ALLIANCES AND AMERICAN NATIONAL 

SECURITY

Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall

October 2006

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for his partnership at the inception of this monograph, Army 

Major Raymond A. Kimball for his superb research assistance, 

and the Carnegie Corporation of New York for providing research 

support under the auspices of the Carnegie Scholar program.

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iii

FOREWORD

One of the greatest challenges facing the United 

States today is the translation of its overwhelming 

might into effective influence. Traditionally, the United 

States has leveraged its power through bilateral and 

multilateral alliances. However, the end of the Cold 

War and the events of September 11, 2001, have led 

some policymakers and analysts to question the value 

of alliances in American foreign and defense policy. 

This monograph by Dr. Elizabeth SherwoodRandall, one of the nation’s leading specialists on 

alliance politics, makes the case that allies are more 

important than ever to the achievement of U.S. national 

security goals. She argues that existing American 

alliances need to be modernized and strengthened, 

and that new alliances should be established. She also 

stresses the value of peacetime security cooperation, 

which builds partnerships that may become alliances. 

Dr. Sherwood-Randall describes the need to evolve the 

concept of alliances to fit 21st century security threats 

that may not be confined to a particular region, such 

as proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or 

pandemic disease, and recommends the networking of 

key American alliance relationships into an “alliance 

of alliances.”

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director

Strategic Studies Institute 
iv

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

ELIZABETH SHERWOOD-RANDALL is the Adjunct 

Senior Fellow for Alliance Relations at the Council on 

Foreign Relations; a Senior Research Scholar at the 

Center for International Security and Cooperation 

at Stanford University; and a Senior Advisor to the 

Preventive Defense Project, a collaborative venture 

between Stanford and Harvard that develops innovative policy solutions to national security problems. 

She is also a 2004 Carnegie Scholar. She served as Deputy 

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Russia, Ukraine, and 

Eurasia from 1994-96. She was Associate Director of the 

Harvard Strengthening Democratic Institutions Project 

from 1990-93. She has been Chief Foreign Affairs and 

Defense Policy Advisor to Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr., 

and a Guest Scholar in Foreign Policy Studies at the 

Brookings Institution. Dr. Sherwood-Randall received 

her B.A. from Harvard College and her D.Phil. in 

International Relations from Oxford University, where 

she was a Rhodes Scholar. 
v

SUMMARY

The protection and advancement of the national 

security interests of the United States requires a 

greater investment than ever in alliances. In the 

intensely interconnected security environment of the 

21st century, the view that alliances are encumbrances 

rather than enablers is flawed strategically. Alliances 

are the antithesis of altruism or passivity. They are a 

highly self-interested proposition in that they are an 

essential instrument for advancing American national 

security. Going forward, the purpose of alliances in U.S. 

national security policy must be fourfold: To generate 

capabilities that amplify American power; to create a 

basis of legitimacy for the exercise of American power; 

to avert impulses to counterbalance American power; 

and to steer partners away from strategic apathy or 

excessive self-reliance. 

What does an alliance offer that the United States 

cannot obtain otherwise? Alliances are binding, 

durable security commitments between two or more 

nations. The critical ingredients of a meaningful 

alliance are the shared recognition of common threats 

and a pledge to take action to counter them. To forge 

agreement on threats, an alliance requires ongoing 

policy consultations that continually set expectations 

for allied behavior. In light of the unpredictable and 

amorphous nature of new security challenges, such 

consultations will be essential instruments of American 

leadership, especially with regard to building and 

maintaining consensus on ends and means. To 

generate the capacity to operate together, an alliance 

requires sustained preparations for combined action. 

What distinguishes an alliance from any other kind of 

cooperative relationship is the existence of interoperable 
vi

military capabilities that enhance prevention, provide 

deterrence, and contribute to effective defense. In the 

past, such action has resided largely in the domain of 

military cooperation; in the future, it will extend to a 

much broader set of collaborative activities that only 

recently have come to be understood as vital to national 

security.

Alliances can range in their obligations from the 

most expansive—“an attack on one is an attack on 

all”—to guarantees that are more limited in ambition. 

Across all alliances, the ideal is the creation of an 

entity in which the sum of cooperation between or 

among the participating states will be greater than the 

sheer arithmetic addition of the constituent parts. At a 

minimum, allies are expected to take into consideration 

the perspectives and interests of their partners as they 

make foreign and defense policy choices. The first 

impulse of allies should be to turn to one another for 

support; the last impulse should be to go without or 

around an ally, or to oppose and seek to thwart an 

ally’s policy goals actively. 

Alliances also create incentives for reaching 

multinational consensus. In the most effective alliances, 

participants benefit from a central coordinating 

mechanism that structures consultations and enables 

horse trading. Allies do not consider each policy 

issue narrowly on its own merits, but rather within 

the broader context of prior shared experience, 

concomitant items on the current agenda, and longerterm goals. Thus allies constantly are stimulated to 

consider how their interests dovetail with the interests 

of their partners in order to maximize support for their 

own priority initiatives. 

The array of alliance relationships that the United 

States maintains today provides a strong foundation for 

the exercise of American influence. However, it needs 
vii

to evolve in several critical dimensions to meet present 

and future needs. It must acknowledge that some 

traditional allies no longer depend on the United States 

for their survival as they did during the Cold War, and 

that the United States may depend more rather than 

less on its allies in Europe and Asia to achieve its global 

goals. Further, in the face of transnational dangers, 

the United States will need to promote alliances 

that are defined in broader terms than the classical 

geographically-based model. Transregional linkages 

among allies and alliances need to be forged in response 

to global threats. Finally, effective security cooperation 

necessitates a much wider embrace of governmental 

functions. A dense network of interactions will be 

required to deal with challenges such as proliferation 

and terrorism, which are less susceptible to traditional 

military tools and require intimate cooperation across 

previously “domestic” structures. 

Some evidence suggests that a tactical course 

correction is underway in the second term of the 

Bush administration. The president and his senior 

advisors have signaled a renewed appreciation of the 

utility of partners in pursuing American foreign and 

defense policy goals. Examples include the transition 

of responsibility for some sectors of Afghanistan from 

U.S. forces to NATO forces, a qualified endorsement of 

the European Union diplomatic approach to addressing 

the Iranian nuclear program, and continued deference 

to the six-party process for North Korea. Some bilateral 

alliance relationships also have been strengthened, most 

notably ties between Washington and Tokyo, although 

others, such as the American bond with Turkey, 

remain severely strained. However, to meet the future 

requirements of its national security, the United States 

needs to move beyond case-by-case actions toward the 
viii

strategic recognition that alliances are a net benefit. 

Long-term policies must be established to support and 

grow American alliances. 

The United States should pursue an alliance strategy

that is multifaceted, multilayered, and multi-yeared. 

This would entail a four-pronged approach: First, to 

build upon existing bilateral and multilateral alliance 

institutions, relationships, and capabilities; second, 

to promote the establishment of stronger ties that 

might become enduring alliances (both bilaterally and 

multilaterally) with several key countries and regions; 

third, to invest in peacetime security cooperation with 

countries that can be coaxed toward partnership and 

may in the future be capable of sustaining an alliance 

relationship; and fourth, to utilize the full spectrum of 

cooperative international arrangements that complement alliances. 

To achieve an enduring sense of common interest and 

purpose, it will not be sufficient to flex American power 

and expect others to fall in line. The United States must 

find ways to transform its power into a magnetic force 

that draws peoples and nations to its goals. It will not 

serve American national security interests to disparage 

multilateralism, nor to abandon the pursuit of enduring 

ties in the illusory hope that less formal arrangements 

will provide both flexibility and sustained support. The 

United States must rebuild its alliances and innovate a 

new kind of connectivity across countries, institutions, 

and regions that result in a broadly-based alliance 

system that is far greater than the sum of its disparate 

parts. The United States also must remain committed 

to the nitty-gritty effort to make it possible for foreign 

forces to operate capably alongside American troops, 

and to establish mechanisms that permit more effective 

security cooperation with international institutions 

and nongovernmental organizations.
1

ALLIANCES AND AMERICAN 

NATIONAL SECURITY

Do Americans know who their allies are? If the 

United States is attacked, do its citizens know who 

will stand with them? It is surprisingly difficult 

to answer these questions with certainty. Should 

Americans care if they have allies? The United States 

is the strongest nation on earth, the only standing 

superpower, and its natural impulse is to assume 

that it can act unencumbered. Paradoxically, America 

needs allies because of its overwhelming strengths 

and the vulnerabilities that lurk in the shadow of such 

unprecedented national power.

In this era of American predominance, alliances 

are more compelling than ever. Yet compiling a list 

of U.S. allies and alliances is a sleuthing game. No 

definitive policy document or reference book provides 

a straightforward answer.1 American citizens largely 

are unaware or uninformed; for example, in the recent 

uproar over the potential acquisition by a Dubai 

company of contracts for management of U.S. ports, 

many were ignorant of Dubai’s status as a long-standing 

partner providing critical support to American policies 

in the Persian Gulf. The lack of clarity underscores 

the fact that policymakers and analysts have failed to 

think strategically or systematically about the role that 

alliances should play in American national security 

in the 21st century. As a consequence, they also have 

failed to build and sustain the public support necessary 

for enduring global engagements. 

What does an alliance offer that the United States 

cannot obtain otherwise? Alliances are binding, 

durable security commitments between two or more 
2

nations. The critical ingredients of a meaningful 

alliance are the shared recognition of common threats 

and a pledge to take action to counter them. To forge 

agreement on threats, an alliance requires ongoing 

policy consultations that continually set expectations 

for allied behavior. In light of the unpredictable and 

amorphous nature of new security challenges, such 

consultations will be essential instruments of American 

leadership, especially with regard to building and 

maintaining consensus on ends and means. To generate 

the capacity to operate together, an alliance requires 

sustained preparations for combined action. In the 

past, such action has resided largely in the domain of 

military cooperation; in the future, it will extend to a 

much broader set of collaborative activities that only 

recently have come to be understood as vital to national 

security. 

Alliances can range in their obligations from the 

most expansive—“an attack on one is an attack on 

all”—to guarantees that are more limited in ambition. 

Across all alliances, the ideal is the creation of an 

entity in which the sum of cooperation between or 

among the participating states will be greater than the 

sheer arithmetic addition of the constituent parts. At a 

minimum, allies are expected to take into consideration 

the perspectives and interests of their partners as they 

make foreign and defense policy choices. The first 

impulse of allies should be to turn to one another for 

support; the last impulse should be to go without or 

around an ally, or to oppose and seek to thwart an 

ally’s policy goals actively. 

Alliances also create incentives for reaching 

multinational consensus. In the most effective alliances, 

participants benefit from a central coordinating 

mechanism that structures consultations and enables 
3

horse trading. Allies do not consider each policy 

issue narrowly on its own merits, but rather within 

the broader context of prior shared experience, 

concomitant items on the current agenda, and longerterm goals. Thus allies are stimulated constantly to 

consider how their interests dovetail with the interests 

of their partners in order to maximize support for their 

own priority initiatives. 

It is instructive to contrast an alliance with the 

current vogue in cooperation: the “coalition of the 

willing.” The two are entirely different organisms with 

respect to the durability of the commitment and the 

breadth of cooperation—in an era in which cooperation 

must go far beyond traditional military definitions. 

Indeed, the sloppy thinking that has characterized 

the argument that alliances can be replaced with 

such impromptu arrangements derives from a failure 

to recognize one fundamental fact: The capabilities 

that have been fielded by these groupings (despite 

their evident shortcomings) have derived almost 

entirely from underlying alliance commitments that 

over decades have coordinated national policies and 

prepared participants to operate together effectively 

on the battlefield. Recent coalitions of the willing have 

borrowed from investments made in long-standing 

alliances without acknowledging their debt. 

The differences could not be starker between 

alliances and coalitions of the willing in terms of value 

added over time. To borrow from the language of 

interpersonal relations, an alliance is akin to a long 

marriage, based on an initial lofty commitment that 

creates a context of comfort, convenience, and the 

pooling of resources. It also assures reliability because 

it sets clear standards about partners’ behavior. 

Although it eventually can be burdened by cyclical 
4

irritations, accumulated baggage, and the inevitable 

inclination to push each others’ buttons, the price of 

exit is high. 

A coalition of the willing is more like a summer 

romance, an intense but fleeting attachment, without 

any fundamental commitment, beginning with the 

best of behavior but deteriorating over time, and 

not infrequently ending in heartbreak. It confers 

less legitimacy and does not offer the promise of 

enduring loyalty, leading to a greater inclination on 

the part of members to “play the field,” and resulting 

in a relatively insecure and unpredictable security 

environment. Above all, a coalition of the willing 

forsakes the opportunity to invest over the long term 

and reap the consequent rewards. Comparing the two 

options, Ashton B. Carter has written that coalitions of 

the willing should be judged as “a desperate fallback, 

not a preferred vehicle for U.S. leadership.”2

ALLIANCES UNDER SIEGE

Across American history, alliances have occupied 

a dubious status in the minds of some strategists and 

practitioners and, indeed, in a segment of public opinion. Beginning with the Founding Fathers, the preference has been to “steer clear of permanent alliances,” 

avoid “entangling alliances,” and to enter only into 

“temporary alliances for extraordinary emergencies.”3

At the time of the establishment of the nation, the world 

power dynamic was notably different: The Americans 

were weaker than the Europeans who sought their 

support, and they feared being implicated in wars 

that that did not reflect the nascent national interest. 

But these early admonitions established the template 

for resistance to binding international commitments 
5

that could constrain U.S. freedom of action and drag 

America into unwanted conflict. 

Two centuries later, presidential candidate George 

W. Bush and his senior policy advisors upheld the 

enduring legacy of this skepticism about ties that might 

unduly influence U.S. policy choices. For the team that 

helped Bush prepare for the presidency, the end of the 

Cold War informed a world view that heralded the 

special role of American power and warned against 

the perils of multilateralism. Within a year of taking 

office, these perspectives would be sharpened by the 

requirements of waging war against terrorists who 

threatened the American homeland. 

In early 2000, Bush campaign advisor Condoleeza 

Rice laid down the marker that America’s “remarkable 

position” must define its global role. “Power matters,” 

she argued, “both the exercise of power by the United 

States and the ability of others to exercise it.” She 

derided those who are “uncomfortable with the notions 

of power politics, great powers, and power balances.” 

In a Bush Administration, America would use its 

unprecedented strength to shape the malleable postCold War world consistent with its interests, which 

will “create conditions that promote freedom, markets, 

and peace.”4 Ivo Daalder and James Lindsay use the 

term “hegemonist” to describe this approach, which 

holds that “America’s immense power and willingness 

to wield it, even over the objections of others, is the 

key to securing America’s interests” in a Hobbesian 

world.5

In rhetoric, the early statements by individuals who 

would become senior Bush administration national 

security officials generally were positive about alliances, 

though usually carefully caveated. Rice acknowledged 

that American interests “are served by having strong 
6

alliances” but added that “multilateral agreements 

and institutions should not be ends in themselves.”6

She expressed the strongest disdain for those who 

believe that the legitimate exercise of American power 

derives from the support of other states or international 

institutions, concluding that the foreign policy of a 

Republican administration would “proceed from 

the firm ground of the national interest, not from the 

interests of an illusory international community.”7

The case for assertive leadership of America’s 

alliances, consistent with Rice’s view on the privileged 

role of the United States, was set forth as well. Governor 

Bush made the case in 1999, emphasizing the guiding 

role the United States must play in the transatlantic 

relationship: “For NATO to be strong, cohesive and 

active, the President must give it consistent direction: 

on the alliance’s purpose; on Europe’s need to invest 

more in defense capabilities; and, when necessary, in 

military conflict.”8 Paul Wolfowitz outlined a more 

general theme the following year with a message 

intended to reach allies as well as adversaries who 

might choose to distance themselves from U.S. policy: 

The United States would use its power to reward 

supporters and punish those who undercut its global 

goals. Describing the American alliance “vocation,” he 

argued that, 

No Cold War lesson is more important than what 

can be learned from the remarkable U.S. record in 

building successful coalitions. This includes lessons 

about the importance of leadership and what it consists 

of: not lecturing and posturing and demanding, but 

demonstrating that your friends will be protected and 

taken care of, that your enemies will be punished, and 

that those who refuse to support you will live to regret 

having done so.9
7

With regard to the specific role of alliances in the 

arsenal of American power, skepticism was growing 

in Republican circles about whether they should and/

or could continue to play a central role in U.S. foreign 

policy. Underlying this doubt were emerging questions 

about whether there would be a sufficient overlap of 

fundamental interests to sustain alliance commitments 

and whether future international circumstances would 

be predictable enough to permit joint threat assessment 

and agreement on priorities and action.10

Furthermore, other kinds of less formal arrangements, such as coalitions of the willing, were gaining 

in appeal. Such groupings had been promoted during 

the Clinton administration by the Supreme Allied 

Commander for Europe General John Shalikashvili, 

who sought to establish a modality that would 

allow a self-selecting group of North Atlantic Treaty 

Organization (NATO) allies to engage in collective 

military action using Alliance assets but without 

implicating all members.11 The intent was to supplement 

rather than supplant the Alliance framework. Richard 

Haass subsequently put forth the related concept of 

“foreign policy by posse,” which offered the flexibility 

of “selected nation states coalescing for narrow tasks 

or purposes.” However, he also noted that, 

the informal coalition approach is not without significant 

drawbacks. By definition, such groups do not exist before 

the problem or crisis emerges. They therefore offer no 

deterrent—although, if formed quickly enough, they can 

still provide a preventive function. Informal coalitions 

take time to forge . . . The lack of common equipment, 

military doctrine, and common experience is likely to 

limit effectiveness. So, too, will a lack of resources.12

With the election of George W. Bush and the events 

of September 11, 2001 (9/11), many of the principles 
8

and perspectives articulated during the campaign 

would be operationalized. The decision to go to war 

in Afghanistan to rout the Taliban provided the first 

case. The administration chose not to accept offers of 

military assistance from NATO and sought instead to 

put together a coalition providing specific elements 

of support for the U.S. operation, such as permission 

for overflight and basing rights in Central Asia. When 

urged by a European leader to have lots of consultation 

and take into account the views of others, Bush 

asserted that “my belief is the best way that we hold 

this coalition together is to be clear on your objectives 

and to be clear that we are determined to achieve them. 

You hold a coalition together by strong leadership and 

that’s what we intend to provide.”13

In late 2001, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld 

reinforced the message that the United States might 

not choose to rely on mechanisms built during the 

Cold War to meet new security challenges, observing 

on CNN that “The worst thing you can do is to allow a 

coalition to determine what your mission is . . . It’s the 

mission that determines the coalition.”14 Thus began 

the effort to establish an ad hoc group of countries 

willing to fight the war on terror as defined by the 

United States. 

As it sought to build support for the invasion of Iraq 

over the course of the next 2 years, the administration 

made policy decisions consistent with the views set 

forth by leading Republican thinkers in 2000. In addition 

to its fundamental mistrust of ties that bind American 

power in pursuit of the interests of others and concern 

about the potential perfidy of allies and institutions 

that would not support or might even actively obstruct 

U.S. policy goals, the Bush team became alarmed about 

the practical liabilities of relying on others to conduct 

wars.
9

Emphasizing the imperative of being nimble and 

responsive in real time, President Bush announced 

in 2004 with reference to the United Nations (UN) 

that “America will never seek a permission slip to 

defend the security of our country.”15 This resistance 

to subjecting American national security policy to the 

scrutiny of an international organization extended 

to alliances. Looking back on NATO’s campaign in 

Bosnia and Kosovo—the first “hot” war ever fought by 

the Atlantic Alliance—attention focused increasingly 

on the cumbersome multinational decisionmaking 

processes that hampered U.S. diplomatic and 

military effectiveness.16 Further, the U.S. military’s 

after-action analysis process pointed up the tactical 

challenges of operating alongside allies who were 

not as technologically advanced as American forces, 

as well as the difficulties of preventing the misuse or 

abuse of intelligence information in a multinational 

environment.17 In the face of daunting new security 

challenges, the costs of allies seemed to outweigh 

the benefits. Charles Krauthammer summed up this 

perspective: “Interests diverge. No use wailing about 

it. The grand alliances are dead. With a few trusted 

friends, America must carry on alone.”18

Some evidence suggests that a tactical course 

correction is underway in the second term of the Bush 

administration. The president and his senior advisors 

have signalled a renewed appreciation of the utility of 

partners in pursuing American foreign and defense 

policy goals.19 Examples include the transition of 

responsibility for some sectors of Afghanistan from 

U.S. forces to NATO forces, a qualified endorsement 

of the European Union (EU) diplomatic approach to 

addressing the Iranian nuclear program, and continued 

deference to the six-party process for North Korea. 

Some bilateral alliance relationships also have been 
10

strengthened, most notably ties between Washington 

and Tokyo, although others, such as the American 

bond with Turkey, remain severely strained. However, 

to meet the future requirements of its national security, 

the United States needs to move beyond case-by-case 

actions toward the strategic recognition that alliances 

are a net benefit to it. Long-term policies must be 

established to support and grow American alliances. 

WHAT DOES AMERICA GET FROM ALLIANCES?

In the intensely interconnected security environment of the 21st century, the view that alliances 

are encumbrances rather than enablers is flawed 

strategically. Alliances are the antithesis of altruism or 

passivity: They are a highly self-interested proposition 

in that they are an essential instrument for advancing 

American national security. While it is self-evident 

that the United States should retain the right to defend 

itself, that old institutions must adapt to changing times 

and, given that less formal arrangements can make a 

meaningful security contribution, America’s national 

interests now require a greater investment than ever 

in alliances. Going forward, the purpose of alliances 

must be fourfold: To generate capabilities that amplify 

American power; to create a basis of legitimacy for 

the exercise of American power; to avert impulses to 

counterbalance American power; and to steer partners 

away from strategic apathy or excessive self-reliance. 

Generating Capabilities that Amplify 

American Power.

The Iraq war often is cited as an example of why 

traditional alliance relationships are no longer required 

or useful. This is wrong both with respect to Iraq itself 
11

as well as with regard to the underlying assumption 

that Iraq is the most likely model of future conflict. The 

involvement of some NATO allies on a national basis 

provided important (though not decisive) military 

support, and almost entirely depended on the years 

of doctrinal development, planning, equipping, and 

training undertaken by NATO members. Further, 

that the Atlantic Alliance was split over the decision 

to go to war and that key NATO allies such as France 

and Germany were unwilling to join in the military 

campaign ensured that the United States would not 

have broad multinational support and assistance in the 

much longer and more costly “post-conflict phase” of 

the effort. 

Even more important, the Iraq war is not likely to 

be the dominant paradigm for the engagement of U.S. 

military power in the 21st century. Although being 

prepared to conduct large-scale warfighting operations 

against a conventional opponent will remain necessary 

to enhance deterrence as well as deploy force, many of 

the threats America will face will not lend themselves 

to traditional military responses, much less unilateral 

ones. 

The short list of major threats which we can 

neither prevent nor respond to alone includes attacks 

by terrorists armed with nuclear and/or biological 

weapons (making the tragedies in New York, Madrid, 

Bali, and London look like child’s play); widespread 

proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) 

and long-range delivery vehicles, including to nonstate 

actors who have no return address and therefore 

cannot be deterred in traditional terms; a growing 

number of failed states that are perfect petri dishes for 

extremist groups; and the rise of “new” transnational 

security challenges such as pandemic disease. It is 
12

worthy of note that each of these threats may grow 

in danger in relation to the growth of another; for 

example, the proliferation of WMD beyond the current 

nuclear weapons states makes it much more likely that 

terrorists will be able to obtain them. In order to act 

preventively rather than react only after catastrophe, 

America needs access to an expanded toolkit that fully 

engages the capabilities of other countries as well as 

its own. It is hard to imagine any scenario in which 

the United States can respond effectively to these 

challenges without the sustained support of allies and 

partners, as it cannot hermetically seal its borders and 

cocoon itself within them. 

Across history, what has distinguished an alliance 

from any other kind of cooperative relationship between 

or among nations is the existence of interoperable 

military capabilities that enhance prevention, provide 

deterrence, and—should prevention and deterrence 

fail—contribute to effective defense. A fully evolved 

alliance is notable for its capability to undertake 

combined strategic planning, in which two or more 

nations’ national security establishments conduct 

threat assessments, anticipate future security needs, 

and commit to the development and implementation 

of a common program to meet the requirements 

generated by this process. Rather than scrambling to 

coordinate their capabilities in a crisis, allies can count 

on being prepared to operate alongside one another. 

Preparedness in the face of new security threats 

will require the expansion of strategic planning and 

coordination of effort across allied governments, 

involving agencies that previously did not consider 

themselves essential to national security. The dayto-day business of a meaningful alliance of the 

future will necessitate the collaboration of national 
13

security establishments, not just defense and military 

establishments. This will involve broader and deeper 

integrated planning, training, and equipping of 

personnel—including those that do not belong to 

departments or ministries of defense—than previously 

has been achieved. To be fully effective, the United 

States will need to lead an effort to link agencies 

of government that have not engaged in sustained 

multinational collaborative activities and which 

traditionally have resisted “foreign” access. This is 

most notable in the need for sharing intelligence and 

fusing data in real time. Such cooperation is very 

different from preparing to capture and hold territory 

in order to plant a victory flag on top of a hill.20

In the defense and intelligence domains, America’s 

extraordinary technological prowess presents an 

additional challenge to the full integration of allied 

capabilities. It is hard for most militaries to fight 

alongside American forces.21 Yet it is not in the 

American interest for its allies to lack capabilities, to 

use such a deficit as an excuse not to join in military 

action, or to be such a burden on the U.S. military 

that it resists taking allies along (as was the case in 

Afghanistan in 2001). Thus the United States needs 

to lead a continuing effort to make such coordination 

possible, working through established mechanisms 

provided by its alliance relationships. 

Creating a Basis of Legitimacy for the 

Exercise of American Power.

For the United States, the issue of legitimacy largely 

was dormant throughout the Cold War. America held 

the moral high ground; the enemy was repressive 

domestically and imperialistic abroad. Occasionally it 
14

chose to use its power in ways that strained relations 

with its allies, such as at Suez in 1956 or during the 

Vietnam War, but never to the breaking point; what 

held its alliances together was much more compelling 

than whatever centrifugal forces might be at work. 

In the aftermath of three seminal events—

November 9, 1989 (11/9, the fall of the Berlin Wall and 

what it presaged: the collapse of the Soviet Union and 

the Warsaw Pact); 9/11; and the decision by the Bush 

administration to resort to preventive war in Iraq—the 

game has changed. For the first time since the end of 

World War II, American legitimacy, or the very right 

to exercise America’s power on the world stage and to 

count on the support of others in doing so, has come 

under fire. Without legitimacy, it will not be feasible 

for the United States to make and sustain the alliance 

relationships that American national security requires. 

Thus the pursuit of legitimacy must be understood as 

an instrumental element of alliance policy. 

With traditional approaches to prevention, 

deterrence, and defense under siege, alliances offer a 

crucial mechanism for working to achieve an updated 

consensus on when and how to use force. Planning 

for and using American power in a multinational 

context provides the single most effective mechanism 

for ensuring that U.S. actions are perceived to be 

legitimate. Acting without such international “cover” is 

increasingly problematic, because it foments resistance 

to U.S. policies and because the United States needs 

the help of others to achieve its goals, especially in 

the arduous and extended aftermath of most military 

operations. Acting through its alliances, the United 

States can blunt the hegemonic edge of American 

leadership, share costs and risks, and increase the 

prospects of success.
15

The legitimacy conferred by alliance relationships 

can either strengthen the U.S. hand or reduce its 

effectiveness in another way. If America uses its power 

in ways that are perceived to respect international 

norms, it can bolster the global stature and influence of 

its allies. This creates a favorable climate for the pursuit 

of its national security goals. Conversely, if it chooses 

to act outside of its alliances, it undermines its allies’ 

international standing, making it harder for them 

to support American policies. This, in turn, makes it 

harder to achieve American objectives. Ultimately, 

the United States also risks diminishing the stature of 

leaders who are most closely identified with its policies 

leading to their ouster and the election of governments 

less committed to cooperation with the United States. 

Revealingly, President Bush’s closest ally in the war on 

terror, British Prime Minister Tony Blair, has pleaded 

with the United States to take a more cooperative 

approach. At the annual Davos conclave in January 

2005, he asserted: “If America wants the rest of the 

world to be part of the agenda it has set, it must be part 

of their agenda, too.”22

Averting the Impulse to Counterbalance 

American Power.

As America’s power has become ever more 

dominant, a growing inclination, even among its 

closest allies, is to seek means of constraining U.S. 

unilateralism—to bind the American Gulliver. In 

the Atlantic Alliance, this is due in part to historical 

European discomfort with the imbalance of power that 

rendered the members of NATO largely dependent 

on America for their security for half a century.23 The 

current effort to generate EU foreign and defense policy 
16

competencies in part reflects the impulse to create 

a counterweight. In the U.S.-Korean relationship, a 

new generation of Koreans now yearns to diminish 

American influence on regional security affairs and 

chart its own course, potentially balancing U.S. power 

through the cultivation of closer relations with China. 

Across history, states have formed alliances to 

enhance their power. The godfather of American 

realists, Hans Morgenthau, anchored the notion of 

alliances as force multipliers in the minds of many a 

national security expert. States act, he contended, based 

on interests—which largely are motivated by the quest 

for power and national stature—and therefore seek to 

establish alliances not as a matter of “principle, but of 

expediency.” By contrast, he argued, a nation will “shun 

alliances if it believes that it is strong enough to hold 

its own unaided” or if the obligations of partnership 

outweigh the benefits.24

The idea that alliances contribute to checking the 

imperial ambition of a nation or group of nations 

guided mainstream American foreign and defense 

policy intellectuals for a half-century. It animated 

the creation of a network of alliance relationships to 

contain Soviet expansionism in the early 1950s that 

transformed the U.S. global role. Further, the alliances 

built during that era provided a firm Western anchor 

for countries that might otherwise have wavered in 

their political orientation. They also offered vehicles 

through which allied militaries developed doctrine, 

equipped interoperable forces, and conducted 

continuous combined training. The reality of ongoing 

military-to-military cooperation between the United 

States and numerous countries around the world 

provided a strong deterrent as well as a warfighting 

capability. 
17

The pernicious power being balanced and contained 

by the post-World War II American alliance system 

evaporated nearly 15 years ago, resulting in a unipolar 

world in which the United States assumed the status of 

the lone superpower. Until recently, what the French 

have described as American “hyperpuissance” did 

not provoke alliance formation to counterbalance this 

unprecedented strength. The failure to do so can be 

explained by the fact that states resort to such binding 

ties that infringe upon their autonomy for the most 

part only when they perceive they are threatened.25

Warning signs abound, however, that perceptions 

of the United States and its role in the world are shifting 

from benign to malign. The view that American power 

presents a challenge to global peace and stability is a 

relatively new phenomenon. During the Cold War, the 

United States was the beacon of hope to many living 

behind the Iron Curtain. In a short period of time, 

public attitudes—even in countries that have been 

America’s closest allies—have shifted dramatically.26

The price of such intimate association is perceived to 

be increasingly costly. 

The more disproportionate is America’s strength, 

the more its alliances serve its purposes. The United 

States needs the support of others to pursue its 

global goals; as Richard Haass recently wrote in The 

Opportunity, “leadership implies followership.”27

By transmitting its power through binational or 

multinational structures, America undercuts potential 

balancing behavior. While the United States may prefer 

to be unconstrained by obligations to others because 

it is burdensome to have to accommodate the views 

of allies or to act in their interest, their cooperation is 

critical to meeting the security challenges of the 21st 

century. In this context, shunning alliances is actually 

contrary to Morgenthau’s realist tenets. 
18

Steering Partners away from Strategic 

Apathy or Excessive Self-reliance.

Another challenge facing the United States is the 

real danger that key allies will cease to believe that 

international security requires their active engagement. 

The end of the Cold War exacerbated latent tendencies 

in this direction, and the construction of a unified 

Europe has provided an internally-oriented focal point 

for many over the past decade. Such a divergence of 

attention has begun to create a divergence of interests 

that undermines solidarity in the Atlantic Alliance. 

Across the globe and under different circumstances, 

long-standing American ties in the Republic of Korea 

are facing challenges, especially from those born long 

after the Korean war who feel no debt to the United 

States, with the potential to significantly alter the 

security landscape in that region and beyond. 

Historically, American alliances have provided 

the framework within which the United States and 

its partners have built a strong foundation of shared 

values and sustained a constant process of public 

education that ensured continuing commitments to 

security cooperation. Among the original members 

of NATO, democratic institutions and processes have 

been a common denominator that strengthened their 

bonds; in cases where democracy has been shaky, U.S. 

leadership and engagement have provided leverage 

for democratic progress. Today, the growing ranks of 

democracies in Europe and Asia provide the most likely 

pool of allies that have a strong interest in maintaining 

global stability and an open economic system and 

can be inspired to retain or embrace a sense of 

international responsibility that can be translated into 

concrete capabilities and commitments. In the absence 
19

of the continuous political and military coordinating 

mechanism that effective alliances provide, America 

cannot assume that other countries will generate or 

maintain the consensus required to play a constructive 

global role. 

In the other extreme, countries that perceive their 

vital interests to be threatened but which do not feel 

confident that their security is embedded in a network 

of reliable relationships may be inclined to pursue 

autarkic paths that undermine rather than strengthen 

international stability. The history of efforts to prevent 

nuclear proliferation is instructive on this point. A 

number of key allies—notably Germany and Japan—

have benefited from the American nuclear guaranty 

and have, to date, foregone the development of their 

own nuclear weapons. This also has reduced stimuli 

for arms racing among their neighbors and rivals. 

Further, opportunities to establish cooperative security 

ties with the United States and NATO during the 1990s 

generated incentives for complete denuclearization 

in Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus. In those three 

cases, the promise to expand cooperation in the future 

was a major inducement for doing the right thing at 

the time. Looking forward, leaders seeking to distance 

their countries from the United States or feeling 

insecure about American policies could fan the flames 

of fanatical nationalism, leading some to revisit and 

possibly reverse their commitments to the Nuclear 

Non-Proliferation Treaty. 

WHAT ALLIANCES CAN AMERICA 

COUNT ON TODAY?

In 2006, the landscape of American commitments 

around the world—as well as the commitments that 
20

others have made to the United States—retains many 

of the features of the Cold War alliance system. In 

sum, the arrangements are neither systematic nor 

comprehensive. The durability of the old structures can 

be explained by several factors: the pent-up longing 

for association with the West that finally was requited 

after the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist 

Republics (USSR); the U.S.-led effort to redefine the 

missions of key alliances and partnerships in the 

1990s; sheer inertia; and that 15 years is a mere blip in 

human history, so that change may be underway but, 

as yet, is not entirely perceptible, especially because 

the generation that invested so much in Cold War 

institutions still retains some influence over the policy 

process in many allied countries. 

Looking at the globe, two major sets of alliance 

relationships are discernable, one cluster in Europe 

and one in Asia. They are vastly different in structure 

and in content. In addition, the United States maintains 

bilateral alliance relationships with countries in other 

regions, predominantly in the Middle East. What is most 

striking is that there is no overarching framework for 

America’s relationships abroad and that unparalleled 

U.S. power does not translate necessarily into the 

ability to achieve American security goals. In addition, 

there are broad swaths of territory across Africa and 

Latin America where the United States does not have 

alliances. In the Cold War, security analysts used to 

worry about a “strategy-force mismatch”; now they at 

least should be concerned equally about the “powerinfluence mismatch.” 

In the taxonomy of American alliance relationships, 

NATO has been the gold standard. The Article V 

security guarantee, which requires each member to 

come to the defense of any other, is without rival. Over 
21

its more than 50-year history, NATO has evolved an 

elaborate set of procedures, supported by a strong 

institutional framework that has both a political and 

a military dimension, that has provided the focus and 

momentum for joint action. Every day in Brussels 

(NATO’s political headquarters), Mons (NATO’s 

military headquarters), and a variety of diplomatic 

outposts and subordinate commands, the business of 

the alliance is conducted. Traditionally, an assignment 

to NATO has been considered to be prestigious and 

career-enhancing and consequently has been highly 

sought after by the best and the brightest public 

servants in allied nations, creating an elite network 

across all the member countries of individuals who are 

deeply invested in transatlantic ties.

Adding to its allure and to the swelling of its 

ranks, NATO adapted to changing times when its 

long-time “raison d’etre”—the Soviet threat—literally 

disappeared. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and 

the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, a new category of 

countries emerged on the world stage that for decades 

had either not existed or did not have the opportunity to 

choose an orientation or seek a meaningful international 

role. The United States led a concerted effort in the mid1990s to establish substantial bilateral security ties with 

each of these states, as well as between NATO and each 

of these countries. The implementation of this concept 

changed the map of Europe, erasing old dividing lines 

and creating new opportunities for collaboration in 

pursuit of common security interests.28

Asserting its operational relevance, NATO took the 

bold decision in the mid-1990s to engage in offensive 

military action for the first time in its history in the 

former Yugoslavia. In the past few years, it has put to 

rest the age-old argument about whether it would go 
22

“out-of-area” to advance and defend allied interests. 

While the United States made a mistake in not finding 

a way to take advantage of NATO’s invocation of the 

Article V guarantee when it went into Afghanistan 

in the aftermath of 9/11, subsequent efforts to bring 

NATO into the peacekeeping and reconstruction 

efforts there and in Iraq have considerably advanced 

its efforts to achieve consensus on a post-Cold War 

“out-of-area” role. 

Furthermore, the bilateral relationships that 

undergird NATO are among the strongest in world. 

Because of historic U.S. leadership of NATO, the ties 

between each of the now 25 national capitals and 

Washington have been an important component of 

the alliance commitment and an axis through which 

bonds have been cultivated and solidified. The 

“Special Relationship” between the United States and 

the United Kingdom has weathered many storms, 

but to this day the cooperation between the two has 

unparalleled scope and depth.29 Other relationships in 

the “Old Europe” share many of these features, and 

at times—especially in the case of France—the public 

expressions of acrimony are in direct proportion to the 

intensity of cooperation behind the scenes. In addition, 

for many years a discreet body known as “the Quad” 

functioned as a kind of steering committee for the 

Alliance, in which senior political and military officials 

from the United States, the UK, France, and Germany 

met regularly to discuss and coordinate policy 

initiatives. This has fallen into disuse as a consequence 

of Iraq and because of frustration on the part of other 

NATO members at being excluded from such an elite 

club. 

A number of new bilateral relationships have 

emerged over the past 15 years. With the collapse of 
23

the Soviet Union in 1991, its 15 constituent republics 

became independent countries; in addition, the Eastern 

European countries that had been held hostage by the 

Communist grip became free to choose their partners. 

The United States seized the initiative in the last decade 

of the century to build security cooperation relationships 

across Eurasia. From Poland to Uzbekistan, leaders 

chose to establish the most binding ties that the United 

States was willing to offer; in complement many 

aggressively sought membership in NATO. 

In Asia today, the United States faces an entirely 

different set of opportunities and challenges to the 

maintenance of durable security ties. No structure 

like NATO integrates American allies into a web of 

relationships or provides the vehicle for day-to-day 

policy coordination and combined military training that 

NATO offers. With Australia, Japan, the Philippines, 

the Republic of Korea, and Thailand, the United States 

has long-standing bilateral mutual security or defense 

treaties. Some provide reciprocal security guarantees; 

some are less explicit in their defense obligations. In 

the cases of Japan and Korea, the agreements have 

involved the basing of large numbers of U.S. troops. 

Pakistan and Thailand also have been designated a 

“Major Non-NATO Ally,” which is a title of uncertain 

distinction; they have become eligible for certain kinds 

of military assistance, including purchasing excess 

defense articles and participating in cooperative 

defense research and development projects. At last, 

India appears to be on the cusp of becoming an ally.

Several of these bilateral relationships are 

under considerable strain. Although some have 

been strengthened, such as the U.S.-Japan alliance, 

generational change in which the benefits of 

partnership with the United States do not have the 
24

same valence as they did during the Cold War (and 

indeed may have negative associations) will inevitably 

affect future attitudes. Continued fidelity cannot be 

assumed or assured unless America is effective in 

revitalizing commitments. Taiwan represents a unique 

case in which the United States has deterred Chinese 

aggression through close military cooperation but 

resists the aggrandizement of this relationship into 

alliance status.30

Although there is no NATO for Asia, there are a 

number of multilateral groups that address security 

issues. Some date to the period of “Pactomania” that 

characterized U.S. policy in the early years of the Cold 

War. These organizations, Australia-New ZealandU.S. Treaty (ANZUS) and Southeast Asia Treaty 

Organization (SEATO), never developed anything 

parallel to the institutional framework that grew up 

around the initial NATO commitment, and indeed the 

command and control apparatus for ANZUS has been 

largely absorbed by the U.S. Pacific Command. SEATO 

had no unconditional “attack on one is an attack on 

all” provision, and is now largely dormant. 

Since the end of the Cold War, several new structures 

have emerged in Asia, some of which involve the 

United States but several of which pointedly do not. 

Americans do participate in both Asia-Pacific Economic 

Cooperation (APEC), which deals principally with 

economics, and the Association of Southeast Asian 

Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum (ARF), a vehicle for 

security dialogue in the Asia-Pacific region. The newest 

entrant is the mechanism of the “Six Party Talks” 

that were established in 2003 to address the security 

challenge posed by North Korea’s nuclear ambitions; 

these involve the United States, China, Japan, Russia, 

and both North and South Korea. Washington and 
25

Seoul have expressed joint interest in this becoming 

a permanent consultative forum. In stark contrast, 

“ASEAN Plus Three”—a process involving Southeast 

Asian nations along with China, Japan, and the Republic 

of Korea—and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization 

(SCO), which involves China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 

Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan (and which recently 

extended observer status to India, Iran, Mongolia, 

and Pakistan), do not accord Americans a place at the 

table. 

DO AMERICA’S ALLIANCES MEET U.S. NEEDS?

The array of relationships that exists today provides 

a strong foundation for the exercise of American 

influence. However, it needs to evolve in several critical 

dimensions to meet present and future needs. First, 

the United States must accept the reality that its allies 

no longer depend as they once did on the American 

security guarantee. Second, the United States needs to 

spearhead a sustained initiative to reconcile the tension 

between the regional rootedness of its partnerships 

and the increasingly globalized nature of 21st century 

security challenges. Third, the United States should 

work to expand its alliance relationships to encompass 

a wider set of governmental and nongovernmental 

capabilities that provide tools to respond to the full 

range of threats that it will face. 

In the 20th century, Europe absorbed the lion’s 

share of America’s international energies. Although 

conflicts in other regions of the world preoccupied the 

United States from time to time, Europe dominated in 

terms of the attention and resources it absorbed and 

the partnership it offered in support of U.S. policies. In 

the 21st century, other regions of the world command 
26

American interest and engagement. With Europe 

reunified, “whole and free,” the United States is no 

longer riveted on its fate; so, too, the Europeans feel 

they no longer need to depend on the United States for 

their security as they did throughout the Cold War. The 

same may be said, albeit to a somewhat lesser degree, 

of American alliances in Asia. Overall, the tables are 

turning slowly: In the future, the United States—all 

powerful in one dimension but often hamstrung by its 

very might—may depend more rather than less on its 

allies in Europe and Asia to achieve its global goals.

Further challenging existing maps and mindsets, 

the United States is now faced with the phenomenon 

of globalization in all its dimensions. Though the most 

precise definition is an economic one,31 globalization 

has significant implications in the security domain, 

with consequences for threats as well as responses. 

With respect to alliances, it compels rethinking of 

some of the fundamentals. In the face of transnational 

dangers, alliances will need to be defined in broader 

terms than the classical geographically-based model. 

Transregional linkages among allies and alliances will 

need to be forged in response to the fact that many 21st 

century threats are global rather than regional. 

Within this context, effective security cooperation 

also necessitates a much wider embrace of governmental functions. This is true within the American 

government, between the United States and key allies, 

and among alliances that span the globe. Alliances 

provide the political framework, the fundamental 

underpinning, to broad engagement across agencies 

that affect national security. It will be necessary to build 

up over time, both bilaterally and in multinational 

alliances, a dense network of interactions. This will 

be crucial in dealing with threats such as WMD 
27

proliferation and stateless terrorism, which are less 

susceptible to traditional military tools and which 

instead require intimate cooperation across previously 

“domestic” structures such as departments of justice, 

treasury, health, and law enforcement. Old notions 

of protection of national intelligence assets also are 

challenged severely by the imperatives of addressing 

new threats, where the sharing of information on a 

timely basis may make the difference between life and 

death for millions. 

HOW DOES AMERICA GET THERE FROM HERE? 

An American alliance strategy would take a 

comprehensive, long-range view of national security 

requirements and would bemultifaceted, multilayered, 

and multiyear. It would commit the United States to a 

four-pronged policy: first, to build upon existing bilateral and multilateral alliance institutions, relationships, and capabilities; second, to promote the 

establishment of stronger ties that might become 

enduring alliances (both bilaterally and multilaterally) 

with several key countries and regions; third, to invest 

in peacetime security cooperation with countries that 

can be coaxed toward partnership and may in the 

future be capable of sustaining an alliance relationship; 

and fourth, to utilize the full spectrum of cooperative 

international arrangements that complement 

alliances.

To follow these simultaneous paths, American 

policymakers would need to pursue a new approach 

to the leadership and management of its alliances. 

Shouldering the preponderance of the burden and 

wielding proportionate clout is no longer a sustainable 

posture for the United States; the imbalance of 
28

unipolarity requires a shrewder distribution of power 

and responsibility. To protect and advance American 

national interests, the United States needs to empower 

others in order to build and sustain consensus regarding 

the most challenging security issues of our times. 

The hard bargain that would need to be struck 

would be that America’s allies would earn increasing 

clout as they generate meaningful capabilities and 

demonstrate a willingness to use them in the face of real 

threats. Going forward, this would mean that rather 

than assuming the magnanimous—and sometimes 

patronizing—role of the guarantor of security in 

alliance relationships, and assuming that it therefore 

should be accorded the dominant voice in setting the 

agenda, in developing policy initiatives, and in deciding 

on courses of action, the United States explicitly would 

give allies more voice and more capacity to influence 

their own future in exchange for their assumption of 

greater responsibility. In some instances, the United 

States would delegate power in order to accrue it. 

First Prong: Build upon Existing Bilateral and 

Multilateral Institutions, Relationships, and 

Capabilities, and Create a Network among Them.

The vitality and magnetism of existing alliance 

relationships, both bilateral and multilateral, should not 

be underestimated. The attraction of what during the 

Cold War was referred to as the “West,” as evidenced 

by the long list of countries still clamoring to get into 

NATO, is testimony to this fact. Indeed, throughout 

the administrations of George H. W. Bush and Bill 

Clinton, American power—and indeed America’s 

status as the lone remaining superpower—generated 

little antipathy. Instead, countries that had been barred 
29

from engagement with the United States leapt at the 

opportunity to establishing the most binding ties that 

Washington was willing to offer. 

In the aftermath of the first term of George W. 

Bush, a number of long-standing close allies distanced 

themselves from the United States. Polling data shows a 

huge drop in public support for American policies and 

doubts about America’s role in the world. However, 

goodwill—and a longing to work constructively 

together—still remains, especially among the older 

generation that recalls the role America played in 

ensuring freedom in Europe and Asia and among 

elites that have much invested in transatlantic ties. For 

the younger generations, U.S. behavior now and in the 

near future will influence profoundly whether they see 

American leadership as benign or malign. 

The Bush administration needs to undertake a 

major effort to renew the most important bilateral 

relationships. Spanning the globe from Turkey to the 

Republic of Korea, from Brazil to Poland, a systematic 

and sustained commitment to listening to allies 

is required urgently. Consultation must be more 

than just informing counterparts of predetermined 

American positions; it must take their perspectives 

into consideration while policies are being formulated. 

Genuine give and take is crucial to the achievement of 

consensus on threats and responses. Furthermore, in 

numerous cases these bilateral ties also are the essential 

building blocks of multinational alliances. 

Given the pace of globalization and the transnational 

and transregional nature of new threats, it makes sense 

to ask whether the existing regionally-based alliance 

structures are outdated. To a certain extent, geography 

is still destiny, and the neighborhood in which a state 

exists will play a great part in shaping its security 
30

perspective and in determining its participation in 

alliances. But to be relevant to the full range of real and 

potential security challenges, alliances increasingly 

must be functionally oriented. NATO already has 

realized this important trend and has transformed 

itself, moving from a strict definition of its theater 

of operations to common acceptance that its only 

meaningful missions will most likely be “out-of-area.” 

Extending this concept further, NATO should 

pursue a greater degree of interface and potential 

formal coordination with other countries, groups, and 

organizations. Already, some of this is taking place, 

through mechanisms such as the Istanbul Cooperation 

Initiative, Mediterranean Dialogue, and Southeast 

Europe Initiative; in discussions of expanded linkages 

with Israel; in structured partnerships with Russia 

and Ukraine; and in dialogues with Australia, Japan, 

and the Republic of Korea. However, no overarching 

conceptual framework exists for these arrangements. 

The evolution of mechanisms for marrying NATO’s 

competencies with the EU potential will be critical in 

this regard as well, especially as the EU seeks to expand 

its range of competencies.32

In Asia, U.S. interests dictate the maintenance of a 

robust diplomatic, economic and military presence for 

many reasons. In the cases of Japan and the Republic of 

Korea, it is far preferable to wrestle with disagreements 

within the context of an alliance relationship than to 

succumb to pressures that would cast either one of 

them strategically adrift. Further, the presence of U.S. 

forces in both countries ensures that neither begins to 

feel that it is isolated in playing its role as an American 

ally; should the U.S. presence be reduced drastically 

or terminated in one, pressures could mount in the 

other to follow suit. As China plays an increasingly 
31

shrewd game in the region, cultivating opportunities to 

enhance its power in ways that may diminish the U.S. 

role, America’s Asian alliances become all the more 

significant. Furthermore, they are necessary building 

blocks for collective responses to global security 

challenges. 

Looking to the longer term, the United States 

should seek to establish a worldwide network of key 

allies, with the objective of establishing an alliance of 

alliances. This would permit bridge-building between 

and among existing institutional arrangements, and 

would facilitate linkages with broader organizations 

such as the G8, the OSCE and the UN. It would 

allow each to perform to its competitive advantage, 

marrying competences in diplomacy, economics, and 

defense. Such a multiplicity of capabilities is required 

urgently in meeting threats such as those posed by 

transnational terrorist groups—threats which require 

far more extensive and intimate cooperation than the 

coordination of military action and which themselves 

exploit the network model. Such an approach also 

would take advantage of what exists and what does 

work and avoid having to try to create entirely new 

institutions when and where that may be too hard or 

costly in political will, manpower, dollars, or time. 

Second Prong: Promote the Establishment 

of Stronger Ties that Have the Potential to Become 

Enduring Alliance Relationships.

A U.S. alliance strategy that maximizes the benefits 

of enduring security cooperation relationships would 

not only seek to strengthen existing bilateral and 

multilateral arrangements but also to advance the 

development of relationships that currently fall short 
32

of alliance status. For a variety of reasons, it will most 

likely not be realistic to offer or ask for NATO Article 

V style guarantees, but the United States, nevertheless, 

can and should pursue the institutionalization of 

security cooperation with a number of countries.

In identifying countries that should be considered 

as potential allies, the United States should take 

into consideration a complex of factors, including 

governance, geography, regional stature, and potential 

for meaningful security cooperation. Based on these 

standards, in the bilateral domain, primus inter pares

should be the development of fuller security ties with 

India. With a very capable professional military under 

firm civilian control—setting it apart from many of 

its neighbors—and major modernization programs 

underway, India has the potential to be a highly 

competent military partner. Much progress has been 

made in this direction in the past 5 years, but much 

more is possible. Inevitably the pursuit of enhanced 

ties with India will complicate the relationship with 

Pakistan, and while this dynamic must be wellmanaged, it should not stand in the way of the fruition 

of an important alliance relationship. Other countries 

that present opportunities for the advancement of 

bilateral security cooperation with a view toward the 

establishment of more formal alliance ties include 

Brazil, Egypt, Indonesia, Malaysia, and South Africa. 

In the multilateral domain, the absence of a security 

cooperation mechanism is most striking in Asia. The 

United States has played a major stabilizing role in the 

region since the end of World War II and has relied 

heavily on bilateral relationships to achieve its security 

goals. Historic and current rivalries among regional 

powers have been a major obstacle to the establishment 

of institutionalized multinational cooperation. Yet the 
33

need is greater than ever for a mechanism that provides 

a regular forum for consultation, policy coordination, 

and crisis management and response. Given the 

nature of the threats, it would be preferable that 

this mechanism not be narrowly defined in security 

terms, though it would be optimal if it offered the 

prospect of combined military capabilities, at least in 

the peacekeeping domain. Finally, such a mechanism 

could create a vehicle for policy coordination with 

institutions in other regions, such as NATO, especially 

in the face of global threats. 

Third Prong: Pursue Peacetime Security Cooperation 

with Countries that Will Not Necessarily Become 

Formal Allies.

A much undervalued U.S. policy instrument 

involves the pursuit of peacetime security cooperation 

with countries whose orientation and future may 

be uncertain. Former Defense Secretary William J. 

Perry described such initiatives as “defense by other 

means,”33 suggesting the long-term benefits to national 

security that they can generate without having to put 

American soldiers in harm’s way. The 2006 Quadrennial 

Defense Review Report provides some guidance in 

support of this approach. For example, it makes 

the case for “Security cooperation and engagement 

activities including joint training exercises, senior staff 

talks, and officer and foreign internal defense training 

to increase understanding, strengthen allies and 

partners, and accurately communicate U.S. objectives 

and intent.”34 Correctly conceived and executed, such 

efforts can reduce suspicion, build confidence, and 

encourage reform; they can also lay the foundations 

for prospective partnership and potential alliance 
34

relationships. In Latin America and Africa, defense 

cooperation often has followed this looser model; the 

results have been mixed, but on balance favorable.

Such initiatives are usually low in cost but offer the 

possibility of big payoffs if they are sound conceptually 

and pursued with sensitivity and discretion. A leading 

example took place a decade ago in Central Asia. 

Looking at maps of the world, senior Pentagon officials 

noted that what had been considered the underbelly 

of the Soviet Union was now accessible and without 

firm geopolitical orientation. A subsequent relatively 

modest program to establish bilateral and multilateral 

security ties with these countries literally redefined the 

borders of Europe so that newly independent states 

adjacent to Afghanistan and Iran became members 

of NATO’s Partnership for Peace and offered basing 

rights to the United States after 9/11.

Today, a variety of countries exist in the world with 

whom discreet, substantive security cooperation—

such as in preventing proliferation or interdicting 

terrorist activity—can contribute to shaping positive 

perceptions. In some cases, these initiatives will 

establish patterns of behavior that ultimately might 

take on the characteristics of an alliance. In others, they 

may not lead to such close ties but nevertheless will 

anchor participants in activities that serve their own 

security interests as well as contribute to American 

goals, demonstrating the rewards of partnership 

to both sides. In less felicitous cases, they provide 

American policymakers with valuable early warning 

about deteriorating domestic conditions, derailments 

in bilateral relations, or looming sources of conflict.

Such investments require U.S. policymakers to 

look beyond the immediate requirements of national 

security. They require sustained engagement, and 
35

taking a genuine interest in the perspectives and 

concerns of other countries. For the senior leadership 

in Washington, this kind of work sometimes presents 

what might be called a problem of “bandwidth,” 

as they are so preoccupied with the crisis of the day 

that it is hard to make time to do anything where the 

payoff might not be until a subsequent administration. 

However, the American government has sufficient 

capacity to do the job, especially when its policies are 

clear, and more junior officials are given a mandate 

to act with authority and some autonomy. The U.S. 

military can also contribute a great deal in this regard, 

as it demonstrated in spearheading multiple “shaping” 

missions during the 1990s.35

Fourth Prong: Utilize the Full Spectrum of 

Cooperative International Arrangements that 

Complement Alliances.

An effective American alliance strategy would 

be complemented and indeed strengthened by the 

recognition that alliances will not fulfill all U.S. national 

security needs, and that other arrangements may 

be more appropriate in specific circumstances. The 

informal approach to multilateralism has sound roots: 

During the Cold War, for example, the United States 

and its NATO allies found that out-of-area challenges 

beyond the formal domain of allied commitment often 

were best met through ad hoc arrangements. These drew 

upon the political foundation and military preparedness 

of the Alliance structure, but did not burden the allies 

with reaching agreement to or participation in action 

by all members.36 A leading contemporary case of 

such cooperation was the first Gulf War, for which the 

United States organized a multinational coalition that 
36

drew upon NATO assets outside the formal Alliance 

framework and also involved non-NATO nations. The 

Combined Joint Task Force model developed in the 

mid-1990s to create a vehicle for those NATO members 

with the will and capability to take action beyond the 

European theater is an example of available synergies 

between existing alliance structures and less formal 

arrangements. 

In the diplomatic realm, informal coalitions have 

been devised to address specific policy challenges, 

and “contact groups” have been created for ongoing 

conflict resolution efforts such as the Middle East peace 

process and the status of Nagorno-Karabakh. Further, 

processes such as the Six Party Talks on North Korea 

have facilitated engagement with interested parties on 

an issue of vital national security concern to the United 

States. Finally, the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) 

has created a new model of cooperation for a specific 

international security challenge: interdicting the transit 

of materials and delivery systems for WMD.37 These 

examples suggest the range of additional possibilities 

available to an American administration that seeks to 

fully exploit opportunities for international support. 

Less formal structures do not, however, supplant 

more formal arrangements. Indeed, the success of 

informal undertakings will depend in large part on the 

vitality and durability of the bilateral and multilateral 

ties the United States maintains and cultivates. 

Decisions about participation in such ad hoc groupings 

will continue to be made on a case-by-case basis in 

national capitals. Further, multilateral alliances can 

generate momentum and incentives for supporting 

American initiatives that are being pursued through 

more informal processes. 
37

CONCLUSION 

As the smoke and dust hung heavy over lower 

Manhattan in the aftermath of 9/11, a headline in 

the French newspaper, Le Monde, announced: “Nous 

sommes tous Americains.”38 Echoing the sentiment 

expressed nearly 4 decades earlier by President John 

F. Kennedy in Berlin, this bold statement underscored 

the extent to which allies’ fates are inextricably 

intertwined. Such solidarity will again be required to 

meet the security challenges of the 21st century. 

To achieve an enduring sense of common interest 

and purpose, it will not be sufficient to flex American 

power and expect others to fall in line. The United 

States must find ways to transform its power into a 

magnetic force that draws peoples and nations to its 

goals. It will not serve American national security 

interests to disparage multilateralism nor to abandon 

the pursuit of enduring ties in the illusory hope that 

less formal arrangements will provide both flexibility 

and sustained support. The United States must rebuild 

its alliances and innovate a new kind of connectivity 

across countries, institutions, and regions that results 

in a broadly-based alliance system that is far greater 

than the sum of its disparate parts. The United States 

also must remain committed to the nitty-gritty effort 

to make it possible for foreign forces to operate 

capably alongside American troops, and to establish 

mechanisms that permit more effective security 

cooperation with international institutions and 

nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). 

Day in and day out, the default mode must work 

with allies to get things done. In the short run, it may 

be easier to go it alone. However, foreign and defense 

policies are not only measured by how they respond to 
38

present requirements, but also by whether they create 

the conditions for a safer future. A strategic approach 

to American alliances will enable the United States 

to translate its unique power into effective global 

influence that genuinely enhances American national 

security.

ENDNOTES

1. Treaties in Force, published by the U.S. Government, comes 

closest to being a thorough compilation, but it is so detailed that 

it offers little perspective on the real utility or relative value of 

legally binding ties. See Office of the Legal Advisor, Treaties in 

Force: A List of Treaties and Other International Agreements of the 

United States, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, January 

1, 2004.

2. Ashton B. Carter, “How to Counter WMD,” Foreign Affairs, 

Vol. 83, No. 5, September/October 2004, p. 74.

3. George Washington, “Farewell Address to the People of 

the United States,” Independent Chronicle, September 26, 1796; 

and Thomas Jefferson, “First Inaugural Address,” March 4, 1801, 

usinfo.state.gov/usa/infousa/facts/democrac/11.htm. 

4. Condoleeza Rice, “Campaign 2000: Promoting the National 

Interest,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 79, No. 1, January/February 2000, 

pp. 46-47.

5. Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay, America Unbound: 

The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy, Washington, DC: Brookings 

Institution Press, 2003, pp. 40-45.

6. Rice, “Promoting the National Interest,” pp. 47-48. 

7. Ibid., p. 62.

8. Governor George W. Bush, “A Distinctly American Internationalism,” Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, November 19, 

1999, www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/bush/wspeech.htm.

9. Paul Wolfowitz, “Remembering the Future,” The National 

Interest, Vol. 59, Spring 2000, p. 41. 

10. Richard Haass, The Reluctant Sheriff: The United States After 

the Cold War, New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1997, pp. 

78-80. 
39

11. See NATO doctrine on Combined Joint Task Forces at www.

nato.int/docu/facts/2000/cjtf-con.htm. 

12. Haass, The Reluctant Sheriff, pp. 93-97.

13. Bob Woodward, Bush at War, New York: Simon & Schuster, 

2002, p. 281.

14. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, interview by Larry 

King, Larry King Live, CNN, December 5, 2001.

15. President George W. Bush, “State of the Union Address,” 

January 20, 2004. 

16. See, for example, Wesley K. Clark, Waging Modern War, 

New York: Public Affairs, 2001. 

17. See, for example, U.S. Department of Defense, Report 

to Congress, Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After-Action Report; 

Benjamin S. Lambeth, The Transformation of American Air Power, 

Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000, p. 213; and James P. 

Thomas, The Military Challenges of Transatlantic Coalitions, Adelphi 

Paper No. 333, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies 

(IISS), May 2000, p. 53. 

18. Charles Krauthammer, “Who Needs Allies?” Time 

International, January 26, 2004.

19. See, for example, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, 

“Remarks at the Institut d’Etudes Politiques,” Paris, France, 

February 8, 2005; and President Bush, “Second Inaugural 

Address,” Washington, DC, January 20, 2005.

20. Ariel E. Levite and Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall, “The Case 

for Discriminate Force,” Survival, Vol. 44, No. 4, Winter 2002-03.

21. David C. Gompert, Richard L. Kugler, and Martin C. Libicki, 

Mind the Gap, Washington, DC: National Defense University 

Press, 1999; and Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall, “Managing the 

Pentagon’s International Relations,” in Ashton B. Carter and John 

P. White, eds., Keeping the Edge: Managing Defense for the Future, 

Cambridge: MIT Press, 2000, pp. 235-264.

22. Blair, quoted in Robert Wielaard, “Blair: U.S. Needs to 

Integrate With World,” Associated Press, January 26, 2005. 

23. For an insightful and enduring treatment of the challenge 

that America’s unrivaled power poses to its foreign policy, see 

Stanley Hoffmann, Gulliver’s Troubles, Or the Setting of American 

Foreign Policy, New York: McGraw Hill, 1968. 
40

24. Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for 

Power and Peace, 5th ed., New York: Knopf, 1978, p. 181.

25. Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances, Ithaca: Cornell 

University Press, 1987, p. 5. 

26. See surveys: “A Year After Iraq War: Mistrust of America 

in Europe Even Higher,” Pew Research Center, March 16, 2004, 

pewglobal.org/reports/pdf/206.pdf; “Transatlantic Trends 2004,” German Marshall Fund, September 9, 2004, www.transatlantictrends.

org/apps/gmf/ttweb2004.nsf; “Transatlantic Trends: Key Findings 

2005,” German Marshall Fund, September 7, 2005, www.

transatlantictrends.org/doc/TTKeyFindings2005.pdf; and “America’s 

Image Slips, But Allies Share U.S. Concerns Over Iran, Hamas,” in 

Pew Global Attitudes Project, June 13, 2006, pewglobal.org/reports/

pdf/252pdf.

27. Richard Haass, The Opportunity, New York: Public Affairs, 

2005, p. 26.

28. For example, animated by the Pentagon but under 

Partnership for Peace (PFP) auspices, a pathbreaking military 

exercise program led by the then Supreme Allied Commander 

Atlantic—a strapping U.S. Marine Corps General—conducted 

joint training in Central Asia among troops of the U.S. 82nd 

Airborne Division and soldiers from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 

and Uzbekistan. At the time, skeptics thought that security 

cooperation with this largely forgotten corner of the world, that 

had been the underbelly of the Soviet Union, would not tangibly 

benefit the United States. After 9/11, these countries immediately 

stepped forward to offer their full support in the campaign to rout 

al-Qai’da and oust the Taliban from neighboring Afghanistan.

29. For a reflection on the history of close U.S.-UK ties by an 

experienced British participant, see Lord Renwick of Clifton, 

“Can the ‘Special Relationship’ Survive Into the 21st Century?” 

The British Library, October 4, 1998, www.bl.uk/pdf/renwick.pdf. 

30. Section 3302 of the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act states that: 

The President is directed to inform the Congress 

promptly of any threat to the security or the social or 

economic system of the people on Taiwan and any danger 

to the interests of the United States arising therefrom. 

The President and the Congress shall determine, in 

accordance with constitutional processes, appropriate 
41

action by the United States in response to any such 

danger.

“Taiwan Relations Act of 1979,” U.S. Code 22, ch. 48, §3302.

31. Martin Wolf, Why Globalization Works, New Haven and 

London: Yale University Press, 2004, p. 13-19.

32. A number of useful ideas for linking the United States, 

NATO, and the EU are offered by Charles Grant and Mark 

Leonard in “What New Transatlantic Institutions?” Centre for 

European Reform Bulletin, Issue 41, April/May 2005, www.cer.

org.uk./articles/41_grant_leonard.html. 

33. See Elizabeth D. Sherwood, “Revolution and Evolution in 

Russia, Ukraine and Eurasia,” Defense ’95, No. 6, p. 22. 

34. Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 6, 2006, 

Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, p. 31, at www.dod.

mil/pubs/pdfs/QDR20060203.pdf. 

35. In its most recent statement of doctrine, the U.S. military 

reconfirmed the centrality of this mission to the achievement of 

U.S. national security goals: 

A deep understanding of the cultural, political, 

military, and economic characteristics of a region 

must be established and maintained. Developing this 

understanding is dependent upon shared training and 

education, especially with key partners, and may require 

organizational change as well. The overall effectiveness 

of multinational operations is, therefore, dependent on 

interoperability between organizations, processes, and 

technologies.

Joint Vision 2020, www.dtic.mil/jointvision/jvpub2.htm, pp. 17-

18.

36. Elizabeth D. Sherwood, Allies in Crisis: Meeting Global 

Challenges to Western Security, New Haven and London: Yale 

University Press, 1990, pp. 184-187. 

37. See www.state.gov/t/np/c10390.htm for further information 

about PSI. 

38. Jean-Marie Colombani, “Nous sommes tous Americains,” 

Le Monde, September 12, 2001.