FM 3-100.12

MCRP 5-12.1C

NTTP 5-03.5

AFTTP(I) 3-2.34

FEBRUARY 2001

ARMY, MARINE CORPS, NAVY, AIR FORCE

AIR LAND SEA

APPLICATION

CENTER

MULTISERVICE TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES

RISK

MANAGEMENT

DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION:

Approved for public release;

distribution is unrestricted
FOREWORD

This publication has been prepared under our direction for use by our respective

commands and other commands as appropriate.

JOHN N. ABRAMS BRUCE B. KNUTSON, JR.

General, USA Lieutenant General, USMC

Commander Commanding General

Training and Doctrine Command Marine Corps Combat

 Development Command

ROBERT G. SPRIGG LANCE L. SMITH

Rear Admiral, USN Major General, USAF

Commander Commander

Navy Warfare Development Command Headquarters Air Force Doctrine Center

This publication is available on the General

Dennis J. Reimer Training and Doctrine Digital

Library at www.adtdl.army.mil
i

PREFACE

1. Scope

This publication describes risk management functions and responsibilities applicable to

the joint task force (JTF) and service staffs. It applies risk management planning

procedures to the military decision making process and employs the Joint Operation

Planning and Execution System (JOPES) for the operation planning team.

2. Purpose

This publication provides a consolidated multiservice reference addressing risk

management background, principles, and application procedures. To facilitate multiservice

interoperability, this publication identifies and explains the risk management process and

its differences and similarities as it is applied by each service.

3. Applicability

The audience for this publication includes combatant command, JTF, and functional

and service component staffs. The target staff level is the JTF headquarters staff. This

publication serves as a source document for developing service and joint manuals,

publications, and curricula, and may be used as a stand-alone document.

4. Implementation Plan

Participating service command offices of primary responsibility will review this

publication, validate the information, and reference and incorporate it in service and

command manuals, regulations, instructions, and curricula as follows:

Army. The Army will incorporate this publication in U.S. Army training and doctrinal

publications as directed by the Commander, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command

(TRADOC). Distribution is in accordance with DA Form 12-99-R.

Marine Corps. The Marine Corps will incorporate the procedures in this publication in

U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) training and doctrinal publications as directed by the

Commanding General, U.S. Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC).

Distribution is in accordance with Marine Corps Publication Distribution System (MCPDS).

Navy. The Navy will incorporate these procedures in U.S. Navy (USN) training and

doctrinal publications as directed by the Commander, Navy Warfare Development

Command (NWDC). Distribution is in accordance with Military Standard Requisitioning

and Issue Procedures (MILSTRIP) Desk Guide and Navy Standing Operating Procedures

(NAVSOP) Publication 409.

Air Force. The Air Force will validate and incorporate appropriate procedures in

accordance with applicable governing directives. Distribution is in accordance with Air Force

Instruction 33-360, Volume 1.

5. User Information

a. The TRADOC-MCCDC-NWDC-Headquarters (HQ) Air Force Doctrine Center

(AFDC) and Air Land Sea Application (ALSA) Center developed this publication with the

joint participation of the approving service commands. ALSA will review and update this

publication as necessary.

b. This publication reflects current joint and service doctrine, command and control

organizations, facilities, personnel, responsibilities, and procedures. Changes in service

MARINE CORPS: PCN 14400009300
ii

protocol, appropriately reflected in joint and service publications, will be incorporated in

revisions of this document.

c. We encourage recommended changes for improving this publication. Key your

comments to the specific page and paragraph and provide a rationale for each

recommendation. Send comments and recommendations directly to—

Army

Commander

U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command

ATTN: ATDO-A

Fort Monroe, VA 23651-5000

DSN 680-3153 COMM (757) 788-3153

Marine Corps

Commanding General

U.S. Marine Corps Combat Development Command

ATTN: C42 (Director)

3300 Russell Road

Quantico, VA 22134-5001

DSN 278-6234 COMM (703) 784-6234

Navy

Commander

Navy Warfare Development Command

ATTN: N5

686 Cushing Road

Newport, RI 02841-1207

DSN 948-4201 COMM (401) 841-4201

Air Force

HQ Air Force Doctrine Center

ATTN: DJ

216 Sweeney Boulevard Suite 109

Langley Air Force Base, VA 23665-2722

DSN 574-8091 COMM (757) 764-8091

E-mail Address: afdc.dj@langley.af.mil

ALSA

ALSA Center

ATTN: Director

114 Andrews Street

Langley Air Force Base, VA 23665-2785

DSN 575-0902 COMM (757) 225-0902

E-mail: alsa.director@langley.af.mil
iii

FM 3-100.12

MCRP 5-12.1C

NTTP 5-03.5

AFTTP(I) 3-2.34

FM 3-100.12 U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command

Fort Monroe, Virginia

MCRP 5-12.1C Marine Corps Combat Development Command

Quantico, Virginia

NTTP 5-03.5 Navy Warfare Development Command

Newport, Rhode Island

AFTTP(I) 3-2.34 Headquarters Air Force Doctrine Center

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

15 February 2001

RISK MANAGEMENT

Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Risk Management

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY.................................................................................................... v

Chapter I RISK MANAGEMENT FUNDAMENTALS ......................................................... I-1

1. Background ................................................................................................... I-1

2. Risk Management Goal................................................................................. I-1

3. Key Aspects of Risk Management................................................................. I-1

4. Principles of Risk Management .................................................................... I-2

5. Levels of Risk Management.......................................................................... I-3

6. Risk Management Process Overview............................................................ I-3

7. Risk Management Process Application Guidelines...................................... I-3

8. Relationship of Force Protection to Risk Management................................ I-5

Chapter II RISK MANAGEMENT PROCESS AND OPERATIONAL

CONSIDERATIONS .................................................................................................. II-1

1. Background ..................................................................................................II-1

2. Application of Risk Management.................................................................II-1

3. Integration of Risk Management.................................................................II-7

4. Analysis Models............................................................................................II-8

Chapter III STAFF FUNCTIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES ............................................. III-1

1. Background ................................................................................................ III-1

2. Responsibilities .......................................................................................... III-1
iv

3. Integration into Training and Operations................................................. III-6

4. Review of the Risk Management Process .................................................. III-6

Appendix A Risk Management Tools.............................................................................. A-1

Appendix B Force Protection Working Group ............................................................... B-1

References.......................................................................................................... References-1

Glossary.............................................................................................................. Glossary-1

Index.................................................................................................................... Index-1

Figures I-1. Continuous Application of Risk Management............................................ I-4

II-1. Identify the Threats ...................................................................................II-1

II-2. Assess the Threat.......................................................................................II-2

II-3. Develop Controls and Make Risk Decisions ..............................................II-3

II-4. Implement Controls ...................................................................................II-5

II-5. Supervise and Review ................................................................................II-6

A-A-1. Sample Completed Risk Management Worksheet..............................A-A-1

A-B-1. Sample Force Protection Priority Matrix........................................... A-B-1

A-D-1. Risk Assessment Matrix..................................................................... A-D-1

A-E-1. Sample Risk Control Options Planning Matrix..................................A-E-1

B-1. Potential Sources for the FPWG ................................................................ B-1

B-2. Example FPWG Meeting Agenda .............................................................. B-2

B-3. Sample Risk Considerations Matrix .......................................................... B-5

Tables II-1. Criteria for Effective Controls ................................................................... II-3

II-2. Risk Management Execution (Risk Management in Deliberate

Planning) ...................................................................................................II-7

II-3. Risk Management Execution (Risk Management in Crisis Action

Planning) ...................................................................................................II-8

II-4. Considerations and Potential Threats Analyzed (Man Element,

5-M Model)...............................................................................................II-11

II-5. Considerations and Potential Threats Analyzed (Machine Element,

5-M Model)...............................................................................................II-11

II-6. Considerations and Potential Threats Analyzed (Media Element,

5-M Model)...............................................................................................II-12

II-7. Management Tools and Examples Analyzed (Management Element,

5-M Model)...............................................................................................II-12

A-C-1. Sample Force Protection Tasks, Conditions, Desired Effects, and

Activities ............................................................................................... A-C-1

A-D-1. Risk Severity Categories .................................................................... A-D-2

A-D-2. Probability Definitions ....................................................................... A-D-3

A-E-1. Examples of Risk Control Options ......................................................A-E-2
v

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Risk Management

This publication

• Provides multiservice tactics, techniques, and procedures for tactical level

risk management in the planning and execution of operations in a joint

environment.

• Provides a basic risk management process that may be used by all services.

• Applies to all elements of a force that assists in planning and conducting

force protection.

• Provides risk management tools for commanders and staffs to use to

manage risk during planning, preparation, and execution of joint operations.

Chapter I

Risk Management Fundamentals

Chapter I introduces risk management as a process to assist decision makers in

reducing or offsetting risks. It identifies the goal, key aspects, and principle concepts of the

process; provides general guidelines for applying the process; and gives an overview of the

process:

• Identifying threats.

• Assessing threats to determine risks.

• Developing controls and making risk decisions.

• Implementing controls.

• Supervising and reviewing.

Chapter II

Operational Considerations and Implementation

Chapter II describes the actions involved in applying the risk management process;

identifies pitfalls, types of controls, and feedback requirements; and integrates the risk

management process into the planning process. This chapter describes how common

situation analysis tools support the risk management process.

Chapter III

Staff Functions and Responsibilities

Chapter III ties the risk management process to the chain of command and the staff

directorates, and describes how leader involvement at all levels is necessary for the process

to be effective. This chapter also describes the integration of the risk management process

into all aspects of operations and training and illustrates how constant review of the

process leads to improvement in the process.
vi

PROGRAM PARTICIPANTS

The following commands and agencies participated in the development of this

publication:

Army

HQ TRADOC (ATDO-A) & (ATBO-SO), Ingalls Rd Bldg 133 Room 7, Ft. Monroe,

VA 23651-5000

Combined Arms Center (CAC), Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate (CADD),

Ft Leavenworth, KS

OG-D, BCTP, Ft Leavenworth, KS

CDR, XVIII Airborne Corps, Ft Bragg, NC

Army Safety Center, Training Division, Ft Rucker, AL

USAREUR, DCSPER, Unit 29351, APO AE, 09063

Marine Corps

Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Joint Doctrine Branch (C427) 3300 Russell

Rd, 3rd Floor Suite 318A, Quantico, VA 22134-5021

Marine Corps Combat Development Command, MSTP (C54) 2076 South Street,

Quantico, VA 22134-5021

Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code SD), 2 Navy Annex, Room, 3317,

Washington, DC 20380-1775

Navy

OPNAV, N09K, 2000 Navy Pentagon 5E816, Washington, DC 20305-2000

Commander, Navy Warfare Development Command/N5, 686 Cushing Rd,

Newport, RI 02841-1207

Commander, Naval Safety Center, 375 A Street, Norfolk, VA 23511-4399

COMPHIBGRU TWO, NAB Little Creek, Norfolk, VA 23521

Air Force

HQ Air Force Doctrine Center, 155 N Twining Street, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL 36112

AFDC Detachment 1, 216 Sweeny Bvld. Ste 109, Langley Air Force Base, VA 23665

HQ USAF/SE, 9700 G Ave SE, Kirkland Air Force Base, NM 87117-5670
I-1

Chapter I

RISK MANAGEMENT FUNDAMENTALS

1. Background

Risk management is a process that assists decision makers in reducing or offsetting risk

(by systematically identifying, assessing, and controlling risk arising from operational

factors) and making decisions that weigh risks against mission benefits. Risk is an

expression of a possible loss or negative mission impact stated in terms of probability and

severity. The risk management process provides leaders and individuals a method to assist

in identifying the optimum course of action (COA). Risk management must be fully

integrated into planning, preparation, and execution. Commanders are responsible for the

application of risk management in all military operations. Risk management facilitates the

mitigation of the risks of threats to the force. For the purposes of this document, threat is

defined as a source of danger—any opposing force, condition, source, or circumstance with

the potential to negatively impact mission accomplishment and/or degrade mission

capability.

a. Each of the services uses similar but slightly different processes. This publication

provides a single process to enable warfighters from different services to manage risk from

a common perspective.

b. Risk management is useful in developing, deploying, and employing the joint force.

Development concerns force design, manpower allocation, training development, and

combat material developments. Deploying and employing the joint force generates concerns

in force protection and balancing risk against resource constraints.

c. Military operations are inherently complex, dynamic, dangerous and, by nature,

involve the acceptance of risk. Because risk is often related to gain, leaders weigh risk

against the benefits to be gained from an operation. The commander’s judgment balances

the requirement for mission success with the inherent risks of military operations. Leaders

have always practiced risk management in military decision making; however, the

approach to risk management and degree of success vary widely depending on the leader's

level of training and experience.

d. Since the Korean conflict, United States forces have suffered more losses from noncombat causes than from enemy action. Key factors contributing to those losses include—

(1) Rapidly changing operational environment.

(2) Fast-paced, high operations tempo and high personnel tempo.

(3) Equipment failure, support failure, and effects of the physical environment.

(4) Human factors.

2. Risk Management Goal

The fundamental goal of risk management is to enhance operational capabilities and

mission accomplishment, with minimal acceptable loss.

3. Key Aspects of Risk Management

a. Risk management assists the commander or leader by—

(1) Enhancing operational mission accomplishment.

(2) Supporting well-informed decision making to implement a COA.

(3) Providing assessment tools to support operations.
I-2

(4) Enhancing decision-making skills based on a reasoned and repeatable process.

(5) Providing improved confidence in unit capabilities. Adequate risk analysis

provides a clearer picture of unit readiness.

(6) Preserving and protecting personnel, combat weapon systems, and related

support equipment while avoiding unnecessary risk.

(7) Providing an adaptive process for continuous feedback through the planning,

preparation, and execution phases of military operations.

(8) Identifying feasible and effective control measures where specific standards do

not exist.

b. Risk Management does not—

(1) Replace sound tactical decision making.

(2) Inhibit the commander’s and leader’s flexibility, initiative, or accountability.

(3) Remove risk altogether, or support a zero defect mindset.

(4) Sanction or justify violating the law.

(5) Remove the necessity for rehearsals, tactics, techniques, and procedures.

4. Principles of Risk Management

The basic principles that provide a framework for implementing the risk management

process include—

a. Accept No Unnecessary Risk. An unnecessary risk is any risk that, if taken, will

not contribute meaningfully to mission accomplishment or will needlessly endanger lives or

resources. No one intentionally accepts unnecessary risks. The most logical choices for

accomplishing a mission are those that meet all mission requirements while exposing

personnel and resources to the lowest acceptable risk. All military operations and off-duty

activities involve some risk. The risk management process identifies threats that might

otherwise go unidentified and provides tools to reduce or offset risk. The corollary to this

axiom is “accept necessary risk” required to successfully complete the mission or task.

b. Make Risk Decisions at the Appropriate Level. Anyone can make a risk

decision; however, the appropriate level for risk decisions is the one that can make

decisions to eliminate or minimize the threat, implement controls to reduce the risk, or

accept the risk. Commanders at all levels must ensure that subordinates know how much

risk they can accept and when to elevate the decision to a higher level. Ensuring that risk

decisions are made at the appropriate level will establish clear accountability. The risk

management process must include those accountable for the mission. After the commander,

leader, or individual responsible for executing the mission or task determines that controls

available to them will not reduce risk to an acceptable level, they must elevate decisions to

the next level in the chain of command.

c. Accept Risk When Benefits Outweigh the Cost. The process of weighing risks

against opportunities and benefits helps to maximize mission success. Balancing costs and

benefits is a subjective process and must remain a leader's decision.

d. Anticipate and Manage Risk by Planning. Integrate risk management into

planning at all levels. Commanders must dedicate time and resources to apply risk

management effectively in the planning process, where risks can be more readily assessed

and managed. Integrating risk management into planning as early as possible provides

leaders the greatest opportunity to make well-informed decisions and implement effective

risk controls. During execution phases of operations, the risk management process must be
I-3

applied to address previously unidentified risks while continuing to evaluate the

effectiveness of existing risk control measures and modify them as required.

5. Levels of Risk Management

The risk management process has two levels of application: crisis action and deliberate.

Time is the basic factor that contributes to the selection of the level of application used.

a. Crisis Action. Crisis action risk management is an “on-the-run” mental or verbal

review of the situation using the basic risk management process. The crisis action process

of risk management is employed to consider risk while making decisions in a timecompressed situation. This level of risk management is used during the execution phase of

training or operations as well as in planning and execution during crisis responses. It is

particularly helpful for choosing the appropriate COA when an unplanned event occurs.

b. Deliberate. Deliberate risk management is the application of the complete process

when time is not critical. It primarily uses experience and brainstorming to identify threats

and develop controls and is, therefore, most effective when done in a group. Examples of

deliberate applications include planning upcoming operations, reviewing standing

operating procedures (SOP), maintenance, training, and developing damage control or

disaster response plans.

6. Risk Management Process Overview

The risk management process involves the following:

• Identifying threats.

• Assessing threats to determine risks.

• Developing controls and making risk decisions.

• Implementing controls.

• Supervising and reviewing.

a. Threat Identification and Threat Assessment. These elements comprise the

risk assessment portion of risk management. In threat identification, individuals identify

the threats that may be encountered in executing a mission. In threat assessment, they

determine the direct impact of each threat on the operation. Risk assessment provides

enhanced awareness and understanding of the situation. This awareness builds confidence

and allows timely, efficient, and effective protective measures.

b. Develop Controls, Make Decisions, Implement Controls, Supervise, and

Review. These remaining elements of the risk management process are the essential

follow-through actions of managing risk effectively. Leaders weigh risk against benefits and

take appropriate actions to eliminate unnecessary risk. During planning, preparation, and

execution, the commander should communicate his acceptable risks to subordinates and

continuously assess risks to the overall mission. Finally, leaders and individuals evaluate

the effectiveness of controls and capture lessons learned.

7. Risk Management Process Application Guidelines

This section provides general guidelines for applying the risk management process. To

get maximum benefit from this tool—

a. Apply the Process in Sequence. Each element is a building block for the next

one. For example, if threat identification is interrupted to focus control on a particular

threat, other more important threats may be overlooked and the risk management process

may be distorted. Until threat identification is complete, it is not possible to prioritize risk

control efforts properly.
I-4

b. Maintain Balance in the Process. All parts of the process are important. If only

an hour is available to apply the risk management process, the time must be allocated to

ensure the total process can be completed. Spending fifty minutes of the hour on threat

identification may not leave enough time to apply the other parts of the process effectively.

The result would be suboptimal risk management. Of course, it is simplistic to rigidly insist

that each of the parts is allocated ten minutes. The objective is to assess the time and

resources available for risk management activities and allocate them to the actions in a

manner most likely to produce the best overall result.

c. Apply the Process as a Cycle. See Figure I-1 below. Notice that “supervise and

review” feeds back into the beginning of the process. When “supervise and review” identifies

additional threats or determines that controls are ineffective, the entire risk management

process should be repeated.

Figure I-1. Continuous Application of Risk Management

List Threats

Assess the Threat

Develop Controls and

Make Risk Decisions

Supervise Review

Lessons

Learned

New

Threats

Assess Threat

Probability

Determine risk level for

each threat and overall

mission risk

Develop Controls

and Determine

Residual Risk

Make Risk

Decisions

New

Controls

MISSIONS

Feedback

Provide

Support

Implement Controls

Establish

Accountability

Identify the Threats

Analyze Mission List Causes

Make

Implementation

Clear

Supervise and Review

Assess Threat

Severity

As controls for threats are identified and selected, the

Assess Threats Process is repeated.
I-5

d. Involve People Fully. The only way to ensure the risk management process is

effective is to involve the people actually exposed to the risks. Periodically revalidate risk

management procedures to ensure those procedures support the mission.

8. Relationship of Force Protection to Risk Management

The commander has the dilemma of weighing mission requirements and force protection

measures. One of his primary tools for weighing mission and protection is reconciled by

assessing and balancing risk. This process forms a direct relationship between force

protection and risk management. In the force protection process, we consider three

elements: planning, operations, and sustainment. Risk management enables the force

protection process by using risk assessment and controls in each element. The relationship

between force protection and risk management is evident in the following:

a. In planning, we conduct risk assessment and develop controls.

b. In operations, we update risk assessment and implement controls.

c. In sustainment, we continue to update assessments and adjust controls.
II-1

Chapter II

RISK MANAGEMENT PROCESS AND OPERATIONAL

CONSIDERATIONS

1. Background

This chapter discusses the risk management process and how it may be applied in the

planning and execution phases of all operations. This chapter also provides two situational

analysis models. These models are the mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and

support available, time (METT-T) model and the man, machine, media, management,

mission (5-M) model.

2. Application of Risk Management

a. Identify Threats. A threat is a source of danger: any opposing force, condition,

source, or circumstance with the potential to impact mission accomplishment negatively

and/or degrade mission capability. Experience, common sense, and risk management tools

help identify real or potential threats. Threat identification is the foundation of the entire

risk management process; if a threat is not identified it cannot be controlled. The effort

expended in identifying threats will have a multiplier effect on the impact of the total risk

management process. Figure II-1 depicts the actions necessary to identify threats

associated with these three categories: (1) mission degradation, (2) personal injury or death,

and (3) property damage.

Figure II-1. Identify the Threats

(1) Action 1—Analyze Mission. This is accomplished by—

(a) Reviewing operation plans and orders describing the mission.

(b) Defining requirements and conditions to accomplish the tasks.

(c) Constructing a list or chart depicting the major phases of the operation

normally in time sequence.

(d) Breaking the operation down into “bite-size” chunks.

(2) Action 2—List Threats. Threats (and factors that could generate threats) are

identified based on the mission and associated vulnerabilities. The output of the

identification phase is a list of inherent threats or adverse conditions, which is developed by

listing the threats associated with each phase of the operation. Stay focused on the specific

steps in the operation; limit your list to “big picture” threats. Examine friendly centers of

gravity for any critical vulnerabilities. Threats may be tracked on paper or in a computer

spreadsheet/database system to organize ideas and serve as a record of the analysis for

future use.

(3) Action 3—List Causes. Make a list of the causes associated with each threat

identified in Action 2. Although a threat may have multiple causes, it is paramount to

identify the root cause(s). Risk controls may be more effective when applied to root causes.

b. Assess Threats. Each threat is assessed for probability and severity of occurrence.

Probability is the estimate of the likelihood that a threat will cause an impact on the

ACTION 1

ANALYZE MISSION

ACTION 2

LIST THREATS

ACTION 3

LIST CAUSES
II-2

mission. Some threats produce losses frequently; others almost never do. Severity is the

expected consequence of an event in terms of degree of injury, property damage, or other

mission-impairing factors (such as loss of combat power). The result of this risk assessment

allows prioritization of threats based on risk. The number one risk is the one with the

greatest potential impact on the mission. However, the least risky issue may still deserve

some attention and, possibly, risk control action. Keep in mind that this priority listing is

intended for use as a guide to the relative priority of the risks involved, not as an absolute

order to be followed. There may be, as an example, something that is not a significant risk

that is extremely simple to control. Figure II-2 depicts the necessary actions.

Figure II-2. Assess the Threat

(1) Action 1—Assess Threat Severity. Determine the severity of the threat in

terms of its potential impact on the mission, exposed personnel, and exposed equipment.

Severity categories are defined to provide a qualitative measure of the worst credible

outcome resulting from external influence (such as combat or terrorist action; personnel

error; environmental conditions; design inadequacies; procedural deficiencies; or system,

subsystem, or component failure or malfunction). Severity categories listed in Appendix A,

Annex D, provide guidance for a wide variety of missions and systems.

(2) Action 2—Assess Threat Probability. Determine the probability that the

threat will cause a negative event of the severity assessed in Action 1. Probability may be

determined through experienced-based estimates or derived from research, analysis, and

evaluation of historical data from similar missions and systems. The typical event sequence

is much more complicated than a single line of erect dominos; tipping the first domino

(threat) triggers a clearly predictable reaction. Supporting rationale for assigning a

probability should be documented for future reference. Generally accepted definitions for

probability may be found at Appendix A, Annex D.

(3) Action 3—Complete Risk Assessment. Combine severity and probability

estimates to form a risk assessment for each threat. When combining the probability of

occurrence with severity, a matrix may be used to assist in identifying the level of risk. A

sample matrix is in Appendix A, Annex D. Existing databases and/or a panel of personnel

experienced with the mission and threats can also be used to help complete the risk

assessment.

(4) Output of Risk Assessment. The outcome of the risk assessment process is a

prioritized list of threats. The highest priority threat is the most serious one to the mission;

the last is the least serious risk of any consequence.

(5) Risk Assessment Pitfalls. The following are some pitfalls that should be

avoided during the assessment:

(a) Over optimism: “It can’t happen to us. We’re already doing it.” This pitfall

results from not being totally honest and not looking for root causes of the threats.

(b) Misrepresentation: Individual perspectives may distort data. This can be

deliberate or unconscious.

(c) Alarmism: “The sky is falling” approach, or “worst case” estimates are used

regardless of their possibility.

ACTION 1

ASSESS THREAT

SEVERITY

ACTION 2

ASSESS THREAT

PROBABILITY

ACTION 3

COMPLETE RISK

ASSESSMENT
II-3

(d) Indiscrimination: All data is given equal weight.

(e) Prejudice: Subjectivity and/or hidden agendas are used instead of facts.

(f) Inaccuracy: Bad or misunderstood data nullify accurate risk assessment.

(g) Enumeration: It is difficult to assign a numerical value to human behavior.

• Numbers may oversimplify real life situations.

• It may be difficult to get enough applicable data; this could force

inaccurate estimates.

• Numbers often take the place of reasoned judgment.

• Risk can be unrealistically traded off against benefit by relying solely on

numbers.

c. Develop Controls and Make Risk Decisions. These actions are listed as

separate and distinct parts of the overall process by the U.S. Air Force (USAF), but will be

dealt with under this overall heading for the purpose of this publication. Figure II-3 depicts

the necessary actions.

Figure II-3. Develop Controls and Make Risk Decisions

(1) Action 1—Develop Controls. After assessing each threat, leaders should

develop one or more controls that either eliminate the threat or reduce the risk (probability

and/or severity) of threats. For each threat identified, develop one or more control options

that either avoid the threat or reduce its risk to a level that meets the commander’s risk

guidance. Examples of criteria for establishing effective controls are listed in Table II-1.

Table II-1

Criteria for Effective Controls

CONTROL

CRITERIA REMARKS

Suitability Control removes the threat or mitigates (reduces) the residual risk to an acceptable

level.

Feasibility Unit has the capability to implement the control.

Acceptability Benefit gained by implementing the control justifies the cost in resources and time.

Explicitness Clearly specifies who, what, where, when, why, and how each control is to be used.

Support Adequate personnel, equipment, supplies, and facilities necessary to implement a

suitable control is available.

Standards Guidance and procedures for implementing a control are clear, practical, and

specific.

Training Knowledge and skills are adequate to implement a control.

Leadership Leaders are ready, willing, and able to enforce standards required to implement a

control.

Individual Individual personnel are sufficiently self-disciplined to implement a control.

ACTION 1

DEVELOP CONTROLS AND

DETERMINE RESIDUAL

RISK

ACTION 2

MAKE RISK

DECISIONS
II-4

(a) Some types of controls are as follows:

• Engineering controls. These controls use engineering methods to reduce

risks, such as developing new technologies or design features, selecting better materials,

identifying suitable substitute materials or equipment, or adapting new technologies to

existing systems. Examples of engineering controls that have been employed in the past

include development of aircraft stealth technology, integrating global positioning system

data into cruise missiles, and development of night vision devices.

• Administrative controls. These controls involve administrative actions,

such as establishing written policies, programs, instructions, and SOPs, or limiting the

exposure to a threat either by reducing the number of personnel/assets or length of time

they are exposed.

• Educational controls. These controls are based on the knowledge and

skills of the units and individuals. Effective control is implemented through individual and

collective training that ensures performance to standard.

• Physical controls. These controls may take the form of barriers and

guards or signs to warn individuals and units that a threat exists. Use of personal

protective equipment, fences around high power high frequency antennas, and special

controller or oversight personnel responsible for locating specific threats fall into this

category.

• Operational controls. These controls involve operational actions such as

pace of operations, battlefield controls (areas of operations and boundaries, direct fire

control measures, fire support coordinating measures), rules of engagement, airspace

control measures, map exercises, and rehearsals.

(b) A control should avoid/reduce the risk of a threat by accomplishing one or

more of the following:

• Avoiding the risk. This often requires canceling or delaying the task,

mission, or operation and is, therefore, an option rarely exercised because of mission

importance. However, it may be possible to avoid specific risks: risks associated with a

night operation may be avoided by planning the operation for daytime; thunderstorm or

surface-to-air-missile risks can be avoided by changing the flight route.

• Delay a COA. If there is no time deadline or other operational benefit to

speedy accomplishment of a task, it may be possible to reduce the risk by delaying the task.

Over time, the situation may change and the risk may be eliminated, or additional risk

control options may become available (resources become available, new technology becomes

available, etc.) reducing the overall risk. For example, a mission can be postponed until

more favorable weather reduces the risk to the force.

• Transferring the risk. Risk may be reduced by transferring a mission, or

some portion of that mission, to another unit or platform that is better positioned, more

survivable, or more expendable. Transference decreases the probability or severity of the

risk to the total force. For example, the decision to fly an unmanned aerial vehicle into a

high-risk environment instead of risking a manned aircraft is risk transference.

• Assigning redundant capabilities. To ensure the success of critical

missions to compensate for potential losses assign redundant capabilities. For example,

tasking a unit to deploy two aircraft to attack a single high value target increases the

probability of mission success.
II-5

(c) Determine Residual Risk. Once the leader develops and accepts

controls, he or she determines the residual risk associated with each threat and the overall

residual risk for the mission. Residual risk is the risk remaining after controls have been

identified, selected, and implemented for the threat. As controls for threats are identified

and selected, the threats are reassessed, and the level of risk is revised. This process is

repeated until the level of residual risk is acceptable to the commander or leader or cannot

be further reduced. Overall residual risk of a mission must be determined when more than

one threat is identified. The residual risk for each of these threats may have a different

level, depending on the assessed probability and severity of the hazardous incident. Overall

residual mission risk should be determined based on the threat having the greatest

residual risk. Determining overall mission risk by averaging the risks of all threats is not

valid. If one threat has high residual risk, the overall residual risk of the mission is high, no

matter how many moderate or low risk threats are present.

(2) Action 2—Make Risk Decisions. A key element of the risk decision is

determining if the risk is justified. The leader should compare and balance the risk against

the mission’s potential gain. The leader alone decides if controls are sufficient and

acceptable and whether to accept the resulting residual risk. If the leader determines the

risk level is too high, he or she directs the development of additional or alternate controls,

or modifies, changes, or rejects the COA. Leaders can use the risk assessment matrix or

other tools found in Appendix A, in conjunction with their commanders’ guidance, to

communicate how much risk they are willing to allow subordinate leaders to accept.

d. Implement Controls. Once the risk control decision is made, assets must be made

available to implement the specific controls. Part of implementing controls is informing the

personnel in the system of the risk management process results and subsequent decisions.

Figure II-4 depicts the actions necessary to complete this step. Careful documentation of

each step in the risk management process facilitates risk communication and the rational

processes behind risk management decisions.

Figure II-4. Implement Controls

(1) Action 1—Make Implementation Clear. To make the implementation

directive clear, consider using examples, providing pictures or charts, including job aids,

etc. Provide a roadmap for implementation, a vision of the end state, and description of

successful implementation. The control should be presented so it will be received positively

by the intended audience. This can best be achieved by designing in user ownership.

(2) Action 2—Establish Accountability. Accountability is important to effective

risk management. The accountable person is the one who makes the decision (approves the

control measures); therefore, the right person (appropriate level) must make the decision.

Clear assignment of responsibility for implementation of the risk control is required.

ACTION 1

MAKE

IMPLEMENTATION

CLEAR

ACTION 2

ESTABLISH

ACCOUNTABILITY

ACTION 3

PROVIDE

SUPPORT
II-6

(3) Action 3—Provide Support. To be successful, the command must support the

risk controls. This support requires—

(a) Providing the personnel and resources necessary to implement the control

measures.

(b) Designing in sustainability from the beginning.

(c) Employing the control with a feedback mechanism that will provide

information on whether the control is achieving the intended purpose.

e. Supervise and Review. Supervise and review involves determining the

effectiveness of risk controls throughout the operation. There are three aspects: monitoring

the effectiveness of risk controls; determining the need for further assessment of either all,

or a portion of, the operation due to an unanticipated change; and capturing lessons

learned, both positive and negative. Figure II-5 depicts the necessary actions.

Figure II-5. Supervise and Review

(1) Action 1—Supervise. Monitor the operation to ensure—

(a) Controls are implemented correctly, effective, and remain in place.

(b) Changes requiring further risk management are identified.

(c) Action is taken to correct ineffective risk controls and reinitiate the risk

management process in response to new threats.

(d) Risks and controls are reevaluated any time the personnel, equipment, or

mission tasks change, or new operations are anticipated in an environment not covered in

the initial risk management analysis.

Successful mission performance is achieved by shifting the cost versus benefit balance

more in favor of benefit through controlling risks. By using risk management whenever

anything changes, we consistently control risks identified before an operation and those

that develop during the operation. Addressing the risks before they get in the way of

mission accomplishment saves resources and enhances mission performance.

(2) Action 2—Review. The risk management process review must be systematic.

After controls are applied, a review must be accomplished to see if the risks and the mission

are in balance. To determine if appropriate risk management controls have been applied,

compare METT-T or the 5-M model from the earlier steps to the present risk management

assessment.

(a) To accomplish an effective review, commanders identify whether the actual

cost is in line with expectations. The commander needs to determine what effect the risk

control had on mission performance. It is difficult to evaluate the risk control by itself;

therefore, the focus should be on the aspect of mission performance the control measure

was designed to improve.

(b) Measurements are necessary to ensure accurate evaluations of how

effectively controls eliminated threats or reduced risks. After Action Reports (AAR),

surveys, and in-progress reviews provide great starting places for measurements.

ACTION 1

SUPERVISE

ACTION 2

REVIEW

ACTION 3

FEEDBACK
II-7

(3) Action 3—Feedback. A review by itself is not enough; a mission feedback

system should be established to ensure that the corrective or preventative action taken was

effective and that any newly discovered threats identified during the mission were analyzed

and corrective action taken.

(a) When a decision is made to accept risk, factors (cost versus benefit

information) involved in the decision should be recorded; proper documentation allows for

review of the risk decision process. Then, when a negative consequence occurs, the decision

process can be reviewed to determine where errors in the process may have occurred.

(b) Risk analysis will not always be perfect the first time. When errors occur in

an analysis, use feedback (such as briefings, lessons learned, cross-tell reports,

benchmarking, or database reports) to identify and correct those errors. This feedback will

help determine if the previous forecasts were accurate, contained errors, or were

completely incorrect.

3. Integration of Risk Management

Tables II-2 and II-3 integrate the risk management process into each phase of the

deliberate and crisis action Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES). The

annotations of the joint task force (JTF) and major subordinate element (MSE) in the

matrix identify the level of command primarily responsible for risk management execution

during each particular phase of planning. The risk management process should be

considered throughout the planning process by each level of command.

Table II-2

Risk Management Execution

(Risk Management in Deliberate Planning)

Deliberate Planning Identify

Threats

Assess

Threats

Develop Controls

Make

Risk Decision

Implement

Controls

Supervise

and Review

PHASE I

Initiation JTF

PHASE II

Concept Development JTF JTF

PHASE III

Plan Development MSE MSE JTFMSE

PHASE IV

Plan Review JTF

PHASE V

Supporting Plans MSE MSE MSE JTFMSE

EXECUTION JTF

MSE

JTF

MSE

JTF

MSE

JTF

MSE

JTF

MSE
II-8

Table II-3

Risk Management Execution

(Risk Management in Crisis Action Planning)

CRISIS ACTION

PLANNING

Identify

Threats

Assess

Threats

Develop Controls

Make Risk

Decision

Implement

Controls

Supervise

and Review

PHASE I

Situation Development JTF JTF

PHASE II

Crisis Assessment JTF JTF JTF

PHASE III

COA Development

JTF

MSE

JTF

MSE

JTF

MSE

PHASE IV

COA Selection

JTF

MSE JTF

PHASE V

Execution Planning

JTF

MSE

JTF

MSE

PHASE VI

Execution MSE MSE MSE JTFMSE

JTF

MSE

4. Analysis Models

a. The METT-T Model. The METT-T model can be used for conducting a situation

analysis by breaking it into five general areas: (1) the mission itself, (2) the enemy, (3)

terrain/weather, (4) troops and support available, and (5) time available.

Note.The U.S. Army uses mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support

available, time available, civil considerations (METT-TC), adding civil considerations

as a sixth area of analysis.

(1) Mission. Leaders first analyze the assigned mission. They look at the type of

mission to be accomplished and consider possible subsequent missions. Certain kinds of

operations are inherently more dangerous than others. For example, a deliberate frontal

attack is more likely to expose a unit to losses than would a defense from prepared

positions. Identifying missions that routinely present greater risk is imperative. Leaders

also look for threats associated with complexity of the plan (such as a scheme of maneuver

that is difficult to understand or too complex for accurate communications down to the

lowest level) or the impact of operating under a fragmentary order.

(2) Enemy. Commanders look for enemy capabilities that pose significant threats to

the operation. For example, “What can the enemy do to defeat my operation?”

(a) Common shortfalls that can create threats during operations include failure

to—

• Assess potential advantages to the enemy provided by the battlefield

environment.

• Fully assess the enemy’s capabilities.

• Understand enemy capabilities and friendly vulnerabilities to those

capabilities.
II-9

• Accurately determine the enemy’s probable COAs.

• Plan and coordinate active ground and aerial reconnaissance activities.

• Disseminate intelligence about the enemy to lower echelons.

• Identify terrorist threats and capabilities.

(b) Intelligence plays a critical part in identifying threats associated with the

presence of an enemy or an adversary. Intelligence preparation of the battlespace is a

dynamic staff process that continually integrates new information and intelligence that

ultimately becomes input to the commander’s risk assessment process. Intelligence assists

in identifying threats during operations by—

• Identifying opportunities and constraints the battlefield environment offers

to enemy and friendly forces.

• Thoroughly portraying enemy capabilities and vulnerabilities.

• Collecting information on populations, governments, and infrastructures.

(3) Terrain and Weather. Terrain and weather pose great potential threats to

military operations. The unit must be familiar with both the terrain and its associated

environment for a mission to succeed. Basic issues include availability of reliable weather

forecasts, how long the unit has operated in the environment and climate, and whether the

terrain has been crossed before.

(a) Terrain. The main military aspects of terrain are observation and fields of

fire, cover and concealment, obstacles, key terrain, and avenues of approach; these may be

used to identify and assess threats impacting friendly forces. Terrain analysis includes both

map and visual reconnaissance to identify how well the terrain can accommodate unit

capabilities and mission demands.

• Observation and fields of fire. Threats associated with observation and fields

of fire usually involve when the enemy will be able to engage a friendly unit and when the

friendly unit’s weapon capabilities allow it to engage the enemy effectively.

• Cover and concealment. Threats associated with cover and concealment are

created either by failure to use cover and concealment or by the enemy’s use of cover and

concealment to protect his assets from observation and fire.

• Obstacles. Threats associated with obstacles may be caused by natural

conditions (such as rivers or swamps) or man-made conditions (such as minefields or builtup areas).

• Key terrain. Threats associated with key terrain result when the enemy

controls that terrain or denies its use to the friendly forces.

• Avenues of approach. Threats associated with avenues of approach include

conditions in which an avenue of approach impedes deployment of friendly combat power or

conditions that support deployment of enemy combat power.

(b) Weather. To identify weather threats, leaders and unit personnel must

assess the impact on operating systems. Threats may arise from—

• Lack of understanding of reliability and accuracy of weather forecasting.

• Effects of climate and weather on personnel and equipment operation and

maintenance.

• Effects of weather on mobility.
II-10

(4) Troops and Support Available. Leaders analyze the capabilities of available

friendly troops. Associated threats impact both individual personnel and the unit. Key

considerations are level of training, manning levels, the condition and maintenance of

equipment, morale, availability of supplies and services, and the physical and emotional

health of personnel. All personnel must be vigilant to the fact that threats in these areas

can adversely affect a mission. Even when all tactical considerations point to success,

mission failure can be caused by—

(a) Threats to physical and emotional health. The health threat depends on a

complex set of environmental and operational factors that combine to produce “disease

non-battle injuries” as well as combat injuries. Care of troops requires long-range

projection of logistical and medical needs with close monitoring of mission changes that

could impact troop support.

(b) Threats to task organization or units participating in an operation. Threats

include poor communication, unfamiliarity with higher headquarters SOPs, and

insufficient combat power to accomplish the mission. How long units have worked together

under a particular command relationship should be considered when identifying threats.

(c) Threats associated with long-term missions. Long-term missions include

peacekeeping, or insurgency/counterinsurgency operations. Threats associated with these

missions include the turmoil of personnel turnover, lack of continuity of leadership,

inexperience, and lack of knowledge of the situation and the unit’s operating procedures.

Long-term missions can also lead to complacency; units conditioned to routine ways of

accomplishing the mission fail to see warnings evident in the operational environment. An

especially insidious threat is the atrophy of critical-skills that results from not performing

mission-essential task list related missions.

(5) Time Available. The threat is insufficient time to plan, prepare, and execute

operations. Planning time is always at a premium. Leaders routinely apply the onethird/two-thirds rule (providing two thirds of time available to subordinates for planning) to

ensure their subordinate units are given maximum time to plan. Failure to accomplish a

mission on time can result in shortages of time for subordinate and adjacent units to

accomplish their missions.

b. U.S. Army Situation Analysis. While Joint, Marine Corps, Air Force, and Navy

doctrine use METT-T for situation analysis, the Army uses METT-TC. The “C” in METT-TC

is civil considerations—how the attitudes and activities of the civilian leaders, populations,

and organizations within an area of operations will influence the conduct of military

operations. Threats associated with civil considerations include, but are not limited to,

collateral damage, changing political and social attitudes, civilian unrest, the influence of

the press on public opinion, conflicting goals and objectives of private voluntary

organizations (PVOs) and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and the handling of

refugees, noncombatants, and protesters.

c. 5-M Model. The 5-M model provides an alternative framework for conducting

mission analysis by examining the impacts and inter-relationships between the composite

elements of Man, Machine, Media, Management, and Mission. The amount of overlap or

interaction between the individual components is a characteristic of each mission and

evolves as the mission develops.
II-11

(1) Man. This is the area of greatest variability and thus possesses the majority of

risks. Some considerations and potential threats are listed in Table II-4.

Table II-4

Considerations and Potential Threats Analyzed

(Man Element, 5-M Model)

Considerations Potential Threats

Selection Wrong person psychologically/physically, not proficient in assigned

task, no procedural guidance

Performance Lack of awareness, false perceptions, over-tasking, distraction,

channelized attention, stress, peer pressure, over/lack of

confidence, poor insight, poor adaptive skills, pressure/workload,

fatigue

Personal Factors Expectations, lack of job satisfaction, poor values, families/friends,

command/control, poor discipline (internal and external), perceived

pressure (over tasking) and poor communication skills

(2) Machine. Used as intended, limitations interface with man. Some

considerations and potential threats are listed in Table II-5.

Table II-5

Considerations and Potential Threats Analyzed

(Machine Element, 5-M Model)

Considerations Potential Threats

Design Engineering reliability and performance, ergonomics

Maintenance Availability of time, tools, and parts, ease of access

Logistics Supply, upkeep, and repair

Technical Data Clear, accurate, useable, and available
II-12

(3) Media. This includes external, largely environmental forces. Some

considerations and potential threats are listed in Table II-6.

Table II-6

Considerations and Potential Threats Analyzed

(Media Element, 5-M Model)

Considerations Potential Threats

Climatic Ceiling, visibility, temperature, humidity, wind, and precipitation

Operational Terrain, wildlife, vegetation, man-made obstructions, daylight,

maritime environment, and darkness

Hygienic Ventilation/air quality, noise/vibration, dust, and contaminants

Trafficability Pavement, gravel, dirt, ice, mud, dust, snow, sand, hills, and

curves

(4) Management. Directs the process by defining standards, procedures, and

controls. While management provides procedures and rules to govern interactions, it cannot

completely control the system elements. For example, weather is not under management

control and individual decisions affect off-duty personnel much more than management

policies. Some considerations and examples are listed in Table II-7.

Table II-7

Management Tools and Examples Analyzed

(Management Element, 5-M Model)

Considerations Examples

Standards Doctrine statements, applicable criteria, and policy directives

Procedures Checklists, SOPs, work cards, and multi-command manuals

Controls Crew rest, altitude/airspeed/speed limits, restrictions, training

rules/limitations, rules of engagement (ROE), lawful orders

(5) Mission. The desired outcome. Objectives: Big picture understood, well defined,

obtainable. The results of the interactions of the other 4-Ms (Man, Media, Machine, and

Management).
III-1

Chapter III

STAFF FUNCTIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES

1. Background

The unit commander, staff, leaders, and individual members integrate risk

management by embedding the risk management process into unit operations, culture,

organization, systems, and individual behaviors.

a. Successful risk management is underwritten by the chain of command. Leaders do

not expect all missions to be accomplished with zero defects. Leaders need to support

subordinates’ decisions to accept risks that are within the leaders’ understanding of the

commander’s intent and guidance. Demanding rigid standards, such as zero defects, leads

to over-supervision and paralysis, producing timid leaders afraid to make tough decisions in

crisis, and unwilling to take risks necessary for successful military operations. A zerodefects mindset creates conditions that will inevitably lead to failure and higher casualties

in battle.

b. Leaders anticipate things may go wrong, even with the certain knowledge that

subordinates do all within their power to prevent incidents. When incidents occur, leaders

step forward and accept the responsibility along with their subordinates. Furthermore, risk

management does not justify taking actions to facilitate an unethical, immoral, or illegal

action.

2. Responsibilities

a. Commanders. With the assistance of their leaders and staffs, commanders manage

risks. Minimizing risk is the responsibility of everyone in the chain of command, from the

highest commander, through his subordinate leaders, to each individual service member.

Managing risk is critical for all operations, whether for training or operations; commanders

should issue clear risk guidance.

(1) Military plans should make risk management a priority. It is an inherent part of

every mission and a basic responsibility of commanders. Leaders and service members at

all levels are responsible and accountable for managing risks by ensuring that threats and

associated risks are—

(a) Identified during planning, preparation, and execution of operations.

(b) Controlled during preparation and execution of operations. Service members

are responsible for executing risk controls to standards. They continuously assess variable

threats such as fatigue, equipment serviceability, and the environment. They make risk

decisions consistent with the higher commander’s guidance.

(2) Sometimes commanders are not properly advised in situations where the

assumption of risk may affect or imperil their units, the intent of their higher commander,

or the operations of an adjacent unit. This is most often attributed to—

(a) Risk denial syndrome—leaders do not want to know of the risk.

(b) Staff members who believe that the risk decision is part of their jobs and

do not want to bother the commander or section leader.

(c) Subordinates failure to fully understand the higher commander’s

guidance.

(d) Complacency—outright failure to recognize a threat or the level of risk

involved, or overconfidence in one’s abilities or the unit’s capabilities to avoid or recover

from a hazardous incident.
III-2

(e) Use of a standardized risk assessment tool, such as a risk assessment

matrix, that is not tailored to the unit’s mission or adapted to the factors of METT-T/5-M

and may put missions in the routine low-risk category.

b. Commanders/Leaders.

(1) The commander directs the organization and sets priorities and the command

climate (values, attitudes, and beliefs). Successful preservation of combat power requires

embedding risk management into unit behavior. This requires commitment, creative

leadership, innovative planning, and careful management. It also requires the chain of

command’s demonstrated support of the risk management process. Commanders establish

a command climate favorable for risk management integration by—

(a) Demonstrating consistent and sustained risk management behavior through

leading by example—habitually doing risk management—and actively participating

throughout the risk management process.

(b) Providing clear guidance where to accept risk or what risk to accept.

(c) Obtaining and providing to subordinates the necessary assets to control risk.

(d) Knowing their own limitations, their leaders’ and service members’

limitations, and their unit’s capabilities.

(e) Preventing a zero-defects mindset from creeping into their command’s

culture.

(f) Allowing subordinates to make mistakes and learn from them.

(g) Demonstrating full confidence in subordinates’ mastery of their trade and

their ability to execute a chosen COA.

(h) Keeping subordinates informed and consulting with subordinate leaders

before making a decision, if feasible.

(i) Listening to subordinates.

(j) Establishing clear, feasible risk management policies and goals.

(k) Conducting detailed planning within time constraints; assessing each

mission and task in terms of its risk; continuously reassessing risk as the mission and

conditions change and experience is gained.

(l) Making informed risk decisions; establishing and clearly communicating

risk guidance.

(m)Training on the risk management process. Ensuring subordinates

understand who, what, where, when, how, and why of managing risk, and how the risk

management process applies to their circumstances and assigned responsibilities.

(n) Examining how subordinates manage risk and how service members protect

themselves.

(o) Supervising and evaluating the unit’s execution of risk controls during the

mission.

(p) Advising the chain of command on risks and risk-reduction measures and

providing subordinates with feedback on their performance and ways to improve.

(q) Assessing the effectiveness of their unit’s risk management program.

(r) Capturing and disseminating lessons learned to ensure they are continued

from mission to mission so that others may benefit from the experience.
III-3

(2) Commanders weigh the repercussions of casualties, damage to the environment,

impact on civilians, and loss of equipment. They also consider the public reaction to loss

against national, strategic, operational, or tactical objectives. Commanders are also

responsible for keeping subordinates from becoming complacent. An acceptable risk is the

result of an informed decision. A gamble is an uninformed bet or guess on a hopeful

outcome. Leaders and service members need to clearly understand the difference.

(3) Risk decisions are frequently required by, and dependent on, the immediate

situation. Judgment is required; a formula, rule, or checklist, by itself, is not appropriate

under such circumstances. An effective commander’s approach to managing risk is to

empower leaders by pushing risk decisions as far down the chain of command as feasible

within the next higher commander’s guidance. Subordinates consider threats outside their

assigned responsibilities that impact the mission. The result is coordination and

communication—laterally and up and down the chain of command.

(4) Risk management is a two-way street. It is important that those involved in

mission preparation and execution are fully aware of the amount of command involvement

and actions necessary to control or remove threats.

(a) The higher commander’s guidance specifies the degree of acceptable damage

or risk to subordinate units during the current operation.

(b) Subordinates ensure they understand and implement their commander’s

intent and guidance.

• If, during the planning process, residual risk exceeds that which the higher

commander is willing to accept, the subordinate informs his commander. He requests the

resources necessary to mitigate the risk.

• If, during mission execution, the subordinate determines the risk is too

great, he directs the development of additional or alternate controls or modifies or changes

the COA; then he notifies the next higher commander of his decision. Requiring

subordinates to report to the higher commander when a risk decision point is reached

during mission execution can result in paralysis.

(5) The objective of managing risk is not to remove all risk, but to eliminate

unnecessary risk. Commanders conduct tough, realistic training, knowing that they may

put lives and property at risk in the course of military operations. If an action will result in

an unacceptable risk, take measures to mitigate it. If the risk cannot be mitigated to an

acceptable level, do not execute the action. Circumstances may occur during mission

execution when a decision to stop and defer execution of the operation should be made to

avoid taking unwarranted risk. Such a situation will generally occur at the tactical level.

For example, circumstances may determine if a trade-off between maintaining the

momentum of the attack and risking fratricide or serious accidents is justified.

c. Staffs.

(1) The chief of staff or executive officer may be assigned responsibility for

supervising integration of risk management across the staff. As a means of assessing and

monitoring threats, commanders may establish a force protection working group (FPWG),

which is covered in detail in Appendix B. He coordinates development of risk controls with

emphasis on deconflicting controls that affect multiple functional areas and adjacent units.

The staff officer helps the commander eliminate unnecessary risks by—

(a) Analyzing his functional area and applying risk management during the

military decision-making process.

(b) Identifying both constraints and restraints in the higher commander’s risk

guidance.
III-4

(c) Including threats and their risks in the mission analysis briefing.

(d) Including a risk assessment for the commander’s estimate.

(e) Considering the risk assessment in the operations estimate.

(f) Including risks and recommending ways to reduce their impact in the staff

estimate.

(g) Implementing risk controls by coordinating and integrating them into the

appropriate paragraphs and graphics of the operation order (OPORD) and into products

such as SOPs and operation plans (OPLANs).

(h) Establishing procedures and standards that are clear and practical.

(i) Determining the effectiveness of risk controls and continuously assessing

their suitability, feasibility, supportability, clarity, and acceptability.

(j) Supervising, evaluating, and assessing the integration of risk management

during an operation.

(k) Continuously identifying threats, assessing initial and residual risks for

each threat, and recommending control measures to reduce the risk.

(l) Identifying and assessing threats associated with complacency, especially

during extended operations, and recommending appropriate actions to the commander.

(2) Staffs focus on threats and their risks across the spectrum of protecting the force.

These staffs—

(a) Identify friendly vulnerabilities during current operations and implement

controls to mitigate risk.

(b) Implement commander’s intent on acceptance of risk in current operations.

(3) The following list identifies some of the risk management responsibilities of the

primary JTF directorates:

(a) J-1 (Personnel):

• Estimate time delay risks on personnel deployment flow.

• Determine casualty risks for each COA.

• Estimate casualty and replacement flow risks on future operations.

• Ensure controls for personnel-related activities are conducted to diminish

operations security vulnerabilities and support military deception initiatives.

• Estimate risks of employed local civilian labor in coordination with the J-4

(logistics), J-2 (intelligence), and legal officer.

(b) J-2:

• Monitor and report threats that counter the effectiveness of friendly combat

identification/counter-fratricide measures.

• Develop current regional threat assessments.

• Determine risk of loss of low-density intelligence collection assets.

(c) J-3 (Operations):

• Develop risk assessment for the commander’s estimate.
III-5

• Perform as staff proponent for combat identification/counter-fratricide

measures. Develop policy, procedures and assign responsibility for combat

identification/counter-fratricide measures.

• Report and investigate reports of fratricides.

• Develop risk assessment of military and political aspects of draft ROE and

supplemental ROE.

• Determine criticality and vulnerability of bases in the Joint Rear Area to

prioritize controls and levels of response.

(d) J-4:

• Make recommendations to the JTF commander on the combat

identification/counter-fratricide technology acquisition and procurement strategies.

• Assess the risk of critical supply levels not meeting required number of days

of supply days.

• Determine petroleum, oils, and lubricants storage site vulnerabilities and

controls.

• Determine munitions storage site vulnerabilities and safety requirements.

(e) J-5 (Plans):

• Integrate functional directorate risk management controls and combat

identification/counter-fratricide measures into deliberate planning products.

• Identify friendly maneuver and firepower vulnerabilities during mission

analysis, wargaming and plan controls to mitigate risk.

(f) J-6 (Communications): Responsible for assessing risk to geospatial

information and services systems and developing controls to counter threats.

(g) Special staff offices: Risk management should be addressed in the various

special staff offices, including—

• Surgeon (health and nonbattle injury, return to duty policy, preventative

medicine).

• Legal officer (Uniform Code of Military Justice, law of armed conflict, and

host nation (HN) law).

• Public affairs officer (media coverage, public opinion, etc.).

• Safety officer.

d. Individuals.

(1) An individual’s level of expertise and maturity influences risk management

proficiency. Managing risk is subjective because its basis is individual judgment.

Inexperienced service members are routinely charged with executing risk controls and risk

reduction measures. Their limited experience can significantly increase the level of risk

they are willing to accept. Their sense of indestructibility, motivation (esprit de corps), and

willingness to achieve the mission at any cost can lead to failure to consider risks. Due to

inexperience or complacency, they may become susceptible to—

(a) Overestimating their ability to respond to, or recover from, a hazardous

incident—they become overconfident.

(b) Underestimating the level of risk posed by a threat. It is imperative that

individuals understand and execute controls directed by leaders and staffs.
III-6

(2) Individuals should be aware of, and fully understand, the situation, and

maintain self-discipline when they perform their duties. They should—

(a) Understand and apply risk management.

(b) Execute controls directed by their leaders, that is, perform to standards.

(c) Carry risk management over into all activities—both on and off duty.

(d) Look out for others—anyone has authority to halt something that is

inherently unsafe.

3. Integration into Training and Operations

a. Integrating risk management into training and operations—

(1) Preserves the lives and well-being of everyone.

(2) Conserves equipment, facilities, environmental resources, and combat power.

b. Risk management is planned up front, not treated as an afterthought. Leaders and

managers of materiel acquisition, base operations, and industrial operations budget risk

control costs up front at the level of expected payback over the duration of the activity, or

the life cycle of materiel/weapons system.

c. When integrating risk management into sustained operations, leaders consider

increases in turbulence, personnel turnover, critical skill atrophy, and mission

development. Leaders continuously assess—

(1) The complexity of mission development and associated changing

interrelationships with other agencies.

(2) The inclusion of civilian contractors, such as logistics civilian augmentation

programs, as part of the force.

(3) The presence of the media, NGOs, and PVOs. These diverse elements need to be

integrated into the risk management process.

d. A key consideration relevant to managing risk in complex operational environments

is understanding the culture of the indigenous population or society and its way of doing

business. Leaders consider the impact of interference with the indigenous population’s way

of life and local customs. Such interference could risk damage to relationships and increase

the potential for introducing instability into the local society. Leaders do not, however,

intentionally allow these considerations to endanger their force or its mission.

e. Leaders and service members systematically provide observations and assessments

of the unit’s risk management performance for the training management cycle and SOPs.

They should have the skills, knowledge, and attitude to manage risks inherent in all

operations effectively. Effective training helps service members become proficient. It

qualifies them technically and tactically, and as leaders, to accomplish the mission without

unnecessary risk.

f. Unit leaders and their staffs continually assess and evaluate the integration of risk

management into short-, near-, and long-term training plans. They continually review Joint

Mission Essential Task Lists to ensure that training is supported by realistic risk

management objectives. The services consider past experiences to avoid repeating mistakes.

4. Review of the Risk Management Process

a. Reviewing the risk management process determines a unit’s current level of

proficiency in implementing the process. How well risk is managed affects readiness.

Leaders need to know the current status and effectiveness of their unit's risk management
III-7

program. Reviewing the unit’s effectiveness in managing risk permits the unit to gain

insight into areas for improvement and obtain feedback on subordinates’ understanding

and application of risk guidance. The objective is to determine how—

(1) Effectively risk management is embedded into planning and preparing for

operations.

(2) Well subordinate leaders and service members understand risk management.

(3) Effectively risk management is used to execute operations. Leaders assess the

effectiveness of their units by reviewing how well threats are identified and risk controls

are—

(a) Specified in oral and written OPORDs, OPLANs, and SOPs.

(b) Communicated to lowest level of chain of command.

(c) Included in short-, near-, and long-term training plans.

(d) Implemented into all activities, on and off duty.

(e) Embedded into force protection programs.

(f) Included in AARs and captured in lessons learned.

b. Risk management cannot be seen as a competitive program whereby a unit or leader

is judged or compared in a competitive sense. Focus is strictly on both reduction of risk and

hazardous incidents.
A-1

Appendix A

Risk Management Tools

Commanders, leaders, and staffs use risk management tools to facilitate the risk

management process—identification of threats and development of controls. The tables and

matrices in this appendix are samples of tools that commanders, leaders and staffs may use

when integrating the risk management process. It is impractical to create detailed

procedures to ensure the “right” tools are used for each activity and every contingency.

However, choosing the best tools is important when planning a potentially hazardous

operation. Most tools in this appendix can be used in a variety of creative ways; the user

selects the appropriate tool, or combination of tools, and the extent of effort to expend on

each. Since there are no right or wrong selections, the user must rely on his knowledge and

experience to make the right choice for each situation.

Annex A: Risk Management Worksheet

Annex B: Force Protection Priority Matrix

Annex C: Force Protection Tasks, Conditions, Desired Effects and Activities

Annex D: Risk Assessment Matrix

Annex E: Sample Risk Control Option Planning Matrix
A-A-1

Annex A

Risk Management Worksheet

The risk management worksheet provides a starting point to track the process of

threats and risks logically. It can be used to document risk management steps taken during

planning, preparation, and execution.

Mission Date Worksheet Prepared

Identify Threats Assess

Threats

Develop Risk Controls and

Make Risk Decisions

Implement

Controls Supervise

Phases Threats Causes Initial RAC Develop Controls Residual

RAC

How to

Implement

How to

Supervise

Initial

entry Protesters Religious

belief Medium

Personnel

awareness,

cantonment area

Low

Training

Civil Affairs,

perimeter fencing

First line

supervisors

Initial

entry Diseases Water

airborne High Immunize

field sanitation Low Predeployment

actions, training

Component

commanders

Lodgment

expansion Pilferage Local

economy High Increase security

force Medium Augment force J-3/4

Lodgment

expansion

Air

Defense

Artillery

Battery (-)

Deny

airfield High Direct action Medium

Airfield takedown

1st Ranger

Battalion

J-3

Accept Risks Yes/No

Comm with Higher/Yes No

Legend: RAC—Risk Assessment Code

Figure A-A-1. Sample Completed Risk Management Worksheet
A-B-1

Annex B

Force Protection Priority Matrix

This matrix prioritizes force protection tasks and operating systems used for protection

in each task. It reverses the normal targeting methodology and focuses the Joint Planing

Group on what it needs to protect for each specific task.

Force Protection Task 1:

Maintain flank security

Force Protection Task 2:

Maintain security of vital areas

Priority Operational

Operating System Protected Capability Operational Operating

System Protected Capability

1 Maneuver

3d Marine Division (PD)

101st Airborne Division

(Air Assault) (PD)

Logistics CSSA (PN)

JLOTS Site (PN)

2 Logistics Command and Control

MEB Command Post (PN)

TACC (PN)

Ground Mobile Force Site

(PS)

3 Fires Fires Airbase A (PN)

Airbase B (PN)

4 Intelligence UAV FOB Intelligence

5 Command and

Control Maneuver

6 Force Protection Force Protection Tactical Combat Force (PD)

Key:

PD—Prevent Destruction

PN—Prevent Neutralization

PS—Prevent Suppression

Legend:

CSSA—combat service support area

FOB—forward operating base

JLOTS—joint logistics over the shore

MEB—Marine Expeditionary Brigade

TACC—Tactical Air Command Center

UAV—unmanned aerial vehicle

Figure A-B-1. Sample Force Protection Priority Matrix
A-C-1

Annex C

Force Protection Tasks,

Conditions, Desired Effects, and Activities

Troop-to-task analysis may reveal deficiencies that require risk assessment and

subsequent adjustments. The following table is a sample analysis that draws out the logical

consequences of a force protection task. It can also be rendered as a decision tree. During

COA development, each member of the joint planning group needs to be able to justify the

tasking of resources to support force protection tasks.

Table A-C-1.

Sample Force Protection Tasks, Conditions, Desired Effects, and Activities

Force Protection Task

• Maintain security of vital areas

• Minimize losses

Force Protection Condition

• GMF remains fully operational during H-hour to H+24

• Rapid evacuation of casualties

Force Protection Desired Effect

• GMF site safe from local attack and from effects of weapons of mass destruction

• Air MEDEVAC less than 20 minutes

• Surface MEDEVAC to regimental aid stations only

Force Protection Activities

• Local security in place

• TCF prepared to respond to level III threat

• TBMD coverage includes GMF site

• Task MAW to dedicate/configure 2 CH-46 for air MEDEVAC during H+10 – H+ 24

• Ensure adequacy of Class VIII prior to H + 10

Legend:

GMF—Ground Mobile Force

MAW—Marine Air Wing

MEDEVAC—medical evacuation

TBMD—theater ballistic missile defense

TCF—Tactical Combat Force
A-D-1

Annex D

Risk Assessment Matrix

The Risk Assessment Matrix combines severity and probability estimates to form a risk

assessment for each threat. Use the Risk Assessment Matrix to evaluate the acceptability

of a risk, and the level at which the decision on acceptability will be made. The matrix may

also be used to prioritize resources, to resolve risks, or to standardize threat notification or

response actions. Severity, probability, and risk assessment should be recorded to serve as

a record of the analysis for future use.

Risk Assessment Matrix

Probability

Severity Frequent

A

Likely

B

Occasional

C

Seldom

D

Unlikely

E

Catastrophic I E E H H M

Critical II E H H M L

Marginal III H M M L L

Negligible IV M L L LL

Figure A-D-1. Risk Assessment Matrix

1. Risk Definitions

a. E - Extremely High Risk: Loss of ability to accomplish the mission if threats occur

during mission. A frequent or likely probability of catastrophic loss (IA or IB) or frequent

probability of critical loss (IIA) exists.

b. H – High Risk: Significant degradation of mission capabilities in terms of the

required mission standard, inability to accomplish all parts of the mission, or inability to

complete the mission to standard if threats occur during the mission. Occasional to seldom

probability of catastrophic loss (IC or ID) exists. A likely to occasional probability exists of a

critical loss (IIB or IIC) occurring. Frequent probability of marginal losses (IIIA) exists.

c. M – Moderate Risk: Expected degraded mission capabilities in terms of the

required mission standard will have a reduced mission capability if threats occur during

mission. An unlikely probability of catastrophic loss (IE) exists. The probability of a critical

loss is seldom (IID). Marginal losses occur with a likely or occasional probability (IIIB or

IIIC). A frequent probability of negligible (IVA) losses exists.

d. L – Low Risk: Expected losses have little or no impact on accomplishing the

mission. The probability of critical loss is unlikely (IIE), while that of marginal loss is

seldom (IIID) or unlikely (IIIE). The probability of a negligible loss is likely or less (IVB

through (IVE).
A-D-2

2. Severity Categories

The following table outlines severity categories:

Table A-D-1

Risk Severity Categories

Category Definition

CATASTROPHIC (I)

Loss of ability to accomplish the mission or mission failure. Death or permanent

disability. Loss of major or mission-critical system or equipment. Major property

(facility) damage. Severe environmental damage. Mission-critical security failure.

Unacceptable collateral damage.

CRITICAL (II)

Significantly degraded mission capability, unit readiness, or personal disability.

Extensive damage to equipment or systems. Significant damage to property or the

environment. Security failure. Significant collateral damage.

MARGINAL (III) Degraded mission capability or unit readiness. Minor damage to equipment or

systems, property, or the environment. Injury or illness of personnel.

NEGLIGIBLE (IV)

Little or no adverse impact on mission capability. First aid or minor medical

treatment. Slight equipment or system damage, but fully functional and serviceable.

Little or no property or environmental damage.

3. Probability Categories

The following table outlines probability categories for the risk assessment matrix:
A-D-3

Table A-D-2

Probability Definitions

Element Exposed Definition

FREQUENT (A) Occurs very often, continuously experienced

Single item Occurs very often in service life. Expected to occur several times over duration

of a specific mission or operation.

Fleet or inventory of items Occurs continuously during a specific mission or operation, or over a service

life.

Individual Occurs very often. Expected to occur several times during mission or operation.

All personnel exposed Occurs continuously during a specific mission or operation.

LIKELY (B) Occurs several times

Single item Occurs several times in service life. Expected to occur during a specific mission

or operation.

Fleet or inventory of items Occurs at a high rate, but experienced intermittently (regular intervals, generally

often).

Individual Occurs several times. Expected to occur during a specific mission or operation.

All personnel exposed Occurs at a high rate, but experienced intermittently.

OCCASIONAL (C) Occurs sporadically

Single item Occurs some time in service life. May occur about as often as not during a

specific mission or operation.

Fleet or inventory of items Occurs several times in service life.

Individual Occurs over a period of time. May occur during a specific mission or operation,

but not often.

All personnel exposed Occurs sporadically (irregularly, sparsely, or sometimes).

SELDOM (D) Remotely possible; could occur at some time

Single item Occurs in service life, but only remotely possible. Not expected to occur during

a specific mission or operation.

Fleet or inventory of items Occurs as isolated incidents. Possible to occur some time in service life, but

rarely. Usually does not occur.

Individual Occurs as isolated incident. Remotely possible, but not expected to occur

during a specific mission or operation.

All personnel exposed Occurs rarely within exposed population as isolated incidents.

UNLIKELY (E) Can assume will not occur, but not impossible

Single item Occurrence not impossible, but can assume will almost never occur in service

life. Can assume will not occur during a specific mission or operation.

Fleet or inventory of items Occurs very rarely (almost never or improbable). Incidents may occur over

service life.

Individual Occurrence not impossible, but may assume will not occur during a specific

mission or operation.

All personnel exposed Occurs very rarely, but not impossible.
A-E-1

Annex E

Sample Risk Control Options Planning Matrix

This matrix combines risk control options and responsible personnel that appear

suitable and practical with potential options. Many of these options may be applied at more

than one level. For example, the training option may be applied to operators, supervisors,

senior leaders, or staff personnel.

OPTIONS OPERATOR LEADER STAFF COMMANDER

ENGINEER

Limit energy X X X

Substitute safer form X

Prevent release X X

Rechannel/separate in time/space X

Provide special maintenance of controls X X X

EDUCATIONAL

Core tasks (especially critical tasks) X X

Leader tasks X X

Emergency/contingency tasks X

Rehearsals X X X

Briefings X X

ADMINISTRATIVE

Facilities/equipment X X

Number of people or items X X

Mental criteria X X

Emotional criteria X X

Physical criteria X X

Experience X

Emergency medical care X X

PHYSICAL

Barrier between X X

On human or object X X

Raise threshold (harden) X

Time X X

Signs/color coding X X

Audio/visual alarms X

OPERATIONAL

Sequence of events X X X

Timing (within tasks, between tasks) X X X

Simplify tasks X X

Backout options X X

Contingency capabilities X X

Emergency damage control procedures X X

Backups/redundant capabilities X X

Mission capabilities X

Figure A-E-1. Sample Risk Control Options Planning Matrix
A-E-2

Table A-E-1

Examples of Risk Control Options

Option Example

ENGINEER

Limit energy Small amount of explosives, reduce speeds

Substitute safer form Use air power, precision guided munitions

Prevent release Containment, double/triple containment

Separate Barriers, distance, boundaries

Provide special maintenance of

controls

Special procedures, environmental filters

EDUCATIONAL

Core Tasks (especially critical tasks) Define critical minimum abilities, train

Leader tasks Define essential leader tasks and standards, train

Emergency contingency tasks Define, assign, train, verify ability

Rehearsals Validate processes, validate skills, verify interfaces

Briefings Refresher warnings, demonstrate threats, refresh training

ADMINISTRATIVE

Mental criteria Essential skills and proficiency

Emotional criteria Essential stability and maturity

Physical criteria Essential strength, motor skills, endurance, size

Experience Demonstrated performance abilities

Number of people or items Only expose essential personnel and items

Emergency medical care Medical facilities, personnel, medical evacuation

Personnel Replace injured personnel, reinforce units, reallocate

Facilities/equipment Restore key elements to service

PHYSICAL

Barrier Between revetments, walls, distance, ammunition storage facility

On human or object Personal protective equipment, energy absorbing materials

Raise threshold (harden) Acclimatization, reinforcement, physical conditioning

Time Minimize exposure and number of iterations/rehearsals

Signs/color coding Warning signs, instruction signs, traffic signs

Audio/visual Identification of friendly forces, chemical/biological attack warning

OPERATIONAL

Sequence of events (flow) Put tough tasks first before fatigue, do not schedule several tough

tasks in a row

Timing (within tasks, between tasks) Allow sufficient time to perform, practice, and time between tasks

Simplify tasks Provide job aids, reduce steps, provide tools

Reduce task loads Set weight limits, spread task among many

Backout options Establish points where process reversal is possible when threat is

detected

Contingency capabilities Combat search and rescue, rescue equipment, helicopter rescue,

tactical combat force

Emergency damage control

procedures

Emergency responses for anticipated contingencies, coordinating

agencies

Backups/redundant capabilities Alternate ways to continue the mission if primaries are lost

Mission capabilities Restore ability to perform the mission
B-1

Appendix B

Force Protection Working Group

1. Purpose

The purpose of the force protection working group (FPWG) is to review threats, identify

vulnerabilities, recommend counter-measures, determine force protection levels, assess in

place measures, review tasks to components, monitor corrective actions, and direct special

studies (force protection assessment teams). The primary responsibility is to monitor and

assess the risk and threats to forces in the joint operations area and implement risk

controls to maintain the protection of the force. Each command and control node, rear,

intermediate support base, or FOB, should have a FPWG.

2. Group Composition

The composition will vary based on the threats and forces available. Suggested potential

sources to provide representatives to the FPWG are listed in Figure B-1.

Chief of Staff

Personnel

Intelligence

Operations

Logistics

Plans

Communications

Engineer

Aviation

Senior Enlisted Representative

Public Affairs

Surgeon

Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical

Chaplain

Staff Weather Officer

Safety

Political Advisor

Host Nation Support Representative

Army Forces

Marine Forces

Air Force Forces

Navy Forces

Special Operations Forces

Security Forces

Judge Advocate General

BOTTOM LINE: Composition is Mission Dependent

Figure B-1. Potential Sources for the FPWG

3. Procedures

The group may meet daily, weekly, or on-call in the vicinity of the Joint Operations

Center to use the risk management process.

4. Agenda

The officer in charge of the command and control node or a designated representative

should chair the meetings. The chairperson for the FPWG is not necessarily designated by

duty position, but based on the ability of the person to fulfill the duties of force protection

officer. A recommended agenda for conducting FPWG meetings follows:

a. Start with updates from—

(1) J2 Representative: intelligence update with focus on changes to the situation

that may lead to additional threats for the force.

(2) Counterintelligence (CI) representative: follows the J2, clarifies and provides

details of current risks based on his field reports.

(3) J3 Representative: overview of current operations and force protection measures

currently in place.
B-2

b. Next, update new or evolving threats. This is an open discussion by functional area.

For example, the surgeon would focus on medical health of command, the veterinary on new

or changing food sources, etc. Steady state activities are raised during this phase of the

meeting. All members consider emerging trends and determine if new vulnerabilities

within their area of responsibility require the focus of the task force or if they are just

isolated incidents. Each member comes to the meeting with documented concerns and

recommendations.

c. When new threats are identified, the FPWG will discuss measures to reduce the

threat. For example, Threat identified: current route from billeting area to the Joint

Operations Center is dangerous and not acceptable at night. Control: CI team will contact

the country team, identify alternate routes, and drive and assess the routes. At the next

FPWG meeting a decision will be made to change route.

d. Once controls are decided upon (above example, CI to conduct a reconnaissance of a

new route), that information is captured by the J3 representative and placed, as a directive

for action, in the next fragmentary order.

e. Following identification and development of controls for new threats, the group will

review current measures in effect against known threats and determine the requirement

for any changes or adjustments. Figure B-2 is an example FPWG agenda.

Event Input

Threat Situation Review J2

Current Force Protection Levels J3

Current Operations J3

Results of Previous Meeting Components, J3

Threat Identification FPWG

Vulnerability Identification FPWG

Identify Controls FPWG

Recommend Force Protection Level FPWG

Recommend Taskings FPWG

Summary J3

Confirm Next Meeting J3

Figure B-2. Example FPWG Meeting Agenda

5. Assessment Teams

To maintain visibility of threats, the FPWG may designate assessment teams to

monitor the situation continuously. These teams may be tailored to review specific threats

(such as preventive medicine and surgeon for medical, CI and Provost Marshal/Security

Officer/Chief Security Forces for perimeter security). These teams may be assigned and

operate at all operating bases throughout the joint operations area.

a. The assessment teams mission includes—

(1) Identify and assess threats and vulnerabilities.

(2) Recommend controls.
B-3

(3) Report through FPWG to Commander of the JTF.

(4) Gather information.

b. Assessment teams may use the following checklist:

(1) Threat.

(a) What is the terrorist threat/capability?

(b) What is the in-country leave and pass policy?

(c) Are there any areas service members should avoid due to criminal or terrorist

threats?

(d) What is the pre-disposition of the local populace to Americans (is it safe for

service members to mix with public)?

(e) Could operations be affected by civil disturbances protesting U.S. policy?

(f) What criminal threats are likely to threaten operations (are there any threats

of pilferage affecting sustainment operations)?

(g) What is the relationship of local population with host nation (HN) authorities

(is there any threat of civil unrest that could affect operations)?

(h) Are there other threats such as para-military organizations or hostile

intelligence that may target operations?

(2) Facilities.

(a) What facilities will the task force occupy?

• Tent city vs. hard site?

• Location—urban or rural?

(b) What is the status of—

• Perimeters?

• Barriers?

• Lighting?

• Motor pool facilities?

(c) Will the node collocate with HN or friendly forces?

(d) Is secure storage available for arms, ammunition, and explosives and

classified, high dollar, and sensitive items?

(e) Are there high-speed avenues of approach?

(f) What checkpoints and barriers are necessary to control compound access?

(3) Where will mission-essential vulnerable areas be established for arms,

ammunition, and explosives storage; sensitive item storage; pilferable high dollar value

item storage; fuel storage etc.?

(a) What is their proximity to the perimeter?

(b) What is their vulnerability to attack or observation?

(4) Will the task force operate any sustainment operations facilities at air, sea, or

rail ports?

(5) Joint Operations.
B-4

(a) If the task force occupies facilities with HN or friendly forces, who has

command and control for force protection?

(b) Who must the task force coordinate with concerning force protection, HN,

friendly forces?

(c) What are capabilities of friendly forces, HN armed forces, HN police forces,

and HN security forces?

(d) How are in-place friendly forces approaching force protection?

(e) What historical problems have in-place friendly forces had concerning

criminal activity (such as pilferage, assaults, terrorist threat, civil disturbance, and hostile

intelligence)?

(f) What threats do they perceive as possible?

(g) What operations security measures are in effect?

(h) What movement security measures are in effect?

6. FPWG Products

Based on the FPWG meeting, there are three suggested deliverables.

a. First—an update to the Force Protection Matrix. This should be briefed to the JTF

commander and placed on the SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network for the staff and

components. Figure B-3 is an example of the risk considerations matrix.

b. Second—Fragmentary Order directing execution of the new FPWG measures.

c. Third — risk assessment for the current phase of the operation.

d. Force protection assessment—continuous process throughout the conduct of the

operation.
B-5

Event: JTF FOB establishment location /component: FOB

Operational

Operating

System

Threat Vulnerability Countermeasure Action

Movement/

Maneuver

Local faction Troop movement

Route to hotel

Minimize

Standard route/

Alternate routes

Adjust battle rhythm

All drivers with

alternate route maps

Aircraft Crossing flight

lines

Do not cross

Intelligence Accident Civil rights Know embassy

numbers

Accident card

USAF security patrols

post speed limit

Speeding flight line Pedestrians Slow speed

(15 mph)

LNOs brief forces

Fires Loitering Theft/bad press Minimum

presence in hotel

Place of duty or room

Sustainment Fire Threats Personnel and

equipment

Know route,

exiting and alert

procedure

Fire break around

FARP

No help/assist Personnel

stranded

Blood chits Order 500 chits

Command and

Control

Personnel

accountability/

location

Unsafe location/

Unknown location

Frequent

reporting, improve

communication

Command emphasis

Distribute cell phones

Protection Heat Injury Water discipline Monitor WGBT

Disease-malaria Health Buddy check

Field sanitation

Take pills

Clean latrines

Dogs Injury/health Caution Stay clear

Legend:

FARP—forward arming and refueling point

LNO—liaison officer

mph—miles per hour

USAF—U.S. Air Force

WGBT—wet globe bulb temperature

Notes.

Any changes made by the FPWG are highlighted.

An additional column labeled “Assessment” can show how the countermeasures are working

Figure B-3. Sample Risk Considerations Matrix
References-1

REFERENCES

National

Presidential Decision Directive 39, U.S. Policy on Counterterrorism, 21 June 1995

Department of Defense

DODI 6055.1, DOD Safety and Occupational Health (SOH) Program, 19 August 1998

Joint

CJCSM 3500.03, Joint Training Manual for the Armed Forces of the United States, 1 June

1996

CJCSM 3500.04, Universal Joint Task List, 1 November 1999

CJCSM 3500.05, Joint Task Force Headquarters Master Training Guide, 15 April 1997

JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 1 September

2000

JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, 1 February 1995

JP 3-10, Joint Doctrine for Rear Area Operations, 28 May 1996

JP 3-11, Joint Doctrine for Operations in Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC)

Environments, 11 July 2000

JP 3-13.1, Joint Doctrine for Command and Control Warfare (C2W), 7 February 1996

JP 3-54, Joint Doctrine for Operations Security, 24 January 1997

JP 3-58, Joint Doctrine for Military Deception, 31 May 1996

JP 4-0, Doctrine for Logistics Support of Joint Operations, 6 April 2000

JP 5.00.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Campaign Planning (Draft)

JP 5-00.2, Joint Task Force (JTF) Planning Guidance and Procedures, 13 January 1999

Air Force

AFDD 2-4.1, Force Protection, 29 October 1999

AFPD 90-9, Operational Risk Management, 1 April 2000

AFI 90-901, Operational Risk Management, 1 April 2000

AFPAM 90-902, Operational Risk Management Guidelines and Tools, 14 December 2000

Army

FM 3-0 (FM 100-5), Operations, 14 June 1993

FM 3-07 (FM 100-20), Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflicts, 5 December 1990

FM 3-07.3 (FM 100-23), Peace Operations, 30 December 1994

FM 3-58 (FM 90-2), Battlefield Deception, 3 October 1988

FM 6-22 (FM 22-100), Army Leadership, 31 August 1999

FM 3-21.10 (FM 7-10), The Infantry Rifle Company, 31 October 2000

FM 7-10 (FM 25-101), Battle Focused Training, 30 September 1990
References-2

Coast Guard

COMMANDANT INSTRUCTION 3500.3 Operational Risk Management (Draft)

Marine Corps

Marine Corps Order 3500.27, Operational Risk Management, 3 April 1997

ALMAR 210/97, Operational Risk Management, 15 July 1997

MCDP-1, Warfighting, June 1997

MCDP 1-2, Campaigning, August 1997

MCWP 3-22, Antiair Warfare, 23 June 2000

MCWP 5-1, Marine Corps Planning Process, January 2000

Navy

OPNAVINST 3500.38, Universal Naval Task List, 30 September 1996

OPNAVINST 3500.39, Operational Risk Management, 3 April 1997
Glossary-1

Glossary

PART I—ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

5-M man, machine, media, management, mission

A

AAR After Action Report

AFB Air Force Base

AFDC Air Force Doctrine Center

AFTTP Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

AL Alabama

ALSA Air Land Sea Application

APO Army Post Overseas

C

CAC Combined Arms Center

CADD Combined Arms Doctrine Development Center

Cdr commander

CI counterintelligence

COA course of action

CSSA combat service support area

D

DC District of Columbia

DCSPER Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel

DSN Defense Switched Network

E

etc etcetera

F

FARP forward arming and refueling point

FM field manual

FOB forward operating base

FPWG force protection working group

G

GMF ground mobile force
Glossary-2

H

HN host nation

HQ headquarters

J

J-1 Manpower and Personnel Directorate of a joint staff

J-2 Intelligence Directorate of a joint staff

J-3 Operations Directorate of a joint staff

J-4 Logistics Directorate of a joint staff

J-5 Plans Directorate of a joint staff

J-6 Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems

Directorate of a joint staff

JLOTS joint logistics over-the-shore

JOPES Joint Operation Planning and Execution System

JP joint publication

JTF joint task force

K

KS Kansas

L

LNO liaison officer

M

MAW Marine air wing

MCCDC Marine Corps Combat Development Command

MCPDS Marine Corps Publication Distribution System

MCRP Marine Corps Reference Publication

MEDEVAC medical evacuation

METT-T mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available,

time available

METT-TC mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available,

time available, civil considerations (Army)

MILSTRIP Military Standard Requisitioning and Issue Procedures

MSE major subordinate element

MSTP Marine Air Ground Task Force Training Program
Glossary-3

N

NAVSOP Navy Standing Operating Procedure

NC North Carolina

NWDC Navy Warfare Development Command

NGO nongovernmental organization

NM New Mexico

O

OPLAN operation plan

OPORD operation order

P

PD prevent destruction

PN prevent neutralization

PS prevent suppression

PVO private voluntary organization

R

RAC risk assessment code

RI Rhode Island

ROE rules of engagement

S

SOP standing operating procedure

T

TACC Tactical Air Command Center

TBMD theater ballistic missile defense

TCF tactical combat force

TRADOC United States Army Training and Doctrine Command

U

UAV unmanned aerial vehicle

USAF United States Air Force

USAREUR United States Army, Europe

USMC United States Marine Corps

USN United States Navy
Glossary-4

PART II—TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

acceptable risk. The portion of identified risk that is allowed to persist without further

controls

assessment. 1. Analysis of the security, effectiveness, and potential of an existing or

planned intelligence activity.

2. Judgment of the motives, qualifications, and characteristics of present or

prospective employees or “agents.” (JP 1-02)

controls. Actions taken to eliminate threats or reduce their risk. This term and its

definition are applicable only in the context of this publication and should not be referenced

outside this publication.

exposure. The frequency and length of time subjected to a hazard (FM 3-100.12/100-14).

extremely high risk. Risk that could result in loss of ability to accomplish the mission if

threats occur during mission. A frequent or likely probability of catastrophic loss (IA or IB)

or frequent probability of critical loss (IIA) exists. This term and its definition are

applicable only in the context of this publication and should not be referenced outside this

publication.

high risk. Risk that could result in significant degradation of mission capabilities in terms

of the required mission standard, inability to accomplish all parts of the mission, or

inability to complete the mission to standard if threats occur during the mission. Occasional

to seldom probability of catastrophic loss (IC or ID) exits. A likely to occasional probability

exists of a critical loss (IIB or IIC) occurring. Frequent probability of marginal losses (IIIA)

exists. This term and its definition are applicable only in the context of this publication and

should not be referenced outside this publication.

identified risk. A risk determined by applying severity and probability analysis to an

identified threat.

inherently dangerous. An activity or task containing a danger to life or limb that is a

permanent and inseparable element of the activity. This term and its definition are

applicable only in the context of this publication and should not be referenced outside this

publication.

low risk. Risk that could result in expected losses having little or no impact on

accomplishing the mission. The probability of critical loss is unlikely (IIE), while that of

marginal loss is seldom (IIID) or unlikely (IIIE). The probability of a negligible loss is likely

or less (IVB through IVE). This term and its definition are applicable only in the context of

this publication and should not be referenced outside this publication.

moderate risk. Risk that could result in degraded mission capabilities in terms of the

required mission standard will have a reduced mission capability if threats occur during

mission. An unlikely probability of catastrophic loss (IE) exists. The probability of a critical

loss is seldom (IID). Marginal losses occur with a likely or occasional probability (IIIB or

IIIC). A frequent probability of negligible (IVA) losses exists. This term and its definition

are applicable only in the context of this publication and should not be referenced outside

this publication.

operational protection. The conservation of the forces’ fighting potential so that it can be

applied at the decisive time and place. This activity includes actions taken to counter the

enemy's forces by making friendly forces (including operational formations, personnel, etc.),

systems, and operational facilities difficult to locate, strike, and destroy. (CJCSM 3500.04)
Glossary-5

probability. The likelihood that a hazardous incident will occur.

frequent (A): Occurs very often, continuously experienced.

likely (B): Occurs several times

occasional (C): Occurs sporadically

seldom (D): Remotely possible; could occur at some time

unlikely (E): Can assume will not occur, but not impossible.

This term and its definitions are applicable only in the context of this publication and

should not be referenced outside this publication.

residual risk. The level of risk remaining after controls have been identified and selected

for threats that may result in loss of combat power. This term and its definition are

applicable only in the context of this publication and should not be referenced outside this

publication.

risk. 1. Probability and severity of loss linked to threats.

2. See degree of risk. See also risk management. (JP 1-02)

risk assessment. Identification and assessment of threats; an identified threat is assessed

to determine the risk (both the probability of occurrence and resulting severity) of a

hazardous incident due to the presence of the threat. This term and its definition are

applicable only in the context of this publication and should not be referenced outside this

publication.

risk decision. The decision to accept or not accept the risks associated with an action;

made by the commander, leader, or individual responsible for performing that action. This

term and its definition are applicable only in the context of this publication and should not

be referenced outside this publication.

risk management. A process by which decision makers reduce or offset risk. Also called

RM. (JP 1-02) The systematic process of identifying, assessing, and controlling risks arising

from operational factors and making decisions that weigh risks against mission benefits.

severity. The intensity of the expected consequence of an event in terms of degree of

injury, property damage, or other mission-impairing factors (loss of combat power and so

on) that could occur.

catastrophic (I): Loss of ability to accomplish the mission or mission failure. Death or

permanent total disability. Loss of major or mission critical system or equipment. Major

property (facility) damage. Severe environmental damage. Unacceptable collateral

damage. Mission-critical security damage.

critical (II): Significantly degraded mission capability or unit readiness. Permanent

partial disability. Extensive (major) damage to equipment or systems. Significant

damage to property or the environment. Security failure. Significant collateral damage.

marginal (III): Degraded mission capability or unit readiness. Minor damage to

equipment or systems, property, or the environment.

negligible (IV): Little or no adverse impact on mission capability. Slight equipment or

system damage, but fully functional and serviceable. Little or no property or

environmental damage.

This term and its definitions are applicable only in the context of this publication and

should not be referenced outside this publication.
Glossary-6

threat. A source of danger; any opposing force, condition, source, or circumstance with the

potential to negatively impact mission accomplishment and/or degrade mission capability.

This term and its definition are applicable only in the context of this publication and should

not be referenced outside this publication.

total risk. The sum of identified risk and unidentified risk. It is accepted by the

appropriate decision-maker because further efforts at risk control are not justified by the

perceived gain.

unacceptable risk. The risk that cannot be tolerated and must be eliminated or

controlled.

unidentified risk. The risk that has not been identified. It is unknown or immeasurable.
Index-1

Index

A

acceptability, II-3, III-4, A-D-1

acceptable loss, I-1

acceptable risk, I-2, I-3, II-3, II-5, III-3, A-D-1, Glossary-4

accountability, I-2, II-5, III-1, B-5

administrative controls, II-4, A-E-1, A-E-2

alarmism, II-2

application of risk management, i, I-1, I-3, I-4, II-1

assessment, I-1, I-3, I-5, II-2, II-3, II-5, II-6, II-8, II-9, III-2, III-4, III-5, III-6, A-1, A-A-1, AC-1, A-D-1, A-D-2, B-1, B-2, B-3, B-4, B-5, Glossary-3, Glossary-4, Glossary-5

complete, II-2

matrix, A-D-1

output, II-2

pitfalls, v, II-2

teams, B-1

assigning redundant capabilities, II-5, A-E-1, A-E-2

avenues of approach, II-9, B-3

avoiding the risk, I-2, II-3, II-4, III-3

C

catastrophic, A-D-1, A-D-2, Glossary-4, Glossary-5

chain of command, v, I-2, III-1, III-2, III-3, III-7

civil consideration, II-8, II-10, III-3, III-4, III-6, A-A-1, B-3, B-4, B-5, Glossary-2

climate, II-9, III-2

commander, i, v, vi, I-1, I-2, I-3, I-5, II-3, II-5, II-6, II-8, II-9, III-1, III-2, III-3, III-4, III-5, A1, A-A-1, A-E-1, B-3, B-4, Glossary-1, Glossary-5

complacency, II-10, III-1, III-4, III-5

complete risk assessment, II-2

controls, risk, v, I-2, I-3, I-4, I-5, II-1, II-3, II-4, II-5, II-6, II-7, II-8, II-9, II-12, III-1, III-2,

III-3, III-4, III-5, III-6, III-7, A-1, A-A-1, A-E-1, A-E-2, B-1, B-2, Glossary-4, Glossary-5

administrative, II-4, A-E-1, A-E-2

avoiding risk, I-2, II-3, II-4, III-3

delay COA, II-4

develop, v, I-3, I-5, II-3, II-4, II-5, II-7, II-8, III-3, III-5, A-1, A-A-1, B-2

educational, II-4, A-E-1, A-E-2

engineering, II-4, A-E-1, A-E-2

implement, v, I-3, I-5, II-3, II-4, II-5, II-6, II-7, II-8, III-4, A-A-1, B-1

operational, II-4, A-E-1, A-E-2

options, II-3, II-4, A-1, A-E-1, A-E-2

physical, II-4, A-E-1, A-E-2

planning matrix, A-E-1
Index-2

redundant capabilities, II-4, A-E-1, A-E-2

residual risk, II-3, II-5, III-3, III-4, A-A-1, Glossary-5

support, v, II-3, II-6, III-2, III-4

transferring risk, II-4

course of action (COA), I-1, I-3, I-4, II-3, II-4, II-5, II-8, II-9, III-2, III-3, III-4, A-C-1,

Glossary-1

cover and concealment, II-9

crisis action, I-3, II-7, II-8

critical, I-3, II-1, II-4, II-9, II-10, III-1, III-5, III-6, A-D-1, A-D-2, A-E-1, A-E-2, Glossary-4,

Glossary-5

D

decisions, i, v, I-1, I-2, I-3, II-3, II-5, II-6, II-7, II-8, II-12, III-1 III-2, III-3, A-A-1, A-C-1, AD-1, B-2, Glossary-5, Glossary-6

delay, II-4, III-4

deliberate, I-3, II-2, II-7, II-8, III-5

develop controls, v, I-3, I-5, II-3, II-5, II-7, II-8, III-3, III-5, A-1, A-A-1, B-2

E

enemy, I-1, II-1, II-8, II-9, Glossary-2, Glossary-4

engineering, II-4, II-11, A-E-1, A-E-2, B-1

exposure, II-4, A-E-2

F

feasibility, I-2, II-3, III-2, III-3, III-4

feedback, v, I-2, II-6, II-7, III-2, III-7

force protection, v, I-1, I-5, III-3, III-7, A-1, A-B-1, A-C-1, B-1,B-2, B-4, Glossary-1

activities, A-C-1

agenda, B-1, B-2, B-3

assessment team, B-1, B-2

checklist, B-3

composition, B-1

conditions, A-1, A-C-1

effects, A-1, A-C-1

facilities, B-3, B-4

priority matrix, A-1, A-B-1

procedures, B-1

products, B-4

tasks, A-1, A-B-1, A-C-1

force protection working group (FPWG), III-3, B-1, B-2, B-3, B-4, B-5, Glossary-1

forward area refueling point (FARP), B-5, Glossary-1
Index-3

H

high risk, II-5, A-A-1, A-D-1, Glossary-4

host nation (HN), III-5, B-1, B-3, B-4, Glossary-1

hygienic, II-12

I

identify, i, v, I-1, I-2, I-3, I-4, II-1, II-2, II-3, II-4, II-5, II-6, II-7, II-8, II-9, II-10, III-1, III-3,

III-4, III-5, III-7, A-1, A-A-1, A-B-1, A-E-2, B-1, B-2, Glossary-4, Glossary-5, Glossary-6

impact, mission, probability and severity, I-1, I-3, II-1, II-2, II-8, II-9, II-10, III-3, III-4, III6, A-D-2, Glossary-4, Glossary-5

implementation, i, v, I-1, I-2, I-3, I-5, II-3, II-4, II-5, II-6, II-7, II-8, III-3, III-4, III-6, III-7,

A-A-1, B-1

J

Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES), i, II-7, Glossary-2

joint task force (JTF) i, II-7, II-8, III-4, III-5, B-3, B-4, B-5, Glossary-2

K

key aspects, v, I-1, II-6, II-9, III-5

L

logistics, II-10, II-11, III-4, III-6, A-B-1, B-1, Glossary-2

loss, I-1,II-2,II-4, II-8, III-3, III-4, A-C-1, A-D-1, A-D-2, Glossary-4, Glossary-5

low risk, I-2, II-5, III-2, A-A-1, A-D-1, Glossary-4

M

machine, II-1, II-10, II-11, II-12, Glossary- 1

maintenance, I-3, II-9, II-10, II-11, A-E-1, A-E-2

major subordinate element (MSE), II-7, II-8, Glossary-2

man, machine, media, management, mission (5-M) model, II-1, II-6, II-10, II-11, II-12, III-2,

Glossary-1

managing, I-3, III-1, III-2, III-3, III-5, III-6, III-7

marginal, A-D-1, A-D-2, Glossary-4, Glossary-5

media, II-1, II-10, II-12, III-5, III-6, Glossary-1

METT-T (mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time

available), II-1, II-6, II-8, II-10, III-2, Glossary-2

METT-TC (mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time

available, civil considerations [Army]) II-8, II-10, Glossary-2

moderate risk, II-5, A-D-1, Glossary-4

N

negligible, A-D-1, A-D-2, Glossary-4, Glossary-5

O

objective, I-4, II-10, II-12, III-3, III-6, III-7
Index-4

observation, II-9, III-6, B-3

operational, v, I-1, II-1, II-4, II-10, II-12, III-3, III-6, A-B-1, A-C-1, A-E-1, A-E-2, B-5,

Glossary-4, Glossary-5

operation order (OPORD), III-4, III-7, Glossary-3

operation plan (OPLAN), III-4, III-7, Glossary-3

operations, military, v, I-1, I-2, I-3, I-5, II-1, II-4, II-6, II-8, II-9, II-10, III-1, III-3, III-4, III6, III-7, A-1, A-D-3, B-1, B-2, B-3, B-4, Glossary-2

P

performance, II-4, II-6, II-11, III-2, III-6, A-E-2

personal, II-1, II-4, II-11, A-D-2, A-E-2

physical, I-1, II-4, II-10, II-11, A-E-1, A-E-2

probability, I-1, II-1, II-2, II-3, II-4, II-5, A-D-1, A-D-2, A-D-3, Glossary-4, Glossary-5,

category, A-D-2

definitions, A-D-3

procedures, i, v, I-2, I-3, I-5, II-3, II-10, II-12, III-4, III-5, A-1, A-E-1, A-E-2, B-1, B-5,

Glossary-1, Glossary-2, Glossary-3

process, i, v, I-1, I-2, I-3, I-4, I-5, II-1, II-2, II-3, II-5, II-6, II-7, II-9, II-12, III-1, III-2, III-3,

III-6, A-1, A-A-1, A-E-2, B-1, B-4, Glossary-5

R

residual risks, II-3, II-5, III-3, III-4, A-A-1, Glossary-5,

responsibilities, i, v, II-5, III-1, III-2, III-3, III-4, III-5, B-1, B-2

commander, III-1, III-2, III-3

leaders, III-1, III-2

individual, III-5

staff, III-3

risk, i, v, I-1,1-2, I-3, I-4, I-5, II-1, II-2, II-3, II-4, II-5, II-6, II-7, II-8, II-9, II-11, III-1, III-2,

III-3, III-4, III-5, III-6, III-7, A-1, A-A-1, A-C-1, A-D-1, A-D-2, A-E-1, A-E-2, B-1, B-4, B-5,

Glossary-3, Glossary-4, Glossary-5, Glossary-6

assessment, II-2, III-4, A-C-1, A-D-1, A-D-2

probability categories, A-D-2

probility definitions, A-D-3

severity categories, II-2, A-D-2

unacceptable, III-3, Glossary-6

unnecessary, I-2, I-3, III-3, III-6

risk management, i, v, I-1, I-2, I-3, I-4, I-5, II-1, II-5, II-6, II-7, II-8, II-10, II-12, III-1, III-2,

III-3, III-4, III-5, III-6, III-7, A-1, A-A-1, B-1, Glossary-5

application guidelines, I-3, III-7

application, i, I-1, I-3, II-1

assessment, I-1, II-6, III-6

crisis action, I-3, II-7, II-8

cycle, I-4

decisions, II-5
Index-5

deliberate, I-3, II-7

execution, II-7, II-8

feedback, v, I-2, II-6, II-7, III-2, III-7

framework for implementing, I-2

fundamentals, v, I-1

goal, v, I-1

implement, I-2, III-6

integration, v, II-7, III-2, III-3, III-4, III-6

key aspects, v, I-1

levels, I-3

objective, III-3, III-6, III-7

principles, i, v, I-2

process, i, v, I-1, I-2, I-3, I-4, I-5, II-1, II-5, II-6, II-7, III-1, III-2, III-6, A-1, B-1,

Glossary-5

review, v, I-3, I-4, II-1, II-6, II-7, II-8, III-6, III-7

sequence, I-3

supervise, I-3, I-4, II-6, II-7, II-8, A-A-1

training, III-2, III-6

use, I-1, I-3

worksheet, A-1, A-A-1

risk management fundamentals, v, I-1

risk management goal, v, I-1, II-10, III-2

S

services, v, I-1, II-10, III-5, III-6

situational analysis, II-1

supervise and review, I-3, I-4, II-6, II-7, II-8, A-A-1

T

threat, v, I-1, I-2, I-3, I-4, II-1, II-2, II-3, II-4, II-5, II-6, II-7, II-8, II-9, II-10, II-11, II-12, III1, III-3, III-4, III-5, III-7, A-1, A-A-1, A-C-1, A-D-1, A-E-2, B-1, B-2, B-3, B-4, B-5,

Glossary-4, Glossary-5, Glossary-6

assessment, I-3, III-4

causes, II-1, II-2, A-A-1

checklist, B-3

identification, v, I-2, I-3, I-4, II-1, II-3, II-5, II-7, II-8, II-9, II-10, III-4, A-1, A-A-1, B-2,

Glossary-4, Glossary-5

probability, II-1, II-2, II-3, A-D-1, Glossary-5

severity, II-1, II-2, II-3, Glossary-4, Glossary-5

U

unacceptable risk , III-3, Glossary-6

unnecessary risk, I-2, I-3, III-3, III-6
FM 3-100.12

MCRP 5-12.1C

NTTP 5-03.5

AFTTP(I) 3-2.34

15 February 2001

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

ERIC K. SHINSEKI

Official: General, United States Army

 Chief of Staff

JOEL B. HUDSON

Administrative Assistant to the

 Secretary of the Army

 0106101

DISTRIBUTION:

Active Army, Army National Guard, and U.S. Army Reserve: To be distribute in

accordance with the initial distribution number 115840 requirements for FM 3-

100.12.

 By Order of the Secretary of the Air Force:

LANCE L. SMITH

Major General, USAF

Commander

Headquarters Air Force Doctrine Center

 Air Force Distribution: F
MARINE CORPS: PCN 14400009300