WHAT'S WITH THE RELATIONSHIP

BETWEEN AMERICA'S ARMY AND CHINA'S PLA?

An Examination of the Terms of the

U.S. Army's Strategic Peacetime Engagement

with the People's Liberation Army of the

People's Republic of China

Colonel Jer Donald Get

September 15, 1996
ii

*******

The views expressed in this report are those of the author

and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of

the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the

U.S. Government. This report is cleared for public release;

distribution is unlimited.

*******

Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be

forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army

War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5244. Copies of this

report may be obtained from the Publications and Production

Office by calling commercial (717) 245-4133, DSN 242-4133, FAX

(717) 245-3820, or via the Internet at rummelr@carlisleemh2.army.mil.

*******

All 1995 and later Strategic Studies Institute (SSI)

monographs are available on the Strategic Studies Institute

Homepage for electronic dissemination. SSI's Homepage address is:

http://carlisle-www.army. mil/usassi/
iii

FOREWORD

In May 1995, Secretary of Defense William J. Perry asked the

Army to examine various ways to re-establish the army-to-army

ties which existed between the U.S. Army and Beijing's People's

Liberation Army (PLA) prior to the 1980s. U.S. President George

Bush ordered a curb in military-to-military ties following the

Tiananmen incident in 1989, and, since then, efforts at

rapproachment between the two armies have been faltering and

uneven.

There are some who question the value of renewing military

ties with the People's Republic of China (PRC) based on the

limited gains accrued to the U.S. Army from the earlier

relationship. In this essay, U.S. Army Colonel Jer Donald Get

argues that this is a short-sighted attitude. The reasons for

renewing army-to-army ties are substantial given that China's

relevance as a power will grow. The United States needs to

marshal all the resources at its disposal to influence China

positively. One of those resources, Colonel Get argues, is

America's Army.

The ideas expressed in this monograph constitute a host of

positive recommendations which could influence the course of

trans-Pacific relations over the next decade. Our Army and the

PLA must take a measured approach, setting pragmatic objectives

and extending the reciprocity that characterizes relations

between great powers. For both armies, and both nations, the

stakes are high----to engage as strategic partners rather than

clash again in conflict.

RICHARD H. WITHERSPOON

Colonel, U.S. Army

Director, Strategic Studies Institute
iv

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

COLONEL JER DONALD GET is a Military Intelligence Officer and

former Army War College Fellow at the Institute for the Study of

Diplomacy at Georgetown University. His military service includes

both tactical and strategic assignments in a variety of locations

to include overseas duty in Germany, Hong Kong, and Korea.

Colonel Get has also been trained as a Foreign Area Officer for

the People's Republic of China, and he has served as the China

politico-military affairs desk officer on the Army Staff. Colonel

Get is assigned to Camp Zama, Japan, where he commands the 500th

Military Intelligence Brigade.
v

SUMMARY

In the late spring of 1995, Secretary of Defense William J.

Perry asked the Secretary of the Army to look into the

restoration of functional exchanges between the American Army and

China's People's Liberation Army (PLA). This request was a major

step toward the re-establishment of U.S. Army-PLA ties suspended

by U.S. President George Bush in response to the 1989 Tiananmen

incident. Reviving functional exchanges by Chinese and American

military personnel is particularly significant because these

exchanges had been one of the "three pillars" of Sino-American

military cooperation during the 1980s. Furthermore, even though

the U.S. Army has a long- standing tradition of maintaining

military-to-military contacts with foreign armies, these contacts

and other forms of "peacetime engagement" have grown in

significance in the post-Cold War era.1 This is due to a number

of factors including the recent reduction of the U.S. Army's

force structure, personnel, and overseas presence, as well as the

nation's increasing reliance on coalition partners for deterring

or prosecuting the potential conflicts of the future.

There are, however, some who question the value of renewing

American military ties with the Chinese based on the rather

limited U.S. gains from the earlier relationship. Furthermore,

significant changes in the political environment make the U.S.

Army's re-engagement with the PLA somewhat problematic. The

original "China Card" rationale for military ties, that of using

China as a strategic counterweight against the Union of Soviet

Socialist Republics (USSR), became inoperative with the USSR's

demise. Thus, criticism regarding military cooperation with what

many Americans view as a repressive Chinese regime, once muted

for the greater good of Soviet containment, has found both a

stronger voice and more receptive listeners. Additionally,

reductions in manpower, money, and materiel, when taken together

with growing worldwide demands for the attention and/or

intervention of the U.S. military, make the cost effectiveness of

investing in a relationship with a country that still harbors

significant distrust of U.S. strategic intentions rather

questionable.

Before re-establishing functional military ties with the

PLA, the U.S. Army owes itself a detailed look at the

relationship. This study, undertaken to support that process,

examines the terms of the American Army's engagement with the

PLA.

The examination begins by exploring the history of the

broader U.S.-PRC security relationship from which army-to-army

ties were derived. The brief historical expedition reveals the

security foundations of the original breakthrough in friendly

bilateral relations. The historical trace also reveals how this
vi

foundation first cracked under the pressures of Tiananmen and

finally crumbled with the fall of the old Cold-War bipolarity.

With the original engagement rationale overcome by world

events, the examination then focuses on answering the question of

why the U.S. Army should renew its ties to the PLA. The answer is

in three parts: first, China is relevant to U.S. interests;

second, the United States can positively influence the PRC as

China develops into a world power; and, third, one of America's

most effective engagement tools is the U.S. Army.

After validating the role of the U.S. Army in the U.S.-PRC

relationship, the study moves to an evaluation of the terms on

which the U.S. Army should renew its engagement with the PLA.

This begins with a determination of what went right and wrong for

the U.S. Army during its initial peaceful interaction with the

Chinese. From these lessons, five actions are recommended. To

secure better terms in its renewed engagement with the PLA, the

U.S. Army must:

(1) Establish a comprehensive long-range strategy with

clearly identified mission objectives.

(2) Prioritize and coordinate (internally and externally)

the identified objectives.

(3) Develop tactics, techniques, and procedures to attain

these objectives.

(4) Establish measures of effectiveness to track the

progress made toward the attainment of particular goals and

objectives.

(5) Conduct periodic assessments to refine the engagement

strategy.

Finally, in conducting this study, it was determined that a

contributing factor to the ad hoc nature of Sino-American

military ties is the lack of peacetime engagement doctrine. A

final recommendation, therefore, is for the U.S. Army to use its

ongoing work on the China engagement strategy as the baseline for

the development of a broader peacetime engagement doctrine.
1

WHAT'S WITH THE RELATIONSHIP

BETWEEN AMERICA'S ARMY AND CHINA'S PLA?

An Examination of the Terms of the

U.S. Army's Strategic Peacetime Engagement

with the People's Liberation Army of the

People's Republic of China

We believe that engagement is the best strategy to

ensure that as China increases its power it does so as

a responsible member of the international community.

And we believe that [emphasis added] is critical if

peace, prosperity and stability are to endure in Asia

and around the world.2

U.S. Secretary of Defense

William J. Perry.

As an instrument of American policy, the Army must be

ready to provide the nation a variety of tools to

influence the international environment . . . The U.S.

Army is engaged with the armies of friends around the

world through military assistance programs, joint

training exercises, and military to military

exchanges.3

From DECISIVE VICTORY:

America's Power Projection Army,

White Paper, October 1994.

The preceding statements reflect the rationale for the U.S.

Army's peacetime engagement with the People's Liberation Army

(PLA) of the People's Republic of China (PRC). Secretary Perry's

remarks represent not only the current administration's official

policy, but also the "conventional wisdom" regarding how the

United States should deal with a rapidly modernizing Chinese

Army, intent on gaining both strength and stature in the "New

World Order." The second statement reaffirms the American Army's

long-standing role as a strategic force in U.S. foreign policy.

However, in today's complex international environment, where

demands on American soldiers are growing while their numbers and

other key resources are increasingly constrained, one might

question the wisdom of having the U.S. Army engage an army,

resistant to American values of liberty and democracy, which is

still used as an instrument of state repression. The current

national security strategy of the United States prescribes that:

"Our engagement must be selective, focusing on the challenges

that are most relevant to our own interests and focusing our
2

resources where we can make the most difference. We must also use

the right tools . . ."4 The questions that naturally follow then

are: Is China a nation both relevant to U.S. interests and

responsive to U.S. resources?, and Is the U.S. Army the right

tool for engagement? To answer these questions, this study

explores the history of the U.S. Army's peacetime engagement with

China's PLA and explains why U.S.-PRC army-to-army ties should

continue. The paper further evaluates what is both right and

wrong with the current relationship and suggests how America's

Army can create a more effective China engagement strategy for

the future.

EXPLORING THE HISTORY OF THE U.S. ARMY'S PEACETIME ENGAGEMENT

WITH THE PLA

The China Card.

On October 11, 1995, the Asia and Pacific Affairs

Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee began 2

days of hearings on the Security and Military Considerations of

U.S. Policy toward China. The congressional concerns regarding

U.S. national security policy toward the PRC voiced during these

hearings were not new. They echoed those raised in similar

hearings held over a decade earlier when America was still in the

initial stages of normalizing its relations with China. At that

time, there was particular apprehension about the admin-istration

entering into a military relationship with the Chinese.5

 However,

since China was seen by many foreign policy specialists in those

Cold War days as a significant counterweight to the Soviet Union,

bilateral military ties were established. In fact,

military/strategic ties provided the primary raison d'être for

Sino-American normalization.6

The origin of the modern, official, public Sino-American

military relationship can be traced to the January 1980 visit of

Defense Secretary Harold Brown to Beijing.7 The Brown visit was

followed by numerous exchanges, by a wide variety of high-ranking

defense officials from both countries, which were to become the

first of the "three pillars" of Sino-American security

cooperation. In addition to high level visits, the "three

pillars" announced by Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger in

1983 also included bilateral functional exchanges by

military/security subject matter experts and the sale by the

United States of defensive military weapons, equipment, and

technology to China.8

The U.S. Army had significant involvement in each of the

"three pillars." Between 1981 and 1988, there were five high

level army-to-army exchanges (see Appendix A). Second pillar

functional exchanges focused primarily on training. The
3

Department of the Army delegated responsibility for the conduct

of the training exchanges to its Training and Doctrine Command

(TRADOC) located at Fort Monroe, Virginia. From 1984 to 1989,

TRADOC participated in four exchange visits (training seminar

list at Appendix B). Other U.S. Army functional level interaction

with the Chinese included Corps of Engineer cooperative studies

with PRC research institutes from 1986 to 1989; a U.S. military

history delegation visit to China in 1987; and Army participation

in U.S. Defense Department-hosted logistics, medical, and

educational exchanges. Under the third pillar of technology

transfer and weapons sales, the Chinese expressed interest in a

number of Army weapons systems including TOW anti-tank missiles,

Redeye and Stinger anti-aircraft missiles, artillery munitions,

artillery counter-battery radar systems, and scout, transport,

and attack helicopters. From these, the U.S. Army initiated two

projects under the U.S. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program--the

transfer of technology related to the modernization of Chinese

artillery ammunition known as the Large Caliber Ammunition

Modernization Program (LCAMP), and the sale of U.S.-manufactured

AN/TPQ-37 "Firefinder" counter-battery radar systems. Both of

these were suspended prior to completion due to the Tiananmen

incident.

Clearly, through the 1980s America's Army was an active

supporter of the military-to-military relationship between the

United States and China. In fact, the Army's LCAMP was the only

FMS program close to completion prior to Tiananmen. Furthermore,

the sale to the PRC of the AN/TPQ-37 "Firefinder" radar systems

included a training package whereby a number of Chinese soldiers

actually were trained on the system at the U.S. Army Artillery

School at Fort Sill, Oklahoma. These PLA soldiers were later able

to demonstrate their capability with the radar to the American

TRADOC Commander, General Maxwell Thurman, when he visited China

in the summer of 1988. Finally, the U.S. Army's top two leaders,

Secretary of the Army John Marsh and Chief of Staff of the Army

General Carl Vuono were scheduled to visit the PRC as the decade

was coming to a close. Secretary Marsh's trip, originally

scheduled for the spring of 1988, was postponed by the United

States because of American human rights concerns regarding

China's handling of its Tibetan minority. General Vuono, who was

scheduled to visit China in June of 1989, was asked by the

Chinese to postpone his trip because of their concerns about a

growing democracy demonstration at Tiananmen Square.

Crisis At The Heavenly Gate And A Change In The Correlation Of

Forces.

The year 1989 was a watershed for Sino-American ties as two

momentous events were to change the fundamental nature of the

relationship. First, the decision of the Chinese government to
4

use massive military force to deal with the democracy movement at

Tiananmen Square horrified the American people and led to a June

5th order from President George Bush for the U.S. Defense

Department to suspend all military cooperation with the PRC. The

immediate effect of this presidential order on U.S. Army

relations with the PLA essentially was to cancel the previously

postponed China visits of both the Secretary of the Army and the

Army's Chief of Staff, end the annual bilateral training

seminars, withhold the delivery of hardware and software which

would have closed out the LCAMP FMS project, and withhold the

delivery of two AN/TPQ-37 "Firefinder" radar systems.

The second major event affecting U.S.-PRC army-to-army ties

was the fall of the Berlin Wall, which marked the beginning of

the end of the Cold War. With the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact

and the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Eastern Europe, the U.S.

accommodation with the PRC was no longer deemed essential to

containing Soviet expansionism.9 Thus, the Chinese lost the

strategic cover that had, in the past, helped American Cold

Warriors overlook the ills and transgressions of the PRC and

other authoritarian regimes.

After Tiananmen, A Gradual Renewal.

In the immediate aftermath of Tiananmen, U.S. Army contact

with the PLA was severely restricted. By late summer of 1990,

however, the United States moderated its restrictions against

contact with the Chinese military, as the American government was

looking for PRC cooperation in responding to Saddam Hussein's

invasion of Kuwait. As part of its campaign to persuade the

Chinese not to veto the U.S.-authored United Nations (UN)

resolution for the use of all means available (i.e., force) to

deal with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the Bush administration

reinitiated limited official Sino-American military contact. At

the inception of Operation DESERT SHIELD, PRC military attache

visits to Department of Defense (DoD) personnel were approved on

a case-by-case basis and restricted to U.S. military personnel of

the ranks of two-star general/admiral and below. However, by the

end of DESERT STORM, PLA attaches in Washington were starting to

gain access to higher-ranking military officials and were

routinely receiving briefings on U.S. operations in the Gulf.

Furthermore, in the euphoria of the war's successful completion,

the United States even included the PRC as a coalition partner in

the June 8, 1991, victory parade down Constitution Avenue in

Washington, DC. Once again, security cooperation protected the

PRC from its American critics. However, for some opponents to the

U.S. engagement with China, this Gulf War cover was to be as

short lived as the conflict itself.

After the liberation of Kuwait, the American domestic debate
5

over U.S. policy toward the PRC tended once again to focus on the

Chinese government's human rights record, which had been linked

by congressional pressure to the administration's annual renewal

of the PRC's Most Favored Nation (MFN) trade status. Opponents of

MFN renewal also cited their concerns with China's proliferation

of nuclear and missile technology, rapidly rising trade surplus

with the United States, and its failure to protect American

intellectual property rights. In order to renew MFN and blunt

criticism that they were "soft" on China, both the late Bush and

the early Clinton administrations tended to limit Sino-American

dialogue to human rights and trade discussions, which precluded

the advancement of security initiatives. However, by the end of

President Clinton's first year in office, the U.S. Government

signaled its desire to reopen the suspended high-level SinoAmerican military dialogue by dispatching Assistant Secretary of

Defense Charles Freeman to Beijing to meet with PLA leaders.

Secretary Freeman concluded his 2 days of talks with "an

agreement to a ‘modest' agenda of future dialogue and

professional exchanges."10

The "modest" military dialogue was initiated in the

military-academic arena with a January 1994 China visit by a U.S.

National Defense University (NDU) delegation led by American Army

Lieutenant General Paul Cerjan, the NDU President. This was

followed by an August visit to the United States by a PLA Deputy

Chief of the General Staff, General Xu Huizi, whose itinerary

included a meeting with U.S. Defense Secretary Perry. Perry, in

turn, made his first visit to China as the Secretary of Defense

in October of that year. Sino-American military exchanges (to

include additional reciprocal high-level visits and the first

U.S. Navy ship visit to China since Tiananmen) continued through

 the first half of 1995, when they were essentially frozen by the

Chinese in protest of the U.S. Government allowing President of

Taiwan Lee Teng Hui to visit the United States. Lee's visit,

which led the Chinese leadership to question America's commitment

to a "one China policy," together with increasingly vocal

disagreements over human rights, trade, and weapons proliferation

issues, plunged Sino-American diplomatic relations to their

lowest point since Tiananmen. Despite this rift, the U.S. defense

establishment steadfastly maintained its policy objective of

peaceful engagement as an element of the Clinton administration's

comprehensive engagement strategy with the PRC. This position was

reiterated by Assistant Secretary of Defense for International

Security Affairs, Joseph Nye, during his October 11, 1995,

testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on East Asian and

Pacific Affairs. (See Appendix C for the new "five pillars" of

the Sino-American security engagement.)

Thus, even though the Chinese had postponed the June 1995

U.S. visit of their Defense Minister, General Chi Haotian

(rescheduled to begin April 6, 1996, but again postponed due to
6

tensions over Taiwan's presidential elections), the PLA was

allowed to participate in lower level functional visits on

logistics and air traffic control. However, even though U.S. Army

personnel participated in the post-Tiananmen round of SinoAmerican military exchanges, the American Army, as an

institution, was not a major player until Secretary Perry

dispatched a May 1995 memorandum to Secretary of the Army Togo

West asking the U.S. Army "to explore the feasibility of

conducting functional exchanges with the PLA in the areas of

training and military jurisprudence."11 In preparing its response

to the Secretary of Defense, the Department of the Army had an

ideal opportunity to examine fully the goals and objectives of

U.S. peacetime engagement with the Chinese Army; then, reassess

its own prior army-to-army engagement results; and, finally,

apply the lessons of the past to develop a comprehensive and

coordinated plan for the future.

EXPLAINING THE U.S. ARMY'S PEACETIME ENGAGEMENT WITH THE PLA

The "Why's" of the Army-to-Army Relationship: Why China?

Our engagement must be selective, focusing on the

challenges that are most relevant to our own interests

and focusing our resources where we can make the most

difference. We must also use the right tools . . .12

The easiest explanation of why the U.S. Army should

participate in peacetime engagement operations with China's PLA

is to execute a mission specifically requested by the Secretary

of Defense. This simplistic rationale, however, ill serves both

the Army itself and the nation it defends. For the U.S. Army to

play an effective role in comprehensive engagement with China,

its leadership must have a sound understanding of their

Commander-in-Chief's intent. Thus, it is first necessary to

understand the rationale for the broader Sino-American security

relationship.

A most obvious initial question that must be answered is,

Why is China relevant to U.S. interests? In his recent testimony

before the Asia and Pacific Affairs Subcommittee of the Senate

Foreign Relations Committee, Assistant Secretary of State for

East Asian and Pacific Affairs Winston Lord offered these facts

on the PRC's relevance:

China is not only the most populous country in the

world, with 1.2 billion people, but it has the largest

standing army. Even after a 25% reduction in its armed

forces in the late 1980's, it still has 3 million men

and women in arms. China is a nuclear power, and along

with France, the only country in the world still

testing nuclear weapons, to our regret. China possesses
7

ballistic missiles, including ones capable of reaching

the United States. It is a permanent member of the UN

Security Council, with the rights and responsibilities

that go with membership in that exclusive club.13

China's relevance to the United States is directly related

to its power. While its military might is currently nowhere near

that of the United States, the PRC, with its nuclear-armed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), can inflict grievous harm

to America's territory and citizens. In the world political

arena, China's UN veto authority gives it the power to thwart

American international interests. This was evidenced by U.S.

concerns over the previously mentioned PRC vote during the

buildup to the Gulf war and America's recent frustration with

China's reluctance to support a UN resolution condemning the

February 1996 Cuban shoot-down of two U.S. civilian aircraft.

Yet, what is even more important for Americans to understand is

the relevance of China's future power potential to U.S. national

interests. Though it is not yet a dominant economic force in the

world, the PRC, which enjoyed a 1995 trade surplus with the

United States of almost $33 billion, is projected to have the

world's largest economy in the first part of the 21st century.

Furthermore, it is apparent from the PLA's ongoing defense

modernization that the PRC is developing force projection

capabilities which will soon make it a major regional military

power. Additionally, assuming China's defense modernization is

able to parallel its economic development, there is a strong

possibility that sometime in the 21st century the PRC will be a

major military power capable of challenging the United States.14

In summary, then, as Secretary Perry recently remarked, "A new

geopolitical order is being created in the Asia Pacific region as

one of the world's most ancient nations (China) emerges as one of

the world's most powerful nations."15

The "Whys" of the Army-to-Army Relationship: Why Engagement?

Our engagement must be selective, focusing on the

challenges that are most relevant to our own interests

and focusing our resources where we can make the most

difference. We must also use the right tools . . .16

During his October 1995 confirmation hearings, U.S.

Ambassador-designee to the People's Republic of China James J.

Sasser reflected not only the importance the U.S. government

places on the Sino-American relationship, but also its belief

that America can make a difference in China's development. He

testified that,

Secretary (of State) Christopher has said our

relationship with China is one of the most important
8

bilateral relationships we have. Even without a

cooperative relationship with the United States, China

will continue, no doubt, in growth and influence,

albeit at a lower rate. But a constructive American

relationship with China can play an important role in

the development of Chinese policies and attitudes in

the pivotal post-Deng (Xiao Ping) era. Our interests

dictate that we move boldly to establish a productive

bilateral relationship with China.17

The basic premise behind America's comprehensive engagement

with the PRC is that such a strategy will facilitate the orderly

entry of China, an acknowledged regional and potential world

power, into international and regional affairs and allow the

world to avoid the conflict that accompanied the rise of earlier

powers such as Nazi Germany or Imperial Japan in the 1930s. This

premise is reflected in America's most recently published

national security strategy which states,

Our (U.S.) leadership must stress preventive diplomacy-

- through such means as support for democracy, economic

assistance, overseas military presence, military to

military contacts, and involvement in multilateral

negotiations . . . in order to help resolve problems,

reduce tensions, and defuse conflicts before they

become crises.18

The more specific reasons the U.S. Government is currently

attempting to engage the Chinese in the security arena were

articulated by Assistant Secretary of Defense Nye during his

October 1995 congressional testimony. (See Appendix D for the

seven reasons cited by Secretary Nye.)

Yet, even if one accepts the validity of the need for

America's strategic engagement with the PRC, the operative

question then becomes whether or not China is responsive to

American influences. For a variety of reasons, the answer is a

"qualified" yes. First, there is significant anecdotal evidence

of engagement leading to the Chinese government's acquiescence to

U.S. initiatives. This has been true not only in the security

arena, which saw Beijing helping the United States reach an

agreement with North Korea to stop the North Korean nuclear

weapon's program,19 but also in a number of other areas as well.

One area was economics, where China agreed to open its markets to

U.S. farm products and to hold talks on allowing more U.S.

telecommunications and insurance services.20 Another was human

rights, with China's 1995 adoption of a law that allows its

citizens to recover damages from the government for infringement

of their rights.21 Second, there is also ample evidence that,

when the U.S. Government has chosen to focus its resources,

there are few countries in the world that have been able to
9

resist. Yet, one must always keep in mind that, for most matters,

the "yes" answer is "qualified" because there are limits both to

the degree of PRC accommodation and to what the United States can

focus on at any particular time.

Even with these limitations, America's strategic engagement

with China's military is sound policy because, with or without

direct influence, strategic engagement with the PRC brings

America other benefits. The most important of these is access to

and a channel for communicating with the PLA, an important

segment of Chinese leadership. Increased bilateral communication

normally leads to increased understanding, which can prevent

military miscalculations that have so often in the past led to

armed conflict.

The "Whys" of the Army-to Army Relationship: Why the Army?

Our engagement must be selective, focusing on the

challenges that are most relevant to our own interests

and focusing our resources where we can make the most

difference. We must also use the right tools . . .22

The rationale for America's Army to be involved in the

comprehensive engagement strategy with the PRC is two-fold. The

first is related to the dominant role the PLA plays in Chinese

politics. The roots of the PLA's political power were succinctly

described in the recent congressional testimony of Richard D.

Fisher, who stated,

In China, to an even higher degree than most other

communist systems, the military is an integral part of

the political power equation: it brought the Chinese

Communist Party to power, remains its ultimate

guarantor, and is a key tool for fulfilling the Party's

international goals.23

Thus, in order to engage China's leadership, the U.S. must engage

the leadership of China's Army.

The second reason for Army involvement in engagement is

related to the special part the U.S. Army plays in American

defense and foreign policy. As reported to the U.S. Congress in

its Fiscal Year 1996 posture statement,

America's Army plays a unique role in the defense of

the nation. As the strategic core of U.S. forces for

joint or multilateral operations, the Army can be used

by national leaders to . . . demonstrate U.S.

capabilities, promote stability, and contribute to the

nation's ability to influence world events.24
10

The U.S. Army sees its role as being particularly important in

the peaceful engagement of foreign nations because,

In most nations, armies are the foundation of military

forces . . . . This means that America's Army, as the

counterpart of the armies of other nations, is an

indispensable tool to influence the policies and

practices of other nations, through nation assistance,

army-to-army contacts, security assistance and shared

training.25

Finally, while the validity of this statement may be debatable

for some nations, there is little doubt that in China the

People's Liberation Army is the dominant military service. In the

words of Rear Admiral Michael McDevitt, a former PoliticoMilitary Affairs Officer with service in both the Pacific Command

and the Office of the Secretary of Defense, "The Army is

generally the dominant service in Asian countries and it most

certainly is in the PRC. It is important for the U.S. Army as an

institution to engage the PLA."26

The underlying justification for the American Army's

strategic mission of peacetime engagement with China's PLA is

essentially sound. Sound mission justification does not, however,

necessarily lead to successful mission accomplishment. In fact,

it is the perception that the U.S. military gained precious

little of substance from its prior strategic cooperation with

China in the 1980s that causes some to oppose renewing the SinoAmerican military engagement. Yet, America's Army should not be

precluded from building ties to the PLA by the perceived or real

failures of their earlier interaction. Rather, the U.S. Army

should take advantage of that experience to develop a strategy

for the peacetime engagement of the Chinese Army, which both

eliminates what was wrong as well as reinforces what was right

with their previous engagement.

EVALUATING THE U.S. ARMY'S PEACETIME ENGAGEMENT WITH THE PLA

The "What's" of the Army-to-Army Relationship: What's Wrong?

. . . the confusion and controversy surrounding U.S.

policy toward China reflects the fact that American

foreign policy more generally is also in a state of

serious disarray . . . Without a consensus on a new

national strategy in the post-Cold War era, the context

for a new American policy toward China will remain

uncertain.27

Much of what has been wrong with the development of a

constructive U.S. Army relationship with the PLA stems from
11

friction in the overall Sino-American relationship. Many of these

larger problems can be attributed to the failure of the American

government to articulate an overarching strategy with clear

priorities and measurable objectives for dealing with China. This

has been particularly true since Tiananmen and apparently still

plagues the current administration. According to Leon T. Hader of

the Cato Institute, significant intergency disagreements

characterize management of U.S. policy toward China,

For example, Secretary of State Warren Christopher and

his human rights aides threatened Beijing with trade

sanctions if it refused to release dissidents just days

after top Commerce Department officials had bombarded

the Chinese with new U.S. trade and investment

proposals. Similarly, after John H. F. Shattuck, the

State Department's top human rights officer, attacked

the Chinese for their human rights abuses, Secretary of

Defense William Perry and other Pentagon officials

announced their plans to pursue contacts with the

Chinese military, described as prime villains in the

1989 Tiananmen Square killings.28

The lack of a well-defined strategy adversely affects Sino-U.S.

relations in a number of ways. First, with priorities for

engaging China described by one operator currently involved in

policy execution as a "food fight," executive branch departmental

interactions with China can appear from China's perspective to be

ad hoc, competitive, personality driven, uncoordinated, and at

cross-purposes. This puts American policy officials at a decided

disadvantage when negotiating with their Chinese counterparts. It

also leaves the administration's comprehensive engagement policy

vulnerable to inquiry, influence, and interference from opponents

both at home and abroad.

The absence of an administration plan has also been cited as

a key reason no political consensus on the broader subject of

overall Sino-American ties exists in either Washington or

Beijing. On the American side, the lack of consensus has been

most visible in the legislative branch where there are a

multitude of views on how to deal with the PRC. Factors

contributing to the varied views among congressional

representatives include a belief that the executive branch has

often failed either to consult with or inform Congress of

administration initiatives regarding China;29 a perception that

the Chinese government has been reluctant to cooperate with the

United States in the areas of human rights,30 trade,31 and weapons

proliferation;32 and strong residual ties among some members of

Congress to America's former Chinese Nationalist allies on

Taiwan.33

A particular problem that politicization has brought to the
12

army-to-army ties is the disruption of the high-level exchanges

which serve as one of the basic foundations of the developing

relationship. These have included the politically motivated

cancellation of U.S. Secretary of the Army John O. Marsh's 1988

Beijing visit and the postponement of PRC Defense Minister Chi

Haotian's 1995/1996 U.S. visit (now rescheduled for late 1996).

Politicization has also hurt Sino-American defense conversion

cooperation, another pillar of the current relationship. In a

move many observers attribute to partisan politics, the U.S.

Congress eliminated funding for U.S. participation in SinoAmerican defense conversion cooperation by inserting special

restrictive language in the Fiscal Year 1996 Defense

Authorization Bill.

The Chinese Army's participation in the bilateral

relationship is, of course, also affected by its country's

domestic politics, as the leadership in China is also split

regarding Sino-American cooperation. The most divisive issue is

an argument over American intentions toward the PRC. One major

group in Beijing distrusts the West in general and sees the U.S.

policy of comprehensive engagement in particular as being a code

name for the containment of China.34 Another Chinese leadership

element takes a more positive view toward the West and believes

the American engagement policy is benign.35 PRC internal

politics, however, do not fully explain the PLA's record of

uneven cooperation, a third major problem encountered by the U.S.

Army in its engagement with the Chinese. One of the more constant

complaints by Americans who have dealt with the Chinese military

is the PLA's unwillingness to reciprocate in terms of frankness

in discussions, access to people and information, and other

activities normally associated with bilateral military

exchanges.36 While Chinese uniformed leaders are constantly

soliciting data and opinions from their American counterparts,

their typical offerings and responses to U.S. presentations are

mostly a rote reiteration of "party line" positions. Furthermore,

in their meetings with Americans, PLA leaders often open their

remarks with general assertions in an attempt to control and

limit discussion.37

One of the most frustrating problems for U.S. military

representatives visiting China is having to deal with their

counterparts through the PRC Defense Ministry's Foreign Affairs

Bureau (FAB). One senior U.S. Army official described the FAB as

the PLA's modern "barbarian handlers," whose mission is to

construct bureaucratic barriers both to control their own PLA

personnel and keep the Americans at arms length. Another

technique the PLA uses to perpetuate the uneven relationship is

to "kill their guests with kindness." Under this rubric, the

mandatory escorts assigned to U.S. visitors are not there to

watch the Americans or restrict access (which they do quite

effectively) but to ensure that the "foreign guests" are
13

comfortable and safe from "bad elements." An additional PLA ploy

is to include the spouses when inviting U.S. leaders, which has

often had the effect of transforming substantive military

exchanges into tourist visits. The Chinese have also been known

to make last minute changes to discussion topics or venues to

catch their counterparts off guard.

Another problem in the general U.S. military engagement with

China which also adversely affects the army-to-army relationship

is in the area of doctrine. Although military-to-military

contacts are identified as a key program in the peacetime

engagement component of the U.S. national military strategy,

there is currently no doctrine on how to execute those contacts.

Doctrine is important because it "provides a military

organization with a common philosophy, a common language, a

common purpose, and a unity of effort."38 As one of its six

institutional imperatives, doctrine is even more critical to the

U.S. Army because it

touches all aspects of the Army. It facilitates

communications between Army personnel no matter where

they serve, establishes a shared professional culture

and approach to operations, and serves as the basis for

curriculum in the Army school system. Doctrine

permeates the entire organizational structure of the

Army and sets the standard for leadership development

and soldier training.39

With no doctrine to guide the development of military-tomilitary contacts, a key part of America's military engagement

with the Chinese (like the overall U.S. China policy) has been a

succession of ad hoc experiments subjected to unnecessary,

counterproductive, and personality-driven internecine rivalry.

Another major failing in the past Sino-American army-to-army

relationship was the absence of the Army Reserve and National

Guard in the China engagement activities. Although the National

Guard Bureau had expressed a strong interest in participating in

the early development of the relationship, this interest was

largely overlooked by the Department of the Army staff officers

who worked the issue at that time. This omission cannot be

allowed to continue, as it is completely contrary to the "Total

Army" spirit. Moreover, in today's constrained fiscal

environment, the National Guard and the Reserves are resources

that the active Army leadership cannot afford to overlook when

considering current and future peacetime engagement operations.

One final negative aspect of past U.S.-PRC army ties was

that almost everything that happened was driven from the top

down. With the focus on strategic ties, particularly when the

Soviets were still a threat, little or no engagement input was
14

solicited from America's operational and tactical soldiers who

were the ones tasked to provide the briefings, demonstrations,

and escorts for the visiting Chinese military delegations. The

failure to get this segment of the U.S. Army involved in the

army-to-army relationship with the Chinese (other than as

training aids) was a missed opportunity, for, as the current Army

Chief of Staff has repeatedly pointed out, these soldiers are not

just in the Army, they are the Army.

The "What's" of the Army-to-Army Relationship: What's Right?

This (American) policy of comprehensive engagement with

China is not new. Indeed, U.S. engagement with China

has been pursued for over 20 years by six American

presidents, both democrat and republican, and it has a

solid track record.40

It is quite a challenge identifying what is right with the

Sino-American army-to-army relationship. This is because, at

first glance, there appears to be little evidence of the U.S.

Army receiving any substantive benefit from peacetime engagement

with the PLA. A closer investigation, however, reveals that there

have been some positive aspects to U.S.-PRC security ties.

First, they are part of a larger peaceful contemporary SinoAmerican relationship that has survived many ups, downs, and near

crises since normalization in 1979. It is also heartening to note

that, despite a myriad of disputes, a succession of leaders in

both the United States and China have recognized the importance

of this relationship and have remained committed to its continued

development.41 Furthermore, even though changes in the

international environment altered the original foundation of the

security ties, the military leadership of both countries

understands the need to continue it.42

While they are hard to measure objectively, there have been

a number of intangible benefits of Sino-American security

relations in general and the army-to-army ties in particular.

Foremost is access to and a direct means of communicating with

the PLA, a key segment of China's leadership. This direct line of

communication has been proven repeatedly to be important to U.S.

interests. For example, army-to-army contacts played an important

role in gaining Chinese cooperation in two key areas during the

Gulf War, that is, securing the PRC's commitment not to veto the

UN Security Council resolution allowing the use of force to

liberate Kuwait and getting technical information on Chinese

weapons systems used by the Iraqi forces to develop

countermeasures. Direct communications between Chinese and

American military leaders also proved valuable in moderating the

tensions that had built up on the Korean peninsula in the summer

of 1994 due to North Korea's nuclear weapons development and
15

aggressive force posture. U.S.-PRC military-to-military contacts

are believed to be one of the factors that persuaded China to

play a positive role in the successful multilateral effort to

contain North Korea's nuclear ambition. These communications

links were also used to reassure the Chinese regarding U.S.

strategic intentions toward North Korea when the Commander-inChief of U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM), Admiral Charles Larson,

was able to use a visit to Beijing to reassure the PLA personally

that the U.S. actions taken in response to North Korea were

defensive in nature and not the precursor to a preemptive

attack.43

Another benefit of increased U.S. military contacts with the

PLA is that these contacts have also led to an increased American

understanding of China's ongoing military modernization goals and

objectives. During recent NDU leader exchanges, senior PLA

leaders were more forthcoming about issues of multilateralism and

budget transparency than they had ever been. According to one

report, the PLA visitors shared information "unprecedented in its

candor and specificity."44

Another area that has seen significant improvement is the

inclusion of regional forces in the planning and execution of the

U.S. military's peacetime engagement with the Chinese. While the

Defense and Service Attaches in Beijing have always been key

players in the U.S.-PRC military relationship, the participation

of the PACOM's Unified and Component Commands has been rather

uneven. Recently, however, the PACOM and its supporting component

commands have been proactive participants in the development and

execution of Sino-U.S. military engagement plans. The U.S. Army

Pacific has played an especially active role in hosting the

Chinese Army in recent multilateral gatherings such as the annual

Pacific Armies Management Seminars.

One final element that is right with the current state of

the Sino-American army ties is the U.S. Army's recognition of its

need to develop a strategy for engaging the PLA in order to

optimize the relationship. Taking a long term strategic approach

to the contacts with China's PLA should help the American Army

avoid the failings of the past and allow it to build a

relationship with the Chinese Army that will stand the test of

time.

The "What's" of the Army-to-Army Relationship: What's the Army To

Do?

Initiating and sustaining cooperation is never easy,

because it not only requires that both sides have

common interests but also requires that their conflicts

of interests be either insignificant or manageable.

More often than not, there are significant preexisting
16

and ongoing bilateral conflicts, so that establishing

and sustaining cooperation requires mutual adjustment

and extensive negotiations. Cooperation is neither

spontaneous nor self-perpetuating. Maintaining

cooperative relations requires considerable effort by

both parties.45

The establishment of a cooperative relationship with China's

PLA will require a significant effort on the part of America's

Army. The first order of business is to establish a clear

strategy. Clarity requires the Department of the Army (DA) Staff

to identify the goals and objectives it desires from the

peacetime engagement of the PLA, as well as the means to attain

them. In developing these means, goals, and objectives, former

U.S. Ambassador to China J. Stapleton Roy recommended that the

Army take a step back and evaluate the situation with a long-term

perspective. He also offered the opinion that the Army should

determine not only what it wants, but also how easy or difficult

its objectives will be to attain. Ambassador Roy further

cautioned the Army not to push harder than the traffic can bear.

One possible U.S. Army objective offered by the Ambassador was to

demonstrate to the PLA that the United States does, in fact, have

the best military forces in the world. This would be done to

prevent the Chinese from underestimating America's ability to

respond to a crisis in the Far East. Another objective should be

to persuade the PLA that the United States has neither a desire

nor a design to "contain" China. Finally, contacts with the PLA

could also help the U.S. Army's leadership gain insight into the

thought processes of their Chinese counterparts.46

Clearly understanding what the traffic can bear is

particularly important in the currently highly politicized SinoAmerican relationship. One regional operator pointed out that

there have been a couple of conflict areas that have tended to

dominate the relationship.47 A prime example of a "hot button"

issue was the proposed April 6, 1996, U.S. visit by PRC Defense

Minister General Chi Haotian, who was in a key PLA leadership

position in 1989 when the Army was used to suppress dissidents at

Tiananmen Square. This visit, originally scheduled for June 1995,

was again postponed due to significant bipartisan opposition in

the U.S. Congress.48 Another controversial issue involves

possible U.S. military discussions with the PLA on advanced

command and control communications technology. Understanding 

and, if necessary, avoiding those issues that are not politically

supported by the administration or the Congress are key to

setting one boundary of the U.S. Army's peacetime engagement with

the PLA.

It is equally important for the U.S. Army to recognize that

there are "traffic cops" on the PRC's side of the relationship

who will limit what the bilateral traffic will bear. In order to
17

define the engagement strategy's Chinese boundary, the DA Staff

must determine what the PLA is willing to bring to the

relationship. Awareness of these boundaries is significant for

two important reasons. First, this knowledge will allow the Army

to conserve resources by not investing operator or staff time

preparing for unexecutable bilateral activities. Second, this

boundary will also set the bottom-line for U.S. Army-PLA

engagement negotiations.

Once the general external boundaries have been determined,

the next step in developing the Army's engagement strategy is to

gain an understanding of the relative priority of internal (Army

only) and external (other agencies) objectives. Then the Army

should determine how focusing on any one issue will affect the

ability to achieve progress on the others.49 These processes

require measures of effectiveness to track the progress toward

the attainment of particular goals and objectives. Yet, one must

be careful in choosing measures of effectiveness. Ambassador Roy

warns that the Army should not let its China policy be defined in

terms of what is not under American control. Rear Admiral

McDevitt also cautions that "rigid ‘bench marks' will put

engagement under the control of the PRC. The Chinese will then

dictate the pace by what they decide they are willing to do."50

There are, however, other ways to measure the effectiveness of

and progress in Sino-American army-to-army ties than the rigid

reciprocity and bench marks currently being employed. For

example, one measure of progress could be the topical content of

what the Chinese military is willing to discuss with their

American counterparts during high level and functional exchanges.

Another measure is the level and type of PLA academic

institutions accessible to U.S. soldiers. The task for the DA

staff, then, is to create a menu of prioritized options with

multiple measures of effectiveness. This menu will enhance

operational flexibility while providing a way to measure

progress.

To gain an understanding of both the contentious issues and

the relative priority of objectives mentioned above, the American

Army faces another imperative in the development of its China

engagement strategy. That imperative is comprehensive

coordination, which is essential if Army actions involving the

PRC are to be complementary to rather than at cross purposes with

those of other U.S. agencies.

Internal staff coordination has to cover the full spectrum

of Army activities. Horizontally, coordination must encompass the

"Total Army" structure, including the Army Reserves, the Army

National Guard, and the Department of the Army civilian work

force. The Reserve component adds value to the engagement

process by bringing skills of interest to the PLA not always

found in the active force. More importantly, however, is the
18

visible testimony America's citizen soldiers give regarding the

strength and power of the Army of a democracy. Thus, "Total Army"

coordination can only enrich the possibilities in the menu of

engagement options.

Vertical coordination must be from the Army Secretariat down

to the operating forces. The tactical forces, in particular, have

much to offer the DA Staff as it develops the implementing

objectives of the Army's China strategy. For example, America's

Army has a tremendous asset available in its 25th Infantry

Division (Light) (ID(L)) at Schofield Barracks, Hawaii. The 25th

ID(L), also known as the Tropic Lightning Division, currently

represents the U.S. Army and the U.S. Pacific Command in a number

of activities with several foreign armies in the Pacific theater

through U.S. Army Forces, PACOM's Expanded Relations Program

(ERP). The Division has already provided tactical demonstrations

for high ranking Chinese military visitors to include PLA

Generals Xu Huizi and Zhu Dunfa. According to one division staff

officer, interaction with the PLA would be a tremendous teaching

and learning opportunity for Tropic Lightning soldiers. The 25th

ID(L) could share its knowledge through a number of individual

and small unit infantry courses conducted by its outstanding

Light Infantry Training Command (LITC) and Non-Commissioned

Officers Academy (NCOA). Conversely, the LITC and NCOA cadre have

a continuing interest in the field craft (e.g., tracking,

infiltration, marksmanship) of all armies in the Pacific,

including China's PLA.

The U.S. Army's formal external staff coordination should

begin with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for

International Security Affairs (OSD/ISA), which has been

designated the lead agency for Defense Department elements

dealing with the PLA. In the development and execution of its

China strategy, the DA Staff should be in constant and close

contact with the OSD/ISA country director for China, who will

normally set the azimuth and boundaries for U.S.-PRC security

engagement actions. The Army staff should also maintain close

liaison with staff counterparts from the other services (Marines,

Navy, and Air Force) and the Joint Staff (J-2 and J-5). Meetings

with this core group should take place on a routine basis

(probably monthly) to identify and deconflict potential problem

areas, exchange good ideas, and synchronize future actions.

Direct Army coordination should also be effected on an asrequired basis with the various other agencies concerned with

China that belong to or are in support of the Department of

Defense.49 Additionally, because of the highly politicized nature

of Sino-American relations, the Army must maintain an awareness

of the concerns of the U.S. Congress when developing and

implementing its peacetime engagement strategy for the PRC.

Congressional concerns or legislation potentially affecting U.S.-

PRC army ties should be routinely addressed by the Army 
19

leadership through its Office of Congressional and Legislative

Liaison.

Informal coordination on China issues by the Army should, of

course, be limited only by the time and energy the DA staff has

to devote to the particular issue or action. Fortunately for the

Army there are a plethora of China experts in the close vicinity

of the Pentagon. Among the resources available are the agencies

in the U.S. intelligence community, offices in the Department of

State and other executive departments, think tanks, academic

institutions, as well as congressional researchers and staffers.

Because of the high level of interest in Sino-American relations

and the number of players involved, the full coordination of the

Army's engagement strategy will be a laborious and time consuming

effort. This effort must be undertaken, however, if the Army's

peacetime engagement of the PLA is to have politically realistic

goals and objectives.

Although the completion of a clear and coordinated

engagement strategy would certainly be a step in the right

direction, this cannot be the terminal objective of the Army

staff. In addition to building its China strategy, the DA Staff

must also develop sound procedures for its successful

implementation, for history has demonstrated that even great

strategies have been doomed to failure by poor execution.

The first recommended procedure is to ensure that every U.S.

Army leader who is likely to be involved in direct interaction

with the PLA is thoroughly briefed on how the Chinese will

approach the relationship. Knowledge of the PLA approach is

particularly important in these early stages of the renewal of

army ties as American repre- sentatives are preparing to

negotiate the terms for moving the relationship forward. This is

because Americans in the past have learned,

The contrasting approach to the bilateral relationship

also affected the course of (U.S.-PRC) negotiations.

China was often content to defer compromise and

agreement until it extracted maximum U.S. concessions;

it never compromised until it had to, often at the last

minute. It adopted an "optimizing" bargaining strategy

. . . . But whereas China rejected compromise until

necessary, the United States adopted its problem

solving approach and presented China with a succession

of conciliatory proposals, hoping to elicit Chinese

compromise and renewed cooperation. The United States

adopted an "accommodative" approach to resolving

conflict. In such circumstances, Chinese leaders

acquiesced only when the United States refused to make

additional concessions, leaving them with the choice of

either compromise or escalated conflict. Beijing always
20

chose compromise.52

Another key reason for U.S. Army leaders to receive extensive

briefing on PLA negotiating tactics is to forewarn them that,

Chinese negotiators tend to exploit the psychological

dimension of interpersonal relations. Such highly

personalized diplomacy is intended to create 

obligations and attitudes receptive to psychological

demands. The full implication of such techniques as old

friends, shame and sympathy, criticism, and nonverbal

communications are often not recognized by Americans.

Generally these techniques are very effective

stimulating the friendly or hostile responses that help

the Chinese negotiator maintain the initiative.53

These and other tactics such as late changes of agendas or venues

have historically been used by the PLA to protect Chinese

interests in dealing with Americans. Briefing U.S.

representatives on Chinese negotiating tactics should help them

recognize these tactics and expect their employment by the PLA.

Briefings should also include positive procedures for

dealing with the Chinese military. One such procedure was

provided by a senior U.S. naval officer who has had extensive

dealings with the PLA. He noted, "The way to get the attention of

China's leadership is for U.S. objectives to be clear and

constantly reinforced by including them as talking points for all

U.S. visitors to China, e.g., Commerce, State, Defense, etc."54

In its preliminary stages of engagement, the U.S. side

should also offer to set up a bilateral Executive Steering

Committee (ESC). The Chinese and American members of this

committee would work together to set up the initial engagement

parameters and then mutually guide the relationship through its

early development. This approach is strongly recommended as the

Army has had positive experiences in employing the ESC technique

in developing contacts with other foreign armies. The U.S.-PRC

Executive Steering Committee should be a functional exchange at

the high-intermediate level of leadership (major general and

below) to minimize its politicization.

In preparing to deal with their Chinese counterparts,

another technique that the U.S. Army should adopt is the use of

relative rather than rigid reciprocity. A policy of rigid

reciprocity, whereby each exchange must be matched in substance

and style by the two parties, will tend to limit Sino-American

army interaction because of the disparity in the relative wealth

and technology between the Chinese and Americans. Rather than

reciprocating event for event, U.S. and PRC Army objectives

should be matched in terms of relatively equal levels of
21

priority, accessibility, and transparency.

Another tactic beneficial to the engagement process would be

for the Army leadership to ensure that Department of the Army

civilians are routinely included. These key members of the "Total

Army" team bring a continuity that is highly valued by the

Chinese. Military leaders in China tend to remain in a given

position much longer than most of their uniformed American

counterparts.

A final key procedure that should be developed is a periodic

internal Army reassessment of its engagement with the PLA.

Objectives of the reassessment would be to measure the efficiency

and effectiveness of executing the China strategy as well as the

cost and benefits of engaging the PLA. Regular reassessments will

allow the Army not only to re-evaluate its engagement goals and

objectives, but also refine its tactics, techniques, and

procedures for working with the PLA. Scheduled evaluations can

also be used by the Army to capture the actual monetary costs

associated with U.S.-PRC army-to-army ties. As the program

matures, this fiscal data could be used to make China engagement

part of the Army's Five Year Defense Plan (FYDP) input for

programmatic funding. Programmed funds would eliminate the

requirement for the Army either to use its limited "initiative"

funds or find other bill payers for each China initiative.

Including China engagement in the Army's FYDP would have the

additional benefit of ensuring everyone would be working from the

same game plan.

ENDORSING THE U.S. ARMY'S PEACETIME ENGAGEMENT WITH THE PLA

Conclusions.

A historic opportunity is still present to secure a

more orderly, less disruptive Chinese entry into

international and regional affairs than occurred with

the rise of other powers in the past century. But that

opportunity will be lost if the leaders of China and

the United States do not seize upon it during the

coming decade.55

Part of the current U.S. China policy of comprehensive

engagement, designed to take advantage of the historic

opportunity mentioned above, is for the U.S. Army to renew its

peacetime engagement with China's PLA. The reasons for renewed

army-to-army ties are clear. First, China's relevance to U.S.

interest, which is already significant, will increase with

China's rapidly growing power. Second, the United States has

resources at its disposal that can positively influence China's

development. Finally, one of the most effective resources for
22

engaging the PRC is America's Army.

To maximize its effectiveness as an instrument of U.S. China

policy, the American Army must learn from its past interaction

with the PLA. The recommendations offered here are by no means

exhaustive. A significant limiting factor is the lack of

peacetime engagement doctrine and supporting tactics, techniques,

and procedures. Thus, a final recommendation is for the U.S. Army

to use its ongoing work on the China engagement strategy as the

baseline for the development of peacetime engagement doctrine.

This doctrine should then yield the full range of tactics,

techniques, and procedures necessary for building a clear,

consistent, coordinated, and comprehensive campaign plan for

engaging China's PLA. Such a carefully planned approach to

peacefully engaging the PRC would, to paraphrase Rear Admiral

McDevitt, be the modern day functional equivalent of America's

Army "keeping its powder dry."
23

APPENDIX A

HIGH LEVEL SINO-U.S. ARMY-TO-ARMY EXCHANGES

 Among the senior U.S. and Chinese Army officials who conducted

high level visits in the 1980s were:

NAME POSITION YEAR

Lieutenant General Commander, U.S. Army 1981

William R. Richardson Combined Arms Center

General William R. Commanding General, 1983

Richardson Training & Doctrine Command

General John A. Wickham Chief of Staff 1986

of the U.S. Army

General Maxwell Thurman Commanding General, 1988

U.S. Army Training &

Doctrine Command

Lieutenant General Xu Deputy Chief of PLA 1988

Huizi General Staff
24

APPENDIX B

SINO-U.S. ARMY-TO-ARMY TRAINING EXCHANGES

August Chinese observed U.S. individual, specialized,

17- 29, collective, and combined arms training at Fort

1985 Benning, GA; Fort Bragg, NC; and Fort Irvin, CA.

October Americans visited PLA Armor and Artillery

14-26, Academies, observed Chinese combined arms train1986 ing, and received presentations on PLA militia

training.

October Chinese observed curriculum, composition and

3-16, selection process at the U.S. Military Academy,

1987 West Point, NY; computer simulation and academic

program at the U.S. Army War College, Carlisle

Barracks, PA; discussed computer simulation, the Joint

Readiness Training Center, force structure, and

training management at Fort Monroe, VA; and observed a

combined arms live-fire exercise at U.S. Army Western

Command (now U.S. Army Pacific).

September Americans visited China's National Defense

14-25, University, the Nanjing Command College, an

1988 airborne training brigade at Yingshan, and a live-fire

exercise at Luo Tu Shan.
25

APPENDIX C

FIVE PILLARS OF SINO-AMERICAN SECURITY ENGAGEMENT

In his October 11, 1995, testimony before the Senate Foreign

Relations Committee, Asian Pacific Affairs Subcommittee,

Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

Joseph Nye listed the following five pillars through which the

United States is implementing its policy of security engagement

with the People's Republic of China.

(1) High-level visits. This includes visits such as Defense

Secretary William Perry's to China in October 1994.

(2) Functional exchanges. These are working level

professional exchanges such as those between our National Defense

Universities and our military medical communities.

(3) Routine military activities and confidence building

measures. Included in this category are ship visits (such as the

visit of USS Bunker Hill to Qingdao in March 1995) and defense

transparency talks.

(4) Participation in multinational security fora. The

Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Command hosted a series of

conferences and symposia in which PLA participation has been

fairly good.

(5) Defense conversion activities. Through the activities of

the Sino-American Joint Defense Conversion Commission, we seek to

maintain a channel of communications with an important element of

the PRC's defense establishment.56
26

APPENDIX D

REASONS FOR SINO-AMERICAN SECURITY ENGAGEMENT

In his October 11, 1995, Congressional testimony, Assistant

Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Joseph

Nye listed the following seven reasons why the United States is

implementing its policy of security engagement with China.

(1) Security dialogues and military exchanges are important

during periods of international transition. These dialogues get

at the heart of issues of greatest importance to the countries

involved. . . . China's Pacific power and presence is still in a

formative stage and outcomes can be influenced. This is why we

choose to engage China, not contain it.

(2) U.S. allies and friends in the region support a policy

of engagement. Japan, South Korea, Australia, the Philippines,

and Thailand have all pressed the United States to engage China

on a broad range of issues, including security concerns.

(3) We are trying to promote transparency and mutual

understanding. . . . In this post-Cold War environment, we want

to promote transparency and build confidence in the Pacific--not

arsenals.

(4) China holds the key to progress in a variety of regional

trouble spots and, increasingly, in global security issues. . . .

the PRC's support and cooperation is vital to our ability to

establish effective international arms control and

nonproliferation regimes.

(5) The military and security elite in China will play a

critical role during a period of internal political transition.

The military retains power and access in modern China and has a

voice on issues of concern to us. Dialogue allows us to gain

valuable insights into the evolving political system, and allows

us a line of communication with this powerful entity.

(6) We must avoid and prevent military accidents and

dangerous misperceptions. Our interests in the Asia-Pacific

region mean that we will likely in the future operate in the same

areas as Chinese forces.

(7) China must be encouraged to join and participate in

regional and global security regimes and institutions . . . that

support U.S. national security objectives. . . . As a global and

Pacific power, we can facilitate the process of drawing China

into those collective regimes and frameworks that enhance mutual

understanding and confidence, and ultimately stability.57
27

ENDNOTES

1. According to the 1995 National Military Strategy of the

United States of America, peacetime engagement describes a broad

range of noncombat activities undertaken by the Armed Forces that

demonstrate commitment, improve collective military capabilities,

promote democratic ideals, relieve sufering, and enhance regional

stability. The elements of peacetime engagement include militaryto-military contacts, nation assistance, security assistance,

humanitarian operations, counterdrug and counterterrorism, and

peacekeeping. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, National

Military Strategy of the United States of America, 1995, A

Strategy of Flexible and Selective Engagement, Washington, DC:

U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995, pp. 8-9.

2. William J. Perry, Remarks At The Washington State China

Relations Council, Seattle, WA, October 30, 1995.

3. Decisive Victory: America's Power Projection Army, White

Paper, Washington, DC: Department of the Army, October 1994, pp.

2, 3.

4. The White House, A National Security Strategy of

Engagement and Enlargement, Washington, DC: U.S. Government

Printing Office, February 1995, p. 7.

5. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, The

United States and the People's Republic of China: Issues for the

1980's, Hearings before the Subcommittee on East Asian and

Pacific Affairs, 96th Congress, 1st Session, April 1, 1980,

Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1980, p. 1.

6. Ibid., p. 3.

7. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, The

New Era in East Asia, Hearings before the Committee on Asian and

Pacific Affairs, 97th Congress, 1st Session, July 16, 1981,

Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1981, p. 338.

8. Thomas L. Wilborn, Security Cooperation With China:

Analysis and a Proposal, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies

Institute, November 1994, p. 5.

9. Harry Harding, A Fragile Relationship: The United States

and China Since 1972, Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution,

1992, p. 325.

10. Kerry Dumbaugh, "China-U.S. Relations," Congressional

Research Service (CRS) Issue Brief, Washington, DC: Congressional

Research Service, 1995, p. 11.
28

11. William J. Perry, "Engagement Strategy with Chinese

PLA," Memorandum For Secretary of the Army, Washington, DC, May

16, 1995.

12. A National Security Strategy of Engagement and

Enlargement, p. 7.

13. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Affairs,

The Growth and Role of the Chinese Military, Hearing before the

Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Testimony of

Winston Lord, "U.S. Policy Toward China: Security and Military

Considerations," 104th Congress, 1st Session, October 11, 1995,

Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996, passim.

14. The Growth and Role of the Chinese Military, Testimony

of Alfred D. Wilhelm, Jr., "The PRC and Future Trends in Regional

Stability Over the Next Two Decades," October 11, 1995, passim.

15. William J. Perry, Remarks at the Washington State China

Relations Council, Seattle, WA: October 30, 1995.

16. A National Security Strategy of Engagement and

Enlargement, p.7.

17. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations,

Confirmation Hearings on U.S. Ambassador to the People's Republic

of China, Statement by James S. Sasser, 104th Congress, 1st

Session, October 12, 1995, Washington, DC: U.S. Government

Printing Office, 1996, p. 4.

18. A National Security Strategy of Engagement and

Enlargement, p. 7.

19. Robert G. Sutter, "China in World Affairs--U.S. Policy

Choices," CRS Report for Congress, Washington, DC: Congressional

Research Service, January 31, 1995, p. 9.

20. Dumbaugh, p. 11.

21. U.S. Department of State, 1994 China Human Rights

Report, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office 1995, p.

2.

22. A National Security Strategy of Engagement and

Enlargement, p.7.

23. The Growth and Role of the Chinese Military, Testimony

of Richard D. Fisher, "China's People's Liberation Army:

Challenges for American Policy," October 11, 1995, passim.

24. Togo D. West and Gordon R. Sullivan, A Statement on the
29

Posture of the United States Army Fiscal Year 1996, Posture

Statement presented to the 104th Congress, 1st Session,

Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, 1995, p. 3.

25. Ibid., p. 26.

26. Rear Admiral Michael McDevitt, Commandant, National War

College, Fort Leslie J. McNair, Washington, DC, interview by

author, December 4, 1995.

27. Harding, p. 327.

28. Leon T. Hadar, The Sweet-and-Sour Sino-American

Relationship, Policy Analysis No. 148, Washington, DC: Cato

Institute, 1996, p. 6.

29. The New Era in East Asia, passim.

30. Detailed human rights concerns can be found in U.S.

Department of State, 1994 China Human Rights Report, Washington,

DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995.

 31. For a recapitulation of trade issues, see Wayne M.

Morrison, "China-U.S. Trade Issues," CRS Issue Brief, Washington,

DC: Congressional Research Service, August 4, 1995.

32. Proliferation issues are well addressed in Robert Shuey

and Shirley A. Kan, "Chinese Missile and Nuclear Proliferation:

Issues for Congress," CRS Issue Brief, Washington, DC:

Congressional Research Service, September 29, 1995; and The

Growth and Role of the Chinese Military, Testimony of Gerard

White, October 12, 1995, passim.

33. Stephen Friedman, Managing the Taiwan Issue: Key is

Better U.S. Relations with China, New York: Council on Foreign

Relations, 1995, p. 22.

34. Sutter, p.10.

35. Michael D. Swaine, China: Domestic Change and Foreign

Policy, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1995, p. 33.

36. The Growth and Role of the Chinese Military, Testimony

of Ross H. Munro, "The China Military: Its Role and Growth,"

October 12, 1995, passim.

37. Dr. Bernard D. Cole, Professor of Maritime History and

Strategy, National Defense University, Fort Leslie J. McNair,

Washington, DC, interview by author, November 4, 1995.

38. General George H. Decker, Preface to Chapter II, Office
30

of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 1-01.1,

Compendium of Joint Publications, Washington, DC: Joint Staff,

1995.

39. Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-

5, Operations, Washington, DC: U. S. Government Printing Office,

1993, p. 1-1.

40. William J. Perry, Remarks At The Washington State China

Relations Council, Seattle, WA, October 30, 1995.

41. Robert S. Ross, Negotiating Cooperation: The United

States and China, 1969-1989, Stanford, CA: Stanford University

Press, 1995, p. 236.

42. Dr. Ronald N. Montaperto, Senior Fellow, Institute for

National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, Fort

Leslie J. McNair, Washington, DC, interview with author, November

28, 1995.

43. McDevitt, interview with author, December 4, 1995.

44. Montaperto, interview with author, November 28, 1995.

45. Ross, p. 1.

46. Ambassador J. Stapleton Roy, former Ambassador to the

PRC, Washington, DC, interview with author, November 15, 1995.

47. Army Lieutenant Colonel David Carlson, China PoliticoMilitary Affairs Officer, U.S. Pacific Command, Camp Smith, HI,

interview with author, December 6, 1995.

48. Bill Gertz, "Top Chinese general's visit gets

bipartisan opposition," The Washington Times, March 16, 1996, p.

A-5.

49. Montaperto, interview with author, November 28, 1995.

50. McDevitt, interview with author, December 4, 1995.

51. A group of these agencies known collectively as the U.S.

Military China Working Group currently meets on an as-needed

basis.

52. Ross, p. 257.

53. Alfred. D. Wilhelm, The Chinese at the Negotiating

Table: Style and Characteristics, Washington, DC: National

Defense University Press, 1994, p. 205.
31

54. McDevitt, interview with author, December 4, 1995.

55. Michael Oksenberg, "Heading Off a New Cold War With

China," The Washington Post, September 3, 1995, p. C-3.

56. The Growth and Role of the Chinese Military, Testimony

of Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "The Chinese Military: Its Role and

Growth," October 11, 1995, pp. 3,4.

57. Ibid., pp. 2-3.
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Richard A. Chilcoat

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director

Colonel Richard H. Witherspoon

Director of Research

Dr. Earl H. Tilford, Jr.

Author

Colonel Ger Donald Get

Director of Publications and Production

Ms. Marianne P. Cowling

Secretary

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Mrs. Mary Jane Semple

Cover Artist

Mr. James E. Kistler