FI L ED U.S. COURT OF A P P E A LS E LE V E N T H C IR C U IT Marc h 13, 2008 THOMAS K. KAH

N CL ERK [PUBLISH]
IN THE UN ITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE EL EV EN TH CIRC UI T

N o. 06- 1135 1 D. C. Dock etNo. 0 5- 80 14 6- CR-KAM UNITED STAT ES OF AMERIC A, Plaintiff-Appellee,
ve rs us EARL BURGEST, a. k. a. E ar l B ur ge ss, D ef en dant- Appe llant.
Appeal f rom the United State s District Court fo r the S outhe rnD istri ct

of F lor ida (M ar ch 13, 200 8) Befo re EDMONDSON, Ch ie f Ju dg e, DUBINA, Cir cu it Ju dg e, an d S TORY,* District Judge.

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ___ *Honora ble Richard W. Story , United States District J udg e for the Northe rn District of Ge org ia, sitti ngby desig nation.Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. C t. 1602 (1966). 1 “The dual sovere ignty

doctrine is founded on the common-law conception of crime a s an 2 offe nse ag ainst the sovere ignty of the g overnme nt. When a defe ndant in a sing le ac t vio l ates the ‘pea ce a nd dignity ’ of two sove reigns by brea king the laws of each, he has committed two distinct ‘off ence s.’” Heath v. A labama , 4 7 4 U. S
. 8 2 , 8 8 , 1 0 6 S
. C t . 4 3 3 , 4 3 7 (1 9 8 5 ) ( qu o t i n g United States v . La nz a , 260 U.S. 377, 382, 43 S. C t. 141, 142 (1922)). 2 DU BIN A, Circuit Judge: Appe llant E ar l B ur ge st ( “ Burg es t” ) ap pe al s hi s c onvi ct ion s ontw o c ount s of poss es sio n w ithint en t t o di str ibu te f ive gr am s or

m or e of c ra ck c oc ai ne , in violatio n of 21 U. S. C. § 841 (a)( 1). Burgest contends th at the district court err ed by adm itting into evid ence his post-arrest statem ent given to feder al authorities af te r he w ai ve d hi s M

ira nda rights bu t while he had re tained couns el for a

1 pe ndi ng s ta te dr

ug c harg e. B ur ge st’ s c ha lle nge pr es en ts an is sue of f ir st im pr es sio n inthi s c ir cu it: w he the r the dua l so ve re ign ty doc tr ine appl ie s to the

2 Si xthA m en dm en t r igh t t o c ouns el
. B as ed on the f oll ow ing dis cu ssi on, w e j ointhe
m aj or ity of c ir cu its and h old

that the dua l so ve re ign ty doc tr ine appl ie s inthe S ixth A m en dm en t c ont ex t. B ec au se the dr ug o ff en se s vi olate d th e law s of se parate
sove re ign s, the state and f ed er al of fe nse s are not

the sam e fo r pur

pose s of the Si xthA m en dm en t r igh t t o c ouns el
. T hus, Burg es t’ s r igh t t o c ouns el ha d no t atta ch ed to his unc harg ed

f ed er al of fe nse s a t the ti m e he m ad e his inc ri m inatin g state m en ts. A cc or din gly , w e co nc lud e that the dis tr ic t c ourt di d no t e rr inBur g est also challeng es the district court’s de nial of his motion to s uppress the a dmission 3 of the c rac k coca ine discover ed by office rs during a s ea rc h o f Burg est. Be cause the ar resting office r’s testimony

established proba

ble cause for solicitation of prosti tution under Florida law, the sear ch incident to B urg est’s ar rest did not violate his Fourth Ame ndment rig hts. There fore , the district court prope rly

denied B urg est’s motion to suppress the cra ck coc aine. B ur g e st a lso c la ime d th at th e state me nts sh ou ld be su pp re sse d und e r t

he F if th Ame ndme nt, 4 and the dis tr ic t c ourt

de nie d th e mot ion

to s up pr e ss o n th is gro un d a s w e ll. Ho we ver , b e c a us e Bur g est does notasser

t a Fif th Amendment violation on appea l, we will not consider this asser tion. See U nited States v. Cunningham , 161 F.3d 1343, 1344 ( 11th Cir. 1998) (holding that defe ndant abandons a

n issue for whic h no argument is offer ed on appe al). 3 adm itt ing Burg es t’ s po st- ar re st s ta te m en t i nto e vid en ce , and w e af fi rm his
co nvi ct ion s. 3 I. BACKG ROUND A f ed er al gr an d j ur

y ind ic te d B ur ge st o n tw o c ount s of pos se ssi on w ith intent to distribu te at least f ive gram s of cra ck cocaine, in viol ation of 21 U.S .C. §§ 8 41( a) (1 ), ( b) (1 )( B) (i ii)
. B ur ge st, thr oughc ouns el , f ile d apr e- tr ia l m oti on t o supp re ss, arg uin g th at

state m en ts h e m ad e to f

ed er al a ge nts dur ing an in te rr oga tio n shou ld b e supp re sse d be ca use the S ta te of

F lor ida ha d f orm al ly c harg ed him w ith poss es sio n of

c oc ai ne , and h e w as r ep re se nte d by c ouns el f or the state c harg e whe n fe de ral ag en ts in te rro ga te d h im reg ard in g t he fed eral dru g p os se ss io n c ou nt s. Burg es t a sse rt ed

that hi s w ri tte n w ai ve r of his M ira nda r igh ts w as ins uf

fi ci en t t o ove rc om e ana tta ch ed

S ixth A m en dm en t r igh t t o c ouns el
. T he G ove rn m en t 4
re spon de d th at

Burg es t’ s r igh t t o c ouns el w as not vio la te d w he n th e fe de ra l a ge nts int er vie w ed him r eg ar din g hi s dr

ug p oss es sio n c harg es be ca use the state and4

fe de ra l c harg es vio la te d th e law s of se parate sov er ei gns an d w er e thu s no t the
sam e offe nse. The district court held an evidentiary hearing on the m otion
. The par ties
re ite rate d th e ar gum en ts m ad e in the ir r es pe ct ive m em or an daon the m oti on t o supp re ss. A ddi tio na lly , the G ove rn m en t no te d, and the de fe nse c onc ed ed , that the state c harg e w as f

or pos se ssi on o f co ca ine and the f ed er al c harg es w er e fo r poss ession o f cr ack cocaine w ith inten t to dist ribute. T he district court deferr ed
ru lin g onthe m oti on unti l tri al
. A t tri al , the dis tr ic t c ourt de nie d th e m oti on, fi ndi ng the dua l so ve re ign ty doc tr ine appl ic ab le to the S ixth A m en dm en t r igh t t o co unse l ana ly sis
. T hus, be ca use Burg es t c om

m itt ed tw o di sti nc t of

fe nse s, the district court foundthat his right to counsel di d not attach to hi s federa l charges at th e ti m e fed eral ag en ts qu es ti on edhi m . The c ase procee ded to trial, and Burgest m oved for j udgm ent of acquittal at the c onc lus ionof

the G ove rn m en t’ s c as e an d a t the c onc lus ionof the pr es en ta tio n of a ll the e vid en ce . T he dis tr ic t c ourt de nie d bo th m oti ons, and the j ur y f ound Burg es t gu ilty

on b othc ount s. T he dis tr ic t c ourt su bse que ntl y

se nte nc ed

Burg es t to 3 60 m onths i m

pr iso nm en t onboth c ount s, to run c onc ur re ntl y , f oll ow ed by ei ght y ears sup er

vis ed r el ea se . B ur ge st the n pe rf ec te d th is a

ppe al
. II . ISSUE5

Whe the r the dis tr ic t c ourt e rr ed by a dm itt ing Burg es t’ s po st- ar re st s ta te m en t giv ento fe de ra l auth or iti es a ft er he ha d r et ai ne d c ouns el f or ape ndi ng s ta te charge. III. STA ND AR D O F REVIE W Whe n c on si de rin g a di st ric t co ur t’s d en ia l o f a m ot io n t o s up pr es s, we re vie wit s f

ind ing s of

f ac t f or c le ar e rr or and i ts a ppl ic at ionof

the lawto tho se fa ct s de novo
. Uni te d S ta te s v. N ews ome , 475 F. 3d 12 21, 1223 (11t h Cir. 2007 ), cert. denied , 128 S
. Ct
. 218 ( 2007 ). W e co nstru e al l f ac ts i n th e lig ht m ost fav or ab le to th e p rev ai li ng pa rty, in t hi s ca se , th e Gov ern m en t. Id
. a t 12 23- 24. IV. D ISCU SSION Under the S ixth Am endm ent, “ [i] n all crim inal prosecution s, the ac cused shall enjoy

the right . .
. to have the assistance of counsel for his defence. ” U . S
. Co ns t. am en d. VI. The Six th Am en dm en t ri gh t t o c ou ns el is off en se sp eci fic
. M cN ei l v
. W isc onsi n , 501 U
. S. 171 , 175 , 111 S
. Ct
. 220 4, 220 7 ( 1991 ). “ It c an not be inv oke d on ce f

or a ll fu tur e pr ose cu tio ns, f or it doe s no t a tta chunt il a prosecution is com

m enced, that is, at or a fter the initiation of adversary j udicial
cr im ina l pr oc ee din gs –

w he the r by

w ay of f orm al c harg e, pr el im inary he ar ing , indictm ent, inform ation, or ar raignm ent.” Id

. ( int er na l qu otatio n m ar

ks and ci t at i o n o m i t t ed ). Mo re o v er , “ i f p o l i ce i n i t i at e i n t erro g at i o n af t era d ef en d an t ’s6

as se rt ion , a t an arr ai gnm en t or sim ilar pr oc ee din g, of

his r igh t t o c ouns el , any
w ai ve r of the de fe ndant’ s r igh t t o c ouns el f or that po lic e- ini tiate d in te rr oga tio n is invalid .” M

ic higan v . J

ac ks on , 475 U. S. 625, 636, 106 S. Ct. 1404 , 1411 (1986). Inthi s c as e, the re is no que sti on tha t B ur ge st’ s S ixth A m en dm en t r igh t t o co unse l ha d a tta ch ed

to the state dr

ug c harg e at

the ti m e the f

ed er al a ge nts int er vie w ed him
. B ec au se the S ixth A m en dm en t r igh t t o c ouns el is of fe nse spe ci fi c, Burg es t’ s pr ior

inv oc at ionof

his r igh t t o c ouns el f

or the c harg ed

state offense did not attach to Burgest’s uncharged f ederal drug offe nses if the federa l offenses are separate offenses fr om the state drug offense. W e hold that where conduct vi olates laws of separ ate sovereigns, the offe nses are distinct for purposes of the Sixth Am endm ent right to coun sel. A ccordingly , B urgest’ s right to cou nsel di d n ot att ach to hi s fe de ral ch arg es at t he ti m e fed eral ag en ts qu es ti on edhi m . See U nit ed Sta tes v . A lv arad

o , 44 0 F .3d19 1 (4 th Cir . 20 06 ), cert. denied , 127 S
. Ct
. 81 ( 2006 ) (a

ppl y ing dua l so ve re ign ty doc tr ine to Si xthA m en dm en t) ; United States v. Coker , 433 F
. 3d 3 9 ( 1st Ci r. 200 5) ( sa m e) ; U

nit ed Sta tes v . A va nts , 278 F. 3d 5 10 ( 5thCi r. 200 2) ( sa m e) ; se e als o U nit ed Sta tes v . M

cC lou d , N o. CR406- 247, 200 7 W L 170 6353 ( S. D
. G a. Jun e 11, 200 7) ; U nit ed Sta tes v . L all , N o. 8:0 6- cr-5 08 -T-2 3M AP, 20 07 W L 15 21 48 7 (M .D. Fla. Ma y 23 , 20 07 ). But see United7

Sta tes v . M

ill s , 412 F
. 3d 3 25 ( 2d C ir
. 200 5) ; U nit ed Sta tes v . R ed

B ird , 287 F
. 3d 70 9 (8 th Cir . 20 02 ). As the Coker

c ourt no te d, [a ] ft er c ar ef ull y e xa m ini ng Co bb , w e conclude that the dual sovereigntydoctrine applies for the purposes of definin g what constitu tes the sam e offe nse in the Sixth Am endm ent right to coun sel co nte xt. I n do ing so, w e re j ec t the r ea soni ng o f the S ec ond Ci rc uit in M ill s and a dopt

the r ea soni ng o f the F if

th C ir cu it in A va nts . T he co urt i n M

ill s state d th at

“ [n ] ow he re in Co bb , e ith er e xpl ic itl y

or by im put at ion , is the re sup port f or adua l so ve re ign ty

e xc ep tio n” in the Si xt h Am en dm en t ri gh t t o c ou ns el co nt ex t. M ill s , 41 2 F .3dat 3 30
. T his state m en t, in our

vie w , doe s no t gi ve a de qua te c onsi de ratio n to the Court’ s statem ent that it saw “ no const itutio nal differe nce be tw ee n th e m eanin g of

the te rm ‘ of fe nse ’ in the c ont ex ts o f doub le j eopardy and of the right to coun sel.” Co bb , 532 U. S. at 173, 121 S. Ct. 1335
. If the C ourt intend ed to incorporate onlythe Blockburger te st i nto it s S ixth A m en dm en t j ur isp ru de nc e, the n it s st at em en t i n Co bb w oul d m ak e no s en se , a s th er e w oul d be adif fe re nc e in the m eanin g of

the te rm “ of fe nse ” in the c ont ex ts o f doub le j eo pardy and of the r igh t t o c ouns el
. 433 F. 3d at 44
. T hus, “ be ca use [ the c harg es ] or igi na te [d ] f ro m auto nom ous sovereigns th at eac h ha[d] the authority to define and prosecute crim inal condu ct,” A lv arad o , 440 F
. 3d at 19 4, Burg es t’ s st at e dr ug c harg e w as adif

fe re nt o ff en se than hi s f ed er al dr ug c harg es f

or S ixth A m en dm en t purp ose s. B ur ge st’ s pr ior inv oc at ionof

his r igh t t o c ouns el f

or the state dr

ug c harg e did

not a tta chto the
un ch arg edfed eral dru g o ffen se s at th e ti m e o f th e in te rv ie w. There fo re, we co n cl u d e t h at th e f

ed er al ag en t s ’ qu es t i o n i n g , wh i ch o cc u rr ed af t erBu rg es t ’sBur g est urg es the a pplication of the Ba rtk

us v . I lli no is , 359 U.S. 121, 79 S. Ct . 676 (1959), 5 e xce pti on to t he du a l so ve re ig nty do c tr ine
. Th is exc e pti on ari se s whe n “ on e so ve re ig n s o th or ou g hly dominates or manipulates the prosec utorial machine ry” of the other sover eig n or “if it appe ars that on e so ve re ig n is contr oll ing the pr os e c uti on of ano the r me re ly to c ir c umv e nt t

he de fe nd ant’ s Sixth Amendment ri gh t t o counsel.” Coker , 4 33 F .3 d at 46 (q uo tatio ns omi tte d) . Sp e c if ic a lly , B ur g e st c la im s th at t

h e f e d e r a l a n d s tate inv e s ti g ati o n s w e r e in e xtr ic a b ly inte rtw in e d , an d

th e f e d era l authorities wer e aw are of his state counse l retention whe n they interviewe d him. He claims that the ag ents had a prec onceive d plan to g et him to admit to hi s involvement in drugactivity . Howeve r, Bur g est does not support his mere c ontention that the Bartkus exception appli es i n h is case. Acc ording ly , we f

ind no merit to his argument. 8 vol unt ar y w ai ve r of

his r igh t t o c ouns el and d id n ot c onsi st o f an y que sti ons co nc er nin g th e pe ndi ng s ta te dr

ug c harg e, did

not vio la te his S ixth A m en dm en t ri ght to co unse l. 5 Ev en i f w e w er e t o fi n dth at th e d i s t ri ctco u rt erre di n d en yin g Bu rg es t ’s
m oti on t o su

ppr es s hi s in cr im inatin g st at em en ts, the e rr or w as harm le ss b ey ond a reas on ab le do ub t. See U nited Sta tes v. Turner , 871 F. 2d 15 74, 1581-82 (11th Cir. 1989 ). H av ing r ev ie w ed

the r ec or d, w e ar e co nvi nc ed that, e ve n inthe abse nc e of the c onf es sio n, the e vid en ce a ga ins t B ur ge st w as suf fi ci en t t o su

ppor t hi s co nvi ct ion
. A n of

fi ce r te sti fi ed

that w he n he arr es te d B ur ge st, he ha d apil l bo ttl e co nta ini ng a

larg e quanti ty

of c ra ck c oc ai ne in his poc ke t, a lon g w ith$28 5 inbil ls folded in a fashion comm onlyutilized by drug dealers. (R. Vol. 5, p. 411-16.) Lab or at ory

tes ts sh owe d t ha t t he su bs ta nc e in th e p il l b ot tl e was co cai ne ba se . ( Id
. at 450-52.) A dditi onally , a confidential inform ant testified that he purchased
cr ac k c oc ai ne f

ro m Burg es t. ( R. V ol. 6, p. 590 -9 8. ) T he G ove rn m en t pr es en te d a9

videotape of the drug transaction showing Burgest sellin g drugs to the confidential inform ant. T hus, because the re cord dem onstrates that the evidence of guilt wa s overwhelm ing, any

err or in adm itting Burgest’ s incrim inating statem ent was harm le ss. V. C ONC LUS ION

“ [A ] feder al offense and a state offense do not consti tute the ‘ sam e offe nse’ unde r the S ixth A m en dm en t – ev enif the of fe nse s are ide nti ca l i n th ei r re spe ct ive elem ents – because they

are violatio ns of the laws of tw o separate sovereigns.” A va nts , 278 F
. 3d at 52 2. T he re fo re , Burg es t’ s pr ior inv oc at ionof

his r igh t t o co unse l f or his state dr

ug c harg e did

not a tta chto the unc harg ed

f ed er al dr ug of fe nse s w he n th e fe de ra l a ge nts int er vie w ed him
. T hus, the dis tr ic t c ourt di d no t err i n d en y in g B ur ge st ’s m ot io n t o s up pr es s h is in cri m in at in g s ta te m en ts . A cc or din gly , w e af

fi rm Burg es t’ s c onvi ct ion s. AFFIR MED.