Response to Comments on

Draft Class VI Permits Issued to the 

FutureGen Industrial Alliance

United States Environmental Protection Agency 

Region V 

77 West Jackson Boulevard 

Chicago, Illinois 60604
 

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................................................. i

SECTION 1. GENERAL AND OUT OF SCOPE COMMENTS............................................................................... 1

SECTION 2. GENERAL COMMENTS ..............................................................................................................22

SECTION 3. AREA OF REVIEW (AOR) AND CORRECTIVE ACTION COMMENTS............................................52

SECTION 4. FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY COMMENTS ............................................................................... 105

SECTION 5. CONSTRUCTION AND PRE-INJECTION TESTING COMMENTS ................................................ 136

SECTION 6. OPERATIONS COMMENTS ...................................................................................................... 148

SECTION 7. TESTING AND MONITORING COMMENTS ............................................................................. 160

SECTION 8. PLUGGING AND POST-INJECTION SITE CARE COMMENTS .................................................... 197

SECTION 9. EMERGENCY AND REMEDIAL RESPONSE COMMENTS .......................................................... 213
i 

INTRODUCTION 

On March 31, 2014, the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) issued draft Class VI 

permits to inject carbon dioxide for the purpose of geologic sequestration (permit numbers IL-137-6A0001, IL-137-6A-0002, IL-137-6A-0003, and IL-137-6A-0004) to the FutureGen Industrial Alliance, Inc. 

(FutureGen), and invited public comment. 

Twenty-nine (29) parties submitted comments to EPA, either in writing or during a public hearing held 

on May 7, 2014 (or both). These commenters are presented in Table 1. This document categorizes the 

public comments submitted on the draft Class VI permits and includes EPA’s responses to those 

comments, although there is some overlap between the categories and the responses. 

This document is organized as follows. 

 Section 1: General and Out of Scope Comments: comments including general introductory 

statements and comments that are “out of scope” for these permitting actions.

 Section 2: General Comments: comments generally supporting or opposing the draft permit 

actions or about the permitting process; geologic sequestration; the geology of the FutureGen 

site; and general permit conditions. 

 Section 3: Area of Review (AoR) and Corrective Action Comments: comments on the size of the 

AoR and the modeling approach used to delineate the AoR; AoR reevaluations; wells in the AoR; 

Part G of the draft permit; and Attachment B. 

 Section 4: Financial Responsibility Comments: comments on cost estimates for the covered 

activities; the financial instruments used; Part H of the draft permit; and Attachment H. 

 Section 5: Construction and Pre-Injection Testing Comments: comments on the injection well 

components (e.g., casing/cement and tubing/packer); pre-injection logs and tests to be 

performed; Parts I and J of the draft permit; and Attachment G. 

 Section 6: Operations Comments: comments on Part K of the draft permit (e.g., injection 

pressure limitations); and Attachment A. 

 Section 7: Testing and Monitoring Comments: comments on the testing and monitoring 

activities (e.g., mechanical integrity testing, ground water monitoring, and plume and pressure 

front tracking) in Part M of the draft permit; Attachment C; and the quality assurance and 

surveillance plan for testing and monitoring activities. 

 Section 8: Plugging and Post-Injection Site Care Comments: comments on post-injection 

monitoring; the post-injection site care timeframe; the non-endangerment demonstration; site 

closure activities; Part O of the draft permit; and Attachments D and E. 

 Section 9: Emergency and Remedial Response Comments: comments on Part P of the draft 

permit; Attachment F; and induced seismicity. 
ii

Table 1: Commenters on the FutureGen draft Class VI permits

American Coalition for Clean Coal Electricity, Coal Utilization Research Council, Edison Electric 

Institute, Illinois Coal Association, National Mining Association (NMA), National Rural Electric 

Cooperative Association

Betty Niemann

Bradley Zeller

Carl Hankel

Central Iowa Building & Construction Trades Council (CIBCTC)

ClearStack Combustion Corporation

Danny Little

Ed Shaw

Elizabeth Rigor 

FutureGen Industrial Alliance, Inc. (FutureGen)

Global Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) Institute

ILL Coal Association

Illinois Chamber of Commerce

Illinois Department of Commerce and Economic Opportunity (DCEO)

International Brotherhood of Boilermakers Local 363

International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW) Local 193

Jacksonville Regional Economic Development Corporation (EDC)

Karen Shaw

Laborers' International Union of North America (LIUNA)

Leinberger & Critchelow families

Lillian Korous

Marc Landers

Mick Mcintyre 

Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), Clean Air Task Force, and Sierra Club 

Pipefitters Local 137

Robert J. Finley

U.S. Carbon Sequestration Council (CSC)

US Fish and Wildlife Service

Wilmot McCutchen
1 

SECTION 1. GENERAL AND OUT OF SCOPE COMMENTS 

EPA regulations at 40 C.F.R. Parts 144 and 146 state the requirements and standards that a permit applicant must meet to have an Underground 

Injection Control (UIC) permit application approved. Those regulations define the general scope of EPA’s authority and review process. Federal 

regulations require EPA to briefly describe and respond to significant comments received on UIC permits. 

EPA received numerous general comments and comments directed at matters outside the scope of the UIC Program’s purview. EPA 

acknowledges the submittal of these comments and clarifies that because they raise matters that are not addressed by the UIC regulations and 

are outside the scope of the UIC permit process, EPA does not respond to them specifically in this document. 

The comments falling into the “out of scope” category focus on topics including: job creation and economic benefits of the project; cost of the 

project; general support for or non-specific opposition to the project; the Department of Energy’s process, decisions and Environmental Impact 

Assessment; approvals and processes of other regulatory programs; climate change; the power plant; the pipeline; other Carbon Capture and 

Storage projects; other Geologic Sequestration projects (e.g., the Archer Daniels Midland project); neutral statements of fact; background 

information on the commenters or the project; pore space ownership; mineral rights; eminent domain; takings; land owner compensation; 

natural gas storage operations; and general introductory statements to specific concerns. These general comments are listed below without 

response. Specific comments that address topics that are relevant to this permitting decision, with responses, follow in subsequent sections. 

Although EPA is not responding to general statements of support and opposition to the permit individually, it did consider them in making the 

decision to issue final permits. 
2 

# Commenter Comment Text

1 Boilermakers 

Local 363

I'm here to speak in favor of the permits on behalf of myself and our members. 

Our primary work is in power plants and power generation facilities and we believe not only the jobs that will be 

created during construction and the direct and indirect jobs that will be created will be more permanent jobs after 

construction are important, but also the ramifications of this power plant and the carbon capture technology that 

could spread to other plants and keep our industry viable for many years. 

And I think it should also be noted when talking about the jobs that a lot of our living is made during, what we refer 

to as the outage season. When we do periodic maintenance on these power plants. And so there will be -- I think 

the job numbers are low because we will be back to service the facility on a fairly regular basis. And those are jobs 

that haven't been talked about today, but they're very important to myself and our members because that's how 

we make our living. 

We, you know, we aren't scientists. We have read, we're well-read on the carbon capture and we do believe that 

the Environmental Protection Agency and FutureGen Alliance has our -- has protected us and looked out for our 

best interest. So, again, we're in favor of moving this forward. 

2 Bradley 

Zeller

I'm here to briefly discuss the economic and environmental impact of the FutureGen 2.0 project. Specifically, the 

sequestration site and it's what we're here for today and the ground water. But economically the project itself is a 

1.6 billion dollar impact for our economy. That's the actual construction cost. To put that in layman's terms, we are 

a board of review for the county. I'm looking back. I should be -- but anyway, to put this in perspective the County of 

Morgan has a 500-million dollar EAV. That's our total tax base that we base all of our taxes. For our school district, 

the county, all the taxing body which is equivalent to a 1.5-billion dollar value. 500 million is one-third of our fair 

market value. Now, there's roads and hospitals and things out of that EAV, but that's 1.5 billion total value of 

Morgan County. This is bringing in 1.6 billion dollars to the county, which is more than the county is worth in total. 

An independent study by the University of Illinois projects a 12-billion dollar impact to the community over the next 

20 years; 12 billion dollars to the county that's worth 1.5 billion. I think that's going to have a huge effect - 1650 

temporary jobs, 650 permanent jobs. 

3 CIBCTC Hi, my name is Paul Moore, M-o-o-r-e, and I'm the president from the Central Illinois Building and Construction 

Trades Council. This council is made up of the skilled craft who will build this project. We whole-heartedly support 

FutureGen for the following reasons:

The importance of a carbon capturing system, which is widely used as an essential technology in the effort to 

address climate change concerns. This system offers the potential to largely eliminate the CO2 emissions associated 

with power plants, cement plants, refineries and other stationary industrial sources.

Also, the educational value that FutureGen 2.0 will gain with worldwide attention by being one of the first near 
3 

# Commenter Comment Text

single zero emissions commercial scale coal-fueled power plant that is fully integrated with underground carbon 

capture and storage, and will prove out that the integration of the power plant, CO2 pipeline, CO2 storage site result 

will to be used to develop additional projects in Illinois, the United States, and possibly around the world.

...

It is the same CO2 that would be released into the atmosphere. There is also community support for this project with 

an open dialogue between the building trades, FutureGen Alliance and the citizens board, and most importantly is 

job creation for Morgan and surrounding counties. Thank you.

4 Danny Little I would like to express my support for the Morgan County CO2 storage facility and the FutureGen ll Project in 

general.

5 DCEO In addition to FutureGen ... which will capture and store more than 20 Million Metric Tons of C02 ...Archer, Daniels 

Midland in Decatur is fast one of the nation's first large scale CCS projects...

...This project, in a constructive manner, takes clean coal technology to the next level by capturing Carbon Dioxide 

and permanently storing it underground, greatly reducing the emission footprint for a coal fired power plant. 

FutureGen type coal projects, along with the great strides made in increasing America's renewable energy portfolio,

goes a long way in meeting an “all of the above" domestic energy portfolio strategy. The FutureGen 2.0 oxycombustion retrofit, coal to electricity with 90% interest of the carbon capture and storage project is in the best 

citizens of the United States.

In the end, I hope that everyone understands that FutureGen is a well-planned, world-class effort to demonstrate 

technology that can make a difference in reducing the emissions of greenhouse gases

I thank all of you for your time and interest in Future Gen 2.0.

6 Ed Shaw Please approve this project! Let Illinois be first in this new technology. We need the jobs and the tax base!

7 Global CCS 

Institute

Commercial demonstration of carbon capture and storage (CCS) technology is an essential step towards wide-scale 

global deployment needed to address climate change at least cost. Every first-mover CCS project, including 

FutureGen 2.0, will provide the learnings necessary to move the technology forward and realise its full potential. It 

is within this context that the Global CCS Institute urges the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency to expedite its 

final approval for the FutureGen 2.0 Class VI underground injection control permit.
4 

# Commenter Comment Text

8 IBEW Local 

193

My name is Glenn Baugh. Last name is B-a-u-g-h. I'm the business manager of IBEW Local 193 in Springfield, Illinois. 

We represent a little over 300 electrical workers and we're ready to start this project and build this project. I won't 

be redundant with all the technical information that's been presented before me, but I would like to sum it up if I 

could.

This is the first for a near zero emissions coal-fueled power plant. And this project when finished will be viewed and 

visited by the world, putting Jacksonville and Meredosia, Illinois in the spotlight. It will bring jobs and revenue to an 

area at a time when jobs are limited. And I believe from the folks that spoke before me, as well as the EPA who has 

looked at this hard, that the homework's been done and it's time to move forward and grant these permits. Thank 

you.

9 ILL Coal 

Association

The Illinois Coal Association supports the FutureGen Alliance 2.0 Underground Injection Control Class VI permit. The 

FutureGen project is important to the development of clean coal technology, and the Illinois Coal Association has 

been an active supporter since this project was first announced in 2003. I didn't make a mistake there. It's 2003. 

Yes, that was 11 years ago. And that's part of our frustration; it's taken 11 years to get to this point. And we still 

don't have steel in the ground. We're not being able to learn yet from deployment technology, clean coal 

technology that's going to be able to use coal. Even the technology has changed from the zero emissions, freestanding power plant in Mattoon to retrofitting existing power plants with the oxy-combustion technology. We 

accept that. Kind of grudgingly but, and it wasn't your choice to do that. I know. But we'd rather be building free 

standing-power plants. This project is very important to the State of Illinois as coal is an abundant resource here.

10 ILL Coal 

Association

This landmark draft permit is integral to the advancement of CCS technology for future use in the United States and 

around the world. While the Department of Energy, which issued it's record -- a decision for financial support as you 

know of this project in January has had several pilot projects designed to capture and store CO2. It is time to scale 

up the technology to commercial size on coal-fueled power plants that will be fully integrated with geologic storage. 

The lessons learned from this first of its kind project will be key to the wide-spread commercialization of CCS 

technologies. On behalf of the Illinois Coal Association, I urge final approval of the permit without delay to enable 

the FutureGen 2.0 project to move forward. Thank you.
5 

# Commenter Comment Text

11 Illinois 

Chamber of 

Commerce

On behalf of the Illinois Chamber of Commerce and its members, we respectfully ask the US EPA to issue the final 

Class VI UIC permits for FutureGen 2.0. We do so for the following reasons: 

Importance of FutureGen 2.0 and of CCS 

The Obama Administration and the US EPA have both talked about the importance of carbon capture and 

sequestration (CCS) as a way to keep coal in our existing energy mix while decreasing the amount of greenhouse gas 

emissions in the atmosphere. As we all know, CCS is not currently a proven technology on a commercial scale and 

for it to become one we need projects like FutureGen 2.0 to be successful and they need permits to sequester 

carbon dioxide to confirm the process. 

Since CCS offers the potential to largely eliminate the carbon dioxide emissions associated with power plants, 

cement plants, refineries and other stationary industrial sources, we think it prudent to provide the necessary 

permits to allow a commercial-scale CCS project in southern Illinois. 

12 Illinois 

Chamber of 

Commerce

So many more reasons 

There are a plethora of additional reasons why you should issue the final permits, but please know that the Illinois 

Chamber looks at these projects with great interest and we hope the US EPA will grant the necessary permits so 

FutureGen 2.0 can become a reality and a success for the industry and our environment. 
6 

# Commenter Comment Text

13 Jacksonville 

Regional EDC

My name is Terry Denison and I am President of the Jacksonville REGIONAL Economic Development Corporation. 

We are a professional, non-profit organization whose objective is to retain, create and recruit job opportunities for 

residents of our region. One of these opportunities is FutureGen 2.0 and the many benefits associated with it. In 

today's economic environment, it is tough to attract new businesses to Morgan and Scott Counties, but we've had 

the good fortune to attract several companies recently, and FutureGen is among them. FutureGen represents an 

excellent opportunity to give the community an economic shot-in-the- arm.

According to the recent University of Illinois FutureGen 2.0 Economic Impact Study Report, during the construction 

phase of FutureGen, the project is likely to generate as many as 683 direct jobs (452 jobs for the power plant and 

231 for the C02 pipeline and storage site) and 1,610 total jobs (direct and indirect jobs) for the State of Illinois in 

2015, the second year of the construction phase (Phase III). Many of those jobs, by the nature of construction, will 

be short term.

As the project matures and goes into full operation starting in 2018, the number of direct jobs for Morgan County is 

estimated to be 118 (91 for the power plant, 27 for the C02 pipeline and storage site). The number of total jobs 

(direct and indirect jobs) is estimated to be 181. In the long-term, FutureGen will produce increased tax revenues 

and help replace the jobs lost as a result of the closure of the Meredosia power plant in 2011.Speaking of 

Meredosia, we are already seeing the economic benefits of FutureGen in Meredosia. When the Meredosia Power 

Plant ceased generating power in December of 2011, the County faced the potential loss of more than $500,000 per 

year in property taxes. Most of the money goes to the Meredosia school district and without those funds the school 

district would be facing an uncertain financial future. However, with the FutureGen project's active maintenance of 

the plant and preparations for future construction, those property taxes continue to be paid. That makes a very real 

financial difference to the County and our schools.

And lastly, over 50% of the power delivered by rural electric cooperatives nationwide is coal based. So, coal is 

important to rural America. However, with ever-tightening environmental regulations, we need new technology to 

make coal cleaner. FutureGen is a great opportunity to demonstrate clean coal technology. Recently our office had 

the honor and pleasure of hosting and visiting with former New Jersey Governor and U.S.E.P.A. AdministratorChristine Todd Whitman. As Ms. Whitman stated - "Alternative energy sources are not going to replace coal as the 

main producer of electricity!" And, electrical demand is going to increase greatly in the next few years. "Coal is and 

will be very important to our economy." So let's build this plant and the pipeline and protect the coal power rural 

America needs.

14 Karen Shaw This method appears to be a safe way of containing emissions of carbon dioxide. Let's let Illinois be the leader - for 

once - instead of the follower - per usual.
7 

# Commenter Comment Text

15 LIUNA And as was previously mentioned this project -- we support the approval of the permits. That's my -- what I wanted 

to say. 

But as it was previously mentioned this project stands to create over 1600, as someone called part, or temporary 

jobs. Those temporary jobs aren't just temporary jobs. They're construction jobs. 

And when people talk about construction jobs as if they're temporary, I guess, in one sense they are temporary in 

that construction by its very nature is temporary. You either build something or you tear something down. So all 

construction jobs by their very nature are temporary. However, construction careers are permanent. 

This is the kind of project, particularly in the State of Illinois and in this area where construction unemployment is 

nearing 50 percent. It can carry over these men and women through two or three, maybe four seasons to help the 

next set of projects get going. They help more private investment get to take off. They help the state and federal 

government invest more in infrastructure. These are the kind of projects we need.

The 600 permanent jobs stand to be good family supporting jobs. We encourage the EPA to approve the permits, 

issue the final permits. Not just for the construction and the economic benefit, but also what this can do for the 

area in terms of research, because this will be a pilot plan as everyone has suggested in terms of research and 

development in this area. 

So I encourage the EPA to approve the project, approve the permit. On behalf of the Laborers' International Union 

of North America, our employers, and signatory contractors, I encourage the EPA to approve it. Thanks.

16 Marc Landers I truly believe FutureGen would support the ongoing and future use of the nation's abundant coal reserves in a 

manner that addresses both the aging power production and environmental concerns. 

As a nation and as a community we have an opportunity to develop technologies that utilize the abundant 

resources our State has. One of them happens to be lots of coal. While keeping environmental -- while keeping 

environmental concerns up front and as a number one priority we can move these technologies and processes 

forward so our sons and daughters will have the opportunity to raise their sons and daughters with a safe, reliable 

environmentally responsible power supplies. All the while shoring up our local economy and putting Illinois 

residents to work. 

I'm very much in favor of moving this permitting process forward and letting the men and women of Central Illinois 

show the world what an educated well-trained work force can achieve. This country did not put men on the moon 

by sitting on our hands. Let's put that same spirit of progress and innovation behind FutureGen and the proud 

residents of Morgan County. Together we can develop these processes in a safe environmentally responsible 

manner and set a standard for the rest of the power industry worldwide. 
8 

# Commenter Comment Text

17 NMA The members of our respective organizations are writing in support of the FutureGen 2.0 Project and applaud EPA 

for issuing the first draft Class VI underground injection control permit under Title 40 of the Code of Federal 

Regulations.

This landmark draft permit is not only integral to the advancement and success of the

FutureGen 2.0 Project, but the advancement of carbon capture and storage (CCS) technology for future use in the 

U.S. and around the world. While the U.S. Department of Energy has several pilot projects designed to capture and 

store carbon dioxide, it is time to scale up the technology to commercial size on coal-fueled power plants that will 

be fully integrated with geologic storage. The lessons learned from this first of its kind project will be key in the 

effort to adequately demonstrate CCS integrated with commercial-scale electricity production and the ultimate 

commercialization of CCS technologies.

We urge final approval of the permit without delay to enable the FutureGen 2.0 Project to move forward on 

schedule.

18 NRDC Sierra Club and NRDC have significant concerns about the FutureGen 2.0 project; in particular with regard to 

discrepancies between how the project is described to the public and the way it is has been permitted to date. 

While the Club and NRDC are concerned that the FutureGen 2.0 project’s permits to date allow for serious air and 

water impacts, the Club and NRDC recognize the importance of getting the first Class VI UIC permits issued properly 

under the law and thus join in the comments below.

B. Comments

General comments

These permit applications are significant, in that they represent the first effort to permit a CO2 

sequestration project using EPA’s December 2010 Safe Drinking Water Act Underground Injection Control Program 

(“UIC”) Class VI rules. Precedents may be set, with respect to what applicants look to in submitting in future 

applications. And through this review, EPA sends an important message about how it intends to implement the UIC 

Class VI regulations. 

At the outset, we commend the Applicant for compiling an application that is clear and that attempts to address 

most of the requirements of Class VI in a considered manner. While we may have questions or suggestions with 

respect to specific parts of the application, overall we are encouraged by the approach taken in evaluating and 

operating the site, as well as the conciseness with which information is presented. 

We do list a number of technical points below for EPA’s consideration and resolution, and we can see a clear 

pathway forward for the issuance of the injection permits under consideration here, as we believe that our 

comments can be readily addressed by the Applicant and EPA. We support this effort, and hope that it can be the 
9 

# Commenter Comment Text

precursor to more opportunities to permanently remove carbon pollution from the atmosphere and sequester it 

safely in the deep subsurface.

19 Pipefitters 

Local 137

I'm a member of the Pipefitters Local 137 out of Springfield, but I live in Jacksonville. And everybody's talking about 

the impact on Morgan County. Well, what about the counties around Morgan County? When we built that power 

house they was from Brown County, Pike County, all around. They wasn't all just from Morgan County. And it's 

going to help the people of Meredosia because they'll be buying groceries there, they'll fill their cars up with gas 

when they come to work or when they leave. So I think this is an impact on the whole community. West Central 

Illinois total. Not just Morgan County. 

20 US Fish and 

Wildlife 

Service

The Service does not have any comments at this time on the draft permits.

21 Plumbers & 

Steamfitters 

Local 137 

I am John Haines Business Manager of the Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 137 I represent 950 hard working families 

in Central Illinois. Our Association has Jurisdiction of the Future Gen Project and the CO2 pipeline. We believe that 

the technology has been proven and that the future of the coal industry in Illinois hinges on this project. Our 

members will strive to make this project a complete success in hope that the Global energy market will utilize this 

technology and help reduce their carbon footprint. Local 137 is fully committed and supports this project 100%.

22 Robert J. 

Finley

I am writing in support of the FutureGen Alliance 2.0 Underground Injection Control (UIC) Class VI permit which will 

allow the drilling of four injection wells whose purpose is to demonstrate carbon storage in the Mt. Simon 

Sandstone in western Illinois. The FutureGen endeavor is an important one in terms of understanding the ability to 

safely and effectively store carbon dioxide within the geological framework rather than allow emissions to the 

atmosphere. International bodies, such as the International Energy Agency and the Intergovernmental Panel on 

Climate Change, have repeatedly recognized carbon sequestration as an essential technology to manage carbon 

dioxide emissions and reduce the hazards posed by climate change.

23 Robert J. 

Finley

I summary, I find the proposed activities under the FutureGen 2.0 draft Class VI permit to be well thought out and 

comprehensive. The proposed activities will advance understanding of carbon storage as a key technology to 

mitigate climate change impacts while protecting underground sources of drinking water in Illinois, my state of 

residence. I urge the US EPA to grant the final permit and authorize injection as proposed by the applicant.
10

# Commenter Comment Text

24 Betty 

Niemann

I believe people like to eat. I know we need power but we also need to eat. 

Now, this is my main concern for tonight, is the fact that we do have a responsibility for the future. Not only with 

clean air and clean water, but we also have to protect our resources for the future. And those resources are not only 

our coal but our water and I find that the oxy-combustion method used by FutureGen uses a lot more coal and we 

will run out of it faster if this is deployed as a widespread technology. 

FutureGen is not the first sequestration power-generated plant. It's the first oxy-combustion. Edwardsport, Indiana 

has a facility that is to produce greater than 500 megawatts of energy. However, it was supposed to be a CCS 

technology but the "S" dropped out when the Mount Simon Sandstone couldn't support it. The next one that is 

almost operational is Kemper down in Mississippi. Both of these plants uses less coal for their carbon capture than 

the FutureGen project. 

So I'm hoping that FutureGen is a one-of-its-kind, because if we need to go widespread CCS deployment we need to 

also use our coal wisely. Thank you very much.

25 Betty 

Niemann

I am against the USEPA Region 5 granting this permit or certification for several reasons all of which are based upon 

scientifically questioning the information contained within the applications and subsequent FutureGen submissions.

26 Betty 

Niemann

Please deny this permit. It is not needed. If a cost-benefit analysis were run on the FutureGen project, the increased 

cost of the project versus the impact on the atmospheric CO2 reduction, adding in the extra amount of coal to drive 

this oxy-combustion method for CCS and the contamination of future potential water sources, is this project cost 

effective for climate change mitigation? I feel that the answer is NO! ...and the permits should be denied.

The initial emphasis of this project based upon the EPA regulations is that it was for CO2 for climate mitigation. 

When Bush pulled the funding, and in order to justify the project again, the emphasis became job production which 

is how I believe this has been spinned by the media and the climate mitigation has taken a back seat to job creation.

27 Elizabeth 

Rigor 

I am writing this to let you know that I am opposed to the sequestration of CO2 under Illinois farmland in Morgan 

County, Illinois.

I do not believe that pumping supercritical CO2 into the Mt. Simon formation is a way to eliminate it from the 

atmosphere because some people believe that CO2 causes climate change. Out of sight, out of mind, therefore it 

doesn't exist however isn't this polluting the land? By the way, I do not believe that CO2 clauses climate change nor 

that the sequestration of CO2 is safe.

... 

Please do not grant FutureGen its permits.
11

# Commenter Comment Text

28 Lillian Korous I have long been disturbed by this project, hoping it would go away. To spend resources on an experimental project 

using a coal fired electric plant is poor judgment. Coal plants are a dying technology that is very polluting and 

restarting such a plant is counterintuitive. Coal is an outdated source of energy and coal-fired power plants are the 

dirtiest sources of energy in use today. After reading the Illinois EPA website for the start- up, I learned that, other 

than CO2, the increases in emissions with the proposed plant would exceed the significant emission thresholds for a 

major project under PSD rules. “Limits are established for the emissions of pollutants from this plant to ensure that 

the project is not subject to the federal PSD rules.” Our local paper mentioned that coal to be used would be high 

sulfur. It seems all the emphasis is on capturing CO2 which undoubtedly contributes to the green- house effect but 

does not cause asthma, allergies, lung problems, acid rain and polluted water which other emissions cause and are 

present from every coal –fired power plant. CO2 capture is the star of Future Gen 2.0, but pity the nearby 

inhabitants who have enjoyed a clear atmosphere during the facility shutdown, but who will now be affected by 

dirty air again. 

Using coal for energy has devastating environmental impacts during every point in its life cycle. Mining coal from 

the ground damages lands, water, and air. Transporting by trucks and diesel train adds air emissions and dust 

dispersal. The new oxy-combustion boiler will need 25% more coal than a traditional air boiler, thereby adding the 

increased emissions and impacts mentioned above. Coal ash is another huge contributor to pollution of the 

countryside. 

29 CSC We commend EPA on the issuance of these draft permits for public comment and on the work that has been 

undertaken to process these first of a kind permit drafts. 

30 DCEO Projects of this type are complex and have many moving actions at the same time. A lot has been accomplished in a 

very short time.

I would like to commend the citizens of Jacksonville and Meredosia, their elected officials and the citizens of 

Morgan County and their county board members for their support, their patience and their enthusiasm of 

FutureGen 2.0.

As the first Class VI well application the US EPA has taken to a hearing, I am aware of the scrutiny that the 

permitting process, testimony and your responses will receive. The state of Illinois has worked with the FutureGen 

Alliance and the US DOE to insure best practices have been used since the first stages of the FutureGen project.

After reviewing the criteria used by the US EPA to evaluate the technical and project specific information, I am 

confident that the US EPA's efforts to evaluate all available information to reach the decision to issue this draft 

permit was comprehensive and accountable to the people of the state of Illinois.

31 FutureGen The Alliance certainly welcomes the opportunity to come talk again about the FutureGen project and its importance 

to Jacksonville, to Morgan County and to Illinois, as well as to the nation. We also want to thank EPA for their 
12

# Commenter Comment Text

sustained effort to review our very detailed application for the underground injection control permit. They spent a 

year looking at the information we provided, asking us questions, reviewing our answers to their questions. It was a 

long very slog on their part and we appreciate all of their efforts. 

32 FutureGen The project involves retrofitting the Meredosia Energy unit -- Meredosia Energy Center in Meredosia with oxycombustion technology. This will allow us to capture carbon dioxide, transport it in an underground pipeline and 

inject it deep underground in a site in northeastern Morgan County. 

The project will capture and permanently store 90 percent of the CO2 emissions that -- CO2 that would normally be 

emitted from coal fuel in the Meredosia Energy Center. We've made great progress on the project to date. We have 

received construction permits, air and water construction permits from Illinois Environmental Protection Agency for 

the construction of the Meredosia Energy Center. We have had our pipeline approved by the Illinois Commerce 

Commission. We have done the significant design work and will be getting final design. And the Department of 

Energy has completed its environmental impact statement process where it analyzed in detail potential 

environmental impacts of the project as a whole and it concluded that there were no significant environmental 

impacts. 

33 FutureGen Supporting documentation involves the description of the geology, as well as construction operation plan, a 

monitoring plan, and assurances that the Alliance would maintain financial responsibility for the project as a whole 

for the life of the project. 

34 Color Art 

Integrated 

Interiors

I read the article and think it is a creative approach to this important issue. We certainly must do something to 

reduce the carbon release into the atmosphere. Would the 1.1 mil metric tons be enough to make any kind of a 

difference? 

...

It seems reasonable that in 20 or more years we may have a better options for dealing with this off gas. Would like 

to know more but like the creative thinking on how to reduce green house gasses in the short term. 

35 Illinois 

Chamber of 

Commerce

You’ve done this before.

As you know, there is a CCS pilot project going on in Decatur, Illinois where carbon dioxide from ADM’s facilities is 

being sequestered. The pilot project is about 80% complete with almost 800,000 metric tons of carbon already 

sequestered. DOE has seven pilot demonstration carbon dioxide storage sites around the country, including this one 

in Central Illinois. These pilot projects have proven that CO2 storage can be done safely. 

36 McCutchen By 2035 the EIA forecasts annual US CO2 emissions of 6.32 billion metric tons, 38% of which (2.40 billion) will be 

from coal plants alone. To put that in perspective, consider that in Texas the huge Permian Basin oil field's current 

annual enhanced oil recovery (EOR) demand is only 7 million tons of CO2, about the output of a single 1 GW coalfired power plant. See this article from POWER magazine at http://www.powermag.com/carbon-control-the-long-
13

# Commenter Comment Text

road-ahead/. Clearly, EOR in depleted oil and gas reservoirs can't handle the expected volume of CO2 that must be 

stored each year just from power generation. 

The only other potentially available pore space, once we set aside the tiny capacity of depleted reservoirs, coal 

beds, and dry formations, is in deep saline formations. Although deep saline formations have lots of pore space, i.e. 

spaces between grains in the rock, the pores in the rock are full of brine. Deep saline formations are not empty 

tanks, but full tanks. Moving the brine out and the CO2 in may well be impossible at the scale of billions of tons each 

year. We hear a lot about the 25 years of successful experience with EOR, but it is the extrapolation of this EOR 

experience to permanent CO2 storage in deep saline formations that is at issue because there are not enough 

depleted reservoirs to accommodate the tremendous volumes of CO2 going to permanent storage. So EOR in 

depleted reservoirs (empty tanks) is immaterial. 

Once injected into the formation, the CO2 would have to be securely contained there. This fundamental point 

seems to have been overlooked. In 2010, a sobering article appeared in the referenced Journal of Petroleum Science 

and Engineering (70:123-130), authored by two distinguished full professors, Christine Ehlig-Economides and 

Michael J. Economides. Here's a quote from the abstract:

"Published reports on the potential for sequestration fail to address the necessity of storing CO2 in a closed system. 

The lifetime emissions from just one large coal-fired power plant would displace water equal to the size of a giant oil 

field (4.1 billion oil barrels), as USGS research geologist Robert Burruss pointed out in his testimony to Congress in 

2008. Work would be required to lift all of that brine to the surface to make way for the tremendous volume of 

CO2. That work would presumably come from combustion of fossil fuels, adding to the CO2 emissions. Will the 

energy for CCS create more CO2 than it stores? 

37 Betty 

Niemann

I also wish to point out that the farmers in Morgan County in the area of the natural gas storage deposit in the St. 

Peter Sandstone Formation are experiencing leakage...

President Obama has said that one event does not make a trend....

By the way, I found it unscientific for FutureGen to select Morgan County as its carbon storage site without drilling 

characterization wells in the other two areas. It seems to me that cost has driven FutureGen to take the path of 

least expense.

38 Betty 

Niemann

At the public hearing on 7 May 2014, FutureGen said that it had received permission from the Illinois Commerce 

Commission on the Pipeline. Under ICC Docket number 13-0252, FutureGen received "conditional permission" for 

the pipeline based upon FutureGen securing all the permits before construction. 

i Under ICC Docket 14-0177 (Illinois Public Utilities Act Compliance) pages 16 through18 of the Final Order 

discusses the Underground Injection Control Permit from the USEPA 
14

# Commenter Comment Text

ii FutureGen has also been granted "conditional permission" on 13 May 2014 for the pipeline and sequestration of 

the CO2.

The Climate Change Argument:

First, let us take a trip back to 1970 and the first Earth Day. Those of you younger than 50 years old in this room will 

not remember the doomsday predictions made by notables of that era.

The greatest of these predictions is that the earth is cooling and the world is tumbling to the next ice age. Here we 

are 44 years later making a doomsday prediction of the exact opposite and that this global warming is based upon 

anthropogenic CO2 production.

I believe that CO2 does not cause global warming nor that climate change is caused by man. I base this on what my 

family experienced after a move to the island of Bahrain in 1992 just after the first Gulf War. Kuwait, just north and 

slightly west of Bahrain, was "on fire" so to say with the huge number of oil wells burning after the war. Each 

burning well produced over 450 ppm of CO2 at the well head. Yet, Bahrain did not experience high temperatures. 

Instead, Bahrain had two of the coldest and wettest winters since the early thirties. This cooling and extra rain was 

attributed to the smoke pall from the oil well fires covering the Arabian Gulf and

preventing the waters in the Gulf from warming. The cool Gulf waters prevented the land from warming during the 

cooler months. The smoke provided condensation nuclei thereby causing increased amounts of rain and flooding. 

To me, this firsthand experience leads me to conclude that the any global warming is not caused by CO2 but by solar 

radiation.

If my conclusion is true, then the climate scientists should be able to document temperature increases over barren 

land compared to land that is not barren.

Carbon Capture and Sequestration has been touted to be the "technology to mitigate CO2 ". Yet, Gina McCarthy of 

the USEPA said that its new rules to mitigate CO2 levels and therefore climate change will have negligible effects or 

impact on CO2 levels and therefore climate change in a House Subcommittee on Energy and Power under the 

Energy and Commerce Committee on 18 September 2013. I might add that DOE Secretary Moniz was also present 

at this same meeting. In a testimony by Mr. Ed Whitfield from Kentucky, chairman of the subcommittee, he stated 

that human CO2 production amounts to only 3.75% of 30 gigatons of

the total CO2 output of 800 gigatons. 
15

# Commenter Comment Text

iii If human activity is only 3.75%, then just how much of this 3.75% is due to coal fired power generation.

Mr. McKinley of West Virginia also reports in this same House Subcommittee hearing that (in lines from 2258 to 

2266):

"we can say over 40 years there has been almost no increase in temperature, very slight. In fact, the

CO2 levels even with the increased greenhouse CO2 level emissions, the Arctic ice has actually increased by 60 

percent... Also that Antarctica is expanding. But more importantly, this report coming out of the United Nations, the 

IPCC report coming up is saying that most experts, most experts believe by 2083, and 70 years, the benefits of 

climate change will still outweigh the harm."

iv Mr. McKinley goes on to say, "Let's put this in perspective. Hypothetically, let's assume that all coal-fired 

generation in America were curtailed, all coal-fired generation were curtailed. According to the United Nations and 

the IPCC, this would reduce the CO2 levels of the globe by merely 2/10 of 1 percent by ridding all coal-fired power in 

the United States.

The Administration also needs to remind people, as you heard from the chairman in his opening remarks, that 

manmade problems, if we could, only represent 4 percent of all the emissions of the globe. Natural emissions 

represent 96 percent. So as a result, this Administration is, by virtue of this stream of job-killing regulations, is 

putting our Nation at risk all in the idea of clinging to the notion that cutting 2/10 of 1 percent is going to save the 

world environment."

v To further emphasize the impact, I have calculated the number in parts per million per year that the atmosphere 

will be reduced by 1 metric ton of CO2 by the FutureGen project and this is 0.00047 ppm. FutureGen 2.0’s 

sequestration is projected to reduce the amount of CO2 by 1.1 million metric tons of CO2 per year for 20 years or a 

total of 22 million metric tons if the project’s estimates are correct.

Therefore: 1.1 metric tons stored per year x 0.00047 = 0.0005 ppm per year or 0.01 ppm total for the 20 years of the 

project if my calculations are correct. There is more discussion on later in this comment paper.

There is another way to look at the amount of CO2 in the project. The USEPA website on CCS purports that a 500 

MWe coal fired power plant produces 3 million metric tons of CO2. 

vi According to FutureGen's copyrighted Conservation Plan
16

# Commenter Comment Text

vii, the designed maximum output of the Meredosia Energy Center is 168 MWe but will have only a net of 99MWe. 

In order to equate the net output of the FutureGen power plant with the typical 500 MWe then we need to multiple 

FutureGen's data by 5 which means that the 1.1 million tons becomes 5.5 million tons of CO2 produced by 

FutureGen to be sequestered which is 2.5 million more metric tons produced by the FutureGen project than the 

output of the typical 500 MEe power plant. This extra 2.5 million metric ton amounts to a loss or energy penalty of 

83%. This means 83% more coal will have to be utilized by FutureGen for the oxy-combustion capture of CO2. This is 

a waste of our coal resources and will cause the world to use its coal reserves faster than normal.

Then if we compare the oxy-combustion FutureGen project with the Kemper IGCC CCS project in Mississippi and the 

Edwardsport IGCC CCS project in Indiana against the USEPA's 500MWe typical plant, as to CO2 output and energy 

penalty, we will find that the FutureGen oxy- combustion project produces more CO2 and has a higher energy

penalty than the IGCC projects.

*Capture is rate to be 65%

** Edwardsport will emit 4 million metric tons into the atmosphere as the site was not geologically suitable for 

sequestration.

From this chart, it appears that of the two methods of capturing the CO2, IGCC and oxy- combustion, the oxycombustion carries the largest energy penalty and therefore is not energy efficient. This inefficiency goes against 

the thrust of energy efficiency in the White House Energy Policy.

Climate Progress reported on an update of a Harvard Study on the true cost of coal. They summarized that CCS, to 

mitigate CO2, is costly and carries numerous health and environmental risks, which would be multiplied if carried 

out on a widespread deployment.

ix If this is the case, then why such a thrust for Carbon Capture and Sequestration IF CO2 is not the cause of global 

warming or climate change? CCS has been called a scam by more than one entity.

In addition, in 2011, the thrust for CCS was THIS IS the TECHNOLOGY to mitigate climate change. Now, in 2014, after 

Gina McCarty has testified at a House Subcommittee hearing on Energy that the EPA regulations which tout CCS for 

climate change mitigation will have negligible effect to curb climate change. (This is also stated in the Final DOE/EIS 

0460 but is buried in the Appendices.) So now the spin is that CCS becomes a "bridging" technology for energy and 

climate change.
17

# Commenter Comment Text

Since this FutureGen project was started in 2003, to me, there have been so many permutations on the facts, that it 

is hard to know what the true facts are given.

My husband, his nephews, and his cousins have not had what other property owners have had when dealing with 

FutureGen. The decision to participate in FutureGen was not offered to them but was made for them without 

seeking their opinion on the matter by a trustee for a family trust. Hence, they are very concerned about the project 

and the ramifications to the farmland.

39 Betty 

Niemann

3. Land Deformation and Effects on Agricultural Land: (Also see discussion of the number of gallons of CO2 below.)

...

The Agricultural Mitigation Agreement did not address this possibility nor inform the Farm Bureau nor the farmers 

that this might happen. Farmers have drainage tile under their land and is FutureGen prepared to continually repair 

this drainage tile during and after the project ends? 

40 Betty 

Niemann

I would like to add that the Gulf Oil spill that happened in April of 2011 was an estimated spill of only 210 million 

gallons of oil. In one year, FutureGen is to inject 1.83 times as much supercritical CO2 into the Mt. Simon layer 

under Morgan County.

41 Betty 

Niemann

Comments from the Final DOE/EIS-0460

b. CO2 Mitigation:

(1) The amount of CO2 mitigated by the FutureGen 2.0 project to the atmosphere is negligible. (2) DOE does 

recognize this fact but it is buried on page I-41 Response 2-06.*

*Page I-41 of the DOE/EIS-0460 (in Volume II) contains the DOE's response to my question concerning my 

comments about the 0.00047 ppm. The response is marked 2-06 to my comments also marked 2-06. The response 

is: "DOE acknowledges that the direct contribution of any single coal-fueled power plant equipped with carbon 

capture and storage to reducing worldwide atmospheric concentration of CO2 would be negligible

and the incremental impacts on global climate change cannot be determined effectively. Therefore, DOE considered 

the impacts of CO2 emissions on global climate to be a subject for cumulative impact analysis addressed in Section 

4.3, Potential Cumulative Impacts of the Draft EIS. As stated on page 4.3-25 of the Draft EIS, “These reductions in 

emissions alone would not appreciably reduce global concentrations of GHG emissions. However, these emissions 

changes would incrementally affect (reduce) the atmosphere’s concentration of GHGs, and, in combination with 

past and future emissions from all other sources, contribute incrementally to future change in atmospheric 
18

# Commenter Comment Text

concentrations of GHGs.” As stated under Climate and Greenhouse Gases in Table 4.3-3 of the Draft EIS, “the 

successful implementation of the project may lead to widespread acceptance and deployment of oxy-combustion 

technology with geologic storage of CO2, thus fostering a beneficial long-term reduction in the rate of CO2 emissions 

from power plants across the United States.” DOE agrees with the scientific community that the cumulative effects 

of CO2 emissions on global climate change cannot be ignored, which is why the agency is participating in the 

FutureGen 2.0 Project and continues to fund other demonstration projects involving carbon capture and storage. 

Please refer to DOE’s response to Comment 14-01 for further discussion on this topic."

(3) Because the CO2 is mitigated in this project at a negligible rate, the DOE shifts the CO2 negligible impact from the 

draft EIS to its position in the Final EIS to considering "potential cumulative impact" using the buzz word of 

“incremental" impact upon which to make its decision.

(4) This shift of position to "potential cumulative incremental impact" is tantamount to twisting the results to 

support the desired outcome in my opinion

(5) Using that same position in 3 above, the Final EIS does not take into the account of the incremental (potential 

cumulative impact) of increase CO2 stored under pressure in the Earth during widespread deployment.

Risks of the FutureGen Project: Page 8 of 10

for a 30 year project as first conceptualized. FutureGen 2.0 is forging ahead acquiring property rights/non-reversible 

options even through there is a lawsuit filed on the ICC's decision. IF FutureGen goes bust, and it could, the losers 

will be the landowners who were coerced, duped, misled by omission (my opinions and conclusions) to give up their 

property rights which if FutureGen 2.0 does go bust could be sold (for money) and not given or sold back to the 

landowners - all for a CO2 mitigation of 0.00047 ppm per year.

Again, in my opinion, the Final EIS conclusions are based upon incomplete impact analyses; i.e.: education and 

research center impacts upon the community as FutureGen requested 5 acres of the city park which is used by the 

community and the area requested contains beautiful trees, and the socioeconomic impact to the landowners if 

FutureGen fails as there are NO provisions in options and agreements for restoring property rights back to the 

owners if the project fails, and the failure to acknowledge that CO2 may not be the factor to cause climate 

change/global warming or that research is biased only to prove climate change/global warming existence to name a 

few.

There are other studies that also indicate doubts about and risks associated with FutureGen 2.0: o In 2009, the 

Government Accounting Office prepared a report entitled "CLEAN COAL DOE Should Prepare a Comprehensive 

Analysis of the Relative Costs, Benefits, and Risks of a Range of Options for FutureGen", which discusses the 

FutureGen Mattoon Project before Mattoon backed out of the project.
19

# Commenter Comment Text

o In 2012, the Congressional Budget Office published a report entitled "Federal Efforts to Reduce the Cost of 

Capturing and Storing Carbon Dioxide" which has one conclusion on page i: "CBO’s analysis suggests that unless the 

federal government adopts policies that encourage or require utilities to generate electricity with fewer greenhouse 

gas emissions, the projected high cost of using CCS technology means that DOE’s current program for developing 

CCS is unlikely to do much to support widespread use of the technology."

o On April 3, 2013, Peter Folger, of the Congressional Research Service, published a report entitled, "FutureGen, A 

Brief History and Issues for Congress". In it there are questions raised about the success of such a project and cites 

rising costs. It does not, however, quote the costs touted by Exelon, in its letter to Senator Durbin, of $3-4.5 billion 

which must be borne by the Illinois rate payers and taxpayers.

42 Betty 

Niemann

I have looked at the ADM applications for Class VI wells that were applied for in 2011 and so far there has not been 

a public hearing scheduled for either of the well applications.

43 Carl Hankel It is shameful to see that an agency that is supposed to protect the public is wasting money on "carbon 

sequestration" to "protect" us against "global warming" which does not exist except in the minds of kleptocrats and 

scientists who have consistently changed their bogus data to support their "proof" of something that isn't proven 

and only exists as a consensus statement among those who stand to profit from continual hysteria. The EPA needs 

to divest itself from junk science and focus on things that really matter, like water pollution and particulate air 

pollution.

44 ClearStack 

Power LLC

Here is an excerpt from a paper written by a National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) 

meteorologist; "Climate models used for estimating effects of increases in greenhouse gases show substantial 

increases in water vapor as the globe warms and this increased moisture would further increase the warming." 

However, this meteorologist along with the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) crowd got it backwards 

about water vapor and CO2 -- they cool the earth like all other gases in our atmosphere!

The amount of CO2 from man is a mouse milk quantity compared to nature's emissions. If we eliminated worldwide, 

all man-made CO2 emissions, we would go back to the level we had in January 2005. It was slightly warmer (about 

0.1 °C) in January 2005 than it was in January 2011.

The US EPA regulating man-made CO2 is orders of magnitude beyond stupid. The man-made CO2 being generated in 

the United States in 2010 that contributes to the CO2 concentration in the atmosphere is 16.4% of the worldwide 

man-made total and that calculates to be (11.5*0.164) = 1.9 ppmv. The CO2 release from Medieval warming has 

caused CO2 in the atmosphere to rise some 2 ppmv per year from 1993 to 2011. So if you eliminated all man-made 

CO2 from the U.S. today, next year at this time it would be the same as this year before the CO2 emissions were 

stopped.
20

# Commenter Comment Text

45 ILL Coal 

Association

And low cost energy from coal has been the backbone of our nation's economy since the Industrial Revolution. 

Illinois is the Saudi Arabia of coal. In fact, the energy content from our coal is greater than the energy content of the 

oil from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait combined. So we believe coal must be part of America's energy mix in the future. 

This project will allow coal to be part of the all of the above energy strategy that's been getting quite a bit of 

attention lately. It's very disappointing to us that another part of your agency, U.S. EPA, continues to propose 

emission limits on carbon dioxide that cannot be met with the current technologies. Last year EPA announced 

standards for new power plants that can only be met by FutureGen-type technologies. And next month the 

standards for existing plants will be proposed. Is there any reason for me to be optimistic about how those 

standards will effect coal? This process is getting the cart before the horse. Carbon limits for coal can only be met by 

a technology that isn't even under construction yet for project FutureGen. If coal is supposed to be part of our 

future energy base, then this doesn't make sense to me, the process. The coal industry had a consistent request for 

several years, defer or postpone the imposition of carbon limits on power plants until commercially proven carbon 

capture and storage technology, CCS, is available. Doing otherwise will result in significantly higher electricity costs 

that will have a negative economic impact on this State, the region and the nation. That's why FutureGen is so 

important and needs to move forward now.

46 Illinois 

Chamber of 

Commerce

Pipelines make sense.

One of the major differences between the Decatur and FutureGen 2.0 proposals is that the FutureGen 2.0 project 

will transport the carbon dioxide thirty miles via pipeline. Carbon dioxide is non-corrosive and non-flammable and 

since pipelines are safe in general and there are more than 4,500 miles of pipelines carrying carbon in the U.S., we 

are glad this mode of transportation is being used. 

47 Leinberger & 

Critchelow 

families

The Permit is deficient in fundamental respects. 

....

The project involves the injection of millions of tons of carbon dioxide (1.1 million metric tons per year for 20 years) 

into an area where persons reside and private property is located. See AR # 16. Carbon dioxide is lethal to humans, 

animals and vegetation in the compressed liquid form that will be piped and injected underground.2 

Carbon dioxide is a supercritical fluid at temperatures greater than 31.1 degrees Celsius and 7.38 MPa. See 

Alexandra B. Klass & Elizabeth J. Wilson, Climate Change, Carbon Sequestration, and Property Rights, 2010 U. Ill. L. 

Rev. 363, 428 (2010) (citing CRC Handbook of Chemistry and Physics 6-39 (David R. Lide ed., 88th ed. 2008)), 

attached in Exhibit 3. “When released, supercritical CO2 depressurizes into a gas and has the potential to 

asphyxiate humans at high concentrations, among other possible adverse health effects.” Jeffrey W. Moore, The 

Potential Law of on-Shore Geologic Sequestration of CO2 Captured from Coal-Fired Power Plants, 28 Energy L.J. 443, 
21

# Commenter Comment Text

470 (2007) (citing Eric J. Beckman, Supercritical and Near-Critical CO2 in Green Chemical Synthesis and Processing, 

28 J. of Supercritical Fluids 121, 123 (2003)), attached in Exhibit 3. EPA recognized the unique risks to underground 

sources of drinking water (“USDW”) associated with geologic sequestration (“GS”) in its Final rule, stating, “Large 

CO2 injection volumes associated with GS, the buoyant and mobile nature of the injectate, the potential 

presence of impurities in the CO2 stream, and its corrosivity in the presence of water could pose risks to 

USDWs...recognizing that an improperly managed GS project has the potential to endanger USDWs...the properties 

(of CO2), as well as the large volumes that may be injected for GS result in several unique challenges for protection 

of USDWs in the vicinity of GS sites from endangerment.” See 75 FR 77230, Section II.A. (3), AR# 330. 

FN2: The draft Permit and application have little to no discussion on the impact of the 30 miles of piping (and the 

related connection area where the piping meets the UIC well) on the aquifer closest to the surface (Drinking Water 

Aquifer).

48 Lillian Korous FutureGen does not consider who will be responsible for covering possible escalating costs of FutureGen 2.0. 

Carbon capture and sequestration have a history of exceeding costs. The first FutureGen project was abandoned in 

2010 due to increased expenses. Mississippi Power Company’s Kemper IGCC plant costs had doubled throughout 

the course of the project. Most of Kemper’s $4 billion price tag will be paid by ratepayers in economically 

depressed communities of color in Mississippi. The State of Illinois has bound its utilities to purchase electricity 

from FutureGen 2.0 for 20 years, without any commitment regarding the rates that will be charged to customers. 

Why? This is a huge blunder or a huge sell-out. 

49 Lillian Korous The last topic is the building of a large “show place” facility featuring the FutureGen 2.0 project, including a visitor 

and research center, training facility and an arts center. The building is to be built on a 5 acre site in Jacksonville, 

Illinois’ Community Park. Mature trees will be cut down and space will be subtracted from various established 

activities traditionally held at the park. FutureGen 2.0 already has office space in Jacksonville’s downtown square. I 

believe this is a huge waste of money, better designated for the actual project, PARTICULARLY WHEN PROJECTS LIKE 

THIS GO OVER BUDGET. The visitor center at the Park smacks of ingratiation. It looks to me that the arts center is 

an add-on to appease the public for the unnecessary industrial move-in in our green Community Park.

50 Robert J. 

Finley

The development of UIC Class VI requirements by the US EPA has been an important milestone in allowing 

demonstration and testing of carbon sequestration while assuring protection of underground sources of drinking 

water. These requirements are extensive and, in my judgment, highly protective of underground water resources. 
22

SECTION 2. GENERAL COMMENTS 

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

1 Bradley 

Zeller

Now, the environmental impacts of the sequestration, it is 

CO2. It's carbon and oxygen and I see nothing toxic about 

either one of those elements. They're burying it 5,000 feet 

below the ground. The displacement value is equivalent to a 

dime in a bathtub. So there's not much of a factor. There's not 

going to be any heaving. We naturally have natural gas 

pockets in our county that people are using as wells for 

heating sources and things of that nature. Nobody's worried 

about them breaking out of their natural cavities. We 

currently have Panhandle Eastern which is storing natural gas 

in east south central Morgan County in a natural geological 

dome that they're storing over there. There have been no 

environmental impacts from that process either. Our well 

water is surface water. Our water comes from the top down. 

It does not come from the earth up. Just a quick story on 

myself. My oldest son is 30 years old. We didn't have city 

water at that time. We still have our shallow well, which is 18 

feet deep. The deepest well in Morgan County that supplies 

Morgan County is 90 foot deep. But I have been more of a 

culprit to contaminating my well than FutureGen will by my 

farming practices, because it failed because of my trace values 

were too high in my own well. In summary, I'd like to say I 

have confidence in the science. Love the opportunity to come 

into Morgan County a clean energy site of the world and am 

excited about the fact that we did something to help with the 

global warming weather issues. Thank you.

The Mt. Simon formation, which will receive the CO2, is thousands 

of feet below the ground surface (between 3,785 and 4,432 feet) 

at the FutureGen site, and contains porous spaces to accept and 

store the CO2; it is beneath the Lombard and Proviso Members of 

the Eau Claire Formation which is a confining layer of rock that will 

trap the CO2 and act as a natural barrier to leakage. The CO2 will be 

injected through technically engineered wells with multiple 

barriers designed to isolate the injectate in the well and protect 

formations outside the well materials.

FutureGen’s permits comply with the tailored requirements in the 

Class VI Rule that specifically address the unique nature of CO2

Geologic Sequestration (GS) and focus on ensuring protection of 

underground sources of drinking water (USDWs) and human health 

where geologic sequestration is occurring.
23

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

2 CIBCTC It will also be a safe system as C02 is non corrosive and 

nonflammable. The CO2 that will be transported in the 

pipeline and injected underground for permanent storage. 

The Mt. Simon formation, which will receive the CO2, is thousands 

of feet below the ground surface (between 3,785 and 4,432 feet) 

at the FutureGen site, and contains porous spaces to accept and 

store the CO2. Based on local and regional geologic study and 

testing, EPA has determined that the Mt. Simon is sufficiently 

laterally extensive and porous to allow it to safely receive the 

volume of CO2 FutureGen plans to inject. 

3 DCEO We offer some of the best sequestration geology anywhere. 

The Mt. Simon Sandstone, in this case, is a large-capacity 

porous rock layer filled with briny water.

The Mt. Simon formation, which will receive the CO2, is thousands 

of feet below the ground surface (between 3,785 and 4,432 feet) 

at the FutureGen site, and contains porous spaces to accept and 

store the CO2. Based on local and regional geologic study and 

testing, EPA has determined that the Mt. Simon is sufficiently 

laterally extensive and porous to allow it to safely receive the 

volume of CO2 FutureGen plans to inject. 

4 Illinois 

Chamber of 

Commerce

The rocks are good! 

Illinois geology has been rigorously studied by independent 

scientists and is ideal for carbon dioxide storage because the 

porosity, permeability, depth and the presence of an 

impermeable caprock all contribute to the ability to safely 

store it. 

The FutureGen Alliance has proven through geologic testing 

and engineering studies that the Morgan County site is highly 

suitable for CO2 storage. 

The Mt. Simon formation, which will receive the CO2, is thousands 

of feet below the ground surface (between 3,785 and 4,432 feet) 

at the FutureGen site, and contains porous spaces to accept and 

store the CO2. Based on local and regional geologic study and 

testing, EPA has determined that the Mt. Simon is sufficiently 

laterally extensive and porous to allow it to safely receive the 

volume of CO2 FutureGen plans to inject. The suitability of the site 

is based on evaluation of extensive information about the 

proposed site, including the geological, geomechanical, 

hydrogeological, and geochemical properties of the injection and 

confining zones; local hydrogeology; geochemistry; and seismic 

history in the context of the planned injection operation. 
24

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

5 Betty 

Niemann

Most of you know that I'm against granting the permits for 

the underground injection well. And just recently as of Sunday 

a thought occurred to me, the Houston Chronicle reported 

Brazoria County, Texas, which is south of Houston, is going to 

use the saline aquifer and pump out the saline and apply 

desalination to fulfil their water requirements in a drought 

situation. 

So as the U.S. EPA is over the drinking water, what plans do 

you have for the future if the doomsday predictions are that 

we are going to end up in drought and we will have to seek 

other ways for water? 

The Mount Simon sandstone is a saline aquifer. It's large and 

could possibly be a water source with the desalination as a 

result of its being pumped out to produce fresh water for this 

water and for agriculture. 

The UIC requirements, including the Class VI Rule, are designed to 

protect USDWs, which are defined by the regulations (under Safe 

Drinking Water Act (SDWA) authority) as ground water formations 

containing less than 10,000 parts per million (ppm) of total 

dissolved solids (TDS). Based on this definition, the Mt. Simon is 

not considered a USDW as it has a salinity of 47,500 ppm TDS (as 

measured in samples taken from the FutureGen stratigraphic test 

well). Therefore, injection into that formation, with appropriate 

protective measures as outlined in the rule and implemented in 

the permits, is allowable under SDWA and the UIC regulations.

This comment did not request, and does not require, a change to 

the draft permits.

6 Elizabeth 

Rigor 

The USEPA should study all the ramifications of the injected 

CO2 in the geological formations beneath Illinois farmland. 

Solving CO2 so called GHG pollution by contaminating the 

geology is not actually ridding the world of the CO2.

FutureGen’s permits comply with the tailored requirements in the 

Class VI Rule that specifically address the unique nature of CO2 GS 

and focus on ensuring protection of USDWs and human health

where geologic sequestration is occurring.

The suitability of the site is based on evaluation of extensive 

information about the proposed site, including the geological, 

geomechanical, hydrogeological, and geochemical properties of 

the injection and confining zones; local hydrogeology; 

geochemistry; and seismic history in the context of the planned 

injection operation. 

7 Betty 

Niemann

I do not believe that FutureGen has been transparent in the 

release of information about this project and can cite 

instances from which I based my beliefs.

FutureGen submitted—and EPA reviewed—all information 

required in the Class VI rule. All of the information that FutureGen 

submitted to EPA and that EPA considered in its permitting 

decision is available to the public as part of the administrative 
25

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

record for this permitting process. Much of the information is 

available through EPA’s website and at the document repositories.

8 Betty 

Niemann

Since FutureGen's application was made in 2013, all of a 

sudden there seems to be a public hearing scheduled. Why 

the rush? Was Region 5 pressured or urged to speed up the 

Class VI applications? With the Illinois Commerce Commission 

on 13-0252, FutureGen urged the commission to grant a 

conditional approval pending that FutureGen obtains all the 

necessary permits and also urged the commission to grant 

limited power of eminent domain for the pipeline even 

though FutureGen does not have all the permits thereby 

depriving landowners due process of the law of right to 

ownership. FutureGen cited economic hardship of having to 

meet ARRA deadlines of 30 Sept. 2015 if it does not have the 

ICC approval.

Did FutureGen apply this same tactic with Region 5?

The FutureGen public hearing was scheduled to take place during 

the public comment period for the draft permit(s) pursuant to Part 

124 of the Code of Federal Regulations to ensure that the public 

has opportunity to provide input.

EPA performed an extensive review of the detailed geologic and 

operational information in FutureGen’s permit application. The 

review team included geologists, geochemists, hydrogeologists, 

modelers, and well engineers who are familiar with the geology of 

Illinois and the UIC requirements. Throughout this review, EPA 

requested and FutureGen provided additional information as 

needed to ensure that the permit determination was based on 

appropriate information and that the permit conditions will ensure 

protection of USDWs from endangerment. 

EPA proceeded with the draft permit decisions once it had 

completed its review and permit drafting. FutureGen has made 

EPA aware of the ARRA [American Recovery and Reinvestment Act] 

deadlines, but EPA has been clear in communicating to FutureGen 

that EPA would not proceed with any regulatory decisions until the 

record was complete and EPA could determine whether all 

permitting requirements in the regulations had been met. 

While the other permits the commenter mentions are out of the 

scope of the UIC regulations, EPA clarifies that, under Part A of the 

Class VI permit, the FutureGen Alliance may not commence 

injection until it meets all other necessary regulatory 

requirements.

9 CSC Our interest, and our reason for commenting on these draft 

permits, is directed at the potential precedents being 

established for these draft FutureGen permits and all future 

EPA will not make the suggested changes. FutureGen is responsible 

to comply with both the permit requirement and the regulatory 

requirement upon which it is based.
26

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

Class VI permits that may be issued by EPA Region 5, other 

EPA regions and state primacy programs. 

We want to make sure that the permits, the conditions 

contained therein, and the plans approved as part of permits 

are consistent with the regulatory requirements and designed 

to assist with full understanding of the requirements and 

safeguards of Class VI permits. Our comments are designed to 

improve the clarity and accuracy of these Class VI permits. 

To begin, we commend EPA for the very important and 

fundamental recognition in Section A of the draft permits that 

“[f]or purposes of enforcement, compliance with this permit 

during its term constitutes compliance with Part C of the Safe 

Drinking Water Act (SDWA)”. This is a fundamental tenant of 

virtually every EPA permitting program. Permit applicants are 

called upon to submit their plans and proposals for complying 

with the regulatory permit requirements that have been 

promulgated by EPA based on the underlying legislative 

mandates enacted by the U.S. Congress to achieve specific 

statutory objectives. In this case, the permit applications 

provide for compliance with the UIC program requirements 

promulgated by EPA pursuant to the Safe Drinking Water Act 

(SDWA) to protect underground sources of drinking water 

(USDW) from endangerment consistent with the mandate of 

that statute. As EPA has recognized in numerous provisions of 

the draft permit, the approved application, the required 

plans, and the individualized permit conditions provide for 

compliance with the promulgated regulatory requirements of 

the Class VI UIC program. That is why compliance with the 

final permit “constitutes compliance with Part C of the 

SDWA”. 

For example, Section M(3) of the draft permit states: 

“This monitoring shall be performed as described in the 

Testing and Monitoring Plan to meet the requirements of 40 

Some of the specific permit references identified by the 

commenter are discussed and responded to in more detail 

elsewhere in the response to comments document. However, as a 

general matter, the permits are intended as a roadmap to identify 

the relevant requirements and obligations of FutureGen. In some 

cases, the relevant regulatory provisions for operational details can 

be relatively lengthy and technical, so that the permit language 

may summarize those requirements and provide reference to the 

regulatory details rather than copying them in their entirety. This 

makes the permits more reader-friendly and easy to follow. 

Incorporating the additional details by reference does not create 

any conflict or confusion between the terms of the permit and the 

regulations. 

By issuing final permits containing the language as presented in the 

draft permits, EPA approves the plans as presented. However, EPA 

also recognizes that site-specific conditions encountered during 

drilling, operating and monitoring may present the need to alter 

any of the project plans, at which time FutureGen may propose to 

the Director changes in the plan. Any such changes would result in 

a permit modification –which, depending on the nature of any 

changes, could warrant an additional public notice and comment 

period. EPA anticipates that the plans will be regularly reviewed 

and revised as required by the Class VI regulations. Reference to 

the relevant regulatory provisions provides clarity on the standards 

against which any revisions will be judged. 
27

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

CFR 146.90(b).” This is an excellent recognition of the process 

whereby, the applicant has submitted a Testing and 

Monitoring Plan that provides for satisfying the requirements 

of the UIC Class VI regulations in section 40 CFR 146.90(b) and 

EPA has approved the plan and the permit because it meets 

those requirements. Accordingly, compliance with the Testing 

and monitoring Plan of this permit during its term will 

constitute compliance with the section 146.90(b) 

requirements as noted by the permit condition in sections 

M(3) of the draft permits. 

Unfortunately, other conditions in the draft permits that also 

reference regulatory provisions are too loosely worded and 

give the inappropriate impression that the permittee must 

take some further steps—beyond complying with the permit 

and the approved incorporated plans—to meet the regulatory 

requirements. For example, Section G(1) of the draft permits 

states: “The permittee shall maintain and comply with the 

approved Area of Review and Corrective Action Plan 

(Attachment B of this permit) which is an enforceable 

condition of this permit and shall meet the requirements of 

40 CFR 146.84.” This wording is inappropriate because 

maintaining and complying with “the approved Area of 

Review and Corrective Action Plan (Attachment B of this 

permit) which is an enforceable condition of this permit” will 

be entirely sufficient to meet the requirements of 40 CFR 

146.84. EPA makes that determination when it issues the 

permit and approves the plan as part of that permit. No 

further action is necessary; therefore the inclusion of the 

words “and shall meet the requirements of 40 CFR 146.84” is 

both unnecessary and inappropriately confusing. It would be 

acceptable to use wording similar to that in Section M(3) and 

say “to meet” rather than “and shall meet” but given the 

reference to the plan being an enforceable condition of the 
28

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

permit, that is unnecessary and may potentially be confusing. 

There are a number of other places in the draft permits where 

loose—and potentially contradictory language (that is, 

language that would contradict section A)—is used. The 

attached detailed comments identify these provisions and 

provide specific recommendations of alternative language. 

The problem identified with the potential conflict created by 

referencing both permit conditions and regulatory provisions 

is exacerbated by the frequent repetition of regulatory 

requirements throughout the draft permits. This is an unusual 

departure from past approaches in UIC permits. For example, 

Class IH permits issued by EPA Region 5 have included 

conditions for post-closure plans that say: 

“The permittee has submitted a plan for post-closure 

maintenance and monitoring, which is included in Part III(B) of 

this permit. This plan includes the information required by 

Section 146.72(a) and demonstrates how each of the 

applicable requirements of Section 146.72(a) will be met. The 

obligation to implement the post-closure plan survives the 

termination of this permit or the cessation of injection 

activities.” 

This excellent language provides a very straightforward 

explanation of how the submitted plan, which has been 

reviewed and approved by EPA, provides for compliance with 

the regulatory requirements and becomes an enforceable 

part of the permit. A similar approach could easily be used for 

each of the required plans included in the Class VI permits and 

would provide a clearer understanding of how the plans 

function in providing for compliance with the regulatory 

requirements as part of the Class VI permit.
29

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

10 Leinberger & 

Critchelow 

families

Strict adherence to the applicable UIC regulations is 

imperative.

...

Pursuant to Section 1421 of the Safe Drinking Water Act (AR # 

18, 477), the purpose of the of the Underground Injection 

Control Program is to prevent underground injection which 

endangers drinking water sources 42 U.S.C. 300h (b)(1). The 

UIC regulations must prevent contamination of drinking water 

and prevent the movement of fluids containing contaminants 

that “otherwise adversely affect human health.” In re NE Hub 

Partners, L.P., 7 E.A.D. 561, 567 (1998) (citing 40 C.F.R. § 

144.12(a)). Due to the deficiencies in the materials submitted 

to EPA, FutureGen has not met this standard and the resulting 

draft Permit is based on erroneous findings.

FutureGen’s permits comply with the tailored requirements in the 

Class VI Rule that specifically address the unique nature of CO2 GS 

and focus on ensuring protection of USDWs and human health 

where geologic sequestration is occurring.

Suitability is based on evaluation of extensive information about 

the proposed site, including the geological, geomechanical, 

hydrogeological, and geochemical properties of the injection and 

confining zones; local hydrogeology; geochemistry; and seismic 

history in the context of the planned injection operation. 

FutureGen submitted—and EPA reviewed—all of the information 

required in the Class VI rule to demonstrate that the site meets the 

geologic siting, AoR, construction, and financial responsibility 

requirements for injection of CO2 that does not endanger USDWs.

EPA found that the final documents on which the FutureGen 

permit decisions were based were sufficient to meet regulatory 

standards. 

11 Leinberger & 

Critchelow 

families

A. FutureGen Caused Movement of Fluid into Underground 

Sources of Drinking Water

Already before construction, FutureGen has allowed the 

movement of contaminated fluid into underground sources of 

drinking water. In October 2011, FutureGen drilled a deep 

stratigraphic well to support the evaluation of the carbon 

storage location. The stratigraphic well is approximately 1 

mile east of the intended injection site, at longitude 

90.05228W, latitude 39.8067N. The drilling ceased in 

December 2011. See Supporting Documentation, 2.1.3, AR# 1, 

2. At that same time, water pumped from one of the 

Critchelow’s wells turned a yellowish/brown color for 

approximately one month. See Critchelow Declaration, Ex. 5. 

The Critchelows use the well water for washing and drinking, 

Drilling and construction of the stratigraphic test well occurred 

under a permit issued by the Illinois Department of Natural 

Resources (IDNR). Such drilling and construction is not under EPA’s 

jurisdiction. EPA contacted the IDNR and found that there were no 

complaints of well contamination registered in Morgan County 

during the drilling of the stratigraphic test well. The information 

provided by the commenter is not detailed enough to provide any 

direct correlation between drilling and construction of the 

stratigraphic test well and the issues with the Critchelow well. EPA 

has no reason to expect that the well would have been 

hydraulically connected to the FutureGen well. Inquiries with the 

State have not resulted in any information about this alleged 

incident. EPA is willing to require that Future Gen provide advance 

notice to the Critchelows when the well construction is scheduled, 
30

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

yet were unable to do so when it was so discolored. 

Moreover, the drilling caused the water in the well to 

overflow. Id. The discoloration and pressure impacts to the 

Critchelow’s well only ceased when the drilling ceased. The 

water in the well has never changed colors or overflowed in 

the 25 years the Critchelows have lived on their property. Id. 

The discoloration and pressure impacts of the drilling of the 

stratigraphic well were in clear violation of the mandates of 

the SDWA and the underlying regulations. Specifically, Section 

144.12(a) of the general requirements for underground 

injection wells states: 

No owner or operator shall construct, operate, maintain, 

convert, plug, abandon or conduct any other injection activity 

in a manner that allows the movement of fluid containing any 

contaminant into underground sources of drinking water, if 

the presence of that contaminant may cause a violation of 

any primary drinking water regulation under 40 CFR part 142 

or may otherwise adversely affect the health of persons. The 

applicant for a permit shall have the burden of showing that 

the requirements of this paragraph are met (emphasis 

added).

By causing the Critchelow’s well to overflow and the water in 

the well to be discolored, FutureGen has already failed in its 

burden of showing that it has not constructed and operated 

an injection activity that allows the movement of fluid into 

underground sources of drinking water or adversely affects 

the health of persons. The proposed injection well in the draft 

Permit will be about a mile closer to the Critchelow Property

than the stratigraphic well. FutureGen has not conducted an 

investigation or provided any explanation for the impact on 

the Critchelow well. See also, Ex. 1, para. 6 (Price report).

Under its discretionary authority, the Director should require 

FutureGen to investigate this impact and refrain from issuing 

so that they can see whether their well shows any impacts. If any 

impacts are observed, it would trigger actions under the corrective 

action plan. 

As proposed in the draft permit and contained in Attachment F of 

EPA’s final permit, the Emergency and Remedial Response Plan 

identifies potential adverse incidents that will be watched for 

during the construction period, including movement of brine 

between formations during drilling. The Plan identifies response 

actions to be taken to mitigate any potential endangerment of 

USDWs.
31

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

the Permit until the issues presented, including probable 

impacts to wells in the Survey Area and Area of Review, are 

resolved.

12 Leinberger & 

Critchelow 

families

The Director of the EPA Region V Water Division 

(“Director”) should use her discretion to require additional 

information regarding the project, as necessary, in order to 

properly assess the Permit. See, e.g. 40 CFR §146.82(a)(21), 

146.84(c)(2).

EPA geologists, geochemists, hydrogeologists, modelers, and well 

engineers who are familiar with the geology of Illinois and the UIC 

requirements performed an extensive review of the detailed 

geologic and operational information in FutureGen’s permit 

application. Throughout this review, EPA requested and FutureGen 

provided additional information as needed to ensure that the 

permit determinations were based on appropriate information and 

that the permit conditions will ensure protection of USDWs from 

endangerment.

The extensive information in the administrative record is sufficient 

to assess the portion of the project subject to UIC permitting. The 

permits and the regulations clearly provide that additional 

information will be developed throughout the construction and 

operation of the wells, and that the permits will be reviewed and 

revised to reflect newly developed information. 

13 CSC Provision: Page 1

Text of Draft Permit: as characterized in the permit 

application and the administrative record as a liquid,

References:

Proposed Revision: as characterized in the permit application 

and the administrative record as a liquid, supercritical

Comment: A supercritical fluid is not a liquid. It is a 

supercritical fluid having properties of a gas.

The permit language provides assurance that the permit is 

applicable in the event that a change in phase occurs in the CO2

stream. 

Therefore, the permit language has not been modified based upon 

this comment.
32

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

14 FutureGen The depth interval of the injection zone may change based on 

site specific data at the CO2 injection location.

The Alliance suggests changing the last part of the first 

sentence to read:

at depths between approximately 3785 feet and 4432 feet 

below ground surface, with actual depths based on sitespecific data, upon the express condition that the permittee 

meet the restrictions set forth herein.

To the extent that small deviations to the planned depths are 

identified after the wells are constructed and surveyed, those 

corrections can be made through the minor modification process 

identified in 40 C.F.R. § 144.41.

Therefore, the permit language has not been modified based upon 

this comment.

15 FutureGen In the second to last sentence,

The Alliance suggests the following wording regarding the 

confining zone:

The designated confining zone for this injection well is 

identified as the upper part of the Eau Claire Formation 

formed by the upper part of the Lombard Member and the 

Proviso Member.

EPA changed the text as requested to provide greater clarity and 

specificity regarding the names of the geologic formations at issue. 

16 Color Art 

Integrated 

Interiors

Obviously safety is the next important question. How can we 

be sure that this carbon dioxide will not escape up through 

the ground or contaminate our water/other below the 

surface? 

The Mt. Simon formation, which will receive the CO2, is thousands 

of feet below the ground surface (between 3,785 and 4,432 feet) 

at the FutureGen site, and contains porous spaces to accept and 

store the CO2; it is beneath the Lombard and Proviso Members of 

the Eau Claire Formation which is a confining layer of rock that will 

act as a natural barrier to leakage. The CO2 will be injected through 

technically engineered wells with multiple barriers designed to 

isolate the injectate in the well and protect formations outside the 

well materials.

After injection begins and throughout the life of the project, 

FutureGen will implement an EPA-approved Testing and 

Monitoring Plan that includes monitoring of the CO2, the well, 

ground water quality, and the position of the carbon dioxide plume 

and pressure front. FutureGen and EPA will review the monitoring 

and operational data. If, based on the results of such monitoring, 
33

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

there is reason to believe that the project is posing a risk to 

USDWs, human health and the environment, there are permit 

conditions that require FutureGen to cease injection and 

implement its Emergency and Remedial Response Plan. 

This comment did not request, and does not require, a change to 

the draft permits.

17 Lillian Korous Another concern regards the permanence of CO2 storage 

schemes. Improper storage or long term monitoring could 

lead to health risks to nearby populations, harm agriculture, 

create pressure changes causing ground heave, and even 

trigger seismic events. Safe and permanent storage cannot be 

guaranteed and even low leakage rates would undermine any 

climate mitigation effect. This is not a tried and tested 

process. In 1986 a large leakage of naturally sequestered CO2

rose from Lake Nyos in Cameroon and asphyxiated 1,700 

people. While the CO2 had been sequestered naturally, the 

event could be evidence for the potentially catastrophic 

effects of sequestering carbon artificially. Local residents fear 

a potentially dangerous CO2 leak and the lack of adequate 

evacuation procedures. Is future long term monitoring or a 

financial assurance plan to insure the long term stability of 

the CO2 sequestration addressed?

FutureGen’s permits comply with the tailored requirements in the 

Class VI Rule that specifically address the unique nature of CO2 GS 

and focus on ensuring protection of USDWs and human health 

where geologic sequestration is occurring.

Suitability is based on evaluation of extensive information about 

the proposed site, including the geological, geomechanical, 

hydrogeological, and geochemical properties of the injection and 

confining zones; local hydrogeology; geochemistry; and seismic 

history in the context of the planned injection operation. 

Based on an evaluation of this information, EPA determined that 

the FutureGen site is suitable to receive and store the anticipated 

volume of CO2 without endangering USDWs.

The FutureGen site has little in common with the physical setting 

or mechanism that resulted in the release of naturally-occurring 

CO2 trapped at the bottom of Lake Nyos, a stratified tropical lake 

that suddenly overturned through a process known as "limnic 

eruption." No injection was associated with this event.

The Mt. Simon formation, which will receive the CO2, is thousands 

of feet below the ground surface (between 3,785 and 4,432 feet) 

at the FutureGen site, and contains porous spaces to accept and 

store the CO2; it is beneath the Eau Claire Formation which is a 

confining layer of rock that will act as a natural barrier to leakage. 
34

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

After injection begins and throughout the life of the project, 

FutureGen will implement a testing and monitoring plan that 

includes monitoring of the CO2, the well, ground water quality, and 

the position of the carbon dioxide plume and pressure front. 

FutureGen and EPA will review the monitoring and operational 

data. If, based on the results of such monitoring, there is reason to 

believe that the project is posing a risk to USDWs, human health 

and the environment, there are permit conditions that require 

FutureGen to cease injection and implement its Emergency and 

Remedial Response Plan. 

The permits and the regulations require FutureGen to have 

financial assurance in place for the entire life of the project. See 

Part H of the Permits and 40 C.F.R. §146.85(a)(2). EPA also 

understands that under Chapter 20 of the Illinois Compiled 

Statutes, Section 1108, the State of Illinois assumes certain

liabilities and long-term stewardship obligations associated with 

the injected carbon dioxide.

18 McCutchen What will be done with all of that brine once it is extracted? 

Reverse osmosis reject brine (brine concentrate) is classified 

as "industrial waste" by the EPA, and the extracted deep 

saline brine will be even saltier (up to 463,000 ppm). Disposal 

of reverse osmosis reject brine is already a limiting factor in 

desalination deployment, and this will be a much bigger and 

saltier waste stream. 

You can't just dump it, so where will that deep saline brine go 

to make way for the tremendous volumes of CO2 that will 

replace it deep underground? If the plan is to hammer the 

supercritical, buoyant CO2 into the saline formation in order 

to force the water to flow elsewhere underground, will that 

even be possible against the tremendous pressure at the 

depth required to maintain supercriticality? Will the 

displaced brine flow up to pollute fresh water supplies or 

The Mt. Simon formation, which will receive the CO2, is thousands 

of feet below the ground surface (between 3,785 and 4,432 feet) 

at the FutureGen site, and contains porous spaces to accept and 

store the proposed volumes of CO2; it is beneath the Lombard and 

Proviso Members of the Eau Claire Formation which is a confining 

layer of rock that will act as a natural barrier to leakage. 

Within the subsurface the native brines will be displaced by CO2, 

but remain in subsurface (i.e., it will not be produced). EPA has 

determined that the Mt. Simon is sufficiently extensive and porous 

to allow it to receive the volume of CO2 FutureGen plans to inject 

without excessive pressure buildup that could allow fluid 

movement outside of the injection zone or allow fractures to 

propagate in the confining zone. 
35

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

increase soil salinity, leading to famine? Will the hydraulic 

hammering of pumping CO2 fracture the sealing formation, 

leading eventually to a disaster like Lake Nyos in 1986, where 

1,700 people died from asphyxiation when CO2 erupted from 

underground? If a CO2 plume does escape from the sealing 

formation, what can be done about it?

Additionally, the permit conditions limit the injection pressure to 

less than 90% of fracture pressure, to provide further assurance 

that excessive pressure buildup will not occur; this will be 

confirmed through testing and monitoring and periodic remodeling of the carbon dioxide plume and pressure front 

throughout the life of the project.

The FutureGen site has little in common with the physical setting 

or mechanism that resulted in the release of naturally-occurring 

CO2 trapped at the bottom of Lake Nyos, a stratified tropical lake 

that suddenly overturned through a process known as "limnic 

eruption." 

In response to the question regarding CO2 escaping from the 

sealing formation, the Class VI permit is structured in a manner to 

reduce this risk –from siting, construction, operation through to 

post-injection site care. This is of principal importance. In the 

unlikely event that CO2 were to be detected outside the injection 

zone through a suite of EPA-approved monitoring techniques 

incorporated in the Testing and Monitoring Plan of the permit, 

FutureGen would be required to implement the Emergency and 

Remedial Response Plan, an enforceable part of the Class VI 

permit, which outlines the protocol to be implemented under 

specific circumstances (e.g., migration of CO2 out of the permitted 

injection zone) including the process and actions to be 

implemented to shut in the injection well(s), mitigate risks, and 

communicate with EPA, other relevant authorities, and the public. 

19 Betty 

Niemann

f. There is a growth fault in the Mt. Simon layer, according to 

a private conversation with the FutureGen Geologist at the 

Public Hearing on 7 May 2014. Also, he said that there were 

transgressive sequences. I am not a geologist, but what I read 

is that these types of formations can lead to ways for the 

supercritical CO2 to migrate upward. xv Has the geology of 

FutureGen submitted and EPA evaluated information on the 

presence of faults and fractures in the area of the site to identify 

whether any pathways for fluid movement to USDWs exist. Based 

on the results of seismic surveys and an evaluation of the local and 

regional geology (based on maps and cross sections submitted by 

the permit applicant and additional information referenced by 
36

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

the sequestration site been thoroughly mapped and potential 

upward pathways identified if any?

EPA), EPA determined that no transmissive faults or fractures that 

may interfere with containment of the CO2 exist in the confining

zone. Information on EPA’s evaluation is available in multiple 

documents in the Administrative Record including but not limited 

to: “Induced Seismicity Evaluation Using the EPA-Developed 

Decision Model” and the “FutureGen Alliance Class VI Injection 

Project: Evaluation of Area of Review Delineation and Corrective 

Action.”

Additionally, the permit conditions limit the injection pressure to 

less than 90% of the fracture pressure of the Mt. Simon formation 

to prevent the creation of fractures.

20 Betty 

Niemann

Seismic Monitoring Identification of Subsurface Structural 

Features: Seismic monitoring data indicate the possible 

presence of a fault or fracture near the CO2 injection zone in 

the sedimentary cover or in the basement (concentration of 

microearthquakes of M<<1 in elongated clusters). The Testing 

and Monitoring Plan provides extended information about the 

microseismic monitoring network.

Action: The cause of the indicated microseismicity patterns 

will be evaluated. In conjunction, various operational 

parameters will be tested using the computational model to 

determine if the microseismic activity can be controlled to 

acceptable levels. xx

I recognize the input of Dr, McBridexxi in that he states 

"however it cannot be definitively determined that there are 

no faults in the Morgan County data."

The website www.energyjustice.net/coal/igcc states that CO2

is a more permanent storing of the gas and and it must be 

stored without leaking for thousands of years. "We have been 

unable to safely store solid and liquid radioactive wastes for 

FutureGen submitted and EPA evaluated information 

characterizing the seismic history of the region. The nearest 

seismic event to the proposed FutureGen project site was reported 

to have occurred in July 1909 (equivalent to a Magnitude 4.8) 

approximately 28 miles north of the site. EPA also evaluated 

extensive site characterization information and injection well 

operational data –including site-specific information on the local 

and regional geology, the presence of faults and fractures and 

computational modeling analyses of plume and pressure front 

behavior over the project duration and determined that the 

project poses a low risk of inducing felt seismic events. 

Documentation of EPA’s evaluation and assessment are included in 

but not limited to the: “Induced Seismicity Evaluation Using the 

EPA-Developed Decision Model” and the “FutureGen Alliance Class 

VI Injection Project: Evaluation of Area of Review Delineation and 

Corrective Action.” As noted above, EPA determined that no 

transmissive faults or fractures exist in the Eau Claire Formation 

(the confining zone).

Additionally, FutureGen’s permit limits the injection pressure to 

below 90% of the fracture pressure in the Mt. Simon formation; 
37

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

50-60 years with out leakage. It's unlikely that we will be able 

to store a significant part of the world's 28 billion metric tons 

of CO2 gas emitted every year without leakage problems."xxii

From what I have seen in the applications and the questions 

asked by the USEPA for further information, is this 

sequestration site based upon literature values and the 

assumption that it will work as a reservoir for supercritical 

CO2? An assumption must be scientifically tested with 

samples and geologic testing, mapping, and such. I believe 

that IF FutureGen has based this entire project on the fact 

that the literature states this geologic formation can be a 

reservoir for CO2 and not conducted a thorough geologic 

analysis of the formation, then the permits should be denied 

until such time all parameters are thoroughly studied and the 

geologic formation information is verified by an independent 

geophysical engineer.

this pressure limitation is designed to reduce the potential for 

inducing any seismic events. It is based on the fracture pressure of 

the injection zone, which will be confirmed during pre-injection 

testing of the injection and confining zones at the well sites (which 

FutureGen must perform prior to commencing injection). 

As additional information becomes available, that calculated value 

may change. To the extent new information indicates that the 

current value in Attachment A exceeds at 90 percent of the 

fracture pressure of the injection zone(s), the maximum injection 

pressure would be reduced to assure compliance with the 

regulatory standard in 40 C.F.R. § 146.88(a) and protection of 

USDWs. 

Also, throughout the life of the project, FutureGen will monitor for 

induced and naturally occurring seismic events using five passive 

seismic monitoring stations. Should a seismic event occur, the 

Emergency and Remedial Response Plan outlines the protocol to 

be implemented (based on a range of Magnitudes and attributes of 

the event), including the process and actions to be implemented to 

shut in the injection well(s), mitigate risks, and communicate with 

EPA, other relevant authorities, and the public. 

It is important to note that CO2 and radionuclides behave 

differently in the subsurface; the Class VI rule requirements—and 

FutureGen’s permits— specifically address the unique nature of 

CO2 GS and address the risks that EPA determined that CO2

injection may pose to USDWs.

In response to statements and comments regarding the permit 

application information evaluated by EPA prior to issuing these 

draft permit decisions, EPA clarifies that FutureGen complied with 

the requirements at 40 C.F.R. § 146.82(a). For compliance with 

these requirements, site specific information, information from 
38

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

The ILBD (Illinois Basin Decatur) Project, in my opinion has a 

lot more research and facts about the Mt. Simon formation 

and the geology of the Illinois Basin and from which valid 

determination on CO2 sequestration can be made. This 

research should be applied to FutureGen as a comparison to 

see if the geology and the Mt. Simon formation are consistent 

with the findings in the Decatur area for proper CO2

sequestration. If there are any anomalies between the two, 

then I feel the FutureGen site should be further examined and 

studied or the permit is denied based on insufficient data.

...

There have been studies in the geology of the CO2 Storage 

Area and these are NOT discussed in great detail in the 

Geology section of the EIS 460D document. The findings of 

these studies may have an impact on the CO2 storage area 

which may or may not be transferred through the layers to 

the surface.

natural analogues and literature values may be presented to 

inform a draft permit decision. 

Prior to commencing injection, FutureGen must perform preinjection testing of the injection and confining zones at the well 

sites. Specifically, FutureGen must conduct well log analyses and 

take cores of the injection zone and confining system; sample 

formation fluids from the injection zone (and record the physical 

and chemical characteristics of the formation fluids such as fluid 

temperature, pH, conductivity, reservoir pressure, and static fluid 

level); determine the fracture pressure and other physical and 

chemical characteristics of the injection and confining zones; and 

perform tests to verify the hydrogeologic characteristics of the 

injection zone. If necessary to protect USDWs, based on the results 

of this testing, the permit conditions or project plans will be 

revised. Any such changes would result in a permit modification –

which, depending on the nature of any changes, could warrant an 

additional public notice and comment period. 

Additionally, at least once every 5 years, FutureGen must re-run 

the computational models to verify that the CO2 is moving through 

the subsurface as predicted; if any divergence from predictions is 

detected (through this modeling or based on any site information), 

EPA will as necessary modify the permit conditions. 

While the examples cited by the commenter (including the ADM 

site) provide information about the ability of reservoirs to receive 

and confine CO2, EPA clarifies that the permit determinations were

based on an evaluation of site-specific information about the 

FutureGen site documented in the administrative record.

21 Betty 

Niemann

d. “The biggest risk associated with this acid plume is the 

long term effects on geological features (primarily cap rocks) 

and abandon wells...”xxx “Leakage of the acidic brine 

through damaged cap rocks, and/or corroded rock-cement 

CO2 in the presence of water is mildly acidic. To address this, 

FutureGen evaluated all of the wells in the AoR to verify that any 

penetrating the confining zone are adequately constructed or 

plugged with CO2 -compatible materials. The materials and cement 
39

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

and casing cement interfaces, pre-existing or abandoned 

wells, can cause contamination of the adjacent also stressed 

by Dr. Sally Benson (see remediation below) in that the acid 

plume as it migrates upwards into a potable aquifer may 

cause the release of heavy metals into the drinking water 

thereby contaminating the drinking water.

The pressures that the supercritical CO2 must be pumped into 

subsurface reservoirs are substantial and the added fluid must 

displace ambient fluid as the (CO2) propagates throughout the 

reservoir. xxxii

One such study is the study concerning the reactivity of the 

Eau Claire and Mt. Simon interface. For instance “CO2 –brine–

caprock reaction would lead to modification of the pore 

geometry and effective permeability” and “Recent 

hydrological modeling of pressure build-up and cap rock 

permeability indicates that, moderate brine migration 

through the caprock can be beneficial in terms of relief of 

pressure build -up in the reservoir and geomechanical stresses 

to the sealing caprock (Zhou et al., 2008; Benson and 

Chabora, 2009; Zhou and Birkholzer, 2011). However, the 

geochemical consequences of the brine migration through 

cap rock have not been explored.” xxxiii This could mean that 

the CO2 can leach upwards through the cap rock and over 

time to the surface. In my opinion, there is not just enough 

information known with the Eau Claire/Mt. Simon interface in 

the Illinois Basin to provide a true picture for safe storage of 

CO2. Another study on CO2 storage which finds there are 

considerable uncertainties in

modeling of the CO2 over time. xxxiv This is discussed by Mike 

Bickle and Niko Kampman. xxxv

in injection and monitoring wells at the site will be constructed to 

be compatible with fluids with which the materials may be 

expected to come into contact, including the CO2 and formation 

fluids and be able to maintain integrity over the life of the project. 

EPA will evaluate the quality of the wells and materials before 

authorizing FutureGen to inject any CO2.

The Mt. Simon and lower Eau Claire formations (the injection zone) 

are separated from the lowest USDWs by approximately 1800 feet 

of rock. Based on extensive, site-specific geologic information and 

modeling, EPA has determined that neither the CO2 nor any 

formation fluids will migrate out of the injection zone or endanger 

USDWs. As described above, injection pressures will be limited to 

prevent fracturing of the confining zone and the site will be 

extensively monitored throughout the life of the project to confirm 

USDW protection from endangerment.
40

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

22 Betty 

Niemann

Additional Concerns come from my comments on the Draft 

DOE/EIS-060 on 21 May 2013:

Possible Geologic Impact of 385 million gallons of supercritical 

CO2 per year:

As I said at the public hearing on the draft EIS, the 1.1 million 

metric tons of CO2 sequestered in Morgan County will 

approximately be 385,000,000 (385 million) gallons per year 

injected under Morgan County’s prime farmland. This, I do 

believe, will have a major impact to the land environment.

Based on the extensive geologic information evaluated by EPA to 

inform its permit decision, the FutureGen site is not expected to 

endanger USDWs or impact the land surface. FutureGen will, as 

part of their approved Testing and Monitoring Plan, use a 

combination of five permanently located tiltmeters in combination 

with monthly Differential Interferometric Synthetic Aperture Radar 

(DInSAR) surveys and Global Positioning System (GPS) readings to 

verify the absence of surface deformation.

23 Betty 

Niemann

I have also used British Geological Survey publication of Andy 

Chadwick's chart 3 Site Screening, Ranking and Selection from

page 25 of the "Best Practice for the Storage of CO2 in Saline 

Aquifers" to compare the FutureGen data with the Positive 

Indicators just to see if the injection and storage site meets 

the Best Practice Criteria.

The FutureGen data (in same measurement terms) has a 

depth of 1315m, reservoir thickness of 156m, porosity varies 

within the EIS-0460D is 20.42%, and the permeability is 

horizontal 3.10E+02 and the vertical permeability is 1.55E+02. 

Grain density is 2.65 and Compressibility is 3.7E-10. I am just a

housewife with a chemistry and biology (hence scientific) 

background trying to understand injecting supercritical CO2

into the Mt Simon layer of sandstone. FutureGen's injection 

interval is only 7 meters thick which is under the Best Practice 

reservoir thickness. This bothers me very much as there 

seems from the EIS data that there the Mt.Simon layer is not 

uniform but has 17 different layers so to speak. I find the 

FutureGen's salinity not within the perameters of the Best 

Practice criteria at 47.5 grams per liter. However it does seem 

EPA’s determination that the Mt. Simon formation is suitable to 

receive and store the anticipated volume of CO2 without 

endangering USDWs is based on an evaluation of the site-specific 

information in the permit application against the requirements of 

the Class VI rule that specifically address the unique nature of CO2

GS and address the risks that EPA determined may pose to USDWs. 

The permits are based on the risks identified in and addressed by 

the Class VI Rule developed by EPA, rather than the best practices 

document that the commenter cites; for example, protection is 

afforded to USDWs as defined in the UIC regulations (10,000 TDS) 

and not the less conservative salinity level cited in the best 

practices document. 

EPA based its permit determinations on the site-specific 

information in the Class VI permit application, and not the 

descriptions of the site in the EIS; the information in the permit 

application is the most recent and site-specific available, and is 

more relevant to evaluating risk to USDWs than the information in 

the EIS. 

Suitability is based on evaluation of extensive information about 

the proposed site, including the geological, geomechanical, 
41

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

to be within the requirements of the USEPA.

The discussion on page 3.4-8 of the DOE/EIS-0460 on the Mt. 

Simon Formation (Injection Zone), to me, is a text book cut 

and paste discussion that contains nonspecific information to 

the FutureGen project. Words like “This suggests that the 

formation exhibits characteristics, such as sufficient 

permeability and porosity, which make it suitable for longterm gas storage.” are most unsettling and not reassuring as 

this statement makes an assumptions and not Morgan County 

site specific conclusions. I also wish to point out that it seems 

that most data has been extrapolated from the gas storage 

wells and field in Illinois for this project. Gas has different 

properties than semi-liquid carbon dioxide. You cannot just 

“plug and play the data” and say they are the same.

...

So If the CO2 does migrate upwards into the St. Peter 

Formation, there is great potential for leakage into the 

atmosphere.

It really seems to me that the Morgan County Carbon Storage 

Area has not been properly mapped and characterized and 

that a lot of the assumptions made for the site have been 

made from literature research or general descriptions about 

the Mt. Simon Formation that are not site specific.

One characterization well, with core samples from wells 

outside the carbon storage area does not make a good 

characterization of the geologic formation of the Morgan 

County Injection site.

hydrogeological, and geochemical properties of the injection and 

confining zones; local hydrogeology; geochemistry; and seismic 

history in the context of the planned injection operation. 

This evaluation is augmented by computational modeling of the 

extent of the carbon dioxide plume and pressure front that 

accounts for all phases of the injected CO2 stream and incorporates 

site-specific geologic, geochemical and geomechanical properties 

of the injection and confining zones and operational information. 

The data on which the model is based are specific to the FutureGen 

site and CO2 movement in the subsurface and has not been 

extrapolated from natural gas storage.

Additionally, prior to commencing injection, FutureGen must 

perform pre-injection testing of the injection and confining zones 

at the well sites. Specifically, FutureGen must conduct well log 

analyses and take cores of the injection zone and confining system; 

sample formation fluids from the injection zone (and record the 

physical and chemical characteristics of the formation fluids such 

as fluid temperature, pH, conductivity, reservoir pressure, and 

static fluid level); determine the fracture pressure and other 

physical and chemical characteristics of the injection and confining 

zones; and perform tests to verify the hydrogeologic characteristics 

of the injection zone. If necessary to protect USDWs, based on the 

results of this testing, the permit conditions or project plans will be 

revised. See Part Q.4 of the permits.

After injection begins and throughout the life of the project, 

FutureGen will implement a Testing and Monitoring Plan that 

includes monitoring of the CO2, the well, ground water quality, and 

the position of the carbon dioxide plume and pressure front. 

FutureGen and EPA will review the monitoring and operational 

data. If, based on this, there is reason to believe that USDWs are 

endangered, FutureGen must cease injection and implement its 
42

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

Emergency and Remedial Response Plan. See Part P.2 of the 

permits.

Additionally, at least once every 5 years, FutureGen must re-run 

the computational models to verify that the CO2 is moving through 

the subsurface as predicted; if any divergence from predictions is 

detected (through this modeling or based on any site information), 

EPA will as necessary modify the permit conditions. See Part G of 

the permits.

24 Betty 

Niemann

Mike Bickle and Niko Kampman from the University of 

Cambridge in the United Kingdom state in their article, 

“Lessons in carbon storage from geological analogues” that 

“...we can constrain the nature and rates of the processes 

governing the fate of CO2 in geological storage reservoirs. 

Interpreting these observations fully, requires understanding 

the hydrology of the settings, invariably complex where 

multiphase flows are involved.”xli Given this, will FutureGen 

have on staff qualified person or person(s) on site to 

understand the injection process? If not, then the project 

should be scrubbed.

The permits require a qualified operator to be on site. The 

Emergency and Remedial Response Plan (part of the Class VI 

permits) identifies many of the FutureGen staff associated with the 

project. 

Additionally, EPA staff who reviewed the permit application and 

will review data generated over the life of the project include 

geologists, geochemists, hydrogeologists, modelers, and well 

engineers who are familiar with the geology of Illinois, the UIC 

requirements and injection operations.

25 Leinberger & 

Critchelow 

families

FutureGen is also required to provide information on geologic 

structure, including any known or suspect faults and fractures 

that may transect the confining zones in the Area of Review 

and a determination that they would not interfere with 

containment, and provide information on the seismic history 

including the presence and depth of seismic sources and a 

determination that the seismicity would not interfere with 

containment. See 40 CFR §146.82, AR # 18. FutureGen admits 

that the data provided on faults in the area of the injection 

well is inconclusive such that the Director has little 

information on which to rely. See Ex. 1, para 5 (Price report). 

Further, although the size of the Area of Review has been 

FutureGen submitted and EPA evaluated information 

characterizing the seismic history of the region. The nearest event 

to the proposed FutureGen project site was reported to have 

occurred in July 1909 (equivalent to a Magnitude 4.8) 

approximately 28 miles north of the site. EPA also independently 

evaluated extensive site characterization information and injection 

well operational data–including information on the presence of 

faults and fractures and computational modeling analyses of plume 

and pressure front behavior over the project duration and 

determined that the project poses a low risk of inducing felt 

seismic events.
43

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

increased since the filing of FutureGen’s permit application, 

FutureGen failed to then include the larger Area of Review in 

its assessment of the seismic data. Id. Finally, in light of the 

much larger Area of Review, the Director should also require 

additional analysis of the threat and resulting impact of a

large earthquake in the general area, since this storage facility 

will persist for the long term.4 See In re Stonehaven Energy 

Mgmt, LLC (UIC Appeal No. 12-02, EAB March 28, 2013) 

(Region III failed to adequately support and explain its 

conclusion that earthquakes were not a risk for the UIC 

activity). 

FN4: The New Madrid Fault is located in the Midwest and runs 

through a portion of southern Illinois. See Facts About The 

New Madrid Seismic Zone, Missouri Department of Natural 

Resources, located at 

https://www.dnr.mo.gov/geology/geosrv/geores/techbulletin

1.htm. According to the U.S. Geological Survey (“USGS”), 

there is an appreciable risk of a major earthquake affecting 

west central Illinois. Earthquake Hazard In The New Madrid 

Seismic Zone Remains A Concern, p. 2 (USGS 2009), located at 

http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2009/3071/pdf/FS09-3071.pdf. The 

USGS’s 2008 National Seismic Map accords FutureGen’s 

injection site a significant possibility of an earthquake. USGS 

National Seismic Map, p. 1 (USGS 2008), located at 

http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2008/3018/pdf/FS08-3018_508.pdf. 

Due to geology, earthquakes in the Midwest affect a larger 

area. “Due to the harder, colder, drier and less fractured 

nature of the rocks in the earth’s crust in the central United 

States, earthquakes in this region shake and damage an area 

approximately 20 times larger than earthquakes in California 

and most other active seismic areas.” See Facts About The 

New Madrid Seismic Zone, Missouri Department of Natural 

Resources, located at 

Additionally, FutureGen’s permits limit the injection pressure to 

below 90% of the fracture pressure in the injection zone; this 

pressure limitation is designed to reduce the potential for inducing 

any seismic events. Also, throughout the life of the project, 

FutureGen will monitor for induced and naturally occurring seismic 

events using five passive seismic monitoring stations. FutureGen 

will also monitor the position of the carbon dioxide plume and 

pressure front.

Should a seismic event occur, the Emergency and Remedial 

Response Plan outlines the protocol to be implemented (based on 

a range of Magnitudes and attributes of the event), including the 

process and actions to be implemented to shut in the injection 

well(s), mitigate risks, and communicate with EPA, other relevant 

authorities, and the public. 

There is no indication that the CO2 plume and pressure front will 

impact the New Madrid Seismic Zone. The maximum extent of the 

pressure front that was used to calculate the AoR, (defined as the 

maximum extent of the 10 psi contour), is predicted to extend 

approximately 25 miles from the injection site to the south and 

east. Both the New Madrid Seismic Zone (extending southwest 

from Cairo, IL through the central Mississippi Valley) and the 

Wabash Valley Seismic Zone (along the Illinois/Indiana border in 

southeastern Illinois and southwestern Indiana) are located well 

outside of this boundary, where there will be no measurable 

pressure effects from the injection project and so no likelihood of 

inducing seismicity at those locations. 

Documentation of EPA’s analysis of the Area of Review/Site 

Characterization information is captured in a report in the 

Administrative Record for this permitting action. Additionally, 

included in the Administrative Record for this permitting action is a 
44

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

https://www.dnr.mo.gov/geology/geosrv/geores/techbulletin

1.htm. These articles are attached as combined Exhibit 6.

report documenting EPA’s analysis of seismic information related 

to the FutureGen sites to inform draft permit decisions. 

EPA believes that its evaluation provides the documentation of its 

investigation to determine that there is no evidence of significant 

seismic activity in the well area. Also, EPA documents its review of 

the geologic data to confirm that there are no transmissive faults 

that intersect the confining zone or could be influenced by the 

intended zone of injection. That evaluation and the underlying data 

are part of the record available to the public. EPA therefore 

believes its evaluation is consistent with EPA protocols and with 

the EAB’s discussion in In re Stonehaven Energy Mgmt, LLC (UIC 

Appeal No. 12-02, EAB March 28, 2013). 

26 Betty 

Niemann

g. What is the thickness of the injection zone. At the time of 

the DOE/EIS-0460, it was said to be a 23 foot thick layer. Can 

this 23 foot layer assimilate four injection wells and 1.1million 

metric tons of pressurized supercritical CO2 per year? The 

ADM sequestration project has only managed to inject 

750,000 tons over a three year period into a similar geologic 

formation.

The Mt. Simon formation (the injection zone) is 565 feet thick at 

the nearby stratigraphic well. The 23 foot thick injection interval 

that the commenter cites from the DOE/EIS-0460 is only one layer 

within the larger injection zone. Based on local and regional 

geologic study and testing, EPA has determined that the Mt. Simon 

is sufficiently laterally extensive and porous to allow it to receive 

the volume of CO2 FutureGen plans to inject without excessive 

pressure buildup that could allow fluid movement outside of the 

injection zone or fractures to propagate in the confining zone.

After injection begins and throughout the life of the project, 

FutureGen will implement a Testing and Monitoring Plan that 

includes monitoring of the CO2, the well, ground water quality, and 

the position of the carbon dioxide plume and pressure front. 

FutureGen and EPA will review the monitoring and operational 

data. If, based on this, there is reason to believe that USDWs are 

endangered, FutureGen must cease injection and implement its 

Emergency and Remedial Response Plan. See Part P.2 of the 

permits.
45

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

27 Betty 

Niemann

1. Contamination of future water sources:

a. Brazoria County in Texas announced in 4 May 2014 

Houston Chronicle that it is planning to use brine drawn from 

saline aquifers beneath its county and the desalination 

process to produce clean water due to the extreme drought. 

Now, if in the far future, Illinois farmers would be required to 

draw brine from saline aquifers of the Mt. Simon layers for 

the same reason, will the CO2 injected into the Mt. Simon 

layer prevent the farmers/cities from obtaining fresh water?

b. Brazoria County's study may seem far away from Illinois 

but in researching this comment, I discovered a study 

prepared under contract with The Department of the Interior 

, Office of Saline Water by the Illinois State Water Survey, 

University of Illinois in 1973.x This study is entitled 

"FEASIBILITY STUDY ON DESALTING BRACKISH WATER FROM 

THE MT. SIMON AQUIFER IN NORTHEASTERN ILLINOIS". In 

1973, there was enough of a concern for fresh water that the 

saline aquifer of Mt. Simon was studied to apply desalination 

technology to the brine from the aquifer to produce fresh 

water for Chicago.

c. In 2011, when FutureGen targeted land held in trust for my 

husband and his nephews and cousins, I studied the CCS 

process. I uncovered a document that I cannot locate now 

that contained a study which indicated that the Mattoon 

FutureGen project would not contaminate the drinking water 

of Chicago.

d. This Underground Injection Control Class VI permit is 

designed to protect fresh or drinking water. How can the 

USEPA justify contaminating the saline aquifer in the Mt. 

The UIC requirements, including the Class VI Rule, are designed to 

protect USDWs, which are defined by the regulations (under SDWA 

authority) as ground water formations containing less than 10,000 

ppm TDS. Based on this definition, the Mt. Simon is not considered 

a USDW, as it has a salinity of 47,500 ppm TDS (as measured in 

samples taken from the FutureGen stratigraphic test well). 

Therefore, injection into that formation, with appropriate 

protective measures as outlined in the Class VI Rule and 

implemented in the permits, is allowable under SDWA and the UIC 

regulations. 

In response to the comment about the impact of pumping water 

from the Mt. Simon, the current computational modeling accounts 

for all planned operations within the injection zone, which 

currently includes injection activities only. If future plans were 

made to produce water from the injection zone, such changes 

would trigger a required reevaluation of the AoR including 

updating the modeling to account for the changes and, if 

necessary, revision of the permit and associated project plans. Any 

such changes would result in a permit modification –which, 

depending on the nature of any changes, could warrant an 

additional public notice and comment period. 
46

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

Simon layer with supercritical CO2 when the Mt. Simon 

aquifer has the potential to provide future fresh water which 

using modern desalination processes could be used for 

drinking and/or agricultural uses in drought conditions?

e. The FutureGen project is for the here and now, but in the 

future many years from now, if the saline aquifer is tapped as 

a water source, then there are forces that need to be 

addressed in FutureGen's UIC Class VI application which are 

not included in their applications. The models of the CO2

plume are for a static in situ CO2 reservoir. As the brine for 

fresh water desalination is pumped from the aquifer, then 

there may be forces come into play that may change the CO2

plume. For example, if Springfield, Illinois decides to obtain its 

water supply from the Mt. Simon saline aquifer, what will 

happen to the shape of the CO2 plume and the pressure ban? 

This should be studied for all UIC Class VI applications 

especially if there is to be wide spread deployment of CCS in 

saline aquifers.

I feel that if the presence of CO2 prevents the creation of fresh 

water from saline aquifers, then FutureGen has contaminated 

the saline aquifer and has prevented the creation of fresh 

water.

28 Betty 

Niemann

e. In the second response to questions raised of FutureGen by 

the USEPA Region 5, FutureGen makes the following 

statement:

"At the FutureGen site there are many potential thief zones 

between the injection reservoir (Mt. Simon Sandstone and 

Elmhurst) and the lowermost USDW (St. Peter Sandstone) 

that could justify the use of the proposed analysis.

The results of the analysis will be prepared in January 2014 

Based on the extensive, site-specific, geologic information 

generated by FutureGen and evaluated by EPA, there is no 

indication that any pathways for fluid movement to USDWs or 

drinking water sources exists. 

This determination is based on an evaluation of information about 

the proposed site, including the geological, geomechanical, 
47

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

describing the model, input parameters, and results of this 

analysis." xiv

Does this mean there are areas of possible paths of leakage 

from the reservoir to the St. Peter Sandstone layer which 

serves as a drinking water reservoir? Where are the results of 

this analysis?

hydrogeological, and geochemical properties of the injection and 

confining zones; local hydrogeology; and geochemistry. 

This will be confirmed through pre-injection testing of the injection 

and confining zones at the well sites. Specifically, FutureGen must 

conduct well log analyses and take cores of the injection zone and 

confining system; determine the fracture pressure and other 

physical and chemical characteristics of the injection and confining 

zones; and perform tests to verify the hydrogeologic characteristics 

of the injection zone. If necessary to protect USDWs, based on the 

results of this testing, the permit conditions or project plans will be 

revised. See Part Q.4 of the permits.

The reference to “thief zones” does not mean that there are 

known or existing potential paths of leakage from the reservoir to 

the St. Peter Sandstone. Rather, the assumption of “thief zones” is 

a conservative approach used for modeling purposes and was 

made to better understand the various paths of CO2 migration if 

CO2 were to leave the injection zone. 

The results of this modeling analysis are included in the 

Administrative Record for this permit action. EPA clarifies that this 

more conservative and protective approach including 

consideration of “thief zones” was required of the permit applicant 

in their final modelling assumptions to ensure an understanding of 

geologic system behavior. 

29 Betty 

Niemann

2. Possible Leakage of CO2 from the Mt. Simon Layer and 

ground water contamination:

a. There have been extensive studies by the USEPA in the 

ADM and Illinois Basin Decatur (ILBD) CCS processes. xi 

Reading the second reference caused some concern with me. 

There are several tasks under this study but my concern is 

with Task 4 which had this concern over the Eau Claire cap 

FutureGen provided and EPA reviewed information on 

geochemistry, hydrogeochemistry, and the mineral and chemical 

composition of the injection formation and native fluids. No 

endangerment to USDWs as a result of mineralization or 

geochemical reactions is anticipated at FutureGen based on this 

extensive geologic study.

Additionally, prior to commencing injection, FutureGen must 

perform pre-injection testing of the injection and confining zones 
48

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

rock intregrity:

"The Eau Claire Shale experiments indicate the possibility of 

some degree of chemical reactivity when exposed to 

supercritical CO2 at reservoir conditions; however, because 

the changes in pre- and post-reaction geochemistry and rock 

texture were so small, it was difficult to quantify the 

magnitude of this reactivity, the rate at which it was occurring 

and its effect on porosity, permeability, and overall 

competency of the Eau Claire shale to serve as a cap rock."

Have the core samples from the 

characterization/stratrigraphic well been tested as in the 

study at ADM in Decatur? If not why not?

As a corollary on this, there is a question raised about the

broaching of the drinking water near the Archer Daniel 

Midland sequestration site. xii I believe that since the ADM 

sequestration project occurs within the same geologic 

formation in the Illinois Basin, lessons from the ADM project 

can be learned an applied to the FutureGen project. In my 

opinion, this possible broach of the drinking water should be 

thoroughly investigated and if anything is learned applied to 

the FutureGen project before FutureGen's permits are 

granted.

at the well sites. Specifically, FutureGen must conduct well log 

analyses and take cores of the injection zone and confining system 

and sample formation fluids from the Mt. Simon formation (and 

record the physical and chemical characteristics of the formation 

fluids such as fluid temperature, pH, conductivity, reservoir 

pressure, and static fluid level). See Parts J and Q.4 of the permits.

If necessary to protect USDWs, based on the results of this testing, 

the permit conditions or project plans will be revised. Any such 

changes would result in a permit modification –which, depending 

on the nature of any changes, could warrant an additional public 

notice and comment period. Because EPA is currently the 

permitting authority nationally, for all Class VI projects, any lessons 

learned at any Class VI projects will be applied, as appropriate, to 

these sites or future projects. 

The FutureGen permit determinations, however, are based on sitespecific information generated at the FutureGen site.

30 Betty 

Niemann

a. What precisely is the surface flux/land deformation 

farmers can expect in the land over the injection wells Since 

nothing is removed from the deep subsurface, it stands to 

reason that the land above the injection zone will swell due to 

the 385 million gallons of supercritical CO2 injected into the 

deep subsurface per year or 7.7 billion gallons over the 20 

year life of the project.

No surface deformation is anticipated at the site; the Mt. Simon 

formation is thousands of feet below the surface, overlain by 

multiple layers of rock. In addition, the Mt. Simon is sufficiently 

laterally extensive and porous to allow it to receive the volume of 

CO2 FutureGen plans to inject without excessive pressure buildup.

FutureGen will, as part of their approved Testing and Monitoring 

Plan, use a combination of 5 permanently located tiltmeters in 
49

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

combination with monthly DInSAR surveys and GPS readings to 

verify the absence of surface deformation.

31 Leinberger & 

Critchelow 

families

The Director should use her discretion pursuant to regulation 

to require information to establish that the Drinking Water 

Aquifer will not be impacted.

EPA performed an extensive review of the detailed geologic and 

operational information in FutureGen’s permit application. 

Throughout this review, EPA requested and FutureGen provided 

additional information as needed to ensure that the permit 

determination was based on appropriate information and that the 

permit conditions would be sufficient to ensure protection of 

USDWs from endangerment. Additionally, the permits require 

FutureGen to construct and operate a number of wells and 

monitoring systems designed to ensure compliance with UIC 

requirements and protect USDWs.

32 Betty 

Niemann

There seem to be some inconsistencies with the Public 

Hearing for FutureGen's UIC Class VI Public Hearing.

This EPA page 

http://www.epa.gov/region5/newsevents/index.html says the 

public hearing will be on 6 May 2014.

Clicking the link: 

http://www.epa.gov/region5/water/uic/futuregen/index.htm

indicates in the chart that Hold Public Hearing is 7 May 2014.

Which date is the correct date?

Also, I should be on the list to receive Class VI notifications, 

but as of yet, have not received this notice.

The public hearing was held on May 7, 2014. The website was 

updated to address this inaccuracy 43 days before the end of the 

public comment period and 35 days before the hearing. EPA has 

not heard from any party that indicated it missed the hearing due 

to confusion over the date. 

EPA has added the commenter to the Class VI notification list. The 

mailing list was used to make electronic notifications on April 2, 

2014.

The FutureGen draft permit public notice is governed by and was 

fully compliant with Part 124 of the Code of Federal Regulations. 

Indeed, EPA extended the public comment period beyond the 

baseline period provided for in the regulations. 
50

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

Also, I would really like to see LARGE official public notices in 

the public notice section of the classifieds in the local 

newspapers and not little bitty ones as the Illinois 

Commerce Committee just did.

To me, there has not been adequate public notice on many of 

the public hearings for FutureGen.

33 FutureGen The CO2 injection well coordinates in EPA’s draft FutureGen 

UIC Class VI Permit Cover Letter and Attachments for each of 

the injection wells is the injection point location described in 

FG-RPT-017, Revision 1 (May 2013). These same coordinates 

are used for all of the 4 injection wells throughout the 

FutureGen permitting documentation. Because the currently 

planned CO2 injection wells’ locations and their mid-point 

location are to the NW of the stated location, the Alliance 

suggests the following wording and footnote throughout the 

permitting documentation for the injection well locations:

(If using one set of coordinates for all CO2 injection wells’ 

permit documentation...)

Location of Injection Well1: Morgan County, IL; 26-16N9W; 39.80104°N and 90.07517°W

1 Actual injection well location will be surveyed after injection 

well construction.

(If using the planned coordinates of the individual CO2

injection wells in each well’s permit documentation...)

(Well#1)

Location of Injection Well1: Morgan County, IL; 26-16N9W; 39.80111°N and 90.07491°W

1 Actual injection well location will be surveyed after injection 

well construction.

(Well#2)

Location of Injection Well1: Morgan County, IL; 26-16NThe first page of each permit and the first page of each attachment 

have been updated to reflect the proposed location of the well to 

which the documents apply.

Additionally, the location of each injection well is indicated as 

where the wells are intended to be placed. Small deviations in 

location(s) are corrected through minor permit modifications of 

the final permits once the well(s) are drilled.
51

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

9W; 39.80097°N and 90.07491°W

1 Actual injection well location will be surveyed after injection 

well construction.

(Well#3)

Location of Injection Well1: Morgan County, IL; 26-16N9W; 39.80097°N and 90.07544°W

1 Actual injection well location will be surveyed after injection 

well construction.

(Well#4)

Location of Injection Well1: Morgan County, IL; 26-16N9W; 39.80111°N and 90.07544°W

1 Actual injection well location will be surveyed after injection 

well construction.

34 CSC Provision: A

Text of Draft Permit: For purposes of enforcement, 

compliance with this permit during its term constitutes 

compliance with Part C of the Safe Drinking Water Act 

(SDWA).

References:

Proposed Revision:

Comment: We commend EPA for including this very 

important and fundamental provision. This is a fundamental 

tenant of virtually every EPA permitting program. 

Unfortunately, some of the language in other conditions 

appears inconsistent with this provision.

FutureGen’s permits comply with the tailored requirements in the 

Class VI Rule that specifically address the unique nature of CO2 GS 

and focus on ensuring protection of USDWs, human health and the 

environment where geologic sequestration is occurring.

This comment did not request, and does not require, a change to 

the draft permits.

35 Leinberger & 

Critchelow 

families

Due to the high level of potential risk to USDW, EPA must 

make every effort to strictly adhere to UIC regulations and the 

Director should use her discretion to obtain sufficient 

information to ensure that the project will not adversely 

impact drinking water in Morgan County or otherwise 

adversely affect human health or the environment.

FutureGen’s permits comply with the tailored requirements in the 

Class VI Rule that specifically address the unique nature of CO2 GS 

and focus on ensuring protection of USDWs, human health and the 

environment where geologic sequestration is occurring. The 

permits require FutureGen to construct and operate a number of 

wells and monitoring systems designed to ensure compliance with 

UIC requirements and protect USDWs. The permit requirements 
52

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

are designed to ensure safe injection and extensive monitoring to 

ensure safe containment of injected fluids.

The suitability of the site is based on EPA’s independent evaluation 

of extensive information about the proposed site, including the 

geological, geomechanical, hydrogeological, and geochemical 

properties of the injection and confining zones; local hydrogeology; 

geochemistry; and seismic history in the context of the planned 

injection operation. 

SECTION 3. AREA OF REVIEW (AOR) AND CORRECTIVE ACTION COMMENTS 

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

1 Betty 

Niemann

To reiterate my oral comments, Faye Liu’s et al research 

on Coupled Reactive Flow and Transport Modeling of CO2 

Sequestration in the Mt. Simon sandstone formation, 

Midwest U.S.A. (2011) xxvii which discusses long term risk 

assessment of the acidic plume:

a. Acid plume forms from the interaction between brine 

and the supercritical CO2 (CO2 dissolution) in the storage 

layer and could persist for a long time even after the 

complete dissolution of CO2. Replenishment of the 

upstream ground water flow (brine movement) through 

the storage sandstone facilitates the spread of the CO2

plume and promotes and replenishes the geomechanical 

reactions.

40 C.F.R. §146.83 establishes the minimum criteria for siting. A 

permit applicant may choose the site they wish to propose. EPA will 

issue a permit for that site if the application meets all regulatory 

requirements. FutureGen must demonstrate that the location is a 

suitable geologic system, comprising: (1) An injection zone(s) of 

sufficient areal extent, thickness, porosity, and permeability to 

receive the total anticipated volume of the carbon dioxide stream; 

and (2) Confining zone(s) free of transmissive faults or fractures and 

of sufficient areal extent and integrity to contain the injected carbon 

dioxide stream and displaced formation fluids and allow injection at 

proposed maximum pressures and volumes without initiating or 

propagating fractures in the confining zone(s).
53

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

b. “The acidic brine will continuously migrate and react 

with minerals in the storage formation, dissolving and 

precipitating minerals and altering porosity and 

permeability.” xxviii

c. “Our simulations indicate the prolonged existence of 

an acidic brine plume, which suggests drinking water 

aquifers and potential releases at land surface.” xxxi This 

last concern is long term risk assessment should transfer 

from the primary risk of (buoyant) CO2 leakage to 

secondary risk of acidic plume leakage after all the CO2 is 

dissolved.”

Beyond those criteria, the site characterization, geochemical 

evaluation, and AoR modeling data submitted by the FutureGen 

Alliance demonstrates that the Morgan County CO2 storage site is a 

suitable geologic system for long term CO2 storage and the confining 

zones have sufficient extent and integrity to contain the injected CO2

(including dissolved CO2) and displaced formation fluids. 

Analyses of hydraulic heads and salinities of the different formations 

indicate that the ground water within the St. Peter and Mount Simon 

bedrock aquifers is physically isolated from each other indicating that 

supercritical or dissolved CO2 along with brine will be contained in 

the Mount Simon hydrogeologic unit and will not pose any risks to 

USDWs. 

Under the permits, the plume and pressure front will be regularly 

monitored. (See Part M.8 of the permits.) This will continue even 

after well closure, until FutureGen has demonstrated that the project 

no longer poses any endangerment to USDWs. (See Part O.6 of the 

permits.)

2 CSC Provision: G(1)

Text of Draft Permit: The permittee shall maintain and 

comply with the approved Area of Review and Corrective 

Action Plan (Attachment B of this permit) which is an 

enforceable condition of this permit and shall meet the 

requirements of 40 CFR 146.84.

References:

Proposed Revision:The permittee shall maintain and 

comply with the approved Area of Review and Corrective 

Action Plan (Attachment B of this permit) which is an 

enforceable condition of this permit. and shall meets the 

requirements of 40 CFR 146.84.

--OR—

The permittee has submitted an Area of Review and 

As a general matter the UIC permit is intended as a roadmap to 

identify the relevant requirements and obligations of FutureGen. The 

relevant regulatory provisions for delineating the AoR are relatively 

lengthy and technical, so that the permit language may summarize 

those requirements and provide reference to the regulatory details 

rather than copying them in their entirety. This makes the permit 

more reader-friendly and easy to follow. Incorporating the additional 

details by reference does not create any conflict or confusion 

between the terms of the permit and the regulations.

In addition, 40 C.F.R. §146.84(b) makes it clear that FutureGen is 

responsible to comply with both the permit requirement and the 

regulatory requirement upon which it is based. For Class VI wells, 

EPA anticipates that the AoR must be reevaluated periodically during 
54

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

Corrective Action Plan, which is included in Attachment B 

of this permit. This plan includes the information required 

by Section 146.84 and demonstrates how each of the 

applicable requirements of Section 146.84 will be met.

Comment: Complying with the approved Area of Review 

and Corrective Action Plan does ipso facto meet the 

requirements of 40 CFR 146.84. There is not a 

requirement to comply with the approved plan and –in 

addition—comply with some other interpretation of the 

requirements of 146.84. By issuing this permit, EPA has 

determined that compliance with the Area of Review and 

Corrective Action Plan during the term of the permit 

constitutes compliance with 146.84.

the lifetime of the geologic sequestration project [40 C.F.R. § 

146.84(b) and (e) and Section G of the Permits]. Reference to the 

relevant regulatory provisions provides clarity on the standards 

against which any revisions will be judged. 

By issuing final permits containing the language as presented in the 

draft permits, EPA approves the AoR and Corrective Action Plan as 

presented. However, EPA also recognizes that site-specific conditions 

encountered during drilling, or monitoring and operational 

conditions, may present the need to alter the AoR and Corrective 

Action Plan, at which time FutureGen may propose to the Director 

changes in the plan. Any such changes would result in a permit 

modification—which, depending on the nature of any changes, could 

warrant an additional public notice and comment period, as provided 

in 40 C.F.R. Part 144. Therefore, EPA will not make the suggested 

changes to the permits.

3 FutureGen The reference point for units of depth varies throughout 

Attachment B for all injection wells. Both “ft KB” (15 

instances in text and 2 instances in tables), “ft bgs” (5 

instances in text, ), “ft below ground surface” (1 instance 

in text), and “ft GS” (2 instances in figures and 1 instance 

in a table) are used. 

The Alliance suggests using depth below ground surface 

(bgs) for depth units. The reference point for ft KB is 14 ft 

above ground surface. Recalculating KB-referenced 

depths would change the following depths:

EPA agrees that this change would provide consistency and clarity in 

the plan and made these suggested revisions to the permits 

submitted by FutureGen. EPA has verified that all of the revised 

depths are accurate with the exception of depth referenced on page 

12, paragraph 2, line 2. This depth was changed to 4,180 ft bgs.

4 FutureGen On pages 15 and 16, Table 1, column 2, all depths are 

actually ft KB, not ft GS. Recalculating KB-referenced 

depths would change the following depths to ft bgs in 

column 2 of Table 1:

EPA agrees that this change would provide consistency and clarity in 

the plan and made these suggested revisions to the permits 

submitted by FutureGen. EPA has verified that all of the revised 

depths are accurate.

5 FutureGen The CO2 injection well coordinates in EPA’s draft 

FutureGen UIC Class VI Permit Cover Letter and 

Attachments for each of the injection wells is the injection 

EPA has revised the first page of each permit and the first page of 

each permit attachment to reflect the accurate proposed location for 

each of the wells. To the extent that small deviations to the planned 
55

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

point location described in FG-RPT-017, Revision 1 (May 

2013). These same coordinates are used for all of the 4 

injection wells throughout the FutureGen permitting 

documentation. Because the currently planned CO2

injection wells’ locations and their mid-point location are 

to the NW of the stated location, the Alliance suggests the 

following wording and footnote throughout the 

permitting documentation for the injection well locations:

(If using one set of coordinates for all CO2 injection wells’ 

permit documentation...) 

Location of Injection Well1: Morgan County, IL; 26-16N9W; 39.80104°N and 90.07517°W 

1 Actual injection well location will be surveyed after 

injection well construction. 

(If using the planned coordinates of the individual CO2

injection wells in each well’s permit documentation...) 

(Well#1) 

Location of Injection Well1: Morgan County, IL; 26-16N9W; 39.80111°N and 90.07491°W 

1 Actual injection well location will be surveyed after 

injection well construction. 

(Well#2) 

Location of Injection Well1: Morgan County, IL; 26-16N9W; 39.80097°N and 90.07491°W 

1 Actual injection well location will be surveyed after 

injection well construction. 

(Well#3) 

Location of Injection Well1: Morgan County, IL; 26-16N9W; 39.80097°N and 90.07544°W 

1 Actual injection well location will be surveyed after 

injection well construction. 

(Well#4) 

Location of Injection Well1: Morgan County, IL; 26-16Nlocations are identified after the wells are constructed and surveyed, 

those corrections can be made through the minor modification 

process identified in 40 C.F.R. § 144.41.
56

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

9W; 39.80111°N and 90.07544°W 

1 Actual injection well location will be surveyed after 

injection well construction.

6 Leinberger 

& 

Critchelow 

families

12) Inaccurate information provided on Whitlock graphic 

log

Information provided on the Whitlock graphic (Figure 

3.30, Page 3.47, Supporting Documentation) is inaccurate. 

FutureGen indicates that the well was reworked and 

completed as an observation well in 1997. Completion 

information available from the ISGS indicates that the 

well was indeed converted to an observation well in 1997 

but no reworking was conducted. Perforations in the 

Potosi and Oneota Formations which the FutureGen 

graphic indicates occurred in 1997 actually occurred in 

1965. 

Requested Change/Action: Figure 3.30 needs to be revised 

to correct the inaccuracies.

EPA requested records on the Whitlock #7-15 from both the Illinois 

State Geological Survey (ISGS) and the IDNR to help clarify this issue. 

EPA finds that the perforations in the Oneota formation existed as 

early as 1967 and the perforations in the Potosi formation existed as 

early as 1987. While the date on which the perforations were 

completed was not listed accurately in the permit application, this 

information does not influence the safety of the proposed project 

nor the permitting decision. Currently, the Whitlock #7-15 well is 

constructed and plugged back in a manner that prevents the 

likelihood of pressure from the FutureGen project displacing fluids 

up the well. Therefore, the permit language has not been modified 

based upon this comment.

7 Robert J. 

Finley

The use of four (instrumented) horizontal injection wells 

will give a unique plume shape, and together with the two 

deep wells proposed for pressure/temperature 

monitoring and three deep wells proposed for cased-hole 

logging, should give new insight into plume development. 

While such data are being gathered, the existence of the 

injection well instrumentation and the drilling of the five 

monitoring wells will be highly protective of underground 

water resources. The pressure front position can be 

readily modeled from this extensive data set, and as a 

result reservoir simulation models may be updated to 

monitor the Injectate and evaluate pre-injection 

modeling. Such models are important to understand 

carbon dioxide distribution and to guide appropriate 

environmental monitoring.

EPA agrees with the commenter that the reservoir simulation models 

used for predicting plume and pressure front evolution during a 

proposed project are instrumental in delineating the AoR and 

supporting the development of effective strategies for testing and 

monitoring. Reevaluation of these models throughout the project 

based on the monitoring data collected is necessary and critical to 

support project decisions and ensure the protection of USDWs. See 

Part G of the permits.
57

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

8 Betty 

Niemann

In the EIS-0460D, there was little discussion of the CO2

storage area when it came to calculating the capacity of 

the storage area. From above:

In 2010 Jacksonville, Tuscola, City of Vandalia, and 

Christian County vied for the new location of the 

FutureGen project after Coles Together pulled out of the 

Mattoon project when the DOE pulled the funding, the 

Request for Site Proposal Dated 25 October 2010 and 

amended on 11

November 2010 by FutureGen indicated initially 1000 

acres. Morgan County residents were first told that 1000 

acres would be needed so when landowners first 

committed to the storage area by signing options, they 

were under the impression that the storage area was to 

be 1000 acres. A letter, dated 10 March 2011, from the 

Trustee who committed 400 acres of one Family Farm 

Trust Property plus another 200 acres also held in the 

same trust document to a 2nd beneficiary for a total of 

600 of 1000 acres states 2500 acres will be needed for 

carbon storage. Reading the EIS 460D, the storage area 

has not yet be identified and yet the EIS 460D discusses a 

5300 acre study area for the storage area. FutureGen, 

when the announcing the geological results, did nothing 

to dispel the 1000 acre for the storage acre size. Hence, 

there are probably people who still think of the storage 

area as 1000 acres until they read the draft EIS 460D. In 

April of this year, Ken Humphries gave a presentation at 

West Virginia University that indicated a Carbon Storage 

Area of 8000 acres. I am quite certain that the farmers in 

This carbon storage area and Morgan County citizens are 

not aware of this increase in the number of acres in the 

storage area. My question is what is the correct number 

Results of the AoR delineation modeling submitted by the FutureGen 

Alliance demonstrate that the Morgan County CO2 storage site is a 

suitable geologic system for long-term CO2 storage with sufficient 

storage capacity that can receive and store the planned injected 

amount of CO2 without endangering USDWs and the confining zones 

have sufficient extent and integrity to contain the injected CO2

(including dissolved CO2) and displaced formation fluids. 

The plume area was estimated by the Alliance to be 6.35 mi2(about 

4 acres) at the end of injection period. EPA’s independent modeling 

assessment resulted in a plume area of 6.46 mi2, thereby confirming 

and agreeing with the Alliance’s modeling result. However, to 

account for any risks associated with pressures due to injection, EPA 

conservatively defined the pressure front by the maximum extent of 

the 10 psi contour at 60 years which yields an area of 1,814 mi2for 

the AoR (Figure 15 of Attachment B). 

This information has been presented to the public as part of the 

permitting process. FutureGen will continue to develop, and EPA will 

continue to review, information concerning the plume and the 

storage area. This will occur before, during and after injection, and 

the collected information will be available to the public. (See Parts G, 

J, M, and O of the permits.) If the newly developed information 

requires modifications to the permit (including the plans), it may also 

warrant an additional public notice and comment as provided in 40 

C.F.R. Part 144. 

The permit language has not been modified based on this comment.
58

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

of acres in the carbon storage area?

It is very important that the storage area be correctly 

assessed as to size and storage capacity. xxxvii xxxviii

With the Mt. Simon sandstone layer not as deep in 

Morgan County as it was in Coles County (Mattoon), the 

1000 acre estimate for size should be reevaluated. 

Applicants and the public should have been informed 

during the application process if the RFP 1000 acres were 

not going to be adequate and the public should have been 

informed in my opinion

9 Leinberger 

& 

Critchelow 

families

3.) FutureGen should provide maps of the extent of the 

dissolved-phase plume (Permit Section: Attachment B, 

p.B37/46).

The “CO2 plume” plotted on maps in the permit 

application is missing a significant portion of the injected 

CO2 mass. According to FutureGen modeling, 20 percent 

of the injected CO2 occurs in the dissolved phase at the 

end of the simulation period, and the remaining 80 

percent occurs in the supercritical phase (FutureGen, 

2013, p. 3-27). For the purpose of the FutureGen permit 

application, the ‘CO2 plume’ is defined as 99 percent of 

the supercritical CO2 mass (FutureGen, 2013, p.3-25), and 

does not include the dissolved phase. Therefore, the 

FutureGen ‘plume’ includes only 99 percent of 80 percent 

(equal to 79 percent) of the total injected mass. The 

dissolved-phase plume likely extends much farther 

horizontally than the plotted ‘plume maps.’ The presence 

of dissolved-phase CO2 poses potential risks to 

groundwater, including geochemical changes and 

potential leaching of inorganic constituents. For this 

reason, the extent of the projected dissolved-phase 

plume should be clear to EPA and stakeholders. 

Pursuant to the Class VI Rule, which EPA developed to address the 

unique risks of CO2 injection for GS, the boundaries of the AoR, 

where the GS project may cause endangerment to USDWs, are 

required to be determined based on the predicted maximum extent 

of the separate-phase plume and pressure front over the lifetime of 

the project and the entire timeframe of the model simulations. One 

hundred percent of the CO2 was modeled, but the CO2 plume plotted 

on maps is the surface expression of 99% of the CO2 injected. This 

was done due to difficulties in representing very low concentrations 

of supercritical CO2 at the margins of the modeled plume. 

Supercritical CO2 is more buoyant than the very salty formation fluids 

and therefore extra care must be taken to ensure that the CO2 is 

contained within the injection formations permanently. However, 

the AoR extends much further than the plume of supercritical CO2

and EPA evaluated the potential for not only supercritical CO2, but 

also native brines with and without dissolved CO2. The Rule, and the 

permits, provide for periodic reevaluation of the AoR to incorporate 

monitoring and operational data and verify that the CO2 plume and 

the associated area of elevated pressure are moving as predicted 

within the subsurface. See 75 Fed. Reg. 77248-49 (Dec. 10, 2010).
59

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

FutureGen should submit maps of the extent of the 

dissolved-phase CO2 plume overlaid with the supercritical 

plume, the pressure boundary that defines the AoR, 

model boundaries, and the proposed FutureGen 

monitoring network.

Once CO2 dissolution occurs, it results in less CO2 that is subject to 

the buoyant forces that may cause endangerment to USDWs. 

Although the dissolved CO2 may alter the geochemistry of fluids in 

the injection zone, it is unlikely that these changes would increase 

the possibility of leakage out of the injection zone. Therefore, 

contrary to the commenter’s indication, dissolution of CO2 generally 

reduces potential risks to groundwater and EPA therefore did not

separately require the delineation of the dissolved CO2 phase. 

Dissolution is, in fact, a trapping mechanism, reducing the risk for 

endangerment to USDWs as long as the storage site is suitable for 

the containment of the brine with dissolved CO2. To ensure the 

protection of USDWs and to account for any risks of brine migration 

via a potential pathway caused by pressure increase in the injection 

formation, EPA conservatively defined the pressure front by the 

maximum extent of the 10 psi contour at 60 years which yields an 

area of 1,814 mi2for the AoR (given in Figure 15 of Attachment B). 

An assessment of any potential leakage pathways within this area 

was conducted.

Furthermore, the Alliance analyzed the hydraulic heads and salinities 

of different formations, which indicate that the ground water within 

the St. Peter and Mount Simon bedrock aquifers is physically isolated 

from each other. FutureGen did supply maps and figures of the 

information requested by the commenter with the exception of the 

surface expression of the dissolved phase of the CO2. Since EPA does 

not consider that information would result in any additional 

requirements in a permit, EPA will not ask FutureGen to supply it.

FutureGen will continue to develop, and EPA will continue to review, 

information concerning the plume and the storage area. This will 

occur before, during and after injection, and the collected 

information will be available to the public. (See Parts G, J, M, and O 

of the permits.) If the newly developed information requires 
60

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

modifications to the permit (including the plans), it may also warrant 

an additional public notice and comment as provided in 40 C.F.R. 

Part 144. 

The permit language has not been modified based on this comment.

10 Leinberger 

& 

Critchelow 

families

4.) FutureGen should include 100 percent of the 

supercritical CO2 mass in their delineation of the 

supercritical plume (Permit Section: Attachment B, 

p.B37/46).

FutureGen’s inclusion of only 99 percent of the total 

supercritical mass in the ‘plume boundary’ is not 

consistent with EPA guidance, which states that the 

extent of the supercritical mass should be delineated, not 

the extent of 99 percent of the supercritical mass (U.S. 

EPA, 2013a, p.45/83). FutureGen’s “VIMPA” analysis 

(FutureGen, 2013, p.3-37) effectively removes the thin 

leading edge of the supercritical plume from their 

delineation. 

FutureGen should re-delineate the supercritical CO2

plume to include 100 percent of the supercritical mass, 

such that it is clear to EPA and all stakeholders the 

complete projected horizontal extent of supercritical CO2.

EPA, in its independent analysis, evaluated the change in areal 

coverage based on different definitions of the plume (i.e., 99% or 

100% of the mass of separate phase CO2). The difference in areal 

coverage between 99% or 100% of separate phase CO2 mass was 

found to be very minimal and by issuing final permits based on the 

AoR delineated by a minimum of 10 psi pressure differential (relative 

to the initial pressure distribution within the injection formation), 

EPA determined that the project addresses all risks to USDWs, 

including risks associated with 100% of the total separate-phase CO2

mass. Therefore, although FutureGen modeled all of the CO2, they 

showed a prediction of the extent of 99% of the separate phase CO2. 

Sensitivity analyses as well as subsequent modeling further 

undermine the value of attempting to exactly define a plume based 

on a single 100% delineation.

EPA disagrees with the commenter’s claim that the plume depiction 

is inconsistent with EPA guidance. The citation referenced refers to 

the “maximum extent” of the CO2 plume and pressure front over the 

injection and post-injection time frames. One hundred percent of the 

CO2 was modeled, but the CO2 plume plotted on maps is the surface 

expression of 99% of the CO2 injected. This was done due to 

difficulties in representing (and the limited value of representing) 

very low concentrations of supercritical CO2 at the margins of the 

modeled plume. EPA therefore believes that the existing plume 

depiction is a reasonable representation of the maximum extent of 

the supercritical CO2.
61

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

In response to comments and concerns regarding the approved AoR, 

EPA clarifies that additional site information will be collected under 

the pre-operational testing requirements within the Class VI Rule and 

the AoR will be reassessed based on the new data, as described 

under 40 C.F.R. § 146.82(c), prior to injection. Any changes in the 

model and/or the AoR would result in a permit modification – which, 

depending on the nature of changes, could warrant an additional 

public notice and comment as provided by 40 C.F.R. Part 144. 

Furthermore, the AoR delineation and the predicted extent of the 

supercritical CO2 plume will be reevaluated periodically over the life 

of the project in order to incorporate testing and monitoring data 

into the model to ensure protection of USDWs from endangerment. 

See Part G of the permits.

The permit language has not been modified based on this comment.

11 Leinberger 

& 

Critchelow 

families

When properly modeled to address these factors, the 

projected CO2 plume will be significantly larger than 

currently identified in the draft Permit. See Ex. 2, paras. 1-

6 (Schnaar report). In fact, FutureGen’s own modeling 

sensitivity analysis resulted in a plume 120% larger in size. 

See Ex. 2, para. 1 and Figure 1. Dr. Schnaar, in Figure 1 of 

his expert report, shows the impact of the 120% plume, 

and explains that the 120% size is a minimum size for the 

projected plume given the deficiencies of the model. Id. 

Further, the 120% minimum projected plume size does 

not account for the significant differences in injection 

rates and well construction amongst the injection wells. 

Id at para 10. Thus, at an absolute minimum, the plume 

should be designated in the draft Permit as 120% larger 

than currently modeled. 

The Director should also require that FutureGen provide 

additional information concerning the horizontal lateral 

injection wells. The injection wells are pointed towards 

The Class VI regulations were developed to address any risks to 

USDWs associated with CO2 injection for GS and the AoR is 

delineated to cover the area where endangerment may occur. As 

described in response to comment #8 above, based on its 

independent analysis of the plume and pressure front of the 

proposed project and with due consideration given to the risk of 

endangerment to USDWs, EPA approved the delineation of the AoR 

based on a pressure differential which extends well beyond the 

plume. Therefore, a CO2 plume based upon the most conservative 

analyses did not result in EPA evaluating the risks differently or 

changing permit conditions. Additionally, depictions of the results of 

sensitivity analyses can be misleading. Plume depictions should 

represent the applicant’s and Agency’s best estimate of where the 

supercritical CO2 will be at a certain point in time. This will allow the 

comparison of observations and predictions and can then confirm, or 

show a need for revision of, the previous model.
62

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

the Critchelow Property and Leinberger Property. See Ex. 

2, para. 10 (Schnaar report); draft Permit, p. B41. Yet, 

the size of the projected plume in the direction of 

the Properties is barely larger than the size of the plume 

in the directions where no lateral injection wells are 

directed. Additional information is necessary to justify 

this projected extent and configuration of the plume.

In addition, EPA collected detailed information about the directional 

injection wells as part of its independent evaluation of the AoR 

delineation modeling. This information, for each well, included: the 

coordinates of the injection well’s trajectory; the depths for the 

screened intervals; the mass rate of injection; the fracture gradient 

and the maximum injection pressure, as well as the elevation 

corresponding to this pressure and a description of how these values 

were calculated; the composition of injectate; and the injection 

schedule. This information was applied to the model developed for 

the independent evaluation. The results from EPA’s evaluation 

confirmed the observed plume development submitted by 

FutureGen as it is depicted in the AoR and Corrective Action Plan. By 

issuing final permits, EPA approved these results and does not 

believe further information at this point is necessary on the injection 

wells.

In response to comments and concerns regarding the approved AoR, 

EPA clarifies that additional site information will be collected under 

the pre-operational testing requirements within the Class VI Rule and 

the AoR will be reassessed based on the new data, as described 

under 40 C.F.R. § 146.82(c), prior to injection. Any changes in the 

model and/or the AoR would result in a permit modification under 

40 C.F.R. Part 144 – which, depending on the nature of changes, 

could warrant an additional public notice and comment. The 

regulations, and the permits, also provide for periodic reevaluation 

of the AoR over the life of the project to incorporate monitoring and 

operational data and verify that the CO2 plume and the associated 

area of elevated pressure are moving as predicted within the 

subsurface to ensure protection of USDWs from endangerment. See 

75 Fed. Reg. 77248-49 (Dec. 10, 2010) and Part G of the permits.

The permit language has not been modified based on this comment.
63

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

12 Leinberger 

& 

Critchelow 

families

G. EPA Should Address Policy Considerations Resulting 

from an Increased Plume Size

Section A of the draft Permit states: “issuance of this 

permit does not convey property rights of any sort or any 

exclusive privilege; nor does it authorize any injury to 

persons or property, any invasion of other private rights, 

or any infringement of State of local laws or regulations.” 

Despite this statement, by allowing the draft Permit to 

proceed in its current state, EPA is establishing a policy 

through which it is authorizing a trespass and/or a 

regulatory taking of property. Although FutureGen has 

obtained the pore space ownership rights within various 

properties directly impacted by the CO2 plume as 

modeled, FutureGen has not executed an option to 

acquire such rights from properties impacted by a larger 

plume, including the Critchelow Property or Leinberger 

Property. See Leinberger Declaration, Ex. 4, para. 5. As 

described above, using reasonable bounding values, 

FutureGen’s modeling resulted in a plume 120% larger 

than identified on Figure 12. According to the expert, this 

120% is the minimum size of the CO2 plume and the 

plume is expected to be even larger than the 120% given 

the many errors in the plume model. See Ex. 2 (Schnaar 

report). Even the 120% larger plume size impacts many 

additional properties in the area, including the entire 

Critchelow Property and portions of the Leinberger 

Property.

The Director, through her discretionary authority and as 

an important policy matter, should require FutureGen to 

establish that it is not impacting additional properties 

through the projected CO2 plume or the pressure front 

created by that plume, and that it has the appropriate 

pore space ownership rights. Although EPA generally 

As EPA’s “Geologic Sequestration of Carbon Dioxide: Underground 

Injection Control (UIC) Program Class VI Well Area of Review 

Evaluation and Corrective Action Guidance” (May 2013) states at p. 

2, [T]he purpose of the AoR and corrective action requirements of 

the Class VI Rule is to ensure that the areas potentially impacted by a 

proposed GS operation are delineated, all wells that need corrective 

action receive it, and that this process is updated throughout the 

injection project. While the details of all of the requirements are 

presented in later sections of this guidance, the basic requirements 

that owners or operators of GS projects must meet include: 

• Prepare, maintain, and comply with an AoR and Corrective Action 

Plan that includes all of the required elements of the plan [40 C.F.R. §

146.84(b)]; 

• Delineate the AoR using computational modeling and identify all 

wells that require corrective action [40 C.F.R. § 146.84(c)]; 

• Perform all required corrective action on wells in the AoR [40 C.F.R. 

§ 146.84(d)]; 

• Reevaluate the AoR throughout the life of the project [40 C.F.R. §

146.84(e)]; 

• Ensure that the Emergency and Remedial Response Plan and 

financial responsibility demonstration account for the most recently 

approved AoR [40 C.F.R. § 146.84(f)]; and 

• Retain modeling inputs and data used to support AoR reevaluations 

for 10 years [40 C.F.R. § 146.84(g)]. 

As the comment notes, Section A of the permits clearly states that 

“issuance of this permit does not convey property rights of any sort 

or any exclusive privilege; nor does it authorize any injury to persons 

or property, any invasion of other private rights, or any infringement 

of State of local laws or regulations.” Property rights issues are 

outside of EPA jurisdiction and are governed by legal principles other 

than the UIC regulations. See also 40 C.F.R. §144.35.
64

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

does not include individual property rights in its permit 

review, EPA is required to determine the extent of the 

CO2 plume, and has previously sought information from 

FutureGen regarding pore space rights. See December 

10, 2013 Response to Comments, p. 2/41, AR # 4 (EPA 

requests information re “sensitive areas” and FutureGen 

explains that “sensitive areas” are properties to which the 

project has not acquired pore space rights. These 

properties were avoided by orienting the horizontal legs 

of the injection wells.”) FutureGen should not be 

permitted to present an inaccurate approach to its model 

and projected plume simply to allow it to avoid having to 

purchase options for pore space on impacted properties. 

FutureGen must establish that additional “sensitive areas” 

are not impacted by a more likely and larger plume. The 

location of the CO2 plume directly impacts the analysis of 

whether there is sufficient monitoring and whether 

underground drinking water supplies are endangered due 

to the location of the plume, which are squarely within 

the permit review.

Without information confirming that these additional 

“sensitive areas” are not impacted by the larger projected 

plume, the Director is allowing FutureGen to trespass, and 

thus subjecting itself to potential liability. A person can be 

liable for trespass for an intrusion by a third party if he 

acts with knowledge that his conduct will, with a 

substantial degree of certainty, result in the intrusion, or 

aids, abets or directs the commission of the trespass. Sak 

v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 940 F.Supp.2d 802, 804 (N.D.Ill. 

2013), citing Dietz v. Ill. Bell Tel. Co., 154 Ill.App.3d 554, 

107 Ill.Dec. 360, 507 N.E.2d 24, 26.9 Here, the EPA’s 

actions with regards to allowing the project to proceed 

with an under sized plume model will result in the 

As described in the response to comment #11, the Class VI 

regulations were developed to address any risks to USDWs 

associated with CO2 injection for GS and the AoR is delineated to 

cover the area where endangerment may occur. As described in 

response to comment #8 above, based on its independent analysis of 

the plume and pressure front of the proposed project and with due 

consideration given to the risk of endangerment to USDWs, EPA 

approved the delineation of the AoR based on a pressure differential 

which extends well beyond the plume. 

Regarding the comment that “EPA...has previously sought 

information from FutureGen regarding pore space rights” EPA 

clarifies that requests for additional information made of FutureGen 

during the permit application review process regarding “sensitive 

areas” were merely requests for clarification of the term “sensitive 

areas.” EPA was not delving into the issue of pore space rights or 

ownership based on this clarifying line of inquiry. EPA’s decisions 

regarding the final AoR were made based on geologic and operation 

information and not on pore space or property rights. 

In response to comments and concerns regarding the approved AoR, 

EPA clarifies that additional site information will be collected under 

the pre-operational testing requirements within the Class VI Rule and 

the AoR will be reassessed based on the new data, as described 

under 40 C.F.R. § 146.82(c), prior to injection. Any changes in the 

model and/or the AoR would result in a permit modification – which, 

depending on the nature of changes, could warrant an additional 

public notice and comment as provided in 40 C.F.R. Part 144. 

Furthermore, the regulations, and the permits, also provide for 

periodic reevaluation of the AoR over the life of the project to 

incorporate monitoring and operational data and verify that the CO2

plume and the associated area of elevated pressure are moving as 

predicted within the subsurface to ensure protection of USDWs from 
65

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

intrusion on the Critchelow Property and Leinberger 

Property (as well as others) and the potential to adversely 

affect human health. In other words, the EPA is aiding and 

abetting the commission of a trespass that impacts 

human health. This is a significant policy issue that 

warrants EPA consideration prior to issuing the permit.

Similarly, by permitting a Class VI underground injection 

well that will have a projected plume at a minimum 120% 

greater than the projected model, and thus allowing the 

plume to enter onto other sensitive areas including the 

Critchelow Property and Leinberger Property, the EPA is 

“taking” the properties for a public purpose without just 

compensation. U.S. Const. amend. V, Lingle v. Chevron, 

544 U.S. 528, 543, 125 S.Ct. 2074, (2005) (“The Takings 

Clause presupposes government interference with one's 

property rights in pursuit of a public purpose”). While a 

typical taking involves a government appropriating some 

interest in a person’s property for the use of the 

government, a private party taking may be attributable to 

the government.10

Here, the U.S. is giving FutureGen a billion dollars to 

construct a power plant, a 30-mile pipeline, and a carbon 

sequestration well. See www.futurealliance.org/faqs/. In 

fact, the U.S. is the primary source of funding for the 

project, contributing 60% of the funds required for the 

project. See “Feds pledge $1 billion to FutureGen 2.0 in 

Morgan County,” State Journal Register, January 16, 2014, 

attached as Exhibit 7. Importantly, this billion dollar grant 

is not described as a “loan,” signifying that FutureGen 

would have to repay the U.S., but instead the U.S. states it 

is “providing” the money appropriated under the 

American Recovery and Reinvestment Act. See 79 FR 

3577; Record of Decision and Floodplain Statement of 

endangerment. See 75 Fed. Reg. 77248-49 (Dec. 10, 2010) and Part G 

of the permits.

The permit language has not been modified based on this comment.
66

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

Findings for the FutureGen 2.0 Project; January 22, 2014, 

attached as Exhibit 8. By permitting an undersized plume, 

EPA will allow FutureGen to appropriate additional 

“sensitive areas,” including the Critchelow Property and 

Leinberger Property, without just compensation. This 

constitutes a taking. EPA should not engage in a policy of 

supporting a private party taking another person’s 

property for the public use, especially when that use is 

high risk and has the potential to impact human health.

It cannot be EPA’s policy to knowingly allow the 

undersized plume in the Permit that would result in a 

trespass or a taking. The policy issue can easily be avoided 

by ensuring that FutureGen has the adequate porestorage ownership agreements in place to account for a 

more realistic plume size, before the Permit is granted. In 

the alternative, the Director should require FutureGen to 

submit additional information to establish that the 

increased plume size will not impact additional properties 

and will not impact human health.

13 NRDC 5. In the model, Applicant used values for residual 

aqueous saturation, Srw, lower than the values in 

published literature. As the Applicant notes, “[...] using a 

lower Srw value for the injection zone will possibly result 

in a somewhat smaller predicted CO2 plume size and a 

smaller spatial extent of the pressure front compared to 

using a higher value of Srw.” EPA should require the 

Applicant to provide an estimate of the difference in the 

extent of the plume and pressure front using the more 

conservative values for Srw in the published literature, 

unless better site-specific data are obtained.

EPA, in its evaluation of the AoR modeling submitted for these

permits, considered the impact of residual aqueous saturation values 

on the predicted plume and pressure front developments. The values 

selected by the FutureGen Alliance along with other parameters 

used in the capillary pressure-saturation function (a total of three) 

were obtained by fitting mercury intrusion-capillary pressure data 

from the Manlove gas storage site in Champaign County, IL. This 

approach provided an advantage of deriving consistent parameter 

values that are fitted using the same original and complete data set 

from the region rather than values taken from different sources and 

perhaps from incomplete data sets. In addition, the values reported 

for residual aqueous saturation in the literature reviewed showed 

wide range with some uncertainty. Furthermore, the Webb 
67

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

extension used for the capillary pressure-saturation functions 

employed in the AoR delineation modeling also helped mitigating the 

effects of selected residual aqueous saturation values. Although 

FutureGen modeled all of the CO2, the model presented a prediction 

of the extent of 99% of the separate phase CO2. Sensitivity analyses 

as well as subsequent modeling further undermine the value of 

attempting to exactly define a plume based on a single 100% 

delineation.

Following a detailed evaluation, by issuing final permits, EPA 

approved the values selected (by the FutureGen Alliance) for this 

parameter and the approach used by FutureGen. 

EPA also clarifies that additional site specific information will be 

collected under the pre-operational testing requirements within the 

Class VI Rule and the AoR will be reassessed based on the new data, 

as described under 40 C.F.R. § 146.82(c), prior to injection. Any 

changes in the model and/or the AoR would result in a permit 

modification – which, depending on the nature of changes, could 

warrant an additional public notice and comment as provided in 40 

C.F.R. Part 144. Furthermore, the regulations, and the permits, also 

provide for periodic reevaluation of the AoR over the life of the 

project to incorporate monitoring and operational data and verify 

that the CO2 plume and the associated area of elevated pressure are 

moving as predicted within the subsurface to ensure protection of 

USDWs from endangerment. See 75 Fed. Reg. 77248-49 (Dec. 10, 

2010) and Part G of the permits. The permit language has not been 

modified based on this comment.

14 FutureGen Section: Wells within the Survey Area

This section, as written, is confusing. It is suggested to 

replace text on page B31 with the following:

Wells within the Survey Area

A detailed survey was completed over a 25 mi2(65 km2) 

EPA agrees that this clarification is appropriate and helpful, so the 

requested change was made. In response to comments, EPA has also 

conducted an extensive review of the entire AoR. After obtaining and 

reviewing information from the ISGS database, EPA has determined 

that there are 6,110 wells within the entire AoR. Of those wells, 
68

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

area, termed the “Survey Area.” This area is centered on 

the proposed injection location (labeled as “Injection 

Site”) and encompasses the predicted maximum extent of 

the CO2 plume (Figure 12). Wells, surface bodies of water 

and other pertinent surface features, administrative 

boundaries, and roads within the Survey Area are shown 

in Figure 12. There are no subsurface cleanup sites, 

mines, quarries, or Tribal lands within this area. The 

Survey Area is near the center of the AoR (Figure 15).

A total of 129 wells are located within the Survey Area. 

However, no well but the FutureGen Alliance’s 

stratigraphic well penetrates the injection zone (Mount 

Simon Sandstone and the lower Eau Claire [Elmhurst 

Sandstone Member and lower portion of the Lombard 

Member]), the confining zone (Upper portion of Lombard 

Member and Proviso Member of the Eau Claire 

Formation), or the secondary confining zone (Franconia 

Dolomite).

Shallow domestic water wells with depths of less than 50 

ft (15 m) are the most common well type within the 

Survey Area. Five slightly deeper water wells were 

identified that range in depths from 110 ft (33 m) to 405 

ft (123 m). Other wells include stratigraphic test holes, 

coal test holes, and oil and gas wells.

Twenty four of the 129 wells in the Survey Area are 

identified with only a general location (center of a 

section) in the ISWS database. These wells are included in 

Table 9 but are not shown on the map.

A general survey of the AoR outside the Survey Area was 

conducted by reference of publicly available information. 

Maps of existing water wells, oil and gas wells, 

miscellaneous wells, coal mines, surface water, and 

geologic structures were submitted to complete the 

three wells (including the FutureGen Alliance’s stratigraphic well) 

penetrate the confining zone (Upper portion of Lombard Member 

and Proviso Member of the Eau Claire Formation). Of those wells, 

one is plugged, and the other is located 16 miles from the injection 

site. It is anticipated that this location would receive only increased 

pressure, if anything, and that such effects would not occur until 

after injection proceeded for a significant time. This well would be 

monitored under the corrective action plan and during regular 

reviews of the AoR and corrective action plan under Part G of the 

permits, it could also be considered for plugging. Only the FutureGen 

Alliance’s stratigraphic well penetrates the injection zone within the 

AoR boundary. Other oil and gas wells within the AoR may extend 

deeper than typical residential wells, but ISGS data indicate that with 

the two exceptions noted above, they do not extend through the 

confining zone. 
69

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

permit requirements. 

There are 4,386 water wells and 740 oil and gas wells 

within the AoR, but only two of these penetrate the 

confining zone. These two wells identified in the AoR are 

approximately 16 miles from the injection site, but they 

are adequately plugged.

15 FutureGen All wells in Table 9 are in the AoR that is defined by the 10 

psi contour of the aqueous pressure differential.

Please delete the right-most column of Table 9 on page 

B33.

EPA agrees that this column is unnecessary and this correction is 

appropriate and consistent with the rest of the Plan, so the 

requested change was made.

16 FutureGen Page B37, Figure 12

Please change the text under the legend to:

Several water wells are identified only with a general 

location (section, township and range) in the ISWS 

database. Those wells are not shown on the map, but are 

included in Table 9. Wells outside the Survey Area are not 

shown. The well ID number next to the well symbol on 

the map refers to the Map ID in Table 9.

EPA agrees that this correction is more accurate, and is appropriate 

and consistent with the rest of the Plan. The requested was made.

17 FutureGen Page B40, Par. 2

1

st four words under Pressure Front Delineation:

Please add “Figure” between “in” and “16”.

EPA agrees that this typographical error should be corrected. The 

requested change was made.

18 FutureGen Page B42, Par. 1

entence 1: Please replace “a range of numerical solutions 

(Table 13)” with:

three other simplified “open conduit” approaches (Table 

13).

EPA agrees that the other approaches considered for AoR delineation 

represent more than just “numerical solutions,” so that the provision 

should be changed. However, the description of them as “simplified 

open conduit approaches” may be too narrow as well. Therefore, 

EPA changed the language on page B42 “...a range of numerical 

solutions (Table 13)...” to “...a range of other approaches (Table 

13)...” This change is incorporated into the final permits.

19 FutureGen Page B43, Par. 1

The existing paragraph:

“Pressure delineated AoR

Acknowledging that each approach is an approximation 

with a set of assumptions, that there are applicable 

EPA agrees that this clarification is appropriate and helpful, so the 

requested change was made, except that in the last sentence 

containing “...the maximum extent of the 10 psi contour of pressure 

differential during the life of the project life (60 years) as shown in 

Figure 15” the language was changed to “...the maximum extent of 
70

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

components of a number of the approaches considered, 

and with a focus on adopting a conservative, protective 

approach for the pressure-delineated AoR, the FutureGen 

Alliance, in consultation with EPA, delineated the AoR as 

the maximum extent of the 10 psi contour of pressure 

differential during the life of the project life (60 years) as 

shown in Figure 15.”

Should be replaced with the following:

Pressure delineated AoR

Each of the pressure front analysis methodologies 

evaluated by the FutureGen Alliance (Table 13) are 

mathematical approximations applicable under 

prescribed conditions and subjected to simplifying 

assumptions. The simplified critical pressure calculations 

based on the open conduit concept are not applicable 

under site conditions because the ambient conditions in 

the lowermost USDW at the FutureGen site are underpressured relative to the reservoir. Although the open 

conduit approaches are not strictly applicable under 

FutureGen site conditions, results from these 

conservative and protective approaches were used by 

EPA to delineate the pressure front AoR as the maximum 

extent of the 10 psi contour of pressure differential during 

the life of the project life (60 years), as shown in Figure 

15.

the 10 psi contour of pressure differential during the life of the 

project, which occurs 60 years after injection commences and is 

shown in Figure 15.” This makes it clearer that under the model, the 

maximum extent of the psi contour occurs after 60 years, not that 

the project life is 60 years.

20 FutureGen Page B7, Par. 3 

Conceptual Model Domain: 

This description of the model layers is not correct. 

Please replace the first paragraph in the Conceptual 

Model Domain section with these 3 paragraphs:

A stratigraphic conceptual model of the geologic layers 

from the Precambrian basement to ground surface was 

constructed using the EarthVision® software package. 

EPA agrees that this more accurate and complete description of the 

model layers is helpful and appropriate, so the requested change 

was made.
71

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

The geologic setting and site characterization data 

described in the Underground Injection Control (UIC) 

Permit Supporting Documentation and later in this 

section were the basis for the Morgan County CO2 storage 

site computational model. Borehole data from the 

FutureGen 2.0 stratigraphic well and data from regional 

boreholes and published regional contour maps were 

used as input data (Figure 4, step 1). There is a regional 

dip of approximately 0.25 degrees in the east-southeast 

direction (Figure 4, step 2). 

To define the numerical model domain, an expanded 100-

by 100-mi conceptual model was constructed to 

represent units below the Potosi dolomite interval, 

including the formations of Franconia, Ironton, Eau Claire 

(Proviso, Lombard, and Elmhurst), and Mount Simon. 

Each of these formation layers was further divided into 

multiple sub-layers based on the data from the 

stratigraphic well. The elevations of Franconia top, Mount 

Simon top, and Mount Simon Bottom were determined 

by EarthVision® based on borehole data and regional 

contour maps. The elevations of the interfaces between 

sub-layers were determined by the three bounding 

surfaces from EarthVision® and the stratigraphic well to 

make up the boundary-fitted stratigraphic layers of the 

computational model. 

The numerical model grid in the horizontal directions was 

designed to have constant grid spacing with higher 

resolution in the area influenced by the CO2 injection (3-

mi by 3-mi area), with increasingly larger grid spacing 

moving out toward the domain boundaries.

21 FutureGen Page B11 

Line 6: Please change “because Kh could not be ...” to

“because Kv could not be ...”

EPA agrees that this typographical error should be corrected. The 

requested change was made.
72

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

22 FutureGen Page B13 

Line 7: Please change “numerical model grid” to

“numerical model layers”

EPA agrees that this clarification is appropriate and more accurate, 

so the requested change was made.

23 FutureGen Table 3 

The values for Kv/Kh applied to model layers the Elmhurst 

Layer 5, 3 and 1 are incorrect. They should be 0.1 (not 

0.4).

EPA agrees that these typographical errors should be corrected to 

reflect the actual values used. The requested changes was made.

24 FutureGen Page B23 

Please replace “The first value (3.71E-10 Pa−1) has been 

used for sands that are compressible because of the 

presence of porosity. The second value (7.42E-10 Pa−1) is 

assigned for all other rocks that are less compressible 

(dolomite, limestone, shale, and rhyolite)” with: 

The first value (3.71E-10 Pa−1) has been used for 

sandstone. The second value (7.42E-10 Pa−1) is assigned 

for all other rocks.

The commenter has not provided any basis or explanation for this 

change. The existing language in the plan is accurate. Therefore, EPA 

will not make any changes to the permits based on this comment.

25 FutureGen Page B23 

Line 3: Please change “to overcome capillary and 

interfacial forces ...” to “to overcome the capillary force 

...”.

EPA agrees that the rephrasing uses more accepted terminology. The 

suggested change is incorporated into the final permits.

26 FutureGen Page B25 

Line 10: Please change “72 mN/m” to “70 mN/m”

There is no justification in the documents submitted to EPA to 

support this revision. Therefore, EPA will not change the permits in 

response to this comment.

27 FutureGen Page B29 

Line 6: Please change “injecting” to “injection”

EPA agrees that this typographical error should be corrected. The 

requested change was made.

28 FutureGen Page B30 

Line 7: Please change “200 ft (61 m) deep” to “200 ft (61 

m) depth”

EPA agrees that this correction is appropriate, and the requested 

change was made to the permits.

29 FutureGen Page B38 

Line 13: The elevation of the top of the open interval that 

is used in the model is -3220 ft (not -3231 as stated). This 

elevation is based on the elevation at the injection site. 

EPA agrees that this correction is appropriate and consistent with the 

rest of the Plan, so the requested change was made.
73

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

Please change “elevation of -3,231 ft” to “elevation of -

3,220 ft”

30 FutureGen Page B42 

LBNL should be replaced by published reference. 

Please replace “LBNL non conservative” with: 

Cihan (2011)

EPA agrees that this correction is appropriate and consistent with the 

rest of the Plan, so the requested change was made.

31 FutureGen Page B42 

The “LBNL conservative” approach was not evaluated by 

the Alliance. 

Unless EPA did an independent evaluation, it should be 

deleted. 

If retained, LBNL conservative should be replaced with: 

Cihan (2011) conservative

EPA evaluated using the Cihan (2011) approach but did not utilize 

that approach when delineating the AoR. Following review by EPA, 

the citation of “LBNL Conservative” was changed to “Cihan (2011) 

Conservative” in the final permits.

32 Leinberger 

& 

Critchelow 

families

B. The Geologic Formation Data is Incomplete

The draft Permit includes a finding that “The permittee 

has demonstrated to the satisfaction of the Director that 

the well is in an area with suitable geology in accordance 

with the requirements at 40 C.F.R. §146.83. See draft 

Permit, section I. As described in the attached Expert 

Report of Daniel J. Price, Exhibit 1, there are a number of 

inadequacies in FutureGen’s assessment of the geology of 

the area. 

FutureGen has not provided sufficient information 

concerning permeability values, and has not provided 

information concerning the potential change in hydraulic 

head based on the pressure change induced by injection 

into the Mt. Simon Sandstone. See Ex. 1, paras. 1-3. 

FutureGen should provide additional discussion that 

demonstrates the pressure change induced by injection 

into the Mt. Simon would not be great enough to allow 

brine migration and impact underground sources 

of drinking water. Significantly, the geologic data shows 

that there is a regional “dip” in the formation that is not 

Following a detailed, independent evaluation, by issuing final 

permits, EPA approved the permeability values used by the 

FutureGen in the model, and the demonstration that the planned 

operation will not endanger USDWs due to induced pressures. 

The intrinsic permeability values were estimated based on sitespecific data including geophysical wireline surveys and, where 

available, laboratory measurements of rotary side-wall cores (SWCs), 

core plugs from the whole core intervals, hydrologic tests (including 

wireline Modular Formation Dynamic Tester), and packer tests. 

These values were further assessed by a set of sensitivity analyses by 

FutureGen. EPA also conducted an independent modeling of the AoR 

and a separate set of sensitivity analyses confirming FutureGen 

results, which is documented in the Administrative Record. 

EPA, as the commenter suggests, did a comprehensive and accurate 

search of the AoR to determine if any natural or manmade conduits 

existed that might be pathways for flow into USDWs. This was done 

to address concerns similar to those of the commenter that increases 

in hydraulic head due to injection could displace deep formation 
74

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

reflected in the Permit analysis. See Ex. 1, para. 4. These 

data points have the potential to impact the results of the 

model of the CO2 plume and should be more accurately 

discussed and, as set forth below, incorporated into the 

CO2 model as part of its sensitivity analysis.

fluids into USDWs. This is discussed in EPA’s response to comment 14 

of this section. EPA determined that the project as proposed and the 

permit conditions address these risks.

To demonstrate that the injection operation will not endanger 

USDWs, FutureGen submitted flux rate and cumulative flux values 

for CO2 and brine for the evaluation of flows based on pressure 

change induced by the injection. Their evaluations indicated zero CO2

flux across the east, west, north, and south of 4x4 mi2 and 8x8 mi2

areas around the injection location. Also, CO2 flux across the top of 

Proviso unit also indicated no leakage. The delineation of the AoR is 

based upon the modeling of pressure effects in the Mt. Simon 

formation which is done to evaluate risks of displacing brine upwards 

into USDWs. EPA reviewed those calculations and found them to be 

reasonable. EPA also collected detailed model domain data and 

evaluated it to confirm that the regional dip was appropriately 

implemented in the geological and numerical model by the Alliance. 

The regional dip was accounted for in the numerical modeling 

conducted for the AoR delineation. See also Response to Comment 

#20.

EPA also clarifies that additional site information will be collected 

under the pre-operational testing requirements within the Class VI 

Rule and the AoR will be reassessed based on the new data, as 

described under 40 C.F.R. § 146.82(c), prior to injection. Any changes 

in the model and/or the AoR would result in a permit modification –

which, depending on the nature of changes, could warrant an 

additional public notice and comment, as provided in 40 C.F.R. Part 

144. Furthermore, the regulations, and the permits, provide for 

periodic reevaluation of the AoR over the life of the project to 

incorporate monitoring and operational data and verify that the CO2

plume and the associated area of elevated pressure are moving as 

predicted within the subsurface to ensure protection of USDWs from 
75

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

endangerment. See 75 Fed. Reg. 77248-49 (Dec. 10, 2010) and Parts 

G and Q of the permits.

The permit language has not been modified based on this comment.

33 Leinberger 

& 

Critchelow 

families

C. The Plume Size is Materially Understated and 

Incorrectly Configured

The model predicting the projected lateral and vertical 

migration of the CO2, as required under 40 C.F.R. 

§146.84(c)(1), has resulted in a projected plume size that 

is materially understated. As described in the attached 

Expert Report of Dr. Gregory Schnaar, Exhibit 2, there are 

several issues have resulted in the under sizing of the CO2

plume, including: 

-FutureGen failed to follow EPA Guidance to use 

maximum-risk scenario simulation and conservative input 

parameter values; 

-The carbon dioxide plume on maps in the permit 

application Supporting Documentation do not include the 

complete modeled extent of the injected carbon dioxide; 

-The grid-cell blocks used in the model are too large, 

resulting in a smaller plume; 

-FutureGen’s modeling sensitivity analysis is inadequate, 

and does not provide for a full understanding of potential 

model under-prediction of carbon dioxide plume and 

pressure-front extent; and 

-FutureGen’s model assumption of no regional or local 

flow gradient in the injection zone is not valid and may 

have a significant impact on model results.

The Class VI regulations are developed to address any risks to USDWs 

associated with CO2 injection for GS and the AoR is delineated to 

cover the area where endangerment may occur. 

EPA, in its independent evaluation, ensured that the data used in the 

model for delineating AoR were consistent with the site 

characterization data, and conservatively selected and based on 

measurements conducted at or near the site; and the model 

assumptions were reasonable. Sensitivity analyses were conducted 

by both the FutureGen and EPA to understand the effects of certain 

parameters. EPA used conservative input parameters in its sensitivity 

analyses creating maximum risk scenarios. The large AoR beyond the 

variations in predicted plume dimensions was evaluated for potential 

leakage pathways. Refer also to EPA’s response to comment #10 of 

this section on how EPA evaluated the complete extent of CO2

proposed to be injected by FutureGen. 

Flow gradient data for the Mt. Simon formation is scarce but “high” 

rates on the order of 1 to 2 cm per year would mean that during the 

50 years of proposed post injection period, the plume would be 

shifted by 3 feet or less. This is trivial considering other forces 

considered by the models [Gupta and Bair, 1997; Mehnert, phone 

conversation 2014]. By issuing final permits containing the language 

as presented in the draft permits and based on the AoR delineated 

by a minimum of 10 psi pressure differential (relative to the initial 

pressure distribution), EPA approved the appropriateness of the 

modeling approach and that the project addresses all risks to 

USDWs.
76

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

EPA concluded that the AoR modeling and delineation were 

sufficiently conservative and consistent with EPA guidance. 

EPA also clarifies that additional site information will be collected 

under the pre-operational testing requirements within the Class VI 

Rule and the AoR will be reassessed based on the new data, as 

described under 40 C.F.R. § 146.82(c), prior to injection. Any changes 

in the model and/or the AoR would result in a permit modification –

which, depending on the nature of changes, could warrant an 

additional public notice and comment, as provided in 40 C.F.R. Part 

144. Furthermore, the regulations, and the permits, also provide for 

periodic reevaluation of the AoR over the life of the project to 

incorporate monitoring and operational data and verify that the CO2

plume and the associated area of elevated pressure are moving as 

predicted within the subsurface to ensure protection of USDWs from 

endangerment. See 75 Fed. Reg. 77248-49 (Dec. 10, 2010) and Parts 

G and Q of the permits. See also responses to comments #9 and #10 

on the extent of the plume; #39 on the grid sizes. 

The permit language has not been modified based on this comment.

34 Leinberger 

& 

Critchelow 

families

The Director is authorized to request additional 

information and should require that FutureGen fully 

address the undersizing of the plume and to explain why 

injection well length and injection rates have little to no 

influence on the lateral configuration of the plume and 

pressure front around the injection wells. Without this 

information, the Director is accepting a plume analysis 

that is poorly documented and potentially erroneous.

EPA conducted independent modeling of the AoR and additional 

sensitivity analyses [Evaluation of Area of Review Delineation 

Modeling, Critical Pressure and Corrective Action: FutureGen Alliance 

Class VI Injection Project Prepared to Support U.S. EPA Region 5 

Permitting Decisions; March 2014] to confirm that the delineated 

AoR covers the area where endangerment may occur. The AoR is 

delineated based on a pressure differential which extends well 

beyond the plume. By issuing final permits based on the AoR 

delineated by a minimum of 10 psi pressure differential (relative to 

the initial pressure distribution within the injection formation), EPA 

confirmed that the project and the modeling addresses all risks to 

USDWs. 
77

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

EPA also clarifies that additional site information will be collected 

under the pre-operational testing requirements within the Class VI 

Rule and the AoR will be reassessed based on the new data, as 

described under 40 C.F.R. § 146.82(c), prior to injection. Any changes 

in the model and/or the AoR would result in a permit modification –

which, depending on the nature of changes, could warrant an 

additional public notice and comment, as provided in 40 C.F.R. Part 

144. Furthermore, the regulations, and the permits, also provide for 

periodic reevaluation of the AoR over the life of the project to 

incorporate monitoring and operational data and verify that the CO2

plume and the associated area of elevated pressure are moving as 

predicted within the subsurface to ensure protection of USDWs from 

endangerment. See 75 Fed. Reg. 77248-49 (Dec. 10, 2010) and Parts 

G and Q of the permits. See response to comment #11 for additional 

information on injection wells. 

The permit language has not been modified based on this comment.

35 Leinberger 

& 

Critchelow 

families

Geology and Hydrology

1) Permeability numbers utilized as inputs for the model 

are unable to be readily assessed.

In Section 2.1.3.1 (Injection Zone) of the Supporting 

Documentation (Administrative Record “AR” # 1, 2) and 

Page B11 of 46 of Attachment B: Area of Review and 

Corrective Action Plan (Attachment B) , the injection zone 

permeability measurements discussed included rotary 

side-wall cores and plugs from whole cores. The 

permeability ranges from these cores are described in the 

text but these results are not tabulated in a manner to 

allow for individual review as they were for the primary 

and secondary confining zones. As a result, the adequacy 

of these numbers for use in the model cannot be readily 

assessed. 

Requested Change/Action: FutureGen should provide 

1- EPA collected additional detailed data on permeability values 

used in the model to support its independent assessment of the 

AoR modeling conducted by FutureGen [Evaluation of Area of 

Review Delineation Modeling, Critical Pressure and Corrective 

Action: FutureGen Alliance Class VI Injection Project Prepared to 

Support U.S. EPA Region 5 Permitting Decisions; March 2014]. 

EPA developed a separate model with these input parameters to 

assess their appropriateness and conducted additional sensitivity 

analyses. Therefore, EPA concluded that all necessary 

information on permeability values used for the injection zone 

was submitted by FutureGen. No further action is needed. 

2- In its independent assessment, EPA evaluated the selection of 

model layers based on the site characterization information 

submitted by the Alliance (Figure 2.11, page 2.17 of permit 

application) and confirmed that the modeling inputs were 
78

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

tabulated permeability ranges for the injection zone.

2) Vertical/horizontal permeability averages

Table 3.3 on Page 3.9 of the Supporting Documentation 

provides lithology-specific permeability anisotropy 

averages that were utilized to assign a vertical 

permeability to each model layer. The Documentation 

does not provide a specific discussion regarding the 

decision process on how these lithology values were 

selected for each model layer other than stating that the 

lithology used to subdivide each stratigraphic layer of the 

model was deduced from wire line logs and core data. 

Additional discussion specifying the data and decision 

processes used to subdivide and assign lithology types to 

each model layer should be provided in order to allow for 

complete review. The literature-based permeability 

anisotropy values listed in Table 3.3 were used to assign 

vertical permeability (Kv) and horizontal permeability (Kh) 

to each layer of the model and are provided in Table 3.4 

and the updated Table 3 of the March 2014 Evaluation of 

Area of Review Delineation and Corrective Action (AR # 

296) to also include Kv/Kh ratios determined from core 

pairs (available for specific intervals) as provided in the 

response to request for additional information (summary 

of the Kv/Kh ratios applied to model layers). It appears 

the additional Kv/Kh ratio data was only provided in the 

updated table but was not utilized in the modeling. 

Requested Change/Action: FutureGen should provide 

additional data with regard to how the Kv values were 

selected.

3) Hydraulic head differential between the Mt. Simon 

(injection zone) and overlying units.

a) FutureGen states that the upper unconsolidated 

Quaternary aquifer, which is the current source of 

appropriate. EPA also confirmed that the Kv/Kh ratios are applied 

to each model layer. EPA’s review is described in the Final 

FutureGen AoR Evaluation Report. No further action is needed. 

3- a & b. Detailed modeling results submitted by FutureGen indicate 

no leakage of CO2 into the upper unconsolidated Quaternary 

aquifer due to pressures induced by the injection (see also the 

response to comment #32). EPA’s independent review reached 

the same conclusion in the previously mentioned report on the 

evaluation of the AoR. Furthermore, the AoR delineated by a 

minimum of 10 psi pressure differential (relative to the initial 

pressure distribution within the injection formation) covers the 

area in which USDWs may potentially be endangered and 

addresses all risks associated with the injection activity. Because 

of the potential for a conduit, EPA has done a comprehensive 

review of wells in the AoR and found only two wells outside of 

the project that penetrated the confining zone. One of those 

wells has been recently plugged and the other is plugged back, 

isolating the injection zone from overlying formations and is 

currently actively owned by a gas storage operations over 15 

miles from the FutureGen project. In addition, further site 

information will be collected under the pre-operational testing 

requirements within the Class VI Rule and the AoR will be 

reassessed based on the new data, as described under 40 C.F.R. §

146.82(c), prior to injection. Any changes in the model and/or 

the AoR would result in a permit modification – which, 

depending on the nature of changes, could warrant an additional 

public notice and comment, as provided in 40 C.F.R. Part 144. 

Furthermore, the regulations, and the permits, also provide for 

periodic reevaluation of the AoR over the life of the project to 

incorporate monitoring and operational data and verify that the 

CO2 plume and the associated area of elevated pressure are 

moving as predicted within the subsurface to ensure protection 
79

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

drinking water for residential wells within the survey area, 

has a naturally higher hydraulic head than the Mt. Simon 

indicative of a downward-gradient (Page 2.48, Supporting 

Documentation). However, the potential change in 

hydraulic head based on the pressure change induced by 

injection into the Mt. Simon is not discussed in any detail. 

b) It is also noted a positive hydraulic head differential 

between the Mt. Simon Sandstone and the St. Peter 

Sandstone (Page 2.48, Supporting Documentation) 

indicating that vertical flow would be from the Mt. Simon 

to the St. Peter under natural conditions (prior to 

injection) if a conduit between the two units exists. 

Requested Change/Action: FutureGen should provide 

additional discussion that demonstrates the pressure 

change induced by injection into the Mt. Simon would not 

be great enough to allow brine migration to the shallow 

surficial underground source of drinking water (USDW) if a 

conduit does exist. In addition, the positive vertical head 

between the Mt. Simon and the St. Peter makes the need 

for a comprehensive and accurate well survey (refer to 

comment 6 below regarding adequacy of the well survey) 

over the expanded area of review (AoR) critical to ensure 

that no “potential” conduits exist that would breach both 

units and support the conclusion that there are no wells 

within the AoR that would require corrective action (AR 

#296).

4) Regional dip is not reflected in the modeled results.

Modeled results (Figures 3.22 and 3.23, Pages 3.32 

through 3.35, Supporting Documentation and Appendix C 

of RAI #2) do not appear to be affected by the regional 

dip of the lithologic units. Although the dip of the 

injection and confining units is relatively minor (1% or 

less), some affect would be anticipated. 

of USDWs from endangerment. See 75 Fed. Reg. 77248-49 (Dec. 

10, 2010) and Parts G and Q of the permits. A corrective action 

plan is also in place to address any leakages or potential leakages 

identified through ongoing monitoring conducted under the 

permits. See Attachments B and C to the permits. No further 

action is needed.

4- In its independent assessment, EPA collected detailed model 

domain data and evaluated it to confirm that the regional dip 

was appropriately implemented in the geological and numerical 

model by the Alliance. No further action is needed. 

5- EPA’s review of induced seismicity potential included evaluation 

of extensive information about the proposed site, including the 

geological, geomechanical, hydrogeological, and geochemical 

properties of the injection and confining zones; local 

hydrogeology; geochemistry; and seismic history in the context 

of the planned injection operation. EPA reviewed FutureGen’s 

seismic evaluation and performed its own evaluation. FutureGen 

submitted and EPA evaluated information on the presence of 

faults and fractures in the area of the site to identify whether any 

pathways for fluid movement to USDWs exist. Based on the 

results of seismic surveys and an evaluation of the local and 

regional geology (based on maps and cross sections submitted by 

the permit applicant and additional information referenced by 

EPA), EPA determined that no transmissive faults or fractures 

that may interfere with containment of the CO2 exist in the 

confining zone through the entire AoR [Section 2 of FutureGen’s 

permit application]. Additionally, a transmissive fault in the area 

would likely cause native pressure in the Mt. Simon to bleed off 

in relation to overlying formations which has not been observed. 

Information on EPA’s evaluation is available in multiple 

documents in the Administrative Record including but not limited 
80

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

Requested Change/Action: FutureGen should provide a 

discussion regarding the angle of dip used in the model 

and any affects the local/regional dip of the geologic 

strata may have on the movement of the sc CO2 plume 

and the pressure differential front over time.

5) Quality of seismic data

a) Seismic data for lines that FutureGen ran (L101 and 

L201) to assess faults and subsurface structure in the 

immediate area of the proposed injection well were very 

poor quality (Figures 2.15 and 2.16, Page 2.25 of 

Supporting Documentation). FutureGen obtained a 

second opinion of the interpretation [Dr. John McBride a 

former Illinois State Geologic Survey (ISGS) employee] and 

in his interpretation the presence of shallow faults could 

not completely be ruled out (Response to USEPA Request 

for Additional Information #1 dated November 19, 2013 –

RAI #1) 

b) The ISGS 120 mile long seismic reflective survey that 

was to shed some light on subsurface structures in the 

area reportedly showed no discernable faults west of 

Ashland, but again the quality was reportedly so poor 

such that reprocessing of the information was considered 

but rejected because it was thought that additional 

benefit in interpretation would not be obtained (RAI #1). 

c) None of the seismic data run to date in the immediate 

area of the proposed injection well is conclusive with 

regard to faults and subsurface structures in the area; 

FutureGen expanded the size of the AoR subsequent to 

the Supporting Documentation, but it does not appear 

that FutureGen has made an attempt to obtain any 

additional seismic data that may exist within the larger 

AoR. 

Requested Change/Action: FutureGen should conduct a 

to: the “FutureGen Alliance Class VI Injection Project: Evaluation 

of Area of Review Delineation and Corrective Action” and

“Induced Seismicity Evaluation Using the EPA-Developed 

Decision Model The FutureGen Alliance Project: Morgan County 

Class VI UIC Wells 1, 2, 3 and 4 (EPA Permit Numbers: IL-137-6A0001, IL-137-6A-0002, IL-137-6A-0003 and IL-137-6A-0004)” 

(March 2014). The format and contents of this document are 

modeled after the “Injection-Induced Seismicity Decision Model” 

developed by EPA and state agencies with input from the United 

States Geological Survey, academic institutions, and other 

national seismicity experts.

In response to comments and concerns regarding the approved AoR, 

EPA clarifies that additional site information will be collected under 

the pre-operational testing requirements within the Class VI Rule and 

the AoR will be reassessed based on the new data, as described 

under 40 C.F.R. § 146.82(c), prior to injection. Any changes in the 

model and/or the AoR would result in a permit modification – which, 

depending on the nature of changes, could warrant an additional 

public notice and comment, as provided in 40 C.F.R. Part 144. 

Furthermore, the regulations, and the permits, also provide for 

periodic reevaluation of the AoR over the life of the project to 

incorporate monitoring and operational data and verify that the CO2

plume and the associated area of elevated pressure are moving as 

predicted within the subsurface to ensure protection of USDWs from 

endangerment. See 75 Fed. Reg. 77248-49 (Dec. 10, 2010) and Parts 

G and Q of the permits. The permit language has not been modified 

based on this comment.
81

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

new seismic survey in the area of the proposed injection to 

obtain better quality data and/or conduct additional 

research with regard to the availability of seismic data 

that may exist within the expanded AoR and provide the 

findings within the revised permit supporting 

documentation.

36 Leinberger 

& 

Critchelow 

families

13) Mistake in modeled cross-sectional views

Literature indicates and FutureGen states that the Mt. 

Simon and overlying strata dip to the southeast (Page 2.9, 

Supporting Documentation). However, the modeled 

cross-sectional views provided in Figure 3.23 of the 

Supporting Documentation show the formations dipping 

to the west (B’-B) and southwest (A’-A), respectively 

(pages 3.32 through 3.35), completely opposite of the 

east to southeast trend in the Illinois basin. Updated 

modeled cross-sectional views (Figure 3.22 A through E) 

provided in Appendix C of FutureGen’s response to USEPA 

for additional information (Response to USEPA Request 

for Additional Information #2 dated December 10, 2013) 

identifies the well bores by number which allows one to 

ascertain that the B’-B and A’-A designations are reversed 

and therefore the depicted dip is actually to the east and 

southeast. 

Requested Change/Action: This labeling error needs to be 

corrected and the update figures re-submitted to avoid 

confusion during future reviews of the permit and 

supporting documentation.

EPA reviewed the referenced permit application figure and agrees 

that it is mislabeled. This error in the figure does not reflect an error 

in the underlying modeling. Because the figure is not part of the 

permits, a revised figure is not needed to finalize the permits. This 

correction will be requested from FutureGen and any future 

documentation produced during the regular re-evaluations of the 

AoR and the model will make sure this error is not repeated. The 

commenter has not requested a change to the permits, and EPA will 

not change the permits in response to this comment.

37 Leinberger 

& 

Critchelow 

families

2.) FutureGen should revise their modeling sensitivity 

analysis to account for all relevant parameters and 

incorporate reasonable scaling factors (Permit Section 

3.1.10, p.3-41).

FutureGen’s modeling sensitivity analysis is inadequate, 

and does not provide for a full understanding of potential 

EPA conducted an independent evaluation of the AoR modeling by 

developing a separate model to assess the reasonableness of the 

input parameters and the development of the plume/pressure front, 

and also ran additional sensitivity analyses (e.g., for residual aqueous 

saturation). This evaluation indicates that that the AoR delineated by 
82

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

model under-prediction of CO2 plume and pressure-front 

extent. Sensitivity analysis is the primary way to evaluate 

modeling uncertainty (U.S. EPA, 2013a, p.23/83). 

FutureGen’s sensitivity analysis did not include varying of 

parameters that were based on literature values and/or 

prone to significant uncertainty, and are likely to have a 

large impact on model results (FutureGen, 2013, p.3-42). 

Additional parameters necessary for the sensitivity 

analysis include, but are not limited to the following: 

permeability-saturation relationships; capillary pressuresaturation relationships; anisotropy of intrinsic 

permeability; gas entry pressure; regional hydraulic 

gradient; and formation dip. 

As stated by FutureGen, they have selected a 

“parsimonious” set of parameters upon which to conduct 

the sensitivity analysis (FutureGen, 2013, p.3-41). This 

approach is not one that would, by design, rigorously 

evaluate model uncertainty resulting from data 

limitations, and provide a conservative estimate of plume 

migration. 

Additionally, scaling factors used in the existing sensitivity 

analysis are also too small given the range of possible 

input values (FutureGen, 2013, p.3-42). For example, 

estimates of intrinsic permeability for the Lower Mt. 

Simon varied by approximately a factor of 4.0 (i.e., 400 

percent), for the wireline ELAN log testing and field 

hydraulic packer tests (FutureGen, 2013, p.3-6). However, 

the ‘scaling factor’ for testing the sensitivity of this 

parameter was only ±25 percent (FutureGen, 2013, p.3-

42).

FutureGen should revise the modeling sensitivity analysis 

to include all relevant model parameters, and larger 

scaling factors that reflect the true range of reasonable 

a minimum pressure contour of 10 psi sufficiently covers the area in 

which USDWs may be endangered due to the injection activity. 

In response to comments and concerns regarding the approved AoR, 

EPA clarifies that additional site information will be collected under 

the pre-operational testing requirements within the Class VI Rule and 

the AoR will be reassessed based on the new data, as described 

under 40 C.F.R. § 146.82(c), prior to injection. Any changes in the 

model and/or the AoR would result in a permit modification – which, 

depending on the nature of changes, could warrant an additional 

public notice and comment, as provided in 40 C.F.R. Part 144. 

Furthermore, the regulations, and the permits, also provide for 

periodic reevaluation of the AoR over the life of the project to 

incorporate monitoring and operational data and verify that the CO2

plume and the associated area of elevated pressure are moving as 

predicted within the subsurface to ensure protection of USDWs from 

endangerment. See 75 Fed. Reg. 77248-49 (Dec. 10, 2010) and Parts 

G and Q of the permits. As part of these future reevaluations of the 

model, EPA will consider additional parameters for consideration 

when performing additional sensitivity analyses. 

The permit language has not been modified based on this comment.
83

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

values (including a scaling factor of 400 percent for 

intrinsic permeability of the Lower Mt. Simon). Discussion 

should be added to justify the chosen values of the scaling 

factors. 

38 Leinberger 

& 

Critchelow 

families

1.) FutureGen should revise plume and pressure-front 

delineations with maximum-risk scenario simulations 

and conservative input parameter values (Permit 

Section: Attachment B, p.B37/46).

EPA modeling guidance states (U.S. EPA, 2013a, p.38/83): 

The use of an a priori AoR delineation based on 

computational modeling predictions highlights the need 

for uncertainty and sensitivity analyses for the initial 

prediction. Conservative predictions will be needed prior 

to the commencement of injection and the availability of 

any site-specific data on carbon dioxide migration 

paths and rates. EPA recommends conducting 

sensitivity analyses as the principal evaluation tool for 

characterizing the most and least important sources of 

error in computational models (USEPA, 2003). Based on 

these results, maximum-risk scenario simulations can be 

conducted considering plume extent and pressure 

perturbation predictions that account for uncertainties in 

the model.

FutureGen modeling and AoR delineation is not 

consistent with this EPA modeling guidance. Using 

“reasonable bounding values” for input parameters, 

FutureGen’s existing modeling sensitivity analysis resulted 

in a plume as much as 120 percent larger in size than their 

base case model runs (FutureGen, 2013, p.3-42, 3-43). I 

have included a map (Figure 1) with the FutureGen 

estimated supercritical CO2 plume, and a plume area 120 

percent larger. The 120- percent larger plume is likely a 

minimum for how much larger the FutureGen projected 

EPA conducted an independent evaluation of the AoR modeling by 

developing a separate model to assess the reasonableness of the 

input parameters and the development of the plume/pressure front, 

and also ran additional sensitivity analyses (e.g., for residual aqueous 

saturation). This evaluation indicates that that the AoR delineated by 

a minimum pressure contour of 10 psi sufficiently covers the area in 

which USDWs may be endangered due to the injection activity. This 

issue has been responded to under comments #8, #9 and #11 above.

In response to comments and concerns regarding the approved AoR, 

EPA clarifies that additional site information will be collected under 

the pre-operational testing requirements within the Class VI Rule and 

the AoR will be reassessed based on the new data, as described 

under 40 C.F.R. § 146.82(c), prior to injection. Any changes in the 

model and/or the AoR would result in a permit modification – which, 

depending on the nature of changes, could warrant an additional 

public notice and comment, as provided in 40 C.F.R. Part 144. 

Furthermore, the regulations, and the permits, also provide for 

periodic reevaluation of the AoR over the life of the project to 

incorporate monitoring and operational data and verify that the CO2

plume and the associated area of elevated pressure are moving as 

predicted within the subsurface to ensure protection of USDWs from 

endangerment. See 75 Fed. Reg. 77248-49 (Dec. 10, 2010) and Parts 

G and Q of the permits.

The permit language has not been modified based on this comment.
84

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

CO2 plume should be given limitations in FutureGen’s 

sensitivity analysis, and other FutureGen modeling 

limitations as discussed below. It is essential for 

FutureGen to provide a conservative estimate of the 

extent of the supercritical CO2 plume in order to 

effectively manage project risk and design the site 

monitoring network. 

In my opinion, the plume as currently modeled is 

undersized and more likely than not to be greater than 

120 percent larger when the model is run to include the 

appropriate conservative input parameter values. 

FutureGen should update plume and pressure-front 

delineation maps using maximum-risk scenario 

simulations, addressing each parameter that could 

significantly affect plume and pressure extent, and based 

on conservative parameter values determined through 

sensitivity analysis, consistent with EPA guidance as cited 

above.

39 Leinberger 

& 

Critchelow 

families

5.) FutureGen should demonstrate that model grid block 

sizes are sufficiently small (Permit Section: Attachment 

B, p.B37/46).

AoR and CO2 plume modeling is clearly impacted by overly 

large grid-cell spacing. It is likely that the modeled CO2

plume would extend farther horizontally if the model 

used smaller grid-cell blocks. FutureGen’s modeled CO2

plume shows a ‘stair-stepped’ shape around the edges, 

with long ‘flat’ sections (e.g., FutureGen, 2014a, 

p.B37/46). The stair-stepped geometry is a sign that grid 

cell block sizes are too large. EPA’s modeling guidance 

discusses limitations of using overly large grid cell 

blocks, including results from Yamamoto and Doughty 

(2009) demonstrating that grid refinement may have a 

substantial effect on overall simulated plume extent (U.S. 

5. Yamamoto and Doughty (2009) indicate that coarse gridding in a 

vertical cross-section underestimates gravity override due to vertical 

mixing caused by numerical dispersion; as a result, the horizontal 

extent of the plume may be underestimated. It is unclear in the 

commenter’s note if he/she refers to vertical or horizontal spacing.

Nevertheless, the AoR delineated by a minimum pressure contour of 

10 psi sufficiently covers the area in which USDWs may be 

endangered due to the injection activity. The commenter assumes 

that EPA relied only on FutureGen’s modeling. The AoR delineation 

and the plume modeling (including grid size and spacing) was 

evaluated independently by EPA and is conservative and protective 

of USDWs and public health.

6. As a result of its independent evaluation of the model used for 

delineating AoR, EPA approved the approach for the assumption of 
85

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

EPA, 2013a, p.21/83). 

FutureGen should demonstrate that grid cell blocks used 

in AoR modeling are adequately small through rigorous 

model testing, and present detailed results of this testing 

to EPA and stakeholders. If necessary, all modeling 

figures should be revised based on the finer grid mesh 

model. 

6.) FutureGen should incorporate regional hydraulic 

gradients into model simulations (Permit Section: 

Attachment B, p.B41/46).

FutureGen’s model assumption of no regional or local 

flow gradient in the injection zone is not valid and may 

have a significant impact on model results. FutureGen 

model simulations assume hydrostatic conditions and no 

regional or local flow conditions (FutureGen, 2014a, 

p.B30/46). However, regional hydrogeologic maps clearly 

show a regional hydraulic gradient at the project location 

(FutureGen, 2014a, p.B27/46). 

FutureGen model simulations should be conducted to test 

the assumption of no background gradient on plume and 

pressure-front migration. If this assumption is found to 

have an observable impact on model results, model 

simulations should be re-run considering a realistic 

regional gradient.

7.) FutureGen should present critical pressure 

calculations for all USDWs (Permit Section: 

Attachment B, p.B40/46).

FutureGen presents the results of pressure calculations 

for the lowermost USDW, but does not consider 

additional USDWs located above the proposed project 

(FutureGen, 2014a, p.40/46). FutureGen pressure 

calculations should be performed for all overlying USDWs, 

not only the lowermost USDW. If the critical pressure for 

hydrostatic conditions within the injection zone by FutureGen, and 

the demonstration that final delineated AoR covers the area that 

USDWs may potentially be endangered due to the injection activity. 

As noted in EPA’s response to comment 33 above, regional hydraulic 

gradients are trivial considering other forces considered by the 

models and including any estimations of them does not add to the 

value of the modeling.

7. EPA considers the delineation of the AoR by a minimum of 10 psi 

pressure increase to be a conservative approach to identify the area 

in which USDWs may be endangered due to injection activities

(based upon EPA’s previously referenced FutureGen AoR evaluation 

report). However, EPA also recognizes that site-specific conditions 

encountered during drilling may provide direct measurements of 

these parameters, at which time FutureGen may propose to the 

Director changes in the critical pressure estimation if warranted. 

Given that the deepest USDW is overlain by hundreds of feet of 

formations that are not only non-potable aquifers, but help isolate 

the deepest USDW from shallower USDWs, determining pressures 

from shallower USDWs will not affect EPA's determination of the 

AoR.

8. EPA approves of the assumption used by FutureGen that the 

impact of the amount of potential impurities in the injectate is 

negligible. 

9. EPA’s independent analysis of the AoR modeling indicated that the 

selected boundary conditions had no effects on the results. The 100 

by 100 mile range is sufficiently large considering that at 25 miles 

(the approximate distance of the 10 psi contour), it took 20 years of 

injection and 40 years of post-injection to build up the additional 10 

psi. 
86

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

another USDW is found to be less than 10 psi, the AoR 

boundary should be re-delineated based on the smaller 

critical pressure value. 

8.) FutureGen should account for fluid impurities in 

computational modeling (Permit Section: Attachment B, 

p.B10/B46).

FutureGen’s model assumes fluid injectate is pure CO2, 

while in reality it may have up to 3 percent impurities 

(FutureGen, 2014a, p. B10/46). Fluid transport properties 

may be impacted by the presence of impurities, and 

model simulations must be conducted to test the 

assumption of 100 percent pure CO2. If accounting for

fluid impurities has an observable impact on model 

results, the modeling should be updated to account for 

representative fluid properties. 

9.) FutureGen should provide detailed justification that 

model boundary conditions have no observable impact 

on modeling results (Permit Section Attachment B 

p.B31/46).

FutureGen states the following in regards to Boundary 

Conditions of their model domain (FutureGen, 2014a, 

p.B31/46): “The lateral and top boundary conditions were 

set to hydrostatic pressure using the initial condition 

with the assumption that each of these boundaries is 

distance enough from the injection zone to have minimal 

to no effect on the CO 2 plume migration and pressure 

distribution.” FutureGen, however, provides no basis for 

this important assumption. EPA’s modeling guidance 

discusses the necessity of model testing to ensure that 

boundary conditions are set sufficient far to avoid 

numerical error (U.S. EPA, 2013a, p.37/83). 

Model testing should be presented to demonstrate that

the model boundary conditions are sufficiently far from 

10. EPA collected detailed information about the directional injection 

wells as part of its independent evaluation of the AoR delineation 

modeling. This information, for each well, included: the coordinates 

of injection well’s trajectory; the depths of the screened intervals; 

the mass rate of injection; the fracture gradient and maximum 

injection pressure (along with the elevation corresponding to this 

pressure) and a description of how these values were calculated; the 

composition of injectate; and the injection schedule. This 

information was applied to the model developed for the 

independent evaluation. The results from EPA’s evaluation 

confirmed the observed plume development submitted by 

FutureGen. By issuing final permits, EPA indicates approval of these 

results and does not believe further evaluation is necessary. 

In response to comments and concerns regarding the approved AoR, 

EPA clarifies that additional site information will be collected under 

the pre-operational testing requirements within the Class VI Rule and 

the AoR will be reassessed based on the new data, as described 

under 40 C.F.R. § 146.82(c), prior to injection. Any changes in the 

model and/or the AoR would result in a permit modification – which, 

depending on the nature of changes, could warrant an additional 

public notice and comment, as provided in 40 C.F.R. Part 144. 

Furthermore, the regulations, and the permits, also provide for 

periodic reevaluation of the AoR over the life of the project to 

incorporate monitoring and operational data and verify that the CO2

plume and the associated area of elevated pressure are moving as 

predicted within the subsurface to ensure protection of USDWs from 

endangerment. See 75 Fed. Reg. 77248-49 (Dec. 10, 2010) and Parts 

G and Q of the permits.

The permit language has not been modified based on this comment.
87

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

the injection point and projected pressure boundary as to 

not impact model results, especially in light of the 

more recently delineated AoR equal to 10 psi 

pressure increase. 

10.) FutureGen should provide explanation for the 

approximately symmetrical plume and pressure 

delineation based on their modeling given significant 

differences in injection rates and well construction 

amongst the four injection wells, and the regional 

formation dip (Permit Section: Attachment B, p.B37/46).

FutureGen’s modeled plume and pressure front 

delineations are approximately symmetrical in the 

horizontal plane around the four planned injection wells 

(FutureGen, 2014a, p.B41/46). However, the two 

horizontal injection wells directed towards the southwest 

(Well No. 3) and southeast (Well No. 2) include a 

significantly longer perforated interval (2,500 ft. versus 

1,500 ft.) and larger injection rates (0.35 MMT/yr versus 

0.19-0.21 MMT/yr) compared to the two wells directed 

towards the north. Additionally, the formation dips 

approximately 0.25 degrees in the east-southeast 

direction (FutureGen, 2014a, p. B7/46), which would be 

expected to cause preferential plume migration in the 

east-southeast direction. 

FutureGen should provide a narrative explanation for why 

formation dip, injection well length, and injection rates 

appear to have a minor influence on the lateral 

configuration of the plume and pressure front around the 

four injection wells.

40 NRDC 2. The Applicant chose to represent the Franconia 

Formation portion of the secondary confining layer as a 

single, 172-foot-thick layer in the conceptual model. As 

such, this layer is assigned only one value each for 

EPA approves of FutureGen’s approach for including the Franconia 

Formation as a single layer. As the secondary confining zone, this 

formation does not receive any CO2 fluxes based on the analyses 

conducted; therefore, more detailed evaluation of this formation is 
88

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

porosity, vertical and horizontal permeability, grain 

density, and compressibility. This is unlikely to be 

representative of the actual hydrologic properties of this 

formation, and likely overstates its homogeneity. We 

recognize that the number of available data points was 

limited by the small number of available core samples and 

the fact that permeability in this formation is at or below 

the low end of the instrument limits for both wireline log 

and core sample analytic methods. However, this should 

not prevent the use of more detailed data for log- and 

core-derived hydrologic properties other than 

permeability. EPA should require more detailed modeling 

of the Franconia portion of the secondary confining zone 

to more accurately reflect real-world conditions, including 

if necessary a requirement to collect additional hydrologic 

data for the Franconia Formation as part of the logging, 

sampling, and testing program (40 CFR § 146.87 et seq).

not necessary at the moment. However, EPA also recognizes that 

site-specific conditions encountered during drilling may present the 

need to alter this decision, at which time FutureGen may propose to 

the Director changes in model and its results. Any such changes 

would result in a permit modification—which, depending on the 

nature of any changes, could warrant an additional public notice and 

comment period, as provided in 40 C.F.R. Part 144.

41 NRDC 3. The plan includes a number of parameters for which 

site-specific data were not available when the conceptual 

model was built, including: 

• Hydraulic fracturing tests and fracture pressure values; 

• Formation compressibility; 

• Capillary pressure; 

• Trapped gas saturation; 

• Gas entry pressure; 

• Hydrologic test data for the Elmhurst Sandstone, 

confining zones, and the upper part of the injection zone 

(lower part of the Lombard); and 

• Modular formation dynamics test data for the confining 

zone and upper part of the injection zone (lower part of 

the Lombard). 

In particular, site-specific data on formation fracture 

pressure for the injection and confining zones is crucial to 

EPA considers the delineation of the AoR by a minimum of 10 psi 

pressure increase to be a conservative approach to address any 

uncertainty associated with the data used where site-specific 

measurements were not available. Based on the Class VI Rule, which 

EPA developed to address the unique risks of CO2 injection for GS, 

FutureGen is required to conduct a pre-injection testing to collect 

site-specific information during the drilling of the injection well. 

EPA clarifies that under Part Q of the permits, this additional site 

information will be collected under the pre-operational testing 

requirements within the Class VI Rule and the AoR will be reassessed 

based on the new data, as described under 40 C.F.R. § 146.82(c), 

prior to injection. Any changes in the model and/or the AoR would 

result in a permit modification – which, depending on the nature of 

changes, could warrant an additional public notice and comment, as 

provided in 40 C.F.R. Part 144. Furthermore, the regulations, and the 
89

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

safe operation of the injection wells. As discussed above, 

we understand that site-specific data will be collected 

when the injection wells are drilled. However, EPA and 

the Applicant have not provided a clear description of 

how the model will be updated once logging, sampling, 

and testing data become available. EPA should require 

this site-specific data to be collected as part of the 

logging, sampling, and testing program and that the 

conceptual model and that the AOR be revised to reflect 

this new data. The Applicant should describe how and 

when this data will be used to update the model.

4. In the model and simulation, injection is modeled 

through a well completed open-hole. However, the 

permit application states that the decision to complete 

the wells as either open-hole or cased- hole will not be 

made until after the wells are drilled and data is collected. 

EPA should require the model and simulation to be 

revised to reflect the actual completion configuration 

after the wells are drilled and completed but before 

injection begins.

permits, also provide for periodic reevaluation of the AoR over the 

life of the project to incorporate monitoring and operational data 

and verify that the CO2 plume and the associated area of elevated 

pressure are moving as predicted within the subsurface to ensure 

protection of USDWs from endangerment. See 75 Fed. Reg. 77248-

49 (Dec. 10, 2010) and Parts G and Q of the permits. 

The permit language includes the requested provisions and so has 

not been modified based on this comment.

42 NRDC Post Injection Site Care

1. We are encouraged by the proposed Post-Injection 

Site Care and Site Closure (“PISC”) Plan, which proposed 

to monitor the site through a variety of methods for fifty 

years after injection. At this point, we presume that the 

projected, largely isotropic, modeled evolution of the CO2

plume and pressure front are due to the relative lack of 

site-specific data, which remains to be acquired during 

drilling and operation. However, it is likely that the actual 

development will not be symmetrical, and that the plume 

will develop in a manner or direction(s) that may render 

the currently proposed locations of the monitoring wells 

sub-optimal. The Applicant should discuss the probability 

EPA clarifies that additional site information will be collected under 

the pre-operational testing requirements within the Class VI Rule and 

the AoR will be reassessed based on the new data, as described 

under 40 C.F.R. § 146.82(c), prior to injection. Any changes in the 

model and/or the AoR would result in a permit modification – which, 

depending on the nature of changes, could warrant an additional 

public notice and comment, as provided in 40 C.F.R. Part 144. 

Furthermore, the regulations, and the permits, also provide for 

periodic reevaluation of the AoR, testing and monitoring plan and 

PISC over the life of the project to incorporate monitoring and 

operational data and verify that the CO2 plume and the associated 

area of elevated pressure are moving as predicted within the 

subsurface to ensure protection of USDWs from endangerment. See 
90

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

of this happening and also the intended course of action 

for revisions to the PISC Plan but also the Testing and 

Monitoring Plan and AOR should this turn out be the case. 

EPA should require appropriate revisions to those and any 

other plans as needed in order to take into account of the 

latest and most complete information.

75 Fed. Reg. 77248-49, 77259-68 (Dec. 10, 2010) and Parts G, M, O 

and Q of the permits. The permit language has not been modified 

based on this comment.

43 CSC Provision: G(2)

Text of Draft Permit: 2. At the fixed frequency specified in 

the Area of Review and Corrective Action Plan, or more 

frequently when monitoring and operational conditions 

warrant, the permittee must reevaluate the area of 

review and perform corrective action in the manner 

specified in 40 CFR 146.84 and update the Area of Review 

and Corrective Action Plan or demonstrate to the Director 

that no update is needed.

References: 146.84(b) The owner or operator of a Class VI 

well must prepare, maintain, and comply with a plan to 

delineate the area of review for a proposed geologic 

sequestration project, periodically reevaluate the 

delineation, and perform corrective action that meets the 

requirements of this section and is acceptable to the 

Director. The requirement to maintain and implement an 

approved plan is directly enforceable regardless of 

whether the requirement is a condition of the permit. As 

a part of the permit application for approval by the 

Director, the owner or operator must submit an area of 

review and corrective action plan that includes the 

following information:

* * * *(2) A description of: (i) The minimum fixed 

frequency, not to exceed five years, at which the owneror 

operator proposes to reevaluate the area of review; (ii) 

The monitoring and operational conditions that would 

warrant a reevaluation of the area of review prior to the 

As a general matter the UIC permit is intended as a roadmap to 

identify the relevant requirements and obligations of FutureGen. The 

relevant regulatory provisions are lengthier and more detailed so 

that the permit language may summarize those requirements and 

provide reference to the regulatory details rather than copying them 

in their entirety. This makes the permit more reader-friendly and 

easier to follow. EPA believes that incorporating additional details by 

reference does not create any conflict or confusion between the 

terms of the permit and the regulations.

In addition, 40 C.F.R. §146.84(b) makes it clear that FutureGen is 

responsible to comply with both the permit requirement and the 

regulatory requirement upon which it is based. 

EPA has not made any change to the permits based on this 

comment.
91

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

next scheduled reevaluation as determined by the 

minimum fixed frequency

Proposed Revision: 2. At the fixed frequency specified in 

the approved Area of Review and Corrective Action Plan 

(Attachment B of this permit), or more frequently when 

monitoring and operational conditions warrant as 

described in that plan, the permittee must reevaluate the 

area of review and perform corrective action in the 

manner specified in 40 CFR 146.84 and update the Area of 

Review and Corrective Action Plan or demonstrate to the 

Director that no update is needed.

Comment: The plan itself is intended to spell out the 

frequency of review and the conditions that will trigger an 

earlier review. It is better to specify the fixed frequency or 

to use the same formula of “approved Area of Review and 

Corrective Action Plan (Attachment B of this permit)”.

44 CSC Provision: G(3)

Text of Draft Permit: 3. Following each AoR reevaluation 

or a demonstration that no evaluation is needed, the 

permittee shall submit the resultant information in an 

electronic format to the Director for review and approval 

of the AoR results.

References: 146.84(e)(4) Submit an amended area of 

review and corrective action plan or demonstrate to the 

Director through monitoring data and modeling results 

that no amendment to the area of review and corrective 

action plan is needed. Any amendments to the area of 

review and corrective action plan must be approved by 

the Director, must be incorporated into the permit, and 

are subject to the permit modification requirements at §§ 

144.39 or 144.41 of this chapter, as appropriate.

Proposed Revision: G.3. Following each AoR reevaluation 

or a demonstration that no evaluation is needed, the 

As a general matter the UIC permit is intended as a roadmap to 

identify the relevant requirements and obligations of FutureGen. The 

relevant regulatory provisions are lengthier and more detailed so 

that the permit language may summarize those requirements and 

provide reference to the regulatory details rather than copying them 

in their entirety. This makes the permit more reader-friendly and 

easy to follow. EPA believes that incorporating additional details by 

reference does not create any conflict or confusion between the 

terms of the permit and the regulations.

In addition, 40 C.F.R. §146.84(b) makes it clear that FutureGen is 

responsible to comply with both the permit requirement and the 

regulatory requirement upon which it is based. 

EPA has not made any change to the permits based on this 

comment.
92

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

permittee shall submit either the resultant information 

updated area of review and corrective action plan in an 

electronic format to the Director for review and approval 

of the AoR results, or a demonstration that no update is 

needed.

Comment: The language in the draft permit is awkwardly 

worded and the reference to “resultant information” is 

potentially open-ended. The regulation requires the 

permittee to submit either an amended plan or a 

demonstration that amendment is unnecessary.

45 FutureGen Page B44, Item 4

Action, first line: Please change “calculated pressures” to

“observed pressures”

EPA agrees that this correction is more accurate, and is appropriate 

and consistent with the rest of the Plan. The requested change was

made.

46 NRDC 6. The proposed composition of the CO2 stream to be 

injected appears reasonable. However, higher 

concentrations of impurities could lead to adverse effects, 

from added toxicity in the event of leakage, to loss of 

injectivity due to precipitation. We suggest that EPA and 

the Applicant add material changes in the chemical or 

physical characteristics of the CO2 injection stream to the 

list triggers that may necessitate a reevaluation of the 

AOR.

Part G.2 of the permits states “At the fixed frequency specified in the 

Area of Review and Corrective Action Plan, or more frequently when 

monitoring and operational conditions warrant, the permittee must 

reevaluate the area of review and perform corrective action in the 

manner specified in 40 C.F.R. § 146.84 and update the Area of 

Review and Corrective Action Plan or demonstrate to the Director 

that no update is needed.” This language provides EPA with the 

flexibility to require AoR re-evaluation based on material changes in 

the injection stream. Nothing in Attachment B of the permits 

constrains that flexibility. Therefore, EPA has not made any change 

to the permits based on this comment.

47 Betty 

Niemann The EIS 460D overlaid the oil and gas well maps from the 

ISGS but did not include any water wells in the overlay. 

ALL of these are potential sources for CO2 leaks from the 

storage area.

Numerous water and oil/gas wells in the area are significantly 

shallower than either the injection or primary confining formations 

and are unlikely to be “potential sources for CO2 leaks from the 

storage area.” Various monitoring wells required under the permits 

will monitor formations deeper than most of these wells and EPA will 

evaluate data from these wells throughout the life of the project to 

ensure that shallower wells do not become leakage pathways.

48 Betty 

Niemann

As above, there is the potential for leakage through wells. 

In Volume I, Page 3.4-13 is Figure

In addition to evaluating FutureGen’s review of the area wells, EPA 

completed its own independent review of well records at the ISGS.
93

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

3.4-4 Oil, Gas, and Gas Storage Wells in the Underground 

Injection Control Survey Area. This figure does not 

represent all ground penetrations by wells.

There is this map from the ISGS:

From the Illinois State Geological Survey Prairie Research 

Institute there are many more wells indicated than shown 

in Figure 3.4-4. The red areas indicate gas fields south of 

the CO2 Storage Area. Each well may indicate a potential 

source for CO2 leakage. These are identified in the EIS.

Water Wells from the ISGSxl :

Note the Carbon Storage Area (Primarily 16N 9W Section 

25) has a major sand and gravel aquifer beneath the 

surface which, if the CO2 migrates upwards, has a 

potential for large potable water contamination.

EPA looked at the 6,110 wells within the AoR. EPA did not find any 

improperly constructed artificial penetrations that reach the 

confining zone. Regarding the “major sand and gravel aquifer,” the 

permit application was reviewed to determine the safety of the 

project in protecting all USDWs. The proposed project should not 

impact USDWs and extensive monitoring is being required to confirm

that.

Therefore, the permit language has not been modified based upon 

this comment.

49 Leinberger 

& 

Critchelow 

families

The Parties own property located within the Area of 

Review of the FutureGen UIC project. The Critchelow 

Family’s property is approximately four acres and is 

located at 1760 Bluegrass Road in Jacksonville, Illinois 

(“Critchelow Property”). The Critchelow Property is 

located directly on the edge of the CO2 plume modeled by 

FutureGen. See Permit map Figure 12, modified to show 

Critchelow and Leinberger Properties and wells, attached 

to the Declaration of Karl Leinberger, Exhibit 4. The 

Critchelow Family has a water well on their property, 

which the family uses for drinking and washing. The well 

is not identified in the Permit materials.

3 The Critchelow Family has lived on their property and 

used the well water for over 25 years. See Declaration of 

William Critchelow, attached as Exhibit 5. 

In addition to evaluating FutureGen’s review of the area wells, EPA 

completed its own independent review of well records at the Illinois 

State Geological Survey. EPA looked at the 6,110 wells within the 

AoR, as documented in the Administrative Record. EPA did not find 

any improperly constructed artificial penetrations that reach the 

confining zone.

It is true that, by their nature, the State’s large private well databases 

may be inaccurate or out of date to some extent. However, the 

productive aquifers that are generally used for drinking water 

supplies in the AoR and beyond are generally shallow (less than a 

couple of hundred feet deep), and so are many hundreds of feet 

above the confining zones and injection zones for this project. Given 

that there are no known private water wells in the AoR that are deep 

enough to be of concern and given known hydrogeologic information 
94

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

The members and trusts of the Leinberger family own 

approximately 1,285 acres within the Area of Review 

(“Leinberger Property”). Portions of the Leinberger 

Property are on the edge of the CO2 plume identified by 

FutureGen, with the remaining parcels very close to the 

CO2 modeled plume. See Attachment A to Leinberger 

Declaration, Ex. 4. The draft permit for FutureGen’s 

project identifies only one water well located on 

Leinberger Property. This water well is identified as Map 

ID Number 58. See Permit, Table 9, p. B34. There are two 

other water wells located on Leinberger Property. 

Neither of those two water wells is identified in the draft 

Permit. See Leinberger Declaration, Ex. 4, paras 9-10. 

The Leinberger Property also has many oil and gas wells 

on their Property and within the Area of Review that are 

either mis-identified or not identified at all in the draft 

Permit. The draft Permit properly identifies only one 

oil/gas well (#118). The oil/gas wells identified as Map ID 

Numbers 116 and 119 appear to be located on Leinberger 

Property, but are misidentified in Table 9 on page B35 of 

the draft Permit as belonging to other owners. There are 

17 non-producing oil/gas wells located on Leinberger 

Property that are reflected in the Illinois State Geological 

Survey (“ISGS”) database, but are not reflected in 

FutureGen’s draft Permit in Table 9 or Figure 12 on pages 

B33-B37. See Ex. 4, paras 6-8. There are also two nonproducing natural gas wells located on Leinberger 

Property that are not reflected in the draft permit nor in 

the ISGS database. Id. One old natural gas well is located 

within 0.3 miles of FutureGen’s projected carbon dioxide 

plume. The second old natural gas well is approximately 

0.7 miles from the projected plume. Id.

FN3: In fact, the Critchelows appear to have water two 

of the area, EPA believes that there is no concern of any unknown 

private water wells that would penetrate the confining zone. Oil and 

gas wells in the region are also shallow in relation to the injection 

and confining zones of this project. Therefore, even if an oil and gas 

well was drilled that the ISGS did not know about, it would likely be 

much too shallow to pose a threat of leakage outside of the injection 

formation.
95

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

wells on their property, neither of which is identified by 

FutureGen. See Leinberger Declaration, attached as 

Exhibit 4.

50 Leinberger 

& 

Critchelow 

families

D. Inaccurate Well Identification and Information

Under the Class VI regulations, FutureGen must account 

for all wells in the Area of Review and must provide any 

other information the Director may require. 40 C.F.R. 

§146.82(a)(4) (emphasis added). EPA Guidance instructs 

permit applicants that resident interviews and well 

surveys may be used to identify area wells. See UIC 

Program Class VI Well Area of Review Evaluation and 

Corrective Action Guidance, Section 4, AR# 439. There is 

no indication that FutureGen performed a complete 

investigation of wells, especially after the Area of Review 

was enlarged subsequent to the permit application. 

Although FutureGen identifies the wells within the new 

Area of Review, it does not provide details or locations of 

those wells. See Ex. 1, paras. 6, 7 (Price report). As a 

result, the draft Permit fails to identify or mis-identifies 

the wells located in the project areas.

5 The FutureGen draft Permit does not account for the 

Critchelow or Leinberger private wells, and, as noted 

above, it appears the Critchelow well was impacted by 

FutureGen’s drilling activities. Given the much larger 

Area of Review, and the possibility that some of the 

water wells in the area could penetrate the confining 

zones, the Director should require a more thorough and 

aggressive approach, pursuant to recommendations of 

EPA Guidance, to identifying potential water wells 

based on updated modeling results.

FN5: See In re Bear Lake Properties, LLC, 42 ELR 41361 

(2012) (Class II well) (EAB remanded a permit where the 

In addition to evaluating FutureGen’s review of the area wells, EPA 

completed its own independent review of well records at ISGS. These 

records identified 6,110 wells in the AoR. EPA examined the 

information on well depths and only two wells were deep enough to 

warrant investigation. Of those wells, two wells (besides the 

FutureGen’s stratigraphic well) penetrate the confining zone (Upper 

portion of Lombard Member and Proviso Member of the Eau Claire

Formation). Of those wells, one is plugged, and the other is located 

16 miles from the injection site. It is anticipated that this location 

would receive only increased pressure, if anything, and that such 

effects would not occur until after injection proceeded for a 

significant time EPA did not find any improperly constructed artificial 

penetrations that reach the confining zone. 

Given that there are no known private water wells in the AoR that 

are deep enough to be of concern and given known hydrogeologic 

information of the area, EPA believes that there is no concern of any 

unknown private water wells that would penetrate the confining 

zone.

Therefore, the permit language has not been modified based upon 

this comment.
96

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

Region did not adequately demonstrate that it surveyed 

all of the drinking water wells in the Area of Review).

51 Leinberger 

& 

Critchelow 

families

There are two wells located with the expanded Area of 

Review that penetrate the primary confining zone, and 

therefore could provide a potential preferential pathway 

between the injection zone and shallow USDW aquifers. 

See draft Permit, p. B3. FutureGen states that both wells 

are believed to have been sufficiently plugged and 

recompleted, but there does not appear to be any 

supporting documentation verifying that these wells are 

plugged as required. See Ex. 1, para. 8 (Price report). 

Without complete data on area wells, the draft Permit 

discussion of well identification and information is based 

on significant errors in fact.

Plugging of well Criswell #1-16 was completed on June 16, 2014. A 

plugging and abandonment form (OG-6) was filed at the appropriate 

regulatory agency (Illinois Department of Natural Resources) after an 

IDNR inspector visited the site on June 18.

The second deep well (Whitlock # 7-15) is located roughly 16 miles 

from the injection site. Under the permits, the plume and pressure 

front will be regularly monitored. To the extent that the Whitlock 

well or any other wells identified or installed in the future may 

require corrective action (such as plugging), it can be addressed 

under the corrective action plan. See Attachment B and Attachment 

C. 

52 Leinberger 

& 

Critchelow 

families

Wells Within the Survey Area

6) The adequacy of the well survey within the AoR is 

incomplete.

a) The Class VI Rule requires potential Class VI injection 

well owners or operators to identify all artificial 

penetrations located within the delineated AoR, including 

active and abandoned wells and underground mines, that 

may penetrate the confining zone and provide a 

description of each well’s type, construction, date drilled, 

location, depth and, if applicable, the record of plugging 

and/or completion and any additional information the UIC 

Program Director may require [40 CFR 146.84(c)(2)]. 

b) FutureGen appears to have restricted their well search 

to only public records; the ISGS database for oil and gas 

wells in the area and the Illinois State Water Survey 

(ISWS) database for water wells. These surveys are 

incomplete as not all historic water wells or oil and gas 

wells have been recorded with the state. 

c) FutureGen acknowledges the potential for private 

In addition to evaluating FutureGen’s review of the area wells, EPA 

completed its own independent review of well records at ISGS. EPA 

looked at the 6,110 wells within the AoR. EPA did not find any 

improperly constructed artificial penetrations that reach the 

confining zone. A tabulation of all the wells identified in the AoR is in 

the Administrative Record. EPA’s May 2013 guidance only suggests

options like “site reconnaissance, review of aerial and satellite 

imagery and geophysical surveys,” but these are not required nor 

always appropriate.

Given that there are no known private water wells in the AoR that 

are deep enough to be of concern and given known hydrogeologic 

information of the area, EPA believes that there is no concern of any 

unknown private water wells that would penetrate the confining 

zone.

Drilling and construction of the stratigraphic test well occurred under 

a permit issued by the IDNR. EPA contacted the IDNR and found that 

there were no complaints of well contamination registered in 
97

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

water supply wells to have been left out of their survey 

results as they state on the footnote for Figure S.4 (March 

2013 submittal) many of the 63 residences shown on the 

map may have unregistered wells. This point is illustrated 

by those wells identified and not identified on the 

Leinberger farm which has three water wells within the 

25 square mile survey area, of which only one was 

identified. The same holds true for oil and gas wells in the 

area. There are two old natural gas wells located on 

Leinberger property that are within the survey area that 

were not identified, as well as 17 oil/gas wells on the 

Leinberger property that are located just outside the 

original 25 square mile survey area, but well within the 

expanded AoR. 

d) Reportedly when FutureGen drilled the 

characterization/stratigraphic well, the water in a nearby 

water well at the Critchelow’s residence turned yellow 

and the well overflowed. The well was not one of the 

wells identified in the ISWS well search and no 

information on the completion specifics was known by 

the property owner. The Supporting Documentation does 

not provide a geologic or hydrogeologic reason that could 

explain why the drilling of the stratigraphic well could 

have caused this observed event. The Critchelow’s 

property is located just south of the sc CO2 plume 

boundary along Blue Grass Road, approximately 0.6 miles 

south of Negus Road. 

e) Given the number of private residences within the 25 

square mile survey area and the known fact that many 

water wells and oil and gas wells were not identified, a 

more aggressive approach to identifying potential wells in 

the area should have been considered. USEPA produced a 

guidance document in May 2013 that identifies the 

Morgan County during the drilling of the stratigraphic test well. The 

information provided by the commenter is not detailed enough to 

provide any direct correlation between drilling and construction of 

the stratigraphic test well and the issues with the Critchelow well. 

EPA has no reason to expect that the Critchelow well would have 

been hydraulically connected to the FutureGen well. Inquiries with 

the State have not resulted in any information about this alleged 

incident. EPA ask that FutureGen provide advance notice to the 

Critchelows when the well construction is scheduled, so that they 

can see whether their well shows any impacts. If any impacts are 

observed, it would trigger actions under the corrective action plan. 

As provided in Attachment F of permits, the Emergency and 

Remedial Response Plan identifies potential adverse incidents that 

will be watched for during the construction period, including 

movement of brine between formations during drilling. Potential 

response options were identified in that Plan to be able to mitigate 

any potential endangerment of USDWs.

Plugging of well Criswell #1-16 was completed on June 16, 2014. A 

plugging and abandonment form (OG-6) was filed at the appropriate 

regulatory agency (Illinois Department of Natural Resources) after an 

IDNR inspector visited the site on June 18.

The January 2014 Battelle report titled Analysis of Impacts on 

Lowermost USDW from Focused Leakage of Brine from Plugged and 

Abandoned or Poorly Constructed Wells at the FutureGen 2.0 Site was 

not based on analysis of the actual construction or plugging at the 

site. As noted above, the Criswell #1-16 has been plugged and 

should not pose a threat to USDWs. The Whitlock #7-15 well is 

currently owned by a private entity. The Whitlock well is currently 

operated as a monitoring well by the gas storage operator and is 

under the jurisdiction of the IDNR. EPA finds that the Whitlock well 
98

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

following stages for well investigation within the AoR in 

addition to historical research of public records: site 

reconnaissance, review of aerial and satellite imagery and 

geophysical surveys. These were not performed. 

Requested Change/Action: FutureGen should conduct a 

site reconnaissance or door-to-door survey to assist in 

identifying wells in at least the 25 square mile survey area 

if not the entire expanded AoR. The wells identified should 

be added to the figures and tables of the supporting 

documentation.

7) Wells identified within the expanded AoR have not 

been described.

Though revised Attachment B to the draft Permit (dated 

March 31, 2014) does address the number of wells within 

the newly defined larger AoR (4,386 water wells and 740 

oil and gas wells), the well data provided in Table 9 and 

Figure 12 of Attachment B only provides descriptions for 

and mapped locations of those wells within the 25 square 

mile survey area. Revised maps depicting all of these well 

locations as well as coal mines and surface water body 

features were provided to the USEPA via email dated 

March 15, 2014, but no description (tabulated 

information) regarding the wells was provided. In 

accordance with 40 CFR 146.84(c)(2), “Using methods 

approved by the UIC Program Director, identify all 

penetrations, including active and abandoned wells and 

underground mines, in the AoR that may penetrate the 

confining zone(s). Provide a description of each well’s 

type, construction, date drilled, location, depth, record of 

plugging and/ or completion, and any additional 

information the UIC Program Director may require.” This 

information should have been provided. 

Requested Change/Action: FutureGen should provide a 

has construction that is appropriate to ensure protection of USDWs. 

These wells will be regularly assessed under the permits and 

corrective action will be required if it is determined to be necessary 

to protect USDWs.

Therefore, the permit language has not been modified based upon 

this comment.
99

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

tabulated description of the well data for all the wells 

identified in the expanded AoR as required.

8) Wells that penetrate the injection zone

a) There are two wells located with the expanded AoR 

that penetrate the primary confining zone and therefore 

could provide a potential preferential pathway between 

the injection zone and shallow USDW aquifers. These 

wells are located at the Waverly Storage Field, an active 

natural-gas storage facility located approximately 16 miles 

south-southeast of the proposed injection well. The 

primary storage reservoir at the Waverly Storage Field is 

the St. Peter Sandstone. However, these two test wells 

were drilled deeper into the Mt. Simon Sandstone. 

The two wells are identified as the Criswell #1-16 (API 

#121370034900) and Whitlock #7-15 (API 

#121370034601) (Page 3.46, Supporting Documentation). 

FutureGen states that both wells are believed to have 

been sufficiently plugged and recompleted and therefore 

no longer provide a preferential migration pathway from 

the injection zone to shallower USDWs. They go on to 

conclude therefore that no direct monitoring and/or 

corrective action will be performed (Page 3.46, 

Supporting Documentation and AR #296). 

b) FutureGen provides a discussion of the recompletion 

activities for these two wells on generic completion 

diagrams (Figures 2.15 and 2.16, Page 2.25, Supporting 

Documentation). ENVIRON reviewed the completion logs for these wells obtained from the ISGS and FutureGen’s 

depiction for the Criswell well appears accurate (plug and 

cap installed in 1978); however, information provided on 

the Whitlock graphic (Figure 3.30, Page 3.47, Supporting 

Documentation) is inaccurate (well was not reworked in 

1997 and the cement plug dates back to 1965). 
100 

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

c) In January of 2014, Battelle produced a report on 

behalf of FutureGen titled Analysis of Impacts on 

Lowermost USDW from Focused Leakage of Brine from 

Plugged and Abandoned or Poorly Constructed Wells at 

the FutureGen 2.0 Site (AR #464) to assess the potential 

for brine migration at the two wells nearest the proposed 

injection wells that breach the Mt. Simon caprock. The 

two wells they assessed are the Criswell well mentioned 

above and the FutureGen stratigraphic well FGA #1. The 

simulation results indicated small volumes of brine 

leakage into the lowermost USDW at both well locations. 

Requested Change/Action: Based on the age of the plug 

and 5 feet thick hydromite cap (36 years) in the Criswell 

well, the age of the cement plug in the Whitlock well (49 

years) and the fact that FutureGen’s own simulations 

indicated that small volumes of brine leakage into the St. 

Peter Sandstone would occur, FutureGen should directly 

monitor both the Whitlock and Criswell wells and perform 

corrective action as appropriate.

53 Leinberger 

& 

Critchelow 

families

14) Mistake on Figure 2.32

Page 2.50 of the Supporting Documentation states, “The 

map in Figure 2.32 shows the locations of four proposed 

injection wells for which permits are being sought.” The 

four proposed injection well locations are not depicted on 

Figure 2.32. 

Requested Change/Action: Figure 2.32 needs to be 

modified to show the location of the four proposed 

injection wells

EPA reviewed the referenced permit application figure and agrees 

that it is mislabeled. This error in the figure does not reflect an error 

in the underlying modeling. Because the figure is not part of the 

permits, a revised figure is not needed to finalize the permits. This 

correction will be requested from FutureGen and any future 

documentation produced during the regular re-evaluations of the 

AoR and the model will make sure this error is not repeated. The 

comment has not requested a change to the permits, and EPA will 

not change the permits in response to this comment.

54 NRDC 7. In the permit application, the Applicant indicates that 

drilling records reviews and “site walkthroughs” were 

performed to identify possible penetrations of the 

confining zone. The Applicant should provide additional 

details as to the exact methods that were used to identify

In addition to evaluating FutureGen’s review of the area wells, EPA 

completed its own independent review of well records at ISGS and 

the Illinois State Water Survey. EPA looked at the 6,110 wells within 

the AoR. EPA did not find any improperly constructed artificial 

penetrations that reach the confining zone.
101 

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

existing wells, including a more extensive discussion of 

the history of the site and any past uses to aid in 

determining whether other undocumented wells are 

likely to exist in the AOR. The Applicant must justify a 

decision to not deploy more advanced methods of 

locating undocumented wells, such as aeromagnetic 

surveys. Improperly constructed, maintained, and/or 

abandoned wells are one of the most likely pathways by 

which injected fluids may reach USDWs, as has been 

evidenced by surface leakage of CO2 at oil fields such as 

Salt Creek in Wyoming. EPA must require the use of 

such methods prior to injection if it the current 

sources of information are not sufficiently trustworthy.

In addition, the permits include a regular monitoring program 

designed to identify any unknown or unanticipated pathways. See 

Part M of the permits and Attachment C.

Therefore, the permit language has not been modified based upon 

this comment.

55 NRDC 2. The Applicant states that “[o]ther than the project and 

monitoring wells, other distant potential conduits for fluid 

movement, or leakage pathways within the AoR are 

adequately constructed and/or plugged. Based on this 

information, the potential for fluid movement through 

artificial penetrations of the confining formation does not 

present a risk of endangerment to any USDWs.” Given 

that the sources of information are limited to publicly 

available records and site walkthroughs, we are 

concerned with this conclusion, especially given that the 

number of wells identified within the larger AOR is large 

and that these include 740 oil/gas wells (which are more 

likely to penetrate deeper). The Applicant should further 

discuss and justify such a conclusion. EPA should also 

evaluate whether to require further assessment and 

corrective action on known wells, and also whether to 

require the use of further methods to reveal unknown 

wells in the area.

In addition to evaluating FutureGen’s review of the area wells, EPA 

completed its own independent review of well records at the ISGS

and the Illinois State Water Survey. EPA looked at the 6,110 wells 

within the AoR. EPA did not find any improperly constructed 

artificial penetrations that reach the confining zone.

Therefore, the permit language has not been modified based upon 

this comment.

56 McCutchen “Our calculations suggest that the volume of liquid or 

supercritical CO2 to be disposed cannot exceed more than 

One of the underlying assumptions in the Ehling-Economides and 

Economides (E&E) 2010 paper is that the reservoir is a closed system. 
102 

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

about 1% of pore space. This will require from 5 to 20 

times more underground reservoir volume than has been 

envisioned by many, and it renders geologic sequestration 

of CO2 a profoundly non-feasible option for the 

management of CO2 emissions." 

Profoundly non-feasible is a polite way of saying 

laughable. Curiously, the Ehlig-Economides paper, a peerreviewed article authored by two prominent experts in 

petroleum engineering, was not among the references 

cited in the recent interagency report on CCS. So its 

optimism about sequestration may be based on 

ignorance.

Cramming 2 billion tons a year into deep saline 

formations is a vain hope, with no test data. One known 

problem is pore space near the well clogging with the 

hoped-for mineralization and thus shutting off flow of CO2

into the formation. The danger of saline intrusion into the 

groundwater and CO2 plumes erupting and killing people 

must be weighed against the trivial benefit to global 

warming, which is the ostensible motivation for 

FutureGen. 

In EOR the flow is steady state and not intermittent 

because there is a production well that provides a path 

out of the formation and the flow is at constant pressure. 

The CO2 dissolves in the oil and is recycled back into the 

reservoir after it is extracted. The depleted reservoir is 

like an empty tank, with flow in and out, i.e. an open 

system. All sequestration projects so far -- the "25 years 

of successful experience" -- are of this type, and they have 

been done because of the economic benefit to oil 

companies of capturing the CO2 and injecting it back into 

the formation to scavenge oil from depleted reservoirs. 

Ehlig-Economides et al. challenge the steady state 

The Mt. Simon formation is not a closed reservoir. Comments from 

the American Petroleum Institute (API) the Natural Resources 

Defense Council, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL), 

Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, Edinburgh University and 

the Imperial College of London have all criticized many of the 

assumptions of the E&E paper.

EPA is reluctant to evaluate or comment on arguments on the 

validity of CCS. The task of EPA was to determine if the proposed 

project meets the regulatory requirements and can be done in a safe 

manner.

The complex numerical modeling submitted by FutureGen was 

evaluated and independently remodeled by EPA. That analysis

demonstrates that the proposed project can inject the anticipated 

amount of CO2 within the regulatory requirements and is protective 

of USDWs and human health and the environment. Extensive 

monitoring required by the regulations and the permit will be 

compared with modeling results to continuously evaluate the 

protectiveness of the project.
103 

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

assumption underlying capacity calculations for deep 

saline formations: "models that assume a constant 

pressure outer boundary for reservoirs intended for CO

2

sequestration are missing the critical point that the 

reservoir pressure will build up under injection at 

constant rate. Instead of the 1-4% of bulk volume 

storability factor indicated prominently in the literature, 

which is based on erroneous steady state modeling, our 

finding is that CO

2 can occupy no more than 1% of the 

pore volume and likely as much as 100 times less." 

The steady state assumption is clearly not appropriate 

with respect to deep saline aquifers, where there exist no 

means for flow out of the formation, and injection would 

have to be against high pressure into a full tank, raising 

the pressure. Pumps to hammer in the supercritical CO

2

and displace the brine would produce pulsed, not steady, 

flow. As more CO

2 goes in, the pumps will have to work 

even harder against higher pressure. 

The density of the injected supercritical CO

2 is only 50

-

70% of the density of the saline water, (Burruss, p. 4) so 

sequestered CO

2 would be buoyant and would have to be 

physically trapped by caprock and lateral containment. 

Hydraulic fracturing of the sealing formation by high 

pressure (the fracture pressure of the sealing formation is 

>4200 psi), pulses during supercritical CO

2 injection might 

have disastrous consequences. Lateral leakage of 

buoyant supercritical CO

2 out of the sealing formation 

would also be a disaster because this high pressure 

bubble could find its way around the caprock and erupt at 

the surface, or into groundwater supplies. The CO

2

cannot dissolve in the brine or become carbonate quickly 

enough to mitigate the danger from leakage. When 

sequestration proponents expect the storage formations 
104 

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

to leak enough to be classified as open systems, then 

there seems to be no point (other than EOR for the oil 

companies) of injecting CO2 underground and it probably 

is safer to dump it in the atmosphere. 
105 

SECTION 4. FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY COMMENTS 

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

1 Betty 

Niemann

Along with the remediation plan comes costs. These 

remediation costs must be paid by someone, entity, or 

alliance. What happens long after FutureGen has 

completed the project especially when well casings 

deteriorate due to the acid plume? Who will be in place 

to activate the remediation plan and from whence shall 

the money come? Ken Humphries has said that 

companies or alliances don’t last and states do. So in 

light of his remark, will the State of Illinois have to 

remediate a leak? Will the State of Illinois have people 

in place for a rapid response? Better yet, will the State 

of Illinois have the monetary resources available for a 

rapid response? These are all the questions that will 

need to be answered and told to the landowners. The 

carbon storage landowners are “ground zero” for CO2

damage and not the “strong community” 

supporters/stakeholders residing in the city of 

Jacksonville.

FutureGen will be released from its post-injection site care 

responsibilities only after a non-endangerment demonstration is 

made and the Director has approved the site closure (at 40 C.F.R. §

146.93), which is also the basis for releasing the owner or operator 

from financial responsibility (40 C.F.R. §146.85(b)(1)). FutureGen 

must also plug the wells in a manner that minimizes the risk of longterm failure. However, any remediation costs incurred in the very 

long term (i.e., after the non-endangerment determination and the 

release from post-injection site care responsibilities) is beyond the 

scope of the Class VI financial responsibility requirements and the 

UIC permitting process. Therefore, EPA will not make any changes to 

the permits based on this comment. EPA understands, however, that 

under Chapter 20 of the Illinois Compiled Statutes, Section 1108, the 

State of Illinois assumes certain liabilities and long-term stewardship 

obligations associated with the injected carbon dioxide.
106 

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

2 CSC Provision: H(1)

Text of Draft Permit: 1. Financial Responsibility – The 

permittee shall maintain financial responsibility and 

resources to meet the requirements of 40 CFR 146.85 

and the conditions of this permit. Financial 

responsibility shall be maintained through all phases of 

the project. The approved financial assurance 

mechanisms are found in Attachment H and in the 

administrative record of this permit.

The financial instrument(s) must be sufficient to cover 

the cost of:

(a) Corrective action (that meets the requirements of 40 

CFR 146.84);

(b) Injection well plugging (that meets the requirements 

of 40 CFR 146.92);

(c) Post injection site care and site closure (that meets 

the requirements of 40 CFR 146.93);

(d) Emergency and remedial response (that meets the 

requirements of 40 CFR 146.94).

References:

Proposed Revision: 1. Financial Responsibility – The 

permittee shall maintain financial responsibility and 

resources to meet the requirements of 40 CFR 146.85 

and in accordance with the conditions of this permit. 

Financial responsibility shall be maintained through all 

phases of the project. The and the approved financial 

assurance mechanisms are found in Attachment H and 

in the administrative record of this permit. Financial 

responsibility shall be maintained through all phases of 

the project.

The financial instrument(s) must be sufficient to cover 

the cost of:

(a) Corrective action (that meets the requirements of 40 

As a general matter, the UIC permit is intended as a roadmap to 

identify the relevant requirements and obligations of FutureGen. 

The relevant regulatory provisions for financial responsibility are 

relatively lengthy and technical, so the permit language may 

summarize those requirements and provide reference to the 

regulatory details rather than copying them in their entirety. This 

makes the permit more reader-friendly and easy to follow. 

Incorporating the additional details by reference does not create any 

conflict or confusion between the terms of the permit and the 

regulations.

In addition, 40 C.F.R. §146.85(b) makes it clear that FutureGen is 

responsible to comply with both the permit requirement and the 

regulatory requirement upon which it is based. For Class VI wells, 

EPA anticipates that financial responsibility amounts and 

mechanisms will be regularly reviewed and revised in connection 

with the regular reviews of the AoR, corrective action plan, injection 

well plugging plan, Post Injection Site Care (PISC) and site closure 

plan, and Emergency and Remedial Response Plan (ERRP). See 75 

Fed. Reg. 77271 (Dec. 10, 2010) and Section H of the Permits. 

Reference to the relevant regulatory provisions provides clarity on 

the standards against which any revisions will be judged. 

Therefore, EPA will not make the suggested changes to the permits.
107 

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

CFR 146.84);

(b) Injection well plugging (that meets the requirements 

of 40 CFR 146.92);

(c) Post injection site care and site closure (that meets 

the requirements of 40 CFR 146.93);

(d) Emergency and remedial response (that meets the 

requirements of 40 CFR 146.94).

--OR—

The permittee has submitted the approved financial 

assurance mechanisms, which are included in 

Attachment H of this permit. These mechanisms include 

the information required by Section 146.85 and 

demonstrate how each of the applicable requirements 

of Section 146.85 will be met.

Comment: These initial draft permits use a pattern of 

reciting the regulatory requirements and stating that 

these must be met without giving full recognition to the 

fact that issuing the permit constitutes a determination 

that the applicable regulatory requirements have been 

met through the application and the supporting 

materials. As noted in Section A of the permit, 

compliance with the approved Attachment H 

constitutes compliance with the recited provisions of 

the regulations. Yet, including those same provisions as 

permit conditions suggests that something beyond 

complying with the financial assurance mechanisms 

could be required, which is not the case.
108 

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

3 FutureGen The CO2 injection well coordinates in EPA’s draft 

FutureGen UIC Class VI Permit Cover Letter and 

Attachments for each of the injection wells is the 

injection point location described in FG-RPT-017, 

Revision 1 (May 2013). These same coordinates are 

used for all of the 4 injection wells throughout the 

FutureGen permitting documentation. Because the 

currently planned CO2 injection wells’ locations and their 

mid-point location are to the NW of the stated location, 

the Alliance suggests the following wording and 

footnote throughout the permitting documentation for 

the injection well locations:

(If using one set of coordinates for all CO2 injection 

wells’ permit documentation...) 

Location of Injection Well1: Morgan County, IL; 26-

16N-9W; 39.80104°N and 90.07517°W 

1 Actual injection well location will be surveyed after 

injection well construction. 

(If using the planned coordinates of the individual CO2

injection wells in each well’s permit documentation...) 

(Well#1) 

Location of Injection Well1: Morgan County, IL; 26-

16N-9W; 39.80111°N and 90.07491°W 

1 Actual injection well location will be surveyed after 

injection well construction. 

(Well#2) 

Location of Injection Well1: Morgan County, IL; 26-

16N-9W; 39.80097°N and 90.07491°W 

1 Actual injection well location will be surveyed after 

injection well construction. 

(Well#3) 

Location of Injection Well1: Morgan County, IL; 26-

16N-9W; 39.80097°N and 90.07544°W 

EPA has revised the first page of each permit and the first page of 

each permit attachment to reflect the accurate proposed location 

for each of the wells. To the extent that small deviations to the 

planned locations are identified after the wells are constructed and 

surveyed, those corrections can be made through the minor 

modification process identified in 40 C.F.R. §144.41.
109 

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

1 Actual injection well location will be surveyed after 

injection well construction. 

(Well#4) 

Location of Injection Well1: Morgan County, IL; 26-

16N-9W; 39.80111°N and 90.07544°W 

1 Actual injection well location will be surveyed after 

injection well construction.

4 Leinberger & 

Critchelow 

families

F. The Financial Responsibility Provided For In The 

Draft Permit Is Deficient

The draft Permit fails to accurately demonstrate 

financial assurance for the FutureGen Class VI project. 

The Class VI UIC rules broadly require financial 

responsibility related to the creation, operation and 

closure of a Class VI well. 40 C.F.R. §146.85. The 

financial responsibility “must be sufficient to address 

endangerment of underground sources of drinking 

water. 40 C.F.R. §146.85(a)(3). Thus, FutureGen must 

demonstrate and maintain financial responsibility 

sufficient to cover the cost of four categories: the 

corrective action, injection well plugging, post injection 

site care and site closure, and emergency and remedial 

response.6 40 C.F.R. §146.85(a)(2). Moreover, section 

144.12(a) of the UIC regulations states that injection 

activity must be conducted in a manner that does not 

allow the movement of contaminants that may cause a 

violation of drinking water standards, or may otherwise 

adversely affect the health of persons.7 40 C.F.R. 

§144.12(a). Given the purpose of the SDWA in providing 

remedial protections, it would be inconsistent with the 

SDWA to narrowly construe the financial 

responsibilities set forth in §146.85(a). In addition to 

the language of the regulations, it is an important policy 

Financial responsibility requirements for area properties and 

persons that may be adversely affected by the underground 

injection of CO2 are within the scope of the Class VI rule only to the 

extent to which they apply to area properties and persons affected 

through endangerment of USDWs (see 40 C.F.R. §146.85(a)(3)). 

Based on a thorough review of FutureGen’s cost estimates, EPA has 

determined that FutureGen has met the financial responsibility 

requirements of the Class VI Rule. The rule clearly defines which 

phases of the project must be covered by financial responsibility at 

40 C.F.R. §146.85(a)(2). Furthermore, the rule explicitly states which 

costs the owner or operator must cover for each phase, as defined 

at 40 C.F.R. §§146.84, 146.92, 146.93, and 146.94.

Any coverage for damages and risks beyond protection of USDWs 

and human health from contaminants injected into the wells cannot 

be a condition of a UIC permit. For these reasons, EPA will not make 

any changes to the draft permits based on this comment. 

EPA understands, however, that under Chapter 20 of the Illinois 

Compiled Statutes, Section 1108, the State of Illinois may address 

some of the risks beyond those addressed under the UIC permitting 

regulations. 
110 

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

consideration to ensure that area properties and 

persons are not adversely affected by the underground 

injection of CO

2. 

For this draft Permit, the financial responsibility is 

provided for exclusively by a trust fund funded with the 

following amounts: Activity: Performing Corrective 

Action on Deficient Wells in AoR 

Estimated Cost: $623,000

Activity: Plugging Injection Wells 

Estimated Cost: $2,723,000 

Activity: Post-Injection Site Care 

Estimated Cost: $18,320,000 

Activity: Site Closure 

Estimated Cost: $3,402,000 

Activity: Emergency and Remedial Response (Pre-

Injection) 

Estimated Cost: $6,100,000 

Activity: Emergency and Remedial Response (Post-

Injection) 

Estimated Cost: $20,600,000 

FutureGen will not fully fund the trust before 

construction of the wells begins, but instead will pay 

into the trust in a phased approach, which is reflected 

in Table 2 of Attachment H of the draft Permit. 

The financial assurance provided for in Section H and 

Attachment H of the draft Permit is deficient because it 

does not reflect important policy considerations in 

connection with the UIC regulations and does not 

strictly adhere to the regulations, thus thwarting the 

purposes of the SDWA.

FN6: The authorized financial instruments include trust 

funds, surety bonds, letter of credit and insurance. 40 

C.F.R. §146.85(a)(1).
111 

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

FN7: 40 C.F.R. §144 applies to the UIC programs and 

should be read in conjunction with 40 C.F.R. §146. 40 

C.F.R. §146.1(A).

5 Leinberger & 

Critchelow 

families

4) The pay-in-period provisions should be eliminated, 

and instead, FutureGen should fully fund the Trust Fund 

before the project starts. At the very least, the pay-inperiod should be reduced to the shortest time possible. 

This is equally true should FutureGen acquire an 

insurance policy for the emergency and remedial 

response financial assurance. Regardless, the final 

Permit should positively state that the Director 

approved the pay-in-period for the trust fund. 

5) The final Permit should positively state that 

FutureGen may not terminate the financial assurance 

instruments until the Director approves the completed 

post-injection site care and site closure plan and 

approves site closure.

According to 40 C.F.R. §146.85(b), a financial instrument may be 

terminated upon several conditions, one of which is that the 

Director “approves the completed post-injection site care and site 

closure plan” and “approves site closure.” However, the permit 

language should not restrict the Director’s ability to approve the 

termination of an instrument to this condition alone. For example, 

FutureGen may seek to substitute one form of financial mechanism 

for another. If EPA approves such a substitution, termination of the 

superseded instrument would also be appropriate. 

According to 40 C.F.R. §146.85(f), a pay-in period for a trust fund is 

allowable if approved by the Director. EPA approved the pay-in 

structure identified in Attachment H of FutureGen’s permits because 

it is sufficient to protect USDWs and because it minimizes the risk of 

instrument failure in the interim for the following reasons:

1. The first deposit in the proposed pay-in period – of $8.823 

million -- will occur within seven days of final permit approval, 

which will occur before the permits become effective and, 

therefore, before well construction may begin. This 

requirement will ensure that the instrument is sufficiently 

funded during the entire construction phase. 

2. Based on a review of the independent third-party cost 

estimates (Patrick Engineering, Appendix C of the permit 

application), EPA has determined that the initial deposit of 

$8.823 million is sufficient to cover risks associated with the 

potential need to address well plugging and/or Emergency and 

Remedial Response (E&RR) during the construction phase of 

the project. The phase-in approach is based on an evaluation 

of when financial risk will be incurred over the life of the 

project. The $6.1 million cost estimate would cover the 
112 

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

response to a catastrophic failure of the caprock, which was 

the costliest potential event identified. Such an occurrence is 

unlikely to occur even once injection proceeds, and caprock 

failure or other threats to USDW are highly unlikely to result 

from the mere act of constructing injection and monitoring 

wells. 

3. The trust fund will be supplemented with an additional 

payment of $22.345 million within a year of the final permit 

issuance (or prior to any injection if injection is authorized by 

that point). Trust fund resources would be available for any of 

the activities requiring financial responsibility. The trust fund 

would then be fully funded with an additional $20.6 million 

within two years of final permit issuance, which EPA 

anticipates will occur prior to injection of CO2. The full cost 

estimate is based on multiple potential events over a number 

of years. It is unlikely that multiple issues would arise, and 

especially unlikely that they would all arise at the very 

beginning of injection when the volume of sequestered CO2

would be low. The two-year pay-in period is still shorter than 

the three-year period contemplated in the preamble to EPA’s 

final class VI rules (see 75 Fed. Reg. 77271 (Dec. 10, 2010)); and 

its Underground Injection Control (UIC) Program Class VI 

Financial Responsibility Guidance, July 2011, p. 38. 

The final permits, which include Attachment H as an enforceable 

condition, require approval from the Director. Therefore, approval of 

the final permits constitutes approval by the Director of the pay-in

period for the trust fund, as clarified by the changes described 

above. 

Therefore, EPA will not revise the permits in response to these 

comments.
113 

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

6 Leinberger & 

Critchelow 

families

iv. Improper Pay-in Period 

The draft Permit allows FutureGen to incrementally pay 

into the trust fund for each task. See Attachment H, 

Schedule C, entitled the “pay-in-periods.” The Director 

should require that Future Gen fully fund the trust fund

to ensure it has sufficient funds for the entire project. 

As the UIC Guidance Document states, “A fully funded 

trust fund or escrow account minimizes the risk of 

instrument failure. While longer pay-in periods reduce 

the up-front financial burden for the owner or operator, 

longer pay-in periods also increase the risk that the 

instrument will fail if the owner or operator cannot 

meet its obligations.” See U.S. EPA Underground 

Injection Control (UIC) Program Class VI Financial 

Responsibility Guidance, July 2011 p. 23, AR# 438. As 

this is a first of its kind project, FutureGen should have 

all of the funds available to minimize the risk of 

instrument failure.8

Alternatively, the Director should shorten the pay-inperiod to minimize the risk of instrument failure. Id. at 

23. In particular, the incremental funding of the 

emergency and remedial response fund is too long. The 

draft Permit provides that FutureGen will only have 

$6.1 million in emergency response during the drilling 

period, and will add $20.6 million when it begins to 

inject CO2. Because emergency and remedial response 

costs often have a large one-time cost, (see p. 23 of UIC 

Guidance Document), the Permit should require that 

FutureGen have all of its emergency and remedial 

response costs in the trust fund before drilling begins. 

Further, if the Director requires that FutureGen have an 

insurance policy for the emergency and remedial 

response financial assurance per the recommendation 

See response to comment #5 immediately above for a response to 

this comment.
114 

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

above, then the Insurance policy should be fully funded 

to account for an unexpected scenario that will have a 

large on-time cost. Id at 23.

7 Leinberger & 

Critchelow 

families

v. The Draft Permit Improperly Authorizes the Trustee 

and FutureGen to terminate the Trust Fund 

Section 17 of the Trust Agreement in Attachment H of 

the draft Permit states that the trust is irrevocable and 

“shall continue until terminated by the Grantor and 

Trustee, with the concurrence of the EPA Water 

Division Director.” This language is inconsistent with the 

regulations and should be revised. Under 40 C.F.R. 

§146.85(b)(1), the owner or operator must maintain 

financial responsibility and resources until the Director 

“approves the completed post-injection site care and 

site closure plan” and “approves site closure.” 

To ensure that the draft Permit follows the 

requirements under the regulations, the Permit should 

explicitly state that the Trust Fund will not terminate 

until the Director approves the completed postinjection site care and site closure plan and approves 

the site closure. In light of the fact that this is a first-ofits-kind commercial-scale Class VI well, it is important 

that proper financial safeguards be in placeOnce.

According to 40 C.F.R. §146.85(b), a financial instrument may be 

terminated upon several conditions, one of which is that the 

Director “approves the completed post-injection site care and site 

closure plan” and “approves site closure.” However, the permit 

language should not restrict the Director’s ability to approve the 

termination of an instrument to this condition alone. For example, 

FutureGen may seek to substitute one form of financial mechanism 

for another. If EPA approves such a substitution, termination of the 

superseded instrument would also be appropriate. 

As to the specific language in the trust agreement, EPA believes it is 

adequate, as EPA would not concur in the termination of the trust 

agreement unless all regulatory conditions had been met. 

Therefore, EPA will not revise the permits in response to this 

comment.

8 FutureGen It should also be noted that, in Table 1 in Attachment H, 

EPA states that the Alliance’s estimated cost of 

emergency and remedial response is $26.7 million. That 

is an estimate developed by EPA, not the Alliance. In 

addition, that amount assumes that multiple serious or 

catastrophic events occur over the life of the project, 

which is virtually impossible given the level of 

monitoring that will be conducted. In its application, 

the Alliance estimated the cost of groundwater cleanup 

FutureGen’s independent third party cost estimate (by Patrick 

Engineering, Appendix C of the original permit application) 

estimated the cost of E&RR given one possible E&RR event 

(catastrophic failure of the caprock) at $6.1 million. However, EPA 

determined that this estimate was too low based on the range of 

costs provided by EPA’s Cost Estimation Tool. EPA’s Cost Estimation 

Tool is designed to provide an “acceptable range of costs” for GS 

financial responsibility activities using information from the permit 

application. The Cost Estimation Tool estimated costs for E&RR 
115 

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

in the event of a catastrophic failure of caprock (the 

worst possible emergency and remedial response action 

that would be necessary) as $6.1 million. However, the 

Alliance also stated its intention to acquire insurance in 

the amount of $100 million.

based on a scenario in which CO2 moves into the USDW (which is 

generally the costliest event to remediate).

EPA developed the revised cost estimate of $26.7 million based on 

the mid-range cost estimate for E&RR activities (see Exhibit B-2 of 

EPA’s Summary of Financial Responsibility Estimates for FutureGen 

Based on Cost Estimation Tool Outputs, March 2014). As described 

in detail in this summary, the Cost Estimation Tool develops a cost 

estimate using conservative assumptions to provide for financial 

responsibility mechanisms that are sufficient to cover the costs of 

Emergency and Remedial Response as provided in 40 C.F.R. 

§146.85(a)(2)(iv).

In particular, the Cost Estimation Tool looks at:

1) The costs of pump operations and maintenance to create a 

hydraulic barrier to protect USDWs

2) The costs of cement plugs and plug retainers to seal a well

3) The costs of a maintenance rig to repair a well

4) The costs to drill and run extraction wells to treat 

contaminated water from a USDW

The Cost Estimation Tool conservatively assumes that all CO2

injected could leak into the USDW. The FutureGen submission does 

not specify the amount of CO2 assumed to leak into the USDW. The 

Cost Estimation Tool also assumes it will be necessary to stop 

injection for, establish a hydraulic barrier for, and chemically seal, all 

4 wells. That would not necessarily be the case.

FutureGen estimated that pump and treat activities would occur for 

2 years, whereas the Cost Estimation Tool estimates that pump and 

treat activities may continue for anywhere between 2 and 30 years. 

The estimated years of operation provide the main difference 

between the mid-range cost estimate (which assumes 18 years) and 

the high-end cost estimate (which assumes 30 years). Those cost 
116 

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

estimates are inherently conservative because they are derived from 

Superfund groundwater remediation costs, although a GS well 

failure would not be expected to produce the same kinds of toxic 

contamination as found in a Superfund site. GS sites would be 

expected to use the same pump-and-treat techniques in case of 

contamination, but would likely require less complex (and so less 

costly) treatment than is assumed in the estimates.

Especially because of the conservatism built into the Cost Estimation 

Tool assumptions, the proposed trust fund is sufficient to 

demonstrate financial responsibility, and EPA did not find it 

necessary to additionally fund the trust fund to the high-end 

estimate generated by the Cost Estimation Tool at this time. The cost 

estimates will be regularly reviewed, and revised as necessary, under 

the permits. 

EPA informed FutureGen that it had revised the ERRP cost estimate 

to $26.7 million and FutureGen agreed to provide financial 

responsibility for that amount through the trust fund already in 

place to provide financial responsibility for corrective action, well 

plugging, and post-injection site care and site closure. EPA’s final 

E&RR cost estimate was revised upward by approximately $700,000 

after FutureGen had completed a trust agreement for the $26.7 

million figure. The subsequent revision was small enough that the 

trust agreement funding remains sufficient, especially because the 

cost estimates and financial responsibility mechanisms will be 

regularly revisited over the life of the project under Part H of the 

permits. 

Therefore, EPA will not revise the permits in response to this 

comment.
117 

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

9 Leinberger & 

Critchelow 

families

Even if FutureGen is allowed to use a trust fund for the 

emergency and remedial response, the amount is 

insufficient to account for and remedy all possible 

exigencies. Due to last minute changes regarding the 

emergency and remedial response financial assurance, 

the cost estimate is not based upon a detailed written 

estimate as required under the regulations. 

In the permit application, FutureGen proposed to establish an 

insurance policy with a $10 million coverage limit for the preinjection phase and to develop a policy with a $100 million coverage 

limit for the injection phase (to be submitted prior to the injection of 

CO2). However, these policies would have also covered FutureGen’s 

liabilities unrelated to financial responsibility. 

As described in more detail below in response to comment #11, 

because FutureGen’s proposed insurance coverage included a 

number of elements beyond financial assurance for the ERRP and 

did not propose to initially cover the estimated post-injection ERRP 

costs, it is not clear what amount of coverage would have been 

dedicated to financial responsibility under the permits. Without an 

insurance policy clearly delineating the liability amount dedicated to 

financial responsibility for E&RR, EPA could not be certain that the 

insurance policy provided the protective conditions of coverage 

required by 40 C.F.R. §146.85(a)(4)(i).

EPA informed FutureGen that it had revised the ERRP cost estimate 

to $26.7 million, and FutureGen agreed to provide financial 

responsibility for that amount through the trust fund already in 

place to provide financial responsibility for corrective action, well 

plugging, and post-injection site care and site closure. The trust fund 

approach provides full and certain coverage for the entire ERRP cost 

estimate. That cost estimate is calculated using conservative 

assumptions and will be regularly reassessed over the entire life of 

the project. As FutureGen notes, the estimate is sufficient to cover 

multiple serious or catastrophic events that occur over the life of the 

project, a circumstance that is unlikely given the level of monitoring 

that will be conducted. 

The revised estimate of $26.7 million was developed by using EPA’s 

Cost Estimation Tool (see Exhibit B-2 of EPA’s Summary of Financial 
118 

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

Responsibility Estimates for FutureGen Based on Cost Estimation 

Tool Outputs, March 2014). EPA’s Cost Estimation Tool is designed to 

provide an “acceptable range of costs” for GS financial responsibility 

activities based on information submitted with a permit application.

Because EPA’s revised estimate falls within this range, EPA has 

determined that it is sufficient and does not find it necessary to 

additionally fund the trust fund to the high-end estimate generated 

by the Cost Estimation Tool at this time. Because the costs of any 

covered activities for a Class VI project will change over time, EPA 

will, over the life of the project, request revised cost estimates from 

FutureGen and modifications to the financial instruments if changes 

to any of the project plans increase the cost of those activities. See 

Part H. of the permits. If these revisions require modifications to the 

permits, they will go through the permit modification process 

described in 40 C.F.R. Part 144.

As described in more detail in response to comment#8 above, the 

revised cost estimate was developed by EPA, using detailed cost 

information provided by FutureGen, and applying EPA’s Cost 

Estimation Tool. The regulations do not require a cost estimate to 

break down costs into pre-injection and post-injection categories, 

and as described in response to comment#6 above, the approach 

used to establish funding of the trust account is conservative. 

In Appendix C of its permit application, FutureGen provided a 

written detailed cost estimate for E&RR from a third party (Patrick 

Engineering). This cost estimate provided details including a 

description of the project and engineering assumptions; a 

description of activities that are included for each phase identified at 

40 C.F.R.§ 146.85(a)(2); and the company’s methodology for 

developing the cost estimates. The rule does not require that the 

third party provide working papers of the analysis or to provide 

separate costs for the injection and post-injection phases, and EPA 
119 

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

does not find them necessary to evaluate the cost estimates at this 

time. EPA considers the details provided in the cost estimate 

adequate to meet the requirements at 40 C.F.R. § 146.85(c) for the 

permit application.

EPA anticipates that financial responsibility for any Class VI project 

will change over time. Over the course of the project, EPA will

regularly require revised cost estimates from FutureGen and 

modifications to the financial instruments if changes to project plans 

identified at 40 C.F.R. § 146.85(a)(2) increase the cost of those 

activities. See Part H of the permits. These changes will go through 

the permit modification process described in 40 C.F.R. Part 144.

The independent third-party cost estimates developed by Patrick 

Engineering were based on the best understanding of the project 

details at the time FutureGen submitted its permit application. EPA 

is not aware of additional wells in the larger AoR that are deep 

enough to potentially require corrective action. Additional 

information will be developed during construction and pre-injection 

testing and during the pre-injection review of the AoR required 

under Part Q.4 of the permits. EPA will require a new cost estimate 

if, based on information generated, there is reason to believe that 

the scope of corrective action is different than predicted in 

FutureGen’s original plans. Any such changes will go through the 

permit modification process described in 40 C.F.R. Part 144.

Therefore, EPA will not revise the permits in response to these 

comments.

10 Leinberger & 

Critchelow 

families

2) If FutureGen continues to use a trust fund for the 

emergency and remedial response cost estimate, the 

trust fund amount should increase to the high end cost 

estimate of $77.9 million presented in the March 2014 

Estimate. 

See response to comment #9 immediately above for a response to 

this comment.
120 

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

3) The Director should require FutureGen to provide a 

written detailed estimate from third-parties regarding 

the emergency and remedial response for the injection 

and post-injection. The Director should require those 

detailed estimates to be supported with working papers 

showing the analysis for each item. The Director should 

also require FutureGen to increase the cost estimate for 

performing the corrective actions on deficient wells to 

accurately account for the increased Area of Review.

11 Leinberger & 

Critchelow 

families

ii. Improper Reduction of The Emergency Response 

Estimate And Insufficient Amount 

The proposed $26.7 million for the emergency and 

remedial response for the entire project was improperly 

reduced from the originally proposed estimate and is 

insufficient to cover all possible risks and exigencies for 

this project. As stated above, FutureGen originally 

proposed to include a $100 million insurance policy 

with a term of 3 to 5 years for the emergency and 

remedial actions as well as various other insurance 

policies including Control of Well and General Liability 

insurance and Umbrella/Excess coverage. See Sections 

9.4.2.2, 9.4.2.5 and App. D Supporting Documentation; 

FutureGen Response to U.S. EPA p. 4. Attachment H to 

the Permit does not provide for any insurance but 

instead states that there will be $26.7 million in the 

trust fund for the emergency and remedial response. 

This is a significant reduction in financial assurance for 

the multiple possible scenarios that may arise in an 

emergency. Instead of $100 million to cover all possible 

environmental risks, now there is a quarter of the 

coverage originally provided. This is clearly insufficient, 

particularly in light of the multiple unknowns involved 

in this first of its kind project. The Director has no basis 

In the permit application, FutureGen proposed to establish an 

insurance policy with a $10 million coverage limit for the preinjection phase and to develop a policy with a $100 million coverage 

limit for the injection phase (to be submitted prior to the injection of 

CO2). However, these policies would have also covered FutureGen’s 

liabilities unrelated to financial responsibility. 

As stated above, FutureGen originally proposed to include a $100 

million insurance policy with a term of 3 to 5 years for the 

emergency and remedial actions as well as various other insurance 

policies including Control of Well and General Liability insurance and 

Umbrella/Excess coverage. See Sections 9.4.2.2, 9.4.2.5 and App. D 

Supporting Documentation; FutureGen Response to U.S. EPA p. 4. 

Because FutureGen’s proposed insurance coverage included a 

number of elements beyond financial assurance for the ERRP and 

did not propose to initially cover the estimated post-injection ERRP 

costs, it is not clear what the actual amount of coverage would have 

been dedicated to financial responsibility under the permits. 

Without an insurance policy clearly delineating the liability amount 

dedicated to financial responsibility for E&RR, EPA could not be 

certain that the insurance policy provided the protective conditions 

of coverage required by 40 C.F.R. §146.85(a)(4)(i).
121 

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

to approve this reduction and should require 

FutureGen, to obtain, prior to permit issuance, an 

insurance policy with coverage up to $100 million as 

originally proposed to cover the emergency and 

remedial response costs. 

In the event EPA allows FutureGen to use a trust fund 

for the emergency and remedial response financial 

assurance, the allocated amount should be significantly 

increased. The proposed $26.7 million is an insufficient 

amount for the emergency and remedial response 

costs. In the March 2014 Estimate, FutureGen states 

that the range of estimates for the emergency and 

remedial response costs are from $14.7 million to $77.9 

million, and the proposed $26.7 million is the middle 

range of the estimated costs. See March 2014 Estimate, 

p. 8. The largest gap between the middle cost estimate, 

$26.7 million, and the high end cost estimate, $77.9 

million, is the estimated cost to treat contaminated 

water from USDW. See March 2014 Estimate, Ex. B-2. In 

the middle cost estimate, FutureGen estimates that 

treating contaminated water will cost $14.4 million 

dollars, whereas the high end cost estimate is $62.8 

million. Id. There is no explanation or accounting for the 

vast differences in amounts for treating contaminated 

groundwater. Because of the high degree of risks and 

the numerous unknowns, the emergency and remedial 

response cost estimate should be increased to the high 

cost estimate of $77.9 million thus ensuring that 

FutureGen will have sufficient funds to cover all 

potential emergency and remedial situations 

particularly as it relates to treating contaminated 

drinking water. 

EPA informed FutureGen that it had revised the ERRP cost estimate 

to $26.7 million and FutureGen agreed to provide financial 

responsibility for that amount through the trust fund already in 

place to provide financial responsibility for corrective action, well 

plugging, and post-injection site care and site closure. The trust 

fund approach provides full and certain coverage for the entire ERRP 

cost estimate. That cost estimate is calculated using conservative 

assumptions, and will be regularly reassessed over the entire life of 

the project. As FutureGen notes, the estimate is sufficient to cover 

multiple serious or catastrophic events occur over the life of the 

project, a circumstance that is unlikely given the level of monitoring 

that will be conducted. 

The revised estimate of $26.7 million was developed by using EPA’s 

Cost Estimation Tool (see Exhibit B-2 of EPA’s Summary of Financial 

Responsibility Estimates for FutureGen Based on Cost Estimation 

Tool Outputs, March 2014). EPA’s Cost Estimation Tool is designed to 

provide an “acceptable range of costs” for GS financial responsibility 

activities based on information submitted with a permit application.

Because EPA’s revised estimate falls within this range, EPA has 

determined that it is sufficient and does not find it necessary to 

additionally fund the trust fund to the high-end estimate generated 

by the Cost Estimation Tool at this time. Because the costs of any 

covered activities for a Class VI project will change over time, EPA 

will, over the life of the project, request revised cost estimates from 

FutureGen and modifications to the financial instruments if changes 

to any of the project plans increase the cost of those activities. See 

Part H. of the permits. If these revisions require modifications to the 

permits, they will go through the permit modification process 

described in 40 C.F.R. Part 144.

Therefore, EPA will not revise the permits in response to this 

comment.
122 

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

12 Leinberger & 

Critchelow 

families

iii. Failure to provide detailed cost estimate 

A detailed written estimate is missing from the draft 

Permit and supporting materials for the injection and 

post-injection emergency and remedial response trust 

fund amount. Under 40 C.F.R. §146.85(c), “The owner 

or operator must have a detailed written estimate, in 

current dollars, of the cost of performing corrective 

action on wells in the Area of Review, plugging the 

injection well(s), post-injection site care and site 

closure, and emergency and remedial response.” 

Section 146.85(c) further provides: “The cost estimate 

must be performed for each phase separately and must 

be based on the costs to the regulatory agency of hiring 

a third party to perform the required activities. A third 

party is a party who is not within the corporate 

structure of the owner or operator.” 40 C.F.R. 

§146.85(c)(1)

In Attachment H of the draft Permit, Tables 1 and 2 

show the cost estimates for the activities that are 

covered by the Financial Responsibility. In support of 

these estimates, the draft Permit refers to the thirdparty cost estimates submitted by FutureGen in 

Appendix C of the permit application and EPA’s 

independent evaluation of the cost estimates. See 

Attachment H, draft Permit, p. 11. Yet, Appendix C of 

the permit application Supporting Documentation is 

outdated and has inaccurate information. See App. C 

“Cost Estimate to Demonstrate Financial Responsibility 

for Class VI UIC Permit,” March 2013 (“2013 Cost 

Estimate”). The 2013 Cost Estimate does not contain an 

accounting for the proposed emergency and remedial 

response trust fund amount for the injection and postinjection activity. At that time, FutureGen was 

In Appendix C of its permit application, FutureGen provided a 

written detailed cost estimate for E&RR from a third party (Patrick 

Engineering). This cost estimate provided details including a 

description of the project and engineering assumptions; a 

description of activities that are included for each phase identified at 

40 C.F.R. § 146.85(a)(2); and the company’s methodology for 

developing the cost estimates. The rule does not require that the

third party provide working papers of the analysis or to provide 

separate costs for the injection and post-injection phases, and EPA 

does not find them necessary to evaluate the cost estimates at this 

time. EPA considers these details adequate to meet the

requirements at 40 C.F.R. § 146.85(c) for the permit application.

EPA anticipates that financial responsibility for any Class VI project 

will change over time. Over the course of the project, EPA will 

regularly require revised cost estimates from FutureGen and 

modifications to the financial instruments if changes to project plans 

identified at 40 C.F.R. § 146.85(a)(2) increase the cost of those 

activities. See Part H of the permits. These changes will go through 

the permit modification process described in 40 C.F.R. Part 144.

As described in more detail in response to comment #8 above, the 

revised cost estimate was developed by EPA, using detailed cost 

information provided by FutureGen, and applying EPA’s Cost 

Estimation Tool. The regulations do not require a cost estimate to 

break down costs into pre-injection and post-injection categories, 

and as described in response to comment #6 above, the approach 

used to establish funding of the trust account is conservative. 

The independent third-party cost estimates developed by Patrick 

Engineering were based on the best understanding of the project 

details at the time FutureGen submitted its permit application. EPA 

is not aware of additional wells in the larger AoR that are deep 
123 

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

proposing two insurance policies for the emergency and 

remedial response financial assurance. See permit 

application Supporting Documentation, Section 9.4.2.2 

and Appendix D. Now, without explanation, the 

emergency and remedial response trust fund amount is 

$26.7 million. See Attachment H, draft Permit, p. 12. 

The additional financial responsibility documents 

submitted by FutureGen to the AR also do not include a 

detailed cost estimate for emergency and remedial 

response. FutureGen submitted to EPA its March 2014 

Estimate which proposed $26.7 million for emergency 

and remedial response. FutureGen’s only explanation 

was that it was the middle range of costs generated by 

its “Cost Tool.” See March 2014 Estimate, p. 8. 

According to the Cost Tools Output Table, Exhibit B-2, 

the estimated cost of treating contaminated water from 

a USDW ranged from $3.2 million to $62.8 million. Id at 

p. B2. The March 2014 Estimate did not give any additional 

details on the basis for the contaminated water 

estimates, but merely stated that the proposed $14.4 

million was in the middle range of the estimate. Id. As 

required by the regulations, a detailed cost estimate is 

necessary to effectuate one of the important goals of 

the SDWA in protecting drinking water sources. 

Similarly, there is no explanation for the total costs for 

emergency and remedial response as proposed in 

Exhibit B-2. 

The draft Permit is equally opaque in its basis for the 

emergency and remedial response action cost 

estimates. The draft Permit breaks down the 

emergency and remedial response action cost 

estimates by assigning $6.1 million to the pre-injection 

enough to potentially require corrective action. Additional 

information will be developed during construction and pre-injection 

testing and during the pre-injection review of the AoR required 

under Part Q.4 of the permits. EPA will require a new cost estimate 

if, based on information generated, there is reason to believe that 

the scope of corrective action is different than predicted in

FutureGen’s original plans. Any such changes will go through the 

permit modification process described in 40 C.F.R. Part 144.

Therefore, EPA will not revise the permits in response to this 

comment.
124 

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

emergency and remedial response, and $20.6 million 

for the injection and post-injection emergency and 

remedial response. See Attachment H of draft Permit, 

Table 2. There is no accounting or breakdown of the 

injection and post-injection emergency and remedial 

response cost estimate of $20.6 million.

The cost-estimate for performing corrective actions on 

deficient wells in the Area of Review is also improper. 

As explained above, the Area of Review for the project 

significantly increased in the draft Permit, yet 

FutureGen did not reevaluate the wells in the Area of 

Review. Nor did FutureGen reevaluate the cost 

estimate for the wells in the Area of Review. Because 

FutureGen did not reconsider the additional deficient 

wells in the increased Area of Review, the proposed 

cost estimate for performing corrective actions is 

insufficient. The Director should require FutureGen to 

increase the cost estimate accordingly.

The absence of explanation of the significant reduction 

in emergency and remedial response cost estimate is 

contrary to the regulatory requirements in 40 C.F.R. 

§146.85(c) which requires a detailed written estimate 

of the cost of emergency and remedial response. To 

remedy this legal deficiency, the Director should require 

FutureGen to provide a detailed explanation of the cost 

estimate for all of the emergency and remedial 

response cost estimates, particularly the cost estimate 

proposed for the injection and post-injection 

emergency and remedial response. 
125 

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

13 FutureGen Attachment H relates to Financial Assurance 

Demonstration and notes that the Alliance has agreed 

to use a trust fund to cover the costs of corrective 

action, emergency and remedial response, injection well 

plugging, and post-injection site care and site closure. 

The Alliance originally proposed to use third-party 

insurance to cover the costs of emergency and remedial 

response. The agreement to use the trust fund for such 

costs came after EPA expressed concern over the terms 

of the insurance policy specimen submitted by the 

Alliance.

EPA’s Class VI UIC permit regulations require an 

applicant to demonstrate financial responsibility for all 

aspects of the project – from construction through postinjection site care. An applicant must also demonstrate 

it has the financial capability to take any emergency 

and remedial response actions that may be necessary 

over the life of the project to protect underground 

sources of drinking water. Just as individuals purchase 

insurance to cover the cost of accidents or fires, the 

Alliance intends to purchase insurance to cover the cost 

of any emergency and remedial response actions that 

could be needed for the FutureGen 2.0 Project. The 

Alliance described its intention in its Class VI UIC permit 

application Supporting Documentation, and included a 

specimen insurance policy.

During the course of EPA’s review of the Alliance’s 

permit applications, the terms of the specimen 

insurance policy were discussed between EPA and the 

Alliance. As a result, the Alliance, working with its 

insurance broker and insurance company AIG, was able 

to modify the terms of the policy in an effort to satisfy 

EPA’s concerns with respect to renewal and 

As stated above, FutureGen originally proposed to include a $100 

million insurance policy with a term of 3 to 5 years for the 

emergency and remedial actions as well as various other insurance 

policies including Control of Well and General Liability insurance and 

Umbrella/Excess coverage. See Sections 9.4.2.2, 9.4.2.5 and App. D 

Supporting Documentation; FutureGen Response to U.S. EPA p. 4. 

Because FutureGen’s proposed insurance coverage included a 

number of elements beyond financial assurance for the ERRP and 

did not propose to initially cover the estimated post-injection ERRP 

costs, it is not clear what the actual amount of coverage would have 

been dedicated to financial responsibility under the permits. 

Without an insurance policy clearly delineating the liability amount 

dedicated to financial responsibility for E&RR, EPA could not be 

certain that the insurance policy provided the protective conditions 

of coverage required by 40 C.F.R. §146.85(a)(4)(i).

Prior to issuing the draft permit decision, EPA worked closely with 

FutureGen to identify an insurance policy coverage that would be 

adequate to cover all of the activities identified in the Class VI rule 

(40 C.F.R. § 146.85). However, FutureGen submitted a quote for an 

insurance policy for the pre-injection phase with a $10 million 

coverage limit. While FutureGen had made substantial progress on 

the language of the policy, EPA determined that this policy was not 

sufficient to meet the rule requirements for the following reasons:

1. The policy did not specify the amount of funds available for the 

purpose of meeting financial responsibility requirements 

should an E&RR event occur. FutureGen’s proposed $10 million 

insurance policy did not distinguish the coverage dedicated to 

financial responsibility versus other liabilities.

2. EPA did not find the policy limits acceptable given the 

estimated cost of E&RR events, as it appeared there were 

aggregate and per incident limits on the allowable claims for 

E&RR events.
126 

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

cancellation. However, that effort was unsuccessful. 

Instead of relying on insurance, the Alliance agreed to 

add over $25 million to its trust fund already established 

to cover the cost of other aspects of the project.

The Alliance continues to believe that insurance is the 

most cost-effective risk transfer mechanism to address 

emergency and remedial response actions that may be 

– but are not expected to be – required and plans to 

continue its discussions with EPA prior to issuance of 

any final permits.

Based on the discussions the Alliance and the Alliance’s 

agents have had with insurance companies, it is not 

possible to have an insurance policy that is guaranteed 

to renew in perpetuity. Insurers are required to provide 

capital for a fixed-time period to cover potential claims, 

with option to renew at the end of the period. Similarly, 

it is not possible to obtain a non-cancellable policy. The 

cancellation clause of an insurance policy may be 

modified to be non-cancellable for anything other than 

non-payment of the premium, but it is not possible to 

entirely remove the cancellation provision of the policy. 

EPA must recognize these limitations within the 

insurance industry or be willing to accept that insurance 

is not a qualifying financial instrument as is indicated in 

the financial responsibility regulations.

3. The policy did not meet the required conditions of coverage 

specified at 40 C.F.R. §146.85(a)(4). Specifically, the provisions 

for cancellation and renewal were not sufficient to ensure 

adequate time to identify and establish a new financial 

instrument should the insurance company choose to cancel or 

fail to renew the proposed insurance policy.

Therefore, EPA was not confident that the coverage amounts and 

terms of those policies would adequately cover FutureGen’s 

financial responsibility obligations.

Given that EPA pursued parallel discussions about the use of the 

trust fund concurrent with discussions of the insurance policy, EPA 

accepted the use of the trust fund as an alternative instrument to 

demonstrate financial responsibility for E&RR, as indicated in the 

comment. This final decision facilitated the issuance of the draft 

permit(s) in March 2014. 

EPA will continue to work with FutureGen to identify acceptable and 

feasible language to meet these conditions of coverage if FutureGen 

decides to pursue the use of an insurance policy to cover E&RR.

As stated in its comments, FutureGen did continue its discussions 

with EPA after issuance of the draft permits, obtaining further 

information on the necessary elements of an insurance policy that 

would satisfy the regulatory requirements. EPA is willing to work 

with FutureGen and potential insurers to consider approaches that 

would use options to renew (with lead time to substitute alternate 

mechanisms if it appears the policy may not be renewed at the end 

of its term) and that would consider use of commercially necessary 

cancellation provisions (as long as they provided sufficient notice so 

that FutureGen could substitute alternate mechanisms). 
127 

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

If FutureGen wishes to substitute an insurance policy as a financial 

responsibility mechanism for E&RR activities, it may propose to do 

so at any time. If the proposed policy satisfies the requirements of 

40 C.F.R. §146.85, the proposal may proceed through the permit 

modification process outlined in 40 C.F.R. §144.39.

Therefore, EPA will not revise the permits in response to this 

comment.

14 Leinberger & 

Critchelow 

families

It is also improper to allow FutureGen to fund the trust 

fund in a phased-approach because of the risks to the 

instrument and the potential for insufficient coverage 

later. Finally, the draft Permit fails to provide that the 

trust fund may not terminate until the Director has 

approved the completed post-injection site care and 

site closure plan and the final site closure. To resolve 

these deficiencies, the Director should require that 

FutureGen make the changes proposed herein, at 

minimum, so that the final Permit is legally sufficient.

According to 40 C.F.R. § 146.85(f), a pay-in period for a trust fund is 

allowable if approved by the Director. EPA approved the pay-in 

structure identified in Attachment H of FutureGen’s permits because 

it is sufficient to protect USDWs and because it minimizes the risk of 

instrument failure in the interim for the following reasons:

1. The first deposit in the proposed pay-in period – of $8.823 

million -- will occur within seven days of final permit approval, 

which will occur before the permits become effective and, 

therefore, before well construction may begin. This 

requirement will ensure that the instrument is sufficiently 

funded during the entire construction phase. 

2. Based on a review of the independent third-party cost 

estimates (Patrick Engineering, Appendix C of the permit 

application), EPA has determined that the initial deposit of 

$8.823 million is sufficient to cover risks associated with the 
128 

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

potential need to address well plugging and/or E&RR during 

the construction phase of the project. The phase-in approach 

is based on an evaluation of when financial risk will be incurred 

over the life of the project. The $6.1 million cost estimate 

would cover the response to a catastrophic failure of the 

caprock, which was the costliest potential event identified. 

Such an occurrence is unlikely to occur even once injection 

proceeds, and caprock failure or other threats to USDW are 

highly unlikely to result from the mere act of constructing 

injection and monitoring wells. 

3. The trust fund will be supplemented with an additional 

payment of $22.345 million within a year of the final permit 

issuance (or prior to any injection if injection is authorized by 

that point). Trust fund resources would be available for any of 

the activities requiring financial responsibility. The trust fund 

would then be fully funded with an additional $20.6 million 

within two years of final permit issuance, which EPA 

anticipates will occur prior to injection of CO

2. The full cost 

estimate is based on multiple potential events over a number 

of years. It is unlikely that multiple issues would arise, and 

especially unlikely that that would all arise at the very 

beginning of injection when the volume of sequestered CO

2

would be low. The two-year pay-in period is still shorter than 

the three-year period contemplated in the preamble to EPA’s 

final class VI rules (see 75 Fed. Reg. 77271 (Dec. 10, 2010)); and 

its Underground Injection Control (UIC) Program Class VI 

Financial Responsibility Guidance, July 2011, p. 38. 

According to 40 C.F.R. § 146.85(b), a financial instrument may be 

terminated upon several conditions, one of which is that the 

Director “approves the completed post-injection site care and site 

closure plan” and “approves site closure.” However, the permit 

language should not restrict the Director’s ability to approve the 
129 

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

termination of an instrument to this condition alone. For example, 

FutureGen may seek to substitute one form of financial mechanism 

for another. If EPA approves such a substitution, termination of the 

superseded instrument would also be appropriate. 

As to the specific language in the trust agreement, EPA believes it is 

adequate, as EPA would not concur in the termination of the trust 

agreement unless all regulatory conditions had been met. 

Therefore, EPA will not revise the permits in response to this 

comment.

15 Leinberger & 

Critchelow 

families

Foremost, the emergency and remedial response 

financial assurance should not be a trust fund, but 

should be an insurance policy as originally proposed in 

the Permit Application. Because of the switch to a trust 

fund, the emergency and remedial response is now a 

quarter of the amount of coverage FutureGen originally 

proposed. 

EPA agrees that a well-developed insurance policy that meets all 

necessary conditions of coverage and that clearly provides adequate 

coverage for E&RR costs is the best instrument to use to 

demonstrate financial responsibility for E&RR. However, for reasons 

described in response to comment #13, EPA did not find the 

insurance policy submitted by FutureGen on March 27, 2014 to be 

sufficient to meet financial responsibility requirements. As described 

in the response to comment #14, FutureGen’s proposed insurance

policies did not distinguish the coverage dedicated to financial 

responsibility versus other liabilities, so that it is not clear the 

amount actually devoted to E&RR costs, or even the precise nature 

of the policy or commitment to insure the injection and postinjection period.

FutureGen may use any of the financial instruments listed at 40 

C.F.R. § 146.85(a)(1) to demonstrate financial responsibility for E&RR 

as long as the instrument is sufficient to address endangerment of 

USDWs. EPA determined that the use of a trust fund for E&RR will 

meet this requirement because it meets the required conditions of 

coverage at 40 C.F.R. § 146.85(a)(4) and is sufficiently funded to 

cover the likely costs of E&RR events, as evaluated by EPA’s Cost 
130 

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

16 Leinberger & 

Critchelow 

families

i. A Trust Fund is Improper for the Emergency Remedial 

Response 

A trust fund to cover the emergency and remedial 

response financial assurance is improper and 

FutureGen should be required to obtain a pollution 

insurance policy as originally provided for in its Permit 

Application. The U.S. EPA Underground Injection 

Control (UIC) Program Class VI Financial Responsibility 

Guidance (“UIC Guidance Document”) does not 

recommend a trust fund for emergency responses. “For 

activities of uncertain frequency and cost, such as 

emergency and remedial responses, the trust will likely 

not have the right amount of funds—too little is a 

partial failure of the instrument and too much 

represents an inefficient use of funds that unnecessarily 

raises GS costs. See U.S.EPA Underground Injection 

Control (UIC) Program Class VI Financial Responsibility 

Guidance, July 2011 p. 21, AR #438. Instead, the 

UIC Guidance Document states that “[i]nsurance 

policies are best suited for diversifying environmental 

risk. Insurance is the ideal instrument for handling the 

numerous possible scenarios associated with uncertain 

events such as emergency and remedial response 

demonstrations.” Id at p. 22. 

In the permit application Supporting Documentation, 

FutureGen proposed to include a $100 million insurance 

policy with a term of 3 to 5 years for the emergency and 

remedial response actions. See Sections 9.4.2.2, 9.4.2.5 

and App. D. In FutureGen’s November 2013 response to 

U.S.EPA’s Request for Additional Information, 

FutureGen stated that it “intends to obtain third party 

insurance for costs related to any required emergency 

and remedial response action.” See FutureGen 

Estimation Tool. Therefore, a requirement to use an insurance policy 

(precluding any other instrument) cannot be a condition of the UIC 

permit.

Furthermore, EPA notes that it is beyond the scope of the Class VI 

rule to require various other insurance policies, such as Control Well 

and General Liability insurance and Umbrella/Excess coverage, 

beyond the coverage requirements at 40 C.F.R. § 146.85(a)(2). 

Therefore, EPA will not revise the permits in response to comments

#15, 16 and 17.
131 

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

Response, November 2013, p. 4, AR# 3. FutureGen 

further stated that it would obtain a $10 million 

insurance policy for the drilling phase and increase the 

coverage to a $100 million policy for the injection phase 

as well as “various other insurance policies including 

Control of Well and General Liability insurance and 

Umbrella/Excess coverage.” Id. 

Yet, the draft Permit as issued only provides for a trust 

fund of $26.7 million. The draft Permit does not explain 

this last minute change in the financial assurance and 

nor does the “Summary of Financial Responsibility 

Estimates for FutureGen Based on Cost Tool Options” 

submitted on March 28, 2014 (the “March 2014 

Estimate”). See AR# 320. The March 2014 Estimate 

merely states that FutureGen decided it would use a 

trust fund/agreement to cover the emergency and 

remedial response costs. Id at p. 7. As explained by the 

Guidance Document, insurance policies are the best 

financial mechanisms to provide for the virtually infinite 

possible emergency scenarios that may occur. This is 

particularly true for a first of its kind project such as this 

one. Thus, the Director should require FutureGen to 

reinstate an insurance policy to provide for all of the 

possible environmental risks associated with such a 

new project. The insurance policy must have a limit of 

at least $100 million and must not contain exclusions 

that render the policy inadequate for its purpose.

17 Leinberger & 

Critchelow 

families

vi. Proposed Changes to the Financial Assurance 

As detailed above, there are multiple deficiencies in 

the financial assurance portion of the Draft Permit. 

The following are proposed remedies for these 

deficiencies: 

1) In light of the unproven nature of the project and the 
132 

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

high risks associated with this first-of-its-kind project, 

FutureGen should have a $100 million pollution policy 

as originally planned as well as various other insurance 

policies including Control Well and General Liability 

insurance and Umbrella/Excess coverage as provided 

for in FutureGen’s November 2013 Response to 

U.S.EPA’s comments.

18 NRDC Financial Responsibility

1. Effective financial assurance mechanisms are 

necessary to ensure that closure and post-closure site 

care, such as monitoring, can be conducted when the 

time comes, and that should corrective action and 

emergency and remedial responses become imperative, 

there is funding sufficient to complete this work. Were 

Applicant to become insolvent without an adequate 

financial assurance mechanism, significant delays could 

occur, increasing the likelihood of environmental 

contamination and adverse human health effects. 

Moreover, federal or state governments (and ultimately 

the general public) might become financially 

responsible for the closure and post- closure site care 

costs or emergency and remedial responses should 

those be required. Consequently, any uncertainties 

about the adequacy of financial assurances need to be 

minimized. 

It is clear that the Applicant has given considerable 

thought to the Financial Responsibility package for the 

FutureGen Storage Site. The Applicant originally 

proposed in section 9.0 of the application, to provide 

for and fund a Trust Fund to cover the expected future 

costs of any corrective action, injection well plugging, 

post-injection site care and site closure, and emergency 

and remedial response, pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 146.85; 

As discussed in more detail in response to comment #13, FutureGen

originally proposed to use a third-party insurance policy to cover the 

expected future costs of emergency and remedial response as well 

as other potential liabilities beyond the scope of the UIC permitting 

program. The draft permits reflected a change in that approach to 

use the trust fund to provide financial responsibility for E&RR costs 

as well. The amount in the trust fund covers the entire cost estimate 

for financial responsibility elements required under the UIC 

permitting regulations. Consistent with those regulations, other or 

additional financial assurance will be required if the cost estimates 

increase so that the trust fund value no longer covers the expected 

costs. See 40 C.F.R. §146.85(c). 

According to 40 C.F.R. § 146.85(f), a pay-in-period for a trust fund is 

allowable if approved by the Director. EPA approved the pay-in 

structure identified in Attachment H of FutureGen’s permits because 

it is sufficient to protect USDWs and because it minimizes the risk of 

instrument failure in the interim for the following reasons:

1. The first deposit in the proposed pay-in period – of $8.823 

million -- will occur within seven days of final permit approval, 

which will occur before the permits become effective and, 

therefore, before well construction may begin. This 

requirement will ensure that the instrument is sufficiently 

funded during the entire construction phase. 

2. Based on a review of the independent third-party cost 

estimates (Patrick Engineering, Appendix C of the permit 
133 

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

and also a third-party insurance policy (a Pollution Legal

Liability policy), to be available to cover additional 

costs, should the Applicant become legally obligated to 

conduct any necessary emergency or remedial response 

actions. Application at 9.4.2.1. The Draft Permit and its 

attachments, however, refer only to the funding of a 

Trust Fund to cover all the costs, although also 

providing a directive to “establish other financial 

assurance or liability coverage,” within 60 days of an 

update that indicates the cost estimate has been 

adjusted to a point at which the Trust Fund value no 

longer covers the expected costs. Proposed Draft 

Permit Attachment H. 

In general it appears that the Applicant was thoughtful 

in its approach to this issue, concerning the valuation of 

the amounts needed for initial capitalization of the 

Trust Fund, in initially proposing a backstop insurance 

policy. See Application section 9. EPA must take a hard 

look at the Trust document provided by the Applicant in 

Attachment H – because we see several aspects of the 

Trust Fund-only structure that are of concern to us, 

and that necessarily should be remedied, for the 

Trust Fund to meet the regulatory requirement to be 

“demonstrated and maintained” as “sufficient” to cover 

the costs outlined in 40 C.F.R. § 146.85 (a)(2) and (3). 

We think that it is relatively simple to fix the issues we 

identify and urge the Agency to consider our comments 

as it finalizes this Permit. 

First, as it is structured, there is no requirement for the 

Trust Fund to be fully capitalized before injection 

begins. See Attachment H, Schedule C. Partial 

capitalization must occur before injection begins, at a 

level of $31.168 million, but the remaining $20.6 million 

application), EPA has determined that the initial deposit of 

$8.823 million is sufficient to cover risks associated with the 

potential need to address well plugging and/or E&RR during 

the construction phase of the project. The phase-in approach is 

based on an evaluation of when financial risk will be incurred 

over the life of the project. The $6.1 million cost estimate 

would cover the response to a catastrophic failure of the 

caprock, which was the costliest potential event identified. 

Such an occurrence is unlikely to occur even once injection 

proceeds, and caprock failure or other threats to USDW are 

highly unlikely to result from the mere act of constructing 

injection and monitoring wells. 

3. The trust fund will be supplemented with an additional 

payment of $22.345 million within a year of the final permit 

issuance (or prior to any injection if injection is authorized by 

that point). Trust fund resources would be available for any of 

the activities requiring financial responsibility. The trust fund 

would then be fully funded with an additional $20.6 million 

within two years of final permit issuance, which EPA 

anticipates will occur prior to injection of CO2. The full cost 

estimate is based on multiple potential events over a number 

of years. It is unlikely that multiple issues would arise, and 

especially unlikely that that would all arise at the very 

beginning of injection when the volume of sequestered CO2

would be low. The two-year pay-in period is still shorter than 

the three-year period contemplated in the preamble to EPA’s 

final class VI rules (see 75 Fed. Reg. 77271 (Dec. 10, 2010)); and 

its Underground Injection Control (UIC) Program Class VI 

Financial Responsibility Guidance, July 2011, p. 38. 

The trust fund approved in the draft permits includes restrictions on 

ways to invest the funds in Section 6 “Trustee Management,” which 

is consistent with the recommended language in the Class VI 
134 

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

(covering emergency and remedial response costs, for 

which it would appear that the Applicant originally 

intended to provide an insurance policy), does not need 

to be in the Trust except “within two years of final 

permit issuance.” Proposed Draft Permit, Attachment H, 

Schedule C, Table 1 (italics in original). We urge EPA to 

consider directing that all Trust Fund capitalization be 

completed before full- scale injection begins. 

Second, the Trust Fund document included with the 

Draft Permit does not limit the kinds of instruments 

that can be used for initial capitalization of the Trust 

Fund, for example, to low-risk securities or U.S. 

government instruments. We recognize that the Fund 

amounts must grow to maintain over time the amounts 

of money needed to cover the costs identified in 40 

C.F.R. § 146.85(a)(2) and (3). But it seems unusually 

risky not to limit the investment or reinvestment of 

funds or to require that the principal amount must be 

maintained, at the very least. But the Trust Fund 

instrument in Attachment H does not limit how the 

initial capital can be reinvested – it does not, for 

example require that only amounts above the identified 

needed principal amount can be reinvested, or limit the 

kinds of investment that can occur to low-risk 

instruments (U.S. government bonds, for example). 

That concerns us, particularly when combined with the 

decision not to provide up front an insurance policy to 

cover the costs which 40 C.F.R. § 146.86 requires must 

be covered at “sufficient” levels and “maintain[ed].” 

In sum, we urge the Agency to require the Applicant at 

least to fully fund the Trust Fund before injection 

begins, and also to limit the extent to which the Trustee 

can invest the principal of the Trust, by allowing 

Financial Responsibility Guidance. This language has undergone 

extensive review by industry experts and stakeholders, and EPA has 

determined that it is sufficiently protective of funds in the proposed 

trust fund. Furthermore, according to 40 C.F.R. § 146.85(a)(5)(ii), 

FutureGen must maintain financial responsibility requirements at all 

times. Therefore, if the value of the trust fund drops below the

minimum funding requirements, FutureGen must deposit funds 

needed to maintain financial responsibility requirements. EPA also 

requires annual valuations of the trust fund and may require 

additional funds to be placed in the trust fund if the Director 

determines that its value is inadequate. EPA has determined that 

these safeguards are sufficient to ensure the adequacy of 

FutureGen’s financial responsibility demonstration through the life 

of the project. 

Therefore, EPA will not revise the permits in response to this 

comment.
135 

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

investment only of amounts above the required 

principal amount identified by the Applicant as 

sufficiently covering and maintaining amounts sufficient 

to meet the potential responsibilities outlined in 40 

C.F.R. § 146.85(2)(a), and by limiting such 

investments to financial instruments of low or 

moderate risk.
136 

SECTION 5. CONSTRUCTION AND PRE-INJECTION TESTING COMMENTS 

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

1 Betty 

Niemann

Property owners were promised by Terry Dennison 

of the Jacksonville Region Economic Development 

Corporation that the FutureGen Project would be 

under close scrutiny. However, I believe that there is 

not enough scrutiny for me to rest easy about the 

CO2 sequestration under the family land.

I have experienced a definite lack of correct detail in 

initial documents prepared by FutureGen. What 

experience does the FutureGen Alliance have in 

drilling and maintaining wellheads?

EPA regulations at 40 C.F.R. Parts 144 and 146 state the requirements and 

standards that a permit applicant must meet to have a UIC permit 

application approved. These regulations deal primarily with the geologic 

siting, well engineering, operating, and monitoring standards for deep 

injection wells. EPA has reviewed the permit applications and finds that 

they contain sufficient information to satisfy the requirements of 40 C.F.R. 

Part 146, Subpart H, and the other relevant portions of 40 C.F.R. parts 144 

and 146. Experience with drilling and maintaining wellheads is not 

addressed by the UIC regulations and is outside the scope of the UIC 

permit process.

2 Robert J. 

Finley

The requirements for construction meet or exceed 

standards employed in other sequestration sites 

around the world and build on the work done at 

these sites. 

Thank you for your comment. 

3 CSC Provision: I(2)

Text of Draft Permit:

2. Casing and Cementing – Casing and cement or 

other materials used in the construction of the well 

must have sufficient structural strength for the life 

of the geologic sequestration project. All well 

materials must be compatible with all fluids with 

which the materials may be expected to come into 

contact and must meet or exceed standards 

developed for such materials by the American 

Petroleum Institute, ASTM International, or 

comparable standards acceptable to the Director. 

The casing and cementing program must prevent 

the movement of fluids into or between USDWs for 

the expected life of the well in accordance with 40 

CFR 146.86. The casing and cement used in the 

construction of this well are shown in Attachment G 

By issuing final permits with the same language used in the draft permits, 

EPA approves the casing and cementing plans submitted by 

FutureGen. However, EPA also recognizes that site-specific conditions or 

new information may present the need to alter the casing and cementing 

plan. To the extent new information indicates that the casing and/or 

cementing plans need to be revised, the permit language emphasizes the 

need to assure compliance with 40 C.F.R. § 146.86 and makes clear the 

standards against which any necessary revisions would be judged. At that 

time, FutureGen may propose to the Director changes in the casing and 

cementing plan. If any changes to the casing and cementing plans are 

required, those changes can be made through the permit modification 

process. Further, as stated in the response to General Comments above, 

FutureGen must comply with both its permits and the applicable 

regulations. Therefore, the permit language has not been modified based 

upon this comment.
137 

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

of this permit and in the administrative record for 

this permit. Any change must be submitted in an 

electronic format for approval by the Director 

before installation.

Proposed Revision: 2. Casing and Cementing – The 

permittee has demonstrated to the satisfaction of 

the Director that the casing and cement or and other 

materials to be used in the construction of the well 

must have sufficient structural strength for the life 

of the geologic sequestration project, . All well

materials must be are compatible with all fluids with 

which the materials may be expected to come into 

contact, and must meet or exceed standards 

developed for such materials by the American 

Petroleum Institute, ASTM International, or 

comparable standards acceptable to the Director,. 

The casing and cementing program must prevent 

the movement of fluids into or between USDWs for 

the expected life of the well in accordance with 40 

CFR 146.86. The casing and cement used in the 

construction of this well are shown in Attachment G 

of this permit

Comment: Once again, this condition is written in a 

way that suggests that compliance requires 

something beyond following the approved 

construction plan. That is not the case. It is sufficient 

for the permittee to follow the construction plan 

submitted with the permit application and approved 

in the permit.
138 

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

4 Leinberger 

& 

Critchelow 

families

Well Design

11) Surface casing through lowermost USDW

a) FutureGen proposes to install 24 inch diameter 

conductor casing to a depth of approximately 140 

feet bgs, 16 inch diameter surface casing to a depth 

of approximately 570 feet bgs and 10.75 inch 

diameter intermediate casing a depth of 

approximately 3,150 feet bgs where the 7 inch 

diameter stainless steel transition casing will extend 

to a depth of approximately 3,900 feet bgs (Section 

4.2.2, Page 4.6, Supporting Documentation). 

Response to USEPA Request for Additional 

Information #1 (RAI-1), Page 25 of 30, illustrates the 

open-hole completion that confirms these casing 

depths relative to the geologic formation depths. 

b) As stated in 40 CFR.86(b)(2), “Surface casing must 

extend through the base of the lowermost 

USDW.....” Since the lowermost identified USDW is 

the St. Peter Sandstone with its base at 

approximately 1,950 feet bgs it would be 

appropriate to extend the surface casing to a depth 

of approximately 2,000 feet bgs not only to comply 

with the regulations but also to ensure that no 

contaminants (oil) are dragged down from overlying 

geologic units during the drilling process. 

Requested Change/Action: FutureGen should modify 

their downhole casing design to comply with the 

regulations and ensure no cross contamination of 

the St. Peter Sandstone USDW from overlying 

geologic formations.

EPA has determined that the casing details in the permit applications meet 

the requirements set forth in 40 C.F.R. § 146.86. The Preamble to the 

Class VI Rule (75 Fed. Reg. 77229) states that the “...two types of casing in 

most injection wells are (1) surface casing, the outermost casing that 

extends from the surface to the base of the lowermost USDW and (2) 

long-string casing, which extends from the surface to or through the 

injection zone.” In addition, 40 C.F.R. § 146.86(b)(2) states “Surface casing 

must extend through the base of the lowermost USDW and be cemented 

to the surface through the use of a single or multiple strings of casing and 

cement.” Although the well schematic uses technical nomenclature to 

distinguish the multiple strings of casing from one another, the proposed 

well construction consists of three strings that together comprise the 

surface casing (denoted as the Conductor Casing, Surface Casing, and 

Intermediate Casing) and one long-string casing (denoted as the 

Production Casing). All three strings of surface casing are to be cemented 

to the surface. The deepest portion of the surface casing (the 

Intermediate Casing) extends to 3,150 feet, which exceeds the lowermost 

USDW depth of 1,950 feet by more than an additional 1,000 feet. EPA 

finds that the proposed well construction meets both the letter and intent 

of the regulations and is designed to protect against contamination of the 

St. Peter Sandstone and other USDWs. Therefore, the permit language 

has not been modified based upon this comment.

5 NRDC Well Design

1. In the permit application, Applicant indicates 

that, if a cased-hole completion configuration is 

In their permit application, FutureGen stated that they propose to clean 

out their perforations with hydrochloric acid containing additives such as 

surfactants, clay stabilizers, and iron sequestering agents. This is a 
139 

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

used, the perforations in such injection wells will be 

acidized in order to clean up formation damage in 

the near-wellbore. EPA should require Applicant to 

fully disclose the identities, quantities, and 

concentrations of all chemicals used to acidize 

the perforations, including Chemical Abstract 

Service Registry Numbers (“CASRNs”).

common well completion technique. After soaking to clean out the 

perforations, the acid will be removed from the well. Some flexibility is 

appropriate within those general parameters to adjust to the site-specific 

conditions. After injection wells are drilled and completed, a permittee is 

required to submit a well completion report pursuant to 40 C.F.R. §

146.82(c). This well completion report must include a list precisely 

identifying which constituents, including the quantities and 

concentrations, that were used to acidize the perforations.

Therefore, the permit language has not been modified based upon this 

comment.

6 CSC Provision: I(3)

Text of Draft Permit: 3. Tubing and Packer 

Specifications – Tubing and packer materials used in 

the construction of the well must be compatible 

with fluids with which the materials may be 

expected to come into contact and must meet or 

exceed standards developed for such materials by 

the American Petroleum Institute, ASTM 

International, or comparable standards acceptable 

to the Director. The permittee shall inject only 

through tubing with a packer set within the long 

string casing at a point within or below the confining 

zone immediately above the injection zone. The 

tubing and packer used in the well are represented 

in engineering drawings contained in Attachment G 

of this permit. Any change must be submitted in an 

electronic format for approval by the Director 

before installation.

Proposed Revision: 3. Tubing and Packer 

Specifications – Tubing and packer materials used in 

the construction of the well must be compatible 

with fluids with which the materials may be 

By issuing final permits containing the language as presented in the draft 

permit, EPA approves the tubing and packer plans submitted by 

FutureGen. However, EPA also recognizes that site-specific conditions or 

new information may present the need to alter the tubing and packer 

plan. To the extent new information indicates that the Well Construction 

Plan needs to be revised, FutureGen will propose to the Director a new 

plan that complies with 40 C.F.R. § 146.86, and makes clear the standards 

against which any necessary revisions would be judged. If any changes to 

the casing and cementing plans are required, those changes can be made 

through the permit modification process. Further, FutureGen must 

comply with both its permits and the regulations. Therefore, the permit 

language has not been modified based upon this comment.
140 

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

expected to come into contact and must meet or 

exceed standards developed for such materials by 

the American Petroleum Institute, ASTM 

International, or comparable standards acceptable 

to the Director. The permittee shall inject only 

through tubing with a packer set within the long 

string casing at a point within or below the confining 

zone immediately above the injection zone. The 

tubing and packer used in the well are as

represented in engineering drawings contained in 

Attachment G of this permit. Any change must be 

submitted in an electronic format for approval by 

the Director before installation.

Comment: Once again, this condition is written in a 

way that suggests that compliance requires 

something beyond following the approved 

engineering drawings, which is not the case. It is 

sufficient for the permittee to follow the 

engineering drawings submitted with the permit 

application and approved in the permit.

7 FutureGen Page G1, 1st table

Please change footnote (a) 

A corrosion-resistant alloy such as 13 Cr (13 percent 

chromium) having strength properties equal to or 

greater than 29-lb/ft P-110 and having premium 

connections will be used for this section.

to read as:

A corrosion-resistant alloy such as 13 Cr (13 percent 

chromium) having strength properties comparable 

to 29-lb/ft P-110 and having premium connections 

will be used for this section.

Using “comparable” casing does not connote a clear standard that EPA can 

use to determine if an alternative casing is adequate. The comment did 

not provide any explanation or rationale for the change. If there is concern 

that a preferred option may be acceptable but may not meet the 

standard, those circumstances can be addressed through a plan revision 

and permit modification using the procedures described in 40 C.F.R. Part 

144.

Therefore, the permit language has not been modified based upon this 

comment.
141 

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

8 FutureGen Page G1, 1st table 

Please add the following footnote (b) to this table:

The depths shown in this table are based on geologic 

data from the FutureGen 2.0 stratigraphic well, 

located approximately 1.24 mile from the injection 

well location. Actual depths may vary depending on 

geologic conditions at the injection well location. 

Materials of construction may vary slightly 

depending on availability at time of construction.

UIC wells are initially permitted based upon best available information at 

the time of the application. All final information will be submitted by the 

FutureGen Alliance in a well completion report, pursuant to 40 C.F.R. §

146.82(c). To the extent that small deviations to the anticipated depths 

and construction details are identified after the wells are constructed and 

the geology is further surveyed, those corrections can typically be made 

through the minor modification process identified in 40 C.F.R. § 144.41. 

Therefore, the permit language has not been modified based upon this 

comment.

9 FutureGen Figure 1

Please add the following note to this figure:

The depths shown in this figure are based on 

geologic data from the FutureGen 2.0 stratigraphic 

well, located approximately 1.24 mile from the 

injection well location. Actual depths may vary 

depending on geologic conditions at the injection 

well location. Materials of construction may vary 

slightly depending on availability at time of 

construction.

UIC wells are initially permitted based upon best available information at 

the time of the application. All final information will be submitted by the 

FutureGen Alliance in a well completion report, pursuant to 40 C.F.R. §

146.82(c). To the extent that small deviations to the anticipated depths 

and construction details are identified after the wells are constructed and 

the geology is further surveyed, those corrections can typically be made 

through the minor modification process identified in 40 C.F.R. § 144.41.

Therefore, the permit language has not been modified based upon this 

comment.

10 FutureGen Page G5

In Pre-Injection Testing Plan, 1st paragraph, lines 4-6, 

please change the following sentence:

The pre-operational testing program will include a 

combination of logging, coring, formation 

hydrogeologic testing (e.g., a pump test and/or 

injectivity tests), and other activities during the 

drilling and construction of the CO2 injection well.

To read:

The pre-operational formation testing program will 

include a combination of logging, coring, formation 

hydrogeologic testing (e.g., a pump test and/or 

injectivity tests), and other activities during the 

drilling and construction of the CO2 injection well, 

This suggested change accurately clarifies the intended scope of the preoperational formation testing program. The suggested change is 

incorporated into the final permits; however, in the last line of the 

suggested language, EPA will change “or” to “and” since the testing will 

apply to all of those wells listed.
142 

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

monitoring well(s), or the FutureGen 2.0 

stratigraphic well.

11 FutureGen Page G5

In Wireline Logging, lines 7-10, please change the 

following sentence:

Open-borehole logs will include caliper, gamma, 

spontaneous potential (or brine formation 

equivalent), resistivity, neutron, density, 

photoelectric cross-section, sonic (full waveform), 

nuclear magnetic resonance, resistivity-based and/or 

acoustic-based micro-image, and gammaspectroscopy logs.

To read as follows:

Open-borehole logs for the surface, intermediate, 

and long-string sections of the well will include a 

suite of standard logs including gamma ray, 

formation density, neutron porosity, resistivity, 

spontaneous potential, photoelectric factor, and 

caliper. In addition, one or more specialized logs 

may also be run on the long-string section of the 

well, including for example, spectral gamma,sonic, 

resistivity-based and/or acoustic-based image,

nuclear magnetic resonance, and elemental capture 

spectroscopy.

The comment helps to draw a distinction between logs that will be run on 

all casing strings and those that might be run on only the long string of 

casing. This clarification meets the requirements at 40 C.F.R. § 146.87 and 

is acceptable. 

The suggested change is incorporated into the final permits.

12 CSC Section J(1)(d) of the draft permits appears to 

require that “tests” be conducted to determine 

“fracture pressure and the physical and chemical 

characteristics of the injection and confining zones”. 

Fracture pressures and physical and chemical characteristics can vary 

between geologic formations, even when they are of comparable depths 

and/or rock types. Therefore, determining fracture pressures and other 

formation characteristics accurately requires some testing as part of an 
143 

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

Yet, the applicable provision of section 146.87(d) 

only requires that “the owner or operator must 

determine or calculate” these items. Actual testing 

may or may not be necessary and should be 

completely optional if sufficient information is 

already available. Our attached detailed comments 

provide alternative language to achieve this result.

analysis. Information collected from tests of nearby wells may be 

confidently used without the need to collect data from the well being 

drilled. In those cases, the required test may collect the necessary 

information in a nearby well and be applied to the subject well via a 

corresponding calculation. In the case of FutureGen, actual testing of the 

formation is necessary to accurately determine fracture pressures, 

physical and chemical characterization and hence safe operating limits. 

Since this information may be applicable to the immediate area, this 

testing is not required at every well but still needs to be gathered. 

To the extent this provision goes beyond the specific language of the 

regulation, EPA may add permit requirements beyond those laid out 

specifically in the UIC regulations on a case-by-case basis under 40 C.F.R. § 

144.52(a)(9) (case-by-case conditions as necessary to prevent migration) 

and § 144.52(b) (case-by-case conditions as required to provide for and 

assure compliance with all applicable requirements of the SDWA and 

regulations). This provision is a rational extension of the regulatory 

language, and is in place to assure protection of the well, the USDWs, and 

FutureGen. Protective language is especially important here, as these will 

be the first Class VI wells operated at this scale in the United States and 

accurate characterization of the injection and confining zones is a central 

part of the Class VI regulatory provisions. 

Therefore, the permit language has not been modified based upon this 

comment.
144 

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

13 Betty 

Niemann

b. The reservoir or storage layer also encompasses 

the Elmhurst Layer at the bottom of the Eau Claire 

formation. FutureGen did not do any porosity and 

pressure tests of this upper most layer of the 

storage zone. Why? One would think that the 

porosity and pressure datum would be important 

information to further define the storage zone.

c. What is the pressure of the overburden? Will the 

injection pressure of the CO2 be above the 

overburden pressure or below. If the overburden 

pressure is under the injection pressure, then there 

is a chance of the CO2 to escape the injection and 

storage layers? As I understand a study on 

mechanisms for CO2 leakage prevention by Johannes 

M. Miocic, Stuart M V Gilillan, Christopher 

McDermott, and R Stuart Haszeldine,xiii they 

conclude that supercritical CO2 under pressure 

which is less than 50% of overburden (lithographic 

pressure) will have the least chance of leakage.

d. What is the fracture pressure of the Eau Claire 

layer and what assurances that the injection 

pressure of the supercritical CO2 will be below this 

fracture pressure?

b. FutureGen combined regional geologic data with specific site data 

collected via well logs, sidewall cores, and whole cores to characterize the 

Elmhurst formation. Elmhurst formation permeability values were 

determined using ELAN-based (ELAN=elemental analysis) calculated values 

derived from wireline logs. FutureGen will measure values from logging 

and coring data collected when additional wells are drilled to confirm or 

refine their current estimates. Therefore, the permit language has not 

been modified based upon this comment.

c. EPA evaluated the information submitted by FutureGen and finds that 

the Eau Claire formation provides a suitable caprock to contain the 

injected carbon dioxide in the Mount Simon Sandstone. Background 

pressures of the Eau Claire and Mount Simon formations, and well as postinjection pressures, were all contained in the computational modeling that 

confirmed the viability of the injection site. Therefore, the permit 

language has not been modified based upon this comment.

d. FutureGen’s application states that site specific numbers will be 

obtained when the injection wells are drilled. EPA bases the maximum 

allowable injection pressure on the injection zone, where elevated 

pressure due to injection will be the highest. EPA is basing maximum 

allowable injection pressures on the lowest fracture pressure identified 

and recalculated based on the depth it will be monitored at. FutureGen 

determined fracture pressures at two locations (depths) within the 

confining zone and five within the injection zone. The lowest fracture 

pressure found was at the depth where the downhole pressure

monitoring will occur. FutureGen will be collecting additional fracture 

pressure data for various depths in the confining and injection formations 

as new wells are drilled. EPA recognizes that site-specific conditions or 

new information may present the need to alter the maximum injection 

pressure. To the extent new information indicates that the permit needs 

to be revised, FutureGen will propose to the Director a proposed injection 

pressure that complies with 40 C.F.R. § 146.88. If any changes to 
145 

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

Attachment A are required, those changes can be made through the 

permit modification process. Therefore, the permit language has not been 

modified based upon this comment.

14 Betty 

Niemann

i. Well cement - during drilling of the wells and the 

use of cement, will FutureGen take core samples of 

each pore and test the core sample to see if the pore 

meets operational criteria in order to identify 

possible cement malfunctions in the future?

j. Now on page B12 of 46 for Injection Well No. 1 

FutureGen states, " Core samples that were noted as 

having potential cracks and/or were very small were 

eliminated if the results appeared to be 

unreasonable based on the sampled lithology." xvi If 

the core samples have potential cracks, why didn't 

FutureGen investigate as to why these core sample 

have potential to crack thereby compromising the 

integrity of the injection well and also thereby 

increasing the risk of seismic activity at the injection 

well site. If this is a true and honest well site 

characterization, all aspects are studied, and none 

are discarded?

k. Page 12 (Appendix) of the Second Response for 

more information states," It should be noted that 

there is no available whole core from the confining 

layers; and available rotary sidewall cores do not 

i. Prior to commencing injection, FutureGen must perform pre-injection 

testing of the injection and confining zones at the well sites. Additionally, 

the integrity of the casing and cement will be evaluated on all wells 

constructed. The volumes of cement used (some of which is special CO2 -

resistant cement) must be verified. Injection wells will be required to run 

tests to demonstrate that fluid is not leaking upwards behind the casing. 

These external demonstrations of mechanical integrity must be run 

annually. Therefore, the permit language has not been modified based 

upon this comment.

j. The drilling and extraction process can often cause core samples to 

break, and artificially introduced cracks can make test analyses suspect. 

When drilling the injection wells, FutureGen is required to retrieve more 

core samples. Further, as part of the tests required on the injection wells 

prior to commencing injection, FutureGen will obtain information from 

fracture finder and other logs that verify the cracks were artificially 

introduced. Fracture finder logs are imaging techniques (often sonic) that 

are used to locate fractures in rocks adjacent to a wellbore. Cracks in core 

samples do not automatically compromise the integrity of the wells or 

project, and do not increase the risk of seismic activity at the well site. EPA 

will analyze any new data when new wells are drilled to determine 

whether its initial findings are still valid and whether any revisions to the 

permit are needed. Therefore, the permit language has not been modified 

based upon this comment.
146 

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

provide sufficient sample size for vertical 

measurements of permeability" xvii If this is 

correct, then HOW CAN FutureGen be certain that 

the reservoir will contain the supercritical CO2 or 

how it will react within the reservoir?

k. Although FutureGen was unable to obtain whole core or usable sidewall 

cores from the confining zone in the stratigraphic test well, extensive 

downhole logging was completed in the well that verified previously 

documented data finding the confining zone to be appropriate. 

Additionally, when drilling the injection wells, FutureGen is required to 

retrieve more core samples of the confining zone. These additional data 

will be evaluated before injection may begin, under Part Q of the permits. 

Therefore, the permit language has not been modified based upon this 

comment.

15 Betty 

Niemann

h. In the drilling of the characterization well, there 

was a water leakage at the Potosi layer, what 

precautions will be taken to prevent a loss of CO2 at 

this level or the Potosi layer being a layer for 

possible CO2 leakage?

EPA believes the “leakage” mentioned is actually a case of lost circulation. 

Lost circulation can happen during drilling and/or cementing when a 

formation has a high capacity to accept fluids and the drilling mud or 

cement flow into the formation at higher than desired rate. The Potosi 

formation will be separated from the injection well tubing by two layers of 

protective steel casing and cement, consistent with the regulatory 

requirements. Therefore, the permit language has not been modified 

based upon this comment.

16 CSC Provision: J(1)(d)

Text of Draft Permit: (d) Tests to provide 

information about the injection and confining zones, 

including calculated fracture pressure and the 

physical and chemical characteristics of the injection 

and confining zones and the formation fluids in the 

injection zone that meet the requirements of 40 CFR 

146.87(d); and

References: 146.87(d) At a minimum, the owner or 

operator must determine or calculate the following 

information concerning the injection and confining 

zone(s): (1) Fracture pressure; (2) Other physical and 

chemical characteristics of the injection and 

confining zone(s); and (3) Physical and chemical 

characteristics of the formation fluids in the 

Information collected from tests of nearby wells may be confidently used 

without the need to collect data from the well being drilled. In those 

cases, the required test may collect the necessary information in a nearby 

well and be applied to the subject well via a corresponding calculation. In 

the case of FutureGen, actual testing of the formation is necessary to 

accurately determine fracture pressures, physical and chemical 

characterization and hence safe operating limits. Since this information 

may be applicable to the immediate area, this testing is not required at 

every well but still needs to be gathered. The proposed change follows the 

regulatory requirements, which point out that collection of some data 

may be unnecessary when data collected nearby meets that need. The 

suggested change is incorporated into the final permits.
147 

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

injection zone(s).

Proposed Revision: (d) Tests as necessary to provide 

information about the injection and confining zones, 

including to allow determination or calculationed of 

characteristics of the injection and confining zones 

and the formation fluids in the injection zone that 

meet the requirements of 40 CFR 146.87(d); and 

fracture pressure and the physical and chemical

Comment: The applicable provision here is to make 

a determination or calculation. It may not be 

necessary to conduct any additional testing if the 

information already available is sufficient to support 

the determination or calculation.
148 

SECTION 6. OPERATIONS COMMENTS 

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

1 CSC Provision: K(1) 

Text of Draft Permit: 1. Injection Pressure 

Limitation – Except during stimulation, the 

permittee must ensure that injection pressure does 

not exceed 90 percent of the fracture pressure of 

the injection zone(s) so as to ensure that the 

injection does not initiate new fractures or 

propagate existing fractures in the injection 

zone(s). In no case shall injection pressure initiate 

fractures or propagate existing fractures in the 

confining zone or cause the movement of injection 

or formation fluids into a USDW. The maximum 

injection pressure limit is listed in Attachment A.

References: Attachment A states: 

The maximum injection pressure, which serves to 

prevent confining-formation fracturing, was 

determined using the following 

formula/methodology:

· For maximum injection pressure using a downhole 

pressure gauge, the maximum pressure is 

calculated as follows: 90% of fracture pressure of 

the injection zone. Therefore, the maximum 

injection pressure using downhole pressure gauge 

is 2,252 psia or 2,252-14.7 = 2,237 psig.

· For surface maximum wellhead injection pressure, 

this limitation was calculated using the following 

formula: [{90% of fracture gradient-

(0.433psi/ft)(specific gravity)} X upper depth of 

perforated interval ] - atmospheric pressure. The 

maximum wellhead injection pressure is: [{0.585-

Although the maximum injection pressure listed in Attachment A is 

calculated to set a limit at 90 percent of the fracture pressure of the 

injection zone(s) based on the information currently available, as 

additional information becomes available, that calculated value may 

change. To the extent new information indicates that the current value in 

Attachment A exceeds at 90 percent of the fracture pressure of the 

injection zone(s), the maximum injection pressure should be reduced even 

before any conforming change is made to the permits. This assures 

compliance with the regulatory standard in 40 C.F.R. § 146.88(a) and 

protection of USDWs. Similarly, although it is very unlikely, it may be 

possible for FutureGen to initiate new fractures or propagate existing 

fractures in the injection or confining zones, or cause the movement of 

injection or formation fluid into a USDW, even if they comply with the 

maximum injection pressure limitation. In that case, injection pressure 

would also need to be reduced to protect USDWs and to comply with 40 

C.F.R. § 146.88(a). 

Therefore, the permit language has not been modified based upon this 

comment.
149

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

(0.433)(0.64 )}3850] -14.7 = 1,171psig.

Proposed Revision: 1. Injection Pressure Limitation 

– Except during stimulation, the permittee must 

ensure that injection pressure does not exceed 90 

percent of the fracture pressure of the injection 

zone(s) so as to ensure that the injection does not 

initiate new fractures or propagate existing 

fractures in the injection zone(s). In no case shall 

injection pressure initiate fractures or propagate 

existing fractures in the confining zone or cause the

movement of injection or formation fluids into a

USDW. the maximum injection pressure limit is

listed in Attachment A.

Comment: The applicable requirement is to comply 

with the maximum pressure limitation in the 

permit. The rest of what is specified in this 

condition has already been accomplished as a basis 

for setting that limit.

2 CSC Section K(1) of the draft permits inappropriately 

recites the regulatory requirements for 

determining the maximum injection pressure as if 

those requirements constitute additional permit 

conditions and, only after doing so, then states that 

“[t]he maximum injection pressure limit is listed in 

Attachment A”. Referring to Attachment A confirms 

that the stated maximum injection pressure has 

been approved as properly calculated in 

accordance with the regulatory provisions. It can 

only be confusing to state this permit condition as if 

it constitutes a number of different requirements 

that must also be met. Compliance with the 

maximum injection pressures in Attachment A 

constitutes compliance with the regulatory 

Although the maximum injection pressure listed in Attachment A is 

calculated to set a limit at 90 percent of the fracture pressure of the 

injection zone(s) based on the information currently available, as 

additional information becomes available, that calculated value may 

change. To the extent new information indicates that the current value in 

Attachment A exceeds at 90 percent of the fracture pressure of the 

injection zone(s), the maximum injection pressure should be reduced even 

before any conforming change is made to the permits. This assures 

compliance with the regulatory standard in 40 C.F.R. § 146.88(a) and 

protection of USDWs. Similarly, although it is very unlikely, it may be 

possible for FutureGen to initiate new fractures or propagate existing 

fractures in the injection or confining zones, or cause the movement of 

injection or formation fluid into a USDW, even if they comply with the 

maximum injection pressure limitation. In that case, injection pressure 
150 

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

requirement, which does not need to be restated in 

the condition in addition to being fully stated and 

explained in Attachment A.

would also need to be reduced to protect USDWs and to comply with 40 

C.F.R. § 146.88(a). 

Therefore, the permit language has not been modified based upon this 

comment.

3 NRDC Summary of Requirements

1. EPA has specified both surface and downhole 

maximum injection pressures for the injection 

wells. These pressures are based on the presumed 

fracture pressure/gradient of the injection zone. 

However, site-specific data on the fracture pressure 

of the injection and confining zones have not yet 

been collected, and the presumed fracture gradient 

of the injection formation of 0.65 psi/ft is based on 

wireline logs, triaxial pressure tests on core plugs, 

and published literature. The permit application 

states that step-rate injection tests or leak-off test 

data to more accurately determine the formation 

fracture pressures will be obtained when the 

injection wells are drilled. As such, EPA and the 

Applicant must reevaluate the allowable injection 

pressures once such site-specific data are collected, 

and agree on a timeline for doing so.

The maximum injection pressure limitation listed in the permits is based 

upon site specific data. FutureGen drilled a stratigraphic test well at the 

site and collected data used to determine the fracture pressure, the 

fracture pressure gradient, and the hence the maximum injection pressure 

limitation. However, once well drilling commences, the FutureGen will 

gather additional information to confirm or refine information about the 

fracture pressure and fracture pressure gradient. As part of the review 

conducted pursuant to Section Q.4 of the permits and 40 C.F.R. §146.82(c), 

the pressure limitations can be re-evaluated.

Therefore, the permit language has not been modified based upon this 

request.

4 FutureGen The CO2 injection well coordinates in EPA’s draft 

FutureGen UIC Class VI Permit Cover Letter and 

Attachments for each of the injection wells is the 

injection point location described in FG-RPT-017, 

Revision 1 (May 2013). These same coordinates are 

used for all of the 4 injection wells throughout the 

FutureGen permitting documentation. Because the 

currently planned CO2 injection wells’ locations and 

their mid-point location are to the NW of the stated 

location, the Alliance suggests the following 

EPA has revised the first page of each permit and the first page of each 

permit attachment to reflect the accurate proposed location for each of 

the wells. To the extent that small deviations to the planned locations are 

identified after the wells are constructed and surveyed, those corrections 

can be made through the minor modification process identified in 40 C.F.R. 

§ 144.41.
151 

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

wording and footnote throughout the permitting 

documentation for the injection well locations:

(If using one set of coordinates for all CO2 injection 

wells’ permit documentation...) 

Location of Injection Well1: Morgan County, 

IL; 26-16N-9W; 39.80104°N and 90.07517°W 

1 Actual injection well location will be surveyed 

after injection well construction. 

(If using the planned coordinates of the individual

CO2 injection wells in each well’s permit 

documentation...) 

(Well#1) 

Location of Injection Well1: Morgan County, 

IL; 26-16N-9W; 39.80111°N and 90.07491°W 

1 Actual injection well location will be surveyed 

after injection well construction. 

(Well#2) 

Location of Injection Well1: Morgan County, 

IL; 26-16N-9W; 39.80097°N and 90.07491°W 

1 Actual injection well location will be surveyed 

after injection well construction. 

(Well#3) 

Location of Injection Well1: Morgan County, 

IL; 26-16N-9W; 39.80097°N and 90.07544°W 

1 Actual injection well location will be surveyed 

after injection well construction. 

(Well#4) 

Location of Injection Well1: Morgan County, 

IL; 26-16N-9W; 39.80111°N and 90.07544°W 

1 Actual injection well location will be surveyed 

after injection well construction.

5 CSC Section K(8) of the draft permits incorrectly states 

that injection must cease if “[t]he automatic alarm 

While 40 C.F.R. § 146.88(f) might permit a well to resume operating while 

the “owner or operator ... immediately investigate[s] and identif[ies] as 
152 

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

or automatic shut-off system is triggered” or if “[a] 

significant unexpected change in the annulus or 

injection pressure” occurs. Cessation of injection is 

required in such circumstances only if, “upon 

investigation, the well appears to be lacking 

mechanical integrity” after the event occurs. Our 

detailed comments provide an appropriate revision 

to make this condition consistent with the 

regulatory requirements of sections 146.88(f) and 

146.94(b).

expeditiously as possible the cause of the shutoff,” EPA believes it is a 

reasonable and appropriate precaution to cease operations while that 

immediate investigation proceeds. The same is true with respect to any 

significant unexpected change in annulus or injection pressure. All of these 

occurrences are indicators of a potential loss of mechanical integrity 

and/or fracturing of the injection and/or confining formations. If the 

facility were to resume injection before completing an investigation, its 

investigation may confirm that the well lacked integrity or that injection 

damaged the formation and that its interim injection activities caused 

significant violations of the permit and threats to USDWs. Shutting a well 

in when a loss of mechanical integrity is suspected limits the potential for 

endangering USDWs as well as limiting FutureGen’s exposure to 

potentially serious violations. By ceasing injection, FutureGen will limit CO2

volume associated with the event, isolate the injectate, and minimize the 

risk of subsurface fluid movement and associated problems that may 

endanger USDWs. 

To the extent this provision goes beyond the specific language of the 

regulation, EPA may add permit requirements beyond those laid out 

specifically in the UIC regulations on a case-by-case basis under 40 C.F.R. § 

144.52(a)(9) (case-by-case conditions as necessary to prevent migration) 

and § 144.52(b) (case-by-case conditions as required to provide for and 

assure compliance with all applicable requirements of the SDWA and 

regulations). This provision is a rational extension of the regulatory 

language, and is in place to assure protection of the well, the USDWs, and 

FutureGen. Protective language is especially important here, as these will 

be the first Class VI wells operated at this scale in the United States. 

Therefore, the permit language has not been modified based upon this 

comment.

6 CSC Provision: K(8)

Text of Draft Permit: 8. Circumstances Under 

Which Injection Must Cease – Injection shall cease 

Some level of variation in annulus or injection pressure is typical of well 

operation, and some planned events (such as well start up or tests) will 

create more substantial variations by design. However, as noted above, 
153 

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

when any of the following circumstances arises:

(a) Failure of the well to pass a mechanical integrity 

test;

(b) A loss of mechanical integrity during operation;

(c) The automatic alarm or automatic shut-off 

system is triggered;

(d) A significant unexpected change in the annulus 

or injection pressure;

(e) The Director determines that the well lacks 

mechanical integrity; or

(f) The permittee is unable to maintain compliance 

with any permit condition or regulatory 

requirement and the Director determines that 

injection should cease.

References: 146.88(f) If a shutdown (i.e., downhole or at the surface) is triggered or a loss of 

mechanical integrity is discovered, the owner or 

operator must immediately investigate and identify 

as expeditiously as possible the cause of the 

shutoff. If, upon such investigation, the well 

appears to be lacking mechanical integrity, or if 

monitoring required under paragraph (e) of this 

section otherwise indicates that the well may be 

lacking mechanical integrity, the owner or operator 

must: (1) Immediately cease injection; (2) Take all 

steps reasonably necessary to determine whether 

there may have been a release of the injected 

carbon dioxide stream or formation fluids into any 

unauthorized zone; (3) Notify the Director within 24 

hours; (4) Restore and demonstrate mechanical 

integrity to the satisfaction of the Director prior to 

resuming injection; and (5) Notify the Director 

when injection can be expected to resume.

significant, unanticipated variations may be indicators of a potential loss of 

mechanical integrity and/or fracturing of the injection and/or confining 

formations. It is difficult to define the precise levels that may trigger these 

requirements, especially when the wells are not yet operational. As 

FutureGen and EPA gain more actual experience, it may be feasible to lay 

out more specific ground rules through modifications to the permits

and/or incorporated plans. In the meantime, however, this provision 

requires FutureGen to make reasonable judgments on when it views an 

unanticipated variation as significant. If that creates an incentive for 

FutureGen to be cautious about this decision in the absence of more 

precise standards, that incentive is appropriate given the potential risks 

associated with injection into a well without mechanical or geological 

integrity. To the extent this provision goes beyond the specific language of 

the regulation, EPA may add permit requirements beyond those laid out 

specifically in the UIC regulations on a case-by-case basis under 40 C.F.R. § 

144.52(a)(9) (case-by-case conditions as necessary to prevent migration) 

and § 144.52(b) (case-by-case conditions as required to provide for and 

assure compliance with all applicable requirements of the SDWA and 

regulations).

Therefore, the permit language has not been modified based upon this 

comment.
154 

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

146.94(b) If the owner or operator obtains 

evidence that the injected carbon dioxide stream and associated pressure front may cause an 

endangerment to a USDW, the owner or operator 

must:

(1) Immediately cease injection;

(2) Take all steps reasonably necessary to identify 

and characterize any release;

(3) Notify the Director within 24 hours; and (4) 

Implement the emergency and remedial response 

plan approved by the Director.

Proposed Revision:

8. Circumstances Under Which Injection Must 

Cease – Injection shall cease when any of the 

following circumstances arises:

(a) Failure of the well to pass a mechanical integrity 

test;

(b) A confirmed loss of mechanical integrity during 

operation;

(c) If, upon investigation, the well appears to be 

lacking mechanical integrity after

(1) the automatic alarm or automatic shut-off 

system is triggered or ; (d2) A significant unexpected change in the annulus 

or injection pressure; (ed) The Director determines that the well lacks 

mechanical integrity; or (fe) The permittee is unable to maintain compliance 

with any permit condition or regulatory 

requirement and the Director determines that 

injection should cease.

Comment: The permit condition is not consistent 

with the regulatory requirement, and the 
155 

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

requirement to cease injection when there is “a 

significant unexpected change in the annulus or 

injection pressure” is very ambiguous and 

potentially troublesome. The recommendations for 

revised language will modify the permit conditions 

to be consistent with the applicable regulatory 

provisions which trigger investigations rather than 

automatic shutdowns. Cessation of injection must 

occur only when there is a reason to believe that a 

loss of mechanical integrity may have occurred. The 

“significant unexpected change” language remains 

ambiguous, and there should be some better 

understanding of how large these unexpected 

changes should be. For example, any change in 

annular pressure should be larger by more than 

double the magnitude of normal diurnal and 

temperature related fluctuations. The significance 

levels for these triggers should be established by 

written agreement once operating experience 

provides a basis for doing that.

7 FutureGen Table-Injection Well Operating Conditions 

1) It should be specified that the injection depth is 

based on the FutureGen stratigraphic well 

observations and will be replaced by the actual 

depth at the injection wells once they will have been 

drilled. All the given injection pressures are based 

on this depth and will be also updated accordingly.

2) The EPA method for calculating the maximum 

surface injection pressure does not fully account for 

all well-bore processes that affect pressure, in 

particular the friction loss, and for the variation of 

CO2 density with pressure and temperature. The 

alliance proposes to use the model CO2Flow 

1) The depths of formations at both injection and monitoring wells are 

listed as where they are anticipated to be. Attachment A of the permits 

lists the depth of the downhole gauge and injection pressure calculations 

at 3850 feet below ground surface. Small deviations of depths are 

corrected through the minor modification process identified in 40 C.F.R. §

144.41.

2) The permits have the downhole pressure gauge as the primary point of 

compliance. Since this is at the injection interval, any compensation for the 

weight of the fluid, friction loss, etc., will be unnecessary. If the 

bottomhole gauge fails, a gauge on the wellhead will be the new point of 

compliance. To the extent that small deviations to the planned depths are 

identified after the wells are constructed and surveyed, those corrections 

can be made through the minor modification process identified in 40 C.F.R. 
156 

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

developed by PNNL and that accounts for all wellbore processes and the impacts of pressure and 

temperature. This value will be adjusted based on 

the observed relationship between surface pressure 

and downhole pressure measured during the 

injection period. 

The Alliance thus proposes to replace the entire 

section “Injection Well Operating Conditions” by:

-PARAMETER/CONDITION: Maximum Injection 

Pressure (Surface) PARAMETER/CONDITION: 1,360 

UNIT: psig

-PARAMETER/CONDITION: Maximum Injection 

Pressure (Downhole) PARAMETER/CONDITION: 

2,237 UNIT: psig

-PARAMETER/CONDITION: Annulus Pressure

PARAMETER/CONDITION: 100 minimum UNIT: psig

-PARAMETER/CONDITION: Annulus 

Pressure/Tubing Differential

PARAMETER/CONDITION: 100 above surface 

injection pressure UNIT: psig

The downhole gauge for injection pressure 

monitoring is to be located at 3,850 feet below 

ground surface. This depth is based on the 

stratigraphic well observations and will be replaced 

by the actual depth at the injection wells once they 

will have been drilled. All the injection pressures 

based on this depth will be updated accordingly.

The maximum injection pressure, which serves to 

prevent confining-formation fracturing, was 

determined using the following 

formula/methodology:

· For maximum injection pressure using a downhole 

pressure gauge, the maximum pressure is 

§ 144.41. This includes adjustments to the maximum injection pressure if 

the fracture pressure is measured at the different depth than was planned.

FutureGen proposed using the CO2FLOW program to calculate surface 

injection pressures. Documentation for CO2FLOW states that is accuracy 

could be plus or minus 15% of the actual value which is unacceptable to 

EPA. Although use of the CO2FLOW program for calculating surface 

pressures might be considered in the future, EPA would need to verify the 

accuracy of its calculations while injection was taking place by comparing 

the calculations with measurements taken from calibrated downhole and 

surface gauges. Therefore, the permit language has not been modified 

based upon this comment. 
157 

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

calculated as follows: 90% of fracture pressure of 

the injection zone at this depth. Therefore, the 

maximum injection pressure using downhole 

pressure gauge at 3,850 feet below ground surface 

is 2,252 psia or 2,252-14.7 = 2,237 psig. This 

pressure will be recalculated if the downhole 

pressure gauge is at a different depth.

For surface maximum wellhead injection pressure, 

this limitation was calculated using the PNNL model 

(CO2Flow) that accounts for all well-bore processes 

and variations of CO2 density with pressure and 

temperature. The maximum wellhead injection 

pressure is 1360 psig. This pressure will be 

measured during operation. The measured 

pressure will be adjusted to the maximum wellhead 

injection pressure after EPA’s approval.

If the downhole pressure gauge fails to function 

properly, then the maximum injection pressure 

shall immediately be limited to the calculated 

surface pressure until the downhole pressure gauge 

is repaired or replaced.

8 FutureGen The Shutdown Procedure paragraph should be 

replaced by:

The permittee shall develop and submit for EPA 

approval a procedure for implementing a gradual 

well shutdown prior to commencing injection.

FutureGen did not propose a gradual well shutdown procedure as part of 

the permit application, and is not required to do so by the regulations. If 

FutureGen wishes to propose a procedure for EPA review and approval, it 

may do so through the permit modification process outlined in 40 C.F.R. 

§144.39. Therefore, the permit language has not been modified based 

upon this comment.

9 FutureGen The CO2 injection well coordinates in EPA’s draft 

FutureGen UIC Class VI Permit Cover Letter and 

Attachments for each of the injection wells is the 

injection point location described in FG-RPT-017, 

Revision 1 (May 2013). These same coordinates are 

used for all of the 4 injection wells throughout the 

EPA has revised the first page of each permit and the first page of each 

permit attachment to reflect the accurate proposed location for each of 

the wells. To the extent that small deviations to the planned locations are 

identified after the wells are constructed and surveyed, those corrections 

can be made through the minor modification process identified in 40 C.F.R. 

§ 144.41.
158 

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

FutureGen permitting documentation. Because the 

currently planned CO

2 injection wells’ locations and 

their mid-point location are to the NW of the stated 

location, the Alliance suggests the following 

wording and footnote throughout the permitting 

documentation for the injection well locations:

(If using one set of coordinates for all CO

2 injection 

wells’ permit documentation...)

Location of Injection Well

1

: Morgan County, 

IL; 26-16N-9W; 39.80104°N and 90.07517°W

1 Actual injection well location will be surveyed 

after injection well construction. (If using the planned coordinates of the individual

CO

2 injection wells in each well’s permit 

documentation...)

(Well#1)

Location of Injection Well

1

: Morgan County, 

IL; 26-16N-9W; 39.80111°N and 90.07491°W

1 Actual injection well location will be surveyed 

after injection well construction.

(Well#2)

Location of Injection Well

1

: Morgan County, 

IL; 26-16N-9W; 39.80097°N and 90.07491°W

1 Actual injection well location will be surveyed 

after injection well construction.

(Well#3)

Location of Injection Well

1

: Morgan County, 

IL; 26-16N-9W; 39.80097°N and 90.07544°W
159 

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

1 Actual injection well location will be surveyed 

after injection well construction.

(Well#4)

Location of Injection Well1: Morgan County, 

IL; 26-16N-9W; 39.80111°N and 90.07544°W

1 Actual injection well location will be surveyed 

after injection well construction.
160 

SECTION 7. TESTING AND MONITORING COMMENTS 

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

1 Betty 

Niemann

Will the monitoring of the injection process install 

underground sensors to detect this land 

deformation?

Underground pressure, temperature and chemical data obtained from 

monitoring wells will be integrated with ground surface, aerial and orbital 

(satellite) data to detect slight changes in elevation of the ground surface 

at the injection site.

No changes to the permits are needed in response to this comment.

2 Betty 

Niemann

Concerns about Storage Leakage and CO2 Leakage 

Remediation

First and foremost, before any leakage can be 

determined, a baseline study must be carried out. 

Page 2.66 discusses the baseline study. It does not 

mention the length of the study. The Midwest 

Geological Sequestration Consortium conducted an 

approximate 2 year baseline study prior to starting 

the injection process. What is the length of the 

baseline study that FutureGen will conduct?

EPA believes there are additional and potentially more important factors 

to consider in obtaining baseline data for geologic sequestration projects 

than the duration of the baseline study. A baseline study will typically 

include many different types of sampling and testing techniques and not 

necessarily a specified duration of study. EPA’s draft permits for the 

FutureGen project include a minimum number of baseline sampling events 

that must occur prior to commencement of the project. The duration of 

baseline testing varies based on the parameter and location. For example, 

baseline pressure monitoring within the injection zone will be for one year 

prior to injection.

No changes to the permits are needed in response to this comment.

3 Robert J. 

Finley

My reading of the draft permit shows that it 

contains numerous provisions that meet the Class 

VI permit requirements, and in many cases can be 

interpreted to exceed the basic requirements in 

terms of monitoring and maintaining safe 

operations. 

EPA believes that the permit requirements closely follow the regulatory 

requirements. To the extent any provisions go beyond the specific 

language of the regulation, EPA may add permit requirements beyond 

those laid out specifically in the UIC regulations on a case-by-case basis 

under 40 C.F.R. § 144.52(a)(9) (case-by-case conditions as necessary to 

prevent migration) and § 144.52(b) (case-by-case conditions as required to 

provide for and assure compliance with all applicable requirements of the 

SDWA and regulations). Protective language is especially important here, 

as these will be the first Class VI wells operated at this scale in the United 

States. 
161 

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

4 FutureGen Page C2

In the last sentence of paragraph 3, EPA changed 

“may be activated” to “will be activated”.

The Alliance suggests the following rewording for 

this sentence: 

If deep early-detection monitoring locations 

indicate that primary confining zone leakage has 

occurred, a comprehensive near-surfacemonitoring program will be evaluated (in 

consultation with the UIC Program Director), and if 

warranted, will be activated to fully assess 

environmental impacts relative to baseline 

conditions.

40 C.F.R. §146.90(h) gives EPA broad discretion to include surface air 

and/or soil gas monitoring as a requirement of the initial permits. EPA has 

not required that monitoring initially, but such a provision is appropriate 

and protective if monitoring indicates leakage from the primary confining 

zone. The regulation provides for surface air and/or soil gas monitoring to 

address potential risks to USDWs within the AoR. Evidence of leakage from 

the confining zone presents such a risk.

Therefore, the permit language has not been modified based upon this 

comment.

5 FutureGen Page C10

Table 1

The requirement to measure injection parameters 

(i.e., flow rate, pressure, temperature) every 5 

seconds during injection is unnecessary. There is no 

reason to measure these parameters this frequently 

as injection will be a steady process that does not 

cause large changes in these parameters over a 

short time period, except during startup and shut 

down. Such a high frequency measurement 

program will result in excessive and unnecessary 

data collection and data management. The 

Alliance recommends changing this requirement to

every 5 minutes to match the minimum recording 

frequency.

The regulations and permits require “continuous” monitoring of flow rate, 

injection pressure, annulus pressure, annulus fluid level, and injection fluid 

temperature. The sampling frequency of every five seconds refers to how 

often the monitoring device obtains data from the well for that particular 

parameter. This is not the frequency at which this data must be recorded. 

Although most wells are designed to operate as a steady process, the five 

second monitoring frequency ensures that operational aberrations trigger 

corresponding alarm systems promptly and limits equipment and/or 

formation damage. Therefore, this provision of the permits has not been 

changed.

6 FutureGen The last sentence of page C6’s paragraph 5 should 

be removed. 

Redundant fiber optic P/T monitoring is being 

EPA agrees that this correction is appropriate and consistent with the rest 

of the Plan.

The suggested change is incorporated into the final permits.
162 

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

considered for the SLR monitoring wells, not the 

injection wells.

7 FutureGen Page C2

In the last sentence of paragraph 3, EPA changed 

“may be activated” to “will be activated”.

The Alliance suggests the following rewording for 

this sentence: 

If deep early-detection monitoring locations 

indicate that primary confining zone leakage has 

occurred, a comprehensive near-surfacemonitoring program will be evaluated (in 

consultation with the UIC Program Director), and if 

warranted, will be activated to fully assess 

environmental impacts relative to baseline 

conditions.

If primary containment were to be breached, a more comprehensive nearsurface monitoring program would be warranted and the nature and 

extent of such a program would be at the Director’s discretion.

Therefore, the permit language has not been modified based upon this 

comment.

8 FutureGen The CO2 injection well coordinates in EPA’s draft 

FutureGen UIC Class VI Permit Cover Letter and 

Attachments for each of the injection wells is the 

injection point location described in FG-RPT-017, 

Revision 1 (May 2013). These same coordinates are 

used for all of the 4 injection wells throughout the 

FutureGen permitting documentation. Because the 

currently planned CO2 injection wells’ locations and 

their mid-point location are to the NW of the stated 

location, the Alliance suggests the following 

wording and footnote throughout the permitting 

documentation for the injection well locations:

(If using one set of coordinates for all CO2 injection 

wells’ permit documentation...) 

Location of Injection Well1: Morgan County, 

IL; 26-16N-9W; 39.80104°N and 90.07517°W 

EPA has revised the first page of each permit and the first page of each 

permit attachment to reflect the accurate proposed location for each of 

the wells. To the extent that small deviations to the planned locations are 

identified after the wells are constructed and surveyed, those corrections 

can be made through the minor modification process identified in 40 C.F.R. 

§ 144.41.
163 

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

1 Actual injection well location will be surveyed 

after injection well construction. 

(If using the planned coordinates of the individual

CO2 injection wells in each well’s permit 

documentation....

(Well#1) 

Location of Injection Well1: Morgan County, 

IL; 26-16N-9W; 39.80111°N and 90.07491°W 

1 Actual injection well location will be surveyed 

after injection well construction. 

(Well#2) 

Location of Injection Well1: Morgan County, 

IL; 26-16N-9W; 39.80097°N and 90.07491°W 

1 Actual injection well location will be surveyed 

after injection well construction. 

(Well#3) 

Location of Injection Well1: Morgan County, 

IL; 26-16N-9W; 39.80097°N and 90.07544°W 

1 Actual injection well location will be surveyed 

after injection well construction. 

(Well#4) 

Location of Injection Well1: Morgan County, 

IL; 26-16N-9W; 39.80111°N and 90.07544°W 

1 Actual injection well location will be surveyed 

after injection well construction.

9 FutureGen Page C1 

Lines 2, 3, 4 - Suggest changing sentence to:

Central to this monitoring strategy is the 

measurement of CO2 saturation within the 

reservoir using three reservoir access tubes (RATs) 

extending through the base of the Mount Simon 

Formation and into the Precambrian basement.

EPA finds that this suggested change does not compromise the purpose of 

this testing and monitoring requirement. Thus, this correction is 

incorporated into the final permits.
164 

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

10 FutureGen Page C1 

Lines 6, 7, 8 - Suggest changing sentence to: 

The three wells have been placed at increasing 

radial distances from the injection site to provide 

measures of CO2 saturation at locations within the 

outer edges of the predicted 1-, 2-, and 4-year CO2

plumes, respectively.”

EPA finds that this suggested change corrects the statement to better align 

with the modeled prediction. Thus, this change is incorporated into the 

final permits.

11 FutureGen Page C5 

Under Analytical techniques: 

The QASP Sections referred to here are incorrect. 

B.4.4 should be B.1.4.

EPA agrees that this correction is appropriate and consistent with the rest 

of the Plan.

The suggested change is incorporated into the final permits.

12 Robert J. 

Finley

Baseline monitoring is proposed that allows a clear 

understanding of any out-of-bounds event that 

may occur or may be alleged, as turned out to be 

very important in the case of the Weyburn Field 

enhanced oil recovery project, however unlikely 

such events may be. 

Thank you for your comment. 

13 FutureGen QASP Page B.1

Cement-evaluation and casing inspection logging is 

not planned as part of the regular annul MIT 

demonstration, therefore, revise the following 

sentence:

5. External Mechanical Integrity Testing – includes

temperature logging and pulsed-neutron capture 

(PNC) logging (both gas-view and oxygen-activation 

mode), as well as cement-evaluation and casing 

inspection logging. See Section B.5.

to read:

5. External Mechanical Integrity Testing – includes 

temperature logging and pulsed-neutron capture 

(PNC) logging (both gas-view and oxygen-activation 

mode). See Section B.5.

EPA finds that the text included in the draft permits is appropriate. EPA 

acknowledges that the cement-evaluation and casing inspection logging 

tools listed on page B.1 are not be planned as part of the regular annual 

MIT demonstration and finds that the inclusion of their mention under this 

heading does not prescribe the tests to be conducted on an annual basis. 

Further, the referenced Section B.5 states that cement-evaluation logs will 

be run when tubing is removed from the well. 

Therefore, the permit language has not been modified based upon this 

comment.
165 

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

14 FutureGen Revise the following paragraph at bottom of page 

B.3 and top of page B.4 of the QASP:

Continuous Recording of Injection Pressure and 

Temperature

“An electronic P/T gauge will be installed on the 

outside of the tubing string, approximately 30 ft 

above the packer, and ported into the tubing to 

continuously measure CO2 injection P/T inside the 

tubing at this depth. Mechanical strain gauges and 

thermocouples will be the primary monitoring 

devices for pressure and temperature. Injection P/T 

will also be continuously measured at the surface 

via real-time P/T instruments installed in the CO2

pipeline near the pipeline interface with the 

wellhead. The P/T of the injected CO2 will be 

continuously measured for each well. The pressure 

will be measured by electronic pressure transmitter 

with analog output mounted on the CO2 line 

associated with each injection well. The 

temperature will be measured by an electronic 

temperature transmitter mounted in the CO2 line at 

a location near the pressure transmitter, and both 

transmitters will be located near the wellhead. The 

transmitters will be connected to the Annulus 

Pressurization System (APS) programmable logic 

controller (PLC) located at the injection well site. 

Because the surface instruments can be more 

readily accessed and maintained than the 

bottomhole gauge, they will be used to control 

injection operations and trigger shutdowns.”

To read:

Continuous Recording of Injection Pressure and 

EPA finds that the downhole gauge is the primary point of compliance for 

injection pressure. Removing the language stating “Mechanical strain 

gauges and thermocouples will be the primary monitoring devices for 

pressure and temperature” could create confusion over the primary point 

of compliance. 

Therefore, the permit language has not been modified based upon this 

comment.

Additionally, the last sentence of this section “Because the surface 

instruments can be more readily accessed and maintained than the 

bottomhole gauge, they will be used to control injection operations and 

trigger shutdowns.” has been removed because it suggests that the 

downhole gauge is not the primary point of compliance. 

EPA does agree, however, that the additional detail that the PLC is 

“located in the Control Building adjacent to the injection well pad” 

provides helpful clarification. This clarification is appropriate and 

consistent with the rest of the Plan, so that requested change has been

made.
166 

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

Temperature

An electronic P/T gauge will be installed on the 

outside of the tubing string, approximately 30 ft 

above the packer, and ported into the tubing to 

continuously measure CO2 injection P/T inside the 

tubing at this depth. Injection P/T will also be 

continuously measured at the surface via real-time 

P/T instruments installed in the CO2 pipeline near 

the pipeline interface with the wellhead. The P/T of 

the injected CO2 will be continuously measured for 

each well. The pressure will be measured by 

electronic pressure transmitter with analog output 

mounted on the CO2 line associated with each 

injection well. The temperature will be measured 

by an electronic temperature transmitter mounted 

in the CO2 line at a location near the pressure 

transmitter, and both transmitters will be located 

near the wellhead. The transmitters will be 

connected to the Annulus Pressurization System 

(APS) programmable logic controller (PLC) located 

in the Control Building adjacent to the injection 

well pad. Because the surface instruments can be 

more readily accessed and maintained than the 

bottomhole gauge, they will be used to control 

injection operations and trigger shutdowns.

15 FutureGen QASP Page B.4

Continuous Recording of Injection Mass Flow Rate

Revise the 1st sentence of the 2nd paragraph in this 

section:

The RTU will communicate with the Control Center 

through the APS PLC located at the injection well 

site.

EPA agrees that this correction is appropriate and consistent with the rest 

of the Plan. This requested change is only a terminology edit. 

The suggested change is incorporated into the final permits.
167 

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

To read:

The flow meters will be connected to the main CO2

storage site SCADA system for continuous 

monitoring and control of the CO2 injection rate 

into each well.

16 FutureGen QASP Page A.15

Cement-evaluation and casing inspection logging 

are not planned as part of the regular annual MIT 

demonstration, therefore, revise the following 

sentence:

External Well Mechanical Integrity Testing

Wireline logging, including pulsed-neutron capture 

(PNC) logs (both in the gas-view and oxygen 

activation modes) and temperature logs, and 

cement-evaluation and casing inspection logging, 

will be conducted to verify the absence of 

significant fluid movement through potential 

channels adjacent to the injection well bore and/or 

to determine the need for well repairs.

to read:

External Well Mechanical Integrity Testing

Wireline logging, including pulsed-neutron capture 

(PNC) logs (both in the gas-view and oxygen 

activation modes) and temperature logs will be 

conducted to verify the absence of significant fluid 

movement through potential channels adjacent to 

the injection well bore and/or to determine the 

need for well repairs.

EPA finds that the text included in the draft permits is appropriate. EPA 

acknowledges that the cement-evaluation and casing inspection logging 

tools listed on page A.15 are not planned as part of the regular annual 

Mechanical Integrity demonstration and finds that the inclusion of their 

mention under this heading does not prescribe the tests to be conducted 

on an annual basis. 

Therefore, the permit language has not been modified based upon this 

comment.
168 

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

17 FutureGen QASP Page B.3

Delete the following paragraph, as it is repeated in 

the subsequent section: 

The injection wells will be completed with a string 

of 3.5-in.-OD tubing that extends from the wellhead 

at the surface to near the top of the perforated 

interval. A tubing string that is 4,000 ft long will 

extend approximately 11 ft below the top of the 

perforations. The tubing string will be held in place 

at the bottom by a packer that is positioned just 

above the uppermost perforations (approximate 

measured depth of 3,850 ft). An optical or 

electronic pressure-and-temperature (P/T) gauge 

will be installed on the outside of the tubing string, 

approximately 30 ft above the packer, and ported 

into the tubing to continuously measure CO2

injection P/T inside the tubing at this depth. In 

addition, injection P/T will also be continuously 

measured at the surface via real-time P/T 

instruments installed in the CO2 pipeline near the 

pipeline interface with the wellhead. Because the 

surface instruments can be more readily accessed 

and maintained than the bottom-hole gauge, they 

will be used to control injection operations and 

trigger shutdowns.

EPA agrees that this correction is appropriate and consistent with the rest 

of the Plan.

The suggested change is incorporated into the final permits.
169 

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

18 FutureGen Page C55

APPENDIX F: Injection Well Continuous 

Monitoring Device Locations. 

What is the purpose of this table, because it is not 

informative as a stand-alone table? If it needs to 

stay in the permit, the following changes need to be 

made:

Change:

Injection Pressure Monitoring – primary / Reservoir 

- Below Packer

To: 

Injection Pressure Monitoring – primary / Reservoir 

- Above Packer

Change:

Temperature Monitoring / Reservoir - Below Packer

To:

Temperature Monitoring / Reservoir - Above 

Packer

EPA agrees that these suggestions do not change the intent to comply with 

a downhole measurement, but rather clarify where that measurement will 

occur. Currently, instead of referencing the well construction, such as 

above or below the packer, Attachment A lists the downhole monitoring 

depth as 3,850 feet below ground surface. EPA believes this is more 

appropriate, and changed Appendix F on page C55 to give the depth of 

primary Injection Pressure and Temperature monitoring to 3,850 feet 

below ground surface. 

As noted in this document with other parameters, these are anticipated 

depths and are therefore subject to change. Small deviations identified 

after construction is completed can be corrected through the minor 

modification process identified in 40 C.F.R. § 144.41. 

19 FutureGen Page C9

The following Note should be added to Table 4:

All depths are approximate and may be adjusted 

based on information obtained when the well is 

drilled.

The depth of each well, as well as formation depths, are indicated as

where the wells are intended to be placed. Since each permit has 

numerous citations of depths and locations, noting that these are 

anticipated depths and are therefore subject to change, would overly 

complicate the permits and be potentially confusing. Small deviations 

identified after construction is completed can be corrected through the 

minor modification process identified in 40 C.F.R. § 144.41. 

Therefore, the permit language has not been modified based upon this 

comment.
170 

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

20 Leinberger 

& 

Critchelow

families

11.) FutureGen should present a detailed 

justification for monitoring well placement and 

add additional monitoring wells as necessary 

based on the more-recently delineated AoR 

(Permit Section: Attachment C).

FutureGen’s monitoring network includes two 

“early-detection” wells completed in the first 

permeable unit above the confining zone 

(FutureGen 2014b, p.C1-C2/56). FutureGen has not 

demonstrated that these two monitoring wells 

alone will be adequate to detect potential leakage 

consistent with EPA guidance and regulations. 

EPA regulations require that AoR modeling be used 

to designate the number and placement of 

monitoring wells above the primary confining zone, 

and monitoring well placement be based on 

specific information about the project, including 

injection rate and volume, geology, the presence 

of artificial penetrations, and baseline geochemical 

data (U.S. EPA, 2010; 146.90[d]). 

EPA guidance recommends that monitoring wells 

be placed strategically to maximize the ability of 

the monitoring well network to detect potential 

leakage, and suggests that monitoring wells be 

cited based on modeling results, projected plume 

migration, dip direction, and the presence of 

potential leakage pathways (U.S. EPA, 2013b, 

p.56/115). EPA’s monitoring guidance also states 

the following (U.S. EPA, 2013b, p.56-57/115): 

The number of required monitoring wells may be 

greater for projects with larger predicted areas of 

elevated pressure and/or plume movement, or in 

The two monitoring wells in the Ironton Sandstone, immediately above the 

Eau Claire confining zone, are sufficient to detect changes in fluid 

chemistry, temperature and pressure that would indicate the movement 

of CO2 beyond the injection zone formation. This is particularly true during 

the early years of the project where the CO2 plume would typically still be 

relatively close to the wells and a potential problem with the confining 

zone (such as previously unknown faults or fractures or other permeable 

features) would be likely to become apparent. EPA also recommended in 

its guidance that monitoring wells be placed strategically to maximize the 

ability of the monitoring well network to detect potential leakage and 

track the plume migration and pressure front while minimizing the number 

of wells, which increase the risk for fluid movement.

EPA considered the AoR modeling and geologic data in evaluating the 

spatial distribution and frequency of sampling at the monitoring wells

(Evaluation of Area of Review Delineation and Corrective Action, March 

2014). The proposed system of monitoring wells complies with 40 C.F.R.

§146.90(d). The Testing and Monitoring Plan does refer to two wells that 

will monitor pressure in the Mt. Simon but a third well is planned and is 

required by the permit. This third well was described on pages C2 and C3 

of the draft permit, and it will be a third Single-Level Reservoir (SLR) well to 

monitor below the confining zone. The Director may require additional 

monitoring wells as necessary if the Director determines that is needed for 

compliance with the permit and with 40 C.F.R. §146.90(d).

Under the Permits (see Parts G and M), the AoR and the Monitoring 

Program will be regularly reviewed, and revised as appropriate. A review 

and re-evaluation is required before injection begins under Part Q of the 

permits. Those reviews will consider the factors identified in this 

comment, and other considerations. Any modifications made as part of 

those reviews will go through the permit modification process described in 

40 C.F.R. Part 144. 
171 

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

cases of more complex or heterogeneous 

injection/confining zone hydrogeology. If the 

predicted area of impact of a given project 

increases in size as indicated during an AoR 

reevaluation, additional monitoring wells may be 

necessary...

The number of monitoring wells placed above the 

confining zone should be determined such that any 

leakage through the confining zone that may 

endanger a USDW will be detected in sufficient 

time to implement remedial measures. The 

number of monitoring wells above the confining 

zone may be determined based on a modeling 

and/or statistical analysis, which may be 

documented in the Testing and Monitoring Plan. 

Considerations that may be included in this analysis 

are the regional hydraulic gradient, flow paths, 

transmissivity, and baseline geochemistry.

In the initial FutureGen permit application, 

monitoring wells were placed within the 

boundaries of the projected carbon dioxide plume, 

which at that time defined the AoR (FutureGen, 

2013). Subsequently the AoR size was significantly 

increased to include the boundaries of the 10 psi 

pressure increase (FutureGen, 2014a). However, 

additional monitoring wells were not added in the 

updated Testing and Monitoring Plan within this 

much larger area of elevated pressure. 

FutureGen has provided no analysis regarding 

additional search for potential leakage pathways or 

sensitive areas in this now larger AoR that may 

require additional monitoring wells above the 

In addition to evaluating FutureGen’s review of the area wells, EPA 

completed its own independent review of well records at the ISGS and the 

Illinois State Water Survey. EPA did not find any improperly constructed 

artificial penetrations that reach the confining zone.

Therefore, the permit language has not been modified based upon this 

comment.
172 

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

primary confining zone. Further, FutureGen has 

not provided any modeling or statistical analysis 

to demonstrate that two monitoring wells above 

the confining zone are adequate to detect leakage 

in sufficient time to implement remedial measures 

based on site-specific conditions, as suggested in 

EPA guidance as cited above. 

FutureGen should present a detailed analysis 

justifying the placement of monitoring wells, in 

consideration of the most recently updated AoR, 

and including a search for all potential leakage 

pathways within the expanded AoR. Additional 

monitoring wells may be necessary in order to be

consistent with EPA guidance.
173 

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

21 Leinberger 

& 

Critchelow 

families

E. Insufficient Monitoring

FutureGen’s proposed monitoring system is 

insufficient. As stated by EPA in the Preamble to 

the Class VI Rule, “GS is a new technology and there 

are a number of unknowns associated with the 

long-term effects of injecting large volumes of CO2

...” Federal Requirements Under the Underground 

Injection Control Program for Carbon Dioxide 

Geologic Sequestration Wells (“E.P.A. Rule”), 75 

Fed. Reg. 77230, 77261 (2010). Consequently, the 

monitoring and testing protocols must reflect the 

untested nature of the project. 

EPA regulations require that Area of Review 

modeling be used to designate the number and 

placement of monitoring wells. See 40 C.F.R. 

§146.90 (d)(2). EPA guidance suggests that 

monitoring wells be cited based on modeling 

results, projected plume migration, dip direction,

and presence of potential leakage pathways. See 

Geologic Sequestration of Carbon Dioxide: 

Underground Injection Control (UIC) Program Class

VI Well Testing and Monitoring Guidance p. 56/115, 

AR #441. In the initial (March 2013) permit 

application, monitoring wells were placed within 

the boundaries of the projected carbon dioxide 

plume, which at that time defined the Area of 

Review. See Permit App. Supporting 

Documentation p.C4/56. Subsequently, FutureGen 

significantly increased the size of the Area of 

Review to include the boundaries of the 10psi 

pressure increase. See Permit, Attachment B. 

However, no additional monitoring wells are 

The commenter’s statement that “no additional monitoring wells are 

included...in this area of elevated pressure” is inaccurate. Much of the plan 

does refer to two wells that will monitor pressure in the Mt. Simon but a 

third well is planned and is required by the permit. This third well was 

described on pages C2 and C3 of the draft permit, and it will be third SLR 

well to monitor below the confining zone.

EPA considered the AoR modeling and geologic data in evaluating the 

spatial distribution and frequency of sampling at the monitoring wells 

(Evaluation of Area of Review Delineation and Corrective Action, March 

2014). The proposed system of monitoring wells complies with 40 C.F.R.

§146.90(d). The Director may require additional monitoring wells as 

necessary if the Director determines that it is needed for compliance with 

the permit and with 40 C.F.R. §146.90(d). EPA also recommended in its 

guidance that monitoring wells be placed strategically to maximize the 

ability of the monitoring well network to detect potential leakage and 

track the plume migration and pressure front while minimizing the number 

of wells, which increase the risk for fluid movement.

Regarding potential leakage pathways in the expanded Area of Review, 

when the AoR was expanded, EPA investigated whether this larger area 

included any wells that penetrated the injection and/or confining zones. 

EPA found only two wells (aside from FutureGen’s stratigraphic test well). 

One of those deep wells was plugged in June 2014. The other well is being 

used as an observation well at a gas storage operation. The well log 

database maintained by the ISGS did not show any other wells in the area 

that were drilled into the confining and/or injection formations. 

In addition to evaluating FutureGen’s review of the area wells, EPA 

completed its own independent review of well records at the ISGS and the 

Illinois State Water Survey. EPA did not find any improperly constructed 

artificial penetrations that reach the confining zone.
174 

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

included in the updated Testing and Monitoring 

plan to monitor in this area of elevated pressure. 

No discussion is included regarding any additional 

search for potential leakage pathways or sensitive 

areas in this now larger Area of Review. See Ex. 2, 

para. 11 (Schnaar report). The Director must 

obtain and review this additional information in 

order to ensure the monitoring system is adequate 

and the Permit is based on accurate data. 

Because geologic sequestration is a new 

technology, methods for monitoring the location of 

the plume are largely untested. Neither the draft 

Permit nor the Supporting Documentation contain 

details on how the number, type, and proposed 

location of the five monitoring wells (three 

Reservoir Access Tubes [RATs] and two Single-Level 

in- Reservoir [SLR] wells) for the injection zone 

(Attachment C p.C4/56) satisfy the Class VI 

requirements. Further, and as set forth in Section 

II.C above, FutureGen’s modeled CO2 plume must 

be enlarged, including in the southerly directions 

due to injection well length, injection pipe 

directions, and injection rates, and the extent of 

the monitoring in those areas must be 

correspondingly increased to satisfy the 

regulations. Additional deep monitoring wells 

penetrating the confining zone and shallow 

monitoring wells are needed. The proposed 

monitoring configuration would be inappropriate in 

light of a material change to the size and shape of 

the projected plume. 

Therefore, the permit language has not been modified based upon this 

comment.
175 

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

22 Leinberger 

& 

Critchelow 

families

Monitoring Well Network and Monitoring 

Activities

9) Shallow groundwater monitoring

A shallow groundwater well sampling investigation 

was performed in 2011 by ISGS for private domestic 

water-supply wells within 1.5 miles of the 

FutureGen stratigraphic well location (designated 

FG1 on Figure 2.26 on Page 2.41 of the Supporting 

Documentation). All of the wells were reportedly 

shallow (14 to 47 feet deep) and were identified 

with a FG-P-# designation. A summary of the 

analytical findings is provided in the Supporting 

Documentation. However, these wells are not 

identified by their ISWS ID numbers and do not 

appear to coincide with any of the wells identified 

on any other figures or tables within the Supporting 

Documentation. In Section 5 of the Supporting 

Documentation (Page 5.18) these wells are 

identified as being included in the planned shallow 

groundwater monitoring program. 

Requested Change/Action: Since these well are part 

of the future monitoring network, FutureGen needs 

to identify these wells either by the ISWS number, if 

they are registered, or provide the owner 

identification and legal description (township and 

range). The full analytical reports from the previous 

sampling event should also be provided as part of 

their supporting documentation.

10) Monitoring above the St. Peter Sandstone

FutureGen is considering using three abandoned oil 

and gas wells reportedly located within the limits of 

the sc CO2 plume (original AoR) for soil-gas 

In section 9, the commenter stated that shallow groundwater wells are 

part of a future groundwater monitoring network. The nine landowners 

wells were sampled as a baseline sampling, but no sampling of these wells 

are planned during the injection phase. The results from all monitoring 

wells will be submitted to EPA after they are completed and EPA will retain 

this information in the event that sampling of these wells is conducted in 

the future for comparison to baseline conditions.

Regarding the comments on section 10, the subject abandoned oil-gas 

wells, even with no evaluation of well construction and well cement, are 

unlikely to serve as conduits for fluid movement to the surface because 

they do not intersect the injection zone, CO2 plume, or confining zone for 

the project. In the unlikely event that leakage out of the injection zone did 

occur, or if these wells were recompleted as monitoring wells, the Director 

would require any corrective action and/or emergency response necessary 

to protect USDWs, including requiring mechanical integrity testing.

The commenters raised concerns about the use of older wells for 

monitoring shallower formations. The use of these wells is acceptable to 

EPA as long as they meet the required monitoring needs and do not serve 

as pathways for leakage into USDWs. EPA will fully evaluate these wells if 

they are converted. Although not explicitly required by the UIC 

regulations, EPA is requiring in the permits that the wells not only initially 

demonstrate mechanical integrity, but also re-demonstrate mechanical 

integrity every five years that the well is in use to help assure 

protectiveness.

Therefore, the permit language has not been modified based upon this 

comment.
176 

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

monitoring. The wells reportedly extend to depths 

of approximately 1,000 to 1,500 feet below ground 

surface (bgs) through some of the shallower shale 

formation above the St. Peter Sandstone and 

therefore have the potential for providing a 

preferential pathway for CO2 gas migration (Section 

5.1.1, Page 5.3, Supporting Documentation). 

Requested Change/Action: FutureGen did not 

specifically identify the three wells though their API 

identification numbers can be deduced from the 

tables and figures. FutureGen needs to confirm their 

identification and conduct an assessment of the 

drilling and abandonment logs to assess the 

integrity of the wells. If these wells become part of 

the future monitoring program, integrity testing 

and upgrading of these wells would be required and 

this requirement should be a condition of the 

Permit.

23 Leinberger 

& 

Critchelow 

families

FutureGen is considering use of three abandoned 

oil and gas wells completed at greater than 1,000 

feet bgs for soil-gas monitoring because of their 

potential for providing a preferential pathway for 

CO2 gas migration. See Ex. 1, para. 10 (Price report). 

The Director should require that FutureGen provide 

information concerning the wells, including 

integrity testing and the need for upgrading of 

these wells, given their potential use.

These abandoned oil-gas wells, even with no evaluation of well 

construction and well cement, are unlikely to serve as conduits for fluid 

movement to the surface because they do not intersect the injection zone, 

CO2 plume, or confining zone for the project. If these wells were to be 

required monitoring wells per the permits, the Director would require any 

testing or corrective action necessary to protect USDWs, including 

mechanical integrity testing. Therefore, the permit language has not been 

modified based upon this comment.
177 

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

24 CSC Provision: M(1)(a)

Text of Draft Permit: (a) The permittee shall 

maintain and comply with the approved Testing 

and Monitoring Plan (Attachment C of this permit) 

and with the requirements at 40 CFR 144.51(j), 

146.88(e), and 146.90. The Testing and Monitoring 

Plan is an enforceable condition of this permit. 

Samples and measurements taken for the purpose 

of monitoring shall be representative of the 

monitored activity. Procedures for all testing and 

monitoring under this permit must be submitted to 

the Director in an electronic format for approval at 

least 30 days prior to the test. In performing all 

testing and monitoring under this permit, the 

permittee must follow the procedures approved by 

the Director. If the permittee is unable to follow the 

EPA approved procedures, then, the permittee 

must contact the Director at least 30 days prior to 

testing to discuss options, if any are feasible. When 

the test report is submitted, a full explanation must 

be provided as to why any approved procedures 

were not followed. If the approved procedures 

were not followed, EPA may take an appropriate 

action, including but not limited to, requiring the 

permittee to re-run the test.

Proposed Revision:

(a) The permittee shall maintain and comply with 

the approved Testing and Monitoring Plan 

(Attachment C of this permit) and with to meet the 

requirements at 40 CFR 144.51(j), 146.88(e), and 

146.90. The Testing and Monitoring Plan is an 

enforceable condition of this permit. Samples and 

As a general matter the UIC permit is intended as a roadmap to identify 

the relevant requirements and obligations of FutureGen. The relevant 

regulatory provisions are lengthier and more detailed, so that the permit 

language may summarize those requirements and provide reference to the 

regulatory details rather than copying them in their entirety. This makes 

the permit more reader-friendly and easy to follow. Incorporating the 

additional details by reference does not create any conflict or confusion 

between the terms of the permit and the regulations.

In addition, 40 C.F.R. §146.90 makes it clear that FutureGen is responsible 

to comply with both the permit requirement and the regulatory 

requirement upon which it is based. For Class VI wells, EPA anticipates that 

the testing and monitoring plan will be regularly reviewed and revised as 

required by 40 C.F.R. §146.90(j) and Section M of the Permits. Reference 

to the relevant regulatory provisions provides clarity on the standards 

against which any revisions will be judged. 

Therefore, the permit language has not been modified based upon this 

comment.
178 

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

measurements taken for the purpose of monitoring 

shall be representative of the monitored activity. 

Procedures for all testing and monitoring under this 

permit must be submitted to the Director in an 

electronic format for approval at least 30 days prior 

to the test. In performing all testing and monitoring 

under this permit, the permittee must follow the 

procedures approved by the Director. If the 

permittee is unable to follow the EPA approved 

procedures, then, the permittee must contact the 

Director at least 30 days prior to testing to discuss 

options, if any are feasible. When the test report is

submitted, a full explanation must be provided as

to why any approved procedures were not

followed. If the approved procedures were not followed, EPA may take an appropriate action,

including but not limited to, requiring the

permittee to re-run the test.

--OR—

The permittee has submitted the approved Testing 

and Monitoring Plan, which is included in 

Attachment C of this permit. This plan includes the 

information required by Sections 144.51(j), 

146.88(e), and 146.90 and demonstrates how each 

of the applicable requirements will be met. The 

Testing and Monitoring Plan is an enforceable 

condition of this permit.

Comment: The procedures are all spelled out in the 

plan.
179 

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

25 CSC Provision: M(2)

Text of Draft Permit:

2. Carbon Dioxide Stream Analysis – The permittee 

shall analyze the carbon dioxide stream with 

sufficient frequency to yield data representative of 

its chemical and physical characteristics, as 

described in the Testing and Monitoring Plan and to 

meet the requirements of 40 CFR 146.90(a).

Proposed Revision: 2. Carbon Dioxide Stream 

Analysis – The permittee shall analyze the carbon 

dioxide stream with sufficient frequency to yield 

data representative of its chemical and physical 

characteristics, as described in the Testing and 

Monitoring Plan and to meet the requirements of 

40 CFR 146.90(a).

Comment: By issuing the permit, EPA has 

determined that implementing the Testing and 

Monitoring Plan does meet the requirements of 40 

CFR 146.90(a).

As a general matter the UIC permit is intended as a roadmap to identify 

the relevant requirements and obligations of FutureGen. The relevant 

regulatory provisions are lengthier and more detailed, so that the permit 

language may summarize those requirements and provide reference to the 

regulatory details rather than copying them in their entirety. This makes 

the permit more reader-friendly and easy to follow. Incorporating the 

additional details by reference does not create any conflict or confusion 

between the terms of the permit and the regulations

In addition, 40 C.F.R. §146.90 makes it clear that FutureGen is responsible 

to comply with both the permit requirement and the regulatory 

requirement upon which it is based. For Class VI wells, EPA anticipates that 

the testing and monitoring plan will be regularly reviewed and revised as 

required by 40 C.F.R. §146.90(j) and Section M of the Permits. Reference 

to the relevant regulatory provisions provides clarity on the standards 

against which any revisions will be judged. 

Therefore, the permit language has not been modified based upon this 

comment.

26 FutureGen Page C5

Under Laboratory to be used/chain of custody 

procedures: 

The QASP Sections referred to here are incorrect. 

B.4.5 through B.4.7 should be B.1.4 through B.1.7.

EPA agrees that this correction is appropriate and consistent with the rest 

of the Plan. The suggested change is incorporated into the final permits.

27 FutureGen Page C5 

Under Quality assurance and surveillance 

measures: 

The QASP Sections referred to here are incorrect. 

A.9 should be B.14. B.4 should be B.1.3 and B.14.

EPA agrees that this correction is appropriate and consistent with the rest 

of the Plan. The suggested change is incorporated into the final permits.
180 

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

28 FutureGen Page C6 

The acronym “WAPMMS” (well annulus pressure 

maintenance and monitoring system) should be 

replaced with APS (annulus pressurization system) 

throughout the permit documents.

This requested change is only a terminology clarification. The suggested 

change is incorporated into the final permits.

29 FutureGen Page C6 

In the section titled Continuous Recording of 

Injection Mass Flow Rate

Change the following sentence: 

The flow transmitters will each be connected to a 

remote terminal unit (RTU) on the flow meter skid. 

The RTU will communicate with the Control Center 

through the well annular pressure maintenance and 

monitoring system (WAPMMS) programmable logic 

controller (PLC) located at the injection well site. 

To read: 

The flow meters will be connected to the main CO2

storage site SCADA system for continuous 

monitoring and control of the CO2 injection rate 

into each well.

EPA agrees that this clarification provides helpful detail, and is appropriate 

and consistent with the rest of the Plan. The suggested change is 

incorporated into the final permits.

30 FutureGen Page C6 

In the section titled Continuous Recording of 

Injection Pressure 

Change the last sentence to read: 

The transmitter will be connected to the APS PLC 

located in the Control Building adjacent to the 

injection well pad.

EPA agrees that this clarification provides helpful detail, and is appropriate 

and consistent with the rest of the Plan. The suggested change is 

incorporated into the final permits.
181 

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

31 FutureGen Page C6

In the section titled “Continuous Recording of 

Injection Temperature”

The PLC will be located in the Control Building 

adjacent to the injection well pad.

In the section’s 2nd paragraph, change the sentence:

Mechanical strain gauges and thermocouple wires 

will be the primary monitoring devices for P/T and 

will be frequently recalibrated (initially on a 

quarterly basis; any changes to this frequency will 

be in consultation with the UIC Director). 

to read:

Instruments for measuring surface injection 

pressure and temperature will be calibrated initially 

before commencing injection and recalibrated 

periodically as needed based on regular (e.g., 

quarterly) instrument checks.

Paragraphs 3 and 4 should be combined and revised 

as shown below and a new section header titled 

“Bottomhole Pressure and Temperature” should be 

inserted after the second paragraph in this section.

Bottomhole Pressure and Temperature 

An optical or electronic P/T gauge will be installed 

on the outside of the tubing string, approximately 

30 ft above the packer, and ported into the tubing 

to continuously measure CO2 injection P/T inside 

the tubing at this depth. The downhole sensor will 

be the point of compliance for maintaining 

injection pressure below 90% of formation fracture 

pressure. If the downhole probe goes out between 

scheduled maintenance events then the surface 

pressure limitation noted in Attachment A of this 

EPA agrees that the clarification suggested for the section titled 

“Continuous Recording of Injection Temperature,” provides helpful detail. 

The suggested change has been incorporated into the final permits with 

additional changes to provide further clarity. It now states “Instruments 

for measuring surface injection pressure and temperature will be

calibrated initially before commencing injection and recalibrated 

periodically as needed based on regular (e.g., quarterly) instrument 

checks. These instruments for measuring surface injection pressure and 

temperature will be recalibrated annually. [emphasis added]

Regarding the second part of this comment, EPA agrees that putting this 

under a new section header is appropriate. However, EPA does not agree 

to the suggested revision of the two paragraphs that will appear beneath 

the heading. Revising the paragraphs to the commenter’s suggested text 

would remove reference to the surface instrumentation/monitoring 

points. EPA also has corrected the paragraph to provide consistency with 

other portions of the permits by removing the following sentence from the

permits: “The CO2Flow program developed by the Pacific Northwest 

National Laboratory estimates pressure and fluid state evolution as CO2

moves through pipelines and injection tubing and will be used to 

determine an equivalent downhole pressure.” While use of the CO2Flow 

program for calculating surface pressures might be considered in the 

future; EPA would need to verify the accuracy of its calculations while 

injection was taking place by comparing the calculations with 

measurements taken from calibrated downhole and surface gauges. 

EPA will also remove the CO2Flow text regarding the same from section 

A.6.1 of the QASP that stated “If the downhole probe fails between 

scheduled maintenance events, then the surface pressure measurement 

coupled with the analytical code, CO2Flow, will be used to determine 

permit compliance downhole at the injection elevation. The CO2Flow 

program estimates pressure and fluid state evolution as CO2 moves 
182 

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

permit will be used as a backup until the downhole 

probe/gauge is repaired or replaced. The CO2Flow 

program developed by the Pacific Northwest 

National Laboratory estimates pressure and fluid 

state evolution as CO2 moves through pipelines and 

injection tubing and will be used to determine an 

equivalent surface pressure that will not cause 

bottomhole pressure to exceed 90% of formation 

fracture pressure.

through pipelines and injection tubing and will be used to determine an 

equivalent downhole pressure.”

32 CSC Provision: M(3)

Text of Draft Permit: 3. Continuous Monitoring –

The permittee shall maintain continuous 

monitoring devices and use them to monitor 

injection pressure, flow rate, volume, the pressure 

on the annulus between the tubing and the long 

string of casing, annulus fluid level, and 

temperature. This monitoring shall be performed as 

described in the Testing and Monitoring Plan to 

meet the requirements of 40 CFR 146.90(b).

Comment: This is excellent because it properly 

recognizes that performing in accordance with the 

Testing and Monitoring Plan meets the 

requirements of 40 CFR 146.90(b).

The permit language has not been modified based upon this comment.

33 FutureGen Page C7 

In line 2, surface pressure “limation” should be 

changed to surface pressure limitation.

EPA agrees that this correction is appropriate. The suggested change is 

incorporated into the final permits.
183 

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

34 CSC Provision: M(4)

Text of Draft Permit: 4. Corrosion Monitoring –

The permittee shall perform corrosion monitoring 

of the well materials for loss of mass, thickness, 

cracking, pitting, and other signs of corrosion on a 

quarterly basis using the procedures described in 

the Testing and Monitoring Plan and in accordance 

with 40 CFR 146.90(c) to ensure that the well 

components meet the minimum standards for 

material strength and performance set forth in 40 

CFR 146.86(b).

Proposed Revision: 4. Corrosion Monitoring – The 

permittee shall perform corrosion monitoring of 

the well materials for loss of mass, thickness, 

cracking, pitting, and other signs of corrosion on a 

quarterly basis using the procedures described in 

the Testing and Monitoring Plan and in accordance

with 40 CFR 146.90(c) to ensure that the well 

components meet the minimum standards for

material strength and performance set forth in 40 

CFR 146.86(b).

Comment: Once again, this condition is written in a 

way that suggests that compliance requires 

something beyond following the approved 

corrosion monitoring process, which is not the 

case.

As a general matter the UIC permit is intended as a roadmap to identify 

the relevant requirements and obligations of FutureGen. The relevant 

regulatory provisions are lengthier and more detailed, so that the permit 

language may summarize those requirements and provide reference to the 

regulatory details rather than copying them in their entirety. This makes 

the permit more reader-friendly and easy to follow. Incorporating the 

additional details by reference does not create any conflict or confusion 

between the terms of the permit and the regulations

In addition, 40 C.F.R. §146.90 makes it clear that FutureGen is responsible 

to comply with both the permit requirement and the regulatory 

requirement upon which it is based. For Class VI wells, EPA anticipates that 

the testing and monitoring plan will be regularly reviewed and revised as 

required by 40 C.F.R. §146.90(j) and Section M of the Permits. Reference 

to the relevant regulatory provisions provides clarity on the standards 

against which any revisions will be judged. 

Therefore, EPA will not make any changes to the permits based on this 

comment.
184 

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

35 FutureGen Page C8

Change the table caption: 

“Table 3. Wireline Tools for Monitoring Corrosion of 

Casing and Tubing.” 

To read: 

Table 3. Example Wireline Tools for Monitoring 

Corrosion of Casing and Tubing.

The commenter has not provided any basis or explanation for this change. 

The table lists identified tools that may be used. They are not examples. 

Therefore, EPA will not make any changes to the permits based on this 

comment.

36 FutureGen Page C7

In section Corrosion Monitoring 

In the 4th paragraph in this section, change the 

following sentence: 

“ The tools (described in Table 3), which will be used 

to monitor the condition of well tubing and casing, 

include:” 

To read:

The types of tools (examples described in Table 3), 

which may be used to monitor the condition of well 

tubing and casing, include:

Table 3 lists identified tools that may be used. They are not examples. 

Because there is flexibility in deciding which tool or tools to use, EPA will 

change “will” to “may” in the quoted language. EPA will not make any 

other changes to the permits based on this comment.

37 CSC Provision: M(5) and (6)

Text of Draft Permit: 5. Ground Water Quality 

Monitoring– The permittee shall monitor ground 

water quality and geochemical changes above the 

confining zone(s) that may be a result of carbon 

dioxide movement through the confining zone(s) or 

additional identified zones. This monitoring shall be 

performed for the parameters identified in the 

Testing and Monitoring Plan at the locations and 

depths, and at frequencies described in the Testing 

and Monitoring Plan to meet the requirements of 

40 CFR 146.90(d).

Comment: The language in these conditions 

succeeds better than other formulations in 

Thank you for your comment. The permit language has not been modified 

based upon this comment.
185 

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

indicating that compliance with the Testing and 

Monitoring Plan will “meet the requirements” of 

the respective regulatory provisions. The approach 

reflected in the Class IH permit provisions used by 

EPA Region 5 is still preferable to this formulation, 

but this approach is acceptable.

38 FutureGen Page C12 

In the first sentence, the word techniques should be 

changed to requirements.

EPA agrees that this correction is appropriate. The suggested change is 

incorporated into the final permits.

39 FutureGen The last sentence on page C10 refers to Table 1 for 

monitoring well sampling/recording frequencies 

(i.e., for continuous monitoring data), but Table 1 

presents frequency specifications for injection wells 

only. Tables 6, 7, 13, 14, and 17 also refer back to 

Table 1. 

Table 1 needs to be modified to address monitoring 

well sampling/recording frequencies.

Either a new “Well Condition” needs to be added or 

the second category could be changed to read “For 

monitoring wells and Injection wells that are shutin:” The planned monitoring well sampling 

frequency is 10 minutes; this specification is well 

within the minimum specification for shut-in 

injection wells. The specification for operating 

injection wells is not appropriate for monitoring 

wells since changes would be expected to occur 

much more slowly. If EPA prefers to create a new 

“Well Condition” for monitoring wells, then the 

Alliance recommends a minimum sampling 

frequency of 30 minutes and a minimum recording 

frequency of 2 hours. 

EPA agrees that this correction is appropriate. Table 1 was revised to 

reflect sampling and recording frequencies for all monitoring well 

categories, specifically to show the continuous sampling frequency of 

every 30 minutes (and recording of data every 2 hours) for temperature 

and pressure monitoring in: the St. Peter monitoring well; the two ACZ 

wells in the Ironton; and the two SLR wells in the Mt. Simon. 
186 

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

40 FutureGen Page C11

The following Note should be added to Table 6:

Depth is approximate and may be adjusted based 

on information obtained when the well is drilled.

The depth of each well, as well as formation depths, are indicated as 

where the wells are intended to be placed. Since each permit has 

numerous citations of depths and locations, noting that these are 

anticipated depths and are therefore subject to change would overly 

complicate the permits and be potentially confusing. Small deviations 

identified after construction is completed can be corrected through the 

minor modification process identified in 40 C.F.R. § 144.41. 

Therefore, the permit language has not been modified based upon these 

comments.

41 FutureGen Page C12

The following Note should be added to Table 7:

Depth is approximate and may be adjusted based 

on information obtained when the well is drilled.

42 FutureGen Please append the following paragraph to page 12:

The relative benefit of each analytical 

measurement will be evaluated throughout the 

design and initial injection testing phase of the 

project to identify the analytes best suited to 

meeting project monitoring objectives under sitespecific conditions. If some analytical 

measurements are shown to be of limited use, they 

will be removed from the analyte list and not 

carried forward through the operational phases of 

the project. This selection process will consider the 

uniqueness and signature strength of each 

potential analyte and whether their characteristics 

provide for a high-value leak-detection capability. 

Any modification to the parameter list in Table 8 

will be made in consultation with the UIC Program 

Director.

This is also EPA’s understanding, and the suggested language was added 

to the permits to provide clarification. As a further clarification, the 

following sentence will be added as well: “Modifications to the parameter 

list will also require modifications to the permits through the process 

described in 40 C.F.R. Part 144.” EPA will consider in the future the merits 

of modifying the sampling targets on a case-by-case basis.
187 

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

43 NRDC Area of Review (“AOR") and Corrective Action

1. As noted in the permit application, the 

Cambrian Ironton-Galesville Sandstone is a 

groundwater aquifer, and serves as an 

underground source of drinking water (“USDW”) in 

Northern Illinois. The Ironton-Galesville lies directly 

above the primary confining zone at the injection 

well site. The Applicant estimates based on a 

groundwater salinity map and calculations from 

wireline logs that the salinity in the IrontonGalesville at the proposed injection well site is 

approximately 15,000 mg/L, however no fluid 

samples have been collected and there is no 

published data on the salinity at the site. We 

support the Applicant’s proposal to take three 

baseline samples in each of the two above 

confining zone (”ACZ”) wells, and urge that the final 

permit contain obligations to measure the salinity 

in the aquifer in a reliable and accurate manner. If 

the results of the baseline fluid sampling program 

in the Ironton-Galesville in the ACZ monitoring 

wells reveal lower salinity than expected, EPA must 

require Applicant to discuss what implications this 

may have for the suitability of the primary 

confining zone to protect the Ironton-Galesville, 

and to make any necessary changes accordingly to 

the AOR, corrective action plan, the testing and 

monitoring plan, and any other relevant plans and 

requirements.

Future information obtained after drilling and sampling of various 

formations, including the Ironton-Galesville, will be evaluated by EPA at 

that time. Additional site specific information will inform the model and 

may require additional modeling.

Under the Permits (see Parts G and M), the AoR, Corrective Action, and the 

Monitoring Program will be regularly reviewed, and revised as 

appropriate. A review and re-evaluation is required before injection begins 

under Part Q of the permits. Those reviews will consider the factors 

identified in this comment, and other considerations. Any modifications 

made as part of those reviews will go through the permit modification 

process described in 40 C.F.R. Part 144. 

Therefore, EPA will not make any changes to the permits based on this 

comment.
188 

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

44 NRDC Testing and Monitoring

1. The testing and monitoring plan includes 

mechanical integrity tests (“MITs”) of monitoring 

wells every five years. As noted previously, 

improperly constructed or maintained wells are the 

most likely pathway by which injected fluids may 

reach USDWs. As stated in the permit application,

“This positive head difference suggests a natural 

vertical flow potential from the Mount Simon to 

the overlying St. Peter if hydraulic communication 

is afforded (e.g., an open communicative well).” 

Although the monitoring wells are constructed with 

CO2 -resistant materials and will have continuous 

monitoring of pressure, temperature, and 

specific conductance, more frequent proactive 

MITs can help identify and remediate mechanical 

integrity issues before they become problematic. 

EPA should consider requiring more frequent MITs 

in the monitoring wells that penetrate the injection 

or confining zone, particularly once the CO2 plume 

reaches these wells.

The UIC regulations do not require that monitoring wells demonstrate 

mechanical integrity since they are not injection wells. However, 

demonstrations of mechanical integrity in these wells are valuable for at 

least two reasons: to ensure that the wells are not acting as leakage 

pathways; and to ensure that the monitoring is of the targeted zone. Given 

that these monitored wells are being observed and evaluated for unusual 

changes in monitored parameters, EPA’s five year mechanical integrity 

schedule is appropriate.

Therefore, the permit language has not been modified based upon this 

comment.

45 CSC Provision: M(5) and (6)

Text of Draft Permit: 6. External Mechanical 

Integrity Testing – The permittee shall demonstrate 

external mechanical integrity as described in the 

Testing and Monitoring Plan and Section L of this 

permit to meet the requirements of 40 CFR 

146.90(e).

Comment: The language in these conditions 

succeeds better than other formulations in 

indicating that compliance with the Testing and 

Monitoring Plan will “meet the requirements” of 

Thank you for your comment. The permit language has not been modified 

based upon this comment.
189 

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

the respective regulatory provisions. The approach 

reflected in the Class IH permit provisions used by 

EPA Region 5 is still preferable to this formulation, 

but this approach is acceptable.

46 FutureGen Page C16

The section titled External Mechanical Integrity 

Testing discusses both external MIT and internal 

MIT, so the section heading should be changed to 

reflect this or else create a new section for Internal 

Mechanical Integrity Testing and move related text 

to this section.

EPA agrees with this comment and corrected the section heading by 

deleting the word “External.” This suggested change is incorporated into 

the final permits.

47 FutureGen Page C16

Delete the last sentence of 3rd paragraph: “A 

preliminary schedule for the annual well 

maintenance event is provided in Table 10.” 

Table 10 is provided for informational purposes and is not, in itself, a 

permit requirement. Therefore, the permit language has not been 

modified based upon this comment.

48 FutureGen Page C16

The exact maintenance activities and their 

sequence and duration should not be a permit 

requirement.

Delete Table 10.

49 FutureGen Page C17, Par 2

Since the monitoring wells will not be used to inject 

fluids, there is no valid reason to conduct internal 

mechanical integrity testing of the monitoring 

wells. Furthermore, only the SLR (single-level 

reservoir [SLR] monitoring wells will have tubing 

and packer installed.

Mechanical integrity of monitoring wells is essential to ensure that the 

monitoring wells themselves do not serve as conduits for leakage. EPA will 

retain the requirement that all monitoring wells must demonstrate 

protective construction by demonstrating integrity of the tubulars and 

cement after well construction. However, wells that do not reach the Eau 

Claire formation will not be required to continually demonstrate 
190 

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

50 FutureGen Page C17, Par 2

This paragraph needs to be reworded to clarify the 

difference between SLR and ACZ monitoring wells. 

The Alliance requests the following wording of this 

paragraph:

External mechanical integrity tests will be 

conducted for monitoring wells that penetrate the 

primary confining zone, once after construction and 

every five years until they are plugged. No well 

maintenance is anticipated for the ACZ and USDW 

monitoring wells during the 20-year operational 

(i.e., injection) period or the subsequent post 

injection monitoring period. Unlike the in-reservoir 

monitoring wells, these wells do not penetrate the 

primary confining zone; therefore, conducting 

external MITs to look for evidence of upward CO2

or brine migration out of the CO2 storage zone is 

not warranted.

mechanical integrity – tests on these monitoring wells will only be required 

if a potential problem is detected.

Based on these comments, the language in the final permits is modified to 

read:

“All monitoring wells required under this permit will establish and 

maintain mechanical integrity. After construction, each monitoring well 

must establish internal and external mechanical integrity. Wells that do 

not have a tubing and packer shall perform a pressure test on the casing. 

Each monitoring well that reaches the Eau Claire (the confining zone) shall 

establish mechanical integrity after construction, shall conduct an Internal 

mechanical integrity test at least every five years or continuously monitor 

the annulus, and shall conduct an External mechanical integrity test at 

least every five years. The testing of monitoring wells that reach the Eau 

Claire shall continue until they are plugged.”

51 FutureGen Page C17

The activities listed in Table 11 (other than PNC 

logging) are not required and will only be 

performed if necessary to maintain well integrity 

and performance.

Delete the paragraph 3 that begins “It is also 

anticipated that....”

Table 11 and its descriptive paragraph are provided for informational 

purposes and are not, in themselves, permit requirements. Therefore, the 

permit language has not been modified based upon these comments.

52 FutureGen Page C17

The activities listed in Table 11 (other than PNC 

logging) are not required and will only be 

performed if necessary to maintain well integrity 

and performance.

Delete Table 11.
191 

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

53 FutureGen Page C18

Since fall-off testing is required once every 5 years, 

the gauges used for the purpose of fall-off testing 

should be calibrated per the method described prior 

to conducting the fall-off test rather than annually.

In lines 5 and 6 of paragraph 2, revise the following 

sentence:

Pressure gauges that are used for the purpose of 

the fall-off test will be calibrated on an annual basis 

with current annual calibration certificates provided 

with test results to EPA.

To read:

Pressure gauges that are used for the purpose of 

the fall-off test will be calibrated prior to 

conducting the fall-off test with current calibration 

certificates provided with test results to EPA. 

The intent of requiring gauge calibration is to ensure that the gauge used 

for a fall-off test has been calibrated no more than one year prior to its use 

for the fall-off test. EPA clarified the language identified by the 

commenter to read: “Pressure gauges that are used for the purpose of the 

fall-off test shall have been calibrated no more than one year prior to the 

date of the fall-off test with current calibration certificates provided with 

the test results to EPA.”

This suggested change is incorporated into the Final Permits.

54 Betty 

Niemann

The EIS 460D document makes the following 

statements: “Other planned monitoring may 

include 10 to 15 permanent surface monitoring 

stations for measuring injection related ground 

surface deformation by interferometric synthetic 

aperature radar, gravity surveys, tilt meters, and 

differential positioning systems...Surface changes 

for CO2 storage would be measured in millimeters 

and, if present, would not be visible to the human 

eye.” xxiii In other words, FutureGen 2.0 will be 

using InSARxxiv xxv xxvi- interferometric synthetic 

aperature radar as part of its MVA. There is no 

discussion of the impact this might have on tile and 

drainage systems or what happens if there is a 

development of sink holes/subsidence. 

The proposed ground deformation monitoring is expected to have no 

effect on tile and drainage systems. Evaluation of the site geology by both 

FutureGen and EPA, and further supported by the historical absence of any 

occurrence, indicate that sink hole and/or subsidence is unlikely to occur. 

Therefore, the permit language has not been modified based upon this 

comment.
192 

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

55 CSC Provision: P(1)

Text of Draft Permit:

1. The Emergency and Remedial Response Plan 

describes actions the permittee must take to 

address movement of the injection or formation 

fluids that may cause an endangerment to a USDW 

during construction, operation, and post-injection 

site care periods. The permittee shall maintain and 

comply with the approved Emergency and 

Remedial Response Plan (Attachment F of this 

permit), which is an enforceable condition of this 

permit, and with 40 CFR 146.94.

Proposed Revision: 1. The Emergency and 

Remedial Response Plan describes actions the 

permittee must take to address movement of the 

injection or formation fluids that may cause an 

endangerment to a USDW during construction, 

operation, and post- injection site care periods. The 

permittee shall maintain and comply with the 

approved Emergency and Remedial Response Plan 

(Attachment F of this permit), which is an 

enforceable condition of this permit, and with 40 

CFR 146.94.

Comment: Once again, this condition is written in a 

way that suggests that compliance requires 

something beyond following the approved 

Emergency and Remedial Response Plan, which is 

not the case. The revision recommended here 

should be adopted and incorporated in the final 

permit.

As a general matter the UIC permit is intended as a roadmap to identify 

the relevant requirements and obligations of FutureGen. The relevant 

regulatory provisions are lengthier and more detailed, so that the permit 

language may summarize those requirements and provide reference to the 

regulatory details rather than copying them in their entirety. This makes 

the permit more reader-friendly and easy to follow. Incorporating the 

additional details by reference does not create any conflict or confusion 

between the terms of the permit and the regulations.

In addition, 40 C.F.R. §146.94(a) makes it clear that FutureGen is 

responsible to comply with both the permit requirement and the 

regulatory requirement upon which it is based. For Class VI wells, EPA 

anticipates that emergency and remedial response plan will be regularly 

reviewed and revised as required by 40 C.F.R. §146.94(d) and Section P of 

the Permits. Reference to the relevant regulatory provisions provides 

clarity on the standards against which any revisions will be judged. 

Therefore, EPA will not make any changes to the permits based on this 

comment.
193 

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

56 CSC Provision: M(8)

Text of Draft Permit: (a) The permittee shall use 

direct methods to track the position of the carbon 

dioxide plume and the pressure front in the 

injection zone as described in the Testing and 

Monitoring Plan and to meet the requirements of 

40 CFR 146.90(g)(1).

(b) The permittee shall use indirect methods to 

track the position of the carbon dioxide plume and 

pressure front as described in the Testing and 

Monitoring Plan and to meet the requirements of 

40 CFR 146.90(g)(2).

Proposed Revision: (a) The permittee shall use 

direct methods to track the position of the carbon 

dioxide plume and the pressure front in the 

injection zone as described in the Testing and 

Monitoring Plan and to meet the requirements of 

40 CFR 146.90(g)(1). (b) The permittee shall use 

indirect methods to track the position of the carbon 

dioxide plume and pressure front as described in 

the Testing and Monitoring Plan and to meet the 

requirements of 40 CFR 146.90(g)(2).

Comment: By issuing the permit, EPA has 

determined that implementing the Testing and 

Monitoring Plan does meet the applicable 

requirements.

As a general matter the UIC permit is intended as a roadmap to identify 

the relevant requirements and obligations of FutureGen. The relevant 

regulatory provisions are lengthier and more detailed, so that the permit 

language may summarize those requirements and provide reference to the 

regulatory details rather than copying them in their entirety. This makes 

the permit more reader-friendly and easy to follow. Incorporating the 

additional details by reference does not create any conflict or confusion 

between the terms of the permit and the regulations

In addition, 40 C.F.R. §146.90 makes it clear that FutureGen is responsible 

to comply with both the permit requirement and the regulatory 

requirement upon which it is based. For Class VI wells, EPA anticipates that 

the testing and monitoring plan will be regularly reviewed and revised as 

required by 40 C.F.R. §146.90(j) and Section M of the Permits. Reference 

to the relevant regulatory provisions provides clarity on the standards 

against which any revisions will be judged. 

Therefore, EPA will not make any changes to the permits based on this 

comment.

57 FutureGen Page C20

The following Note should be added to Table 12:

All depths are approximate and may be adjusted 

based on information obtained when the well is 

drilled.
194 

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

58 FutureGen Page C21

The following Note should be added to Table 13:

All depths are approximate and may be adjusted 

based on information obtained when the well is 

drilled.

The depth of each well, as well as formation depths, are indicated as 

where the wells are intended to be placed. Since each permit has 

numerous citations of depths and locations, noting that these are 

anticipated depths and are therefore subject to change would overly 

complicate the permits and be potentially confusing. Small deviations 

identified after construction is completed can be corrected through the 

minor modification process identified in 40 C.F.R. § 144.41. 

Therefore, the permit language has not been modified based upon these 

comments.

59 FutureGen Page C22

The following Note should be added to Table 14:

Depth is approximate and may be adjusted based 

on information obtained when the well is drilled.

60 FutureGen Please append the following paragraph to page 23:

The relative benefit of each analytical 

measurement will be evaluated throughout the 

design and initial injection testing phase of the 

project to identify the analytes best suited to 

meeting project monitoring objectives under sitespecific conditions. If some analytical 

measurements are shown to be of limited use, they 

will be removed from the analyte list and not 

carried forward through the operational phases of 

the project. This selection process will consider the 

uniqueness and signature strength of each 

potential analyte and whether their characteristics 

provide for a high-value leak-detection capability. 

Any modification to the parameter list in Table 8 

will be made in consultation with the UIC Program 

Director.

This is also EPA’s understanding, and the suggested language was added to 

the permits to provide clarification. As a further clarification, the following 

sentence was added as well: “Modifications to the parameter list will also 

require modifications to the permits through the process described in 40 

C.F.R. Part 144.” EPA will consider in the future the merits of modifying the 

sampling targets on a case-by-case basis.

61 FutureGen Page C28

Table 1 lists injection well sampling frequencies and 

is not relevant to the indirect methodologies 

The reference to Table 1 is relevant due to the requirement for continuous 

monitoring in certain parts of Table 17. The permit language has not been 

modified based upon this comment.
195 

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

presented in Table 17.

The Note referring to Table 1 and the related 

sentence in the text just prior to this table should be 

removed. 

62 FutureGen Page C20

In section Direct Pressure Monitoring,

Revise the 4th bullet point: 

Gauges will be installed above any packers so they 

can be removed if necessary for recalibration by 

removing the tubing string. Redundant gauges may 

be run on the same cable to provide confirmation of 

downhole P/T. 

To read: 

P/T gauges will be installed in the injection wells 

above any packers so they can be removed if 

necessary by removing the tubing string without 

pulling the packer. P/T gauges will be installed 

either above or below the packer in the two SLR 

monitoring wells that will have tubing and packer.

EPA finds that this suggested clarification does not change the 

requirement to monitor pressure and temperature downhole in the wells, 

it only specifies whether the gauge is above or below the packer. Based on 

this comment, the language in the final permits is modified to read: “P/T 

gauges will be installed in the injection wells above any packers so they 

can be removed if necessary by removing the tubing string without pulling 

the packer. P/T gauges will be installed either above or below the packer 

in the SLR monitoring wells that will have tubing and packer. Redundant 

gauges may be run on the same cable to provide confirmation of 

downhole P/T.”

63 FutureGen Page C21 

The paragraph starting with “Injection P/T will also 

be continuously measured ...” is not relevant to 

direct pressure-front monitoring. Delete that 

paragraph.

EPA finds the language in the paragraph still applicable since the injection 

wells will monitor pressure and temperature. However, the last sentence 

of this section “Because the surface instruments can be more readily 

accessed and maintained than the bottomhole gauge, they will be used to 

control injection operations and trigger shutdowns.” has been removed 

because it suggests that the downhole gauge is not the primary point of 

compliance.

64 FutureGen Page C23 

In the last sentence of paragraph 2, the word

techniques should be changed to requirements.

EPA agrees that this clarification is appropriate, so the requested change 

was made.

65 FutureGen Page C24 EPA agrees that this clarification is appropriate, so the requested change 

was made.
196 

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

The Table 15 caption should be changed to: 

Table 15. Aqueous Sampling Requirements for 

Target Injection Zone Parameters.

66 FutureGen Page C28

2

nd bullet point should be:

PNC logging for determination of reservoir CO2

saturation;

EPA agrees that this correction is appropriate, so the requested change 

was made.

67 Robert J. 

Finley

Further, I particularly commend the monitoring in 

the Ironton-Galesville Sandstone, the first 

permeable and porous zone above the primary 

seal, which would give significant advance warning 

should any leakage occur through the primary 

sealing lithologies. This type of subsurface 

monitoring has become a key standard at other 

demonstration sites, and would show any impacts 

long before near-surface potable ground water 

would be affected.

Thank you for your comment. 
197 

SECTION 8. PLUGGING AND POST-INJECTION SITE CARE COMMENTS 

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

1 FutureGen The CO2 injection well coordinates in EPA’s draft 

FutureGen UIC Class VI Permit Cover Letter and 

Attachments for each of the injection wells is the 

injection point location described in FG-RPT-017, 

Revision 1 (May 2013). These same coordinates are 

used for all of the 4 injection wells throughout the 

FutureGen permitting documentation. Because the 

currently planned CO2 injection wells’ locations and 

their mid-point location are to the NW of the stated 

location, the Alliance suggests the following 

wording and footnote throughout the permitting 

documentation for the injection well locations:

(If using one set of coordinates for all CO2 injection 

wells’ permit documentation...) 

Location of Injection Well1: Morgan County, 

IL; 26-16N-9W; 39.80104°N and 90.07517°W 

1 Actual injection well location will be surveyed 

after injection well construction. 

(If using the planned coordinates of the individual

CO2 injection wells in each well’s permit 

documentation...) 

(Well#1) 

Location of Injection Well1: Morgan County, 

IL; 26-16N-9W; 39.80111°N and 90.07491°W

1 Actual injection well location will be surveyed 

after injection well construction. 

(Well#2) 

Location of Injection Well1: Morgan County, 

IL; 26-16N-9W; 39.80097°N and 90.07491°W 

1 Actual injection well location will be surveyed 

EPA has revised the first page of each permit and the first page of each 

permit attachment to reflect the accurate proposed location for each of 

the wells. To the extent that small deviations to the planned locations are 

identified after the wells are constructed and surveyed, those corrections 

can be made through the minor modification process identified in 40 C.F.R. 

§ 144.41.
198 

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

after injection well construction.

(Well#3) 

Location of Injection Well1: Morgan County, 

IL; 26-16N-9W; 39.80097°N and 90.07544°W 

1 Actual injection well location will be surveyed 

after injection well construction. 

(Well#4) 

Location of Injection Well1: Morgan County, 

IL; 26-16N-9W; 39.80111°N and 90.07544°W 

1 Actual injection well location will be surveyed 

after injection well construction.

2 FutureGen Page D3 to D6 

Is there a reason why there are the four PAP instead 

of one?

Each permit’s Attachment D has been corrected to show only the plugging 

and abandonment plan for that particular injection well. Attachment D is 

consequently shortened from six to three pages for each permit.

3 FutureGen Page 25

Reference to O(5)(c) is not consistent with permit 

organization.

The references to Section O(5)(c) on page 25 of the permits have been 

corrected to Section O(6)(d).

4 FutureGen Page 25

Reference to O(5)(b) is not consistent with permit 

organization.

The references to Section O(5)(b) on page 25 of the permits have been 

corrected to Section O(6)(b).
199 

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

5 CSC Provision: O(6)(b)

Text of Draft Permit: (b) The permittee shall 

monitor the site following the cessation of injection 

to show the position of the carbon dioxide plume 

and pressure front and demonstrate that USDWs 

are not being endangered, as specified in the PostInjection Site Care and Site Closure Plan and in 40 

CFR 146.90, and 40 CFR 146.93, including:

Proposed Revision: (b) The permittee shall monitor 

the site following the cessation of injection to show 

the position of the carbon dioxide plume and 

pressure front and demonstrate that USDWs are 

not being endangered, as specified in the PostInjection Site Care and Site Closure Plan and in 40 

CFR 146.90, and 40 CFR 146.93, including:

Comment: By issuing the permit, EPA has 

determined that implementing the Post-Injection 

Site Care and Site Closure Plan does meet the 

applicable requirements.

As a general matter the UIC permit is intended as a roadmap to identify 

the relevant requirements and obligations of FutureGen. The relevant 

regulatory provisions for testing and monitoring, and for the PISC, are 

relatively lengthy and technical, so that the permit language may 

summarize those requirements and provide reference to the regulatory 

details rather than copying them in their entirety. This makes the permit 

more reader-friendly and easy to follow. Incorporating the additional 

details by reference does not create any conflict or confusion between the 

terms of the permit and the regulations.

In addition, 40 C.F.R. §146.93(a) makes it clear that FutureGen is 

responsible to comply with both the permit requirement and the 

regulatory requirement upon which it is based. For Class VI wells, EPA 

anticipates that the PISC Plan may require revisions. See 75 Fed. Reg. 

77266 (Dec. 10, 2010) and Section H of the Permits. Reference to the 

relevant regulatory provisions provides clarity on the standards against 

which any revisions will be judged. 

Therefore, EPA will not make the suggested changes to the permits.

6 CSC Provision: O(6)(b)(v)

Text of Draft Permit: (v) The permittee shall 

continue to conduct post-injection site monitoring 

for at least 50 years or for the duration of any 

alternative timeframe approved pursuant to 40 CFR 

146.93(c) and the Post-Injection Site Care and Site 

Closure Plan.

References: 146.93(b) (2) If the owner or operator 

can demonstrate to the satisfaction of the Director 

before 50 years or prior to the end of the approved 

alternative timeframe based on monitoring and 

other site-specific data, that the geologic 

sequestration project no longer poses an 

endangerment to USDWs, the Director may 

Per 40 C.F.R. § 146.93(a), the owner or operator must submit the postinjection site care and site closure plan as a part of the permit application 

to be approved by the Director. Among other requirements cited at 40 

C.F.R. § 146.93(a)(2), the post-injection site care and site closure plan must 

include the duration of the post-injection site care timeframe and, if 

approved by the Director, the demonstration of the alternative postinjection site care timeframe that ensures non-endangerment of USDWs

FutureGen did not submit an alternative post-injection timeframe with its 

permit application. 

At any time during the life of the geologic sequestration project, the owner 

or operator may modify and resubmit the post-injection site care and site 

closure plan for the Director's approval. The language cited by the 
200 

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

approve an amendment to the post-injection site 

care and site closure plan to reduce the frequency 

of monitoring or may authorize site closure before 

the end of the 50-year period or prior to the end of 

the approved alternative timeframe, where he or 

she has substantial evidence that the geologic 

sequestration project no longer poses a risk of 

endangerment to USDWs.

Proposed Revision: (v) The permittee shall 

continue to conduct post- injection site monitoring 

until the Director has authorized site closure. for at 

least 50 years or for the duration of any alternative 

timeframe approved pursuant to 40 CFR 146.93(c) 

and the Post-Injection Site Care and Site Closure 

Plan .

Comment: There are a number of different 

scenarios that would allow the permittee to cease 

post-injection monitoring before 50 years, but all 

involve obtaining authorization for site closure. 

Therefore, this wording is sufficient to cover all of 

those contingencies.

commenter provides information on the process and standards that would 

apply if FutureGen seeks a change.

The post injection site care plans for the four FutureGen permits meet the 

federal UIC regulations in 40 C.F.R. § 146.93, and there is no basis or need 

to amend the language of this section of the permits. 

Therefore, the permit language has not been modified based upon this 

comment.

7 CSC Provision: O(6)(d)

Text of Draft Permit: (d) Prior to authorization for 

site closure, the permittee shall submit to the 

Director for review and approval, in an electronic 

format, a demonstration, based on information 

collected pursuant to Section O(5)(b) of this permit, 

that the carbon dioxide plume and the associated 

pressure front do not pose an endangerment to 

USDWs and that no additional monitoring is 

needed to ensure that the project does not pose an 

endangerment to USDWs, as required under 40 CFR 

146.93(b)(3). The Director reserves the right to 

The references to Section O(5)(c) on page 25 of the permits have been 

corrected to Section O(6)(d).

The references to Section O(5)(b) on page 25 of the permits have been 

corrected to Section O(6)(b).

As EPA’s “Geologic Sequestration of Carbon Dioxide: Underground 

Injection Control (UIC) Program Class VI Well Project Plan Development 

Guidance” (Aug. 2012) states at p. 50, [t]he purpose of reviewing the PISC 

and Site Closure Plan is to consider:
201 

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

amend the post-injection site monitoring 

requirements (including extend the monitoring 

period) if the carbon dioxide plume and the 

associated pressure front have not stabilized or 

there is a concern that USDWs are being 

endangered.

References: 146.93(b) (3) Prior to authorization for 

site closure, the owner or operator must submit to 

the Director for review and approval a 

demonstration, based on monitoring and other

site-specific data, that no additional monitoring is 

needed to ensure that the geologic sequestration 

project does not pose an endangerment to USDWs.

Proposed Revision: (d) Prior to authorization for 

site closure, the permittee shall submit to the 

Director for review and approval, in an electronic 

format, a demonstration, based on information 

collected pursuant to Section O(5)(b) of this permit, 

that the carbon dioxide plume and the associated 

pressure front do not pose an endangerment to 

USDWs and that no additional monitoring is 

needed to ensure that the project does not pose an 

endangerment to USDWs, as required under 40 CFR 

146.93(b)(3). The Director reserves the right to 

amend the post-injection site monitoring 

requirements (including extend the monitoring 

period) if the carbon dioxide plume and the

associated pressure front have not stabilized or

there is a concern that USDWs are being 

endangered.

Comment: There is no requirement for the carbon 

dioxide plume and the associated pressure front to 

“stabilize”, whatever that means. Indeed, the word 

• Whether post-injection site care is adequate to ensure that USDWs are 

protected from endangerment from carbon dioxide injection activities (or 

provide early warning of potential endangerment); 

• Whether changes to monitoring are needed, e.g., if the types of 

monitoring can be reduced as data indicate post-injection stabilization of 

the carbon dioxide plume and pressure front; and 

• Whether appropriate amounts and types of data are being collected to 

support an eventual non-endangerment demonstration, and whether 

making this demonstration before the required fifty (50) year PISC 

timeframe is appropriate. The UIC Program Director may determine 

whether a shorter or longer PISC timeframe is necessary. 

Since the concern about the “stabilization” of the CO2 plume and/or 

injection pressure front in the guidance is based upon the protection of 

USDWs, EPA made the change suggested by the commenter to reflect the 

regulatory language more precisely. It should be clear under EPA’s 

guidance, however, that plume and pressure front stability will be factors 

EPA will consider in evaluating whether there is a risk to USDWs. 
202 

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

stabilize does not appear in any form in the final 

Class VI regulations and is unnecessary here.

8 CSC Provision: O(6)(f)

Text of Draft Permit: (f) After the Director has 

authorized site closure, the permittee shall plug all 

monitoring wells as specified in Attachment E of 

this permit – the Post-Injection Site Care and Site 

Closure Plan – in a manner which will not allow 

movement of injection or formation fluids that

endangers a USDW. The permittee shall also 

restore the site to its pre- injection condition.

Proposed Revision: (f) After the Director has 

authorized site closure, the permittee shall plug all 

monitoring wells as specified in Attachment E of 

this permit – the Post-Injection Site Care and Site 

Closure Plan – in a manner which will not allow 

movement of injection or formation fluids that 

endangers a USDW. The permittee shall also 

restore the site to its pre-injection condition. 

Comment: The UIC regulations do not include a 

requirement for site restoration.

Good stewardship of the facility at the time of closure is a logical extension 

of the closure process. As EPA’s “Geologic Sequestration of Carbon 

Dioxide: Underground Injection Control (UIC) Program Class VI Well Project 

Plan Development Guidance” (Aug. 2012) states at p. 47: “EPA 

recommends that owners or operators also describe in their PISC and Site 

Closure Plan how they plan to close the site following the conclusion of the 

PISC period. Site closure activities may include: plugging all monitoring 

wells, removing all surface equipment, and restoring the site to its prior 

condition (e.g., planting vegetation).”

The guidance also states on p. D-6 that the template for a PISC and Site 

Closure Plan, “Describe plans for removing all surface equipment and 

restoring vegetation.”

In EPA’s April 2013, “Draft Underground Injection Control (UIC) Program 

Guidance on Class VI Well Plugging, Post-Injection Site Care, and Site 

Closure, this same concepts are reiterated at p. 47, p. D-4 and at p. G-2

that a template for a site closure report “Include a description of 

completed site restoration activities such as removing all surface 

equipment and restoring vegetation (or status, as appropriate).” 

In the Post-Injection Site Care (PISC) Plan that FutureGen submitted, they 

state that the site will be restored to its pre-injection condition. The PISC 

plans are part of the final permits and are therefore enforceable 
203 

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

conditions. Retaining the language is consistent with the permit condition 

in the PISC Plan.

Therefore, the permit language has not been modified based upon this 

comment.

9 FutureGen The CO2 injection well coordinates in EPA’s draft 

FutureGen UIC Class VI Permit Cover Letter and 

Attachments for each of the injection wells is the 

injection point location described in FG-RPT-017, 

Revision 1 (May 2013). These same coordinates are 

used for all of the 4 injection wells throughout the 

FutureGen permitting documentation. Because the 

currently planned CO2 injection wells’ locations and 

their mid-point location are to the NW of the stated 

location, the Alliance suggests the following 

wording and footnote throughout the permitting 

documentation for the injection well locations:

(If using one set of coordinates for all CO2 injection 

wells’ permit documentation...) 

Location of Injection Well1: Morgan County, 

IL; 26-16N-9W; 39.80104°N and 90.07517°W 

1 Actual injection well location will be surveyed 

after injection well construction. 

(If using the planned coordinates of the individual

CO2 injection wells in each well’s permit 

documentation...) 

(Well#1) 

Location of Injection Well1: Morgan County, 

IL; 26-16N-9W; 39.80111°N and 90.07491°W 

1 Actual injection well location will be surveyed 

after injection well construction. 

(Well#2) 

EPA has revised the first page of each permit and the first page of each 

permit attachment to reflect the accurate proposed location for each of 

the wells. To the extent that small deviations to the planned locations are 

identified after the wells are constructed and surveyed, those corrections 

can be made through the minor modification process identified in 40 C.F.R. 

§ 144.41.
204 

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

Location of Injection Well1: Morgan County, 

IL; 26-16N-9W; 39.80097°N and 90.07491°W 

1 Actual injection well location will be surveyed 

after injection well construction. 

(Well#3) 

Location of Injection Well1: Morgan County, 

IL; 26-16N-9W; 39.80097°N and 90.07544°W 

1 Actual injection well location will be surveyed 

after injection well construction. 

(Well#4) 

Location of Injection Well1: Morgan County, 

IL; 26-16N-9W; 39.80111°N and 90.07544°W 

1 Actual injection well location will be surveyed 

after injection well construction.

10 FutureGen The CO2 injection well coordinates in EPA’s draft 

FutureGen UIC Class VI Permit Cover Letter and 

Attachments for each of the injection wells is the 

injection point location described in FG-RPT-017, 

Revision 1 (May 2013). These same coordinates are 

used for all of the 4 injection wells throughout the 

FutureGen permitting documentation. Because the 

currently planned CO2 injection wells’ locations and 

their mid-point location are to the NW of the stated 

location, the Alliance suggests the following 

wording and footnote throughout the permitting 

documentation for the injection well locations:

(If using one set of coordinates for all CO2 injection 

wells’ permit documentation...) 

Location of Injection Well1: Morgan County, 

IL; 26-16N-9W; 39.80104°N and 90.07517°W 

1 Actual injection well location will be surveyed

after injection well construction. 

(If using the planned coordinates of the individual

EPA has revised the first page of each permit and the first page of each 

permit attachment to reflect the accurate proposed location for each of 

the wells. To the extent that small deviations to the planned locations are 

identified after the wells are constructed and surveyed, those corrections 

can be made through the minor modification process identified in 40 C.F.R. 

§ 144.41.
205 

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

CO2 injection wells in each well’s permit 

documentation...) 

(Well#1) 

Location of Injection Well1: Morgan County, 

IL; 26-16N-9W; 39.80111°N and 90.07491°W

1 Actual injection well location will be surveyed 

after injection well construction. 

(Well#2) 

Location of Injection Well1: Morgan County, 

IL; 26-16N-9W; 39.80097°N and 90.07491°W 

1 Actual injection well location will be surveyed 

after injection well construction.

(Well#3) 

Location of Injection Well1: Morgan County, 

IL; 26-16N-9W; 39.80097°N and 90.07544°W 

1 Actual injection well location will be surveyed 

after injection well construction. 

(Well#4) 

Location of Injection Well1: Morgan County, 

IL; 26-16N-9W; 39.80111°N and 90.07544°W 

1 Actual injection well location will be surveyed 

after injection well construction.

11 FutureGen Page E1, Par. 2nd from bottom

The maximum injection is limited by the 90% 

fracture pressure, which is dependent on depth 

below ground surface. The limit of 2,252 psi was 

calculated for the depth of 3,850 ft bgs. After 

injection well construction, the depth of the 

injection point may not be exactly at 3,850 ft bgs. 

Hence, the number 2,252 psi should not be used. A 

revised version of the last sentence is:

Current permit limitations will require the pressure 

at the injection point not to exceed 90% of the 

Establishing a maximum injection pressure (MIP) permit condition is a 

pivotal part of EPA’s permitting process. EPA’s calculation of MIP uses 

conservative values to prevent formations from fracturing. This assures 

compliance with the regulatory standard in 40 C.F.R. § 146.88(a) and 

protection of USDWs. EPA limits maximum injection pressure (MIP) by 

calculating MIP with conservative values. A definitive MIP is a necessary 

condition in any final permit; however, as additional information becomes 

available, that calculated value may change. The permitted MIP can be 

modified by Region 5 to reflect that actual construction specifications, 

including injection interval depth, through the minor modification process 

identified in 40 C.F.R. § 144.41.
206 

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

fracture pressure at the injection point depth and 

measured at this well . Therefore, the permit language has not been modified based upon this 

comment.

12 CSC Section O(6)(b)(v) incorrectly states that “[t]he 

permittee shall continue to conduct post- injection 

site monitoring for at least 50 years or for the 

duration of any alternative timeframe approved 

pursuant to 40 CFR 146.93(c) and the Post-Injection 

Site Care and Site Closure Plan.” The permittee may 

discontinue post-injection site monitoring earlier 

than either of those dates if, pursuant to section 

146.93(b)(2) the Director “authorize[s] site closure 

before the end of the 50- year period or prior to 

the end of the approved alternative timeframe”. A 

permittee is never subject to an absolute 

requirement to continue monitoring for at least 50 

years, and the permit should not suggest 

otherwise. Given the potential alternative scenarios 

for discontinuation of monitoring, it would be more 

accurate to simply state: “The permittee shall 

continue to conduct post-injection site monitoring 

until the Director has authorized site closure.”

As described in comment Response #6 above, the post-injection site care 

and site closure plan must include the duration of the post-injection site 

care timeframe and, if approved by the Director, the demonstration of the 

alternative post-injection site care timeframe that ensures nonendangerment of USDWs.

FutureGen did not submit an alternative post-injection timeframe with its 

permit application. At any time during the life of the geologic 

sequestration project, the owner or operator may modify and resubmit 

the post-injection site care and site closure plan for the Director's 

approval. 

The post injection site care plans for the four FutureGen permits meet the 

federal UIC regulations in 40 C.F.R. § 146.93, and there is no basis or need 

to amend the language of this section of the permits. Therefore, the 

permits were not modified based upon this comment.

13 FutureGen Page E30

The Alliance suggests the following addition to this 

section: 

As indicated in Section O(6)(b)(v) of this permit, the 

permittee shall continue to conduct post-injection 

site monitoring for at least 50 years or for the 

duration of any alternative timeframe approved 

pursuant to 40 CFR 146.93(c).

EPA has determined that this additional cross-reference is a helpful 

clarification. Therefore, this suggested change is incorporated into the final 

permits.
207 

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

14 FutureGen Page E9, Par. 2

Groundwater sampling in the surficial aquifer is not 

planned for the PISC phase of the project, as 

indicated in Tables 2 and 3.

The last sentence of paragraph 2 should be 

removed.

Inclusion of this sentence in the draft permits was in error. EPA 

acknowledges that FutureGen had originally proposed to monitor the 

surficial aquifer during the injection and post-injection periods, but during 

subsequent documented communications, FutureGen decided not to 

monitor shallow groundwater wells. FutureGen is not required to monitor 

the surficial aquifer under the regulations, and EPA finds that the 

monitoring program contained in the permits is appropriate without the 

inclusion of shallow groundwater monitoring.

The Director may require additional monitoring wells as necessary if the 

Director determines it is needed for compliance with the permit and with 

40 C.F.R. §146.90(d). Under the Permits, the Monitoring Program will be 

regularly reviewed, and revised as appropriate, as required by 40 C.F.R. 

§146.90(j) and Section M of the Permits.

Thus, the suggested change is incorporated into the final permits.

15 FutureGen Groundwater sampling in the surficial aquifer is not 

planned for the PISC phase of the project, as 

indicated in Tables 2 and 3. Information on these 

surficial aquifer wells is provided in the Testing and 

Monitoring Plan.

The last paragraph on page 10, related Figure 8 on 

page 12, and Appendix B should be removed.

As noted in the response to the above comment #14, FutureGen is not 

required to monitor the surficial aquifer under the regulations. 

The last paragraph on page E10 will be changed to “Although monitoring 

of the shallow surficial aquifer is not required or anticipated during the 

post-injection period, the network remains available for monitoring 

activities should the need arise.” 

16 FutureGen Table 2

The Note at the bottom of this table refers to Table 

13 for monitoring well sampling/recording 

frequencies (i.e., for continuous monitoring data) 

but Table 13 presents frequency specifications for 

injection wells only. Tables 4, 5, 8, and 9 contain 

this same footnote and Table 13 is referred to in 

several other places in the text for monitoring well 

sampling/recording frequencies. 

Table 13 on page 29 needs to be modified to 

EPA agrees that this correction is appropriate. Table 13 has been revised to 

reflect sampling and recording frequencies for all monitoring well 

categories. Specifically, Table 13 will be revised to show the continuous 

sampling frequency of every 30 minutes (and recording of data every 2 

hours) for temperature and pressure monitoring in: the St. Peter 

monitoring well; the two ACZ wells in the Ironton; and the two SLR wells in 

the Mt. Simon. 
208 

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

address monitoring well sampling/recording 

frequencies. 

Either a new “Well Condition” needs to be added or 

the second category could be changed to read “For 

monitoring wells and Injection wells that are shutin:” The planned monitoring well sampling 

frequency is 10 minutes; this specification is well 

within the minimum specification for shut-in 

injection wells. The specification for operating 

injection wells is not appropriate for monitoring 

wells since changes would be expected to occur 

much more slowly. If EPA prefers to create a new 

“Well Condition” for monitoring wells, then the 

Alliance recommends a minimum sampling 

frequency of 30 minutes and a minimum recording 

frequency of 2 hours. 

17 FutureGen Page E9 

Line 1: Pressure monitoring in the injection zone 

will occur in three monitoring wells, not four. 

During the first few years of operations, injection 

zone pressure will be monitored in the two singlelevel in-reservoir wells discussed in the second 

bullet on the same page and shown in Figure 7. 

The Alliance committed to installing one additional 

injection zone pressure monitoring well within 5 

years of the start of injection so it will be available 

for monitoring during the PISC phase of the project.

The statement that pressure monitoring would occur in four monitoring 

wells was in error. EPA agrees that this correction is appropriate. 

The suggested change is incorporated into the final permits.

18 FutureGen Table 2 

As indicated in the previous text, there are 9 local 

landowner wells, not 10.

The statement that there are 10 local landowner wells was in error. EPA 

agrees that this correction is appropriate. 

The suggested change is incorporated into the final permits.

19 FutureGen Page E14, Second bullet: The Table 6 parenthetical 

should be moved to the end of the bullet item since 

EPA agrees that this correction is appropriate. 
209 

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

Table 6 also includes indicators of brine 

composition.

The suggested change is incorporated into the final permits.

20 FutureGen Page E14, Third bullet: The Table 6 parenthetical 

should be moved to the end of the sentence since 

Table 6 also includes indicators of brine 

composition: 

Target parameters include pressure, temperature, 

and hydrogeochemical indicators of CO2 and brine 

composition (Table 6).

EPA agrees that this correction is appropriate. 

The suggested change is incorporated into the final permits.

21 FutureGen Page E23 

Discussion of tracers should be removed since they 

are not planned. This is outdated language was 

taken from the permit application. The first 

sentence should be ended after “...TDS, specific 

gravity)” and delete everything between this point 

and the sentence leading with “Analysis of carbon 

and oxygen isotopes....” (line 7).

EPA agrees that this correction is appropriate, so the requested change has 

been made. FutureGen explained in documented discussions with EPA the 

rationale for deciding not to use tracers and EPA agrees that they are 

neither necessary nor required. Although FutureGen may do sampling and 

analysis of isotopes or other tracer methods, these are currently not a 

requirement in the permits. Under the Permits, the monitoring program 

will be regularly reviewed, and revised as appropriate, as required by 40 

C.F.R. §146.90(j) and Section M of the Permits.

The suggested change is incorporated into the final permits.

22 FutureGen Page E23 

In line 11 of paragraph 3, the word techniques 

should be changed to requirements.

EPA agrees that this correction is appropriate. 

The suggested change is incorporated into the final permits.

23 FutureGen Page E14, Par 1

The last sentence states that the baseline data will 

be collected during the injection phase.

It should instead state that baseline data will be 

collected prior to start of the injection phase.

The statement that the baseline data would be collected during the 

injection phase was in error. EPA agrees that this correction is 

appropriate. 

The suggested change is incorporated into the final permits.
210 

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

24 FutureGen Page E15

1) The surficial aquifer will not be sampled so 

discussion of additional analytes is irrelevant; 2) 

The last sentence repeats test immediately above.

The last two sentences on the page should be 

removed.

Given that there are no current plans to conduct additional sampling and 

analysis of the surficial aquifers, Table 3 on page E14 seems unnecessary. 

However, EPA reserves the right to require such sampling in the unlikely 

event of leakage out of the injection zone and into shallower USDWs. EPA 

may add permit requirements beyond those laid out specifically in the UIC 

regulations on a case-by-case basis under 40 C.F.R. § 144.52(b) (case-bycase conditions as required to provide for and assure compliance with all 

applicable requirements of the SDWA and regulations). Therefore, EPA will 

retain the table and all discussion of monitoring in the surficial aquifer. The 

list of analytes is consistent with other monitoring wells. 

EPA agrees that the last sentence on page E15 is redundant. This portion 

of the suggested change is incorporated into the final permits.

25 FutureGen Page E19, Par 1

Pipeline fluid sampling will not be conducted during 

the PISC phase of the project, so it is unclear why 

the CoC requirements are mentioned here.

EPA agrees that this correction is appropriate and consistent with the rest 

of the Plan, so the reference to “and pipeline fluid” has been removed.

26 FutureGen The following Note should be added to Table 8: 

Depth is approximate and may be adjusted based 

on information obtained during drilling.

The depth of each well, as well as formation depths, are indicated as 

where the wells are intended to be placed. Since each permit has 

numerous citations of depths and locations, noting that these are 

anticipated depths and are therefore subject to change would overly 

complicate the permits and be potentially confusing. Small deviations 

identified after construction is completed can be corrected through the 

minor modification process identified in 40 C.F.R. § 144.41. 

Therefore, the permit language has not been modified based upon this 

comment.
211 

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

27 FutureGen Page E23

Last sentence of paragraph 2 should be removed.

This verbiage was from the permit application and 

was later updated to reflect the fact that present 

CO2 saturation could not be derived from aqueous 

samples due to sampling artifacts.

Inclusion of this sentence in the draft permits was in error. The updated 

version of the Testing and Monitoring Plan, on Page C1, states “However, 

once supercritical CO2 (scCO2) breakthrough occurs, these wells can no 

longer provide representative fluid samples because of the two-phase fluid 

characteristics and buoyancy of scCO2.” This language and the identical 

sentence on Page C23 of the Testing and Monitoring Plan has been

deleted, as suggested in the comment, in order to provide consistency 

with the intended methods as quoted from Page C1.

28 FutureGen Page E30

3D surface seismic surveys are not planned for the 

PISC phase of the project. The Alliance recommends 

replacing the third sentence with the following:

The data used to update the computational model 

and to monitor the site will include both direct 

(e.g., temporal measurements of pressure, 

temperature, groundwater quality, and injection 

zone fluid composition) and indirect geophysical 

methods (e.g., passive seismic and integrated 

deformation monitoring, PNC logging).

EPA agrees that this clarification and additional detail is appropriate and 

helpful, so the requested change has been made.

29 FutureGen Page E31

3D surface seismic surveys are not planned for the 

PISC phase of the project. 

The 2nd sentence under “Evaluation of Carbon 

Dioxide Plume” should be removed. 

EPA agrees that inclusion of this sentence was in error. EPA retains the 

ability to require additional monitoring in support of a non-endangerment 

demonstration, such as seismic surveys, if the demonstration is not 

adequate to ensure protection of USDWs. EPA agrees that this correction 

is appropriate and will provide consistency with the Testing and 

Monitoring Plan, so the suggested change is incorporated into the final 

permits.

30 FutureGen Page E33 

Will the control building be downsized for the PISC 

phase? The footprint of this building is relatively 

small and it’s hard to see how the effort/cost to 

downsize the building is justified. The MVA 

datacenter capability would need to be maintained 

at a minimum.

FutureGen’s application for four Class VI injection wells included a 

proposed Site Closure Plan. This part of the application (7.3.1), proposed 

the following: 

“At the end of the active injection period, plume monitoring will continue, 

but there will be no further need for the pumping and control equipment. 

The Site Control Building will be demolished. All features will be removed 
212 

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

except the WAPMMS Building, a 12-ft-wide access road with five parking 

spaces, a concrete sidewalk from the parking lot to the building, 

underground electrical and telephone services, and a chain-link fence 

surrounding the building. The common wall between the WAPMMS 

Building and the Site Control Building will be converted to an exterior wall. 

The injection wells will be plugged and capped below grade (see Chapter 

6.0). The gravel pad will be removed. The WAPMMS Building at the 

storage site will be repurposed to act as the collection node for data from 

the plume monitoring equipment. The building will contain equipment to 

receive real-time data from the monitoring wells and other monitoring 

stations and send the data via an internet connection to be analyzed 

offsite during the 50-year post-injection monitoring period.”

The permits reflect the proposal in the permit application. The comment 

does not propose any specific changes. If FutureGen wishes to propose a 

revised PISC Plan that addresses these concerns and questions for EPA 

review and approval, it may do so through the permit modification process 

outlined in 40 C.F.R. Part 144. Therefore, the permit language has not been 

modified based upon this comment.

31 FutureGen Page E33 

It is suggested that we make a recommendation at 

the end of the PISC to delete all references to 

downsizing the control building on page E33

The permits reflect the proposal in the permit application. If FutureGen

wishes to propose a revised PISC Plan that addresses these concerns and 

questions for EPA review and approval, it may do so through the permit 

modification process outlined in 40 C.F.R. Part 144. Therefore, the permit 

language has not been modified based upon this comment.

32 FutureGen Page E33/Global

Change the reference to the WAPMMS to annulus 

pressurization system (APS) for the injection wells.

This requested change is only a terminology clarification. The suggested 

change is incorporated into the final permits.
213 

SECTION 9. EMERGENCY AND REMEDIAL RESPONSE COMMENTS 

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

1 Betty 

Niemann

What is really missing from the remediation plan in 

case of leakage or seismic event are detailed plans 

ready to implement. The remediation plan is 

alluded to in the USEPA UIC permitting application 

reference on page 2-67. Dr. Sally Benson xlii from 

Stanford University, Benson Laboratory, 

recommends that when an injection site is 

selected, the remediation plan should be part of 

the site selection and determined first - before any 

construction and injection takes place. In her work 

along with Ariel Esposito, “Evaluation and 

development of options for remediation of CO2

leakage into groundwater aquifers from geologic 

carbon storage”, she states “There are many good 

reasons to have confidence in the long-term 

security of carbon dioxide (CO2) storage in properly 

selected and operated projects. However, the 

possibility remains that the CO2 leaks out of the 

formation, for example, up an abandoned well, into 

an overlying groundwater aquifer. As large scale 

demonstration projects of carbon capture and 

storage (CCS) come closer to development in the 

US, the need for contingency planning to formulate 

groundwater remediation scenarios in case of a 

possible leakage event from a geologic storage site 

is very important. Leakage of CO2 into groundwater 

aquifers may degrade valuable groundwater 

resources, may pose a risk to human health if 

hazardous trace metals dissolve into ground-water, 

and may interfere with agricultural activities. “ xliii 

40 C.F.R. §146.83 establishes the minimum criteria for siting. A permit 

applicant may choose the site they it wishes to propose. EPA will issue a 

permit at that site if the application meets all regulatory requirements. 

FutureGen must demonstrate that the location is a suitable geologic 

system, comprising: (1) An injection zone(s) of sufficient areal extent, 

thickness, porosity, and permeability to receive the total anticipated 

volume of the carbon dioxide stream; and (2) Confining zone(s) free of 

transmissive faults or fractures and of sufficient areal extent and integrity 

to contain the injected carbon dioxide stream and displaced formation 

fluids and allow injection at proposed maximum pressures and volumes 

without initiating or propagating fractures in the confining zone(s).

Beyond those criteria, initial site selection and considerations involved are 

beyond the scope and role of EPA’s regulatory process. The FutureGen 

Alliance proposed this location in its UIC permit application and EPA finds 

the location suitable for geologic sequestration of CO2 under its Class VI 

rule.

In the unlikely event of a large magnitude seismic event or CO2 leakage 

from the injection zone formation, remedial response procedures will 

need to be tailored to the specific circumstances, extent of contamination 

and risk factors involved. These details would be unknowable prior to the 

seismic event and emergency situation. EPA finds the ERRP plan to contain 

sufficient detail to mandate the appropriate remedial response to the full 

range of unlikely but possible emergency scenarios. It identifies likely 

options and appropriate factors for consideration in implementing 

responses, while providing the flexibility to adjust and adapt to 

unpredictable or unforeseeable circumstances. Although the well 

construction, operation and monitoring requirements under the permits

and the regulations make it unlikely that FutureGen would need to 

implement emergency and remedial response actions, it is important to 
214 

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

I have spoken to her and she feels this is very 

important in the success of Carbon Storage. Ken 

Humphries’ in many presentations indicates that 

CO2 storage is safe but in my research for this 

commentary, I found Dr. Benson’s paper and also 

her presentation to the contrary. If CO2 storage is 

completely safe, then why is there a need for a 

remediation plan? To me the risk to ground water 

contamination in an agricultural injection site 

setting is unsettling to say the least.

require that FutureGen show its readiness and ability to respond if it 

becomes necessary. 

EPA does not take a position in regard to the research or views of Dr. 

Benson or Mr. Humphrey. Under the Safe Drinking Water Act, EPA does 

not issue UIC permits unless it is satisfied that USDWs will be protected 

from the proposed injection activity. EPA finds that USDWs are adequately 

protected from the proposed injection activity and notes that the permits 

are designed so that CO2 will be stored well below any potential USDW.

Therefore, EPA has not made any change to the permits based on this 

comment.

2 CSC Provision: P(1)

Text of Draft Permit:

1. The Emergency and Remedial Response Plan 

describes actions the permittee must take to 

address movement of the injection or formation 

fluids that may cause an endangerment to a USDW 

during construction, operation, and post-injection 

site care periods. The permittee shall maintain and 

comply with the approved Emergency and 

Remedial Response Plan (Attachment F of this 

permit), which is an enforceable condition of this 

permit, and with 40 CFR 146.94.

References:

Proposed Revision:

1. The Emergency and Remedial Response Plan 

describes actions the permittee must take to 

address movement of the injection or formation 

fluids that may cause an endangerment to a USDW 

during construction, operation, and post- injection 

site care periods. The permittee shall maintain and 

As a general matter the UIC permit is intended as a roadmap to identify 

the relevant requirements and obligations of FutureGen. The relevant 

regulatory provisions are lengthier and more detailed so that the permit 

language may summarize those requirements and provide reference to the 

regulatory details rather than copying them in their entirety. This makes 

the permit more reader-friendly and easy to follow. EPA has determined 

that incorporating additional details by reference does not create any 

conflict or confusion between the terms of the permit and the regulations.

In addition, 40 C.F.R. §146.94(a) makes it clear that FutureGen is 

responsible to comply with both the permit requirement and the 

regulatory requirement upon which it is based. For Class VI wells, EPA 

anticipates that the emergency and remedial response plan will be 

regularly reviewed and revised as required by 40 C.F.R. §146.94(d) and 

Section P of the Permits. Reference to the relevant regulatory provisions 

provides clarity on the standards against which any revisions will be 

judged.

EPA has not made any change to the permits based on this comment.
215 

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

comply with the approved Emergency and 

Remedial Response Plan (Attachment F of this 

permit), which is an enforceable condition of this 

permit, and with 40 CFR 146.94.

Comment:

Once again, this condition is written in a way that 

suggests that compliance requires something 

beyond following the approved Emergency and 

Remedial Response Plan, which is not the case. The 

revision recommended here should be adopted and 

incorporated in the final permit.
216 

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

3 CSC Provision: P(1)

Text of Draft Permit: 1. The Emergency and 

Remedial Response Plan describes actions the 

permittee must take to address movement of the 

injection or formation fluids that may cause an 

endangerment to a USDW during construction, 

operation, and post-injection site care periods. The 

permittee shall maintain and comply with the 

approved Emergency and Remedial Response Plan 

(Attachment F of this permit), which is an 

enforceable condition of this permit, and with 40 

CFR 146.94.

Proposed Revision: 1. The Emergency and 

Remedial Response Plan describes actions the 

permittee must take to address movement of the 

injection or formation fluids that may cause an 

endangerment to a USDW during construction, 

operation, and post- injection site care periods. The 

permittee shall maintain and comply with the 

approved Emergency and Remedial Response Plan 

(Attachment F of this permit), which is an 

enforceable condition of this permit, and with 40 

CFR 146.94.

Comment: Once again, this condition is written in a 

way that suggests that compliance requires 

something beyond following the approved 

Emergency and Remedial Response Plan, which is 

not the case. The revision recommended here 

should be adopted and incorporated in the final 

permit.

As a general matter the UIC permit is intended as a roadmap to identify 

the relevant requirements and obligations of FutureGen. The relevant 

regulatory provisions are lengthier and more detailed so that the permit 

language may summarize those requirements and provide reference to the 

regulatory details rather than copying them in their entirety. This makes 

the permit more reader-friendly and easy to follow. EPA believes that 

incorporating additional details by reference does not create any conflict 

or confusion between the terms of the permit and the regulations.

In addition, 40 C.F.R. §146.94(a) makes it clear that FutureGen is 

responsible to comply with both the permit requirement and the 

regulatory requirement upon which it is based. For Class VI wells, EPA 

anticipates that the emergency and remedial response plan will be 

regularly reviewed and revised as required by 40 C.F.R. §146.94(d) and 

Section P of the Permits. Reference to the relevant regulatory provisions 

provides clarity on the standards against which any revisions will be 

judged.

EPA has not made any change to the permits based on this comment.
217 

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

4 Betty 

Niemann

What experience does FutureGen writing, 

implementing and keeping up to date a disaster 

plan for the sequestration site that includes but not 

limited to drilling, well problems, well maintenance, 

monitoring sites and their technology, weather 

related problems, seismic potential and finally 

preventing damage to agricultural land in America's 

breadbasket?

EPA’s regulatory purview under the Safe Drinking Water Act includes 

consideration of measures to protect underground sources of drinking 

water only and does not include consideration of the permit applicant’s 

past experience.

EPA finds that FutureGen’s plan meets the requirements of the regulations 

in 40 C.F.R. §146.94 and is consistent with “Geologic Sequestration of 

Carbon Dioxide: Underground Injection Control (UIC) Program Class VI 

Well Project Plan Development Guidance” (Aug. 2012). The regulations 

and the permits require regular review of the plan to take into account 

new information and data related to the matters identified by the 

commenter. See 40 C.F.R. §146.94(d) and Section P of the Permits.

EPA has not made any change to the permits based on this comment.

5 Betty 

Niemann

There is also no discussion on the mitigation 

compensation of such changes of surface 

deformation to individual landowners during the 

life of the project or after the project ends.

Any coverage for damages and risks beyond protection of USDWs and 

human health from contaminants injected into the wells cannot be a 

condition of a UIC permit. For this reason, EPA has not made any change to 

the draft permits based on this comment.

EPA notes that surface deformation was evaluated as part of the 

permitting process and found to be negligible and that surface 

deformation will also be monitored throughout the life of the project, 

although EPA’s regulatory authority is focused on protection of USDWs.

EPA also understands that under Chapter 20 of the Illinois Compiled 

Statutes, Section 1108, the State of Illinois may address some of the risks 

beyond those addressed under the UIC permitting regulations.
218 

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

6 Betty 

Niemann

In addition, the Lawrence Berkley National 

Laboratory has performed studies on CO2 storage 

areas even to the extent that it may be necessary 

to drill wells to remove brine in saline aquifers to 

keep the CO2 plume within the storage area. xxxvi 

If this happens, then where does the brine go, how 

it is treated as it cannot be used for drinking and 

agriculture?

At present, there are no plans for the removal of brine for pressure 

maintenance or CO2 plume control, but in the event that brine disposal is 

necessary in the future, any brine disposal activity would be subject to all 

regulatory requirements. Part A of the permits stipulates that “Issuance of 

this permit does not convey property rights of any sort or any exclusive 

privilege; nor does it authorize any injury to persons or property, any 

invasion of other private rights, or any infringement of State or local laws 

or regulations. Nothing in this permit shall be construed to relieve the 

permittee of any duties under applicable regulations.” Therefore, EPA has 

not made any change to the permits based on this comment. If FutureGen 

needed to consider brine disposal in the future, they would need to 

coordinate with the applicable state and federal programs to determine 

what safe and legal method is most appropriate.

7 Betty 

Niemann

b. What mitigation plan does FutureGen have for 

agricultural damage to the land that could happen 

if CO2 mitgrates[sic] upward over time and the land 

becomes unusable for agriculture? How will 

FutureGen repair the agricultural land?

Critical Pressure Front, Increased Seismic Activity 

and Possible Effects on Sangamon County

Subsidence

a. On the Critical Pressure Front comments, 

The possibility of the FutureGen Project damaging agricultural land is 

remote given the depth of proposed injection, the many geologic confining 

zones between the injection zone and the surface, and the required 

monitoring at various depths that would detect such fluid movement 

before it reaches the surface. Any coverage for damages and risks beyond 

protection of USDWs and human health from contaminants injected into 

the wells cannot be a condition of a UIC permit. For these reasons, EPA has 

not made any change to the draft permits based on this comment.

EPA understands, however, that under Chapter 20 of the Illinois Compiled 

Statutes, Section 1108, the State of Illinois may address some of the risks 

beyond those addressed under the UIC permitting regulations. 

EPA does not expect the FutureGen Project to cause subsidence of the 

surface land and finds that underground coal mine shafts do not extend to 

the depth of the Mt. Simon and Eau Claire injection formations. No 

increase in pressure is expected in the shallower formations where the

coal mine shafts exist. Obtaining compensation for damage resulting to 

homes as a result of the FutureGen project is beyond the scope and role of 
219 

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

FutureGen was to make known in January of this 

year the studies on critical pressure and the 

pressure front. I have looked at the map included 

in the UIC Class VI public hearing notification. The 

red circle denotes a 10psi pressure front that 

spreads eastward all the way through the middle of 

Springfield and encompasses even Petersburg. I 

would like to know what effect this pressure front 

will have on the underground coal mine shafts 

which occur under the western half of Springfield 

and even under parts of Petersburg. This is 

important, as there has been one instance of 

subsidence in Springfield in 1989. xviii Will the 

pressure front from the FutureGen sequestration 

project cause and increase in the potential of 

subsidence in the AoR. Note: if one plots the 10psi 

pressure front line on an ISGS map of underground 

mines (I used Menard County map) this line clearly 

encompasses half of the underground mines in 

western Springfield, Illinois. Is FutureGen prepared 

to pay for any home destruction in Springfield, 

Illinois or other homes in the AoR by subsidence?

EPA’s UIC Program. Part A of the permits clearly states: “Issuance of this 

permit does not convey property rights of any sort or any exclusive 

privilege; nor does it authorize any injury to persons or property, any 

invasion of other private rights, or any infringement of State or local law or 

regulations.” (See also 40 C.F.R. §144.35.) 

Any coverage for damages and risks beyond protection of USDWs and 

human health from contaminants injected into the wells cannot be a 

condition of a UIC permit. For these reasons, EPA has not made any 

change to the permits based on this comment.

EPA understands, however, that under Chapter 20 of the Illinois Compiled 

Statutes, Section 1108, the State of Illinois may address some of the risks 

beyond those addressed under the UIC permitting regulations. 

8 FutureGen The CO2 injection well coordinates in EPA’s draft 

FutureGen UIC Class VI Permit Cover Letter and 

Attachments for each of the injection wells is the 

injection point location described in FG-RPT-017, 

Revision 1 (May 2013). These same coordinates are 

used for all of the 4 injection wells throughout the 

FutureGen permitting documentation. Because the 

currently planned CO2 injection wells’ locations and 

their mid-point location are to the NW of the stated 

location, the Alliance suggests the following 

wording and footnote throughout the permitting 

EPA has revised the first page of each permit and the first page of each 

permit attachment to reflect the accurate proposed location for each of 

the wells. To the extent that small deviations to the planned locations are 

identified after the wells are constructed and surveyed, those corrections 

can be made through the minor modification process identified in 40 C.F.R. 

§ 144.41.
220 

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

documentation for the injection well locations:

(If using one set of coordinates for all CO

2 injection 

wells’ permit documentation...) 

Location of Injection Well

1

: Morgan County, 

IL; 26-16N-9W; 39.80104°N and 90.07517°W 

1 Actual injection well location will be surveyed 

after injection well construction. (If using the planned coordinates of the individual

CO

2 injection wells in each well’s permit 

documentation...) 

(Well#1) 

Location of Injection Well

1

: Morgan County, 

IL; 26-16N-9W; 39.80111°N and 90.07491°W

1 Actual injection well location will be surveyed 

after injection well construction. 

(Well#2) 

Location of Injection Well

1

: Morgan County, 

IL; 26-16N-9W; 39.80097°N and 90.07491°W 

1 Actual injection well location will be surveyed 

after injection well construction.

(Well#3) 

Location of Injection Well

1

: Morgan County, 

IL; 26-16N-9W; 39.80097°N and 90.07544°W 

1 Actual injection well location will be surveyed 

after injection well construction. 

(Well#4) 

Location of Injection Well

1

: Morgan County, 

IL; 26-16N-9W; 39.80111°N and 90.07544°W 

1 Actual injection well location will be surveyed 

after injection well construction.
221 

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

9 FutureGen Table 4 

Presently the Operations Staff Description does not 

include a professional skilled in mechanical and 

instrument operations and maintenance from a 

process engineering perspective. It is suggested 

that a fifth position be added to the bottom of 

Table 4. The entry might be as follows: 

Position: Operations Engineer 

Function: Manages mechanical and fluid 

management operation of the injection wells, 

annulus pressure control system, and well head 

piping systems. Maintains and repairs injectionrelated equipment, including valves, instruments, 

piping. Assists in mechanical and electronic control 

of injection process. 

Qualifications: Undergraduate degree in 

engineering, preferably related to mechanical, 

chemical or process control. At least 2 years of 

direct hands on operation and service of equipment 

and instruments related to pressurized well 

systems and wellhead controls. 

EPA agrees that adding this detail will improve the Emergency Response 

and Remediation Plan and has incorporated the suggested change into the 

final permits.

10 Betty 

Niemann

b. Likewise, Alberto Mazzoldi, Antonio P. Rinaldi, 

Andrea Borgia, and Jonny Rutqvist, have authored 

an article entitled "Induced Seismicity within 

Geological Carbon Sequestration Projects: 

Maximum Earthquake Magnitude and Leakage 

Potential from Undetected Faults".xix There have 

been two measureable earthquakes (1986 and 

2011) felt in Morgan County. These earthquakes 

did not originate within Morgan County but have 

caused people to feel them. Has adequate seismic

studies been performed by FutureGen to identify 

possible preexisting small faults or the potential of 

EPA reviewed FutureGen’s seismic evaluation (study) and performed its 

own evaluation. As a summary of its evaluation, EPA produced the 

document titled “Induced Seismicity Evaluation Using the EPA-Developed 

Decision Model The FutureGen Alliance Project: Morgan County Class VI 

UIC Wells 1, 2, 3 and 4 (EPA Permit Numbers: IL-137-6A-0001, IL-137-6A0002, IL-137-6A-0003 and IL-137-6A-0004)” (March 2014). The format and 

contents of this document are modeled after the “Injection-Induced 

Seismicity Decision Model” developed by EPA and state agencies with 

input from the United States Geological Survey, academic institutions, and 

other national seismicity experts.
222 

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

cracks in important integral formations? I believe 

FutureGen should reexamine the stratigraphic 

characterization bore samples in light of this new 

research paper to determine if there is a potential 

for the project to create seismic events especially 

given the following that FutureGen has stated that:

Regarding the specific test types mentioned by the commenter, a 

seismic survey would not be an appropriate technique to assess the 

potential for fractures in formations, nor would the evaluation of core 

samples and logs for fractures be an appropriate test for seismic potential. 

The presence or absence of fractures, by itself, is not an indicator of the 

potential for seismic activity.

The purpose of conducting a reflected seismic survey (transmitting surface 

vibrations downward through geologic strata and then detecting the 

reflections of those vibrations bounced back from subsurface geologic 

features) is to identify where displacement along a potential fault might 

have occurred in the past. Since movement along a fault can result in 

seismic events, the extent of such movement in the past can be used to 

evaluate the potential for seismic events in the future or evaluate if there 

are natural leakage pathways that need to be investigated. EPA has 

determined that the reflective seismic survey conducted by FutureGen as 

part of its seismic study, indicates no faults of concern (i.e., no faults 

where significant displacement has occurred or that might serve as 

leakage pathways).

11 NRDC 2. We support Applicant’s proposal to perform 

passive microseismic monitoring to help identify 

induced seismicity that may be caused by injection 

operations. However, we suggest that EPA require 

additional information and planning to address the 

risk of induced seismicity. As noted in the permit 

application, the 2D seismic reflection survey at the 

proposed injection well site is low quality and, 

“...insufficient to rule out the presence of smallscale faults/fracture zones.” Documented 

incidences of induced seismicity caused by UIC 

Class II injection operations have often occurred 

on previously unknown and/or sub-seismic 

faults. 2 According to the comprehensive report 

EPA’s review of the potential for induced seismicity included evaluation of 

extensive site-specific information, including the seismic history of the 

area, the location of faults and fractures, operating data (including the 

volume of CO2 to be injected) and computational modeling analyses of 

plume and pressure front behavior over the duration of the project. This 

evaluation was much more extensive than the evaluations typically 

performed for Class II permits such as those associated with the events in 

Ohio and Oklahoma to which the commenter refers, and supports a 

conclusion that the wells pose a low risk of inducing felt seismic events. 

See “Induced Seismicity Evaluation Using the EPA-Developed Decision 

Model The FutureGen Alliance Project: Morgan County Class VI UIC Wells 

1, 2, 3 and 4 (EPA Permit Numbers: IL-137-6A-0001, IL-137-6A-0002, IL137-6A-0003 and IL-137-6A-0004)” (March 2014).
223 

# Commenter Comment Text EPA Response

on induced seismicity and energy technologies 

produced by the National Academy of Sciences, 

“The factor that appears to have the most direct 

consequence in regard to induced seismicity is the 

net fluid balance (total balance of fluid introduced 

into or removed from the subsurface)...”3 Projects 

that do not balance injection and withdrawal, like 

carbon capture and sequestration or storage 

(“CCS”), may have a greater potential to cause 

induced seismicity, although more research is 

needed. Induced earthquakes caused by Class II 

injection operations have been large enough to 

cause property damage and injury.4 Even in the 

absence of actual damage, induced seismicity is a 

nuisance and source of anxiety for nearby 

communities, and may undermine public trust and 

support for CCS projects. Researchers at Lawrence 

Berkeley National Laboratory5 and the National 

Academy of Sciences6 have published detailed 

information on the elements that should be 

considered for inclusion in a protocol for addressing 

induced seismicity, including but not limited to 1) a 

stakeholder communications and outreach plan; 2) 

criteria for ground vibration and noise; 3) a hazard 

assessment; 4) a risk assessment; 5) seismic 

monitoring, and; 6) mitigation plans. Using these 

guidelines we request that EPA require Applicant to 

develop a protocol to address induced seismicity.

Although the components suggested by Lawrence Berkeley National 

Laboratory and the National Academy of Sciences are not required by the 

UIC regulations, EPA agrees with the need to monitor for and potentially 

address induced seismicity. The Emergency and Remedial Response Plan, 

which is an enforceable condition of FutureGen’s permits, includes 

protocols for natural and induced seismic events that include many of the 

same things as are recommended in the National Academy of Science 

publication the commenter cited. The Plan includes response protocols 

that correspond to the site’s potential risk and the level of seismic activity 

and an emergency communications plan.

Required passive seismic monitoring (described in the enforceable Testing 

and Monitoring Plan) will inform FutureGen and EPA regarding when any 

natural or induced event occurs—any such event will require 

implementation of the Emergency and Remedial Response Plan.
Final Permit 

The final permits and Response to Comments document are available for viewing at the Jacksonville Public Library, 201 W. College 

Avenue, Jacksonville, Illinois. 

Please contact Jeffrey McDonald of my staff at (312) 353-6288, or via email at mcdonald.jeffrey@epa.gov if you have any questions 

about the FutureGen Industrial Alliance injection well permits. 

kv~fi.~~hG. Hyde - U 

Director, Water Division 

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 

Region 5 

Date L-<f t J./)11 

224