Serial: 231697 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI 

No. 2017-CT-01488-SCT 

FRANKIE L. WILLIAMS a/k/a FRANKIE WILLIAMS 

alkla FRANKIE LEE WILLIAMS 

v. 

STATE OF MISSISSIPPI 

EN BANC ORDER 

FILED 

MAY 28 2020 

OFFICE OF THE CLERK 

ci~11,'~w~i~s 

The instant matter is before the Court on the Petition for Writ of Certiorari filed by 

Frankie L. Williams. The petition was granted by order of the Court on November 12, 2019. 

Upon further consideration, the Court finds that there is no need for further review and that 

the writ of certiorari should be dismissed. 

IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the writ of certiorari is hereby dismissed on the 

Court's own,motion. 

SO ORDERED, this the JP ~ay of May"""""""~ 

J IAH DENNIS COLEMAN, JUSTICE 

FOR THE COURT 

TO DISMISS: RANDOLPH, C.J., COLEMAN, MAXWELL, BEAM, CHAMBERLIN, 

ISHEE AND GRIFFIS, JJ. 

KING, P.J., OBJECTS TO THE ORDER WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN STATEMENT 

JOINED BY KITCHENS, P.J. 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI 

NO. 2017-CT-01488-SCT 

FRANKIE L. WILLIAMS alk/a FRANKIE WILLIAMS 

a/k/a FRANKIE LEE WILLIAMS 

v. 

STATE OF MISSISSIPPI 

KING, PRESIDING JUSTICE, OBJECTING TO THE ORDER WITH 

SEPARATE WRITTEN STATEMENT: 

11. Because the Court of Appeals decided this case incorrectly, I object to the order 

dismissing the petition for certiorari that this Court previously granted. This Court should 

reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. 

12. Frankie Williams was convicted of murder and possession of a firearm by a convicted 

felon. He appealed, arguing that the trial court violated his right to represent himself and that 

he received ineffective assistance of counsel. A divided Court of Appeals affirmed, finding 

that the record did not indicate that Williams wished to waive counsel, and that even if it did, 

he was incompetent to represent himself. The Court of Appeals also dismissed Williams's 

ineffective assistance of counsel claim without prejudice to his ability to raise the issue in 

post-conviction proceedings. Williams petitioned this Court for certiorari, which we granted 

to address the issue of whether the trial court violated his right to represent himself. We now 

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dismiss the petition for certiorari, despite the trial court's error of failing to follow Rule 

7 .1 ( c) of the Mississippi Rules of Criminal Procedure. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

,3. Prior to trial, Williams underwent mental evaluations, and the trial court held a 

competency hearing in May 2017. The trial court found Williams competent to stand trial. 

On October 2, 2017, the first day of trial, defense counsel requested outside of Williams's 

presence that Williams be able to speak to the court. The court denied that request, stating 

that "I will hear from you [counsel]. I don't need to hear from him." Defense counsel 

replied that "Part of it is that I think he wants to fire counsel." The discussion continued, 

BY THE COURT: Its [sic] too late for that and he is not qualified to represent 

himself. So, just tell him that we are going forward with the trial at this stage. 

I don't need to hear any more from him, I've heard enough from him. He has 

got two counsels who are able to represent him and we are going forward 

unless he want[ s] to plea. , 

BY [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: No, he does not want to plea. Is it permissible 

for either me or him to make a motion before the Court that he be permitted to 

try himself? 

BY THE COURT: I'm telling you that he is not going to do that. 

BY [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I just want to make a record. 

BY THE COURT: I've seen enough [ ofh]is antics over the last four years to 

say that he is not qualified to serve as his own counsel . . . . 

BY [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: All I want to know is that in going forward I 

want to make sure that the record is clear that we have voiced what he wants. 

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BY [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: There is one other point that he insists on 

making sure that I understand and that is he is going to file complaints against 

all of us and I told him that was his right. And I just want it to be on the 

record. 

BY THE COURT: I'm sure that I got some judicial complaints out there 

somewhere. But again, ... and I understand and I think you have put your 

concerns on the record or his concerns on the record. 

But I am again making the ruling that he can not [sic] represent himself. 

BY [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I just needed to put that on the record. 

In making the ruling that Williams could not represent himself, the trial court detailed some 

of the difficulties Williams had caused with prose filings and other "antics." 

14. Later that day, Williams and the trial court had the following exchange: 

BY MR. WILLIAMS: Yes, sir and also pertaining to the case that me and 

[ defense counsel], he said, for the record, that I had asked them to be excused 

but he said for some reason that -

BY T~ COURT: Well, Mr. Williams let me tell you what I told him. I am 

not- he has been appointed to represent you .... Personally, we have had 

conversations back and forth and the Court is ruling that they are your 

attorneys .... 

BY MR. WILLIAMS: For the record, I don't feel satisfied with his 

judgement[ sic]. 

BY THE COURT: Yes, sir. 

BY MR. WILLIAMS: [O]fficially, [ defense counsel], acting by counsel, rules 

himself what he wants to (inaudible). 

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BY THE COURT: You can take him back to lunch because we are going to 

lunch. 

BY [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: He asked me to remove myself. 

BY THE COURT: The Court has ordered you to stay on this case, [defense 

counsel], to try this case. Now, that is the order of the Court to try this case to 

the best of your ability which I know that you will do and that is all that the 

Court can ask you to do .... 

The trial proceeded with Williams represented by defense counsel. 

,5. The Court of Appeals determined that "Williams did not waive counsel and invoke 

his right of self-representation." Williams v. State, No. 2017-KA-01488-COA, 2019 WL 

1915376, at *6 (Miss. Ct. App. Apr. 30, 2019). The Court of Appeals then found that even 

if Williams did invoke his right of self-representation, the trial court did not err by denying 

Williams that right because Williams met an exception to the right of self-representation. Id. 

at *7. The Court of Appeals analyzed the facts itself and found that Williams was '" so ... 

mentally incompetent to speak to the jury that his right to a fair trial [ would have been] 

endangered' had he represented himself." Id. (quotingArmsteadv. State, 716 So. 2d 576, 

580 (Miss. 1998)). The separate opinion found that Williams did indicate that he wanted to 

represent himself, thus triggering the mandatory procedure found in Rule 7 .1 of the 

Mississippi Rules of Criminal Procedure. Williams, 2019 WL 1915376 (Westbrooks, J., 

concurring in part and dissenting in part). 

ANALYSIS 

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,6. A criminal defendant has a constitutional right to self-representation. That right is 

found explicitly in the Mississippi Constitution of 1890, which provides that "[i]n all 

criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to be heard by himself or counsel, or 

both[.]" Miss. Const. art. 3, § 26. The right is also found implicitly in the Sixth Amendment 

to the United States Constitution. U.S. Const. amend. VI; Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 

806, 95 S. Ct. 2525, 45 L. Ed. 2d 562 (1975). "[T]his Court reviews constitutional issues de 

novo." Grim v. State, 102 So. 3d 1073, 1078 (Miss. 2012). 

,1. The right to self-representation is deeply entrenched in both the state and federal 

constitutions. "[F]orcing a lawyer upon an unwilling defendant is contrary to his basic right 

to defend himself if he truly wants to do so." F aretta, 4 22 U.S. at 81 7 ( also examining the 

lengthy history of self-representation). A refusal to allow a defendant to argue his own case 

"is in direct violation of [Mississippi Constitution article 3, section 26] and requires 

reversal." Gray v. State, 351 So. 2d 1342, 1345 (Miss. 1977). To protect a defendant's 

rights in waiving counsel, Rule 7 .1 ( c) of the Mississippi Rules of Criminal Procedure "adopts 

the constitutional standard" for waiver of the right to counsel. MRCrP 7 .1 ( c) cmt.; see 

Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835; Patton v. State, 34 So. 3d 563, 565-69 (Miss. 2010). Rule 7.l(c) 

provides that"[ w ]hen the court learns that a defendant desires to act as his/her own attorney, 

the court shall conduct an on-the-record examination of the defendant to determine if the 

defendant knowingly and voluntarily desires to act as his/her own attorney." MRCrP 7 .1 ( c) 

( emphases added). When defense counsel asked that Williams be allowed to speak to the 

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trial court, the trial court refused the request. The trial court then detailed why it would not 

let Williams represent himself. When defense counsel requested that he or Williams be 

allowed to make a motion that Williams represent himself, the trial court declined the 

request. It then detailed several more times why it would not allow Williams to represent 

himself. Clearly, the trial court "learned" that Williams desired to represent himself, 

triggering Rule 7.l(c). Had the trial court not "learned" of this, its repeated statements that 

it would not allow Williams to represent himself would amount to nonsense. 1 Rule 7 .1 ( c) 

provides that once the trial court "learns" of the defendant's "desire" to self-represent, it 

"shall" conduct the procedure provided in Rule 7.l(c). "Shall" is mandatory. Moore v. 

State, 287 So. 3d 905, 918 (Miss. 2019); Newberry v. State, 145 So. 3d 652, 656 (Miss. 

2014). The Court of Appeals' determination that Williams did not "waive" counsel or 

"invoke" the right to self-representation ignores the plain language of Rule 7.l(c), and 

appears to require Williams to use "magic words" to invoke his rights. Williams was not 

required to waive counsel to invoke Rule 7.l(c); indeed, the procedures in Rule 7.l(c) are 

how a trial court determines whether a defendant waives counsel, and those procedures were 

not followed in this case. A trial court need only "learn" of the "desire" to self-represent to 

trigger the mandatory procedures found in Rule 7 .1 ( c ), and that clearly occurred in this case. 

1Furthermore, the fault for any alleged lack of clarity regardi1_1g whether Williams 

desired to represent himself lies squarely with the trial court, as it refused to allow Williams 

to move to represent himself. The trial court's refusals to allow him to make a formal request 

should not be held against Williams. 

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Absent narrow exceptions, a defendant has an absolute right to self-representation, and the 

State may not force counsel onto a defendant. Faretta, 422 U.S. 806. The trial court failed 

to make the appropriate determination regarding whether Williams knowingly and voluntarily 

waived counsel, and, if so, whether he met one of the narrow exceptions that may deprive a 

defendant of the right to self-representation. 

,s. Further, the Court of Appeals' determination that Williams met one of the exceptions 

to the right to self-representation was inappropriate. The trial court did not make any such 

determination. As an appellate court, the Court of Appeals should not generally determine 

an issue not determined by the trial court, nor should it engage in fact-finding. See Miss. 

Const. art. 6, § 146. 

,9. As the separate opinion noted, self-representation is usually unwise, and it is not 

"unreasonable to conclude that Williams's interest in self-representation was primarily a 

means to prolong his trial." Williams, 2019 WL 1915376 at *9 (Westbrooks, J., concurring 

in part and dissenting in part). But such notions do not relieve the trial court of its duties to 

follow the procedures in Rule 7 .1 ( c ), to determine whether a proper waiver of the right to 

counsel has occurred, or to determine whether an exception to the right to self-representation 

is met, if applicable. 

,10. Because the trial court erred by failing to make an on-the-record determination under 

Rule 7 .1 ( c) regarding whether Williams waived the right to counsel, and because the right 

to self-representation is firmly entrenched in both our state and federal constitutions, I would 

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grant Williams' s petition for certiorari, reverse Williams' s conviction, vacate the portion of 

the Court of Appeals opinion that affirms Williams' s conviction, and remand the case to the 

trial court for a new trial. 

KITCHENS, P.J., JOINS THIS SEPARATE WRITTEN STATEMENT. 

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