GETTING READY FOR A NUCLEAR-READY IRAN

Edited by

Henry Sokolski

Patrick Clawson

October 2005

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 This book has been 2 years in the making and has benefited from the financial 

backing of both private foundations and the U.S. Department of Defense. It would not 

have been possible, however, without the expertise and guidance of several individuals. 

The first and most important among these is Patrick Clawson who, as co-editor, was 

instrumental in identifying both the topics and authors of the commissioned research 

that makes up this volume’s chapters. 

 Also critical was the editorial assistance of the U.S. Army War College’s Strategic 

Studies Institute. The Nonproliferation Policy Education Center (NPEC) has worked 

closely with Dr. Douglas Lovelace, Ms. Marianne Cowling, and Ms. Rita Rummel at 

the Institute. This volume constitutes our organizations’ fifth successful collaboration. 

Michael Eisenstadt, the author of Chapter 10, “Deter And Contain: Dealing With 

A Nuclear Iran,” would like to thank Jeff Cary, Brock Dahl, and Ryan Phillips for their 

invaluable research assistance in preparing his chapter.

 Finally and most important, has been the good patience of the book’s authors in 

updating their essays and of NPEC’s Deputy Executive Director, Amanda Sokolski, 

my wife; and our assistant, Mohammad Nasseri-Asl, in pulling it all together. Without 

their hard work and good humor there would have been nothing to publish.

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CONTENTS

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v

Part I. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

1. Getting Ready for a Nuclear-Ready Iran: 

Report of the NPEC Working Group

Henry Sokolski . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Part II. Tehran’s Nuclear Endeavors: What’s the Worry? . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

2. Arab Security Responses to a Nuclear-Ready Iran

Richard L. Russell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

3. The Nuclear Capabilities and Ambitions of Iran’s Neighbors

Wyn Q. Bowen and Joanna Kidd . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

4. Turkey, Iran and Nuclear Risks

Ian O. Lesser . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89

5. The Day after Iran Gets the Bomb

Kenneth R. Timmerman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113

Part III. Is There a Simple Military or Sanctions Fix? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131

6. Is the Begin Doctrine Still a Viable Option for Israel?

Shlomo Brom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133

7. Strategy for a Nuclear Iran

Thomas Donnelly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159

8. Iran Gets the Bomb―Then What?

George Perkovich, with Silvia Manzanero . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177

Part IV. Further Courses of Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207

9. Reducing Vulnerability of the Strait of Hormuz

Dagobert Brito and Amy Myers Jaffe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 209

10. Deter and Contain: Dealing with a Nuclear Iran

Michael Eisenstadt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225

11. Managing the Iranian Threat to Sea Commerce Diplomatically

Douglas E. Streusand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 257

12. What Transatlantic Strategy on Iran?

Thérèse Delpech . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 285

About the Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 309

v

INTRODUCTION

 Little more than a year ago, the Nonproliferation Policy Education 

Center (NPEC) completed its initial analysis of Iran’s nuclear 

program, Checking Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions. Since then, Tehran’s 

nuclear activities and public diplomacy have only affirmed what 

this analysis first suggested: Iran is not about to give up its effort 

to make nuclear fuel and, thereby, come within days of acquiring 

a nuclear bomb. Iran’s continued pursuit of uranium enrichment 

and plutonium recycling puts a premium on asking what a more 

confident nuclear-ready Iran might confront us with and what we 

might do now to hedge against these threats. 

 These questions are the focus of this volume. The book is divided 

into four parts. The first presents the findings of the NPEC’s working 

group on Iran. It reflects interviews with government officials and 

outside specialists and the work of some 20 regional security experts 

whom NPEC convened in Washington to discuss the commissioned 

research that is contained in this book. Some of this report’s findings 

to keep Iran and others from overtly deploying nuclear weapons or 

leaving the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) are beginning 

to gain official support. The U.S. Government, the International 

Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and an increasing number of 

allies now support the idea that states that violate the NPT be held 

accountable for their transgressions, even if they should withdraw 

from the treaty. There also has been increased internal governmental 

discussion about the need to clarify what should be permitted under 

the rubric of “peaceful” nuclear energy as delineated under the NPT. 

The remaining report recommendations, which were presented in 

testimony before Congress in March of 2005, remain to be acted 

upon. Whether they will or will not, of course, depends greatly on 

how public officials view the Iranian nuclear threat.

 This, then, brings us to the book’s second part, “Tehran’s 

Nuclear Endeavors: What’s the Worry?” Richard Russell starts off 

this section by detailing how Iran’s neighbors are likely to hedge 

their own security bets as Tehran goes literally more and more 

nuclear and ballistic. Critical to what these nations might do is just 
vi

how nuclear-capable they are themselves. This is detailed by Wyn 

Bowen and Joanna Kidd in their chapter, “The Nuclear Capabilities 

and Ambitions of Iran’s Neighbors.” In it, we learn just how close 

Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Syria, and Iraq are to acquiring nuclear 

weapons of their own. The special case of Turkey, a full-fledged 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) ally, is addressed in 

greater detail in Ian Lesser’s chapter, “Turkey, Iran and Nuclear 

Risks.” The good news here is that if the European Union and the 

United States provide proper support on both security and economic 

fronts, Turkey is unlikely to go its own way. The bigger picture of 

what might transpire after Iran overtly goes nuclear, though, is sure 

to be grim. Kenneth Timmerman spells out the increased prospects 

for war and much more violent terrorism in his chapter, “The Day 

After Iran Gets the Bomb.” 

 What can be done? The two popular policy options―military 

strikes against Iran’s known nuclear facilities and imposing 

economic sanctions against Tehran―are analyzed in the book’s 

third part, “Is There A Simple Military or Sanctions Fix?” Shlomo 

Brom, a retired Israeli general, explains why, although it would 

be extremely popular in Israel to attempt another Osiraq-like raid 

against Iran’s known facilities, the operational prospects for success 

are not very high. What of having the United States assume this 

mission? Thomas Donnelly, a staunch supporter of the invasion of 

Iraq, explains how launching a limited raid against Iran’s nuclear 

facilities could jeopardize the larger American campaign to liberalize 

and moderate the Middle East. Imposing economic sanctions against 

Iran is a possible alternative, but how realistic or effective would 

these likely be? These questions are addressed in the analysis by 

George Perkovich and Silvia Manzanero, “Iran Gets the Bomb―

Then What?” Their conclusion is that it will be difficult to secure the 

support necessary to make sanctions against Iran work.

 This, then, brings us to the book’s final part, “Further Courses 

of Action.” In it, two traditional and two unorthodox policy 

options are examined. The first of these, which is to reduce the 

potential vulnerability of Persian Gulf energy shipments to Iranian 

interference, is examined by Dagobert Brito and Amy Myers Jaffe in 

their chapter, “Reducing Vulnerability of the Strait of Hormuz.” By 

refurbishing existing pipe lines and building others, the need to send 
vii

oil and gas through the strait could be dramatically reduced at a 

relatively affordable level of spending. This, of course, would require 

the cooperation and support of the major oil producers in the region. 

Their help also would be needed to fortify existing levels of defense 

cooperation with the United States, without which the prospects of 

deterring and containing a nuclear-ready Iran would surely be low. 

What exactly can be done in cooperation with the Persian Gulf states 

is detailed by Michael Eisenstadt in his chapter, “Deter and Contain: 

Dealing with a Nuclear Iran.” What role might diplomacy play in 

keeping Iran from exploiting its ability to disrupt energy exports from 

the region? Douglas Streusand examines this question in his analysis, 

“Managing the Iranian Threat to Sea Commerce Diplomatically.” 

Using the sea control agreements reached with Turkey and the Soviet 

Union as models, Streusand suggests several negotiating and public 

diplomacy initiatives that would keep Iran from using its military 

capabilities to interfere with continued free passage of goods in and 

out of the Persian Gulf. The success of this effort, as with so many 

others, of course, would depend on the solidarity of the United States 

and its key allies, not only in but outside of the Gulf region. How 

likely such support may be is the focus of the concluding chapter by 

Thérèse Delpech entitled “What Transatlantic Strategy on Iran?”

1

CHAPTER 1

GETTING READY FOR A NUCLEAR-READY IRAN:

REPORT OF THE NPEC WORKING GROUP

Henry Sokolski

OVERVIEW

 When it comes to Iran’s nuclear program, most U.S. and allied 

officials are in one or another state of denial. All insist it is critical 

to prevent Tehran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Yet, few 

understand just how late it is to attempt this. Iran is now no more 

than 12 to 48 months from acquiring a nuclear bomb, lacks for 

nothing technologically or materially to produce it, and seems dead 

set on securing an option to do so. As for the most popular policy 

options―to bomb or bribe Iran―too few analysts and officials are 

willing to admit publicly how self-defeating these courses of action 

might be.

 This report, based on commissioned research and 2 years’ worth 

of meetings with the nation’s leading experts on Iran, the Middle East, 

and nuclear proliferation, is intended to highlight sounder policy 

options. It makes seven recommendations designed to reduce the 

potential harm Iran might otherwise do or encourage, once it gained 

nuclear weapons or the ability to have them in a matter of days. 

The report reflects analysis done at a series of competitive strategies 

workshops that focused on the next 2 decades of likely competition 

between America and Iran and what comparative strengths the 

United States and its allies might use to leverage Iranian behavior1.

 These workshops identified three threats that are likely to increase 

following Iran’s acquisition of a nuclear weapons option.

1. Even More Nuclear Proliferation. Iran’s continued insistence 

that it acquired its nuclear capabilities legally under the Nuclear 

Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) would, if unchallenged, encourage 

its neighbors (including Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Syria, Turkey, 

and Algeria) to develop nuclear options of their own by emulating 

Iran’s example, by overtly declaring possession (in Israel’s case) 
2

or by importing nuclear weapons (in Saudi Arabia’s case). Such 

announcements and efforts, in turn, would likely undermine nuclear 

nonproliferation restraints internationally and strain American 

relations with most of its key friends in the Middle East.

2. Dramatically Higher Oil Prices. A nuclear-ready Iran could be 

emboldened to manipulate oil prices upward. It might attempt this 

either by threatening the freedom of the seas (by mining oil transit 

points as it did in the l980s, or by threatening to close the Straits of 

Hormuz), or by using terrorist proxies to threaten the destruction of 

Saudi and other Gulf state oil facilities and pipelines.

3. Increased Terrorism Designed to Diminish U.S. Influence.

With a nuclear weapons option acting as a deterrent to the United 

States and allied action against it, Iran would likely lend greater 

support to terrorists operating against Israel, Iraq, Libya, Saudi 

Arabia, Europe, and the United States. The aim of such support 

would be to reduce American support for U.S. involvement in 

the Middle East, for Israel, and for actions against Iran generally, 

and to elevate Iran as an equal to the United States and its allies 

on all matters relating to the Persian Gulf and related regions. An 

additional aim of the terrorism that Iran would support would be to 

keep other nations from supporting U.S. policies and the continued 

U.S. military presence in the Middle East. 

 All of these threats are serious. If realized, they would undermine 

U.S. and allied efforts to foster moderate rule in much of the Middle 

East and set into play a series of international competitions that could 

ultimately result in major wars. Most U.S. and allied policymakers 

understand this and are now preoccupied with trying to prevent 

Iran from ever acquiring a nuclear weapons option. As Iran gets 

closer to securing this option, though, two questionable courses of 

action―bombing or bribing Iran―have become increasingly popular. 

Neither, however, is likely to succeed and could easily make matters 

worse.

 Certainly, targeting Iran’s nuclear facilities risks leaving other 

covert facilities and Iran’s nuclear cadre of technicians untouched. 

More important, any overt military attack would give Tehran a casus 

belli either to withdraw from the NPT, or to rally Islamic Jihadists 
3

to wage war against the United States and its allies more directly. 

Whatever might be gained in technically delaying Iran’s completion 

of having a bomb option would have to be weighed against what 

might be lost in Washington’s long-term efforts to encourage more 

moderate Islamic rule in Iran and the Middle East; to synchronize allied 

policies against nuclear proliferation; and to deflate Iran’s rhetorical 

demonstrations against U.S. and allied hostility. Meanwhile, merely 

bluffing an attack against Iran―sometimes urged as a way around 

these difficulties―would only aggravate matters: The bluff would 

eventually be exposed, and so only embolden Iran and weaken U.S. 

and allied credibility further. 

 As for negotiating directly with Tehran to limit its declared nuclear 

program―an approach preferred by most of America’s European 

allies―this, too, seems self-defeating. First, any deal the Iranian 

regime would agree to would only validate that the NPT legally 

allows its members to acquire all the capabilities Iran mastered. 

Second, it would foster the view internationally that the only risk 

in violating required NPT inspections would be to be caught and 

then bribed to limit only those activities the inspectors managed to 

discover.

 Considering these shortcomings, the working group decided 

that, rather than trying merely to eliminate Iran’s ability to develop 

a nuclear option (something that may no longer be possible), it also 

would be useful to devise ways to curb the harmful things Iran might 

do or encourage, once it secured such an option. This approach 

produced seven recommendations that the workshop participants 

believed were not receiving sufficient attention currently. These 

steps, they argued, would increase the credibility of current efforts 

to prevent Iran from going nuclear and needed to be pursued, in any 

case, if prevention failed. These recommendations were:

 1. Discrediting the legitimacy of Iran’s nuclear program as a 

model for other proliferators through a series of follow-on meetings 

to the 2005 NPT Review Conference to clarify what activities qualify 

as being “peaceful” under the NPT. 

 2. Increasing the costs for Iran and its neighbors to leave or 

infringe the NPT by establishing country-neutral rules against 

violators withdrawing from the treaty and against NPT violators 

more generally.
4

 3. Securing Russian cooperation in these efforts by offering 

Moscow a lucrative U.S. nuclear cooperation agreement. 

 4. Reducing Persian Gulf oil and gas production and distribution 

system vulnerabilities to possible terrorist disruptions by building 

additional back-up capabilities in Saudi Arabia.

 5. Limiting Iran’s freedom to threaten oil and gas shipping by 

proposing a Montreux-like convention to demilitarize the Straits of 

Hormuz and an agreement to limit possible incidents at sea.

 6. Isolating Iran as a regional producer of fissile materials by 

encouraging Israel to take the first steps to freeze and dismantle such 

capabilities.

 7. Backing these diplomatic-economic initiatives with increased 

U.S.-allied anti-terrorist, defense, naval border security, and nuclear 

nonproliferation cooperation.

Would taking these steps eliminate the Iranian nuclear threat? 

No. Given Iran’s extensive nuclear know-how and capabilities, 

it is unlikely that the United States or its allies can deny Iran the 

technical ability to covertly make nuclear weapons. Yet, assuming 

adoption of the steps described, it would be far riskier diplomatically, 

economically, and militarily for Iran to acquire nuclear weapons 

than is currently the case. More important, taking these steps would 

leverage the comparative strengths of the United States and its friends 

in a manner that would undermine Iran’s efforts to divide the United 

States from its allies and to deter them from acting against Iranian 

misbehavior. It would not only discourage Iran’s neighbors from 

following Iran’s nuclear example, but force a needed reconsideration 

of what nuclear activities ought to be protected under the NPT 

(including those Iran has used to justify completing its own nuclear 

breakout capabilities). Finally, it would map a non-nuclear future 

for the Middle East that might be eventually realized (assuming a 

change of heart by Iran and others) through verifiable deeds rather 

than dependent on precise intelligence (which is all too elusive).

BACKGROUND

 When U.S. and allied officials speak of Iran’s nuclear weapons 

program, imperatives are used freely: Iran, we are told, must not 
5

be allowed to acquire nuclear weapons; the United States and its 

allies cannot tolerate Iran going nuclear; a nuclear-armed Tehran is 

unthinkable. 

 Yet, the truth is that Iran soon can and will get a bomb option. 

All Iranian engineers need is a bit more time―1 to 4 years at most. 

No other major gaps remain: Iran has the requisite equipment to 

make the weapons fuel, the know-how to assemble the bombs, and 

the missile and naval systems necessary to deliver them beyond its 

borders. As noted in the working group’s earlier report (Checking 

Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions), no scheme, including “just in time” delivery 

of fresh fuel and removal of spent fuel from Bushier, will provide 

much protection against Iran diverting its peaceful nuclear program 

to compliment its covert efforts to make bombs.2

 As for eliminating Iran’s nuclear capabilities militarily, the United 

States and Israel lack sufficient targeting intelligence to do this. In 

fact, Iran long has had considerable success in concealing its nuclear 

activities from U.S. intelligence analysts and International Atomic 

Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors. (The latter recently warned 

against assuming the IAEA could find all of Iran’s illicit uranium 

enrichment activities). As it is, Iran already could have hidden all it 

needs to reconstitute a bomb program, assuming its known declared 

nuclear plants were hit.

 Compounding these difficulties is what Iran might do in response 

to such an attack. After being struck, Tehran could declare that it 

must acquire nuclear weapons as a matter of self-defense, withdraw 

from the NPT, and accelerate its nuclear endeavors. This would 

increase pressure on Israel (which has long insisted that it will not be 

“second” in possessing nuclear arms in the Middle East) to confirm 

its possession of nuclear weapons publicly, and thus set off a chain 

of possible nuclear policy reactions in Cairo, Damascus, Riyadh, 

Algiers, and Ankara. 

 On the other hand, Iran could continue to pretend to comply 

with the NPT, which could produce equally disastrous results. After 

being attacked, Iran might appeal to the IAEA, the Arab League, the 

Non-Aligned Movement, the European Union (EU), and the United 

Nations (UN) to make Iran’s nuclear program whole again, and 

once again, use this “peaceful” program to energize and serve as 

a cover for its covert nuclear weapons activities. This would again 
6

put the entire neighborhood on edge, debase the NPT, and set a 

clear example for all of Iran’s neighbors to follow on how to get a 

weapons option. In addition, as more of Iran’s neighbors secured 

their own nuclear options, Washington’s influence over its friends 

in the region (e.g., Egypt and Saudi Arabia) would likely decline, 

as well as Washington’s ability to protect North Atlantic Treaty 

Organization (NATO) allies (e.g. Turkey) and non-NATO allies (e.g., 

Israel) in the region.

 In addition, Iran might respond to an overt military attack by 

striking back covertly against the United States, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, 

or Israel through the support of non-Iranian terrorist organizations.

 The ramifications of any of these responses are difficult to 

minimize. Finally, Iran could take any and all of these actions without

actually ever testing, sharing, or deploying, nuclear weapons. 

Certainly, as long as most nations buy Tehran’s argument that the 

NPT’s guarantee to “peaceful” nuclear energy gives it and all other 

members the right to develop everything needed to come within a 

screwdriver’s turn of a nuclear arsenal, Iran will be best served by 

getting to this point and going no further. Indeed, by showing such 

restraint, Iran’s mullahs could avoid domestic and international 

controversies that might otherwise undermine their political 

standing, along with possible additional economic sanctions, and 

the added costs of fielding a survivable nuclear force. Meanwhile, 

as long as Iran could acquire nuclear weapons quickly, Tehran could 

intimidate others as effectively as if it already had such systems 

deployed.

 None of this, of course, argues for reducing pressures on Iran 

to curb its nuclear activities. The United States and its allies should 

continue to do all they can to head Iran off, including efforts to 

throttle Iran’s “civilian” program. Indeed, if all Washington and its 

allies do is pressure Iran not to acquire nuclear arms openly, without 

pressuring Iran to give up its “civilian” nuclear efforts, Iran will 

best them easily by using these civilian facilities to develop a quick 

nuclear breakout capability, claiming its entire nuclear program 

is legal under the NPT, and wielding it diplomatically much as it 

would if it actually had nuclear weapons.

 What should we expect when, in the next 12 to 48 months, 

Iran secures such a breakout option? If the United States and its 
7

allies do no more than they have already done, two things. First, 

many of Iran’s neighbors will do their best to follow its “peaceful” 

example. Egypt, Algeria, Syria, and Saudi Arabia will all claim that 

they too need to pursue nuclear research and development to the 

point of having nuclear weapons options and, as a further slap in 

Washington’s face (and Tel Aviv’s), will point to Iran’s “peaceful” 

nuclear program and Israel’s undeclared nuclear weapons arsenal 

to help justify their own “civil” nuclear activities. Second, an ever 

more nuclear-ready Iran will try to lead the revolutionary Islamic 

vanguard throughout the Islamic world by becoming the main 

support for terrorist organizations aimed against Washington’s key 

regional ally, Israel; America’s key energy source, Saudi Arabia; and 

Washington’s prospective democratic ally, Iraq. 

 Early in 2004, senior Saudi officials announced they were 

studying the possibility of acquiring or “leasing” nuclear weapons 

from China or Pakistan (this would be legal under the NPT so long as 

the weapons were kept under Chinese or Pakistani “control”). Egypt 

earlier announced its plans to develop a large nuclear desalinization 

plant and is reported recently to have received sensitive nuclear 

technology from Libya. Syria, meanwhile, is now interested in 

uranium enrichment. Some intelligence sources believe Damascus 

already may be experimenting with centrifuges. And Algeria is in 

the midst of upgrading its second large research reactor facility, 

which is still ringed with air defense units. 

 If these states continue to pursue their nuclear dreams (spurred 

on by Iran’s example), could Iraq, which still has a considerable 

number of nuclear scientists and engineers, be expected to stand idly 

by? And what of Turkey, whose private sector was recently revealed 

to have been part of the A. Q. Khan network? Will nuclear agitation 

to its south and its repeated rejection from the EU cause Turkey to 

reconsider its non-nuclear status? Most of these nations are now 

friends of the United States. Efforts on their part to acquire a bomb 

under the guise of developing “peaceful” nuclear energy (with Latin 

American, Asian, European, Russian, or Chinese help), will only 

serve to strain their relations with Washington.

 With such regional nuclear enthusiasms will come increased 

diplomatic pressure on Israel, an undeclared nuclear weapons state 

and America’s closest Middle East ally. In July 2004, the IAEA’s 
8

Director General and the major states within the Middle East urged 

Israel to give up its nuclear arms in proposed regional arms control 

negotiations. Israel’s understandable reluctance to be dragged into 

such talks or to admit to having nuclear arms now will not end these 

pressures. If Israel has a secret nuclear arsenal, Arabs argue, why 

not balance it with Iranian, Saudi, Egyptian, or other covert nuclear 

weapons programs? How fair is it for the United States and Europe 

to demand that Middle Eastern Muslim states restrain their own 

“peaceful” nuclear ambitions if Israel itself already has the bomb 

and is publicly arguing that it will not be “second” to introduce 

nuclear weapons into the region? Wouldn’t it make more sense to 

force Israel to admit it has nuclear weapons and then to demand 

that it give them up in a regional arms control negotiations effort 

(even though once Israel admits it has weapons, many of its Muslim 

neighbors, who still do not recognize Israel, are likely to then use 

Israel’s admission to justify getting nuclear weapons themselves)?

 This then brings us to the second likely result of Iran becoming ever 

more nuclear-ready: A more confident Iran more willing to sponsor 

terrorist organizations, especially those opposed to Israel and the 

current government in Iraq. With Hamas in decline, Iran already has 

been seen to be increasing its support to groups like Hezbollah in 

Iraq, Israel, and Lebanon, groups which want to liberate their lands 

from American and Israeli “occupation.” Increasing its aid to these 

groups certainly would help Iran take the lead in the Islamic crusade 

to rid the region of Zionist―American forces and thereby become 

worthy of tribute and consideration by other Islamic states. Also, 

bolstering such terrorist activity would help Tehran deter Israel and 

the United States from striking it militarily.

 Beyond this, Iran is likely to increase its assistance to groups 

willing to risk striking the United States. News reports in August 

2004 claimed that Iranian diplomats assigned to UN headquarters 

in New York were to survey 29 American targets to help terrorist 

organizations interested in hitting the United States. The aim here 

appears to be, again, to deter the United States from hitting Iran 

and to divide U.S. opinion about the merits of backing Israel, or 

supporting any other anti-Iranian measure or group.

 A nuclear-ready Iran is also likely step up its terrorist activities 

against Iraq, Libya, and Saudi Arabia. Iran already is reported to 
9

have several thousand intelligence agents operating in Shia regions 

of Iraq and is actively contributing to community associations there. 

Meanwhile, there are nearly a dozen terrorist organizations operating 

within Iraq now employing Hezbollah in their groups’ names. As in 

the case of earlier Iranian penetration of Lebanon, these efforts will 

enable Iran to scout, recruit, and control terrorist operatives. The aim 

here will be to pressure the United States and its allies to remove 

their military forces from Iraq, and thereby allow a government 

more sympathetic to Iran to emerge.

 As for Libya, Iran’s Mullahs are concerned about how much 

Qaddafi might tell the United States and the IAEA about what illicit 

nuclear technology Iran might have gained from Libya, Pakistan, and 

others. Recent unconfirmed reports indicate Iran has been arming 

the Libyan Combat Islamic Group at camps in southern Iran; this is 

an organization Qaddafi expelled from Libya in the late 1990s and 

the United States expelled from Afghanistan in 2001. If true, these 

reports suggest how Iran might try to leverage Qaddafi’s behavior.

 Iran also has a history of supporting terrorist activity in Saudi 

Arabia. Although only roughly 10 percent of Saudi Arabia’s 

population is Shia, this sect constitutes an overwhelming majority of 

the population living in Saudi Arabia’s key northern oil-producing 

region. Any terrorist action anywhere in Saudi Arabia, though, tends 

to raise questions about the general viability of the Saudi regime and 

the security of the world’s largest oil reserves. Historically, after a 

major terrorist attack in Saudi Arabia, markets worry, the price of 

oil increases, and Iran’s own oil revenues, in turn, surge upward. 

The reason is simple: Saudi Arabia has the world’s largest reserve 

oil production capacity (roughly 7 million barrels a day). Damage 

Saudi Arabia’s ability to ramp up production or to export what 

it can produce (or merely raise doubts about the current Saudi 

government’s continued ability to protect these capabilities), and you 

effectively cripple the world’s capacity to meet increased demand for 

oil internationally. Terrorism in Saudi Arabia, in short, provides Iran 

with a quick, effective way to manipulate international oil prices. 

This cannot help but garner Iran greater leverage in getting the 

Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) to support 

its long-ignored calls to increase oil prices. It also will help Iran garner 
10

increased European and Asian regard for its calls for more financial 

support, investment, and advanced technology. Iranian progress on 

these fronts is likely to be fortified by Tehran’s offers of oil rights to 

European states, Russia, and China. This, in turn, will help keep the 

current regime in power longer, will further reduce U.S. influence in 

the region, and will make action in the UN Security Council (UNSC) 

against Tehran far less likely.3

 Yet, another way Iran could drive up oil prices is by threatening 

free passage of oil through the Straits of Hormuz or by engaging in 

naval mining in the Gulf and other key locations, using its surface 

fleet of fast boats or its smaller submarines as it did in the late 

l980s. Iran already has deployed anti-shipping missiles at Qeshm, 

Abu Musa Island, and on Sirri Island, all of which are in range of 

shipping through the Strait. It has also occupied and fortified three 

islands inside the shipping lanes of the Strait of Hormuz―Abu 

Musa, The Greater Tunbs and the Lesser Tunbs. Given that one-fifth 

of the world’s entire oil demand flows through the Straits (as well 

as roughly a quarter of America’s supply of oil) and no other nation 

has fortified its shores near Hormuz, an Iranian threat to disrupt 

commerce there would have to be taken seriously by commercial 

concerns (e.g., insurers and commodity markets) and other nations. 

RECOMMENDATIONS

 What are the chances of Iran credibly making these threats? If the 

United States and its friends do little more than they already have, 

the odds are high enough to be worrisome. 

 What more should the United States and its friends do? 

Ultimately, nothing less than creating moderate self-government 

in Iraq, Iran, and other states in the region will bring lasting peace 

and nonproliferation. This, however, will take time. Meanwhile, 

the United States and its friends must do much more than they are 

currently to frustrate Iran’s efforts to divide the United States, Israel, 

and Europe from one another and from other friends in the Middle 

East and Asia; and to defeat Tehran’s efforts to use its nuclear 

capabilities to deter others from taking firm action against Iranian 

misbehavior.
11

 This is a tall order, one that will require new efforts to: 

 • Significantly increase the diplomatic costs of Iran ever 

deploying nuclear weapons or of any of its neighbors following 

Iran’s model of “peaceful” nuclear activity by getting the 

international community to insist on a tougher view of the 

NPT.

 • Make Russia, Iran’s key nuclear partner, a willing backer of 

U.S. and European efforts to restrain Iran’s nuclear ambitions, 

and a backer of nuclear restraint in the Middle East more 

generally. 

 • Reduce the vulnerability of Middle Eastern oil and gas 

production and distribution systems to Iranian-backed 

terrorist attacks that could significantly increase energy 

prices.

 • Force Iran into choosing between backing free passage of 

energy commerce in and out of the Gulf or becoming an 

outlaw in the eyes not just of the United States, but of Europe 

and Asia.

 • Strengthen U.S. and allied support of Israel by cooperating 

on a positive Middle Eastern nuclear restraint agenda that 

Tel Aviv could pace by deeds (rather than negotiation) and 

highlight the problem of large nuclear facilities located in Iran 

and the Middle East more generally.

 How might these goals be achieved? First, by exploiting or 

leveraging:

 • The desire of all nations to produce some result from the 

upcoming NPT Review Conference in May 2005 to strengthen 

the NPT and increase its influence. 

 • French proposals to the EU and the NPT Review Preparatory 

Committee to make withdrawal from the NPT difficult and 

EU sanctions likely for any nation that the IAEA cannot find 

to be in full compliance with the NPT. 

 • Russia’s long-standing interest in securing a nuclear cooperative agreement with the United States to secure Russia’s 

backing to strengthen nuclear restraints internationally.
12

 • Oil producers’ anxieties to increase the security of Saudi oil 

production and distribution systems from possible terrorist 

attacks. 

 • Tehran’s desire to secure multinational guarantees to enhance 

Iran’s security and increase its access to critical European high 

technology imports.

 • Israel’s clear regional lead in advanced nuclear capabilities.

 • Europe’s desire to play an active role in promoting nuclear 

nonproliferation in the Middle East.

Specifically, these levers could be pulled by taking the following 

steps:

1. Clarify what is peaceful under the NPT. The United States and 

other like-minded nations should use the occasion of the NPT review 

conference in May 2005 to convene a series of follow-on meetings 

dedicated to reevaluating under what circumstances specified forms 

of nuclear power should be considered to be “peaceful” and thus 

protected by the NPT. These meetings should take into account 

the latest information regarding the spread of covert centrifuge 

and reprocessing technology, bomb design, and the availability of 

separated plutonium and highly enriched uranium. In addition, they 

should raise the questions of what nuclear materials and activities can 

be safeguarded in a manner that will detect potential violations early 

enough to achieve the IAEA’s and the NPT’s goal of “preventing 

diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or 

other nuclear explosive devices.” This set of international gatherings, 

which should meet periodically in anticipation of the next NPT 

review conference in 2010, should also evaluate how increased use of 

free market competitions and private financing could help identify 

uneconomic, suspect nuclear activities. These meetings could be 

held under IAEA or UNSC auspices. If this proves to be impractical, 

though, the United States and other like-minded nations should 

proceed on their own (much as the Proliferation Security Initiative 

was promoted) to hold these meetings with as many like-minded 

nuclear power and large nuclear research reactor-capable nations as 

possible.
13

2. Establish country-neutral rules for NPT violators. The United 

States and its allies should build on France’s recent proposals that 

the UNSC adopt a set of a country-neutral rules for dealing with 

NPT violators, such as Iran and North Korea, which would stipulate 

that:

a. countries that reject inspections and withdraw from the 

NPT without first addressing their previous violations must 

surrender and dismantle their large nuclear capabilities (i.e., 

large research and power reactors and bulk handling facilities) 

to come back into compliance. Until the UNSC unanimously 

agrees to drop this ban, violators would lose the right to 

acquire nuclear technology under the NPT (a ban against 

exporting such help to these nations would be imposed), and 

international financial institutional support for major projects 

within their borders would be suspended. 

b. countries that violate their safeguards obligations under the 

NPT and that the IAEA cannot find to be in full compliance 

should no longer receive nuclear assistance or exports from 

any other country until the IAEA Board of Governors is able 

to unanimously give them a clean bill of health. 

c. countries that build new, large nuclear fuel-related facilities 

that cannot be justified economically and monitored in 

a manner that can assure timely warning of diversion of 

enough nuclear material to make a bomb, should not receive 

nuclear assistance or exports from another country until the 

IAEA Board of Governors is able to unanimously agree that 

the project in question is economically imperative or capable 

of being safeguarded to provide timely warning of potential 

diversions.

 The idea in passing these resolutions would be to make it clear to 

both Iran and its neighbors that violating the NPT as Iran or North 

Korea have done will have consequences for their nuclear programs 

and for continued international financial institution support. 

Diplomatically, this will help the United States and its allies identify 

and treat Iran and North Korea in a country-neutral manner, not 

as an equal in negotiations, but as legally branded violators of the 

NPT.
14

 In addition, the United States should encourage the EU, and short 

of this, the governments of Italy, Germany, and France, to threaten 

to sanction Iran’s nuclear misbehavior by holding up their exports 

of machinery and materials to Iran, which make up a vast majority 

of all the imports Iran takes in. The continued flow of these exports 

is critical to the maintenance of Iran’s economy.

 3. Offer Russia a U.S. nuclear cooperative agreement. To help 

secure the support for these resolutions from Russia, the United States 

should offer Moscow a nuclear cooperative deal that Moscow has long 

sought. This deal would allow Russia to store U.S. origin spent fuel 

from Asia and Europe and pocket 10 to 20 billion dollars in revenues 

from this business. For nearly a decade, U.S. progress on this deal has 

been stymied in the United States because of Russian unwillingness 

to drop its nuclear cooperation with Iran. Russia, meanwhile, insists 

that its cooperation with Iran is peaceful. Moscow has made it clear, 

however, that it would suspend its nuclear cooperation with Tehran 

if asked to do so by a resolution of the IAEA or the UNSC. If the 

country-neutral rules described above were passed, Russia would 

not have to announce that it was permanently dropping nuclear 

cooperation on Bushier, only that it was temporarily suspending 

nuclear cooperation with Iran as required by the resolution. Any 

resumption of Russian-Iranian nuclear cooperation that violated 

the resolution, however, would jeopardize continued U.S. consent 

to send additional U.S. origin spent fuel, which should continue to 

require case-by-case approval by Washington (as is normally the 

case) under any nuclear cooperative agreement the United States 

strikes with Russia.

4. Reduce the vulnerability of the Saudi oil production and 

distribution system by building additional capacity. In a study 

conducted for NPEC by energy researchers at Rice University, two 

key vulnerabilities in the Gulf oil production and distribution system 

in Saudi Arabia were identified. The first is an Iranian threat to close 

the Straits. Such a threat, Rice analysts argue, could be significantly 

reduced by upgrading and complimenting the trans-Saudi Arabian 

Petroline, which would allow 11 million barrels a day to be shipped 

to ports on the Red Sea. This could be done with technical upgrades 

to the trans-Saudi Arabian line and by bringing the Iraqi-Saudi 
15

pipeline (Ipsa-2) back on line. To do the later would require an 

agreement with Baghdad. The cost of the entire project is estimated 

to be $600 million. Assuming the worst―a complete closure of the 

Straits of Hormuz―this bypass system is estimated to be capable of 

reducing the economic impact to the United States to a loss of only 

1 percent of gross domestic product. This figure could be reduced 

even further if additional pipelines were built from Abu Dhabi to 

ports in Oman. There are a number of ways in which these projects 

could be financed. Given the high price of oil and the large revenue 

streams high prices are now generating, the best time to finance such 

construction is now.

 The second vulnerability Rice researchers identified is the major 

oil processing facilities located at Abqaiq. If terrorists were to attack 

these facilities, the loss could be as high as several million barrels a 

day of production. Work needs to be done to detail how best to reduce 

this vulnerability but, again, the time to address these concerns (and 

finance their fixes) is now when oil prices are high. In the longer run, 

of course, the steady rise in energy prices is likely to produce both 

increased conservation and new alternative sources of energy that 

will reduce U.S. and allied reliance on Gulf oil and gas.

5. Call on Iran to agree to a Montreux Convention to demilitarize 

the Straits of Hormuz and an agreement to limit possible incidents 

at sea. One of the constant complaints of Iranian diplomats is that 

the United States and other major powers are unwilling to negotiate 

directly with Iran to guarantee its security. Certainly, the United 

States is loath to negotiate directly with Iran’s representatives for fear 

that this would give its current revolutionary government greater 

support than it otherwise would have. More importantly, after 

having been disappointed so many times, Washington officials are 

rightly skeptical that Tehran is serious about reaching substantive 

agreements. The Council on Foreign Relations recently highlighted 

this problem in a report on Iran, which eschewed attempting any 

grand bargaining with Tehran. Several of America’s key European 

allies and other influential interest groups, however, are inclined 

to negotiate, if at all possible, incrementally. This suggests that the 

pressure for talks will persist and that, in some fashion, they will 

continue. Where should such negotiatons be focused? One sensible 

area, which unlike nuclear and human rights matters (where it is 
16

in Iran’s interest to hide its hand or lie and where negotiating with 

Iran would only lend greater legitimacy to the current regime’s bad 

policies), is demilitarizing and guaranteeing free passage through 

the Straits of Hormuz and agreeing to naval standards of behavior 

in and around the Gulf. Securing a Montreux-like agreement for the 

Straits of the sort in place for the Dardanelles and an incidents at sea 

agreement like that the United States secured with the Soviets during 

the Cold War would be in Iran’s interest. An agreement regarding 

Hormuz could assure multipower guarantees to prevent any foreign 

nation from closing the straits (through which nearly all of Iran’s 

own oil exports flow). It would require submarines―including U.S., 

Israeli, French, and British special forces vessels―to surface before 

entering or exiting the Straits. It ultimately (after initial sounding 

talks with key European nations) would entail negotiations with the 

United States. 

 On the other hand, such an agreement would also be in the 

interest of the United States and its allies. It would require Iran to 

demilitarize all of the islands and coast it has fortified with artillery 

and antishipping missiles near or adjacent to the Straits. It would 

give additional international legal grounds for military action 

against Iran if it should threaten to close the Straits (by moving 

Iranian military systems beyond an agreed demilitarized zone, the 

agreement would help give timely warning of Iranian efforts to 

cheat and allow superior allied air and reconnaissance capabilities 

a clear shot at identifiable ground or sea movements). Finally, it 

would serve as a confined, limited set of talks, the progress of which 

could be used as a barometer of Iranian seriousness in negotiations 

generally. Similar benefits could be secured with an incidents at sea 

like agreement with Iran that might include provisions to restrict 

any nation’s ability to covertly mine key waterways in or near the 

Gulf.

6. Encourage Israel to initiate a Middle East nuclear restraint 

effort that would help isolate Iran as a regional producer of fissile 

materials. Israel should announce that it will unilaterally mothball 

(but not yet dismantle) Dimona, and place the reactor’s mothballing 

under IAEA monitoring. At the same time, Israel should announce 

that it is prepared to dismantle Dimona and place the special nuclear 
17

material it has produced in “escrow” in Israel with a third trusted 

declared nuclear state, e.g., the United States. It should make clear, 

however, that Israel will only take this additional step when at least 

two of three Middle Eastern nations (i.e., Algeria, Egypt, or Iran) 

follow Israel’s lead by mothballing their own declared nuclear 

facilities that are capable of producing at least one bomb’s worth of 

plutonium or highly enriched uranium in 1 to 3 years. Israel should 

further announce that it will take the additional step of handing over 

control of its weapons usable fissile material to the IAEA when: 

a. All states in the Middle East (i.e., the three mentioned above) 

dismantle their fissile producing facilities (large research 

and power reactors, hexafluoride, enrichment plants, and all 

reprocessing capabilities).

b. All nuclear weapons states (including Pakistan) formally 

agree not to redeploy nuclear weapons onto any Middle 

Eastern nation’s soil in time of peace. 

Such arms restraint by deed rather than negotiation should avoid 

the awkwardness of current Middle Eastern arms control proposals 

that would have Israel enter into nuclear arms talks with states that 

do not recognize it and have it admit that it has nuclear weapons―a 

declaration that would force Israel’s neighbors immediately to justify 

some security reaction including getting bombs of their own.

 7. Back these diplomatic-economic initiatives with increased 

U.S.-allied anti-terrorist, defense, naval, and nuclear nonproliferation cooperation. A key derivative benefit of pursuing the 

proposals described above is their potential to frustrate Iran’s efforts 

to divide the United States from its friends and to deter them from 

acting against the worst of what Iran might do. Specifically, it would 

be useful to: 

• Have the United States canvass the EU, international financial 

institutions, and other nations about their willingness to back 

an Israeli nuclear restraint initiative of the sort described above.

Clearly, it will make little sense for Israel to launch a nuclear 

restraint initiative if other key nations merely dismiss it. To 

help determine its prospects for success, the United States 

ought to talk with its key allies in Europe and elsewhere to 

guage their willingness to back the proposal described. Would 
18

the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and other EU nations 

see the proposal as a positive step that other Middle Eastern 

nations should be encouraged to follow? Would they be 

willing to announce that they would be prepared to provide 

any Middle Eastern nation that matched Israel’s actions 

help in funding non-nuclear energy systems and smaller 

research reactors (that cannot make a critical weapon’s worth 

of material in anything less than a decade)? Construction of 

these facilities might begin once dismantlement commenced. 

Would international financial institutions, meanwhile, be 

willing to announce that they would put on hold further 

loans to states that subsidize or invest in uneconomical large 

research, desalination, or power reactors and other nuclear 

bulk handling facilities in the Middle East? If so, Washington 

should consult with Israel and, assuming Israel’s willingness 

to proceed, announce that America will use existing U.S. 

cooperative threat reduction efforts to commence securing 

escrowed Israeli nuclear material and converting this material 

into appropriate storable form on a schedule that Israel will 

set.

• Increase the level and tempo of allied naval exercises in an around 

the Persian Gulf. These exercises should emphasize mineclearing, protection of commercial shipping, nuclear export 

and import interdictions, and reopening the Straits under 

a variety of “seizure” scenarios. The exercises should be 

conducted with as many other interested Gulf and non-Gulf 

nations as possible. 

• Increase international cooperation to help Iran’s neighbors secure 

their borders against illicit commerce and illegal immigration. 

One of the key problems facing Iran’s neighbors (especially 

Iraq and Turkey) is the threat of terrorists and illicit nuclear 

imports and exports transiting into and out of their territories. 

Cooperative efforts to secure these borders could be made 

a part of a larger international effort to help European and 

other states protect their borders and shores as well against 

illicit strategic weapons-related imports or leakage. This 

effort should be made an integral part of President Bush’s 

Proliferation Security Initiative. 
19

• Consider ways to share the benefits of turn-key missile defense and 

reconnaissance systems in the Middle East in a manner that would 

avoid compromising these systems. The utility of missile defense 

and reconnaissance cooperation with friendly nations is 

clear enough. The dangers of sharing more than one are less 

obvious but no less real.4

 As noted in the overview, none of these proposals can guarantee 

Iran will not go nuclear. Assuming the United States continues to 

stick by its key friends in the Middle East, though, these measures 

will give Iran and its neighbors much greater cause to pause in further 

violating the NPT. More importantly, they will go a long way toward 

frustrating Iran’s efforts to divide and deter the United States and its 

major allies from taking firm actions against the misdeeds Iran would 

otherwise be tempted to do once it becomes nuclear ready. Finally, 

and most important, these proposals, if implemented, are much 

more likely in the near-term to restrain Iran’s nuclear enthusiasm 

and that of its neighbors than any effort to bargain over Tehran’s 

nuclear capabilities, or to try to bomb them. In the end, however, 

only Iran’s eventual transition to more moderate self-rule will afford 

much chance for lasting, effective nonproliferation. Until then, the 

suggestions noted above are our best course.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 1

 1. For background, see Checking Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions, Carlisle, PA: U.S. 

Army War College, 2004, at http://www.npec-web.org/pages/checkiran.htm.

 2. For a discussion of how best to reduce the risks associated with power 

reactors see NPEC’s detailed technical analysis, Victor Gilinsky, et al., A Fresh 

Examination of the Proliferation Dangers of Light Water Reactors, at http://www.npecweb.org/projects/NPECLWRREPORTFINALII10-22-2004.pdf.

 3. The current Iranian regime thrives on corruption and central planning, both 

of which require ever larger amounts of cash.

 4. For a detailed discussion of these issues and how best to manage them, see 

NPEC’s commissioned research, “Missile Nonproliferation and Missile Defense” 

and “Controlling Unmanned Air Vehicles: New Challenges,” at http://www.

npec-web.org/published/hl_761.pdf and http://www.npec-web.org/projects/uavs.pdf, 

respectively.

PART II

TEHRAN’S NUCLEAR ENDEAVORS:

WHAT’S THE WORRY?

23

CHAPTER 2

ARAB SECURITY RESPONSES TO A NUCLEAR-READY IRAN

Richard L. Russell

 The current American and international attention on Iran’s 

suspected nuclear weapons aspirations is high, but Tehran’s belated 

admissions and continued maneuvering with the International 

Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) may, in the medium to longer 

runs, allow Iran to press ahead with a clandestine nuclear weapons 

program. Tehran probably looks to the North Korean model in 

which Pyongyang ostensibly conformed to the Nonproliferation 

Treaty (NPT) to politically diffuse any international or American 

resolve for preemptive military action to stem North Korea’s 

nuclear weapons program. After establishing a minimal nuclear 

deterrent, North Korea was able to publicly withdraw from the 

NPT and announce its nuclear weapons capabilities to up the ante 

for any consideration of American-instigated military action against 

the hermit kingdom. Tehran also can look closer to home to Iraq’s 

unsuccessful bid for nuclear weapons in the run up to the 1990-91 

Gulf war. Saddam managed to remain in good standing with the 

NPT, while harboring an enormous nuclear weapons infrastructure 

that would have produced a nuclear weapons arsenal had Saddam 

not provoked international military intervention with his invasion 

of Kuwait. The lessons from North Korea and Iraq underscore for 

Iran how it is possible to continue working on nuclear weapons even 

with the presence of IAEA inspectors on the ground, while parlaying 

“compliance” with the NPT safeguards against international 

military action against suspected nuclear weapons-related sites and 

infrastructure.

 Iran’s confidence that it can pursue a clandestine nuclear weapons 

program under the watchful eye of the IAEA may be bolstered by 

American preoccupation with Iraq. The American military is stretched 

thin with operations against insurgents in Iraq and would be poorly 

suited to undertake yet another ambitious military campaign against 
24

neighboring Iran. American political legitimacy also is strained over 

the course of events in Iraq. Moreover, domestic and international 

confidence in the quality of American intelligence is in doubt after an 

apparently less than stellar performance against Saddam’s Iraq. For 

all of these reasons, Iran might calculate that the Americans are illprepared to move militarily against its nuclear weapons program.

 Public and policy debate on Iran has focused on Tehran’s bid 

for nuclear weapons, but significantly less attention is paid to the 

regional consequences if Iran is eventually successful in evading 

IAEA safeguards and acquiring nuclear weapons. To the extent that 

regional reaction to Iran’s drive for nuclear weapons or its eventual 

possession of nuclear weapons is addressed, it is devoted largely to 

the dilemmas for American and Israeli policy. While Iran straddles 

the Middle East and South Asia, the major powers in South Asia—

Pakistan and India—already have nuclear weapons, and their security 

perception is likely to be less startled by Iran’s acquisition of nuclear 

weapons than those in the Arab world. Parenthetically, Islamabad 

appears to have cast aside any long-term strategic concerns about 

Iranian nuclear weapons in favor of short-term financial windfalls 

from aiding Iran’s nuclear weapons program.

 But Arab states too will face new security challenges and burdens 

if faced with Iranian nuclear weapons capabilities. Authoritative Arab 

debate and discussion of the impact of Iranian nuclear weapons has 

not yet surfaced and probably should not be expected. Arab states, 

for all intents and purposes, still consider the public debate and 

discourse of national security policies to be taboo. Notwithstanding 

the arrival of satellite television and cable news programs, Arab 

public discussion of national security is muted, and what little 

does get aired publicly is intellectually superficial and resembles 

platitudes rather than hardheaded strategic analysis.

 In light of the paucity of public sources, a great deal of analytic 

speculation, as well as analysis based on off-the-record conversations 

with officers and diplomats from the region, are required to answer 

the question, “How will Arab states react and respond to a nuclearready Iran?” This chapter sets the analytic scene by examining Arab 

threat perceptions of Iran writ large. The chapter assumes that most 

regional states believe that over the next 5 to 10 years Iran could 
25

readily and rapidly have nuclear weapons, even if Tehran does not 

make a formal policy declaration or detonate a nuclear device to 

demonstrate its nuclear power status. The chapter examines Arab 

perception of American and Israeli security, which is intertwined 

intimately with Arab contemplation of Iranian nuclear weapons 

capabilities. The chapter then discusses likely courses of action by 

Arab states nearest Iran in the Persian Gulf, as well as Arab states 

geographically located farther afield in the Levant and northern 

Africa. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the options and 

limitations for U.S. policy in stemming political-military pressures on 

Arab states to redouble their weapons of mass destruction (WMD) 

and delivery system programs in the aftermath of a suspected or 

demonstrated Iranian nuclear weapons stockpile.

ARAB THREAT PERCEPTION OF IRAN

 Arab states traditionally have worked to balance Iranian power 

in the Persian Gulf and Middle East. Most of the Arab states, with 

the notable exceptions of Syria and Yemen, politically, economically, 

and militarily backed Iraq in its war with Iran out of concern that 

Iranian forces threatened at various stages in the 1980-88 war to 

overwhelm Iraqi forces, thus gaining a strategic foothold in southern 

Iraq from which Tehran could exercise a stranglehold on Kuwait and 

Saudi Arabia. Such a course of events would have positioned Tehran 

to better export its then revolutionary zeal to undermine moderate 

Arab states throughout the region and to dominate the regional 

distribution of power.

 The Iran-Iraq war depleted Iranian political, military, and 

economic power and reduced the acuteness of Arab threat perception 

of Iran during the 1990s. The substantial American military presence 

in the region as a legacy of the 1990-91 war to monitor and deter any 

renewed Iraqi military ambitions in the Gulf, reassured Arab Gulf 

states that neither Iraq nor Iran would be able to mount an ambitious 

military campaign to upset the regional balance of power. Iran’s 

election in 1997 of President Khatami, who was widely perceived 

as a moderating political influence in Tehran, dampened Iran’s zeal 

for exporting the Islamic revolution and led to a further easing of the 

Arab threat perception of Iran.
26

 The American ouster of Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq may 

have diminished further Arab concern about Iran’s ability to leverage 

its geopolitical mass to dominate the Gulf. Arab states are in awe, if 

only privately, of American military capabilities that they witnessed 

slash through the massive Iraqi forces widely regarded as the most 

formidable Arab military forces in 1990. Arab military forces too 

must be impressed with the relative ease with which American and 

British forces smashed through Iraq to occupy Baghdad. Arab states 

must calculate that as long as American forces occupy Iraq, Tehran 

would not dare to undertake any conventional military operations to 

challenge the Gulf distribution of power. Indeed, many Arab officers 

and diplomats today are more concerned about American political 

and military intentions in the Gulf than they are about Iran in its 

weakened political, military, and economic condition.

 The public disclosures in 2002 and 2003 about the scope and 

sophistication of Iran’s nuclear weapons program is just beginning 

to seep into the strategic calculations of Arab diplomats, officials, 

and military officers. The Arab states have been slow to perceive the 

strategic threat posed by Iranian nuclear weapons. As Judith Yaphe 

observes, the Gulf Cooperation Council states, “have shrugged off 

dire predictions of the dangers of a nuclear armed Iran.”1

 The author’s discussions with a wide array of senior military 

officers and diplomats from the Middle East reveal a fairly commonly 

held view that Iranian nuclear weapons would have a stabilizing 

effect on the region. These officials and officers observe that Israel 

and the United States both have robust nuclear weapons capabilities 

while Arab states do not, and only one Muslim state, Pakistan, does. 

They reason that Iranian nuclear weapons would have salutary 

effects on regional security because Tehran’s nuclear arsenal would 

“balance” Israeli and American nuclear weapons. The implicit 

assumption of this line of reasoning is that Israel and the United 

States have political, military, and economic ambitions in the region 

that could only be checked by Muslim nuclear weapons, even if in 

the hands of the Farsi-speaking Islamic regime in Tehran.

 The superficial reasoning behind this Arab strategic thought may 

reflect the equivalent of an intellectual “knee jerk” reaction. As time 

passes and the reality of an Iran armed with nuclear weapons comes 
27

into sharper focus, Arab diplomats and officers are more likely to 

come to grips with the dilemmas posed by a nuclear-armed Iran. 

They will have to worry that American security backing of Arab 

states may lessen in the face of Iranian nuclear weapons. Arab 

security policy officials would have to concede that the United 

States might be less willing to come to Arab states’ aid in the event 

of a future regional crisis in which Iran wields nuclear weapons. 

Had Iraq had nuclear weapons in 1990, for example, the risks and 

potential costs of an American military campaign to liberate Kuwait 

would have been greater and might have led the United States to 

accept Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait as a fiat accompli. In a future 

regional contingency, the Iranians could make limited land grabs 

in the Persian Gulf―whether against Iraq, Kuwait, or the United 

Arab Emirates―and hope to hold American conventional forces 

at bay with the threat of Iranian nuclear weapons. Iranian nuclear 

weapons too would afford Tehran the titular leadership role in 

the Gulf and give it substantial political sway with the Arab Gulf 

States.

 Arab states also will have to worry that Iran’s possession of 

nuclear weapons will embolden Tehran to revert to a more aggressive 

foreign policy. The clerical regime might calculate, for example, 

that it could give more material assistance and lessen restrictions 

on Hezbollah to engage in operations against Israeli and American 

interests. The Iranians have supported Hezbollah operations against 

American forces as an appendage of Iranian foreign policy to push the 

Americans out of the Gulf, most notably in assisting Saudi Hezbollah 

attacks against the Khobar Towers. Tehran might calculate that it 

could support an even more ambitious unconventional terrorist 

campaign against American forces in the Gulf and the smaller Arab 

Gulf states that host American forces if it has a nuclear weapons 

arsenal. Tehran might assess that, even if its hand is exposed, the risks 

of American military retaliation would be minimal, given Iranian 

nuclear weapons. If push came to shove, Tehran could use nuclear 

weapons against American military assets or hosting countries in 

the region with Iranian ballistic missiles, or clandestinely insert them 

into the United States to directly target American cities and citizens.
28

ARABS WEIGHING AMERICAN AND ISRAELI REACTIONS

 Scratching the analytic surface of the dilemmas posed by Iranian 

nuclear weapons will lead Arab defense planners to contemplate 

American and Israeli security policies. For Arab states, the United 

States and Israel are the “bulls in the china shop” whose actions will 

have to be gauged in mapping out Arab reactions to Iranian nuclear 

weapons. How the United States and Israel behave toward an Iran 

armed with nuclear weapons will affect their security policies and 

strategies.

 Arab officials already are alarmed at what they see as an American 

precedent for waging preemptive or preventive war. While American 

security studies scholars are careful to distinguish preemptive war as 

moving militarily first in a crisis against an adversary, and preventive 

war as moving to stop an adversary from growing too powerful, 

particularly with nuclear weapons, Arab officials appear to use these 

terms in conversations in English interchangeably. Arabs worry that 

the United States will move militarily against Iran either before or 

after Iran acquires nuclear weapons by using its military position in 

the Gulf to bring forces to bear against Iran.

 The Arab states worry that they will be caught in a crossfire in an 

American military campaign against Iran. The Saudis, for example, 

may hope that the ending of the American military footprint in 

Saudi Arabia will lessen the potential for Saudi Arabia to become 

embroiled in a future conflict with Iran. The Saudis, after all, resisted 

the investigation of the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing which killed 

numerous American servicemen out of fear that it would uncover 

Iranian ties to the operation and put the Kingdom in the middle of 

an American-Iranian conflict. The Gulf states, particularly Saudi 

Arabia, also worry that American military operations against Iran 

would give the Americans potentially too great an influence over the 

global oil market.

 The Arab states will be concerned about Israeli preemptive or 

preventive military action. The Arab regimes especially will worry 

that Israeli military operations against Iran―whether by air or sea―

would spark street demonstrations that could spark public resentment 

against Arab regimes. Despite their worst fears in the run up to 
29

the 2003 war against Iraq, “the Arab street” was muted. But Arab 

regimes will worry that Israeli military action against Iran would 

prove to be more volatile politically than American military action 

against Iraq had been. Arab military officers and diplomats have a 

hard time, though, understanding Israel’s perception of geographic 

vulnerability and the severe security demands that Iran’s acquisition 

of nuclear weapons would have on Israeli defense policy.

 The Arab world has a begrudging respect for Israeli air power, in 

particular due to its prowess demonstrated in the Arab-Israeli wars, 

air battles with Syrian aircraft in struggles over Lebanon, the air 

strikes against Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) headquarters 

in Tunis, and the preventive air strikes against Iraq’s nuclear reactor. 

The mystique of Israeli air power, however, probably is larger than 

reality in the case of Iran, which is located a far reach from Israeli 

airspace.2 Depending on the flight route, Israeli aircraft would have 

to violate Jordanian, Syrian, Iraqi, or Saudi airspaces to strike Iranian 

targets. While some speculate that Israel could gain basing support 

to launch aircraft from Turkish bases, Ankara’s unease with working 

with the Americans vis-à-vis Iraq shows how squeamish the Turks 

are over relations with their southern neighbors. The Israeli air force’s 

ability to generate sorties for a sustained air bombardment of Iranian 

nuclear weapons-related facilities, moreover, pales in comparison of 

that of the United States which enjoys wide access in the Persian 

Gulf, both in host countries and based on aircraft carriers.

 Tel Aviv, for its part, will try to work closely with Washington 

on the shared threat from Iran’s nuclear weapons. In November 

2003, the head of the Israeli intelligence service, the Mossad, told 

the Israeli Knesset that Iran’s nuclear weapons program represented 

“the biggest threat to Israel’s existence since its creation” in 1948.3

The Israelis would be relieved to have the Americans carry the lion’s 

share of the burden for working diplomatically and, if necessary, 

militarily to stop Iran’s nuclear weapons drive.

THE GULF NEIGHBORHOOD

 The policy plate of U.S. security officials is already overflowing with 

its current load of security responsibilities, and the contemplation or 

implementation of yet another formidable security task represented 
30

by moving militarily―even in a limited air campaign―against Iran’s 

nuclear weapons infrastructure may simply be one bridge too far 

for American policymakers. Should the United States be unable or 

unwilling to use military actions against Iran’s nuclear weapons 

program, Tehran will likely acquire nuclear weapons sooner rather 

than later. How, then, are Arab states likely to react in the next 5 to 

10 years to a suspected or demonstrated Iranian nuclear weapons 

stockpile and robust ballistic missile inventories as delivery means?

 Arab Gulf states will feel the Iranian threat most acutely. Iraq, for 

example, will continue to see Iran as the largest and most formidable 

national security threat in the region regardless what shape, form, or 

nature the post-Saddam government in Baghdad eventually takes. A 

relatively transparent, moderately disposed government in Baghdad 

probably would want American military reassurance to shore up 

its security vis-à-vis Iran. The Iraqis might be amenable to residual 

American and international ground and air forces hosted in Iraq. 

The Iraqis might want a profile small enough to minimize charges by 

political opposition that the Iraqis are subservient to the Americans, 

but large enough to serve as a “trip wire” to deter Iranian military 

ambitions against Iraq, particularly as Iraq’s new armed forces are 

just taking root. The American presence in Iraq also would reassure 

Iraqis that the Iranians could not parlay their nuclear weapons for 

political coercion against Iraq.

 The Iraqis, too, probably will want force projection capabilities 

to deter Iranian military activities as well as to strike Iran in the 

event that deterrence fails. The residual American and international 

presence in Iraq might work to dampen Iraqi interests and ability 

to restart ballistic missile programs to match Iran’s ballistic missile 

capabilities. The Iraqis, though, probably would press the United 

Stats and the West for advanced air force capabilities to project power 

and to compensate for not resuming ballistic missile endeavors. 

Parenthetically, while much public discussion has centered on the 

size and nature of Iraq’s post-Saddam army, little debate has touched 

upon the legitimate air power needs of the future Iraq.

 Over the longer run, the withdrawal of American and international 

forces from Iraq probably would heighten Iraqi fears vis-à-vis Iran’s 

nuclear weapons arsenal. Even if Iraqi conventional forces evolve 
31

into relatively modern, professional, and capable forces―albeit in 

fewer numbers than the forces during Saddam’s rule―the Iraqis will 

be under strong pressure to contemplate resurrecting Iraq’s nuclear 

program to counterbalance Iran’s nuclear weapons inventory. 

From Baghdad’s perspective, Iran could parlay its nuclear weapons 

advantage to politically coerce Iraq. The Iranians, for example, could 

embark on an aggressive campaign to support Iraqi Shia opposition 

in the south or challenge the Shat al Arab, calculating that Baghdad 

would be deterred by Iranian nuclear forces from undertaking 

conventional military reprisals across the border. The Iraqis would 

have to worry that, should they seek to strike conventionally against 

Iran, Tehran could resort to tactical nuclear weapons to destroy Iraqi 

forces on the battlefield.

 A Turkish decision to acquire nuclear weapons in response to 

Iran’s nuclear arsenal would further increase Iraq’s incentive to 

resurrect its nuclear weapons programs. A deterioration in TurkishAmerican relations, coupled with failed efforts to gain entry into the 

EU, over time could lead Ankara to be substantially less confident in 

NATO’s resolve to come to Turkey’s defense in the event of a military 

contingency with Iran. The Turks might then calculate that they need 

to have their own, independent nuclear deterrent as a hedge against 

Iran’s nuclear forces, as well as future nuclear weapons aspirants to 

Turkey’s southern borders.

 Saudi Arabia has worked to restore diplomatic ties with Tehran 

that were ruptured by the Iranian revolution and the Iran-Iraq 

war, but Tehran’s possession of nuclear weapons is likely to cause 

discomfort in the kingdom. While the restoration of normal diplomatic 

relations appears on the surface to ease tensions, neither the Saudis 

nor the Iranians have abandoned their traditional aspirations to be 

the most influential nation-state in the Gulf. The Saudis are likely to 

view Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons as a substantial Iranian 

effort toward politically and militarily dominating the Gulf. The 

Saudis probably would suffer a sense of political humiliation that 

the Iranians have the political prestige or reputation for power that 

accompanies nuclear weapons.

 Iranian nuclear weapons would add already substantial 

political-military incentive for Saudi Arabia to pursue its own 

nuclear weapons capabilities. The Saudis have limited conventional 
32

military capabilities to defend their large geographic space from 

outside threats, the most serious of which, Iran and Iraq, could be 

armed with nuclear weapons. The Saudis worried in the Iran-Iraq 

war that Iranian forces would defeat Iraqi forces in southern Iraq 

to threaten Kuwait and the eastern province of Saudi Arabia. The 

Saudis would have to worry that a nuclear-armed Iran could again 

militarily threaten the Gulf. The Saudis, too, would have to worry 

about the foreign policy orientation of the future government in 

Iraq and hedge against the specter of Iraq in the long run, tapping 

its technical expertise to resurrect a nuclear weapons program. The 

Saudis also harbor deep mistrust of Israel and resent Israeli military 

prowess and nuclear weapons capabilities.

 The Saudis, too, have a wary eye on the military power of the 

United States. The Saudis have been shaken by post-September 11, 

2001, events. They were shocked both by signs of formidable domestic 

political opposition against the Saudi regime and internationally by 

the anger in the United States over the stark, if belated, recognition 

that Saudi Arabia was a hotbed for al-Qaeda. The political backlash 

in the United States must have heightened Saudi concern that 

the United States could one day pose a threat to the Kingdom. 

Although this concern is never uttered, Saudi officials remember 

that the Kingdom was vulnerably dependent on the United States 

for its survival in the 1990 war. It would not take too much Saudi 

imagination to appreciate that the United States, with its 500,000 

troops then stationed in Saudi Arabia, could have forcibly taken 

over the Kingdom in a couple of days. The Saudis today probably 

worry that that United States could, in the future, “overreact” to an 

al-Qaeda attack against American interests with retaliatory strikes 

or military occupation in Saudi Arabia, much as the Americans have 

done in Afghanistan and Iraq.

 A Saudi nuclear weapons capability would work strategically 

to shore-up Saudi insecurities vis-à-vis Iran’s nuclear weapons 

capabilities, but also against potential hostile actions in the longer 

run from Israel, Iraq, and the United States. The Saudis have already 

taken several steps in this direction. In the 1980s, unknown to the 

United States, they secretly negotiated for and purchased intermediate 

range CSS-2 ballistic missiles from China. According to Anthony 
33

Cordesman, the Saudis purchased 50-60 CSS-2 missiles, 10-15 mobile 

launchers, and technical support from China.4

 The missiles would 

be ideal for delivering nuclear weapons, but poorly suited for the 

delivery of conventional munitions because they are very inaccurate 

and too limited in numbers in the Saudi arsenal to be used in the 

massive missile barrages with the conventional weapons necessary 

to compensate for inaccuracies. The missiles, moreover, were sold 

from Chinese operational nuclear force inventories. Although Beijing 

and Riyadh claim that the missiles in Saudi Arabia are armed with 

conventional weapons, no American or international observers have 

been allowed by the Saudis to inspect and independently verify 

Chinese and Saudi claims.5

 The international revelations in 2003 about the scope and depth of 

Iran’s nuclear weapons-related activities have brought to the public 

domain reports of Saudi contemplation of nuclear weapons with the 

assistance of Pakistan. The British newspaper, the Guardian, reported 

that Saudi officials have admitted that, in light of Iran’s nuclear 

weapons program and the post-September 11 security environment, 

the Kingdom is considering a variety of national security policy 

options, one of which is the pursuit of nuclear weapons.6 Other press 

reports allege that then Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah bin Abdulaziz 

traveled to Pakistan in October 2003 and secured a secret agreement 

with President Pervez Musharraf, under which Pakistan will provide 

the Saudis with nuclear-weapons technology in exchange for cheap 

oil.7 Naturally, Pakistani and Saudi officials deny these reports, but 

both Pakistan and Saudi Arabia have national interests consistent 

with such a course of actions. Pakistan needs money to support its 

military competition with India, while Saudi Arabia needs a deterrent 

to compete with Iran and Israel, and as a hedge against a distancing 

of security ties with the United States.

 While a body of circumstantial evidence suggests that Saudi 

Arabia has the interests, means, and intentions to lean toward a 

nuclear weapons option, there is little to suggest that the smaller 

Gulf Arab states are as far along in their strategic thinking as Saudi 

Arabia. To greater and lesser degrees, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the 

United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Oman gauge a threat from Iran in 

general. Yemen, on the other hand, takes great reassurance from its 

geographic separation from Iran and sees little to no direct military 
34

threat coming from Tehran. Yemen’s security preoccupation, despite 

Iranian nuclear weapons in the Gulf region, will continue to be its 

neighbor to the north, Saudi Arabia.

 The richer small Arab Gulf states have the financial wherewithal 

to purchase nuclear weapons and delivery systems, but they 

would face obstacles in moving along such a strategic path. China 

and Pakistan, for example, probably are more willing to press the 

envelope of risk with international and American backlash for public 

discovery of clandestine WMD-related dealings in exchange for the 

strategic prize of security ties with Saudi Arabia, the richest and one 

of the three major states in the Gulf balance of power, but they might 

be less willing to take these risks for the sake of security ties with 

the smaller Gulf states. The Chinese and Pakistanis might be more 

concerned with the operational security of any clandestine WMD 

cooperation with the smaller Arab Gulf states, recognizing that they 

need strong ties with the Americans that would increase the risk of 

public exposure. The Saudis, in contrast, have proven themselves 

adept at keeping secrets from the Americans. While Saudi Arabia 

may calculate that it could survive the international and American 

opprobrium that would accompany revelations of a Saudi nuclear 

weapons program, the smaller Arab Gulf states would have to 

worry that exposure of nuclear weapons aspirations would alienate 

their security backers―namely the United States and Saudi Arabia―

which are the cornerstones for ensuring their autonomies from the 

larger states of Iraq and Iran.

 Small Gulf Arab state efforts to develop their own nuclear fuel 

cycles and nuclear power plants under the guise of civilian electric 

power generation would be a long and expensive undertaking. Such 

a course of action, moreover, might set off international alarm bells 

in light of Iran’s successful exploitation of this route for acquiring 

nuclear weapons. The small Arab Gulf states might be less able than 

Iran to ride out international criticisms of ostensible civilian nuclear 

power infrastructure; they are far more dependent on critical trade 

and security from the West than Iran and therefore more vulnerable 

to the effects of international economic sanctions and ruptures in 

bilateral security arrangements, particularly with the United States, 

Britain, and, to a lesser extent, France. The small Gulf Arab states, too, 
35

would have to worry that their nascent nuclear power infrastructure 

would be vulnerable to preventive and preemptive attacks from 

larger regional powers.

 The notable exception to this line of reasoning might be the UAE, 

which perceives the Iranians as a threat more acutely than their Gulf 

Arab counterparts. The UAE still harbors resentment toward the 

Iranians for their occupation of the contested territories of Greater 

and Lesser Tunbs and Abu Musa Islands.8 The UAE might calculate 

that Iran’s nuclear weapons will reduce, if not eliminate, what little 

incentive Tehran has to negotiate a settlement to the island disputes, 

as well as embolden Tehran to take even more assertive actions 

against the UAE.

 The UAE has demonstrated a willingness to spend top dollar for 

defense as evident in procurement of combat aircraft from France 

and the United States, as well as Scud missiles from North Korea. 

The UAE blindsided the United States when Dubai purchased ScudB missiles from North Korea in 1989, according to Simon Henderson.9

Dubai is suspected of having six Scud-B launchers.10 The UAE might 

see its Mirage 2000 and its F-16 aircraft as ideal nuclear weapons 

delivery systems and could turn to Pakistan for technical assistance. 

These aircraft and well-trained UAE pilots could readily navigate 

the Persian Gulf to hold at risk Iran’s nuclear weapons infrastructure 

at Bushier and major naval facilities at Bandar Abbas. The UAE, 

moreover, has demonstrated willingness to purchase controversial 

weapons systems such as Scud missiles and suffer economic sanctions 

as a consequence. The Chinese and the Pakistanis might be willing 

to undertake the risk of exposure for substantial economic reward 

to assist the UAE in developing nuclear, chemical, or biological 

payloads for its combat aircraft or ballistic missiles.

THE LEVANT NEIGHBORHOOD

 Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons will have security 

repercussions for Arab states beyond the immediate Persian Gulf area. 

Syria and Egypt are geopolitically central to Middle Eastern security 

and will see their interests most directly affected by Iran’s nuclear 

weapons power. Concerns about the prospects of Syrian or Egyptian 

nuclear weapons programs, however, have been muted in part due 
36

to the economic weaknesses of both states. Common wisdom holds 

that nuclear weapons programs often are prohibitively expensive 

undertakings that put the nuclear weapons option beyond the grasp 

of many nation-states with poor, if not dysfunctional, economies, 

such as Syria and Egypt.

 A cursory look at reality shatters that common assumption. Two 

of the world’s poorest and most ineffective economies in Pakistan and 

North Korea illuminate the stubborn fact that countries with an expert 

technical elite and the determination to siphon off scarce financial 

resources from their economies can defy reasonable assumptions 

and establish nuclear weapons programs. Pakistan and North Korea 

are estimated to have 2002 per capita gross domestic product (GDP) 

of $462 and $903, respectively.11 Egypt and Syria have estimated 

2002 per capita GDPs of $1,190 and $1,100, respectively,12 which puts 

Cairo and Damascus on a richer footing than both Islamabad and 

Pyongyang. And like Pakistan and North Korea, Syria and Egypt 

have black market means for making funding streams for clandestine 

nuclear weapons programs. With the Pakistani and North Korean 

nuclear weapons histories in mind, one should not be too confident 

in dismissing futures in which the poorly performing economic 

states of Syria and Egypt embark on nuclear weapons programs.

 Syria, at least initially, might take some solace from Iran’s 

nuclear weapons stocks. Damascus is increasingly isolated and in 

a weakened regional security position. It is encircled by states that 

enjoy strong security relationships with the United States; Israel to 

the southwest, Jordan to the south, Iraq to the east, and Turkey to 

the north. Syria, while the reigning influence in Lebanon, has only 

Iran to cooperate with in regional politics against the other regional 

powers influenced by the United States. In the short term, Damascus 

might welcome Iran’s nuclear weapons as a means to bolster, by 

association, its marginal regional power.

 Over the longer run, Syria probably would come to see the negative 

strategic consequences of Iranian nuclear weapons. If, in response to 

Iranian nuclear weapons, Turkey and Iraq pursue nuclear weapons 

options, Syria will see its power position in the region deteriorate even 

further.13 Turkish or Iraqi nuclear weapons will add to the already 

strong Syrian strategic incentive to pursue nuclear weapons because 

Damascus views Israel as its most formidable security threat.
37

 The Syrian regime is isolated politically and might calculate that 

it has no other means to ensure its survival other than a nuclear 

deterrent. Damascus might calculate that it has no alternative to 

running the risk of Israeli military action in the near and medium 

terms in order to achieve a margin of security in the longer run 

under a nuclear umbrella. The Syrians have a rudimentary nuclear 

infrastructure upon which to build.14 But aside from the formidable 

technical obstacles for acquiring the fuel cycle infrastructure to 

support a nuclear weapons program, Damascus would have a major 

challenge keeping its nuclear program secret to avoid provoking 

Israeli preemptive or preventive military action either against 

Syria’s clandestine nuclear weapons infrastructure or against the 

regime itself. Tel Aviv probably could not tolerate Syrian possession 

of nuclear weapons, and, unlike the case of Iran, Israel has more 

than sufficient military capabilities needed to wage a sustained air 

campaign to damage Syrian political, military, and economic nodes 

significantly.

 Syria could respond more readily to accelerated regional nuclear 

weapons proliferation by strengthening its “poor man’s nuclear 

weapon option.” The Syrian conventional military is dying on the 

vine since it lost its principal military backer with the collapse of the 

Soviet Union. Today, Syria’s conventional military is less capable on 

the battlefield than the Iraqi military of the 1991 war. The Syrian 

military is a thoroughly political institution unable to compete 

with Israel’s military on the battlefield. Damascus compensates for 

conventional military inferiority by relying on chemical, and perhaps 

biological, weapons and ballistic missiles to deter Israeli military 

action. Undersecretary of State for Arms Control John Bolton testified 

to a House hearing in September 2003 that Syria has “a stockpile of 

the nerve agent sarin that can be delivered by aircraft or ballistic 

missiles, and has engaged in the research and development of more 

toxic and persistent nerve agents such as VX.” Bolton also stated 

that Syria “is continuing to develop an offensive biological weapons 

capability” and expressed concern about Syria’s nuclear activities, 

noting that Russia and Syria “have approved a draft program on 

cooperation on civil nuclear power.”15 Damascus probably will 

redouble efforts in the chemical and biological weapons arenas to 
38

shore up its weak deterrent capabilities against Israeli, Turkish, Iraqi, 

and Iranian conventional and nuclear forces in the distant future.

 The Syrians would have to depend on their substantial ballistic 

missile forces to deliver chemical or biological weapons against 

regional threats because of the uncertainty over their air force 

capabilities. Only Syria’s ballistic missiles would stand a chance of 

penetrating Israeli airspace, probably even with the deployment of 

the Israeli Arrow ballistic missile defense system which cannot be 

entirely foolproof. Syria’s air force would be an unreliable means to 

deliver WMD payloads, given the exceptionally poor performance 

of Syrian aircraft and pilots against Israeli forces in the air battles of 

the 1980s in which Israel downed some 80 Syrian aircraft without 

a loss of one Israeli. The Syrians have 18 Scud-B launchers with 

200 missiles, 8 Scud-C launchers with 80 missiles, and an unknown 

number of Scud-D missiles.16

 The Syrians appear to be working on modernizing their ballistic 

missile forces in fits and starts. “Syria tested a 700-kilometer range 

Scud-D on September 23, 2000, following a successful test of Israel’s 

Arrow missile defense system.”17 Syria also could look to acquire 

more modern, mobile, reliable, and accurate ballistic missiles such as 

the M-9―whether from China directly, or indirectly from Pakistan. 

Syrian President Bashir has yet to demonstrate much prudence in 

regional politics and might be persuaded by Syria’s old guard military 

that new missiles will bring Syria greater security and influence visà-vis Israel. Tel Aviv might, in turn, shatter that Syrian assessment 

and judge that such a change of the status quo is unacceptable and 

militarily move against Damascus, particularly since Damascus is 

in a profoundly weaker position in the Middle East than it had been 

during the Cold War.

 Egypt is geographically farther from Iran and does not feel 

the direct Iranian military threat as acutely as those states located 

closer. Nevertheless, Cairo is likely to view Iran’s nuclear weapons 

as another blow to the Egyptian worldview as the leader in the 

Arab and Islamic worlds. As journalist Nicholas Kralev observes, 

“Egyptian politicians, intellectuals, and journalists are worried that 

their country is losing its status as a major regional player in the 

Middle East.”18 The blow to Egyptian prestige because of Iran’s 
39

nuclear weapons status may not be sufficient in and of itself to alter 

Egypt’s restraint from a nuclear weapons program, but it adds to an 

already large pile of incentives to pursue nuclear weapons.

 Egypt had incentive to contemplate nuclear weapons well before 

Iran’s nuclear weapons come to the foreground in regional politics. 

The Egyptians, notwithstanding the peace treaty with Israel, have 

long resented Israel’s nuclear weapons program that they see as a 

substantial source of Israeli political leverage over Egypt and the 

other Arab states. Cairo has long pressed diplomatically for a nuclear 

free zone in the Middle East as a means to negotiate away Israel’s 

unilateral nuclear weapons advantage in the region. Cairo has long 

warned that it could reconsider its nuclear weapons restraint if the 

Israelis indefinitely refuse to negotiate for a nuclear free zone.

 Egypt does have a nuclear power infrastructure upon which to 

begin a program with military applications. In the 1970s, Egypt may 

have debated pursuing nuclear weapons, but the peace treaty with 

Israel, aid from the United States, and limited financial means derailed 

a policy in this direction.19 Nevertheless, the Egyptians have a nuclear 

research center with a Soviet-supplied two megawatt research reactor 

that started in 1961, and an Argentine-supplied 22 megawatt light 

water reactor that started in 1997.20 The Wisconsin Project estimates 

that the Argentine reactor gives Cairo access to bomb quantities of 

fissile material, possibly enough plutonium to make one nuclear 

weapon per year.21 If the Egyptians were to embark on a nuclear 

weapons program based on its nuclear power infrastructure, they 

would have to move gingerly much as the Syrians to reduce the risk 

of Israeli military action. Cairo, however, might judge that it would 

face less of a risk from Israeli military action than Syria because of 

Egypt’s security relationship with the United States. Cairo could also 

calculate that Tel Aviv would be loath to undertake military action 

that would threaten the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty and risk the 

return of hot wars between Arab states and Israel.

 The Egyptians, much like the Syrians, also could redouble their 

“poor man’s nuclear weapon” option. The Egyptian military in the 

1980s modernized its chemical warfare agent production facilities 

to manufacture the nerve agents and even cooperated with Iraq on 

chemical weapons; in 1981 Iraq gave Egypt $12 million to expand 
40

Egypt’s chemical agent production facilities and, in return, Cairo 

assisted Baghdad in the production and storage of chemical weapons 

agents.22 And the Egyptians could undertake similar modernization 

efforts of their suspected biological warfare capabilities. “In 1996, 

U.S. officials reported that by 1972 Egypt had developed biological 

warfare agents and that there was no evidence to indicate that Egypt 

has eliminated this capability and it remains likely that the Egyptian 

capability to conduct biological warfare continues to exist.”23

 Egyptian and Syrian pursuit of the “poor man’s nuclear option” 

might prove in the end to be only stopgap measures. The Egyptians 

and Syrians, drawing lessons from the 1991 and 2003 wars against 

Iraq, might conclude that nuclear weapons are inherently greater 

sources of deterrence than chemical and biological weapons. The 

Iraqis had robust chemical and biological weapons inventories in 

1991, and the United States believed that Baghdad had retained some 

of these capabilities in the run-up to the 2003 war. The American 

campaign against Saddam probably has shaken Egyptian and Syrian 

confidence in the deterrence value of chemical and biological weapons 

because the U.S. perception of Iraqi chemical and biological weapons 

stores was insufficient to deter the United States from waging a 

war against Baghdad. Israeli, American, and Iranian possession of 

nuclear weapons might pressure Syria and Egypt to pursue nuclear 

weapons as the ultimate guarantor of their securities.

 The Egyptians appear to be continuing efforts to modernize 

their ballistic missile forces, which could be used as a foundation 

for a nuclear weapons deterrent posture. The Egyptians probably 

already have on hand at least 24 Scud B/C launchers with about 100 

missiles.24 The Wisconsin Project assesses that the long-standing 

relationship with North Korea has given Egypt the capability to 

indigenously produced Scud-B missiles, and Cairo is developing 

Scud-C missile production capabilities.25 In August 2002, Slovak 

authorities revealed that two North Korean agents based in Slovakia 

were procuring millions of dollars of ballistic missile components 

for Egypt. Although the North Korean agents fled the country before 

Slovak authorities could arrest them, remaining documents showed 

that between 1999 and mid-2001, they ordered more than $10 million 

worth of equipment and supplies for Egypt, to include items that 
41

suggest that Cairo is trying to acquire a ballistic missile with a range 

of about 1,500km.26 The Egyptian ballistic missile program, which has 

escaped much international scrutiny, has benefited from substantial 

North Korea assistance, which Cairo might eventually tap to support 

a nuclear weapons program such as warhead designs to carry on top 

of Egypt’s ballistic missiles.

 Egypt’s interest in ballistic missiles with longer ranges than the 

Scud is long-standing. In the 1980s, Egypt cooperated with Iraq and 

Argentina on the Condor missile program. The United States in 1988 

revealed that the Egyptians turned to Argentina for production help 

and Iraq for funding in a $3.2 billion Condor-2 project intended to 

provide Egypt and Iraq each with 200 solid-fuel ballistic missiles 

comparable to the American Pershing II nuclear delivery system.27

Intense U.S. diplomatic pressure, as well as the 1990 Gulf war, forced 

the collapse of the program. Cairo might be rekindling its efforts 

to procure longer range missiles, calculating that U.S. attention is 

diverted elsewhere.

 A series of scenarios could be envisioned in which Egypt could 

embark on a nuclear weapons program in earnest. If American grant 

assistance were cut significantly, the lifeblood for Egypt’s conventional 

military modernization would evaporate and put more pressure on 

Cairo to compensate with comparatively cheaper investments in 

unconventional weapons. A continuing political deterioration over 

the Israel-Palestinian conflict, Arab street backlash over American 

military occupation of Iraq, popular Egyptian uprisings against the 

Mubarak regime, or Mubarak’s death all could work to reduce Cairo’s 

responsiveness to U.S. diplomatic pressure below what was the case 

when Egypt abandoned the Condor missile program. Cairo could look 

to nuclear weapons acquisition as a means for the political prestige 

needed to shore-up Egypt’s domestic security situation and sagging 

political stature in the Arab world. Egypt might look to Pakistan 

as a model in this regard; a poor state, but one in which popular 

support for the nuclear program worked to Musharraf’s political 

advantage at home and abroad. Arguably, Pakistan benefits from 

more international attention and American assistance than would 

have been the case had Pakistan not had nuclear weapons. Cairo 

also could calculate that only nuclear weapons could bring sufficient 
42

political pressure on Israel to engage in serious arms control talks, 

much as they had between the Americans and Soviets during the 

Cold War.

AMERICAN POLICY AVENUES

 The United States will have leverage and influence over Iraqi 

responses to Iranian nuclear weapons inventory as long as American 

and international forces play critical roles inside Iraq, but, over the 

longer run, that influence will subside and the incentives for Iraq to 

resume ballistic missile and nuclear weapons programs will grow 

stronger to balance growing Iranian ballistic missile and nuclear 

forces. The smaller Gulf Arab states, moreover, might be supportive 

of Iraqi efforts in this direction because they would see Iraq as a 

geopolitical counterbalance to Iranian and Saudi power much as 

they had during the 1980-88 Gulf war.

 To stem this course of events, the United States will have to 

bolster Iraq’s force projection capabilities by providing assistance in 

building a modern, capable air force to compensate for Iraqi restraint 

in resurrecting Iraqi ballistic missile programs. The Iraqis will 

have legitimate security demands for force projection capabilities 

against Iran’s growing ballistic missile forces. The Iraqis also will 

need American and international security reassurance in continued 

linkages to western militaries to ensure that Iraqi conventional forces, 

while smaller than Iranian forces, are more capable in conventional 

military operations to deter Iranian ambitions. The Iraqis, too, will 

need international security reassurance to dampen the powerful 

incentive to pursue nuclear weapons to counterbalance Iran’s nuclear 

weapons inventory.

 The United States should be forward-leaning in diplomatic 

efforts to stem Egyptian and Saudi incentives to pursue nuclear 

weapons options. The United States is bound to have more leverage 

over Egypt, which benefits from substantial American military and 

economic assistance. As Jon Alterman observes, “the $1.3 billion in 

military aid that the United States provides annually is useful as 

the present regime distributes patronage in the armed forces. U.S. 

economic aid, just under $800 million annually and slowly declining, 

also helps the regime consolidate its patronage networks.”28
43

 Egypt demonstrated sensitivity to U.S. diplomatic and political 

pressure that ended its Condor ballistic missile program in the late 

1980s. The Egyptians, however, probably calculate that the United 

States has a short attention span and is easily distracted by other 

global events, especially today in Iraq and Afghanistan. In light of 

Iran’s nuclear weapons program, the United States needs to squeeze 

Egypt’s ballistic missile program and potential nuclear weapons 

aspirations back on to the policy agenda. The United States needs 

to speak firmly and directly with the Egyptians and challenge the 

country on the activities of its ballistic missile forces, which could be 

the platform for nuclear weapons delivery in the future.

 American leverage against Saudi Arabia will be less than is the case 

with Egypt. The Saudis by no means depend on American economic 

support or largesse for the modernization of the Saudi military. Still 

though, the Saudis continue to see the United States as a strategic 

backdrop that could potentially again bolster the Kingdom in a 

future contingency. The United States needs to leverage the security 

reassurance it gives to the Saudis to gain access and Saudi updates on 

the status of CSS-2s. The United States should argue that the Saudi 

military benefits from access to American military facilities, and that 

the Saudis should reciprocate by allowing U.S. officials to inspect 

on a bilateral basis Saudi military facilities, missiles, and warheads, 

and to speak with Saudi personnel. Such efforts would give the 

United States a better understanding of the Saudi infrastructure, as 

well as underscore the potential negative consequences of the Saudis 

undertaking a bid for nuclear weapons on ballistic missiles.

 The possession of nuclear weapons in Egypt and Saudi Arabia 

would be particularly troubling given the potential for political 

instability in these countries over the longer run. Both countries have a 

burgeoning demographic bulge of young and unemployed men who 

will be vulnerable for recruitment by domestic―especially militant 

Islamic―political opposition. Egypt in the past has had its armed 

forces penetrated by Islamic militants, witness the assassination of 

President Sadat during a military parade, and might again suffer from 

Islamic militants in military ranks who might have knowledge and 

access to nuclear weapons inventories. The same case could be made 

of Saudi Arabia. While these scenarios would not appear likely in the 

near term, they might not appear so hypothetical in 15 or 20 years. 
44

These scenarios underscore the imperative of American statecraft to 

try to head off the Egyptian or Saudi acquisition of nuclear weapons 

in the near term to avoid being saddled in the future with unstable 

regimes politically struggling against militant Islam opposition both 

inside and outside the gates of power, much as the United States 

faces today with respect to Pakistan.

 Syria will require more use of coercive diplomacy that entails 

the threat of force than the cases of Egypt and Saudi Arabia, if the 

United States is to discourage Syria from undertaking the nuclear 

weapons route. The Syrians have demonstrated a stubborn resistance 

to conciliatory measures from outside as well as a propensity to put 

their near-term interests over longer-term strategic interests. The 

Syrians, for example, appear to have rendered logistics assistance for 

Iraqi regime exodus from Iraq after the 2003 war, as well as facilitated 

the travel of Jihadists from the region into Iraq to fight American 

occupation forces. The United States needs to reaffirm directly to 

Syria that it is an isolated regime squeezed between powers―Israel, 

Jordan, Turkey, and Iraq―which are more favorably disposed to 

American than Syrian strategic interests. Damascus needs to know 

directly and clearly that the initiation of a nuclear weapons program 

would not be tolerated and the American or Israeli military forces 

could wreak havoc on Syria’s limited infrastructure and obsolete 

conventional forces, the destruction of which would leave the ruling 

regime wobbly.

 Rather than procure their own nuclear weapons capabilities, 

the smaller Gulf Arab States might seek to use a set of overlapping 

security arrangements to acquire a rough, if minimal measure, of 

deterrence against the Iranian nuclear weapons threat. Iranian 

nuclear weapons could act as a further catalyst for Arab Gulf States 

to nurture their security relationships with the United States. Kuwait, 

Bahrain, Oman, and Qatar might increase the already substantial 

security links that have bloomed with the United States since the 

1991 Gulf war. These states see security ties with the United States 

as critical to ensure their autonomies from the major regional states 

of Iraq, Iran, and Saudi Arabia. If they were to become wedged 

between nuclear powers in Iran―and subsequently in Iraq and Saudi 

Arabia―the small Arab Gulf states might try to get themselves more 

closely tied with American conventional deterrence as well as under 
45

a potential American nuclear umbrella. The small Arab Gulf states, 

moreover, would need to hedge their bets and simultaneously work 

to nurture ties with Saudi Arabia and Iraq to counterbalance Iranian 

aspirations for dominance in the Gulf.

 The small Arab Gulf states will be looking to secure a protective 

coverage of American nuclear deterrence. They will seek to leverage 

their hosting and support of American conventional forces in the 

region for American security guarantees that an American nuclear 

forces deterrent will be leveraged against Iranian nuclear capabilities. 

Gulf States might ask the United States for a contemporary rendition 

of the “Carter Doctrine,” in which the United States made a veiled 

threat to respond with nuclear weapons in the event that the Soviet 

Union made a military bid for warm water Gulf ports. President 

Carter announced in January 1980, in response to the Soviet Union’s 

invasion of Afghanistan and closer proximity to the Persian Gulf, 

that “Any attempt by any outside force to gain control of the 

Persian Gulf will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of 

the United States of America; any such an assault will be repelled 

by any means necessary, including military force.”29 Although the 

United States might opt to couch a policy that applies to the whole 

region―as the Carter Doctrine had―the Arab Gulf states are unlikely 

to be able to coordinate among themselves a coordinated pitch to the 

United States. The United States, though, would be well-advised to 

steer clear of a renewed Carter Doctrine that imprudently relies on 

nuclear weapons. The Carter Doctrine made strong strategic sense, 

but because the United States at the time lacked the conventional 

force projection capabilities to make good the threat against Soviet 

forces, the doctrine amounted to a veiled American threat to resort 

to nuclear weapons.

 The United States would be better off offering ballistic missile 

defense coverage than a new grand doctrine with veiled threats of 

American nuclear retaliation for military disruptions to the Gulf 

balance of power. The Gulf States with the experience of the 1991 

and 2003 Gulf Wars have grown accustomed to benefiting from the 

provision of American ballistic missile defense coverage. And Iran’s 

acquisition of nuclear weapons undoubtedly will increase the Gulf 

Cooperation Council (GCC) states’ sense of vulnerability because 

one nuclear tipped Iranian missile could decimate the government, 
46

ruling families, and societies of the smaller GCC states that, in some 

respects, have more in common with ancient city-states than modern 

nation-states. The United States might look to the GCC states for 

financial assistance to offset the research, development, procurement, 

and deployment of ballistic missile defense systems in the region, 

whether land- or sea-based. While sea- and land-based American 

ballistic missile defense systems are unable to provide strategic 

defense protection of the United States with its large landmass, they 

are capable of providing strategic protection to small states such as 

Qatar and Bahrain.

 The Arab Gulf states and the United States would have advantages 

in drawing the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) into 

the Gulf to shore-up deterrence against a nuclear-ready Iran. From 

the Gulf state perspective, encouraging greater European security 

involvement in the Gulf via NATO is a potential means to hold in check 

what they perceive as assertive “unilateral” American diplomacy 

and statecraft vis-à-vis Iran. From the American perspective, NATO 

involvement potentially would give U.S. endeavors aimed at 

countering Iran at least a cloak of multilateral legitimacy. NATO’s 

European members, moreover, have recently shown more interest 

in Alliance involvement in the greater Middle East―particularly in 

Afghanistan―in no small measure to help repair the damage done 

to the trans-Atlantic relationship due to bitter French and German 

opposition to the war in Iraq. Washington should parlay European 

interest in repairing security ties to the United States to move NATO’s 

traditional focus on continental Europe to the greater Middle East, 

with a concentrated focus on dealing with a nuclear-ready Iran.

 NATO involvement should complement rather than replace the 

U.S. role as the premier security broker in the Persian Gulf. Despite 

a recent upswing in European interest in the Gulf, the worldviews of 

European capitals remain focused on security issues in and around 

Europe. The Europeans are all too willing to let political and military 

problems in the Middle East fester, to step aside and let the Americans 

carry the lion’s share of the region’s political-military burdens, and 

to eagerly criticize American policy for failing to deliver a “perpetual 

peace” to the troubled region. While NATO’s European members 

devote considerable attention to political pomp and circumstance, 

their military capabilities are seriously eroding, leaving them with 
47

little to no means to project military power into the Gulf.30 The Gulf 

States understand that NATO can help politically contain American 

power, but, if push comes to shove in a future military contingency 

in the Gulf, only the Americans have the military power needed to 

act.

 The United States today―unlike its European allies―does not lack 

the conventional means to project power in the Gulf as demonstrated 

in the wars of 1991 and 2003 against Iraq. And the United States 

would be wise strategically to tap that reputation for power to 

reassure partners in the region―in order to dampen incentives 

for exploring the nuclear weapons option―with ballistic missile 

defenses and conventional military means. The United States, with 

its preponderance of conventional forces, could threaten to remove 

the regime in Iran should nuclear weapons be used against American 

forces and regional partners. The reliance on conventional deterrence 

will underscore internationally the lack of usability of nuclear 

weapons, a mindset that, in turn, would dampen regional interest 

and prestige linked to nuclear weapons acquisition. Conversely, the 

American threat of nuclear weapons response in kind would heighten 

the importance and prestige of nuclear weapons and contribute 

to incentive for nuclear weapons proliferation. In the event that 

nuclear deterrence fails, the United States would have to make good 

on its nuclear threat and retaliate with nuclear weapons to cause 

most likely the end of the regime in Tehran, but at the unacceptable 

moral cost of thousands to millions of innocent Iranian civilian lives. 

Massive and tightly targeted conventional force retaliation offers a 

profoundly more moral and strategically effective deterrent because 

the threat is more credible than nuclear weapons response in light of 

the American restraint in inflicting civilian casualties in numerous 

conflicts since the end of the Cold War.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 2

 1. Kori N. Schake and Judith S. Yaphe, The Implications of a Nuclear-Armed Iran, 

McNair Paper 64, Washington, DC: National Defense University, 2001, p. 31.

 2. The author is indebted to Eliot Cohen on this point. See his “The Mystique 

of U.S. Air Power,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 1, January-February 1994. 

 3. Quoted in Thomas Fuller, “A Top EU Aide Backs Iran in Feud over Arms,” 

International Herald Tribune, November 18, 2003.
48

 4. Anthony H. Cordesman, Saudi Arabia: Guarding the Desert Kingdom, Boulder, 

CA: Westview Press, 1997, p. 178.

 5. For a discussion of the Saudi strategic logic for nuclear weapons, see Richard 

L. Russell, “A Saudi Nuclear Option?” Survival, Vol. 43, No. 2, Summer 2001, pp. 

69-79.

 6. Ewen MacAskill and Ian Traynor, “Saudis Consider Nuclear Bombs,” The 

Guardian, September 18, 2003, p. 1.

 7. Arnaud de Borchgrave, “Pakistan, Saudi Arabia in Secret Nuke Pact,” 

Washington Times, October 22, 2003. 

 8. For background on these disputes, see Simon Henderson, The New Pillar: 

Conservative Arab Gulf States and U.S. Strategy, Policy Paper No. 58, Washington, 

DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2003, pp. 24-25.

 9. Henderson, The New Pillar: Conservative Arab Gulf States and U.S. Strategy, 

p. 72.

 10. Ephraim Kam and Yiftah Shapir, eds., The Middle East Strategic Balance, Tel 

Aviv, Israel: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, 2003.

 11. The Military Balance, 2003-2004, London: Oxford University Press for 

International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2003, pp. 289, 299. 

 12. Ibid., pp. 276, 279. 

 13. For background on Turkey’s fits and starts with nuclear power, see Mustafa 

Kibaroglu, “Turkey’s Quest for Peaceful Nuclear Power,” The Nonproliferation 

Review, Spring-Summer 1997, pp. 33-44. 

 14. See Nuclear Threat Initiative website for analysis on Syria provided by 

the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International 

Studies at http://www.nti.org/e_research/proflies/Syria/2074_2076.html, accessed 

November 21, 2003.

 15. Quoted in Judith Miller, “Senior U.S. Official to Level Weapons Charges 

Against Syria,” New York Times, September 16, 2003.

 16. Kam and Shapir.

 17. Joseph Cirincione with Jon B. Wolfsthal and Miriam Rajkumar, Deadly 

Arsenals: Tracking Weapons of Mass Destruction, Washington, DC: Carnegie 

Endowment for International Peace, 2002, p. 85.

 18. Nicholas Kralev, “Egypt Fears Dwindling Influence,” Washington Times, 

November 19, 2003, p. 16.

 19. For background on Egypt’s past contemplation of a nuclear weapons 

option, see Barbara M. Gregory, “Egypt’s Nuclear Program: Assessing SupplierBased and Other Developmental Constraints,” The Nonproliferation Review, Fall 

1995, p. 21.
49

 20. See Nuclear Threat Initiative website for analysis at http://www.nti.org/e_

research/proflies/Egypt/index.html, accessed November 21 2003.

 21. Wisconsin Project, “Egypt’s Budding Nuclear Program,” The Risk Report, 

Vol. 2, No. 5, September-October 1996, available at http://www.wisconsinproject.org/

countries.egypt/nuke.html, accessed November 21. 2003.

 22. Dany Shoham, “Chemical and Biological Weapons in Egypt,” The 

Nonproliferation Review, Spring-Summer 1998, pp. 50-51.

 23. Cirincione, et al., p. 10.

 24. Kam and Shapir.

 25. Wisconsin Project, “Egypt’s Missile Efforts with Help from North Korea,” 

The Risk Report, Vol. 2, No. 5, September-October 1996, available at http://www.

wisconsinproject.org/countries/egypt/miss.html.

 26. Bertil Lintner and Steve Stecklow, “Paper Trail Exposes Missile Merchants,” 

Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 166, No. 6, February 13, 2003, pp. 12-16.

 27. “Behind the Condor Carbon-Carbon Smuggling Scam,” U.S. News & World 

Report, July 25, 1988, p. 38.

 28. Jon B. Alterman, “Egypt: Stable, but for How Long?” Washington Quarterly, 

Vol. 23, No., 4, Autumn 2000, p. 116.

 29. Quoted in Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National 

Security Adviser, 1977-1981, New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1985, p. 443.

 30. For a critical analysis of the European military contribution to NATO in 

the post-September 11 security environment, see Richard L. Russell, “NATO’s 

European Members: Partners or Dependents?” Naval War College Review, Vol. LVI, 

No. 1, Winter 2003, pp. 30-40. 

51

CHAPTER 3

THE NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES AND AMBITIONS

OF IRAN’S NEIGHBORS

Wyn Q. Bowen and Joanna Kidd

INTRODUCTION

 The Islamic Republic of Iran has been suspected of pursuing 

nuclear weapons since the mid-1980s. Over the past 2 years, these 

suspicions have intensified due to revelations about Tehran’s past 

failures to inform the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) of 

significant nuclear activities and facilities. The most serious failures 

have involved neglecting to declare extensive work on uranium 

enrichment and plutonium separation―the two routes to producing 

weapons-grade material for nuclear weapons.

 Iran’s failure to live up to the both the letter and spirit of its 

Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA has prompted a serious 

deterioration in assessments of when Tehran could acquire nuclear 

weapons. It has been suggested that the time frame for Iran “going 

nuclear” could now be as early as 2005-07.1 Such assessments have 

not gone unnoticed in Iran’s immediate neighborhood, and concern 

is growing about the potential response of some of its neighbors, in 

particular whether Tehran’s behavior could prompt other regional 

actors to consider acquiring nuclear weapons. Four countries, Saudi 

Arabia, Egypt, Turkey, and Syria, stand out in this respect due to their 

relative proximity to Iran and because there are suspicions that they 

have all, at one time or another, been interested in acquiring nuclear 

weapons. Although beyond the scope of this chapter, it is recognized 

that if one or more of these countries acquired, or came close to 

acquiring, a nuclear weapons capability, then this would influence 

nuclear deliberations in other countries, both within and beyond the 

Middle East and North Africa. If Egypt went nuclear, for example, 

this probably would influence nuclear decisionmaking in Algeria. 

Moreover, although the chapter does not examine the current case of 
52

Iraq in relation to Iran, it is recognized that, in the long-term, a postSaddam government could feel sufficiently vulnerable to consider 

acquiring nuclear weapons to counteract a future nuclear-armed 

Tehran.

 Drawing purely on open sources, this chapter seeks to cast some 

light on the nuclear capabilities and ambitions of Saudi Arabia, 

Egypt, Turkey, and Syria. In addition to generally available sources, 

the authors utilize original Arabic and Turkish language sources and 

information derived from various scientific and technical journals/

proceedings. For each country, an assessment is made of current 

nuclear capabilities, including various elements of the fuel cycle that 

could potentially be used to support the development of nuclear 

weapons. Attention is also given to the drivers of potential nuclear 

and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs in the 

countries concerned, and potential nuclear delivery systems.

 An analysis of available open sources revealed relatively little 

about national intentions regarding the acquisition of nuclear 

weapons―both in general terms and, more specifically, in response 

to the current Iranian nuclear crisis. The lack of pertinent information 

in this respect appears to stem primarily from the political sensitivity 

of the issue and the relatively closed and nontransparent nature of 

the societies involved, with the exception of Turkey. In contrast, it 

did prove possible to develop a fairly detailed picture of the various 

elements of the fuel cycle currently in existence or being developed in 

the four countries, as well as their potential nuclear delivery options. 

Although it is assessed that each country currently lacks the technical 

capacity to build a nuclear weapon, it is essential to note that open 

sources rarely will provide the complete picture. This is particularly 

the case with regard to the most sensitive aspects of nuclear weapons 

development―uranium enrichment, plutonium separation, and 

weaponization―which are subject to the greatest secrecy. Moreover, 

revelations throughout 2004 about the role of Pakistani scientist A. Q. 

Khan in illicitly supplying nuclear technology to Libya and Iran, raise 

the concern that other countries also may have benefited from this 

clandestine proliferation network. For example, Libya’s acquisition 

of technology and assistance via the network prior to December 2003 

had enabled Pakistan to begin to initiate a step change in its nuclear 
53

weapon program. Moreover, Khan is known to have made business 

trips to numerous other countries including Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and 

Syria, although it is not known what the Pakistani scientist actually 

did on these visits.2

SAUDI ARABIA

 Saudi Arabia does not possess a nuclear weapons capability and, 

based on an assessment of available open sources, the Kingdom 

does not appear to possess the necessary technical infrastructure 

to develop one indigenously, bar significant infusions of external 

assistance. However, there are some suspicions that Saudi Arabia 

has considered the nuclear option and even sought to purchase 

nuclear weapons from abroad, notably from Pakistan. This despite 

the country’s non-nuclear weapon status and commitments under 

the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) which Riyadh signed in 1988.3

However, the Kingdom has yet to conclude a comprehensive 

safeguards agreement with the IAEA.4

 Beyond the nuclear realm, there is “no confirmed evidence” 

that Saudi Arabia has a chemical or biological weapons program.5

Indeed, the Kingdom long has denied any intention to acquire WMD 

of any type and, similar to Egypt, has called for an agreement to 

make the Middle East a WMD-free zone.6 In Autumn 2002 Prince 

Naef bin Ahmed Al-Saud, a colonel in the Saudi Armed Forces with 

responsibilities for strategic planning, noted that “Proliferation must 

be seen in terms of regional realities: the Israeli monopoly in nuclear 

weaponry, defiance by Pakistan and India of nonproliferation 

regimes, and reported efforts by both Iraq and Iran to develop 

nuclear capabilities.”7 At least one Saudi newspaper has expressed 

concern about Iran’s nuclear intentions by noting that, “the danger 

will include countries such as Saudi Arabia, Oman, Iraq, Afghanistan, 

Turkmenistan, and Azerbaijan.”8

 Speculation about the Kingdom’s potential interest in acquiring 

nuclear weapons goes back to the 1980s. Saudi Arabia originally 

signed the NPT in 1988 to address concerns that it wanted to arm 

its newly acquired DF-3 (CSS-2) intermediate range ballistic missiles 

(IRBM) with nuclear warheads. The missiles had been acquired 

from China at some point between 1986 and 1988. The transfer 
54

was significant because it provided the Kingdom with the longestrange ballistic missiles (2,700-2,800km) outside the Permanent Five 

members of the United Nations (UN) Security Council. Indeed, the 

DF-3 gave Saudi Arabia the capability to strike targets throughout and 

beyond the Middle East. Moreover, the missiles had been withdrawn 

from Chinese service as nuclear delivery systems, although they 

reportedly were modified prior to shipment as non-nuclear capable 

systems.9 Despite suspicions that Saudi Arabia planned to arm the 

missiles with unconventional warheads, Riyadh claimed it had no 

intention to do so.

 In early September 2002, Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon 

said that “there might be Saudi money involved” in Libya’s nuclear 

weapons program, but this had not been confirmed.10 There has 

been much greater speculation about a potential nuclear link with 

Pakistan. Since the 1980s, there have been suspicions that Saudi 

Arabia has paid, or wanted to pay, Pakistan to conduct research 

and development of nuclear weapons. These suspicions have been 

based in part on the history of defence cooperation between the 

two countries including, for example, the training of Saudi pilots 

and naval collaboration. In recent years, suspicions have been fed 

by several visits to Pakistan by Saudi officials. In 1999, a team of 

defence officials visited Pakistan’s enrichment and missile assembly 

facilities at Kahuta where they were briefed by A. Q. Khan, the 

father of the Pakistani nuclear weapons program.11 In 2002, the son 

of Crown Prince Abdullah was reportedly an invited guest at the test 

firing of Pakistan’s 950-mile range Ghauri nuclear-capable missile.12

More recently in October 2003, it was alleged that Abdullah visited 

Pakistan and concluded a secret agreement on “nuclear cooperation” 

to cover nuclear technology in return for cheap oil. However, Saudi 

Arabia has denied this allegation.13 Recent revelations about the 

role of Khan in proliferating nuclear technology to several states 

of concern has further fueled suspicion about the Saudi-Pakistan 

nuclear connection.14 Indeed, Khan has travelled to Saudi Arabia in 

the past, although it is not known what he actually did during his 

time in the Kingdom.15

 Prince Naef argued in 2002 that, “Saudi Arabia does not accept 

the notion that a Pakistani bomb is an Islamic bomb. Instead, national 

interest is regarded as the most likely factor affecting how nuclear 
55

capabilities will be used. Nevertheless, regional competition increases 

concern among Saudis over the spread of WMD and ballistic missiles. 

Moreover, despite the lack of evidence that Riyadh may be pursuing 

a nuclear option, some speculate on the possibility.”16 Indeed, it 

was reported in September 2003 that Saudi Arabia was conducting 

a strategic review including deliberations related to the potential 

acquisition of nuclear weapons. The review appears to be the result of 

a growing perception of strategic vulnerability prompted by several 

interrelated factors, including: the crisis over Iran’s nuclear program 

and intentions, the lack of international pressure to address Israel’s 

nuclear arsenal, general regional instability in the Middle East, and 

the deterioration of relations with the United States since September 

11, 2001 (9/11), including concerns about the reliability of U.S. 

security guarantees and the American nuclear umbrella. Although 

it is not known whether a decision has yet been made, the strategic 

review reportedly is considering three potential options on the 

nuclear front: (1) acquiring nuclear weapons for deterrent purposes; 

(2) maintaining an alliance or entering into a new alliance with an 

existing nuclear weapon power; and (3) seeking an agreement for a 

Middle East free of nuclear weapons.17

Nuclear Capabilities.

 The national nuclear authority in Saudi Arabia is the King 

Abdul Aziz City for Science and Technology (KACST) in Riyadh.18

KACST describes itself as “an independent scientific organization 

of the Saudi Arabia Government”19 which provides “scientific and 

technological advice” and conducts “applied research programs 

and joint research activities with other international scientific 

institutions.” KACST assists the private sector in applied research 

for promoting agricultural and industrial development and funds 

research projects in universities such as studies of alternative energy 

resources and sewage water treatment.20

 The Atomic Energy Research Institute (AERI) was established 

within KACST in 1988 with the aim of adapting the nuclear sciences 

and technologies and utilizing them “in support of the economic, 

industrial and agricultural plans of the Kingdom.” The objectives of 
56

AERI include drafting a national atomic energy plan and supervising 

its implementation; conducting research in the field of nuclear 

technologies; identifying manpower requirements in the area of 

atomic energy research; and training and developing manpower 

in the area of atomic energy research.”21 To do this, the institute 

has several departments: a Radiation Protection Department; 

an Industrial Applications Department; a Nuclear Reactors and 

Safety Department; and a Materials Department.22 The institute 

has programs that focus on industrial applications of radiation and 

radioactive isotopes, nuclear power and reactors, nuclear materials, 

and radiation protection.

 A review of available open sources generated the following 

observations related to Saudi Arabia’s nuclear capabilities.

Uranium Resources. The U.S. Geological Survey makes no reference 

to uranium resources in its 2001 report on Saudi Arabia’s mineral 

sector.23 However, it is evident that the Kingdom has conducted 

research into uranium prospecting, mining, and milling. In 1986, the 

IAEA approved a technical cooperation agreement with KACST and 

the Nuclear Engineering Department of King Abdul Aziz University 

to provide “training for the application of neutron capture techniques 

in in-situ mineral exploration.” The agreement covered prospecting, 

mining and analyzing raw nuclear materials.24

 Saudi Arabia does not appear to be involved in the recovery of 

uranium from phosphate rock. However, relevant research has been 

conducted in this area in the past. In 1987, for example, an academic 

currently at King Abdul Aziz University wrote a Ph.D. thesis on 

“The Separation and Determination of Rare Earths in Phosphate 

Deposits from the North of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.”25 Saudi 

Arabia’s phosphate mines are operated by the Ma’aden mining 

company,26 which was founded in 1997 to become the focal point of 

the country’s minerals sector. Ma’aden operates mines at Al Hajar, 

Al Sukhaybarat, and Bulgah which produce gold and silver. A 

mine at Mahad Ad Dabab produces copper, gold, and silver; and a 

mine at Al Amar produces copper, zinc, and gold. The company is 

carrying out exploration programs in the Al-Jalamid and Umm Wual areas.27

Nuclear Power. Saudi Arabia does not possess a nuclear power 

reactor. However, the Kingdom has certainly demonstrated an 
57

interest in nuclear power since at least the late 1970s. The IAEA 

approved a technical cooperation project in 1978 on nuclear energy 

planning with the Atomic Energy Department, Ministry of Petroleum 

and Mineral Resources, in Saudi Arabia. The aim was to establish 

“training and research institutions with regard to the introduction 

of nuclear power in the country.”28 It is evident that the Kingdom’s 

interest in nuclear power has focused, at least partially, on its potential 

application in the desalination of seawater.29 Indeed, researchers 

from AERI and the Nuclear Engineering Department of King Abdul 

Aziz University recently conducted research into the role of nuclear 

desalination in Saudi Arabia.30 In 2001, the IAEA approved a technical 

cooperation agreement with AERI on transferring and enhancing 

national capabilities and skills “in modern forecasting techniques for 

the development and regular updating of future energy demands 

and optimal expansion plans for the power sector.”31

Reprocessing, Spent Fuel and Waste Storage. Although Saudi Arabia 

does not appear to possess a reprocessing capability, the AERI has 

four laboratories of potential relevance in this field. These include 

laboratories for physical separation, chemical separation, radio 

chemistry, and radioactive isotopes and chemical separation.32

 Saudi Arabia does not have a spent fuel and waste storage 

capability. However, AERI is responsible for controlling radioactive 

waste disposal “in all installations that use radioactive material” 

and is reported to be preparing national regulations for radioactive 

waste disposal.33 In 1995, the IAEA approved a technical cooperation 

agreement with AERI to establish a “comprehensive radioactive 

waste management program covering regulations, storage, and 

treatment.” The agreement covered safety issues and technologies 

related to radioactive waste management.34

Research Reactor. Saudi Arabia does not have a research reactor. 

However, it should be noted that the IAEA has provided extensive 

assistance to develop nuclear research and applications in the 

Kingdom.35 According to one source, Saudi Arabia opened a nuclear 

research centre in a desert military complex at Al-Suleiyel, near AlKharj in 1975.36

Delivery Capabilities. Saudi Arabia’s potential nuclear delivery 

capabilities include both ballistic missiles and aircraft. Saudi Arabia 
58

possesses 40-60 DF-3 (CSS-2) IRBMs, which can carry payloads of 

up to 2,500kg. The DF-3 is a single stage missile with a circular error 

probable of 1km. The missiles are reportedly deployed at two sites 

located 500km (al-Sulaiyil) and 100km (al-Joffer) south of Riyadh.37

The missiles had been withdrawn from Chinese service as nuclear 

delivery systems, although they reportedly were modified prior to 

shipment as non-nuclear capable systems.38 Their current status is 

unknown. According to one recent report, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan 

“have arranged a deal by which Pakistan will provide Saudi Arabia 

with nuclear technology in return for cheap oil,” and the Kingdom 

will also acquire a new generation of Chinese-supplied long-range 

missiles with a range of 4,000-5,000km.39 In terms of fighter and 

ground attack aircraft, Saudi Arabia is reported to possess 50 F-15s 

(with 75 on order), 91 F-15C/D Eagles, 24 Tornado ADVs (F Mk3), 92 

Tornado IDs, approximately 64 F-5E/Fs and 10 RF-5Es.40

EGYPT

 Egypt acceded to the NPT in 1981 and its comprehensive Safeguards Agreement entered into force in 1982 (INFCIRC 302).41

However, the country has been critical of the nuclear nonproliferation regime primarily because of Israel’s possession of 

nuclear weapons. In a debate at the UN General Assembly in 

late September 2003, Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmed Maher 

said, “It is unacceptable that Israel’s possession of such weapons 

should remain a reality that some prefer to ignore or prevent the 

international community . . . from facing it squarely and frankly.”42

According to the Wisconsin Project, Egypt strongly opposed efforts 

to extend the NPT indefinitely in 1995. 43 Despite this lack of faith 

in the nonproliferation regime, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak 

frequently has proposed the creation of a WMD-free zone in the 

Middle East as a way to address the nuclear threat posed by Israel 

and the wider challenge of proliferation.44

 Throughout 2003-04, it appears that Egypt has, in its public 

statements, continued to be much more concerned about Israel’s 

nuclear arsenal than Iran’s recent nuclear activities. As the Egyptian 

Foreign Minister said after John Bolton visited Egypt in June 

2003, “Talks with the American official dwelt on Israel’s nuclear 
59

arms.”45 Moreover, Egyptian-Iranian relations appeared to improve 

significantly in late 2003 when negotiations were initiated over the 

resumption of diplomatic relations between the two countries.46

 In 2004 and early 2005, several media reports claimed that 

Egypt has been working on a clandestine nuclear program. These 

have included a few reports about potential “Egyptian links” to 

Libya’s nuclear program in the past. One report even referred to 

“evidence uncovered by a British-U.S. team of nuclear inspectors” 

working in Libya which confirmed “an exchange of nuclear and 

missile technology between Libya and Egypt in late 2003.”47 Officials 

reportedly stated that the evidence confirmed suspicions of a 3-yearlong secret trade between Cairo and Tripoli in strategic weapons 

obtained from North Korea.48 Egyptian links with Libya in the 

nuclear field are believed to go back to the early 1970s. According to 

Shyam Bhatia writing in 1988, a link developed between Libya and 

high calibre Egyptian nuclear scientists in the early 1970s. This link 

reportedly resulted in the transfer of manpower and ideas to Libya. 

Bhatia wrote that Egypt explored the possibility of using Libyan 

money to keep up the momentum of research and development 

at Egypt’s nuclear center at Inshas and other locations, and both 

Qadhafi and Nasser reportedly gave this project their personal 

backing. However, Libyan-Egyptian cooperation was short-lived 

because relations between the two countries deteriorated in the 

mid-1970s when it emerged that Libya had backed a plot against 

Egyptian President Sadat.49 Relations between the two countries 

later had recovered sufficiently to enable joint research in nuclearrelated fields including personnel exchanges.50

In addition to the alleged link with Libya, it was reported in 

November 2004 that the IAEA was looking into why plutonium 

particles had been discovered near a nuclear facility in Egypt.51

This was followed in January 2005 by a report that, according 

to diplomats, the IAEA “has found evidence of secret nuclear 

experiments in Egypt that could be used in weapons programs.”52

A report by the IAEA Director General to the Agency’s Board of 

Governors dated February 16, 2005, and leaked into the public domain 

shortly thereafter, subsequently confirmed that Egypt, indeed, had 

possessed undeclared materials and conducted undeclared activities 
60

at its Inshas Nuclear Centre near Cairo. The materials and activities 

related to uranium extraction and conversion, the irradiation of 

uranium targets, and reprocessing. The key findings of these IAEA 

investigations related to Egypt are included in the sections below.

Nuclear Capabilities.

 The Egyptian Atomic Energy Authority (AEA) is at the center of 

the country’s civilian nuclear program and the main AEA nuclear 

research center is located at Inshas near Cairo. Egypt has conducted 

a considerable amount of nuclear relevant research. A review of 

available open sources generated the following observations related 

to Egypt’s nuclear capabilities.

Uranium Resources. The AEA Nuclear Materials Authority has 

undertaken various technical co-operation projects with the IAEA 

on uranium exploration since 1989.53 However, Egypt appears to 

have placed an emphasis on extracting uranium from phosphates as 

opposed to mining uranium itself. For example, IAEA investigations 

in 2004 revealed that Egypt’s Nuclear Materials Authority (NMA) 

had conducted a project to separate uranium at a Phosphoric Acid 

Purification Plant at Inshas, although “it was never able to work as 

designed for the separation of uranium.” It was also discovered that 

the NMA currently has “a program for heap leaching of uranium 

ore in the Sinai and Eastern deserts.” The Egyptian authorities have 

claimed that “none of the uranium ore concentrate produced as a 

result of its leaching activities has been of a purity and composition 

that required it to be reported” to the IAEA.54 In 1990, the AEA began 

a technical cooperation program with the IAEA titled, “Potential for 

yellowcake production.” The objective was to provide expert services 

to undertake a prefeasibility study to assess the potential of two sites 

for a pilot plant.55

Conversion, Enrichment, and Fuel Fabrication. The IAEA noted 

in February 2005 that investigations in 2004-05 had revealed that, 

prior to Egypt’s Safeguards Agreement taking force in 1982, it 

imported nuclear material and conducted uranium conversion 

activities, using some of this material at Laboratories in the 

Nuclear Chemistry Building at Inshas.56 According to the Egyptian 
61

authorities, the experiments were designed within the “framework 

of staff development for the front end of the fuel cycle.” Initial IAEA 

investigations have discovered that Egypt failed to include in its first 

report to the Agency in 1982 “approximately 67 kg of imported UF4, 

3 kg of uranium metal (some of which had been imported, and some 

of which had been produced from imported UF4), approximately 

9.5 kg of imported thorium compounds, and small amounts of 

domestically produced UO2, UO3 and UF4.”57

 In January 2005 it had been reported that, according to diplomats, 

the IAEA “has found evidence of secret nuclear experiments in Egypt” 

involving the production of “various components of uranium.” The 

Egyptians reportedly have produced “several kilograms of uranium 

metal and of uranium tetrafluoride―a precursor to uranium 

hexafluoride gas.” According to the diplomats, the work appears 

“to have been sporadic, involved small amounts of material, and to 

have lacked a particular focus,” indicating that it was “laboratory 

scale” and “not directly geared toward creating a full-scale program 

to make nuclear weapons.”58 The experiments reportedly were 

conducted mainly during the 1980s and 1990s, but there may also be 

evidence suggesting that some experiments “were as recent as a year 

ago.”

 Egypt does not appear to have an established enrichment program 

but research has been performed on relevant processes. For example, 

scientists at Cairo University have researched the chemical exchange 

process as a method of uranium isotope enrichment.59 Moreover, 

research has been conducted at the University of Alexandria on 

multicomponent isotope separation in asymmetric cascades, which 

could potentially be used in uranium enrichment using aerodynamic 

methods.60

 The AEA has a Fuel Manufacturing Plant to produce the nuclear 

fuel necessary for the operation of the Agency’s multipurpose reactor. 

According to the AEA: “The starting material is uranium hexafluoride 

(UF6) gas, 19.75 percent enrichment. This is converted into U3O8

through treatment with ammonia and water in special chemical 

reactors. This is followed by filtration and thermal treatment to get 

the appropriate particle size of U3

O8. The oxide powder is mixed 

with aluminium powder and cold-pressed under 4.5 tons/cm2

 into 

compacts, which are then cladded with sheets of aluminium 6061 
62

alloy, and sealed by welding all around.”61 The plant can produce 

two fuel elements per month, which is sufficient for the continuous 

operation of the reactor. According to the Wisconsin project, Egypt 

had plans to build a larger fuel fabrication plant in the mid 1990s 

with help from Germany.62 However, these plans do not yet appear 

to have come to fruition.

Nuclear Power. Egypt does not have any nuclear power reactors. 

The Egyptian government has shown interest in starting a civilian 

nuclear power program since the 1960s. The Federation of American 

Scientists states that in the mid-1970s, the United States pledged to 

provide Egypt with eight nuclear power plants, and the necessary 

cooperation agreements were signed. This project was cancelled in 

the late 1970s after the United States unilaterally revised the bilateral 

agreements and introduced new conditions that were unacceptable 

to the Egyptian government.63

 Interest in nuclear power reactors has continued, and Egypt has 

carried out several relevant research programs. In 2001, the AEA 

began a technical cooperation project with the IAEA entitled, “Human 

Resource Development for Nuclear Power Project Preparation 

and Project Management.” The project’s objective was to “transfer 

knowledge, information, and experience related to the development 

of human resources for planning and implementing a nuclear power 

project for electricity generation and/or desalination.”64 It was 

reported in September 2002 that an Egyptian government minister 

had announced the country’s intent to build a nuclear power plant 

on the north coast of Egypt, although no details of the plan were 

available.65 Indeed, initial negotiations reportedly were underway in 

2001 with Russia, after Egypt requested information about Russia’s 

atomic energy industry. According to General Director of Russia’s 

Atomenergostroi Viktor Kozlov, contracts may be signed as early as 

2006.66 Although new plans have not yet been announced, the media 

reported that Egypt has held negotiations with both China and 

Russia over the construction of nuclear power plants.67 However, it 

was reported later in 2004 that the likely site for a nuclear power 

plant, Dabba, was about to be turned into a tourist resort.68

Reprocessing, Spent Fuel, and Waste Storage. It has emerged as a 

result of recent IAEA investigations that in the late 1970s, Egypt 

concluded a number of contracts with a foreign company to construct 
63

a laboratory (the Hydrometallurgy Pilot Plant) for conducting 

“‘bench scale radiochemistry experiments’ involving the separation 

of plutonium and uranium from irradiated fuel elements of the 2 MW 

research reactor.” According to Egyptian authorities, the experiments 

were motivated by plans to construct eight nuclear power plants and 

to develop expertise in the nuclear fuel cycle.69

 In 1987, Egypt subsequently performed “acceptance tests 

using unirradiated uranyl nitrate in chemical reagents” at the 

Hydrometallurgy Pilot Plant. The uranyl nitrate had been blended 

with a solution acquired from the dissolution of domestically 

produced scrap UO2 pellets (estimated total weight of 1.9 kg of 

uranium compounds). However, Egypt failed to report to the IAEA 

both the materials and their use in test.70

 The reason offered by Egypt for not including the Hydrometallurgy 

Pilot Plant in its initial declaration to the IAEA in 1982 is that it “had 

not considered it to be a facility since it was being constructed only 

to carry out bench scale radiochemistry experiments.” The IAEA 

believes the plant constituted a nuclear facility, given its intended 

purpose and design capabilities, and Egypt should have informed 

the Agency “as early as possible prior to the introduction of nuclear 

material into the facility.” 71

 Further undeclared activities took place between 1990 and 2003. 

Egypt informed the IAEA in December 2004 that, between 1990 and 

2003, 16 experiments had been performed, “involving the irradiation 

of small amounts of natural uranium in its reactors to test the 

production of fission product isotopes for medical purposes.” Twelve 

experiments involving a total of 1.15g of natural uranium compounds 

took place at the 2MW research reactor between 1990 and 2003. Four 

experiments involving 0.24g of natural uranium compounds took 

place at the 22MW reactor between 1999 and 2000. Nine thorium 

samples also were irradiated in the 2MW reactor. Moreover, the 

irradiated targets “had been dissolved in three laboratories located 

in the Nuclear Chemistry Building” although Egypt claims that 

“no plutonium or U-233 was separated during these experiments.” 

According to the Egyptian authorities, similar experiments were 

performed before its Safeguards Agreement took force, and between 

1982 and 1988, but that it has been unable thus far to locate relevant 

source documentation with respect to such experiments.” 72
64

 Egypt also informed the IAEA in December 2004 that it had not 

included in its initial Safeguards report imported “unirradiated fuel 

rods containing uranium enriched to 10% U-235 and some of which 

had been used in experiments” at the Nuclear Chemistry Building 

prior to its Safeguards Agreement taking force. The experiments 

were reported to have involved “laboratory scale testing of fuel 

dissolution in anticipation of the development of a reprocessing 

laboratory.”73

 Egypt currently is constructing a new Radioisotope Production 

Facility at Inshas for the separation of radioisotopes from uranium 

enriched to 19.7 percent in U-235 to be irradiated at the 22MW 

reactor. However, the Egyptian authorities have informed the IAEA 

that no nuclear relevant equipment yet has been acquired for the 

facility. According to the IAEA, the decision to construct the facility 

should have been conveyed to Vienna “no later than 1997 when it 

undertook to provide early design information for new facilities.”74

Research Reactors. Egypt commissioned its first research reactor, 

the 2MW Soviet-supplied ET-RR-1 in 1961.75 A second, the 22MW 

open pool Multi-Purpose Reactor (MPR), was commissioned in 1997. 

The MPR, supplied by the Argentine company, INVAP, is designed 

to produce radioisotopes for industrial and medical applications, as 

well as research on neutron physics and training personnel.76 Both 

reactors are located at Inshas and are under IAEA safeguards.

 It is reasonable to assume that, based on standard operating 

levels, the MPR will produce about 22g of plutonium per day of 

operation. Assuming that the MPR runs for 300 days a year (if in 

heavy service), it would produce 6.6kg of plutonium per year. The 

Fatman nuclear bomb used by the United States in 1945 used 6.5kg 

of plutonium.77

Delivery Capabilities.

 Egypt’s potential nuclear delivery capabilities include both 

ballistic missiles and aircraft. Egypt has a range of ballistic missiles 

both in its inventory and under development. Egypt is reported to 

have nine SCUD-B launchers78 and slightly over 100 SCUD-B missiles. 

The inventory also reportedly includes approximately 90 Project 

T missiles, with a range of 450km and a payload of 985kg.79 Other 
65

ballistic missiles apparently are being developed. There are reports 

that Egypt has developed an enhanced SCUD-C missile, with a range 

of 550km and a 500kg payload. Furthermore, Egypt reportedly signed 

an agreement with North Korea in 2001 to purchase the 1000kmrange Nodong system. 80 These reports have not been confirmed. It 

is also reported that Egypt is developing the Vector missile with a 

range of 800-1,200km and a 450-1,000kg payload.81 In March 2004, it 

was reported that evidence was uncovered by a British-U.S. team of 

nuclear inspectors working in Libya that, “an exchange of nuclear 

and missile technology between Libya and Egypt” took place “in late 

2003.”82 Egypt possesses seven squadrons of fighter-ground attack 

aircraft (including Mirage 5E2) and 22 squadrons of fighter aircraft 

(including F-16A and D, Mirage 2000C and 5D/E, and MiG-21).83 It 

would appear that the range of combat aircraft available to Egypt 

would provide Cairo with a theoretical capability to deliver nuclear 

weapons.

TURKEY

 Turkey’s ratification of numerous nonproliferation agreements 

commits the country to the application of nuclear technology for 

purely peaceful purposes. These commitments include the NPT, 

IAEA Safeguards (including the Additional Protocol) and the 

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).84 Although the country 

does not possess a nuclear power reactor, the Turkish Atomic Energy 

Authority (TAEK) conducts a considerable amount of research in the 

nuclear field and operates one research reactor.85

 In the recent past, Turkey has shown considerable interest 

in establishing a civil nuclear power sector to alleviate energy 

shortfalls. The country is a net energy importer because it is not 

rich in energy resources. For example, Turkey imported 62 percent 

of its energy requirements in 2001. Turkish government officials 

believe this figure will increase by about 8-10 percent annually up to 

2010, which will necessitate an installed power production capacity 

of approximately 46GW.86 In 2002 and 2003 there were calls from 

national newspapers,87 and even the head of the TAEK,88 for Turkey 

to initiate a nuclear power program in order to reduce energy 
66

imports. The Turkish government demonstrated a renewed interest 

in nuclear power in 2004. In November 2004, Turkish Minister of 

Energy and Natural Resources Hilmi Guler said Turkey should be 

producing 4,500MW of nuclear power beginning in 201289 with three 

nuclear power plants.90

 There is no evidence in available open sources that suggests 

Turkey has a nuclear weapons program. Indeed, given the openness 

of Turkey’s nuclear research program, small uranium reserves, 

and lack of enrichment and reprocessing capabilities, it is difficult 

to believe that Ankara could develop a weapons program in the 

near future. Although some allegations have been made about the 

potential proliferation threat posed by Turkey, it is important to note 

that most have been voiced by Greek officials and focused on alleged 

nuclear cooperation between Turkey and Pakistan. For example, 

following a military coup in Turkey in September 1980, military 

leaders of Turkey and Pakistan reportedly exchanged a series of 

official visits, which prompted Greek Prime Minister Papandreou 

to accuse Pakistan of expecting Turkey “to act as a trans-shipper of 

material for a nuclear bomb” and likely to “reciprocate by proudly 

sharing the nuclear bomb technology with Turkey.”91 Moreover, 

following the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests an article in the 

Turkish daily “Radical” reported that then Pakistan Prime Minister

Nawaz Sharif offered Turkey cooperation on nuclear weapons by 

stating, “Let’s work together on nuclear weapons.”92

 Ankara certainly has reacted with concern to Iran’s recent 

activities in the nuclear field. Defense Minister Vecdi Gonul noted 

in November 2003 that Iran’s efforts to export its own revolution, 

its contradictory attitude towards terrorism, and its policies towards 

Armenia and Azerbaijan are not in line with Turkey’s interests, and 

make it difficult for Ankara to develop bilateral relations with Tehran. 

Moreover, he noted that Iran might be working on the production of 

nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, which would threaten 

the whole region.93 As Larabee and lesser note, a nuclear-armed Iran 

“could dramatically change the security equation for Turkey and

could have broader consequences for military balances elsewhere 

on Turkey’s borders.”94 However, it was reported on November 

19, 2004, that Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul had told 
67

journalists in Ankara that Turkey wanted the Middle East to be a 

region free of nuclear weapons. With regard to American concerns 

over Iran’s nuclear activities, Gul said he expected caution on both 

sides, adding that Iran had a “long-standing place in the region. It 

would probably be very cautious. So we expect the problem to be 

resolved eventually.”95 It would appear, then, that there may be a 

substantial difference of opinion between the Foreign and Defence 

ministries in Turkey in terms of threat perceptions related to Iran.

 Although Turkish and Israeli military and civilian officials 

appear to have discussed “joint threats” as part of their strategic 

cooperation,96 it is not known to what extent Iran and its nuclear 

ambitions have featured in their discussions.

Nuclear Capabilities.

 It appears that almost all aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle have 

been examined in Turkey except uranium enrichment. The Çekmece 

Nuclear Research and Training Centre is in charge of these activities, 

which are conducted by a network of nuclear-related research centers 

and laboratories based at government facilities and universities.

Uranium Resources. It was reported in November 2004 that Hilmi 

Guler had said that Turkey has 230,000 tons of thorium reserves and 

9,200 tons of uranium reserves. Moreover, Guler noted that, while 

current technology in Turkey was more suited to uranium, thorium 

would be considered in the future.97 Indeed, preliminary work has 

been conducted to survey, analyze, and determine the feasibility of 

using the country’s natural thorium resources to fuel a future nuclear 

power industry in Turkey. Moreover, TAEK initiated a feasibility 

study on uranium extraction from phosphoric acid in the early 1980s, 

with assistance from the IAEA. According to the IAEA database on 

technical cooperation, this work is still active and may not yet be 

complete.98 TAEK is working with ETI Holding and the Directorate 

General of Mineral Research and Exploration (MTA) on rare soil 

elements and the development of thorium extraction/purification 

technology.99

Conversion, Enrichment, and Fuel Fabrication. Turkey appears to 

have one facility capable of engaging in conversion activities, a fuel 

pilot plant at the Çekmece Nuclear Research and Training Centre. 
68

The extent of the facility’s work remains unclear.100 Moreover, 

while Turkey does not appear to have any enrichment capabilities, 

some potentially relevant research has been conducted at Turkish 

universities.

101

Turkey has experimented with nuclear fuel fabrication on a 

laboratory scale. Relevant experiments have been conducted at several 

universities in Turkey, with research undertaken to understand the 

properties of nuclear fuel and the process of fuel fabrication. Dr. 

Gungor Gunduz, Department of Chemical Engineering, Middle East 

Technical University (METU), has participated in numerous projects 

with the TAEK and supervised student projects in this field.102

Fuel fabrication experiments and uranium analysis studies have 

also been conducted in the Department of Chemistry, Cumhuriyet

University.

Nuclear Power. Although Turkey does not have a nuclear power 

plant, the country has shown an interest in nuclear power ever since 

U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower’s Atoms for Peace speech in 

December 1953. However, it was not until the mid-1990s that Turkey 

made its most definite attempt to initiate a civil nuclear power program. 

In 1996, following additional feasibility and exploration work 

conducted by the Korean Atomic Energy Institute (KAERI), Turkey 

invited bids to construct a nuclear power plant at Akkuyu. By the 

end of 1997, three competing vendors were negotiating with Turkey 

for the deal: AECL (Canada), Nuclear Power International (NPI)―

which included Germany’s Siemens and France’s Framatome―and 

the U.S. Westinghouse Electric Co. However, Turkish Prime Minister

Bulent Ecevit announced in July 2000 that the Akkuyu project had 

been cancelled, blaming it on the International Monetary Fund’s 

demands on Turkey with regard to its domestic economic policies. 

The country’s nuclear power program was shelved indefinitely, and 

TAEK recommended Turkey’s concentration on the development of 

natural gas and hydroelectric options until at least 2015.103

The Turkish government began to demonstrate a renewed interest 

in nuclear power in 2004. In May 2004, Guler reportedly said that 

technical studies continued on nuclear power plants, Turkey would 

“soon get in touch with the countries producing such power plants,” 

and that things are at the specifications of contract stage. According 
69

to Guler, the government wants to involve the private sector in all 

kinds of investment in the energy sector, but the government could 

invest itself where necessary.104 During a visit to Brazil in October 

2004, Turkish Finance Minister Kemal Unakitan was due to hold talks 

with officials in Sao Paolo and Rio de Janeiro on economic relations. 

The meetings were expected to focus in part on cooperation in many 

fields including nuclear energy.105

 Guler said in November 2004 that Turkey should be producing 

4,500MW of nuclear power from 2012.106 The Turkish Ministry of 

Energy and Natural Resources also issued a statement in November 

2004 noting that nuclear power was one of the most important 

alternative energy sources for Turkey. According to the ministry, 

Turkey is one of the few developing countries that possesses the 

infrastructure to transfer and to develop nuclear technology.107

According to a report dated November 19, 2004, Guler said Turkey 

was planning to construct three nuclear power plants, and they 

would be on-line after 2011. Guler said that domestic resources 

were insufficient to meet the country’s energy requirements, and an 

energy shortage could occur if no measures are taken. According to 

Guler, Turkey plans three nuclear plants to prevent such a shortage. 

The goal is to generate 8-10 percent of the country’s energy needs 

using nuclear power plants. Guler said that the plan is to fuel the 

plants with uranium, and that current technology in Turkey was 

more suited to uranium, altough thorium would be considered as a 

fuel in the future.108

Reprocessing, Spent Fuel, and Waste Storage. Since the late 1980s, 

academics and government scientists in Turkey have worked both 

at home and abroad on studies to determine the most effective 

method for reprocessing spent fuels.109 For example, a research 

project involving the Nuclear Engineering Department of Hacettepe

University and the TAEK Nuclear Safety Department established 

feasible flow sheet calculations for using the solvent extraction process 

to reprocess thorium based spent fuel.110 The project was carried out 

in anticipation that Turkey may eventually build a thorium-based 

HTR reactor.

The majority of Turkey’s radioactive waste classified as lowlevel is produced by the country’s single research reactor, several 

research centers, and radiological sources in universities, hospitals, 
70

and industries. The waste is collected, treated, and stored at the 

Radioactive Waste Processing and Storage Facility of the Çekmece 

Nuclear Research and Training Centre.111

During negotiations to build a power reactor at Akkuyu, Turkey 

started to plan for an interim storage facility to accommodate spent 

fuel. Negotiations were initiated with Bulgaria and Hungary in 

1997 to establish a regional interim storage facility or repository in 

south Eastern Europe―potentially in a remote location in Turkey. 

The site would have served as an interim storage facility or potential 

repository for spent fuel from the planned Akkuyu power reactor 

and reactors in Bulgaria and Hungary.112 Given the cancellation of 

the Akkuyu project, negotiations with these countries are not likely 

to continue.

Research Reactors. Turkey has one operational research reactor. 

The ITU-TRR is a 250 kw TRIGA Mk II reactor, which was supplied 

by General Atomics and went critical in 1979.113 The reactor is located 

at the Istanbul Technical University, operated by the Institute for 

Nuclear Energy, and licensed by TAEK. Turkey’s first research 

reactor, the 1MW TR-1 located at Çekmece Nuclear Research and 

Training Centre, was shut down in 1977.114 The country’s second 

research reactor, the TR-2, a 5MWth upgrade of the TR-1, was 

shutdown in 1995.115

Delivery Capabilities.

 Turkey’s potential nuclear delivery capabilities include both 

ballistic missiles and aircraft. Turkey is reported to be developing a 

satellite launch vehicle (SLV) similar to the French Ariane SLV, which 

could potentially form the basis of a theoretical nuclear missile. The 

project is scheduled for completion by 2010 at the earliest, if the 

rocket and the satellite are completed simultaneously. The Rocketan 

Corporation has begun production activities related to the rocket 

under the supervision of the Turkish Aviation Institution. Other 

organizations involved include the Turkish Armed Forces, the Middle 

East Technical University, Istanbul Technical University, and the 

Turkish Scientific and Technical Research Institution. No decision yet 

has been reached on the location of the launch site, which is expected 

to be situated on the Turkish coast.116 Turkey is believed to have 120 
71

MGM-140 Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS), with a range 

of 160km and a payload capability of 450kg.117 The Turkish Air Force 

has a range of combat aircraft including 223 F-16 fighter aircraft (193 

F-16C and 30 F-16D); 87 F/NF-5A/B fighter ground attack aircraft; 

and 170 F-4E aircraft (88 fighter ground attack, 47 fighters, and 35 

recce).118 In addition, the air force now has some 100 Israeli Popeye-1 

air-launched standoff missiles, with a range of 100km and a payload 

of 360kg. One hundred more may be delivered by Israel, and there 

are plans to co-produce, with the Israeli firm, Rafael, Popeye-2 airlaunched standoff missiles, with a 350km range and a payload of 

360kg.119

SYRIA

 Syrian President Bashar Assad effectively admitted in an interview 

published in January 2004 that his country has developed chemical 

and biological weapons as a last resort defence against Israel.120

Indeed, it has long been known that Damascus possesses a substantial 

chemical warfare capability and a more limited biological weapons 

capability.121 From a review of available open sources, however, it 

does not appear that Syria is pursuing seriously the development of 

nuclear weapons. Moreover, it appears that Syria does not currently 

possess the infrastructure and personnel necessary to establish a 

nuclear weapons program, bar significant infusions of external 

assistance.122 This assessment reflects Syria’s non-nuclear weapons 

status under the NPT,123 which has been subject to IAEA verification 

since the country’s Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC 407) took force 

in 1992.124 Syria has not concluded an Additional Protocol with the 

IAEA or signed the CTBT.125

 The U.S. National Intelligence Council noted in December 2001 

that the American intelligence community “remains concerned about 

Syria’s intentions regarding nuclear weapons.”126 The country’s 

limited infrastructure includes a nuclear research center at Dayr 

Al Hajar127 and a small Chinese-supplied research reactor under 

IAEA safeguards. In May 1999, Damascus signed a “broad nuclear 

cooperation agreement” with Russia covering the construction 

of a small light-water research reactor, which will be subject to 

IAEA safeguards.128 Syria and Russia have also approved “a draft 
72

cooperative program on cooperation in the civil nuclear power 

field.” It has been assessed by U.S. intelligence that, “In principle, 

broader access to Russian expertise provides opportunities for Syria 

to expand its indigenous capabilities, should it decide to pursue 

nuclear weapons.”129 In 2004, there were reports alleging that Syria 

may have acquired centrifuge enrichment technology from the A. Q. 

Khan network.

In March 2004 an agreement reportedly was signed between Syria 

and Iran on defense and military cooperation.130 Both Syria and Iran 

confront a similar strategic situation and appear to recognize that they 

have a vested interest in cooperating with each other to retain their 

political independence. Both countries are united against Israel in 

support of the Palestinians, Hezbollah, and Lebanon. Moreover, they 

were both rivals of the Iraqi Ba’athist regime of Saddam Hussein, and 

both currently fear American hegemony and intentions in the region 

due to their own WMD ambitions and support for terrorism.131

Nuclear Capabilities.

 The Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) is at the center of Syria’s 

civilian nuclear program. A review of available open sources 

generated the following observations related to Syria’s nuclear 

capabilities.

Uranium Resources. Syria has conducted significant work to 

examine the feasibility of exploiting phosphatic rock to recover 

uranium. The country is rich in phosphatic rock deposits and produces 

around one-fifth of the phosphate rock mined in the entire Middle 

East.132 In 2001, Syria mined over 2.04 million tons of phosphate.133

 Syria operates a uranium recovery micro-pilot plant at Homs.134

The plant was designed to be the precursor for a pilot plant and an 

industrial scale plant, with potential operations such as refining, 

conversion, enrichment, and fuel fabrication.135 However, a study, 

conducted to determine whether the technology used for extracting 

uranium from phosphoric acid produced at Homs could be 

industrialized, found that it was not feasible financially.136 Damascus 

signed a tripartite contract with the IAEA and an unnamed entity in 

1996 to improve its technical capabilities to recover uranium from 

triple superphosphate.137
73

Several Syrian experts reportedly have spent time at Ranstad 

Mineral in Sweden, a facility that extracted uranium for enrichment 

purposes between 1997 and 2002. Although the IAEA reportedly 

sponsored some of the visits, according to the facility’s owner, Bengt 

Lillja, the Syrians made additional trips “on their own.”138

 Conversion, Enrichment, and Fuel Fabrication. Syria does not appear 

to have conversion, enrichment, or fuel fabrication capabilities. 

However, there were various reports in 2004 related to Syria’s 

potential acquisition of enrichment related technology from the A. 

Q. Khan network. According to one report in August 2004, American 

officials believe that Syria received “an unspecified number” of P1 

centrifuge components “in what could be the most significant step” 

in the country’s “nascent nuclear weapons program.” According to 

the officials, Firas Tlas, son of Syrian Defence Minister Mustafa Tlas, 

became a customer of A. Q. Khan in 2001. The components and other 

nuclear equipment reportedly were ordered by the Saddam regime in 

Iraq via Syria, and deliveries may have continued after Saddam’s fall 

in April 2003.139 In May 2004, however, it was reported that the U.S. 

intelligence community was divided on the issue of whether Syria 

had received technology from the clandestine network.140 Moreover, 

a January 2004 report in The Washington Post noted that, although 

network middlemen from South Africa, Germany, the Netherlands, 

Sri Lanka, and elsewhere allegedly offered their services to Syria, the 

deals never apparently transpired.141

 Moving beyond the centrifuge allegations, Syria does operate 

a Cyclon-30 cyclotron which was provided by Belgium’s Ion Beam 

Applications (IBA).142 IBA also supplied a cyclotron of the same 

model to Iran, which analysts suspect may have been used to research 

uranium enrichment.143 The AEC had asked for IAEA assistance in 

1996 to build a cyclotron facility at its Nuclear Medicine Centre. 

The project was approved by the IAEA, and construction of the 

facility began in 1997. The stated aim is to produce radioisotopes for 

medical purposes.144 It should be noted that personnel at the AEC are 

also conducting research on CO2 lasers, which could potentially be 

applied to laser isotope separation and therefore enrichment.145

Nuclear Power. Although Syria does not have a nuclear power 

reactor, it has long viewed nuclear energy as a viable source to meet 

Syria’s future energy needs. Damascus performed a feasibility study 
74

in the early 1980s with help from the IAEA to identify the requirements 

for a potential power program,146 and since the late 1980s has actively 

sought to acquire a nuclear power capability. Syria initiated a plan in 

1988 to build six nuclear power reactors by the late 1990s capable of 

producing 6,000MW at a cost of $3.6 billion. Although Belgium, the 

Soviet Union, and Switzerland were approached for assistance, the 

plan came to nothing as a result of financial and technical issues.147

In 1990, for example, Syria asked the Soviet Union if it could buy up 

to four VVER-1000 power reactors and the associated fuel.148

 Russia and Syria signed a Comprehensive Cooperation 

Agreement in 1997 under which Russia reportedly will build two 

nuclear reactors in Syria, although it is unclear whether they will 

be for research or power production.149 Syria’s continuing interest in 

nuclear power was demonstrated in 2001 when the IAEA agreed to 

provide assistance for another project to assess the potential role of 

nuclear power in the country.150

 One potential application of nuclear power in Syria is desalination. 

The AEC is involved with Damascus University in a program to 

develop desalination technologies in conjunction with the Scientific 

National Commission for Water Desalination, based at the Higher 

Institute of Applied Science and Technology, Damascus.151

 It was subsequently reported in 2003 that Russia and Syria had 

entered negotiations for the construction of a $2 billion nuclear 

facility in Syria. Russia’s Ministry of Atomic Energy confirmed that 

discussions were underway to supply a nuclear power plant and a 

nuclear desalination plant, but no agreement had been reached.152

However, the Russian Foreign Ministry denied that such discussions 

had taken place.153

Spent Fuel and Waste Storage. There do not appear to be any spent 

fuel storage facilities in Syria, although the AEC is currently planning 

to construct a waste processing facility. To this end, the AEC recently 

established a Radioactive Waste Management Division to collect, 

treat, and store naturally occurring radioactive waste from Syria’s 

mining, oil, and natural gas sectors.154

 Research Reactor. Syria’s single 30kw research reactor―the SRR1 (Syrian Research Reactor, Syrian Miniature Neutron Source 

Reactor)―was provided by China along with 90 percent enriched 

uranium fuel. The reactor is located at the Der Al-Hadjar Nuclear 
75

Research Centre near Damascus, and went critical in 1996. It is used 

for basic and applied research and training reactor operators.155 Syria 

and Russia have reportedly signed an agreement for the provision 

of a 25MW light-water pool-type research reactor to be housed in a 

new research centre.156

Delivery Capabilities.

 Syria’s potential nuclear delivery capabilities include missiles 

and aircraft. Syria has several hundred SCUD-B, SCUD-C and SS-21 

missiles, according to The Military Balance157 and the U.S. Department 

of Defense (DoD).158 DoD states that Syria continues to acquire 

SCUD-related equipment and materials from Iran and North Korea, 

including considerable assistance from Pyongyang in producing 

SCUD-C missiles. According to Jane’s Defence Weekly, Syria may have 

some SCUD-D missiles with a range of 650km.159 Syria allegedly has 

tested a SCUD-B with a warhead designed to disperse VX nerve 

agent.”160 Damascus is also said to be attempting to develop a 

capability to arm ballistic missiles with biological warheads, although 

this has not been verified.161 Since 1999, it is thought that Syria has 

worked on establishing a solid-propellant rocket motor development 

and production capability with external assistance from abroad, 

including Iran. In addition, DoD claims that foreign equipment and 

assistance for Syria’s liquid-propellant missile program has come 

from North Korean entities, as well as Chinese and Russian firms. 

According to DoD, these developments are part of Syria’s efforts to 

acquire a modern, solid-fueled, short-range missile.162 Syria possesses 

10 squadrons of fighter-ground attack aircraft (including Su-24, Su22 and MiG-23 BN) and 16 squadrons of fighter aircraft (including 

MiG-21, MiG-23, MiG-25 and MiG-29A, and Su-27), according to The 

Military Balance 2003-2004.

163 The combat aircraft available to Syria 

would provide Damascus with a theoretical capability to deliver 

nuclear weapons.

CONCLUSION

 The Iranian nuclear crisis has resulted in concerns about the 

potential response of some of Iran’s neighbours, in particular 
76

whether Tehran’s behavior could prompt other regional actors to 

consider acquiring nuclear weapons. Within this context, the chapter 

sought to shed some light on the nuclear capabilities and ambitions 

of four key countries in Iran’s immediate neighbourhood: Saudi 

Arabia, Egypt, Turkey, and Syria. These countries were singled out 

due to their relative proximity to Iran and because there have been 

suspicions that they have all been interested, at one time or another, 

in acquiring nuclear weapons. For each country, an assessment was 

made of current capabilities, including the various elements of the 

fuel cycle that could potentially be used to support nuclear weapons 

development and potential nuclear delivery systems. Attention 

also was given to the drivers of potential nuclear and other WMD 

programs in the countries concerned.

 An analysis of available open sources revealed relatively little 

about national intentions in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey, and Syria 

regarding the acquisition of nuclear weapons―both in general terms 

and more specifically with regard to the current Iranian nuclear crisis. 

The lack of pertinent information in this respect appears to stem 

primarily from the political sensitivity of the issue and the relatively 

closed and nontransparent nature of the societies involved, with the 

exception of Turkey. In contrast, it was possible to develop a fairly 

detailed picture of the various elements of the fuel cycle currently in 

existence or being developed in the four countries, as well as their 

potential nuclear delivery options. It is assessed that each country 

currently lacks the technical capacity to build a nuclear weapon, 

barring significant infusions of external assistance. However, the 

recent exposure of Egypt’s undeclared materials and activities is a 

significant cause for concern―not just in its own right, but in terms 

of whether it is indicative of a broader trend in the region already 

demonstrated by the Iran and Libya cases. Indeed, given that A. 

Q. Khan has previously visited Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Syria, it 

is quite possible that, in addition to Iran and Libya, these countries 

also may have secretly acquired sensitive nuclear technology and 

expertise from this clandestine proliferation network in the past.
77

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 3

 1. See Steven Everts,”The EU and Iran: How to Make Conditional Engagement 

Work,” Policy Brief, Centre for European Reform, p. 2, http://www.cer.org.uk; David 

Albright and Corey Hinderstain,”Iran, Player or Rogue?” Bulletin of the Atomic 

Scientists, Vol. 59, No. 5, September–October 2003, pp. 52–58.

 2. “A.Q. Khan’s Secrets,” International Herald Tribune, December 31, 2004, 

http://www.iht.com.

 3. “WMD in the Middle East: Saudi Arabia,” Center for Nonproliferation 

Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, http://cns.miis.edu/research/

wmdme/saudi.htm, accessed April 19, 2004.

 4. International Atomic Energy Agency, http://www.iaea.org/Publications/

Factsheets/English/nptstatus_overview.html, accessed April 19, 2004.

 5. On chemical and biological, see “Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle 

East,” Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International 

Studies, http://cns.miis.edu.

 6. Simon Henderson,”Toward a Saudi Nuclear Option: the Saudi Pakistani 

Summit,” Policy Watch, No. 793, The Washington Institute for Near East 

Policy, October 16, 2003, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/watch/Policywatch/

policywatch2003/793.htm.

 7. Prince Naef bin Ahmed Al-saud,”Underpinning Saudi National Security 

Strategy,” Joint Force Quarterly, Autumn 2002, pp. 124-130.

 8. “Iranian Nuclear Program,” Asharq al-Awsat newspaper (Arabic), October 

8, 2003; “An East that is Free of Nuclear Weapons,” Okaz newspaper (Arabic), 

October 30, 2003.

 9. Wyn Q. Bowen, The Politics of Ballistic Missile Nonproliferation, Basingstoke: 

Macmillan, 2000, pp. 17-18, 47.

 10. Ross Dunn,”Libya Leads Arab Race for Nuclear Bomb―Sharon,” Sydney 

Morning Herald, September 6, 2002, p. 10.

 11. See Ewen MacAskill and Ian Traynor,”Saudis Consider Nuclear Bomb,” 

The Guardian, September 18, 2003, http://www.guardian.co.uk; Simon Henderson.

 12. Henderson.

 13. Arnaud de Borchgrave,”Pakistan, Saudi Arabia in Secret Nuke Pact,” The 

Washington Times, October 22, 2003, http://www.washingtontimes.com.

 14. Anton La Guardia, Ahmed Rashid and Alec Russell,”The Nuclear 

Supermarket,” Telegraph online, February 6, 2004, http://www.telegraph.co.uk.

 15. “A. Q. Khan’s Secrets.”

 16. Prince Naef bin Ahmed Al-saud, pp. 124-130.

 17. MacAskill and Traynor.
78

 18. International Nuclear Information System (INIS), International Atomic 

Energy Agency (IAEA), Vienna, http://www.iaea.or.at/inis/ws/nuclear_authorities/

saudi_arabia.html.

 19. King Abdul Aziz City for Science and Technology, Saudi Arabia, http://

www.kaau.edu.sa.

 20. “KACST―Saudi Arabia’s Foremost Research Centre,” Embassy of Saudi 

Arabia in Washington, DC, http://www.saudiembassy.net/publications/MagazineSummar-00/KACST.htm.

 21. Atomic Energy Research Institute, King Abdul Aziz City for Science and 

Technology, Saudi Arabia, http://www.kacst.edu.sa/en/institutes/aeri/index.asp.

 22. For additional information on the constituent units of these departments, a 

list of institute laboratories, as well as services, studies, and consultations provided 

by the institute, see Atomic Energy Research Institute, King Abdul Aziz City for 

Science and Technology, Saudi Arabia, http://www.kacst.edu.sa/en/institutes/aeri/

index.asp.

 23. See Philip M. Mobbs, The Mineral Industry of Saudi Arabia 2001, U.S. 

Geological Survey, http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/country/2001/samyb01.pdf.

 24. “Nuclear Techniques in Mining,” SAU/3/003, IAEA Dept of Technical 

Cooperation, http://www-tc.iaea.org/tcweb/projectinfo/default.asp. 

 25. See Asaad M. B. Moufti (now in the Department of Mineral Resources and 

Rocks, Faculty of Earth Sciences, King Abdul Aziz University, Saudi Arabia),”The 

Separation and Determination of Rare Earths in Phosphate Deposits from the 

North of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia,” Ph.D. thesis, University of Strathclyde, 

United Kingdom, 1987 (via University of Michigan Theses Database).

 26. “Saudi Arabia: Quarry Mining Company Ma Din,” MENA Business Reports, 

December 31, 2002.

 27. Ma’aden Company, Saudi Arabia, http://www.maaden.com.sa.

 28. “Nuclear Energy Planning,” SAU/0/002, IAEA Dept of Technical 

Cooperation, http://www-tc.iaea.org/tcweb/projectinfo/default.asp. 

 29. “Prospects for Nuclear Desalination in Saudi Arabia,” SAU/4/004, IAEA 

Dept of Technical Cooperation, http://www-tc.iaea.org/tcweb/projectinfo/default.asp. 

 30. See Mohammed S. Aljohani, Abdul Rahman, A. F. Abdul Fattah, and 

Abdullah I. Almarshad, “Role of Nuclear Desalination in the Kingdom of Saudi 

Arabia,” World Council of Nuclear Workers Conference on Nuclear Desalination: 

Challenges and Options, Marrakesh, Morocco, October 16-18, 2002, http://www.

wonuc.org/conference/water022.htm.

 31. “Long-Term Energy Demand Forecasting and Expansion Plans,” 

SAU/0/006, IAEA Dept of Technical Cooperation, http://www-tc.iaea.org/tcweb/

projectinfo/default.asp. 

 32. Atomic Energy Research Institute.
79

 33. “KACST―Saudi Arabia’s Foremost Research Centre,” Embassy of Saudi 

Arabia in Washington, DC, http://www.saudiembassy.net/publications/MagazineSummar-00/KACST.htm.

 34. See “Radioactive Waste Management and Processing Program,” 

SAU/9/004, IAEA Dept of Technical Cooperation, http://www-tc.iaea.org/tcweb/

projectinfo/default.asp. 

 35. See “Training in Nuclear Science and Engineering,” SAU/0/003, 1995, 

IAEA Dept of Technical Cooperation, http://www-tc.iaea.org/tcweb/projectinfo/

default.asp; “Human Resource Development and Nuclear Technology Support,” 

SAU/0/007, 2003, IAEA Dept of Technical Cooperation, http://www-tc.iaea.org/

tcweb/projectinfo/default.asp. 

 36. “Saudi Arabia Special Weapons,” Global Security.org, http://www.

globalsecurity.org.

 37. See “Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East,” Center for 

Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, http://cns.

miis.edu.

 38. Wyn Q. Bowen, The Politics of Ballistic Missile Nonproliferation, Basingstoke: 

Macmillan, 2000, pp. 17-18, 47.

 39. Stephen Blank,”Saudi Arabia’s Nuclear Gambit,” Asia Times Online Co, 

November 7, 2003, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/EK07Ak01.html.

 40. See “Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East.”

 41. “IAEA Membership, Safeguards Agreements, Physical Protection, and 

Nuclear Safety,” Centre for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of 

International Studies, http://cns.miis.edu/research/npt/safeg.htm.

 42. “Nuclear Watchdog Ignores Israel,” BBC News online, September 30, 2003, 

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/3151552.stm.

 43. “Egypt’s Budding Nuclear Program,” Risk Report, Vol. 2, No. 5, SeptemberOctober 1996, http://www.wisconsinproject.org/countries/egypt/nuke.html.

 44. “IAEA Delegate: Mubarak’s WMD Initiative Bedrock of Egypt’s Policies,” 

Egyptian State Information Service, September 19, 2003, http://www.sis.gov.eg/

online/html10/o190923a.htm.

 45. “Maher, Bolton Take Up Israel’s Nuclear Program,” Egyptian State 

Information Service, June 2003, http://www.sis.gov.eg/online/html19/o160623m.htm.

 46. “Khatami: Negotiations to Resume Diplomatic Relations between Egypt 

and Iran,” Egyptian State Information Service, December 24, 2003, http://www.sis.

gov.eg/online/html10/o241223s.htm.

 47. “Report: Libya, Egypt Swapped Nukes,” United Press International, March 

31, 2004, cited in Egypt Profile, NTI, 2004, http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/

Egypt/Nuclear/1697_4612.html.
80

 48. “Libyan Inspections Find Evidence of Collaboration with Egypt,” 

WorldTribune Online, March 29, 2004, http://216.26.163.62/2004/me_egypt_03_

29.html.

 49. Shyam Bhatia, Nuclear Rivals in the Middle East, London and New York: 

Routledge, 1988, pp. 64-71.

 50. For example, in June 1992, A. M. Hammad co-authored a paper with staff 

at the Tajura Nuclear Research Centre in Libya while on leave there from the 

Metallurgy Department of the Atomic Energy Establishment in Egypt. See A. M. 

Hammad, S. M. El-Mashri, and M. A. Nasr, “Mechanical Properties of the Zr-1% 

Nb Alloy at Elevated Temperatures,” Journal of Nuclear Materials, Vol. 186, Issue 2, 

January 1992, pp. 166-176.

 51. George Jahn, “U.N.: Traces of Plutonium Found in Egypt,” Associated 

Press, November 3, 2004, cited in Egypt Profile, NTI, 2004, http://www.nti.org/e_

research/profiles/Egypt/Nuclear/1697_4612.html.

 52. “Egypt Conducted Secret Nuclear Experiments, UN Says,” Associated 

Press, in Globe and Mail, January 4, 2005, http://www.theglobeandmail.com.

 53. For example, see “Uranium Resources Development in the Eastern Desert,” 

EGY/3/014, 1999, IAEA Department of Technical Cooperation, http://www-tc.iaea.

org/tcweb/projectinfo/default.asp; “Uranium Exploration,” EGY/3/013, 1993, IAEA 

Department of Technical Cooperation, http://www-tc.iaea.org/tcweb/projectinfo/

default.asp. 

 54. Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Arab Republic of Egypt, 

Report by the Director General, International Atomic Energy Agency, to the 

Board of Governors, GOV/2005/9, February 14, 2005, 6 pp., available via Global 

Security.Org, http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/report/2005/egypt_iaea_gov2005-9_14nov2005.pdf, accessed February 16, 2005.

 55. “Potential for Yellow Cake Production,” EGY/3/010, IAEA Department of 

Technical Cooperation, http://www-tc.iaea.org/tcweb/projectinfo/default.asp.

 56. Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Arab Republic of 

Egypt.

 57. Ibid.

 58. “Egypt Conducted Secret Nuclear Experiments, UN Says.” 

 59. Sayed M. Badawy, “Uranium Isotope Enrichment by Complexation with 

Chelating Polymer Adsorbent,” Radiation Physics and Chemistry, Vol. 66, No. 1, 

January 2003, pp. 67-71.

 60. Abstract of an MSC thesis in Nuclear Engineering, Tareq Khayri Mursi, 

University of Alexandria, Egypt, 1997. “Nuclear Fuel Cycle,” 1997, The Egyptian 

National Scientific and Technical Information Network, http://www.sti.sci.eg/.

 61. “Fuel Manufacturing Plant,” Atomic Energy Authority, Egypt, http://www.

frcu.eun.eg/www/homepage/aea/mpr6.htm.
81

 62. “Egypt’s Budding Nuclear Program,” Risk Report, Vol. 2, No. 5, SeptemberOctober 1996, http://www.wisconsinproject.org/countries/egypt/nuke.html.

 63. “Egypt: Nuclear Weapons Program,” Federation of American Scientists, 

http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/egypt/nuke/index.html.

 64. “Human Resource Development for Nuclear Power Project Preparation 

and Project Management,” EGY/4/045, 2001 IAEA Department of Technical 

Cooperation, http://wwwtc.iaea.org/tcweb/projectinfo/default.asp. 

 65. “NPP Plans and Proposals,” Generation: Nuclear Power Quarterly, September 

2002, p. 2, http://www.ansto.gov.au/info/reports/nucpower/generation02sep. pdf.

 66. “Russia Hopes to Build Nuclear Power Plants Abroad,” ITAR-TASS, 

Moscow, in English, December 7, 2001.

 67. “Egypt Shelves Nuclear Energy Program,” Middle East Newsline, January 2, 

2004, http://www.menewsline.com.

 68. The Keyfaya Organization, October 23, 2004, Arabic, http://www.kefaya.

org.

 69. Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Arab Republic of 

Egypt.

 70. Ibid.

 71. Ibid.

 72. Ibid.

 73. Ibid.

 74. Ibid.

 75. “About AEA,” Atomic Energy Authority, Egypt, http://www.frcu.eun.eg/

www/homepage/aea/about.htm.

 76. “The Multipurpose Reactor MPR,” Atomic Energy Authority, Egypt, http://

www.frcu.eun.eg/www/homepage/aea/mpr.htm.

 77. Figures provided by Professor Peter Zimmerman, War Studies Department, 

King’s College, London.

 78. The Military Balance 2002-2003, London: IISS, 2002.

 79. “Egypt,” Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East, Center for 

Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, http://cns.

miis.edu/research/wmdme/egypt.htm.

 80. “Egypt,” NTI Country Profiles, http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Egypt/

index.html.

 81. “Egypt,” Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East.

 82. “Report: Libya, Egypt Swapped Nukes.”

 83. The Military Balance 2002-2003, p. 103.
82

 84. See “Documentation: NPT Parties,” PPNN Newsbrief, No. 24, Fourth 

Quarter 1993, Program for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation, pp. 23-24; 

“IAEA Membership, Safeguards Agreements, Physical Protection, and Nuclear 

Safety,” Centre for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International 

Studies, http://cns.miis.edu/research/npt/safeg.htm; INFCIRC/295/Add.1, January 

16, 2002, International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna, http://www.iaea.org/

worldatom/Documents/Infcircs/2002/infcirc295a1.pdf; “Country Profile: Turkey,” 

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organisation, Vienna, Austria, http://www.ctbto.

org/.

 85. Turkish Atomic Energy Authority, http://www.taek.gov.tr, Turkish.

 86. Erdener Birol, “National Energy Outlook of Turkey and Expectations from 

Nuclear Technology,” World Nuclear Association Annual Symposium 2002, London, 

http://www.worldnuclear.org/sym/2002/birol.htm.

 87. “Turkey’s Energy Policy,” Hurriyet newspaper, November 26, 2002, 

Turkish.

 88. Erdener Birol, “Significance of Physics Engineering in Nuclear Energy 

and Nuclear Technology,” Turkish Chamber of Physics Engineers, http://www.

fizikmuhoda.org.tr/fm/nukleer.htm, Turkish.

 89. “Parliamentary Debate on the Budget of the Ministry of Energy,” Anatolia 

News Agency, November 10, 2004, http://www.anadoluajansi.com.tr, Turkish.

 90. “Minister of Energy: “Three Nuclear Power Plants Planned,” Anatolia 

News Agency, November 19, 2004, http://www.anadoluajansi.com.tr, Turkish.

 91. Mustafa Kibaroglu phone conversation with Omer Ersun, March 24, 1997, 

as cited in Mustafa Kibaroglu, “Turkey’s Quest for Peaceful Nuclear Power,” The 

Nonproliferation Review, Spring-Summer 1997, p. 35, http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/

vol04/43/kibaro43.pdf.

 92. Denis Zeyrek,”Pakistan’s Offer for Cooperation,” Radical, June 1, 1998, 

as cited in David Martin, “The Threat of Nuclear Weapons Proliferation from 

Turkey: Media Backgrounder,” Nuclear Awareness Project, June 1998, http://www.

cnp.ca/issues/turkey-nuclear-background.html.

 93. Vecdi Gonul, quoted in Hurriyet newspaper, Turkish, November 4, 2003.

 94. F. Stephen Larrabee and Ian O. Lesser, Turkish Foreign Policy in an Age 

of Uncertainty, Centre for Middle East Public Policy, National Security Research 

Division, RAND, 2003, pp. 1-14, http://www.rand.org/.

 95. “Foreign Minister Gul Says Turkey Wants the Middle East to be a Nuclear 

Weapon Free Zone,” Anatolia News Agency, November 19, 2004, http://www.

anadoluajansi.com.tr, Turkish.

 96. “Turkish-Israeli Discussions Concerning Military Maneuvers,” ArabicNews.

Com, April 23, 1998, http://www.arabicnews.com/ansub/Daily/Day/980423/1998042328.

html.
83

 97. “Minister of Energy: “Three Nuclear Power Plants Planned,” Anatolia 

News Agency, November 19, 2004, http://www.anadoluajansi.com.tr, Turkish.

 98. In 1982, TAEK, the Ankara Nuclear Research and Training Centre, and the 

Cekmece Nuclear Research and Training Centre, in cooperation with the IAEA, 

conducted a feasibility study on the extraction of uranium from phosphoric acid. 

“Uranium Recovery,” TUR/3/005, 1982, IAEA Department of Technical 

Cooperation, http://www-tc.iaea.org/tcweb/tcprogram/projectsbycountry/query/default.

asp.

 99. Technology Department, TAEK, http://www.taek.gov.tr, Turkish.

 100. See Mustafa Kibaroglu, “Turkey’s Quest for Peaceful Nuclear Power,” 

The Nonproliferation Review, Spring-Summer 1997, p. 41, http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/

npr/vol04/43/kibaro43.pdf; Cekmece Nuclear Research and Training Centre, Turkish 

Atomic Energy Authority, http://www.taek.gov.tr, Turkish.

 101. For example: (1) Z. E. Erkmen, Department of Metallurgy and Materials, 

Istanbul University, TR-34850 Istanbul, Turkey, “A Study on the Reaction of Yttria 

(Y2O3) in Flowing Uranium Hexafluoride (UF6) Gas at 900 Degrees Celsius,” 

Journal of Nuclear Materials, Vol. 257, Issue 2, November 1, 1998, pp. 152-161; (2) M. 

R. Buchmeiser and G. Bonn, Institute for Analytical Chemistry and Biochemistry, 

Innsbruck University, A-6020 Innsbruck, Austria, and M. Merdivan, Department 

of Chemistry, Balikesir University, TR-10100 Balikesir, Turkey, “Phosphonatebased Resins for the Selective Enrichment of Uranium (VI),” Analytica Chimica 

Acta, Vol. 402, Issue 1-2, December 3, 1999, pp. 91-97.

 102. See “Department of Chemical Engineering,” Middle Eastern Technical 

University, 2003, http://www.che.metu.edu.tr/who.php?who=ggunduz; “Department 

of Chemical Engineering: 1995 Theses,” Middle Eastern Technical University, 

2003, http://www.metu.edu.tr/home/wwwfbe/thesis/theabs/che95.htm.

 103. Mark Hibbs, Ann MacLachlan, and Ray Silver, “Turkey Drops Akkuyu

Project, Citing IMF Economic Program,” Nucleonics Week, Vol. 41, No. 30, July 27, 

2000.

 104. “Turkey at ‘Specifications of Contract’ Stage for Nuclear Power Plant,” The 

Anatolia News Agency archives online, May 7, 2004, http://www.anadoluajansi.

com.tr, Turkish.

 105. “Turkish-Brazilian Nuclear Co-operation,” The Anatolia News Agency 

online, October 2, 2004, http://www.anadoluajansi.com.tr, Turkish.

 106. “Parliamentary Debate on the Budget of the Ministry of Energy,” Anatolia 

News Agency, November 10, 2004, http://www.anadoluajansi.com.tr.

 107. “Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources: ‘Nuclear Power is One of the 

Most İmportant Alternative Energy Sources’,” Anatolia News Agency, November 

18, 2004, http://www.anadoluajansi.com.tr.

 108. “Minister of Energy: “Three Nuclear Power Plants Planned.”
84

 109. Zabunoglu, “Reprocessing of Long-Cooled Nuclear Fuel: Process 

Description and Plant Design,” Ph.D. Dissertation, Iowa State University, 1988;

Akbas, “Reprocessing of Th-U Based Fuels: Flow Sheet Calculations,” M.Sc. thesis, 

Hacettepe University, 1995.

 110. Zabunogulu; and Akbas, “Flow Sheet Calculations in Thorex Method 

for Reprocessing Th-based Spent Fuels,” Nuclear Engineering and Design, No. 219, 

2003, pp. 77-86.

 111 A. I. Izmir and I. Uslu, “Non-fuel Cycle Radioactive Waste Policy in 

Turkey,” Turkish Atomic Energy Authority, May 29, 2003, http://www.taek.gov.tr/

taek/rsgd/yayinlarimiz/teknik/rad_waste.htm.

 112. Mark Hibbs, “Turkey Considers Spent Fuel Deal with Bulgaria, Hungary 

for Akkuyu,” Nuclear Fuel, Vol. 22, No. 17, August 25, 1997.

 113. Research Reactor Database, International Atomic Enrgy Agency, http://

www.iaea.org/worldatom/rrdb.

 114. “Background Note on Cekmece TR-2 Reactor,” Nuclear Awareness Project, 

1998.

 115. Ibid.

 116. Onay Yilmaz, “Let the Animal Hides We Collect be Sacrificed by the 

‘Missile’,” Istanbul Milliyet, Internet version, February 1, 2004, Turkish (FBIS 

translated).

 117. “Turkey: Weapons of Mass Destruction Capabilities and Programs,” 

Center for Non-proliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, 

http://cns.miis.edu/research/wmdme/turkey.htm#5.

 118. The Military Balance 2004-2005.

 119. “Turkey: Weapons of Mass Destruction Capabilities and Programs.”

 120. Interview of Syrian President Bashar Assad by Benedict Brogan, “Israel is 

Responsible for the Suicide Bombers. Only Israel can Stop Them,” Daily Telegraph, 

January 6, 2004, p. 4.

 121. For a brief overview of Syria’s chemical and biological weapons capabilities, 

see “Syria Profile,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/

Syria/index.html.

 122. See, for example, Proliferation: Threat and Response, Office of the Secretary 

of Defense, January 2001, pp. 42-45, http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/ptr20010110.

pdf.

123. Signed July 1, 1968, and ratified September 24, 1969. “Treaty on the 

Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT): Treaty Membership,” Centre for 

Nonproliferation Studies, Montery Institute of International Studies, http://cns.

miis.edu/research/npt/memb.htm.
85

 124. “IAEA Membership, Safeguards Agreements, Physical Protection, and 

Nuclear Safety,” Centre for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of 

International Studies, http://cns.miis.edu/research/npt/safeg.htm.

 125. “Country Profile: Syria,” Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organisation, 

Vienna, Austria, http://www.ctbto.org/.

 126. See “Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat 

Through 2015: Unclassified Summary of a National Intelligence Estimate,” 

December 2001, released January 9, 2002, U.S. National Intelligence Council, 

December 2001, 1-15 pp, http://www.cia.gov/nic/pubs/other_products/Unclassifiedball

isticmissilefinal.htm.

 127. Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology 

Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 

January 1 through June 30, 2002, U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, http://www.cia.

gov/cia/publications/bian/bian_apr_2003.htm#toc.

 128. Proliferation: Threat and Response, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 

January 2001, pp. 42-45, http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/ptr20010110.pdf.

 129. Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating 

to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions.

 130. “Iran and Syria Have Signed Agreements,” Jane’s Intelligence Digest, 

March 5, 2004.

 131. Haytham Mouzahem and Anders Strindberg, “Syria and Iran: Strained 

Relations in a Changed Environment,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, October 1, 2003.

 132. Michael Mew, “Phosphate Rock,” Mining Annual Review, December, 1998, 

p. 111.

 133. Syria Country Profile, Economist Intelligence Unit, London, 2003.

 134. For detailed operations of the AEC’s fertilizer plant in Homs, see “MEABTurnkey: SAEC Plant in Homs, Syria,” Metallextraktion AB, http://www.meab-mx.se/

en/service_turnkey_syrien.htm.

 135. “SYR/3/003: Report on Pre-feasibility Study on the Recovery of 

Uranium from Phosphoric Acid,” International Atomic Energy Agency, Technical 

Cooperation Report, November 12, 1992, http://www-tc.iaea.org/.

 136. “Uranium Recovery From Phosphoric Acid: SYR/3/003,” International 

Atomic Energy Agency, http://www-tc.iaea.org/, completed 12/30/1992; “SYR/3/003: 

Report on Pre-feasibility Study on the Recovery of Uranium from Phosphoric 

Acid.” 

137. “Technical Cooperation Report for 2001,” GC(46)/INF/4, International 

Atomic Energy Agency, 2001, p. 39, http://www.iaea.or.at/worldatom/About/Policy/

GC/GC46/Documents/gc46inf-4.pdf. AEC personnel have conducted numerous 

research projects relevant to uranium exploration. See, for example, Youssef M. 

Jubeli, Department of Geology and Nuclear Ores, AEC, Syria, “Comparison of 

Uranium Determination in Some Syrian Geologic Samples Using Three Reactor 
86

Based Methods,” Applied Radiation and Isotopes, Vol. 52, Issue 4, April 2000, http://

www.elsevier.com; Y. M. Jubeli, M. Al-Hilal, A. Al-Ali, Department of Geology and 

Nuclear Ores, AEC, Syria, and G. Rajja, Department of Radiation Protection and 

Safety, AEC, Syria, “Radiometric Profiles of Uranium Dispersal Pattern Adjacent 

to Cretaceous Phosphatic Sediments in Wadi Qasser Al-Hallabat Basin, Central 

Syria,” The Exploration and Mining Geology Journal, Vol. 7, No. 4, June 1998, http://

www.cim.org/geosoc/indexEmg.cfm; M. Aissa and Y. M. Jubeli, Department of 

Geology and Nuclear Ores, AEC, Syria, “Carborne Gamma-ray Spectrometric 

Survey of an Area East of Homs, Central Syria,” Applied Radiation and Isotopes, Vol. 

48, No. 1, 1997, http://www.elsevier.com.

 138. See “Pakistan Knew of Nuclear Black Market,” Associated Press, March 

7, 2004.

 139. “Syria Believed to Have Centrifuges,” Middle East Newsline, August 26, 

2004, http://www.menewsline.com/.

 140. Louis Charbonneau, “Some in U.S. Think Syria Has Atomic CentrifugesSources,” Reuters, May 5, 2004.

 141. Kamran Khan, “Pakistanis Exploited Nuclear Network,” The Washington 

Post, January 28, 2004, p. A1.

 142. “Customer References,” IBA website, accessed May 25, 2003, http://www.

iba-ri.com/root_ri/pages/IBARI07_RadIsoRefs.htm.

 143. See Kenneth R. Timmerman, “Iran’s Nuclear Program: Myth and Reality,” 

The Middle East Data Project, Inc., 1995, http://www.uspid.dsi.unimi.it/proceed/cast95/

ItalyIran.html; Mark Hibbs, “US Officials Say Iran is Pursuing Fissile Material 

Production Research,” Nuclear Fuel, December 7, 1992; Anthony H. Cordesman, 

“Syria and Weapons of Mass Destruction,” Israel and Lebanon: The New Military and 

Strategic Realities, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC, 

October 2000, http://www.csis.org/stratassessment/reports/syriaWMD.pdf.

 144. “SYR/4/007: Cyclotron Facility for Medical Radioisotopes,” International 

Atomic Energy Agency, Technical Cooperation Projects, 1997, http://www-tc.iaea.

org/tcweb/tcprogramme/projectsbycountry/query/default.asp. 

 145. For example, see M. Soukieh, B. Abdul Ghani, and M. Hammadi, 

“Mathematical Modeling of TE CO2 Laser with SF6 as a Saturable Absorber,” 

Optics & Laser Technology, Vol. 31, 1999, pp. 601-611, via Science Direct; B. Abdul 

Ghani, M. Hammadi, “Mathematical Modeling of Hybrid CO2 Laser,” Optics & 

Laser Technology 33, 2001, pp. 243–247, via Science Direct.

 146. The agreement covered advice to the Ministry of Electricity “in connection 

with a feasibility study on introduction of nuclear power including manpower 

development” and the “planning of the nuclear power program.” See “Nuclear 

Energy Planning,” SYR/0/003, IAEA Department of Technical Cooperation, 

http://www-tc.iaea.org/tcweb/projectinfo/default.asp.

 147. E. Rosen,”Syria is Preparing to Build Six Nuclear Reactors,”, Hebrew, 

Ma’ariv, September 17, 1989, p. A6, cited in Michael Eisenstadt, “Syria’s Strategic 

Weapons,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, April 1, 1993.
87

 148. P. Rubina, “The Soviet Union is Considering a Syrian Request to Purchase 

a Nuclear Power Plant,” Hebrew, Davar, November 25, 1991, cited in Michael 

Eisenstadt, “Syria’s Strategic Weapons,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, April 1, 1993.

 149. See “Russian Nuclear Assistance to Syria: Scam or Scandal?” Middle East 

Intelligence Bulletin, Vol. 5, No. 1, January 2003, http://www.meib.org/articles/0301_

s1.htm.

 150. The cooperation agreement covers the transfer to Syria of “the Agency’s 

methodologies and tools for analysis of energy systems and to train a team of 

local experts in their use to analyze the role of nuclear power and other energy 

options in the future energy mix of the country.” See “Energy and Nuclear Power 

Planning Study,” SYR/0/006, IAEA Department of Technical Cooperation, http://

www-tc.iaea.org/tcweb/projectinfo/default.asp.

 151. See also S. Al Ayoubi, Z. Salhani, A. H. Zein, and M. Azmeh, “The 

Desalination Commission in Syria,” paper presented at the INCO-MED Water 

Conference, Amman, Jordan, June 11-13, 2001, http://www.medaqua.org/Conf2001/

abstracts/52.htm.

 152. Andrew Jack, Stephen Fidler, and Roula Khalaf, “Russia in Talks to Build 

Syrian Nuclear Reactor,” Financial Times, January 16, 2003.

 153. “Russian Nuclear Assistance to Syria: Scam or Scandal?” 

 154. Ghafar, Mohammad, “Radioactive Waste Management Facility in Syria,” 

International Conference on Management of Radioactive Waste from Non-Power 

Applications, International Atomic Energy Agency, Report No.IAEA-CN-87/79, 

July 1, 2001, http://www.etde.org/etdeweb/.

 155. See I. Khamis, “The Role of Small Research Reactors in Developing 

Countries: The Syrian Perspective,” Small Research Reactor Workshop, 

International Centre for Environmental and Nuclear Sciences, January 13-17, 2003, 

http://www.icens.org/Reactor_Workshop/Sessions_5_6_7/sessions_5_6_7.htm;

“SYR/4/004: Miniature Neutron Source Reactor,” International Atomic Energy 

Agency, Technical Cooperation Projects, 1998, http://www-tc.iaea.org/tcweb/

tcprogramme/projectsbycountry/query/default.asp; “Syria,” Research Reactors 

Database, International Atomic Energy Agency, updated September 26, 2002, 

http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/rrdb/; A. George, “Syria Takes Delivery Of its 

Chinese Reactor,” Nuclear Engineering International, December 1, 1993, pp. 46-

47. For an account of the role of the SRR-1, see I. Khamis, “The Role of Small 

Research Reactors in Developing Countries: The Syrian Perspective,” presentation 

at The International Centre for Environmental and Nuclear Sciences, University 

of the West Indies conference on January 13-17, 2003, http://www.icens.org/Reactor_

Workshop/Sessions_5_6_7/sessions_5_6_7.htm.

 156. “Nuclear Agreement between Syria and Russia,” Science, July 20, 1998; 

“Novosti Minatoma’, ‘Minatom News,” Atom-Pressa, No. 25, July 15, 1998; Oleg 

Lebedev, “Russia, Syria Agree on Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy,” Moscow RIA, 

July 6, 1998, in FBIS, FTS19980707000041, July 7, 1998.

 157. The Military Balance 1999-2000.
 158. Proliferation: Threat and Response, Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. 

Department of Defense, January 2001, pp. 42-45, http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/

ptr20010110.pdf.

 159. “Syria in the U.S. Spotlight,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, April 23, 2003, http://

www.janes.com.

 160. Syria Profile, Nuclear Threat Initiative, http://www.nti.org/e_research/

profiles/Syria/index.html.

 161. “Syria Preparing to Build Extended-Range SCUD,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, 

June 19, 2002, http://www.janes.com.

 162. Proliferation: Threat and Response, Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. 

Department of Defense, January 2001, pp. 42-45, http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/

ptr20010110.pdf.

 163. The Military Balance 2003-2004.

88
CHAPTER 4

TURKEY, IRAN, AND NUCLEAR RISKS

Ian O. Lesser

INTRODUCTION

 Turkey is among the countries most exposed to proliferation 

developments in the Middle East. New disclosures regarding Iran’s 

nuclear ambitions, and Tehran’s apparent commitment to proceed 

with more extensive IAEA inspections and safeguards, comes 

at a time of general flux in Turkey’s strategic environment and 

in the country’s foreign and security policy outlook. For some 50 

years, Turkey has lived with nuclear weapons on its borders and 

deployed on its territory. Although not a nuclear state, and unlikely 

to become one, nuclear forces and doctrines have been part of the 

security calculus of the modern Turkish republic for the majority 

of its existence. But only since the Gulf War of 1990-91, and with 

increasing attention over the past few years, have Turkish planners 

and policymakers begun to view the combination of weapons of 

mass destruction (WMD) and the means for their delivery at longer 

ranges as a proximate threat to the security of the country. 

 In the context of a foreign and security policy that is, at base, 

conservative and multilateral, the Middle East is one region where 

Ankara has been prepared to think and act more assertively. The 

prospect of one or more nuclear or near-nuclear states on Turkey’s 

Middle Eastern borders is now a significant factor in Turkish strategic 

thought. But in the nuclear realm, Turkey retains a strong preference 

for multilateral approaches, imbedded in the North Atlantic Treaty 

Organization (NATO)—and to an increasing extent, European—

policies. The NATO (really the United States) nuclear guarantee has 

been the cornerstone of an approach that still owes much to Cold 

War patterns. Only very recently have Turkish strategists begun to 

contemplate a capacity for deterrence and response that goes beyond 

Alliance arrangements.

89
90

 Turks worry about the reliability of both NATO and U.S. 

commitments to Turkish defense in Middle Eastern contingencies, 

and Turkey will be strongly affected by changes in Alliance strategy, 

missions, and cohesion, all of which are in flux. If the European Union 

(EU) does open formal accession talks with Ankara, as most Turks 

hope, the European part of this equation is set to grow in importance. 

While the defense dimension of Turkey’s relations with Europe has 

been less prominent (and sometimes strained), this too is set to grow 

in prominence as the EU focuses more heavily on extra-European 

challenges, including proliferation.

 Could Turkey act more radically, outside multilateral 

arrangements, to meet risks posed by a nuclear-ready Iran? The short 

answer is yes, but it is not very likely. Could Turkey “go nuclear”? 

Again, the answer is yes, but it is most unlikely. The key in both 

cases would be a sharp deterioration in the quality of Turkish defense 

cooperation with the West, and a sense that Turkey was being left to 

go it alone in a dangerous geo-strategic setting. Overall, the existence 

of a nuclear-ready Iran poses some direct risks to Turkish security—

and many indirect but highly consequential ones. Implications for 

U.S. and Western policy abound. 

 This chapter explores the contours of Turkey’s perceptions and 

potential responses to a nuclear-ready Iran. Section One discusses the 

Turkish strategic context, both regional and functional. Section Two 

assesses relations with Iran in the context of proliferation challenges, 

including the effect on wider regional dynamics. Section Three treats 

the range of possible Turkish responses to a nuclear or near-nuclear 

Iran, and external influences on Turkish choices. Section Four offers 

conclusions and policy implications. 

SECTION ONE: THE TURKISH STRATEGIC CONTEXT

 Turkey is a security-conscious society in which territorial defense 

and internal security remain priorities for the political class, the 

military, and the public. Broadly, the Turkish strategic culture displays 

several key characteristics that shape Ankara’s approach to the 

challenge of a nuclear Iran, and relations with allies on proliferation 

matters. These characteristics include a pronounced sensitivity to 
91

questions of national sovereignty (far higher the modern norm in 

Europe), a low threshold of tolerance for national insecurity and 

threats to the “homeland,” a high threshold for intervention outside 

the country, and a willingness to act massively and decisively when 

this threshold is crossed (e.g., Cyprus in 1974 and more recent cross 

border actions in northern Iraq). Foreign policy debates in Ankara 

are also characterized by an historic tension between the Ataturkist 

tradition of nonintervention, even isolation, and demands for 

more active regional engagement. Turkey shares many of these 

characteristics with the United States.1

A Conservative Approach. 

 Turkish perceptions regarding Iran and proliferation issues are 

affected by a deep tradition of conservatism in foreign and security 

policy.2 As a former imperial power, Turkey takes its regional role 

seriously, and Turkish strategists like to take the long view. Often, 

this puts them somewhat out of step with their Western counterparts. 

As an example, despite the transformation of western relations 

with Russia since the end of the Cold War, Turks have retained a 

very wary approach to Russian power and geopolitical aims. They 

have remained highly sensitive to the nuclear aspects of Russian 

doctrine, and Russia’s role in places like the Balkans and Cyprus—at 

a time when it has become fashionable to down-grade or dismiss 

the Russian factor in Europe and even Eurasia. In historical terms, 

Turkey has seen Russia as its primary geo-strategic competitor. 

Turkey’s relations with Arab neighbors in the Middle East have been 

colored by the experience of empire, including its collapse, leaving 

a legacy of mutual diffidence and mistrust. Iran, by contrast, has 

been a relatively stable and predictable neighbor, with no history of 

conflict with Ottoman Turkey or the Turkish republic. 

 Turks—like many others—have been relatively slow to adapt 

their security thinking to new risks, although this dimension of 

Turkey’s conservatism in external policy is changing under pressure 

of new regional realities, and a new constellation of actors in the 

policymaking process. Turkey’s very significant conventional 

military strength, with the second largest military establishment 
92

in NATO, an increasingly modern force structure, and a growing 

capacity for power projection beyond its borders, is an important 

element in the country’s perception of regional risks.3 One the one 

hand, Turkey’s overwhelming conventional superiority vis-á-vis its 

Middle Eastern neighbors, and its NATO membership, are obvious 

and very potent deterrents to aggression in relations with Iran, Iraq, 

and Syria. On the other hand, like their counterparts in Israel and 

the United States, Turkish strategists worry that their conventional 

superiority compels regional adversaries to adopt unconventional, 

asymmetric strategies. This can take the form of support for terrorism 

and insurgency, as with Syria’s past support for the Kurdistan 

Workers Party (PKK), or the threat to use chemical, biological, or 

even nuclear weapons against Turkish population centers or bases.4

 Like other NATO allies, much Turkish thinking about nuclear 

forces and doctrine derives from Cold War experience. For 50 

years, Turkey was a key forward location for intelligence and early 

warning on Soviet strategic forces and a base for potential nuclear 

operations against the Soviet Union. Nuclear-armed Jupiter missiles 

based in Turkey were traded away during the Cuban missile crisis, 

but Turkey continued to host tactical nuclear forces deployed in a 

NATO context. Turkish strategists remain attuned to shifts in Russian 

nuclear forces and doctrine. Even as Turkish-Russian political 

and economic relations have expanded dramatically over the past 

decade, security relations have remained tenuous, and Turks have 

been among the most sensitive of NATO members on the question 

of the re-nuclearization of Russian military doctrine.

Changing Perceptions of WMD Exposure.

 Given the extraordinary extent of Turkey’s exposure to WMD 

and missile risks emanating from the Middle East—easily the most 

pronounced in NATO—some analysts express surprise that Turkey 

did not signal its concern about proliferation issues earlier and more 

forcefully.5 As general concern about WMD in the Middle East grew 

among Western and Israeli strategists, even prior to the Gulf War, 

Ankara remained relatively unconcerned, adopting a “surprisingly 

nonchalant attitude” toward the threat.6

 Several explanations can 
93

be offered for this stance. First, a perception of substantial strategic 

depth, with the main Turkish population and economic centers at 

some distance from Middle Eastern borders.7 Obviously, as the range 

of missiles deployed in the region has increased, this perception 

has waned. Second, in line with Cold War thinking and prior to the 

troubling experience of the Gulf War in 1990, Turkey assumed that 

the NATO security guarantee was relevant and more than sufficient 

to deter regional, unconventional threats. Third, the Turkish security 

elite, like the Turkish elite in general, has preferred to focus on 

European and transatlantic issues, holding Middle Eastern problems 

at arms length wherever possible.

 Turkish military planners noted with concern the exchange of 

missile strikes during the so-called “war of the cities” during the 

Iran-Iraq war. But the Gulf War of 1990 was the real watershed in 

Turkish strategic perceptions regarding WMD and missile risks.8

The war also had a negative effect on Turkey’s assumptions about 

the predictability of the NATO security guarantee in “out-of-area” 

contingencies. Despite threats from Baghdad, Turkey was not 

targeted by Iraq in its Scud missile campaign. Nonetheless, the Ozal 

government’s active role in the Gulf War coalition and the extensive 

air operations conducted from Incirlik Air Base, could well have 

made Turkey a target for retaliatory attack. During the run-up to 

the war, Turks were dismayed by the slow and contentious allied 

response to Ankara’s request for NATO air defense reinforcements 

(an experience repeated in the months before the 2003 Iraq war). The 

Scud attacks on Israel and in the Gulf made a strong impression on 

the Turkish military, who took away the lesson that Turkey’s large 

but rather out-dated military establishment required substantial 

modernization, including the ability to address WMD and missile 

risks from Iraq, Iran, and, above all, Syria. 

 From the early 1990s, Turkey’s small cadre of strategic analysts 

outside the government, including academic observers and 

journalists, began to pay increased attention to WMD and missile 

risks. At the official level, the response remained largely rhetorical. 

Turkey was never a particularly enthusiastic supporter of the United 

Nations Special Commission’s (UNSCOM) work in Iraq, although 

Ankara clearly benefited from the military containment of Baghdad. 
94

With proximate reasons for conflict, Syrian chemical and improvedScud programs remained the leading concern. Iran’s nuclear and 

missile ambitions were seen as a more distant risk—linked more 

closely to American interests and behavior than to Turkish-Iranian 

dynamics.

 Growing attention to the WMD problem was reflected in changes 

to Turkey’s air defense strategy, which for the first time (1993) 

included the concept of countering medium-range missiles and 

potential nuclear arsenals deployed in countries to the south and 

east, with “countering” a matter of forward planning for enhanced 

early warning and missile defense procurement. The Turkish mix 

of active and passive defense against WMD envisioned reliance 

on NATO assets for deterrence, hardening of military targets and 

command and control, and bolstering the ability to locate and attack 

mobile targets (a tough problem, even for far more capable allies). The 

informed public debate noted the importance of the issue, largely as 

reflected through American and Israeli analyses, but was generally 

dismissive of Turkey’s own missile defense strategy.9

 As noted above, the general perception of threat from Iran and 

Iraq has been low. Turks in general have not shared the American 

concern regarding nuclear and missile risks emanating from either 

country, largely because Turkish observers find it difficult to imagine 

circumstances under which Iran or Iraq would employ such weapons 

against Turkey—except in retaliation for American intervention 

launched from Turkish bases. Turkey does have pronounced 

stakes in the future of Iran and Iraq, but these turn on questions of 

instability, consequences for Kurdish separatism affecting Turkey, 

the role of the region’s Islamists in Turkish politics, and access to 

energy. The question of direct, state-to-state conflict has not loomed 

large in Turkish perceptions, in stark contrast to a far more unstable 

relationship with Syria.

The Israeli Factor.

 Arguably, a leading factor in elevating Turkish attention to WMD 

risks, and Iranian WMD risks in particular, has been the development 

of a broad-based strategic relationship with Israel. Israel is an active 
95

participant in Turkey’s defense modernization program, and there 

is an impressive degree of collaboration on training and intelligence 

sharing, including surveillance and possible responses to nuclear 

and missile threats. More broadly, there has been a substantial 

convergence in strategic perception and regional risk assessment, 

driven by increased dialogue and objective factors. This strategic 

relationship has been encouraged by Washington, but has its origins 

in Turkish and Israeli interests. In some cases, Turkey sees Israel as 

an alternative and perhaps more reliable supplier of defense goods 

and services than the United States or the EU. Iran’s nuclear and 

missile capabilities are central to Israel’s strategic outlook, and this 

has certainly reinforced the issue in Turkish thinking (the potential 

for Turkish-Israeli cooperation in strikes against Iran’s nuclear 

facilities are discussed in Section Four). Neither the Islamist Erbakan 

government of the mid 1990s, nor the current government led by 

Prime Minister Erdogan, with its “recessed” Islamic roots, has 

interfered significantly with Turkish-Israeli relations—a portfolio in 

which the Turkish military continues to play a leading role. 

The Iraq War—and A More Diverse Security Debate.

 The recent experience of the War in Iraq has focused Turkish 

attention firmly on the problem of northern Iraq, where Turks across 

the political spectrum perceive substantial stakes. The key variable 

here is the potential emergence of an independent Kurdish state out 

of the chaos in Iraq, and the effect this might have on Turkey’s own 

Kurdish separatists. A secondary factor is Turkish affinity for Iraq’s 

Turcomen, although this, too, is seen through the lens of the ethnic 

power balance in northern Iraq. Turks have been, and remain, less 

interested in the issue of WMD in Iraq, and tend to share European 

skepticism regarding the accuracy of pre-war intelligence (despite 

the fact that Turkish sources contributed to this intelligence, and 

Turkish analysts were no less convinced of Iraq’s WMD capabilities 

than their opposite numbers in Europe and the United States). 

 That said, the risk of chemical or missile attacks on Turkish 

territory certainly figured in the public debate about cooperation 

with the United States prior to the war. The net effect was to reinforce 
96

the sense that Turkey had a stronger stake in regional stability than 

in regime change with an unpredictable neighbor. The failure of 

bilateral negotiations over access to Turkish facilities in the spring of 

2003—a close run thing—had multiple sources.10 Turkish concerns 

about WMD exposure, and lackluster backing from NATO, played a 

small but measurable role in this calculus of cooperation.11

 Today, Turkey’s perception of nuclear and missile risks is shaped 

by an increasingly diverse national debate on security questions. 

The outlook of the Turkish General Staff still counts heavily, of 

course. But independent analysts and a vigorous private media 

now play a key role—and public opinion counts. The new elites, 

from cosmopolitan business circles to more traditional elements 

associated with the current AKP government, tend to be less security 

conscious and more heavily focused on domestic reform. Their views 

on external issues, including proliferation, are influenced heavily by 

international debates and, to an ever-increasing extent, by attitudes 

in Europe. Absent a direct threat to Turkish security, Turks across the 

political spectrum are now as likely—perhaps more likely—to frame 

policy toward Iran and its WMD capabilities in European rather 

than American terms. Barring a sharp deterioration in relations with 

the EU, the desire to stay in the European mainstream will be a key 

factor in Turkey’s approach to a nuclear-ready Iran in the years to 

come. The result may be pronounced tension between an Israeli and 

American-inspired hard line on proliferation matters, and a softer, 

“diplomacy first” approach flowing from Brussels. These disparate 

approaches could be brought into line if the EU begins to take 

proliferation risks more seriously. 

SECTION TWO: VIEWS OF IRAN, ITS NUCLEAR 

AMBITIONS, AND REGIONAL DYNAMICS

 In a region which Turks are inclined to treat as a source of risk 

rather than opportunity, relations with Iran have been essentially 

stable, with little of the propensity for assertiveness evident in 

relations with Syria.12 Both states have traditionally seen each other as 

status quo powers, and pre-revolutionary Iran had much in common 

with the secular, modernizing, western-oriented society Ataturk 

had promoted in Turkey. Turks often refer to their “dangerous 
97

neighborhood” in the Middle East, but are also quick to note that 

Turkey and Iran lack a recent history of armed conflict. As a broad 

generalization, Turks take Iran seriously as a society and as a regional 

power, something that cannot be said for Turkey’s approach to Syria, 

Iraq, or the Arab Gulf states. Iran and Israel are treated as peers in the 

Middle East; Syria, Iraq, and the Arab states of the Gulf are not.13

Sources of Turkish Concern.

 This relatively favorable view of Iran has been slow to change 

since the Iranian revolution. Only within the last few years have 

elements of the Turkish security establishment come to see Iran as 

a serious challenge, and even today there are strong countervailing 

interests in improved relations. The sources of Turkish concern are 

straightforward. First, Turkey’s secular elites, including the military, 

increasingly have been concerned about the export of Islamic 

radicalism from Iran. This concern is driven by Iranian financial and 

other support for activists abroad, and the ebb and flow of Iran’s 

support for international terrorism. An Iranian hand is sometimes 

seen in the construction of Turkish religious schools (where Saudi 

backing has certainly played a larger role) and the financing of 

Islamist movements. In reality, these are marginal factors on the 

Turkish political scene. But those inclined to worry about secularism 

in Turkey, including harder-line elements in the military and 

Kemalists of the old school, tend to see Iran as an internal security 

threat.

 Second, Iran is a key player with regard to the Kurdish issue in 

its regional setting, and relations on Kurdish matters continue to 

be a leading barometer of Turkish-Iranian relations as a whole. The 

history here is largely one of cooperation against a common fear of 

Kurdish separatism, but the vagaries of PKK/Kurdistan Workers/

Labour Party (KADEK) deployments have led to periodic frictions. 

When the expulsion of the PKK from Syria forced Kurdish insurgents 

to operate from bases in Iran, Ankara responded forcefully, and the 

Turkish air force reportedly struck PKK camps inside Iran in July 

1999. 

 Third, as noted earlier, Turkey increasingly has been concerned 

about the influence of WMD and missile proliferation on the security 
98

environment, its own regional freedom of action, and that of its 

alliance partners. Iraq and Syria have also been part of this equation, 

and the WMD capabilities of these countries generally have been 

seen as posing a more proximate risk to Turkey. In the case of Syria, 

the regime’s support for the PKK, against a background of frictions 

over territory and resources, actually brought the two countries to 

the brink of a military clash in 1998. Recurring Western military 

intervention in Iraq, and the use of Incirlik Air Base for Operation 

NORTHERN WATCH, made the possibility of Iraqi retaliation on 

Turkish soil an ongoing concern. In terms of its WMD capabilities 

and missile reach, Iran may have posed a more serious threat on 

paper, but few Turks worried about a clash with Iran in which WMD 

might become a factor—there was little rationale for conflict on either 

side. Indeed, Turkish economic interests in Iran, including access to 

natural gas, have been a strong countervailing factor.

Sources of Iranian Concern—and Improved Ties. 

 On the Iranian side, there are also some concerns regarding 

Turkey, although none have risen to a level posing a risk of direct 

conflict. Under conditions of instability in Iran, Turkey could chose 

to foment separatism among ethnic Turks in Azerbaijan, although 

Ankara, with its own concerns about national integrity, has been 

wary of supporting separatist movements elsewhere, whether in 

Chechnya or Kosovo—despite some internal pressures to do so. 

Iran has also been troubled by the presence of Iranian opposition 

groups in Turkey, including elements of the Mujahiddin-i Khalq. 

Turkish secularism and membership in the Western strategic “club” 

surely trouble Iranian conservatives. More specifically, Turkey 

could facilitate American or Israeli intervention in Iran, including 

the provision of intelligence, bases, and over-flight rights for strikes 

against Iranian nuclear or missile facilities. But on the whole, Iranian 

decisions regarding strategy and force structure, including nuclear 

and missile programs, are almost certainly driven by other factors.

 Over the past year, Turkish-Iranian relations have improved 

considerably (as have Turkish relations with Syria), with four 

high-level Turkish visits to Iran, and six from Iran to Turkey. The 
99

bilateral dialogue has spanned economic and educational matters, 

as well as the critical question of policy toward Kurdish groups in 

northern Iraq. Iranian nuclear and missile programs do not seem 

to be part of this agenda, although Turkey has been supportive of 

EU-led efforts to forestall new UN-sponsored sanctions over WMD 

matters.14 Observers attribute this improvement in Turkish relations 

with Tehran (and Damascus) to several factors, from the desire for a 

concerted approach to northern Iraq, to the more open attitude of the 

Justice and Development Party (AKP) government to engagement 

with Iran. Not least, Ankara has followed the lead of Europe in its 

own more active engagement of both states over the past year.15

Effect of a Nuclear-Ready Iran on Turkish Interests

and Regional Dynamics.

 A nuclear-capable or near-nuclear Iran would pose both direct 

and indirect challenges to Turkish interests. In direct terms, a 

functioning Iranian nuclear arsenal, coupled with Iranian short and 

medium-range missiles, would pose a much more dramatic and 

politically salient threat to Turkish security, going well beyond the 

current rather amorphous sense of WMD threat. An open Iranian 

nuclear capability would place immediate pressure on Turkey’s 

slow-moving missile defense plans, and would probably compel 

Ankara to press for a much more direct NATO (and EU) stance 

regarding Article V and other commitments in Middle Eastern 

contingencies. Exposure to a nuclear arsenal on Turkey’s borders 

would not be a new phenomenon for Turkey—Turks have lived 

with the reality of Soviet and Russian nuclear power for decades—

but it would immensely increase the sense of insecurity in an already 

security-conscious society. In the absence of a predictable Western 

security guarantee, Ankara might also consider acquiring deterrent 

capabilities of its own, although the prospect for this is complicated 

and politically risky for Turkey.

 Given the paucity of proximate flashpoints in Turkish-Iranian 

relations, the consequences of a nuclear Iran are likely to be felt more 

heavily across a range of wider geopolitical interests (i.e., interests 

beyond the defense of Turkish territory per se). First, a nuclear Iran 
100

would acquire new strategic weight in its relations with Ankara, 

among others. This could greatly complicate Turkish diplomacy over 

Kurds, energy, and other issues that have been at the center of the 

bilateral agenda. In a less easily measured way, it might also affect 

Turkey’s relative regional standing, with implications for relations 

across the Middle East, the Caucasus, Central Asia, and even the 

Balkans. 

 Second, a nuclear Iran would severely complicate Turkey’s 

security relationships with Washington, Israel, and Europe. A new 

nuclear threat to Turkish territory, however theoretical, might 

encourage a convergence of strategic perception among those most 

affected by this development. In practical terms, however, Ankara 

will confront a series of new security dilemmas. Turkey’s sense of 

regional exposure, and the need to “live” with neighbors, however 

unpalatable, is already a strong influence on the calculus of defense 

cooperation, as seen on numerous occasions since 1990, and as shown 

quite clearly in 2003. The potential for nuclear retaliation on Turkish 

territory would revive questions of alliance vulnerability, coupling, 

decoupling, and “singularization” familiar from the late Cold War. 

 Given the near-term potential for Western and Israeli 

intervention in Iran, these would not be theoretical considerations 

for Ankara. Indeed, the very existence of a nuclear arsenal in Iran 

would immediately raise the likelihood of and stakes surrounding 

intervention—at least until Iran acquired a sufficiently credible 

nuclear capability to deter a conventional first strike. At which 

point a very different calculus would emerge, with Turkey playing 

a role analogous to Germany during the Cold War. Under these 

conditions, Turkish strategists would need to consider whether a 

nuclear confrontation between Iran and the West would likely to be 

fought over their heads—possible if Iran developed ballistic missiles 

of intercontinental range—or on Turkish territory. The prospect 

would surely reopen doctrinal debates about nuclear strategy within 

NATO, at a time when the Alliance is contemplating a formal role in 

security across the “greater Middle East.” 

 Turkey would not be alone in confronting these new dilemmas. 

For some time, southern European members of NATO have faced the 

reality of increasing exposure to retaliation from regimes across the 
101

Mediterranean. Southern Europe and the Mediterranean, the least 

nuclear of theaters during the Cold War, have emerged as leading 

centers of nuclear and other WMD risks in the current strategic 

environment. With Libya’s decision to dismantle its WMD and 

missile inventory, the center of gravity for this “southern exposure” 

has shifted to the eastern Mediterranean, where Iranian, Syrian, and 

Egyptian arsenals continue to shape NATO and EU perceptions of 

WMD risk.

 Third, the advent of a nuclear Iran, and the possibility of a regional 

arms race embracing Turkey, could affect military balances and 

perceptions beyond the Middle East. Russia might feel compelled to 

respond, technically or doctrinally, to a nuclear Iran, with negative 

implications for the security of Turkey (unless the Russian response 

came as part of a concerted approach with the United States and 

Europe). Similarly, new nuclear and missile capabilities in Iran 

could have a cascading effect on security balances in the Balkans and 

the Aegean, where Greece is highly sensitive to changes in Turkish 

force structure and strategy. This effect has already been seen in the 

context of Turkish defense modernization (e.g., new air refueling 

tankers, airborne warning and control systems [AWACS], and 

army tactical missile systems [ATACMS]) aimed at Middle Eastern 

contingencies; it might also influence the Greek and Turkish interest 

in moving ahead with mutual and balanced force reductions, now 

being discussed.

 Finally, Turkey could become an even more prominent focus 

of Western concern as a transit route for the “leakage” of nuclear 

materials and technology. Turkey is already at the center of police 

and intelligence cooperation regarding the interdiction of nuclear 

contraband. A nuclear capable Iran would raise the specter of another 

marketplace for nuclear technology, along the lines of Pakistan. 

The existence of such a market on Turkey’s borders would make 

Turkey an even more essential security partner for the United States 

and Europe, but might also reinforce existing European wariness 

regarding the security “baggage” Turkey brings to the table. Which 

raises a larger question of deep interest to Turkey: Will the EU want 

to acquire a formal border with Iraq, Syria, and a nuclear armed 

Iran? This is a question Turks would prefer not to have as part of the 
102

equation in relations with Europe at a time of critical decisions on 

Turkey’s EU candidacy.

 Under conditions of increased risk from a nuclear Iran, Turkey 

would have a very strong stake in the development of more active 

NATO and EU approaches to nonproliferation, counterproliferation, 

and missile defense. Ankara has been a leading proponent of 

multilateral initiatives in this area, especially those oriented toward 

the Mediterranean and the Middle East. Over the past few years, and 

with increasing urgency since 2003, NATO and the EU have placed 

proliferation issues higher on their agendas. The new European 

Security Strategy (the “Solana” document) identifies proliferation as 

a leading concern, and the EU now has in place an “action plan” on 

WMD.16 The new, tougher EU approach to proliferators can be seen 

in recent policy toward Iran and especially Syria, in which trade and 

cooperation negotiations clearly have been linked to progress on the 

WMD front (another likely rationale for Libya’s recent disarmament 

moves).17 As Turkey enters a critical phase in its relations with the 

EU, looking toward the formal opening of accession negotiations in 

2005, it is likely to see a growing and very welcome tendency to take 

nuclear proliferation more seriously in Brussels.18

 NATO has had a series of initiatives in this area since the first Iraq 

war, and has devoted significant resources to improving intelligence 

sharing and command and control in WMD-related contingencies. But 

for both organizations, the improvements are largely in the realm of 

strategic concepts and doctrine, rather than capabilities. Confronted 

with a specific new nuclear threat from Iran, Turkey, like the United 

States and Israel, will focus on practical, operational responses rather 

than enhanced debate about the problem. Turkish policymakers will 

have the opportunity to encourage Alliance attention to nuclear 

risks and possible responses at the NATO summit in Istanbul in June 

2004.

SECTION THREE: POSSIBLE TURKISH RESPONSES 

AND POLICY INFLUENCES

 Revelations regarding the status of Iran’s nuclear program, 

and the apparent Iranian commitment to enhanced International 

Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections, have not yet produced a 
103

measurable response from Ankara, although Turkish policymakers 

are clearly supportive of pressure on Tehran over nuclear matters, at 

least in a multilateral context. But how might Turkey respond to the 

advent of an openly nuclear Iran, or an Iran that declares itself bent 

on acquiring nuclear weapons regardless of international sanctions? 

The range of possible Turkish responses is wide, from “denial”—

ignoring the threat—to the acquisition of a nuclear deterrent of its 

own. 

 The critical context for Turkish decisionmaking in this sphere 

will be the extent and character of Turkish security ties—with the 

United States, within NATO, and with European partners. Internal 

political developments may also have a bearing on Turkish choices. 

But the perceived relevance and predictability of the country’s 

alliance relations will be the overwhelmingly important influence on 

Turkey’s response.

Denial and Decoupling.

 Turkey could respond to a nuclear-ready Iran simply by denying 

the significance of the risk. There is some precedent for this approach 

in terms of Turkey’s relatively unconcerned response to proliferation 

trends in Iraq and across the Middle East prior to the Gulf War of 

1990. A credible nuclear capability in Iran would be more difficult 

for Turkey to ignore, even if the prospect of a military clash with 

Iran remains very low. A nuclear-ready Iran threatens American 

and Israeli strategic interests in ways that Ankara cannot ignore if 

it is to maintain an effective security relationship with these critical 

partners. Under conditions of ambiguity or dispute regarding Iranian 

capabilities, Turkey might well opt for an assessment and response in 

the European mainstream, which might well lean toward “denial.” 

 Turks who wish to minimize the nuclear threat from Iran will 

do so by arguing that Turkey’s exposure comes about largely as a 

result of American and Israeli policies, and the direct risks to Turkey 

come via the prospect of American or Israeli intervention in Iran. In 

this case, many Turks might seek to decouple the country’s security 

policies from allies who bring more exposure than reassurance. But, 

with the range of hard security challenges Turkey faces, in multiple 

regions, it is unlikely that the current Turkish security establishment, 
104

even in light of public opinion, would be willing to jeopardize 

Turkey’s overall deterrent posture to pursue a strategy of decoupling 

in relation to Iranian risks.

Reinforced Conventional Deterrence.

 The prospect of a nuclear-ready Iran would underscore existing 

Turkish concerns about defense modernization and could accelerate 

plans for improving the country’s early warning and missile 

defense capabilities. Turkey might also seek to bolster its capacity 

for locating and striking mobile targets, as well as its rudimentary 

missile capability, currently limited to ATACMs and an exploratory 

short-range missile program. Turkey might decide to develop and 

press forward with an indigenous medium-range ballistic missile 

program, bringing it into line with several of its Middle Eastern 

neighbors. These efforts could be strengthened if Turkey proceeds 

with reported plans to develop its own space launch vehicle for 

military reconnaissance and commercial purposes by 2010.19 Turkey’s 

alliance partners, especially Greece, might regard this with concern. 

Russia, a reconstituted Iraq, and above all, Syria, would regard this 

with alarm.

 Rapid expansion of Turkey’s missile defenses would be a less 

controversial and probably more useful approach. Turkey has already 

gone some distance in this direction with plans to acquire Patriot

(PAC-3) missiles, and to participate in the Israeli Arrow and perhaps 

the U.S.-led medium-range extended air defense (MEADS) program 

with other European allies. Turkey is also a likely site for sensors and 

boost-phase interceptors deployed as part of an American strategic 

missile defense architecture.20

 The scale of Turkey’s conventional forces and their increasing 

capacity for regional power projection, coupled with new missile 

and missile defense capabilities, surely would cause even a nucleararmed regional adversary to think twice about confronting Turkey. 

That said, Turkish analysts are probably correct in their judgment 

that the real source of nuclear risk to Turkey flows from the strategic 

decisions of others—the United States and Israel—regarding Iran. 

Under these conditions, Turkey’s own capacity for conventional 

preemption or response may not weigh heavily.
105

The Nuclear Option.

 Could Turkey go nuclear? This question has been raised from time to 

time over the past 2 decades by Turks and others. The short answer is 

probably “yes.” Given sufficient time, Turkey probably would have 

the technical wherewithal to develop a limited nuclear arsenal and 

the means for delivering nuclear weapons in regional contingencies. 

That said, the costs—material, and, above all, political—of pursuing 

the nuclear option are almost certainly prohibitive for Turkey. 

The calculus surrounding the nuclear option could become more 

favorable only under drastically changed conditions, both internal 

and external.

 Turkey has been a party to the NPT since 1980, and an additional 

safeguards agreement with the IAEA is also in force. The country’s 

nuclear research facilities consist of the Cekmece Nuclear Research 

and Training Center and a 250kw TRR research reactor at Istanbul 

Technical University supplied by General Atomics in the late 1970s.21

Since the mid-1960s, Turkey has explored the idea of building one or 

more nuclear power plants—even soliciting tenders for a 1,200MW 

plant at Akkuyu Bay near Mersin. But for a variety of financial and 

environmental reasons, little progress has been made.22 Over the last 

2 decades, Turkey’s growing energy demands have driven a variety 

of new arrangements for importing oil and natural gas from Iran, 

Central Asia, and Russia. These demands could well have justified 

a nuclear power program, but the financial instability of recent 

years slowed the growth in energy demand and put an expensive 

nuclear program out of reach. Apart from cost, the leading internal 

impediment to nuclear power development in Turkey is now 

environmental politics, as elsewhere in Europe (critics charge that 

the proposed plant at Akkuyu is prone to seismic risks).

 Concern about Turkish nuclear intentions has surfaced on a 

number of occasions, notably in 1981, when Turkey was alleged to 

have facilitated transfers of nuclear-related technology to Pakistan, 

and again in 1992, when Senators Glenn and Symington led an effort 

to halt aid to Turkey in light of allegations about Turkish-Pakistani 

nuclear cooperation.23 Recent revelations regarding Pakistani nuclear 

technology transfers to Iran, North Korea, and Libya raise the question 
106

of whether Pakistani scientists might have tried to sell nuclear designs 

and equipment to Ankara. Greek analysts have produced several 

studies exploring Turkish interests and capabilities in the nuclear 

realm.24 Most of these pre-date the current détente between Athens 

and Ankara, and most allege a Turkish interest in acquiring nuclear 

material and technology from the Turkic republics of the former 

Soviet Union. Ankara has been quick to deny these allegations. For 

the most part, however, Greece and other neighbors with a stake in 

Turkish nuclear developments have been at least as focused on the 

environmental risks associated with civil nuclear power projects in 

Turkey. Few regional analysts have taken seriously the prospects for 

Turkey becoming a nuclear weapons state. 

 Pursuit of an independent nuclear capability would be a costly 

long-term project for Turkey, given the lack of a substantial civil 

nuclear infrastructure on which to build.25 Western partners would 

not transfer the required technology outside the context of a civil 

program (they have been reluctant to do so even in the context of power 

projects), and all such transfers are now under intense scrutiny. As 

an open, democratic society, it would be extraordinarily difficult for 

Turkey to pursue a clandestine weapons program. To do so openly, 

to “break out” from NPT and technology transfer agreements would 

mean estrangement from key Western allies—or worse. A nucleararmed Turkey would raise many of the same concerns associated 

with a nuclear Germany or a nuclear Japan. It would probably mean 

the end of Turkey’s EU ambitions, and could render the country a 

pariah in NATO circles. In short, it is an inconceivable path under 

current conditions. 

 Under what conditions might Turkey consider running these 

very considerable risks to acquire a nuclear deterrent? Internal 

politics could influence the attractiveness of a nuclear option, but 

it would probably require a complete reversal of Turkey’s secular, 

Western-oriented path—in short, an anti-western revolution. This 

is extraordinary unlikely. Externally, some combination of highly 

disruptive developments could make a nuclear option attractive, if no 

more practical. A short list of such developments would include the 

collapse of NATO and its nuclear-backed security guarantee; a deadend in Turkey’s EU candidacy; a formal collapse of the international 
107

nonproliferation regime and the rise of multiple new nuclear 

weapons states; and the emergence of real, proximate flashpoints in 

Turkish-Iranian relations outside the nuclear realm—taken together, 

regional and international anarchy as seen from Ankara.

Bilateral and Multilateral Responses.

 Without question, Turkey’s preferred response to a nuclear Iran 

will be multilateral. If there is a transatlantic consensus to act, either 

to constrain or sanction Iranian nuclear plans, or to prevent the 

production and deployment of nuclear weapons in a nuclear-ready 

Iran, Ankara will most likely be supportive, diplomatically and 

militarily. In the absence of a transatlantic consensus, the Turkish 

calculus will be more complex and uncertain. With decisions 

regarding EU accession talks looming on the horizon (and with other 

obstacles such as Cyprus on the way to resolution), Ankara will be 

wary of getting out of step with mainstream European policies, even 

under pressure from the United States or Israel. The ideal approach 

from the Turkish perspective would be a multilateral, UN-backed 

action aimed at the nuclear disarmament of Iran, leaving in place 

or even expanding the economic engagement of Tehran—essentially 

the Libyan model.

 If diplomatic pressure and new sanctions are ineffective in slowing 

Iran’s nuclear ambitions and Iran reaches a more advanced “nuclear 

ready” posture or actually prepares for the deployment of nuclear 

weapons, Turkey might back an American or Israeli strike against 

Iranian nuclear and missile facilities. Incirlik airbase could be put at 

the disposal of U.S. air expeditionary forces. Intelligence gathered 

from facilities in Turkey, as well as access to Turkish airspace for 

transit and refueling, would facilitate greatly Israel’s ability to strike 

Iran’s WMD infrastructure.26 Turkey’s increasingly capable air force 

could also contribute to counternuclear operations or strikes against 

Iranian missile sites of special concern (e.g., Shahab-3 launchers). 

 Participation in an Israeli or American strike would imply some 

risks for Turkey, including the possibility of a preemptive or retaliatory 

Iranian missile strike, possibly WMD-armed, on Turkish bases or 

cities. Even Turkish support for stronger nuclear-related sanctions on 

Iran could jeopardize cooperation with Tehran on issues of concern 
108

to Ankara. It could further complicate Turkey’s Kurdish policies, 

and might spur Iranian meddling in Turkey’s religious politics, or 

support for terrorism inside Turkey. On balance, however, Ankara 

will most likely run some risks to assure that it will not confront a 

nuclear Iran, with all that this would imply for longer-term Iranian 

leverage over Ankara across the board. The political dilemmas may 

be more difficult for Turkey, especially in the absence of European 

backing for military action against Iran. With European relations 

in the balance, Ankara might well opt to observe the destruction 

of Iranian nuclear facilities from the sidelines (perhaps with some 

very quiet intelligence and logistical support) rather than risk the 

political—and possibly real—fallout from active participation.

SECTION FOUR: CONCLUSIONS 

AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

 After years of relative neglect of WMD risks emanating from 

the Middle East, Turkey has begun to focus more seriously on these 

risks, above all the prospect of new nuclear powers appearing on the 

country’s borders. A nuclear or near-nuclear Iran would negatively 

affect Turkish interests. Quite apart from the country’s physical 

vulnerability to nuclear attack with missiles of increasing range and 

accuracy, a nuclear-ready Iran would complicate Turkey’s regional 

policies, many closely tied to internal security concerns. Ankara 

already takes Iran seriously as a regional actor. A nuclear Iran would 

acquire far greater strategic weight in its relations with Turkey, and 

others. It is a development Turkey’s security elite and increasingly 

active and well-informed public would prefer not to confront. This 

analysis points to a number of conclusions about Turkey’s exposure 

and potential responses, with some important policy implications 

for the United States, Europe, and NATO.

 First, Turkey’s relations with Iran lack obvious flashpoints for 

direct military confrontation. There are certainly sources of friction, 

and these could worsen. But there is little risk of an overt clash 

of the kind imaginable with Syria until quite recently. Few Turks 

perceive a direct military threat from Iran. A nuclear Iran would 

reduce Ankara’s regional freedom of action, but might not threaten 
109

Turkish security directly in the near-term. The real effect on Turkish 

interests—and it could be substantial—would be of a longer-term, 

geopolitical nature.

 Second, to the extent that Turkey does perceive a threat from 

Iranian WMD and missile capabilities, it tends to be seen as a product 

of American and Israeli confrontation with Iran, and possible 

spillovers affecting Turkey. Turkish bases and population centers 

would be exposed to the retaliatory consequences of intervention by 

Turkey’s western partners. Turks have had to confront this reality 

as part of their calculus of cooperation with Washington in Iraq; it 

operates with equal force in relation to Iran. Turkish exposure, and 

an inherent ambivalence regarding sovereignty compromises in 

defense ties, means that Turkish cooperation in preventive action 

against Iran cannot be taken for granted despite Ankara’s clear 

interest in forestalling the emergence of new nuclear powers in the 

Middle East.

 Third, Turkey will be heavily affected by the strategies of others—

the United States, Europe, Israel, Russia—vis-à-vis a nuclearready Iran. The country is not well-placed to undertake unilateral 

responses, and will exhibit a strong preference for multilateral 

approaches that do not expose Turkey to risks in its overwhelmingly 

important transatlantic and European relationships. Conventional 

and unconventional responses to Iranian nuclear proliferation could 

also have a cascading effect on strategic balances beyond the Middle 

East, affecting Turkish relations with Russia, Greece and others.

 Fourth, the critical external influences on Turkish decisionmaking 

toward a nuclear-ready Iran are the perceived predictability of the 

NATO security guarantee, including a credible nuclear component, 

and Turkey’s continued integration in Europe. To the extent that the 

NATO tie remains credible, Turkey’s leadership is likely to adopt a 

measured response to Iranian risks. To the extent that the prospect of 

EU membership remains alive, Ankara will be wary of policy options 

that might jeopardize relations with Brussels and key European 

partners. Turkey could well find itself caught between more forward 

leaning American and Israeli counterproliferation policies on the one 

hand, and a more relaxed European approach on the other. This would 

be a tremendously challenging situation for Turkey, whose security 
110

establishment, absent political considerations, might well prefer a 

more aggressive stance. The solution would be the development of a 

more assertive European approach to proliferation risks in Iran and 

elsewhere—and there is evidence to suggest that this is emerging.

 Fifth, the United States and Europe have a clear stake in 

encouraging Turkey to take Iranian proliferation risks seriously, but 

without pursuing dangerous and destabilizing unilateral options 

in response. Turkey is inclined to pursue a measured path. In 

doing so, Ankara will rightly seek reassurance regarding NATO’s 

commitment to Turkish defense in Middle Eastern contingencies. 

Turkish policymakers will look for evidence that NATO allies are 

addressing the doctrinal and operational challenges implied by the 

need to confront new nuclear and non-European risks. Turkey will 

seek, and should get, arrangements for the more rapid deployment 

of air and missile defense assets, and accelerated movement in the 

area of theater missile defense, including joint projects with Israeli 

participation. The June 2004 Istanbul Summit offers an excellent 

opportunity to place nuclear and missile risks higher on the NATO 

agenda and higher on bilateral agendas with Ankara.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 4

 1. For a more extensive discussion, see F. Stephen Larrabee and Ian O. Lesser, 

Turkish Foreign Policy in An Age of Uncertainty, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2003.

 2. On Turkey’s strategic culture, see Philip Robins, Suits and Uniforms: Turkish 

Foreign Policy Since the Cold War, London: Hurst and Company, 2003, pp. 161-181.

 3. In the mid-1990s, Turkey initiated a sweeping and very costly plan for 

defense modernization, possibly totaling 150 billion dollars or more in new 

acquisitions and up-grades over 25 years. The financial crisis of 2000 and onward 

has cast considerable doubt on the extent and pace of this program, but key aspects 

continue to move ahead as planned. Annual procurement spending is now in the 

region of $3 billion per year, with an overall defense budget (narrowly defined) of 

roughly $7.5 billion in 2001.

 4. The ability of Turkey’s adversaries to play an internal security card was 

central to the much-debated argument set out by Ambassador Sukru Elekdag in 

1994, regarding the need for a “two and a half war” strategy, with Greece, Syria, 

and the PKK insurgency as key contingencies for planning. 

 5. Until quite recently, the author would have described Turkish policymakers 

as being “in denial” regarding the nature of proliferation risks on the country’s 

borders and the implications for security cooperation with allies. See Ian O. Lesser 
111

and Ashley J. Tellis, Strategic Exposure: Proliferation Around the Mediterranean, Santa 

Monica, CA: RAND, 1996.

 6. Efraim Inbar, “The Turkish-Israeli Entente,” unpublished paper.

 7. Robins, p. 202.

 8. See Anthony H. Cordesman, Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle 

East, London: Brassey’s, 1991, pp. 40-42; and Duygu Sezer, Turkey’s New Security 

Environment, Nuclear Weapons and Proliferation, Los Alamos, NM: Center for 

National Security Studies, 1994.

 9. See, for example, Turkish Daily News, August 11, 1992, cited in Robins, p. 

203.

 10. See Lesser, “Playing Turkey,” Aspenalia, Vol. 21, No. 22, 2003, pp. 166-174.

 11. For a official Turkish assessment of NATO defense support to Turkey in 

the run-up to the Iraq War, see Turkey’s Security Perspectives and Its Relations with 

NATO, Turkish Foreign Ministry, December 2003, p. 4, www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/af/

secure.htm.

 12. I am grateful to Alan Makovsky for this description of Turkish attitudes 

toward the Middle East.

 13. For an excellent discussion of Turkish strategy in the Middle East generally, 

see Kemal Kirisci, “Post Cold War Turkish Security and the Middle East,” Middle 

East Review of International Affairs (hereafter MERIA), Vol. 1, No. 2, July 1997.

 14. See Amberin Zaman, “Syrian Leader’s Visit Highlights Shift in Relations 

with Turkey,” Los Angeles Times, January 7, 2004.

 15. Soner Cagaptay, “A Turkish Rapprochement with Middle East Rogue 

States?” Policywatch, No. 825, Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East 

Policy, January 9, 2004.

 16. See A Secure Europe in A Better World: European Security Strategy, Paris: 

European Union Institute for Security Studies, December 2003; and the “Action 

Plan for the Implementation of the Basic Principles for an EU Strategy against 

Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction,” The European Union and WMD 

Non-proliferation, 2003, accessed at http://www.sipri.org/contents/expcon/eu_wmd.

html.

 17. This linkage is also noted in Javier Solana, “The EU Security Strategy: 

Implications for Europe’s Role in a Changing World,” remarks delivered in Berlin, 

November 12, 2003, accessed at http://europa-eu-un.org/articles/en/article_3006_

en.htm.

 18. See Dalia Dassa Kaye, “Europe, Syria and Weapons of Mass Destruction,” 

Policywatch, No. 824, January 8, 2004, Washington, DC: Washington Institute for 

Near East Policy.

 19. “Report on Turkey’s Plans to Launch its Own Missile into Space by 2010 at 

Earliest,” Istanbul Milliyet, February 1, 2004 (FBIS text).
112

 20. See Guray Al, “Turkey’s Response to Threats of Weapons of Mass 

Destruction,” unpublished thesis, Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 

December 2001, p. 119. 

 21. Ephraim Kam and Yiftah Shapir, eds., The Middle East Strategic Balance 

2002-2003, Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, 2003, p. 259.

 22. See Robins, p. 205. For an extensive discussion of Turkey’s civil nuclear 

program, see Mustafa Kibaroglu, “Turkey’s Quest for Peaceful Nuclear Power,” 

The Nonproliferation Review, Spring/Summer 1997.

 23. Kibaroglu, pp. 38-39.

 24. See, for example, Thanos Dokos, “Greece,” in Harald Muller, ed., Nuclear 

Export Controls in Europe, Brussels: European Interuniversity Press, 1995; and 

Spyros Traiforos, “Nuclear Policy in Turkey: Is Turkey on Its way to Become a 

Nuclear Weapons State?” Defensor Pacis, January 1, 1999.

 25. Robins, p. 205.

 26. See Michael Eisenstadt, “Turkish-Israeli Military Cooperation: An 

Assessment,” Policywatch No. 262, Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near 

East Policy, July 24, 1997.
113

CHAPTER 5

THE DAY AFTER IRAN GETS THE BOMB

Kenneth R. Timmerman

 Many analysts believe that a nuclear-ready Iran will act rationally 

and respond positively to Western-style cost-benefits analysis. Iran’s 

clerical leaders are not suicidal, this argument goes, and do not seek a 

military confrontation with either the United States or Israel, because 

of the tremendous damage their country is likely to suffer.

 Others argue that Iran has responded to classic deterrence in the 

past, and can be deterred successfully in the future. They point to 

the brief but brutal confrontation in November 1987 between the 

U.S. Navy and Iranian Revolutionary Guards forces who were using 

three offshore oil platforms as bases for harassment attacks against 

shipping in the Gulf. The United States destroyed the oil platforms 

and sank a number of Iranian ships, and Iran ceased its aggressive 

tactics. A nuclear Iran may talk aggressively, but in practice it can be 

contained and deterred.

 But as I will argue in this chapter, this interpretation of Iranian 

behavior overlooks key facts, among them:

• Iran’s motivation for seeking nuclear weapons;

• Iran’s long record of support for international terrorism, 

including terror attacks against U.S. military targets in Beirut 

(Marine Barracks, 1983) and Dahran (Khobar Towers, 1996); 

and,

• The internal dynamics and core values of the regime.

DIPLOMATIC AND ECONOMIC MOVES

Conclusion 1: Iran will not Give Up Its Nuclear Capabilities 

through Negotiation.

 After 16 months of intensified International Atomic energy 

Agency (IAEA) inspections during which Iran agreed to suspend 
114

uranium enrichment and to stop building enrichment centrifuges, the 

Iranian leadership decided to reverse course and resume enrichment 

activities. On June 12, 2004, Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi 

announced that Iran “won’t accept any new [safeguard] obligations. 

Iran has a high technical capability and has to be recognized by the 

international community as a member of the nuclear club. This is an 

irreversible path.”

 Kharrazi essentially pointed to the red line, indicating that 

Iran had no intention of abandoning its work to master the entire 

nuclear fuel cycle, from uranium mining, milling, conversion, and 

enrichment, to spent fuel reprocessing. “That somebody demands 

that we give up the nuclear fuel cycle . . . is an additional demand,” he 

said. “We can’t accept such an additional demand, which is contrary 

to our legal and legitimate rights,” he said. “No one in Iran can make 

a decision to deny the nation of something that is a source of pride.”1

That “pride” clearly does not stem from mastering civilian nuclear 

technology, since Iran has been working in this area since its first 

U.S.-built research reactor went critical in November 1967.2

 Similar statements about Iran’s nuclear intentions have been 

made by Hasan Rohani, head of the Iran’s Supreme National 

Security Council, and the regime’s chief nuclear negotiator; Supreme 

Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei; and recently-elected leaders of 

Iran’s Parliament, or Majlis. Even so-called “moderate” President 

Mohammad Khatami said his country had no obligation to respect 

the IAEA injunctions. “Nothing stands in the way” of renewed 

centrifuge activity, he declared on July 15, 2004, shortly after Iran 

broke the seals the IAEA had placed on key production equipment. 

“We are not committed any longer to the promise to expand the 

suspension to include building centrifuges because they [Britain, 

Germany, and France] failed to keep their promise of closing Iran’s 

dossier,” he said.3 On July 28, the IAEA reported that Iran had 

resumed production of uranium hexafluoride gas. That same day, 

an IAEA Governing Board member state circulated a two-page 

intelligence report alleging that “Iranian middlemen . . . are in the 

advanced stages of negotiations in Russia to buy deuterium gas” as 

a booster for thermonuclear warheads.4

 Iran has insisted on mastering the fuel cycle even though its 

insistence has caused delays and increased the cost of building the 
115

Bushier nuclear plant. To meet proliferation concerns, Russia initially 

offered to deliver reactor fuel worth $30 million for Bushier over a 

10-year period starting in 2001, taking the spent fuel rods back to 

Russia for reprocessing.5 But Iran subsequently rejected the Russian 

demand. In June 2003, the Russian government—eager to get paid and 

to conclude additional nuclear deals with Iran—offered to guarantee 

deliveries of nuclear fuel regardless of whether Iran acceded to the 

“Additional Protocol,” a key IAEA demand. Finally, in October 

2003, Russian defense minister Sergey Ivanov declared, during a 

visit to Canada, that Russia would only supply the fuel if Iran made 

good on its pledge to sign a contract for returning spent nuclear fuel 

to Russia.6

 By that point, Iran was unveiling to the IAEA its own 

nuclear fuel fabrication and reprocessing capabilities, making the 

whole question of Russian fuel deliveries and reprocessing moot.

 Iran can be expected to continue this type of commercial nuclear 

hardball with its suppliers. As it gains expertise and capabilities, 

Iran could conceivably sever its commercial relationship with Russia 

and operate the reactor on its own under IAEA safeguards, until it 

decides to reprocess the spent fuel for a nuclear weapons arsenal. 

 Ignoring this recent history, a July 2004 Council on Foreign 

Relations (CFR) Task Force on Iran report suggested a grand nuclear 

bargain to the ruling clerics in Tehran. Under the CFR proposal, 

Iran would be asked to commit to permanently ceasing all its enrichment 

and reprocessing activities, subject to international verification. In return, 

the international community would guarantee access to adequate nuclear 

fuel supplies, with assurances that all spent fuel would be returned to the 

country of origin, and to advanced power generation technology (whose 

export to Iran is currently restricted).7

But Tehran’s leaders have already rejected this approach; saying 

“pretty please” won’t help. The Islamic Republic wants to retain 

these capabilities because it wants to use the “legend” of nuclear 

power to mask its break-out capabilities. Iran’s negotiating record 

with the IAEA shows that the only nuclear bargain it finds of interest 

is one that runs out the clock, playing on the delusions of the willfully 

naïve and the appeasers until Iran has enriched enough uranium 

for a modest arsenal. France, Britain, and Germany have further 
116

encouraged Iran toward intransigence by allowing it to break the 

IAEA seals on centrifuge production equipment with impunity.

Conclusion 2: Iran will Leverage Its Friends and Suppliers.

 The Islamic Republic has few real friends. Syria and Libya were 

allies in its 8-year war against Iraq; and while Syria has remained 

true, Libya has not. There are indications that Iran’s ruling clerics 

fear what Qaddafi will tell the United States and Britain about 

their shared uranium enrichment procurement efforts, following 

Libya’s unilateral decision in December 2003 to surrender its nuclear 

weapons programs and equipment to the United States and Britain. 

Unconfirmed reports suggest that Iran has been arming the Libyan 

Combat Islamic Group at camps in southern Iran, after Qaddafi 

expelled the group from Libya in 1997. The group initially relocated 

to Afghanistan, where it worked with al Qaeda, but relocated to Iran 

after the United States expelled the Taliban regime in late 2001.8

 A 

nuclear-ready Iran will feel more brazen to “punish” Qaddafi for 

cooperating with the United States and Britain by supporting this 

and other Libyan opposition groups. It also will reinforce ties with 

Syria, using Syria as a transit point for arming Hezbollah in Lebanon 

for stepped up attacks on Israel. It may be tempted to share weapons 

of mass destruction (WMD) technologies with Syria.

 If friends are few, suppliers are many. The Islamic Republic’s 

military and strategic relationship with North Korea goes back to 

the early 1980s and, because of the secrecy of both regimes, is not 

well-known to the general public. Iran’s Shahab-3 missile program 

was developed with North Korean, as well as Russian assistance. 

Former Revolutionary Guards commander Major General Mohsen 

Rezai was a key player in the military exchanges with North Korea, 

and frequently traveled to Pyongyang to observe missile tests and 

purchase equipment. Considered by regime insiders as a nationalist, 

not an Islamist, Rezai’s continued involvement in Iran’s strategic 

weapons programs is another indicator that all factions of the ruling 

elite consider the acquisition of broad-based WMD capabilities critical 

for the regime’s survival. In late June 2004, new reports surfaced 

that Iran had been purchasing highly enriched uranium (HEU) from 
117

North Korea over the previous 2 years. A nuclear-ready Iran could 

step up these purchases as a counter to international inspections or 

surveillance of its own enrichment plants.

 Russia has been a major supplier of conventional weapons and 

nuclear and missile technologies. Indicators of Russia’s willingness to 

help Iran’s nuclear weapons program first surfaced nearly a decade 

ago when President Yeltsin’s advisor for Ecological Affairs, Alexei 

Yablokov, revealed that part of the $800 million nuclear deal signed 

between Russia and Iran in January 1995 included a Russian offer 

to supply a complete centrifuge enrichment plant.9 This was further 

confirmed when the complete text of the accord was published in 

May 1995 by the Natural Resources Defence Council in Washington, 

DC. 

 After intense U.S. criticism, President Yeltsin acknowledged 

at the Moscow summit on May 10, 1995, that the agreement with 

Iran contained military as well as civilian nuclear technology and 

material, but insisted that it had been “concluded legitimately and 

in accordance with international law and no international treaties 

were violated in the process.” Yeltsin added that Russia was now 

amenable, 

to separate those two. In as much as they relate to the military component 

and the potential for creating weapons grade fuel and other matters—the 

centrifuge, the construction of shafts—we have decided to exclude those 

aspects from the contract. So the military component falls away and what 

remains is just a civilian nuclear power station with light water reactors, 

which are designed to provide heat and power.10

Since that time, world attention has focused on Russia’s ongoing 

negotiations with Iran over Bushier, not its involvement in the 

Iranian centrifuge enrichment program or the supply of know-how 

and expertise. In its public reports, the IAEA has pointedly excised 

all references to the “foreign sources” of Iran’s centrifuge enrichment 

and reprocessing equipment.

 Russia’s role in helping Iran to design and build the nuclearcapable Shahab-3 missile is much better known and well-documented 

than North Korea’s. On July 20, 2003, production missiles were 

delivered to the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps, following 
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a final evaluation test that demonstrated that the Shahab-3 was 

capable of launching a nuclear warhead to targets up to 800 miles 

distant, bringing Israel and U.S. bases throughout the Middle East 

into range. Top military and strategic advisors to Presidents Yeltsin 

and Putin have argued that Russia’s long-term strategic interests are 

best-served by a powerful Iran capable of checking U.S. power in the 

Persian Gulf. Accordingly, Russia defied U.S. pressure throughout 

the mid and late 1990s by continuing to provide assistance to the 

Iranian missile programs, despite U.S. sanctions and threats of a cutoff in space cooperation.11

 Far from alienating Russia, a nuclear-ready Iran will exploit this 

long-standing relationship in ways that on the surface could appear 

contradictory. On the one hand, Iran might grudgingly agree to a 

Russian cut-off in assistance to the Bushier nuclear plant—thereby 

allowing Russia to appear “helpful” to Western nations seeking to 

apply pressure on Iran to abandon its clandestine nuclear capabilities. 

But at the same time, the Russian government could “wink and nod” 

at “nongovernment actors” who provide nuclear assistance and 

technology to Iran through grey market deals, just as they did with 

Iran’s missile programs.

 If the United States and its allies take Iran’s case to the United 

Nations (UN), Iran will seek Russia’s support in preventing UN 

Security Council sanctions or resolutions authorizing the use of 

force. To achieve Russian cooperation, Iran’s leaders will offer 

Russia commercial inducements (oil and gas development contracts, 

industrial contracts, etc.) and strategic inducements, such as a pledge 

not to support Islamic groups in Chechnya and elsewhere opposing 

Russian rule. Iran played a similar game with noteworthy success 

during the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war. The Union of Soviet Socialist 

Republics (USSR) rewarded Iran for its refusal to tolerate anti-Soviet 

resistance activities by Afghan refugees with extensive covert arms 

deliveries from the USSR and its surrogates. The Soviet-Iran arms 

relationship emerged into the open in June 1989, when the two 

countries signed a $1.9 billion arms transfer agreement that included 

MiG 29 jet fighters and T-72 tanks.12

 Communist China is another key partner. China’s assistance 

to Iran’s nuclear programs began with the supply of a subcritical 
119

“training reactor” in 1985. China has helped Iran exploit uranium 

mines in Yazd province, giving Iran an unsafeguarded source of 

nuclear material for enrichment; it has supplied milling plants, and 

reportedly, a facility for producing uranium hexafluoride gas for 

enrichment centrifuges. Chinese assistance to Iran’s nuclear efforts 

was so extensive by 1991 that President George H. W. Bush issued a 

rare public rebuke to China’s leaders.13 Iran has now acknowledged 

having built many of these facilities, and has opened some of them 

to inspection by the IAEA, which has been careful in its public 

reports not to name names or even identify the countries involved in 

transferring critical technologies and design information. 

 A nuclear ready Iran will leverage trade for political support 

from China as well—both to restrain the IAEA, and when that fails 

and Iran’s case is referred to the UN, to veto UN Security Council 

action.

Conclusion 3: Iran will Attempt to Drive a Wedge between Europe 

and the United States.

 Britain, France, and Germany have been trying since the fall of 

2003 to convince Iran to abandon the most dangerous elements of its 

previously undeclared nuclear program. European Foreign Ministers 

have announced a series of “agreements” and “understandings” with 

Tehran aimed at freezing Iran’s uranium enrichment, reprocessing, 

and heavy water programs. In exchange, the Europeans have pledged 

to block U.S. efforts to get the IAEA to refer Iran’s noncompliance 

with the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to the UN Security Council 

for eventual sanctions. So far, Iran has found excuses for not 

respecting its commitments to the Europeans without any ill effects. 

Even after the IAEA announced that Iran had broken IAEA seals on 

its centrifuge production equipment in late July 2004, the Europeans 

refused to cancel a scheduled negotiating session with the Iranians 

in Paris.

 The Islamic Republic has faced down Europe before. In 1997, 

after a German court convicted the Tehran leadership of having 

ordered the gangland murder of Iranian Kurdish dissidents at the 

Mykonos restaurant in Berlin, the European Union (EU) recalled its 
120

ambassadors from Tehran and issued arrest warrants for top Iranian 

government officials. Iran denied the verdict, refused to hand over 

its officials, and the EU sent its ambassadors back to Tehran a few 

months later.

 A nuclear-ready Iran will seek to turn Europe against the United 

States and Israel, offering lucrative trade agreements and superficial 

concessions at the IAEA to win EU backing. As further inducements, 

Iran could offer intelligence on terrorist groups operating in Europe 

(some of which it may itself be funding), or even concessionary oil 

supply arrangements. It could invite European journalists to tour its 

nuclear facilities, as a demonstration of Iran’s peaceful intent. Should 

Europe adopt a harder line and back U.S.-led sanctions or military 

force, however, Iran could step up work on its Shahab-4 missiles, said 

to have sufficient range to target European capitols.

STRATEGIC AND MILITARY MOVES

Conclusion 4: The Regime’s Core Values will Drive It Ineluctably 

toward Aggressive Military Action, Not Responsibility.

 Until recently, U.S. policy toward Iran has been driven by 

two underlying assumptions. The first assumption was that there 

were “moderates” within the ruling elite who sincerely wanted to 

cooperate with the United States, and who had serious differences 

with hard-liners in areas of critical U.S. interest14. The second was 

that the United States could offer them sufficient incentives (or inflict 

enough pain on the hard-liners) to convince the clerics to change 

those policies the United States found objectionable: in this case, to 

freeze and ultimately abandon nuclear weapons development. For 

nearly 2 decades, these assumptions have rarely been debated, let 

alone challenged, except by a select group of analysts.

 But as I have argued elsewhere,15 the drive to obtain nuclear 

weapons and a broad spectrum of WMD capabilities is only one of 

five goals that unite the ruling clerical elite. These are the core values 

that form the bedrock of this regime, and will shape the actions of a 

nuclear-ready Iran. The remaining four are:

 1. Maintaining the Islamic Republic at all costs, starting with the 

system of Velayat-e faghih (absolute clerical rule). Iran’s ruling clerics 
121

understand that their regime is increasingly unpopular at home. In 

July 1999, students at universities across the country revolted. While 

the regime has managed through heavy-handed repression to break 

the back of organized opposition, the signs that trouble is brewing 

just beneath the surface are many.

 On the eve of the February 2004 parliamentary elections, 117 

reformist members of Parliament resigned en masse to protest having 

been barred from running. The reformers had been seeking a “kinder, 

gentler” Islamic Republic, not an end to absolute clerical rule. The 

resulting election sweep by hard-liners effectively marked the end of 

the reform movement mirage. Iranian voters massively boycotted the 

elections but as of yet have not managed to otherwise challenge the 

regime, which has emerged emboldened from the election crisis.

 At the same time, regime leaders fear foreign support for the prodemocracy movement, and increasingly view the proliferation of 

satellite radio and television broadcasts into Iran from abroad with 

alarm. As the United States contemplates providing support for the 

pro-democracy movement, we must understand that Iran’s new 

nuclear capabilities increase the stakes. A nuclear-ready Iran will not 

stop at violently suppressing domestic dissent, but will actively seek 

ways of lashing out at what it sees as the sources of that dissent: the 

United States and Israel. Similarly, any outbreak of dissent inside 

Iran, whether fueled by outside forces or not, will be blamed on the 

United States and Israel.

 2. Aggressive expansion of Iran’s influence in the Persian Gulf 

region to become the predominant power, militarily, politically, and 

eventually economically. The Islamic Republic has a long history of 

using terror and subversion against neighboring states to achieve 

its goals. With a real or virtual nuclear arsenal at its disposal, Iran’s 

leaders may be emboldened to take more aggressive steps to assert its 

pre-eminence and to weaken competitors. A few examples include:

Saudi Arabia. Iran will resist Saudi efforts to step up oil production 

in order to lower world oil prices, and will want Saudi Arabia to 

feel the heat of Iran’s new power. A nuclear ready Iran could feel 

emboldened to step up its support for Saudi terrorist groups and 

direct them to sabotage or otherwise attack Saudi oil installations, 

should the Saudis refuse to decrease production. 
122

Iraq. The Iranian government pursued an aggressive campaign of 

subversion against the Iraqi Governing Council following Operation 

IRAQI FREEDOM. It supported renegade Shiite cleric Muqtada Sadr, 

beamed anti-American propaganda into Iraq on 42 Arabic-language 

radio and television stations, and built a network of social services in 

southern Iraq that bested those provided by the Coalition Provisional 

Authority and the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC). A nuclear-ready 

Iran could step up subversion inside Iraq (attacks on oil installations, 

U.S. and Iraqi forces), with the goals of scaling back Iraqi oil exports, 

driving the United States to withdraw its troops, and preventing the 

emergence of a strong central Iraqi government that could challenge 

Iran.

Qatar. Iran is competing with Qatar to attract international 

investment to develop a massive shared gas field in the Persian Gulf. 

(The Iranians refer to the offshore gas field as South Pars; the Qataris 

call it the North Dome.) They are also competing to supply natural 

gas to India and Pakistan.16. Fear of a natural gas “glut” could lead 

Iran to seek to limit foreign investment in Qatari gas projects.

Turkey. Iran’s main economic competitor in the region is Turkey. 

Should Turkey’s secular parties or the military replace the current 

Islamic governing party, Iran could resume its support for Islamic 

terrorist groups to destabilize Turkey.

3. Calls to end the U.S. military presence in the Persian Gulf, which 

the Islamic Republic views as a direct challenge to its predominance. 

The Islamic Republic has long sought to force the withdrawal of U.S. 

military forces from the Gulf. Since the testimony of former Federal 

Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Director Louis Freeh on December 18, 

2003, in a civil suit against the Islamic Republic of Iran brought by 

families of the Dhahran victims, Iran’s direct involvement in the 

bombing has become a matter of public record. The Iranian attack 

was aimed at causing casualties unacceptable to the U.S. public that 

would force a U.S. withdrawal from Saudi Arabia. 17

 In the past, the regime’s use of terror against U.S. targets has 

been selective, as Iran carefully gauged the U.S. response. A nuclear 

ready Iran will feel emboldened to launch terrorist attacks on U.S. 

forces wherever they are stationed in the region as the price of U.S. 

retaliation dramatically escalates. To step up pressure on the United 
123

States to withdraw its forces, Iranian surrogates could also launch 

attacks against countries that host U.S. military bases (Qatar, Kuwait, 

the United Arab Emirates [UAE], Bahrain, Oman), and on U.S. naval 

ships patrolling the Gulf. (It is my judgment that Iran is less likely to 

seek to close the Strait of Hormuz, since this would cripple its own 

oil exports, or to openly challenge U.S. warships passing through 

the Strait, if it can achieve its goal of a U.S. military pullout through 

other means).

4. Active subversion of the Middle East peace process. 

Notwithstanding the vicious anti-Semitic rhetoric of its leaders, the 

Islamic Republic views Israel as a competitor. The ruling clerics fear 

that if the peace process succeeds, Israel will become the predominant 

economic power in the region and the partner of choice for the Arab 

world, Turkey, and Central Asia, instead of Iran. A nuclear-ready 

Iran will seek to broaden the struggle against Israel by expanding its 

support for terrorist groups based in the Palestinian territories, Syria 

and Lebanon. If war between Israel and its Arab neighbors were to 

break out, Iran has made clear it would throw its support behind 

Syria.

Conclusion 5: Iran Hopes Nuclear Capability will Deter a U.S. or 

Israeli Conventional Strike.

 The chronology of Iranian nuclear development, which has 

accelerated rapidly since the September 11, 2001, attacks on America, 

strongly supports the view that Iran’s leaders believe they can deter 

an American conventional attack with the threat of nuclear retaliation. 

“Iran’s national defense doctrine has been based on the assumption 

that it will, one day, fight a war with the United States, plus its Arab 

allies and Israel,” writes Iranian analyst Amir Taheri. 

The central assumption of Iranian strategists is that the U.S. cannot 

sustain a long war. It is therefore necessary to pin down its forces and 

raise the kill-die ratio to levels unacceptable to the American public. In 

the meantime, Iran would put its nuclear weapons program in high gear, 

and brandish the threat of nuclear war as a means of forcing the U.S 

to accept a ceasefire and withdraw its forces from whatever chunk of 

Iranian territory they may have seized.18
124

Iran’s leaders have become increasingly bold in brandishing the 

threat of using nuclear weapons against Israel should the Israelis 

attempt a conventional strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities. This is 

dramatically different from the Cold War logic of mutually-assured 

destruction, since it states that Iran would escalate a conventional 

conflict into a nuclear exchange. 

 But they have also hinted that they seek nuclear weapons (and 

the missiles needed to deliver them) to give them new offensive 

capabilities. Iran’s Defense Minister Ali Shamkhani told reporters 

after a September 25, 1998, military parade that Iran would strike “in 

a way the Israelis cannot imagine” in the event Israel should launch 

a preemptive attack on Iran. “Today, we are much stronger than in 

the past. The most clear example is the Shahab-3. It will make the 

Israelis ponder about putting an end to the arms race one day,” he 

said. Banners with the slogan, “Israel must be wiped off the map” 

in both Farsi and English, were hung from the Shahab-3 missiles put 

on parade. Shamkhani explained: “We have written on the warhead 

of the Shahab-3 that this will not land in any Islamic country. . . . Of 

course, this program will be pursued, and we will have the Shahab-4 

and even the Shahab-5 to respond to our defense needs.”19

 At times, Iran’s leaders speak with a kind of millennial exaltation 

when evoking a nuclear exchange with Israel. In a speech in Tehran 

in October 2000, former president Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani 

clearly stated that Iran believed it would come out the winner. “In 

a nuclear duel in the region, Israel may kill 100 million Muslims,” 

Rafsanjani said. “Muslims can sustain such casualties, knowing that, 

in exchange, there would be no Israel on the map.”20

 Rafsanjani expanded on this doomsday calculus in a oft-cited 

Friday prayer sermon in Tehran on December 14, 2001, noting “the 

use of a [single] nuclear bomb in Israel will leave nothing on the 

ground,” whereas an Israeli strike on Iran “will only damage the 

world of Islam” [emphasis mine]. Rafsanjani said that Israel would 

be “removed from the region and the world of Islam [as] ‘extraneous 

matter’,” and that “those who have gathered together in Israel 

would one day be dispersed again.” This is not the language of 

mutually assured destruction or deterrence. This is the language of 

genocide.21
125

 When asked about the possibility of Israel launching a preemptive 

strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities, Rafsanjani boasted to al-Jazeera 

television on September 18, 2003, “We are not worried about Israel 

and its threats. If Israel committed such an error, we would give it a 

slap it would never forget—not only during several years, but for all 

its history.”22

 Rafsanjani gets credited with having revived Iran’s stalled nuclear 

program, first as Parliament Speaker in the early 1980s, and later as 

President from 1989-97. He now heads the Expediency Council, a 

leadership body capable of overturning the legislature or even the 

Islamic Republic’s main religious court, the Council of Guardians. 

Once labeled a moderate by the Washington Post and the State 

Department, “either Rafsanjani fooled diplomats and pundits alike, 

or moderate in Iran implies first-strike use of nuclear weapons,” 

scholar Michael Rubin commented.23

 Other government spokesmen have reinforced Rafsanjani’s 

threats, as Israeli officials began warning publicly that a preemptive 

strike against Iranian nuclear sites could become necessary. Seyed 

Masood Jazayeri, spokesman for Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, 

accused Washington of using its “wild dog”—Israel—to go after 

Iran’s nuclear programs. If Israel tried to disrupt the Iranian program, 

it “would be wiped off the face of the Earth and U.S. interests would 

be easily damaged,” he warned in July 2004.24 President Khatami 

added that Iran would consider the United States co-responsible for 

an Israeli attack. “In the international arena, America’s capital is Tel 

Aviv, not Washington. It’s the Zionists who dominate the United 

States,” he told reporters as he emerged from a Cabinet meeting. 

He also announced that Iran had resumed uranium enrichment 

activities.25

 The clarity of Iran’s threats should not be dismissed as mere 

exaggeration or wishful thinking. A nuclear-ready Iran is likely to 

goad Israel into launching a preemptive attack, after it has dispersed 

its nuclear material to ensure that it survives the strike. If the regime 

feels threatened—from domestic dissent, or foreign attack—the risk 

of nuclear miscalculation is enormous.
126

U.S. OPTIONS

 In my judgment, the United States has only two options if it 

allows Iran to achieve breakout nuclear capability: capitulation, or 

war. The United States might seek to encourage Iran to become a 

“responsible” member of the nuclear club, by opening a “dialogue” 

with the regime. In exchange for Iran’s agreement to abide by “rules” 

such as no nuclear first use, and no onward proliferation to third 

parties, the United States might chose to offer incentives such as:

 • a resumption of normal trade and investment,

 • a resumption of diplomatic relations,

 • an end to stigmatizing the Islamic Republic as a member of 

the Axis of Evil, and

 • ending “the language of regime change.”26

 The recent Council on Foreign Relations report opines that 

the underlying rationale for Iran’s persistent clandestine nuclear 

weapons programs is its fear of regional rivals, especially the United 

States. “Ultimately, only in the context of an overall rapprochement 

with Washington will there be any prospect of persuading Iran to 

make the strategic decision to relinquish its nuclear program,” the 

report states.

 Such an analysis assumes that Iran developed nuclear weapons as 

a bargaining chip, which it would be willing to give up in exchange 

for certain concessions. But the United States repeatedly has offered 

to resume normal trade and investment, to hold a security dialogue 

with the regime, and to eschew the language of regime change, if only 

Iran would abandon other objectionable behavior—in particular, its 

support of international terrorist groups and its violent opposition to 

the Middle East peace process. If the Islamic Republic was unwilling 

to take up the offer when the costs were relatively low, why should 

it take the offer now when the costs are much higher? At best, the 

Islamic Republic might agree to a U.S. offer of trade and relations, 

in exchange for a pledge of no nuclear first use and no onward 

proliferation. But Iran’s leaders will take such a U.S. offer as a sign 

of weakness. Far from giving up its nuclear capability in exchange, 
127

the Iranian regime will insist that it be treated with respect as a 

new member of the nuclear club. With the EU, Russia, and China in 

agreement to thwart strong UN Security Council action, the United 

States will have no levers available should Iran find a convenient 

excuse at some later date to break its promise and unsheath the 

nuclear sword.

 The only other option for the United States is preemptive war. If 

so, it will be war in splendid isolation, and with active opposition from 

Europe, Russia, China, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, 

and just about every UN member state except, possibly, Israel.

 Once the United States begins a buildup of offensive forces poised 

on Iran’s borders, the Islamic regime is unlikely to wait before it 

uses whatever nuclear arsenal it possesses. Its first target will not be 

U.S. forces, but Israel. The Islamic regime will claim to be attacking 

in “self-defense” (and most of world public opinion will probably 

agree), since the U.S. administration will be portrayed as doing 

Israel’s bidding, as the “moderate” president Khatami asserts. 

 Only one Iranian nuclear-tipped missile needs to penetrate 

Israel’s Arrow anti-missile defenses to devastate Israel’s highlyconcentrated population. Even a cowed Israeli leadership, deterred 

from preemptively attacking Iranian nuclear sites, can be expected 

to unleash its nuclear arsenal, in a tragic reenactment of the Jewish 

defenders at Masada 2,000 years ago, who preferred suicide to 

surrendering to the Roman legion.

A NUCLEAR IRAN IS NOT AN OPTION

 From the foregoing, it should be clear that allowing a nuclear Iran 

to emerge, for as long as Iran is ruled by a radical clerical regime, is not 

an option any U.S. policymaker wants to face. It should also be clear 

that the intentions of Iran’s leaders are the issue, not the capabilities 

of its military. If nuclear weapons alone were the problem, the United 

States would have security issues with Great Britain.

 It is my judgment that the United States must take decisive action 

before Iran becomes nuclear-ready, for as long as the Islamic regime 

remains in power in Tehran.
128

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 5

 1. Ali Akbar Dareini, “Tehran Says No to New Oversight,” Washington Times, 

June 13, 2004, accessed at http://www.washtimes.com/world/20040612-113944-3765r.

htm.

 2. This 5 MegaWatt reactor, installed at the University of Tehran’s Tehran 

Nuclear Research Center (TNRC), was supplied by AMF Atomics, a division of 

American Machine and Foundry, and was initially fueled with U.S.-supplied 

highly enriched uranium (HEU).

 3. “No Impediments for Iran to Build Uranium Centrifuges,” Gulf News, July 

15, 2004. The IAEA acknowledged that its seals had been broken on July 27. 

 4. “Agents Seek Russian Sale of Nuke-Boosting Gas,” Washington Times, July 

29, 2004.

 5. “Russia to Supply Iran with Nuclear Fuel,” Washington Times, August 24, 

1995; see also, “Russian Nuclear Deal Worries Germans,” Iran Brief, September 5, 

1995.

 6. “Russia Not to Export Nuclear Fuel to Iran,” http://www.russiajournal.com/

news/cnewswire.shtml?nw=40726#n40726.

7. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Brent Scowcroft, et.al, Iran: Time for a New Approach, 

Council on Foreign Relations, July 2004, p. 39.

 8. Con Coughlin, “Tehran Will Turn Terrorists on Gaddafi If The Former Ally 

Reveals Its Nuclear Weapon Secrets,” Sunday Telegraph (London), February 29, 

2004.

 9. “Uranium Enrichment Program Confirmed,” Iran Brief, May 1, 1005.

 10. “Russian Nuclear Deals are On,” Iran Brief, June 1, 1995. I provide a 

more detailed chronology of Iran’s then clandestine nuclear weapons efforts and 

its suppliers in “Iran’s Nuclear Program: Myth and Reality,” a paper presented 

before the Sixth International Castiglioncello Conference, Castiglioncello, Italy, 

September 30, 1995. (Fifty Years of Nuclear Weapon: Proceedings of the Sixth 

Castiglioncello Conference, USPID, Milano (Italy), 1996.)

 11. Kenneth R. Timmerman, “Russian Assistance to Iran’s Missile Programs,” 

testimony before the Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics of the Committee 

on Science, U.S. House of Representatives, July 13, 1999.

 12. “Post-Khomeini Iran: Looking for Friends,” Mednews, Vol. 17, Issue 2, June 

26, 1989.

 13. “The China-Iran Nuclear Cloud,” Mednews, July 22, 1991.

 14. Many journalists and academics continue to use the terms “moderate” 

and “conservative” to describe the two main camps. I will discuss Khatami’s 

“moderation” in this chapter. As for the “conservatism” of clerics such as Ayatollah 

Khamenei, who was educated at Patrice Lumumba University and has long 
129

supported state control of the economy, he is about as “conservative” as Joseph 

Stalin. For a more detailed discussion, see “Change in Iran and Challenges for U.S. 

Policy-makers,” a paper delivered at a Congressional Research Service forum on 

Iran, January 8, 1999, available at http://www.iran.org/tib/krt/krt_index.htm. 

 15. See, in particular, “Fighting Proliferation through Democracy: A 

Competitive Strategies Approach Toward Iran”; From Prevailing in a Well-Armed 

World: Devising Competitive Strategies Against Weapons Proliferation, Henry Sokolski, 

ed., Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, March 2000. 

Versions of this thesis were presented in seminar format at the U.S. Army War 

College, the U.S. Department of Energy, and elsewhere.

 16. In July 2004, Iran revived stalled efforts to attract investment to build an 

Iran-India natural gas pipeline that would cross Pakistan, either by land or in 

Pakistan’s offshore economic zone.

 17. Freeh and his deputy for Counterterrorism, Dale Watson, described 

FBI interviews with participants in the attack who provided evidence to the 

FBI that they had been trained, funded, and armed by the Iranian government. 

Testimony in Heiser v. Islamic Republic of Iran, U.S. District Court for the District 

of Columbia. See also Kenneth R. Timmerman, Countdown to Crisis: The Coming 

Nuclear Showdown with Iran, New York: Crown Forum, 2005, pp. 188-189.

 18. 20. Amir Taheri, “Recipe for Disaster,” National Review, November 14, 

2003; http://www.nationalreview.com/nr_comment/taheri200311140918.asp.

 19. “Shamkhani’s Threats,” Iran Brief, October 5, 1998.

 20. Taheri.

 21. Rafsanjani’s sermon was paraphrased in Tehran newspapers. This quote 

comes from the English-language version that appeared in Tehran. “Former 

Iranian President Rafsanjani on Using a Nuclear Bomb Against Israel,” MEMRI 

Special Dispatch No. 325, January 3, 2002.

 22. “Iran’s Rafsanjani Warns Israel against Attacking Nuclear Sites,” AFP, 

September 18, 2003.

 23. Michael Rubin, “The Iranian Ticking Bomb,” Jerusalem Post, February 17, 

2002.

 24. David R. Sands, “Tehran Breaks U.N. Seals on Nukes,” Washington Times, 

July 28, 2004.

 25. “No Impediments for Iran to Build Uranium Centrifuges,” Gulf News, July 

15, 2004.

 26. Most of these proposals are drawn from the final report of a Council on 

Foreign Relations task force on Iran chaired by Zbigniew Brzezinski and Robert 

Gates. See “Iran: Time for a New Approach,” CFR, July 2004.

PART III

IS THERE A SIMPLE MILITARY OR SANCTIONS FIX?

133

CHAPTER 6

IS THE BEGIN DOCTRINE STILL A VIABLE OPTION

FOR ISRAEL?

Shlomo Brom

THE BIRTH OF THE PREEMPTION DOCTRINE

A General Israeli Proclivity towards Preemption and Prevention.

 Preemption and prevention were an important part of the security 

discourse in Israel since the inception of the state of Israel. The 

development of such a discourse was natural because of the unique 

geo-strategic situation of the state of Israel; a small state with a small 

population surrounded by much larger Arab states determined in 

these years to reverse the results of the 1948-49 Independence War 

and put an end to the existence of the Jewish state. When the Israeli 

defense doctrine was formulated by its first prime minister, David 

Ben-Gurion, it was evident that Israel could not afford a major 

invasion of its very limited territory. Two major principles were 

included in this doctrine to prevent the occurrence of such invasion. 

The first was “early warning” and the second was “transferring war 

to the enemy’s territory as soon as possible.” 

 “Early warning” was supposed to enable taking effective 

countermeasures against an invasion by the establishment of an 

efficient intelligence system that would be capable of giving accurate 

and timely warning of an approaching invasion. If time allowed and 

the necessary reserve forces could be mobilized, a preemptive strike 

could be launched. If time did not allow such a strike, then it was 

envisaged that a very short defensive battle would be utilized to 

gain enough time to mobilize the reserve forces that would carry the 

battle to the enemy’s territory.

 In this discourse sometimes the notion of preemptive war was 

mixed with the notion of preventive war, and there was no real 

distinction between them. The first example of an implementation 

of these doctrines was in the Sinai Campaign of 1956. The Israeli 
134

leadership that was following the large weapons deals of Egypt 

in the Soviet Union and the Eastern Block suspected that these 

weapons deals served as preparation for an approaching Egyptian 

strike against Israel. They also decided to exploit the conflict that 

developed between Egypt and France and the United Kingdom 

(UK) following the nationalization of the Suez Canal; Israel formed 

an alliance with France and the UK that led to an attack on Egypt by 

the three powers. From the point of view of Israel, this operation was 

highly successful. It led to the de-facto demilitarization of the Sinai 

Desert separating Israel from Egypt, to a stoppage of terrorist attacks 

from Egypt, and to a substantial improvement of Israel’s strategic 

situation.

 In I967 the same scenario repeated itself, but this time with 

a more concrete threat. Egypt forced the United Nations (UN) 

peacekeeping force to leave the Sinai and deployed massive forces 

on Israel’s border. This was interpreted by Israel as preparation for 

an all out attack. Israel preempted and attacked the Egyptian army 

in the Sinai before it had a chance to attack Israel. Once again, it was 

perceived that preemption saved Israel from an imminent threat to 

its existence.1

 In 1973 the government of Golda Meir considered a premptive 

strike when it had reliable information about the approaching 

Egyptian-Syrian attack but decided not to take this step because of 

concern for the possibility of political repercussions, coupled with too 

much confidence in the Israeli Defense Force’s (IDF) capabilities.

 In 1982 Israel initiated the war in Lebanon. This war is very 

controversial in Israel because many Israelis were not convinced 

that it was really necessary. But its saliency for the understanding of 

Israel’s security doctrine stems from the fact that the arguments of 

the supporters of the war, arguments that succeeded in convincing 

the Israeli cabinet to approve it, were based on the need to preempt 

the terrorist threat from Lebanon. 

Weapons of Mass Destruction and Preemption/Prevention.

 Early in the Israeli preemption discourse, weapons of mass 

destruction (WMD) played an important role because, for Israel, such 

threats touch raw nerves. First, they roused holocaust memories. The 
135

Nazis tried to exterminate the Jews with the use of poisonous gas. 

The talk about chemical and biological weapons creates among Jews 

an association with the darkest time in Jewish history. At the same 

time, these weapons were posing an existential threat on a nation that 

was already highly aware of the opposition of its neighborhood to 

its existence. The first time these considerations played a major role 

was at the end of the 1950s, when Nasser’s Egypt was leading the 

Arab opposition to the existence of Israel and initiated projects for 

the development and production of ballistic missiles and chemical 

weapons. For that purpose, German World War II scientists and 

engineers were mobilized by the Egyptians. They moved to Egypt 

and started to play a major role in these projects. German technology 

based firms were also used to supply components and technology 

for the Egyptian projects.2

 In the years 1960-64, Israel made a concerted effort to preempt 

the Egyptian missile project by a combination of covert action by the 

Israeli external intelligence agency, the Mossad, against the German 

personnel that were involved in the project, and political action 

aimed at the German government. In this framework the means 

adopted were covert assassination attempts and intimidation. The 

combination worked and eventually the German assistance stopped, 

leading to the collapse of the Egyptian indigenous program.3

 In the beginning of the 1970s, Saddam Hussein, already the defacto ruler of Iraq, initiated a military nuclear program. The Iraqis 

decided to get fissile material through the production of plutonium 

in a reactor and its separation. The plutonium producing reactor was 

procured from France in the framework of a nuclear cooperation 

agreement concluded in 1975. The separation instrumentation was 

acquired in Italy. 

 Aware of the Iraqi program, Begin’s government decided to 

preempt it by preventing the construction and operation of the 

French-built reactor. First, the well-proved combination of covert 

action and political action in France was attempted, but it failed to 

stop the project. Israeli agents succeeded in sabotaging the core of 

the reactor while it was stored in France prior to its shipment to Iraq. 

That only delayed the shipment, and the French government refused 

to acknowledge the real nature of the Iraqi project and stop French 
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involvement. In the next stage, Israel decided to attack the reactor 

and destroy it before it started operation. On June 7, 1981, eight 

Israeli F-16 aircraft attacked the Iraqi Osiraq reactor in Tuweitah, 

near Baghdad, and destroyed it completely.4

 At first, world opinion reaction to the attack was hostile. It 

was described as a violation of acceptable norms in international 

relations. The U.S. administration condemned the action and decided 

to suspend the supply of military aircraft to Israel. The UN Security 

Council condemned Israel for this action as well. Ten years later, 

after the war on Iraq and the exposure of the Iraqi military nuclear 

program by the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM), there was 

general recognition that the attack on Osiraq was justified.5

 While Israel chose to stop the above two programs by the use of 

force, either covertly or overtly, other ballistic missile programs and 

WMD programs were dealt with differently. The salient examples 

are:

 • Egypt had an extensive chemical and biological weapons 

program from the end of the 1950s. Israel chose not to do any 

thing against this program.

 • Syria initiated a chemical weapons program after the 1973 

war. Once again, Israel chose not to act against this program. 

When Syria started a program for the indigenous production 

of ballistic missiles in the 1990s, the same approach was 

adopted.

 • In 1981-83, Iraq, with the support of European companies, 

built a large scale facility for the production of chemical 

weapons at Al-Muthana, and nothing was done by Israel. The 

Iraqi missile production projects received the same Israeli 

attitude.6

 • The most interesting example is that of the renewed Iraqi 

nuclear project after the destruction of Osiraq. This time, 

Iraq chose the track of enrichment of uranium for acquisition 

of military grade fissile material. Different methods were 

tested and developed; enrichment by gas centrifuges, electromagnetic isotope separation (EMIS), chemical enrichment, 

and gaseous uranium diffusion enrichment. In parallel, much 

work was invested in the technologies of the production of a 
137

warhead based on enriched uranium (explosives, electronics, 

and metallurgy). Israel had good information about important 

parts of these projects, but it choose, until the 1991 Gulf War, 

not to use force in any way and preferred to focus on political 

pressure directed at European governments to prevent 

assistance to the Iraqi program by companies that operated in 

these states, mainly, Germany, UK, Italy, and Switzerland.7

 • Israel also did not make any real attempt to stop the Pakistani 

nuclear program during the 1970s and 1980s, although it was 

perceived as an “Islamic bomb” and a threat to Israel.8 At the 

time, there were some rumors and suspicions that Israel was 

involved in acts against the Pakistani program, but they were 

never confirmed.

Developing a General Theory.

 Following the Israeli attack on Osiraq, there was a tendency among 

researchers to propose that Israel had adopted a comprehensive 

and all encompassing preventive counterproliferation doctrine 

sometimes referred to as “the Begin Doctrine.” This was based to 

a great extent on Israeli government statements. Shai Feldman, for 

example, describes how, in its June 9 announcement of Osiraq’s 

destruction, Israel’s government articulated its belief that, had Iraq’s 

President Saddam Hussein acquired nuclear bombs, he would not 

have hesitated to drop them on Israeli cities and population centers. 

The Israeli government then went on to a general preventive 

doctrine: “under no circumstances would we allow the enemy to 

develop weapons of mass destruction against our nation; we will 

defend Israel’s citizens, in time, with all the means at our disposal.”9

Feldman adds that this theme soon was crowned as a “doctrine,” 

not only because it was immediately viewed as such by numerous 

observers worldwide, but also because Israel’s leaders have since 

repeated it on numerous occasions. One example is a major policy 

address given by Israel’s then Minister of Defense and present Prime 

Minister Ariel Sharon:

The third element in our defense policy for the 1980s is our determination 

to prevent confrontation states from gaining access to nuclear weapons. 
138

Israel cannot afford the introduction of the nuclear weapon. For us, it is 

not a question of balance of terror but a question of survival. We shall 

therefore have to prevent such a threat at its inception.10

Feldman, however, doubts the long-term feasibility of the 

doctrine.11

 Other scholars argue that Israel is more prone to launch preventive 

strikes against other proliferators because of its specific posture as 

the only Middle Eastern state that lives in a hostile environment, 

is perceived as a nuclear power, but keeps an “ambiguous nuclear 

policy.” Etel Solingen proposes that “opaqueness” (that is the term 

she prefers for what is named elsewhere as “ambiguity”) may 

include the use of compellence by actively preventing an adversary 

from achieving a nuclear capability, presumably because the power 

that chose opaqueness did it as a way of retaining its nuclear 

monopoly.12 Scott D. Sagan sees a wider risk of preventive wars 

among proliferators when he refers to the perils of proliferation. 

He uses evidence from the U.S.-USSR, India-Pakistan, and Ukraine 

cases to argue that this evidence does suggest strongly that military 

officers have strong proclivity towards preventive war. His main 

concern, of course, is preventive nuclear wars and not conventional 

surgical strikes against nuclear installations. Strangely enough, Sagan 

does not discuss the Israeli case perhaps because he believes Israel 

succeeded in developing stable civil-military relations and therefore 

it is more likely to adopt a prudent policy.13 Bruce Berkowitz is raising 

a similar concern when he says that, considering the expected costs of 

acquiring an opponent armed with nuclear weapons, a prospective 

nuclear power would present other countries with a temptation 

to conduct the ultimate “preemptive strike”--attacking the state’s 

nuclear reactors or weapons fabrication plants before a bomb is tested. 

He adds that the Israelis did this to Iraq in 1981 with fighter-bombers 

armed with conventional bombs, but it would not be outlandish to 

argue that the Israelis would have been willing to consider using 

nuclear weapons on the mission if such weapons were available and 

if they were deemed necessary for success.14 The ease with which 

Berkowitz describes Israel’s resort to a nuclear preemptive strike 

looks quite outlandish, but it reflects a popular belief that Israel 

would do anything to prevent nuclear proliferation in the Middle 
139

East. Frank Barnaby sees the Middle East as particularly unstable 

because of the danger of preemptive strikes against nuclear-weapons 

sites. “A large-scale Israeli deployment of nuclear weapons could 

provoke a preemptive Arab attack against production sites, arsenals, 

and command centers. Israel would almost certainly respond to 

any Arab attempt to acquire nuclear weapons with a military strike 

such as the one on Iraq’s reactor.”15 This kind of almost automatic 

response to an Arab nuclear or other WMD program does not reflect 

the actual Israeli policies as describes in the previous chapter, and 

that raises the question: Under what circumstances is Israel willing 

to take violent preemptive action against an adversary’s nuclear 

program?

 Barry Schneider deals more generally with the question of the 

necessary specific set of conditions for any head of state to order 

a preemptive counterproliferation strike. He assumes the nuclear 

aspirant would have to be approaching the nuclear threshold and be 

led by a hostile government that appeared ready to take extreme risks. 

The developing scenario would have to directly and immediately 

threaten a vital interest of the country considering the preemptive 

strike. It would require information on important nuclear target 

locations of the adversary and the ability to achieve tactical surprise. 

The adversary should not be able to threaten the preemptor with 

nuclear arms or other WMD or have a strong ally who is likely to 

do so on its behalf. All other reasonable options should have been 

exhausted before such a strike is undertaken. The head of state should 

also have adequate domestic and international political support for 

the action and for bringing any military campaign to a successful 

conclusion before choosing this type of nonproliferation activity.16

 Evidence suggests that in the Israeli case some modifications of 

this model are necessary. First, there is a need to define the meaning 

of approaching the nuclear threshold. In the Israeli case, it seems 

that this point is defined as the point of irreversibility, namely the 

time in which the proliferator stops being dependent on external 

assistance; it controls all the necessary technologies and knowledge; 

and it cannot be denied these capabilities through pressure over 

the states and private elements that supply assistance. Thus, Israel 

decided to attack Osiraq when it was clear that all the equipment of 
140

the reactor and the separation cells was already supplied by France 

and Italy, respectively.

 Second, there is a wider question of the feasibility of the military 

operations against the nuclear installations. It is not only a matter of 

having the necessary intelligence about their locations and having 

the capability to achieve tactical surprise.

 Third, it is not true in the case of Israel that when the adversary 

can threaten the preemptor with any WMD, preemptive action will 

not be undertaken. Israel attacked Qsiraq although it was already 

argued at this stage that Iraq had chemical weapons, and there 

already were Iranian allegations, not corroborated, that Iraq used 

these weapons in the war.17 It did not deter Israel from carrying out 

the attack.

 Fourth, international support is not a must. Israel launched its 1981 

attack without international support. The United States launched its 

recent war on Iraq without international support. The real issue is 

what is at stake and is it worth international condemnation. It seems 

that, in many cases, leaders are willing to take the risks.

 Fifth, the proposition that the developing scenario is directly and 

immediately threatening a vital interest of the country considering 

the preemptive strike, is highly dependent on the perception of the 

preemptor. There is no objective way of measuring it. In Israel, there 

is high propensity to see any Arab and Iranian nuclear capability as 

an existential threat for Israel.18

 The modified Israeli model that explains the differences in Israeli 

reaction to different ballistic missiles and WMD programs in the 

Middle East should include the following set of considerations that 

are taken during the decisionmaking process by the Israeli leaders:

The magnitude and severity of the threat. In Israel’s case, the immediacy 

of a WMD threat does not play an important role. Israel destroyed 

Osiraq in 1981 when Iraq was embroiled in a long and difficult war 

with Iran and when it was clear that Iraq could not afford another 

conflict with Israel. On the contrary, Iraq started some gestures 

towards Israel at that time. The severity of the threat is dependent 

on the type of WMD and their delivery means. The term “weapons 

of mass destruction” is misleading. The destructive power of nuclear 

weapons surpasses significantly the other categories of WMD, and 

biological weapons are considered more destructive than chemical 
141

weapons. It is dependent also on the availability of countermeasures. 

There are no countermeasures against nuclear weapons, while it is 

possible to acquire protection from chemical and biological weapons, 

whether by protective clothes or suitable building codes. There are 

also post-attack medical treatments for the victims of chemical and 

biological attacks. It is not surprising that in the 1980s and 1990s, 

the Israeli decisionmakers felt that they could deal with chemical 

weapons and possibly biological weapons, and therefore there 

was no acute need to take preemptive action. The availability of 

countermeasures is changing through time. In the 1960s, there was a 

feeling in Israel that there were no countermeasures against ballistic 

missiles, and hence preemptive actions were undertaken against 

the Egyptian missile program. Twenty years later, technological 

advancements made it possible to develop effective countermeasures. 

The severity of the threat is also linked to the level of animosity in 

the relationship between Israel and the proliferators. Thus Israel did 

not see Pakistan’s nuclear capability as having a direct bearing on 

its security, while a nuclear Iraq presided over by megalomaniac 

Saddam was considered an existential threat. 

Feasibility. Can use of force stop the program or at least delay 

it for a substantial time? The answer depends on the character of 

the program and on the availability of operational capabilities that 

can be used against the program. The decision to attack Osiraq was 

relatively easy because the entire nuclear project was dependent on 

this one facility, a Plutonium producing reactor. It was clear that 

the destruction of the reactor would lead to the stoppage of this 

nuclear project, and indeed after the attack the Iraqis abandoned 

the Plutonium track, and when they decided to resume the nuclear 

program, they based it on enrichment of uranium by a number of 

methods. The same thing was true for the Egyptian missile program 

in the 1960s. It was clear that the program was totally dependent on 

the assistance of the German personnel, and they provided an easy 

and soft target.

 In comparison, it was difficult to find one link in the research, 

development, and production chain of the Iraqi chemical weapons 

that, when attacked, would have caused a stoppage or a substantial 

delay of the program. These programs were much more dispersed 

and redundant than the initial Iraqi nuclear program.
142

 A good example was the Iraqi main chemical weapons production 

facility at Al Muthana. It was a huge facility, covering tens of acres, 

with several dozen buildings in which there were hundreds of 

equipment items. None of these buildings or equipment items was 

unique or irreplaceable.19

 The same thing was true for the post-1981 Iraqi nuclear program. 

The Iraqis learned the lessons of the 1981 attack, and their new 

program was much less vulnerable and included many redundancies. 

They worked in parallel on several methods for the enrichment 

of uranium. When they started to build fully operational plants, 

they constructed two different plants at different areas of Iraq for 

the enrichment of uranium with EMIS. They also planned to build 

several facilities for gas centrifuges enrichment. The new system 

was dispersed and could not be destroyed with one surgical strike. 

One can assume that this added difficulty contributed to the Israeli 

decision not to attack these facilities.

 Feasibility is also dependent upon the level of intelligence available 

to Israel. It should know the location and function of the different 

facilities, and be certain the intelligence at its disposal is complete 

enough to ascertain that, once these installations are destroyed, the 

WMD program will be stopped or delayed for a substantial time. 

In the case of the post-1981 Iraqi nuclear program, the findings of 

the IAEA Iraq action team show clearly that the intelligence that 

was available to Israel and its Western allies about the Iraqi nuclear 

program was partial,20 and it is doubtful whether it allowed for an 

effective preventive strike.

 Last, feasibility is dependent upon the operational capabilities 

needed for the desired effects in the targets. The Israeli Air Force 

(IAF) has formidable capabilities and enjoys unchallenged supremacy 

vis-à-vis the other Middle East air powers, but Israel has no aircraft 

carriers and it cannot use airbases in other Middle East states; 

therefore its operational capabilities are reduced when the targets are 

located far from its territory. Based on the past performance of the 

IAF, its order of battle that includes only F-15I and F-16C/D aircraft 

capable of long range strike, and the deployment of its aircraft,21 it 

is possible to determine that at long ranges (more then 600 km), the 

IAF is capable of a few surgical strikes, but it is not capable of a 
143

sustained air campaign against a full array of targets. The operational 

capability is dependent also on the expected opposition to the attack 

by the adversary’s air defense system. Targets that are well-defended 

by ground air defense and interceptors have to be attacked by a 

larger aerial force composed of the attack aircraft, interceptors that 

protect them, and other support aircraft (for air refueling, electronic 

countermeasures [ECM] support, communication, and rescue).

 Covert action demands other kind of operational capabilities. 

The intelligence needed for these kinds of operations is usually more 

detailed and necessitates a better penetration of the adversary’s 

program. The covert sabotage options are linked to the adversary’s 

program’s dependence on other states’ assistance. Usually it is 

easier to operate covertly outside the adversary’s territory. The 

proliferators in the Middle East are usually states that are ruled by 

authoritarian regimes with strong control of their security services, 

and very limited freedom of movement for foreigners. The locations 

that are part of the WMD program are high security installations and 

are well-protected. The only vulnerable point is the connections with 

the outside world in states in which Israel’s security services have 

better operational capabilities.

 Israeli leaders, like other leaders, resort to use of violent means 

when other means are exhausted. Osiraq was attacked after many 

attempts to convince the French government not to supply the 

reactor to Iraq.22 Israel acted against the German experts that helped 

the Egyptian missile program only when it seemed that the German 

government was not doing anything to prevent this assistance, and 

stopped its actions when it became clear that Germany was willing 

to take decisive action against these experts. This decision of Prime 

Minister Ben Gurion led to the resignation of Director of the Mossad 

Issar Harel who objected and argued for the continuation of the 

covert operations.23

 An Israeli leader that considers preventive action has to take 

into account the cost of the action, externally and domestically. He 

has to consider two scenarios; a scenario of failure and a scenario of 

success. In case of failure, the cost is mainly in the loss of domestic 

support. Present Prime Minister of Israel Ariel Sharon suffered a real 

blow to his political career because he initiated a preventive war in 
144

Lebanon in 1982 that was perceived by many in Israel as a failure. 

Nevertheless, it seems that because of the high sensitivity in the 

Israeli public to the acquisition of WMD by its adversaries, an Israeli 

leader may assume that the public will not punish him, even for a 

failed attempt of prevention. The external cost of a failure is smaller 

because the powers that would have objected to the action will feel 

that Israel was punished enough by the failure. In a case of success, 

the domestic opposition will be silenced, while Israel may pay a 

cost in its external relations. The attack on Osiraq is an interesting 

test case. Domestically, there was some opposition to the operation; 

some by opposition leaders and some by officials that knew about 

its preparations, but it subsided a short time after the successful 

implementation.24 The external reactions were much harsher and 

included sanctions by the United States.

 The discussion of the domestic cost raises the question whether the 

Israeli doctrine of preemption/prevention is affected by partisanship. 

Generally, one can argue that right-wing governments are more 

inclined to exhibit tough policies towards Israel’s adversaries, and 

therefore it can be assumed that they will be more inclined to adopt 

preemptive/preventive policies. Nevertheless, it is not possible to 

reach this conclusion from the few cases of Israeli implementation of 

preventive action against WMD programs in the Middle East. A leftcenter government initiated violent preventive actions against the 

Egyptian ballistic missiles program, while a right-wing government 

decided on the destruction of Osiraq. In this latter case, there was 

opposition and support for the operation among opposition persons 

and among persons that were part of the right-wing administration. 

The operation became a highly contested political issue only because 

it was executed a short time before the general elections, and it was 

argued that it was a kind of elections campaign spin.25 Therefore, 

it seems that usually such matters of national security are not 

considered a partisan subject as long as they are not perceived as 

something that is going to serve the domestic political agenda of the 

ruling party.

 Another part of the perceived cost is the possible violent reaction 

of the attacked proliferators. The Israeli leader has to weigh the 

utility of the planned operations, especially in cases where it is 

clear that only a delay will be achieved, against the possible cost 
145

in life and property as a result of the adversary’s reprisals. There 

are several explanations for Saddam’s decision to launch ballistic 

missiles against Israeli cities in 1991, but one of the simplest and most 

probable explanations is that Saddam used the opportunity of the 

war to settle the account of the 1981 attack by Israel. In considering 

the risk of reprisal, the Israeli leader will have to weigh the military 

capabilities of the adversary, the record of its regime, the potential of 

reprisal by nonmilitary means, e.g., terror, and the efficacy of Israel’s 

defenses against these challenges. 

THE IRANIAN CASE

 Any estimation of a possible Israeli preemptive attack on the 

Iranian nuclear program should be based on the specific parameters 

of the Iranian case.

Israeli Perception of the Threat.

 There are two schools of thought in Israel that have different 

perceptions of the Iranian threat. The first one is represented by 

persons like member of Knesset (the Israeli parliament) Ephraim 

Sneh and by the Military Intelligence community who perceive Iran 

as a bitter ideological enemy that is determined to bring about the 

physical annihilation of Israel. This school does not believe that a 

regime change in Iran is possible in the foreseeable future. The clear 

conclusion is that Israel cannot live with an Iran that has military 

nuclear capabilities, because sooner or later Iran will use them 

against Israel.

 The other school of thought looks at Iran as a more complex 

entity with a policy that is influenced by many considerations, the 

ideological consideration being only one of them. According to this 

line of thinking, Iranian policies are motivated more by national 

interests and preservation of the regime considerations than by 

ideology. In the case of the Iranian policy vis-à-vis Israel, Iran is 

pursuing its ideological agenda because it serves its national interest 

of getting influence in the Arab world and a status of leadership in 

the Moslem world, and it helps the regime to retain its revolutionary 
146

image and thus keep its raison d’etre for being a legitimate regime. 

This school of thought is represented in the Israeli intelligence 

community by the Mossad, Israel’s foreign intelligence agency,26 and 

has supporters in the Ministry of Defense and the National Security 

Council.

 Different perceptions lead to different conclusions. While the 

first school assumes no political pressure can force Iran to stop its 

military nuclear program, the other school believes that political 

pressure can be effective in at least delaying the nuclear program 

significantly. The second school believes that a nuclear Iran with a 

different regime will not pose a high risk to Israel and can be easily 

deterred. Furthermore, they believe that, if the nuclear program is 

to be deferred sufficiently, regime change eventually will occur in 

Iran, and it will diminish substantially the risk to Israel of an Iranian 

nuclear program. The first school believes that Israel cannot accept 

Iran being nuclearized under any political circumstances. These 

differences of view between those that can be defined as Iran hawks 

and those that can be defined as Iran doves imply that the first will 

be more prone to recommend proactive and preemptive/preventive 

violent operations against the Iranian nuclear program. The dividing 

line is not partisan. One of the most vociferous Iran Hawks is Labor 

(left-wing) Member of Knesset and ex-minister Ephraim Sneh, while 

the present Likud (right-wing) Minister of Defense Shaul Mofaz 

sometimes preaches for restraint in Israel’s approach to Iran, even 

when he points at the danger of Iran’s nuclear program.

The Nature of the Iranian Nuclear Program 

and Its Vulnerabilities.

 The Israeli attack on the Iraqi reactor, Osiraq, had a deep 

impact on the evolution of other nuclear programs in the Middle 

East. States that were determined to continue with such programs 

learned the lessons of the attack and concluded that they should 

strive to decrease the vulnerability of their program by adding more 

protection and more redundancy. The new nuclear projects are 

much more dispersed and well-protected. That is also true for the 

Iranian nuclear program. The most essential part of every military 
147

nuclear program is the production of fissile materials. According 

to recent revelations concerning the Iranian nuclear program, Iran 

intends to produce fissile materials in two tracks; the uranium track 

and the plutonium track. First, using the excuse of a plan to produce 

fuel for nuclear power plants, Iran is building uranium enrichment 

capabilities. Iran is also pursuing different methods of enrichment 

to ensure redundancy. It is vigorously building an industrial size 

facility for uranium enrichment with gas centrifuges in Natanz, 

and it pursued also LASER enrichment of uranium. In parallel, 

it is striving to control technologies that will enable it to build a 

plutonium production heavy water reactor. In this context, it was 

recently discovered that Iran is building a heavy water production 

facility in Arak, and also has an intention to build at the same location 

a heavy water so-called “research reactor,” which will probably be 

used for irradiating of uranium, and later separation of plutonium 

from the irradiated uranium rods.27 Uranium enrichment specifically 

enables dispersion of the production facilities in a relatively large 

number of small facilities. It is very difficult to assure that there are 

no additional facilities other than those that were already traced. 

According to one estimate, there are 19 traced suspected nuclear 

facilities in Iran without assurance that this number is finite.28

 The nuclear facilities that Iran is constructing are also welldefended. The centrifuge plant built at Natanz is underground, and 

it is defended by an extensive ground air defense system.29

 It is very difficult to find in the Iranian nuclear program one 

vulnerable point that, once it is attacked and destroyed, the Iranian 

program is stopped or stalled for a long time. The Bushier nuclear 

power plant, which is relatively vulnerable to attacks, is not really 

a part of the military nuclear program, and it mostly serves as an 

excuse for an Iranian wish to have control over the full fuel cycle, 

namely building a capacity for uranium enrichment. Its attack would 

not have a real effect on the military program. The net effect is that 

any attempt to attack the Iranian nuclear program would necessitate 

sustainable attacks on a relatively large number of targets that are 

well-defended, passively and actively.
148

Israeli Operational Capabilities vis-à-vis Iran.

 Iran is situated more then 1,000 kms from Israel. It is a vast country, 

and all the meaningful nuclear targets are, and most probably will 

continue to be, situated far from its Western borders. That means 

that once Israel decides to attack Iran’s nuclear facilities, it will have 

to plan a sustainable attack on a number of targets that are situated 

1,500-1,700 kms from Israel. For that purpose, Israel can use only 

its air force. The targets usually are far from the Indian Ocean, and 

Israel has no significant seaborne air power assets. Although Israel 

has some military relationships with friendly states that are situated 

closer to Iran, most notably, Turkey and India, these states also are 

keeping a friendly relationship with Iran, and it is highly unlikely 

that they would let Israel use their territories for the purpose of 

attacking Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. This means that the Israeli 

attack aircraft would have to take off from air bases in Israel, fly 

1,500-1,700 kms to the targets, destroy them, and then fly back 1,500-

1,700 kms. It is also possible that the flight would be even longer 

for the Israeli planes because they would have to fly through the air 

space of Jordan and Iraq to use the direct shorter route to Iran. Flying 

through Jordan without the explicit or implicit permission of the 

Jordanians would hurt relations with a friendly Arab state. Flying 

over Iraq without coordination with the United States would lead to 

a clash with U.S. interceptors. Any attempt at coordination with the 

United States or asking permission from Jordan might compromise 

the operation. It is also very doubtful whether Jordan and the United 

States would be willing to be involved in such Israeli operations. As 

a result, the Israeli planes would have to use the longer route over 

the Indian Ocean, with minimal penetration of the air space of other 

states.

 The IAF does not have any bombers. Its air fleet consists only of 

fighter-bombers with limited range of action. Israel has 25 F-15I and 

137 F-16C/D fighter-bombers. It is going to improve its long range 

capability in 2004 with few operational F-16I aircraft with greater 

range of action then the F-15I, but the burden of the attacks would be 

laid mostly on the F-15I aircraft that have better capabilities at longer 

ranges. F-15I has a radius of action of 1,270 kms. The corresponding 
149

one for F-16C/D is 925 kms and for F-16I, 2,100 kms (but Israel will 

have only few of them at the relevant time).30 The real operational 

radius is even shorter because for parts of the route, the planes would 

have to fly at low altitude to avoid radar detection. That shortens the 

range of flight because of higher fuel consumption at low altitudes. 

It means that the attack aircraft would need to be refueled at least 

twice, on their way to the targets and from the targets. That adds 

complication to the operation because Israel has only a few air 

refuelers based on Boeing 707 aircraft platforms. Such aircraft are 

very vulnerable, and therefore air refueling cannot take place in 

hostile air space.

 Assuming that the attack aircraft succeeded in entering the Iranian 

air space, they would have to avoid early detection and be capable 

of dealing with Iranian interceptors. Iran is a vast country, and the 

radar assets available to the Iranian air defense system are limited. 

If the Israeli planners had good information about their location, it 

would be possible to plan approach routes to the targets that would 

avoid early detection. If the attacking aircraft were detected and 

intercepted, the Israeli F-15s and F-16s enjoy vast superiority over 

the Iranian interceptors and would probably defend themselves 

successfully. The problem is that such long range attacks are very 

sensitive to interferences, and therefore the intercepted attack 

formation might have to abort its mission.

 If the Israeli attack aircraft succeed in avoiding early detection 

and interception, it can be safely assumed that they would be capable 

of avoiding the surface to air missile defenses and the antiaircraft 

artillery (AAA) defenses deployed closer to the targets and destroy 

the targets by use of a combination of tactics, ECM, and smart 

munitions. 

 In any case, any Israeli attack on an Iranian nuclear target would 

be a very complex operation in which a relatively large number 

of attack aircraft and support aircraft (interceptors, ECM aircraft, 

refuelers, and rescue aircraft) would participate. The conclusion is 

that Israel could attack only a few Iranian targets and not as part 

of a sustainable operation over time, but as a one time surprise 

operation.

 Even if Israel had the attack capabilities needed for the destruction 

of the all elements of the Iranian nuclear program, it is doubtful 
150

whether Israel has the kind of intelligence needed to be certain that 

all the necessary elements of the program were traced and destroyed 

fully. Israel has good photographic coverage of Iran with the Ofeq 

series of reconnaissance satellites, but being so distant from Iran, 

one can assume that other kinds of intelligence coverage are rather 

partial and weak. 

 Covert action demands different kinds of operational capabilities 

and intelligence. There is no indication that Israel has capabilities 

of covert operations in Iran. The recent information about the 

development of the Iranian program indicated that it reached a 

status of being independent of external assistance. Moreover, the 

assistance Iran got was mostly from Pakistan, another place which is 

not a traditional area of operations for the Israeli secret services, like 

Europe or South America. It seems that there is no real potential for 

covert Israeli operations against the Iranian Nuclear program.

Were Other Options Exhausted?

 So far, Israel has no reason to believe that the political negotiated 

option was exhausted. Developments uncovered since the new 

advances in the Iranian nuclear program indicate that a coordinated 

action of the United States, the EU, and IAEA succeeded in forcing 

the Iranians to suspend their uranium enrichment activities and 

accept the additional protocol that will tighten monitoring of their 

nuclear program. It seems that this success is also a byproduct of the 

war in Iraq. It is feasible that the United States can deter Iran from 

continuing its military nuclear program, especially when Europe is 

cooperating with the United States and not letting Iran exploit the 

differences of views between them.

 In the meantime, the Israeli government doubts whether Iran 

will, indeed, keep its commitments to stop the enrichment project 

and adopts a “wait and see” policy, keeping all options open.31

The Domestic Cost of Action.

 Iran is on a clash course with Israel since Humeini’s revolution. 

It is leading a flagrant anti-Israeli policy. It supports terror groups 

that operate against Israel; Hezbollah in Lebanon, and the Islamic 
151

Palestinian terror groups.32 It was directly involved in the terrorist 

bombings of the Israeli embassy and the Jewish community center 

in Buenos Aires, Argentina. It is no wonder that at present Iran 

has a very negative image in the eyes of the Israeli public. Israelis 

constantly are bombarded with anti-Iranian declarations by political 

leaders and the media. They hear the director of the General Security 

Service (GSS)33 saying at an open conference on December 16, 2003, 

that Iran is the number one terror state in the world and a strategic 

threat to Israel, and that it operates against Israel and its interests 

everywhere.34 The director of the Mossad said that Iran is a threat to 

world peace and is an existential threat to Israel when he appeared 

in the Knesset’s Security and Foreign policy committee.35 It can be 

safely assumed that any Israeli action against the Iranian nuclear 

program would enjoy vast support by Israeli public opinion. Even 

a failure of the operation would not erode the support because of 

the almost general consensus of the public. Most probably, such an 

action would not become a matter of partisan debate because there 

are supporters and opposers of proactive action against the Iranian 

nuclear program among the coalition and opposition parties.

Iranian Possible Responses as a Constraint.

 Although presently Israel enjoys vast superiority in long range 

strike capabilities in comparison with Iran, Iran is succeeding 

in maintaining a balance of mutual deterrence with Israel. Until 

recently, Iran’s deterrence was based on the use of proxies, terror 

groups that operated from areas close to Israel or in the global arena. 

Iran could balance Israel’s ability to strike at targets in its territory 

with the ability of these proxies to attack Israeli towns in northern 

Israel or Israeli interests all over the world, using the infrastructure 

that these terror groups have established in many states. The most 

salient of these groups is Hezbollah in Lebanon. It succeeded, with the 

support of Iran, in building a large array of surface to surface rockets 

in South Lebanon that presents a constant threat over the civilian 

population in a large part of Israel. In recent years, Hezbollah has 

acquired from Iran longer range rockets (Fajr 3 and 5) and expanded 

its strike capability to a larger part of Israel.36 Iran also demonstrated 
152

its ability to hurt Israeli interests in others states when its agents 

were involved in the bombing of the Israeli embassy and the Jewish 

community center in Buenos Aires.

 Iran is developing a 1,330 kms range ballistic missile, Sheab-3, 

that will give Iran the capability to strike directly at targets in Israel’s 

territory. The missiles have reached initial operational capabilities.37

 Iran admitted after signing the Chemical Weapons Convention 

(CWC) that it developed and stockpiled chemical weapons, probably 

mustard gas and nerve agents. It was supposed to destroy these 

weapons in accordance with the provisions of the CWC, but there is 

no report that this was done and Iran is suspected of continuing its 

activities in this area.38

 If Israel decides to attack Iran’s nuclear installations, it will have 

to take into account a response in kind. Iran may use its ballistic 

missiles to attack Israeli nuclear installations. Such attacks will not 

be effective because of the inaccuracy of its missiles. The probability 

of an attempted Iranian attack with aircraft is lower, although strike 

aircraft may be more accurate. Iran has a very small number of 

long range SU-24 strike aircraft and some air-refueling capability, 

but such a long range attack with the challenge of the Israeli air 

defense system is a formidable task for its air force. It is possible 

that Iran would follow the example of Iraq, and, being aware of the 

ineffectiveness of the missile attack on nuclear installations, it would 

launch its missiles against Israeli cities.

 Iran would probably use its proxies to hit at Israeli targets and 

interests in Israel and elsewhere. Under the present circumstances, 

striking Israel from Lebanon would be difficult because Israel 

probably would react harshly against Syria, Iran’s ally, which is 

in a position of weakness; and that does not serve Iran’s Interests. 

Hitting Israeli and Jewish targets abroad may look to the Iranians as 

less risky.

 If an Israeli strike in Iran caused some radioactive contamination, 

Israel would have to take into account Iranian use of chemical 

weapons. In all other circumstances, such use is highly improbable 

because an Iranian chemical attack would be a blatant violation of 

the CWC, and might lead to international action against Iran.

 It is not possible to ascertain accurately what would be the Iranian 

response, but the experience of the Israeli- Iranian relationship in 
153

the last 2 decades and the declarations of the Iranian leadership39

indicate clearly that there would be a violent Iranian reaction to any 

Israeli attack in Iran.

Global and Regional Responses as Constraints.

 The Israeli leadership will have to assess the ramifications of 

such an attack on its foreign relations when it weighs arguments 

for and against the preemptive action. Israel enjoys the position of 

a state that already has been through such an experience, attacking 

the Iraqi reactor, absorbing general international condemnation, and 

being vindicated later. It seems that the Israeli leadership can only be 

encouraged by this experience. First, the political price it had to pay 

eventually was insignificant; U.S. sanctions were limited and stopped 

after a short time, and the negative effect on its relations with other 

states also subsided very quickly. Second, the environment is more 

conducive today for an Israeli preemptive action, because in 1991 

Iraq was considered an ally of the West, while Iran is a member of 

the “Axis of Evil,” and because after 9/11 and the war on Iraq, the 

concept of preemption is not rejected by everyone as it was in 1991; 

at least the only global superpower, the United States, adopted it 

as part of its doctrine. Third, after the experience of Iraq, one can 

assume that some states will be more cautious in their reaction to the 

Israeli action.

 From Israel’s point of view, the ramifications of such an action 

would be in three arenas; the Middle East, the United States, and 

Europe. Israel can assume that the reactions in the Middle East 

would be mixed. On the one hand, the Arab States would look on 

the Israeli operation as another example of Israel’s intransigence and 

aggressiveness, and would object to the manifestation of Israel’s wish 

to retain a nuclear monopoly. But on the other hand, they would feel 

relieved, because the Iranian nuclear posture is a threat to them as 

well. It is quite probable that they would condemn the Israeli action 

but would not take any other steps.

 Assuming that the preemptive operation took place when it was 

clear that the Iranian program could not be stopped in any other 

way, it would be difficult for the United States to condemn an action 
154

that suits perfectly its own positions. Israel can be assured that the 

action would not harm its relationship with the United States.

 The EU is composed of a majority of states already voicing their 

opposition to the U.S. preemption doctrine and the war on Iraq as a 

manifestation of this doctrine. They would most probably condemn 

Israel. Nevertheless, Israel can assume that such an attack that came 

after an European failure to make Iran stop the nuclear program 

would not lead to sanctions other than verbal condemnation.

CONCLUSION

 The Iranian decision to suspend its uranium enrichment activities 

and to sign the additional protocol with the IAEA implies to Israel 

that Israel does not yet have to decide on a violent preventive action 

against the Iranian nuclear program, and can postpone this difficult 

decision. As long as it is possible to stop the Iranian program and roll 

it back without resort to violence, Israel will prefer it because it will 

minimize risks and the price it would have to pay for this objective.

 The decision is difficult because the probability of success is 

not high, the risks are high, and the cost is certain. The probability 

of success is not high because, on one hand, the Iranian nuclear 

installations are dispersed, well-defended and have much 

redundancy; and on the other, the Israeli operational capabilities for 

sustainable operations, and not a one of its kind surgical strike, are 

limited. It is not certain at all whether any Israeli operation will stop 

the Iranian nuclear program or delay it substantially. The risks are 

high because the operational difficulties may lead to a high casualty 

rate and because of the high probability of failure. The cost is certain, 

because an Iranian violent reaction is almost a certainty. The Israeli 

leadership will have to consider whether it is willing to take the risks 

and pay the costs for an operation with doubtful results. On the other 

hand, there are no real political constraints domestically or in Israel’s 

foreign relations that should prevent it from making such a decision. 

The conclusion is that eventually the two parameters that will be 

decisive in the Israeli decision will be the assessment whether the 

Iranian program can be stopped by other means and the assessment 

of the operational feasibility.
155

 It is not surprising that, based on these assessments, Israel 

believes that the key to the fight against the Iranian nuclear program 

is in the hands of the United States, especially after the war in Iraq. 

On November 8, 2002, Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon said, in 

an interview given to the New York Post, that the U.S. war on terror 

should not end with Iraq. He added, “as soon as Iraq is dealt with, 

I will push for Iran to be at the top of the ‘to do’ list . . . Iran makes 

every effort to possess weapons of mass destruction . . . and ballistic 

missiles . . . That is a danger to the Middle East and a danger to the 

world.”40

 Israel’s preferred policy is to let the United States and the 

European states help deal with Iran. It believes that keeping the 

ambiguity concerning possible Israeli reactions in case the attempts 

to stop Iran fail may help the U.S.-European effort because it may 

induce some actors—those who wish to prevent Israeli operations 

that may lead to further destabilization of the Middle East (especially 

the Europeans)—to increase their pressures on Iran, and it also may 

have a deterring effect on Iran. An examination of Israeli statements 

on the Iranian nuclear program shows a constant emphasis on the 

danger to the civilized world of this program; concern that the 

Iranians are using deceitful tactics; and threats of an Israeli action 

against the nuclear installations as a last resort, combined with 

declarations that Israel prefers peaceful solutions.41

 The United States has to take into account the possibility of an 

Israeli preemptive strike against the Iranian nuclear facilities when 

considering its policy options. First, such an attack, especially if it 

did not achieve its planned objectives, would have a destabilizing 

effect on the Middle East. It could lead to acceleration of the Iranian 

program and to a chain of violent clashes between Iran and Israel. The 

United States should prepare contingency plans for such an event that 

include actions aimed at deterring Iran from destabilizing the Middle 

East, and the necessary political reactions, including prevention of 

initiatives aimed at a show of support for Iran internationally from 

such organizations as the UN. The United States has an interest 

in knowing the Israeli intentions and affecting them. That can be 

achieved only through an open, detailed, and continuous dialogue 

between the two nations. 
156

 Second, if the United States is considering preemptive strikes 

against Iran, it should weigh the pros and cons of cooperation with 

Israel in such attacks. The main argument against such cooperation 

is that it would fortify the existing perception in the Moslem world of 

an anti-Islamic Judeo-Christian conspiracy. That could be balanced 

only by very convincing and clear operational advantages of such an 

alliance.

 Last, the United States should make use of the threat of a 

preemptive Israeli strike in its deliberations with its other allies, 

mostly its European allies. It may help convince them to take a more 

robust stand against the Iranian nuclear program. The Europeans 

most probably will consider an Israeli preemptive strike a disaster 

and will be ready to invest in an effort to induce Israel to avoid it.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 6

 1. Randolph S. Churchill and Winston S. Churchill, The Six Day War, London: 

Heinmann, 1967, pp. 53-77.

 2. The Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of 

International Studies (CNS), “Egypt Profile: Missile Chronology,” http://www.nti.

org/e_research/profiles/Egypt/Missile/2362_2918.html

 3. Ibid.; Amikam Shapira, “The German Scientists in Egypt,” Mabat, Vol. MLM, 

No. 34, October 2003, in Hebrew, pp. 14-15. 

 4. Shlomo Nakdimon, Tammuz in Flames, Tel Aviv: Edanim, 1993, pp. 49-258, 

in Hebrew.

 5. A very detailed description of world reaction appears in Nakdimon, pp. 

268-339, 414-426.

 6. UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) 

working document, March 6, 2003, http://nti.org/db/profiles/iraq/unmovic_jan6.pdf, 

pp. 139-141.

 7. Nakdimon, pp. 439-447.

 8. CNS, http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Pakistan/index.html. 

 9. Ha’aretz, Israel, June 9, 1981.

 10. Jerusalem, Government Press Office, December 15, 1981. See FBIS, 

December 18, 1981, p. I-17. 

 11. Shai Feldman, “The Bombing of Osiraq-Revisited,” International Security, 

Vol. 7, No. 2, Autumn, 1982, p. 122.
157

 12. Etel Solingen, “The Domestic Sources of Regional Regimes: The Evolution 

of Nuclear Ambiguity in the Middle East,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 38, 

No. 2, June 1994, p. 307.

 13. Scott D. Sagan, “The Perils of Proliferation: Organization Theory, Deterence 

Theory, and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons,” International Security, Vol. 18, No. 4, 

Spring 1994, pp. 81-85.

 14. Bruce D. Berkowitz, “Proliferation, Deterrence, and the Likelihood of 

Nuclear War,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 29, No. 1, March 1985, p. 129.

 15. Frank Barnaby, “The Nuclear Arsenal in the Middle East,” Journal of 

Palestine Studies, Vol. 17, No. 1, Autumn 1987, p. 104. 

 16. Barry R. Schneider, “Nuclear Proliferation and Counter-Proliferation: 

Policy Issues and Debates,” Mershon International Studies Review, Vol. 38, No. 2, 

October 1994, pp. 225-226.

 17. See http://projects.sipri.se/cbw/research/factsheet-1984.html.

 18. See, for example, Globes, Israel, August 28, 2003, p. 40. 

 19. UNMOVIG working document, March 6, 2003, ibid., pp. 139-141.

 20. See http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/Programmes/ActionTeam/nwp2.html.

 21. The Jaffe Center for Strategic Studies, Middle East Military Balance, http://

www.tau.ac.il/jcss/balance/Israel.pdf, pp. 17,21.

 22. Nakdimon, pp. 57-122.

 23. Shapira, pp. 14-15.

 24. Nakdimon, pp. 167-179, 191-199, 210-214, 216-225.

 25. Nakdimon, pp. 353-379.

 26. The debate between Military Intelligence and the Mossad is described in 

Yitzhak Latz, “A Nuclear Problem,” Globes, August 28, 2003, pp. 36- 41, in Hebrew; 

and in Ben Kaspit, “Israeli Assessment: The Regime in Iran is Developing Nuclear 

Weapons Because it is Concerned about the Approaching End of the Regime,” 

Maariv, June 12, 2003, in Hebrew.

 27. Shlomo Brom, “Military Balances in the Region” in Ephraim Kam and 

Yiphtah Shafir, eds., The Middle East Strategic Balance 2002-2003, Tel Aviv: The Jaffe 

Center for Strategic Studies, 2003, p. 81. 

 28. GlobalSecurity.org, “Target Iran--Air Strikes,” http://www.globalsecurity.org/

military/ops/iran-strikes.htm.

 29. Michael Knights, “Iranian Nuclear Weapons, Part II: Operational 

Challenges,” Washington Institute, Policy Watch. No. 761, May 28, 2003.

 30. Shlomo Brom and Yiftah Shapir, eds., The Military Balance 2001-2002, 

Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2002, pp. 433-434.

 31. Maariv, November 16, 2003; Ha’aretz, October 28, 2003, in Hebrew.
158

 32. See, for example, a long story that appeared in The Israeli Daily (Maariv), 

January 18, 2002, and covered in detail the Iranian involvement in the Palestinian 

terror war against Israel.

 33. Israel’s internal security organization.

 34. Maariv, December 17, 2003, in Hebrew.

 35. Ibid., November 18, 2003, in Hebrew.

 36. Brom and Shapir, p. 229.

 37. Ibid., p. 148.

 38. Ibid.

 39. For example, in December 24, 2003, Iranian Minister of Defense Admiral 

Samhani said, ”if the Zionist regime will attack our nuclear installations, we will 

strike back with all the means available to us . . . the Zionist entity will pay a heavy 

price . . . its leadership will not have any safe place.” Maariv, December 25, 2003, in 

Hebrew.

 40. Another example is a statement by then Israeli Minister of Defense Binyamin 

Beb Eliezer who said on the eve of a visit in the United States that he intends in 

this visit to focus on the accelerated efforts of Iran to acquire nuclear weapons 

and long range missiles. “His aim is to convince the U.S. administration that it is 

not only a threat to Israel, but a threat to all the world. Such strategic capabilities 

at the hands of the Ayatullahs in Teheran will threaten the whole Gulf and even 

Europe.” Maariv, January 18, 2002.

 41. One example is the Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs’ statement during a 

meeting with his Austrian colleague on November 19, 2003, in which he said that 

Israel does not have plans to attack Iran’s nuclear installations and it intends to use 

only peaceful means. Reuters, Vol. 16, November 19, 2003, p. 57.
159

CHAPTER 7

STRATEGY FOR A NUCLEAR IRAN

Thomas Donnelly

 The Islamic Republic of Iran continues to speed toward acquiring 

nuclear weapons—a reality that has provoked a “do something” 

moment across Washington. Conventional wisdom among the 

mandarins of America’s foreign policy establishment is that the Bush 

administration should pursue some kind of “bargain” with Tehran. A 

recent report by the Council on Foreign Relations, for instance, calls 

for the United States to offer the regime incentives for disarmament 

while dropping the “rhetoric of regime change.” 

 Such a “balance-of-power” approach, which attempts to divorce 

U.S. concerns about Iran’s nuclear ambitions from any broader regional 

or global strategic framework, is an intellectual relic of an earlier era. 

It ignores new geopolitical realities of the post-September 11, 2001 

(9/11), era, most profoundly the Bush Doctrine’s commitment to a 

“forward strategy of freedom” that seeks to transform the politics of 

the greater Middle East while containing China’s rising geostrategic 

power. Iran stands directly athwart this project, as a sponsor of 

Islamist terrorism and an increasingly important patron of Beijing. 

A nuclear-armed Iran is doubly threatening to U.S. interests not only 

because of the possibility it might employ its weapons or pass them 

to terrorist groups, but also because of the constraining effect it will 

impose on U.S. behavior in the region. 

 Any overt bargain with Iran surely will be read as a retreat from 

the Bush administration’s proclaimed project of democratization and 

regional transformation. However, direct military confrontation is 

equally problematic, particularly given that a single, surgical strike 

is unlikely to be fully successful or have a lasting effect. Rather, the 

most attractive long-term strategy for Iran is traditional containment, 

which would emphasize breaking Iran’s ties to China while pressing 

for reform and transformation in the greater Middle East. The real 

isolation of Iran will come when it is drowned in a larger sea of 

liberal, accountable governments in the region. 
160

 The Islamic Republic in Iran continues to speed toward acquiring 

nuclear weapons, with every week, it seems, bringing further 

evidence of its progress. In late September 2004, the head of Iran’s 

Atomic Energy Organization, Gholamreza Aghazadeh, announced 

his country had begun enriching a “test amount” of uranium—

enough, that is, for several nuclear weapons. Soon, there will be no 

insurmountable hurdles left; it is simply a matter of engineering, time, 

and Tehran’s choice. This is a reality that the next U.S. administration 

will have to confront—and a very unpleasant reality it will be. As 

Max Boot recently observed:

[Iran] is also working on missiles with the range to strike targets in 

Europe and North America, though the likeliest vehicles for delivering 

an Iranian nuke would be its terrorist networks. Hassan Abasi, a senior 

member of the Revolutionary Guards, recently boasted that Iran had “a 

strategy drawn up for the destruction of Anglo-Saxon civilization.”1

 The anxiety raised by the prospect of nuclear-armed Iran is 

creating a “do something!” moment across Washington and within 

parts of the Bush administration. Boot, a strong supporter of the 

Bush administration’s strategy for the greater Middle East, allows 

that, “On Iran, as in so many other areas, the administration seems 

to be paralyzed by disagreements between Defense Department 

hawks and State Department doves.”2 During the 2004 election 

season, the Democrats, by contrast, made a point of advocating a 

“grand bargain” with the mullahs that would allow them to keep 

their nuclear power plants in exchange for a promise to give up the 

kind of nuclear fuel used to make bombs. To some degree, this was 

a recycling of Clinton-era Iran policy with a sprinkling of the ideas 

that underlay the 1994 “Agreed Framework” with North Korea, a 

widely celebrated bit of arms control that did nothing to prevent 

Kim Jong Il from acquiring his current arsenal. Undeterred by that 

failure, Senators Kerry and Edwards made a point of advancing a 

“nonconfrontational” approach to Iran that emphasized areas of 

“mutual interest.” 

 Divining mutual interests between the United States and Iran has 

been an addiction of many American diplomats since the Iranian 

revolution of 1979. Even at the height of the Iran-Iraq war of the 
161

1980s, the Reagan administration proved itself open to dealing with 

Ayatollah Khomeini; witness the infamous “Iran-contra” affair. The 

first Bush administration came to office, sending the Iranians the 

message, in the President’s words, that “Goodwill begets goodwill.”3

After Khomeini’s death in 1989, the rise of Hashemi Rafsanjani 

appeared as a moment of renewed dialogue and moderation, but in 

the end, Iran remained implacably hostile to the United States, ever 

more so after the first Gulf War. As Kenneth Pollack has observed, 

the period of 1991-92 marked a newly aggressive period in Iranian 

foreign policy and, significantly, a correlating strategic emphasis on 

nuclear weapons:

The [former] shah had an interest in nuclear weapons, but it was actually 

rather restrained, given his approach to other aspects of military power. 

He did have a nuclear weapons program, but it had not progressed 

beyond basic research and was not lavishly funded . . . . The end of 

[the Iran-Iraq] war did not diminish Iran’s desire for nuclear weapons. 

Instead, it actually began to pump additional resources into its program. 

. . . Iran’s logic for accelerating its nuclear weapons program was very 

straightforward: if you want to pursue a policy that runs contrary to the 

vital interest of the United States, you must be able to deter an American 

invasion, and the only sure way to do that is to have a nuclear arsenal. 

. . . Deterring the United States was not the only motive Iran had for 

acquiring nuclear weapons (deterring Israel, building prestige, and 

dealing with a revived threat from Iraq were also considerations), but it 

was its most important incentive.4

 Indeed, after the disaster of the Iran-Iraq war, Iran began 

to coordinate its nuclear program more closely with its overall 

strategy. The United States responded in exactly the inverse 

fashion, by separating its nuclear concerns from its larger strategic 

framework. As in the Cold War, questions of nuclear proliferation 

were considered quite apart from their proper policy context; in fact, 

proliferation was often believed to be the primary concern.

 In the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and at the National 

Security Council, Pollack had a front-row seat for Clinton 

administration policymaking toward Iran. Despite a supposedly 

nuanced policy of “dual containment” that was to weigh more heavily 

on Saddam Hussein’s Iraq than Rasfanjani’s Iran, American hopes 

for moderation were frustrated constantly. The new pan-European 
162

engagement with Iran, dubbed “Critical Dialogue,” only made 

matters worse; what was meant to be a carrot-and-stick approach left 

Tehran free to snack on European carrots while dodging American 

sticks. Yet, when Rafsanjani stepped down as president and was 

replaced by Mohammed Khatami in 1997, the chimera of Iranian 

“reformists” beckoned again to the administration.

 From 1997 to 1999, U.S.-Iranian diplomacy resulted in a series 

of public displays of affection. As Pollack tells it, the Clinton 

administration had all but talked itself into the belief that a big 

breakthrough was at hand. All that was required was one final grand 

gesture on the part of the United States.5

 And so, on April 12, 1999, at 

a state dinner, President Clinton admitted in “unprompted” remarks 

that “Iran . . . has been the subject of quite a lot of abuse from various 

Western nations. And I think sometimes it’s quite important to tell 

people, look, you have a right to be angry at something my country 

or my culture or others that are generally allied with us today did to 

you 50 or 60 or 100 or 150 years ago.”6

 The President’s feel-Iran’spain impulse soon became formal administration rhetoric. On 

March 17, 2000, at Washington’s Omni Shoreham hotel, Secretary 

of State Madeleine Albright acknowledged and apologized for past 

American policy toward Iran:

In 1953, the United States played a significant role in orchestrating the 

overthrow of Iran’s popular Prime Minister, Mohammed Mosaddeq. 

The Eisenhower administration believed its actions were justified for 

strategic reasons; but the coup was clearly a setback for Iran’s political 

development. And it is easy to see now why many Iranians continue to 

resent this intervention by America in their internal affairs. Moreover, 

during the next quarter century, the United States and the West gave 

sustained backing to the Shah’s regime. Although it did much to 

develop the country economically, the Shah’s government also brutally 

repressed political dissent. As President Clinton has said, the United 

States must bear its full share of responsibility for the problems that 

have arisen in U.S.-Iranian relations. Even in more recent years, aspects 

of U.S. policy towards Iraq during its conflict with Iran appear now to 

have been regrettably short-sighted, especially in light of our subsequent 

experiences with Saddam Hussein.7

 Yet even as Albright was speaking, the Iranian government had 

begun to crack down on internal dissent and resume a hard-line, 
163

anti-American stance abroad. Pollack’s verdict on Clinton’s opening 

to Tehran is remarkably blunt and worth recounting at length:

I felt [at the time] that we had come very close to making a major 

breakthrough with Iran and that if only we had done a few things 

differently . . . we might have been able to make it happen. Over the 

years, however, I have come to the conclusion that I was wrong in this 

assessment. Any rapprochement that could be nixed by two words in 

a speech was a rapprochement that was doomed to failure anyway. 

That is the fundamental lesson of the Clinton initiative with Iran. The 

Iranians were not ready . . . . Iran was ruled by a regime in which the 

lion’s share of power—and everything that truly mattered—was in the 

hands of people who were not ready or interested in improving ties with 

the United States.8

But it is rare when a member of the U.S. foreign policy establishment 

comes to such a moment of clarity about Iran. Prior to September 11, 

even Bush administration principals were prone to speak hopefully 

about the future of relations between Washington and Tehran. Vice 

President Richard Cheney, while at Haliburton, had described U.S. 

sanctions on Iran as “self-defeating.” At his confirmation hearings, 

former Secretary of State Colin Powell observed changing conditions 

in Iran and stressed that “Iranians are not our enemies . . . to the 

extent that we can nuance our policy in that regard, I think it serves 

our interests and the interests of the region.”9

 Even in a post-9/11, post-Iraq world, the siren call of an AmericanIranian bargain remains attractive to many in the establishment. The 

latest call—for a “modest bargain” alternative—is encapsulated in 

the recent report, Iran: Time for a New Approach, by the Council on 

Foreign Relations (CFR).10 As is so often the case, this “task force” 

of foreign policy mandarins calling for a new approach is really just 

rehashing old ideas. Thus, the CFR report finds: 

[Tehran] could play a potentially significant role in promoting a 

stable, pluralistic government in Baghdad. It might be induced to be a 

constructive actor toward both Iraq and Afghanistan, but it retains the 

capacity to create significant difficulties for these regimes if it is alienated 

from the new post-conflict governments in those two countries.11

Thus, inevitably, it is the council’s recommendation that the United 

States “engage selectively with Iran to promote regional stability.” 
164

This, in the task force’s eyes, constitutes a “revised strategic approach 

to Iran.” 

 At least the CFR task force acknowledges that the “grand 

bargain” notion “that would settle comprehensively the outstanding 

conflicts between Iran and the United States is not a realistic goal, 

and pursuing such an outcome would be unlikely to produce nearterm progress on Washington’s central interests.”12 However, the 

depth of the differences between the United States and Iran is no 

excuse for restricting “engagement,” in the report’s view, and in 

particular the use of “incentives,” including expanded trade relations: 

“Given the increasingly important role of economic interests in 

shaping Iran’s policy options at home and abroad, the prospect of 

commercial relations with the United States could be a powerful 

tool in Washington’s arsenal.”13 Even more saliently, the task force 

believes that, while the United States is right to advocate democracy, 

America should abandon the “rhetoric of regime change, as it would 

be likely to rouse nationalist sentiments in defense of the regime, 

even among those who currently oppose it.”14 While willing to forgo 

the grandeur, the Council of Foreign Relations hates to pass up a 

bargain. 

 Indeed, to the extent that the CFR report proves anything, it is 

that the Cold War is not over: it lives on, and not just in time-warp 

regimes like Kim Jong Il’s North Korea or Saparmurat Niyazov’s 

Turkmenistan, but among the strategic smart set in the United States, 

for whom détente never dies. But in reality, new geopolitical facts 

obtain, and the United States has started to formulate new strategies 

based upon them. First among these new facts is that the United 

States is the global guarantor of international order, history’s sole 

superpower, and wishes to remain so. The second fact is that the 

“greater Middle East”—the immense swath of the planet stretching 

from West Africa to Southeast Asia—is now the central strategic 

focus of American security policy. The notion of a bargain with Iran 

is the by-product of an earlier era when Europe was the strategic 

key and the Middle East a secondary theater. Thus, the third aboutto-be fact—Iran’s development of a nuclear arsenal—demands a 

genuinely strategic response, one consistent with our broader global 

and regional goals. 
165

Remember the Bush Doctrine?

 The central question for the second Bush administration is 

whether the “Bush Doctrine”—whose main purpose is to preserve 

the generally liberal, stable, and peaceful international order that has 

resulted from the collapse of the Soviet empire and that is predicated 

upon the U.S. role as global guarantor of international security—is 

really the foundation for a lasting security strategy or was simply 

a rhetorical exercise meant to justify invading Iraq. The Bush 

Doctrine represents not just a continuation of the de facto policies 

of the Clinton administration, but a reaffirmation of the most basic 

American strategic habits; it is consistent with what might be called 

American strategic culture. And, in a realpolitik sense, there is no 

quiet life for the world’s sole superpower. 

 At the same time, there is a strong yearning, even among the 

grandees of the Republican Party, to avoid further involvement 

in the greater Middle East and to try to preserve the status quo 

governments—and the status quo relationships—across the region. 

This is not just an expression of “Iraq fatigue,” but a more deepseated skepticism about the prospects for democracy in the Islamic 

world, and Arabia in particular. At the same time, the pretense of a 

return to the status quo in the greater Middle East, of balancing one 

thuggish regime against another, and making strategy in partnership 

with Western European “powers” such as France and Germany, is 

impossible to take seriously in a post-9/11, post-Iraq world. Even if 

the United States could neatly withdraw from Iraq—itself an almost 

oxymoronic formulation—the “war on terrorism” would not end and 

would still include many other actors besides Osama bin Laden. 

 Thus there may be little alternative to the Bush Doctrine’s 

“forward strategy of freedom”; a purely defensive approach is 

impossible exactly because the pre-9/11 political order in the regime 

was the primary source of the nihilism and violence that led to those 

attacks. The Bush Doctrine’s fundamental set of premises may prove 

remarkably stable: the rollback of both Islamic terror organizations 

and the governments that support them; containing China’s military 

ambitions; and, key to it all, preventing any true “axis of evil” that 

marks a conjunction of Islamic radicalism with the rising great-power 

capabilities in Beijing. 
166

 This strategy is nothing if not ambitious. We are attempting 

to resolve a massive civil war within the Islamic world while 

simultaneously preventing a dissatisfied China—even more dependent 

for its economic growth on Middle Eastern oil than the United 

States—from interfering with our efforts. The Bush administration’s 

occasional confessions about the magnitude of the effort required, 

reflected in Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld’s forecast of a “long, 

hard slog” in Iraq and then National Security Adviser Condoleezza 

Rice’s profession of a “generational commitment” to the project of 

transforming the Middle East, only begin to hint at the task before 

the United States. The only good news is that, while our enemies are 

many, they are individually weak and not immediately disposed to 

unite against us.

 U.S. strategy for a nuclear Iran must be made to fit this broader 

framework. The greatest danger is that Tehran’s acquisition of 

nuclear weapons will distort and derail American strategy. Strategic 

realists will once again see the need to pursue a “balance of power” 

approach, undercutting the Bush “liberation strategy.” “Engagers” 

and Europhiles will see an opportunity to rush forward with a great 

new bunch of “carrots” to tempt Iranian moderates. Arms controllers 

will attempt to subordinate real strategy-making to the establishment 

of international agreements limiting weaponry. Perhaps most 

dangerous of all will be those policymakers who rightly propose 

a hard-line against the mullahs: their commendable willingness to 

pressure Tehran, even to the point of military action, has a tendency 

to obscure their strategic judgment. Indeed, hardliners may be most 

prone to the “do something!” fever. It may well be that the United 

States finds itself forced to do something militarily in the case of 

the Islamic Republic, but if so, it is more important to do the right 

something. And the “right” strategy for Iran is one that fits the Iran 

piece within the larger puzzle of political transformation for the 

Middle East. 

Sources of Iranian Conduct.

 To be sure, Iran stands directly athwart this project of regional 

transformation. Indeed, the regime in Tehran came to power by 

ousting Shah Reza Pahlavi in the tumultuous year of 1979, when 
167

the old, autocratic order in the greater Middle East began to 

crumble. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini established an unabashedly 

theocratic and revolutionary government, at the same time calling 

for a broader Muslim uprising and attacks upon the United States, 

the “Great Satan.” And despite international isolation, devastating 

defeat in war, and widespread internal unrest, the regime retains its 

ideological character, as well as a firm grip on power. As the Council 

on Foreign Relations notes, the Islamic Republic has achieved some 

“durability.”15

 But if its political and strategic ends have been consistent, Tehran’s 

means have changed dramatically. One of the best studies of the IranIraq War, done by the United States Marine Corps, observed that the 

casualties of that conflict were so great that it essentially bled the 

Iranian revolution to death.16 Khomeini and his fellow mullahs were 

more than willing to spread revolution by conventional military 

means, but a generation of young Pasdaran zealots broke itself in 

human wave attacks on Saddam Hussein’s army; what the U.S. 

military was able to do so decisively in 1991 and again in 2003—slice 

through the Iraqi field force—the Iranian army could not manage 

even at the cost of perhaps a million casualties over 8 years. 

 If Iran could not export its revolution by conventional military 

means, then unconventional means would have to suffice. 

Iran’s sponsorship of terrorists is well-known. As the U.S. State 

Department’s most recent report on global terrorism puts it, “Iran 

remained the most active state sponsor of terrorism in 2003. Its 

Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Ministry of Intelligence and 

Security were involved in the planning of and support for terrorist 

acts and continued to exhort a variety of groups that use terrorism to 

pursue their goals.”17

 From Beirut to Buenos Aires, international terrorism has been 

central to Iran’s foreign policy since the 1979 revolution. Tehran 

openly provides funding, training, and weapons to Hezbollah, 

Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and the Popular Front for the 

Liberation of Palestine. Iran also has a long relationship with al 

Qaeda. As early as late 1991, Sudan’s Islamist leader, Hassan alTurabi, sponsored meetings designed to encourage Shia and Sunni 

fundamentalists to put aside their differences and work together 
168

against the United States. “Not long afterward,” according to the 

9/11 Commission report, “senior Al Qaeda operatives and trainers 

traveled to Iran to receive training in explosives.”18

 Senior al Qaeda operatives captured by the United States have 

revealed that Tehran attempted to strengthen its ties to Osama bin 

Laden after the USS Cole attack in 2000, and that Iranian officials have 

facilitated the travel of al Qaeda members through their territory, 

failing to stamp their passports. It is also believed that 8 to 14 of the 

9/11 hijackers took advantage of this arrangement to transit through 

Iran in 2000-01.19

 After the fall of the Taliban, several senior al Qaeda operatives 

fled to Iran, where they have found a safe haven from which to 

plot further attacks—including the May 2003 terrorist bombing in 

Riyadh, in which 34 people were killed.20 Although Iran claims to 

hold several al Qaeda members in custody, it refuses to disclose their 

identities publicly and has rebuffed attempts to arrange for their 

transfer.21

 Yet for all the vehemence of its ideology and the violence of its 

anti-Americanism, the clerical regime in Tehran has found itself 

incapable of stemming the seeping U.S. presence in the Persian Gulf 

and in the broader region. While Iran essentially stood aside when 

Operation DESERT STORM drove the Iraqi army from Kuwait and 

contained Saddam Hussein’s regional ambitions, the war ushered 

in the policy of “dual containment,” targeted at Tehran as well as 

Baghdad; indeed, the first Bush administration left Saddam in power 

primarily to serve as a bulwark against Iranian expansionism. The 

“no-fly-zones” and other U.S. operations in the area throughout the 

1990s attested to the fact that, even with no real regional partner—

beyond the on-again, off-again support offered by the Saudis—the 

United States was more than capable of maintaining its military 

forces at Iran’s doorstep and had no intention of withdrawing. 

 And while the mullahs may have celebrated the attacks of 9/11, 

they have come to rue many of the subsequent events. Although 

there was little love lost between Tehran and the Taliban, the 

expanded American military presence along Iran’s eastern flank is 

far from welcome. The invasion of Iraq, though it removed Tehran’s 

longtime nemesis in Baghdad, completed the near-encirclement of 
169

Iran by U.S. military forces. Iran’s attempts to influence the direction 

of post-Saddam Iraq have yet to produce anything more substantive 

than its past efforts to undermine Saddam; Tehran’s sponsorship of 

Moqtada al Sadr helped the “Mahdi army” make headlines, but the 

finality with which mainstream Iraqi cleric Ayatollah Ali al Sistani 

evicted Sadr’s forces from the shrine of Imam Ali in Najaf reinforced 

the truth that the majority of Iraq’s Shia still have little interest in 

taking orders from Iran. 

 Under such apparently bleak circumstances, Tehran’s traditional 

hankering for nuclear weapons has sharpened significantly. Iran’s 

conventional options are now restricted to attempts to limit American 

access to the region, such as by pointing missiles at the Straits of 

Hormuz and bolstering ground-based air defenses. Terrorism with a 

return address carries greater risks, too: it is interesting to speculate 

what the U.S. reaction would be now, in a post-9/11 world, to a 

Khobar Towers–type bombing. What the Iranians could safely 

sponsor in 1996 might not be so safe now. The surest deterrent to 

American action is a functioning nuclear arsenal. 

What to Do?

 To be sure, the prospect of a nuclear Iran is a nightmare. But it is 

less a nightmare because of the high likelihood that Tehran would 

employ its weapons or pass them on to terrorist groups—although 

that is not beyond the realm of possibility—and more because of 

the constraining effect it threatens to impose upon U.S. strategy for 

the greater Middle East. The danger is that Iran will “extend” its 

deterrence, either directly or de facto, to a variety of states and other 

actors throughout the region. This would be an ironic echo of the 

extended deterrence thought to apply to U.S. allies during the Cold 

War. But in the greater Middle East of the 21st century, we are the 

truly revolutionary force, and “revolutionary” Iran is more the status 

quo power. 

 The attitudes of the Council on Foreign Relations Iran task 

force reveal this dynamic with creepy perfection. Aware that the 

fundamental strategic choice on Iran is between policies of regime 

change and détente, the consensus among the task force members is 
170

that the problem is the weapons, not the government building them. 

Indeed, the report makes it clear that the task force was divided 

about the state of Iran’s nuclear program. 

 Although Task Force members voiced differing opinions on 

whether evidence is sufficient to determine that Iran has fully 

committed itself to developing nuclear weapons, the Task Force 

agreed that Iran is likely to continue its pattern of tactical cooperation 

with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), while 

attempting to conceal the scope of its nuclear program in order to 

keep its options open as long as possible.22 But if there were nuances 

about the state of Tehran’s nukes, there seems to be consensus about 

American policy: forget the regime-change idea and concentrate on 

the weapons. By focusing narrowly on the issues of Iran’s weapons, 

any discussion of the larger consequences for American policy can 

be avoided. 

 What would the consequences be of a bargain with Iran—be 

it grand or small—for a strategy of political transformation in the 

greater Middle East? Is it possible to pursue détente with Iran and 

regime change elsewhere? 

 Throughout the greater Middle East, any overt bargain with Iran 

will surely be read as a retreat on the part of the United States. Three 

years after September 11, the question remains: do the Americans 

have the strength, stomach, and sincerity to carry through their 

project of democratization and regional transformation? Observers 

in the Middle East can see that President Bush is committed, but there 

are doubts about the rest of his government, even heading into his 

second term. The world’s other industrial powers either are openly 

afraid and thus hostile, skeptical, or at best noncommittal; but for a 

handful of allies, America stands alone. Détente with Iran would 

compel the forces of freedom in the Middle East to further hedge 

their bets, and our sometime allies, like the Saudis, who through the 

1990s tried to reach an accommodation with Tehran, would equally 

reckon that U.S. ambitions for change had overleaped themselves. 

Even Pakistan, congenitally unstable and prone to play all ends 

against the middle absent unceasing American attention, might toy 

with the idea of reversing its post-9/11 policies. 

 Even more importantly, an obsessive attention to Iran would 

divert the United States from the most important, ideological aspect 
171

of its effort in the Middle East: the project to reform politics among 

the Sunni Arabs. This is the real heart of the conflict in the region. 

The essential question is whether the Sunni community will cling 

to near-monarchical autocracies—be they relatively benign and 

modern, as in Jordan, or actively aggressive, such as the Wahhabifueled Saudis—or opt for an even more repressive, Osama-bin-Ladenstyle revolution. U.S. strategy is to foment a genuinely democratic 

and modernizing revolution. Over the coming decades, the hearts 

and minds of Sunnis represent the strategic center of gravity in the 

region, and the likely effect of an Iran-centric U.S. policy would be 

to obscure this fact and reinforce the impulse to cling to the Sunni 

status quo—an “old order” which almost certainly is in the midst of 

collapsing.

 A bargain with Iran would also have global effects. The most 

serious would not be in France or Germany, whose governments 

have made it plain that they have no heart for transformation in the 

Middle East or for a serious effort to oppose Iran, but in China. Beijing 

and Tehran share a mutual dissatisfaction with the Pax Americana 

and have a long record of direct and indirect cooperation on nuclear 

and missile programs. Hu Jintao and the new generation of leaders in 

China have a much larger, global perspective than did Jiang Zemin 

and Deng Xiaoping before them, greater confidence flowing from 

China’s economic modernization, and, almost certainly, an appetite 

to play the geopolitical game more actively. Their horizons very 

clearly extend throughout the greater Middle East—China’s energy 

interest in Sudan already has posed perhaps the largest roadblock 

to stopping the genocide in Darfur, for example—and they are 

deeply conscious of the potential U.S. stranglehold on China’s future 

growth. Torn between their interests in U.S. security guarantees and 

a desire for greater autonomy, Beijing will keenly note, and perhaps 

be happy to broker, any bargain for Iran. 

Regime Change by Other Means. 

 If détente with a nuclear Islamic Republic jeopardizes the project 

of Middle East transformation, then direct military confrontation is 

an equally unappetizing method of regime change. In the heat of the 
172

“do something!” moment, the difficulties of even limited military 

strikes are too little appreciated. While a full discussion of the 

operational realities is beyond the scope of this chapter, some hard 

truths are worth mentioning. Iran is large, populous, rugged, and 

its nuclear facilities are spread throughout the country.23 Its nuclear 

program probably cannot be crippled in a single, surgical strike, as 

was Iraq’s in Israel’s famous Osiraq raid. 

 And speaking of the Israelis, it is not uncommon to hear the 

hope expressed among U.S. policymakers, albeit sotto voce, that 

they somehow will solve the puzzle that perplexes us. Earlier in 

September, the Israeli newspaper, Haaretz, reported that Tel Aviv 

was planning on buying 500 bunker-busters, precisely the kind of 

munitions that might be able to destroy Iran’s underground nuclear 

facilities.24 In truth, however, a preemptive strike by Tel Aviv 

would be exceedingly difficult. Israel’s long-range strike capacity is 

a fraction of the U.S. military’s and would, as a matter of logistics, 

require at least American acquiescence (we own a good deal of the 

airspace between Tel Aviv and Tehran). And even if, miraculously, 

an Israeli strike achieved some tactical success, the Iranians would 

surely hold us responsible and target U.S. interests in retaliation. In 

sum, punitive strikes cannot be designed to end the Iranian nuclear 

threat nor ensure regime change, as our decade-long experience with 

Saddam Hussein should remind us. 

 A full-scale invasion would be a “porridge-too-hot” prospect 

in other than the most dire circumstances. While in a conventional 

fight, the Iranian army might provide no stiffer resistance than 

did the Iraqi army in 1991 or 2003, and a post-invasion campaign 

might concentrate solely on a full dismantling of Iranian nuclear 

infrastructure and identifying scientists and program officials, it is 

far from certain that U.S. objectives could be so neatly limited. It 

is impossible to know the degree of post-invasion resistance, but to 

underestimate it would be an even greater folly than underestimating 

it was in Iraq.

 The military approach that perhaps best balances risks and 

rewards might be a comprehensive air campaign, lasting perhaps a 

week, to be followed by fomenting an Afghanistan-style insurgency. 

Iran continues to suppress separatist moments among Iranian 
173

Kurds, Azeris, and Baluchis—Tehran has never had perfect control 

of its own borders. Even the most successful strike campaign would 

have only transitory effect; having crossed the military threshold, 

the United States must be ready to keep regime-threatening pressure 

on the mullahs. Indeed, the Bush administration would do well 

to put in place covert contacts with Iranian dissident factions—as 

well as military supplies capable of sustaining them if needed—

before considering any punitive air campaign. And while there 

are tremendous risks associated with any proxy war, it provides 

an improvement over air strikes alone. The United States should 

not enter a war with Iran without at least some reasonable plan for 

victory, measured by regime change in Tehran. 

 Yet perhaps the most attractive strategy for a nuclear Iran 

is traditional containment. There are risks associated with this 

approach, and it does not mean “multilateral” diplomacy. From 

Khartoum to Tehran, the “international community” is proving 

again that it is unwilling to confront renegade regimes. Iran’s 

flouting of the IAEA and the United Nations (UN) also takes a page 

from Saddam’s book. Despite growing evidence of Iran’s nuclear 

malfeasance, many countries are reluctant to sanction it for what 

they view as its legitimate right to develop a complete nuclear fuel 

cycle. We must anticipate that the primary burden of isolating and 

containing a nearly nuclear Iran rests with the United States. Like so 

much of our future work in the greater Middle East, this must be a 

long-term effort requiring patience and resolve. 

 The first order of business is to keep Iran from establishing a 

deeper relationship with great-power sponsors. Breaking Tehran’s 

ties to China will be difficult, given that no American administration, 

Republican or Democrat, has yet been willing to force Beijing to choose 

between the constraints and the benefits of the Pax Americana—

witness Taiwan, North Korea, and now Sudan. Better hopes lie with 

India, which, if pressured to scale back its links to Iran as the price of 

a real strategic partnership with the United States, might become a 

serious future ally. 

 The second order of business is for the United States to retain the 

initiative in its new project of reform and transformation in the greater 

Middle East. The real isolation of revolutionary Iran will come when 
174

it is drowned in a larger sea of liberal, accountable governments in 

the region. As democracy takes hold in Afghanistan and Iraq, Iran’s 

dictatorship will come under increasing pressure. 

 In a curious way, Iran suffers from both the Middle East’s great 

maladies: it is both a sclerotic autocracy and a backward-looking 

theocracy. The success of democracy in Afghanistan and Iraq not 

only will surround Iran strategically, but ideologically as well. In 

the final analysis, supporting and expanding the forces of freedom 

in the region offers, for now, our best hope for containing Iran and 

diluting the value of its nuclear deterrent.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 7

 1. Max Boot, “Bush Can’t Afford Inaction on Iran,” Los Angeles Times, September 

9, 2004. 

 2. Ibid.

 3. Kenneth Pollack, The Persian Puzzle: The Conflict between Iran and America, 

New York: Random House, 2004, p. 245.

 4. Pollack, pp. 258-259; see also Ray Takeyh, “Iran’s Nuclear Calculations,” 

World Policy Journal, Summer 2003.

 5. Pollack, esp. pp. 303-343.

 6. The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Remarks at Millenium 

Evening: The Perils of Indifference: Lessons Learned from a Violent Century,” 

April 12, 1999; quoted in Pollack, p. 323.

 7. Pollack, p. xxv.

 8. Ibid., pp. 341-342.

 9. Quoted in Ibid., p. 343.

 10. Zbigniew Brzezinski and Robert M. Gates, cochairs, Iran: Time for a New 

Approach, New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2004. Accessed at http://www.

cfr.org/pdf/Iran_TF.pdf.

 11. Ibid., p 2.

 12. Ibid., p. 3.

 13. Ibid., pp. 3-4.

 14. Ibid., p. 4.

 15. Ibid., p. 1.

 16. Douglas V. Johnson and Stephen C. Pelletiere, Lessons Learned: The IranIraq War, Volume I, Fleet Marine Force Reference Publication 3-203, Quantico, VA: 

Marine Corps Combat Development Command, December 10, 1990.
175

 17. Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of 

State, April 2004. Available at http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2003/. 

 18. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, The 

9/11 Commission Report, July 2004, p. 61. Available at http://www.9-11commission.

gov/report/ 911Report_FM.pdf. 

 19. Ibid., p. 240-241.

 20. Douglas Jehl and Eric Schmitt, “U.S. Suggests al Qaeda Cell in Iran Directed 

Saudi Bombings,” New York Times, May 21, 2003. 

 21. Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003. 

 22. Brzezinski and Gates, p. 2.

 23. The December 2004 issue of The Atlantic magazine printed a long article 

discussing the operational issues involved in both an air campaign targeted at 

Iran’s nuclear program and an invasion aimed at regime change. The discussion 

in many ways was manipulated to lead a reader to the conclusion that any military 

action against Iran would not be worth the cost, but the discussion nonetheless 

was illustrative of the magnitude of the challenge. See James Fallows, “Will Iran 

Be Next?” The Atlantic, December 2004.

 24. Craig S. Smith, “Iran Moves Toward Enriching Uranium,” New York Times, 

September 22, 2004.

177

CHAPTER 8

IRAN GETS THE BOMB—THEN WHAT?

George Perkovich with Silvia Manzanero

 The acquisition of nuclear weapons by terrorists or any additional 

states would shake the international system. The more strategically 

important the state, the greater the potential threat to global 

security.

 Iran is a strategically vital actor in the international system. It 

incarnates an historically major civilization. It is the largest state in 

the regional complex that comprises the Persian Gulf, the Middle 

East, and Central Asia, including Turkey. Major developments 

in Iran, therefore, have wide reverberations simply as a matter of 

political geophysics. Iran’s large role in the global supply of fossil 

fuels makes it still more important. As a direct source of fuel, and 

also as a shaper of regional dynamics, Iran can significantly affect 

the global economy, and therefore politics. Iran’s ties to terrorist 

organizations operating (primarily) in the Middle East renders 

Tehran a vital actor in the international campaign against terrorism. 

Iran has the capability to peacefully augment or violently disrupt 

U.S. missions in Afghanistan and Iraq. Thus, a major change in Iran’s 

military strength and/or political status would directly affect major 

U.S. and international interests.

 Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons would upset international 

order significantly more than did the acquisition of nuclear weapons 

by India, Israel, Pakistan, and North Korea. It would strain the North 

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO): Turkey would perhaps seek a 

countervailing capability or reassurances, and the United States and 

other NATO allies would differ in responses to Iran. Iran’s acquisition 

of the bomb would threaten the viability of the Nonproliferation 

Treaty (NPT) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA): 

unlike India, Israel, and Pakistan, Iran did sign the NPT and now 

puts the treaty’s enforcers in a position of having to uphold its terms. 

A nuclear Iran would widen fissures within the Arab world and 
178

between Arabs and Iran, fissures that run through the Persian Gulf 

and that would shake international oil markets.

 Curiously, almost no literature has emerged to discuss how 

Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons would affect the international 

system beyond the Middle East. Discussion has tended to focus on 

potential knock-on effects in the Persian Gulf and Middle East (i.e., 

Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt, and Israel), to the exclusion of broader 

implications. 

 In the absence of official indicators, we are left to speculate that 

the international community could respond broadly in two ways to 

Iran’s going nuclear. It could seek to roll back this acquisition and 

bring Iran back into compliance with the obligations of non-nuclearweapon states, or the world could adapt itself to Iran’s new status 

and seek a modus vivendi through deterrence, containment and 

diplomacy. 

 This paper assumes that the first response will be to seek roll back. 

Iran has been caught in noncompliance with its reporting obligations 

under the NPT. This violation of the NPT has been recognized by 

the IAEA, by all leading states in the international system, and by 

Iran itself. Having violated its compliance obligations, Iran cannot 

now withdraw from the treaty and escape the consequences of its 

violations. Thus, if Iran goes ahead and acquires nuclear weapons, 

it will be in open defiance of the international regime designed to 

prevent such acquisition. This distinguishes Iran from North Korea, 

whose initial acquisition of nuclear weapons capability occurred 

before the international system declared it to be in clear violation. The 

net effect is that Iran poses the most severe test yet to enforcers of the 

nonproliferation regime, and acquiescence to Iran’s proliferation is 

not a viable option.

 It can be assumed that the United States (with others if possible) 

would use various forms of coercion to achieve roll back.1 Coercion 

or punishment would have three aims. First, to impose enough pain 

to compel Iranian leaders to change their minds and abandon nuclear 

weapon capabilities. Second, to reduce the perceived benefits Iran 

would gain from nuclear weapons and to otherwise weaken Iran. 

Third, drawing on the former two desired effects to punish Iran, 

thus deterring future proliferators. 
179

 Potential coercive options are discussed below, as are the roles 

of key institutions in authorizing or implementing them. It is worth 

noting that if Iran were compelled to roll back its acquisition, the 

benefits to the international system in terms of security, political, 

and economic developments would be far reaching. The greater 

challenge is to assess whether the international community would 

muster enough will and muscle to coerce Iran to roll back, and if it 

failed, what the consequences might be. These are the matters we 

address.

 We proceed first by assessing Iran’s susceptibility to various 

forms of coercion. This analysis is rudimentary, but suggestive. 

How susceptible would Iran be to international political ostracism? 

To economic sanctions? Would military force of various scales be 

effective? After considering types of coercion, we then assess the 

considerations that different actors likely would have in deciding 

whether to apply each form of coercion. How would the permanent 

five members of the United Nations (UN) Security Council respond? 

What about the European Union (EU)? How would Iran’s going 

nuclear affect U.S. relations with Russia? Russia’s position vis-àvis the United States and the EU? How would the broader Muslim 

community and the oil importing states of Northeast Asia likely react 

to U.S.-led efforts to deal with a nuclear Iran?

 Finally, although this paper assesses the challenge of reversing 

Iran’s proliferation, it also would be wise to consider the alternative 

strategy of adaptation to a nuclear Iran. If Iran effectively resisted 

roll back, the United States and others would shift to a strategy of 

deterring Iran from “using” its nuclear capability as an instrument of 

coercive diplomacy (nuclear blackmail) or military aggression (using 

a nuclear umbrella to shield low-intensity conflict in other states). 

A shift from roll back to a strategy of deterrence and containment 

would come early if Iran indicated it is deterrable and desired nuclear 

weapons only to protect its own autonomy, not to alter the status 

quo in the Gulf and Middle East. Iran’s more pragmatic international 

policy since 1997 suggests that it is moving toward a more status quo 

orientation and would not wield nuclear weapons provocatively. If 

this were to prove true, the United States would find it extremely 

difficult to sustain international cooperation in seeking to coerce 

Iranian roll back. This paper, however, does not explore the adaptive 
180

strategy of deterrence and containment because such a strategy 

would not be nearly so difficult for the United States to execute as 

would be the strategy of rallying international cooperation in roll 

back. 

COERCIVE ROLL BACK OPTIONS

 Coercion can be framed as an escalating ladder of potential 

measures to raise the cost and pain Iran would experience, with the 

aim of making Tehran’s leaders finally decide to let go of their nuclear 

weapons capabilities. Political isolation is the first rung. Economic 

sanctions and potential embargoes comprise a rising series of midrange steps up this ladder. Various forms of military action occupy 

the next highest rungs.

Political Isolation.

 Iranian elites display great pride in Persian civilization and 

history. They resent pariahdom in ways, for example, that North 

Koreans or even Pakistanis do not seem to. The intensity of the 

Iranian elite’s desire for international respect is easily underestimated 

by U.S. commentators and officials who have little or no contact 

with Iran. To be sure, the desire to be integrated into the broader 

international community, to partake in a dialogue of civilizations, is 

felt most keenly by Western-educated reformers, urban youth, and 

some business interests. The most conservative elements in Iran, 

particularly those associated with the Revolutionary Guard, the 

Guardian Council, and autarkic economic interests, do not consider 

political isolation a major threat. However, these elements must take 

care not to stimulate active resistance against themselves by causing 

Iran’s further isolation. 

 The utility of political ostracism depends on the political dynamics 

within Iran at any given moment. The threat of isolation will be more 

effective in preventing Iran from completing acquisition of nuclear 

weapon capabilities than it would be in reversing acquisition if Iranian 

decisionmakers choose to take that course. The conservatives who 

would decide to defy the international community and acquire the 

bomb would calculate that political isolation does not threaten their 
181

hold on power. Otherwise they would be less inclined to take the 

risk in the first place. Once they have the bomb, abandoning it would 

be seen as admitting a grave mistake and capitulating to outside 

pressure. Conservatives would not be compelled by international 

political opprobrium alone. Were the bomb to be acquired under 

autarkic leadership, the capacity of subsequent reformist leaders 

to reverse course would depend on variables that simply cannot be 

anticipated at this time.

Economic Sanctions.

 Iran is economically vulnerable. Unemployment is a grave 

problem, hovering at around 20 percent, and even worse for youth. 

The Revolutionary government simply has not been able to manage 

the economy in ways that produce jobs at a pace with growth of the 

job-seeking public. Beyond necessary regulatory and policy reforms, 

Iran needs massive capital infusion from abroad to stimulate growth. 

Therefore, sanctions to cut off investment and exports can deprive 

the country of badly needed capital and, consequently, growth.

 Two types and targets of sanctions could be considered: against 

foreign investment into Iran, and against exports of oil, natural gas, 

and other commodities out from Iran. Between 40 percent and 50 

percent of the central government’s revenue comes from oil exports, 

and they constitute about 80 percent of Iran’s total export earnings.2

In order to remain a profitable source of revenue, however, the oil 

industry needs to be modernized, and new oil fields have to be 

developed. Iran is counting on approximately $5 billion per year in 

foreign investment in order to update onshore fields and develop 

new ones. Iran needs $8 to $10 billion to develop its offshore fields. 

Similarly, Iran expends about $1 billion a year in oil imports, mainly 

gasoline, because it lacks the infrastructure and technology to 

produce it on its own.3 Blocking the flow of gasoline imports would, 

therefore, constitute an additional pressure measure. 

 Iran also possesses the second-largest natural gas resources in 

the world. Although it now lacks the capacity and infrastructure to 

export significant amounts, Iran could become a leading exporter of 

natural gas in coming years. Sanctions on natural gas exports would 
182

send a strong message, but they would not cripple significantly 

Iran’s economy in the short term. Curtailing foreign investment in 

this industry, however, would more dramatically increase the cost 

of Iran’s noncompliance with the demands of the international 

community.

Imposing Sanctions on Foreign Investment in Iran’s Energy Sector. 

Without new investment, Iranian officials say that Iran might become 

a net importer of oil by 2010.4 Despite the threat from U.S. secondary 

sanctions, several countries have already invested significantly in 

Iran’s energy industry, and more companies are expected to take 

advantage of latest deals presented by the National Iranian Oil 

Company, a state-owned enterprise offering 16 new “buyback”5

contracts. 

 In the next 2 decades, world energy demand also will shift from 

oil to natural gas. North America, Europe, and Asia are expected to 

account for 60 percent of this growth. Because of its proximity, Iran 

hopes to become a key supplier of European and Asian countries. 

Despite its vast resources, however, Iran needs large amounts of 

foreign investment to develop treatment facilities, pipelines, and 

liquefied natural gas (LNG) tankers for transportation. Moreover, 

many of these deals are still being negotiated, providing the option 

of stopping investments before they begin rather than the more 

difficult task of reining in projects already underway.

 Stopping ongoing projects and deterring key potential investors 

from Iran’s energy industry will be difficult, however. Through 

2004, the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) sanctions had not yet been 

imposed on any foreign company investing in Iran’s energy industry. 

This sanction-forbearance is due largely to questions over the legality 

of the Act outside U.S. national territory and its jurisdiction over 

non-U.S. entities. Furthermore, if secondary sanctions were actually 

to be imposed, the effects on trade relations would be harmful to 

both parties. It is also not certain that other governments would 

sanction companies under their own jurisdiction. Iran could threaten 

to annul any agreements with current partners and offer “sweet” 

deals to less prominent investors. For instance, China Petroleum 

& Chemical Corporation (SNP) has already stated that it will not 

yield to Washington’s pressure.6

 Further, despite growing concerns 

over Iran’s nuclear program, Total (France) and Petronas (Malaysia) 
183

recently have agreed to invest $2 billion for the creation of Pars LNG 

Company, which will manage the production of 8 million tons of 

LNG a year.7

Year Country Company Field Value

1999 France Elf Aquitaine/Totalfina Doroud $1,000

1999 France & Canada Elf Aquitaine & Bow Valley Balal $300

1999 U.K. & Netherlands Royal Dutch & Shell Soroush & Nowruz $800

2000 Italy ENI South Pars, 4 & 5 $3,800

2000 Norway Statoil Salman $850

2000 Norway Norsk Hydro Anaran N/A

2001 U.K. Enterprise Oil South Pars, 6,7 & 8 N/A

2001 Sweden GVA Consultants Caspian Sea $226

2001 Italy ENI Darkhovin $550-

1,000

2001 Japan Japex, Indonesia Petroleum Azadegan $2,500

 & Tomen

2002 Canada Sheer Energy Masjid-e-Soleman $80

2002 South Korea LG Engineering Group South Pars, 9&10 $1,600

2002 Norway Statoil South Pars, 6,7 & 8 $300

2002 South Korea Hyundai Processing Trains $1,000

2002 Spain Cepsa & OMV* Cheshmeh-Khosh $300

2003 Japan Japanese Consortium South Pars, 6,7, &8 $1,200

2004 Japan Japex, Indonesia Petroleum Azadegan $2,500

 & Tomen

2004 France & Malaysia Total & Petronas Pars LNG $2,000

2005 China Zhuhai Zhenrong Co. LNG deal $20,000

* Cepsa and OMV annulled their contract after 3 years of negotiations.

Table 1. Foreign Investment in Iran’s Energy Sector 

(millions of dollars).8

 Yet, the task is not impossible. Steps have already been taken 

toward building a coalition to block new investments in Iran’s oil 

sector, where Iran might have tremendous natural resources but is 

certainly not the only place to invest. Russia and the nearby Caspian 

oil fields of Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan are potential destinations for 

foreign investors. 

 Furthermore, after 3 years of negotiations, Spanish companies 

have pulled back, alleging commercial issues.9

 John Browne, chief 

executive of U.K’s British Petroleum (BP), has also expressed his 

concerns over investing in Iran, given the current international 
184

political environment.10 And although a Japanese consortium has 

recently agreed to develop the vast Azadegan oil field, negotiations 

took 4 years, in part because Japan shares U.S. interests in 

nonproliferation and also did not want to jeopardize U.S.-Japanese 

trade relations.

Oil Exports. Iran’s key oil customers include Japan, China, South 

Korea, Taiwan, France, Germany, and Italy. These countries are 

among the world’s top petroleum net importers, and together they 

receive about 1.2 million bbl/d out of the 2.6 million that Iran exports 

daily.11 Although Germany and France have shown a decrease in 

demand for Iranian oil in the last decade, Japan, China, and South 

Korea have increased it, and even Italy still imports about 8.8 percent 

of its oil from Iran. Therefore, establishing sanctions on Iranian oil 

would entail convincing these countries to stop oil trade with Iran, 

or at least to significantly decrease it. Their compliance would, in 

turn, require that they be provided with a reliable alternative source 

of oil supply. 

 

1991 2001

Total Iran Percent Total Iran Percent

Japan 5,458 385 7.053 5,324 531 9.973

China N/A N/A N/A N/A 24212 6.700

South Korea 1,384 N/A N/A 2,831 155 5.475 

France 2,166 172 7.94 2,241 76 3.391

Germany 2,829 53 1.873 2,922 1 0.342

Italy 2,168 233 10.747 2,129 188 8.830

Table 2. Main Importers of Iranian Oil (Million Barrels per Day).13

 Approximately 1.2 million bpd would have to be redirected to 

this group of countries.14 One possible source is Saudi Arabia, which, 

on its own, has an excess capacity of 1.4-1.9 million bpd, as of the 

year 2003.15 Venezuela, too, has the capacity to expand production by 

1 million bpd with stable foreign investment.16 Other Organization 

of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)17 such as the United Arab 

Emirates (UAE), Kuwait, Nigeria, and Libya also have the capability 

to increase production at no significant additional cost.18 In addition, 

non-OPEC countries such as Norway, Mexico, and more importantly, 
185

Russia, would be prime sources of extra oil supply. Without almost 

one-half of its oil exports revenue, the Iranian central government 

would be seriously depleted of important resources. 

Country Production Consumption Net Exports

Saudi Arabia 9.1 1.3 7.8

Russia 6.7 2.4 4.3

Norway 3.3 0.2 3.1

Venezuela 3.1 0.5 2.7

Iran 3.8 1.2 2.6

United Arab Emirates 2.5 0.3 2.2

Iraq 2.6 0.5 2.1

Kuwait 2.2 0.2 2.1

Nigeria 2.1 0.3 1.9

Mexico 3.5 2.0 1.4

Libya 1.5 0.2 1.3

Algeria 1.4 0.2 1.2

United Kingdom 2.8 1.7 1.1

Table 3. Top Petroleum Net Exporters, 2000 

(Million Barrels per Day).19

 More complex issues to consider are the political and economic 

implications that could derive from this kind of punishment. 

Sanctions against Iranian oil could be seen as an indirect reward 

to substitute supplier countries that are less than democratic. This 

could undermine international will to cooperate with sanctions. 

More likely, countries necessary for effective sanctions against 

Iranian exports would be reluctant to endanger their important nonoil trade relations with Iran (see discussion below.) At the same time, 

it is difficult to predict how oil-producing states would react to the 

oil sanctions. Although oil prices have been highly volatile in the 

last 25 years, Iranian oil customers might decide not to comply with 

the oil embargo if oil producers take advantage of the situation by 

significantly increasing already-high oil prices. Furthermore, the 

political instability in countries such as Venezuela might add to the 

pressure on oil prices to reach levels not acceptable to importing 

states. 

 In short, sanctioning Iranian oil exports would require many 

major states to put nuclear counter-proliferation ahead of economic 
186

well-being, at least in the near term. In democracies, elected leaders 

would calculate whether their publics would care more about the 

security implications of Iranian nuclear weapons than rises in their 

cost of living. These calculations would in turn be affected by national 

threat perceptions and by the process by which sanctions would 

be authorized. Would a nuclear Iran be seen as a threat primarily 

to Israel and U.S. forces in the Persian Gulf? Would key European 

Union states feel more threatened by Iranian nuclear weapons or by 

inflation? Major Asian importers of Iranian oil probably would not 

feel directly threatened by Iranian nuclear weapons and therefore 

less inclined to cooperate with sanctions. This reluctance would 

be greater still, if sanctions were seen as primarily a U.S. “project”. 

Thus, it would be vital to obtain UN Security Council authority for 

such sanctions, in order to broaden the legitimacy of such action, 

and if done under Chapter VII, to make all states obligated to impose 

sanctions.

Tackling Iran’s Non-oil Exports. Iran’s non-oil exports constitute 

about 15 percent of the country’s total export revenues (about $6 billion 

in 2003). Products include carpets, fruits and nuts, and chemicals. 

The United Arab Emirates, Germany, Azerbaijan, Italy, Japan, China, 

and India are among Iran’s major customers. Curtailing imports 

from Iran might not significantly cripple Iran’s economy. If the ban 

on imports was multilateral, however, the message to Iran might 

be significant enough that, in addition to other sanctions, it could 

either force Iranian leadership to reconsider its nuclear aspirations, 

or provoke strong protest within Iran’s civilian population against 

the direction of the government’s policies.

Tackling Exports to Iran. Perhaps as significant and hard to achieve 

as a multilateral ban on Iranian non-oil exports, would be to restrain 

other countries’ exports to Iran. Although previous sanctions on 

U.S. exports forced Iran to find new providers, the cost that Iran has 

incurred in value and quality, particularly on high-tech products, 

has been significant. Iran is presently in great need of machinery, 

transportation vehicles, chemical products, iron, and steel. Current 

major suppliers to Iran include the European Union (EU), with 37.2 

percent of Iran’s total imports; Russia, with 5.6 percent; the UAE, 

with 5.5 percent; and Japan, with 5 percent.20 
187

1997/98 2001/02

United Arab Emirates 286 641

Germany 392 313

Azerbaijan 194 314

Italy 276 192

China 62 177

India 95 187

Japan 104 239

Ukraine 84 142

USA 5 108

Others 1,412 2,252

Total21 2,910 4,565

Table 4. Main Customers of Iran’s Non-oil Exports

(millions of dollars).22

 The EU in this case is in a very strong position to influence 

Iran’s behavior. The EU and Iran are negotiating a “Trade and 

Co-operation Agreement” that is contingent on Iran’s compliance 

with the Europeans’ demands to resolve the nuclear proliferation 

crisis, to cease support of terrorist groups and actions, to support 

a peaceful resolution of the Middle East conflict, and to end abuses 

of human rights. This treaty is of particular significance because, 

despite repeated attempts, the World Trade Organization (WTO) 

keeps denying Iran access into the trade organization. The fear of 

isolation against a unified front between the United States, Europe, 

and Japan would dramatize the cost in any cost/benefit analysis by 

the Iranian leadership and thus compel it to abandon any desires to 

pursue a nuclear weapons program. Moreover, Iran’s dependence 

on Germany, France, Italy, and the U.K. for imported machine tools 

poses a vulnerability that could be exploited by targeted sanctions. 

Russia, too, would be forced to collaborate with this multilateral 

sanctions regime or face the possibility of being left without its 

privileges at the G8 negotiation table.23
188

Product 1997/98 2001/02

Food and live animals 2,508 2,106

 Grains and derivatives 1,705 1,472

Beverages and Tobacco 8 18

Raw nonedible products 647 675

Mineral products, fuel, oil products, 265 578

 and derivatives

Vegetable and animal shortening 434 388

Chemical products 1,890 2,384

Goods classified by composition 2,720 3,319

 Iron and steel 1,290 1,895

Transportation vehicles, machinery and tools 5,045 7,565

 Nonelectric machinery 2,672 4,051

 Electric machinery, tools and appliances 1,444 1,819

 Transportation vehicles 929 1,696

Miscellaneous finished products 384 535

Other 295 57

Total 14,196 17,626

Table 5. Value of Imports by Product (millions of dollars).24

1997/98 2001/02

Germany 1,854 1,807

UA Emirates 562 1,633

Russia 704 914

Italy 795 996

South Korea 552 958

Japan 882 787

France 675 1,109

China 395 887

Brazil 294 896

U.K. 681 666

Table 6. Iran Main Import Suppliers (millions of dollars).25

 France, Germany, Italy, and the U.K might be faced with a difficult 

but necessary choice. Regardless of their differences with the United 

States, these countries must prove that they are truly committed to 

the basic premises of the “Trade and Co-operation Agreement.” If 

Iran decides to restart its uranium enrichment program or impede 

IAEA inspections, French, German, Italian, and U.K leaders will have 

to compromise very significant profits (based on 2002 data, about 

$1,109, $1,807, $996, $666 million in exports, respectively.) The gains 

from doing so, however, would translate into international security. 
189

 Again, the question would be the relative priority that various 

polities attach to nonproliferation compared to economic growth. 

Attaining collaboration from these countries is uncertain precisely 

because the economic relations between the two sides are very 

significant. Italy, for instance, has not only shown great reluctance 

to constrain trade with Iran, but has also claimed that some sort of 

recognition or reward measures should be given to Iran for showing 

improved cooperation regarding its nuclear program.26

Tackling Credit by International Financial Organizations. As a state 

designated a supporter of terrorism, Iran has been forbidden since 

1984 from receiving any U.S. contributions to international financial 

institutions. The U.S. Government has also lobbied other country 

members of such international bodies to uphold their donations. For 

7 years, the United States was successful in ensuring multilateral 

cooperation from members of the World Bank Group. Between 

July 1993 and May 2000, a coalition among the G7 states blocked 

all contributions from the World Bank to Iran. Consensus broke, 

however, when European partners adopted an engagement strategy 

with Iran. Since then, the World Bank has awarded four loans for 

development projects in Iran: $145 million for the Tehran Sewerage 

Project, $87 million for the Primary Health Care and Nutrition 

Project, $20 million for the Environmental Management Support 

Project, and $180 million for the Earthquake Emergency Recovery 

Project.27 In addition, $150 million will be directed to establishing 

a local development fund, $80 million for a low-income housing 

project, $120 million for a water supply and sanitation project and 

$295 million for a “deurbanization” project.28 As major contributors 

to international financial institutions and trade partners with Iran, 

European countries have, once again, a pressure point to force Iran 

to comply with its obligations under the NPT. 

 It should be noted, however, that despite economic pressures 

throughout the last 3 decades, Iran has never applied for assistance 

to the International Monetary Fund (IMF). While other countries 

have chosen to receive loans from the IMF’s Contingency and 

Compensatory Financing Facility (CCFF), Iran has implemented 

arduous structural reforms that, in the long term, have helped the 

country to ensure economic growth.29 
190

Use of Force.

 The most direct and limited way to apply force to reverse or 

contain Iran’s nuclear acquisition would be to destroy key nodes of 

Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. If, for the sake of this analysis, Iran is 

assumed already to have acquired at least a few nuclear weapons, the 

military task becomes even more complicated. Enforcers would want 

to destroy extant weapons as well as production infrastructure. 

 Experience with Iraq and, more speculatively, North Korea 

suggests that reliable intelligence will not exist on the exact location 

of Iran’s nuclear weapons and all relevant production infrastructure. 

The lack of high confidence that all desired targets could be identified 

and destroyed need not preclude attacks. Degradation of some but 

not all capabilities could still be deemed valuable enough to warrant 

attack, both to limit Iran’s capacities and to demonstrate resolve. 

 Yet, lack of high confidence in destroying all weapons and 

production capabilities would raise the major question of Iran’s 

potential use of surviving nuclear weapons against U.S. forces and 

allies. An attack on Iran would make Iranian counterattacks more 

likely. Many, especially in the Muslim world, would find such 

responses justified. This would affect the calculus of the long-term 

political and strategic effects of attacks on Iran. Would such attacks 

weaken, rather than strengthen, international support for those 

who authorized and/or conducted the attacks? Depending on the 

perceived legitimacy of the attacks, and their consequences, the 

lesson could be that a few select states should seek nuclear weapons 

to deter illegitimate exercise of force by, say, the United States. 

Others, including in Europe, could express disaffection with “U.S. 

militarism” by defecting from cooperation with the United States in 

nonmilitary nonproliferation initiatives. Again, the conditions and 

agencies through which such attacks on Iran were authorized would 

affect their perceived legitimacy.

 Iran does not lack means to deter and/or retaliate against military 

attacks against it. Iranian Revolutionary Guards reportedly have 

deployed action cells in Iraq. These cells appear not to have been 

activated yet, but rather are to provide capabilities to attack U.S. forces 

in the region if Iranian decisionmakers judge it necessary to respond 

to U.S. actions in Iraq and/or against Iran. Nor can the possibility be 
191

dismissed that Iran has “terrorist” capabilities deployed in Europe, 

South America, or even the continental United States for activation 

“if necessary.” Again, these capabilities could be seen as a form of 

asymmetric strategic deterrence against U.S. action.

 Of course, the United States and/or a multilateral coalition, or the 

UN Security Council could decide that a nuclear Iran poses a threat 

to international peace and security sufficient to warrant military 

action to remove the current government in Iran. Regime removal in 

Iran would be more demanding than the invasion of Iraq. Without 

pretending a detailed analysis, one can say that current military and 

international political and economic conditions militate against such 

a risky enterprise. Among other things, it is practically impossible to 

estimate how events in Iran would evolve following a military action 

to remove the current government, even if such action were feasible. 

Those who would contemplate forcible regime change would be 

obligated to posit realistic scenarios and means to effect a future in 

Iran better than the current situation. 

 The United States also could contemplate supporting armed 

opponents of the current regime to take power in Iran. This would 

lower the direct risk to the United States, but would attract almost 

no international support. The United States likely would rely in part 

on the Mujaheddin-e-Khalq (MeK) to conduct such an insurgency. 

Given that the United States itself has deemed the MeK a terrorist 

organization, and given widespread international misgivings over 

the U.S.-U.K. 1953 coup in Iran, Washington could expect almost no 

international support for such a regime change effort. Indeed, the 

effort would seriously harm U.S. legitimacy. 

 In sum, if Iran acquires nuclear weapons, the options for coercive 

measures to roll back this capability are highly problematic. Political 

isolation, alone, would seem inadequate. Military force would be 

unlikely to “solve” the problem in the sense of completely eliminating 

Iran’s nuclear wherewithal. Use of force would likely unleash 

dangerous counteractions by Iran, which, in turn, would likely 

dissuade many in the international community from supporting 

such measures. A tremendous campaign to remove the offending 

government in Iran would seem beyond the means and will of 

the United States and the international community today. Robust 

economic sanctions, beyond those yet applied to any country, 
192

would seem more promising, though still highly problematic. 

The willingness to effectively apply such sanctions would depend 

heavily on the development of a widespread consensus that Iran’s 

proliferation is such a grave threat to international security and order 

that leading states and institutions of the international system must 

act decisively. 

How are key national and international actors likely to interpret 

and respond to Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons?

 This section explores how key actors likely would deal with the 

aftershocks of Iran’s acquisition and cooperate with efforts to compel 

Iran to roll back. It should be noted, however, that if roll back fails 

within a couple of years, many in the international community will 

defect and pursue a strategy of adapting to a nuclear Iran through 

deterrence, containment, and diplomacy.

The UN Security Council.

 The United States, U.K., and France, as well as other leading UN 

states such as Japan and Germany, appear determined to compel 

Iran to adhere to its obligations under the NPT and to prevent 

Tehran from acquiring nuclear weapons capabilities. Yet the ultimate 

(or penultimate) test will come if and when the Iranian matter is 

forwarded to the UN Security Council. The course of prevention 

will not be complete unless and until the Security Council, as the 

ultimate enforcer of the NPT, addresses the challenge. 

 Presumably, then, if Iran does acquire nuclear weapons, it will be 

either in defiance of the Security Council or in the aftermath of the 

Council’s failure to act. Specifically, this means that the United States, 

U.K., France, Russia, and China will have failed to act effectively 

together. In this case, some of these five states will either have to act 

more decisively to roll back a capability they failed to prevent from 

developing, or adjust their own policies and global institutions to 

overcome the implications of this failure. 

 If the Security Council were unified in the “prevention” stage, 

and Iran had defied a strong Council position, then the Council 

would be more likely to cooperate to authorize punitive measures 
193

such as strong sanctions. Authorization of military action would be 

less likely, especially if events in Iraq do not yield durable progress. 

Still, under this scenario, the Council could be expected to impose 

unprecedented political and economic costs on a proliferator—Iran. 

The imposition of such costs would preserve at least some vital role 

for the Council as an enforcer of international peace and security.

 If Iran’s defiance came before the Security Council had occasion to 

consider proposed antiproliferation resolutions by the United States 

and other states, Iranian proliferation would hasten the adoption 

of tougher new norms and enforcement mechanisms. The ensuing 

response would be like shutting the barn door after at least one horse 

escaped, but the argument would be “better late than never.”

 It is more likely, though, that if Iran acquires nuclear weapons, it 

will be in the context of disunity among the P-5 in trying to prevent 

it. In this scenario, there would be mutual recriminations among the 

P-5 over blame for the breakdown in prevention. Some members, 

then, would have to be willing to retreat from prior positions and 

rededicate themselves to seeking unity. Decisions whether to alter 

policies would occur in a highly charged international atmosphere, 

with domestic tensions in each of the capitals—not an environment 

conducive to the sort of statesmanship the situation will require.

 Based on recent performance, we can anticipate that the United 

States would be charging at least one or two of the other members 

with fecklessness, and they in turn would be charging the United 

States with recklessness. Depending on how this contest played out, 

it is conceivable that the United States and other members would 

conclude for different reasons that the Security Council simply 

cannot fulfill its security-providing function. In such a circumstance, 

it is unlikely that the Security Council would authorize truly robust 

economic sanctions against Iran, or military reprisals. The Security 

Council’s position in the international system would be gravely 

damaged, perhaps beyond repair for the foreseeable future.

The European Union.

 If any entity has economic and political leverage over Iran, 

the EU is it. Historical and current animosities between Iran and 

the United States make rapprochement between them extremely 
194

difficult, whereas Iranian desire for community with Europe is 

relatively uncomplicated. The more revolutionary segments of Iran 

do not appear so interested in ties with Europe that they would alter 

policies significantly, but reformers and pragmatic conservatives 

wish to take steps to accommodate European concerns. 

 Iranians desire ties with Europe for identity and political reasons 

and for economic interests. The EU has conditioned its willingness to 

open relations with Iran on Tehran’s compliance with nonproliferation 

rules, human rights, and disavowal of terrorism. A special trade 

relationship is the key incentive the EU offers conditionally.

 If Iran goes ahead and acquires nuclear weapons, EU leaders 

will likely block trade and other forms of normalization. Imposing 

more punitive sanctions would be more difficult, given aspirations 

of European energy corporations. However, proscriptions on 

investment in Iran could be seen as a minimal EU action to uphold 

the international norm against proliferation. An embargo on Iranian 

oil exports would be more difficult, but if the United States were 

prepared to suffer the global economic consequences, the EU would 

be hard-pressed not to go along given the failure of their strategy 

of engagement to dissuade Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. 

(Again, this calculus would be altered if the United States were 

seen to undermine the EU’s diplomatic strategy to prevent Iran’s 

acquisition and could be “blamed” for “driving” Iran toward the 

bomb.)

 France has demonstrated real determination to block Iran’s 

proliferation, and as long as the United States does not move 

precipitously and unilaterally to use force, France appears likely to 

join with a tough U.S. approach. Thus, if the United States and France 

stay aligned on preventive strategy and tactics, and Iran nonetheless 

defies them, France would be inclined to work with Washington on 

punitive measures short of force. German Foreign Minister Fischer, 

according to knowledgeable sources, evinces strong determination to 

prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. The United Kingdom, 

though politically chastened by opposition to its participation in the 

Iraq War, and therefore publicly dismissing the prospects of military 

action against Iran, nonetheless recognizes the need for success in 

diplomatically diverting Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons 

capability. Italy would find an embargo most difficult, on economic 

grounds.
195

 Were the EU to participate in sanctions and other punitive 

measures against Iran, and then be hit by terrorist reprisals, some 

politicians would urge steps to learn to live with a nuclear Iran. 

Their aim would be to obtain Iranian assurances that its nuclear 

capability would be used only to deter attack against Iran, and not 

for offensive purposes. Some would also move quickly to note that 

Israel possesses nuclear weapons and that Iran’s acquisition was 

inevitable because of this. The prospect of knock-on proliferation 

in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, or other states would be left for the United 

States to deal with. Many in Europe would urge the opening of a 

regional security dialogue to address the Israel-Palestine conflict 

and WMD issues as a comprehensive problem. 

 Still, Europeans would be chastened by Iran’s acquisition and 

could be expected to join with IAEA Director General El Baradei’s call 

to reinterpret the rules of nuclear technology management. Members 

of the Nuclear Suppliers Group would probably agree to proscribe 

exports of fuel-cycle capabilities to states that do not already possess 

them, and to toughen export control enforcement.

The IAEA.

 The IAEA has much riding on preventing Iran from acquiring 

nuclear weapons. The Agency failed to detect key proliferation 

steps in Iran, but, once given leads and authority to press, Iran has 

investigated admirably within the limitations of its mandate as 

determined by the states comprising its Board of Governors.30 

 IAEA professionals do not determine policy, the states on the 

board of governors do. The Board will determine how to press Iran 

to comply with its obligations and whether and when to send the 

matter to the Security Council for enforcement. If action or inaction 

by the Board is subsequently blamed for failing to prevent Iran from 

acquiring nuclear weapons, the value of the IAEA in the international 

system will come under severe doubt. 

 If the board is divided, and these divisions later explain fateful 

inaction, the United States and others will press to reform the 

Agency’s governance. Such reforms likely would seek to disempower 

countries that were loath to pursue tough enforcement, probably 
196

developing countries. Rancor would ensue over the discriminatory 

effort by the United States and others to rewrite the long-standing 

nuclear bargain to disadvantage developing countries in favor of 

those who already possess nuclear weapons and now want to impose 

backwardness on the poor. The United States and its allies would 

press for streamlined authority and specialization to strengthen the 

Agency’s detection and inspection capabilities, while others would 

demand greater nuclear cooperation. If this struggle over governance 

reform appeared intractable, the United States and likeminded states 

would be inclined to disinvest the Agency of authority and resources 

to facilitate nuclear cooperation. 

 It is impossible to predict how this drama would unfold, but 

the net effect would be polarization of the nuclear order. Nuclear 

technology-providing states that are most security minded would 

act coalitionally to toughen the standards and terms of nuclear 

cooperation and the operation of nuclear complexes, while countries 

that depend more on assistance would suffer the consequences. The 

future of nuclear energy would come under doubt on proliferation 

grounds. The nuclear industry’s argument that nuclear power must 

expand to reduce growth in greenhouse gas emissions, would 

bump hard against evidence that nuclear power provides cover for 

dangerous proliferation.

The NPT Community.

 Many states participate in the international nonproliferation 

regime primarily through their membership in the NPT and 

involvement in the treaty’s review process. Argentina, Brazil, 

South Africa, Japan, Sweden, Egypt, Mexico, Australia, and Canada 

are among the most important participants. These non-nuclearweapons states would help determine whether and how to adjust 

interpretations of NPT requirements in the aftermath of Iran’s 

acquisition of nuclear weapons.

 Much would depend on the context in which Iran acquired 

nuclear weapons. The U.S., leading EU states, and the IAEA Board of 

Governors have not yet developed a consensus to demand that Iran 

permanently abjure acquisition of national fuel-cycle capabilities. 

Such a demand, hinted at by Director General el Baradei and 
197

explicitly endorsed by President Bush on February 11, amounts to a 

reinterpretation of NPT Article IV. That article does not specify that 

particular technologies must be shared with states in good standing 

with the NPT, but it also does not say that particular technologies 

may be categorically exempted from cooperation. As long as Iran 

(or any other state) is not in full compliance with the treaty, it is 

reasonable to insist that no cooperation should be extended to it. 

(The UN Security Council would do well to make this a rule: no state 

not deemed in full compliance with the NPT shall receive nuclear 

cooperation, except for safety purposes, and it should be illegal for 

any person or entity to provide such cooperation to such a state.) 

The more ambitious NPT interpretation would be that even states in 

good standing should no longer be eligible to acquire (indigenously 

or through import) uranium enrichment and plutonium separation 

capability under national control. 

 If NPT members had not agreed on this rule before Iran acquired 

nuclear weapons, they would be more likely to do so afterward to 

try to contain follow-on proliferation. But non-nuclear-weapons 

states would demand “quids” for the quo. Article IV contains one 

of the two major bargains in the NPT: in return for renouncing 

nuclear weapons, non-nuclear-weapons states received guarantees 

of generous civilian assistance from the nuclear-weapons states 

and the IAEA. If the terms of nuclear assistance are to be radically 

reinterpreted, the non-nuclear-weapons states will demand 

corresponding gains. These demands could be for significantly 

subsidized fuel-cycle services to be provided to states that have or 

will acquire nuclear-power reactors. The other major NPT bargain 

is Article VI’s pledge by the five nuclear-weapons states to cease the 

nuclear arms race and unequivocally to seek “the total elimination 

of their nuclear arsenals.” A reinterpretation of Article IV would be 

perceived to favor the nuclear-weapons states. Leading non-nuclearweapons states would demand a corresponding concession by the 

nuclear-weapon states on the disarmament front. 

 In other words, efforts to strengthen NPT norms and rules 

following Iran’s break out would entail intense and confrontational 

negotiations over the core tradeoffs between the nuclear-weapons 

and non-nuclear weapons states. Many developing non-nuclearweapons states would use the opportunity to blame the United 
198

States, Russia and other nuclear-weapons states for failing to reduce 

the perceived value of nuclear weapons. Many states also would cite 

Israel’s possession of nuclear weapons and refusal to join the NPT 

as a central cause of Iran’s proliferation. Parties would blame the 

United States for indulging Israel on this score and more broadly. 

 Beyond the conflict between nuclear-weapons “haves” and 

“have nots,” NPT parties would divide over the future of the nuclear 

industry. States that have large and export-hungry nuclear industrial 

establishments will resist efforts to tighten severely the conditions 

under which nuclear technology can be transferred. The United 

States and like-minded states focusing on proliferation risks will call 

for greater concentration of inspection and enforcement efforts on 

ill-defined “suspect” states, while developing countries will resist. 

The United States will press to exclude further separation and use of 

plutonium as a reactor fuel, while Japan and India (not an NPT state) 

will cling to hopes for breeder reactors. 

 Thus, in the wake of Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons,the 

United States and other nonproliferation stalwarts would not yet 

give up on nonproliferation. They would seek to create new norms 

and rules to prevent states from acquiring dual-use fuel cycle 

capabilities, strengthen inspections and other processes to detect 

and deter proliferation, and establish more automatic measures to 

enforce compliance and punish non-compliance with NPT norms and 

rules. Key non-nuclear-weapons states would see the merits of such 

measures but also would argue that the blame for proliferation lies 

with the United States and other nuclear-weapons states that have 

failed to comply with their disarmament obligations. To the extent 

that knock-on proliferation pressures would center on the Middle 

East, NPT debates would elicit enormous pressure on Israel, and the 

United States as Israel’s patron. Intense bargaining would ensue, 

the outcome of which cannot be predicted. Not only would major 

U.S. security interests be at stake; the legitimacy of U.S. leadership in 

nonproliferation also would hang in the balance. 

U.S.-Russian Relations.

 Washington and Moscow have butted heads over the Iranian 

nuclear issue for a decade. The United States feels vindicated by 
199

IAEA acknowledgement that Iran has been lying and deceiving the 

international community about its nuclear activities. Russia appears 

a bit chastened by this, and also perturbed that Iran had secretly 

acquired enrichment capabilities through non-Russian channels. Yet, 

Moscow’s frustration with Tehran is tempered by an ongoing desire 

to conduct lucrative nuclear commerce with Iran. Russia has pledged 

that if the IAEA finds Iran noncompliant with its NPT obligations, 

Russia will discontinue nuclear cooperation with Iran until Iran has 

brought itself back into compliance. 

 Moscow’s willingness to cooperate in a roll back strategy will 

depend significantly on how the United States and the EU first manage 

negotiations to bring Iran into compliance with its obligations. Iran 

still must clarify the complete story of its past nuclear activities, 

ensure total transparency, and, in the meantime, not violate a stillundefined suspension of fuel-cycle activity. The United States and key 

EU states also condition Iran’s rehabilitation on Tehran’s agreement 

permanently to forgo acquisition of national fuel-cycle capabilities. 

From Russia’s point of view, the key element is whether the United 

States and the EU will induce Iran to accept these terms by blessing 

the completion of the Bushier power reactor (and perhaps others) 

with a guaranteed fuel services agreement with Russia. Such a deal 

would satisfy the economic, bureaucratic and political interests of 

Russia, including the Ministry of Atomic Energy. If the United States 

were to endorse such a deal, and the package were offered to Iran via 

talks with the EU, the IAEA Board of Governors or even the Security 

Council, and Iran were to turn it down, then Russia would be much 

more willing to support a coercive response against Iran. If, on the 

other hand, Iran were not “allowed” to complete nuclear power 

stations, Russia would be reluctant to penalize subsequent Iranian 

acquisition of nuclear weapons.

 Russian leaders (and increasingly society) evince disdain 

for Muslims, in large part due to the Chechen war. But Iran is an 

exception, in many ways. Iran has cooperated with Russia in 

containing unrest in Tajikistan. Iran has not exploited the Chechen 

war. Nor has Iran worked against Russian interests in the ArmenianAzerbaijani conflict. The two states regard each other warily over 

dispensation of Caspian Sea resources, but neither has appeared 
200

inclined to make the matter a source of crisis. The two states seek 

business-like relations; neither needs another adversary to worry 

about, so both seem interested in strategies of reassurance.

 Against this background, Russia will be reluctant to accede to U.S. 

demands to punish severely Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons. 

As noted above, this reluctance will be even greater if the United 

States does not endorse Russian-Iranian nuclear cooperation in the 

current prevention-phase of diplomacy with Iran. Still, if Iran acquires 

nuclear weapons despite a “fair” effort by the United States, EU, and 

the IAEA to stop it, Russia will acknowledge the need for a punitive 

response. Russia’s historic leadership role in the nonproliferation 

regime and its desire for greater integration with the West will impel 

it to cooperate with Western leaders. That is, Russia’s equities in the 

NPT-system and a strong UN Security Council would be the only 

strong motivations for joining the United States in trying to coerce 

Iranian roll back.

 Because Russia will feel less directly threatened by Iranian 

nuclear capability than the United States and others, it will seek 

side payments for supporting sanctions. Such payments could come 

in the form of agreements for Russia to be a substitute supplier of 

oil to states embargoing Iranian exports. The powerful Russian 

nuclear industry also would seek compensation for the closing of 

the Iranian market. Over time, Russia may actually benefit from the 

consequences of Iranian nuclear acquisition. Tensions within NATO 

over Turkey’s response to Iran, would not alarm Russia. Knock-on 

proliferation in Saudi Arabia or Egypt would destabilize the Middle 

East and perhaps raise oil prices, which would advantage Russia 

as an exporter. Russia faces terrorist challenges from Chechnya, 

Uzbekistan, and perhaps elsewhere on its southern periphery, but 

even if turmoil in the Persian Gulf and Middle East produced more 

terrorists, it is not evident that Russia would be affected worse by 

such developments than the United States or Western European 

states would be. 

 From a perspective of relative gains or losses, then, Russia would 

not see Iranian nuclear acquisition as a major problem. 
201

The United States and Other Muslim States.

 Despite deep splits within the Muslim world—Sunni versus Shia; 

Arab versus Persian, Pakistani, Indonesian,; fundamentalist versus 

modernist; and regime versus civil society—several issues unite 

most Muslims. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and the perceived 

double standard with which the United States treats Israel, rallies 

many Muslims’ hatred of the United States Similarly, displays 

of U.S. military prowess in attacks that defeat and kill apparently 

hapless Muslims generates widespread hatred of Washington. These 

two coalescing tendencies would be relevant in the event that Iran 

acquired nuclear weapons, and they probably would not be offset by 

appreciation of U.S. efforts to promote freedom in Arab societies.

 Neighboring Arabs and Turkey would be alarmed by arrogant 

Persia’s acquisition. This alarm would be greater or weaker 

depending on the bellicosity and character of the Iranian government. 

But the United States would find it difficult to channel neighboring 

states’ concerns into support for coercion against Iran if the United 

States were not simultaneously pressing Israel to relinquish its 

nuclear weapons, and if Israel were not closer to a resolution with 

the Palestinians. Privately, Arab leaders might welcome coercion 

against Iran, but publicly they and their societies would denounce 

the United States for its favoritism of Israel. Iranian leaders know 

this and would be expected to frame their acquisition of nuclear 

weapons as a necessity to counter the nuclear-armed Zionist entity 

and the arrogant United States. 

 Antipathy toward the United States (and any coalition it would 

muster) would be greatest in the event of military attacks on Iran. 

Strikes pinpointed against Iran’s “illegal” nuclear infrastructure 

would be more understandable than a wider military campaign that 

could harm civilians, especially if Iran completed its nuclear facilities 

despite promises not to. Common people would see military action in 

a now-common narrative: the United States, with its overwhelming 

military machine and thousands of nuclear weapons, does Israel’s 

bidding by smashing poor Muslims who, after all, are only trying 

to acquire what Israel has. The narrative extends further to a U.S. 

determination to keep Muslims backward by denying them advanced 

technology. 
202

 If the United States eschewed military action against Iran and 

implicitly or explicitly recognized that Iran’s capability were not 

going to be rolled back, Iran’s neighbors would quietly seek greater 

U.S. security assurances against potential aggression or intimidation 

by Iran. It is possible for people in Arab states, Pakistan, and 

elsewhere simultaneously to denounce the United States for being 

anti-Muslim and imperialistic and at the same time demand that the 

United States insert itself more robustly to protect them. If attempts 

to coerce Iranian roll back gave way to a strategy of deterrence, Iran’s 

neighbors would be receptive to U.S. security guarantees against 

Iran. 

U.S. Relations with Oil Hungry Asia.

 China receives one-sixth of its oil from Iran, Japan imports 

one-tenth, and five percent of South Korea’s total oil needs come 

from Iran. China and Japan are key: China is a permanent member 

of the UN Security Council, and Japan is a leading advocate of 

civilian nuclear power and of preventing new states from being 

accepted as nuclear-weapons possessors. Both Asian leaders can 

play important roles in diplomacy to prevent Iran from acquiring 

nuclear weapons. If this diplomacy fails, however, it is difficult to 

see either state supporting sanctions against Iranian oil exports. The 

resultant economic dislocations would be daunting, and a nucleararmed Iran would not directly threaten them militarily or in terms of 

international status. 

 By contrast, Japan saw India’s acquisition as a greater threat 

insofar as India bids to be a great power and therefore a rival to Japan. 

Similarly, China views India as a direct military and major-power 

competitor. Both Japan and China have accommodated India’s nuclear 

evolution. Iran would be significantly less “threatening” to Tokyo and 

Beijing. The only major interest a nuclear Iran would threaten is the 

viability of the NPT-related nonproliferation regime. China gradually 

has determined that it genuinely benefits from nonproliferation and 

would not welcome the disorder that proliferation could cause, but 

if the effects could be contained in the Gulf region, China could 

live with it. Japan is an NPT stalwart, but it also has latent nuclearweapons capabilities and a frustrated-nationalist vein that could be 
203

tapped to favor “going nuclear” if the NPT dam collapsed. If in the 

wake of Pakistan and India going nuclear, Iran and North Korea 

were to follow suit and the five recognized nuclear-weapon states 

continued not to take nuclear disarmament seriously, Japan could 

adopt a more overt hedge strategy. This would alarm China, but 

is probably a sufficiently uncertain and indirect possibility that it 

would not inform China’s strategy toward Iran. 

 In short, given their economic equities in Iran, and the distance 

of the Iranian threat, it is difficult to see China and Japan favoring a 

truly robust coercive strategy to roll back or punish Iran’s acquisition 

of nuclear weapons. Unlike a tough strategy to persuade Iran to 

comply with its NPT obligations and abjuration of national fuel-cycle 

capabilities, coercion to achieve roll back would seem open-ended. 

Neither Japan nor China likely would feel it could afford indefinite 

biting economic sanctions against Iran’s oil exports. 

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 8

 1. Presumably, if we were willing to use positive inducements, we would offer 

them now while there is still opportunity to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear 

weapons. If Iran rejected positive inducements in the prevention phase, then the 

United States and others would be less likely to deploy such incentives to seek roll 

back. On the other hand, if we refuse to offer positive inducements to dissuade Iran 

from acquiring nuclear weapons and rely only on pressure, then if that pressure 

fails and Iran goes ahead and acquires nuclear weapons, many will argue that 

positive inducements should have been offered earlier and should be given a try 

as part of a roll back strategy. Thus, failure to offer positive inducements in the 

prevention phase may undermine Washington’s capacity to rally international 

support in a roll-back-and-punish phase.

 2. Iran Country Analysis Brief, EIA, November, 2003. 

 3. Ibid. 

 4. Kenneth Katzman, The Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA), CRS Report for 

Congress, updated July 31, 2003, p. 2.

 5. Arrangements made possible by the 1987 Petroleum Act whereby foreign 

firms fund and manage the development of oil and gas fields in exchange for 

a preaccorded share of production. All production operations are eventually 

transferred to the National Iranian Oil Company.

 6. Sally Jones, “Sinopec Wants Iranian Oil Deal Despite U.S. Pressure-Exec,” 

Dow Jones Newswires, January 29, 2004. 

 7. “Iran Wins $2bn Gas Deal with Total and Petronas,” Daily News, February 

26, 2004.
204

 8. Kenneth Katzman, “The Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ISLA), CRS Report 

for Congress, updated July 31, 2003, available at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/

organization/23591.pdf and “Iran,” Country Analysis Briefs, EIA, November 2003, 

available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/iran.html, accessed November 18, 

2003, updated March 2005; Christian Oliver and Ikuko Kao, “Iran Set to Seal 

Controversial Oil Deal with Japan,” Reuters, February 18, 2004; “Iran Forms Joint 

LNG Firm with Total and Petronas,” Reuters, February 25, 2004.

 9. “Iranian Oilfield Bids Soldier On Despite Set-back,” Daily Times, January 30, 

2004.

 10. Ibid.

 11. The United States tops the list, with Spain and India in 7th and 8th place. 

respectively.

 12. Expected amount for 2003, “Chinese Oil Imports from Iran To Hold 

Steady,” Alexander’s Gas & Oil Connections, October 30, 2002.

 13. Energy Information Administration/International Petroleum Monthly, 

December 2003, Tables 411, 413, 414, 415, 416; “Chinese Oil Imports to Hold 

Steady,” Alexander’s Gas and Oil Connections, October 30, 2002.

 14. Based on 2003 production levels and not including Taiwan’s data. 

 15. “The New Geopolitics of Oil,” The National Interest, Winter 2003/04. 

 16. “International Energy Outlook: World Oil Markets,” 2003.

 17. OPEC countries include Algeria, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, 

Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Venezuela.

 18. “International Energy Outlook: World Oil Markets,” 2003.

 19. Energy Information Administration, available at www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/

security/topexp.html.

20. “Trade Issues: Bilateral Trade Relations, Iran,” http://europa.eu.int/comm/

trade/issues/bilateral/countries/iran/index_en.htm, website accessed January 13, 2004.

 21. Total of all Iran’s non-oil exports.

 22. IMF, Islamic Republic of Iran, Statistical Appendix, Country Report No. 

03/280, Septemner 5, 2003.

 23. Patrick Clawson, “Can ILSA help stop Iranian Proliferation and Terrorism?” 

Committee on International Relations, Statement for June 25, 2003, Hearing of the 

House International Relations Committee, Sub-Committee on the Middle East and 

Central Asia on Enforcement of ILSA and Increasing Security Threats from Iran.

 24. IMF, Islamic Republic of Iran, Statistical Appendix, Country Report, 

No. 03/280.

 25. Ibid.

 26. Italian Foreign Minister Franco Frattini remarked on a recent meeting with 

his Iranian counterpart that “the decision [to sign the Additional Protocol] should 
205

spur Europe to make some kind of return gesture toward Iran.” “Frattini, EU 

Should Made Return Gesture Toward Iran,” AGI, January 27, 2004. 

 27. Projects & Programs, The World Bank Group, website accessed January 8, 

2004.

 28. Testimony by Deputy Assistant Secretary of Treasury William E. Schuerch 

before the House Financial Services Subcommittee on Domestic and International 

Monetary Policy, Trade and Technology, October 29, 2003. http://www.treas.gov/

releases/js952.htm website accessed November 20, 2003.

 29. Meghan L. O’Sullivan, Shrewd Sanctions, Washington, DC: Brookings 

Institution Press, 2003, p. 70.

 30. National intelligence services with assets the IAEA lacks also failed at 

detection. The bigger issue is failure by leading states to adapt national and IAEA 

policies to act on the strategic warning they have had of Iran’s efforts to acquire 

suspect capabilities.

PART IV

FURTHER COURSES OF ACTION

209

CHAPTER 9

REDUCING VULNERABILITY OF THE STRAIT OF HORMUZ

Dagobert Brito and Amy Myers Jaffe

 The Strait of Hormuz is a vitally important international 

waterway that connects the Persian Gulf with the Gulf of Oman. 

The passageway is by far the single most important chokepoint in 

the world oil transportation system. It consists of two, mile-wide 

channels for inbound and outbound tanker traffic in addition to a 

2-mile-wide buffer zone. It is 50 kilometers wide at its narrowest 

point.1

 The Strait is the main passageway for 15 to 16 million barrels of 

oil a day, roughly two-thirds of total world oil trade by tanker and 20 

percent of total world daily oil demand. Oil and petroleum products 

from Iraq, Iran, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab 

Emirates (UAE) transit the Strait of Hormuz. Large quantities of 

liquefied natural gas are also exported from Qatar through the 

Strait. The significance of the Strait of Hormuz has become enhanced 

in recent years because virtually all of the world’s excess spare 

production capacity that can be brought on line quickly to defend 

against the adverse effects of a sudden oil supply crisis or disruption 

is located in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the UAE and thereby could 

be cut off, if the Strait could be closed.

 Maintaining the free flow of oil through the Strait of Hormuz 

is of vital strategic importance to the world economy and to the 

United States and its allies. The United States receives about 25 

percent of its imported oil via the Straits. Asia buyers are other key 

purchasers of Persian Gulf oil with China, Japan, South Korea, India, 

and Singapore receiving the lion’s share of Middle East exports 

through the Strait of Hormuz. Keeping the Strait open is important 

as a matter of protecting the international order and global economy 

by maintaining the indisputable right of the freedom of navigation 

of international seaways that is so vital to international trade and 

commerce. About 30 U.S. warships now patrol the Persian Gulf and 

nearby waters, about twice the level posted there during the IranIraq war in the 1980s.2
210

 There have been several challenges to the freedom of navigation 

in the Strait of Hormuz and adjacent territories over the last several 

decades. The most prolonged threat to navigation in the Persian Gulf 

in recent years arose during the 8-year war between Iraq and Iran. By 

1984, the then 3-year-old Iraq-Iran war entered its so-called “tanker 

phase,” with regular bombings of shipping and oil export facilities, 

and mining of the waters of the Persian Gulf.3

 By 1987, the United 

States responded to the escalation of attacks on Persian Gulf shipping 

by organizing a fleet of frigates, destroyers, and minesweepers in the 

region to combat the threat against shipping.4 In March 1987, the U.S. 

Government agreed to transfer Kuwaiti oil and gas tankers to the 

American flag, and in July 1987, the U.S. Navy initiated Operation 

EARNEST WILL, providing naval escorts to tankers passing through 

the Persian Gulf.5

 In April 2004, U.S. Navy vessels were called to service to repel 

attacks by terrorist suicide bombers on both of Iraq’s offshore oil 

shipping terminals, and shippers from the Persian Gulf region 

are again asking the U.S. military to provide naval escorts.6 The 

possibility of terrorist attacks at the Strait of Hormuz cannot be ruled 

out as similar threats already have been identified in Asia against 

another vital oil waterway, the Straits of Malacca.7

 The nature of future risks against free navigation in the Strait of 

Hormuz appear at present to come mainly from two directions: (1) 

the possibility that a nongovernmental group, such as al-Qaeda, will 

plot to disrupt traffic in the Strait through suicide bombings attacks 

using divers or small ships, or by deploying a dirty bomb or other 

kinds of weapons of mass destruction (WMD); or (2) the possibility 

that a neighboring state would threaten passage of the Strait through 

conventional or nonconventional military means to gain leverage in 

a localized dispute or during a political or strategic conflict with a 

major power such as the United States or a major Asian oil consuming 

nation.

 The U.S. naval presence in the Persian Gulf and overwhelming 

U.S. naval superiority for the foreseeable future is likely to discourage 

a major conventional attack on shipping in the Persian Gulf by any 

nation with naval capabilities. There currently does not appear to be 

an emerging naval power with the means or inclination to challenge 

the U.S. mission of protecting the Strait of Hormuz. However, the 
211

possibility of a smaller, regional nation-state threatening free passage 

through the Strait using non-naval military capabilities cannot be 

ruled out. Iran, for example, has a history of challenging the status 

quo in the region and might, under extreme circumstances, pose a 

risk to the safety of passage through the waterway.

 A territorial dispute between Iran and the UAE over three islands 

inside the shipping lanes of the Strait of Hormuz has continued for 

several decades. The islands, Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser 

Tunbs, were determined to be run under co-sovereignty by the two 

nations in 1971, following the departure of British colonial rule from 

the region. However, since 1992, Iran has occupied the islands and 

taken steps towards unilateral control over the course of the 1990s, 

restricting outside access, building an airstrip, and deploying SA-6 

surface-to-air missiles, 155 millimeter artillery, and seersucker antiaircraft missiles on Abu Musa.8

 Iran test fired an anti-ship missile 

near the Strait of Hormuz in 19879 and again in January 1996.10 Iran 

has silkworm missiles deployed at Qeshm, Abu Musa Island, and on 

Sirri Island, all within range of shipping through the Strait.11

 In June 2004, a UAE warship fired on an Iranian fishing vessel 

in waters close to Abu Musa Island.12 The Arab Gulf Cooperation 

Council has backed UAE claims to the islands, but Iran has refused 

to agree to international arbitration on their status. In April 2004, 

Iran also accused Qatar of overproducing its share of natural gas 

from the giant offshore North Field that straddles the Qatari-Iranian 

border, warning that Iran would resort to “other ways and means 

of resolving the issue” if Qatar did not enter new negotiations about 

regulating production from the field. The North Field/South Pars 

gas reserves were clearly demarcated in a maritime border deal in 

the late 1980s.13

Assessing The Threat of a Nuclear Iran to the Strait. 

 The backdrop of conventional Iranian military actions inside 

the Persian Gulf has raised concerns about whether a nuclear Iran 

would use the leverage of nuclear capability to demand political 

or other gains by threatening traffic through the Strait of Hormuz 

via conventional or nonconventional means. A potential conflict 

between the United States and Iran on a number of issues, including 
212

international terrorism or the proliferation of WMD, would raise 

the stakes of such a risk. The possibility of such a threat, however, 

must be evaluated against the backdrop of improved U.S.-Iranian 

cooperation in several arenas in recent years. In the 1990 Gulf War, 

Iran “helped” the coalition by “not interfering.”14 During the U.S. war 

in Afghanistan, Tehran assisted in efforts to form the interim Afghan 

government at a meeting in Bonn in December 2001. Iran also was 

relatively cooperative during the early days of the campaign in Iraq, 

although its long-term intentions are unclear.15 Iran also is seeking 

better ties with the European Union (EU), whose long term strategy 

with Iran focuses on linking into potential economic and political 

reform there. As starting points, Iran has attained observer status to 

the EU Energy Charter and is discussing a proposed gas pipeline to 

Greece.16

 Still, it remains a possibility that a nuclear Iran could make a threat 

in political negotiations to use conventional weapons to close the 

Strait of Hormuz. “Words of warning” from Israeli officials that Tel 

Aviv could hit vulnerable oil export facilities like Kharg Island and 

other offshore regions instead of preemptively attacking the Bushier 

nuclear plant could bring such an issue to the fore, as suggested 

by Geoff Kemp of the Nixon Center in his monograph, “U.S. and 

Iran: The Nuclear Dilemma, Next Steps.”17 In the context of issues 

discussed in this chapter, Israeli grandstanding against Iranian oil 

facilities is not constructive to common goals and, in fact, aggravates 

the issues rather than serving as a deterrent. A threat of this nature 

has immediate cost ramifications in that it would instantly raise the 

price of oil, benefiting Iran overnight as it is a major oil exporter, and 

hurting the United States and its allies in the industrial world who 

are major oil importers.

 Iran traditionally has been a strong advocate for higher oil prices 

at meetings of the Organization for Petroleum Exporting Countries 

(OPEC) and is considered a pivotal price hawk leader inside the 

producer oil cartel, inclined to ignore concerns that soaring oil prices 

might hurt future oil demand or damage world economic conditions. 

Its policy history on the subject of oil prices has been relatively 

consistent since the early days of the Islamic revolution, and Tehran 

has used its influence when it could to boost world oil price levels 
213

through a combination of public statements, diplomatic initiatives, 

and outright threats.

 In autumn 1984, as an oil price war was looming, influential 

speaker of the Iranian Parliament Hojjatolislam Hashmi Rafsanjani 

indicated in a sermon that Iran might attempt to block the flow of 

oil from the Persian Gulf if oil prices continued to fall, warning if 

Iran “was one day pressured in a price-cutting war, it will create 

such a crisis in the region that it will be similar to the days of the 

revolution and oil would not flow to the other side.”18 Iran’s minister 

of oil announced the country would like to see $25 per barrel oil 

remain OPEC’s minimum price in the aftermath of the Gulf War and 

was able to orchestrate a high level political agreement with Saudi 

Crown Prince Abdullah to boost prices above the traditional $18 a 

barrel target price starting in 1999.19 In recent years, Iran has lobbied 

within OPEC to keep prices high by pressing the producer cartel 

to maintain a pattern of pivotal oil production cuts. It has used its 

leadership position inside OPEC to try to thwart the producer group 

from raising production during times of market disruptions.

 Iran’s economy is highly dependent on oil export revenues, 

which constitute roughly 80 percent of its total export earnings, 40-

50 percent of the government budget, and 10-20 percent of its gross 

domestic product (GDP). The U.S. Department of State concluded 

in its 2002 Patterns of Global Terrorism Report that Iran remained “the 

most active state sponsor of terrorism in 2002.” Oil revenue represents 

a significant portion of Iran’s disposable income. This report 

concluded that Iran provided Lebanese Hezbollah and Palestinian 

rejectionist groups, such as HAMAS, the Palestine Islamic Jihad, and 

the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command, 

with funding, safe haven, training, and weapons. Iranian funding 

for Hezbollah was reportedly about $60 million to $80 million a year 

in the 1980s. The report also asserted that Iran provided support to 

extremist groups in Central Asia, Afghanistan, and Iraq. 

 The United States first placed Iran on the State Department 

terrorism list in 1984, in response to allegations of Iranian involvement 

in the 1983 suicide attack by Hezbollah on the U.S. Marine barracks 

in Lebanon.20 Iran was also linked to the bombing of Khobar Towers 

in Saudi Arabia, where 19 American servicemen were killed. On 

June 21, the Justice Department announced that it had indicted 13 
214

Saudis and one Lebanese who were members of Saudi Hezbollah. 

The indictment said that these individuals belonged to groups that 

were “inspired, supported, and supervised” by elements of the 

Iranian government.21 In April 2001, Iran sponsored an international 

conference supporting Palestinian groups, including groups 

promoting violence in Israel. In January 2002, a shipment of 50 tons 

of arms from Iran to the Palestinian Authority was uncovered.22 The 

United States maintains economic sanctions against Iran because of 

its terrorist links, and American firms are not allowed to purchase oil 

from Iran nor invest in its oil fields.23

 Political negotiations between Iran and the United States and its 

allies can result in different outcomes. If the points in the bargaining 

set dominate a war outcome, both sides, if they are rational, may very 

well decide to choose to negotiate a solution rather than fight a war. 

However, if they choose not to bargain or if they cannot agree, then 

one option open to Iran is to try to block the Strait using conventional 

force. The United States currently has the ability to attack Iranian 

missile sites and can, at some cost, reopen the Straits. Iran’s shift to 

nuclear status most likely would alter its political leverage vis-à -vis 

conflict with the United States and its allies.

 The implications for an Iran that has acquired nuclear capability 

differs from the above scenarios. It is unlikely that Iran would have 

nuclear weapons in sufficient number and sophistication that they 

would use them to attack the United States and it allies. From the 

Iranian point of view, perhaps the greatest utility to attaining nuclear 

weapons is to protect its territory from outside aggression, and deny 

the United States aggressive interference in its internal affairs or at 

the extreme, an Iraq-style invasion by U.S. or allied troops. Iran also is 

concerned about the nature of the military balance in its neighborhood, 

which includes several nuclear powers (Israel, Pakistan, and India). 

Iran is not expected to deploy an intercontinental ballistic missile 

capable of striking the continental United States. This means that 

for Iran even to consider implementing an actual regional nuclear 

attack, it would have to be able to withstand a massive preemptive 

U.S. conventional attack, or if Iran used nuclear weapons first in 

the theatre, a nuclear second strike by the United States. In strategic 

terms, therefore, it is difficult to see why a rational Iran would use its 
215

nuclear weapons except under dire circumstances where its existence 

was threatened. 

 However, it cannot be ruled out that a more radicalized regime in 

Tehran might pass nuclear material to a terrorist group. Alternatively, 

should the political climate in the region change, it would be possible 

for Iran to threaten to use its nuclear weapons as an umbrella to close 

the Strait of Hormuz. It has been estimated that a 3-month closure 

of the Strait of Hormuz, without any offsetting oil export procedures 

or market intervention, could cost the United States a 4 to 5 percent 

drop in GDP, with up to 2 percent added to the unemployment rate 

and 7 percent added to the inflation rate.24

 Bargaining with threats is really a two-stage process.25 The first 

stage is explicit bargaining. The second stage, in which the threat point 

will be implemented should the bargaining process fail, is implicit. 

The logical difficulty is that such games usually are not subgame 

perfect. In the bargaining process, it may be optimal to threaten to use 

nuclear weapons should a player’s demands not be met. However, 

it is unlikely that the player will want to implement its threats. One 

way to address this problem is through a commitment mechanism. If 

a player can restrict its freedom of action so that it has no alternative 

but to implement the threat, then the threat is credible.

 Precommitment mechanisms can be subtle.26 One example would 

be to transfer control of nuclear weapons to battlefield commanders. 

This creates the possibility that in the “fog of war,” the weapons will 

be used. The aggressor is forced to try to evaluate the probability that 

the other side will use its nuclear weapons. If it is a nuclear power, it 

can invoke the threat point by using the argument in its negotiations 

that political instability may create the danger that the nuclear 

weapons may fall into irresponsible hands. Thus, the potential for 

political instability is itself a form of a precommitment mechanism. 

A non-nuclear power does not have the advantage of this type of 

leverage. Given the enormous damage nuclear weapons can inflict, 

their expected loss can be large, even though the subjective probability 

of their use is small. Given the political instability of Iran, it would be 

dangerous to assume that all bargaining would be rational, as there 

would the very real possibility that the nuclear weapons would be 

under the control of the more radical elements of the government.
216

 Since the nuclear threat is credible, the status quo is likely to be 

stable. Nuclear weapons put the burden of accepting the risk of the 

threat being implemented on the party that wants to change the 

status quo. The potential use of nuclear weapons also can change 

the probability distribution of potential gains and losses from 

conventional war so as to reduce its expected gain. In fact, a very 

small probability of enormous loss due to the use of nuclear weapons 

can change the expected value of a conventional war from positive 

to negative.

 The acquisition of nuclear weapons is thus a means to validate 

conventional superiority. If a country has both conventional 

superiority and nuclear weapons, it can use the threat of conventional 

weapons to achieve the result it desires and use its nuclear weapons 

to validate this action. This threat would deter third parties from 

intervening in a regional conflict. Suppose, for example, that Iraq had 

been a nuclear power in the summer of 1990. Having taken Kuwait, 

Iraq would have forced the allies to choose between accepting the 

new allocation, or risking that its threat of using nuclear weapons 

would be implemented.

 Iran’s arsenal of Silkworm and Seersucker missiles mean that it 

could use these missiles in an attempt to close the Strait.27 Under 

normal circumstances, this would be a problem, but one that could 

be addressed by U.S. naval power. However, if Iran has nuclear 

weapons, the nature of the threat to the Strait or other Persian Gulf 

energy facilities would change. The military problem would be much 

more complex, as it would be necessary to destroy Iran’s nuclear 

weapons before attacking the conventional forces that are blocking 

the Strait. Under such circumstances, time becomes a precious 

commodity, and the ability to buy time by moving Saudi and other 

Gulf production to the Red Sea and the Mediterranean becomes a 

key resource. 

Strategies for Reducing Threats to the Closure 

of Strait of Hormuz.

 Maintaining alternatives to shipments of Persian Gulf oil through 

the Strait of Hormuz will be a critical aspect to limiting the economic 

damage to oil importing countries of a major shutdown of the Strait. 
217

The first line of defense in this regard is the existence of the emergency 

stockpiling system of the International Energy Agency (IEA) which 

includes the joint release of oil from U.S. strategic petroleum reserve, 

together with strategic oil stocks of other Organization for Economic 

Cooperation and Development (OECD) member states. However, 

the potential of the IEA strategic stocks is limited, as it can only 

replace the volume of oil coming through the Strait for less than 30 

days. Western industrialized nations likely would have to resort to 

emergency conservation measures in combination with a major stock 

release to mitigate the damage of a prolonged closure of the Strait of 

Hormuz, barring other alternative strategies.

Emergency preparedness

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

0-30 31-60 61-90 91-120 121-150 151-180 181-210 211-240 241-270

Days from start of drawdown

US Germany Japan Other

million b/d

S ource: IE A

Maximum withdrawal profile from OE C D S trategic R es erves

Table 1.

 Western strategic oil stocks could be supplemented by unsold 

oil stored near end-user markets by key producers like Saudi Arabia 

or Russia. Such “floating” stocks were pivotal in stabilizing oil 

markets in 1990 when Iraq invaded Kuwait.28 Floating stocks would 

be beneficial in today’s circumstances and should be considered. 

However, other alternative strategies do exist that could give the 

United States and its allies time to pursue a negotiated solution or to 

properly prepare for a military response. Among those alternatives 

P
218

are to use existing pipeline and oil export infrastructure to create a 

bypass to the Strait of Hormuz. The costs and options for doing so 

have been studied in detail by the James A. Baker III Institute and 

the Center for Naval Analysis.29

 One significant existing Strait of Hormuz bypass is the transSaudi Arabian Petroline, an oil pipeline that has existing capacity to 

move over 5 million barrels a day of crude oil from Saudi oil fields to 

the Red Sea port of Yanbu. 

 A second pipeline, the Ipsa-2 pipeline, which extends from 

southern Iraq to the Saudi Red Sea port of Mu’jiz, could be refurbished 

and adjusted to carry an additional 1.65 million barrels a day of 

oil from Iraq and Saudi Arabia (and with construction of a spur 

line, Kuwait) to the Red Sea, bypassing the Persian Gulf. The 1.65 

million b/d Iraqi-Saudi (Ipsa-2) pipeline was closed indefinitely by 

Riyadh during the Gulf War. Although Saudi Arabia has refused to 

comment on whether it would ever bring the line back on stream, it 

has maintained its portion in good working order. In June 2001, the 

kingdom announced that it had taken ownership of Ipsa-2, which was 

used to export Iraqi crude oil via Saudi Arabia in the 1980s during 

the Iraq-Iran war. Riyadh said that it was seizing the line, including 

pumping stations, storage tanks, and the maritime terminal, as Gulf 

War reparations for Iraqi military actions. Baghdad, for its part, has 

insisted that it still owns the line and has not accepted the legitimacy 

of the Saudi appropriation. Utilization of this line would require a 

diplomatic initiative involving both Saudi Arabia and Iraq. 

 The capacities of both of these pipelines could be upgraded by 

65 percent in the event of a Hormuz incident to 11 million barrels a 

day by upgrading the lines through the use of drag reduction agents 

that reduce turbulent eddies in the oil which lessen the volume of 

oil that can be transported through a pipeline at any given time. 

Costs of such a project are calculated to be relatively low at around 

$600 million. Drag reduction agents (DRAs) are chemicals that are 

injected into crude oil pipelines to reduce energy loss. DRAs have 

been used on the Alaskan pipeline, and frequently on the Colombian 

pipeline system, to make up for lost flows during times of operational 

interruption. Another option would be to build a spur line from Abu 

Dhabi and other regional production centers so that oil could exit to 

world markets via Oman. 
219

 Upgrading these pipelines could allow the United States to 

respond to a closure on a deliberate and risk-minimizing timeline, 

potentially lessening the need for U.S. military deployment during 

a crisis. The existence of such contingency options also could be 

used to reduce Iranian motivation to close the Strait of Hormuz by 

reducing the political leverage and gain from doing so. Studies show 

that full use of a bypass option would mean that a closure of the 

Strait of Hormuz would only result in a loss of U.S. GDP of roughly 1 

percent, also mitigating the impact on unemployment and inflation.30

However, the bypass option only would be effective if Iran did not 

have the capability to simultaneously threaten the bypass facilities 

or Saudi Arabian oil production facilities themselves, but focused 

solely on closing the Strait as its primary target. 

 The bypass contingency plan described above certainly would 

be extremely effective against a one-of-a-kind terrorist attack that 

temporarily affected the passage of oil through the Strait. Rapid public 

announcement of the planned utilization of bypass routes could be 

used in combination with strategic stocks to keep oil markets calm 

during such an event by demonstrating to the markets that Persian 

Gulf oil will still be made available.

High Costs of a Loss of Access to Saudi Facilities.

 While there exist several alternative ways to bypass a loss of access 

to the Strait of Hormuz, a major attack on Saudi oil production facilities 

would be harder to counterbalance. Saudi oil export infrastructure 

has important, substantial built-in redundancies on both the east and 

west coasts of the kingdom that would make it extremely difficult for 

terrorist cells or saboteurs to knock out Saudi export capacity for any 

significant period of time. The same would apply to military attacks 

by air. The kingdom’s export capacity is over 14 million b/d, almost 

twice as much as current export levels, and a wide variety of facilities 

would have to be substantially jeopardized simultaneously before 

any oil export curtailment would be unavoidable. The kingdom also 

has access to other less well-known offshore loading facilities and 

makeshift systems, such as single-buoy mooring systems that could 

be used to load ships for export of Saudi oil.
220

 However, a major attack on core Saudi oil production facilities that 

significantly affected oil production and handling operations at the 

major processing facilities at Abqaiq would prove far more difficult 

to replace quickly. As noted in the Economist Magazine, “Saudi 

Arabia remains the indispensable nation of oil.”31 Saudi Arabia not 

only exports more oil than any other producer, it maintains over one 

million barrels a day of idle swing capacity on hand for emergencies 

and can, in a relatively short order, bring on new fields to replace the 

exports of any other single exporter in the world. No other nation 

currently sits in this important position. The ramifications of Iran or 

some other nuclear power or group being able to blackmail the West 

would be quite extreme. A loss of access to Saudi production facilities 

at Abqaiq would leave world markets with a deficit in the millions 

of barrels a day (depending on the extent of damage) and would 

not be replaced easily, even in the 3 to 6-month timeframe when 

strategic stocks could be used to replace lost Saudi barrels. Certain 

facilities can take between 1 to 2 years to rebuild on an expedited 

basis. To lessen the impact of an attack by a terrorist group or others 

on important Saudi oil processing facilities, construction of some 

alternative bypass facilities should be considered and implemented 

where possible, and critical parts for the repair or reconstruction of 

such oil processing facilities should be stockpiled in country.

 In the event of a major attack on Abqaiq facilities, Saudi production 

eventually could be replaced with investment in new fields in 

Venezuela, Iraq, Russia, and West Africa, but this process is also 

likely to take several years. In the meantime, the United States and 

other large industrial and emerging economies would be forced to 

restrict the use of oil through rationing and other extreme measures 

to prevent a full blown market crisis of proportions reminiscent of 

the crisis of 1973. 

Conclusion.

 The United States has acted to protect the freedom of navigation 

of the Strait of Hormuz for several decades. However, military 

strategies alone may be less effective than a combination of strategic 

options, should hostile parties in the region acquire WMD and be 
221

willing to use them to threaten core Saudi oil production facilities 

significantly as a means of deterring a military response to a closure 

of the Strait. 

 The United States, through a combination of release of IEA 

emergency strategic stockpiles, utilization of strategic export 

bypass facilities, and military operations, could ease any threat or 

actual blockade to the Strait of Hormuz. For an investment totaling 

roughly $600 million, existing pipeline systems in Saudi Arabia 

could be modified to permit the export of up to 11 million barrels 

a day of oil to bypass the Strait of Hormuz.32 Used in combination 

with the release of strategic stocks, an upgraded bypass system 

could almost completely offset the loss of oil due to the closure of 

the Strait of Hormuz for as much as 90 days. Such a strategy would 

allow the United States to respond to the threat of a closure or an 

actual closure on a deliberate and risk-minimizing timeline and 

could limit the extent of military engagement needed. The existence 

of such contingencies could reduce the Iranian motivation to close 

the Strait of Hormuz and reduce the political leverage they get from 

threatening to do so. 

 However, the effectiveness of this deterrent is reduced under 

scenarios where Iran is a nuclear power and might consider threatening 

Saudi oil production surface facilities. A nonconventional attack on 

certain key Saudi oil production facilities would be extremely difficult 

to deal with, given the lack of alternative idle production capacity 

that could be brought on line in other oil producing countries. This 

extreme case, however, would have to be considered by Iran in the 

context of a massive U.S. response.

 Given all the factors considered in this question, having the ability 

to by-pass the Strait of Hormuz has two significant benefits. First, it 

buys time, allowing the United States to move forces into the region 

to address the Iranian nuclear threat. Second, Iran would have to 

use its nuclear weapons without provocation; this weakens their 

position in negotiations. It is one thing to threaten to use nuclear 

weapons in response to an attack and quite another to threaten to 

use nuclear weapons if a concession is not made in negotiations. In 

the latter case, Iran runs high risks of serious consequences that its 

small nuclear arsenal would not enable it to guard against.
222

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 9

 1. See www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/choke.pdf.

 2. Chip Cummins, “As Threats to Oil Facilities Rise, U.S. Military Becomes 

Protector,” Wall Street Journal, June 30, 2004, p. A1.

 3. Nadia El-Sayyed El-Shazly, The Gulf Tanker War: Iran and Iraq’s Maritime 

Swordplay, London: Macmillan Press, 1997.

 4. Rosemarie Said Zahlan, “The Impact of U.S. Policy on the Stability of the Gulf 

States: A Historian’s View,” Iran, Iraq and the Gulf Arab States, Joseph Kechichian, 

ed., New York: Palgrave, 2001. 

 5. John Partin, Special Operation Forces in Operation EARNEST WILL, Prime 

Chance I, MacDill Air Force Base, FL: U.S. Special Operations Command, History 

and Research Office, April 1998, p. 5-7; also see Hassan Hamdan Al-Alkim, “The 

Arabian Gulf at the New Millennium: Security Challenges,” in Keahiahian.

 6. Cummins.

 7. See http://www.janes.com/security/international_security/news/fr/fr040630_1_

n.shtml; http://www.nydailynews.com/front/story/119482p-107611c.html.

 8. BBC website, BBC Timeline, Abu Dhabi; Al-Alkim.

 9. See http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Iran/Missile/3876_4086.html.

 10. See http://www.converger.com/eiacab/chron.htm.

 11. See http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Iran/Missile/3876_4086.html.

 12. AFP news service, June 13, 2004.

 13. “Iran Accuses Qatar of Overproducing Gas,” Oil Daily International, 

Energy Intelligence Group, April 24, 2004, available at www.energyintel.com.

 14. So argues Geoffrey Kemp in his monograph, U.S. and Iran: The Nuclear 

Dilemma: Next Steps, available at www.nixoncenter.org.

 15. Details available in ibid.

 16. Friedemann Miller, “Why Iran is Key for Europe’s Security of Energy 

Supply,” Eugene Whitlock, ed., Iran and Its Neighbors Diverging Views on a Strategic 

Region, SWP Berlin: German Institute for International and Security Affairs, July 

2003.

 17. Kemp. 

 18. “Iran Threatens Action if Oil Price War Erupts,” Middle East Economic 

Survey (MEES), Vol. XXVII, No. 6, November 19, 1984.

 19. “Iran Hopes $25/barrel Minimum Price Remains After Gulf Crisis,” MEES, 

Vol. XXXIII, No. 49, September 10, 1990; “Saudi Arabia and Iran See Eye to Eye on 

Oil Price Issue,” MEES, Vol. XLII, No. 21, May 24, 1999.
223

 20. Meghan L. O’Sullivan, “Shrewd Sanctions: Statecraft and State Sponsors of 

Terrorism,” Washington DC: Brookings Institute Press, 2003, Chapter 3.

 21. See http://news.findlaw.com/cnn.

 22. An overview on Iranian terrorism links also is outlined by George Tenet, 

Testimony given on “Current and Future Threats to National Security,” Senate 

Armed Services Committee, February 2, 1999.

 23. For a detailed account of the U.S. oil sanctions policy against Iran, see 

Meghan L. O’Sullivan, “Shrewd Sanctions: Statecraft and State Sponsors of 

Terrorism,” Washington, DC: Brookings Institute Press, 2003.

 24. Estimates are based on the U.S. Department of Energy DIS model and do 

not cover any ameliorating policies such as the release of the strategic petroleum 

reserve or utilization of alternative export routes.

 25. Dagobert Brito and M. D. Intriligator, “The Economic and Political 

Incentives to Acquire Nuclear Weapons,” Security Studies, 1993.

 26. Ibid.

 27. For details on Iran’s military capabilities, see Wisconsin Project on Nuclear 

Arms Control, Iran Missile Update, 2004, Risk Report, Vol. 10, No. 2, March-April 

2004; also see Al-Alkim.

 28. Because of weak markets in mid-1990, Saudi Arabia and Iran held tens of 

millions of barrels of oil afloat, unsold, that served as a cushion to the sudden loss of 

Kuwaiti and Iraqi oil production. Throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s, Saudi 

Arabia maintained a policy of storing oil abroad in the Caribbean and Northwest 

Europe to make sure it could respond to any sudden disruption in oil markets. 

See Ronald Soligo, Amy Myers Jaffe, and Peter Mieszkowski, “Energy Security,” 

working paper, The Political, Economic, Social, Cultural and Religious Trends in 

the Middle East and the Gulf and Their Impact on Energy Supply, Security and 

Pricing, available at www.rice.edu/energy.

 29. For a detailed study of this subject which is the basis for this section of this 

chapter, see M. Webster Ewell, Jr., Dagobert Brito, and John Noer, “An Alternative 

Pipeline Strategy in the Persian Gulf,” available at www.rice.edu/energy, under 

Research/Other Publications and Presentations. A classified version of the study 

also exists that should be revisited by policymakers, given the risks to Persian Gulf 

facilities described in this chapter.

 30. Ibid.

 31. “What If?” The Economist, May 29, 2004, p. 69-70.

 32. Ewell, Brito, and Noer.

225

CHAPTER 10

DETER AND CONTAIN:

DEALING WITH A NUCLEAR IRAN

Michael Eisenstadt

 For nearly 2 decades, Iran has been acquiring nuclear technology 

from around the world, ostensibly to support its civilian nuclear 

power program. These efforts have made slow, but steady progress. 

Reviewing the scope and nature of Iran’s clandestine and overt 

nuclear-related activities over the past 20 years, and the long trail 

of partial, misleading, and/or untruthful declarations about these 

activities that it has provided to the International Atomic Energy 

Agency (IAEA), it is hard to avoid the conclusion that many of these 

activities were likely intended to support a clandestine nuclear 

weapons program. 1

 How close might Iran be to acquiring a capability to produce “the 

bomb”? It is hard to say, as estimating nuclear timelines is far from 

an exact science, and Iran’s nuclear program often has moved slower 

than reasonably might have been expected, given what is known 

about other nuclear programs in the developing world. That being 

said, several nongovernmental analysts and organizations have 

estimated that were it to decide to do so, and were it to encounter 

no major obstacles, Iran could probably produce a nuclear weapon 

within 3-5 years.

 • Were Iran to employ clandestine gas centrifuge cascades of 

the type being built for its declared civil program (presumably 

its preferred path), it might be able to acquire enough fissile 

material for a bomb in 3-5 years—provided that it resolves 

technical problems that have apparently dogged this effort 

and centrifuge programs elsewhere.2

 • If it were to fall back on its reactor at Bushier, which is 

nearly complete and which, according to Russian officials, 

will commence operations by the end of 2006 if there are 

no teething problems, Iran could produce enough fissile 
226

material for its first bomb within 2-3 years of start-up. To do 

so, however, it would have to be willing to openly violate 

its Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) obligations by 

diverting safeguarded spent fuel, or to withdraw from the 

NPT before taking this step.3

 • If Iran were to secretly obtain fissile material from abroad 

(i.e., North Korea or Pakistan), it could conceivably build a 

device or weapon within a year—assuming it possessed plans 

for a viable design and the necessary special materials and 

components needed to build a bomb. 

 By contrast, according to public statements by U.S. intelligence 

officials and news reports summarizing authoritative U.S. and Israeli 

intelligence assessments, Iran could have a nuclear weapon by early 

to mid-next decade—that is, within 5-10 years. 4

 In any case, due to uncertainty about the Islamic Republic’s actual 

nuclear status (as a result of enduring concerns about the possible 

existence of a clandestine weapons program), Iran increasingly is 

likely to be perceived as a nuclear capable or de facto nuclear weapons 

state in the coming years. Accordingly, some of its neighbors, and 

some members of the international community, are likely to start 

treating Iran with the deference generally reserved for nuclear 

weapons states. 

 For this reason, U.S. policymakers and military planners can 

be expected to devote more attention to the special challenges of 

deterring and containing a nuclear Iran that derive from the nature 

of the Islamic Republic, regional political realities, and Iran’s support 

for and involvement in terrorism.

DETERRING THE “MARTYRDOM-SEEKING NATION”

 Because Shi‘i religious doctrine exalts the suffering and martyrdom of the faithful, and because religion plays a central role in the 

official ideology of the Islamic Republic, Iran is sometimes portrayed 

as an “undeterrable” state driven by the absolute imperatives of 

religion, rather than by the pragmatic concerns of statecraft. This 

impression has been reinforced by Iran’s use of costly human-wave 

attacks during the Iran-Iraq War, its prolongation of the war with 
227

Iraq due to its single-minded pursuit of the overthrow of Saddam 

Hussein, and its support for groups such as the Lebanese Hizballah 

and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, that have pioneered the tactic of 

the suicide bombing.5

Is Iran “Undeterrable”? 

 Iranian officials frequently have sought to cultivate and play on 

this image of Iran abroad as a fanatical, indefatigable foe, whose 

soldiers seek martyrdom, and whose society is willing and able to 

absorb heavy punishment, in order to bolster the country’s deterrent 

capability. Thus, according to Iran’s former Army chief of staff, Major 

General ‘Ali Shahbazi, though

. . . the United States or some country incited by it may be able to begin a 

military conflict . . . it will not be strong enough to end it. This is because 

only Muslims believe that “whether we kill or are killed, we are the 

victors.” Others do not think this way. 6

 The perception, however, of Iran as an irrational, undeterrable 

state with a high pain threshold is both anachronistic and wrong. 

Within the context of a relatively activist foreign policy, Iranian 

decisionmakers have generally sought to minimize risk by shunning 

direct confrontation and by acting through surrogates (such as the 

Lebanese Hizballah) or by means of stealth (Iranian small boat and 

mine operations against shipping in the Gulf during the Iran-Iraq 

War) in order to preserve deniability and create ambiguity about 

their intentions. Such behavior is evidence of an ability to engage in 

rational calculation and to accurately assess power relationships. 

 Moreover, despite the frequent resort to religious imagery in 

speeches and interviews, Iranian officials often employ the language 

of deterrence as it is spoken and understood in the West when 

discussing the country’s national security strategy. Thus, shortly 

after the Shehab-3 missile test launch in July 1998, Defense Minister 

Ali Shamkhani explained that to bolster Iran’s deterrent capability 

“we have prepared ourselves to absorb the first strike so that it inflicts 

the least damage on us. We have, however, prepared a second strike 

which can decisively avenge the first one, while preventing a third 

strike against us.”7
228

 Tehran’s conduct during the later stages of the Iran-Iraq War 

demonstrated that Iran is not insensitive to costs. It is possible to 

argue that in the heady, optimistic, early days of the revolution—

from the early-to-mid 1980s—Iran, as a society, had a relatively high 

threshold for pain. During the early years of the war, Tehran was 

willing to endure hardships, make great sacrifices, and incur heavy 

losses in support of the war effort—eschewing the opportunity for 

a cease-fire in 1982 to pursue the overthrow of the Ba‘th regime in 

Baghdad and the export of the revolution. But as the war with Iran 

dragged on, popular support for it had waned: the population was 

demoralized and wearied by years of inconclusive fighting, making 

it increasingly difficult to attract volunteers for the front. Many 

clerics had come to the conclusion that the war was unwinnable.8

This was not, as Ayatollah Khomeini was fond of saying, “a nation 

of martyrs.” 

 Khomeini was probably the only figure with the charisma and 

moral authority to inspire the Iranian people to sustain the level of 

sacrifice required to continue the war for 8 years. The double blow 

embodied by the unsuccessful conclusion of the war in August 1988 

and the death of Khomeini in June 1989 marked the end of the decade 

of revolutionary radicalism in Iranian politics. Years of revolutionary 

turmoil and the long, bloody war with Iraq made Iranians weary of 

political violence and war, and risk averse. With respect to its ability 

to absorb casualties and bear costs, Iran has since become a much 

more “normal” state. 

 This has clearly been manifest in Iran’s domestic and foreign policy 

behavior during the past decade and a half. Its cautious behavior 

during the 1991 uprising in Iraq, and the 1998 crisis with Afghanistan 

that followed the Taleban victory there, provides perhaps the best 

proof that Tehran is wary of stumbling into a costly quagmire for 

which there would be little or no public support. In both cases, it 

failed to intervene on behalf of endangered Shi‘i communities. It 

will sooner compromise its Islamic ideological commitments and 

abandon endangered Shi‘i communities to their enemies, rather than 

risk Iranian national interests by entering into foreign adventures. 

 Such pragmatism is consistent with a basic principle of 

decisionmaking established by Khomeini shortly before his death. 

In a series of letters to then President ‘Ali Khamene’i and the Council 
229

of Guardians in December 1987 and January 1988, he affirmed the 

Islamic government’s authority to destroy a mosque or suspend the 

observance of the five pillars of faith (the fundamentals of Muslim 

observance) if Iranian state interests so required. In so doing, he 

sanctioned the supremacy of state interest over both religion and 

the doctrine of the Revolution.9 Ever since then, national interest has 

been the guiding principle of Iranian decisionmaking, whether with 

regard to social issues (such as birth control), the economy (foreign 

investment in the oil sector), or foreign and defense policy (restraint, 

since the early 1990s, in exporting the revolution).10

 This basic policy framework is unlikely to be altered by the 

emergence of a new generation of highly nationalistic politicians in 

the legislative and executive branches of the Iranian government, 

who count among their ranks many veterans of the security services, 

the Revolutionary Guard, and the Iran-Iraq War—as exemplified by 

Iran’s new president, Mahmud Ahmadinejad. This is due, in large 

part, to the fact that those wielding real power in Iran consist largely 

of the same old familiar cast of “unelected” leaders: Supreme Leader 

‘Ali Khamene’i, Expediency Council Head ‘Ali Akbar Hashemi 

Rafsanjani, Guardian Council head Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati, and 

others. The defiant, confrontational style of this new generation of 

assertive nationalist leaders (evident in Iran’s recent handling of the 

diplomacy with representatives of the European Union regarding its 

nuclear program) is, however, liable to further aggravate tensions 

with the West, and could contribute to an Iranian miscalculation visà-vis the United States, Israel, or its more immediate neighbors.11

Challenges for Deterrence.

 The main problem in deterring a nuclear Iran is not the putative 

“irrationality” of the regime or its high threshold for pain. Rather, it 

is: 1) the impact of political factionalism on the regime’s behavior; 2) 

the possibility that a nuclear Iran might be more likely to engage in 

terrorism or military aggression, or seek an “eliminationist” solution 

to the Arab-Israeli conflict, and; 3) the effect of domestic instability 

on the security of Iran’s nuclear stockpile and on the officials that 

control its nuclear arsenal. Each of these could complicate efforts to 

create a stable deterrent relationship with a nuclear Iran. 
230

Political Factionalism. Political factionalism has sometimes led 

to dramatic zig-zags in Iranian policy, as different personalities, 

factions or branches of the government worked at cross purposes, 

sought to subvert their rivals, or pressed the government to take 

actions inconsistent with its general policy line. Accordingly, Iranian 

policy has often been inconsistent and unpredictable. Such behavior 

would seriously complicate efforts to establish a stable deterrent 

relationship with a nuclear Iran.

 Recent examples of this tendency can be seen in Iranian policy 

toward Afghanistan and Iraq. According to U.S. officials, while 

Iranian diplomats played a constructive role at the Bonn Conference 

in December 2001 and the subsequent creation of an Afghan Interim 

Authority, members of the Revolutionary Guard Qods Force were 

working to undermine the authority of the nascent central government 

by arming and training the Afghan Shiite Sepah-e-Mohammad militia 

and cultivating the warlord Ismail Khan in Herat.12 Likewise, in the 

wake of the U.S. invasion of Iraq, the Iranian government apparently 

encouraged Shi‘i parties such as the Supreme Council for the Islamic 

Revolution in Iraq to cooperate with coalition forces and to participate 

in the U.S.-backed Iraq government, while supporting and arming 

groups engaged in attacks on Iraqi and coalition forces.13

 This tendency has even expressed itself in the economic domain. 

Revolutionary Guards shut down a new Tehran airport operated by 

a Turkish-Austrian consortium only one day after it opened in May 

2004—claiming that the Turkish firm did business in Israel (a charge 

it denied). In September 2004, the Majlis froze a $2.5 billion deal with 

a Turkish consortium to create a privately-owned cell phone network, 

only days after the contract was signed. Finally, a $390 million deal 

with the French company Renault to build cars in Iran came under 

attack by critical legislators in October 2004, though the Majlis has 

not blocked this contract. This ongoing struggle between advocates 

and opponents of foreign investment in Iran—part of the broader 

political struggle among factions of the dominant conservative 

bloc—is likely to continue.14

Propensity for Risk-Taking. There are two schools of thought 

regarding how nuclear weapons affect the behavior of states. One 

argues that the acquisition of nuclear weapons induces greater 

prudence and caution among possessor states, and adduces U.S. and 
231

Soviet behavior during the Cold War as proof. However, post-Cold 

War revelations about the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis and other Cold 

War crises have shown how close the superpowers came to nuclear 

war on several occasions, thereby diminishing the appeal of this 

model. 

 The other school of thought argues that the acquisition of weapons 

of mass destruction (WMD) in general and nuclear weapons in 

particular can lead to an increased propensity for risk-taking. Iraq’s 

maturing chemical and biological weapons programs may have 

emboldened Saddam Hussein to pursue a more aggressive regional 

policy in 1989-90, and ultimately to invade Kuwait. Similarly, the 

confidence that Pakistan’s leadership drew from its May 1998 nuclear 

weapons test may have emboldened it to attempt to seize a portion 

of Kashmir from India, in the mistaken belief that India would be 

deterred from responding militarily, leading to the Kargil Crisis of 

May-July 1999. 

 Thus, Iranian decisionmakers might convince themselves that 

the possession of nuclear weapons could provide them with greater 

latitude to pursue more aggressive policies against their neighbors, 

the United States, or Israel. Iran is unlikely to engage in outright 

military aggression against any of its neighbors; its conventional 

military forces are weak, and there are few scenarios in which a 

conventional military move would make sense—at least under 

current conditions (although a civil war in Iraq might generate 

pressure for Iran to intervene, particularly if coalition forces were to 

leave Iraq). For now, however, surrounded by potential enemies and 

U.S. forces on all sides, Tehran seems more interested in preserving 

the political and territorial status quo in the Gulf, than in altering it. 

 A nuclear Iran might, however, increase support for antiAmerican or anti-Israeli terrorist groups, or be tempted to resume 

efforts to export the revolution to places where there are large Shi‘i 

communities. Iran’s past successes in obscuring its involvement 

in terrorism or avoiding retribution (e.g., the 1983 Beirut Marine 

barracks bombing, the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing), might lead 

some Iranian decisionmakers to believe that they could encourage 

or sponsor terrorist attacks on U.S. personnel or interests with 

impunity—and that their possession of “the bomb” would protect 
232

them from retaliation. Such reasoning could lead to miscalculations 

and imprudent risk-taking. Such a scenario is not far-fetched: an 

attack by Pakistani-based extremists on the Indian Parliament in 

December 2001 sparked a prolonged crisis and nearly led to war 

between the two countries.

 A nuclear Iran might also be more inclined to take risks vis-à-vis 

Israel, in the belief that its nuclear capability would deter retaliation. 

This may have been the assumption underpinning the assertion in 

a December 2001 Friday prayer sermon by ‘Ali Akbar HashemiRafsanjani, Expediency Council chairman, that “If one day, the 

Islamic world is also equipped with weapons like those that Israel 

possesses now, then the imperialists’ strategy will reach a standstill 

because the use of even one nuclear bomb inside Israel will destroy 

everything. However, it will only harm the Islamic world. It is not 

irrational to contemplate such an eventuality.” 15

 While Rafsanjani’s sermon lends itself to alternative readings—

as either a matter-of-fact description of strategic reality in a Middle 

East in which more than one country has nuclear weapons or, 

more ominously, as a statement of intent—it raises the disquieting 

possibility that some Iranians may see nuclear weapons as a means of 

pursuing an eliminationist solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. This 

would not be surprising in light of the prevalence of anti-Semitic 

attitudes and anti-Israel vitriol in the public political discourse of 

both reformers and conservative hard-liners.

 A discussion about terrorism and a nuclear Iran necessarily raises 

the issue of nuclear terrorism. The fact that Iran or its agents have not 

yet used chemical and/or biological agents in terrorist attacks may 

indicate the existence of a normative threshold against WMD terror, 

or it may indicate that, having achieved significant successes by 

means of conventional terrorism, Tehran and its surrogates perceive 

no need to incur the risk that use of nonconventional weapons would 

entail. 

 Nonetheless, because of the importance that Tehran traditionally 

has attached to preserving deniability, Iran is likely to seek, when 

acting against more powerful adversaries, the ability to deliver 

covertly nonconventional arms by nontraditional means (for instance, 

terrorists, boats, or remotely piloted aircraft). Because such methods 

offer the possibility of deniability, they are likely to become important 
233

adjuncts to more traditional delivery means such as missiles, and 

in situations in which deniability is a critical consideration, they 

are likely to be the delivery means of choice—either by members 

of Iran’s security services, or by operatives of Hizballah’s security 

apparatus, which has cooperated with their Iranian counterparts on 

some of the most sensitive and risky operations Iran has undertaken. 

The possibility of deniable, covert delivery of nuclear weapons by 

Iran could pose a major challenge for deterrence—particularly if the 

country’s leadership believed that the regime’s survival was at stake. 

For this reason, convincing Tehran that U.S. forensic capabilities (e.g., 

the ability to determine the origin of a nuclear device or weapon 

by analyzing the isotopic signature of its fission products) preclude 

the possibility of deniable delivery would be of vital importance for 

efforts to deter a nuclear Iran. 

Instability in Iran. Finally, there are the implications of political 

instability and domestic unrest in a nuclear Iran. Should anti-regime 

violence escalate to the point that it were to threaten the existence of 

the Islamic Republic (unlikely in the near-term, but possible in the 

future, should Iran’s conservative leadership prove unable to better 

the population’s living standards, and continue to ignore calls for 

political change), diehard supporters of the old order might lash out 

at the perceived external enemies of the regime with all means at their 

disposal, as the regime teeters on the brink. In such a scenario, the 

apocalyptic possibility of nuclear terrorism by the Islamic Republic 

in its death throes must be treated seriously.

 There is not a lot that the United States can do to alter those 

aspects of Iranian politics that make establishing a stable deterrence 

relationship with Tehran potentially problematic. What it can do, is 

to understand Iran’s “red lines,” the crossing of which could lead to 

crisis or conflict, while clearly communicating its own “red lines” to 

Tehran, in order to reduce the risk of miscalculation, and to introduce 

an element of predictability into relations between the two countries. 

And it can continue to encourage those Iranians working for political 

change in their country in the hope that, through these efforts, a more 

moderate leadership may come to power; a leadership not wedded 

to the use of terrorism or to the acquisition of nuclear weapons, or at 

least more likely to act responsibly should Iran nonetheless acquire 

nuclear weapons. 
234

OPERATIONALIZING DETERRENCE

 U.S. efforts to influence a potentially hostile nuclear Iran must 

incorporate measures to deter by denial as well as by punishment.16

Raising doubts in the minds of Iranian decisionmakers about the 

country’s ability to reliably deliver its nuclear weapons, and stoking 

fears that the attempted use of such weapons could threaten their 

personal survival and that of the regime, could make the use of 

nuclear weapons prohibitively risky for Tehran in all but the most 

dire of circumstances.

Deterrence by Denial: Countering Iran’s Ability to Project Influence 

and Deliver Nuclear Weapons.

 By preventing Tehran from using its nuclear potential to 

intimidate neighbors and enemies and casting doubt on its ability to 

reliably deliver nuclear weapons, the United States and its allies can 

strengthen deterrence and undermine the utility of Iran’s nuclear 

arsenal. It is therefore crucial to understand how a nuclear Tehran 

might project influence or deliver its nuclear weapons. 

 To bolster deterrence and warfighting, Iran has created a triad 

of capabilities that leverages the country’s geographic location 

adjacent to the world’s main oil supply routes, exploits the regimes’ 

connections to terrorist groups with global reach, and reflects the 

preference of the clerical regime for ambiguity and opacity in its 

actions. Iran’s deterrent/warfighting triad consists of the ability to: 

1) disrupt oil exports from the Persian Gulf; 2) launch terror attacks 

on several continents in conjunction with the Lebanese Hizballah 

and other groups, and; 3) deliver nonconventional weapons against 

targets in the Middle East and beyond, by aircraft, land-based ballistic 

missiles, and by various nontraditional means such as ship-based 

ballistic missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles, boats, and terrorists.17

 As Iran stands up and expands its nuclear arsenal, it might seek 

to provide a nuclear “punch” to all three legs of its triad. In addition 

to building nuclear bombs and ballistic missile warheads, it might 

produce nuclear naval mines and nuclear-tipped anti-ship missiles 

(for use against U.S. aircraft carriers), and perhaps eventually, manportable nuclear devices (the so-called, but inaccurately labeled, 
235

“suitcase nukes”) for use by Iranian special forces or foreign terrorist 

groups aligned with Tehran.18

 Iran may rely on nontraditional delivery means before it can use 

more traditional delivery systems, such as strike aircraft or missiles. 

Iran’s first nuclear weapon might be too large and/or heavy for 

delivery by aircraft or missiles, and insufficiently rugged to withstand 

the rigors of flight. It might therefore put such a device on a vehicle 

or boat. 

 To counter Iran’s deterrent/warfighting triad, the United States 

and its allies will need to enhance their ability to:

 • Detect and interdict attempts to deliver covertly nuclear 

devices by sea, air, or land;

 • Identify and neutralize terrorist cells affiliated with Tehran; 

 • Detect and intercept nuclear-armed strike aircraft, cruise, and 

ballistic missiles;

 • Counter Iranian naval mine, small boat, and submarine 

warfare operations.

Much progress has been made in recent years in developing 

capabilities to deal with some of these threats. In other areas, much 

remains to be done. Exactly what can be done will be discussed in 

greater detail below.

Deterrence by Punishment: Threatening the Survival 

of the Islamic Republic.

 Iran’s leaders must understand that should they brandish or 

use nuclear weapons, the United States (and/or its regional allies) 

could threaten their personal survival and the stability of the Islamic 

Republic by conventional military strikes that: 

 • Target the senior leadership of the Islamic Republic;

 • Disrupt the functioning of the security organizations responsible for the survival of the regime, and;

 • Target key elements of the country’s economic infrastructure.
236

 Would the threat of conventional attack be sufficient, or is the 

threat of nuclear retaliation necessary for deterring a nuclear Iran? 

The awesome potential of modern air power—particularly the ability 

to disable modern industrial and economic infrastructures—was 

dramatically demonstrated during Operations DESERT STORM 

(1991) and ALLIED FORCE (1999) and, to a lesser degree, Operation 

IRAQI FREEDOM (2003). 

 This capability enables Washington to counter conventional and 

nuclear threats by Iran (and others) with the credible threat of a 

devastating conventional riposte that does not necessitate the use 

of nuclear weapons (although the knowledge that the United States 

possesses a vast nuclear arsenal would undoubtedly enter into the 

calculations of Iranian decisionmakers). 

 The bottom line is that the United States does not necessarily 

have to respond to the emergence of a nuclear Iran by extending 

a nuclear deterrent umbrella to its regional partners (which would 

undermine those elements of U.S. nonproliferation policy that seek 

to devalue nuclear weapons); its conventional capabilities might be 

sufficient to deter Iran in all but the most extreme circumstances. 

And at any rate, the United States ultimately retains the ability to use 

nuclear weapons, if the threat of a conventional response is deemed 

insufficient in some circumstances to deter the use of nuclear weapons 

by Iran.

Targeting Iran’s Leadership. Iran’s leaders must understand that 

if the Islamic Republic uses nuclear weapons, they will be held 

accountable for the consequences, and will become legitimate military 

targets. There are, however, practical obstacles to operationalizing 

such an approach. 

 Political authority in the Islamic Republic is widely diffused.19

Though the Supreme Leader is the paramount authority, many 

other individuals play important roles in the regime. Moreover, 

the dualistic power structure of the Islamic Republic, in which 

revolutionary Islamic institutions counterbalance the traditional 

institutions of the Iranian state (the Supreme Leader counterbalances 

the President, the Guardian Council counterbalances the Parliament, 

and the Revolutionary Guard counterbalances the regular army) 

provides the system of clerical rule with great resilience, and would 

complicate efforts to destabilize the Islamic Republic by decapitation 

strikes.
237

 Though Iran’s leadership is drawn from geographically diverse 

origins, many senior officials now live in Tehran (including some 

of the posher neighborhoods in north Tehran). 20 Many residents of 

the city know the location of the villas of senior clerics and regime 

personalities, making decapitation strikes possible—at least in 

principle. The difficulties of striking leadership targets from the 

air, however, should not be underestimated. During recent wars in 

Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, and Iraq, numerous attempted strikes on 

“high value targets” (key individuals) failed. In Iraq alone, some 50 

attempted decapitation strikes involving manned aircraft failed to 

kill even one of the intended leadership targets, while inadvertently 

killing scores, if not hundreds, of innocent civilians.21 Success here 

will await U.S. development of better human intelligence, and more 

flexible and responsive precision-strike capabilities and tactics, 

techniques, and procedures (TTPs). With sufficient resources and 

talent devoted to this effort, it could become a viable future option.

 If targeting senior officials offers uncertain prospects for success 

(at least for now), targeting their finances, business interests, and 

properties has a certain appeal, given the near-legendary avarice and 

corruption of Iran’s clerical elite. It is, however, hard to conceive of 

how this might be done in a way that is meaningful for purposes of 

deterrence. Many officials have made their fortunes in the informal 

economy or through the bonyads (parastatal foundations); as a result, 

little is known about their finances or their business interests, greatly 

complicating efforts to target their assets.22 Moreover, the financial 

holdings of many bonyads and of at least some senior politicians are 

highly diversified, further complicating efforts to put the squeeze 

on these individuals. Perhaps most importantly, the track record 

of recent efforts elsewhere to target the financial assets of senior 

government officials and their cronies in order to deter or compel, is 

not encouraging.23

Targeting the Regime’s Command and Control. In Iran, several 

organizations have responsibility for ensuring the survival of the 

regime, including the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), 

the Law Enforcement Forces (LEF), the Basij militia, the security 

and intelligence organs of the Justice Ministry, and the street thugs 

of Ansar-e-Hizballah. The IRGC and LEF units are garrisoned 
238

throughout the country, while the Basij is more loosely organized, 

as is the more informal Ansar-e-Hizballah. The locations of most 

major IRGC garrisons and LEF facilities are well-known to local 

residents, though the fact that these organizations are rather 

lightly armed (relative to similar entities in other countries, such as 

Syria’s Republican Guard and Iraq’s Republican Guard and Special 

Republican Guard units) and are garrisoned in or near populated 

areas, could make it difficult to strike these organizations in a way 

that would undermine their effectiveness and loosen the regime’s 

grip on power. 

Targeting Iran’s Economic Infrastructure. Iran is acutely vulnerable 

to economic warfare. Its economy is heavily dependent on oil and 

gas exports, which provide the country with some 80 percent of its 

foreign exchange earnings. Nearly all of its major oil and gas fields 

are located in the exposed southwest corner of the country and in the 

Gulf—where all six of its major oil terminals are also located—and 

nearly all of its oil and gas exports pass through the Strait of Hormuz. 

Four of Iran’s six main ports are located on the Persian Gulf; these 

handle about 90 percent of all imports by tonnage, while Iran’s sea 

lines of communication in the Gulf are vulnerable to interdiction along 

their entire length.24 Thus, the United States and its allies could halt 

Iranian oil exports as well as critical imports of refined oil products 

and other necessities, causing great harm to the economy—which is 

the regime’s Achilles’ heel—and perhaps leading to popular unrest 

and political instability in the Islamic Republic.

 During the Iran-Iraq War (1980-88), both belligerents targeted 

each others’ oil industry in the hope that economic warfare might 

bring their adversary to its knees. Oil facilities, tankers, and tanker 

terminals were hit, and though these attacks succeeded in reducing 

overall oil exports of both sides, these attacks were not pressed home 

in a sustained fashion, and therefore did not have a decisive impact 

on the outcome of the war.25 There can be little doubt that the United 

States has the means to succeed where both failed in the past, and 

effectively shut down Iranian oil exports through action in the air 

and on the sea. The main challenge would be to deter or disrupt 

Iranian retaliatory moves, which might not be limited to the Gulf 

region, and could take the form of an attempt to close the Strait of 
239

Hormuz, attacks on oil and gas installations on the other side of 

the Gulf, attacks on shipping in the Gulf, and/or a terror campaign 

spanning several continents.

CONTAINING A NUCLEAR IRAN

 What factors might affect Tehran’s ability to derive benefit from 

its nuclear weapons? And how might Tehran’s acquisition of nuclear 

weapons affect U.S. efforts to organize a “coalition of the willing” to 

deter and contain a nuclear Iran? 

 Tehran’s ability to derive political benefits from nuclear weapons 

will depend, to some extent, on whether Iran remains silent about its 

nuclear capabilities, adopts a policy of ambiguity, or makes known 

its newly acquired capabilities by means of an announcement or a 

weapons test.26 Iran’s actual nuclear status, however, is less important 

than the fact that in the coming years its neighbors increasingly are 

likely to perceive it as a threshold nuclear state, if not a de facto nuclear 

power, and to act accordingly. The domestic and regional contexts 

are also important here: Is there domestic calm or unrest in Iran? Is 

Iran at peace with its neighbors, or embroiled in crises or war? All 

these factors will affect the intensity with which the threat posed by 

Iran’s nuclear program is felt by its neighbors, and could affect U.S. 

efforts to enlist foreign support in containing a nuclear Iran.

 During the 1990s, Iran’s neighbors rebuffed U.S. efforts to 

politically isolate and economically pressure the Islamic Republic; 

they generally deemed these measures as unnecessarily provocative 

and injurious to their own economic interests. Rather, they have 

generally preferred to keep open channels of communication with 

Tehran to avoid antagonizing or provoking their large and powerful 

neighbor, and to preserve access to Iranian markets. For these same 

reasons, Iran’s neighbors likely will avoid participating in future 

efforts to politically isolate and economically pressure the Islamic 

Republic. In the international division of labor, it will largely be the 

job of the United States, Europe, and others to isolate Iran politically 

and pressure it economically. 

 Iran’s neighbors might, however, be prepared to join the United 

States and Europe in pointing out to Iran’s leaders that the acquisition 

of nuclear weapons will more likely harm than help their country, 
240

by prompting the formation of a loosely-knit coalition to contain 

Iran, deepening the U.S. role in the region, and perhaps prompting 

further proliferation—much of it directed at the Islamic Republic. 

Hopefully, this message would encourage Iranian decisionmakers 

to reassess the potential costs of a nuclear breakout. Some of Iran’s 

neighbors might also welcome the opportunity to strengthen their 

hand vis-à-vis Iran by deepening their relationship with Washington; 

by expanding access, basing, and overflight rights to U.S. forces in 

the region; and by strengthening their conventional forces to enable 

them to better deal with potential Iranian military moves.

Small Steps or Grand Design? The Military-Technical and 

Political-Military Context of Efforts to Contain a Nuclear Iran.

 Operation IRAQI FREEDOM initially inspired hopes that the 

United States would build on its military success in the war to 

establish a new regional security architecture capable of generating 

stability and security in the Persian Gulf.27 Most of these proposals 

call for confidence and security-building measures, the establishment 

of a regional security forum, collective security arrangements, or a 

mix of the three. Though such ideas merit consideration, conditions 

are not ripe for the creation of a regional security architecture in the 

Gulf, where politics are highly personalized, and characterized by 

distrust and petty rivalries.28 This militates against the creation of 

truly effective regional organizations that require state members to 

cede authority to the collective (this is the experience of the Gulf 

Cooperation Council (GCC) and its Peninsula Shield force) or to 

work together to counter a common threat. 

 Accordingly, the United States should work to improve militarytechnical cooperation with regional friends and allies, by deepening 

existing bilateral security relationships where feasible (with 

Turkey, the GCC states, and the Central Asian Republics), forging 

new bilateral security relationships where possible (with Iraq and 

Afghanistan), and pursuing regional cooperative ventures where 

desirable (augmenting efforts already underway to create shared 

air- and missile-defense early warning and command, control, 

communications, computers, and intelligence [C4

I] arrangements). 
241

No doubt, such an approach lacks the appeal of more ambitious 

proposals to create new regional political and security structures, 

but it would allow the United States to build on existing bilateral 

and multilateral efforts and, through incremental steps, lay the 

foundation for future regional collective security arrangements.

Countering the Iranian Threat.

 The principal security threats posed by a nuclear Iran include 

terror and subversion, limited conventional military operations 

conducted under the protection of Iran’s nuclear umbrella, and the 

actual use of nuclear weapons. When feasible, it would be desirable 

for the United States to provide its friends in the region with the 

means to deal with each of these threats on their own—to include 

the fielding of an independent conventional retaliatory deterrent 

by some allies—so that they might have the confidence not to yield 

to Iranian intimidation, and might not feel compelled to acquire 

chemical or nuclear weapons to counter Iran’s nuclear option. In 

most cases, however, the burden of responding to these threats will 

fall to the United States.

Regional Subversion, Global Terror. Iran might support opposition 

groups or sponsor acts of terrorism in neighboring countries (as it did 

during the 1980s) in order to intimidate, compel them to deny U.S. 

access and basing requests, and to undercut U.S. power projection 

capabilities in the region. Here, intelligence sharing and cooperation 

with friends and allies, and U.S. efforts to enhance the internal security 

capabilities of Iran’s neighbors, will be key. Also vital will be U.S. 

efforts to encourage political and economic reform in the region, in 

order to defuse popular disaffection with the political status quo—

particularly in countries where extreme Islamists have in the past 

shown a willingness to work with Iran’s intelligence services (e.g., 

Turkey, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Afghanistan).

Staying the Hand on the World’s Oil Jugular. Iran’s conventional 

offensive options are limited. It does not pose a ground threat to 

any of its neighbors due to the small size and limited capabilities 

of its ground forces, although it could launch limited air or rocket 

and missile strikes into neighboring countries (as it did in Iraq on 
242

several occasions during the past decade). The main conventional 

threat from Iran is in the naval arena, specifically: the threat it poses 

to the flow of oil from the region, and the ability of the United States 

to project power in the Gulf. 

 Iran’s force of mines, missiles, small boats, and submarines could 

temporarily disrupt shipping in the Strait of Hormuz. It could not, 

however, block the strait (as it claims), which is too wide and too 

deep to be obstructed. Moreover, although the Gulf is a significant 

barrier to major acts of aggression against the southern Gulf states, 

Iran could conduct limited amphibious operations to seize and hold 

lightly defended islands or offshore oil platforms in the Gulf. Its naval 

special forces could sabotage harbor facilities, offshore oil platforms 

and terminals, and attack ships while in ports throughout the lower 

Gulf, disrupting oil production and maritime traffic there.

 Some Iranian decisionmakers might believe that “the bomb” 

might provide them with a free hand to take such steps with relative 

impunity, by deterring an effective response by its neighbors or 

the United States. For this reason, it is critical that the United States 

help its GCC allies obtain the means to counter Iran’s naval mine, 

special warfare, small boat, submarine, and coastal anti-ship missile 

forces on their own. Countering these capabilities will also require 

a significant U.S. military presence in Gulf. As a result, the U.S. 

Navy will remain susceptible to Iranian attempts to intimidate U.S. 

allies into denying U.S. forces access and basing. This will remain a 

potential vulnerability for the foreseeable future.

 For this reason, the U.S. Navy’s Sea Power 21 “Sea Basing” 

concept may be particularly useful for contingencies in or near the 

Gulf. This concept calls for the U.S. Navy to develop an ability to 

operate independent of shore-based logistical hubs, thereby limiting 

the impact of enemy anti-access measures and decisions by friendly 

states to refuse or limit access, basing, and overflight rights during 

crises or wartime.29

 The concepts under consideration to free the United States 

from reliance on shore-based facilities include new Maritime 

Prepositioning Force (Future) cargo ships, Joint Mobile Offshore 

Bases (JMOBs), and large, semisubmersible platforms. (The latter two 

are floating structures derived from offshore oil drilling platforms.) 

These would deploy to crisis zones, and serve as large afloat logistics 
243

hubs, storage or repair depots, forward operating bases for combat 

and support personnel, or air bases (the cargo ships may be fitted 

with flight decks and/or runways, or several JMOBs could be linked 

together for this purpose). These concepts, if proven viable, could 

preserve the navy’s operational freedom in the Gulf, even if denied 

access to basing in the region. They are all, however, very expensive, 

are untried, and suffer from various drawbacks that might preclude 

their eventual deployment.30 Moreover, large floating bases would 

be vulnerable to an Iranian nuclear strike, vitiating their utility 

in circumstances where the use of nuclear weapons is a plausible 

Iranian option.

Preventing Nuclear Armageddon. To deal with the possible use of 

nuclear weapons by Iran, the United States will need to be able to 

detect the deployment of nuclear weapons and preempt their use, or 

at least interdict the device or weapon en route to its target. 

 The United States and its allies will need to establish the ability to 

detect the transport of nuclear weapons by small boats or merchant 

ships originating in Iranian ports, motor vehicles exiting Iran at 

official and/or unofficial border crossing points, and perhaps 

eventually, by individuals carrying “suitcase nukes.”

 Given the relatively short distances that penetrating radiation 

from a nuclear device or weapon may be detected (tens of meters for 

gamma radiation, scores of meters for neutron radiation emanating 

from an unshielded device or weapon), the early detection of a 

nuclear weapon being delivered by nontraditional means (such 

as a truck or boat) will pose formidable challenges.31 Nonetheless, 

the United States should consider (if it is not already doing so) 

unconventional methods of employing radiation monitors: aboard 

yachts or other civilian pleasure craft plying the waters of the Persian 

Gulf; on helicopters patrolling the waters of the Persian Gulf; on 

unattended floating sensors clandestinely emplaced at the mouth of 

Iranian harbors, and on unattended ground sensors emplaced along 

traditional smuggling routes on Iran’s border and clandestinely 

planted adjacent to runways at Iranian military airfields. In addition, 

portal monitoring for radiation sources should be carried out at 

official border crossing points and ports of entry in neighboring 

states.32
244

 Preventing the delivery of a nuclear weapon by sea will also 

require U.S. naval forces to work with local naval forces and coast 

guards in the Gulf to identify and monitor suspicious vessels plying 

the waters of the Gulf and passing through the Strait of Hormuz, 

and interdict them if need be. Detecting the transport of so-called 

suitcase bombs will require neighboring states to monitor official 

ports of entry, unofficial border crossing points, and, if feasible, 

known smuggling routes, though the sheer number of these might 

render such a task impractical.

 The United States and its allies should likewise continue to 

encourage the networking of regional air- and missile-defense early 

warning and C4I networks to enhance the capabilities of regional 

air- and missile-defenses. Several such initiatives are already 

underway.

 • The so-called “Cooperative Belt” (Hizam al-Ta‘awun) program 

to create a distributed C4

I network for the air defenses of the 

states of the GCC that will enable them to jointly identify, 

track, and monitor hostile aircraft and to coordinate a response 

to airborne threats.33

 • American Aegis-equipped cruisers and destroyers in the 

Persian Gulf can provide early warning and a first line of 

defense against air or missile attacks from Iran toward the 

southern Gulf states and Saudi Arabia, with their AN/SPY-1

radar and Standard SM-3 missile—which is just now entering 

operational service with the U.S. Navy.34

 • The Cooperative Defense Initiative (CDI), which involves 

the GCC six, plus two (Egypt and Jordan), and which has 

promoted cooperation in the area of shared missile defense 

early warning.35 More, however, needs to be done to enhance 

cooperation among GCC members and with non-GCC 

members in the region.

 Currently, cooperation in the area of shared missile defense early 

warning is limited to the GCC plus two, but future efforts could 

expand to include other participants. Thus, missile defense early 

warning radars located in Turkey, Iraq, Kuwait, or Saudi Arabia 

could provide early warning and detection and tracking data for 
245

missiles launched from western Iran against the states of the lower 

Persian Gulf (Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates [UAE], and 

Oman), and Israel. Some of the lower Gulf states could provide 

early warning to Saudi Arabia with regard to missiles coming from 

south-central or southeastern Iran. The main challenge here will 

be to convince the Arab Gulf states to increase funding for missile 

defenses, and to transcend the petty rivalries that have in the past 

hindered cooperation among the Arab Gulf states in the conventional 

military arena.

 Further afield, Israel, Jordan, and Turkey are also natural 

candidates for cooperation. Jordan has expressed concern that 

Israeli missile defenses could knock down incoming missiles from 

Iraq or Iran over the populated western half of the country, possibly 

producing casualties on the ground. Contingency deployment of 

U.S. missile defenses to Jordan might resolve this problem.

 In addition, some have argued that boost-phased missile defense 

systems employing ground-based interceptors located in southeastern 

Turkey, aboard ships in the Caspian Sea and/or the Sea of Oman, 

and in Tajikistan, could protect the United States against Iranian 

intercontinental-range missiles, if and when these are fielded. While 

a boost-phase missile defense would likely have many advantages 

over a mid-course national missile defense system, it has a major 

political drawback: the remnants of intercepted Iranian missiles 

and their warheads might land in Russia, virtually ensuring that 

deployment of such a system would meet with strong opposition 

from Moscow.36

 Though regional allies may have an important role to play in 

deterring and defending against military initiatives by a nuclear 

Iran, they are unlikely to play a role in any preventive strike the 

United States might undertake against Iran’s nuclear program. The 

need to preserve operational security, and the desire of local allies 

to avoid being caught in the middle of a U.S.-Iran conflict, would 

likely preclude their provision of overt support for a preventive 

strike, which, for this reason, would probably be conducted by 

heavy bombers (most likely B-2s) based out of the continental United 

States. They could, however, play a supporting role in preemptive 

strikes against deployed Iranian nuclear forces (boats or merchant 
246

vessels, missiles, or bombers) during a crisis, by providing access 

and basing to U.S. Air Force aircraft (F-117s, F-15Es) participating in 

such a strike. 

Iraq as Regional Counterweight to Iran? 

 Some have argued that as part of its efforts to dissuade Iran from 

crossing the nuclear threshold, Washington might indicate to Tehran 

that should it acquire nuclear weapons, the United States would 

encourage Iraq to build-up its military as a counterbalance to that 

of Iran—and thereby ensure that Iran’s acquisition of “the bomb” 

harms, rather than enhances, its security.37

 For now, however, building up the Iraqi military as a counterbalance to Iran is neither practical nor desirable. Rebuilding Iraq’s 

armed forces will be an immensely costly task that will take many 

years. Current plans call for the Iraqi Army to field between 100,000-

150,000 men, organized into some eight divisions by 2006.38 For the 

foreseeable future, however, Iraq will lack the funds and the equipment 

needed to field a larger, more capable army, and the United States is 

unlikely to provide either. At present, the U.S. priority is to prepare 

Iraq’s internal security forces to assume increased responsibility for 

dealing with internal threats—particularly the insurgency raging in 

the so-called “Sunni triangle.”

 Moreover, it will be up to Iraq to decide on the roles, missions, 

and force structure of its army (though the United States is likely to 

retain some influence over Iraqi decisions on these matters for years 

to come). It is not clear that the expansion of the Iraqi Army will 

be a priority of a new Iraqi government, that an Iraqi government 

in which Iraqi Shi‘a and Kurds are likely to play a major role will 

see Iran as its primary threat, or that the Iraqi government will take 

directions from the United States on such matters.

 Nor is it in the U.S. interest that Iraq has a large military. For 

the coming years, it will be in the U.S. interest to keep the Iraqi 

Army relatively small, logistically constrained, capable of deterring 

and/or defending against external meddling and intervention in its 

external affairs, but incapable of threatening its larger neighbors. 

This might make it easier to convince Iraq’s neighbors to forgive or 
247

defer repayment of its debt and/or reparations burden, and thereby 

facilitate Iraq’s political and economic integration into the region. 

Finally, it is in the U.S. interest that the Iraqi Army remains small, 

should efforts to create a stable, democratic Iraq fail, and the country 

reverts to authoritarian rule and an aggressive posture vis-à-vis its 

neighbors. 

 To ensure that a post-Saddam Iraq does not eventually resurrect 

its WMD programs to counter Iran’s own WMD, it would be desirable 

for the United States to include Iraq in CDI and associated efforts to 

enhance regional defenses against missiles and WMD, and to provide 

security guarantees that it will come to Iraq’s assistance in the event 

of Iranian meddling or intervention (should such guarantees be 

sought from the United States). 

Reassure Allies by Enhancing Local Capabilities for Conventional 

Defense and Deterrence.

 The United States will want to ensure that regional friends 

and allies do not respond to an Iranian nuclear breakout by either 

accommodating Tehran, or acquiring WMD of their own (Saudi 

Arabia might try to purchase nuclear weapons, while some of the 

smaller GCC states might leverage their extensive petrochemical 

industries to create a modest chemical warfare capability).

 To avoid such an outcome, the United States should underscore 

that nuclear weapons will not stop it from meeting its security 

commitments to friends and allies in the region, or from retaliating for 

WMD use against U.S. and allied personnel. Continued U.S. efforts 

to enhance the ability of CDI participants to defend against and/or 

mitigate the impact of a WMD incident will be the most tangible 

expression of this commitment. Such activities should, moreover, 

be complemented by efforts to enhance the ability of local allies to 

deal with Iranian subversion, terror, and sea denial capabilities in 

the Gulf—activities that might someday be conducted under the 

cover of a nuclear umbrella. However, such capabilities may not be 

enough to reassure some allies.

 The United States should therefore consider helping those allies 

that feel most threatened by an Iranian “bomb” and that desire to do 

something about it, to develop a credible independent conventional 
248

deterrent in order to build confidence in their ability to stand up to 

Iranian intimidation, and to discourage them from acquiring WMD 

in response to Iran’s acquisition of the bomb. 

 The United States can do this by helping select Gulf allies enhance 

their naval special warfare and aerial precision-strike capabilities 

(capabilities that some are already developing) so that if Iran were 

ever to threaten their ability to produce and export oil, they could 

threaten to respond in kind by attacking Iranian oil production and 

export facilities, interrupting Iranian port operations, and interdicting 

Iran’s sea lines of communication. Emphasis should be placed on 

helping these countries develop relatively short-range precision 

strike capabilities so that they can hit high-value Iranian targets in 

the vicinity of the Gulf, but not much beyond that. This is because the 

most important Iranian economic targets are in the Gulf region, and 

because the ability to attack leadership or other targets in and around 

Tehran is of dubious strategic value. And by focusing on only shortrange strike capabilities, the United States can ensure that its efforts 

to build up Arab capabilities in the Gulf do not compromise U.S. 

efforts to preserve Israel’s “qualitative edge.” Finally, U.S. assistance 

in creating such capabilities should be explicitly conditioned on a 

commitment by these states to eschew the development or acquisition 

of WMD, and to dramatically clamp down on the smuggling of 

special materials and dual-use technologies for the WMD programs 

of third countries (such as Iran) through their territories. This, in 

particular, is a problem for Dubai in the UAE.39

 Admittedly, this is a potentially risky course of action, and it is 

not altogether clear that enhancing the ability of allies to disrupt the 

flow of Iranian oil from the region is desirable, or is an acceptable 

tradeoff for a halt to, or more likely a slowdown in the proliferation 

of WMD in the Gulf region. For this reason, continued high-level 

U.S. engagement with its allies will be essential, in order to keep 

tensions among the GCC states in check, and to restrain them in 

times of crisis, so that they do not use these capabilities against each 

other, or Iran, except in extremis. 

 Such efforts should, whenever possible, leverage assets and 

weapons currently in the inventories of these countries to avoid the 

appearance that the United States is stoking a regional arms race, to 

avert tensions among GCC states (who may fear that such capabilities 
249

will more likely be used against their fellow GCC members, rather 

than Iran), and to avoid provoking Iran. Emphasis should be put 

on qualitative, over quantitative enhancements, and the creation 

of small, highly capable units that will constitute the mainstay of 

regional efforts to deter a nuclear Iran. Most of the smaller countries 

in the region simply lack the manpower to create large, highly 

capable forces anyhow. This approach is appropriate, considering 

their resource base and needs.

 This is not an unrealistic goal; several Arab militaries have 

succeeded in creating small elite units or organizations that performed 

well in combat, even if the performance of their sister services left 

much to be desired. Examples of such units or organizations include 

the special forces of Syria and Jordan, the Republican Guard of Iraq, 

and Iraq’s F-1 and Saudi Arabia’s F-15 fighter squadrons.40 There are 

already signs that some of the GCC states may be heading down this 

path: the UAE’s interest in commercial satellite imagery, computerized 

mission planning support software, advanced simulators, and its 

efforts to build a potent conventional strike capability around its 

force of advanced precision munition-equipped Mirage 2000-9s (30) 

and F-16 Block 60s (80), show what even a small state can do in this 

regard.41

CONCLUSIONS

 Efforts to deter and contain a nuclear Iran would likely encounter 

significant challenges. The nature of the Islamic Republic, regional 

politics, and Iran’s involvement in terrorism make establishing a 

stable deterrent relationship with a nuclear Iran risky and uncertain. 

The experience of the United States and the Soviet Union during the 

Cold War, and of India and Pakistan since then, demonstrate that 

both preventive diplomacy and luck may be necessary to avert some 

kind of nuclear crisis involving Israel or the United States on the 

one hand, and Iran on the other hand, should Iran become a nuclear 

power in the coming years. Managing the instability and uncertainty 

created by a nuclear Iran is likely to pose major challenges for U.S. 

policymakers.

 Iran may likewise emerge as the driving force behind efforts to 

create a new regional security architecture in the Persian Gulf and 

southwest Asia. While it is in the long-term U.S. interest to create 
250

a free-standing balance of power in the Gulf that obviates the need 

for a permanent forward U.S. presence, for the foreseeable future, 

the stabilization of Iraq, the Global War on Terrorism, and ongoing 

efforts to counter the nuclear ambitions of Iran will draw the United 

States deeper into the affairs of the region. Enhancing the military 

capabilities of regional allies threatened by Iran, deepening bilateral 

cooperation with these countries, and encouraging multilateral 

cooperation in the areas of air- and missile-defense and beyond may 

be the best way to lay the basis for regional collective security. For the 

near term, however, the United States will remain the “indispensable 

nation” when it comes to formulating a response to the possible 

emergence of a nuclear Iran, and to achieving security and stability 

in a proliferated region.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 10

 1. For the most comprehensive and up-to-date account of what is known about 

Iran’s nuclear program, see Report by the Director General to the IAEA Board of 

Governors, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of 

Iran, GOV/2005/67, September 2, 2005.

 2. For instance, David Albright and Corey Hinderstein, “Iran: Countdown to 

Showdown,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November/December 2004, pp. 67-

72. 

 3. For instance, Victor Gilinsky, Marvin Miller, and Harmon Hubbard, “A 

Fresh Examination of the Proliferation Dangers of Light Water Reactors,” The 

Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, October 22, 2004, at http://www.npecweb.org/projects/NPECLWRREPORTFINALII10-22-2004.pdf. 

 4. According to public Israeli intelligence estimates, Iran could have a nuclear 

weapon as early as 2008, but more likely by 2012. Orly Halpern, “Iranian Nukes: 

New Estimates for the Bomb,” The Jerusalem Post, August 1, 2005, p. 3. Likewise, 

in a recently completed National Intelligence Estimate, the U.S. intelligence 

community reportedly concluded that Iran could have a nuclear weapon by “early 

to mid-next decade.” Dafna Linzer, “Iran is Judged 10 Years from Nuclear Bomb,” 

The Washington Post, August 2, 2005, p. A1; and Steven R. Weisman and Douglas 

Jehl, “Estimate Revised on When Iran Could Make Nuclear Bomb,” The New 

York Times, August 3, 2005, p. A8. See also, Vice Admiral Lowell E. Jacoby, U.S. 

Navy, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, Statement for the Record, Senate 

Select Committee on Intelligence, February 16, 2005, at http://www.dia.mil/Public/

Testimonies/DIA_DR_WWT_20050216U.pdf.
251

 5. Parts of this section are based on Michael Eisenstadt, “Living with a Nuclear 

Iran?” Survival, Vol. 41, No. 3, Autumn 1999, pp. 124-148; and Michael Eisenstadt, 

“Delay, Deter and Contain, Roll Back: Toward a Strategy for Dealing with Iran’s 

Nuclear Ambitions,” in Geoffrey Kemp, ed., Iran’s Bomb: American and Iranian 

Perspectives, Washington, DC: The Nixon Center, 2004, pp. 13-31. 

 6. Ettela’at, September 24, 1995, p. 3, in Foreign Broadcast Information System

(FBIS)-NES, October 3, 1995, p. 75. See also the quote of ‘Ali Akbar Hashemi 

Rafsanjani cited in endnote 15.

 7. Interview with Defense Minister Admiral ‘Ali Shamkhani on Tehran IRIB 

Television Second Program, July 30, 1998, translated in FBIS-NES-98-217, August 

5, 1998.

 8. Shaul Bakhash, The Reign of the Ayatollahs: Iran and the Islamic Revolution, 

New York: Basic Books, 1990, p. 273.

 9. David Menashri, Revolution at a Crossroads: Iran’s Domestic Politics and 

Regional Ambitions, Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for Near East 

Policy, 1997, p. 8. Former President ‘Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani recently 

reaffirmed the enduring relevance of Khomeini’s dispensation allowing for the 

violation of religious duties when they conflicted with raison d’etat, in an interview 

in which he stated that “to put the country in jeopardy on the ground that we are 

acting on an Islamic basis is not at all Islamic.” IRNA, April 12, 2003, at http://www.

irna.ir/en/tnews/030413151207.etn02.shtml.

 10. The fact that Iranian decisionmaking on critical policy issues has, during 

the past decade and a half, generally been based on raison d’etat and the national 

interest—and not religious doctrine or ideology, has interesting implications for 

Tehran’s claim that Islam prevents it from acquiring or using nuclear weapons.

 11. For more on this new generation of politicians, see Bill Samii, “Iran: A New 

Generation and the Drift to the Right,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, June 

21, 2005, at http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2005/6/6840A374-8025-444E-8760-

29904337784F.html; and Patrick Clawson, “Next Generation,” New Republic Online, 

June 30, 2005, at http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC06.php?CID=845.

 12. See the comments by Special Presidential Envoy to Afghanistan Zalmay 

Khalilzad to The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, August 2, 2002, at 

http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC07.php?CID=168.

 13. Toby Harnden, “Iran ‘Supplies Infra-Red Bombs’ that Kill British Troops 

in Iraq,” Sunday Telegraph, London, August 21, 2005, p. 27; Bill Gertz, “Rumsfeld 

Says Iran is Arming Iraqi Insurgents,” Washington Times, August 20, 2005, p. A4; 

Eric Schmitt, “Some Bombs Used in Iraq are Made in Iran, U.S. Says,” The New 

York Times, August 6, 2005, p. A5; Patrick Bishop, “U.S. Troops Killed as Bremer 

Accuses Iran,” The Telegraph, September 19, 2003, at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/

news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2003/09/19/wirq19.xml.

 14. Vali Nasr and Ali Gheissari, “Foxes in Iran’s Henhouse,” The New York 

Times, December 13, 2004, p. A27; Marc Champion, “Iran, Flush with Oil Cash, 

Seems to Cool to Foreign Investments,” Wall Street Journal, February 8, 2005, p. 1.
252

 15. Rafsanjani, as quoted by Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran, December 14, 

2001, and translated by BBC Worldwide Monitoring, December 15, 2001.

 16. See Paula A. DeSutter, Denial and Jeopardy: Deterring Iranian Use of NBC 

Weapons, Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1997.

 17. Iran reportedly test-launched a short-range ballistic missile from a barge 

in the Caspian Sea in early 1998. Basing short-range ballistic missiles on merchant 

ships could allow Iran to hit targets currently out of missile range (such as the 

United States) while maintaining deniability, since a merchant vessel launch 

platform might be able to disappear into the great expanses of the open seas after 

launch and thereby escape detection. See K. Scott McMahon, “Ship-Based Missiles 

Surface as Potential Terror Weapon,” Defense News, March 15, 1999, p. 27.

 18. For more on “suitcase nukes,” see David Smigielski, “A Review of the 

Suitcase Nuclear Bomb Controversy,” RANSAC Policy Update, September 2003, at 

http://www.ransac.org/Documents/suitcasenukes090103.pdf.

 19. By contrast, in Hafez al-Asad’s Syria and Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, absolute 

power was concentrated in the hands of the President making decapitation (e.g., 

as attempted at the outset of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM) a viable strategy—at 

least in theory. 

 20. Thus, the half-dozen top members of Iran’s ruling elite hail from different 

towns and cities from around the country: Supreme Leader ‘Ali Khamene’i is 

from Mashhad in Khorasan province; Expediency Committee head ‘Ali Akbar 

Hashemi Rafsanjani is from Bahraman, near Rafsanjan in Kerman province; 

President Mahmud Ahmadinejad is from Garmsar in Markazi province; Defense 

Minister Mostafa Mohammad Najjar is from Tehran, which is in Tehran province; 

while Minister of Intelligence Qolam Hossein Mohseni-Ejei was born in Ejei in 

Esfahan province. By contrast, in Hafez al-Asad’s Syria and Saddam Hussein’s 

Iraq, a disproportionate number of senior officials came from the president’s home 

village or its environs (Qardaha in Latiqiyah governorate, and Tikrit in Salahuddin 

governorate, respectively), making it possible, at least in theory, to target the family 

and tribal networks that underpinned the power structures of these regimes. 

 21. Off Target: The Conduct of the War and Civilian Casualties in Iraq, Washington, 

DC: Human Rights Watch, 2003, pp. 22-23.

 22. Jahangir Amuzegar, “Iran’s Underground Economy,” Middle East Economic 

Survey (MEES), Vol. XLVI, No. 36, September 8, 2003, at http://66.34.243.131/iran/

html/article1161.html. For more on the corruption of many senior clerics and the 

resentment this has engendered, see Paul Klebnikov, “Millionaire Mullahs,” 

Forbes, July 21, 2003, at http://www.forbes.com/global/2003/0721/024.html.

 23. During Operation ALLIED FORCE (March-June 1999), NATO airpower 

engaged in “crony targeting”—bombing the financial assets (factories in particular) 

of cronies of Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic—in order to generate 

pressure on him to accept NATO’s terms for an end to the bombing. It remains 

unclear what impact the bombing had on the war’s outcome, although it seems 

that it was not of decisive importance. For assessments of “crony targeting” during 
253

Operation ALLIED FORCE, see Stephen T. Hosmer, The Conflict Over Kosovo: Why 

Milosevic Decided to Settle When He Did, RAND Publication MR-1351-AF, 2001, pp. 

73-76; Benjamin S. Lambeth, NATO’s Air War for Kosovo: A Strategic and Operational 

Assessment, RAND Publication MR-1365-AF, 2001, pp. 71-72.

 24. For more on Iran’s oil industry, see U.S. Department of Energy, “Iran 

Country Analysis Brief,” November 2003, at http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/iran.

html. For information on Iran’s commercial ports, see Farjam Behnam, Karan 

Behrooz, and Dr. Farhad Shahabi, eds., Iran Almanac 2003, Tehran, at http://www.

iranalmanac.com, 2003, pp. 372-373.

 25. Anthony H. Cordesman and Abraham R. Wagner, The Lessons of Modern 

War: The Iran-Iraq War, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990, pp. 485-489.

 26. Iran might initially remain silent to avoid censure for violating its 

nonproliferation treaty obligations, or to avoid compromising ongoing clandestine 

efforts to procure fissile material or nuclear technology from abroad. In the longrun, however, Iran’s leadership might eventually be tempted to test a nuclear 

weapon, to demonstrate its nuclear capabilities to its domestic supporters and 

adversaries, and to the world.

 27. For more on post-Saddam security architectures for the Gulf, see James 

A. Russell, “Searching for a Post-Saddam Regional Security Architecture,” Middle 

East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 7, No. 1, March 2003; Andrew Rathmell, 

Theodore Karasik, and David Gompert, “A New Persian Gulf Security System,” 

RAND Issue Paper No. 248, 2003; Kenneth M. Pollack, “Securing the Gulf,” Foreign 

Affairs, July/August 2003, pp. 2-16; and Joseph McMillan, Richard Sokolsky, 

and Andrew C. Winner, “Toward a New Regional Security Architecture?,” The 

Washington Quarterly, Vol. 26, No. 3, pp. 161-175.

 28. Michael Knights, “Troubled Waters: U.S. Security Assistance to the Gulf 

States,” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, forthcoming.

 29. Admiral Vern Clark, “The U.S. Navy: Sea Power 21” U.S. Naval Institute 

Proceedings, October 2002, at http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/cno/proceedings.

html.

 30. For more on this, see Jason Sherman, “A Cargo Ship with a JSF Runway?” 

Defense News, March 15. 2004, pp. 1, 8; Office of the Under Secretary of Defense 

for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, Defense Science Board Task Force on Sea 

Basing, August 2003, pp. 73-77, at http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/seabasing.pdf.

 31. For more on the challenges of detecting nuclear devices or weapons, see 

Steve Fetter, Valery A. Frolov, Marvin Miller, Robert Mozley, Oleg F. Prilutsky, 

Stanislav N. Rodionov, and Roald Z. Sagdeev, “Detecting Nuclear Warheads,” 

Science & Global Security, 1990, Vol. 1, pp. 225-302; Steve Fetter and Frank von 

Hippel, “The Black Sea Experiment: Measurements of Radiation from a Soviet 

Warhead,” Science & Global Security, 1990, Vol. 1, pp. 323-327; S. T. Belyaev, V. I. 

Lebedev, B. A. Obinyakov, M. V. Zemlyakov, V. A. Ryazantsev, V. M. Armashov, 

and S. A. Voshchinin, “The Use of Helicopter-borne Neutron Detectors to Detect 
254

Nuclear Warheads in the USSR-US Black Sea Experiment,” Science & Global 

Security, 1990, Vol. 1, pp. 328-333.

 32. During the Cold War, the U.S. Navy ran a clandestine program in which 

yachts and pleasure craft were fitted with sensors that could detect radiation 

emitted by nuclear weapons aboard Soviet warships transiting the Bosphorus 

in Turkey. The boats, manned by foreign crews in civilian clothes, would draw 

alongside the Soviet warships as they passed through the strait to allow the 

sensors to take a reading. See Jeffrey T. Richelson, “Task Force 157: The US Navy’s 

Secret Intelligence Service, 1966-77,” Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 11, No. 

1, January 1996, pp. 116-119. Such a capability would be useful for dealing with 

the possibility of the covert delivery by Iran (or other proliferators) of a nuclear 

device by sea. Likewise during the Cold War, U.S. agents in East Germany planted 

clandestine radiation monitors along railway lines leading to the Soviet Union, to 

verify the withdrawal of nuclear-tipped missiles from East Germany, in accordance 

with the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty signed in December 1987. 

Milt Bearden and James Risen, The Main Enemy: The Inside Story of the CIA’s Final 

Showdown with the CIA, New York: Random House, 2003, p. 387.

 33. Ed Blanche, “Gulf States Take Major Step Toward C3I Update,” Jane’s 

Defence Weekly, December 3, 1997, p. 5; Michael Sirak, “GCC Commissions Joint 

Aircraft Tracking System,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, March 7, 2001, p. 41.

 34. Beginning in September 2004, the U.S. Navy commenced the continuous 

deployment of an Aegis-equipped destroyer to the Sea of Japan, as a long-range 

surveillance and tracking platform capable of sharing cueing and targeting data 

with ground based missile defenses; in 2005, it expects to field its first ballistic 

missile defense capable warship, and by 2006, the Navy expects to have 15 

destroyers and 3 cruisers configured to conduct ballistic missile defense operations 

worldwide. Christopher P. Cavas, “U.S. Ships to Begin Detect-and-Track Duties,” 

Defense News, August 30, 2004, p. 14.

 35. CDI has five pillars which include: 1) shared early warning of missile 

strikes/C4I interoperability to permit a coordinated response to these threats; 2) 

active defense against theater air and missile threats; 3) passive defense against 

chemical and biological weapons; 4) medical countermeasures against chemical 

and biological weapons, and; 5) consequence management to deal with the 

aftermath of WMD use. For more, see Cooperative Defense Initiative Against Weapons 

of Mass Destruction in Southwest Asia, U.S. Central Command pamphlet, 2002.

 36. Richard L. Garwin, “Boost-Phase Intercept: A Better Alternative,” Arms 

Control Today, September 2000, at http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2000_09/bpisept00.

asp?print.

 37. Patrick Clawson, in Washington Institute Special Policy Forum Report No. 

743, A View From Tehran: War and Challenges in the Post-Saddam Middle East, April 7, 

2003.

 38. John J. Lumpkin, “Buildup of Iraqi Security Forces Slowed as Policies 

Changed and Insurgency Grew,” January 31, 2005, at http://www.wtnh.com/Global/
255

story.asp?S=2878113; Special Defense Department Briefing on Iraq Security Forces 

by Lieutenant General David Petraeus, Commander, Multinational Security 

Transition Command-Iraq, February 4, 2005, at http://www.defenselink.mil/

transcripts/2005/tr20050204-2083.html.

 39. Gary Milhollin and Kelly Motz, “Nukes ‘R’ Us,” New York Times, March 4, 

2004, p. A29.

 40. Kenneth M. Pollack, Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness, 1948-1991, Lincoln 

NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2002, p. 560.

 41. For more on efforts by the UAE to create a long-range precision-strike 

capability, see Michael Knights, The Unfriendly Skies: Procurement and Employment 

Trends in GCC Air Forces, Hastings: Cross-Border Information, 2002, pp. 81, 86. 

257

CHAPTER 11

MANAGING THE IRANIAN THREAT TO SEA COMMERCE 

DIPLOMATICALLY

Douglas E. Streusand

 Between the completion of this chapter and its appearance 

in print, new developments doubtless will have occurred in the 

continuing saga of Iran’s nuclear program and the global response 

to it. In all probability, these changes will take the form of evolution, 

not resolution. The Iranian nuclear program will remain a matter 

of international contention for years, as North Korea’s has, rather 

than ending with a bang like Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction 

(WMD) programs, or in a whimper like, apparently, Libya’s. Despite 

all the rhetoric about the possible use of force against Iran, whether 

to overthrow the regime or to destroy nuclear facilities, there are 

substantial reasons for the Bush administration to avoid the use of 

force and choose to manage the threat of a nuclear Iran. If it becomes 

a lasting problem, it requires management. 

 In Richard Haass’s words,

Management is not a solution, which implies the end of conflict through 

a meeting of the minds, engendered by compromise, but something very 

different . . . [When a solution is not possible] the best that can reasonably 

expected . . . is . . . to bring about some modest degree of progress, or, 

failing that, at least keep things from getting worse.1

This chapter presents and evaluates a series of diplomatic options 

for coping with a nuclear Iran with particular reference to the Strait 

of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf. The vital role of the Strait in the 

world energy market, admirably explained by Dagobert Brito and 

Amy Jaffe in their chapter,2

 and Iran’s status as a major producer of 

petroleum and natural gas, make the management of any Iranian 

crisis a matter of vital global interest. Iran’s international economic 

importance, pivotal geopolitical position, and large population make 

it a far different proposition than North Korea. This chapter argues 
258

that the importance of the Strait of Hormuz as the world’s jugular 

vein implies opportunity as well as vulnerability. The chapter has 

four sections: (1) an exposition of the problem to be managed, (2) 

a discussion of three historical management regimes which offer 

precedents for the current problem: the Lausanne Convention, 

which governed the use of the Turkish Strait from 1923 to 1936, the 

Montreux Convention, which replaced the Lausanne Convention and 

remains in force, and the Prevention of Incidents at Sea Agreement 

between the United States and Soviet navies; (3) an examination of 

possible methods of managing tensions; and, (4) a conclusion. The 

chapter presents only modest proposals, in the literal sense of the 

term. Despite their modesty, they may well fail to win international 

approval. But even suggesting them might give the United States 

additional leverage.

STATING THE PROBLEM

 The nature of the Iranian regime, not the power of nuclear weapons, 

makes a nuclear Iran a threat to the United States. Though we profess 

to frown upon nuclear proliferation in principle, in practice the 

context matters more than the fact. Iran’s Islamic totalitarian ideology 

and record of supporting international terrorism distinguish it from 

all other nuclear powers; North Korea is the only other state with 

a similar record which has or shortly may have nuclear capability. 

The United States has not taken preemptive action against North 

Korea, primarily because of North Korea’s conventional deterrent. 

North Korea’s conventional capabilities, especially tube and rocket 

artillery capable of hitting Seoul, give North Korea the ability to 

massively retaliate to an attack without WMD.3

 Iran’s ability to block 

passage through the Strait of Hormuz, albeit temporarily, constitutes 

a comparable conventional deterrent. If, however, Iran does obtain 

a nuclear deterrent, it would have greater freedom to use its other 

capabilities. 

 Iran might use nuclear weapons against Israel, against U.S. or 

allied interests abroad, or even against the United States or supply 

them to a terrorist proxy. It has tested medium range ballistic missiles; 

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) analysis in 1999 suggested 

that Iran could test an intercontinental ballistic missile capable of 
259

reaching the continental United States within 10 years.4 This threat 

adds to the justifications for global ballistic missile defense, but Iran, 

despite its Islamic totalitarian ideology, is not necessarily more likely 

to use nuclear weapons than any other state. The regime, despite its 

confidence about the next world, wishes to survive in this one and 

thus to avoid suffering nuclear retaliation. Even supplying nuclear 

weapons to terrorists would be extremely risky; Iran hardly could 

expect to avoid being held responsible. Iran is far more likely to 

use nuclear weapons the way nuclear powers have used them since 

1945, as a deterrent, however aggressive its intentions are. The oft 

repeated, if not confirmed, statement of a senior Iranian officer to an 

Indian counterpart that Operation DESERT STORM taught one great 

lesson: never confront the United States without nuclear weapons, is 

consistent with this position.5 It suggests that with a nuclear deterrent 

the Islamic Republic might perceive itself free to take provocative 

actions with conventional or irregular forces. The possible range 

of such actions extends far beyond the Gulf and Strait, but Iran 

would have the most leverage in that critical region. Diplomatic 

management of a nuclear Iran must thus include preventing Iran 

from taking provocative military action in the Gulf under the cover 

of its nuclear deterrent. 

 Iran’s military programs reflect its identity and foreign policy. 

Beyond survival, it has two competing yet complementary agendas, 

the national and the revolutionary. Inevitably, if ironically, the 

Islamic Republic shares much of the vision of the late Shah: Iran 

as the dominant power in the Persian Gulf by virtue of location, 

population, wealth, and history.6

 Like the Pahlavi regime, the Islamic 

Republic fears a superpower; unlike the Pahlavi regime, it cannot 

rely on another superpower for protection. The Islamic Republic 

also faces three regional nuclear powers, India, Pakistan, and 

Israel. The national aspect of Iran’s agenda includes a compelling 

argument for nuclear weapons.7 The acquisition of nuclear weapons 

also offers Iran a cheaper way of improving its military position 

than modernizing its conventional forces.8 Thus far, there is no 

indication that international efforts to dissuade Iran from acquiring 

nuclear weapons will work, and little reason to believe that even a 

more representative Iranian government would relinquish nuclear 
260

ambitions.9 If Iran’s conventional deterrent, and other considerations 

make preemption too dangerous or costly, management is the only 

alternative. It must begin with deterrence and containment.10 A 

diplomatic approach would be a complement to military capability 

and entirely dependent upon it. 

 U.S. interest in the Strait of Hormuz has not changed since 1971, 

when Great Britain relinquished responsibility for keeping order 

in the Persian Gulf, or perhaps since the first oil shock of 1973: to 

prevent interference with free and safe passage through the Strait 

from disrupting the global petroleum market. This concern goes 

far beyond preventing an actual halt to passage through the Strait; 

concrete threats and even vague fears raise tension and prices. This 

interest, of course, goes beyond the Strait themselves; any disruption 

in the production and distribution of Persian Gulf petroleum harms 

the global economy and might harm global order. The Strait draws 

special attention because more petroleum is more vulnerable there 

than anywhere else. Although the Iranian military lacks the ability 

to sustain a blockade of the Strait against a sustained U.S. effort to 

open them, it certainly has the ability to close them temporarily. A 

leading expert on Iran’s military forces has concluded that Iran has 

the ability to interfere significantly with Gulf traffic and perhaps to 

block the Strait of Hormuz temporarily with anti-ship missiles and 

mines.11 Any form of naval engagement in the Strait might leave 

wrecks which would interfere with navigation until they were 

cleared, not to mention the potential for environmental damage if 

loaded tankers were sunk or petroleum facilities damaged. Insofar 

as the issue may be limited to the Strait themselves, the preservation 

of free and secure navigation matters the most. 

 The dependence on petroleum traffic, of course, runs both ways; 

the exporters depend on it as much as the importers do. A closure of 

the Strait would harm all concerned. Does that mutual dependence 

create a mutual deterrence on which all concerned may rely, making 

the vulnerability of the Strait a nonissue? Unfortunately, it does not. 

Faced with what it considered an existential threat to the regime, the 

leadership of the Islamic Republic of Iran certainly would be willing 

to close the Strait, however destructive the effects would be on their 

own economy.12 Two generations ago, the Mossadeq government 

deprived itself of oil revenue when it nationalized the oil industry.13
261

Iran’s economy is far more dependent on oil and gas export revenues 

today than in 1952, but the regime could survive a short blockage. 

Since a far larger proportion of world energy supplies comes from 

the Persian Gulf now than in the past, Iran has greater leverage now 

than it did under Mossadeq. 

 The U.S. interest in the security of Gulf petroleum goes far beyond 

the Strait. Since 1973, the United States has employed a variety of 

strategies to secure our interests in the Gulf, from the “twin pillars” 

policy—reliance on Iran and Saudi Arabia as U.S. proxies to keep 

order—of the 1970s to the dual containment policy of the 1990s. Until 

2003 at least, two themes have remained consistent through all the 

changes in policy and administrations: protection of the production 

and distribution of petroleum from external attack, whether from 

the Soviet Union, the Islamic Republic of Iran, or Saddam’s Iraq; 

and support of stable regimes against internal subversion, whether 

from the Communist left or the Islamist right. Operation IRAQI 

FREEDOM and the George W. Bush administration’s new emphasis 

on the promotion of democracy in the Middle East have altered these 

themes, though encouragement for the Gulf regimes to develop 

more representative institutions (especially the smaller members of 

the Gulf Cooperation Council [GCC]) is hardly new and produced 

palpable results in the 1990s.14 The destruction of the Ba`ath regime 

in Iraq eliminated any possible counter to Iran from within the 

region for years to come. The GCC countries still lack the ability to 

counterbalance Iranian power. It will take years for Iraq to regain the 

ability even to defend itself. There is no power capable of preventing 

Iran from dominating the Gulf except for the United States.15

 These realities fix the parameters of the international issue 

requiring management: the conflict between Iran’s national objective 

of regional dominance and revolutionary objective of spreading 

Islamic totalitarianism and the Western objective of security for the 

production and transportation of oil and natural gas from the Gulf 

region. Any reduction in tension and uncertainty in the Gulf and Strait 

would affect global oil and natural gas prices directly by reducing 

insurance premiums on shipments without reducing the income of 

the producers. It thus would serve the interests of both producers 

and consumers. For this reason at least, the competition between the 

United States and Iran is not a zero sum game, creating opportunities 
262

for mutually beneficial management. The lack of diplomatic relations 

and persistent hostility between the United States and Iran does not 

make the establishment of a management regime impossible, though 

it certainly makes it more difficult. The United States has negotiated 

with and entered into agreements with North Korea, though the 

results hardly have been encouraging. But a management regime 

would not necessarily involve direct negotiations; it might consist 

merely of an exchange of public statements. It also might involve the 

creation of a multilateral organization specifically to deal with the 

Strait of Hormuz or the Gulf as a whole; it might or might not have 

a regional disarmament component. 

 Any such diplomatic initiative would have to be fail-safe, meaning 

it would need to meet three criteria. First, the presentation of the 

initiative would need to strengthen the standing and credibility of 

the United States, globally and regionally, even if Iran rejected it. 

Second, if Iran accepted the initiative and then violated it after it 

went into effect, the stigma or penalty Iran would need to suffer by 

doing so would need to outweigh substantially any disadvantage 

to the United States. Concretely, the United States must retain the 

ability to blockade Iranian shipping outside the Persian Gulf, as well 

as to take effective military action against Iranian territory. Third, 

if Iran accepted the arrangement and abided by it, the result would 

need to make disruption of traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, and, 

preferably, of the supply of hydrocarbons from the Gulf in general, 

less likely. Any diplomatic initiative which did meet these criteria 

would warrant serious investigation. It, of course, would not deal 

with Iran’s nuclear program directly and would, in fact, constitute 

an entirely separate diplomatic track. 

THE PRECEDENTS

 A different set of Straits preoccupied global statesmen for most 

of the 19th and 20th centuries. The “Straits Question,” the question 

of control over access to the Black Sea through the Bosporus and 

Dardanelles, was the core of the Eastern Question, the unknown 

prognosis of the Ottoman Empire, the “Sick Man of Europe”. It 

attracted enough attention to add the word “jingoism” to the English 
263

language; the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78 inspired a popular song 

in Britain with the refrain:

We don’t want to fight, but, by jingo if we do 

We’ve got the ships, we’ve got the men, we’ve got the money too.

We’ve fought the Bear before, and while Britons shall be true, 

The Russians shall not have Constantinople!16

The European powers addressed the Straits Question in a series of 

treaties, beginning with the London Protocol of 1830 and ending with 

the Montreux Convention. Evaluation of the terms and functioning of 

the Montreux Convention and the preceding Lausanne Convention 

thus requires review of the history behind them. 

 Geopolitics, not geography or the routine functioning of 

international law, made the Straits Question a question. The 

Dardanelles is no more than four miles wide, and the Bosporus even 

narrower. As long as a single state controlled both shores, the Straits 

ordinarily would be the territorial waters of that state, and the Sea of 

Marmara between them an enclosed sea. When the Ottoman Empire 

was a great power, there could be no Straits Question. The Treaty of 

Kucuk Kaynarca of 1774 ended that era. It established the Russian 

presence on the Black Sea littoral and awarded Russian ships free 

navigation through the Straits. The other major European powers 

gained similar rights by individual treaties; the Black Sea, for centuries 

an Ottoman lake, became an international waterway. Access to the 

sea for commerce, however, did not make the Straits a matter of high 

politics. The Russian desire to dominate the Black Sea and to gain 

unfettered access to the Mediterranean Sea through the acquisition 

of Constantinople did so. Britain, the chief maritime power of the 

time, regarded Russian control of the Straits an unacceptable threat 

to her interests. It would have created a fundamental asymmetry, 

with the Russian fleet able to penetrate the Mediterranean and the 

Black Sea closed to outside forces. The British determination to deny 

the Straits to Russia kept the Sick Man of Europe alive. The AngloRussian rivalry over the Straits formed the complement of the “Great 

Game,” the competition between the two powers in Central Asia.17

 In its broader form, then, the Straits question concerned control 

of Constantinople and the Straits littoral; the more narrow form, 
264

which the diplomatic instruments generally addressed, concerned 

the passage of shipping, especially naval forces, through the Straits. 

The Anglo-Turkish Treaty of 1809 stated that the prohibition of the 

passage of foreign warships through the Straits was an “ancient rule” 

of the Ottoman Empire. Britain sought to transform the ban from an 

Ottoman policy to international law. Russia sought to replace the 

ban with an exclusive privilege to use the Straits for naval purposes. 

The procession of treaties governing the use of the Straits during 

the 19th century reflected the ebb and flow of British and Russian 

fortunes and interests. The 1841 London Convention prohibited all 

foreign naval shipping, with some minor exceptions, from passing 

through the Straits; subsequent treaties in the 19th century continued 

this arrangement. This compromise satisfied Russia because it kept 

the superior Royal Navy out of the Black Sea, and Britain because it 

kept the Russian fleet from threatening the Mediterranean lifeline to 

India. In essence, this situation remained stable so long as no outside 

force altered the policies of Britain and Russia. In the 20th century, 

Germany twice became that outside force.18

 When the Ottoman Empire entered World War I by permitting 

the German battlecruiser Goeben and cruiser Breslau to enter the 

Dardanelles and closing the Straits to pursuing British warships, 

it ended, temporarily, the conflict between Britain and Russia over 

the Straits. Turkish control of the Straits blocked the best route for 

British supplies to reach Russia; the British leadership considered 

the Russian alliance essential for the defeat of Germany. Although 

the Allied efforts to force the Straits failed, British opposition to 

Russian control of the Straits ended. Russia demanded possession 

of Constantinople and the entire western shore of the Straits and the 

Sea of Marmara; Britain agreed. That commitment later became part 

of what is generally known as the Sykes-Picot Agreement, although 

Russian foreign minister Sergei Sazanov also signed it, and it was 

negotiated in Petrograd in 1916.19

 When the war ended, the Russian Empire had ceased to exist, 

and the Soviet regime had renounced the Russian claims on Ottoman 

territory. The Armistice of Mudros, which ended hostilities with the 

Ottoman empire on October 31, 1918, opened the Straits to Allied 

shipping and permitted the Allies to occupy Constantinople and 

the Bosporus fortifications. The Allies addressed the future of the 
265

Ottoman Empire in the Treaty of Sevres, signed August 10, 1920. The 

Treaty called for the partition of the Ottoman Empire. It assigned 

the western shore of the Straits except Constantinople to Greece; 

an Ottoman rump would retain control of Constantinople and the 

eastern shore. Those states, however, would delegate sovereignty 

over both shores of the Straits, designated as the Straits Zone, to a 

Straits Commission, consisting of representatives of the Allied 

powers. Under the Commission, all ships and aircraft would have 

virtually unfettered freedom of navigation in the Straits, in peace 

and war.20

TREATIES GOVERNING USE OF TURKISH STRAIT

The Lausanne Convention.

 The emergence of the new Turkey under Mustafa Kemal, later 

Kemal Ataturk, rendered the Treaty of Sevres moot. When Kemal’s 

forces, already in control of Anatolia, approached the Allied garrison 

at Constantinople in October 1922, Britain and Greece agreed to an 

armistice and revision of the Treaty of Sevres. During the course of 

the negotiations which produced the Treaty of Lausanne, signed 

July 24, 1923, Ataturk put a formal end to the Ottoman Empire and 

established Turkey as a republic. The Soviet Union, now firmly 

established, participated in the Lausanne negotiations. The Lausanne 

Treaty gave the new republic full sovereignty over Anatolia and 

a small enclave in Europe, including the important city of Edirne, 

but not control over the Straits. The old polarity between Britain 

and Russia over the Straits had reappeared. The Soviet delegation 

at Lausanne supported Turkish sovereignty over the Straits with 

commercial traffic entirely unrestricted and naval passage entirely 

prohibited, a return to the status quo ante bellum. Britain and 

the other Western powers, however, wanted to retain the Sevres 

arrangements for the Straits. Prolonged and difficult negotiations 

produced the Convention of Lausanne, signed August 14, 1923, 

which was separate from the broader Treaty of Lausanne and dealt 

only with the Straits Question.21

 The Lausanne Convention had four main provisions: freedom 

of navigation through the Straits, demilitarization of the Straits, 
266

an international guarantee for the security of the Straits, and the 

establishment of a Straits Commission to execute the provisions of 

the Convention. This arrangement satisfied neither Turkey, which 

did not gain sovereignty over the Straits, nor the Soviet Union, 

which confronted the possibility of facing hostile naval forces 

in the Black Sea. But the Convention protected Soviet interests to 

a degree. It distinguished between riparian states, states on the 

shores of the Black Sea, and nonriparian outside powers. No outside 

power could send into the Black Sea a naval force larger than the 

most powerful riparian fleet, inevitably but not explicitly that of 

the Soviet Union, but outside powers had the unconditional right 

to send flotillas of up to three ships, with the largest not to exceed 

ten thousands tons. This provision tacitly prohibited outside capital 

ships—battleships and aircraft carriers—from entering the Black 

Sea. In time of war, these arrangements did not change if Turkey 

was neutral; if Turkey was a belligerent, neutral warships retained 

the right to pass through the Straits but enemy ships and aircraft 

were prohibited. The Straits Commission, not Turkey, had the right 

and the responsibility to enforce these provisions. This arrangement 

reassured the Soviets about a possible threat from the Black Sea, but 

permitted the nonriparian states to operate naval forces there and 

assured international control of the Straits. Although Turkey was 

deprived of control over the Straits and sovereignty over the Straits 

littoral, Ataturk had every reason for satisfaction with the broader 

settlement of the Treaty of Lausanne and priorities beyond the 

Straits.22

 The growth of German power in the 1930s reduced the importance 

of British and Soviet differences over the Straits and increased the 

value of Turkey as a potential ally. This situation gave Turkey the 

opportunity to obtain a revision of the Lausanne Convention. The 

revision of other components of the postwar settlement provided the 

Turks with a pretext for requesting revision of the Convention in 

1933, though the conference to do so did not meet until 1936.23

The Montreux Convention.

 During the complex series of negotiations which produced the 

Montreux Convention, Britain took the position that the Straits were 
267

an “international waterway connecting two international seas.”24

The Soviets sought to differentiate between the Mediterranean as an 

international sea and the Black Sea as a closed one. To the Turks, 

the issue of Black Sea access mattered less than that of sovereignty 

over the Straits and the Straits littoral. Turkey’s ability to occupy 

the Straits Zone unilaterally, as Germany had the Rhineland, gave 

the Turks considerable leverage, as the terms of the Convention 

indicate. It gave each of the major participants in the negotiations 

enough of their objectives to make the arrangement acceptable. For 

Britain, the principle of freedom of navigation in the Straits became 

a matter of international law, and nonriparian states gained the right 

to operate substantial but limited naval forces in the Black Sea. For 

the Soviet Union, the restrictions on nonriparian naval forces in the 

Black Sea and the privilege of passing large naval units through 

the Straits mitigated failure to gain closed status for the Black Sea. 

Turkey got full sovereignty, including the right to fortify the Straits, 

but not sovereign control of navigation. 

 The provisions of the Convention restrict commercial navigation 

in the Straits only if Turkey is at war, or regards war as imminent. 

In that circumstance, nonbelligerent vessels may pass the Straits 

as long as their passage does not assist Turkey’s enemies, which 

implies Turkey’s right to inspect passing vessels. The Convention 

does not distinguish between the riparian and nonriparian states 

with regard to commercial navigation. In peacetime, small warships 

and naval auxiliaries of both riparian and nonriparian states may 

pass the Straits without restriction in daylight. Submarines of Black 

Sea navies may pass through the Straits on the surface, but only if 

constructed outside the Black Sea for use within it or for repair at 

outside yards and return from them, not for routine deployment. 

Nonriparian states may send no more than 15,000 tons of naval 

shipping through the Straits at one time; riparian states may exceed 

that tonnage—and thus send capital ships through the Straits—if 

their large units have no more than two accompanying destroyers. 

Nonriparian states may not maintain a total of more than 30,000 tons 

in the Black Sea at any given time, but this provision is subject to 

change. If the strongest riparian fleet—meaning the Soviet fleet—

expanded by 10,000 tons from its size at the time of the signature 
268

of the Convention, the permissible size of nonriparian fleets was to 

grow to 45,000 tons. Nonriparian naval forces may not remain in the 

Black Sea longer than 21 days. If Turkey is at war or, significantly, 

regards itself in imminent danger of war, the passage of combatant 

ships, of any power, becomes subject to its sole discretion. The 

wording of the Convention makes it effectively perpetual unless one 

of the signatories gives notice of intent to denounce.25

 The Montreux Convention remains in force to this day. It has 

survived through 7 decades of geopolitical turbulence not because 

the conflict of interests over the Straits ended, but because it managed 

the situation well enough that none of the parties had sufficient 

motivation to raise tensions enough to change it. It has been a classic 

example of successful management as Haass describes it. The Soviet 

Union sought to alter the terms of the Convention, before, during, 

and after World War II. It proposed to transfer responsibility for the 

security of the Straits from Turkey to a Turkish-Soviet condominium 

which would have given the Soviets military bases at the Straits. This 

return to the historical Russian desire to control the Straits inevitably 

elicited firm opposition from Turkey, Great Britain, and the United 

States. Soviet pressure on Turkey in the postwar years impelled the 

United States to become involved in the eastern Mediterranean, 

thus helping to establish the pattern of the Cold War. 26 Even today, 

Turkey chafes under the Montreux provisions which deprive it of the 

right to restrict commercial traffic through the Straits.27 Successful 

management regimes chafe, but rarely raise blisters.

The Prevention of Incidents at Sea Agreement.

 The Agreement Between the Government of the United States 

of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist 

Republics on the Prevention of Incidents On and Over the High 

Seas (INCSEA), signed on May 25, 1972, by Secretary of the Navy 

John Warner and Admiral of the Fleet Sergei Gorshkov, differs from 

the Lausanne and Montreux Conventions in many dimensions. A 

bilateral executive agreement between the U.S. and Soviet Navies 

rather than a formal treaty, it remained in effect for only 16 years 

before it was replaced by the Prevention of Dangerous Military 
269

Activities Agreement of 1988. It did not address a long-standing 

major international issue. It encompassed only a narrow aspect of 

the rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union. Within 

these limits, INCSEA achieved its objectives. 

 The expanding presence and increasing assertiveness of the 

Soviet Navy created the need for INCSEA. Soviet ships and aircraft 

often interfered with U.S. naval operations. Because the Soviets were 

deploying an array of new ships, aircraft, and weapons systems, U.S. 

ships often approached Soviet units closely to gather intelligence 

visually. Near misses and collisions, some of which caused the loss 

of aircraft and casualties, had become frequent. The United States 

raised the possibility of an agreement to reduce incidents in 1968. 

The final agreement was straightforward. It required the two navies 

to obey the standard nautical Rules of the Road, to avoid provocative 

behaviors, such as simulating attacks on or aiming weapons at each 

other, to use navigation lights properly, to use signals to warn each 

other of danger, and to meet annually to review the implementation 

of the agreement.28

 INCSEA established a new pattern of professional interaction 

among American and Soviet naval officers. It reduced the number 

of incidents and proved particularly useful during the October 

1973 Arab-Israeli War, when both navies had large forces in the 

eastern Mediterranean and international tension compelled the 

commanders to jockey for tactical advantages. The two navies came 

to value the unique service-to-service relationship and to resent 

outside interference in it. During the tense period of the early 1980s, 

U.S. warships repeatedly entered what the Soviets considered 

internal waters in order to demonstrate the principle of freedom of 

navigation. These incursions led to a number of naval confrontations 

which the INCSEA annual reviews helped to resolve. When Soviet 

units interfered with U.S. salvage operations in international waters 

after the destruction of Korean Air Lines Flight 007, the United States 

invoked INCSEA to demand that the Soviets end their harassment, 

and they complied. When the United States temporarily terminated 

official contacts with the Soviet armed forces after the murder of 

Major Arthur Nicholson in 1985, the decision deeply disturbed Soviet 

naval officers.29 INCSEA became a model for a bilateral agreement 
270

between the German and Polish navies in 1990, and the United 

States proposed a multilateral equivalent as part of a comprehensive 

Middle East settlement in 1992. The U.S. and Chinese navies signed 

a similar agreement in 1998.30

 David Winkler, the leading authority on INCSEA, gives six 

reasons for its success. Both navies wanted to avoid damage to their 

ships and aircraft and the possibility of an escalation of tensions 

or even hostilities as result of accident or imprudence. Because the 

rapid growth of the Soviet Navy put many inexperienced officers in 

command positions, this danger concerned the Soviets particularly. 

The simplicity of INCSEA’s terms, the professionalism of those 

charged with enforcing it, and the practice of discussing violations 

in advance of the annual review made the review process effective. 

The social norms established for the review sessions created a 

positive atmosphere. The low profile of the agreement—which did 

not require congressional approval and concerned professional 

military officers primarily—facilitated its success. The provision for 

direct communications between the navies and the annual reviews 

made verification far easier than in more elaborate arms control 

agreements.31 INCSEA gave the navies of both countries, especially 

the insurgent Soviet Union, a growing vested interest in keeping 

tensions low. This interest certainly would not have prevented 

them from going to war at the behest of their political masters. It 

did, however, function as a confidence-building measure, which 

gradually impressed observers outside of the two navies.

Precedent Conclusions.

 The precedents offer a variety of models for the Persian Gulf and 

Strait of Hormuz, though, of course, none fits precisely. The Lausanne 

Convention offers the most applicable model for a comprehensive 

agreement. The primary objection to Lausanne, Turkey’s lack of 

sovereignty over the Straits, would not apply to the Strait of Hormuz 

because neither Iran nor any other state has claim to sovereignty; the 

Strait is inherently an international waterway. Demilitarization and 

international control exercised by an intergovernmental organization 

devoted to the maintenance of free and secure navigation could 
271

benefit all concerned. A more modest and less visible agreement on 

the model of INCSEA, reducing local tensions and the probability of 

provocative incidents, would have similar advantages on a smaller 

scale. Many possibilities exist between the two extremes. 

MANAGEMENT IN THE PERSIAN GULF 

AND STRAIT OF HORMUZ

Several different variables define the matrix of possible 

management regimes. In addition to the diversity in the scope and 

diplomatic formality suggested by the precedents, the geographic 

compass of an agreement could vary from the Strait of Hormuz alone 

to the entire Gulf and its littoral. The United States thus has a wide 

range options from which to select a management regime to meet the 

fail-safe criteria. In proposing and, perhaps, implementing the regime, 

the United States would have the initiative and significant strategic 

advantages. The establishment of a management arrangement 

for the Gulf or Strait, properly done, would be an opportunity to 

turn military capability into diplomatic advantage, not an offer of 

concessions for returns which may prove ephemeral. 

 The strategic advantages are inherent in the power relationship 

between a global maritime power and an insular regional power. The 

military leverage of the United States comes, most importantly, from 

the ability to interdict Iranian shipping outside the Strait of Hormuz, 

in the Gulf of Oman or Arabian Sea, and to conduct effective strikes 

against Iran from outside the region. No agreement restricted to the 

Gulf and its littoral would affect those capabilities. Though Iran’s 

military capabilities threaten U.S. interests, there is little doubt that 

U.S. capabilities pose a greater threat to the Islamic Republic. This 

fact makes it possible for a management regime to meet the fail-safe 

criteria because it creates the possibility of a quid pro quo with the 

Iranian regime which does not harm U.S. interests. 

 In the context of the Gulf, the United States has a narrow agenda: 

the protection of the production and export of petroleum and natural 

gas, and the reduction of the protection costs paid for them.32 We are 

free to pursue those objectives as long as we do not compromise other 

broader objectives, as would happen, for example, if a management 
272

regime restricted the U.S. ability to take whatever actions deemed 

necessary to deal with the Iranian nuclear program. A pledge not 

to attack Iranian nuclear facilities in exchange for an Iranian pledge 

not to block the Strait, for example, would not be acceptable; it 

would guarantee the success of Iran’s conventional deterrent. The 

United States could, however, promise not to interfere with Iranian 

shipping within the Gulf and Strait or attack Iranian oil and natural 

gas facilities, onshore and offshore, in return for an Iranian pledge 

not to attack shipping or the oil and gas facilities of other Gulf states. 

By reducing the probability of attack, this type of agreement would 

have a direct impact on prices by reducing insurance premiums, 

even it had no other effect. Such an agreement would prohibit attack 

on Iran’s most important economic assets, but it appears so unlikely 

that the United State would choose to do so under any circumstances 

that the prohibition appears acceptable. 

 U.S. military action against Iran might have one of four general 

purposes: preemption, punishment, rollback of aggression or 

provocation, or regime change. Preemptive or small scale punitive 

operations probably would consist either of precision guided 

munitions, or possibly, the insertion and extraction of special 

operations forces to destroy specific military or paramilitary targets. 

The Israeli attacks on the Osiraq reactor in 1981 and the Palestinian 

Liberation Organization (PLO) headquarters in Tunis in 1985; 

Operation EL DORADO CANYON against Libya in 1986; the 1998 

cruise missile strikes against targets in Afghanistan and the Sudan; 

and commando operations like the Israeli, German, and French 

hostage rescue operations at Entebbe, Uganda in 1976; Mogadishu, 

Somalia in 1977; and Kolwezi, Zaire in 1978, exemplify this type 

of mission. Only if the Islamic Republic used oil and gas facilities 

to shield other activities, which the large number of non-Iranians 

involved in the petroleum industry makes unlikely, would a 

prohibition on attacking them interfere with this type of operation. 

 Iran’s conventional military weakness makes the type of 

aggression or intervention which would require a punitive response 

comparable to Operation DESERT STORM highly unlikely. Without 

considering either the probability or the desirability of a military 

intervention to change the Iranian regime, such an operation would 
273

not target the energy facilities. Energy resources and facilities form an 

important component of national power, as Ray Cline’s methodology 

for assessing national power indicates.33 But regime change 

operations, after all, seek to overthrow governments, not conquer 

nations. Iraqi oil facilities were not, and Iranian facilities are not, the 

centers of gravity of the regime. Clausewitz presents the concept of 

center of gravity thus: “One must keep the dominant characteristics 

of both belligerents in mind. Out of the characteristics, a certain 

center of gravity develops, the hub of all power and movement, on 

which everything depends. That is the point against which all our 

energies must be directed.”34 John Warden relies on this concept as 

the organizing principle of his analysis of air warfare.35 The Islamic 

Republic’s center of gravity consists of the mechanisms of political 

coercion which keep it in power, not the economic resources of 

the country in general. Attacking oil facilities also has inherent 

environmental risks. The United States thus could surrender the 

option of attacking Iranian oil facilities without violating the fail-safe 

criteria. 

 To Iran, the proposition would appear less favorable, because 

the ability to interfere with traffic in the Strait is not only the 

keystone of Iran’s conventional deterrence but also a major source 

of Iran’s regional leverage. Iran might well reject such a proposal, 

whatever diplomatic form it took. It would, however, do so at the 

cost of appearing of intransigent, globally and regionally. An Iranian 

rejection would imply that Iran considered blocking the Strait and 

attacking its neighbors’ shipping and energy facilities an option, 

which the other Gulf countries would hardly welcome.36

 This discussion of a no-attack pledge suggests ways in which 

even the proposal of a management regime could serve American 

interests. Other initiatives could have similar effects. Narrowing 

the geographic range of the proposed regime to the Strait and 

drawing on the Lausanne precedent raises the possibility of a local 

demilitarization. There would be some advantage, however, in an 

agreement which simply moved Iranian forces away from the Strait. 

Iranian control of the disputed islands of Abu Musa, the Great Tunbs, 

and the Lesser Tunbs, some 50 kilometers west of the Strait, and 

undisputed Sirri Island further west, offer it a definite advantage in 
274

closing the Strait, though not a militarily decisive one.37 Given the short 

distances involved, Iran could fire antishipping missiles or conduct 

special operations with small craft from bases on the mainland.38 A 

territorial arms control agreement or demilitarized zone would have 

to extend well beyond the Strait to deny Iran the ability to interdict 

traffic in the Strait. If it did so, it would encompass the major Iranian 

naval base at Bandar Abbas and the entire territory of several of the 

emirates of the United Arab Emirates (UAE). But the elimination of 

military forces from the Strait and their immediate environs, even 

if only the islands and the tip of the Musandam Peninsula—part 

of Oman, which the United States could probably prevail upon to 

cooperate—would make it harder for Iran to interfere with Strait 

traffic without preparation, and easier for the United States to detect 

and respond to Iranian actions. But the demilitarization of Omani 

territory would hardly be an incentive for Iran and, from the Iranian 

perspective hardly a concession for the United States. The most 

relevant form of concession would resemble some of the restrictions 

on passage through the Turkish Straits. 

 The United States could accept restrictions as long as they did 

not interfere significantly with military operations in the Gulf. 

Restrictions on the total number or size of vessels inside the Gulf 

would not be acceptable; a requirement for formal notice of passage 

would be. A requirement that submarines pass through the Strait 

only on the surface would interfere with U.S. submarine operations 

there. The United States began operating submarines inside the 

Gulf only when Iran acquired advanced conventional submarines 

from Russia, suggesting that submarines may have an important 

force protection role.39 Even so, the passage restriction might be 

acceptable. Iranian naval power in the region depends far more on its 

small submarine forces than the United States does on submarines. 

Restrictions on passage also could include the prohibition of ships 

and aircraft carrying mines through the demilitarized zone. 

 Whether included in a broader demilitarization agreement or not, 

a prohibition of mines in the Strait area or in the entire Gulf would be 

a useful management instrument. As the damage to the Bridgeton and 

USS Samuel B. Roberts during the 1987-88 tanker war demonstrates, 

mines pose a significant hazard to Gulf shipping, especially if laid 
275

clandestinely. The removal of this threat would reduce uncertainty 

about navigation substantially.40 Since Iran is the only Gulf state 

likely to employ mines, it would probably not be difficult to get the 

remainder of the Gulf states and outside navies operating in the Gulf 

to agree to a comprehensive regional ban on naval mines. 

 The disputed islands present another option, but unfortunately not 

a desirable one. The islands have small populations and no intrinsic 

worth beyond their location. Under the territorial arrangements 

established when Britain withdrew from the Gulf in 1971, Iran 

was to share sovereignty over Abu Musa and the Tunbs with the 

UAE. Just before the British withdrew; Iranian forces occupied all 

three islands. Iran and the UAE reached an agreement for joint 

administration just before the Iranian occupation; there was no such 

agreement with the UAE. The joint administration of Abu Musa has 

led to friction, notably since 1992 when Iran began to assert unilateral 

control over the island. There have been a number of incidents since 

that time; in June 2004, for example, a UAE patrol boat fired on an 

Iranian fishing boat. The UAE, backed by the other members of the 

GCC, have sought international arbitration to resolve the situation; 

Iran has refused.41 Iranian overtures to the Gulf countries have not 

altered their position.42 Even the mention of the most basic agreement 

regarding the islands, presumably exchanging recognition of Iranian 

sovereignty for demilitarization, would deeply offend the Gulf Arabs 

and encourage Iranian territorial claims elsewhere in the Gulf. Iran 

asserted a historical claim to Bahrain, originally in 1927, but officially 

relinquished that claim in 1970. Recognition of the Iranian claims 

to the Tunbs and Abu Musa might encourage Iran to revive the 

claim to Bahrain.43 Since Iran has controlled the Tunbs for 30 years 

and apparently has obtained what it wants in Abu Musa, the island 

situation appears to offer little leverage for obtaining concessions 

from Iran. For Iran, the islands are a national issue, not related to the 

revolutionary agenda.44

 The INCSEA precedent suggests a different management 

approach, focused on freedom of navigation and avoidance of 

provocation. Like INCSEA, an “INCGULF” could involve only 

actual armed forces (air and naval) operating in the Gulf and Strait 

and would regulate only behavior. It could begin with a promise 
276

to observe the maritime rules of the road and their equivalents in 

the air and continue by circumscribing provocative behaviors, 

such as the loading of mines aboard ships or aircraft or the use of 

missile guidance radars, and might extend to notice of naval and air 

exercises. The lack of diplomatic relations between the United States 

and the Islamic Republic would be an obstacle to the negotiation 

of such an agreement, particularly if it involved the creation of a 

review body. But the United States and Iran already cooperate 

in a program for the monitoring of wrecks and other hazards to 

navigation in the Strait, managed by the U.S. Coast Guard; anecdotal 

reports suggest that formal and respectful contacts frequently take 

place between U.S. and Iranian naval officers in the Strait area. A 

Prevention of Incidents structure simply would place those contacts 

on an ongoing basis without involving interaction at the diplomatic 

level. It would improve the security of traffic through Strait and thus 

appeal not only to the other Gulf states and the United States, but to 

all major importers of oil from the Gulf, including India and China. 

The Iranian Revolutionary Guard, essentially the armed forces of the 

revolutionary agenda, probably would reject an INCGULF out of 

hand. The rejection would both isolate Iran and contribute to friction 

between the regular Iranian armed forces and the Revolutionary 

Guard. 

 The idea of a Gulf commission, modeled up to a point on the 

Strait Commission established in the Lausanne Convention, offers 

an intriguing prospect. (The Strait Commission could not be an exact 

model, since it was imposed by the victorious Allies and actually 

controlled its own territory, the Strait Zone.) A Gulf Commission 

would address the question of secure and orderly navigation in the 

international waters of the Strait and Gulf. It would be established 

by an international convention and have responsibility for enforcing 

the terms of that convention. A Gulf convention could include any of 

the possible agreements mentioned above—local demilitarization, a 

mine ban, an INCGULF, for example—as well as such matters as 

maintenance of aids to navigation and wrecks, on which anecdotal 

evidence suggests that there is already a good deal of informal 

cooperation. It also could serve as a clearing house for information 

on the passage of ships and aircraft. More formal and intrusive 
277

mechanisms of management could include requiring that an official 

of the Commission be aboard all nonriparian vessels and all warships 

operating in international waters in the Gulf, or even that ships 

passing through the waters administered by the Commission fly a 

Commission flag in addition to their national colors. The expenses of 

the Commission would be considerable; it could be funded either by 

fees paid by the users of the Gulf or contributions from the members 

of the Commission. 

 Since it is impossible to bring surface ships into the Gulf 

surreptitiously, the functioning of a Commission would not limit 

U.S. military options significantly. If a situation justified military 

action, it would also justify violating the rules of the commission. 

The convention which created the commission would have to 

have an escape clause to deal with this circumstance. It also might 

declare certain violations of the convention as acts of war against 

the signatories. Such a structure would give the United States a 

legal role in maintaining the security of Gulf. The establishment 

of a commission thus would defeat Iran’s longstanding goal of 

establishing a collective security structure in the Gulf which would 

the exclude the United States. An Iranian rejection of an agreement 

would imply that Iran valued its national interest above order and 

security in the Gulf, and thus isolate Iran.45

 Even if these initiatives turned out to be no more than diplomatic 

theater, the United States still would benefit. Thus far, the United States 

has dealt with Iran’s nuclear program primarily with sanctions and 

harsh rhetoric, unlike the European Union (EU), which has offered 

positive incentives.46 The proposal of management instruments or 

regimes for the Gulf would show flexibility without altering policy 

on the nuclear issue. Even if the flexibility is not sufficient to impress 

the Islamic Republic, it would impress the global community and 

might facilitate cooperation with the European powers on nuclear 

issues and continuing security cooperation with the GCC countries. 

If, of course, Iran accepted one of the proposals and then violated 

it, it would weaken Iran’s position, even if it were not so gross a 

provocation as Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait. In either of these cases, 

the United States would benefit as long our adherence to whatever 

instrument or regime Iran had violated did not compromise our 

ability to act in the Gulf. 
278

 Showing flexibility to the Islamic Republic would have some 

risks. Iran might take plasticity as weakness and take more aggressive 

actions as a result. But in doing so, the Islamic Republic would weaken 

its international position. Iranian adherence to an agreement might 

well pose the greatest challenge. Iranian acceptance of a management 

instrument for the Gulf would be as much a strategic choice as 

offering it would be for the United States. If the GCC countries, 

Iran’s other neighbors, and the world community (not to mention 

the United States) perceived Iranian acceptance of a management 

as a sign of a new and more benign approach to the world, and 

acted accordingly, the situation would become far more dangerous. 

A reduction in tensions in the Gulf cannot and must not serve as 

the basis for a redefinition of the U.S. relationship with the Islamic 

Republic. It could not replace, only complement the sanctions regime 

and a vigorous military policy in the region. Whatever confidence 

these measures might build could not become the basis of a new 

Gulf policy.47

CONCLUSION

 No management instrument or regime could either dissuade 

the Islamic Republic of Iran from its pursuit of nuclear weapons or 

eliminate the threat to global and regional order which a nuclear Iran 

would pose. The most comprehensive and formal concept would 

offer no more than a marginal improvement in the overall situation. 

But in such a serious situation, even the prospect of marginal 

improvement is worth careful investigation. An approach to Iran, 

whether through secret diplomacy or open declaration, would create 

a new arena in which the United States could employ its power 

to reduce Iran’s international support and freedom of action and, 

perhaps, capability. A management regime can be, and must be, an 

instrument of statecraft, not a substitute for it.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 11

 1. Richard N. Haass, Conflicts Unending: the United States and Regional Disputes, 

New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990, pp. 1-2. 

 2. Dagobert Brito and Amy Jaffe, “Reducing Vulnerability of the Strait of 

Hormuz,” chap. 9, this volume.
279

 3. On this point, see, for example, Philip C. Saunders, “Military Options for 

Dealing with North Korea’s Nuclear Program,” Monterey Institute of International 

Studies, January 27, 2003, available at http://cns.miis.edu/research/korea/dprkmil.htm. 

 4. Anthony H. Cordesman, Iran’s Evolving Military Forces, Washington, DC: 

Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2004, p. 42; idem., Iran’s Military 

Forces in Transition, Westport, CT: Praeger, 1999, covers the Inanian military forces 

at greater length. 

 5. Numerous authors on nuclear issues have quoted Sundarji’s words, but 

I have been unable to locate the original source in which they appeared. For 

wording, see Keith B. Payne, Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age, Lexington, KY: 

University Press of Kentucky, 1996, p.20. 

 6. On the continuity of Iranian foreign policy, see Graham E. Fuller, The “Center 

of the Universe”: The Geopolitics of Iran, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991, esp. pp. 

8-33. 

 7. On Iran’s nuclear ambitions in regional context, see ibid., p. 237. 

 8. Mihael Eisenstadt, “Living with a Nuclear Iran,” in Crises in the Contemporary 

Persian Gulf, Barry Rubin, ed., London and Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2002, p. 

227. 

 9. On these issues, see Fuller, ibid.; Christin Marschall, Iran’s Persian Gulf Policy: 

From Khomeini to Khatami, New York: Routledge Curzon, 2003, pp. 3-62; Anthony 

H. Cordesman, Iran’s Military Forces in Transition, Westport, CT: Praeger, 1999, pp. 

20-30, 265-270. Robin Wright, “Desire for Nuclear Empowerment a Uniting Factor 

in Iran,” Washington Post, November 14, 2004, demonstrates the Iranian desire for 

nuclear capability.

 10. The reference to containment does not imply an acceptance of the Iranian 

regime as permanent or desirable, but to containment as a prerequisite for any 

other policy to deal with the Iranian regime. 

 11. Cordesman, Iran’s Evolving Military Forces, http://csis.org/features/0407_

IranMilForces.pdf, p. 18. Cordesman summarizes reports on Iranian nuclear 

programs on pp. 49-60. 

 12. Iran’s ability to close the Strait might be said to constitute a Samson option, 

comparable to Israeli nuclear capability as described in Seymour Hersh, The Samson 

Option: Israel’s Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy, New York: Random 

House, 1991. 

 13. On the Mossadeq era, see Sepehr Zabih, The Mossadeq Era: Roots of Iranian 

Revolution, Chicago: Lake View Press, 1986; Mostafa Elm, Iran’s Oil Nationalization 

and Its Aftermath, Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1992, among others. 

With the exception of Zabih, nearly all the literature on Mossadeq and his time 

overestimates the degree of popular support for Mossadeq, the stability of his 

government, and his commitment to free and representative government, and 

underestimates the Communist threat to and within Iran. 
280

 14. For a recent survey of political patterns in the GCC countries other than 

Saudi Arabia, see Malcolm C. Peck, “Eastern Arabian States; Kuwait, Bahrain, 

Qatar, United Arab Emirates, and Oman,” David E. Long and Bernard Reich, 

The Government and Politics of the Middle East and North Africa, 4th. Ed., Boulder, 

CO: Westview Press, 2002, pp. 128-173. Political liberalization in Qatar led to the 

establishment of al-Jazeera. 

 15. James H. Noyes, The Clouded Lens: Persian Gulf Security and US Policy, 

Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1982, covers the early years of U.S. Gulf 

policy. Anthony Cordesman has continued the story in a series of volumes, 

including The Gulf and the Search for Strategic Stability, Boulder, CO: Westview, 

1984; The Gulf and the West: Strategic Relations and Military Realities, Boulder, CO: 

Westview, 1988; and After the Storm: the Changing Military Balance in the Middle 

East, Boulder, CO: Westvew, 1993. There is also M. E. Ahrari and James H. Noyes, 

eds., The Persian Gulf After the Cold War, Westport, CT: Praeger, 1993, and Michael 

A. Palmer, Guardians of the Gulf: A History of America’s Expanding Role in the Persian 

Gulf, 1833-1992, New York: Free Press, 1992.

 16. The Oxford Dictionary of Quotations, 3rd. ed., New York Oxford University 

Press, 1979, attributes this verse to G. W. Hunt, and describes it as the lyrics of a 

“Music Hall Song.”

 17. Any mention of the “Great Game” justifies citing Peter Hopkirk’s superb 

The Great Game: the Struggle for Empire in Central Asia, New York: Kondansha 

International, 1994. 

 18. On the Straits question in the 19th century, see Harry N. Howard, Turkey, 

the Straits and U.S. Policy, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974, 

pp. 1-27; Christos L. Rozakis and Petros N. Stagos, The Turkish Straits, Dordrecht, 

Holland: Maritnus Nijhoff, 1987, pp. 1-24, 80-89; Ferenc A. Vali, The Turkish Straits 

and NATO, Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1972, pp. 3-25; William Hale, 

Turkish Foreign Policy, 1174-2000, London: Frank Cass, 2000, pp. 13-37. This list, 

and subsequent lists of sources on the Straits question, is hardly exhaustive. 

 19. On the Straits question during World War I, see Howard, Turkey, pp. 27-45; 

Rozakis and Stagos, Turkish Straits, pp. 25-31; Vali, Turkish Straits, pp. 26-29; Hale, 

Foreign Policy, pp. 37-44; David Fromkin, A Peace to End All Peace: The Fall of the 

Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modern Midde East, New York: Avon, 1990, 

especially pp. 137-145, 189-199. These references are hardly comprehensive and do 

not deal with the Dardanelles expedition at all. 

 20. On Sevres and Lausanne, see Howard, Turkey, pp. 51-129; Vali, Turkish 

Straits, pp. 26-34; Rozakis and Stagos, Turkish Straits, pp. 26-39, 89-100, Anthony 

R. DeLuca, Great Power Rivalry in the Turkish Straits, Boulder, CO: East European 

Monographs, 1981, pp. 1-14; Fromkin, A Peace to End All Peace, pp. 427-434, 465-

568.

 21. Ibid. 

 22. On the terms of the Convention of Lausanne, see Petros and Rozakis, 

Turkish Straits, pp. 89-100; Howard, Turkey, pp. 83-129, 300-313. 
281

 23. Howard, Turkey, pp. 126-147; Rozakis and Stagos, Turkish Straits, pp. 36-42; 

DeLuca, Rivalry, pp. 14-50. 

 24. Lord Stanhope, the leader of the British delegation at the beginning of the 

conference, used this phrase. Actes de la Conference de Montreux: 22-Juin-20 Juillet: 

Compte Rendu des Seances Plenieres et Proces-Verbal Des Debats du Comite Technique, 

with an introduction by Thanassis Aghnides, Paris: 1936, p. 43, quoted in DeLuca, 

Rivalry, p. 56. 

 25. On the negotiations and general framework of the Montreux Convention, 

see Howard, Straits, pp. 147-156; Rozakis and Stagos, pp. 102-104; Vali, Straits, pp. 

36-40; DeLuca, Rivalry, pp. 25-135. On the specific provisions, see Howard, Straits,

pp. 292-315; Rozakis and Stagos, Straits, pp. 104-136. The Convention’s provisions 

regarding aircraft carriers are not clear. Because the text of the Convention makes no 

reference to aircraft carriers but refers only to capital ships and Annex II specifically 

excludes aircraft carriers from the category of capital ships, it appears that aircraft 

carriers are subject to the 15,000 ton limit, which effectively prohibits them from 

passing through the Strait. At least partially, if not entirely, because of this issue, 

the Soviet Union designated all of its aircraft carriers, which were constructed at 

Nikolayev in the Ukraine for use outside the Black Sea, as cruisers, which qualified 

as capital ships under the Convention, rather than aircraft carriers. Article 15 states 

“Vessels of war in transit through the Strait shall in no circumstances make use 

of any aircraft which they may be carrying,” thus prohibiting the use of aircraft 

during transit but not their carriage. On these issues, see Rozakis and Stagos, ibid., 

pp. 50-55, 132-133. 

 26. Bruce R. Kuniholm, The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East: Great Power 

Conflict and Diplomacy in Iran, Turkey and Greece, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 

Press, 1980, provides an excellent overview of this topic; Harry N. Howard, Turkey, 

the Straits and U.S. Policy, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974, pp. 

210-280, covers the issue of the Strait in detail. 

 27. On this issue, see, for example, Christopher Slaney, “Turkish Concern for 

Bosporus Complicates Oil Transport Scenarios,” Washington Report on Middle East 

Affairs, Vol. XXII, No. 4, May 2004. 

 28. David F. Winkler, Cold War at Sea: High-Seas Confrontation between the United 

States and the Soviet Union, Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute, 2000, discusses the 

historical background of INCSEA and the negotiation which led up to it on pp. 

1-107, and summarizes the terms on pp. 106-107. Significantly, INCSEA did not 

address collisions or other incidents involving submerged submarines. 

 29. Ibid., pp. 108-176, esp. pp. 129-130, 146-147, 150-151. 

 30. Ibid., pp. 170-171. 

 31. Ibid., pp. 172-175. 

 32. Frederick C. Lane developed the concept of protection costs. For a collection 

of his articles on this point, see Profits from Power: Readings in Protection Rent and 

Violence Controlling Enterprises, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1979. 
282

 33. Ray S. Cline, The Power of Nations in the 1990s: A Strategic Assessment, 

Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1994, pp. 29-30, 54-55. 

 34. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Michael Howard and Peter Paret, ed. and 

trans., Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976, pp. 595-596. 

 35. Colonel John A. Warden, USAF, The Air Campaign, San Jose, CA: To Excel 

Press, 2000, pp. 7-10. 

 36. For a recent report of Iran’s continuing efforts to improve relations with the 

GCC countries, see “Iran’s Gulf Inroads,” Eurasia Security Watch, Vol. 67, January 

14, 2005, www.afpc.org/esw67.shtml. 

 37. I deal with the boundary dispute below. 

 38. Anthony H. Cordesman, “Iranian Military Capabilities and Dual 

Containment,” in The Persian Gulf at the Millennium: Essay in Politics, Economy, 

Society, and Religion, Gary G. Sick and Lawrence Potter, ed., New York: St. Martin’s, 

1997, pp. 205-206. 

 39. Michael Collins Dunn, “The Iranian Submarines: A New Naval Arm,” 

Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, December 1992/January 1993, http://www.

washington-report.org/backissues/1292/9212040.html.

 40. On the tanker war, see Palmer, Guardians, pp. 128-149. 

 41. On the diplomatic history of the dispute over the islands, see Pirouz, 

Mojtahed-Zadeh, “Iran’s Maritime Boundaries in the Persian Gulf: the Case of 

Abu Musa Island,” in the Boundaries of Modern Iran, Keith McLachlan, ed., New 

York: St. Martin’s, 1994, pp. 101-127; Richard N. Schofield, “Border Disputes in 

the Gulf: Past, Present and Future,” in ibid., pp. 142-156; idem., “Gulshan Dietl, 

“Iran in the Emerging Greater Middle East,” in Oil and Water: Cooperative Security 

in the Persian Gulf, Bjorn Moller, ed., New York: I. B. Tauris, 2001, pp. 74-75. On the 

June 2004 incident, see Simon Henderson, Incident in the Shatt al-Arab Waterway: 

Iran’s Border Sensitivities,” Washington Incident for Near East Policy Policywatch, 

Vol. 879, June 28, 2004, available at www.washingtoninstitute.org/watch/policywatch/

policywatch2004/879.htm. Although the Abu Musa incident is not Henderson’s 

actual topic, he provides an admirable summary of it. 

 42. See the archive of news stories on the islands issue maintained by the UAE 

Ministry of Information and Culture, at http://www.uaeinteract.com/news/default.

asp?ID=147.

 43. On the Iranian claim to Bahrain, see George Lenczowski, The Middle East in 

World Affairs, 4th ed., Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1980, p. 671. 

 44. On this point, see “Always and Forever the Persian Gulf,” at www.

marzeporgohar.org/index.php?l=1&cat=17&scat=31&artid=370. The web site is 

maintained by Iranians for a Secular Republic. 

 45. The possibility exists that the regime would actually welcome a strike 

to strengthen its domestic position, but there is no evidence to support such 

speculation. 
283

 46. Eisenstadt, “Living With a Nuclear Iran,” pp. 244-45; this observation 

remains valid despite the 5 years since Eisenstadt made it. The overtures to 

Khatami which he mentions have produced nothing. 

 47. Lawrence G. Potter, “Confidence Building Measures in the Persian Gulf,” 

in The Persian Gulf at the Millennium, Gary G. Sick, ed.; and idem., New York: St. 

Martin’s Press, 1997, pp. 231-248, discuss possible continental ballistic missiles 

among the Persian Gulf littoral states, but do not propose any arrangement similar 

to the Convention proposed here. 

285

CHAPTER 12

WHAT TRANSATLANTIC STRATEGY ON IRAN?

Thérèse Delpech

 Unlike the situation prevailing on Iraq, where Europe and 

America have been arguing for years over international inspections, 

war tactics, and overall policy, there is no serious transatlantic 

dispute concerning Iran. There may be differences of emphasis on 

the two sides of the Atlantic, but on what really matters, the positions 

are pretty close. Europe and America share a common objective visà-vis Tehran. They share a common analysis of the Iranian nuclear 

program,1 and they even shared a common caution concerning the 

success of the negotiations that finally failed in August 2005. Yet, 

this does not amount to a transatlantic strategy on Iran. Far from 

it. Regular exchange of information, lack of alternative policy, 

and absence of confrontation would be a better description of the 

situation.

On the European side, a first round of negotiations collapsed 

in June 2004, when some of the suspended nuclear activities were 

resumed by the Iranians. The international community was abruptly 

set back to square one at the International Atomic Energy Agency 

(IAEA) September Board meeting. The second agreement with 

the three European capitals (London, Berlin, and Paris) came into 

existence 2 months later—on November 15, 2004—under these difficult circumstances. The substance of the negotiations was now 

broader. There were three issues at stake (nuclear, trade, and 

security), and the nature of the Iranian commitments was more 

precise—leaving very little room, if any, for interpretation of what the 

suspension actually covers. In August 2005, this second agreement 

was terminated by Iran, which decided to resume suspended 

conversion activities. Iranian intentions are now clearer. According 

to the main negotiator, Hassan Rohani, Iran has used the talks with 

the Europeans to gain time.

 On the other side of the Atlantic, America has been watching on the 

sidelines, without a strategy of its own, waiting to see what happens. 
286

The Americans have not endorsed the European initiative explicitly, 

nor have they condemned it. Instead they have displayed a benign 

scepticism. But at the end of 2004, President Bush himself made it clear 

that a diplomatic solution to the Iranian conundrum was preferable 

to any other—assuming, naturally, that such a solution was possible. 

After his trip to Europe in February 2005, Europeans and Americans 

came even closer.2

 What will happen now that the talks have failed 

is still open to question.3

 Tehran had threatened repeatedly to agree 

only to a “short” suspension, which was terminated shortly after the 

new president took office. A transatlantic cooperation now appears 

indispensable for the next steps to take.

 Finally, beyond transatlantic relations, it is important to 

understand how crucial the Russian factor is as well. Moscow, 

where anxieties over Iran’s nuclear program are growing, should 

be on board for transmission of the Iranian dossier to the United 

Nations (UN) Security Council. In August 2005, during the IAEA 

Board meeting, the Russian delegation appeared worried about the 

prospect of any decisive step concerning Tehran. There apparently is 

much less reason than in the 1990s to suspect that Moscow will help an 

Iranian nuclear program, at least directly. But the prospect of losing 

the contracts associated with Bushier because of an international 

crisis does constitute an important factor in Russian calculations.4

 Eventually, a common strategy among these three actors—

Europe, America, and Russia—is key to any satisfactory solution 

to the potential nuclear threat posed by Iran, since China, as usual, 

will not like to appear isolated. But the first indispensable step is a 

transatlantic agreement.5

UNDERSTANDING THE PLAYERS

Iran. 

 A good understanding of what the Iranian government wants

to achieve with its nuclear program is essential; a second question 

being what it can actually achieve, both politically and technically. 

The first question may be answered in different ways.

Iran wishes to create an indigenous civilian nuclear fuel. Such has 

been the most frequent claim in Tehran: the program is entirely 
287

peaceful, and there is no reason to deprive Iran of its inalienable right 

to benefit from the peaceful nuclear uses that the Nonproliferation 

Treaty (NPT) guarantees in a solemn fashion in its Article IV. 

Leaving aside the fact that the “right” guaranteed by the NPT is 

conditional to fulfillment by member states of their nonproliferation 

commitments, the problem with this hypothesis is not so much that 

Iran’s energy resources (oil and gas) are so abundant that nuclear 

energy does not make economic sense. After all, Tehran has the 

right to prepare for the future with some further diversification of 

its energy policy. The problem lies elsewhere: in the long (20-year) 

secrecy surrounding such “peaceful” nuclear expansion and in the 

size and variety of its nuclear fuel cycle. The 50,000 P1 centrifuges 

planned in Natanz appear grossly disproportionate to Iran’s only 

reactor under construction (Bushier), which will receive Russian 

fuel for the next 10 years. (Those first generation centrifuges are, in 

addition, uneconomical). 

 The kinds of imports that Iran has been engaged in also often make 

little sense in a civilian program. Finally, the production of materials 

such as uranium metal points in the direction of military ambitions 

as well. But if Iran actually wants a nuclear energy program after 

raising so many suspicions, then the solution is easy to find. The fuel 

cycle activities should again be suspended permanently, the facilities 

dismantled, and the necessary fuel will be provided by Russia, with 

a European guarantee, should Russia be unable to implement its 

pledge. This guarantee was explicitly offered to Tehran by the three 

European nations in August 2005 and rejected.

Iran wishes to use its nuclear program as a bargaining chip. Parallels 

with North Korea may be suggestive. For years, Washington has 

favored such an analysis concerning Pyongyang’s nuclear activities. 

Eventually, a good deal will lead Kim Jong Il to drop his nuclear 

ambitions because the real objective was to get America’s attention 

and security guarantees for the regime. There is very little evidence 

to support this view in the North Korean case, particularly since it 

appears that the enrichment route was investigated shortly after 

the plutonium route was closed down by the Agreed Framework 

in 1994. (The Joint Declaraction adopted on September 19, 2005, and 

challenged less than 24 hours later by Pyongyang, does not alter 

this analysis.) In the case of Iran, the regime may have reasons to be 
288

fearful after the insistence by the Bush administration on “regime 

change” in “rogue states,” and even more after having witnessed the 

short time needed for the American troops to overthrow Saddam 

Hussein in March 2003. The Iranian regime indeed may wish to get 

a guarantee that it can get only from America. But this cannot be the 

purpose of nuclear activities started in 1985! At that time, the enemy 

was Iraq, and the chemical attacks on Iranian troops already were 2 

years old. The main problem with the West was not only its silence 

on the proscribed use of chemical weapons (CW) (under the 1925 

Geneva Convention), but its open support of Baghdad. Yet, the fact 

that the Iranian nuclear program was not conceived as a bargaining 

chip—a pretty obvious fact—does not mean that it could not have 

become such a chip under different circumstances. But the choice of 

the new regime apparently was to close this door.

Iran wants the bomb, period. All the main indicators are pointing in 

this direction. If there was one major benefit of the two deals with the 

Europeans in October 2003 and November 2004, it was undoubtedly 

the extensive knowledge acquired on the Iranian program during 

the years 2003, 2004, and 2005. Iran was soon in no position to delay 

further intrusive inspections on its soil, even though the very first 

inspection, planned for October 2003, only took place in February 

2004. After Natanz and Arak, many other sites were subject to 

international inspections, including Isfahan, Lashkar Abad, and 

the Kalaye Electric factory (Tehran), which was supposed to be a 

watch factory and appeared to be a pilot plant for P1 centrifuges.6

The first explanations provided by Iran on a number of issues had to 

be changed and complemented at different times in order to make 

them consistent with findings or outside revelations. Actually, not 

all the information came through the IAEA inspections. The Libyan 

revelations and the discovery of A.Q. Khan network, for instance, 

were crucial in uncovering in 2004 the P2 centrifuges deal with 

Pakistan in 1995. But the reading of the different IAEA reports to 

the Board show how much came out of the hundreds of inspections 

performed on Iranian territory, far beyond what Iran was willing to 

acknowledge at the beginning of the process. In addition, it appears 

that Iran discussed acquiring technologies central to making nuclear 

arms as soon as 1986 and 1987 with members of the network run by 

A. Q. Khan.7

 If the bomb is the only credible objective of so much 
289

secrecy, so many purchases,8 and so many lies, then the main question 

was when the tactical decision to agree to the suspension would be 

revised. The answer was provided in August 2005.

What can Iran achieve technically? This question is difficult to discuss 

for a simple reason. While much knowledge has been acquired 

since February 2003, there is no certainty whatsoever that the entire 

range of Iranian nuclear activity is known. The possible existence 

of a clandestine nuclear program located in military facilities or in 

undisclosed places also has to be taken into account. By definition, 

what has been, is, and still may be done there is unknown. And the 

relationship between the civilian open fuel cycle and hidden nuclear 

military activities is unknown as well. What part of the civilian fuel 

cycle is necessary for the clandestine program? The answers to these 

questions are essential for assessing the current stage of development 

of the Iranian nuclear program. One can note, however, that the pace 

of conversion during the summer and fall of 2004 demonstrated a 

good mastery of the process, and also that the advancement of 

conversion activities looked urgent on the fall. This is probably why, 

instead of suspending conversion on November 15 as promised to 

the Europeans, activities went on until the adoption of the IAEA 

resolution—and apparently until February 18 for conversion into 

UF4!—in order to make the best possible use of time. This does not 

mean that Iran does not face some technical difficulties, for instance, 

when dealing with P2 centrifuges. Some technical incompetence 

should not be ruled out. But progress is most probably steady as well, 

as claimed by the Iranians themselves with or without assistance 

from abroad.

What can Iran achieve politically? Iran’s political game is pretty 

transparent. First, to get overwhelming support of the nonaligned 

nations by insisting on the right to benefit from peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Second, to neutralize Arab countries by emphasizing 

Israel’s nuclear capability and by promoting a “nuclear weapon free 

zone” in the Middle East, an objective that is particularly dear to 

Egypt. Third, to question available intelligence on Iran by making 

frequent references to intelligence failures regarding Iraq. Fourth, 

to “cheat and retreat,” delay access, remove evidence. And fifth, 

to engage in discussions with as many interlocutors as possible in 

order to divide them. Iran has been obliged to deal with the IAEA 
290

since its ratification of the NPT, and at the beginning of the crisis 

in September 2002, its relations with that agency were tense. The 

resolution adopted by the IAEA Board of Governors in September 

2003 was rejected by Iran. The Europeans entered the stage then, 

and Iran quickly understood that some room for maneuver was 

available. The demands presented by Berlin, London, and Paris were 

characterized as going beyond Iran’s obligations under the IAEA 

statute, and confusion was created concerning the perimeter of the 

suspension agreed on in October 2003. Fortunately, thus far the three 

European powers have displayed good coordination—but there may 

still be some differences between them that can be exploited.9

 Then there is the commercial relationship with Russia. The 

Iranian hope was that Moscow would focus its attention solely on 

trade, and that Europe would compete with Russia. Neither of these 

beliefs proved exactly right, but even though Iran feels that it has 

been let down by the Russians, it will continue to attempt to play the 

Russian card. And this card still is far from being fully transparent to 

the rest of the world.

 Finally, there is the Transatlantic relationship. Tehran first wanted 

to secure from the Europeans a number of commitments that would 

have directly opposed them to Washington. In increasing order of 

importance, they were: no additional discussion of the Iranian issue 

at the IAEA Board of Governors;10 no transfer of the dossier to the 

Security Council; no sanctions whatsoever; a rejection of any threat 

or use of force, and of any European participation should a military 

operation eventually take place. No such commitments could be 

made by any responsible player, but the Iranian strategy seemed to 

be that it did not cost much to at least try! 

The Europeans. 

 Initially, the Europeans came together for three different reasons: 

they wanted to show that diplomatic means could succeed in stopping 

proliferating nations; they were anxious to find some unity after the 

dispute over Iraq in 2003; and, last but not least, they felt threatened 

by Iranian nuclear and ballistic missile programs. The deadlock that 

the IAEA found itself in when Tehran rejected the September 2003 

resolution was therefore the occasion for the European initiative. 
291

Effective Multilateralism. The European Union (EU) published 

a common strategy on weapons of mass destruction (WMD) 

nonproliferation in June 2003. That document covers nuclear, 

biological, and CW and their delivery vehicles. One of its main 

objectives was to present “multilateralism” as a means not to delay 

action or postpone crises, as Washington was inclined to see it, but 

to achieve concrete results. The leading role played by the United 

Kingdom (UK), Germany, and France in trying to stop Iran’s nuclear 

program is an essential part of this policy. Another important 

illustration of “effective multilateralism” is the Proliferation Security 

Initiative (PSI), launched in Cracow but signed in Paris, which was 

designed to interdict the passage of cargoes intended for use in 

WMD programs. The PSI deserves special mention, since it was the 

interdiction of a German ship in October 2003 that led to the discovery 

of the P2 centrifuges deal between Pakistan and Iran that had been 

made in 1995. Both cases are supposed to demonstrate “effective 

multilateralism” not only on paper, but also in action. Therefore, 

success or failure of current negotiations will be seen in the wider 

context of the “European way.” This way is not limited to diplomacy: 

the European pressure on Iran has been backed by a threat to send 

the matter to the Security Council, which would be asked to make a 

decision about any further measures imposed on Iran. As a result of 

this pressure, in November 2004 Iran retracted its decision to resume 

uranium enrichment. The threat is still valid, particularly after Iran’s 

resumption of conversion activities in August 2005, and in this 

context no action is excluded in principle. But the clear preference 

of the European nations was to obtain a permanent suspension of 

enrichment and reprocessing activities in Iran, as well as access and 

verification without sanctions, coercion, or use of force. 

Solidarity of the three European Powers. Although differences 

between London, Berlin, and Paris exist concerning their respective 

situations and approaches, they have maintained close cooperation 

at all stages of the Iranian saga, from October 2003 onwards. The 

British have to take into account their military presence in Iraq, which 

is unpopular in the UK, and where Iranian agents or operatives are 

in a position to cause a great deal of trouble. This is particularly 

relevant since the UK is operating in Shia-dominated areas. Paris 

and Berlin are not burdened by this handicap. The Germans have 
292

a Green Foreign Minister, whose party is famous for its hostility 

not only to nuclear weapons—a matter of contention with France—

but also to military action, whatever the circumstances. This last 

characteristic was again very much present during the German 

electoral campaign in 2005. The French have a tendency—particularly 

difficult to swallow in London—of defining their policy in opposition 

to Washington. Still, the Europeans’ common resolve to stop Iran’s 

nuclear ambition by leading international pressure on Tehran took 

precedence over misunderstanding or disagreement on other issues. 

Regular meetings have been held in the three capitals and in Vienna 

before any discussion with the Iranians, and so far the differences 

between them have been more cosmetic than real. This being said, it 

was always clear that should diplomatic pressure eventually fail, the 

situation may change. The United States has dropped hints about 

taking military action in order to halt Iranian ambitions.11 If such steps 

were taken in the future, who would be most reluctant to follow suit? 

The answer to this question is not easy. In fact, the greatest surprise 

has come first from London, not from Germany, when Jack Straw 

declared in November 2004 that there was no military solution to the 

Iranian problem. This statement came at the worst possible time, just 

before a crucial meeting with the Iranian delegation.12

The Iranian Threat to Europe. Most observers have understood 

the European initiative as a way of preventing some unspecified 

American action against Iran.13 This interpretation misses completely 

what is probably the most important point: Europe, like Russia, 

sees Iran’s ambitions as threatening. Granted, the threat is, first and 

foremost, internal to the Middle East. A nuclear capability would 

radicalize the region, may justify additional nuclear programs in 

Arab nations (Egypt, Saudi Arabia, or Syria), and constitute a threat 

to the security of Israel—whose very existence is not recognized by 

Tehran.14 But the Middle East is one of the regions where Europe 

wants to play an increasing political role. This is true in today’s 

world, and will become even more so in the future. If and when 

Turkey is admitted into the EU, Europe will have a border within

the Middle East. This geo-strategic situation will entail additional 

responsibilities regarding the stability of the whole region. In this 

context, it is difficult to overemphasize the security turmoil that an 

Iranian nuclear bomb would create. Moreover, such a capability 
293

could pose a direct threat to European territory, taking into account 

the range of the Iranian ballistic missiles.

 Ballistic missile programs in Iran are making steady progress. 

When Tehran tested its Shehab 3 in 1998, it came as an unpleasant 

surprise not only to the region, but also to Europe.15 Cooperation 

between Tehran and Pyongyang is well-established, ranges are 

increasing, and the prospect of seeing these delivery vehicles equipped with unconventional warheads is quite real. Iran’s basic motive 

for acquiring nuclear weapons may be defensive in nature, but it may 

also be coercive, part of a much more dangerous doctrinal posture. 

Finally, Iran’s involvement in terrorism is well-documented, and 

one cannot completely rule out threats of WMD terrorism supported 

by Tehran.

America. 

 The United States faces difficult choices in Iran, and it remains 

unclear whether those choices already have been made. No clear policy 

can be discerned from public statements made so far. The preference 

for Security Council intervention expressed by Washington since 

November 2003—which would indeed be well-founded16—does not 

mesh with a more forward-looking strategy. What exactly would the 

Security Council do? A clearer and more determined U.S. policy is 

essential to any favorable outcome.

The Burden of the Past. In 1979 when the collapse of Reza Shah 

Pahlavi took place, the event was seen in Washington as a political 

and strategic disaster. It also came as a surprise: when President 

Carter took office in 1977, he had a number of foreign policy priorities, 

among which Iran was not expected to be a problem. But on November 

4, 1979, the U.S. embassy in Tehran was overrun, and the hostage 

crisis began—one of the worst international situations Washington 

has faced in the last 3 decades. Over the next 6 months, the Iranian 

issue was given priority at the daily cabinet-level meetings, and 

eventually Iran so dominated the last years of the Carter presidency 

that it contributed to its defeat.

 Then followed the Iran-Iraq war where Washington sided 

with Baghdad, which further angered Tehran. More recently, the 

bombing of the U.S. military barracks at Khobar Towers in Saudi 
294

Arabia in 1996 was identified as being instigated by Iran. Finally, 

Iran funds the Hezbollah and harbors al Qaida operatives. Since 1979 

the United States has imposed sanctions on Iran that are regularly 

reconfirmed. Diplomatic relations remain broken, and attempts to 

engage even informal talks with Tehran have never succeeded. The 

Iranian rhetoric with regard to “The Great Satan” may now be less 

inflammatory than it was, but it is still harsh. Deep distrust remains 

present on both sides. The recent election in Tehran is unlikely to 

alleviate it. 

The Iraqi Conundrum. Observers may be too quick to suspect 

secret deals between Washington and Tehran, but the paramount 

importance of the Iraqi dossier for the Bush administration is hard 

to forget. It must be integrated into any U.S. strategy over Iran. 

This being said, it probably would be a mistake to conclude that 

Washington will be soft on Iran because of Iraq. The stakes in the 

region are simply too high to be ignored. When former President 

Khatami declared that “America is not in a position to take a lunatic 

action of attacking Iran” because “the United States is deeply 

engaged in Iraq,” the statement was misleading for this very reason. 

But Iraq does remain the primary concern. Those who believe that 

the Europeans are in a better position to negotiate, because they do 

not have to take into account the Iraq dimension as much as America 

does, are also wrong.

 First, the UK has a problem similar to that of America, with the 

presence of significant British troops in the southern part of Iraq.17

Second, Iraq is a much more complex issue in Tehran than are the 

results of the 2003 war. The Iranians have never forgotten that the West 

in general, not only the United States, supported Iraq in the bloody 

1980-88 war. Nor have they forgotten the absence of international 

response when Iraq employed CW against Iranian troops. Although 

this period is now more than 20 years in the past—the first use of 

CW was in 1983—it is still very much present in the Iranian psyche.18

As recently as October 2003, at the very moment when the first deal 

was concluded with the three European powers, an article appeared 

in the Iranian press with the following sentence: “One can still see 

the wounds on our war veterans that were inflicted by poison gas as 

used by Saddam Hussein that was made in Germany and France.”19
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American Deterrence. The Iranian regime may be fundamentalist, 

but it has not so far shown tendencies towards adventurous moves.20

Tehran is not North Korea, at least until now. And there is no doubt 

in Iran that its military strength is dwarfed by that of America. 

Washington may have good reason to think twice before deciding 

on any use of force against Tehran, but the last thing the mullahs or 

new president want is a military confrontation with Washington.21

If one were to take bets on who is more afraid of a military scenario, 

the answer is clear. It also is obvious that any attack against Israel 

by Tehran, particularly a nuclear attack, would trigger a massive 

American response. What is at stake for the Iranians is both the 

security of their country and the survival of the current regime. 

Authoritarian regimes tend to be conservative by nature: they know 

how the famous Clausewitzian concept of “friction” could change 

even the most firmly established political situation during a war. And 

if the current regime has succeeded in eliminating any meaningful 

opposition, the fact is that it also appears inexperienced and far from 

firm.

Russia. 

 In a recent article, an American official with direct knowledge of 

the subject stated that “Stopping Russian assistance to Iran’s nuclear 

program was a high priority for the United States throughout much 

of the 1990s.”22 Moscow long has been an ambiguous player with 

regard to Iran and may have changed in recent years—the coming 

months will tell. In the past, Minatom has had confidential agreements 

with Tehran, related in particular to the training of experts and the 

export of equipment—both of which could have helped the Iranian 

military program. Russia may still fear that the full extent of its deals 

with Tehran will surface. Moscow also still has important economic 

interests in the country. But the acquisition of a nuclear capacity may 

be increasingly frightening to the Russian leadership as well. And 

rightly so, since Iran is far from being an ally to Moscow. Conflicting 

interests are therefore shaping Russia’s position.

A more serious partner than in the past? Taking into account 

the experience of the 1990s, Russia has long been considered an 

ambiguous partner on Iran. The situation seemed to change in 
296

the fall of 2003, probably because some new elements about the 

Iranian nuclear program became known in Moscow. The question is 

whether the leadership in Moscow has given precise instructions—

to Minatom/Rosatom in particular—to exert utmost prudence. The 

decision to withhold the contract concerning the fuel destined for 

the light water reactor at Bushier up to the moment where sufficient 

guarantees were acquired by the Russians has been seen as an 

indication that Moscow not only actively supported the European 

talks, but even wanted to contribute to them in kind. The contract 

concerning the return of the spent fuel was signed on February 

27, 2005, and the Bushier reactor may start operating in December 

2006, with the fuel delivered at the beginning of the year. Granted, 

IAEA inspectors are supposed to “monitor closely the use of the fuel 

and where it goes,” according to the IAEA’s spokeswoman Melissa 

Fleming, but the Russian move has raised some concern related to a 

possible crisis just during or after the delivery. The crucial question 

is what will happen to the fuel if Iran decides to put an end to all 

international inspections. Under the current circumstances a wise 

decision would be to delay the date of delivery.

There is no doubt in Moscow about Iran’s intentions. At the highest 

levels of the Russian leadership, the judgement concerning Iran’s 

intentions is no longer an enigma for the outside world: Moscow 

strongly believes that Iran has nuclear weapons ambitions. Apart 

from the indications that can be found in the IAEA reports, which 

are already strong enough, Russia undoubtedly has intelligence of 

its own on the subject. It may even know more than the West does 

about people involved in the program, about sensitive imports, and 

even about additional locations. After all, since so many people 

from Minatom/Rosatom—and other agencies—have been in Iran 

over the years, it is difficult to believe that such is not the case. And 

the Russians are no amateurs in the area of intelligence. Sharing this 

information would add confidence to the Moscow/West dialogue 

on Iran, but is unlikely. An opposite result would occur if influential 

officials in Moscow were to continue making ambiguous statements 

about the nature of the program. Such was the case in January 2005, 

when Russian Foreign Minister Serguei Lavrov declared: “I have 

no basis to believe that the situation is diverging from a normal 

course and that the peaceful character of Iran’s nuclear program 
297

will be changed”;23 and again in February, just before the signature 

of the spent fuel contract, when President Vladimir Putin, himself, 

contrary to his own beliefs, declared that there was no indication 

that Iran was pursuing a military nuclear program. In August 2005, 

similar statements were again made, raising doubts about Moscow’s 

commitments.

Moscow recognizes the security threat, but not openly. Lavrov’s and 

Putin’s statements notwithstanding, there are indications that, in the 

context of instability at the Russian southern border, this additional 

and most serious development is actually worrying Moscow. The 

question is whether consistent diplomatic positions based on this 

awareness will be adopted, particularly at a time when new tension is 

rising with Washington over the “democracy” issue, Ukraine and the 

Baltic states. An important question in Moscow is whether Iran has 

reached the point of self-sufficiency, and whether the empowerment 

of those seeking a nuclear breakout is generating an unstoppable 

proliferation momentum. Iran is fully aware of some change of mood 

in Russia and is somewhat concerned by it, trying to keep Russian 

statements as ambiguous as possible. As long as Moscow does 

not openly recognize the military nature of the program, it will be 

difficult to know what will happen should the dossier be transferred 

to the UN Security Council. Russian support may be difficult to get, 

as Chinese support is, for energy reasons.

For all the above reasons, Russia should be at the same time reassured 

and asked to provide more clarity in its position. Europe and America 

can duly consider Russia’s security fears. Russia, in return, should 

coordinate its actions and support transmission to the Security 

Council if talks run into a dead end. But will it?

The IAEA.

The Only Multilateral Player. The IAEA is in unique position: what 

the inspectors report to the Secretariat, and what the Secretariat 

reports to the Board24 are widely seen as unbiased by any national 

position. Whether this is entirely true in the case of Iran remains 

to be seen. Within the hierarchy of the Agency, there seemed to be 

different viewpoints concerning the Iranian dossier, highlighted by 

an interview Pierre Goldschmidt gave to the French newspaper, 
298

Le Figaro, when he left office in June. The differences of views are 

sometimes palpable in the reports. And there is also some obvious 

reluctance at the IAEA to do anything that could result in a 

transmission to the Security Council, whatever the findings on the 

ground. In addition, there is no real expertise within the IAEA on 

weaponization, with the exception of the Head of the Action Team 

dedicated to Iraq who took another position in the Agency. Finally, 

there have also been factual mistakes, for instance when an IAEA 

report in February 2004 identified P125 and L126 as G1.27 This has 

raised useless suspicions about the Agency’s competence. More 

serious is the fear, expressed by George Perkovich in an open letter 

to the IAEA’s Director General, that “Many capitals are so resistant 

to the current administration bullying that they urge you to cook 

the books to produce reports that will forestall another Iraq-style 

showdown.”28 Such a belief would call into question the neutrality of 

the Agency and its ability to report facts, or rather all the facts, to the 

Board of Governors. In this context, it is interesting to note that at the 

February 2005 Board, for the first time, Mohammed El Baradei issued 

no formal written report on Iran (the same occurred again in June). 

This shift was decided at a time when significant new elements had 

surfaced (to mention just two of them: the—undeclared—existence of 

a tunnel just north of the uranium conversion facility at Isfahan, and 

the new evidence concerning an extensive offer by the A. Q. Khan 

network in 1987). One can also wonder why the IAEA asked for an 

entire month in August to produce its report on the implementation 

of safeguards in Iran, losing precious time at a moment when Iran 

was resuming conversion activities at full speed.

The IAEA has an uneasy relationship with Iran. The story of the 

Iran/IAEA relationship is one of concealment and constant efforts 

to hinder inspection,29 and of constant reluctance on the part of the 

IAEA to recognize clear violations or make full use of its powers. In 

January 2005, while a EU3/Iran meeting was in progress, UN nuclear 

experts were allowed to take environmental samples from some 

green spaces in the complex of Parchin.30 For months, the Agency 

had been pressing Tehran for permission to inspect the military 

complex which was used to produce high explosives and missiles. 

If the intent was to assess proscribed Iranian research concerning 
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explosives related to the bomb, environmental samples will be 

insufficient.31 And in addition, access was only very partial. But, as a 

result, Iran is now in a position to pretend that access to Parchin has 

been granted—and that no nuclear activity had been detected. Why 

has the IAEA agreed to such bizarre modalities of inspections?32

Consequently, the IAEA did ask Iran to allow a second inspection 

on the same site, which has not been accepted so far.33 The modalities 

of inspection should include “complementary access” to the site and 

its facilities, in conformity with the Additional Protocol signed by 

Iran, rather than just environmental samples in a limited area. 

The IAEA is an ambiguous partner for the Europeans. In October 

2003, the IAEA, then engaged in a standoff with Iran, was somewhat 

irritated by the first European deal. The Agency narrowed the 

perimeter of the suspension agreed among the three European 

powers with the argument that it was too comprehensive to be 

acceptable under the IAEA statute. A significant problem has 

also surfaced because the IAEA will never pass judgement on the 

implementation of the “suspension” agreed with Iran by the EU/3, 

while the Agency is recognized as the ultimate authority to decide 

compliance or violation with commitments undertaken by Iran and 

has a November 2004 Board resolution supporting the EU/Iran 

agreement. When quality tests were undertaken by Iran on pieces 

of centrifuges in January 2005, for instance, they were thought to 

be inconsistent with the November 15 deal, but the IAEA did not 

consider them a breach, having in mind the statute more than the EU/

Iran agreement. In general terms, there is no doubt in IAEA minds 

that the way the Iranian program was carried out was unjustifiable 

economically and points to a military program, but there is no clear 

statement of this kind from the Agency. IAEA reports do not even 

always permit obtaining a clear view of what is going on in Iran:34 in 

the November 2004 report to the Board, for instance, where a long 

list of breaches from Iran had been listed (see paragraph 86 of the 

report), a sentence inconsistent with the report had been inserted: 

“To date, there is no evidence that the previously undeclared 

nuclear material and activities referred to above are related to a 

nuclear weapons program.” To what else could all the concealment, 

conversion activities in uranium metal, multiple attempts to acquire 

beryllium, and contradictory statements be related? Such a sentence 
300

having been written, the IAEA should at least show the international 

community that it indeed has done everything possible to justify the 

assertion. “Complementary access” to additional sites, including 

military sites, will be necessary for that purpose, but the Agency 

appears unwilling to make full use of its rights. Only in February 

2005 was there a clear backing by the IAEA for a comprehensive 

deal with the Europeans that would address nuclear power, 

regional security, and trade, but this was at a time when such a 

deal already was considered highly unlikely in European capitals 

because the main objective of the talks—cessation of enrichment and 

reprocessing activities—was already simply rejected by Tehran at 

that stage, without any alternative solution presented by Iran to the 

Europeans. 

SOME TRANSATLANTIC SCENARIOS

 As Robert Einhorn has put it: “The Iran nuclear issue poses two 

critical tests for the United States and Europe. The first is whether, 

after the deep divisions over Iraq, Americans and Europeans can 

work together effectively on an issue of major importance to each 

other as well as the world at large. The second is whether dissuading 

a resourceful, determined country from acquiring nuclear weapons 

is possible through means short of military force. The two tests are, 

of course, closely related.”35 It is with this in mind that the following 

scenarios should be appreciated.

America Joins European Negotiations. 

 Good arguments, which are unlikely to be effected at this stage, 

could be presented in favor of this move, if Iran returns to suspension. 

A transatlantic deal with Iran would be the best scenario for all 

players concerned: Iran would shut down its fuel cycle activities and 

keep proliferation-resistant nuclear reactors; the nuclear fuel would 

be provided by Russia with European guarantee and returned to 

the supplier. The abandonment of Iran’s military nuclear ambitions 

would be accomplished in return for economic and security benefits. 

Whether such a bargain can be realized with Iran is open to question. 

It appears very unlikely with the new government and the new 
301

negotiator, who never accepted contemplation of a permanent 

suspension. But such was also the position of the previous team, 

and the price to pay for continuing fuel cycle activities useless for 

a civilian program may focus minds at some point. If this scenario 

would become more realistic than it is in September 2005, Washington 

should be on board to help achieve it: the main benefits cannot 

come from Europe alone. The only meaningful security guarantees 

are American, and trade with Iran is also meaningless without 

American sanctions being lifted.36 In any case, negotiations should 

in no case be bilateral, as some Iranian officials have sometimes 

suggested, because this would only add confusion and room for 

maneuver in Tehran. The benefit of an American involvement can 

result only from good coordination with the Europeans. Should the 

talks succeed, Washington would be part of the success. And success 

could mean either reaching an agreement or buying time in order for 

the Iranian leadership to evolve. Should negotiations fail, the Bush 

administration would be in a position to maintain that it has tried 

to help the diplomatic process to no avail. As a precaution though, 

Washington could present three conditions to the Europeans. First, it 

would be prepared to help the process only if the suspension could 

be considered permanent in an explicit—not only implicit—manner, 

with an endorsement from the Security Council now that Iran has 

breached a second agreement with Europe. Second, the UF6 produced 

in Iran since August 2005 should leave the territory of Iran. Third, any 

significant finding would lead the Europeans and the Americans to 

work together to transfer the Iranian nuclear dossier to the Security 

Council for harsher measures as soon as November 2005. There the 

United States, Europe, and Russia would be able jointly to choose a 

range of measures that should be determined between them in advance. 

 Last but not least, America—along with the European powers—

could mobilize Arab states that are also worried about nuclear 

developments in Iran. As George Perkovitch notes, they currently 

are much too passive. Egypt, for instance, sees it very much as Israel 

does: as a threat to its very existence, but its diplomacy at the NPT 

review conference in May 2005 has, in fact, shielded Iran. Why? Gulf 

nations have no doubt about Iran’s hypocrisy when Tehran tries to 

neutralize them.37 Nuclear weapons in Iran are seen as an indication 
302

of Iran’s will to exert dominance over the region, particularly over 

the Gulf, and to reshape the Middle East. 

 This first scenario had gained some ground at the beginning 

of the second Bush administration. After returning from Europe 

in February 2005, President Bush reportedly asked his advisors to 

think about a list of incentives to offer Tehran as part of European 

talks with Iran. But events on the Iranian political scene since have 

again put it on the back burner.

Europe Joins America in the Security Council. 

 This is an outcome that the Europeans have never ruled out. 

Again on January 19, French Minister of Foreign Affairs Michel 

Barnier stated that, “In case the negotiations fail, the dossier will 

be brought to the Security Council where a resolution will define 

what the international community should do.” And in August 2005, 

Jacques Chirac repeated the same threat: “If Iran does not reestablish 

confidence, the Security Council will have no other choice than to 

take up the dossier.” In the first half of 2005, the Europeans have 

been delaying the Iranian program but not solving the problem.38

What was lacking in the European negotiations was a clear threat of 

precise punitive measures to back the talks. Without such a threat, 

the talks were actually doomed.39 The Security Council was not 

seen by Iran as a realistic scenario because the kind of action that 

could be adopted in New York remained unclear. Beyond a clear 

endorsement of the European demands, the UN Security Council 

could ask for more intrusive powers for the inspectors who currently 

have no sufficient access to sites, documents and personnel; adopt 

sanctions related to investments on oil and gas infrastructures, very 

much needed in Iran; decide on an arms embargo; and at the end of 

the process, if nothing else has worked, an oil embargo and even a 

threat of further action. The only condition to fulfill is to take into 

consideration the importance of time : if action is not quick enough, 

the international community may find itself with another North 

Korea, able to blackmail the world with capabilities that are not fully 

known.

 The second round of negotiations has been presented all along 

as the “last chance” for Iran. The deal was to suspend any transfer 
303

to the Security Council while the suspension of fuel cycle activities 

were themselves suspended. At the present stage, no option should 

be withdrawn from the table,40 and such is the IAEA message of the 

September resolution. But it is fair to acknowledge that a transfer to 

the UN Security Council would have been easier in November 2003,41

when a long list of violations was acknowledged, than now, when 

additional problems have surfaced without any major new violation 

being identified. By major violation, one can understand either 

further discovery related to nuclear materials or Iranian activities on 

weaponization. So far, the strongest evidence of a nuclear weapons 

program is the 1987 A.Q. Khan offer, and, if confirmed, the thousands 

pages of Farsi-language computer files that were revealed by The 

Wall Street Journal in March and July, documenting Iran’s efforts to 

adapt its Shehab 3 missile for delivering a nuclear warhead. The paper 

gives specifications for size, weight and even height of detonation. 

This highly classified information was reportedly shared with 

the three Europeans and with the IAEA. However, short of using 

intelligence, transfer to the UN Security Council can still use past 

violations, that, according to the IAEA statute, shall be reported to the 

Council, without any specification of date. In addition, the IAEA has 

recognized in its reports to the Board that it was not in a position to 

verify in detail the chronologies and descriptions of the experiments 

which took place in Iran, and that the lack of records with regard 

to the amount of uranium rendered impossible a precise material 

accounting in the country. This is also a ground, according to the 

IAEA statute for referring the matter to the UN Security Council.

The Two Sides of the Atlantic Break Apart. 

 This is Iran’s preferred scenario, and the most dangerous 

outcome. It could happen in a number of ways: the Americans 

continuing to remain inactive on Iran, insisting on regime-change;42

the British giving priority to the fear of Iranian interference in 

Iraq, and downplaying the Iranian nuclear threat;43 the Germans 

remaining reluctant to use any means of coercion, particularly 

during an electoral campaign; the French—along with the British 

and the Germans—refusing to condone any U.S. threat to use force, 
304

whatever the circumstances.44 In addition, taking into account that 

the only meaningful sanction would concern investments on oil and 

gas infrastructures and Iranian oil sales, there may be reluctance in 

the three capitals to go that far for a number of reasons. One is the 

Iraqi precedent;, another is the effect on oil prices, already very high; 

and a third is China’s already stated position that Beijing would veto 

such measures at the Security Council. But whether this European 

reluctance would amount to a transatlantic divide is unclear. After 

all, America also might worry about the international consequences 

of such a move. But all the players would be well-advised not to 

forget that this particular dimension of the Iranian nuclear issue is 

far more complex. If Iran continues its military program, a number 

of regional players will be tempted to follow suit—including Saudi 

Arabia. Since this is the major oil producing nation in the world, what 

will be the effect on oil prices and how would this new problem be 

dealt with? 

CONCLUSION

 Time is running out in September 2005 and stakes are high for 

both America and Europe. A multipolar nuclear Middle East is 

the last thing both partners wish to see develop.45 For that reason, 

even an Iranian advanced nuclear capability that has not yet built 

a bomb is unacceptable. Such a situation would give rise to similar 

ambitions in the region and encourage the same kinds of military 

developments. As North Korea has taught us in East Asia, where 

Japan increasingly is nervous, ambiguity is dangerous.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 12

1. As Robert Einhorn puts it, “Prospects for forging an agreed transatlantic 

approach toward Iran depend to a significant extent on whether the United 

States and Europe share a common understanding of Iran’s nuclear intentions.” 

“A Transatlantic Strategy on Iran’s Nuclear Program,” The Washington Quarterly, 

Autumn 2004. They did not in the 1990s. They now do.

2. On March 11, 2005, the U.S. Secretary of State issued a statement supporting 

the EU/3 efforts, underlining that “The Europeans have been very clear with the 

Iranians that there will have to be certain objective guarantees that Iran is not trying 

to use a civilian nuclear program to provide cover for a weapons program.”
305

3. But for the first time on March 10, 2005, the three European powers have 

made clear that they “will have no choice but to support referring Iran’s nuclear 

program to the UN Security Council,” if Iran does not maintain the suspension of 

all its nuclear enrichment related and reprocessing activities and does not fulfill all 

its international agreements.

 4. The agreement signed on February 27, 2005, between Russia and Iran 

concerning the fuel necessary for the Bushier reactor was consistent with the 

European negotiation in that it showed that Iran does not need fuel cycle 

activities of its own. But the fear of losing this contract may now have undesirable 

consequences.

5. The Euro-American talks at the end of January in Washington may well 

have had this purpose, in preparation for the visit to Brussels of President Bush 

in February. And the need for closer contacts was felt in August as well, when 

resumption of conversion activities took place in Iran.

6. Among the other inspected facilities were Bushier Nuclear Power Plant, 

Esfahan Nuclear Technology Centre, Laser Separation Laboratory, Lashkar Ab’ad, 

Tehran Nuclear Research Centre, and Karaj Nuclear Research Center.

7. The evidence relunctantly was turned over by Iran to the IAEA in February 

2005. Mr Khan’s representatives offered in particular the technology necessary to 

cast uranium metal.

8. Or even attempts of purchases. For instance, there is evidence that Iran 

has attempted to purchase significant quantities of the substance. Five countries 

were involved in the attempts: Russia, China, Germany, Kazakhstan, and the 

United Kingdom. According to Reuters, January 21, “The only successful import 

of beryllium by Iran was a few grams purchased in Britain.” There is no evidence 

that the other attempts succeeded. 

9. The common letter signed on March 10 by the EU/3 is the best show of unity 

so far. It states clear readiness to refer Iran’s nuclear program to the UN Secuirity 

Council under certain circumstances, namely if full suspension is not maintained. 

Germany apparently had forgotten it in August.

10. When Iran renewed its enrichment activities in June 2004, the pretext was 

already that the Europeans had not honored their “promise” to remove the Iranian 

nuclear issue from the IAEA agenda. No such promise had ever been made. 

11. At the beginning of the second Bush mandate, though, a number of 

statements were made in Washington concerning the absence of any military 

plans against Iran in the near future.

12. Probably to show that he did not do it by mistake, Jack Straw repeated 

the same position on January 19, saying that there was no alternative to Europe’s 

approach of using diplomacy to try to persuade Iran to give up technology that 

could be used to make nuclear weapons.

13. This interpretation was revived in January 2005 when media reported that 

the United States had been flying drones over Iran to locate hidden nuclear sites. 
306

On February 15, Iranian state TV even reported that a missile had been fired from 

an unknown fighter not far from the Bushier nuclear reactor.

14. It would be more accurate to say that the regime in Tehran calls explicitly 

for the destruction of the State of Israel.

15. Since then, progress has been made in Iran. In October, Tehran announced 

successful trials of its Shehab 3 ballistic missile with a range of 2000km, putting 

parts of Europe, as well as Israel and U.S. bases in the Gulf, within reach.

16. Because of the many violations Iran has already committed in the last 20 

years!

17. In June 2004, eight servicemen were abducted by the Iranian Pasdaran to 

remind London, if need be, of their nuisance capability. 

18. Rafsanjani himself noted: “The war taught us that international laws were 

only scraps of papers.” See IRNA, 19 October 1988.

19. To my knowledge, the real issue on the French side at the time of Iraqi 

chemical attacks on Iranian troops was the use of French aircraft for the delivery 

of the gas.

20. In January 2005, the ISNA Student news agency quoted President Rafsanjani 

as saying, “The Islamic Republic is not a place for adventurism.”

21. On January 18, there was a cryptic statement in Tehran: “We are able to say 

that we have strength such that no country can attack us because they do not have 

precise information about our military capabilities due to our ability to implement 

flexible strategies. We can claim that we have rapidly produced equipment that 

has resulted in the greatest deterrent.” The IAEA should ask for an explanation 

concerning the meaning of what appears to be a nuclear threat. But it remembers 

Saddam’s statements and Kim Jong Il’s statements more than an actual threat that 

would lead Iran to the Security Council. 

22. Robert Einhorn.

23. Interfax News Agency, January 18, 2005. Serguei Lavrov was in Petrozavodsk 

when he made this statement. The worst part of the statement is actually what 

follows: “The Iranian leadership assures us that the peaceful character of the 

nuclear program is precisely the aim of Tehran.” An expert in leadership like 

Serguei Lavrov certainly knows what confidence can be attached to such empty 

claims. 

24. There have been seven written reports to the IAEA Board so far: 

GOV/2003/40, dated June 6, 2003; GOV/2003/63, dated August 26, 2003; 

GOV/2003/75, dated November 10, 2003; GOV/2004/11, dated February 24, 

2004; GOV/2004/34, dated June 1, 2004; GOV/2004/60, dated September 1, 2004; 

and GOV/2004/83, dated November 15, 2004.

25. Iranian centrifuges in Natanz, Iran.

26. Iranian centrifuges found in Libya in 2004. The Iranian and the Libyan 

models are based on design information stolen in the Netherlands by A. Q. Khan. 
307

27. The G1 is a subcritical, single tube German model from the 1960s far 

simpler than the supercritical Dutch centrifuges. This mistake has correctly been 

denounced by Nuclear Fuel in January 2005, and the IAEA consequently should 

make a corrigendum in its next report. 

28. George Perkovich, “Memorandum to Mohammed El Baradei,” Foreign 

Policy, January-February 2005, pp. 60-64. 

29. A flavor of the uneasy IAEA/Iran relationship can be provided by the 

last IAEA report, GOV/2004/83, where one can read on the first page—in the 

inimitable IAEA style—that the September Board of Governors,

strongly urged that Iran respond positively to the Director General’s 

findings on the provision of access and information by taking such steps 

as are required by the Agency and/or requested by the Board in relation 

to the implementation of Iran’s Safeguards Agreement, including the 

provision of prompt access to locations and personnel, and by providing 

further information and explanations when required by the Agency and 

proactively to assist the Agency to understand the full extent and nature of 

Iran’s enrichment program and to take all steps within its power to clarify 

the outstanding issues before the Board’s 25 November 2004 meeting, 

specifically including the sources and reasons for enriched uranium 

contamination and the import, manufacture and use of centrifuges.

30. Out of four areas identified by the Agency to be of political interest, the 

Agency was permitted to select one area. In addition, in that area the Agency was 

requested to minimize the number of buildings to be visited.

31. Unless some radioactive (other than fissile) material has been used in the 

process.

32. There was probably an internal debate on this subject within the IAEA 

since some days after the useless inspection, the agency was expressing the wish 

to come back to the Iranian military complex.

33. See “IAEA wants to conduct second Parchin inspection,” Nuclear Threat 

Initiative, Global Security Newswire, January 19, 2005. Tehran considers that there 

is no justification for any additional visit.

34. What can be made for instance of the following sentence: “The Director 

General noted an increased degree of cooperation by Iran, while noting that some 

of the information and access were at times slow in coming and incremental, and 

that some of the information was in contrast to that previously provided by Iran.” 

GOV/2003/75, November 10, 2003.

35. Einhorn. 

36. This being said, contrary to the security basket, where the United States 

is the only serious player, the Europeans have a list of possible exports and 

investments that present a real interest for the Iranians.

37. The First International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) Gulf Dialogue 

in Bahrain (December 3-5, 2004) made this point abundantly clear. See also George 
308

Perkovitch, “Iran is not an Island: A Strategy to Mobilize the Neighbours,” 

forthcoming Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Policy Brief.

38. In order to have a clearer view on this point, it would be necessary to 

know how the overt program, which is suspended, is connected with the covert 

program. 

39. See Gary Samore to AFP January 20: “In a way, the American threat to 

bomb Iran is also indirect pressure on Europe to do its very best to achieve a 

diplomatic solution.”

40. The New Yorker has carried a detailed and only partially denied report that 

U.S. forces are carrying out missions inside Iran, pinpointing sites that could be hit 

by air-strikes. If such is the case, it may be part of a deterrence policy more than the 

indication that a choice has already be made. 

41. This has long been the position in Washington, and the Americans have a 

point here.

42. A more moderate regime might bring some positive development, but it 

should be kept in mind that any threat of regime change would have the effect 

of strengthening the more conservative Iranians and that the Iranian youth are 

apparently supporting the nuclear option. See Ray Takeyh, “Iran Builds the 

Bomb,” Survival, Vol 6, No. 4, Winter 2004-05, p. 59. In addition, reformers have 

lost ground during the last years.

 43. How the British elections in the spring will influence the negotiating 

process is an open question.

44. In January 2004, a number of European leaders have indicated that talks 

with Iran were excluding any threat to use force. Geermany repeated this position 

in August, when talks failed.

45. This is why, as a group of eminent experts gathered in November 2004 

in Washington put it: “Just as the Europeans must be prepared to punish Iran 

should it fail to uphold the latest agreement, the United States must be willing to 

engage in a security dialogue with Tehran.” See Iran Watch Roundtables (with the 

following panelists: Rolf Ekeus, Stanley K. Fraley, John Sigler, Terence Taylor, and 

Marcus Winsley).
309

ABOUT THE CONTRIBUTORS

WYN Q. BOWEN is Director of Research in the Defence Studies 

Department, King’s College London (KCL) at the Joint Services Command 

and Staff College (JSCSC), Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, 

and Director of the International Centre for Security Analysis (ICSA) at 

KCL. In addition, Dr. Bowen has served as a Specialist Advisor to the 

United Kingdom’s House of Commons’ Foreign Affairs Committee for 

inquiries into “The decision to go to war in Iraq” (2003) and “Weapons 

of Mass Destruction” (2000). From 1995 to 1997 he was a Senior Research 

Associate of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute 

of International Studies, California. During 1997 and 1998, he participated 

in three weapons inspection missions with the United Nations Special 

Commission in Iraq.

DAGOBERT BRITO is the Peterkin Professor of Political Economy in the 

Department of Economics and a Baker Scholar at the James A. Baker III 

School of Public Policy at Rice University. His current research is focused 

on optimal tax theory, economics of defense, energy economics, and 

law economics. He served in the U.S. Army from 1963-66. Dr. Brito’s 

recent Iran-related publications include “Upgrading the Saudi Petroline: 

An Alternative to the Strait of Hormuz?” Center for Naval Analyses 

Memorandum, SECRET, with M. W. Ewell, Jr., A. Hashim, and J. Noer 

(October, 1998) PP. 98-130; and “Alternatives to the Strait of Hormuz,” The 

Energy Journal, with E. Sheshinski (1998). Dr. Brito received his BA, MA, 

and Ph.D. in Economics from Rice University.

SHLOMO BROM joined the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies (JCSS) as 

a Senior Research Associate in 1998, retiring as a Brigadier General after 

a long career in the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF). His most senior post in 

the IDF was Director of the Strategic Planning Division in the Planning 

Branch of the General Staff. Brigadier General Brom participated actively 

in peace negotiations with the Palestinians, Jordanians, and Syrians, and 

in the Israeli delegation to the Arms Control and Regional Security group 

of the multilateral regional negotiations. In 2000 he was named Deputy 

to the National Security Advisor, returning to JCSS at the end of his post. 

Brigadier General Brom authored Israel and South Lebanon: In the Absence of 

a Peace Treaty with Syria (Jaffee Center, Special Studies, September 1999); 

and edited the JCSS publications, The Middle East Military Balance 1999-

2000 and The Middle East Military Balance 2001-2002.
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PATRICK CLAWSON is deputy director of the Washington Institute 

for Near East Policy and senior editor of Middle East Quarterly. He has 

published numerous scholarly articles on the Middle East in Foreign Affairs, 

International Economy, Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics and Middle 

East Journal. Also, he has published opinion articles in the New York Times, 

Wall Street Journal, and Washington Post. Mr. Clawson was co-convener 

of the Presidential Study Group organized by The Washington Institute, 

which published its recommendations to the new Bush administration in 

the form of a monograph, Navigating Through Turbulence: America and the 

Middle East in a New Century (The Washington Institute, 2001). His most 

recently authored and edited works include How to Build a New Iraq After 

Saddam, editor (The Washington Institute, 2003) and The Last Arab-Israeli 

Battlefield? Implications of an Israeli Withdrawal from Lebanon, co-editor (The 

Washington Institute, 2000).

THÉRÈSE DELPECH is currently Director for Strategic Studies at the 

Atomic Energy Commission of France, and Senior Research Fellow 

at CERI. She is also UNMOVIC Commissioner and Member of the IISS 

Council. She chaired the UN Advisory Board for Disarmament Matters in 

1999 and served as Advisor to the French Prime Minister Alain Juppé for 

politico-military affairs (1995-97). She also served as permanent consultant 

to the Policy Planning Staff, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1991-1995). Ms. 

Delpech is the author of three books: L’Héritage Nucléaire (Complexe, 

1997), La Guerre Parfaite (Flammarion, 1998) and Politique du Chaos (Le 

Seuil, 2002), and has written numerous articles in journals such as Politique 

Etrangère, Internationale Politik, Survival, Global and Commentaire Politique 

Internationale.

THOMAS DONNELLY is presently a Resident fellow at the American 

Enterprise Institute (AEI). He is the author of AEI’s National Security 

Outlook. At AEI, he specializes in defense and national security. His latest 

book is Operation Iraqi Freedom: A Strategic Assessment (AEI, 2004). From 

1995 to 1999, Mr. Donnelly was policy group director and a professional 

staff member for the Committee on National Security (now named the 

Committee on Armed Services) in the U.S. House of Representatives. He 

has also been editor of Army Times and deputy editor of Defense News. Mr. 

Donnelly received his BA from Ithaca College and his M.I.P.P. from the 

Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies. 
311

MICHAEL EISENSTADT is a senior fellow and director of the Military 

and Security Studies Program at The Washington Institute for Near East 

Policy. He is a specialist on Persian Gulf and Arab-Israeli security affairs 

and has published numerous articles and monographs on U.S. strategy in 

the Middle East; nonconventional weapons proliferation in the Near East 

and Southwest Asia; and the armed forces of Iraq, Iran, Syria, Israel, and the 

Palestinian Authority. Prior to joining the Institute in 1989, Mr. Eisenstadt 

worked as a civilian military analyst with the U.S. Army. In 1992, he took 

a leave of absence from the Institute to work on the U.S. Air Force Gulf 

War Air Power Survey, to which he contributed a chapter on Iraqi strategy 

and planning. Mr. Eisenstadt is a reserve officer in the U.S. Army and in 

1991 served in Turkey and Iraq as part of Operation PROVIDE COMFORT. 

More recently, he served at U.S. Central Command, on the Joint Staff, and 

in the Office of the Secretary of Defense during Operations ENDURING 

FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM. Mr. Eisenstadt has a master’s degree in 

Arab Studies from Georgetown University. 

AMY MYERS JAFFE is the Wallace S. Wilson fellow for Energy Studies at 

the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy and associate director of 

the Rice University energy program. Her research focuses on the subject of 

oil geopolitics, strategic energy policy including energy science policy, and 

energy economics. Ms. Jaffe is widely published in academic journals and 

numerous book volumes and served as co-editor of Energy in the Caspian 

Region: Present and Future (Palgrave, 2002). She was among the 2004 Key 

Women in Energy-Americas honorees in the Pathfinders/Trailblazers 

category and received the 1994 Award for Excellence by the International 

Association for Energy Economics. She is a member of the Council on 

Foreign Relations. Prior to joining the Baker Institute, Ms. Jaffe was the 

senior editor and Middle East analyst for Petroleum Intelligence Weekly, a 

respected oil journal. She has written for a variety of publications including 

the New York Times, Dow Jones International, and the Mideast Report. Ms. 

Jaffe is a Princeton University graduate in Arabic Studies.

JOANNA KIDD is a Deputy Director of the International Centre for 

Security Analysis (ICSA), King’s College London (KCL). From 1999 to 

2003 she was a Defence Analyst at the International Institute for Strategic 

Studies (IISS) where she researched, published and broadcast extensively 

on naval, maritime and security issues. Prior to joining the IISS, Ms. Kidd 

had been a junior warfare officer in the UK Royal Navy. She was educated 

at the University of Oxford and the London School of Economics.
312

IAN O. LESSER is Senior Scholar, Southeast Europe Program, Woodrow 

Wilson International Center for Scholars, and President, Mediterranean 

Advisors, LLC. Previously, he was Vice President and Director of Studies 

at the Pacific Council on International Policy in Los Angeles, and a senior 

analyst at RAND Corporation, specializing in strategic studies and 

Mediterranean affairs. In 1994-95 Dr. Lesser was a member of the State 

Department’s Policy Planning Staff, where his responsibilities included 

southern Europe, Turkey, North Africa and the multilateral track of the 

Middle East peace process. Earlier in his career, he was affiliated with 

the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the Atlantic Council 

of the United States, International Energy Associates, Ltd. Dr. Lesser’s 

publications include Turkish Foreign Policy in an Age of Uncertainty (RAND, 

2003); A Sense of Siege: The Geopolitics of Islam and the West (Westview, 1995); 

and Strategic Exposure: Proliferation Around the Mediterranean (RAND,1994).

Dr. Lesser received his D. Phil. in international politics from Oxford 

University in 1988.

SILVIA MANZANERO is a native of Madrid, Spain, and is a paralegal 

at Stetson University College of Law. As a Carnegie Junior Fellow, Ms. 

Manzanero worked in the Nonproliferation, U.S. Leadership and Russia 

and Eurasia Projects. While at Carnegie, Ms. Manzanero co-authored “Plan 

B: Using Sanctions to End Iran’s Nuclear Program”; contributed to Carnegie 

Draft Paper, “The Global Consequences of Iran’s Acquisition of Nuclear 

Weapons”; and wrote several analytical essays on Iraq’s democratization 

prospects, U.S.-Spanish relations and military humanitarian interventions. 

Ms. Manzanero’s research expertise also includes transitions to democracy, 

national identity formation and constitutional decentralization processes. 

After completing her B.A. degree in Political Science/Economics from the 

New College of Florida, the Honors School of the Florida State University 

System, Ms. Manzanero was awarded the prestigious Carnegie Endowment 

for International Peace Fellowship. 

GEORGE PERKOVICH is Vice President for Studies at the Carnegie 

Endowment for International Peace. He served as a speechwriter and 

foreign policy advisor to Senator Joe Biden. Dr. Perkovich is author of 

India’s Nuclear Bomb (University of California, 2001), which won the 

Herbert Feis Award from the American Historical Association and the A.K. 

Coomaraswamy Award from the Association for Asian Studies. His work 

has appeared in a variety of publications, including Foreign Affairs, Atlantic 

Monthly, Weekly Standard, the Wall Street Journal, the Washington Post, and 

the New York Times. Dr. Perkovich obtained a BA from the University of 
313

California at Santa Cruz; an MA in Soviet studies from Harvard University; 

and a Ph.D. in foreign affairs, from the University of Virginia.

RICHARD L. RUSSELL is a Professor at the National Defense University’s 

Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies. He also is an Adjunct 

Associate Professor in the Security Studies Program and a Research 

Associate in the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, both at the Edmund 

A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University. Dr. Russell 

served for 17 years as a political-military analyst at the Central Intelligence 

Agency, where he analyzed security issues relating to the Middle East and 

Europe. He is the author of two books: Weapons Proliferation and War in the 

Greater Middle East: Strategic Contest (Routledge, 2005) and George F. Kennan’s 

Strategic Thought: The Making of an American Political Realist (Praeger, 1999). 

Dr. Russell obtained his Ph.D. from the University of Viriginia.

HENRY SOKOLSKI is the Executive Director of the Nonproliferation Policy 

Edcuation Center, a Washington-based nonprofit otganization founded in 

1994 to promote a better understanding of strategic weapons proliferation 

issues for academics, policy makers, and the media. He served from 1989 

to 1993 as Deputy for Nonproliferation Policy in the Office of the Secretary 

of Defense and earlier in the Office of Net Assessment and as a legislative 

military aide in the U.S. Senate. Mr. Sokolski is the author of Best of Intentions: 

America’s Campaign Against Strategic Weapons Proliferation (Praeger, 2001), 

and co-editor with Patrick Clawson, Deputy Director, Washington Institute 

for Near East Policy, of Checking Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions (Carlisle, PA: 

Strategic Studies Institute, 2004).

DOUGLAS E. STREUSAND is a professor at the American Public 

University System and founder and coordinator of the Global Strategy 

Seminar of the Center for Security Studies. He was a John M. Olin Public 

Affairs Fellow at the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace in 

1988-89, Visiting Fellow at the Heritage Foundation in 1989, and Senior 

Fellow and Director of the Greater Middle East Program at the U.S. Global 

Strategy Council in 1995-96 and has taught at the University of Maryland 

College Park, the University of Maryland University College, and the 

Johns Hopkins University. He is the author of The Formation of the Mughal 

Empire (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1989), as well as numerous 

articles and reviews. Dr. STREUSAND received a BA in history from Duke 

University and a Ph.D. in Islamic history from the University of Chicago.
314

KENNETH R. TIMMERMAN is a former Congressional aide and 

investigative reporter who has worked such periodicals as Time magazine, 

Readers Digest, and the American Spectator, and was a Senior Writer for 

Insight, the weekly newsmagazine of the Washington Times. His latest book, 

Countdown to Crisis: The Coming Nuclear Showdown With Iran, was published 

by Crown Forum in June 2005. In the 1980s, Mr. Timmerman covered wars 

in Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq. In 2000 he was a primary candidate for the 

U.S. Senate. Mr. Timmerman has authored several books, including The 

Death Lobby: How the West Armed Iraq (Houghton Mifflin, 1991) and Weapons 

of Mass Destruction: The Cases of Iran, Syria and Libya (Simon Wiesenthal 

Center, 1992).