Regionalism, 

Security & 

Cooperation in 

Oceania

Edited by Rouben Azizian and Carleton Cramer
Regionalism, Security & Cooperation in Oceania

Edited by Rouben Azizian and Carleton Cramer

First published June 2015 

Published by

the Daniel K. Inouye 

Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies

2058 Maluhia Road

Honolulu, HI 96815

www.apcss.org

For reprint permissions, contact the editors via: pao@apcss.org

ISBN 978-0-9719416-7-0

Printed in the United States of America.

Vanuatu Harbor Photo used with permission ©GlennCraig

Group photo by: Philippe Metois

Maps used with permission from:

Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)

Center for Pacific Island Studies (CPIS)

University of Hawai’i at Manoa
This book is dedicated to the people of Vanuatu 

who are recovering from the devastating impact of Cyclone Pam, 

which struck the country on March 13, 2015.
2 Regionalism, Security & Cooperation in Oceania 

Acknowledgments and Disclaimers.............................................. 4

List of Abbreviations and Glossary............................................... 6

Introduction: Regionalism, Security and Cooperation in Oceania

Rouben Azizian.............................................................................. 9

1

	 	 Regional Security Architecture in the Pacific

 Islands Region: Rummaging through the Blueprints

 R.A. Herr.......................................................................... 17

2

 Regional Security Environment and Architecture in

		 the Pacific Islands Region

 Michael Powles................................................................ 32

3

 China’s Role in the Pacific Islands Region

 Jian Zhang ....................................................................... 43

4

 Still Missing in the Rebalance? The United States and 

		 the Pacific Island Countries

 Eric Y. Shibuya................................................................. 57

5

		 Australia and Security in the Pacific Islands Region

 Jenny Hayward-Jones...................................................... 67

6

 Finding Common Ground: New Zealand and Regional 

		 Security Cooperation in the Pacific

 Anna Powles.................................................................... 79

Table of Contents
 Table of Contents 3

7

 Indonesian Diplomatic Maneuvering in Melanesia: 

 Challenges and Opportunities

 Jim Elmslie ...................................................................... 96

8 Acting West, Looking East: Timor-Leste’s Growing 	 	 Engagement with the Pacific Islands Region

 Jose Kai Lekke Sousa-Santos ........................................ 110

9

 Communities of Interest and Communities of Practice: 

 The Role of Norms, Values and Principles in Training 

 for Peace Operations

 Russel Parkin................................................................. 122

10	 Managing Maritime Resources in the Pacific—With a Focuson Tongan EEZ Management

Yoichiro Sato.................................................................. 135

11 Climate Change Challenges to Security in the PacificIslands Region and Opportunities for Cooperation to 

Manage the Threat

J. Scott Hauger.............................................................. 147

Conclusion: Regional Security Architecture in Oceania: Quo Vadis? 

Carleton Cramer....................................................................... 161

Notes on Contributors............................................................... 166
4 Regionalism, Security & Cooperation in Oceania 

 The publication of this volume has been possible due to significant contributions of many whose names do not necessarily appear in the Notes on 

Contributors. The idea of the book was formulated and formalized at the 

workshop on Regional Security Architecture in Oceania held in Port Vila, 

Vanuatu, on Aug. 4-8, 2014. The event was co-hosted by the Honolulu-based 

Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS) and Port Vila-based 

Pacific Institute of Public Policy (PiPP), as well as supported by the United 

States Pacific Command (USPACOM) and Melanesian Spearhead Group 

(MSG) secretariat, headquartered in Port Vila. We are grateful to the leadership of these organizations and specifically to Dan Leaf, James Hirai, Derek 

Brien, Ben Bohane, Peter Forau and Molean Kilepak. Workshop participants were inspired by opening remarks from Vanuatu Prime Minister Joe 

Natuman and U.S. Ambassador Walter E. North. 

The Port Vila event gathered 48 senior attendees from 21 nations and territories, key regional and international organizations, and leading academic 

and non-governmental organizations from across the Pacific Islands region. 

Among the nations and territories represented were Australia, China, the 

Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Guam, Indonesia, Japan, Kiribati, Nauru, New Zealand, New Caledonia, Niue, Papua New Guinea, the Republic of 

the Marshall Islands, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Taiwan, Tonga, Tuvalu, the 

United States, and Vanuatu. Also represented were three pivotal regional organizations (the Pacific Islands Forum, Secretariat of the Pacific Community, 

and MSG), the United Nations Development Programme Regional Pacific 

Center, and FemLINKPACIFIC, a regional non-governmental organization 

addressing work related to UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security. Workshop discussions and interactions provided a 

 Acknowledgments and Disclaimers
 Acknowledgments 5

wealth of regional knowledge and experience that is reflected in this book’s 

chapters. We are very grateful to all workshop participants for their candid 

and constructive assessments and suggestions. 

Our thanks also go to the APCSS, PiPP, MSG and U.S. Embassy staff 

whose tireless efforts made the workshop a great success and thus significantly contributed to the development of ideas for the book. They are Cherrielynn Kamahele, Raelyn Brett, Scott Hauger, Mary Markovinovic, Alfred 

Oehlers, Lenore Patton, Nathan Springer, Thomas Peterman, Dulciana Somare-Brash, Frida Bani-Sam, Barbara Age, Joeli Pickering, Andre Rivier, 

Scott Sherard and Paul Strauss. 

We are thankful to Vanuatu photographer Philippe Metois for taking the 

workshop group photo, and to Debra Castro from APCSS for the book cover 

illustration. We thank Aneta Pachedzhieva, an APCSS intern, for developing the list of abbreviations and the glossary, and ensuring the accuracy and 

accessibility of references and Web links.

Most importantly, on behalf of all authors, we would like to thank our 

copy editor, Jesse Hall, from APCSS for his very thoughtful comments and 

highly professional editing. 

Finally, we would like to end with a disclaimer that the opinions expressed 

in this book are those of the authors and do not represent the official policies 

or positions of their organizations and governments.

 Rouben Azizian and Carleton Cramer 

 

 
6 Regionalism, Security & Cooperation in Oceania 

Abbreviations and Glossary

AAPTC- Association of Asia-Pacific Peace Operations Training Centres

ACFID- Australian Council for International Development

ACMC- Australian Civil Military Centre

ADF-POTC- Australian Defence Force Peace Operations Training Centre

AFP- Australian Federal Police

AFPIDG- Australian Federal Police International Deployment Group

ANZAC- Australian and New Zealand Army Corps

ANZUS- Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty

ARF- ASEAN Regional Forum

ASEAN- Association of Southeast Asian Nations

AUD- Australian Dollar

CAVR- Comissão de Acolhimento, Verdade e Reconciliação 

 (Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation)

CHOGM- Commonwealth Meeting of Heads of Government

CoESPU -European Union’s Centre of Excellence for Stability Policing Units

COM - Congress of Micronesia

COPs- Conferences of the Parties

CPLP- Comunidade dos Países de Língua Portuguesa (Community of Portuguese 

Language Countries)

CROP- Council of Regional Organizations of the Pacific

DCP- Defense Capability Plan

DMRR- Defense Midpoint Rebalancing Review

DPKO- Department of Peacekeeping Operations

DWP- Defense White Paper

EEZ- Exclusive Economic Zone

FFA- Pacific Islands Forum Fishery Agency

F-FDTL- Falintil-Forças de Defesa de Timor Leste (Timor-Leste Defence Force)

FLNKS- Front de Libération Nationale Kanak et Socialiste (The Kanak and Socialist National Liberation Front) 

FMM- Foreign Ministers Mission

FRANZ- France, Australia and New Zealand agreement

FRSC- Forum Regional Security Committee

FRWP- Federal Republic of West Papua

FSM- Federated States of Micronesia

GK- GARUDA/KOOKABURRA Exercise

GCCA - Global Climate Change Alliance
 Abbreviations and Glossary 7

HA/DR- Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief

IAPTC- International Association of Peace Training Centres

iCLIM- Pacific Climate Change Information Management Project

IDG- International Deployment Group

IPCC- Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change

ISA- International Seabed Authority

KNPB- Komite Nasional Papua Barat (National Committee for West Papua)

LDC- Least Developed Countries

MAP- Mutual Assistance Programme

MAT-Mobile Assistance Team

MSG- Melanesian Spearhead Group

NAP- National Action Plan

NAPAs- National Adaptation Plans of Action

NOAA- National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration

NZ- New Zealand

OECD- Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development

PaCIS -Pacific Climate Information System

PACOM- U.S. Pacific Command

PET- Policy Evaluation and Training

PICs- Pacific Island Countries

PICT- Pacific Island Countries and Territories

PIDF- Pacific Islands Development Forum

PIF- Pacific Islands Forum

PIFS- Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat

PIPA- Pacific Islands Producers Association

PI-POTC -Pacific Islands Peace Operations Training Centre

PIR- Pacific Islands Region

PIRCA- Pacific Islands Regional Climate Assessment

PJ- PIRAP/JABIRU Exercise

PLA Navy- People’s Liberation Army Navy

PMG- Peace Monitoring Group

PNA- Parties to the Nauru Agreement

PNG- Papua New Guinea

PNGDF- Papua New Guinea Defense Force

PNGLNG- Papua New Guinea Liquefied Natural Gas Project

POS- Peace Operations Seminar

PPBP- Pacific Patrol Boat Program

PRAN- Pacific Regional Assistance to Nauru

PRC-People’s Republic of China

RAMSI- Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands

RSIP- Royal Solomon Islands Police

RSIPF- Royal Solomon Islands Police Force
8 Regionalism, Security & Cooperation in Oceania 

SBY- Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono

SIDS- Small Island Developing States

SPC- South Pacific Community

SPC/SOPAC- Secretariat of the Pacific Community

SPEC- South Pacific Bureau for Economic Cooperation

SPOCC- South Pacific Organizations Coordinating Committee

SPREP- Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment Programme

SRO- Single Regional Organization

TDS- Tongan Defense Services

TTPI- Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands

UDT- União Democrática Timorense (Timorese Democratic Union)

UNAMET- United Nations Mission in East Timor

UNAMIR- United Nations Mission in Rwanda

UNCLOS- United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea

UNDOF- United Nations Disengagement Observer Force

UNDP- United Nations Development Programme 

UNESCO- United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

UNFCCC- United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

UNTAG- United Nations Transition Assistance Group

UN-United Nations

VMF- Vanuatu Mobile Force

VMS- Vessel Monitoring System

WCPTFC- Western and Central Pacific Tuna Fisheries Commission

WPNCL -West Papua National Coalition for Liberation

WPS- Women, Peace and Security
9

Introduction: 

Regionalism, Security & Cooperation in Oceania

Rouben Azizian

If the three terms regionalism, security and cooperation from the title of 

the book were to be combined together, the title could translate into a more 

benign regional security cooperation or even a more reassuring regional security architecture. In fact, the aspirational title and focus of the APCSS workshop in Vanuatu in August 2014 was Regional Security Architecture. Realities on the ground, findings from the workshop, and this book’s chapters, 

however, require caution and patience in heralding significant success in 

regional security cooperation or development of a viable regional security 

architecture. The Pacific Islands region, or Oceania, (the two terms will be 

used in the volume interchangeably at the risk of raising questions from 

geographic “purists” in the regional scholarly community), remains torn 

between various visions of regionalism, and unreconciled between notions 

of security and development. It also remains underwhelmed by piecemeal 

and reactive response and cooperation on security as well as challenged and 

somewhat unprepared to deal with entry onto the regional security arena of 

new and powerful players. 

In Chapter One, Richard Herr summarizes specific challenges in the development of a regional security architecture. States supporting a regionalism from outside the region emphasize traditional state security issues, 

while those on the inside stress development-related, human security concerns. As independence has progressed across the region, and the agenda of 

non-traditional security concerns expanded to include resource protection, 

environmental protection and climate change, the separation between the 

relative interests in the two approaches to security became increasingly evident. Most island states do not have the domestic security infrastructure to 
10 Regionalism, Security & Cooperation in Oceania 

effectively engage regionally with standard state security arrangements used 

by the traditional extra-regional sponsors of the Pacific Islands’ regional system. Consequently, continues Richard Herr, bridging the two approaches 

to security has proved challenging at many levels — not least at the regional 

level where institutional renovation has come under serious pressure to find 

mutually accommodating answers. The regional system is not self-funded, 

and its dependence on extra-regional funding is another important driver 

for architectural reform. Finally, re-engagement with Fiji after the country’s 

democratic elections in September 2014, and given its central contribution 

to the regional system, constitutes the major contemporary challenge for 

architectural reform. 

The most significant aspect of today’s regional security environment in 

the Pacific Islands region, according to Michael Powles (Chapter Two), is the 

rise of China as a major power. His essay looks at China’s ambition to resume 

what it sees as its rightful place as not only the predominant Asia-Pacific regional power, but also a major global power—as the driving force behind 

changes in the Pacific Islands security environment. For small powers in 

the Oceania region, security nervousness will rise or fall depending on two 

factors: first, the extent to which China demonstrates in its dealings with 

other states a respect for international law and the established international 

order; secondly, the extent to which the West, the United States in particular, 

is prepared to share power and give China the geopolitical space it seeks. 

Michael Powles notes that today, there is more Chinese activity in terms of 

movement of people, trade and cultural exchanges in the Pacific region than 

ever before. It raises a legitimate question of whether China might have 

additional objectives beyond its resumption of great power status; objectives 

which could impact specifically on the region’s strategic environment. 

Jian Zhang expounds in Chapter Three on China’s intentions and role in the 

region by suggesting that Chinese regional interests are diverse, wide-ranging and expanding over time. Its objectives include enduring political and 
 Introduction - Azizian 11

diplomatic interests, expanding economic and trade considerations, and 

managing new and growing security concerns and needs. Beijing’s diverse 

interests do not mean it has a clearly-thought, well-coordinated grand regional strategy. Instead, many of its activities have appeared spontaneous 

and lacking coordination, with some even undercutting the effectiveness of 

others. Jian Zhang offers an interesting observation that China is actually 

trading more with Island countries with which it has no formal diplomatic 

ties than with the Oceania countries with which it has formal relations. This 

suggests economic interests, more than political considerations, drive China’s engagement with the region. He argues that China’s growing regional 

presence is a new reality that needs to be accommodated, not resisted. Resisting Chinese influence will only lead to a zero-sum strategic competition 

that could divide the region. Accommodating China’s role, however, requires greater understanding of Chinese interests and views. 

Eric Shibuya agrees in Chapter Four that shifts in great power politics, 

most notably, the rise of China, require the United States, to consider many 

other actors and not take them for granted, while considering the secondand third-order effects of its policies. He believes that the United States’ 

general goodwill and political capital in the region is not endless, nor is it 

unchallenged; and it would do well to consider how to reinvigorate its profile in the region, particularly with Pacific Island nations. The U.S. rebalance 

to the Asia-Pacific announcement was a welcome one, but its substance has 

left much to be desired for many in the region. While there has been a 

host of diplomatic and economic initiatives — such as high level U.S. participation at the Pacific Islands Post-Forum dialogue and the Trans-Pacific 

Partnership — there has clearly been a gap between rhetoric and reality. 

For the Pacific Islands, however, there are significant obstacles to expanding 

cooperation. While many countries in the Asia-Pacific have concerns over 

erosions of sovereignty in cooperating with the U.S., the Islands must also 

consider issues of scale. For many island states, there is simply not enough 

personnel to meet official reporting and coordination requirements that the 
12 Regionalism, Security & Cooperation in Oceania 

U.S. and other international donors often place upon them. Eric Shibuya 

concludes that creative solutions — finding different ways to do the same 

things — is critical to improving cooperation. Ultimately, greater U.S. cooperation with Pacific Island nations may not be an issue of more, but rather 

better engagement.

The United States, while it retains primacy in the Asia-Pacific region as 

a whole, looks to Australia, according to Jenny Hayward-Jones in Chapter 

Five, to take the lead on regional security for the South West Pacific, while 

it retains direct responsibility in the North Pacific. New Zealand provides 

for the security of the Cook Islands, Niue and Tokelau, while France guarantees the security of the French Pacific, with defense forces based in New 

Caledonia and French Polynesia. Australia may not always be the Pacific 

Islands region’s most influential player from an economic perspective, but 

it is the Pacific Islands region’s “indispensable” power from a security perspective. Jenny Hayward-Jones notes that Australia, like other dominant 

players in their own regions, will always be both damned and praised for 

its various actions.  It has led important security interventions, including 

helping restore and build peace in Bougainville and restoring law and order 

in the Solomon Islands. But it has not done as well as it could in responding 

to climate change concerns. Australia has much work to do in understanding security from a Pacific Island viewpoint; it remains, however, the power 

most able and most likely to guarantee regional security in the interests of 

the Pacific Islands people.

Anna Powels points out in Chapter Six that colonial history, current constitutional obligations, and the role of development donor to the region, 

places New Zealand with Australia alongside the regional periphery powers of France, United Kingdom, and the United States. Geography, culture 

and historical linkages serve to situate New Zealand in the region and on 

its periphery. In recognition of the region’s shifting strategic environment, 

New Zealand is increasingly playing a critical role as a conduit, or bridge, 
 Introduction - Azizian 13

between periphery powers, the non-traditional powers seeking an increased 

role in the region, and the Pacific Islands themselves. New Zealand’s engagement with China on a water infrastructure development project in the 

Cook Islands is an example of how New Zealand has effectively harnessed 

China’s strategic interests in the Pacific with the development needs of a Pacific Island country. This type of bilateral partnership is viewed as a discreet 

benchmark for development practice in the region. However, New Zealand 

cannot take its relationship with Pacific Island states — and the goodwill 

shown to it — for granted. Anna Powles echoes Eric Shibuya’s warning to 

the United States by concluding that New Zealand too, if it is to retain its 

influence in the region in the face of competing states, must re-engage with 

the region in a far more meaningful manner. 

Indonesia has recently become one such competing state that has dramatically increased its presence in Oceania. The growth of Indonesia’s regional 

visibility can be attributed to several factors, to include its economic rise 

and successful democratic transition, but also its domestic concerns abound 

West Papua. James Elmslie in Chapter Seven provides a detailed analysis 

of Indonesia’s maneuvering in Melanesia. He notes that adding Indonesia 

into the diplomatic mix may strengthen Pacific Island nations’ bargaining 

positions in their negotiations with Australia, New Zealand and other donor nations over a range of issues, such as access to visas, design and focus 

of aid programs, implementation of land registration, and general levels of 

assistance. Indonesia could act as a bridge for Pacific and Indian Ocean 

states. But Indonesia’s support, it seems, comes at a price. James Elmslie believes that Melanesian countries’ support for the self-determination of West 

Papuans in Indonesia has waned as their financial and strategic relationships with Indonesia has grown. However, with the recent election of Joko 

Widodo to the Indonesian presidency, a window of opportunity may have 

opened, both for relations between Indonesia and the Melanesian countries, 

and for the fortunes of the West Papua people – two closely linked issues. 
14 Regionalism, Security & Cooperation in Oceania 

No other country can help the Pacific Islands in understanding the challenges and opportunities of dealing with Indonesia better than perhaps 

Timor-Leste. According to Jose Sousa Santos in Chapter Eight, Timor-Leste 

is increasingly interested in interacting with countries of Oceania. He writes 

that the nation has a focused and proactive foreign policy driven by a form 

of “comprehensive and collective engagement” that seeks the path of many 

small nations: peaceful dialogue and collective action. This approach accurately reflects its geostrategic position at the juncture of Southeast Asia 

and the Pacific Islands, and embodies, first, a pragmatic understanding of 

the need for political reconciliation with Indonesia, the former occupying 

power, and secondly, an affinity with the island’s development challenges, 

which mirrors those of its Pacific neighbors. Much of the eastern half of 

Timor-Leste is ethnically Melanesian and Polynesian, and this has led to 

discussion as to whether Timor-Leste should identify as a nation with the 

Pacific Islands as opposed to Southeast Asia. Timor-Leste has a nascent 

special force capabilities, growing UN peacekeeping experience, and large, 

and well-trained and equipped policing and paramilitary units. Given this, 

and in light of the Melanesian Spearhead Group’s (MSG) proposed initiative 

to develop a regional peacekeeping capability, it would be advantageous in 

Jose Santos’ opinion, to engage Timor-Leste in strengthening the regional 

security apparatus. The addition of Timor-Leste to an MSG regional peacekeeping force would establish a triumvirate of states — Papua New Guinea, 

Fiji and Timor-Leste — with experienced and growing defense forces. 

The challenges and opportunities of peacekeeping in the region are discussed by Russell Parkin in Chapter Nine. Referring to the ambition to 

establish “a regional facility (for) training civilian police for international 

peacekeeping” proposed by the 2013 Review of the Pacific Plan, he argues 

for the establishment of a Pacific Islands Peace Operations Training Centre 

(PI-POTC). In Russell Parkin’s opinion, such an institution would be more 

than just an important venue for educating and training regional security 

forces, both police and military. The norms and values that such an insti-
 Introduction - Azizian 15

tution would diffuse throughout regional security forces would be powerful 

mechanisms for greater integration and cooperation in the Pacific. Educating security forces in a range of internationally recognized behaviors, protocols and skills would also significantly enhance their professionalism and 

contribute to the region’s capacity to deal with its own security problems. 

The training center would create an environment where the existing level of 

peacekeeping expertise residing in regional military and police forces could 

interface with the international peacekeeping community. These interactions could produce regional approaches to peace-building, peace-making 

and peacekeeping that reflect the Pacific’s unique cultural milieu, while still 

conforming to accepted international norms.

The next two chapters of the book address perhaps the most dramatic security challenges of the region: resources and environment. For 

Pacific Island nations, the sea is an essential source of traditional living, 

notes Yoichiro Sato in Chapter Ten. Large-scale commercial fishing of tuna 

species by long-distance fishing states has presented a rising level of threat 

to fish stocks on which local lives depend. Expanding the definition of 

coastal states’ rights over the sea by international law has not been accompanied by corresponding growth in island states’ capacity to protect their 

rights through maritime law enforcement. Furthermore, regional fishing 

management organizations have barely slowed the long-term decline of key 

tuna species. Additionally, improvements in science and engineering have 

made seabed resources more accessible for mining, and Pacific Island states 

have literally become the new Wild West, where a sense of lawlessness provides fraudsters opportunities for exploitation. Yoichiro Sato’s chapter looks 

closely at Tonga’s ocean resource issues in order to illustrate the serious implications of weak governance on effectively managing its maritime wealth. 

By virtue of their shared geographic characteristics, writes Scott Hauger in 

Chapter Eleven, the Pacific Islands have an overlapping set of shared vulnerabilities to the environmental impacts of climate change. They are exposed 
16 Regionalism, Security & Cooperation in Oceania 

to tropical storms and rising sea levels in ways that continental states are 

not. Major climate-related security concerns for the Pacific Islands include: 

access to fresh water (due to changes in rainfall patterns and salt water intrusion); local food supply (damage to coral reefs, declining fisheries, and impacts on agriculture); and infrastructure damage (through rising sea levels, 

other flooding, and storm damage). Potential second-order consequences 

include economic loss from these events, declining revenues from tourism, 

and emigration to escape the situation — especially from atoll islands subject to inundation from sea level rise. For some Island nations consisting entirely of low-lying atolls, including Kiribati, Tuvalu and the Marshall Islands, 

rising sea levels comprise an existential threat. Scott Hauger predicts that 

climate change will present a growing challenge to Pacific Islands’ security 

for the foreseeable future. Pacific Island countries and territories must seize 

opportunities for regional collaboration to plan and implement adaptation 

strategies, and to develop and disseminate science-based knowledge to meet 

the threat. They should work together to influence large nations that are 

substantial greenhouse gas emitters. Finally, they should take advantage of 

the slow-motion aspect of climate change to plan for increased capacities 

to manage regional and global response to future needs for humanitarian 

assistance and disaster response. 

The eleven chapters in the book address diverse but related issues. They 

offer competent and profound analysis of key trends, challenges and opportunities for enhancing regional security cooperation and harmonizing 

Oceania’s regional security architecture. At the same time, the book does 

not pretend to be an all-inclusive study of the regional security environment. It hopefully helps build more interest toward better understanding 

of Oceania’s security — an interest (and attention) that is often missing or 

lacking cultural sensitivity and strategic vision as many of the authors in this 

volume suggest.
17

Chapter 1

Regional Security Architecture in the Pacific 

Islands Region: Rummaging through the 

Blueprints

R.A. Herr

Executive Summary

The Pacific Island regional system has evolved significantly since its colonial origins to become today’s robust, but complex arrangement of institutions. The historic pragmatism of this adaptive architecture has been both 

a factor in its success and a recurrent irritant, promoting demand for renovation. Security expectations of this architecture were important from the 

outset. However, a fundamental cleavage in perspectives on these security 

objectives appeared with decolonization in the 1970s. This chapter reviews 

the foundations, additions and renovations of the Pacific Island regional architecture noting that:

• States supporting regionalism from outside the region continued to emphasize traditional state security issues, while those on the inside stress 

development-related, human security concerns. 

• The regional system is not self-funded, and its dependence on extra-regional funding is a second important driver for architectural reform. 

• Re-engagement with Fiji, as a central contributor to the regional system, 

constitutes the major contemporary challenge for architectural reform. 
18 Regionalism, Security & Cooperation in Oceania 

Introduction

Security has been a significant factor in the Pacific Islands regional architecture since the first blueprints for its construction. It has remained the 

central component of every renovation and redesign since. However, the 

relevance of the Pacific Islands1

 to drafting these architectural sketches and 

blueprints has always been problematic, even in the post-colonial period. 

A number of factors have contributed to this alienation of the inhabitants 

from the designs ostensibly intended for their benefit. A very significant 

influence has been the continuity of the original blueprint and its centrality 

to the subsequent renovations of this architecture. Another factor in the 

post-colonial era has been the means available to the regional countries (the 

“owner-occupiers” of the regional architecture) to afford some options needed for a structural makeover. Most island states do not have the domestic 

security infrastructure to effectively engage regionally with standard state 

security arrangements used by the traditional extra-regional sponsors of the 

Pacific Islands’ regional system. 

Fundamentally, however, the key long-term factor has been a divergence 

in the core national interests with regard to regional security. The Islands 

have focused on “human” or non-traditional security over state or traditional security at the regional level. Consequently, linking the two approaches 

to security has proved challenging at many levels — not least at the regional 

level where institutional renovation has come under serious pressure to find 

mutually accommodating answers. 

This chapter is intended as an overview of key features of the relevant regional architecture and looks at the emergence of institutions and processes 

that historically have established and reshaped the contemporary security 

architecture of the Pacific Islands region. 

1 The terms “Pacific Islands” and the abbreviated forms “Island” or “Islands” are capitalized within 

this book to identify the region and those polities within it as distinct from other Pacific islands such 

as Hawai’i or Okinawa, which are islands outside this region.
 Regional Security Architecture - Herr 19

Not for reproduction without permission
20 Regionalism, Security & Cooperation in Oceania 

The Region 

Global perspectives of the Pacific Islands region often seem reduced to 

a rather vague awareness of a few familiar names scattered imprecisely and 

inaccurately across a vast expanse of blue. At best, this lack of nuance has 

unfortunate political consequences. Images of small states remote from major centers of power with problems that are small compared to those of other 

developing regions has undermined their diplomatic “relevance” internationally. At worst, this stereotype has served at times to justify heavy-handed disregard of the Islands’ interests in favor of broader, extra-regional interests by generalizing regionally from worst-case individual circumstances 

or events. 

Scope of the South Pacific Commission from 1962

Historically, the post-1962 ambit of the South Pacific Commission (now 

the Pacific Community, but still known as the SPC) has defined the boundaries of the Pacific Islands region.2

 The value of the SPC staking out the 

region’s boundaries became apparent a decade later when the South Pacific 

Forum validated and legitimized their authenticity. The Forum decided in 

1972 to regard Island polities within this sphere as its potential membership 

pool. This essentially confirmed the region’s scope both internally and as the 

region has presented itself extra-regionally. 

It should be noted that the South Pacific Forum (now the Pacific Islands 

Forum) did not redraw its borders to include Australia and New Zealand 

despite their status as Forum founding members and the fact that Forum 

decisions apply to both countries. The region’s architecture continues to rely 

on the SPC ambit as the region’s core delimiter. Consequently, an “insider/

outsider” ambiguity was created as to where Australia and New Zealand fit 

2 The historical development of these boundary issues are canvassed in some detail in: Richard 

Herr, “The Frontiers of Pacific Islands Regionalism: Charting the Boundaries of Identity,” Asia Pacific 

World, 4(1), Spring 2013, 36–55.
 Regional Security Architecture - Herr 21

within the regional system; the spatial location of the two developed states 

was not an issue at the time. Increasingly, uncertainties as to which role 

they were playing at critical points of regional decision-making has become 

an architectural irritant in Pacific Islands’ regionalism. 

The two ANZAC countries’ bifocal approach to the region remains one of 

the enduring challenges to regional restructuring and is often a catalyst for 

demands for architectural renovation. 

Pacific Island Regionalism and State Security

Traditional security issues have had significant influences on the development of the regional architecture. These effects have come predominantly 

from outside the region and were linked to geopolitical security issues that 

did not directly affect the Islands. Nevertheless, changes in Western perceptions of their traditional state security interests in the Pacific Islands have 

profoundly shaped the structure and renovation of the regional architecture. 

These impacts can be seen in the following chart, which identifies them by 

periods in the external perceptions of security risks in or through the region. 

State Security Eras of Pacific Island Regionalism 

The present regional system dates back to preparations for post-World 

War II reconstruction by Australia and New Zealand documented in their 

1944 ANZAC Pact. The two allies wanted a broad regional defense commitment through collective security relationships with France, the Netherlands, 

United States and United Kingdom. This led ultimately to the establishment 

 View

Era

1944 - 1976 Security risk Invasion route through 

Islands ANZAC Pact / ANZUS

1976 - 1989 Security liability Fear of Soviet “breakout” “Strategic Denial”

1990 - 2001 Financial liability “Pacific Paradox” “Constructive Commitment”

2001 – 2011 Failed state incubator Threat from non-state actors Biketawa/RAMSI/“Pacific 

Plan”

2011 – present Arena for geo-political 

rivalry Political realignment PIDF/ “New Framework for 

the Region”

External View of Pacific 

Islands Perceived Nature of risk Regionalist Response
22 Regionalism, Security & Cooperation in Oceania 

of the South Pacific Commission in 1947, a cooperative body created to promote the welfare of the Pacific Islands people. In 1953, the ANZUS Treaty 

served to provide more traditional security coverage in the region for Australia, New Zealand and the United States and their territorial possessions, 

but was not a general treaty for regional security.3 

The second of the regional security eras began in the mid-1970s when the 

establishment of diplomatic relations between Tonga and the Soviet Union 

triggered ANZUS concerns for a breach in the Western strategic policy of 

containment. Critical changes occurred in policy settings for the ANZUS 

allies. At a policy level, ANZUS took a direct interest in the regional security 

architecture and so informally linked state security interests of traditional 

sponsors of the regional system to its existing institutional arrangements. 

Within the region, this manifested itself through much greater financial and 

technical support for the Islands’ human security goals as well enhanced 

political sensitivities to regional priorities. 

The end of the Cold War led to a consequential reduction in the region’s 

traditional security concerns. They were replaced by a decade of more critical consideration of the region’s value to extra-regional interests – summed 

up in the World Bank’s finding of a “Pacific Paradox;” it was critical of the 

region’s high levels of aid and less-than-expected levels of economic growth. 

The decade did not produce any substantial renovation in the state security-related architecture, although the ANZUS linkage, already damaged by 

the suspension of collaboration with New Zealand through ANZUS in 1985, 

virtually vanished. 

The Pacific Islands Forum added new wrinkles through declarations 

seeking to buttress Island state financial and governance capacities in the 

face of higher expectations of state responsibility. Moreover, there was a 

more “hands on” approach by Australia in managing compliance through 

3 R. A. Herr, “A Child of its Era: Colonial Means and Ends.” New Guinea and Australia, the Pacific 

and South-East Asia, 9(2), 1974, 2-14.
 Regional Security Architecture - Herr 23

regional arrangements characterized by Australia’s then Foreign Minister 

Gareth Evans as “constructive commitment.”4 

The economic emphasis of Western engagement with the Pacific Islands 

regional security architecture returned sharply to state protection in the 

wake of 9/11. A perception of state fragility, encapsulated in the phrase “arc 

of instability,” drew parallels with security threats from failed or failing states 

to suggest that similar risks to extra-regional states might emerge from the 

Pacific Islands region.5 Coups and civil unrest, particularly in Fiji and the 

Solomon Islands, resulted in significant renovations to the region’s state security architecture during the ensuing decade. The Biketawa Declaration 

and the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI) went beyond “hands on” to direct intervention and included even bilateral intervention through such measures as the Enhanced Cooperation Programme by 

Australia with Papua New Guinea. 

Whether there is a new era of geopolitical rivalry based on the heightened interest of extra-regional powers as exemplified by the American pivot 

to the Pacific can be debated. Nevertheless, the tone of the debate, to date, 

suggests there has been a shift away from the failed state imagery of the previous decade. New and established extra-regional powers are also taking a 

much greater interest in the region’s security architecture. Elements of this 

argument are developed further below. 

4 The importance of this is reviewed in Greg Fry, “Framing the Islands: Knowledge and Power in 

Changing Australian Images of ‘the South Pacific’,” in David Hanlon and Geoffrey M. White Hanlon 

(eds.) Voyaging Through the Contemporary Pacific (Lanham: Rowan & Littlefield Publishers, 2000), 

37-46.

5 See for example: Dennis Rumley, Vivian Louis Forbes and Christopher Griffin, eds., Australia and 

the Arc of Instability: The Political and Cultural Dynamics of Regional Security (Dordrecht: Springer, 

2006). 
24 Regionalism, Security & Cooperation in Oceania 

Human Security in the Architecture of the Pacific Island 

Regionalism

The Pacific Islands have their own perspectives on the regional security 

architecture, and these have not been identical with the state-centric traditional security concerns of the extra-regional powers. However, this divergence of security interests was not especially marked initially; the SPC’s 

establishment satisfied the extra-regional founders’ need for a common purpose in the region. Yet the SPC’s original work programme — economic, 

health and social development — addressed Islander human security needs. 

As independence progressed across the region, and the agenda of non-traditional security concerns expanded to include resource protection, environmental protection and climate change, the separation between the relative 

interests in the two approaches to security became increasingly evident. 

The contrast in security interests was inevitable and, at some point, had 

to emerge as an issue. The overwhelming majority of regional states chose 

to leave state defense largely to a benign international order. Only three 

states — Fiji, Papua New Guinea and Tonga — established formal defense 

forces. In certain independence arrangements, there were bilateral relations 

covering defense considerations, but these did not create treaty obligations. 

Moreover, there are no regional mutual security treaties that include any Pacific Island countries. ANZUS, whose initial coverage included much of the 

region’s geographic scope, never expanded to include any newly independent states as signatories. This stands in contrast to the SPC, which opened 

its treaty to new members. 
 Regional Security Architecture - Herr 25

Human Security Eras of Pacific Island Regionalism 

Pacific Island entities were not in a position to manage their participation in regional affairs, much less shape the regional security architecture, 

due to their colonial status for several decades after SPC establishment. Yet, 

as the pressure for decolonization mounted, some local leaders asserted a 

claim for ownership of their regional security interests. A catalyst for this 

was West New Guinea’s removal from the region in 1962. The territory was 

transferred from Dutch to Indonesian control without conferring with the 

territory’s people. 

There were reports of heart-wrenching tears shed by West New Guinean delegates at the 1962 South Pacific Conference as they expressed their 

anguish at the knowledge they would not see their South Pacific brothers 

again at the conference. This outraged Fiji’s prominent leader Ratu Kamisese Mara. He attended the next SPC in Lae in 1965 and demanded change 

at the regional level to ensure that the Pacific peoples, not outsiders, would 

decide who belonged in their region. This demarche, coupled with Western 

Samoa’s entry into full SPC membership as an independent state, kicked off 

a period of rapid renovation of the regional architecture with a strong focus 

on the autonomy of Island peoples to decide the regional agenda. 

In addition to reform of the SPC’s decision-making processes, Fiji, Tonga 

and Western Samoa established the Pacific Islands Producers Association 

(PIPA) in 1965 to promote better terms of trade with New Zealand. PIPA 

 View

Era

1962- 1971 Decolonisation Regional agenda controlled 

externally Reform of the SPC/ PIPA

1971 -1988 Assertion of sovereignty Inadequacy of existing 

architecture South Pacific Forum/FFA/SRO

1988 - 2004 Intra-system cooperation Inclusive linkages SPOCC/CROP

2004 - present Architectural renovation Moderating pressures for 

rationalisation Pacific Plan

Pacific Island View Perceived Nature of risk Regionalist Response
26 Regionalism, Security & Cooperation in Oceania 

expanded its membership to include the Cook Islands, the Gilbert and Ellice Islands Colony, and Niue a few years later. This association provided a 

mechanism outside the formal colonial networks to develop ideas for more 

indigenous influence over the regional architecture. PIPA played a pivotal 

role in this when the failure to politically reform the SPC in 1970 led to an 

initiative that became the South Pacific Forum in 1971. 

The institutional fracture created by the formation of the Forum was a 

visible demonstration of the widening gulf in security aspirations within the 

region in the declining days of colonialism. For the Island countries, nuclear testing was a human rather than state security issue. It pitted the risk to 

human, environment and marine resources health against perceived state 

security benefits for the testing powers. The Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) has 

become the critical element for the security (state and human) of its Island 

members in the four decades since it was added to the regional architecture.6

The South Pacific Forum did not institutionalize itself, but rather was 

content initially to remain a “club” of regional leaders along the lines of the 

Commonwealth Meeting of Heads of Government (CHOGM). Instead, 

the South Pacific Bureau for Economic Cooperation (SPEC) was created 

in 1973 as an inter-governmental economic advisory agency to the Forum. 

SPEC became the Forum’s secretariat in 1975 and gradually acquired more 

responsibility on the Forum’s behalf. It was re-badged in 1988 as the Pacific 

Islands Forum Secretariat. 

Shortly after its creation, the Forum espoused an objective to completely 

renovate the regional architecture to bring the entire region under one roof 

— its own. The “Single Regional Organization” (SRO) proposal essentially 

reflected a desire by some, but not all Forum members to decolonize the regional architecture. Despite the Forum’s commitment to an SRO, the Forum 

sanctioned the creation of a new organization in 1979 in order to respond to 

6 Eric Shibuya, “The Problems and Potential of the Pacific Islands Forum,” in Jim Rolfe, ed., The 

Asia-Pacific: A Region in Transition (Honolulu: Asia-Pacific Centre for Security Studies, 2004), 

102–115.
 Regional Security Architecture - Herr 27

global changes in the Law of the Sea and assert regional ownership of marine resources security. There was a temporizing gesture to the SRO ideal, 

however. The South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA) was autonomous 

in law, but with a membership restricted to that of the Forum and reported 

annually to the Forum. 

By 1987, the Forum accepted the SRO concept was moribund, and a period of regional cohabitation emerged with an architecture to reflect the new 

policy environment. A South Pacific Organizations Coordinating Committee (SPOCC) was established to replace the SRO concept. As the following 

chart of SPOCC members illustrates, human security remained the regional 

focus. Significantly, the strength of the human security focus was such that 

SPOCC was more inclusive. SPOCC was renamed the Council of Regional 

Organizations of the Pacific (CROP) in the late 1990s as part of a general 

move regionally to eliminate “South Pacific” from organizational names to 

demonstrate respect for membership north of the equator. 

Regional Organizations 
28 Regionalism, Security & Cooperation in Oceania 

State security needs resurfaced at the end of the Cold War, however. 

The Forum secretariat established a Forum Regional Security Committee 

(FRSC) to collect and share intelligence on a variety of transnational crime, 

border protection and terrorism-related issues. As previously noted, the 

Forum itself agreed to a number of declarations addressing threats to state 

security.7 However, by 2005, threats perceived from weak, fragile and failing 

states led to what was virtually a reinvention of the SRO under a new name 

— the Pacific Plan. This Forum-based regional strategy was a root-andbranch renovation of the regional architecture to strengthen state capacity 

within the Pacific Islands.8 

The Challenge of Sub-Regionalism: Attached, Semi-Detached 

or Detached?

From the early 1980s, the coherence of regional arrangements came under a new set of pressures for reform. Ironically for the Forum, given its 

early desire for an SRO, the pressures to recognize sub-regional interests 

affected it much more than the SPC. The primary reason for this was that 

motivation for sub-regional recognition was driven by politics rather than 

technical efficiency. 

7 “Declaration by the South Pacific Forum on Law Enforcement Cooperation,” http://www.forumsec.org/resources/uploads/attachments/documents/HONIARA%20Declaration.pdf; “Aitutaki 

Declaration on Regional Security Cooperation,” 1997, http://www.forumsec.org/resources/uploads/

attachments/documents/AITUTAKI%20Declaration.pdf; and the “Biketawa Declaration, 2000,” 

http://www.forumsec.org/resources/uploads/attachments/documents/Biketawa%20Declaration,%20

28%20October%2020002.pdf.. 

8 For a wide–ranging review of regionalism and security challenges faced by the Pacific Islands at 

the origins of the Pacific Plan see Michael Powles, ed., Pacific Futures (Canberra: Pandanus Books, 

2006).
 Regional Security Architecture - Herr 29

Ethno-geographic Pacific Island sub-regions 

Interestingly, the first significant sub-regional renovation was not culturally based, but was, in fact, driven by a national desire for resource security. 

The Parties to the Nauru Agreement (PNA), established to put some “spine” 

into the FFA, included the richest tuna states and so spanned all three of the 

ethno-geographic sub-regions. The Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG) 

formed to support the indigenous Kanaks’ desire for independence in New 

Caledonia. The MSG’s success as a culturally linked, sub-regional association made it a catalyst for the Polynesian and Micronesian sub-regions to 

follow suit, albeit rather less fruitfully. The current arrangements are summarized in the following table. 
30 Regionalism, Security & Cooperation in Oceania 

Sub-regional associations

† The MSG was formed as a sub-regional association in 1983, but institutionalized with a treaty and headquarters in 2007.

* The PNA was formed by treaty in 1982, but, as it used the FFA headquarters 

for its activities, was not regarded as meeting the formal requirements of an IGO 

until 2010 when it set up an independent headquarters in Majuro.

A New Blueprint for Renovating the Regional Architecture?

In response to being frozen out of Forum activities, including its security arrangements in 2009, Fiji’s Prime Minister Voreqe Bainimarama has 

pursued a new association of regional countries — the Pacific Islands Development Forum (PIDF).9

 The PIDF has added new challenges and pressures for the renovation of Pacific Islands’regional institutions. PIDF’s key

objective is seen by some as a lever to crowbar Australia and New Zealand 

out of their “insider” status within the Forum. Alternatively, the PIDF initiative has been seen as a means to break the historic nexus between the 

SPC’s island membership and entry into regional clubhouses. Bainimara9 Sandra Tarte, “A New Regional Pacific Voice?,” Pacific Islands Brief 4, Pacific Islands Development Program, East-West Center, August 28, 2013. 
 Regional Security Environment and Architecture - Powles 31

ma has raised the prospect of extending full membership in PIDF to Asian 

states while excluding Australia and New Zealand. The positive spin on 

the need for the PIDF is that it will allow non-state stakeholders from civil 

society and the private sector to get a seat at the regional corporate body’s 

table. Taking this line, the Fijian prime minister has argued that the PIDF 

will not be competitive against, but complementary to the existing regional 

architecture.

Conclusions

The ad hoc evolution of the Pacific Island regional system has been a 

factor in both its adaptive institutional development and the recurrent perceived need to renovate it. The security elements of this architecture were 

important from the outset. However, a fundamental divergence in perspectives on security objectives between those outside the region and those inside has become a source of tension in proposals for remodeling the overall 

architecture. Central to this friction has been the engagement of the outside 

powers that constructed the original edifice and continue to fund the system 

and those on the inside who inhabit the region. 

The contemporary regional system is not well suited to cover state security, having been designed ostensibly for, and then adapted to focus on human 

security issues. Post-Cold War developments such as global terrorism, the 

emergence of the Asia-Pacific century, and the U.S. pivot to the Pacific have 

renewed external concerns for the adequacy of state security issues within 

the existing regional architecture. Fiji’s role in re-engaging with the regional 

system after its 2014 election has amplified apprehensions as to the direction 

both general and sub-regional architectural renovation might take. Given 

the dependence on extra-regional support for the Pacific Islands regional 

system, it is unlikely that future renovations will be entirely do-it-yourself 

for regional states despite what some of them might wish. 
32 Regionalism, Security & Cooperation in Oceania 

Chapter 2

The Regional Security Environment and 

Architecture in the Pacific Islands Region 

Michael Powles

Executive Summary

• The debate is intensifying on the question of whether China’s rising power 

and influence in the Asia-Pacific region will continue largely peacefully.

• Concerns about wider regional and global developments associated with 

China’s rise cause nervousness in the Pacific Islands region.

• China’s intentions in the Pacific Islands region are viewed increasingly as 

being more to demonstrate and strengthen its power status in the region 

rather than any malevolence towards the South Pacific.

• Countries of the region, including New Zealand, are increasingly engaging with China on development cooperation and in other fields.

Introduction

The most significant aspect of today’s regional security environment in 

the Pacific Islands region is the rise of China as a major power. The respected political scientist, Joseph Nye of Harvard University, has described the 

power shift as the twenty-first century’s most consequential development.1

1 Joseph Nye, “The Old World’s New Roles,” Project Syndicate, July 10, 2014, http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/joseph-s--nye-believes-that-europe-must-fulfill-some-key-responsibilities-vis-a-vis-a-rising-china. 
 Regional Security Environment and Architecture - Powles 33

It is being felt globally. Some in remoter parts of the Pacific Islands region 

may hope their environments remain unaffected; they will be disappointed 

for two reasons. First, as Nye indicated, the development is a global one, 

with potential impact on the global security environment. Secondly, the 

Pacific Islands region is, of course, a sub-region of the wider Asia-Pacific, 

China’s home region. China’s rise and the reaction to it of other Asia-Pacific 

powers will almost certainly reshape the Pacific security environment, even 

though it’s almost impossible to see precisely what the new security environment will look like.

To avoid being surprised by developments that call for deliberate and 

carefully planned responses rather than knee-jerk reactions, we need to understand today’s major trends and the forces driving them. This chapter 

looks at China’s ambition to resume what it sees as its rightful place as not 

only the predominant Asia-Pacific regional power, but also a major global 

power...as the driving force behind changes in the Pacific Islands security 

environment. Given the current role and place of the United States in the 

region and, indeed, in the global security environment, this raises the question of how China’s emergence in the region will play out.

Divided Perspectives 

One group of observers, the so-called “realists,” see real grounds for extreme nervousness in the present international security situation. John 

Mearsheimer, of the University of Chicago, drawing on lessons from history, 

not least the run-up to the first World War, asserted emphatically, “To put it 

bluntly: China cannot rise peacefully.”2 A number of observers, both politicians and political scientists, agree with Mearsheimer.

2 Julian Sneider, “Mearsheimer’s big question: Can China Rise Peacefully?,” The Interpreter, April 

15, 2014, http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2014/04/15/Mearsheimer-Can-China-rise-peacefully.

aspx?COLLCC=781054369&
34 Regionalism, Security & Cooperation in Oceania 

Not everyone agrees, however. Some countries in Southeast Asia, which 

have generations of experience dealing with competing major powers in 

their region, are less pessimistic. Singapore’s foreign minister has said: “The 

world and Asia are big enough to accommodate a rising China and a reinvigorated United States.”3

 Similar optimism is heard from Malaysia and 

Indonesia. None of these countries sees the need to protect itself by joining 

a China bandwagon or seeking a security treaty with the United States.

Of course, some countries have to be optimistic. Several, Australia and 

New Zealand are examples, aim to get on well with both the existing superpower, the United States, and the emerging one, China. They have to do 

this because Australia’s and New Zealand’s biggest trading partner is, by far, 

China, while their traditional security partner has been the United States. 

Australia is a major U.S. ally, and has tended to give priority to that relationship. New Zealand, in contrast, has used its smallness and reputation for 

independent thinking to give emphasis to its relationship with China.

Do China’s leaders indicate their future plans for their nation’s role in the 

world? In many ways they do. After what they have termed their “century 

of humiliation,” in which Western powers and Japan subjugated much of 

China for their own benefit, leading Chinese officials speak of the nation 

resuming its rightful role as a world leader, a position which it held for many 

centuries before Western and Japanese interventions. There is little doubt 

of their determination to achieve what has been called the “Chinese dream.”

Many observers believe this aim doesn’t involve global or regional subjugation. But it does require of other countries the provision of both respect 

and the geopolitical space appropriate for a great power. Like other great 

powers before it, it does not like to be challenged, particularly in its home 

region.

3 David Kang, “PacNet #64 - Is America Listening to Its East Asian Allies?,” 

Center for Strategic and International Studies, October 18, 2012, http://csis.org/publication/

pacnet-64-america-listening-its-east-asian-allies.
 Regional Security Environment and Architecture - Powles 35

For small powers, including those in the Pacific Islands region, security 

nervousness will rise or fall depending on two factors: 

• First, the extent to which China demonstrates in its dealings with other 

states a respect for international law and the established international 

order. Many observers are concerned on this point due to recent developments in the East and South China Seas.

• Secondly, the extent to which the West, the United States in particular, is 

prepared to share power and give China the geopolitical space it seeks. 

Here, too, many observers see stronger grounds for pessimism than optimism. Within Asia itself, however, stalwart allies of the West, such as the 

Republic of Korea, have indicated they will have nothing to do with any 

Western plans to contain or obstruct China’s emergence as a great power.

The head of Australia’s foreign affairs department, Peter Varghese, 

spoke carefully on this point in terms that apply not only to Australia, but also to a number of other Asia-Pacific countries. He related:

“Australia does not want to be put in the position where we 

have to choose between the U.S. and China...China has every 

right to seek greater strategic influence to match its economic 

weight. The extent to which this can be peacefully accommodated will turn ultimately on both the pattern of China’s international behaviour and the extent to which the existing international order intelligently finds more space for China.”4

Against these criteria, the outlook for peace and security in the wider 

Asia-Pacific region seems somewhat doubtful. The risk of full-scale con4 Hugh White, “America wants to know whose side Australia is on: Could the US and China share 

equal billing?,” The Sydney Morning Herald, March 5, 2013, http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/

political-opinion/america-wants-to-know-whose-side-australia-is-on-20130304-2fgr9.html.
36 Regionalism, Security & Cooperation in Oceania 

flict between major powers might not be great. But if it should occur, consequences for the wider Asia-Pacific region, including the Pacific Islands 

region, would be devastating. Some nervousness is understandable. But, 

does China pose any more of a direct challenge to peace and security in the 

Pacific Islands region?

China’s Regional Objectives

I have discussed already the possible impact of China’s rise and its ambitions on the global or Asia Pacific-wide security environment. Is there a 

direct impact on the Pacific Islands region? What, if any, are China’s specific 

objectives in relation to the region and how do they affect the region’s security environment?

Today, there is more Chinese activity in terms of movement of people, 

trade and cultural exchanges in our Pacific region than ever before. It raises a legitimate question of whether China might have additional objectives 

beyond its resumption of great power status; objectives which could impact 

specifically on the region’s strategic environment. 

Is the prime driver of China’s policy in the Pacific, as elsewhere, the pursuit of trade, as many Western business people believe? Or, is it perhaps 

the acquisition of resources to keep the fires of China’s engines of growth 

burning, as some economic strategists maintain? Or, is China seeking to 

challenge American geostrategic supremacy in the Pacific? Some academics 

have asserted this and claim that the Pacific Islands region could be a focus 

for this competition. This argument first attracted attention several years 

ago with the publication of a powerful polemic entitled “Dragon in Paradise: 

China’s Rising Star in Oceania.”5

Some of these factors undoubtedly play a role, if not the predominant 

one, in shaping China’s Pacific objectives. But, I have no doubt that China’s 

5 John Henderson, Benjamin Reilly, and Nathaniel Peffer, “Dragon in Paradise: China’s Rising Star 

in Oceania,” The National Interest, Summer 2003, 72.
 Regional Security Environment and Architecture - Powles 37

prime consideration and highest priority in the region is much simpler: to 

demonstrate its major power status throughout the wider Pacific region. 

While proponents of the “Dragon in Paradise” thesis contend that China’s 

intentions in the region are more malevolent than benevolent, this may not 

now be the common view. New Zealand has demonstrated its belief in the 

opposite view by cooperating practically with China in a symbolically significant development project in the Pacific Islands.

The Negatives

Despite all this, there have been aspects of China’s involvement in the 

Pacific that have not been welcomed. A decade ago, China and Taiwan were 

engaged in an intense and bitter competition in the region for diplomatic 

recognition. The competing campaigns involved significant bribing of politicians, resulting in serious destabilization in one Pacific Island country in 

particular. New Zealand and Australian foreign ministers spoke out against 

what they called “check book diplomacy.” Fortunately, the election of a new 

president in Taiwan, one more inclined to cooperate with Beijing than compete, solved the problem...for the present at least.

As China becomes more involved in the Pacific, inevitably Chinese criminals become increasingly involved, too. I have clear recollections of problems caused by dishonest traders and fraudsters in the past — often individuals from Australia, New Zealand or the United States.6

There has been natural apprehension about whether China’s hunger for 

raw materials to sustain its thriving economy might result in resource depletion in the Pacific and possibly environmental degradation. A combination 

of rapacious business practices by some Asian timber companies and weak 

6 When I first visited Tuvalu back in 1980 to present a letter of credentials as New Zealand’s high 

commissioner, I found that the only other guests at the Funafuti hotel were three members of the Ku 

Klux Klan from Texas. They quite openly said their purpose was to persuade Tuvalu’s Finance Minister to invest the country’s financial reserves with the Klan. Fortunately, the minister at the time, the 

late Sir Henry Naisali, was never likely to take up their offer.
38 Regionalism, Security & Cooperation in Oceania 

governance in some Melanesian countries has caused considerable harm in 

these areas. 

Chinese fishing fleets join those from Japan, Korea, Taiwan, United States 

and Europe in harvesting the Pacific’s tuna resource, the largest in the world. 

Some fishing is done by Pacific Island countries, but the bulk is done by 

foreign interests. It is regulated by the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries 

Convention. While the long-term sustainability of the tuna resource is far 

from certain, China itself has generally observed its obligations under the 

convention.

Jian Yang, a Chinese New Zealand academic, and now a politician, has 

written the most comprehensive study so far of China’s objectives and policies in the Pacific Islands region. In “The Pacific Islands in China’s Grand 

Strategy: Small States, Big Games,” he emphasizes the significance of the fact 

that China’s presence and role in the Pacific Islands is increasing dramatically.7

 But he does not believe that Beijing has specifically aggressive or 

threatening attitudes towards the region’s governments or peoples. Nor does 

he believe there is any intent to challenge the United States in the Pacific 

Islands region, dismissing the “Dragon in Paradise” thesis. Yang believes 

that China will play an increasing role in the evolution of the regional order. 

It will insist that it plays a role at least as significant as, and possibly greater 

than, any other major power. Very clearly, this includes the security field as 

well as others.

Security Environment Impact

Since Yang’s book was published in 2011, tensions have risen over disputed islands in the northern Pacific, specifically in the East and South China 

Seas. Debate continues as to whether these rising tensions arose in reaction 

to, or were a cause of, the American pivot, or “rebalance,” to Asia.

7 Jian Yang, The Pacific Islands in China’s Grand Strategy: Small States, Big Games (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2011).
 Regional Security Environment and Architecture - Powles 39

China has certainly been flexing its muscles in its disputes with Japan 

and nearby ASEAN8 neighbors. This is clearly affecting the North Pacific 

security environment, not least because the deteriorating China/Japan relationship risks involving the United States directly because of its security 

treaty obligations to Japan. 

None of this is impacting directly on the Pacific Islands at this stage, but 

it certainly could if hostilities should break out, which is a real possibility. 

Security arrangements and architecture in the Pacific Islands region clearly 

have to take this risk into account. Nervousness will be fed by uncertainty 

whether the United States and China are, or will finally become, strategic 

partners or competitors. Most likely, their relationship will continue to involve a mix of partnership and competition, justifying a watchful wariness 

on the part of other players in the Asia-Pacific region, including the Pacific 

Islands.

There is increasing recognition in the region that most immediate challenges to the security environment arise from governance inadequacies 

within the region itself. And with that recognition, new thinking is being 

given to the promotion of good governance, with less emphasis on universal, largely Western values and norms, and more emphasis on indigenous 

customs and traditions.9

 At the same time, new thinking is going into the 

region’s physical security architecture, and how it is changing and hopefully 

being improved. Other chapters in this book elaborate on that.

Regional Architecture Evolution

Since Pacific leaders and elders first began to face the challenges of independence half a century ago, they demonstrated their capacity to create 

whatever regional architecture, formal or informal, was necessary. 

8 Association of Southeast Nations

9 Elise Huffer and Ropate Qalo, “Have We Been Thinking Upside Down?” The Contemporary Pacific, 16(1), 2004, 87-116.
40 Regionalism, Security & Cooperation in Oceania 

Historically, this should not surprise us. Back when several Island countries were still colonies, and the Pacific Islands Forum was not even a gleam 

in Ratu Mara’s10 eyes, the only regional meeting at the governmental level 

was the South Pacific Commission (SPC) — now renamed, of course, the 

Secretariat of the Pacific Community. Some SPC meetings had politicians 

from just-independent or soon-to-be-independent territories among the 

delegates, but only colonial or metropolitan powers had full rights at these 

events.

Early Pacific leaders resented their lack of power at the conferences. 

Plenary discussion of political issues was not allowed, and this policy was 

strenuously policed by the old colonial powers, including the French and 

Americans. Future Pacific leaders used to go along, because they valued 

the opportunity to get together privately with their peers, usually in the evenings. They shared stories about their respective journeys into independence, asked each other’s advice, and enjoyed each other’s company. Albert 

Henry, of the Cook Islands, and his ukulele would often bring the evening to 

a close with his distinctive rendition of “Pearly Shells.”11

It may seem a long step from ukuleles and “Pearly Shells” to the Biketawa 

Declaration and the Melanesian Spearhead Group and the several similar 

groupings today; a long step perhaps, but historically a very logical one.

Not surprisingly, soon after most Island countries gained independence, 

the idea of a South Pacific Forum, later called the Pacific Islands Forum, was 

promoted. It included the Island countries, and Australia and New Zealand, 

but not the more foreign colonial powers. After a period in which Australia and New Zealand are thought to have thrown their comparative weight 

around in PIF meetings, it is perhaps natural that Island countries should today be seeking forums in which their own views are predominant and don’t 

have to be negotiated with the region’s two developed countries. 

10 Fiji’s first prime minister, serving from 1970 to 1992. He formed the Pacific Islands Forum in 

1971.

11 Ian Johnson and Michael Powles, eds., New Flags Flying: Pacific Leadership (Wellington: Huia 

Publishers, 2012), 6-7.
 Regional Security Environment and Architecture - Powles 41

Conclusion

After many years living and traveling in and among Pacific Island countries, I have become aware of an optimistic attitude, a positive Pacific spirit, 

among Pacific Island peoples, even during difficult or uncertain times. I 

think it was best expressed by the revered Tongan philosopher and artist, the 

late Epeli Hau’ofa, who described so well the Pacific spirit. 

Hau’ofa, who had had his fill of foreign denigration of Pacific Islanders, 

their communities and their universe, stated:12

“[T]he surrounding ocean as far as they could traverse and 

exploit it...and the heavens above with their hierarchies of 

powerful gods and stars and constellations that people could 

count on to guide their ways across the seas. Their world was 

anything but tiny. They thought big and recounted their deeds 

in epic proportions... Islanders today still relish exaggerating 

things out of all proportions. Smallness is a state of mind...

Theirs was a large world in which peoples and cultures moved 

and mingled unhindered by boundaries of the kind erected 

much later by imperial powers....”

“Today’s economic reality [led] people to shake off their 

confinement and they have since moved, by the tens of thousands, doing what their ancestors had done before them: 

enlarging their world as they go, to Australia, New Zealand, 

Hawai’i, mainland USA, Canada and even Europe; they strike 

roots...all across their ocean, and the ocean is theirs because 

12 Epeli Hau’ofa, “Our Sea of Islands,” in A New Oceania: Rediscovering Our Sea of Islands (Suva, 

1993).
42 Regionalism, Security & Cooperation in Oceania 

it has always been their home. Social scientists may write of 

Oceania as a Spanish Lake, a British Lake, an American Lake, 

and even a Japanese Lake. But we all know that only those 

who make the ocean their home and love it, can really claim it 

theirs. Conquerors come, conquerors go, the ocean remains, 

mother only to her children. This mother has a big heart; she 

adopts anyone who loves her.”
43

Chapter 3

China’s Role in the Pacific Islands Region

Jian Zhang

Executive Summary

• China’s emergence as an increasingly consequential power in the Pacific 

Islands region has been one of the most important developments in regional affairs over the past decade. Chinese interests in the region are 

wide-ranging and expanding over time.

• While concerns about China’s growing presence abound, fears of Chinese ambitions to dominate the region are unwarranted. Instead, China’s 

active engagement provides important new and potentially long-lasting 

developmental opportunities for Pacific Island countries. 

• China’s distinctively different approach to regional engagement, particularly its controversial aid program, poses acute challenges for traditional 

aid donors in the region. In the foreseeable future, substantial coordination between China and other aid donors is unlikely due to a significant “perception gap” between Chinese and Western views of the nature 

and impact of China’s foreign aid program. However, there is room for 

cooperation. 

• Whether China’s growing presence will spark destabilizing strategic 

competition in the region will be determined not only by Beijing’s behavior, but also by the responses of other external great powers. China’s 

rising regional influence needs to be accommodated; attempts to resist 

and contain Chinese emergence would likely be unsuccessful and potentially divide countries in the region. 
44 Regionalism, Security & Cooperation in Oceania 

Introduction

On Nov. 22, 2014, Chinese President Xi Jinping paid a state visit to Fiji, 

where he held a summit meeting with leaders of the eight Pacific Island 

countries that have diplomatic ties with China. During that meeting, Xi 

and his Pacific counterparts announced their decision to elevate the relationship between China and the eight Pacific Islands countries to the level 

of “strategic partnership.”1

 More than anything else, Xi’s visit symbolizes 

China’s growing presence in the Pacific Islands region, and its far-reaching 

consequences for the evolving regional order.

The South Pacific has long been perceived as either “an American lake” or 

Australia’s and, to a lesser extent, New Zealand’s traditional area of influence. 

Such perceptions, however, no longer reflect the region’s changing geopolitical landscape. Over the last decade, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) 

has emerged as an increasingly consequential player in the region through 

active political and diplomatic engagements, significant aid provisions and 

expanding trade and economic ties. Xi’s visit represents the latest example 

of increasingly closer ties between China and Pacific Island countries. 

Moreover, Chinese interests in the region reflect the country’s new-found 

economic strength and evolving diplomatic and economic agendas. As 

rightly noted by some commentators, China’s increased presence provides 

valuable new opportunities for regional economic development.2

 However, its distinctively different approach to engagement with Pacific Island 

countries also complicates the efforts of Western countries to promote good 

governance and sustainable development in a region facing a multitude of 

development and security challenges. 

1 “China, Pacific island countries announce strategic partnership,” Xinhua News Agency, November 

22, 2014, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-11/22/c_133807415.htm.

2 For example, see Yongjin Zhang, “China and the emerging regional order in the South Pacific,” 

Australian Journal of International Affairs, 61(3), 2007, 367-381.
 China’s Role in the Pacific Islands Region - Zhang 45

China’s Growing Presence in the South Pacific

China’s growing presence in the Pacific Islands region is first and foremost 

demonstrated by its substantial aid activities. While the PRC has a long history of providing aid to the region, dating back to the 1970s, it is over the last 

decade that the nation has become a major aid donor to the poverty-stricken 

region. According to a study, in 2009 China was the third largest aid provider in the South Pacific, after Australia and the United States. 3

 Another 

analysis estimates that between 2006 and 2011, China provided a total of 

$850 million in aid to the region, making it the fifth largest donor after Australia ($4.8 billion), the United States ($1.27 billion), New Zealand ($899.3 

million), and Japan ($868.8 million).4 According to China’s two foreign aid 

white papers published in 2011 and 2014 respectively, the South Pacific’s 

share in China’s total foreign aid increased from 4 percent in 2009 to 4.2 

percent during the period 2010 to 2012, demonstrating Beijing’s increased 

attention to this region. 

While some commentators rightly point out that the overall size of Chinese regional aid is still far smaller than that of some long-standing aid donors, such as Australia and the United States, it should be noted that aggregated aid figures (as shown above) do not reveal the full extent of the 

significance of Chinese aid. One must evaluate not only the size of China’s 

aid, but also how the nation delivers it. China’s approach to aid provision 

differs from that of OECD5

 donors in two aspects: unlike OECD countries 

that often use aid conditionally as a tool to promote agendas, such as good 

governance, human rights and civil society development, China attaches 

virtually no political conditions to its aid. This is based on its long-held foreign policy principle of non-interference in nations’ internal affairs. 

3 Mary Fifita and Fergus Hanson, “China in the Pacific: The New Banker in Town,” Issues & Insights, 11(5), April 2011, 3, http://csis.org/files/publication/issuesinsights_v11n05.pdf.

4 Jenny Hayward-Jones, “Big Enough for All of Us: Geo-strategic Competition in the Pacific Islands,” analysis, Lowy Institute for International Policy, 11, May 2013, http://www.lowyinstitute.org/

files/hayward_jones_big_enough_web.pdf. 

5 OECD: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development.
46 Regionalism, Security & Cooperation in Oceania 

Additionally, OECD donors tend to focus aid on projects promoting political and economic reforms. China’s aid, however, funds infrastructure 

projects and public facilities, such as roads, bridges, dams, schools, hospitals, 

sports facilities and government buildings. China also funds commercial 

projects that can deliver immediate economic benefits for recipient countries. It’s not surprising, therefore, that many Pacific Island governments 

have seen Chinese aid as a preferred option to increasingly condition-attached development assistance from traditional OECD aid donors. 

Moreover, while at the regional level, the overall size of China’s aid is still 

considerably smaller than Australian and U.S. aid, in some individual countries, Chinese aid is becoming most consequential. This is perhaps best illustrated in Tonga. Over the last few years, the country received a number 

of large Chinese “concessional loans” worth more than $100 million. This 

led to a Tongan accumulated debt load that, as of 2009, was 32 percent of its 

GDP, raising concerns about the country’s vulnerability to future Chinese 

manipulation.6

Another case is Fiji. After its 2006 coup, the country went through a considerable period of sanctions, diplomatic isolation and aid reduction from 

many Western countries, especially Australia and New Zealand. Beijing, 

however, continued to actively engage with the interim government, led by 

the coup leader, Commodore Frank Bainimarama. Indeed, Beijing provided a total of $121 million aid to Fiji in 2007, attracting strong criticism from 

Australia and other Western countries. China’s aid and diplomatic engagement, however, drew praise from Fiji’s military government.

Apart from its aid program, China’s growing presence is further reflected 

in its expanding economic and trade ties with the region. Between 2000 

and 2012, China’s trade with the eight Island countries with whom it has 

diplomatic ties7

 rose from $248 million to $1.767 billion, a more than sev6 Fifita and Hanson, “China in the Pacific,” 7.

7 Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Tonga, Vanuatu, Cook Islands, Samoa, Niue and Federated States of 

Micronesia.
 China’s Role in the Pacific Islands Region - Zhang 47

en-fold increase.8 In 2009, China became the second-largest trade partner 

in the region, after Australia. According to a report by China’s Ministry of 

Commerce, based on 2012 Chinese customs statistics, China’s total trade 

with all Pacific Island countries, including those having no diplomatic ties 

with Beijing, was as high as $4.5 billion.9 Additionally, China has become an 

important export market for some Pacific Island economies. For example, 

around 45 percent of Solomon Islands’ 2013 exports went to China.10 For 

Papua New Guinea, China has become the largest market for its timber exports over the last decade. 

Together with expanding trade ties, Chinese investments in the region 

have increased significantly. Between 2003 and 2012, Chinese enterprises 

invested more than $700 million in Pacific Island countries. Papua New 

Guinea (PNG) has been, by far, the largest recipient of Chinese investment, 

receiving a total of $313 million, followed by Samoa ($265 million) and Fiji 

($111 million).11 China’s investment in the $1.4 billion Ramu Nickel Project 

in PNG is the largest Chinese investment in the region. 

In addition to direct investment, Chinese enterprises have become increasingly active in the region, bidding for large government projects or 

projects financed by external multilateral financial institutes, such as the 

World Bank and Asian Development Bank. Up to 2012, Chinese enterprises 

reportedly had won a total of $5 billion in contracts for various projects.12 

Not surprisingly, China’s active diplomatic engagements within the region have been equally impressive. In particular, while Beijing has formal 

diplomatic relationships with only eight of 14 Pacific Island countries — Fiji, 

PNG, Samoa, Tonga, Vanuatu, Cook Islands, Niue and the Federated States 

of Micronesia — it reportedly deploys more diplomats in the region than 

8 Yu Chensen, Chang Chenguang and Wang Xuedong, eds., The Blue Book of Oceania: Annual Report of Development of Oceania 2013-14 (Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press, 2014), 8. 

9 Ibid.

10 “Solomon Islands,” Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade factsheet, http://www.

dfat.gov.au/trade/resources/Documents/solo.pdf. 

11 Yu, Chang and Wang, eds., The Blue Book of Oceania, 15-16.

12 Ibid., 17.
48 Regionalism, Security & Cooperation in Oceania 

any other country. Moreover, in recent years, China’s active diplomatic engagement has been further characterized by high-profile, senior-level visits. 

For example, in 2006, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao visited Fiji, announcing 

the establishment of the China-Pacific Island Countries Economic Development and Cooperation Forum (CPICEDCF). 

In 2009, China’s then vice-president, Xi Jinping, visited Fiji. In the same 

year, China’s then senior vice-premier, Li Keqiang, visited PNG. As mentioned earlier, President Xi visited Fiji again in November 2014 after attending the G20 Summit in Australia. These regular visits by top Chinese leaders 

highlight the importance Beijing has attached to the region. It should also 

be noted that leaders of Pacific Island countries have also visited China frequently, often sponsored by Beijing.

In addition to its bilateral relationships with Pacific Island countries, Beijing has also actively engaged with regional multilateral institutions. Having 

been a dialogue partner of the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) since 1989, Beijing has shown more interest in PIF in recent years, sending senior officials 

(often at the vice-foreign minister level) to attend meetings. In 2000, China 

also set up the China-PIF Cooperation Fund and sponsored establishment 

of a PIF trade office in Beijing in 2002. It is noteworthy that, apart from its 

contacts with PIF, Beijing has also developed close relationships with other 

sub-regional groups, such as the Melanesia Spearhead Group (MSG). China 

funded the building of the MSG headquarters in Vanuatu. 

China also created its own multilateral platform to engage with the region, 

the aforementioned CPICEDCT, comprised of China and its eight diplomatic partners in the region. In the Forum’s first meeting, held in Fiji in April 

2006, Wen, among others, pledged a total of RMB 300 million13 aid over the 

next three years to the region as well as a number of tariffs reductions and 

debt waiver initiatives. In November 2013, the Forum’s second meeting was 

held in the Chinese city of Guangzhou, during which Chinese Vice-Premier 

13 RMB: Chinese monetary unit (yuan).
 China’s Role in the Pacific Islands Region - Zhang 49

Wang Yang announced an aid package of $1 billion to the eight Pacific Island 

countries and promised to set up a $1 billion fund to support infrastructure 

development in the region.14

As part of its overall regional engagement, China has, in more recent 

years, sought to actively expand its cultural influence in the region. For 

example, in 2006, Beijing set up the Confucius Institute at the University 

of South Pacific in Fiji, offering courses on Chinese languages and culture. 

Between 2004 and 2012, the Chinese foreign ministry also organized six 

training workshops for South Pacific diplomats. In the aforementioned 

2013 meeting of the CPICEDCF, Wang also announced the offer of 2,000 

scholarships in the next four years to support students from South Pacific 

island countries to study in China. According to one seasoned observer of 

China-South Pacific relations, among all the other external powers in the 

region, China has been the most active in promoting the study of its national 

language. During Xi’s visit to Fiji in November 2014, he also announced the 

establishment of a Chinese Culture Centre in that nation.

The last decade has also seen an expanding Chinese diaspora in the region. 

As a result of China’s opening its doors to outward migration, numbers of 

Chinese migrants (legal and illegal) in the region have increased significantly. While accounting for only a tiny percentage of the entire population in 

the South Pacific, the Chinese community arguably has a disproportionately high economic influence in the region, partly because Chinese business 

people have tended to dominate certain economic sectors, such as retail and 

restaurants. The often held perception, however, that some Chinese community members engage in illegal activities or have close relationships with 

corrupted local officials, makes the Chinese community a target of local resentment in Pacific Island countries. The growing Chinese community, thus, 

adds an element of complexity to Beijing’s relationship with these countries.

14 “Address of Wang Yang at the 2nd China-Pacific Island Countries Economic Development and 

Cooperation Forum,” Ministry of Commerce, People’s Republic of China, November 12, 2013, http://

english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/newsrelease/significantnews/201311/20131100386982.shtml 
50 Regionalism, Security & Cooperation in Oceania 

China’s Evolving Interests in the Region

What drives China’s growing engagements in the region? A prevailing 

view is that as China rises as a potential hegemonic power, its enhanced 

activities in the South Pacific are driven by an ambition to dominate the 

region, challenging the longstanding strategic primacy of the United States 

and its allies. Thus, for some, the South Pacific represents a microcosm of 

the US-China rivalry in the broader Asia-Pacific region.15 Others, however, are dismissive of such a view, arguing that China’s regional interests are 

limited and largely driven by its economic and trade interests, especially its 

growing appetites for the region’s resources and consideration for SouthSouth cooperation.16

In reality, Chinese regional interests are diverse, wide-ranging and expanding over time; objectives include enduring political and diplomatic interests, expanding economic and trade considerations, and managing growing new security concerns and needs. As noted by many scholars, Beijing’s 

diverse interests do not mean it has a clearly-thought, well-coordinated 

grand strategy for the region.17 Instead, many of its activities have appeared 

spontaneous and lacking coordination, with some even undercutting the effectiveness of others. 

Political and diplomatic interests have always been high on Beijing’s 

agenda since the PRC began its Pacific Islands engagement. Beijing’s official 

links with the region started in 1970s when Island countries were acquiring 

independence as a result of the decolonization process sweeping the region. 

Beijing, for example, established formal diplomatic ties with Fiji and Samoa 

15 Joanne Wallis, “The South Pacific: Microcosm of future US-China competition?,” e-International Relations, September 12, 2012, http://www.e-ir.info/2012/09/19/

the-south-pacific-microcosm-of-future-us-china-competition/. 

16 For example, see Hayward-Jones, “Big Enough for All of Us.”. South-South cooperation broadly 

refers to developmental cooperation between developing countries. As China still sees itself as a 

developing country, it tends to treat its aid activities to other developing countries as part of SouthSouth cooperation. For more information on South-South cooperation, see United Nations Development Programmes at http://ssc.undp.org/content/ssc/about/what_is_ssc.html.

17 For example, see Zhang, “China and the emerging regional order;” see also Hayward-Jones, ‘Big 

Enough for All of Us.”
 China’s Role in the Pacific Islands Region - Zhang 51

in 1975 and with PNG in 1976. Throughout the Cold War period, China’s 

regional policy was driven by ideological factors — such as the desire to 

build a united front with developing countries to oppose the two superpowers — and pragmatic considerations, particularly its competition with Taiwan for diplomatic ties with Pacific Island countries. 

Following China’s reforms, its “opening up” in the late 1970s, and the 

Cold War’s end, the diplomatic rivalry with Taiwan became a main theme 

in Beijing’s regional policy. This is due to Taiwan’s pro-independence movement, which gained momentum in the early 1990s. Given that six out of 

twenty-two countries in the world that recognize Taiwan are Pacific Island nations, it is not surprising the region has become a major focus of 

the Taipei-Beijing diplomatic rivalry. Both Beijing and Taipei have engaged 

with the region through intensified aid, attracting widespread criticism of 

the destabilizing impacts of their “check book diplomacy” on various Island countries. The diplomatic competition was particularly stark under 

pro-independence Taiwanese President Chen Shuibian from 2000 to 2008. 

During Chen’s term, two Pacific Island countries, namely Kiribati and Nauru, switched their diplomatic recognition from Beijing to Taipei. Despite a 

diplomatic truce announced by both sides after the election of Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou in 2008, the issue of diplomatic recognition is still important for both Beijing and Taipei. 

While Taiwan has been an important driver of China’s regional activities, Beijing also has other broader political and diplomatic interests in the 

region. Enlisting the support of Island countries for China’s agenda in the 

international arena has also been a long-term and enduring consideration 

driving Chinese activities in the region. For example, in 2008, a number of 

Island nation leaders attended the opening ceremony of the Olympic Games 

in Beijing when leaders of certain Western countries chose not to do so amid 

widespread calls in the West for boycotting the event due to China’s human 

rights issues. 
52 Regionalism, Security & Cooperation in Oceania 

Compared to its long-standing and enduring political and diplomatic 

interests, China’s economic interest in the region is relatively new, but no 

less important. This interest has grown strongly due to China’s “go global” 

strategy since the early 2000s. China’s heightened demand for overseas resources and markets add further impetus to its Pacific Islands engagement. 

The region’s rich mineral, timber, fish, and potential seabed resources are 

all of great interest to China. The Pacific Islands have also emerged as new 

markets for Chinese products, thus giving China a stake in the economic 

development of the region.

The growing importance of economic considerations is perhaps most 

clearly reflected by the fact that China is actually trading more with Island 

countries with which it has no formal diplomatic ties than with those with 

which it has formal relations. This suggests economic interests, more than 

political considerations, drive China’s engagement with the region. As mentioned earlier, China’s total 2012 trade volume with Pacific Island countries 

exceeded $4.5 billion. Its trade with the eight Island countries with which it 

shares diplomatic ties accounted for less than 40 percent of this figure. 

This trade pattern contrasts sharply with China’s aid distribution in the 

region, with nearly all funds going to countries that diplomatically recognized Beijing. In more recent years, China’s engagement with the region, as 

in other parts of the world, is driven by growing concerns about the safety 

and security of the increasing number of Chinese citizens working and living in Island countries. The issue is particularly significant in the South 

Pacific region, where in a number of Island countries, Chinese communities 

have been targets of attacks by local residents during domestic riots. For 

example, in the aftermath of the 2006 anti-Chinese riot in the Solomon Islands’ capital, Honiara, China undertook an urgent evacuation operation to 

remove more than 300 Chinese out of the country. 

Moreover, Xi, who came to power in November 2012, has enlisted Island 

countries’ support for Beijing’s effort to pursue corrupt Chinese officials 
 China’s Role in the Pacific Islands Region - Zhang 53

hiding overseas, many of them in Island countries. During his visit to Fiji 

in November 2014, Xi expressed particular gratitude for that nation’s assistance in this area and vowed further cooperation between the two nations’ 

law enforcement agencies.

The latest Oceania Blue Book, an authoritative annual development report published by the Centre of Oceania Studies at China’s Sun Yat-sen University, summarized China’s varied interests in the region:

“Politically to reinforce China’s political ties with the region, economically to explore potential economic opportunities 

for mutually beneficial development through increased trade, 

investment and aid, exploring the Oceania market, pursing 

economic interests and improving China’s influences in the 

region.”18

Aid Coordination with China? 

So far, China’s increased regional engagements have generated considerable concerns and criticisms in countries like Australia and the United 

States, which have exercised significant regional influence. Many critics target China’s aid policy. According to China’s 2011 foreign aid white paper, 

key features of this policy are:

• Unremittingly helping recipient countries build up their self-development capacity

• Imposing no political conditions

• Adhering to equality, mutual benefit and common development

18 Yu, Chang and Wang, eds., The Blue Book of Oceania, 6.
54 Regionalism, Security & Cooperation in Oceania 

• Remaining realistic while striving for the best

• Keeping pace with the times and paying attention to reform and 

innovation19

This represents a sharply different approach to aid provision from that 

of Western donors both in terms of focus (prioritizing development over 

governance) and style (attaching no political conditions, but emphasizing 

mutual economic benefits). To many Western commentators, China’s aid 

program, especially its “no-strings-attached” approach, has not only undermined the influence of other aid donors, but is also detrimental to Island 

nations’ interests by ignoring issues of good governance, and political and 

economic reforms. 

Others are more positive, seeing that China’s emergence as a major aid 

provider has created new development opportunities for the Pacific Islands. 

However, they also call for changes in the no-strings-attached policy, requesting China undertake greater coordination with other aid donors by 

aligning with Western aid norms and practice. The recent trilateral cooperation between China, New Zealand and the Cook Islands on a water-quality 

improvement project is widely perceived as a major breakthrough for this 

desired coordination.

While coordination between China and aid donors should certainly be 

encouraged, a case could be made that any such coordination will be limited, if not symbolic, in the foreseeable future. For a number of reasons, it is 

unlikely China will change its distinctively different aid policy to match the 

practice and principle of OECD donors. First, despite its rapid rise, China 

still perceives itself as a developing country and undertakes its aid program 

19 “China’s Foreign Aid,” Information Office of the State Council white paper, April 2011.
 China’s Role in the Pacific Islands Region - Zhang 55

as part of South-South cooperation. Consequently, it sees its relationships 

with countries receiving its aid as fundamentally different from the traditional donor-recipient relationship between developed countries and developing countries. Thus, China’s long-held principles such as “non-interference of each other’s internal affairs,” “equality” and “mutual benefits” have 

been central to China’s aid policies.

Moreover, contrary to external criticism, Chinese policy-makers and 

commentators see their nation’s aid program as a distinctively more effective 

model of development assistance than the Western model. In particular, 

a widely held belief in China is that development is the pre-condition for 

good governance rather than vice versa. Chinese officials and scholars generally believe that China’s focus on improving development capacities suits 

the need of receiving countries more than Western donors’ focus on governance, and political and economic structural reforms. 

Such confidence is boosted by China’s own developmental experiences 

and the positive response to Chinese aid programs from many Pacific Islands leaders. Indeed, China’s 2011 foreign aid white paper proudly claimed 

that China’s foreign aid program has emerged as an effective model with 

its own unique characteristics. In this context, it’s not surprising that, despite aforementioned cooperation between China, New Zealand and Cook 

Islands, China still refuses to join the 2009 Cairns Compact, designed for 

promoting greater donor coordination and aid transparency in the Pacific 

Islands region. 
56 Regionalism, Security & Cooperation in Oceania 

Conclusion

Given China’s diverse and expanding regional interests, and its rising economic and strategic strength, one can expect that Chinese presence in the 

region will only grow stronger in the coming decades. China’s growing regional presence is a new reality that needs to be accommodated, not resisted. 

On the one hand, Chinese activism in the region has provided important 

developmental opportunities for regional countries. On the other hand, 

given Beijing’s expanding ties with Pacific Island states, resisting Chinese influence will only lead to a zero-sum strategic competition that could divide 

the region. 

Accommodating China’s role, however, requires great understanding 

of Chinese interests and views. Given the substantial difference between 

Chinese and Western views about China’s unique aid policy, effective aid 

coordination between China and other aid donors must be based on a twoway socialization process, with both sides acknowledging the merits of each 

other’s aid practices. Simply requesting that China conform to rules set up 

by traditional aid donors is unlikely to work; other donors might need to 

consider how to refine their own aid approaches by learning from the positive aspects of Chinese practices. 
57

Chapter 4

Still Missing in the Rebalance? The United States 

and the Pacific Island Countries

Eric Y. Shibuya

Executive Summary

• The regional reaction to the U.S. “rebalance” to Asia is mixed. Many 

countries are more reassured by the returning U.S. focus on the Asia-Pacific region, while others are concerned that they see more rhetoric than 

reality. For Pacific Island countries, much of the discussion is summed 

up as just “more of the same” with island states mostly missing in any 

discussion of the rebalance’s impacts. 

• This chapter describes the history of U.S.-Pacific Island relations, highlighting instances of neglect and unwanted attention. While some countries may look to benefit from greater U.S. attention to the region as part 

of the rebalance, history suggests they should proceed with caution. 

• While U.S. disinterest in Pacific Island countries is hardly new, it is more 

of a mistake today. Globalization has made the world smaller, and international connections, for good or ill, are faster and easier to make. Island 

nations have built great networks of regional cooperation and are working on ways to connect communities with international actors. Forums, 

such as those provided by the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for 

Security Studies, should be taken advantage of as much as possible. Island states have much to teach the international community about cooperation and resilience, and we should learn to listen. 
58 Regionalism, Security & Cooperation in Oceania 

Introduction

The announced U.S. “pivot” towards Asia in 2011 was welcomed by many 

U.S. allies and friends in the region. Resources diverted to wars in Afghanistan and Iraq had taken its toll on U.S. forces’ personnel and preparedness 

in the U.S. Pacific Command area. Coupled with concerns over a “rising 

China,” a re-prioritized focus towards the Asia-Pacific alleviated other countries’ fears that China’s increasing influence would go unchecked.

Almost immediately after its announcement, however, the U.S. government found itself having to parse what it meant by “pivot.” First, the policy was retitled the “rebalance” to avoid perceptions of a “quick or sudden 

move” as the pivot implied for some. Second, beyond the semantics, the U.S. 

needed to explain how the rebalance was not about confronting China (to 

avoid tensions with a major trading partner), while at the same time, assuring allies that the rebalance did check an assertive China. Secretary of State 

Hillary Clinton stressed the former,1

 yet focused more on the latter when out 

of office.2 As fiscal constraints became tighter, the United States struggled to 

give substance to its rebalance rhetoric.

To be sure, there have been visible aspects of the rebalance (though many 

of these were in the negotiation stages long before the announcement of the 

rebalance). The porting of littoral combat ships in Singapore and development of the rotating force of U.S. Marines in Darwin, Australia, are certainly 

among the most visible of military adjustments.3

 Diplomatically and economically, the appointment of the first U.S. ambassador to the Association 

of Southeast Asian Nations — in 2008, long before the rebalance — and ex1 Julian Pecquet, “Clinton: ‘Pivot to Asia’ about promoting democracy, not countering China,” The 

Hill, July 9, 2012, http://thehill.com/policy/international/236743-clinton-says-administrations-pivot-to-asia-really-about-human-rights-democracy.

2 Graeme Dobell, “Hillary’s pivot posse and China as Wild West desperado,” The Strategist, June 30, 

2014, http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/hillarys-pivot-posse-and-china-as-wild-west-desperado/. 

3 The “full” return of New Zealand into the ANZUS alliance deserves mention as well. Suspended 

for nearly thirty years due to New Zealand’s anti-nuclear policy, US-NZ military relations improved 

while working together in Iraq and Afghanistan, culminating in New Zealand’s full participation in 

the Rim of the Pacific naval exercises in 2014.
 The United States and the Pacific Island Countries - Shibuya 59

pansion of the Tran-Pacific Partnership also highlight that, while the Middle 

East was certainly the priority over the last 10-plus years, the United States 

did not completely lose focus on matters in Asia. In all of these actions, 

however, there remains a glaring absence of a policy towards Pacific Island 

countries. 

This would hardly be the first time Island nations were afterthoughts in 

U.S. policy in the Asia-Pacific; if indeed, one could say they were thought 

of at all. Being ignored in the world of international politics is sadly nothing new for the Pacific Islands, but there are increasingly impending threats 

that demand their voices be heard on the global stage. Conversely, shifts in 

great power politics (most notably, the rise of China and India) require the 

United States to consider many other actors and not take them for granted, 

while considering the second- and third-order effects of its own policies. 

The United States’ general goodwill and political capital in the region is not 

endless, nor is it unchallenged; and it would do well to consider how to reinvigorate its profile in the region, particular with Pacific Island nations. 

The United States and the Pacific Islands: From Benign 

Neglect to Unwanted Attention

In the aftermath of World War II, there was no question as to the predominant superpower in the Asia-Pacific. Unlike in Europe, where the Soviet 

Union could contest American power, the Cold War security arrangement 

in the Pacific clearly favored the United States. Soviet alliances with the People’s Republic of China, North Korea, and Vietnam were never as strong as 

the Soviets wished. Additionally, these states were surrounded by a network 

of U.S. bilateral agreements with Japan, South Korea, Thailand, and the Philippines, as well as a trilateral agreement with Australia and New Zealand. 

These relationships formed a ring around the Pacific Ocean and were the 

framework of the region’s security architecture. The heart, however, of U.S. 

influence in the region, was, in fact, among Pacific Island nations, particu-
60 Regionalism, Security & Cooperation in Oceania 

larly island states in free association with the United States. These included 

the Federated States of Micronesia, Republic of the Marshall Islands, and 

Republic of Palau. Along with the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana 

Islands, they formed the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (TTPI).

The TTPI was under a UN trusteeship system administered by the United 

States for roughly 30 years, starting in 1947. While eleven other trusteeships that included other Island nations, such as Nauru, New Guinea, and 

Western Samoa, fell under the jurisdiction of the UN General Assembly, 

the Security Council had oversight over the TTPI. Furthermore, Article 15 

of the trusteeship agreement prohibited the agreement from being “altered, 

amended, or terminated without the consent of the Administering Authority (the United States).”4

 Coupled with U.S. veto power in the Security Council, no other trustee holder had such overarching power over its trusteeship. 

The trusteeship period between the end of World War II through the 

Kennedy Administration is often referred to as a period of “benign neglect,” 

but such a notion is debatable. On the security front, there was certainly 

no neglect of the TTPI, and the attention was hardly benign. The area was 

closed off for nuclear testing (even American citizens required a security 

clearance to enter the TTPI); Island populations from Bikini and Enewetak 

Atolls were completely displaced for nuclear device testing; and the Kwajalein Atoll population was moved for intercontinental missile and, later, 

missile defense testing. 

While justifications for closing off the TTPI from much of the outside 

world were to preserve the culture of Island societies, clearly the real intention was to secure military interests. Further, without deference to or 

understanding of these cultures, the United States established several social 

programs — universal education, health care, and governmental systems — 

all patterned after the American model. These caused great problems within these small societies; problems that worsened during the Kennedy and 

4 Stewart Firth, Nuclear Playground (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1987), 52. 
 The United States and the Pacific Island Countries - Shibuya 61

Johnson Administrations. A UN report highly critical of the handling of the 

TTPI appeared somewhat embarrassingly the same year that President John 

Kennedy gave a speech denouncing colonialism before the UN General Assembly. Reports in the popular press referring to the “Rust Territory,” “Our 

Bungled Trust,” and “Trust Betrayed,” also appeared.5 The Kennedy Administration responded by throwing more money at the problem. Appropriations for the TTPI — averaging from $1 million to $5 million a year from 

1947 to 1963 — exploded to $15 million. Under Lyndon Johnson’s “Great 

Society” programs, appropriations expanded to $35 million. The impacts to 

the traditional cultures of those under the Trust were devastating.6

The late 1960s signaled the end of the colonization era, and the beginning of TTPI members’ work to re-shape their relationships with the United States. The Congress of Micronesia (COM) was established in 1965 to 

further the political development of the TTPI, though the U.S. high commissioner still held much of the governing authority. In 1967, the COM 

set up a political status commission to explore varying options towards terminating the trusteeship. The COM advocated “free association” (a new 

status developed between New Zealand and the Cook Islands) and entered 

into negotiations with the United States in 1969. These efforts stalled as the 

United States favored commonwealth status, which is essentially complete 

integration, along the lines of Puerto Rico, Guam and American Samoa. 

TTPI leaders hoped for maximum independence with maximum financial 

assistance, while the United States looked to preserve the potential for military use of the islands. 

5 Donald F. McHenry, Micronesia: Trust Betrayed (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1975), 14.

6 Robert C. Kiste, “New Political Statuses in American Micronesia,” in Contemporary Pacific Societies: Studies in Development and Change, Victoria S. Lockwood, Thomas G. Harding and Ben J. Wallace 

(eds.) (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1993). 
62 Regionalism, Security & Cooperation in Oceania 

Free Association and the End of the Cold War

Despite earlier resistance to free association, the United States became 

more accepting of the idea after the TTPI’s unity ended. The Northern 

Mariana Islands wished to enter into commonwealth status with the United States, and once that agreement was accepted in 1975, the rest of the 

TTPI began to negotiate separately, looking for the most advantageous deals 

possible. 

The Republic of the Marshall Islands (home to Kwajalein Atoll) and the 

Republic of Palau (westernmost of the TTPI and a great strategic location) 

separated from the rest of the TTPI, which remained together as the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM). The Marshalls and FSM formally entered 

into a Compact of Free Association (COFA) with the United States in 1986. 

Palau’s status was more controversial due to strong anti-nuclear provisions 

in its new constitution, yet it entered into free association with the U.S. in 

1994.7

In return for financial provisions and a host of other services and privileges — such as the use of the U.S. Postal Service at U.S. domestic prices and 

visa-free entry into America — the U.S. kept the right of strategic denial and, 

possibly, for future military use of the islands. Perhaps most importantly, 

the Compact places the highest obligation of defense on the United States. 

Title Three, Article 1 of each COFA establishes the U.S. “obligation to defend 

the Marshall Islands and the Federated States of Micronesia and their peoples from attack or threats thereof as the United States and its citizens are 

defended” (emphasis added). Similar wording exists in the Palau Compact. 

This defense provision is not one-sided, as citizens of the freely associated 

states serve with distinction in the U.S. Armed Forces. 

7 The fight over approval of Free Association status for Palau was particularly contentious, to include the assassination of a Palauan president and the suicide of his successor under suspicious circumstances. See among others Arnold H. Leibowitz, Embattled Island: Palau’s Struggle for Independence (Westport: Praeger, 1996), Sue Rabbitt Roff, Overreaching in Paradise: United States Policy in 

Palau Since 1945 (Juneau: Denali Press, 1991), and Lynn B. Wilson, Speaking to Power: Gender and 

Politics in the Western Pacific (New York: Routledge, 1995). 
 The United States and the Pacific Island Countries - Shibuya 63

The end of the Cold War contributed to return of a general state of neglect 

by the U.S. towards these Compact States. Relations continued with little 

controversy, the only exception being that associated with negotiations for 

compensation for those displaced by and exposed to nuclear testing in the 

1950s. Compact States citizens traveled to the United States without visas 

(and occasionally without passports) and built lives in the United States, 

while remaining connected to their home islands. The late 1990s to early 

2000s included security concerns about “near-peer competitors” (i.e., China), and while Compact States offer geostrategic locations in reacting to 

potential Chinese aggression, most associated discussions barely included 

these States, if at all. 

“Patching” the Global War on Terror: 

Failed States and Cooperative Intervention 

While Compact security provisions exist until both parties approve their 

termination, financial provisions had a fifteen-year time limit. A perception

had developed that many Compact States citizens had settled in Hawaii 

and Guam, and had become an economic burden on these governments. 

Renegotiations resulting in “Compact II” included “impact funds” for Hawaii and Guam, though this was not seen as a major aspect of negotiations, 

which began in 2001. 

Compact renegotiations focused heavily on oversight of immigration of 

member citizens into the United States. The September 11 attacks made 

immigration oversight even more of a U.S. necessity. While concerns were 

raised there would be limitations placed on immigration and/or entry by 

Compact citizens, the U.S. government’s position was that it was simply 

strengthening oversight, to include implementing machine-readable passports and requiring passports for entry.8

8 Eric Shibuya, “The Freely Associated States and the United States 2004-2005: Holding Firm,” 

(Honolulu: Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, February 2005). 
64 Regionalism, Security & Cooperation in Oceania 

The “Global War on Terror” reached the Pacific Islands in many ways. In 

April 2003, allegations arose that Nauruan passports had been found with 

known al-Qaeda operatives.9 Though there seems to be little information 

beyond these initial reports, Nauru terminated its passport sales at the time. 

Additionally, concerns over the threat of “failed states” and their potential to 

become terrorist havens entered the discussion and served as the intellectual 

justification for the Australian-led intervention into the Solomon Islands. 

(Connecting failed states in the Pacific to potential terrorist threats also allowed Australia to lower its commitment in Afghanistan and Iraq on the 

justification that it was protecting its “patch” in the Pacific). By 2007, there 

were also investigations of the rise of Islam in the Pacific, noting that while 

alarmist cries of an al-Qaeda foothold in Oceania are overblown, the idea of 

a completely benign environment is also an exaggeration.10

The Asia-Pacific Rebalance: Careful What You Wish For (?)

Certainly, the rebalance announcement was a welcome one, but its substance has left much to be desired for many in the region. While there has 

been a host of diplomatic and economic initiatives — such as high-level U.S. 

participation at the Pacific Islands Post-Forum dialogue and the Trans-Pacific Partnership — there has clearly been a gap between rhetoric and reality. Significant disagreements within the U.S. government led to a government shutdown that brought into stark relief the fiscal realities the Obama 

Administration and its successors will confront. This reality also generally 

dampened expectations around the region of a massive influx of military 

personnel and equipment, and their associated economic benefits. 

There were also some sighs of relief, considering the social and environmental pressures that accompany a large foreign presence. Considerations 

of long-term potential adjustments in U.S. force structure and presence 

9 Uli Schmetzer, “Anti-terror quest leads to tiny Pacific Island,” Chicago Tribune, April 17, 2003, 

http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2003-04-17/news/0304170274_1_nauru-passports-kevin-rudd 

10 Ben Bohane, “Green Moon Rising: Islam Is Spreading In Melanesia,” Pacific Magazine, July/August 

2007. 
 The United States and the Pacific Island Countries - Shibuya 65

could have interesting implications — positive and negative — for Pacific 

Island nations, especially the Compact States. 

Unlike all of the other defense agreements, which deal with the considerations of an attack, the Compact relationship puts a proactive requirement 

on the United States to defend these States. The Compact States’ geostrategic location make them attractive staging points for U.S. assets, and the 

Compact obligation could justify a greater U.S. presence there. This would 

undoubtedly bring increased financial benefits and some infrastructure improvements, but again, associated social and environmental tensions should 

not be downplayed. The rebalance policy could bring greater U.S. attention 

onto the Compact States, but it wouldn’t be entirely beneficial for them, and 

they may find there are worse things than being relatively ignored by the 

United States. 

Conclusions: Getting the Balance Right in the Rebalance

The U.S.-Compact States relationship is — at least by legal wording — the 

strongest defense relationship the United States has with another country. 

The general U.S. indifference regarding this relationship has strained the 

generally positive relationship and good political capital the U.S. has with 

these countries. For example, as of October 2014, Palau’s budget has been 

funded by continuing U.S. Congressional resolutions because their Compact 

budget — originally scheduled for a 2011 approval — was caught up in the 

budget battle between Congress and the Obama Administration.11 The U.S. 

cannot afford for a relatively insignificant disbursement, totaling about $189 

million between 2014 and 2023, to cripple the relationship with a country 

whose location could have greater security implications in the longer term. 

Whatever the larger physical manifestations of the rebalance, the policy 

focus will be a return to greater engagement by the U.S. with the Asia-Pa11 Elke Larson, “Prioritizing Palau: Why the Compact Budget Matters,” Pacific Partners Outlook,

3(10), October 10, 2013, http://csis.org/publication/prioritizing-palau-why-compact-budget-matters. 
66 Regionalism, Security & Cooperation in Oceania 

cific region by expanding avenues for cooperation. For the Pacific Islands, 

however, there are significant obstacles to expanding cooperation. While 

many countries in the Asia-Pacific have concerns over erosions of sovereignty in cooperating with the U.S., the Islands must also consider issues of 

scale. For many island states, there is simply not enough personnel to meet 

official reporting and coordination requirements that the U.S. and other international donors often place upon them. They’re capable of focusing on 

missions or coordination with larger entities, but frequently cannot do both. 

Creative solutions — finding different ways to do the same things — are 

critical in improving cooperation. Taking advantage of small populations 

and the ability of information to flow quickly could have major benefits in 

police investigations, for example. What is needed is developing a greater 

connection between these community networks and the more official policy/security structures. 

U.S. entities that facilitate this connection are the Asia-Pacific Center for 

Security Studies (APCSS) in Honolulu and other Department of Defense regional centers for security studies. They provide powerful venues for building relationships, and greater personal and professional networks among 

military and government professionals. Representatives of Pacific Islands 

civil and government organizations attend APCSS courses and workshops 

— both at the Center and abroad — that build the cultural understanding 

necessary for greater communication and cooperation. 

Greater engagement improves cultural understanding, and greater cultural understanding leads to better, more effective engagement. Ultimately, 

greater U.S. cooperation with Pacific Island nations may not be an issue of 

more, but rather better engagement. From issues spanning conflict resolution to resource management, Island cultures have a lot to teach us; we need 

to learn how to listen. 
67

Chapter 5

Australia and Security in the Pacific Islands 

Region

Jenny Hayward-Jones

Executive Summary

• Australia has been the dominant power in the Pacific Islands region, or 

the South West Pacific, for at least three decades. Australia’s continued 

regional dominance is assured in the medium term thanks to its prominent position as an aid donor, the strength of its trade and investment 

links, and the depth of its security cooperation efforts. 

• The region has long attracted the interest of major powers. France and 

the United States hold territories of various statuses in the region. Japan 

has been a long-term player, and China and Taiwan have been on the 

scene for many years. There has been speculation that the power dynamics in the region are changing, but the region has not yet become an 

object of great power competition.

• The relative peace the Pacific Islands enjoy makes it difficult for the 

region’s governments to attract international attention to the serious 

non-traditional security threats they face. It is in this area that Australia 

could do more to assist the region by assisting in mitigating and adapting to adverse effects of climate change; managing the impact of natural 

disasters; and supporting sustainability of the region’s fisheries.
68 Regionalism, Security & Cooperation in Oceania 

Introduction

Australia, by dint of geography, trade and investment links, tourism, aid, 

defense assets and sport, has exercised a dominant influence in the Pacific 

Islands region, particularly in Melanesia, for at least three decades. 

Australia’s 2013 National Security Strategy identifies the nation’s principal and enduring interests in the Pacific Islands region as “security, stability and economic prosperity.” The strategy document doesn’t address “hard 

threats,” but rather economic, gender, social, governance, and security issues 

as those that hamper sustainable development and potentially undermine 

the region’s stability.1

Future instability in the region — whether it is a further breakdown in 

law and order in the Solomon Islands; internal conflict in the Southern 

Highlands of Papua New Guinea; civil unrest in any island country; a return 

of anti-Chinese riots; or population movements driven by climate change — 

will demand an Australian response. Affected governments and citizens will 

look to Canberra for help or guidance.  Similarly, other major powers will 

continue to rely on Australia to respond to crises in the region. 

Australia may be the region’s dominant player, but the balance of influence has changed since 2003 when Australia drove the establishment of the 

Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI).  China is a much 

more important player, even if not by strategic design.2

 The United States 

is more engaged.  U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton related at the 2012 

Pacific Islands Forum — and the traditional powers and China likely agree 

— that they all have important contributions to make, and each have a stake 

in the region’s successful advances in security, opportunity and prosperity.3

1 Australian Government, Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, “Strong and Secure: a 

Strategy for Australia’s National Security” (Canberra: Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, 

2013), http://apo.org.au/files/Resource/dpmc_nationalsecuritystrategy_jan2013.pdf. 

2 Jenny Hayward-Jones, “Big Enough for All of Us: Geo-Strategic Competition in the Pacific Islands,” Lowy Institute Analysis (Sydney: Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2014).

3 Stephen Dziedzic, “US in Pacific for the Long Haul: Clinton,” ABC News, September 1, 2012, 

http://www.abc.net.au/news/2012-09-01/us-in-pacific-for-the-long-haul-clinton/4237756.
 Australia & Security in the Pacific Islands Region - Hayward-Jones 69

Australia’s Regional Economic Dominance 

Australia’s dominant influence in the region is underlined by its status 

as the region’s primary trading partner and aid donor, and most prominent 

investor.   Australia’s merchandise trade with the Pacific Islands was worth 

over AUD$7 billion in 20134

.   

Australia is a significant partner of the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat 

(PIFS). In signing the Australia-PIFS partnership for 2014-2016 in April 

2014, it pledged AUD$21.6 million to support advancing regionalism, which 

includes regional security initiatives.5 

Australia as the Dominant Aid Partner

Nothing illustrates Australian predominance more than its aid commitment to the region. Australia committed more than AUD$1.1 billion to the 

Pacific Islands in the 2014-2015 financial year; the vast majority of which is 

spent in Melanesia (principally Papua New Guinea and Solomon Islands).6

In 2012 — the most recent year for which comparative data is available 

from the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development — 

Australia’s net disbursements totaled US$1.147 billion, which constituted 60 

percent of the bilateral and 54 percent of the Pacific Islands region’s total 

aid.7 According to OECD Development Assistance Committee statistics for 

2012, the next biggest OECD donors are the United States, New Zealand, 

Japan and France.8

4 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Composition of Trade Australia 2013, http://www.dfat.

gov.au/about-us/publications/Documents/cot-cy-2013.pdf.

5 “Australia and Pacific Islands Forum sign new agreement,” http://www.forumsec.org/pages.cfm/

newsroom/press-statements/2014-1/australia-pacific-islands-forum-sign-new-agreement.html

6 Senator the Hon Brett Mason, “Deputy Prime Minister Truss and Parliamentary Secretary to the 

Minister for Foreign Affairs to attend the Pacific Islands Forum Leaders’ Meeting,” news release, July 

28, 2014, http://ministers.dfat.gov.au/mason/releases/Pages/2014/bm_mr_140728.aspx.

7 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, “Oceania,” Development Aid at a 

Glance: Statistics by Region, 2014, http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/documentupload/6.%20Oceania%20Development%20Aid%20at%20a%20Glance%202014.pdf, 2. 

8 Ibid.
70 Regionalism, Security & Cooperation in Oceania 

Australia is the region’s leading donor by a significant margin, but new 

development assistance is coming from as far as Russia, South Korea, India, 

United Arab Emirates, Kuwait and Qatar. 

China

China’s global aid program has grown as has its economy and defense 

spending. From 2006 to 2011, it gave approximately $850 million to the 

eight Pacific Island states that recognize it as the “one China,” making it the 

region’s fifth largest donor over this period.9 In contrast, in that same period, Australia gave more than five times that amount: $4.8 billion. The United States gave $1.27 billion, New Zealand provided $900 million, and Japan 

gave $869 million.10

China’s growing engagement in the Pacific Islands has fueled talk of a 

power struggle in the region. But viewing China’s regional activities in geostrategic terms is inappropriate and potentially counterproductive. China 

has not been disruptive — in a security sense — in Pacific Island countries; 

it has been a largely constructive partner, with its aid and investment largely 

concentrated in building infrastructure.11

The Traditional Security Domain

Australia is the key security partner for many Pacific Island states. More 

broadly, it bears much of the security responsibility for the South Pacific, 

which it identified in the 2013 Defence White Paper as one of Australia’s 

four key strategic interests.12

9 Hayward-Jones, Big Enough.

10 Ibid.

11 Ibid.

12 Australian Government, Department of Defence, Defence White Paper 2013 (Canberra: Department of Defence, 2013), http://www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper2013/docs/WP_2013_web.pdf, 25. 

The Defence website is currently undergoing a redevelopment and upgrade and the page cannot be 

opened.
 Australia & Security in the Pacific Islands Region - Hayward-Jones 71

In support of these strategic interests, Australia spends $53 million per 

annum on defense cooperation with Papua New Guinea and other Pacific 

Island countries, and $130 million on securing the neighborhood.13

The United States, while it retains primacy in the Asia-Pacific region as a 

whole, looks to Australia to take the lead on regional security for the South 

West Pacific, while it retains direct responsibility in the North Pacific. New 

Zealand provides for the security of Cook Islands, Niue, and Tokelau, while 

France guarantees the security of the French Pacific with defense forces 

based in New Caledonia and French Polynesia.

Australia, New Zealand and France actively cooperate on defense, disaster 

relief and regional maritime surveillance under the FRANZ arrangement, in 

place since 1992.14 There are also cooperative arrangements between Australia, New Zealand, France and the United States that coordinate surveillance 

in the region. 

Japan demonstrates renewed strategic interest in the region by its participation in Pacific Partnership humanitarian missions and its aid to Pacific 

Island countries. It has also shown interest in the PNG’s Liquid Natural 

Gas Project, highlighted by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s visit to Papua New 

Guinea in July 2014, and cooperation on military training with the Australian Defense Force, PNG Defense Force and U.S. Armed Forces.15

China’s contributions include refurbishing barracks in and providing military uniforms, vehicles and other non-lethal equipment to Fiji, Papua New 

Guinea and Tonga. China also provides some training to the Fiji military.16

13 Jenny Hayward-Jones, “Dreaming of China in the Pacific Islands,” The Interpreter (blog), May 16, 

2013, http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2013/05/16/Dreaming-of-China-in-the-Pacific-Islands.

aspx.

14 New Zealand Government, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, “Key pacific Issues – Disaster Relief “(Auckland: Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2013), http://www.mfat.govt.nz/Foreign-Relations/Pacific/0-disasterrelief.php.

15 Jemima Garrett and Liam Cochrane, “Thousands greet Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe 

as he visits a World War II Battlefield in PNG,” ABC News, July 11, 2014, http://www.abc.net.au/

news/2014-07-10/japan-pm-shinzo-abe-arrives-in-png/5588602.

16 Hayward-Jones, Big Enough.
72 Regionalism, Security & Cooperation in Oceania 

Military cooperation between Australia and China beyond the Pacific 

Islands suggests China will not seek a disruptive security presence in the 

region. Australian troops, alongside New Zealand and U.S. forces, are due 

to train on the ground in China for the first time. Chinese troops are also 

coming to Darwin to train with Australian soldiers and U.S. Marines.17 China also invited two Australian Defence Force (ADF) doctors to join their 

People’s Liberation Army (PLA) hospital ship Peace Ark on its 2014 humanitarian mission in the Pacific Islands.18

Australia’s Dominant Security Role 

The Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI) is the most 

striking example of Australian security dominance and influence in the Pacific Islands.  It cost Australia AUD$2.6 billion over a decade, with Australian funding making up 95 percent of overall mission costs. The nation spent 

AUD$2.2 billion on law and justice operations alone — 83 percent of overall 

costs. Defence absorbed AUD$406 million, while the Australian Federal 

Police (AFP) spent almost AUD$1.5 billion. It was a high price to pay for 

restoring stability in a small country. There were nevertheless many laudable achievements for RAMSI, the most important of which was the value 

of working with the whole region. The cooperation of defense and police 

forces from every country in the region was vital to the mission’s success.19

Defence support is underpinned by 24 Royal Australian Navy maritime 

surveillance and technical advisers located across the Pacific Islands (two 

additional participants are Royal New Zealand Navy personnel). In June 

2013, a new training contract was established for the provision of training 

17 Jesse Dorset, “Chinese Troops to Train with Australian Army and US Marines 

for First Time,” ABC News, July 18, 2014, http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-07-18/

chinese-troops-to-train-with-australian-army/5605982.

18 Australian Government, Department of Defence, “ADF Deploys with Chinese Navy 

Hospital Ship,” news release, Sept. 9, 2014, http://news.defence.gov.au/2014/09/09/

adf-deploys-with-chinese-navy-hospital-ship/

19 Jenny Hayward-Jones, “Australia’s Costly Investment,” Lowy Institute for International Policy, 

May 8, 2014, http://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/lessons-ramsi.
 Australia & Security in the Pacific Islands Region - Hayward-Jones 73

services in support of the program.20

More recently, the government approved almost AUD$594 million in purchase costs and AUD$1.38 billion for maintenance and personnel costs over 

the next thirty years of the updated Pacific Maritime Security Program.21

The program, which replaces the Pacific Patrol Boat Program, assists 

Pacific Island countries in managing their exclusive economic zones. The 

program is a key element of Australia’s defense engagement in the Pacific Islands region and provides financial, technical, logistics, maintenance, training, and other support to 22 patrol boats across 12 Pacific Island countries. 

The boats are the sovereign assets of Pacific Island countries and are used 

principally for maritime surveillance and law enforcement tasks. 22

Pacific Islands Defense Forces

Among Pacific Island nations, only Papua New Guinea, Fiji and Tonga 

have their own military forces, although the Vanuatu Police have a paramilitary wing. These militaries are small and lightly equipped; none would 

be capable of defending their nations against a foreign military force. In 

Fiji, the military itself has been a major contributor to domestic instability. 

In Papua New Guinea, certain undisciplined forces have instigated violence 

against civilians.

The Tongan military benefits from a close relationship with the U.S. and 

Australian militaries, and has deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq, but has only 

done so with significant financial and material assistance from the United 

States and Australia.23

20 Australian Department of Defence, Defence Annual Report 2012-13, http://www.defence.gov.au/

annualreports/12-13/part_two/program_1_1.asp.

21 Minister for Foreign Affairs and Minister for Defence, Australia, “Maritime security strengthened through Pacific Patrol Boat Program,” news release, June 17, 2014, http://www.minister.defence.

gov.au/2014/06/17/minister-for-foreign-affairs-minister-for-defence-maritime-security-strengthened-through-pacific-patrol-boat-program/.

22 Karl Claxton, “Boats to Patrol the Pacific,” The Strategist (blog), April 7, 2014, http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/boats-to-patrol-the-pacific/.

23 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, “US Relations with Tonga” 

(Washington: U.S. Department of State, 2014), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/16092.htm.
74 Regionalism, Security & Cooperation in Oceania 

The PNG military’s main roles are enforcing internal law and order, and 

border protection. It has been careful to maintain its independence from the 

nation’s famously unstable political situation, but is not consistently reliable.

Although Fiji’s military contributes to UN operations, most prominently 

in the Sinai and Golan Heights, it is lightly equipped and suffered suspension from the Australian Defence Force’s (ADF) Defence Cooperation Program after the 2006 coup. 

The ADF maintains an approximately AUD$27 million Defence Cooperation Program (DCP) with Papua New Guinea, comprised of training, exercises, technical advice and infrastructure upgrades. This was enhanced in 

May 2013 with the signing of the Defence Cooperation Arrangement, which 

provides a framework of principles as a point of reference for future cooperation between the two countries.24

In the wider Pacific Islands, the AUD$31 million Australian DCP assists 

defense and police forces through the provision of advisers, capability, infrastructure development, and support for exercise participation.25 

Defence and security issues are increasing in profile in the region. South 

Pacific defense ministers met for the first time formally in Tonga in May 

2013. The meeting included participation from Australia, New Zealand, 

Papua New Guinea, Tonga, France, and Chile. Ministers agreed it was important to build within the region’s traditional and new partners an awareness about the region’s unique security challenges.26 The meeting also resulted in the announcement of the new “Povai Endeavour,” a cooperative 

arrangement between the ADF and Pacific Island militaries to carry out regional exercises.27

24 Australian High Commission Papua New Guinea, “Senator Feeney’s Visit to Papua New Guinea” 

(Port Moresby: Australian High Commission Papua New Guinea, 2013), http://www.png.embassy.

gov.au/pmsb/72.html. 

25 Hayward-Jones, “Big Enough.”

26 Australian Government, Department of Defence, South Pacific Defence Ministers’ Meeting 

Joint Communiqué (Canberra; Department of Defence, 2013), http://www.minister.defence.gov.au/

files/2013/05/South-Pacific-Defence-Ministers-Meeting-Joint-Communique2.pdf.

27 Ibid.
 Australia & Security in the Pacific Islands Region - Hayward-Jones 75

At this time, it is difficult to see state-to-state conflict arising in the Pacific Islands region. Australia’s National Security Strategy 2013 identifies the 

more likely risk to its interests as “another state seeking to influence Australia or its regional and global partners by economic, political or military pressure.”28 The 2013 Defence White Paper states Australia needs to ensure “that 

no major power with hostile intentions establishes bases in our immediate 

neighborhood from which it could project force against us.”29

The nation’s forthcoming 2015 Defence White Paper is likely to reconfirm 

the strategic importance of the Pacific Islands region to Australia, but may 

have more to say about cooperation in regional security. 

Most island states in the region (with the possible exception of Fiji) are 

not seeking to change the existing security order, even if they could; although, they are keen to attract new external aid and commercial partners. 

Their attitude was best summed up by Papua New Guinea Prime Minister 

Peter O’Neill, who said his nation’s paramount strategic and security relationships were with Australia and the United States, but his country will 

continue to look for economic growth opportunities throughout Asia, as 

well as in Australia.30

Non-traditional Threat Domain

The Pacific Islands region is widely regarded as being peaceful, which 

means it is not on the radar of international security experts or on the agenda of the UN Security Council. In a world distracted by security crises in 

the Middle East and Ukraine, and China’s activity in East Asia, it’s difficult 

to attract much-needed international attention to non-traditional security 

threats affecting the Pacific Islands region.

28 Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, “Strong and Secure,” 11.

29 Department of Defence, Defence White Paper 2013, 25. No file, see above footnote 12.

30 Peter O’Neill, “Papua new Guinea in the Asian Century” (speech, Lowy Institute for International 

Policy, Sydney, November 29, 2012).
76 Regionalism, Security & Cooperation in Oceania 

Australia can continue to play an important role in working with the Pacific Islands region on non-traditional security issues. Australia, together 

with New Zealand and France, under the terms of the “FRANZ” arrangement, are usually the first foreign responders after cyclones, earthquakes 

and tsunamis hit countries in the region, quickly mobilizing defense and aid 

assets to assist affected populations.31

Australia has made sizable aid contributions to assist Pacific Island countries in responding to climate change challenges. However, Australia’s current lack of attention to climate change on a global scale has disappointed 

Pacific Island states.32 They have urged Australia to alter its climate change 

policy.33 The region’s leaders look to Canberra to take a leading role in acting 

on this issue and advocating for the needs of small island states in international forums. 

Another regional issue — illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing — 

is the main reason for reduction in the region’s fish stock. Australia has 

cooperated in fisheries surveillance, largely through the Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency, and in monitoring the exclusive economic zones of 

respective Pacific Island countries through the Pacific Patrol Boat Program, 

now known as the Pacific Maritime Security Program.34

Fiji 

Fiji’s isolation from the region since the 2006 coup has led it to pursue 

relationships with other powers and emerging economies, and promote 

sub-regional arrangements that do not include Australia. This approach 

31 New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Key Pacific Issues – Disaster Relief, http://

www.mfat.govt.nz/Foreign-Relations/Pacific/0-disasterrelief.php.

32 Nick O’Malley, “Australia is a Pacific island - it has a responsibility,” The Sydney Morning Herald, 

September 21, 2014, http://www.smh.com.au/world/australia-is-a-pacific-island--it-has-a-responsibility-20140921-10jwdw.html.

33 Catherine McGrath, “Pacific nations urge climate change action, ask Australia for help,” Australian Broadcasting Corporation, May 26, 2014, http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-05-27/

pacific-countries-make-climate-change-appeal/5481050.

34 “Pacific Island Forum Fisheries Agency,” https://www.ffa.int/about.
 Australia & Security in the Pacific Islands Region - Hayward-Jones 77

served to diminish Australia’s role in dominating the regional conversation 

about security issues. For example, Fiji has sought military assistance from 

China, Russia, United Arab Emirates, and Israel because of the suspension 

of defense cooperation with Australia. The Fiji government has signed 

memorandums of understanding on military cooperation with China, Russia, and United Arab Emirates, and has approached Brazil about a similar 

arrangement. 

Australia is re-establishing defense cooperation ties with Fiji following the island state’s Sept. 17, 2014, democratic elections. In the lead up 

to the elections, Australia ensured that Fiji received Australian intelligence 

and other cooperation during international efforts to secure the release of 44 

Fijians captured in the Golan Heights.35 The 44 were participating in a UN 

Disengagement Observer Force.36 Additionally, Vice Admiral Ray Griggs, 

ADF vice-chief, visited Fiji in December 2014, holding talks with Timoci 

Natuva, Fiji’s Minister of Defense, National Security and Immigration. It 

was Australia’s first senior officer visit to Fiji since 2006.37

35 Minister for Foreign Affairs, Australia, “Detention of Fiji Peacekeepers,” news release, August 30, 

2014, http://foreignminister.gov.au/releases/Pages/2014/jb_mr_140830b.aspx.

36 Ibid.

37 “Aust, Fiji move to resume defence ties,” news.com.au, December, 9, 2014, http://www.news.com.

au/national/breaking-news/aust-fiji-move-to-resume-defence-ties/story-e6frfku9-1227149922471.
78 Regionalism, Security & Cooperation in Oceania 

Conclusion

Australia may not always be the Pacific Islands region’s most influential 

player from an economic perspective, but is the Pacific Islands region’s indispensable power from a security perspective. 

Australia, like other dominant players in their own regions, will always be 

both damned and praised for its various actions.  It has led important security interventions, including helping restore and build peace in Bougainville 

and restoring law and order in the Solomon Islands. But, it has not done as 

well as it could in responding to climate change concerns.

Australia has much work to do in understanding security from a Pacific 

Island viewpoint; it remains, however, the power most able and most likely 

to guarantee regional security in the interests of the Pacific Islands region’s 

people.
79

Chapter 6

Finding Common Ground:

New Zealand and Regional Security Cooperation 

in the Pacific

Anna Powles

Executive Summary

• The Pacific is growing in geostrategic relevance, and this has implications for New Zealand’s engagement and influence in the regional security architecture. 

• Regional security architecture in the Pacific Islands is becoming increasingly tested, contested and challenged as a consequence of sub-regional 

dynamics and the heightened engagement of new and non-traditional 

partners.

• Geopolitical dynamics are also re-shaping regional security in the Pacific 

as periphery powers China, India and Russia challenge the influence of 

the traditionally dominant smaller powers, Australia and New Zealand.

• Larger peripheral powers, China, India and Russia, have stepped up engagement with the Pacific Islands; and France, having previously shown 

little interest in the actual region in which her Pacific outre-mer, or overseas territories, are situated, is becoming increasingly concerned about 

being left out of the regional security architecture.
80 Regionalism, Security & Cooperation in Oceania 

Introduction

The geopolitics of the Pacific is entering a fascinating phase. The winds 

of political change are gathering strength within the region — in part, spearheaded by Fiji’s fiercely independent foreign policy — and will ultimately 

transform regional security and governance. The region, historically the site 

of external geopolitical competition, is increasingly experiencing the pressures and tensions of the larger powers on its periphery. 

With New Zealand’s election to a non-permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council (2015 - 2016), there is an opportunity for New Zealand perspectives on the regional security architecture in the Pacific Islands 

to gain a wider currency and influence. This will, however, require New 

Zealand to demonstrate stronger leadership in the region. 

The nature of threats facing the Pacific Islands region, including climate 

change, fragile cities, resource and environmental security, demographic 

pressures, the potential emergence of two new states in the next decade, and 

worsening health security, demand innovative and creative solutions. The 

regional security architecture will be challenged by two independence referendums scheduled to be held in Bougainville and New Caledonia before 

2020. Regional security groupings will need to reorient themselves to face 

these challenges, and that will mean engaging new and non-traditional actors seeking greater influence in the region. As a consequence, New Zealand 

can no longer assume its influence in the region. 

It is argued here that New Zealand’s influence in the Pacific has already 

waned significantly, although Wellington has been reluctant, indeed resistant, to acknowledge the fact. This chapter first examines New Zealand’s 

strategic environment and approaches to the Pacific, and its engagement 

with and contribution to regional security cooperation mechanisms. The 

chapter then asks what effective and resilient regional security cooperation 

mechanisms look like; and critiques opportunities for New Zealand to further enhance regional security cooperation. The chapter then concludes 
 New Zealand and Regional Security Cooperation - Powles 81

that New Zealand needs to reclaim its comparative advantage in the regional 

security cooperation arena. 

New Zealand’s Immediate Strategic Environment

New Zealand’s strategic environment is unequivocally the Pacific. The 

nation considers itself a Pacific nation with a considerable Pasifika population1

 and with constitutional responsibility for the realm territories of the 

Cook Islands, Niue and Tokelau, and a significant marine territory. In 1897, 

New Zealand Prime Minister Richard Seddon, who viewed New Zealand as 

a natural leader of island peoples, advocated for the annexation of Pacific 

Islands as far away as Hawaii. The failure of Britain to develop a Monroe 

Doctrine for the South Pacific apparently “caused chagrin” in New Zealand 

as American, German and French influence extended into the region. 

Almost a century later, official documents have continued to advance the 

link between New Zealand and the Pacific Islands. A 1984 report by the 

Ministry of Foreign Affairs examining New Zealand’s relations with its Pacific neighbors declared as one of its assumptions that “New Zealand should 

recognize that we are part of the Pacific.” In 2002, former Labour Government Foreign Minister Phil Goff suggested that “We see ourselves as a Pacific nation with key responsibilities in the South Pacific, with an increasingly 

important trading and political relationship with Asia.” 

The legacy of these desires for a South Pacific sphere of influence can be 

seen in New Zealand’s constitutional relationships with Tokelau, Niue and 

the Cook Islands, and through its Treaty of Friendship with Samoa. The 2010 

“Inquiry into New Zealand’s Relationships with South Pacific Countries,” by 

Parliament’s Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee, acknowledged 

the nation’s increasing Pacific composition and found that “New Zealand 

1 The New Zealand 2013 census showed that 295,941 people identified with one or more Pacific 

ethnic groups; Pacific peoples were the fourth largest ethnic group, making up 7.4 percent of the 

population; however the Pasifika population grew by 11.3 percent compared with 14.7 percent the 

previous census period. http://www.stats.govt.nz/Census/2013-census.aspx. 
82 Regionalism, Security & Cooperation in Oceania 

is increasingly part of the regional fabric.” To what extent New Zealand’s 

alleged “Pacificness” and the rhetoric on championing regional issues and 

regional sensitivity remains debatable. 

Historian Malcolm McKinnon, writing in the 1990s, was skeptical that 

New Zealand had adopted a stronger Pacific identity. He argued that rather 

than viewing New Zealand’s regional policies — including concerns over nuclear waste, fisheries, and Law of the Sea issues — as exemplifying a Pacific 

dimension, they should be seen as a continuation of its independence in foreign policy, of an alternative strategic culture, and reflecting interest-driven 

policies.2 This was certainly the case in response to the coup in Fiji in 2006. 

Following the Fiji coup, Australia and New Zealand both responded with 

a similar tone, reflecting a rigid, non-negotiable and principled stance; a 

stance that was appropriate from a neo-liberal democratic perspective, but 

has been quietly criticized for lacking a more nuanced appreciation of the 

cultural and political context. As former New Zealand diplomat Gerald 

McGhie pointed out, while rhetoric on New Zealand’s Pacific-orientation 

and engagement with the region is oft-repeated, the country has yet to fully 

address the complex nature of problems facing Pacific states; this requires a 

change in approach.

The paradox of New Zealand’s relationship with the Pacific is that New 

Zealand sits both within the region, but also on the periphery. A colonial 

history, current constitutional obligations, and its role as a development donor to the region, places New Zealand alongside Australia with the regional 

periphery powers of France, United Kingdom, and the United States. Geography, culture and historical linkages therefore serve to situate New Zealand 

in the region and on its periphery. In recognition of its shifting strategic 

environment, New Zealand is increasingly playing a critical role as a conduit 

2 Malcolm McKinnon, Independence and Foreign Policy (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 

1993), 271.
 New Zealand and Regional Security Cooperation - Powles 83

or bridge between the periphery powers, non-traditional powers seeking an 

increased role in the region, and Pacific Islands themselves. 

Since the U.S. rebalance to the Asia-Pacific and the resumption of 

high-level ties between Washington and Wellington,3 there has been a clear 

expectation that New Zealand will support American interests in the region. 

The 2010 Wellington Declaration states New Zealand and the United States 

are both Pacific nations; our governments and peoples share a deep and 

abiding interest in maintaining peace, prosperity and stability in the region; 

and cites practical cooperation in the Pacific region in the areas of renewable 

energy, disaster response management, and climate adaptation. 

The 2012 Washington Declaration on defense cooperation between the 

United States and New Zealand includes maritime security cooperation, 

including strengthening maritime domain awareness, maritime security 

presence and capabilities, and humanitarian and disaster relief preparedness.4

 The two landmark declarations restoring relations between the two 

countries have led to growing questions about the impact of the renewed 

U.S.-New Zealand relationship on the Pacific Islands. Since Eleanor Lattimore wrote in November 1945 that “the United States proposes to make an 

American lake out of the Pacific Ocean,”5

 U.S. interest in the region over the 

past 70 years has proven more ambivalent than ambitious. For Pacific Island 

countries, the pivot has been underwhelming and there is regular debate 

that the region is once again the object of geopolitical contestations. 

The “China in the Pacific: The View From Oceania” conference, held in 

Samoa in February 2015, sought to address some of these concerns and successfully highlighted three key issues: the variance in views towards Chinese 

3 The Wellington Declaration was signed in 2010.

4 “Washington Declaration on Defence Cooperation Between the Department of Defense of the 

United States of America and the Ministry Defence of New Zealand and the New Zealand Defence 

Force,” June 19, 2012. 

5 Eleanor Lattimore, “Pacific Ocean or American Lake? Far Eastern Survey,” November 7, 1945, 

14(22), 313-316.
84 Regionalism, Security & Cooperation in Oceania 

engagement; Beijing’s lack of a clear and coherent “Pacific Strategy” in the 

region; and the depth of personal relationships being built between the Chinese and their counterparts in the Pacific Islands.

New Zealand’s engagement with China on a water infrastructure development project in the Cook Islands is an example of how New Zealand has 

effectively harnessed China’s strategic interests in the Pacific with the development needs of a Pacific Island country. This type of bilateral partnership 

is viewed as a discreet benchmark for development practice in the region. 

At the 2014 Pacific Islands Forum Post-Forum Dialogue, U.S. Secretary of 

State Hillary Clinton said New Zealand was leading the way in working with 

China on Pacific development projects, and that her nation would model its 

regional cooperation with China on New Zealand initiatives.6

Significantly, New Zealand’s oldest and most longstanding peripheral 

partnership is with Australia, and it is one of convergence and divergence, 

competition and collaboration. New Zealand is at times uncomfortable 

with Australia’s “sphere of influence” approach to the Pacific Islands region, 

but will bandwagon where necessary. What is clear is that the increasing 

divergence between Australia and New Zealand on defense capability and 

political agendas may have potential ramifications for regional security cooperation. This is particularly in relation to defense interoperability, differing policy approaches to key issues of concern in the region, such as China’s 

rise, and, most significantly, an understanding of the region which is not 

always complimentary. 

Moreover, with regards to Fiji – and by extension the region – there is the 

most room for divergence. Following the resumption of Australian-Fijian 

diplomatic ties and the lifting of sanctions, Australian Foreign Minister Julie 

Bishop’s visit to Fiji in November 2014 revealed a potential estrangement in 

trans-Tasman relations. Bishop’s and Fiji Prime Minister Voreqe Bainimara6 “New Zealand and China collaborate on world first in development,” New Zealand Aide Programme, September 2012, http://www.aid.govt.nz/media-and-publications/development-stories/

september-2012/new-zealand-and-china-collaborate-world-fi. 
 New Zealand and Regional Security Cooperation - Powles 85

ma’s announcement that a meeting (hereafter, the Sydney Meeting) would 

be held in early 2015 with the aim of reviewing the regional architecture 

caught New Zealand and the rest of the Pacific Islands by surprise. 

Bainimarama’s diplomatic seduction, combined with Bishop’s inexperience in regional politics, resulted in the successful conflation of two critical 

issues in regional governance; the first of which is Fiji’s readmission as a 

member of the Pacific Islands Forum. Since its expulsion from the Forum 

in 2009, Fiji has categorically stated that it would only return if Australia and 

New Zealand were downgraded from full members to development partner 

status. The second issue is the role of non-traditional periphery partners in 

the Pacific, such as China, Japan, South Korea, France and the United States,

7

 and the impact and influence of larger power tensions and geopolitics on 

Pacific governance and security. 

These are distinct issues wrongfully conflated. Moreover, the failure of 

both Australia and Fiji to consult with other Forum member countries has 

signaled a potential schism in regional dynamics. It heralded a divergence 

in Canberra-Wellington relations where traditionally the two countries have 

presented a common front. It also signaled an emerging nascent geopolitical competition between Fiji and Papua New Guinea (PNG). The regional 

competition between Fiji and PNG has been further intensified by PNG becoming a regional development donor as well as recipient; increased PNG 

investment in Melanesian states; and the appointment of PNG’s Dame Meg 

Taylor as Secretary-General of the Pacific Islands Forum. 

Fiji considers itself the natural “hub and leader” of the Pacific and the 

region’s leading defense actor. PNG Prime Minister Peter O’Neill responded 

to Fiji’s refusal to rejoin the Forum unless Australia and New Zealand are 

excluded by calling for a dialogue and a common sense approach that rec7 “Analyst says Aust/Fiji Forum deal concerning,” Dateline Pacific, November 3, 2014. 
86 Regionalism, Security & Cooperation in Oceania 

ognized “that we all live in the same region and Australia and New Zealand 

are very much part of that region.”8

The Sydney Meeting was postponed indefinitely in March 2015.9 The 

delay has given Canberra much-needed time to consider the implications 

of Fiji’s proposal and the opportunity for Forum member states to consult 

amongst themselves prior to the Forum Leader’s Meeting in late 2015. The 

delay has also given Fiji further opportunity to consolidate its relationships 

with non-regional defense and economic partners, such as the United Arab 

Emirates, Qatar, India, China, Russia and Indonesia. From New Zealand’s 

perspective, it is a critical time to re-evaluate the shifting geopolitical dynamics within the region and the consequences for New Zealand’s influence. 

New Zealand Engagement with Regional Security 

Cooperation Mechanisms

New Zealand does not have a formal strategy to guide its regional security cooperation, but rather employs a patchwork of bilateral and multilateral 

engagements. This ad hoc approach has resulted in some within the security 

and defense community to call for a more coherent strategy. Whether a regional security strategy would necessarily better inform and guide New Zealand’s contribution to regional security cooperation is debatable, given the 

complexities of the issues facing the Pacific Islands region. What is clear is 

that while defense and law enforcement cooperation is a considerable part of 

New Zealand’s regional security cooperation strategy, there is deep regional 

engagement involving a cross-section of multiple government agencies despite the absence of a whole-of-government strategy. Certainly, the country 

would benefit from greater cross-sectoral engagement in order to develop 

more nuanced approaches and responses. Government departments are in8 “Papua New Guinea PM Peter O’Neill dismisses Fiji’s push to remove Australia from Pacific Islands Forum,” Australian Broadcasting Corporation, November 28, 2014, http://www.abc.net.au/

news/2014-11-28/png-pm-wants-australia-to-remain-in-pacific-regional-body/5926014. 

9 Bainimarama was rumoured to be “unavailable.”
 New Zealand and Regional Security Cooperation - Powles 87

herently vulnerable to the silo effect where information is not shared across 

agencies and lessons learned are not transferred. 

For New Zealand, there has been a consistent emphasis that Pacific Islands’ security is a shared responsibility. Official New Zealand government 

documents consistently emphasize the centrality of regional security issues 

to the nation. This regional focus is underpinned in the “Defence White Paper 2010” (DWP 10); “2014 Defence Capability Plan” (DCP); “Headquarters 

New Zealand Defence Force: The 2013 - 2016 Statement of Intent;” the recent “Defence Midpoint Rebalancing Review” (DMRR); and the May 2014 

Cabinet review of peace support operations. Continued focus on regional 

security issues has informed, for example, the acquisition of military capabilities, such as joint amphibious capability systems. Alongside growing collective regional efforts, New Zealand has been providing extensive support 

to law and justice sector reforms. Targeted assistance has been provided 

to improve policing and crime prevention, access to and delivery of justice 

services, accountability mechanisms, and to reduce corruption in Fiji, PNG, 

Solomon Islands, Tonga and Vanuatu. 

The Pacific Security Cooperation Committee is the central oversight body 

managing the Pacific Security Fund. The fund, established in 2003 under the 

leadership of Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, aims to enhance the 

region’s security environment. The annual fund of $3 million is accessible 

by New Zealand law enforcement and border control agencies to provide 

training and other support to Pacific Island countries. Projects funded to 

date include assisting Pacific Island states with becoming compliant with the 

International Maritime Organisation’s International Ships and Port Security Code, and customs laws. The Fund also provides a forum for discussing 

security issues. There are recommendations that the Fund’s scope be broadened to include projects that may be outside New Zealand’s immediate interests, but which are highly relevant to Pacific partners. 
88 Regionalism, Security & Cooperation in Oceania 

Other security cooperation mechanisms in support of New Zealand 

foreign policy objectives include the New Zealand Mutual Assistance Programme (MAP).10 This is a New Zealand Army training assistance programme that includes training assistance to Tonga, PNG, Samoa, Cook Islands, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu and Niue. The MAP supports New Zealand 

Defence Force initiatives to strengthen the capabilities and effectiveness of 

regional security forces through the development of professional skills rather than the provision of equipment. 

In regards to conflict resolution in the region, New Zealand spearheaded a new approach to intervention and peacemaking in Bougainville in the 

1990s; a context and mission-specific form of hybrid peacebuilding. The 

nation led the way in reintegrating development specialists and diplomats 

into a peace support operation that also incorporated cultural and customary approaches to peacemaking. New Zealand’s experiences and the lessons learned in the early days of the Bougainville peace process — including 

the highly successful, but provocative decision that the initial deployment, 

the Truce Monitoring Group, would be deployed to the island unarmed — 

still need to be better integrated into current regional security cooperation 

mechanisms. 

From a regional perspective, as a member of the Pacific Islands Forum 

and the Forum Regional Security Committee, New Zealand’s approach to 

regional security cooperation is guided by the Biketawa Declaration and 

other key regional declarations.11 New Zealand supported the Biketawa 

Declaration-mandated Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands 

(RAMSI); the Pacific Regional Assistance to Nauru (PRAN, 2004); and the 

decision to sanction Fiji following the 2006 coup. New Zealand’s contribu10 The MAP was originally created to provide training assistance to Tonga, Singapore and Malaysia. 

It has since been expanded to the Philippines, Thailand, Brunei, Papua New Guinea, Western Samoa, 

Cook Islands, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu and Niue.

11 The Honiara Declaration on Law Enforcement Cooperation (1992), the Waigani Convention 

(1995), the Aitutaki Declaration on Regional Security Cooperation (1997), the Nasonini Declaration 

on Regional Security (2002). 
 New Zealand and Regional Security Cooperation - Powles 89

tions to RAMSI were substantial, but there has yet to be a comprehensive 

analysis of the nation’s cost benefit and lessons learned from the RAMSI 

experience.12

New Zealand is also party to several multilateral frameworks with periphery partners, which effectively exclude Pacific Islands Forum nations, 

although they are designed to strengthen regional security. These include 

FRANZ, the QUADRILATERAL Agreement, and, more recently, a reinvigorated version of ANZUS, a result of recent re-engagement between the 

New Zealand and U.S. militaries. New Zealand’s approach to regional security cooperation has traditionally been backed by strong bipartisan political 

will, but it has limited assets and resources with which to act. Allegations 

that New Zealand has been conducting mass surveillance of Pacific Island 

countries13 has been met with quiet disapproval by the region’s political leaders and undermines the fabric of political and personal trust between New 

Zealand and the region. 

Effective and Resilient Regional Security Cooperation 

Mechanisms 

Security cooperation mechanisms can be described as a patchwork of five 

elements: activities, programs, resources, processes and organizational relationships (RAND, 2012). Security cooperation mechanisms and security 

governance — at both the regional and national levels — are inter-related 

and mutually reinforcing. 

The key question for New Zealand as a regional security actor is how to 

measure and evaluate what is effective and therefore resilient? A key challenge in assessing regional security cooperation lies in the choice of benchmarks by which to evaluate progress. Assessing the value of what are es12 See, for example, Jenny Hayward-Jones’ report on “Australia’s Costly Investment in the Solomon 

Islands,” The Lowy Institute, May 8, 2014. 

13 “NZ spying on Pacific ‘growing,’” Radio New Zealand, March 5, 2015, http://www.radionz.co.nz/

news/political/267788/nz-spying-on-pacific-’growing’. 
90 Regionalism, Security & Cooperation in Oceania 

sentially qualitative activities and where the correlation among activities is 

not always apparent is difficult. Additionally, regional security cooperation 

mechanisms face critical challenges, including limitations of resources and 

institutional capacity. The fundamental challenge in assessing security cooperation mechanisms is that the quantitative, or measurable, indicators of 

efficiency and effectiveness are neither developed nor tracked in a systematic 

manner. Even qualitative indicators are based more on anecdotal evidence 

and narrative than structured assessment. A fairer question, then, would be 

what added value, if any, regional approaches provide compared to available 

alternatives?

And Missed Opportunities 

There are several high-profile and highly significant examples of where 

Pacific Island countries have not been included in regional security decision-making. These are the missed opportunities to develop resilience. The 

2003 - 2014 Australian-led Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI) is an example of a missed opportunity to build effective and 

resilient regional security cooperation amongst Forum member states. Ultimately, RAMSI supported the creation of a “negative peace” — the freezing 

of tensions through intervention — but not positive, sustainable, resilient 

peace. RAMSI was a neo-liberal state-building project that reflected the 

Howard government’s14 desire to radically re-engineer the Solomon Islands 

from the corridors of Canberra. RAMSI was mandated under the Biketawa 

Declaration with widespread regional support; however, the participation of 

Pacific Island bureaucrats, civil servants and policy-makers in the strategic 

planning and day-to-day running of the mission was minimal. 

The 2013 report “RAMSI Decade,” commissioned by the Solomon Islands 

government and the Pacific Islands Forum, acknowledged the mission’s key 

successes. It also identified a number of factors critical to success in future 

14 John Howard served as prime minister of Australia 1996 – 2007. 
 New Zealand and Regional Security Cooperation - Powles 91

interventions. This included addressing the absence of local ownership. The 

authors of “RAMSI Decade” cautioned against heralding the mission as a 

successful model for regional intervention because one of its core elements, 

the rebuilding of the Royal Solomon Islands Police Force (RSIPF), is deeply flawed. They relate that RAMSI has contributed to the police force’s demoralization and dependence on outside support. Moreover, earlier reports 

noted the lack of Solomon Islanders’ and other Pacific Island states’ participatory engagement 

What Does Success Look Like?

What are the strengths of regional security cooperation in the Pacific? 

Regional security cooperation mechanisms at the multilateral and bilateral 

levels have proven to work in the Pacific. It is arguable, though, that the 

key strengths of Pacific regional security cooperation remain untapped. The 

strengths of the Biketawa Declaration lie in its flexibility, cooperative security, and the range of tools it has at its disposal. Combined with the Human 

Security Framework for the Pacific (2012 - 2015), there is a clear drive and 

opportunity for the full and inclusive participation of all peoples affected by 

conflict. 

The evidence, including that from New Zealand’s Bougainville experience, suggests that local, inclusive approaches can provide legitimacy, a 

framework for long-term, self-sustaining efforts, and deeper integrative effects. As a consequence, culture and communication are important part of 

regional engagement tools. 

In measuring the success of security cooperation mechanisms in the Pacific region, three criteria should be considered. The first is legitimacy; the 

second is effectiveness; and the third is resilience, or robustness. The three 

are interrelated, but legitimacy underpins effectiveness and resilience. Legitimacy is critical, whether achieved at the local or village level, or national 
92 Regionalism, Security & Cooperation in Oceania 

and regional levels. Without legitimacy, security cooperation mechanisms 

lack sustainability. And without full and inclusive participation, legitimacy 

cannot be achieved or sustained. 

Opportunities for Enhancing Regional Security Cooperation 

New Zealand has contributed to Pacific Islands’ regional security by developing and strengthening its own security frameworks and infrastructure, 

but there remain areas of critical strategic importance. For New Zealand, 

there has been a consistent emphasis that Pacific Islands’ regional security 

is a shared responsibility. To address future challenges, New Zealand must 

re-examine its approach to the Pacific in the following five areas: 

Development of New Zealand’s maritime strategy policy

When the New Zealand government ratified the UN Convention on the 

Law of the Sea in July 1996, it acquired a maritime territory between fifteen 

and twenty times larger than the total land mass of New Zealand. As a consequence, New Zealand is recognized as having one of the largest maritime 

domains of all coastal states, with an Exclusive Economic Zone considered 

the world’s fourth or fifth largest. Moreover, under its constitutional obligations, New Zealand has responsibility for the maritime territories of Tokelau, Cook Islands and Niue. 

However, New Zealand defense strategists suffer from sea blindness. 

New Zealand has little maritime consciousness despite the Maori legends of 

ocean voyages from Hawaiki. It is a strategic paradox that New Zealand is 

a marine nation, but not a maritime nation. With the anticipated release of 

both New Zealand’s maritime security policy and the Defence White Paper 

due in 2015, it is hoped that a comprehensive, overarching maritime strategy 

is articulated; one that drives increased maritime awareness and capabilities 

to enable New Zealand to undertake a greater role in monitoring, surveillance, patrolling and protection of its maritime domain. 
 New Zealand and Regional Security Cooperation - Powles 93

Advancing the Security-Development Nexus

Former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan said that “development and 

security are inextricably linked” and the 2001 Organisation for Economic 

Co-operation and Development study on “Security Issues and Development 

Cooperation” stated that “the security of states and the security of people 

should be seen as mutually reinforcing.” The emergence of the security-development nexus is critical to conflict prevention and peacebuilding, and 

comprises governance, security sector, and the rule of law. The concept of 

“developmental peacekeeping” originated in South African scholarship and 

seeks to create “sustainable levels of human security through activities aimed 

at accelerating capacity building and socio-economic development, to dismantle war economies and conflict systems, and replace them with globally 

competitive ‘peace economies.’” 

New Zealand has an opportunity and an imperative to ensure that regional security cooperation mechanisms incorporate human security principles 

in keeping with the comprehensive Pacific Island Forum Human Security 

Framework for the Pacific (2012 - 2015). The framework is Pacific-centered 

and includes conflict-sensitive approaches to programming and policies; its 

core principles are preventative, localized, collaborative, people-centered 

and inclusive. In practical terms, the framework has significance for New 

Zealand Defence Force personnel involved in humanitarian assistance and 

disaster response operations, particularly those in post-conflict countries 

and fragile cities. An example of NZDF operations includes the 2014 humanitarian assistance and disaster relief response to flooding in the Solomon Islands. 

A New Approach to Engaging in Regional Defense Diplomacy

There is an emerging culture of defense diplomacy within the region and 

between regional island states and external defense partners (such as the establishment of defense ties between Fiji and a number of countries, includ-
94 Regionalism, Security & Cooperation in Oceania 

ing Indonesia, Russia, China, and India). New Zealand and Australia are no 

longer the primary defense partners for Pacific states, and it is critical that 

New Zealand changes its approach to how it engages with Pacific militaries. 

Enhancing mechanisms for interaction among security actors is crucial to 

building resilience within regional security cooperation. Examples include 

exchanges between the Vanuatu Military Force and PNG Defence Force on 

the PNG officer cadet course, and PNG and New Caledonia bilateral military 

field training exercises. While examples given are military-to-military exchanges designed to strengthen regional security cooperation mechanisms, 

key avenues exist for developing civil-military relations through training 

and educational exchanges. 

Making the UN Non-Permanent Seat Meaningful to the Pacific 

In August 2014, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Security Council Resolution 2167 (2014) affirming the critical role of regional 

cooperation in international peacekeeping and security. The importance 

of regional security arrangements has long been encouraged under the socalled subsidiarity principle, but has gained currency as a consequence of 

the seeming intractability of conflicts and failures of intervention. The resolution does not suggest that regional organizations supplant the United Nations in peacekeeping, but rather that comparative strengths need to be recognized. The resolution calls for regional organizations to strengthen their 

relationships and develop more effective partnerships. Fiji’s statement on 

the resolution, given by Fijian diplomat Namita Khatri, echoed an accepted 

truth in peace operations: “regional organizations are likely to have a keener 

understanding of the local situation and cultures.” 

New Zealand successfully won a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council for the 2015 - 2016 period with the considerable support of the 

Pacific Island Forum member states. New Zealand regards the role as an 

opportunity to influence at the reform level, and there is an opportunity for 

New Zealand to contribute to the transformation of regional UN security 
 New Zealand and Regional Security Cooperation - Powles 95

cooperation mechanisms. This includes addressing how the UN can better support, through regional security cooperation mechanisms, local capacities and leadership for local solutions to conflict; and how the United 

Nations can ensure, through regional security cooperation, greater accountability towards the local population. These questions underpin the overriding one: how will New Zealand bring its win at the United Nations home to 

the region? How will New Zealand ensure its UN Security Council position 

is meaningful for Pacific Island states?

Conclusion 

New Zealand’s perspectives on, and contributions to regional security cooperation mechanisms have remained fairly consistent. New Zealand prides 

itself on being a good regional security actor; however, there are certain assumptions around New Zealand’s role that need to be challenged. New Zealand cannot take its relationship with Pacific Island states — and the goodwill 

shown to it — for granted. The failure of New Zealand Prime Minister John 

Key to attend the 2014 Pacific Islands Forum sends signal of ambivalence to 

both the region and New Zealand’s domestic audience about the importance 

that his government places on the region. The Pacific security complex is 

a structured matrix of formal and informal cooperation, and increasingly, 

interdependence, interaction and communication is critical. To build true 

resilience, regional security cooperation mechanisms need to better reflect 

the region, and that means more Pacific Islanders in positions of leadership. 

New Zealand and other periphery partners need to listen more. Creative 

approaches to regional security cooperation — looking beyond the formal 

to informal linkages that strengthen Pacific relations — are essential. New 

Zealand, if it is to retain its influence in the region in the face of competing 

states, must re-engage with the region in a far more meaningful manner. 
96 Regionalism, Security & Cooperation in Oceania 

Chapter 7

Indonesian Diplomatic Maneuvering in 

Melanesia: Challenges and Opportunities

Jim Elmslie

Executive Summary

This paper examines the convoluted process underway in which West 

Papuan political actors are seeking to join the Melanesian Spearhead Group 

(MSG), a sub-regional body representing the interests of a collection of 

South Pacific countries. This development is being vigorously opposed by 

the Indonesian government, which believes it will strengthen the West Papuan independence movement. In the ensuing diplomatic tussle, the regional 

architecture of the Asia-Pacific is being redrawn, creating several challenges 

and opportunities

Challenges to Melanesian countries posed by increased Indonesian 

diplomacy:

• The new “terms of trade” may take focus away from anti-corruption reforms, good governance and the promotion of human rights; they may 

indeed negatively affect these areas.

• Pro-Indonesian policies will clash with growing public support for the 

West Papuan cause, leading to internal conflicts.

The creation of the Pacific Islands Development Forum (PIDF) may undermine the effectiveness of the widely respected Pacific Islands Forum 

(PIF), and diminish Australia’s and New Zealand’s often positive role in the 

region.
 Indonesian Diplomatic Maneuvering in Melanesia - Elmslie 97

Opportunities associated with a greater Indonesian presence in the 

region:

• Increased aid and development assistance from Indonesia would be welcomed, as all MSG countries still lag far behind their development goals.

• Adding Indonesia into the diplomatic mix may strengthen MSG nations’ 

bargaining positions in their negotiations with Australia, New Zealand 

and other donor nations over a range of issues, such as access to visas; 

design and focus of aid programs; implementation of land registration; 

and general levels of assistance.

• Facilitate the MSG as a forum where pressure can be applied to Indonesia over its policies and actions in West Papua. Human rights abuses, a 

lack of land rights, political repression, and poor health and education 

services for West Papuans are significant issues that could be addressed 

by the Indonesian government; however, it has, so far, lacked the will to 

do so.

Introduction

The driving motivation behind Indonesia’s recent diplomatic offensive 

targeting MSG countries has been to counter growing support for the troubled region known as West Papua (understood by indigenous Melanesians 

to comprise the Indonesian provinces of Papua and West Papua). Melanesian inhabitants of West Papua have long desired independence from Indonesia, a dream that has been brutally crushed by military force since Indonesian takeover in 1962. Fellow Melanesians’ sympathy for the West Papuans’ 

plight has not translated into effective support until recently. Now, domestic 

developments, particularly in Fiji, have invigorated the issue of West Papua within the MSG and drawn a countervailing reaction from Indonesia. 
98 Regionalism, Security & Cooperation in Oceania 

This new diplomatic dynamic presents both challenges and opportunities 

for Melanesian countries.1

Proposed West Papuan Membership in the Melanesian 

Spearhead Group

The West Papuan National Coalition for Liberation (WPNCL), the most 

prominent West Papuan umbrella group seeking independence, was encouraged to apply for MSG membership at the group’s annual summit in Noumea 

in June 2013. All MSG members — Vanuatu, Fiji, Papua New Guinea, the 

Solomon Islands and New Caledonia’s Front de Libération Nationale Kanak 

et Socialiste, (FLNKS)2 — appeared initially supportive of this application. 

Then chairman of MSG, Fijian Prime Minister Frank Bainimarama, met 

West Papuan diplomat and WPNCL Vice-Chairman John Otto Ondawame 

and encouraged him to submit the application. Expectations of success were 

high, but ultimately unfulfilled. Vigorous Indonesian diplomacy stymied 

the bid by persuading the MSG to defer the membership application until after a January 2014 Foreign Ministerial Mission (FMM), comprised of 

MSG leaders, to West Papua to investigate the situation firsthand.

Two key points behind the deferral were the veracity of West Papuan 

claims of human rights abuses and the WPNCL’s legitimacy as a representative body of the West Papuan people. Indonesia claimed that significant 

social and economic progress was being made in the province and human 

rights abuses were a thing of the past. Meanwhile, two other West Papuan 

groups disputed WPNCL claims of representation: the West Papuan National Authority and its self-declared government in exile — the Federal Repub1 I would like to thank my colleague, Dr. Cammi Webb-Gannon, coordinator at the West Papua Project, University of Sydney, for her advice and comments on this chapter. See, Jim Elmsie 

and Cammi Webb-Gannon, “MSG Headache, West Papua’s Heartache? Indonesia’s Melanesian 

Foray,” The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus, 12(47), November 24, 2014, http://www.japanfocus.

org/-Camellia-Webb_Gannon/4225. 

2 FLNKS is a New Caledonia political movement, Collins Dictionaries, http://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/french-english/flnks.
 Indonesian Diplomatic Maneuvering in Melanesia - Elmslie 99

lic of West Papua, represented in Noumea by Australian-based activist Jacob 

Rumbiak; and pro-Indonesian West Papuans represented by Franz Albert 

Joku and Nick Messet. 

The FMM proved to be a farce, spending less than half a day on the ground 

in West Papua and representatives meeting none of the government’s critics. 

This was due to the issue’s extreme sensitivity and the likelihood a serious investigation by the FMM would cause mass demonstrations. Concerns that 

the mission would be a whitewash had already caused the Vanuatu government to pull out of the trip. Ultimately, the visit allowed the FMM to merely 

report they were unaware of the existence of local concerns or unrest. Far 

from being a genuine investigation, the mission became a public relations 

exercise. It ended with MSG delegates, together with Indonesian officials, 

signing a statement committing each to respect the “sovereignty, unity and 

territorial integrity and [...] non-interference in each other’s internal affairs.” The MSG-Indonesian statement also promised cooperation in food 

security, trade, education, policing and cultural exchanges.3 MSG countries, 

with the exception of Vanuatu, had effectively leveraged the West Papuan 

issue to enhance their relations with Indonesia. 

Indonesia and MSG Countries

The Vanuatu government has long been a supporter of West Papuans and 

their desire for independence. This is more than a sentiment held by the 

political elite; it is felt strongly amongst the society’s grassroots. Even at the 

time of Vanuatu’s independence in 1980, West Papua was a significant fixture on the political landscape. Vanuatu’s first Prime Minister, Father Walter 

Lini, said the country would never be truly free while other parts of Melanesia, especially West Papua, remained occupied by foreign powers.

The ongoing presence of high-profile West Papuan activists in Vanuatu 

ensured the West Papuan issue has been covered in local papers and media 

3 Arto Suryodipuro, “Building Relations with Pacific Islands Countries,” The Jakarta Post, January 25, 2014, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/01/25/building-relations-with-pacific-island-countries.html.
100 Regionalism, Security & Cooperation in Oceania 

in a way unlike that in other Melanesian countries. Thus, the issue of West 

Papua is strongly embedded in the national psyche and on the domestic 

political agenda. The Vanuatu Traditional Council of Chiefs, which at times 

of political crisis has proved to be Vanuatu’s supreme repository of political 

power, is also vocal in its support for West Papua. So, one can see how the 

issue has percolated down through society from the elite to village level.

Indonesia has been aware of West Papua support within the Vanuatu body 

politic for many years, but has only recently sought to counter it. The most 

obvious example of this was the courting of former Vanuatu Prime Minister Sato Kilman with lavish trips to Jakarta, talks of a closer relationship 

between the two countries, and direct aid, such as police uniforms. Kilman 

was instrumental in the Indonesians obtaining MSG observer status. He was 

forced to resign, however, on March 21, 2013, ahead of a non-confidence 

vote, largely due to his dealings with Indonesia.4 Vanuatu voters believed 

he was too close to the Indonesians, fearing their influence on Vanuatu’s 

internal politics.5

Kilman’s successor as prime minister, Moana Carcasses Kalosil, made 

his support for the West Papuan cause firmly known from the outset of his 

term; in many ways it dominated his short time in office. Kalosil immediately distanced himself from the Indonesian push for closer ties and instead 

embraced attempts to have an official West Papuan presence in the MSG. 

He asked the WPNCL to formally apply for observer status and facilitated 

the efforts of Vanuatu-based Papuan diplomats Andy Ayamiseba and John 

Otto Ondawame to lobby the governments of PNG, the Solomon Islands 

and Fiji.

Meanwhile, Kalosil continued pushing the West Papuan cause even after its other erstwhile MSG supporters faltered. At the United Nations on 

September 28, 2013, he challenged the world body with the question, “How 

4 Bob Makin, “Vanuatu PM Kilman Resigns,” Vanuatu Daily Digest, March 21, 2013, http://vanuatudaily.wordpress.com/2013/03/21/vanuatu-pm-kilman-resigns/.

5 Interview with John Otto Ondawame, Port Vila, Vanutau, April 12, 2013. 
 Indonesian Diplomatic Maneuvering in Melanesia - Elmslie 101

can we then ignore hundreds of thousands of West Papuans who have been 

brutally beaten and murdered?”6 Kalosil went even further on March 4, 

2014, in a speech to the UN Human Rights Committee in Geneva, where 

he specifically referred to the horrific torture and murder of individual West 

Papuans, which had been filmed by soldiers. He called for the Committee to 

establish a country mandate which should “include investigation of alleged 

human rights violations in West Papua and provide recommendations on a 

peaceful political solution in West Papua.”7

The Indonesian ambassador to the United Nations responded forcefully 

to Kalosil’s speech, denying the accusation of human rights abuses. He buttressed his statements with a reference to the FMM:

“Furthermore, the statement of Mr. Kalosil is simply in contradiction with the visit of a high-level delegation of the Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG) members representing [the] 

Melanesian Community to Indonesia from 11 to 16 January 

2014 in which [the] Ministerial Level Delegation of Fiji, Papua 

New Guinea, Solomon Islands and representative[s] of the 

Front de Liberation Nationale Kanak et Socialiste (FLNKS) of 

New Caledonia as well as MSG High Representative conducted [an on-site] visit to Papua province and obtained firsthand 

information.”8

This open diplomatic confrontation was a sign that Indonesia’s diplomatic offensive over West Papua was well underway. While within the Vanuatu 

government and throughout the country, there is heartfelt support and empathy for the Papuan’s struggle, this sentiment proved much more superficial 

in other Melanesian countries. Their support for the West Papuans waned 

6 “Vanuatu Urges Inclusive Development, Pledges to Continue Speaking Out Against Colonialism,” 

UN News Centre, September 28, 2013, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=46117#.

U886C7yfgUQ.

7 “Vanuatu PM Blasts Indonesian Human Rights Violations in West Papua,” Pacific Media Centre, 

March 2, 2014, http://www.pmc.aut.ac.nz/articles/vanuatu-pm-blasts-indonesian-human-rights-violations-west-papua. 

8 Ibid.
102 Regionalism, Security & Cooperation in Oceania 

as their financial and strategic relationships with Indonesia blossomed. 

Indeed, it is hard to separate these two developments. The financial and 

strategic support from Indonesia can be clearly linked to the withdrawal of 

support by MSG states for West Papua. The clearest example of this was Fiji.

Indonesia-Fiji Diplomatic Entente 

Fiji was one of the MSG countries actively promoting West Papua’s membership, or at least the same observer status that Indonesia enjoys. WPNCL 

Vice-Chairman Ondawame received an enthusiastic response from Fiji’s 

Prime minister, Commodore Frank Bainimarama, when he visited Fiji’s capitol, Suva, for talks over proposed MSG membership in March 2013.9

Fiji had been suspended from the Pacific Islands Forum in 2009 under 

pressure from Australia and New Zealand, following the coup launched by 

Frank Bainimarama in 2006. This, along with sanctions, was an attempt to 

diplomatically isolate Fiji and the Bainimarama regime until free and fair 

elections were held for a new government. Bainimarama responded to this 

exclusion by forming a rival organization to the PIF, the Pacific Islands Development Forum (PIDF), which had its inaugural meeting in Suva in early 

August 2013. Australia and New Zealand were not invited.10 Frank Bainimarama also reinvigorated the MSG, principally by pushing West Papua as 

a pan-Melanesian issue.

While regional concerns about the Bainimarama regime are legitimate, 

Fiji also has legitimate grievances against Australia and New Zealand. Pacific countries often felt that the PIF was dominated by the “big two,” whose 

economic, military and diplomatic power dwarfed that of small Pacific nations. Australia brushed aside Pacific nations’ concerns, such as restrictive 

visa policies, the threat of global warming (and rising sea levels), and the 

9 Jim Elmslie interview with John Otto Ondawame, Port Vila, Vanuatu, May 14, 2013. 

10 “Inaugural Meeting of the Pacific Island Development Forum Ends with Allegations of Sabotage,” Australian Network News, August 8, 2013, http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-08-08/

an-pacific-islands-development-forum-wrap/4873060.
 Indonesian Diplomatic Maneuvering in Melanesia - Elmslie 103

off-shore processing of asylum seekers. While Australian development aid 

to all PIF countries is substantial, many policies pushed by the nation, such 

as the registration of traditional land as a precursor for its commodification 

and possible sale (leaving Pacific Islanders landless), are strongly resisted 

by many Islanders, and also deeply resented as an external intrusion into a 

profoundly domestic issue.

While the PIDF may have exercised a degree of legitimacy amongst some 

Pacific nations, it was the role played by Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono at the PIDF forum in June 2014 that transformed the nascent organization into a tiger that threatens the established architecture of 

international relations in the South Pacific. 

Even before the PIDF meeting, Indonesia was not-so-quietly maneuvering to suppress the West Papua issue; it contributed, for example, $30,000 to 

Fiji to help fund the costs of hosting the United Nations’ regional meeting 

of the Special Decolonization Committee. Vanuatu’s Daily Post newspaper 

saw this as blatant manipulation: “Jakarta’s cheque book diplomacy reflects 

its determination to silence any murmurs of regional support or discussions 

within the MSG on the issue of re-enlisting West Papua back on the decolonization list.”11 It seems to have been money well spent as there was 

scant mention of West Papua in official forums, despite local moves by some 

church groups to have the issue aired.

The depth of Indonesian engagement with Fiji became apparent at the 

PIDF meeting held on the island of Denarau on June 17-19, 2013. President 

Yudhoyono was the chief guest and keynote speaker at an event focused on 

climate change and sustainable development. It was the first visit to Fiji by 

a serving Indonesian president, and the length of the stay – three days – 

showed just how important the Indonesians judged the event. Espousing the 

benefits of a closer relationship between Indonesia and Pacific Island states, 

11 Winston Tarere, “Indonesia Exercises Cheque Book Diplomacy Ahead of UN Decolonization 

Conference,” Vanuatu Daily Pos, May 30, 2014, http://www.dailypost.vu/article_fab40dd0-7571-

5c5a-85d1-30188fc6b2eb.html.
104 Regionalism, Security & Cooperation in Oceania 

Yudhoyono also made firm commitments to increase aid and engagement. 

Amongst other things, he promised $20 million over five years to address 

challenges of climate change and disasters; talked of plans to triple trade 

to a billion dollars in coming years; and outlined how Indonesia could act 

as a bridge for Pacific and Indian Ocean states. 12 Yudhoyono was offering 

Indonesia as a conduit by which Pacific Island nations, especially Fiji, could 

interact with not only the dynamic Asian region, but also the wider world.

The PIDF meeting also seemed to acknowledge the “terms of trade” of 

the Indonesian-MSG states relationship: on the one hand, there would be 

silence by Pacific leaders on West Papua, and on the other hand — as the 

former Fiji Times editor, Netani Riki, put it — Indonesia “would not rock the 

boat on questionable governance, transparency and human rights issues.”13

This Faustian pact should have sent alarm bells ringing in Canberra; there 

are already voices of concern being raised in the Pacific. Reverend Francois 

Pihaatae, general secretary of the Pacific Council of Churches, commented, 

“Where our self-determination interests are concerned, whether it be in the 

areas of governance, development and security, or our firm support for West 

Papuan freedom, we cannot allow the state visit to cloud our prudence and 

better judgment.”14

This perhaps is the core of the conundrum. It is no secret that Melanesian countries do have serious problems with poor governance and widespread corruption. What MSG countries need is more transparency, not 

less. Transparency, along with an independent judiciary, are among the few 

effective remedies for reining in corruption. In Papua New Guinea (PNG), 

billions of dollars of foreign aid and a recently resurgent economy have not 

translated into improved living standards, or higher education and health 

12 “Indonesia to Strengthen Ties with Fiji’s PIDF,” Radio New Zealand International, June 19, 2014, http://

www.radionz.co.nz/international/pacific-news/247675/indonesia-to-strengthen-ties-with-fiji’s-pidf.

13 Neatni Rika, “All Aboard the Gravy Train as SBY Visits Fiji,” Crikey, June 19, 2014, http://www.

crikey.com.au/2014/06/19/all-aboard-the-gravy-train-as-sby-visits-fiji/. 

14 Tevita Vuibau, “Plea for West Papua,” The Fiji Times Online, June 20, 2014, http://www.fijitimes.

com/story.aspx?id=271977.
 Indonesian Diplomatic Maneuvering in Melanesia - Elmslie 105

services for the majority of people. In many areas, such as the Sepik River region, basic services have gone steadily backwards since independence. 

The master explanation for this is poor governance and corruption.

Frank Bainimarama was ecstatic over the PIDF meeting’s success and 

Yudhoyono’s visit. He called it “one of the greatest things that had ever happened to Fiji.”15 Yudhoyono must have been well pleased with the visit 

too; there had been no mention (at least publicly) of West Papua, and the 

substitution of Indonesia in the “big brother” role traditionally played by 

Australia, New Zealand and the United States, was being openly discussed. 

For Bainimarama, there was an added bonus: Indonesia co-lead the multinational group of observers that monitored Fiji’s general election in December, which resulted in Bainimarama’s election as prime minister in the ruling 

Fiji First Party. International observers endorsed the results.

Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands and FLNKS

If diplomatic responses by Vanuatu and Fiji to Indonesian maneuvering 

can be seen as the two ends of the spectrum, the responses by PNG, the 

Solomons and FLNKS lie somewhere in between. Solomon Islands’ Prime 

Minister Gordon Darcy Lilo had been openly supportive of the WPNCL’s 

bid for the MSG prior to the Noumea Summit; however, shortly thereafter, 

he visited Indonesia. This trip, allegedly paid for by the Indonesian government, marked a turning point in the Solomons’ endorsement of West 

Papuan aims. Despite strong public criticism that he had been “lured” by Indonesia, Lilo’s support for West Papuan MSG membership waned, replaced 

by an enthusiasm for stronger ties and increased trade with Indonesia.16

PNG has always had a more problematic relationship with Indonesia, 

sharing a long land border with their giant Asian and Muslim neighbor. 

15 Ibid.

16 “Lilo Visits Indonesia,” Solomon Times Online, August, 13, 2013, http://www.solomontimes.com/

news/lilo-visits-indonesia/7834. 
106 Regionalism, Security & Cooperation in Oceania 

A latent fear of military invasion has always constrained PNG’s response 

to the sufferings of their brother Melanesians over the border. Instead, frequent affirmations of Indonesian sovereignty over West Papua remain the 

mantra. There is also PNG’s own secessionist dilemma: the referendum on 

independence for Bougainville is due from 2015, and deep tensions remain 

over the island’s ultimate political status. However, even in PNG, support 

for West Papuans is growing as a younger and more globally experienced 

leadership emerges both within government and NGO circles. Certain individuals, such as prominent PNG politician Powes Parkop, have come out 

openly in support of West Papuan independence. 

PNG’s handling of the West Papuan issue within the MSG is therefore 

more nuanced than other Melanesian states. PNG Prime Minister Peter 

O’Neil did not attend the Noumea Summit; he was leading a large delegation of PNG leaders on a visit to Indonesia for discussions on border controls, and increased trade and investment between the two nations. PNG 

is in a delicate situation as it balances these competing imperatives in its 

asymmetrical relationship with Indonesia. PNG is seeking ways to both 

stay on good terms with Indonesia and fulfill what PNG opposition leader 

Belden Namah refers to as “a moral obligation to raise the plight of the West 

Papuans and their struggle for independence with the Indonesians and before international bodies and forums.”17 The prospect that there might be a 

linkage made between the independence struggles in Bougainville and West 

Papua is an intriguing, but potentially creative initiative for peace building 

in the region.

The FLNKS, an organization formed to advocate for New Caledonia’s independence, has also prioritized its own concerns ahead of West Papuan 

MSG membership, even though it’s expressed its strong support for West 

Papua. As the FLNKS enters the final phase of the Noumea Accord, where 

a referendum(s) will decide New Caledonia’s eventual political relationship 

17 “PNG Opposition Officially Supports a Free West Papua,” Free West Papua Campaign, April 16, 

2014, http://freewestpapua.org/2014/04/16/png-opposition-officially-supports-a-free-west-papua/.
 Indonesian Diplomatic Maneuvering in Melanesia - Elmslie 107

with France, it is fearful of losing MSG support for its own cause, or of an 

internal split (over West Papua) that might weaken the MSG as an organization. There are also genuine misgivings about whether the WPNCL 

should be the West Papuan people’s sole representative. The Kanak delegate 

who completed the FMM visit, Yvon Faua, noted, “The report FLNKS has to 

make to the leaders is that it is not possible to accept the application. I think 

the [WPNCL] has to join all the others because we know there are also other 

organizations.”18

The MSG Decision

Prospective WPNCL membership in the MSG was deferred at the June 

2013 Noumea Summit, pending the FMM fact-finding trip to Indonesia. 

The MSG’s decision was formally announced at its meeting in PNG’s capitol, 

Port Moresby, on June 26, 2014. Not surprisingly, given the foregoing analysis of regional politics, the WPNCL’s application was knocked back. The 

official MSG communiqué announced that:

8. The Leaders:

(i) Noted and accepted the contents of the Ministerial Mission’s Report;

(ii) Agreed to invite all groups to form an inclusive and united umbrella group in consultation with Indonesia to work on 

submitting a fresh application;19

This represented a substantial victory for Indonesian diplomacy in thwarting WPNCL attempts to join the MSG. The group’s decision appeared to, 

18 “Umbrella Papuan Group Suggested To Apply For MSG,” Pacific Islands Report, January 22, 2014, 

http://pidp.eastwestcenter.org/pireport/2014/January/01-23-03.htm.

19 Section of the MSG Communiqué in relation to West Papuan application for membership,” AWPA 

Sydney News, blog, June 27, 2014, Awpasydneynews.blogspot.com.au/2014/06/section-of-msg-communique-in-relation.html.
108 Regionalism, Security & Cooperation in Oceania 

in effect, give the Indonesian government a veto over MSG policy on West 

Papua. Apparently, West Papuan membership would only be reconsidered if 

competing independence groups — the WPNCL, FRWP, the influential activist movement Komite Nasional Papua Barat (KNPB), and pro-Indonesian 

West Papuans — collectively apply and gain the Indonesian government’s 

approval. Given the deep antagonism felt between these various groups and 

the individuals who lead them, a united application appeared to be a difficult 

undertaking. 

However, in a seminar at the University of Sydney on June 30, 2014, West 

Papuan “dialogue” diplomat Octo Mote spoke of the recently articulated 

willingness of WPNCL and FRWP leaders within West Papua, and those of 

the KNPB to work together in this regard. Unity amongst the three groups 

was achieved at the West Papuan Leaders’ Summit held in Port Vila December 4-8, 2014, which saw the creation of the United Movement for Liberation of West Papua (ULMWP). A new application for MSG membership 

was lodged by ULMWP on Feb 4, 2015, to be considered by the MSG in 

June. Jakarta’s longstanding opposition to inclusion of West Papua in the 

MSG is obviously still a barrier. Although, according to Mote, West Papuans 

can appeal to the MSG on the basis that FLNKS did not need France’s approval to join the MSG, so why should West Papua need Indonesia’s? 

Optimists expressed the view that this potential unity grouping may be 

able to create a forum in which serious negotiations could take place between various segments of West Papuan society and the Indonesian government.20 While this may appear unlikely, diplomatic power plays between 

Pacific nations and Indonesia are far from over. Vanuatu, which has always 

supported the WPNCL and boycotted the FMM, continues to advocate on 

the West Papuans’ behalf. Recently installed Vanuatu Prime Minister Joe 

Natuman raised the prospect of referring the case of West Papua to the International Court of Justice, declaring: “We consider seeking an opinion on 

20 “Jakarta/West Papua Talks Urged,” Radio New Zealand International, July 2, 2014, http://www.

radionz.co.nz/international/pacific-news/248848/jakarta-west-papua-talks-urged.
 Indonesian Diplomatic Maneuvering in Melanesia - Elmslie 109

the legal process held by the UN when it handed over West Papua to Indonesia.”21 Such a proposal is anathema to Indonesia. The recent establishment 

of ULMWP in Port Vila, in December between the various West Papuan 

groups, who are still hopeful of jointly gaining a place at the MSG table, 

shows this process is far from over.22 Indeed there is something intrinsically 

Pacific about how the negotiations are unfolding in the face of the seemingly 

insurmountable MSG communiqué.

Indonesia’s machinations over West Papuan’s MSG membership have also 

forced the different West Papuan groups to try to thrash out a ‘unity ticket’ 

in the form of ULMWP. This is a positive development. With the recent 

election of Joko Widodo to the presidency of Indonesia, a window of opportunity may have opened, both for relations between Indonesia and the 

Melanesian countries, and for the fortunes of the West Papua people – two 

closely linked issues. President Widodo visited Papua Province twice in 

his election campaign and stated his clear intention to address many of the 

social, economic and political problems besetting the two Indonesian provinces that make up West Papua. He did, however, rule out any discussion on 

independence, but affirmed his commitment to end human rights abuses. 

These are promising statements and the MSG, by using possible West Papuan membership as a pressure point and showing creative diplomacy, may 

help its broader aims become something more than mere rhetoric.

21 “Vanuatu states its commitment to liberation of West Papua,” West Papua Daily, July 3, 2014, 

http://tabloidjubi.com/en/?p=2821.

22 , “Papuans Confident Spearhead Group Will Support Application,” Pacific Islands Report, July 8, 

2014. http://pidp.eastwestcenter.org/pireport/2014/July/07-09-07.htm.
110 Regionalism, Security & Cooperation in Oceania 

Chapter 8

Acting West, Looking East:

Timor-Leste’s Growing Engagement with 

the Pacific Islands Region

Jose Kai Lekke Sousa-Santos

Executive Summary

• Timor-Leste is situated geopolitically and culturally at the crossroads of 

Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands region, and has pursued a two-pillared neighborhood foreign policy of “comprehensive and collective engagement,” which is defined by “Acting West” and “Looking East.”

• Timor-Leste is seeking to integrate itself within regional governance and 

security structures, and institutions of both Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands, thereby increasing its strategic role as a conduit for cooperation and collaboration between the two regions. 

• Timor-Leste is of increasing geostrategic importance to the Asia Pacific 

in view of the growing focus on the Pacific Ocean in terms of resource 

security and the growing competition between China and the United 

States.

• Timor-Leste could play an increasingly significant role in regional defense diplomacy developments if the Melanesian Spearhead Group regional peacekeeping force is realized. 
 Timor-Leste’s Engagement with the Pacific Islands Region - Santos 111

“We may be a small nation, but we are part of our interconnected region. Our nation shares an island with Indonesia. We are part of the fabric of Southeast Asia. And we are 

on the cross road of Asia and the Pacific.” 1 

 - Xanana Kay Rala Gusmao

Introduction

Timor-Leste is situated geopolitically and culturally on the crossroads of 

Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands region and has, since achieving independence in 2002, pursued a two-pillared neighborhood foreign policy 

of ‘Acting West’ and ‘Looking East.’ Timor-Leste claims that its geographic 

position secures the “half-island” state as an integral and categorical part 

of Southeast Asia while at the same time, acknowledging the clear links it 

shares with its Pacific Island neighbors to the west, particularly in the areas 

of development and security. Timor-Leste, for example, has sought greater influence and engagement with regional inter-governmental groupings 

— the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF), Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG), 

Pacific Islands Development Fund (PIDF), and the Small Islands Developing States (SIDS). This chapter examines why the nation is pursuing deeper 

relations with its neighbors to the west, and explores how Timor-Leste can 

both meaningfully contribute to and benefit from Pacific regional security 

architecture and governance structures.

A Short History 

Timor-Leste comprises the eastern side of Timor Island and the enclave of 

Oecusse in the island’s western region. West Timor is part of the Indonesian 

province of East Nusa Tenggara. Timor-Leste’s long history of colonialism 

1 Xanana Kay Rala Gusmao, “Timor-Leste’s Role and Future in a Rising Asia Pacific,” Lecture delivered at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Singapore, June 4, 2013, http://timor-leste.

gov.tl/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/RSIS-Distinguished-World-Leaders-Lecture.pdf.
112 Regionalism, Security & Cooperation in Oceania 

and resistance, and its short history as a modern independent state has shaped 

and captured its national identity and foreign policy in highly complex ways. 

Referring to the Portuguese landing in 1515 in Lifau, Oecusse, Timorese 

Prime Minister Xanana Gusmao stated: “We believe that it was this meeting 

of civilization and cultures that shaped the destiny of a People, a Country 

and a Nation — with a history and a culture that are unique in the region.”2

The Portuguese colonized Timor-Leste for over four hundred years in 

a largely indifferent and inconsistent approach that was met with both indigenous acquiescence and resistance. Following the 1974 pro-democracy 

Carnation Revolution in Portugal, which led to the fall of the fascist Salazar-Caetano dictatorship, those Portuguese colonies furthest from Lisbon 

were set adrift. After the failure of both Portuguese and Timorese initiatives 

seeking to develop a roadmap towards independence, Indonesia capitalized 

on the security vacuum, and on Dec. 7, 1975, invaded Timor-Leste. The 

twenty-four years of Indonesian occupation were as influential — and more 

brutal — than the four centuries of Portuguese colonization that preceded it. 

Strong indigenous political forces had emerged within Timor-Leste, and 

between 1974 and 1975, a brief civil war pitted the Democratic Union of 

Timorese (UDT), who favored progressive autonomy,3

 against the pro-independence Fretilin force (Revolutionary Front for an Independent East 

Timor). Fretilin won the civil war and declared national independence on 

Nov. 28, 1975. Capitalizing on perceptions of instability in the former colony 

against the backdrop of fears of communism spreading throughout Southeast Asia, Indonesia invaded Timor-Leste nine days later. The 2005 report 

by the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (CAVR), titled 

Chega! (Enough!), cited human rights violations during Indonesian rule, 

estimating that approximately 180,000 Timorese died during the Indonesian 

2 Gusmao, “Timor Leste and ASEAN: Perspectives and Challenges,” speech delivered at the University  of Malaysia, Sabah, April 2, 2014, http://timor-leste.gov.tl/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/

Timor-Leste-ASEAN_Perspectives-and-Challenges-2.4.14.pdf.

3 A third political party emerged during this period and favored integration with Indonesia: APODETI (Popular Democratic Association of Timorese).
 Timor-Leste’s Engagement with the Pacific Islands Region - Santos 113

occupation, either as a direct consequence of conflict or indirectly due to illness and hunger, with an estimated 55 percent of the population displaced.4

In 1999, almost a quarter century after occupation, the tripartite May 5 

agreement was signed by the United Nations, Portugal and Indonesia, establishing the unarmed UN Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) to oversee 

the act of popular consultation. This took place Aug. 30, 1999, under UN 

Security Council Resolution 1236. In a climate of increased intimidation 

and violence, 98.6 percent of the population registered to vote, and on Aug. 

12, 1999, 78.5 percent voted in favor of independence, rejecting special autonomy within Indonesia. Prior to the ballot, the Indonesian military and 

locally-sponsored militias conducted a three-week campaign in September 

1999 called Operation Clean Sweep, killing hundreds, possibly thousands, 

and causing mass displacement and destruction of 70 percent of the physical 

infrastructure. In the East Timor capitol, Dili, upwards of 95 percent of the 

infrastructure was destroyed. The CAVR report states that following the 

ballot, Dili became “the crucible of post-ballot violence and destruction.” 

An estimated 250,000 to 280,000 people were displaced or forcibly removed 

to West Timor. 

Following the referendum’s clear result and post-ballot violence, UNAMET II was established, and on Sept. 12, 1999, Indonesia acknowledged 

its inability to manage the situation in East Timor and accepted the immediate admission of a UN-sanctioned international force. Since gaining the 

restoration of independence in 2002, Timor-Leste has experienced twelve 

years of a UN interregnum comprising five successive UN missions,5

 the last 

of which withdrew following successful and peaceful elections in 2012. 

Since independence, Timor-Leste has experienced periods of instability, 

4 The Report of the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in Timor-Leste (CAVR), 

Chega!, 2005, http://www.cavr-timorleste.org/en/chegaReport.htm. 

5 The five missions are: United Nations Assistance Mission in East Timor (UNAMET), June 1999 

to October 1999; UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), October 1999 to May 

2002; UN Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET), May 2002 to May 2005; UN Office in 

Timor-Leste (UNOTIL), May 2005 to August 2006; UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT), 

August 2006 to December 2012. 
114 Regionalism, Security & Cooperation in Oceania 

most notably in 2006, when violent in-fighting among the nation’s political 

elements shattered Timor-Leste’s image as “the poster child” of successful 

UN state building. When the political and security sector crisis fractured 

and polarized Dili, it gave rise to East versus West regional identity tensions, 

and displaced 15 percent of the population. 

Timor-Leste’s Foreign Policy: Acting West, Looking East

Timor-Leste has a focused and proactive foreign policy driven by a form 

of “comprehensive and collective engagement” that seeks the path of many 

small nations: peaceful dialogue and collective action. This approach accurately reflects its geostrategic position at the juncture of Southeast Asia and 

the Pacific Islands, and embodies, first, a pragmatic understanding of the 

need for political reconciliation with Indonesia, the former occupying power, and secondly, an affinity with the island’s development challenges, which 

mirrors those of its Pacific neighbors to the west.

Timor-Leste has consistently advanced the geopolitical message that it is 

part of Southeast Asia and should, therefore, be engaged as a strategic player 

within and by the region. Achieving full membership in the Association of 

Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is a paramount strategic objective of the 

Timorese government.6 Prime Minister Gusmao argues that being part of 

Southeast Asia geographically means that Timor-Leste wants to be part of 

ASEAN and, “together, contribute to regional growth, social progress and 

cultural development in a spirit of partnership. We feel like an integral part 

of our neighborhood and have a strong sense of regionalism and solidarity 

with our Southeast Asian Nations — we are one of you.”7 

The ‘Act West’ approach is pursued through a consistent message from 

6 “TimorLeste Prepares for Benefits of ASEAN Membership,” 4-traders.com, Asian Development 

Bank release, May 7, 2014, http://www.4-traders.com/news/ADB-Asian-Development-Bank--TimorLeste-Prepares-for-Benefits-of-ASEAN-Membership--18431308/. 

7 Selver B. Sahin, “Timor Leste: A More Confident or Overconfident Foreign Policy Actor?” Southeast Asian Affairs, January 2012, p. 350.
 Timor-Leste’s Engagement with the Pacific Islands Region - Santos 115

Timorese political leadership that its Portuguese colonial heritage brings 

with it economic advantages. Timor-Leste has sought to position itself as 

the corridor between Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands, while exploiting 

its “Lusophone alliances” with fellow former Portuguese colonies as gateways into Europe, Africa and Latin America. Gusmao articulated his strategic outlook in 2014, stating:

“Timor-Leste is strategically located between the CPLP 

countries and ASEAN, China, and the Island States of the 

Pacific. We also want to make use of our strategic positioning 

in Southeast Asia, since we have the possibility of creating 

bridges with Europe, Africa and Latin America.”8

Timor-Leste regards itself as having multiple roles within the various regions it seeks to connect. This includes serving as an economic and political 

conduit between the CPLP and Asia, but also the aspiration to play a bigger role in the international arena by setting an example for “post-conflict” 

development as manifested in Timor-Leste’s chairmanship of the “g7+” 

program.9 

Moreover, Timor-Leste strongly advocates ASEAN goals of greater political and economic integration within the region. The nation uses the example of its reconciliation with Indonesia and growing bilateral ties between 

the two as evidence of Timor-Leste’s commitment to a shared vision. In the 

words of Gusmao:

“Many would have thought this too would be improbable. 

In a model of reconciliation, and with a firm commitment 

to focus on the future, we have built a strong relationship 

of trust and friendship. Rather than being enslaved by the 

8 Gusmao, “Timor Leste and ASEAN: Perspectives and Challenges.”

9 Sahin, “Timor Leste: A More Confident or Overconfident Foreign Policy Actor?” The g7+ initiative is a voluntary association of 20 countries that are or have been affected by conflict and are in the 

next stage of development. Its main objective is to allow participating nations to share experiences 

and learn from one another, and advocate reform to the ways the international community engages 

with conflict-affected states, g7+, http://www.g7plus.org.
116 Regionalism, Security & Cooperation in Oceania 

trauma of our history, we are instead honoring our struggle 

by working towards a better future for our people. We know 

that Indonesia and Timor-Leste not only share an island, we 

share a future. 10

In fact, Timor-Leste could see this reconciliation as a way forward for 

greater dialogue and peacebuilding within the region. Gusmao has also 

driven the economic message that: “Asia Pacific countries will profit from 

Timor-Leste’s strategic location as the connector between two regional organizations — ASEAN and the Pacific Islands Forum — thus creating opportunities for wider trade and cooperation...The country also has a good 

relationship with Australia, Indonesia, New Zealand, the Solomon Islands, 

and Vanuatu that could benefit ASEAN.” 11

Timor-Leste has also sought to integrate itself into the regional security and governance architecture through its membership in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) since 2005, and more recently, as a participant in the 

Bali Democracy Forum, Shangri-La Initiative and the Jakarta International Defence Dialogue. ASEAN remains, however, in the words of Gusmao, 

“the cornerstone of our foreign policy.”12

‘Looking East’ to the Pacific Islands 

‘Looking East’ is the second pillar of Timor-Leste’s neighborhood foreign 

policy and reflects its desire to engage with the Pacific Islands region in its 

capacity as a conduit, or corridor, to Southeast Asia and Europe, and as a 

champion of new development approaches in fragile and conflicted states 

within the g7+ grouping. 

There is also a subtle distinction being made in relation to Timorese identity. Much of the eastern half of Timor-Leste is ethnically Melanesian and 

10 Gusmao, “Timor-Leste’s Role and Future in a Rising Asia Pacific.”

11 “Xanana Gusmao, Timor Leste and regional politics,” Jakarta Post, June 17, 2013, http://m.thejakartapost.com/news/2013/06/17/xanana-gusmao-timor-leste-and-regional-politics.html.

12 Gusmao, “Timor Leste and ASEAN: Perspectives and Challenges.”
 Timor-Leste’s Engagement with the Pacific Islands Region - Santos 117

Polynesian, and this has led to discussion as to whether Timor-Leste should 

identify as a nation with the Pacific Islands as opposed to Southeast Asia. 

The latter lobby is currently prominent. This subtle distinction is borne out 

in a recent speech by Gusmao, in which he states “In Timor-Leste, as well as 

in the Pacific Islands, we can find a combination of the best that nature has 

to offer. We share the same conviction that the Timorese, and all peoples of 

the Pacific, know how to take advantage in a peculiar way of their precarious 

resources, transforming them into major achievements.”13 

Timorese political leadership, however, have been careful not to alienate 

its neighbors to the east, a number of whom, such as Vanuatu, supported the 

Timorese independence struggle.14 Parallels are also drawn between similar 

shared issues of vulnerability and fragility, and Timor-Leste has pursued a 

proactive policy of engagement with the regional governance architecture. 

Timor-Leste has been an observer at the Pacific Islands Forum since 2002; 

participated in the Pacific Small Islands Developing States meetings; and 

contributed as a donor partner15 to the Pacific Islands Development Forum 

established in 2014.16

Timor-Leste has assumed a similar development partner role with the Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG), funding the MSG Secretariat’s economic 

advisory position. Timor-Leste has also attended MSG Leaders’ Summits17

and the Secretariat has indicated a strong desire to engage with Timor-Leste 

on other issues, including security and development. Herein lays two signif13 Gusmao, “Leadership, Innovation and Partnership for Green / Blue Pacific Economies” Keynote 

address at the opening of the Pacific Islands Development Fund meeting, Suva, Fiji, August. 5, 2014, 

http://timor-leste.gov.tl/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/Pacific-Islands-Development-Forum-5.8.13.

pdf. 

14 Gusmao, “Timor-Leste’s Role and Future in a Rising Asia Pacific.”

15 Timor-Leste donated USD250, 000 for the establishment of the Private Infrastructure Development Group (PIDG) Secretariat in Suva, Fiji. 

16 His Excellency Ratu Epeli Nailatikau, Address at State Dinner in Timor-Leste, Hotel Timor, Dili, 

February  28, 2014, http://www.fiji.gov.fj/Media-Center/Speeches/H-E--RATU-EPELI-NAILATIKAU---ADDRESS-AT-STATE-DINN.aspx.

17 Mereani Gonedua, “Melanesian Spearhead group’s partners recognized in Fiji. Observer nations 

also responsible for regional funding,” Pacific Islands Report, March 29, 2012, http://pidp.eastwestcenter.org/pireport/2012/March/03-30-06.htm.
118 Regionalism, Security & Cooperation in Oceania 

icant avenues for future Timorese engagement with the MSG. Timor-Leste’s 

defense force, Falintil-Forças de Defesa de Timor-Leste (F-FDTL), consists 

of two active light infantry battalions and 1,500 reservists, with a unit of 

marines and small brown water naval capabilities. 

Timor-Leste also has a nascent special force capabilities and growing UN 

peacekeeping experience, as well as large, and well-trained and equipped 

policing and paramilitary units. In light of the MSG’s proposed initiative 

to develop a regional peacekeeping capability, it would be advantageous to 

engage Timor-Leste in strengthening the regional security apparatus from 

both “boots on the ground” and security sector perspectives. The addition 

of Timor-Leste to an MSG regional peacekeeping force would establish a 

triumvirate of states — Papua New Guinea, Fiji and Timor-Leste — with experienced and growing defense forces. Should Timorese integration within 

MSG increase, analysts suggest that the Group will be further strengthened 

as the most powerful regional integration movement, totally overshadowing 

economic possibilities from the Pacific Plan.18 

Engagement with Timor-Leste brings clear benefits to the Pacific Islands 

region, including the nation’s role as a conduit to Southeast Asia and ASEAN 

member states. This may help states, such as Papua New Guinea (PNG), 

which despite receiving special observer status with ASEAN in 1981, and its 

extensive and, at times, troubled shared border with Indonesia, has not been 

able to achieve full ASEAN membership. 19

Timor-Leste is also hoping to expand its engagement with the Pacific 

Islands through membership in the Secretariat of the Pacific Community 

(SPC). 20 Timor’s representative at the 2014 Pacific Islands Forum in Palau, Ambassador Abel Gutteres, related that Timor-Leste was eager to build 

18 Wadan Narsey, “An emerging chasm in Pacific integration,” Islands Business, February 27, 2013, http://

www.islandsbusiness.com/news/pacific-region/448/an-emerging-chasm-in-pacific-integration/. 

19 Sean Jacobs, “No thanks, not yet: PNG’s ASEAN bid,” East Asia Forum, December 4, 2012, http://

www.eastasiaforum.org/2012/12/04/no-thanks-not-yet-pngs-asean-bid/.

20 Nic Maclellan, “Timor Leste seeks SPC membership,” Islands Business, July 31, 2014, http://www.

islandsbusiness.com/news/45th-pacific-islands-forum/5901/timor-leste-seeks-spc-membership/.
 Timor-Leste’s Engagement with the Pacific Islands Region - Santos 119

practical (fisheries and environmental security) as well as political ties with 

the region. “We are hopeful...that Pacific countries will endorse it, so we can 

participate in the SPC family,” said Gutteres.

Timor-Leste’s extensive experience in nation-building, conflict transformation and development processes, and the leadership role it is increasingly 

assuming has real relevance for the Pacific Islands region. Timor-Leste’s 

approach to conflict transformation and the reintegration of veterans and 

former combatants into the modern independent state has important lessons for other fragile and conflict-affected states in the Pacific, such as the 

Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea, particularly Bougainville. The 

Timorese government has been successful so far in averting “the Zimbabwe effect” by ensuring that veterans of the resistance struggle have received 

favorable treatment, from pensions to a degree of political empowerment, 

and thereby preventing veterans from capturing the state. This has been a 

fine balancing act which underpins the complexities of the security-development nexus in Timor-Leste. 

Moreover, twelve years of successive UN missions have shaped Timorese 

perspectives of their own political agency and the role of the client state 

within development of the donor-client continuum. On one hand, the UN 

presence cultivated a degree of dependence, but it also encouraged – quite 

possibly inadvertently — an opposing desire for greater sovereignty and autonomy. The UN experience and legacy in Timor-Leste has also influenced 

Timorese notions about development processes and successes, and has led 

to Timor-Leste g7+ leadership within a consortium that represents 350 million people from 20 countries experiencing fragility as a consequence of development challenges and/or conflict. 

The Timorese Minister of Finance, Emilia Pires, held the inaugural chairmanship, and the nation has taken a driving role in crafting critical agreements on development. Among these agreements is the Dili Declaration 

(2010), which laid out innovative approaches towards peacebuilding and 
120 Regionalism, Security & Cooperation in Oceania 

state building processes, and improvement of donor efficiency.21 Timor-Leste’s leading g7+ role also includes the drafting of a “New Deal” which the 

United Nations is considering as part of its post-2015 Development Agenda. 

Timor’s role in this project is driven in large part due to frustrations which 

emerged during the UN interregnum years. As Gusmao stated: 

“During our own State building process we noticed that 

the international agencies of support and the United Nations 

pursued the wrong approaches to development in fragile and 

post-conflict countries. The international community insisted 

on a ‘one size fits all’ policy and felt that it was in a position 

to say what was best for those peoples.”22

Timor-Leste can offer the Pacific Islands region a critical understanding of the relationship between development and security in fragile and 

conflict-affected states and the imperative of seeking context-appropriate 

solutions. Moreover, there are critical lessons to be learned in regards to 

challenges posed by a growing youth demographic and related issues of disenfranchisement, vulnerability and growing criminality. Growing youth 

demographics in Timor-Leste and the Pacific Islands region are conducive 

to and facilitate transnational crime. Cooperation between Timor-Leste and the Pacific Islands in countering transnational crime is critical, as 

both regions are increasingly targeted by transnational criminal syndicates 

due to their porous borders, corruption levels, and strategic geography as 

gateways to richer neighbors. Timor-Leste is a prescient warning of how 

quickly transnational narcotics syndicates can take root in the fragile and 

conflict-affected states.

21 “Dili Declaration,” April 2010, Dili, Timor -Leste.

22 Gusmao, “Timor-Leste and ASEAN: Perspectives and Challenges.”
 Timor-Leste’s Engagement with the Pacific Islands Region - Santos 121

Conclusion

Timor-Leste’s growing engagement with the Pacific Islands region reflects 

an under-prioritized and less known aspect of Dili’s neighborhood foreign 

policy. It could potentially, however, become one of the more significant 

dynamics within the Timorese strategic outlook with the increasing importance of the Pacific Ocean in terms of resource security and the growing 

competition between China and the United States. There are also critical 

areas for cooperation and collaboration available between Timor-Leste and 

the Pacific Islands in the security and development arenas.
122 Regionalism, Security & Cooperation in Oceania 

Chapter 9

Communities of Interest and Communities of 

Practice: The Role of Norms, Values and 

Principles in Training for Peace Operations

Russel Parkin

Executive Summary

The ambition to establish “a regional facility (for) training civilian police 

for international peacekeeping” is one of the outcomes of the 2013 Review 

of the Pacific Plan.1 This chapter argues that the creation of such a facility 

could:

• Enhance regionalism and expand the professionalism of regional security forces;

• Become a focal point for the collection, development and dissemination of regional expertise in peace operations, including indigenous approaches to peacebuilding and peacemaking to the Pacific community 

of nations; 

• Act as a center for development of regional leaders and assist in developing expertise areas, such as disaster response and crisis management, 

for security forces, with a particular focus on climate change effects in 

the region. 

1 See Pacific Islands Forum, Pacific Plan Review: Report to Leaders, Vol I (Suva, Fiji, Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat 2013), 93, http://www.pacificplanreview.org/review-team/team-documents/; 

alternative URL is http://www.cid.org.nz/assets/Key-issues/Pacific-development/Pacific-Plan-Review-2013-Volume-1.pdf.
 Training for Peace Operations - Parkin 123

Peace Operations

Creating a facility for training civilian police in international peacekeeping is a laudable objective; however, peacekeeping is not just a police task. 

Former UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld once said, “Peacekeeping 

is not a soldier’s job, but only soldiers can do it.” The concept of peacekeeping has evolved considerably since the first operation in 1956;2

 modern peace operations are complex, multi-agency undertakings. From its inception, peacekeeping has been a military task. Pacific Island nations with 

armed forces — Fiji, New Guinea and Tonga — have considerable expertise 

in both international and regional peacekeeping operations. Sir Brian Urquhart, the only Hammarskjöld adviser with significant military experience, 

described the task of peacekeeping as dependent upon:

“...the non-use of force and on political symbolism. It is 

the projection of the principle of non-violence onto the military 

plane. It requires discipline, initiative, objectivity and leadership, as well as ceaseless supervision and political direction. 

It takes time to develop the full effectiveness of a peacekeeping 

operation and to secure the confidence and cooperation of the 

conflicting parties...For soldiers, peacekeeping can be a thankless and unglamorous task, and yet we have found that most of 

the soldiers value the experience....”3

These insights hold true for the role of police in modern peace operations, especially since law enforcement tasks are an integral part of many 

missions. It would, therefore, make little sense to exclude the military from 

involvement in such a training facility. Indeed, the involvement of both po2 Quoted in Dave Woycheshin and Miriam de Graaff, eds., Comprehensive Approach to Operations 

–International Perspectives, (Kingston, Ontario, Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2013), 133.

3 Brian Urquhart, A Life in Peace and War (New York, W.W. Norton, 1987), 248.
124 Regionalism, Security & Cooperation in Oceania 

lice and military personnel would have considerable advantages, such as enhanced regional interoperability between security forces. Additionally, such 

an institution has the potential to increase the professionalism of regional 

police and military forces through the diffusion of internationally accepted 

norms and standards to which personnel would be exposed during training.

Peacekeeping reforms that followed release of the 2000 “Brahimi Report” 

saw the United Nations adopt a holistic approach to training peacekeepers. 

While training security forces for peace operations is the responsibility of 

individual member states, all training is coordinated by the Policy Evaluation and Training (PET) Division of the UN’s Department of Peacekeeping 

Operations (DPKO). PET provides member states with training publications and materials as well as training assistance and certification. 

From its inception, a Pacific Islands Peace Operations Training Centre 

(PI-POTC) would be able to draw on PET’s standardized training materials 

and courses. This link would also make training at PI-POTC a mechanism 

for diffusion of internationally accepted norms and standards, because institutions focused on education and training provide a very effective means 

of establishing, promoting and maintaining norms. Institutions, however, 

are not just collections of norms. They derive their individual character 

and competence from a range of behavioral elements, such as procedures, 

rules, protocols and practices, working together with norms to produce a 

level of institutional performance that determines an organization’s success 

or failure. 

A PI-POTC would have considerable advantages in terms of its access 

to both regional and international expertise in peacekeeping. The training 

center would create an environment where the existing level of peacekeeping expertise residing in regional military and police forces could interface 

with the international peacekeeping community. These interactions could 

produce regional approaches to peace-building, peace-making and peacekeeping that reflect the Pacific’s unique cultural milieu, while still conform-
 Training for Peace Operations - Parkin 125

ing to accepted international norms. In terms of the Biketawa Declaration’s 

framework for dealing with regional security interventions, the creation of 

a PI-POTC would be within the scope of the declaration’s call to support 

“appropriate institutions or mechanisms that would assist a resolution of 

regional security issues.”4 Indeed, a PI-POTC would represent a significant 

increase in the region’s capacity to deal with its own problems in a credible, 

coherent and consistent manner. 

Communities of Interest and Communities of Practice

One interface for such an exchange of ideas and diffusion of norms is 

the international community of interest developed around topics of peace 

and peace operations. The term “community of interest” describes a group 

of people or organizations who share a common professional interest. In 

2000, the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization’s (UNESCO) World Directory of Peace Research and Training Institutions listed over 

1,200 organizations — either academic or private peace research bodies — 

in 80 countries.5 By engaging with this worldwide community, a PI-POTC 

could further develop the level of knowledge and expertise residing within 

the region’s security forces. More specifically, a PI-POTC would also have 

access to a global community of practice through interaction with peace 

operations training centers around the world and other organizations with 

a similar focus on training and educating security forces for participation 

in peace and stability operations.6 The community could evolve to mirror 

the Australian Defence Force’s Peace Operations Training Centre (ADFPOTC), and how it operates as a center of excellence for peace operations 

4 Biketawa Declaration (Suva, Fiji, Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat 2000), Pacific Islands Forum, 2,

http://www.forumsec.org/pages.cfm/political-governance-security/biketawa-declaration/ .

5 World Directory of Peace Research and Training Institutions, UNESCO, (Paris, UNESCO Publishing, 2000, 9th edition)

6 See Etienne Wenger, Communities of Practice: Learning, Meaning, and Identity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). Wenger is a cognitive anthropologist who, with colleagues, developed 

the idea of a community of practice as a group that shares a professional domain and collectively 

advances their professional knowledge through a process in which members learn from one another 

by sharing experiences, thus increasing the professional understanding of the whole community.
126 Regionalism, Security & Cooperation in Oceania 

education and training in conjunction with a number of partner institutions 

and organizations, both nationally and globally.

Australian Defence Force’s Peace Operations Training 

Centre’s Community of Practice

Each year, ADF-POTC engages with a range of partners at national, regional and international levels. These activities include, but are not limited 

to, student and instructor exchanges and the conduct of training courses 

and seminars. In a typical year, the Centre will work and interact with a 

range of organizations that comprise its community of practice:

National

ADF-POTC conducts a number of courses, including the UN Military 

Observers Course that is attended by both Australian and foreign military 

students. The course’s final exercise takes place in a purpose-built training facility run by the Australian Federal Police International Deployment 

Group (AFPIDG) at Majura in Canberra.

Regional

The Centre is a member of the Association of Asia-Pacific Peace Operations Training Centres (AAPTC) and holds joint exercises with two other 

member nations: Thailand and Indonesia. 

Exercise PIRAP/JABIRU (PJ)7

 is a bilateral series of exercises that commenced in 1998 and are conducted in English. PJ is held biennially and uses 

seminar and syndicate work for the consideration of problems. The PJ exercise scenario is a complex, multi-dimensional situation with forces operating under a UN Chapter VII mandate. This scenario serves as the basis for 

consideration of problems such as the roles of international, government, 

and non-government organizations (NGOs) in peace operations. The exer7 A Pirap is a Thai bird and a Jabiru is an Australian bird.
 Training for Peace Operations - Parkin 127

cise is designed to provide a forum for regional cooperation in peace operations and contribute to regional security through confidence building. It 

also includes a number of social and cultural activities to promote networking. Since 2012, PJ has involved approximately 100 personnel, including 

Thai and Australian police, as well as personnel from up to twenty regional 

nations. The theme for PJ 2014 was “Putting Vulnerable Civilians First.”

Exercise GARUDA/KOOKABURRA (GK)8 is an Australian and Indonesian bilateral activity that aims to provide peace operations training to 

officers from both nations who are likely to be deployed to UN missions. GK 

seeks to improve their understanding of strategic and operational planning 

considerations for participating in complex and multi-dimensional peace 

operations. As with JB, this exercise series uses English as the instruction 

language and employs scenario-based problems and syndicate work for consideration of problems.

International

In addition to engagements with the UN DPKO and partner institutions 

in nations such as Chile, Brazil, Canada, the United States, and in Africa 

states, ADF POTC is an active member of the International Association of 

Peace Training Centres (IAPTC). The organization holds annual conferences of member institutions. These conferences are themed around training issues. The 20th IAPTC Conference was hosted by the Indonesia Defence Forces Peacekeeping Centre in June 2014 with a theme of “Towards a 

Global Peacekeeping Training Architecture.”

To conduct this program, the ADF POTC has a full-time staff of six, supplemented by around fifteen military reservists. The Centre’s annual budget 

is $330,000, a relatively modest figure considering the scope of its activities. 

8 A Garuda is a large mythical bird-like creature from Hindu and Buddhist mythology and a Kookaburra is an Australian bird.
128 Regionalism, Security & Cooperation in Oceania 

The ADF POTC aims to position itself as a center of excellence for peace operations training and the partner of choice for institutions in other nations 

looking to develop their expertise in training for stability and peace operations. This institutional ambition, Australia’s membership in the Pacific 

Islands Forum, and its geographic proximity would make the ADF POTC a 

natural partner for a PI-POTC and the first link in its community of practice.

Other Initiatives within the Australian Peace Operations 

Community of Practice

In 2012, a partnership between the Australian Civil Military Centre 

(ACMC) and the Australian Council for International Development (ACFID) led to the development of a handbook entitled, Same Space, Different 

Mandates: a civil-military guide to Australian stakeholders in international disaster and conflict response. This publication aims to improve 

the collective understanding of civil-military stakeholders responding to international natural disasters and complex emergencies and to create greater 

opportunities for constructive engagement between them. The handbook is 

a guide to the principles, expectations and operational styles of key stakeholders involved in responding to natural disasters and complex emergencies. In addition to serving as a reference for military personnel, police and 

field workers from both government agencies and NGOs, the publication is 

also designed for use in education and training.

In recent years, both the ADF POTC and the Australian Command and 

Staff College have adopted a similar approach to fostering constructive engagement between multiple agencies involved in peace and stability operations. ADF POTC conducts a Peace Operations Seminar (POS) series that 

brings together personnel from various agencies and countries to consider 

the type of problems frequently encountered in peace and stability operations, including rule of law issues, the conduct of elections and dealing with 

displaced persons. The POS employs a complex scenario involving both a 
 Training for Peace Operations - Parkin 129

natural disaster and civil unrest in a small, fragile island state. 

A primary POS learning objective is conveying the primacy of the political and the need to sometimes refrain from acting, even if the capacity to 

act exists. A military force can often bring stability and security through its 

visible presence in activities, such as regular patrols. While participation of 

military personnel in peace and stability operations is an important factor 

in the success of such missions, Urquhart noted success can often hinge on 

“the non-use of force and on political symbolism (and)...requires discipline, 

initiative, objectivity and leadership, as well as ceaseless supervision and political direction.”9

 

During the Bougainville crisis, however, military members of the Peace 

Monitoring Group (PMG) frequently expressed their frustration at not pursuing a more active role.10 Military culture has a strong planning component 

and, for most military personnel, planning implies that action will follow. In 

scenario-based activities, the impulse of military participants is often to plan 

“the solution” without considering broader contexts available through discussion with multiple participants and stakeholders. 

In some situations encountered in complex emergencies, military action 

or even a high-profile military presence is not appropriate. For example, 

military tasks generally don’t include significant development activities, 

conducting elections or running refugee camps; the military may have support roles in such activities, such as the provision of transport and logistics. 

It is also important to expose students to organizations, such as Médecins 

Sans Frontières, which will reject military security because its members believe it compromises their independence and can actually endanger their 

field workers.

The learning model adopted by the POS and the Australian Command 

and Staff College aims to bring participants together rather than simply pro9 Ibid.

10 See for example, Anthony J. Regan, “Light Intervention: Lessons from Bougainville” (Washington, 

D.C., United States Institute of Peace Press, 2010), 80-81.
130 Regionalism, Security & Cooperation in Oceania 

duce a solution to a problem; students consider situations’ complexity and 

associated issues. This approach produces a more open exchange between 

all participants – military, police, government officials and NGOs – who exchange ideas and counter-ideas in a process that is neither competitive nor 

wholly consensus-building. The end result is a conversation that deepens 

and intensifies both the understanding and the meaning of what is being 

discussed. 

As this brief survey of ADF POTC’s activities demonstrates, a PI-POTC 

would have access to a well-established community of practice. From its inception, the institution could draw on a professional network with abundant 

connections, both regionally and globally. With most Pacific nations relying 

on police as their major security force, the PI-POTC would have a particular 

interest in establishing links with institutions such as the Australian Federal 

Police International Deployment Group (AFPIDG) and the New Zealand 

Police. 

Another important potential partner is the European Union’s Centre of 

Excellence for Stability Policing Units (CoESPU) located in Vicenza, Italy. 

CoESPU’s institutional aims would make it a natural partner for a PI-POTC 

because its charter is to conduct training programs, including “train the 

trainer” courses, and send out Mobile Assistance Teams (MATs) to instruct 

on international and humanitarian law, peace support operations, rules of 

engagement, operational planning and procedures, and policing techniques 

in hostile environments. CoESPU also seeks to promote interoperability between police, military forces and other organizations, and to develop common doctrine and operational procedures for use in complex emergencies. 

CoESPU’s charter aspires to create a doctrinal network worldwide by 

interacting with a range of international organizations, academic institutes 

and research centers that share a similar focus on peace and stability operations. While principally focused on Africa since its creation in 2005, 

CoESPU has entered into a range of agreements that have seen it conduct 
 Training for Peace Operations - Parkin 131

training in Italy, Chile, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Nepal, Pakistan, Romania, 

Serbia and Ukraine.11

“Plans are worthless, but planning is everything” 12

Australia’s response to peace and stability operations, particularly regional emergencies in Bougainville, East Timor and the Solomon Islands, has 

emphasized the missions’ interagency nature. While East Timor was a military-led operation, civilians and police had a much greater role in Bougainville and also in the 2003 Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands 

(RAMSI). Much of what is now taught at ADF POTC and Australian Command and Staff College reflects the evolution of such missions over the past 

fifteen years, from military-led peacekeeping operations to multi-agency 

undertakings in response to complex political, social and economic emergencies. The lessons absorbed by Australian agencies through their participation in such missions demonstrate the importance of two interrelated 

factors: leadership and planning. 

Leadership – One of the main factors in RAMSI’s initial success was 

the experience of key personnel. The mission was civilian-led, with Australian diplomat Mr. Nick Warner as the special coordinator. RAMSI’s initial mandate was to restore law and order. Participating police forces were 

commanded by Australian Federal Police Assistant Commissioner Ben McDevitt, whose police had primacy over the mission’s military component. 

Both Warner and McDevitt had previous experience with complex emergencies, and both men also worked in the Pacific prior to their involvement 

in RAMSI. Warner had been head of the Australian Liaison Office to the 

UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) in Namibia during 1989 and 

1990. He also served in Cambodia from 1991 to 1993 and was the Austra11 See http://www.carabinieri.it/Internet/Arma/CoESPU/.

12 Dwight D. Eisenhower, speech to the National Defense Executive Reserve Conference in Washington, D.C., November 14, 1957. In the Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Dwight 

D. Eisenhower (Washington, D.C, National Archives and Records Service, Government Printing Office, 1957), 818.
132 Regionalism, Security & Cooperation in Oceania 

lian high commissioner to Papua New Guinea from 1999 to 2003 during the 

Bougainville crisis. 

Similarly, McDevitt served in various national and international law enforcement roles over three decades. His service includes time with the AFP; 

working as law enforcement advisor to the Bougainville Peace Monitoring 

Group; and deployment with UN police in Cyprus before his appointment 

to RAMSI. The mission’s military commander, Lt. Col. John Frewen, was 

a skilled infantry officer who had deployed as a peacekeeper with the UN 

Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR).

Planning – Eisenhower’s oft-quoted aphorism is generally truncated 

and worth quoting in full: 

“I tell this story to illustrate the truth of the statement I 

heard long ago in the Army: Plans are worthless, but planning 

is everything. There is a very great distinction because when 

you are planning for an emergency you must start with this one 

thing: the very definition of ‘emergency’ is that it is unexpected, 

therefore it is not going to happen the way you are planning.”13

In a mission’s planning stages, consideration of issues is more important 

than arriving at a “solution.” In the lead up to RAMSI, Australian agencies 

involved in the mission had ten weeks to plan the deployment of 2,200 police — civilian and military — to meet mission objectives. As McDevitt 

recalled, “We had a very interesting series of meetings...the military representative said securing the strategic military points would take 32 days, 

and then the military would be ready to withdraw.”14 Putting the security 

problem in context, McDevitt explained “the community had lost trust in 

the RSIP (Royal Solomon Islands Police) and the police component of the 

mission could take up to 10 years.”15 

13 Ibid.

14 “Into Paradise Lost,” Australian Federal Police Platypus Magazine (Canberra, Australian Federal 

Police, Edition 114, October 2013), 8.

15 Ibid.
 Training for Peace Operations - Parkin 133

Another agency then explained that issues, such as dealing with corruption, infrastructure development, and governance reforms, would require 

a generation before seeing results. Different agencies eventually managed 

to compromise over widely varying timeframes. It is worth noting that the 

last rotation of Australian and Tongan troops withdrew from the Solomon 

Islands in August 2013. This substantiates Eisenhower’s belief that in emergency situations, “it is not going to happen the way you are planning.” 

RAMSI has been a watershed in Australia’s whole-of-government approach to complex emergencies. In 2004, for example, the AFP established 

its International Deployment Group (IDG) to provide the Australian government with a standing capacity to deploy police to contribute to stability 

and security operations. The lessons of planning and leadership from RAMSI and other recent missions have contributed significantly to the development of a methodology for responding to complex emergencies that is still 

evolving.

While it is prudent to create an organization with the expertise needed to deal with regional security issues, a vision for a PI-POTC might also 

include a role for the Centre in crisis management, with a particular focus 

on natural disasters and climate change. The rationale for such a role is 

that military and police personnel are among those expected to respond to 

such crises, especially on the basis of their planning and management skills. 

Security forces, however, also have the potential to become risk managers, 

particularly in relation to climate change, which can be viewed as a slowly 

developing disaster that will affect Pacific Island nations in the years and 

decades to come. 

The characteristics of a community of practice, outlined above, would 

make security forces, along with health, transport and communications authorities (plus a range of other technical specialists), the obvious groups to 

work together to coordinate information, and develop guidelines and plans 

for managing and responding to a range of natural disasters; Such disasters 
134 Regionalism, Security & Cooperation in Oceania 

include cyclones, tsunamis, volcanic eruptions, earthquakes and the effect 

of storm surges on vulnerable islands and infrastructure. By providing this 

institutional framework for crisis management and response, a PI-POTC 

would further enhance regional integration and cooperation.

Conclusion

The ambition to establish a PI-POTC is something Pacific nations should 

consider seriously. Such an institution would be more than just an important venue for educating and training regional security forces, both police 

and military. The norms and values that such an institution would diffuse 

throughout regional security forces would be powerful mechanisms for 

greater integration and cooperation in the Pacific. Educating security forces in a range of internationally recognized behaviors, protocols and skills 

would also significantly enhance their professionalism and contribute to the 

region’s capacity to deal with its own security problems. 

The case outlined above has demonstrated developing a PI-POTC would 

be greatly assisted by its ability to participate in communities of interest and 

communities of practice that connect it to regional and global networks. 

These same networks would also position the Centre to develop additional 

expertise in crisis management and natural disaster response. In time, the 

institution might also serve as a place to develop leaders who share a common understanding of how to approach regional security issues from the 

perspective of the norms and values they absorbed from their education and 

experience in peace and stability operations. More importantly, it might also 

be the place where security forces of Pacific Island nations, schooled in these 

international doctrines, can begin to develop “Pacific Ways” of peace-making, peace-building and peacekeeping that have been shaped by their own 

traditions, values and practices. 
135

Chapter 10 

Managing Maritime Resources in the Pacific—

With a Focus on Tongan EEZ Management1

Yoichiro Sato

Executive Summary

• Management of key maritime resources in Pacific Island states suffers 

from the mismatch between their vast resource potentials and the shortfall in their enforcement capabilities.

• Tuna fishery resources in the region have been relatively healthy, but the 

decline in yellowfin and big eye tuna call for introduction of a new international management scheme and development of national enforcement 

capacity.

• Lack of financial resources is a major obstacle to fishery patrols, yet interagency and multilateral cooperation have been attempted to achieve 

efficient and effective enforcement.

• Seabed mining in national and international waters offers attractive revenue potentials for some Pacific Island states. However, Tonga’s experience shows that lack of technical and legal expertise, 

and transparency in governance may greatly reduce this potential.

1 This chapter draws from two previously published journal articles: Yoichiro Sato, “Protecting Tonga’s Maritime Security,” New Zealand International Review, 37(5), September/October 2012, 17-21; 

and “Tonga’s Risky Seabed Mining Ventures,” New Zealand International Review, 39(2), March/April 

2014, 19-20. I would like to express my gratitude to the Review for granting me permission to use its 

material.
136 Regionalism, Security & Cooperation in Oceania 

Introduction

For Pacific Island nations, the sea is an essential source of traditional living. Large-scale commercial fishing of tuna species by long-distance fishing states has presented a rising level of threat to fish stocks on which local 

lives depend. Expanding the definition of coastal states’ rights over the sea 

by international law has not been accompanied by corresponding growth 

in island states’ capacity to protect their rights through maritime law enforcement. Furthermore, regional fishing management organizations have 

barely slowed the long-term decline of key tuna species. Additionally, improvements in science and engineering have made seabed resources more 

accessible for mining, and Pacific Island states have literally become the new 

Wild West, where a sense of lawlessness provides fraudsters opportunities 

for exploitation.

This chapter will look closely at Tonga’s ocean resource issues in order to 

illustrate the serious implications of weak governance on effectively managing maritime resources. Such management is made more challenging by 

expanding scientific knowledge and engineering skills, and current business 

models and globalization. A governance shortfall exists at both national and 

international levels, with the former contributing to the latter. This chapter 

will also briefly discuss associated cooperation activities that assist in Tonga’s maritime resource management.

Maritime Resource Security for Pacific Island States

The International Law of the Sea, particularly its granting of 200-nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) to coastal states, is the basis for 

Pacific Island nations’ claims to vast amounts of maritime resources. Previously limiting themselves to traditional fishing, island states have struggled 

with the dilemma between the new international legal entitlement to these 

resources and their own lack of financial, technical and scientific expertise 
 Managing Maritime Resources - Sato 137

to commercially exploit them. Pacific Island states, for example, have even 

been unable to effectively patrol their vast EEZs against poachers.

In the past, depletion of tuna stocks impacted the expensive temperate 

bluefin tuna in the Atlantic and the Southern Oceans; but it now has reached 

Pacific Ocean species, including the Pacific bluefin tuna and tropical species, such as big eye and yellowfin tuna. The Western and Central Pacific 

Tuna Fisheries Commission (WCPTFC) for the first time agreed to set a total catch quota for Pacific bluefin tuna in 2014 and has started more closely 

monitoring other Pacific species.2 Because tuna are highly migratory species, improving international tuna resource management regimes is important to the Pacific Islands as is improving their own EEZ patrol capabilities.

The launching of the WCPTFC in 1996 with inclusion of Pacific Island 

EEZ states and long-distance fishing nations, such as Japan, Korea, and 

United States, was a milestone in managing Pacific tuna. The new regime 

has developed quickly through lessons learned from earlier tuna management protocols. Previous regimes, heavily dependent on national scientists 

from member states, often suffered from politicization of scientific stock assessment processes.3

 Under the new program, the science committee uses 

external expertise directly answerable to the commission. The WCPTFC 

mechanism provides the means to overcome island states’ lack of scientific expertise, which previously resulted in domination by national scientists 

from long-distance fishing states. Cooperation between Pacific Island nations and long-distance fishing states has further improved catch certification and trade statistics to narrow the windows for unreported fishing and 

product distribution. Such cooperation is essential for further refinement of 

international management regimes.

2 “Consensus reached on Pacific Bluefin Tuna Conservation,” Environment News Service,

December 3, 2014, http://ens-newswire.com/2014/12/03/consensus-reached-on-pacific-bluefin-tuna-conservation/

3 Yoichiro Sato, “The Southern Bluefin Tuna Regime: Rebuilding Cooperation,” New Zealand International Review, July/August 2001, 26(4), 9-13; and “Fishy Business: Two-Level Game Political-Economic Analysis of the Southern Bluefin Tuna Dispute,” Asian Affairs: An American Review, Winter 

2002, 28(4), 217-237.
138 Regionalism, Security & Cooperation in Oceania 

For Pacific Island nations, seabed mineral resources offer growing potential for boosting economic development; their vast EEZs are host to various 

mineral resources as yet untapped. Furthermore, the seabed in Pacific international waters is now open to international mining consortiums under 

management of the International Seabed Authority (ISA) of the UN Law of 

the Sea Commission. While most participants are from developed countries with large capital reserves and advanced technology, Pacific countries 

like Nauru and Tonga have partnered with an international investor to join 

the mining effort. In EEZ mining, national governments hold authority in 

licensing for area prospecting and actual production. In addition to setting 

license fees, ensuring that subsequent operations are environmentally sound 

is an important national government responsibility.

EEZ Fishery Management

Tonga’s EEZ hosts a rich tuna resource. Species caught in the area include yellowfin, big eye, albacore and skipjack tuna, as well as several types

of swordfish. The main catch during the early 2000s was albacore tuna at

a time when more than 20 vessels operated in Tongan waters.4 In recent 

years, longline fishermen have avoided schools of smaller and cheaper albacore tuna; smaller boats operating within territorial waters catch skipjack 

tuna to be sold along with reef fish in the local fish market. Some big eye

and yellowfin tuna, and swordfish are airlifted to Japan, as are occasional

catches of more expensive bluefin tuna. Remaining tuna catches go mostly

to upscale local restaurants. Only three Tonga-registered boats catch these 

tuna using longline gear, mostly within the country’s EEZ. 

Some twenty foreign fishing vessels were licensed to operate in the Tongan EEZ, but the government placed a moratorium on foreign fishing operations in 2004. The Tongan government resumed licensing of foreign vessels 

4 “GEF II Project: National Projects Preparation Report Tonga,” p. 1, IW:LEARN.net, 

http://iwlearn.net/iw-projects/2131/reports/ofm-assessments-reports/Tonga.pdf/at_download/file.
 Managing Maritime Resources - Sato 139

for EEZ fishing in 2010, and one Taiwanese vessel has been licensed since 

then. During the moratorium period, some violations were confirmed. In 

2008, a New Zealand areal patrol identified a Taiwanese vessel illegally fishing inside the Tongan EEZ (but outside the “Proclamation” area), and in 

2010, a Tongan patrol boat identified a Korean fishing vessel in a similar 

non-enforced part of the EEZ. The extent of actual violations during this 

period is unknown, however, due to shortage of routine patrol activities.

Two Tongan government agencies assume primary responsibilities for 

fishery management. The Fishery Ministry is responsible for licensing foreign vessels and monitoring fishing vessels over six meters in length and operating inside the Tongan EEZ. Tonga’s monitoring efforts rely on the Vessel 

Monitoring System (VMS), managed by the Pacific Island Forum Fishery 

Agency (FFA), which receives and disseminates data on fishing activities 

throughout the Pacific Islands region. The Tongan Defense Services (TDS) 

conducts actual fishery patrols at sea and enforces fishery laws. There is no 

catch quota on tuna and swordfish in the Tongan EEZ, thus, enforcement 

targets non-licensed vessels. Other participating agencies include the Customs Office, which certify export contents (including fish); the Police Ministry, which supports enforcement of the Fishery Act; and the Transportation 

Ministry, which registers marine vessels.

Budget shortfalls generally limit Tonga’s fishery management capabilities, 

so it remains dependent on external partners for assistance. The need to 

patrol the large EEZ and the absence of “domestic” tuna fishing industry to 

match the country’s potentially large fishery resources compound Tonga’s 

difficulties.

The U.S. Coast Guard has signed a “rider’s agreement” with Tonga to allow the latter’s law enforcement officers on board its patrol boats visiting the 

area, and the U.S. Navy is considering a similar arrangement. Tongan fishery 

and other officers can take advantage of such limited, yet low-cost opportunities to increase patrolling frequencies.
140 Regionalism, Security & Cooperation in Oceania 

In order to maximize the efficiency of surface patrol boats, air surveillance is necessary. No Tongan government agency owns patrol aircraft; thus, 

the nation relies on infrequent air patrols by New Zealand and France, and 

occasional flyovers by the United States and Australia. Australia’s return to 

more frequent air patrols is one assistance possibility, as is a multilateral regional approach to replace current bilateral air patrol agreements.

Pacific Patrol Boat Program 

To help with Tonga’s efforts, Australia provided the TDS with three boats 

under the Pacific Patrol Boat Program (PPBP) to use for EEZ fishery patrol, 

or search and rescue operations. Australia pays fuel costs when the boats 

are used for these specific missions; this amounts to about half the total fuel 

cost. Tonga may use the boats for other operations, but its domestic law 

mandates the TDS use them primarily for fishery enforcement and external defense. To encourage boat usage, Australia also applies an AUD$1,000 

subsidy toward the cost of “slipping” (preventive maintenance at a dry dock) 

for every day the boat is at sea. Australia has also provided life-extension 

repairs for the three boats, which recently cost AUD$15 million. 

TDS can perform first-level maintenance, but no hull repairs under the 

waterline because there is no dry dock facility anywhere in Tonga. Such 

repairs must be performed overseas. The TDS’ boat maintenance capability 

relies on the comprehensive training course its engineering officers receive 

at the Australian Maritime College in Tasmania. The Tongan Maritime 

School also enrolls a number of TDS officers for more basic engineering 

training. The Australian Navy stations mechanical and technical officers in 

Tonga to assist boat maintenance by the TDS. 

The boats will reach their lifespan in approximately ten years, and the 

future of the PPB program is undetermined as of this writing. The change

from the Navy to the Custom’s Office as Australia’s lead agency for coordinating 
 Managing Maritime Resources - Sato 141

assistance to Pacific Island countries may result in the emphasis of 

alternatives.

Vessel Monitoring System

The Vessel Monitoring System (VMS), which locates fishing vessels in 

the EEZs of Pacific Islands Forum members, tracks signals emitted from 

vessels’ onboard VMS units. It is a powerful surveillance tool; when combined with other surveillance data, such as that from air and surface patrols, 

it’s possible to identify craft operating illegally without a mandatory VMS 

unit (or without turning it on). The first generation of VMS, tied to the 

Argos satellite system, has reached its lifespan, so the FFA is shifting to a 

newer system based on INMARSAT and is providing operating subsidies to 

member states. 

Aging VMS units on Tongan vessels are in disrepair with no local repair 

capability. This will be a continuing problem, because Tonga’s small market 

doesn’t warrant local stationing of the manufacturer’s technical staff. Upfront costs of switching to the new system are estimated at US$50,000 for the 

first year ($2,500 for each of 20 domestic snapper boats), which local boat 

owners would not be able to shoulder. Because only three Tongan boats 

conduct longline tuna fishing, VMS for all 20 Tongan boats may not be an 

absolute necessity. However, its potential utility for search and rescue, and 

other purposes (such as anti-trafficking enforcement) needs to be taken into 

account.

Fishery Ministry and TDS are working on closer coordination in fishery 

regulations’ enforcement. The Fishery Ministry has to overcome two obstacles in order to fully benefit from the VMS. First, powerful real-time data 

feeds from the system are not fully utilized due to the ministry’s slow internet connection. The ministry does not subscribe to the fastest available service in Tonga due to budget shortfalls. Secondly, the ministry needs training 

for its staff in analyzing and using historical VMS data more thoroughly. 
142 Regionalism, Security & Cooperation in Oceania 

This was put into action during the region-wide multilateral Operation Kurukuru, which targeted illegal fishing in November 2011 and was led by the 

FFA. Participating FFA members included Australia, New Zealand, France, 

and the United States.5

Seabed Mining

Despite Tonga’s “democratic transition” after the Nukualofa riot of 2006, 

its politics has been dominated by the royal family. The absence of transparent law governing deep sea mining, and the Tongan government’s decision to sign international joint exploration and production agreements have 

set the stage for partial privatization of its national resources without a fair 

return to the general government coffer. The Tongan government’s involvement in seabed mining in international waters exposes it to risk of losses 

and liabilities, which will have to be shouldered by the taxpayers. With 

Tonga’s poorly developed governance competency, seabed mining simultaneously offers too much economic lure and demands too much supervising 

responsibility.

Deep-water seabeds within the Tongan EEZ are host to numerous hydrothermal vents known as “black smokers” that produce polymetallic sulphide 

deposits containing various metals, such as copper, lead, zinc and gold. In 

March 2008, the Tongan government granted a 15-year exploration license 

to Nautilus Minerals — a Canada-based firm active in deep sea mining 

throughout the Pacific — for an 80-square-kilometer area off Nukualofa 

known as the Lau Basin.6 Nautilus organized its first exploration voyage in 

September 2008.7 

5 “Illegal Fishing Maritime Surveillance Operation,” Pacific.Scoop, November 22, 2011. http://pacific.scoop.co.nz/2011/11/illegal-fishing-maritime-surveillance-operation/

6 “Tonga industry: Seabed-mining exploration to begin,” Economist Intelligence Unit, Country ViewsWire, March 10, 2008, via Academic OneFile, http://go.galegroup.com/ps/i.

do?id=GALE%7CA179064900&v=2.1&u=colomines&it=r&p=AONE&sw=w.

7 “Seabed mining firm confident of finds off Tonga,” BBC Monitoring International Reports, September 23, 2008, via Academic OneFile, http://go.galegroup.com/ps/i.

do?id=GALE%7CA187557228&v=2.1&u=colomines&it=r&p=AONE&sw=w.
 Managing Maritime Resources - Sato 143

Tonga’s government also awarded the Korean government a similar exploration license in March 2008; the Koreans completed three exploration 

voyages within the following month. The project attracted US$13.8 million 

in investment from five “local” companies.8

The Tongan government is also involved in Nautilus’ deep sea mining 

outside the Tongan EEZ. The government, in 2008, sponsored the application by Tonga Offshore Mining — a sole subsidiary of Nautilus Minerals 

— to explore the Clarion Clipperton Zone in the Central Pacific. The area 

is located midway between Hawaii and Mexico, and governed by the International Seabed Authority (ISA).9

 The government asked to postpone the 

application process in 2009 over the question of responsibility and liability 

of sponsoring states,10 but was persuaded to proceed. The exploration right 

was granted by ISA in July 2011, and the agreement between the ISA and 

Tonga Offshore Mining was signed in January 2012.11 The Tongan government signed an agreement with Tonga Offshore Mining to receive royalties 

for the initial 15 years at “US$1.25 per dry ton for the first 3 million dry tons 

of nodules mined per year, and US$0.75 per dry ton for all subsequent tons 

mined thereafter in that same year.”12 Nautilus has signed a similar agreement with Nauru Ocean Resources Inc., with Nauru government’s sponsor8 “South Korea launches deep-sea mining in South Pacific,” BBC Monitoring International Reports, April 8, 2011, Apr. 2011, via Academic OneFile, http://go.galegroup.com/ps/i.

do?id=GALE%7CA253617582&v=2.1&u=colomines&it=r&p=AONE&sw=w

9 “Deep Seabed Minerals Contractors,” International Seabed Authority, http://www.isa.org.jm/

deep-seabed-minerals-contractors/overview.

10 Kogan is critical of the ISA legal opinion that places too much responsibility and liability based 

on the precautionary principle. Lawrence Kogan, “Revised U.S. Deep Seabed Mining Policy Reflects 

UNCLOS and Other International Environmental Law Obligations,” LexisNexis® Emerging Issues 

Analysis, January 2013, no. 6896, http://www.koganlawgroup.com/uploads/Revised_U.S._Deep_Seabed_Mining_Policy_Reflects_UNCLOS_and_Other_Environmental_Law_Obligations__2-1-13_.

pdf. The U.S. model of government constraining exploratory activities of U.S. firms is not applicable 

to the Tongan case. In Tonga, the sponsoring government lacks enforcement capabilities to fulfill its 

supervisory and regulatory responsibilities in a remote area.

11 Fax-Davies Capital Newsflash, January 12, 2012, http://www.proactiveinvestors.co.uk/columns/

fox-davies-capital/7968/cluff-gold-orosur-mining-patagonia-gold-providence-resources-plus-others-feature-in-todays-fox-davies-capital-newsflash-7968.html.

12 “Nautilus Minerals Defines 410 million tonne Inferred Mineral Resource.” ENP Newswire, September 29, 2012, accessed via Academic OneFile, http://go.galegroup.com/ps/i.

do?id=GALE%7CA302806162&v=2.1&u=colomines&it=r&p=AONE&sw=w.
144 Regionalism, Security & Cooperation in Oceania 

ship, to explore seabed mineral resources in separate ISA-governed blocs. 

While the Tongan-sponsored bloc has announced good resource prospects, 

Nauru-sponsored blocs have not. Meanwhile, Nautilus has tied the Tongan 

project to Nauru’s through a swapping of interests in the two subsidiaries. 

The company now controls 100 percent of the Tongan project and let Tonga 

hold 50 percent of the Nauru project.13

While seabed mining in the Tongan EEZ seems promising, the lure of a 

quick profit in the poorly governed regulatory environment invites shady 

figures. An investor group, comprised of mysterious firms allegedly based 

in Denver and London, and centered on a Russian individual, signed agreements with the Tongan government for hydrocarbons exploration and mining, and established three Tonga-registered subsidiaries. Princess Royal Pilolevu Tuita owns 20 percent shares in each of the three subsidiary firms.14

The three firms received exploration rights for 11 years and 35 years of 

production rights if resources are found in the “37,000 square kilometers 

of marine scheduled lands.”15 The area amounts to 5.5 percent of the Tongan EEZ,16 and an international investment of US$20 to $40 million was 

sought for the initial exploration set to start in 2014.17 “Not one public notice released by the advisory committee based in the Tongan prime minister’s office or from the company itself gestured to a start date.”18 Tonga’s 

“new business models and practices” to bring international capital to a risky 

emerging market19 have effectively privatized a part of the Tongan EEZ sea

13 “-Nautilus Minerals Defines 410 million tonne Inferred Mineral Resource,” ENP Newswire, September 20, 2012, accessed via Academic OneFile, http://go.galegroup.com/ps/i.

do?id=GALE%7CA302806162&v=2.1&u=colomines&it=r&p=AONE&sw=w.

14 Michael Field, “New Scam in Tonga: This Time Russian Oil Deal?,” February 13, 2011, http://

www.tnews.co.nz/forum/showthread.php?tid=4072.

15 “Denver firm optimistic on Tonga offshore oil prospects.” BBC Monitoring International Reports, January 31, 2011, accessed via Academic OneFile, http://go.galegroup.com/ps/i.

do?id=GALE%7CA248090089&v=2.1&u=colomines&it=r&p=AONE&sw=w.

16 Field, “New Scam in Tonga?” 

17 “Denver firm optimistic.”

18 Teena Brown Pulu, “Off the Deep End: Tonga’s Continental Shelf Politics,” Te Kaharoa, no. 7, 

(2014), 205. www.tekaharoa.com/index.php/tekaharoa/article/download/171/129

19 Ibid.
 Managing Maritime Resources - Sato 145

bed, despite no major international oil and gas firms having shown interest 

in the prospect of hydrocarbons there.

Tonga’s inexperience with international negotiations and lack of legal 

training concerning deep sea mining have been addressed by a collaboration of international and regional organizations, such as the European 

Union and the Applied Geoscience and Technology Division of Secretariat 

of the Pacific Community (SOPAC).20 Critics are skeptical, however, about 

acculturation of the Tongan elite through associated workshops.21 Tonga’s 

“Strategic Development Framework, 2011-2014,” states:

The opportunities for oil exploration and seabed mining remain in the future, however, government recognizes the potential contribution these could make to the future development of 

the Kingdom. Government also recognizes that there are many 

lessons to be learned from other countries where oil and mineral wealth has greatly disrupted political reform and social 

solidarity.

Government will review the need for new legislation to ensure that exploration and any future mining or extraction of resources will generate a significant benefit to the Kingdom. This 

legislation will include measures to ensure royalties and other 

charges are received by Government and to protect the economy and political system from any possible economic disruption 

and potential corruption that might eventuate from a failure to 

effectively manage mineral wealth.22

20 “Tonga to Host Regional Workshop on Law and Contract Negotiations for Deep Sea Minerals 

in the Pacific,” Islands Business, March 5, 2013, http://www.islandsbusiness.com/news/tonga/509/

tonga-to-host-regional-workshop-on-law-and-contrac/.

21 Teena Brown Pulu, “Deep Sea Tension: The Kingdom of Tonga and Deep Sea Minerals,” Te Kaharoa, no. 6, (2013), 50-76. 

22 Kingdom of Tonga, Ministry of Finance and National Planning, “Tonga Strategic Development 

Framework, 2011-2014,” 2011, 15; and http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/linked-documents/

cobp-ton-2014-2016-oth-02.pdf.
146 Regionalism, Security & Cooperation in Oceania 

Tonga issued three exploration licenses in its EEZ in 2008 without a national 

law on seabed minerals mining. Legislation was scheduled for August 2013, 

but was delayed until a year later. The European Union and the Secretariat of the Pacific Islands community assisted the preparation of the Seabed 

Minerals Act of 2014, which spelled out a “vetting process” and “public consultation” for deep-sea and seabed mining and legally empowered the government to enforce “environmental impact assessment” and “monitoring.”23

Conclusion

Despite the vast potential for EEZ resources, Tonga’s development of its 

state capacity to manage these resources has lagged behind. The Tongan 

case illustrates a danger of weak governance leading to ineffective development and utilization of its available maritime resources. While developing 

its own national scientific, business, and legal talents, which takes time, it

seems an urgent and necessary task for Tonga to better exploit sources of 

external expertise in these areas through cooperation with government and 

non-government organizations. Furthermore, political pluralization, which 

enables a freer flow of such knowledge, is lacking in Tonga’s transitional

polity. The government would ultimately benefit from a political process

that encourages open dialogue between national leaders and the citizens, 

particularly those impacted most heavily by the nation’s maritime policies. 

Governance capability in Tonga has made positive progresses in sync with 

its political opening. Active debates over seabed mining issues involving the 

vocal expat communities have played a key role in steering the government 

policy into the right direction. While it is premature to judge Tonga’s performance in enforcing the newly legislated processes, other Pacific Island 

states are well-advised to emulate Tonga’s shift towards increased transparency and comprehensive governance of seabed resources. 

23 “Tonga Enacts Region’s First Seabed Mining Law” (a report based on Radio New Zealand International, September 2, 2014), Pacific Islands Report, September 3, 2014, Pacific Islands Development 

Program, East-West Center., http://pidp.eastwestcenter.org/pireport/2014/September/09-03-06.htm.
147

Chapter 11

Climate Change Challenges to Security in the 

Pacific Islands Region and Opportunities for 

Cooperation to Manage the Threat

J. Scott Hauger

Executive Summary

• The Pacific Islands are especially vulnerable to the impacts of climate 

change.

• Direct security impacts may include diminished access to fresh water, 

local food supply and coastal infrastructure damage. 

• For atoll island nations, climate-related sea level rise is an existential 

threat.

• Areas for cooperation to manage the threat are mitigation, adaptation 

and response, plus knowledge creation and dissemination in support of 

those initiatives.

• The Pacific Islands should promote and exploit opportunities for regional collaboration to better manage mitigation, adaptation and response 

to climate change, and to develop and disseminate better knowledge in 

support of those activities.
148 Regionalism, Security & Cooperation in Oceania 

Introduction

There is a strong scientific consensus that global warming is causing 

changes in the Earth’s climate system with consequent impacts on environmental security.1

 By virtue of their shared geographic characteristics, the 

Pacific Islands have an overlapping set of shared vulnerabilities to the environmental impacts of climate change. They are exposed to tropical storms 

and rising sea levels in ways that continental states are not. Island nations 

depend on reef-generated fisheries and tourism, both threatened by ocean 

acidification and rising temperatures. Fresh water supplies are vulnerable 

because of limited land area to capture precipitation and because of groundwater exposure to saline intrusion from rising sea levels. 

For small islands, the latest Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 

(IPCC) assessment report projects a medium risk of “loss of livelihoods, 

coastal settlements, infrastructure, ecosystem services and economic stability,” in the near term (2030 - 2040), and a very high risk in the long term 

(2080 - 2100).2

 More generally, it projects “reduced biodiversity, fisheries 

abundance and coastal protection by coral reefs,” and “coastal inundation 

and habitat loss due to sea level rise, extreme events, changes in precipitation, and reduce[d] ecological resilience,” with high risk in the near term 

and very high risk in the long term.3

Security Implications

Major climate-related security concerns for the Pacific Islands include:

access to fresh water (due to changes in rainfall patterns and salt water 

intrusion); local food supply (damage to coral reefs, declining fisheries,

and impacts on agriculture); and infrastructure damage (through rising sea 

1 Stocker, T. F., et al., eds., Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC) “Summary for Policymakers” in Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2013). 

2 Field, C.B., et al., eds., IPCC “Summary for policymakers” in Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Part A: Global and Sectoral Aspects (Cambridge: Cambridge University 

Press), 23.

3 Ibid., Assessment Box SPM2 Table 1, 24.
 Climate Change Challenges to Security - Hauger 149

levels, other flooding, and storm damage). Potential second-order consequences include economic loss from these events, declining revenues from 

tourism, and emigration to escape the situation — especially from atoll islands subject to inundation from sea level rise. For some Island nations 

consisting entirely of low-lying atolls, including Kiribati, Tuvalu and the 

Marshall Islands, rising sea levels comprise an existential threat.

These anticipated climate change impacts interact with other global 

trends, such as population growth, water and air pollution, and increasing 

demands for natural resources, such as tuna, from developing nations. The 

U.S. Department of Defense summarized its assessment of the security implications of climate change as follows:

“The pressures caused by climate change will influence resource competition while placing additional burdens on economies, societies, and governance institutions around the world. 

These effects are threat multipliers that will aggravate stressors 

abroad such as poverty, environmental degradation, political 

instability, and social tensions — conditions that can enable 

terrorist activity and other forms of violence.”4

The security threat is similarly recognized by Pacific Island nations, as 

stated by the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) Secretariat: 

“Climate change is an immediate and serious threat to sustainable development and poverty eradication in many Pacific 

Island Countries, and for some their very survival. By their 

geography and mid-ocean location they are at the ‘frontline.’ 

Yet these countries are amongst the least able to adapt and 

to respond; and the consequences they face, and already now 

4 “Quadrennial Defense Review 2014,” U.S. Department of Defense, March 2014, 8, http://www.

defense.gov/pubs/2014_Quadrennial_Defense_Review.pdf.
150 Regionalism, Security & Cooperation in Oceania 

bear, are significantly disproportionate to their collective miniscule contributions to global emissions.”5

Managing the Security Impacts of Climate Change in the 

Pacific Islands

Adaptation and response to climate change, together with greenhouse gas 

mitigation and knowledge creation, make up available tools for managing 

climate change security impacts. Mitigation refers to activities to reduce 

greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere (and thus the oceans). 

“Adaptation” means activities to strengthen resilience to climate change impacts, the extent of which will depend on the success of global mitigation 

strategies. “Response” refers to activities that work to ameliorate higher levels of danger, disaster or catastrophe that may occur despite our best efforts 

to mitigate and adapt. “Knowledge creation” is a key activity that enables 

mitigation, adaptation and response in the face of the complex and emergent nature of climate change. In particular, there is a need within the security sector for actionable knowledge that can guide associated policy and 

planning.

Figure 1 presents a matrix of governance levels and tools available for 

international cooperation to manage climate change security impacts. Regional organizations active in cooperative initiatives include the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF), Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG), Secretariat of the 

Pacific Community (SPC), and Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment Programme (SPREP).

Mitigation

Pacific Island countries and territories contribute little to global greenhouse gas emissions. Nonetheless, there is a high level of awareness of 

fossil fuel dependence across the region where diesel generators are the 

5 “The role of PIFS in climate change,” Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, September 2014, http://

www.forumsec.org/pages.cfm/strategic-partnerships-coordination/climate-change/ .
 Climate Change Challenges to Security - Hauger 151

main source of electricity and where commerce depends on the maritime 

transport of goods. There is a common policy emphasis in island states on 

the adoption of renewable energy for sustainable development, as expressed 

by PIF in the September 2013 Majuro Declaration, which states in part:

“We, the Leaders of the Pacific Islands Forum, underline 

the need for urgent action at all levels to reduce greenhouse 

gas emissions commensurate with the science and to respond 

urgently and sufficiently to the social, economic, and security 

impacts of climate change to ensure the survival and viability of all Pacific small island developing States, in particular 

low-lying atoll States, and other vulnerable countries and 

regions worldwide.”6

Figure 1. Matrix of Tools and Levels of Governance for International 

Cooperation to Manage the Security Impacts of Climate Change

GlobalRegionalBilateral

Key

Mitigation

Adaptation Good progress

Response Some progress

Knowledge Progress limited

An underlying political purpose of the Majuro Declaration was to present 

a united position to the Conferences of the Parties (COPs) to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) as they seek to establish 

an effective global agreement on greenhouse gas emissions in the 2015 Paris 

6 “Majuro Declaration for Climate Leadership,” Pacific Islands Forum, 2013, http://www.majurodeclaration.org/the_declaration.
152 Regionalism, Security & Cooperation in Oceania 

meeting.7 This is a goal that has eluded the parties since the Kyoto Protocol drafting in 1997. Thus, the Majuro Declaration represents a dialogue 

between Pacific Island nations and major world powers (and emitters). Although the declaration expresses a regional intent to reduce greenhouse gas 

emissions, the actual commitments are at the national level. An annex to 

the declaration aggregates specific commitments by the fifteen PIF member 

nations.

Adaptation

The UNFCCC has provided significant support to the “least developed

countries” (LDCs) to plan for climate adaptation, establishing a fund to support the preparation and implementation of national adaptation plans of action (NAPAs). The Pacific Island nations of Kiribati, Samoa, the Solomon

Islands, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu have completed NAPAs and received support 

from the LDC Fund.8

 The World Bank has provided $140 million for climate adaptation projects and policy assistance in six Pacific Island nations,

and has pledged to increase its investments.9 The European Union’s Global 

Climate Change Alliance (GCCA), working through SPC and SPREP has 

supported adaptation projects in nine Pacific Island countries.10

Much of the funding for climate mitigation and adaptation activities, 

however, comes to the Pacific Islands through bilateral aid and technical 

assistance. According to the Organization for Economic Co-operation 

and Development, in 2012, climate-related, bilateral assistance worldwide 

reached $21.5 billion in 2010 to 2012, with 58 percent for mitigation, 25 

7 Ibid.

8 “NAPAs received by the secretariat,” United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 

http://unfccc.int/adaptation/workstreams/national_adaptation_programmes_of_action/items/4585.

php. 

9 “Acting on Climate Change & Disaster Risk for the Pacific,” The World Bank, November 20, 2013, http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2013/01/18530985/

acting-climate-change-disaster-risk-pacific. 

10 “Secretariat of the Pacific Community – Global Climate Change Alliance: Pacific Small Island States,” Global Climate Change Alliance, http://www.gcca.eu/regional-programmes/

gcca-pacific-small-island-states. 
 Climate Change Challenges to Security - Hauger 153

percent for adaptation and 18 percent mixed. In Small Island Developing 

states (SIDS) worldwide, climate adaptation projects accounted for 45 percent of assistance. Although nations in Oceania received only 2 percent of 

adaptation aid overall, SIDS, including the Pacific Island nations, received 

the highest amount of such aid on a per capita basis.11

Multilateral aid has flowed to Pacific Island nations from the UNFCCC Adaptation Fund and agencies, such as the World Bank and the Asian 

Development Bank, and is expected to increase. For example, in February 

2014, the European Union and PIF signed a financing agreement that allocates EUR 37 billion for climate change adaptation and sustainable energy 

in the Pacific Islands.12 SPREP is working to obtain and manage funds from 

the Green Climate Fund, being established by UNFCCC.13 

Nonetheless, overall progress toward climate resilience remains slight. A 

recent report to the UN Development Program (UNDP) estimates that over 

the last 25 years, several hundred million dollars in climate-related aid has 

come to the Pacific Islands, but observes, “While worthy and sincere, most 

of these initiatives have failed to either inform Pacific Island people about 

the need for long-term sustainable adaptation or to develop and mainstream 

appropriate solutions throughout the region.”14

The four mentioned regional organizations are all engaged in multilateral climate adaptation projects. For example, PIF addressed climate issues 

at its Majuro Summit in 2013 and manages collaborative climate programs 

with both the European Union and the United States. SPREP undertakes 

11 “OECD DAC Statistics. Aid to Climate Change Adaptation,” March 2014, http://www.joecd.org/

dac/environment-development/Adaptation-related%20Aid%20Flyer%20-%20March%202014%20

v2.pdf

12 “European Union and Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat sign a FJ$90.8m. programme on climate 

change,” Joint Press Release from the European Union and the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, 

February 27, 2014, http://www.forumsec.org/pages.cfm/newsroom/press-statements/2014-1/european-union-pacific-islands-forum-secretariat-sign-fj908m-programme-on-climate-change.html

13 Giff Johnson, “Pacific deals with global climate, development issues,” Marianas Variety, October 

2, 2014, http://www.mvariety.com/regional-news/69731-pacific-deals-with-global-climate-development-issues

14 Nunn, Patrick, “Climate Change and Pacific Island Countries,” UNDP Asia-Pacific Human Development Report Background Papers Series, July 2012.
154 Regionalism, Security & Cooperation in Oceania 

a variety of programs in adaptation, mitigation and policy development, 

including the Pacific Adaptation to Climate Change Project in partnership 

with UNDP, which coordinates national activities in 14 Pacific Island countries and territories.15 MSG designated an environment and climate change 

officer in 2013, and has executed a memorandum of understanding for climate change projects with Griffith University in Brisbane, Australia. SPC 

has prepared policy briefs on climate adaptation topics and manages several 

climate adaptation projects funded by the European Union, Germany, and 

the United States.16

Response

From the security sector perspective, climate response will be understood 

as an element of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR). Based 

on scientific consensus that climate change will cause an increase in natural 

disasters, there will be a growing need for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief over the course of this century. Planning for that challenge is in 

its early stages, as evidenced by a special session on “Climate Change, HA/

DR, and Security in the Asia Pacific,” held on May 31, 2014, as part of the 

Shangri-La Dialogue. In his remarks, Raymond Quilop, of the Philippines’ 

Department of National Defense, noted that the session brought together 

the issues of HA/DR and climate change, which have long been treated separately. During this session, Lord Tu’ivakano, Tonga’s prime minister, stated 

that “Climate change is [the] number one threat to the security of our region, our survival and our people,” noting that “Tonga is doing what we can 

do internationally. But climate change poses threats that are beyond our 

own capacity to respond.”17

15 Climate Change overview, Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment Programme, http://

www.sprep.org/climate-change/climate-change-about-us. 

16 “Climate Change,” Secretariat of the Pacific Community, http://www.spc.int/en/our-work/climate-change/introduction.html. 

17 “Special Session 3: Climate change, HADR, and security in the Asia-Pacific,” in The 13th IISS Asia 

Security Summit, the Shari La Dialogue, May 31, 2014, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 

http://www.iiss.org/-/media/Documents/Events/Shangri-La%20Dialogue/SLD%2014/Special%20

Sessions/Special%20Session%203.pdf. 
 Climate Change Challenges to Security - Hauger 155

Adm. Samuel Locklear, commander of U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM), has also acknowledged the connection between climate change and 

HA/DR missions. At the Atlantic Council, in March 2014, he was asked if 

climate change provided a framework for military-to-military cooperation 

in the Asia-Pacific region. He responded, “I think the consequences of climate change already drive that. One thing we can find common among all 

of us is the need to be able to respond to human disasters. And we’re doing 

it.”18 

Knowledge creation and dissemination

Because climate change is an emerging threat, there is continuous need 

for new knowledge to support planning for mitigation, adaptation and response. Thanks to the IPCC’s work, scientific knowledge of climate change 

— its environmental impacts and their societal implications — is increasingly well-known and available to governments and the public.19 Sections of 

the Fifth Assessment Report directly address issues pertaining to the Pacific 

Islands, and, more generally the oceans and small island states, and provide 

valuable information to security policy makers.20

Regional organizations are also engaged in developing knowledge networks for climate adaptation and response, often in collaboration with partner nations. From 2010 to 2014, for example, the University of the South 

Pacific administered the Pacific component of the Global Climate Change 

Alliance, funded by the European Union. This capacity development project 

provided training of climate adaptation professionals and supported applied 

research in 15 Pacific Island nations. More recently, SPREP has been work18 Transcript of remarks of Admiral Samuel J. Locklear III to the Atlantic Council, “Must 

watch: PACOM Commander on the Climate Change Threat to the Asia-Pacific,” The Center for Climate & Security, March 6, 2014, http://climateandsecurity.org/2014/03/07/

must-watch-pacom-commander-on-the-climate-change-threat-to-the-asia-pacific/. 

19 Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) (2013-14), http://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/.

20 Pacific Island nation scientists are under-represented; among the 841 contributing authors and 

editors to the report, only three are from Pacific Island nations. Fifth Assessment Report Authors and 

Review Editors, IPCC, May 27,2014, https://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/ar5/ar5_authors_review_editors_updated.pdf. 
156 Regionalism, Security & Cooperation in Oceania 

ing with Griffith University, with support from the Australian government, 

to implement a Pacific Climate Change Information Management project.21

Several domestic U.S. research and knowledge dissemination programs 

address the interests of the Hawaiian archipelago and U.S.-affiliated Pacific 

Islands. For example, the Pacific Islands Regional Climate Assessment (PIRCA), funded by the Department of the Interior and the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), has assessed climate 

change indicators and adaptive capacities of these islands, and provided input to the 2014 U.S. National Climate Assessment.22 A consortium of the 

University of Hawaii Manoa, the University of Hawaii Hilo and the University of Guam manages a Pacific Island Climate Science Center funded by 

the Department of the Interior.23 NOAA has also established a web-based 

Pacific Climate Information System (PaCIS) that provides information to 

support climate adaptation.24

Ways Ahead

With relatively small populations and limited resources, Pacific Island

countries and territories should pursue highly collaborative strategies to 

manage climate change threats. Interagency, cross-sectoral, regional and 

international collaborations are in order to represent common interests, to 

forge consensus approaches, to combine physical and intellectual resources, 

and to maximize the influence of Pacific Island countries and territories in

the global arena. Global mitigation outcomes will depend primarily on the 

actions of large countries that are responsible for most carbon emissions. 

21 Pacific iCLIM Project, Griffith University, http://www.griffith.edu.au/research/research-excellence/pacific-iclim .

22 “Pacific Islands Regional Climate Assessment (PIRCA),” http://www.pacificrisa.org/projects/

pirca/. 

23 “About the Pacific Islands CSC,” U.S. Department of the Interior, http://www.doi.gov/csc/pacific/

about.cfm. 

24 “Pacific Climate Information System,” National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, http://

collaborate.coast.noaa.gov/PRiMO/Hazard%20Clearing%20House/PaCIS%20Fact%20sheet.pdf. 
 Climate Change Challenges to Security - Hauger 157

Because they are among the most vulnerable to climate change resulting 

from these emissions, Pacific Islands should continue to work together to 

influence those nations through the UN Framework Convention on Climate 

Change system and other available means. Island nation economies depend 

on fisheries, on resilient coastal infrastructures, and on environments and 

weather that are attractive to tourism — elements threatened by climate 

change. Protection of these resources is important not only to Pacific Islanders but also to those international consumers who travel to experience 

the islands. This situation provides clear opportunities for coordinated public diplomacy and for cross-sectoral collaboration to influence public opinion and public policy in developed nations.

Local opportunities will remain for Pacific Island initiatives to reduce 

greenhouse gas emissions. The relatively high cost of imported fossil fuels 

provides an economic incentive for sustainable development based on renewable energy. Developed nations continue to make funds available for 

such projects. Moreover, USPACOM has supported military-to-military 

demonstration projects in the past, and current policies should be supportive of future initiatives.25 

A key area for potential reduction in greenhouse gas emissions in the 

Islands is the maritime use of biofuels. A variety of civil sector research, 

development and demonstration projects are ongoing in this arena, as well 

as military projects such as the joint Department of Agriculture – U.S. Navy 

“Farm to Fleet” venture.26 Pacific Islands can work together through regional organizations to influence shipping firms to test, demonstrate and adopt 

these technologies, and they can propose and request mil-to-mil projects to 

transfer biofuel technologies.

Adaptation to inevitable climate change impacts must be a core concern 

25 “Memorandum: USPACOM Energy Strategy,” US Pacific Command,, October 24, 2013, http://

energy.defense.gov/Portals/25/Documents/Blog/20140207_PACOM_Energy_Strategy.pdf.

26 “Agriculture, Navy Secretaries Promote U.S. Military Independence with ‘Farm-to-Fleet,” U.S. Department of Agriculture, News Release No. 0237.132013, December 11, 2013. http://www.usda.gov/

wps/portal/usda/usdamediafb?contentid=2013/12/0237.xml&printable=true&contentidonly=true. 
158 Regionalism, Security & Cooperation in Oceania 

of Pacific Island countries and territories. The extent of these impacts will 

depend on the success of mitigation efforts. Even the most successful outcomes, however, will result in an extended period of global warming for 

the foreseeable future. Adaptation to climate change in the Pacific Islands, 

therefore, will be a long-term, strategic process and a way of life.

Most adaptation activities, such as infrastructure strengthening or changes to agricultural practices, will be managed at national or community levels. According to emerging national and international policies, strategic adaptation will be an integral part of sustainable development. International 

support for such activities — either bilaterally or through regional organizations — is likely to grow over the coming decades, largely through agencies 

and mechanisms that are already or soon to be in place. 

For islands or nations with higher ground, adaptation may be expensive 

and stressful, but manageable if resources are available. But for atoll islands 

and nations, in situ adaptation may be impossible. It is not yet possible to 

project future sea level rise, and its interaction with tides and storms, with 

enough precision to predict when specific islands will become uninhabitable. This is likely to be a long-term, gradual, and in some ways, sporadic 

process leading to increasing emigration over time. A reasonable guess is 

that some low lying atolls may become uninhabitable by the end of this century. That schedule, however, could be accelerated by complex, interactive 

factors, such as increased methane release from Arctic permafrost, which 

accelerates the melting of polar icecaps. 

For those Island nations under existential threat, there is a critical need 

for international cooperation to manage the security aspects of human migration; the legal and economic aspects of the pending loss of nationality; 

and of the sovereign right to natural resources under the UN Convention 

on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). To wit, there is a need to update UNCLOS, which did not anticipate sea level rise associated with climate change 

and doesn’t adequately address the economic rights pertaining to Exclusive 
 Climate Change Challenges to Security - Hauger 159

Economic Zones (EEZs) of Island nations which may become submerged.27

Working together through regional organizations, Pacific Island countries 

and nations must pursue these issues of social and legal adaptation and promote their common interests in global forums.

Anticipating the increase over time of natural disasters related to climate change and their impacts on infrastructures, livelihoods and human 

security, Pacific Island countries and territories should strengthen national 

and regional capabilities to respond. They should also work with regional 

powers and civil sector organizations to enhance their capacity to facilitate 

and manage international HA/DR operations when they become necessary. Planning should anticipate worst-case scenarios where climate-related 

events, such as cyclones, occur coincidentally with other events, such as an 

earthquake, volcanic eruption or tsunami, to create a catastrophic “black 

swan” event.

Pacific Island countries and territories should invest in maintenance and 

expansion of institutions and programs for knowledge creation and dissemination regarding the impacts of climate change and their potential for mitigation, adaptation and response. There is a continuing need for education 

at all levels — from public education for an informed citizenry to higher 

education to provide the skills necessary to fully participate in global scientific and policy communities. Pacific Islanders should also pursue a higher 

level of participation in climate-related research and policy; for example as 

authors and editors in any subsequent round of IPCC assessment reporting 

and as participants in growing observation networks to collect and analyze 

data on climate-related events, environmental change, and social impacts of 

these phenomena.

27 Hayashi, Moritaka. “Islands’ Sea Areas: Effects of a Rising Sea Level,” Review of Island Studies, July 

10, 2013, http://islandstudies.oprf-info.org/research/a00003/. 
160 Regionalism, Security & Cooperation in Oceania 

Finally, there is an apparent opportunity for closer collaboration between 

Pacific Island nations and the United States, which sponsors a variety of domestic research and development programs concerned with Pacific Island 

climate issues as they pertain to U.S. states, territories and associated states. 

Most of this research is relevant to other Island entities, but to be rigorously 

relevant, it should specifically include data and analyses from non-US-associated islands. There will be bureaucratic barriers to such inclusiveness 

based on different responsibilities and funding streams for agencies with domestic and international missions. With goodwill and intent, however, these 

should be resolvable issues, requiring interagency agreements and transfer of 

funds, and perhaps requiring authorization by Congress. It would be in the 

interests of both the U.S. research community and Pacific Island nations to 

establish a presumption of such collaboration in future research programs.

Climate change will present a growing challenge to Pacific Islands’ security for the foreseeable future. Pacific Island countries and territories must 

seize opportunities for regional collaboration to plan and implement adaptation strategies, and to develop and disseminate science-based knowledge 

to meet the threat. They should work together to influence large nations that 

are substantial greenhouse gas emitters. Finally, they should take advantage 

of the slow-motion aspect of climate change to plan for increased capacities 

to manage regional and global response to future needs for humanitarian 

assistance and disaster response. 
161

Conclusion

Regional Security Architecture in Oceania: 

Quo Vadis?

Carleton Cramer

The Pacific Islands region was settled thousands of years ago. Starting in 

the sixteenth century and continuing through the nineteenth century, European and American explorers and traders colonized the region. By the turn 

of the twentieth century and onset of World War I, major external powers 

were ceding and acquiring Pacific territories through political compromise 

and necessity. World War II brought global notoriety to the Pacific Islands 

region through many famous and bloody battles, including the Solomon Islands Campaign, the Battle of the Coral Sea, and the Marshall Islands campaign. In the decades following WW II, the British, French and Americans 

used various remote Pacific Island locations to conduct atomic and nuclear 

testing. During this same time frame, the region rejected the yoke of colonialism and pursued self-determination in various forms, from independence to compact-protectorate type arrangements. 

Who then, from among the regional nation-states and the external powers with strategic interests in the region, should gather together to discuss 

twenty-first century security cooperation? And, just as importantly, on 

which security challenges should their limited time together be focused? 

As was suggested in the introduction, this book incorporates authored 

chapters as well as findings from a week-long workshop which brought together an inclusive group of Oceania officials, non-governmental organizations, and external powers. The workshop leveraged the outcomes of the 
162 Regionalism, Security & Cooperation in Oceania 

Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) Leaders Summit on the regional strategic vision 

held in Palau, in July 2014. It provided a timely opportunity to engage the 

region following participants’ own assessment of the regional security architecture, and to discuss and prioritize areas where action and assistance could 

best be applied to enhance security governance.

No topic was off limits, including the then pending internationally monitored elections in Fiji. Many passionate discussions continued far into the 

evening hours. Attendees’ start point was self-assessment of the effectiveness of Oceania’s regional security architecture. Attendees identified key 

regional norms and values, as well as development challenges and opportunities to see how they shaped the regional security architecture. This effort, 

aided greatly by this book’s authors and workshop presentations, contributed to rich workshop discussions that followed. The assessment process 

enabled further discussion of key questions associated with the future development and prosperity of Oceania. First, what were the required next steps 

for enhancing regional security architecture? Second, to the extent possible, 

what would be the metrics of success in enhancing the regional security 

architecture? 

During discussions, participants identified key issues for consideration. 

They noted that while recognizing diverse national interests across the Pacific, attendees desire a Pacific which is peaceful, stable, and prosperous; 

a region in which people live according to the universal rule of law, customs and traditions, and who value inclusivity, responsibility, respect and 

dignity. Attendees all expressed a desire to maintain traditional values, but 

to also ensure that traditional practices and norms adhered with current 

international norms. Participants expressed concern that donor money often brings donor values that may conflict with traditional values, principles 

and systems. There was broad consensus that outsiders do not necessarily 

understand how the region works and improving the understanding of “international” outsiders on local and regional values was necessary. Finding 
 Conclusion - Cramer 163

commonalities and similarities between traditional norms and international 

universal rights was identified as an important next step. 

Attendees focused on “The Pacific Way” – inclusiveness, listening, consensus and non-confrontation — as a valuable means for economic development, and reconciliation and peacebuilding. Inclusiveness at village, district 

and national levels was identified as crucial to addressing a host of economic and political security challenges. The “Wantok” system from Melanesia 

was highlighted as important in that decisions made “today” do impact relationships “tomorrow.” Attendees expressed a continuing common desire 

for regional solidarity to be achieved through consensus in the Pacific Way 

and, in this regard, recognized the necessity of improved communication 

and accountability between national and regional stakeholders. There was 

candid recognition that decision making at the regional level is significantly 

more difficult now that there are more member nations represented.

Attendees recognized that economic interests, growth and development 

do in fact drive the security infrastructure, and that current mechanisms are 

failing to deal with these drivers. They cited problems that included uneven 

and growing economic gaps, taxation, transnational crime and the fundamental inability to meet requirements imposed by both trade and aid agreements. Participants also identified greater emphasis on human security and 

local, district and national economic planning as important links between 

regional security, development and sustainable growth. 

The week-long workshop was important from the perspective of both 

“process” and product. Intimate, small-group discussions allowed for transparent, mutually respectful discussion. Difficult issues concerning the role 

of external powers, the regional security architecture and comprehensive 

security policies were discussed with candor and passion. Three broad conclusions resulted from the event: 

First, there was a belief the current security architecture was capable of 

accommodating and reconciling potential challenges to regional stability, 
164 Regionalism, Security & Cooperation in Oceania 

including the tension between extant regional structures and sub-regional 

groupings, such as the Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG) and recently 

formed Pacific Islands Development Forum (PIDF). Participants, to include 

senior Pacific Islands leaders, applauded the initiative of convening a workshop on this topic at a timely juncture in regional relations. The event facilitated a conciliatory atmosphere among several regional bodies that will 

enable closer cooperation and coordination in future efforts. 

Second, discussions highlighted the important role of larger external 

powers in the region and the need for greater dialogue between such powers 

and Pacific Island nations to enhance trust, confidence and transparency in 

regional security. For the United States, in particular, participants emphasized an increased diplomatic presence was more important for the Pacific 

Islands region than additional military activity. 

Third, attendees emphasized that enhancing the development of national security processes and documents is a way to generate greater political 

commitment and national ownership over regional security arrangements. 

They also stressed that development of a robust national security policy is a 

crucial foundation for a resilient regional security architecture. Discussions 

with PIF and the UN Development Programme Pacific Centre highlighted 

the urgent importance of assistance to the Solomon Islands particularly in 

view of the current drawdown of the Regional Assistance Mission to the 

Solomon Islands (RAMSI). 

Summary

Oceania represents one of the world’s most diverse regions. It is an extraordinary mix of cultures, languages, peoples and countries. Most countries in this region are “young,” having achieved their modern independence 

in the post-World War II era. Perhaps more so than any other region of the 

world, Oceania struggles in reconciling traditional norms with international 
 Conclusion - Cramer 165

values driven by globalization. Issues such as overfishing and environmental degradation represent nontraditional security challenges to many countries around the world. These same challenges threaten the very survival of 

Oceania. Tragically, Oceania may play a key role in global norm setting for 

the movement of people associated with climate change.

The peoples and countries of this region are connected by the oceans. As 

is frequently acknowledged in many Pacific Island cultures, the ocean does 

not separate people, but instead, connects them. In a broader context, Oceania connects Asia with the Americas and serves as a maritime highway between East and West. The twenty-first century is being driven by important 

trends, all associated with the maritime domain. Maritime commerce continues to grow exponentially; giant “K Mart” ships loaded with many thousands of containers with products from around the world are a common 

sight. Growing sea lanes of commerce cut throughout the Pacific Islands 

region. More and more, countries are relying on their maritime commerce 

for their economic growth and prosperity of their people. Pacific Island 

countries are unique among the world community in that all have vast maritime territories that significantly exceed their relatively modest amount of 

land territory. And, in the broader Asia-Pacific region, countries are engaged in an unprecedented naval arms modernization. As noted in previous 

chapters, few Pacific Island nations have armed forces. In many respects, 

these three mega-trends are converging in the vast waters of Oceania. What 

happens in Oceania has global implications. Hopefully this book will help 

inform the discussion and contribute to a successful way forward. 1

1 The conclusion to this book is derived in large part from DKI APCSS staff and faculty working 

papers, as well as recorder notes from workshop plenary and small group discussions.
166 Regionalism, Security & Cooperation in Oceania 

Notes on Contributors

Rouben Azizian is a professor at the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (DKI APCSS)in Honolulu, Hawaii. His main areas 

of research and teaching are regional security architecture, security sector 

development, Oceania, and Russian and Central Asian security issues. Dr. 

Azizian has published seven books as well as numerous book chapters, journal articles, and working papers on regional security. From 1994 to 2002, he 

taught at the Department of Political Studies, University of Auckland, New 

Zealand. Prior to becoming a full-time academic, Dr. Azizian had an extensive career in the Soviet and later Russian Foreign Service, which included 

assignments in Nepal, Sri Lanka, and New Zealand. He is a member of the 

editorial boards of Asian Politics & Policy, Asia-Pacific Journal of Marine 

Science and Education, Central Asia Journal of Area Studies and Russia and 

the Pacific (scientific journal). 

Carleton Cramer is the Dean of the College of Security Studies at the 

Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Honolulu, Hawaii, where he has also been a faculty member since 2004, focusing on international law, counterterrorism and maritime security. His previous naval 

career includes numerous assignments in the Asia-Pacific region. His additional experience in the region includes working for the Supreme Court of 

Hawaii and U.S. Attorney, District of Hawaii. Mr. Cramer is a member of 

both the California and Hawaii State Bars. He is admitted to practice before 

the U.S. Supreme Court, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, 

U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit and the U.S. District Court, District of Hawaii.
 Contributors 167

Jim Elmslie is the co-convener of the West Papua Project at the Centre 

for Peace and Conflict Studies, University of Sydney, which he founded in 

2002. In this capacity, he has coordinated many workshops and conferences, 

and has published widely on the conflict in West Papua. Dr. Elmslie has been 

involved in study, research and business on the island of New Guinea since 

1983, simultaneously working as an art consultant and a political economist 

in both Papua New Guinea and West Papua. He has completed a master’s of 

international studies degree and a doctorate of philosophy on the political 

economy of West Papua at Sydney University. 

James Scott Hauger is an associate professor at the Daniel K. Inouye 

Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (DKI APCSS) in Honolulu, Hawaii. He teaches in areas of science, technology and security policy, including climate change and environmental security, and space and the global 

commons. Prior to joining DKI APCSS, Dr. Hauger served as research 

professor and vice president for government and business relations at Nevada’s Desert Research Institute (DRI). Dr. Hauger’s career has spanned the 

research and innovation enterprise across the private, academic, non-profit 

and government sectors. In the 1980s, he was founder and CEO of Applied 

Concepts Corporation, a high-tech, small business firm addressing issues of 

technology assessment and innovation. In the 1990s, he founded the Science and Technology Studies program at Virginia Tech’s Northern Virginia 

Center. He then served as a program director at the American Association 

for the Advancement of Science (AAAS). Dr. Hauger’s initial education was 

in chemistry at Stetson University (B.S.) and the Johns Hopkins University 

(M.A.). He holds a master’s degree in American history from the University 

of Chicago, and a doctorate in science and technology studies from Virginia 

Tech, with an emphasis on science. 
168 Regionalism, Security & Cooperation in Oceania 

Richard Herr is the director of the Centre for Regional and International 

Affairs at the University of Fiji. He taught at the University of Tasmania for 

four decades and has held a variety of positions including head of department. Dr. Herr has held academic appointments in Hawaii, New Caledonia, 

Republic of Korea and the USSR. He was awarded a Medal in the Order of 

Australia (OAM) in the 2007 Queen’s Birthday Honours List, for promoting higher education. The Royal United Services Institute awarded him the 

2013 Blamey Medal for his security assessment of Melanesia, and AusAID 

conferred a Peace Builder Award in 2002 for his work in the Solomon Islands. Dr. Herr has served as a consultant on the regional architecture for 

the governments of the Pacific Islands on a regular basis since 1976.

Jenny Hayward-Jones is director of the Melanesia Program at the Lowy 

Institute. Prior to joining the Lowy Institute, she was an officer in Australia’s 

Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade for thirteen years, serving in the 

Australian missions in Vanuatu and Turkey. She worked as policy adviser 

to the special coordinator of the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon 

Islands from its inception in July 2003 to 2004. Dr. Hayward-Jones holds 

a bachelor of arts with honors in political science from Macquarie University and a master’s degree from Monash University. Her interests focus on 

Australian policy in the Pacific Islands region, political and social change in 

Melanesia, and the strategic and economic challenges facing Pacific Islands 

in the Asian century. 

Russell Parkin is a member of the directing staff at the Australian Defence Force Command and Staff College in Canberra. He served in the 

Australian Army as both a reserve and regular officer between 1980 and 

2004. Since 2004, he has been employed in government service and the 

higher education sector, including with the Department of Defence, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the University of Canberra, and the 
 Contributors 169

Australian National University. Dr. Parkin’s research interests include Australian military and political history, professional military education, peace 

operations and regional security issues. 

Anna Powles is a senior lecturer in security studies with the Centre for 

Defence and Security Studies at Massey University, New Zealand. She is 

co-editor of “United Nations Peacekeeping Challenge: The Importance of 

the Integrated Approach,” (Ashgate: July 2015); co-editor of “Private Military and Security Companies in the Pacific” (forthcoming: 2016); and is

writing on the rise of geopolitics in the Pacific. Dr. Powles previously held

positions as the monitoring and evaluation security sector specialist with 

the United Nations in Timor-Leste; the Timor-Leste analyst with the International Crisis Group; and as advisor to the Timorese government on its response to the 2006 crisis. She has conducted humanitarian response evaluations for the Norwegian Refugee Council, Oxfam International, and World 

Vision International as well as undertaken research projects on post-conflict

recovery in the Solomon Islands and the protection of civilians during the 

2006 crisis in Timor-Leste. Dr. Powles is an Alumni Fellow of the Asia 

-Pacific Center for Security Studies, Honolulu, Hawaii. She is the founder

of the New Zealand affiliate of Women in International Security (WIIS NZ),

a member of Women, Peace and Security Academic Collective (Australia/

New Zealand), and a committee member of the New Zealand Institute of 

International Affairs. 

Michael Powles currently serves as a Senior Fellow with the New Zealand Centre for Strategic Studies in Wellington, New Zealand. In February 

2015, he was Conference organizer for a conference held in Samoa on China 

and the Pacific: “The View from Oceania,” sponsored by one university each 

from New Zealand, China and Samoa. Ambassador Powles has also edited 

two books on Pacific politics and modern Pacific Island history. He was 
170 Regionalism, Security & Cooperation in Oceania 

ambassador and permanent representative of New Zealand to the United 

Nations from 1996 to 2000. His previous experience in international relations is extensive, having served as New Zealand’s ambassador to China and 

Indonesia and as high commissioner to Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru and Tuvalu. 

He was former deputy secretary for the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign 

Affairs and Trade with responsibility for the South Pacific, North Asia, the 

United Nations, the Middle East and Africa. Ambassador Powles holds a 

master’s degree in law from Victoria University, Wellington.

 Yoichiro Sato currently teaches and is the director of International Strategic Studies at Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University in Japan. Previously, 

he also taught at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Honolulu, Hawaii; Auckland University in New Zealand; and Kansai Gaidai Hawaii College, and University of Hawaii. In fall 2013, Dr. Sato was a visiting 

professor and researcher at Colorado School of Mines. His major works include Norms, Interests, and Power in Japanese Foreign Policy (co-edited with 

Keiko Hirata, Palgrave, 2008); and The Rise of China and International Security (co-edited with Kevin Cooney, Routledge, 2008); and The U.S.-Japan 

Security Alliance (co-edited with Takashi Inoguchi and G. John Ikenberry, 

Palgrave, 2011). Dr. Sato holds a bachelor of arts degree in law from Keio 

University, master of arts in international studies from University of South 

Carolina, and doctor of philosophy in political science from University of 

Hawaii. 

Eric Shibuya is professor of Strategic Studies at the Command and Staff 

College, Marine Corps University in Quantico, Virginia. Prior to his joining 

Marine Corps University, he was associate professor at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS) in Honolulu, Hawaii, from 2000 to 2007, 

where he taught courses on Oceania and was one of the founders of APCSS’ 

Comprehensive Security Responses to Terrorism course. Dr. Shibuya’s re-
 Contributors 171

search interests are in the politics of Oceania, post-conflict demobilization/

reintegration, and transnational political violence. He holds degrees from 

the University of Hawaii, University of Oklahoma, and Colorado State University. He was a Fulbright Fellow to Australia in 1999 and a 2002 Pacific 

Century Fellow, and has been adjunct faculty with the Center for Civil-Military Relations (Naval Postgraduate School) and Center for Asymmetric 

Warfare, participating in maritime security and pandemic response exercises in the Marshall Islands and Micronesia. Dr. Shibuya’s latest publications 

are Demobilizing Irregular Forces (Polity, 2012) and “Beijing Building Influence, Shelving Competition in the South Pacific,” China Brief, vol.12, issue 

20, October 19, 2012, Jamestown Foundation. 

Jose Sousa-Santos is a principle consultant with JKLSS Consulting 

and a regular contributor for IHS Jane’s on Asia-Pacific security and defense issues. He is a former lead analyst with the UN Integrated Mission 

in the Timor-Leste Joint Mission Analysis Cell and advisor to the acting 

prime minister and president of Timor-Leste. Mr. Sousa-Santos received 

numerous commendations and awards for his role in conflict mediation in 

Timor-Leste, including a 2008 nomination for the Sergio Vieira de Mello 

Human Rights Award, United Nations and Government of Timor-Leste, 

for achievements in the area of community conflict mediation and dispute 

resolution during the 2006 crisis; a 2007 UN Police National Investigations 

Department Commendation; and a 2006 Presidential Commendation for 

the facilitation of multi-party negotiations between martial arts and ritual 

arts groups, the government of Timor-Leste, and the UN Integrated Mission 

in Timor-Leste. He is completing a masters in international relations at Victoria University, Wellington, New Zealand. 
172 Regionalism, Security & Cooperation in Oceania 

Jian Zhang is deputy head of school, School of Humanities and Social 

Sciences, the University of New South Wales at the Australian Defence Force 

Academy, Australia. His primary research interests are in China’s foreign 

and security policy, Chinese military and Asia-Pacific Security. Dr. Zhang 

has published widely in various international journals and edited volumes. 

He is a member of the Australian Committee of the Council for Security 

Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (AUS-CSCAP).