:ftl 

· f Deparbnent of Command, Leadership, and Management 


~ Unili!d Slates Army War College ~ 

2010 
Department of Command, Leadership and Management 


United States Army War College 


Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050 


3rct Edition edited by 

Colonel (Ret) Stephen J. Gerras, Ph.D. 

Professor of Behavioral Sciences 

This Primer is the result of several years of research by the faculty of the Department of 

Command, Leadership, and Management. Please forward comments to Dr. Steve Gerras, Box 

406 (phone: 717-245-3571). 
 

 

 

TABLE OF CONTENTS
	

Preface to 3rd Edition  ii 

Chapter 1 Introduction 1 

Chapter 2 The Strategic Leadership Environment9 

Chapter 3 Vision 20 

Chapter 4 Strategic Leader Competencies28 

Chapter 5 Strategic Decision Making Paradigms 35 

Chapter 6 Strategic Leadership Tasks48 

Chapter 7 The Strategic Leader and the Human

 Dimension of Combat55 

Appendix A Strategic Leadership Competencies Monograph58 

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PREFACE TO 3rd EDITION
	

The original edition of the Strategic Leadership Primer, published in 1998, served the 

US Army War College (USAWC) well as a basic overview of Strategic Leadership Written 

by Dr Rod Magee with the assistance of several other faculty members, it was intended as 

an orientation reading for students arriving at the USAWC whose backgrounds were 

primarily in the tactical and operational field environment The Primer was useful because 

there was no other adequate work that described and defined strategic leadership in terms that 

could be understood and applied by USAWC students 

A 2nd edition was published in 2004 and edited by Colonel (Ret) Steve Shambach This 

3rd edition updates significant portions of the Primer, especially Chapters 1, 2, and 3 and 

also adds a chapter on decision making (Chapter 5) It is not that the nature of strategic 

leadership has changed drastically, rather this edition preserves the salient features of 

the original editions It is updated with contemporary literature and examples to sustain the 

Primer’s relevance 

The editor acknowledges the tremendous contributions of Colonel Murf Clark and 

Professor Charles Allen, along with editing assistance from Commander Traci Keegan and 

Dr Richard Meinhart, while also acknowledging previous edition contributions from Dr 

Lenny Wong, Dr Craig Bullis, and Colonel (Ret) George Reed 

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CHAPTER 1 

INTRODUCTION 

It became clear to me that at the age of 58 I would have to learn 

new tricks that were not taught in the military manuals or on the 

battlefield. In this position I am a political soldier and will have to put 

my training in rapping-out orders and making snap decisions on 

the back burner, and have to learn the arts of persuasion and guile. I 

must become an expert in a whole new set of skills. 

George C Marshall 

General Marshall is alleged to have made this observation as he reflected upon his early 

years as Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) in the beginning months of World War II Marshall 

apparently believed his previous education, training, and experience had not adequately 

prepared him for high-level leadership1 As the CSA, his success depended upon his ability 

to persuade influential people and organizations, both in and out of government, to employ 

their efforts on behalf of his vision of a winning wartime strategy and to mobilize the Army 

to make that strategy a reality General Marshall’s particular insights in this matter support 

the belief that beyond the direct and organizational levels is a third level of leadership: the 

strategic level This Primer is intended to set the stage for a greater understanding and more 

in-depth study of leadership at the strategic level—the context, challenges, characteristics, 

and requirements of strategic leadership The purpose of this chapter is to provide an 

overview of strategic leadership 

General Marshall seems to have intuitively understood that the development of a national 

strategy and the force structure to execute that strategy required a complex decision making 

structure at the national and even international levels As CSA, Marshall collaborated 

with civilian leaders to develop a vast industrial war machine and coordinated among 

the allied nations to ensure unity of effort Since Marshall’s time as CSA, the political 

complexity of these national and international decision making structures has continued to 

grow Therefore, to be effective in today’s strategic arena, senior military leaders and their 

staffs must understand the Nation’s strategic vision and how strategy is formulated As 

well, they must appreciate the environment and multiple cultures in which they will operate, 

the competencies they must develop, and the tasks they must perform Bringing the sum 

of their intellect and experience to bear, they must conceive a positive vision of the future 

and work towards those stated ends by developing policies and strategies that allow the clear 

articulation of the corresponding ways and means In short, strategic leaders must succeed in 

an environment marked by volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity (VUCA) 

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Though the lines between these levels sometimes blur, we distinguish the strategic 

level of leadership from the tactical and operational levels in order to better understand the 

unique roles and responsibilities of today’s senior leaders At the turn of the 21st Century, 

discussions about the realities of military conflict in the Information Age have addressed the 

concept of the “Strategic Corporal,” claiming that the mandates of strategic leadership now 

have the potential to extend to the lowest levels of military organizations—asserting that 

the most junior member’s actions can have strategic impact and implications This Primer 

asserts that this is very different from exercising strategic leadership yet, more than ever, 

every level of the organization must appreciate its responsibilities, functions and impacts at 

the strategic level To accommodate this multi-level awareness requirement, strategic leaders 

have a responsibility to spread knowledge and values throughout their organizations by clearly 

communicating a vision, shaping climate, influencing culture, coaching, mentoring, teaching, 

and exemplifying appropriate behaviors 

So what is strategic leadership? The USAWC has traditionally defined strategic 

leadership as: 

The process used by a leader to affect the achievement of a desirable and 

clearly understood vision by influencing the organizational culture, allocating 

resources, directing through policy and directive, and building consensus 

within a volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous global environment which 

is marked by opportunities and threats. 

Differing slightly from the USAWC version, in 2008 CSA General George Casey 

asserted: 

Strategic leaders guide the achievement of their organizational vision within a 

larger enterprise by directing policy and strategy, building consensus, acquiring 

and allocating resources, influencing organizational culture, and shaping complex 

and ambiguous external environments They lead by example to build effective 

organizations, grow the next generation of leaders, energize subordinates, seek 

opportunities to advance organizational goals, and balance personal and professional 

demands2 

Providing another perspective, Rich Hughes and Katherine Beatty from the Center for 

Creative Leadership asserted that: 

Individuals and teams enact strategic leadership when they think, act, and influence 

in ways that promote the sustainable competitive advantage of the organization3 

An informal synthesis of these definitions may offer some common characteristics of 

strategic leadership First, strategic leadership often involves a comprehensive assessment 

and interpretation of the external environment which, if interpreted effectively, is eventually 

aligned to the organization’s vision Second, although strategic leaders lead at the enterprise 

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level and have great autonomy, they oftentimes need to build consensus across a wide range 

of stakeholders to properly make and execute decisions Third, aligning their organization 

with a rapidly changing environment implies that strategic leadership is about leading 

and managing change to include the need to build a strategy and to align the resources 

and priorities to realize their vision In short, strategic leadership focuses on alignment, 

visioning, and change 

ALIGNMENT 

Strategic leaders most often operate at the enterprise level where various organizational 

sub-systems converge to support the common purpose Subsequently, it is at this level where 

strategic leaders have decision making authority and influence over key organizational 

drivers such as strategy, structure, technology, and people Military leaders often attribute 

the title “strategic leader” to individuals who are, in fact, “leaders at the strategic level” 

as opposed to “strategic leaders” The Joint Staff J-5 is clearly an important policy and 

planning leader at the strategic level At the same time, however, the J-5 has only marginal 

influence on the military enterprise The J-5 can’t change promotion policies, pick the 

next group of four-star generals, or make key decisions on weapons and technology 

procurements The J-5 makes recommendations to strategic leaders and surely needs to 

be able to view through the lens of a strategic leader, but he does not wear the mantle of 

“strategic leader” as intended in this Primer This distinction is important when describing 

the strategic leader requirement to provide alignment 

Strategic leadership requires strategic leaders to initiate processes that ensure their 

organization scans the environment to maintain an awareness of societal, international, 

technological, demographic, and economic developments Chapter 2 discusses elements 

of the relevant external environment for military leaders The primary role in this 

environmental scanning process for the strategic leader is to interpret the scanned data to 

determine the organization’s response For example, if the CSA learns from the general 

in charge of Accessions Command that high-school recruits don’t have the requisite math 

skills to operate many of the Army’s high-tech systems, the Chief needs to interpret this 

data and then explain to relevant stakeholders what this observation means to the Army and 

the nation He then needs to solicit ideas from his senior civilian and military leaders for 

taking action, decide a course for the organization, and influence external decision makers 

to collaborate on solutions 

On a holistic level, the interpretation of environmental scanning in a VUCA world ought 

to lead to the creation of a vision that is aligned with a best estimate of the future environment 

The organization’s vision represents an idealized representation of what the organization 

should strive to become The subsequently developed strategy, however, should explicitly 

align ends (objectives), ways (concepts and methods), and means (resources) to ensure the 

organization’s resources are committed in a manner that allow the organization to succeed 

in its current and future environments—in short—to enact the vision Strategic leaders 

must therefore ensure that they align the vision with their interpretation of the changing 

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environment, and that the organization’s strategy is aligned with this vision Similarly, 

the structure, culture, personnel policies, and technology also need to be aligned with the 

vision and strategy in order to achieve the vision and maintain competitive advantage 

Alignment needs to be both vertical — the lowest levels of the organization understand and 

accept the big picture, and horizontal — each of the stovepipes that come together at the 

strategic level are in sync 

As an example, early in Operation Iraqi Freedom Army leadership realized its vision 

and strategy required a decentralized, deployable, and agile force structure to meet the 

heavy demands of the contemporary operating environment The CSA concluded that the 

Army’s division-centric structure was out of alignment with this requirement and therefore 

directed a rapid re-structuring to a brigade-centric Army This restructuring exemplifies 

how a strategic leader aligns organizational structure with mission requirements to realize 

a vision Similarly, in 2009, the Army concluded its culture was not aligned to address 

two major health issues affecting soldiers deployed in support of Operations Iraqi and 

Enduring Freedom, specifically post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and mild traumatic 

brain injury (MTBI) Aspects of Army culture reinforced long-held negative stereotypes 

about Soldiers who reported non-visible health issues like PTSD and MTBI Given the 

impact and frequency of PTSD and MTBI in the wartime Army, Army leadership created a 

strategic communications plan to attempt to align Army culture to deal appropriately with 

these common wartime health issues 

The preceding paragraphs frequently referred to terms we often think of as civilian 

management terms Military officers routinely frown when leadership conversations turn 

to a discussion of terms like core competencies, enterprise leadership, and competitive 

advantage As strategic leaders, however, these terms are part of the vernacular Of the 

three, the one most often denigrated as a “corporate” term (and therefore not viewed as 

applicable to the military) is competitive advantage In a section on alignment it is prudent 

to attempt to change this negative reaction Scholars of strategic leadership have argued 

that the primary focus of strategy, and hence strategic leaders, is to achieve sustainable 

competitive advantage for their organization—the focus is on winning now AND in the 

long term 

Ironically, one must wonder why the term “competitive advantage” would receive 

pushback from a warfighting organization Clearly all the military services desire to 

achieve a vision, especially in terms of strategy, technology, structure, and culture, that 

positions the Services to defeat America’s current and future potential foes In short, 

they want competitive advantage Unfortunately, the relationship between competitive 

advantage, the corporate world, and the military usually drives the discourse to an analysis 

of the competition over resources between each of the military Services plus other federal 

agencies This discussion is sometimes uncomfortable for military leaders, but it needs to 

occur 

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Commercial and government organizations compete in different ways, but they all are in 

competition with some other entity4 The primary difference is that the governmental agency 

provides services to a broad client base (eg, citizens) and in fact competes for resources 

by contending with other government agencies that seek to provide a specific service or 

perform a given function Commercial organizations seek to dominate markets and build 

market share by price competition, product differentiation and quality, or even monopoly 

formation that simply excludes competitors Governmental agencies compete against 

other agencies in more limited and nuanced ways For instance, they seek monopoly status 

by exclusive ownership of a mission Agencies also attempt to broaden their population 

served to build a larger, long-term client base They (or stakeholder lobbies) build 

relationships with the legislative authorizers and appropriators in Congress to guarantee 

agency programs are funded in the future Anyone who does not think the discussion within 

the Department of Defense (DOD) over cyberspace isn’t about competitive advantage for 

each of the military services does not understand the subtleties of strategic leadership 

This competitive advantage focuses on potential enemies, but also on the allocation of 

resources to fight the cyber war Although the strategies are different between commercial 

and government entities, at the end of the day both seek competitive advantage to ensure 

the continued flow of resources These resources, in most cases, are generally limited and 

therefore, to some extent, create a zero-sum competition 

VISIONING 

The preceding section introduced the importance of the concept of alignment, which 

ensures sustainable competitive advantage Despite its importance, however, most strategic 

leadership scholars, and strategic leaders themselves, cite the ability to develop and 

articulate a compelling vision as the most important task of strategic leadership Chapter 

3 covers this topic in detail and emphasizes that: (1) the visioning process is a team sport; 

the strategic leader alone cannot create and communicate an organizational vision, (2) 

communicating a vision takes a great deal of effort Strategic leaders must often repeat a 

clear and concise message many times, in many places, to ensure the vision cascades down 

through the organization, and (3) actions speak louder than words Most observers will 

quickly detect when the espoused vision is not aligned with enacted values and priorities, 

thereby decreasing the chances of achieving the vision 

CHANGE 

Many well-written books describe how to lead an organization through change John 

Kotter’s Leading Change stands out as one of the best of the genre5 Kotter pointed out that 

individual or organizational change at its most basic involves three processes: unfreezing, 

changing, and refreezing The unfreezing step requires that stakeholders and participants 

view the current situation as unsuitable The change step focuses on enacting changes within 

various components of the enterprise, to include structure, strategy, people, technology, or 

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culture The refreezing step attempts to make those changes a permanent aspect of the 

organization Chapter 6 of this primer discusses managing change as a strategic leader 

task Suffice it to say that if the environment is changing at a faster and faster rate, then 

strategic leaders need to build organizations that can change even faster to align with the 

environment For example, the 1950s-era General Motors bureaucratic model, rooted in 

inertia-plagued hierarchies, is probably in the distant past for most public and private sector 

organizations 

THE STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP TEAM 

Top leaders of any organization, including staff members, share the responsibility of 

strategic leadership Realistically, only one or two percent of the members of an organization 

will ever attain strategic leadership rank or position, but, anyone working directly for a 

strategic leader should be well-versed in strategic thinking concepts in order to adequately 

support and advise the leader. Effective strategic decision making and leadership cannot 

reside merely in one leader The changing external environment and the complexity of large 

organizations create a situation where the leader at the top of the organizational hierarchy 

cannot possibly lead the organization without receiving help in information gathering, 

assessment, and knowledge management Effective leadership depends on the interactions 

amongst the leader, those being led or influenced (both in and out of the organization) and 

the situation or circumstances facing the organization The complexity of these relationships 

and interactions determine the effectiveness of strategic leaders and their teams Therefore, 

this Primer focuses on the concept of strategic leadership, rather than the strategic leader 

alone 

While the need exists for senior officers to transition to the strategic level of leadership, 

the leadership skills and qualities developed at the direct and organizational levels remain 

invaluable The strategic leader must still exercise direct leadership of his subordinate 

commanders and staff At the same time, the strategic leader must manage and lead a very 

large and complex organization, represent the organization to the external environment, 

and wield influence to shape the external environment to help the organization accomplish 

its vision and purpose More so than at any other level of leadership, strategic leadership 

requires proactive consensus building and collaboration with other organizations, agencies 

and nations At the same time, though the primary focus turns outward, the leader must 

also tend to the internal organizational environment Excessive focus inside or outside 

the organization will detract from organizational success and perhaps even viability The 

keys to a successful transition to strategic leadership are an appreciation for the dramatic 

increase in scope of leadership responsibilities, an understanding of the unique nature 

of these increased responsibilities, and the dedication of effort necessary to understand and 

influence the complex and dynamic environment in which these leadership responsibilities 

reside Beyond understanding this strategic environment, strategic leaders and their staffs 

must exercise strategic leadership competencies to achieve their vision within that volatile, 

uncertain, complex, and ambiguous environment Leadership expert John Gardner asserted: 

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...the hierarchical position of leaders within their own system is of 

limited value, because some of the most critically important tasks require 

lateral leadership---boundary-crossing leadership—involving groups over 

whom they have no control. They must exercise leader like influence beyond 

the system over which they preside. They must do what they can to lead 

without authority.6 (bold added for emphasis) 

STEWARDSHIP 

Finally, professional ethics play a foundational role in the effectiveness of strategic 

leaders All professions share some common traits, among them a shared value system, a 

contribution to society, a specialized jurisdiction, and an internal, self-policing mechanism 

At the strategic level of leadership, these qualities manifest themselves most distinctly in 

the requirement for a responsible use of power 

For example, effective strategic leaders and their teams are cognizant of the amplified 

impact of their decisions Whether they are conducting a war, developing a strategy, 

or investing in military capabilities, they appreciate the gravity of their office Almost 

by definition, effective strategic leaders take an expansive view of their stewardship 

responsibilities toward the long term health of the institution They exercise a wariness 

of their natural tendency to act in their self-interest and build a small cadre of advisors or 

accountability partners to protect themselves from personal mistakes that can affect the 

entire organization The strategic leader who conducts himself with a selfless professional 

ethic builds public trust, and in the process accumulates a reservoir of moral authority that 

serves both his office and the institution well 

SUMMARY 

Strategic leadership is generally a team sport that requires a strategic leader-led visioning 

process to create the alignment between the organization’s strengths and weaknesses and 

the anticipated demands of the future external environment Strategic leaders understand 

the importance of vertical and horizontal alignment, ensuring the vision and strategy of the 

organization align with the processes, structures, culture, and technology of the organization 

Finally, strategic leaders are the change agents that enact the constant realignments required 

in the 21st century’s VUCA environment 

ENDNOTES 

1 Marshall was promoted from Brigadier General directly to General on September 1, 1939, so his 

experience is atypical, but still well illustrates the different skills and perspectives needed by the most senior 

leaders 

2 General Casey presentation to the USAWC, September 22, 2008 Cited with permission of Office of 

Chief of Staff 

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3 Richard L Hughes and Katherine C Beatty, Becoming a Strategic Leader (San Francisco: Wiley and 

Sons, 2005): p 9 

4 See TO Jacobs, Strategic Leadership: The Competitive Edge (unpublished manuscript, 2002): p 10 

for a more detailed comparison of civilian and government organizations 

5 John Kotter, Leading Change (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1996) 

6 John Gardner, On Leadership (New York: The Free Press, 1990): p 98 

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CHAPTER 2
	

THE STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP ENVIRONMENTI
	

I don’t think I am exaggerating when I say that we face the most daunting 

strategic environment in generations

1 

Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, 2009 

These times are, one might say, ordinary times, a slice of life like any other. 

Who can bear to hear this, or who will consider it? Are we not especially 

significant because our century is – our century and its nuclear bombs, its 

unique and unprecedented Holocaust, its serial exterminations and refugee 

populations, our century and its warming, its silicon chips, men on the 

moon, and spliced genes? No, we are not and it is not

2 

Annie Dillard, The Wreck of Time; Taking Our Century’s Measure 

A human being is not one thing among others; things determine each 

other, but man is ultimately self-determining. What he becomes—within 

limits of endowment and environment—he has made out of himself. In 

the concentration camp, we watched and witnessed some of our comrades 

behave like swine while others behaved like saints. Man has both potentials 

within himself; while one is actualized depends on decisions but not on 

conditions

3

 (bold emphasis added) 

Victor Frankl, Man’s Search for Meaning 

Carlisle, PA May, 2010 Twitter limits the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff—and 

everyone else—to 140 characters per tweet, and he tweets once or more almost daily4 400 

million people have established accounts on Facebook5 Worldwide, approximately 33 

million people are living with HIV6 Mandatory entitlement programs account for over $2 

trillion of the $355 trillion 2010 Federal Budget and the Office of Management and Budget 

estimates that the percentage of the national debt held by the public will increase from 587% 

to 672% in the next 10 years7 Personal bankruptcies have doubled in the US in the last 20 

years, and quadrupled between 1980 and 20008 The US military budget dwarfs the defense 

budget of China by a multiple of at least four (depending on how one calculates)9 10 11 

I This chapter was significantly updated for the 3rd edition by Colonel Murf Clark 

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Which of these facts is relevant to a military leader? 

For the first time in its history, in 2009, the NFL issued guidelines for players suffering 

concussions12 The US Energy Information Administration estimates that between now and 

2030 the percentage of electricity the world gets from nuclear power will decrease from 15 

to 12 percent13 The fastest growing population segment in most industrialized countries is 

centenarians14 

Should you care? 

A recent Harvard Business Review article recommended asking questions that challenge 

the status quo in your organization “at least 10 times each day”15 

Is that a good idea for leaders in the US military? Do you spend time considering what 

constitutes “the status quo in your organization?” 

Senator Kirk, who in September 2009 replaced longtime Senator Edward Kennedy on 

the Senate Armed Services Committee, questioned Chairman Mullen in the wake of the 

president’s December 1, 2009 announcement of a troop surge for Afghanistan16 

Do you know what they said? Should such testimony influence your thinking? 

Amidst much clamor about “unprecedented change” brought on by the Information Age, 

Foreign Policy magazine quotes an economist who believes the continued proliferation of 

the plain old TV has much more potential to change the world than the internet and wireless 

technology17 Despite claims about the overwhelming technology leaps being made by 

India and China, internet penetration in those countries (7% and 29% of total population, 

respectively) remains far below North America (74%) and most other western democracies18 

What knowledge can leaders derive from this information and how can they manage 

the gathering, sorting, and assessing of that knowledge in order to better understand the 

environment in which they must make decisions and lead large organizations into the future? 

Many of the facts in the previous paragraphs will be outdated or less relevant by the time 

of publication; that fact alone further illustrates the challenge of environmental scanning 

and strategic decision making in the Information Age Because of the multiplicity of factors 

and influences at play and the long lead times required for change in large organizations, 

strategic leadership requires a much broader skill set than leadership practiced at lower 

levels Strategic decision making is extremely difficult, requiring exhaustive research, 

analysis, collaboration, and compromise to reach the best possible solutions to problems 

Even highly experienced leaders—especially highly experienced leaders—may be tempted 

to substitute “educated guessing” or “intuition” for sound processes of information gathering, 

assessment, and risk management Resource constraints and political considerations may 

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interfere The competitive environment demands that organizations assume risk In Strategic 

Leadership; The Competitive Edge, T Owen Jacobs describes the external environment 

as filled with Volatility, Uncertainty, Complexity, and Ambiguity; hence, the acronym, 

“VUCA” That the environment of the Information Age is fraught with VUCA does little 

to excuse irresponsibility, carelessness, or a lack of rigor when attempting to understand 

the environment, anticipate change, and manage risk 21st Century leaders must approach 

this challenge with intelligence, energy, and urgency, confident that these realities and 

complexities can as easily be transformed into a competitive advantage when turned against 

the enemies of our nation 

Given the extent of their responsibilities and the expanding effects of their decisions, 

strategic leaders must consider a vast array of facts, influences, and participants To say 

they must consider all things may be only a slight exaggeration Therein lies the rub With 

limited time and finite knowledge, effective leaders must literally decide how to decide 

That is, they must determine which elements of their environment are most important to a 

particular situation or decision and then focus their attention and efforts there 

Strategic leaders and strategists must attempt to understand, interpret, and master the 

VUCA environment Jacobs suggests leaders cannot attain complete knowledge about the 

many factors governing strategic decisions Nonetheless, leadership requires that decisions 

be made To answer the challenge of VUCA, we must first understand the basic implications 

of its constituent terms 

Volatility: the rate of change of the environment Volatility in the Information Age 

means even the most current data may not provide an adequate context for decision making 

Beyond an ability to accurately assess the current environment, leaders must anticipate rapid 

change and do their best to predict what may happen within the time scope of a project, 

program, or operation Volatility in the environment coupled with the extended timelines 

of modern acquisition programs creates a special challenge for strategic leaders and their 

advisors 

Uncertainty: the inability to know everything about a situation and the difficulty of 

predicting the nature and effect of change (the nexus of uncertainty and volatility) Uncertainty 

often delays decision-making processes and increases the likelihood of vastly divergent 

opinions about the future It drives the need for intelligent risk management and hedging 

strategies 

Complexity: the difficulty of understanding the interactions of multiple parts or factors 

and of predicting the primary and subsequent effects of changing one or more factors in 

a highly interdependent system or even system of systems Complexity differs from 

uncertainty; though it may be possible to predict immediate outcomes of single interactions 

within a broader web, the non-linear branches and sequels multiply so quickly—and double 

back on previous connections—so as to overwhelm most assessment processes Complexity 

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could be said to create uncertainty because of the sheer volume of possible interactions and 

outcomes 

Ambiguity: describes a specific type of uncertainty that results from differences 

in interpretation when contextual clues are insufficient to clarify meaning Ironically, 

“ambiguous” is an ambiguous term, whose definition changes subtly depending on the 

context of its usage For our purposes here, it refers to the difficulty of interpreting meaning 

when context is blurred by factors such as cultural blindness, cognitive bias, or limited 

perspective At the strategic level, leaders can often legitimately interpret events in more 

than one way and the likelihood of misinterpretation is high 

VUCA environments and large organizations Large, complex organizations 

consist of intricate networks of staff, functional, and operating components To achieve 

organizational goals, these components must function together and interact with external 

entities that are equally as complex A strategic leader not only leads the organization, 

but must also represent his or her organization during the necessary interactions with a 

maze of other entities that constitute the organization’s external environment Strategic 

leaders must shape the form and direction of their organizations and influence external 

actors toward accomplishment of objectives Within the VUCA environment, tasks must 

be accomplished collaboratively rather than through individual effort Seldom does a 

single leader possess sufficient knowledge to adequately develop the organizational vision; 

strategic leaders must develop the ability to collaborate, cooperate, and compromise to 

influence external agencies Outside the organization, when rank and position become 

less compelling, leaders must employ tact, persuasion, and sound argumentation 

Thus, the strategic leadership environment consists of both internal and external 

complexities that directly and indirectly affect the resourcing, structuring, and operational 

performance of the organization The dynamics of a changing threat, the changes in 

international coalitions, the shifting of public attitudes, the rapid advances in technology, the 

election of new governments, the fluctuation of national budgets, the evolution of new 

missions, and changing demographics all increase the challenges of strategic leadership 

Strategic leaders must monitor and understand the crosscurrents of the organization’s external 

environment, staying alert for opportunities to implement constructive changes 

Savvy leaders broaden their environmental scan by developing a network of 

knowledgeable associates in external agencies Optimally, a strategic leader’s staff would 

develop similar contacts at the working level to assure that this multiplicity of networks runs 

like a root system throughout the external environment Timely receipt of relevant information 

greatly aids decision making and action taking Leaders armed with current information 

and context can more effectively persuade partners, educate stakeholders, and influence key 

decision makers In undertaking such consensus building, the strategic leader must be 

willing to compromise as necessary Partial achievement of organizational objectives is 

clearly preferable to failure and may set the conditions for further progress 

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The aspects and elements of the external environment that historically have the greatest 

impact upon the Army as an institution include: threats, international alliances, national 

cultures, the military-industrial complex, public opinion, federal budget, technology, federal 

government, private organizations and internal environment Successful strategic leaders 

develop a sophisticated understanding of each aspect and apply this knowledge to develop 

visions for their organizations and to influence the external environment to set conditions for 

success Advisors to strategic leaders should also understand these elements and monitor 

them while helping to guide the organization through this ever-changing environment 

THREATS 

Obviously, of all the variables in the external environment, those most relevant to the 

USArmy are threats to national security and our vital national interests Since 9/11, there has 

been a dramatic increase in regional conflicts, civil wars, insurgencies, terrorist activities, 

weapons proliferation, and drug trafficking Regional instabilities that threaten our 

national interests or threaten the lives of our citizens living abroad may require us to employ 

military forces in a variety of hostile and non-hostile circumstances, either unilaterally, 

multilaterally, or within the United Nations framework Because of multiple regional 

instabilities in the post-9/11 environment, leaders and planners face the difficult task of 

predicting when, where, and how our forces may need to respond Strategic leaders must 

ensure their organizations remain ready to respond to worldwide challenges across the full 

range of military operations as part of a joint and/or combined force 

INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCES 

Operating effectively in the international environment demands an understanding of the 

various political, economic, and cultural factors that influence decision making in other 

countries Combined operations in alliance or coalition circumstances, or under the auspices 

of the United Nations, are commonplace The current influence of radical religious groups, 

transnational threats, and non-state actors further complicates the ability to form strategic 

alliances As such, strategic leaders must determine who may share common interests 

in addressing an international threat, what alliances and relationships exist among and 

between involved factions, and what the political and diplomatic dynamics of the situation 

may be both internationally and domestically Strategic leaders must also be aware that the 

successful conduct of combined operations requires a particular sensitivity to the impact 

the deployment of US forces may have on the laws, traditions, and customs of a host 

country 

NATIONAL CULTURE 

While our military maintains the uniqueness and value of its own culture, it remains a 

subculture within a broader and even more powerful national and societal culture It must 

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shape and define itself within the limits of that dominant culture The military services can 

and should mirror the highest ideals of our society and set standards of conduct that require 

the total dedication and commitment of those who serve in their ranks, but, to best defend the 

nation, they must always be a part of our social fabric An Army that reflects the beliefs and 

values of American society will more easily maintain the respect and trust of that society 

On the other hand, events such as the mistreatment of detainees at Abu Ghraib in 2004 and 

scandals at our military academies can quickly erode the confidence of Americans and the 

international community in the Army’s ideals and conduct 

THE MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX 

When he retired from public service at the end of his presidency, General Eisenhower 

coined a new term as he warned the nation of a powerful new force in our lives—the 

“military-industrial complex” 

This conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms industry 

is new in the American experience. The total influence — economic, political, 

even spiritual — is felt in every city, every statehouse, every office of the federal 

government. We recognize the imperative need for this development. Yet we must 

not fail to comprehend its grave implications. Our toil, resources and livelihood are 

all involved; so is the very structure of our society. In the councils of government, 

we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought 

or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous 

rise of misplaced power exists and will persist. We must never let the weight of 

this combination endanger our liberties or democratic processes. We should take 

nothing for granted. Only an alert and knowledgeable citizenry can compel the 

proper meshing of the huge industrial and military machinery of defense with our 

peaceful methods and goals so that security and liberty may prosper together.19

 President Dwight D Eisenhower

 Farewell Address to the Nation, January 17, 1961 

Almost 50 years later, the military-industrial complex is alive and well, providing 

state-of-the-art capabilities as well as significant political, financial, and ethical challenges 

Information sharing between industry partners and senior military officials leads to mutual 

understanding and increases the likelihood of finding the best solutions to technical 

problems, but simultaneously creates the potential for conflict of interest and real or 

perceived unethical and illegal dealings A few well-known cases highlight the potential 

for corruption in an industry that deals in terms of billions of dollars A recent controversy 

ponders the role of retired senior military leaders working with both defense contractors 

and their former services and questions the propriety of this potential conflict of interest 

or unfair advantage to the defense firms by whom they are employed or contracted While 

most actions of these influential leaders remain clearly within the letter of current law, 

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prominent political voices have wondered aloud if those laws are too tolerant of behavior 

we might reasonably judge as beyond “the proper meshing” of industry and the military 

PUBLIC OPINION 

Strategic leaders must examine how their anticipated decisions and actions may be 

perceived and received by the public, advocacy groups, and elements of society likely to be 

affected, to include their own organizations, and the media Most reputable media outlets 

attempt to provide a balanced view of the military as an institution In turn, the taxpaying 

public and public officials have a legitimate right to information, as long as it does not 

compromise the security of operations and plans Strategic leaders should work with the 

media and consider how best to provide information for mutual benefit The media can 

rapidly and dramatically affect world opinion, policy, and ultimately strategy 

Strategic leaders must be skilled in information operations and strategic communications 

They must proactively work to inform both foreign and domestic audiences concerning the 

Armed Services as organizations and about the missions they perform Strategic leaders 

should use all available means to tell their story and articulate organizational purpose and 

action to a world-wide audience Over the last 60 years, public support has become an 

increasingly vital ingredient in successful military operations In addition, leaders should 

quickly inform civilian leadership and the public when problems arise Transparency and 

timeliness help maintain the credibility enjoyed by the military profession The American 

people do not expect a perfect military They do expect military leaders to deal with 

problems, take care of their sons and daughters, and defend our nation 

FEDERAL BUDGET 

The dynamics of the federal budgeting process strongly influence decision making at 

the strategic level Competition for finite resources demands clear justification and strict 

accountability Interest on the national debt, entitlement programs, and the budgetary desires 

of each department of government constrain the federal budget The DOD develops far more 

requirements than the federal budget can meet Within the DOD planning, programming, 

budgeting and execution (PPBE) process, the Executive and Legislative Branches expect 

strategic leaders to set priorities, advocate for the most important requirements, and provide 

candid assessments of the risks and consequences of various programming and budgeting 

alternatives To be effective in this national system of resource allocation, strategic leaders 

must thoroughly understand the PPBE process, the role of the Office of Management and 

Budget, and the Congressional Authorization and Appropriation Process 

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TECHNOLOGICAL FACTORS
	

U.S. forces must leverage information technology and innovative networkcentric concepts of operations to develop increasingly capable joint forces. New 

information and communications technologies hold promise for networking highly 

distributed joint and multinational forces.20 

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld 

Across the range of military operations, technological developments have enhanced 

the capabilities of the Army by giving our forces significant advantages in networking, 

command and control, situational awareness, and overall combat power The technological 

revolution in warfare has dramatically increased the tempo of operations, the rapidity 

of maneuver, the precision of firepower, the processing of critical information, and the 

complexities of command Technology has also enhanced the ability of the Army to 

function in a joint, interagency, and multi-national operational environment Strategic 

leaders must have a broad understanding of relevant technologies and how advancements 

in each of these technologies can be incorporated into Army organizations, doctrine, and 

equipment to permit continued advancements in combat effectiveness and efficiency 

However, new technology cuts two ways With increased capability also come new and 

different vulnerabilities The asymmetric nature of future warfare requires the leader to 

understand not only the capabilities of new technologies, but also its inherent vulnerabilities 

Such vulnerabilities can and will be exploited by any determined adversary 

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 

Because the military answers to civilian government control, strategic leaders must 

engage with numerous executive, legislative, and judicial organizations and agencies The 

military plays a key advisory role in the development of the national security strategy, the 

national military strategy, and legislation affecting the administration of the Armed Forces 

Within the parameters of such directives and laws, strategic leaders develop the necessary 

strategies, plans, and policies to support and implement President, Secretary of Defense, 

and Congressional intent 

Strategic leaders frequently provide counsel to civilian executive authorities and 

routinely testify before congressional committees and subcommittees Federal Courts 

occasionally review certain decisions, bringing the judiciary branch into play as well 

Additionally, top military leaders must positively influence the interagency process In 

order to succeed in these duties, they must cultivate relationships, collaborate effectively 

with outside agencies, and foster a spirit of cooperation despite differing priorities 

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PRIVATE ORGANIZATIONS 

Many Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and Private and Volunteer 

Organizations (PVOs) perform important functions in the contemporary operating 

environment and therefore influence strategy development and policy Strategic leaders 

frequently interact with representatives of these organizations and must ensure that such 

interactions remain within the parameters of policy guidance and ethical conduct The 

manner in which the military’s strategic leaders leverage and aid these organizations can 

spell the difference between success and failure 

THE INTERNAL ENVIRONMENT 

In many ways the internal environments of the Army and the national military structure 

are just as complex and demanding as the external environment It would be impractical 

to describe all the organizations, systems, and subsystems that exist at the strategic level 

within and among the Services, the combatant commands, international commands, the 

Joint Staff, and the Department of Defense Nor is it practical in this short review to 

describe the multitude of interlocking relationships, lines of communication, and operating 

dynamics Suffice it to say that the strategic leader must interact within this complex 

internal arena to realize the organizational vision 

SUMMARY 

Strategic leadership transcends the organization by orchestrating internal events and 

exerting personal and organizational influence on the external environment to achieve an 

organizational vision Unfortunately, the internal and external environments are volatile, 

uncertain, complex, and ambiguous Consequently, the strategic leader must scan many 

aspects of the environment, assess their observations, and discern how best to influence 

events for the benefit of the organization Furthermore, they must continuously apply 

themselves to building consensus among key stakeholders Those elements within the 

environment that have characteristically had the greatest impact on the Army include: the 

threat, international alliances, our national culture, the military-industrial complex, public 

opinion, the federal budgeting process, technology, our national system of government, 

private organizations, and the internal organization of our Services and the Department 

of Defense To be successful, the strategic leader must remain a perpetual student of the 

environment and remain constantly engaged in the process of adapting to that environment 

ENDNOTES 

1 Michele Flournoy, “Department of Defense Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy” 

USDP Remarks for USAF Senior Leader Orientation Course (August 14, 2009) http://policydefensegov/ 

(accessed May 4, 2010) 

2 Annie Dillard, “The Wreck of Time; Taking Our Century’s Measure” Harper’s Magazine (January 

1998): pp 51-56 

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3 Victor Frankl, Man’s Search for Meaning (Boston: Beacon Press, 1959): pp 119-120 

4 Michael Mullen, Adm, “on my way to the AOR with USO troop, including actor james gandolfini, tony 

sirico, rose mcgowan, and superbowl champion jon stinchcomb.” March 29, 2010 http://wwwtwittercom/ 

thejointstaff (accessed March 29, 2010) 

5 Facebook Press Room “Facebook Corporate Website” Facebook. March 29, 2010 http://facebook 

com/press/infophp?statistics (accessed March 29, 2010) 

6 Centers for Disease Control “Working Together to Advance America’s Commitment to Combat 

Global HIV/AIDs” CDC. March 29, 2010 http://wwwcdcgov/Features/WorldAIDSDay2009 (accessed 

March 29, 2010) 

7 Office of Management and Budget “Budget Summary, Table S-1, “Budget Totals” Office of 

Management and Budget. January 4, 2010 http://wwwwhitehousegov/omb/budget/Overview/Budget 

Summary (accessed January 4, 2010) 

8 American Bankruptcy Institute “Interactive Charts” American Bankruptcy Institute. May 7, 2010 

http://wwwabiworldorg/bkstats/historicalhtml (accessed May 7, 2010) 

9Anup Shah, “World Military Spending” Global Issues; Social, Political, Economic, and Environmental 

Issues that Affect Us All. September 13, 2009 http://wwwglobalissuesorg/article/75/world-military-spendi 

ng#InContextUSMilitarySpending VersusRestoftheWorld (accessed May 7, 2010) 

10 Michael Wines and Jonathan Ansfield “The New York Times Online” Asia Pacific. March 4, 2010 

http://wwwnytimescom/2010/03/05/world/asia/05chinahtml (accessed May 7, 2010) 

11 Office of the Secretary of Defense Military Power of the People’s Republic of China. Annual 

Report to Congress, Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2009 

12 Alan Schwarz, N.F L. Issues New Guidelines on Concussions. December 2, 2009 http://www 

nytimescom/2009/12/03/sports/football/03concussion (accessed May 7, 2010) 

13 US Energy Information Administration “International Energy Outlook 2009” Independent 

Statistics and Analysis. May 27, 2009 http://wwweiadoegov/oiaf/ieo/highlightshtml, Fig 6 (accessed 

May 7, 2010) 

14 The Associated Press “NYDailyNewscom” Daily News, July 21, 2009 http://wwwnydailynews 

com/lifestyle/2009/07/21/2009-07-21_more_people_are_living_past_100 _years_oldhtml (accessed May 7, 

2010) 

15 Hal B Gregersen, Jeffrey H Dyer, and Clayton M Christensen “The Innovator’s DNA” Harvard 

Business Review, December 2009 

16 Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing to Receive Testimony on Afghanistan. Hearing 

Transcript, Washington, DC: US Senate, Committee on Armed Services, 2009 

17 Charles Kenny, “Revolution in a Box “Foreign Policy. November/December 2009 http://www 

foreignpolicycom/articles/2009/10/19/revolution_in_a_box?page=full (accessed May 7, 2010) 

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18 Internet World Stats “Usage and Population Statistics” Asia and North America Internet 

Penetration. 2007, 2009 

19 Dwight D Eisenhower, “Farewell Address by President Dwight D Eisenhower” Final TV Talk. 

Washington, DC: Eisenhower Library, National Archives and Records Administration, January 17, 1961 

20 Donald H Rumsfeld, NetCentric Warfare; Creating a Decisive Warfighting Advantage. Pamphlet, 

Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, Director, Force Transformation, 2003 

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CHAPTER 3
	

VISION
	

Of the three strategic leader tasks presented in Chapter 1, alignment, vision, and change, 

arguably the most important is for the leaders to develop and promulgate a vision for the 

organizationI Chapter 2 covered the strategic environment in detail and demonstrated 

the challenges for leaders operating in an environment characterized by VUCA To be 

successful strategic leaders, however, requires the development of a set of competencies that 

enable them to effectively navigate the strategic environment and through their influence 

promulgate a vision They must be agile enough to learn from the past, adapt to current 

circumstances, and anticipate the future from trends and potentialities1 Leaders should 

establish clarity of purpose for themselves and their organization and have the ability to 

communicate with internal and external constituents2 The preceding skills are necessary 

and invaluable in developing and sharing the vision for an enterprise

3 

Like the concept of leadership, the construct of vision can be conceived at overlapping 

levels yet still linked to specific goals At the individual level, there is a personal vision (eg, 

“be a millionaire by age 30”) More common treatments of vision are at the organizational 

and institutional levels (eg, “be a Fortune 100 company” or “the most prestigious institution 

for the education of strategic leaders”) 4 More difficult to attain are the visions at the 

civic, governmental and societal levels (eg, “best community—America’s Hometown” or 

“beacon of freedom for the world”) Having coherence in visions such that the lower levels 

are nested within those visions at higher levels may preclude goal conflicts and cognitive 

dissonance among members 

DEFINITION AND IMPORTANCE OF VISION 

The concept of vision has become so familiar within academic, government, defense, 

and corporate circles that it is sometimes dismissed or derided as “oh, that vision thing!”5 

As the various definitions are examined, however, some common characteristics and trends 

emerge The term “vision” suggests that a core element is a visual image—a mental picture 

of what the future enterprise or environment will look like The concept also implies a 

longer time horizon This time horizon tends to be middle to long-term in nature (five to 

twenty years) 

Definitions of vision are as numerous and varied as those for leadership Our USAWC 

vision statement meshes well with the definitions by John Kotter, “...a picture of the 

future with some implicit or explicit commentary on why people should strive to create 

that future”6 and Peter Senge, “...a shared picture of the future we seek to create” and 

“...pictures... that foster genuine commitment and enrollment rather than compliance”7 

I This chapter was significantly updated for the 3rd edition by Professor Charles Allen 

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Practically, visions should be clear and concise, communicate a sense of purpose—the 

raison d’être, and be shared with others When enterprise members perceive it as worth 

the effort, the vision creates energy, commitment, and belonging When shared by all 

participants, the vision can bring people to significant achievements 

So defined, vision transcends all levels of an organization The importance of vision 

is demonstrated through many facets It provides a sense of identity for individuals and 

members of organizations An effective and enduring vision becomes part of the culture 

that dictates how people behave and serves as a motivating influence on their actions 

Visions compel and guide For senior leaders, visions serve as touchstones as well as 

aligning mechanisms for decisions and actions For strategic leaders, a vision is important 

for spanning organizational boundaries A statement of vision not only directs internal 

members, but is useful in influencing and garnering support from external stakeholders by 

building consensus and providing access to otherwise unavailable resources as well 

Vision provides a sense of ultimate purpose, direction, and motivation for all members 

and activities within an enterprise It provides an overarching concept that serves to initiate 

and then specify goals, plans, and programs The process of developing the vision offers 

a means of analyzing and understanding the pressures and exigencies of the external 

environment The vision helps to identify what in the environment is important, what 

requires action, and what action should be taken It also establishes and reinforces the 

basic values of the enterprise and of its leaders 

Visions are intended to be enduring During the process of environmental scanning and 

organizational diagnosis, however, it may become apparent that the vision has become out 

of focus or irrelevant The visioning process allows leaders and their enterprises to define 

the vision, to rediscover and affirm the vision during times of stress and turbulence, or to 

adjust and adapt the vision to better align the enterprise with its environment Consider the 

following visions and statements from across an array of domains (national, societal, and 

corporate) 

We hold these truths to be self-evident; that all men are created equal; that they are 

endowed by their creator with certain unalienable rights; that among these are life, 

liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; that to secure these rights, governments are 

instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed.

 Declaration of Independence 

When the architects of our republic wrote the magnificent words of the Constitution 

and the Declaration of Independence, they were signing a promissory note to which 

every American was to fall heir. This note was a promise that all men would be 

guaranteed the inalienable rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.8 

Dr Martin Luther King, Jr 

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To enable people and businesses throughout the world to realize their full potential.9

 Microsoft 

Google’s mission is to organize the world’s information and make it universally 

accessible and useful.10

 Google 

Saving people money to help them live better

11 

Walmart 

Should visions be sacrosanct and unchanging? No, visions help leaders and enterprises 

sustain relevancy in changing environments What if Steve Jobs and Apple Computer, Inc 

stayed the course with its 1976 vision of “An Apple on every Desk”?12 Recognizing and 

seizing opportunities, “that vision thing” changed for Apple to “make a contribution to the 

world by making tools for the mind that advance humankind”13 This mindset led to the 

now-ubiquitous iTunes, iPods, iPhones, and the iPad 

STRATEGIC LEADER RESPONSIBILITIES 

Are vision statements useful for leading organizations? Do they enable strategic leaders 

to develop and communicate a compelling, understandable strategic direction for the 

organization? An effective vision is a means of focusing effort and progressing toward a 

desired future—what ought to be While the vision is an image of a future state, it is also 

the result of a process that an enterprise leader can use to guide future development An 

effective vision also requires an implementing strategy or plan to enable its attainment— 

how to get there 

Creating the vision is a collaborative effort that begins with strategic leaders Their 

competency, coupled with the authority of position, bestow upon strategic leaders the 

unique responsibility and opportunity to establish long-term strategic intent and direction 

A strategic vision, properly articulated, can be compelling and enduring 

Defining the vision is the first step in the development of strategies and plans for 

change Once the vision is expressed, then the methods and resources to achieve it should 

be identified Visioning is an inherently creative process that may come from years of 

experience or deep study through education (Note that the Google founders were 23 years 

old when it was initially released in 1996) The process brings together known information 

and new ideas, integrates these ideas with prospective technologies and future organizational 

requirements, and blends them into an innovative approach to realize the potential of its 

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people Through visioning, leaders forecast the future based on environmental conditions 

and trends to seek opportunities and identify competitors and threats Leaders then develop 

the image of the desired “what ought to be” for the enterprise, positioning it for success 

in the future environment Leaders build upon the visions of others that have gone before 

them 

If I have seen further it is only by standing on the shoulders of giants.14

 Sir Isaac Newton 

CREATING THE VISION 

A vision should be the product of a dynamic, logical, and collective organizational 

process Vision is often attributed only to leaders because of their critical role in developing, 

articulating, and directing it Effective visions however, are rarely the result of leaders 

creating visions in isolation Visions do not reside only in leaders; rather, visions are 

developed as a collaborative effort, with leaders performing the critical role of integrating 

and guiding the process Though far from simple, the visioning process consists primarily 

of examining the external environment, projecting likely future states, and developing a 

desired end state In this task, leaders are assisted by the efforts of key members of the 

enterprise: deputies, chiefs of staff, subordinate leaders, and advisors Visioning may be 

an informal process; however, at higher levels of organization, temporary or permanent 

specialized staffs—“think tanks” or “futures groups”—often assist leaders in this complex 

task 

The visioning process begins with a comprehensive assessment of the environment, the 

organization’s history, mission, and trends as well as an understanding of competitors, to 

determine which are most likely to be dominant in determining the future of the enterprise— 

to discern opportunities and threats to its relevancy The process should also incorporate an 

internal assessment of the organization to determine its strengths and weaknesses From 

the examination of the environment and the enterprise, leaders project into the future and 

develop likely alternative future states They must assess the future environment and 

state of the organization as objectively and realistically as possible Creating a vision 

involves intuition based in judgment gained through experience Experience in analyzing, 

integrating, and synthesizing information equips leaders with “frames of reference”— 

the ability to perceive new information, relationships, and possibilities Although the 

collaboration with others internal and external to the enterprise is important, it is the leader 

whose experience, values, frames of reference, and role contribute most to the creation of 

the vision 

Complex visions captured in a few words, a sentence, or a paragraph can inspire and 

guide a large organization even without the direct presence of the leader A brief vision 

statement can convey a conceptual image broad and powerful enough to give authority and 

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offer utility over a more detailed, but less easily remembered, presentation of the vision 

The vision statement should be flexible enough to accommodate a range of plausible futures 

and contain values that make it worthy of the effort required to achieve it For example, 

this statement was made about the European Recovery Plan, better known as the Marshall 

Plan 

Our policy is directed not against any country or doctrine but against hunger, 

poverty, desperation, and chaos. Its purpose should be the revival of a working 

economy in the world so as to permit the emergence of political and social conditions 

in which free institutions can exist.15

 George C Marshall, Secretary of State 

Drawing from experience and knowledge, leaders apply judgment to create and decide 

upon the vision to pursue As the US Army struggled with defining its role with the 

disintegration of the Soviet Union threat in the 1990s and facing the 21st century as a new 

era of conflict, its senior leaders offered the following statements We see a consistent 

theme in the purpose of the Army and should also discern its institutional responses to 

environmental conditions before and after the attacks of September 11, 2001 

The Army’s fundamental purpose is to fight and win the Nation’s War by establishing 

conditions for lasting peace through land force dominance. This dominance is 

established through integration of the complementary capabilities of all the 

services.16

 FM 100-1 The Army, June 14, 1994 

The Army’s nonnegotiable contract with the American people is to fight and win our 

Nation’s wars. Our unique contribution to national security is prompt, sustained 

land dominance across the range of military operations and spectrum of conflict. 

The Army provides the land force dominance essential to shaping the international 

security environment. 

FM 1 The Army, June 14, 2001 

U.S. Army Vision 

Our Army is serving a Nation at war. This war requires that all elements of our 

national power be applied in a broad, unyielding, and relentless campaign... This 

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is not business as usual... The Army’s Way Ahead...explores how we will obtain a 

more relevant and ready campaign-quality Army with a Joint and Expeditionary 

Mindset.17 

General Peter J Schoomaker, CSA, 2004 

The Army will remain America’s principal land force, organized, trained, and 

equipped for prompt and sustained combat or operations on land to defeat enemy 

land forces and to seize, hold, and defend land areas, and provide forces for long 

term area security operations abroad, including initial establishment of military 

government pending transfer of this responsibility to other authorities.18 

Army Capstone Concept, 2009 

Once a desired future state and resulting vision are developed, strategic leaders create a 

pathway to the future by means of strategy and plans They develop ends (objectives), ways 

(concepts and methods), and means (resources) to achieve the vision Explicitly defined 

objectives make vision attainment recognizable when it comes to fruition Definable 

objectives also provide a method of measuring and evaluating progress toward achieving 

the vision Thus said, visions serve another purpose—that of accountability There is an 

inherent accountability of the leader to the enterprise members and external stakeholders to 

ensure that the leader’s actions are consistent with the espoused vision The vision is also a 

means of holding enterprise members accountable so that the organizational structures and 

processes, as well as their behaviors, remain in alignment with the vision 

SUMMARY 

Vision is a leader-focused activity that gives a sense of identity, purpose, direction, and 

energy This process exists at many levels and in every type of organization; its content 

is the desired future of the organization For that reason, vision adds value by providing 

the means for the enterprise to anticipate and move toward the future Visions generally 

increase in complexity and extend in the time horizon at successively higher levels of 

organization Strategic vision establishes the priority for influence and the allocation of 

resources 

This chapter has provided several perspectives on visions and the visioning process 

It should be clear that there is no “cookie cutter” solution or best template for creating 

and implementing a vision It is important for future strategic leaders to consider several 

techniques and to pursue the technique that fits the context of the enterprise and its 

environment 

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Leaders at every level of organizations must be effective custodians, developers, and 

articulators of their vision In the military context, whether advisors to senior and strategic 

leaders or members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, leaders guide the definition of the desired 

endstate for US national security Arguably, only strategic leaders possess the decision 

authority, perspective, position, and experience to derive a vision from assessment of 

the environment, understanding of personal and professional values, and appreciation of 

the potential of the enterprise Leaders are also responsible for the continual evaluation 

and refinement of the vision in response to internal and external changes The measure 

of effectiveness of the vision is both objective and subjective—the degree to which the 

enterprise accomplishes its mission and maintains its relevancy in the present and in the 

future aligned with its environment 

ENDNOTES 

1 This framework of Learn, Adapt, and Anticipate is modified from the work of Eliot Cohen, and John 

Gooch Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War. (New York: The Free Press, 1990) 

2 Bob Johansen, Get There Early: Sensing the Future to Compete in the Present (San Francisco: 

Berrett-Koehler, 2007): pp 45-68 He turned the VUCA acronym on its head with these proposed strategic 

leadership skills 

3 Johansen’s model of VUCA does not include the additional “C” for communication 

4 U. S. Army War College Strategic Plan (Carlisle, PA: USAWC, February 1, 2005): p 5 

5 Attributed to Governor George W Bush in 1987 See Robert Ajemian “Where is the Real George 

Bush?” Time, January 26, 1987; http://wwwtimecom/time/magazine/article/0,9171,963342-2,00html 

6 John Kotter, Leading Change (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1998): p 68 

7 Peter Senge, The Fifith Discipline: The Art and Practice of the Learning Organization (New York: 

Currency1990): p 9 

8 Martin L King, Jr, “I have a Dream Speech,” (Washington, DC, August 28, 1963); http://www 

usconstitutionnet/dreamhtml 

9 See http://wwwmicrosoftcom/enable/microsoft/missionaspx 

10 See http://wwwgooglecom/corporate/ 

11 See http://walmartstorescom/AboutUs/8123aspx 

12 Steve Ditlea, “An Apple on every desk: How Apple Computer has inaugurated the workplace of the 

future,” Inc., http://wwwinccom/magazine/19811001/2033html (accessed December 10, 2009) 

13 See http://macdailynewscom/indexphp/weblog/comments/22817/ 

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14 Isaac Newton, “Letter to Robert Hooke,” (February 5, 1676); http://enwikipediaorg/wiki/Standing_ 

on_the_shoulders_of_giants 

15 “Remarks of Secretary of State George C Marshall at the Harvard University Commence Exercises, 

(June 5, 1947); http://usausembassyde/etexts/marshall/pam-sphtm 

16 Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-1 (FM 100-1) The Army (Washington, DC; Department 

of the Army, June 14, 1994): p 2 

17 US Army Strategic Communications (Pentagon, Washington, DC: December 11, 2003): http:// 

wwwarmymil/thewayahead/, (accessed February 6, 2004) 

18 Department of the Army The Army Capstone Concept Operational Adaptability: Operating under 

Conditions of Uncertainty and Complexity in an Era of Persistent Conflict 2016-2018 (Washington, DC: 

Department of the Army, December 21, 2009): p 9 

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CHAPTER 4
	

STRATEGIC LEADER COMPETENCIES
	

Competencies are the knowledge, skills, attributes, and capacities that enable a leader 

to perform his required tasks Although competencies are often related to natural traits 

and abilities, what typically distinguishes a competency from a trait is the understanding 

that competencies can be developed and significantly improved for most individuals A 

competency can be improved through education, but most often is developed by reflective 

experience Strategic leader competencies are often no different than the same abilities 

required to be a leader at any level However, some strategic leader competencies are 

qualitatively different and new For instance, strategic leaders not only need to have the 

skills required to lead and take care of their subordinates, they also need to able to envision 

long range future requirements and to apply integrative thinking skills 

The major categories of leadership competencies can be grouped as conceptual, 

technical, and interpersonal Strategic conceptual competencies include the thinking skills 

needed to understand and deal with the complex and ambiguous strategic world Technical 

competencies include knowledge of external political, economic, and cultural systems that 

impact the organization Interpersonal competencies include consensus building, both 

internal and external to the organization, and the capacity to communicate effectively For 

a more detailed examination of senior leader competencies see Appendix A 

CONCEPTUAL COMPETENCIES 

Strategic leaders require the capacity to deal with extraordinary complexity Theirs is 

an environment of difficult, competing issues, few of which have clear solutions and all of 

which pose risks or challenges Many issues have more than one feasible solution, but no 

one solution may be totally acceptable, while all incur costs It is important to understand 

such issues fundamentally and accurately to determine the underlying threads that may 

connect apparently unrelated issues and to chart actions that will have the best long-term 

outcomes In doing so, an understanding of second- and third-order effects is necessary 

to resist actions that may appear reasonable in the short run but are detrimental in the long 

term Strategic conceptual competencies include frame of reference development, problem 

management, and envisioning the future 

Frame of Reference Development Every leader builds a complex knowledge structure 

over time from schooling, personal experience, and self-study For the strategic leader, this 

knowledge structure is a “map” of the strategic world; it is a dynamic representation of the 

significant factors in the strategic environment with cause-and-effect interrelationships A 

frame of reference acts as a basis of observation and judgment 

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Three attributes are essential for building a good frame of reference First, the leader 

must be open to new experiences and input from others including subordinates and peers 

Second, the leader must be reflective, and not afraid to rethink past experiences and learn 

from them Third, he must be comfortable with abstracts and concepts common in the 

strategic environment 

A frame of reference cannot be taught by conventional classroom methods It is 

developed by the individual over time as he reflects and makes sense of new knowledge 

and experiences Frames of reference form as leaders progress from the direct through 

the organizational to the strategic levels of leadership Individual initiative is important 

to developing a broad frame of reference Consequently, part of becoming a strategic 

leader is approaching this mental activity as intrinsically interesting and rewarding In the 

following vignette General Lynch explains the value of a fighting level frame of reference 

that characterized then Colin Powell’s service as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

One of your greatest challenges in the Pentagon is trying to explain to other people 

the problems down at the fighting level. So many of those guys started out as vice 

presidents and worked their way up. They never had an appreciation of what goes 

on down there at the lowest level. Powell had the advantage of going up through 

those levels. For the younger leaders in Vietnam, there was a tremendous moral 

and ethical challenge that was never faced by the commanders in World War II. 

When a guy is steeped in the moral and ethical issues down at the fighting level 

he’s more inclined to back off from gross solutions and try to equate what they are 

saying to how difficult it would be to implement it down where he remembers it. 

Powell was the first Chairman who had that experience and was able to carry it up 

through the ranks.1 

General Mike Lynch, US Army (Ret) 

Much like the intelligence analyst, the strategic leader, equipped with a well developed 

frame of reference, templates events that may have no discernable pattern to his subordinates 

He is more able to understand the true situation and, most importantly, know where these 

events are likely to lead if no intervention occurs Such leaders are uniquely equipped to 

deal with events having complex causes and to envision creative solutions This enables 

timely and proactive decision making 

A well-developed frame of reference also gives the strategic leader a thorough 

understanding of organizational subsystems This understanding enables visualizing the 

interactive dynamics of the total system Appreciation for these interdependencies helps 

to ensure that decisions taken in one area will not have an unanticipated adverse impact 

in others Without this capacity, changes in policy, regulation, or action may indirectly 

produce other changes that are neither anticipated nor desired 

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Problem Management. Management of strategic problems deals with issues that 

are competing, that have manifold implications which are often difficult to understand 

completely, and that have potentially catastrophic outcomes if not resolved carefully There 

are no “right” answers Many issues are not so much a choice between “right and wrong” 

as a choice between “right and right” Strategic leaders must be able to think families of 

issues through as systems so that decisions move the problem as a whole toward resolution 

This involves applying past experiences, identifying and creating patterns, discarding non 

useable data, understanding second- and third-order effects, maintaining flexibility, and 

knowing what is an acceptable outcome for the system as a whole It also involves working 

and thinking interactively and not solving problems individually 

Problem management and decision making are two distinct activities The first involves 

managing the problems towards the desired outcome—making adjustments, modifying 

the initial approach, and discarding alternatives that inhibit progress Many of the most 

significant problems at the strategic level require this approach because simple and direct 

alternative courses of action do not exist The second involves developing alternative 

courses of action, assessing probability of success, and pursuing the selected course of 

action This differentiation between problem management and decision making is a major 

element in the transition from direct to more indirect leadership. Most past training and 

work experiences at the direct level are based on developing short-term solutions and 

deciding on relatively well-structured problems by choosing among alternative courses 

of action Long-term, ill-defined problems for which it is difficult to envision desired 

outcomes are not frequently encountered at lower levels These are the problems, however, 

that strategic leaders frequently encounter 

Strategic leadership requires a refined ability to recognize and avoid irrelevant and 

marginal issues An important ability in working strategic issues is to see beyond the 

immediately obvious information received and to know what information is missing This 

includes recognizing multiple paths to the same goal, understanding the opportunity costs 

for each path, and foreseeing the indirect effects of each 

Additionally, acceptance of some degree of risk is essential Strategic issues are generally 

ill-defined, and most information available is ambiguous and incomplete Most possible 

courses of action have such complex second- and third-order effects that a completely 

accurate prediction of their outcomes is not possible This necessitates committing to 

decisions and operating effectively under conditions of uncertainty In the face of risk, the 

ability to recognize and seize opportunities is evident most clearly in the effectiveness with 

which the strategic leader identifies relevant information, understands the significance of 

projects or activities of others, and discards distracters 

Envisioning the Future. The capability to formulate and articulate strategic aims and 

key concepts is perhaps the strategic leader’s most significant capacity, the application of 

which was discussed in Chapter 3, Vision He must lead the organization in the development 

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of strategic plans to address mid- and long-term programs designed to achieve the strategic 

aims This demands an understanding of the interaction of ends, ways, and means as they 

interact to form a strategy A staff of strategists may develop and refine the strategy, but the 

strategic leader provides the direction, the concept, and the focus 

A senior leader must not only have the ability to envision the future, but must also work 

proactively to shape the future environment to enhance goal attainment At the strategic 

level, goals may be far-reaching and should be formulated to accommodate contingencies 

that reflect the organization’s relationship to a changing environment This requires the 

thinking and processing of information creatively outside the established boundaries It is 

an ability to see the organization and environment not as it is but rather as it ought to be 

TECHNICAL COMPETENCIES 

Strategic leader technical competencies differ significantly from those skills required 

at the direct or organizational level While the technical skills used at lower levels are 

important elements of the strategic leader’s frame of reference, they usually are not directly 

relevant to the specific tasks required at the higher level At the strategic level, technical 

competencies include an understanding of organizational systems, an appreciation of 

functional relationships outside the organization, and knowledge of the broader political 

and social systems within which the organization operates Success at the strategic level is 

a matter of continuous learning as exemplified by George Washington 

The crucial military difference (apart from levels of innate ability) between 

Washington and the commanders who opposed him was that they were sure they 

knew all the answers, while Washington tried every day and every hour to learn.2 

James Thomas Flexner 

Systems Understanding. At the organizational level, leaders understand how their 

organizations operate and how to foster conditions that enable them to be more effective 

At the strategic level there is decreased concentration on internal process and system 

integration and increased concentration on how the organization fits within the total DOD 

framework and into the broader international arena Organizational systems at these levels 

have complex inter-relationships, and strategic leaders may have numerous reporting and 

coordinating relationships Thus the leader must understand the separate roles he plays, 

the boundaries of these roles, their demands and constraints, and the expectations of other 

departments and agencies 

Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, Multinational (JIIM) Relationships. 

National force projection necessitates an understanding and integration of joint and 

combined operations Different nations have different operating practices and principles 

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which impact operations of a combined force Similarly, each Service has developed a 

different culture, vocabulary, and expectation for its members Strategic leaders must 

know how to operate in a multicultural environment to gain the full understanding and 

commitment of their subordinates 

Political and Social Competence. The ability to participate effectively in the 

interagency process inherent in national security policy formulation and execution is 

fundamental Just as important is the capacity for interacting with the legislative branch 

It is necessary to have this political and social competence to advise in developing the 

policy, preparing the strategy, and working to secure adequate resources to implement the 

strategy Leaders at the strategic level function as members of the policy formulation team, 

helping to determine national interests and objectives They present a balanced argument 

of national security requirements, benefits, costs, and risks 

INTERPERSONAL COMPETENCIES 

Strategic leader interpersonal competencies include the ability to build consensus within 

the organization, the ability to negotiate with external agencies or organizations in an 

attempt to shape or influence the external environment, and the ability to communicate 

internally and externally While these are not the only three interpersonal competencies 

needed by strategic leaders, they are the most important when leading organizations at the 

highest levels 

Consensus Building. In contrast with organizational-level leaders, strategic leaders 

devote far more of their time dealing with outside organizations and with leaders of other 

Services or nations Consensus on an issue is necessary if coordinated and effective action 

is to be taken Consensus building is a complicated process based on effective reasoning, 

logic, and negotiation which may take place over an extended period Consensus is not 

unanimous agreement It is more about what all parties can live with than what any one 

party would prefer It is arriving at a decision that results in the absence of sabotage or 

interference in an activity while allowing some amount of time for the issue to resolve 

itself It requires involving all stakeholders, encouraging input, making problems visible 

and resolving them, and making decisions collaboratively Even when consensus is 

achieved, the leader and organization must continuously work to ensure that “apparent” 

consensus bears out in the actions of the consensus stakeholders Strategic leaders must 

be persuasive yet willing to compromise when necessary Consensus building is different 

from directing or commanding While strategic leaders, like organizational leaders, may 

issue direct orders, such orders have less force in the complex strategic world In working 

with peers, it is imperative to reach consensus Peers will not respond to orders In essence, 

the process of consensus building ensures that effective reasoning has taken place and that 

contentious issues have been resolved which gains commitment to long term goals that 

likely extend well into the future 

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The hindsight of the historian can only reinforce Washington’s conviction that the 

crucial battles of the war were in the arenas of public opinion. There can be no 

doubt that the British were totally outclassed in the warfare for the minds of men. 

It was in those mental arenas that the civilian-soldier George Washington shone the 

brightest. He kept forever in mind, as more radical statesmen of either the right or 

the left could not do, that the fundamental objective was not to foster division but 

to increase unity.3 

James Thomas Flexner 

Negotiation. As stated earlier, many relationships at the strategic level are lateral and 

without clear subordination In many of these relationships strategic leaders must rely 

heavily on negotiating skills Successful negotiation requires a range of interpersonal 

skills Perhaps the most important is the ability to stand firm on nonnegotiable points 

while simultaneously communicating respect for other participants Personal attributes 

underlying this ability require skills in listening, in diagnosing unspoken agendas, and 

the capacity to detach oneself personally from the negotiation process The essence of 

successful negotiating is communicating a clear position on an issue while still conveying 

willingness to compromise 

Communication. Internal to the organization, strategic leaders communicate through 

a variety of direct and indirect means Their actions and statements are always carefully 

analyzed Observers are keenly sensitive to nuances of meaning Effective communication 

within the organization is important to changing, or even maintaining, direction or policy If 

change is desired, large organizations can be steered on a new course only very deliberately 

because of their inertia When leaders attempt change through policy, regulation, or vision, 

their communications are interpreted at every level Thus, care in choice of words is 

essential to ensuring the desired message is received 

External to the organization, strategic leaders communicate with Congress, government 

agencies, national political leaders, and their constituents This is accomplished through a 

variety of means Through writing, meetings, interviews for news media, or through public 

speaking engagements, strategic leaders communicate for the organization This requires 

clarity of thought, direction, and process Possessing these communicative attributes, 

coupled with a high degree of persuasiveness, provides the leader with the necessary tools 

to build support, build consensus, and negotiate successfully Communicating in a brief, 

clear, and persuasive manner--a considerable challenge when dealing in a vague, uncertain 

environment--is a competency strategic leaders must master General Powell had the 

ability to effectively communicate to external audiences as illustrated below 

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Of more immediate concern to General Powell, however, was mounting press and 

congressional pressure for a ‘peace dividend.’ The Chairman wished to counter 

criticism that the Department’s planning ignored changes in the world. Determined 

to convince the American people and the Congress of the need for continued U.S. 

engagement worldwide, General Powell had already begun publicly to articulate 

his strategic vision.4 

Lorna S Jaffe 

SUMMARY 

Strategic leader competencies fall under three broad categories: conceptual, technical, 

and interpersonal These competencies are supported by a broad and rich frame of reference 

developed throughout the leader’s life that enables the leader to deal with tremendously 

complex issues and events Although theoretical and historical readings can make salient 

the knowledge, skills, and abilities related to any strategic leader competency, most often 

these competencies will be developed through hands-on experiences, especially if linked to 

some sort of candid feedback mechanism Future strategic leaders should balance identified 

weaknesses with challenging jobs and opportunities in order to stretch and develop current 

skills 

ENDNOTES 

1 General Mike Lynch in Howard Means, Colin Powell: Soldier/Statesman – Statesman/Soldier (New 

York: Knopf, 1992): p 266 

2 James Thomas Flexner, George Washington in the American Revolution (1775-1875) (Boston: Little 

Brown, 1968): p 535 

3 Ibid, p 534 

4 Lorna S Jaffe, The Development of the Base Force 1989-1992 (Washington, DC: Joint History Office, 

Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1993): p 28 

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CHAPTER 5 

STRATEGIC DECISION MAKING PARADIGMS: 

A PRIMER FOR SENIOR LEADERSI 

The goal for the year at the USAWC is to prepare our students to be strategic leaders or 

to serve as effective advisers to the senior leadership of our military and this Nation Nobel 

Laureate, Elihu Root, the Secretary of War in 1901, challenged our institution to study the 

three great problems of “national defense, military science and responsible command”1 

This means that our graduates are part of the system that determines and reaffirms the 

values and the security interests of our Nation This system formulates policies and spawns 

the series of strategic documents beginning with the National Security Strategy of the US, 

and supported by the Quadrennial Defense Review, the National Defense Strategy and the 

National Military Strategy generated within the DOD As members of the profession of 

arms sworn to protect and defend against all enemies, our graduates must be experts in 

the development of plans and the employment of military forces in the execution of our 

national policies The USAWC’s primary mission is to help students gain an appreciation 

of the challenges of strategic decision making by incorporating into its curriculum lessons 

relating to the theory and practice of strategy formulation, implementation and evaluation 

The curriculum does so by providing an overlay of historical case studies to make real the 

complexity involved in strategic decision making 

STRATEGIC DECISION MAKING 

Strategic Change 

There are several strategic decisions that involved change in the US Army in the second 

half of the 20th century After the conclusion of World War II, the US Army roles and 

missions were explicitly stated in the National Security Act of 1947 These established 

its jurisdiction vis-à-vis the other services2 In the 1950’s, the Army sought to redefine 

itself to accommodate the defense priorities of President Dwight D Eisenhower At issue 

during the Eisenhower Administration was the contentious restructuring of the force for 

the nuclear era3 Later, the Vietnam War necessitated a change in Army doctrine and force 

structure to deal with the environment of unconventional war In the 1970’s and 80’s, the 

Army again redefined itself to face the Soviet threat in Western Europe as it learned to 

operate with the all-recruited and professionalized “all-volunteer” force Each of these 

periods required strategic decisions reached by senior leadership and implemented using a 

framework that is today referred to as Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leader 

I This chapter is a reprint of an unpublished manuscript by Professor Charles Allen and Dr Breena Coates 

(2009) 

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Development, Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPF) Our Army, as part of the national 

defense establishment, is always faced with strategic decisions on how to develop and 

position our forces for success in the joint operating environment (JOE) and for the future 

In each case, Army leadership was engaged and defined the purpose of the organization, 

establishing the vision, and developing supporting strategies to achieve it—deciding what 

to do, when, and how Accordingly, strategic decisions are made by the members of the 

organization who have the ultimate responsibility to ensure fulfillment of its purpose and 

who accept the consequences when it does not For the US military, strategic decisions 

are made by the civilian Secretary of Defense, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Service 

Secretaries and Service Chiefs, and Combatant Commanders, all of whom bear responsibility 

to the Chief Executive, Congress, and ultimately to the American people Decisions about 

the Army involve other organizations and agencies that clearly have a stake in what the 

Army does, and how it goes about doing it The nature of the contemporary operating 

environment (COE) necessitates consideration of capabilities possessed by JIIM and nongovernmental actors Thus, strategic decision makers may be significantly influenced by 

stakeholders outside of the organization 

The Ontology of Strategic Decision Making 

Strategic decisions are non-routine and involve both the art of leadership and the 

science of management Making routine decisions of how to efficiently manage resources 

according to established procedures and clearly understood objectives is the technical work 

of management Routine decisions are normally the purview of supervisors and middlelevel managers that have the requisite authority and responsibility to take action However, 

non-routine decisions require what Harvard Professor Ron Heifetz refers to as “adaptive 

work” where senior leadership must consider the broader implications of the situation, take 

an active role in defining the problem, creatively explore potential solutions, and apply 

judgments as to what should be done4 The USAWC definition of Strategic Leadership as 

the process of influence for “achievement of a desirable and clearly understood vision by 

influencing the organizational culture, allocating resources, directing through policy and 

directive, and building consensus,”5 implicitly requires the capacity for strategic decision 

making 

The Complexity of Strategic Decision Making 

Strategic decisions entail “ill-structured,”6 “messy” or “wicked problems” that do not 

have quick, easy solutions7 HL Mencken’s quip is amusing and accurate, “there is always 

a well-known solution to every human problem—neat, plausible, and wrong”8 This 

concept, known as the Error of the Third Kind, describes how complex problems are often 

addressed with a correct solution to the wrong problem9 At the strategic level, the scope 

of decision making is different than at other levels within a military organization—tactical 

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and operational—which have established and accepted procedures that are normative and 

prescriptive Tactical convoy movements of an infantry platoon can be reduced to several 

definable parameters—number of vehicles, rate of march, interval between vehicles, number 

of refuel and rest stops, etc, so that the platoon leader can arrive at the “right” solution to 

get the unit to a desired location At the operational level, movements from a staging area 

for multiple brigade combat teams along parallel routes may be more complicated, but use 

the same parameters to determine a “best” way to deploy combat forces into an area of 

operation in accordance with a well-prescribed movement table However, the strategic 

level decision on the number of brigade combat teams that the Army will field as part of 

its Transformation to the Modular Force involves innumerable interdependent activities 

within the DOTMLPF framework Such a decision is inherently more complex and “illstructured” in pursuit of the objective to provide relevant landpower forces to combatant 

commanders for future battlefields 

At the strategic level, the national defense establishment and its members must interact 

across diverse environmental domains and are required to demonstrate effectiveness in 

the eyes of multiple constituents Strategic decision making occurs at a key nexus of that 

interaction, culminating from decision criteria associated with dynamic, nonlinear, highly 

interconnected, and interdependent relationships The power to make strategic decisions 

is usually dispersed over a number of constituencies The purpose of this chapter is to 

show commonly used decision paradigms while highlighting their particular strengths 

and weaknesses as appropriate Making sense of strategic decisions requires adding a 

set of mental models distinct from the traditional military decision making models The 

decision theories presented provide leaders with an understanding of the major forms of 

decision making used in complex environments These models are more than abstract 

conceptualizations; they provide frameworks by which to analyze past strategic practices 

and develop new ones The models are generally categorized as either prescriptive or 

descriptive As the term implies, the prescriptive model suggests methods and processes 

that should be used in order to make better decisions This type of model is seen as a matter 

of choice by decision makers (eg, the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP)) In 

contrast, descriptive models attempt to detail the process of how decisions are actually 

made 

THE BASIC DECISION MAKING PARADIGMS 

There are many models of decision making useful for strategists in conceptualizing 

decisions Some of the most well known that are of value for USAWC students are: 

1) Rational Model, 2) Bounded-Rationality Model, 3) Incremental Model, 4) MixedScanning Model, 5) Polis Model, 6) Garbage Can Model, 7) Bargaining Model, 8) 

Participative Model Other decision making models that have foundations in microeconomic 

theory, such as the public-choice model, the prospect model, etc, relate more closely to the 

civilian, non-military sector and thus are not addressed here 

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Rational Decision Making: This approach, also known as “the rational-comprehensive” 

model, borrows from economic theory and has the goal of maximizing efficiency by 

picking the best alternative based on specific criteria Congruent with the MDMP, it is 

often described as a six-step process: 

1 Define goals 

2 Identify alternatives 

3 Calculate the consequences 

4 Decide the most favorable using a calculated ratio of benefits to costs 

5 Monitor implementation 

6 Begin again 

The rational approach is very attractive and easy to embrace with its simplicity The 

formulation intuitively seems to make sense It provides a structured way to address a 

problem and arrive at a solution The approach may appear to impose certainty and clarity 

However, it is best suited for simple, well-structured problems The rational decision 

making process depends on clear statements of goals accepted by those seeking to address 

problematic conditions It works well on technical issues when goals are precisely defined 

and there is general agreement on measures for analysis and selection criteria NASA 

uses the rational approach because engineering parameters and procedures tend to be less 

ambiguous The use of this approach is much more difficult and problematic for defense 

organizations whose goals are constantly a matter of debate in a political system designed 

to balance federal power between three branches of government

 Figure 1 The Joint Planning and Execution Community10 

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Although the rational approach of the MDMP is embraced by our military culture, 

many factors prevent its strict adherence as a prescriptive process We see the challenge 

presented by the rational approach when our military leaders seek clear expressions of 

desired end-states as a precursor to developing military strategy and operational plans (eg, 

Weinberg-Powell doctrine as implemented in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm) 

Using the context of the Joint Planning and Execution Community shown in Figure 1, it is 

arguably difficult to have each sub-community agree on the common goals to be achieved 

The nature of the problems and the complexity of the environment would generate an 

unmanageable number of possible alternatives to consider The uncertainty and ambiguity 

of the environment would also undermine any confidence in determining consequences if a 

particular alternative were selected Those consequences, either in the attainment of stated 

goals or commensurate benefits and costs, assume causality between selected courses of 

actions and subsequent results While military leaders prefer clear expressions of end 

states and objectives, ambiguity is valuable in a political environment The desire for 

clearly delineated goals and objectives are rarely to be found and even when they are stated 

publicly, they are often subject to change Hence, the rational decision making approach 

is not sufficient to explain the real-world decisions made at the operational and strategic 

level 

The Behavioral Model (Bounded Rationality): The most important critique of the 

rational approach comes from the work of Nobel Laureate, Herbert Simon, who presented 

the concept of “bounded rationality”11 This theory holds that: 

1 Humans are intellectually ill-equipped to make cognitively rational decisions 

because they can only process a few bits of data at a time 

2 Comprehensive analysis is impossible due to limitations on the availability of 

information, time, and expertise 

3 Individuals cannot imagine every possible solution to a problem, and therefore not 

all possible alternatives are considered or analyzed 

The practical application of the rational MDMP has decision makers simplifying the 

problem set and restricting themselves to a few major alternatives This happens in the 

face of time constraints and the limitations of people In practice, decision makers identify 

a limited number of decision making criteria and subsequently examine a limited range of 

alternatives that have worked before or are easy to develop Alternative selection tends 

to stop at the first alternative that sufficiently addresses the problem at hand Given the 

lack of perfect information to make the decision and the impossibility of optimization in 

the problem-setting, Simon argued that decision makers “satisfice” That is to say that 

people do not optimize decisions, but actually seek to find a solution that is minimally 

sufficient and satisfactory—one that is “good enough” to meet minimum established 

criteria The conclusion of Operation Desert Storm in 1991, short of an invasion of Iraq 

and the overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s regime, could be viewed as a satisficed decision 

that was good enough at the time 

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This model often has an implicit choice variant where, although multiple alternatives are 

presented, there is a clear favorite that will likely be selected so decision criteria are skewed 

to support the choice Those military planners and operators who have been involved with 

MDMP can recount the development of the obligatory three courses of action and the 

“objective weighting” that resulted in selection of the staff favorite course of action (ie, 

the one that the commander would approve) 

Incremental Model: Charles Lindblom also rejected the rational-comprehensive 

model and presented an alternative “incremental” approach to decision making In his 

now famous paper, “The Science of Muddling Through,”12 Lindblom saw that most policy 

decisions are made in small analytical increments in response to events and circumstances 

where the decision maker’s analysis is focused on familiar, better-known experiences 

This significantly reduces the number of decision factors and alternatives available 

“Disjointed” incrementalism, argued Lindblom, is really how problems are solved over 

time, in piecemeal, rather than in comprehensive, fashion Relatively small or incremental 

policy changes tend to be the norm because of the need for consensus among the interested 

parties and negotiation efforts are directed to what can be achieved Unfortunately, the 

attainment of short-term solutions may be at the expense of more important and farreaching goals Incrementalism is not inherently undesirable since small changes from the 

resulting decisions are more subject to correction if they produce unfavorable outcomes 

The theory of incrementalism explains how the process of decision making is slowed down, 

and organizations avoid making big mistakes that could be costly militarily, financially and 

politically However, focusing on smaller problems and failure to confront the larger issues 

may result in “kicking the can down the road” to deal with later when the situation may be 

more complex and dangerous Furthermore, the incremental model may slowly move the 

organization away from the original espoused goals If the organization is faced with an 

environment that has changed significantly, the incremental approach is unlikely to result 

in the necessary amount of change to guarantee organizational survival13 

The incremental model has the following characteristics: 

1 Only a few options and means are considered 

2 Decisions are the product of negotiated settlements 

3 Changes are made gradually over time 

4 Decisions tend to be made reactively 

5 Political considerations are important in determining outcomes 

The incremental approach to decision making is reflective of the Planning, Programming, 

Budgeting, and Executing (PPBE) process used in the military The greatest predetermining 

factor for any year’s budget is the prior year’s budget Anything more than incremental 

change is unlikely when it comes to the budgetary process An item might be submitted 

and approved in the Program Objective Memorandum (POM), and might be incrementally 

added to by using the Supplemental Budget to gain more resources for it Alternatively, a 

program might be incrementally developed in the POM over several years Several of our 

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Department of the Army (DA) weapons systems programs (eg, Bradley Fighting Vehicle, 

the Remotely Piloted Vehicle, and the Future Combat System could be viewed using the 

incremental model) In the case of the Bradley Fighting Vehicle, the original espoused 

goals were incrementally contradicted over time14 

Lindblom conceded shortcomings of the incremental approach including: fragmentation 

of decisions, arbitrary exclusions, and decision makers may overlook excellent policies not 

suggested by the chain of successive policy steps Yehezkel Dror offered other critiques 

of incrementalism It may not suffice to meet real growing demands; it may miss the mark 

entirely; it lacks responsiveness to large-scale needs; it makes acceptable the forces that 

tend toward inertia; it maintains the status quo, and, it lacks innovativeness15 The result 

may be a failure to confront major issues The danger is that the situation may become 

more complex and tenuous 

Mixed Scanning Model: This is a hybrid, or compromise, paradigm derived from 

rational and incremental decision making theories It is drawn from the work of sociologist 

Amitai Etzioni16 who suggested its use in seeking policy solutions to short-term, but urgent, 

needs It is, in effect, a concept that can be described as “splitting the difference” between 

the models Etzioni likens the concept to a photographer working with two cameras A 

broad-angled camera quickly pans through the entire environment—which is the rational 

approach Another camera “would zero in on those areas revealed by the first camera 

to require more detailed examination”17 Janis and Mann18 call this the quasi-satisficing 

approach For example, the US National Security Advisor to the President in suggesting 

a policy decision on terrorist camps in Pakistan, might superficially scan all recent 

developments, which is the comprehensive approach He might then focus on the issues 

that have come up since the last scan, which is the incremental approach 

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, given a strategic problem, such as providing 

advice to the Secretaries of Defense and State on whether the US should assist Israel 

in its ongoing conflict with Hamas, would plausibly review the chessboard19 of options: 

military support; political and diplomatic support; watch-and-wait, or some other strategy 

He might then choose a particular approach Having done so, he and his team would 

go back to examining, in detail, the options within the chosen subset When President 

Franklin Delano Roosevelt and his advisors scanned the available options for the US prior 

to involvement in World War II, they were utilizing the rational approach When it became 

clear that the preferred option was involvement in the war, FDR and advisors then scanned 

pertinent decisions required for US involvement In turn, this scan generated the strategy 

for entry into the war 

Etzioni criticized both approaches as being insufficient He observed that on the 

one hand, calling the rational approach unrealistic and arguing that a full examination 

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of all pertinent choices is impractical and, on the other hand, that incrementalism did not 

distinguish between core and peripheral issues 

Polis Model: Another scholar critical about the rational and the incremental models 

is Deborah Stone, who offered another perspective of public policy making—the Polis 

model of a political community20 Stone presented opposing viewpoints of the market (a 

rational model for political decision making) and the polis (how political decisions really 

happen) She argued the polis perspective is more descriptive of the way decisions are 

really made by comparing the theoretical political environments of the market and the polis 

and considering the goals of the respective communities How problems are defined in the 

market versus the polis is a function of symbolism, causes, and interests that influence how 

problems are addressed Decisions are made and solutions (policy-strategies) are formed 

with inducements, rules, rights, and powers as the driving forces In sum, the polis model 

assumes inconsistencies in life where the political community is able to deal with less 

than comprehensive information and less than reliable information Stone’s model has the 

following characteristics: 21 

1 State goals ambiguously and keep some secret 

2 Be prepared to shift and redefine goals as the political situation dictates 

3 Keep undesirable alternatives off the agenda by not mentioning them 

4 Make your preferred alternative appear to be the only feasible one 

5 Focus on one part of the causal chain and ignore politically difficult ones 

6 Use rhetorical devices to blend alternatives to prevent strong opposition 

7 Selectively project consequences that make your decision look the best 

8 Choose the action that hurts powerful constituents the least, but portray your 

decision as creating the maximum social good 

The Polis Model can be applied to the decision making process of President Lyndon 

Johnson for the Vietnam War As HR McMaster recounts in his book, Dereliction of Duty, 

Johnson’s goals for the conflict were not clearly stated nor shared with the US Congress22 

With support of Secretary of Defense McNamara, the president co-opted the Joints Chiefs 

of Staff to gain their silence as he pushed for his Great Society agenda at the expense of 

recommended force levels for operations in Vietnam 

Garbage Can Model: Cohen, March, and Olsen developed the notion that decisions 

are made based on chance and unsystematic interactions of actors and opportunities, and 

the current availability of resources23 This model, based on the theory of organizational 

anarchy, posits the notion that organizations have inconsistent and ill-defined preferences, 

and operate on the basis of trial and error; that stakeholders only partially understand the 

processes; and that decision-makers often act whimsically and impulsively Within this 

framework, March and his colleagues theorized that organizations produce many solutions 

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for which there are no immediate problems, and these are dumped in a holding can—the 

garbage can Problems needing solutions will arise in the future and a search through the 

garbage might yield a solution In this sense, the garbage can is really an “opportunity” 

can The mix of opportunities lying in waiting are based on the organization’s current and 

past environmental realities The garbage can’s relevance depends on how quickly these 

cans get filled and also how quickly the garbage cans are discarded While the garbage 

can presents opportunities for addressing the important problems, it has the threat of 

unsystematic rationality 

Vice Admiral Joseph Metcalf used the garbage can model to explain decision making 

of the 1983 Grenada Rescue Operation24 VADM Metcalf was the commander of the joint 

US forces, CJTF 120, for Operation Urgent Fury, who in his reflections commented, “It is 

clear that many decisions just ‘happened’”25 While the goals of the invasion were clearly 

established and communicated, the command and staff structure was cobbled together with 

available forces from all Services (an existing solution used to solve the emergent problem) 

The paper organization of CJTF 120 was fleshed out by re-directing personnel—a notable 

case was taking the Army liaison officer, Major General Norm Schwarzkopf, and naming 

him the deputy commander While the operation was a success, several problems with 

intelligence, communications, and coordination (resulting in fratricide) among the joint 

forces led to congressional investigations The review of Operation Urgent Fury contributed 

to the enactment of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 

1986 (GNA) GNA established authorities for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

revised military command structures, and instituted requirements for joint training In 

sum, the non-rationality of the decision making process led to legislation to provide more 

structure and control 

Bargaining Model: Bargaining reflects a decision making process both between 

individuals within an organization and between organizations through their representatives 

This perspective requires an understanding of the principles of negotiation The essence of 

decision making of groups involves tradeoffs between constituents that may have competing 

interests and agendas In seeking to identify common interests and mutual benefit for 

the involved parties, some concessions may be made, but the resulting decision should 

produce a condition that is acceptable to either side Here the anchoring and adjustment 

bias inhibits substantial movement from the status quo so it is unlikely to have drastic 

change in policy or strategy embraced by the group 

The bargaining approach is common in government, but does have a number of 

advantages and weaknesses26 It may be effective for addressing and presenting issues 

while serving as the catalyst for getting multiple perspectives before the decision making 

body However, this approach may not result in the best alternative for a given situation 

since political consensus sometimes results in the lowest common denominator—achieving 

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a decision that all will accept Consequently, it may lead to an equitable distribution of 

power and benefit that may be inherently less effective than a contested decision 

Kettl and Fesler provide us with an example as they deconstruct the US decisions 

during the Cuban Missile Crisis27 Based on Graham Allison’s classic study, The Essence of 

Decision, the example demonstrates the bargaining among the key Kennedy Administration 

advisers ranging from the senior military officials, Secretary of Defense, Secretary of State, 

Director, Central Intelligence Agency and others under the leadership of the Attorney 

General, Robert Kennedy28 The Cuban Missile Crisis was a high-stakes and time-sensitive 

event with potentially catastrophic consequences for failure The key players within the 

Kennedy Administration had distinctly opposing views on the goals to be achieved and 

what should be done (eg, General LeMay’s insistence on confronting the Soviet Union 

with direct military strikes) in an environment of uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity 

The final US actions were derived from reaching consensus through several iterations of 

discussions with the advisers 

Bargaining is a process that gives each participant a voice in the proceedings While 

it may not be the case where a simple majority wins, it can be fraught with contention and 

can be time-consuming in the attempt to resolve points of disagreement In this form of 

decision making, the needs of the most powerful parties are more likely to be met, but the 

larger interests of the aggregate may not be addressed Limiting the number of people 

involved in making decisions presents is own paradoxes Smaller numbers of participants 

may be able to reach decisions more quickly by excluding less powerful members, but may 

not have the requisite diversity of thought and experience to formulate better decisions 

The potential for better decisions increases when the participant pool is larger even though 

achieving agreement may be more difficult 

Participative Decision Making Model: The participative decision making perspective 

is an expansion of the bargaining approach and attempts to include all those directly 

affected by the decision It is the most democratic form of decision making where 

there is an opportunity to provide input and influence However, there is an important 

distinction between “consultation” and “shared decision making power”29 Providing the 

opportunity to voice an opinion is not the same as giving power to make the decision We 

commonly see this approach as one that calls for “consultation and stakeholder analysis” 

and that places emphasis on meeting with “constituents and clientele” to discern the key 

issues for consideration before decisions are reached While these efforts may be largely 

symbolic, such stakeholder groups can wield significant power and present obstacles if 

not appropriately included in the decision process These groups may have their own 

agenda and interests to protect, hence raising concerns about the degree to which they 

truly represent the goodwill of the greater community To address this concern, advisory 

groups are often sought to represent all views of the community in a grass roots fashion30 

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Participative decision making takes place in the United Nations, NATO, and other world 

bodies 

The 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process had obvious implications 

for the members of the Joint Planning and Execution Community Decisions made by the 

Services responsible to provide the Title 10 functions of training and sustaining fielded 

forces have a significant impact on the Combatant Commands (CoComs) that have the 

mission to execute the national military strategy, joint plans, and operations The BRAC 

decisions recommended by the Army in such areas as realignment of operational forces of 

the Active Army at installations DOD-wide, return of overseas units back to the continental 

US, and consolidation of headquarters and other activities in Joint or multifunctional 

installations have obvious implications for warfighting commands31 To gain input from 

the military departments on areas of common interest, Joint Cross Service Groups were 

formed and provided input to the Army infrastructure analysis for the BRAC deliberations 

Once the DOD BRAC report was submitted to the executive branch, members of the 

Presidential BRAC commission visited installations recommended for closure to hear from 

those impacted by such decisions 

Participative decision making is slow and expensive While it is an effective means 

to collect information, the amount and unorganized nature of the information is a problem 

in its own right that has to be addressed The quality of the decision in this approach 

often depends on the expertise and commitment of the participants There are a number 

of important factors that can influence the quality of participative decision making The 

participants should strive to subordinate self-interest in pursuit of common goals There 

should be an appropriate level of representation from the stakeholders and those groups 

should have enough power to influence the outcome32 

CONCLUSION 

Each decision paradigm presented here provides a method to analyze problems that our 

USAWC graduates will face as they move into higher levels of command It is evident that 

each paradigm has its opportunities and challenges The advantages and disadvantages 

will manifest themselves in varying degrees and in different contexts As they sit at the 

decision making table, our graduates will be able to recognize and analyze the paradigmatic 

limitations and strengths as they are being discussed in strategy planning They will also 

know that while we aspire to be rational in our choices of action, we are limited in our 

cognitive ability to comprehensively develop and assess alternatives Additionally, we 

have innate biases and use heuristics that effect how we process and use information Since 

implementing decisions generally requires the involvement of others, it is necessary to 

include them in the process of identifying key issues and determining potential solutions 

The environment and context of the problem should influence the extent of inclusion 

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and collaboration In such cases, either the bargaining or participative decision making 

approach may be more appropriate to establish common interests and produce agreement 

as to what should be done and how The Kettl and Fesler conclusion that no single approach 

offers a best solution to all the problems of making decisions captures the central theme to 

the USAWC perspective on decision making33 Having a variety of decision tools in our 

kitbags helps us identify the appropriate approach to individual problem sets 

ENDNOTES 

1 This quote from Elihu Root is the guiding principle that establishes the USAWC core curriculum and 

is cited in the USAWC command briefing 

2 The discussion of jurisdictions for military profession is included in Don M Snider, “The US Army 

as Profession” in Don M Snider (ed) The Future of the Army Profession (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2005): 

pp 17-21 

3 AJ Bacevich and Lawrence F Kaplan, “Generals Versus The President: Eisenhower and the Army, 

1953 – 1955, A Case in Civil Military Relations (CS 0697-02),” (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University: 

National Security Studies, 1997) 

4 Ronald Heifetz, Leadership without Easy Answers (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1994): pp 23-26 

5 Stephen Shambach (ed) Strategic Leadership Primer (Carlisle, PA: USAWC, 2004): p 5 

6 Ian Mitroff and Francisco Sagasti, “Epistemology as a General Systems Theory: An Approach to the 

Design of Complex Decision-Making Experiments,” Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 3 (1973): pp117-34 

7 The term is more commonplace and was introduced in H Rittel and M Webber “Dilemmas in a 

General Theory of Planning,” Policy Sciences (Amsterdam: Elsevier Scientific Publishing Company, Inc, 

Vol 4, 1973): pp 155-169 

8 Henry Louis Mencken, Prejudices: Second Series, 1920, http://wwwphnetfi/public/mamaa1/ 

menckenhtm and US editor (1880 - 1956) http://wwwquotationspagecom/quote/282html (November 12, 

2006) 

9 Howard Raiffa, Decision Analysis (New York: Addison-Wesley, 1968) 

10 This figure is included in a slide presentation found at http://wwwdticmil/doctrine/jrm/plan4 

ppt The concept of Joint Planning and Execution is detailed in “Chapter I Principles and Concepts” Joint 

Publication 5-0 Joint Operation Planning Figure I-3 provides an illustration of the Joint Planning and 

Execution Community 

11 Herbert A. Simon, Models of Man (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1957) 

12 Charles Lindblom, “The Science of Muddling Through” Public Administration Review (Spring, 

1959): pp79-88 

13 Ibid 

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14 For an amusing treatment of the evolution of the Bradley Fighing Vehicle from an infantry troop 

transport to an imposing combat system see the HBO film, “The Pentagon Wars” 1998 directed by Richard 

Benjamin 

15 Yehezkel Dror, “Muddling Through –“Science’ or Inertia?” Public Administration Review (1964): 

pp 153-177 

16 Amatai Etzioni, “A Third Approach of Decision-Making,” Public Administration Review (1967): 

pp 385-392 Amatai Etzioni, “Mixed Scanning Revisited,” Public Administration Review (1986): pp 8-14 

17 Etzioni (1967) 

18 Irving Janis and Leon Mann, Decision-Making (New York: The Free Press, 1977) 

19 Paul A Haynes, “Towards a Concept of Monitoring,” Town Planning Review (1974): pp 8-14 

20 Deborah Stone, Policy Paradox: The Art of Political Decisionmaking (New York: WW Norton & 

Co, Inc, 2002) 

21 Ibid 

22 H R McMaster, Dereliction of duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

and the lies that led to Vietnam (New York: HarperCollins, 1998) 

23 Michael Cohen, James March and Johan Olsen, “The Garbage Can Model of Organizational Choice” 

Administrative Science Quarterly 17(1), (1972): pp 1-25 

24 Joseph Metcalf, “Decisionmaking and the Grenada Rescue Operation” in J G March and R 

Weissinger-Baylon (eds) Ambiguity and command; Organizational perspectives on military decisionmaking 

(Marshfield, Massachusetts: Pitman Publishing, 1986): pp 277-297 

25 Ibid, p 277 

26 Ibid, pp 240-242 

27 Donald Kettl and James Fesler, The Politics of the Administrative Process (Washington, DC: CQ 

Press, 2005): pp 238-240 

28 Graham T Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown, 

1971) 

29 Ibid, p 242 

30 Ibid, p 244 

31 Craig College and William Tarantino, Leading Change within the Army BRAC 2005 Process Paper 

presented at Defense Analysis Seminar, Seoul Korea (April 2006): p 8 

32 Kettl and Fesler, p 247 

33 Ibid, p 251 

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CHAPTER 6
	

STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP TASKS
	

The pressure to respond to the challenges of the volatile, uncertain, complex, and 

ambiguous nature of the environment tends to focus strategic leaders’ attention on tasks 

associated with the present However, if strategic leaders become enmeshed in shortterm requirements, they cannot focus on the mid- and long-term tasks that only they 

have the authority to perform Strategic leaders must concentrate their efforts on longterm tasks while simultaneously addressing short-term requirements in the context of the 

organization’s long-term direction 

Below is a discussion of key strategic leadership tasks No single leader performs all the 

tasks associated with strategic-level leadership without the assistance of members of the 

senior leadership team Key strategic leadership tasks include the following major areas of 

responsibility: 

•	 Provide vision 

•	 Shape culture 

•	 Build and shape joint, interagency, multinational and intra-agency relationships 

•	 Build and shape national-level relationships 

•	 Represent the organization 

•	 Lead and manage change 

PROVIDE VISION 

As detailed in Chapter 3, a primary task required of strategic leaders is to create a vision 

for their organizations The vision, which sets the tone for the future of the organization, 

is the first step in the development of plans and strategies for change For a military 

organization, creation of the vision should include determining future required operating 

capability by considering developing concepts for the future nature of war, emerging threat 

capabilities and intentions, and advances in technology 

The strategic leader’s vision sets the long-term direction for an organization The solutions 

to short-term requirements should be consistent with the articulated vision A strategic 

leader must institutionalize a strategy to implement the vision, including the selection and 

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mentoring of subordinate leaders to carry on that strategic vision Other key strategic 

leadership vision tasks are related to communicating, developing, and implementing that 

vision 

SHAPE CULTURE 

The strategic leader must take steps to shape the organization’s culture in a manner that 

supports and helps to communicate the vision Tasks within this area include: 

•	 Ensuring that organizational culture is aligned with the future demands of 

the environment yet also built on values deemed essential by the leaders and 

members of the organization 

•	 Ensuring the organization’s values are rooted in aligned underlying assumptions 

that position the organization to maintain competitive advantage in the future 

•	 Ensuring that stated values, as related to the strategic vision, are communicated 

throughout the organization and are internalized by its members 

•	 Building consensus within the organization to gain support for goals and 

objectives that support and achieve the vision 

BUILD AND SHAPE JOINT, INTERAGENCY, MULTI-NATIONAL 

AND INTRA-AGENCY RELATIONSHIPS 

Strategic leaders develop and manage joint and combined lateral relationships with 

strategic leaders of other Services, other countries, and government agencies in both peace 

and war Major tasks include: 

•	 Creating understanding and acceptance of organizational goals and national 

objectives and, in turn, understanding goals and objectives of other national 

forces 

•	 Creating consensus required to enable joint and combined action to be 

undertaken in pursuit of shared goals and objectives 

•	 Maintaining the knowledge and resource base that the organization requires to 

envision future desired outcomes and negotiating to make them happen 

Strategic leaders must actively participate in the development and sustainment of 

coalitions and alliances that are central to national strategy Operating effectively in the 

multinational environment requires an international perspective This task requires the 

strategic leader to understand the political, economic, and social factors of other countries 

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Managing the organization to achieve joint obligations is also a major task Fulfillment 

of this task requires the strategic leader’s commitment to joint doctrine and joint operations 

The strategic leader must view the organization from a joint perspective and design internal 

policy and organizational structure to meet joint requirements 

Strategic leaders must also articulate the roles and missions of the organization as they 

apply to the joint arena This task requires an appreciation for the roles and missions 

of other Services and an understanding of their goals and objectives The organization 

must be designed, equipped, trained, and maintained at a state of readiness that allows it 

to participate fully in joint and combined operations This means that strategic leaders 

must understand and be sensitive to the cultures within which their fellow strategic leaders 

operate 

Because the future portends increased emphasis on joint and combined operations in 

peace and war, the strategic leader’s vision should identify and develop the organization’s 

role in those arenas Developing and sustaining coalitions, managing the organization to 

achieve joint obligations, and appreciating the roles and missions of other organizations in 

the joint arena are tasks that assist in implementing and achieving the strategic vision 

BUILD AND SHAPE NATIONAL-LEVEL RELATIONSHIPS 

The Congress shall have Power To ... provide for the common Defense...of the 

United States; ...To raise and support Armies,...To provide and maintain a Navy; 

To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces. 

US Const, Article I, Section 8 

Managing relationships between the organization as a component of the nation’s total 

defense force and the overarching national policy apparatus is a major responsibility of 

strategic leaders They use their national and international frames of reference to influence 

opinion and build consensus for organizational roles, missions, and objectives They garner 

the support of diverse players to enable the vision to be achieved 

Requirements in this area include: 

•	 Providing advice and counsel in national policy formulation 

•	 Interpreting national policy guidelines and directions 

•	 Planning for the development and sustainment of the military capability required to 

implement national policy in the joint, combined, and interagency arenas 

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•	 Articulating the organization’s requirements for resources and capabilities 

•	 Developing competitive strategies 

•	 Bridging the gap between political decisions made as part of the national security 

decision process and the individuals that ultimately carry out those decisions 

Strategic leaders are responsible to ensure that the leadership of the organization 

understands national security policy To accomplish this task, they formulate organizational 

programs and policy directives that accurately interpret and reflect national security 

objectives These programs and directives prepare the organization to respond to all 

security requirements in either peace or war 

REPRESENT THE ORGANIZATION 

The strategic leader represents the organization in its relationships with the larger 

society These responsibilities include: 

•	 Regularly communicating with elements of the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial 

Branches 

•	 Acting as a spokesperson for the organization with other Federal agencies, the 

media, influential people at the national level, and the public at large 

•	 Building and maintaining a network of information sources that can be used to 

understand and influence the environment 

To accomplish these tasks, strategic leaders’frames of reference must include a thorough 

understanding of our national culture, values, interests and the political, economic, and 

military elements of national power Strategic leaders must also be experts in the processes 

and procedures for developing national security objectives, national military strategy, and 

for the development, deployment, and use of the nation’s military forces 

An understanding of current and projected national and international situations is 

necessary for credibility in testimony to Congress and for interactions with executives 

of other federal and state agencies, business leaders, the media, and others who influence 

national attitudes toward the military An awareness of the outlook, values, and priorities 

of political leaders and those who influence public opinion requires an understanding of 

American society This perspective is necessary not only for public representation, but also 

for shaping the culture and values of the organization as an integral part of the total society 

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No organization operates in a vacuum To achieve the organizational short-term 

objectives and to implement the long-term vision, strategic leaders must understand how 

the organization fits into the national security framework They must also build consensus 

within that framework The best method to achieve consensus in a multifaceted, pluralistic 

system is through networking Informal contacts with knowledgeable, influential people 

holding key positions in other organizations and agencies assist in gathering the diverse 

support that allows the organization’s vision to be achieved Integrity and the power of 

personality are keys to accomplishing this consensus-building task Strategic leaders who 

have the ability to persuade others, who know how and when to compromise without 

abandoning principles, and who gain and maintain the trust of other influential decisionmakers will go a long way toward achieving the organization’s objectives 

MANAGE CHANGE 

Strategic leaders proactively manage change through the processes associated with 

embedding their vision within the organization and shaping organizational culture to 

support the vision Achieving the vision requires change to bridge the gap between the 

present and the future External environmental factors, such as the changing nature of 

military threats, adjustments to national military strategy, legislation affecting DOD, 

changes in international alliances, and budget considerations generate the need for change 

within the organization Internally, improvements in warfighting doctrine, equipment 

modernization, resource adjustments resulting from technology advancements, and other 

factors also drive organizational change These factors and changes may be so extensive 

that they periodically require that the strategic vision be revised 

I have conceived of many plans, but I was never free to execute one of them. For 

all that I held the rudder, and with a strong hand, the waves were always a good 

deal stronger.1 

Napoleon Bonaparte 

DOD, Joint Staff, and Service-unique strategic-level planning systems provide strategic 

leaders the processes to manage change in the environment of strategic leadership Decisions 

made within the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS); the Joint Operation Planning and 

Execution System (JOPES); the Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution (PPBE) 

process; and the Services’ systems integration processes provide purpose and direction to 

lower levels of the organization Management of change at the strategic level includes the 

following: 

•	 Identifying the necessary force capabilities to accomplish the national military 

strategy 

52
	
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

•	 Identifying and assigning strategic and operational roles and missions,
	

including priorities for allocating resources
	

•	 Preparing strategies and plans for the use of military forces across the operational 

continuum in the unified, joint, combined, and interagency arenas 

•	 Developing and improving operating doctrine and the associated training 

methodologies to support the doctrine 

•	 Understanding and planning for second- and third-order effects of actions to 

implement change 

•	 Maintaining effective leader development and other human resources programs 

Decision-making at the strategic level almost always requires major resource commitments 

that cannot easily be reversed Continual analysis of requirements, capabilities, and risks 

associated with capability shortfalls is essential to the decision making process Strategic 

leaders rely on timely, accurate feedback to prevent making decisions based on incomplete 

or inadequate information Systems must be designed to be top-driven and bottom-fed 

Purpose, direction, and motivation are provided from the top, while information and 

recommendations flow upward from within the organization 

The management of change demands that strategic leaders focus primarily on future 

mid- and long-range issues while dealing with current short-term requirements This 

means that strategic leaders must empower subordinate echelons to implement strategies 

and policies within the established framework Effective, systematic feedback is essential 

to provide strategic leaders with information on which to judge the progress and ultimate 

results of desired changes within the organization 

Empowering subordinate leaders in this fashion helps to perpetuate and achieve the 

strategic vision Because short-term solutions should be consistent with the long-term 

vision, subordinates must understand and internalize the vision to implement strategies 

and policies Because the tenure of any individual strategic leader is limited, subordinate 

leaders must be selected, mentored, and educated to carry on the vision The history of the 

United States Army has been built from great leaders who produced great subordinates 

One of these leaders was TRADOC Commander in the mid-1970s, General William E 

DePuy Biographer Henry Gole asserted: 

Bill DePuy found the men who would help him in what he called “my life’s work”: 

a thorough reform of the Army, a task he set for himself. And he seeded the system 

with talented people who would directly succeed him and others who would succeed 

them to direct the Army a dozen years and even two decades after his retirement.2 

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SUMMARY 

Strategic leaders have the challenge and responsibility to lead large, complex organizations 

which change very slowly, with great expenditure of energy The tasks required to meet 

this challenge begin with the strategic leader providing a vision to the organization With 

this vision and well-articulated organizational values, strategic leaders then influence and 

shape their organization’s culture They also lead the organization on a daily basis, ensuring 

it meets all requirements in the unified, joint, combined, and interagency arenas This 

task requires strategic leaders to deal with short-term challenges, including operational 

contingencies, consistent with mid- and long-term objectives They also manage the 

organization’s relationships with national-level agencies and organizations, representing 

the organization before Congress, the media, and other influential opinion groups The 

objective is to gain consensus among these various groups and organizations in support 

of the roles and missions, goals, and objectives of the organization Such consensus is 

essential to achieving the organization’s vision in the strategic environment Finally, by 

facilitating the management of change, strategic leaders guide the organization today while 

molding it to meet tomorrow’s challenges 

ENDNOTES 

1 Will Durant and Ariel Durant, The Age of Napoleon (New York: Simon and Shuster, 1975): p 241 

2 Henry G Gole, General William E. DePuy: Preparing the Army for Modern War (Lexington, 

Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky, 2008): p 296 

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CHAPTER 7 

THE STRATEGIC LEADER AND
	

THE HUMAN DIMENSION OF COMBAT
	

The trained American possesses qualities that are almost unique. Because of his 

initiative and resourcefulness, his adaptability to change and his readiness to resort 

to the expedient, he becomes, when he has attained a proficiency in all the normal 

techniques of battle, a formidable soldier. Yet even he has his limits; the presentation 

of his individual and collective strength is one of the greatest responsibilities of 

leadership.1 

General Dwight D Eisenhower 

No matter how involved strategic leaders may become in working to further their 

vision for the Army, they must always be mindful that they are leaders of an organization 

whose fundamental purpose is to protect our national interests and that often involves 

committing personnel to the violence of battle The phenomenon of human combat is like 

no other activity in which mankind engages Within the crucible of armed conflict, those 

who participate are dramatically affected by the fear of death or maiming, the trauma of 

participating in and witnessing violent death and destruction, the grief from the loss of 

comrades, and the deprivation of even the simplest of life’s needs 

The psychological impact of battle and the prospect of future battle have a tremendous 

influence upon the performance of individuals and of the units in which they are members 

Individuals and units can minimize the adverse effects of facing and participating in sustained 

combat by being properly conditioned, supported, and trained Unfortunately, the costs of 

creating and sustaining the institutional processes necessary to conserve the psychological 

capacity of our Army to function effectively in battle often have little perceived value in 

the day-to-day administration and training of the force in peacetime Thus, it is essential 

that strategic leaders have an appreciation for the human dimension of combat, so that they 

will stop external and internal influences from constricting those policies and associated 

resources dedicated to enhancing the psychological staying power of our Army in battle 

Too often, and with the best of intensions, this psychological staying power is undermined 

in the quest for administrative efficiency, cost-effectiveness, and peacetime mission focus 

It was clear to me after my time in Iraq that we’re going to be at this for a while; 

and (that) the human mind and body weren’t made to deal with repeated combat 

deployments...As we’re getting some of the young Soldiers from society, we’re 

finding that some of the things they may see in deployments or overseas 

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assignments are pretty traumatic. I think we have to train them to be prepared for 

that.2 

General George W Casey, 

CSA 

A fundamental understanding of this human dimension can only be achieved through 

personal study and contemplation Although such appreciation and understanding can 

result from personal combat experience, there is no level of personal experience that cannot 

be significantly reinforced with an analysis of the experiences of others 

Strategic leaders such as Generals Eisenhower and Arnold possessed no personal 

experience in the human dimension of combat before they assumed significant strategic 

leader responsibilities at the outset of World War II Yet both of these distinguished 

strategic leaders had by that time achieved an understanding of this dimension of warfare 

through years of reading and reflecting upon the commentaries of those who wrote of 

such experiences Every decision that these two strategic leaders made was only after 

consideration of the consequences of the decision on the soldiers and airmen who bore the 

brunt of battle Each of these leaders understood the human dynamics of combat and its 

relationship to the psychological staying power of the forces they led 

Achieving an understanding of the human dimension of combat is a continuing 

professional commitment of any Army leader, but most especially the leader at the strategic 

level It is a subject area that is as rich and as complex as any quest for an understanding 

of human nature As such, it encompasses such diverse topics as: the value system of a 

society and its military; how individual values are influenced or changed; the psychological 

and physical manifestations of combat stress; the influences of training and conditioning to 

prevent or ameliorate the stress of combat; the dynamics of unit performance and cohesion; 

and numerous other related topics 

In the best of all worlds, leaders will achieve the strategic level without personal 

experience in the human dimension of combat After ten years of conflict in the Middle 

East this lofty goal is clearly not realistic now or in the foreseeable future Regardless 

of whether they’ve personally experienced the stress of combat, strategic leaders must 

possess a fundamental appreciation for this dimension of warfare for the very reason that 

our Army must always be prepared to commit its forces to combat to protect our nation’s 

interests Every decision that Army strategic leaders make, now or in the future, must 

be made with consideration of the impact of that decision on the psychological staying 

power of our soldiers and units in battle To permit our Army to lessen the proper focus on 

psychological readiness for sustained combat is to break faith with those soldiers who will 

commit themselves in current and future conflicts 

56
	
ENDNOTES 

1 General Dwight D Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, Garden City (New Jersey: Doubleday, 1948): p 

453 

2 Army News Service, “General Casey Lauds ‘Comprehensive Soldier Fitness’ Progress,” (April 13, 

2010), http://wwwarmywell-beingorg 

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APPENDIX A 

STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP COMPETENCIESI 

On December 21, 2001, the CSA tasked the USAWC to identify the strategic leader skill 

sets for officers required in the post-September 11th environment A research group of four 

students and a faculty advisor completed the following report after extensive research and 

analysis Research visits conducted by the team included the Center for Army Leadership, 

the Objective Force Task Force office, the Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and 

Social Sciences, US Army Cadet Command, the US Military Academy, Training and 

Doctrine Command headquarters and schools, and the leader development offices in the 

Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-1 and G-3 Additionally, the group consulted with 

leader development experts in organizations such as the Center for Creative Leadership, 

Bristol-Myers Squibb, and Strategic Leadership Solutions 

STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP 

The search for strategic leader competencies (knowledge, skills, attributes, and 

abilities) is a natural progression of the research in the field of leadership In the late 

1980s, some social science researchers began to question whether leadership actually made 

a difference in organizations while others suggested that perhaps the study of leadership 

had reached its nadir Rather than disappearing, however, the study of leadership took on 

new energy with an emphasis on leadership of organizations, rather than the traditional 

leadership approaches that focused on face-to-face interaction at lower levels Studies 

of transformational leadership, organizational culture, visionary leadership, organizational 

change, and charismatic leaders re-invigorated the field of leadership Thus, the notion 

of strategic leadership was introduced While lists of leadership competencies were very 

popular in the 1980s, the most recent literature distills strategic leadership to a few key 

skills and competencies, or a process 

In 1991, the USAWC hosted a conference on the fledgling field of strategic leadership 

At that conference, strategic leadership aspects were based on Jaques’s Stratified Systems 

Theory (SST) SST essentially argues that there are critical tasks that must be performed 

by leaders in effective organizations At each higher level in an organization, these tasks 

become increasingly complex and qualitatively different Consequently, leaders at the 

strategic level must have higher levels of cognitive complexity– the ability to deal with 

I This appendix is a reprint of the Strategic Studies Institute Publication by Dr Leonard Wong, 

Dr Stephen Gerras, COL William Kidd, COL Robert Pricone, and COL Richard Swengros, Strategic 

Leadership Competencies, September 2003, available at: http://wwwstrategicstudiesinstitutearmymil/pubs/ 

displaycfm?pubID=382 

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abstract, longer timeframe concepts The influence of SST on the USAWC (and Army) is 

evident with the emphasis on cognitive complexity that permeates much of the strategic 

leadership instruction 

In its Strategic Leadership Primer, 1998 Edition, the USAWC provided a list of strategic 

leader competencies using the Be, Know, Do typology The list is comprehensive and 

appears to capture every possible aspect of leadership 

BE (Disposition - values, attributes): 

• The Values Champion- the standard bearer; beyond reproach 

• Master of the Strategic Art- ends, ways, means 

• Quintessential Student of History 

• Comfortable with Complexity 

• High Personal Stamina- physical, mental, stress management 

• Skilled Diplomat 

• Possesses Intellectual Sophistication- alternative frames of reference, pattern 

recognition, and able to see 2nd, 3rd, and 4th-order effects 

KNOW (Disposition - skills): 

Conceptual 

• Envisioning - anticipating the future, proactive thinking - practices critical, 

creative, reflective thinking 

• Frame of Reference Development - including systems understanding, scanning, 

pattern recognition 

• Problem Management - competing issues, no right answers, ability to recognize 

and ignore irrelevant issues 

• Critical Self-Examination 

• Critical, Reflective Thought 

• Effective within Environment of Complexity 

• Skillful Formulation of Ends, Ways, Means 

Interpersonal 

• Communication- to a much broader audience; negotiations, consensus- building 

across a variety of stakeholders; systems knowledge; sophisticated persuasion 

skills 

• Inspires Others to Act 

• Organizational Representation - to internal and external audiences/stakeholders 

• Skillful Coordination of Ends, Ways, Means 

• Master of Command and Peer Leadership 

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Technical 

• Systems Understanding - political, economic, cultural, logistical, force 

management, and joint/combined interrelationships, etc 

• Recognizes and Understands Interdependencies - systems, decisions, 

organizations, etc 

• Information-age Technological Awareness - next generation awareness, 

sophisticated time/space selection 

• Skillful Application of Ends, Ways, Means 

DO (Action - influencing, operating, and improving): 

• Provide for the Future - visioning (long-term focus, time span, perspective) 

• Initiate of Policy and Directive 

• Shape the Culture - Values-based organization, leverage diversity, 

understanding and accepting differences, multiple perspectives 

• Teach and Mentor the Strategic Art 

• Manage Joint/Combined and Interagency Relationships 

• Manage National-Level Relationships 

• Represent the Organization 

• Leverage Technology 

• Lead and Manage Change - creating and building “learning organizations” 

• Build Teams and Consensus at Strategic Level (can’t dictate action at this level) 

-co-opting, coalition building, negotiating, etc 

• Practice the Strategic Art - allocates resources; develops and executes strategic 

plans derived from the inter-agency process 

Similarly, in FM 22-100, Army Leadership, the Army’s doctrinal leadership manual, the 

skills and actions required of strategic leaders are a cumulative list of forty-one competencies 

addressing the direct, organizational, and strategic levels Twenty-one competencies are 

provided for the strategic level alone: 

FM 22-100, Army Leadership 

Strategic Level Skills and Actions 

• Communicating 

• Using dialogue 

• Negotiating 

• Achieving consensus 

• Building staffs 

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• Envisioning 

• Developing frames of reference 

• Strategic art 

• Motivating 

• Leveraging technology 

• Executing 

• Communicating a vision 

• Decision making 

• Leading change 

• Strategic planning 

• Learning 

• Strategic assessing 

• Translating political goals into military objectives 

• Building 

• Dealing with uncertainty and ambiguity 

In one sense, the USAWC and FM 22-100 lists of strategic leader competencies are 

too comprehensive At the individual level, it is difficult to assess one’s leadership ability 

when the lists suggest that a strategic leader must be, know, and do just about everything 

At the institutional level, the lack of parsimony makes it difficult to focus an institution’s 

attention and resources on leader development when such a broad array of competencies 

is advocated Hence, the task of identifying the competencies of future strategic leaders 

becomes one of reducing the lists to a few metacompetencies that will prove useful in: 

a) directing leader development efforts in the process of producing leaders with strategic 

leader capability, and b) facilitating self-assessment by officers of their strategic leader 

capability 

Looking across the existing literature on strategic leadership, the current lists of Army 

strategic leader competencies, and the environment of the future force, six metacompetencies 

were derived: identity, mental agility, cross-cultural savvy, interpersonal maturity, worldclass warrior, and professional astuteness Before addressing each metacompetency, it 

should be noted that concentrating on just six metacompetencies does provide focus, but 

there are some associated disadvantages First, some skills and abilities are not explicitly 

described by a metacompetency label For example, strategic leaders need to be politically 

savvy – knowing when to compromise, understanding that many strategic decisions are 

not black and white, and knowing what is best in the long run for the Nation and the Army 

This ability is captured in the professional astuteness metacompetency description, but is 

not obvious in the words professional astuteness Understanding the meaning and intent 

behind each metacompetency is much more important than creating a catchy mnemonic 

containing the first letter of each of the six labels Similarly, the metacompetency labels may 

be misinterpreted if separated from their descriptions For example, cross-cultural savvy 

includes the ability to work across organizational boundaries, but the metacompetency 

can be narrowly misinterpreted to refer to working only across national boundaries In 

other words, the six metacompetency labels were not developed as a stand-alone list 

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The concepts behind the labels, not the labels themselves, are the focal points for leader 

development and assessment 

The following section describes each of the six metacompetencies This report is not 

intended to be an exhaustive explanation of strategic leadership – the civilian literature 

does that adequately It is also not intended as a blueprint to overhaul the Army’s entire 

leader development system Instead, this report contrasts the future environment with the 

current status of strategic leader development and suggests some aiming points for leader 

development efforts 

STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP METACOMPETENCIES 

Identity. This metacompetency is derived from the work of Douglas Hall who 

heavily influenced the conclusions of the Army Training and Leader Development PanelOfficer (ATLD Panel) According to Hall, identity is “the ability to gather self-feedback, to 

form accurate self-perceptions, and to change one’s self-concept as appropriate”1 

The ATLD Panel describes self-awareness, and describes it as the ability to understand 

how to assess abilities, know strengths and weaknesses in the operational environment, and 

learn how to correct those weaknesses The metacompetency of identity moves beyond 

simply knowing one’s strengths and weaknesses as connoted by self-awareness It includes 

the understanding of one’s self-concept as an officer in the Army Identity also includes an 

understanding of one’s values and how they match up to the values of the Army Identity 

implies maturation beyond self-awareness as officers come to an understanding of who 

they are, not just how well they do things 

Identity, as opposed to self-awareness, also brings in aspects of development over a 

career As senior leaders gain responsibility, they focus less on their own contributions and 

more on the accomplishments of others The metacompetency of identity acknowledges 

that as an officer develops strategic leadership capability, his role extends beyond personal 

contributions and shifts to serving as a catalyst for success for subordinates 

Mental agility. In addition to self-awareness, the ATLD Panel report recommends that 

the Army focus on developing the enduring competency of adaptability that includes the 

predisposition and readiness to scan and recognize changes in the environment; to determine 

what is new and what must be learned to be effective; and the willingness to modify to a 

given situation Mental agility builds on the ability to scan and adjust learning based on 

the environment, and brings aspects of cognitive complexity, improvisation, and lightness 

found in the strategic leadership literature Strategic leaders operate in an environment of 

ambiguity and uncertainty Typical strategic situations lack structure, are open to varying 

interpretations, and potentially pertinent information is often far flung, elusive, cryptic, or 

even contradictory Mentally agile strategic leaders possess the requisite cognitive skills 

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to navigate in this milieu and be adaptable enough to alter their actions and those of their 

organizations to function in this complex environment 

From a cognitive perspective, strategic leaders must learn how to scan the environment, 

understand their world from a systems perspective, and eventually envision different futures 

and directions for their organization Scanning involves a constant search for information 

that affects current assumptions, along with the future of the organization Officers with 

mentally agility search for more information and spend more time interpreting it They 

also analyze large amounts of sometimes conflicting information and try to understand 

why things happen and identify possible courses of action to affect events Mentally agile 

leaders know which factors really matter in the big picture; they identify root causes quickly, 

display a keen sense of priority, relevance and significance, and integrate information from 

a variety of sources while detecting trends, associations, and cause-effect relationships Just 

as important, mentally agile leaders translate complex situations into simple, meaningful 

explanations that others can grasp 

Mentally agile leaders efficiently gather and process relevant information in order to 

process it from a systems perspective and then envision feasible futures within increasingly 

longer time horizons From a systems perspective, they challenge assumptions, facilitate 

constructive dissent, and analyze second- and third-order consequences of their decisions 

Mentally agile leaders are comfortable making important decisions with only part of the 

information available More importantly, they know when to act and when to experiment 

to validate beliefs or assumptions Once mentally agile strategic leaders have scanned 

the environment, processed information from a systems perspective, and envisioned 

the future effect of that information on the organization, they then adapt and implement 

learning mechanisms to alter the processes, structure, and behaviors of their organization 

to accommodate their envisioned future 

Cross-cultural savvy. With the increasing frequency of coalition warfare and an 

emphasis on theater security cooperation, the necessity for cross-cultural savvy is obvious 

The Army’s future leaders clearly need to be well versed in interacting with cultures 

outside the US borders Cross-cultural savvy, however, refers to more than just the ability 

to work with non-US militaries The metacompetency, cross-cultural savvy, includes 

the ability to understand cultures beyond one’s organizational, economic, religious, 

societal, geographical, and political boundaries A strategic leader with crosscultural 

savvy is comfortable interacting with and leading joint, international, interagency, or interorganizational entities Future strategic leaders must be able to work with a diverse group 

of people and organizations ranging from 24-year-old congressional staffers, to Northern 

Alliance warlords, to representatives from non-governmental organizations 

While cross-cultural skills have been desirable in the past, they will be even more critical 

for future strategic leaders due to several factors First, globalization has vastly increased 

interaction with other nations Second, the global war on terrorism is illustrating that the 

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Army must coordinate closely with other services, agencies, and organizations in the new 

national security environment Third, the Army has traditionally been accused of being 

somewhat inept in its dealings with Congress and the media As societal exposure to the 

military decreases, it becomes increasingly important for Army officers to tell the Army 

story to those outside the Army culture Finally, although the US remains the world’s only 

superpower, unilateral military action is becoming less common Coalitions will continue 

to be vital to the security strategy 

Cross-cultural savvy implies that an officer can see perspectives outside his or her own 

boundaries It does not imply, however, that the officer abandons the Army or US culture 

in pursuit of a relativistic worldview Instead, the future strategic leader is grounded 

in National and Army values, but is also able to anticipate and understand the values, 

assumptions, and norms of other groups, organizations, and nations 

Interpersonal maturity. Many of the interpersonal skills required of strategic leaders 

are basically the same attributes used at the organizational level applied at a higher level 

For example, much like a junior leader, strategic leaders are expected to display compassion 

when dealing with subordinates on sensitive issues However, there are several interpersonal 

skills that, although based on direct and organizational leadership characteristics, are 

qualitatively different at the strategic level Strategic leaders must possess an interpersonal 

maturity that goes beyond face-to-face leadership Strategic leaders devote far more of 

their time dealing with outside organizations and leaders of other services, agencies, and 

nations The power relationship between the strategic leader and individuals from these 

entities is markedly different than the power relationship typically experienced at the direct 

and organizational level 

Several interpersonal skills become very important at this level Most important among 

these is empowerment Strategic leaders need to share power with their subordinates, 

peers, and constituents They must have the willingness and ability to involve others and 

elicit their participation based on the subordinate’s knowledge and skills because tasks will 

be too complex and information too widely distributed for leaders to solve problems on 

their own An interpersonally mature strategic leader needs to be persuasive and rely less 

on fiat, asking others to join in rather than telling them Empowerment implies that the 

leader is a good listener; leadership at the strategic level is as much collaboration as it is 

authoritative leadership Interpersonal maturity implies that strategic leaders do not feel 

compelled to do all the talking and resist imposing a solution on others Because of the 

unique power relationships, the skills of consensus building and negotiation rise to the top 

of a strategic leader’s interpersonal maturity Consensus building is a complicated process 

based on effective reasoning and logic that may take place over an extended period Peers, 

outside agencies, foreign governments, and other services will not necessarily respond to 

orders In essence, the process of consensus building is insurance that effective reasoning 

has taken place and that contentious issues have been resolved As part of this process, or 

even separate, strategic leaders will find that they need to understand the art of negotiation 

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Again, because many relationships at the strategic level are lateral and without clear 

subordination, leaders will find themselves in difficult situations where success rests in 

their ability to negotiate an agreeable solution 

Interpersonal maturity also includes the ability of officers to analyze, challenge, and 

change an organization’s culture to align it with the ever changing outside environment 

Strategic leaders must therefore have skills in analyzing cultural assumptions, identifying 

functional and dysfunctional assumptions, and evolving processes that enlarge the culture 

by building on its strengths and functional elements Strategic leaders then need to 

proactively manage change through the processes associated with embedding their vision 

within the organization and shaping organizational culture to support the vision Noel 

Tichy posits, “As long as a culture fits the external environment, it succeeds, but when 

the external realities change, the culture has to change as well...at certain critical stages, 

radical cultural shifts are needed, and without leadership, they just don’t happen”2 

Lastly, strategic leaders must have the interpersonal maturity to take responsibility for 

the development of the Army’s future strategic leaders Therefore, strategic leaders need 

to teach, coach, and mentor, while creating an environment where other leaders may do the 

same Interpersonal maturity includes the ability to ensure leader development does not 

get neglected in the pursuit of everyday mission accomplishment 

World-class warrior. This is the simplest and most understandable of the six strategic 

leadership metacompetencies As a world-class warrior, strategic leaders move beyond 

tactical and operational competence in the employment of the future force They understand 

the entire spectrum of operations at the strategic level to include theater strategy; campaign 

strategy; joint, interagency, and multinational operations; and the use of all the elements of 

national power and technology in the execution of national security strategy 

Professional astuteness. In their comprehensive study of the Army profession, Don 

Snider and Gayle Watkins arrive at an important conclusion concerning the current officer 

corps: 

The Army’s bureaucratic nature outweighs and compromises its professional 

nature. This is true in practice, but, of greater importance, it is regarded as true in 

the minds of the officer corps. Officers do not share a common understanding of the 

Army profession, and many of them accept the pervasiveness of bureaucratic norms 

and behaviors as natural and appropriate.3 

Strategic leaders who are professionally astute understand that they are no longer merely 

members of a profession, but leaders in the profession as the Army serves the Nation They 

see the need to develop the future leaders of the profession, work with stakeholders, and 

communicate this responsibility to future leaders of the profession In his recent book, 

Good to Great, Jim Collins talks about Level 5 leaders–leaders who can transform a 

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company He writes, “Level 5 leaders channel their ego needs away from themselves and 

into the larger goal of building a great company It’s not that Level 5 leaders have no ego or 

self-interest Indeed, they are incredibly ambitious-but their ambition is first and foremost 

for the institution, not themselves”4 In contrast, Level 4 leaders are often effective and 

charismatic, yet the company falls apart after they leave since Level 4 leaders put their 

personal success and egos ahead of institutional success 

The future force will need strategic leaders who are Level 5 leaders – leaders who take 

responsibility for the Army as a profession Leaders with professional astuteness get the 

mission accomplished, but they also have the insight to do what is best for the profession 

and Nation This may include having political savvy, knowing when to compromise, or 

understanding the many constituents that the Army serves Additionally, strategic leaders 

with professional astuteness seek to ensure the officer corps maintains its expertise in 

national defense as well as adhering to a professional ethic Professional astuteness is 

a strategic leadership competency that insures that the Army deliberately takes the steps 

to insure the Army remains a profession, not merely a job, organization, bureaucracy, or 

occupation 

CONCLUSIONS 

In both the civilian and military literature, there is a plethora of material discussing 

strategic leadership and strategic leader competencies Part of the difficulty encountered 

by anyone desiring to adjust leader development or education efforts is the broad array 

of competencies presented in the literature This section combines what is known about 

strategic leadership competencies and integrates it with the characteristics of the officer 

corps and the future force environment The result is a list of six metacompetencies for 

strategic leadership 

ENDNOTES 

1 Douglas T Hall, Careers In and Out of Organizations (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, Inc, 

2002): p 161 

2 Noel M Tichy, The Leadership Engine (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, Inc, 1997): p 26 

3 Gayle L Watkins and Don M Snider, “Project Conclusions,” in Don M Snider, Gayle L Watkins, and 

Lloyd J Matthews, ed, The Future of the Army Profession (Boston: McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc, 2002): 

p 537 

4 Jim Collins, Good to Great: Why Some Companies Make the Leap . . . and Others Don’t (New York: 

HarperCollins Publishers, Inc, 2001): p 21 

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Untted States Army War College 


Carlisle, Pennsylvania 17013-5050