U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

66–252 CC WASHINGTON : 2000

U.S. POLICY TOWARD IRAQ

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

THURSDAY, MARCH 23, 2000

Serial No. 106–134

Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/international—relations

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COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York, Chairman

WILLIAM F. GOODLING, Pennsylvania

JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa

HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois

DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey

DAN BURTON, Indiana

ELTON GALLEGLY, California

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida

CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina

DANA ROHRABACHER, California

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California

PETER T. KING, New York

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio

MARSHALL ‘‘MARK’’ SANFORD, South

Carolina

MATT SALMON, Arizona

AMO HOUGHTON, New York

TOM CAMPBELL, California

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York

KEVIN BRADY, Texas

RICHARD BURR, North Carolina

PAUL E. GILLMOR, Ohio

GEORGE RADANOVICH, California

JOHN COOKSEY, Louisiana

THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado

SAM GEJDENSON, Connecticut

TOM LANTOS, California

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American

Samoa

MATTHEW G. MARTINEZ, California

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey

SHERROD BROWN, Ohio

CYNTHIA A. MCKINNEY, Georgia

ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida

PAT DANNER, Missouri

EARL F. HILLIARD, Alabama

BRAD SHERMAN, California

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida

STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey

JIM DAVIS, Florida

EARL POMEROY, North Dakota

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York

BARBARA LEE, California

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York

JOSEPH M. HOEFFEL, Pennsylvania

RICHARD J. GARON, Chief of Staff

KATHLEEN BERTELSEN MOAZED, Democratic Chief of Staff

STEPHEN G. RADEMAKER, Chief Counsel

MARILYN C. OWEN, Staff Associate

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C O N T E N T S

WITNESSES

Page

The Honorable C. David Welch, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of International

Organization Affairs, U.S. Department of State ............................................... 10

The Honorable A. Elizabeth Jones, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary,

Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Department of State ............................. 15

Ms. Alina Romanowski, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and

South Asian Affairs, U.S. Department of Defense ............................................ 15

APPENDIX

Prepared Members’ statements:

The Honorable Benjamin A. Gilman, a Representative in Congress from New

York and Chairman, Committee on International Relations ........................... 32

The Honorable John Conyers, Jr., a Representative in Congress from Michigan ......................................................................................................................... 35

The Honorable Sam Gejdenson, a Representative in Congress from Connecticut .................................................................................................................. 40

The Honorable Joseph Crowley, a Representative in Congress from New

York ....................................................................................................................... 41

Prepared Witness statements:

Assistant Secretary David Welch and Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary

Beth Jones, U.S. Department of State ............................................................... 45

Alina L. Romanowski, Principal Assistant Secretary, Department of Defense .. 51

Additional materials submitted for the record:

Question submitted by William Delahunt, a Representative in Congress from

Massachusetts, together with answer of Assistant Secretary Welch (Exhibit

A) ........................................................................................................................... 56

Letter submitted by Christopher Smith, a Representative in Congress from

New Jersey and Chairman, Subcommittee on International Operations and

Human Rights, to Secretary of State Madeleine Albright on February 18,

2000 (Exhibit B) ................................................................................................... 57

Question submitted by Mr. Smith, together with answer of Assistant Secretary Welch (Exhibit C) ..................................................................................... 60

Question submitted by Mr. Smith, together with answer of Assistant Secretary Welch (Exhibit D) ..................................................................................... 61

Question submitted by Marshall ‘‘Mark’’ Sanford, a Representative in Congress from South Carolina, together with answer of Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Alina Romanowski, (Exhibits E and F) ................................ 62

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U.S. POLICY TOWARD IRAQ

Thursday, March 23, 2000

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,

Washington, D.C.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room

2200, Rayburn House Office Building, Benjamin A. Gilman (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.

Chairman GILMAN. The Committee will come to order.

I want to welcome our distinguished witnesses to today’s hearing

on our nation’s policy toward Iraq. Iraq has been a festering foreign

policy problem for our nation for a long time. What most distresses

us is that our nation stopped making headway on the problem

years ago. Now it seems that, pretty much across the board, we are

losing ground to Saddam Hussein.

There have been no international weapons inspections in Iraq for

15 months. There is every reason to believe that Saddam has used

this time to reconstitute his weapons of mass destruction programs.

Three months ago, the U.N. decided to set up a new inspections

program, but we all know that threatened vetoes in the U.N. Security Council are likely to prevent that new organization from beginning work in Iraq for many, many months.

Our nation has a policy of containing Saddam militarily. That

policy has cost us some $8 billion since the end of the Gulf War

in 1991.

It cost over $1.2 billion last year alone.

In December 1998, we launched Operation Desert Fox to punish

Saddam for not cooperating with international weapons inspections. The Administration told us at that time that we had degraded Saddam’s capabilities and so the operation was declared a

success. Since then, Saddam has routinely challenged our aircraft

patrolling over the no-fly zones, and we have retaliated each time

with air strikes. Again, we are told that this policy is a success because it is degrading Saddam’s capabilities.

Maybe we are degrading his capabilities, but he does not seem

to mind too much, because he keeps provoking us to degrade him

some more. A year and a half ago, a number of us here in the Congress decided to help our President end this problem once and for

all by passing the Iraq Liberation Act. That legislation authorized

the President to provide $97 million in U.S. military assistance to

the democratic opposition to Saddam Hussein.

President Clinton welcomed that authority, and in November

1998 he declared he was going to use it to remove Saddam from

power. Since then, there has been precious little follow through on

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the President’s commitment. Of the $97 million we authorized in

military assistance to the opposition, the only assistance that has

actually been provided is training for four men in civil affairs. Of the $18 million we appropriated on three separate occasions

for political assistance to the opposition, not one dime has actually

been provided to the opposition, and less than $4 million has been

expended on their behalf. It is no wonder that our allies in the region, to say nothing of members of the opposition itself, question

whether the Administration is really serious about its declared policy of removing Saddam from power. If the Administration is truly

serious about supporting the opposition, there are two things it

should do right away.

First, it should immediately deliver to the opposition the assistance that currently is being withheld. The funds we have appropriated for the opposition should immediately be transferred to the

opposition, and the military drawdown authority should be invoked

to begin providing equipment such as radio transmitters, uniforms,

boots, and communications gear.

Second, the Administration should immediately establish a crossborder humanitarian aid program into Iraq, run by the Iraqi opposition. Such a program could do a great deal to ameliorate the

plight of the Iraqi people, who continue to suffer under Saddam’s

rule. It also would address the concern that some members have

expressed about the effect of U.N. sanctions on the Iraqi people.

I want to urge the Administration today to take these two steps

in order to demonstrate that it stands by President Clinton’s November 1998 pledge to remove Saddam from power. Before I recognize our witnesses, I would like to recognize our Ranking Member,

Mr. Gejdenson, for any opening remarks that he may have. Mr.

Gejdenson.

[The prepared statement of Chairman Gilman appears in the appendix.]

Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Chairman, might we suspend with the

opening remarks? We have our colleague here who wants to make

a statement and needs your approval. Could we all hold up and let

Mr. Conyers speak, if that is OK?

Chairman Gilman: Without objection, if that is agreeable, we will

proceed. I would like to welcome our distinguished colleague, the

Honorable John Conyers of Michigan, who has asked to join us

today to make a brief statement. I know of his long abiding interest

with regard to Iraq. Mr. Conyers.

Mr. CONYERS. Thank you very much, Chairman Gilman; and my

dear friend, Mr. Gejdenson; my colleague on Judiciary, Mr. Berman; and, of course, Barbara Lee, who I have worked with for

years; and Members of the Committee. I am delighted to be here.

You have my prepared statement. I wanted to just take a few minutes to summarize where we are going, because I heard the ending

part of the Chairman’s opening remarks, with which I agree.

Before I start, I wanted to thank the Chairman and Ranking

Member for all they have been doing in trying to get Haiti’s elections on the right path. That is a very important issue for me, and

I would like to praise you for that. You were going down there before I was, Mr. Chairman, and we enjoy your staff accompanying

us and helping us out. Now, the question here is that after we have

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had resignations from two Assistant Secretaries General for United

Nations Humanitarian Relief, Halliday and Von Sponeck, the pressures are now rising. Today I noticed we have increased the

amount of food-for-oil ratios. I think it has been doubled, and I am

happy about that.

But there is a fundamental problem, which is that 23 million

people cannot recover from a wrecked infrastructure, no matter

how much we raise those levels. What I am here to suggest to you

is that the UNICEF figure of 5,000 children dying every month has

raised us to a point where this is trading our integrity and our belief in human rights. As a matter of fact, we are undermining them

by continuing the oil-for-food transaction.

I would like to suggest to you, and maybe I am the first witness

you had who would take into account that maybe the time has

come for us to abandon this plan. It is too complicated to administer. The U.N. has not been effectively doing it. I think that what

we are doing here, Mr. Chairman and Members, is committing war

by yet another means.

So it is my hope that we will consider that the main problem

with oil-for-food is that it does not generate sufficient funds to

begin the process of rehabilitating Iraq’s infrastructure, which is

now at a very, very low level and condition.

Children are dying from diseases that would otherwise be treated. The long-term danger of economic sanctions goes beyond the

crisis of dying children. There are many other problems as well.

The point that I have arrived at, thanks to Bishop Thomas

Gumbelton and Reverend Ed Rowe of the Methodists, Denis

Halliday, whom I have met with, the Institute of Policy Studies

staffer Phyllis Dennis, and many others, has led me to suggest to

you that we consider doing a couple of things.

As long as there is a temporary program, it is not going to work.

If we lift it altogether, the economic sanctions altogether, do away

with the oil-for-food restrictions, and replace it instead with monitoring from both the inside and the outside, with the U.N. watching the borders, I think with UNMOVIC we will be able to move

much further down the line. The reason that we would be able to

move away from the humanitarian problem, of course, is that we

would be able to bring in medical supplies and food.

Also, in the dual-use area, I would beg you to look at that in

terms of some of the things we can do with chlorine and incubators

that could be monitored carefully enough so that we would not run

into a problem. So increasing the allocation is not enough. Temporarily lifting the ban is not enough. I think that we would begin

to strengthen ourselves, in terms of building up a citizenry for the

objective that you and I all are working toward. I think Hussein’s

burned a lot of bridges behind him with the OPEC countries as

well. I think there could be a quid pro quo for lifting these sanctions. I think Tariq Aziz would support monitoring with a new kind

of cooperation, if there were a lifting of this ban.

So I think that this ought to move in that direction, because we

cannot achieve democracy by undemocratic means. We cannot inspire respect for human rights by undermining them. I beg that

you consider the fact that the killing of 500,000 children because

we have not been creative enough to create another way to prevent

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the possibility of an unknown potential future threat, is simply unacceptable.

I thank you for this time. My detailed remarks are, of course, included in my statement.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Conyers appears in the appendix.]

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Conyers, for taking the time

to appear before us.

Are there any questions anyone would like to direct to Mr. Conyers? We appreciate your continued interest in humanitarian efforts, and particularly in Haiti, as well as this issue. Mr. Berman.

Mr. BERMAN. If you accept the premise that the regime in Iraq

is totalitarian, in a sense it controls. If you were to get rid of embargoes on trade in food and medicines, it would control distribution and all of that. Why would that make things better than the

oil-for-food and medicines program that now exists, and also provides in part for distribution of food and medicines in the North of

Iraq? In a sense, the Iraqi oil is being used to pay to help feed and

supply the Kurds in the North.

Mr. CONYERS. There are a couple of considerations, Mr. Berman.

One is that there is a maldistribution of what is going on between

the north and mid-south, a very serious one that has been brought

to my attention, in terms of the supplies and equipment.

Mr. BERMAN. Do you mean more is getting to the north?

Mr. CONYERS. To the north; yes, sir. But over and beyond that,

what we are doing is that we are becoming the oppressors. Obviously, we are reducing the possibility of the people from ever becoming organized and increasing their resistance because obviously

they are blaming us. It is our policy, although I have heard arguments both ways.

By changing this formula drastically, as I have suggested, we

would then be allowing Iraq to make major financial investments.

There is no way they can do that now, because they cannot develop

their oil resources any further and because nobody will invest there

at this point.

That is why I think that the foreign minister has agreed to comply stringently with the requirements that we would put on. Most

importantly, the food and the medicines would have to be going to

the people. That would encourage them.

As a matter of fact, it has been predicted that they would then

begin to invest more in their own people themselves than they have

been, since they did that after the Iraq-Iran war. We think that

would resume again. Right now they are just blaming us. That is

why I recommend that there be a departure, a drastic departure,

to help the Iraqi people.

Mr. BERMAN. Their investments during the Iraq-Iran war were

for weapons, many of them provided by Western countries, to develop their nerve gas potential to use against their own people in

Iraq.

Mr. CONYERS. There was some of that. But the people that have

told me that they would be able to employ more resources. Whether

they would or not, I cannot defend against any arguments.

Mr. BERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Smith.

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Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much.

Mr. Conyers, I share concern, as we all do, about the loss of life

for children, and women and men in Iraq, but especially for the

children. I am frankly torn about the efficacy of the sanctions.

I have been going back and forth in my own mind about what

is being achieved when you have a malevolent dictator like Saddam

Hussein, who in my view, and I think you would agree, and maybe

you might want to say it for the record, compounds the problem by

not allowing, by impeding, the flow of medicines and food so that

more children do die so then he can turn around and say, look, see

what the sanctions are doing.

I think we have to be very cognizant of that lethal game that he

employs. Just a couple of very brief comments: A 1999 UNICEF

study found an increase in child mortality since 1991. It noted that

Iraq had not allowed implementation of the food-for-oil program

until 1996, too late to have a substantial impact on the child mortality statistics measured by the study, which were for the period

1994 to 1999.

Again, if there are ten children who are dying, that is ten too

many. If there is one child dying, that is one too many. But the

5,000 figure, just so we know, is that accurate as of today? Every

month are 5,000 kids still dying?

Mr. CONYERS. This is a UNICEF figure.

Mr. SMITH. I know that, but in terms of their study, from at least

the UNICEF report I read, that dates back a bit. But if you could,

just for clarity?

Mr. CONYERS. For clarity, I can repeat that UNICEF still stands

by their astounding estimate of about 5,000 children dying every

month.

Mr. SMITH. That would be this February and March?

Mr. CONYERS. Yes.

Mr. SMITH. OK. Just so we have that.

Mr. CONYERS. It is an incredible figure; I agree with you. By the

way, I want to underline my support for everything you have said

about Hussein getting the better end of this deal. We are in a

quandary. If this were easily resolved, we would not have to hold

a hearing.

I would really like to continue to urge you, Mr. Smith, to think

about another mechanism, because the oil for food program does

not promote enough, even with the 100 percent improvement in allotments, to make really a serious difference. I think that we have

to help the U.N. craft another way.

Mr. SMITH. I appreciate it.

Mr. CONYERS. Thank you.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you. Ms. Lee.

Ms. LEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First, let me just say to Mr. Conyers, thank you very much for

being here and for your leadership. I have joined you for the last

couple of years in signing the letter to the Administration asking

for the de-linking of the military and the economic sanctions. Certainly for me, we understand who Saddam Hussein is.

We also understand that there are 5,000 children a month dying.

It is a calculated risk because, like you say, who knows what? We

can only anticipate that less people would die, less children would

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die, if economic sanctions were lifted. I think it is worth the risk,

because in no way should our country be even in part allowing

these numbers to die before us. It is just an immoral position, I

think, to take.

Let me just ask you, in terms of what is going on in Iraq with

regard to the military buildup, if we were to lift economic sanctions—let me put it another way. From your point of view, does

Saddam Hussein or does the international community bear the responsibility for the deaths of these children in Iraq? Or do you believe that is a question that cannot be answered, that we just have

to move forward to try to stop it?

Mr. CONYERS. There are people on both sides of it. Let me just

put it to you frankly. It is our approved policy that is doing this.

The fact that Hussein is aggravating, manipulating, taking advantage of it, and playing it as a crude political tool at the expense

of his own people, should not in any way dissuade us from reconsidering the policy.

What I am suggesting is that the damage that is being done is

so great that there is no way within the oil-for-food program that

we can ever turn these numbers substantially around. What we are

doing, in my judgment, is committing war by another means. It is

on the most helpless of a civilian population. I would like to help

these people buildup. You know what that is doing, for those of you

who have been over there, what this is doing for our relationships

with the people themselves, who keep asking, why are they doing

this to us?

I think it would give us a new way to go in there. I would be

the first to say if for any reason it does not work or they are so

duplicitous that it will not ever happen, then I would be willing to

withdraw. We have enough creativity to not get hooked on a program that has led two administrators of the program to throw up

their hands in disgust.

Chairman Gilman: Thank you, Ms. Lee. Dr. Cooksey.

Mr. COOKSEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Mr.

Conyers. I really want to ask a question of you and everyone of the

panel in the room. We have had sanctions in Iraq and they have

not worked. I, too, am concerned about it from a humanitarian

standpoint, particularly the children. But, the weakest in society

are the children and the very elderly.

We have done the same thing in Cuba since 1959 or 1960. My

question is, is there a model out there that we have used or that

has been used elsewhere in the world that has worked to get rid

of a dictator?

Mr. CONYERS. Yes, the South African anti-apartheid regime, but

that model will not work in this case because, there, the African

people were totally united with ANC. There was a coming together,

which of course Hussein has skillfully prevented from happening in

Iraq. His people are not only not united, but they are seriously divided; thanks to him. So he has made it impossible to follow that

model.

With our pursuit of this plan, we are also taking on the angst

of the Iraqi people. It is clear to them that they have no allies outside of Iraq. It only aggravates the problem, from my view. That

is why I want to reiterate what you said, what Barbara Lee said:

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continue the military sanctions. As a matter of fact, we might be

able to tighten them. I think we could come around on the other

hand and begin to show to the people that we are revising our position on this policy. It is a U.N. policy. It is not American made, but

is American supported, and we must be willing to revisit this policy.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you.

Mr. COOKSEY. Could I yield to Mr. Berman?

Did you have another example? You were about to say something?

Mr. BERMAN. No, I was thinking one can make a case that the

sanctions and the prohibitions on new investments in South Africa

helped persuade the business community there to lobby, to come

down against apartheid and the apartheid government, and played

a major role in creating the dynamic by which Nelson Mandela was

freed, and they went to free elections.

Mr. CONYERS. Of course, there is not any private sector. It is a

different dynamic going on in Iraq. This is the problem.

Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Delahunt?

Mr. DELAHUNT. Yes, thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Conyers, on this side.

Mr. CONYERS. Good morning.

Mr. DELAHUNT. I think the point about the sanctions in South

Africa that should be made is that those sanctions were crafted and

imposed in consultation with the ANC, with those forces in South

Africa that were attempting to overthrow the apartheid system, the

apartheid regime. But that, in my opinion, has not occurred, and

I do not know if it is feasible, within Iraq nor in Cuba. I have visited Cuba on several occasions. I have spoken with dissidents

there. The ones with whom I have discussed the issue of the sanctions, indicate that it does not accrue to their benefit. I think that

is important.

In this particular case, if I am clear as to your position, it is that.

I would hope that when the Administration witnesses come before

us to testify, that they speak first to the issue of the validity of that

5,000-a-month figure. I think that is very important, because it is

something that no matter what, if we can do anything to reduce

that figure, I think it is a moral obligation on the United States

to do.

It would be your position if that figure is accurate, that if we lifted the economic sanctions, then the burden and the onus would

then be on Saddam Hussein and the regime to distribute, in a fair

and equitable manner, resources to reduce that figure. If it did not,

he then would lose support, popular support, and the battle of public opinion within the country. Is that your position?

Mr. CONYERS. Yes. His credibility would then legitimately come

under the attack that it has escaped.

Mr. DELAHUNT. It would become very clear to the Iraqi people

that it was not the Great Satan, it was, in fact, the regime itself

that was responsible for the tragedy that is occurring.

Mr. BERMAN. Would the gentleman yield?

Mr. DELAHUNT. I yield to Mr. Berman.

Mr. BERMAN. Could I just give the opposite side of that view?

First of all, these sanctions were imposed to achieve certain things,

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first and foremost of which is to help ensure the elimination of a

program of weapons of mass destruction. They are not essentially

designed to make Saddam fall.

There are other aspects of U.S. policy that are maybe directed toward that. The Chairman has been heavily involved in some of

those issues. But this was evolved for the possibility of the lifting

of sanctions, and was held out to the Iraqi government, based on

their willingness to go along with a serious and intrusive inspection program to ensure that these programs were not going on.

We have no idea what the Iraqi people think, because Saddan

uses every means of repression and suppression, up to and including mass executions and murder, to create the demonstrations of

support for his regime, the squashing of dissidents and all of that.

Leading up to the Gulf War, the argument of people who opposed

the war was, do sanctions. The people who decided to support the

war were saying, we do not think sanctions are going to achieve

getting them out of Kuwait. But now the sanctions are focused on

getting back in a meaningful inspection program, and then, with

the possibility then that sanctions would be lifted.

It is possible that if you took away the oil-for-food program and

allowed free trade and donations in food, that resources would then

go to otherwise better the lives of the Iraqi people for infrastructure. I believe it is just as equal or an even greater possibility that,

that program will be used to even more quickly rebuild the military, pursue the weapons of mass destruction program, and freeup those resources from oil sales for that purpose. That is the other

side of the debate.

Mr. CONYERS. Yes, sir. That’s not an impossible belief. The fact

of the matter is, the lifting of the economic sanctions in no way

interferes with stopping them from their nuclear and military capabilities, because military sanctions would continue. We will be giving ourselves an advantage that we have never enjoyed before, one

of preventing civilian deaths, while also preventing military capabilities.

If anything, Howard, I would be for increasing military sanctions

in exchange for lifting of the economic sanctions. We had indications from at least the second in command, if that means anything,

that this could be a way out of our dilemma. It would give them

the chance that they need to create massive capital to buildup their

oil reserves and production capability, which will always be kept

down, the way we are doing it. Plus we have this hugely immoral

policy, that to me does not square us with our role in the United

Nations and around our country.

Chairman GILMAN. The gentleman’s time has expired. Mr. Sanford.

Mr. SANFORD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would simply say that I agree with a lot of what you have said.

The one component that I would disagree with, and would just be

curious to hear your thoughts on, would be the idea of lifting economic but leaving in place military sanctions. It seems to me, as

an advocate of our armed forces, right now we have something that

is providing a lot of wear and tear on our military forces, something that is providing a lot of expense to the American taxpayer.

9

That is this enforcement of the no-fly zones, which were originally

put in place to uphold U.N. Security Council Resolution 688.

This was basically to help in easing the repression of Iraqi forces.

It has not done that. As a result, I think American pilots go around

blowing holes in the sky. Every morning, they will leave Turkey at

4 a.m., F–16 pilots out of Turkey, be up at first sunlight there over

the northern watch, and roll in to provide enforcement of that,

quote, ‘‘no -fly zone.’’ It is, in essence, a patchwork that has proved

to be, I think, ineffectual in really making that difference that is

called for in U.N. Security Council Resolution 688. So I would just

be curious as to why the one, but not the other?

Mr. CONYERS. That is why I said that we may have to strengthen

our military sanctions, and that would include revisiting them to

develop something that might be more effective. So I am not asking

that we do anything but continue and maybe even strengthen

those. But as to this other part, Mr. Sanford, the humanitarian

part, we are losing the war with the people. This compares with

South Africa, where they had a feeling that many people in America and its government, finally, and other governments, were in the

struggle with them.

That feeling does not exist in Iraq and cannot exist with the tactics that Hussein is using, which may be considered far more vicious than the ones that were applied in South Africa.

So I do not have a strategy for the military sanctions, but I do

think they should be continued or tightened. By the way, I do not

know how long Mr. Delahunt was sitting over there, but I commended the Chairman and Ranking Member for their participation

in our efforts to get free and fair elections in Haiti. I want to include his name in that for the record.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Thank you.

Chairman GILMAN. If there are no further questions of Mr. Conyers, we want to thank Congressman Conyers for taking the time

and for sharing his thoughts with us.

Mr. CONYERS. I am honored to be before the Committee. Thank

you so much.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you. We will now proceed with the

balance of our hearing. Mr. Gejdenson.

Mr. GEJDENSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be brief. I am

concerned of the erosion of the international consensus on the Iraq

policy; especially within the Security Council. It is clear that Saddam Hussein would use any additional resources to rebuild his arsenal of mass destruction and, frankly, try to increase his ballistic

missile capability.

I think that we have to recognize that if there is a diminution

of support in the Security Council and elsewhere in this country for

this policy, it will not be sustained over the long haul. Just because

we do not have good options, does not mean that we ought to stick

with the policy as it is.

In every conversation that I have had with General Zinni, with

Arab leaders from the region, the opposition is not taken seriously.

I know this Congress spends a lot of time wanting to arm and in

other ways facilitate the opposition. Even the Administration announced today that it will grant $260,000 to the Iraqi National

Congress. My sense of a leadership that spends most of its time in

10

fancy hotels in London is that they are not the ones that are going

to lead a revolution on the ground in Iraq.

We do have to build a consensus with Iraq’s neighbors, as difficult as that is and as often frustrating as it is. It is clear that

Saddam Hussein, with his present resources, is not paying attention to his people’s needs. It is hard to believe that even if he has

more oil and more resources, that he would use it for his own citizens instead of building billion-dollar palaces and trying to get

more weapons. But again, we will not be successful unless we build

broad-based support for our policy.

I would like to applaud the president and Secretary Albright for

the steps they have taken toward Iran, made easier, obviously, by

Iran’s own moderate actions and the elections of moderate officials

to their parliament. But I do think we need a new approach and

a new look at this policy in Iraq, so that we can have a broad-based

political response here in the United States and overseas.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Gejdenson appears in the appendix.]

Chairman Gilman: Thank you, Mr. Gejdenson.

I will now ask our witnesses to come forward. Mr. Welch, Ms.

Romanowski, Ambassador Jones. Our panel of witnesses today is

headed by C. David Welch, Assistant Secretary of International Organization Affairs for our Department of State. Mr. Welch has

served in that position since October 1998, after most recently serving as principal Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of Near

Eastern Affairs. Mr. Welch has had a long career in foreign service

prior to this, serving us in a number of posts overseas in the Middle East.

We welcome you, Assistant Secretary Welch. You may put your

full statement in the record and abbreviate it, or whatever you

deem appropriate.

STATEMENT OF HONORABLE C. DAVID WELCH, ASSISTANT

SECRETARY, BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. WELCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank you and your colleagues for holding this hearing this morning. Mr. Chairman, with

your permission, I would like to use my statement this morning in

view of the importance of this issue, the gravity of some of the

things said, in particular about Administration policy, so that I

may give you as comprehensive a look at this issue as I think it

merits.

Chairman GILMAN. Please proceed.

Mr. WELCH. I am going to speak on behalf of the State Department and the Administration. I am joined by my colleague Beth

Jones, who covers overall policy toward Iraq, and including toward

the Iraqi opposition. Ms. Romanowski, from the Department of Defense, can address our military posture and our security presence

in the area.

I am going to focus in these introductory remarks on two areas.

First, the humanitarian situation in the country, including the balance between the impact of sanctions and the benefits of the oilfor-food program. I would also like to say a few words on disarVerDate 11-MAY-2000 08:26 Oct 13, 2000 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 66252.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1
11

mament, prevention of rearmament, and what we expect from what

is called UNMOVIC over the next few months.

Mr. Chairman, the humanitarian situation is a complex subject,

and we are concerned about the recent flow of misinformation and

biased assertions from several sources that has made it difficult to

maintain sight of what our policy really is and what is really happening on the ground in Iraq. We hope to provide some clarification

today.

U.S. policy toward Iraq has followed a consistent course since the

liberation of Kuwait in January 1991; and whatever you might

have read in the papers lately, there is no sea-change in the offing.

Our policy is based on the objective judgment that the regime of

Saddam Hussein poses a continuing threat to regional peace and

security, which must be contained.

Again, despite what you may have seen in the press, containment remains a cost-effective and successful policy. U.N. sanctions

are extremely important and must continue until Iraq complies

with its obligations under the Security Council resolutions. Let me

state for the record that we do not expect Iraq to meet that standard any time soon.

In fact, we doubt that Iraq will take the sensible steps necessary

to obtain the lifting or the suspension of sanctions, as long as Saddam Hussein is in power. Those sanctions do not target the civilian

population, however, and have in fact never restricted the importation of basic medicines and food.

The United States has focused on addressing humanitarian

needs in Iraq since the immediate aftermath of Operation Desert

Storm in 1991, when brutal military repression displaced tens of

thousands of civilians in northern Iraq. We responded with Operation Provide Comfort, a U.S.-led coalition effort that provided food,

shelter, and other forms of disaster assistance on a massive scale.

The coalition also instituted a no-fly zone in the north in 1991,

and another one in the south in 1992. That has contained the Iraqi

military and prevented any repetition of large scale use of force

against civilians. In the Security Council, we have championed the

humanitarian interests of the Iraqi people, and we continue to do

so as we speak. Let me cite a few examples.

In April 1991, we helped shape Security Council Resolution 688,

which demanded an end to Iraqi repression of civilians and provided part of the rationale for the no-fly zones. In August 1991, we

played a leading role in drafting Resolution 706, which included

the original oil-for-food program, a program Iraq promptly rejected.

Let me repeat that date: August 1991. In May 1995, we cosponsored Resolution 986, which expanded and fleshed out the oil-forfood concept. You will recall the tragically slow evolution of that

concept. Iraq rejected that resolution outright for at least another

year, and then slow-rolled it for six more months, so that the first

delivery of humanitarian goods under that resolution did not occur

until March 1997; three years ago. Some critics are attempting now

to portray oil-for-food as part of the humanitarian problem in Iraq.

In fact, it is a solution whose implementation was long delayed by

the Iraqi regime and whose full potential is only now being approached.

12

In February 1998, we supported Resolution 1153, which ex- panded that oil-for-food program to $5.2 billion in oil export revenues during each six months; over $10 billion a year. In December

1999, we supported Resolution 1284, which removed that ceiling on

the value of oil exports authorized to meet humanitarian needs in

Iraq. That resolution also included numerous provisions to improve

the efficiency of oil-for-food.

I want to emphasize that the need to balance the impact of sanctions and the benefits of the oil-for-food program is not a new challenge for U.S. policy. Sanctions were imposed for valid reasons,

have been in place for nine and one-half years, and are likely to

continue for some time. Oil-for-food has been in place almost exactly three years, during which oil prices have fluctuated, and the

program itself has been constantly reassessed and adjusted. That

process of assessment and adjustment is ongoing, as indicated in

Resolution 1284, and will certainly continue.

Sanctions are not aimed at the Iraqi people. The bottom line is

this. We believe that oil-for-food, properly managed, can effectively

mitigate the impact of sanctions on Iraq’s civilian population for as

long as sanctions on the Iraqi regime remain in effect. Success will

require the U.N. to do the best possible job of administering the

program.

Similarly, Iraq will have to be pressed to do its part, cooperating

with the program, rather than seeking to discredit it, rather than

seeking to circumvent it, and rather than attempting to eliminate

it. Maintaining the proper balance will never be easy, but we believe it is an achievable result and certainly a result worth the utmost effort over the long haul.

Criticism of sanctions is understandable. But we believe much of

the recent criticism has been misplaced. In particular, those who

see negative consequences from sanctions and advocating lifting

sanctions as the only solution overlook at least three important

points.

First, the Saddam Hussein regime is among the most brutal and

systematic violators of human rights in modern memory. The most

recent report of the U.N. Special Rapporteur For Human Rights

noted that the gravity of human rights in Iraq has few parallels

since the end of the second World War.

Second, sanctions deprive Saddam Hussein of the financial

wherewithal to pursue his manifest goal of acquiring and using

weapons of mass destruction. Saddam, deploying WMD, would be

the worst imaginable humanitarian outcome for the Iraqi people

and for all the peoples of the region.

Third, lifting sanctions would enable Saddam to rebuild his military and put his WMD programs on the fast track, but would not

guarantee a better life for the average Iraqi. On the contrary, conditions for many Iraqis, especially in the north, would deteriorate

dramatically if oil-for-food and the U.N. presence disappeared.

Let me be crystal clear. Providing resources to Saddam Hussein

would not mean relief for the Iraqi people. Conversely, providing

relief to the Iraqi people is not the same as helping Saddam. Let

me explain that.

First, Saddam Hussein’s perennial spending priority is military

development and WMD. It is not civilian well-being. Lifting sancVerDate 11-MAY-2000 08:26 Oct 13, 2000 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 66252.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1
13

tions would simply enrich the regime and enable it to pursue

Saddam’s spending priorities. Lifting sanctions would not help the

Iraqi people.

Second, we also hear criticism from the other side, from those

who say that oil-for-food is in fact helping Saddam Hussein. Just

as providing more resources to the Iraqi regime, for example by

lifting sanctions, would not benefit the Iraqi people, it is our view

that oil-for-food resources provided to the people do not benefit the

regime. On the contrary, providing humanitarian assistance to the

Iraqi people is essential to maintaining international support for

sanctions on the regime.

Oil-for-food is having a clear and measurable impact. Nutrition

has improved. Per capita intake is up from 1,300 calories per day

before the program began to over 2,000 now, thanks to a ration

basket, the U.N. ration basket, that is augmented by locally grown

foods. Food imports are now at pre-war levels. In the year before

the program began Iraq imported about $50 million worth of medicine.

Over the past three years more that $1 billion worth of medicines

have been approved. Similarly, over a billion dollars worth of goods

for the water, sanitation, electrical and agricultural sectors have

been approved. The impact has been the greatest in the northern

provinces. The reason for that is simple. The U.N. manages the

program there without interference from the regime.

For example, the same UNICEF study others have cited this

morning showed that infant mortality in the north has fallen below

pre-war levels. Yet in south central Iraq, where the Iraqi government handles distribution of oil-for-food goods, the study has revealed a disturbing rise in child mortality to more than double the

pre-war level. These numbers show that oil-for-food can meet the

needs of the Iraqi people, if manipulation by the regime can be

overcome.

Let me say a few words about how the United States can make

this program more effective. We have been accused recently of having too many holds or having the wrong holds on contracts proposed under this program. Of course there are those in Baghdad,

and I have to say even in the Security Council, who seem to believe

that neither the United States nor any member of the Iraq Sanctions Committee should put any contract on hold for any reason.

Our goal is to help the oil-for-food program succeed. With that

in mind, we want to approve every contract we can and do it as

quickly as we can. But there is another goal that is equally as important, and that is to deny Saddam Hussein inputs for his weapons of mass destruction and military programs. That goal makes a

heavy demand on us, as it can mean the painstaking review of each

and every contract. This is a responsibility we take seriously.

Our rigorous and responsible approach has won plaudits from

some smaller countries in the Sanctions Committee, countries that

lack the resources and the expertise which the U.S. can apply to

this process. It has also elicited criticism from some larger Members of the Committee which have the resources and the expertise,

but have chosen to turn a politically, or even perhaps commercially,

blinded eye to possible dual-use items included in oil-for-food contracts.

14

Three Security Council Member States have one-third of all oilfor-food contracts. There is an orchestration of complaints about

holds, often joined by those who are motivated for commercial gain.

Ninety percent of these contracts have been approved, but the

number of our holds has mounted over the past year for a variety

of reasons. Some of these contracts lack adequate information, and

we are unable to act on them until we get details from those who

have submitted them.

The program’s revenue has grown as oil prices have gone up.

There is an accelerating flow of contracts that has crowded our review process. However, it is our view that the holds that we have

put on have had minimal impact on the humanitarian bottom line

to date. Nonetheless, we agree that while we must be vigilant, we

must also strike a balance with legitimate humanitarian concerns.

We are currently examining our contract review procedures to

ensure that they appropriately reflect our twin priorities: maximizing assistance to the people while denying the regime access to

goods it could use to reconstitute its military and WMD programs.

We are also seeking to enhance the U.N.’s capacity to monitor potentially sensitive items, such as electricity generating equipment

or water purification plants; to ensure that such items, if approved,

are installed in the approved location and used for the approved

purpose.

Let me turn briefly to the WMD issue. A major portion of Resolution 1284 deals with the creation of UNMOVIC, the U.N. Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission, as a subsidiary

body of the Security Council and a successor to UNSCOM. After

consultation with council members, the secretary general has appointed Mr. Hans Blix to serve as the executive chairman of this

new body.

My colleague, Robert Einhorn, Assistant Secretary for Non-proliferation, and I had the opportunity to meet with Mr. Blix shortly

before he took up his duties on March 1. As former head of the

International Atomic Energy Agency, Dr. Blix is fully qualified for

the sizable task he faces, and he has adopted a serious and methodical approach that seems well-suited to the task. He is currently structuring his organization and assembling his staff and

will submit an organizational plan to the Security Council in midApril.

He will then proceed with lining up potential inspectors with the

requisite technical expertise to resume inspection and monitoring

activities in Iraq. Baghdad, meanwhile, has publicly rejected Resolution 1284 and ruled out the return of U.N.-mandated weapons inspections teams, but that, I do not think, is the final word. Should

Iraq reconsider, as it has on several other resolutions, and allow

UNMOVIC in, we expect Dr. Blix and his teams to be robust in

carrying out the mission it has inherited from UNSCOM. The

United States will provide all possible support for that.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Sorry to go on. I wanted to get all

this into the record.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Welch appears in the appendix.]

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Welch.

15

THE HONORABLE A. ELIZABETH JONES, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY

ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

I’m pleased to introduce Ambassador Elizabeth Jones, who is a

career member of the senior Foreign Service class of career ministers. She took over as Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary in the

Department’s Bureau of Near Eastern affairs in October 1998, after

having served as Ambassador to the Republic of Kazakhstan. She

has held many other Washington assignments, and her overseas’

assignments have been concentrated in the Middle East, South

Asia and Germany. We welcome Ambassador Jones for any comments she would like to make.

Ms. JONES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I associate myself with

the comments made by Assistant Secretary Welch, and I would like

to conserve some of our time and wait for questions.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you very much.

We now introduce Ms. Alina Romanowski, the Deputy Assistant

Secretary of Defense for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs in

the office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International

Security Affairs, serving as the principal adviser to the Secretary

of Defense on matters relating to those areas of the world. Her

prior service has been both in Washington and in the field, having

served as country director for Israel after coming to the Department of Defense from service with the CIA as an intelligence analyst in the Near East and South Asia region.

We welcome Ms. Romanowski.

ALINA ROMANOWSKI, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, NEAR

EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF

DEFENSE

Ms. ROMANOWSKI. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I have

submitted a written statement for the record. Also, in the interest

of time, I will be here to take questions on the military aspects of

our policy on Iraq.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Romanowski appears in the appendix.]

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Secretary Romanowski.

We’ll now turn to questions.

Mr. CROWLEY. Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GILMAN. Yes, Mr. Crowley.

Mr. CROWLEY. Unfortunately, I have to leave. I just want to

thank you for holding these hearings.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you. Do you have a question you want

to address to our witnesses?

Mr. CROWLEY. I actually have to leave right now. I have a statement to read into the record.

Chairman GILMAN. Without objection, the statement will be

placed in the record.

Mr. Crowley: Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Crowley appears in the appendix.]

Chairman GILMAN. My first question is directed to Secretary

Welch. In the more than three months that have passed since the

approval of our U.N. Security Council Resolution 1284, it has beVerDate 11-MAY-2000 08:26 Oct 13, 2000 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00019 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 66252.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1
16

come obvious that UNMOVIC, the new U.N. weapons inspection

agency, is going to have trouble getting its inspectors back into

Iraq at any time in the near future. In particular, the requirement

for Security Council approval, first of the appointment of the executive chairman of UNMOVIC, then of the executive chairman’s organizational plan for UNMOVIC, and then of UNMOVIC’s work program, sets up repeated confrontations within the Security Council

that are certain to delay the resumption of weapons inspections in

Iraq.

Indeed, some analysts have looked closely at the resolution and

concluded it must have been structured to make certain that Saddam is not confronted with the request from UNMOVIC to admit

inspectors into Iraq until after our Presidential election next November. In order to reassure us that this is not true, can you tell

us when you expect UNMOVIC to ask Saddam Hussein to admit

inspectors for the agency?

Mr. WELCH. In Resolution 1284, there were a number of questions asked of the new executive chairman, particularly with respect to organization. That is the plan that he will present in, I

guess, about three weeks. April 15th is the deadline for that. After

that plan is presented, if it is approved by the council, UNMOVIC

is up and ready to operate. The only thing inhibiting its operation,

then, in the full sense of the word, would be whether it can do it

inside Iraq.

What stops that right now is the Iraqi government has not accepted, indeed it has rejected, Resolution 1284. If they were to accept Resolution 1284, and the council has approved the organizational plan, then the monitoring and inspection activity could resume in Iraq just as soon as they were able to get there, which of

course could be any time after April 15th and certainly well before

November.

Chairman GILMAN. Can you tell us when you expect the council

to approve the UNMOVIC plan?

Mr. WELCH. The council has not actually gotten it yet, Mr. Chairman. It is hard to predict how that debate will go. It depends on

what is in the plan. The debate for the selection of an executive

chairman, which was the other deadline contained for Council action in 1284, was easily met and that deadline was satisfied. I have

had some experience with working on the Security Council in these

issues. They frequently do cause a lot of debate.

I would imagine that the other council members have the same

degree of confidence we do in Dr. Blix. The question of organization

is not going to divert attention for that long.

Chairman GILMAN. What would you estimate to be an outside

date for final approval of UNMOVIC’s organizational plan and

work program?

Mr. WELCH. Again, I cannot say. But, typically the council acts

reasonably rapidly on these things. As I said, the only example we

have under this resolution is the selection of the executive chairman. Most of the debate took place before the nomination. Once the

nomination was received, consensus was easily had.

Chairman GILMAN. Conservatively speaking, what are we looking

at by way of a timeframe?

17

Mr. WELCH. I would say within a few business days to look at

the organizational plan. I would add, that should be juxtaposed to

what is our estimate of the likelihood of Iraqi acceptance of the resolution in any near timeframe. That estimate I cannot give you.

That is probably a more important impediment to them restoring

their activity in Iraq.

Chairman GILMAN. So it could be at least several months, is that

correct?

Mr. WELCH. That is entirely in the hands of the Saddam Hussein

regime.

Chairman GILMAN. Ambassador Jones, on March 3rd of this

year, the leadership of the Iraqi National Congress sent a letter to

Secretary Albright, proposing that our Nation establish a cross-border humanitarian aid program into Iraq that should be run by the

Iraqi National Congress. Such a program would resemble the crossborder humanitarian aid program that we used to have in Afghanistan, back when our Nation was helping the Afghans free themselves from Soviet occupation. In general terms, what is the Administration’s reaction to that proposal?

Ms. JONES. The Administration would certainly welcome anything that improves the humanitarian situation for the people inside Iraq. That is the primary reason that we worked so hard on

the various elements of 1284 that Assistant Secretary Welch has

just described. What I cannot say is what kind of cross-border system might work the best. I would not want to equate the situation

in Iraq with the situation in Afghanistan, in that respect.

It is certainly a proposal that we have been working on with Mr.

Chalabi, have been discussing with him and with some of his colleagues and would welcome discussing further with the Committee.

Chairman GILMAN. Do you expect to have some proposal before

us at some reasonable date?

Ms. JONES. We have not gotten as far as drafting a proposal, no.

Chairman GILMAN. Ms. Romanowski, are we in fact accomplishing anything of military significance with our repeated air

strikes in response to the Iraqi threats to our aircraft patrolling the

no-fly zone?

Ms. ROMANOWSKI. The short answer is yes, Mr. Chairman, I

think we are. The monitoring of the no-fly zones is actually accomplishing two important things. One is to ensure that Iraqi aircraft

cannot, in fact, fly and be used to repress the civilian populations

in the areas where the no-fly zones are.

There is also an added benefit. Because the Iraqis are continuing

to challenge our presence there, we are, in our response, degrading

the Iraqi air defense capabilities over time. It also allows us to

monitor, importantly, the presence of the Iraqi military forces to

determine if they are changing their posture and becoming an even

greater threat to Iraq’s neighbors.

Chairman GILMAN. Are we inflicting any substantial damage on

Saddam, particularly if we are dropping bombs filled with cement,

as has been reported in the press? Has this been really an effectual

program?

Ms. ROMANOWSKI. To my knowledge, we are not dropping bombs

with cement. We are responding to Iraqi provocations and threats

18

to our coalition partners. We are responding to that. We are, in

fact, degrading Iraq’s air defense capabilities.

Chairman GILMAN. Seventy Members—and this is for the full

panel, anyone who cares to respond—70 Members of the House recently sent a letter to the President calling on him to end the economic embargo in Iraq, but to keep in place the military embargo.

The U.N. Security Council Resolution 1284, which was adopted last

December, eliminates the ceiling on Iraqi oil exports and directs

that future Iraqi imports of a list of humanitarian items, like food,

medicine, and medical supplies, be exempt from U.N. review.

After that resolution is fully implemented, will there still be, in

any meaningful sense, an economic embargo in place against Iraq

with regard to trade in items that are of no military significance?

Mr. Welch, would you care to respond to that?

Mr. WELCH. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me also in my

answer attempt to address some of the concerns that Representative Conyers raised. First, I think I have a difference with him on

what the fundamental problem is. The fundamental problem, in

our view, is the noncompliance of the Saddam Hussein regime with

its obligations under Security Council resolutions. Because of that

extended noncompliance, sanctions have remained on.

Because sanctions are Saddam’s primary target, the reason that

he has them as his primary target is he wants the money. Because

he wants the sanctions lifted and access to his money again, he will

exploit anything, including the suffering of his own people to that

end. There is a need to address the suffering of the Iraqi people,

but lifting the sanctions is not the answer. It is too dangerous. It

will not work, and we have a better idea.

It is too dangerous, because the reason you have control of revenues through sanctions is to oblige Iraq to disarm and to prevent

its rearmament. If he gets access to the revenues, you are not going

to succeed at either. It will not work because he does not have any

intention of using these revenues for the benefit of his people. We

have a better idea because, yes, in 1284 there is a whole broadening of the humanitarian program laid out that can do that more

effectively.

It is meaningful in the sense of maintaining sanctions. Why is

that? Because the U.N. controls that program and Iraqi revenues,

not the regime. As long as that is the case, we will see an answer

which, I will be the first to admit, has been imperfect in the operation of this program so far, but can be better to the situation on

the ground. Conversely, if you take the other option of lifting the

sanctions, you are not going to succeed in any of those objectives.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you. Mr. Gejdenson.

Mr. GEJEDSON. Thank you. My assessment of our success rate

with insurgences or opposition groups in a military sense, at least

in my time here, has not been all that successful. The Contras did

not work out all that well. Before that, the Bay of Pigs was not exactly a success. Even if the Afghan guerrillas got the Russians out,

I am not sure that at the end of the day we have ended up with

a better situation there. So first I would like to ask Ms.

Romanowski, and I have talked to General Zinni, is the opposition

even potentially a military force?

19

Ms. ROMANOWSKI. The opposition, I believe, needs a lot of training in the areas that we have identified to make them into an effective, external political opposition and political voice. We are looking

at providing them training to make them more effective in those

areas. In our discussions with them, it is clear that they also feel

that the kind of training that we are offering them will provide

them some benefits. We are focusing on that.

Mr. GEJDENSON. What date would you estimate in this plan they

would be ready to militarily confront Saddam Hussein? In this millennium or the next?

Ms. ROMANOWSKI. I would not want to put an exact date on that.

Mr. GEJDENSON. Thank you. It was a very good answer. I was

getting lost, which is why I have to interrupt you. Ambassador

Jones, at this point within Iraq, is there a groundswell of support

for the opposition?

Ms. JONES. I think it is probably very difficult to overstate the

amount of repression that there is inside Iraq. There is no question

that there are people who would like very much, a lot of people

would like very much, to come out from under that repression, to

come out from under the Saddam Hussein regime. That has been

the case for a very long time, certainly since he first took over and

from the days that I lived and worked there.

Mr. GEJDENSON. But right now, momentarily, they cannot do

anything and politically they cannot do anything, because the repression is very effective.

Ms. JONES. We actually do not know that.

Mr. GEJDENSON. He kills people that look funny.

Ms. JONES. That is exactly right.

Mr. GEJDENSON. All right.

Ms. JONES. He kills anybody before they even have a thought in

their head about what they might do.

Mr. GEJDENSON. And anybody near that person, just in case they

might have been contagious.

Ms. JONES. That would be correct.

Mr. GEJDENSON. So it seems to me we feel good around here and

we say we are going to give all this money to the Iraqi opposition.

I am sure they are enjoying their stays in London, where the leaders seem to be for a large part of time. But at the end of the day,

I see absolutely no reasonable hope that Iraqi opposition will have

any impact on our policy, except to make Congress feel like we are

doing something.

Then it seems to me the next place we have to look at is the embargo. Now, we all know what happens in the debating process. If

you put up a proposition, and we can demonstrate a few failures,

it often undermines the public’s confidence in the whole process. It

is not right, but that is how it works. When you add to that a recalcitrant Security Council, the reality is, that this 15-Member decisionmaking group, including us, on what goes through to the Iraqis

makes us look foolish.

Because the Iraqis are not going to show you the palaces, the billion-dollar palaces that Saddam is building. They are not going to

show you the weapons he is trying to smuggle into the country.

They are going to show you dying children. They are going to say,

20

‘‘Country A’’ in the Security Council held up syringes, water, medicine, whatever it was, and that is why we are dying.

So unless you can come up with a better process of getting stuff

through quickly, without these ‘‘We don’t know some minor detail,

so we are going to put a hold on it,’’ that hold then ends up being

the whole reason Iraqi children die. Now, people have told me the

Iraqis get, the Iraqis who live in the north where we get to distribute or people we trust more get to distribute the food, are doing

fine. They are not dying. Saddam Hussein gets a proportionate

share and so theoretically his people should not be dying either.

But he is beating you on two counts. We have a dumb system for

approving products going into Iraq, so it then shows us is that the

whole thing looks kind of silly. We have evaporating Security

Council support for our policies. Frankly, the same problem is happening in the United States.

So I agree with your fundamental assessment. He is a very dangerous guy. If he gets free access to lots of cash, he is going to

spend most of it acquiring weapons of mass destruction; and the

next hearing we could have here is about where we were when

Saddam Hussein got the missile and the chemical, biological or nuclear weapons that took out some city in the Middle East, children

and all.

So we have got to find a way to reshape this policy very rapidly,

or you are going to find a Congress, an international community,

that isolates the United States, not Iraq. Last, I guess my question

is, we have been very good and lucky, but if one of America’s

planes bumps into one of Saddam Hussein’s antiaircraft missiles,

we have got a major problem here.

He has got an American he can march around. We are heading

for a Presidential campaign. We have got to get through the next

six months before some element of rationality will return to the

discussion here. You have to be very careful with those resources,

because I think he is a threat to the region. I think he is a threat

to the Iraqi people. But I do not think the present policy gets us

there.

Mr. WELCH. Mr. Gejdenson, thank you for your statement, which

I will take as confirming the direction that I indicated that we

ought to go.

Mr. GEJDENSON. You are all very good at this.

Mr. WELCH. I have been doing it for some years—considering our

adversaries on this issue, you get a bit of training. Mr. Gejdenson,

I think at the core of what you said, with respect to the implementation of our sanctions policy, it ought to be that we find a way to

redress these humanitarian issues while not losing sight of the responsibility we have not to let this cat out of the bag again.

That is a tough balance to strike. I hear from what you say a

recognition that when we strike it we ought to, if we are going to

hold on something, do it for a valid and important reason. But also

I expect you would agree with me that if we are going to release

on something, we do it with having had some real scrutiny.

The United States is, I think, the only member of the council

that rigorously applies this scrutiny. If at the end of the day we

take some heat internationally for that, frankly, we will have to

bear that, because it is also our responsibility to ensure peace and

21

stability in this region. That is an important part of our National

security interests.

Mr. GEJDENSON. I do not want to take up Members’ time. I

would just say it is not a question of heat. Heat, I am always

happy to take. But being able to sustain a policy is the fundamental question here, and not just doing something because we,

have had this embargo on Cuba now for 40 years. What a great

success. We are fighting whether a boy spends his time with his

aunts and uncles or whether he goes back to his father.

It just does not make sense to sustain a policy that is isolating

the United States, that is losing support in the American public,

because you are not going to achieve your goals at the end of the

day. Sometimes you may have to let something through, I would

argue. If you have not got a good damn reason to stop it, let it go.

I would rather catch him after the fact because we have got to get

the international community to support something that makes

sense and not continue on something that does not seem to be

working.

Chairman GILMAN. The gentleman’s time has expired. Mr. Rohrabacher.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

First of all, I would like to compliment you on your presentation

here today. It was comprehensive. I learned a lot. The questions

that have been asked and the answers here have been answered

directly. I appreciate the professionalism that you have all shown.

With that said, let me know that we do not have a cat in the bag.

What we have got is a rabid dog in the bag. If you let the cat out

of the bag, it may or may not hurt you.

Saddam Hussein is an animal that could, not only is hurting his

own people, but would hurt Americans if he can get the chance to

do so. We cannot afford to let him out of the bag. Let me note that

when we keep talking about the effects of our policies and the effects of what is going on, on the children of Iraq, we all sympathize

with innocent people.

Mr. Welch, I think you adequately covered the fact that the fault

of the suffering of those poor children and the civilians in Iraq is

not the fault of the people of the United States, but the fault of

Saddam Hussein himself. I think you said it quite well. I think

that the statistics that you have shown, shows that we are permitting them to have what is necessary to feed those children. He is

choosing instead to spend that money on weapons and to screw his

own people. That is terrible.

We should never have a hearing on Iraq unless we recognize, Mr.

Chairman, that Saddam Hussein, Saddam insane, Saddam Hussein, is still holding hundreds of Kuwaiti prisoners. There are hundreds of people that have been taken from Kuwait.

As a proportion of their population, it is a monstrous crime

against the people of Kuwait. Anything we do to try to stop to

change this situation in that part of the world has to take into consideration these prisoners that we believe Saddam Hussein is still

holding. I must ask, is there some evidence that Saddam Hussein

is still holding many of these Kuwaiti prisoners alive, or has he

murdered all of them, too?

22

Mr. WELCH. Frankly, it is hard to say because the degree of their

cooperation with that inquiry process has been so poor.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Which again underscores the nature of this

regime; holding Kuwaiti prisoners. He refuses to give any type of

humanitarian report to their families. I would call on Saddam Hussein today, and anybody who is advocating that we end this embargo, to make a call on Saddam Hussein before anything happens to

make sure we have an accounting of those prisoners.

Second, I agree that supporting the resistance does not seem to

have worked. I do not think this Administration has taken seriously the move by Congress to provide resources for Kuwaiti resistance, not as seriously as it should have been taken. However, I

would say that before we can be taken seriously, Mr. Chairman, I

believe that the Congress, and I would call on Congress, and I may

offer this resolution myself, to provide legislation that will end the

prohibition on the assassination of foreign leaders in relationship

to Saddam Hussein.

Saddam Hussein is a rabid dog who is murdering his own people,

who is a threat to millions of other people’s lives, and we should

repeal that prohibition in relationship to people like Saddam Hussein, and Saddam Hussein specifically. Perhaps if Congress would

do that, the $100 million we provided for the overthrow of Saddam

Hussein would be taken seriously. After all, what was that $100

million for? It was to replace Saddam Hussein.

We think that they are going to carry him out, let him go to some

island, and live a life of luxury for the rest of his life? Is that what

the resistance would have done in our view? No. It would have

military confrontation, and hopefully Saddam Hussein would have

lost it. With that said, I commend again the job that you have been

doing. I have been more angry than most.

I backed the Chairman in the Chairman’s resolution that passed

before the House yesterday, in asking the Administration to use

this leverage to bring down oil prices. I believe Saudi Arabia and

Kuwait, by being involved in that price fixing conspiracy, have

shaken the faith that many of us had in that friendship. I commend the President. I commend the Chairman for the leadership

he has provided in that. But we should never forget at the same

time that there is a severe challenge in that region, and that is

why Saudi Arabia and Kuwait should make sure they keep our

friendship and loyalty. Thank you very much.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Rohrabacher. Mr. Delahunt.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Just one question, that is all. I know we are running out of time. We have a vote. The 5,000 figure that UNICEF

claims, if you could respond, is that a fair and accurate figure?

Mr. WELCH. Thank you, Mr. Congressman, for asking this question, because there have been numerous references.

Mr. DELAHUNT. I do not care where it came from. I am just interested in the accuracy of the figure. I do not want an explanation.

Mr. WELCH. If I could just say, though, one thing.

Mr. DELAHUNT. We have got to vote, Mr. Welch. I have great respect for you, but is it a figure that, give or take——

Mr. WELCH. Please permit me just to say one thing. Regardless

of the figures, U.S. policy is not based on finding an acceptable

number of dead children. Mr. Delahunt. Believe me, Mr. Welch, I

23

am not questioning the policy. I just want to know, if that is an

inaccurate figure, what is the figure? I have an estimate.

Mr. WELCH. We have pursued this. . .

Mr. DELAHUNT. I am not blaming the United States. I just want

to know.

Mr. WELCH. We pursued this question with UNICEF. Frankly,

the numbers are hard to know. Causality is hard to prove or to disprove.

Mr. DELAHUNT. I am not even asking for causality. I am just

saying——

Mr. WELCH. The data that seems to be relatively well-established

in their report is on the number of live births, number of deaths

per birth. In the north, that figure is better today than it was before the war. In the south and central Iraq that figure is worse.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Welch, I respect that, but we have less than

a moment. Are we talking approximately 5,000 dying?

Mr. WELCH. I do not know. That is a new one to me.

Mr. DELAHUNT. So, you cannot question the validity or the legitimacy. You do not have enough information to challenge the validity of the numbers.

Mr. WELCH. But I do want to establish what connection it has

to our policy and to the causality question.

Mr. DELAHUNT. I am not even suggesting that there is a causality. I did not mean to suggest that. But I just wanted to see if

there is a disagreement or if there is credible evidence that, that

is an inaccurate figure. You do not have any evidence.

Mr. WELCH. Congressman, I would like the opportunity to provide in writing an answer with respect to the 5,000 number.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Sure.

[The information referred to appears as Exhibit A in the appendix.]

Mr. DELAHUNT. We have got to go vote. Thank you.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Delahunt.

The Committee will stand in recess pending the votes on the

Floor. We will continue our discussion as soon as the voting is over

with.

The Committee stands in recess.

[Recess.]

Mr. SMITH. [Presiding.] The Committee will resume its sitting.

First of all, Secretary Welch, thank you for your patience. We do

appreciate your standing by during this series of votes we have on

the Floor. Chairman Gilman, unfortunately, has a delegation that

he is meeting with from one of the other countries, oh, from New

York State. So, again, I thank you for your patience.

I do have a couple of questions I would just like to pose. Back

on February 18th, I had sent a letter, as Subcommittee Chairman

of International Operations and Human Rights, to Secretary of

State Madeleine Albright, asking a number of very specific questions. I mean, as I said in my opening comments, I am like many

others very torn by these reports of so many children dying.

While there may be some hyperbole, if there are just some children dying, and any of this is attributable to our sanctions regime,

and we are not doing all that can be done to mitigate that outcome,

shame on us. So the question that I pose, and I would ask unaniVerDate 11-MAY-2000 08:26 Oct 13, 2000 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00027 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 66252.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1
24

mous consent that the letter be made a part of the record, and the

questions that are asked in that letter be considered by you, Secretary Welch, as questions that we really would like to get on the

record as quickly as possible.

[The information referred to appears as Exhibit B in the appendix.]

Mr. SMITH. Just to ask a couple of questions that are of concern,

you mentioned that about, I think it was 10 percent of the oil-forfood contracts are held up. As you probably know, on February 7th,

the Secretary, or the Director, I should say, Sevan, reiterated his

serious concern, and these are his words, ‘‘serious concern,’’ at the

persistent high level of holds placed on applications for humanitarian supplies. I think the number you gave us is about 10 percent.

He also pointed out that there is currently a backlog of around

800 humanitarian and oil sector applications awaiting review. Is

that true? Are there that many that have not been approved? To

what do we attribute it? Is there a lack of staffing, an insufficient

number of people? What’s the holdup?

Mr. WELCH. Mr. Smith, I would also like to add an answer, because I said something while you were not in the room, sir, and it

referred back to a point you had raised. I think your words were,

in looking at this problem of infant mortality, that one dead child

is one too many. I could not agree more with that. What I said to

one of your colleagues was, please understand that American policy

is not based on the calculation of acceptable numbers of dead children. I feel it is very important as an American official to make

that statement. There are no acceptable numbers.

Audience Member: That is not what the Secretary of State said.

She said that——

Mr. SMITH. Please, order. This is a hearing. This is not a town

meeting. So I would ask you to refrain from any comments. You

can make them to the press, if you like, outside the door.

Mr. WELCH. Mr. Smith, I have your letter, and we have been

doing a considerable amount of work to get you specific answers to

each of the detailed questions you ask, which are very good questions, sir. Normally it is my preference to answer such correspondence before we have hearings on the matter. However, in view of

the importance of this subject, we wanted to come up here and

have a chance to get all our information out in public. We will answer your letter now very rapidly.

One part of this gets to the high level of holds that you asked

about both in the letter and just now. When we received your letter, we were in the midst of an internal review of how we administer the oil-for-food program. Contrary to the headlines in some of

the newspapers that this constitutes an easing or changing of sanctions, what it is, is a way to look at a more effective administration

of the program. If I could just say a couple of words about that.

First, the responsibility for that is shared.

Iraq should do something. The U.N. should do something. The

Security Council should do something, and the United States probably should, too. I can only speak and have control over the last

of those things. In response to your question, we have undertaken

this review of how we run the program. I do not know what it will

25

produce with respect to the numbers of contract holds. It is my

hope, of course, that the numbers go down.

But as I said in my testimony, we feel there is a valid approach

that we have to striking a balance between humanitarian concern

and non-proliferation risks. We want to strike the right balance in

both cases. I think we can make an improvement, frankly. Now, in

terms of the numbers, the number is actually today greater than

800. It is probably more than 1,000. But that masks a lot of different kinds of issues.

For example, I would say fully a third of that number, that is,

somewhere between 300 and 400, is because when we get a contract, it will say something like spare parts. You cannot make a

good judgment about humanitarian concern or non-proliferation

risks if the information is incomplete.

Another area is dual-use technology, technology that is specifically barred from entry into Iraq, unless there is adequate monitoring on the other end. Right now, frankly, the monitoring is deficient, because UNMOVIC is not there. That category of holds probably comprises another 300 or so. There is a great deal of difficulty

in addressing that. That may be a figure we have a hard time coming to grips with.

Another group of holds would be the ones where, frankly, we sat

around and not had the resources or the intensity to focus on them.

A large part of that is because this program has grown very rapidly. I was telling one of your colleagues earlier that the full value

of the oil-for-food program was actually attained only in the fall of

1999. Thus, the amounts of contracts and the deposits into the

bank account, the escrow account, have grown logarithmically, and

that has put a strain on our resources.

Secretary Albright has directed that we give more attention to

this, and has directed also that more personnel be provided to the

effort. They are working through that now.

Mr. SMITH. Personnel are actually deployed in this effort.

Mr. WELCH. It is an interagency system. That includes people

from the intelligence community, the Department of Defense, the

Department of Energy now. We have gotten them into it because

of certain kinds of contracts that ought to be reviewed by DOE, and

the State Department. In the State Department, there are personnel from the non-proliferation bureau, which has the main authority for export-import monitoring and export controls. There are

a couple of people who work on this in my office, and a couple of

people in the Middle East bureau. I cannot give you an exact figure

on the aggregate number in the State Department, but I would say

no more than, would I be right in saying, about ten or so?

Mr. SMITH. Do you suspect that you will actually increase that,

in order to accommodate this explosion of available cash and the

need?

Mr. WELCH. I would like to do that. Unfortunately, resources are

a real problem in the department today. I am sure you heard this

from my boss several times, Mr. Smith. We have a deficit of personnel. What that means, practically speaking, is we have 400 jobs

in the State Department right now that cannot be filled because we

do not have the people. But, yes, this is a high priority. The SecVerDate 11-MAY-2000 08:26 Oct 13, 2000 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00029 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 66252.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1
26

retary has directed that increased resources be given to it. I believe

that will mean that we will do so.

Mr. SMITH. If you could get back to us as to those plans, because

it would seem to me that the allocation of scarce resources is urgent, especially given the implications of not doing it and the loss

of life, or at least the mitigation of health on the part of these kids.

Mr. WELCH: Yes, sir.

[The information referred to appears as Exhibit C in the appendix.]

Mr. SMITH. The number 5,000, could you shed some light on the

veracity of that number? I tried, in questioning Mr. Conyers, and

he seemed to indicate that it is current and up to date, and, as of

this past February, there were another 5,000 children who have

died. Is this accurate? That is not to say that if it is 2,000, it is

OK. There is no acceptable number, from my point of view as well.

But we really need to have absolute clarity, as much as humanly

possible, as to what the real numbers are.

Mr. WELCH. The honest answer is I do not know. The estimates

that UNICEF did where we thought there was statistical validity

were on infant mortality as a percentage of live births. There, I

think I would agree, if I understand the conclusion that Mr. Conyers was drawing, that infant mortality has increased in South and

Central Iraq during the decade of the 1990’s. It was rightly pointed

out that it has gone down by comparison to pre-war levels in the

North.

UNICEF itself does not, however, assert causality.

Causality is hard to prove or disprove in this situation.

But they have not asserted that these deaths are specifically the

result of sanctions.

We believe that the problem of infant mortality has, however,

been aggravated by the deterioration, in particular in the sanitation sector. It is our conviction that some of that can be addressed

by better administration of the oil-for-food program, including looking at those areas where potential dual-use items might be needed

for that purpose.

Let me mention, for example, chlorine. I have done some work

now with UNICEF to check whether their monitoring of chlorine

usage would hold up, because chlorine is a precursor, as you know.

I think we are reassured that, yes, that system is working reasonably well. But now we need to look at the potential dual-use equipment more carefully.

Mr. SMITH. It terms of medicines, you pointed out that there

were, over the past three years, more than $1 billion worth of

medicines approved. I assume by ‘‘approved’’ you also mean imported? Because you used the word ‘‘imported’’ before about the 50

million, or are they at some stage of getting into the country?

Mr. WELCH. No, I would expect that some part of that number

is in the pipeline.

Mr. SMITH. How does all of that relate to pre-war numbers? I

mean, was there an indigenous pharmaceutical industry at all in

Iraq? I do not know that. I really would like to know.

Mr. WELCH. I cannot say. I can provide an answer on that, Mr.

Smith.

Mr. SMITH. OK, that would be fine.

27

[The information referred to appears as Exhibit D in the appendix.]

Mr. SMITH. Do you know whether or not they were net or total

importers of all of their drug——

Mr. WELCH. I think that one indicator we have, though, broadly

speaking, of the requirements in the medical area is provided in

the Secretary General’s recent report. That report basically says

that the availability of medicines is much improved, with 90 percent of the needs being met. I cannot say what the criticality of the

remainder would be, and that the more acute needs are now in

other sectors.

Mr. SMITH. Let me just ask, are international humanitarian nongovernmental organizations presently afforded full and unfettered

access to the areas of Iraq controlled by the government?

Mr. WELCH. No; less than full and fettered access. In the North,

there are numerous NGO’s and international organizations that operate effectively and easily. In South and Central Iraq, the situation is far poorer by comparison, especially in South Iraq, where

the government cites security reasons for not allowing international organizations in. I believe ICRC has finally established a

presence in Basra, but I cannot think of any others at the moment

that have been able to operate down there.

I am sorry, I forgot this. In 1284, the Security Council imposed

an obligation on Iraq to permit that access, because it is cognizant

that it obviously would be better if international organizations

were in there and had a chance to take a look.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you.

I would like to ask Mr. Sanford if he could take the Chair. Regrettably, I have to leave myself. But I thank you, Secretary Welch,

for your testimony.

Mr. SANFORD. [Presiding.] I would echo Mr. Smith’s sentiments

in thanking you for your very generous use of time. I will basically

have four quick questions.

Mr. WELCH. Yes, sir.

Mr. SANFORD. First of all, in your testimony you had described

containment as a factor. Even before I say that, I would make a

strong division between economic and military sanctions. I would,

for the most part, agree with your thoughts on economic sanctions.

I strongly disagree with, in essence, your and Ms. Romanowski’s

thoughts on the military sanctions and their efficacy.

Toward that end, you said in your testimony that containment

was effective, but it did not meet the standards necessary to bring

about its end. In other words, Saddam would not do the things in

his regime to bring about its end over the course of his life.

Now, I find that really unsettling, because I come from South

Carolina. We have got a guy named Strom Thurmond, who is two

years away from hitting 100, which is to say that if Saddam had

anywhere near the same kind of life expectancy, you could be looking at, let us say, another 40 years of him being around, which is

to say if we add up the $1.2 billion that it is now costing the military to impose these, in essence, military sanctions, and we leave

off OPTEMPO, which I think wears out troops, we leave off depreciation of assets, that would be about $48 billion in direct cost to

28

continue to maintain these military sanctions. Do you think this

approximately $50 billion expenditure is worthwhile?

Mr. WELCH. If I might answer the last first. The answer, Mr.

Sanford, is yes, I do. I am not certain that, that is the exact cost

to the United States.

Mr. SANFORD. Probably higher, because of OPTEMPO, again, depreciation of assets, et cetera. But ballpark, we would say in this

hypothetical it could be $50 billion worth of expense.

Mr. WELCH. I think every Administration has agreed that the

Persian Gulf area is of vital strategic interest to the United States.

That since August 1990, the Iraqi regime poses the most significant

threat to peace and security in that area. Therefore, successive Administrations have felt that this is a price that’s appropriate. I believe that even were Saddam not there, America would have an interest in a security presence in that area. Were those all of your

questions?

Mr. SANFORD. No, no. That is the first one. I have four. But we

can come back. Do you have a thought? Go ahead.

Mr. WELCH. You asked about whether this is never going to end

in effect until Saddam is gone.

Mr. SANFORD. Those were your words.

Mr. WELCH. Right. I said I did not expect him to comply.

Mr. SANFORD. Right.

Mr. WELCH. I do not. That is an objective judgment.

However, if lightning strikes and I am proven wrong, the United

States signed up to these Security Council resolutions, and we will

implement them. I think the answer that I have tried to give on

economic and military sanctions was to draw a distinction here,

which I feel is important.

Mr. SANFORD. I agree with the distinction.

Mr. WELCH. Because the sanctions provide control of money. If

you lift those and you lose control of those revenues to this

regime——

Mr. SANFORD. I am not disagreeing with you. Again, because of

what you have said about effectiveness, in other words, I would not

dispute at all that this is an area of vital strategic interest. But in

terms of effectiveness, in other words, there I think I would have

to disagree, because the question you have to ask when spending

the hypothetical $50 billion is, are we effectively making a difference on what the air cover is supposed to be doing, which according to U.N. Security Council Resolution 688, is to cease repression of Iraqi civilian populations. To suggest that this is the case,

that somehow people in Iraq are unrepressed, I think is just at

total odds with the facts on the ground.

Mr. WELCH. Yes, sir. I think perhaps in that particular area,

what our presence has done is deter the worst of the depredations

but not all of them. So you are absolutely right. In terms of the effectiveness of containment, of course everybody has an opinion on

this. Let me offer just the following view. I think that some pretty

strong words have been said about this regime here today.

Mr. SANFORD. Sure.

Mr. WELCH. I would make my own contribution in that regard.

Mr. SANFORD. Absolutely.

29

Mr. WELCH. But we do know the leader of Iraq. He has struck

out at his neighbors once every decade with a major war.

Mr. SANFORD. Right.

Mr. WELCH. The sanctions that have been in place have, at a

minimum, deterred one in this last decade. That is not an unimportant result.

Mr. SANFORD. I do not know that you could draw that. I do not

know that, that is a validate hypothesis. In other words, it may

have been that the economic sanctions were partly attributable to

him not lashing out over the last ten years. It may have been the

fact that he has been rebuilding infrastructure over the last ten

years that has kept him from lashing out.

So I want to specifically focus, in my remarks, really on the nofly zone. That is what I am really getting at here. I do not know

how you would say that the no-fly zone is effective, because we can

through satellite imagery and otherwise come up with detection as

to whether or not he is massing troops, et cetera.

In fact, I would go on to my second point. Your comment in your

testimony, then, that we have contained the Iraqi military, which

I guess is what you are stressing now. He has not lashed out in

the last ten years. But if you look at 1999 numbers, there were 600

breaches of the no-fly zone in 1999.

In essence, to round it, basically two times a day, he is breaching

the no-fly zone. I go back again to effective containment. How is

that an effective containment of his air forces? Or turned another

way, do you see any place within Iraq where an insurrection has

been made possible because of the no-fly zone?

Mr. WELCH. They are not there to promote insurrection in the

area under their supervision, but to deter the government of Iraq

from using air power against the populations in those areas. In the

case of the southern no-fly zone, they are associated with the enforcement of Resolution 949, which says that Iraq cannot put additional forces into that area.

Mr. SANFORD. If I were to go back with what you just said, that

there was outright repression of the Iraqi people, they would say

to me, in other words—it was explained a long time ago—that one

of the possible outcomes of having a no-fly zone would be that Saddam would not be able to get his troops to places where Iraqi National Congress or others would gather folks to storm up in arms

against him. That did not happen.

You say that is not one of the goals of the current no-fly zone.

In fact, it is to make sure there is not repression. So instead they

shoot you with a gun, a pistol, as opposed to a gun out of a helicopter.

Mr. WELCH. Yes, I agree that there is that risk that Saddam

could do that. We have seen him do it in the past. I am sorry my

defense colleague is not here to talk about the numbers of

breaches, and their character, and how we respond. Let me say

something from my own experience in the past.

I have negotiated several cease-fires with the Kurdish groups in

northern Iraq. I have been to northern Iraq several times myself.

To a person, the population of northern Iraq would be frightened,

dismayed, perhaps to the point of voting with their feet, were an

American presence not overhead. This is something that they

30

strongly desire, fervently desire. Now, with respect to the no-fly

zone in the south, there is——

Mr. SANFORD. But that is not to say that they are not repressed.

Mr. WELCH. Actually, in the North, things are a lot better.

Mr. SANFORD. Better, but still repressed.

Mr. WELCH. Wherever Saddam can reach, he generally has a

practice of repression.

Mr. SANFORD. Right.

Mr. WELCH. That is certainly the case in the South. In that instance, however, I would argue that the no-fly zones help prevent

and deter the worst of the depredations through use of helicopters.

I would also argue that Iraq’s immediate neighbors are profoundly

reassured by the presence of American forces over the skies of

southern Iraq. That is not unimportant to us, in terms of our regional security interests.

Mr. SANFORD. Third question: The military have a term called

center of gravity, wherein if you hit your enemy, for instance, in

the war in Vietnam, we never really impacted North Vietnam’s

center of gravity. As a result, every night they had on the news

nightly body counts, but we were not impacting their center of

gravity. As a result, we lost. Could you show me where this air

war, if you will, is impacting Saddam’s center of gravity?

Mr. WELCH. I do not know that I am competent to answer that

question, Mr. Sanford. If you do not mind, I would like to submit

an answer or have the Department of Defense submit its answer

with respect to that. But as I understand your question, it would

be what effect this is having on the Iraqi military.

Mr. SANFORD. Right.

Mr. WELCH. Yes, sir.

[The information referred to appears as Exhibits E and F in the

appendix.]

Mr. SANFORD. Last question: Scott Ritter, who himself has been

on the ground, as have you, has basically said that the no-fly zone

is pretty much a waste of time. Is he incompetent, misinformed; or

if wrong, why?

Mr. WELCH. Mr. Ritter has had lots of views. I also understand

he has written advocating the lifting of sanctions. I have expressed

the Administration’s view today on that idea.

Mr. SANFORD. I am not disagreeing with you on that part.

Mr. WELCH. So he pretty much covered a lot of ground in his

views.

Mr. SANFORD. Sure.

Mr. WELCH. He did a good job when he was at UNSCOM. I am

sorry he quit when he did, because the job was incomplete. With

respect to his opinions now, he is entitled to have those. I would

have to look at exactly what he said and see whether I agree with

it or not. I do not agree with his idea about lifting sanctions. I

think he wrote an editorial to the Boston Globe about that.

Mr. SANFORD. I sure appreciate your time. Nobody else is here,

so the hearing is adjourned.

Mr. WELCH. Thank you.

[Whereupon, the Committee was adjourned.]

(31)

A P P E N D I X

MARCH 23, 2000

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