IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

No. COA17-50

Filed: 21 November 2017

Guilford County, No. 13 CVS 6027

PLUM PROPERTIES, LLC, Plaintiff,

v.

JAVENO NAJAHWANN HOLLAND, TARA LATRICE DIALLO formerly TARA 

LATRICE COVINGTON, DONALD RAY LITTLEJOHN, JR., JEREMY TUCKER, 

DELISA L. THOMPSON (a/k/a DELISA L. SPARKS and TUCKER), ARNOLD F. 

SPAUGH, MATEJ SELAK, SABAHETHA SELAK, JUSTIN LASHAWN WILLIAMS 

AND IRMA ELIZABETH ZIMMERMAN, Defendants.

Appeal by Plaintiff from order entered 5 June 2014 by Judge Susan E. Bray in 

Guilford County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 9 August 2017.

Gregory A. Wendling, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Teague, Rotenstreich, Stanaland, Fox & Holt, PLLC, by Stephen G. Teague, for 

Defendant-Appellees. 

MURPHY, Judge.

Where property owners were damaged by the intentional acts of minor 

children, the parents cannot be held liable if they did not know or should not have 

known of the necessity for exercising such control. The minors’ “sneaking out” and 

resulting injury to personal property could not have been prevented by the exercise 

of reasonable care by the parents. Summary judgment is proper in favor of 

defendants when plaintiffs can show no genuine issue of material fact to support their 
PLUM PROPS., LLC V. HOLLAND

Opinion of the Court

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claims that the parents were negligent or in breach of duty to supervise their minor 

children. 

Plum Properties, LLC (“Plaintiff”) sued in Guilford County Superior Court on 

claims of negligence, breach of parent’s, guardian’s, and/or responsible adult’s duty 

to supervise minor children, trespass to real and personal property, private nuisance, 

parental strict liability for destruction of property by minors, and punitive damages 

against the above named Defendants. The trial court granted a motion for partial 

summary judgment for Sabahetha Selak and Delisa Sparks (“Defendants”)

dismissing the claims of negligence, breach of parent’s, guardians’s and/or 

responsible adult’s duty to supervise minor children, trespass to real and personal 

property, private nuisance, and punitive damages.

1 Defendants did not move for 

summary judgment as to the complaint of parental strict liability for destruction of 

property by minors. After a bench trial, judgment was entered against Defendants 

in favor of Plaintiff on 26 August 2016 for $6,0000 each. On appeal, Plaintiff argues 

that genuine issues of material facts as to its claims of negligence and failure to 

supervise minor children exist relative to Defendants, and thus partial summary 

judgment was not appropriate. We affirm the trial court’s order, concluding that 

 

1 Our Court has jurisdiction for determination of this appeal under N.C.G.S. §§ 7A-27(b)(1) and 1-

277(a) (2015), as the Order Granting Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is now ready for appeal 

as there have been final judgments entered in the underlying action. Plaintiff does not argue nor cite 

authority in its brief in support of its claim for nuisance, trespass, or punitive damages. These claims 

are deemed abandoned. N.C.R. App. P. 28(b)(6) (2016). 
PLUM PROPS., LLC V. HOLLAND

Opinion of the Court

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there were no genuine issues of material fact existing relative to Defendants, and 

thus partial summary judgment by the trial court was appropriate. 

Background

On three separate occasions between 5 to 21 November 2010, Defendants 

Javeno Holland, Justin LaShawn Williams, Matej Selak, and Jeremy Tucker broke 

into and vandalized four neighborhood properties owned by Plaintiff. At the time of 

the vandalisms, Defendants Matej Selak and Jeremy Tucker were both juveniles and 

lived with their mothers, Sabahetha Selak and Delisa L. Sparks, respectively. 

Defendants Matej Selak and Jeremy Tucker testified that, on each occasion of 

vandalism, they had “snuck out” of the Defendant Delisa Sparks’s residence.

Defendants testified that they had no prior knowledge of their sons sneaking 

out of the Sparks’s residence. Although Matej Selak and Jeremy Tucker both 

admitted to trying marijuana once, both parents also testified that they did not know

of their respective sons using marijuana prior to 2010. Both parents kept reasonable 

rules concerning their children’s curfew and behavior. Matej Selak admitted that he 

had snuck out of his mother’s house on two occasions. Jeremy Tucker testified that 

he too had snuck out of his mother’s house “once or maybe twice.” Both Matej Selak 

and Jeremy Tucker testified that they had not previously engaged in vandalism or 

acts of property damage. 
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Defendant Javeno Holland testified that he had heard that Matej Selak had 

been involved in “something about him messing up [a] football field”, and that Jeremy 

Tucker had been involved previously in an act of vandalism with Jeremy’s uncle, 

although he could provide no details for either claim or vouch for whether or not they 

were true. 

Analysis

“Our standard of review of an appeal from summary judgment is de novo[.]” In 

re Will of Jones, 362 N.C. 569, 573, 669 S.E.2d 572, 576 (2008) (citation omitted). 

Summary judgment is appropriately granted if the movant can prove that “the 

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together 

with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 

and that any party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” N.C.G.S § 1A-1, 

Rule 56 (2015); In re Estate of Redding v. Welborn, 170 N.C. App. 324, 329-30, 612 

S.E.2d 664, 668 (2005). The movant may meet its burden “(1) by showing an essential

element of the opposing party’s claim is nonexistent or cannot be proven, or (2) by 

showing through discovery that the opposing party cannot produce evidence to 

support an essential element of his or her claim.” Belcher v. Fleetwood Enters., Inc., 

162 N.C. App. 80, 84, 590 S.E.2d 15, 18 (2004). Upon production of evidence 

supporting the motion for summary judgment, the burden then shifts to the nonmovant to produce evidence of a prima facie case at trial. Welborn, 170 N.C. App. at 
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329, 612 S.E.2d at 668. Here, Plaintiff failed to meet its burden on the elements of 

its claims for negligence and breach of parent’s, guardians’s, and/or responsible 

adult’s duty to supervise minor children by failing to produce any admissible evidence 

of a prima facie case at trial. 

“The correct rule is that the parent of an unemancipated child may be held 

liable in damages for failing to exercise reasonable control over the child’s behavior if 

the parent had the ability and the opportunity to control the child and knew or should 

have known of the necessity for exercising such control.” Moore v. Crumpton, 306 N.C. 

618, 623, 295 S.E.2d 436, 440 (1982) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 

In Moore, our Supreme Court held that the parents were not liable for 

negligent parental supervision of their seventeen year old minor, who threatened and 

raped a woman. The minor had a history of substance abuse, regularly using 

marijuana and other controlled substances. The parents were aware of the substance 

abuse at all times. The minor was also in possession of a number of weapons given 

to him by his parents. The parents were aware of his instability, but left him home 

alone while going on vacation. During this time, the minor took a number of drugs, 

and broke into a girl’s house, and raped her. Id. at 621-25, 295 S.E.2d at 439-41. There 

were discrepancies in the testimony which suggested that Moore’s father may have 

been home and asleep when the child snuck out. Id. at 626, 295 S.E.2d at 442. 
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Our Supreme Court determined that the parents had no opportunity to control 

their child. “Short of standing guard over the child twenty-four hours a day, there 

was little that the defendant father could do to prevent [the minor] from leaving the 

home after the father was asleep.” Id. at 626-27, 295 S.E.2d at 442. Our Supreme 

Court also determined that after midnight, when the parents were typically asleep,

was “a time when parents ordinarily would not be expected to be engaged in 

maintaining surveillance of their children.” Id. at 626, 295 S.E.2d at 442.

Furthermore, the Supreme Court found that even with the plethora of evidence 

showing the parents were aware of his previous issues and substance abuse problems, 

this awareness did not “support a conclusion that the father knew or should have 

known that his failure more closely to control [the minor] would result in generally 

injurious consequences to anyone other than, perhaps, [the minor].” Id. at 628, 295 

S.E.2d at 443.

In the instant case, Defendants had no reason to suspect their sons would 

break into and vandalize Plaintiff’s property, and they would not have had an 

opportunity to exercise control over them. On each occurrence of vandalism, the boys 

“snuck out” while Delisa Sparks was asleep and while the boys were supposed to be 

asleep at the Sparks’s home in the late night or early morning hours of the day. These 

are hours, as stated in Moore, when parents would ordinarily be expected to be in bed

and not expected to be surveilling their children. Furthermore, the parents did not 
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have any indication their children were out to cause any trouble in the neighborhood.

While the boys admitted to trying marijuana previously and admitted such to their 

parents, this was not an indication that they would engage in destructive behavior.

The testimony given by Javeno Holland stating that the boys had engaged in 

destructive acts in the past is inadmissible hearsay, and cannot be used to meet the 

burden of production necessary to defeat summary judgment for Defendants. In order 

to support a motion for summary judgment, affidavits and accompanying evidence 

must be made on “personal knowledge, . . . [and] be admissible in evidence.” N.C.R. 

Civ. P. 56(e) (2017) (emphasis added). Inadmissible hearsay evidence cannot be used

in opposition to a motion for summary judgment. Rankin v. Food Lion, 210 N.C. App. 

213, 220, 706 S.E.2d 310, 315 (2011) (holding that hearsay evidence should not be 

considered with respect to a motion for summary judgment). 

While Javeno Holland testified that he heard Matej Selak had “messed up” a 

football field at one time, and that Jeremy Tucker once reported an incident of

vandalism involving his uncle, Holland was neither testifying of his own personal 

knowledge, nor were the statements by a party opponent. This testimony is

inadmissible hearsay. Assuming, arguendo, this testimony had been admissible,

these events would not rise to the level required under Moore or alert the parents 

that they should have known that their sons would commit vandalism, as they had 
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no recent information to indicate that another such instance might occur. Moore, 306 

N.C. at 627, 295 S.E.2d at 442.

Conclusion

The trial court correctly found that there were no genuine issues of material 

fact as to the preserved claims against Defendants. Accordingly, we affirm Judge 

Bray’s grant of partial summary judgment in Defendants’ favor. 

AFFIRMED.

Judges HUNTER, JR. and JUDGE DAVIS concur.