THE ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM:

ASIAN SECURITY WITHOUT AN AMERICAN UMBRELLA

Larry M. Wortzel

December 13, 1996
ii

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and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of

the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the

U.S. Government. This report is cleared for public release;

distribution is unlimited.

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Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be

forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army

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iii

FOREWORD

The United States is an Asian power, but its role and

credibility lack clear definition in the minds of many Asian

leaders. Some mistrust the United States, thinking it harbors

chiefly economic, even "imperialist," motives. Others have little

faith in U.S. commitments, recalling our about-face in Vietnam.

U.S. Asian policy today is a curious blend of seemingly firm

bilateral commitments and occasionally startling ambiguities. The

latter, while preserving American flexibility, run the risk of

signalling weakness when friends and potential adversaries probe

for clarity of purpose. This American "inscrutability" in Asia is

all the more troubling in a region lacking a strong web of

multilateral institutions, as exists across the North Atlantic.

Indeed, if the United States is to maintain regional stability in

Asia, Colonel Larry Wortzel, the U.S. Army attache in Beijing,

argues, it must make multilateral dialogues like the Association

of Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum a major tenet of its

Asian policy. The problems that need to be addressed by the

United States in conjunction with its Asian friends, allies and

potential foes--proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,

ethnic conflict, territorial issues, trade relations, and the

future of democracy throughout the region--are every bit as

important to U.S. security in the Asian context as they are in

Europe, where they receive intensive, continuous, multilateral

scrutiny.

Therein lies the value of Colonel Wortzel’s monograph. It

calls our attention to the nascent ASEAN Regional Forum and

causes us to consider its potential to enable a highly diverse

group of nations to enhance their mutual understanding,

stability, and security as they enter the 21st century.

RICHARD H. WITHERSPOON

Colonel, U.S. Army

Director, Strategic Studies Institute
iv

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

LARRY M. WORTZEL is a U.S. Army military intelligence officer and

foreign area officer specializing in China and East Asia. As an

infantry officer from 1973-77, he served in the 29th Infantry at

Fort Benning, GA, and the 9th Infantry at Camp Casey, Korea. He

has served in intelligence and foreign area officer positions in

China, Thailand, Singapore, and the U.S. Pacific Command

headquarters in Hawaii. From 1984-88 he served in policy-related

positions in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and on the

Department of the Army Staff in the Pentagon from 1990-93. From

1993-95 he was an assignment officer in Colonels Division at the

Total Army Personnel Command. Colonel Wortzel holds a Ph.D. in

political science from the University of Hawaii-Manoa. He is a

1995 graduate of the U.S. Army War College Corresponding Studies

Course. Colonel Wortzel is the author of Class in China;

Stratification in a Classless Society (Greenwood Press, 1987),

the editor of China's Military Modernization: International

Implications (Greenwood Press, 1988), and is completing a book on

20th century Chinese military history. He has published several

articles on China and on Asian security including "China Seeks

Traditional Great Power Status" in the Spring 1994 edition of

ORBIS. Colonel Wortzel was assistant Army attache in Beijing,

China, from 1988-90. He returned to Beijing in July 1995, where

he is serving as the Army attache to China.
1

THE ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM:

ASIAN SECURITY WITHOUT AN AMERICAN UMBRELLA

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum

(ARF), first held in July 1994 in Bangkok, Thailand, is a unique,

Asian-led experiment in multilateral security in Asia. It took

shape at a time when the United States seemed to have withdrawn

from its leading role in regional and world security,

particularly in the Asia-Pacific region. In fact, according to

quotes attributed to a senior Chinese leader by former Assistant

Secretary of Defense Charles Freeman, despite assurances from

Washington, the perception in Asia is that the United States

would never trade one of its cities (Los Angeles was the city in

question) for the goal of securing peace for one of its friends

in Asia.1

The ARF has been cast in theoretical language as an example

of multipolarity and interdependence in the post-Cold War world.

It has been compared and contrasted by some analysts with the

Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). The

member nations of the Association for Southeast Asian Nations

(ASEAN), however, work hard to avoid comparisons with CSCE and

see the situation in the Asia-Pacific region somewhat

differently.2 For them, the fundamental goal for regional

cooperation is to create stability. The ARF concentrates on

confidence-building measures and conflict avoidance. ASEAN

leaders want to foster economic growth in a region with some

tensions but no major conflicts, a region with the highest

economic growth rate in the world. The CSCE and the 1975 Helsinki

agreement, on the other hand, were instruments primarily

developed to manage a specific, volatile, East-West conflict--

that between the countries comprising the Warsaw Pact (with its

Soviet leadership) and NATO. The CSCE goal was to "set the final

seal on the map of Europe as drawn at Yalta."3 ASEAN member

states have worked hard to avoid that parallel. This monograph

explores the genesis of the ARF and discusses how perceptions of

a U.S. withdrawal from the Asia-Pacific security scene affected

the ASEAN states. The author argues that the ARF emerged as a

regional solution to deal with potential threats. In conclusion,

he discusses the ARF's future as ASEAN struggles to maintain the

initiative in the forum.

For ASEAN, the key to the ARF's raison d'etre is in dialogue

to "avoid the potential for regional conflicts in the Asia

Pacific."4 ASEAN members emphasize that the ARF is a "discussion

of security matters, and not a common defense."5 When all is said

and done, the impetus for the ARF and an Asian regional security

dialogue is very different from that of the European situation.

The CSCE came into being to moderate the threat of aggression

between powers that were deeply hostile--the Soviet Union and the
2

Warsaw Pact, and the United States and its NATO allies. The ARF's

genesis is the opposite. The ARF was born because of the

perceived weakness or withdrawal of a power that before had

provided the security umbrella for Asia--the United States.

The Perception of a U.S. Withdrawal.

 The confidence of Asian friends and allies in the U.S.

security umbrella has undergone a slow process of erosion over

the past two decades. The establishment of diplomatic relations

with China and the downgrading of relations with Taiwan as a

means to help extricate the United States from Vietnam in 1972

were certainly factors in the process.6 Vietnam was the first

really unsuccessful war for the United States in the 20th

century, and, as Washington ended it, the United States sought to

define its ideological differences with its stated enemies

(Vietnam and China) in order to get out of the war. That

process, which led to the opening with China but ultimately saw

the collapse of South Vietnam and the Vietnamese invasion of

Cambodia, demonstrated for Asia the realpolitik of U.S. policy.

More importantly, it demonstrated the significant effect of

public opinion in the United States on America's foreign policy.

The sudden shift in U.S. policy in relation to Taiwan and the

recognition of China 6 years later underscored that, in some

cases, political reality, not ideology, drove U.S. policy. In one

stroke, Washington withdrew its previous staunch support for

Taipei.

In 1979, after breaking with Taiwan and recognizing China,

President Carter announced that U.S. troop strength in Korea

would be significantly reduced, and the confidence of Asian

friends and allies in the United States was further eroded.7

Again, the strength and sincerity of U.S. security pledges were

brought into question because the Carter reductions were seen as

responses to domestic pressures. To many in Asia, the rationale

for the reductions was based on unrealistic assessments of a

potentially hostile situation on the Korean peninsula. Certainly

the nations of Asia were more confident of the United States

earlier, in 1976 for instance, when, in response to the axe

murders of American soldiers in Panmunjom over a tree-cutting

incident, the U.S. 2d Infantry Division was sent to combat

positions with its weapons and ammunition ready for war, while

U.S. troops trimmed the offending tree even as bomb-laden B-52s

flew overhead.

The takeover of the U.S. embassy in Tehran, Iran, and the

failure of the hostage rescue operation in the desert did little

to buttress confidence in U.S. military strength. More

importantly, the difficulty of the naval, air, and logistical

effort to support U.S. operations in the Indian Ocean and Persian
3

Gulf convinced the Asian nations who witnessed it that the United

States had difficulty projecting decisive conventional power over

long distances. Even with bases in Japan and the Philippines, the

U.S. military effort required support in the form of transit

rights, refueling, and short-term basing from friends and allies

in Asia. Diego Garcia, in the Indian Ocean, became a key forwardoperating base that proved to be equally critical to the U.S.

strategy in the Gulf War during Operations DESERT SHIELD and

DESERT STORM against Iraq.

In the years of the Reagan administration, a steady buildup

of U.S. forces increased American capabilities. But the effect

of the Vietnam War was seen in the "Weinberger Doctrine," which

declared that the United States would not use its forces unless

it had strong public support and was sure of a victory. Secretary

of Defense Caspar Weinberger argued that military forces cannot

simply be brought to bear in any crisis, but that "we should

engage our troops only if we must do so as a matter of our own

vital national interest. We cannot assume for other sovereign

nations the responsibility to defend their territory--without

their strong invitation--when our own freedom is not

threatened."8 He set out six criteria to be used as tests when

force should be employed. Weinberger's more restrictive criteria

on the use of force, however, are still influential today where

they have been incorporated in President Clinton's A National

Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement.9

The success of Operation DESERT STORM with the decisive

defeat of Iraqi forces had a mixed message for those countries

dependent on U.S. security guarantees. The world witnessed the

strength and lethality of U.S. weapons and equipment and the

quality of U.S. soldiers. The tactics and the operational art of

U.S. forces were validated. But this was done with an

accommodation to multilateralism. As in World War II, the victory

depended on a coalition of forces, and, perhaps more

significantly, the United States ensured that there was United

Nations (UN) support and participation before acting, despite the

fact that its own vital interests were clearly at stake.

Hindsight makes us question whether unilateral action such as the

early insertion of a Marine Expeditionary Unit or a brigade of

the 82d Airborne Division into Kuwait, combined with forceful

diplomacy by the American Ambassador in Iraq, could have headed

off the war, but that did not happen. Some nations perceived that

the United States was reluctant to act decisively, not just

unilaterally, but at all. The question had to be asked: "What if

my nation is in trouble and, despite security guarantees, it

became more expedient for the United States to bow to ‘United

Nations' or ‘coalition' interests?"

In his book, Diplomacy, Henry Kissinger tells us that, in

such an instance, political realism dictates that it is a mistake
4

to assume that all nations are prepared to "run identical risks"

in opposing an act of aggression because, in the end, their

national interests differ.10 This is a basic tenet of the realist

school of politics. As Hans Morgenthau set forth in defining a

realist theory of international relations, prudence and the

weighing of consequences define the character of relations and

interests.11 The ASEAN states began to weigh the question of what

was prudent for their own security.

After Operation DESERT STORM, a combination of economic,

natural, and political circumstances brought into question the

strength of U.S. commitment to Asia. The case of the Philippines

brought this matter into sharp focus. Understanding the

psychological impact of the U.S. withdrawal from the Philippines

is seminal in understanding why the ASEAN states have become so

concerned about U.S. presence in the region. Domestic political

forces in Manila called for either more money from the United

States or for the dismantling of the U.S. presence in Subic Bay

and Clark Air Force Base. The Philippine government clearly was

asking for more money than the United States would pay and the

Soviet Union was collapsing, making the bases less critical to

Washington. U.S. Pacific strategy began to examine the viability

of the concept of "places not bases" (i.e., securing access

rights with no permanent presence). Such a strategy, in addition

to saving money and reducing military force structure, permitted

the United States to be ambiguous about the involvement of U.S.

forces in conflicts with China and Vietnam over any dispute, such

as in the Spratly Islands. At the same time, the eruption of

Mount Pinatubo made the Philippine bases for a time virtually

unusable and too expensive to resurrect and repair for the

dwindling U.S. defense coffers. U.S. forces simply withdrew and

developed a series of base-use and port arrangements throughout

Asia. To this day, however, some in the political and military

establishments around Asia believe that the United States simply

left when it got too expensive and hard to maintain those bases.12

Their confidence in U.S. security guarantees and capabilities was

shaken. At the time, the U.S. administration was able to credibly

point out that the United States was not acting like a colonial

or occupying power and would remove its forces from a country

when asked. That had already been demonstrated in Thailand in the

mid-1970s. Nonetheless, the perception was that the United States

left and abandoned a security commitment.13

The dispute with North Korea over nuclear materials and

reactors is another example of a perceived weakness in U.S.

resolve. No nation in the region wanted a conflict on the Korean

Peninsula, despite calls by some U.S. pundits (even by Australian

observers of Asian affairs) for forceful U.S. military action.14

The Chinese counseled patience and restraint, as did the

Japanese.15 South Korea sought to maintain its strong role in the

negotiations and in its relationship to the United States. The
5

intervention of former President Jimmy Carter, however, while

defusing the situation and producing an agreement, did not

produce one that pleased all of the observers in Washington or in

Asia.16 Serious concerns over North Korean facilities remain, and

nuclear specialists have taken seriously a 1993 Japanese Foreign

Ministry statement that "Japan must be prepared to defend itself

against the nuclear threat."17 In the end, notwithstanding the

provision of new reactors to Pyongyang, it remains possible that

the United States may have accepted a North Korea with a limited

number of nuclear devices as a fait accompli.18

The Evolving U.S. Force Structure and Strategy.

Communist governments are still in power in a few places

around the world, but the communist challenge to democracy and

free trade is essentially defeated. Its defeat brought forth a

plethora of security challenges and problems ranging from

terrorism, to population displacement, drugs, and the challenges

of new conflicts based on ethnic and religious nationalism. Asia

has not been spared these new problems but has remained

relatively calm, compared to Africa, the Middle East, Europe, and

Central Asia. Adjusting to these changes after 45 years of Cold

War tension has focused a sometimes partisan debate in the United

States on the types of forces needed in the new era and on the

best strategy for securing U.S. interests in today's world.

Even if the global security system following the Cold War

was not crystal clear, U.S. security strategy in East Asia and

the Pacific gained definition with the publishing of the National

Security Strategy in 1992.19 This document set out the framework

of enduring U.S. interests upon which strategy might be adjusted

based on exigencies and political realities. The security

interests are:

• protecting the United States and its allies from attack;

• maintaining regional peace and stability;

• preserving U.S. political and economic access;

• contributing to nuclear deterrence;

• fostering the growth of democracy and human rights;

• stopping proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and

biological weapons, and ballistic missile systems;

• ensuring freedom of navigation; and,

• reducing illicit drug trafficking.20
6

There have been subsequent adjustments of note. In November

1992, Secretary of Defense Cheney provided assurances to regional

allies in Asia that U.S. policy would be guided by six

principles: (1) assurance of U.S. engagement in Asia and the

Pacific, (2) a strong system of bilateral security arrangements,

(3) maintenance of modest but capable forward deployed U.S.

forces, (4) sufficient base structure to support those forces,

(5) a request that Asian allies assume greater responsibility for

their own defense, and (6) complementary defense cooperation.21

To put this statement by Secretary Cheney in context, one

must remember that it was designed to reassure U.S. friends and

allies of a U.S. commitment as a hint of doubt began to creep

into the thinking of our friends in the region. Bases were

closing, forces were reducing, and, increasingly, the United

States put more emphasis on the capabilities of allies. It was in

1991 and 1992 that ASEAN suggested using an expanded forum to

promote dialogue on enhancing security in the region, and the

Cheney assurances should be viewed, in large measure, as a

response to the ASEAN initiatives. The desire on the part of

ASEAN seems to have been based on the belief that there was no

articulation of a new strategic view by Washington. Domestic

economic and political forces in the United States created

pressure for troop reductions and showed a tendency toward

isolationism. If ASEAN suggested a dialogue to keep the United

States involved in Asia, it was successful. However, the fact

that ASEAN had to take the initiative showed that confidence in

the United States was already slipping.22

Even Australia, perhaps the most staunch ally of the United

States in the Asia-Pacific region, began to reexamine the outlook

for a future U.S.-Australia security relationship as a result of

the closing of the bases in the Philippines and the changes in

the U.S. national security strategy.23 Increasingly, Australia is

becoming more engaged with ASEAN and its Asian neighbors. This is

not surprising, given that between 1991 and 1993 the Pentagon's

strategy for Asia called for a "10-12 percent reduction" of

forces.24 Since 1993, forces have been further reduced. The

Australian reorientation toward Asia is a practical response as

well. Australia is culturally and politically European (British),

but geographically Asian. It has been the host recently to many

immigrants from Asia and must become more engaged in the region.25

The world has changed dramatically. The Warsaw Pact fell

apart, the Berlin Wall was destroyed, and Germany has unified.

Communism collapsed in the Soviet Union, which itself dissolved.

In response to these changes, which were the objective of the

containment strategy, the United States reexamined its national

security strategy.26 The Department of Defense, in order to be

able to respond to future threats, published a new defense
7

strategy that focused on four foundations: Strategic Deterrence

and Defense, Forward Presence, Crisis Response, and

Reconstitution.27

Based on lessons from the Gulf War, and keeping in mind the

continuing debate in the U.S. Congress over the future

requirements for U.S. forces, the focus of the National Military

Strategy shifted somewhat. The new strategy paid greater

attention to the conduct of multilateral operations and

collective security. Although the strategy cited the lessons of

the 1991 Gulf War as a basis for the change, a dwindling U.S.

budget, a swelling debt, and the changed world situation combined

to limit what the United States could, or needed to, do within

its own fiscal constraints.28 The strategy is not only fiscally

constrained, but is also limited by the ability of the United

States to project its forces and put them on the ground when such

forces are increasingly based in the continental United States.

Faced with the new conditions, in order to correctly assess and

define U.S. capabilities, the Clinton administration initiated

the "Bottom-Up Review" (BUR) of U.S. forces, published in

September 1993.29

The Clinton administration's BUR was designed to "rebuild

defense strategy, forces, and defense programs and budgets . . .

to meet new dangers and seize new opportunities."30 With the overarching Soviet threat gone, the focus of U.S. strategy became

more regional in nature and was designed to "protect and advance

American security with fewer resources."31 The new strategy was

designed to be able to contend with two major regional conflicts

in the world (the examples given in the BUR document were

conflicts in the Persian Gulf and in Korea). The regional

scenarios were chosen as planning tools that allowed U.S.

military staffs to build appropriate, effective force packages to

respond to crises based on theoretical and quantitative models

derived from actual experience in the Persian Gulf and other

conflicts. However, some ambiguity was built into the statements

of U.S. capabilities.

When first announced, the BUR stated that the intent of the

United States was to be able to respond to "two nearly

simultaneous major regional conflicts."32 That key word, "nearly,"

seems to have been almost lost in the discussion of the strategy

in the United States. When Secretary of Defense William Perry, in

an October 1994 speech at the Chinese National Defense

University, reiterated that the United States could not fight two

major conflicts simultaneously, it caused some surprise in the

Pentagon among some military officers who perhaps had not read

the original document carefully.33 However, to many Asians this

echoed a revision of the U.S. and allied strategy in World War

II, when a "win-hold-win" strategy called for the serial defeat

first of Germany, then Japan.34 Winning in the European theater
8

while "holding" in the Pacific, then concentrating force on the

defeat of Japan, was a sensible way to manage the combined effort

in World War II. This historical parallel has not been lost in

Asia, which had already seen that the United States placed its

emphasis first on European and Middle Eastern interests.35 Many

Chinese military officers and Asian military attaches bring up

the fact that the United States placed Asia as second in

importance to Europe during World War II. They express their

belief that this is still the case.

After much debate, the BUR fixed the U.S. force presence in

Northeast Asia at about 100,000 personnel, divided primarily

between Japan and Korea. The plans for the future, however,

called for significant reductions of U.S. forces between 1995 and

1999, including two active and one reserve Army divisions, three

active and four reserve Air Force fighter wings, one active and

one reserve Navy air wings, and a carrier and 55 surface ships

and submarines.36

The strategy underlying the BUR was designed to bring forces

to bear on regional dangers, but was really focused on deterring

or defeating large-scale aggression. In Asia, that meant a focus

on Korea. In Southeast Asia, where U.S. forces were no longer

based, the rationale for a regional security dialogue was

strengthened.

 If the strategy debate in the United States added to the

rationale for a regionally based security dialogue in Southeast

Asia, earlier congressional testimony by the Assistant Secretary

of State-Designate for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Winston

Lord had demonstrated that the United States was prepared to

support a multilateral approach to security consultation in the

Pacific region. Ambassador Lord, who had experience in the region

as an aide to Henry Kissinger in the 1970s and as the U.S.

ambassador to China in the late 1980s, reminded the Congress

that:

America has fought three wars in Asia during the past

half century. We have abiding security interests there.

Forty percent of our trade is with the region, its

share swelling more rapidly than that of any other, and

half again as large as with Western Europe. More and

more eager, talented Asian immigrants enrich America's

cultural and economic mosaic. Our nation's population

and production shift steadily toward our Pacific coast.

. . . We have enormous stakes in the Pacific. We need

to integrate our economic, political and security

policies. We need fresh approaches and structures of

cooperation. . . . It is time to build--with others--a

New Pacific Community.37
9

Lord's plan called for the development of new, multilateral

forums for security consultations in Asia. At the same time,

Ambassador Lord indicated that in doing so, traditional U.S.

alliances in Asia would continue.38 However, the new policy

emphasized that the United States would support Japan for a seat

in the UN Security Council. Ambassador Lord carefully, even

cryptically, referred to the need for Japan to make contributions

"worthy of a major political and economic power" to world

councils, and discussed security consultations, without

specifically asking Japan to take a stronger hand in regional

security.39 This was perhaps one of the more delicate issues. When

the Reagan adminis-tration asked Japan to take responsibility for

patrolling the seas out to a distance of 1,000 miles, it raised

some concerns in those nations in Asia that had suffered under

Japanese aggression earlier in the century. Many of Japan's

neighbors are not comfortable that the United States seems to be

pushing Tokyo to break its own self-imposed boundaries or to

stretch its constitutional restrictions on military activity and

collective security.

Human Rights and U.S. Values as a Factor.

At the same time that the testimony sought to reassure

Congress and U.S. allies of the U.S. commitment to the region, it

underscored one of the greatest sources of tension for U.S.

policy: how to support human rights and democracy while at the

same time maintaining open trade and working toward security

consultation and cooperation with countries in the region despite

some disagreements over the concept of human rights. Lord

candidly said that there is a necessary balance among

"geopolitical, economic, and other factors" in the democracy and

human rights equation. However, he pointed out that the "end of

the global rivalry with the Soviet Union reduces the pressure to

muffle concerns about unsavory governments for the sake of

security."40 Specifi-cally mentioning China, Burma, and Indonesia,

Lord set the U.S. agenda on human rights and democracy squarely

in front of the Congress as a significant factor in policy.

This was and remains a very sensitive matter throughout

Asia, where many states have taken a different view than that of

the United States on what constitutes human rights and democracy.

James Hsiung, in his study of human rights in East Asia, has

characterized the Western concept of human rights as essentially

"adversarial," something to be fought for by the individual. In

Asia, however, according to Hsiung, there is a Confucian model in

which "individual rights will be taken care of within the group

or may be protected by purposeful distancing from external

authorities."41 Hsiung has called this a "consensual model" under

which individuals may be compelled to rise up only when

authorities fail in their responsibilities to the group. The
10

society becomes an extended family, with the government the

benevolent patriarch. If the CSCE in Europe had a human rights

component in the Helsinki accords, the nations of Asia, and

especially ASEAN, want to avoid that component in their

negotiations with the United States. Following this "consensual"

or "Confucian" model, some Asian officials have emphasized that

social stability and economic growth leading to the satisfaction

of such basic needs as food, housing, and clothing are basic

human rights which sometimes must be satisfied, even if that

means that a government must use more authoritarian means than

that desired by the United States. In a spirited defense of the

Asian view of human rights, Kishore Mahubani, of the Singapore

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, writing in Foreign Affairs, sought

to convince U.S. critics of Asian policies that culture and

economic reality are important components to be considered when

evaluating such policies. More recently, in the December 1994

issue of Current History, Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong of

Singapore defended the new authoritarianism of Singapore as a

model for Asia.42 Why all of this from Singapore? Clearly there

are differences between the United States and Singapore on the

issue, and they came to public attention at the time the articles

were published because of such incidents as the caning of an

American citizen for vandalism and the fine levied on an American

professor for his veiled criticism of Singapore's system of

justice. But there are other reasons as well, including the fact

that Singapore's elder statesman, Lee Juan-yew, has been a

staunch defender of China, where the United States has expressed

more serious human rights concerns.

The continued dialogue between East and West on this issue

illustrates the seriousness of the matter and under-scores why

ASEAN states (and their neighbors in Asia) are so concerned over

the focus of U.S. policy now that Cold War tensions no longer

provide the focal point for U.S. ideology and values. In

historical perspective, however, this policy focus of the United

States is really no different from that which provided the

foundation for the Cold War values of the United States. The

United States is a nation founded on a few basic principles,

particularly respect for the individual, individual rights,

freedom of expression, freedom from arbitrary arrest, freedom of

religion, and freedom of the press. The reason for the

containment strategy of the Cold War, which was directed against

the Soviet Union, was that the Soviets and their system were the

 greatest ideological and military threat against the things that

the United States holds dear.43 Now the Soviet Union exists no

longer, and there is no over-arching military threat to the

United States. The containment strategy changed to one of

engagement, particularly in Asia, and the United States continues

to pursue its values in its foreign policy.

By July 1994, the Clinton administration defined its own
11

national security strategy--one of "engagement and enlargement."44

An important facet of that policy, one that directly affects

ASEAN and the Regional Forum, is the explicit call for a policy

that facilitates regional integration. The rationale for

fostering such regional integration was that nations that would

work together in the absence of the United States may be willing

to coalesce around the United States in a crisis.45 The Clinton

National Security Strategy set out the extent to which the

national interest of the United States will dictate the "pace and

extent" of U.S. engagement on an issue. It also gave warning that

"where vital or survival interests of the United States are at

stake, U.S. use of force will be decisive and, if necessary,

unilateral."46 However, many Asian countries remain confused by

the policy, which they see as ambiguous. News correspondent

Daniel Williams, in an analytical piece in The Washington Post,

explained how the "comprehensive engagement" approach is

sometimes confusing to other countries.47 Using China as an

example, Williams explained that rather than defining broad

policy goals that would transcend other problems or issues (the

"common ground of mutual concerns over national interest"), the

United States might emphasize a "menu of missions," any of which

may get emphasis at a given time. According to Williams, this is

confusing because a country never knows what is important.

Military and political representatives from most govern-ments in

Asia still question the focus of comprehensive engagement. They

routinely complain that they are confused over what the United

States thinks is most important--trade, security, human rights,

or weapons proliferation.

The concept of "enlargement" proves to be even more

problematic than that of engagement. The strategy makes it clear

that U.S. strategic interests are "served by enlarging the

community of democratic and free market nations," making a

"commitment to free markets and respect for human rights" a key

part of the strategy.48 This statement defines the pursuit through

foreign policy of the basic values upon which the United States

was founded. This "enlargement" of U.S. interests was envisioned

to include activities not only by government officials, but also

through private and nongovernmental groups. It is no wonder that

some countries in Asia still ruled by communist parties,

particularly China and Vietnam, are uncomfortable with this new

U.S. strategy, which they see as designed to undermine their

governmental systems. The interesting dynamic in the region is

that the very countries that initiated the ARF, the ASEAN states,

 feel threatened by China and are concerned about being abandoned

by the United States. Nevertheless, some of these countries feel

they are under attack by the United States on human rights

grounds. Washington, of course, views this not as an attack by

the United States, but as a strong, healthy dialogue on the

values that the American people believe are important, and that

the U.S. Government must therefore advance. To offset any
12

potential threat from China, which presents the most direct

threat to ASEAN, and to foster stability, ASEAN has opened its

doors to Vietnam, also a target of the U.S. "enlargement"

strategy.

ASEAN has also been building bridges with Burma, where China

seems to be posturing itself to expand its military presence into

the Bay of Bengal and developing bases that potentially threaten

India.49 The United States has taken explicit steps to isolate

Burma, while ASEAN wants Burma in the dialogue.50 One can see why

some ASEAN states are ambivalent about the "enlargement" aspect

of the new strategy. Nonetheless, the U.S. policy is a flexible

one, and it permits momentum in any direction when Washington

wants it. At least with respect to China, the United States

showed that flexibility by de-linking China's Most Favored Nation

status from its record on human rights and again in the

settlement of the dispute on intellectual property rights in

February 1995. More importantly, and this is perhaps not always

recognized, the strategy articulates U.S. values flexibly by

making it clear that while "each nation must find its own form of

democracy . . . there is no cultural justification for torture or

tyranny."51

 The debate in the United States over its role in the new

international order and U.S. strategic interests has given rise

to fears in Asia that the U.S. security commitment there could be

weakened. The main shock to Asia was the U.S. withdrawal from

Subic Bay and the Philippines. One Washington-based

representative from Singapore who watches regional security

issues suggested that part of ASEAN's rationale for the ARF was

to get the United States re-engaged in Asia in a "discussion of

security interests in the Asia-Pacific." It took about 2 years to

get the United States squarely involved. When the idea of a

regional dialogue was first advanced, the United States seemed

cool to the concept, since it threatened to undermine

Washington's network of bilateral security commitments.

The Dragons of the ASEAN Regional Forum.

There are a variety of multilateral channels for the

discussion of mutual interests in Asia: the ASEAN Ministerial

Meeting (AMM), held annually; the ASEAN Post-Ministerial

Conference (PMC), held after the AMM and attended by observer and

dialogue partners; and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation

(APEC), which was designed to promote trade and investment in the

Pacific Basin. The genesis for the ARF is from the ASEAN PMC

meetings.52

The concept of ASEAN security cooperation was initially

raised formally by Philippine Foreign Secretary Raul Manglaupus
13

at the ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference in Jakarta, Indonesia,

in 1989.53 At that time, there was little support for such an

expansion in the role of ASEAN, but Chinese activities in the

South China Sea, combined with the U.S. military drawdown in the

region, focused ASEAN on the need for some form of dialogue. A

series of security seminars were held involving primarily

nongovernmental entities that served as exploratory models for

the ARF. The first two were held within ASEAN in Manila and

Bangkok in 1991. Workshops on the South China Sea were also held

in Bali, Indonesia, in 1990 and 1991.54 It was at these meetings

that the discussion within ASEAN focused on the need for

developing an Asian-based and controlled mechanism for internal

dialogue over security cooperation. However, some of that

dialogue was conditioned by the reaction to the U.S. withdrawal

from the Philippines. Just prior to the Fourth ASEAN Summit in

Singapore in January 1992, Thai Foreign Minister Sarasin made it

clear that, in the view from Bangkok, "a threat in Southeast Asia

no longer exists," consequently, no U.S. base was welcome in

Thailand.55 This statement should be viewed as rhetoric for

domestic political consumption. At the same time that Sarasin

drew the line on U.S. bases, there was a strong U.S. association

with Thailand through exercises, military exchanges, and

landing/refueling rights. The Thais were clearly comfortable with

the level of the U.S. presence in the region.

Early in 1992 there was some criticism within ASEAN of the

agreements between Singapore and the United States over the

potential basing of U.S. ships in Singapore. From the

Philippines, especially, came accusations that Singapore was

"trying to be the ‘junior partner' of the United States" within

ASEAN, and was acting like "America's little foot soldier" in the

region.56 Malaysia also reacted to any attempt by the United

States to set up new bases in the region.57 The situation within

ASEAN prior to the conference was perhaps best summed up by an

editorial in Bangkok's The Nation, which outlined individual

national perspectives on the degree to which the United States

should be involved in the region.58 Both Indonesia and Malaysia

wanted to work hard to maintain a nonaligned status (and

Indonesia especially was working to draw Vietnam into the

dialogue); Singapore and Thailand wanted a visible U.S. presence

in the region; and Manila, still stinging over the U.S.

withdrawal, continued editorial attacks on Singapore in the

press, calling for closer cooperation within ASEAN on security

matters.

There was a great deal of give and take at the 1992 ASEAN

Summit. Singapore, after consultation with Prime Minister

Mahathir of Malaysia, ruled out any U.S. bases, but agreed to

hosting a naval logistics element to provide support to the U.S.

Navy under the framework of the Memorandum of Understanding

signed between Vice President Dan Quayle and Lee Kuan Yew in
14

Japan in November 1990.59 ASEAN members agreed that no military

alliance would be formed, since they saw no major threat to the

region. However, ASEAN's goal was to expand cooperation with

other countries in the region to "consolidate the existing

equilibrium and peace and stability in Southeast Asia."60

Individual national perspectives were aired, and these

complemented the broader agreement. The declaration at the close

of the summit asked for UN recognition of the 1976 Treaty of

Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia to resolve disputes

peacefully and asked for implementation of the 1972 declaration

of a "Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN)" in the

region.61 However, Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir stated his

belief that any military cooperation within ASEAN should be

bilateral and that no U.S. ships, particularly nuclear, should be

in the region. Mahathir also strongly restated his country's

long-standing position that there should be no military role for

Japan in Southeast Asia.62

By mid-1992, ASEAN nations began to implement the general

agreements reached at the January 1992 summit. Singapore Defense

Minister Goh Chok Tong and Indian Defense Minister Sharad Pawar

met to discuss security in the region.63 Sharad assured Goh that

there was no reason that Southeast Asia should feel threatened by

India.64 In Japan, where there was ambivalence over any expansion

of a military role, the Japanese press reported on a conference

attended by members of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences

(CASS), where CASS researchers supported a U.S. military presence

in the region and U.S. bases in Japan lest the Japanese

government be tempted to increase their military forces to

compensate for a U.S. withdrawal from the region.65 Meanwhile,

speaking at the National University of Singapore, Indonesian

Foreign Minister Ali Alatas called for more structured security

consultations on regional issues. Alatas suggested both stronger

confidence-building measures (CFBM) and transparency in military

exercises in the region. He also called for a continuous forum

for dialogue within ASEAN.66

How should the meetings and statements after the 1992 Summit

be read? It is clear that the greatest concern within the region

was that the United States was wrestling with its own policies in

the light of the end of the Cold War. Despite the assurances in

U.S. policy documents and statements, including those in the

National Security Strategy, doubt persisted in Asia. There was

still the perception that the United States lacked a clearly

articulated strategic paradigm which permeated and gave coherence

to its post-Cold War foreign and national security policy. But

there was disagreement within ASEAN as to the purpose of the

organization and to the best approach to regional issues.

While the dialogue on the ARF continued, a parallel,

nongovernmental organization (NGO) effort continued on a separate
15

track (Track 2). The Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia

Pacific (CSCAP), initiated in Kuala Lumpur in July 1992, brought

together NGOs to explore some of the more difficult questions

that would clearly bog down and ultimately halt formal

discussions. For example, even today the CSCAP meetings are

slowly and quietly wrestling with the question of how to have

Taiwan represented along with China.

Nonetheless, the dialogue continued, and within the

dialogue, a form of agreement emerged--a consensus that led to

the ARF. If this seems a slow dance, taking place over a 5-year

period, perhaps the answer is found in three points. First, there

was, and is, no really significant threat within the region to

which ASEAN has to react. The ASEAN nations want to be able to

adjust to how the United States changes its posture in the AsiaPacific, while the United States does not want to be pinned down,

but prefers to concentrate on "national interest." Second,

bilateral tensions between the ASEAN states have existed for

years, and although there is the recognition of the need for a

regional approach, the national interests differ enough that each

country wants to avoid hasty action. Third, as students of Asia

such as Lucian Pye would tell us, the political culture in the

region is more comfortable with this sort of indirect dialogue,

which leads to a recognition of individual sensitivities and

positions on issues while a political consensus builds, but

avoids confrontation by gently testing the waters on issues where

there is friction.67 The process has produced its own form of CFBM

(the dialogue itself), and at least the formal process of an

ASEAN Regional Forum began in July 1994.

ARF: Asian Security without a U.S. Umbrella.

The reduced U.S. presence in the Asia-Pacific, combined with

conflicting claims over the South China Sea islands, were the

principal factors that contributed to the development of the

regional security dialogue in ASEAN.68 Even the Commander-in-Chief

of the U.S. Pacific Command, Admiral Charles Larson, in 1994,

ruled out any new bases for the United States in Asia, preferring

to rely on such activities as "ship repair in Singapore,

Malaysia, and Indonesia, in addition to the other normal

peacetime activities" to establish the U.S. presence.69 This

contributed to the feeling of insecurity in the region. The U.S.

security policy was intended to ease concerns that the Western

Pacific was an U.S. "lake." However, the perception in Asia was

that a power vacuum was created that could be filled by China, a

resurgent Japan, or even India. The changed situation, and

ASEAN's own success as a means to discuss and resolve issues in a

multilateral forum, made an ASEAN-led regional security dialogue

more palatable in 1993-94 than it was before.
16

When the ARF met in Bangkok in July 1994, in addition to the

six ASEAN countries, several "dialogue partners" were involved:

the United States, Canada, New Zealand, Australia, South Korea,

and the European Union. "Observer countries" with significant

economic and security interests in the region (Laos, Papua New

Guinea, Vietnam, Russia, and China) were also invited. In all,

there were 18 participants. At the invitation of the Thai

government, a representative from Burma was present and took part

in some sideline bilateral discussions.70 Of note, the ASEAN

dialogue was one that was indigenous to the region and was not

dominated or controlled by the United States or another outside

power.

An important backdrop to the Bangkok meetings was the

perception that within Southeast Asia an arms race was taking

place. At the same time that CFBM were explored, the ASEAN states

individually began to build their defenses. Assessments of the

new purchases of weapons in the ASEAN states have been mixed.

Thailand began to explore air defense system upgrades, new armor

systems, and maritime patrol mechanisms.71 Indonesia began

discussion with India over ship maintenance, while it entered

into discussions with the United States over aircraft systems

upgrades.72 Malaysia explored a range of systems including British

trainers, Russian MiG-29M fighters, and U.S. F-18D aircraft.73

Malaysia also began to look into new helicopters from a variety

of sources, a Polish version of the Russian T-72 tank, and

organized a rapid deployment force to respond to threats

offshore. Other ground systems flowing into Malaysia included

Korean-made infantry fighting vehicles. The Philippines, strapped

for cash, nevertheless began exploring the purchase of new

fighter and trainer aircraft, naval and maritime air patrol

craft, and infantry vehicles. Some analysts attribute the arms

purchases to a normal evolution of military modernization based

on improved economies; others see the new purchases as a means to

discourage Chinese aggression.74 But most of the ASEAN nations

deny that the weapons modernization efforts are aimed at any

other country. Rather, the purchases are said to represent

modernization efforts designed to keep pace with the rapid

technological advances in weaponry.75

Chinese strategic thinkers, meanwhile, began to share their

own assessments of the region, focusing on the growing importance

of ASEAN, economic factors and the dominance of Japan in the

economic sphere, and the existence of major territorial disputes

as reasons for developing some form of regional dialogue on

security. The Chinese did not advance a specific form of security

agenda but were obviously committed to be a part of the dialogue.

The Chinese were strongly opposed to any linkage of human rights

issues and trade sanctions to a security mechanism.76 Their

support for ARF helped Beijing counterbalance U.S. influence in

the region and found allies who opposed U.S. human rights
17

policies.

If there was a country targeted by the ARF, the targeting

was discreet. No minister who attended the 1994 meeting singled

out another country as the main threat. But at least one analyst

in the region candidly said that "the idea behind the {ARF} is to

try to tame the tiger. . . . All Southeast Asian countries see

China as a potential threat . . . and there is general agreement

that constructive engagement is the right approach."77 But

building a bloc against China was not the purpose of the meeting.

The goal was to present a nonconfrontational but regional front

to China. Instead of attacking a specific country, the meeting

participants reviewed issues such as nuclear nonproliferation,

means for conflict resolution, confidence-building measures, and

peacekeeping. Among the proposals that were discussed at the ARF

in Bangkok were the establishment of a regional peacekeeping

center and a mechanism for preventive diplomacy.78

In the discussion of China and its role in the region,

Chinese legislation on the law of the sea and Beijing's right to

use force to enforce maritime claims were central concerns.79 Four

major topics of concern at the ARF meeting were the question of

Cambodia and the stability of its government, the South China

Sea, Burma, and the continuing problems on the Korean Peninsula.

Reportedly the Canadians, attending as dialogue partners, pushed

for more formality to the meetings at some stage. But the ASEAN

member states seem to have rejected this approach. With regard to

arms purchases, the member states attempted to reassure each

other that new purchases are only for modernization and do not

represent an arms race.80 Although the United States avoided

contact with Burma, which attended as an observer at the

invitation of Thailand, ASEAN clearly wants Burma to be part of

the dialogue. This is probably for two reasons: Burma's location

in Southeast Asia and the apparent pressure by China to put Burma

into its sphere of influence. More importantly, the decision to

allow Vietnam to join ASEAN at the 1995 ministerial meeting in

Brunei served as another hedge against China and helps to foster

Vietnam's integration into the economy of Southeast Asia as

Vietnam makes a transition away from communism to a market

economy.

Singaporean analysis of the ARF identified the problem of

the Spratly Islands as central to regional tensions. In a veiled

reference to China, Singaporean editorials warned against

"gunboat diplomacy" in the South China Sea, echoing similar words

from the Canadian delegation at the meeting.81 The most

significant difference that emerged, however, may be in approach.

The same Straits Times editorial noted that Australia and the

United States wanted to move quickly to upgrade regional

security, while the "Asian view is that a comfort level be

established first among ideological disparate members." Both
18

China and Korea suggested that subregional forums be formed,

including one in Northeast Asia comprised of North and South

Korea, the United States, Russia, Japan and China.82 However,

ASEAN now begins to fear that the ARF could take off and live a

life of its own, herded in a different direction by Japan, China,

or the United States, increasingly divorced from the ASEAN states

and the Post-Ministerial Conference that gave birth to the ARF.83

If ASEAN initiated a dialogue as a means to strengthen its

own position and its own influence, as well as to draw the

potential conflicting parties into discussions, the plan worked.

The United States, still wrestling with a post-Cold War policy,

was also drawn into the dialogue and, in the end, modified its

own policies with the publication of the March 1995 Asia-Pacific

strategy by the Clinton administration. Although reluctant to be

pinned down on the specific instances under which the United

States might resort to force in the world, policy utterances in

the United States made it clear that, while the United States

still focused on pressing problems in Europe and in the Middle

East, Asia is of vital importance to Washington.84 The ARF process

served U.S. interests, but Washington seemed to want a more

formal and faster process. Regardless of speed, the ARF was the

sort of dialogue that the U.S. strategy supported.

The 1995 ARF Meeting in Brunei.

In the intervening year between 1994 and the August 1995 ARF

meeting in Brunei, Chinese actions once more drew attention to

the South China Sea problem, while an ambiguous U.S. reaction

again did little to reassure its friends in Asia. China, reacting

to Filipino moves to secure a stronger footing in the Spratlys,

seized Mischief Reef and built a military structure there to

reinforce its claim. Despite proclamations that this was merely a

"fishing structure," photographic evidence showed that there were

military radars on the reef.85 Manila reacted by sending out a few

naval patrol boats, and fears in the region grew once more.

Washington, despite its pronouncements that it was in the region

as a forceful presence, took no official position on the

Philippine claim to Mischief Reef or the Spratlys. In fact,

Pacific naval commanders pointed out that the U.S.-Philippine

Mutual Defense Treaty did not provide for a U.S. response to a

foreign attack or seizure of this disputed territory.

ASEAN regrouped, thinking that it must reach accom-modation

with Beijing. It was months later that the U.S. Pacific

Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Macke, finally made a firm statement

of U.S. resolve to ensure the peaceful resolution of disputes in

the region and to maintain open shipping.86 By the time of the

August Brunei meeting, China declared its intent to discuss the

Spratlys issue using the international Law of the Sea as a basis
19

for settling claims.87 Moving beyond procedural issues, the second

ARF Ministerial meeting took up substantive discussion on mutual

CFBM, transparency in defense policy, search and rescue, and

peacekeeping.

There were three main themes that could be discerned from a

study of the 1995 meeting in Brunei: first, an over-arching

concern about China, its growing military power, and its South

Pacific maritime claims; second, an ambivalence toward the United

States, evidenced by a continual desire to keep U.S. military

forces involved in the security of the region, while struggling

to maintain the ARF (and ASEAN) as a Southeast Asian-controlled

security mechanism; and, third, a rejection of U.S. pressure on

the sensitive issue of human rights, as evidenced by the

admission of Vietnam and the formal observer status for Burma.88

China Looms as a Factor in Regional Security.

Tensions in East Asia were complicated when Taiwan President

 Lee Teng-hui was allowed to visit Cornell University in June

1995. This visit led to a series of military exercises and

demonstrations of force by China in the Taiwan Strait, designed

to influence the Taiwanese presidential election in March 1996,

the U.S. Congress, and the Clinton administration. China wanted

to remind officials in Washington that Taiwan is a "go-to-war"

issue for the Beijing leadership. This message was also intended

for ASEAN leaders, who had been permitting Taiwan officials more

"international space." In addition, the exercises were also

intended to suppress support among the Taiwan people for an

independence platform.

China's robust military exercise schedule, which included a

"conceptual" blockade of Taiwan established by use of exercise

closure areas at sea, shocked Asia and the world. The closure

areas, which were established to let Beijing launch cruise

missiles and ballistic missiles in close proximity to the island,

and the missile launches, proved to be a political disaster for

Beijing.89 ASEAN's concerns over Mischief Reef were reinforced by

the firing of M-11 (Dong Feng-15) ballistics from China into the

vicinity of Taiwan in March 1996. The Chinese military exercises

brought out two U.S. carrier battle groups in reaction, a move

welcomed by Asian nations.

Despite Beijing's own pleas for understanding and assurances

of China's peaceful intentions, China once more openly became the

focus of ARF concerns.90 China published a defense white paper in

October 1995, outlining its peaceful intentions. Taiwan was

treated by Beijing as a purely internal matter. China's military

forces were characterized as only defensive in nature. But the

Philippines was drawn into a joint defense Memorandum of
20

Understanding with Great Britain in January 1996; Malaysia called

for a greater Australian role in Southeast Asia; and Australia

and Indonesia, two countries traditionally wary of each other,

initialed a security agreement.91

All of these countries sought to avoid directly antagonizing

China. However, the firing of missiles in close proximity to

Taiwan reminded the ASEAN states that, despite China's "selfperception as a pacific, non-threatening country that wishes

nothing more than to live in peace with its neighbors," Beijing

has a disturbing history of using force to settle territorial

disputes.92 In fact, since 1949, China has resorted to military

force in territorial disputes in no fewer than 16 cases.93

The 1996 ARF Meeting in Jakarta.

As the third ARF meeting in July 1996 approached, Robert

Elegant, an established Asian-based editorial writer and author,

focused attention on China. Elegant said that no foreign power

will "define the role that China will play" into the 21st

century. He concluded that, "China will remain assertive,

justifying its behavior as retribution for nearly two centuries

of exploitation by a militarily superior west . . . . China's

foreign policy will remain in the service of the regime's passion

for revenge and power."94 At Jakarta, therefore, the ARF members

performed a balancing act.

The ASEAN Ministerial Meeting admitted Burma as an observer,

which gave it the same status in the ARF. This is a mechanism to

counter China's influence in Burma, and was a direct rebuff of

U.S. human rights concerns.95 In another move to check Chinese

maritime influence, the ARF was expanded to include India, a

modernizing Chinese rival for power.96

Pressures from other countries to join the ARF, such as

Great Britain, France, North Korea, and landlocked states like

Mongolia and four central Asian republics caused ARF members to

adopt formal criteria for membership.97 Meanwhile, at the ARF

meetings, the United States, China, Russia, Japan, New Zealand,

Canada, Laos, Burma, Cambodia, the European Union, and Papua New

Guinea took part as observers or dialogue partners.98 Of note,

Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas made it clear that the

ASEAN member states, in their control of the ARF, would not be

overshadowed by observers or dialogue partners. Alatas said that

the ARF will continue to focus on security, transparency, CFBM,

and conflict resolution. However, Alatas warned, sensitive issues

such as human rights would not "become automatically eligible" to

be raised at ARF meetings, a rebuff of U.S. Secretary of State

Warren Christopher.99
21

In the wake of the 1996 ARF meeting, there were ample

warnings to China about its use of force to settle disputes.

Indonesia scheduled a major exercise around the Natuna Islands

where there are natural gas deposits. In preparation for that

exercise, one security specialist at the Indonesian Institute of

Sciences said that, while Indonesia is engaged in a range of

contacts with China, it "would be foolish for us to be completely

naive. China respects strength. If they see you as being weak,

they'll eat you alive."100 In a separate set of exercises, the

Five-Power Defense Agreement countries (Great Britain, Australia,

New Zealand, Malaysia, and Singapore) ran Exercise STARFISH. This

involved over 20 aircraft and 21 ships from these five

countries.101 Thus, despite a preference for not appearing as an

alliance against China, these countries revealed their continued

concerns with the power of the Chinese "Dragon."

Conclusions.

There are some real problems for ASEAN, not the least of

which is how to retain initiative and control as the dialogue

expands and new countries are admitted to ASEAN. Canada pushes

for formality, Northeast Asian countries push for separate

forums, and the United States continues to pursue its policy of

"enlargement," which for ASEAN means pressure over human rights.

And the United States is trying to tell the ASEAN ministers what

countries to admit to the status of dialogue partners.

ASEAN's perception is that the United States does not have a

post-Cold War policy and strategy. In fact, the ambiguity of U.S.

policy has been a major problem, one that was not corrected

until the successive rounds of Chinese threats against Taiwan,

when Washington finally deployed a decisive naval force of two

carrier battle groups off Taiwan as a signal to Beijing that the

United States will not stand by to see a military resolution to

the political dispute between the Mainland and Taiwan. Although

it may not be what ASEAN wants to hear, the U.S. policy and

strategy has been set forth reasonably clearly. It is not a

single-minded containment strategy. Nor is it a strategy that

replaces the Soviet threat with a Chinese threat. China does not

threaten the United States at the present time, and U.S.

interests are best served by the inclusion of China in a dialogue

as a responsible regional actor.

The United States seeks to maintain regional stability in

the world; seeks to avoid ethnic and religious strife; wants to

counter weapons and nuclear, biological, and chemical

proliferation; and seeks to advance democracy and human rights

throughout the world. Participating in the multilateral dialogues

like the ARF is a tenet of the new U.S. policy. The policy is

flexible and is designed to bring the nations of the world into
22

the international community. The strategy to implement the policy

has political, military, and economic components that permit

Washington to employ U.S. power and pursue U.S. interests in a

measured way. There is a plan of application for the regional

interests of the United States and the existence of the ARF

advances those interests. The United States is engaged and

involved in Asia.

Dialogue may not work, and exercises are demon-strations of

military force. If the ARF is to be more than a venue for

communication and dialogue on transparency, it is really up to

ASEAN to make it so.102 If ASEAN is afraid of the Chinese

"Dragon," ASEAN must continue to engage China or must confront

China on issues either as a body or as individual states.

However, the "slow dance" in Bangkok in July 1994 failed to keep

the Chinese from seizing another part of the Spratlys in February

1995, when Beijing took over Mischief Reef. Perhaps the ASEAN

states would do well to review again the U.S. policy, which

permits pressure through a variety of levers: economic,

political, military, and even ideological. With such strong

economies but weak militaries, there could still be a way to tame

the "Dragon" through economic pressure. China depends heavily on

investment to prop up its regime and stabilize economic growth.

In the final analysis, however, as Indonesian strategist Dewi

Fortuna Anwar pointed out, fundamentally, the "Dragon" respects

strength.103

ENDNOTES

1. The title of this paper is not meant to suggest that the

U.S. role in Asia has been solely to provide a nuclear umbrella

for the region. The term "umbrella" is used here in the sense of

simply providing some protection, as a barrier against other

elements. The comments attributed to an unnamed Chinese official

by Freeman were in reponse to China's perceptions about how far 

the United States would go to help Taiwan in the face of the

threat of a Chinese invasion precipitated by a declaration of

independence from mainland China by Taiwan's leadership.

2. ASEAN was formed on August 9, 1967, by Indonesia,

Malaysia, The Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand to strengthen

regional cohesion and self-reliance, with special emphasis on

economic, social, and cultural cooperation and development.

Brunei was later admitted as a member nation. Vietnam joined

ASEAN in 1995. An excellent example of the framing of the

security debate in Asia in theoretical and policy terms related

to the European debate may be found in Stephen J. Blank, Helsinki

in Asia, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute,

1993. Blank compares the security environment in the Asia-Pacific

region with that in Europe. Barbara Opall and Naoaki Usui, staff

writers for Defense News, wrote that some attendees at the ARF
23

drew parallels between the 1975 Helsinki Accords in Europe and

the ASEAN meeting (Defense News, August 1-7, 1994, pp. 1, 26).

However, as this paper will argue, the ARF is more about

security, confidence-building, and transparency. The human rights

component of the Helsinki Accords is probably the area in which

there is the least agreement within the ASEAN states, especially

with the desire of ASEAN to admit Vietnam and to include Burma

(Myanmar) in the dialogue. At the July 1994 ASEAN Ministerial

meeting in Bangkok, the subject was sidestepped; see The Jakarta

Post, July 26, 1994, p. 4, in Foreign Broadcast Information

Service Daily Report-Southeast Asia (hereafter cited as FBISEAS)-94-149, August 3, 1994, p. 53.

3. The 1975 Helsinki Final Act was seminal in changing the

pace of democratization and cooperative threat reduction in

Europe. The human rights initiative in the Helsinki Final Act is

a feature that is not on the table for the ARF. Perhaps the most

important features of the CSCE are the mutual security measures

that followed, the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty and the

process of developing confidence and security-building measures

(CSBM). See Massimmo Dal Piaz, "A Regional Perspective on

European Defense," Parameters, Vol. XXIV, No. 4, Winter 1994, pp.

57-65. The process by which the former Warsaw Pact countries were

drawn into security cooperation with NATO in the Partnership for

Peace is explained in Michael Ruhle and Nicholas Williams,

"Partnership for Peace: A Personal View from NATO," Parameters,

Vol. XXIV, No. 4, Winter 1994, pp. 66-75.

4. "One on One: Lieutenant General Herman Mantri, Chief of

General Staff, Indonesian Armed Forces," Defense News, October

31-November 6, 1994, p. 30.

5. Indonesian Embassy to the U.S. Deputy Chief of Mission

Tjahjono at the Morning Newsmaker Press Conference, National

Press Club, Washington, DC, July 14, 1994. The author is indebted

to Mr. Peter Hickman of the National Press Club, sponsor of the

conference, for providing a transcript and videotape of the

conference for use in the preparation of this paper.

6. In his book, Henry Kissinger notes that the conflicting

views of China and the United States over international affairs,

and on Taiwan and Vietnam, were significant factors in the

Shanghai communique. Although Kissinger treats the U.S.

extrication from Vietnam in another chapter of his book and links

the China recognition with triangular diplomacy and geopolitics

relative to the Soviet Union, the author's own experience with

Asian military leaders and diplomats is that they see the way

that the 1972 communique was made, and President Carter's

subsequent announcement of formal diplomatic recognition of the

People's Republic of China, as singular examples of how the

United States "treats its friends" in the interest of expedience.
24

See Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy, New York: Simon and Schuster,

1994, pp. 674-702, 725-732.

7. Indeed, when Major General John Singlaub, then assigned

to U.S. Forces Korea in a senior position, challenged President

Carter and was fired, it was Singlaub who was proven correct

after a new assessment of North Korean troop strength and

intentions. Although senior leaders may have privately advised

Carter not to reduce troop strength, and the move was the subject

of great debate on Capitol Hill, the fact that Singlaub went

public (a rare thing for a senior military officer) demonstrates

how strongly he felt about the matter of both China and North

Korea. Singlaub parachuted into Hainan Island in World War II and

later saw it fall to the communists. Then he fought in the Korean

conflict where he also parachuted into North Korea. He was a

veteran Cold War warrior who had worked with the CIA in special

operations.

8. See Caspar W. Weinberger, "The Uses of Military Power,"

Defense ‘85, Armed Forces Information Service, Arlington, VA,

December 1985, pp. 2-11.

9. William J. Clinton, A National Security Strategy of

Engagement and Enlargement, The White House, Washington, DC, July

1994, p. 10.

10. Kissinger, Diplomacy, p. 249.

11. See Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The

Struggle for Power and Peace, New York: Knopf, 1960, pp. 27-35.

12. For almost 3 years, from 1990-93, the author had the

opportunity to meet monthly with groups of about a dozen military

officers from the Asia Pacific region who were visiting the

United States. These officers were generally in the grade of

captain or major with about 6-14 years of service in the armed

forces. This was almost uniformly their opinion. During the same

period, the author met monthly with military attaches from the

Asia-Pacific region based in Washington, DC. Their perceptions of

the U.S. action were roughly the same--that there was a U.S.

withdrawal. Chinese strategic thinkers have also expressed

concerns over a U.S. withdrawal, although they are more concerned

about Northeast Asian stability and Japan. See Du Youkang,

"Southeast Asia: An Uncertain Factor in Sino-U.S. Relations,"

Shanghai Institute for International Strategic Studies Journal, Vol. 2, No. 1, March 1996, pp. 23-24; Yan Xuetong, "China's PostCold War Security Strategy," Contemporary International

Relations, Vol. 5, No. 5, May 1995, pp. 2-3.

13. During the same period Philippine officers in particular

were incredulous that the United States withdrew. They were
25

deeply concerned about the South China Sea and whether the U.S.-

Philippine Mutual Defense Treaty applied to the Spratly Islands.

U.S. officials take the position that the islands are disputed

territory and are not covered by the terms of the treaty, but the

United States would like to see the dispute settled peacefully.

14. North Korea continually insisted that the United States

and South Korea suspend Exercise TEAM SPIRIT before any UN or

International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors could gain access

to some facilities under the December 1991 agreement signed

between the two Koreas on denuclearization. A number of U.S.

political commentators, including Victor Gilinski, a former U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory commissioner, and Henry Sokolski, a former DoD

official in the Bush administration, insisted that strong

measures were the only effective way to bring Pyongyang to the

point of permitting the agreed inspections (Washington Post,

November 23, 1994, p. A19). See "Clinton advised to offer halt in

exercises with South Korea," Washington Times, November 16, 1993,

p. 1; "U.S. Weighs N. Korean Incentives," The Washington Post,

November 17, 1993, p. A31; "South Korea begins to anger as North

vetoes nuclear inspection," Chicago Tribune, May 5, 1994, p. 12;

on Australian views, see "Australia: Military Authorities Edgy

over Potential Asian threat," Ottawa Citizen, May 3, 1994, p.

F13. A particularly strong attack arguing against compromise with

North Korea came from the Republican Party at a July 1994

gathering. There the Republican National Committee Foreign Policy

Forum membership said that the Clinton administration lacked

resolve in facing down North Korea. However, a Washington Post

article on the meeting noted that the Bush administration took no

action in 1989 when it became obvious that North Korea was

diverting nuclear material to build a bomb. The Republican Party

attacks were dismissed as largely partisan rhetoric aimed at the

November 1994 congressional and gubernatorial elections (The

Washington Post, July 28, 1994, p. A23).

15. "U.S. and China Reach Accord at UN on Korean Nuclear

Issue," New York Times, April 1, 1994, p. 7.

16. "U.S. Aide Admits North Korea Nuclear Policy May Not

Work," New York Times, May 6, 1994, p. 6; "U.S. Mustn't Tread Too

Quickly in Asia," Long Island Newsday, August 24, 1994, p. 31.

17. The Washington Post, November 10, 1993, p. 13.

18. For a synopsis of the positions on this issue, see

"Congress Mixed on North Korea Nuke Deal," and "Last-minute Move

Kept U.S. from War in Korea," Army Times, Alexandria, VA,

February 13, 1995, p. 26. See also Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr.,

"North Korea's Nuclear Arsenal: Motivation, Doctrine, and

Possible Employment," Special Report No. 9, Jane's Intelligence

Review, March 1996. The Jane's special report suggests that North
26

Korea has at least two nuclear weapons in its inventory.

19. The publication of the National Security Strategy and

the National Military Strategy as unclassified documents proved

to be a superb step in inducing a positive dialogue around the

world on general military intentions and on confidence-building

measures.

20. "A Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim," A

Presidential Report to Congress Prepared by the Office of the

Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security

Affairs, 1992. This was updated in February 1995 with the

publication of "United States Security Strategy for the East

Asia-Pacific Region," in which Secretary of Defense Perry

announced the stabilization of force levels in Asia.

21. Ibid.

22. At a National Press Club conference in Washington, DC,

on July 14, 1994, Philippine Ambassador Race reminded

participants that Philippine Foreign Secretary Raul Mangalapus,

during the ASEAN Post Ministerial conference held in Jakarta,

Indonesia in 1989, broached the topic of security cooperation in

ASEAN. The dialogue on security cooperation really took off,

however, as the United States began to depart the Philippines.

Partial transcript prepared by the Australian Embassy Public

Affairs Office, Washington, DC.

23. See Thomas-Durell Young, Australian-U.S. Security

Relations in the Post-Cold War World, SSI Special Report,

Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, January 20, 1993. In

an interview in Defense News, July 18-24, 1994, p. 62, Australian

Army Chief of Staff Lieutenant General John Grey commented that

Australian defense priorities remain with the United States, but

that the United States does not dominate Australian strategic

thinking. The growing relationship with regional friends is

important and calls for Australia to be an equal partner in the

region. The Howard government has revitalized its links with the

United States while continuing to maintain close ties with

Southeast Asian nations; see International Herald Tribune, July

26, 1996, pp. 1, 4.

24. William J. Crowe, "Rethinking Pacific Security," Foreign

Affairs, Spring 1991, p. 126.

25. Today an Australian Army officer must speak an Asian

language prior to advancement to field grade rank. Australian

defense policy has acknowledged geographical reality.

26. On the containment strategy, see "Telegram No 511: The

Long Telegram," The Charge in the Soviet Union (George F. Kennan)
27

to the Secretary of State, Moscow, February 22, 1946, reprinted

in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, Eastern Europe;

the Soviet Union, Vol. 6, pp. 696-709; "X" (George Kennan), "The

Sources of Soviet Conduct," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 25, No. 4, July

1947, pp. 566-582; and NSC 68, "A Report to the National Security

Council by the Executive Secretary, Washington, April 14, 1950,"

in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Vol. 1, National

Security Affairs; Foreign Economic Policy, pp. 234-292.

27. National Military Strategy of the United States,

Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992.

28. Ibid, pp. 8-9.

29. Les Aspin, The Bottom-Up Review: Forces for a New Era,

Washington, DC: Department of Defense, September 1, 1993.

30. Ibid., p. 1.

31. Ibid., p. 2.

32. Ibid., p. 10.

33. The Washington Post, October 19, 1994, p. 34; The New

York Times, October 19, 1994, p. 14; Baltimore Sun, October 19,

1994, p. 6; Washington Times, October 19, 1994, p. 13.

34. Louis Morton, "Germany First, The Basic Concept of

Allied Strategy in World War II," in Command Decisions,

Washington, DC: Office of the U.S. Army Chief of Military

History, 1959, pp. 11-17.

35. This emphasis should not surprise anyone. The majority

of the U.S. population is still culturally of European origin;

American political, legal, religious, and economic traditions are

based on European practice; and the nations of Western Europe are

all democratic states with freely-elected governments. The

containment strategy targeted the Soviet Union because it sought

to destroy those traditions. Moreover, taken collectively, Europe

still represents a major market for the United States.

36. Les Aspin, "Bottom-Up Review" press briefing slides,

Washington, DC: Department of Defense, October 1, 1993, p. 40.

37. Winston Lord, "A New Pacific Community: Ten Goals for

American Foreign Policy," testimony before Congress, Washington,

DC, March 31, 1993, p. 2.

38. Ibid., p. 4. The ten goals are: 1) Forging a fresh

global partnership with Japan that reflects a more mature balance

of responsibilities; 2) Erasing the nuclear threat and moving
28

toward peaceful reconciliation on the Korean peninsula; 3)

Restoring firm foundations for cooperation with a China where

political openness catches up with economic reform; 4) Deepening

our ties with ASEAN as it broadens its membership and scope; 5)

Obtaining the fullest possible accounting of our missing in

action as we normalize our relations with Vietnam; 6) Securing a

peaceful, independent and democratic Cambodia; 7) Strengthening

APEC as the cornerstone of Asian-Pacific economic cooperation; 8)

Developing multilateral forums for security consultations while

maintaining the solid foundations of our alliances; 9) Spurring

regional cooperation in global challenges like the environment,

refugees, health, narcotics, non-proliferation and arms sales;

10) Promoting democracy and human rights where freedom has yet to

flower.

39. Lord, testimony, p. 5.

40. Lord, testimony, p. 14.

41. James C. Hsiung, ed., Human Rights in East Asia: A

Cultural Perspective, New York: Paragon House Publishers, 1985,

p. 14.

42. Goh Chok Tong, "Social Values, Singapore Style," Current

History, December 1994, pp. 417-422; Melanie Chew, "Human Rights

in Singapore: Perceptions and Problems," Asian Survey, Vol.

XXXIV, No. 11, November 1994, pp. 933-948; also see Meredith WooCommings, "The ‘New Authoritarianism' in East Asia," Current

History, December 1994, pp. 413-416.

43. Read the Constitution and The Federalist Papers, New

York: New American Library, 1961. On the containment strategy,

see "X," "The Sources of Soviet Conduct." See also George F.

Kennan, "Telegram No. 511: The Long Telegram." Henry Kissinger

analyzes the containment strategy in Diplomacy, pp. 446-472.

44. William J. Clinton, A National Security Strategy of

Engagement and Enlargement, July 1994.

45. Ibid., p. 8.

46. Ibid., p. 10.

47. "China Finds Comprehensive Engagement Hard to Grasp,"

The Washington Post, February 13, 1995, p. A17.

48. Ibid., pp. 18-19. The U.S. emphasis on human rights has

continued in the 3 years since the ARF began to meet. At the 1996

ARF meeting in Jakarta, Secretary of State Christopher's July 23

statement renewed attacks on the SLORC government in Burma for

its "refusal to heed the desire of a majority of the Burmese
29

people for a transition to democratic rule and its increased

harassment of the democratic opposition." See U.S. Information

Agency Wireless File, Wednesday, July 24, 1996, pp. 16-18.

49. Larry M. Wortzel, "China Pursues Traditional Great-Power

Status," Orbis, Spring 1994, pp. 157-176. Far Eastern Economic

Review, December 16, 1993, p. 26. Burma will probably be admitted

to ASEAN at the 1997 meeting. Vietnam joined ASEAN in July 1995.

International Herald Tribune, July 28, 1995, pp. 1, 10.

50. "U.S. Steps Up Campaign to Isolate Burma Rulers," The

Washington Post, March 26, 1994, p. A20; The Straits Times,

Singapore, July 28, 1994, p. 28, FBIS-EAS-94-147, August 1, 1994,

p. 82; see also FBIS-EAS-94-144, July 27, 1994, p. 1.

51. William J. Clinton, A National Security Strategy of

Engagement and Enlargement, July 1994, p. 24. In response to many

comments from Asia, the Clinton strategy responds by saying that

"democracy and human rights are not Occidental yearnings; they

are universal yearnings and universal norms."

 52. See David Shambaugh, "Pacific Security in the Pacific

Century," Current History, December 1994, pp. 423-429.

53. Philippine Ambassador Raul Ch. Rabe to the National

Press Club Morning Newsmaker Press Conference, Washington, DC,

July 14, 1994.

54. Comments by Brunei Darussalam Ambassador Haji Jaya bin

Abdul Latif, National Press Club, July 14, 1994.

55. FBIS-EAS-92-006, January 9, 1992, p. 58.

56. Manila Chronicle, January 8, 1992, p. 4, in FBIS-EAS-92-

005, January 8, 1992, pp. 44-45.

57. FBIS-EAS-92-003, January 6, 1992, pp. 44-45.

58. The Nation, Bangkok, Thailand, January 23, 1992, p. A10,

in FBIS-EAS-92-015, January 23, 1992, pp. 1-2.

59. See FBIS-EAS-92-017, January 27, 1992, pp. 1-4. Also see

Lee Lai To, "Beyond Containment: The Future Utility of the U.S.

Presence in the Asia-Pacific--A View From Southeast Asia," in

Ronald N. Montaperto, ed., Cooperative Engagement and Economic

Security in the Asia-Pacific Region, Washington, DC: National

Defense University Press, 1993, pp. 119-136.

60. FBIS-EAS 92-017, January 27, 1992, p. 1.

61. FBIS-EAS 92-019, January 29, 1992, pp. 1-4.
30

62. Ibid., p. 9.

63. Although Singapore was not threatened by India, there

were reasons for concern. Naval conflict between India and China,

a remote possibility, would present a threat to trade and

commerce in the region and could affect passage of the straits.

Also, in the event of ethnic or religious tensions between Hindu

and Moslem populations in Singapore, Malaysia, or Indonesia,

there is concern in Southeast Asia that India could become the

"protector" of the Hindu populace. While such "protection" would

only be a pretext for action, there is a precedent, such as when

Beijing challenged Vietnam in 1978 over the treatment of ethnic

Chinese in south Vietnam.

64. FBIS-EAS-92-041, March 2, 1992, pp. 48-49. How Sharad

justified this statement is hard to see, since at the time India

had two aircraft carriers, 26 major surface combatants, and 15

submarines, including a nuclear submarine. Australia certainly

viewed India as a potential threat, as did China.

65. FBIS-EAS-92-076, April 20, 1992, p. 11.

66. FBIS-EAS-92-210, October 29, 1992, pp. 39-40.

67. Lucian W. Pye, Asian Power and Politics: The Cultural

Dimensions of Authority, Cambridge, MA: The Harvard University

Press, 1985. Whenever one attempts to characterize in

generalities cultural norms or forms of behavior, one is open to

charges of having reified the culture of "orientalism." However,

the issue of "face" (mianzi in Chinese) is a very real one in

most cultures in Asia (as it is in Latino, Arab, and Southern

Italian culture). Parties avoid direct disagreement or dispute in

a negotiation to give "face" to the other side. National or

personal negotiating positions are often put on the table

informally or through third parties in early consultation to

insure that there will be no confrontation at formal sessions.

This is not to say that Asians avoid decisive action or are

afraid of confrontation; but "face" is always a consideration,

and direct confrontation is not the preferred style.

68. P. Lewis Young, "With Declining U.S. Presence, ASEAN

Banks on Interdependence," Armed Forces Journal, Vol. 130, No. 8,

March 1993, pp. 25-26. See also Pan Shiying, "The Nansha Islands:

A Chinese Point of View," Window, September 3, 1993, pp. 23-36;

"Flashpoints Update," Jane's Defense Weekly, January 2, 1993, pp.

18-19.

69. Jim Mann, "Retooling Southeast Asia Geopolitical Map,"

Los Angeles Times, February 4, 1994, p. 1.
31

70. See FBIS-EAS-94-144, July 27, 1994, pp. 3-5, on various

national positions with respect to Burma's participation and the

human rights situation in Burma.

71. Defense News, October 16-24, 1994, p. 10.

72. Ibid.; see also Defense News, August 22-28, 1994, p. 18.

73. Defense News, October 10-16, 1994, pp. 1, 36.

74. See Philip L. Ritchelson, "China's Impact on Southeast

Asian Security," Military Review, May 1994, pp. 44-57, especially

50-53; David Shambaugh, "Growing Strong: China's Challenge to

Asian Security," Survival, Vol. 36, No. 2, Summer 1994, pp. 43-

59; Michael Richardson, "Southeast Asia Maritime Allies Gingerly

Keep Up Their Guard," International Herald Tribune, September 6,

1994, p. 6.

75. Barbara Opall, "Modernization Effort Fuels Pacific Arms

Buys," Defense News, October 24-30, 1994, pp. 10, 22.

76. He Fang, "Safeguard and Promote Peace and Security in

the Asia-Pacific Region," Zhongguo Junshi Kexue (China Military

Science), No. 1, March 1994, pp. 93-95.

77. Interview with Kusuma Snitwongse, Director, Institute of

International Studies, Bangkok, in Barbara Opall, "Southeast

Asian Allies Keep a Wary Eye on China's Might," Defense News,

October 24-30, 1994, p. 16. The general consensus seems to have

been that if not now, certainly in the next decade, China will be

a potential threat to the region.

78. Peter Maitri Ungphakon, "How Effective is the ASEAN

Regional Forum," The Sunday Post, Bangkok, July 31, 1994, p. 18,

in FBIS-EAS-94-147, August 1, 1994, pp. 92-95.

79. Ibid., p. 93. See also "Gunboat Diplomacy," Far Eastern

Economic Review, June 16, 1994, pp. 22-26.

80. Ungphakon, "How Effective is the ASEAN Regional Forum,"

pp. 93-94.

81. The Straits Times, July 28, 1994, p. 28, in FBIS-EAS-94-

147, August 1, 1994, p. 82.

82. FBIS-EAS-94-143, July 26, 1994, pp. 6-8.

83. Frank Ching, "Growing ASEAN Faces Strains," Far Eastern

Economic Review, December 29, 1994, and January 5, 1995, p. 23.

84. Department of Defense, Office International Security
32

Affairs, United States Security Strategy for the East AsiaPacific Region, Washington, DC: The Pentagon, February 1995.

85. Asian Wall Street Journal, July 31, 1995, pp. 1, 5;

International Herald Tribune, July 31, 1995, pp. 1, 7.

86. See "A U.S. CINCPAC Perspective on East Asia," AsiaPacific Defense Forum, Vol. 19, No. 4, Spring 1995, pp. 10-17.

87. International Herald Tribune, July 31, 1995, pp. 1, 7.

88. Speech by Dr. Tony Tan Keng Yam, Deputy Prime Minister

and Minister of Defense of Singapore, at the Third Asia-Pacific

Defense Conference, February 6, 1996.

89. See "Boost in Chinese Buildup Fuels Asian Worry,"

Defense News, January 29-February 4, 1996, p. 6; "Beijing's

Aggressive Hard Line is Bad News for China, Too," International

Herald Tribune, August 1, 1995, p. 6.

90. For its own part, China published a defense white paper

and also issued calls for military transparency and dialogue. See

Luo Renshi, "On the Ways of and China's Efforts in Increasing

Transparency in the Asia-Pacific Region," International Strategic

Studies, No. 4, December 1995, pp. 10-13.

91. FBIS-EAS, January 4, 1996, p. 35; Australia-Indonesia

Agreement on Maintaining Security, December 14, 1995.

92. John W. Garver, Foreign Relations of the People's

Republic of China, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1993,

pp. 250-252.

93. Ibid., p. 251.

94. International Herald Tribune, July 18, 1996, p. 8. The

annual Japanese Defense White Paper also identified China as a

greater threat than Russia to regional security; see The Straits

Times, July 20, 1996, p. 3.

95. International Herald Tribune, July 20-21, 1996, pp. 1,

5.

 96. The Straits Times, July 20, 1996, p. 3; International

Herald Tribune, July 23, 1996, p. 4. See also Wortzel, "China

Seeks Traditional Great Power Status," passim.

97. Viet Nam News, July 20, 1996, pp. 1, 6.

98. The seven ASEAN states today are Thailand, Singapore,

Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, Bunei, and Vietnam. Dialogue
33

partners are the United States, Canada, Japan, South Korea, the

European Union, Australia, New Zealand, China, India, and Russia.

Other countries are observers.

99. Viet Nam News, July 26, 1996, p. 6.

100. Quoted in "Indonesia Plans War Games to Caution China,"

International Herald Tribune, August 16, 1996, p. 4.

101. International Herald Tribune, September 30, 1996, p. 4.

102. Shambaugh, "Pacific Security in the Pacific Century,"

p. 428. Shambaugh criticizes the ARF as "an important channel of

communication, but of little significance except for articulating

perceptions, voicing concerns, seeking clarification, and

building confidence." He dismisses a little too quickly some very

important aspects of diplomacy and security policy.

103. See International Herald Tribune, August 16, 1996, p.

4.
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Richard A. Chilcoat

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

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Author

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Director of Publications and Production

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