### IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT JACKSON September 17,

2001 Session EDDIE MCPEAK v. MUFFLERS, INC. Direct Appeal from the Circuit Court for Madison County

No. C-00-270 Roger A. Page, Judge

No. W2001-00471-COA-R3-CV - Filed November 7, 2001

This appeal concerns the proper amount of damages due to the Plaintiff after the Defendant damaged the engine in the Plaintiff’s 1970 Dodge Challenger . Three witnesses provided testimony on the proper amount of damages that should be awarded to the Plaintiff . T he trial court utilized the testimonyof the Defendant’s expert witness in assessing damages. The Plaintiff appeals the trial court’s judgmen t, asserting that the Defe ndant’s witness re

lied on untrustwort

hy informat

ion in forming his expert opinion. F or the reasons se

t forth below, we af

firm the judgment of the trial court. Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appe al as of Right; Judgme

nt of the Circuit Cour

t Affirmed; and Remanded
D AVID R. F ARMER , J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which A LAN E. H IGHERS and H OLLY K. LILLARD , J.J., joined. David A. Riddick, Jackson, Tennessee, for the appellant, Eddie McPeak. Garry R. Wilkinson and Russell C. Rutledge, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellee, Mufflers, Inc.
OPINION
Eddie McPeak is t he owner of a 1 970 Dodge Charger. The vehicle, a classic “muscle” car, was powered by a 340-V8 engine. Mr. McPeak maint ain ed the original engine in the vehicle and had the engine repaired on several occasions to keep it working properly. In Dec ember 1999, Mr. McPeak drove the car to Mas ter Muffler in Jackson, Tennessee in order to get a new muffler installed. When Mr. McPeak returned to pick up the vehicle, it failed to operate. After inspecting the vehicle, Mr. McPeak determined that Master Muffler had damaged the eng ine.1 Mufflers, Inc . is Master M uffler’s corpo rate name a nd is the nam ed defend ant in this action.
2 The liability of Mufflers , Inc. is not at issue on appeal. T he trial court he ld Mufflers, In c.100% at fault in causing the damage to Mr. McPeak’s engine, and the parties do not contest that decision.

3 Th e cost to i

nstall the engi ne, the cost of t he suppli

es, and t he amount of

sales t ax are not

contest ed on thi s appeal. T he only value at issue is the $10 91.68 tha t the court assign ed to the eng ine. -2- Sub seq uen tly, Mr. McPeak sued Mufflers, Inc. 1 in the Circuit Court of Madison County. At trial, three witnesses g

ave testimony

on the issue of dama

ges. 2 The first witness , Mr. McPe ak, testifiedthat a replacem

ent engine for

a 1970 Dodge Cha

llenger would

cost $3,400. Mr. McPeak arrived at this value by contacting a company in California and requesting an estimate. Mr. McPeak’s other witness on damag es was James Mickey Grant. Mr. Grant had “refreshened” the engine in the past and gave expert testimony regarding the replacement cost of the engine. Mr. Grant testifie d that he did not know

where one could

locate a 340 engine; therefore, he statedthat a

360 engine would be the proper engine replacement in Mr. McPeak’s Dodg e Charger. Mr. Grant stated that the 360 engine costs “about $3,500.” Mr. Grant arrive d at this f

igure by consulting books that contained engines and their prices. Mufflers,Inc. produced its own expert witness, Robert Hopper, to aid the court in assessing damages. Mr. Hopper testified that a rebuilt 340 V-8 en

gine would cost $1 ,091.68. To arriv e at this figure, Mr. Hopper

testified that he contacted three automobile parts stores. Two of the stores stated that the y c ould supply Mr. Hopper with the engine. The second of the two, Motor Parts and Bearings, gave the estimate of $1,091.68 that Mr. Hopper quoted at trial.
The trial court held Mufflers, Inc. liable to Mr. McPeak for the damaged engine. The court awarded Mr. McPeak damag

es in the amount of $ 1877.76. The cour t based itsaward on the price of a rebuilt engine ($1091.6 8 as given by Mr. Hopper), the cost to install the engine ($600) 3 , the supplies necessary to replace the engine ($35.00) , and the applicable sales tax ($151.08). Mr. McPeak appeals this award, raising the following issue for our review:
Did th e tria l cour t judg e cor rect ly a ssess plain tiff’ s dama

ges?
To the extent this issue i

nvolves questions o

f fact, our revi

ew of the trial co

urt’s ruling is de novo with a presumption of correctness. Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d). We may not reverse t he tria l court’s fact

ual fin dings unless they are contrary to the preponderance of the evidence. Id . With respect to the trial court’s legal conclusions, our re view is de novo with no presumption of correctness. Bain v. Wells , 936 S.W.2d 618, 622 (Tenn. 1997).
Mr. McPeak takes exce

ption to the trial co

urt’s valuati

on of the vehicle’s engine. Mr. McPeak contends that the trial court erred by rely ing on Mr. Hopper’s testimony as to the value of the engin e, stating that Mr. Hopper’s testimony failed to comply with Rule 703 of the Te nnessee-3-

Rules of Evidence. Mr. McPeak argues that the only

credible evidence that illustrates the engine’s value is his own testimony, or the testimony of Mr. Grant. Thus, Mr. McPeak argues, the trial court could not have valued the vehicle’s engine below $3400.00.
In Tennessee, tria

l courts possess a g

reat deal of disc

retion when admitt

in g or exclu ding evidence; accordingly, appellate courts, absent a clea r abuse of discretion, will notinterfere with a trial court’s evidentiary rulings. Tire Shredders, Inc. v. ERM-North Central , 15 S.W.3d 849, 958 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999). Further, trial judges have wide discre tion regardi ng the qualifications of expertwitnesses. Otis v. Cambridge Mut. Fire Ins. Co. , 850 S.W.2d 439, 443 (Tenn. 19 92). In Otis , our Supreme Court statedthat one who give s expert testimony

must be “particula

rly skilled, learned, or experienced in a science, art, trade, business, profession or v ocation. The exper t must possess a thorough knowledge upon which he testifies that is not within the general knowledge and experience of the average person.” Id. (citing Kinley v. Tennessee State Mut. Ins. Co. , 620 S.W.2d 79, 81 (Tenn. 1981)). Additionally, Rule 702 of the Tennessee Rules of evi dence governs the testimonyof experts. Rule 702 states that “[i] f scientifi c, technica l, or other specializ ed knowledge will substantially assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,training, or edu cation may t

estify in the form of an opinion or otherwise.” Tenn. R. Evid. 702. The bases of an expe rt’s opi nion testimonyare governed by Rule 703 of the Tennessee Rules of Evidence . Rule 703 states as follows:
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the hearing. If of a type reasonably reliedupon b y experts in th e particular fie

ld in forming opinions or inferenc es upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible

in evidence. The court shall disallow testimony in the form of an opinion or inference if the underlying facts or da ta indicate lack of trustworthiness.
Tenn. R. Evid. 703. Over Mr. McPeak’s objection, the trial court accepted Mr. Ho

pper as an expert i

n the field of automobile mec

hanics. Though it is not clear from his br ief, Mr. McP eak appears t o challenge this evidentia ry ruling. From our review of the record, we find no fault in the trial court’s decision to accept Mr. Hopper

as an expert. At the time of trial, Mr. Hopper worked as an automobile, truck, andheavy equipment specialist at GAB Robbins, anindependent insurance adjustment agency and investigation service. Mr. Hopper investigated and inspected automob

ile engines on a

daily basis. Furt her, Mr. Hopper’s duties with GAB Robbins included the estimation of automobile repa irs , which he performed on

a frequent basis . Finally, Mr . Hopper had previous experience as an automobile

mechanic, and he owned an automobile shop and dealership in the past. In light of these qualifications, the trial court did not err in accepting Mr. Hopper as an expert.
Mr. McPeak’s central argument is that Mr. Hopper’s testimony regarding the cost to replace the engine was “too speculative, untrustworthy, and was not based upon any cr

edible evidence.” Mr. McPeak asserts that the un

derlying f

acts a nd data used by Mr. Hopper in his testimony were4 At trial, Mr. McPea k objected to M r. Hopper’s test imo ny regarding t

he replacement cost

of the engin

e, maintaining the testimony was based on hearsay. The court overruled the objection, s tating that Mr. Hopper w a s an expert, and therefore, co uld rely on he arsay testimon y. -4- unt rus two rth y, and therefore, in violation of Rule 703 of t he Tennessee Rules of Evidence. 4 We cannot agree with Mr. McPeak’s position.
Mr. Hopper conclude

d that a replace

ment engine woul

d cost $1091.68. On c ross examination, Mr. Hopper s tated that Danny Milam at Motor Part s and Bearings quoted the price of the engine. Further, Mr. Hopper stated that he obtained this information in the same way he normally does, by calling a business and m aking sure the company can supply the engine for the quotedprice. Mr. McPeak failed to elicit testimony from Mr. Hopper indicating that the data or

facts that Mr. Hopper

rel ied upo n we re un tru stw ort hy. A ddi tio nal ly, Mr. McPeak faile d to demonstrate to the trial court

that the quote was

unreliable or tha

t other experts in the

field would

conduct their examinations differently. The only obj ection that Mr. Mc Peak made to

the testimony

was a hearsay objection. Mr. McPeak did not question the testimony in any other way . Based on the record before us, we cannot determine that Mr. Hopper’s testimony was untrustworthy. Therefore, w e conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the testimony of Mr. Hopper

. As a general rule, the proper measure of damages for the loss or destruc tion o f personal property is the mark et val ue of the property at the time of its loss or destruction. Reid v. State , 9 S.W.3d 788, 794 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999). In its discretion, the trial court properly concluded that the cost to replace the e

ngine would

be $1091.68. Mr. Hopper testified that this was the cost of a rebuilt 340 engi ne . Evidence at trial illustrated that Mr. McPeak’s engine had been rebuilt, repaired and “refreshened” in the past. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court did not err in its damage award to Mr. McPeak.
Acco rdi ngly, we affirm the de cision of the trial

court. The costs o

f this appeal are taxed

to the appellant, Mr. McPeak, and his surety, for which execution may issue if necessary.

___________________________________ DAVID R. FARMER, JUDGE