THIRD DIVISION

                                     Filing Date: June 28, 2002

No. 1-01-3131

CHARLES ALLEN and EUGENIA MELKO,      ) Appeal from the 

                                      ) Circuit Court of

        Plaintiffs-Appellees,         ) Cook County.

                                      )

        v.                            ) No. 98 CH 16228

                                      )

WOODFIELD CHEVROLET, INC. and         )

WIDERMYRE ASSOCIATES,                 ) Honorable 

                                      ) Dorothy Kirie Kinnaird,

        Defendants-Appellees.         ) Judge Presiding.        

     PRESIDING JUSTICE HALL delivered the opinion of the court: 

     The plaintiffs, Charles Allen and Eugenia Melko, filed a

four-count complaint against the defendants, Woodfield Chevrolet

(Woodfield) and Widermyre Associates (Widermyre), seeking damages

in connection with the purchase of a vehicle by the plaintiffs

from Woodfield.  Counts I and II of the complaint solely

concerned Woodfield.  Counts III and IV solely concerned

Widermyre.  

     Count II of the complaint sought a declaratory judgment that

certain provisions of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive

Business Practices Act (the Act) (815 ILCS 505/1 et seq. (West 1996)) are unconstitutional. 

     The plaintiffs filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings

as to count II of their complaint.  The circuit court denied the

motion, and subsequently, entered judgment for Woodfield on count

II.   Following the dismissals of counts I, III and IV, the

plaintiffs filed a timely notice of appeal.  

     This appeal concerns only count II of the complaint and only

defendant Woodfield.

     The sole issue raised on appeal is whether the 1993 and 1996

amendments to the Act are unconstitutional as either special

legislation or as violative of equal protection.

	 FACTUAL BACKGROUND

     The following facts are taken from the plaintiffs'

complaint.  

     On or about April 2, 1996, the plaintiffs purchased a 1993

Nissan Pickup 4 by 4 vehicle from Woodfield for $15,495.  Because

of a problem with the vehicle, they returned it to Woodfield a

few days later.  While there, they noticed an advertisement for a

1993 Nissan Pickup 4 by 4 for $10,900.  When they inquired as to

the difference in price between the vehicle they had purchased

and the advertised vehicle, they were told that, while it was the

same make and model as the one they had purchased, it was a

different vehicle and had a different stock number. 

     After determining from the odometer disclosure statement

that the vehicle they had purchased had the same stock number as

the vehicle advertised, they returned to Woodfield and demanded a

reduction in price for the vehicle they had purchased.  They were

told that it was not possible to obtain a reduction in the price.

     The plaintiffs filed a four-count complaint against

Woodfield and Widermyre Associates, who, on behalf of Woodfield,

had attempted to collect the debt owed by the plaintiffs on the

vehicle they purchased.    

     Count II of the complaint alleges that subsections (f), (g) and (h) of section 10a of the Act (815 ILCS 505/10a(f), (g), (h)

(West 1996)), violates the 1970 Illinois Constitution's

prohibition against special legislation and violates the equal

protection provisions of the 1970 Illinois Constitution and

United States Constitution.  The plaintiffs acknowledged that

Allen did not comply with the pre-suit notification required by

section 10a(h) of the Act.

      The plaintiffs filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings

solely as to count II of the complaint.  In their memorandum of

law, they also raised the unconstitutionality of section 10a(a)

of the Act as special legislation and violative of equal

protection.  In their memorandum of law, the plaintiffs argued

that the above amendments are special legislation in that they

benefit only dealers of new and used vehicles and are not based

on any real or substantial differences between that group and

others who are alleged to have committed consumer fraud under the

Act.   They also argued that the above amendments violate equal

protection in that there is no rational difference between a

consumer bringing a fraud action under the Act against a car

dealer and any other dealers of goods who are not car dealers. 

     Woodfield filed a response to the plaintiffs' motion for

judgment on the pleadings.  Woodfield argued that, under the

rational basis test applicable to both equal protection and

special legislation challenges to statutory enactments, the

amendments were necessary to correct the practice of utilizing the Act to discourage resolution of disputes and to generate

attorney fees, which were burdening the automobile industry.

     The circuit court denied the plaintiffs' motion for judgment

on the pleadings.  Subsequently, the circuit court entered

judgment for Woodfield on count II and granted the plaintiffs'

motion to voluntarily dismiss counts III and IV against

Widermyre.  On July 26, 2001, the circuit court dismissed count I

of the complaint on the basis that the plaintiffs did not provide

pre-suit notice as required by the Act.  See 815 ILCS 505/10a(h)

(West 1996).  This timely appeal followed.

	ANALYSIS

	I.  Legislative Background

	     In 1993, the Illinois legislature amended section 10a of the Act by adding the following subsections:

	     "(f) At any time more than 30 days before the

commencement of trial, a party, who is a new vehicle dealer

or used vehicle dealer within the meaning of Chapter 5 of

the Illinois Vehicle Code and who is defending a claim under

this Act, may serve upon the party seeking relief under this

Act an offer to allow judgment to be taken against the

defending party to the effect specified in the offer with

costs then accrued.  If within 10 days after service of the

offer, the offeree serves written notice that the offer is

accepted, either party may then file the offer and notice of

acceptance together with proof of service of the notice; the court shall then enter judgment.  An offer not accepted

shall be deemed withdrawn and evidence of the offer is not

admissible except in a proceeding to determine costs.  When

a party seeking relief under this Act does not accept an

offer filed with the clerk and served upon the attorney for

that party more than 30 days before the commencement of

trial and when that party fails to obtain a judgment in an

amount more than the total offer of settlement, that party

shall forfeit and the court may not award any compensation

for attorney's fees and costs incurred after the date of the

offer.

	      (g) At any time more than 30 days before the

commencement of trial, a party who is seeking relief under

this Act from a new vehicle dealer or used vehicle dealer

within the meaning of Chapter 5 of the Illinois Vehicle Code

may serve the dealer an offer to allow judgment to be taken

against the dealer to the effect specified in the offer with

costs then accrued.  If within 10 days after service of the

offer, the offeree serves written notice that the offer is

accepted, either party may then file the offer and notice of

acceptance together with proof of service of the notice; the

court shall then enter judgment.  An offer not accepted

shall be deemed withdrawn and evidence of the offer is not

admissible except in a proceeding to determine costs.  When

a dealer does not accept an offer filed with the clerk and served upon the attorney for the dealer more than 30 days

before the commencement of trial and if the party seeking

relief against a dealer obtains a judgment in an amount

equal to or in excess of the offer amount, the party seeking

relief shall be paid interest on the offer amount at the

rate as provided in Section 2-1303 of the Code of Civil

Procedure from the date of the offer until the judgment is

paid."  Pub. Act 87-1140, eff. Jan. 1, 1993 (amending 815

ILCS 505/10a (West 1994)).

     Subsequently, in 1996, the legislature amended section 10a

(a) and added subsection (h) as follows:

	     "10a.  Action for actual damages.

		     (a) Any person who suffers actual damages as a

result of a violation of this Act committed by any

other person may bring an action against such person. 

The court, in its discretion may award actual economic

damages or any other relief which the court deems

proper; provided, however, that no award of punitive

damages may be assessed under this Section against a

party defendant who is a new vehicle dealer or used

vehicle dealer within the meaning of Chapter 5 of the

Illinois Vehicle Code, unless the conduct engaged in

was willful or intentional and done with evil motive or

reckless indifference to the rights of others.  Proof

of a public injury, a pattern, or an effect on consumers and the public interest shall be required in

order to state a cause of action under this Section

against a party defendant who is a new vehicle dealer

or used vehicle dealer within the meaning of Chapter 5

of the Illinois Vehicle Code.  Proof of such public

injury may be shown by any one of the following

factors:   

		     (1) Violation of a statute that has a public

interest impact.

		     (2) Repeated acts prior to the act involving the

plaintiff.

     		(3) Potential for repetition.

	***

	      (h) At least 30 days prior to the filing of an action

under this Section, a party who is seeking relief shall

serve a written notice of the nature of the alleged

violation and demand for relief upon the prospective party,

who is a new vehicle dealer or used vehicle dealer within

the meaning of Chapter 5 of the Illinois Vehicle Code,

against whom such action will be commenced.  Any person

receiving such a demand for relief may, within 30 days of

service of the demand for relief, submit a written offer of

settlement, which offer is to be exclusive of attorney's

fees, to the party serving the notice and demand.  The party

who is seeking relief must certify in any cause of action that the notice and demand was served upon the named

defendants and the substance of their response, if any.  If

the offer of settlement is rejected in writing by the party

who is seeking relief, then, in any subsequent action, the

court shall deny any award of attorney's fees and costs

requested by the party seeking relief under this Act

incurred after the rejection of the written offer of

settlement, if the judgment is less than the amount

contained within the offer of settlement.  All written

offers of settlement under this subsection shall be presumed

to be offered without prejudice in compromise of a disputed

matter." Pub. Act 89-144, eff. January 1, 1996) (amending

815 ILCS 505/10a(a) (West 1996)).  

		II. Standard of Review

     The constitutionality of a statute is a question of law subject to de novo review.  Miller v. Rosenberg, 196 Ill. 2d 50, 57, 749 N.E.2d 946, 951 (2001)

		III.  Constitutional Issues

	     A.  Analysis Applicable to Constitutional Questions

     Courts should begin any constitutional analysis with the

presumption that the challenged legislation is constitutional and

that it is the plaintiff's burden to clearly establish that the

challenged provisions are unconstitutional.  Best v. Taylor Machine Works, 179 Ill. 2d 367, 689 N.E.2d 1057, 1063 (1997).  The legislature has broad discretion to determine not only what the public interest and welfare require but to determine the

measures needed to secure such interest.  Chicago National League Ball Club, Inc. v. Thompson, 108 Ill. 2d 357, 364, 483 N.E.2d 1245, 1248 (1985).  Whether the course chosen by the legislature

"'is wise or whether it is the best means to achieve the desired

result is not a proper subject of judicial inquiry.' [Citation.]"

Fireside Chrysler-Plymouth Mazda, Inc. v. Edgar, 102 Ill. 2d 1, 7, 464 N.E.2d 275, 278 (1984).  The legislative history of an

enactment may be considered if the resolution of an issue so

requires.  Best, 179 Ill. 2d at 382, 689 N.E.2d at 1065.

	B. Special Legislation 

     The special legislation clause of the 1970 Illinois

Constitution provides:

	     "'The General Assembly shall pass no special or local

law when a general law is or can be made applicable. 

Whether a general law is or can be made applicable shall be

a matter for judicial determination.' (Emphasis added.)" Best, 179 Ill. 2d at 390-91, 689 N.E.2d at 1069; Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV, §13.

     The special legislation clause prohibits legislation which

arbitrarily discriminates in favor of a select group.  Bilyk v. Chicago Transit Authority, 125 Ill. 2d 230, 236, 531 N.E.2d 1, 3 (1988).  This constitutional provision supplements the equal

protection guarantee, which prohibits arbitrary and invidious

discrimination against a person or a class.  Bilyk, 125 Ill. 2d at 236, 531 N.E.2d at 3.  A special legislation challenge

generally is judged under the same standards applicable to an

equal protection challenge.  Best, 179 Ill. 2d at 393, 689 N.E.2d at 1070-71.  Where, as in this case, the legislation in question

does not affect a fundamental right or involve a suspect or

quasi-suspect classification, the appropriate standard of review

is the rational basis test.  Best, 179 Ill. 2d at 393, 689 N.E.2d at 1071.  Under this standard, the court must determine whether

the statutory classification is rationally related to a

legitimate State interest.  Best, 179 Ill. 2d at 393, 689 N.E.2d at 1071.  

     Our supreme court has noted the difficulty in determining

whether a statutory enactment violates the special legislation

clause and has described the dilemma as follows:

	     "'It is impossible to conceive of a law that has

universal impact and affects everyone or everything in the

same way.  By enacting laws, the legislature can hardly

avoid excluding some category of people or objects.  In

enforcing this prohibition, the courts must decide if the

legislature has made a reasonable classification. 

Differences of opinion are bound to exist in such situations

and the ultimate decision must rest with some judgment as to

the soundness of the legislature's action.' [Citation.]"

Best, 179 Ill. 2d at 394, 689 N.E.2d at 1071.

     A legislative decision is not subject to courtroom factfinding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported

by admissible evidence or empirical data.  Alamo Rent A Car, Inc. v. Ryan, 268 Ill. App. 3d 268, 272, 643 N.E.2d 1345, 1349 (1994).  Under the rational basis test, the court may hypothesize reasons

for the legislation, even if the reasoning advanced did not

motivate the legislative action.  Alamo Rent A Car, Inc., 268 Ill. App. 3d at 272-73, 643 N.E.2d at 1349.  Because the court

may on its own initiative articulate the facts necessary to

justify the legislation, the question of whether the legislation

is constitutional is a question of law for the court to

determine.  Alamo Rent A Car, Inc., 268 Ill. App. 3d at 273, 643 N.E.2d at 1349.  If there is any conceivable basis for finding a

rational relationship, the law will be upheld.  Alamo Rent A Car, Inc., 268 Ill. App. 3d at 273, 643 N.E.2d at 1349-50.  It is the burden of the person attacking the legislation to negate every

conceivable basis which supports it.  Alamo Rent A Car, Inc., 268 Ill. App. 3d at 273, 643 N.E.2d at 1350.  Under the rational

basis test, the existence of a less onerous or more equitable

alternative means of securing a governmental interest is not by

itself sufficient to render an ordinance unconstitutional.  Hunt v. Daley, 286 Ill. App. 3d 766, 774, 677 N.E.2d 456, 462 (1997).

     Our supreme court has invalidated legislative

classifications under the special legislation clause where they

have an artificially narrow focus and which appear to be designed

primarily to confer a special benefit on a particular private group without a rational basis, rather than to promote the

general welfare.  See Best, 179 Ill. 2d at 395-96, 689 N.E.2d at 1071 (cases cited therein).  The hallmark of an unconstitutional

classification is its arbitrary application to similarly situated

individuals without adequate justification or connection to the

purpose of the statute.  Best, 179 Ill. 2d at 396, 689 N.E.2d at 1072.

     The purpose of the Act in this case is to protect consumers

against fraud, unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the

conduct of trade or commerce.   Skyline International Development v. Citibank, F.S.B., 302 Ill. App. 3d 79, 85, 706 N.E.2d 942, 946 (1998).  The question then is whether there is adequate

justification or connection to purpose of the Act for making the

amendments in this case applicable only to new and used car

dealers.  Even so, the court is not confined to the purpose

articulated in the Act but may find any plausible purpose

supporting the legislation.  Alamo Rent A Car, 268 Ill. App. 3d at 273, 643 N.E.2d at 1350.  

     According to the legislative history, the 1993 amendments to

the Act, which imposed penalties on both consumers and dealers

for refusing to settle cases, were designed to encourage

reasonable settlements of disputes.  87 Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate

Proceedings, June 19, 1992, at 16 (statements of Senator Weaver). 

The 1996 amendments to the Act changed "actual damages" to

"actual economic damages," limited the ability of the consumer to receive punitive damages and added a notice requirement prior to

bringing suit.  The need to modify the allowance of punitive

damages was explained as follows:

	     "There have been a variety of cases filed under the

Consumer Fraud Act that have rendered excessive awards in

the area of punitive damages and attorney's fees.  I mean

it's the belief by many that the courts do not have a clear

[sic] or through they're [sic] interpretations there's confusion as to what the true cause of action would be ...

how the cause of action should be outlined in filing a case. 

So it's an attempt to clean up some confusion within the

judicial area and also to outline the burden of proof in

order to award ... receive actual damages and punitive

damages."  89th Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, May 22,

1995, at 269 (statements of Representative Cross).  

According to Representative Cross, section 10a of the Act has

been abused as exemplified by situations in which simple mistakes

by car dealers have garnered as much as $20,000 in punitive

damages.  89th Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, May 22, 1995, at

271 (statements of Representative Cross).  

     The need for the pre-suit notice requirement was explained

as follows:

	"Senator Cronin:  What we're attempting to address is a

problem that, as I said, came to my attention, whereby an

aggressive group of plaintiffs' attorneys would churn cases seeking - - and their - - their intent is questionable.  The

Car Dealers felt that the - - the goal was to  - - to seize

attorneys' fees, and there wasn't a good-faith basis for the

claim.  And so claims that would be minimal in nature, there

was never a good-faith effort to negotiate or to try to work

out problems.  The lawyers would persist and ring up fees,

and as you know, those fees are guaranteed under the

Consumer Fraud Act.  

	***

	We just wanted to give the parties - - it's a kind of almost

like mandatory arbitration.  Give them an opportunity to sit

down and maybe work it out before it goes into the court

system."  89th Gen Assem., Senate Proceedings, April 26,

1995, at 30, 32 (statements of Senator Cronin).  

     According to Representative Cross, some 250 lawsuits have

been filed under section 10a of the Act; however, these were not

necessarily all frivolous.  89th Gen. Assem., House Proceedings,

May 22, 1995, at 270 (statements of Representative Cross).  

     Finally, when a question was raised as to why these

amendments were not made applicable to other persons who defraud

consumers under the Act, Representative Cross responded as

follows:

	     "Well, Representative [Currie], this was language that

was agreed upon by ... as I said earlier, the trial lawyers

and the Attorney General's Office.  In talking with them, it was an attempt to compromise, it was an attempt to work out

an agreement.  As I just said earlier, they are neutral on

the Bill.  This seems to be one area where there has been an

abuse of this statute prior to this proposed Amendment. 

That's the reason for limiting it to that.  If you want to

broaden the people or the entities or the agencies that have

been listed, that we've listed here, I'll be glad to work

with you on that.  If you want to include yacht dealers

that's fine, if you want to include refrigerator dealers

that's fine, if you want to include air conditioner dealers

that's fine, motorcycle dealers.  I'd be more than happy to

talk to you about it."  89th Gen. Assem., House Proceedings,

May 22, 1995, at 290-91 (statements of Representative

Cross).  

     In the present case, this court must determine if the

classification created by the 1993 and 1996 amendments to the Act

is based upon reasonable differences in kind or situation and

whether the basis for the classification is sufficiently related

to the evil to be obviated by the statute.  Best, 179 Ill. 2d at 394, 689 N.E.2d at 1071.  While the legislature has wide

discretion in the exercise of its police powers, in evaluating a

challenged provision, the court must consider the natural and

reasonable effect of the legislation on the rights affected by

the provision.  Best, 179 Ill. 2d at 394, 689 N.E.2d at 1071.  

     The amendments in this case were urged because the legislature perceived that in cases involving new and used car

dealers, as opposed to other persons or entities subject to the

Act, the availability of punitive damages and awards of attorney

fees encouraged consumers to file lawsuits rather than attempting

to work out a settlement in lieu of going to court.  The

"legitimate State interest" as reflected in the legislative

history is to encourage settlement of consumer fraud cases

involving new and used car dealers and to discourage the filing

of lawsuits in these cases which are brought only to generate

attorney fees and/or achieve a windfall by means of a large

punitive damages award.  

     In this case, by enacting the 1993 and 1996 amendments, the

legislature sought to provide a statutory scheme whereby the

automobile dealers and consumers must evaluate the worth of their

respective cases before filing suit or rejecting a settlement

offer, or risk either the loss of an award of attorney fees which

would otherwise be available to them under the Act or the

imposition of interest on the judgment amount.  Further, the

legislature sought to restrict awards of punitive damages in

those cases by requiring the consumer to meet a higher standard

of proof than required in other cases under the Act.  Finally,

failure to comply with the mandatory pre-suit notification

requirement would result in the dismissal of the consumer's cause

of action under the Act. 

      Assuming that the State has a legitimate interest in the settling of disputes and in discouraging lawsuits brought merely

to generate attorney fees, there is nothing more unique about a

fraud case brought against a car dealer than one brought against

any other person or entity subject to the Act.  Moreover, the

effect of the legislation in this case is to penalize the

consumer and not the attorneys who, according to the legislative

history, are the ones the legislators deemed responsible for

filing lawsuits merely to generate fees for themselves.

     "'[O]ne of the purposes of allowing attorney fees to be

awarded under section 10a(c) [of the Consumer Fraud Act] to

prevailing parties is to encourage consumers to bring actions to

vindicate their rights under the Act. [Citation.]  Without such a

provision, it would be difficult for injured consumers to obtain

counsel in light of the sums of money that are in dispute in most

consumer fraud litigation.' [Citation.]"  Majcher v. Laurel Motors, Inc., 287 Ill. App. 3d 719, 733, 680 N.E.2d 416, 426 (1997).  Thus, a consumer would be discouraged from pursuing an

action for fraud against an automobile dealer for fear that he or

she risks the loss of an award of attorney fees and therefore

must pay the attorney out of his or her own pocket.  It also

discourages attorneys from representing consumers who can not

otherwise afford an attorney, and therefore, deprives consumers

of legal representation.   

     With regard to the limitations imposed on awards of punitive

damages, the new standards create an increased burden on consumers not required of consumers defrauded by non-car dealers

and are not sufficiently related to the evil to be obviated by

the statute.  Increasing the burden of proving punitive damages

would not decrease the filing of suits to generate attorney fees,

since attorney fees may be awarded in the absence of a punitive

damage award.  

     Woodfield maintains that the applicability of the amendments

in this case solely to new and used car dealers is not an

arbitrary classification.  It argues that the legislature has

enacted and our supreme court has upheld laws pertaining solely

to automobile dealers, and therefore, it is apparent that the

buying and selling of automobiles is considered unique and

distinct from the activities of other persons or entities subject

to the Act.  See Fireside Chrysler-Plymouth Mazda, Inc., 102 Ill. 2d 1, 464 N.E.2d 275 (Sunday closing statute pertaining only to

new and used car dealers upheld as part of the regulatory scheme

by which the legislature demonstrated that it wished to regulate

certain aspects of the selling of automobiles in a manner

different from other retail enterprises).

     Woodfield further argues that classifications based upon

activities rather than status are given deference.  See Fujimura v. Chicago Transit Authority, 67 Ill. 2d 506, 368 N.E.2d 105 (1977) (notice and filing requirements applicable only to the CTA

upheld based upon the CTA's unique governmental function and the

higher duty of care standard applicable to it than to other local government units).  

     Both cases are distinguishable.  Unlike the Sunday closing

statute in Fireside Chrysler-Plymouth Mazda, Inc., section 10a is not part of the regulatory scheme for the selling of automobiles. 

Instead, it is a statute designed to aid consumers who have been

defrauded, and not only by automobile dealers.  Moreover, unlike

the CTA in Fujimura, the disputes between new and used car dealers and their customers are not so unique from other disputes

under the Act as to justify a classification apart from that of

other persons or entities subject to the Act.

     Finally, Woodfield argues that the amendments to section 10a

were enacted because the legislators recognized that new and used

car dealers were the victims of abuses not experienced by others

subject to the Act.  

     In Grace v. Howlett, 51 Ill. 2d 478, 283 N.E. 2d 474 (1972), the plaintiffs challenged amendments to the Insurance Code which

limited a party's ability to collect damages depending upon

whether the party at fault was using a vehicle for commercial or

private usage.  In support of the legislation, the defendants argued that the legislation was in response to the growing public

demand for a change in the way society copes with the enormous

legal, social and economic problems produced by car accidents. 

The defendants identified small personal injury actions as one of

the major defects of the system of compensating car accident

victims.  Grace, 51 Ill. 2d at 484, 282 N.E. 2d at 477.  

     In determining whether the challenged provisions violated

the special legislation prohibition and equal protection, the

court stated:

	     "We assume that the problems described by the

defendant[s] do exist.  But as has been pointed out, the

fact that a problem 'does exist does not permit arbitrary or

unrelated means of meeting it to be adopted.' [Citation.]" 

Grace, 51 Ill. 2d at 485, 282 N. E. 2d at 478.

The court noted that there were many purposes for which the

obvious differences between private passenger vehicles and

commercial vehicles would justify different legislative

treatment.  However, the determination of the amount to be

recovered by a person injured by those vehicles and the

conditions governing that recovery was ere not one among of those purposes. 

Grace, 51 Ill. 2d at 487, 282 N.E. 2d at 479.   

    In addition, while acknowledging that the equal protection

guarantee and the special legislation clauses cover much the same

ground, the Grace court noted that they are not duplicates, and that, in the case of a special legislation challenge, the court

has an additional responsibility to determine whether a general

law "'is or can be made applicable.'" Grace, 51 Ill. 2d at 487, 282 N.E. 2d at 479.  The court stated:

	     "Unless this court is to abdicate its constitutional

responsibility to determine whether a general law can be

made applicable, the available scope for legislative experimentation with special legislation is limited, and

this court cannot rule that the legislature is free to enact

special legislation simply because 'reform may take one step

at a time.' [Citation.]" Grace, 51 Ill. 2d at 487, 282 N.E. 2d at 479.

But see Alamo Rent A Car, 268 Ill. App. 3d at 275, 643 N.E. 2d at 1351 (legislature need not pass a law addressing all of the

problems in a field, but may consider degrees of problems and

proceed one step at a time).

     The Act makes awards of attorney fees and punitive damages available to all consumers who have a cause of action under the

Act and does not require any pre-suit notice in any other case.   

We note that no hearing was held on the 1993 amendments.   See

89th Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, June 19, 1992, at 20

(statement of Senator Del Valle).  There is also no indication

that the 1996 amendment received a hearing.  The factclaim that 250

lawsuits involving car dealers have been filed under the Act, is

an empty statistic without any evidence as to how many of these

suits against car dealers were in fact frivolous or how many

lawsuits were filed against other retailers alleging violations

of the Act.  Compare Miller, 196 Ill. 2d 50, 749 N.E.2d 946 (legislation eliminating the need to prove special damages in

malicious prosecution cases arising out of medical malpractice

cases was reasonably related to resolving the perceived crisis in

medical malpractice suits arising from frivolous claims).

     In the present case there is simply not enough evidence that

a similar "perceived crisis" exists in the automobile dealership

industry to require the legislature to adopt the measures set

forth in the 1993 and 1996 amendments to the Act.

     Moreover, even if the court were to assume that the problem

existed, there is no basis for distinguishing between fraud

committed by automobile dealers and others covered by the Act who

defraud consumers.  Even Representative Cross conceded the

plaintiffs' point that a general law could be made applicable by

agreeing that the proposed amendments could be expanded to

include other areas covered under the Act.  As the plaintiffs

point out, the legislature has now extended the "car dealer

amendments" to "holders of retail installment contracts within

the meaning of Section 2.12 of the Motor Vehicle Retail

Installment Sales Act."  See Pub. Act. 91-270 eff. January 1,

2000 (amending 815 ILCS 505/10a (West 2000)).

     We conclude that the 1993 and 1996 amendments to section 10a

of the Act violate Illinois's  constitutional prohibition against

special legislation.  Deciding this case as we do, we need not

separately address whether the legislation violates as well the

equal protection clauses of the Illinois and United States

Constitutions.

     The judgment of the circuit court granting Woodfield's

motion for judgment on the pleadings as to count II of the

complaint is reversed.  We reverse the circuit court's denial of the plaintiffs' motion for judgment on the pleadings and remand

this cause to the circuit court for the entry of an order

granting judgment on the pleadings on count II for the plaintiffs

and for further proceedings.

     Reversed and remanded with directions.

     WOLFSON and SOUTH, JJ., concur.