IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 1 STATE OF NEW MEXICO, 2 Plaintiff-Appellee, 3

v. NO. 29,210 4 CREIGHTON M., 5 Child-Appellant. 6 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF SAN JUAN COUNTY 7 Sandra A. Price, District Judge 8 Gary K. King, Attorney General 9 Santa Fe, NM 10 for Appellee 11 Hugh W. Dangler, Chief Public Defender 12 Will O’Connell, Assistant Appellate Defender 13 Santa Fe, NM 14 for Appellant 15 MEMORANDUM OPINION 16 KENNEDY, Judge. 17 Creighton M. (Child) appeals from the judgment and disposition, adjudicating 18 Child to have violated his probation and committing him to the custody of CYFD for 19 a period of a year with residential treatment s as appropriate. [RP 167] Child contends 20 that the evidence presented at Child’s probation revocation hearing was not sufficient 212 to support finding that Child violated his probation. [DS 3] This Court’s calendar 1 notice proposed summary affirmance. [Ct. App. File, CN1] Child has filed a 2 memorandum in opposition. [Ct. App. F ile, MIO] Unpersuaded, we affirm. 3 DISCUSSION 4 In the memorandum, Defendant continues to contend that the State presented 5 insufficient evidence to prove that Child viol ated the terms of his probation. [MIO 2] 6 Child’s memorandum confirms the facts this Court relied upon inthe calendar notice 7 except for the admission of laboratory test re sults for cocaine ingestion. [MIO 1-3] 8 The memorandum reveals that the State did not present evidence that Child had 9 violated his probation by ingesting cocaine . [MIO 2-3] Child acknowledges, however, 10 that the State presented evidence that Child violated the probation condition that 11 prohibited him from possessing or consuming alcohol, and Child continues to assert 12 that the State’s evidence on this issue was insufficient to support revocation of his 13 probation. [MIO 3-5] In continuing to argue for reversal of the revocation of his 14 probation, Child relies on State v. Franklin , 78 N.M. 127, 428 P.2d 982 (1967), and 15 State v. Boyer , 103 N.M. 655, 712 P.2d 1 (Ct. App. 1985). We are not persuaded. 16 NMSA 1978, Section 32A-2-24 (B) (1993), provides in applicable part that 17 “[t]he standard of proof in probation revocation proceedings shall be evidence beyond 18 a reasonable doubt and the hearings shall bebefore the court without a jury.” 193 “Before a court can find Child to have violated his probation, evidence tending to 1 establish his own willful conduct beyond a reasonable doubt must have been presented 2 to the court.” In re Bruno R. , 2003-NMCA-057, ¶ 11, 133 N.M. 566, 66 P.3d 339; 3 see also In re Aaron L. , 2000-NMCA-024, ¶ 24, 128 N.M. 641, 996 P.2d 431 (“[The] 4 Children’s Code and the Children’s Rules both mandate that juvenile s be afforded the 5 same rights and procedures in revocation proceedings that they are afforded in 6 delinquency proceedings[.]”). In determining whether there was sufficient evidence 7 to support the district court’s revocation of Child’s probation, we apply the Rules of 8 Evidence and view the evidence presented ina light most favorable to the State 9 indulging all reasonable inferences in favor of the district court’s judgment. State v. 10 Erickson K. , 2002-NMCA-058, ¶ 21, 132 N.M. 258, 46 P.3d 1258. 11 In this case, the State filed a petiti on to revoke Child’s probation on August 27, 12 2008. [RP 143] The State asserted that Child had violated conditions numbers 1, 2, 13 4, and 8 of his probation agreement. [I d.] The alleged viol ations included the 14 following: Child did not have permission to be away from his residence on August 15 23, 2008; Child had not notified surveillance of his whereabouts when seen driving 16 on August 23, 2008; Child was observed to be under the influence of alcohol by 17 Officer Stock on August 23, 2008; and Childtested positive for cocaine on August 26, 18 2008. [Id.] The memorandum indicates thatthe State presente d evidence to support 194 revocation of Child’s probation on the grounds that he was observed to be under the 1 influence of alcohol by Officer Stock on August 23, 2008. [MIO 2-3] 2 Officer Stock testified that on August 23, 2008, he observed Child at his place 3 of employment, a car wash establishment, and could smell alcohol on Child. [DS 2, 4 MIO 1] In addition, Child swayed back and forth when he spoke to the officer. [Id.] 5 Officer Stock also testified that Child eventually admitted to drinking a couple of 6 beers the night before. [DS 2, MIO 2] The officer further testified that Child had 7 bloodshot, watery eyes. [DS 2, 3, MIO 2] Child testified that on August 23, 2008, 8 he was working with a chemi cal (acid) at the car wash, which was why he smelled of 9 alcohol at the time he talked with OfficerStock. [DS 3, MIO 2] Child denied 10 admitting to Officer Stock that he had been drinking. [Id.] 11 We hold that the State presented substantial evidence that Child had violated 12 his probation agreement by consuming alcohol . To the extent the officer’s and 13 Child’s testimony conflicted, the district court determined Officer Stock’s testimony 14 to be more credible than Child’s testimony. See State v. Mora , 1997-NMSC-060, ¶ 15 27, 124 N.M. 346, 950 P.2d 789 (“The reviewi ng court does not weigh the evidence 16 or substitute its judgment for that of the fact finder as long as there is sufficient 17 evidence to support the verdict.”); see State v. Rojo , 1999-NMSC-001, ¶ 19, 126 N.M. 18 438, 971 P.2d 829 (“Contrary evidence supporting acquittal does not provide a basis 195 for reversal because the jury is free to rej ect [the defendant’s] version of the facts.”). 1 CONCLUSION 2 We affirm the judgment and disposition revoking Child’s probation. 3 IT IS SO ORDERED. 4

___________________________________ 5 RODERICK T. KENNEDY, Judge 6 WE CONCUR : 7

___________________________ 8 MICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE, Judge 9

___________________________ 10 LINDA M. VANZI, Judge 11