STABILITY OPERATIONS IN SOMALIA

1992-1993: A CASE STUDY

Glenn M. Harned 

Carlisle Barracks, PA and

UNITED STATES 

ARMY WAR COLLEGE

PRESS
PKSOI PAPER

STABILITY OPERATIONS IN SOMALIA 

1992-1993:

A CASE STUDY

Glenn M. Harned

Colonel, U.S. Army (Retired)

July 2016

The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and 

do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. 

Government. Authors of Peacekeeping and Stability Operations 

Institute (PKSOI) publications enjoy full academic freedom, provided they do not disclose classified information, jeopardize 

operations security, or misrepresent official U.S. policy. Such 

academic freedom empowers them to offer new and sometimes 

controversial perspectives in the interest of furthering debate on 

key issues. This report is cleared for public release; distribution 

is unlimited.

*****

This publication is subject to Title 17, United States Code, Sections 101 and 105. It is in the public domain and may not be copyrighted.
*****

Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should 

be forwarded to: Director, Peacekeeping and Stability Operations 

Institute, U.S. Army War College, 22 Ashburn Drive, Carlisle, PA 

17013-5054. 

*****

All Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute 

(PKSOI) publications are available on the PKSOI homepage for 

electronic dissemination. Hard copies of this report also may be 

ordered while copies last from our homepage. PKSOI’s homepage 

address is: https://pksoi.army.mil

*****

The Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute publishes a quarterly journal to update the peace and stability operations community on the research of our analysts, recent and 

forthcoming publications and upcoming conferences sponsored 

by PKSOI. Each quarterly journal has a specific theme related to 

peace and stability operations and a commentary by the Director of PKSOI entitled The Director's Corner. If you are interested 

in receiving this journal, please subscribe on our homepage at 

http://pksoi.army.mil/subscription.cfm.

ISBN: 978-0-9861865-8-5

ii
iii

Table of Contents

Foreword........................................................................vii

About the Author...........................................................ix

Introduction....................................................................xi

Background and Strategic Conditions 

for the Operation..............................................................1

Geography.........................................................................2

Economy............................................................................2

Civil Society.......................................................................3

European Colonization....................................................3

Trust Territory and Independence.................................4

Somali Democratic Republic...........................................4

Somali Rebellion...............................................................5

Operation EASTERN EXIT.............................................9

Civil War and Anarchy...................................................9

Drought and Famine......................................................11

Early United Nations Efforts.........................................11

United Nations Operation in Somalia I 

(UNOSOM I)...................................................................14

Operation PROVIDE RELIEF.......................................16

Operational Environment.............................................19

Somali Opposition..........................................................20

Infrastructure..................................................................21

Health Conditions..........................................................22

Political Implications.....................................................22

Strategic Guidance..........................................................23

The U.S. Decision to Intervene.....................................23

The U.N. Decision to Expand UNOSOM....................27

Planning and Preparation.............................................31

Mission Statement..........................................................31

U.S. Joint Task Force Organization..............................32

Concept of Operations...................................................35

Humanitarian Relief Sectors..........................................38

Rules of Engagement.....................................................38
iv

Deployment and Intervention......................................40

Phase I – Establishing the Lodgment Area.................40

Unified Task Force (UNITAF)......................................43

Phase II – Securing the Major Relief 

Distribution Centers.......................................................43

Phase III – Stabilizing the Area of 

Operations.......................................................................47

Political-Military Operations........................................48

Disarmament...................................................................49

Reconciliation..................................................................51

Internal Security.............................................................53

Civil-Military Operations..............................................54

Psychological Operations..............................................55

Stabilization in the Sectors..............................................55

Redeployment and Rotation.........................................63

Phase IV – Transition to UNOSOM II.........................64

Initial Transition Planning.............................................64

The Change in U.S. Administrations...........................66

The U.N. Transition Plan..............................................69

The Actual Transition....................................................73

Aftermath.........................................................................74

Assessment and Insights...............................................78

Peace Enforcement Operations.....................................88

Political-Diplomatic-Military Cooperation.................89

Transitional Governance versus 

Nation-Building..............................................................89

“Mission Creep”.............................................................90

The Political Impact of U.N. Failure............................91

Conclusion......................................................................92

Appendix A: Glossary of Terms 

and Abbreviations..........................................................96

Terms...............................................................................96

Abbreviations.................................................................98

Appendix B: References...............................................101

Books..............................................................................101
v

Articles...........................................................................102

Other References...........................................................103

Appendix C: Somalia Chronology..............................106

Appendix D: Key Actors.............................................120

U.S. Government Key Actors......................................120

United Nations Key Actors.........................................122

Unified Task Force (UNITAF) Key Actors................123

Somali Faction Warlords.............................................125

Appendix E: United Nations Security 

Council Resolution 733 (January 23, 1992)..................129

Appendix F: United Nations Security 

Council Resolution 746 (March 17, 1992)..................132

Appendix G: United Nations Security 

Council Resolution 751 (April 24, 1992).......................135

Appendix H: United Nations Security 

Council Resolution 767 (July 27, 1992).......................140

Appendix I: United Nations Security 

Council Resolution 775 (August 28, 1992)..................145

Appendix J: United Nations Security 

Council Resolution 794 (December 3, 1992)...............149

Appendix K: Unified Task Force 

Troop List......................................................................155

Coalition Forces............................................................155

Australia........................................................................155

Belgium..........................................................................155

Canada...........................................................................156

France.............................................................................156

Germany........................................................................156

Greece............................................................................156

Italy.................................................................................157

Detachment, 46th Aviation Brigade..........................157

Kuwait............................................................................157

Morocco.........................................................................157

New Zealand.................................................................157

Nigeria...........................................................................157
vi

Saudi Arabia.................................................................158

Sweden...........................................................................158

Tunisia............................................................................158

Turkey............................................................................158

United Arab Emirates..................................................158

Zimbabwe......................................................................162

Appendix L: Seven Point Agreement Signed by 

Mohamed Farah Aidid and Ali Mahdi Mohamed 

(December 11, 1992).....................................................163

Appendix M: General Agreement and 

Supplement Signed in Addis 

Ababa (January 8 and 15, 1993)..................................164

Appendix N: Addis Ababa Agreement 

of the First Session of the Conference 

on National Reconciliation in Somalia 

(March 27, 1993)...........................................................170

Appendix O: United Nations Security 

Council Resolution 814 (March 26, 1993)...................181

Appendix P: United Nations Security 

Council Resolution 837 (June 6, 1993)........................191

Appendix Q: Joint Meritorious 

Unit Award for UNITAF Somalia..............................195
vii

Foreword

This stability operations case study project emerged 

from a Joint Requirements Oversight Council task to examine how Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) 

institutions teach operational planning for steady-state 

peacekeeping and stability operations. The Joint Staff 

J-7 requested the U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability 

Operations Institute (PKSOI), as the Joint Proponent for 

Peace and Stability Operations, accomplish a number of 

tasks to improve JPME curricula. As part of this effort, 

PKSOI is developing a series of professionally focused, 

historical case studies of successful joint peacekeeping and stability operations. The purpose of these case 

studies is to provide balanced analyses of the strategic 

conditions and guidance underlying each selected operation, and describe how military leaders successfully 

interpreted and implemented this guidance during the 

conduct of joint operations. The case studies provide 

current and future military leaders with insights into 

the principles and challenges of stability operations, and 

describe practical approaches for designing, planning, 

and conducting joint operations in a complex environment, particularly in situations when the Department of 

Defense does not lead the U.S. government effort. Each 

case study focuses on answering the question: Did the 

joint force commander and staff effectively design, plan, 

and establish the mission in a way that provided for initial operational success, while establishing the basis for 

long-term operational and strategic success?

Gregory P. Dewitt

Colonel, U.S. Army

Director

Peacekeeping and Stability

 Operations Institute
viii
ix

About the Author

Colonel Glenn Harned is a retired Army Infantry 

and Special Forces officer who now works as an independent defense consultant in the fields of irregular 

warfare and special operations. His last assignment 

was Acting Director of Special Operations Policy in 

the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict. Other 

assignments included Commander of the joint Special Operations Command Korea; Director of Training, Doctrine, and Concept Development, U.S. Army 

John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School 

(SWCS).

He is a former Principal (Senior Executive), Program Manager, and Senior Defense Analyst in charge 

of developing, managing, and leading Booz Allen 

Hamilton’s Northern Virginia-based SOF and irregular warfare business. His team developed the MultiService Concept for Irregular Warfare, USSOCOM 

Capstone Concept for Special Operations, the first two 

versions of the Department of Defense (DoD) Irregular 

Warfare Joint Operating Concept, and the DoD Joint 

Integrating Concepts for Unconventional Warfare, 

and Defeating Terrorist Networks. He was primary 

author of the 2006 DoD Irregular Warfare Implementation Roadmap, and served as a permanent member 

of the Joint Staff J-7 Defense Adaptive Red Team. He 

contributed to the development of three U.S. Joint 

Forces Command Activity Concepts for Engagement, 

Security, and Relief and Reconstruction. 

He is a graduate of the Army Command and General Staff College, Army School of Advanced Military Studies, Armed Forces Staff College, and Marine 

Corps War College. He has a B.S. in Economics from 
x

the Wharton School of Finance and Commerce at the 

University of Pennsylvania, and three master’s degrees in Business Administration, Strategy, and Theater Operations. 
xi

Introduction

Operation RESTORE HOPE, a U.S.-led peace enforcement operation conducted in Somalia under 

United Nations (U.N.) auspices from December 1992 

to May 1993, offers many lessons that are applicable 

to a range of possible challenges in the future. Unlike 

peacekeeping operations, which rely on the consent 

and good will of the parties to a dispute, peace enforcement operations involve the show or use of military force in an armed conflict to separate combatants 

and create, maintain, or reinstate a cease-fire. The 

Joint Force conducts these operations with limited or 

no consent by the warring parties. Peace enforcement 

operations are inherently joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational in nature. They require 

close cooperation with nongovernmental organizations and the civil society of the host nation. Peace enforcement is complex and one of the most difficult and 

challenging missions. It warrants heightened study by 

national security professionals.

The 1992-1993 Unified Task Force (UNITAF) operation in Somalia, which was the centerpiece of RESTORE HOPE, was unprecedented. It was the first 

time the U.N. Security Council elected to intervene 

in the internal affairs of a country without a request 

from its central government; Somalia had no central 

government during this period. This intervention was 

the first U.N. peace enforcement operation since the 

United Nations Operation in the Congo from 1960 to 

1964, and it was much larger, with 37,000 troops on the 

ground. The United States, not the U.N., planned, organized, and conducted the UNITAF operation under 

a U.N. mandate. The approach taken by the UNITAF 

military and diplomatic leaders in Somalia provides 
xii

an excellent example of how a coalition of willing and 

able nations, led by a great power with well-trained 

and well-equipped combat-capable forces, can restore 

stability in a failed state devastated by civil war. UNITAF established the political and military conditions 

necessary for the U.N. to begin the process of national 

reconciliation and the negotiation of a political settlement of differences among warring factions. As this 

case study will explain, the subsequent United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) II changed 

the course of events in Somalia and failed in its mission to promote national reconciliation and a political 

settlement, but not because of anything UNITAF did 

or failed to do. The UNOSOM II failure should not detract from the importance of learning about how the 

earlier UNITAF effort accomplished its mission.

There are eight sections in this monograph. “Background and Strategic Conditions” sets the stage for the 

operation. “Operational Environment” describes the 

conditions in Somalia, introduces the Somali political 

factions that UNITAF had to deal with, and explains 

the political implications of Operation RESTORE 

HOPE. “Strategic Guidance” describes the events 

that led to the U.S. decision to intervene and the U.N. 

choice to expand UNOSOM. This section outlines the 

strategic guidance and direction provided to JTF Somalia (later UNITAF). “Planning and Preparation” 

outlines how JTF Somalia developed its task organization and four-phased operation plan. “Deployment 

and Intervention” describes how the operation actually unfolded on the ground in Somalia and explains 

why UNITAF successfully accomplished its mission 

months ahead of schedule. “Aftermath” describes 

what happened in Somalia after the termination of 

the operation and explains why UNSOM II failed and 
xiii

Somalia returned to a state of anarchy. “Assessment 

and Insights” examines Operation RESTORE HOPE 

in terms of the twelve principles of joint operations 

and offers insights into peace enforcement operations. 

The “Conclusion” includes a list of best practices for 

peace enforcement operations, which derive from this 

case study. At the end of the monograph are 17 appendices filled with relevant original documents and 

other supplemental materials to aid in a more detailed 

study of the operation.

This monograph draws on three principal sources. 

The Joint Staff history of the operation, The Effort to 

Save Somalia August 1992-March 1994 by Walter S. 

Poole, provides an excellent description of nationallevel interagency coordination and the interactions 

between the U.S. government and the U.N. staff. The 

Marine Corps history of the operation, Restoring Hope: 

In Somalia with the Unified Task Force, 1992-1993 

by Marine Corps historian and UNITAF participant 

Colonel Dennis P. Wroczjowski, provides the operational and tactical details of the operation in Somalia. 

The “Historical Background” article on the U.N. UNOSOM website provides the U.N. perspective on the 

U.S.-led operation and exposes the policy differences 

that led to the ultimate failure of the follow-on operation, UNOSOM II.

The study of Operation RESTORE HOPE is important to the education of future U.S. military and civilian national security leaders because it highlights the 

challenges associated with complex contingency operations, the requirement for unity of effort to achieve 

a common purpose, and the vital role of key leaders in 

translating strategic guidance into tactical actions to 

achieve favorable political outcomes.

Glenn M. Harned

Colonel, U.S. Army (Retired)
xiv
1

Background and Strategic Conditions 

for the Operation

I and Somalia against the world.

I and my clan against Somalia.

I and my family against the clan.

I and my brother against the family.

I against my brother – Somali Proverb1

In the summer of 1992, Somalia seemed an unlikely place for a U.S. military intervention. Considered 

strategically unimportant since 

the end of the 

Cold War, it was 

one of the poorest countries on 

earth. In today’s 

terms, Somalia was a failed 

state wracked by 

civil war. Then, 

in a preview of 

today’s information environment, images of 

starving people 

in a devastated 

land on the remote Horn of 

Africa inundated the American 

people. The preInternet media—television newscasts, print articles, 

and radio programs—generated pressure on the 

United States and the international community to “do 
something” to resolve the human tragedy in Somalia.

Geography

Somalia is a large country of 246,200 square miles 

(slightly smaller than Texas) (see Map 1). It is strategically located on the Horn of Africa along the southern 

approaches to the Bab el Mandeb strait connecting the 

Gulf of Aden to the Red Sea and Suez Canal. Somalia 

borders Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Kenya to the west; the 

Gulf of Aden to the north; and the Indian Ocean to the 

east and south. The country is principally desert, with 

southern and central Somalia receiving significantly 

more rainfall than the drier north. Somalia has a dry 

season from January to March, the monsoon season is 

from April to June, and two hot and humid seasons 

of short and irregular rainfall from July to December. 

Less than two percent of the land is arable; most of the 

land is permanent pasture suitable for the nomadic 

herding of livestock. The terrain is mostly flat to undulating plateau, rising to hills in the north. Its natural 

resources include uranium and largely unexploited 

deposits of iron ore, tin, gypsum, bauxite, copper, salt, 

natural gas, and likely oil.

Economy

The U.N. classifies Somalia as a “least developed 

country.”2 Most of the Somali people are nomadic or 

semi-nomadic herders of livestock (goats, sheep, camels, and cattle). Many others engage in subsistence 

farming or fishing. The processing of agricultural 

products for the domestic market is the basis of the 

modest industrial sector.

2
3

Civil Society

In 1992, Somalia had an estimated population of 

8.3 million.3 The family and the clan are the foundations of Somali society, which is divided into five clanfamilies and subdivided into clans, sub-clans, and 

families.4 All ethnic Somalis trace their lineages to Abu 

Taalib, an uncle of the Prophet Mohammed. They can 

recite their lineage back for several generations, allowing individual Somalis to understand their obligations 

and responsibilities to other Somalis (see the Somali 

proverb above). Somalia’s clan-based society tends to 

unify against an external threat. Absent such a threat, 

the Somali clans are fiercely antagonistic toward one 

another as they compete for scarce water and arable 

land to support their local clan-based economies and 

preserve their traditional lifestyle.

European Colonization

An independent and unified Somali country did 

not exist until 1960. Local sultans governed the various clans without a central government until the Suez 

Canal opened in 1869. The European empires then 

recognized the new geostrategic importance of the 

Bab el Mandeb strait and the Horn of Africa. In northwest Somalia, at the southern tip of the strait, France 

imposed various treaties with local sultans between 

1883 and 1887 before establishing the colony of French 

Somaliland in 1894. In 1888, Great Britain established 

a protectorate over British Somaliland in northern Somalia on the Gulf of Aden. In 1889, Italy established 

Italian Somaliland as a similar protectorate in central 

and southern Somalia along the Indian Ocean. The 

self-proclaimed Dervish State opposed the coloniza-
tion of Somalia, fighting an insurgency against the 

Ethiopian, British, and Italian Empires from 1899 to 

1920 that purged the Somali interior of European influence.

Trust Territory and Independence

During World War II, the British defeated the 

Italian forces in Somalia and seized control of Italian 

Somaliland in 1941. After the 1947 peace treaty with 

Italy, the British continued to administer the occupied 

territory.5 In 1949, the U.N. awarded Italy trusteeship 

over the former Italian Somaliland, with the stipulation that the new Trust Territory of Somaliland must 

be independent by the end of 1960. In 1956, the British 

agreed to the independence of British Somaliland and 

its union with the Trust Territory. The British granted 

independence to British Somaliland on June 26, 1960. 

On July 1, it joined with the Trust Territory to establish the Somali Republic.

Great Britain and Italy did not adequately prepare 

their Somali territories for independence. The major 

issues facing the new country were deplorable social 

conditions and inadequate physical infrastructure. 

However, many Somali political leaders became distracted by the idea of Pan-Somalism. They called for 

unification with the Somali people living in the bordering countries of Kenya, Ethiopia, and Djibouti, 

placing Somalia in confrontation with its neighbors.

Somali Democratic Republic

During the first decade of Somali independence, 

the ruling Somali Youth League Party became corrupt; 

personal gain, nepotism, and clan allegiances took pri4
5

ority over public service to the new country. On October 15, 1969, President Abdirashid Ali Shermarke was 

assassinated, apparently over a clan grievance. On October 21, when Prime Minister Ibrahim Egal tried to 

arrange the selection of a new president, Major General Mohammed Siad Barre seized power in a bloodless 

coup and assumed leadership of the new Supreme 

Revolutionary Council. General Barre arrested members of the old government, outlawed political parties, 

abolished the National Assembly, and suspended the 

constitution.6 Educated in the Soviet Union, he renamed the country as the Somali Democratic Republic 

and embarked on a socialist program to end government corruption and clan allegiances, raise literacy, 

and improve the fragile economy. He accepted Soviet 

military and economic assistance in exchange for basing rights at Berbera on the Gulf of Aden. He also continued to pursue Pan-Somalism, especially regarding 

the Ogaden region controlled by Ethiopia, which led 

to Somalia’s unsuccessful invasion of the disputed territory from July 13, 1977 to March 15, 1978. The Soviet 

Union supported the Marxist regime in Ethiopia and 

severed its relationship with Somalia. In retaliation, 

General Barre expelled the Soviets and reached an 

agreement with the United States similar to the one he 

had with the Soviet Union.

Somali Rebellion

Despite General Barre’s programs to eliminate the 

political influence of the clans, or perhaps because of 

these efforts, Somalis increasingly identified Barre’s 

government with his own Marehan sub-clan of the Darod clan-family. Pervasive public corruption added to 

the dissatisfaction of many Somalis with Barre’s government. When Barre was injured in an automobile 
6

accident on May 23, 

1986, rivals within 

his own government and insurgent 

groups in northern 

Somalia entered 

into open rebellion. 

There were four 

main clan-based 

opposition groups 

(see Map 2 and text 

box):

1. The United 

Somali Congress (USC), 

a Hawiye 

clan-family 

faction in 

central Somalia, became the largest and most 

successful opposition group. By December 

1990, USC forces pushed the Somali National 

Army back to the outskirts of the Somali capital, Mogadishu.

2. The Somali National Movement (SNM), an 

Isaaq clan-family organization based in northwestern Somalia, launched a military campaign 

in May 1988. In response, the predominantly 

Marehan-based SNM conducted savage reprisals against the Isaaq, destroying water wells, 

killing livestock, and forcing 300,000 Isaaqis to 

flee to Ethiopia.

3. The Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM), a Darod 

family-clan faction, opposed the Barre government in the south around Kismayo.

4. The Somali National Front (SNF), another Darod family-clan faction, supported the Barre 

Map 2 Somali Clans and Factions 1992

(Source: Mroczkowski, pg. 2)
7

government and sought to restore it to power 

in southern and central Somalia.

Somalia Clan and Faction Affiliations

Clan and sub-clan loyalties defined the power struggle 

among the various political factions after the overthrow of 

Dictator Siad Barre. Virtually all factions derived their influence from their affiliation with one of the clans or clan-families. The United Somali Congress (USC), Somali National 

Front (SNF), and Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) had the 

greatest impact on Operation RESTORE HOPE:

Composed principally of Hawiye clan-family members, the 

USC was the largest of the factions operating in central and 

southern Somalia. It was one of the first to fight against the 

Barre regime. After capturing Mogadishu in January 1991, 

the USC fractured into two factions. General Mohamed Farah 

Hassan Aidid led one faction called USC Aidid. Its members 

belonged to the Habr Gedr clan led by Aidid. The second 

faction, USC Mahdi, under Ali Mahdi Mohamed, drew its 

support from the Abgal clan and battled the USC Aidid faction. Both were strong in the Mogadishu area, and each had 

supporters in other factions in the Kismayo area.

General Mohamed Said Hirsi (“General Morgan"), Minister 

of Defense in the Barre regime, established the SNF in March 

1991 to restore Barre to power. The SNF was composed of 

Barre supporters, principally from the Marehan clan of the 

Darod clan-family, and the remnants of the Somali National 

Army. It was active in southwestern Somalia along the Kenya border and in the Kismayo area, extending its reach as 

far north as Bardera and Baidoa. Morgan was allied with 

USC Mahdi against USC Aidid.

The SPM was active mainly in the south around Kismayo. 

Its members belonged to the Ogadeni clan of the Darod 

clan-family. The SPM also fractured into two rival factions. 

Colonel Ahmed Omar Jess led the faction allied with General 
8

Aidid, and Colonel Aden Gabiyu led the faction aligned with 

the SNF.

Several other armed factions also operated in Somalia at this 

time. These factions had less impact on Operation RESTORE 

HOPE than the USC, SNF, and SPM.

Dominated by the Issaq clan-family, the Somali National 

Movement (SNM) operated in northwest Somalia. Under the 

leadership of Abdulrahman Ali Tur, this faction declared the 

independence of former British Somaliland and established 

the Somaliland Republic.

The Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) also operated in the north. It was the political and military arm of the 

Majertain clan of the Darod clan-family, which opposed the 

USC.

The Somali Democratic Movement (SDM), affiliated with 

the Rahanweyne clan-family, operated to the west of Mogadishu. Centered on the town of Bardera, the SDM was also 

strong in Baidoa.

The Southern Somali National Movement (SSNM) had its 

center in the town of Kismayo. The SSNM was the political 

and military arm of the Biyemal clan of the Dir clan-family.

There also were several religious-based factions, particularly 

in the north. These groups included Islamic Unity, which opposed the SSDF in the north, and the Muslim Brotherhood, 

which operated throughout the country.

Derived from Colonel Dennis P. Mroczkowski, Restoring 

Hope; In Somalia with the Unified Task Force, 1992-1993, pg. 3.
9

Operation EASTERN EXIT

On December 5, 1990, faced with escalating violence 

and chaos in Mogadishu, U.S. Ambassador James K. 

Bishop ordered the departure of non-essential personnel and dependents from Somalia. By January 1, the 

situation was too dangerous for the remaining personnel to stay at the U.S. Embassy compound, and Ambassador Bishop requested permission to evacuate. Vice 

Admiral Stanley R. Arthur, commanding U.S. Naval 

Forces, U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM), had 

already alerted his staff to prepare for a non-combatant 

evacuation operation (NEO) in Mogadishu. Although 

heavily committed to Operation DESERT SHIELD in 

Saudi Arabia and the final preparations for Operation 

DESERT STORM to liberate Kuwait, USCENTCOM 

began NEO planning. By the time the Chairman of 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), General Colin Powell, 

U.S. Army, issued the execute order on January 2, Admiral Arthur was already assembling an amphibious 

task force composed of the helicopter assault ship USS 

Guam and amphibious transport dock USS Trenton. At 

0345 hours on January 5, the 60-man evacuation force 

lifted off from Guam, flew to the embassy compound, 

and loaded the initial group of evacuees into its two 

CH-53 helicopters. The evacuation force secured the 

embassy compound until the evacuation was complete that evening.7

Civil War and Anarchy

With the successful completion of the NEO, the 

U.S. presence in Somalia ended for almost two years. 

The civil war continued in Somalia, while most of the 

world focused on Operation DESERT STORM and its 

aftermath in Southwest Asia. On January 27, 1991, the 
10

USC forced General Barre to flee from Mogadishu to 

southern Somalia. However, the USC failed to reach a 

political settlement with the other principal anti-Barre 

factions, the SNM, SPM, and SSDF. On May 18, 1991, 

the SNM-controlled northwestern region seceded 

from Somalia and declared itself the independent Republic of Somaliland, the successor state to the former 

British Somaliland.8 An international conference on 

Somali national reconciliation convened in Djibouti 

on June 5-11, 1991. The conference participants selected Somali entrepreneur and USC politician Ali 

Mahdi Mohamed to serve as Interim President. General Mohamed Farrah Aidid, Chairman of the USC 

and military leader of its powerful militia, boycotted 

the Djibouti conference and rejected Mahdi’s authority. 9 The other factions did not rally behind Mahdi’s 

presidency because the USC was an instrument of the 

Hawiye clan, so Mahdi was never able to assert his 

authority beyond North Mogadishu and its northern 

environs. The USC split into two rival factions led by 

Aidid and Mahdi respectively, which began to fight 

each other for control of the interim central government and the capital city of Mogadishu. The other 

opposition groups began competing for influence in 

the power vacuum, but no group was strong enough 

to defeat the others.10 The SPM, active around Kismayo in southern Somalia, split into two factions as 

well, with one group supporting Aidid and the other 

aligned with Mahdi. After Barre failed twice to retake 

Mogadishu, Aidid forced him into exile on April 29, 

1992.11 With no clear military victor and no effective 

central government, central and southern Somalia 

sank deeper into anarchy and chaos.
11

Drought and Famine

Adding to the suffering of the Somali people, a 

three-year drought devastated Somali subsistence 

farming and led to widespread famine. Food and water became weapons as rival groups deprived each 

other of these precious resources. Individual Somalis 

could not tend their crops or livestock in the midst of 

armed conflict, and local food production dropped 

precipitously. With lawlessness an everyday reality, 

the Somali people armed themselves, formed local militias for collective defense, or hired others for protection.12

The civil war and drought caused widespread 

death and destruction in Somalia. Almost one million 

Somalis sought refuge in neighboring countries and 

elsewhere. According to the U.N., almost 4.5 million 

Somalis—over half its estimated population of 8.3 million—suffered from severe malnutrition and related 

disease.13 Beyond the immediate humanitarian crisis, 

the continuing civil war threatened the stability of the 

entire Horn of Africa region.

Early United Nations Efforts

In January 1991, the U.N. began to coordinate international humanitarian efforts to relieve the suffering of the Somali people. By March, six main U.N. organizations were operating in Somalia: the Food and 

Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, United Nations Development Programme, United Nations 

Children’s Fund, Office of the United Nations High 

Commissioner for Refugees, the World Food Programme, and World Health Organization. In addition, 

more than 30 international and local non-governmen-
12

tal organizations (NGOs) were operating in Somalia 

as U.N. “implementing partners.” Over the following 

months, the volatile security situation forced the U.N. 

on several occasions to withdraw its personnel temporarily, but despite these interruptions, it continued 

its humanitarian activities in cooperation with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and 

other NGOs.

On December 27, 1991, as the situation in Somalia 

continued to deteriorate, U.N. Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar (Peru), in cooperation with the 

League of Arab States (LAS), the Organization of African Unity (OAU), and the Organization of the Islamic 

Conference (OIC), began an initiative to restore peace 

in Somalia. His term as Secretary-General expired on 

December 31, and Boutros Boutros-Ghali (Egypt) succeeded to the post on January 1, 1992. In early January, 

Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs James 

O.C. Jonah (Sierra Leone) led a team of senior U.N. 

officials into Somalia to arrange a ceasefire and secure 

access to the civilian population by the international 

relief community. All faction leaders expressed unanimous support for a U.N. role in achieving national 

reconciliation. All but General Aidid expressed support for a ceasefire in Mogadishu. On January 20, the 

Charge d’Affaires of Somalia, Fatun Mohamed Hassan, wrote a letter requesting a meeting of the Security 

Council on the situation in Somalia.

On January 23, 1992, the U.N. Security Council 

adopted Resolution 733 (Appendix E), urging all parties to the conflict to cease hostilities, and calling on 

all states to implement an immediate embargo on all 

deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Somalia. The Security Council requested that the Secretary-General increase humanitarian assistance to the 
13

affected population, and contact all parties involved 

in the conflict to seek their commitment to the cessation of hostilities, promote a ceasefire, and assist in 

reaching a political settlement.14

On January 31, Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali 

invited the LAS, OAU, and OIC, as well as representatives of Interim President Mahdi and General Aidid, to 

participate in consultations at U.N. Headquarters. The 

parties held talks on February 12-14, which resulted 

in Mahdi and Aidid agreeing to an immediate ceasefire. Both faction leaders also consented to a visit by a 

high-level delegation from the U.N., OAU, LAS, and 

OIC to conclude a ceasefire agreement. The delegation 

arrived in Mogadishu on February 29. On March 3, 

Mahdi and Aidid signed an “Agreement on the Implementation of a Ceasefire.”15 In this document, the rival faction leaders accepted the deployment of a U.N. 

military contingent to provide security for humanitarian relief convoys, and 20 military observers to monitor the ceasefire. Based on this agreement, the Security Council adopted Resolution 746 (Appendix F) on 

March 17, supporting the Secretary-General’s decision 

to send a technical team to Somalia from March 23 to 

April 1 to prepare plans for monitoring the ceasefire 

and delivering humanitarian assistance. Accordingly, 

on March 27 and 28, respectively, Aidid and Mahdi 

agreed to implement a ceasefire in Mogadishu and to 

accept U.N. “mechanisms for monitoring the ceasefire 

and for the equitable and effective distribution of humanitarian assistance.”16
14

United Nations Operation in Somalia I 

(UNOSOM I)

On April 24, 1992, in accordance with the agreements reached with Mahdi and Aidid in Mogadishu, 

the Security Council adopted Resolution 751 (Appendix G), which established UNOSOM as a Chapter VI 

(peacekeeping) mission to monitor the ceasefire and 

assist the humanitarian relief effort. In the resolution, 

the Security Council requested the Secretary-General 

deploy 50 unarmed uniformed U.N. military observers immediately to monitor the ceasefire in Mogadishu. It also agreed, in principle, to establish a U.N. 

security force as soon as possible to provide protection and security for U.N. personnel, equipment, and 

supplies at the seaports and airports in Mogadishu, 

and escort deliveries of humanitarian supplies from 

these ports to distribution centers in the city and its 

immediate environs. The Security Council also asked 

the Secretary-General, in cooperation with LAS, OAU, 

and OIC, to pursue a conference on national reconciliation and unity. Finally, the Security Council called on 

the international community to provide financial and 

other support for the Secretary-General’s 90-day Plan 

of Action for Emergency Humanitarian Assistance to 

Somalia. On April 28, the Secretary-General appointed Mohammed Sahnoun (Algeria) as his Special Representative for Somalia to provide overall direction of 

U.N. activities in that country.17

On June 23, the Secretary-General informed the Security Council that Mahdi and Aidid had agreed to the 

immediate deployment of the unarmed military observers. The U.N. Chief Military Observer, Brigadier 

General Imtíaz Shaheen (Pakistan), and 45 unarmed 

UNOSOM military observers arrived in Mogadishu 
15

on July 23, 1992, almost four months after the rival faction 

leaders agreed to U.N. monitoring of the ceasefire. On August 12, the Secretary-General informed the Security 

Council that Mahdi and Aidid would accept the deployment of 500 U.N. security personnel to Mogadishu as part of UNOSOM. The Government of Pakistan 

agreed to contribute a military unit for this purpose. 

The Pakistani security unit arrived in Mogadishu by 

U.S. airlift on September 14, 1992, six months after Mahdi and Aidid agreed to their deployment.

On July 22, the Secretary-General reported to the 

Security Council on the complex political and security 

situation in Somalia, as well as the country’s desperate need for “humanitarian assistance, recovery programmes, and institution-building.”18 The SecretaryGeneral concluded that the U.N. needed to intensify 

its efforts to arrange a countrywide ceasefire and promote national reconciliation. The Security Council 

approved the Secretary-General’s report on July 27 

and adopted Resolution 767, urging all parties, movements, and factions in Somalia to facilitate U.N. efforts 

to provide humanitarian assistance to the affected 

population (Appendix H).

With the support of the Security Council, the 

Secretary-General sent another technical team to Somalia, August 2 to 15. In his subsequent 24 August 

1992 report, the Secretary-General described a number of urgent steps to mitigate the widespread and 

escalating starvation in central and southern Somalia. 

While the U.N. and its partners were ready and able 

to provide substantially increased humanitarian assistance, large-scale looting of relief supplies stymied 

their efforts. The Secretary-General recommended the 

deployment of four additional U.N. security units, 

each with a strength of up to 750 personnel, to protect 
16

the humanitarian convoys and distribution centers 

throughout Somalia. He also recommended establishing four UNOSOM zone headquarters, each headed 

by a civilian official who would assist the Special Representative in all aspects of his duties. On August 28, 

the Security Council approved the Secretary-General’s report and adopted Resolution 775 (Appendix I), 

which authorized the increase of 3,000 troops for the 

UNOSOM mission. Further, on September 8, the Security Council approved the Secretary-General’s plan 

to deploy three logistic units (up to 719 personnel) to 

support the enlarged UNOSOM operation. Consequently, the total authorized strength of UNOSOM 

rose to 4,219 all ranks.19

Operation PROVIDE RELIEF

The U.S. government was initially reluctant to get 

involved in Somalia, hoping that voluntary contributions from Saudi Arabia and other neighboring countries would resolve the humanitarian crisis. With the 

Cold War won, no U.S. vital national interests were 

at stake in Somalia. Remembering the U.S. peacekeeping experience from 1982 to 1984 in the Lebanese Civil 

War, General Powell wanted to avoid another openended commitment with no clear objectives. Other 

participants in the policy debate warned that getting 

involved in Somalia on humanitarian grounds would 

establish a dangerous precedent. Smith Hampstone, 

the U.S. Ambassador to Kenya, wrote in a diplomatic 

cable on July 30, 1992:

There is little reason to believe that the bitter and longstanding clan rivalries that have turned Somalia into a 

particularly murderous African Lebanon will yield to 
17

outside intervention . . . . Tragic as the situation is in 

Somalia . . . the dissolution of the Somali nation-state 

does not affect vital U.S. security interests. Accordingly, USG should think—and think again—before allowing itself to become bogged down in a quagmire without the promise of offsetting concomitant benefits.20

Eventually, however, political and humanitarian 

concerns overcame these objections. In late July 1992, 

President George H.W. Bush decided to support UNOSOM by accelerating the delivery of relief supplies, 

promoting national reconciliation, and transporting 

the 500-man Pakistani security force to Mogadishu. 

On August 16, the CJCS issued an execute order to 

General Joseph P. Hoar (USMC), Commander-inChief of the U.S. Central Command (USCINCCENT), 

to commence Operation PROVIDE RELIEF and the associated airlift of emergency relief supplies into Somalia. Initially, four C-141 and eight C-130 aircraft participated in the operation, with the number of C-130 

aircraft growing to 14 by December 1992. The first 

U.S. military flight into Somalia occurred on August 

28. Military aircraft brought relief supplies to distribution centers in the interior of Somalia, but Somali 

warlords and gangs stole the relief supplies as soon 

as they arrived, just as it was happening on the docks 

of Somali seaports. The first UNOSOM security unit 

arrived in Mogadishu by U.S. airlift on September 14, 

but General Aidid refused to allow the Pakistanis to 

protect the docks or the relief convoys. Aidid’s forces 

outnumbered and outgunned the Pakistanis who, 

“did not try to move out from the airfield and could 

not be persuaded to protect relief convoys.”21

On October 21, two months after the Security Council adopted Resolution 775, the Deputies Committee 

of the U.S. National Security Council (NSC) endorsed 
18

a greater U.N. security presence in Somalia.22 On October 26, U.N. Special Representative Sahnoun resigned 

after publicly criticizing the inadequacy of the U.N. relief effort. Two days later, Secretary-General BoutrosGhali asked the U.S. government to transport 3,000 

additional security troops to reinforce UNOSOM: 

one battalion each from Belgium, Canada, Egypt, and 

Nigeria; a Norwegian headquarters company; and a 

Pakistani augmentation element. On November 4, the 

NSC agreed in principle to transport the U.N. security troops, but only if the security environment was 

permissive. The U.N. troops would enter Somalia only 

with the consent of the warlords, because UNOSOM was a 

peacekeeping operation, not a peace enforcement operation

(see text box).

United Nations Terms

Peacemaking generally includes measures to address conflicts in progress and usually involves diplomatic action to 

bring hostile parties to a negotiated agreement. The U.N. 

Secretary-General may use his or her office to facilitate the 

resolution of the conflict. Peacemakers may also be envoys, 

governments, groups of states, regional organizations or the 

United Nations. Peacemaking efforts may also be undertaken by unofficial and non-governmental groups, or by a 

prominent personality working independently.

Peace enforcement involves the application of a range of 

coercive measures, including the use of military force. It requires the explicit authorization of the Security Council. It is 

used to restore international peace and security in situations 

where the Security Council has decided to act in the face of 

a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression. The Council may utilize, where appropriate, regional 

organizations and agencies for enforcement action under its 

authority and in accordance with the U.N. Charter.
19

Operational Environment

The situation in Somalia in November 1992 manifested three disturbing patterns. First and most important, clan dynamics were still a dominant force in 

Somali society. Second, the Barre government reforms 

had destroyed the balance of power among the clans, 

and removed many of the old mechanisms by which 

Somali society had kept clan rivalries and violence 

within acceptable limits.23 Third, the Somali clans had 

Peacebuilding aims to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing 

into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels 

for conflict management, and to lay the foundation for sustainable peace and development. It is a complex, long-term 

process of creating the necessary conditions for sustainable 

peace. Peacebuilding measures address core issues that affect the functioning of society and the State, and seek to enhance the capacity of the State to carry out its core functions 

effectively and legitimately.

Peacekeeping operations, in principle, support the implementation of a ceasefire or peace agreement, but they are 

often required to play an active role in peacemaking efforts and may also be involved in early peacebuilding activities. Today's multidimensional peacekeeping operations 

facilitate the political process, protect civilians, assist in the 

disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of former 

combatants; support the organization of elections, protect 

and promote human rights and assist in restoring the rule 

of law. Peacekeepers may use force to defend themselves, 

their mandate, and civilians, particularly in situations where 

the State is unable to provide security and maintain public 

order.

Source: United Nations, “United Nations Peacekeeping,” 

http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/peace.

shtml, accessed on November 24, 2015
20

accumulated large quantities of weapons (including 

tanks and artillery) while Somalia was a client state of 

the Soviet Union and the United States, intensifying 

the level of societal violence and the threat to intervening forces. The United States, U.N., and international 

relief community would have to understand and address these patterns to be successful in Somalia. 24

In October and November 1992, despite all the 

efforts of the international community, the U.N. 

Secretary-General, and his Special Representative 

for Somalia, the situation continued to deteriorate. 

Somalia remained without a central government. Rival militias continued to clash in the divided city of 

Mogadishu. Throughout the country, clan-based factions fought each other for power and resources. The 

resulting political chaos and physical destruction led 

to widespread looting, armed banditry, and general 

lawlessness. These deplorable conditions prevented 

the delivery and distribution of relief supplies to the 

affected Somali population. Compounding this tragedy, several powerful Somali factions, most notably 

those led by Interim President Mahdi and General 

Aidid, intimidated into inaction the U.N. troops responsible for securing the delivery and distribution of 

relief supplies.

Somali Opposition

On November 22, 1992, General Hoar issued his 

estimate of the situation, in which he assumed that the 

primary threat to security would be the armed Somali 

factions.25 He wrote, “Overall, the security environment throughout Somalia is volatile. The situation 

may deteriorate further because there is no centralized governmental control of Somali factions.”26
21

The U.N. recognized 14 political factions in Somalia, and considered 11 of them to be warring factions. 

Four of these factions were responsible for most of the 

armed conflict during Operation RESTORE HOPE: The 

two USC factions led by General Aidid and Interim 

President Mahdi, the SNF led by General Morgan, and 

the SPM faction led by Colonel Jess. USCENTCOM 

estimated that General Aidid controlled about 20,000 

USC troops, including 5,000-10,000 in Mogadishu. Interim President Mahdi controlled 15,000-30,000 USC 

troops, including 5,000-6,000 in Mogadishu. General 

Morgan controlled about 9,000 SNF troops, mostly in 

southern Somalia along the Kenya border and around 

Kismayo. Colonel Jess controlled an estimated 15,000 

SPM troops, many of them former Somali National 

Army, including 3,000 in the Kismayo area. These 

troops had an intimate knowledge of their operational 

areas, but they were generally undisciplined, illiterate, and often under the influence of drugs. Although 

these troops were heavily armed, there were indications they suffered from shortages of ammunition and 

spare parts. Their ability to operate and maintain their 

heavy weapons was questionable.

Infrastructure

The U.S. and coalition forces would have to rely 

on Somalia’s transportation systems to accomplish 

their mission, but Somalia was largely undeveloped. 

Somalia had no railroads. It had 18,000 kilometers of 

roads, but only 3,000 kilometers were paved and another 3,000 kilometers were graveled. The remaining 

12,000 kilometers were dirt roads or tracks. The factions maintained few of these roads during the civil 

war.
22

Somalia had 40 airfields, but only ten of them were 

C-130 capable. Few of them had material-handling 

equipment or covered storage, and air traffic control 

was almost nonexistent. The airports at Mogadishu, 

Bale Dogle, Hargeisa, and Kismayo had rudimentary 

maintenance and service facilities.

Somalia had three major seaports at Mogadishu, 

Kismayo, and Berbera. The port of Berbera was on the 

Gulf of Aden in the autonomous Somaliland region. 

The condition of the material handling equipment at 

the other two ports was uncertain.

Health Conditions

The Horn of Africa presented medical challenges 

to military forces operating in the region. The famine made numerous endemic diseases more virulent 

among the affected population. Poor sanitation made 

dysentery and cholera common and frequently lethal. 

Virtually all water was unpotable, even if boiled. An 

effective preventive medicine program was essential 

to the preservation of the force.

Political Implications

In addition to the massive humanitarian crisis, 

the potential failure of the UNOSOM peacekeeping 

mission threatened the credibility of U.N. peacekeeping operations worldwide. While the United States 

enjoyed its “peace dividend” after the Cold War, the 

Serbs in Bosnia, Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, and rival tribes in Africa, among others, all watched to see 

whether the U.N. could compel warring factions to 

comply with Security Council resolutions designed 

to maintain or restore peace and order in a failed 
23

state. Similarly, foreign political leaders evaluated 

U.N. management of the Somali crisis to determine 

the suitability and effectiveness of working through 

the U.N. to resolve similar conflicts in the post-Cold 

War era. The international community sought to understand how the United States, the only remaining 

super-power, would redefine its role as the leader of 

the Free World. The United States struggled with this 

question as well.

Strategic Guidance

The U.S. Decision to Intervene

On November 6, 1992, the NSC Policy Coordination Committee (PCC) for Africa, chaired by Assistant 

Secretary of State for African Affairs Herman Cohen, 

reconvened to discuss the situation. The PCC Chair, 

Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Robert Houdek, asked the Central Intelligence 

Agency (CIA) whether the U.N. peacekeeping strategy appeared likely to succeed. Three days later, the 

CIA estimated that “far more than 3,500 troops would 

be needed to ensure that relief supplies reached the 

two million Somalis in danger of starvation.”27

In Mogadishu, General Aidid continued to threaten the UNOSOM security force and thwart U.N. relief 

efforts. On November 6, the U.S. Ambassador to the 

U.N., Edwards Perkins, sent a cable to the Department 

of State explaining that the worldwide credibility of 

U.N. peacekeeping was at stake, arguing the Serbs 

in Bosnia and the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia would 

pay no heed to the U.N. Security Council “if bandits 

force it to take flight in Somalia.” He urged “a clear 

show of force and a demonstrable willingness to use it 
24

[against] the smallest bully on the block.”28 However, 

General Hoar at USCENTCOM was worried that if the 

United States took the lead, other nations would not 

join what they perceived was a unilateral U.S. operation.

On November 12, the NSC PCC for Africa endorsed 

the CIA assessment and agreed the NSC Deputies 

Committee should decide whether to recommend a 

significantly larger U.N. troop presence in Somalia. It 

was becoming clear that the PROVIDE RELIEF “airlift 

alone could not prevent mass starvation” in Somalia.29

On November 16, the new U.N. Special Representative 

to Somalia, Ismat Kittani (Iraq), reported that humanitarian supplies had become the basis for an otherwise 

non-existent economy. He reported that Somali “authorities” at all levels competed for anything of value; 

threats and killing often decided the outcome.30 They 

were extorting large sums of money from NGOs, and 

perhaps no more than 20 percent of relief supplies 

reached the intended recipients. On November 20, the 

Deputies Committee requested that USCENTCOM 

submit military courses of action for NSC consideration. Two days later, General Hoar proposed three 

alternatives:

1. Employ a brigade-size force to establish a lodgment area at Kismayo in southern Somalia, expanding the operation to Mogadishu in later 

phases.

2. Employ a division-size force to secure Mogadishu, expanding the operation to Kismayo and 

into the interior in later phases.

3. Seize Mogadishu and Kismayo simultaneously.

General Hoar recommended course of action two 

because it seized Somalia’s political center of gravity 
25

and largest seaport, but he rated course of action one 

as acceptable.

The Joint Staff J-5 also developed three options:

1. Continue the current U.N. operation with expanded U.S. air and sealift.

2. Urge the U.N. to accelerate and increase the 

deployment of U.N. security forces to 10,000 

to 15,000 troops instead of the planned 3,500. 

Provide logistical support and an off-shore 

Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) with an embarked Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) to 

deter Somali attacks on U.N. forces (and to presumably act as a Quick Reaction Force (QRF) if 

deterrence failed).

3. Organize a division-size U.S.-led coalition force 

under U.N. auspices.

The NSC Deputies Committee considered the Joint 

Staff options on November 23. The Department of 

State favored Option Two, but there were four major 

issues. First, the Deputies Committee wanted U.S. officers to command U.S. troops, as was done during the 

Korean War. Second, Deputies Committee members 

discussed whether U.S. troops should focus on the humanitarian relief mission and leave political issues to 

the U.N. The DoD representatives argued successfully 

that no such distinction was possible because U.S. 

troops could not perform the relief mission without 

challenging the warlords, destabilizing the political 

situation, and pursuing structural political changes. 

Third, the DoD representatives argued that the NSC 

Staff proposal for a four- to six-month timetable was 

meaningless because the operation would be eventdriven. Fourth, all the representatives agreed on a 
26

troop strength of about 15,000 to establish and secure 

an effective food distribution system.31

On November 25, President Bush presided over a 

decisive NSC meeting. Generals Powell and Hoar both 

recommended Joint Staff Option Three. Both officers 

were reluctant to intervene, but they believed the situation had deteriorated to the point that Option Three 

was the only realistic option if the President decided to 

intervene. Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney concurred. However, General Powell warned the President that “it would be foolish not to anticipate taking 

on the full spectrum of Somalia’s problems . . . other 

consequences would follow and getting out would 

be difficult.”32 President Bush selected Option Three, understanding that it could lead to confronting the warlords 

and disarming the factions. Public sentiment shaped the 

decision; the Somali tragedy was massive and the media made it vivid. No U.S. vital interests were at stake 

in Somalia, but the United States wanted to preserve 

the credibility of U.N. peacekeeping operations. Only 

the United States possessed the means to intervene 

promptly and decisively. There was agreement that 

the Korean War precedent was the one to follow, with 

a U.S. commander carrying out Security Council resolutions. National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft 

wanted U.S. troops out of Somalia before President 

Bush left office on January 20, 1993, but General Powell and Secretary Cheney informed him this was infeasible. Based on President Bush’s decision to intervene, 

General Powell issued an alert order to General Hoar. 

A planning order followed on December 1.
27

The U.N. Decision to Expand UNOSOM

The U.N. considered a variety of options for dealing with the worsening situation in Somalia, including 

a potential expansion of the UNISOM role. U.S. Government representatives and U.N. staff members met 

regularly to exchange information and coordinate actions, but they did not agree on a strategic approach to 

address the humanitarian crisis. In a letter to the U.N. 

Security Council on November 24, 1992, the SecretaryGeneral reported on the deteriorating situation in Somalia and the factors preventing UNOSOM from implementing its mandate. He cited the lack of a central 

government in Somalia; the failure of various factions 

to cooperate with UNOSOM; the extortion, blackmail 

and robbery of the international relief effort; and the 

repeated attacks on the personnel and equipment of 

the U.N. and other relief agencies. The Security Council members discussed this letter the next day, agreed 

the situation in Somalia was intolerable, and asked the 

Secretary-General to present specific recommendations on how the U.N. could remedy the situation. On 

November 29, the Secretary-General submitted to the 

Security Council another letter, outlining five options 

for the Council’s consideration:

1. Continue efforts to deploy the 4,200 UNOSOM 

security troops that the Security Council authorized in September.

2. Withdraw UNOSOM.

3. Stage a UNOSOM show of force in Mogadishu 

and actually use force if necessary.

4. Have U.N. members conduct a countrywide 

operation to create the conditions necessary to 

ensure the delivery of relief supplies.

5. Conduct a countrywide operation under U.N. 

command and control.
28

The Secretary-General rated Options One, Two, 

and Three unacceptable, and Option Five infeasible. 

He recommended Option Four, which was similar 

to the option President Bush selected on November 

25, but extended the operation countrywide instead 

of focusing on central and southern Somalia. The 

Secretary-General informed the Security Council of 

a visit he received on November 25 from Lawrence 

Eagleburger, Acting U.S. Secretary of State, who indicated that, should the Security Council decide to authorize member states to ensure the delivery of relief 

supplies, the United States would be ready to take the 

lead in organizing and commanding the multinational 

operation. The Secretary-General stressed that such an 

operation should be precisely defined and limited in 

duration, “in order to prepare the way for a return to 

peacekeeping and post-conflict peace-building.”33

The Security Council selected Option Four. On December 3, it adopted Resolution 794 (Appendix J), authorizing the use of “all necessary means to establish 

as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia.” It was the first time 

the Security Council elected to intervene in the internal 

affairs of a country without a request from the country’s 

central government, which was unavoidable because 

Somalia did not have a legitimate central government. 

Acting under Chapter VII (peace enforcement) of the 

U.N. Charter, the Security Council authorized the Secretary-General and the participating member states to 

arrange for “the unified command and control” of deploying military forces. It called on all member states 

that were in a position to do so to provide military 

forces and make cash or in-kind contributions. The 

Security Council requested that the Secretary-General 

establish a fund through which donors could channel 
29

contributions to participating states or the U.N. operation as a whole.34

Resolution 794 authorized the United States to intervene in Somalia with a U.S. commander leading a 

multinational effort under U.N. auspices. In return, 

the U.S. government conceded a supervisory role to 

the UN. Both the U.S. government and the U.N. anticipated that a U.N. peacekeeping force would relieve 

the U.S.-led force as soon as practicable.

In a televised address to the nation on December 

4, President Bush announced to the American people 

that U.S. ground forces would enter Somalia, under 

the auspices of U.N. Security Council Resolution 794, 

to conduct Operation RESTORE HOPE. In this address, he clearly stressed the limited mission of U.S. 

ground forces:

First, we will create a secure environment in the hardest hit parts of Somalia, so that food can move from 

ships over land to the people in the countryside now 

devastated by starvation.

Second, once we have created that secure environment, we will withdraw our troops, handing the security mission back to a regular U.N. peacekeeping 

force. Our mission has a limited objective: To open the 

supply routes, to get the food moving, and to prepare 

the way for a U.N. peacekeeping force to keep it moving. This operation is not open-ended. We will not stay 

one day longer than is absolutely necessary.

Let me be very clear: Our mission is humanitarian, 

but we will not tolerate armed gangs ripping off their 

own people, condemning them to death by starvation. 

General Hoar and his troops have the authority to take 

whatever military action is necessary to safeguard the 

lives of our troops and the lives of Somalia’s people. 

The outlaw elements in Somalia must understand this 
30

is serious business. We will accomplish our mission. 

We have no intent to remain in Somalia with fighting 

forces, but we are determined to do it right, to secure 

an environment that will allow food to get to the starving people of Somalia.

To the people of Somalia I promise this: We do not 

plan to dictate political outcomes. We respect your 

sovereignty and independence. Based on my conversations with other coalition leaders, I can state with 

confidence: We come to your country for one reason 

only, to enable the starving to be fed.35

That same day, President Bush authorized USCINCCENT to take whatever military action was 

necessary to safeguard American and Somali lives, 

enabling the joint force commander to issue permissive rules of engagement focused on force protection.36

At the urging of General Powell, President Bush recalled Ambassador Robert Oakley, formerly U.S. Ambassador in Somalia from 1983-1984, from retirement 

and appointed him U.S. Special Envoy to Somalia. 

President Bush also sent a letter to Secretary-General 

Boutros-Ghali, emphasizing the U.S.-led peace enforcement operation should have a limited, specific 

mission: Create conditions that would allow the feeding of 

starving Somalis and make possible the transfer of security 

functions to a follow-on U.N. peacekeeping force. By December 7, 12 member states had offered 13,650 troops 

for the U.S.-led peace enforcement mission, and five 

others had offered 5,653 personnel for UNOSOM 

peacekeeping duties.37
31

Planning and Preparation

The Joint Staff, USCENTCOM, and Joint Task Force 

(JTF) Somalia used standard crisis action procedures 

to plan the operation. Because of close collaboration 

among the three staffs and other supporting organizations, planning was concurrent, rapid, and effective. 

The key players knew and trusted each other because 

of their shared experience during Operations DESERT 

SHIELD and DESERT STORM. The preexisting working relationships among many commanders and staff 

officers contributed to the efficiency of the planning 

effort.

Mission Statement

General Powell’s warning order to General Hoar 

on December 1, 1992, included this mission statement:

When directed by the [President or Secretary of Defense], USCINCCENT will conduct military operations in Somalia to secure the major food distribution 

points and air/seaports, guard relief convoys and 

relief organization operations, and assist relief organizations in providing humanitarian relief in Somalia 

under U.N. auspices.38

On December 2, General Powell issued a planning 

order that assigned USCINCCENT an additional mission: “disarm, as necessary, forces which interfere 

with humanitarian relief operations.” The subsequent 

execute order contained the same language. However, 

when General Hoar protested strongly, General Powell deleted this additional mission on December 6.

Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali protested the deletion of the additional mission. In a letter dated De-
32

cember 8, he told President Bush the purpose of the 

intervention should be to “create a secure environment throughout Somalia.”39 The Secretary-General 

believed it was essential to neutralize the factions’ 

heavy weapons. Despite this protest, President Bush 

assigned USCENTCOM a more limited mission. He 

restricted efforts to disarm the factions and focused on 

neutralizing weaponry that interfered with relief operations. He refused to deploy U.S. troops into northern Somalia to challenge the secession of the former 

British Somaliland, where no relief effort was necessary.40

U.S. Joint Task Force Organization

On November 27, 1992, General Hoar designated 

the I Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), based at 

Camp Pendleton, California, as the headquarters and 

nucleus for JTF Somalia. The I MEF commander, Lieutenant General Robert B. Johnston (USMC) became the 

JTF commander. As General Hoar later wrote: “Designating a component or element headquarters as the 

foundation of the mission . . . allowed an established 

service staff to transition quickly to a [JTF staff] with 

little need for start-up time.”41

General Johnston’s first decision was whether to 

organize the new JTF by service or functional component. He saw no need for a Joint Force Air Component 

Commander to integrate the service air assets committed to the operation, or a Joint Force Land Component 

Commander to integrate Marine Corps and Army 

ground forces, so he organized the JTF by service component.
33

JTF Somalia Task Organization 1992-1993

The I MEF staff had experience exercising command and control over Marine air-ground task forces, 

but it was not large or diverse enough to function effectively as a JTF staff. All four services augmented 

the I MEF staff with their best people, and these individuals quickly integrated into the new JTF, with 

Marines comprising 57 percent of the expanded staff.

The subordinate elements of I MEF contributed 

heavily to the JTF task organization (Appendix K). 

With General Johnston serving as JTF Commander, 

Major General Charles E. Wilhelm (USMC) took command of Marine Forces (MARFOR) Somalia. General 

Wilhelm’s augmented 1st Marine Division headquarters became the headquarters of an integrated Marine 

air-ground task force with elements of the 1st Marine 

Division; 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing; 1st Surveillance, 

Reconnaissance, and Intelligence Group; and 1st Force 

Service Support Group (FSSG).

The nucleus for Army Forces (ARFOR) Somalia 

was the 10th Mountain Division, a light infantry division based at Fort Drum, New York. Its Commanding 

JTF 

SOMALIA

ARFOR NAVFOR

(10th Mtn Div)

JTF Support Command

(13th Spt Comd)

JSOFOR

AFFOR

(437th Wing)

JPOTF

MARFOR

(I MEF)
34

General, Major General Steven L. Arnold (USA), knew 

General Johnston well, having served with him as Operations Officer of the Third U.S. Army during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. General 

Arnold commanded the 10th Mountain Division during the disaster relief mission in southern Florida after 

Hurricane Andrew struck in August 1992.

The Ranger Carrier Battle Group and the Tripoli 

ARG, with the 15th MEU embarked, became the nucleus of Naval Forces (NAVFOR) Somalia. These task 

groups were already operating in the USCENTCOM 

area of responsibility. The three ships of Maritime 

Prepositioning Squadron (MPS) 2, based at the British island of Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, joined 

NAVFOR, as did the naval forces of coalition partners. 

The first NAVFOR commander was Rear Admiral William J. Hancock (USN), but command changed hands 

five times during the operation.

Brigadier General Thomas R. Mikolajcik (USAF) 

commanded Air Force Forces (AFFOR) Somalia.42 With 

only 500 Air Force personnel deployed in theater, AFFOR was responsible for the inter- and intra-theater 

air movement and delivery of supplies, equipment, 

and troops.

General Johnston made three exceptions to the 

service component structure of the JTF. The original 

plan was to sustain the JTF initially using the assets 

of the 1st FSSG and MPS 2, with ARFOR assuming 

responsibility for JTF logistics about D+50.43 Recognizing that expeditionary logistics in a remote and 

austere operational area would be a critical challenge, 

General Johnston established a functional JTF Support 

Command reporting directly to the JTF headquarters, 

even though the JTF Support Command was composed entirely of Army units. The 13th Corps Support 
35

Command, based at Fort Hood, Texas, commanded 

by Brigadier General Billy K. Solomon (USA), provided the JTF Support Command headquarters. His 

major subordinate units were the 593rd Area Support 

Group, 62nd Medical Group, and 7th Transportation 

Group, with their subordinate units coming from the 

United States and Europe.

The second functional component of the JTF was 

Joint Special Operations Force (JSOFOR) Somalia, 

commanded by Colonel Thomas D. Smith (USA), 

the Director of Operations (J-3) of Special Operations 

Command, Central Command (SOCCENT). SOCCENT already had Army Special Forces and Air Force 

Special Operations Forces combat air traffic controllers in Somalia. Their mission was to support Operation PROVIDE RELIEF by controlling air traffic at the 

austere airfields that would receive relief supplies. 

Reprising their primary role in Operations DESERT 

SHIELD and DESERT STORM, SOCCENT organized 

eight six-man coalition support teams to coordinate 

close air support, medical evacuation, and other operational support matters for the coalition forces from 

Pakistan, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Belgium, France, 

Botswana, Canada, and Italy.

The third functional component of the JTF was the 

Joint Psychological Operations Task Force (JPOTF) 

Somalia. Lieutenant Colonel Charles Borchini (USA) 

commanded this component.44

Concept of Operations

USCENTCOM issued its operation order on December 5, 1991, four days before the anticipated DDay on December 9. The mission statement was to:
36

Conduct joint/combined military operations in Somalia to secure the major air and seaports, key installations and food distribution points, to provide open 

and free passage of relief supplies, provide security 

for convoys and relief organization operations, and 

to assist in providing humanitarian relief under U.N. 

auspices.45

The USCENTCOM staff defined the desired end 

state for the operation as “the creation of an environment where U.N. and relief organizations can assume 

responsibility for security and relief operations.”46

USCENTCOM understood the need to establish precise measures for determining when JTF Somalia had 

established a secure environment and accomplished 

its mission. However, determining which measures of 

effectiveness to use remained a problem for much of 

the operation.

Anticipating clan and faction resistance, USCENTCOM prepared a concept of operations with four 

slow-paced phases:

• Phase I, D-Day (December 9) through D+24: 

Embarked Marines would secure the port and 

airfield at Mogadishu. Follow-on Marine and 

Army elements would occupy Baidoa and Bale 

Dogle airfields northwest of Mogadishu.

• Phase II, D+24 through D+90: An Army brigade would secure the lodgment area around 

Baidoa, and occupy relief centers at Belet 

Weyne, Oddur and Gialalassi.

• Phase III, D+90 through D+180: Follow-on coalition forces would secure the port and airfield 

at Kismayo, the land route between Baidoa and 

Bardera, and Bardera itself.

• Phase IV, D+180 through D+240: The JTF 

would transfer responsibility to a U.N. peacekeeping force.
37

Because of the close cooperation between the USCENTCOM and JTF staffs, the JTF was able to issue its 

operation order on December 6, one day after issuance 

of the USCENTCOM order. The JTF Somalia mission 

statement was essentially identical to the USCENTCOM mission statement. The JTF commander’s intent 

was as follows:

JTF Somalia will focus on securing the lines of communication used for the ground movement of relief 

supplies by U.N. and [NGO] agencies to distribution 

sites. JTF Somalia will not be primarily involved in 

transporting supplies, but will assist relief organizations by securing their operating bases as well as the 

ground transportation routes to relief distribution 

sites.47

The JTF Operation Order had four phases:

• Phase I: Establish a base of operations and logistics in Mogadishu to gain control over the 

flow of humanitarian relief supplies through 

the city and enable the movement of U.N. forces throughout the JTF area of operations (AO). 

Amphibious forces would secure the seaport 

and airport, and establish a lodgment area for 

follow-on forces.

• Phase II: Expand the operation to the major 

interior relief distribution sites at Gialalassi, 

Bardera, Belet Weyne, Oddur, and elsewhere 

as required; and establish sufficient security to 

enable unimpeded relief operations.

• Phase III: Expand the operation to additional 

seaports and airports, including Kismayo.

• Phase IV: Transition from a U.S.-led to a U.N.-

controlled effort with a gradual relief in place 

of JTF forces.
38

Humanitarian Relief Sectors

The JTF plan divided the area of operations into 

eight humanitarian relief sectors (HRS), each centered 

on a major city serving as a distribution center: Mogadishu, Bale Dogle, Baidoa, Bardera, Kismayo, Oddur, 

Gialalassi, and Belet Weyne (see Map 3). The JTF established the HRS boundaries by simple grid coordinates, without regard to the clan or tribal affiliation 

of the local inhabitants or the former administrative 

districts of Somalia (see Map 1). During the operation, 

the JTF added a ninth HRS centered on Merka.

Rules ofEngagement

In an operational 

area devoid of the 

rule of law, the 

JTF developed 

permissive rules 

of engagement 

(ROE) focused on 

force protection. 

All JTF members 

had the right to 

protect themselves 

not only against 

a hostile act, but 

also against the 

perceived threat 

of such an act. JTF 

members did not 

have to wait to be 

fired upon before 

taking action; a Map 3 UNITAF Areas of Operation

(Source: Mroczkowski, pg. 28)
39

weapon aimed in a threatening manner was sufficient 

cause. The JTF considered all technical vehicles and 

crew-served weapons as threats, regardless of intent.48

The JTF printed and distributed ROE pocket cards, 

and conducted classes to ensure all JTF members understood their rights and responsibilities under the 

ROE. During the operation, UNITAF troops were 

highly disciplined in the face of Somali provocations, 

and incidents of overreaction were rare.
40

Deployment and Intervention

Phase I – Establishing the Lodgment Area

The Tripoli ARG and its embarked 15th MEU departed Singapore on November 23, 1992, and arrived 

off the southern Somali coast on December 3. At 0500 

hours on December 9, a Marine-SEAL task unit went 

ashore to secure the Mogadishu port facility before 

the main landing at 0540 hours. The MEU used the 

landing as a dramatic show of force to minimize opposition. The Marines’ strength and speed of execution 

were evident as they moved beyond their initial objectives and into the city without any Somali opposition. 

The Marines secured the abandoned U.S. Embassy 

compound, which would serve as the JTF headquarters. The airport was open at 1145 hours and the first 

C-130 aircraft landed soon after, followed by a C-141 

aircraft carrying members of the JTF headquarters to 

establish the JTF (Forward) command post. The first 

coalition contingent, a company of the French 2nd 

Foreign Legion Parachute Regiment, arrived by air 

from its base in Djibouti.

According to Marine historian Colonel Dennis 

Mroczkowski, Mogadishu was in ruins when the Marines seized control of the city:

There was no electricity, no running water, or no functioning sanitation system. Law enforcement was nonexistent because there were no police or judicial system. Public buildings had been looted and destroyed 

and most private homes were severely damaged; 

virtually every structure was missing its roof and had 

broken walls, doors, and windows. The commerce of 

the city was at a standstill. Schools were closed and 

gangs of youths roamed the streets. Crowded refugee 
41

camps seemingly filled every parcel of open land, and 

new graves were encountered everywhere. Gunfire 

could be heard throughout the city.49

The JTF focused on force and logistical build-up 

for the next week. The first maritime prepositioning 

ship entered the port of Mogadishu on D-Day and 

began offloading directly onto the pier, expediting its 

delivery of much-needed engineering equipment and 

construction materials to rebuild the port facilities. 

General Johnston flew into Mogadishu on December 

10. General Wilhelm and MARFOR headquarters arrived in Mogadishu by air on December 11 and initially took operational control of all U.S. and coalition 

land forces on the ground.

Coalition military contingents also began arriving in Mogadishu. Forces from France, Belgium, Italy, 

Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Australia arrived 

throughout December 1992.50 The creation of a cohesive multinational force was challenging. USCENTCOM screened potential coalition partners to ensure 

their forces were operationally capable, mobile, and 

willing to adhere to U.S. operational control and rules 

of engagement. However, it had no authority to reject 

a military contribution from a U.N. member state. USCENTCOM built the multinational force around large 

and capable military contingents from France, Italy, 

Belgium, Canada, Australia, and Turkey. In total, 23 

member states contributed military forces to the operation (Appendix K).51

Bale Dogle: On December 13, General Wilhelm 

began to expand the UNITAF lodgment area into the 

interior (see Map 4). The 2nd Battalion, 9th Marines, 

conducted a heliborne assault to secure Bale Dogle

airfield, 98 kilometers northwest of Mogadishu. Later 
42

that day, the lead elements of the 2nd Brigade, 10th 

Mountain Division, flew directly into Bale Dogle, 

followed by the Canadian Airborne Regiment Battle 

Group on December 14. On December 15, the 2nd Brigade assumed responsibility for the Bale Dogle HS.

Baidoa: On December 16, Task Force Hope, comprising elements of the 15th MEU and French forces, 

secured the Baidoa airport, another important distribution center 126 kilometers northwest of Bale Dogle 

in the interior. Thereafter, the 1st Marine Division assumed responsibility for the Baidoa HRS. By DecemMap 4 Road Distances Between Towns in Somalia

(Source: Mroczkowski, pg. 42)
43

ber 16 (D+7), the JTF had secured the first three HRS 

and completed Phase I of the operation 17 days ahead 

of schedule.

Unified Task Force (UNITAF)

The U.S.-led coalition force adopted the designation of UNITAF. While the U.S. Government expected 

General Johnston would command all U.N. forces in 

Somalia, the U.N. decided that UNITAF would not 

exercise operational control over UNOSOM I. Consequently, General Johnston exercised only coordinating authority over UNOSOM I, which remained in 

Mogadishu, monitoring the ceasefire and planning 

for the transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II. This 

diversion from the principle of unity of command 

contributed to different approaches to transition planning, with disastrous consequences after the changeover from UNITAF to UNOSOM II.

Phase II – Securing the Major Relief 

Distribution Centers

The Bale Dogle and Baidoa operations established 

the tactical approach for Phase II: UNITAF used a 

series of joint and combined operations to secure the 

major relief distribution centers in central and southern Somalia, using the coalition forces that had volunteered to assume responsibility for the respective 

HRS whenever possible. U.S. forces were under the 

tactical control of coalition commanders for the initial operation and then withdrew after the coalition 

unit assumed responsibility for the HRS. Ambassador Oakley, the U.S. Special Envoy, played a key role 

during this phase. Before the start of each operation, 
44

he travelled to the city and met with tribal elders and 

leaders to explain in detail what was about to happen, 

assure them of the peaceful intentions and humanitarian purpose of the operation, and warn them not 

to oppose the UNITAF forces. The next day, aircraft 

would drop leaflets to repeat this message directly 

to the local population. The approach worked; there 

was no opposition to any of these UNITAF operations. 

UNITAF relied heavily on psychological operations to 

explain its actions to the local Somali leaders and population, and the overwhelming strength and speed of 

coalition forces presented the warlords with an unacceptable risk if they provoked UNITAF.

Kismayo: The next objective was Kismayo, Somalia’s second largest seaport, located 329 kilometers 

southwest of Mogadishu. Two warring factions—Colonel Jess’s SPF and General Morgan’s SNF—vied for 

control of the city. On December 17, the two warlords 

agreed to declare Kismayo an open city. Jess would remain in the city, and Morgan would move his forces 30 

kilometers to the north. On December 20, elements of 

the 15th MEU and the Belgian 1st Parachute Battalion 

made an unopposed amphibious landing at Kismayo. 

With the arrival of additional Belgian forces, the Marines were withdrawn the next day and the Belgians 

assumed responsibility for the Kismayo HRS.

Bardera: On December 22, a mechanized task force 

of the 7th Marines departed Mogadishu on a road 

movement to Bardera, 217 kilometers southwest of 

Baidoa. The task force secured Bardera and assumed 

responsibility for the Bardera HRS on December 24.

Oddur: On December 24, a combined French-U.S. 

task force began its road movement to secure Oddur, 

110 kilometers north of Baidoa, close to the Ethiopian 

border, arriving on December 25. Over the next few 
45

days, the remaining French forces in Somalia moved 

to Oddur, secured the surrounding towns, and assumed responsibility for the Oddur HRS. On December 29, Major General Rene de l’Home, the French 

commander, requested a boundary change to include 

the town of Tiyegloo in the Oddur HRS.52

Gialalassi: On December 27, the Italian Folgore 

Airborne Brigade began its road movement from 

Mogadishu to Gialalassi, 115 kilometers to the north 

of Mogadishu. The Italians secured the airfield by 

1800 hours and assumed responsibility for the Gialalassi HRS the next day.

Belet Weyne: On December 28, a U.S.-Canadian 

task force conducted a heliborne assault to secure the 

Belet Weyne airfield, 320 kilometers north of Mogadishu, near the Ethiopian border. Additional forces flew 

in to reinforce the assault elements, and by December 

30, the Canadians assumed sole responsibility for the 

Belet Weyne HRS, the last of the eight original HRS.

Merka: UNITAF added a ninth HRS around the 

port city of Merka, 70 kilometers southwest of Mogadishu.53 A corrupt Somali major had conspired with 

local bandits to prevent the delivery of relief supplies 

to NGOs operating in the city for six months. On 

December 28, a combined U.S.-Italian task force conducted a ground and heliborne assault to secure the 

airfield and seaport. The 2nd Brigade, 10th Mountain 

Division, assumed responsibility for the Merka HRS, 

which was adjacent to its Bale Dogle HRS.

The successful completion of the Belet Weyne operation on December 30 (D+21) marked the end of 

Phase II, 69 days ahead of schedule. Coalition forces 

had established nine HRS and secured the major 

distribution points. A network of nine major supply 

routes connected the sectors and distribution points, 
46

thereby permitting the unimpeded delivery and distribution of relief supplies. Engineering efforts were 

underway to improve the supply routes and remove 

thousands of land mines endangering coalition forces 

and the local population.

President Bush visited UNITAF over the New 

Year’s holiday. He arrived in Mogadishu on December 31, visiting units in the city and aboard ships in 

the harbor. On January 1, he visited units in Baidoa 

and Bale Dogle.

Two factors contributed to the rapid UNITAF success during Phase II. First, the Somali factions did 

not oppose UNITAF security operations. The overwhelming strength and speed of coalition forces, and 

the relatively unrestrictive rules of engagement, presented the warlords with an unacceptable risk if they 

provoked UNITAF. Nevertheless, there were sporadic 

violent incidents. On December 23, a UNITAF vehicle 

struck a Soviet land mine near Bardera, and Lawrence 

Friedman, a U.S. government civilian employee and 

retired U.S. Army Special Forces sergeant major, became the first UNITAF member killed in the performance of duty.

Second, UNITAF relied heavily on psychological 

operations to explain its actions to the local Somali 

leaders and population. The visits by Ambassador 

Oakley; the effective use of radio broadcasts, leaflet 

drops, and publication of a Somali-language newspaper; and the restraint exercised by coalition forces 

persuaded the Somali people of the peaceful and humanitarian purpose of the UNITAF presence in their 

country.
47

Phase III – Stabilizing the Area of Operations

Once UNITAF established the nine HRS and ensured the unimpeded delivery and distribution of relief supplies, it began to expand its operations beyond 

the major distribution centers to stabilize the entire 

area of operations. General Johnston and Ambassador Oakley “recognized very early that this was a 

very, very complex environment.”54 Military success 

was necessary but insufficient to achieve U.S. and 

U.N. political objectives. It bears noting, as Prussian 

soldier-philosopher Carl von Clausewitz wrote in On 

War, “the political object is the goal . . . and [military] 

means can never be considered in isolation from their 

purpose.”55

Ultimately, General Johnson and Ambassador 

Oakley decided that the strategic aim, or desired end 

state, was the end of organized political violence by 

the warring factions, and the suppression of criminal violence by armed bandit groups. Based on this 

aim, the UNITAF staff developed a set of measures 

of performance and effectiveness (“indicators”) in five 

categories: resistance to UNITAF operations, humanitarian relief, infrastructure, populace, and transition 

actions. Each sector commander reported weekly on 

these indicators, so the UNITAF leadership could assess progress toward achieving the strategic aim of 

the operatio.
48

UNITAF Task Organization Phase III

Political-Military Operations

As the Marine Corps noted in Fleet Marine Force 

Manual 1-1, Campaigning (1990): “The more limited 

the aims of conflict, the less predominantly military 

is the conduct of the war, and the more difficult it is 

to translate [strategic] aims into military conditions.” 56

Stabilization depended on political engagement to establish 

conditions for a peaceful solution to the civil war, but successful political dialogue with the warring faction leaders 

depended on UNITAF military power to make the faction 

leaders turn to non-military measures to protect and advance their interests.

JTF SOMALIA

AFFOR NAVFOR

(437th Wing)

ARFOR

(10th Mtn Div)

JTF Spt Comd

(13th Spt Comd)

JSOFOR JPOTF

MARFOR

(I MEF)

Australia

Belgium

Canada

France

India

Italy

Pakistan

Turkey

New Zealand

Germany

United Kingdom

Belgium

Canada

Morocco

Australia

France

Greece

Italy

Sweden

Pakistan

Turkey

Zimbabwe

Botswana

Kuwait

Saudi Arabia

Egypt

Nigeria

United Arab Emirates
49

Ambassador Oakley played a key role in the integration of political and military activities. He recognized the necessity to assist the military leadership 

with political issues. He and General Johnston supported each other seamlessly and presented a united 

front to the Somali factions. The two leaders established a coordinating committee that met at least daily 

“to tie the diplomatic-political considerations with 

our military power.”57 It was a cooperative effort with 

neither side dictating to the other, and it enabled the 

coalition leadership to speak with one voice and present a clear message to the faction leaders. As a unified team, General Johnston and Ambassador Oakley 

addressed three major political issues: disarmament, 

reconciliation, and internal security.

Disarmament

The U.S. government was convinced the Somali 

factions would fight rather than disarm under U.N. 

coercion. President Bush specifically excluded disarmament as a specified task for UNITAF because it 

was infeasible and unnecessary to the limited UNITAF mission of providing a secure environment for 

the humanitarian relief operations. The sheer volume 

of small arms made their confiscation impossible, and 

there were legitimate needs for the Somali people to 

have weapons to protect themselves. There were local militias in many towns and villages that protected 

their communities against armed banditry. The NGOs 

hired local security forces to protect their operations. 

Disarming the Somali people, even if feasible, would 

increase the burden on UNITAF to provide internal 

security beyond its resources to do so. Nevertheless, 

General Johnston had to do something to reduce the 
50

number of weapons in the UNITAF area of operations 

to mitigate the threat to coalition forces.

On December 8, 1992, Acting Secretary of State 

Lawrence Eagleburger instructed General Johnston 

to make the following points during his first meeting 

with the Somali warlords:

• UNITAF would not permit weapons in “exclusion areas,” which initially included the Mogadishu seaports and airports and the American 

Embassy compound.

• UNITAF would permit heavy weapons only in 

“cantonment areas,” meaning small and clearly 

defined areas where personnel and equipment 

were encamped.58

On December 11, based on these instructions, General Johnston and Ambassador Oakley implemented a 

weapons control program in their area of operations. 

The first priority was to remove the technical vehicles 

from Mogadishu, where they posed a serious threat 

to coalition forces and the Somali people. At their 

first meeting with Interim President Mahdi and General Aidid on December 11, the two warlords agreed 

to move their technical vehicles and heavy weapons 

voluntarily to cantonment areas (“authorized storage sites”) outside the city, where UNITAF personnel 

would monitor them (Appendix L). UNITAF used this 

initial agreement to obtain similar arrangements in the 

other HRS. Colonel Jess and General Morgan in the 

Kismayo HRS were the last to comply, after Task Force 

Kismayo confiscated several non-compliant technical 

vehicles. On January 8, UNITAF implemented a program of weapons registration and banned the open 

carrying of unregistered (“unauthorized”) weapons 

to protect coalition and Somali lives. Coalition forc-
51

es enforced this ban by confiscating unauthorized 

weapons.

Reconciliation

Reconciliation depended on the willingness of the 

faction leaders to accept the reduction of their power 

and agree to a political settlement of the civil war. 

General Johnston and Ambassador Oakley began the 

reconciliation process during their initial meeting with 

Aidid and Mahdi on December 11. On December 28, 

the two warlords agreed to abolish the “Green Line” 

that divided Mogadishu into factional areas. Subsequently, Ambassador Oakley established and chaired 

a political committee that brought the faction leaders 

together to discuss and resolve their issues and concerns peacefully. Brigadier General Anthony C. Zinni, 

the UNITAF Director for Operations (J-3), established 

and chaired a security committee that brought together the leaders of the faction militias to discuss and 

resolve security issues and address other concerns, 

such as ceasefire violations and weapons control. By 

bringing the faction leaders together to resolve their 

differences peacefully, these two committees moved 

the two factions incrementally toward defusing the 

violent power struggle among the clans.

The Secretary-General convened an informal meeting in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on January 4-15, 1993, to 

prepare for a national reconciliation conference under 

U.N. auspices. A total of 14 Somali political factions 

participated in the meeting, along with the Secretaries-General of LAS, OAU, and OIC; the Chairman of 

the Standing Committee of the Countries of the Horn; 

and representatives of the Chairman of the Movement 

of Non-Aligned Countries. The parties concluded and 

signed three formal agreements:59
52

• The General Agreement of January 8, 1993 (Appendix M), in which the parties agreed to:

• A conference on national reconciliation in 

Addis Ababa on March 15, 1993;

• An immediate and binding ceasefire in all 

parts of the country under the control of the 

concerned warring factions;

• Immediate cessation of all hostile propaganda against each other;

• Full and unrestrained cooperation with the 

international relief effort;

• Facilitation of the free movement of the Somali people throughout the entire country.

• An Agreement on Implementing the Ceasefire 

and on Modalities of Disarmament (Appendix 

M), including the voluntary encampment, disarmament, and demobilization of the factions 

under the auspices of a U.N. ceasefire-monitoring group.

• An agreement on the establishment of an ad 

hoc committee to help resolve the criteria for 

participation at, and the agenda for, the conference on national reconciliation on March 15, 

1993.

The voluntary encampment of faction forces outside Somali cities and towns created a challenging 

new mission for the U.N. Besides UNITAF, the only 

U.N. military presence in Somalia was UNOSOM I 

and its 500-member Pakistani security unit. UNITAF 

agreed to assist with the new mission within its area 

of operations, but monitoring the ceasefire and assisting outside its area of operations were beyond its assigned mission. The U.N. had to act quickly to take 

advantage of the window of opportunity opened at 
53

the Addis Abba meeting, but “getting the U.N. to act 

with resolution and dispatch was an issue that would confront the UNITAF staff” for the rest of its time in Somalia.

60

The U.N. held the conference on national reconciliation at Addis Abba on March 15-27. All Somali factions participated except the SNM, which controlled 

the secessionist Republic of Somaliland in northwest 

Somalia. The representatives unanimously adopted 

the Addis Abba Agreement of the First Session of 

the Conference on National Reconciliation in Somalia (Appendix N). In the agreement, all factions (except the SNM) committed to ending the civil war and 

peacefully reconciling their differences in a two-year 

transition period leading to a new central government 

in March 1995. The factions also pledged to a “complete and simultaneous disarmament” throughout 

the country within 90 days and asked UNITAF and 

UNOSOM I to assist in the disarmament process by 

accepting their weapons.

Internal Security

Before the civil war, Somalia had a 40,000-member 

national police force that the Somali people respected 

and trusted because it did not align with any clan. The 

national police force evaporated during the civil war, 

but the arrival of UNITAF provided the opportunity 

to reestablish it. On January 14, the faction members 

of General Zinni’s security committee told him they 

wanted to assume responsibility for their own security. General Johnston and Ambassador Oakley wanted 

to help because a national police force would reduce 

the UNITAF security burden, weaken the power of 

the most intransigent faction leaders, and facilitate the 

transition to the follow-on U.N. peacekeeping mission. 
54

However, helping to reestablish a Somali national police force was beyond the UNITAF peace enforcement 

mandate and was inconsistent with U.S. law, which 

generally prohibits U.S. military forces from training, 

advising, or supporting foreign law enforcement forces.61 At the time, U.S. law also prohibited U.S. military 

forces from providing foreign military assistance to 

Somalia. 62 To avoid violating U.S. law, General Johnston and Ambassador Oakley decided to establish 

an “auxiliary security force,” which included former 

Somali police officers that were locally vetted. 63 The 

U.N. provided most of the funds. The U.N. World 

Food Programme paid the force with food. The Italian, 

Australian, and French contingents, unconstrained by 

their national laws, helped with training. By January 

30, a 3,000-member auxiliary security force was operating from 14 stations around Mogadishu to provide 

much-needed security to the Somali people.64

Civil-Military Operations

Based on the recent experience with the Kurdish relief efforts during Operation PROVIDE COMFORT in 

northern Iraq, the UNITAF senior leaders understood 

the importance of establishing good relationships with 

the NGOs conducting relief operations in Somalia. 

UNITAF established a civil-military operations center in Mogadishu and placed civil-military operations 

teams in each HRS. These UNITAF elements worked 

closely with the humanitarian operations center established by the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, 

U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), 

to plan, support, and monitor the delivery and distribution of relief supplies. Colonel Kevin M. Kennedy 

was dual-hatted as Director of the Civil-Military Op-
55

erations Center and Military Deputy Director of the 

Humanitarian Operations Center, to foster unity of 

effort and facilitate the provision of military support, 

such as convoy escort, security of facilities, and spaceavailable use of military flights.65

Psychological Operations

The JPOTF mission was to present a benevolent 

image of the U.S./U.N. humanitarian presence, capable and willing to use force to protect the relief effort. General Johnston also tasked the JPOTF to assure 

all factions of JTF impartiality in the conduct of the 

relief operations, and its neutrality in the civil war, to 

dissuade the factions from impeding the relief operations. The JPOTF used face-to-face communications, 

radio and loudspeaker broadcasts, leaflets, posters, 

coloring books, and other printed products to disseminate its messages to the local populace.66

Stabilization in the Sectors

UNITAF sector commanders were also achieving success in their HRS. Every HRS used a system 

of checkpoints and patrols to create a secure environment for the unimpeded delivery and distribution 

of humanitarian relief supplies. Every HRS security 

force implemented the UNITAF weapons control 

policy, used civil-military operations teams to coordinate the needs of NGOs, established a local auxiliary 

security force, cleared mines, and established councils 

or committees that placed responsibility for local governance and security back in the hands of local elders 

and leaders. However, the conditions in each HRS 

were unique. Recognizing this fact. General Johnston 
56

gave broad mission guidance to the sector commanders and trusted them to adapt to local conditions.

Mogadishu: By the end of December 1992, the 

2,000-member MARFOR Task Force Mogadishu implemented its plan to collect information on the city, 

the local population, and armed groups; establish a 

presence with foot patrols and checkpoints to reduce 

violence and reassure the local populace of UNITAF’s 

benign intent; and conduct raids against the city’s 

arms markets and caches. The increased MARFOR 

presence drove weapons off the streets and made the 

city safer. However, sporadic and random shooting 

incidents continued in Mogadishu.67 On the night of 

January 12, 1993, Somali small arms fire killed Private 

First Class Domingo Arroyo, a field wireman with the 

11th Marines, when his security patrol was ambushed 

near the airport. He was the first uniformed member 

of UNITAF to die in Somalia.

Task Force Mogadishu implemented an operation 

from December 28, 1992, to January 6, 1993, to clear 

the city’s main roads of all types of rubbish and the 

debris of war. The operation allowed MARFOR to 

move rapidly throughout the city, but it also allowed 

the local population to reopen roadside markets and 

resume local economic activity.

On January 6, members of General Aidid’s faction 

at two authorized weapons storage sites fired on a 

UNITAF convoy traveling through Mogadishu. A U.S. 

Marine task force surrounded the two storage sites. 

The next morning, the Marines attacked to seize the 

sites and confiscate all the weapons and equipment 

located in them, including four tanks, nine howitzers, 

and 13 armored personnel carriers.

On February 22, 1993, the SNF forces of General 

Morgan attacked the SPM forces of Colonel Jess in a 
57

fight for control of Kismayo. Morgan was an ally of 

Interim President Mahdi, while Jess was an ally of 

General Aidid (see below). The next day, Aidid disregarded UNITAF actions against Morgan, used his 

own propaganda services to spread the story that 

UNITAF cooperated with General Morgan in the attack on Colonel Jess, and called upon his followers to 

attack UNITAF forces in Mogadishu. That evening, 

thousands of Somalis took to the streets, demonstrating, setting up roadblocks, and starting fires. The civil 

disturbances continued until February 25, when Marines sealed off and swept the area. Quiet returned, 

but the Marines learned a valuable lesson: Cayenne 

pepper spray in aerosol cans is more effective than 

tear gas. The Marines issued protective visors that attached to helmets, and fabricated “cow-catchers” for 

their vehicles to allow them to move through crowds 

and barricades with minimal harm to demonstrators.

Bale Dogle; On January 12, 1993, the Moroccan 

contingent began to relieve the 10th Mountain Division from responsibility for the Bale Dogle HRS, completing the relief on March 1. The primary mission 

was to provide security to the air base, which served 

as a major aerial port for the operation. The Moroccans patrolled the sector and escorted convoys in their 

light tactical vehicles. The King of Morocco expanded 

his country’s mission to include establishing a large 

hospital that saw 400-500 people daily, and providing an engineering specialist to help purify water in 

the sector. The Bale Dogle HRS soon became one of 

the quietest sectors in the UNITAF area of operations, 

with few reported incidents.

Baidoa: When MARFOR occupied Baido, armed 

bandits plagued the town, not warring factions. These 

bandits openly carried weapons in the city. The Ma-
58

rines patrolled aggressively, conducted raids, and 

told the local leaders they would seize any weapon 

openly carried on the streets, any crew-served weapon, and any technical vehicle with a gun mount. The 

power of the bandits declined, and the local elders 

reasserted their authority within the first few days of 

the Marines’ arrival. With help from a Marine civilmilitary operations team and local NGOs, the elders 

established a security council with representatives of 

all major groups and clans. With a rudimentary local 

governance mechanism in place, conditions in Baidoa 

began to improve. By early January, people were back 

on the streets, the markets were open, and the local 

buses were running.

On January 16, responsibility for the Baidoa HRS 

transferred from MARFOR to ARFOR, with the Marines at Baidoa temporarily under the operational control of the 10th Mountain Division. The next day, the 

lead elements of the Australian contingent flew into 

Baidoa. On January 19, the Australians assumed responsibility for the sector. The Australians launched 

an aggressive four-month anti-banditry campaign, 

confiscating and destroying almost 1,000 weapons, 

while being engaged only four times and sustaining 

no casualties.

Bardera: The Somali civil war had ravaged the town 

of Bardera. General Abdi Dahir Warsame led the local 

clan faction, the United Somali Party. The townspeople felt no obligation to help displaced refugees from 

the outlying areas, with whom they did not share any 

family or clan relations. Some 300 refugees died each 

day from starvation, disease, and the depredations of 

armed bandits. With the arrival of the Marines and the 

unimpeded distribution of relief supplies, that number soon dropped to less than 30 a day. As in Baidoa, 
59

the Marines helped the local elders to establish a security council and restore local governance. By February 

7, Bardera had an auxiliary security force. The influence of armed bandits declined, and Bardera became 

a quiet sector for the next four months.

Oddur: Most of the population of Oddur came 

from the Rahanweyne clan, but the sub-clans fought 

among themselves. As in Bardera, the townspeople 

felt no obligation to help displaced refugees who were 

not related to them, especially those belonging to the 

rival Ogaden clan from near the Ethiopian border. The 

French contingent, many of whom had served in Djibouti and understood the importance of Somali clan 

affiliation, employed the “oil spot” tactic the French 

had developed during the colonial wars in Indochina, 

Madagascar, and Morocco from 1890 to 1925.68 The 

French broke down the sector into three sub-sectors 

centered on Oddur, Wajid, and Tiyegloo. A battalion 

occupied each sub-sector. Within the sub-sectors, ten 

company-sized forces occupied towns or hamlets, and 

ten platoons occupied other locations. The French operated from these 20 strongpoints to establish their 

presence throughout the sector. A heliborne QRF 

at Oddur was ready to intervene if any strongpoint 

needed reinforcement. This tactic allowed the French 

to establish security in the sector, while controlling 

the flow of refugees and bandits across the ill-defined 

frontier between Somalia and Ethiopia.

Gialalassi: Because of Italy’s colonial past in Somalia, Italian participation in UNITAF concerned General Johnston. He did not know how the Somalis would 

react to the presence of Italian troops, or whether the 

warlords would use their participation for propaganda purposes. General Johnston gradually moved 

the Italian contingent into Mogadishu, where the Ital-
60

ians reclaimed and secured their embassy compound. 

He then moved Italian forces into the countryside, 

while assessing the Somali reaction to their presence. 

After the successful Merka and Gialalassi operations 

during Phase II, General Johnston extended the Gialalassi HRS to include the area in northeast Mogadishu 

where the Italian embassy compound was located, in 

an area controlled by Mahdi’s forces. Most of the other 

UNITAF forces in Mogadishu occupied positions in 

the southwest of the city, in areas controlled by Aidid’s forces. This gradual approach calmed any Somali 

concerns regarding Italian neocolonialism or UNITAF 

favoritism toward one faction or the other.

The Italians occupied their sector of Mogadishu and 

the towns of Balcad, Jawhar, and Gialalassi. A battalion-size task force occupied each strongpoint, with the 

Italian headquarters centrally located in Balcad. Task 

Force Alpha in Mogadishu had the highest number of 

incidents as the forces of Aidid and Mahdi continued 

to clash in Mogadishu. MARFOR and the Italians coordinated their operations in the city, exchanged liaison, 

and established the U.S.-Italian Task Force Columbus 

to conduct combined patrols. The main threat to the 

other Italian strongpoints came from armed bandits.

Merka: A battalion task force from the 2nd Brigade, 10th Mountain Division, occupied the Merka 

HRS. Armed banditry was a problem in and around 

the town of Afgooye, which was astride a major supply route in the adjacent Bale Dogle HRS. On January 

31, the 2nd Brigade began a large cordon and search 

operation at Afgooye to suppress banditry, and then 

left behind the 98th Military Police Company to maintain order. On March 1, when the Moroccans assumed 

responsibility for the Bale Dagle HRS, General Johnston transferred Afgooye to the Merka HRS under 

ARFOR control.
61

Belet Weyne: The Canadians divided their HRS 

into four sub-sectors and quickly began aggressive patrolling throughout the sector. Most of the sector was 

quiet by the end of January, but the political situation 

to the north and east caused concern. A USC faction 

loyal to General Aidid had a strong presence in the 

sector and in the adjoining area outside the UNITAF 

area of operations. Another USC faction in the sector 

declared itself independent of both Aidid and Mahdi. 

Strong SNF, SSDF, and SNM forces also operated in 

and beyond the sector, near the frontier with Ethiopia. 

The Canadians acted as a buffer separating the factions and prevented incidents along the international 

frontier by establishing personal relationships with local Somali and Ethiopian leaders.

Kismayo: ARFOR established Task Force Kismayo 

to assume responsibility for the Kismayo HRS. The 

10th Mountain Division Artillery provided the task 

force headquarters, which controlled the Belgian 1st 

Parachute Battalion; U.S. 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry; 

and other division assets. Brigadier General W. Lawson Magruder III (USA), the Assistant Division Commander, commanded the task force.

After Mogadishu, the Kismayo HRS had the greatest number of incidents. The major ARFOR challenge 

was to keep the warring SNF and SPM factions separated. On December 29, General Magruder met with 

Colonel Jess, local elders and leaders, and former police officers to establish an interim security council for 

the sector. The council established an auxiliary security force that conducted patrolling and manned checkpoints with coalition forces. On January 1, the council 

issued a “no weapons” policy that banned the open 

carrying of unauthorized weapons and the transport 

of crew-served weapons within the city limits.
62

On January 15, the factions agreed to a ceasefire 

requiring all factional forces to remain in place. Less 

than one week later, General Morgan’s SNF forces 

began to move south from the Kenyan border to confront Colonel Jess’s forces for control of Kismayo. On 

January 23, General Magruder met personally with 

General Morgan, explained the “no weapons” policy, 

and told him that UNITAF would destroy any crewserved weapons or technical vehicles found outside 

factional cantonment areas. General Morgan told General Magruder the locations of his forces in the sector. 

General Morgan said he had already instructed his 

forces not to engage coalition forces or interfere with 

relief convoys. General Morgan agreed not to initiate 

attacks against other factions, but this agreement did 

not last 24 hours. On January 24, Morgan’s forces attacked Colonel Jess’s cantonment area at Bir Xanni, 35 

kilometers from Kismayo. After Morgan ignored two 

UNITAF warnings, General Johnston ordered General 

Magruder to stop Morgan’s advance by force. U.S. attack helicopters engaged Morgan’s forces, which returned fire and then withdrew. After this UNITAF 

strike, the factional fighting in the sector ceased. The 

sector entered a period of simmering tension that lasted a month.

On February 22, General Morgan infiltrated small 

groups into Kismayo and attacked Colonel Jess’s 

forces in a short but intense action, killing innocent 

civilians and terrorizing the entire city. General Johnston and Ambassador Oakley issued an ultimatum to 

General Morgan, directing him to withdraw from the 

lower Jubba Valley to locations north of Dhoble by 

February 25, or face a UNITAF attack against his noncompliant forces. As Morgan’s fighters withdrew, 

General Magruder ordered Colonel Jess to move his 
63

forces out of the city to the Jilib area. These actions 

were “timely, effective, and balanced,” but they 

sparked three days of civil disturbances in Mogadishu 

when General Aidid’s followers protested UNITAF 

military actions against Aidid’s southern ally, as previously addressed.69

On March 5, ARFOR relinquished responsibility 

for the Kismayo HRS to the Belgian contingent. On 

March 16, General Morgan’s forces again attacked to 

seize control of Kismayo. Jess’s followers fled, and 

UNITAF committed its 500-member QRF and 13 attack helicopters to push Morgan’s forces out of the 

city. On March 25, the Wasp ARG landed the 24th 

MEU at the port of Kismayo to reinforce the Belgians. 

By the end of March, UNITAF had restored order in 

the city and the sector.

These tactical actions had two serious consequences. First, General Aidid lost credibility with his followers because their civil disturbances were unsuccessful, 

causing him to seek an opportunity to regain his former stature.70 Second, the Kismayo actions caused the 

United States and U.N. to reevaluate the transition to 

UNOSOM II and revise the UNITAF redeployment 

schedule.

Redeployment and Rotation

Concurrent with stabilization efforts, UNITAF 

began a three-phase reduction of the U.S. presence 

as other coalition elements arrived and assumed responsibility for HRS from U.S. troops. From January 15 to February 5, MARFOR and ARFOR reduced 

their contingents to reinforced brigades, and the JTF 

Support Command assumed responsibility for logistical support of the residual forces. From February 
64

6-20, the UNITAF headquarters, AFFOR, NAVFOR, 

JOSOF, and the JTF Support Command began their 

drawdown. From February 21 to March 5, MARFOR 

and ARFOR reduced their forces to understrength brigades.

Phase IV – Transition to UNOSOM II

By the end of Phase III, the Somali people were 

ready to further the reconciliation process. Unfortunately, the U.N. was not prepared to exploit UNITAF successes, as General Zinni noted on March 19:

The key to the fourth phase is the U.N. structures to 

provide security and basic humanitarian needs. Nations of the world must provide funding and forces. 

The presence of security forces will be needed for a 

while. The factions must reconcile their differences 

and agree on how to restructure the government. The 

U.N. must help with basic services and infrastructure 

to allow them to be self-sustaining.71

Initial Transition Planning

Transition planning began on December 10, 1992 

(D+1), when the Bush NSC agreed that UNOSOM 

II would need a stronger Security Council mandate 

than the original UNOSOM authorization. The NSC 

directed the State Department to prepare a draft U.N. 

Security Council resolution, and instructed the Joint 

Staff to prepare a paper describing what UNOSOM II 

should look like. By December 23, the Joint Staff proposed a solution to facilitate a rapid transition from 

UNITAF to UNOSOM II:

• The U.N. Security Council would approve a 

new UNOSOM II mandate calling for an inter-
65

national security force of 12-15,000 personnel 

with adequate weaponry to meet hostile challenges; permissive rules of engagement, allowing the destruction of heavy weapons; and authority to help establish a Somali police force.

• The United States would urge UNITAF contributors to join UNOSOM II.

• The United States would provide 3-5,000 personnel with unique military capabilities – communications, engineers, logistics, air traffic 

control, civil affairs – to UNOSOM II.

• UNOSOM II forces would extend their operations into northern Somalia.

• With few exceptions, UNITAF and UNOSOM 

II would neutralize heavy weapons wherever 

they found them.

• UNITAF would continue to pacify southern 

and central Somalia, while UNOSOM II “developed greater confidence and operational integrity” in the north.

• Some UNITAF units would shift into UNOSOM II.

• After U.S. forces left Somalia, the United 

States would maintain a small QRF offshore 

under USCENTCOM control to respond to 

emergencies.72

On December 19, Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali 

submitted to the U.N. Security Council a report outlining his transition plan. Like the U.S. plan, it called for 

an expanded military mandate, substantially greater 

troop levels, and an incremental area-by-area transfer 

of responsibility from UNITAF to UNOSOM II. However, the plan also called for UNITAF to disarm all 

organized factions, or at least confiscate their heavy 
66

weapons; expand its area of operations into northern 

Somalia; and postpone the withdrawal of UNITAF 

until it met two conditions:

• Heavy weapons belonging to the organized 

factions are neutralized and brought under international control throughout Somalia.

• Heavy weapons belonging to “gangs” are confiscated and destroyed throughout Somalia.73

On December 30, in Geneva, Ambassador Frank 

Wisner, Under Secretary of State for International Security Affairs, and Lieutenant General Barry McCaffrey, Assistant to the CJCS, conferred with SecretaryGeneral Boutros-Ghali, pushing for a new Security 

Council resolution and transition planning. BoutrosGhali preferred to wait until President-elect Bill 

Clinton took office. Nevertheless, weekly transition 

planning meetings between the Joint Staff and U.N. 

officials began on January 6. The Joint Staff officers 

“found no comparable staff expertise at U.N. Headquarters, a weakness that would become more evident 

and more crippling as time went on. The U.N. headquarters could barely support a U.S.-led operation, much 

less a U.N. one.”74

The Change in U.S. Administrations

When President Bill Clinton took office on January 

20, 1993, UNITAF consisted of 37,000 troops (24,000 

U.S. and 13,000 coalition) in central and southern Somalia, covering about 40 percent of the country’s territory. The Bush Administration had secured offers of 

some 18,000 non-U.S. troops for UNOSOM II. President Clinton’s new NSC Deputies Committee, chaired 

by Samuel Berger, the incoming Deputy Assistant to 
67

the President for National Security Affairs, convened 

on January 25. The committee made clear that President Clinton supported all of President Bush’s policies 

“except willingness to play a major part in UNOSOM 

II.” 75 Any contribution beyond a QRF and a few logistic 

units would require a Presidential decision. Two days 

later, Frank Wisner, now designated as Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, stated in a memorandum to 

the new Secretary of Defense, Les Aspin, that the price 

of success in Somalia was an extended commitment 

to provide logistic support to UNOSOM II. He also 

suggested the new Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, persuade Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali to 

do four things: support a new Security Council mandate for UNOSOM II under Article VII (peace enforcement), name a UNOSOM II commander, increase and 

improve the U.N. military support staff, and begin 

organizing a Somali police force under UNITAF and 

then UNOSOM II.76

On January 27, General Hoar submitted to General 

Powell the USCENTCOM plan for withdrawing U.S. 

forces from Somalia:

• Phase I: Reduce U.S. forces to 15,500 troops 

ashore and 4,500 afloat, with MARFOR and ARFOR reduced to one reinforced brigade each.

• Phase II: Reduce U.S. forces to 12,000 troops 

ashore and 4,000 afloat, with MARFOR and 

ARFOR reduced to one understrength brigade 

each. Transfer responsibility of the nine HRS 

sector-by-sector from UNITAF to UNOSOM II.

• Phase III: Reduce U.S. forces to 6,500 troops 

ashore and 4,000 afloat, with only a QRF and 

limited logistic support units in Somalia.

• Phase IV: Reduce U.S. forces to 1,400 troops 

ashore and 4,500 afloat, with only logistic support units ashore and the QRF afloat.
68

The new NSC Principals Committee convened on 

January 28. It recommended the United States commit 

up to 4,000 support troops to UNOSOM II, about the 

same number the Joint Staff proposed in December. 

On January 29, General Johnston reported the UNITAF 

mission in southern and central Somalia complete, 

and he recommended a transition to UNOSOM II. The 

DoD wanted a rapid transition for budgetary reasons, 

because Operation RESTORE HOPE was funded out 

of the Services’ operations and maintenance accounts. 

The DoD estimated that a three-month operation with 

4,000 U.S. support troops would cost $560 million, and 

the new Secretary of Defense, Les Aspin, submitted a 

zero-sum reprogramming request to Congress.77

The Clinton Administration officials were evidently unaware of the questionable ability or willingness 

of the U.N. to lead an operation the size of UNOSOM 

II. On January 31, General Johnston expressed doubt 

that U.N. officials were truly committed to establishing UNOSOM II, and Ambassador Oakley warned 

that an “underlying culture of passivity and the bureaucratic manner in which all UNOSOM activities 

are conducted” boded ill for the future.78

President Clinton ordered an interdepartmental 

review of U.S. policy, with focus on what could be 

done to prevent Somalia from “sliding back into anarchy and famine.”79 By late February, the National 

Intelligence Council reported that the creation of a 

stable society could take years and would require extensive external intervention. The new PCC for Africa 

reviewed all the responses to President Clinton’s order, agreed that, “while the prospects for a new Somali 

political order appeared limited at best, a “bottom up” 

approach emphasizing local and regional governance 

had the best chance of succeeding,” and that a strong 

U.S. ground presence was critical to success.80
69

President Clinton was unwilling to extend the UNITAF mandate, but he was committed to the success of UNOSOM II. The Clinton Administration was “not fully 

confident that the objectives in Resolution 814 were realistic and within the capabilities of the U.N,” but the 

Administration believed that “a relatively benign environment would continue to exist, creating a chance 

for success.”81 On May 19, 1993, President Clinton issued Presidential Decision Directive 6. The classified directive did not articulate a strategic goal, what political outcome the President sought, or a strategy to achieve the goal. 

Perhaps the President believed U.N. Security Council 

Resolution 814 provided sufficient strategic guidance, 

given that the United States was planning to play only 

a supporting role in UNOSOM II. However, President 

Clinton did approve:

• Participation of 4,000 U.S. support troops under the operational control of UNOSOM II, the 

number reducing to 1,400 by January 1994.

• Retention in Somalia of a QRF in support of UNOSOM II, but under the operational control of 

USCENTCOM and with the U.S. Deputy Force 

Commander of UNOSOM II exercising tactical 

control of the QRF when it was employed in an 

emergency situation. 82

• Support of U.N. programs to collect heavy 

weapons and help create a professional Somali 

police force at the regional and national levels.

83

The U.N. Transition Plan

On March 3, 1993, the Secretary-General submitted 

to the Security Council a report containing his recommendations concerning the transition from UNITAF 
70

to UNOSOM II. UNITAF had a positive impact on the 

security situation in Somalia and on the effective delivery of humanitarian assistance. The Secretary-General 

pointed out, however, that despite the improvement, 

a secure environment had not yet been established in 

Somalia and incidents of violence continued to occur. 

There was still no effective functioning government in 

the country, no organized civilian police force, and no 

disciplined national armed forces. The security threat 

to personnel of the U.N. and its agencies, UNITAF, 

ICRC and the NGOs was still high in some areas of 

Mogadishu and other places in Somalia. There was 

no deployment of UNITAF or UNOSOM troops in 

northern Somalia, or along the Kenyan-Somali border, where security continued to be a matter of grave 

concern.84

The Secretary-General concluded in his report that 

the Security Council should endow UNOSOM II with 

enforcement powers under Chapter VII of the U.N. 

Charter to enable it to establish a secure environment 

throughout Somalia. To that end, UNOSOM II, under 

the mandate recommended by the Secretary-General, 

would seek to complete the restoration of peace, stability, and law and order through disarmament and 

reconciliation. The recommended mandate would also 

empower UNOSOM II to assist the Somali people in 

rebuilding their economy and social and political life, 

re-establishing the country’s institutional structure, 

achieving national political reconciliation, recreating 

a Somali State based on democratic governance, and 

rehabilitating the country’s economy and infrastructure.85 In short, the U.N. committed itself to a “top-down” 

and open-ended nation-building effort, with disastrous consequences.
71

The Secretary-General estimated that UNOSOM II 

would need a military force of 20,000 troops to carry 

out the assigned tasks and an additional 8,000 troops 

to provide logistic support. UNOSOM II would also 

include a civilian staff of approximately 2,800 individuals. In addition, the Secretary-General reported that 

the U.S. government agreed in principle to provide a 

tactical QRF in support of UNOSOM II. He suggested 

May 1, 1993, as the date of transfer of budgetary and 

administrative control from UNITAF to UNOSOM II. 

That date later changed to May 4.86

On March 5, the Secretary-General appointed Admiral Jonathan T. Howe (USN, Retired) as his new 

Special Representative for Somalia for an initial period of three months, effective March 19. The SecretaryGeneral asked Admiral Howe to oversee the transition 

from UNITAF to UNOSOM II, in addition to “promoting political reconciliation, coordinating humanitarian 

assistance, and paving the way for rehabilitation and 

reconstruction of the country.”87

On March 26, the Security Council, acting under 

Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, adopted Resolution 

814 (Appendix O). This resolution expanded the size 

and mandate of UNOSOM II in accordance with the 

Secretary-General’s recommendations. It authorized 

an expanded UNOSOM II through October 31, 1993. 

The Security Council demanded that all Somali parties comply fully with the commitments they had 

undertaken, in particular with the Agreement on 

Implementing the Ceasefire and on Modalities of 

Disarmament signed at Addis Abba in January 1993. 

The Security Council insisted that all Somali parties 

ensure the safety of the personnel of all organizations 

engaged in humanitarian and other assistance to Somalia. The Security Council called upon all member 
72

states, in particular those neighboring Somalia, to cooperate in the implementation of the arms embargo 

established under Resolution 733 (Appendix E). In 

other provisions of the resolution, the Security Council 

requested the Secretary-General, through his Special 

Representative, and with assistance from all relevant 

U.N. entities, to “provide humanitarian and other assistance to the people of Somalia in rehabilitating their 

political institutions and economy and promoting political settlement and national reconciliation.”88

Resolution 814 made the UNOSOM II mission different from the UNITAF mission in four key respects. 

First, it was a U.N.-led operation with no member 

state serving as a lead nation.89 Second, it expanded 

the UNOSOM II area of operations to encompass the 

entire country, including the secessionist northwest. 

Third, it called for total disarmament within 90 days. 

Fourth, it envisioned “top-down” nation-building 

concurrent with military operations to disarm and 

pacify the country.

UNOSOM II presented the U.N. with many challenges it had never experienced before. Unlike the 

United States, it had no standing military forces to 

deploy to Somalia. It was completely reliant on member nations contributing forces and staff personnel. As 

Brigadier General Zinni recalled:

There was no precedent for the [U.N.] to follow as it 

embarked on this course, no example but the one it 

was about to set, and there were many unanswered 

questions about the undertaking to which the international community had committed itself. Would member governments contribute sufficient troops, including the necessary logistics elements, and place them 

under the command of the United Nations? Would 

these forces be deployed in time for a smooth transi-
73

tion from UNITAF? Would the troop-contributing 

countries follow through on an enforcement mission 

if hostile action by one or more of the factions led to 

casualties among their troops? And would member 

states be willing to pay for what would inevitably be 

an expensive operation.”90

The Actual Transition

By early March 1993, UNITAF had “accomplished 

much in terms of creating security, ending famine, 

and helping to encourage reconciliation and the reconstruction of social structures.”91 Ambassador Oakley departed Somalia on March 2. On March 8 (D+88), 

three months earlier than originally planned, the UNITAF operations staff officially began the transition to 

UNOSOM II. On March 9, Major General Thomas M. 

Montgomery (USA) arrived to become Commander, 

U.S. Forces Somalia, and Deputy Force Commander, 

UNOSOM II. On March 15, Lieutenant General Cevik 

Bir (Turkey) arrived to take command of UNOSOM 

II. That same day, UNOSOM II staff members began 

to integrate into the UNITAF operations center in a 

“twinning” process whereby counterparts worked 

next to each other until they were ready to take the 

hand-off of responsibility.92

No transition was necessary in the five HRS where 

non-U.S. UNITAF forces remained in place under UNOSOM II control. These forces comprised the Moroccans in Bale Dogle, Australians in Baidoa, French in 

Oddur, Italians in Gialalassi, and Canadians in Belet 

Weyne.

On March 5, the Belgian contingent assumed responsibility for the Kismayo HRS, and Task Force 

Kismayo began its move to Mogadishu, where it redeployed to the United States with the 10th Mountain 
74

Division main command post on March 11. General 

Arnold redeployed two days later.

By March 13, MARFOR was concentrated in the 

Mogadishu and Bardera HRS. General Wilhelm redeployed on March 23. On March 26, the Pakistani UNOSOM II force assumed responsibility for the Mogadishu HRS. On April 18, the Botswanan UNOSOM II 

force assumed responsibility for the Bardera HRS. 

On March 30, the advance party of the 1st Brigade, 

10th Mountain Division, arrived in Mogadishu to relieve the 2nd Brigade.93 The 1st Brigade assumed full 

responsibility for ARFOR operations, the UNITAF 

QRF, and the Merka HRS on April 9.On April 28, the 

1st Brigade transferred responsibility for the Merka 

HRS to the Pakistani UNOSOM II force.

While the U.S. intent was to “ensure a seamless transition and prevent a significant loss in capability” during the 

transition, delays in the arrival of UNOSOM II troops created a significant underlap.

94 Nevertheless, the U.S. withdrawal continued, “to prevent the U.N. from further 

delaying its assumption of the mission.”95 On May 4, 

1993, in a ceremony at UNITAF headquarters, General Johnston transferred responsibility for all U.N. 

military operations in Somalia to General Bir. General 

Johnston and the remaining members of his staff redeployed the same day.

On June 29, 1993, UNITAF received the Joint Meritorious Unit Award for its exceptionally meritorious 

service in Operation RESTORE HOPE (Appendix Q).

Aftermath

As General Montgomery noted in the U.S. Forces 

Somalia after action report, “the seamless transition 

from UNITAF to UNOSOM II was not entirely seam-
75

less.”96 At the time of the transfer of responsibility on 

May 4, UNOSOM II comprised about 16,000 personnel 

from 21 nations, 57 percent of its authorized strength 

of 28,000.97 The UNOSOM II staff was at 22 percent of 

its authorized strength of 300 personnel.

[The UNOSOM II staff was] formed from scratch with 

no [standard operating procedures] or organic equipment or supporting infrastructure such as computers, 

office supplies, or communications systems. The presence of NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] 

officers from Belgium, Canada, France and Italy on 

the staff facilitated the introduction of STANAG [Standard NATO Agreement] procedures and formats for 

orders and staff planning. However, there were many 

members of the staff who were unfamiliar with the 

STANAG.98

On May 6, just two days after the transfer of responsibility, General Aidid tested the capabilities and will 

of UNOSOM II. Colonel Jess, General Aidid’s southern 

ally, attempted to retake Kismayo and clashed with 

the Belgians for two days. On June 5, General Aidid’s 

forces attacked Pakistani troops in Mogadishu, killing 

24 and wounding 57. The next day, the U.N. Security 

Council adopted Resolution 837, strongly condemning the unprovoked attack and reaffirming that the 

Secretary-General was authorized to take all necessary measures against those responsible for the attack, 

including their arrest and detention for prosecution, 

trial, and punishment (Appendix P). On June 17, U.N. 

Special Envoy Jonathan Howe issued an arrest order 

for General Aidid and announced a $25 million reward for his capture. UNOSOM II forces, supported 

by U.S. troops, began operations to capture General 

Aidid and bring him to justice as a war criminal. These 
76

actions may have been appropriate, but they had unforeseen consequences. UNOSOM II became a belligerent in the Somali civil war, in direct confrontation with 

Aidid’s strong political faction and its military forces. 

Intentionally or not, the de facto objective of UNOSOM 

II shifted from peaceful political settlement to the military 

defeat of General Aidid. Many Somalis believed they 

had to defend their land against the U.N. As the Somali proverb in the background section would have 

predicted, they joined General Aidid in his resistance 

against UNOSOM II.99

After the adoption of Resolution 837, the UNOSOM 

II coalition forces began to lose their will to conduct 

the offensive actions (patrols, searches, etc.) necessary to maintain a secure environment in Mogadishu. 

General Montgomery, the UNOSOM II Deputy Force 

Commander, increasingly employed the U.S. QRF to 

perform these critical but non-emergency operations 

in the immediate vicinity of U.S. bases to protect U.S. 

forces.

In August 1993, the United States deployed Task 

Force Ranger to Mogadishu to support U.N. efforts to 

capture Aidid. At 1540 hours on October 3, the task 

force conducted a daylight raid to capture Aidid and 

some of his chief lieutenants. At 1620 hours, the Somalis shot down the first of two U.S. helicopters and surrounded the U.S. assault force. With no armored vehicles of its own, the U.S. QRF requested four Pakistani 

M-48 tanks and 28 Malaysian M-113 armored personnel carriers from the UNOSOM II QRF. Pakistani reluctance to commit its tanks to the relief effort delayed 

the operation until 2315 hours, when the U.S. QRF in 

the Malaysian vehicles began to fight its way through 

the streets of Mogadishu to rescue the assault force. 

The QRF reached the assault force at about 0230 hours, 
77

but the last assault force members did not reach safety 

until 0700 hours. In 15 hours of fighting, U.S. casualties were 18 killed and 84 wounded. Two Malaysian 

soldiers were killed. One U.S. helicopter pilot, Chief 

Warrant Officer Michael Durant, was a prisoner for 11 

days. Two members of Task Force Ranger, Master Sergeant Gary Gordon and Sergeant First Class Randall 

Shughart, received the Medal of Honor posthumously 

for their actions trying to rescue Chief Warrant Officer 

Durant during the battle. The Somalis claimed their 

casualties were 312 killed and 814 wounded.100

The cost of a favorable political outcome in Somalia suddenly became more than the Clinton Administration was 

willing to bear. Televised images of a dead American 

being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu “fueled popular revulsion against staying in Somalia.”101

The Clinton Administration faced a firestorm of criticism from Congress. On October 7, President Clinton announced his decision to withdraw U.S. forces 

from Somalia by March 31, 1994.102 The U.S. forces in 

Somalia terminated their operations against General 

Aidid, and their primary mission became to, “protect 

our troops and our bases,” with the secondary mission 

to “keep open and secure the roads, port and lines of 

communication essential for the flow of relief supplies,” until the last U.S. troops withdrew on March 

3, 1994.103 Other nations followed the U.S. lead. On 

November 4, 1994, the U.N. Security Council adopted 

Resolution 954, terminating UNOSOM II on March 31, 

1995. From January 9 to March 3, 1995, USCENTCOM 

conducted Operation UNITED SHIELD, a U.S.-led 

multinational military operation that safely evacuated 

all UNOSOM II troops from Somalia. By the time the 

U.S. Liaison Office closed on September 19, 1995, Somalia had regressed to a state of anarchy similar to 
78

1992.104 The civil war continued until August 20, 2012, 

when the Federal Government of Somalia replaced 

the interim Transitional Federal Institutions created 

from April to October 2004.

Assessment and Insights

Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations, identifies 

twelve principles of joint operations. Joint Publication 

3-07, Stability Operations, emphasizes eight of these 

principles. What follows is an assessment of Operation RESTORE HOPE in terms of the twelve principles 

of joint operations.105

Objective: Direct every military operation toward a 

clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective. The objective of a stabilization effort is to achieve and maintain a workable political settlement among the host 

nation government, competing elites, and the wider 

population. This primacy of the political purpose applies at both a local and national level. Military operations, along with the application of other instruments 

of power, are integral to the unified actions required 

to shape and drive this political settlement.

The UNITAF mission was clearly defined, limited 

in scope and duration, and attainable. General Johnston and Ambassador Oakley understood the strategic aim, set appropriate objectives, and ensured unity 

of effort in their area of operations. They recognized 

what specific conditions and circumstances would result in mission success, and those that would lead to 

mission failure. Operation RESTORE HOPE did not 

meet the long-term objectives of the U.N. SecretaryGeneral, but the United States never intended to meet 

them. The operation established the conditions for 

UNOSOM II to achieve the U.N. strategic objectives, 
79

but those objectives proved to be unattainable at a cost 

the United States and its coalition partners were willing to pay. President Clinton’s decision to discontinue 

major U.S. participation in UNOSOM II led to its failure and termination.

Offensive: Seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. Failing to act quickly to gain and maintain the initiative in 

stabilization efforts may create opportunities for enemies or adversaries to foment dissent and organize 

resistance.

UNITAF seized the initiative by rapidly deploying 

a large combat-capable force, establishing a lodgment 

area in the capital city and major port of Mogadishu, 

and then moving into the interior to secure the major 

relief distribution centers. When a Somali faction challenged UNITAF in Mogadishu or Kismayo, UNITAF 

responded rapidly and decisively.

The U.N. subsequently lost the initiative when it 

deployed fewer and less capable military forces to relieve the U.S. forces as part of UNOSOM II. Furthermore, the UNOSOM II troops did not act aggressively 

enough to deter or neutralize challenges from General 

Aidid and his allies.

Mass: Concentrate the effects of combat power at the 

decisive time and place. Mass matters in stability operations, particularly when they are conducted in a hostile environment (e.g., during a major operation or in 

counterinsurgency). Deploying a stability force that 

has the capability to satisfy the concurrent requirements to protect the population and neutralize hostile 

groups is a major planning consideration. The level of 

violence or humanitarian need may require the joint 

force to conduct a broad range of stability operations 

functions beyond providing civil security.106 Insufficient mass will often result in loss of the initiative.
80

UNITAF deployed with sufficient mass to ensure the unimpeded delivery and distribution of 

humanitarian relief supplies. The threat and use of 

overwhelming combat power demonstrated UNITAF 

resolve and commitment, deterred the militias of the 

Somali factions, suppressed armed banditry, and supported UNITAF political-military interactions with 

the warlords in ways that promoted security. 

Economy of Force: Allocate minimum essential combat 

power to secondary efforts in order to allocate the maximum possible combat power on primary efforts. Personnel 

should not presume that stability operations are “secondary” efforts, particularly during major operations 

and campaigns or even within the context of theater 

strategic planning efforts. On the contrary, joint force 

commanders should consider stability operations 

across all phases of a joint operation, applying appropriate combat power to support conflict transformation and tying joint operations to the political objectives.

Within the USCENTCOM area of responsibility, 

Somalia was a secondary effort. The United States had 

higher priority interests in Iraq, the Persian Gulf, and 

the Levant. However, the U.S.-led coalition in Somalia 

provided appropriate combat power to UNITAF. The 

military contributions of the 23 participating member 

states varied widely in capability, but General Johnston achieved economy of force by assigning his most 

capable forces to his primary efforts in Mogadishu 

and Kismayo and dispatching his less capable forces 

to secondary efforts. However, the United States did 

not allocate sufficient combat power to the U.S. QRF 

in support of UNOSOM when USCENTCOM established the QRF using lightly armed 10th Mountain 

Division troops with no armored vehicles.
81

Maneuver: Place the enemy in a position of disadvantage through the flexible application of combat power. Maneuver is the movement of forces in the operational 

area in combination with fires to achieve or retain a 

position of advantage in respect to the enemy.

UNITAF gained positional advantage over the Somali factions by occupying the major relief distribution centers and then employing checkpoints, patrols, 

and raids to restore order to the area of operations. 

These efforts helped to keep the militias off balance 

and ensure the unimpeded delivery and distribution 

of humanitarian relief supplies.

Unity of Command: Seek unity of effort in every operation. Unity of command means that all forces operate 

under a single commander with the requisite authority to direct all forces employed in pursuit of a common purpose. The risks inherent in the employment 

of the armed forces requires that the military chain 

of command remain inviolate. Additionally, unity 

of command helps ensure that offense, defense, and 

stability operations drive toward common objectives. 

Stability operations must be closely coordinated with 

appropriate interagency authorities—as well as host 

nation and other partner nation representatives; in 

many cases, the joint force commander will be supporting non-Defense USG departments/agencies and 

international partners. Coordination arrangements 

among military and civilian government agencies, 

intergovernmental organizations, NGOs, and other 

organizations will often be informal, relying largely 

on personal relationships and trust built over time. In 

some cases, de-confliction may be the only achievable 

arrangement with some actors in the environment.

In complex stability operations, unity of command 

may be difficult to attain. In Operation RESTORE 
82

HOPE, the U.S. chain of command remained intact 

because UNITAF was a U.S.-led coalition task force 

built around JTF Somalia. U.S. diplomatic and political efforts at the national level created the foundation 

on which USCENTCOM and UNITAF could operate 

effectively: The United States established the mission objectives and coalition partners followed the U.S. lead. As 

a result, the United States ensured that UNITAF had 

internal unity of command. In contrast, the U.N. violated the principle of unity of command by not giving 

General Johnston operational control of UNOSOM I, 

creating two separate multinational forces in Somalia: 

UNITAF and UNOSOM I.

General Johnston and Ambassador Oakley achieved 

unity of effort by defining their personal relationship as one 

of mutual support. They collaborated with each other 

seamlessly and integrated military, diplomatic, and 

humanitarian efforts in Somalia effectively. UNITAF 

established a civil-military operations center to coordinate its actions with the U.N. agencies and NGOs 

providing humanitarian relief in the UNITAF area 

of operations. UNITAF also established councils and 

committees of Somali elders and leaders at the national, regional, and local levels to allow Somalis to 

assume responsibility of their own governance and 

security, in close cooperation with UNITAF forces.

Security: Prevent the enemy from acquiring an unexpected advantage. In stability operations, security deals 

principally with the protection of the Joint Force, its 

partners, and potentially non-combatants in the area 

of operations. Threats may include virtually any person, element, or group hostile to U.S. and partner interests. Military commanders should be ready to counter 

activity that could bring significant harm to units or 

jeopardize mission accomplishment. They should not 
83

believe that the non-hostile and humanitarian intent 

of their mission keeps them from danger. They should 

understand that the local population and its leadership may feel threatened by the presence of a foreign 

military force, even if its intentions are good. Military 

forces must be capable of transitioning rapidly from 

humanitarian activities to combat operations, should 

the need arise. The inherent right of self-defense from 

the unit to the individual level applies to all operations.

The rapid introduction of overwhelming military 

power provided General Johnston the resources he 

needed to provide security and enable humanitarian 

efforts in the UNITAF area of operations. UNITAF established checkpoints, conducted security patrols, established auxiliary security forces, and used force, or 

the threat of force, to compel compliance with its policies, thereby instilling a sense of security in the Somali 

people. UNITAF minimized violent actions against its 

forces through a combination of show of force operations, military presence operations, permissive rules 

of engagement, an effective psychological operations 

program, and adroit political-diplomatic engagement 

with the faction leaders. When attacked, the UNITAF 

response balanced strength and restraint.

Surprise: Strike at a time or place or in a manner for 

which the enemy is unprepared. Surprise creates a psychological advantage by shocking and paralyzing adversaries. Surprise can help the commander shift the 

balance of combat power and achieve success well out 

of proportion to the effort expended.

In peace operations, surprise may fuel the fears and 

suspicions of the local population and the warring parties. 

Transparency reduces these fears and suspicions, builds 

trust and confidence, and contributes to the legitimacy and 
84

credibility of the stabilization force. General Johnston and 

Ambassador Oakley told the warring factions and the 

local populations in advance what actions UNITAF 

was going to take, when and where it was going to 

act, and why it was taking action. The overwhelming 

combat power of UNITAF allowed its leadership to 

forego surprise to advance the strategic purpose of 

the operation. There were obvious exceptions to this 

general policy. For example, UNITAF withheld information on the time and location of raids on suspected 

weapon caches. These tactical exceptions occurred 

within the framework of an overall UNITAF policy of 

transparency.

Simplicity: Increase the probability that plans and operations will be executed as intended by preparing clear, 

uncomplicated plans and concise orders. Simplicity contributes to successful operations. Simple plans and 

clear, concise orders minimize misunderstanding and 

confusion. The benefits of simplicity extend to task organization and command relationships. When other 

factors are equal, the simplest plan is preferable. Simplicity in plans allows better understanding and execution planning at all echelons. Simplicity and clarity of expression greatly facilitate mission execution 

in the stress, fatigue, fog of war, and complexity of 

modern combat, and are especially critical to success 

in multinational operations.

Stability operations are inherently complex. Nevertheless, UNITAF issued clear and concise orders, and employed sequential operations in Phase I and II to make 

them as uncomplicated as possible. General Johnston 

recognized that the UNITAF staff could not centralize the planning and execution of the operation, so 

he wisely established nine HRS, issued mission-type 

orders, and delegated to the sector commanders the 
85

authority to adapt their operations and activities to 

the unique circumstances of each HRS.

Restraint: Apply appropriate military capability prudently. During stability operations, defending and 

protecting the population is paramount. A foundation 

of civil security is often a necessary precondition to 

achieve a political settlement of a conflict. The necessity of enabling local security, coupled with the need to 

protect the force and its partners, may require the conduct of offensive and defensive operations alongside 

stability operations. However, the use of force may 

antagonize the population, possibly damaging the legitimacy of the friendly forces campaign. Restraint requires the careful and disciplined balancing of protecting the 

people and infrastructure, conducting military operations, 

and achieving the overarching objectives of the operation. A 

single act can cause significant military and political 

consequences. Therefore, the use of force must be lawful and measured. A joint force best achieves restraint 

when all military personnel understand the political 

objectives and the potential impact of inappropriate 

actions. Commanders must develop rules of engagement that are sensitive to political concerns, consistent 

always with the right and obligation of self-defense.

UNITAF troops demonstrated excellent discipline in the face of Somali provocations. The rules of 

engagement were permissive, but instances involving the excessive use of force by UNITAF personnel 

were isolated and rare. The UNITAF weapons control 

policy balanced force protection with the legitimate 

security needs of the Somali people. When UNITAF 

did apply force against a Somali militia, the action was 

measured and appropriate to the situation.

Perseverance: Prepare for the measured, protracted application of military capability in support of strategic aims. 
86

The stabilization of fragile states is, fundamentally, a 

protracted effort. The long-term focus of transformational stability activities and efforts to foster sustainability require a conviction among the local population that external support for their government will be 

sufficient and enduring. Perceptions of a half-hearted 

or transitory engagement by the part of the United 

States and partner nations will undermine the effort. 

Alternatively, there is the danger of creating a sense 

of permanence, amounting to dependency, and leading to a perception of the external forces as occupiers. 

With the need for this delicate balance in mind, military forces should conduct initial response activities 

to fill immediate gaps in assistance and enable civilian 

control of stabilization efforts. This may facilitate the 

early withdrawal of military forces, while preserving 

the long-term viability of international stabilization 

efforts. However, military forces should not cease 

their stabilization activities before other host nation 

institutions, particularly security forces, are prepared 

to assume responsibility.

Peace enforcement operations may require years to 

achieve national reconciliation and a political settlement. 

The underlying causes of a civil war rarely have a 

clear beginning or a decisive resolution. The patient, 

resolute, and persistent pursuit of strategic objectives, 

for as long as necessary to achieve them, is often the 

requirement for success.

The UNITAF mission was limited in scope and 

short in duration. From the U.N. perspective, it was 

the initial phase of an extended campaign to save 

Somalia from civil war. However, the United States 

decided not to participate in the long-term, openended U.N. campaign, which proved to be beyond 

the capacity of the U.N. without major participation 
87

by U.S. combat forces. The withdrawal of U.S. combat 

forces from Somalia emboldened the faction leaders, 

especially General Aidid. The premature transition of 

responsibility from UNITAF to UNOSOM II, before 

the latter was prepared to assume its responsibilities, 

aggravated this problem.

Legitimacy: Sustain the legitimacy of the operation and 

of the host government. The credibility of the host nation 

government and its ability to generate consent is crucial. The population’s attitude toward U.S. or multinational forces may be a significant element in this but, 

ultimately, is of secondary importance. The sentiment 

towards the U.S. forces conducting stability operations will encompass a spectrum of attitudes and vary 

from active opposition, through grudging tolerance, 

to active support. The actions of the United States and 

its partner nations must convince the majority of the 

population and wider audiences, including adversaries, that the host nation government will prevail and 

that the belligerent parties can reach an acceptable political settlement.

Legitimacy is the willing acceptance by the people of the 

right of the government to govern or of a group or agency 

to make and carry out decisions. In the case of Operation 

RESTORE HOPE, there was no host nation central 

government. Security Council Resolution 794 authorized UNITAF and provided international legitimacy 

to its presence and operations in Somalia. UNITAF 

“broadened and extended its claim to legitimacy by 

its conduct.”107 Its restraint and neutrality in the Somali civil war were major factors in sustaining its legitimacy with the Somali people and the international 

community.
88

Peace Enforcement Operations

Peace enforcement operations, where there is limited or no consent of the warring parties to end hostilities, rely on the threat or use of force to compel the 

parties to stop fighting and pursue a peaceful settlement of their differences. Therefore, peace enforcement operations require well-trained, disciplined, and 

combat-capable military forces with effective command and control, a refined decision-making process, 

and adequate sustainment.108 UNITAF was successful 

because it threatened the warring factions with the 

use of overwhelming force if they did not comply with 

U.N. Security Council resolutions. With notable exceptions, UNITAF deterred the warlords from openly 

fighting each other. In contrast to the U.S.-led UNITAF, the UNOSOM II did not have the capability to 

plan, coordinate, organize, or conduct peace enforcement operations. The warlords waited for UNITAF to 

leave, tested UNOSOM II, and proved it incapable of 

enforcing the peace imposed by UNITAF. The U.N. 

has no standing military forces to respond rapidly 

and decisively to a threat to international peace and 

security under Article VII of the U.N. Charter. The 

U.N. has no equivalent of the U.S. Joint Staff or a U.S. 

combatant command. The U.N. should entrust peace 

enforcement operations to a lead nation at the head of 

a coalition of willing and able nations, or to a regional 

organization with effective military forces, and provide them the legitimacy of a U.N. Security Council 

resolution.
89

Political-Diplomatic-Military Cooperation

In an interview with Marine historian Colonel Dennis Mroczkowski, General Johnston noted. “I suppose 

if there is a blueprint for how the diplomatic and political side should work with the military on an operation like this, [Operation RESTORE HOPE] was it.”109

President Bush and his NSC provided clear, unambiguous, and realistic strategic guidance and policy to 

military forces in the field. Generals Powell and Hoar 

provided sage military advice to the President and his 

cabinet secretaries and other NSC officials, who were 

wise enough to incorporate that advice into national 

security policy and strategy. General Johnston and 

Ambassador Oakley established a high standard for 

collaboration to achieve unified action at the operational level. The new and inexperienced Clinton Administration changed President Bush’s foreign policy 

and regional strategy for Somalia based on a more 

optimistic assessment of the U.N. capability to conduct peace enforcement operations. President Clinton 

minimized U.S. participation in the follow-on UNOSOM II. Unwilling to pay the human and financial 

costs associated with achieving an enduring political 

outcome in Somalia, he withdrew entirely after the 

battle of Mogadishu, leading to U.N. failure and the 

resumption of civil war.

Transitional Governance versus Nation-Building

Nation building was not a UNITAF mission, and it 

proved to be an unrealistic assignment for UNOSOM 

II. In any situation characterized by civil war and the destruction of civil institutions and infrastructures, military 

forces will have to address the governance and reconstruc-
90

tion challenges in their area of operations. In Somalia, 

UNITAF used a “bottom up” approach by encouraging and enabling local Somali elders and leaders to 

take responsibility for their own governance and security. Although U.S. law prohibits U.S. forces from 

training foreign police forces without a Presidential 

directive or Congressional authorization, UNITAF 

helped establish local auxiliary security forces composed of former Somali police officers. In Operation 

RESTORE HOPE, this “bottom up” approach was 

effective in reconstituting local civil institutions and 

infrastructures. The U.N. “top down” approach focused more on creating a central government and 

national civil institutions before the warring parties 

were ready to accept national reconciliation and a political settlement. Both the “top down” and “bottom 

up” approaches can draw the Joint Force into the internal affairs of a country, creating the potential for 

unnecessary friction with the civil population and its 

leaders. In Somalia, the “bottom up” approach moved 

at the pace of the host nation populace, who perceived 

the “top down” approach to be an external imposition 

linked to external goals, not an effort focused on the 

readiness of the Somalis to move forward toward a 

long-term solution.

“Mission Creep”

The UNITAF mission was clearly defined, limited 

in scope and duration, and attainable. The Bush Administration considered the broader strategic objectives of the U.N., and steadfastly refused to disarm the 

factions forcibly, take sides in the civil war, extend operations into northern Somalia, or rebuild the country. 

In retrospect, the Somali civil war might have ended 
91

years sooner if the United States had agreed to an extension of the UNITAF mandate and greater support 

for U.N. efforts to achieve Somali national reconciliation and a political settlement, while continuing the 

“bottom up” approach to establishing security and 

restoring Somali civil society. However, the Clinton 

Administration did not commit to an open-ended nation-building mission in Somalia. Instead, the United 

States withdrew its ground combat troops (except for 

a QRF) and provided limited military support to UNOSOM II, to which the U.N. Security Council assigned 

a predictably unrealistic mission with inadequate resources to accomplish it. UNOSOM II was unprepared 

to force the Somali factions to disarm, or to take sides 

and fight in the civil war. General Aidid, no longer 

deterred by U.S. ground combat power, attacked the 

Pakistanis who relieved the U.S. Marines in Mogadishu. This attack forced UNOSOM II to take sides in 

the civil war, fatally undermining its neutral status. 

When the United States withdrew its support for U.N. 

operations against General Aidid, UNOSOM II failed.

The Political Impact of U.N. Failure

The political impact of the U.N. failure in Somalia 

was significant. It was a major factor in President Clinton’s decision not to intervene in the genocidal Rwandan civil war. The failure influenced his decision to 

intervene in Haiti with a U.S.-led coalition under U.N. 

auspices. The failure also shaped his eventual decision 

to intervene in Bosnia and Kosovo with a NATO-led 

coalition. Allies and adversaries alike, including al 

Qaeda, perceived the U.N. failure in Somalia as a failure of U.S. will and resolve. 
92

Conclusion

Every military operation is unique. Nevertheless, 

Operation RESTORE HOPE deserves study as an example of how to conduct a complex joint, interagency, 

intergovernmental, and multinational stability operation to achieve limited objectives. The operation 

embodied the current principles of joint operations 

even before the Joint Force codified them. UNITAF 

demonstrated how the introduction of overwhelming combat power, and its measured use, could dramatically change the conditions in a failed or failing 

state. The operation set a high standard for politicaldiplomatic-military-humanitarian cooperation and 

unity of effort. A study of the operation suggests that 

a “bottom up” approach to restoring civil institutions 

and infrastructures may be more effective in the short 

term and an excellent complement to a “top down” 

approach focused on restoring a central government. 

The operation highlighted the inability of the U.N. to 

lead a peace enforcement operation without a capable 

lead nation.

In this era of persistent armed conflict and protracted stability challenges, national security professionals can learn many important lessons by studying 

Operation RESTORE HOPE in detail. As a starting 

point for learning from this operation, below is a list 

of best practices derived from this study,
93

Operation RESTORE HOPE

Best Practices for Peace Enforcement

Strategic Guidance

• Conduct peace enforcement operations under 

U.N. auspices, but with a multinational and 

combat-capable coalition force led by the United States or another lead nation.

• Negotiate with the U.N. or regional security 

organization to reach agreement on a mission 

statement and strategic approach that is feasible, suitable, acceptable, and measurable.

• Clearly state the mission, define the political 

objectives, and identify limitations on the joint 

force commander’s freedom of action.

• Authorize the joint force commander to take 

whatever military actions are necessary to accomplish the mission and establish the military 

conditions necessary to begin the process of 

national reconciliation and achieve a peaceful 

political settlement of the differences among 

the warring factions.

• Provide the joint force commander sufficient 

authorities and resources to accomplish the 

mission, including the authority to organize, 

train, and equip local police and other security 

forces.

• Appoint a special envoy of ambassadorial rank 

to be the counterpart of the joint force commander, orchestrate U.S. government efforts in 

the area of operations, and assist the military 

leadership with political and diplomatic issues.

• Explain the military intervention to the American people and the international community, 

and keep them informed as the operation progresses.
94

Planning and Preparation

• Establish the joint force around the nucleus of 

a combat-capable standing service headquarters (i.e., Army corps or Marine expeditionary 

force).

• Augment the joint force headquarters with the 

best available personnel.

• Understand the human aspects of the operational environment, the root causes of the 

armed conflict, and the strategic objectives of 

the warring factions.

• Plan concurrently and make use of warning orders to reduce the time required to deploy.

• Establish permissive rules of engagement.

• Develop measures of performance and effectiveness for assessment of the operation.

Operational Employment

• Intervene rapidly and with overwhelming combat power to intimidate warring factions into 

compliance with the U.N. or regional security 

organization mandate.

• Engage faction leaders at all levels and develop 

joint proclamations to ensure the indigenous 

population and other actors understand that 

the parties agree on a shared approach to deescalate the conflict and promote stability.

• Take necessary actions (establishing outposts, 

conducting security patrols, implementing 

population and resource control measures, 

conducting searches and seizures, physically 

separating warring factions, etc.) to establish a 

secure environment and protect coalition and 

indigenous lives.
95

• Issue broad mission guidance to subordinate 

area commanders and trust them to adapt to 

the unique operational environment in their 

areas of operations.

• Use force only when necessary, and measure its 

use to compel compliance, without appearing 

to take sides in the armed conflict.

• Integrate information operations into all actions in the physical domains.

• Restore and foster local governance as soon as 

possible after the initial operations to reestablish order and create a secure environment.

• Reconstitute local police and security forces to 

return responsibility for law enforcement to the 

indigenous population as soon as possible.

• Establish a joint force civil-military operations 

center and place civil affairs teams with all subordinate area commanders.

Transition

• Plan for a deliberate and event-driven transfer 

of responsibility for the area of operations to 

another legitimate and competent authority.

• Stagger the departure of units and staff members to preserve situational awareness and the 

continuity of operations.

• Do not transfer responsibility until the new authority is fully capable of performing the mission.
96

Appendix A: Glossary of Terms 

and Abbreviations

Terms

Coordinating authority – A commander or individual 

who has the authority to require consultation between 

the specific functions or activities involving forces of 

two or more Services, joint force components, or forces 

of the same Service or agencies, but does not have the 

authority to compel agreement. (JP 1-02)

Operational control – The authority to perform those 

functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, 

assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. (JP 1-02)

Peacebuilding – (1) Stability actions, predominately 

diplomatic and economic, that strengthen and rebuild 

governmental infrastructure and institutions in order 

to avoid a relapse into conflict. (JP 1-02)

Peace enforcement – (1) Application of military force, 

or the threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore 

peace and order. (JP 1-02)

Peacekeeping – (1) Military operations undertaken 

with the consent of all major parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an 

agreement (ceasefire, truce, or other such agreement) 
97

and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term 

political settlement. (JP 1-02)

Peacemaking – (1) The process of diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, or other forms of peaceful settlements that arranges an end to a dispute and resolves 

issues that led to it. (JP 1-02)

Permissive environment – Operational environment 

in which host country military and law enforcement 

agencies have control as well as the intent and capability to assist operations that a unit intends to conduct. 

(JP 1-02)

Tactical control – The authority over forces that is 

limited to the detailed direction and control of movements or maneuvers within the operational area necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. (JP 

1-02)
98

Abbreviations

AFFOR Air Force Forces

ARFOR Army Forces

ARG Amphibious Ready Group

CIA Central Intelligence Agency

CJCS Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff

DoD Department of Defense

FSSG Force Service Support Group

HRS Humanitarian Relief Sector

ICRC International Committee 

of the Red Cross

JPME Joint Professional Military 

Education

JPOTF Joint Psychological Operations 

 Task Force

JSOFOR Joint Special Operations Forces

JTF Joint Task Force

LAS League of Arab States

MARFOR Marine Forces

MEF Marine Expeditionary Force

MEU Marine Expeditionary Unit

MPS Maritime Prepositioning 

Squadron

NATO North Atlantic Treaty 

Organization

NAVFOR Naval Forces

NEO non-combatant evacuation 

 operation

NGO non-governmental organization

NSC National Security Council

OAU Organization of African Unity
99

OIC Organization of the Islamic 

Conference

PCC Policy Coordination Committee

PKSOI U.S. Army Peacekeeping and 

Stability Operations Institute

QRF Quick Reaction Force

ROE Rules of Engagement

SAMO Somali Africans Muki 

Organization

SDA Somali Democratic Alliance

SDM Somali Democratic Movement

SEAL Sea-Air-Land (Naval Special 

Operations Unit)

SNA Somali National Alliance

SNDU Somali National Democratic

Union

SNF Somali National Front

SNM Somali National Movement

SNU Somali National Union

SOCCENT Special Operations Command, 

Central Command

SOF Special Operations Forces

SPM Somali Patriotic Movement

SSDF Somali Salvation Democratic 

 Front

SSNM Southern Somali National 

Movement

STANAG Standard North Atlantic Treaty 

Organization Agreement

SWCS U.S. Army John F. Kennedy 

Special Warfare Center 

and School

U.N. United Nations

UNITAF Unified Task Force
100

UNOSOM United Nations Operation in 

Somalia

U.S. United States

USA U.S. Army

USAF U.S. Air Force

USAID U.S. Agency for International 

Development

USC United Somali Congress

USF United Somali Front

USMC U.S. Marine Corps

USMCR U.S. Marine Corps Reserve

USN U.S. Navy

USP United Somali Party

USCENTCOM U.S. Central Command

USCINCCENT Commander-in-Chief, 

U.S. Central Command
101

Appendix B: References

Books

Allard, Colonel Kenneth. Somalia Operations: Lessons 

Learned. Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1995.

Clarke, Walter and Jeffrey Herbst. Learning from Somalia: The Lessons of Armed Humanitarian Intervention. 

Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002.

Clausewitz, Carl von, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. On War. Princeton, 

New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984.

DiPrizio, Robert C. Armed Interventions: U.S. Interventions from Northern Iraq to Kosovo. Boulder, Colorado: 

Westview Press, 1997.

Hirsch, John L., and Robert B. Oakley. Somalia and 

Operation Restore Hope: Reflections on Peacemaking and 

Peacekeeping. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace 

Press, 1995.

Mroczkowski, Colonel Dennis P. (USMC (Retired)). 

Restoring Hope: In Somalia with the Unified Task Force, 

1992 - 1993: U. S. Marines in Humanitarian Operations.

Washington, D.C.: History Division, U.S. Marine 

Corps, 2005.

Poole Walter S. The Effort to Save Somalia, August 1992 

- March 1994. Washington, D.C.: Joint History Office, 

Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2012.
102

Prados, John. Keepers of the Keys, A History of the National Security Council from Truman to Bush. New York: 

William Morrell and Company, 1991.

Articles

Antal, Major John F. (USA), and Captain Robert L. 

Dunaway (USA), “Peacemaking in Somalia: A Background Brief,” Marine Corps Gazette, Vol. 77, No. 2 

(February 1993), 38-43.

Barth, Major Fritz J. (USMCR), “A System of Contradiction,” Marine Corps Gazette, Vol. 82, No. 4 (April 

1998), 26-29.

Bartlett, Tom, “Guns of Many Nations: The Disarming 

of Somalia,” Leatherneck, Vol. 76, No. 4 (April 1993), 

12-15.

Cooling, Major Norman L. (USMC), “Operation Restore Hope in Somalia: A Tactical Action Turned Strategic Defeat,” Marine Corps Gazette, Vol. 85, No. 9 (September 2001), 92-106.

Crocker, Chester A., “The Lessons of Somalia: Not Everything Went Wrong,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 74, No. 3 

(May/June 1995), 2-8.

Hoffman, Lieutenant Colonel Frank G. (USMCR (Retired)), “One Decade Later -- Debacle in Somalia,” U.S. 

Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 130, No. 1 (January 

2004), 66-71.

Hooker, Richard D., Jr., “Hard Day’s Night: A Retrospective on the American Intervention in Somalia,” 

Joint Force Quarterly, Issue 54 (Third Quarter 2009), 

128-135.
103

Murphy, John R., “Memories of Somalia,” Marine 

Corps Gazette, Vol. 82, No. 4 (April 1998), 20-25.

Oakley, Ambassador Robert B., “An Envoy’s Perspective,” Joint Force Quarterly, Issue 2 (Autumn 1993), 44-

55.

Siegel, Adam B., “Mogadishu One: The NEO Prelude, 

Eastern Exit Set Stage for Restore Hope,” Seapower, 

Vol. 36, No. 3 (March 1993), 24-26.

Other References

Baumann, Robert F., and Lawrence A. Yates, with 

Versalle F. Washington, “My Clan Against the World” 

in U.S. and Coalition Forces in Somalia 1992-1994, Fort 

Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute Press, 

2004.

Bryden, Matt, Somalia Redux? Assessing the New Somali 

Federal Government, Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, August 2013.

Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook, 

https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/theworld-factbook/geos/so.html, accessed on November 11, 2015.

Dworken, Jonathan T., Operation Restore Hope: Preparing and Planning the Transition to U.N. Operations (CRM 

93-148), Alexandria, Virginia: Center for Naval Analyses, March 1994.

Jareb, Anthony M., Logistics in Operation Restore Hope 

(U) (CRM 93-126) (SECRET), Alexandria, Virginia: 

Center for Naval Analyses, January 1994.
104

Joint Staff, Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, September 9, 1993.

Joint Staff, Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations, August 11, 2011.

Joint Staff, Joint Publication 3-07, Stability Operations, 

September 29, 2011.

Joint Staff, Joint Publication 3-16, Multinational Operations, 16 July 2013.

Lofland, Valerie J., “Somalia: U.S. Intervention and 

Operation Restore Hope,” http://www.au.af.mil/

au/awc/awcgate/navy/pmi/somalia1.pdf, accessed 

on October 26, 2015.

McGrady, Katherine A.W., The Joint Task Force in Operation Restore Hope (CRM 93-114), Alexandria, Virginia: 

Center for Naval Analyses, March 1994.

Oliver, Colonel George F. (USA), “The Other Side of 

Peacekeeping: Peace Enforcement and Who Should 

Do It?” in International Peacekeeping: The Yearbook of 

International Peace Operations, Volume 8 (Netherlands: 

Koninklyke, 2002), 99-117.

Porch, Douglas, “Bugeaud, Galliéni, Lyautey: The Development of French Colonial Warfare,” in Peter Paret 

(editor), Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to 

the Nuclear Age (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 

Press, 1986), 376-407.

Tucker, David and Ambassador Robert B. Oakley, 

Two Perspectives on Interventions and Humanitarian Operations, Carlisle, Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute, July 1, 1997.
105

United Nations, “United Nations Peacekeeping,” 

http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/

peace.shtml, accessed on November 24, 2015.

U.S. Army, Department of the Army Pamphlet 550-86, 

Somalia: a country study, 1993.

U.S. Army Center of Military History, The United States 

Army in Somalia, 1992-1994, 

http://www.history.army.mil/brochures/somalia/

somalia.htm, accessed on October 26, 2015.

U.S. Army Center of Military History, United States 

Forces, Somalia After Action Report,

http://www.history.army.mil/html/documents/

somalia/SomaliaAAR.pdf, accessed on October 26, 

2015.

U.S. Naval War College, Operations Department, 

White Paper: An Analysis of the Application of the Principles of Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) 

in Somalia (NWC 2243), Langley Air Force Base, Virginia: Army-Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict, February 1994.
106

Appendix C: Somalia Chronology

July 1. 1960

British Somaliland and Italian 

Somaliland unify to establish the 

independent Somali Republic.

October 15, 1969

President Abdirashid Ali Shermarke 

was assassinated, apparently over a 

clan grievance.

October 21, 1969

Major General Mohammed Siad Barre 

seizes power in a bloodless coup and 

assumes leadership as dictator of the 

country, which he renames as the 

Somali Democratic Republic.

July 13, 1977 – 

March 15, 1978

Somalia’s unsuccessful invasion of the 

disputed Ogaden region of Ethiopia.

May 23, 1986

General Barre is injured in an 

automobile accident, after which rivals 

within his government and insurgent 

groups in northern Somalia enter into 

open rebellion.

January 5, 1991

U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) 

conducts Operation EASTERN EXIT 

to evacuate American Embassy 

personnel from the Somali capital city 

of Mogadishu.

January 27, 1991

Dictator Siad Barre flees Mogadishu 

as various rebel factions, primarily 

the United Somalia Congress (USC) 

led by the powerful warlord General 

Mohamed Farrah Aidid, Chairman of 

the USC, takes control of the Somali 

capital.
107

May 18, 1991

Northwestern Somalia, under the 

control of the Somali National 

Movement (SNM), secedes from 

Somalia and declares itself the 

independent Republic of Somaliland, 

the successor state to the former British 

Somaliland.

June 5-11, 1991

An international conference on Somali 

national reconciliation held in Djibouti 

selects USC politician Ali Mahdi 

Mohammed as Interim President of 

Somalia, but General Aidid and the 

other factions do not rally behind his 

presidency. The USC fractures into two 

factions led by Interim President Mahdi 

and General Aidid. 

January 1, 1992

Boutros Boutros-Ghali, former Egyptian 

Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, 

becomes U.N. Secretary-General.

January 23, 1992

U.N. Security Council adopts 

Resolution 733, urging all parties to the 

Somali conflict to cease hostilities, and 

calling on all states to implement an 

immediate arms embargo on Somalia.

March 3. 1992

Interim President Mahdi and General 

Aidid agree on the implementation of a 

ceasefire monitored by 20 U.N. military 

observers, and the deployment of a 

U.N. military unit to provide security 

for the humanitarian relief effort.
108

April 24, 1992

U.N. Security Council adopts 

Resolution 751, establishing a United 

Nations Operation in Somalia 

(UNOSOM) as a Chapter VI U.N. 

peacekeeping mission to monitor the 

recent ceasefire and provide security 

for delivery and distribution of the 

humanitarian relief supplies in Somalia.

April 29, 1992

The USC forces of General Aidid force 

former dictator Siad Barre into exile in 

Nairobi, Kenya.

May 17, 1992

Former dictator Siab Barre moved 

under pressure to Lagos, Nigeria, 

where he was granted political asylum.

July 23, 1992

The U.N. Chief Military Observer, 

Brigadier General Imtíaz Shaheen 

(Pakistan), and 45 unarmed UNOSOM 

military observers arrived in 

Mogadishu.

July 27, 1992

U.N. Security Council adopts 

Resolution 767, urging all Somali 

factions to facilitate U.N. efforts to 

provide humanitarian assistance to the 

affected populations in Somalia.

August 16, 1992

USCENTCOM begins Operation 

PROVIDE RELIEF to airlift emergency 

relief supplies into Somalia in support 

of UNOSOM.

August 28, 1992

U.N. Security Council adopts 

Resolution 775, authorizing the increase 

of 3,000 troops in the strength of 

UNOSOM to protect humanitarian 

convoys and distribution centers 

throughout Somalia.
109

September 14, 1992

The first UNOSOM security unit arrives 

in Mogadishu by U.S. airlift, six months 

after Mahdi and Aidid agreed to accept 

their deployment to provide security 

for the humanitarian relief effort.

November 3, 1992 Ismat Kittani (Iraq) appointed as U.N. 

Special Representative for Somalia.

November 25, 1992

President George Bush decides to 

intervene in Somalia with a divisionsize U.S.-led coalition force under U.N. 

auspices.

December 3, 1992

U.N. Security Council adopts 

Resolution 794, authorizing a Chapter 

VII U.N. peace enforcement mission 

to establish a secure environment 

for humanitarian relief operations in 

Somalia.

December 4, 1992

President Bush publicly announces that 

U.S. ground troops will enter Somalia 

under U.N. auspices to conduct a 

limited humanitarian operation named 

Operation RESTORE HOPE. He also 

authorized USCENTCOM to take 

whatever military action was necessary 

to safeguard American and Somali 

lives.

December 9, 1992

15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) 

launches from Tripoli Amphibious 

Ready Group and occupies Mogadishu 

unopposed to initiate Operation 

RESTORE HOPE. Lead elements of the 

French 9th Marine Infantry Division 

arrived in Mogadishu from Djibouti.
110

December 10, 1992

General Robert B. Johnston, 

commanding JTF Somalia, arrives in 

Mogadishu and establishes the Unified 

Task Force (UNITAF) headquarters at 

the former U.S. Embassy compound.

December 11, 1992

Major General Charles E. Wilhelm, 

commanding Marine Forces (MARFOR) 

Somalia, arrives in Mogadishu, initially 

takes operational control of all U.S. 

and coalition ground forces. The 1st 

Marine Division assumes responsibility 

for the Mogadishu sector. Interim 

President Mahdi and General Aidid 

sign a formal ceasefire agreement and 

accept the UNITAF weapons control 

policy. U.N. Secretary-General Boutros 

Boutros-Ghali invites 11 Somali faction 

leaders to a preparatory meeting for a 

conference of national reconciliation.

December 13, 1992

The 2nd Battalion, 9th Marines, 

conducts heliborne assault to secure 

Bale Dogle airfield, 98 kilometers 

northwest of Mogadishu. First Army 

units, elements of the 2nd Battalion, 

87th Infantry, airland at Bale Dogle. The 

Belgian 1st Parachute Battalion and lead 

elements of the Italian Folgore Airborne 

Brigade arrive in Mogadishu.

December 14, 1992 The Canadian Airborne Regiment Battle 

Group arrives at Bale Dogle.

December 15, 1992

2nd Brigade, 10th Mountain Division 

assumes responsibility for Bale Dogle 

sector.
111

December 16, 1992

Task Force Hope, composed of 

elements of the 15th MEU and French 

forces, secures the airfield at Baidoa. 

The 1st Marine Division assumes 

responsibility for the sector. Phase 

I of Operation RESTORE HOPE is 

complete.

December 20, 1992

Elements of the 15th MEU and Belgian 

1st Parachute Battalion make an 

unopposed amphibious landing at 

Kismayo and secure the seaport and 

airport, with the Belgians assuming 

responsibility for the sector the next 

day. The first truck convoy in more 

than a month reaches the starving 

inland town of Baidoa.

December 21, 1992

A mine near Bardera kills Lawrence N. 

Freedman, a U.S. government civilian 

employee and retired U.S. Army Special 

Forces sergeant major. Mr. Freedman 

is the first of 100 peacekeepers to die in 

the performance of duty in Somalia.

December 24, 1992

A mechanized task force of the 7th 

Marines secures Bardera and assumes 

responsibility for the sector.

December 25, 1992

A combined French-U.S. task force 

secures Oddur. The French contingent 

assumes responsibility for the sector on 

December 29.

December 27, 1992

The Italian Folgore Brigade secures 

Gialalassi, assuming responsibility 

for the sector the next day. The 3rd 

Battalion, 9th Marines, relieves the 15th 

MEU of responsibility for the Baidoa 

sector.
112

December 28, 1992

The Canadian Airborne Regiment 

Battle Group secures Belet Weyne 

airfield in the last of the originally 

planned relief sectors. A combined 

U.S.-Italian task force secures the Merka 

seaport and airfield. The 2nd Brigade, 

10th Mountain Division, assumes 

responsibility for the new sector. 

General Aidid and Interim President 

Mahdi agree to dismantle the “green 

line” dividing Mogadishu.

December 30, 1992

The Canadian Airborne Regiment 

Battle Group assumes responsibility 

for the Belet Weyne sector. Phase 

II of Operation RESTORE HOPE is 

complete.

December 31, 1992

President Bush arrives in Mogadishu, 

visiting units in the city and aboard 

ship.

January 1, 1993 President Bush visits units in Baidoa 

and Bale Dogle.

January 4-15, 1993

U.N. convenes informal meeting at 

Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, to prepare for 

national reconciliation conference; 14 

Somali political factions participated 

and signed three formal agreements 

on a national reconciliation conference 

convening at Addis Ababa on March 

15, an immediate ceasefire, cessation of 

hostile propaganda, cooperation with 

the international relief effort, the free 

movement of the Somali people, and 

voluntary disarmament.
113

January 6-7, 1993

Members of General Aidid’s faction at 

two authorized weapons storage sites 

fire on a UNITAF convoy traveling 

through Mogadishu. A U.S. Marine task 

force surrounds the two storage sites. 

The next morning, the Marines attack 

to seize the sites and confiscate all the 

weapons and equipment located in 

them.

January 12, 1993

Private First Class Domingo Arroyo, a 

field wireman with the 11th Marines, 

is killed by small arms fire when his 

security patrol was ambushed near the 

Mogadishu airport. He was the first 

uniformed member of UNITAF to die 

in Somalia.

January 15, 1993

UNITAF begins Phase I of the U.S. 

redeployment, reducing MARFOR 

and ARFOR to reinforced brigades by 

February 5. JTF Support Command 

assumes responsibility for logistical 

support of residual forces.

January 16, 1993

The 10th Mountain Division relieves the 

1st Marine Division from responsibility 

for the Baidoa sector.

January 19,1993

The 1st Battalion Group, The Royal 

Australian Regiment, relieves the 10th 

Mountain Division from responsibility 

for the Baidoa sector.

January 20, 1993 President Clinton takes office.
114

January 24, 1993

The Somali National Front (SNF) forces 

of Mohammed Said Hirsi (“General 

Morgan”) attacks the Somali Patriotic 

Movement (SPM) forces of Colonel 

Ahmed Omar Jess at Bir Xanni, 35 

kilometers from Kismayo. When 

General Morgan ignores two UNITAF 

warnings, Task Force Kismayo attack 

helicopters engage the SNF forces, 

which return fire and withdraw.

January 30, 1993

A 3,000-member Somali auxiliary 

security force operates from 14 stations 

around Mogadishu to provide muchneeded security to the Somali people.

February 6, 1993 UNITAF begins Phase II of the U.S. 

redeployment.

February 21, 1993

UNITAF begins Phase III of the U.S. 

redeployment, reducing MARFOR and 

ARFOR to understrength brigades by 

March 5.

February 22-26, 

1993

General Morgan’s SNF forces attacks 

Colonel Jess’ SPM forces in a fight for 

control of Kismayo. UNITAF Task 

Force Kismayo forces General Morgan 

to withdraw his forces to avoid a 

UNITAF attack. General Aidid accuses 

UNITAF of cooperating with General 

Morgan in the attack, and thousands of 

his followers riot in Mogadishu until 

U.S. Marines restore order.

March 1, 1993

The Moroccan 3rd Motorized Infantry 

Regiment relieves the 10th Mountain 

Division from responsibility for the Bale 

Dogle sector.
115

March 2, 1993 Ambassador Robert Oakley departed 

Somalia.

March 5. 1993

The Belgian 1st Parachute Battalion 

relieves the 10th Mountain Division 

from responsibility for the Kismayo 

sector.

March 9, 1993

Major General Thomas M. Montgomery 

(USA) arrives in Mogadishu to become 

Commander, U.S. Forces Somalia, and 

Deputy Force Commander, UNOSOM 

II.

Admiral Jonathan T. Howe (USN, 

Retired), replaced Ismat Kittani (Iraq) 

as U.N. Special Representative for 

Somalia.

March 11, 1993

The 10th Mountain Division main 

command post and Task Force Kismayo 

redeploy to the United States.

March 15, 1993

Lieutenant General Cevik Bir, Turkish 

Army, arrives in Mogadishu to take 

command of UNOSOM II. UNOSOM 

II staff members begin to integrate into 

the UNITAF operations center.

March 15-27, 1993

U.N. convenes national reconciliation 

conference at Addis Ababa; 14 

Somali political factions (but not the 

secessionist SNM in northwestern 

Somalia) commit to ending the civil 

war and peacefully reconciling their 

differences in a two-year transition 

period.
116

March 16-31, 1993

General Morgan’s SNF forces attack to 

seize Kismayo. UNITAF commits its 

Quick Reaction Force (QRF) and the 

24th MEU lands at Kismayo on March 

25 to reinforce the Belgians. UNITAF 

restores order in the city and sector by 

the end of the month.

March 26, 1993

U.N. Security Council adopts 

Resolution 814, expanding the size and 

mandate of UNOSOM II under Chapter 

VII (peace enforcement) of the U.N. 

Charter through October 31, 1993. The 

Pakistani UNOSOM II force relieves 

MARFOR from responsibility for the 

Mogadishu sector.

March 30. 1993

The advance party of the 1st Brigade, 

10th Mountain Division, arrives in 

Mogadishu to relieve the 2nd Brigade.

April 5, 1993

Chairman Powell meets with Generals 

Bir and Johnston who inform him that 

the transfer of authority from UNITAF 

to UNOSOM II could occur by the end 

of May.

April 9, 1993

The 1st Brigade, 10th Mountain 

Division, assumes full responsibility for 

ARFOR operations, the UNITAF QRF, 

and the Merka sector.

April 18, 1993

The Botswanan UNOSOM II force 

relieves MARFOR from responsibility 

for the Bardera sector.

April 22, 1993 Generals Bir and Johnston agree to 

turnover date on May 4.
117

April 28, 1993

The Pakistani UNOSOM II forces 

relieves the 1st Brigade, 10th Mountain 

Division, from responsibility for the 

Merka sector.

May 4, 1993

Lieutenant General Johnston transfers 

responsibility for U.N. military 

operations in Somalia to Lieutenant 

General Bir. General Johnston and 

the last of UNITAF headquarters staff 

depart Somalia.

May 6-7, 1993

Colonel Jess attempts to retake Kismayo 

and clashes with Belgian forces for two 

days.

May 19, 1993

President Clinton issues Presidential 

Decision Directive 6, approving 

participation of 4,000 U.S. support 

troops under the operational control 

of UNOSOM II, the number reducing 

to 1,400 by January 1994; retention in 

Somalia of a QRF under the operational 

control of USCENTCOM; and support 

of U.N. programs to collect heavy 

weapons and help create a professional 

Somali police force.

June 5, 1993

General Aidid’s forces attack a 

Pakistani unit in Mogadishu, killing 24 

and wounding 57 Pakistani troops.
118

June 6, 1993

U.N. Security Council adopts 

Resolution 837, strongly condemning 

the unprovoked attack on the Pakistani 

troops and reaffirming that the 

Secretary-General was authorized to 

take all necessary measures against 

those responsible for the attack, 

including their arrest and detention for 

prosecution, trial and punishment.

June 17, 1993 

U.N. Special Envoy Jonathan Howe 

issued an arrest order for General Aidid 

and announced a $25 million reward 

for his capture.

June 29, 1993 UNITAF is awarded the Joint 

Meritorious Unit Award.

October 3, 1993

U.S. Task Force Ranger conducts 

a daylight raid to capture General 

Aidid, resulting in 15 hours of fighting 

with his forces. U.S. causalities from 

the attack include 18 killed and 84 

wounded. Somali casualties consist of 

312 killed and 814 wounded.

October 7, 1993

President Clinton announced his 

decision to withdraw all U.S. forces 

from Somalia by March 31, 1994. Other 

nations follow the U.S. lead.

November 4, 1994

U.N. Security Council adopts 

Resolution 954, terminating UNOSOM 

II on March 31, 1995.

January 9 to March 

3, 1995

USCENTCOM conducts Operation 

UNITED SHIELD, a U.S.-led 

multinational military operation that 

safely evacuates all UNOSOM II troops 

from Somalia.
119

September 19, 1995 The United States closes its Liaison 

Office in Mogadishu.

April to October 

2004

The Somali political factions establish 

the Transitional Federal Institutions of 

Somalia.

August 20, 2012

The Somali political factions establish 

the Federal Government of Somalia, 

finally ending the Somali civil war.
120

Appendix D: Key Actors

U.S. Government Key Actors

President George H. W. Bush: Given the media coverage of suffering in Somalia and fresh from the triumph 

in Operation DESERT STORM, President Bush felt he 

could not ignore the situation in Somalia. He initially 

used U.S. forces to airlift humanitarian aid to Somalia in Operation PROVIDE RELIEF, but the operation 

was unsuccessful because the Somali factions looted 

relief supplies as soon as they arrived in the country. 

He decided that a prompt commitment of U.S. ground 

troops was necessary to establish a secure environment for the relief effort. He ordered American troops 

to conduct Operation RESTORE HOPE as a U.S.-led 

multinational peace enforcement operation under 

U.N. auspices to ensure that relief supplies reached 

the people who needed them and thus to break the 

famine and save lives. President Bush steadfastly refused to accept the broader missions of peacebuilding 

and peacemaking, which he left to the follow-on U.N.-

led effort.

President Bill Clinton: President Clinton supported 

President Bush’s Somali policies, but he was unwilling to play a major part in UNOSOM II. President 

Clinton wanted a quick transition from UNITAF to 

UNOSOM II. He agreed to contribute 4,000 U.S. support troops to UNOSOM II through August 1993, with 

the number reducing to 1,400 by January 31, 1994. He 

also agreed to provide a U.S. Quick Reaction Force under USCENTCOM operational control. After the battle 

in Mogadishu on October 3, 1993, President Clinton 
121

decided to withdraw all U.S. forces from Somalia by 

March 1994.

General Colin L. Powell (USA): As Chairman of the 

Joint Chief of Staff, General Powell was initially reluctant to commit U.S. military forces to Somalia. Once 

President Bush made the decision to intervene, General Powell recommended a large-scale ground intervention with a division-size U.S.-led coalition force 

under U.N. auspices. He opposed directing the U.S. 

force commander to focus only on the humanitarian 

relief mission and leave political issues to the U.N. He 

argued successfully that no such distinction was possible because U.S. troops could not perform the relief 

mission without challenging the warlords, destabilizing the political situation, and pursuing structural 

political changes. Because humanitarian, political and 

security goals were so interdependent, he advocated 

for an integrated U.S. and U.N. policy whereby progress would occur concurrently.

General Joseph P. Hoar (USMC): As the Commander-in-Chief of U.S. Central Command, General Hoar 

recommended commitment of a division-size force to 

secure Mogadishu, later expanding the operation to 

Kismayo and into the interior. General Hoar feared 

“mission creep” and wanted to remain focused on 

the humanitarian mission. Once UNITAF had accomplished its limited mission by the end of January 1993, 

he recommended a quick transfer of responsibility 

from the U.S.-led UNITAF to the U.N.-led UNOSOM 

II. 

Ambassador Robert Oakley: Chairman Powell recommended to President Bush that retired Ambassador Oakley be recalled to active service as the Presi-
122

dent’s Special Envoy to Somalia. Ambassador Oakley 

was Ambassador to Somalia in 1983-84. In 1987-88, 

he worked under General Powell on the National Security Council Staff as Director for Middle East and 

South Asian Affairs. The Chairman saw Oakley as 

a man who could harmonize the Department of Defense’s concerns with the incoming administration’s 

objectives. Indeed, Oakley critically established a 

cease-fire between the warring factions as a precondition to launching UNITAF operations in the interior of 

the country. Oakley later warned the Department of 

State that problems resulting from the absence of a police force were “rapidly reaching crisis proportions” 

and that U.N. political and relief structures outside 

Mogadishu lay “in a state of catastrophic weakness 

and disorganization.”110 Without a strong U.N. presence in the field, he warned, efforts to rebuild Somalia 

would collapse when the troops departed. The new 

Clinton administration, however, proved slow in recognizing that U.N. weaknesses were endangering the 

long-term mission.

United Nations Key Actors

Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali (Egypt): Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali was a major catalyst in transitioning 

UNOSOM I to UNITAF. He recommended to the U.N. 

Security Council that the United States lead a peace 

enforcement operation of limited duration to ensure 

the delivery and distribution of relief supplies in Somalia, and create the conditions necessary for a return 

to peacekeeping and peacebuilding. Boutros-Ghali 

determined that the U.N. was already overstretched 

by UNOSOM I, and could not exercise command and 

control over a large-scale military operation. Boutros-
123

Ghali believed it was essential that the purpose of 

intervention should be to create a secure environment throughout Somalia by disarming the militias of 

the warring factions, but President Bush limited the 

UNITAF area of operations to the hardest-hit areas in 

southern and central Somalia.

Mr. Ismat Kittani (Iraq): As U.N. Special Representative for Somalia, Ismat Kittani reported on November 

16, 1992, that humanitarian supplies had become the 

basis of an otherwise non-existent economy and that 

the warring factions were extorting large sums from 

private relief agencies so that perhaps no more than 

twenty percent of relief supplies actually reached 

needy Somalis.

Unified Task Force (UNITAF) Key Actors

Lieutenant General Robert B. Johnson (USMC): 

The Commanding General of I Marine Expeditionary Force, General Johnston commanded Joint Task 

Force (JTF) Somalia and UNITAF. He commanded a 

Marine battalion in Lebanon in 1982 and understood 

how difficult peacekeeping was in the midst of civil 

war. His experience organizing a joint and combined 

staff, as Chief of Staff of USCENTCOM during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, influenced how he organized his own JTF for Operation 

RESTORE HOPE.

Major General Charles E. Wilhelm (USMC): The 

Commanding General of the 1st Marine Division, 

General Wilhelm commanded Marine Forces Somalia (MARFOR), an integrated Marine air-ground task 

force. Immediately upon arrival in Somali, he assumed operational control of all U.S. ground troops in 
124

Somalia until Army Forces Somalia (ARFOR) became 

operational.

Major General Steven L. Arnold (USA): The Commanding General of the 10th Mountain Division, 

General Arnold commanded Army Forces in Somalia 

(ARFOR). He served as the Operations Officer, Third 

U.S. Army, during Operation DESERT STORM. During the summer of 1992, General Arnold commanded 

the division in disaster relief activities in Florida during Operation HURRICANE ANDREW.

Brigadier General Anthony C. Zinni (USMC): As 

UNITAF Director for Operations (J-3), General Zinni 

orchestrated the operations and activities of the multinational force. Based on his experience with the Kurdish relief efforts during Operation PROVIDE COMFORT in northern Iraq, General Zinni understood the 

importance of establishing good relationships with 

the NGOs conducting relief operations in Somalia. He 

established a civil-military operations center in Mogadishu that worked closely with the humanitarian operations center established by the Office of Foreign 

Disaster Assistance, USAID. He also established and 

chaired a security committee that brought together 

the leaders of the faction militias to discuss and resolve security issues and address other concerns, such 

as ceasefire violations and weapons control.

Brigadier General William Magruder III (USA): As 

an assistant division commander of the 10th Mountain 

Division, General Magruder commanded Task Force 

Mountain (2nd Brigade, 10th Mountain Division), 

which secured the port city of Kismayo. He then took 

command of Task Force Kismayo. Magruder took decisive steps to neutralize inter-clan fighting between 
125

General Morgan and Colonel Jess in the Kismayo area. 

Task Force Kismayo was the first UNITAF element to 

use preemptive force against one of the Somali factions to enforce the Addis Ababa Accords.

Somali Faction Warlords

General Mohamed Farrah Aidid: A former general in 

the Somali National Army, General Aidid served as 

Ambassador to India and later as Intelligence Chief. 

He served as Chairman of the USC, and the head of its 

militia, from late 1989 until his death in 1996. The USC 

was the political/military arm of the large and powerful Habr Gidr sub-clan of the Hawiye clan-family in 

central Somalia. The Hawiye clan-family opposed the 

Barre regime because of its violent repression in Mogadishu. Aidid directed USC militia operations during 

the civil war and forced Barre to flee Mogadishu in 

January 1991. After driving Barre from the country, 

the USC divided along sub-clan lines after Ali Mahdi 

Muhammad was elected Interim President. General 

Aidid protested and rejected Mahdi’s authority. Aidid 

formed his USC faction to destroy Mahdi’s rival USC 

faction and assume Barre’s seat. In June 1992, Aidid 

allied himself with the SPM faction of Colonel Ahmed 

Jess in southern Somalia to establish the SNA. In December 1992, Aidid’s faction retained influence over 

70 percent of Mogadishu. Aidid was an extremely 

proficient political and media manipulator. His strategic objective was consistent from the introduction 

of U.N. troops in July 1992: the withdrawal of U.N. 

forces and the positioning of himself as the dominant 

leader in Somalia. 
126

Ali Mahdi Mohamed: Ali Mahdi Mohamed was an 

independent Somali entrepreneur and politician who 

was aligned with Aidid during the civil war. After the 

USC forced Barre to flee Mogadishu in January 1991, 

the USC failed to reach a political settlement with its 

principal rivals, the SNM, SPM and the SSDF. An international conference in Djibouti selected Mahdi to 

serve as Interim President. General Aidid boycotted 

the Djibouti conference and rejected Mahdi’s authority, and he was never able to assert his authority beyond North Mogadishu and its northern environs. 

The USC split into two factions along sub-clan lines. 

Mahdi controlled the USC/Mahdi faction, which was 

the political/military arm of the Abgal sub-clan of the 

Hawiye clan-family in central Somalia. Mahdi was 

pro-U.N., but he would not support any move that 

might benefit Aidid. Therefore, Mahdi’s cooperation 

with the U.N. and UNITAF was always qualified. 

Mahdi’s sole strategic objective was to defeat Aidid 

and assume undisputed control of a new central government in Mogadishu.

Colonel Ahmed Omar Jess: Jess served as the field 

commander of the SPM militia and the chairman of 

the political arm of the SPM/SNA faction, which operated in southern Somalia with a militia strength 

of about 2,000 troops. The SPM was formed in 1989 

when southern army garrisons, primarily of the Ogadeni clan, mutinied and went into opposition against 

Barre. After the Barre regime collapsed in May 1992, 

the SPM split into competing factions that tried dominating each other for control of the Kismayo economy. 

The SPM faction of Colonel Jess, which was the political/military arm of the Absame sub-clan of the Darod 

clan-family, controlled the town and the immediate 
127

area around the port city of Kismayo. In June 1992, 

Colonel Jess allied his SPM faction with General Aidid’s USC faction to establish the SNA. After the initial Addis Ababa conferences in January 1993, fighting 

erupted in the Kismayo area between the SPM/SNA 

and General Morgan’s SNF. This fighting continued 

intermittently until December 1993, when an SNF assault on the town resulted in the loss of the SPM/SNA 

foothold in the Kismayo area to General Morgan’s rival faction.

General Mohamed Siad Hersi (“General Morgan”):

The son-in-law of former dictator Siad Barre, General 

Morgan commanded the Somali National Army Special Forces (“Red Berets”) as a colonel. From 1986 to 

1988, as a general, he commanded the 26th Military 

District (the region of British Somaliland). In 1988, he 

was in charge of the military operations against the 

SNM. He became known as the “Butcher of Hargeisa” 

for the savage reprisals his forces inflicted on the Isaaq 

clan-family, including the shelling and bombing of the 

city of Hargeisa, leading to the deaths of an estimated 

50 - 60,000 people, and forcing 300,000 Isaaqis to flee to 

Ethiopia. In September 1990, he was appointed Minister of Defense and Substitute Head of State of Somalia. Two months after fleeing Mogadishu with Barre in 

January 1991, Morgan became Chairman of the SNF. 

The SNF, composed of Barre supporters and the remnants of the Somali National Army, functioned as a 

militia to restore the old Barre regime. General Morgan operated throughout the Middle and Lower Juba 

Valley in southern Somalia. He became an archrival of 

Colonel Jess. Pro-western in personal and professional 

style, Morgan’s strategic objectives were to exploit the 

presence of U.N. troops in Kismayo, and position SNF 
128

forces to control the inter-riverine and coastal regions 

around Kismayo.
129

Appendix E: United Nations Security Council 

Resolution 733 (January 23, 1992)

RESOLUTION 733 (1992)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 3039th 

meeting, on 23 January 1992

The Security Council,

Considering the request by Somalia for the Security 

Council to consider the situation in Somalia (S/23445),

Having heard the report of the Secretary-General on 

the situation in Somalia and commending the initiative taken by him in the humanitarian field,

Gravely alarmed at the rapid deterioration of the situation in Somalia and the heavy loss of human life and 

widespread material damage resulting from the conflict in the country and aware of its consequences on 

the stability and peace in the region,

Concerned that the continuation of this situation constitutes, as stated in the report of the Secretary-General, a threat to international peace and security,

Recalling its primary responsibility under the Charter 

of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security,

Recalling also the provisions of Chapter VIII of the 

Charter of the United Nations,

Expressing its appreciation to the international and regional organizations that have provided assistance to 

the populations affected by the conflict and deploring 

that personnel of these organizations have lost their 

lives in the exercise of their humanitarian task,
130

Taking note of the appeals addressed to the parties by 

the Chairman of the Organization of the Islamic Conference on 16 December 1991, the Secretary-General 

of the Organization of African Unity on 18 December 

1991, and the League of Arab States on 5 January 1992 

(S/23448),

1. Takes note of the report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Somalia, and expresses its concern with the situation prevailing in that country;

2. Requests the Secretary-General immediately 

to undertake the necessary actions to increase humanitarian assistance of the United Nations and its 

specialized agencies to the affected population in all 

parts of Somalia in liaison with the other international 

humanitarian organizations and to this end to appoint 

a coordinator to oversee the effective delivery of this 

assistance;

3. Requests the Secretary-General of the United 

Nations, in cooperation with the Secretary-General of 

the Organization of African Unity and the SecretaryGeneral of the League of Arab States, immediately 

to contact all parties involved in the conflict, to seek 

their commitment to the cessation of hostilities to permit the humanitarian assistance to be distributed, to 

promote a cease-fire and compliance therewith, and 

to assist in the process of a political settlement of the 

conflict in Somalia;

4. Strongly urges all parties to the conflict immediately to cease hostilities and agree to a cease-fire and 

to promote the process of reconciliation and of political settlement in Somalia;

5 Decides, under Chapter VII of the Charter of the 

United Nations, that all States shall, for the purposes 
131

of establishing peace and stability in Somalia, immediately implement a general and complete embargo on 

all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to 

Somalia until the Security Council decides otherwise;

6. Calls on all States to refrain from any action 

which might contribute to increasing tension and to 

impeding or delaying a peaceful and negotiated outcome to the conflict in Somalia, which would permit 

all Somalis to decide upon and to construct their future in peace;

7. Calls upon all parties to cooperate with the Secretary-General to this end and to facilitate the delivery 

by the United Nations, its specialized agencies and 

other humanitarian organizations of humanitarian assistance to all those in need of it under the supervision 

of the coordinator;

8. Urges all parties to take all the necessary measures to ensure the safety of personnel sent to provide 

humanitarian assistance, to assist them in their tasks 

and to ensure full respect for the rules and principles 

of international law regarding the protection of civilian populations;

9. Calls upon all States and international organizations to contribute to the efforts of humanitarian assistance to the population in Somalia;

10. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the 

Security Council as soon as possible on this matter;

11. Decides to remain seized of the matter until a 

peaceful solution is achieved.
132

Appendix F: United Nations Security Council 

Resolution 746 (March 17, 1992)

RESOLUTION 746 (1992)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 3060th meeting, on 17 March 1992

The Security Council,

Considering the request by Somalia for the Security 

Council to consider the situation in Somalia (S/23445),

Reaffirming its resolution 733 (1992) of 23 January 

1992,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General 

on the situation in Somalia (S/23693),

Taking note of the signing of the cease-fire agreements 

in Mogadishu on 3 March 1992, including agreements 

for the implementation of measures aimed at stabilizing the cease-fire through a United Nations monitoring mission,

Deeply regretting that the factions have not yet abided 

by their commitment to implement the cease-fire and 

thus have still not permitted the unimpeded provision and distribution of humanitarian assistance to 

the people in need in Somalia,

Deeply disturbed by the magnitude of the human suffering caused by the conflict and concerned that the 

continuation of the situation in Somalia constitutes a 

threat to international peace and security,

Bearing in mind that the factors described in paragraph 76 of the Secretary-General’s report (S/23693) 

must be taken into account,
133

Cognizant of the importance of cooperation between 

the United Nations and regional organizations in the 

context of Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United 

Nations,

Underlining the importance which it attaches to the 

international, regional and non-governmental organizations, including the International Committee of the 

Red Cross, continuing to provide humanitarian and 

other relief assistance to the people of Somalia under 

difficult circumstances,

Expressing its appreciation to the regional organizations, including the Organization of African Unity, the 

League of Arab States and the Organization of the Islamic Conference, for their cooperation with the United Nations in the effort to resolve the Somali problem,

1. Takes note with appreciation of the report of 

the Secretary-General;

2. Urges the Somali factions to honour their commitment under the cease-fire agreements of 3 March 

1992;

3. Urges all the Somali factions to cooperate with 

the Secretary-General and to facilitate the delivery by 

the United Nations, its specialized agencies and other 

humanitarian organizations of humanitarian assistance to all those in need of it, under the supervision 

of the coordinator mentioned in resolution 733 (1992) ;

4. Requests the Secretary-General to pursue his 

humanitarian efforts in Somalia and to use all the resources at his disposal, including those of the relevant 

United Nations agencies, to address urgently the critical needs of the affected population in Somalia;

5. Appeals to all Members States and to all humanitarian organizations to contribute to and to cooperate with these humanitarian relief efforts;
134

6. Strongly supports the Secretary-General’s decision urgently to dispatch a technical team to Somalia, accompanied by the coordinator, in order to work 

within the framework and objectives outlined in paragraphs 73 and 74 of his report (S/23693) and to submit 

expeditiously a report to the Security Council on this 

matter;

7. Requests that the technical team also develop a 

high priority plan to establish mechanisms to ensure 

the unimpeded delivery of humanitarian assistance;

8. Calls on all parties, movements and factions in 

Mogadishu in particular, and in Somalia in general, 

to respect fully the security and safety of the technical 

team and the personnel of the humanitarian organizations and to guarantee their complete freedom of 

movement in and around Mogadishu and other parts 

of Somalia;

9. Calls upon the Secretary-General of the United 

Nations to continue, in close cooperation with the Organization of African Unity, the League of Arab States 

and the Organization of the Islamic Conference, his 

consultations with all Somali parties, movements and 

factions towards the convening of a conference for national reconciliation and unity in Somalia;

10. Calls upon all Somali parties, movements and 

factions to cooperate fully with the Secretary-General 

in the implementation of this resolution;

11. Decides to remain seized of the matter until a 

peaceful solution is achieved.
135

Appendix G: United Nations Security Council 

Resolution 751 (April 24, 1992)

RESOLUTION 751 (1992)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 3069th meeting, on 24 April 1992

The Security Council,

Considering the request by Somalia for the Security 

Council to consider the situation in Somalia,

Reaffirming its resolutions 733 (1992) of 23 January 

1992 and 746 (1992) of 17 March 1992,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General 

of 21 and 24 April 1992 on the situation in Somalia.

Taking note of the signing of the cease-fire agreements 

in Mogadishu on 3 March 1992, including agreements 

for the implementation of measures aimed at stabilizing the cease-fire through a United Nations monitoring mission.

Taking note also of the signing of letters of agreement 

in Mogadishu, Hargeisa and Kismayo on the mechanism for monitoring the cease-fire and arrangements 

for the equitable and effective distribution of humanitarian assistance in and around Mogadishu,

Deeply disturbed by the magnitude of the human suffering caused by the conflict and concerned that the 

continuation of the situation in Somalia constitutes a 

threat to international peace and security,
136

Cognizant of the importance of cooperation between 

the United Nations and regional organizations in the 

context of Chapter III of the Charter of the United Nations,

Underlining the importance which it attaches to the 

international, regional and non-governmental organizations, including the International Committee of the 

Red Cross, continuing to provide humanitarian and 

other relief assistance to the people of Somalia under 

difficult circumstances,

Expressing its appreciation to the regional organizations, including the Organization of African Unity, the 

League of Arab States and the Organization of the Islamic Conference, for their cooperation with the United Nations in the effort to resolve the Somali problem,

1. Takes note with appreciation of the report of the 

Secretary-General of 21 and 24 April 1992 on the 

situation in Somalia;

2. Decides to establish under its authority, and in 

support of the Secretary-General in accordance 

with paragraph 7 below, a United Nations Operation in Somalia;

3. Requests the Secretary-General immediately to 

deploy a unit of fifty United Nations observers to 

monitor the ceasefire in Mogadishu in accordance 

with paragraphs 24 to 26 of the Secretary-General’s 

report;

4. Agrees, in principle, also to establish under the 

overall direction of the Special Representative of 

the Secretary-General a United Nations security 

force to be deployed as soon as possible to perform 
137

the functions described in paragraphs 27 to 29 of 

the report of the Secretary-General;

5. Requests the Secretary-General to continue his consultations with the parties in Mogadishu regarding 

the proposed United Nations security force and, in 

the light of those consultations, to submit his further recommendations to the Security Council for 

its decision as soon as possible;

6. Welcomes the intention expressed by the Secretary

General in paragraph 64 of his report to appoint 

a Special Representative for Somalia to provide 

overall direction of United Nations activities in Somalia and to assist him in his endeavours to reach 

a peaceful resolution of the conflict in Somalia;

7. Also requests the Secretary-General as part of his 

continuing mission in Somalia to facilitate an immediate and effective cessation of hostilities and 

the maintenance of a ceasefire throughout the 

country in order to promote the process of reconciliation and political settlement in Somalia and to 

provide urgent humanitarian assistance;

8. Welcomes the cooperation between the United 

Nations and the League of Arab States, the Organization of African Unity and the Organization of 

the Islamic Conference in resolving the problem in 

Somalia;

9. Calls upon all parties, movements and factions 

in Somalia immediately to cease hostilities and to 

maintain a cease-fire throughout the country in 

order to promote the process of reconciliation and 

political settlement in Somalia;
138

10. Requests the Secretary-General to continue as 

a matter of priority of priority his consultations 

with all Somali parties, movements and factions 

towards the convening of a conference on national 

reconciliation and unity in Somalia in close cooperation with the League of Arab States, the Organization of African Unity and the Organization of 

the Islamic Conference

11. Decides to establish, in accordance with rule 28 of 

the provisional rules of procedure of the Security 

Council, a Committee of the Security Council consisting of all the members of the Council, to undertake the following tasks and to report on its work 

to the Council with its observations and recommendations:

(a) To seek from all States information regarding 

the action taken by them concerning the effective 

implementation of the general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military 

equipment to Somalia imposed by paragraph 5 of 

resolution 733 (1992);

(b) To consider any information brought to its 

attention by States concerning violations of the 

embargo, and in that context to make recommendations to the Council on ways of increasing the 

effectiveness of the embargo;

(c) To recommend appropriate measures in response to violations of the embargo and to provide information on a regular basis to the Secretary-General for general distribution to Member 

States;
139

12. Notes with appreciation the ongoing efforts of 

the United Nations, its specialized agencies and 

humanitarian organizations to ensure delivery of 

humanitarian assistance to Somalia, particularly to 

Mogadishu;

13. Calls upon the international community to support, with financial and other resources, the implementation of the ninety-day Plan of Action for 

Emergency Humanitarian Assistance to Somalia;

14. Urges all parties concerned in Somalia to facilitate the efforts of the United Nations, its specialized agencies and humanitarian organizations to 

provide urgent humanitarian assistance to the affected population in Somalia and reiterates its call 

for the full respect for the security and safety of the 

personnel of the humanitarian organizations and 

the guarantee of their complete freedom of movement in and around Mogadishu and other parts of 

Somalia;

15. Calls upon all Somali parties, movements and factions to cooperate fully with the Secretary-General 

in the implementation of the present resolution;

16. Decides to remain seized of the matter until a 

peaceful solution is achieved.
140

Appendix H: United Nations Security Council 

Resolution 767 (July 27, 1992)

RESOLUTION 767 (1992)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 3101st meeting, 

on 27 July 1992

The Security Council,

Considering the request by Somalia for the Security 

Council to consider the situation in Somalia (S/23445),

Reaffirming its resolutions 733 (1992) of 23 January 

1992, 746 (1992) of 17 March 1992 and 751 (1992) of 24 

April 1992,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General 

on the situation in Somalia (S/74343),

Considering the letter of the Secretary-General to the 

President of the Security Council informing him that 

all the parties in Mogadishu have agreed to the deployment of the fifty military observers, and that the 

advance party of the observers arrived in Mogadishu 

on 5 July 1992 and that the rest of the observers arrived in the mission area on 23 July 1992 (S/24179),

Deeply concerned about the availability of arms and 

ammunition in the hands of civilians and the proliferation of armed banditry throughout Somalia,

Alarmed by the sporadic outbreak of hostilities in several parts of Somalia leading to continued loss of life 

and destruction of property, and putting at risk the 

personnel of the United Nations, non-governmental 

organizations and other international humanitarian 

organizations, as well as disrupting their operations,
141

Deeply disturbed by the magnitude of human suffering caused by the conflict and concerned that the situation in Somalia constitutes a threat to international 

peace and security,

Gravely alarmed by the deterioration of the humanitarian situation in Somalia and underlining the urgent 

need for quick delivery of humanitarian assistance in 

the whole country,

Recognizing that the provision of humanitarian assistance in Somalia is an important element in the effort 

of the Council to restore international peace and security in the area,

Responding to the urgent calls by the parties in Somalia for the international community to take measures 

in Somalia to ensure the delivery of humanitarian assistance in Somalia,

Noting the Secretary-General’s proposals for a comprehensive decentralized zonal approach in the United Nations involvement in Somalia,

Cognizant that the success of such an approach requires the cooperation of all parties, movements and 

factions in Somalia,

1. Takes note with appreciation of the report of 

the Secretary-General of 22 July 1992 (S/24343);

2. Requests the Secretary-General to make full use 

of all available means and arrangements, including the 

mounting of an urgent airlift operation, with a view to 

facilitating the efforts of the United Nations, its specialized agencies and humanitarian organizations in 

accelerating the provision of humanitarian assistance 

to the affected population in Somalia, threatened by 

mass starvation;
142

3. Urges all parties, movements and factions in 

Somalia to facilitate the efforts of the United Nations, 

its specialized agencies and humanitarian organizations to provide urgent humanitarian assistance to 

the affected population in Somalia and reiterates its 

call for the full respect of the security and safety of the 

personnel of the humanitarian organizations and the 

guarantee of their complete freedom of movement in 

and around Mogadishu and other parts of Somalia;

4. Calls upon all parties, movements and factions 

in Somalia to cooperate with the United Nations with 

a view to the urgent deployment of the United Nations security personnel called for in paragraphs 4 and 

5 of its resolution 751 (1992) , and otherwise assist in 

the general stabilization of the situation in Somalia. In 

the absence of such cooperation, the Security Council 

does not exclude other measures to deliver humanitarian assistance to Somalia;

5. Reiterates its appeal to the international community to provide adequate financial and other resources for humanitarian efforts in Somalia;

6. Encourages the ongoing efforts of the United 

Nations, its specialized agencies and humanitarian 

organizations, including the International Committee 

of the Red Cross, to ensure delivery of humanitarian 

assistance to all regions of Somalia;

7. Appeals to all parties, movements and factions 

in Somalia to extend full cooperation to the military 

observers and to take measures to ensure their security;

8. Requests the Secretary-General, as part of his 

continuing efforts in Somalia, to promote an immediate and effective cessation of hostilities and the main-
143

tenance of a cease-fire throughout the country in order 

to facilitate the urgent delivery of humanitarian assistance and the process of reconciliation and political 

settlement in Somalia;

9. Calls upon all parties, movements and factions 

in Somalia immediately to cease hostilities and to 

maintain a cease-fire throughout the country;

10. Stresses the need for the observance and strict 

monitoring of the general and complete embargo of 

all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to 

Somalia, as decided in paragraph 5 of its resolution 

733 (1992) ;

11. Welcomes the cooperation between the United 

Nations, the Organization of African Unity, the League 

of Arab States and the Organization of the Islamic 

Conference in resolving the situation in Somalia;

12. Approves the Secretary-General’s proposal to 

establish four operational zones in Somalia as part of 

the consolidated United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM);

13. Requests the Secretary-General to ensure that 

his Special Representative for Somalia is provided 

with all the necessary support services to enable him 

to effectively carry out his mandate;

14. Strongly supports the Secretary-General’s decision urgently to dispatch a technical team to Somalia, 

under the overall direction of the Special Representative, in order to work within the framework and objectives outlined in paragraph 64 of his report (S/24343) 

and to submit expeditiously a report to the Security 

Council in this matter;

15. Affirms that all officials of the United Nations 

and all experts on mission for the United Nations in 
144

Somalia enjoy the privileges and immunities provided 

for in the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations of 1946 and in any other 

relevant instruments and that all parties, movements 

and factions in Somalia are required to allow them full 

freedom of movement and all necessary facilities;

16. Requests the Secretary-General to continue urgently his consultations with all parties, movements 

and factions in Somalia towards the convening of a 

conference on national reconciliation and unity in Somalia in close cooperation with the Organization of 

African Unity, the League of Arab States and the Organization of the Islamic Conference;

17. Calls upon all parties, movements and factions 

in Somalia to cooperate fully with the Secretary-General in the implementation of this resolution;

18. Decides to remain seized of the matter until a 

peaceful solution is achieved.
145

Appendix I: United Nations Security Council 

Resolution 775 (August 28, 1992)

RESOLUTION 775 (1992)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 3110th meeting, on 28 August 1992

The Security Council,

Considering the request by Somalia for the Security 

Council to consider the situation in Somalia (S/23445),

Reaffirming its resolutions 733 (1992) of 23 January 

1992, 746 (1992) of 17 March 1992, 751 (1992) of 24 

April 1992 and 767 (1992) of 27 July 1992,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General 

on the situation in Somalia (S/24480),

Deeply concerned about the availability of arms and 

ammunition and the proliferation of armed banditry 

throughout Somalia,

Alarmed by the continued sporadic outbreak of hostilities in several parts of Somalia leading to continued 

loss of life and destruction of property, and putting 

at risk the personnel of the United Nations, non-governmental organizations and other international humanitarian organizations, as well as disrupting their 

operations,

Deeply disturbed by the magnitude of the human suffering caused by the conflict and concerned that the 

situation in Somalia constitutes a threat to international peace and security,

Gravely alarmed by the deterioration of the humanitarian situation in Somalia and underlining the urgent 
146

need for quick delivery of humanitarian assistance in 

the whole country,

Reaffirming that the provision of humanitarian assistance in Somalia is an important element in the effort 

of the Council to restore international peace and security in the area,

Welcoming the ongoing efforts by the United Nations 

organizations as well as the International Committee 

of the Red Cross (ICRC), non-governmental organizations and States to provide humanitarian assistance to 

the affected population in Somalia,

Welcoming in particular the initiatives to provide relief through airlift operations,

Convinced that no durable progress will be achieved 

in the absence of an overall political solution in Somalia,

Taking note in particular of paragraph 24 of the report 

of the Secretary-General,

1. Takes note with appreciation of the report of 

the Secretary-General of 24 August 1992 (S/24480) on 

the findings of the technical team and the recommendations of the Secretary-General contained therein;

2. Invites the Secretary-General to establish four 

zone headquarters as proposed in paragraph 31 of the 

Secretary-General’s report (S/24480);

3. Authorizes the increase in strength of the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) and the 

subsequent deployment as recommended in paragraph 37 of the Secretary-General’s report;

4. Welcomes the decision of the Secretary-General 

to increase substantially the airlift operation to areas 

of priority attention;
147

5. Calls upon all parties, movements and factions 

in Somalia to cooperate with the United Nations with 

a view to the urgent deployment of the United Nations security personnel called for in paragraphs 4 and 

5 of its resolution 751 (1992) and as recommended in 

paragraph 37 of the Secretary-General’s report;

6. Welcomes also the material and logistical support from a number of States and urges that the airlift 

operation be effectively coordinated by the United 

Nations as described in paragraphs 17 to 21 of the report of the Secretary-General;

7. Urges all parties, movements and factions in 

Somalia to facilitate the efforts of the United Nations, 

its specialized agencies and humanitarian organizations to provide urgent humanitarian assistance to 

the affected population in Somalia and reiterates its 

call for the full respect of the security and safety of the 

personnel of these organizations and the guarantee of 

their complete freedom of movement in and around 

Mogadishu and other parts of Somalia;

8. Reiterates its appeal to the international community to provide adequate financial and other resources for humanitarian efforts in Somalia;

9. Encourages ongoing efforts of the United Nations, its specialized agencies and humanitarian organizations including the International Committee of 

the Red Cross and non-governmental organizations 

to ensure delivery of humanitarian assistance to all 

regions of Somalia and underlines the importance of 

coordination between these efforts;

10. Requests also the Secretary-General to continue, in close cooperation with the Organization 

of African Unity, the League of Arab States and the 
148

Organization of the Islamic Conference, his efforts to 

seek a comprehensive political solution to the crisis in 

Somalia;

11. Calls upon all parties, movements and factions 

in Somalia immediately to cease hostilities and to 

maintain a cease-fire throughout the country;

12. Stresses the need for the observance and strict 

monitoring of the general and complete embargo on 

all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to 

Somalia, as decided in paragraph 5 of its resolution 

733 (1992) ;

13. Calls upon all parties, movements and factions 

in Somalia to cooperate fully with the Secretary-General in the implementation of this resolution;

14 Decides to remain seized of the matter until a 

peaceful solution is achieved.
149

Appendix J: United Nations Security Council 

Resolution 794 (December 3, 1992)

RESOLUTION 794 (1992)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 3145th meeting, on 3 December 1992

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its resolutions 733 (1992) of 23 January 

1992, 746 (1992) of 17 March 1992, 751 (1992) of 24 

April 1992, 767 (1992) of 27 July 1992 and 775 (1992) 

of 28 August 1992,

Recognizing the unique character of the present 

situation in Somalia and mindful of its deteriorating, complex and extraordinary nature, requiring 

an immediate and exceptional response,

Determining that the magnitude of the human 

tragedy caused by the conflict in Somalia, further 

exacerbated by the obstacles being created to the 

distribution of humanitarian assistance, constitutes 

a threat to international peace and security,

Gravely alarmed by the deterioration of the humanitarian situation in Somalia and underlining 

the urgent need for the quick delivery of humanitarian assistance in the whole country,

Noting the efforts of the League of Arab States, the 

Organization of African Unity, and in particular the 

proposal made by its Chairman at the forty-seventh 

regular session of the General Assembly for the organization of an international conference on Somalia, 

and the Organization of the Islamic Conference and 

other regional agencies and arrangements to promote 
150

reconciliation and political settlement in Somalia and 

to address the humanitarian needs of the people of 

that country,

Commending the ongoing efforts of the United Nations, its specialized agencies and humanitarian organizations and of non-governmental organizations and 

of States to ensure delivery of humanitarian assistance 

in Somalia,

Responding to the urgent calls from Somalia for the 

international community to take measures to ensure 

the delivery of humanitarian assistance in Somalia,

Expressing grave alarm at continuing reports of 

widespread violations of international humanitarian law occurring in Somalia, including reports of 

violence and threats of violence against personnel 

participating lawfully in impartial humanitarian relief activities; deliberate attacks on non-combatants, 

relief consignments and vehicles, and medical and 

relief facilities; and impeding the delivery of food 

and medical supplies essential for the survival of 

the civilian population,

Dismayed by the continuation of conditions that 

impede the delivery of humanitarian supplies to 

destinations within Somalia, and in particular reports of looting of relief supplies destined for starving people, attacks on aircraft and ships bringing 

in humanitarian relief supplies, and attacks on the 

Pakistani UNOSOM contingent in Mogadishu,

Taking note with appreciation of the letters of the 

Secretary-General of 24 November 1992 (S/24859) 

and of 29 November 1992 (S/24868),

Sharing the Secretary-General’ s assessment that the 

situation in Somalia is intolerable and that it has be-
151

come necessary to review the basic premises and 

principles of the United Nations effort in Somalia, 

and that UNOSOM’ s existing course would not in 

present circumstances be an adequate response to 

the tragedy in Somalia,

Determined to establish as soon as possible the necessary conditions for the delivery of humanitarian 

assistance wherever needed in Somalia, in conformity with resolutions 751 (1992) and 767 (1992),

Noting the offer by Member States aimed at establishing a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia as soon as possible,

Determined further to restore peace, stability and 

law and order with a view to facilitating the process 

of a political settlement under the auspices of the 

United Nations, aimed at national reconciliation in 

Somalia, and encouraging the Secretary-General 

and his Special Representative to continue and intensify their work at the national and regional levels to promote these objectives,

Recognizing that the people of Somalia bear ultimate responsibility for national reconciliation and 

the reconstruction of their own country,

Reaffirms its demand that all parties, movements 

and factions in Somalia immediately cease hostilities, maintain a cease-fire throughout the country, 

and cooperate with the Special Representative of 

the Secretary-General as well as with the military 

forces to be established pursuant to the authorization given in paragraph 10 below in order to promote the process of relief distribution, reconciliation and political settlement in Somalia;

Demands that all parties, movements and factions in 
152

Somalia take all measures necessary to facilitate the 

efforts of the United Nations, its specialized agencies 

and humanitarian organizations to provide urgent 

humanitarian assistance to the affected population in 

Somalia;

Also demands that all parties, movements and factions in Somalia take all measures necessary to ensure 

the safety of United Nations and all other personnel 

engaged in the delivery of humanitarian assistance, 

including the military forces to be established pursuant to the authorization given in paragraph 10 below;

Further demands that all parties, movements and factions in Somalia immediately cease and desist from all 

breaches of international humanitarian law including 

from actions such as those described above;

Strongly condemns all violations of international humanitarian law occurring in Somalia, including in 

particular the deliberate impeding of the delivery of 

food and medical supplies essential for the survival 

of the civilian population, and affirms that those who 

commit or order the commission of such acts will be 

held individually responsible in respect of such acts;

Decides that the operations and the further deployment of the 3,500 personnel of the United Nations 

Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) authorized by paragraph 3 of resolution 775 (1992) should proceed at the 

discretion of the Secretary-General in the light of his 

assessment of conditions on the ground; and requests 

him to keep the Council informed and to make such 

recommendations as may be appropriate for the fulfilment of its mandate where conditions permit;

Endorses the recommendation by the Secretary-General in his letter of 29 November 1992 (S/24868) that 
153

action under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United 

Nations should be taken in order to establish a secure 

environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia as soon as possible;

Welcomes the offer by a Member State described in 

the Secretary-General’ s letter to the Council of 29 November 1992 (S/24868) concerning the establishment 

of an operation to create such a secure environment;

Welcomes also offers by other Member States to participate in that operation;

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United 

Nations, authorizes the Secretary-General and Member States cooperating to implement the offer referred 

to in paragraph 8 above to use all necessary means to 

establish as soon as possible a secure environment for 

humanitarian relief operations in Somalia;

Calls on all Member States which are in a position to 

do so to provide military forces and to make additional contributions, in cash or in kind, in accordance with 

paragraph 10 above and requests the Secretary-General to establish a fund through which the contributions, 

where appropriate, could be channeled to the States or 

operations concerned;

Authorizes the Secretary-General and the Member 

States concerned to make the necessary arrangements 

for the unified command and control of the forces involved, which will reflect the offer referred to in paragraph 8 above.

Requests the Secretary-General and the Member 

States acting under paragraph 10 above to establish 

appropriate mechanisms for coordination between 

the United Nations and their military forces;

14. Decides to appoint an ad hoc commission 
154

composed of members of the Security Council to report to the Council on the implementation of this 

resolution;

15. Invites the Secretary-General to attach a small 

UNOSOM liaison staff to the Field Headquarters of 

the unified command [UNITAF];

Acting under Chapters VII and VIII of the Charter, 

calls upon States, nationally or through regional agencies or arrangements, to use such measures as may 

be necessary to ensure strict implementation of paragraph 5 resolution 733 (1992);

Requests all States, in particular those in the region, to 

provide appropriate support for the actions undertaken by States, nationally or through regional agencies 

or arrangements, pursuant to this and other relevant 

resolutions;

Requests the Secretary-General and, as appropriate, the States concerned to report to the Council on 

a regular basis, the first such report to be made no 

later than fifteen days after the adoption of this resolution on the implementation of this resolution and 

the attainment of the objective of establishing a secure 

environment so as to enable the Council to make the 

necessary decision for a prompt transition to continued peace-keeping operations;

19, Requests the Secretary-General to submit a plan 

to the Council initially within fifteen days after the 

adoption of this resolution to ensure that UNOSOM 

will be able to fulfil its mandate upon the withdrawal 

of the unified command;

Invites the Secretary-General and his Special Representative to continue their efforts to achieve a political 

settlement in Somalia;

Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.
155

Appendix K: Unified Task Force Troop List

Command and Staff

Commanding General: Lieutenant General 

Robert B. Johnston

Deputy Commanding General: Major General W. 

D. Moore, USA

Joint Force Air Component Commander: Major 

General Harold W. Blot

Chief or Staff: Colonel Billy C. Steed

Political Advisor: Mr. John Hirsch

Administration (J-1): Colonel L. Rehberger III

Intelligence (J-2): Colonel W. M. Handley, USA

Operations (J-3): Brigadier General Anthony 

C. Zinni

Logistics (J-4): Colonel Sam E. Hatton, USA

Plans and Policy (J-5): Colonel John W. Moffett

Command Control, Communications (J-6): 

Colonel Robert G. Hill

Executive Assistant (J-8/EA): Colonel Michael 

W. Hagee

Joint Information Bureau: Colonel Frederick C. 

Peck

Joint Visitor’s Bureau: Colonel R. J. Agro

Civil-Military Operations Center: Colonel Kevin 

M. Kennedy

Surgeon: Captain Michael L. Cowan, USN

Engineer: Colonel Robert B. Flowers, USA

Headquarters Commandant: Major Eric C. Holt

Joint Combat Camera Detachment: Lieutenant 

Commander James P. Kiser, USN

Coalition Forces

Australia

Commanding Officer: Colonel William J. Mellor, 

Australian Army

1st Battalion Group, The Royal Australian 

Regiment

1st Battalion, The Royal Australian 

Regiment

1st Battalion, Support Group

B Squadron, 3rd/4th Cavalry 

Regiment

Battery Commander’s Party, 107th 

Field Battery

17th Troop, 18th Field Squadron, 3rd Combat 

Engineer Regiment

Detachment, 103rd Signals Squadron

Naval 

Contingent

HMAS Jervis Bay

HMAS 

Tobruk

Belgium

Commanding Officer: Colonel Marc Jacqmin, 

Belgian Army

1st Parachute Battalion (Reinforced)

Headquarters Company

Support 

Company

11th 

Company

13th 

Company

21st 

Company

Reconnaissance Company

Engineer Platoon

Supply Platoon 

(Reinforced)

Surgical Team

Signal Platoon

Explosive Ordnance Disposal Team

Aviation Detachment

Judge Advocate General 

Team

Naval Contingent

HMS Zinnia
156

Botswana

Commanding Officer: Lieutenant Colonel 

Thulanganyo Masisi, Botswana Defense Force

Composite Reinforced Company

Command Section

1st Platoon (Mechanized)

2nd Platoon (Light Infantry)

3rd Platoon (Light Infantry)

4th Platoon (Light Infantry)

Special Forces Troop

Mortar Platoon

Medical Section

Transportation Section

Signals Section

Stores Section

Messing Section

Central Arms Depot

Engineer Section

Canada

Commanding Officer: Colonel Serge Labbe, 

Canadian Army

Canadian Joint Force Somalia

Canadian Airborne Regiment Battle Group

I 

Commando

2 Commando

3 Commando

Service Commando

DFS Platoon

Reconnaissance Platoon

A Squadron, Royal Canadian Dragoons

Engineer Troop

Signal Troop

Aviation 

Detachment

Naval Contingent

HMCS Preserver

Egypt

Commanding Officer: Colonel AJ-Fakhrani, 

Egyptian Army

Composite Reinforced Company

1st Platoon (Light Armored)

2nd Platoon (Light 

Armored) Logistics 

Platoon

Medical Section

Engineer Section

Maintenance 

Section

Logistics Section

France

Commanding General: Major General Rene 

Delhome, French Army

Command Element, 9th Marine Infantry 

Division

Battalion, 13th Foreign Legion DemiBrigade

Battalion, 5th Combined Arms Overseas 

Regiment

3rd Company, 3rd Marine Infantry 

Regiment

4th Company, 3rd Marine Infantry 

Regiment

3rd Company, 6th Foreign Legion 

Engineer Regiment

Detachment, 5th Combat Helicopter 

Regiment

Detachment, Special Forces

Detachment, Logistics Support Battalion

Naval Contingent

Frigate Georges Leygues

Light Transport La Grandiere

Amphibious Ship 

Foudre

Tanker Var

Germany

Commanding Officer: Lieutenant Colonel 

Meitzner, German Air Force

Three Luftwaffe C-160 aircraft operating 

from Mombasa, Kenya

Greece

Commanding Officer: Colonel Spilitios, Greek 

Army

Infantry Battalion (-)
157

India

Commanding Officer: Commodore Sam Pillai, 

Indian

Navy

Naval Contingent

Tanker INS Deepak

Amphibious Landing Ship INS Cheetah

Frigate INS Kuthar

Italy

Commanding General: Major General Gianpietro 

Rossi, Italian Army

Headquarters Element

Folgore Parachute Brigade

Headquarters Regiment

186th Parachute Regiment 

187th Parachute Regimen t

9th Assault Parachute Battalion

Logistics Battalion

Armored Vehicle Company

Engineer Company

Tank Company

Field Hospital “Centauro”

Surgical Detachment

San Marco Battalion (Marine Infantry)

Composite Helicopter Regiment

Detachment, 46th Aviation Brigade

Naval Contingent

Frigate ITS Grecale

Logistical Landing Ship ITS Vesuvio

Landing Ship Tank ITS San Giorgio

Kuwait

Commanding Officers: Lieutenant Colonel 

Mohamad al-Obaid, Kuwaiti Army

Major Al Muzien, Kuwaiti Army

Composite Reinforced Motorized Company

Company Headquarters

Armored Car Platoon

Scout Platoon

Medical Section

Engineer Section

Logistics Section

Communications Section

Military Police Section

Post Exchange Section

Public Affairs Section

Morocco

Commanding Officer: Colonel Major (brigadier 

general equivalent) Omar Ess-Akalli, Royal 

Moroccan Army

Base Section

3rd Motorized Infantry 

Regiment

Infantry Company

Infantry Company

Cavalry Company

Air Defense Artillery 

Element

Medical Section

New Zealand

Commanding Officers: Colonel Dunne, Royal 

New

Zealand Air Force, December 9, 1992 to March 

18,

1993

Wing Commander Duxfield, Royal New 

Zealand Air Force, from March 18, 1993

Detachment, 42 Squadron (3 Andover transport 

aircraft)

Nigeria

Commanding Officer: Lieutenant Colonel 

Olagunsoye Oyinlola, Nigerian Army

245 Reconnaissance 

Battalion

Battalion 

Headquarters

Administration Company

Company A (Mechanized 

Infantry)

Company B (Mechanized 

Infantry)

Company C (Reconnaissance 

Company)

Company D (Reconnaissance 

Company)
158

Pakistan

(Note: Does not include Pakistani forces in 

Somalia as part of UNOSOM I)

Commanding Officers: Colonel Asif, Pakistani 

Army

Lieutenant Colonel Tariq S. Malik, Pakistani Army

6th Battalion, The Punjab Regiment

7th Battalion, Frontier Forces

10th Battalion, Baluch 

Regiment

1st Battalion, Sind Regiment

Saudi Arabia

Commanding Officer: Colonel Ali al Sbehri, Royal 

Saudi Land Forces

5th Royal Saudi Land Forces Airborne Battalion 

(Reinforced)

Sweden

Commanding Officer: Lieutenant Colonel Lars A. 

Hedman, Swedish Army

1st Field Hospital

Tunisia

Commanding Officer: Lieutenant Colonel 

Sharif, Tunisian Army

Infantry Battalion (-)

Turkey

Commanding Officers: Colonel Huseyin Erim, 

Turkish Army, December 9, 1992 to March 25, 

1993

Major Haldun Solmazturk, Turkish Army, from 

March 25, 1993

1st Company, 1 Battalion Mechanized, 28 

Brigade

Headquarters Section

1st Platoon (Mechanized 

Infantry)

2nd Platoon (Mechanized 

Infantry

3rd Platoon (Mechanized Infantry

Fire Support Platoon

Quartermaster Platoon

Transport and Maintenance 

Platoon

Signal Section

Medical 

Section

Engineer 

Section

Naval Contingent

Landing Ship Tank 

Ertugrul

Logistics Ship Derya

Destroyer Fatih

United Arab Emirates

Commanding Officers: Lieutenant Colonel 

Alkefbi, United Arab Emirates Army, February 

9, 1993

Lieutenant Colonel Abdullah Ketbi, United Arab 

Emirates Army, from February 9, 1993

Al Wajeb Battalion

Headquarters 

Company

Services Section

Combat Engineer 

Platoon

81mm Mortar Platoon

Reconnaissance Company

2nd Company (Mechanized 

Infantry)

3rd Company (Mechanized Infantry)

United Kingdom

Commanding Officer: Wing Commander 

Humphrey, Royal Air Force

Two Royal Air Force C-130 aircraft flying out of 

Mombasa, Kenya

United States

Air Force Forces Somalia

Commanding Officers: Brigadier General Thomas 

R. Mikolajcik, USAF, December 9, 1992 to March 

2 9 , 1993

Colonel Wirthe, USAF, from March 29, 1993

Air Force Forces Somalia Staff, Mogadishu

437th Tactical Airlift Wing

5th Combat Communications Group

823rd Civil Engineering Squadron

Mogadishu Airfield Tactical Airlift Control Element
159

Mogadishu Airfield Support

Deployed Tactical Airlift Control Element

Army Forces Somalia

Commanding Generals: Brigadier General William

Magruder III, USA

Major General Steven L. Arnold, USA, December

22, 1992 to March 13, 1993

Brigadier Greg L. Gile, USA, March 13 to May 4,

1993

10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry)

2nd Brigade (Commando Brigade)

3rd Battalion, 14th 

Infantry

2nd Battalion, 87th 

Infantry

A Company, 1st Battalion, 87th Infantry

E Company, 1st Battalion, 87th Infantry

(Provisional)

Scout Platoon, 1st Battalion, 87th 

Infantry

Aviation Brigade (Falcon Brigade)

3rd Battalion (Assault), 25th 

Aviation

3rd Squadron, 17th 

Cavalry

10th Mountain Division Support 

Command

210th Support Battalion (Forward)

710th Support Battalion (Main) 

10th Signal Battalion 

41st Engineer 

Battalion

10th Military Intelligence 

Battalion

10th Military Police Company

Battery B, 3rd Battalion, 62nd Air 

Defense Artillery

Detachment, Battery A, 3rd Battalion,

62nd Air Defense Artillery

Joint Psychological Operations Task Force

Commanding Officer: Lieutenant Colonel Charles

Borchini, USA

8th Psychological Operations 

Battalion

Product Dissemination Battalion

9th Psychological Operations Battalion 

(Tactical)

Joint Special Operations Force

Commanding Officers: Colonel Thomas Smith, 

USA

Lieutenant Colonel William L. 

Faistenhammer, USA, after January 20, 1993

1st Battalion, 5th Special Forces Group

Company B

Company C

2nd Battalion, 5th Special Forces Group

Company A (Operation Provide Relief)

Company C

Joint Task Force Support Command

Commanding General: Brigadier 

General

Billy K. Solomon, USA

36th Engineer Group

43rd Engineer Battalion

63rd Engineer Company (Combat Support 

Equipment)

642nd Engineer Company (Combat Support 

Equipment)

74th Engineer Detachment (Diving)

95th Engineer Detachment (Fire Fighting)

520th Engineer Detachment (Fire Fighting)

597th Engineer Detachment (Fire Fighting)

33rd Finance Battalion (Provisional) (FSU)

602nd Maintenance Company

Detachment, 514th Maintenance 

Company

62nd Medical Group

32nd Medical Battalion (Logistics)

86th Evacuation Hospital

159th Medical Company (Air Ambulance)

423rd Medical Company (Clearing)

514th Medical Company (Ambulance)

61st Medical Detachment (Preventive

Medicine Sanitation)

73rd Medical Detachment (Veterinary)

224th Medical Detachment (Preventive

Medicine Sanitation)

227th Medical Detachment (Epidemiology)

248th Medical Detachment (Veterinary)

257th Medical Detachment (Dental)
160

485th Medical Detachment (Preventive 

Medicine Entomology)

528th Medical Detachment (Combat Stress 

Team)

555th Medical Detachment (Surgical)

Detachment, 513th Military Intelligence 

Brigade

593rd Support Group (Area)

4th Support Center (Material Management)

548th Supply and Services Battalion

62nd Supply Company

266th Supply Company (Direct Support)

364th Supply Company

7th Transportation Group

49th Transportation Center (Movement 

Control)

6th Transportation Battalion

24th Transportation Battalion

24th Transportation Company

57th Transportation Company

100th Transportation 

Company

119th Transportation 

Company

155th Transportation 

Company

360th Transportation Company

710th Transportation Company 

(Provisional) (Boat)

870th Transportation Company

22nd Transportation Detachment

160th Transportation Detachment

169th Transportation Detachment

329th Transportation Detachment

491st Transportation Detachment

2nd Chemical Battalion

720th Military Police Battalion

511th Military Police Company

571st Military Police Company

978th Military Police Company

984th Military Police Company

Military Police Criminal Investigation 

Element

240th Quartermaster Battalion

110th Quartermaster Company (POL)

267th Quartermaster Company

18th Quartermaster Platoon

26th Quartermaster Detachment

30th Quartermaster Detachment

82nd Quartermaster Detachment

22nd Quartermaster Laboratory

Detachment, 54th Quartermaster Company 

(Graves Registration)

Task Force Thunderbird (Signal)

209th Signal Company

516th Signal Company

Company C, 327th Signal Battalion

Detachment, Headquarters and 

Headquarters Company, 11th Signal Brigade

Detachment, 63rd Signal Battalion

Headquarters and Headquarters 

Detachment, 86th Signal Battalion

Detachment, 19th Signal Company

Detachment, 69th Signal Company

Detachment, 385th Signal Company

Detachment, 505th Signal Company

Detachment, 521st Signal Company

Detachment, 526th Signal Company

Detachment, 593rd Signal Company

10th Personnel Services Company

546th Personnel Services Company

129th Postal Company

711th Postal Company

Detachment, Company B (Air Traffic Control), 

1st Battalion, 58th Aviation

Task Force 5-158 Aviation

13th Ordnance Detachment (EOD)

60th Ordnance Detachment (EOD)

542nd Ordnance Detachment (EOD)

27th Public Affairs Team

28th Public Affairs Team

Marine Forces Somalia

Commanding Officers: Major General Charles 

E. Wilhelm, December 9, 1992 to March 23, 1993

Colonel Jack W. Klimp, March 23 to April 9 , 1993

Colonel Emil R. Bedard, April 9-28, 1993

Colonel Kenneth W. Hillman, April 28 to May 4 ,

1993

1st Marine Division (-) (Reinforced)

Headquarters Battalion, 1st Marine Division 

(-) (Reinforced)

7th Marines (-) (Reinforced)

Headquarters Company, 7th Marines

1st Battalion, 7th Marines

3rd Battalion, 9th Marines

3rd Battalion, 11th Marines (-) 

(Reinforced)
161

3rd Light Armored Infantry Battalion (-) 

(Reinforced)

3rd Amphibious Assault Battalion (-)

1st Combat Engineer Battalion (-) 

Reconnaissance Company, 5th Marines

Company C, 1st Tank Battalion (-) 

(Reinforced)

15th Marine Expeditionary Unit

2nd Battalion, 9th Marines (Reinforced)

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 

164 (Composite)

Marine Expeditionary Unit Service 

Support Group 15

24th Marine Expeditionary Unit

1st Battalion, 2nd Marines (Reinforced)

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 

263 (Composite)

Marine Expeditionary Unit Service 

Support Group 24

1st Surveillance, Reconnaissance and 

Intelligence Group

Headquarters Company (-)

1st Intelligence 

Company (-)

1st Force Service Support Group

Headquarters, 1st Service Support Group 

(Forward)

Headquarters and Service Battalion (-)

7th Engineer Battalion (-)

7th Motor Transport Battalion (-)

1st Landing Support Battalion (-)

1st Supply Battalion (-)

1st Maintenance Battalion (-)

1st Medical Battalion (-)

1st Dental Battalion (-)

Marine Aircraft Group 16

Headquarters, Marine Aircraft Group 16

Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 

369

Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 363

Marine Aerial Transport Refueler Squadron 

352

Detachment, Marine Heavy Helicopter 

Squadron 466

Marine Air Traffic Control Squadron 38 (-)

Detachment, Headquarters and 

Headquarters Service Squadron

Detachment, Marine Wing 

Communications Squadron 38

Detachment, Marine Air Traffic Control 

Squadron 38

Detachment, Marine Air Support 

Squadron 3

Detachment, Marine Air Control 

Squadron l

Detachment, Marine Wing Support 

Squadron 1

Detachment, Marine Aviation Logistics 

Squadron 16

30th Naval Construction Regiment

Headquarters, 30th Naval Construction 

Regiment

Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 1

Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 40

9th Communications Battalion

1st Radio Battalion

1st Naval Gunfire Liaison Company (-)

Integration Instruction Team

National Intelligence Support Team

Naval Forces 

Somalia

Commanding Officers: Rear Admiral William J. 

Hancock, USN, December 19-28, 1992

Rear Admiral (Lower Half) James B. Perkins 

III, USN, December 28, 1992 to January 15, 

1993

Captain J. W. Peterson, USN, January 15, 

1993 to February 1, 1993

Captain Terry R. Sheffield, USN, February 1, 

1993 to March 5, 1993

Captain Nathan H. Beason, USN, March 5-23, 

1993

Commodore Pyle, USN, from March 23, 1993

Ranger Battle Group

Cruiser Destroyer Group l

Destroyer Squadron 7

USS Ranger

Carrier Air Wing 2

Fighter Squadron I

Fighter Squadron 2

Attack Squadron 145

Attack Squadron 155

Air Anti-Submarine Squadron 38

Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron 

31

Helicopter Anti-Submarine Squadron 

14
162

Carrier Airborne Early Warning 

Squadron 116

Detachment 2, Helicopter AntiSubmarine Squadron Light 47 

Detachment 10, Helicopter

Combat Support Squadron 11 

USS Wabash

USS Valley Forge

Kitty Hawk Battle Group

Cruiser Destroyer Group 5

Destroyer Squadron 17

USS Kitty Hawk

Carrier Air Wing 15

Fighter Squadron 111

Fighter Squadron 51

Carrier Airborne Early Warning 

Squadron 114

Helicopter Anti-Submarine Squadron 4

Air Anti-Submarine Squadron 37

Fighter/Attack Squadron 27

Fighter/Attack Squadron 97

Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron 

134

Attack Squadron 52

Marine Detachment

Detachment, Explosive Ordnance Unit 

3

USS Leahy

USS W H. Standley

USS Sacramento

USS Tripoli

USS Juneau

USS Rushmore

Maritime Prepositioning Ship Squadron 2

Combined Task Force 156 (Tripoli ARG)

USS Tripoli

USS Juneau

USS Rushmore

USS Niagara Falls

Task Force 156 (Wasp ARG)

USS Wasp

USS El Paso

USS Louisville

USS Nashville

USS Barnstable County

Naval Beach Group 1

Assault Craft Unit I

Beachmaster Unit l

Amphibious Construction Battalion l

Cargo Handling Group l

Military Sealift Command Office, Mogadishu

Patrol Squadron Special Project Unit

Zimbabwe

Commanding Officer: Major Vitalis Chigume,

Zimbabwe Army

S Company, 42 Infantry Battalion (Reinforced)

81mm Mortar/Antitank Platoon

Medical Platoon
163

Appendix L: Seven Point Agreement Signed by 

Mohamed Farah Aidid and Ali Mahdi Mohamed 

(December 11, 1992)

1. Immediate and total cessation of hostilities and 

restoration of unity of the [United Somali Congress].

2. Immediate and total cessation of all negative 

propaganda.

3. To break the artificial lines in the capital city of 

Mogadishu.

4. All the forces and their technicals should report 

to their respective designated locations outside 

the city within the next 48 hours, and be controlled by the joint committee.

5. The already established reconciliation committee of the [United Somali Congress] should convene their meetings within the next 24 hours.

6. We call upon all Somalis throughout the country to seriously engage on cessation of all hostilities and join with us for peace and unity of 

Somalia.

7. We express our deep appreciation to the international community for its efforts to assist Somalia 

and appeal to it to extend and expand its assistance including not only humanitarian relief 

aid but also reconstruction and rehabilitation as 

well as a national reconciliation conference.
164

Appendix M: General Agreement and Supplement 

Signed in Addis Ababa (January 8 and 15, 1993)

General Agreement Signed in Addis Ababa on 

January 8, 1993

We, the undersigned Somali political leaders, meeting at the United Nations Economic Commission for 

Africa in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, from 4 January 1993 at 

the Informal Preparatory Meeting on National Reconciliation in Somalia, would like to thank the SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations, H.E. Boutros BoutrosGhali, who has facilitated this meeting in collaboration 

with the Organization of African Unity, the League of 

Arab States, the Organization of the Islamic Conference and the Standing Committee of the Horn of Africa.

We also thank the Government and people of Ethiopia, and H.E. Meles Zenawi, President of the Transitional Government of Ethiopia, for hosting the Meeting 

and for his personal engagement in assisting our efforts to reach the following agreement.

We, the Somali participants, further express our 

deep appreciation for the concern of the international 

community for the humanitarian crisis in our country 

and recognize their wish for us to reach a peaceful solution to our country’s severe problems.

After discussing ·our problems and considering all 

options, we have agreed on the following points:

1. The convening of a National Reconciliation 

Conference in Addis Ababa on 15 March 1993;

2. The declaration of an immediate and binding 

cease-fire in all parts of the country under the 

control of the concerned warring factions, subject to paragraph (a) below;

3. The immediate cessation of all hostile propa-
165

ganda against each other and the creation of 

an atmosphere conducive to reconciliation and 

peace;

4. The United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM). in consultation with the relevant regional and subregional organizations, will be 

responsible for the logistical preparations of 

the National Reconciliation Conference;

5. The establishment of further mechanisms for 

the continuation of free dialogue amongst 

all political factions and leaders in Somalia in 

preparation for the National Reconciliation 

Conference;

6. To continue and enhance our full and unrestrained cooperation with all international 

organizations working inside and outside Somalia to distribute humanitarian relief to our 

people;

7. To commit ourselves, without reservation, to 

facilitating the free movement of Somali people 

throughout the entire country as a measure of

confidence-building before the National Reconciliation Conference.

This agreement shall be valid upon completion 

and adoption by consensus on the following three 

points, and a separate communique will be issued 

before leaving Addis Ababa:

a. The establishment of the modalities for implementing the cease-fire amongst all warring parties 

and the creation of a mechanism for disarmament;

b. The agenda of the National Reconciliation Conference;

c. The criteria for participation in the National Reconciliation Conference.
166

This agreement, signed in Addis Ababa on 8 January 

1993, shall be considered binding on all the undersigned parties henceforth and all signatories shall 

be obliged to secure the support and implementation of this agreement amongst their movements 

and followers.

1. Somali Africans Muki Organization (SAMO)

Mr. Mohamed Ramadan Arbow, Chairman

2. Somali Democratic Alliance (SDA)

Mr. Mohamed Farah Abdullahi, Chairman

3. Somali Democratic Movement (SDM)

Abdi Muse Mayo; Chairman

Col. Mohamed Nur Aliyou, Chairman (SNA)

4. Somali National Democratic Union (SNDU)

Mr. Ali Ismael Abdi, Chairman

5. Somali National Front (SNF)

General Omar Hagi Mohamed Hersi, 

Chairman

6. Somali National Union (SNU)

Dr. Mohamed Ragis Mohamed, Chairman

7. Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM)

General Aden Abdillahi Noor, Chairman

8. Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) (SNA)

Col. Ahmed Omar Jess, Chairman

9. Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF)

General Mohamed Abshir Musse, Chairman
167

10. Southern Somali National Movement 

(SSNM) (SNA)

Col. Abdi Warsame Isaaq, Chairman.

11. United Somali Congress (USC) (SNA)

General Mohamed Farah Aidid, Chairman

12. United Somali Congress (USC)

Mr. Mohamed Qanyare Afrah, Chairman

13. United Somali Front (USF)

Mr. Abdurahman Dualeh Ali, Chairman

14. United Somali Party (USP)

Mohamed Abdi Hashi, Chairman

January 8, 1993

Addis Ababa, ETHIOPIA

Africa Hall

Agreement on Implementing the Cease-fire and 

on Modalities of Disarmament Signed in Addis 

Ababa on January 15, 1993

(Supplement to the General Agreement signed in 

Addis Ababa on January 8 , 1993)

We, the undersigned Somali political leaders, meeting 

in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on 15 January 1993 at the 

Informal Preparatory Meeting on National Reconciliation in Somalia;

Having agreed on the need for a viable and verifiable 
168

cease-fire to promote the peace process in Somalia;

Recognizing that such cease-fire is intricately linked 

to questions of disarmament;

Further recognizing that disarmament cannot be 

accomplished in a single event but through a sustained process;

Hereby agree on the following:

I. Disarmament

1.1 All heavy weaponry under the control of 

political movements shall be handed over 

to a cease-fire monitoring group for safe

keeping until such time as a legitimate 

Somali Government can take them over. 

This process shall commence immediately and be completed in March 1993.

1.2 The militias of all political movements 

shall be encamped in appropriate areas 

outside major towns where the encampment will not pose difficulties for peace. 

The encamped militias shall be disarmed 

following a process which will commence 

as soon as possible. This action shall be 

carried out simultaneously throughout 

Somalia. The international community 

will be requested to provide the encamped militias with upkeep.

1.3 The future status of the encamped militia 

shall be decided at the time of the final 

political settlement in Somalia. Mean-
169

while, the international community will 

be requested to assist in training them for 

civilian skills in preparation for possible 

demobilization. All other armed elements, 

including bandits, shall be disarmed immediately and assisted through rehabilitation 

and integration into civil society.

1.4 All other armed elements, including bandits, shall be disarmed immediately and 

assisted through rehabilitation and integration into civil society,

II. Cease-fire monitoring group

2.1 A cease-fire monitoring group comprising 

UNITAF/United Nations troops shall be established immediately. There shall also be a 

committee composed of representatives of 

the warring factions to interlocute with the 

monitoring group and observe the implementation of the agreement by UNITAF/

United Nations troops.

III. All sides agree in principle that properties unlawfully taken during the fighting shall be returned to 

the lawful owners. This shall be implemented as and 

when the situation allows.

IV. All POWs shall be freed and handed over to the 

International Committee of the Red Cross and/or UNITAF. This process shall commence immediately and be 

completed by 1 March 1993.

The present agreement shall enter into effect on 15 

January 1993.
170

Appendix N: Addis Ababa Agreement of the First 

Session of the Conference on National 

Reconciliation in Somalia (March 27, 1993)

After long and costly years of civil war that ravaged 

our country, plunged it into famine, and caused acute 

suffering and loss of life among our people, there is 

the light of hope at last: progress has been made towards the restoration of peace, security and reconciliation in Somalia.

We, the Somali political leaders, recognize how vital 

it is that this process continue. It has our full commitment.

By our attendance at this historic Conference, we have 

resolved to put an end to armed conflict and to reconcile our differences through peaceful means. We 

pledge to consolidate and carry forward advances in 

peace, security and dialogue made since the beginning of this year. National reconciliation is now the 

most fervent wish of the Somali people.

We commit ourselves to continuing the peace process 

under the auspices of the United Nations and in cooperation with the Regional Organizations and the 

Standing Committee of the Horn as well as with our 

neighbors in the Horn of Africa.

After an era of pain, destruction and bloodshed that 

turned Somalis against Somalis, we have confronted 

our responsibility. We now pledge to work toward the 

rebirth of Somalia, to restore its dignity as a country 

and rightful place in the community of nations. At the 

close of the Holy Month of Ramadan, we believe this 
171

is the most precious gift we can give to our people.

The serenity and shade of a tree, which according to 

our Somali tradition is a place of reverence and rapprochement, has been replaced by the conference hall. 

Yet the promises made here are no less sacred or binding.

Therefore, we, the undersigned Somali political leaders, 

meeting at Africa Hall in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia between 15 and 27 March 1993, hereby reaffirm our 

commitment to the agreements signed during the 

Informal Preparatory Meeting on National Reconciliation in January 1993.

In concord to end hostilities, and to build on the 

foundation of peace for reconstruction and rehabilitation in Somalia, we agree to proceed within the 

framework of the following provisions and decisions:

I. Disarmament and Security

1. Affirm that uprooting of banditry and crime is 

necessary for peace, stability, security, reconciliation, reconstruction and development in 

Somalia;

2. Further affirm that disarmament must and 

shall be comprehensive, impartial and transparent;

3. Commit ourselves to complete, and simultaneous disarmament throughout the entire country in accordance with the disarmament concept and timeframe set by the 

Cease-fire Agreement of January 1993; and 

request that UNITAF/UNOSOM assist these 
172

efforts so as to achieve a substantial completion of the disarmament within 90 days;

4. Further reiterate our commitment to the 

strict, effective and expeditious implementation of the Cease-fire/Disarmament Agreement signed on 8 and 15 January 1993;

5. Reaffirm our commitment to comply with 

the requirements of the Cease-fire Agreement 

signed in January of 1993, including the total 

and complete handover of weapons to UNITAF/UNOSOM;

6. Urge UNITAF/UNOSOM to apply strong and 

effective sanctions against those responsible 

for any violation of the Cease-fire Agreement 

of January 1993;

7. Stress the need for the air, sea and land borders of Somalia to be closely guarded by UNITAF/UNOSOM in order to prevent any flow 

of arms into the country and to prevent violation of the territorial waters of Somalia;

8. Further stress the need for maximum cooperation by neighboring countries to assure that 

their common borders with Somalia are not used 

for the movement of weapons in Somalia, in keeping with the United Nations arms embargo 

against Somalia;

9. Agree on the need to establish an impartial National and Regional Somali Police Force in all regions of the country on an urgent basis through 

the reinstatement of the former Somali Police 

Force and recruitment and training of young So-
173

malis from all regions, and request the assistance 

of the international community in this regard.

II. Rehabilitation and Reconstruction

1. Affirm the need to accelerate the supply and operation of relief, reconstruction and rehabilitation programs in Somalia;

2. Welcome the conclusion of the Third Coordination Meeting on Humanitarian Assistance to Somalia;

3. Express our appreciation to donor countries for 

their continued humanitarian assistance to Somalia and, in particular, for the generous pledge, 

made at the Third Coordination Meeting, to mobilize $142 million for relief and rehabilitation efforts in Somalia;

4. Call upon UNOSOM, aid agencies and donor 

countries to immediately assist in the rehabilitation of essential public and social services, and of 

necessary infrastructure, on a priority basis by the 

end of June 1993;

5. Assure the international community of the full 

desire of Somali leaders to reestablish, with the 

assistance of UNOSOM, a secure environment 

for relief, reconstruction and rehabilitation operations and the protection of relief and rehabilitation workers and supplies;

6. Condemn the acts of violence committed against 

relief workers and all forms of extortion regarding humanitarian operations;
174

7. Urgethe organizations within the UN system and 

NGOs to effectively utilize Somali human resources in the rehabilitation and reconstruction 

process in Somalia.

III. Restoration of Property and Settlement of Disputes

1. Affirm that all disputes must henceforth be settled by dialogue, negotiations and other peaceful and legal means;

2. Further affirm that all private or public properties that were illegally confiscated, robbed, stolen, seized, embezzled or taken by other fraudulent means must be returned to their rightful 

owners;

3. Decide to deal with this matter within the 

framework specified in the report of the committee on the peaceful settlement of disputes.

IV. Transitional Mechanisms

The Somali people believe that there is concurrence 

among the people of Somalia that Somalia must retain 

its rightful place in the community of nations and that 

they must express their political views and make the 

decisions that affect them. This is an essential component of the search for peace.

To achieve this, political and administrative structures 

in Somalia need to be rebuilt to provide the people as 

a whole with an opportunity to participate in shaping 

the future of the country.

In this context, the establishment of transitional 

mechanisms which pre pare the country for a stable 

and democratic future is absolutely essential. During 
175

the transitional period, which will last for a period of 

two years effective from the date of signature to this 

agreement, the emphasis will be upon the provision 

of essential services, complete disarmament, restoration of peace and domestic tranquility and on the 

attainment of the reconciliation of the Somali people. 

Emphasis will also be put on the rehabilitation and reconstruction of basic infrastructure and on the building of democratic institutions. All of this will prepare 

the country to enter a constitutional phase in which 

the institutions of democratic governance, rule of law, 

decentralization of power, protection of human rights 

and individual liberties, and the safeguarding of the 

integrity of the Somali Republic are all in place.

Therefore, we have agreed to a broad outline of a 

framework for a transitional system of governance to 

allow for the provision of essential services, the creation of a basis for long-term planning, and for the 

resumption of greater administrative responsibility 

by Somalis. In general terms, this system will be composed of four basic administrative components that 

will be mandated to function during the transitional 

period.

Taking into account the reality of the situation in 

Somalia today and the need for stability, we hereby 

agree to the establishment of the following four basic 

transitional organs of authority:

1. TheTransitional National Council (TNC)

The TNC will:

a. be the repository of Somali sovereignty;

b. be the prime political authority having legislative 

functions during the period in question;
176

c. interact, as appropriate, with the international 

community, including UNOSOM ;

d. appoint various committees, including the Transitional Charter Drafting Committee, as required;

e. appoint Officers for its various functions;

f. appoint the heads of administrative departments;

g. oversee the performance of the departments created; and

h. establish an independent Judiciary.

The TNC shall be composed of:

a. Three representatives from each of the 18 regions 

currently recognized, including one woman from 

each region;

b. Five additional seats for Mogadishu;

c. One nominee from each of the political factions 

currently participating in the First session of the 

National Reconciliation Conference;

2. The Central Administrative Departments (CADs)

The TNC will appoint the heads of the Central Administrative Departments, whose prime function will 

be to re-establish and operate the departments of civil 

administration, social affairs, economic affairs and humanitarian affairs, paving the way for the re-establishment and operation of a formal government. The CADs 

shall comprise skilled professionals having the ability 

to reinstate, gradually, the administrative functions of 

national public administration. The performance 

of these departments will be overseen by the TNC.
177

3. Regional Council (RCs)

Regional Councils shall be established in all the 

existing 18 regions of Somalia. The present 18 regions shall be maintained during the transitional 

period. The Regional Councils shall be entrusted 

primarily with the task of implementing humanitarian, social and economic programs in coordination with the TNC and will also assist in the conducting of the internationally-supervised census. 

The Regional Councils will liaise with UNOSOM 

II, UN specialized agencies, NCOs and other 

relevant organizations directly and through the 

Central Administrative Departments and Transitional National Council. The Regional Councils 

shall also be responsible for law and order at the 

regional level. In this regard, the law enforcement institution will be a regional police force 

and a regional judiciary. The District Councils 

(see below) in each region shall send representatives who will constitute the Regional Councils.

4. District Councils

District Councils shall be established in the present districts in every region. District council 

members shall be appointed through election or 

through consensus-based selection in accordance 

with Somali traditions. The District Councils 

shall be responsible for managing the affairs of 

the district including public safety, health, education and reconstruction.

V. Conclusion

The Conference agreed on the appointment, by 

the TNC, of a Transitional Charter Drafting Com-
178

mittee referred to in section IV 1 (d) above. In 

drafting the Transitional Charter, the Committee 

shall be guided by the basic principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and by the 

Somali traditional ethics.

The Conference agreed that the TNC shall appoint a “Peace Delegation” composed of political 

movements and other social elements to travel to 

all parts of the country for the purpose of advancing the peace and reconciliation process as well 

as to explain the agreements reached in Addis 

Ababa.

We further agree that the TNC shall appoint a 

National Committee to bring about reconciliation 

and seek solutions to outstanding political problems with the SNM.

The Conference also calls upon the international 

community and in particular on the neighboring 

states to facilitate the noble effort at reconciliation 

by providing moral and material support.

In conclusion, we the undersigned, in agreeing to the above, 

resolve that never again will Somalia suffer the tragedy of 

the recent past. Emerging from the darkness of catastrophe 

and war, we Somalis herald the beginning of a new era of 

peace, of healing and rebuilding, in which cooperation and 

trust will overcome hatred and suspicion. It is a message 

we must pass on to our children and our grandchildren so 

that the proud Somali family, as we knew it, can once again 

become whole.

We, the undersigned, hereby pledge to abandon the logic of 

force for the ethic of dialogue. We will pursue the process of 

national reconciliation with vigor and sincerity, in accor-
179

dance with this declaration and with the cooperation of the 

people of Somalia as a whole.

Recognizing the tragic and painful recent history of problems in our country, we pledge to achieve comprehensive 

national reconciliation through peaceful means. We 

also pledge to adopt, in all parts of Somalia, transitional 

measures that will contribute to harmony and healing of 

wounds among all the people of Somalia.

We invite the Secretary-General of the United Nations and 

his Special Representative in Somalia, in accordance with 

the mandate entrusted to them by the UN Security Council, 

to extend all necessary assistance to the people of Somalia 

for the implementation of this agreement.

SIGNATORIES

1. SAMO Mohamed R. Arbow

2. SDA Mohamed F. Abdullahi

3. SDM Abdi Musse Mayow

4. SDM (SNA) Mohamed Nur Alia

5. SNDU Ali Ismail Abdi

6. SNF Gen. Omar Haji Mohamed

7. SNU Mohamed Rajis Mohamed

8. SPM Gen. Aden Abdullahi Nur

9. SPM (SNA) Ahmed Hashi Mahmmud

10. SSDF Gen. Mohammed Abshir 

Mussa

11. SSNM Abdi Warsame Isaq

12. USC (SNA) Gen. Mohammed Farah H. 

 Aidid

13. USC Mohammed Qanyare Afrah

14. USF Abdurahman Dualeh Ali

15. USP Mohamed Abdi Hashi
180

Before proceeding to adopt the Agreement, I should also 

like to confirm to the participants that at the meeting of all 

political leaders yesterday, prior to the signing of the document they unanimously agreed that one of the five additional seats for Mogadishu would be reserved for Mr. Ali 

Mahdi. This understanding remains binding.
181

Appendix O: United Nations Security Council 

Resolution 814 (March 26, 1993)

RESOLUTION 814 (1993)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 3188th 

meeting, on 26 March 1993

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its resolutions 733 (1992) of 23 January 1992, 746 (1992) of 17 March 1992, 751 (1992) of 

24 April 1992, 767 (1992) of 27 July 1992, 775 (1992) of 

28 August 1992 and 794 (1992) of 3 December 1992,

Bearing in mind General Assembly resolution 

47/167 of 18 December 1992,

Commending the efforts of Member States acting pursuant to resolution 794 (1992) to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations 

in Somalia,

Acknowledging the need for a prompt, smooth 

and phased transition from the Unified Task Force 

(UNITAF) to the expanded United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II),

Regretting the continuing incidents of violence 

in Somalia and the threat they pose to the reconciliation process,

Deploring the acts of violence against persons 

engaging in humanitarian efforts on behalf of the 

United Nations, States, and non-governmental organizations,

Noting with deep regret and concern the continuing reports of widespread violations of interna-
182

tional humanitarian law and the general absence of 

the rule of law in Somalia,

Recognizing that the people of Somalia bear the 

ultimate responsibility for national reconciliation 

and reconstruction of their own country,

Acknowledging the fundamental importance of 

a comprehensive and effective programme for disarming Somali parties, including movements and 

factions,

Noting the need for continued humanitarian relief assistance and for the rehabilitation of Somalia’s 

political institutions and economy,

Concerned that the crippling famine and 

drought in Somalia, compounded by the civil strife, 

have caused massive destruction to the means of 

production and the natural and human resources 

of that country,

Expressing its appreciation to the Organization 

of African Unity, the League of Arab States, the Organization of the Islamic Conference and the NonAligned Movement for their cooperation with, and 

support of, the efforts of the United Nations in Somalia,

Further expressing its appreciation to all Member States which have made contributions to the 

Fund established pursuant to paragraph 11 of resolution 794 (1992) and to all those who have provided humanitarian assistance to Somalia,

Commending the efforts, in difficult circumstances, of the initial United Nations Operation in Somalia 

(UNOSOM) established pursuant to resolution 751 

(1992).
183

Expressing its appreciation for the invaluable assistance the neighbouring countries have been providing to the international community in its efforts 

to restore peace and security in Somalia and to host 

large numbers of refugees displaced by the conflict 

and taking note of the difficulties caused to them 

due to the presence of refugees in their territories,

Convinced that the restoration of law and order 

throughout Somalia would contribute to humanitarian relief operations, reconciliation and political 

settlement, as well as to the rehabilitation of Somalia’s political institutions and economy,

Convinced also of the need for broad ·-based consultations and deliberations to achieve reconciliation, agreement on the setting up of transitional 

government institutions and consensus on basic 

principles and steps leading to the establishment of 

representative democratic institutions,

Recognizing that the re-establishment of local and 

regional administrative institutions is essential to 

the restoration of domestic tranquility,

Encouraging the Secretary-General and his Special Representative to continue and intensify their 

work at the national, regional and local levels, including and encouraging broad participation by all 

sectors of Somali society, to promote the process of 

political settlement and national reconciliation and 

to assist the people of Somalia in rehabilitating their 

political institutions and economy,

Expressing its readiness to assist the people of 

Somalia, as appropriate, on a local, regional or national level, to participate in free and fair elections, 

with a view towards achieving and implementing a 

political settlement,
184

Welcoming the progress made at the United 

Nations-sponsored Informal Preparatory Meeting 

on Somali Political Reconciliation in Addis Ababa 

from 4 to 15 January 1993, in particular the conclusion at that meeting of three agreements by the 

Somali parties, including movements and factions, 

and welcoming also any progress made at the Conference on National Reconciliation which began in 

Addis Ababa on 15 March 1993,

Emphasizing the need for the Somali people, 

including movements and factions, to show the 

political will to achieve security, reconciliation and 

peace,

Noting the reports of States concerned of 17 

December 1992 (S/24976) and 19 January 1993 

(S/25126) and of the Secretary-General of 19 December 1992 (S/24992) and 26 January 1993 (S/25168) on 

the implementation of resolution 794 (1992),

Having examined the report of the SecretaryGeneral of 3 March 1993 (S/25354 and Add. 1 and 2),

Welcoming the intention of the Secretary-General to seek maximum economy and efficiency and to 

keep the size of the United Nations presence, both 

military and civilian, to the minimum necessary to 

fulfil its mandate,

Determining that the situation in Somalia continues to threaten peace and security in the region,

1. Approves the report of the Secretary-General 

of 3 March 1993;

2. Expresses its appreciation to the SecretaryGeneral for convening the Conference on 

National Reconciliation for Somalia in accordance with the agreements reached during 
185

the Informal Preparatory Meeting on Somali 

Political Reconciliation in Addis Ababa in

January 1993 and for the progress achieved 

towards political reconciliation in Somalia, 

and also for his efforts to ensure that, as appropriate, all Somalis, including movements, 

factions, community leaders, women, professionals, intellectuals, elders and other representative groups are suitably represented at 

such conferences;

3. Welcomes the convening of the Third United 

Nations Coordination Meeting for Humanitarian Assistance for Somalia in Addis Ababa 

from 11 to 13 March 1993 and the willingness 

expressed by Governments through this process to contribute to relief and rehabilitation 

efforts in Somalia, where and when possible;

4. Requests the Secretary-General, through his 

Special Representative, and with assistance, 

as appropriate, from all relevant United Nations entities, offices and specialized agencies, to provide humanitarian and other 

assistance to the people of Somalia in rehabilitating their political institutions and economy and promoting political settlement and 

national reconciliation, in accordance with 

the recommendations contained in his report 

of 3 March 1993, including in particular:

a) To assist in the provision of relief and in 

the economic rehabilitation of Somalia, 

based on an assessment of clear, prioritized needs, and taking into account, as 

appropriate, the 1993 Relief and Rehabilitation Programme for Somalia prepared 
186

by the United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs;

b) To assist in the repatriation of refugees 

and displaced persons within Somalia;

c) To assist the people of Somalia to promote and advance political reconciliation, 

through broad participation by all sectors 

of Somali society, and the re-establishment 

of national and regional institutions and 

civil administration in the entire country;

d) To assist in the re-establishment of Somali 

police, as appropriate at the local, regional 

or national level, to assist in the restoration and maintenance of peace, stability 

and law and order, including in the investigation and facilitating the prosecution of 

serious violations of international humanitarian law;

e) To assist the people of Somalia in the development of a coherent and integrated 

programme for the removal of mines 

throughout Somalia;

 f) To develop appropriate public information activities in support of the United Nations activities in Somalia;

g) To create conditions under which Somali 

civil society may have a role, at every 

level, in the process of political reconciliation and in the formulation and realization of rehabilitation and reconstruction 

programmes;
187

B

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the 

United Nations,

1. Decides to expand the size of the UNOSOM 

force and its mandate in accordance with the 

recommendations contained in paragraphs 

56-88 of the report of the Secretary-General 

of 3 March 1993, and the provisions of this 

resolution;

2. Authorizes the mandate for the expanded 

UNOSOM (UNOSOM II) for an initial period 

through 31 October 1993, unless previously 

renewed by the Security Council;

3. Emphasizes the crucial importance of disarmament and the urgent need to build on the 

efforts of UNITAF in accordance with paragraphs 56-69 of the report of the SecretaryGeneral of 3 March 1993;

4. Demands that all Somali parties, including 

movements and factions, comply fully with 

the commitments they have undertaken in

the agreements they concluded at the Informal Preparatory Meeting on Somali Political 

Reconciliation in Addis Ababa, and in particular with their Agreement on Implementing 

the Cease-fire and on Modalities of Disarmament (S/25168, annex III);

5. Further demands that all Somali parties, including movements and factions, take all 

measures to ensure the safety of the personnel 

of the United Nations and its agencies as well 

as the staff of the International Committee of 

the Red Cross (ICRC}, intergovernmental or-
188

ganizations and non-governmental organizations engaged in providing humanitarian 

and other assistance to the people of Somalia 

in rehabilitating their political institutions 

and economy and promoting political settlement and national reconciliation;

6. Requests the Secretary-General to support 

from within Somalia the implementation of 

the arms embargo established by resolution 

733 (1992), utilizing as available and appropriate the UNOSOM II forces authorized by 

this resolution, and to report on this subject, 

with any recommendations regarding more 

effective measures if necessary, to the Security Council;

7. Calls upon all States, in particular neighbouring States, to cooperate in the implementation of the arms embargo established by resolution 733 (1992);

8. Requests the Secretary-General to provide security, as appropriate, to assist in the repatriation of refugees and the assisted resettlement 

of displaced persons, utilizing UNOSOM II 

forces, paying particular attention to those 

areas where major instability continues to 

threaten peace and security in the region;

9. Reiterates its demand that all Somali parties, 

including movements and factions, immediately cease and desist from all breaches of international humanitarian law and reaffirms 

that those responsible for such acts be held 

individually accountable;
189

10. Requests the Secretary-General, through his 

Special Representative, to direct the Force 

Commander of UNOSOM II to assume responsibility for the consolidation, expansion 

and maintenance of a secure environment 

throughout Somalia, taking account of the 

particular circumstances in each locality, on 

an expedited basis in accordance with the 

recommendations contained in his report of 

3 March 1993, and in this regard to organize a 

prompt, smooth and phased transition from 

UNITAF to UNOSOM II;

11. Requests the Secretary-General to maintain 

the fund established pursuant to resolution 794 (1992) for the additional purpose of 

receiving contributions for maintenance of 

UNOSOM II forces following the departure 

of UNITAF forces and for the establishment 

of Somali police, and calls on Member States 

to make contributions to this fund, in addition to their assessed contributions;

12. Expresses appreciation to the United Nations agencies, intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations and the ICRC 

for their contributions and assistance and 

requests the Secretary-General to ask them 

to continue to extend financial, material and 

technical support to the Somali people in all 

regions of the country;

13. Requests the Secretary-General to seek, as 

appropriate, pledges and contributions from 

States and others to assist in financing the 

rehabilitation of the political institutions and 

economy of Somalia;
190

14. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the 

Security Council fully informed on action 

taken to implement the present resolution, 

in particular to submit as soon as possible a 

report to the Council containing recommendations for establishment of Somali police 

forces and thereafter to report no later than 

every ninety days on the progress achieved 

in accomplishing the objectives set out in the 

present resolution;

15. Decides to conduct a formal review of the 

progress towards accomplishing the purposes of the present resolution no later than 31 

October 1993;

16. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.
191

 Appendix P: United Nations Security Council 

Resolution 837 (June 6, 1993)

RESOLUTION 837 (1993)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 3229th 

meeting, on 6 June 1993

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its resolutions 733 (1992) of 23 January 1992, 746 (1992) of 17 March 1992, 751 (1992) of 

24 April 1992, 767 (1992) of 27 July 1992, 775 (1992) of 

28 August 1992, 794 (1992) of 3 December 1992 and 

814 (1993) of 26 March 1993,

Bearing in mind General Assembly resolution 

47/167 of 18 December 1992,

Gravely alarmed at the premeditated armed attacks launched by forces apparently belonging to 

the United Somali Congress (USC/SNA) against 

the personnel of the United Nations Operation in 

Somalia (UNOSOM II) on 5 June 1993,

Strongly condemning such actions, which directly undermine international efforts aimed at the 

restoration of peace and normalcy in Somalia,

Expressing outrage at the loss of life as a result 

of these criminal attacks,

Reaffirming its commitment to assist the people 

of Somalia in re-establishing conditions of normal 

life,

Stressing that the international community is 

involved in Somalia in order to help the people of 

Somalia who have suffered untold miseries due to 
192

years of civil strife in that country,

Acknowledging the fundamental importance of 

completing the comprehensive and effective programme for disarming all Somali parties, including 

movements and factions,

Convinced that the restoration of law and order 

throughout Somalia would contribute to humanitarian relief operations, reconciliation and political 

settlement, as well as to the rehabilitation of Somalia’s political institutions and economy,

Condemning strongly the use of radio broadcasts, in particular by the USC/SNA, to incite attacks against United Nations personnel,

Recalling the statement made by its President 

on 31 March 1993 (S/25493) concerning the safety 

of United Nations forces and personnel deployed 

in conditions of strife and committed to consider 

promptly measures appropriate to the particular 

circumstances to ensure that persons responsible 

for attacks and other acts of violence against United 

Nations forces and personnel are held to account 

for their actions,

Taking note of the information provided to the 

Council by the Secretary-General on 6 June 1993,

Determining that the situation in Somalia continues to threaten peace and security in the region,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the 

United Nations,

1. Strongly condemns the unprovoked armed 

attacks against the personnel of UNOSOM 

II on 5 June 1993, which appear to have been 

part of a calculated and premeditated series 
193

of cease-fire violations to prevent by intimidation UNOSOM II from carrying out its 

mandate as provided for in resolution 814 

(1993);

2. Expresses its condolences to the Government 

and people of Pakistan and the families of 

the UNOSOM II personnel who have lost 

their lives;

3. Re-emphasizes the crucial importance of the 

early implementation of the disarmament of 

all Somali parties, including movements and 

factions, in accordance with paragraphs 56-

69 of the report of the Secretary-General of 

3 March 1993 (S/25354), and of neutralizing 

radio broadcasting systems that contribute 

to the violence and attacks directed against 

UNOSOM II;

4. Demands once again that all Somali parties, 

including movements and factions, comply 

fully with the commitments they have undertaken in the agreements they concluded at 

the informal Preparatory Meeting on Somali 

Political Reconciliation in Addis Ababa, and 

in particular with their Agreement on Implementing the Cease-fire and on Modalities of 

Disarmament (S/25168, annex III);

5. Reaffirms that the Secretary-General is authorized under resolution 814 (1993) to take 

all necessary measures against all those responsible for the armed attacks referred to in 

paragraph 1 above, including against those 

responsible for publicly inciting such attacks, 

to establish the effective authority of UNOSOM II throughout Somalia, including to 
194

secure the investigation of their actions and 

their arrest and detention for prosecution, 

trial and punishment;

6. Requests the Secretary-General urgently to 

inquire into the incident, with particular emphasis on the role of those factional leaders 

involved;

7. Encourages the rapid and accelerated deployment of all UNOSOM II contingents to 

meet the full requirements of 28,000 men, all 

ranks, as well as equipment, as indicated in 

the Secretary-General’s report of 3 March 

1993 (S/25354);

8. Urges Member States to contribute, on an 

emergency basis, military support and 

transportation, including armoured personnel carriers, tanks and attack helicopters, to 

provide UNOSOM II the capability appropriately to confront and deter armed attacks 

directed against it in the accomplishment of 

its mandate;

9. Further requests the Secretary-General to 

submit a report to the Council on the implementation of the present resolution, if possible within seven days from the date of its 

adoption;

10. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.
195

Appendix Q: Joint Meritorious Unit Award 

for UNITAF Somalia

Citation:

Unified Task Force Somalia, United States Central 

Command, distinguished itself by exceptionally meritorious service in Operation RESTORE HOPE from 5 

December 1992 to 4 May 1993. During this period, the 

Unified Task Force organized and deployed the largest humanitarian assistance mission in history, a joint 

and combined task force of over 38,000 personnel. 

Rapidly establishing security in eight Humanitarian 

Relief Sectors in war-torn and famine-raged Somalia, 

they effectively neutralized warring factions that had 

paralyzed and devastated the country. Unified Task 

Force Somalia enabled the delivery of over 42,000 

metric tons of relief supplies to the starving population, disarmed warring factions, fostered a cease fire, 

and restored police and judiciary systems. It accomplished a major infrastructure rebuilding effort, restoring roads, airfields, seaports and public utilities 

that had been destroyed by two years of civil war. 

Through the intervention and leadership of Unified 

Task Force Somalia, relief efforts of over 60 different 

air and relief organizations and the support of 23 nations were coordinated and focused to reverse a human tragedy of famine and disease that was claiming 

the lives of thousands each day. Under the stability 

provided by Unified Task Force Somalia, the process 

of reconciliation and rebuilding began. The successes 

of the members of Unified Task Force Somalia in the 

accomplishment of national security objectives, and 

their exemplary performance of duty have brought 
196

great credit to themselves, their Services, the United 

States Central Command, and to the Department of 

Defense.

Given under my hand this 29th day of June 1993

Colin L. Powell

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
197

Endnotes

1. Nairaland Forum, Somali Proverbs, October 22, 2013, available 

from www.nairaland.com/1487904/somali- proverbs, accessed on October 28, 2015.

2. United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs webpage, “What are least developed countries?” available 

from http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/cdp/

ldc_info.shtml, accessed on January 22, 2016. A least developed 

country is a country that, according to the U.N., exhibits the lowest indicators of socioeconomic development, with the lowest Human Development Index ratings of all countries in the world. A 

country is classified as a least developed country if it meets three 

criteria:

• poverty (based on per capita gross national income),

• human resource weakness (based on indicators of nutrition, health, education and adult literacy), and 

• economic vulnerability (based on instability of agricultural production, instability of exports of goods and services, economic importance of non-traditional activities, 

merchandise export concentration, handicap of economic 

smallness, and the percentage of population displaced by 

natural disasters).

3. Population data source is www.populstat.info/Africa/somaliac.htm, accessed on November 11, 2015.

4. There is no clear agreement on Somali clan and sub-clan 

structures. Most sources agree on five clan-families: Darod, Dir, 

Hawiya, Isaaq, and Rahanwein. Some sources list the Digil clan 

under the Rahanwein clan-family, while others list it as a sixth 

clan-family.

5. In Article 23 of the Treaty of Peace between Italy and the Allied and Associated Powers on February 10, 1947, Italy renounced 

all right and title to its territorial possessions in Africa, including 

Italian Somaliland; and agreed they would continue under their 

present administration until their final disposition.

6. Colonel Dennis P. Mroczkowski, Restoring Hope: In Somalia 

with the Unified Task Force, 1992-1993, Washington, DC: History 

Division, U.S. Marine Corps, 2005 (hereafter Mroczkowski), p. 5.
198

7. Mroczkowski, p. 7.

8. Internationally recognized as an autonomous region of Somalia, Somaliland remained relatively stable after its de facto secession from Somalia.

9. In some sources, General Aidid’s last name is spelled “Aideed,” but the author uses the spelling “Aidid” as shown in the 

U.N. documents at Appendices J and K.

10. In June 1992, General Aidid formed the Somali National 

Alliance (SNA), which included Aidid’s USC faction and the SPM 

faction led by Colonel Ahmed Omar Jess.

11. Former dictator Siad Barre fled to Nairobi, Kenya, but Somali opposition groups with a presence there protested his arrival and support of him by the Kenyan government. On May 17, 

1992, he moved under pressure to Lagos, Nigeria, where he was 

granted political asylum. Barre died from a heart attack in Lagos 

on January 2, 1995.

12. Mroczkowski, p. 8.

13. United Nations webpage, “UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN SOMALIA I, UNOSOM I (April 1992 - March 1993): Historical Background”, available from www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/

missions/past/unosomi.htm, accessed on November 23. 2015 (hereafter Historical Background), p. 1.

14. Historical Background, p. 2.

15. Historical Background, p. 2.

16. Historical Background, p. 2.

17. Historical Background, pp. 2-3.

18. Historical Background, p. 3.

19. Historical Background, p. 4.

20. Nairobi Message 243067 to Secretary of State, July 30, 

1992; cited by Walter S. Poole in The Effort to Save Somalia, August 

1992-March 1994, Washington, DC: Joint History Office, Office of 

the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2005 (hereafter Poole), 

p. 8.

21. Poole, p. 11.

22. The Bush Administration’s National Security Council system comprised eight regional or functional Policy Coordinating 
199

Committees (PCCs); the Deputies Committee (DC) chaired by the 

Deputy National Security Advisor, and the Principals Committee 

(PC) chaired by the National Security Advisor. See John Prados, 

Keepers of the Keys, A History of the National Security Council from 

Truman to Bush (New York: William Morrell and Company, 1991), 

p. 548.

23. For example, Somalia had a long history of inter-clan mediation by elders, and extensive intermarriage among clans, to 

bring together rival clans. As Head of State, Siad Barre outlawed 

references to clan identity, stressed national unity, emphasized 

socialist ideology, and manipulated the clan system to oppress 

entire clans and encourage conflict among the clan-families. See 

john L. Hirsch and Ambassador Robert B. Oakley, Somalia and 

Operation Restore Hope, Reflections on Peacemaking and Peacekeeping, 

Washington, DC: U.S Institute of Peace Press, 1995, pp.4 and 8-9.

24. Mroczkowski, pp. 8-9.

25. Mroczkowski, p. 22.

26. USCINCCENT Commander’s Estimate of the Situation, 

dated November 22, 1992, cited by Mroczkowski, p. 22.

27. Poole, p. 15.

28. USUN message 5143 to Secretary of State, November 6, 

1992; cited by Poole, p. 15. Vietnam invaded Cambodia in 1979 

and overthrew the Khmer Rouge regime, but the Khmer Rouge 

continued a resistance movement against the Vietnamese, and 

later an insurgency against the new Cambodian government, until 1998.

29. Poole, p. 16,

30. Poole, p. 16.

31. Poole, p. 18.

32. Poole, p. 19.

33. Historical Background, p. 6.

34. Historical Background, p. 6.

35. President George H.W. Bush, “Address on Somalia,” 

December 4, 1991, available from http://millercenter.org/president/bush/speeches/speech-3984, accessed on January 22, 2016.

36. NWC White Paper, p. 3.
200

37. Poole, p. 23.

38. Poole, p. 22.

39. Poole, p. 23.

40. Poole, p. 23. It is unclear why Secretary-General BoutrosGhali switched from the term “disarmament” to the more ambiguous term “neutralization.” Perhaps he was seeking a political 

compromise with President Bush, who considered disarmament 

both infeasible and unnecessary to the success of the limited mission assigned to JTF Somalia. However, President Bush authorized the limited neutralization of the factions’ heavy weapons 

to prevent their use to interfere with relief operations. The subsequent UNITAF weapons control policy was to neutralize the 

factions’ heavy weapons by restricting them to designated cantonment areas under faction control.

41. General Joseph P. Hoar (USMC), “A CinC’s Perspective,” 

Joint Forces Quarterly (Autumn 1993), p. 56.

42. General Mikolajcik commanded the 437th Airlift Wing, 

which was based at Charleston AFB, South Carolina

43. A maritime prepositioning squadron carries enough supplies to support a force of 16,000 personnel for 30 days, but JTF 

Somalia would reach 23,000 personnel by late December 1992.

44. Psychological operations were subsequently renamed 

military information support operations (MISO).

45. Mroczkowski, p. 21.

46. Mroczkowski, p. 21.

47. JTF Somalia Operation Order, December 5, 1992, cited by 

Mroczkowski, p. 27.

48. Technical vehicles (“technicals”) were improvised weapon 

platforms, usually comprised of a pick-up truck or similar vehicle 

with a heavy machinegun or some other crew-served weapon 

mounted in the bed.

49. Mroczkowski, p. 34.

50. Lead elements of the French 9th Marine Infantry Division arrived from Djibouti on December 9. On December 13, the 

Belgian 1st Parachute Battalion and lead elements of the Italian 

Folgore Airborne Brigade arrived. A reinforced Kuwaiti motorized rifle company arrived on December 14. The lead elements of 
201

the reinforced Saudi 5th Airborne Battalion and reinforced Turkish 1st Company, 1st Battalion, 28th Mechanized Brigade, arrived 

on December 19. The advance party of the 1st Battalion Group, 

The Royal Australian Regiment, arrived on December 22.

51. In addition to the U.S. forces, UNITAF included military 

units from Australia, Belgium, Botswana, Canada, Egypt, France, 

Germany, Greece, India, Italy, Kuwait, Morocco, New Zealand, 

Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Tunisia, Turkey, United 

Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, and Zimbabwe.

52. Tiyegloo had always been an administrative part of the 

Oddur District, but the arbitrary grid-like method the JTF headquarters used to establish the eight sectors excluded it from the 

Oddur HRS

53. The name of this city is also spelled Marca, Marka, or 

Merca.

54. Mroczkowski, p. 51.

55. Carl von Clausewitz, edited and translated by Michael 

Howard and Peter Paret, On War (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 87.

56. U.S. Marine Corps, Fleet Marine Force Manual 1-1, Campaigning, Washington, DC: U.S. Marine Corps, 1990, p. 35.

57. Mroczkowski, p. 51.

58. Poole, p. 26.

59. Mroczkowski, p. 57.

60. Mroczkowski, p. 58.

61. Section 2420 of title 22, U.S. Code, specifically prohibits 

assistance to a foreign police force. However, section 2364 of title 

22 authorizes the President to furnish foreign assistance without 

regard to any provision of the Foreign Assistance Act, the Arms 

Export Control Act, any law relating to receipts and credits accruing to the United States, and any act authorizing or appropriating 

funds for use under the Foreign Assistance Act, when the President:

(1) Determines it furthers any of the purposes of the Foreign 

Assistance Act;

(2) Determines it is important to U.S. security interests to furnish such assistance; and
202

(3) Notifies in writing the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations 

of the Senate.

The President normally makes exceptions to Section 2420 by issuing a presidential directive granting authority to the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Department of State, to 

assist foreign police. However, President Bushed issued National 

Security Presidential Directive 36 in 2004, granting authority to 

the Commander, USCENTCOM, with the policy guidance of the 

Chief of Mission, to direct all U.S. Government efforts and coordinate international efforts in support of organizing, equipping, and 

training all Iraqi security forces, including Iraqi police. Similarly, 

President Obama issued a presidential directive in 2009 granting 

authority to Commander, USCENTCOM to support the training 

of Afghan police by the NATO Training Mission--Afghanistan. 

Congress has also granted specific legislative exceptions to the 

prohibition on providing U.S. assistance to foreign police, including authority to train foreign police involved in counter narcotics 

in Latin America and the Caribbean.

62. Section 2420 of title 22, U.S. Code, states, “On and after 

July 1, 1975, none of the funds made available to carry out this 

chapter, and none of the local currencies generated under this 

chapter, shall be used to provide training or advice, or provide 

any financial support, for police, prisons, or other law enforcement forces for any foreign government.” The 1991 Appropriations Act prohibited a foreign military financing program or international military education and training programs for Somalia, 

among other countries.

63. Mroczkowski, p. 61.

64. Mroczkowski, pp. 58-61.

65. Mroczkowski, pp. 140-142.

66. Mroczkowski, p. 27.

67. Mroczkowski, p. 68.

68. Douglas Porch, “Bugeaud, Galliéni, Lyautey: The Development of French Colonial Warfare,” in Peter Paret (editor), Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, Princeton, 

NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986, pp. 376-407.

69. Mroczkowski, p. 97.
203

70. Mroczkowski, p. 98.

71. Mroczkowski, p. 147.

72. Mroczkowski, pp. 27-29.

73. Poole, p. 28.

74. Poole, p. 30.

75. Poole, p. 34.

76. Poole, p. 34.

77. In April 1993, the new Secretary of Defense, Les Aspin, 

asked Congress to reprogram $750 million from Service procurement and research and development accounts to Service 

personnel and operations and maintenance accounts. Congress 

approved this reprogramming in July 1993. The actual cost of Operation RESTORE HOPE was $692.3 million. See Poole, pp. 32-33.

78. Poole, p. 35.

79. Poole, p. 35.

80. Poole, p. 35.

81. U.S. Army Center of Military History, The United States 

Army in Somalia, 1992-1994, http://www.history.army.mil/brochures/somalia/somalia.htm, accessed on October 26, 2015, p. 77.

82. USCENTCOM expected an afloat MEU to be the QRF supporting UNOSOM II, but the French warned General Hoar that 

they would withdraw if the United States did not keep a ground 

combat force in Somalia. USCENTCOM established a lightly 

armed 1,200-member Army QRF ashore with no armored vehicles, using assets from the 1st Brigade, 10th Mountain Division.

83. Poole, p. 38

84. Historical Background, p. 7.

85. Historical Background, p. 8.

86. Historical Background, p. 8.

87. Historical Background, p. 8.

88. Historical Background, p. 8.

89. A lead nation structure exists when all member nations 

place their forces under the operational control of one nation. The 

lead nation provides the command and staff framework with subordinate elements retaining strict national integrity See Joint Publication 3-16, Multinational Operations, 16 July 2013, p. xi.
204

90. Interview with Colonel Dennis Mroczkowski,-(USMC), 

cited by Mroczkowski, p. 147.

91. Mroczkowski, p. 147.

92. The relevant histories do not indicate when UNOSOM II 

or U.S. Forces, Somalia, were formally established.

93. The Army established a four-month rotation policy for 

Army units and personnel assigned to UNITAF. Under UNOSOM II, Army units and personnel served tours of six months 

to one year.

94. U.S. Army Center of Military History, The United States 

Army in Somalia, 1992-1994, http://www.history.army.mil/brochures/somalia/somalia.htm, accessed on October 26, 2015, p. 77.

95. U.S. Army Center of Military History, The United States 

Army in Somalia, 1992-1994, http://www.history.army.mil/brochures/somalia/somalia.htm, accessed on October 26, 2015, p. 77.

96 U.S. Army Center of Military History, The United States 

Army in Somalia, 1992-1994, http://www.history.army.mil/brochures/somalia/somalia.htm, accessed on October 26, 2015, p. 77.

97. At its peak in November 1993, UNOSOM II was a multinational force of 29,732 personnel from 29 nations. The largest 

force contributors were India (5,000), Pakistan (4,500), the United 

States (4,200, including the USCENTCOM QRF of 1,100), and Italy 

(2,600). No useful task organization chart is available for inclusion 

in this case study.

98. U.S. Army Center of Military History, The United States 

Army in Somalia, 1992-1994, http://www.history.army.mil/brochures/somalia/somalia.htm, accessed on October 26, 2015, p. 62.

99. Mroczkowski, p. 155.

100. Poole, p. 57.

101. Poole, p. 58.

102. The last U.S. forces left Mogadishu on March 25, 1994. By 

then, the French, German, Belgian, Italian, Turkish, and Tunisian 

contingents of UNOSOM II had already left.

103. Poole, p. 59.

104. Poole, p. 67.
205

105. Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations, August 11, 2011, 

pp. A-1 to A-5; and Joint Publication 3-07, Stability Operations, 

September 29. 2011, pp. I-16 to I- 20.

106. Stability operations functions include security, humanitarian assistance, economic stabilization and infrastructure development, rule of law, and governance and participation. See Joint 

Publication 3-07, Stability Operations, 29 September 2011, p. vii.

107. NWC White Paper, p. 5.

108. Colonel George F. Oliver, “The Other Side of Peacekeeping: Peace Enforcement and Who Should Do It?” in International 

Peacekeeping: The Yearbook of International Peace Operations, Volume 

8, Netherlands: Koninklyke, 2002, p. 101.

109. Mroczkowski, p. 51.

110. Poole, pp. 31-32.
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General William E. Rapp

Commandant

*****

PEACEKEEPING & STABILITY OPERATIONS 

INSTITUTE

Director

Colonel Daniel A. Pinnell

Assistant Director

Professor William J. Flavin 

Author

Glenn M. Harned

Colonel, U.S. Army (Retired)

Senior Editor

Dr. Raymond Millen

Publications Coordinator

Mr. R. Christopher Browne

*****

Composition

Mrs. Jennifer E. Nevil
USAWC Website

FOR THIS AND OTHER PUBLICATIONS, VISIT US AT

http://www.carlisle.army.mil/

This Publication PSKOI Website

ISBN: 978-0-9861865-8-5