Filed 3/2/22

CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION1

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

BENJAMIN TZE-MAN CHUI, 

as Trustee, etc., et al.

Plaintiffs and Respondents,

v.

CHRISTINE CHUI, Individually 

and as Personal Representative, 

etc.,

Defendant and Appellant;

MICHAEL CHUI, a Minor, et al.,

Appellants;

ESTHER SHOU MAY CHUI 

CHAO et al.,

Respondents.

 B306918

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. BP154245)

1 Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rules 8.1105(b) and 

8.1110, this opinion is certified for publication with the exception 

of parts A, B.1, B.2, B.3, B.4, B.5, B.7, B.8, C.2, C.3, C.4, C.5, D, E.2,

and F of the Discussion.
2

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles 

County, David J. Cowan, Judge. Affirmed.

Bohm Wildish & Matsen and James G. Bohm for Defendant 

and Appellant Christine Chui.

Ambrosi & Doerges, Mary E. Doerges; Karcher Harmes and 

Kathryn Karcher for Appellant Michael Chui.

Law Offices of Michael S. Overing, Michael S. Overing and 

Edward C. Wilde for Appellant Jacqueline Chui.

Willkie Farr & Gallagher, Alex M. Weingarten, Eric J. 

Bakewell and Sean P. Hanle for Plaintiff and Respondent Benjamin 

Chui.

Glaser Weil Fink Howard Avchen & Shapiro, Miriam J. 

Golbert and James T. Grant for Plaintiff and Respondent Margaret

Tak-Ying Chui Lee.

Oldman, Cooley, Sallus, Birnberg, Coleman & Gold and 

Justin B. Gold for Respondent Esther Shou May Chui Chao.

Hinojosa & Forer, Jeffrey Forer and Shannon H. Burns for 

Respondent Jackson Chen.

McBride Law Group and Julia C. McBride for Respondents 

Helena Chang Chui and Ruth Chang.

________________________________

In proceedings under the Probate Code concerning the 

administration of a trust, the co-trustees and a beneficiary of the 

trust filed petitions under Probate Code section 8502 alleging that 

Christine Chui misappropriated trust assets and committed elder 

abuse against the trustor. On the day set for trial on the petitions, 

2 Unless otherwise indicated, all undesignated statutory

references are to the Probate Code.
3

the litigants settled and recited the terms before the court. The 

terms affecting Christine’s minor children—Jacqueline and 

Michael3—who are beneficiaries under the trust, were subject to 

the approval of their guardian ad litem, Jackson Chen, and the 

court. Chen, on behalf of the Minors, subsequently entered into 

an agreement with the co-trustees and certain trust beneficiaries, 

but not Christine (the first GAL agreement). The first GAL 

agreement recited Chen’s approval of the oral settlement agreement

and set forth additional terms.

Christine sought to cancel and repudiate the agreements

through a variety of procedural methods. The court granted the 

co-trustees’ motion to enforce the oral settlement agreement under 

Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6, but denied Chen’s petition 

for approval of the first GAL agreement. Chen, the co-trustees, 

and certain trust beneficiaries—but not Christine—subsequently 

entered into a second agreement (the second GAL agreement). 

Over Christine’s objections, the court granted Chen’s petition to 

approve that agreement. The court also denied Christine’s petition 

to remove Chen as the Minors’ guardian ad litem in the trust 

litigation and granted Chen’s petition to be appointed the Minors’ 

guardian ad litem in related probate cases.

Christine and the Minors appealed, challenging the orders 

(1) enforcing the oral settlement agreement; (2) granting Chen’s 

petition to approve the second GAL agreement; (3) appointing 

Chen as the Minors’ guardian ad litem in certain probate cases; 

3 Some of the parties have the same surname. To avoid 

confusion and to enhance the opinion’s readability, we will refer to 

the parties by their first names. We mean no disrespect. We will 

also refer to Jacqueline and Michael collectively at times as the 

Minors.
4

and (4) denying Christine’s motion to remove Chen as the Minors’ 

guardian ad litem. 

For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the court’s orders.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY

A. The Trust

King Wah Chui (King) and Chi May Chui (May) had three 

children: Robert, Margaret, and Esther.

Robert married Helena Chui in 1974. They had one child, 

Benjamin. Robert and Helena divorced in 2002.

Robert married Christine in March 2003. They had two 

children, Jacqueline (born March 2003) and Michael (born May 

2004).

In 1988, King and May established a revocable trust (the

Trust). The assets of the Trust consist primarily of interests in 

residential apartment complexes and related business entities, 

other real property, and financial accounts.

After May died in March 2004, the Trust was divided into 

three subtrusts: Trust A, Trust B, and Trust C.

4 Trust B and 

Trust C were irrevocable. Among the assets of Trust C are interests 

in properties the parties refer to as Taylor, Paularino, Domingo, 

Derek (or Pepperwood), and Calle Cristina.

5 According to the Trust 

document, these properties are to be distributed upon King’s death

4 We will refer to the Trust and the subtrusts collectively 

as the Trust unless a more specific reference to a subtrust is 

appropriate.

5 Consistent with the terms of the Trust and the parties’ 

understandings, our references to properties includes the Trust’s 

interests in partnerships and limited liability companies that hold 

real property. 
5

to Robert or, if Robert is not then living, to Robert’s children—

Benjamin, Jacqueline, and Michael—equally.

After May’s death, King amended Trust A several times.6

Under an amendment made in June 2004, interests in properties 

the parties refer to as Three Lanterns and Sycamore are to be 

distributed upon King’s death to Robert or, if Robert is not then 

living, to Christine; but if Christine is not then living, these 

properties are distributed to Michael.

Under an amendment made in January 2005, a certain 

residence in Monterey Park is to be given to Jacqueline.7

Under an amendment made in November 2005, property the 

parties refer to as Atlantic Towers is to be distributed upon King’s 

death to Robert or, if Robert is not then living, to Christine.8

In addition to the distributions described above, the Trust 

document provides for distributions of real properties, business 

interests, and money to Robert, Margaret, Esther, Benjamin, 

6 As a result of the amendments to Trust A, Robert’s 

share of the Trust assets allegedly increased from 36.6 percent 

to 69.7 percent. Benjamin alleged that King made these 

amendments as a result of Christine’s and Robert’s “psychological, 

emotional, and financial elder abuse on an increasingly demented 

and incapacitated King.”

7 Certain bequests are made to the trustees of trusts 

established for the benefit of Esther, Benjamin, or Jacqueline. 

Our references to bequests to such individuals includes bequests 

to the trustee of such trusts unless the more specific reference is 

appropriate. 

8 The Atlantic Towers property was sold in 2013. It appears 

from our record that proceeds of the sale have been held in a 

separate account of a limited partnership that remains a Trust 

asset. The parties’ references to Atlantic Towers appears to refer 

to the Trust’s interests in that limited partnership. 
6

Jacqueline, and Michael, among others. The Trust document 

includes other bequests that are not relevant for our purposes.

The Trust document further provides for the distribution 

of the Trust residue; that is, trust property for which there is 

no specific bequest. Under the residuary provisions, 30 percent 

of the residue goes to each of Robert, Margaret, and Esther, and 

10 percent goes to Benjamin; if, however, Robert predeceases King, 

Robert’s 30 percent share of the residue is distributed in equal parts 

to each of Robert’s children—Benjamin, Jacqueline, and Michael.

In February 2011, King, whose cognitive abilities had 

allegedly been in decline for some time, resigned as trustee of the 

Trust and, pursuant to the Trust document, Robert and Margaret

became co-trustees.

In January 2013, Robert became incapacitated and, in March 

2013, the superior court appointed Benjamin (Robert’s son by his 

first wife, Helena) to act as co-trustee of the Trust together with 

Margaret. (We will sometimes refer to Benjamin and Margaret 

collectively as the co-trustees.)

Robert died in June 2013.

King died in June 2014.

B. Trust Litigation

In October 2012 (prior to Robert’s and King’s deaths), 

Esther filed a petition in the Los Angeles Superior Court alleging 

that Robert and Margaret improperly delegated to Christine 

their fiduciary duties as trustees of the Trust. The petition was 

assigned case No. BP137413. Esther sought an accounting and an 

order removing Robert and Margaret as trustees.

In March 2013, Esther requested the appointment of a 

guardian ad litem for the Minors in Los Angeles Superior Court 

case No. BP137413. The court, over Christine’s objection, granted 
7

the request and appointed Chen as the Minors’ guardian ad litem. 

At that time, Jacqueline and Michael were ages 10 and 8, 

respectively.

In February 2014 (after Robert’s death and the appointment 

of Benjamin as co-trustee of the Trust), Esther filed an amended 

petition in case No. BP137413, alleging that Christine converted 

trust assets for her benefit. On the same day, Esther filed another 

amended petition under section 850 in the same case alleging 

that Benjamin and Margaret breached their fiduciary duties as 

co-trustees of the Trust.

In August 2015, Benjamin and Margaret filed a petition 

in case No. BP137413 for an order surcharging Robert’s estate

based on allegations that Robert breached his fiduciary duties 

as trustee “by making improper and unauthorized payments and 

disbursements of [t]rust assets.”

In July 2016, Benjamin filed a petition under section 850 in 

Los Angeles Superior Court case No. BP154245. Benjamin alleged, 

among other claims, that Robert and Christine committed elder 

financial abuse against King and, acting as trustee and/or trustee 

de son tort, breached their fiduciary duties and misappropriated 

trust assets—including money, jewelry, and antiques—for their own 

benefit. Benjamin sought compensatory, statutory, and punitive 

damages, an order requiring Christine to disgorge assets wrongfully 

taken from the Trust, and a determination that Christine be 

deemed to have predeceased King for purposes of section 259.

In October 2016, Christine filed petitions in Los Angeles 

Superior Court case No. BP155345 to remove Benjamin and 

Margaret as trustees of the Trust based on alleged breaches of

trust. Christine sought, among other relief, an order suspending

and removing Benjamin and Margaret as trustees and surcharging

them for losses to Trust A incurred as a result of their
8

mismanagement. Benjamin moved to dismiss the petition under 

the anti-SLAPP statute (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16). The court 

denied the motion on February 20, 2018.9

In August 2017, Margaret filed a “joinder” to Benjamin’s

petition in case No. BP154245. In March 2018, Benjamin and 

Margaret filed a first amended petition that alleged claims similar 

to those Benjamin alleged in the original petition and sought 

similar relief.

Esther filed another amended petition in January 2017 

under case No. BP155345. She alleged that King suffered 

from dementia since 2004 and was susceptible to undue influence 

since that time. Christine and Robert allegedly took advantage 

of King’s vulnerability to wrongfully transfer to themselves 

approximately $10 million of trust assets. Esther sought, among 

other relief, an order that Christine return the property taken from 

the Trust and pay double damages pursuant to section 859. She 

also sought an order determining that Christine predeceased King 

for purposes of section 259.

In addition to the Trust litigation in case Nos. BP137413, 

BP154245, and BP155345 described above, at least five other 

probate court proceedings have been deemed related to these 

cases. Although the substance and status of these related cases 

are not entirely apparent from our record, they have been identified 

(and summarily described) as Los Angeles Superior Court case 

No. BP143884 (concerning Robert’s estate); case No. BP145642

(concerning Robert and Helena’s irrevocable life insurance trust

9 Benjamin appealed that order to this court, which we 

assigned case No. B288425. On January 29, 2020, we ordered the 

appeal stayed “pending determination of the proceedings before the 

probate court.” 
9

(ILIT)); case No. BP145759 (concerning the guardianship of the 

Minors); case No. BC544149 (concerning litigation regarding 

Robert’s estate); and case No. BP162717 (concerning the King 

Chui and Chi May Chui life insurance trust).

10

In 2014, the court appointed Christine as guardian of the 

estates of Jacqueline and Michael in case No. BP145759 and

guardian ad litem for the Minors in case No. BP145642 (concerning 

the ILIT litigation).

It does not appear that, prior to March 3, 2020, any guardian 

ad litem had been formally appointed for the Minors other than 

Chen in case No. BP137413 and Christine in the ILIT litigation, 

case No. BP145759.11

C. The Settlement Agreement

Trial in the Trust litigation was set to begin on May 14, 

2018.

12 That day, counsel for Christine, Benjamin, Margaret, and

Esther announced a settlement (the settlement agreement) in court

and orally set forth the terms on the record in accordance with Code 

of Civil Procedure section 664.6. Guardian ad litem Chen was not 

present and the Minors were not represented in the proceeding.

10 The parties also refer to Los Angeles Superior Court case 

No. BP16STP04524, which is apparently concerned with Robert’s 

separate property trust, although it does not appear that a court 

has deemed that case related to the others.

11 In March 2020, the court expressed its view that the 

failure to appoint Chen in “several other cases” that had been 

deemed related was the result of the court’s “oversight” and an 

“administrative defect,” which it then “cur[ed]” by appointing 

Chen as guardian ad litem in several of the related cases.

12 It is not clear from our record which cases were the subject 

of the trial that was scheduled to begin on May 14, 2018.
10

Christine’s counsel recited the following settlement terms on 

the record:

(1) Christine “waives all rights to Trust A, including but not 

limited to claims regarding Three Lanterns, Sycamore, and Atlantic 

Towers. Such interest goes to the residue.”

(2) Benjamin’s interest in “Taylor, Derek, and Paularino are 

disclaimed to the Minor[s],” and the Minors and Christine “disclaim 

their beneficial interest in Domingo” to Benjamin.

The property known as “Calle Cristina will be sold, and 

two-thirds of the net proceeds will go to Ben[jamin], and the 

remaining one-third will go to the minor children’s trusts.”

“The parties consent to the sale of [property known as] 

Hellman for fair market value, and shall cooperate as needed.”13

(3) Christine will deliver to Benjamin’s lawyers certain 

jewelry and other items of personalty within one week.

(4) Christine will pay $3 million to Benjamin’s counsel’s trust 

account within one week.

(5) The property to be distributed to Jacqueline and Michael

under the Trust “will be distributed to their respective irrevocable 

trusts that were established by King, Robert[,] and Christine.”

(6) “Christine disclaims any rights as a beneficiary of King’s 

trusts. The minor children’s claims, if any, can only be brought 

by their guardian ad litem Jackson Chen, his designee, or his 

court-appointed successor, until such time as they reach the age 

of majority.”

(7) Christine’s appeal in the ILIT case and Benjamin’s appeal 

from the order denying his anti-SLAPP motion will be dismissed

with prejudice, each side bearing their own costs and attorney fees.

13 The Hellman property was not the subject of a specific 

bequest in the Trust and was considered part of the Trust residue.
11

(8) Benjamin “disclaims any further interest or rights or 

standing in Robert’s trust, with the exception of the Domingo 

property.” “All litigation between the parties . . . will be dismissed, 

with each side to bear their own costs and attorney fees.” No one 

admits liability and all parties “agree to a waiver of Civil Code 

section 1542.”

(9) “[A]ll provisions of this agreement affecting the Minors’ 

interests and rights are subject to approval by the guardian 

ad litem.”

(10) “[T]he parties shall work together to cause the Trust 

to be amended to effectuate the settlement with the resulting tax 

treatment that is fair and equitable to all parties.”

(11) “[A]ll objections to any accountings are dismissed with 

prejudice, and all parties waive rights to future accountings.”

(12) The parties shall “prepare a long form agreement, with 

all disputes regarding the long form agreement to be resolved by” 

a specified judge “via a binding arbitration.”

The court confirmed with counsel that the agreement would 

be enforceable under Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6.

After Christine’s counsel recited the foregoing terms, counsel 

for Benjamin announced that “there are other terms that are not 

material to the agreement with Christine that have been reached 

as and among all the other parties.” He proposed to read these 

additional terms into the record after the court has questioned 

the parties about the agreement. The court then asked Christine, 

Benjamin, Margaret, and Esther if they heard and understood 

the terms of the agreement, if they had had enough time to speak 

to their lawyers about the terms, and if they agreed to the terms.

Each answered the questions affirmatively.

The court concluded that, “subject to, with the exception of 

Mr. Chen on behalf of the two minor children, everybody appears 
12

to have agreed to these terms, and the court can, with that 

one exception, assuming they agree, find that there’s a binding 

settlement of all issues, and all petitions will be disposed of per 

the agreement.”

Benjamin’s counsel then indicated he wanted to place the 

additional terms on the record. Christine’s counsel asked if they 

“need[ed] to stay.” The court suggested that they “stay, just in 

case,” but told counsel, “[Y]ou can leave if you want.” Christine’s 

counsel responded, “Let’s leave.” Christine and her counsel then 

left the courtroom.

Benjamin’s counsel then recited the following additional

terms: Esther will receive the $3 million that Christine agreed 

to deliver to Benjamin’s lawyers; Helena Chui (Robert’s first 

wife and Benjamin’s mother) and Ruth Chang (Helena’s mother) 

will exercise a right to purchase the Sycamore property “at book 

value”; Esther has a right of first refusal on any offer for the 

Three Lanterns property without commission; and Margaret will 

have the authority to assign family burial plots. Lastly, a time 

limit established in the Trust that bars Esther from full access to 

her trust property shall be waived.

The court inquired of Esther, Margaret, Helena, and Ruth 

as to their understanding and acceptance of the terms and their 

opportunity to speak with counsel, and received affirmative 

responses from each. The court then found that “there’s another 

binding agreement between the parties enforceable under [Code of 

Civil Procedure section] 664.6.”

Within one week after the settlement agreement was placed 

on the record, Christine delivered to Benjamin’s counsel $3 million

and certain jewelry, in accordance with the agreement.
13

D. The First GAL Agreement

On July 5, 2018, Christine filed a motion to set aside the 

settlement agreement, asserting that her consent to the settlement 

“was legally invalid because she was under the influence of codeine, 

as well as ill and sleep-deprived.” She further asserted that the 

settlement agreement is “unconscionable.” The court denied 

Christine’s motion without prejudice as procedurally improper.14

On July 23, 2018, Chen, pursuant to a request from the court,

provided a report to the court in which he referred to a “long-form”

“draft ‘Settlement Agreement and Mutual Release,’ ” which 

Benjamin’s counsel had circulated. Chen informed the court: 

“At the present time, with the long-form agreement as drafted, I 

do not believe that the proposed settlement is in the best interests 

of the Minors and I am unable to sign the agreement.” He made 

the following comments: (1) The $3 million Christine paid to 

Benjamin’s counsel’s trust account should be deposited in the 

Trust to be applied to estate taxes and administration expenses; 

(2) He could not agree to “broad releases, including a waiver 

of Civil Code [s]ection 1542”; (3) He has “substantial concerns” 

regarding the distribution of property into the Minors’ trusts, 

which “are not supervised by the [c]ourt” and would extend the 

time the distributions are held in trust “to the detriment of the 

Minors”; (4) He would not agree to the approval of trust accountings 

or to waive the Minors’ rights to future accountings; and (5) The 

provision giving the guardian ad litem the power to bring claims 

14 The court denied the motion to vacate the settlement 

because “there was no such thing as a motion to vacate an 

agreement. You either file a complaint to vacate an agreement . . . 

or perhaps you bring a petition in probate court parallel to a 

complaint to vacate an agreement.”
14

on behalf of the Minors should be limited to matters connected 

to proceedings in which a guardian ad litem is appointed. Chen 

concluded that he “will insist on certain changes to the long-form 

agreement before” he agrees to sign it.

On August 10, 2018, Benjamin, Margaret, Esther, and 

Chen entered into the first GAL agreement, which recites 

that Chen “agrees to the terms of the Settlement Agreement 

subject to this Agreement.” The first GAL agreement included, 

among other provisions, an agreement that the Minors will each 

receive $500,000 out of the $3 million Christine had delivered 

to Benjamin’s counsel. The agreement further provides that the 

guardian ad litem’s waiver of rights under Civil Code section 1542 

is limited to matters pertaining to the Trust and that, although

Chen agrees to withdraw any objection to previously filed petitions 

for accountings, he “retains the right to request future accountings.”

Christine is not named as a party to the first GAL agreement, 

and she did not sign it. 

E. Motion to Enforce the Settlement Agreement

On August 15, 2018, Benjamin and Margaret filed a motion 

to enforce the settlement agreement under Code of Civil Procedure 

section 664.6. The motion was supported in part by Chen’s 

declaration in which he states that he believes the first GAL 

agreement “did not change the material terms of the settlement

agreed to by the other parties.” The settlement agreement, 

he stated, “is in the best interest of the [M]inors and the other 

beneficiaries of the . . . Trust.” In a supplemental declaration, 

he stated that he “never rejected the May 14, 2018 [s]ettlement,” 

and he had “agreed to the settlement on behalf of the [M]inors on 

August 10, 2018.”
15

Christine filed an opposition to the motion and argued, 

among other arguments, that Chen’s July 23, 2018 report 

“amounted to a rejection of the offer set forth in the [settlement]

[a]greement,” and the first GAL agreement includes terms that

differ from the settlement terms.

On September 12, 2018, the court held a hearing on the 

motion and took the matter under submission. On September 17, 

the court issued a written ruling granting the motion. The court 

rejected Christine’s argument that the terms of the oral settlement 

agreement were changed by the first GAL agreement. The first 

GAL agreement, the court explained, “explicitly states Chen’s 

agreement to the terms of the settlement agreed to by the other 

parties on the record before the [c]ourt on May 14, 2018.” The 

court also rejected the argument that Chen’s July 23, 2018 report 

to the court constituted a rejection of the settlement agreement: 

“Chen never stated that he rejected the terms of the settlement”;

he “stated merely that he would not sign the proposed long form 

agreement as drafted.”

The court concluded by stating that “[t]he [settlement] 

agreement still remains subject to [c]ourt approval of the [M]inors’ 

compromise.”

In its order, the court noted that although “Chen was 

appointed initially as [guardian ad litem] in just one case, 

thereafter the parties stipulated that the pending petitions in 

all these related cases were to be tried together. The [c]ourt 

understood that [Chen] was [guardian ad litem] for all of these 

cases—as did Chen.” In that order, the court refers to the following 

cases as “related”: BP137413, BP143884, BP145642, BP145759, 

BP154245, BP155345, BP162717, and BC544149.

On September 27, 2018, Christine filed a motion for 

reconsideration of the order enforcing the settlement agreement.
16

She argued that she had been denied an evidentiary hearing and 

that the court erred in concluding that the agreement among other 

parties that the $3 million she had paid would be given to Esther 

was immaterial. She further argued that Chen’s July 23, 2018 

report constituted a rejection of the settlement “offer.”

Before that motion was heard, Christine filed a motion 

to vacate the order enforcing the agreement on the grounds:

(1) Two pending appeals in related cases deprived the court of 

jurisdiction to make the order enforcing the settlement agreement; 

(2) Christine, in her capacity as guardian ad litem for the Minors 

in the ILIT case and as guardian of the Minors’ estates, did not 

consent to the settlement agreement; (3) There was no meeting of 

the minds because Christine was mistaken as to material terms of 

the settlement agreement; (4) The settlement agreement was the 

result of extrinsic fraud or mistake; (5) The settlement agreement

is unconscionable and contrary to public policy; and (6) Christine’s 

mental condition at the time of the agreement was “impaired.”

On December 14, 2018, the court denied the motion for 

reconsideration and the motion to vacate the order enforcing the 

settlement agreement.

On December 17, 2018, Christine filed a petition in case 

No. BP154245 to set aside the settlement agreement, appoint 

an interim trustee to manage the Trust, and appoint herself as 

guardian ad litem for the Minors in place of Chen, among other 

relief. The court subsequently granted Benjamin’s anti-SLAPP 

motion and dismissed the petition.

15

15 Christine has appealed the order granting Benjamin’s 

anti-SLAPP motion to this court (case No. B301214). We stayed 

proceedings on appeal pending the outcome of the litigation 

regarding the settlement agreement.
17

In January 2019, the court entered its order enforcing the 

settlement agreement.

16

F. Chen’s Petition for Approval of the First GAL 

Agreement

On November 12, 2018, Chen filed a petition for an order 

approving the first GAL agreement. A trial on Chen’s petition took 

place in April and May 2019. After Chen rested his case, Christine 

made a motion for nonsuit, which the court treated as a motion for 

judgment under Code of Civil Procedure section 631.8.

On July 18, 2019, the court granted Christine’s motion and 

denied Chen’s petition for approval of the first GAL agreement.

Chen, the court stated, had not proven “that the agreement is in 

both or either of the [Minors’] best interests.” The court also issued 

an order to show cause (OSC) re removal of Benjamin and Margaret 

as co-trustees.

G. The Second GAL Agreement

On July 29, 2019, Benjamin and Margaret moved for 

reconsideration of the court’s order granting Christine’s motion 

for judgment. On August 22, Chen, Benjamin, and Margaret filed 

motions to reopen the trial. During the hearing on these motions 

in October 2019, the parties agreed to participate in a mediation.

16 Christine filed a notice of appeal from this order on 

March 5, 2019, which we assigned case No. B296150. In June 

2019, Benjamin filed a motion in this court to dismiss the appeal 

on the ground that the order was not an appealable order because 

the settlement agreement was subject to approval of the Minors’ 

compromise. On July 3, 2019, we granted Benjamin’s motion and 

dismissed the appeal “as premature.”
18

On December 5, 2019, Benjamin, Margaret, Chen, and 

Christine participated in a mediation. All participants other than 

Christine reached an agreement (the second GAL agreement).

At a status conference held on December 16, 2019, the court 

was informed of the second GAL agreement and ordered that the 

motions to reopen the trial and the motion for reconsideration of 

the order granting Christine’s motion for judgment were withdrawn 

as moot. The court explained that Chen’s petition for approval 

of the first GAL agreement was “denied with prejudice as to that 

agreement” and without prejudice to a motion for approval of “some 

revised [GAL] agreement.”

The second GAL agreement was memorialized in a writing

dated January 16, 2020, and signed by, among others, Benjamin 

and Margaret (in their individual capacities and as trustees of the 

Trust), Esther, Helena (Robert’s first wife), and Chen as the Minors’ 

guardian ad litem. Christine did not sign the document. 

The second GAL agreement incorporates the terms of 

the settlement agreement and states that the parties “agree to 

and approve the terms of the Settlement Agreement that affect 

Jacqueline and Michael, and except as expressly provided herein, 

nothing in [the second GAL agreement] modifies or eliminates any 

term of the [settlement].”

According to the second GAL agreement: Benjamin shall 

give to the Minors his interests in the Taylor, Derek, and Paularino 

properties and the Minors shall give to Benjamin their interests in 

the Domingo property; the Minors shall each receive $500,000 out 

of the $3 million Christine paid to Benjamin’s counsel under the 

settlement agreement and approximately $190,000 “from Insurance 
19

Trust #1”;17 Helena and Ruth shall pay $740,000 to each of the 

Minors for the Minors’ interests in Sycamore; the Calle Cristina 

property will be sold and one-third of the net proceeds “shall 

collectively be distributed” to the Minors “equally”; the Hellman 

property shall be sold and 10 percent of the net proceeds “shall 

collectively be distributed” to the Minors “equally”; Benjamin, 

Margaret, and Esther shall pay any estate tax liability attributable 

to the interests the Minors receive from the Trust; the Minors shall 

receive “a credit for their share of the [e]xpenses of [a]dministration 

[as defined] coupled with a complete and full distribution of their 

share of the Trust” and, as a result, they shall “have no further 

interest in the Trust and/or in the future accountings of the Trust”; 

the trustees shall pay any property taxes attributable to the Minors’ 

property interests in the Trust until the properties are distributed 

to them; “ ‘all objections to any accountings are dismissed with 

prejudice, and all parties waive rights to future accountings’ ”; 

the parties release the Minors from any liability for legal and 

administrative expenses attributable to the interests distributed 

under the second GAL agreement; and the parties waive their 

rights under Civil Code section 1542, provided that Chen’s waiver is 

limited to matters pertaining to the administration of and litigation 

relating to the Trust; the parties waive their right to object to 

approval of the second GAL agreement and to appeal from an order 

approving the agreement.

17 The Trust document does not refer to an “Insurance Trust,” 

and it is not clear from our record to what the phrase “Insurance 

Trust #1” refers. Its nature and the amount due the Minors under 

this trust, however, does not appear to be in dispute.
20

H. The Repudiations

On December 3, 2018, Christine filed a notice of repudiation 

of the settlement agreement and the first GAL agreement. 

Three days later, she filed an amended and supplemental notice 

of repudiation of the settlement agreement and the first GAL 

agreement. Christine purported to repudiate these agreements

in her capacity as parent and guardian of the Minors, guardian 

ad litem of the Minors with respect to the ILIT case, “and as a 

petitioner, respondent, and beneficiary of the . . . Trust.” According 

to Christine, the terms other parties agreed to after she left the 

courtroom on May 14, 2018 “resulted in material prejudice to 

the Minors.” She also relied on a declaration by an accountant

who opined that the settlement agreement resulted in a net loss 

to the Minors of $25,251,430. In addition, “she has reason to 

believe” the settlement agreement may have caused “as much as 

$100,000,000.00” in economic harm to the Minors.

In February 2019, Jacqueline (then 15 years old) filed an 

unverified notice of her repudiation of the settlement agreement

and the first GAL agreement. She states that she is repudiating 

the settlement agreement “on her own” “because it is not in her best 

interests,” it waives various rights and claims she holds, disclaims 

her interest in the Domingo property, “and in many ways leav[es]

her in a worse position than if Christine . . . had lost at trial.”

On December 26, 2019—after the parties to the second GAL 

agreement participated in the mediation that led to that agreement 

and before that agreement was memorialized in writing—Christine

filed a notice of repudiation of the second GAL agreement on the 

ground, among others, that the agreement was not in the best 

interest of the Minors. After the written second GAL agreement 

was executed, Christine filed a supplemental repudiation of the 

agreement. In each document, she stated she was acting as the 
21

parent and guardian ad litem for the Minors in the ILIT case, 

guardian of the Minors’ estates, trustee of Robert’s separate 

property trust, and the trustee of the Minors’ irrevocable trusts. 

According to Christine, the Minors “are far better off without” the 

second GAL agreement “by approximately $50 million” and, if the 

agreement is disapproved, the Minors “will reserve their rights and 

claims of $100 million against Esther,” Benjamin, and Margaret, as 

well as their “rights to accountings, and appeal.”

On January 31, 2020, Jacqueline (then 17 years old) 

and Michael (then 15 years old) signed and filed declarations 

repudiating the second GAL agreement. The Minors stated that 

Chen “has never met or spoken with [them]” during the preceding 

eight years and has assisted others in litigating against them 

and their interest. According to the Minors, the agreement also: 

“waives [their] substantial rights and claims including 8-year 

past due and future trust accountings”; “waives [their] substantial 

rights, interests, [and] claims of over $100 million against [others]”; 

and “waives [their] constitutional rights to appeal.” The Minors 

further stated that Chen has a conflict of interest by representing 

both of them.18

On February 27, 2020, the co-trustees filed a response to 

Christine’s purported repudiations. Among other points, they 

asserted that Christine does not have standing to repudiate the 

agreements in any capacity because Chen is the only person who 

can act for the Minors with respect to the Trust litigation, Christine 

has an irreconcilable conflict of interest with the Minors, and 

18 The court ultimately struck these declarations because 

they were not verified. The declarations were resubmitted in 

March 2020 with the Minors’ verifications.
22

Christine waived any rights to represent the Minors when she 

agreed to the settlement agreement.

I. The March 3, 2020 Consolidated Rulings

The day after the second GAL agreement was signed, Chen 

filed a petition for its approval and a petition to remove Christine 

as the Minors’ guardian ad litem in all related cases and to appoint 

Chen in her place. In response, Christine filed demurrers to each 

petition and a petition to remove Chen as guardian ad litem for the 

Minors.

19

On March 3, 2020, the court heard oral argument from 

counsel for Christine, Benjamin, Margaret, Esther, and Chen 

regarding the pending petitions and demurrers. At the conclusion 

of the hearing, the court issued a “consolidated ruling,” in which 

the court made the following rulings, among others: (1) The 

court overruled Christine’s demurrer to Chen’s petition to remove

Christine as guardian ad litem of the Minors and granted Chen’s 

petition, appointing him guardian ad litem of the Minors in 

Christine’s place in all related cases except the case concerned with 

19 On the same day, Christine, in her individual capacity 

and in her capacity as a fiduciary of Jacqueline and Michael, 

filed a petition under section 850 alleging, among other claims, 

that Benjamin, Margaret, and Esther had misappropriated 

trust property and tortiously interfered with Christine’s and 

the Minors’ expected inheritance. Among other relief, Christine 

sought: the return of property “wrongfully taken”; punitive 

damages; an order disinheriting Esther, Margaret, and Benjamin;

and the removal of Benjamin and Margaret as co-trustees of the 

Trust.
23

the guardianship of the estate of the Minors (case No. BP145759);

20

(2) The court denied without prejudice Christine’s petition for 

removal of Chen as the Minors’ guardian ad litem; and (3) The court 

overruled Christine’s demurrer to Chen’s petition for approval of 

the second GAL agreement and granted the petition. The court also 

discharged its OSC regarding removal of Benjamin and Margaret as 

co-trustees.

Initially, the court stated that the co-trustees and Christine 

lacked standing to challenge Chen’s petition for approval of the 

second GAL agreement. “Proceedings on a [guardian ad litem’s] 

[p]etition for [a]pproval,” the court explained, “are fundamentally 

between the [M]inors, the [guardian ad litem], and the [c]ourt—and

nobody else.” The court also rejected the need for an evidentiary 

hearing because “proceedings on a [p]etition for [a]pproval are 

generally non-adversarial in nature, as the proceeding is purely 

between the [c]ourt and its officer, the [guardian ad litem], to 

determine whether a proposed agreement is a good deal for the 

[M]inors.”

In evaluating the second GAL agreement, the court 

considered the Trust document and evidence of what the Minors

would receive under the second GAL agreement. The court noted 

that the second GAL agreement provided “substantially better 

economic terms for the Minors than the [first] GAL agreement,” 

which the court had rejected eight months earlier. In addition 

to greater economic benefits, the second GAL agreement also 

“disentangles the Minors’ assets from Ben[jamin]’s assets, 

substantially mitigating the possibility of future disputes.” 

20 The court subsequently corrected this order to the extent 

it appointed Chen as guardian ad litem in case No. BP145642, 

involving the ILIT.
24

Although the Minors were waiving their right to future accountings, 

the court determined that this waiver had no “negative effect” on 

the Minors because, as a result of the property exchanges between 

the Minors and Benjamin, and the co-trustees’ agreement to cover 

the Minors’ liabilities for estate taxes and trust expenses, the 

co-trustees “will no longer hold any of the Minors’ assets,” and “the 

Minors no longer had any financial interest in the Trust.”

The court approved of the second GAL agreement’s handling 

of Three Lanterns, Sycamore, and Atlantic Towers. The Minors 

would receive a total of $1,480,000 for their share, as residuary 

beneficiaries, of the Trust’s interest in the Sycamore property—an 

amount “corresponding to the Minors’ 20 [percent] interest in the 

[T]rust residue.” Three Lanterns will be sold to pay estate taxes

in accordance with the terms of the Trust document,

21 and the 

Minors’ share of that property’s value and the Atlantic Towers 

sale proceeds—equal to approximately $1.75 million—will, in effect, 

be exchanged for a “waiver” of the Minors’ $3.2 million share of 

estate taxes, producing “a net improvement of $1.45 million” for 

the Minors. The court expressly declined to consider “hypothetical 

trial results—where the evidence is unknown” and rejected

“[u]nnecessary speculation as to the outcome of a highly contested, 

lengthy and expensive trial,” which “would not clarify the merits of 

the [a]greement.”

In overruling Christine’s demurrer to Chen’s petition to 

remove Christine as guardian ad litem and her demurrer to Chen’s 

21 Pursuant to the 2008 amendment to the Trust, estate 

taxes attributable to the gifts made of Trust A property were to 

be paid from the residue of the Trust and from the Three Lanterns 

property. According to evidence submitted by the co-trustees, there 

were insufficient assets in the residue to pay all the taxes due. The 

sale of Three Lanterns was therefore necessary to pay the taxes.
25

petition for approval of the second GAL agreement, the court 

rejected Christine’s reliance on her and the Minors’ repudiations of 

the second GAL agreement. The repudiations filed by the Minors, 

the court explained, “are not legally operative documents, as they 

are unverified and not prepared by or with the Minors’ [guardian 

ad litem].” Because the Minors “have no legal authority to file 

repudiations without the representation of a guardian ad litem,”

the repudiations are “ineffective and improper.”

The court stated that although Christine, as the Minors’ 

parent, “would generally have a right to object or repudiate, she is 

precluded from doing so here because her objection is inconsistent 

with the Minors’ interest.” Moreover, “Christine has expressly 

waived her right to bring claims on the Minors’ behalf or object to 

the terms of the [second] GAL [a]greement” under the settlement 

agreement. The court struck Christine’s repudiations “as improper 

and irrelevant.”

In granting Chen’s petition to remove Christine as guardian 

ad litem and appointing Chen in her place in certain cases, the 

court found that Christine “waived her right to represent the 

Minors as their guardian for purposes of the settlement agreement” 

and that she has a conflict of interest arising “from her persistent 

opposition to any possibility of settlement,” which precludes 

“her from acting on the Minors’ behalf in this litigation.” The 

court further explained that, although the court had previously 

deemed the other cases related to the case in which Chen had been 

appointed guardian ad litem and had indicated to Chen that he 

should seek appointment in the related cases, Chen had not done so

“until now.” By extending his appointment of Chen as guardian 

ad litem to the other cases, the court stated that it was “remedying 

an administrative defect” and “curing its own oversight.”
26

In denying Christine’s petition to remove Chen as guardian 

ad litem, the court noted that Christine waived her right to seek 

Chen’s removal when she agreed that the Minors’ claims “ ‘can only 

be brought by their guardian ad litem[,] . . . Chen.’ ” Moreover, the 

court found that “there is no basis to remove Chen where he has 

successfully done his job by negotiating an approvable settlement 

for the Minors, leaving them far better off than they were under the 

[first] GAL [a]greement.”

On March 23, 2020, the court entered an order incorporating 

the March 3 rulings.

Christine filed a motion for reconsideration of the 

consolidated rulings on March 13, 2020, and a motion for new 

trial on March 27, 2020.

On April 28, 2020, the court denied Christine’s motion for 

a new trial. The court rejected Christine’s reliance on the Minors’ 

repudiations of the second GAL agreement because Christine 

lacked the authority to prepare and file the repudiations on the 

Minors’ behalf without Chen. Chen, the court explained, “must be 

involved in any [r]epudiations by the Minors.”

On June 24, 2020, the court granted Christine’s motion for

reconsideration of the court’s March 3, 3020 rulings with respect

to her removal as guardian ad litem in the ILIT case (case

No. BP145759), and otherwise denied the motion. On the same

date, the court entered an order: approving the second GAL

agreement; appointing Chen guardian ad litem of the Minors

in case Nos. BP145642, BP154245, BP162717, 16STPB04524, 

BC544149; denying without prejudice Christine’s petition to 

remove Chen as guardian ad litem; and discharging the OSC 

regarding removal of the co-trustees.
27

On July 23, 2020, Christine, Jacqueline, and Michael filed 

separate notices of appeal from the court’s orders issued on March 

3, 2020, April 28, 2020, and June 24, 2020. 

Chen filed a motion in this court to dismiss the appeals 

filed by Jacqueline and Michael. We summarily denied that 

motion on March 22, 2021. Christine, Jacqueline, and Michael—

each represented by separate counsel—thereafter filed separate 

appellant’s briefs. The co-trustees, Esther, and Chen filed 

respondent’s briefs.

DISCUSSION

A. The Effect of Pending Appeals on the Trial Court 

Proceedings

Christine and the Minors argue that the trial court lacked 

jurisdiction to make the challenged orders enforcing the settlement 

and approving of the second GAL agreement because appeals 

on other rulings were pending in this court.22 We reject this 

argument.

1. Background: The Pending Appeals

The pending appeals are case Nos. B286548, B288425, and 

B301214. Case No. B286548 is an appeal from a judgment in the 

22 Esther contends that we should not consider the appeals 

by Jacqueline and Michael because they were represented by 

a guardian ad litem, Chen. Esther argues that the Minors can 

speak through only “[o]ne [v]oice”—in this case, Chen’s—and there

cannot be a “second voice” speaking for the Minors on appeal,

even their own. As we explain below, even if we assume that the 

Minors may appeal, they have failed to establish prejudicial error. 

We do not, therefore, need to decide whether Chen’s trial court 

appointment as the Minors’ guardian ad litem precludes the Minors 

from challenging the court’s orders on appeal. 
28

ILIT litigation (L.A. Superior Court case No. BP145642) (the ILIT 

appeal). In that case, the trial court determined that Benjamin is 

the sole remainder beneficiary under Robert’s life insurance trust 

“and is entitled to . . . 100 [percent] distribution of the assets in the 

[trust].” The court entered a judgment in favor of Helena (Robert’s 

first wife) and Benjamin (Robert and Helena’s child) and against 

Christine (Robert’s second wife), in her capacity as guardian of the 

estates of Jacqueline and Michael (Robert and Christine’s children). 

Christine filed her notice of appeal in November 2017.

Under the settlement agreement reached in May 2018, 

Christine agreed to dismiss the ILIT appeal.

On February 21, 2019, we granted Benjamin’s motion to stay 

proceedings in the ILIT appeal pending resolution of Christine’s 

challenges to the settlement agreement and the second GAL

agreement. 

Case no. B288425 is an appeal by Benjamin from an 

order issued on February 20, 2018 (L.A. Superior Court case

No. BP155345) denying his anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss

Christine’s petition to remove Benjamin as a trustee of the Trust.

Benjamin filed his notice of appeal on February 23, 2018. Under 

the settlement agreement, Benjamin agreed to dismiss the appeal.

On January 29, 2020, we granted Benjamin’s motion to stay 

proceedings on appeal in case No. B288425 “pending determination 

of the proceedings before the probate court.”

Case No. B301214 is an appeal by Christine of an order 

issued on March 29, 2019 (L.A. Superior Court case No. BP154245)

granting Benjamin’s anti-SLAPP motion dismissing Christine’s 

petition to set aside the settlement agreement and for other relief.

On January 31, 2020, we granted Benjamin’s motion to stay 
29

proceedings on appeal in this case “pending determination of the 

proceedings before the probate court.”23

2. Discussion

Under section 1310, an appeal of a judgment or order in 

proceedings governed by the Probate Code generally “stays the 

operation and effect of the judgment or order.” (§ 1310, subd. (a).) 

The question is thus whether the statutory stay of the “operation 

and effect” of the judgment in the ILIT case and the anti-SLAPP 

orders precluded the court from ruling on the motion to enforce the 

settlement agreement and Chen’s petition to approve the second 

GAL agreement.

The purpose of the automatic stay under section 1310, like 

the automatic stay imposed in civil actions generally, “ ‘is to protect 

the appellate court’s jurisdiction by preserving the status quo 

until the appeal is decided. The [automatic stay] prevents the 

trial court from rendering an appeal futile by altering the appealed 

judgment or order by conducting other proceedings that may affect 

it.’ ” (Varian Medical Systems, Inc. v. Delfino (2005) 35 Cal.4th 

180, 189 (Varian) [discussing Code of Civil Procedure section 916, 

subdivision (a)].)

In considering the analogous Code of Civil Procedure section 

that generally imposes a stay of proceedings “in the trial court upon 

the judgment or order appealed from or upon the matters embraced 

therein or affected thereby” (Code Civ. Proc., § 916, subd. (a)), our 

Supreme Court has explained that the “fact that [a] postjudgment 

or postorder proceeding may render the appeal moot is not, by itself, 

23 We take judicial notice of the notices of appeal and our 

orders staying proceedings on appeal in case Nos. B286548, 

B288425, and B301214.
30

enough to establish that the proceeding . . . should be stayed.”

(Varian, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 189.) “Rather, something more is 

needed. For example, the trial court proceeding must directly or 

indirectly seek to ‘enforce, vacate or modify [the] appealed judgment 

or order.’ [Citation.] Or the proceeding must substantially 

interfere with the appellate court’s ability to conduct the appeal.” 

(Id. at pp. 189−190, fn. omitted.) A stay of trial court proceedings 

may also be required when “the possible outcomes on appeal and 

the actual or possible results of the proceeding are irreconcilable.” 

(Id. at p. 190.)

Here, the motion to enforce the settlement agreement and 

petition to approve the second GAL agreement had two possible 

outcomes with respect to the pending appeals: (1) the motion or 

petition (or both) would be denied, in which case the provisions in 

the settlement agreement requiring the dismissal of the ILIT and 

anti-SLAPP appeals would be ineffective, the ILIT judgment and 

anti-SLAPP orders would be unaffected, and the appeals would 

proceed as if there had been no settlement agreement; or (2) if the 

motion and petition were granted, the appeals would be dismissed 

pursuant to the settlement agreement. Under the first possible 

outcome, there would be no impact on the effect or operation of the 

ILIT judgment and the anti-SLAPP orders and no interference with 

our ability to conduct the appeals from such judgment and orders. 

Under the second possible outcome, although the dismissal of the 

appeals necessarily interferes with our ability to conduct those 

appeals, it is an interference that the law encourages. As our 

Supreme Court has explained, settlement and dismissal of cases 

on appeal are favored “because it will preclude the need for future

expenditures of time and money by the parties and the judiciary. 

Requiring parties to continue to litigate a matter over which there 

is no longer a real dispute ‘is wasteful of the resources of the 
31

judiciary.’ ” (Neary v. Regents of University of California (1992) 

3 Cal.4th 273, 277.) We therefore reject the argument that the 

pending ILIT and anti-SLAPP appeals had the effect of staying

the proceedings that are the subject of this appeal.

Christine further argues that Chen was required to bring 

his petition for approval of the second GAL agreement in this 

court. She relies on Anderson v. Latimer (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 667

(Anderson). In that case, a minor was injured in an auto accident 

and sued the drivers of the two cars involved. (Id. at p. 670.) A jury 

found in his favor and against each defendant, and judgment was 

entered thereon. The defendants appealed. While the appeal was 

pending, one of the defendants settled with the minor’s guardian 

ad litem. (Id. at p. 676.) The guardian ad litem filed a petition 

in the superior court for approval of the settlement. Based on the 

statutory requirement that a minors’ compromise be approved by

“the court in which the action or proceeding is pending” (Code Civ.

Proc., § 372, subd. (a)(1)), the Court of Appeal held that the superior 

court “lacked jurisdiction to address the petition”; the Court of 

Appeal “was the only court possessing jurisdiction to hear and 

determine whether to approve or disapprove the compromise.” 

(Anderson, supra, 166 Cal.App.3d at p. 676.)

The Anderson court’s analysis implies that the action or 

proceeding in that case was “pending” only in the Court of Appeal. 

A motion in a case in which an appeal is pending may go forward 

in the trial court, however, so long as the motion is not precluded 

by a stay put in place by statute or a court order. (See, e.g., Henry 

M. Lee Law Corp. v. Superior Court (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 1375, 

1383 [trial court can proceed on matters not stayed by appeal].) As 

to such postappeal motions, the action or proceeding continues to be 

“pending” in the trial court even while the appeal is pending in the 

Court of Appeal. As set forth above, the related appeals did not 
32

stay Chen’s petition for approval of the second GAL agreement in 

the trial court. Chen was not required, therefore, to file his petition 

in this court.

B. The Order Granting Motion to Enforce the 

Settlement Agreement

Christine and the Minors contend that the court erred 

in granting the co-trustees’ motion to enforce the settlement 

agreement because: (1) The court failed to hold an evidentiary 

hearing on the motion; (2) The agreement the court enforced 

contains terms to which Christine did not agree; (3) Christine did 

not agree that the money she paid to Benjamin’s counsel would be 

delivered to Esther; (4) The court failed to make a finding as to the 

meaning of “residue”; (5) Chen rejected the settlement agreement; 

(6) The agreement is unconscionable; (7) The court failed to consider 

“inseverability”; and (8) The agreement was the result of extrinsic 

fraud. We reject these arguments.

1. Failure to Hold an Evidentiary Hearing

In connection with the motion to enforce the settlement, the 

co-trustees (in support of the motion) and Christine (in opposition 

to the motion) submitted declarations and documentary evidence 

in support of their positions. The court held a hearing at which 

counsel for Christine and the co-trustees appeared and argued.

Chen also appeared as guardian ad litem for the Minors.

Christine contends that she was denied due process because

the court failed to hold a “full evidentiary hearing,” where she could 

present witness testimony. We agree with the trial court that, even 

if Christine had a right to present testimony at the hearing, she 

waived that right by failing to request an evidentiary hearing or to

seek to introduce evidence at the hearing on the motion.
33

Although Christine’s counsel indicated at the hearing that he 

had sought to present testimony and other evidence in connection 

with Christine’s earlier motion to set aside the settlement, that 

motion was not before the court when the motion to enforce the 

settlement was heard. The court had previously denied Christine’s 

motion to set aside the settlement without prejudice on the ground 

that it was procedurally improper, and Christine did not challenge 

that ruling. Christine does not refer us to any point in the record 

where she requested an evidentiary hearing or the right to present 

testimony during the motion to enforce the settlement. Therefore, 

even if she had a due process right to present evidence at that

hearing, she waived that right. 

Christine also relies on section 1022, which provides that 

“[a]n affidavit or verified petition shall be received as evidence 

when offered in an uncontested proceeding under this code.” Under 

this rule, “ ‘affidavits and verified petitions may not be considered 

as evidence at a contested probate hearing’ ” “ ‘when challenged 

in a lower court.’ ” (Estate of Bennett (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1303, 

1309.) When, however, “the parties did not object to the use of 

affidavits in evidence, and both parties adopted that means of 

supporting their positions” and “participated in such presentation of

the evidence as a matter of convenience . . . , they cannot question 

the propriety of the procedure on appeal.” (Estate of Fraysher 

(1956) 47 Cal.2d 131, 135; accord, Estate of Nicholas (1986) 177 

Cal.App.3d 1071, 1088; see McMillian v. Stroud (2008) 166 

Cal.App.4th 692, 704 [trial court did not err in failing to hold 

evidentiary hearing where appellants “neither expressly requested 

an evidentiary hearing . . . nor made an offer of proof establishing 

the necessity for a hearing”].) 

Here, both sides submitted and relied on declarations and 

documentary evidence to support their views and, although 
34

Christine filed objections to the moving parties’ evidence, she 

did not object to the use of declarations generally or rely on 

section 1022. She has therefore forfeited the argument on appeal. 

2. Alleged Changes to the Settlement Agreement

Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6 permits a court to 

“ ‘enter judgment pursuant to the terms of a settlement if the 

parties stipulate orally before the court or in writing to settle 

all or part of a case. [Citation.]’ ” (Leeman v. Adams Extract & 

Spice, LLC (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 1367, 1373–1374 (Leeman).) 

A settlement is enforceable under Code of Civil Procedure 

section 664.6 if some parties stipulate orally in court while 

others agree in writing. (See Elyaoudayan v. Hoffman (2003) 

104 Cal.App.4th 1421, 1432 [Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6 

allows “a ‘mix and match’ approach to the manner of agreement 

as long as all parties agree to the same material terms”]; accord, 

Critzer v. Enos (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1259.)

In ruling on a motion to enforce a settlement under Code of 

Civil Procedure section 664.6, “the court may interpret the terms 

of the parties’ settlement agreement” and decide “ ‘what terms the

parties themselves have previously agreed upon,’ ” but may not 

“ ‘create the material terms of a settlement.’ ” (Leeman, supra, 

236 Cal.App.4th at p. 1374, quoting Weddington Productions, Inc. v. 

Flick (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 793, 810 (Weddington Productions).) 

A new or altered term is material if “it changes the rights or duties 

of the parties, or [any] of them.” (Consolidated Loan Co. v. Harman

(1957) 150 Cal.App.2d 488, 491; see Humphreys v. Crane (1855) 

5 Cal. 173, 175 [a change that “does not vary the meaning, the 

nature, or subject matter, of the contract is immaterial”].) 

We review the court’s factual findings to determine if they

are supported by substantial evidence and review legal conclusions
35

de novo. (Weddington Productions, supra, 60 Cal.App.4th at p. 815; 

Connerly v. State Personnel Bd. (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1169, 1175.)

Christine contends that the “purported settlement” the court 

enforced “ ‘was different from the terms of the parties’ stipulated 

settlement agreement.’ ” She discusses 10 terms of the settlement 

agreement, which she argues were changed, and describes 15 terms 

that appear only in the second GAL agreement. Michael makes a 

similar argument, asserting that the agreement the court enforced 

included “30 modified and new terms.” More specifically, Michael 

lists 10 terms of the settlement agreement that were allegedly 

changed and 20 “new terms” that were added in the second GAL 

agreement.

Christine’s and Michael’s arguments improperly conflate the 

settlement agreement and the second GAL agreement. Although 

the second GAL agreement relates to the settlement agreement

and Chen’s approval of the settlement agreement is a condition to 

the effectiveness of the agreement, Christine is not a party to the 

second GAL agreement and that agreement does not impose any 

obligation on her or deprive her of any right or interest she acquired 

in the settlement agreement. Although the terms of the second 

GAL agreement are relevant to challenges to the court’s approval 

of the second GAL agreement (see Discussion part C, post), the 

purported 15 terms that Christine identifies and the 20 terms 

Michael identifies that were purportedly added in the second GAL

agreement in January 2020 are irrelevant to the issue whether 

the court erred in granting the motion to enforce the settlement 

agreement in September 2018.

As for the 10 terms that Christine and Michael contend the 

court had changed when it granted the motion to enforce the 

settlement agreement, a close examination reveals that the 

contentions are without merit. 
36

The first term of the settlement agreement is that Christine 

“waives all rights to Trust A, including but not limited to claims 

regarding Three Lanterns, Sycamore, and Atlantic Towers. Such 

interest goes to the residue.” According to Christine, under the 

agreement the court enforced, “Michael gets only $740,000 of the 

‘net fair market’ value of Sycamore” and “Atlantic Tower and 

Three Lanterns will be sold to pay for estate tax, and neither 

Minor receives anything from these properties.” The reference 

to Michael’s receipt of $740,000 is to language in the second GAL

agreement and does not appear in the court’s order enforcing the 

settlement agreement. Nor does that payment change or affect any 

of Christine’s rights or obligations under the settlement agreement. 

Michael contends that under the first term he “should receive 

Sycamore and Three Lanterns outright.” The first term, as recited 

by Christine’s counsel before the court, however, does not provide 

for Michael to receive any interest in Sycamore or Three Lanterns. 

Instead, Christine—the devisee of Sycamore and Three Lanterns

under the Trust document—expressly waived her interest in these 

properties and agreed that they would go “to the residue.”

Under the second term of the settlement agreement, the 

“parties consent to the sale of Hellman for fair market value, and 

shall cooperate as needed.” According to Christine and Michael, 

these terms were changed because Hellman is part of the Trust

residue and the Minors are 10 percent residual beneficiaries, yet 

the Minors “would each receive only [five percent] of the proceeds”

from the sale of Hellman. Christine and Michael again refer to 

the second GAL agreement for the allegedly changed term, not 

the order enforcing the agreement, which did not specify what, if 

anything, the Minors would receive from the sale of the Hellman

property. Moreover, Christine does not explain how the Minors’ 
37

receipt of five percent of the sale of Hellman affects any of her 

rights or obligations under the settlement agreement. 

Under the third term, certain jewelry and other items 

specified in discovery responses shall be provided to counsel for 

Benjamin within one week. According to Christine and Michael, 

the enforced agreement differed because the Minors will not receive 

the specified items. The agreement as recited by Christine’s 

counsel in court, however, did not specify who would ultimately 

receive the items. There is thus no difference. 

The fourth term of the settlement agreement required 

Christine to pay $3 million to Benjamin’s lawyers’ “trust account.” 

Contrary to Michael’s assertion, the parties did not agree that the 

“Minors will receive $3 million”; in fact, the parties did not specify 

the ultimate recipients of the money.

According to Christine, this provision was changed in the 

second GAL agreement by requiring that Jacqueline and Michael 

each receive $500,000 of the $3 million. Even if the provision for 

such payments in the second GAL agreement is deemed a change to 

the settlement agreement, it does not change any right or obligation 

of Christine’s; it merely provides Michael with $500,000 he did not 

have a right to receive under the settlement agreement. 

Under the fifth term, the Minors’ interests in the Trust will 

be distributed to their respective irrevocable trusts established 

by King, Robert, and Christine. Christine asserts that this was 

changed to provide for distribution “to those trusts that are under 

[c]ourt supervision.” She cites only to the second GAL agreement, 

and the citation does not support the assertion.

Under the sixth term, Christine disclaims any rights as a 

beneficiary under the Trust and the Minors’ “claims, if any, can only 

be brought by” Chen, his designee, or his court-appointed successor 

until they reach the age of majority. According to Christine and 
38

Michael, this term was changed because Chen waived the Minors’ 

“claims of $100 million” and the Minors do not “want to waive 

[their] claims.” Again, Christine cites only to the second GAL

agreement, and the citation does not support the alleged change. 

Michael refers also to his and Jacqueline’s repudiations of the 

agreements. The repudiations (which are discussed below), were 

not asserted until after the court ruled on the enforcement of the 

settlement agreement. Therefore, although they may bear upon 

the effectiveness of the second GAL agreement, they cannot be 

relied on to challenge the court’s September 2018 ruling enforcing

the settlement agreement. (See Sacramento Area Flood Control 

Agency v. Dhaliwal (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1328 [we review 

a court’s ruling based on the record as it existed at the time of the 

ruling].)

Under the ninth term, the provisions of the agreement 

affecting the Minors’ interests and rights are subject to approval 

by the guardian ad litem. Christine notes that Chen was appointed 

“in only one case of nine cases and had no power to bind the Minors 

for the remaining cases.” Michael adds that he “did not want to 

dismiss his ILIT appeal.” These points, however, do not indicate 

any change in the term in the settlement agreement. Indeed, in 

ruling on the motion to enforce the settlement, the court explained 

that the settlement agreement was “subject to the condition 

precedent of Chen’s agreement.”

The 10th term provides that “the parties shall work together 

to cause the Trust to be amended to effectuate the settlement with 

the resulting tax treatment that is fair and equitable to all parties.”

Christine argues that this “[n]ever occurred and is not part of the 

final judgment,” and that “the tax treatment achieved by the final 

judgment is unfair and inequitable.” Michael makes a similar 

argument. The references to “final judgment” appear to be to the 
39

second GAL agreement or the court’s order approving the 

second GAL agreement, not to the order enforcing the settlement 

agreement, which made no change to this provision. Moreover, 

Christine’s and Michael’s comments indicate an alleged breach of 

the agreement, which is irrelevant to the determination of whether 

the agreement was enforceable under Code of Civil Procedure 

section 664.6. 

Under the 11th term, the parties dismissed with prejudice all 

objections to accountings and waived rights to future accountings. 

Christine and Michael assert that this was changed in the second 

GAL agreement where the minors “waived all rights to full and 

independent past due, current, and future trust accountings.” They 

do not refer to any change in the agreement as enforced by the court 

and, in any case, they do not explain how any change in the second 

GAL agreement has any effect on their rights or obligations.

Lastly, under the 12th term, “the parties are to prepare a 

long form agreement, with all disputes regarding the long form

agreement to be resolved . . . via binding arbitration.” Christine 

and Michael argue that this provision was changed because they 

were excluded from any long form negotiations, and refer to 

the second GAL agreement as a “long form” to which they never 

consented. As with the arguments regarding the 10th term, the 

alleged exclusion from negotiations suggests a possible breach of 

the settlement agreement, not a changed term.

Christine makes a cursory assertion that the court “had 

no power to enforce a settlement that, as the [t]rial [c]ourt found 

here, had been procured by fraud.” The undeveloped assertion 

is made without citation to the record. We therefore decline to 

consider it. (See Alki Partners, LP v. DB Fund Services, LLC (2016) 

4 Cal.App.5th 574, 590, fn. 8 [“courts will decline to consider any 
40

factual assertion unsupported by record citation at the point where 

it is asserted”].)

For the foregoing reasons, we reject Christine’s and Michael’s 

arguments that the court enforced an agreement with terms 

different from the agreement Christine made in May 2018.

3. Christine’s Alleged Lack of Consent to Esther as 

the Recipient of $3 Million

Christine contends that she did not consent to the “additional 

material terms” recited by Benjamin’s counsel on May 14, 2018,

after Christine and her attorneys left the courtroom.24 Because 

these terms were added in her absence, she argues, there was no 

meeting of the minds as to these terms and therefore no contract.

In particular, Christine points to the agreement reached 

among Benjamin, Esther, Margaret, and Helena that the $3 million 

that Christine agreed to pay to Benjamin’s law firm’s trust fund 

“goes to Esther.” Christine asserts that she “would never have 

agreed to give a penny to Esther” and “would have never consented 

to this term.” According to Christine, her $3 million payment

should have been added to the Trust corpus, which would have 

benefited her children as residuary beneficiaries. Christine, 

however, could have bargained for a provision requiring the money 

be added to the Trust or distributed to particular persons (such 

as her children) or not distributed to particular persons (such as 

24 Christine asserts that she “was precluded from all 

knowledge of the additional material terms added on May 14, 

2018,” and that “[r]espondent coerced [her] into leaving the 

[c]ourtroom to record Esther’s name.” The record, however, 

indicates that the court invited Christine and her counsel to remain 

in the courtroom “just in case,” but that Christine and her counsel 

left voluntarily.
41

Esther). Christine made no such bargain, however, and upon 

transferring the money as agreed, she had no right to direct what 

happens to the money thereafter. 

4. The Court’s Failure to Make a Finding as to the 

Meaning of “Residue”

Christine next contends that the court never made a factual 

finding concerning the meaning of the word, “residue,” as used in 

the settlement agreement. Pursuant to term one of the agreement, 

Christine agreed to waive “all rights to Trust A, including but not 

limited to claims regarding Three Lanterns, Sycamore, and Atlantic 

Towers. Such interest goes to the residue.” According to Christine, 

the word “residue” could mean the “[r]emainder” of the trust estate 

as defined in the Trust document or, as she understood it, “the 

corpus of Trust A, since the family often referred to Trust A as 

the Residue Trust.” If residue means the remainder of the Trust, 

her interests in Trust A assets, including Three Lanterns and

Sycamore, would be distributed to the residuary beneficiaries. 

According to Christine, however, she understood that she was 

relinquishing her interests in Three Lanterns and Sycamore to 

Michael.

Christine did not, however, raise this point in her opposition 

to the motion to enforce the settlement. She refers us to her 

declaration in support of her motion to set aside the settlement 

agreement. But in that declaration, she states only that she 

learned “what it meant for [her] property to enter into the ‘residue’

of [the] . . . Trust” after her accounting expert evaluated the

settlement. She does not state what her understanding was of 

the Trust residue either before or after the accountant explained 

it to her. Thus, even if the court considered her declaration 

in connection with the motion to enforce the settlement, her 

declaration is insufficient to raise the issue she asserts on appeal. 
42

In any case, the meaning of “residue” in the context of trust 

and probate litigation has a readily understandable meaning 

as the surplus of the estate remaining after the payment of debts 

and the distribution of specific bequests and devises. (See Estate 

of Lawrence (1941) 17 Cal.2d 1, 8; Blech v. Blech (2018) 25 

Cal.App.5th 989, 1003; Estate of Keller (1955) 134 Cal.App.2d 

232, 241; § 21117, subd. (f).) Here, with respect to Trust A—in 

which Three Lanterns and Sycamore were held and which was 

the subject of term 1 of the settlement agreement—the reference 

to the “residue” unambiguously refers to the provision of the Trust 

document that provides for the distribution of “[t]he remainder 

of Trust ‘A,’ after any payments and distributions by the [t]rustee 

[of specific bequests] pursuant to the provisions of [specified] 

subparagraphs” of the Trust document. Although the treatment of 

such “remainder” under the Trust document is somewhat complex, 

there is no reasonable reading of the Trust document that supports 

Christine’s interpretation by which the Trust’s entire interest in 

Three Lanterns and Sycamore as part of the residue, would be 

given to Michael. 

5. Chen’s Alleged Rejection of the “Settlement Offer”

Christine next contends that Chen rejected the “settlement 

offer” in his July 23, 2018 report to the court on a proposed 

“long form” agreement, and that his rejection “killed Christine’s 

offer.” She argues further that Chen could not “revive” “the 

offer” by his subsequent “purported acceptance.” The argument 

is fundamentally flawed because, as the trial court found, the 

settlement reached by the parties in court on May 14, 2018, was not 

an offer, but an agreement subject to a condition, namely, Chen’s 

approval. Specifically, Christine and the other parties present in 

court agreed that the terms “affecting the Minors’ interests and 
43

rights are subject to approval by the guardian ad litem.” The 

phrase “ ‘[s]ubject to’ is generally construed to impose a condition 

precedent.” (Rubin v. Fuchs (1969) 1 Cal.3d 50, 54.)

The court found that this condition of Chen’s approval was 

met when Chen entered into the first GAL agreement and stated 

that he “agrees to the terms of the Settlement Agreement” reached 

in court on May 14, 2018. Chen reiterated his approval of the 

settlement terms in his declaration filed in support of the motion 

to enforce the settlement, in which he states his “agreement to the 

terms of the settlement agreed to by the other parties on the record 

before the [c]ourt on May 14, 2018.” The court’s finding is thus 

supported by substantial evidence.

Christine further argues that even if Chen approved of 

the settlement agreement, the additional terms in the first GAL

agreement differed from the settlement agreement and constituted 

a rejection of the settlement terms. Christine, however, again 

erroneously conflates the settlement agreement with Chen’s 

separate agreement with other parties in the first GAL agreement. 

Christine was not a party to the first GAL agreement and nothing 

in that agreement alters any of Christine’s rights, interests, or 

duties under the settlement agreement.

6. Alleged Unconscionability

Christine contends that the trial court erred in rejecting her 

argument that the settlement agreement is unconscionable. “ ‘The 

unconscionability doctrine ensures that contracts, particularly 

contracts of adhesion, do not impose terms that have been variously 

described as “ ‘ “overly harsh” ’ ” [citation], “ ‘unduly oppressive’ ” 

[citation], “ ‘so one-sided as to “shock the conscience” ’ ” [citation], or 

“unfairly one-sided” [citation].’ ” (Sanchez v. Valencia Holding Co., 

LLC (2015) 61 Cal.4th 899, 910–911.) The doctrine “ ‘ “has both a
44

procedural and a substantive element, the former focusing on

oppression or surprise due to unequal bargaining power, the latter

on overly harsh or one-sided results.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 910.) Both 

elements must “ ‘ “be present in order for a court to exercise its 

discretion to refuse to enforce a contract or clause.” ’ ” (Ibid.)

Christine contends that the settlement agreement “was 

procedurally unconscionable because it contained terms that were 

unknown to Christine prior to their announcement on the record.” 

Although she uses the plural, “terms,” she refers only to her lack

of understanding of the word “residue.” She argues that the 

agreement “was substantively unconscionable because its terms 

were drastically harmful to Christine and her children, and any 

bargain therein was illusory.” The arguments are without merit.

When the settlement was placed on the record, Christine 

was present and represented by three attorneys from different law

firms.25 After the terms were recited by her counsel, the court 

asked her if she heard and understood “all of the terms,” and she 

responded, “Yes.” She also answered affirmatively to the question 

whether she “had enough time to speak to [her] lawyer about [the 

terms],” and whether she agreed “to all of those terms.” Under

these circumstances, Christine has failed to establish procedural 

unconscionability. 

Regarding substantive unconscionability, we note that 

Christine was facing claims by Benjamin, Margaret, and Esther 

that she had committed financial elder abuse against King and 

used her position as trustee de son tort to misappropriate more 

25 One of Christine’s attorneys, Vikram Brar, was not present 

for the trial. When later asked why he was not there, he explained 

that being Christine’s attorney “doesn’t mean [he] would attend all 

hearings.”
45

than $12 million in cash and $12.5 million in other property 

interests from the Trust. In addition to damages for these losses, 

the petitioners were seeking $14.4 million in statutory damages 

and attorney fees (§ 859), punitive damages, and a determination 

that Christine predeceased King pursuant to section 259.

The trial court, which was familiar with the case, explained 

that, “even assuming [the petitioners] have likely exaggerated their 

probability of prevailing at trial, proving unconscionability is still 

a heavy burden for Christine: It is not enough to assert merely 

that she may have prevailed but rather that the settlement terms 

‘shock the conscience.’ This they do not where it appears there 

was at least some probability Benjamin and the others might 

have prevailed. Given their showing that Christine might not 

have prevailed, it is not inconceivable to the [c]ourt that she might 

have elected to avoid potentially greater losses by entering into an 

agreement that may not be particularly favorable to her.”

On appeal, Christine does not attempt to show that she might 

have prevailed at trial. Instead, she argues that the settlement left 

her and the children “over $35 million worse off than if she had lost 

the case on the merits.” She explains that if she had lost, she could 

have been deemed to have predeceased King under section 259. 

In that case, she contends, Michael would have received her share 

of the Three Lanterns and Sycamore because the Trust document 

provides that Michael is to receive these properties if both Robert 

and Christine predecease King. Therefore, she argues, by 

preventing her from losing at trial, the settlement “effectively 

disinherited . . . Michael, thus leaving her family over $35 million 

worse off than if she had lost the case.” (Boldface omitted.)

Christine’s argument is based on a misunderstanding of 

section 259. Under subdivision (a) of section 259, a person who, 

among other requirements, is liable for physical or financial 
46

abuse or neglect of a decedent, will be deemed to have predeceased 

the decedent “to the extent provided in subdivision (c).” (§ 259, 

subd. (a).)26 Under subdivision (c), a person who is liable under 

subdivision (a) shall not “receive any property, damages, or costs 

that are awarded to the decedent’s estate in an action described in 

subdivision (a).” (§ 259, subd. (c).) 

As one court has explained, a “person found liable under

subdivision (a) of section 259 is deemed to have predeceased the 

decedent only to the extent the person would have been entitled 

through a will, trust, or laws of intestacy to receive a distribution 

of the damages and costs the person is found to be liable to pay to 

the estate as a result of the abuse. Section 259 does not necessarily 

eliminate the abuser’s entitlement to a share of the estate; it 

simply restricts the value of the estate to which the abuser’s 

percentage share is applied and prevents that person from 

benefiting from his or her own wrongful conduct.” (Estate of Dito

(2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 791, 803−804, fn. omitted.) Thus, if the

co-trustees established Christine’s liability under section 259, 

subdivision (a), and recovered property, damages, or costs from 

Christine as a result of such liability, Christine could not receive 

26 Subdivision (a) of section 259 provides that a “person shall 

be deemed to have predeceased a decedent [for certain purposes] 

where all of the following apply: [¶] (1) It has been proven by clear 

and convincing evidence that the person is liable for physical abuse, 

neglect, or financial abuse of the decedent, who was an elder or 

dependent adult. [¶] (2) The person is found to have acted in bad 

faith. [¶] (3) The person has been found to have been reckless, 

oppressive, fraudulent, or malicious in the commission of any of 

these acts upon the decedent. [¶] (4) The decedent, at the time those

acts occurred and thereafter until the time of his or her death, has

been found to have been substantially unable to manage his or her

financial resources or to resist fraud or undue influence.” 
47

any share of the recovered property, damages, or costs. The 

statute would not operate, as Christine suggests, to give Michael 

alone property that is “awarded to the decedent’s estate.” (§ 259, 

subd. (c).) Christine and “her family,” therefore, could not win 

by losing, and her substantive unconscionability argument fails.

7. The Court’s Alleged Failure to Consider 

Inseverability

Christine next argues that “the court failed to consider 

inseverability by enforcing a modified agreement with terms 

to which [she] did not consent.” (Boldface and capitalization 

omitted.) She asserts that her “deal was inseparable from her

children’s” and, until the court approved the “precise terms” 

affecting Jacqueline and Michael, “there was no settlement to 

enforce.” In placing the terms of the settlement on the record on 

May 14, 2018, however, the parties and their counsel made clear 

that they were setting forth the terms of a binding agreement, 

enforceable under Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6, subject 

only to Chen’s approval. There is nothing in the record to suggest 

that Christine was withholding her acceptance of the agreement 

pending her review of other terms to which the Minors, through 

their guardian ad litem, and others agreed. We therefore reject the 

argument. 

8. Michael’s Claim of Extrinsic Fraud by the Court

Michael contends that the order enforcing the settlement 

agreement is unenforceable because the court did not intend

to perform it. He discusses at some length the law that permits 

a contracting party to rescind a contract that was induced by 

extrinsic fraud. He refers to orders made after his appeal in 

this case in which the court allegedly required the Minors to 

pay $500,000 in Chen’s legal fees and to sell the Taylor property. 
48

These orders, he argues, are contrary to the terms of the settlement 

agreement and indicate that “[t]he trial [c]ourt enforced the 

settlement without any intention of performing it.” (Boldface 

omitted.)

Aside from the fact that the trial court is not a party to the 

settlement agreement and has no duty to perform any of its terms, 

Michael’s assertions are made without citation to the record and, in 

any case, are not encompassed within the scope of Michael’s notice 

of appeal. Therefore, we reject the argument.

C. The Court’s Approval of the Second GAL 

Agreement

Christine and the Minors challenge the court’s order granting 

Chen’s petition approving of the second GAL agreement on the 

following grounds: (1) Chen, as a guardian ad litem appointed 

in one case only, did not have capacity to make the second GAL 

agreement; (2) the court failed to hold an evidentiary hearing 

on the petition; (3) the lack of notice to the Minors deprived them

of due process; (4) the agreement was not in the Minors’ best 

interests; (5) the court failed to approve Chen’s attorney fees; 

and (6) Christine and the Minors repudiated or disaffirmed the 

settlement agreement and the second GAL agreement. We address 

each in turn.

1. Chen’s Capacity to Make the Second GAL 

Agreement

Jacqueline contends that Chen lacked capacity to make a 

contract in Jacqueline’s name because, prior to March 2020, Chen 

had been formally appointed the guardian ad litem in only one of 

the many cases involving or related to the Trust. We reject this 

argument. 
49

Initially, we note that in proceedings under the Probate Code,

the court is not necessarily required to appoint a guardian ad litem 

for minors involved in the proceedings. Under section 1003, 

the court “may, on its own motion or on request of a personal 

representative, guardian, conservator, trustee, or other interested 

person, appoint a guardian ad litem” for a minor “if the court 

determines that representation of the interest otherwise would 

be inadequate.” (§ 1003, subd. (a).)27 The word “may” implies 

discretionary decision-making authority (People v. Moine (2021)

62 Cal.App.5th 440, 448), and, as the statutory text indicates, such 

discretion is to be guided by the court’s determination regarding 

the adequacy of the representation of the minor’s interest in the 

absence of a guardian ad litem. 

In the absence of an appointment of a guardian ad litem, the 

Minors were not, as Jacqueline asserts, representing themselves 

“in pro[.] per.” Rather, the court is “the guardian of the minor” 

(Serway v. Galentine (1946) 75 Cal.App.2d 86, 89 (Serway)), and 

the guardian ad litem is appointed, if at all, “ ‘ “merely to aid and to 

enable the court to perform that duty of protection.” ’ ” (Williams v. 

Superior Court (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 36, 49–50 (Williams); see 

27 Section 1003’s discretionary appointment power contrast 

with the requirement under section 372 of the Code of Civil 

Procedure that “[w]hen a minor . . . is a party, that person shall

appear either by a guardian or conservator of the estate or by a 

guardian ad litem appointed by the court in which the action or 

proceeding is pending.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 372, subd. (a)(1), italics 

added.) “The general provisions for appointment of a guardian

ad litem” under Code of Civil Procedure section 372, however, 

“do not apply in probate proceedings. Instead, the matter is 

governed by [section] 1003.” (Ross & Cohen, Cal. Practice Guide: 

Probate (The Rutter Group 2021) ¶ 3:558.)
50

Cole v. Superior Court of City & County of San Francisco (1883) 63 

Cal. 86, 89 (Cole) [“[t]he court is, in effect, the guardian—the person 

named as guardian ad litem being but the agent to whom the court, 

in appointing him (thus exercising the power of the sovereign 

[s]tate as parens patriœ) has delegated the execution of the trust”]). 

Therefore, the fact that a guardian ad litem had not been appointed 

for the minors in particular probate proceedings does not mean that 

the minors were representing themselves. 

In light of the discretionary authority provided by 

section 1003, the absence of an appointment of a guardian ad litem 

would ordinarily imply that the court found that it could adequately 

protect a minor’s interest, if any, and that the aid of a guardian 

ad litem was not required. Here, however, the court indicated that 

its failure to appoint a guardian ad litem was an “oversight” on 

its part and a “clerical issue” and “administrative defect,” which 

it “cur[ed]” when the court granted Chen’s request to be appointed 

guardian ad litem in the related cases.

Whatever the reason for failing to appoint a guardian 

ad litem in particular related cases, there is no merit to Jacqueline’s 

assertion that she represented herself in pro. per. in those cases. 

Where a guardian ad litem was not appointed to act as the court’s

aid or agent in performing the court’s duty to protect the Minors’ 

rights, the court merely proceeded without the aid of a guardian 

ad litem in performing that duty. In this light, we see no legal 

significance in the fact that Chen had not been appointed guardian 

ad litem in the related cases when he negotiated the second GAL 

agreement. As guardian ad litem in at least one of the Trust 

litigation cases, he negotiated an agreement ostensibly to aid the 

court in its duty of protecting the Minors’ interests. The fact that 

the agreement encompasses claims the Minors may have in related 

cases—over which the court acted as the Minors’ guardian without 
51

the aid of a guardian ad litem—means only that Chen arguably 

provided more aid to the court than his case-specific appointment

required. Although the court had the power and duty to reject such 

aid if it determined that the agreement was not in the Minors’ best 

interests, there is no bar to accepting such aid. Therefore, the fact 

that Chen had not been appointed guardian ad litem in all cases in 

which the second GAL agreement affected the Minors’ rights did not 

preclude the court from approving of the second GAL agreement. 

2. Christine’s Standing to Oppose the Petition for 

Approval of the Second GAL Agreement

Among other rulings made at the hearing held on March 3, 

2020, the court denied standing of the co-trustees and Christine to 

object to Chen’s petition for approval of the second GAL agreement.

“Proceedings on a [guardian ad litem’s] [p]etition for [a]pproval,” 

the court explained, “are fundamentally between the [M]inors, the

[guardian ad litem], and the [c]ourt—and nobody else.” Christine 

and the Minors challenge this ruling. 

The approval of a petition or motion to approve a 

minor’s compromise is governed by section 3500, subdivision (b), 

sections 3600−3612, Code of Civil Procedure section 372, and 

rules 7.950 through 7.952 of the California Rules of Court.28 None 

of these statutes or rules requires notice or an adversary hearing to

28 Although the appointment of a guardian ad litem in 

probate proceedings is governed by section 1003, the Probate Code 

does not provide for a guardian ad litem to compromise a minor’s 

claim. Code of Civil Procedure section 372, which does permit 

a guardian ad litem to compromise a minor’s claim with court 

approval, thus provides the applicable rule. (See § 1000 [except 

where Probate Code provides an applicable rule, the rules 

of practice in civil actions applies].)
52

approve a minor’s compromise. (Pearson v. Superior Court (2012)

202 Cal.App.4th 1333, 1337, fn. 2 (Pearson); Weil & Brown, Cal.

Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 

2021) ¶ 12:579; see Burge v. City and County of San Francisco

(1953) 41 Cal.2d 608, 614 [“[a]lthough it would ordinarily be better 

practice to hold a hearing and take testimony, the [predecessor to 

section 3500] does not require it”].) Thus, the Pearson court stated, 

albeit in dictum, “it would appear that a petition to approve or 

disapprove a minor’s compromise may be decided by the superior 

court, ex parte, in chambers.” (Pearson, supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at 

p. 1337, fn. 2; see 4 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (6th ed. 2021) Pleading, 

§ 80 [application for approval of a minor’s compromise is made 

ex parte and may be heard in chambers].) 

The question whether Christine had standing to oppose 

Chen’s position is complicated by that fact that she was the 

Minors’ parent and their guardian ad litem in one case—the ILIT 

litigation—directly affected by the settlement agreement. A person 

in her position is arguably entitled to participate in the hearing 

at which her children and wards have much at stake. The weight 

of such status, however, is arguably diminished by the fact that, 

although Christine is a parent and guardian ad litem, the court 

found that she had a conflict of interest with the Minors and 

“appears to be using the Minors to pursue her own agenda”—

an agenda that is “inconsistent with the Minors’ interest[s].”

We need not decide whether the court erred in determining 

that Christine lacked standing with respect to the petition for 

approval. Even if the court erred, Christine has failed to establish 

prejudice. The record demonstrates that the court considered 

Christine’s demurrer to Chen’s petition for approval on the merits

and addressed her arguments on the petition at the hearing. In 

her demurrer, Christine argued, among other arguments: (1) her 
53

repudiation of the second GAL agreement precluded the court’s 

approval; (2) Chen is not the guardian ad litem in all matters 

affected by the agreement; (3) the pending appeals bar 

consideration of Chen’s petition for approval; and (4) Chen failed 

to provide any basis to show that the second GAL agreement is 

better than the previously rejected agreement. The court was also 

aware of Christine’s and the Minors’ positions as expressed in their 

repudiations of the agreements.

In addition, after the court’s ruling, Christine filed a motion 

for reconsideration and a motion for new trial, each supported by 

voluminous evidence, including the declaration of an accounting 

expert addressing the economic aspects of the second GAL 

agreement. The court addressed Christine’s arguments in these 

motions on the merits and at length in written rulings denying the 

motion for new trial and granting in part and denying in part the 

motion for reconsideration.29

On appeal, Christine does not point to any evidence or 

argument that the trial court failed to consider and address at 

one hearing or another, and she does not explain how she has been 

prejudiced by the court’s ruling. Prejudice is not presumed, and 

the appellant has the duty to show that an error is prejudicial. 

(Vaughn v. Jonas (1948) 31 Cal.2d 586, 601; see Paterno v. State of 

California (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 68, 106 [“the appellant bears the 

duty of spelling out in his brief exactly how the error caused a 

miscarriage of justice”].) Christine has failed to make that showing 

29 Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the court did not hear 

oral argument on the motion for new trial, which was set for 

April 23, 2020. It did hold a hearing on Christine’s motion for 

reconsideration via remote video or audio conferencing on June 24, 

2020. In addition to Christine’s counsel, Christine, Jacqueline, and 

Michael were present by telephone.
54

here. In any case, based on our review of the record, it is not 

reasonably probable that, in the absence of the alleged error, 

Christine would have obtained a more favorable result. (See Cal. 

Const., art. VI, § 13; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.) 

We therefore conclude that, if the court erred by ruling that 

Christine lacked standing to oppose the petition, the error was 

harmless.

3. The Court’s Approval of the Second GAL 

Agreement

In determining whether to grant a guardian ad litem’s 

petition to approve a settlement of the ward’s claims, a court 

must determine whether it is reasonable and in the minor’s best 

interest. (See Pearson, supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at p. 1338; Scruton 

v. Korean Air Lines Co. (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1596, 1607 (Scruton); 

Espericueta v. Shewry (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 615, 626; see also 

Cal. Rules of Court, rule 7.950 [petition for approval of a minor’s 

compromise “must contain a full disclosure of all information that

has any bearing upon the reasonableness of the compromise”].) 

We review the probate court’s ruling for an abuse of discretion. 

(Breslin v. Breslin (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 801, 806; Estate of Green

(1956) 145 Cal.App.2d 25, 28.) 

Here, in approving the second GAL agreement, the court 

relied in part on its comparison of what the Minors would receive 

under the Trust document in the absence of a settlement and the 

second GAL agreement with what the Minors would receive under 

the second GAL agreement.

According to evidence submitted in support of the petition, if 

the terms of the Trust document are applied without regard to the 

settlement or the second GAL agreement, Jacqueline and Michael 

would collectively receive $600,000 pursuant to the terms of Trust B 

and $351,024 pursuant to an “Insurance Trust.” These amounts 
55

do not appear to be in dispute. Because Robert predeceased King, 

Benjamin, Jacqueline, and Michael would each receive one-third of 

the Trust’s interest in the Taylor, Derek, Paularino, Calle Cristina, 

and Domingo properties. Based on appraisals of the properties 

reported by Christine’s expert, the values of the Minors’ collective 

two-thirds interest in these properties, as of the date of the 

May 2018 settlement, was $2,880,000, $2,260,000, $5,405,860, 

$161,111, and $3,144,510, respectively, for a total of $13,851,481. 

As residuary beneficiaries, they would also receive interests, 

collectively valued at $91,736, in the Hellman property. Jacqueline

would also receive the Monterey Park residence valued at $840,000. 

In addition, pursuant to the provisions of Robert’s separate property

trust, the Minors held remainder interests in the Paularino 

and Domingo properties with present values of $1,678,623 and 

$2,074,763, respectively. Their share of estimated estate taxes 

and unpaid trust administration fees would be $2,153,660, and 

$328,516, respectively. Therefore, based on these amounts, the 

net value of the Minors’ collective beneficial interests in the Trust

in the absence of the settlement agreement and the second GAL 

agreement would be approximately $17 million.

Under the settlement agreement and second GAL agreement, 

the Minors would receive the same amounts due them under 

Trust B ($600,000) and the insurance trust ($351,024), and the 

same values attributed to the Hellman property ($91,736) and 

the Monterey Park residence ($840,000). The primary differences 

between the Minors’ entitlement under the Trust document and the

second GAL agreement arise from (1) what Chen refers to as the 

“property swap”; (2) payments of cash to the Minors; (3) the absence 

of the Minors’ liability for estate taxes and the Trust’s litigation 

and administration expenses; and (4) the mutual releases and the 

Minors’ waivers of past and future accountings. 
56

Pursuant to the property swap, the Minors would receive 

Benjamin’s one-third of the Trust’s interest in the Taylor, Derek, 

Paularino, and Calle Cristina properties. The Minors’ interest in 

these properties would thus increase by 50 percent and be valued 

at $4,320,000, $3,390,839, $8,108,988, and $241,667, respectively.30

The minors would swap, or disclaim to Benjamin, their combined 

two-thirds interest in the Domingo property (valued at $3,144,510), 

as well as their remainder interest in that property (valued at 

$2,153,660).

The additional cash payments under the second GAL 

agreement include, collectively, $1 million (out of the $3 million 

Christine paid to Benjamin’s counsel’s trust account)31 and 

payments totaling $1,480,000 in exchange for the Minors’ 

20 percent interest in Sycamore—an interest they gained as 

residuary beneficiaries after Christine waived her right to that 

property in the settlement agreement.32

30 Under the second GAL agreement, the Calle Cristina 

property is to be “sold on the open market for fair market value.” 

Jacqueline and Michael will receive their share of the net proceeds 

as defined.

31 Arguably, the $3 million Christine paid to Benjamin’s 

counsel’s “trust account” should have been considered part of the 

Trust corpus and distributed to the residual beneficiaries. If so, 

the Minors, as residuary beneficiaries, were entitled to receive, 

collectively, 20 percent of the $3 million. Even if this argument 

is accepted, the amount they received from this source under the 

second GAL agreement—$1 million—is 66 percent more than the 

$600,000 they could have received as residuary beneficiaries in the 

absence of the second GAL agreement. 

32 Under the Trust, neither Minor had an interest in Three 

Lanterns, Sycamore, or Atlantic Towers; because Robert had 
57

The provisions protecting the Minors from liability for estate 

taxes and unpaid litigation and Trust expenses are valued at 

$2,482,176.

Based on these amounts, the Minors’ collective net value 

under the settlement agreement and second GAL agreement would 

thus be approximately $22 million—approximately $5 million 

more than what they were entitled to receive under the terms 

of the Trust. In addition, Chen produced evidence that the 

additional income to the Minors resulting from the increased 

interest in the Taylor, Derek, and Paularino properties would more

than offset, by approximately $100,000 per year, the loss of income 

that results from disclaiming the Domingo property to Benjamin.

Christine and the Minors contend, however, that the second 

GAL agreement deprived the Minors of “real and unique properties” 

worth between $25 million and $35 million. The theory is based 

primarily on the assumption that Michael had an interest in, or 

“stood to inherit,” Three Lanterns, Sycamore, and Atlantic Towers. 

The assumption, however, is unfounded, as the Trust document 

unambiguously provides for such properties to be given to 

predeceased King and Christine had not, these properties were 

to be distributed to Christine. Under the settlement agreement, 

Christine agreed to waive her interest in these properties, which 

would then become part of the residue of the trust estate. The 

Minors, as 10 percent residuary beneficiaries under the Trust, 

would thus be entitled to a share of these properties. According 

to Chen’s petition, Three Lanterns and Atlantic Towers are to be 

“liquidated and used to pay the [e]state [t]axes for the Trust.” As 

a result, “[t]here is no portion of those assets that remain to be 

distributed to the Minors.”

The $1,480,000 payment is for the Minors’ residuary share of 

Sycamore’s fair market value based upon the net fair market value 

as determined by “Christine’s designated expert appraiser.”
58

Christine. Michael was a contingent beneficiary under the Trust 

who would have been entitled to Three Lanterns and Sycamore only 

if Christine predeceased King. Because that did not occur, Michael 

was not entitled to these properties. 

The further assumption that “unique properties,” such as 

family heirlooms and jewelry, were bequeathed to the Minors is 

similarly without support. Christine relied on a provision of the 

Trust document stating that the gifts of certain real properties 

includes “any personal property located on and used in connection 

with such real properties,” for the assertion that Jacqueline stands 

to inherit the antiques located in the Monterey Park residence, 

which King had bequeathed to her. The provision Christine relied

on, however, relates only to real properties held in Trust C; the 

Monterey Park residence is held in Trust A. The provision devising 

the Monterey Park residence to Jacqueline expressly entitles 

Jacqueline to “the real property and improvements” only.

Christine also contends that the Minors would be entitled 

to undistributed income from the Taylor, Domingo, Derek, and 

Paularino properties, and that the $500,000 that each Minor will 

receive out of the $3 million she paid to Benjamin’s counsel should 

be compared with “the accumulated income of $6 million from [the 

Minors’] expected inheritance properties.” She does not, however, 

point to any provision of the Trust or other evidence to support the 

Minors’ entitlement to any such income.

Christine and Michael also refer to claims the Minors have 

against the co-trustees for “$100 million.” The purported claims

appear to be based upon allegations in a petition Christine filed 

in February 2020, six days before the hearing on Chen’s petition 

for approval of the second GAL agreement. Aside from their 

belatedness, they are unsubstantiated in our record and the court 

reasonably could, as it did, consider them speculative and decline to 
59

give them any weight in evaluating the benefits of the agreement to 

the Minors. 

In addition to the economic benefits for the Minors obtained 

in the second GAL agreement, the court also noted the benefit of 

terminating this costly litigation and its drain on trust assets,33

and considered favorably the fact that the property swap provisions 

would disentangle the interests of the Minors and Benjamin. 

Instead of Benjamin, Jacqueline, and Michael holding undivided 

one-third interests in several properties, Jacqueline and Michael 

will jointly hold interests in some properties while relinquishing 

their entire interest in one property—Domingo—to Benjamin. 

The separation will presumably avoid or reduce future litigation 

among these individuals as well as avoid the need for future 

Trust accountings to the Minors and the litigation that could arise 

therefrom.

In light of the economic benefits the Minors obtained under 

the second GAL agreement, the extrication of the Minors from 

a situation where they would jointly hold property interests with 

a half sibling hostile to them, the end to costly litigation, and the 

peace that the settlement should provide for all sides, the court did 

not abuse its discretion in approving the second GAL agreement. 

4. The Failure to Provide Notice of Chen’s Petition 

to the Minors

Michael and Jacqueline contend that they were entitled to 

notice of Chen’s petition. They cite to sections 1460 and 1511. 

Section 1460 governs the manner and timing of notice to a “ward”

(§ 1460, subd. (b)(2)), among others, “if notice of hearing is required 

33 According to Chen, attorney fees and costs relating to Trust 

administration and litigation, for the period between June 1, 2016 

and September 30, 2019, amounted to $14,693,290.
60

under this division.” (§ 1460, subd. (a).) The referenced division 

covers the Guardianship-Conservatorship law (§ 1400 et seq.). 

Section 1511 is also concerned with proceedings under that law. 

Neither section 1460 nor section 1511 applies to a guardian 

ad litem appointed pursuant to section 1003, nor to petitions to 

approve a minor’s compromise, which are governed by Code of Civil 

Procedure section 372.

Although the Minors had a right to be present at the hearing 

on Chen’s petition (see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 7.952(a)), that 

right can be “dispense[d] with” for good cause. Here, the court 

waived that requirement at the request of Christine’s counsel with 

respect to the hearing on the first GAL agreement. In response to 

Christine’s motion for new trial after the ruling on the second GAL 

agreement, the court noted that Christine did not seek “any update 

on that requirement and did not herself attempt to bring the Minors 

to the March 3, 2020 hearing.”

Even if the absence of the Minors at the hearing was error, 

the Minors fail to establish that the error was prejudicial. Although 

the court rejected the Minors’ repudiations of the second GAL 

agreement, the court acknowledged that the “[r]epudiations made 

the [c]ourt and Chen aware of the Minors’ positions” regarding 

the second GAL agreement and, in response to Christine’s motion 

for new trial, stated that, even if the court had considered the 

repudiations, it is not “ ‘reasonably probable that a result more 

favorable to [the Minors] would have been reached.’ ” Other than 

the repudiations, which are discussed below, and the arguments 

they assert on appeal, which we have rejected, the Minors do not 

point to any argument they would have asserted if they had been 

present. In light of the benefits to the Minors provided by the 

second GAL agreement, as discussed above, and our rejection of the
61

arguments asserted on appeal, they have not established that the 

Minors’ absence at the hearing was prejudicial.

Michael further contends his right to due process was violated 

because Chen had waived his rights under the Trust, his right to 

appeal, and his right to object to the second GAL agreement, and 

his “right to claims of $100 million against the [co-trustees and 

Chen].” His argument that Chen deprived him of his right to 

appeal is moot because we have permitted Michael and Jacqueline 

to appeal. Michael’s contention regarding the alleged loss of 

$100 million in claims is, like Christine’s similar contention, 

without support in the record. We reject the further claims that

Chen and the court deprived them of other rights as beneficiaries 

under the Trust because they received countervailing benefits 

under the second GAL agreement. (See In re Christina B. (1993) 

19 Cal.App.4th 1441, 1454 [guardian ad litem can compromise 

minor’s rights with “some countervailing and significant benefit”].)

5. Michael’s Argument Concerning the Omission of 

Approval of Attorney Fees

Michael contends that the court erred “by omitting to 

approve that [c]o-[t]rustees’ $20 million legal fees was funded 

by Michael’s expected inheritance.” The somewhat incoherent 

argument lacks apposite authority and pertinent citations to the 

record. It appears to be based on the assumption that Michael 

was entitled to the Three Lanterns property and to “expected

accumulated income from his various expected inheritance 

properties,” including Sycamore, and the co-trustees breached a 

duty owed to him by encumbering that property with a $6 million 

debt. Michael was not, however, entitled under the Trust document 

or otherwise to acquire Three Lanterns or Sycamore. We reject 

this argument.
62

6. Christine’s Repudiations

Christine filed purported repudiations of the settlement 

agreement and the first and second GAL agreements. She 

purported to repudiate the agreements in her capacity as guardian 

ad litem for the Minors in the ILIT case, as guardian of the Minors’ 

estates, as the Minors’ parent, and as trustee of a trust established 

for Michael’s benefit.

In its March 3, 2020 consolidated ruling, the court 

acknowledged that Christine would ordinarily have a right to object 

or repudiate agreements made by her children, but stated that “she 

is precluded from doing so here because her objection is inconsistent 

with the Minors’ interests.” Christine contends that this was error. 

We disagree.

Christine relies on Scruton, supra, 39 Cal.App.4th at p. 1606. 

In that case, a guardian ad litem of two minors settled the minors’ 

tort claims against an airline and petitioned the court for approval 

of the settlement. (Id. at p. 1600.) Prior to the hearing on the 

petition, the guardian ad litem repudiated the settlement and 

withdrew the petition. The defendant airline then filed a motion 

to enforce the settlement, which the trial court granted. (Ibid.) 

The Court of Appeal reversed. The court held that the 

guardian ad litem could repudiate the settlement at any time prior 

to the court’s approval of it, and the guardian ad litem’s repudiation 

was entitled to “some deference.” (Scruton, supra, 39 Cal.App.4th 

at p. 1608.) Notwithstanding such deference, the Scruton court 

further explained that the trial court had the power to enforce a 

settlement repudiated by a guardian ad litem if it finds that the 
63

repudiation is “adverse to the best interests of the minors.” (Ibid.)

34 

Because the trial court in Scruton failed to make such a finding, the 

Court of Appeal reversed the judgment. (Ibid.)

Scruton reflects the general principles discussed above that, 

with respect to minors, the “court is, in effect, the guardian” and 

the guardian ad litem’s actions are subject to court supervision. 

(Cole, supra, 63 Cal. at p. 89; accord, McClintock v. West (2013) 

219 Cal.App.4th 540, 549; County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court 

(2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1303, 1311 (County of Los Angeles); Serway, 

supra, 75 Cal.App.2d at p. 89.) Under such supervision, the court 

may “rescind” a guardian ad litem’s actions that are “inimical to the 

legitimate interests of the ward.” (Regency Health Services, Inc. v. 

Superior Court (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 1496, 1502; accord, Zapanta 

v. Universal Care, Inc. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 1167, 1175.) Thus, 

as Scruton indicated, the court could reject a guardian ad litem’s 

repudiation of an agreement if the court determines the repudiation 

is “adverse to the best interests of the minors.” (Scruton, supra, 39 

Cal.App.4th at p. 1608.) 

Although Scruton was concerned with guardian ad litem’s

repudiation of an agreement, the same principles apply to a parent 

of a minor. Because the “court has the responsibility to protect 

the rights of a minor who is a litigant in court,” it “has the inherent 

authority to make decisions in the best interests of the child, even 

34 According to Jacqueline, Scruton held that the trial court 

can consider whether the agreement is in the best interest of 

the minor only if the guardian endorses the agreement. This is 

incorrect. (See Scruton, supra, 39 Cal.App.4th at p. 1608 [“we hold 

the trial court here could not unilaterally and summarily enforce 

the repudiated compromise without first determining whether, in 

rejecting the agreement, [the guardian ad litem] had acted contrary 

to the best interests of the minors”].)
64

if the parent objects.” (Williams, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at p. 49, 

italics added; accord, In re Marriage of Metzger (2014) 224 

Cal.App.4th 1441, 1448.) 

Here, Christine and the Minors analogize Christine to the 

guardian ad litem in Scruton, whose repudiation was entitled 

to some deference. (Scruton, supra, 39 Cal.App.4th at p. 1608.) 

Christine, however, is not in the same position as the guardian 

ad litem in Scruton. There was only one guardian ad litem 

in Scruton; here, there are two—Chen and Christine—each 

presumably entitled to some deference under Scruton, yet with 

diametrically opposing views as to the benefits of the agreements 

for the Minors. As between these two, the scope of Chen’s 

appointment, which encompasses the Trust litigation that is the 

primary focus of the settlement and second GAL agreement, would 

appear to warrant greater deference to his view than to Christine’s. 

Although Christine is the guardian ad litem in the ILIT case and 

the guardian of the children’s estates, the relationship of these 

cases to the settlement appears to be incidental. 

More importantly, the court found that Christine has 

a conflict of interest in purporting to represent the Minors in 

repudiating the agreements. We review that determination for 

an abuse of discretion and any underlying factual findings for 

substantial evidence. (See Haraguchi v. Superior Court (2008) 

43 Cal.4th 706, 713 [abuse of discretion standard applies where 

trial court is in better position to “evaluate the consequences of a 

potential conflict [of interest] in light of the entirety of a case”].)

Christine’s interest in defending the co-trustees’ claims 

against her is in conflict with the Minors’ interests because 

what the co-trustees recover from Christine for her alleged 

misappropriation of Trust assets would be available to the 

residuary Trust beneficiaries, including the Minors. If, on the
65

other hand, Christine successfully defended against such claims, 

she would retain what the co-trustees were seeking in damages 

and there would be correspondingly less to distribute to the 

beneficiaries, including the Minors. 

Christine’s conflict of interest is also apparent with respect 

to the settlement and second GAL agreements. If Christine 

is successful in opposing the second GAL agreement (thereby 

causing the settlement agreement to fail due to the failure of that 

condition), she would benefit by retaining her claims under the 

Trust document to Three Lanterns, Sycamore, and Atlantic Towers, 

while the Minors would be denied the benefits of having such 

properties added to the Trust residue, as well as denied the receipt 

of Benjamin’s interests in the Taylor, Paularino, Derek, and Calle

Cristina properties and the additional income these properties 

would produce. They would also be denied the receipt of cash 

payments and favorable tax provisions that would be unavailable 

to them without the settlement. The Minors, along with other trust

beneficiaries, would also have to endure further litigation at the 

expense of the Trust estate. 

The court, therefore, did not abuse its discretion in finding 

that Christine has a conflict of interest with the Minors. In light 

of these conflicts, any deference she would arguendo otherwise be 

due as a guardian ad litem under Scruton is negated or severely 

limited.

Christine contends, however, that she made an irrevocable 

assignment of her interest in Three Lanterns and Sycamore 

to Michael and that her and Michael’s interests are therefore 

“completely aligned.” She has not developed this point, and 

Christine does not explain how such an assignment would avoid the 

conflicts between her and the Minors. In any case, the purported 

assignment was made in April 2019, almost one year after she 
66

waived her rights to Three Lanterns and Sycamore in the May 

2018 settlement agreement. By that point, she had no interest 

in these properties to assign. As the co-trustees contend, the 

assignment “had no legal effect.”

Even if Christine has no conflict of interest with the 

Minors and her repudiations were entitled to some deference 

under Scruton, the court could reject the repudiations if they are

“adverse to the best interests of the [M]inors.” (See Scruton, supra, 

39 Cal.App.4th at p. 1608.) Although the court did not expressly 

rely on this rationale, it is implicit in its determination that the 

second GAL agreement is in the Minors’ best interest and its 

finding that Christine’s repudiations were intended to deny the 

Minors the benefits of that agreement. Because the court did not 

abuse its discretion in determining that the second GAL agreement 

was in the Minors’ best interests, the court’s implied determination 

that Christine’s repudiations were adverse to the Minors’ best 

interests is also not an abuse of discretion.

7. The Minors’ Repudiations

The Minors contend that they disaffirmed the settlement 

agreement and the second GAL agreement when they filed their 

repudiations of the agreements. They rely on the general principle 

that “a contract of a minor may be disaffirmed by the minor before 

majority or within a reasonable time afterwards.” (Fam. Code, 

§ 6710; see, e.g., Berg v. Traylor (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 809, 820

(Berg) [“ ‘[a] contract (or conveyance) of a minor may be avoided by 

any act or declaration disclosing an unequivocal intent to repudiate 

its binding force and effect’ ”].) This rule exists to protect minors 

“against [their] own improvidence and the designs of others. The 

policy of the law is to discourage adults from contracting with an 

infant and they cannot complain if as a consequence of violating the 
67

rule they are injured by the exercise of the right of disaffirmance 

vested in the infant.” (Burnand v. Irigoyen (1947) 30 Cal.2d 861, 

866.)

As the cases Jacqueline cites illustrate, the principle has been 

applied to permit minors to disaffirm a minor’s execution of a deed 

of trust (Lee v. Hibernia Savings & Loan Society (1918) 177 Cal. 

656, 659), a minor’s contract for personal services (Berg, supra, 

148 Cal.App.4th at p. 817), a minor’s execution of a deed (Sparks v. 

Sparks (1950) 101 Cal.App.2d 129, 137), a minor’s execution of a 

promissory note (Niemann v. Deverich (1950) 98 Cal.App.2d 787, 

793), and a minor’s contract for the purchase of real property

(Maier v. Harbor Center Land Co. (1919) 41 Cal.App. 79, 80−81). 

The Minors, however, have not referred us to a case in which 

a minor disaffirmed an agreement entered into by the minor’s 

guardian ad litem subject to court approval. 

The general principle the Minors rely on—that a minor 

may disaffirm a contract before reaching majority—is subject 

to the proviso: “Except as otherwise provided by statute.” 

(Fam. Code, § 6710.) Code of Civil Procedure section 372, 

subdivision (a)(1) expressly provides that a court-appointed 

guardian ad litem “shall have power, with the approval of the 

court in which the action or proceeding is pending, to compromise 

the same, to agree to the order or judgment to be entered therein 

for or against the ward . . . , and to satisfy any judgment or 

order in favor of the ward . . . or release or discharge any claim 

of the ward . . . pursuant to that compromise.” This statute thus 

authorizes a guardian ad litem to make settlement agreements 

in judicial proceedings subject only to the approval of the court. 

(See County of Los Angeles, supra, 91 Cal.App.4th at p. 1311; 

Safai v. Safai (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 233, 245.) To allow a minor 

to disaffirm a contract negotiated by the guardian ad litem would 
68

negate this authority. It thus falls squarely within the “otherwise 

provided by statute” exception to the general rule under Family 

Code section 6710 allowing minors to disaffirm contracts.

The exception is also supported by sound policy. The policy

of discouraging adults from contracting with a minor is outweighed 

by the policy that favors settlement of litigation; if a minor could 

disaffirm a settlement agreement negotiated by his or her guardian 

ad litem, litigants opposing minors would have little incentive 

to seek a settlement with the minor, resulting in a waste of the 

litigants’ and judicial resources. The policy concern supporting the 

general rule of protecting minors against their own improvidence 

and the design of others is accommodated by the requirement that 

the court must approve the agreement reached by the guardian 

ad litem.

Jacqueline relies on a statement in Pearson, supra, 202 

Cal.App.4th 1333, that while a guardian ad litem’s “petition 

for approval of [a minor’s settlement agreement] is pending[,]

the settlement agreement is voidable only at the election of the 

minor or his guardian.” (Id. at p. 1339.) Jacqueline points to the 

disjunctive “or” to argue that, prior to judicial confirmation of the 

settlement agreement, the agreement is voidable at the election of 

the minor. The statement in Pearson, however, is dictum that does 

not withstand scrutiny.

In Pearson, a minor, represented by a guardian ad litem, 

sued a defendant to recover damages for personal injuries. 

(Pearson, supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at p. 1336.) The parties settled 

and the guardian ad litem filed a petition to approve the settlement 

with the court. After the settlement was reached and before the 

court approved it, the minor died. If the litigation had not settled, 

the minor’s death would have extinguished his claim for damages 

for pain and suffering. (Ibid.) The settling defendant then opposed 
69

the petition for approval of the settlement. The trial court granted 

the motion because, as a result of the extinguishment of pain and 

suffering damages, the settlement “would result in a ‘windfall’ for 

plaintiffs.” (Id. at pp. 1336−1337.) 

The guardian ad litem in Pearson filed a petition for writ 

of mandate in the Court of Appeal to compel the trial court to 

grant the motion for approval of the settlement. The court issued 

the writ, and explained that “while the motion for approval of 

the minor’s compromise is pending, the settlement agreement is 

voidable only at the election of the minor or his guardian. Neither 

the letter nor the spirit of [Code of Civil Procedure] section 372 

confers any right on the defendant . . . to object when the court 

approves or disapproves of a settlement agreement.” (Pearson, 

supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at p. 1337.) 

Pearson was thus concerned solely with the question 

whether a defendant who enters into a settlement agreement with 

a guardian ad litem “can object to court approval of the settlement.” 

(Pearson, supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at p. 1339.) The court had no 

occasion to consider whether a minor can “void” a settlement 

agreement entered into by his or her guardian ad litem. The 

language Jacqueline relies on suggesting that the minor can do so—

that “the settlement agreement is voidable . . . at the election of the 

minor” (id. at p. 1339)—even when the guardian ad litem continues 

to seek the court’s approval of the agreement, is thus dictum. 

Because the statement in Pearson is unsupported by authority or 

sound policy, and contrary to our analysis of the interplay between 

Code of Civil Procedure section 372 and Family Code section 6710, 

we decline to adopt such dictum or extend Pearson’s holding to the 

facts in this case. 
70

D. Christine’s Additional Arguments

At pages 102 to 108 of her opening brief, Christine asserts 

a series of arguments that lack citations to the record and citations 

to pertinent legal authority, and are at times incoherent and 

conclusory. These include the following assertions: The trial court

“failed its duty to carry out the Trustors’ [i]ntent and Christine’s 

purpose of relinquishing assets of $35 million, to oversee [the 

guardian ad litem] and [c]o-[t]rustees’ breach of fiduciary duty, 

and to protect the minors”; “The Trustors and Christine had 

expected that it should be the duty of the [c]ourt, [the guardian 

ad litem] and the [t]rustees’ [sic] to carry out the Trustors’

irrevocable and indisputable intent that these real properties 

relinquished by Christine should have gone to the [c]hildren, not 

Esther, Margaret, Benjamin, Benjamin’s mother and wife (who 

are not even the Trust beneficiaries)”; The minors “were deprived 

by their expected inheritances, namely over $35 million in real 

and unique real properties, including Sycamore, Three Lanterns, 

Atlantic Towers, Taylor, family heirloom jewelries, and antique [sic] 

in the amount, which carry a sentimental value from the Trustors 

to the Minors and had generated substantial annual income of over 

$1 million for over 50 years”; “Christine would not agree to give

Esther a penny (let alone $3 million cash, family heirloom jewelry

and antique [sic], and Three Lanterns and Atlantic Tower), since

Esther had sued Robert into an early [sic] and was the major 

cause of Robert’s death”; The court “erroneously removed Christine 

from protecting her children when enforcing the settlement on 

June 24, 2020”; and “The [c]ourt erred in restricting Christine 

from advocating for her purpose [sic] of relinquishing $35 million,

carrying out the Trustors’ intent and protecting her children, by 

enforcing the settlement with adding 25 material terms, which 

Christine has never consented to.” Because these points are 
71

undeveloped or incoherent and lack pertinent citations to the record 

or legal authority, we decline to address them. 

E. Order Denying Christine’s Petition to Remove 

Chen as Guardian Ad Litem

1. Chen’s Alleged Conflict of Interest

Christine and Michael contend that the court erred in 

denying Christine’s petition to remove Chen as the Minors’ 

guardian ad litem because Chen’s representation of both allegedly 

created an unavoidable conflict of interest. The argument is 

based on the same misunderstanding of section 259 discussed in 

Discussion part B.6, ante. 

Christine and Michael rely on the provision of the Trust 

document that provides for the Three Lanterns and Sycamore 

properties to be given to Robert if Robert is living when the last 

trustor dies and, if Robert is not then living, to Christine and, if 

neither Robert nor Christine is then living, to Michael. Christine 

argues that due to this provision, Michael and Jacqueline had 

divergent views as to whether Christine, if the case had gone 

to trial, could have been deemed to have predeceased King for 

purposes of section 259. Under Christine’s view of section 259, 

if she is deemed to have predeceased King, Michael would receive 

the Trust’s entire interests in Three Lanterns and Sycamore, and 

Jacqueline would receive no interest in these properties. But if 

Christine’s view of section 259 is incorrect, Three Lanterns and 

Sycamore would be distributed as part of the Trust residue of which 

Michael and Jacqueline are 10 percent beneficiaries. Christine 

therefore contends that Michael’s interests are aligned with her 

view of section 259, while Jacqueline’s interests are aligned with 

the opposing view. Chen, Christine concludes, was thus conflicted 

by the opposing interests of his wards. 
72

Christine’s view of section 259, as discussed above, is based 

on an untenable construction of the statute. According to Christine, 

if she is deemed to have predeceased King under section 259, 

she has also predeceased King for purposes of the Trust bequest 

that Michael shall receive Three Lanterns and Sycamore if she 

predeceases King. The scope of the determination that one has 

“predeceased a decedent” under section 259, however, is expressly 

limited “to the extent provided in subdivision (c)” of that statute. 

Subdivision (c) extends no further than to prevent a person found 

liable under subdivision (a) or convicted of a specified crime 

under subdivision (b) from receiving any of the property, damages, 

and costs awarded to the decedent’s estate in an action described 

in subdivisions (a) or (b). That is, it limits what the abuser can

receive; it does not expand the rights of others or create a rule 

for interpreting provisions of a trust document. A determination 

that Christine has predeceased King for purposes of section 259, 

therefore, does not mean that Christine has predeceased King for 

purposes of the bequest of Three Lanterns and Sycamore.

In this light, Christine’s and Michael’s argument that Chen 

had a conflict of interest amounts to an argument that Chen had a 

duty to assert an untenable position on behalf of Michael. He did 

not. There was thus no conflict of interest and, therefore, no error

in denying Christine’s motion to remove Chen as guardian ad litem.

2. Chen’s Alleged Misconduct

Michael further contends that Chen should have been 

removed because he made false statements regarding the 

co-trustees’ legal fees in this litigation. Michael relies on alleged 

statements and actions for which he provides no citation to the 

record. He also relies on Chen’s involvement in certain post-appeal 

orders, which Michael contends violate the terms of the settlement 
73

agreement and the second GAL agreement. These allegations 

are also made without citation to the record and, in any case, are 

not encompassed within the scope of Michael’s notice of appeal. 

Michael further points to Christine’s experts’ declarations to the 

effect that the second GAL agreement deprived the Minors of more 

than $6 million in income from the Sycamore and Three Lanterns 

properties. Even if these statements are credited, they are 

expressly based on the assumptions that the settlement agreement 

is not enforceable and that Michael “stood to inherit Christine 

Chui’s interests in Sycamore.” These assumptions, however, are 

unsupported by the record. For all these reasons, we reject these 

contentions.

F. The Court’s Discharge of OSC Regarding Removal 

of Co-trustees

On July 18, 2019, when the court granted Christine’s motion 

for judgment as to the first GAL agreement, the court further 

ordered that the co-trustees be suspended as trustees and issued 

“an OSC why they should not be removed.” The court did not, 

however, set a date for a hearing on the OSC. The parties (other 

than Christine) thereafter entered into the second GAL agreement

and Chen petitioned for its approval. Replacement trustees for 

Benjamin and Margaret were never appointed and the OSC does 

not appear to have been addressed again until the court issued 

its consolidated rulings on March 3, 2020. At that time, the court 

discharged the OSC because the settlement agreement had “been 

approved and [the] litigation [was] concluded.” The court thus 

found “it unnecessary to proceed on the OSC.”

Christine and Michael argue that the court erred in 

discharging the OSC. Because we have affirmed the court’s ruling 

enforcing the settlement agreement and its approval of the second 

GAL agreement, which effectively terminate Christine’s and the 
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Minors’ interests in the Trust, Christine and Michael do not have 

standing to seek removal of the co-trustees. Accordingly, we reject 

this argument on that basis. 

DISPOSITION

The orders are affirmed. Respondents are awarded their costs

on appeal.

CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION.

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

We concur:

CHANEY, J.

BENDIX, J.