J-A21009-20

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

SAMUEL W.B. MILLINGHAUSEN, III 

Appellant

v.

KAREN DRAKE, ROBERT L. HYSLOP, 

JR., THERESA M. HYSLOP, JOY A. 

CAPKA, MARYANN DIRENZO, JOHN 

DOE ONE, JOHN DOE TWO, JOHN 

DOE THREE, AND JOHN DOE FOUR

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 477 EDA 2020

Appeal from the Judgment Entered March 9, 2020

In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County Civil Division at 

No(s): No. 2012-06050

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., McCAFFERY, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.: FILED OCTOBER 13, 2020

Appellant, Samuel W. B. Millinghausen, III, appeals from the Judgment 

entered on March 9, 2020, after the lower court denied Appellant’s Motion to 

Vacate the Award of the AAA Arbitrator (“Motion to Vacate”).

1

 Upon review, 

we agree with the court’s conclusion that Appellant failed to establish by clear

and precise evidence that he was denied a hearing or that misconduct marred 

the underlying arbitration proceedings. Accordingly, the underlying 

____________________________________________

1

Initially, Appellant appealed from the January 8, 2020 Order denying his 

Motion to Vacate. Because this was not a final, appealable order, we issued a 

Rule directing Appellant to praecipe the common pleas court to enter 

Judgment. See Dunlap By Hoffman v. State Farm Ins., 546 A.2d 1209 

(Pa. Super. 1988). Appellant complied, and the court entered Judgment on 

March 9, 2020. Thus, we discharge the Rule and consider Appellant’s appeal.
J-A21009-20

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arbitration award is conclusive and binding. We affirm on the basis of the 

lower court’s Opinion filed April 16, 2020.

The parties are well versed in the facts and procedural history of this 

case. Briefly, in 2006, Appellant contracted with Legal Access Plans, LLC to 

provide legal services to its plan subscribers (“Contract”). The Contract 

included an arbitration clause. 

In 2012, Appellant commenced defamation litigation in common pleas 

court against Karen Drake, Robert L. Hyslop, Jr., Theresa Hyslop, Joy A. 

Capka, and Maryann Direnzo (collectively, “Clients”).2 Clients filed Preliminary 

Objections to Appellant’s Complaint, seeking to compel arbitration. The lower 

court overruled their Objections, and Clients appealed. Upon review, this 

Court determined that Clients were third-party beneficiaries of the Contract 

and that Appellant’s claims were within the scope of the arbitration clause; 

accordingly, we reversed the lower court and remanded for arbitration 

proceedings. See Millinghausen v. Drake, 102 A.3d 540 (Pa. Super. 2014)

(unpublished memorandum). 

Arbitration proceedings commenced, and Appellant was unsuccessful 

prosecuting his claims. On January 15, 2019, in accordance with the terms of 

____________________________________________

2

In addition to Clients, Appellant sued four unnamed defendants. Appellant 

never identified these individuals. 
J-A21009-20

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the Contract, the arbitrator imposed the costs of arbitration and Clients’ 

attorneys’ fees upon Appellant.3 

Appellant filed a Motion to Vacate in the court of common pleas, 

asserting that the arbitrator lacked jurisdiction to consider Appellant’s claims,

that he had denied Appellant a fair hearing, and that the arbitration award 

was unjust. The common pleas court denied the Motion. 

Appellant timely appealed and filed a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) 

Statement. The court issued a comprehensive and responsive Opinion.

Appellant raises the following issues:

1. Should the [lower] [c]ourt’s denial of Appellant’s [Motion to 

Vacate] be reversed where there was no agreement to 

arbitrate[,] and the court failed to give de novo review[;] 

Appellees repudiated the alleged agreement to arbitrate[;] . . 

. the court improperly applied the standard of 42 Pa.C.S. § 

7341 to the jurisdiction question[;] the court found an 

agreement by implication[;] the court implied consideration not 

in the disavowed document[;] and [the court] improperly relied 

on earlier decisions and the arbitrator’s determinations?

2. Should the [lower] [c]ourt’s denial of Appellant’s [Motion to 

Vacate] be reversed where the award was not properly 

encompassed with[in] [Clients’] counterclaim[;] not filed with 

AAA as required by their rules[;] and Appellant was denied a 

full and fair hearing on the claim where the arbitrator denied 

“All of [Clients’] claims filed and all counterclaim damages 

(including punitive, contractual[,] lost wages, pain and 

suffering[,] and emotional distress)”, but awarded 

$381,292,50 [sic] for claims never raised as required by AAA 

____________________________________________

3 Clients’ fees totaled $355,000.00; Administrative fees of the American 

Arbitration Association were $10,050.00; and compensation due the arbitrator 

was $42,535.00. Motion to Vacate the Award of the AAA Arbitrator, 2/14/19, 

Exhibit No. 1 (“Final Award of Arbitrator”, 1/15/19, at 6).
J-A21009-20

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rules, denying Appellant an opportunity to a full and fair 

hearing on the issues?

3. Should the Appellant’s Motion to Vacate . . . have been 

sustained where the record contains clear, precise and 

indubitable evidence that there was misconduct by [Clients’] 

and/or the arbitrator[,] which demonstrated fraud, 

misconduct, corruption and irregularities [that] denied 

Appellant a full and fair hearing on his claim for defamation?

Appellant’s Br. at 6-7 (suggested answers omitted).

We review a court order confirming a common law arbitration award for 

an abuse of discretion or an error of law. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. 

v. Stein, 683 A.2d 683, 685 (Pa. Super. 1996).

“Judicial review of a common law arbitration award is severely limited 

as otherwise arbitration would be an unnecessary stage of litigation, causing 

only delay and expense without settling the dispute.” U.S. Spaces, Inc. v. 

Berkshire Hathaway Home Servs., Fox & Roach, 165 A.3d 931, 934 (Pa. 

Super. 2017) (citation omitted).4 An arbitrator is the final judge of both law 

and fact, and we shall not reverse a common law arbitration award for a 

mistake of either. F.J. Busse Co. v. Sheila Zipporah, L.P., 879 A.2d 809,

811 (Pa. Super. 2005). Thus, neither this Court nor the trial court may review 

the tribunal’s disposition of the merits of the case. Id.

The award of an arbitrator is binding. Sage v. Greenspan, 765 A.2d 

1139, 1142 (Pa. Super. 2000) (citation omitted). We may not vacate or 

modify an award “unless it is clearly shown that a party was denied a hearing 

____________________________________________

4 This matter proceeded in common law arbitration because the Contract did 

not reference the Uniform Arbitration Act. See Fastuca v. L.W. Molnar & 

Assocs., 950 A.2d 980, 988 (Pa. Super. 2008). 
J-A21009-20

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or that fraud, misconduct, corruption or other irregularity caused the rendition 

of an unjust, inequitable or unconscionable award.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 7341. Thus, 

to challenge an arbitration award successfully, the appellant must establish 

by “clear, precise, and indubitable evidence” both the underlying irregularity 

and the resulting inequity. Gargano v. Terminix Int’l Co., L.P., 784 A.2d 

188, 193 (Pa. Super. 2001) (internal citation omitted).

Appellant raises three broad issues on appeal. First, Appellant maintains 

that there was no agreement to arbitrate and that the arbitrator lacked 

jurisdiction to consider Appellant’s claims. See Appellant’s Br. at 25-55. 

Second, Appellant contends that we must vacate the arbitration award 

because Clients never filed a claim for fees and expenses and because the 

arbitrator had denied Clients’ several counterclaims during the arbitration 

proceedings. See Appellant’s Br. at 55-63. Third, Appellant alleges several 

instances of misconduct by the arbitrator such that he denied Appellant a full 

and fair hearing on his claims for defamation. See Appellant’s Br. at 63-77.5

The Honorable Garrett D. Page has authored a comprehensive, 

thorough, and well-reasoned Opinion addressing each of Appellant’s claims. 

After a careful review of Appellant’s arguments and the certified record, we 

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5

In his Statement of Questions for the appeal, Appellant asserted that Clients 

also engaged in misconduct. See Appellant’s Br. at 7. However, Appellant 

fails to develop any argument in support of this assertion. See Appellant’s 

Br. at 63-77. Thus, we find it waived. See Sephakis v. Pa. State Police 

Bureau of Records and Id., 214 A.3d 680, 686-87 (Pa. Super. 2019); 

Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a).
J-A21009-20

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adopt the Opinion as our own and affirm the lower court’s decision to deny 

Appellant’s Motion to Vacate. See Trial Ct. Op, 4/16/20, at 1-2, 9-10, 14-20 

(discussing this Court’s dispositive ruling that Appellant’s defamation claims 

were subject to arbitration pursuant to the Contract and that Appellant’s 

claims to the contrary are without merit);

6 12-14 (concluding that (a) the 

Contract’s arbitration clause granted the arbitrator authority to award costs 

and fees, (b) the award was supported by evidence, (c) Appellant was given 

an opportunity to challenge the evidence, and (d) the size of the award reflects 

Appellant’s “dilatory and obdurate conduct”, which needlessly prolonged the 

proceedings); and 6-9, 10-12 ((a) examining relevant portions of the

proceedings, (b) finding that Appellant’s assertions of misconduct were 

unfounded and often misleading, and (c) concluding that Appellant failed to 

demonstrate with clear and precise evidence that he was denied a hearing or 

that misconduct led to an unjust or inequitable award).

We direct the parties to annex the lower court’s April 16, 2020 Opinion 

to any future filings.

Rule discharged. Judgment affirmed.

____________________________________________

6 The lower court also cites to a related appeal by Appellant, involving Legal 

Access Plans, LLC, in which a panel of this Court similarly determined that the 

Contract included a valid agreement to arbitrate. Millinghausen v. Legal 

Access Plans, LLC, 60 A.3d 846 (Pa. Super. 2012) (unpublished 

memorandum), allocatur denied, 64 A.3d 632 (Pa. 2013).
J-A21009-20

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 10/13/2020
2012-06050-0237 Opinion, Page 1 Circulated 09/18/2020 02:39 PM

1 

Number 2011-13446. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

April 15, 2020 

477EDA2020 

Lower Court Docket: 

No. 2012-06050 

OPINION 

v. 

Plaintiff 

Defendants 

The instant appeal arises from Plaintiff Samuel W.B. Millinghausen, Ill's challenge to an 

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF MONTGOMERY COUNTY, 

PENNSYLVANIA 

CIVIL DIVISION 

Plaintiff appeals from this Court's Order of January 8, 2020. For the reasons set forth 

In the separate matter at Docket Number 2011-13446, the Legal Access Defendants 

Legal Access Plans, LLC-made defamatory statements that led to the termination of his 

Entry 168. In the underlying action, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Karen Drake, Joy Capka, 

SAMUEL W.B. MILLINGHAUSEN, III 

relationship with Legal Access Plans, L.L.C. See Docket Entry 22. Plaintiff also brought suit 

against the Legal Access Defendants in a separate action in Montgomery County under Docket 

should be dismissed, and the ruling should be affirmed. 

arbitration award issued by Arbitrator Beitch ("the Arbitrator") on January 15, 2019. See Docket 

requested that the case be remanded to arbitration pursuant to an arbitration clause contained in 

Maryann DiRenzo, Robert Hyslop, Jr., and Theresa Hyslop-all clients of Plaintiff referred by 

Page, J. 

below, Plaintiff's appeal is without merit. Therefore, any claim of error on the part of this Court 

KAREN M. DRAKE, ET AL. 
2012-06050-0237 Opinion, Page 2

2006 and 2008 agreements between the parties. Upon the trial court declining to remand the 

matter to arbitration, the Legal Access Defendants filed an appeal. During the pendency of the 

appeal in the matter at Docket Number 2011-13446, Defendants under this docket similarly 

demanded that the instant matter be remanded to arbitration pursuant to the same arbitration 

clause in the 2006 and 2008 agreements, appealing the trial court's denial of their Motion to 

Compel Arbitration. Both Pennsylvania Superior Court panels for the matter under Docket 

Number 2011-13446 and the matter under Docket Number 2012-06050 issued opinions 

remanding Plaintiffs cases-based on the same agreements and same underlying facts-to 

arbitration. Plaintiffs Petition for Allowance of Appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was 

denied for the matter at Docket Number 2011-13446 and denied as having been improvidently 

granted for the matter at Docket Number 2012-06050. 

On January 15, 2019, the Arbitrator issued an arbitration award in favor of Defendants 

and against Plaintiff on his claims for defamation, false light, invasion of privacy, and unpaid 

bills and ordered that Plaintiff pay Defendants' counsel fees. See Docket Entry 181 at Ex. 5. On 

February 14, 2019, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Vacate the Award of the AAA Arbitrator. See 

Docket Entry 168. In said motion, Plaintiff alleges that fraud, misconduct, corruption, and other 

irregularities on the part of both the Arbitrator and defense counsel denied him a fair hearing and 

rendered an unjust, inequitable, and unconscionable award. Plaintiff also contends the arbitration 

award should be vacated based on the allegation that the 2006 and 2008 documents were not 

enforceable contracts, thus the Arbitrator lacked jurisdiction in the absence of an enforceable 

arbitration provision. 

On March 22, 2019, Plaintiff filed an Emergency Motion to Retain Jurisdiction and 

Strike Defendants' Petition to Confirm Arbitration Award, which the Court granted. See Docket 

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2012-06050-0237 Opinion, Page 3

Entries 171; 177. Defendants filed a response in opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Vacate the 

A ward of the AAA Arbitrator on March 22, 2019. See Docket Entry 181. Plaintiff filed a Brief in 

Support of his Motion to Vacate the Award of the AAA Arbitrator on October 3, 2019, and 

Defendants filed their own Brief in Support of their earlier opposition on November 4, 2019. See 

Docket Entries 217; 219. Plaintiff filed a Reply Brief in Support of his Motion to Vacate the 

Award on November 25, 2019. See Docket Entry 220. Plaintiff filed an Argument Praecipe, and 

this Court held oral argument on Plaintiff's Motion to Vacate the A ward of the AAA Arbitrator 

on January 7, 2020. See Docket Entries 222-23. Following argument, the Court denied Plaintiff's 

Motion on January 8, 2020. See Docket Entry 224. Plaintiff filed a Motion for Reconsideration, 

which this Court denied on January 23, 2020. See Docket Entries 225-26. 

Plaintiff filed a timely Notice of Appeal on January 30, 2020. 

ISSUES 

Plaintiff's Concise Statement is reproduced verbatim below: 

1. The Trial Court erred as a matter of law and/or fact or committed an abuse of discretion 

when it failed to fmd arbitrator denied Appellant a full and fair hearing where the arbitrator 

denied Appellant discovery which identified or included information related to the parties 

who made the defamatory [sic] to Legal Access and/or Robert L. Heston, Jr. 

2. The Trial Court erred as a matter oflaw and/or fact or committed an abuse of discretion 

when it failed to fmd arbitrator denied Appellant a full and fair hearing where the arbitrator 

denied Appellant discovery which included Legal Access Plans complete file on Appellant. 

3. The Trial Court erred as a matter oflaw and/or fact or committed an abuse of discretion 

when the arbitrator denied Appellant a full and fair hearing when Appellees failed to move 

any exhibit into evidence, ignoring the arbitrator's order to move exhibits, and denying 

Appellant any meaningful opportunity to object to exhibits. 

4. The Trial Court erred as a matter oflaw and/or fact or committed an abuse of discretion 

when he failed to find an irregularity where the arbitrator denied Appellant a full and fair 

hearing when the arbitrator required Appellant to participate in oral argument conducted in 

Florida over the objections of Appellant. 

5. The Trial Court erred as a matter oflaw and/or fact or committed an abuse of discretion 

when he failed to find an irregularity where the arbitrator engaged in ex parte discussions of 

the case with Appellees' counsel following the close of oral argument. 

6. The Trial Court erred as a matter oflaw and/or fact or committed an abuse of discretion 

when he failed to find an irregularity where the arbitrator's award was unjust, inequitable or 

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2012-06050-0237 Opinion, Page 4

unconscionable where it exceeded Appellant's Schedule C income for his practice and his 

IRS Adjusted Gross Income for ten years and Appellant was denied a full and fair hearing. 

7. The Trial Court erred as a matter oflaw and/or fact or committed an abuse of discretion 

when he failed to find an irregularity where the arbitrator denied Appellant a full and fair 

hearing when no claim was made based on the falsely alleged arbitration clause of the 

renounced documents before the close of hearings. 

8. The Trial Court erred as a matter oflaw and/or fact or committed an abuse of discretion 

when he failed to find an irregularity where the arbitrator denied Appellant a full and fair 

hearing when the arbitrator allowed Appellees to exhaust Appellant economically by refusing 

to dismiss their frivolous Dragonetti claim for five days of testimony at great financial 

benefit to Appellees and to the arbitrator. 

9. The Trial Court erred as a matter oflaw and/or fact or committed an abuse of discretion 

when he failed to find an irregularity where the arbitrator denied Appellant a full and fair 

hearing when the arbitrator demonstrated bad faith, ignorance of the law and indifference to 

the justice of the result in reaching an unjust, inequitable and unconscionable award when he 

stated "I can rule, I believe, that I have jurisdiction of a claim before it's filed." 

10. The Trial Court erred as a matter oflaw and/or fact or committed an abuse of discretion 

when he failed to find an irregularity when the arbitrator denied Appellant a full and fair 

hearing when the arbitrator stated he, [sic] stopped reviewing Appellant's filings midstream. 

11. The Trial Court erred as a matter of law and/or fact or committed an abuse of discretion 

when where [sic] the Trial Court applied an incorrect standard when it refused to find the 

arbitrator lacked any jurisdiction to rule in this case. 

12. The Trial Court erred as a matter oflaw and/or fact or committed an abuse of discretion 

when the Trial Court failed to properly consider after acquired evidence to determine there 

was no jurisdiction for the arbitrator to rule in this case. 

13. The Trial Court erred as a matter oflaw and/or fact or committed an abuse of discretion 

when where [sic] the arbitrator denied Appellant a full and fair hearing on the claim for 

counsel fees, costs and expenses, where the arbitrator made the award based on a claim never 

raised at any time during the AAA proceedings. 

ANALYSIS 

"Judicial review of a common law arbitration award is severely limited as otherwise 

arbitration would be an unnecessary stage of litigation, causing only delay and expense without 

settling the dispute." US. Spaces, Inc. v. Berkshire Hathaway Home Servs., Fox & Roach, 165 

A.3d 931, 934 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2017) ( citation omitted). "The arbitrators are the final judges of 

both law and fact, and an arbitration award is not subject to a reversal for a mistake of 

either." McKenna v. Sosso, 745 A.2d 1, 4 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999) (citation omitted). "Neither [the 

appellate court] nor the trial court may retry the issues addressed in arbitration or review the 

4 
2012-06050-0237 Opinion, Page 5

tribunal's disposition of the merits of the case." Id. There exists a "high burden upon the party 

who excepts to an arbitration award," with "every presumption [being] in favor of [the 

arbitration award's] validity." Reinhart v. State Auto. Ins. Ass 'n, 363 A.2d 1138, 1142 (Pa. 

Super. Ct. 1976). The following standard applies in reviewing an arbitration award in a common 

law arbitration: 

The award of an arbitrator in a nonjudicial arbitration which is not 

subject to Subchapter A (relating to statutory arbitration) or a 

similar statute regulating nonjudicial arbitration proceedings is 

binding and may not be vacated or modified unless it is clearly 

shown that a party was denied a hearing or that fraud, misconduct, 

corruption or other irregularity caused the rendition of an unjust, 

inequitable or unconscionable award. 

42 Pa. C.S.A. § 7341; see also PG Metals Co. v. Hojldn, 218 A.2d 238, 239-40 (Pa. 1966) 

( citations omitted) ("[ A ]n award of arbitrators in a common law arbitration is conclusive and 

binding and cannot be attacked unless it can be shown by clear, precise and convincing evidence 

that the parties were denied a hearing, or there was fraud, misconduct, corruption, or some other 

irregularity which caused the rendition of an unjust, inequitable or unconscionable award."). 

"To prevail on these grounds, actual fraud must be shown, involving collusion with one 

of the parties, or misconduct intended to create a fraudulent result." Gwin Engineers, Inc. v. 

Cricket Club Estates Dev. Grp., 555 A.2d 1328, 1329 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) (citing Mellon v. 

Travelers Ins. Co., 406 A.2d 759, 761 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979)). "An argument that the arbitrators 

were prejudiced or partial, or that they reached an award so unjust that it constitutes constructive 

fraud, will not be heeded." Mellon, 406 A.2d at 761. "Similarly, an 'irregularity' will not be 

found simply upon a showing that an incorrect result was reached." Id. "In an arbitration 

proceeding, an irregularity refers to the process employed in reaching the result of the arbitration, 

5 
2012-06050-0237 Opinion, Page 6

not to the result itself." Chervenak, Keane & Co., Inc. v. Hotel Rittenhouse Assoc., Inc., 477 

A.2d 482 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984). 

I. DISCOVERY/EVIDENTIARY ISSUES 

Plaintiffs first three issues generally boil down into a single overarching error-that this 

Court erred in not finding the Arbitrator denied Plaintiff a hearing with regard to several 

discovery issues. Preliminarily, the Court notes that none of Plaintiffs allegations of error 

related to discovery amount to denial of a hearing or "fraud, misconduct, corruption or other 

irregularity" as required to vacate the award-particularly where Plaintiff was afforded the 

opportunity for extensive discovery. In his first two issues, Plaintiff alleges that the Arbitrator 

denied him discovery related to the identities of those who made defamatory statements and 

Legal Access Plans' complete file on himself. Here, it is factually untrue that the Arbitrator 

denied Plaintiff discovery on the identities of the individuals who allegedly made defamatory 

statements. The Arbitrator ordered that Defendants disclose the identities of said individuals by 

providing Plaintiff with responsive documents. See Docket Entry 219 at Ex. 21. When Plaintiff 

expressed dissatisfaction with Defendants' lack of production of mailing addresses for said 

individuals, the Arbitrator and Defendants offered to conference this issue, to which Plaintiff 

declined the need to further pursue this discovery in the following email: 

I [Plaintiff] do not wish to discuss the issue further. Ms. Wynkoop 

[defense counsel] has stated LAP [Legal Access Plans] does not 

have information on the individuals they have offered as making 

the statements they provided. I do not wish to spend time or 

resources listening to their assertions. I believe there is no issue for 

Mr. Beitch [the Arbitrator] to address and request you do not 

schedule any conference. 

See id. at Ex. 23. 

6 
2012-06050-0237 Opinion, Page 7

Similarly, the Arbitrator addressed Plaintiffs concerns related to production of a 

"complete file" on Plaintiff, finding that such a file likely does not exist and would nevertheless 

be unnecessary to prove his case in light of Plaintiff being afforded extensive discovery: 

Claimant continues to object to a non-existing refusal to grant him 

discovery. I ordered that he be supplied with all germane requested 

documents and this was done. He continues to want "his file" as if 

this will contain additional pejorative statements about him 

proving his case. I believe that there is not a general file labeled 

and maintained as such. There were multiple days of Hearings 

including testimony of the Individual Respondents and employees 

under oath. Claimant had ample opportunity to develop and prove 

his case during the Course of Arbitration). 

See Docket Entry 181 at Ex. 5, ,r C. 

Ultimately, the Arbitrator determined in his Final Award that Defendants sufficiently 

complied with his order compelling discovery. Id. The Court is bound by 42 Pa. C.S. §7341 and 

cannot disturb the Arbitrator's findings of law and fact-particularly here, where Plaintiffs 

allegations of being denied a hearing by way of denial of discovery are especially unavailing. 

Plaintiffs third issue alleges the Court erred in not finding Plaintiff was denied a hearing 

due to the alleged failure of Defendants to move exhibits into evidence-denying Plaintiff the 

opportunity to object to exhibits. The Court finds this claim without merit. Here, the Arbitrator 

noted in his Final A ward that both parties-not just Defendants-were "not diligent in moving 

their exhibits into evidence." See Docket Entry 181 at Ex. 5, ,r M. In fact, Defendants allege in 

their opposition that Plaintiff submitted new testimony and documentary evidence after the close 

of the hearings. Despite Plaintiffs own failure to diligently move exhibits into evidence, the 

Arbitrator nevertheless allowed Plaintiff to submit the evidence he felt necessary to support his 

case. The Arbitrator also noted in his Final Award that in rendering his decision, he "accept[ed] 

all the proffered exhibits for the consideration they deserve, noting that some of these lack 

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2012-06050-0237 Opinion, Page 8

foundation and some are of limited probative value." Id. In this case, Defendants submitted 

exhibits that were marked throughout the evidentiary hearing and referenced with detailed 

citations in corresponding motions and briefs. See Docket Entry 219. As such, Plaintiff was 

afforded the opportunity to object to exhibits through replies to Defendants' briefs and 

throughout the five days of hearings, and the Arbitrator cannot be said to have denied Plaintiff a 

hearing as required to vacate the award. 

II. ORAL ARGUMENT 

In issues four and five, Plaintiff alleges this Court erred in not finding irregularities in the 

oral argument conducted at the close of arbitration. First, Plaintiff argues that that the scheduling 

of closing arguments in Florida over his objections denied him a hearing or resulted in an 

irregularity in the proceedings. This claim lacks merit. Plaintiff cannot be said to have been 

denied a full and fair hearing after being given the benefit of five days of evidentiary hearings 

over the course of two years and the opportunity to attend closing arguments in-person or 

telephonically. See Docket Entry 181 at Ex. 9. The Court notes that at the close of the hearings, 

the parties agreed they preferred in-person closing arguments, with Plaintiff making the 

following on-the-record statement when Florida was raised as a potential location: 

MR. MILLINGHAUSEN: I have a suggestion. If you're going to 

Florida, I think Mr. Wagner [defense counsel] will fly me and the 

family down. 

See Docket Entry 219 at Ex. 17 (N.T. Hearing 5/14/18, pp. 410-11). 

Consistent with Plaintiffs comment, Defendants assert both in their brief in support of 

their opposition and during oral argument on Plaintiffs Motion to Vacate the Arbitration A ward 

that defense counsel did in fact offer to pay for Plaintiffs travel to closing argument in Florida. 

See id.; see also N.T. Hearing 1/7/20, pp. 48; 50-51. The record before the Court indicates the 

8 
2012-06050-0237 Opinion, Page 9

Arbitrator offered to make similar accommodations to Plaintiff's objections to Florida, offering 

that the parties could forego closing arguments or conduct them telephonically. See Docket Entry 

219 at Ex. 17 (N.T. Hearing 5/14/18, pp. 410-11); see also id. at Ex. 9; 18. That Plaintiff is now 

unhappy with his decision to not make an in-person appearance at closing arguments does not 

rise to the level of "fraud, misconduct, corruption or other irregularity" or denial of a hearing 

required for the Court to vacate the award. 

Second, Plaintiff contends that alleged ex parte discussions overheard on the 

teleconference at the end of closing arguments constitute an irregularity providing justification to 

vacate the award. Plaintiff alleges that after closing arguments were finished, he could overhear 

"banter" and defense counsel answering the Arbitrator's question about where to find the 

language concerning "access to clients" in the 2006 agreement. Defendants contend that defense 

counsel merely answered a question of the Arbitrator's during closing arguments. Even taking 

Plaintiff's version of events to be true, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not established that the 

alleged conduct constitutes an irregularity or denial of a hearing, where the question of whether 

"access to clients" was a form of consideration was already belabored at length over the course 

of five days of evidentiary hearings. Thus, Plaintiff's fourth and fifth issues must fail. 

III.OTHER IRREGULARITIES WITH ARBITRATOR 

Plaintiff also raises a number of other errors associated with the Court declining to find 

irregularities in the conduct of the Arbitrator in issues seven, eight, and ten. In issue seven, 

Plaintiff alleges an irregularity in the proceedings and denial of a hearing by way of the fact that 

"no claim was made based on the falsely alleged arbitration clause[.]" In other words, Plaintiff 

contends the matter should not have been remanded to arbitration where Plaintiff's claim was for 

defamation and not breach of contract. Here, the Superior Court already soundly rejected 

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2012-06050-0237 Opinion, Page 10

Plaintiffs position on this exact issue in his earlier appeal, finding Defendants are third party 

beneficiaries of the contract and that the broad language of the arbitration clause covers claims 

"premised upon defamation and slander"-allowing the defamation claim to go to arbitration 

over Plaintiffs objections. See Millinghausen v. Legal Access Plans, LLC, 60 A.3d 846 (Pa. 

Super. Ct. 2012) (unpublished memorandum). Specifically, the Superior Court provided its 

reasomng for the agreement to arbitrate extending to Defendants in a defamation claim as 

follows: 

We now tum to whether Millinghausen's tort claims against 

Appellants are within the scope of the arbitration agreement. The 

trial court determined that Millinghausen's defamation claims 

against Appellants were outside the scope of the arbitration 

clause. See Trial Court Opinion, 8/15/03, at 8. We disagree with 

the trial court based on our prior conclusion that the arbitration 

clause was broad, and applied to Millinghausen's breach of 

contract claim against Legal Access, which was premised in part 

on Appellants' alleged defamatory statements. Millinghausen, 

supra, at 10. We are not persuaded that the current action is 

outside the scope of the broad arbitration clause by which 

Millinghausen is bound. Therefore, based on our prior 

determinations in Elwyn, Callan, Pisano, Schoel/hammer's 

Hatboro Manor, and Millinghausen's action against Legal Access, 

we reverse the trial court's refusal to compel this action to 

arbitration. 

See Millinghausen v. Drake, No. 1205 EDA 2013 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2014) (emphasis added). 

Thus, the Superior Court already reversed the trial court and determined arbitration is 

appropriate-despite the claim being one of defamation and not breach of contract-and 

Plaintiffs issue seven must be dismissed. 

Plaintiff also alleges the Court erred in not finding an irregularity or denial of a hearing 

where the Arbitrator allowed Defendants to present their Dragonetti claim during the hearings. In 

this case, both Plaintiff and Defendants raised Dragonetti claims, which the Arbitrator ultimately 

dismissed in his Final Award. That the Arbitrator permitted both parties to assert counterclaims 

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2012-06050-0237 Opinion, Page 11

can hardly be said to constitute "clear, precise and convincing evidence" of denial of a hearing or 

"fraud, misconduct, corruption, or some other irregularity" as required by the standard set forth 

in 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 7341. Insofar as Plaintiff finds the Arbitrator misapplied the law or 

misinterpreted facts in not dismissing Defendants' Dragonetti claim sooner, a mistake oflaw or 

fact is not subject to judicial review for common law arbitration. To the extent that Plaintiff 

alleges error in Defendants' Dragonetti claim contributing to additional costs for Plaintiff, the 

Court notes that the Arbitrator identified Plaintiffs own legal maneuvers as increasing the time 

and money spent on the proceedings, as will be discussed in Section IV infra. 

In issue ten, Plaintiff alleges an irregularity and denial of a hearing where the Arbitrator 

stated he stopped reviewing Plaintiff's filings "midstream." Initially, the Court notes that the 

Arbitrator never proclaimed to refuse to review Plaintiffs filings altogether, but rather, stated the 

following: 

MR. MILLINGHAUSEN: Well, we're not necessarily agreeing 

to that. We do not necessarily agree to an arbitration. We agreed to 

allow the opportunity for a fair hearing. That's why we are here. 

ARBITRATOR BEITCH: Okay. I take exception to that. We 

already had the issue early on in the proceedings. You objected to 

arbitration. And everybody knows, there is a whole case history 

here where the Pennsylvania Court system dealt with whether 

arbitration was required in this case. And I believe the ultimate 

ruling was, and you filed an objection, stating, I believe correctly, 

that the ultimate decision is mine as to whether I have jurisdiction. 

And in midstream, you made a filing in which you, I believe, 

agreed to waive your argument against the arbitration and proceed. 

Said a nice thing or two about me in that, and I accepted it 

verbatim. [ ... ] 

ARBITRATOR BEITCH: Let me cut you short a moment. I 

don't want us to get on sidetracks. What I am trying to determine 

right now is whether you have agreed to arbitration, or I 

misunderstood what your pleading was. And [if] you are not 

agreeing or renewing your objection. In which case, I will hear 

further argument on it. I stopped reviewing your filings in 

midstream based on your representation that you find arbitration 

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2012-06050-0237 Opinion, Page 12

acceptable, so I don't want us to spend our precious time now 

debating the issue. You both briefed it for me. 

See Docket Entry 219 at Ex. 22 (N.T. Hearing 10/2/17, pp. 8:7-9:2; 11:2-13). 

As seen by the excerpted language, the Arbitrator's statement about stopping review of 

Plaintiffs filings is couched in the context of the parties having to continuously revisit the issue 

of the Arbitrator's jurisdiction throughout the proceedings due to Plaintiffs repeated objections. 

In essence, Plaintiff takes a single out-of-context statement from the Arbitrator and attempts to 

frame it as the Arbitrator having completely neglected to perform his duties-despite ample 

record evidence suggesting the Arbitrator considered the parties' briefs and arguments in making 

a reasoned determination of his jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not 

identified with "clear, precise and convincing evidence" either denial of a hearing or "fraud, 

misconduct, corruption, or some other irregularity" as required by the standard set forth in 42 Pa. 

C.S.A. § 7341. Thus, there was no error in this Court's denial of the Motion to Vacate the 

Arbitration Award. 

IV. ARBITRATION AWARD 

Plaintiffs sixth and thirteenth issues both allege error in the Court having not found 

irregularity associated with the amount and makeup of the arbitration award itself. Specifically, 

Plaintiff alleges that the award is unjust, inequitable, or unconscionable as excessive in relation 

to his income and that the Arbitrator had no basis for awarding counsel fees, costs, and expenses 

as a component of the award. With regard to Plaintiffs claim that his personal financial situation 

merits vacating the award, Plaintiff provides no legal or factual support to establish that the size 

of the arbitration award in this case constitutes "clear, precise and convincing evidence" of 

"fraud, misconduct, corruption, or some other irregularity" as required by the standard set forth 

in 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 7341; PG Metals Co., 218 A.2d at 239-40. Of note, Plaintiff makes no 

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2012-06050-0237 Opinion, Page 13

allegation in his Motion to Vacate or corresponding brief that the amount awarded by the 

Arbitrator exceeded the actual fees and costs in Defendants' fee petitions. 

Here, the Arbitrator identified Plaintiff's "multiple motions and other expensive and time 

consuming actions," "continual[] resist[ ance ]" of arbitration, "obdurate insistence on presenting 

and renewing multiple unfounded positions," and ''unfocused and slow-paced presentation of the 

evidence" as reasons meriting the allocation of counsel fees, costs, and expenses in his Final 

Award. See Docket Entry 181 at Ex. 5, ,r K. Given that the Arbitrator identified Plaintiff's own 

dilatory and obdurate conduct as a primary factor in contributing to the "expensive" and "time 

consuming" nature of the arbitration, this Court notes that Plaintiff need look no further than his 

own conduct with respect to raising a complaint over the size of the arbitration award. Plaintiff 

also cannot claim to have been denied a full and fair opportunity to challenge Defendants' 

counsel fees and costs, where Plaintiff was given the opportunity to submit objections to 

Defendants' fee requests and additional time to supplement said objections. See Docket Entry 

181 at Ex. 11. That the Arbitrator did not agree with Plaintiff's objections does not indicate that 

his conduct rose to the level of "fraud, misconduct, corruption, or some other irregularity" 

necessary for the Court to justify vacating his award, thus issue six must fail. 

As for Plaintiff's contention that the Arbitrator had no basis to award counsel fees, costs, 

and expenses due to Defendants' allegedly not claiming said items, this claim lacks merit. Here, 

the arbitration clause of the underlying agreement at issue specifically granted the Arbitrator the 

authority to require Plaintiff to pay counsel fees and costs, providing that "Each party shall bear 

the costs of its own attorneys' fees in connection with an arbitration unless such costs are 

otherwise allocated by the arbitrator." See Docket Entry 181 at Ex. 1, § 11 (emphasis added). 

Accordingly, the Arbitrator abided by the arbitration clause in § 11 of underlying agreement in 

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2012-06050-0237 Opinion, Page 14

allocating counsel fees, costs, and expenses to Plaintiff in his Final Award. See id. at Ex. 5, ,r K. 

Therefore, to the extent that Plaintiff argues there was no "claim" for counsel fees, costs, and 

expenses, the Arbitrator did in fact have full authority to award such allocations, and Plaintiffs 

thirteenth issue must be dismissed. 

V. ARBITRATOR'S JURISDICTION 

Plaintiff raises similar allegations of error in issues nine, eleven, and twelve, all of which 

relate to the claim that the Arbitrator lacked jurisdiction to rule in this case. Essentially, Plaintiff 

argues that the two agreements underlying the action were not enforceable contracts, making the 

arbitration clause unenforceable. Preliminarily, the Court will note that the issue of the 

Arbitrator's jurisdiction came before the Superior Court twice before, with the Superior Court 

twice finding that there was an enforceable contract requiring each of Plaintiffs lawsuits be 

remanded to arbitration. Specifically, the Superior Court opined the following on the issue of the 

contract's enforceability: 

Accordingly, we found in Millinghausen that Millinghausen and 

Legal Access entered into a valid agreement to arbitrate, a 

conclusion with which the trial court agreed after conducting its 

own analysis. Trial Court Opinion, 8/15/13, at 4-7 ("It is clear to 

this Court, following a review of the Agreement [between 

Millinghausen and Legal Access], that a valid arbitration 

agreement exists."). We agree with both the Millinghausen 

panel from our Court and with the trial court. 

See Millinghausen v. Drake, No. 1205 EDA 2013 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2014) (emphasis added). 

The Superior Court in Plaintiffs lawsuit against the Legal Access Defendants also found 

that the same 2006 document underlying the instant action was an enforceable contract, in 

addition to fmding that Plaintiff already admitted as much: 

In this case, the parties entered a Network Provide agreement on 

January 27, 2006 ... In the present case, Appellee [Plaintiff] does 

not contest the validity of the agreement to arbitrate; rather, he 

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2012-06050-0237 Opinion, Page 15

maintains that his present action is outside its scope because it 

pertains to slander and defamation and Appellant's re-publication 

of slander and defamation. 

See Millinghausen v. Legal Access Plans, LLC, 60 A.3d 846 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012) (emphasis 

added). 

Further, the Arbitrator made his own independent evaluation as to the issue of his 

jurisdiction after multiple rounds of briefing and argument during the evidentiary hearings: 

Claimant continued/continues to object to AAA jurisdiction 

despite his written concession in the course of initial argument on 

the issue. He asserts that the Agreement of the Parties was not 

supported by legal consideration. 

The Agreement offers possible consideration of Claimant for 

client referrals in exchange for his agreement to terms 

governing the resulting relationships. Referrals ensued and 

Claimant valued the resultant benefits conferred upon him. He also 

objects that he strike the provision dealing with indemnity and that 

the Heston Respondents did not sign his amended version. This 

objection is moot given my finding that the indemnity clause is not 

applicable to this litigation, even if not stricken. 

The parties to the writing, acted as if the Agreement was valid 

and in force, and Claimant cited to it multiple times before 

deciding to contest it. The Agreement was terminable without 

cause by either party and Claimant chose to accept its benefits in 

the course of dealings and not to terminate it despite his (one) 

objection to the language. 

Thus, the Agreement which provides for AAA iurisdiction and 

the applicability of its rules is valid and enforceable. 

See Docket Entry 181 at Ex. 5, ,r A (emphasis added). 

Plaintiff himself even offered contradictory statements as to whether he was conceding to 

or objecting to the Arbitrator's jurisdiction during the evidentiary hearings: 

MR. MILLINGHAUSEN: That's why I want to proceed. At least 

if you give me a fair hearing [sic] and I end up with a reasonable 

and appropriate judgment, then the arbitrability is not an issue. 

ARBITRATOR BEITCH: Well, I think that puts you as the 

ultimate determiner in this case rather than me a the rules and 

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2012-06050-0237 Opinion, Page 16

customs would apply. And I can't proceed with arbitration with 

you having a right to pull a veto out of your pocket. [ ... ] 

ARBITRATOR BEITCH: I am not putting you to a choice other 

than whether you are continuing to pursue your objection to my 

jurisdiction. 

MR. MILLINGHAUSEN: I'm not. 

ARBITRATOR BEITCH: But you reserve the right, I thought I 

heard you say. 

MR. MILLINGHAUSEN: No. No. What I'm saying is I never 

agreed to it. There is a difference. 

ARBITRATOR BEITCH: Yes, there is. 

MR. MILLINGHAUSEN: I'm not agreeing to it but - I'm not 

agreeing you have authority. I am agreeing to be here and 

participate and you will make a ruling. And any objection to that 

ruling, any appeal from that ruling will be based on other 

issues, not on whether you have iurisdiction because the 

Superior Court already decided that. 

See Docket Entry 219 at Ex. 3 (N.T. Hearing 10/2/17, pp. 15:1-10; 17:4-21) (emphasis added). 

Although Plaintiff later revoked his consent to jurisdiction in the same day of hearings, 

the point remains that the Arbitrator addressed the basis for his finding that he had jurisdiction at 

multiple points in the proceedings and in his Final Award, after having engaged with the briefs 

and arguments of the parties. Thus, Plaintiffs attempt to cherry-pick the Arbitrator's statement 

"I can rule, I believe, that I have jurisdiction of a claim before it's filed" to allege the Arbitrator 

demonstrated "bad faith, ignorance of the law and indifference to the justice of the result" in 

issue nine is unavailing. A close reading of the hearing transcripts reveals that the Arbitrator's 

full statement was as follows: "I can rule, I believe, that I have jurisdiction of a claim before it's 

filed. I can look at the language of the agreement to arbitrate and say that any particular claim 

whether or not filed with AAA is before me." See Docket Entry 219 at Ex. 3 (N.T. Hearing 

1/11/18, pp. 51 :22-52:3) ( emphasis added). The Arbitrator proceeded to explain that his authority 

to rule on Plaintiffs claims derives from the arbitration agreement, to which Plaintiff again 

insisted "there is no agreement to arbitrate, there is no contract"-an issue already conclusively 

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2012-06050-0237 Opinion, Page 17

ruled on by the Superior Court. See id. (N.T. Hearing 1/11/18, pp. 51:22-52:23). Thus, while the 

crux of Plaintiffs objection to jurisdiction is that the Arbitrator wrongly found there was an 

enforceable contract, such an argument is unpersuasive in the face of two Superior Court 

decisions finding a binding arbitration agreement and the Arbitrator's sound explanation for 

finding an enforceable contract as detailed in his Final Award. Consequently, Plaintiffs 

allegation that the Arbitrator demonstrated "bad faith, ignorance of the law and indifference to 

the justice of the result" in asserting he had jurisdiction is without merit. 

Next, Plaintiff claims in issue eleven that the Court improperly failed to consider "after 

acquired evidence" when deciding the question of the Arbitrator's jurisdiction. Plaintiff contends 

that testimony from Robert Heston and Charlie Jacquo, President and Director of Network 

Management of Legal Access Plans respectively, establishes that the underlying 2006 and 2008 

documents were not contracts. Unfortunately for Plaintiff, this "after acquired evidence" in no 

way establishes the absence of an enforceable arbitration agreement. For one, the Heston 

testimony cited by Plaintiff in his brief and Motion for Reconsideration refers to the 2008 

document. Here, the Superior Court found that the 2006 document was an enforceable arbitration 

agreement, making said testimony of no moment in the Superior Court's finding that an 

arbitration agreement existed. Second, Plaintiff cites Charlie Jacquo' s testimony that Plaintiff 

was "not officially" a network provider pursuant to the 2006 document as proof of said 

document not being a contract---conveniently omitting that she also testified that Legal Access 

Plans would not have continued giving Plaintiff client referrals unless a contract existed: 

Q. Okay. You don't do business with people you don't have 

contract with; do you? 

A.No. 

See Docket Entry 219 at Ex. 17 (N.T. Hearing 5/14/18, pp. 386:13-16). 

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2012-06050-0237 Opinion, Page 18

Plaintiff also cites testimony from Defendants' expert to argue there was no consideration 

between Plaintiff and Legal Access Plans and by extension, no enforceable arbitration 

agreement. Tellingly, Plaintiff cherry-picks the defense expert's statement that Legal Access 

Plans had no obligation to give Plaintiff business to suggest a lack of consideration but ignores 

key portions of the testimony-including the defense expert's next words specifically testifying 

to the fact that there was consideration: 

Q. Now, you said in your testimony that Legal Access Plans had 

no obligation to give me [Plaintiff] business. Is that correct? 

A. Yes. 

Q. They had no obligation? 

A. No obligation. 

Q. They had not [sic] obligation at all? 

A. Correct. 

Q. Okay. And you've seen the document offered as a contract? 

Correct? 

A. I've seen the contract. 

Q. Okay. Now what in the agreement provides consideration to 

me? What is the benefit of the contract, the alleged contract, 

that I received? 

A. Access. 

Q. Access? 

A. Access to putative clients. 

See Docket Entry 168 at Ex. 25 (N.T. 1/12/18, pp. 196:12-197:1-7) (emphasis added). 

In the absence of any new evidence supporting either absence of a valid arbitration 

agreement or the conclusion that the Superior Court would have ruled differently had the new 

testimony been before it, Plaintiffs allegation of error in issue eleven fails. The Court notes that 

the same 2006 and 2008 documents were before the Superior Court when it ordered arbitration 

and that that the new testimony cited by Plaintiff was before the Arbitrator when he issued his 

Final Award. What Plaintiff establishes now is not that the Superior Court was tricked into 

relying on the prior Superior Court Opinion of Millinghausen v. Legal Access Plans, LLC and 

incomplete information when it found an enforceable contract in the instant matter, but rather, 

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2012-06050-0237 Opinion, Page 19

that continued discovery and arbitration hearings further confirmed the existence of an offer, 

consideration, and acceptance. Thus, Plaintiffs claim that "after acquired evidence" establishes 

the Arbitrator's lack of jurisdiction must be dismissed. 

Finally, Plaintiffs claim that the Court applied an incorrect standard when considering 

whether the Arbitrator lacked jurisdiction lacks merit. In making this argument, Plaintiff relies 

on the Civan case, which is inapposite to the matter before the Court. In Civan, the Superior 

Court found that "the narrow standard of review derived from section 7341 is not applicable 

when reviewing a petition to vacate based upon a claim that the parties do not have a valid 

agreement to arbitrate." Civan v. Windemere Farms, Inc., 180 A.3d 489, 499 (Pa. Super. Ct. 

2018). Of significance, however, is a key difference between the facts in Civan and here. In the 

instant case-unlike in Civan-the Superior Court already made a determination as to the 

Arbitrator's jurisdiction to rule and Defendants' status as third-party beneficiaries, ordering the 

matter remanded to arbitration. By contrast, the Civan Court made no determination as to 

whether there was an enforceable arbitration agreement as it related to a particular non-party, 

necessitating the need for the trial court to look beyond the standard of 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 7341 and 

determine whether the award should be vacated for lack of jurisdiction as to this non-party: 

Therefore, because Gambone is not a party to the Agreement and 

there was no court order specifically mandating Gambone's 

submission to arbitration, the arbitration panel exceeded its 

power by determining that the panel had jurisdiction over 

Gambone. 

Civan, 180 A.3d at 499 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2018) (emphasis added). 

Civan clearly provides that the arbitration panel exceeded its power only because it 

assumed jurisdiction despite there being "no court order specifically mandating ... submission to 

arbitration." Id. The inapplicability of Civan could not be more clear here, where the Superior 

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2012-06050-0237 Opinion, Page 20

CONCLUSION 

For all of the aforementioned reasons, this Court's decision and order should be 

Even if Civan were to govern in this case and the Court considers whether Plaintiff "was 

J. 

_js/ Garrett D. Page _ 

GARRETT D. PAGE, 

BY THE COURT: 

20 

This Order has been E- filed on 

Served via e-filing to the parties ofrecord 

Interoffice mail to: 

Court Administration, Civil Division 

Isl Wanda L. Barbee 

------ 

Secretary 

standard as requested, Plaintiff has failed to establish he is entitled to relief. 

claims through the lens of 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 7341 or considering jurisdiction under a separate 

heard oral argument, the Court finds insufficient support to do so. Whether analyzing Plaintiffs 

Arbitrator all found otherwise. After careful review of the extensive record before it and having 

find no contract exists where a different trial court Judge, two Superior court panels, and the 

consideration was in the form of access to clients. Essentially, Plaintiff requests that this Court 

lack of consideration, a full reading of the defense expert's testimony plainly provides that 

determination as to his jurisdiction and rendered his Final Award. As for Plaintiffs allegation of 

to arbitrate. Further, the proffered new testimony was before the Arbitrator at the time he made a 

court order mandating arbitration existed, and the Court need not have applied a standard other 

AFFIRMED. 

Plaintiffs "after acquired evidence" meaningfully changes the record that was before the 

C.S.A. § 7341, Plaintiffs claim for lack of jurisdiction still fails. As discussed supra, none of 

Court in this case specifically ordered the matter be submitted to arbitration. The Arbitrator 

cannot be said to have exceeded his power in exercising jurisdiction over Plaintiff where such a 

than 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 7341. Thus, Plaintiffs twelfth issue lacks merit. 

bound to arbitrate this dispute in the first place" rather than limit review pursuant to 42 Pa. 

Superior Court when it examined the same two documents and found an enforceable agreement