of Washington’s San Francisco System, 

which John Foster Dulles colloquially termed a “hub and spoke” bilateral military architecture.2

 Absent a Fulda Gap-like attack route whereby 

the Soviet Army might have collectively threatened Washington’s array of 

Asian partners and interests, coupled with Washington’s vastly disproportionate power imbalance among its allies, Washington chose in the early 

1950s to negotiate a series of bilateral alliances that retained positional 

advantage over its allies,3 including Seoul. In the intervening years, South 

Korea spectacularly rose from a war-ravaged, pauper state to the world’s 

12th largest economy. This chapter considers the future of the ROK-U.S. 

alliance by assessing its present challenges and current worth as a linchpin 

ally.
Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific

Alliance Challenges

The ROK-U.S. alliance is a strategic relationship that, while actively managed, has often strained heavily under the weight of its own challenges. 

Yesteryears’ challenges included South Korea’s threats to attack North 

Korea in the 1950s and late-1960s, coups d’état in 1961 and 1979, an illicit nuclear weapons program in the 1970s, and human rights abuses up 

through the 1990s. Other alliance challenges included the United States’ 

troop reductions in the 1970s, 1990s, and most recently in 2004,4 unilateral 

threats to militarily strike North Korea in 1994,5 and the Yangju Training Accident (also termed the Highway 56 Accident) in 2002. These and 

other challenges have deeply divided the two allies. When challenges are 

ham-handedly tended, the alliance is senselessly stressed. It is therefore 

prudent to actively identify and deftly manage or resolve emerging alliance 

challenges. To that end, three pressing alliance challenges are presented 

here: (1) negotiating special measures agreement to share stationing costs 

of U.S. forces in Korea, (2) stationing U.S. single threat forces in Korea, 

and (3) transferring wartime operational control of ROK forces back to 

Korea.

Special Measures Agreement

Seoul has directly supported the stationing of U.S. forces in Korea since 

the introduction of those forces in 1945 with no-cost land and facilities 

use. Since 1950, Seoul further contributed to defense cost-sharing of U.S. 

forces in Korea through manpower support of Korean soldiers or Korean 

Augmentations to the U.S. Army (KATUSA) as they are formally known. 

In 1966, Seoul and Washington amended Article IV of the 1953 Mutual 

Defense Treaty with a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) that codified 

in Article V for the U.S. to bear, without cost to the ROK, all expenditures 

incident to the maintenance of the U.S. armed forces in Korea, and for the 

ROK to furnish, without cost to the United States, all facilities and area.6

Significant U.S. defense cuts at the end of the Cold War led Washington 

in 1991 to negotiate with Seoul an exception to Article V of the SOFA, 

necessitating a Special Measures Agreement (SMA) wherein Seoul would 

begin offsetting the non-personnel stationing costs of U.S. forces in Korea through a combination of cash remunerations and payments in-kind 

toward three categories: Korean labor, military facilities, and military support.7

 At the writing of this chapter, the 11th SMA was in contentious negotiation as the 10th SMA expired on December 31, 2019. With defense 

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cost-sharing agreements lasting 29 months on average and taking many 

months to negotiate, cost-sharing disagreements have been a perennial 

source of strain on the alliance. Cost-sharing disputes broadly converge 

on divergences of what constitutes fair-share contributions, how to measure direct and indirect support contributions, and perceptions of coercive 

concession-taking. 

Fair-share contribution disputes emote from divergent viewpoints 

of how to parse the costs of defending against a North Korean threat. 

Toward that view, Washington circumscribes cost expenditures to those 

used in defending South Korea.8 To that point, Washington’s lead SMA 

negotiator asserted that “the most important factor to consider in these 

[SMA] talks is ... [that] the American taxpayer bears a very significant 

burden ... to defend the Republic of Korea [emphasis added].”9 Seoul asserts 

that North Korean threats hazard beyond South Korea’s borders, and that 

it is Washington’s national interests vice its benevolence that underlies the 

stationing of U.S. forces in Korea, Japan and elsewhere, and therefore the 

U.S. defense of Seoul cannot be a singular determinant in parsing costsharing contributions.10

Beyond SMA contributions, Seoul more liberally weighs its alliance 

contributions to be inclusive of its several international security engagements, robust procurements of U.S. defense articles, and its top-tier defense spending of which it ranks ninth globally.11 The alliance, however, 

is cast as a transactional arrangement when a ledger is used to measure its 

worth, which inevitably contributes to Washington’s interrogative doubts 

to continue stationing its single threat forces in Korea to defend Seoul, as 

Seoul publicly muses the future worth of the ROK-U.S. alliance.12

Single Threat Forces

Reminiscent of the Cold War when the United States forward deployed 

single threat forces in Germany against the Soviet Union and in South 

Korea against North Korea, U.S. forces in Korea have stood a 70-year 

vigil against the North Korean People’s Army. The decreasing viability of 

U.S. forces forward-deployed against singularly postured threats seems to 

be running its course. On June 30, 2020, the Pentagon announced that 

the U.S. president had finalized his decision to reduce 9,500 troops from 

Germany.13 In the week preceding this announcement, the U.S. national 

security advisor explained that “[t]he Cold War practice of garrisoning 

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Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific

large numbers of troops with their families on massive bases in places like 

Germany is now, in part, obsolete.”14 Similarly, the president had earlier 

ordered the Pentagon to develop troop reduction plans for Korea,15 and 

then in late 2019, it was reported that he was specifically considering the 

reduction of 4,000 troop from the Korean Peninsula.16

This alliance challenge leaves particular publics and politicians in both 

countries questioning the rationale to continue stationing U.S. forces in 

Korea.17 Attesting to the prospect of contemplated U.S. troop reductions 

from Korea, the U.S. Congress legislated against using 2020 appropriated 

funds to reduce U.S. forces in Korea below the currently stationed strength 

of 28,500, unless the defense secretary certified to Congress that doing 

so would not significantly undermine U.S. allies in the region.18 Considered reduction of U.S. forces from Korea has been a nonpartisan issue 

for the United States as both parties have at times advocated complete 

troop withdrawal, while implementing partial troop reductions. Washington’s perceptions of its flagging national interest to expend treasure and 

troop strength to defend South Korea has been and will continue to be 

its primary argument for directing U.S. troop reductions from the peninsula.19 Consequently, unless Washington adopts core strategic interests 

for forward-stationing troops on the Korean peninsula that are more vital 

than the need for single threat forces to defend against a potential North 

Korean attack, then the ROK-U.S. alliance risks future relevancy.

Respectively incongruent toward the perpetual defense posturing of 

U.S. forces in Korea against a single threat has been successive ROK administrations that have rejected the characterization of North Korea as 

its enemy as was done in three biennial publications of the government’s 

Defense White Papers in 2006, 2008, and 2018.20 Delisting Pyongyang as 

its enemy was taken concurrently with multiple inter-Korean joint statements to establish a permanent peace regime. The dichotomy of establishing a peace regime while jointly posturing “fight tonight” combatants 

is stark and has but two outcomes: perpetuation of mutual hostilities as 

the threat of force overshadows efforts toward peace, or the emergence 

of peace and the irrelevance of combat postured forces. In either scenario, 

the United States’ forward-deployed single threat forces in Korea face a 

future risk of relevance. In the former scenario, Seoul’s public and politicians may perceive U.S. forces in Korea as an obstacle to establishing peace 

with Pyongyang, and in the later scenario, U.S. forces in Korea may be left 

scrambling to justify its continued presence on the peninsula in the face of 

future irrelevance absent an actual North Korean threat.

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The Future of the Republic of Korea & US Alliance

Wartime OPCON Transfer

Since the opening days of the Korean War, the United States has maintained uninterrupted wartime operational control (OPCON) of delegated 

ROK military forces. This military construct, which facilitated unity of 

combined command for seven decades, was contentiously viewed as infringement on Korea’s autonomous defense and sovereignty by the South 

Korean administrations of Presidents Park Chung-hee in the early 1970s, 

Roh Tae-woo in the early 1990s, Roh Moo-hyun in the early 2000s, and 

Moon Jae-in since his 2017 inauguration. Seoul and Washington have 

negotiated, in stages, the transfer of operational control of ROK forces 

from the United States back to South Korea. Peacetime OPCON – train, 

maintain, and equip authority– of ROK forces by the U.S. commander 

was relinquished in 1994;21 and in 2006, it was originally “agreed to expeditiously complete the transition of [wartime] OPCON to the ROK 

... not later than March 15, 2012.”22 However, North Korean security 

threats in the intervening years led to shared decisions to delay OPCON 

transfer. The first decision came in 2010 to delay OPCON transfer until 

December 2015;23 this was followed by a second delay decision in 2014 to 

forego a specified transfer date in favor of a conditions-based approach to 

the transition of wartime OPCON.24 With South Korean President Moon 

Jae-in’s 2017 election, Seoul progressives once again asserted national urgency to regain wartime OPCON of their military forces; an objective 

that Moon wants fulfilled before ending his five year-termed presidency 

in May 2022.25

Complicating the wartime OPCON transfer agreement, is the 2014 

decision by the ROK defense minister and U.S. defense secretary to “transition wartime operational control (OPCON) from the U.S. forces-led 

Combined Forces Command (CFC) to a new ROK forces-led combined 

defense command.”26 The implication of that commitment is that operational control of U.S. forces and capabilities in the Korean theater of 

operation will no longer be exercised by a U.S. commander, but by a ROK 

commander; a decision that Washington seems to have never fully embraced and increasingly appears to be shying from. Favorable OPCON 

transfer conditions will be measured by two factors: South Korea’s capability to lead the ROK-U.S. CFC, and the North Korean threat against the 

ROK-U.S. alliance. The Moon administration sought to actively affect both 

these conditions with enactment of the Defense Reform Plan 2.0 in July 

2018,27 and an inter-Korean cooperative threat reduction plan, colloquially 

termed the Comprehensive Military Agreement of September 2018.28 Fol257
Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific

lowing an agreed three-tiered OPCON transfer certification process, the 

United States certified South Korea’s initial operational capability (IOC) 

in August 2019, agreed to evaluate its full operational capability (FOC) in 

August 2020, and then full mission capability (FMC) in 2021.29 Adherence 

to this timeline would conceivably result in wartime OPCON transfer before the end of Moon’s presidency in May 2022. The timeline, however, 

now seems to be in question as COVID-19 mitigation measures prevented 

ROK-U.S. CFC from conducting their combined springtime exercise in 

March and may alter their August 2020 exercise as well.30

Wartime OPCON transfer is a polarizing issue in South Korea with 

a 50-50 split, according to a January 2019 survey that identified 39.6% 

support for the transfer as planned, 31.5% support to delay the transfer 

period, 10.5% support to eliminate the transfer plan, and 18.3% who were 

uncertain.31 Seoul and Washington both know that if wartime OPCON 

transfer is not implemented in Moon’s administration that absent a consecutive progressive incumbent in 2022, OPCON transfer will be delayed 

by a conservative Seoul administration. President Moon’s left-leaning party, 

however, won a historic landslide victory in April’s midterm parliamentary 

elections,32 which emboldened Moon’s progressive mandate and improved 

the probability of his party retaining power in the 2022 elections. The U.S. 

relinquishment of wartime operational control of ROK military forces 

is inevitable and imminent if a progressive president succeeds President 

Moon Jae-in. Washington needs to either be reconciled that a ROK commander will exercise operational control of U.S. forces allocated to the 

ROK-U.S. CFC, or decide on alternative actions.

Alliance Worth

The ROK-U.S. alliance, valued as a Cold War bulwark against the spread 

of communism in Asia for 40 years and thereafter as a shield against 

Pyongyang’s threat of nuclear weapons and missiles, has been progressively questioned as to its future purposes. As Washington felt increasingly pressured to rationalize the worth of the ROK-U.S. alliance in terms 

of yearly fiscal budgets and calculated casualty rates in the defense of its 

economically vibrant ally in Seoul, the U.S. defense secretary and ROK 

defense minister established in 2002 the Future of the ROK-U.S. Alliance 

(FOTA), a senior defense-level working group, to address near-term alliance adjustments and a longer-term alliance vision.33 Four years later, the 

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The Future of the Republic of Korea & US Alliance

group issued a report that suggested a future in which the alliance would 

contribute to peace and security near and far.34

In 2009, Presidents Barack Obama and Lee Myung-bak issued a Joint 

Vision for the Alliance of the United States of America and the Republic of Korea affirming that the two countries were “building an Alliance to ensure 

a peaceful, secure and prosperous future for the Korean Peninsula, the 

Asia-Pacific region, and the world.”35 Perhaps with renewed uncertainty 

of the defining worth of the ROK-U.S. alliance, the U.S. defense secretary 

and ROK defense minister directed in 2018 yet another joint study; that 

one was titled The Future Defense Vision of the ROK-U.S. Alliance. The study 

results were presented a year later and highlighted “that future alliance 

cooperation should continuously expand and deepen.”36

In a rare exhibit of public candor, Dr. Paik Hak-soon, policy advisor 

to the ROK Ministry of Unification, profoundly questioned the present 

value of the ROK-U.S. alliance while speaking at a CSIS-hosted online 

event in June 2020 with other past and present executive government officials from Washington and Seoul.37 With equal forthrightness, former 

U.S. Ambassador to Seoul Kathleen Stephens then cautioned against rosy 

assumptions that the ROK-U.S. alliance’s future could weather its current 

challenges or the evolution of great power relations.38 In view of two decades’ joint search for the rationale of a future ROK-U.S. alliance, paired 

with mounting cautionary signals from senior alliance experts, it seems 

incumbent on alliance managers and leaders to urgently articulate the alliance’s distinct worth now and into the future. To that end, three elements 

of the alliance’s worth are presented here: (1) evolving the security partnership into a comprehensive strategic alliance, (2) establishing strategic 

flexibility of forward-stationed U.S. forces in Korea, and (3) forming a 

networked security architecture.

Comprehensive Strategic Alliance

Forged in battle and resolute for seven decades, the ROK-U.S. alliance 

firmly stands against the North Korean threat, but what will the alliance 

stand for as the North Korean threat wanes or is abated? Alliances fear entanglement in conflicts not of their choosing, and abandonment in times 

of need. Prospect of alliance irrelevance, therefore, could dissuade an ally 

from advancing threat reduction measures to forestall abandonment. As 

long as the ROK-U.S. alliance is singularly focused on “fight tonight” security readiness, there is lessened impetus for alliance partners to advance 

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Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific

threat reduction measures with North Korea, which in turn could strain 

the rationale for the continued existence of the alliance. Such was the case 

for NATO when the Soviet Union collapsed. Similarly deleterious to an alliance is the notion that it is a burden, which is conveyed often in language 

such as burden-sharing, free-riding, and one-way commitment.39

Seoul and Washington have consistently voiced need to expand the 

ROK-U.S. alliance. As stated earlier in this chapter, Presidents Barak 

Obama and Lee Myung-bak committed in 2009 to build “a comprehensive strategic alliance of bilateral, regional and global scope”;40 and more 

recently, Presidents Donald Trump and Moon Jae-in met in 2017 near the 

inauguration of both of their administrations “to advance the comprehensive strategic Alliance between the United States and the ROK.”41 Reimagining the ROK-U.S. alliance as comprehensive and strategic is to envision its purpose as more far-reaching than just the defense of South 

Korea and its worth to be inherently more than defense alone. Certainly 

more than defense against traditional geographic threats, which are less 

likely from Pyongyang, Beijing or Moscow than their nonmilitary threats 

through diplomatic coercion, economic sanction, disinformation, and cyberattack.42 Moreover, in an era when Washington views China as a revisionist power laboring to displace the United States from the Indo-Pacific 

through coercion of other nations,43 the need to reform the alliance seems 

doubly pressing. Comprehensive strategic alliance reform should consider 

internal reflection and joint inquiry into interests and values that are singular and shared to warrant expenditures that produce aggregate benefits to 

each ally.44 A ROK-U.S. comprehensive security alliance might collectively 

advance health security, gendered security, cyber security, space security, 

maritime security, and networked security with other powers to sustain the 

rules-based regional order.45

Strategic Flexibility 

Respecting the U.S. need for strategic flexibility, Seoul assented in 2006 

for the United States to globally employ its forces from Korea with the 

caveat that Washington respect Seoul’s position to not be involved in a 

regional conflict against its will.46 The United States has yet to meaningfully exercise strategic flexibility of its forces from Korea. Notwithstanding, this dormant foreign minister-level agreement could form the basis to 

transform U.S. forces in Korea from a single threat operational force to a 

forward stationed strategic force. A concurrent decoupling of U.S. war260
The Future of the Republic of Korea & US Alliance

time operational control over ROK forces with the available employment 

of U.S. forces from Korea could significantly increase U.S. strategic reach 

throughout the Indo-Pacific, and beyond. To that end, the present composition of U.S. forces in Korea should be reexamined to better account for 

desirable capability and deployability. An increased use of agile rotational 

forces in Korea was highlighted by the U.S. defense secretary in late June 

2020 as a particular approach toward fostering U.S. “greater strategic flexibility in terms of responding to challenges around the globe.”47

Networked Security Architecture

Washington’s networked security objectives lie in encouraging, and as necessary, supporting allies like Seoul to advance within the region comprehensive efforts that promote the gamut of security dimensions in political 

stability, governance, economics, health, social progress, gendered security, 

environmental protection, peacekeeping, and defense. A networked security architecture should seek to cooperatively cross-level regional security 

accountability among allies and partners. Its effectiveness will be found in 

purposeful cooperation.

Ambassadors and senior representatives of the 21 member states of 

the United Nations Command and Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission gather together often where they are posted in South Korea to discuss 

security matters. Each of these 21 countries is linked by its participation in 

the Korean War, support to the Korean Armistice Agreement, and its security interests in Asia. This networked security architecture is unique as it 

convenes security leaders from all six continents and beyond and includes 

countries from the Americas (Canada, Colombia, United States), Africa 

(South Africa), Asia (Philippines, South Korea, Thailand, Turkey), Europe 

(Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, 

Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom), and the Pacific (Australia, New 

Zealand). This networked security architecture is very active in administering armistice supervision on the Korean Peninsula and to a lesser degree 

military operations. However, this body’s broader potential to collectively 

advance a more comprehensive security in the Indo-Pacific is unrealized. 

Amplifying this collective’s security focus on the Korean Peninsula and 

beyond might necessitate soliciting an enlarged sense of purpose for this 

special group of 21 countries. 

Illustrative of regionally networked security is the Japanese-hosted 

Enforcement Coordination Cell in Yokosuka where eight states partner 

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Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific

to enforce United Nations Security Council resolutions against North Korea’s illegal ship-to-ship transfers of sanctioned cargo.48 Similarly illustrative is the Proliferation Security Initiative, a political commitment of 21 

states who form an Operational Experts Group that loosely lead a large 

body of endorsing states who have pledged to interdict the trafficking of 

weapons of mass destruction.49

Conclusion

Katchi kapshida – “we go together” is the motto of the ROK-U.S. 

Combined Forces Command specifically and the ROK-U.S. Alliance generally. As the guiding dictum over a 70-year relationship, observers might 

be comfortably lulled into thinking that the ROK-U.S. alliance will last 

forever. The alliance’s future, however, is increasingly uncertain, which 

requires alliance leaders and managers to actively tend to its present challenges and pursue its intrinsic worth. There are manifold problems along 

a continuum of the alliance’s strategic and tactical challenges. This chapter examined three perennial matters – special measures agreement, single 

threat forces, and wartime OPCON transfer – that have again risen to 

occupy attention at the highest levels in both capitals. Negotiating a special measures agreement to share stationing costs of U.S. forces in Korea 

needs an immediate resolution to depressurize bilateral grievances over 

the sensitivities of this issue. While present cost-sharing concessions will 

likely be forthcoming, the challenges of this issue will yet linger and likely 

re-fester to the degree that the alliance’s worth is measured on an accounting ledger.

The continuous stationing of U.S. single threat forces in Korea proved 

itself as a problematic policy time and again when confronted by competing U.S. interests and diminishing defense budgets. As a result, four U.S. 

administrations withdrew 34,500 U.S. troops from the Korean Peninsula 

between 1971 and 2008. At the writing of this chapter, Washington again 

debates its rationale for permanently stationing single threat forces on 

the Korean Peninsula. A clear line of examination is drawn between the 

cost to station single threat forces in Korea, and the level of Seoul’s costsharing contributions to offset Washington’s defense burden.50 Resolution 

of this current challenge will likely manifest in two ways; either Seoul will 

increase its cost-sharing contributions, or Washington will reduce its troop 

strength. Both of those resolution methods were employed in yesteryears’ 

crises of defense interests. However, absent an alliance rationale to station 

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The Future of the Republic of Korea & US Alliance

U.S. forces in Korea for reasons other than to “defend” Seoul, this alliance challenge will perennially persist until the last U.S. soldier departs the 

Korean Peninsula. 

The ROK-U.S. CFC has long been heralded as the world’s most combat capable combined force. The cost of this distinction, however, has 

been Seoul’s willing relinquishment of wartime OPCON to an uninterrupted line of U.S. four-star commanders since 1950. No other sovereign 

state with a standing military has tendered it autonomous defense to another country, and Seoul now wrestles to reclaim autonomous defense 

while preserving the ROK-U.S. defense alliance. For 18 years, the challenge of wartime OPCON transfer rose to presidential levels as an alliance 

challenge for each former ROK and U.S. administration. The ROK military is a highly capable force with extremely competent commanders and 

institutional experience from the last four major wars in Korea, Vietnam, 

Afghanistan, and Iraq. The competency of ROK commanders to resume 

wartime operational control of its forces is not the issue at hand. Rather, 

the problem is that Washington is not committed to the prospect of ROK 

commanders assuming operational control over U.S. forces in wartime. A 

standing wartime OPCON relationship over an ally’s military force is not 

essential to the deployment of U.S. forces on the Korean Peninsula, but 

it is the essence of maintaining a future ROK-U.S. CFC. Consequently, 

Washington and Seoul should reconcile to that reality and collectively create a new future that each can support. 

The value of the ROK-U.S. alliance is measurable by seven decades 

of peace and prosperity in South Korea and throughout the region. Alliance challenges are a harbinger that the future of the ROK-U.S. alliance is 

not in preserving its past but in promoting its potential. Unequivocally, this 

author believes that the ROK-U.S. relationship is singular and its future 

boundless if tethered to explicit worth that is collectively heralded in Seoul 

and Washington. This chapter identified three alliance diversifications—

comprehensive strategic alliance, strategic flexibility, and networked security—that could revitalize the ROK-U.S. alliance to be adaptive to its transforming region. As Seoul increasingly labors to normalize relations with 

Pyongyang, a North Korean threat-based alliance will eventually meet a 

test of relevancy. It is in this context worth remembering the colloquial 

tones of Marshall Goldsmith, “what got you here won’t get you there.”51

A ROK-U.S. comprehensive security alliance envisions broad alliance collaboration in manifold areas of health security, gendered security, cyber 

security, space security, maritime security, and networked security.

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Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific

Notes

1 Joel Goldberg, “It Takes a Village to Determine the Origins of an African Proverb,” NPR, July 30, 2016, , https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandso- da/2016/07/30/487925796/it-takes-a-village-to-determine-the-origins-of-an-afri- can-proverb.

2 Victor D. Cha, “Powerplay: Origins of the U.S. Alliance System in Asia,” International Security 34, no. 3 (Winter 2009/2010):158-196, https://www.jstor.org/ stable/40389236. 

3 Victor D. Cha, Powerplay: Origins of the American Alliance System in Asia (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2016), 9-10.

4 Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History, (Massachusetts: Allison- Wesley, 1997): 13, 86. 

5 James M. Minnich, “North Korea Policy: Changed Regime,” Military Review 9, 

no.6 (August 30, 2017): 7, https://www.armyupress.army.mil/journals/militaryreview/online-exclusive/2017-online-exclusive-articles/north-korea-policy/.

6 Department of State, Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States Armed Forces in Korea (Washinton, DC: Department of State, July 9, 1966), https://www.usfk.mil/ Portals/105/Documents/SOFA/A01_SOFA.Art.I-XXXI.pdf.

The exercise of strategic flexibility will diversify the aim and configuration of single threat-based U.S. forces deployed to the Korea Peninsula. As this strategy unencumbers U.S. forces in Korea to respond to 

expanded security roles, the alliance should create opportunities to partner 

in off-peninsula activities that underscore alliance extra-peninsular security 

obligations toward upholding a free and open Indo-Pacific. The dyadic 

nature of the ROK-U.S. alliance should discard any remaining patron-client vestiges and promote a dynamism that produces organic momentum 

toward independently led efforts of greater regional security. The synergy 

produced from such a bilateral alliance will expand its charter from doing 

together to doing with others. This is the essence of a networked security 

architecture where Seoul and Washington labor independently with others 

to uphold a rules based regional order. The ROK-U.S. relationship runs 

deep and long; and while challenges to the alliance future are significant, 

the collective liability is diminutive to a shared worth that needs garnered 

now. A study of the Korean language invariably leads one to learn its proverbs (sokdam). So ilko oeyanggan gochinda translates to “lose the cow then fix 

the barn.” In context, this Korean proverb is an admonition to fix these 

alliance challenges and set its future worth before the alliance is lost.

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The Future of the Republic of Korea & US Alliance

7 Won Gon Park, “A Challenge for the ROK-U.S. Alliance: Defense Cost-Sharing,” EAI Asia Security Initiative Working Paper 30 (July, 2013): 3-5, http://eai.or.kr/data/

bbs/eng_report/2013091110583697.pdf.

8 Michael R. Pompeo and Mark T. Esper, “South Korea is an Ally, Not a Depen- dent,” Wall Street Journal, January 16, 2020, https://www.wsj.com/articles/south- korea-is-an-ally-not-a-dependent-11579219989.

9 James P. DeHart, “U.S.-Republic of Korea Special Measures Agreement Negotia- tions” interview by Mofa Pool Reporters, Department of State, December 18, 2019, 

https://www.state.gov/interview-with-mofa-pool-reporters/. 

10 Sukjoon Yoon, “US Interests Are Not Served by Making a Scapegoat of South Korea,” The Diplomat, January 29, 2020, https://thediplomat.com/2020/01/us-inter- ests-are-not-served-by-making-a-scapegoat-of-south-korea/.

11 “South Korea’s Defense Budget Ranks the World’s Ninth: Report,” The Korea Times, January 31, 2020, http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/na- tion/2020/02/205_282704.html.

12 Paik Hak-soon, “Online Event: ROK-U.S. Strategic Forum 2020, 70 Years Later: Bringing Peace to the Korean Peninsula and Beyond,” Center for Strategic and Interna- tional Studies, June 24, 2020, https://www.csis.org/events/online-event-rok-us-strate- gic-forum-2020. 

13 Department of Defense, Statement by Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs on U.S. Troop Levels in Germany (Washington DC: Department of Defense, June 30, 2020), https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Releases/Release/Ar- ticle/2243194/statement-by-assistant-to-the-secretary-of-defense-for-public-affairson-us-tro/.

14 Robert C. O’Brien, “Why the U.S. is Moving Troops out of Germany,” Wall Street 

Journal, June 21, 2020, https://www.wsj.com/articles/why-the-u-s-is-moving-troops- out-of-germany-11592757552.

15 Mark Landler, “Trump Orders Pentagon to Consider Reducing U.S. Forces in South Korea,” The New York Times, May 3, 2018, https://www.nytimes. com/2018/05/03/world/asia/trump-troops-south-korea.html.

16 “Trump Considering Withdrawing up to 4,000 U.S. Troops from South Korea- Report,” Reuters, November 20, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/southkorea- usa-military/trump-considering-withdrawing-up-to-4000-us-troops-from-southkorea-report-idUSL3N2804OK. 

17 Doug Bandow, “Why are U.S. Troops Still in Korea?” Forbes, May 3, 2011, https://www.forbes.com/sites/dougbandow/2011/05/03/why-u-s-troops-still-inkorea/#4391baf35c92. Jeff Faux, “Why Are US Troops Still in South Korea, Any- way?” The Nation, March 6, 2016, https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/why- are-us-troops-still-in-south-korea-anyway/. Andrew Salmon, “Is Anti-Americanism 

Rising Again in South Korea?” Asia Times, December 20, 2019, https://asiatimes. com/2019/12/is-anti-americanism-rising-again-in-south-korea/. Clint Work, “Be- yond North Korea: Fractures in the US-South Korea Alliance: Tracing Near-Term 

Structural, and Strategic Divergences in the Alliance,” The Diplomat, February 11, 2020, https://thediplomat.com/2020/02/beyond-north-korea-fractures-in-the-ussouth-korea-alliance/.

18 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020, Pub. L. No. 116-92 

(2020),, https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/senate-bill/1790.

19 “Pentagon has Offered White House Options to Reduce Troops in S. Ko- rea: Report,” Yonhap News Agency, July 18, 2020, https://en.yna.co.kr/view/

AEN20200718000351325.

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Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific

20 “S. Korea Removes ‘Enemy’ Reference to N. Korea in New Defense Report,” Voice of America, January 15, 2019, https://www.voanews.com/east-asia/s-korea- removes-enemy-reference-n-korea-new-defense-report.

21 Department of Defense, U.S.-ROK Terms of Reference for the Military Committee and ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command/Strategic Directive 2 (Washington DC: Department of Defense, October 7, 1994). James M. Minnich, “The Year 2012: South Korea’s 

Resumption of Wartime Operational Control,” Military Review 91, no. 3 (May-June 2011): 2-7, https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/military-review/Archives/

English/MilitaryReview_20110630_art004.pdf.

22 Department of Defense, 38th U.S.-ROK SCM Joint Communiqué (Washington DC: Department of Defense, October 20, 2006), https://cryptome.org/us-rok-38scm.

htm.

23 “S. Korea, U.S. to Delay Wartime Command Transfer, Speed Up FTA,” Yonhap News Agency, June 27, 2010, https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20100627002400315.

24 Department of Defense, 46th U.S.-ROK SCM Joint Communiqué (Washington DC: Department of Defense, October 23, 2014), https://archive.defense.gov/

pubs/46th_SCM_Joint_Communique.pdf.

25 “Moon Vows to Push for Early Takeover of Wartime Troop Control, Enhance Deterrence against North,” Yonhap News Agency, April 23, 2017, https://en.yna.

co.kr/view/AEN20170423002200315?section=search. 

26 Department of Defense, 46th U.S.-ROK SCM Joint Communiqué (Washington DC: Department of Defense, October 23, 2014), https://archive.defense.gov/

pubs/46th_SCM_Joint_Communique.pdf.

27 Song Sang-ho, “Defense Reform Plan to Cut Generals, Create Ground Com- mand, Retain 3-Axis System,” Yonhap News Agency, July 27, 2018, https://en.yna.

co.kr/view/AEN20180727003900315.

28 “Agreement on the Implementation of the Historic Panmunjom Declaration in the Military Domain,” NCNK, September 19, 2018, https://www.ncnk.org/sites/ default/files/Agreement%20on%20the%20Implementation%20of%20the%20His- toric%20Panmunjom%20Declaration%20in%20the%20Military%20Domain.pdf.

29 Department of Defense, 51st U.S.-ROK SCM Joint Communiqué (Washington DC: Department of Defense, November 16, 2019), https://www.defense.gov/News- room/Releases/Release/Article/2018651/joint-communiqu-of-the-51st-rok-ussecurity-consultative-meeting/.

30 “S. Korea, US Clash over How to Proceed with Joint Military Exercises,” Hankyo- reh, June 1, 2020, http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_national/947379. html.

31 “South Korean Attitudes toward the U.S.-ROK Alliance and USFK,” The Asian 

Institute for Policy Studies, February 22, 2019, http://en.asaninst.org/contents/south- korean-attitudes-toward-the-u-s-rok-alliance-and-usfk/.

32 Choe Sang-Hun, “In South Korea Vote, Virus Delivers Landslide Win to 

Governing Party,” The New York Times, April 15, 2020, https://www.nytimes. com/2020/04/15/world/asia/south-korea-election.html.

33 Charles M. Perry, Jacquelyn K. Davis, James L. Schoff, and Toshi Yoshihara, Alliance Diversification and the Future of the U.S.-Korean Security Relationship (Virginia: Brassey’s Inc., 2004): 158-164. James M. Minnich, “The Year 2012: South Korea’s 

Resumption of Wartime Operational Control,” Military Review 91, no. 3 (May-June 2011): 2-7, https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/military-review/Archives/

English/MilitaryReview_20110630_art004.pdf.

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The Future of the Republic of Korea & US Alliance

34 James M. Minnich, “The Year 2012: South Korea’s Resumption of Wartime Operational Control,” Military Review 91, no. 3 (May-June 2011): 2-7, https://www. armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/military-review/Archives/English/MilitaryRe- view_20110630_art004.pdf.

35 White House, Joint Vision for the Alliance of the United States of America and the Re- public of Korea (Washington, DC: White House, June 16, 2009), https://obamawhite- house.archives.gov/the-press-office/joint-vision-alliance-united-states-america-andrepublic-korea.

36 Department of Defense, 51st U.S.-ROK SCM Joint Communiqué (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, November 15, 2019), https://www.defense.gov/News- room/Releases/Release/Article/2018651/joint-communiqu-of-the-51st-rok-ussecurity-consultative-meeting/.

37 “Online Event: ROK-U.S. Strategic Forum 2020, 70 Years Later: Bringing Peace to the Korean Peninsula and Beyond,” Center for Strategic and International 

Studies, June 24, 2020, https://www.csis.org/events/online-event-rok-us-strategic- forum-2020.

38 Ibid. 

39 Wukki Kim and Todd Sandler, “NATO at 70: Pledges, Free Riding, and Benefit- Burden Concordance,” Defense and Peace Economics 31 no. 4 (2020): 400-413, https:// doi.org/10.1080/10242694.2019.1640937

40 “Joint Vision for U.S., South Korea,” Voice of America, June 22, 2009, https://edi- torials.voa.gov/a/a-41-2009-06-23-voa2-84656462/1481392.html.

41 White House, Joint Statement between the United States and the Republic of Korea (Wash- ington DC: White House, June 30, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefingsstatements/joint-statement-united-states-republic-korea/.

42 Mira Rapp-Hooper, “Saving America’s Alliances: The United States Still Needs the System that Put it on Top,” Foreign Affairs, March/April, 2020, https://www. foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-02-10/saving-americas-alliances.

43 White House, National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington DC: White House, December 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/

uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905-2.pdf. Department of Defense, 

Indo-Pacific Strategy Report (Washington DC: Department of Defense, 2019), https:// media.defense.gov/2019/Jul/01/2002152311/-1/-1/1/DEPARTMENT-OF-DE- FENSE-INDO-PACIFIC-STRATEGY-REPORT-2019.PDF.

44 “Excerpt: The US-South Korea Alliance,” Council on Foreign Relations, 2012, 

https://www.cfr.org/excerpt-us-south-korea-alliance.

45 Department of Defense, National Defense Strategy Summary (Washington DC: Department of Defense, 2018), https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/

pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf.

46 Department of State, Joint United States-Republic of Korea Statement on the Launch of the Strategic Consultation for Allied Partnership (Washington, DC: Department of State, January 19, 2006), https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2006/59447.htm.

47 Robert Burns, “Esper Says US Considering Troop ‘Adjustments’ in South Korea,” The Washington Post, June 21, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/ world/national-security/esper-says-us-considering-troop-adjustments-in-southkorea/2020/07/21/9c016ed6-cb5b-11ea-99b0-8426e26d203b_story.html.

48 Department of Defense, Indo-Pacific Strategy Report (Washington DC: Department of Defense, 2019), https://media.defense.gov/2019/Jul/01/2002152311/-1/-1/1/

DEPARTMENT-OF-DEFENSE-INDO-PACIFIC-STRATEGY-REPORT-2019.

PDF.

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Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific

49 “Welcome to PSI,” The Proliferation Security Initiative, 2020, https://www.psi-online. info/psi-info-en.

50 James P. DeHart, “U.S.-Republic of Korea Special Measures Agreement Negotia- tions,” Interview by Mofa Pool Reporters, Department of State, December 18, 2019, 

https://www.state.gov/interview-with-mofa-pool-reporters/.

51 Marshall Goldsmith, What Got You Here Won’t Get You There: How Successful People Become Even More Successful (New York: Hyperion, 2007): 1.

268
269

18

THE FANG-SHOU CYCLE IN CHINESE 

POLITICS

Sungmin Cho

“History does not repeat itself but it often rhymes.”

- Mark Twain - 

“长江后浪推前浪 (As in the Yangtze River, the waves 

behind ride on the ones before).” 

- Chinese proverb -

Scholars of Chinese politics have long noticed an apparently oscillating 

pattern of political relaxing and tightening in China, which is also known 

as fang (放: relaxing)-shou (收: tightening) cycle.1 They could detect the 

cycle by observing the expansion or contraction of economic reform programs, ideological relaxation or control, and administrative decentralization or recentralization in Chinese politics.

The fang-shou cycle suggests that there are two contending schools of 

thought within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP): the reformers and 

the conservatives. The two groups take turns to lead the policy agenda: 

first, reformers expand the scope of economic or political reform, followed by a rapid release of pent-up social demand. But the resultant 

“social disorder” may trigger backlash from the conservatives, who then 
Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific

move to regain control. A conservative retrenchment is accompanied by 

an ideological assault on “liberal” tendencies, and the previous reform 

programs may be halted or reversed. During this period of contraction, 

reformers remain silent for fear of persecution, but conservative policies 

may exacerbate the internal contradictions and stresses, which will renew 

the pressure for relaxation and reform. This way the whole cycle repeats.

Table 18.1: China’s Political Orientation 1949-2019.

Period Political Orientation Fang-Shou Cycle

 1949-1957 Nation-building Projects Fang 放 (Relaxing)

 1958-1961 Great Leap Forward Shou 收 (Tightening)

 1962-1965 Pragmatic Adjustment Fang 放 (Relaxing)

 1966-1978 Cultural Revolution Shou 收 (Tightening)

 1979-1982 Reform and Opening Up Fang 放 (Relaxing)

 1982-1983 Anti-Spiritual Pollution 

 Campaign Shou 收 (Tightening)

 1983-1986 Reform and Opening Up Fang 放(Relaxing)

 1986-1987 Anti-Bourgeois Liberaliza

 tion Campaign Shou 收 (Tightening)

 1987-1989 Reform and Opening Up Fang 放 (Relaxing)

 1989-1992 Neo-totalitarianism Shou 收 (Tightening)

 1993-2009 Soft Authoritarianism Fang 放 (Relaxing) 2

2009-

Present Hard Authoritarianism Shou 收 (Tightening)

Source: Author’s compilation.3

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The Fang-Shou Cycle in Chinese Politics

Based upon the fang-shou cycle, the modern history of Chinese politics 

can be divided into distinct periods of political relaxing and tightening.

The fang-shou cycle indicates that Chinese politics has shifted from fang to 

shou for the last 25 years between 1995 and 2019. It also suggests that Chinese politics is likely to shift back from shou to fang at some time between 

2020 and 2045, assuming that future events, to some extent, will resemble 

the pattern of past events. That is, intensifying trends of economic slowdown and political dissatisfaction are likely to cause the demise of the Xi 

Jinping regime and the rise of a reformer faction in the next 25 years. 

For the remainder of this chapter, applying the analytic framework of 

fang-shou cycle, I will explain (1) how Chinese politics has become more authoritarian with its foreign policy becoming more assertive for the period 

from 1995 to the present time, and (2) how political control can be relaxed 

again and a cooperative relationship between China and the West can be 

restored in the next 25 years.

The Past 25 Years: From Fang (Relaxing) to Shou

(Tightening) 

The past 25 years can be further divided into a period of political relaxation between 1995 and 2009 and a period of tightening between 2009 

and the present. The two sub-periods, in combination, constitute the shifting of Chinese politics from fang to shou between 1995 and the present. 

The Fang (Relaxing) Period: 1995-2009 

The first 15 years from 1995 to 2009 in China was a period of deepening 

political reform. Since Deng Xiaoping’s famous Southern Tour in 1992, 

the Chinese leadership revitalized the economic reform and opening-up 

policies, accompanied by political reform programs. Faithfully following 

Deng Xiaoping’s advice, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao maintained the collective leadership. Although factional politics have not disappeared entirely, 

Jiang and Hu successfully implemented the generational change of the 

party leadership in a predictable manner based upon the age and term limits. The political reform within the party led to the liberalizing policies outside the party. The CCP launched legal reform in an effort to establish the 

rule of law in the Chinese society.4 The CCP also consolidated the village 

election to be held every three years in over 600,000 villages by passing the 

Organic Law of Village Committees in 1998.5 The Chinese government 

renewed its efforts to enhance the quality of public service. Last but not 

271
Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific

least, the number of non-governmental organizations (NGO) has dramatically increased, which epitomizes China’s increasingly vibrant civil society.6

Even a critical observer of the Chinese politics, Minxin Pei, concurs that 

the years from 1995 to 2009 were a golden age for China.7

The CCP also maintained, by and large, cooperative relationships with 

the West during this period. In their part, Western governments welcomed 

the CCP’s continued efforts to modernize its economic system and governance style. The aim of the West’s engagement policy was twofold: (1) to 

socialize China’s external behavior by integrating it with the international 

economy and (2) to liberalize the country’s domestic politics by supporting its governance reform programs. In this context, the United States 

supported China’s entry into the World Trade Organization in 2001. The 

United States and Western European countries funded various programs 

to assist the Chinese government’s legal reform and to empower Chinese 

civil society. The CCP positively responded to Western efforts to engage 

with China. The Chinese Ministry of Civil Affairs were encouraged to 

cooperate with Western organizations to facilitate China’s governance reform programs. At times, there were diplomatic incidents that occasionally put China at odds with the West, such as the United States’ accidental 

bombing of the Chinese embassy in Yugoslavia in 1999. But the Chinese government’s overall policy was to avoid direct confrontation with 

the West as much as possible, remaining mostly reactive to the diplomatic 

incidents rather than actively creating them.

This fang period can be explained by Deng Xiaoping’s dictum of “tao 

guang yang hui” (韬光养晦), which can be translated as “hide your capacities and bide your time.” The essence of Deng’s strategy was to focus 

on internal development while avoiding external problems with the West. 

Accordingly, the CCP was determined to concentrate its efforts on deepening economic and governance reform programs during this fang period 

from 1995 to 2009. To achieve this goal, Chinese leaders needed to attract 

foreign direct investment and acquire advanced technologies from the 

West. The need to maintain friendly relationships with the West motivated 

China to avoid problems with the West as much as it could. As a result, 

China enjoyed double-digit economic growth, and its governance capacities were significantly enhanced.8

 These achievements helped Chinese to 

regain confidence for the future of China, a self-confidence that was expressed vigorously at the time of the Beijing Olympics in 2008, which 

coincided with the start of the global financial crisis in Western countries 

including the United States. 

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The Fang-Shou Cycle in Chinese Politics

The Shou (Tightening) Period: 2009-Present 

Although it is hard to pinpoint a single event that breaks the period between fang and shou, 2009 seemed to be an important year that the previously liberal policies took a sudden shift toward a more authoritarian 

direction.9 A series of events, such as the retirement of reformists like 

Zeng Qinghong from the leadership post, which coincided with the rise 

of conservatives like Zhou Yongkang, and external events like the “Color 

Revolutions” in some post-Soviet countries and the “Arab Spring,” paved 

the way for an authoritarian leader like Xi Jinping to rise to power. Many 

analysts in the West assess that Xi Jinping’s assumption of the highest 

office in the country signals the return of strongman politics in China as 

Xi was quickly elevated to a status comparable to that of Mao Zedong.10

Xi Jinping re-emphasized the importance of ideological education against 

Western influence. The social surveillance system and censorship have 

been strengthened under Xi’s watch. The CCP began to reinforce repressive policies targeting potential dissidents like human rights lawyers and 

ethnic Uyghurs in Xinjiang province. In short, Chinese domestic politics 

has been turning more authoritarian for the past 10 years. 

China’s foreign policy also has turned assertive since 2009.11 China has 

visibly increased maritime activities in the South China Sea and East China 

Sea. It has built artificial islands and militarized them in the South China 

Sea. In 2016, the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) ruled against 

China’s maritime claims in the South China Sea, but the Xi Jinping regime 

publicly denounced the international ruling, for which the West accused 

China of ignoring the rule-based international order. In addition to these 

activities that are perceived as outright provocation by many countries in 

the Indo-Pacific region, Beijing began to adopt coercive economic statecraft: China banned the export of rare earth to Japan over the issue of 

Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in 2012 and the travel of tourists to South Korea after the U.S.-South Korea deployment of the Terminal High Altitude 

Area Defense (THAAD) system in 2017.12 Clearly Xi Jinping abandoned 

Deng Xiaoping’s dictum of “keeping a low profile” in foreign policy. 

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Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific

Figure 18.1: Economic Cycle of Factional Politics in China13

Figure 18.1 explains how Chinese politics has shifted from fang to 

shou over the last 25 years. Continuing Deng Xiaoping’s economic reform 

and opening-up policies, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao were able to maintain double-digit economic growth during their terms. However, the rapid 

development caused various problems of an overheated economy, ranging from environmental degradation to widening inequality. Increasingly 

rampant corruption cases that involved government officials and the Chinese people’s anger against it gave rise to the incidents of mass unrests 

across China. But Hu Jintao was not a strong leader who could handle 

the increasingly chaotic order in China.14 Many China experts agree that 

party leaders were dissatisfied with the dispersion of power within the 

CCP, which created inconsistent policy implementation.15 In this context, 

Xi Jinping’s rise as a strong leader has been a product of the stagnation of 

policy-making in the second term of Hu’s leadership: Xi was mandated 

to attack the “vested interests” of networks of corrupted officials and 

break the policy deadlocks.16 However, Xi Jinping turned out to be a conservative in nature as well as a hyper-nationalist leader.17 While Western 

countries were struggling to recover from the global financial crisis, a sense 

of hubris over the decline of Western civilization seemed to amplify Xi’s 

confidence in the exercise of a more assertive foreign policy.18

The Next 25 Years: From Shou (Tightening) to Fang

(Relaxing) 

The fang-shou cycle predicts that Chinese politics will shift back from shou

to fang in the next 25 years. Again, the economic cycle of factional politics depicted by Figure 20.1 can explain how the shift may occur. If the 

274
The Fang-Shou Cycle in Chinese Politics

Xi Jinping regime turns out to be politically too conservative to pursue 

reformist economic policies, especially targeting the vested interests of 

state-owned enterprises and its vast networks with politicians, Xi Jinping 

is likely to fail to adopt the right policies much needed for China’s economic reform. Sluggish economic growth with ever-widening inequalities 

will further frustrate the population. A widespread sense of frustration 

for socio-economic problems will be amplified with political dissatisfaction among Chinese people due to Xi’s repressive politics. Consequently, 

the mounting frustration and complaints outside the party will strengthen 

the potential opposition force against Xi within the party. At some point, 

reform-minded politicians will raise their voices to pressure Xi Jinping to 

fundamentally change the course of policies or to resign. 

There is already evidence that supports the possibility of such a scenario. China has exhausted the easy gains from previously cheap labor 

forces. Many empty buildings in so-called “ghost cities” in China symbolize the problems of over-production and over-investment, which is a consequence of the government’s stimulus package introduced in the wake of 

the 2008 global financial crisis.19 While the diminishing returns of wasteful 

investment deepens, the rapidly aging population would also put another 

massive burden on the Chinese economy.20 To upgrade China’s economic 

system from an investment-led infrastructure and export-oriented model 

to a consumption-driven, high-value added industry, the Xi regime has to 

loosen its excessive control of market mechanisms.21 Yet the playing field 

between the state sector and private firms has not been leveled. Mounting uncertainties from the U.S.-China trade dispute, combined with the 

decade-long debt crisis, has been spreading a pervasive pessimism among 

private entrepreneurs, which will certainly stifle innovation in China.22

The coronavirus outbreak in China further reinforces the existing 

challenges for the Xi regime.23 Beijing initially tried to cover up the outbreak, which led to a massive death toll in China, expanding to a global 

pandemic crisis.24 Despite the CCP’s propaganda to boast its abilities to 

handle the crisis, domestic criticisms against the government’s censorship 

and draconian measures have been mounting, especially among young 

Chinese citizens.25 The global health crisis is most likely going to damage 

China’s economy. China already reported a 6.8% drop in gross domestic 

product (GDP) for the first quarter of 2020 compared with the same period last year, which marks the first contraction in 28 years.26 The downturn 

of global economy, including many countries that are China’s top suppliers 

of intermediate goods and export destinations, will surely prevent China 

275
Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific

from returning to its prior growth trajectory of some 5-6% annually.27

China could rescue its economy with credit-fueled stimulus package as it 

did in response to the 2008 global financial crisis, but that option is off the 

table due to the soaring debt levels this time. China’s economic outlook 

turns definitely gloomier in the wake of the COVID-19 crisis.

A gloomy prospect for the future of the Chinese economy contributes to the low record of the Chinese people’s general sense of happiness. According to the 2019 UN-sponsored World Happiness Report, China, 

the second largest economy in the world, ranked 86th in people’s feelings 

of happiness, which is below Russia and even war-torn Libya.28 The COVID-19 outbreak is most likely to depress the Chinese population to feel 

even less happy than before. The novel virus outbreak evolves from a public health crisis to an economic crisis to a kind of social crisis. The sense 

of crises from all aspects of life will motivate China’s ordinary citizens to 

question whether the Xi regime has been capable of leading the country 

in the right direction.29

Therefore it should not be surprising that Xi Jinping will be faced with 

a growing force of resistance against his authority at home. Despite repressive policies against ethnic minorities and an ever-strengthening social 

surveillance system under Xi’s ruling, Chinese intellectuals, interest groups, 

entrepreneurs, and social activists continue to call for political reform and 

opening, questioning the heavy hand of the party-state.30 Within the party 

as well, although Xi successfully revised all key CCP rules, including the 

removal of term limits from the Constitution and replacing the collective 

leadership with strongman-ruling style, it remains unclear whether such 

changes have been fully accepted as legitimate by the CCP’s rank and file.31

While there is no indication of organized resistance against Xi’s authority, 

it is noteworthy that retired party-elders publicly accused Xi of reversing 

Deng Xiaoping’s legacies, which may be a sign of reform-minded politicians’ retreat of support for Xi Jinping within the party. 

Given the widespread frustration with socio-economic issues in Chinese society and mounting dissatisfaction with the political agenda within 

the party, one should not take Xi’s power for granted. David Shambaugh, 

a renowned scholar on Chinese politics, observes that Li Keqiang and 

Wang Huning, two members of the Politburo Standing Committee, do 

have politically reformist records.32 There is hope that a new group of 

reform-leaning politicians may emerge, backed by Li and Wang, and will 

seize opportunities to defend their policy positions for market reforms 

and liberalizing policies. As reformists regain dominant support within the 

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The Fang-Shou Cycle in Chinese Politics

party, Xi will be under pressure to take the second seat in the policy-making process, if not officially stepping down from the top position. Then, 

as domestic politics steer toward fang, the CCP will moderate its assertive 

foreign policy for the need to focus on domestic affairs and the West may 

well return to support the liberalizing policies and economic transformation of China. 

Does This Mean Democratization of China? 

Political scientists have insisted on distinguishing between liberalization 

and democratization: In a non-democratic setting, liberalization may entail 

a mix of policies such as less censorship, greater space for civil society 

and toleration of criticism against the authorities. Democratization entails 

a liberalization but is a wider concept, requiring open contestation to win 

control of the government and free competitive elections. Based upon 

these definitions, it seems obvious that there can be liberalization without 

democratization.

33

The fang-shou cycle forecasts that Chinese politics will be liberalized 

as it moves to fang, but its liberalization will unlikely be accompanied by 

democratization for three reasons. First, there is no opposition party or a 

political association that can effectively coalesce opposition forces against 

the CCP. Second, there is no external force that can pressure the CCP to 

move toward democratization. Japan, South Korean, and Taiwan became 

democratic because U.S. pressure worked together with the countries’ 

grassroots movements towards democratization.34 But China is not a U.S. 

ally, and Russia, the closest that China has for a great power ally, has zero 

interest in democratizing China. Third, and most importantly, the general 

mass in China still appear to support the CCP, if not Xi Jinping himself. 

It is true that Chinese people have become increasingly frustrated with 

their government. However, researchers have consistently found that the 

Chinese people’s dissatisfaction have been mostly directed at local officials 

while remaining loyal to the authorities at the center.35 Given the Chinese 

people’s long-standing support of the party’s leadership, China is less likely 

to adopt the model of Western liberal democracy. 

In short, what the fang-shou cycle suggests is that China is most likely 

to return to soft-authoritarianism through the fang period of “liberalization without 

democratization.”36 Although there were periods of chaos and violence like 

the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution in the past, the CCP 

has shown to have a remarkable capability to adjust its past policies and 

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Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific

adapt to new challenges. As the gap between the state’s need to control 

society and the society’s desire to pursue more freedom is widening in 

China, the CCP has been struggling to meet rising expectations from an 

increasingly vibrant and diverse society. In this context, the CCP’s efforts 

to stay in power will be recorded as a major test case in human history as 

to whether it is possible for a non-democratic regime to embrace a democratic-governance style without changing its political system. The fang-shou

cycle precisely reveals this tension between (1) the need to adopt liberalization policies and (2) the need to maintain a non-democratic system for the 

CCP’s survival. 

Conclusion

The policy implication from this chapter’s analysis is that the current trend 

of Chinese politics may well change its direction at any given time in the 

future. At this time of writing, Xi Jinping’s power looks strong and stable, 

and the U.S.-China relationship locked in strategic competition. The fangshou cycle suggests that, however, Xi Jinping is more likely to lose power in 

the near future and Chinese politics will return to a liberalizing period with 

its foreign policy becoming more moderate than it is today. In this context, 

William Overholt, an expert on Chinese politics, argues that “it would be 

a mistake for the Western countries to lock themselves into a cold war 

mentality that only bolsters the hardliners in Beijing and to weaken the 

ties that, when change comes, might encourage a more positive future.”37

In this vein, it also makes sense for the security practitioners in the IndoPacific region, who deal with China on a daily basis, to pay attention to 

the alternative ideas circulating within China, which can be more desirable 

than Xi’s repressive and aggressive policies, and to proactively find ways to 

strengthen the supporters of those ideas within China.38

Of course, the fang-shou cycle is not a law of science, but merely an 

analytic concept developed from scholars’ intuitive observation of history. 

The validity of the concept is premised on the assumption that history 

repeats rather than evolves, which many people may find disagreeable. As 

such, the concept of the fang-shou cycle is not free from the criticism that 

it only provides one scenario among the large numbers of other possible 

futures. That said, the concept of fang-shou cycle is still useful to draw a hypothesis that the Chinese politics is likely to shift from political tightening to liberalizing 

period in the next 25 years and the hypothesis can serve as a baseline to assess 

278
The Fang-Shou Cycle in Chinese Politics

in which direction Chinese politics is changing in the future. It also highlights that, despite the optics of Xi Jinping’s hard power, we should always 

pay attention to the continuing calls for political reform and the expression 

of citizens’ activism within China.39

Notes

1 David Shambaugh, China’s Future (MA: Polity Press, 2016), 98.

2 For the fang-shou cycle through the 1990s and 2000s, I refer to David Sham- baugh’s interpretation based upon the CCP’s overall political orientation. For the 

definition of neo-totalitarianism, hard and soft authoritarianism, see Shambaugh, 

China’s Future, 2-5. Of note, regarding the period from 1993 to 1997 under Jiang 

Zemin’s ruling, I categorize it as a period of fang (political relaxation) because, 

although the political mood then was still oppressive, it was relatively relaxed com- pared to the previous period of neo-totalitarianism between 1989 and 1992, which 

were the intervening years between the pro-democracy protest at Tiananmen Square 

and Deng Xiaoping’s Southern Tour.

3 I have divided the era of Mao Zedong into periods of the fang-shou cycle. For the fang-shou cycle through the 1980s, I refer to Richard Baum, “The Road to Ti- ananmen: Chinese Politics in the 1980s,” in Roderick MacFarquhar, ed., The Politics of China: Sixty Years of the People’s Republic of China, third edition (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 338. For the fang-shou cycle through the 1990s to 2000s, as noted above, I refer to David Shambaugh’s division of periods. See Shambaugh, 

China’s Future, 99. 

4 The work report of the 15th Party Congress in 1997 stressed “governing the country through law,” and the Chinese leaders began to emphasize that the CCP 

should protect the legal rights of Chinese citizens from the abuse of state power, es- pecially at the local level. For a discussion on the concepts of “rule of law” and “rule 

by law” in the Chinese context, see Joseph Fewsmith, The Logic and Limits of Political Reform in China (NY: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 98.

5 For more details of the village election and its implications in China, see Tianjian Shi, “Village Committee Elections in China: Institutionalist Tactics for Democracy,” 

World Politics 51, no. 3 (1999): 385-412.

6 The number of NGOs in China has increased from less than 100 in 1990 to 

more than 500,000 in 2014. See “Enter the Chinese NGO,” Economist, April 12, 2014, https://www.economist.com/leaders/2014/04/12/enter-the-chinese-ngo.

7 Pei’s positive assessment also covers the remaining years of the Hu Jintao regime from 2009 to 2012. See Minxin Pei, “China: From Tiananmen to Neo-Stalinism,” 

Journal of Democracy 31, no. 1 (2020): 152. 

8 See the Worldwide Governance Indicators, complied by the World Bank, for comparative data that measure countries’ governance capacities at http://info.world- bank.org/ governance/WGI/#home.

9 Shambaugh, China’s Future, 115. 

10 Suisheng Zhao, “Xi Jinping’s Maoist Revival,” Journal of Democracy 27, no. 3 (July 2016): 83-97.

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Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific

11 Thomas Christensen, “The Advantages of an Assertive China: Responding to Beijing’s Abrasive Diplomacy,” Foreign Affairs 90, no. 2 (March/April 2011): 54-67.

12 For a detailed discussion of China’s abrasive diplomacy with neighboring coun- tries, see Sungmin Cho, “ China’s Foreign Policy in the Indo-Pacific Region and US 

Interests,” Scott McDonald and Michael Burgoyne, ed. China’s Global Influence: Perspec- tives and Recommendations (Honolulu: Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, 2019): 57-72.

13 Developed by the author in reference to Lowell Dittmer and Yu-Shan Wu, “The Modernization of Factionalism in Chinese Politics,” World Politics 47, no. 4 (July 1995): 467-94. 

14 Shambaugh, China’s Future, 98; Joseph Fewsmith and Andrew J. Nathan, “Au- thoritarian Resilience Revisited,” Journal of Contemporary China 28, no. 116 (2019): 167- 179.

15 Fewsmith and Nathan “Authoritarian Resilience Revisited,” p.178

16 Alice Miller, “Only Socialism Can Save China; Only Xi Jinping Can Save Social- ism,” China Leadership Monitor, issue 56 (Spring 2018): 56.

17 Shambaugh, China’s Future, 6.

18 For an excellent discussion of Chinese hubris, see Bilahari Kausikan, “China and 

the Breeding of Black Swans,” Globalbrief, February 19, 2020, https://globalbrief. ca/2020/02/china-and-the-breeding-of-black-swans/.

19 For an excellent review of the Chinese economy after the 2008 global financial crisis, see Arthur R. Kroeber, China’s Economy: What Everyone Needs to Know (NY: Oxford University Press, 2016). 

20 Steven Lee Myers, Jin Wu, and Claire Fu, “China’s Looming Crisis: A Shrinking Population,” New York Times, January 17, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/interac- tive/2019/01/17/world/asia/china-population-crisis.html.

21 Yukon Huang, Cracking the China Conundrum: Why Conventional Economic Wisdom Is 

Wrong (NY: Oxford University Press, 2017).

22 Yue Hou, “The Private Sector: Challenges and Opportunities during Xi’s Second Term,” China Leadership Monitor, issue 59 (Spring 2019): 6.

23 Thomas Fingar and Jean C. Oi, “China’s Challenges: Now It Gets Much Harder,” Washington Quarterly 43, no. 1 (Spring 2020), 67-84.

24 Nadia Schadlow, “Consider the Possibility That Trump Is Right About China,” The Atlantic (April 5, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/04/ consider-possibility-trump-right-china/609493/.

25 Yuan Li, “Coronavirus Weakens China’s Powerful Propaganda Machine,” New 

York Times (February 26, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/26/business/ china-coronavirus-propaganda.html. 

26 Shalini Nagarajan, “China’s Economy Suffers Its First Contraction in 28 Years, Shrinking 6.8% in an ‘Extraordinary Shock’ to the Global Economy,” Business Insider 

(April 17, 2020), https://www.businessinsider.com/china-economy-falls-first-quar- ter-2020-after-half-century-growth-2020-4.

27 Michael Green and Evan S. Medeiros, “The Pandemic Won’t Make China the 

World’s Leader: Few Countries Are Buying the Model or the Message From Beijing,” 

Foreign Affairs (April 15, 2020), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united- states/2020-04-15/pandemic-wont-make-china-worlds-leader. 

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28 “Why So Glum, China?” The Economist, February 16, 2019, https://www.econo- mist.com/china/2019/02/16/why-so-glum-china. 

29 Minxin Pei, “China’s Coming Upheaval: Competition, the Coronavirus, and the Weakness of Xi Jinping,” Foreign Affairs 99, no. 3 (May/June 2020): 82-95, https:// www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-04-03/chinas-coming-upheaval.

30 Elizabeth Economy, “30 Years after Tiananmen: Dissent Is Not Dead,” Journal of Democracy 30, no. 2 (April 2019): 57-63; Willy Wo-Lap Lam, The Fight for China’s Future: Civil Society vs. the Chinese Communist Party (Routledge, 2019). 

31 Minxin Pei, “Rewriting the Rules of the Chinese Party-State: Xi’s Progress in Reinvigorating the CCP,” China Leadership Monitor, issue 59 (Spring 2019): 1. 

32 Shambaugh, China’s Future, 133. 

33 Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe (MD: Johns Hopkins Uni- versity Press, 1996), 1. 

34 Bruce Gilley, “30 Years after Tiananmen: The Young and the Restless,” Journal of Democracy 30, no. 2 (April 2019): 50-56.

35 Tony Saich, “How China’s Citizens View the Quality of Governance under Xi Jinping,” Journal of Chinese Governance 1, no. 1 (January 2016): 1-20; Ernan Cui, Ran Tao, Travis J. Warner, and Dali L. Yang, “How Do Land Takings Affect Political 

Trust in Rural China?” Political Studies 63, no. 1 supplement (April 2015): 91-109.

36 Shambaugh, China’s Future, 131.

37 William Overholt, “China’s Crisis of Success,” published by Alpine Macro, February 25, 2019, https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/0c67/ce8d3ef- 130b08e5279e1dd355261dddd3f16.pdf. 

38 Jeffrey W. Legro, “What China Will Want: The Future Intentions of a Rising Power” Perspectives on Politics 5, no. 3 (September 2007): 515-534.

39 Economy, “30 Years after Tiananmen: Dissent Is Not Dead,” 58. 

281

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19

ARE INDIA AND CHINA DESTINED FOR 

WAR? THREE FUTURE SCENARIOS

Srini Sitaraman

“Frontiers are indeed the razor’s edge on which hang suspended the modern issues 

of war or peace, of life or death to nations.” 

Lord Curzon

Introduction

The Greek historian Thucydides writing on the Peloponnesian War argued 

that when an established power encounters a rising power, the possibility 

of conflict between the established and rising power would become inevitable.1

 Graham T. Allison in his book, Destined for War: Can America and 

China Escape Thucydides’s Trap?, extended Thucydides’ primary argument by 

suggesting that the power dynamics between China and the United States 

is similarly poised, an established power—the United States—confronting 

an aggressive power in China may produce a military conflict between 

them.2 The Thucydides Trap argument has also been applied to the IndiaChina conflict, in which India, a rising power, is confronted by China, the 

established power.3 But such comparisons are unsatisfactory because of 

the power asymmetry is against India. The overall military, economic, and 

political balance of power tilts towards China. Chinese strategists discount 

India as a serious security or economic threat. For China, India assumes 

substantial low priority military threat compared to the United States.4

More often India is described as a “barking dog” that must be ignored 

and its policy actions are described as having little political impact.5 India has resisted the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), refused to the join the 

Beijing-led Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), and 

cancelled many of the Chinese infrastructure projects in India after the 

fighting along the border.6
Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific

Strategic assessments suggests that military balance—conventional 

and nuclear—overwhelmingly leans towards China.7 Indian military leaders have publicly acknowledged that India does not have “the capability 

nor the intention to match China, force for force.”8 However, others have 

cautioned that India will not reflexively acquiesce when faced with a military threat from China.9

 India has not relented against aggressive Chinese 

posture along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in 2013, 2017, and more 

recently in the bloody hand-to-hand combat both India and China suffered casualties in June 2020 (see Table 19.1). But India has resisted Chinese aggressiveness, albeit with the mixed success, along the border since 

the occupation of Tibet in 1959 and the first Sino-Indian war in 1962. The 

Indian armed forced have repelled Chinese incursions across the border 

and managed to stave off the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) drives periodically.10 But for how long can India parry the repeated incursions by 

the PLA along the LAC and does India have the wherewithal to sustain a 

long military campaign against China?11 In the most recent (June 15, 2020) 

military clashes in the Galwan Valley in the Ladakh region along the LAC, 

20 Indian soldiers and 43 Chinese PLA were presumed killed in action.1213

Table 19. 1: Major Military Clashes between India and China

Year Location Outcome=

1962 

(20 Oct-21 Nov)

Aksai Chin and Northeast India Chinese Victory

1967 

(1 Oct 2 Oct 2)

Nathu La & Cho Law (Sikkim) Indian Victory

1975 

(20 Oct)

Tulung La, Arunachal Pradesh Indian Casualties 

1987 

(Spring-Summer)

Sumdorong Chu, Arunachal 

Pradesh

Stand-Off

2013 

(15 April – 5 May)

Daulat Beg Oldi, Ladakh Stand-Off (hand-tohand combat)

2017 

(16 June – 28 Aug)

Doklam, (Tibet, India, Bhutan) Stand-Off (hand-tohand combat)

2020 (May 2020-...) Pangong Tso, Galway Valley, and 

Hot Springs

Hand-to-Hand Combat: Indian & Chinese 

Casualties

*No official confirmation of casualties by the Chinese government.

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Are India And China Destined For War? Three Future Scenarios

Tensions between both countries have repeatedly flared since the creation of India on August 15, 1947 and the People’s Republic of China 

(PRC) on October 1, 1949, when the British colonial government hastily exited India leaving behind a legacy of unresolved boundary disputes 

from Burma in the east to Pakistan in the west, and Tibet and Kashmir 

in the north. The India-China border conflict has evolved not just into a 

geostrategic competition that has outlasted the Cold War because at the 

center of it, the conflict is about the unresolved territorial claims. States 

are fundamentally territorial constructs that engage in vigorous competition for control of such territory and territory with particular salience is 

more susceptible to militarization.14 India and China are no different; both 

countries have engaged in frequent military standoffs to define the border 

and stake claim to contested territory.15 The India-China border dispute 

became particularly contentious after the PRC’s invasion and occupation of Tibet and after the 14th Dalai Lama fled to India in March 1959.16

Subsequently, China attacked India on October 20, 1962; Mao wanted to 

“teach India a lesson” and in the process India permanently lost territory 

(estimated to be around 43,000 sq. km) and more than 3,000 soldiers.17

Regular borders disputes are an outcome of India’s inability to resist continuous expansion along the expansive border—4,057 km—and because 

China refuses to accept India’s conception of the LAC as the border that 

separates the Indo-Tibetan frontier. Beijing has engaged in gray-zone tactics—just below the threshold of a major war—to continuously challenge 

India in multiple arenas.18

Looking ahead another quarter century, this chapter seeks to draw 

insights from foresight analysis to identify some of the possible scenarios 

of the future of India-China conflict. Assuming ceteris paribus, if the last 

25 years or the last 70 years is any indication, one could predict that the 

status quo will probably prevail, but it will be accompanied by continued military build-up across the Line of Actual Control both by India and China, 

with increased strategic competition and frequent military confrontations. 

The status quo refers to a situation in which the present territorial conflict 

continues without any major alterations to the understanding of the LAC 

through the application of military force by China or India. The status quo, 

however, is not a stable equilibrium; it is an extraordinarily fragile arrangement, and it would require sustained efforts by both parties to maintain it. 

More importantly, the status quo is not the preferred outcome of China, but 

only India’s. The PRC would prefer to have a territorial arrangement that 

is diametrically opposed to India’s understanding. Beijing is unceasingly 

searching to alter the prevailing territorial arrangement. It is a revisionist 

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Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific

power that is seeking to revise and expand its territorial boundaries not just 

the land borders with India and Bhutan, but also its maritime borders with 

several littoral states in the Indo-Pacific. China wants to expand its territorial possessions and control land and sea through the One-Belt-One-Road 

initiative (OBOR). 

In this chapter, I outline and discuss three future scenarios (see Table 

19.2) as to how this conflict is likely to progress over the next quarter 

century. Scenario 1: status quo will persist, albeit highly unstable, in which at 

least one party will seek to avoid a military confrontation (hot war) through 

active negotiations, crisis management, and high-level diplomacy. Scenario 

2: an end to the conflict cycle could only be achieved through a grand territorial bargain at the highest level and it will result in a peaceful settlement 

of the border dispute that is mutually agreeable to both parties. Scenario 3: 

a small border conflagration escalates into a wider military conflict (a hot war)

between India and China.

The Future Scenarios in Brief

Drawing from foresight analysis,19 it is possible to imagine all three scenarios as being equally likely in the next 15 or the next 30 years and it could 

produce a combination of the three outcomes, such as return to the status 

quo-ante or the creation of a new status quo after a nasty, brutish, and/or several clashes over period of years in which China is able to secure additional 

territory. History of India-China conflict (see Tables 19.2 and 19.3) has 

shown that border clashes and the attempt to revert back to the status quo

are regular occurrences and they are unlikely to resolve unless one party 

defeats another decisively or if there is a grand bargain. The frequency of 

such clashes may decline or increase, but until the fundamental basis—the 

differing conceptions of border claims—of the conflict is addressed there 

will be no permanent peace. The India-China conflict is locked into a peak 

rivalry mode in which the equilibrium is status quo from the Indian perspective (which is a temporal arrangement) and an ever expanding territorial 

claim, which is a more permanent vision for China. Over the decades India has presented several versions of detailed maps and other historical 

claims, which have all been ignored or rejected by the Chinese side. Beijing 

has not presented any understanding of the border areas—maps or claim 

documents—instead it has parlayed New Delhi’s intentions and it has not 

revealed its understanding of the border area.20 This has allowed China 

to perpetually revise its position and challenge India’s conceptions of the 

border. 

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Are India And China Destined For War? Three Future Scenarios

Table 19. 2: Possible Scenarios of Predicted Course of India-China 

Conflict Pathways

Future 

Scenarios

Fragile 

Status quo

Grand 

Bargain

Hot 

War

0-15 Years Will Continue Unlikely Likely

15-30 Years Uncertain Likely Likely

*Assessed in Years, Holding Other Factors Constant

Scenario 1: 0-15 Years

The baseline assumption is that the fragile status quo is likely to persist, 

though highly tenuous, in which India will fight hard to maintain the current shape of the LAC while attempting not to escalate into a large-scale 

military conflict (or hot war). The aim for India is to continue with the 

current understanding of the LAC in which it seeks to manage aggressive 

Chinese tactics such as salami-slicing—a practice in which China incrementally slices off territory—and changing the facts on the ground, a ploy 

that will cumulatively alter the balance of territorial arrangements in its 

favor; a tactic that Beijing has effectively employed in the South China Sea 

maritime conflict.21

The status quo is not a situation of peace, but a situation of tense military balance in which one party seeks not to be pushed back or out of the 

ring as in a Japanese sumo wrestling competition. Nevertheless, the prediction here is that this fragile status quo that is frequently tested by the 

recurrent clashes (see Table 19.1) between the PLA and the Indian Army 

is unlikely to prevail in the long run (15-30 years out). Changing geopolitical or military balance and shifts in the global alliance arrangements could 

change this delicate balance. 

A grand bargain is unlikely unless both parties are willing to make 

territorial concessions. The prevailing position within the Politburo of 

the ruling Chinese Communist Party of China is that such compromises 

are not required because it believes that it can secure its territorial claims 

without making any concessions.22 The Indian government is more likely 

to pursue a high-stakes diplomatic approach towards a territorial swap to 

settle the border issue, but India very well might be forced into a position in which any territorial concessions to China would have enormous 

domestic political consequences making the possibility of a grand bargain 

complicated. As this unresolved territorial conflict periodically flares up 

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Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific

into military stand-offs and the PLA continues to make incisive forays into 

Indian controlled territory, the possibility of an escalating military conflict 

becomes more likely.

Scenario 2: 15-30 Years

The fragile status quo is unlikely to persist in the long-run precisely because 

it is tenuous and not a permanent solution to the India-China border dispute. Given the brittleness of the status quo, it is unlikely to persist in the 

long run as the PLA continually seeks to alter the status quo either through 

use of force and political coercion. Parallelly, the possibility of a hot war or 

a full-scale military engagement also grows. Change in domestic political 

conditions and external geopolitical factors could force both countries to 

accept a negotiated settlement that is mutually acceptable to both. Beijing 

has signed territorial agreements with some of its neighbors and India 

has settled its borders with Bangladesh and its maritime boundaries with 

Sri Lanka.23 But a grand bargain is only possible when changes to the regional and extra-regional security environment also occur, or if and when 

domestic political changes materialize in China. The current Xi Jinping 

government is not in a concessionary mood and it believes that exercise 

of machtpolitik is necessary to realize the “China Dream”—the dream of 

making China a great power as it once was—and erase from the memory 

the century of humiliation.24 If the current trajectory of Chinese wolfwarrior policy persists, the possibility of a grand bargain is rather dim, 

and the probability of a hot war increases. Hence, the status quo along the 

border is an impermanent arrangement.

Tibet’s Centrality in the India-China Conflict

China’s territorial conflict with India is fundamentally about the territorial 

and cultural incorporation of Tibet into the modern Chinese empire. In 

China’s interpretation, as expressed by Lian Xiangmin, Director of Contemporary Research at the China Tibetology Research Centre, Tawang “is 

a part of Tibet and Tibet is a part of China” so by extension “Tawang is 

a part of China.”25 From a military perspective, India anticipates a highaltitude attack from the Tibet side of China to reshape the Himalayan 

boundary and capture the northeastern Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh, 

particularly the town of Tawang, which is central to Tibetan Buddhism.26

China has protested the visits of high-level officials to Tawang to assert its 

claim over that area. It vociferously protested the visit by the exiled Dalai 

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Are India And China Destined For War? Three Future Scenarios

Lama to Tawang, the visits by the American ambassador to India, and the 

tour of the border areas by the Indian defense minister.27 There has been 

a sustained effort to delegitimize India’s control of Tawang because China 

believes controlling Tawang is critical to China’s efforts at absorbing Tibet. 

Tawang’s centrality also lies in China’s eagerness to manage the succession 

of the next Dalai Lama.28

Beijing wants to ensure that the installation of the next Dalai Lama 

would allow it to control and manipulate the Dalai Lama, something it has 

not been able to do because the 14th Dalai Lama fled Tibet during China’s 

war on Tibet in March 1959.29 The Indian government has not issued 

any official statement on Chinese policies towards its own citizens or with 

regards to Hong Kong, Xinjiang, Tibet, and Taiwan with the intention of 

not provoking and hoping to keep things amicable along the border. India 

has not commented on most aspects of Chinese foreign or domestic policy. However, India hosts the 14th Dalai Lama and allows the exiled Central 

Tibetan Administration (CTA) to function from Dharamshala and this 

has caused much consternation to Beijing.30 In turn, Beijing has launched 

relentless attacks on the Dalai Lama referring to him as a “wolf in monk’s 

robes” and a “splittist” engaging in “anti-China activities overseas under 

the pretext of religion.”31

China-Pakistan Alliance and the India-China Conflict

India’s focus exclusively remains on the border dispute, Pakistan, Indian 

Ocean Region, and to some extent on the South China Sea, but only with 

regard to its own intent to pursue freedom of the seas operations and 

India has not directly commented on China’s South China Sea disputes. 

Similarly, China has been very circumspect in the overt demonstration of 

its nuclear power or issuing direct nuclear threats. In this triangular territorial and regional security competition, Pakistan is the only actor that 

has directly threatened India with a first strike tactical nuclear attack in the 

event of ground or air attacks by India.32

A worrisome factor for India is the China-Pakistan nuclear alliance in 

which China is not only sharing its nuclear know-how with Pakistan, but 

it is also assisting Pakistan’s missile development program and selling Pakistan strategic weapons such as fighter jets and submarines.33 The overall 

probability of a nuclear war between India and China remains relatively 

low to nonexistent, but such a probability is exceptionally high between 

India and Pakistan.34 A South Asian nuclear conflagration could occur 

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Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific

because India and Pakistan also have unresolved territorial issues that is 

equally vexing. A Pakistan emboldened by Chinese support may actually 

utilize battlefield nuclear weapons against Indian troops seeking to cross 

into Pakistani territory in response to a large-scale terror attack, which 

India believes originated from Pakistan.35

Pakistan wants to prevent such Indian plans by suggesting that it will 

respond with nuclear weapons even in response to limited-distance thrusts 

as envisaged under Cold Start doctrine.36 Pakistan’s battlefield deployable 

missile, the Nasr is designed to counter India’s Cold Start doctrine, which is 

an Indian battle plan to punish Pakistan by conducting shallow incursions 

into its territory. The primary objective of this Cold Start doctrine is to not 

provide Pakistan with a justifiable cause for retaliating with a large-scale 

nuclear attack on India. Pakistan’s answer is the Nasr—Theater Nuclear 

Weapon (TNW)—a missile that could carry a small tactical nuclear warhead, which could balance against India’s conventional superiority.37 Pakistan only intends to use this weapon when Indian troops are already in its 

territory, which it believes is justified and less provocative than launching a 

nuclear counterforce attack on India. However, analysts have warned that 

once the first nuclear weapon is used against an enemy force the dynamics 

of uncontrolled escalation come into play.38

The escalatory dynamics of the “hot war” scenario would be something that India would prefer to avoid because the asymmetric power ratios are aligned against India, especially when Pakistan, as a serious military 

state siding with China, would be a considerable challenge for India to 

handle on its own. Although the Indian military has drawn plans for a 

two-front war, experts have warned that it may not be sustainable because 

it would be cost-prohibitive both in terms of manpower and weapons acquisition and deployment.39 Both China and Pakistan are revisionist states 

that are intent on redrawing the borders by gaining territory that is in effective control or claimed by other states,40 Pakistan’s national ambition is 

in wresting Indian controlled Kashmir away from India, which it believes 

to be the unfinished business of the partition of British India in 1947.41

India is a defensive state seeking to maintain the status quo—a point 

acknowledged by Chinese strategists, but not by Pakistan—and domestic 

stability without conceding additional territorial or political space to two 

of its most powerful neighbors. Although there is a stream of political 

thought in India that visualizes a modern territorial India—Ahkand Bharat, 

Greater India or undivided India—stretching from Afghanistan to Tibet, 

which includes Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh and Myanmar in its territorial 

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Are India And China Destined For War? Three Future Scenarios

imagination, it remains a mere dream.42 India has made peaceful territorial settlements with Bangladesh, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, and Nepal,43 which 

includes territorial transfers, and maritime boundary limitation agreements 

with all the littoral states, and it has a river water agreement with Pakistan (Indus Water Treaty 1960).44 Hence territorial expansion, especially 

through application of military force, is not within the policy demesne of 

India in the foreseeable future. Although there is a lot of political rhetoric 

of retaking Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (PoK) and the parts of Kashmir 

(Shaksgam Tract), which Pakistan transferred through treaty in 1963 to 

China, it is unlikely that India would realistically seek to claim it through 

military force and as it is not practical or likely to be successful.45

For India, the grand bargain scenario would be the preferred outcome—

a negotiated outcome accompanied by a territorial settlement without a 

large-scale military conflict—but China may not prefer this outcome because it believes that it could achieve through force and/or through coercion an outcome determinedly in its favor. China could attain its ultimate 

objective of occupying the entire Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh located in the northeast corner of India bordering China and Myanmar and 

it could determine a boundary to its satisfaction to permanently squash the 

Tibetan uprising, and acquire additional territory from Nepal and Bhutan 

by using political coercion.46 Even though military action would be prohibitively costly even for Beijing, it is not improbable. The People’s Republic 

has shown that it has both the political will and military capacity to pursue 

aggressive strategies to occupy territory as it has shown with the ruthless 

crackdown in Hong Kong and Xinjiang. 

But tactical issues such as high altitude and inhospitable terrain along 

the Indo-Tibet frontier areas will impose serious restrictions on flexible 

land based military operations against a large and capable military such as 

India. The rate at which the Indian Army and the Chinese PLA can surge 

soldiers to the border will depend on their gradual acclimatization to higher altitudes.47 Moving supplies and military equipment to this high altitude 

will be daunting and rather expensive proposition for both countries, despite significant advancement in border infrastructure both on the Chinese 

and Indian sides. Large-scale military escalation always remains a very high 

probability because the two opposing militaries are literally few feet from 

each other and they have frequently engaged in physical altercation using 

clubs and nail studded iron rods.48 Fighting involving military armaments 

resulted in significant casualties in 1962, minor casualties in 1975, and substantial casualties most recently in June 2020 (see Table 19.1).

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Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific

What Are the Chances of a Large-Scale Military Conflict 

between China and India?

India and China have already fought once in 1962 in which the Chinese 

were able to teach India a “lesson” as Chairman Mao intended.49 Furthermore, India and China have engaged in multiple military skirmishes 

along the border since 1962 to assert their interpretation of the border 

on each other. China’s military occupation of Tibet in 1959 and the 1962 

war were turning points in the mutual relations between these two Asian 

states (see Table 19.1). The military clashes since 1962 have shaped this 

fraught rivalry, but the brutal clash in the Galwan Valley on June 15, 2020 

was the first confrontation along the border since 1975 that have caused 

fatalities on both sides. The literature on enduring rivalries assert that tangible markers, particularly territorial disputes, make a rivalry particularly 

difficult to resolve.50 Non-fatal confrontations and territorial incursions 

frequently occur along the border (see Table 19.3), and the series of confidence building measures along the border in 1993, 1996, and 2013 were 

designed to maintain peace and tranquility along the border region.51 Despite effective crisis management, frequent military clashes between India 

and China is more likely in comparison to the probability of a war between 

the United States and China because of the outstanding territorial dispute, 

in which China wants to slice more and more territory and India is hoping 

to defend the Line of Actual Control. 

Table 19.3: Border Incursions/Transgressions/Incidents on the LAC 

Year Western

 Sector

Middle 

Sector

Eastern 

Sector

Total

2019 497 28 138 663

2018 284 31 89 404

2017 337 17 119 473

2016 208 17 71 296

2015 342 9 77 428

The 4,057 km border is divided into three sectors (Western, Middle, and Eastern).

Data Source: Indian Express, 22 May 2020, https://indianexpress.com/article/india/aksai- chin-army-big-surge-in-chinese-transgressions-most-of-them-in-ladakh-6421674/ (as Reported by the Indian Ministry of Defense/Ministry of External Affairs; PRC does not report any such data publicly)

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Are India And China Destined For War? Three Future Scenarios

As the stronger actor in this conflict, China need not remain as committed to conflict management, diplomacy, and peaceful settlement because the onus of such activities is on the relatively weaker party. As its 

power continues to ascend and its military capabilities accelerates, Beijing 

believes that it could assert its military dominance over India whenever 

it wants. Beijing has pursued a more hardline stance with India with the 

“three no’s” policy of “no weakness, no concession and no defensive 

defense.”52 Hardliners in Beijing are urging the government to hit India 

hard and make it an example so that it will deter American ambitions 

against China. Meanwhile, undeterred India has been pursuing interoperability agreements with the United States. The U.S.-India Communications 

Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA) intends to facilitate 

“access to advanced defense systems and enable India to optimally utilize 

its existing US-origin platforms.”53 Indian and U.S. forces also engaged in a 

joint tri-services exercise titled Tiger Triumph in November 2019.54

The probability of a large-scale conventional military conflict between India and China remains high because even though India is on the 

receiving end of the asymmetry scale, it is unlikely that it will not counter 

Chinese military action.55 What is even more salient in this case is that 

conflict resolution between asymmetric contestants is less likely since “the 

stronger player will always choose outright conflict because the benefits of 

conflict exceed the expected value of the random allocation.”56 More than 

mere military balance, what is really crucial is the identity value attached 

to the contested territory that is central to the national imagination in the 

contesting countries.

Presently, the territorial conflict between India and China is the 

900-pound elephant in the room. India and China can dance around it 

with negotiations and rounds of bilateral talks at various levels, but the 

territorial conflict has persisted since the birth of modern India and China. 

This territorial conflict is at the root of this enduring rivalry. As with all territorial disputes, both parties perceive this as a zero-sum conflict in which 

they cannot afford to lose face, back down, or concede to the other party, 

particularly when national identities are deeply intertwined with these territories.

China especially believes that it has the upper hand and the time for 

territorial concessions and grand bargains has elapsed. In India the memories of a military defeat at the hands of the Chinese PLA in 1962, the persistent border skirmishes, and overwhelming insecurity dominate strategic 

thinking. Defense and strategic thinking in India has now diverged from 

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Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific

its exclusive focus on Pakistan to elevate China to a major threat. There is 

persistent defense narrative emerging in India that emphasizes the need to 

prepare for a two-front war.57 In both countries competing nationalist narratives govern how the general population understand this conflict. 

Any territorial settlement must be willing to accommodate competing 

and harsh nationalist reactions in which territorial concessions to the rival 

would be seen as a defeat and humiliation.58 India is the weaker party in 

this asymmetric conflict and it is the status quo power seeking to hold 

on to its territory as it confronts the Chinese PLA across the Himalayan 

frontier that has amassed vast military resources in several locations along 

the contentious Line of Actual Control (LAC). India’s defensive posture 

is routinely challenged by China along the border. According to data collected and released by the Indian government, the PLA transgressed the 

boundary area “1025 times between 2016 and 2018”59 (see Table 19.3). 

From January to April 2020, India has recorded 170 border transgressions 

across the LAC, of which 130 incidents have occurred in Ladakh alone.

Is Nuclear Exchange Probable between India and China?

In an opinion piece in the Indian Express newspaper, retired Indian Admiral Arun Prakash outlined the possibility of a nuclear exchange between 

India and China as follows:

While Indian troops have, so far, shown courage and restraint in 

these ridiculous brawls with the PLA, there is no guarantee that 

in a future melee, a punch on the nose will not invite a bullet in 

response. In such circumstances, rapid escalation into a “shooting-war” cannot be ruled out. Thereafter, should either side face 

a major military set-back, resort to nuclear “first-use” would pose 

a serious temptation.

The control for this situation is the policy of “no first use” (NFU) 

nuclear doctrine adopted by China and India, but not by Pakistan.60 Although the Indian defense minister has made some noise about following 

a flexible nuclear doctrine, it is unlikely that India would launch a nuclear 

first strike against China and the same would apply to China.61 Nuclear 

weapons are primarily intended to serve as a deterrent. A nuclear attack by 

India on China would invite an overwhelming second-strike and produce 

unpredictable fallout. Similarly a first strike nuclear attack by China on 

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Are India And China Destined For War? Three Future Scenarios

India is equally inconceivable, as India has also developed second-strike 

capability through submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), longrange ground launched ballistic missiles, and potentially it could air deliver 

such weapons through bombers and fighter jets.62

The idea of first-strike Indian nuclear launch against China or a Chinese nuclear attack on India given the current political trajectory and because of the NFU policy is not within the realm of possibility, but a conventional war along the LAC is a high likelihood and there is very strong 

historical precedence for it. More importantly China believes that its superior conventional military power is sufficient to subdue India; hence 

there would be little need for China to attack India with nuclear weapons or even issue any nuclear threats or warnings to deter India. China’s 

size and its military, economic, and diplomatic capabilities are sufficient to 

deter India from engaging in any military adventurism.63 With regard to 

intentions, Beijing does not believe that New Delhi intends to either initiate a conventional or a nuclear war against China. This is because India’s 

position vis-à-vis China is preservative—hold the territory and continue 

negotiations—and it is unlikely that India would pursue unprovoked and 

unilateral military action against a superior adversary.64 India is preparing 

a defensive strategy by building up its military capacity and infrastructure 

along the border to prevent any encroachment by the People’s Liberation 

Army.65

India’s External Balancing and the India-China Relations

Countering China has required that India move ever closer to the United 

States, the only country that has the capability and alignment of national 

interest in confronting China’s rise. India is a Major Defense Partner of 

the United States, but not a defense ally. The United States and India are 

starting to deliberate about plans and intentions to ensure policies are 

aligned to optimize shared security interests in the Indo-Pacific region. But 

India has been reticent about fully committing to a formal alliance with the 

United States not only to retain its strategic autonomy, but also because it 

does not want to aggravate China in the hopes of pursing a political reset 

and eventual peaceful territorial settlement. India is attempting to balance 

against China by leaning ever closer to the United States by bolstering 

its defense and economic ties. The current belief within the corridors of 

the Ministry of External Affairs is that the time for direct confrontation, 

especially military confrontation and political provocation, is unnecessary 

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Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific

at this juncture, but this situation could change in the long run.66 Nevertheless, India has started procuring large quantities of defense equipment 

from the United States. Most recently, during President Trump’s visit to 

India in February 2020, India signed an arms deal worth 3.5 billion dollars 

with more deals in the offing down the road.67

The Indian goal appears to be aimed at shoring up it defensive options without leading to overt military conflagration with China. India has 

also reached out selectively to the ASEAN countries, namely Vietnam and 

to some extent Indonesia, in an effort to strengthen counterbalancing alliances against China. India has revived the Quad (the Quadrilateral Security 

Dialogue) and engaged with the Quad Plus, a strategic consultation framework involving the United States, Australia, Japan and India and additional 

partners such as South Korea, New Zealand, and Vietnam.68 But the objectives of all these moves and countermoves are fundamentally defensive 

in nature and it is not aimed to militarily confront China.

Beijing also continues to exploit India’s vulnerabilities in other venues, such as trade and through its Belt and Road Initiative, to assert its 

economic and political power. China has thwarted Indian ambitions for 

membership in key international organizations such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)69 and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) 

by often deploying Pakistan as a proxy in these diplomatic battles.70 Beijing 

is also supporting Pakistan’s claim over Kashmir in international forums 

and by introducing resolutions in the United Nations condemning India’s 

policies in Jammu and Kashmir.71 All these efforts are aimed at keeping 

the political pressure dialed-up in multiple forums and prevent New Delhi 

from expanding its political reach beyond the region.

India aims to avoid direct military conflict with China as much as possible, while preparing the defenses for such an eventuality. Both India and 

China are likely to allow the current status quo to continue as along as both 

parties don’t attempt to unilaterally alter it. However, if China attempts to 

alter the shape of the LAC by changing the facts on the ground, it will produce a military standoff as it did in Daulat Beg Oldi in 2013, in Doklam 

in 2017, and in Pangong Tso, Galwan Valley, and Hot Springs in 2020.72

All these situations produced long military standoffs, which was eventually 

reconciled through sustained diplomatic negotiations. Beijing’s encroachments have continuously intensified and it has perpetually demanded additional territory involving many thousands of square kilometers, while 

India has attempted to forestall ever increasing territorial encroachment by 

attempting to negotiate such situations with China.73 But these temporary 

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Are India And China Destined For War? Three Future Scenarios

agreements have only served to calm the periodic territorial standoffs as 

they have not produced any lasting agreements, and it has emboldened 

Beijing to pursue even more expansive claims with aggressive posture. 

Modernization of Chinese military equipment and road-rail linkages into 

the Tibetan plateau has only made China’s territorial claims even more 

acute.74 Although India is attempting to match Beijing’s development of 

the frontier areas, it is being thwarted because Beijing has the first-mover 

advantage in money, manpower, technology, and equipment, which has increased its bargaining power vis-à-vis India. But it is not certain that every 

future situation could be always addressed through negotiations in every 

instance, which increases the prospect of wider escalation as the frequency 

and intensity of these border clashes increase.

To maintain the prevailing status quo India will seek to create diplomatic counter-balance options by developing stronger military ties to the 

United States and regional states such as Australia, New Zealand, Japan, 

and Vietnam.75 But at the same time, India is unlikely to permit any antiChinese activities to be carried out from its territory or allow any official 

criticisms of Chinese policy regarding Xinjiang and Hong Kong or matters that are sensitive to the Chinese government such as the tenuous political status of Taiwan. All of these measures are aimed at not aggravating 

the Chinese government. India will continue to sustain high-level bilateral 

diplomacy with China in an effort to maintain good relations. 

As the weaker power in this asymmetric relationship, India realizes 

that China’s patience with India may suddenly run out and that Beijing will 

not hesitate to use military force to resolve the border issue to its satisfaction. But given the current trends, it is difficult to forecast that the IndiaChina border conflict will be resolved through bilateral diplomacy alone 

unless there is a fundamental change in the perceptions of both governments. Given the zero-sum preferences associated with territorial conflict, 

it is more likely that the status quo will be repeatedly disrupted making a hot 

war more likely rather than less likely, unless a grand bargain is struck.

Internal Balancing and Domestic Factors in Predicting 

Conflict Outcomes

It would be equally difficult to envisage that China would not be tempted 

to rely on its superior military and diplomatic capability to gradually erode 

India’s resolve and force it to accept a situation which may not be to India’s 

likening. As the literature on enduring rivalries suggests, an external shock 

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Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific

that is either exogenous or endogenous to the rivalry dynamics might be 

required to break the stable conflict equilibrium that currently governs the 

India-China conflict.76

The possibility of a border settlement not only depends on the national perceptions of where the borders of each country begin and end 

along the 4,057 km LAC, but it also depends on a confluence of domestic 

factors. China is facing a variety of domestic political challenges that is 

testing the limits of its governance. Beijing is routinely resorting to reflexive authoritarianism and more government resources are being diverted 

to confront threat of the coronavirus, which emerged in Wuhan city in 

Hubei Province and it is causing a global pandemic of monumental proportions. In India, the episodic outbreak of inter-religious violence, mass 

protests over aspects of domestic policies, returning migrant workers, and 

the economic slowdown caused by the spread of the coronavirus have 

preoccupied the state and local governments.

China is facing a looming demographic deficit,77 whereas India is 

likely to experience a demographic dividend with a young and able workforce.78 India on the other hand is facing several fissiparous domestic political movements that might threaten the stability of the union of India. 

Though Beijing is facing a crisis of domestic political legitimacy, it has 

taken to technological control mechanisms, such as the application of facial recognition technology, internet policing, and the social credit system, 

accompanied by violent suppression, as in the case of Hong Kong, to 

manage domestic opposition. 79

Despite the high level summits in October 11-12, 2019 between 

Prime Minister Modi and President Xi in Mamallapuram in Tamil Nadu, 

India and the Wuhan Informal Summit in Wuhan, China from April 27-

28, 2018, widening gaps in mutual perceptions prevail and it is likely to 

continue into the future. The former Indian diplomat TCA Srinivasan 

Raghavan describes “China as a paranoid and opportunistic neighbor with 

an exaggerated sense of entitlement.”80 Raghavan’s sentiments correctly 

encapsulate the predominant view in India. The May-June 2020 military 

clash along the LAC has hardened Indian sentiments towards China.81

A majority of Indians hold unfavorable view of China (41%); only 26 

percent of Indians hold a favorable view of China according a Pew Research Survey conducted in 2017.82 In comparison, 49% of Indians hold a 

favorable view of the United States with only 9% holding an unfavorable 

view.83 In the same survey, 56% of India views China’s growing military 

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Are India And China Destined For War? Three Future Scenarios

strength as a bad thing. In another recent survey, two-thirds of the Indian 

respondents identified China as a bigger problem than Pakistan.84 Fear, 

anxiety, and mistrust of China pervades in the Indian strategic community. 

Most recent Chinese incursion in the LAC has further worsened China’s 

already dwindling popularity in India. The Indian Army chief, General M. 

M. Naravane, addressing a gathering, argued that China has “created this 

aura of China being the undisputed military leader” without firing a single 

shot or inviting counteraction. General Naravane argued that India needs 

to learn how to deal with “non-contact or grey-zone warfare.”85

Conclusion

In this chapter we discussed three scenarios—Status quo, Grand Bargain, 

and Hot War—that are possible conflict pathways between India and 

China. In the next 0 to 15 years, a grand bargain for a border settlement 

seems highly improbable, if not impossible, which would make status quo

the default option particularly for India. India is interested in ensuring that 

an escalatory war does not breakout with China while it is battling a global 

pandemic and drawing up plans to revive its economy. In the next 15 to 30 

years, any and all of the scenarios are likely to prevail. However, the expectation is that if a grand bargain is not struck, then the possibilities of a hot 

war become increasingly higher. It is a safe bet to make that the status quo is 

unlikely to prevail in the long duration—15 years and beyond—because by 

that time the expectation is that a grand bargain will be negotiated or there 

will be a military clash, assuming that other things remain the same. There 

are also few other possibilities such as India could experience significant 

domestic political upheaval causing some states to secede or they attempt 

to secede, testing the territorial union of India. Pakistan and India could 

go to war over a terror attack that may have its origins in Pakistan. 

A conventional war would significantly weaken India and Pakistan, 

and worse yet a nuclear war would dramatically destroy both countries and 

its population, effectively rendering the territorial designs dead. Another 

major global pandemic could weaken China’s authoritarian control over 

its citizens, making domestic political change plausible or there could be a 

military clash between United States and China as posited by the Thucydides 

Trap, which encourages India to take a far more assertive posture against 

China. Domestic politics and leadership change within China could also 

change in such a way that it forces the country to reconsider the aggressive 

path it is pursuing with regards to trade and territorial disputes. Beijing’s 

actions against India have mirrored similar efforts to its territorial claims in 

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Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific

Notes

1 Donald Kagan, The Peloponnesian War (New York: Viking, 2003).

2 Graham Allison, Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap? (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2017). For some critical discussion of the Thucydides Trap, see Chapter 2 of this volume and Steve Chan, Thucydides’s Trap? Historical Interpretation, Logic of Inquiry, and the Future of Sino-American Relations (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2020).

3 Abir Chattaraj, “Thucydides Trap in Asia: The Sino-Indian Conflict,” Modern 

Diplomacy, October 25, 2016, https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2016/10/25/thucydides- trap-in-asia-the-sino-indian-conflict/

4 B. M. Jain, China’s Soft Power Diplomacy in South Asia: Myth or Reality? (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2017), p. 31.

5 Tulsi Jayakumar, “The Myth of the Barking Dog,” Live Mint, November 1, 2016, 

https://www.livemint.com/Opinion/iukS0Mm92GFOHm7C9JuClI/The-mythof-the-barking-dog.html; Liu Xiaoxue, “Indian Boycott of Chinese Goods Results 

in Little Political effect,” Global Times, October 19, 2016, http://www.globaltimes. cn/content/1012431.shtml; Ananath Krishnan, “Why India is No Match for China 

in Southeast Asia,” Daily O, September 8, 2015, https://www.dailyo.in/politics/ asean-india-china-ties-south-china-sea-narendra-modi-act-east-look-east-xi-jinping/

story/1/5554.html

6 Nikhil Inamdar, “Can India afford to boycott Chinese products?” BBC News,

June 25, 2020, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-53150898

7 Frank O’Donnell and Alex Bollfrass, “The Strategic Postures of China and India A Visual Guide,” Harvard Kennedy School, March 2020, https://www.belfercenter.

org/sites/default/files/2020-03/india-china-postures/China%20India%20Postures.

pdf

8 Manu Pubby, “Don’t have Capability or Intention to Match China Force for Force: Navy chief,” Indian Express, August 11, 2009, http://archive.indianexpress. com/news/don-t-have-capability-or-intention-to-match-china-force-for-force-navychief/500573/

9 Siddharth Chakraborty, “How India Stacks Up against China, and Why China Can’t Win Despite its Military Superiority,” Economic Times, July 13, 2018, https:// economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/why-china-cant-subdue-india-despiteits-obvious-military-superiority/articleshow/59679615.cms

10 Rajeev Deshpande, “Several Strategic Objectives at Play in India-China Border Standoff,” Times of India, June 3, 2020, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/article- show/76165955.cms?utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_

campaign=cppst

South China Sea. Chinese Navy and other assorted vessels have menaced 

fishing and research vessels from Vietnam, Malaysia and Indonesia.86 Beijing’s aggressiveness with regards to South China Sea disputes could lead 

to the formation of an alliance against China in which various countries 

from the Indo-Pacific could from an alliance to lead a fightback against 

expansive Chinese maritime claims. 

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Are India And China Destined For War? Three Future Scenarios

11 Chris Dougherty, “Force Development Options for India by 2030,” Center for New American Security, October 23, 2019, https://www.cnas.org/publications/

reports/force-development-options-for-india-by-2030

12 Aman Dwivedi, “Highlights: 20 Indian Soldiers Killed; 43 Chinese Casualties In Ladakh,” NDTV News, June 17, 2020, https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/india- china-updates-army-officer-2-soldiers-killed-in-violent-face-off-with-china-in-lada- kh-2247070

13 Russell Goldman, “India-China Border Dispute: A Conflict Explained,” New York 

Times, June 17, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/17/world/asia/india- china-border-clashes.html

14 John Vasquez, The War Puzzle-Revisited (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

15 A.G. Noorani, India-China Boundary Problem, 1846-1947: History and Diplomacy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).

16 Jianglin Li, Tibet in Agony: Lhasa 1959 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2016).

17 Prabhash K Dutta, “This day in 1962: China-India war started with synchro- nised attack on Ladakh, Arunachal,” India Today, October 20, 2017, https://www. indiatoday.in/india/story/india-china-war-1962-20-october-aksai-chin-nefa-arunchalpradesh-1067703-2017-10-20; John Garver, Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century(Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2001).

18 Lyle J. Morris, et al., Gaining Competitive Advantage in the Gray Zone: Response Options for Coercive Aggression Below the Threshold of Major War (Santa Monica: Rand Corpora- tion, 2019).

19 Maree Conway, “An Overview of Foresight Methodologies,” Thinking Futures, http://www.forschungsnetzwerk.at/downloadpub/An-Overview-of-ForesightMethodologies1.pdf

20 Indrani Bagchi, “ LAC face-off: India to Push China for Maps to Clarify Claim Lines, Actual Control,” Times of India, July 13, 2020, https://timesofindia.indiatimes. com/india/india-to-push-china-for-maps-to-clarify-claim-lines-actual-control/article- show/76930654.cms

21 Robert Haddick, “Salami Slicing in the South China Sea: China’s Slow, Patient 

Approach to Dominating Asia,” Foreign Policy, August 3, 2012, https://foreignpolicy. com/2012/08/03/salami-slicing-in-the-south-china-sea/

22 G. V. C. Naidu, Mumin Chen, and Raviprasad Narayanan, eds., India and China in the Emerging Dynamics of East Asia (India: Springer, 2014).

23 M. Taylor Fravel, Strong Borders, Secure Nation Cooperation and Conflict in China’s Ter- ritorial Disputes (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008).

24 Alison A. Kaufman, The “Century of Humiliation” and China’s National Narra- tives,” Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 

Hearing on “China’s Narratives Regarding National Security Policy,” March 10, 2011, 

https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/3.10.11Kaufman.pdf

25 Press Trust of India, “Tawang is Part of China, Says Tibetan Scholar,” Business 

Standard, March 23, 2017, https://www.business-standard.com/article/international/ tawang-is-part-of-china-says-tibetan-scholar-117032300813_1.html

26 Claude Arpi, “Tawang: One of India’s Most Strategic Districts and a Sacred Hub for Buddhists,” India Today, September 7, 2018, https://www.indiatoday. in/mail-today/story/tawang-buddhism-tibet-dalai-lama-china-india-simla-con- vention-1116137-2017-12-26; Edward Wong, “China and India Dispute Enclave 

on Edge of Tibet,” New York Times, September 3, 2009, https://www.nytimes. com/2009/09/04/world/asia/04chinaindia.html

301
Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific

27 Hindustan Times, “Envoy’s Arunachal Visit Shows Our Support for India’s Sov- ereignty: US,” Hindustan Times, October 31, 2019, https://www.hindustantimes.com/ india-news/envoy-s-arunachal-visit-shows-our-support-for-india-s-sovereignty-us/

story-G6xeYkc56wq1wE8yaO7WNJ.html

28 IANS, “China wants to appropriate Dalai Lama’s succession process: Experts,” NewsD, July 16, 2019, https://newsd.in/china-wants-to-appropriate-dalai-lama-s- succession-process-experts/

29 Jianglin Li, Tibet in Agony: Lhasa 1959, trans.Susan Wilf (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2016).

30 Atman Trivedi, “One Year On, Should India Rethink Its Reset With China?” 

War on the Rocks, April 17, 2019, https://warontherocks.com/2019/04/one-year- on-should-india-rethink-its-reset-with-china/; Tanvi Madan, “Dancing With the 

Dragon? Deciphering India’s ‘China Reset’,” War on the Rocks, April 26, 2018, https:// warontherocks.com/2018/04/dancing-with-the-dragon-deciphering-indias-chinareset/

31 Ngodup Dongchung, “China should be wary of meddling in the Dalai Lama’s reincarnation,” The Week, January 27, 2020, https://www.theweek.in/news/ world/2020/01/27/china-should-be-wary-of-meddling-in-the-dalai-lama-incarna- tion.html

32 Sajid Farid Shapoo, “The Dangers of Pakistan’s Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Why Pakistan’s tactical nukes are inherently a threat to the country’s nuclear security,” 

National Interest, February 1, 2017, https://thediplomat.com/2017/02/the-dangers- of-pakistans-tactical-nuclear-weapons/; Ben Brown, “Pakistan Threatens War on 

India and ‘Any Superpower.’ It’s Time to Take this Nuclear Conflict Seriously,” CCN 

News, March 11, 2019, https://www.ccn.com/pakistan-nuclear-war-india-superpow- er/

33 Charlie Gao, “5 Ways China Has Turned Pakistan Into a Military Monster,” National Interest, February 29, 2020, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/5-ways- china-has-turned-pakistan-military-monster-128542; Jane Merriman, ed.,“China 

signs deal to build new nuclear reactor in Pakistan: WNN,” Reuters, November 24, 

2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-pakistan-nuclear-china/china-signsdeal-to-build-new-nuclear-reactor-in-pakistan-wnn-idUSKBN1DO1W6; Scott 

Neuman, “China Acknowledges Sale Of Advanced Missile Technology To Paki- stan,” National Public Radio, March 22, 2018, https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo- way/2018/03/22/595967125/china-acknowledges-sale-of-advanced-missile-technol- ogy-to-pakistan

34 Kyle Mizokami, “The Possibility of Nuclear War Between India and Pakistan Is Greater Than Experts Would Prefer,” National Interest, November 4, 2019, https:// nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/possibility-nuclear-war-between-india-and-pakistangreater-experts-would-prefer-92716 

35 Hans M. Kristensen & Matt Korda,“Tactical nuclear weapons, 2019,” Bulletin o  the Atomic Scientists 76, no. 5 (August 30,2019): 252-261, https://www.tandfonline. com/doi/full/10.1080/00963402.2019.16542

36 Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, “Pakistan’s Nasr Missile: ‘Cold Water’ over India’s ‘Cold Start’?” Observer Research Foundation, February 1, 2019, https://www.orfon- line.org/research/pakistans-nasr-missile-cold-water-over-indias-cold-start-47711/

37 Mansoor Ahmed, “Pakistan’s Tactical Nuclear Weapons and Their Impact on Stability,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 30, 2016, https://

carnegieendowment.org/2016/06/30/pakistan-s-tactical-nuclear-weapons-and-theirimpact-on-stability-pub-63911

38 Varun Vira, “Escalating from Terrorism to Nuclear War on the Asian Subcon- tinent,” Small Wars Journal, April 4, 2012, https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/ escalating-from-terrorism-to-nuclear-war-on-the-asian-subcontinent

302
Are India And China Destined For War? Three Future Scenarios

39 Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, “Pakistan’s Nasr Missile: ‘Cold Water’ over India’s ‘Cold Start’?” Observer Research Foundation, February 1, 2019, https://www.orfon- line.org/research/pakistans-nasr-missile-cold-water-over-indias-cold-start-47711/; 

Pradip R. Sagar, “How will India handle a two-front war? Army chief General 

Naravane explains,” The Week, January 11, 2020, https://www.theweek.in/news/ india/2020/01/11/how-will-india-handle-a-two-front-war-army-chief-general-nara- vane-explains.html

40 T. V. Paul, ed., The India-Pakistan Conflict: An Enduring Rivalry (Montréal: Cam- bridge University Press, 2005), 38; Brahma Chellaney, “The Many Myths of Kashmir 

and the Subversive Role of Pakistan,” Live Mint,September 9, 2019, https://www. livemint.com/opinion/online-views/the-many-myths-of-kashmir-and-the-subver- sive-role-of-pakistan-1568050894392.html

41 Stephen Philip Cohen, “India, Pakistan and Kashmir,” The Brookings Institu- tion, December 2001, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/

cohens20011201.pdf

42 Varun Parekh, “Why ‘Akhand Bharat’ Is A Pipe Dream,” Huffington Post India, March 17, 2016, https://www.huffingtonpost.in/varun-parekh/why-akhand-bharatremains_b_9461132.html

43 Christopher Snedden, Shifting Geo-politics in the Greater South Asia Region (Honolulu, HI: Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, April 2016), https://

www.jstor.org/stable/resrep14025 

44 World Bank, “Fact Sheet: The Indus Waters Treaty 1960 and the Role of the World Bank,” June 11, 2018, https://www.worldbank.org/en/region/sar/brief/factsheet-the-indus-waters-treaty-1960-and-the-world-bank

45 Christopher Snedden, “To take – not retake – ‘Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir’,” The Lowy Institute, September 20, 2019, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-inter- preter/take-not-retake-pakistan-occupied-kashmir

46 “China claims approximately 90,000 square kilometers of Indian territory in the State of Arunachal Pradesh,” and the Indian government has firmly “reiterated that 

Arunachal Pradesh is an integral and inalienable part of India.” In addition, this posi- tion “has been clearly conveyed to the Chinese side on several occasions, including 

at the highest level.” Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, “Q.No.800, 

Chinese Statement Over Arunachal Pradesh,” Rajya Sabha, April 30, 2015, https://

www.mea.gov.in/rajya-sabha.htm?dtl/25163/qno800chinese+statement+over+aruna

chal+pradesh

47 Aidan Milliff, “Tension High, Altitude Higher: Logistical and Physiological Constraints on the Indo-Chinese Border,” War on the Rocks, June 8, 2020, https:// warontherocks.com/2020/06/tension-high-altitude-higher-logistical-and-physiologi- cal-constraints-on-the-indo-chinese-border/

48 “Galwan Valley: Image Appears to Show Nail-Studded Rods Used in India- China Brawl,” BBC News, June 18, 2020, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia- india-53089037

49 Erik O. Kimbrougha, Roman M. Sheremetab, and Timothy Shields, “Resolving Conflicts by a Random Device,” School of Business and Economics, Maastricht 

University and Chapman University, September 7, 2011, https://www.chapman.edu/

ESI/wp/Sherementa-Shields_ResolvingConflictsbyRandomDevice.pdf

50 Gary Goertz and Paul F. Diehl, “The Initiation and Termination of Enduring Rivalries: The Impact of Political Shocks,” American Journal of Political Science 39, no. 1 

(February 1995) 30-52.

51 Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, “Agreement between the Government of the Republic of India and the Government of the People’s Republic 

of China on Border Defence Cooperation,” October 23, 2013, https://www.mea.

gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/22366/Agreement+between+the+Government

303
Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific

+of+the+Republic+of+India+and+the+Government+of+the+Peoples+Republic

+of+China+on+Border+Defence+Cooperation

52 Antara Ghosal Singh, “The Standoff and China’s India Policy Dilemma,” The 

Hindu, July 15, 2020, https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/the-stand-off-and- chinas-india-policy-dilemma/article32083539.ece

53 Edward Ashbee and Kashish Parpiani, “US-India defence ties ‘socialising’ India into the Indo-Pacific calculus,” Observer Research Foundation, August 29, 2019, 

https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/us-india-defence-ties-socialising-indiaindo-pacific-calculus-54884/

54 J.P. Lawrence, “US Marines, Indian military build ties in first Tiger Triumph exer- cise,” Stars and Stripes, November 20, 2019 https://www.stripes.com/news/pacific/ us-marines-indian-military-build-ties-in-first-tiger-triumph-exercise-1.607978

55 Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “Indian Machiavelli’ Urges Confronting China,” Breaking 

Defense, November 12, 2015, https://breakingdefense.com/2015/11/indian-machia- velli-urges-confronting-china/

56 Erik Kimbrougha, Roman Sheremetab, and Timothy Shields, “Resolving Con- flicts by a Random Device,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 99, no. 1 

(May 2015), 19.

57 Kartik Bommakanti, “India’s Two-Front War Challenge: The Problem of Choice, Scenarios and Uncertainty,” Observer Research Foundation, October 10, 2019, 

https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/indias-two-front-war-challenge-problemof-choice-scenarios-and-uncertainty/; Abhijnan Rej, “The Sobering Arithmetic of 

a Two-Front War,” Observer Research Foundation, July 10, 2018, https://www.

orfonline.org/research/the-sobering-arithmetic-of-a-two-front-war/

58 Hsin-Huang Michael Hsiao, Cheng-Yi Lin, eds., Rise of China: Beijing’s Strategies and Implications for the Asia-Pacific (New York: Routledge, 2009).

59 “1025 Chinese transgressions reported from 2016 to 2018: Government data,” Economic Times, November 28, 2019, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/ defence/1025-chinese-transgressions-reported-from-2016-to-2018-governmentdata/articleshow/72262114.cms?from=mdr

60 Ankit Panda, “No First Use’ and Nuclear Weapons,” Council on Foreign Rela- tions, July 17, 2018, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/no-first-use-and-nuclearweapons

61 For a detailed discussion of India’s NFU doctrine and its consequences see, Christopher Clary and Vipin Narang, “India’s New Nuclear Thinking: Counterforce, 

Crises, and Consequences,” Harvard Kennedy School, May 24, 2019, https://www.

belfercenter.org/publication/indias-new-nuclear-thinking-counterforce-crises-andconsequences

62 Yogesh Joshi, “Angles and Dangles: Arihant and the Dilemma of India’s Under- sea Nuclear Weapons,” War on the Rocks, January 19, 2019, https://warontherocks. com/2019/01/angles-and-dangles-arihant-and-the-dilemma-of-indias-underseanuclear-weapons/

63 Xiaoping Yang, “China’s Perceptions of India as a Nuclear Weapons Power,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 30 June 2016, https://carnegieendow- ment.org/2016/06/30/china-s-perceptions-of-india-as-nuclear-weapons-powerpub-63970

64 Ibid.

65 “India Will Suffer Worse Losses than 1962 If It Incites Border Clash,” Global 

Times, July 7, 2017, https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1054925.shtml; The term “teach India a lesson” was used by Mao and Zhou Enlai with reference to China’s 

304
Are India And China Destined For War? Three Future Scenarios

1962 war against India. For a discussion see, Margaret MacMillan, Nixon and Mao: 

The Week that Changed the World (New York: Random House, 2008), 238.

66 Kanwal Sibal, “View: India Must Respond to Chinese Provocation,” Economic 

Times, August 19, 2019, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and- nation/view-india-must-respond-to-chinese-provocation/articleshow/70730720.cms

67 Sebastien Roblin, “More U.S.-India Arms Sales Could Follow $3.5 Billion 

Helicopter Deal,” Forbes, February 26, 2020, https://www.forbes.com/sites/sebas- tienroblin/2020/02/26/modi-and-trump-sign-35-billion-helicopter-deal-more-couldfollow/#696264c923aa

68 Jagannath Panda, “India and the ‘Quad Plus’ Dialogue,” Commentary, The Royal United Services Institute, June 12, 2020, https://rusi.org/commentary/india-strate- gic-quad

69 Press Trust of India, ‘China Rules Out India’s Nuke Club NSG Entry Without Talks On Treaty,” NDTV News, June 21, 2019, https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/ china-rules-out-indias-nuke-club-nsg-entry-without-talks-on-treaty-2057170

70 Vinay Kaura, “China on India’s UNSC Bid: Neither Yes Nor No,” The Diplomat, June 3, 2015, https://thediplomat.com/2015/06/china-on-indias-unsc-bid-neitheryes-nor-no/

71 Daniel Kliman, Iskander Rehman, Kristine Lee, and Joshua Fitt, “Imbalance of Power: India’s Military Choices in an Era of Strategic Competition with China,” 

Center for New American Security, October 23, 2018, https://www.cnas.org/publi- cations/reports/imbalance-of-power

72 Jonah Blank, “What Were China’s Objectives in the Doklam Dispute?” Rand Corporation, September 8, 2017, https://www.rand.org/blog/2017/09/what-werechinas-objectives-in-the-doklam-dispute.html

73 Ashley J. Tellis, “Hustling in the Himalayas: The Sino-Indian Border Confronta- tion,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 4, 2020, https://carn- egieendowment.org/2020/06/04/hustling-in-himalayas-sino-indian-border-confron- tation-pub-81979

74 Ibid.

75 Rajesh Rajagopalan, “India’s Strategic Choices: China and the Balance of Power in Asia,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September 14, 2017, https://

carnegieindia.org/2017/09/14/india-s-strategic-choices-china-and-balance-of-pow- er-in-asia-pub-73108

76 T.V. Paul, ed., China-India Rivalry in the Globalization Era, (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2018).

77 Euan McKirdy, “Study: China Faces ‘Unstoppable’ Population Decline by Mid- Century,” CNN, January 7, 2019, https://www.cnn.com/2019/01/07/asia/china- population-decline-study-intl/index.html

78 Vishnu Padmanabhan, “How to Reap India’s Demographic Dividend,” Live Mint, July 17, 2019, https://www.livemint.com/news/india/how-to-reap-india-s-demo- graphic-dividend-1563382235153.html

79 Nicholas Wright, Artificial Intelligence, China, Russia, and the Global Order (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 2019).

80 TCA Srinivasan Raghavan, “China: A Paranoid and Opportunistic Neighbor,” The 

Telegraph, March 4, 2020, https://www.telegraphindia.com/culture/books/china-a- paranoid-and-opportunistic-neighbour/cid/1750940

305
Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific

81 Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, “Darkening Mood in Delhi Over China,” The Diplo- mat, July 3, 2020, https://thediplomat.com/2020/07/darkening-mood-in-delhi-over- china/

82 “Global Attitudes and Trends,” Pew Research Center, November 13, 2017, 

https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2017/11/15/india-and-the-world/pg_2017-

11-15_india-modi_4-02/

83 “Indians’ mixed view of other countries,” Pew Research Center, November 13, 

2017, https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2017/11/15/india-and-the-world/

84 “68% people Believe China bigger problem for India than Pakistan: Survey,” Economic Times, June 23, 2020, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics- and-nation/68-people-believe-china-bigger-problem-for-india-than-pakistan-survey/

articleshow/76534897.cms?from=mdr

85 “China’s Created Aura of Military Might Without Combat: Army Chief,” The 

Times of India, March 5, 2020, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/chinas- created-aura-of-military-might-without-combat-army-chief/articleshow/74483985.

cms

86 Jin Wu and Steven Lee Myers, “Battle in the Himalayas,” New York Times, July 18, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/07/18/world/asia/china-indiaborder-conflict.html

306
307

20

HAS MYANMAR BECOME CHINA’S 

BACK DOOR TO THE INDIAN OCEAN?

Miemie Winn Byrd

Introduction

Geography plays a significant role in the strategic competition between the 

United States and China. Recognizing this fact of life, many U.S. strategists 

have focused on the South China Sea but for various reasons omitted the 

Indian Ocean.1 This omission highlights a persistent blind spot for many 

U.S. strategists in the context of strategic competition. This blind spot has 

precluded them from appreciating the significance of Myanmar given its 

important geographical location. U.S. foreign policy towards Myanmar historically has been centered on the human rights and democratization issue. 

Meanwhile, Beijing considers Myanmar a strategically imperative country 

in Southeast Asia for China’s geostrategic positioning and its overall grand 

strategy, which are aimed at leading Asia and diminishing America’s access and influence in the region. With over 2,000 kilometers of coastline 

along the Bay of Bengal and the Andaman Sea, proximity to the western 

entrance of the Malacca Strait, and a direct linkage to the Indian Ocean, 

Myanmar is a geographically significant country in Asia. That was the reason the British colonials and the Japanese during World War II strived to 

control Myanmar. The same geopolitical interests apply to modern-day 

China. A clear indication of this can be seen in Chinese President Xi Jinping’s successful visit to Myanmar in January 2020 at the heel of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruling regarding Myanmar’s treatment of 

the Rohingyas. While others are preoccupied with battling the COVID-19 

pandemic, Beijing has increased its diplomatic pressure to expedite the 

finalization of the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) deal.2
Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific

Beijing’s desire to establish a back door through Myanmar to the Indian 

Ocean is now much closer to becoming a reality.

As strategic competition heats up in the region, it is imperative for U.S. 

policy makers and strategists to reassess the impact of its bilateral policies 

on U.S. strategic position. U.S. policy toward Myanmar must enhance U.S. 

position within the context of strategic competition and assist the overall 

U.S. national and Indo-Pacific security strategy. Particularly, it must reflect 

the strategic imperatives of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific vision. In 

the long run, such a strategically-minded policy will help obtain the human 

rights and democratization goals that are honorable and worthy foreign 

policy aims for the United States. 

The Tortured History of U.S.-Myanmar Relations

U.S.-Myanmar relations for the past 30 years have been dominated by 

sanctions and limited engagement. As a 2018 report of the Congressional Research Service notes, “[b]etween 1989 and 2008, Congress passed 

a series of laws imposing diplomatic and economic sanctions on Burma’s 

military junta, in response to its violent suppression of democratic protests in 1988, 1990, 2003, and 2007.”3

 Another series of mass protests in 

2007—this time led by Buddhist monks and triggered by an economic 

shock—resulted in confrontation and bloodshed. About 8 months after 

the uprising on May 1, 2008, the United States announced a fresh set of 

sanctions on Myanmar. Coincidentally, on the night of May 2, Cyclone 

Nargis hit Myanmar. The United States sent disaster management specialists to assist the Myanmar government with assessment of damages 

immediately after the cyclone. However, the Myanmar generals were absolutely convinced that it was a U.S. ploy to invade Myanmar.4

 The lack 

of trust by Myanmar officials, and their decision of to reject U.S. aid, may 

have prevented innocent lives from being lost but their mindset and fear 

were forged in the past. Thirty years of sanctions could not be overcome. 

A New Beginning for U.S.-Myanmar Relations

Two years after Cyclone Nargis (2010), Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, the 

leader of Myanmar’s National League for Democracy (NLD), was released from house arrest. The Myanmar military regime loosened its grip 

and allowed the country to transition from military authoritarian regime to 

a constitution-based semi-democratic government led by a retired general, 

308
Has Myanmar Become China’s Back Door to the Indian Ocean?

U Thein Sein. U.S. policymakers watched this transition with skepticism. 

When U Thein Sein decisively suspended the construction of Myintsone 

Dam, a big Chinese-built dam project, in September 2011 as the result 

of overwhelming public protests, the United States viewed this decision 

as a significant indicator of the authenticity of military-led democratic 

transition. Within 3 months after the Myintsone Dam suspension, U.S. 

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton made an historic visit to Myanmar. Her 

visit signaled to other western countries and U.S. allies to open their doors 

to the newly democratic Myanmar. Soon after, the United States posted 

an ambassador to head up the U.S. mission in Myanmar and started to 

ease the sanctions. President Barack Obama had historic meetings with 

President U Thein Sein in 2013 in Washington and then in Naypyitaw in 

2014. When Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s party won the free and fair elections 

in 2015 and took the helm of the government in 2016, there was much 

optimism for the future of U.S.-Myanmar relations. As of early 2017, the 

United States had lifted almost all the sanctions and U.S.-Myanmar relations were at their best. 

The U.S. U-Turn

Then came the Rohingya crisis in August 2017. The images of hundreds 

of thousands of Rohingyas fleeing to neighboring Bangladesh streamed 

all over the international news while the Myanmar military claimed to be 

responding to the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army’s (ARSA) “coordinated attacks” on the police and military outposts in western Rakhine 

State.5 The international media and community were quick to blame Daw 

Aung San Suu Kyi for the military’s ruthless response. Since then, many 

Americans came to view Myanmar through the lens of media reports on 

the plight of the Rohingya. This crisis has become another U-turn point 

for Myanmar’s relations with the United States and the West. The United 

States quickly suspended many of the engagements as special interest 

groups put pressure on the U.S. Congress to pass sanctions.

China Achieves Vital Strategic Gains

The August 2017 Rohingya crisis provided China with a lucky opportunity 

to regain its grip on Myanmar. On the heels of the International Court of 

Justice (ICJ) ruling regarding the Myanmar treatment of the Rohingyas, 

Chinese President Xi Jinping made a visit to Myanmar in January 2020.. 

The visit represented a successful step to reach Beijing’s goal of establish309
Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific

ing a back door through Myanmar to the Indian Ocean. Up until this crisis, 

Myanmar had put its relationship with China on a back-burner as Western 

countries led by the United States increased their engagements following 

Secretary Clinton’s visit in December 2011. Myanmar was presented with 

plenty of options for engagement and received many offers of assistance 

for the development of the country’s governance institutions and economy in support of on-going democratic transition. Beijing watched the 

unfolding landscape in Myanmar with increasing concern. It felt it were 

blind-sided by the military-led democratic transition in 2010. The leadership in Beijing was shocked when President U Thein Sein suspended 

the big construction project of the Myintsone Dam in September 2011.6

Their uneasiness increased as the European Union and the United States 

started to insert themselves into Myanmar’s peace talk processes. By 2015, 

Beijing felt that Myanmar was slipping away from its carefully constructed 

grip crafted after 1989 when the first wave of the U.S. and western sanctions went into effect to isolate Myanmar.7

 Every time the United States 

and the West tighten sanctions on Myanmar, China has been able to make 

additional headway in pulling Myanmar tighter into its grip. 

China has viewed Myanmar as a land-bridge to the Indian Ocean. 

Therefore, safeguarding and controlling the Myanmar corridor was of 

vital importance for Beijing’s foreign policy.8 This recognition and the 

ensuing Chinese ambition date back to the early Chinese explorers who 

searched for a route from the land-locked provinces of China (such as the 

modern-day Yunnan area) via Myanmar to the sea.9 Additionally, Myanmar provides a strategic alternative to China’s “Malacca Dilemma.” China’s dependency on the narrow Strait of Malacca, where a majority of its 

shipping and energy supplies must traverse through, created a significant 

vulnerability in its strategic competition with the United States. Beijing 

sees unfettered access to the Myanmar corridor as a key remedy to this 

strategic vulnerability. After Xi Jinping’s January visit and throughout the 

COVID-19 pandemic period, Beijing has increased its diplomatic efforts 

to expedite the finalization of the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor 

(CMEC) deal.10 Furthermore, access to over 2,000 kilometers of Myanmar 

coastline strategically located at the western entrance to the Malacca Strait 

and with direct access to the Indian Ocean would give China an enormous 

advantage over its major competitors. If this comes to fruition, China will 

be able to control both the eastern part of Malacca Strait via the artificial 

islands in the South China Sea and the western part via Myanmar.

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Has Myanmar Become China’s Back Door to the Indian Ocean?

Myanmar, similar to most mainland Southeast Asian nations, shared 

the same fear of its powerful northern neighbor throughout history. Since 

the end of World War II, China’s Communist Party has supported and 

armed communist insurgent groups in Myanmar. Given these Chinese actions, Myanmar has always approached China’s foreign policy with skepticism and caution. However, the stringent Western sanctions left no alternative for Myanmar. Following the sanctions in 1989, Myanmar agreed 

to open its northern border for trade. Myanmar became China’s major 

foreign market for cheap consumer goods and China became a major importer of Myanmar timber, forestry products, minerals, seafood, and agricultural produce.11 By the end of 1991, China became one of the major 

lenders for infrastructure projects in Myanmar and began selling massive 

supplies of military hardware to the Myanmar military.12 Fashioning after 

the United States’ International Military Education and Training (IMET) 

program, China started to educate the next generation of Myanmar military officers. Although the relationship appeared close and friendly on the 

surface, there were still a sense of unease within the Myanmar regime.

Another round of U.S. sanctions in 2004 and 2008 gave needed leverage to China as it pushed for building an oil and gas pipeline connecting 

China’s interior to Myanmar’s Rakhine western coast. The construction 

of the 800 kilometer dual-pipeline commenced in October 2009, providing China with a significant strategic “end-run” around the Malacca Strait 

chokepoint. China’s ability to influence and pressure Myanmar’s military 

regime to allow the construction of the oil and gas dual-pipeline from the 

Yunnan Province to the deep-seaport in Kyaukphyu, on the western coast 

of Myanmar, was a significant major breakthrough. Myanmar’s military 

regime caved in under the western sanctions. This breakthrough delivered 

China a vital strategic alternative to the “Malacca Dilemma” for the first 

time in history. It has also largely neutralized the United States’ previous 

geostrategic advantage with its ability to disrupt China’s energy supply 

route through the Malacca Strait in time of crisis. Indeed, China has been 

able to maneuver out of its entrapping terrain, one of the elements of nine 

terrains of Sun-tzu’s Art of War principle of know the terrain.

13 

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Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific

The Need for Alignment with the U.S. National Security 

Strategy

As the strategic competition between the United States and China escalates in the Indo-Pacific region, pillar number four of the U.S. National 

Security Strategy (NSS December 2017) called for “Advancing American 

Influence.” The NSS specifically recognized that the “Chinese dominance 

risks diminishing the sovereignty of many states in the Indo-Pacific.”14 It 

specifically stated “the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 

and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) remain centerpieces of 

the Indo-Pacific’s regional architecture and platforms for promoting an 

order based on freedom.” Focusing on ASEAN as a regional architecture centerpiece requires efforts to bolster the unity of ASEAN members 

to withstand China’s overtures in the region. Therefore, the need for the 

United States to synchronize its regional strategy with bilateral policies towards ASEAN members is critical. The bilateral policies could inadvertently undermine the regional strategy if these policies are not nested or 

aligned with the intended outcome laid out by the NSS.

Isolating and excluding Myanmar from U.S.-sponsored defense and 

security related activities will give more reasons for Myanmar to turn to 

China, the major strategic competitor of the United States in the IndoPacific region. This in turn may be inadvertently weakening ASEAN. 

“Divide and rule” is a preferred Chinese strategy towards ASEAN. So 

far, China has been able to dominate two (Cambodia and Laos) out of 

five mainland ASEAN members and Myanmar could become the third. 

ASEAN members that rely on China for economic and diplomatic support could be dominated by China and have to act as Beijing’s “Trojan 

horses” in ASEAN in exchange for Chinese largess. The more ASEAN 

members are dominated by China, the more Beijing is able to influence 

the group, and the more ASEAN’s unity is weakened. Therefore, if the 

U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy gives center stage to Southeast Asia and regards 

ASEAN as one of its centerpieces, it must align and synchronize its bilateral policies and practices towards the ASEAN member countries to 

support regional strategy.

Bilateral policies that are less in tune with the strategic imperatives of 

the larger regional and global policies may inadvertently create opportunities for China to gain undue influence over Myanmar and enable China 

to open the back door to the Indian Ocean. Continued disengagement 

and sanctions by the United States and the West could further narrow 

Myanmar’s international space, limit its geostrategic choices, eventually 

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Has Myanmar Become China’s Back Door to the Indian Ocean?

pushing Myanmar closer to the China. Such conditions would be neither 

helpful for the people of Myanmar nor U.S. national security interest in the 

region. As the strategic competition escalates in the Indo-Pacific region, 

U.S. policy should serve to increase America’s influence in and access to 

Myanmar. This requires minimizing the unintended consequences of policies that may contradict the strategic imperatives of the Free and Open 

Indo-Pacific vision.

On the other hand, broadening U.S. bilateral policy to include U.S. 

national security interests and strategic competition dimensions will, in 

the long term, have a positive impact on Myanmar’s human rights and 

democratization efforts as the United States is able to increase its access 

and influence. The institutionalization of democratic and human rights 

values take time. It is unrealistic and naive for the puritanical advocates 

of human rights to think that deep-seated ignorance of human rights issues within Myanmar institutions could be transformed within four to five 

years of engagement. The United States’ enduring and persistent engagement with South Korea since the end of the Korean War would be a good 

model to apply to Myanmar’s case. During these decades, from the 1950s 

to the 1990s, South Korea had internal coups and killings; thousands were 

arrested and hundreds were killed. In the end, however, liberal values were 

able to take root and the political system changed to the better, not least 

thanks to multiple channels between the South Korean society and the 

United States. It took the South Korean people at least four decades to 

change the value system of their society and the character of their political regime. Myanmar, which has 70 years of non-engagement with the 

United States, cannot realign the values within four years. A formal alliance 

may not be essential; however, a general principle of persistent engagement—through some of the most tumultuous domestic political instability and gross human rights violations within South Korea—has paid off 

in the long run for both U.S. security interest and South Korea’s successful 

democratization. Similarly, through enduring and consistent engagements 

with the Myanmar government, military, and society over time, the United 

States may be able to assist Myanmar with its transformation towards a 

genuine democracy while creating access, developing trust, and habits of 

dialogue. Such consistent and enduring engagements do not need to be 

mutually exclusive with advocating for human rights and democratization.

After seizure of a large cache of brand-new Chinese-made weapons 

destined for Rakhine State by Thai officials in the Thai-Myanmar border 

area at the end of June 2020, Myanmar Chief of Defense, Senior General 

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Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific

Notes

1 For example, see Robert Kaplan, “How Trump is Losing Asia,” The Washington Post, July 8, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/07/08/how- trump-is-losing-asia/.

2 Lucas Myers, “The China-Myanmar Ecoinomic Corridor and China’s Determi- nation to See It Through,” Asia Dispatches, Wilson Center, May 26, 2020, https://

www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/china-myanmar-economic-corridor-and-chinasdetermination-see-it-through

3 Congressional Research Service, U.S. Restrictions on Relations with Burma (Washing- ton D.C., 2018).

4 Thant Myint-U, History of Burma: Race, Capitalism, and the Crisis of Democracy in the 21st Century. (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 2020), 99.

5 ICG, “Myanmar: A New Muslim Insurgency in Rakhine State,” International 

Crisis Group, 15 December 2016. https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/ myanmar/283-myanmar-new-muslim-insurgency-rakhine-state 

6 Sun Yun, “New Balance in China-Myanmar Ties,” Brookings, November 3, 2011. 

https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/new-balance-in-china-myanmar-ties/

7 Sun Yun, “Has China Lost Myanmar,” Foreign Policy, January 15, 2013. https:// foreignpolicy.com/2013/01/15/has-china-lost-myanmar/

8 Bertil Lintner, The Costliest Pearl: China’s Struggle for India’s Ocean. (London: C. Hurst & Company Ltd.), 37.

9 Thant Myint-U, History of Burma: Race, Capitalism, and the Crisis of Democracy in the 21st Century. (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2020), 117.

10 Lucas Myers, “China-Myanmar Economic Corridor.”

11 Bertil Lintner, Costliest Pearl, 41.

Min Aung Hlaing, publicly, albeit indirectly, “criticized” China by mentioning “the strong forces that support them [terrorist groups in Rakhine 

State]”.15 His call for “international cooperation in the fight against terrorism” was unprecedented. This latest development creates a small window 

of opportunity for the United States to recalibrate its engagement with 

the Myanmar government and military to pull them out of China’s sphere 

of influence.

Viewing the Indo-Pacific region and the strategic competition 

through the lens of Sun-tzu’s Art of War, terrain was identified as one of 

the major five factors in strategy considerations.16 Based on their actions, 

China’s strategy towards Myanmar heeds Sun-tzu’s advice, “know the terrain.” Therefore, it is imperative for U.S. strategists to recognize Myanmar 

as a key geographical terrain in the context of the strategic competition 

and seize the opportunities for engagement. 

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Has Myanmar Become China’s Back Door to the Indian Ocean?

12 Bertil Lintner, Costliest Pearl, 40.

13 Sun-tzu translated by Ralph D. Sawyer, The Art of War. (New York: Fall River Press, 1994), 142.

14 White House, National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, D.C., U.S. Government, 2017), 46.

15 Editorial, “Myanmar’s Generals Aren’t Happy with China and It’s No Longer a Secret,” The Irrawaddy, July 3, 2020, https://www.irrawaddy.com/opinion/editorial/ myanmars-generals-arent-happy-china-no-longer-secret.html.

16 Sun-tzu translated by Sawyer, Art of War, 142.

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21

TAIWAN’S FIGHT FOR 

INTERNATIONAL SPACE

Michael C. Burgoyne

The Taiwan Strait separating Taiwan and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has long been considered a geopolitical flashpoint. Both sides 

continue to plan and prepare for a kinetic attempt by the PRC to coerce 

Taiwan into unification. However, the gains in the conflict between these 

two entities have largely been made in non-kinetic ways: fights over diplomatic recognition and attendance in international bodies, among others. 

The battleground in which this non-kinetic fight has taken place has come 

to be labeled “international space,” where Taiwan is striving for meaningful participation in the international community—broadly defined and 

evaluated in this chapter as diplomatic relations and participation in intergovernmental organizations (IGO)—and the PRC is trying to isolate the 

island from these interactions.

Having its roots in the Chinese civil war that culminated in the 1940s, 

this fight is crucially important for both sides. The Chinese Communist 

Party (CCP) sees Taiwan as a matter of legitimacy. The Party portrays 

itself as a staunch defender of sovereignty and territorial integrity to its 

citizens, yet Taiwan remains outside its control, which it feels could delegitimize it in the eyes of the populace. Constricting Taiwan’s international 

space is a way to leave Taiwan with no other choice than eventual unification. Taiwan sees itself as a separate country in a practical sense, with a 

strong, advanced economy and many advantages; yet it is only recognized 

as a country by 14 nations, and lacks representation in many IGOs. Taiwan’s fight for international space is ultimately a fight for its survival as a 

separate entity from the PRC.
Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific

This chapter will provide a backdrop of Taiwan’s fight for international space by briefly covering the history and motivations for this conflict from the 1940s onward. It will then highlight various PRC and Taiwan 

decisions from January 2019 until the present, and how these decisions 

potentially altered third-party perceptions of the PRC and Taiwan. I will 

use the COVID-19 pandemic as both an example of how the PRC constricts Taiwan’s international space through its influence in IGOs, as well 

as a significant time in history that highlights decision-making by both 

Taiwan and the PRC to audiences worldwide. Finally, the chapter will 

conclude by showing how decisions by Taiwan and the PRC during this 

period could lead to increased international space for Taiwan.

Hindsight: History and Motivations

The conflict started before World War II in the Republic of China (ROC), 

when the ruling Nationalist Party (Kuomintang, KMT) unsuccessfully 

tried to eliminate a nascent CCP. This failure led to the mythology of the 

Long March, and a civil war for the possession of China. This civil war 

straddled World War II, when both sides called a pause in the fighting to 

address the Japanese invasion. The second half of the civil war mostly 

concluded in 1949, when the KMT led by Chiang Kai-shek fled across the 

Strait to Taiwan, leaving the CCP to consolidate its gains on the Mainland.

Though Taiwan has been at the center of this seven-decade struggle, 

it was only newly acquired by the ROC at the conflict’s onset. Japan acquired Taiwan from the Qing Dynasty in 1895 after defeating the Qing in 

the Sino-Japanese War. After it was defeated in World War II, Japan relinquished Taiwan, and the KMT-led ROC took possession of it. Taiwan and 

various groupings of islands just off the coast of the Mainland, retained 

by the KMT and called the ROC, became the last defendable bastions for 

the KMT after it fled the Mainland. Chiang Kai-shek intended to remain 

on Taiwan only long enough to build up sufficient combat power to eventually defeat the CCP and retake the Mainland. Mao Zedong, the leader 

of the CCP, fully intended to pursue Chiang Kai-shek across the strait and 

finish “liberating” Taiwan. Despite various conflicts in the 1950s, and a 

21-year artillery duel between the Mainland and Kinmen Island that concluded in 1979, neither side succeeded uniting Taiwan and the Mainland.

This history hints at one of the factors contributing to Taiwan’s ongoing fight for international space, and that is the historical importance the 

PRC ascribes to Taiwan. The CCP intended to “liberate” Taiwan during 

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Taiwan’s Fight for International Space

the civil war, as it promised to do to Mainland provinces, though this took 

on renewed importance after the KMT fled there in 1949. At that point, 

CCP intentions toward Taiwan also included finishing the revolution and 

defeating the KMT.

Over time, the CCP derived legitimacy from making the PRC strong 

enough to resist foreign influence or incursions into its territory, hearkening back to 1841, the First Opium War, and the beginning of the Century 

of Humiliation. In this context, Taiwan took on the label of a domestic 

matter, and an issue of sovereignty, from which the CCP could not visibly 

back down after linking it to the Party’s legitimacy. In 2003, PRC officials 

first labeled Taiwan as a “core interest,” which served to further elevate 

Taiwan as an extremely sensitive issue the PRC deems non-negotiable.1

Thus, in many ways, the CCP has linked its legitimacy to successfully unifying with Taiwan as a province of the PRC.

Taiwan is also an issue of strategic importance to the PRC. Taiwan 

sits in the middle of what is referred to as the First Island Chain, which 

encompasses Japan, Taiwan, and the Philippines as a part of the greater 

whole. If the PRC were to engage in combat off its eastern shoreline, it 

would be significantly hindered by a neutral Taiwan, or one allied with a 

hypothetical adversary. For this reason, Taiwan is not just an ideological 

issue, but one of practical import.

The PRC has never renounced its claim to Taiwan, and it has continued to pursue its goal to acquire Taiwan through several means. Analysts 

point to the arms race across the Strait that has tilted in Beijing’s favor in 

recent decades as a way Beijing can force unification through the use of 

its military might or the threat of it. Simultaneously, as outlined below, the 

PRC has constricted Taiwan’s international space by poaching its diplomatic allies and restricting its access to intergovernmental organizations 

with the aim that eventually Taiwan would have no choice but to accede 

to unification. 

Diplomatic Relations

Shortly after its founding in 1949, the PRC had 12 countries recognize it in 

lieu of Taiwan. It established the One China Principle, whereby countries 

acknowledge there is one China, with Taiwan as a part of it, and forced 

countries to make a decision to support one or the other. Over the years, 

the two governments competed over diplomatic recognition, bribing and 

cajoling states through “checkbook diplomacy” to win diplomatic part319
Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific

ners. The number of countries recognizing the PRC instead of Taiwan 

grew until more countries recognized the PRC than Taiwan. In 1971 when 

then U.S. National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger met with PRC Premier Zhou Enlai, it was only a matter of time before Taiwan would lose 

the recognition of the United States as well.

As of this writing, 14 countries and the Vatican formally recognize 

Taiwan. After a pause during Ma Ying-Jeou’s presidency, the PRC resumed 

actively enticing Taiwan’s diplomatic partners to switch recognition to the 

PRC, using promises of lucrative trade and investment deals, among other 

incentives. Interestingly, many of the countries that have switched recognition to the PRC retain unofficial relations with Taiwan and maintain 

organizations that conduct embassy-like functions. Though they are no 

longer official diplomatic partners of Taiwan, some of these countries, 

such as the United States, continue to selectively advocate for Taiwan in 

international settings, and thus work to increase its international space. 

Intergovernmental Organizations

In the 1970s the PRC applied pressure in the United Nations (UN) to 

switch official recognition of “China” from the Republic of China (Taiwan) to the PRC in an effort to acquire one of the permanent five seats on 

the Security Council, as well as to eventually isolate Taiwan from the UN. 

In 1971, the UN Assembly passed Resolution 2758, which granted the 

PRC the China seat in the Security Council as well as the representation 

of China to the UN. Being expelled from the UN was a major setback for 

Taiwan, drastically reducing its say in international affairs, and constricting 

its space to operate.

Being voted out of the UN was significant to Taiwan not only because of its absence in the UN plenary body, but also because it lost ready 

access to the other subordinate bodies within the UN. Crucially, many 

of these bodies are involved with or are responsible for setting rules and 

standards for many aspects of daily life in the relations between governments, and the conduct of international commercial and social activity. 

The debate during the first several months of the COVID-19 pandemic 

about Taiwan’s interactions with the World Health Organization finds its 

roots in this action. As a result of PRC efforts to enforce its One China 

Principle and reduce Taiwan’s ability to operate in the international environment, Taiwan is only allowed to participate in IGOs where statehood 

is not a requirement, which significantly limits its participation in these 

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Taiwan’s Fight for International Space

bodies. The concomitant rise of PRC influence in these bodies means the 

PRC can either formally or informally prevent Taiwan from being invited 

or attending.

Today, Taiwan participates in 59 IGOs in some capacity, including 

the World Trade Organization, Asian Development Bank, and the AsiaPacific Economic Cooperation.2

 Taiwan constantly works to preserve its 

membership and roles in these organizations, while seeking greater participation in IGOs denied to it in order to increase its international space.

Insight: A Series of Fateful Decisions

Prior to January 2020, and Taiwan President Tsai Ing-Wen’s re-election, 

it was much simpler to forecast the near-term trajectory of Taiwan-PRC 

relations, or to identify what each side of the Strait would do to advance its 

interests. Put simply, the PRC would continue to isolate Taiwan by poaching more of its diplomatic allies, limit Taiwan’s participation in international organizations—particularly when Taiwan’s president was from the 

Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)—and try to tie Taiwan’s economy 

more tightly with its own. Taiwan, in turn, would continue its efforts to 

manage its relationship with the PRC while preserving its remaining diplomatic allies and key partners, seek participation in international organizations when possible, and work to diversify its economy through efforts such as the New Southward Policy and perhaps by signing free trade 

agreements with interested countries. The details would have been different from before, but the two parties would essentially have remained in a 

holding pattern.

However, a series of decisions by CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping 

and Taiwan’s President Tsai Ing-Wen have caused the near-term trajectory 

of the relationship to be more uncertain. The first of these decisions was 

made by Xi Jinping on January 2, 2019 when he gave a speech on the 40th 

anniversary of the Message to Compatriots, originally made by former 

paramount leader Deng Xiaoping in 1979 to the citizens of Taiwan to 

announce a policy of “peaceful reunification.” Through the intervening 

years, the verbiage used by CCP senior leadership to describe reunification 

between the PRC and Taiwan has stayed mostly consistent. In the 2019 

speech, however, Xi Jinping used a turn of phrase to describe the 1992 

Consensus that sounded similar to the description of the One Country, 

Two Systems formula used in Hong Kong, which has also been offered to 

Taiwan as an example of a unification model. The 1992 Consensus is an 

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Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific

understanding reached between KMT and CCP representatives in 1992 

that formed the basis for Cross-Strait improvements under KMT administrations, and was the framework KMT presidential candidate Han Kuo-Yu 

used to promise better relations with the PRC under his future administration.3

 Tsai Ing-Wen decided to use Xi Jinping’s phrasing to her advantage, 

though, and successfully associated a Han Kuo-Yu presidency with an intent to reunify with the PRC under a One Country, Two Systems framework. This association became even more damning for the KMT when 

Taiwan voters witnessed large scale protests in Hong Kong—already managed by Beijing under a One Country, Two Systems framework—which 

started in June 2019. Han Kuo-Yu was never able to shake this association, 

and this sequence of events led to a decisive victory and a second term 

for Tsai Ing-Wen and the DPP in the January 2020 presidential elections.

The re-election of Tsai Ing-Wen provided her the political capital and 

confidence of the Taiwan populace to decisively manage the COVID-19 

challenge. The PRC and Taiwan offer a stark contrast in how they handled 

the epidemic, and moreover, provide examples of consequential decisionmaking that impact Taiwan’s difficult fight for international space. Upon 

learning of the virus in late December, Tsai Ing-Wen immediately directed 

measures be put in place to prevent the spread of the virus in Taiwan, to 

include restricting travel from Wuhan, and aggressive testing and contact 

tracing measures. Officials also worked to share what they knew domestically, with friends and partners, and with the World Health Organization 

(WHO). Many of these actions taken by Taiwan can be attributed to Taiwan’s experience with the SARS in 2003, and the painful lessons it learned 

as a result.4 As of the end of July 2020, Taiwan has had one of the greatest successes globally, containing the spread of the virus.5

 In contrast, the 

PRC was widely seen as lacking transparency and decisive action during the 

initial outbreak in Wuhan, which allowed uncontrolled spread throughout 

Wuhan and the surrounding province of Hubei before Xi Jinping ordered 

the city be put into a severe lockdown on January 23, 2020. At this point, 

however, the PRC had missed the opportunity to successfully contain the 

virus, and it was declared a pandemic on March 11, 2020.

The World Health Organization, responsible for preparing for health 

emergencies such as a pandemic, and for coordinating and assisting with 

responses, has been accused of responding slowly to COVID-19, and perhaps even pandering to the PRC while the PRC was controlling the virus 

narrative for its own purposes. The WHO’s actions from January 2020 

to the present provide an interesting glimpse of the relations between an 

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Taiwan’s Fight for International Space

IGO, the PRC, and Taiwan, and how those relations impact Taiwan’s international space.

The reporting in the news about the WHO-PRC-Taiwan triangle 

since the outbreak of the virus has not been favorable to the WHO. From 

the start of the crisis, Taiwan claimed it was trying to communicate with 

the WHO but was unsuccessful. The WHO responded that it was able to 

communicate with Taiwan, though eventually it was clarified that Taiwan 

was expected to go through the PRC to communicate with the WHO. On 

April 11, Taiwan released the contents of an email it sent to the WHO on 

December 31, 2019, in which it claimed it warned about human transmission, while the PRC did not confirm human transmission until three weeks 

later, on January 20.6 This highlighted a question that had been asked in 

various media outlets before the disclosure: why wasn’t Taiwan allowed to 

communicate with the WHO during a crisis, especially when the data they 

had available could potentially sharpen the international response and save 

lives. This question grew more relevant the longer Taiwan continued to 

outperform most other nations containing the virus. After public gaffes 

when WHO officials wouldn’t even say the name “Taiwan” in televised 

interviews, this attention reached a high point in late May, when the World 

Health Assembly (WHA), presumably under pressure from the PRC, refused to allow Taiwan observer status in its annual meeting.7

From February on, the United States remained critical of Taiwan’s 

predicament, which was included within criticism regarding the perceived 

influence of the PRC over the WHO. This criticism culminated in May, 

when the U.S. administration published a letter to the WHO, complaining 

about its handling of the pandemic, including criticism of its handling 

of Taiwan.8 The publication of this letter was followed swiftly by an announcement that the United States was pulling out of the WHO.9

 These 

public quarrels, coupled with Taiwan’s own successful “mask diplomacy” 

raised Taiwan’s profile internationally in a positive way, and drew attention 

to the PRC’s influence over the WHO.

In addition to its actions regarding Taiwan during this period, Xi 

Jinping has overseen an opportunistic pursuit of PRC objectives during 

the pandemic, which has been strident in defense of its actions. Notably, 

People’s Liberations Army forces were part of the first lethal clash in at 

least 45 years along the Sino-Indian Line of Actual Control in Aksai Chin 

in June 2020, and Beijing subsequently pursued a new claim in Arunachal 

Pradesh, which has soured relations with India and prompted a backlash 

among Indian citizens.10 It has also been more active in pursuing its claims 

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Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific

in the South China Sea, and it levied tariffs on Australian exports, suspected in part due to Canberra proposing an inquiry into the origins of 

the virus.11

Perhaps one of the most consequential decisions Xi Jinping has 

made, though, is how he handled the protests in Hong Kong. As a party 

that prioritizes domestic stability, the CCP watched with alarm as largescale protests started in Hong Kong in June 2019 over an extradition law 

proposed by the Chief Executive of Hong Kong, Carrie Lam. These protests continued unabated largely until the pandemic struck, with bouts of 

violence throughout. To control the situation and muzzle the protests, the 

PRC’s National People’s Congress voted to effect a National Security Law 

for the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region that rolled back many 

of the democratic rights under the One Country, Two Systems formula, 

agreed to under the Sino-British Joint Declaration of 1984. Under this 

law, many activities such as protesting or speaking ill of the CCP could 

be labeled sedition or subversion, and numerous pro-democratic figures 

have been arrested as a warning to the populace. Many Western countries 

saw this as a breach of trust, and taken together with other PRC activities 

abroad, indicated a pattern of assertive behavior by Beijing.12

Foresight: Gains in International Space on the Horizon?

The decisions Xi and Tsai have made, starting in January 2019 and into 

this time of the pandemic, have the potential to significantly impact Taiwan’s international space. In so many cases, it is not just decisions made 

specifically between Taiwan and the PRC, regarding their relationship, that 

are impactful. Taiwan and PRC decision-making that affects other nations 

or IGOs also have the ability to influence Taiwan’s fight for international 

space. In particular, this period of time inclusive of the pandemic has 

involved many highly visible decisions by Xi and Tsai that affected other 

nations, not least of which being the ways they have managed the pandemic. Future gains in international space will be most visible in Taiwan’s 

participation in IGOs, and in its diplomatic relations. 

International Organizations

The question about whether Taiwan can increase its international space by 

participating in international organizations depends on at least two conditions: whether the PRC is able to successfully stymie Taiwan’s efforts to 

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Taiwan’s Fight for International Space

participate in these organizations, and the perception by other countries 

of Taiwan’s ability to add value to an organization when it has the opportunity to participate. History shows the PRC has been successful in 

thwarting Taiwan’s participation in international organizations. However, 

the trend lines for both of these conditions may be changing. Taiwan has 

consistently shown itself to be a responsible participant in the global community, and more visibly since the advent of the virus. Since then, Taiwan has made smart, timely, and practical domestic decisions, which have 

been accompanied by first-rate transparency and communication with its 

populace. Furthermore, it has taken these best practices, and done nothing less than show nations struggling to grapple with containing the virus 

how to do so through both its example and its outreach. By any objective 

measure, Taiwan has shown it has a lot to offer the world as it responds 

to COVID-19.

In contrast, the perception of the PRC has not been as favorable, 

and that is not even considering the criticism it has received regarding its 

initial lack of transparency and its handling of the outbreak in Wuhan. 

By obstructing Taiwan’s contributions to the WHO, and participation in 

the WHA, it seemed to place its narrow geopolitical concerns ahead of 

international cooperation, and the overall mission of the WHO. It is not 

purely academic when one asks how many lives could have been saved 

if the WHO could have disseminated some of Taiwan’s best practices 

throughout the international community.

An additional, more long-term concern of the PRC is the growing 

perception that it is has an undue influence in international organizations, 

and this influence is self-serving. The WHO’s complicity in PRC misinformation in January, along with its handling of Taiwan have shown a lot of 

people otherwise not aware of or concerned about Cross-Strait relations 

how enmeshed the PRC is in the governance of international bodies, and 

how it chooses to use this influence.13 The PRC may have overplayed its 

hand regarding Taiwan’s interaction with the WHO, and this may bring 

unwanted scrutiny on its interactions and objectives in international organizations. Due to both Taiwan’s competence in combating the virus, as 

well as rising concern among primarily Western countries about the PRC’s 

influence in international organizations, Taiwan is likely to garner international support to meaningfully participate in certain IGOs, and thus be 

positioned to expand its international space through participation in these 

forums.

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Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific

Diplomatic Recognition

Taiwan’s gains in diplomatic relations will be more indirect than those in 

IGOs. In the near term, Taiwan will likely maintain diplomatic relations 

with its existing partners, and this is primarily due to the actions both Taiwan and the PRC have taken with their respective partners. Taiwan has 

continued to meaningfully support its diplomatic allies with expertise and 

shipments of personal protective equipment (PPE) and other supplies. 

For its part, the PRC has linked support for other nations with its One 

Belt One Road (OBOR) projects, touting the value of being a part of the 

signature initiative.14 Additionally, the PRC has recognized the increased 

financial stress many of the OBOR recipient countries are experiencing 

due to the pandemic and has indicated willingness to discuss suspending 

loan interest payments and perhaps other measures short of debt forgiveness with its partners.15 In short, and based on media reports of these 

actions, there does not seem to be a driving reason for countries to switch 

diplomatic partners. This situation could change if the pandemic creates 

conditions where Taiwan’s diplomatic allies need more aid and support 

than Taiwan can provide, and countries decide to switch recognition to the 

PRC to meet domestic needs in this period of crisis.

A shift in diplomatic support could occur in the mid-term, and contrary to the customary trend of diplomatic partners switching from Taiwan to the PRC. In particular, the United Kingdom (UK) is perceived 

to be taking a harder line on the PRC due to PRC behavior regarding 

the pandemic and the situation surrounding Huawei’s intent to supply 5G 

equipment to the UK. However, it was after the announcement in May 

of a Beijing-imposed National Security Law on Hong Kong that the UK 

became more vocal about its concerns regarding the PRC. The UK was 

among other countries in condemning the move as a violation of the One 

Country, Two Systems principle, and has responded by offering a path to 

UK citizenship for several million Hong Kong citizens. In July, it rescinded 

its commitment to allow Huawei to install 5G components in the UK 

despite persistent PRC lobbying, which was a significant blow to the PRC 

tech company.16 More relevant, though, are the resulting statements and 

articles indicating more support for Taiwan from government officials, 

likely driven by the PRC’s actions on Hong Kong.17

While these statements do not signal anything as drastic as a change 

in diplomatic recognition, they likely indicate a closer relationship between 

Taiwan and the United Kingdom moving forward. Besides the obvious 

questions about what this change could portend for bilateral trade, UK 

326
Taiwan’s Fight for International Space

support for Taiwan participation in IGOs, or even support in the event of 

a cross-Strait crisis, it potentially creates room for other countries to voice 

similar support for Taiwan, and thus prompt a recalibration of their relations with the PRC. Countries directly affected by Beijing’s more assertive 

behavior recently in South Asia, the South China Sea, or in Oceania may 

already be considering these actions. Obviously, this would be deeply concerning to the PRC, as its diplomatic relations with countries are predicated 

on other countries accepting the PRC’s One China Principle. Traditionally, 

the PRC is critical of any deviations from how it interprets compliance to 

the One China Principle, and it especially calls out deviations from historical norms of how countries practice unofficial relations with Taiwan. 

Then President-elect Trump’s interview in January 2017 when he stated 

the One China Policy was up for negotiation is illustrative of the sensitivity 

Beijing ascribes to this Principle, which resulted in the PRC’s condemnation of the statement, as well as Chinese media calling for closing of the 

PRC Embassy in the United States.18 While diplomatic recognitions may 

not change in the near term, the statements and actions by the UK government may prompt other countries to examine their relationships with 

the PRC and Taiwan, and modify them in a way that could enable more 

international space for Taiwan.

Conclusion

Taiwan and the PRC have engaged in various forms of conflict over the 

decades, though the battleground over international space is one where 

the two sides continue to strive. The PRC has made great gains in this fight 

over the past several decades, stripping Taiwan of many of its diplomatic 

allies, and constricting Taiwan’s attendance in IGOs. Decisions leading up 

to the 2020 presidential election in Taiwan and since, though, have potentially created an opportunity for Taiwan to recoup some of its losses, and 

increase its space. While the foresight described in this chapter will not 

be completely accurate, it has been afforded the benefit of time, and the 

actions Taiwan, the PRC, and others have taken to influence trend lines 

regarding Taiwan’s fight for international space.

Taiwan and the PRC are ultimately the main two determinants of Taiwan’s international space, and it is important to emphasize that any gains 

Taiwan makes will result from what it will have done right, but maybe 

more so due to what the PRC will have done wrong. The PRC, through its 

baffling assertiveness on all fronts and at all times, its tone-deaf messaging, 

327
Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific

and its almost frantic pursuit of its objectives has created the opening Taiwan is taking advantage of. If these trends hold—competent, confident 

Taiwan as a contributor to the international community, and a PRC intent 

on using COVID as an opportunity to pursue its objectives at other countries’ expense—then the foresight expressed in this chapter may drastically 

underestimate the amount of international space Taiwan ultimately gains. 

Notes

1 Michael Swaine, “China’s Assertive Behavior--Part One: On ‘Core Interests,’” 

China Leadership Monitor no. 34 (Winter 2011), https://www.hoover.org/publications/ china-leadership-monitor/winter-2011.

2 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China (Taiwan), “IGOs in Which We Participate,” https://www.mofa.gov.tw/enigo/default.html

3 The 1992 Consensus is a formulation whereby the CCP and the KMT agreed there was “One China with Different Interpretations.” Under this framework, both 

Taipei and Beijing purport to be the ruling administration of this “One China,” 

which is where this different interpretation comes into play.

4 Ing-Wen Tsai, “President of Taiwan: How My Country Prevented a Major Out- break of COVID-19,” Time, April 16, 2020, https://time.com/collection/finding- hope-coronavirus-pandemic/5820596/taiwan-coronavirus-lessons/.

5 James Griffiths, “Taiwan’s Coronavirus Response Is among the Best Globally,” CNN, April 5, 2020, https://www.cnn.com/2020/04/04/asia/taiwan-coronavirusresponse-who-intl-hnk/index.html.

6 Taiwan Center for Disease Control, “The Facts Regarding Taiwan’s Email to Alert WHO to Possible Danger of COVID-19,” April 11, 2020, https://www.cdc.

gov.tw/En/Bulletin/Detail/PAD-lbwDHeN_bLa-viBOuw?typeid=158.

7 Huileng Tan, “Taiwan ‘disappointed and Angry’ about Being Excluded from WHO Meeting, Says It Is Developing Its Own Coronavirus Vaccine,” CNBC, May 

19, 2020, https://www.cnbc.com/2020/05/19/taiwan-says-it-is-disappointed-andangry-being-excluded-from-who-meeting.html.

8 The White House, Letter to Dr. Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, Director-Gener- al of the World Health Organization, May 18, 2020, https://www.whitehouse.gov/

wp-content/uploads/2020/05/Tedros-Letter.pdf.

9 Brianna Ehley and Alice Miranda Ollstein, “Trump Announces U.S. Withdrawal from the World Health Organization,” Politico, May 29, 2020, https://www.politico. com/news/2020/05/29/us-withdrawing-from-who-289799.

10 “India Now Says 20 Troops Killed in China Clash,” BBC News, June 16, 2020, sec. Asia, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-53061476. Suhasini Haidar, “China 

Doubles down on Claims on Eastern Bhutan Boundary,” The Hindu, July 5, 2020, sec. International, https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/days-after-demarchechina-doubles-down-on-claims-on-eastern-bhutan-boundary/article31993470.ece.

328
Taiwan’s Fight for International Space

11 Bhavan Jaipragas, “Coronavirus Headlines, but South China Sea Will Be Asean’s Focus,” South China Morning Post, June 25, 2020, https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/ politics/article/3090601/coronavirus-headlines-south-china-sea-will-be-aseansfocus. Scott Waldron, “China’s Tariffs on Australian Barley: Coercion, Protectionism, 

or Both?,” The Diplomat, June 19, 2020, https://thediplomat.com/2020/06/chinas- tariffs-on-australian-barley-coercion-protectionism-or-both/.

12 Dan De Luce, “Amid Pandemic, China Flexes Muscles from Hong Kong to the Himalayas,” NBC News, June 21, 2020, https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/

world-focused-covid-19-china-flexing-its-muscles-hong-kong-n1231635. Kurt M. 

Campbell and Mira Rapp-Hooper, “China Is Done Biding Its Time,” Foreign Affairs, July 15, 2020, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2020-07-15/chinadone-biding-its-time.

13 Courtney J. Fung and Shing-Hon Lam, “China Already Leads 4 of the 15 U.N. Specialized Agencies — and Is Aiming for a 5th,” Washington Post, March 3, 2020, 

https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/03/03/china-already-leads4-15-un-specialized-agencies-is-aiming-5th/.

14 Kirk Lancaster, Michael Rubin, and Mira Rapp-Hooper, “What the COVID-19 Pandemic May Mean for China’s Belt and Road Initiative,” Council on Foreign 

Relations, March 17, 2020, https://www.cfr.org/blog/what-covid-19-pandemic-maymean-chinas-belt-and-road-initiative.

15 James Kynge and Sun Yu, “China Faces Wave of Calls for Debt Relief on ‘Belt and Road’ Projects,” Financial Times, April 30, 2020, https://www.ft.com/ content/5a3192be-27c6-4fe7-87e7-78d4158bd39b.

16 Rhyannon Bartlett-Imadegawa, “UK Turns on China over Hong Kong, Hua- wei and Coronavirus,” Nikkei Asian Review, June 6, 2020, https://asia.nikkei.com/ Politics/International-relations/UK-turns-on-China-over-Hong-Kong-Huawei-andcoronavirus. Hadas Gold, “UK Bans Huawei from Its 5G Network,” CNN, July 14, 

2020, https://www.cnn.com/2020/07/14/tech/huawei-uk-ban/index.html.

17 Jeremy Hunt, “China’s Hostility to Taiwan Threatens the Global Order,” The 

Times, June 4, 2020, sec. comment, https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/chinas- hostility-to-taiwan-threatens-the-global-order-t8299kkp0. David Maddox and Marco 

Giannangeli, “China Warning: Britain Prepares to Back Taiwan and DEFEND State 

against Beijing Aggression,” Express.co.uk, May 31, 2020, https://www.express.

co.uk/news/world/1289273/china-news-taiwan-britain-military-aggression.

18 Caren Bohan and David Brunnstrom, “Trump Says U.S. Not Necessarily Bound by ‘one China’ Policy,” Reuters, December 12, 2016, https://www.reuters.com/ar- ticle/us-usa-trump-china-idUSKBN1400TY.

329

331

About the Authors 

Dr. Ethan Allen joined DKI APCSS in August 2019. His work focuses 

on fostering deeper understandings of the reciprocity among science, 

technology, and the myriad aspects of human security. Previously, he led 

science programs at Pacific Resources for Education and Learning, including a five-year project that engaged residents of U.S.-affiliated Pacific 

islands in understanding science by building their drinking water security. 

Outside of his formal work, for the past seven years, Dr. Allen hosted a 

weekly live-streamed Internet TV show titled “Likable Science.” Earlier, 

he directed science education programs at the University of Washington’s 

Center for Nanotechnology and Department of Molecular Biotechnology, and at the Institute for Systems Biology. Dr. Allen earned a bachelor’s 

degree in biology from the State University of New York at Binghamton, 

a doctorate in systems and integrative biology from the University of Oregon, and did postdoctoral neuroscience research there and at the University of Texas at Austin.

Anu Anwar is a fellow at the Asia Center, Harvard University. He is also 

an associate-in-research at Harvard’s John K. Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies and a visiting fellow at the University of Tokyo’s Institute 

for Advanced Studies on Asia. His research interest covers Asian geopolitics, China’s foreign policy, U.S.-China strategic competition, BRI, and 

FOIP. Prior to joining Harvard, Mr. Anwar worked as a research fellow 

at DKI APCSS. He was also an affiliate scholar at East-West Center, Hawaii, where he conducted a study focusing on the importance of the BRI 

and FOIP for bridging the infrastructure deficit in South Asia. Besides 

academic journals, his work has appeared at East Asia Forum, The Diplomat, South China Morning Post, Harvard Kennedy School Review, Lowy Interpreter, 

among other publications. Mr. Anwar received two master’s degrees from 

Tsinghua University and the University of Dhaka.

Michael Burgoyne joined the faculty at DKI APCSS in July 2016 as a 

U.S. Army military professor. He arrived from the American Institute in 

Taiwan in Taipei, where he served as the Army programs officer in the 

Security Cooperation Office. As a foreign area officer (FAO) specializing 

in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Taiwan, Mr. Burgoyne studied in Beijing and traveled extensively throughout the Asia-Pacific region 
Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific

before his tour in Taiwan. Before transitioning to FAO, he served as a field 

artillery officer and deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom as 

a battery commander in 2004. Mr. Burgoyne has a BA in finance from 

Tulane University in New Orleans, and an MA in East Asian studies from 

Harvard. He is co-editor of China’s Global Influence: Perspectives and Recommendations, which examines PRC influence activities worldwide.

Dr. Miemie Winn Byrd is a professor at DKI APCSS and an adjunct 

fellow at the East West Center in Honolulu. She teaches, researches, and 

publishes in the area of Indo-Asia Pacific security studies, civil-military 

relations, leadership, economics, and women, peace, and security. She 

currently serves on the Board of Governors of the Keck Center for International and Strategic Studies at the Claremont McKenna College in 

California and on the Board of Director of Women’s LEAD organization 

in Lashio, Myanmar. Previously, she has served as the deputy economic 

advisor at the U.S. Pacific Command, civil affairs officer in the U.S. Army, 

and president of Suu Foundation. She earned her doctorate in education 

leadership from the University of Southern California, a master of business administration from the University of Hawaii, and a bachelor of arts 

in economics and accounting from Claremont McKenna College.

Dr. Sungmin Cho is associate professor at DKI APCSS. Originally from 

South Korea, he did his undergraduate studies at Korea University, earned 

an MA in international relations from Peking University in Beijing, China, 

and a PhD in government from Georgetown University. Prior to graduate 

studies, he served in the Korean Army for three years, including a sevenmonth tour to Iraq. He is specialized in the international relations of East 

Asia, with particular focus on the politics of China and North Korea. Dr. 

Cho has published on a wide range of topics including China’s influence 

in the Indo-Pacific region and the contingency planning on North Korea. 

He is currently writing a book on the critical analysis of the Chinese-style 

democracy.

Ben Crowell is a commander in the U.S. Coast Guard and a former military fellow at DKI APCSS. Commissioned as an officer in the U.S. Coast 

Guard in 2005, he has held a myriad of operational and staff assignments 

in Oregon, Maine, California, Virginia, Washington, and Hawaii. His career has largely been spent conducting maritime law enforcement, home332
Author Biographies

land security, and search and rescue operations both domestically and internationally. He has held professional qualifications as a search mission 

coordinator, small boat coxswain, boarding officer, military diving officer, 

deployable team leader, and served as a commanding officer of a boat 

station. He holds a master’s degree from the Naval Postgraduate School 

in homeland defense and security. He is currently assigned to the IndoPacific Command’s Joint Interagency Task Force West, working to stem 

the flows of illicit narcotics throughout the region.

Jerre Hansbrough is currently a theater exercise planner at U.S. IndoPacific Command. He previously served as an Army fellow for one year 

at DKI APCSS with emphasis on infrastructure development, sea level 

rise, and causal loop analysis. He is an Army engineer with over 16 years 

of experience to include serving as the deputy commander for the Japan 

District of the United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), project engineer for the Kanagawa Resident Office, and deputy area engineer 

for the Schofield Barracks Office of the Honolulu District, USACE. He 

holds a BS in chemistry and the life sciences from the United States Military Academy and a MS in civil engineer from the University of Hawai’i. 

He is a graduate from the U.S. Command and General Staff College and 

the Army War College’s Defense Strategy Course. He is a registered professional engineer in the State of Hawai‘i.

Dr. John Hemmings is associate professor at DKI APCSS, where he 

works on Japan, the Koreas, the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific,” 5G, and 

the U.S. alliance system in the Asian region. He is also an adjunct fellow 

at the CSIS and the Pacific Forum. Prior to his current position, he was 

deputy director of research at the Henry Jackson Society and a research 

analyst at the Royal United Services Institute in Whitehall. He has been 

called to give evidence to the UK House of Commons Defence Committee, and taken part in briefings with the Cabinet Office, the Department 

of International Trade, and to the UN Commission of Inquiry on Human 

Rights in the DPRK. Dr. Hemmings completed his doctoral thesis in international relations at the London School of Economics in 2017, where 

he wrote on security trilaterals, the rise of China, and U.S. foreign policy 

in the Asia-Pacific.

333
Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific

Mizuho Kajiwara is a former visiting academic at DKI APCSS, the first 

foreign national to hold that position. She is currently an institute member at Keio University’s Global Research Institute (KGRI). Her current 

research covers game-changing technologies in underwater domain, maritime security, and the U.S-Japan alliance. She was a visiting scholar at the 

University of Hawai’i and King’s College London and was also awarded 

Fulbright Fellowship and Abe Fellowship. She authored U.S. Pacific Command (Tokyo: Kodansha, 2017, in Japanese) and co-authored U.S. Pacific 

Command and Asia: Security in the Indo-Pacific (Tokyo: Chikura Publishing 

Company, 2018, in Japanese). She was a member of the Quadripartite 

Commission (Japan, U.S., Australia, and India) led by the Sasakawa Peace 

Foundation and drafted policy recommendations on the Indian Ocean 

regional security. She appears on a Japanese nationwide TV news program 

as a regular commentator.

Scott D. McDonald is a DKI APCSS non-resident research fellow, currently pursuing a PhD at the Fletcher School, Tufts University. A retired 

U.S. Marine Corps officer, he finished his career as a DKI APCSS military 

professor, where he taught Chinese philosophy and strategic thought, East 

Asia security dynamics, cross-cultural communication, national security 

strategy, and strategic foresight. He also led the Center’s first multilateral 

workshop in Taiwan. As a foreign area officer (FAO), he studied in Beijing, served as an attaché in Australia, was the first Marine Corps affairs 

officer at the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), established the Regional 

Engagement Branch at III Marine Expeditionary Force, and traveled extensively in the region. Mr. Mc

Donald completed a BA in international 

relations from the George Washington University, an MA in national security affairs from the Naval Postgraduate School, and the Seminar XXI 

Program for national security leaders run by the Massachusetts Institute 

of Technology.

Dr. James M. Minnich, Colonel, U.S. Army retired, is a professor at DKI 

APCSS. Formerly he was associate dean and senior military professor, and 

now leads the groups on Northeast Asia, and women, peace and security. He has had in depth experiences in Asia since 1982, including 15 years 

in Korea. In 2016, the South Korean president awarded him the Order 

of National Security Merit Samil for long and substantive service in the 

defense of the Republic of Korea. He served in Korea as the secretary of 

334
Author Biographies

the United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission, deputy 

chief of the Joint U.S. Military Affairs Group, and chief of the USFK 

Policy Branch. He is a senior service college distinguished honor graduate from the Korean National Defense University. He earned a doctorate 

degree from the University of Southern California, master’s degrees from 

Harvard University and the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, and a diploma in Korean language studies from Sogang University in 

Seoul. He has written several books and articles on various security issues.

Dr. Inez Miyamoto joined DKI APCSS in 2019. Prior to joining the 

Center, Dr. Miyamoto was a special agent at the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) where she led cyber investigative teams responding to 

a variety of crimes (i.e., intrusions, fraud, child pornography, intellectual 

property rights, and counterintelligence) and conducted strategic planning, 

risk analysis, and compliance while at FBI Headquarters. Dr. Miyamoto’s 

current research interests include cyber security, transnational crimes, supply chain security, digital surveillance technologies, and women, peace, and 

security (WPS). She is currently working on developing cyber governance 

courses and cyber strategy games and exercises. Dr. Miyamoto holds CISSP and GSEC certifications and is a FBI National Academy graduate.

Dr. Sam Mullins is a professor at DKI APCSS. Prior to joining DKI 

APCSS, he was a professor of counter-terrorism at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, Germany, where he was 

awarded the U.S. Army Superior Civilian Service Award in March 2019. 

Dr. Mullins has been researching and teaching terrorism and counter-terrorism for more than a decade, and has contributed to the professional 

education of more than a thousand counter-terrorism practitioners from 

around the world. He has presented his work for the FBI, the New York 

City Police Department, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, the 

Australian Federal Police, NATO, and the Indonesian National Armed 

Forces, among others. Dr. Mullins is also an honorary fellow at the University of Wollongong, Australia. His most recent book is Jihadist Infiltration 

of Migrant Flows to Europe.

Dr. Srini Sitaraman joined DKI APCSS as a professor in December 

2019. At DKI APCSS his focus is on Indo-Pacific security, particularly 

on South Asia, maritime security, strategic competition, and nonprolifera335
Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific

tion. Dr. Sitaraman has published widely in academic and policy journals, 

and his commentary has appeared in various news outlets. He earned his 

doctorate from the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign. Prior to arriving at DKI APCSS, Dr. Sitaraman was a tenured associate professor in 

the Department of Political Science at Clark University in Worcester, MA, 

where he directed the award-winning Model United Nations Program and 

was a core faculty member of the Asian Studies Program, and affiliated 

with the Strassler Center for Holocaust and Genocide Studies. Dr. Sitaraman was also an associate-in-research at the Fairbank Center for East 

Asian Research at Harvard University.

Shyam Tekwani, who has been studying terrorism and insurgency for 

over thirty-five years, is professor at DKI APCSS where he specializes in 

political violence, terrorism and counterterrorism, security dynamics of 

South Asia and the role of media in security. Professor Tekwani’s extensive 

background in the media as a journalist reporting conflict and insurgency 

in the Asia-Pacific region includes his exclusive reportage of the ethnic 

conflict in Sri Lanka which he covered exhaustively since its inception in 

1983. Professor Tekwani’s publications include: Shutting Down the Mobile 

Phone and the Downfall of Nepalese Society, Economy and Politics (with Ang Peng 

Hwa and Wang Guozhen, 2012); (ed.) Media and Conflict Reporting in Asia 

(2008); Online Networks of Terrorist Groups and their implications for Security: A 

Case Study of Sri Lanka’s Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (2007); Embedded 

Journalists – lessons from the Iraq War (2005); The Media, Information Revolution 

and Terrorism in Southeast Asia (2004).

Wade Turvold joined DKI APCSS in June 2019 after a 30-year career in 

the U.S. Navy. He served in educational assignments at the U.S. Army War 

College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania and at the Joint Services Command and 

Staff College, Defence Academy of the United Kingdom in Shrivenham, 

England. He has extensive experience flying P-3C and P-8A aircraft during seven flying tours. He commanded Patrol Squadron FOUR in Kaneohe Bay, Hawaii, and Air Test and Evaluation Squadron ONE in Patuxent 

River, Maryland. His staff assignments were on the United States SIXTH 

Fleet staff embarked in USS LASALLE in Gaeta, Italy, and at Patrol and 

Reconnaissance Force, United States SEVENTH Fleet in Misawa, Japan. 

He graduated with merit from the U.S. Naval Academy in Annapolis, 

Maryland, in 1989, and with distinction from the U.S. Naval War College 

in Newport, Rhode Island, in 2000.

336
Author Biographies

Dr. Alexander L. Vuving is a professor at DKI APCSS, which he joined 

in July 2008. His areas of expertise include geopolitics, great power competition, regional architecture, soft power, Chinese strategy, and Vietnamese politics and foreign policy. His expertise has been featured in the Associated Press, Bloomberg, the New York Times, the Financial Times, the South 

China Morning Post, the Asahi Shimbun, Foreign Policy, the National Interest, 

the Diplomat, and Asian Survey, among others. He has been a post-doctoral 

fellow and research associate at Harvard University’s Kennedy School 

of Government and a recipient of the German National Merit Scholarship and the Konrad Adenauer Foundation Scholarship, Germany’s most 

prestigious scholarships for top doctoral candidates. He received his PhD 

in political science from the Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz, Germany. He was the lead of the “National Security Coordination in Southeast Asia” workshop, the first gathering of senior representatives from the 

national security councils and their equivalents of Southeast Asian states.

Dr. Virginia Bacay Watson is a professor at DKI APCSS. She has held 

appointments at the University of Denver and Colorado School of Mines, 

and served as an exchange faculty for the University of Colorado in Beijing, China before joining the Center in 2004. She was also a consultant 

for various international and national organizations. Her areas of research, 

teaching, and publication include science, technology and security in the 

Indo-Pacific region, water security, and Southeast Asia geopolitics. She 

served as editor of The Interface of Science, Technology, and Security (2012), 

DKI APCSS’ first e-book. Dr. Watson obtained her bachelor’s degrees in 

Asian studies and management of financial institutions from the Philippines. She holds a master’s degree in Asian studies from Cornell University 

and a doctorate in international studies in public policy and international 

technology assessment and management from the University of Denver’s 

Josef Korbel School of International Studies. She is fluent in Tagalog and 

Ilonggo and conversant in Japanese and Spanish.

Dr. Bill Wieninger joined the faculty of DKI APCSS in November 2008. 

He focuses on myriad subjects including weapons of mass destruction issues, deterrence and missile defense. Prior to joining the center he spent 

15 years on active duty in the U.S. Air Force (USAF), first as a maintenance 

officer on ICBMs and subsequently serving in various political-military 

positions. His last active duty position from 2006-2008 was as the principle 

337
Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific

deputy political advisor for Air Combat Command. In 2008 he entered the 

USAF Reserves and served as a reserve air attaché in various countries, 

retiring in 2017. Dr. Wieninger earned his doctorate at McGill University 

in 2004 with his thesis examining the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence. 

He has taught at various institutions, including the U.S. Air Force Academy 

(1998-2000) and the Defense Nuclear Weapons School (2004-2006).

Dr. Saira Yamin is a professor at DKI APCSS and a non-resident fellow 

at the Center for Global Policy in Washington, D.C. She also serves on 

the Editorial Board of the Journal of Asian Security and International 

Affairs. Dr. Yamin’s research spans a wide range of issues related to international peace and conflict, global governance, democratic transitions, 

and gender. Her writings have been published widely, including by the 

United States Institute of Peace, Oxford University Press, and the Christian Science Monitor.

Dr. Yamin earned both her MSc and PhD in conflict analysis and resolution from George Mason University (GMU). Sh

is the recipient of the Faculty Scholarship and Eleanor Roosevelt Student 

Scholarship awards conferred by the Carter School for Peace and Conflict 

Resolution at GMU, and U.S. federal government awards for excellence as 

mentor of the year (2019) and team excellence (2015).

338
Index

Index

Symbols

5th Generation (5G) 31, 37, 43, 58, 

247, 326

6th Generation (6G) 58–59

863 Program 221

1992 Consensus 321

A

Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) 111, 

111–112, 115, 117–120

Acquisition and Cross-Servicing 

Agreement (ACSA) 151

Afghanistan 92–95, 101, 106, 113, 

123, 149, 163–166, 263, 290

Africa 161–162, 164, 170, 210–211, 

261

Ahmadi 102, 130–131

Aksai Chin 284, 323

Alliance 43, 130, 140, 145–156, 

234, 245, 253–260, 262–264, 

287, 289, 295, 300, 313. See 

also U.S. Alliance System

ROK-U.S. alliance 253–265

Al-Qaeda 91–92, 95, 102, 113, 115, 

118, 121–122

Andaman Sea 307

Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) 

152, 192, 194, 196, 202–205

Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army 

(ARSA) 96, 101, 115, 118, 

309

Architecture xii, xv–xvi, xviii, 43, 

45, 135, 145, 147, 153, 162, 

167, 174, 253, 259, 261, 264, 

312

Arctic 242–246, 248–249

Arms Race 59, 196, 200, 204, 230, 

319

Artificial Intelligence (AI) 37, 40, 

41, 52–53, 55, 55–60, 62–66, 

192, 197, 202, 217, 222, 235, 

244

Arunachal Pradesh 167, 284, 288, 

291, 323

ASEAN (Association of Southeast 

Asian Nations) 145, 147, 

153–154, 173, 296, 312

Asian Development Bank (ADB) 

173, 181–182, 321

Asian Infrastructure Investment 

Bank (AIIB) 163, 165, 186

Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) 312, 321

Assam 137

Assassinations 91–92, 93, 97, 113, 

131

Atlantic Ocean 191, 195, 202

Aung San Suu Kyi 308–309

Australia 30, 33, 35, 136, 146, 

148–156, 172, 174, 180, 182, 

200, 241, 261, 296–297, 324

Authoritarian xii, 41–42, 45, 47, 

71–72, 129–131, 140, 146, 

223, 271, 273, 280, 299, 308

339
Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific

B

Baidu 40, 222

Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) 

231–232

Bandwagoning 153–154

Bangladesh 69, 93, 97, 100–102, 

115, 118, 131–132, 136, 

163–165, 168–169, 171, 173, 

200, 288, 290–291, 309

Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar 

Economic Corridor (BCIMEC) 164, 166, 168

Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao 

(BARMM) 114, 117, 118

Bases 155

Chinese 197

Regional 155

U.S. 147, 256

Bay of Bengal 171, 173, 200, 307

Belgium 261

Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) 

161–174, 283, 296

Bhutan 163, 165, 173, 284, 286, 

290–291

Bilateral 146, 149–151, 155–156, 

182, 253, 260, 262, 264, 293, 

297

Bilateral Alliances 146, 253

Bilateral Cooperation 100–101

Bilateral Policies 308, 312–313

Bin Laden, Osama 91, 95, 99

Biometric Technology 37, 51, 53, 

56, 59, 63

Blue Dot 179–187

Blue Dot Marketplace xvi, 179, 

182–187

Blue Dot Network (BDN) xvi, 

179–180, 182–183, 185–189

Bodu Bala Sena (BBS) 97–98, 132

Border Incursions 292

Bosnia 69–70

Brazil 198

Britain 21–25, 29, 92, 168, 193

British East India Company 17, 

31

British Empire 23, 92, 285, 290, 

307

British Indian Ocean Territory 

30

Sino-British Joint Declaration 

(1984) 324

Burma 136, 285, 308. See Myanmar

Bush, George W. (President/Administration) 18, 147, 149, 

151

C

Cambodia 312

Cameroon 198

Canada 241, 246, 261

CCP. See Chinese Communist 

Party

Century of Humiliation 17, 26, 

288, 319

340
Index

Checkbook Diplomacy 319

Chiang Kai-shek 27, 318

Chicken Game 20, 27–29

China xii, xiv–xvii, xix, 18, 21, 23, 

26–30, 33–35, 40–43, 45, 

49, 129, 133–134, 136–140, 

145–148, 151–154, 161–174, 

179–182, 185–186, 191, 

196–200, 202–205, 218, 

220–225, 229, 231, 239, 

241–251, 269–279, 283–300, 

307, 309–313, 317–328

Beijing 9, 28, 33–35, 153, 161, 

166, 168–169, 174, 181, 205, 

211, 221, 248, 260, 272–273, 

275, 278, 283, 285–289, 291, 

293, 295–300, 307–310, 312, 

319, 322–324, 326–327

China Dream 27, 288

China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) 307, 310

China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) 163, 166–168, 

170

Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 

7–12, 133, 161, 269, 271–

279, 287, 317–319, 321–322, 

324

Chinese Philosophy 5, 7–8

Chokepoint 18, 30, 311

Citizenship 98, 107, 136–137, 

142–143

Clinton, Bill (President/Administration) 146–148

Coast Guard 215

of China 205, 212, 213

of Japan 152

Coercion/Coercive 14, 153, 181, 

186, 255, 260, 273, 288, 291

Cold War xii, 17, 20, 23–25, 29–30, 

145–147, 154, 191, 194–196, 

203, 205, 229–230, 232–233, 

235, 254–255, 258, 278, 285

Colombia 261

Combined Forces Command 

(CFC) 257–258, 263

Communism 146, 258

Communist Party 42, 133, 218, 

269, 311

Competition xii–xiv, xvi, xviii–xix, 

13–32, 42, 56, 162–163, 

172, 179–180, 186–187, 

191, 199, 204–205, 209, 244, 

278, 285, 287, 289, 307–308, 

310, 312–314. See Strategic 

Competition

Concord Game 21, 27

Configuration of Earth 24–25, 29

Contagion Effect 129, 132, 135, 140

Convention on the Elimination of 

All Forms of Discrimination 

against Women 74

Core Interest 28, 319

Coronavirus 94–95, 99, 124–125, 

155, 205, 225, 275, 298. 

341
Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific

See COVID-19

Cost-sharing 254–255, 262

Counterterrorism 91, 98, 101–103, 

116, 123–124, 136, 149

COVID-19 94, 98, 98–102, 151, 

163, 172, 258, 276, 307, 

310, 318, 320, 322, 325, 328. 

See Coronavirus

Cross-Border Terrorism 93–94, 

100

Cultural Revolution 7–8, 220, 270, 

277

Cyber 24, 30–31, 39, 41, 43–46, 59, 

260, 263

D

Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific 

Center for Security Studies 

(DKI APCSS) xi–xiii, 3, 5, 

7–8, 10, 146, 153–154, 199

 DARPA (Defense Advanced 

Research Projects Agency) 

204–205

Data 24, 30–31, 34, 40–44, 46–47, 

51–52, 56–59, 131, 198, 205, 

219, 223, 231, 244, 292, 294, 

323

Data Privacy 44, 223

Debt 165, 170, 173–174, 180–181, 

184, 186, 275–276, 326

Democratic People’s Republic of 

Korea (DPRK) 148, 155, 

233–234

Democratic Progressive Party 

(DPP) 321

Democratization 277, 307–308, 313

Deng Xiaoping 27, 161, 271–274, 

276, 321

Denmark 246, 261

Detention 42, 134, 136–140

Development Finance Corporation 

(DFC) 182

Dhaka 92, 97

Diplomatic Recognition 326

Discrimination 68, 71–72, 74–75, 

98, 130

Displaced 17, 111, 135–136, 140, 

242

Dispute

Afghanistan 95

China-India 162

Cost-Sharing 255

India-Burma 285

India-China 285, 286, 292–293, 

299

Kashmir 93–94, 163, 166–167, 

234, 289

Kuril Islands 239, 243, 245, 249

Russia 242, 246

Sikkim 167

South China Sea 18, 29, 198, 289. 

See South China Sea

US-China Trade 275

Djibouti 181

342
Index

E

East China Sea 29, 148, 153, 202, 

205, 273

Egypt 13, 15, 22–23, 33

Energy 29, 148, 162, 166, 169, 180, 

184, 186, 193, 217, 310–311

Estonia 242

Ethnic 69, 92, 95–99, 135, 137, 

139–140, 163, 240, 242, 273, 

276

Europe xvii, 4, 15–16, 20–23, 

25, 29, 33, 43, 69–70, 136, 

161–162, 239–240, 242, 244, 

246–249, 261

European Union (EU) 25, 44, 55, 

57, 60–61, 99, 172, 181, 215, 

222, 241

Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) 

152, 171, 209–215, 223

Exercise, Military 8, 150, 152, 155, 

239, 258, 293

Malabar 150

F

Facial Recognition 50–53, 55, 57, 

59, 133, 298

Family Law 67–69, 71–74, 76

Fang-shou Cycle xviii, 269–279

Far East 242–250

Fifth Industrial Revolution 46

First Island Chain 319

Fishing xvii, 100, 205, 209–215, 

246, 300

Five Eyes 151

Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 

181, 272

Foreign Fighters 98, 115–116, 

118–119, 124–125

Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR) 

xiv, 30, 37–46, 58

France 21, 25–26, 29, 33, 55, 

154–155, 197, 200, 261

Free Aceh Movement (GAM) 111, 

113, 123

Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) 

xiii, 174, 243, 264, 308, 313

Free Papua Movement (OPM) 111, 

113, 125

G

G20 180, 182–183

GDPR (General Data Protection 

Regulation) 57, 60

Gendered Security xv, 67–82, 

260–261, 263

Gendered Security Analysis Tool 

(GSAT) 79–81

Gender Exclusion 75

Gender Inclusion 74

Georgia 239–240, 242

Germany 21, 25–26, 29, 33, 55, 193, 

197, 200, 255–256

343
Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific

Governance xii, xiv–xv, xvii, xix, 

18, 37–46, 49, 56–57, 59–60, 

63, 67–68, 93, 98–99, 101, 

103, 129–140, 154, 168, 174, 

214, 217, 224, 261, 272, 278, 

298, 310, 325

Grand Bargain xviii, 286–288, 291, 

297, 299

Gray Zone xiv, xvii, 28, 44–45, 152, 

213, 285

Great Power Competition xii–xiv, 

13–32

Great Powers xii–xiv, 13–32, 191

Balance of power among 19

Rise and fall of 31

Greece 181, 261

Gwadar 166, 170–172, 177–178

H

Hambantota 165, 170, 172–173

Heartland 23–25, 29, 32

Hedging 155

Hegemony 18, 21, 23–26, 137

Higher Education 220, 225

Hindutva 137

Historical Experience 25–26, 31, 

240

Hizbul Mujahideen (HuM) 94

Hong Kong xix, 289, 291, 297–298, 

321, 322, 324, 326

Huawei 40, 43, 198, 244, 247, 326

“Hub-and-Spoke” System xv, 145, 

156, 253

Hu Jintao 27, 271, 274

Human Insecurity 140

Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) 155

Human Rights 44, 55, 57, 61, 97, 

102, 113, 129–130, 132–134, 

137, 151, 223, 254, 273, 

307–308, 313

Human Security 77, 217–218, 223, 

225

Hungary 181

Hydrocarbons 243–248

I

Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated (IUU) xvi, 209–215

Imperative 23, 27, 30, 307–308, 314

Inclusion 74, 132, 138, 140

Inclusive Governance 99, 129–140

India xiii, xv–xviii, 16–17, 22–23, 

26, 30–31, 69, 91–100, 

100–101, 134, 136–138, 143, 

146, 150, 153–156, 162–174, 

191, 197, 199–200, 220, 

229–230, 234–235, 243, 248, 

283–299, 323

Indian Ocean xvi, xviii, 202, 204, 

213, 307–308, 310, 312

Indonesia xviii, 30, 111–113, 

115–116, 119–120, 122, 124, 

199–200, 296, 300

Industrial Revolution

Fourth Industrial Revolution 30

344
Index

Second Industrial Revolution 30

Third Industrial Revolution 37, 

40

Inequality 67–69, 71–73, 275

Information Communication and 

Technology (ICT) 55

Infrastructure xvi, 44, 78, 81, 161, 

165–167, 169–171, 173–175, 

178, 179–184, 186–187, 198, 

244, 275, 283, 291, 295, 311

Innovation xvii, 18–19, 37–40, 56, 

138, 187, 217–227, 247, 275

Instability 69, 93, 117, 123–124, 

129, 130, 132, 140, 181, 235, 

313

Insurgency xv, 93, 95–96, 100, 106, 

111–125, 140, 168

Communist 311

International Court of Justice (ICJ) 

307, 309

International Criminal Tribunal 

70, 83

Internet of Things 30, 37, 58

Interoperability 154–156, 293

Intolerance 67, 98, 101, 133

Iraq 93, 97, 100, 113, 115, 119, 122, 

149, 151, 263

ISIS 93–96, 100, 101, 115–116, 118, 

120–122

Islamic Fundamentalists 17–18, 26

Islamic State 93–94, 96, 100

Islamophobia 96, 99, 102–104

Israel 55

Italy 197, 261

J

Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) 94

Jama’atul Mujahideen Bangladesh 

(JMB) 97

Japan xiii, xvi, 17, 23, 26, 29–30, 

33, 55, 145–146, 148–153, 

155–156, 172, 174, 178, 180, 

182, 191, 197, 202–203, 222, 

239, 241–243, 245, 248–249, 

253, 255, 273, 277, 296–297, 

307, 318–319

Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force 

(JMSDF) 203

Jemaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD) 

111, 115, 119, 121–122

Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) 111–113, 

121–123, 125

Jiang Zemin 27, 271, 274

Jihad 99, 112, 121–122

K

Kashmir 93–94, 97–98, 166–168, 

234, 285, 290–291, 296

Kazakh 134

Kim Jong Un 247

Kiribati 181

Korea

North Korea 148–149, 154, 197, 

229–231, 233, 245, 247, 249, 

254–256, 260, 262. See Democratic People’s Republic of 

345
Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific

Korea, DPRK

South Korea xvii, xviii, xix, 29–30, 

55, 146–148, 151, 153–154, 

157, 197, 199, 222, 233, 

233–234, 247, 249, 253–263, 

260–261, 296, 313. See Republic of Korea, ROK; See 

also Republic of Korea, ROK

Korean Peninsula 148, 233, 247, 

253, 256, 259, 261, 261–263

Korean War 69, 253, 257, 261, 313

Kosovo 231

Kuomintang (KMT) 318–319, 322

Kuril Islands 239, 245, 249

Kyaukphyu 311

L

Laos 312

Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT) 93–94, 99

Latvia 242

Liberalization 277–278

Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 

(LTTE). See Tamil Tigers

Libya 276

Life-Cycle Cost 182–184

Lithuania 242

M

Mahan, Alfred 24, 154

Malacca Strait 162–163, 307, 

310–311

Malaysia 30, 111–112, 114, 116–

117, 119–120, 136, 200, 300

Maldives 30, 93, 98, 100, 163, 165, 

171–172, 198

Male Dominance 68–69, 71–73

Maoists 96–97

Marawi 111, 115, 117

Siege of Marawi 115

Maritime xvi–xvii, 23–25, 30–31, 

146, 150, 155, 161–162, 164, 

166, 170–172, 180, 198–200, 

205, 209–215, 223, 246, 260, 

263, 273, 286–288, 291, 300

Maute Group 115

Mekong 223

Mexico 212

Middle East 16, 23, 115, 136, 138, 

161, 164, 166, 245

Minilateralism 145–146

Mischief Reef 211, 223

Modi, Narendra (Prime Minister 

& Government) 165, 172, 

200, 298

Mongol Empire xv, 15, 23, 138–139

Moon Jae-In (President & Adminstration) 153, 257–258, 260

Moro Islamic Liberation Front 

(MILF) 111, 114, 117, 120, 

123

Multilateral 10, 146–147, 154–155, 

166, 174, 182

Mutual Defense Treaty 253–254

Myanmar xv, xvii–xix, 26, 96, 

100–102, 112, 114, 115, 118, 

122, 124, 134–137, 162, 164, 

346
Index

168–171, 212, 216, 290–291, 

307–314

Myintsone Dam 309–310

N

Nagaland 95

Nash Equilibrium 20, 25, 27

National Action Plans (NAP) 74, 

82

Nationalism xii, xv, 96–97, 101, 

129–132, 140

National League for Democracy 

(NLD) 308

National Natural Science Foundation 221

National Security Strategy

Indonesia 199

NATO 155

Naxalites 96–98

Nepal 96–97, 163, 165, 169–170, 

173, 290–291

Netherlands 197, 199, 261

Networked Security xviii, 259–261, 

263–264

New People’s Army (NPA) 111, 

114, 120, 123

New Zealand 154, 241, 261, 

296–297

Norms 4, 6–8, 10, 28, 37, 49, 54, 

56–57, 60, 67–68, 73, 81, 

100–101, 129, 132–134, 140, 

180, 182, 218, 225–226, 231, 

243, 246, 327

North America 136

North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

(NATO) 57, 200, 231, 240, 

242, 260

Norway 261

Nuclear Exchange 235, 294–295

Nuclear Weapons xvii, 19–20, 22, 

26–27, 32, 147–148, 193–

194, 230, 232–236

O

Obama, Barrack (President & Administration) 151–153, 233, 

259–260, 309

Oceania 68, 327

Offshore 23–25, 29, 32, 211

Offshore Balancing 146

One Belt One Road (OBOR) xvi, 

161, 179, 243, 248, 286, 326. 

See Belt and Road Initiative 

(BRI)

One China Principle 199, 319–320, 

327

Operational Control (OpCon) 153, 

254, 257–258, 261, 263

Opium War 17, 319

P

Pacific Ocean xvi, 23, 191, 194–

195, 199, 202, 204, 212

Pakistan xviii, 92–94, 99–103, 

130–132, 150, 162–171, 173, 

197, 200, 229–230, 234–235, 

347
Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific

285, 289–291, 294–295, 296, 

299–300

Pandemic xix, 30, 94, 95, 98–100, 

100, 124–125, 163, 172, 178, 

205, 298–299, 307, 310, 318, 

320, 322–324, 326

Papua New Guinea 68–69

Parti Islam Malaysia (PAS) 117

Partnership 56, 166, 168, 172, 180, 

184, 241, 244, 246, 249, 259, 

283

Patriarchy 72–73, 75

Pax Americana 28, 146

Pax Mongolica 138

Peacekeeping 76, 78, 85, 149, 166

Peace-Lover’s Dilemma 26–28

People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 

204, 284, 287–288, 291, 

293–294

People’s Liberation Army (PLA)

Navy 170–171, 197

People’s Republic of China (PRC) 

5, 152, 154–156, 162, 211, 

216, 218, 220–226, 231, 285, 

292, 317–327

People’s War 96–97

Permanent Court of Arbitration 

(PCA) 211, 223, 273

Philippines 30, 43, 111–115, 117, 

119–120, 122–124, 146–147, 

151, 153–154, 200, 212, 223, 

261, 319

Pipeline 136, 166, 170, 171, 311

Piracy 210–211, 213, 216

Pivot 24, 151, 196–198

Poland 242, 261

Polygyny 71–73

Portugal 21–22

PRC 5, 7–9

Predominance 19–20, 25, 27

Prevention 74, 76–78, 80–81

Prisoner’s Dilemma 19–22, 28–29

Privacy 40–41, 44, 49–51, 53–54, 

56–61, 223

Project 211 221

Project 985 221

Proliferation Security Initiative 262

Putin, Vladimir (President & 

Government) 201, 232, 

240–242, 245, 248, 250

Q

Quad Plus 154–155, 172, 296

Quadrilateral Security Dialogue 

(U.S.-Japan-India-Australia) 

xv, 150, 153–155, 172, 296

Quality Infrastructure Investment 

179, 182

Quasi-Alliance 153, 155–156

Quran 131

R

Radicalization 100–102, 140

Rakhine 96, 115, 135–136, 136, 

171, 309, 311, 313–314

348
Index

Rape 69–71, 73, 136

Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh 

(RSS) 93, 137

Rebalance 151

Re-education Camps 134

Reform 74, 257, 260, 266, 269–272, 

274–276, 279

Refugee 101, 118, 127, 135, 169

Religion 15, 68, 72, 78, 80, 92, 96, 

116–118, 124, 130–131, 

133–134, 136, 138, 140, 289

Buddhism 8, 97–99, 101, 115, 

132–133, 135–136, 139, 288, 

308

Christianity 22, 102, 131–133, 

138–140

Hindu 91, 93, 98, 99, 101, 102, 

132, 137–138, 163, 169

Islam 16–18, 26, 93–94, 97–98, 

100, 102–103, 111, 114–115, 

117, 121–122, 130–131, 

133–139, 163

Religious

Coexistence 129, 138

Diversity 129, 138, 140

Exclusion 130, 135, 137

Freedom 102, 109, 129, 132–133, 

140

Fundamentalists 131

Identity 124, 130

Minorities 97, 102, 116, 129–131, 

133–137, 140

Nationalism 96, 129–132, 140

Pluralism 131

Restrictions 130

Tolerance 132, 139–140

Republic of Korea (ROK) 145, 148, 

151–152, 253–265. See South 

Korea

Research and Development (R&D) 

193, 202, 204, 221, 224, 244, 

247

Rimland 23–25, 29, 32

Risk 32, 98, 117, 119, 133, 163, 

186, 191–192, 229, 231–232, 

234–235, 242, 244, 247, 256

Rohingya 96, 101, 102, 115, 118, 

124, 135–136, 169, 171, 309

Rule of Law 99, 132, 138, 218, 271

Rules-based Order 223

Russia xvii, 18, 26, 29, 33, 45, 

47, 49, 191, 197–201, 204, 

229–232, 239–250, 276–277

Russian Far East 242, 246, 248

Rwanda 70

S

Saffronization 138

Salami-Slicing 28, 154, 287, 301

Samoa 222

Sanctions 241–243, 246–247, 

308–312

San Francisco System 146, 149, 

151, 154, 156, 253

Saudi Arabia 49

349
Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific

Science and Technology Innovation 

2030 Megaprojects 222–227

Science and Technology (ST) 38, 

203, 217–227

Science, Technology, Engineering, 

and Mathematics (STEM) 

xvii, 217

Sea Lines of Communication 30, 

171

Security and Defense Cooperation 

Forum (SDCF) 149, 152

Security Architecture xv–xvi, xviii, 

43, 147, 162, 167, 174, 259, 

261, 264

Security Dilemma xvii, 154, 

230–233

Security Practitioner xi–xiii, 3–12, 

50, 67, 77–78, 80–81, 209, 

218, 278

Senkaku 152, 205, 273

Separatist 92–93, 95, 111–115, 122, 

133, 168

Seven Sisters 95

Shias 95

Sikh 94

Silk Road 138–139, 166, 170, 172, 

180

Singapore 30, 119, 199–200

Single Threat Forces 254–256, 262

Sinhalese 96, 132

Sinicization 134

SLBM (Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles) 191, 193–194

Social Hostilities 129–132

Social Media 50–52

Solomon Islands 181

Somalia 210, 211

Sonar 194–196

Sound Surveillance System (SOSUS) 191, 194–196, 201–202, 

204–205

South Asia 91–103, 130, 136, 

162–175, 234, 243, 300, 327

South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) 93, 100–101, 103, 173

South China Sea 18, 29, 153–154, 

181, 197–200, 203, 205, 

210–211, 222, 246, 248, 273, 

287, 289, 300, 301, 307, 310, 

324, 327

Southeast Asia 4, 29, 95, 111–125, 

136, 151, 161, 170, 200, 

211–212, 216, 243, 248, 307, 

311–312

Soviet Union xii, 20–21, 23, 29, 

69, 191–195, 199, 203, 205, 

230–231, 235, 240–243, 245, 

255, 260

Spain 15, 21–22, 26, 197

Special Measures Agreement 

(SMA) 254–255

Sphere of Influence 17, 30–31, 172, 

241, 314

Spratly Islands 211, 222

350
Index

Sri Lanka 30, 91–93, 95–100, 132, 

163–165, 170–172, 198, 215, 

222, 288, 291

State Hi-Tech Development Plan 

221

Stateless 140

State-owned Enterprises (SOE) 

183, 275

Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) 

254

Status Quo 28, 162, 285–288, 290, 

294, 296–297, 299

Steppe 16, 23, 140

Strategic Ambiguity 155

Strategic Competition xii–xiv, xvi, 

xviii–xix, 19, 26, 43, 179–182, 

278, 285, 307–308, 310, 

312–314

Strategic Flexibility 259–261, 

263–264

Strategy xvi, xix, 3, 19–20, 24, 

27–28, 32, 41–42, 45, 94, 96, 

98–99, 101, 125, 139, 162, 

164, 170, 172, 174–175, 192, 

195, 199, 232, 264, 272, 295, 

307–308, 312, 314

AI Strategy 60–61

Structure xi, xiv, xv

Configurative xiv, 29, 32

Strategic xiv, 29, 31–32

Submarine-launched Ballistic Missiles 230

Submarines

Nuclear-Powered Attack Submarines (SSN) 191–192, 195, 

197, 197–198, 201

Nuclear-Powered Ballistic Missile Submarines (SSBN) 

193–194, 197–198

Suicide Bombings 91, 93, 97, 115, 

120

Sun-tzu 311, 314

Surveillance technologies 49–50, 

52, 54–57, 60–61

Surveillance Towed-Array Sensor 

System (SURTASS) 195, 198

Sweden 197, 261

Switzerland 261

Syria 93, 98, 100, 115–116, 119–123

System-changers 15, 18, 31

System-makers 17, 26

T

Taiwan xvii, xix, 30, 146, 148, 152, 

154, 181, 199, 204, 215, 277, 

289, 297, 317–328

Taliban 93–95, 165–166

Tamil Tigers 91, 95–96

Terrorism xv, 91–94, 97, 98–102, 

111–124, 131, 133

Women and Children in Terrorism 112, 120, 125

Women And Terrorism 97

Terrorist Attacks

Aum Shinrikyo (Japan) 91

351
Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific

Ayodhya (India) 93

Bali Bombing (Indonesia) 113

Bloody Easter 92, 96

Holey Artisan Bakery (Bangladesh) 92

Kargil (India) 234

Mumbai (India) 234

Surabaya Bombings 121

Terrorists 45, 94, 99, 112, 116–118, 

123–124

Thailand xviii, 43, 111–114, 

122–124, 146, 149, 151, 200, 

215, 216, 261

Insurgency 111–114, 122–124

Thein Sein 309–310

The Resistance Front (TRF) 94

Third Industrial Revolution 37, 40

Thousand Talents Program 221

Thucydides Trap xiv, 20–21, 28, 32, 

34, 283, 299

Tiangong-1 222

Tibet xviii, 134, 167, 169–170, 223, 

284–285, 288–292

Trans-Himalayan Economic Corridor (THEC) 166, 169

Transnational Extremist Groups 

131

Trilateral 145, 148–152, 156

Trilateral Coordination Oversight 

Group (TCOG) 148

Trilateral Strategic Dialogue 

(TSD) 149–150

Trump, Donald (President & Administration) 146, 153, 260, 

296, 327

Tsunami 113, 150–151, 151, 156

Turkey 119, 261

Turkic 16, 134

U

Ukraine 239–242

United Kingdom (UK) 22, 25, 

55, 154–155, 195, 197, 261, 

326–327

United Nations (UN) 55, 68–70, 

72, 74–75, 94–95, 210, 216, 

222–223, 261–262, 296, 320

United Nations Convention on 

the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 209, 223

United Nations Development 

Programme 69, 72

United Nations Human Rights 

Council (UNHRC) 94–95, 

99

United Nations Security Council 

74, 231, 262, 296

United States (US) xiii, xvi, xviii, 

4, 17–18, 20–23, 26–28, 

30, 41–45, 55, 91, 95, 102, 

145–152, 154–157, 164, 168, 

171–172, 174, 179–182, 185–

186, 191, 193–194, 196–197, 

199, 201–205, 212, 215, 216, 

219–222, 224–225, 229–234, 

352
Index

236, 239, 241, 243–249, 

253–265, 253–268, 272, 283, 

292, 293, 295–299, 307–314, 

309, 320, 323, 327

U.S. Alliance System xv, xviii, 

145–156

U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) xviii, 

153, 254–265

US Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) 197, 204

U.S. National Security Strategy 

(NSS) 312–314

UUV (Unmanned Undersea Vehicle) xvi, 202, 204–205

Uyghur xv, 133–134, 136, 273

V

Vatican 320

Video Surveillance 53–54

Vietnam 26, 30, 69, 154, 191, 

198–200, 205, 243, 263, 

296–297, 300

Violence xiii

Mob 132, 136–137

Sectarian 92, 131

Societal 67–82

Structural Violence Against

Women xv

Structural Violence Against 

Women 71–73, 76–78

Visiting Forces Agreement (USPhilippines) 153

W

War

by other means

Economic 25, 28

Information 28, 59

Lawfare 28

Political 28

Psychological 25, 28

Riskfare 29

Conventional 295, 299

Indirect 25

Nuclear 20, 25, 27, 229, 233, 289, 

295, 299

Proxy 25

Warfare 17, 19, 20, 25, 26, 28, 69, 

71–73, 192

Electronic 155

Tribal 73

Undersea 204

Wartime Operational Control 254, 

257–258, 260, 263

Weaponization 29, 218, 223

Website Scraping 52

Wilayat al-Hind, 101

Women

and Terrorism 97

Structural Violence Against 

Women 71–73, 76–78

Women and Children in Terrorism 120, 124

Women, Peace and Security (WPS) 

74–77, 82

World Economic Forum 37–38, 41, 

46, 57

353
Hindsight, Insight, Foresight: Thinking about Security in the Indo-Pacific

World Health Assembly (WHA) 

323

World Health Organization 

(WHO) 320, 322–323, 325

World Trade Organization (WTO) 

272, 321

World War I xii, 25, 196

World War II xii, 24–25, 43, 69, 92, 

193, 203, 211, 219, 239, 242, 

244–245, 307, 311, 318

World War III 28

X

Xenophobia 101

Xi Jinping 5, 7–10, 27, 161, 165, 

249, 271, 273–279, 288, 298, 

307, 309–310, 321–324

Xinjiang 42, 133, 163, 166, 180, 

273, 289, 291, 297

Y

Yugoslavia 69–70, 272

Yunnan 164, 171, 310–311

354
Hindsight, Insight, 

Foresight is a tour 

d’horizon of security 

issues in the Indo-Pacific. 

Written by 20 current and 

former members of the faculty at the 

Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center 

for Security Studies, its 21 chapters 

provide hindsight, insight, and foresight 

on numerous aspects of security in the 

region. This book will help readers to 

understand the big picture, grasp the 

changing faces, and comprehend the 

local dynamics of regional security.

9 780977 324668

90000>

ISBN 978-0-9773246-6-8

DANIEL K. INOUYE 

ASIA-PACIFIC CENTER 

FOR SECURITY STUDIES

HONOLULU, HAWAI‘I

WWW.DKIAPCSS.ORG