### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-0 7 -00 658 -CV

Lar r y Br oo ks , A ppe lla nt

v. Mass Mar keting, Ltd., f /k/a Mass Marketing, Inc., d/b /a Su per S F oods , Appellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF COM AL COUNTY , 207TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. C2004 -04 97B , HO NORAB LE DIB WALDRIP , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N L arry Br o o k s sued Mass Mar keting , L td., doing business a s Super S Foods (“Super S”), for i n

j u ri es h e alleg edly

sustained in a slip-and- fall ac cident. B rooks obtained a favor able jury

verdic t of $75,000, and Super S filed a mo t i o n for judg ment notwithstanding the verdic t. The trial cour

t gr anted the motion in part a nd reduc ed B rooks’s aw ard to $25,000. On appea l, Brooks a

rg ues that the trial c ourt err ed in g rantingthe motion because the evidenc e wa s sufficie nt to support the $75,000 awar d. We will rever s e the tria l court’s judg ment and re nder jud g me nt o n th e jur

y ’s ve rd ic t.
F ACTUAL AND P ROCEDURAL BACK GR OUND L arr y Br ooks alleg edly

injured his back when he slipped and fell on a wet floor at the Super S g roce ry store. Approxim ately one month e arlier , Br ooks had slipped and f al l en at an HEB g roce ry

store. In his suit aga inst S uper S, B rooks alleg ed that the two incidents we re unr elated2

and that his bac k injury

(which e ventually

require d two surg erie s) was due entirely to his fall at the Super S store. At trial, Br ooks testified that, up until his fall at the Super S store, he wa s working bu t w a s una

ble to w or

k a ft e r t he fa ll. B ro ok s’ s b ro the r t e sti fi e d to the sam e effec t. B ro ok s a lso tes ti f ie d th a t h e w a s e ar

n in g a p p r o xim a te ly $ 2 8 , 0 0 0 p e r y e ar b e f o r e th e f a ll
. Su p e r S called no rebuttal witnesse s.

Th e jur y re tur ne d a ve rd ic t in

B ro ok s’ s fav or , f

ind ingthat Su

pe r S ’s ne g lig e nc e in inadequately

markingthe wet fl oor proximately cause d Br ooks’s fall. The jury awa rded B rooks $10,000 for phy sical pain a nd suffe ring , $10,000 for pa st phy sical im p ai rm ent, $5,000 for f uture phy sical impairment, and $50,000 f or past lost ear

ning c apac ity
. The jury awa rded B rooks nothing for f uture lost ear

ning c apac ity . The trial court rende red a final judgme nt that or dere d Super S to pay Br ooks the $75,000 in damag es found by the jury
. Sup e r S su

bs equen tly

fi le d a mot ion fo r j ud g me nt n otw ith sta nd ingthe ve rd ic t in which it argued that the e vidence introduced at tr ial did not support any awa rd for pa st lost earning capa city . At the hea

ring on the motion, Super S also arg ued that ther e wa s an irre concilable conflict betwee n the jury ’s finding of $50,000 in pa st lost earningcapa city

and its finding of

$0 in futur e lost earningcapa city
. The trial court requested supplemental briefing , and in its supplemental brief Sup e r S argue d f

or the fi rs t ti me tha

t B ro ok s’ s lost -e arn ing -c a pa c ity e vid e nc e vio late d T e xas C ivi l P rac tice and Re medies Code sec tion 18.091. See T e x. Ci v . Pr a c . & Re m. Co d e A n n . § 1 8 .091 (West 2008) (evide nce of lost earningcapa city

must reflec t impact of income ta x es).Br ooks’s appe llate brief incorre ctly states t hat we should revie w the trial c ourt’s ame nded 1 judgme nt using a

fac tual -s u ff

i ciency analy sis. W e dee m this m istake immaterial be cause fac tual insufficie n cy i s an ea sier standa rd to meet than le g al insufficie ncy , c om pa re Cai n v . B ain , 709 S
. W
. 2 d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986) (under fac tual-suffic iency

standard, c ourt may

set aside jury verdic t “if it is so contrary to the overw helming w eig ht of the evide nce a s to be clea rly wrongand unjust”), with T

anner v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. , 289 S.W .3d 828, 830 (Tex. 2009) (under leg al-suff iciency standard, c ourt may set aside jury verdic t only if it is not supported by more than a scintilla of compe tent evidenc e), a nd, as discussed be low, beca u s e Brooks would pre vail under either standa

rd. 3 Th e tr ia l c ourt fo un d a t le a st on e of Sup e r S’ s argume nts me ri tor iou s, tho ug h it did not spe cify which, and acc ording ly rende red an “ame nded final judgme nt” that set aside the jur y ’s finding of $50,000 in past lost earningcapa city
. The remainder of t he judg ment was not cha ng ed. On a pp e a l, B ro ok s argue s th a t th e c ourt e rr e d in dis re g ard ing the jur y ’s fi nd ingof

$5 0, 00 0 in

pa st l o s te ar n i n g c a p a c i t y.
STA ND AR D O F RE VI EW Whe n r e vie wi ng a gr ant o f j ud g me nt n otw ith sta nd ingthe ve rd ic t, w e c on du c t a leg al-suff iciency an al y s i s o f the evidenc e. See City of Keller v. W ilson , 168 S.W .3d 802, 823 (Tex. 2005). That is to say , a motion for judg ment notwithstanding the ve rdict shou ld be g rante d

1 only when the evidenc e is c onclusive and one par ty is entitled to recove r as a

matter of la

w, or whe n a leg al principle pr eclude s rec overy . Mancorp, Inc. v. Culpeppe r , 802 S.W .2d 226, 227 (Tex. 1990). Put another wa

y , the district co u rt may disreg ard a

jury ’s ver dict and re nder judg ment
no tw ith sta

nd ingthe ve rd ic t if

no e vid e nc e su

pp or ts t he jur y ’s fi nd ing s o r i f a dir e c te d ve rd ic t w ou ld have be en prope r. Se e Till e r v . M c Lur e , 1 21 S.W. 3d

70 9, 71 3 ( Te x. 20 03 ); Brown v. Bank of Galveston , 963 S.W .2d 511, 513 (Tex. 1998)
. The jury ’s finding s must not be dist urbed if mor e thanSuper S also argued that the tria l court er red in e x clu d ing c erta in other medica l rec ords 2 from evide nce. T hat issue was not material to Super S’s motion for judg ment notwithstanding the verdic t, however , beca

use improper ly

exclud ed evidenc e ca

nnot serve a s the basis for a judgme nt notwithstanding the ve rdict; it can only serve as the ba sis for a ne w trial. Se e Sa fe c o I ns . Co . v . J

. L. Henson, Inc

. , 601 S.W .2d 183, 186 (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas 1980, writ ref ’d n.r.e .). 4 a scinti lla of evidence supports them. See International A rmament Corp. v. King , 686 S.W .2d 595, 597 (Tex. 1985). To deter mine whether

the district court e rre d in re n d er i ng judgme nt notwithstanding the ve rdict, we revie w all evidence in a li g ht most favor able to the ve rdict, indulg ing
ever y rea sonable infe renc e in its favor. See W ilson , 168 S.W .3d at 821.
DI SCU SSIO N Super S made four arg uments to support its mot ion for judg ment notwithstanding the verdic t. Be cause the trial cour t did not specify

which of the se ar g uments it found meritorious, we must consider e ach of

them. See Fort Bend County Drainage Dist. v. Sbrusch , 818 S.W .2d 392, 394 (Tex. 1991) (if trial c ourt does not state g rounds for g rantingmotion for judgme nt notwithst anding verdic t, we uphold judg ment if any argument supporting motion was me ritorious). First, S u p e r S a r g u e d th a t m e d ic a l r ecor ds introduced at trial conclusively showed that Br ooks was disabled be fore his fall at the Super S store. I n this c ase, the medical r ecor ds produce d 2 do not conclusively

establish that Br ooks was disabled or entirely unemploy ed befor e the f all at Super S. I nstead, they

raised a fac t issue as to what Br ooks may have told his doctors at the time of the fa ll, an issue that the jury was re quired to re solve in light of the doc umentary evidenc e and Br ooks’s testimony

at trial. B rooks t estified that he inj ured his back when he fell at the Super S store
and th at th e me dic a l r e c or ds su g g e sti ngoth e rw ise we re inc or re c t. T he jur

y re so lve d th e iss ue in5

Br ooks' s favor , and we will not second-guess that determination, which requir ed a w eig hing of
cre dibilit y

and the we ight to be g iven the evide nce. See W ilson , 1 6 8 S
. W
. 3 d at 820 (“ I t is the province of the jury

to resolve c onflicts in evidence .”). Se c on d, Sup e r S argue d th a t B ro ok s’ s te sti mony on se ve ra l matte rs re le va nt t o h is damag es aw ard ( e.g. , his me dical and employ ment histories) was not c redible, so the jur y could not
re a so na bly have fo un d in

B ro ok s’ s f

a vo r. Th e law is wel l sett le d, ho we ve r, that c re dib ili ty deter mina t i o ns are the exclusive province of the jury
. See In re J

.L. , 163 S.W .3d 79, 86-87 (Tex. 2005). As a re sult, Brooks’s pur ported lac k of cr edibility

was not a pr oper ba sis for judg ment
no tw ith sta

nd ingthe ve rd ic t. Th ir d, Sup e r S arg

ue d th a t th e jur

y ’s fi nd ing of $5 0, 00 0 in pas t lost e arn ingc a pa c ity was irr econc ilable with its finding of $0 in fu t u re l o s t ear ning c apac ity . Super S is corre ct that irrec oncil ably

conflicting jury

finding s cannot stand. See B ender v . Southern Pac. Transp. Co. , 600 S.W .2d 257, 260 (Tex. 1980)
. I f jury finding s conflict irre concilably , howeve r, the prope r re lief i s a new trial, not judgme nt notwithst anding the ver dict. Se e In su ra nc e Co. of N . A m. v . B ro wn , 394 S.W .2d 787, 789 (Tex. 1965). I n this appea l, neither party has requested that we rema nd for a new tria l. Moreover , a cour t “may not strike down jury

answe rs on the g round of conflict if ther e is any rea sonable ba sis upon which they can be rec onciled.” Bende r , 600 S.W .2d at 260. Her e, such
rec onciliation is possi ble; the jury could have believed, f

or example, that Br ook s ’s b ack injury beca me l ess debili tating over ti me. Thus, the purporte d conflict be tween the jury ’s finding s was not a prope r basis for

judgme nt notwithst anding the ver dict.6 F ourt h, Sup e r S argue d th a t B ro ok s c ou ld no t recove r f or los t e arn ingc a

pa c ity beca use he violated Tex as C ivil Practice and R emedies Code section 18.091. See Tex. Ci v. Prac. & Re m. Code § 18.091 (evidenc e of lost ea rning capa city

m u s t ref lect impact of

income taxes). Super S waived that argument, howeve r, by failing to raise it in r esponse to the proposed jury char g e. See Intercone

x, Inc. v. Ugarov , 224 S.W .3d 523, 533 (Tex. App.—Houston [1s t Dist.] 2007, no pet.) (par ty waives se ction 18.091 as ground of err or by failing to raise it during trial) (c iting Te x . R. Civ. P. 272 and 274). Thus, Texas Civil Practice and R emedies Code section 18.091 was not a prope r basis for judg ment notwithstanding the ve rdict.

I n sum, we reje ct all four a rg uments Super S made to support its moti on for judg ment
n o t w i t h s t an d i n g t h e v e r d i c t
. W e t h e r e f o r e h o l d t h a tt h e t r i a l c o u rte r

r e d i ng r an t i n g t h e m o t i o n . In addit i o n , afte r re viewing all the evidenc e, we conclude that the evidenc e supporting the jury ’s fi nd ing of $5 0, 00 0 for pa st los s of ea rn ing c a pa c ity wa s n ot s o w e a k a s to re nd e r t he fi nd ingc le arl y wrongand manife stly

unjust. W e re verse the t ri al court’s amende d final judg ment and re nder j u d g m e n t o n t h e j u r

y’ s v e r d i c t t h a t B r o o k s r e c o v e r t h e f u l l $ 7 5 , 0 0 0 i nd a m a g e s f

o u n d b y t h e j u r

y, plus court costs and post-judg ment interest at the r ate se t forth in the trial cour t’s judgme nt.

__________________________________________ J . Woodfin J ones, Chief Just ice Be fore Chief J ustice Jones, J ustices Pury ear and Pember

ton Reverse d and Rende red Filed: De cembe r 8, 2009