The Honorable William A. Norris, Circuit Judge for the Ninth Circuit, sittin g 1 by designation. The Honorable Ann D. Montgomery, United States District Judge for th e 2 District of Minnesota. United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________ No. 96-4219

___________ Donald P. Kolbow, * * Plaintiff-Appellant, * * Appeal from the United States v. * District Court for the * District of Minnesota. Honeywell, Inc., sued as “Honeywell, * Incorporated”, * [PUBLISHED] * Defendant-Appellee. *

___________ Submitted: June 13, 1997 Filed: August 28, 1997

___________ Before MURPHY, LAY and NORRIS, Circuit Judges. 1

___________ PER CURIAM:
DonaldP. Kolbow appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment i n 2 favorof H oneywell, Inc., his former employer, in an age discrimination suit brough t under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 623(a), andThe r ecord reveals that Kolbow received excellent performance evaluation s 3 during much of hi s time at Honeywell. In addition, Kolbow is credited as an inventor on seven patents procured for Honeywell between 1972 and 1993. -2- the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA), Minn. Stat. § 363.03, subd. 1(2). W e affirm.

Ko lbow began working for Honeywell in 1955 and worked there until he wa s laid off in January of 1993. He served a s an engineering aide. In 1992, Honeywell’s 3 Vice Pre sident of Engineering for the Home and Building Controls division, Manfred Ahle, de cided to upgrade quickly the technological skill base of the engineerin g empl oyees. This was to be achieved largely by changing the skill mix of employee s toward m ore degreed engineers and engineers with advanced degrees, and throug h training of retained employees. Pursuant to this direction, Kolbow’s supervisor, James Krueger, completed an assessment in the fall of 1992 of the employees in hi s department to identify training needs. Kolbow received lower scores than the degreed engineers in

all three of the categories used in the assessment. In December of 1992, Krueger was told that layoffs would be part of the skills enhancement plan. Krueger thenused the assessment to recommend that Kolbow and two other employees fro m his department be la

id off. Dale Mueller, Krueger’s supervisor, approved the layoffs.

Pursuant to Honeywell’s plan to upgrade quickly the technological skills of its engineering employees, approximately 50 employees were selected for layoff status , and 47 we re ultimately discharged. Kolbow’s deposition reflects that he thought h e was laid off because he could not be trained in a short time. The district court granted summary judgment o n the ground that Kolbow failed to of fer sufficient evidence that Honeywell’s proffered reasons for his discharge wer e pretext for discrimination. The law gover ning evidentiary burdens in age discriminationThe same standards govern the MHRA claims. See Rothmeier v. Investment 4 Advisers, Inc. , 85 F.3d 1328, 1338 (8th Cir. 1996); Feges v. Perkins Restaurants, Inc. , 483 N.W.2d 701, 710 (Minn. 1992). Ho neywell urges this court that Kolbow did not present a prima facie cas e 5 because the higher standard for a prima facie case in a reduction-in-force (RIF) cas e should apply here. See Bashara v. Black Hills Corp. , 26 F.3d 820, 823 (8th Cir. 1994). The district court viewed the evidence in the light most favorable to Kolbow an d assumed at the summary judgment stage that this was not a RIF case. Kolbow includes an affidavit from Richard Porter, a degreed engineer with 6 whom Kolbow had worked closely for many years. Porter’s affidavit praises Kolbow’s perfo rmanceat Honeywell and disagrees with some of Krueger’s evaluations o f Kolbow. -3- cases is now well established in this circ uit. See Ryther v. Kare 11 , 108 F.3d 832, 836- 38 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied , 117 S.Ct. 2510 (1997). 4
Honeywell stated that Kolbow was laid off pursuant to its plan to upgrade quickly the technological skills of its eng ineering employees both because Kolbow did not have an engineering degree and because of his lack of training and experience with computer te chnology

. Kolbow asserts that the real reason for his discharge was that hi s

5 supervisors thought he was too old. He argues that Honeywell’s explanations wer e pretextual. First, he argues that Honeywell’s response in this litigation is inconsisten t with its response given to the Minnesota Department of Human Rights. He a lso suggests that Honeywell has inconsistently described the skill in which he w as allegedly deficient. S econd, Kolbow argues that Krueger was not qualified to assess his skills because he hadbeen his supervisor for only three to four months, and that the assessment wa s performed in a hurried manner. In addition, Ko lbow objects to the fact that Krueger did notcon sult his past performance evaluations as part of the assessment. Third, h e 6 subm its that the decision to discharge him was made prior to Krueger’s assessment , based on his inclusion on a “surplus” empl oyee list made by Mueller in the fall of 1992.Kolbo w’s argument that Honeywell’s response to his MHRA charge wa s 7 inconsist ent

with its position in this litigation is not supported by the record

. Ho neywell’s letter to the Department of Human Rights explains that Honeywell’ s Home & Building Control Engineering department, the department in which Kolbow was employed, was in the midst of a reorganization to expand the technological skills of its emplo yees, and that Kolbow was laid off because his skills did not meet th e requirements for this plan. That Krueger’s evaluation was not specifically referenced in the letter does not establish that his assessment was not used by Honeywell i n deciding to lay off Kolbow. Kolbow apparently agrees. At his deposition, Kolb ow admitted that he did not 8 think Krueger had any animus against older workers. -4- The distri ct court held that these arguments did not present a genuine issue o f material fact as to whether Kolbow was the victim of intention al age discrimination. We agree. As the district court explained, Honeywell’s reasons for the discharge ar e consiste nt: Kolbow’s supervisors decided that his skills were not sufficient fo r Hone ywell’s plan to upgrade quickly the technological skills of its engineerin g employees. We find nothing in Kolbow’s objections to Krueger’s evaluation fro m

7 which a jury could conclu de that Honeywell’s proffered rationale for his discharge was evidence of pretext. Finally, the “surplus” list shows that Mueller did not thin k 8 Kolbow’s sk

ills were an asset to the department. This fact in no way suggests that the reasons given for Kolbow’s discharge were pretextual.

We hold that Kolbow failed to present sufficient evidence to create a genuin e issue of material fact regarding the charge that Honeywell’s decision to discharge him was motivated by intentional age discrimination. Accordingly, the district court’s grant of summary judgment is affirmed.-5-

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U. S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.