The U.S. Intervention

in Lebanon, 1958:

A Commander's

Reminiscence

by Major General

David W. Gray

U.S. Army (retired)

Reprinted by

COMBAT

STUDIES

INSTITUTE

Fort Kansas

90-5185
•FOREWORD

In the summer of 1982, the Director, Combat Studies Institute, assigned me the task of writing

a Leavenworth Paper on rapid deployment logistics, using the US intervention in Lebanon in

1958 as a case study. Lebanon was chosen because there was ample documentation, much of it

only recently declassified, and because Dr. Roger Spiller had set the strategic and tactical stage in

Leavenworth Paper No. 3, "Not War But Like War": The American Intervention in Lebanon. In the

course of my investigation, I decided to contact several military officers who had participated in

the operation. Major General (Retired) David W. Gray was one of those contacted0

General Gray said in his initial response that he would reply at a later date, after he had had

time to review his papers and comb his memory in order to prepare as thorough and accurate a

narrative as possible. When his reply arrived, it totaled over one-hundred handwritten pages.

In addition to providing answers to my specific questions about logistics, General Gray provided his recollections of the Lebanon operation and a critique of Leavenworth Paper No. 3. His

manuscript not only contained a detailed and candid account of his activities, but amplified, elaborated, and sometimes disputed Dr, Spiller's work. In this sense, it is both an important eyewitness

account and a companion piece.to Leavenworth Paper Mo 3. The reader of both publications will

benefit from being able to draw upon the scholarly work of a trained historian and the memoir of

an actual participant. The historical record could not be better served.

Major(P) Gary H, Wade

Combat Studies Institute

U.S. Army Command and General

Staff College

CSI REPRINTS contain unique, out of print, or difficult to obtain material on military history topics.

The views expressed in a CSI REPRINT are those of the author(s) and not necessarily those of the

Department of the Army or the Department of Defense.
THE U. S. INTERVENTION IN LEBANON, 1958s

A COMMANDER'S REMINISCENCE

by

Major General David W. Gray

United States Army (Retired)

August 1984

Combat Studies Institute

U. S, Army Command and General Staff College

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

86-1503

CONTENTS

Section I: Chronological Narrative . . 6 . . « . . 1

Section II: Comments on Leavenworth Paper #5 , . . . . . . . 29

Section III: Random Afterthoughts and Various Trivia . . . . . 41

Glossary ..... . . . , . . . ..... . . „ . ... . . . 51

SECTION I: CHRONOLOGICAL NARRATIVE

General

I recognize that, years after the fact, it is difficult to

synthesize with complete accuracy and largely from official

documents the actions relating to a military operation. This is

particularly true when references are not available from two

principal participants, CINCNELM and the 322d Air Division.

Given these gaps in source material it is surprising that

Dr. Spiller, the author of Leavenworth Paper //3, "Not War But

Like War"; The American Intervention in Lebanon, has been able

"to reconstruct the planning and execution of Operation BLUEBAT as

accurately and fully as he has. For my own part, I have prepared

these notes, relying on some very meager diary entries, a few

letters, and a memory that has not served me particularly well.

Some aspects I recall with great clarity, some are quite fuzzy,

while concerning still others I draw a complete blank. In this

respect, I note that considerable reliance has been placed on a

24th Division Command Report, dated 13 August 1958. My diary

indicates that I devoted some time to a command report in early

August and that on 13 August I "worked on finalizing command

report"; so it would seem reasonable to assume that the report

was prepared at least in part by us in Lebanon, yet I have no

recollection whatsoever of it.

My first thought was to comment on Dr. Spillerfs Leavenworth

Paper page by page, but I finally decided that, a better

contribution would be to set forth chronologically certain

aspects of my participation in the operation from inception to

final execution. In the course of this narrative I will indicate

a few instances in which the Leavenworth Paper on Lebanon appears

to differ from my recollections. I will also provide additional

information that was not available to Dr. Spiller. In a larger

sense, I hope to illustrate that a plan in its development and

execution encompasses a multitude of individual thoughts,

decisions, and actions performed by mere mortals who at times

demonstrate all the strengths and frailties of the human race,

even including, at times, a bit of high humor. In undertaking

this task I hope I will be forgiven if I use personal

experiences, for in the words of my former Commander of 7th Army,

Lt. Gen. Francis Farrell, "Frankly those are the only kind 1 have

had."

2. SWAGGERSTICK

In 1956 I was Chief of the Operation Division, Department of

the Army (DA). On Sunday afternoon, 31 October 1956, I happened
to be in my office when the DA G-2 duty officer called to inform

me that the British and French were landing in Egypt. I called

the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (DCSOPS), Lt. Gen. C. D.

Eddleman, at his quarters. He instructed me to direct CONARC to

be prepared to brief him the next morning on its contingency plan

for intervention in the Middle East. I literally almost fell out

of my chair as this was the first that I had heard of such a

plan. I can only surmise that as a contingency plan the

requirement had been passed through the DA Plans Division and

then to CONARC. In any event, as the iraplementer at DA level, I

should have known about it, and I was quite chagrined that I

didnft.

A delegation from CONARC, XVIII Airborne Corps, and the 82d

Airborne Division did arrive bright and early the next morning

with Op Plan SWAGGERSTICK in tow. It had obviously been in

preparation for some time, but it was my distinct impression that

this was the first time it had been aired at DA level. Frankly,

I could never understand how it would work, and I jokingly

remarked that the only solution was to call a cease fire, air

drop on the line of contact between opposing forces, and defend

in both directions.

3. DA Directive to USAREUR, 1956

At some time in 1956, I'm not sure when, I was directed to

draft instructions to USAREUR to develop a plan for limited

crisis intervention in the Middle East. The 9th Infantry

Division was given this task and developed a plan involving Task

Force (TF) 9, which I believe consisted basically of a reinforced

regimental combat team. When the 11th Airborne Division replaced

the 9th Division in 1956 under the Gyrascope division rotation

plan, it inherited responsibility for the plan.

11th Airborne Division Revises the Plan, March, 1957

I joined the 11th Airborne Division on 1 March 1957, the same

day the division was reorganized under the pentagonal concept

(ROTAD). This was a very radical change involving the complete

restructuring of the division, a massive shuffling of personnel

and equipment, and drastic changes in doctrine, tactics,

techniques, and procedures. All of this kept everyone scrambling

for a while, so it was a few days before I was officially

introduced to the 201 Plan by the small group of planners who

were responsible for it within the division. The group met on a

Sunday morning and spent the entire day familiarizing me with the

plan and also restructuring the force to conform to the

division's new organization. We also reviewed the individual

equipment to be carried by the soldier and that to be forwarded
later ("B" bags), levels of supply, and back-up logistic

supplies. I was particularly struck by one item—pith helmets.

I had participated in a test of this headgear at Ft. Benning in

193^, a test that rejected the pith helmet as unsuitable for

field duty. Remembering this experience, I asked that it be

struck from the plan. I was assured that it had been, but in the

perverse manner that the system sometimes works, we got the

helmets anyway. We made excellent use of about ten of them for

the lifeguards on the swimming beach that we established. The

rest were returned to USAREUR, where no doubt they still are. At

this meeting, I also realized that the pass I had helped to toss

to USAREUR the previous year in the Pentagon had now been

lateralled to me and that it was my ball to carry from now on.

Each headquarters had a few individuals involved in the

planning who, through meetings, phone calls, and correspondence,

attended to the many details that go into the development and

updating of a contingency plan. We were like moles.

Occasionally we popped to the surface for briefings or when some

major decision was required, but generally we busied ourselves

underground, unmolested and unchallenged in the actions that we

took and the decisions that we made.

5. Effort to Obtain Tactical Intelligence, Spring—Summer, 1957

At this point, TF 201

 fs mission was to air drop or air land

in Jordan. Lebanon was not in the picture. One factor hindering

planning was the lack of hard tactical intelligence on Jordan and

the difficulty of obtaining it without disclosing our

intentions. Illustrative of this problem were events that

occurred in the late spring and summer of 1957.

While attending NATOfs course on atomic weapons at Garmisch,

I visited the Intelligence School at Oberammergau and questioned

the director about any information the school might have on

countries in the Middle East—large-scale maps, photos of

airfields and environs, city maps, etc. Actually, he had very

little, but promised to keep the requirement in mind. It so

happened that, shortly thereafter, he encountered a friend, an

Air Force major, who was due to visit Amman. He asked him if he

would take some pictures of the airport and surrounding terrain.

The major was most happy to oblige and then proceeded to tell all

and sundry at a cocktail party in Amman that he had taken the

pictures for General Gray. Some State Department type overheard

him. A hot cable went to Washington and all hell broke loose.

Who was this guy Gray and what was he up to? At this time, I had

wangled a "space available" trip on an MSTS transport making a

periodic swing around the eastern Mediterranean. My intent was

to get a little better acquainted with a potential area of

operations, and it was only through the intervention of Maj. Gen.

Hugh Harris, who then commanded the 11th Airborne Division, that
I was not immediately hauled back from that trip.

When I did return I found myself on the carpet before the 7th

Army Commander, Gen. Bruce Clarke. I explained to him our

difficulties in obtaining tactical intelligence. I further

explained that I had couched my request in very general terms,

with no reference to any actual plans, and that I had asked if

the school had any information, not for it to go out and actively

seek it. Luckily, I,had served under General Clarke in Korea,

both as a regimental commander and as his G-3 at X Corps. So

after a brief silence he said, "Well if you never try anything,

you never get into trouble, but what I want to know is that after

the ruckus you have raised, did you get the pictures?" We did

eventually get the. pictures, but by then it didnft matter. The

incident must have built a fire under somebody because a few

months later we began getting literally footlockers full of maps

and large-scale photos of every major city and airfield in the.

Middle East. Some looked like SAC target folders with air

routes, etc. We finally had to construct a specially secured

room to hold it all.

6. Meeting in London with CINCNELM, September, 1957

Actually, the London meeting in September, 1957, was sort of

a get acquainted session between us, the NELM representatives,

USAREUR planners, including • COMMZ, and the Air Force

representatives, and it did establish a cordial, cooperative

relationship 'that continued henceforth. My first meeting with

Adm. James Holloway was some experience. I had asked to brief

him on our plan for Jordan and was shown to his office. He was

reclining on a sofa and remained that way throughout the

session. When I would make a particular point, he would exclaim,

"Atta boy," or "That's it. Givefm hell"—a one-man cheering

section, so to speak. It was quite the most incredible briefing

I ever gave. I learned later that he suffered from some ailment

at the time, which required him to take these rest sessions. He

impressed me as a ?big picture1 type, not too interested in

details, but 1 left his office feeling that here was a man for

whom you would make that extra effort and take that extra step.

7. Meeting at CINCNELM, London, November, 1957

The get together in London in November, 1957, was the first

meeting of the entire clan: EUCOM, USAREUR, COMMZ, 11th Airborne

Division, and the Air Force. I can't recall if the Sixth Fleet

was represented or not. It was on the basis of this conference

that CINCNELM issued its first Op Plan specifying a joint Army,

Navy, Marine, Air Force operation in Lebanon. As the Sixth Fleet

ranged all over the Mediterranean, a lot depended on where its
ships were disposed at the time execution was directed. If the

fleet was in the western Mediterranean, we would go first: we

would either air drop or air land, as the situation dictated, and

seize the airfield and the port area for the Marines in Beirut.

If the amphibious forces were in the eastern Mediterranean, the

Marines would either assault land or administratively land, seize

the port area, and then take the airport in preparation for our

entry. The British were definitely not involved at this time and

had no representation at the conference. In fact, there was some

apprehension that they would find out what we were up to. I

regretted this because there were some British in London, notably

Glubb Pasha, who had organized the Jordanian Desert Legion and to

whom I would have loved to talk.

8. War Game at Augsburg, December, 1957

With the advent of the CINCNELM plans, it became obvious that

a lot of close coordination was going to be required among

several headquarters. There was NELM in London, EUCOM in Paris,

USAREUR in Heidelberg, 7th Army in Stuttgart, 11th Airborne

Division in Augsburg, VII Corps near Stuttgart, COMMZ at Orleans,

France, the U.S. Port at Bremerhaven, 12th Air Force at Ramstein,

and the 322d Air Division at Evreux, France. The quickest and

simplest way to achieve coordination seemed to be by means of a

conference; thus the war game that we hosted at Augsburg in

December, 1957.

In the game, we started with a normal situation of no alert

and progressed through all phases of the alert and deployment.

At each phase, headquarters would state the actions they would

take, and all other commands would check to see how these actions

would dovetail or conflict with their actions. If possible,

conflicts were eliminated on the spot, but if they could not be,

they were listed on a chart. When we were finished, more than

100 problems had been identified. Periodic follow-ups were made,

so that by the time of deployment, most of the problems had been

resolved. I believe this was the single most important action

taken in the development of the 201 family of plans. I - am

certain that it eliminated many phone calls and messages, also

much correspondence. Above all, it saved time.

9* Planning and Rehearsal Period.; December, 1957, to Initial

Alert, 17 May 1958

Following publication of CINCNELM's plan for joint U.S.

operations in Lebanon and Jordan, additional directives were

issued for us to develop plans for such far away places as Iran,

Iraq, and Saudi Arabia. We dutifully prepared these plans, but

without strong conviction. Not only was the airlift inadequate,

86-1503
but neither the Air Force nor the Navy could have provided

adequate air support considering the distances from available air

bases and carrier operating areas. Nonetheless, the accumulative

effect was to develop a gut feeling that sooner or later TF 201

was going to go somewhere, and I directed our planners to proceed

strictly on that assumption.

This was not easy to do. Early in the year the Department of

the Army announced a major change in force structure. The 11th

Airborne Division was not to be rotated in toto to CONUS, but was

to be converted in place to the 24th Infantry Division on 1 July

1958. Two battle groups, the 187th and 503d, would retain their

airborne status until late in the year, when they would rotate to

Ft. Bragg and be replaced by two infantry battle groups from

CONUS. At the same time two airborne battle groups from Bragg,

the 50*lth and 505th, would replace two infantry battle groups in

the 8th Division at Mainz. When this rotation occurred, the 8th

Division was to assume the TF 201 mission. Since most 11th

Airborne Division personnel were eligible for return to CONUS,

this meant that throughout the spring and summer of 1958,

thousands of individuals went home and were replaced from the

United States. These replacements had to be quickly incorporated

into units capable of performing their NATO mission.

The division was also charged with training 8th Division

paratroopers for the supporting elements of TF 201, the

headquarters, artillery battery, engineer company, reconnaissance

.troop, etc. It also had to help the 8th Division, in light of

its partial airborne role, in such matters as establishing an

airborne training school at Wiesbaden, drop .zones, departure

airfields, and parachute maintenance facilities. This task was

complicated somewhat by the fact that the 8th Division had a fine

reputation as a well-run, disciplined, straight-leg division, one

that wasn't too keen on being transformed into a hybrid outfit

with a lot of airborne rowdies and their attendant alien

requirements gumming up the works. However, there was one

redeeming feature. The personnel in the 187th and 503d battle

groups who did not have enough overseas time to return to CONUS

were replaced by personnel from the other battle groups who were

eligible. In consequence, both the TF 201 battle groups were jam

packed with officers, NCOs, and other ranks who had all served

three years in Germany and who had participated in numerous major

field exercises and training tests. They were good.

All of this turmoil posed a problem for the TF 201 planners.

How should we divide our time and efforts between our primary

mission of rebuilding our division into a solid NATO force and

our secondary mission which, although small in comparison, could

have serious consequences if not properly carried out? A

desirable goal would have been to have an alert for each TF 201

element each month. We compromised by having an alert for half

of TF 201 one month, and for the other half the next. Some of

these alerts were held in unit casernes and included a complete
check of alert procedures, showdown inspection of equipment, and

movement of needed replacements from other elements of the

division. Other alerts included these actions plus movement to

an airfield, usually Lechfeld, a NATO forward deployment field

that had runways but nothing else. There a Departure Airfield

Control Group (DACG) would be established, and the unit would be

completely processed for equipment, dog tags, shots, I.D. cards,

Geneva Rules of Warfare cards, etc. A rigging line would be

established and type aircraft loads rigged. Equipment and

personnel would be assigned to aircraft and loaded on simulated

aircraft chalked out on the runway. It would have been desirable

to have rigged all loads and placed all troops on actual

aircraft, but lack of funds limited our expendable supplies for

rigging and the Air Force's ability to supply aircraft, although

occasionally the Air Force would provide a few such aircraft when

our. alert coincided with our training jump schedule.

Both Major General Harris and his replacement, Maj. Gen.

Ralph Cooper, were very understanding of our problems, but no

doubt looked askance at the effort expended on this secondary

mission. As for myself, I developed a mild case of schizophrenia

and was never really satisfied that I was doing full justice to

either mission.

In addition to these alerts, we had units that were scheduled

to depart from Bremerhaven, make a practice convoy run with a few

vehicles to that port, and there review their embarkation

procedures. I visited Bremerhav.en and reviewed their

preparations, after which I had no doubt that at least that part

of our operation would proceed efficiently. The Port CO ran just

about the most efficient, disciplined operation I have ever

seen. As one of my officers told me, it was the only time in his

military career that he had been saluted by a civilian—a woman

librarian as I recall. I also visited COMMZ headquarters at

Orleans and reviewed planning with Major General O'Neill and Col.

A. W. Meetze, who headed the 201 Logistical Command. Colonel

Meetze, with several of my officers, visited Adana Air Base in

Turkey and coordinated our requirements there. A staging area on

the base was arranged, but Colonel Meetzefs efforts to establish

prepositioned supplies at Adana were not successful because of a

lack of protected storage space. I mention these activities as

illustrative of the continuous consultation and coordination that

must take place after a plan has been put on paper. Equally

important is the development of close personal relationships

between key participants.

During this period the 322d Air Division was also undergoing

considerable change. On 13 March, a Saturday afternoon, with a

light snow falling, we made our first jump from a C-130 aircraft,

one of those that was then being sent to Europe as replacement

for the C-119s. This change was, of course, welcome, but as

these new planes were phased in gradually, it was impossible for

the Air Force to give us at any one time an accurate forecast of

their potential lift.
10. Initial Alert, 17-2*1 May, and Visit to Cyprus, 22 May

For some reason my notes on this period are practicallynonexistant and my memory equally so. There must have been some

prior warning because on 15 May, the 187th and 503d battle groups

were marshaled at home station, and a conference was held with

all COs of TF 201 units in the 11th Airborne Division. We were

actually alerted at 0455, Saturday, 17 May. I do not recall when

we were authorized to move to Furstenfeldbruck, but we were

completely loaded at 2115, Sunday, 18 May and remained so until

Saturday, 24 May, when the alert was terminated with a mass air

drop of the TF headquarters and the 503d Battle Group at Warner

DZ outside Munich.

One event during this alert period stands out vividly. On

Tuesday afternoon, 21 May, I received instructions from CINCNELM

to proceed to Cyprus in civilian clothes via an aircraft that

would pick me up at Furstenfeldbruck that evening. I arrived

early the next morning at a British airfield where I was met by a

British major straight out of central casting. Short and

slightly rotund, with reddish cheeks and handlebar mustache, he

simply bubbled with energy and good cheer. There followed

undoubtedly the wildest ride I have ever had, over forty miles of

winding mountain road from the airfield to the British

headquarters in what I assume must have been Nicosia. The car

was a 1939 Bentley with heavy, armor plate and 1-inch glass, but

it seemed to me it never went under sixty miles an hour the

entire trip. Speed, it seems, was the best defense against

guerrilla attack, according to the major. At the headquarters to

greet me was a U.S. Army officer from the CINCNELM staff whom I

had met in London and who told me that Admiral Holloway had asked

that I chair a meeting to develop plans for combined U.S.-British

operations in Lebanon and/or Jordan and that the planners were

assembled and waiting for me. This shook me up a bit. The plane

had been noisy, so I had slept little. Expecting hot weather, I

had worn a light suit that rumpled easily. I hadn't had a chance

to shave and had only a cup of bad coffee on the plane for

breakfast. So with wrinkled suit, whiskers, bleary eyes, et al,

I walked into a conference room with at least fifty officers

seated in a rectangle—U.S. Navy and Marines (Brig. Gen.

Sidney Wade included), British Army, Navy, and Air Force, possibly

U.S. Air Force, and CINCNELM representatives all neatly dressed

in uniform. A British brigadier introduced me to the assemblage

and then handed me an agenda saying, "I thought you might need

something to get started." It was the understatement of the day,

but I have always been eternally grateful to him for it.

The basic question confronting us was how to use American and

British forces in simultaneous operations in Lebanon and Jordan.

All depended on the location of the Marines at the time of the

crisis. If they were in the eastern Mediterranean, U.S. Army and

Marine forces would land in Lebanon, while elements of the
British 5th Infantry Brigade from Cyprus would go to Jordan. If

the Marines were in the western Mediterranean, TF 201 and the

British would go to Lebanon and the Marines to Jordan. This

latter option was the one that required a combined plan. What we

did basically was to substitute with some variations the British

for the Marines in the already existing CINCNELM Op Plan. The

landing scheme was somewhat different. We would either air drop

or air land to seize the airfield. The British would then air

land and seize the port area. They would then be responsible for

operations north of a line extending from the port area through

Beirut and out the Damascus road to the Syrian border. We would

be responsible south of that line.

Apparently the British had wished to get involved with us in

the eastern Mediterranean region for some time. I neither know

why we resisted initially nor why we now changed our mind; very

possibly the United States had been feeling slightly lonely out

on that limb on which it had crawled after President Eisenhower

enunciated his Middle East Doctrine. In any event, it was my

distinct impression that the decision for a combined operation

was made just before the conference, and that the British were

clearly very pleased and really gung ho. They simply could not

do enough for us. I was invited to the commanding general's home

for lunch, where I finally got a chance to shave. At our request

there was delivered to our aircraft before departure a large

bundle of maps of the Beirut area, scale of about 1:5,000, that

were invaluable for our planning and actual operations there.

Also at my request, the British mailed to us twenty copies of a

manual based on their long experience fighting guerrillas and

controlling hostile populations. It was much superior to

anything in our manuals at the time. In a lighter vein, the

British also volunteered to determine which hotels in Beirut had

the best belly dancers.

Shortly after this conference, CINCNELM issued a plan

formalizing the arrangements made on Cyprus. To the best of my

recollection, this was the first time the code word BLUEBAT was

used.

The May alert was important, of course, as a test of alert

procedures, but another result was that it let the cat out of the

bag about a U.S. NATO force having a secondary mission. As I

recall, the main reason for the extreme "Need to Know" imposed

upon us was the concern that our Allies, and particularly West

Germany, might find out that the U.S. planned to take forces

fully committed to NATO and use them on a distant mission. As it

turned out, the only concern expressed by anyone was that of

German entrepreneurs who stood to lose revenues upon the

departure of U.S. forces. In all probability, despite our

precautions, NATO knew about it all along, to say nothing of the

Russians.
11. Period of 1st Alert to 2nd Alert, 24 May to 15 July 1958

Following the alert of 17-24 May, first priority was given to

the correction of deficiencies that developed at

Fiirstenfeldbruck. Marshaling an airborne unit involves the

establishment of a DACG for overall supervision; personnel to

erect and seal off, with guards, a tent camp that includes such

facilities as messes, latrines, and sleeping, command, and

briefing tents; other personnel to lay out and run a marshaling

area, where personnel and equipment are processed for loading;

and detachments from the AG, Ordnance, auto maintenance and QM to

provide last-minute administrative services and repairs to, or

replacement of, equipment. When the division had been all

airborne, it had not been difficult to detail individuals and

units familiar with these tasks. But as the division converted

to a straight-leg unit and lost its airborne personnel,

particularly senior officers and NCOs, it also lost much of its

ability to marshal its units quickly and effectively. To

overcome this deficiency, General Cooper tasked Brig. Gen. George

Speidel to operate the departure airfield. In addition to

Speidelfs long experience as a paratrooper, this arrangement had

other advantages as well. Fiirstenfeldbruck was located near

Munich, where General Speidel was stationed. He had supervision

of all the division troops located in' the Munich area and could

draw on them for his task force. Also, as an assistant division

commander, he could make decisions and resolve problems more

quickly than could an officer of lesser rank.

Another problem arising out of the division's reduced

airborne capability was its lessened ability to rig the heavy

drop loads quickly. Normally, the Parachute Maintenance Company

would reinforce the heavy drop platoon with parachute riggers in

order to expedite the heavy rigging. However, this company was

being red.uced in size to service only TF 201, so it could no

longer provide the necessary backup. Accordingly, it was decided

that the two battle groups would assist in rigging their own

equipment. On 5 June, the 503d did conduct such training,

terminating with a heavy drop of part of its equipment. The

187th, at the time of deployment, had not yet conducted such an

excercise. As later events were to prove, this was a mistake. I

should have insisted that the 187th schedule an exercise as a

matter of priority.

One very positive effect of the May alert was a relaxation of

the extreme "Need to Know" restrictions under which we moles had

been required to operate. We now scurried around much nearer the

surface and more frequently popped up to public view. On

Memorial Day, 30 May, Admiral Holloway visited the division. He

was shown a display of what each individual would take with him,

what would follow in his

 ffBlf bag, and what would be stored. Then

he was shown a complete layout of a rifle company—the personnel

and equipment in the air drop, the air land and the seaborne

10
echelons. (Pictures of this display are in CGSC photo files.)

The demonstration terminated with an air drop of a rifle company,

including its heavy equipment.

On 7 June, there was a 201 conference at 7th Army, and on 11

June, one at USAREUR. On Saturday 28 June, there was an all-day

conference at our headquarters to answer certain questions raised

by CINCNELM reference BLUEBAT. On 8 July, there was a CPX held

for all units of the Charlie Force, and on 9 July, we went to

Ramstein for a conference with 12th Air Force. According to ray

notes, we agreed, among other things, to establish a joint CP at

the departure airfield, to have the Air Force furnish us with a

liaison officer, to set up housekeeping for Air Force personnel,

and to have the Air Force provide forward air controllers

(FACs). What we did not agree on was the lift. The Air Force's

chief representative, Brig. Gen. B.O. Davis said, "We gave you

what you asked for in May and now you want more. When are you

going to stop raising the ante?11 I replied in effect that he had

been misinformed. TF Alpha's requirement had been met only by

taking C-124 augmentation from the States meant for TF Charlie.

The simple fact was that there was not enough lift immediately

available in the theatre to meet the full lift requirements of TF

Alpha. This difference in view was not settled, and in

retrospect, this was a mistake. I should have insisted that our

full requirement for TF Alpha be met, realizing that on any one

day, the available lift might fall a little short because of the

operational status of aircraft and other ongoing commitments. If

the Air Force could not promise this, I should have asked that

the matter be settled at a higher level.

On 1 July, the 11th Airbornefs colors were cased for the last

time and the 24th Division's colors were unfurled in their

stead. For us, this change had one distinct advantage. Unlike

ROTAD, the ROCID division organization included a small brigade

headquarters, headed by a colonel, designed to conduct planning

or to command combat elements of the division as a task force.

In effect it was an ideal assignment for our 201 planners; they

could work practically full time on 201 rather than doing so in

addition to other duties, as had been the case. I promised them

nothing but hard work and an out if they wanted it.

Fortunately for us, there were no takers, for suddenly the

moles really began to scurry. I found myself supervising the

training of two battle groups at Hohenfels and the NATO Le Clerc

Matches, which the division was hosting, at Grafenwohr. We had a

new VII Corps CG, Lt. Gen. Gordon Rogers, who had to be

familiarized with the plan. There was also a new 7th Army CG,

General Eddleman.

The annual Special Forces Exercise, DRAGNET, was scheduled to

commence on 14 July. For several months, the Special Forces at

Bad Tolz had been training soldiers, I believe from the 8th

Division, to act as guerrilla bands. On 16 July, Headquarters,

11
TF 201, was to air drop in the Bad Tolz area to serve as the

Control Headquartersc The 187th Battle Group, plus other

divisional elements, would act as the force to rout out the

guerrillas. This was an annual affair in which the Bavarian

civilian population also got involved, and we were happily

anticipating participation in it. On 12 July elements of TF 201

went to Bad Tolz to set up the Control Headquarters. Also on

Saturday, 12 July, the 187th Battle Group completed a very

successful two-week training period at Hohenfels. On that same

day the battle group CO, Col. Tom Sharkey, had somehow wangled

the use of Otter Army aircraft to air drop his b'attle group in

four lifts on the Gablingen DZ beside his home caserne. He then

issued orders for his company commanders to proceed to the Bad

Tolz area to recon the 2000-square miles in which they would be

operating in Operation DRAGNET. On Monday, 14 July, the division

held a rehearsal for General Eddleman1s first visit to Augsburg

on Tuesday. His schedule was to include a full briefing on EP

201, followed by an air drop of personnel and heavy drop from the

503d. It was in this atmosphere of heightened activity that the,

events of the next day began to unfold. General Eddleman got his

briefing all right, but not exactly under the circumstances we

had anticipated.

12. Second Alert, 14-16 July 1958

About 2200 on Monday, 14 July, word was received of the

overthrow of the Iraqi government. Shortly thereafter, we

received a message indicating that some alert measures might be

taken. Upon hearing this news, I went to General Cooper's

quarters, which were adjacent to mine. At that time I should

have recommended that the air drop for General Eddleman be

scrubbed and the heavy drop loads derigged. The critical element

in the launching of an airborne operation is the readiness of the

unit to move when ordered. That readiness, in turn, depends on

the availability of the aircraft, the readiness of the ground

force to be loaded, and the efficiency of the air-ground

personnel in loading. Key to the ground forces preparation is

the expeditious rigging of the heavy drop. Accordingly, the

commander should focus his attention on insuring that nothing

interferes with that task. The problem facing our heavy drop

platoon was this. They would have to first derig the heavy drop

loads set up for General Eddlemanfs visit, check the equipment

for serviceability, and return it to stock. They would then have

to load all of their equipment on trucks, move to the air base,

and set up two rigging lines, one for vehicles and one for A-22

containers. These rigging lines involve the laying down of

roller conveyors and the placement of rigging equipment at the

successive stations along the line. In view of the arduous and

time-consuming nature of this process, the heavy drop for General

Eddleman

 fs visit should have been derigged at the first

indication of a possible alert. This was a mistake in judgment

on my part.

12
At this time the 503d was on tap for Task Force Alpha, but I

had learned the previous day that the CO of the 503d had injured

his leg jumping and was limping quite badly, so much so that I

felt it would impair his ability to jump with his unit and

command it in active operations. On this basis, and this basis

alone, I recommended that the 187th replace the 503d on TF

Alpha. If we were to be alerted, Operation DRAGNET would

obviously have to be postponed or canceled and the 2Uth Division

relieved of participation. I also knew that before the 187th had

departed for two-weeks training at Hohenfels, the battle group

had checked out its GRANDIOS plans, had had all personnel pack

their

 lfBfl bags, and had stored their other personal effects in

cardboard containers. Its jump back into Gablingen from

Hohenfels meant the men were all current in their jump status.

The battle group was definitely ready.

On the basis of a message from General Rogers at VII Corps,

we called an AMBER alert at about 0200 and placed the 187th on TF

Alpha in lieu of the 503d. I deeply regretted the necessity to

do this. Colonel Haynes was an outstanding officer, a proven

combat leader, and was rearing to go. Of course, at that time we

had no idea that TF Bravo would not be deployed; otherwise he

would have undoubtedly protested the switch more than he did.

One glitch in our preparations did develop from this switch.

At the time the switch was made, quite a few officers of the

187th were scattered far and wide within a 2000-square mile area

of the Bavarian Alps, completely out of communication with their

unit. By hook or crook and much luck, Colonel Sharkey was able

to gather them all in time to be marshaled at Fiirstenfeldbruck.

If, when I first considered the switch,. I had consulted with the

Battle Group CO, I would have learned about the reconnaissance.

It would not have altered the decision to lead with the 187th,

but it would have given Colonel Sharkey more time to recover his

absentees.

Based on another message from USAREUR, we switched to an

AZURE alert at 0430 and to a GREEN alert at 0700. Shortly

thereafter General Eddleraan arrived at division headquarters and

was briefed on the situation and our future activities. After

the briefing, he indicated that probably a higher ranking officer

would be designated to command all ground forces, if and when we

got to Lebanon. This surprised me, as in all our prior planning

no mention had ever been made of such a possibility.

Following the briefing, I reviewed with my senior 201 staff

officers the status of our preparations, using as a guide a

Readiness Book that included a check list of actions to be taken

by individuals, by the 201 staff, and by the division. It also

included reference data, such as load requirements, travel times

to Fiirstenfeldbruck, airlift requirements, and deployment time to

Adana and Lebanon. Following this, I tied up loose ends of

division business, reviewed my personal affairs, had lunch at

13
home, and departed from there by helicopter to Fiirstenfeldbruck

at 1400.

A part of the air base at Furstenfeldbruck was occasionally

used as a forward deployment base by NATO air units. This part

included taxiways, parking aprons, and a large hangar that was

central to our operation. We planned to use it for rigging the

heavy drop. Around the hangar were clustered our tent camp and

other activities. We had been informed that morning that a

German Air Force unit was occupying the area that we wished to

use, but would be asked to leave. As we approached the field I

anxiously scanned the area and was relieved to find no trace of

the German unit. I was told later that they got the word at 1100

and that by 1230 they were completely gone, leaving no trace they

had ever been there. I also found General Speidel's Task Force

hard at work with a part of the tent camp already erected.

Shortly after arriving I and members of ray staff met with

Brig. Gen. B. 0. Davis, 12th Air Force, and Col. C. W.

McCafferty, Deputy Commander, 322d Air Division, plus several of

his operations staff.. At that time we were given an estimate of

the airlift that would be available, but according to my notes,

the "final airlift not formed up until about 2000." In fairness

to the Air Force, the 322d was sort of a vagabond airline that on

any one day might have aircraft scattered all the way from India

to Africa to the United States. The aircraft simply could not

all be whistled in in a matter of a few hours, although one was

produced in a matter of minutes. This one happened to be over

Fiirstenfeldbruck en route to Evreux when the pilot got the word,

simply lowered his wheels, and landed.

The Air Force also decided not to collocate their operations

with ours, as is normal, but to set up shop in a room inside the

hangar. I never learned the reason, but surmise that they felt

they did not have sufficient personnel present to handle their

strictly Air Force business and to man a joint operations center

as well. Accordingly, we set up the tent intended for the joint

group as a briefing tent with maps, photos, and charts sufficient

to explain our operations at Fiirstenfeldbruck, Adana, and Beirut.

Meanwhile, our rigging operation was running into real

trouble. To start with, the trucks detailed to load the rigging

equipment arrived with no trailers, which completely screwed up

the loading plan. Normally the trucks would carry the platforms

and large chutes, while the trailers would hold the small

equipment and expendable supplies that would be lined up along

the assembly line. Now all the equipment was intermingled on the

trucks, and as a result the supplies needed at the head of the

assembly line were loaded on the last truck. In haste to make up

lost time, the trucks were dispatched piecemeal instead of in

small serials and were therefore not properly escorted, thus

delaying the entire movement. Making matters worse, the detail

designated to assist the loading of the trucks arrived late. In
consequence the first load did not roll off the assembly line

until 1830. Because of flexibility in our schedule, time lost

from the above mistakes was largely recoverable; time lost in the

derigging operation was not. Therefore, I have always thought

that failure to derig General Eddleman?s demonstration drop the

previous night was the root cause of all the trouble.

By about 1600 the overall operation was taking definite

form. Aircraft were landing, the DACG was established, the tent

camp erected, the marshaling area for personnel and equipment set

up, and serials of the 187th were arriving. Even the Russians

were at the fence taking pictures. In the midst of this we had

visitors—fourteen stars in all. In each case I tried to steer

them to our briefing tent, where I could give them a full rundown

on our plan and on the operation of the marshaling area. With

but one exception, they all gravitated toward the hangar area

where the major activity was and, in the midst of all the bustle

and clamor, began to ask piecemeal questions on various aspects

of the plan. At one time there was Gen. Henry Hodes, CG USAREUR,

Lieutenant General Eddleman, Lieutenant General Rogers, Major

General Cooper, and Brigadier General Davis. They all had a right

to be there, but I was afraid they might try to tinker with the

plan and that was not the time or the place for it. At one point

General Eddleman asked how our army aircraft were being

transported. I replied that the light helicopters were going by

air, the remainder being flown. He suggested that we ask the

Navy to take them on a carrier. I turned to a staff officer and

asked him to look into it. I then promptly forgot about it,

thinking nothing would come of it. Fortunately for me, the staff

officer didnft forget, as much to my surprise the Navy did have a

light carrier at Naples and said they would be happy to transport

our aircraft. That was the only worthwhile suggestion to emerge

from this rather disorganized conclave, and even that was not an

unqualified success, as some aircraft were damaged by salt spray

en route.

Later in the afternoon I received word that Maj. Gen. Paul

Adams, CG of the 7th Army Support Command, was landing. I met

his plane and escorted him to our briefing tent, where I gave him

a complete rundown on our plan and what was underway at the

airfield. He thanked me and departed, but just before boarding

his plane, said that it was possible that he might be sent to

Lebanon to take command of all land forces. At that point his

statement was just one more "if" in a lot of "iffys," but I did

take note of the fact that he was the only visitor who allowed me

to give him a full-scale briefing, and I considered that a good

omen for the future.

After General Adams1 departure I visited the marshaling

area. Here individuals were being checked out for completeness

of shots, dog tags, et cetera, and were also being assigned to

aircraft loads. Vehicles were being decanted, prepared for

rigging, and then lined up in the order in which they would move

15
to the assembly line. Unfortunately, I found, according to my

notes, "that the 187th had not properly supervised the priority

of rigging loads and checked for the uniformity of loads." I

suspect this latter fault was due in part to the old supply

sergeant syndrome of always trying to take along a little extra,

and the former fault due to just plain haste in trying to speed

up the rigging process. Whatever the reason these derelictions

were inexcusable and certainly not repeated when the unit

returned from Lebanon.

The evening was spent in keeping an anxious eye on the

progress of the rigging lines and the loading of aircraft. Since

rigging of the A-22 containers was a much simpler process, we

were able to set up a second line using 187th personnel. The

heavy drop was a different problem. It is a process that

requires deliberate care and precision performed only by trained

personnel. The heavy drop platoon had been hard at it since

early morning and, although still plugging along, was obviously

tired. Since the 187th had not received heavy drop rigging

training, all we could do was give the platoon moral support

while it finished the job.

As for the aircraft loading, my notes indicate only that it

"proceeded slowly." Although I visited several aircraft where

problems developed, I regret that I cannot now recall their exact

nature, except that they involved the interrelations between the

crew chief^ the Air Force loadmaster, and the Army jumpmaster,

all of whom had a stake in seeing that the aircraft safely

dropped its load, but who didn't always agree on exactly how to

do it, especially when they had met for the first time on a dimly

lit runway.

At some time late in the evening, I received a call from my

West Point classmate, Maj. Gen. Gabe Disosway, CG 12th Air

Force. "Dave," he said, "you have the green light to go." I was

too embarrassed to tell him that we weren't ready yet, but as it

turned out we couldn't have departed anyway. About 2400 I took a

snooze and about 0200, 16 July, was awakened by Colonel

McCafferty indicating that clearance had not yet been received

from Austria to overfly that country. Also the O119s, which did

not have the ability to overfly the Alps and therefore had always

been scheduled to fly by way of France, could not take off

because of bad weather. He recommended an 0730 takeoff, and I

agreed. Actually, the C-119s had wheels up at 0817, and I

departed shortly thereafter.

I am sure that General Speidel was largely responsible, but I

was surprised that in contrast with previous practice alerts and

the actual May alert, I had very little to do other than lend

encouragement or occassionally mildly kick a butt or two. No

basic changes had to be made in our plan, and such adjustments as

were required fell entirely within its framework. On the other

hand, we were not loaded and locked within the time we had

16
projected and therefore did not achieve our objective. In sum,

the plan succeeded; we failed in its execution.

13 o Staging at Adana, 16-19 July 1958

As our plane lifted to the Bavarian Hills, my only thought,

mirrored by my staff, I am sure, was one of relief—that finally

after all the planning, alerts, and rehearsal, TF 201 was on its

way, and we would now have a chance to see how the plan would

work. Colonel McCafferty, as the commander of the troop carrier

force, accompanied us and, I believe, piloted our aircraft. As I

had had little sleep in the past forty-eight hours, I lay down on

the floor of the flight deck with my head practically under the

pilot

 fs feet and slept for most of the flight. I do recall

Austrian fighter aircraft flying close off our wing as we passed

high above their country.

We arrived at Adana at about 1500, where we were met by the

base commander, Lieutenant Colonel Thomas and Brig. Gen. James

Roberts, USAF. Thomas seemed to be in a mild state of shock.

His transfer orders had been delayed just as he was about to

depart. Instead of contemplating a pleasant change of station

leave, he was confronted with the realization that his almost

empty base was about to be inundated with one of the largest

concentrations of U.S. aircraft since WW II. I don't believe

General Roberts was much better off. As I recall he was assigned

to HQ, EUCOM, and had just been designated as U.S. Air Force

Commander for the operation, but knew little or nothing about

BLUEBAT beforehand. At least I had never met him at any of our

conferences or heard his name mentioned at any time.

Nonetheless, preparations were in full swing. Tents for the

Air Force were going up and grass was being bulldozed off the

area that Colonel Meetze had arranged for us on his liaison

visit. I stopped that, as I could visualize the dust that would

be generated from the strong, steady winds that seemed to blow

all the time. Instead, each planeload bivouacked beside the

taxiway near its plane. Contrary to Leavenworth Paper #3,

page 31, para 4, no equipment was ever unloaded by TF Alpha or TF

Charlie at Adana. All the C-130s had landed by 2300, and the

last C-124 with Colonel Sharkey aboard at 0600, 17 July. After

giving him instructions on establishing his command area, General

Miller and I departed for Beirut per instructions from

Admiral Holloway.

When we met the admiral aboard the Taconic, he seemed quite

preoccupied and not prepared to give us any definite

instructions. Much to our surprise, he asked us to plan for a

possible airdrop at. Tripoli. We adjourned to the Operations

Center, where we were briefed by NELM staff members and studied

maps and photos of Kleiat airfield and vicinity. We concluded

that a drop could be made, but that the aircraft would either

17
have to approach or climb out dangerously near Syrian territory.

Second, the airfield was miles from the city, which could create

serious problems if resistance was encountered in the intervening

very rough terrain. So with less than full enthusiasm we

returned to Admiral Holloway. His mood had changed completely.

He was quite relaxed and informed us that TF 201 would proceed to

Beirut as originally planned. In retrospect I believe it

probable that, when we arrived, a decision as to our employment

had not yet been made and planning for Tripoli was simply a ploy

to keep us occupied. In the interim, either guidance had been

received from some source, or Admiral Holloway had unilaterally

made the decision. He indicated that we should establish a base

in the large olive grove just east of the airport. I asked,

"Isn't that private property? Whom should I see about it?" I

shall never forget his answer. Waving his arms in characteristic

fashion, he replied, "Matter of military necessity. Send the

bills to the Ambassador." Of course, it didn't work out exactly

that way, but then I suppose I should never have asked the

question in the first place.

Before returning to Adana I made a quick reconnaissance of

the olive groves and also arranged for some trucks from the

Lebanese Army to assist us in moving our supplies. This was

necessary as we wished to keep our TF Alpha vehicles rigged in

case an airdrop was later required. On 18 July a recon party was

sent to Beirut, and in its absence, I inspected all troops and

equipment and talked to all members of TF Alpha. I believed

that, although the external threat could not be discounted

completely, a more probable threat was an internal one between

the different groups inside Lebanon—a threat that might

escalate, requiring our involvement. It was my intent that our

troops should conduct themselves in such a restrained, alert,

highly professional manner that they would not inadvertently

involve themselves, and the Lebanese would not want to get

involved with them either. So my talk was not only to impart a

sense of mission, which is every soldier's due, but just as

important to explain to those gathered the reason for the strict

discipline and attention to duty I intended to enforce.

When the advance party returned, they presented a plan that

looked as if it had been lifted from the diagram in the field

manual for defense of an airhead. It would have disposed our

troops in company-size strong points on the semicircular ridge of

hills that rose to the south and east of the airport and the open

sand dunes to the north, with the ocean to the west. I believed

that if we had trouble, it would come from small forays or acts

of individuals such as snipers, fanatics, or thieves, and it

would be better to initially, at least, deploy ourselves in a

tight perimeter, largely in the olive grove east of the airport,

where we could protect ourselves by mutual support as well as

provide a secure area for the support units that were to followc

In view of these changes, I decided to send the advance party

back to Lebanon that night, but unfortunately a clearance for the

flight could not be obtained from the Beirut Airport.

18
Colonel Meetze, with some members of his 201st Logistical

Command Staff, joined us at Adana and was able to arrange for B

rations, drawn from Air Force supplies stockpiled at Adana, which

thankfully enabled us to go off C rations almost immediately.

Also, since our equipment was to remain rigged, we were short on

amenities of any kind and arranged to draw from the Air Force fly

away kit (Seaweed stocks), stored at Adana, such items as tents,

folding tables and chairs, typewriters, and office supplies. In

the evening a meeting was held with the Air Force, and all

details for the air movement the next morning were finalized. I

also reviewed the TF troop list to see if any changes should be

made in view of the situation we now expected. I cannot now

recall if I requested any deletions to the troop list, but I do

recall two changes—that a truck platoon be placed as top

priority on TF Charlie and that TF Alpha's "B'1 bags be sent by

air rather than by sea. Unfortunately, this last request was

garbled in transmission and was interpreted by the 24th Division

to mean Bravo advance. So a few days later, into Beirut came the

advance party of the 503d, happy as could be. This mistake was

unfortunate in two respects. It unnecessarily raised the hopes

of the 503d that they were to be deployed, and it caused an

unnecessary delay in the receipt of "BTf bags by TF Alpha. To add

insult to injury, there was extensive pilferage of the bags by

the crew of the ship that transported them. The error could have

been avoided in two ways. I should have asked that the key words

in the message be transmitted twice. During WWII in the

Southwest Pacific Theatre, where messages over long distances

were often garbled in transmission, we routinely repeated the

essential elements of a message, so I knew better. On the other

hand the 24th Division should have requested a service on the

garble instead of guessing at the meaning.

14. Movement to Beirut, 19 July

At about 0500 on 19 July I was informed by our G-4, Col. Lynn

Smith, that his efforts during the night to obtain a clearance

for our advance party plane to return to Lebanon had been

unsuccessful. This meant trouble. Our entry into Beirut at best

was not going to be your basic textbook type of air-landed

operation. Although pleasant and accommodating, the airport

officials insisted that our flights would have to be integrated

with their normal civilian traffic, which was by no means light.

Compounding the problem was the size of the airport, which was

not large by current standards. There were two main runways, one

of which was closed for landings because of an extension that was

under construction. There were two taxiways leading to an apron

that extended across the front of the terminal where civilian

planes were ordinarily parked. On the previous day the advance

party had asked that space be provided to park our heavy drop

loads and a taxiway be reserved for our use in unloading

aircraft. It was to finalize these details as well as to recon

19
the new unit locations I had prescribed that we had wanted to

send our advance party back to Beirut the previous evening. As

it turned out, we took off with the advance party plane

Piggybacking on our clearance, bringing up the rear.

When we arrived the press and photographers who were there to

meet us gathered for some reason around the advance party plane,

allowing me with some of my staff to escape unobserved and to

check on the situation. To our dismay we found thatrthe Lebanese

Army trucks promised us had not arrived, the taxiway had not been

reserved, and no space had been allocated for our heavy drop.

There followed a fine example of accelerated, high pressure staff

activity. A taxiway was designated for our use. We were told to

park the heavy drop on the runway that was being extended. The

Lebanese Army trucks were located just as the first group of

C-119s appeared in the distance.

I proceeded to the taxiway reserved for us, and what I saw

there so astonished me that I quickly drove back to the advance

party plane where the press was still gathered and, pointing

toward the C-119s, called to them,

 ffYoufre wasting your time

here. There's your story." As each aircraft turned into the

taxiway still rolling at a considerable speed, a soldier jumped

off and sprinted forward to establish an assembly point for his

planeload. The other soldiers came tumbling out behind him while

the plane was still rolling, neatly stacked their weapons and

equipment in a line designated by the guide, then raced back to

the plane to unload the A-7 containers and weapons bags. In a

matter of several minutes the plane was proceeding to the runway

for takeoff. The troopers had formed up with their equipment and

were moving toward the olive groves. As later related to me by a

Pan Am repre'sentative who observed the operation from an upper

story of the terminal, "It was amazing. One moment the place was

full of soldiers, and the next moment they had just

disappeared." I was so proud of them I conveniently overlooked

the fact that they had exited their aircraft in a manner

certainly not taught to them at jump school or permitted by AF

regulations, but it did portend their conduct throughout the

operation.

The remainder of the day was spent in a variety of activities

normal to entry into a new operational area. I contacted the

Marine battalion commander located near the airport and made a

reconnaissance accompanied by him. I then flew to the Taconic by

helicopter to report to Admiral Holloway, but he was involved

with the U.S. Ambassador, so I did not see him. Returning to the

airport I observed the unloading of the C-130s, which were coming

in at irregular intervals as they could be fitted into traffic.

The scheme for unloading the heavy drop I thought was quite

ingenious. The first plane in brought an extra load of roller

conveyors, which were laid out on the edge of the runway. The

heavy drop loads were rolled out of the plane onto these

conveyors. The roller conveyors under the loads on the first

'plane were then removed and laid on the runway ^for the next

20
plane, so that we ended up with all the heavy drop loads in a

single line on conveyors in proper sequence to be rolled back

onto the aircraft if needed. I then made a check by helicopter

of the activity in the olive grove. The check indicated that the

Headquarters tent camp was being erected on the edge of a large

clearing in the center of the grove, the CP of the 201st

Logistical Command was going up nearby, and the 187th was

settling in very smoothly. Returning to the airfield I conferred

with Colonel McCafferty, who had established his Combat Airlift

Support Unit (CALSU) in several GP tents beside the taxiway. Our

first briefing at our CP was held at 1900, and at 2130 we

reported to CINCSPECOMME that TF Alpha had closed.

15. Consolidation Phase, 20-26 July

Naturally our first consideration was to be able to respond

to any operational requirement that might arise. For quick

response, one company of the 187th was maintained on

thirty-minute alert and one platoon on ten-minute alert. A grid

of the Beirut area was established and heliopads designated in

each grid, together with the shortest vehicle route thereto. A

large-scale photo mosaic of the Basta area was prepared by the

Air Force and studied by us in the event trouble erupted there.

Liaison was established with Marine units and visits made to

their positions. General Wade and I arranged coordination of

Marine artillery with ours, and a TOC established at our

artillery battery was' able to control the fires of all artillery,

our 4.2s, naval gunfire from destroyers offshore, and aircraft

strikes. Simulated missions were run each day for these

capabilities, with fighter aircraft coming down from Adana to

participate. I made an aerial reconnaissance of all Lebanon,

courtesy of the Navy, and made daily flights over Beirut in an

Army L-5, until I became thoroughly familiar with the area.

Our second consideration was the security and well-being of

our troops. A Letter of Instruction was given to each unit

commander as he arrived, and it was reviewed with him in detail.

It contained guidelines for the establishment of his company

area, security, uniform regulations, sanitation, etc. A.

follow-up check was made of the unit, and I spoke to it, all

within the first twenty-four hours of arrival. Colonel Meetze

adopted the same procedure for his units, which ensured that

everyone stepped off on the same foot.

At this time of year our area was a real hotbox with noonday

temperatures from 90-degrees to 100-degrees Farenheit as normal.

Accordingly, I prescribed reveille at 0430, followed by running

and PT for everyone, myself included. The work day extended from

0600 to 1100 and from 1400 to 1700. All individual and unit

training was conducted in the morning hours. The afternoon

periods were reserved for less physically demanding subjects,

21

86-1503
troop information, care and cleaning of equipment, and

athletics. Saturday mornings were reserved for a complete

inspection of all personnel, equipment, and camp areas, followed

by a talk by the unit commander, during which he read my weekly

letter reviewing past performance and setting goals for the

future.

Our third consideration was the movement to Lebanon of TF

Charlie. I met the first unit at 0700, Sunday, 20 July and the

last unit, the 58th Evac Hospital, at about 2000 on 1 August. It

was a very noisy twelve days. The C-130 engines ran at a

constant speed, emitting an ear-splitting roar, and never shut

down while unloading. The C-12^3 undoubtedly made more noise on

takeoff than any aircraft ever built. As the operation was an

airstream type that ran at irregular intervals, the sound of the

engines reverberated night and day through the olive grove and

was a considerable impediment to sleep. Instead of counting

sheep, I counted airplanes and, on one sleepless night, according

to ray diary, recorded 26 of them. The Air Force CALSU and a

detail from the 187th headed by Capt. Gerald Carlson worked

around the clock, performing in an outstanding manner. Toward

the end, Captain Carlson's voice in competition with the engine

noise was reduced to a bare whisper, and it was a wonder that the

whole gang did not end up totally deaf.

Our fourth consideration was the establishment of good

working relationships. Knowing Admiral Holloway was a very busy

man, I did not contact him unless necessary, but worked closely

with Adm. Howard Yeager and General Wade. He and I visited Gen.

Fu'ad Shehab, and I established cordial relations with the two

Lebanese Army units located near me. I worked closely with

Mayor Saab of Chouiefalt, a large Druze settlement adjacent to

the olive grove. Close liaison was established with the U.S.

Embassy, the CIA, USIA, and other U.S. agencies operating in the

area. I also initiated frequent correspondence with Generals

Hodes, Eddleman, and Cooper to keep them fully informed of what

was happening to their troops.

I have included the above not to impress anyone as to what a

busy boy I was, but to establish the framework for the following

account of incidents more directly related to the EP 201 planning

process and also to illustrate that its execution was not

entirely all peaches and cream.

a. The Honest John

USAREUR added an Honest John unit to the Troop List, and

although I was never told directly, I assumed that it was at DA

direction in order to demonstrate that the U.S. Army had the

ability to deploy a tactical nuclear capability quickly in any

and all situations. Although no formal protest was made, I did

22
not favor the idea of being saddled with a weapon I could not

visualize needing. I was also concerned about the highly

restrictive and extensive regulations governing the security of

the launcher and missiles. At that time there were only two air

transportable launchers in Europe, both with the U.S. Task Force

stationed in Italy. One of these was transferred to us in

Germany and was scheduled to be deployed by C-12*l as a part of TF

Charlie. However, soon after the Marines came ashore, some

enterprising reporter asked a Marine officer if their 8-inch guns

could fire nuclear weapons. He tried to hedge his answer, but

did admit that nuclear weapons did exist for 8-inch artillery.

The inference was made that the Marines did in fact have a

nuclear capability, and the fat was in the fire. The ensuing

hubbub apparently caused DA to have second thoughts and to issue

an order canceling the deployment. When this order was received,

the Honest John detachment was already en route to Beirut via

C-124. It was landed after dark, was immediately parked in a

remote part of the airport, and took off the next morning without

unloading. The retraction order went through AF channels, so I

was not informed of it until the following morning. For reasons

I cannot now recall the Honest John personnel were not returned

with the launcher. Since they all were high-quality people, we

decided to keep them, at least until we got a squawk from the

24th Division, but as was characteristic of the division in all

its dealings with us, they suffered our transgressions with

forbearance. Note: I realize the above account differs from

that in Leavenworth Paper #3, page 37. I don't recall it, but

apparently there was a sea tail consisting of the Btrg (-).

b. Command Relationships

When the Marines landed, General Wade quite properly was

designated as CG AMLANFOR as prescribed in the BLUEBAT plan.

This raised a question as to what my designation should be. I

found out when I paid my first call on Admiral Holloway on 19

July. I was piped aboard and announced over the ship's loud

speaker system as

 TfCG, US Army Troops Assigned," which rather

surprised me as I had never heard that terra used before, but I

thought little more about it. This was not true of some of the

Army officers who were assigned to CINCNELM and were now on

CINCSPECOMME's staff. They believed that General Wade and I

should have had the same designation or that I should have had

the title of CG, AMLANFOR. They suggested that I make an issue

of it.

This I did not do. Whatever our respective titles, I was

getting my instructions directly from Admiral Holloway. General

Wade and I were coordinating our activities effectively, and he

at no time made any effort to assert authority over me. I was

well aware and could understand the Navy's desire that a high

ranking Marine Corps general get the job as AMLANFOR and assumed

23
that was why the 2d Battalion, 8th Marines, was rushed from Camp

Lejeune without heavy weapons, vehicles, radios, and other means

required for sustained combat. I was also aware that General

Adams had been given some strong assurance that he was the heir

apparent, otherwise he would not have taken the trouble to visit

me at Fiirstenfeldbruck. I assumed that if Admiral Holloway had

thought it necessary to discuss the matter with me, he would have

done so. Besides, throughout ray service I have consistently

tried to do my job with as little reference to or interference

from my superiors.

Admiral Holloway undoubtedly appreciated this, as one day he

said, "You're my strong right arm. You are the only guy who

comes to see me without asking for something." I believe he was

sincere in saying this. After his visit to us on 30 May at

Augsburg, one of his Array staff officers, Lt. Col. Ben Capshaw,

wrote, "As a matter of interest to you, General, Admiral Holloway

told the senior members of his staff that his visit with you was

one of the most wonderful and educational experiences he has had

in a long time, and he only wished he could have spent longer

with you. After the meeting he called me in individually to

expand on the subject in more detail. I am sure that he was

sincerely impressed." During that visit we gave him an airborne

swaggerstick that, according to his aide, he carried with him

when he first went ashore in Lebanon, and I do know that he

always carried it when he visited our troops on their positions,

something he loved to do.

At the time when we relieved the Marine unit stationed at the

ambassador's residence, Admiral Holloway was spending the night

there. As he told me later, "I awoke this morning and heard

orders being barked and rifle slings slapped and said to myself

that the paratroopers must have relieved the Marines." I recount

all this by way of explaining why, under the circumstances that

existed during this consolidation period, who had what title was

not important, and why I was confident that whatever happened we

would always get a fair shake from Admiral Holloway. It may also

explain why he did not opt to turn us back at Adana. He had real

affection for us and simply did not want to. Of course, no doubt

lurking somewhere in the background was the realization that we

carried with us the supporting wherewithal to make Lebanon a

first-class show and not just a skin-of-the-teeth affair.

c. More Ammunition

On another occasion I was not as fortunate in resisting a

suggestion from the Army members of CINCSPECOMME's staff. The

Army's senior member, a Colonel Ward, was concerned that we did

not have enough ammunition on the ground and wanted me to request

more while the Charlie airlift was still in operation. Knowing

what was on the way by sea and given the existing noncombat
situation, I resisted at first, but the suggestion was made again

while I was hurrying from the Taconic to another appointment, and

in a moment of weakness I agreed. As General Cooper told me

later, the message was received just as a unit was about to take

off. Neither he nor General Speidel could fathom why this urgent

request for Class V, but they decided that if "Dave wants it,

send it." So the unit was unloaded and ammo was loaded on all

available aircraft until the amount we requested had been

dispatched. As a result, the airlift of TF Charlie was

needlessly prolonged, and we had stocks we didn't need. During

our long period of preplanning, I had established a close

relationship with CINCNELM's Army members, and they were

therefore not reluctant to keep me informed of activity within

that staff and to offer suggestions. I appreciated this, but in

this instance I made a mistake in accepting their advice.

d. Our PIO Snafu

The PIO Section of Headquarters, TF 201, consisting of a

Major Bretz and five enlisted members, was furnished by USAREUR.

As they were not jumpers, they were not a part of TF Alpha, but

were assigned to the nonjumping element of the headquarters in TF

Charlie. Consequently, for the first few days in Lebanon, we

were without a PIO section.

When the Marines landed the news media descended on Beirut in

droves, taking pictures of the Marines wading ashore, manning

positions, etc. When we arrived we generated no photohappenings, so some enterprising reporter got one of our soldiers

to pose in his company area, sitting backward on a donkey,

drinking a bottle of soda. The picture by itself was bad enough,

but the Washington Post printed it alongside a grim-faced Marine

in full battle regalia, with bayonet fixed, charging across the

beach. The Army Chief of Staff, General Maxwell Taylor, must

have hit the roof when he saw it, as I received a message from

him direct asking me very pointedly whether our soldiers weren't

doing something more worthwhile than that. Knowing how our men

were actually performing, I was equally exasperated about the.

picture and replied with a message that even now I wonder how I

had the nerve to send. I said that our soldiers certainly were

doing something worthwhile, but that I lacked an adequate PIO

capability. I enumerated what I needed and added that if the

Army would supply it, I would guarantee good PI coverage. Almost

before I had time to finish regretting I had ever sent the

message, a plane arrived direct from Washington carrying a real

PI hot shot, a Lieutenant Colonel Steward, complete with a team

of officers and enlisted specialists who had their own cameras,

jeeps, and mobile photo lab. Both Generals Modes and Eddleman

also chided me, but much less severely, as they were more aware

of the true situation.

25
My basic mistake was to fail to insist that our PI section be

jump qualified, and failing that, I should have taken them to

Adana anyway. Under the circumstances then existing, the section

could have proceeded to Beirut with us. Publishing of the donkey

picture was regrettable, but not of lasting importance. More

important is that a commander understand the awesome power of the

press. His only defense is to insure that he has a good PIO,

keep him fully informed and insure that he is capable of

establishing good working relationships with all the media,

press, TV, and radio. This is particularly important in the

initial phase of an operation when the military and the press

meet for the first time. I failed to do this and therefore did

not provide TF 201 and the Army the initial press coverage it

should have had.

16. Creation of AMLANFOR

During a meeting with Admiral Holloway on 24 July, he

informed me that a decision had been made to establish a Land

Force HQ, and that General Adams would be arriving that evening

at 1900 to organize and command the headquarters. He then asked

me where, if I were General Adams, I would prefer my headquarters

to be. I replied in Beirut, because most of the agencies and the

activities with which AMLANFOR would be concerned were located

there.

When I returned to our CP, in that remarkable way that bad

news travels fast, I found that the staff already had the word

and were in an absolute blue funk. They all had either served

under General Adams-in the XVIII Airborne Corps or knew him by

reputation as a tough, very tough, and demanding boss. Also, I

am sure that quite naturally after all their work, they didn't

like the idea of someone moving in on top of them. At our 1800

briefing I told them that I could understand their

disappointment, but it had been decided that a joint land force

headquarters was necessary, and that being so, General Adams was

the best qualified officer in the Army for the job. He had

extensive experience as a leader in combat, as an administrator,

and as a planner; equally important, he understood airborne

troops, being one of them. Personally I had no illusions. I had

served under him in Korea and the Pentagon and knew that he

walked right down the middle of the road and that everyone under

him better walk there, too.

That evening we got off to an inauspicious start.

CINCSPECOMMEfs Chief of Staff (an Admiral) and I were to meet

General Adams' plane at what I had been informed was 1900 local

time, but instead was ZULU time, an hour earlier. I got the word

while the plane was on final and rushed to the airport to find

General Adams' plane sitting on the tarmac, but no Admiral.

General Adams, realizing something was amiss, tactfully remained

26
aboard until I arrived, but said nothing about the screw-up when

I greeted him. I took him to our CP for a briefing. He visited

with me in my tent for a few minutes, and before we left to drive

into town he said, "You know there is an awful lot of heartbreak

in this business." I replied, "Yes, sir. There is." I knew

what he meant. No one likes to be superseded, but looking back I

believe I was more relieved than sorry* More and more of my time

was being spent coordinating with CINCSPECOMME, General Wade,

Admiral Yeager, Amb. Robert McClintock, and the Lebanese. It was

becoming apparent to me that most of that coordination could

better be done at a higher level than my own.

Two days later, on 26 July, General Adams asked me to have

lunch with him. During the meal he told me that he simply would

not be able to wait for personnel from USAREUR, that he had to be

operational by 1900 that evening, and that the only way he could

do that was to utilize my staff, less thirty-six officers and

enlisted men, who would remain in the field as a brigade

headquarters to command the array combat units. Since the brigade

would exercise purely operational responsibilities, the 201st

Logistical Command would operate under his control. He then said

that I could either be his deputy at his headquarters or command

the brigade. I told him that I thought I could be of more

service to him and to the troops in the field by commanding the

brigade, and he accepted my preference. I also mentioned that,

in anticipation of some decision concerning the command

structure, I had brought my four Gs with me, and if I could be

excused for a minute I would like to send them back to camp to

start planning for the move. Upon my return I told him that I

thought I could function with the allotment given me, but if I

could not, I would utilize personnel from units under my

command. However, if the situation heated up, I would need more

people and would like to prepare a standby augmentation list to

be submitted through him to USAREUR. He agreed.

I then returned to my CP to find the place in an uproar. One

of the officers I had sent back early had made an offhand remark

that was interpreted to mean that the whole headquarters was

going to Beirut. This impression was corrected in a hurry and

thereafter the exodus proceeded in an orderly manner. AMLANFOR

was operational at 1900 and became an effective headquarters in a

remarkably short period of time. There were certainly other,

less gentle ways in which this operation could have been

performed, but General Adams did it as delicately and with as

much compassion for the patient as anyone could expect. As for

us, we survived the major surgery in good shape and quickly

adjusted to our new situation.

The activation of AMLANFOR in effect terminated the execution

of EP 201 and ushered in a new phase in U.S. operations in

Lebanon. We probably would have muddled through without the new

command structure, but we might well have made some mistakes that

need not have been made. General Adams gave firm direction to

27
the entire operation and played a pivotal part in the many

actions that were never publicized, but which eventually nudged

the Lebanese into burying their firearms for a while and allowing

the U.S. to retract its forces.

17o Postscript

I departed from Beirut on Sunday, October 15, w,ith a warm sun

shining down from a clear blue Mediterranean sky. I landed a few

hours later in a typically chilly German fog, so thick that our

wheels almost took the horns from a Bavarian cow as we crossed

the edge of the airfield. Soon, I thought, I will be reassigned

and that will end my association with a contingency plan that

started for me back in the Pentagon in 1956. Well, not quite.

As Brig. Gen. Harold Johnson, the assistant C/S, 7th Army, and I

were traveling to the Infantry Conference at Ft. Benning later

that fall, I remarked that I pitied the brigadier general who

would have to assume the 201 contingency mission in the 8th

Division. He replied, "What makes you think it won't be you?"

And so in January, 1959, much like a missionary, I went to Bad

Krasnauch, the land of the Golden Arrow, to convince the

disbelievers that having an airborne element was not the worst of

all worlds. Besides, 201 was now their baby, and they had better

learn to get on with it. Both the 504th and 505th battle groups

that came from Ft. Bragg had been superbly trained by Maj. Gen.

Ham Howze, which made my job a lot easier.

Learning from the Lebanon experience we kept one rifle

company on two-hour alert with its heavy drop loads rigged and on

a roller conveyor at truck-bed height, so it could be rolled

directly onto trucks. The heavy drop platoon was located in the

same caserne with the two battle groups, so instruction on heavy

drop rigging could be facilitated. A complete scale model mock

up of a departure airfield was contructed in sections so that it

could be transported around the division to train all those who

would be involved in DACG operations. Each month alternately at

Evreux and Bad Krasnauch a conference was held with the 322d Air

Division. In the spring an exercise was held that included the

air drop of a battle group, seizure of an airfield, airlanding of

the battle group's equipment at the airfield, and subsequent

antiguerilla operation, all within fifty miles of our home base

and without expenditure of any other than normal training funds.

At the end of that exercise, the 8th Division was better prepared

to execute 201 than we had been in 1958.

In June I went to work for General Adams, for the fourth

time, as his Chief of Staff at V Corps, and so finally left TF

201 behind me.

28
SECTION II: COMMENTS ON LEAVENWORTH PAPER #3

This section contains my comments with respect to the

relatively few instances wherein either my records or my

recollections differ substantially with specific statements in

Leavenworth Paper //3, "Not War But Like War"; The American

Intervention in Lebanon, by Dr. "Roger Spiller.

1. Page 11, Para 2, Line 3. Statement; "In the light of

subsequent events, however, it is difficult to escape the

conclusion that Air Force planners assumed that general

arrangements made earlier would suffice in this situation also."

Comment; At no time during the planning process did we ever have

any direct contact with any Air Force unit or personnel on the

specific matter of tactical air support. Similarly, there was no

direct liaison between us and CASF Bravo while we were at Adana

or after we arrived in Lebanon. Practice air strikes in Lebanon

were arranged directly between CASF Bravo and our forward air

controllers. Although Maj. Gen. Henry Viccellio visited Beirut

on several occasions that I was aware of, I do not know what

coordination may have been effected between him and General

Adams. If there was any, we were not involved in it in any way.

At the November meeting in London in 1957 a general officer

from the 3d Air Force located in England remarked to Admiral

Holloway in my presence that there was no need for all the

planning; if there was any trouble in the Middle East, just give

them [the Air Force] the mission and they would settle it with

just one bomb. Admiral Holloway never batted an eye, but I

certainly did. I had encountered this officer in the Pentagon

and knew him to be a dyed-in-the-wool SAC type and a devoted

disciple of General Curtis LeMay, down to the ever present big

brown cigar. Nevertheless, I was startled, as I couldn't imagine

any situation that our small force might encounter that would

warrant the use of nuclear weapons. This remark might explain

the less than avid interest the Air Force seemed to take in the

entire operation but it does not explain my own actions or lack

thereof. During World War II as a student at the Army-Navy War

College, I attended the Air Corps School of Applied Tactics at

Orlando, Florida, and during the Korean War, an Air Force school

in Japan for commanders at the regimental/wing level. I knew

that when an Air Force unit was placed in direct support of an

Army unit, an Air Force detachment should be collocated with the

Army unit in order to coordinate their joint operations. Even

though I understood that our tactical air support, if needed,

would come from units already based in Turkey rather than units

in Western Europe, I should have insisted that we be given some

point of contact for the purpose of coordinating tactical air

support. At Adana, when much to our surprise CASF Bravo came

29
zooming out of the sky, I should have initiated coordination then

and requested that an operational element with appropriate

communications accompany us to Beirut. These were major

derelictions on ray part, for which I have no explanation and can

offer no excuse.

One lesson to learn is that a plan is not really complete

unless every single element of it is complete, but more

important, an Army planner should not hesitate to insist that

other services fully engage in the planning process and deliver

the means to execute the missions for which they are tasked.

Note: At Adana, General Viccellio and I were assigned the

only BOQ room on the base* We both slept little, but it seemed

he would be asleep when I came in and leave before I woke up, or

vice versa. In deference to each other we never turned on the

lights, so we never saw each other or spoke until we met in

Beirut. Years later, when he was Deputy CG at Strike Command, we

met often, and he always referred to me as someone with whom he

had roomed for two days and still didn't know what he looked like.

2. Page 22, Para 2, Line 19. Statement: "McClintock later

scored the marines for their 'extremely inflexible orders,' . . .

w

Comment: Lt. Col. Harry Hadd was executing the Op Plan as

written, so I can understand his. reluctance to send a force to

the Presidential Palace. I can also understand the ambassador's

impatience in view of the fact that he traveled freely in the

western part of the city and his own residence was only a few

blocks from the palace. He therefore felt the force could move

to the palace without difficulty.

As chief of the International Branch of the Plans Division on

the DA Staff in 1954-55, I developed a good understanding of the

Country Team concept and was fully aware that unless otherwise

specified as with Eisenhower in Europe in WWII, the ambassador is

responsible for execution of U.S. policy in a foreign country. I

don't recall what was stated in the BLUEBAT plan or any

discussions with CINCLANT on the matter during the planning

stage, but it was my distinct understanding at the time that if

we had gone in first, I was supposed to secure the airport and

the post area and then contact the ambassador for further

instructions pending the arrival of CINCSPECOMME and his

assumption of control. After he arrived I would naturally take

my orders from him.

While I was in Washington, Mr. McClintock was stationed in

Hanoi, and I regularly read his cables to the State Deptartment.

They made much more sense than most of the cable traffic to which

I was exposed. In view of this respect of his ability, I believe

I would have been inclined to accept his assurance that we could

reach the palace without undue difficulty. I would have asked

30
the ambassador to accompany me In his official car with flags

flying on both fenders on a PR of the palace area. Based on the

results of this PR and in the absence of any definite

instructions from CINSCPECOMME, I would have then made a decision

as to whether to commit a force. If I had decided to go, I would

have sent a rifle company, which under ROCID was quite an

effective force, with four rifle platoons and a weapons platoon,

including 81-mm mortars, machine guns, and recoilless rifles. If

the decision had been negative, I hope it would have satisfied

McClintock and avoided the dispatch of Mr. Robert Murphy from

Washington to adjudicate between the military and the State

Department. My basic inclination to go to the palace was largely

influenced by the fact that one of the reasons we went to

Lebanon—as questionable as that reason may have been—was to

preserve the government until this internal squabble could be

resolved. -I don't believe I would have been very happy if a coup

had occurred while I was sitting on my fanny at the airport.

If I am not mistaken, difficulties also arose between the

military and State when we went into the Dominican Republic.

This relationship, especially in the initial stages of execution

of a contingency plan, can get very sticky. It is a matter for

study that should be included in the curriculum of all our higher

military educational institutions.

3. Page 25, Para 3, Line 8. Statement; "... bring one battle

group and airlift therefor [sic] to "a state of readiness to

enable their arrival within 24 hours of execution order on Beirut

airfield assuming it is safely held, or within 36 hours if

airdrop is required and to be prepared to follow with second

battle group."

Comment; I note this communication mentions only the battle

groups. There may have been later clarification, but if there

was not, we deployed a much larger force than the JCS intended.

I can understand why Adm. Arleigh Burke might think in terms of a

battle group only, as the Marine force with the Sixth Fleet had

no support of any kind. But if the message was staffed, the Army

should have detected the oversight. This tends to confirm my

feeling that very few people were familiar with our plan. As for

us, we always assumed that commitment of one or both battle

groups into a potential combat situation would automatically

trigger the commitment of TF Charlie. Actually, I don't recall

that we ever did receive a written message to execute BLUEBAT.

The execution times in the message were feasible only if the

order to execute had come after we were fully loaded and ready at

Fursty. We calculated it would take ten hours after first alert

to completely close TF Alpha at the airfield and twelve hours to

rig and load 126 heavy drop loads. Assuming these two activities

would overlap to some extent and also assuming no hitches, we

figured we could be ready to go in eighteen hours.

31
4. Page 26, Para 4, Line 5. Statement: "... procedures for

marshalling and deploying the task force which looked sufficient

on paper were beginning to seem superficial."

Comment: I must say this statement was a considerable shock to

my ego. If in fact our marshaling procedures were superficial,

then I would hope that some better examples than those given

could be found. They were not simply paper procedures as

Leavenworth Paper #3 implies, but had been practiced and tested

previously to the extent we were able to do so. Unquestionably

the transfer of personnel under the pressure of time was a

difficult operation and never performed in practice to our

complete satisfaction, so no doubt some difficulties did occur,

but these were not unanticipated and did not delay the departure

of the 187th from Gablingen caserne. The disruption to the

division was certainly anticipated by us and was simply a fact of

life, not a weakness in our plans. Actually, the effect on

USAREUR's troop basis was even more severe than on the 24th

Division. Already stretched thin, it could hardly afford the

loss of the combat support and service units we took from it.

That is why in Section I, I referred to us as "moles" who,

largely unnoticed, busied ourselves making plans, but I often had

the uneasy feeling that those above us never took us very

seriously and didn't fully realize what we were doing to their

force structure.

As for the account of me personally selecting officers by

laboriously scrutinizing the division officers1 201 files, the

incident simply never happened. The roster of division personnel

assigned to HQ TF 201 had been set for a long, long time. There

might have been a few last minute changes, but those would have

been handled by our G-1 Section, and I would not have been

involved unless a key individual was involved; luckily there were

none of these. Besides, the division personnel assigned to the

HQ had been fully marshaled in the May alert, and on 16 July the

same group was preparing to jump into the Bad Tolz area. We

tried to spare the division as much as we could. For instance,

our four Gs came from VII Corps or 7th Army, and many of our

nonjumping people, special staff, PIO, Civil Affairs, etc. were

provided by USAREUR. One G-2 specialist was an Arabic linguist

who had been a spook in Berlin for years, didn't even have a

uniform, hadn't touched a rifle since WWII, and certainly looked

it when he arrived for duty. No doubt the division was crippled,

yet none of my correspondence with General Cooper indicated that

it was about to fall apart.

5. Page 26, Para 4, Line 7. Statement: "The battle group for

Force. Alpha was to be augmented to 110 percent of its full

strength."

Comment; I hesitate to comment on this question of augmentation

as my memory draws a complete blank on the subject, and a

32
diligent search of ray files has failed to diminish that blank.

If we did augment TF Alpha to 110 percent of strength, it was a

mistake. During the Korean War, my regiment as well as the other

two in the 25th Division became overstrength to the extent that

our infantry squads numbered fourteen to sixteen men. Because

such a squad was patently unmanageable, the division decreed that

an additional platoon be formed in each company, although I

personally favored forming an additional squad in each platoon.

Whatever the solution, the experience left me strongly opposed to

any unit being overstrength, so much so that I can't understand

why I would not have vehemently opposed it. If I didn't, I

should have.

Equally important is the question of retainability. I cannot

recall what our criteria were for Lebanon. It is not an easy

question to answer. In theory it would be desirable to purge a

unit of all personnel without at least six-months retainability

in order to maximize stability in the early stages of an

operation. Generally, however, this would cause such disruption

in unit integrity prior to deployment that it would be more of a

hindrance than a help. At the other extre.ne, one month is not

enough, as personal turbulance within the unit commences too

early after deployment. During the Vietnam buildup, I believe we

used three months, but as a general rule I prefer two months.

This strikes a balance between the sudden disruption of the unit

prior to deployment, and the degree of stability achieved in the

first critical days following deployment. It must be remembered

that a unit in the field operates twenty-four hours a day, and on

that basis an individual can contribute a lot in sixty days.

6. Page 27, Para 1, Line 4. Statement; "Still, the haste to

deploy was such that some officers and men actually went to

Lebanon without orders."

Comment; What happened was this. By G.O. 194, dated 15 July,

USAREUR activated HQ, TF 201, and HQ, 201st Logistical Command.

Pending receipt of this order, the 24th Division issued S.O. 13

on 15 July assigning all officers and enlisted men of the

division who were a part of the Task Force HQ to Advanced

Detachment, HQ 24th Division. S.O. 19 on 23 July transferred the

same personnel to HQ, TF 201, where they remained assigned—even

when some of them became part of HQ, AMLANFOR—until their return

to Germany. This type of individual assignment order is a G-l/AG

responsibility. When issued, a copy is placed in the

individual's 201 file, and two copies are given the individual.

The movements of units is a different story. These orders

are a G-3 responsibility and are only issued to units, not

individuals. Thus, the majority of our personnel were properly

in Lebanon without individual assignment orders of any kind.

Nonetheless, HQ AMLANFOR directed that each individual be given a

copy of the order that returned his unit to Germany. I did not

33
question this, even though my past experience both as a G-1 and a

G-3 indicated that, although not improper, it was, on the other

hand, not necessary except for people carried as a part of HQ, TF

201, who were reassigned to their parent unit in USAREUR by

Special Orders issued on 15 October by AMLANFOR. Of course, it

is possible that considering the diverse sources from which HQ TF

201 was assembled, a few individuals did either reach Lebanon

without orders or never received their personal copies. I simply

don't know, but if so this would be despite our marshaling

procedures, not for lack of them.

As for considering our move to Lebanon as "a permanent change

of station," technically this is correct, but I doubt if many of

our force thought that they would not return to Germany. We had

operated on the thesis that we were deployed simply because of

close proximity, and if the mission were prolonged, we would be

replaced from CONUS. A DA visiting team in August even told me

what U.S.-based units would replace us.

I don't recall how our unit assignment orders read, but it

must have been in a way so that the umbilical cord between us and

our parent unit was never completely severed. I recall that the

C/S of the division, a Colonel Smith, told me that their

administrative statistics had been considerably improved by the

fact that our units in Lebanon had few if any DRs, AWOLs,

accidents, courts-martial, etc. This could not have happened if

USAREUR did not still consider our units an integral part of the

24th Division.

7. Page 27, Para 2, Line 7. Statements ". . . the 187th

principally drew upon the 1st Battle Group, 21st Airborne

Infantry, for any extra men or equipment."

Comment; I believe the 187th drew from the 19th Infantry Battle

Group, formerly the 504th Airborne Battle Group, which was

located in Augsburg, perhaps a thirty-minute drive from

Gablingen. As replacements went to the receiving unit at its

home station, were checked out there and integrated into their

new unit, it would have been impractical for the 21st to have

furnished replacements because it was located in Munich, sixty

kilometers from Gablingen. However, the 21st was designated to

provide replacements for the 503d, as both occupied the same

caserne in Munich.

8. Page 29, Para 1, Line 4. Statement: ". . „ the dimensions

and number of loads to be carried by the Air Force—had not been

determined; ..."

Comment; I believe this statement is only partially true. The

configuration of each plane load and the total number of loads

for Task Force Alpha had been determined, approved by me, and
given to the Air Force long before 15 July. As related by me in

Section I, this requirement is what I discussed with General

Davis at Ramstein AFB on 9 July.

Task Force Charlie is something else. For security reasons,

we were not allowed any contact with the TF Charlie units prior

to the May alert. After that alert we started working to get the

airlift data from these units and to prepare loading plans. This

was no easy task, as these units had no experience in preparing

such data and had to be educated. The 8 July CPX was designed to

accelerate this process, and another conference was planned to

finalize the loading data. Nonetheless, it is true that these

loading plans were not complete on 15 July. Since most of TF

Charlie had to wait for turnaround planes, this was not a serious

deficiency as time was available to finalize plans while waiting

for inbound planes. Still, if we had gone all out on this, we

could have had the Charlie loading data by 15 July. That we

didnft was my responsibility.

9. Page 29, Para 1, Line 10. Statement;

 tflt was at

Fiirstenfeldbruck airfield that the configurations for loading the

task force were first calculated, . . .

tf

Comment; I believe it is incorrect to say "first calculated."

They had to be recalculated and adjusted to fit the aircraft that

were available on that particular day. This is a standard

procedure in mounting all airborne operations except those where

it is known beforehand that the airlift in proper types required

will be well in excess of the lift requirement. This is why

regulations prescribe the establishment of an Army-Air Force

coordinating group at the departure airfield. It is interesting

to note that on 16 July the airlift available for TF Alpha fell

short by one rifle company. Echo company arrived at Adana a day

late on, I believe, C-124fs scheduled for TF Charlie.

10. Page 29, Para 1, Line 18. Statement; "Finally, there does

not seem to have been any thought given to how the dimensions of

the airlift might affect aircraft availability."

Comment; My comment is more a question than anything else. If

Dr. Spiller is referring to how the size of the Alpha lift would

affect availability of aircraft for Charlie, I'm not sure this is

relevant. It was understood from the beginning that once TF

Alpha was delivered, TF Charlie would be an airstream operation

carried on to completion, regardless of time required.

11. Page 29, Para 1, Line 20. Statement; "At the time, just

how long it would take aircraft to get to Turkey, unload, and

return to Germany for subsequent loads had not been estimated."

35
Comment; I believe this is a mistake. No aircraft were ever

unloaded in Turkey. TF Alpha certainly didnft and after that, to

the best of ray recollection, TF Charlie lift flew direct to

Beirut. We definitely did have airtimes for all type aircraft

from Germany to Adana and then to Beirut for air drop and return

to Germany. I believe it is correct to say that we did not have

a turnaround estimate for an airlanded operation, as there were

too many imponderables. At what intervals could we lend aircraft

at Beirut? What would be the unloading space available? How

would we fit into civil air traffic? And so on. It would have

been a guess of little or no practical value.

12. Page 31i Para 2, Line 6. Statement: "... and, strangely,

Colonel McCafferty of the air liaison staff."

Comment: There seems to be some misunderstanding concerning

Colonel McCaffertyfs role. As Deputy Commander of the 322d Air

Division, he was the Commander of the Air Force element of TF

Alpha, not a liaison officer. Had we had to jump he would have

been in command of TF Alpha en route to the target. It was his

duty to fly with us to Adana and on to Beirut. I believe it is a

misnomer to refer to the Air Force officers at Fursty as liaison

officers. They were an operations element of the 322d.

13. Page 311 Para 4, Line 3- Statement: "... continued to

unload tons of equipment and thousands of men ..."

Comment: I confess I am mystified why the 24th Division Report

should make such a statement. As I have previously indicated, no

equipment was ever unloaded by us at any time at Adana. Our

aircraft were parked off on one side of the field on a secondary

taxiway. Our personnel bivouacked just off the taxiway beside

their aircraft and, as they were not allowed to leave that

immediate area, caused no congestion on the base. I cannot

comment on what problems the Air Force may have had, but I

thought all things considered they handled the situation very

well. The Air Force isnft exactly noted for first class living

under field conditions. Come to think of it, the most congestion

I recall was in the evening when two large, disparate, and

slightly antagonistic groups—the fighter pilots and the

transport pilots—all tried to squeeze into the very small

Officers1 Club designed to hold at most two dozen people.

14. Page 31 f Para 4, Line 11. Statement; "... nor had any

stockpiling of supplies been attempted."

Comment: Colonel Meetze and several of my planners did visit

Adana and did attempt to stockpile supplies. No storage space

was available for us, but the Air Force did have considerable

supplies on hand. As I stated in Section I, we did draw

36
approximately 20,000 B rations and a considerable amount of

housekeeping equipment from these stocks.

15. Page 33, Para 1, Line 9. Statement; "... Adana Air Base

would have made a wonderful target for anyone who wished to take

advantage of it."

Comment; I had always understood that our air support would come

from Air Force bases in Turkey other then Adana. I was surprised

when CASF Bravo blew into town and used Adana as its base.

16. Page 33, Para 2, Line 24. Statement; "No photographs of

the drop zone existed, and none were possible because the

reconnaissance aircraft at Adana did not have the proper

equipment to take any."

Comment; We did see pictures of the airfield that someone,

perhaps the Navy, took. CASF Bravo did have an excellent photo

capability and took many pictures for us, including the fine

mosaic of the Basta. It is probable that on 17 July, when we

went to Beirut, its photo capability was not yet operational, as

CASF Bravo was still arriving at Adana from the United States.

17. Page 36, Para 1, Line 9. Statement; "... no provisions

had been made in the contingency plans for such a command

[CAMLANFOR]."

Comment; This is a Valid criticism. As I recall in CINCNELM's

original plan, I was ARMSPECOMME and the Marine Commander was

MARSPECOMME. Instead there should have been a LANSPECOMME with

us and the Marines subordinate to it. Of course, if this had

been written into NELM's plan it would have been necessary to

predesignate either a Marine or Army Commander, and I doubt if

the JCS were ready to do that, especially when it was not clear

that both Army and Marines would actually become involved.

Perhaps what actually transpired was the best solution obtainable

under the circumstances. Although not intended by us, HQ, TF 201,

luckily exhibited sufficient amoebic tendencies to undergo

fission and provide the nucleus for two viable, operating

headquarters. I might add that the procedure was not entirely

new to General Adams. At Ft. Bragg, the XVIII Airborne Corps was

both a tactical command and a post command. When General Adams

assumed command, he divided responsibilities so that if the Corps

was deployed, a working nucleus would remain behind to run the

post. It is not surprising either that when General Adams

organized the Strike Command, he divided the HQ into two similar

elements, either of which could have been deployed while the

other element continued to function at McDill AFB.

37
18. Page 36, Para 1, Line 18. Statement; "In effect, this

meant that those staff officers were serving"two masters, ..."

Comment; This is not correct. The AMLANFOR staff served only

General Adams and no one else. My HQ and my staff were

completely subordinate to AMLANFOR. There remained a personal

linkage between me and some of the officers who went to AMLANFOR

that was useful to me at times, but there was no question as for

whom they worked. Misunderstanding here may have arisen from the

fact that although there were two separate operating HQs,

AMLANFOR and mine, all of us were officially assigned to HQ, TF

201, throughout our stay. I either never knew this or had

forgotten it until I checked my 201 file while preparing these

comments.

19. Page 38, Para 1, Line 7. Statement; "All these matters

were finally taken up at a joint conference held in Beirut—on 4

August, . . ."

Comment; One of our first actions was to coordinate our

artillery and 4.2-inch mortars with the Marines' artillery and

with the gunfire of Navy destroyers. We relied on our FACs to

coordinate ground panels, smoke, etc., with the Air Force. These

FACs were the same ones we had worked with in Germany, so they

were familiar with our standard procedures.

20. Page 38, Para 2, Line 1. Statement; "Shortly after Force

Alpha reached Beirut, General Gray called the men of the 187th

together for a,talk."

Comment; A nit pic, but I talked to Alpha at Adana and to all

other units within twenty-four hours of their arrival in

Lebanon. General Adams also often spent Saturday and Sunday

afternoons visiting units and giving them a talk.

21. Page 38, Para 4, Line 11. Statement; "... but USAREUR

and USAFE got theirs [new maps] after deployment."

Comment; As I stated in Section I, we received a large bundle of

the British maps on Cyprus in May, and I brought them back to

Germany with me.

22. Page 39, Para 2, Line 6. Statement; ".. . the American

commanders were forced to assess the situation on the spot and

quickly."

Comment; True. On the first day I talked to the CIA, the State

Department, and the Army Attache, all of whom had differing

views, but the best information I received on the situation in

38
Lebanon and the various personalities involved was from the wife

of an American official of Top Line Oil Co. She had more and

better information then all the others put together.

23. Page 43, Para 1, Line 17. Statement; "Still, there was no

overt American reaction to these incidents [sporadic outbreaks of

harassing fire]."

Comment: True, no overt action, but when the trooper was wounded

near-~the Basta, that same evening General Adams called and

directed that we have a demonstration ready the next day on the

reduction of a roadblock. The next afternoon we gave the

demonstration to a select group from the Lebanese Army, using

tanks, bulldozers, APCs, and helicopters and considerable

firepower. Luckily a half-finished seaside resort was ready-made

for the demonstration. Because the Lebanese Army and the rebels

had many close connections, we knew the rebels would soon get the

word. General Adams then informed the Lebanese privately that if

the rebel who shot the soldier was not arrested and prosecuted,

the roadblock would be destroyed. We had no further incidents of

that nature. This was typical of how General Adams operated,

quietly, behind the scenes, but still forcefully.

24. Page 43, Para 2, Line 26. Statement; General Adams "sent

armored vehicles to the very edge of the Basta."

Comment; These tanks followed a patrol route through the city

all night long. When they reached a certain high point on their

route overlooking the city, they turned their guns toward the

Mediterranean and fired one round. It did have a sobering effect

on the hotheads.

25. Page 44, Para 3, Line 7. Statement; "... one is

impressed by the wave of

 fprovisionalismf which dominated

military planning as well as by a certain parochialism in the

services."

Comment; In our case there were two other alternatives. One

would have been to task XVIII Airborne Corps at Ft. Bragg with

the mission. If as was actually assumed, time was a critical

element, then this was not an acceptable solution. The other

alternative would have actually been to activate HQ, TF 201, in

Europe and have it constantly available. Beside the political

nuances of this solution with respect to NATO, it would have

meant committing personnel, housing, equipment, etc, to the

mission. No one would prefer a provisional headquarters over an

established one, but if personnel are well trained and qualified

for the specific positions they occupy, it is amazing how quickly

they coalesce.

39
The above comments are not intended to be contentious.

Leavenworth Paper #3 has certainly raised some very fundamental

questions that need to be considered. If, as the foreword to

Leavenworth Paper #3 states, "The Lebanese contingency operation

represents a gauge to measure the effectiveness of our planning

for the 1980s," then that guage should be stated as accurately as

it is possible to do so and should highlight what was right and

what was wrong with the planning and execution. Accordingly, I

feel an obligation to clarify aspects of the operation which

could not be fully reconstructed from the study of the reference

data available to the author.
SECTION III: RANDOM AFTERTHOUGHTS AND VARIOUS TRIVIA

1. Preposed CPX at Rota, Spain*

In the spring of 1958 someone, I believe EUCOM, proposed a

CPX to be held at Rota, Spain, in which HQ, TF 201, would

parachute into the area. Spanish officers had jumped with us in

Germany and, we noted, wore specially constructed shoes because

of the hard, rocky soil and frequent high winds encountered in

Spain. Although our division boasted that it had never jumped on

a plowed DZ, still we were not too keen on the Rota deal, as

neither was Admiral Holloway. A CPX was certainly needed, but

should have been set up on a less grandios scale. As it was, the

idea got overtaken by events.

2. C-130 Aircraft

For us it was love at first sight. After listening to the

coughing, popping, and sputtering of the durable, but aging

C-119s as they lumbered slowly down the runway, it was, on our

first C-130 jump, a thrill to hear the roar of the plane's four

engines as it surged forward, rose quickly, and, it seemed,

reached jump altitude before it was clear of the runway. As we

prepared to jump and I looked down the stick, I could see the

elation on the faces of the 201 staff. If we had to go, we would

at least go first class.

3« Colonel Carlson's Account

As Col. Gerald Carlson was then a captain in HQ Company of

the 187th, he must have gotten the story about me searching the

files secondhand and a pretty unreliable secondhand at that. If

I had waited until after the alert to form my headquarters and

robbed the 24th Division of its best personnel in the process, I

should have been relieved on the spot and reduced at least one

grade.

President Chamoun's Palace Guard

Chamoun did not fear an external as much as he did an

internal attempt on his life by members of the Palace Guard,

which was part Arab and part Christian. First the Marines, and

then we, maintained a platoon at the U.S. Ambassador's compound

to rush to the palace in event the Guard started something. It
was always questionable in my mind if we could have gotten there

in time.

5* Marine"Modus Operandi

I have abiding respect for the fighting verve of Marines, but

based on association with them in WWII, Korea, and Lebanon, they

seem to believe that there is some merit in making life less

comfortable than it needs to be. When I sought out the CP of the

Marine battalion near the airport on the first day, I found it

consisted of a radio, a map tacked to a piece of cardboard

leaning against a tree, and indications of C rations having been

cooked over an open fire.

One of their companies was disposed tactically on a

completely barren hill exposed all day to a searing sun and

100-degree heat. Another company was spread out in the sand

dunes north of the airport. In the port area, the Marines seemed

to be living amidst the dirt and debris. When we relieved them

on the hilltop, we withdrew the company to a nearby shaded area,

constructed a few covered bunkers on the hill for daytime

observation, and reinforced the hill only at night. In the sand

dune area we built two observation towers that covered the entire

area completely and again only reinforced the position at night.

At the port we set up GP tents on wooden frames and enforced the

same strict rules 'of cleanliness and sanitation that we did

throughout the command. In the current embroglio [the Marine

peacekeeping force in Lebanon] I was disappointed to read in the

Miami Herald that after one month the Marines were still on

C rations, but I was not surprised. I certainly don't believe in

coddling the troops, but their energy should be conserved for the

time when they will really need it.

6. To Bake•or Not to Bake

I was criticized for including a bakery platoon on the troop

list. In Sixth Army in the Southwest Pacific during World War II

the troops didn't have much, but General Walter Krueger insisted

that they have fresh bread whenever possible, even dropping it by

light aircraft on occasion. The policy was popular then and it

was also in Lebanon. The only drawback was that the platoon was

located close to our CP and late at night the aroma of freshly

baked bread would come wafting through the camp and make us all

very hungry.

7. Admiral'Holloway and~the JCS

One day I walked in on Admiral Holloway to find him

sputtering. He said, "Do you know what I just told the JCS? I

42
am sixty-years old, I have thirty-five years of service, I have a

physical infirmity that will allow me to retire tomorrow, and I

will do it if you don't leave me alone and let me do my job."

This is a chronic failing of high command, I am afraid. At

the time of the Dominican Republic action, the alert procedure

was from the JCS to Strike Command to XVIII Airborne Corps to 82d

Airborne Division with a parallel alert channel from DA to CONARC

to HQ, Ft. Bragg. This alert process was quite detailed and

called for specific actions at each level. So what happened?

Gen. Earle G. Wheeler^ Chairman of the JCS, called Maj. Gen.

Robert York, CG of the 82d Airborne Division, direct. He may

have saved five minutes, but he caused so much conflict in

instructions that it took hours to straighten out.

Unfortunately, I was in Puerto Rico at the time on leave. I had

served under General Wheeler in a rifle company^ in the Plans

Division of the DA, and in the JCS. If I had been in my office

at CONARC, I hope I would have called General Wheeler and said,

"For God's sake, Buzz, get back in channels." At least I would

have called him.

8'. Power • of • the Press

When the Press is divided on an issue, their influence is

diffused, but when they are united, their power is overwhelming.

I learned this in Korea. Just before Gen. James A. Van Fleet was

to return to the U.S., a lot of bad publicity developed over an

unfortunate action called "Operation SMACK." General Van Fleet

was very popular with the reporters and realizing that the bad

publicity could hurt him, they joined together not only to erase

completely the bad publicity, but to cast the operation in a

favorable light. They accomplished this in a matter of days. I

might add that General Van Fleet had nothing to do with this

action by the press.

9. You Can't Win Them All

I thought that our troops on their PT runs through the

villages and towns in our vicinity would impress the populace

with energy, discipline, and physical condition. It may have

done that^ but the word soon got back to me that the local

inhabitants didn't particularly appreciate being awakened at 0500

every morning to the sound of pounding feet and the airborne

chant. We kept running, but we did eliminate the chant.

10. Initiative

Early in the operation I made a casual remark that if the

situation remained stable we might want to establish a small

43
Officers1 Club. My assistant S-1, a Captain Holmes, and my

assistant S-4 overheard and immediately arranged to have a very

large supply of liquor sent down from the 24th Division Officers1

Club in Augsburg, mixed in with the Charlie lift. With more

serious consideration I vetoed the idea, and Captain Holmes was

stuck with a tent full of very pilferable whiskey and gentle

nudges from the 24th Division to pay for it. At this point

Holmes and the S-4 decided that they had better tell me what they

had done. Fortunately, Captain Holmes learned that the embassy's

liquor store was running short due to the port being closed, and

the whiskey was sold to the store at a considerable profit which

enabled the 24th Division to bring their club out of the red just

in time to avoid a 7th Array audit.

Lesson: Beware of casual remarks before staff officers,

especially airborne staff officers. They'll take the ball and

run with it.

11. Discipline

When we returned to Germany, General Cooper and General

Speidel remarked that what they noticed most was that the men not

only looked sharp, but when a leader gave an order the troops

jumped. General Watlington, who visited us from EUCOM, wrote,

fflt was certainly a pleasure to see what you've done with your

command. I'm glad you weren't turned loose in Germany while I

was there." When he commanded the 8th Division, it had the best

overall record in Germany, so from him this was high praise,

indeed. I attribute what was accomplished in large part to the

continuous close contact between leaders and the led. In our

headquarters, my staff lived in tents next to mine. Throughout

the command, the platoon leader's pup tent was at one end of the

line, the platoon sergeant's at the other. Whatever the reasons

for doing it, modern barracks with small rooms have lost to the

Army this very valuable disciplinary tool available when troops

live together as a tactical unit. For this reason commanders

should periodically conduct individual and unit training from

tent camps pitched in the field. This one action alone would do

more for cohesion than the fancy theories now being advanced on

this important subject.

12. Khaki Clothing

For reasons of simplicity, clothing items in the

 f'Bff bag were

all combat type with no dress uniforms. General Adams coaxed

General Hodes, at considerable expense to USAREUR, into sending

two sets of the tropical khaki uniform for each soldier for wear

on pass in Beirut. This apparently stuck in General Hodes' craw,

because when he attended a TF 201 parade at Augsburg he spent
more time on the reviewing stand scolding me about the khaki

uniforms than he did reviewing the troops. Perhaps we were

wrong, but then if we had stayed through the winter, we should

have brought winter gear, too. My view is that the "Bff bag

should be kept light and additional items furnished through

supply channels as the situation dictates.

13. Mountain Training

As one phase of our training program I asked that a course in

mountain training be set up. What I had in mind was training for

mountain fighting of the kind experienced in Italy and Korea,

where a regiment sometimes advanced on a one-squad front. What I

got was plain old Ranger training with a dash of Recondo thrown

in. There was rappelling, hand-to-hand combat, the death slide,

the works. The training was set up among some palisades that

rose from the beach along the ocean road into Beirut. The

soldiers liked it. It was very well conducted and the general

populace who could watch it from the road above seemed to enjoy

it most of all, so I didn't interfere. I erred in assuming that

the term "mountain training" was generally understood, but I have

always been disturbed by the tendency to substitute training in

ancillary, more exotic skills that have only occasional

application in large-scale intense combat for the much more basic

and tougher everyday skills of the combat soldier.

Squad Tactics

The first time we tried to practice squad tactics, the

soldiers, to our surprise, ended up with torn shirts and trousers

and blood all over the place. Upon investigating we found that

the terrain was covered with a small thorny bush that punished

anyone who fell upon it. Consequently, we instructed the

soldiers to not flop down as they would normally when they

rushed, but to crouch down behind the outcroppings of rock, which

were just as numerous as the thorn bushes.

I believe more emphasis should be placed on studying tactical

techniques that may be required under varying circumstances. In

Lebanon we had flat terrain with high straw grass, rocky, hilly

terrain with the thorns, high mountains and desert, yet in our

planning we gave no consideration to the effect these conditions

might have on the tactics employed.

Our airborne training in Lebanon is a case in point. When we

initiated jump training we did so in the large sand dune area

that extended from the airfield north toward Beirut. From the

air and from casual observation from the ground, the area

appeared to be quite flat. Much to our surprise upon landing, we
found that it was not flat at all, but a series of undulations

that formed a pattern of fairly small swales and depressions

often twenty to thirty feet deep. I had issued a reminder for

everyone to follow standard procedure and run from the drop zone,

an order I was soon to regret. The sand was extremely loose,

providing little tractionj the temperature was in the nineties,

and by the time I floundered from one depression to another to

reach the assembly area^ I was as close as I ever want to be to

complete exhaustion, even though I had thought I was in fairly

good physical condition. Stretched out on the ground gasping for

breath and with my blood pounding, I jokingly told my aide that

if I didn't make it, he was to tell my executive officer, a

Lieutenant Colonel Knox, that my dying wish was for him to

rescind that stupid order. What we actually did was to modify

the instructions to run only when skylined on a crest, when in

the depressions, one was in complete defilade from all

directions. We also learned that had we actually jumped

tactically into that same area according to our plan, we would

have had one devil of a time getting our vehicles and supplies

off the drop zone, as only tracked vehicles would have been able

to negotiate that sand* Had we known this we could have included

in TF Alpha several of our light air-droppable bulldozers from

our engineer company«

In World War II, the 7th Division was completely unprepared

for the tundra it encountered on Attica, and the Alaskan troops

had to bail them out. Also, our troops sat on their rear ends

for months in England, and no one thought beforehand to devise

special tactics for the bo-age country in France.

I have never understood why at Army HQ level there should be

a Tank Section, an Artillery Section, and Engineer Section, but

no Infantry Section. When I was the Operations Officer of the

G-3 Section, Eighth Army, during the Korean War, I created an

Infantry Branch within my Operations Section, and it proved

extremely useful.

15. The Red Cross

Some enterprising staff officer had the foresight to include

in TF Charlie a Red Cross Detachment complete with a large amount

of expendable supplies. This was a godsend. Until we could get

a PX supply line set up, this was our only source for convenience

items, toilet articles, stationery, etc. The Red Cross

representative was literally a one-man gang and worked his tail

off. No self-respecting contingency operation should be without

one early on.

46
16. Local Enterprise

In a matter of days, almost spontaneously it seemed, a small

group of tradesmen set up shop on the fringe of each unit area.

Usually there would be a barber, a shoe shine boy, a family

collecting laundry and repairing clothing, and someone collecting

films to be processed, selling stationery, etc. These people

were polite, friendly, and scrupulously honest. Outside our CP

area, the service included a booth where orders for merchandise

from a Beirut department store could be ordered using

catalogues. As a matter of control, we decided to issue permits

to all these entrepreneurs, as we did with all the local people

we hired. To discourage proliferation, we decided to charge a

fee for these permits, but we could only do this if we had a

properly established unit fund, and all unit funds were supposed

to have been turned in before we left Germany. As luck would

have it, one unit, Troop C, 17th Cavalry, had failed to do so.

After we started issuing permits, these tradespeople showed me

noticeably more deference. They figured I was now getting my

cut, which is an ancient and honorable custom in the Middle

East. The money was used to buy various items for the soldiers

not available through Army supply channels. Specifically, I

recall books on the history of Lebanon for I & E classes,

horseshoes for a competition, and a bass fiddle for our hillbilly

band.

17. Special Services

After the dust settled a little, one of our main concerns was

to maintain high morale and prevent the soldiers from getting

bored, because that is when they start looking for some kind of

trouble to get into. To prevent this we organized an extensive

extracurricular program. Classes were given in the history and

culture of Lebanon. A group of Christian monks volunteered to

assist in the program, and they turned .out to be quite popular

with the troops. Athletics, geared to our dispersed situation,

were set up—mainly horseshoes and volley ball. A swimming beach

was established on the ocean, and arrangements made for use of a

privately run beach as well. A Softball diamond was set up near

our CP and games scheduled between our units and the crews of

Navy ships. After the game the sailors ate with our troops and

later our men visited the Navy ships.

I mentioned at a Commanders' meeting that I would like to

organize a country music band and a barber shop quartet. An hour

or so later, the Tank Battalion Commander told me there was no

need to organize a band, as he had one, and rather sheepishly

admitted that its members had smuggled aboard ship all the

instruments except a bass fiddle. These two groups visited units

each evening for impromptu concerts and sing alongs.
In addition General Adams set up an afternoon pass program

and also a two-day stay at a hotel free of charge. He also

arranged a joint Army-Marine exercise near Byblos, after which

the troops were given a guided tour through this ancient city.

In September a Soldier Skills Competition, involving both

soldiers and Marines, was held in the sports stadium. This

generated intense competition, not only in the finals but in the

preliminary eliminations as well.

18. The American Colony

Of extensive assistance to us in the program just described

were Americans residing in Lebanon. How this all got started I'm

not entirely sure. From the beginning they seemed to take an

interest in our activities and began inviting us to meetings and

gatherings of various kinds. Although time consuming, I attended

these and took every opportunity to explain our mission and how

we were carrying it out. We invited them to visit our camps and

to attend some of our activities, such as a nighttime fire power

demonstration given for the Lebanese Army and a rifle company

parachute jump. In turn, the resident Americans reciprocated in

every way they could.

An official of the Top Line Oil Company established a Service

Club in Top Line's own Community Center in Beirut. It was

staffed by women volunteers, mainly wives, embassy secretaries

and high school students; it offered snacks, music, entertainment

of some kind, and a place to just relax, talk, write letters,

play cards, etc. The club succeeded beyond highest expectations.

Some of the women also asked if they could bake cakes and

cookies and distribute them to the soldiers in their bivouacs and

on position. I called them our "cooky pushers" and often lifted

them by chopper to the less accessible positions.

On one occasion I mentioned to an oil company executive that

my biggest logistic problem at the moment was getting horseshoes

for our competition. He offered to have them bought in New York

and flown out to us on a company plane due back in a few days.

We got the shoes in due course, but the story doesn't end there.

Several days later on a visit to the Service Club, a young lady

confronted me with the startling statement, "I've got a bone to

pick with you." As a secretary at the Top Line Oil Company, she

was one of two who were authorized to decode confidential

messages. One night she was called at 0200 and told to come to

the office to decode a message. Not too happy about that, she

was less happy when she read the message: "General Gray's

horseshoes arriving Beirut on Flight 416." Her first thought was

to call me and get me up, too, but after cooling down a bit she

decided to ask me in person, "What in heaven's name do you want

with horseshoes?" As I was explaining it to her, the recreation

48
director for the oil company overheard me and said, "I wish I had

known you wanted them. I have a warehouse full of horseshoe

pitching kits." It seems someone got the bright idea of

distributing these kits at pipeline stations in the desert. It

was a complete bust. The only horseshoes the Arabs were

interested in were those on a horse.

At another time I mentioned our need for a bass fiddle. The

news traveled fast. The next morning I got a call from a lady

who said, "I understand you need a cello. I'll ask around in

musical circles and get back to you." A few hours later she had

not only located a cello but had persuaded the owner to open his

store, which he had closed when the trouble started. To be sure,

it was rather old and with the hard usage it got, kept falling

apart and had to be glued back together. But it served its

purpose very well.

To show appreciation before our departure, General Adams had

a reception for the members of the American community who had

helped us and awarded each a Certificate of Appreciation. We

also presented 24th Airborne Brigade certificates to those who

had been of particular assistance to us*

19. The 201st Logistical Command

A pleasant surprise was the functioning of the 201st

Logistical Command. It was, like our headquarters, an ad hoc

organization^ yet, despite a tragic bus accident in France, it

joined us in part at Adana, landed with us in Lebanon at a dead

run, and never stopped running thereafter. As is true in every

organization, the speed with which it settled into its job was

due in large part to its commander, Col. Adam Meetze, who

performed every aspect of his job in an absolutely outstanding

manner.

Some critics, including Hansen Baldwin of the New York Times,

believed that our logistical tail ,was too large. Overlooked was

the fact that it takes an irreducible number of units by type to

provide all the logistics functions for even a minimum combat

force. Also overlooked was the very substantial support the Army

provided the Marines and to some extent the Navy. I believe we

did err in one respect. Instead of a construction battalion we

should have had a provisional company specially tailored to meet

our specific needs. Truthfully, I was flabbergasted as I watched

the parade of heavy equipment, rock crushers, steamrollers,

asphalt dispensers, cranes, you name it, that rolled off ship in

a seemingly endless stream. Under the circumstances we didn't

need it and had difficulty finding a place to park it. Of

course, if we had stayed through the rainy season, more permanent

installations would have been necessary and the construction

battalion would have gotten a workout, but even so I believe our

49
engineer combat battalion plus a provisional construction company

and our airborne engineer company augmented by local labor would

have been adequate. As an amphibious planner in WW II, I knew

that a construction battalion was one big outfit, that it took

sixteen LST's to move it, and I should have put this knowledge to

usee That I didn't was my mistake.

I must say that I am surprised that USAREUR did not question

the deployment as there were only a few of 'these battalions in

Europe and an overabundance of projects assigned to them.

50
GLOSSARY

AF:

AG:

AMLANFOR:

APC:

AWOL:

BOQ:

CALSU:

CASF:

CINCLANT:

CINCNELM:

CINCSPECOMME:

CINCUSAFE:

COMAIHSPECOMME:

COMAMLANFOR:

COMNAVSPECOMME:

CONUS:

CONARC:

C/S:

CIA:

CG:

COMMZ:

CP:

CPX:

DA:

DACG:

DCSOPS:

DR:

DZ:

E-DAY:

EUCOM:

G.O.:

HQ:

JCS:

MATS:

MSTS:

NATO:

NCO:

NELM:

PIO:

PR:

PT:

QM:

ROCID

ROTAD:

SETAF:

Air Force

Adjutant'General

American Land Forces

Armored Personnel Carrier

Absent Without Leave

Bachelor Officers1 Quarters

Combat Airlift Support Unit

Composite Air Strike Force

Comraander-in-Chief, Atlantic

Commander-in-Chief, Naval Element, Mediterranean

Commander-in-Chief, Specified Command, Middle

East

Commander-in-Chief, United States Air Force

Europe

Commander, U.S. Air Forces, Specified Command,

Middle East

Commander, American Land Forces

Commander, Naval Forces, Specified Command,

Middle East

Continental United States

Continental Army Command

Chief of Staff

Central Intelligence Agency

Commanding General

Communications Zone

Command Post

Command Post Exercise

Department of the Army

Departure Airfield Control Group

Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations

Delinquent Report

Drop Zone

The day on which plans become orders

European Command

General Order

Headquarters

Joint Chiefs of Staff

Military Air Transportation Service

Military Sea Transportation Service

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Noncommissioned Officer

Naval Element Mediterranean

Public Information Officer

Personal Reconnaissance

Physical Training

Quartermaster

Reorganization of Current Infantry Divisions

Reorganization of the Airborne Division

Southern European Task Force

51
SPECOMME: Specified Command, Middle East

S.O.: Special Order

STRAC: Strategic Army Corps

SAC: Strategic Air Command

TF: Task Force

TOC: Tactical Operations Center

USAREUHs United States Army Europe

USIA: United States Information Agency

52

86-1503-1500-17 Feb 86
-ABOUT THE AUTHORDavid Warren Gray was born in Evansville, Indiana, on 1 March 1911. After serving in the

CMTC, the National Guard, and the ROTC at Purdue University he received an appointment from

Indiana to the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, graduating in 1933. His early Army service

included attending the Regular Course of the Infantry School in 1937 and the Regular Course of

the Tank School in 1938. From 1938 to 1942 he was an instructor in the Department of Drawing

at West Point From 1942 to January, 1944, he served in the Officers' Assignments Branch, G-l

Section of the Army Ground Forces Headquarters in Washington, D.C. He attended the abbreviated

General Staff Course at the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth from January

through May, 1944, and the Army and Navy Staff College in Washington from May through September,

1944.

Gray's next posting was to the Southwest Pacific as Executive Officer of the G-3 Section of 6th

Army Headquarters from 1944 to 1946. He served in New Guinea, the Philippines, and Japan and

received the Bronze Star for that service. He continued his tour in Japan through early May of

1947 with the 24th Infantry Division and 8th Army Headquarters. From 1947 to 1951 he was

Associate Professor in the Department of Military Topography and Graphics at West Point; he

attended the Army War College in 1951-52.

Gray served as Operations Officer, Headquarters 8th Army; Commanding Officer, 27th Infantry

Regiment, 25th Division; and then as G-3, Headquarters, X Corps, during and after the Korean War

and received the Silver Star and two Legion of Merit awards. During the latter half of the 1950s

he was Chief of Operations, Department of the Army, Assistant Division Commander, llth Airborne

Division, and Commanding General of the 24th Airborne Brigade during the 1958 intervention

in Lebanon. For his service in Lebanon, he received his third Legion of Merit From 1960 to 1963

General Gray served with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He returned to Korea in 1963 for a two-year

tour as Commanding General of the 7th Infantry Division. In 1964 he was assigned to Headquarters,

Continental Army Command, eventually serving as Chief of Staff and Deputy Commanding General

and earning the Distinguished Service Medal. Major General Gray retired in 1968 and now resides

in Golden Beach, Florida,