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Special Report 160 March 2006

United States Institute of Peace

Special Report

The views expressed in this report do not necessarily 

reflect the views of the United States Institute of Peace, 

which does not advocate specific policy positions.

Contents 

Introduction 2

Background to Changes: Saddam’s Regime 3

Iraq’s New Leaders 4

Changes in Leadership between 2003 and 2005 10

The Vision of New Leaders 13

Conclusion and Recommendations 17 

About the Report

This report is part of an ongoing study on Iraq’s new 

political leaders and their visions for the future. Based 

on extensive background data and personal interviews 

with over forty top leaders since 2003, the study finds a 

revolutionary change since the Ba’th in the forces shaping 

the new leaders and their political orientation. A nationalist 

regime committed to a strong central government has been 

replaced by political pluralism and disparate views, with 

no common vision on Iraq’s direction forward. The political 

process has intensified polarization around ethnic and 

sectarian identity, which could lead to Iraq’s fragmentation.

The report suggests several ways to help Iraqis step 

back from this divide, including refocusing on economic 

development, particularly the need for new oil legislation 

that would give all Iraqis a stake in the nation’s major 

resource, and slowing the political process to give leaders 

time to absorb change and refine the political system.

Phebe Marr is a senior fellow at the United States Institute 

of Peace. A leading U.S. specialist on Iraq, she is frequently 

consulted by government and nongovernmental authorities, 

and her book The Modern History of Iraq is considered the 

standard source on contemporary Iraq. A former senior 

fellow at the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the 

National Defense University, she has advised high-level 

officials, often testifies before U.S. Senate and House 

committees, and frequently appears on network TV as a 

commentator on Iraq.

Phebe Marr

Who Are Iraq’s New Leaders? What Do 

They Want?

Summary

•	 Understanding the background and visions of Iraq’s new leaders is critical to analyzing 

where the country may go in the future.

•	 Changes in leadership since Saddam have been revolutionary. Among Iraq’s new leaders there are virtually no holdovers from the Ba’th era. A “de-Ba’thification” program 

to remove the old guard reinforces the divide between those who held office before 

and those who hold it now. 

•	 The ethnic, sectarian, and regional balance of the leadership has also been reversed 

since Ba’th times; Sunni dominance is gone, and Shi’ah constitute the largest group, 

with Kurds and Arab Sunnis making up about a fifth of the leadership. A high percentage of the new leaders are exiles, and most have been shaped by years of opposition 

to Saddam’s regime. Under the Ba’th, affiliation with other parties was prohibited; 

today’s leaders come from a diversity of parties.

•	 Ideological changes are also dramatic. Under the Ba’th, the vision was of a unified 

state with an Arab identity, emphasizing economic development, technology, and independence from foreign influence. The newly elected leaders have differing visions. 

The focus on ethnic and sectarian identity has sharpened; nationalism and a sense of 

Iraqi identity have been weakened. 

•	 The Kurdish parties make Kurdish identity paramount and seek a highly decentralized 

federal region that includes Kirkuk. Kurdish leaders are overwhelmingly secular and 

pro-Western in their orientation.

•	 Shi’ah leaders have more diverse views. Their primary identity is Iraqi, but their sense 

of nationalism is weak. The main interest of most Shi’ah leaders is in Islamizing—and 

reforming—society, in a Shi’ah direction. Because they are a majority, they favor elections and a parliamentary government. 
•	 The secular center has a commitment to an Iraqi identity and a more centralized state, 

but it is losing ground rapidly. A clear vision for the Sunnis has yet to be articulated, 

but judging from their campaign literature, many are still wedded to past Ba’th 

visions. 

•	 One surprising finding is the lack of emphasis on economics. Although new government leaders recognize the need for economic development, they do not make it a 

priority. This puts them at odds with many of their constituents, who say they want 

services and security.

•	 The new politics of communal identity is making compromise on governing difficult. 

While ethnic and sectarian identities have been an important feature of the Iraqi polity in the past, the new political process (elections, constitution making) is sharpening them. So, too, is the insurgency.

•	 It is crucial to address fragmentation before it becomes irreversible. One step would 

be to refocus Iraqis on economic issues, especially the formulation of oil legislation 

that gives all Iraqi communities a stake in oil resources and an equitable share in their 

benefits. 

•	 The political process should be slowed to allow politicians to absorb changes and work 

out compromises, especially in the area of regionalization. Iraqis should be encouraged to mend the political system that is producing polarization—for example, by 

refining political party regulations and the election law. 

•	 The new political leadership must develop an alternative vision for the future that 

encourages economic development, a new middle class, and communal tolerance, or 

the incipient fragmentation will become a reality. 

Introduction

There are few more important determinants of a country’s future direction than the nature 

of its political leadership. It is now almost three years since the overthrow of Saddam 

Hussein’s regime in Iraq, and new leadership is only slowly emerging under a process that 

has been disjointed, difficult, and even polarizing. As a result, Iraq’s future direction is still 

only dimly perceived. Iraq has now passed through a year of three elections, two of them 

designed to select national political leaders. While imperfect, the elections did produce a 

new set of leaders likely to see Iraq through the early stages of its coming transformation, 

and they confirm a certain political pattern and direction likely to persist over the next few 

years—probably even through the decade and beyond. Who are the newly elected leaders 

of Iraq? How do they differ from their predecessors—under Saddam and under the CPA? 

And what do they tell us of Iraq’s likely future direction?

Although the new government is still in the process of formation, enough is known 

about the emerging leadership from the earlier election in January 2005 and the election 

results in December to draw some conclusions. Indeed, many of the same leaders who 

won in January were also victorious in December. This report examines the backgrounds of 

the new leaders, and their views on the future of Iraq, through interviews with them and 

through their published works. 

The report will focus on several sets of leaders to see what they can tell us about change 

and continuity in the new Iraq. To provide a baseline for examining change, the first group 

will be those who were in power at the close of Saddam Hussein’s long dictatorship. The 

second group will be a cohort of ninety-seven new leaders who have held cabinet-level 

or other top offices in the state since 2003. Third will be a comparison of Iraqi leaders 

appointed by the CPA (Coalition Provisional Authority) in 2003 and those elected to office 

in 2005. Even a brief survey of this data makes possible several important conclusions. 

One is the sharp—indeed revolutionary—break with the past that the current leadership 

represents. Another is the significant changes in leadership—and orientation—that have 

About the Institute

The United States Institute of Peace is an independent, nonpartisan federal institution created 

by Congress to promote the prevention, management, and peaceful resolution of international 

conflicts. Established in 1984, the Institute meets 

its congressional mandate through an array of 

programs, including research grants, fellowships, 

professional training, education programs from 

high school through graduate school, conferences 

and workshops, library services, and publications. 

The Institute’s Board of Directors is appointed by 

the President of the United States and confirmed 

by the Senate.

Board of Directors

J. Robinson West (Chair), Chairman, PFC Energy, Washington, D.C. • María Otero (Vice Chair), President, ACCION 

International, Boston, Mass. • Betty F. Bumpers, Founder 

and former President, Peace Links, Washington, D.C. • 

Holly J. Burkhalter, Director of U.S. Policy, Physicians 

for Human Rights, Washington, D.C. • Chester A. 

Crocker, James R. Schlesinger Professor of Strategic 

Studies, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University 

• Laurie S. Fulton, Partner, Williams and Connolly, 

Washington, D.C. • Charles Horner, Senior Fellow, Hudson 

Institute, Washington, D.C. • Seymour Martin Lipset, 

Hazel Professor of Public Policy, George Mason University 

• Mora L. McLean, President, Africa-America Institute, 

New York, N.Y. • Barbara W. Snelling, former State 

Senator and former Lieutenant Governor, Shelburne, Vt.

Members ex officio

Michael M. Dunn, Lieutenant General, U.S. Air

 Force; President, National Defense University • Barry F. 

Lowenkron, Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, 

Human Rights, and Labor • Peter W. Rodman, Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs 

• Richard H. Solomon, President, United States

Institute of Peace (nonvoting)
taken place in the past two years and been reinforced in the December 2005 election. The 

significance of these new orientations, or visions for the future, is borne out in interviews 

with selected members of this new, elected elite during the past year.

Background to Changes: Saddam’s Regime

To understand just how substantial the changes in leadership and direction have been 

since 2003, it is useful to start with a brief look at Iraq’s political leadership in the last 

decade of Saddam’s rule. A study of the key decision makers in the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) and the top-level Regional Command of the Ba’th party in 1998—a 

group of eighteen men—reveals certain characteristics.1

First, at top levels all but one of these key officials, a Kurd, were members of the Ba’th 

party.2 Affiliation with the party was essential, not only for high political office but for 

a good education and for most careers. In fact, by 2003 there were two generations of 

Ba’th party leaders in this group. Under this system there was one party, one leader, and 

no political life outside the party. In fact, by the turn of the century even party life had 

been largely stamped out and replaced by the dictatorship of one man and his security 

network. Nonetheless, party institutions remained, as did the need for membership in the 

party if one hoped for any social mobility, let alone for a rise to the top of the political ladder: hence the sense of entitlement that came to be a hallmark of this elite. The 

totalitarian nature of this system left its mark on all who participated in it.

The second shared characteristic was the high degree of “continuity” in leadership 

over time. A snapshot of the Ba’th regime in 1998 shows an ossified leadership unable 

to change or bring in new blood. Among this top leadership, almost all came from the 

generation that had joined the Ba’th party just before or just after the 1958 revolution, 

four decades earlier. Their longevity in office is striking. Some two-thirds had been in the 

Regional Command of the party for over sixteen years. At least four had been in power 

for three decades. In May 2001 the party attempted to broaden its leadership through 

the election of a new Regional Command. The only notable additions from the younger 

generation were Saddam’s son Qusay and Dr. Huda Ammash, the daughter of a veteran 

Ba’th leader ousted by Saddam in 1971.3 Nor was there much change at lower levels. For 

example, in the years 1997 and 1998 there were three cabinets, but only one position 

changed hands. This shows a leadership that over decades had made few changes at 

the top and had little ability to bring in new figures unless they came from the “Ba’th 

family.”

A third characteristic of the group was its oft-noted ethnic and sectarian imbalance. 

Although Arab Sunnis have always had the lion’s share of positions in most modern Iraqi 

governments, the imbalance in favor of Sunnis under Saddam, particularly in his last 

years, was striking. Among the top leadership in 1998, some 61 percent were Sunni; only 

28 percent Shi’ah, and a mere 6 percent Kurdish. Another 6 percent were Christian. (At 

lower levels, among the cabinet, where there were more technocrats, the imbalance was 

not as great.) As these figures indicate, Sunni dominance was overwhelming in decisionmaking positions, with Shi’ah greatly underrepresented and Kurds all but absent.

The same trend was evident in the regional distribution of the leadership at the top. 

Some 61 percent came from the so-called Sunni Triangle, the small cities and towns 

north and west of Baghdad. Almost a quarter came from Saddam’s hometown of Tikrit, 

with only 6 percent from Baghdad, Iraq’s capital and its most integrated city. Few came 

from the northern (mainly Kurdish) and southern (mainly Shi’ah) areas. The Ba’th regime 

not only failed to represent broad regions of the country but also failed to incorporate 

an important social segment of Iraq’s population: its urban, educated middle class, best 

represented by Baghdad’s inhabitants.

There were other imbalances as well. Until 2001 the group was entirely male. In the 

party’s long reign of thirty-five years only one woman occupied a high-level post (and, as 

Affiliation with the party was 

essential, not only for high 

political office but for a good 

education and for most careers.

A snapshot of the Ba’th regime 

in 1998 shows an ossified leadership unable to change or bring 

in new blood.

The Ba’th regime not only failed 

to represent broad regions of 

the country but also failed to 

incorporate an important social 

segment of Iraq’s population: its 

urban, educated middle class, 

best represented by Baghdad’s 

inhabitants.
indicated, she was the daughter of a previous Ba’th party member). The same was true of 

cabinets, although some women were elected to the parliament and others held professional posts. The Ba’th regime, at its upper levels, also tended to be undereducated. In 

1998, for example, several members of the top group had not gone beyond high school.

Some members, like Saddam himself, later acquired college degrees by well-known 

arrangements with the faculty in Baghdad. In 1998 no top leaders had the equivalent of 

a doctoral degree. Some cabinet members were more highly educated, some even with 

doctorates or other advanced degrees, but only a few of these credentials were attained 

abroad. It must be kept in mind that in Iraq education itself was highly politicized. 

Except for some technical fields, such as engineering and medicine, most subjects of 

study—especially those dealing with political science—required vetting by the regime. As 

a result, most of the political class that held office under the Ba’th was largely Ba’thized, 

while those left outside were often deprived of the background and training that might 

help them in coping with government and public policy issues.

Finally, most of the leaders could be characterized as “insiders,” with little or no 

exposure to the outside world. In 1998 only a handful of the thirty-six leaders under 

study had been educated outside Iraq or traveled much outside its borders, and by the 

late 1990s they were essentially bottled up in Iraq because of sanctions and for security 

reasons. At the top levels, only Saddam had lived abroad (in Cairo, for a few years in his 

youth), and only a few of the rest did much traveling abroad, and this under limited official conditions. Drawn mostly from the smaller cities and towns of the “Triangle,” shaped 

by the conspiratorial nature of the party, they had little contact with the environment of 

neighboring countries, much less the broader international arena. Some of the ministers 

had a broader background and were better educated, but their exposure to the outside 

world in the twilight of the Saddam regime was also very limited. 

What did this mean for the orientation of this leadership? While much of the original 

ideology of the Ba’th party, which had been pan-Arab and socialist, had been reshaped 

under the mallet of Saddam’s personal dictatorship, enough lingered to leave its stamp 

on the leaders who still held power in 2003. The old ideology’s chief characteristic was 

nationalism, both Iraqi and Arab. Identification with the state, which the Ba’thists led, 

was strong, as was the commitment to a strong central government, designed to maintain 

order and stability and to control and exploit Iraq’s oil wealth. As is true of almost any 

long-lasting authoritarian dictatorship, those in the leadership group were possessed of 

a deep sense of entitlement—to governing power and to benefits from Iraq’s wealth. 

While the Ba’th’s original ideology was strongly secular and modern, by the 1990s it had 

been reshaped to incorporate growing Islamist sentiment among the populace. Indeed, 

Saddam himself mounted a “faith campaign” in the mid-1990s, which allowed expression 

of Islamist sentiment and practice, as long as it stayed within the bounds of the Ba’th 

nationalist orientation. By the turn of the century much of this ideology—if it could be 

called that—had turned inward, focusing on Iraq’s suffering at the hands of foreigners 

and neighbors under sanctions and other restrictions imposed after the 1991 Gulf War. It 

is not too much to call this mind-set xenophobic, especially toward the West. It is this 

orientation, to a greater or lesser degree, that many of the Sunni Arabs who served in 

the Ba’th administration have taken with them into opposition, and often into the insurgency, and that helps explain their intransigence in the face of the new order. 

Iraq’s New Leaders

The new political leaders who have emerged since 2003 stand in sharp contrast with 

their predecessors in almost every respect. While everyone realizes that there has been 

“regime change” in Iraq, the extent and depth of the change may not be so widely recognized. Since the fall of Saddam, Iraq has had three different Iraqi administrations and 

The Ba’th regime, at its upper 

levels, also tended to be undereducated. In 1998, for example, 

several members of the top 

group had not gone beyond 

high school.

While the Ba’th’s original ideology 

was strongly secular and modern, 

by the 1990s it had been reshaped 

to incorporate growing Islamist 

sentiment amongthe populace.
is embarking on a fourth. The first, essentially appointed by the CPA in July 2003, was 

the twenty-five-member Iraq Governing Council and an associated Council of Ministers. In 

June 2004 sovereignty was turned over to Iraq, and a new Iraqi interim government was 

selected. In January 2005 an election was held for a temporary national assembly, and 

in May 2005 a new Iraqi government was formed on the basis of that election. This third 

government, more closely analyzed below, represents a genuine expression of popular 

opinion and is the best indicator to date of who Iraq’s new leaders are and where they 

are headed. The election of December 2005 is producing a more permanent government in 

2006. The election results, however, strongly confirm the trends begun in January 2005, 

and the new government will contain a number of the same leaders. Altogether, the three 

governments since 2003 include some ninety-seven leaders—the group that will be used 

for comparison with the old regime.

Continuity and Change

One of the most striking features of this leadership is just how new it is. There may be 

some holdovers from the Ba’th era at the second and third levels of bureaucratic structures, but there are very few left at the top, and those who remain were either “nominal” 

members or had dropped out of the party well before the 1990s. What is most noticeable 

is the total break with the past. Change in the political leadership has been revolutionary, 

not evolutionary. 

One result of this fundamental change, as table 1 shows, is the lack of carryover in 

leadership experience—or outlook—from the Saddam era. Indeed, the gulf between 

those who have come to power since 2003 and those who were in power before then is 

one of the most critical divides in Iraq today, and it may be increasing. It is this factor 

that makes “de-Ba’thification” so sensitive and controversial. Moreover, to ensure that 

such change would be permanent, the CPA issued a law in May 2003 that barred the top 

four levels of Ba’th party members from holding public office. This law and its results help 

explain the alienation felt by those who have been dispossessed of power and position, 

and the suspicion by those now in power of those who came before them. Much of this 

suspicion permeates the bureaucracy today. 

Despite this divide, much about this change has been positive. The Ba’th cohort of 

political leaders was small and inbred, difficult to penetrate. The new political leaders 

have opened up the political system, reflected in the large number of new players (ninetyseven) who have gained entry to the leading rungs of political power. The new political 

system has created considerable political mobility. The newcomers have also brought 

with them different experiences and a different outlook. Many were residents in Western 

society and have brought with them exposure to a democratic way of life. 

But there have been some negative consequences as well. A number of the newcomers 

are also unfamiliar with today’s Iraq and, as exiles, have few ties with the local constituents whom they are supposed to be serving. Another problem is their lack of experience in 

governance, which they have had to gain rapidly. The one partial exception is the Kurdish 

representatives, many of whom have gained valuable experience in self-government in 

the more open political environment in the north. For the most part, however, ministers 

have changed posts rapidly and, even when they have served in several cabinets, have 

not remained in the same post, making it difficult to build bureaucratic institutions or 

develop expertise in the management of their departments. Nor has there been much 

time to develop ties to lower levels of the permanent bureaucracy. Indeed, the absence 

of such ties, as well as changes at the upper levels of bureaucracy, has created much 

uncertainty and dysfunction. These factors help explain why it has been so difficult to 

carry out government services.

Iraq has been afflicted with discontinuity in the past—eras in which coups and revolts 

have wiped out political leaders and drained the educated middle class of talent, which 

The new political leaders have 

opened up the political system, 

reflected in the large number of 

new players (ninety-seven) who 

have gained entry to the leading rungs of political power. 

Iraq has been afflicted with 

discontinuity in the past—eras 

in which coups and revolts have 

wiped out political leaders and 

drained the educated middle 

class of talent, which then had 

to be replaced.
then had to be replaced. The current period may be another such era, as the new leadership gradually builds up the expertise and linkages necessary to run a government.

Table 1. Continuity and Change in Iraq’s Leadership

Continuity Change

Between the Ba’th Party and the 

New Leaders 0% (0) 100% (97)

Between 2003 and 2005 37% (15) 63% (23)

Ethnic and Sectarian Balance

Other characteristics of the new leadership also show a clear break with the past. Not 

surprisingly, the leadership of the post-Saddam period represents a sharp reversal in the 

ethnic and sectarian balance within the leadership. Sunni dominance is gone, and Shi’ah 

have the largest number of leaders, while the Kurds and Arab Sunnis have about equal 

representation. As a whole, Arab Shi’ah constitute at least 45 percent of leaders since 

2003; Kurds, 19 percent; and Arab Sunnis, 19 percent. Some 2 percent are Turkmen, and 

4 percent are Christian, with 9 percent unknown. (Percentages have been rounded.) This 

ethnic and sectarian balance was consciously begun in the IGC (Iraqi Governing Council) 

and its accompanying cabinet, essentially put in place by the CPA. Indeed, giving the 

country’s ethnic and sectarian groups representation in government roughly proportional 

to their percentage of the population was one of the main criteria for appointment, in 

some sense consciously focusing the political process on this communal identity for the 

first time. Although the numbers and percentages have shifted somewhat in subsequent 

governments (see table 2), post-Saddam-era leadership plainly reflects the end of Sunni 

dominance.

Table 2. Ethnic and Sectarian Comparison between Ba’th and New Leaders

Ethnic and 

Sectarian Identity

Top Level, 

Ba’th Regime1

Top Level, 

New Leaders2

Shi’ah Arab 28% (5) 52% (11)

Sunni Arab 61% (11) 24% (5)

Kurd 6% (1) 24% (5)

Unknown 6% (1) 0%

1. Top level, Ba’th regime, comprised the Revolutionary Command Council and the Regional Command of the 

party, some members of which also occupied the key ministerial positions.

2. Top level, new leaders, comprises the presidents, vice presidents, prime minister, deputy prime ministers, 

and ministers of foreign affairs, finance, defense, interior, and state for national security in all three 

governments. 

Geographic Distribution

The same trend is evident in the regional distribution of leadership. The dominance of the 

“Sunni Triangle” and Tikrit has been totally reversed today. By far the highest number of 

leaders come from urban areas, with Baghdad in the lead. Among all leaders since 2003, 

over 21 percent come from Baghdad, 7 percent from Basra, and 3 percent from Mosul. 

Another 7 percent come from Kirkuk. Thus, some 38 percent come from Iraq’s four main 

urban centers. The Kurdish area is well represented with some 14 percent, and some 

21 percent come from the Shi’ah south. Only 3 percent come from the Sunni Triangle. 

Sunni dominance is gone, and 

Shi’ah have the largest number 

of leaders, while the Kurds and 

Arab Sunnis have about equal 

representation.
(Another 23 percent are unknown.) Again, the loss to the Sunni region that dominated 

Saddam’s leadership group is the most striking change, indicating one reason for problems 

in the Triangle. Another striking change is the robust representation of Iraq’s cities, especially Baghdad, missing under the Ba’th, which relied more heavily on rural and small-town 

elements.

Gender

The new governments that have come to power already have a record of putting females 

into power that greatly outstrips the previous Ba’th regime’s. In the post-Saddam leadership group, some 13 percent have been women; in the May 2005 government some 15 

percent of the posts went to women, some of whom have been quite outspoken. While 

the issue of quotas for females in the new parliament may come under scrutiny in the 

future, it is unlikely that any future Iraqi government will be able to leave women out of 

leadership positions, as the Ba’th did for decades.

Education

Iraq’s new leadership is also highly educated. Indeed, higher education is one of its 

hallmarks. This, too, distinguishes it from the Ba’th regime. Among the new leadership, 

almost 47 percent have doctoral degrees or their equivalent. Another 17.5 percent have 

master’s degrees or at least some education beyond the college level, and another 20 

percent have a bachelor’s degree or its equivalent. Almost all this education was acquired 

in secular institutions, although a number of these scholars went beyond such schools to 

acquire religious education as well. Some 41 percent—a very high percentage—acquired 

some higher education in the West. (A few had degrees from Eastern European universities.) A smaller number, 29 percent, were educated wholly in Iraq. (Some 14 percent have 

unknown academic backgrounds.) For the most part, new leaders have an education in scientific or technological subjects. Over 23 percent specialized in engineering or computer 

science; 16 percent in sciences, medicine, or mathematics; and 2 percent in agriculture. A 

minority were trained in subjects related to government. Some 13 percent got law degrees, 

16 percent graduated in the social sciences or public policy, and 3 percent were trained in 

military or police academies. Some 10 percent were trained in other fields.

Age and Generational Change

The post-Saddam leadership as a whole is middle-aged (average age fifty-four). The largest 

group, 22 percent, are in their fifties, some 20 percent are in their forties, and 15 percent 

are in their sixties. There is a large group (25 percent) of unknown age, but this is unlikely 

to change the profile substantially. This makes the leadership slightly younger than that of 

Saddam’s regime. (Saddam himself is now sixty-eight.) But the age factor is less important 

in itself than in what it tells us of the generation now exercising power and of what they 

have experienced in those years. Here the differences from the Ba’th era are much clearer 

and go far in explaining who the new leaders of Iraq are and what they are about. It is 

clear that the post-Saddam leadership is the generation that came to adulthood after the 

Ba’th came to power, and that, despite its differences, the new leadership has, in one way 

or another, been shaped by the regime it grew up under. 

If we take the age of twenty—a time when people are graduating from college or 

going to work and are increasingly aware of their political environment—as a threshold 

of adulthood, at least 57 percent of the current leadership came of age during or after 

1968, the year the Ba’th came to power. The figure would no doubt be higher if some of 

the unknowns (25 percent) were factored in. Few of these leaders have much recollection 

of the pre-Ba’th era. In short, Ba’th rule is probably the single most important factor in 

shaping the lives of these leaders. But unlike the Ba’thists, they were not part of the govThe new governments that have 

come to power already have a 

record of putting females into 

power that greatly outstrips the 

previous Ba’th regime’s.

The age factor is less important 

in itself than in what it tells us 

of the generation now exercising 

power. 

Few of these leaders have much 

recollection of the pre-Ba’th era.
erning apparatus but were on the receiving end of Ba’th power. While the 1970s were less 

disruptive than subsequent decades and were marked by considerable prosperity, the end 

of that decade brought the Islamic revolution in Iran, turbulence and upheaval in Iraq, and 

then a series of wars stretching into the early 1990s (an eight-year war with Iran, Iraq’s 

invasion of Kuwait, and then the first Gulf War with the U.S.-led coalition). The period also 

included a failed revolt by Kurds and Shi’ah in 1991. A number of contemporary leaders 

participated in these wars (some on the Iranian side) and were the subjects of the brutal 

repression that followed the events of 1979–80 and 1991. Not surprisingly, many left Iraq. 

Of those who remained, few appear to have taken much part in the country’s political life, 

many suffered discrimination, and all suffered through the long decade of sanctions as 

well. As a result, a sense of oppression and victimization, particularly at the hands of the 

Ba’th regime, is one of the hallmarks of this new leadership.

Outsiders versus Insiders

One of the most significant features of Iraq’s new political leadership is that exiles—Iraqis 

who have lived outside Iraq for at least a decade, and in some cases two or three—predominate. (This definition does not include Iraqis who spent time abroad for education). 

Today’s leaders are largely those who either left Iraq or lived in the north, free of Saddam’s 

control. Insiders, defined as those who were living under Saddam’s regime in 2003, have 

not yet come into their own. The contrast with Saddam’s regime, which was composed 

wholly of insiders, is clear. Overall, some 38 percent of Iraq’s leaders since 2003 are outsiders, 19 percent are Kurds or others from the “free” zone in northern Iraq, and only 26.8 

percent are insiders. The rest are of unknown background.

By any standards, this is a remarkably large number of exile leaders and indicates the 

difficulties that lie ahead in incorporating into the leadership Iraqis who have remained 

inside Iraq. It may also be difficult to integrate the outsiders, many of whom have left 

family abroad because of the violence of the insurgency. Tensions between these two 

groups is clear. Insiders often resent those who have come from abroad, often bringing 

alien ideas—whether from the West or the East (mainly Iran)—and reputedly failing to 

appreciate their suffering under Saddam. But outsiders do contribute new ideas and bring 

badly needed outside support. The outsiders, conversely, bring suspicion of those from 

inside, particularly those educated under the Ba’th regime and having some experience 

within it. These differences represent a major fault line in Iraqi political dynamics, which 

must be resolved.

Work Experience

More important than where they have been living is what these new leaders have been 

doing. What kind of work has shaped their adult experience? Among the exiles the largest group, 62 percent, were working either full-time or part-time in opposition activities 

designed to replace the Saddam government. The rest were simply working, in business 

or sometimes in the professions, acquiring valuable professional and occupational skills. 

Those living in the West had some experience in relating to and understanding Western 

democratic institutions; many, especially those in the United States and the United 

Kingdom, worked within the system to influence policy in favor of regime change—with 

remarkable success. Most of those in Iran were engaged in antiregime activities and, during the Iran-Iraq war, fought against the Iraqi army. Whatever their experience, much of 

the adult life of this group has been shaped by opposition to the Ba’th, and many have 

paid a high price in the death of relatives, uprooted family life, and sometimes armed 

struggle. They are profoundly alienated from, and suspicious of, anyone connected with 

the previous regime, which will make cooperation with the educated, Ba’thized elite who 

remained in Iraq difficult.



Today’s leaders are largely those 

who either left Iraq or lived in 

the north. Insiders, defined as 

those who were living under 

Saddam’s regime in 2003, have 

not yet come into their own.

Whatever their experience, much 

of the adult life of this group has 

been shaped by opposition to the 

Ba’th, and many have paid a high 

price in the death of relatives, 

uprooted family life, and sometimes armed struggle. 
A second group, the Kurds and others living in the north (almost 20 percent of the 

new leadership), bring a different experience. They, too, opposed the regime, and many 

also fought militarily against it in the Iran-Iraq war and the 1991 revolt. But most of 

these leaders have also had valuable party and government experience. A number are 

long-standing leaders of political parties, who for much of the past fifteen years have 

had the experience, through trial and error, of running a government in real-world circumstances—even through a short civil war. A substantial number have also lived in 

the West and acted in a diplomatic capacity for their Kurdish government at home. It is 

not surprising that these Kurds bring unparalleled experience and political skill to the 

election process (reflected in their robust showing in the January 2005 election) and 

to government in Baghdad. Compared to other newcomers, they are seasoned political 

operatives.

The insiders in this new leadership group are harder to characterize. Certainly they 

have had little or no government experience. A few have been imprisoned by Saddam, 

indicating some opposition activity. Several have been affiliated with underground 

Islamist parties. Others have simply worked, including several professionals who may once 

have been in the Ba’th party and left. But no one with any credentials in the Ba’th party 

or with high positions within it has made it into this leadership group. Again, the rift 

between the opposition and the educated elite who “cooperated” with the Ba’th is clear 

and reflected in the controversy over de-Ba’thification.

Political Party Affiliation

Aside from its opposition to the old regime, the most telling characteristic of the new 

leadership group is its adherence to a variety of political parties. The contrast here with 

the Ba’th regime is too clear to need much comment. Some 70 percent of the leaders under study belong to political parties; less than 15 percent are independent. The 

unknown group makes up about 15 percent, but a number of these are assumed to have 

been simply professionals or technocrats. But these are a minority in the new regime, 

unlike during the Saddam era, when many ministries were occupied by technocrats who, 

although competent in their fields, were devoid of any political ambitions or experience. 

Technocratic expertise is not a valued avenue of political mobility in the new regime.

As these figures indicate, 2003 marked the return of political life in Baghdad, with 

new and different parties competing for power and debating real issues. The removal of 

the Ba’th party, and the ban against its members participating in politics, created political space for competitors. This gap was filled by a number of older, well-known parties 

that had not been able to operate inside Iraq. Some, like the National Democratic party 

(NDP) and the Iraq Communist party (ICP), go back to the Second World War or earlier. 

Both of these parties had a well-established life among Iraq’s intelligentsia in the 1950s 

and 1960s. Of the two main Shi’ah religio-political parties, the Da’wah originated at the 

end of the 1950s and dominated the Iraqi Shi’ah movement until its decimation by Saddam at the end of the 1970s, whereas SCIRI was founded in 1982 in Iran, during the 

Iran-Iraq war. The main Kurdish parties are also old and well established. The Kurdistan 

Democratic party (KDP), dating from the end of World War II, dominated the Kurdish 

national movement for half a century; the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) broke away 

from the KDP and established its independence in 1975. Even the two most important 

Western exile opposition parties, the Iraq National Congress (INC), led by Ahmad Chalabi, 

and the Iraq National Accord (INA), led by Ayyad Allawi, are both well over a decade old. 

The INC, originally an umbrella group of diverse opposition parties, was established early 

in the 1990s. Allawi claims to have broken with the Ba’th as early as the 1970s, and his 

INA was openly established in the 1990s as well. After 2003 many new and smaller parties emerged. Most of these have had difficulty establishing themselves. The exception 

is the Sadrist movement, which has been able to garner much support among “insiders,” 

youth, and the poor.

2003 marked the return of 

political life in Baghdad, with 

new and different parties competing for power and debating 

real issues.

Compared to other newcomers,

the Kurds are seasoned political 

operatives.
10

There is no doubt that party affiliation and competition among political parties are 

dominant characteristics of the new leadership. This has been even more striking since 

2005, when genuine elections became the chief means of selecting Iraq’s leadership and 

distributing the power and patrimony of the state. As a result, leadership has largely been 

determined by party membership, party organization, and the parties’ relative ability to 

mobilize mass support. This return of real politics to Iraq is the single most important 

change from the Ba’th era and is clearly reflected in the leadership that has emerged.

Changes in Leadership between 2003 and 2005

If these are the most important departures from Saddam’s regime, what of changes in 

leadership since 2003? How do the leaders installed in government after a genuine election in 2005 differ from those installed by the CPA in 2003, and what do these differences portend? This can best be gleaned by comparing the government of 2003 (the Iraq 

Governing Council and its ministers) with the government formed in May 2005 after the 

January 2005 election. As expected, a comparison of these two groups shows few significant changes in some areas (educational background, gender, age, and generational experience) but some pronounced changes in others. It is these that we will explore here.

Continuity and Change

While change in leadership over the past two years has certainly not been as dramatic 

as the change from the Ba’th era, there is nonetheless a high degree of turnover. Of the 

elected government of 2005, only 40 percent of leaders are carryovers, that is, have 

served at least once before in a previous government. At best, new leaders who have 

carried over have been able to acquire only a little more than two years’ governing experience in national office. Of this 40 percent, most have been shuffled around in various 

ministries. (Most have been appointed to satisfy party requirements or for ethnic and 

sectarian balance.) Only three have been in the same ministry through all three administrations, and interestingly, all these have been Kurds. One Shi’ah has been in the same 

ministry twice. One minister compared the situation to musical chairs: she no sooner got 

a handle on one ministry than she was shifted to another. Of course, a rapid turnover in 

leadership is to be expected in any revolutionary situation such as that which has taken 

place in Iraq; it will simply take time to develop a new leadership cadre. Under these 

circumstances, perhaps Iraq’s rate of continuity—almost 40 percent—is not all that bad. 

Nonetheless, this factor helps explain why it has been so difficult to build up government 

capacity, and why services are slow. A minister moved from one ministry to another after 

a year cannot build up the infrastructure necessary to govern. Discontinuity affects not 

only the ability to establish government structures but also the links and ties to constituencies. Indeed, disconnection with the populace is one of the common complaints of the 

electorate, which is demanding water, electricity, and jobs. Establishing government and 

getting services to the populace are key elements in creating some stability in Iraq, and 

the rapidity of change in leadership may be hampering this process.

Ethnic and Sectarian Balance

The basic ethnic and sectarian balance in the leadership has not changed significantly 

over the past two years, but some important shifts bear noting. The ICG of 2003 was 

designed to reflect the ethnic and sectarian distribution of the population fairly. Among 

the IGC and its accompanying cabinet, some 54 percent—a slight majority—were Shi’ah, 

22 percent were Kurds, and some 16 percent were Arab Sunnis. Turkmen and Christians 

each made up 4 percent. Although not perfect, this makeup came closer to approximating the real ethnic and sectarian distribution of the population than had any government 

Of the elected government of 

2005, only 40 percent of leaders are carryovers, that is, have 

served at least once before in a 

previous government.

One minister compared the situation 

to musical chairs: she no sooner got 

a handle on one ministry than she 

was shifted to another.

Establishing government and 

getting services to the populace 

are key elements in creating 

some stability in Iraq, and the 

rapidity of change in leadership 

may be hampering this process.
11

since Iraq’s founding. Of course, it reduced the Sunnis’ representation to a more realistic 

level, better represented the Shi’ah majority, and may have overrepresented the Kurds a 

bit. Among the leadership of the government formed after the election in January 2005, 

the mix shifted somewhat, interestingly, in favor of the Kurds. In that government, Arab 

Shi’ah constitute less than half (almost 45 percent), Kurds almost 29 percent, and Arab 

Sunnis 21 percent, with Turkmen and Christians 2.6 percent each. The Kurds have been 

the biggest winners here, with a proportion of seats in the government higher than their 

percentage of the population, while Arab Sunnis have seats about commensurate with 

their numbers in the population. These proportions are expected to change in the forthcoming government, with the percentage of Kurds dropping somewhat and a new Sunni 

contingent participating. Sunni parties gained about 20 percent of seats in the assembly 

and are expected to take part in government. (This will not change the ethnic and sectarian balance of the government, only the political affiliation of the Sunnis.)

Insiders versus Outsiders

The government elected in January 2005 has made only modest progress in integrating 

insiders into the leadership and reducing the number of outsiders. As we can see in table 

3, in the IGC, essentially brought in by the coalition, 38 percent of the leaders were 

outsiders, and some 18 percent were Kurds from the free zone in northern Iraq. Only 28 

percent, a little over a quarter, were insiders. In the elected government of January 2005, 

exiles were nearly 37 percent—still the largest component—and some 29 percent were 

Kurds or others who had been living in the north. Insiders moved up to 31.6 percent but 

were still less than a third. Exiles who had lived mostly in the West declined modestly 

from 26 percent to 21 percent. The problem here is that most “insiders” who might have 

been tapped for positions had affiliations with Ba’thism, whereas most “outsiders” are 

oppositionists—a divide that will remain difficult to overcome.

Table 3. Comparison between the IGC (2003) and the Elected Government (2005)

Insiders versus Outsiders IGC (2003) Elected Government 

(January 2005)

Insiders 28% (14) 32% (12)

Insiders in Northern Free 

Zone 18% (9) 29% (11)

Outsiders (Exiles) 38% (19) 37% (14)

Unknown 16% (8) 3% (1)

Political Parties IGC (2003) Elected Government 

(January 2005)

Membership in Parties 66% (33) 67% (24)

Centrist Parties 30% (15) 3% (1)

Religio-political Parties 22% (11) 36% (13)

Kurdish Parties 14% (7) 28% (10)

Independents 12% (6) 19% (7)

Unknown 22% (11) 14% (5)

Political Party Affiliation

The most telling change in political leadership between the appointed government of 

2003 and the elected government of 2005 is political party affiliation. Here the change—

and what it portends for Iraq’s future orientation—is striking.

The most telling change in political 

leadership between the appointed 

government of 2003 and the elected 

government of 2005 is political 

party affiliation. 
12

In the ICG government, political party representation was high; some 66 percent of 

the leaders belonged to parties, and only 12 percent were independent. (The unknown 

factor is 22 percent). But in that leadership group, which leaned westward, centrist, 

Iraqi-oriented, secular parties were prominent. These included the National Democratic 

Party (led by Nasir al-Chadirchi), the Iraq National Congress (Ahmad Chalabi), the Iraq 

National Accord (Ayad Allawi), the Assembly of Independent Democrats (Adnan Pachachi), and the Communist Party (Hamid Musa). This group made up 30 percent of the 

leaders. Next came the religio-political (mainly Shi’ah) parties, composing 20 percent. 

They consisted mainly of SCIRI and the Da’wah but also included the Sunni Iraqi Islamic 

Party. Third came the Kurdish parties—mainly the KDP under Mas’ud Barzani, and the PUK 

under Jalal Talabani—which are themselves relatively secular but committed to Kurdish 

rather than Iraqi goals. Kurdish party members made up 14 percent of the leaders. Thus, 

the first IGC government was one with wide, inclusive representation of Iraq’s political 

parties (and of its ethnic and sectarian groups), but one in which secularists (including 

the Kurdish parties) predominated; and those secular parties that were moderate, even 

liberal, and had a stronger Iraqi national identity were the largest single group. In short, 

the cabinet was weighted in favor of a moderate, secularist “center” with an Iraqi-oriented identity.

As table 3 shows, the elected government of 2005 changed that balance. This government, too, was dominated by political party members (68 percent), with 18 percent 

independents. But the most striking difference was the domination, first, of the Shi’ah 

religious parties (34.2 percent), and second, of the Kurdish nationalist parties (26.3 

percent). Secular, Iraqi-oriented, centrist parties, which did secure some seats in the 

assembly, were virtually absent in the government, except for one vice president. There 

were a few parties representing minorities, and no Sunni parties, although individual 

Sunnis were present. In the election itself, a number of the smaller, older secular parties, 

such as the NDP, lost outright, disappearing from parliament as well as from the government. The Iraqi List, led by Allawi, was the main secular centrist group in the running, 

but it declined to join the government and instead chose to remain an official opposition 

in parliament; however, its proportion of seats in parliament—14.5 percent—was small. 

The leadership in this government was divided between two ethnic and sectarian blocs: 

a Shi’ah contingent, the UIA, led by two parties, SCIRI and the Da’wah, with support 

from other Shi’ah factions such as the Sadrists and Ahmad Chalabi; and the two Kurdish 

parties, the KDP and the PUK, which united to follow their own Kurdish-oriented agenda. 

The virtual elimination from government (though not from parliament) of the moderate 

center, and the shift to parties based on ethnic and sectarian identity, is clear. So, too, 

is the absence of any party representing Sunni—or Iraqi nationalist—interests. 

The election of December 2005 reinforced the pattern of the January election. Ethnic 

and sectarian voting predominated, and the “center,” represented mainly by Allawi’s 

coalition, shrank further in terms of the popular vote. This time the dominant Shi’ah 

coalition (the UIA), consisted of three main components: SCIRI, the Da’wah party, and 

the Sadrist Current. (Ahmad Chalabi dropped out and ran on a separate ticket, which lost 

in the election.) The UIA won a large plurality of seats, short of a majority, in parliament 

and will probably dominate the new government. The Kurdish coalition, composed mainly 

of the KDP and the PUK, won about 19 percent of the seats in parliament, more commensurate with its numbers in the population. The Kurdish Islamic Union, a party akin to 

the Muslim Brotherhood, broke ranks with the Kurdish front, ran its own ticket, and won 

five seats, thereby slightly weakening the Kurdish nationalist front. Although the centrist 

List, led by Allawi, ran a strong ticket, including Sunni leader Ghazi al-Yawar, the NDP 

(led by Adnan Pachachi), and the ICP (headed by Hamid Musa), it got only 9 percent of 

the vote, indicating a shrinkage of the moderate middle. The new factor in this election 

was the participation of Sunni political parties. The first and strongest grouping was the 

Iraq Accordance Front, consisting of three parties: the Iraqi Islamic Party (an older Iraqi 

Sunni party, established in the early 1960s and close in ideology to the Muslim BrotherThe virtual elimination from government (though not from parliament) of the moderate center, 

and the shift to parties based on 

ethnic and sectarian identity, is 

clear. So, too, is the absence of 

any party representing Sunni—or 

Iraqi nationalist—interests. 
13

hood), led by Tawfiq al-Hashimi; the National Dialogue Council, led by Khalaf al-’Ulayan; 

and the General Conference of the Iraqi People, led by Adnan al-Dulaimi (the latter two 

post-2003 formations). The second was a more secular group, the Iraqi Front for National 

Dialogue, led by a former Ba’thist, Salih al-Mutlaq. Together, these two Sunni groupings 

managed to get about a fifth of the seats in parliament, and either or both are expected 

to represent Sunnis in the next government. While these Sunni parties ran essentially 

on nationalist platforms, their support came almost wholly from Sunni areas, reinforcing 

the pattern of ethnic and sectarian voting. Whether the leaders appointed to Iraq’s new 

government will compromise in ways that enable Iraq to step back from this ethnic and 

sectarian divide and refocus on issues that bring Iraqis together—rather than on cultural 

identity, which seems to divide them—is the big question for the future.

The Vision of New Leaders

Much of the answer to this question lies in the vision—or the political orientation—of 

the new leaders and the political parties that have won in the recent elections, and in 

whether there is enough of a unifying vision to bring them together. Evidence suggests 

that the underlying ethnic and sectarian differences, exacerbated in part by the disastrous 

policies of Saddam in his last decades, have now become powerful, mobilizing forces in 

an environment where politics and the political process are primary. But these differences 

are only a part of a more complex social and intellectual environment. Moreover, vision 

is a nebulous and often changing concept, as is “identity,” but interviews conducted in 

2004 and 2005 with a range of key figures in Iraq’s government and its political parties 

provide some clues on how the new leadership is thinking about Iraq’s future and on 

where they would like to take it. For proper perspective, these views, too, must be compared with those of the preceding Saddam era, which form the backbone of the current 

Sunni insurgency and the nationalist opposition to the current government, centered in 

the Sunni community.

The Ba’th 

Under Saddam Hussein, the “vision” that guided Iraq was that of a unified state that was 

part—indeed, a leader—of the Arab world. It was seen as relatively secular and modern, emphasized economic development and the acquisition of technology, and stressed 

independence from foreign influence and control. A degree of Kurdish separatism was 

acknowledged in an autonomous region in the north, but central government control of 

the region was firm. 

Even under Saddam, by the 1990s this vision no longer conformed to reality. The Kurds 

in the north were developing their own separate institutions, virtually free from central 

government control. The bulk of the Shi’ah population in the south was suppressed and 

alienated. Foreign powers, mainly the United States and the United Kingdom, had greatly 

curtailed Iraq’s independence, through sanctions, control over vast stretches of its air 

space, and weapons inspections, and the government itself did not adequately represent 

Iraq. Dominated by Arab Sunnis from Iraq’s Sunni Triangle and by Saddam’s family and 

clan, the regime relegated educated professionals in the Ba’th party to secondary positions. But despite the reality, the vision persisted among those who were part of the 

regime, including much of its educated middle class, indicating the power of rhetoric 

to influence hopes for the future. The idea of a unified, independent, modern, relatively 

secular Iraq, which was part of the Arab world, was an integral part of the vision or 

mind-set of most of the apparatus that served the Ba’th regime. This was especially true 

for the Sunni population, although some middle-class Shi’ah also agreed. It is certainly a 

view that informs much of the insurgency, and it is the bedrock of the Arab Sunni parties 

and groups that ran in the December elections. Among those removed from power, it is a 

vision that appears to be dying hard. 

Whether the leaders appointed 

to Iraq’s new government will 

compromise in ways that enable 

Iraq to step back from this ethnic and sectarian divide is the 

big question for the future.

Evidence suggests that the 

underlying ethnic and sectarian 

differences have now become 

powerful, mobilizing forces in an 

environment where politics and 

the political process are primary.
14

The new leadership that has come to power in Iraq since 2003—and, more particularly, 

since the elections of 2005—has not only a different background but a different outlook. 

Political activity (mainly opposition to the former regime) and party affiliation have been 

the new guard’s defining characteristics. Among this group, however, no unified vision of 

the new Iraq has emerged. Rather, there are different and increasingly divergent visions. 

Parties that could be characterized as secular, liberal, centrist, and, above all, having a 

stronger national identity are weak and have done poorly in Iraq’s national elections. In 

fact, the combination of the political process, itself involving intense competition for 

political power, a system that rewards political organization and mass mobilization, and 

a vicious insurgency has polarized political leaders around more primordial orientations, 

especially ethnic and sectarian identity. Increasingly, parties are focusing on communal 

identity rather than on programs or interests. As we have seen, this tendency was even 

more pronounced in the December election than in January. The divergent visions for 

Iraq have likewise become more pronounced. While democracy, however defined, is still 

a shared hope, and there is some overlap of aspirations, a pattern of different emphasis 

by different groups emerges. This is borne out in interviews with about forty leaders in 

the new 2005 government (many of them reelected in December) about their hopes and 

desires for the future of Iraq.

The Kurds

The Kurdish leaders have the clearest vision of where they want to go—not surprisingly, 

since Kurdish leaders have had over a decade of self-rule and practice in governing in 

which to define their goals and work toward them. On the critical issue of identity, there 

is near unanimity in defining Kurdish identity as paramount. This is particularly true of a 

younger generation of leaders, taught in Kurdish rather than Arabic, who have spent their 

critical formative years isolated from “Arab” Iraq. It is less true of an older generation of 

Kurds, who went to school in Baghdad and Mosul, know Arabic, and are more pragmatic 

about the prospects for independence in the near or intermediate future. Among these 

older Kurdish leaders there is a strong secondary Iraqi identity, but that identification is 

conditioned by the nature of the newly emerging state. This new state must be democratic 

and inclusive, and Kurds must be able to play a pivotal role within it. Otherwise, the 

impetus to separatism will grow.

Not surprisingly, on the issue of Iraq’s political structure and the kind of “democracy” 

the Kurds would like to see, the concept of federalism dominates. Kurdish leaders, whose 

views are enshrined in the new constitution, want something more akin to confederation: 

a strong regional government that deals with other Iraqi regions and groups on an equal 

basis. Kurdish leaders are focused on consolidating Kurdish rule in the north and extending it to cities and towns considered to have a Kurdish majority, notably Kirkuk. In short, 

Kurds want a federal structure that allows them to keep much of the self-government they 

already have. Within their own region, however, visions of the future are more diverse. 

Minorities (Turkmen, Christians) have mixed feelings about domination by Kurdish nationalist parties. So, too, do smaller Kurdish parties, such as the Kurdish Islamic Union (KIU) 

and the Kurdish Socialist Party, and a younger generation of Kurds is dissatisfied with the 

absence of real democracy and with the iron grip of two parties on their region. Hence, 

the leadership of the two Kurdish parties, who are more moderate on the Iraqi scene, face 

real dissatisfaction from below with their own governance in the north. More democracy 

and freedom is the chief goal of these groups.

The current Kurdish leadership is predominantly secular and believes in a separation of 

mosque and state. This is clearest in the case of the PUK (with its past leftist orientation), 

but it is also true of the more socially conservative KDP. But Islamist parties and influence, 

though moderate in tone, are gaining in the Kurdish region, and they are more committed 

to an Islamic society. The Kurdish Islamic Union (KIU), which established an independent 

presence in the National Assembly, is a good example. The current Kurdish leadership is 

The Kurdish leaders have the 

clearest vision of where they 

want to go—not surprisingly, 

since Kurdish leaders have had 

over a decade of self-rule and 

practice in governing in which 

to define their goals and work 

toward them.

Increasingly, parties are focusing on communal identity rather 

than on programs or interests. 

This tendency was even more 

pronounced in the December 

election than in January.

The current Kurdish leadership is 

also the most pro-American, proWestern group in the country.
15

also the most pro-American, pro-Western group in the country, partly because of Western 

protection of the Kurds since 1991, but also because of continuing contacts between 

Kurds and Western leadership. The Kurdish leaders, alone among Iraqis, would like a 

continuation of the American military presence in Iraq. Kurdish leaders are skeptical of 

their neighbors, especially Iran and Turkey, but Turkey is now viewed as a country whose 

traditional hostility to Kurdish self-rule can be modified by EU pressure. Relations with the 

Arab world are seen as troubling because of Arab reluctance to accept the newly emerging 

order in Iraq, especially Kurdish aspirations for a decentralized Iraq.

Shi’ah Leaders

The views of Shi’ah leaders are more diverse. As indicated, most of the Shi’ah leadership 

(particularly the dominant Da’wah and SCIRI parties) is new to national politics; thus, 

there is less unanimity in views. Nonetheless, among leaders interviewed, certain themes 

have emerged.

Among virtually all Shi’ah leaders, the primary political identity is Iraqi, but their 

sense of nationalism, from which they suffered under Saddam, is weak. A strong secondary identity is that of being Shi’ah (and a majority in Iraq), but that identity is not yet 

strong enough to pull them toward separatism. But as the insurgency brutally targets 

Shi’ah, and as a successful model of Kurdish separatism grows and is “taken for granted,” 

Shi’ah separatism is growing. Among the Shi’ah, Arabism and tribal ties are sometimes 

competing identities, but they do not yet override Iraqi identity. But identification with 

a cohesive Iraqi state is not what drives most new Shi’ah leaders; rather, the driving 

forces are religion and, to a lesser extent, reform of society. Shi’ah leaders assume the 

continued existence of Iraq but want to make its chief orientation Islamic. The nature of 

this Islam has not yet been clearly defined. Since 95 percent of Iraqis are Muslim, they 

may assume that this would be a unifying factor. But in fact, differences in interpretation 

and practice—as well as in communal identity—between Sunnis and Shi’ah could prove 

divisive. Indeed, they already are. So, too, could the fact that many Iraqis, Shi’ah and 

Sunni alike, are more secular and may reject an Islamized society. None of the leaders 

interviewed was inclined toward compelling Islamic compliance; rather, they hoped to 

accomplish this Islamization through persuasion. Nonetheless, in the end, a more Islamic 

Iraq was their vision.

On the question of Iraq’s new political structure, the Shi’ah leadership does not yet 

have a cohesive view, but certain strands of thought continually surface. There is a strong 

desire for a reformed and more democratic society, not surprising from a community that 

has suffered repression. But most leaders revealed an instinctive distrust of a strong state; 

they do not want to resurrect an authoritarian power at the center of government. Rather 

than thinking in terms of the state, they are thinking in terms of society. Thus, many 

will look favorably on a decentralized government with considerable checks and balances 

against authority. On this they may find agreement with the Kurds on strong regional 

government and a weak center. Federalism has gotten more attention, and one leader, Abd 

al-Aziz Hakim, has suggested the formation of a nine-province Shi’ah region in the south, 

similar to that of the Kurds in the north. But this is not a unified Shi’ah position, and 

it faces some opposition, especially among Sadrists and some Da’wah. Shi’ah also favor 

elections, which they expect to benefit them as a majority, and a strong parliament. But 

their leadership also faces the dilemma that a weak central government cannot confront 

an insurgency or deliver services, which many constituents seem to want. So far, however, 

Shi’ah leadership does not have a strong sense of direction on governance. On the role of 

religion and clerics in the state, there are also divergences among the Shi’ah, with some 

wanting a stronger clerical role than others.

On the critical issue of relations with the United States and its allies, Shi’ah politicians 

showed considerable pragmatism. Few like the occupation or the way in which power has 

been exercised, nor do they see occupation as a long-term solution. But most recognize 

As the insurgency brutally targets 

Shi’ah, and as a successful model 

of Kurdish separatism grows and is 

“taken for granted,” Shi’ah separatism is growing.

Federalism has gotten more 

attention, and one leader, Abd 

al-Aziz Hakim, has suggested 

the formation of a nine-province 

Shi’ah region in the south. 
16

the need for continuing U.S. support if they are to maintain power, create a new governing structure, and take on the insurgency themselves. Hostility is high toward many of 

Iraq’s Arab Sunni neighbors, suspected of helping the Sunni insurgents. There is ambiguity 

toward Iran, from which many Shi’ah leaders also draw support. While some Iraqi Shi’ah 

leaders have strong ties with Iran, within Iraq Iranian ties are still seen as a liability. 

Among Shi’ah leadership a divide has developed between senior leaders, many of whom 

spent time in Iran, and those who stayed behind in Iraq and are therefore more Iraqi in 

their loyalties. Those in the Sadrist movement most clearly make this distinction. Sadrists 

are also more anti-Western.

One rather surprising element in interviews with all new government leaders was their 

lack of emphasis on economics. Economic development did not appear to be a paramount 

concern. Although all leaders gave lip service to economic development and jobs, none 

put it at the top of their priorities. At local levels, however, all evidence (anecdotal and 

polling) indicates that the population does put these issues first. Their vision of Iraq is 

one in which they have security, jobs, and services such as electricity and water. This 

indicates a disconnection between the political leaders at the national level and their 

constituents. It also seems to demonstrate the primacy of politics in the new Iraq—one 

outcome of the focus on elections, a redistribution of power, and establishing a new 

constitutional order. 

The Iraqi-oriented centrist parties are losing ground, but their vision is fairly clear. They 

have an Iraqi identity (indicated by the name of the list on which they ran in December: 

the Iraqi List). They are also more secular and more willing to reach across sectarian and 

ethnic lines for alliances in running for office. They fear sectarian politics and separatism 

and want a unified Iraq. They also favor a relatively strong, although not authoritarian, 

central government. Most are Western oriented and favor continued cooperation with the 

United States. But the problem for these parties is that their more Iraqi-centered, secular 

vision, to judge by their weak showing in both elections of 2005, has difficulty in mobilizing mass support and is being squeezed out of power. 

A clear Sunni vision for Iraq has yet to be articulated, but the Sunni political groups 

that ran in the December election and won seats in parliament best represent the views 

of the Sunni mainstream now reentering the political process. To judge from the campaign 

rhetoric, they are strongly committed to an Iraqi—and an Arab—identity, with a varying 

mixture of both. Of all Iraq’s communities, the Sunnis are the strongest nationalists, seeking a unified, independent Iraq. Overwhelmingly, they put their emphasis on freedom from 

foreign influence and control, and an end to occupation. Whether secular or religious, 

they see a unified Iraq, with a strong central government as their chief goal, indicating 

that they would like a modification of federalism. They run the gamut on views of Islam, 

from those who are thoroughly secular—especially the ex-Ba’thists—to those who want 

an Islamic state (the Iraqi Islamic Party). In this they mirror the Shi’ah community, 

although their community is probably more tilted in the secular direction. They are deeply 

suspicious of the Iranian orientation of Shi’ah leaders and favor keeping Iraq’s Arab identity and its role as an Arab state. However, despite these nationalist tendencies, in Iraq’s 

new political environment they are increasingly identifying as Sunnis and as a persecuted 

and marginalized minority—an entirely new phenomenon for them. How deeply rooted 

this new communal identity becomes will depend on how much of their emerging vision 

can be accommodated in the new Iraq.

Preliminary data indicate that cross-cutting issues and values among Iraq’s leaders 

are not strong, although some do exist. Iraqi leaders will have to work hard to find 

a new vision around which most Iraqis can willingly coalesce and cooperate, but the 

concept of a unified Iraq, which finds expression for Iraq’s cultural and ethnic diversity, still has a chance of success. It will require new thinking and a new vision, as 

well as healing among Iraq’s communities. Otherwise, the disparate views and visions 

expressed here will harden, and Iraq’s fragmentation—in fact if not in name—may occur. 

Among Shi’ah leadership a divide 

has developed between senior 

leaders, many of whom spent time 

in Iran, and those who stayed 

behind in Iraq and are therefore 

more Iraqi in their loyalties.

The problem for these parties is 

that their more Iraqi-centered, 

secular vision, to judge by their 

weak showing in both elections 

of 2005, has difficulty in mobilizing mass support and is being 

squeezed out of power. 

Of all Iraq’s communities, the Sunnis are the strongest nationalists, 

seeking a unified, independent 

Iraq. Overwhelmingly, they put 

their emphasis on freedom from 

foreign influence and control, and 

an end to occupation. 
17

Helping Iraqis to coalesce rather than fracture will be difficult but should be the main aim 

of U.S. policy over the next phase of Iraq’s transition.

Conclusion and Recommendations

This study shows that while ethnic and sectarian identities have been an important underlying feature of the Iraqi polity in the past, the new political process is sharpening these 

sentiments by mobilizing them for votes. Iraq under Saddam was a political monolith, 

with a huge imbalance in power among ethnic and sectarian groups. Sunnis from the Triangle predominated, with almost no Kurds in power in the central government, and with 

Shi’ah greatly underrepresented. Today the ethnic and sectarian balance in power very 

closely represents the balance in the country. But the politicization of ethnic and sectarian divisions has never been so severe. The political groups ousted from power, mainly 

Sunni ex-Ba’thists, now joined by religious jihadists, have fomented a determined and 

destructive insurgency, not just against the United States but against the new leadership 

as well, which has bitterly divided communities. Meanwhile, in the race for power in the 

new electoral process, leaders of political parties have used appeal to ethnic and religious 

sentiments to mobilize mass constituencies, playing on communal identity to win elections. But the process, and the conflicting visions of these parties, makes it difficult to 

compromise once power is achieved, while the insurgency makes it even more difficult to 

bring ex-Ba’thists and Sunnis back into the process.

The intense focus on the political process (three elections in one year; drafting of 

a constitution in a few months) has absorbed virtually all the energy and attention of 

emerging new leaders, distracting them from concentrating on other essential areas, 

such as economic development and delivery of services. Interviews conducted for this 

study indicate that these aims do not have a high value for the new national leaders, 

or they assume that such tasks will be left for “technocrats,” despite dissatisfaction of 

most constituents with their failure to deliver. But elections have not forced politicians 

to pay a price for this lapse; indeed, politics reign supreme. While this may be producing a new set of leaders in the short term, it is likely to exact a high price for Iraq and 

Iraqis over the long term. Fragmentation and overpoliticization are likely to continue to 

inhibit investment and economic development in Iraq, and with them the strengthening 

of Iraq’s educated middle class, on which the future of the country—as well as its democracy—depends. Indeed, economic development and a growing middle class are the factors 

most likely to undercut identity politics, by providing new avenues of mobility and new 

visions for the future. These problems and ways to overcome them need to be addressed 

and confronted by Iraqis themselves before the situation becomes irreversible.

What, if anything, can be done? 

While the United States has diminishing influence in Iraq as new Iraqi leadership takes 

charge of the country, the United States can exercise its remaining leverage to help Iraq 

gradually walk back from the recent political polarization, and help put a floor under the 

slide toward ethnic and sectarian fragmentation. There are several steps that would be 

helpful:

1. Help refocus the attention of Iraqi politicians on economic issues, which not only are 

critical to development but also cut across ethnic and sectarian divides and will produce 

alternative visions for Iraq’s future.

•	 First, encourage Iraqis to formulate a new oil law that is national in scope, 

encourages foreign investment in Iraq’s dilapidated oil infrastructure, and gives 

all of Iraq’s citizens and communities a stake in its oil resources, or assured distribution of its benefits on an equitable basis. Such legislation should be the new 

government’s first order of business. How this issue is dealt with will define the 

Helping Iraqis to coalesce rather 

than fracture will be difficult 

but should be the main aim of 

U.S. policy over the next phase 

of Iraq’s transition.

The intense focus on the political 

process has absorbed virtually all the 

energy and attention of emerging new 

leaders, distracting them from concentrating on other essential areas, such 

as economic development and delivery 

of services.

Economic development and a 

growing middle class are the 

factors most likely to undercut 

identity politics, by providing 

new avenues of mobility and 

new visions for the future.
18

prospects for Iraq’s future unity. If “regional” interpretations of the new constitution go so far as to deprive the oil-poor Sunni region of Iraq of an equitable share 

of oil resources located mainly in Kurdish and Shi’ah areas, there will be little hope 

for ethnic and sectarian peace.

•	 Encourage the international community to provide the financial support it has 

promised and to devote these resources to projects that cut across ethnic and sectarian communities, rather than to those that reinforce divisions or are structured 

so that they benefit only one location or community. It should not be difficult to 

identify such projects and focus on them, making the point that economic development, not identity, will be rewarded.

•	 Focus on development in one or two mixed communities as a model for economic 

cooperation. Baghdad should be a focus of this activity.

2. In the short term, the United States should slow down the political process to allow 

politicians to absorb the changes that have taken place and to work out compromises. 

For example:

•	 Slow the process of regionalization, especially the creation of a new nine-province 

federal region in the south. This would give the new Sunni political leaders time to 

accommodate themselves to the concept of federalism and to come up with ideas 

of their own on decentralization.

•	 Postpone the proposed referendum on constitutional amendments slated for 2006, 

giving the Iraqis more time to work out differences. The interim period could be 

used to fill in the many legislative gaps in the constitution on which there is more 

agreement.

•	 Stop local ethnic and sectarian relocations in mixed-population areas where 

intimidation by political forces has occurred (especially south of Baghdad, in 

Diyala, and in Kirkuk), by providing better security in these areas. Mixed-ethnic 

and -sectarian communities must have protected space in which to interact, and 

this space must be expanded.

3. Encourage Iraqis to fix the political system that is producing this polarization. Actions 

that could be considered:

•	 Legislation to regulate political parties, making them more open and accessible to 

ordinary Iraqis. Three areas need attention: financing of political parties, transparency in the process of nomination, and a decoupling of parties from militias.

•	 Revision of the election law in ways that move it away from the single-list system 

(which seems to favor ethnic and sectarian identity) and focus more on district and 

local representation. Many different models and examples can be drawn on, but a 

system that encourages new leadership in local areas is likely to be less ideological 

and more oriented to satisfying constituent demands.

•	 Development of mechanisms to encourage new leadership at municipal, local, and 

provincial levels, where leaders appear to be more responsive to the economic and 

social needs of the population and less oriented toward ideology and identity.

4. The United States and its international partners need to refocus Iraq’s emerging leadership on an alternative vision for the future, one that encourages economic development, 

a stronger middle class, and communal tolerance. 

This is a long-term effort, which needs to be rooted in education and the public media, 

but a very necessary one. While Iraqis must take the lead—and a number are—the 

international community can encourage cross-cultural activities and attitudes by

•	 funding more robustly international exchanges of leaders and opinion makers;

•	 supporting Iraqi think tanks that explore different visions and policy options;

If “regional” interpretations of 

the new constitution go so far 

as to deprive the oil-poor Sunni 

region of Iraq of an equitable 

share of oil resources located 

mainly in Kurdish and Shi’ah 

areas, there will be little hope 

for ethnic and sectarian peace.

Mixed-ethnic and -sectarian communities must have protected 

space in which to interact, and 

this space must be expanded.

Three areas need attention: 

financing of political parties, 

transparency in the process of 

nomination, and a decoupling of 

parties from militias.
19

•	 working on social studies and humanities curricula, in schools and online, which 

encourage cross-cultural tolerance and differing visions of the future, at all levels 

from primary school through university;

•	 encouraging the establishment of an American University in Iraq, in an area accessible to all Iraqis and dedicated to teaching all communities;

•	 helping to establish “charter” or “model” schools that emphasize a modern, crosscultural curriculum that will turn out leaders with a new and different vision.

Notes

1. This group of eighteen not only made decisions but controlled the bureaucracy and the 

military through overlap of personnel and functions. For example, in 1998 the government 

consisted of a president, two vice presidents, and a cabinet. Of the twenty-three people who 

held these positions, seven were among the party’s top leaders, and four more were highranking party officials. In this study a wider group of leaders at the cabinet level has been 

used in the 1997–98 period for comparison with the post-Saddam period. The cohort group 

is thirty-six: eighteen top leaders and eighteen cabinet members—a small group compared 

with the post-2003 cohort.

2. One, Taha Yasin Ramadhan, was of Kurdish origin but was so Arabized that he considered 

himself an Arab.

3. Phebe Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, 2nd ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview, 2004), 310.
United States 

Institute of Peace

1200 17th Street NW

Washington, DC 20036

www.usip.org

An online edition of this and related 

reports can be found on our website 

(www.usip.org), together with additional 

information on the subject.

Of Related Interest

In the fall of 2003, Congress requested the United States Institute of Peace to provide 

assistance for peacebuilding initiatives under way in Iraq. The Institute’s work in this 

area complements many of its long-term programs and initiatives, including support for 

the rule of law in postconflict environments and transitional states, as reflected in recent 

publications that address these issues.

Recent Institute reports include

•	 Iran and Iraq: The Shia Connection, Soft Power, and the Nuclear Factor, by Geoffrey 

Kemp (Special Report 156, November 2005)

•	 Iraq’s Constitutional Process II: An Opportunity Lost, by Jonathon Morrow (Special 

Report 155, November 2005)

•	 Strategies for Promoting Democracy in Iraq, by Eric Davis (Special Report 153, October 

2005)

•	 The Coalition Provisional Authority’s Experience with Governance in Iraq: Lessons Identified, by Celeste J. Ward (Special Report 139, May 2005)

•	 The Coalition Provisional Authority’s Experience with Economic Reconstruction in Iraq: 

Lessons Identified, by Anne Ellen Henderson (Special Report 138, April 2005)

•	 Iraq’s Constitutional Process: Shaping a Vision for the Country’s Future (Special Report 

132, February 2005)

•	 Postconflict Iraq: A Race for Stability, Reconstruction, and Legitimacy, by Faleh A. Jabar 

(Special Report 120, May 2004)

•	 Islamist Politics in Iraq after Saddam Hussein, by Graham E. Fuller (Special Report 108, 

August 2003)