U.S. Army Research Institute

for the Behavioral and Social Sciences

Research Report 1810

Exploiting FBCB2 Capabilities Through

Realistic Feedback

Bruce C. Leibrecht

Karen J. Lockaby

Northrup Grumman Mission Systems

Larry L. Meliza

U.S. Army Research Institute

July 2003 20030731 067

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
U.S. Army Research Institute

for the Behavioral and Social Sciences

A Directorate of the U.S. Total Army Personnel Command

ZITA Wl. SIMUTIS

Director

Research accomplished under contract

for the Department of the Army

Northrup Grumman Mission Systems

Technical review by

John W. Diem, III Corps G3 Battle Command Training Branch

James M. Kanzenbach, TRADOC Warrior-T

NOTICES

DISTRIBUTION: Primary distribution of this Research Report has been made by ARI.

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NOTE: The findings in this Research Report are not to be construed as an official

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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

1. REPORT DATE (dd-mm-yy)

July 2003

2. REPORT TYPE

Final

3. DATES COVERED (from... to)

Mar 02-May 03

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE

Exploiting FBCB2 Capabilities Through Realistic Feedback

5a. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER

DASW01-99-D-0013 (DO 22)

5b. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER

20262785

6. AUTHOR(S)

Bruce C. Leibrecht, & Karen J. Lockaby (Northrop Grumman

Mission Systems); and Larry L. Meliza (U.S. Army Research

Institute)

5c. PROreCT NUMBER

A790

5d. TASK NUMBER

234

5e. WORK UNIT NUMBER

C01

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)

Northrop Grumman Space U.S. Army Research Institute for the

and Mission Systems Behavioral and Social Sciences

One Federal Park Drive Simulator Systems Research Unit

Fairfax, VA 22033-4411 12350 Research Parkway

Orlando, FL 32826

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U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social

Sciences

5001 Eisenhower Avenue

Alexandria, VA 22333-5600

10. MONITOR ACRONYM

ARI

11. MONITOR REPORT NUMBER

Research Report 1810

12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

Delivery Order Contracting Officer's Representative, Larry L. Meliza.

14. A&SIKACX (Maximum 200 v/ords):

This report describes the development of a proficiency measurement architecture for the Force XXI Battle Command

Brigade and Below (FBCB2). It first explores primary dimensions of FBCB2-enabled performance—high-priority

system capabilities, user digital skills and tasks, and network management skills. It then examines key factors that

influence digital performance, including echelon, mission phase, unit standing operating procedures, task difficulty,

and common performance problems. Finally, it discusses measurement implications of digitization, a comprehensive

framework for presenting observation guidelines, and implications for FBCB2-focused After Action Reviews (AAR).

The collective findings establish a basic architecture for measuring high-payoff proficiency targets, enhancing

performance feedback capabilities, and optimizing the benefits of digital training programs. Two practical tools will

help leaders and trainers focus on FBCB2-enabled skills that contribute significantly to combat effectiveness. Key

recommendations for expanding the architecture and knowledge base are included.

15. SUBJECT TERMS

Digitization Digital Training C4I Capabilities FBCB2 Exploitation

Performance Assessment Digital User Skills First Digitized Division Digital Proficiency

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF : 19. LIMITATION OF 20. NUMBER

OF PAGES

53

21. RESPONSIBLE PERSON

(Name and Telephone Number)

Dr. Larry Meliza

(407) 384-3992

16. REPORT

Unclassified

17. ABSTRACT

Unclassified

18. TfflSPAGE

Unclassified

ABSTR

Unlim

ACT

ited
Research Report 1810

Exploiting FBCB2 Capabilities Through

Realistic Feedback

Bruce 0. Leibrecht

Karen J. Lockaby

Northrup Grumman Mission Systems

Larry L. Meliza

U.S. Army Researcfi Institute

Simulator Systems Research Unit

Stephen L. Goldberg, Chief

U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences

5001 Eisenhower Avenue, Alexandria, Virginia 22333-5600

July 2003

Army Projeci Number Personnel Performance and

2O262785A790 Training Technology

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

Preceding Page Blank "^
FOREWORD

Information age warfare challenges warfighters to exploit the powerful capabilities of

advanced digital systems. In training to achieve digital proficiency, unit leaders and trainers

need tools that help them focus on systems-enabled skills contributing significantly to tactical

performance. In support ofthe digitized force, the U.S. Army Research Institute's Simulator

Systems Research Unit (SSRU) investigates training and performance assessment needs. The

SSRU assists III Corps' Battle Command Training Dkectorate and the Program Executive Office

for Simulation, Training and Instrumentation (PEO-STRI) by developing performance

measurement methods and tools for exploiting digital capabilities.

The goal ofthe research described in this report was to estabUsh a basic proficiency

measurement architecture for the Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2), the

workhorse command and control system for platoons, companies, and battalions. The report

explores primary dimensions ofFBCB2-enabled performance, key factors influencing operator and

user performance, and digital proficiency indicators vnth emphasis on observation and feedback

guidelines. The findings estabUsh a systematic fitimework for measuring high-payoflfproficiency

targets, enhancing perfomiance feedback capabiUties, and optimizing the benefits of digital training

programs. A companion report presents two practical products—^a Leader's Primer and an

Exploitation Tool—that spotiight high-payoffmeasurement targets for FBCB2 operators and users.

Training developers and researchers can use the findings to focus training packages and

tools on high-payoffproficiency targets. For ti-aining planners and managers, tiie proficiency

measurement architecture can help enhance the training programs of FBCB2-enabled units—and

ultimately their combat effectiveness. The authors' recommendations can constructively shape

efforts to enhance training as a decisive force multiplier for the future operational environment.

The results ofthis work were briefed to III Corps' Battle Command Training Directorate

at Fort Hood, Texas on 22 November 2002 and agam on 29 January 2003.

FRANKLIN L. MOSES

Acting Technical Director

Preceding Page Blank
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

We thank the members ofthe f' and 2"'' Brigades, 4* Infantry Division (4ID)

(Mechanized) who generously participated in interview sessions. Equally important was the

support of Mr. John Diem, m Corps Battle Command Training Directorate, and staff members

of the Battle Command Training Center (BCTC). We are grateful to Kevin Harrison, Randall

Hill, Marc Dudley, Chris Strauss, Conrad Hinkel, Alva Walker, and Jack Johnston of Northrop

Grumman Mission Systems for then: invaluable input as subject matter experts (SME). Ms.

Wilma Sanders, also of Northrop Grumman Mission Systems, expertly supported editing and

production ofthe report.

VI
EXPLOITING FBCB2 CAPABILITIES THROUGH REALISTIC FEEDBACK

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Research Requirement:

To realize the foil benefits of information age warfighting technology, 21'' Century

warriors need training that enables them to exploit digital capabilities. Such training requires a

focus on high-priority digital tasks and skills, as well as criteria and procedures for measuring

task and skill proficiency. At battalion echelon and below, the primary digital command and

control system is the Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2). The Army has

yet to establish FBCB2-based proficiency measurement standards and criteria in its emerging

mission training plans for the digitized force. The overall goal of the current project was to

develop a basic proficiency measurement architecture to enhance die efficiency and effectiveness

ofthe assessment process in FBCB2-enabled collective training.

Procedure:

The research team leveraged the cumulative experience found in the Army's First

Digitized Division (FDD), the 4* Infantry Division (4ID) (Mechanized). Subject matter experts

(SME) interviewed leaders and soldiers from the 1'' and 2"** Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) of the

division, and they also observed selective training exercises conducted by those units. The team

analyzed the results to evaluate key variables and performance problems affecting FBCB2-

enabled operations. They forther applied the results to develop indicators of digital proficiency,

concentrating on observation guidelines and measurement/feedback implications. They also

used the results, along with the expertise resident within the team, to develop user-friendly

products defining high-payoff proficiency targets for FBCB2 operators and users.

Findings:

More than 20 high-priority FBCB2 capabilities were identified in the areas of operating

basics, battlefield visualization, planning and preparation tools, information exchange, and force

mobility/maneuver. The analytical process yielded nine high-priority user skills, each embracing

up to ten specific FBCB2-driven tasks. Three major network management skills were identified,

along with critical questions about network status. Among the key variables influencing digital

performance were echelon, mission phase, unit standing operating procedures (SOP), task

difficulty, and issues surrounding common performance problems. The matrix format for

presenting observation guidelines conveyed who-what-when-where-why details to structure

performance measurement activities. The ultimate value of much ofthe guideline information

lies in focusing the After Action Review (AAR) process on utilizing FBCB2 capabihties.

Two practical products spotiight high-payoff digital skills proficiency targets for

exploiting FBCB2 capabilities. The Leader's Primer identifies critical FBCB2 capabilities, key

enablers for tactical success, and common exploitation pitfalls. The trainer-oriented Exploitation

Vll
Tool inventories high-priority FBCB2 user skills and tasks, and presents detailed observation

guidelines for obtaining critical performance data. Both products are geared for the platoon,

company and battalion echelons. The complete Leader's Primer and Exploitation Tool appear

separately in a Research Product.

Utilization of findings:

The findings ofthis project establish a basic architecture for measuring high-payoff

proficiency targets for FBCB2 operators and users. As a cornerstone, the knowledge base can be

used to enhance commanders' assessment tools, digital training products and tools, proficiency

measurement methods, and performance feedback capabilities. The ultimate benefits can

optimize digital training programs through enhanced assessment.

A variety of persotinel involved in FBCB2-enabled unit training can use the Leader's

Primer and the Exploitation Tool as planning tools and job aids. By employing these products

unit leaders and trainers can enhance the payoffrealized from their training exercises, ultimately

saving training resources and boosting combat effectiveness on the battlefields ofthe 21*

Century.

vui
EXPLOITING FBCB2 CAPABILmES THROUGH REALISTIC FEEDBACK

CONTENTS

Page

INTRODUCTION 1

Background 1

Problem Definition 3

Technical Objectives 4

METHODS 5

Overview 5

Review of Systems Capabilities 6

Data Collection and Reduction 6

Analytical Procedures 8

Development of Products 9

FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 11

Digital Performance Dimensions 11

Factors Influencing Digital Performance 19

Indicators of Digital Proficiency 23

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 29

Conclusions 29

Recommendations 31

REFERENCES 33

Appendix A A-1

Interview Questions for Each Echelon A-1

Appendix B B-1

List of Acronyms and Abbreviations B-1

IX
CONTENTS (Continued)

Page

LIST OF TABLES

1. Inventory of Major FBCB2Capabmties 12

2. Inventory of Keys to Success for Each Major FBCB2 Capability 13

3. Format ofthe Leader's Primer 16

4. High-Priority User Skills and Tasks 16

5. High-Priority Network Management Skills (Lower TI) 19

6. Matrix Format of FBCB2 Exploitation Tool, with Sample Entries 26

7. AAR Questions for Shifting the Spotiight to FBCB2 Exploitation 27
EXPLOmNG FBCB2 CAPABILITIES THROUGH REALISTIC FEEDBACK

INTRODUCTION

In support of the future force, the U.S. Army Research Institute (ARI) has been

investigating the special training needs generated by digitization. In the project entitled FBCB2

Training Feedback Variables (FBCB2-TFV), ARI's Simulator Systems Research Unit (SSRU)

explored the performance feedback dimensions ofthe Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and

Below (FBCB2), a primary digital command and control tool. The project keyed on the Army's

challenges in capturing digital proficiency data during the evolution ofsystem software. As the

software versions continue to advance the tool's capabilities, units are developing tactics,

techniques, and procedures (TTPs) that apply to digital command and control, rather than a

specific software version. Army training developers have yet to fully incorporate detailed digital

criteria in mission training plans (MTPs). In the absence of published evaluation criteria, trainers

and unit evaluators feel pressure in determining digital skill proficiency that transcends software

versions and upgrades. This research establishes a starting point for measuring digital unit

proficiency that will help focus leaders and trainers on high-payoff targets.

This work is part of the "Methods and Measures of Commander-Centric Training"

Science and Technology Objective (STO). The goals of this STO are to develop and assess

command, control, communication, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

(C4ISR) training methods for Future Combat Systems (FCS) Units of Action, by 2005. This

STO supports:

• the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC),

• the Program Executive Office for Simulation, Training, and Instrumentation (PEO STRI)

• the Project Manager for Future Combat Systems (PM FCS)

This report presents the methods and findings ofthe FBCB2-TFV project. It is intended

as a guide for unit trainers and observers striving to optimize the digital training experience. The

report also provides valuable information for training developers working to create or improve

realistic digital training programs. A great deal of practical information was organized for the 4

Infantry Division (4ID) and I''' Cavalry Division (ICD) in two guides, an FBCB2 Exploitation

Tool and a Leader's Primerfor Exploiting FBCB2. A companion report (Leibrecht, Lockaby, &

Meliza, in preparation) presents the complete guides. Both divisions have received these guides

to assist them during operations, including deployment.

Background

The battlefields of the 21^' century will rely increasingly on information technologies to

acquire, exchange, and employ timely information throughout the battlespace (e.g., U.S.

Department of the Army, 2001). The U.S. Army is in the midst of fielding the Army Battle

Command System (ABCS), a family of digital command, control, communications, computers,
and intelligence (CAT) technologies offering substantially improved warfighting capabilities at all

echelons. The ABCS family includes the FBCB2 as the workhorse tool for brigade and below

elements and the components ofthe Army Tactical Command and Control System (ATCCS) for

the tactical operations centers (TOCs). Effective combat performance will depend heavily on

realistic training to enable warfighters to fully realize the benefits of new digital systems. Such

training requires valid tools for measuring the proficiency of digital tasks and skills.

Digitizing the Army is an evolutionary process driven by doctrine as well as technology.

As the Army's knowledge about harnessing dynamic digital systems increases, TTPs evolve.

Knowing how well units can perform requires measures of digital proficiency that are not

affected by software upgrades. Through robust digital capabilities, the ABCS tools enable

leaders to (a) make better-informed decisions, (b) coUaboratively wargame and refine planned

courses of action, and (c) rapidly change plans in response to new information. Proper

employment of C4I systems is expected to produce faster decision cycles, better targeting, and

greater control over the tactical situation. Success ofthe digitization efforts hinges on the full

exploitation of complex "systems ofsystems." This in turn requires an understanding of the

digital tasks and performance feedback capabilities needed to gain and exploit the advantages

these systems offer on the battlefield. Further, it demands an understanding of how to monitor

the health of the tactical internet (TI), the connectivity backbone for the ABCS. Without that

capability, leaders cannot be assured of the accuracy and completeness of the common

operational picture (COP) provided by the ABCS.

In the training arena, digitization has the potential to overwhelm trainers and evaluators

with observation requirements (Brovra, Anderson, Begley, & Meliza, 1999; Brown, Nordyke,

Geriock, Begley, & Meliza, 1998). In addition to observing the same events applicable to analog

units, trainers for digitized units must monitor the stream of digital messages, interactions

between system operators and digital information users, and even interactions among system

operators. One approach for avoiding observation overload is to identify the aspects of digital

proficiency that most warrant the attention oftrainers, because oftheir potential contributions to

unit effectiveness. Another approach is to tailor observation requirements according to unit

digital proficiency levels.

Investigators in ARI have identified candidates for measuring digital skills proficiency,

based on performance problems noted at the Army's Combat Training Centers (Bamett, Meliza,

& McCluskey, 2001; Meliza, 2003). Related research with the 4ID has shown that there is a

difference in the digital maturity requirements of brigade staffs versus those of battalion staffs

(Dudley, Hill, Johnston, Jones, LeGare, Leibrecht, Longoria, & Meliza., 2002). The same

authors established that some digital performance conditions may call for graduated instead of

all-or-none measures of digital skills. There is also evidence that warfighting and training

behaviors change as leaders and soldiers gain experience using digital systems (Dudley,

Johnston, Jones, Strauss, & Meliza, 2001). These findings highlight the need for measurement

criteria in order to provide adequate feedback to warfighters determined to develop digital skills

proficiency. Measurement criteria and guidelines must focus on high-payoff targets to reduce

the workload of trainers and observers. Additional research was necessary to determine the high

priority measurement targets.
Problem Definition

The numerous "advertised" benefits of digitization will not materialize merely because

new systems are fielded. Units must develop effective digital skills to reap the benefits promised

by the new systems. But how? Combat performance in the future operational environment will

depend greatly on realistic training that enables warfighters to fully exploit tiie advantages of

new digital systems. Among other things, standards for training and evaluating those skills must

be developed. Trainers need criteria and procedures by which to measure digital proficiency. In

the absence of digital TTPs, units have relied on practical experience and on-the-job training of

their digital skills. As experience grows, greater maturity increases the likelihood of employing

major system capabilities. Some ofthese digital capabiUties serve as notable combat multipliers.

The digital combat multipliers are high-payoff skills, those that bridge the gap from situational

awareness to situational understanding (Dudley et al., 2001). Some of these skills may align

with a particular echelon or mission, while others may apply to all. Measurable targets must be

defined for the high-payoff skills in order to assess digital competence. These proficiency

targets should not be software version specific, but should apply across time and should help

reduce trainer workloads.

Leaders need timely feedback on how well their units execute the high-payoff digital

skills. They need to know how well individuals and teams are operating their digital systems and

using the available capabilities and information. They also need feedback on connectivity

among digital systems. As a critical enabler, connectivity must be maintained and monitored in

order for leaders to observe the combat effectiveness oftheir digital units. Feedback on the

health of the TI and the connectivity between TOCs must assure leaders that the picture they

view is timely and complete. This facilitates digital command and control, expediting combat

decisions. Research is needed to establish indicators of network health and system usage that

reveal a unit's level of digital proficiency.

At Fort Hood, Texas, HI Corps leaders have established digital training facilities in the

Battle Command Training Center (BCTC) to support the training programs of resident digital

divisions. Similarly, I Corps leaders have established the Mission Support Training Facility

(MSTF) at Fort Lewis, Washington, to help train the Army's first two Stryker Brigade Combat

Teams (SBCTs). In both the BCTC and MSTF, trainers and observers routinely face the

challenges ofmeasuring digital proficiency levels, and their ranks are growing across the Army.

Trainers for collective training exercises in field and simulation environments lack measures and

standards for assessing how well units employ digital systems. These standards and the guidance

for their application must be carefully structured to avoid overwhelming trainers with

observation requirements. An essential goal of this project was to reduce digital performance

observation workloads to manageable levels by focusing observers' attention on high-payoff

measurement targets and by harnessing automation where feasible. An expanded database was

needed to define targets for digital proficiency measurement that will contribute most effectively

to achieving digital training objectives.
Technical Objectives

The purpose of this research was to establish high-payoff digital proficiency

measurement guidance (emphasis on FBCB2), in the context of an architecture for digital

proficiency feedback. The ultimate goal was to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the

observation process for digital training. The following technical objectives drove the planning

and execution of the project:

Identify and describe major capabilities of FBCB2 to influence tactical operations as

a function of (a) echelon, (b) mission aspects and (c) frequency of employment.

Identify high-priority FBCB2 user skills and tasks, and determine which are difficult

to perform or acquire.

Identify the most frequently occurring problems in operating FBCB2 systems.

Develop detailed guidelines for measuring levels of performance proficiency for

high-payoff FBCB2 user digital tasks.
METHODS

Overview

The overall project strategy leveraged the experience accumulated in the Army's

digitization of Fort Hood units. This experience resided with then-current leaders of digital

units, former leaders of digital units, contractors supporting digitized units with system-specific

and general guidance, and BCTC classroom instructors. The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine

Command (TRADOC) Warrior-T office at Fort Hood has developed numerous products that

included describing digital tasks (Warrior-T 2001a, 2001b, 2002a, 2002b, 2002c). In some

cases these products describe FBCB2 tasks, while in other cases they describe the systems used

by the battle staff that must interoperate with FBCB2. Warrior-T personnel were a valuable

source of information regarding relationships between FBCB2 tasks and unit tactical proficiency.

Contractors that directly support unit operation of digital systems were a valuable source of

information regarding the problems reported and questions asked by operators of digital systems.

The intent of this effort was to develop an FBCB2 measurement architecture to set the

stage for later empirical investigations. Major steps associated with developing the architecture

were as follows:

• Identify digital activities that warrant measurement

• Describe the tactical significance of the activities to be measured

• Identify the echelon(s) to be observed

• Describe the tactical events that set the stage for each observation

• Identify the data and data sources used to assess performance

• Describe information that might be provided by automated systems to support

measurement

• Identify major variables influencing the use of FBCB2 capabilities

Analysts developed digital measurement guidelines in several steps. The team first

identified more than 20 high-payoff FBCB2 user tasks. Then they consolidated these individual

tasks into categories based largely on 4ID warfighter estimates oftheir importance for combat

success. The team resolved to develop critical tasks that did not depend on specific software

versions. For the final set of digital skills, the analysts proceeded to define performance goals,

crafted instructions for observing and measuring performance, then elaborated the measurement

context. Coordination with warfighters helped validate and refine the guidelines. In addition, by

request the team supported a battalion level digital training exercise by, in part, testing an early

version ofthe measurement guidelines.

The outcomes of this work included (a) the identification of fifty FBCB2 digital

performance goals arranged under nine topical areas that warrant measurement, (b) a description

ofthe tactical significance of each goal, and (c) guidance for measuring unit performance with

respect to each goal. One version ofthis information was packaged as a pocket-sized, laminated

booklet and distributed to each unit and vehicle commander in the 1'* and 2"'' Brigades of the 4ID

to support their deployment to Southwest Asia. The product also serves to indicate the

information displays that automated After Action Review (AAR) systems need to produce to

provide units with feedback regarding then: employment of FBCB2. These displays would
employ breakouts of the digital message traffic and breakouts of electronically collected data on

operator interactions with FBCB2. Another outcome of this work was the identification of

FBCB2 capabilities that are not being consistently employed by units at battalion and/or

company/platoon level, what is lost by not using the capability, and measures leaders can use in

deciding whether the capabilities are being employed in a particular unit. Findings also included

a description ofthe major variables influencmg the use of FBCB2 capabilities. Each ofthese

variables impacts the use of more than one FBCB2 capability. Knowing where a unit stands in

reference to these variables enables a trainer to reduce the number of digital performance goals

to be measured. For example, if a unit lacks standing operating procedures (SOPs) for

employing digital systems, the stage will not have been set for addressing certain performance

goals.

Review of Systems Capabilities

The team reviewed relevant documentation of the FBCB2 system (e.g., system user

manuals, system requirements documents, digital operating guides) to inventory the functional

capabilities including feedback features. Documentation of ATCCS systems and the TI was also

reviewed for description of feedback capabilities. Where appropriate, the team inspected actual

ABCS systems to verify or supplement the written information.

Much ofthe information about high-payoff FBCB2 capabilities was derived from two

previous reports in this series. Dudley et al. (2001) interviewed experienced digital leaders to

identity and describe changes in behaviors and attitudes of units as they gained experience using

digital systems. For example, a number of unit leaders noted that they no longer had to

constantly labor with voice radio to keep track of the location of their subordinates, because they

were able to track these locations by looking at their FBCB2 situational awareness displays.

Dudley et al. (2002) employed a variety of digital subject matter experts (SMEs) to describe, in

substantial detaU, how a unit might use digital systems to reduce fratricide and/or gain greater

control over when and how contact is made with the enemy. For example, commanders can use

FBCB2 line-of-sight tools and FBCB2 displays showing the location of enemy forces to predict

when and where their unit is likely to make visual contact with the enemy. These sources of

information helped identify critical FBCB2 capabilities to be addressed by measarement efforts,

and they also provided examples of higher levels of proficiency.

Data Collection and Reduction

Interviews

Interviewparticipants. The research team's lead SME interviewed a sample of 1*'

Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 4ID leadership in the unit's own facilities (Fort Hood) and at their

convenience. The senior leadership sample consisted of the brigade commander, brigade

executive officer and staff, an armor and infantry battalion conunander, armor battalion staff, and

multiple company commanders and platoon leaders. The team also interviewed soldiers and

leaders as they completed Key Leader's Training at the BCTC. These participants included a

company executive officer, an engineer platoon leader, multiple scout leaders, a battalion

maintenance team chief, and a supply sergeant. In addition, informal interviews were held with
two recently retired digital operations SMEs, all with command experience plus service with the

4E), and a few retired senior non-commissioned officers (NCOs) having contemporary active

duty experience in the 4ID.

Interviewprocedures. Most of the interviews were conducted in the context of Fort

Hood's umbrella week. The interview process probed for knowledge of digital capabilities and

their supporting digital skills, in a project-wide context addressing all technical objectives.

Interviews were designed to capture experience and insights ofleaders and soldiers. The intent

was to delve into a reflective thought process concerning the view oftheir digital skills, gather

data based on actual experience, and clarify information obtained firom other sources.

The interview team consisted of at least one SME serving as the facilitator and note-taker

for all sessions. In order to structure the interviews, the facilitator used an interview guide

containing general instructions and questions of interest (Appendix A). Each session lasted

approximately two hours, whether one-on-one or group interview. For some of the group

interviews, questionnaires were used to facilitate concurrent capture of data. A record of each

4ID interview session was prepared from notes made during the session.

Interview questions. Appendix A contains the interview guide used for the majority of

the sessions. The queries targeted the unit's digital operation practices, changes in skills and

proficiency with experience, and operational problems. Specific questions addressed:

• Unit activities for keeping FBCB2 systems and the network operational

• Rules and procedures for managing connectivity, filters, files, etc.

• Use ofFBCB2 tools or features to accomplish specific tasks (e.g., planning fires)

• Means for establishing and maintaining the COP

• Use of planning products such as maneuver plans and orders

• Communicating and sharing information

• Progression to higher levels of proficiency, including skills and insights

• Occurrence (timing, frequency, mastery) of FBCB2 operating and usage problems

• FBCB2 capabilities that discourage routine use because they are difficult to employ

• Monitoring the currency, completeness and evolution of digital products

• Detection and resolution of gaps in digital information

Observations

The research team observed battalion exercises conducted in live, virtual, and

constructive simulation environments, and small unit exercises conducted in the Close Combat

Tactical Trainer (CCTT). The project team provided personnel to serve observer/controller (OC)

functions to support much of this training. This provided opportunities to test early versions of

digital measurement guidance and to question OCs regarding digital proficiency measurement

insights. Occasionally, informal interviews with unit leaders were held in conjimction with the

exercises, notably in association with AARs.
Analytical Procedures

The cumulative data contained qualitative information originating from system-related

documents, interview records, and summaries of observation sessions. Separate but parallel

procedures vi^ere used for analyzing and integrating the data related to (a) the key variables of

echelon, mission type, and task difficulty and (b) FBCB2 operating problems. Given the

qualitative nature of the data, strictly non-quantitative techniques were used for analysis. The

knowledge and judgment resident within the research team were leveraged, especially where

gaps in interview results or available documentation occurred.

Influence ofKey Variables

The research plan called for examining how echelon (platoon through battalion), mission

type, and task difficulty influence the way FBCB2 capabilities impact tactical operations. Task

difficulty was estimated from interview comments and from analysis of FBCB2 operating/usage

problems (see below). Factors ofinterest also included the frequency of employing FBCB2

capabilities as well as the level of digital experience among operators and leaders.

The lead SME reviewed the accumulated data in consecutive passes, deriving

implications for each variable in the process. In reality some ofthe variables had to be

considered in combination, especially echelon and frequency of usage. In tabulating the

frequency of usage for the various capabilities, the SME also took into account the information

needs for a given position. The lead SME then provided the resulting implications and

conclusions to participating SMEs for thek analysis and elaboration. The resulting inputs were

compiled by the lead SME, then team members reviewed the preliminary findings and resolved

substantive issues.

It is important to note that the team's determinations are preliminary and warrant

additional smdy.

Problems Associated with FBCB2 Operation

Problems emerge when the user cannot accomplish an FBCB2 function due to lack of

digital training/experience or when he concludes the payoff of a function is not worth the effort

required. The analysis of FBCB2 operating problems relied on soldiers' interview/questionnaire

comments as well as the expertise ofthe team's SMEs. In addition, the team interviewed

FBCB2 field service representatives (FSRs) at Fort Hood and reviewed FSR reports. Task

difficulty figured prominently in the analysis, as did attempts to investigate the role of digital

experience. The analysts concentrated on identifying problems in using FBCB2 and changes in

problems across time. The team also explored whether and when experience influences the

operator/user's ability to circumvent and overcome problems.
Development of Products

Capabilities Matrix

After preparing a draft list of FBCB2 capabilities, the team queried 4ID warfighters in

interview sessions regarding the importance of each capability in terms of its contribution to

tactical operations. Team members compiled and organized the results in light of their own

digital knowledge and tactical application. The collective results regarding FBCB2 capabilities

and their applicability/utility were collated into a matrix of digital capabilities, containing the

following elements for each capability: tactical importance, implementing actions, and

frequency of employment. In those cases where the capability was not fully employed, the team

examined the root cause, such as lack of awareness/training or perceived lack of payoff. The

team coordinated with 4ID leaders and operators to obtain informal validation ofthe matrix,

which was refined by incorporating their input.

In support of Fort Hood units on alert to deploy to Southwest Asia, the team expanded

the FBCB2 capabilities data and organized the cumulative information into a consolidated

matrix. To the elements ofinformation described in the preceding paragraph the team added

performance problems and sources of data pointing to the problems. The resulting Leader's

Primer was converted to a format convenient for carrying to the field.

Each unit leader in the 4ID's 1'' and 2"^ Brigades was provided with a laminated, pocketsized version of the Leader's Primerfor Exploiting FBCB2. At the request of the DI Corps

Digital Training Chief, all unit leaders in the ICD were also provided with field expedient copies

of the primer.

Exploitation Tool

An important objective was to develop guidelines for digital trainers by integrating the

results regarding high-payoff digital skills, FBCB2 operating problems, and the influence of

echelon and mission type. The team aimed to produce an observer-fiiendly tool that could focus

measurement activities and facilitate high-payoff performance feedback. There were three

practical goals of the Exploitation Tool: (a) reduce the overall workload of exercise observers,

(b) optimize the training value realized by digital units, and (c) provide a guide for leaders to

assess the digital proficiency of their unit.

Relying heavily on interview input, the teamjudged the complete set of FBCB2

capabilities to determine those offering the best return for investment of training effort. The

process involved ranking the list of major capabilities against their expected contributions to

combat effectiveness. This produced a set of nine major capabilities providing the highest

payoff and thus warranting the attention of trainers. Building on the earlier matrix of FBCB2

capabilities, the team then developed observation guidelines for trainers and leaders regarding

each ofthe nine selected capabilities. The guidelines inventoried specific digital actions

(performance goals), echelon applicability, prompting conditions (triggers), and relevant sources

of performance data. The team compiled the results in a matrix format designed for easy use by
leaders, observers and trainers. The final Exploitation Tool spelled out instructions for when,

where, how, and why to collect critical performance information.

Each unit leader and vehicle commander in the 4ID's 1'^ and 2"*" Brigades was provided

with a laminated, pocket-sized version ofthe FBCB2 Exploitation Tool. At the request ofthe III

Corps Digital Training Chief, all unit leaders and vehicle commanders in the ICD were also

provided with field expedient copies of the tool.

10
FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

This chapter presents and discusses the project's findings resulting from the warfighter

interviews, document and system reviews, and analytical efforts. The following sections

organize the presentation:

• Digital Performance Dimensions

• Factors Influencing Digital Performance

• Indicators of Digital Proficiency

The findings focus on recurring patterns and critical insights conveying the weight of

qualitative evidence and concentrate on the fundamental performance dimensions that

characterize digital operations at battalion echelon and below, excluding battle staff operations.

The results provide an initial architecture for measuring digital proficiency of units employing

FBCB2 capabilities.

Digital Performance Dimensions

FBCB2 Capabilities

As the primary digital tool for small units, FBCB2 brings to battle command elements

and maneuver platforms a host of functional capabiUties centering around command, control, and

communications. The team's analysis plus input from the 4ID warfighters revealed more than 20

major capabilities (Table 1) falling in five operational areas:

• Basic features for establishing and maintaining an effective operating environment

• Essential capabilities for supporting robust visualization of the battlefield

• Tools to support planning and preparing for combat missions

• Key functions for exchanging and managing tactical information

• High-priority capabilities to support force mobility and maneuver

The FBCB2 capabilities that emerged from this project (Table 1) represent both operator

and user domains. Some of the functional features (e.g., setting filters, clearing queues and logs)

are performed by system operators. These capabilities convey specific actions that correspond

closely with "buttonology." On the other hand, the majority of the functional features are

orchestrated by users (battle captains or company commanders, for example) and encompass a

family ofspecific actions. Examples of user-based capabilities include planning and controlling

indirect fires and supporting maneuver decisions. There is no practical dichotomy between user

and operator capabilities. Rather, they lie along a spectrum offunctional features stretching from

highly specific actions to broad, multi-action capabilities, from simple (yet critical) to complex

(and equally critical) features.

Relative frequency of employment is one factor to consider in selecting high-payoff

digital proficiency targets. The middle two columns ofTable 1 give estimates of how often the

various capabilities are actually used in the 4ID. The team's SMQEs reached a consensus on the

ratings, in light of their own knowledge plus warfighters' interview comments. In general, basic

planning and command and control capabilities are employed more frequently, while

housekeeping and analytical functions are less frequent. Usage differences between battalion

11
echelon and lower echelons are potentially important. These differences are addressed below in

the discussion ofthe influence of Echelon and Mission Phase. The probability-of-exploitation

ratings do not directly indicate the relative importance of any capability, but they may well

correlate with user perceptions of value or benefits gained. Table 1 provides illusti-ative

evidence supporting the low to medium ratmgs in the Probability of Exploitation columns.

Table 1

Inventory of Major FBCB2 Functional Capabilities

FBCB2 Capabilities

Probability of

Exploitation Evidence of

Bn Co/Pit Exploitation Problems

Digital Basics

Establish proper communication network High „ High FSRs are called to "fix" operator level

problems such as unconnected cables,

systems not tumed on, alerts filtered

out. RIe naming conventions are not in

SOPs.

Clear queues and logs Med Low

Set filters and respond to alerts Low Low

Use filing/naminq conventions Low Low

Perform maintenance and troubleshooting Low Low

Battlefield Visualization

Relate threat to own/unit location High Med/Low Field observations and interviews reveal

Co/Pit leaders lack proficiency to relate

threat to own location. SOPs don't

address tailoring SA picture, managing

Red icons, or posting obstacle overlays.

Tailor SA picture Low Low

Manaqe Red icons Med Low

Post obstacle overlays High Low

Mission Planning and Preparation

Apply Line of Siqht (LOS) tool for ten-ain analysis Low Low Interviews show users forget to use

LOS tool. SIMEX observation reveals

absence of preset CFFs and logistics

players. SOP doesn't address overlay

naming and filing. Interviews show

insufficient digital expertise to support

warqaminq and digital rehearsals.

Apply LOS tool for perimeter defense planning Low Low

Use FBCB2 to plan and control fire support High Med

Use FBCB2 for loqistical planning/preparation Low Low

Constmct and update overlays High Low

Leverage FBCB2 in multi-echelon wargaming Med Low

Tactical Information Exchanc e

Prepare and manaqe messages and graphics High Med Review of unit SOPs reveals lack of

guidance on file naming/storage and

message receipt confinnation.

Disseminate messages and graphics High Med

Confimi receotion of critical messages Med Low

Force Mobility and Maneuver

Use FBCB2 to plan and execute movements High Med SOPs lack guidance on organizing

folders, saving/posting overlays, and

disseminating route maps.

Leverage FBCB2 in maneuver decisions High Med

Exploit FBCB2 in fratricide prevention High Med

The capabilities listed in Table 1 represent those FBCB2 features that play a major role in

successful tactical operations of die 4ID. Considering operational variations across time and

units, the list may offer only limited generality. At the same time, the inventory provides a

reasonable snapshot of the more valuable FBCB2 capabilities supporting Force XXI operational

requirements. It represents an important step in focusing digital proficiency measurement

methods so as to reduce trainer/observer workload and enhance training effectiveness. In the

FBCB2-TFV project, tiie inventory provided the springboard for identifying high-payoff user

digital skills.

12
The next step involved identifying the exploitation steps associated with tactical success.

For each major FBCB2 capability the team's SMEs discerned as many as ten operational keys to

success (Table 2). These represented indicators signaling that critical enablers are in place for

successfully exploiting the power of the FBCB2. The team also compiled common performance

problems that hinder FBCB2 exploitation, also seen in Table 2.

Table 2

Inventory of Keys to Success for Each Major FBCB2 Capability

Major Capabilities —

Tactical importance Keys to Success Exploitation Pitfalls

Digital Basics

Establish proper

communication

networl( — so Blue

picture is accurate.

• SINCGARS/EPLRS have correct COMSEC

• EPLRS and OSMA sewers are operational

• All INCs are operational

• Digital commo checks are part of PCCs/PCIs

• All FBCB2 platforms are reporting on Tl

• BLUFOR icons are visible on FBCB2 display

Leaders and operators at all

echelons fail to establish a fully

functional network, often

without realizing it.

Clear queues and logs

— to avoid frustration

of sluggish systems

• Queues and logs are cleared prior to LD

• Refresh rate is optimal at start of mission

• Queues & logs are cleared after each mission

• User detects slow down and takes action

• Users know when ifs time to clear queues/logs

Co and Pit do not initiate

clearing, due to fear of losing

info or lack of time. Operators

call 31U when system slows

down.

Set filters and respond

to alerts — enabling

better SU and faster

decisions

• TACSOP specifies filter setting procedures

• Filters are set in advance, according to mission

• Filter settings produce clear, standard COP

• Filter settings enable hazard alerts

• Users respond to alerts with appropriate action

• Users adjust filter settings as necessary

Users at all echelons fail to

achieve standard COP, often

without realizing the significance of the COP. Alerts are

filtered out or ignored.

Vehicles enter minefields.

Use file naming

conventions — to

retrieve critical info

faster

• TACSOP specifies file naming conventions

• Order & overlay names are assigned per SOP

• Folders are created lAW mission

• Folders are Identified with DTG

• RIes are saved in conect folder

• Users retrieve and post connect files readily

Users are unsure how to set

up folders and name files, due

to lack of SOPs or training.

They find it difficult to find

correct files, and may display

incorrect overiays.

Perform maintenance

and trouble-shooting —

to sustain continuous

communications

• Operators or users detect problems promptly

• Diagnostfc tools (Help, SysAdmin) are used

• Prompt action avoids lengthy downtime

• Users call 31 Us only when all else fails

• Workarounds are used infrequently

Operators fail to use troubleshooting techniques, due to

lack of training or time. Users

call support personnel

unnecessarily.

Battlefield Visualization

Relate threat to

own/unit location — to

protect Blue forces and

dominate enemy

• CCIRs are disseminated to lowest echelons

• Users report CCIRs as they are encountered

• Users relate own/unit icons to Red locations

• Planned moves are related to Red assets

• All platforms display obstacle overlays

• Blue forces avoid danger zones

Below TF TOC. leaders fail to

monitor CCIRs. Co/Pit view

Red picture but fail to analyze

risk to their operations. Blue

vehicles enter danger zones.

Tailor SA picture — to

enhance decisions thru

better SU

• BOS-based filtering clarifies SA picture

• Collapse/expand function reduces clutter

• BFA drives filters for Red picture

• CM function suits logistics elements in offense

• Slower Blue update rate suits defense

• CM function suite other TFs in reconstitution

Leaders and operators at all

echelons fail to tailor SA

picture for current operations.

Screens become cluttered and

hard to follow.

13
Major Capabilities —

Tactical Importance

Manage Red icons—to

enhance threat picture

Post obstacle overlays

— to avoid Blue

attrition

Keys to Si^ -ess

Apply LOS tool for

terrain analysis — to

enhance Blue Force

protection

Apply LOS tool for

perimeter defense

planning — to improve

speed and accuracy

Use FBCB2 to plan and

control fire support —

to enhance precision

and avoid fratricide

Use FBCB2 to support

logistical planning and

preparation — to

bolster resupply

procedures

Construct and update

overlays — to enhance

COP and SU

Leverage FBCB2 in

multi-echelon wargaming — to optimize

synchronization

TACSOP specifies SPOT: orting procedures

Red picture gives insight c anemy forces

Responsibility for updating Red icons is clear

SPOT reports are updated as needed

Users question when Red Icons become stale

Observer hands off responsibility when necessary

Obstacle overlays are disseminated promptly

Users post obstacle overlays promptly

Users name and save overlays properly

Minefield alerts trigger avoidance actions

Engineers are notified of new minefields

Obstacle overlays are updated as necessary

Mission Planning and Preparation

LOS tool replaces analog map technique

TACSOP specifies digital terrain analysis role

Inter-visibility estimates are more precise

Outcomes appear in planning products

Vulnerable areas of route are identified quicidy

Future engagement areas emerge readily

Digital sector sketches are the norm

Circular LOS tool is used during planning

Fields of fire are optimized quicl<ly

Placement/coverage of LPs/OPs is verified

Enemy avenues of approach are illuminated

Threat fields of fire are predicted accurately

Digital tools replace analog map techniques

NFZ/NFA/RFL appear on operational overlay

TACSOP specifies digital OFF procedures

CFF requests are planned in advance

Pre-planned CFFs are set in Quick Send queue

Rre support triggers appear on SA displays

SA influences decisions to deny fires

Digital CSS overiay accompanies OPORD

Circular LOS tool is used to plan log sites

Digital CSS rock drills are perfonned

Digital LOGSTATs/PERSTATs are the nomi

LOGSTATs are properly routed, reach CSSCS

Supply Point icons are estat>lished

Coordination for supplies occurs digitally

Transporters use FBCB2 Nav tool for deliveries

Leaders find support elements via SA picture

Digital overiays are the norni (vs. hardcopy)

Overiays are named lAW standards (TACSOP)

Digital overiays are disseminated via MDL

Complete dissemination occurs on first attempt

Every platfomi receives obstacle overiay

Users post overiays prior to LD

Overiays are updated as required

Wargaming routinely involves FBCB2

COA analysis is related to SA picture

Digital rehearsals occur routinely

Nav tool helps estimate Blue/Red rate of march

Likely exposure to Red weapons is illuminated

Vulnerable areas are identified for BLUFOR

FBCB2 tools influence decision making

Exploitation Pitfalls

Co and Pit fail to update Red

icons and hand off ownership

when originator loses visual

contact. Red icons fade as

they become stale.

Co/Pit lose wamings by failing

to post obstacle overlay, or

posting old overiay, or failing to

find misfiled overiay. Blue

vehicles enter danger zones.

Leaders and operators fail to

use LOS tool for tenain

analysis, reverting to analog

maprecon. Vulnerable areas

are overtooked. Likely enemy

contact is misjudged.

Units are not leveraging LOS

tool for perimeter defense

planning. This results in

unknown dead space and

degrades placement of

LPs/OPs.

Co and Pit leaders typically fail

to pre-plan CFFs, leading to

delays in execution. Non-use

of COP capabilities can allow

fratricide situations to develop.

CSS annex and overiay are

often omitted or disseminated

late. Units typically bypass

CSS rock drills and struggle

with LOGSTAT rollup. Supply

point capability is rarely used.

Dissemination of overiays to

companies and platoons is

often abortive, fractionated or

incomplete. Users who do

receive overiays often fail to

save them property and post

them to the display.

Companies and platoons fail to

use FBCB2 for mission

analysis. Only partial

capabilities of Nav tools are

used. Digital rehearsals occur

rarely and without strip maps.

14
Major Capabilities —

Tactical Importance Keys to Success Exploitation Pitfalls

Tactical Information Exchange

Prepare and manage

messages/graphics —

to facilitate information

retrieval

• Users set up message folders during PCCs

• Address groups are verified after UTR

• Digital OPORDs/overlays are the norm

• File names follow TACSOP conventions

• Graphics are simple and within size limits

• Graphics are updated as required

• Users purge files when no lonqer needed

Unit SOPs for folders and file

naming are lacking or ignored.

File naming and folder

structure are not standard

across the TF. Purging

seldom occurs.

Disseminate

messages/grapiilcs —

to build complete COP

• Orders are disseminated via FBCB2

• Digital overlays are disseminated via MDL

• Complete dissemination occurs on first attempt

• Users save files in proper folders

• Users retrieve infomnation readily

• Gonect overlays are posted on all platforms

Leaders fail to detect

incomplete dissemination of

messages/overiays. Users fail

to save materials properly and

have trouble retrieving desired

infonnation.

Confirm receipt of

critical messages — to

assure complete

dissemination

• TACSOP specifies confirmation process

• Leaders tracl< message reception status

• Recipients send messages verifying receipt

• Leaders relay status reports higher

• All users have essential messages prior to LD

SOPs ignore confirmation.

Critical messages fail to

require operator response.

Platfomns end up missing

essential infonnation.

Force Mobility and IManeuver

Use FBCB2 to plan and

execute movements —

to increase speed and

precision

• Cun-ent operational graphics are posted

• Cunrent obstacle overlays are posted

• LOS and Nav tools are used to select routes

• CLOS tool reveals vulnerable areas of route

• Hazardous areas and chokepoints are identified

• Leaders disseminate route maps as overiays

• Leaders confirm reception of route infonnation

• Users save route strip maps as overiays

• Drivers use route strip maps to navigate

• Elements navigate safely, accurately, quickly

Lack of wargaming can leave

movement problems (choke

points, danger zones, etc.)

unresolved. Users neitfier

save overiays property nor

post them to the display.

Leaders fail to save and

disseminate route maps.

Leverage FBCB2 in

maneuver decisions —

to enhance BLUFOR

lethality and

sunrivabllity

• Leaders control order/rate of march via FBCB2

• SA facilitates fonnation and dispersion

• Leaders track CCIR & decision points via COP

• Commander uses SA to cue use of UAV

• Geo-reference icons appear in COP

• Leaders monitor breaching and river crossing

• FBCB2 is used to call for precision smoke

• Leaders SPOT traffk: flow problems via SA

• FBCB2 influences maneuver decisions

Ignoring SA picture degrades

control of movement. CCIR

and decision points are

tracked pooriy. Traffic flow

problems are detected late.

Exploit FBCB2 in

fratricide prevention —

to minimize Blue

attrition

• Current operational graphics are posted

• Current obstacle overiays are posted

• Operators set aleri: filters properly

• Icons appear for non-reporting elements

• Users monitor Blue SA regulariy

• Users respond to alerts with appropriate actions

• Elements avoid hazards and danger zones

• Leaders use Blue SA to deny fires

• Net Join occurs when EPLRS sen/ers fail

• S6 periodically checks # systems reporting to Tl

• Degradation of Tl is FFIR

Users fail to save and post

overiays property. Users often

filter out alerts. Icons for

dismounts and recon elements

are not entered. TACSOP fails

to specify procedures when

too few platforms are

reporting. Blue vehicles enter

hazardous areas.

In packaging the cumulative information as a primer for 4ID leaders, the team developed

the format appearing in Table 3. The contents come directly from Tables 1 and 2. The "Keys to

15
Success" represent critical enablers for effective digital operations. "Probability of Exploitation"

is based on SME estimates of 4ID usage rates and is intended as a potential indicator of

underutilized capabilities. "Exploitation Pitfalls" describe performance deficiencies commonly

associated with each capability. The "Says Who?" column summarizes primary evidence for the

pitfalls. The complete Leader's Primerfor Exploiting FBCB2 is found in Leibrecht et al. (in

preparation). The final primer was packaged in an easy-to-read, pocket-sized laminated booklet

for dissemination to warfighters.

Table 3

Format of the Leader's Primer

FBCB2

CapabilitiesTactical Importance Keys to Success

Probability of

Exploitation

Bn—Co/Pit Exploitation Pitfalls Says Who?

Establish commo

network—so Blue

picture is accurate

• Radios have correct COMSEC

• All servers are operational

• BLUFOR icons are visible

High—High

Leaders/operators at all

echelons fail to establish

fully functional network

FSRs are often

called to lix" simple

problems

Post obstacle overlays

—to avoid Blue attrition

• Overlays are disseminated

• Users post overlays promptly

• Overlays are updated

High—Low

Co/Pits lose warnings by

failing to post obstacle

overlays

Blue vehicles enter

minefields in NTC

rotations and FTXs

User Digital Skills and Tasks

In an important step for defining digital proficiency measurement requirements, the team

developed a set of high-priority digital skills and tasks. They accomplished this by translating

the major FBCB2 capabilities (from Table 1) into essential user tasks (specific digital actions),

consolidating the tasks where appropriate, and organizing the tasks into nine skill categories.

The final step was to prioritize the skill categories based on warfighter input and obtain

verification by 4ID leaders and operators. Table 4 displays the resulting skills and tasks.

Table 4

ffigh-Priority FBCB2 User Skills and Tasks

Skills

1. Perform Precombat Checks and

Inspections

2. Disseminate and Manage

Messages and Graphics

Tasks

Perform digital commo check

Verify correct COMSEC files in use

Clear queues and logs

Diagnose problems at lowest feasible level

Verify Blue icons on FBCB2 display

Maintain awareness of # vehicles reporting on Tl

Determine % FBCB2s reporting on Tl

Send critical messages only when comms in place

Verify completeness of COP

Report gaps in Blue SA

Verify address groups

Apply FBCB2 to react rapidly to new mission

Use standard file naming conventions

16
3. Plan and Execute Movements

4. Apply Situational Understanding in

Maneuver Decisions

5. Conduct Collaborative Planning

6. Support Logistical Preparations

Unit-Wide

7. Control Indirect Fires

8. Avoid Fratricidal Situations

9. Employ Filter Settings to Create

Operational Picture

Proactively manage planning process

Reduce staff planning time (1^-2/3 rule)

Disseminate orders and graphics on first attempt

Ensure 100% dissemination of digital graphics

Use LOS tool to create sector sketch/fire plan

Plan/wargame COAs using FBCB2 capabilities

Select routes using Navigation and LOS tools

Check filters for audio and visual alerts

Navigate safely and accurately using FBCB2

Conduct breach operations using FBCB2

Post danger zones on operational graphics

Use FBCB2 graphics and SA to maneuver

Apply FBCB2 in tracking and reporting CCIR

Apply SU in tracking decision points

Use FBCB2 to decide when to deny fires

Wargame using digital systems in TOG

Disseminate latest overlays via MDL

Perfomi digital rehearsal

Disseminate CSS overlay with OPORD

Perform digital CSS rehearsal

Send up CTIL-based LOGSTAT

Send up PERSTAT perTACSOP

Use FBCB2 to detennine logistical status of unit

Utilize Supply Point icon

Use Navigation Tool or SA for resupply missions

Properly route CFFs to supporting AFATDS

Use pre-planned CFF linked to Quick Send

Disseminate and update obstacle overlay

Perfomn Net Join

Create manual icons

Apply SPOT reporting and handoff procedures

Maintain command awareness of platforms on Tl

Use collapse/expand function

Achieve desired operating picture

Use Center of Mass function

The user skills in Table 4 were driven primarily by 4ID operational mission requirements,

not by the organization of FBCB2 capabilities. Thus the skills should link closely with mission

essential tasks as encountered in a Force XXI unit. This important linkage enables the skills to

serve as a valid foundation for developing digital skills proficiency requirements.

Two ofthe high-priority skills are enablers (i.e., prerequisites underpinning essential

combat functions): perform precombat checks and inspections, and employ filter settings to

create the operational picture. The remaining skills (e.g., control indirect fires) directly support

performance of key battlefield functions that must occur for successful tactical operations. All of

the skills, in a sense, constitute higher order applications of digital capabilities—each skill

harnessing multiple FBCB2 features to accomplish functional performance requirements.

17
The nine high-priority user skills, with their informal validation by 4ID warfighters, set

the stage for focusing digital training objectives and the associated proficiency measurement

requirements. They define high-payoff performance dimensions around which to structure

observation and assessment activities of trainers and observers. The consensus priorities provide

a loose framework for weighting the value of various proficiency measures, but they should be

interpreted with professional judgment and conraion sense.

The user skills and tasks presented in this section establish a manageable set of digital

performance dimensions for allocating the attention and effort of training observers. They also

provide a useful basis for shaping unit training programs and leaders' assessment tools. In the

FBCB2-TFV project, the "top nine" skills formed the foundation for developing digital

observation guidelines in the Exploitation Tool (discussed below in the Interim Observation

Guidelines Section).

Network Management Skills

The TI is comprised of a lower TI and an upper TI (the latter is called Warfighter

Information Network-Terrestrial, or WIN-T). The lower TI connects ABCS components with

Embedded Battle Conmiand (EEC), Mobile Subscriber Equipment (MSE), and the Near Term

Digital Radio (NTDR). The lower TI consists of FBCB2, Enhanced Position Location Reporting

System (EPLRS), Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System (SINCGARS), and

internet controllers (BSfCs). Critical to the entire TI are the carrier sense multiple access (CSMA)

servers. They link each battalion to the rest ofthe brigade. Each maneuver battalion has nine

EPLRS-equipped platforms that are the designated CSMA servers. These servers, also called SA

(Situational Awareness) servers, broadcast the battalion's SA picture to the rest ofthe brigade

via an EPLRS logical channel network (LCN). This LCN is resident on all EPLRS systems in

the brigade. However, only the SA servers transmit on this "brigade-wide" LCN. The rest of the

EPLRS simply receive the broadcast and enable displaying the SA from outside the battalion.

For the purposes ofthis report, the team focused on the lower TI and the FBCB2-related

TI responsibilities of the users/leaders in their FBCB2-equipped platforms as well as the Signal

Officer (S6) in the TOC. Unit/leader responsibilities include being aware of gaps in the Blue

picture, ensuring the communication equipment is coimected properly, and verifying they have

the correct communications security (COMSEC) loads. Users must detect problems with the

lower TI and initiate troubleshooting techniques such as verifying EPLRS server functionality

and executing a Net Join if needed.

The analog TOC differs greatly from the digital TOC. Gone are the days where the most

critical piece of conmiunications equipment was the FM radio. Today's digital staff officers

must apply their digital knowledge to the traditional analog TOC operations. The traditional

TOC had each staff section monitoring radio nets and updating the commander verbally and on

the map board. Today's digital TOC still possesses the analog tools but is further complicated

with simultaneous real time information from each section and higher echelons. The digital staff

officers must be knowledgeable in the operation of their digital systems and, just as important,

sort through the large amounts of information the systems provide.

18
The foundation for successftil digital operations is a well-managed TI. Without that,

digital operations will fail. The task force S6 is responsible for ensuring the network is healthy.

He monitors the lower (FBCB2) TI through the Tactical Internet Manager System (TIMS). The

TIM software can be tailored to provide feedback on the number of platforms operational, key

nodes operational, SINCGARS operational servers, EPLRS radio operation, NTDR links to the

flanking brigade, and stams of SA servers. Just as there is a need to measure proficiency of

FBCB2 users and operators, there is also a need to measure the proficiency of the network

manager.

Table 5 lists some high-priority network skills that, when measured, can provide leaders

and trainers information on the proficiency of network managers.

Table 5

High Priority Network Management Skills (Lower TI)

Network Manager Skill Critical Network Query

Verify Task Force Situational

Awareness

• Is SA server active?

• Are flanking TFs and Bde troops in the TF SA pteture?

• Are all platfomis on correct UTR?

• Can all TF platforms see the correlated Red picture from

ASAS?

Verify Task Force Command and

Control

• Did Co Cdrs and special Pit Ldrs receive TF graphics?

• Did all companies receive correct message address groups?

• Did all companies receive tailored CTIL from the S4/CTCP?

Verify Task Force FBCB2 Security • Are all FBCB2 platforms operating at the appropriate

security level?

Factors Influencing Digital Performance

Echelon and Mission Phase

The team initially identified two important factors related to the frequency of application

and the exploitation of FBCB2. These two factors were echelon and type of mission. As the

analysis proceeded, it became clear that the type of mission—attack, defend, movement to

contact—^was not as important as initially thought. The team discerned that the application and

frequency of use related more closely to the phase ofthe mission. In examining mission

phases—^planning, preparation, and execution—^the team found that the higher echelons (staff in

TOC) depended on the FBCB2-provided Blue SA more during the execution phase than did

lower echelons. It was crucial to command and control at the battalion level. During mission

execution, leaders at lower echelons are looking outside the hatch, and they can usually see their

subordinate elements.

The battalion leadership was more likely to set their filters to develop their desired view

ofthe battlefield, especially during the execution phase. This echelon also used FBCB2 during

the close fight to observe the ongoing battle, receive real time feedback, and make decisions

19
based on the SA. The leadership was also much more reliant on FBCB2 for command and

control during nighttime operations or operations that required close monitoring, such as

breaching operations.

In comparison, the lower echelons depended on FBCB2 primarily during the planning

and preparation phases. Below the company conmiand echelon, platform operators were more

consumed with reacting to the battle than with monitoring and applying their FBCB2. The

maneuver company and platoon leadership used FBCB2 in their decision-making process more

during the planning and preparation phases than during the execution phase. The planning and

preparation phases were more conducive to company/platoon application of FBCB2, especially

for reconnaissance, observation ofthe enemy, and plan adjustment. For example, reconnaissance

elements rely heavily on FBCB2 for map reconnaissance, terrain information, and All Source

Analysis System (ASAS)-reported enemy locations in their correlated Red picture. Once the

reconnaissance elements locate the reported enemy, they can keep "eyes on" and help maintain

the current Red picture. This current Red picture helps commanders determine iftheir maneuver

plan needs to be adjusted.

The more engaged the operators became in waging the fight, the less they relied on

FBCB2. Many said the only time they referred to FBCB2 during the battle was for the SA

picture. This mentality changed if the battle occurred at night or through very difficult terrain.

At those times users depended on FBCB2 for SA ofthe Blue force and, more specifically, the

navigation feamres.

Unit Standing Operating Procedures (SOPs)

Tactical units rely on SOPs to detail warfighting practices and conventions that all

elements should follow. For digital operations, unit SOPs play a critical role in specifying the

procedures for employing and exploiting the FBCB2 and other digital systems. The SOPs

should procedurally link specific digital capabilities with basic tactical procedures. For example,

operators and users need to know when/how they are expected to relay digital SPOT reports of

enemy sightings and how to manage the updating ofthose icons. In an unportant sense, the

guidance contained in SOPs shapes the sender and receiver expectations for digital

communications—cornerstone aspects of digital proficiency. The SOPs can also convey why it

is important to use the digital capabilities. Further, procedural standards point to key targets for

digital proficiency measurement. Ultimately unit-generated digital SOPs can become

incorporated in TTPs used across the Army.

Force XXI warfighters have consistently reported that digital SOPs are very important for

successful digital operations (e.g., Dudley et al., 2001). In the Army's groundbreaking

digitization environment, a heavy burden fell on the shoulders of unit leaders to document how

digital capabilities can be used and exploited, then incorporate the discoveries and lessons

learned in the unit SOPs. The discovery and documentation process is progressive. For

example, once units start reporting and posting enemy sightings via digital SPOT reports, the

specifics of managing Red icons come into play. What changes in the Red situation should

trigger updating of Red icons? How are updated Red icons to be detected and interpreted

20
throughout the unit? What happens ifthe initial reporter of the enemy has to move? The

progressive process means that SOPs must be updated frequently.

Because SOPs define performance expectations, they would be expected to heavily

influence digital performance. However, units have found it difficult to establish and maintain

digital SOPs in the press of numerous high-priority demands on their time. Units are not

adequately resourced to document digital procedures in SOPs. Thus unit SOPs have been slow

to incorporate digital procedures. There also has been no organized and effective mechanism to

transfer lessons learned and SOPs from experienced units to those just receiving digital systems.

As a result, the potential for unit SOPs to shape digital performance awaits realization.

TaskDijficulty

The team interviewed soldiers upon their completion of Key Leader's Training at the

BCTC. With the training fi-esh in their minds, the soldiers could readily identify FBCB2 tasks

that were in the "too hard to do" category. None ofthe soldiers and leaders interviewed felt that

any ofthe FBCB2 applications were mentally too difficuh to execute. They defined a task as

"too hard" if it took too many keystrokes to accomplish. If the desired outcome took too long to

achieve, the users did not pursue it. Some ofthe more common high-difficulty tasks are:

• Creating and retrieving overlays

• Using the navigation function

• Creating preformatted messages

• Executing a Net Join

These skills may be perceived as too hard to do during operations as most require more

than three keystrokes to get to the desired end result. If users are under the pressures associated

with combat, they probably will not attempt functions that are too time consuming or not

executed on a regular basis. In the chaos of combat, soldiers desire immediate response to

information needs. They also revert back to the analog procedures to which they are more

accustomed. As documented in previous ARI reports (Elliot, Sanders, and Quinkert, 1996;

Sanders, 1999), digital skills decay if not used regularly. Therefore, any task that is too

cumbersome to execute will likely result in degraded skill proficiency.

Overlay creation is a time consuming process. One cause of frustration resuhs from

placing all Army standardized map symbols in a drop-down menu for selection. The user has to

scroll through the list to find the correct symbol for the overlay. It is a tedious process to select

the location on the map where the symbol goes, then orient the symbol in the proper direction,

and change the color ifso desired.

Units continue to struggle with finding the most recently received overlay, order, or

message. When messages are shown in the flash-immediate-priority-routine (FEPR) queue, the

message type is generic. For example, the engineer obstacle overlay is titled "obstacle." It does

not tell the user the operations order to which the overlay pertains. File naming conventions are

taught in the FBCB2 Key Leader's Course, where the user learns how to name the message as he

saves it and then file it in a message folder he must create.

21
The Navigation tool has numerous steps for users who desire to build a strip map, use the

route analysis function, orjust keep the route displayed on the driver's screen. It is extremely

helpful when maneuvering at night or m situations where visibility is limited. Instead of

employing the tool, users typically apply the "center on" function. This function allows the

operator to select a location that will remain at the center ofthe FBCB2 display regardless ofthe

platform's own location. Drivers simply "center on" a location and drive to it. This method,

while not as effective, is faster.

Preformatted messages were the result of User's Jury comments made during FBCB2

development. They are meant to expedite the creation ofstandard messages (for example,

nuclear, biological, chemical (NBC) reports, SPOT reports, medical evacuation [MEDEVAC]

requests). Using drop-down menus to enter information was thought to be easier, especially if

the vehicle is on the move. However, the creators of messages become frustrated when they

cannot edit the text or enter free text.

Not all FBCB2 platforms are EPLRS servers. For example, in a tank platoon of four

vehicles, two vehicles (the platoon leader and platoon sergeant) host EPLRS servers. When

these vehicles are eliminated from the platoon, the remaining vehicles have no server to transmit

their data to the lower TI. The survivmg vehicles must then perform a Net Join to link with a

new conununications hub so they receive information and transmit SA data via the lower TI.

Training is essential if users are to exploit the high-difficulty skills discussed above.

These skills should be trained and reinforced in the classroom, in simulation exercises, and in the

field. Their employment can resuh in faster, more informed decisions and, in the case of Net

Join, may be key in preventing fratricide.

Performance Problems

In the FBCB2 environment there are various sources of digital performance problems.

Problems may stem from the misapplication of FBCB2 capabilities, the lack oftraining, the

unavailability of SOPs, the lack of appropriate feedback, and inexperience. Problems at one

echelon may not occur at another. In this section, we focus on the lowest level of performance

problems—the operator level. The FBCB2 is the cornerstone ofthe digital battlefield. No

matter how proficient the staff, if the FBCB2 operators do not employ their systems as intended

the COP will not be a true picture. The Red and Blue pictures will be incomplete.

The primary evidence of FBCB2 operator performance problems was found in reports

and interviews from FSRs who supported units at Fort Hood. The FSRs were government

contractors assigned to each unit for technical support. The majority of the problems reported by

FSRs stemmed from lack ofsustainment training and/or failure to apply troubleshooting

procedures.

Units need to be innovative in incorporating digital training into their training schedules.

One recommendation made by a senior FSR was to conduct weekly connectivity exercises

during motor pool maintenance. As part of vehicle preventive maintenance checks and services

(PMCS), operators could load the correct COMSEC fill into their SINCGARS and EPLRS

22
systems, and turn on the FBCB2, Precision Lightweight GPS Receiver (PLGR), INC, and radios.

While completing PMCS, the FBCB2 would go through its booting sequence. Once the PMCS

was complete, the soldiers could then ensure proper connectivity on the appropriate SINCGARS

hopsets and EPLRS network. Once connectivity was verified the operators could conduct both

SA and command and control tasks. For instance, all vehicles would ensure they could see other

icons in their battalion and ensure they could be seen by other platforms. Ifthere were

connectivity problems, operators would conduct the appropriate troubleshooting procedures

found m the FBCB2 operator's manual. As part of verifying command and control connectivity,

all platforms would send an overlay message, a free text message, and a SPOT report.

This simple exercise would also address another weak area the FSRs encountered—

troubleshooting procedures. The FSRs attributed many of the FBCB2 performance problems to

the lack of troubleshooting. Even though troubleshooting procedures are listed in the operator's

manuals, most often soldiers merely notify their 3 lU (unit signal Support Systems Specialist)

when a problem occurs. This can lead to delays because there is only one 31U in each company.

Examples of some of the most common performance problems are revealing: (a) FBCB2

systems are simply not turned on; (b) cables are unconnected, improperly connected or missing;

(c) radios have no COMSEC fill or an improper COMSEC fill loaded; (d) PLGRs are not

connected; and (e) INCs are not mmed on. Such problems involve simple fixes that, if corrected,

mean the difference between a digital network that is fully mission capable and one that is not.

The weekly connectivity exercise would produce benefits in multiple areas—^identifying

faulty hardware, reducing the surge of equipment exchanges during field exercises, and

maintaining basic FBCB2 operator skills by virtue of routine sustmnment training.

Another vital means for establishing and maintaining digital performance is the creation

and application of digital SOPs, discussed above under Factors Influencing Digital Performance.

When queried about the unit's digital SOP, most warfighters interviewed in this project admitted

they did not have one but needed it. They identified the unit's high operational tempo as the

reason digital SOPs had not been created.

The findings on FBCB2 performance problems and high-difficulty tasks indicate the

importance of prioritizing FBCB2 training and observation needs. Just as important is the need

to create digital SOPs and incorporate FBCB2 tasks into unit training schedules on a regular

basis.

Indicators of Digital Proficiency

MeasurementImplications

Measurement of digital skills proficiency is indispensable if units are to improve thenperformance with the aid of C4I tools. Effective digital training demands achievable,

operationally anchored feedback on how well individuals and units are exploiting their digital

capabilities. Failure to measure and assess digital skills proficiency ensures that units will fall

seriously short of their combat effectiveness potential—^most likely without realizing it. At the

same time, measuring digital proficiency must be managed and tailored to optimize the

23
efficiency and effectiveness of the performance assessment process. In large part, optimizing the

assessment process means focusing on high-payoff proficiency targets. This, in turn, contributes

greatly to optimizing the training value, or retum on investment, achieved by the units.

High-payoff digital skills are those that contribute most critically to tactical performance.

The high-priority FBCB2 user skills identified in this project (Table 4) can serve as a spotlight to

focus the attention of observers and the entire feedback process. These skills, along with their

associated tasks, define the digital performance dimensions that most warrant the attention of

trainers and observers. The high-payoff skills spawn measures of digital proficiency (see Interim

Observation Guidelines, below) that can optimize the performance assessment process and AAR

feedback procedures. In the bargain, focusing on top priority user skills can reduce observer

workload and enhance training payoff.

Levels of digital proficiency play a key role in assessing performance. For each of the

implementing actions associated with an FBCB2 user skill, levels of proficiency can be defined

as performance benchmarks. Meliza (in preparation) detailed working levels of proficiency for

seven clusters of digital skills as well as fifteen "diagnostic" indicators of overall proficiency.

Consider the case of "Taking actions to ensure connectivity" as an example. In this case, Meliza

spelled out proficiency levels ranging from "unit is unaware of degree of connectivity

maintained during the last exercise" (low proficiency) to "ability to troubleshoot and address

most connectivity problems" (high proficiency). One advantage of such benchmarks is their preexercise utility for tailoring both training and feedback. An additional advantage is that most of

the indicators of digital proficiency can be applied by simply asking questions of unit members

(e.g., does your unit have an SOP for naming different versions of obstacle overiays?) Future

efforts may be desired to develop proficiency benchmarks for the top nine FBCB2 user skills.

The training and feedback needs of a unit depend on a host of factors including echelon

ofthe training audience, specific training objectives, the unit's pre-exercise level of proficiency,

and designated areas needing emphasis. To meet the diversity of needs, trainers and observers

should be prepared to tailor each training exercise, especially the observation and feedback

procedures, to optimize the training experience. The high-payoff user skills identified in this

project provide a sound basis for tailoring FBCB2-oriented training objectives/methods and the

performance assessment procedures. Such tailoring can enhance the ability of the observers to

provide high-payoff feedback, reduce the workload of the observers, and boost the performance

improvement realized by the unit.

For tailoring observation and feedback during FBCB2 training exercises, several factors

discussed in the preceding Factors Influencing Digital Performance section are valuable. The

findings suggest a practical means for focusing an observer's attention and effort. At company

level and below, observers can concentrate on a narrower set of digital capabilities, at the same

time allocating greater attention to proper connectivity, threat tracking, fire support,

disseminating messages/graphics, and preventing fi:atricide. Mission planning and preparation

phases will generally afford more oppormnities to observe FBCB2 skills in action, especially at

company echelon and below. More difficult digital tasks (e.g., using navigation tools, creating

overlays, performing Net Join) may require greater attention in AARs, even if warfighters tend to

ignore those tasks during the exercise. When operations involve limited visibility or difficult

24
terrain, digital skills supporting navigation will likely merit special attention. Finally, knowing a

unit's overall level of experience or proficiency beforehand will help observers decide whether

to focus on basic digital skills or more advanced applications (Meliza, in preparation).

A number of measurement approaches and techniques are available for measuring digital

skills proficiency. Li earUer work, Dudley et al. (2002) analyzed the measurement needs for

digital skills associated with preventmg fratricide and controlling enemy contact. They

concluded that all-or-none (go/no go) or simple graduated (trained/needs practice/untrained)

approaches are suitable for a range of needs. They determined that the suitability of the two

approaches depends on task criticality, task complexity, and performance time span. For the user

digital skills that emerged in the FBCB2-TFV project, four primary techniques are envisioned for

measuring proficiency. These include examination of digital message traffic, investigation of

user-system interactions, inspection of platform stams or usage, and self-report by operators or

users. In addition to manual procedures, automated tools could be leveraged in support of all

four techniques. In this ongoing research program, development of peiformance measures and

procedures has been reserved for future work.

Specific applications of measurement techniques will be outUned below in the discussion

ofInterim Observation Guidelines. As noted in the foregoing paragraphs, additional research is

needed to systematically develop working tools and procedures as part of a comprehensive

architecture for measuring digital proficiency.

Interim Observation Guidelines

Establishing interim observation guidelines for FBCB2 trainers constituted an important

objective of the project. The team produced a user-friendly Exploitation Tool to focus

measurement activities and facilitate high-payoff performance feedback. The ultimate goals

were to (a) provide a guide for leaders to gauge the digital proficiency oftheir units, (b) optimize

the training value realized by digital units, and (c) reduce the overall workload of exercise

observers.

The matrix format ofthe FBCB2 Exploitation Tool is designed for easy reference and

tracking by digital observers and trainers. For each of the mne high-priority digital skills (from

Table 4), the matrix contains four colunms of practical information (see Table 6). Performance

goals correspond to the tasks appearing in Table 4 and point to fairly specific system-oriented

steps. The echelon column indicates the echelon(s) to which each performance goal apphes—

battalion and below for this project. Trigger information specifies the timefi-ame or condition(s)

that normally prompt the performance of digital tasks. The final column identifies procedures

for obtaining relevant performance data. The various types of data include (a) digital message

traffic (as viewed on system displays), (b) user-system interaction (as observed in real time), (c)

platform status or usage (as observed on system displays), and (d) self-reported performance of

digital actions (warfighter responses to questions). Altogetiier, die tool provides concise

instructions on what performance data to collect, and when, where, and how to collect it. A

companion report (Leibrecht et al., in preparation) contains the complete Exploitation Tool.

25
Table 6

Matrix Format of FBCB2 Exploitation Tool, with Sample Entries

Performance

SkiU Goals Echelon Trigger Where to Find Data

Report gaps in • Battalion User View User-System Interaction:

Blue SA to • Company realizes • User performs troubleshooting to rule out problems

higher & lower • Platoon Blue with his platform (i.e., verifies current COMSEC,

HQ, alerting • Platform picture is verifies EPLRS server is operational, checks filter

network to degraded settings)

degraded COP (not due to

his filter

settings)

Observe natfbrm Data:

• Did user take the initiative and enter Blue icons to

prevent fratricide?

Precombat Query Warfigjiters:

Checks/ • Was CQirect COMSEC loaded?

Precombat • Was notification of any blue SA gaps made network

Inspections wide to avoid fratricide?

(PCCyPQ)

Clear queues • Battalion When Observe User-System Interaction:

and logs to • Company refresh • Note ifsystem refresh rate is visibly slow

speedup • Platoon rate slows; • View message cut to determine last time it was

refresh rate. • Operator at a cleared

resulting in mimmum, Query Warfigjiters:

more accurate prior to • Ask commanders and operators when/how often

and tunely

COP

new

mission they cleared their queues and logs before and during

the mission

The matrix tool is designed to guide the planning and execution of assessment activities

by observers supporting FBCB2 training exercises. It can assist observers in live, virtual, and

constructive training environments, but obtaining performance data is generally easier in

simulation environments. The guide focuses performance assessment efforts on high-value skills

and tasks that especially contribute to overall combat effectiveness. In turn this enhances the

feedback and AAR process. By emphasizing high-payoff feedback in the hands of training

support personnel, the guide helps units get the greatest return from their digital training

exercises. In the process it helps observers achieve economy of effort and manage a potentially

overwhelming workload. Finally, it provides a valuable tool for leaders to gauge the digital

proficiency oftheir units and identify realistic training needs.

During the course ofthe project, the FBCB2 Exploitation Tool was used during battalion

training exercises in CCTT. The limited feedback indicates the format and contents are wellsuited for operational training. The matrix encapsulates what-where-when-how guidelines in a

concise, easy-to-use package that fits all echelons and missions. As a process guide it fosters

insight and resourcefulness on the part of observers. As a conmniander's assessment tool it offers

a systematic fi-amework for training to a level of digital proficiency that directly enhances

combat effectiveness. The potential utility and value of the tool warrants further application and

development.

26
AAR Implications

This effort is the first attempt to provide observers of digital training a measurement

guide so there is a standard digital proficiency goal for units to achieve. The systems and

software are evolving. Our objective was to enable feedback that is not tied to specific software

fiinctionality. Another goal was to provide evaluators with a measurement tool that might

transcend their own digital expertise or lack thereof.

Feedback is essential during operations and during AARs. The Exploitation Tool matrix

presented by Leibrecht et al. (in preparation) focuses on the user's abilities during operations. It

provides detailed questions the observer can ask of operators and users to ascertain their digital

knowledge. Most ofthe AARs the research team observed following digital exercises focused

on how the unit performed tactically, not how well the unit applied the digital tools in support of

the mission. Having structured AAR tools can keep the process focused on the digital aspects of

the operation (when needed). Table 7 contains high-priority questions related to FBCB2

operations that an observer can ask during an AAR to shift attention to exploiting FBCB2

capabilities. In addition, each of the "query warfighter" items in the Exploitation Tool can be

used as a question during AARs.

Table 7

AAR Questions for Shifting the Spotlight to FBCB2 Exploitation

1. How did your use of FBCB2 impact your mission execution? Consider the digital

information you received and how it affected your ability to execute actions.

2. Given the exercise outcome, how would you change the way you used FBCB2?

3. Were there any advantages to planning with the aid of your FBCB2?

4. Did you use any FBCB2 capabilities in your mission rehearsal?

5. What prompted you to view your FBCB2 during contact or movement to contact?

6. Did anyone lose SA during the operation? What troubleshooting techniques did you

apply?

7. What lessons learned would you incorporate into your unit digital TACSOP?

27
28
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusions

The overarching purpose ofthe FBCB2-TFV research project was to develop a basic

architecture for measuring digital skills proficiency. The project pursued three principal goals:

(a) characterize major tactical performance dimensions of FBCB2 utilization, including user

skills; (b) examine key factors influencing digital performance; and (c) establish detailed

guidelines for measuring high-payoff FBCB2 user tasks. The products of the research establish

tools and knowledge that can be used to tailor digital training, enhance the efficiency and

effectiveness of digital feedback processes, and boost the overall payoff of digital training

programs.

Measuring digital skills proficiency is essential if units are to achieve the performance

potential of advanced C4I tools. The current project contributed significantly to tools for

assessing how well individuals and units are exploiting their digital capabilities. The results

advance the state of the art for measuring digital proficiency thus helping trainers and observers

to work smart and focus their efforts on high-payoffskills. Collectively the findings establish an

initial digital proficiency architecture for units employing the FBCB2.

The recurring patterns and critical insights presented in this report are of primary value

where leaders, trainers, and observers are working to prepare realistically for FBCB2-supported

combat operations. Although centered deliberately around the FBCB2 and the 4ID, the findings

may suggest approaches for assessing performance where other digital systems and units are

involved.

Based on their role in achieving unit effectiveness, 21 major FBCB2 capabilities emerged

as major contributors. They fall in five functional categories: digital basics, battlefield

visualization, mission planning and preparation, tactical information exchange, and force

mobility and maneuver.

The Leader's Primerfor Exploiting FBCB2 provides concise information to focus unit

leaders and others on high-payoff proficiency targets. It inventories digital keys to tactical

success, along with indicators of under-utilized capabilities and performance pitfalls. The guide

can support a commander's assessment of his unit's digital proficiency.

The frequency with which units employ the major FBCB2 capabilities varies by type of

function—^planning and command and control functions are more frequent, while housekeeping

and analytical functions are less frequent. Frequency of employment also varies by echelon,

with battalion personnel using most capabilities more often than lower echelons, especially

during the execution phase.

Nine FBCB2 user skills emerged as high-payoff targets, encompassing 50 FBCB2

performance goals. Linked to mission essential tasks, the nine skills support valid skills

proficiency measurement and provide a basis for focusing observation and assessment efforts. In

descending order of priority, the high-payoff skills are:

29
1. Perform Precombat Checks and Inspections

2. Disseminate and Manage Messages and Graphics

3. Plan and Execute Movements

4. Apply Situational Understanding in Maneuver Decisions

5. Conduct Collaborative Planning

6. Support Logistical Preparations Unit-Wide

7. Control Indirect Fires

8. Avoid Fratricidal Situations

9. Employ Filter Settings to Create Operational Picture

Given the importance of a fiiUy functional TI to enable and sustain digital operations,

network management skills are major contributors to digital proficiency. Three high-priority TI

management skills were identified:

1. Verify Task Force Situational Awareness

2. Verify Task Force Command and Control

3. Verify Task Force FBCB2 Security

Unit SOPs at the battalion level and below do not generally describe digital activities in

sufficient detail to shape expectations of digital skills performance. To date the SOPs lack the

maturity to specify acceptable levels of unit digital proficiency. The process for establishing and

updating digital SOPs is not resourced. An important goal for the future force should be to

ensure that comprehensive unit SOPs are developed and maintained, as a cornerstone for

defining and standardizing digital proficiency expectations.

Among the factors influencing digital performance are echelon, mission phase, and task

difficulty. Battlefield conditions, especially limited visibility and difficult terrain, also affect

performance. Echelon and mission phase interact in their effects on performance. Warfighters

define task difficulty in terms of complexity (number of keystrokes required) and/or time

required to perform the task. The most common denominator for gauging performance effects is

frequency of use.

It is difficult to investigate the impact oflevel of digital experience on performance,

especially considering the lack of formal system training, the absence of digital procedures in

unit SOPs, and the paucity of digital measures of performance. As digital training and standards

expand, more rigorous research methods can be applied to study the role of experience level.

The general techniques required for measuring digital skills proficiency understandably

focus on utilizing system capabilities. The primary techniques include examination of digital

message traffic, observation of user-system interactions, inspection of platform status or usage,

and self-report by operators and users.

The compact FBCB2 Exploitation Tool provides interim observation guidelines in userfriendly form. The matrix readily supports convenient referencing and tracking by exercise

observers, with detailed instructions for collecting performance data. The tool also can serve as

a proficiency assessment guide for unit leaders.

30
The outcomes ofthis project, especially the Leader's Primer and the Exploitation Tool,

are expected to directly benefit digital units throughout the Army as well as their training support

elements. Among the projected benefits are:

Enhancement of products supporting brigade operations and training, such as unit

SOPs and training support packages.

Guidance for evaluating key FBCB2 operator/user skills, covering various echelons

and training environments.

Approaches and techniques for improving digital feedback tools and shifting the

A^AR focus to exploiting the power of digital systems.

Knowledge base for improving training effectiveness and reducing observer

workload.

Sharing of hard-won warfighter knowledge and insights so that valuable information

is preserved and disseminated.

Continuing research is essential to build a comprehensive digital proficiency architecture,

expand the knowledge base to encompass the current and future force, develop specialized

measurement/feedback techniques and tools, and validate new or improved assessment methods

and procedures.

Recommendations

The findings ofthis project address the proficiency measurement needs of FBCB2-

equipped units. Extensive work lies ahead to expand the digital proficiency architecture and

tools so they can fully support training programs of the current and future force. The authors

offer the following recommendations:

Emphasize and resource the development and maintenance of digital procedures as a

required component of unit SOPs.

Expand the knowledge base to include the measurement and feedback needs of

ATCCS-equipped units/elements, interim forces, and the Objective Force.

Describe proficiency levels and indicators for system-specific digital performance

across a variety of units and echelons.

Develop and validate observation guidelines for battle staffs, Combat Support units,

and Combat Service Support units.

Develop and validate commander's assessment tools for gauging the proficiency and

training needs of units and battle staffs.

Investigate how key factors (e.g., echelon, mission parameters, task difficulty, level

of experience, battlefield conditions) influence digital performance.

Design and develop automated techniques and tools for measuring digital skills

proficiency and for leveraging high-payoff feedback in AARs.

Evaluate the utility and effectiveness of alternative approaches for measuring digital

skills proficiency in operational settings.

Establish a digital training laboratory to support the systematic investigation of

Objective Force performance and proficiency assessment needs.

The research findings of the FBCB2-TFV project establish an initial architecture for

measuring digital skills proficiency. The products of the research establish tools and knowledge

31
that can be used to tailor digital training, enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of digital

feedback processes, and boost the overall payoff of digital training programs. However, much

remains to be learned through follow-on research. Expanding the tools and knowledge is an

essential step for optimizing the warfighting proficiency of the Objective Force.

Current efforts of the team are directed toward three objectives. The first objective is to

develop guidance for measuring how well a unit exploits C4I systems in the TOC environment,

emphasizing battlefield operating system integration. In addition to providing guidance to

trainers about what to observe during digital exercises, meeting this objective will involve

defining AAR display requirements for training digital staffs. The second objective is to

describe ways in which digital proficiency measurement will change or remain the same with the

Objective Force. The third is to describe AAR system capabilities that can support current

digitized units while providing a foundation for training the Objective Force.

32
REFERENCES

Bamett, J. S., Meliza, L. L., & McCluskey, M. R. (2001). Defining digital proficiency

measurement targetsfor US Army units (ARI Technical Report 1117). Alexandria, VA:

U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences. (AD A396 899)

Brown, B. R., Anderson, L., Begley 11,1. J. & Meliza, L. L. (1999). Cognitive requirementsfor

information operations training (CRIOT) (ARI Study Report 99-02). Alexandria, VA: U.S.

Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences. (AD A365 483)

Brown, B. R., Nordyke, J. W., Gerlock, D. L., Begley, I. J., & MeUza, L. L. (1998). Training

analysis andfeedback aids studyfor live training support (ARI Study Report 98-04).

Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences.

(ADA351107)

Dudley, M. G., Hill, R., Johnston, J. C, Jones, W. S., LeGare, M., Leibrecht, B. C, Longoria,

K., & Meliza, L. L. (2002). Measuring digitalproficiency: Assessment approaches and

echelon considerations (ARI Research Report 1791). Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Research

Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences. (AD A405 055)

Dudley, M. G., Johnston, J. C, Jones, W. S., Strauss, C. P., & Meliza, L. L. (2001). Making the

transitionfrom analog to digital warfighting: Changes in unit behavior and knowledge (ARI

Research Report 1785). Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral

and Social Sciences (AD A397 575)

Elliott, G., Sanders W, and Quinkert, K. A. (1996). Training in a digitized battalion taskforce:

lessons learned and implicationsforfuture training. (ARI Research Report 1695).

Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences.

(AD A313 293)

Leibrecht, B. C, Lockaby, K. J., & Meliza, L. L. (in preparation). A practical guidefor

exploiting FBCB2 capabilities (ARI Research Product). Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army

Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences.

Meliza, L. L. (in preparation). Digital skills and indicators ofoverall digital proficiency (ARI

Technical Report). Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and

Social Sciences.

U.S. Department ofthe Army (2001). Operations (FM 3-0). Washington, DC: Headquarters,

Department of the Army.

Warrior-T (2001a). Digital battle stafftask map (TRADOC ST 20-101-5, Draft). Fort Hood,

TX: Warrior-T Project Office.

Warrior-T (2001b) Army battle command system (ABCS) smart book overivew version

6.2.x. Fort Hood, TX; Warrior-T Project Office.

33
Warrior-T (2002a). Training the digital brigade combat team battle staff(16 April 2002 draft)

. Fort Hood, TX; Warrior-T Project Office

Warrior-T (2002b). Army Battle Command System MCS Workstation Individual Tasks

Version 6.2.x (2 Jul 2002 draft). Fort Hood, TX; Warrior-T Project Office.

Warrior-T (2002c). Force XXI battle command brigade and below (FBCB2) operator

integrator, and decision maker shared individual tasks supporting ST20-101-5-ABCS

(3 Jul 2002 draft). Fort Hood, TX; Warrior-T Project Office.

34
APPENDIX A

Interview Questions for Each Echelon

Name: Rank: Phone:

Position: Date of Assignment to Current Position:

Prior Digital Experience (number and type of FTX/CPXs, duties performed, etc.):

ABCS Specific Training Received to Date:

Email Address:

Platoon Leaders

1. What rules of thumb do you use for setting your FBCB2 filters?

2. Have you ever used your FBCB2 to (if you have not used the below capabiJities, please

indicate why):

Navigate under limited visibility situations?

Move to a breach point?

Avoid threat situations like minefields, contaminated areas, firesacks?

Decide when it is time to transition from movement to maneuver?

Monitor the movement of your platoon or individual platforms to CSS locations?

Navigate to crews requiring casualty evacuation or vehicle recovery?

Link up with another unit?

Control your platoon's fires (defense)?

Select ovenwatch positions?

3. Have you used FBCB2 to consolidate range cards prepared by subordinates? If not, why?

4. Do you use your FBCB2 during the planning process? If so, how?

5. Do you think you have progressed through different levels of FBCB2 proficiency, such that

there were insights you gained or skills you acquired that gave you a greater ability to use

digital systems? If so. what were these skills and insights, and what new capability did you

gain?

A-1
6. Where there any problems in operating FBCB2 or in the application of information that you

encountered early on that you have now mastered? What were these problems?

7. Do you have unit SOPs for filter settings and file management?

8. What PCI's do you perform on digital systems?

A-2
Company Commanders

1. Do you use FBCB2 to predict where, when, and how you will likely engage the enemy?

a. If so, what tools, overlays, etc. do you use?

• FBCB2 terrain analysis tool

• Enemy situation template

• Overlays provided by higher headquarters showing enemy obsen/ation fans,

range fans, etc.

• Obstacle overlays

• Infomriation provided by engineers regarding trafficability, weather, etc.

• Others? ^ ^

b. What decisions does FBCB2 assist you in making (some considerations below)?

• Pick a route or routes offering cover and concealment

• Test route selected

• Decide where smoke or supporting fires might be needed

• Decide where to change formations and movement techniques prior to

contact

• Selection of ovenwatch positions

• Others?

c. Circle below information that is communicated and indicate to whom and how.

• Route and fire support requirements given to battalion

- Commander verbally or via FBCB2

- Every recipient on battalion command net

- Every recipient on company net

• Location where visual contact is likely to be made

- Commander verbally or via FBCB2

- Every recipient on battalion command net

- Every recipient on company net

• Overwatch positions

- Commander verbally or via FBCB2

- Every recipient on battalion command net

- Every recipient on company net

• Others?

2. What digital planning products do you look at during the planning and preparation phases to

make sure you are ready to perform your mission? What do you look for with each product?

• Maneuver plan

• Fire support plan

• CSS plan

• IPB products

A-3
3. If you saw a problem with a plan In temis of information gaps, what would you do?

4. Do you look at digital planning products to see if there have been any changes? If so, which

ones?

5. How do you know when digital planning products are available for the first time and when

they have been updated?

6. What naming conventions do you use in saving orders, overlays and messages?

7. How does your company CP manage digital orders/naming conventions/filing? Is there a

unit SOP governing this?

8. How do you achieve a Common Operating Picture for your company?

9. What rules of thumb do you use for setting your FBCB2 filters? Is there a unit SOP

governing this?

10. Have you used FBCB2 to plan/distribute direct and indirect fire plans? Consolidate platoon

fire plans?

11. Have you ever used FBCB2 SA to:

Monitor your unit's transition from movement to maneuver before contact?

Conduct a tactical movement under limited visibility situations?

Check the actions of platoons?

Move to a breach point or monitor movement of your platoons to a breach point?

Link up with another unit?

Make sure your platoons stay away from threat situations (obstacles, contaminated

areas, firesacks)?

Make sure you are not about to cross paths with another company team?

Monitor movement of platoons or platfomris to CSS locations?

Monitor casualty evacuation and vehicle recovery? (If not, have you participated in

exercises where vehicle recovery and casualty evac were played?)

12. Have you had any problems keeping track of SA data throughout the mission planning,

preparation and execution process (if so, what problems)? How did you know how to solve

the problem?

13. What PCI's do you perform on digital systems?

A-4
14. Do you think you have progressed through different levels of FBCB2 proficiency, such that

there were insights you gained or sl<ills you acquired that gave you a greater ability to use

digital systems? If so, what were these skills and insights, and what new capability did you

gain?

15. Were there any problems in operating FBCB2 or in applying infomiation that you

encountered early on that you have now overcome? What were these problems? What

enabled you to master these skills?

A-5
Battalion Staff

1. Do you think you have progressed through different levels of digital proficiency, such that

there were insights you gained or sl<ills you acquired that gave you a greater ability to use

digital systems? If so, what were these skills and insights, and what new capability did you

gain?

2. Were there any problems in operating digital systems or applying their information that you

encountered early on that you have now mastered? What were these problems? (i.e., What

problems will a new member of the staff have?)

3. As you gained experienced using digital systems were there any activities that you had been

performing in an analog fashion that you gradually shifted over to digital? If so, what were

they?

4. Given that digitization provides the capability to speed up the planning process and

disseminate plans quicker, do you get feedback from other BOSs in time to make changes?

5. Do you have trouble tracking changes in the various plans and overlays? How do you

resolve this?

6. In an actual combat situation, are there any types of feedback about your unit's tactical

performance that you would like to have available in time to take immediate corrective

action? This feedback can cover planning, preparation, execution or

reconstitution/recovery.

7. How do you construct the common operating picture? What problems (if any) are frequently

encountered?

8. Do you have digital SOPs to govern operations and TTPs involving digital C2 systems?

(e.g., How to make the digital capabilities a combat multiplier.)

A-6
Battalion Commander

1. Do you think you have progressed through different levels of digital proficiency, such that

there were insights you gained or sicills you acquired that gave you a greater ability to use

digital systems? If so, what were these skills and insights, and what new capability did you

gain?

2. What are the problems a new battalion commander is likely to encounter operating in the

digital environment? (e.g., What problems did you have that tended to disappear with

experience?)

3. What gradual changes have you noticed in the ability of your company commanders to

exploit the capabilities of digitization? Have these changes resulted in perfomiance

benefits? If so, how?

4. What gradual changes have you noticed in the ability of your staff to exploit the capabilities

of digitization? Have these changes resulted in performance benefits? If so, how?

5. In an actual combat situation, are there any types of feedback about your unit's tactical

performance that you would like to have available in time to take immediate corrective

action? This feedback can cover planning, preparation, execution or reconstitution/

recovery.

A-7
Brigade Commander

1. Do you think you have progressed through different levels of digital proficiency, such that

there were insights you gained or skills you acquired that gave you a greater ability to use

digital systems? If so, what were these skills and insights, and what new capability did you

gain?

2. What gradual changes have you noticed in the ability of your staff to exploit the capabilities

of digitization? Have these changes resulted in performance benefits? If so, how?

3. In an actual combat situation, are there any types of feedback about your unit's tactical

performance that you would like to have available in time to take immediate connective

action? This feedback can cover planning, preparation, execution or reconstitution/

recovery.

A-8
Brigade Staff

1. Do you think you have progressed through different levels of digital proficiency, such that

there were insights you gained or skills you acquired that gave you a greater ability to use

digital systems? If so, what were these skills and insights, and what new capability did you

gain?

2. Given that digitization provides the capability to put draft plans out in front of people earlier,

are you getting feedback from other BOSs in time to make changes? If not, why?

3. Do you have trouble tracking changes in the various plans? How do you overcome this?

4. In an actual combat situation, are there any types of feedback about your unit's tactical

performance that you would like to have available in time to take immediate corrective

action? This feedback can cover planning, preparation, execution and reconstitution/

recovery.

5. Do you have digital SOPs to govern operations and TTPs involving digital C2 systems?

(e.g., How to make the digital capabilities a combat multiplier.)

A-9

APPENDIX B

List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

1CD 1 St Cavalry Division

4JD 4* Infantry Division

AAR After Action Review

ABCS Army Battle Command System

AFATDS Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System

ARI U. S. Army Research Institute

ASAS All Som-ce Analysis System

ATCCS Army Tactical Command and Control System

BCT Brigade Combat Team

BCTC Battle Conmiand Training Center

BFA Battle Functional Areas

BLUFOR Blue Forces

Bn Battalion

BOS Battlefield Operating System

C4I Command, Control, Communications, Computers, And Intelligence

CCIR Commander's Critical Information Requirement

CCTT Close Combat Tactical Trainer

CFF Call For Fire

CLOS Circular Line Of Sight

CM Center Of Mass

Co Company

COA Course Of Action

COMSEC Communications Security

COP Common Operational Picture

CSMA Carrier Sense Multiple Access

CSS Combat Service Support

esses Combat Service Support Control System

CTIL Commander's Tracked Items List

CTCP Combat Trains Command Post

DTG Date Time Group

EBC Embedded Battle Command

EPLRS Enhanced Position Location Reporting System

FBCB2 Force XXI Battle Command Brigade And Below

FBCB2-TFV Fbcb2 Training Feedback Variables [Project]

FDD First Digitized Division

FFTR Friendly Forces Information Requirements

FIPR Flash-Immediate-Priority-Routine

FM Field Manual

FM Frequency Modulation

FSR Field Service Representative

FTX Field Training Exercise

B-1
GPS

lAW

INC

LCN

LD

LOGSTAT

LOS

LP/OP

MDL

MEDEVAC

MSE

MSTF

MTP

NBC

NCO

NFZ/NFA/RFL

NTC

NTDR

OC

OP

OPORD

PCC/PCI

PERSTAT

PLGR

Pit

PMCS

SA

SECT

SIMEX

SESfCGARS

SME

SOP

SSRU

SU

TACSOP

TF

TI

TIM

TOC

TRADOC

TTP

UAV

UTR

WINf-T

Global Positioning System

In Accordance With

Internet Controller

Logical Channel Network

Line Of Departure

Logistics Status [Report]

Line Of Sight

Listening Post/Observation Post

Mission Data Loader

Medical Evacuation

Mobile Subscriber Equipment

Mission Support Training Facility

Mission Training Plan

Nuclear, Biological, Chemical

Non-Commissioned Officer

No Fire Zone/No Fire Area/Restrictive Fire Line

National Training Center

Near Term Digital Radio

Observer/Controller

Observation Post

Operation Order

Pre-Combat Checks/Pre-Combat Inspections

Personnel Status [Report]

Precision Lightweight Gps Receiver

Platoon

Preventive Maintenance Checks And Services

Situational Awareness

Stryker Brigade Combat Team

Simulation Exercise

Single Channel Ground And Airborne Radio System

Subject Matter Expert

Standing Operating Procedure

Simulator Systems Research Unit

Situational Understanding

Tactical SOP

Task Force

Tactical Intemet

Tactical Intemet Manager

Tactical Operations Center

U.S. Army Training And Doctrine Command

Tactics, Techniques, And Procedures

Unmanned aerial vehicle

Unit Task Reorganization

Warfighter Information Network-Terrestrial

B-2