FIGHTING THE HOBBESIAN TRINITY

IN COLOMBIA:

A NEW STRATEGY FOR PEACE

Joseph R. Nuñez

April 2001
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ISBN 1-58487-045-1

ii
FOREWORD

Developing an effective U.S. national security st

for Latin America hinges upon how well Colombia fa

its fight against the major sources of violence: guer

paramilitaries, and narcotraffickers. Curre

Washington supports a counterdrug policy, while B

argues for a counterinsurgency strategy. Consideri

Free Trade Area of the Americas initiative, propos

implementation in 2005, regional security issues no 

will increase in importance. In particular, Colom

troubles are spilling over borders and affecting cou

such as Panama, Ecuador, Peru, Brazil, and Vene

Moreover, Colombia’s leading role in the drug trade to

all countries in the Americas and beyond.

In this monograph, one of a special series on Colo

Colonel Joseph R. Nuñez first analyzes the interv

conundrum of Colombia. He then summarizes the re

for the violent and anarchic situation that frustrates 

wishing to make peace and expand democracy. 

introducing what he calls the “Hobbesian trinity,” h

discusses alternatives to intervention and note

complexity of the human rights challenge. He sugg

new strategy for improving human security, gover

accountability, democratic reform, and peace prospec

counterinsurgency approach is controversia

promising. He then argues that the current appro

heading the wrong way, moving away from peac

fomenting greater instability. Colonel Nuñez conclude

there is a window of opportunity for the United Sta

support Colombia in a new way in its war agains

anarchic trinity. But this will involve overcoming po

factions responsible for the current policy that he arg

ineffective.

This is a timely study. A new administrat

challenged to form a new policy for Colombia, now the 

iii
largest recipient of foreign aid. Thus, this report provi

excellent opportunity for policymakers to review wh

are and where we need to go. The Strategic Studies Ins

is pleased to publish this monograph as a contribution 

national security debate on Colombia within the U

States and abroad.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR

Director

Strategic Studies Institute

iv
FOREWORD

This ambitious monograph by Colonel Joseph Nuñ

cogent response to the question of “What are the str

and operational imperatives for the U.S. military 

implementation of Plan Colombia?” In it he develo

necessary background to make the argument that it i

for the United States to get rid of its Vietnam ghosts, a

Colombia to generate a viable political-military strat

attain security, stability, democratic governance, 

sustainable peace. Together, both countries can m

major contribution to the well-being of the entire W

Hemisphere.

Lacking representation, opportunity, and a tru

society, a Hobbesian monster has emerged to addre

thin veneer of Colombian democracy, a paucity of eco

progress, and the virtual nonexistence of persona

collective security throughout the country. The Hob

trinity, of course, includes the insurgents, the 

militaries, and the illegal drug traffickers. These 

represent the worst passions of humanity—violence, 

corruption, anarchy, and intimidation—and ar

confined within the borders of Colombia. The sp

effects of these forces into neighboring countries is cr

a regional threat to stability, democracy, and peace.

Colonel Nuñez argues that the United States ca

the Colombians defeat this unholy trinity, but the on

to implement the enabling political, economic, and 

components of Plan Colombia is to establish control 

national territory and the people in it. Moreover, th

way to defeat the forces of corruption, disintegr

degradation, and violence is to establish sec

throughout the national territory, progressively. A 

Colombia must be created one municipality at a time

in turn, will require a voluntary constabulary force tr

equipped, and controlled by the government—som

v
very different from past self-defense initiatives—th

rebuild a sense of personal security under the rule o

All this is ambitious, indeed. It will be difficult

consuming, and require strong resolve. But it can and 

be done. It can be done by rethinking the threa

response. It must be done as a result of delib

cooperative, long-term, holistic, and strategic-level 

ways, and means planning to achieve a mutually ben

political end-state. The mission of the U.S. military, a

Army in particular, is to assist Colombia in profe

alizing and modernizing its officer corps and general s

the point where they can train, equip, and utilize the

regular and constabulary forces to directly contribute 

achievement of the stable, democratic, and pe

end-state. Impressively, this can be done without incr

U.S. presence or influence.

The Dante B. Fascell North-South Center o

University of Miami is pleased to join with the Str

Studies Institute in offering this monograph to help i

the national security debate on what is to do be d

Colombia. It is of critical importance to this co

Colombia, and to the hemisphere.

Ambler H. Moss, Jr.

Director

The Dante B. Fascell North-So

 Center

University of Miami

vi
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTH

JOSEPH R. NUÑEZ, a colonel in the U.S. Arm

Professor (select) in the Department of National Se

and Strategy of the U.S. Army War College. A cum 

graduate of St. Lawrence University, he holds the M

Government from the University of Virginia, a

currently completing a Ph.D. in International Rel

from the University of Virginia. He is also a graduate 

U.S. Army War College. With over 23 years of s

Colonel Nuñez has commanded at the compan

battalion level, taught Political Science in the Depar

of Social Sciences at the U.S. Military Academy 

Point), and deployed to Haiti in 1994 with the 

Mountain Division (Light Infantry) for Operation U

Democracy. His research interests are focussed o

Americas and reflected in his dissertation research

recently, Low Intensity Conflict & Law Enforc

published his article, “A New U.S. Strategy for Mexic

presentations on Colombia have included the D

Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Southern Command an

Latin American Center, St. Antony’s College, O

University.

vii
viii

Map of Colombia
FIGHTING THE HOBBESIAN TRINITY

IN COLOMBIA:

A NEW STRATEGY FOR PEACE

In an attempt to hold off the final disaster, the General [Sim

Bolivar] was returning to Santa Fe de Bogotá with a colum

troops, hoping to gather others along the way, in order to be

once again the struggle for national integrity. He said then t

this was his decisive moment . . . “The entire Church, the en

army, the immense majority of the nation, were on my side,

would write later, remembering those days. But despite 

these advantages, he said, it had been proved over and o

again that when he abandoned the south to march north, 

vice versa, the country he left behind was lost, devastated 

new civil wars. It was his destiny.

1

The dominance of the mafias in Colombia has led to the coin

of a new term, “colombianization,” defining a social situa

generated by narcotics traffickers. A colombianization 

characterized by the disintegration of political, economic, 

social structures and a permanent state of violent crimes s

as political assassinations, executions, and human rig

violations.

2

The violent ones [guerrillas] don’t understand or don’t wan

understand that their actions only help to perpetuate 

increase poverty and unemployment. While the vast majorit

Colombians work for the country’s economic recovery, and 

create jobs that make a worthy life possible, the acts of 

violent ones sow only misery. . . .

3

Introduction.

Colombia is unable to protect the rights of its cit

thus raising serious questions of political legitima

Hobbesian trinity of narcotraffickers, guerrillas

paramilitaries has amassed one of the worst reco

human rights abuses ever witnessed in this hemisp

Violence is a daily part of Colombian life. No po

humanitarian (peacemaking) intervention could succ

1
creating a peaceful and secure environment. Geograp

huge advantage to those who espouse violence a

awesome disadvantage to those who wish to make 

Moreover, the unconventional military threat is too 

for even a well-trained and equipped international m

force, and the Organization of American States (OAS) 

willing to support intervention.

5

 Nor is the governm

Colombia willing to permit outsiders to fight against 

who are challenging its sovereignty.

6

 This cou

political and cultural milieu accepts and encourages t

of violence to solve political and economic conflict.

The United States is deeply committed to 

Colombia, particularly in the fight against drugs, but 

best the foundation of a strategy to improve stabili

security. Yet, there is no comprehensive approa

subduing the guerrillas, narcotraffickers, 

paramilitaries. Colombia is very anxious about the U

package ($1.3 billion) contained in Plan Colombia. 

same time, Colombia’s government appears to be par

our counterdrug mantra, and faces criticism 

Colombia’s citizens for not being able to prevent gu

and paramilitary offensives that are now more freque

bloody. This indirect approach to fighting insurge

largely a result of human rights concerns in the 

Congress and a simplistic application of the Vi

metaphor to ambiguous conflict in developing na

Legislators are eager to support President A

Pastrana, but are concerned about providing support 

armed forces to fight all three scourges, particularly 

past human rights performance has been less than s

The United States does not want to be funding a dirt

nor do officials want U.S. military forces conducti

intervention to help fight the rebels.

7

 Finally, t

Americans will support the fight against the scou

drugs, there is no wellspring of support to fight insur

because it brings back unwarranted fears about Vi

and selective learning from Central America in the 1

2
The chaos has not remained within Colombia and 

affects the United States. Moreover, we share a 

measure of responsibility for the violence—our peopl

created a huge demand for the drugs. Large interna

financial interests benefit from the drug trade and p

it.

8

This monograph proposes a strategy to en

widespread terror gripping Colombia, where civil soc

a term no longer understood as something its people 

hope to enjoy now or anytime soon. A key assumption 

the Colombian security challenge is complex, much 

than just a fight against narcotraffickers, guerrilla

paramilitaries. Civil society is weaker because of 

distortions created by serious challenges (shortcomin

regime legitimacy: elite circulation, representation, j

economic development, income distribution, geog

separation, and political fragmentation. Witho

allegiant and consensual national identity, the Colo

government may be able to establish short-term se

Creating a lasting peace that preserves the safety 

citizens is a long-term goal that is still most elusive.

Those seeking to win this war within democratic 

will need a comprehensive approach that incorp

political (executive, legislative, judicial, administ

and military), economic (investment, infrastructure, 

manufacturing, and agriculture), and social (educ

health, religion, and community) programs for refor

renewal. It will require major international supp

advance investment, build democratic institutions, d

infrastructure, and combat multinational criminals 

worldwide drug trade. Before any of these can be effec

implemented, “dirty war” must end. The solution is t

the guerrillas (then the paramilitaries) to negotiate a 

They have not yet sincerely negotiated—there is too 

for them to lose and very little to gain. Clausewitz’

advice is pertinent: “war is . . . an act of force to comp

enemy to do our will.”

9

 Unless you can destroy the en

will to resist, he will continue to wage war agains

3
military.

10

 This requires more than counterdrug opera

but counterinsurgency elicits negative resp

throughout the hemisphere.

This is a very complex war. There are two major gu

organizations, as well as paramilitary forces. Fu

complicating this equation, both guerrillas and 

militaries receive funding from various narcotraff

“mafias” and, in turn, provide protection and co

murder services for the international purveyors of co

heroin, and marijuana. But this is surely war, even 

internal and unconventional. It may sound incong

(not to mention seeming counter-intuitive) but 

require effective military operations—with interna

support—to make peace, yet that is precisely the sit

as it is. This assessment is not popular in Washington

hope that the enemy will negotiate in good faith. O

believe that since the situation has no bearing o

balance of power, outside powers such as the United 

should stay out of this conflict or, at most, conti

counterdrug approach. Both camps are mistaken

enemy must be compelled to accept peace and sto

killing and destruction.

Once a peace accord is realized, an interna

peacekeeping force might be introduced, assuming t

Colombian parties agree to accept multinational m

assistance. An international peacekeeping force could 

in ensuring that the peace holds, the resolve of the st

the Western Hemisphere is demonstrated, human 

are protected, and pressure is placed on narcotraff

and paramilitaries to either leave or obey the rule o

Moreover, this international force is an impartia

legitimate actor which promotes better relations amo

various factions. Their mission is to act as imp

observers, not to intervene forcefully, which would b

as an affront to Colombian sovereignty. Let us now t

Colombia’s situation, the actors and their impact, a

strategic remedy.

4
Colombia’s Contentious Clime.

Colombia has surpassed Chile, Argentina, and Pe

the record as the bloodiest land of this century in 

America. La Violencia, initiated by the 1948 assassi

of Liberal presidential candidate Jorge Eliecer G

produced over 200,000 deaths (many innocent bysta

over 15 years. Colombian elites worked out a power sh

agreement to rekindle a sense of civic culture and c

management. It worked only to postpone conflict for a 

Liberals and Conservatives established the Na

Front—an agreement to alternate the presidency be

parties and share administrative positions in govern

“Peasant republics” emerged during the conflict as “

independent zones for self-defense and self-administ

in agrarian matters.”

11

 While Conservatives and Li

were compromising, a disillusioned and largely 

minority of the country was ignoring them and turn

Marxism. The Colombian Revolutionary Armed 

(FARC) emerged from these peasant republics, as d

Army of National Liberation (ELN), and they found su

from Havana to Moscow. Peasants in rural areas 

frustrated with their lack of representation within th

most powerful political parties, which largely repres

the interests of wealthy urban businessmen and 

landowners.

Over the years, Colombia enjoyed democratic ele

the only exception being the dictatorship of Gustavo 

Pinilla (1953-57). Colombian politics revolves aroun

two major parties, which perpetuate family legac

political power, much to the disdain of many working 

and poor citizens. According to David Jordan, “In Col

the regime is based on elite dominance reinforced by a 

disguised alliance with the immensely wealth

powerful drug cartels.”

12

 From the outside looki

Colombia’s situation or condition as a state is paradox

is one of the oldest democracies in the Western Hemis

It has been free from military dictatorships and 

5
subject to the high level of ethnic cleavages that cha

Andean states such as Peru and Bolivia. Yet it is al

country with the longest running civil war.

How democratic is Colombia? The country is 

durally democratic since it has a record of elections 

pluralism—parties compete for elected positions. But 

is not much more than that to be found. Political par

not represent all groups within society. Sufficient c

and balances between the various branches of gover

do not exist. There is no professional bureaucracy to h

resources in an effective and efficient manner

government is not accountable to the people. Colomb

procedural democracy, as Jordan explains.

The procedural definition of democracy does not theref

exclude the corrupt democratic regime. As long as a country 

able to hold elections it is still considered a democratic regim

whether the government is corrupt or not. Advocates of t

procedural definition do not necessarily believe th

corruption can be avoided in an electoral system, nor do th

address the issue that the electoral system can be used 

maintain corrupt elites. Yet when corruption assists elites 

manipulate the electoral system, then accountability, the ve

purpose of the electoral system, is nullified. In order 

eliminate false claims of democracy, the understanding of t

democratic regime needs to be extended beyond t

procedural definition. It should take into account the potent

symbiotic relationship between ruling elites, organized crim

and the globalized financial system.

13

Communist insurgent groups did not fare well un

latter half of the 1970s, when they began their assoc

with an emerging agribusiness giant, the narcotraff

It was a marriage made in hell, given its effect on dem

and human rights. The guerrillas furnished security 

narcotraffickers, enabling cocaine barons to grow, ha

process, and transport illicit products to their main m

the United States. In return, narcotraffickers provi

guerrillas with funds that enable them to provision 

“soldiers” and purchase high quality automatic we

6
This arrangement created narcoterrorism, “the use o

trafficking to advance the objectives of certain govern

and terrorist organizations.”

14

 Guerrillas and 

traffickers take advantage of the corruption o

government and its superficial sovereignty and demo

based on deals between wealthy elites, not the interes

majority of the people.

This shotgun marriage between guerrilla

narcotraffickers turned into a strange polygamy 

paramilitary groups entered into a security relatio

with narcotraffickers to fund their campaigns again

guerillas. Paramilitaries have their roots in “self-d

groups, usually peasants, who battle alone ag

guerrillas, drug traffickers, and common criminal

surprisingly, these vigilantes commit their sha

atrocities as well.”

15

 Originally funded by large landow

the paramilitaries found even better funding wit

narcotraffickers, which enabled them to buy sophist

small arms, pay their “soldiers” higher wages tha

army, and wage more intense warfare agains

guerrillas. The real losers throughout this escalat

violence have been the peasants, caught between w

factions and subjected to gross human rights abuses. T

scenario add the armed forces and, to a lesser e

national police, who until recent years committed 

share of extrajudicial violence, further exacerbating 

fears.

16

 Yet both the military and police are also vict

this conflict.

17

 Adding insult to injury, the polic

military have been unable to protect citizen

government authorities have been displaced from 

precincts and patrolling areas by ambushing guerril

The human costs of this civil war are enormous

35,000 people killed in the last decade. Besides 

military, other government officials, paramilit

guerrillas, and narcotraffickers, innocent civilian

murdered because they are in the wrong place at the 

time. Colombians live in a state of constant fear and 

is safe from violence. Wealthy businessmen are kidn

7
for ransom. Poor villagers are forced to support guerri

paramilitaries, lest they be made to flee their villa

refugees of war. Prominent citizens who participate 

peace process are assassinated.

18

 University profe

judges, and journalists are targets.

The FARC has an army of at least 15,000 soldiers, 

battle hardened and proficient in the art of gu

warfare; most of the key leaders have 20 to 30 

experience in such operations. Though outnumbered 

Colombian Army, guerrillas are well trained, equippe

often achieve greater combat effect with fewer force

years much of the military lumbered through halfh

static defense operations that were neither effect

developing soldiers who could fight nor of much threat 

guerrillas. FARC columns have more automatic we

than do many infantry battalions.

19

 Drug money

estimates put it at close to $500 million per year

become a guerrilla force multiplier on a strategic 

Without drug money, their largest source of incom

FARC cannot effectively challenge the military and 

Of course this assumes that the guerrillas can be sepa

from their drug money, an assumption that I do hol

even if we could deny them access to drug money, that 

the way to get them to make peace. The FARC could 

increase their kidnapping and extortion actions to fil

war chests.

The second largest insurgency group, the ELN, h

estimated strength of 5,000 fighters. Most of their fu

comes from kidnappings for ransom, bank robberie

contract security for narcotraffickers. They are as bru

the FARC. A favorite tactic is blowing up oil pipelin

October 1998 they demolished a pipeline, ca

devastation in the local community of Machuca. So

people were killed and 60 were injured. Accord

Amnesty International, “ The apparent total disrega

civilian life with which this was carried out breach

fundamental principles of the laws of armed conflict, 

prohibit direct or indiscriminate attacks on civilians.”

8
noteworthy that when the FARC tried to unite gu

movements in 1978, it was criticized by the EL

“splitting the masses of other revolutionary moveme

intimidation through the sacrifice of hundre

peasants.”

21

 While that may have been true, the 

bloody campaigns of terror caused severe harm to pea

just on a smaller scale than their FARC competitors

Paramilitary organizations serve to a large deg

proxy forces of the government, or so it appears. 

paramilitaries are not accountable to the governm

responsive to the criticisms of human rights groups

performance in the field is perceived to be doing the 

work. Carlos Castaño leads an alliance of param

groups called the United Self-Defense Units of Col

(AUC). Castaño’s vision for the AUC is to elevate it 

regional to a national actor in the fight against guer

and some believe that he has already succeeded. To 

the national level, the paramilitaries have insin

themselves in narcotrafficker security work and drug 

“taxation, ”often displacing guerrillas that performed 

lucrative missions. But the methods of the paramil

are very questionable. Instead of just fighting the gue

directly, they also target the civilian population. Acc

to Mark Chernick, “Towns are ‘cleansed’ of a

suspected of supporting the guerillas—or any leftist 

union, social movement or progressive ch

organization—to demonstrate to the population at 

what awaits them if they become involved in 

activities.”

22

The years 1996 to 2000 have established a new 

The military used to be the primary aggressor again

FARC, but no longer is that true. The paramilitari

now the leading purveyors of human rights abuses. 

armed attacks now double what the military and 

achieve combined.

23

 Escalation of paramilitary wa

combined with indiscriminate targeting of civilian

established a new and terrible record. Human 

organizations report that paramilitary forces ar

9
responsible for an estimated 75 to 80 percent of all h

rights abuses,

24

although much of the violence perpe

by guerrilla organizations is not classified as human 

abuse. Most of Colombia’s internal refugees 

by-product of paramilitary actions to displace the F

ELN, and their sympathizers from rural villages and t

The military connection to the paramilitaries has 

reinforced through the participation of former soldie

officers, and even some retired military office

paramilitary groups. Human rights organizations 

that there is a tacit understanding that the paramil

fight the northern campaign—the hottest co

area—and the army fights the southern campaign—t

volatile combat area.

25

 But there is no conclusive p

this.

The government has had a mixed record 

Conservative Party candidate Andres Pastrana was e

president in August 1998. After distancing itself fro

previous presidency of Ernesto Samper that was tain

strong drug corruption influence, the United State

eager to support President Pastrana because he was 

energetic, and was committed to making peace wi

guerrillas. That optimism faded significantly 

Pastrana decided to cede a portion of south c

Colombia to the FARC as an autonomous or demilit

zone—land equal to the size of Switzerland. Past

rationale was that if he acted in good faith with the r

the FARC would agree to make peace.

Pastrana’s plan has not worked so far; rat

enhanced the FARC’s legitimacy as the de facto rule

own state.

26

 The FARC used the area known as the D

(demilitarized zone) to launch a major offensive again

Colombian Army in November 1999, to which Pre

Pastrana criticized, “It showed the guerrillas we

interested in pursuing a peace agreement.”

27

 The arm

able to repel the guerrilla offensive, and accord

General Fernando Tapias (commander of the armed f

killed more than a hundred guerrillas—all of this occ

10
while FARC and government officials continued t

peace talks within the Despeje.

28

Against this surreal peace process, the state has 

some improvements in police and military effectivene

there is no corresponding increase in the secur

Colombian citizens. Though the police have made 

headway in reducing the penetration of narcotraff

they are still regarded as a corrupt institution

explains why the military has been given the maj

enforcement support missions, such as the forming 

anti-narcotics battalion in 1999 that was funded b

United States. Every soldier in the unit had 

investigated—for possible human rights violation

corruption—and cleared before joining this specia

The military fared better than the police in this pro

Additionally, the military is better suited for the mis

combating the guerrillas’ ‘military’ violence that safeg

drug trafficking operations. The United State

Colombia agree that this unit’s mission is to suppo

police in fighting narcotraffickers. If guerrillas happe

providing security, they are considered to be legit

targets.

30

 The counterdrug battalion works in concer

police units. Several additional counterdrug batt

were trained and initiated operations in 2000. The m

will have an elite brigade by mid-2001, the sum of s

battalions. 

The Colombian Army has significantly improv

human rights record over the last few years. Between 

and 1999, the military reduced the number of human 

violation charges from 310 to 103; for the first time ev

number of soldiers and officers convicted of human 

abuses is a double digit figure—22 as of November 1

The army’s decrease in human rights abuses, how

cannot be considered without also considerin

correlation to the significant rise in human rights abu

the paramilitaries. As long as there is a pla

relationship between the military (and the national 

and their “proxy force,” the Colombian people canno

11
trust the institutions that are charged with pro

security. On the other hand, if human rights violatio

combined with International Humanitarian 

violations,

32

 another image emerges. According 

Colombian Council of Jurists, the “reduction in the n

of human rights and International Law viola

attributed to Public Forces has fallen from 15.68 perc

1995, to 3.72 percent in 1998, and to 2 percent in 19

The Colombian judicial system is in shamble

collapse began over a decade ago when judges and pr

tors were given various choices by the narcotrafficker

a bribe, resign from office, flee the country, or be mur

Some brave ones, like Carlos Mauro Hoyos, Colo

attorney general in 1988, stood up to the drug deale

were gunned down.

34

 Not having a strong judiciary to 

with, some criminals have long taken pride in skirti

law. Avoiding taxes or smuggling contraband good

bad enough, but now they face a system that is overwh

and fearful to act. The justice system is characteriz

“criminal impunity from prosecution, govern

inefficiency, high levels of crime, rampant corruptio

lack of security and protection for judicial officials, m

whom have been assassinated.”

35

 To fill the vacuum 

weakened rule of law, other groups have taken up the

forms of justice, such as that administered by param

forces that often operate where there are no judges, la

and police.

36

 The FARC itself provides revolutionary j

for the residents of the Despeje and countless other a

Until recently Colombia was able to maintain a v

economy that was the envy of many of its South Am

neighbors, despite the violence. Rich in natural res

such as oil, bolstered by agricultural products like 

and supplemented by the underground economy of dr

maintained a good quality of life for the upper half of s

largely concentrated in Bogotá and a few other cities. 

was living on borrowed time, as drug money dis

consumption patterns in the economy and eroded 

society. The enormous violence perpetrated b

12
Hobbesian trinity has finally reduced international f

investment, and now the country is in the midst of the 

recession of the past century.

37

 International corpor

are reluctant to set up or increase operations in Colo

uncertain as to whether they can conduct business 

and profitably. This maelstrom has gone far beyon

Hobbesian trinity; there is a huge increase in street 

that has further shaken investor confidence and par

legitimate domestic business such as the constr

industry.

38

 It has also added to the “brain flight” of s

the country’s best and brightest, most of them young 

who no longer see a bright future in their homelan

rather the shadow of death all around.

39

Strategy Dilemmas.

Some policy analysts have considered the poss

that the United States, in concert with other members 

OAS, might need to directly intervene with military fo

Colombia. The rationale is that the country cannot 

the guerrillas, narcotraffickers, and paramilitaries 

own, even with additional military and police su

Rather than let it devolve into interminable viole

complete civil war, something should be done to 

Colombia from its anarchic juggernaut acceleration. 

are not many advocates of this option, which has no c

of success, would make matters worse in Colombia, an

great criticism from our hemispheric neighbors. As a

noted, international peacekeepers welcomed by Col

after a peace accord is reached could be positiv

military intervention to create peace is pure folly.

Why is intervention an awful strategy? St

Hoffmann described the challenges facing many 

states today: “Many are racked or wrecked by 

religious or ethnic conflicts; many never managed to 

stable and effective state structures and have becom

theatre of battling gangs competing for power; some 

autocrats. . . ready to use the worst forms of repress

13
stay in power.”

40

 Hoffmann’s analysis resonates tr

Colombia when he writes about the weakne

governmental institutions and groups fighting for po

control. But Colombia certainly is not a failed stat

Somalia or Liberia; or a murderous state, like Haiti o

under military regimes, or a troubled state, on the s

Sudan, Sri Lanka, or Rwanda.

41

 Yes, there are far too 

political murders occurring in Colombia for the comm

of nations (democratic ones to be sure) to ignore or a

Colombia may exhibit many of the political, economi

social characteristics of failure, however it has n

failed. It is headed toward the cliff, but has not yet fall

is still trying to dig in its heels to stop and is scream

help. Though facing many troubles, it is still un

democratically elected government that is trying ear

to make peace, respect human rights, and provide se

for its people. It does not meet the definition of a tro

state, although one might argue that its weak and 

government is not out of danger to become one.

Colombia is a failing state that is desperately try

turn itself around. It is failing because it has been “bre

down as a result of [its] inability to establish legitimac

any degree of certainty.”

42

 The administration of Pre

Pastrana acknowledges this.

There is no question that Colombia suffers from the proble

of a state yet to consolidate its power: a lack of confidence 

the capacity of the armed forces, the police, and the judic

system to guarantee order and security; a credibility crisis 

different levels and in different agencies of government; a

corrupt practices in the public and private sectors. All this h

been fed and aggravated by the enormous destabilizing effe

of drug trafficking, which, with vast economic resources, h

constantly generated indiscriminate violence while und

mining our values. . . .

43

Humanitarian intervention in Colombia by a 

national force is a scenario to be avoided at all costs. N

the United Nations (U.N.) nor the OAS has legit

authority to intervene.

44

 The administration of Pre

14
Pastrana still has sovereignty. It is a legitimate gover

with international standing. Hoffmann explain

important linkage between intervention and soverei

The case against intervention has a hard core: it is the defenc

the norm of sovereignty, corner stone of the inter-state or

since the seventeenth century. Sovereignty is seen by 

champions, not as a licence for excesses or atrocities at hom

abroad, but as a protection of a society’s individuals and gro

from external control—benevolent perhaps, but alien 

imposed. The sovereign state is deemed to be the protecto

security and property of its subjects, as in Hobbes’ Leviathan

the guardian of their rights, as in Locke and Mill; or 

expression of their collective will, as in Rousseau. Even if

practice, the state is one which violates some of these rig

assaults the security and property of some of its subjects, 

lacks a “general will” because of a clash of antagonistic gr

wills that tear society apart, foreign intrusion is still seen a

greater evil.

45

Intervention is wrong for a second reason

Colombian people are dead set against outside p

asserting military authority within their land, altho

poll revealed a majority of the business class favor

military intervention. The will of the people is to 

peace. Citizens turned out by the millions to suppo

government, and express their disgust with the eno

loss of lives and their desire for a Colombian solution

The third reason is that the OAS and U.N. 

repudiate any parties to this action. While 

organizations have expressed increasing criticism 

Colombia’s inability to safeguard human rights, nei

ready to sanction the introduction of foreign troo

Colombian soil. They are using diplomatic mea

encourage the country to make its Plan Colombia a r

especially since President Pastrana has aggres

argued against intervention and for greater interna

cooperation in the peace process.

47

The final reason to be wary of intervention is th

FARC and ELN might actually benefit from a multina

15
invasion. As stated earlier, an enormous force is requ

pacify Colombia, more than countries are willing to co

An undersized force of conventional ability is no ma

guerrilla units operating in challenging terrain l

comandantes who have been executing succe

ambushes for decades. Once this multinational 

suffered significant casualties—just a few U.S. casu

given today’s force protection conscious military—it 

cease to be effective. The rebels might even do bette

recruiting under the banner of nationalism. Of cours

does not begin to take into account what roles wo

played by the narcotraffickers and paramilitar

multinational force could not safeguard human rig

this most challenging environment.

Even if one subscribes to a communitarian vers

liberalism that values human rights over sovere

Colombian intervention still does not make sense.

48

 W

is never a good idea to place too much value on a l

President Pastrana has demonstrated tha

administration is committed to protecting human 

improving justice, and extending opportunity 

Colombians. It is clear he understands “the moral sta

of society rests on its ability to respect and protect the 

of its members and on their consent, explicit or impl

its rules and institutions.”

49

 Pastrana exemplifies m

the leadership virtues extolled by Laurence Whitehea

came up short in being able “to divert attention 

intractable obstacles.”

50

 To resolve this, he must exer

control over the guerrillas and advance the peace pr

Nonetheless, as long as the Colombian govern

continues to improve its record, what better solutio

outside powers offer?

If intervention is not a viable strategy, the United 

might try to muddle through with its support of 

against drugs. The narcotraffickers are a major reaso

the guerrillas and paramilitaries are so powerful. 

money constitutes a major portion of their war chest

question that needs to be answered is whet

16
counterdrug strategy can be effective in stoppin

growing, harvesting, processing, and transporting of 

U.S. Director of the Office of National Drug Control 

General (retired) Barry McCaffrey points to the answ

Drug czar Barry McCaffrey yesterday blamed the Clin

administration and Congress for failing to provide an 

package of more than $1 billion for expanded assistance to 

Colombian police and military to fight the exportation of coca

and heroin. “Colombia is out of control, it is a flipp

nightmare. If we believe our own rhetoric, I think a pervas

argument can be made that the interests of the American peo

would be served by this assistance package. We need to hav

coherent, longtime democratic response in the region. This 

political decision, but we are after the drugs,” he said, add

that the package was not intended to interfere in Colomb

civil war.

51

Merely fighting drugs will not build democra

Colombia, even if those who are protecting drug traff

are fair game. A long-term democratic response can o

implemented if the country is secure and stable. Se

comes before democracy. Fighting drugs and thos

protect the narcotraffickers is not going to establish 

Guerrillas and paramilitaries will fight on becau

government is unable to defend its citizens in the tow

villages of the mountains and jungles. The militar

police cannot assert pervasive and ubiquitous aut

throughout the country. Our government suffers 

policy gridlock that is due to competing visions of Colo

which further exacerbates the situation.

Fighting drugs does not solve the alarming h

rights conundrum. It will not keep the paramilitarie

guerrillas from continuing a dirty war. Even if a grea

of pressure can be placed on the narcotraffickers, the

react as they have in the past—move operations else

in Colombia or to Peru and Bolivia and ride out the 

They might even target other border countries. Th

only create instability elsewhere, much like pressin

balloon in one place and having it pop out somewher

17
Colombia is beginning to take a stronger stand in sup

human rights, including bringing paramilitary gunm

justice.

52

 In spite of change in government polic

human rights record is still unsatisfactory. For many 

abuses were largely confined to the armed forces a

guerillas. To be sure, many of the assassinations 

“contract hits” paid for by the narcotraffickers and fu

by sicarios, professional “hit men.” The war is d

because paramilitaries are clearly out of contro

increasing their operations. The state cannot distance 

from the paramilitaries—evidence demonstrate

enduring tie.

53

It is no secret that the guerrillas have been more fa

among human rights groups than the paramilitar

there is a bias among human rights groups, both 

national and international levels, it is to the left and n

right. This explains the instances of paramilitaries cla

that they killed a guerrilla, while others claim th

individual was a member of a human rights group and 

guerrilla.

54

 Government officials often complain th

human rights groups are eager to point out abuses 

military, police, and paramilitaries, but are very s

criticize the guerrillas.

55

 Such are the gray areas o

war.

The most innocent victims of conflict are childre

guerrillas are the worst offenders when it com

recruiting children as combatants. The paramilitarie

have children in their ranks, but to a lesser degre

paramilitaries use children as their “eyes and ears”—

provide some of the best intelligence on guerrillas sinc

are often not suspected of collaborating due to 

puerility. On the other hand, the FARC has no compu

about using children as combatants. Some of the ch

are as young as 9 years of age.

56

18
A New Strategy for Colombia.

Until President Pastrana was elected, Col

exemplified what David Jordan calls an ano

state—“the procedural features of democracy 

retaining the features of an autocracy, where the rulin

face no accountability.”

57

 Pastrana is not beholden t

interests, nor does he advocate an elitist statu

approach. His goal is to make peace and im

opportunity for all Colombians.

58

 Yet Colombia has 

way to go to become a truly democratic state. The U

States can assist, but it will require a completel

strategy that is unconventional, comprehensive, supp

of democracy, and makes use of a huge and unt

resource, the people.

The better solution is to adopt an integrated appro

restore security that maintains accountability 

government to the people for their security.

59

 This re

applying old ideas to a new situation—Colombia’s co

circumstances. To defeat this Hobbesian trinity, the 

the people must be mobilized, represented, and utili

create a democratic peace in their war-torn land. A 

Colombia must be created, one town at a time. The on

to defeat the forces of disintegration and anarchy 

establish security progressively—one town, then an

and so on. This new constellation of interlocking popu

centers has the potential to achieve safety through de

respect for human rights, political sovereignty, esta

ment of the rule of law, unencumbered commerce, and 

tie to the national government. Though a difficult mis

achieve, the will of the Colombian people can m

strategic difference.

In short, the internal defense of Colombia must be 

in the hands of the people, much like the militia syste

supported the creation of the United States through 

numbers and unconventional tactics. The governm

Bogotá is already considering the establishmen

voluntary constabulary force, something very differen

19
past self-defense initiatives that failed.

60

 An ess

component that increases the likelihood of success 

integration of national support to the towns. To 

security a reality, the judiciary, police, and military 

establish an enduring relationship with every comm

Presently, guerrillas control (have more influence in 

the government) approximately 40 percent o

Colombian landmass. Beyond the Despeje (which 

than 10 percent of the country), rebels control many v

and towns, displacing judges, police, and military. On

paramilitaries have achieved any lasting succe

reclaiming populated areas, but their unlawful me

and links to narcotraffickers are unacceptable.

The national police and armed forces cannot defe

guerrillas, at least presently. At best they have been a

repel major attacks by the FARC. They may slo

narcotraffickers—no one seriously believes they c

defeated, even with support from the United States. N

the national police nor the armed forces are commit

vanquishing the paramilitaries. While these private a

have been able to accomplish what the police and m

have been largely unable to do, they represent a 

threat to the sovereignty of the state and the human 

of citizens. These unaccountable forces must be compe

turn the fight over to the national police, armed force

the new militia.

There is a recent Andean case for the succ

employment of a militia or civilian defense force. In th

1980s and early 1990s, Peru experienced both failu

success with a peasant militia system known as r

campesinas. These self-defense organizations were 

marginally successful before the government tr

equipped, and supported the village-based syst

defense against Sendero Luminoso and Tupac A

guerrilla forces. In the few cases where the gover

taught people basic defense skills and provided them 

defensive weapons and army advisors (who were con

to military reaction forces), peasants succeeded in pro

20
effective security for their communities.

61

 David 

Palmer, in assessing the rondas campesinas, note

they fulfilled political as well as defensive military ro

strengthening the organization of local communiti

also noted that part of their success was because 

“proved to match more closely peasants’ perceptions o

immediate needs than anything Sendero [Luminos

prepared to offer.”

62

Militias are an excellent demonstration of the will 

people. Not serving as a standing military force, th

civilians first, then citizen soldiers. They are accou

first to their community. Human rights have a 

chance of being protected because civic leaders p

immediate control of the militias. The next le

command is the national military authority. Self-d

forces exclude paramilitary soldiers and leaders, 

they have been screened for human rights abuse

cleared. Everyone in the community who volunteers to 

is not only pledging to defend their community a

guerrillas, narcotraffickers, and paramilitaries, th

also pledging to follow the laws of land warfare and p

the rights of the citizens of their village, town, or cit

militia or constabulary force is the glue that hold

community together. It integrates military, police, c

local government, social services, education, comm

churches, and civic organizations. Citizen soldiers als

the potential to reunite Colombia as a country, th

improved ties to the national government an

establishment of an allegiant civic culture.

The constabulary force’s most urgent mission is 

the community of fear. Only when this is accomplish

there be any hope of positive change. An effective st

must therefore incorporate strong measures to reb

sense of security under the rule of law. Before po

economic, and social changes can construct a more b

democratic Colombia, citizens must be assured that 

are protected in [their] lives, liberties, and property a

that pertains to them.”

63

 It is difficult for many peo

21
understand this since they have not experienced fear 

level that Judith Shklar describes based on pe

knowledge from another time and place.

Given the inevitability of that inequality of military, poli

and persuasive power, which is called government, there 

evidently always much to be afraid of. And one may, thus, 

less inclined to celebrate the blessings of liberty than 

consider the dangers of tyranny and war that threatens it. F

this liberalism the basic units of political life are not discurs

and reflecting persons, nor patriotic soldier-citizens, n

energetic litigants, but the weak and the powerful. . . 

minimal level of fear is implied in any system of law, and t

liberalism of fear does not dream of an end of public, coerc

government. The fear it does want to prevent is that which 

created by arbitrary, unexpected, unnecessary, a

unlicensed acts of force and by habitual and pervasive acts 

cruelty and torture performed by military, paramilitary, a

police agents in any regime.

64

When you add guerillas and narcotraffickers to Sh

realm of fear, the level of personal terror mul

exponentially. Violence comes from every direction. T

no way of knowing when or who might be killed. Deat

come for those whose village happens to be near 

pipeline that explodes into a firestorm because the 

considered it a lucrative target to weaken the state. 

are eliminated by the paramilitaries for conducting 

with guerilla supporters. Those trying to uphold the la

also targeted by narcotraffickers. The randomn

violence has a most chilling effect on people’s daily 

Francisco de Roux understands this Colombian ph

enon very well.

But reality is different. These people...are afraid. There 

uncertainty for the future. There is war, and it reflects 

Barrancabermeja of burned buses and black smoke coming o

of oil-pipes in flames. On the side roads, leading to the f

trails, burned corpses are found and there persists t

uncertain feeling of the possible “lost bullet”. . . Families fr

neighborhood communes locking up themselves at 6 p.m. i

narrow room remember other times in the street when t

22
conversation among neighbors stretched far into the n

breeze, full of stories, songs and rhythms. Now the popular sp

of the river port are almost empty.

65

Henry Shue also addresses the importance of com

fear by placing security on his short list of basic righ

Colombians Shue’s logic is compelling. He c

understands that, particularly in the developing wor

much can be realized unless security is first guarante

all citizens.

No one can enjoy any right that is supposedly protected 

society if someone can credibly threaten him or her w

murder, rape, beatings, etc., when he or she tries to enjoy 

alleged right. Such threats to physical security are among 

most serious and—in much of the world—the most widespr

hindrances to the enjoyment of any right. If any right is to 

exercised except at great risk, physical security must 

protected. In the absence of physical security people are una

to use any other rights that society may be said to be protect

without being liable to encounter many of the worst dang

they would encounter if society were not protecting rights.

6

To fight fear and promote security, Colombia 

develop ties that bind its society together. Suppor

strong and accountable constabulary force or militia 

important part of creating unity and strengthening r

legitimacy. What will it take to make citizen so

competent guardians of their communities? First, a ca

military officers and soldiers must be dedicated to trai

town’s militia volunteers. The cadre must spend at lea

month teaching volunteers the basics: maintainin

firing a shotgun (defensive weapon), defensive fi

positions (tactical emplacement), tactical movement 

fire, cover and concealment, unit drill (cohesio

coordination), communications (internal and externa

aid techniques, physical training, chain of comman

military ethics (human rights). The senior civic leade

demonstrates military ability is then placed in charge 

unit, along with several subordinate leaders who ass

commander. Community militias are provided a r

23
military officer (on a voluntary basis) as an adviso

advisor supports the militia commander with ta

advice, yet is not in the chain of command. Ci

volunteers who pass militia training are issued sho

ammunition, cleaning kit, and uniform. They swear a

to defend each other, their community, and the Repu

Colombia.

Once established, the government supports 

community’s militia, directly and indirectly. Within 

municipality, the national police coordinate daily 

militia leaders to exchange information, update def

requirements, plan training, and make thems

available to citizens who wish to speak with them 

security concerns. These meetings may include 

representatives (church officials, human rights wo

judges, etc.). The militia leader has an office in the 

station that is outfitted with a military radio to c

military units and other militia units in the area. 

community militia can call on the military to pro

reaction force of soldiers to assist them in repelli

attack against their town or village. If nearby, these so

can be quickly transported by military vehicles 

troubled community and reinforce militia efforts. 

away, this force can air assault by helicopter to the ho

Depending on the level of threat, a reaction force 

range in size from a platoon (40 soldiers) to a brigade 

or more soldiers). An interlocking web of security is eff

and efficient; it is the best method of fighting fea

encouraging respect for civil authority.

67

Militias require other support from the na

government. They should be paid for training period

when activated to defend their communities. The 

needs to set up mobile teams that periodically review m

performance, addressing such matters as ta

competence, unit morale, equipment readiness

compliance with the laws of land warfare (protect

human rights). The army also must set up a 

commission to investigate, prosecute, and p

24
militiamen who violate military law. This cann

emphasized enough. Militias must be accountable, no

within a command structure, but also to a code of j

that punishes citizen soldiers for violating the rig

community members. Militia members must c

understand they are to discharge their duties with

rule of law, unlike the brutal paramilitaries, who bre

law by taking “justice” into their own hands, and v

human rights in the name of security.

Once communities are more secure, the str

changes. The national government is obligated to 

other basic needs of the people. Though Colombia’s av

income is in the upper half of South American countri

distribution of income in Colombia has become more s

in the 1990s—the rich are getting richer, and the po

getting poorer.

68

 This wide gap between rich and poo

much to support the growth in the guerilla support ba

to mention narcotraffickers and paramilitaries. U

economic opportunity can be created, and the gover

can take action to reach out to the disadvantaged, Col

will remain mired in anarchy.

Government efforts to create an improved enviro

for the expansion of economic activity can take many 

The military can take on civic action projects that 

proven beneficial to stability and growth elsewhere in 

America.

69

 Improving roads, building bridges, supp

medical clinics, transporting food, improving water so

assisting schools, and developing youth programs are 

of the things that the military can do to help 

communities grow. The national government mus

improve the effectiveness of its civil servants who are t

with bureaucratic responsibilities for suppo

infrastructure. Corruption is pervasive, causing 

communities to go without projects that were pro

funded, paid for, but never executed.

70

 In a s

environment, international development aid can 

through the national government to remote commu

providing small business loans, job training

25
agricultural assistance. Colombia can rekindle ties 

people by extending economic assistance to the mill

citizens who are currently impoverished.

In order for Colombia to begin reclamation of its lan

people, outside support is required, particularly since 

the midst of an economic recession. Already the 

largest recipient of U.S. foreign aid, it will take much 

to save Colombia from the demons that haunt it and p

the rights of its citizens. Current U.S. policy t

Colombia is incomplete at best.

71

 We are far too ea

fight drugs, too afraid of counterinsurgency operation

clearly placing the Pastrana administration i

unenviable position of having to support a strategy th

Colombian people do not find convincing. The 

memories of operations in Central America and Vi

have created a knee-jerk reaction against fig

insurgency. Further exacerbating this situation is a 

propensity for human rights organizations, memb

Congress, and media elites to protest any ty

counterinsurgency support because of the human 

abuses that have been committed around the wo

police, military, and paramilitary forces.

72

It is imperative that the United States support th

militia strategy. It mobilizes the will of the people, 

them in control of their security, helps them to reclaim 

communities, improves civil society, and guards a

human rights abuses. The militia has the poten

displace the guerrillas and encourage them to make 

and end this civil war. In order to make this militia a r

and a success, Washington must assist with funding 

proposal. It is in our national interest to pr

democracy, preserve domestic tranquility, create a 

environment for commerce, and protect human right

The United States has pledged full support 

Colombian peace process. Yet this process has accomp

very little so far. The guerrillas are making a mockery 

negotiations. They were happy to take the Despeje, b

26
loath to concede anything that might diminish their p

They will make peace when they are forced to accept 

of peace. Their situation is too powerful, lucrative

secure. Already their public support is waning.

73

 

strategy of violence has convinced the vast majority 

people that it is time for peace. Current strategi

beginning to make it less profitable to be a gue

particularly when elite forces are now targ

narcotraffickers and their security. The missing str

link is how to make them more insecure, so they migh

to have a peaceful settlement. No current act

accomplishing that, so it is time to consider a new stra

U.S. national interests in these issues go beyon

borders of Colombia and have major consequences f

national security. These problems have great re

impact. Colombia’s civil war displaced over a million p

some of whom have migrated to neighboring cou

Guerrillas and narcotraffickers have penetrated the 

countries of Venezuela, Brazil, Peru, Ecuador

Panama.

74

 The effects of the drug trade are also 

Mexico, Canada, and the United States. Whethe

support of the drug trade or consumption, the corr

and human loss is very significant. Furthermore, Col

is of huge economic importance to the United States a

rest of the hemisphere, far beyond natural resour

Mexico is the gateway to the Free Trade Area 

Americas (FTAA—proposed for 2005), then Colombia 

linchpin.

75

 If Colombia is not stabilized, there will 

hemispheric economic community. It will be an 

nothing proposition when it comes to South Amer

Colombia weighs heavily upon our ability to exten

trade throughout the Americas. We must safeguard ou

hemispheric interests by supporting democ

Furthermore, it is high time the United States devel

new political-military strategy for the Americas, on

changes structure, orientation, attitudes, and techn

In so doing we will have a greater ability to pr

democracy, protect human rights, react quick

27
humanitarian assistance, extend free trade, and 

enduring relationships that create better understa

and cooperation.

76

Heading the Wrong Way.

The events of 2000 do not bode well for the fut

Colombia. Bogotá is about to concede another despeje 

ELN. Larry Rohter paints a troubling picture in Th

York Times.

They say necessity is the mother of invention, but desperat

can also be its source. In Colombia, a government frustra

by its inability to end three decades of warfare with two ma

guerrilla insurgencies is now seeking peace by granting bo

movements one of the things they crave most: uncontes

territory of their own. . . . This has left two zones a kind 

never-never land where it is not clear who is in charge or h

the zones fit into the rest of the country. “You are seeing, i

sense, the hollowing-out of government in critical regions 

Latin America and its replacement by individuals who are

fact, introducing a narco-government, a small narco-empir

Peter Romero, the State Department’s senior official for La

American affairs, warned last week.

77

This concession strategy to advance peace negoti

has not fared well. The FARC is now stronger politica

is a de facto government in the process of levying a 

tax” on citizens and enterprises within its zone. No

outdone, the ELN used terrorist acts (sabotag

kidnapping) to force President Pastrana to concede an

zone.

78

 Colombia moves further away from pea

appeasing guerrillas. Only demonstrations of gover

force and resolve can deter guerrillas from further vi

and make peace something they desire.

79

 Enrique S

Calderón, co-director of the Colombian newspap

Tiempo, reflected the growing frustration of the p

“President Pastrana is a hostage of the peace proces

the FARC.”

80

 There is no movement in the peace proce

guerrillas concede nothing. Their argument is that th

not negotiate until the government halts what they as

28
a government alliance with the paramilitary f

Moreover, the FARC opposes including any dialogu

paramilitary organizations. This resistance by the 

was criticized by Fabian Marulanda, the bish

Florencia, who said, “This is like the behavior of a 

child who gets in a huff and who won’t talk anymore

The results of battlefield operations have been m

From November 1999 until May 2000 the militar

increasing success in combat against rebel for

Improved U.S. support played a part in the military ga

their fight against the rebels, but equally important w

transition within the military’s senior leadership—

bureaucrats to combat veterans with mobile br

experience. By October 2000 the situation ch

significantly. The military offensive to recove

Putumayo region in the south was met with strong gu

resistance, no doubt due to fact that this area is a majo

producing area and source of rebel funding. Param

forces are also fighting to protect their fina

interests—protection money from the narcotraffic

and provide a measure of security that neither the m

nor police have been able achieve.

Both military and guerrillas have suffered inc

casualties.

83

 The military was particularly dishea

when, in addition to losing 56 soldiers during a 

campaign, they lost one of their prized Black 

helicopters. Yet the senior military commander in th

called the battle a victory for Colombian forces.

84

 To b

morale is on the upswing among the soldiers. But the 

is arguably winning the larger war in three major 

First, they are causing further instability amon

civilians in the region and frustrating military and 

efforts.

85

 This instability is rooted in the military’s in

to maintain control of reclaimed territory, largely 

major units being assigned more terrain to control tha

can effectively occupy.

86

 Second, they have succes

managed to get the paramilitaries more spotlight

atrocities than themselves. Third, the rebels are eng

29
in more border and cross-border operations, not to m

causing peasants to flee across borders.

87

 The result 

states in the region are skeptical about the military p

of Plan Colombia and U.S. involvement.

88

 It is also h

an effect on a key supporter of Plan Colombia

Benjamin Gilman (R-NY), who is withdrawing his su

over concerns about the increase in violence and pot

for increased human rights violations given a larger r

the military.

89

 Gilman favors the police. At stak

helicopters needed to increase mobility and surprise

U.S. budgetary support for Colombia faced s

resistance in Congress in the first half of 2000. Critics 

that increased funding of the military will result in 

abuses of human rights as operations expand b

fighting drugs. According to Senator Patrick Leahy (D

“What we are seeing is a dramatic ratcheting up 

counterinsurgency policy in the name of counte

policy.”

91

 If Leahy is correct, it is due to str

“hand-tying” by a Congress haunted by counterinsur

ghosts.

92

 The only hope for a more balanced approac

new administration that can persuade the publi

Congress to adopt a new strategy to help achieve pe

Colombia. The Inter-American Dialogue—sounding a

Clausewitzian—recently recommended that the U

States should continue “helping to turn Colombia’s 

into a better-trained and more professional force,” 

that this will “level the playing field in Colombia, chan

calculations of the guerrillas, and make them more in

to negotiate seriously.”

93

What needs to be changed in order to achieve pea

begin with, the military and police must not be 

against one another in a contest to get their “snouts 

fiscal trough.” Rep. Gilman may want to shift U.S. su

from the military to the police because they are less t

by human rights abuses.

94

 Of course, this overlook

major points. First, the police are more corrupt tha

military.

95

 Second, they are far less capable than m

when it comes to fighting against narcotraffickers pro

30
by guerrilla armies. Where guerrilla forces are inv

military units must be the appropriate response. W

together, the military and police can restore sec

particularly if they join with this new militia t

controlled by the government.

More importantly, the government must deve

winning, not a losing attitude. As Michael Radu pa

points out, the counterinsurgency difference between 

and Colombia is that the former took an aggressive 

against guerrillas and the latter has been weak-wille

too accommodating.

96

 Peru succeeded, and Colombia 

closer to peace or victory. One important difference 

the Colombian guerrillas are better trained, equippe

led than those in Peru; thus Colombia must do m

achieve security, which is why Colombia has sough

secured support from outside. Radu notes that “the 

armed” in the form of rondas campesinas made a diff

in providing security in remote areas.

97

 Colombia’s pr

attempts at self-defense have been disasters, such 

CONVIVIR, due to a lack of government contro

support. The upshot of this has been the widespread 

and government fear of establishing another m

program.

98

 A common retort to the recommendatio

new militia force is that “Colombia has enough vi

already with the paramilitaries and guerrillas; 

weapons to civilians will just make matters worse.”

9

resistance in the face of disaster is frustrating, to s

least.

The dynamics of conflict in Colombia are perplexin

guerrillas do not have widespread support, yet th

being permitted to expand their power. They talk 

making peace, but have made no concessions.

100

 The 

has failed to maintain the most basic human ri

citizens—personal security. Escalation of mi

operations has served to displace citizens and 

tensions in neighboring states. The narcotraffi

supposedly the key target of Plan Colombia, are not 

profits, having mastered the “balloon game,” and shif

31
shipping routes. The reviled paramilitaries, decr

human rights abusers and funded by drug money

been the most effective in fighting the guerrillas

civilians complain about the lack of security, bu

condoned a conscription policy that exempted the m

and upper classes from serving the cause of freedo

democracy. Government institutions are weak, and 

part of that is due to the depth and breadth of corr

among legislators in Congress.

101

 Unless all Colom

stand up against anarchic violence, their future is 

indeed. 

Conclusion.

The Colombian people have suffered enough. Fo

half a century they have had to contend with the ineq

of politics, economics, and society, under a thin ven

democracy. They have been subjected to one of the blo

civil wars ever seen in this hemisphere. La

representation, opportunity, and true civil soci

Hobbesian monster emerged to address the parad

nature of this politically, economically, socially

geographically diverse country. These forces represe

worst passions of humanity—violence, greed, corru

anarchy, and intimidation. It will take the will of the p

political commitment, financial resources, and 

patience to win the peace that the people so richly dese

There is a window of opportunity for the United St

strongly align with the optimistic and ene

administration of Andres Pastrana; a Colombian 

who is deeply committed to peace, democracy, h

rights, and economic opportunity. Washington mu

stay mired in old and unsuccessful strategies. It is t

support a new strategy that solves complex Colo

problems and addresses assistance concerns rais

various political factions in Washington. The nonm

aspects of Plan Colombia, though real and signi

cannot be realized until people can stop living in co

32
fear of dying violently. Washington must not succu

choosing the police over the military, or shy away 

integrating citizens into the security architecture, as l

they are trained, equipped, and controlled b

government.

The mission for the U.S. military, and the Ar

particular, is to assist Colombia in training, equippin

advising their forces to reestablish human securi

essential condition for democratization and develop

This should be done without increasing our prese

influence—it is Colombia’s task to achieve a safe and 

environment for its citizens. A major focus mu

developing a militia that is integrated with the poli

the army, while also being accountable to gover

authority. The key is to maintain legitimacy and 

human rights abuses. Though unpopular, 

counterinsurgency mission has a better chance of imp

human security than the current counterdrug strat

lesson that was learned in Peru. Fighting drugs is a re

or hemispheric mission that requires greater coordi

and cooperation, not to mention demand reduction, to 

the “balloon effect.”

Human rights are best protected when citizens h

role in maintaining their security. Justice, develop

responsive government, opportunity, all markers o

society, cannot be achieved without security. As a

noted, neither humanitarians nor jingoists have adv

a strategy that will work to bring peace. Peace does no

without action, and the guerrillas have made a mock

government attempts to reach out with olive bran

hand. Efforts to make peace will continue to fail as l

Colombia’s priorities are out of alignment with the ne

the people, not to mention those of the region, an

beholden to outside interests and strategies distorti

situation. Yes, it is time for Colombians to fight for h

security, national peace, and a deeper democracy.

33
ENDNOTES

1. Gabriel Garcia Marquez, The General in his Labyrint

York, NY: Knopf, 1990, pp. 112-113.

2. David C. Jordan, Drug Politics: Dirty Money and Demo

Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1999, p. 83.

3. Andres Pastrana, “Colombian President Ridicules Rebel’s 

to Help Poor,” The Washington Post, November 26, 1999, p. A1

4. Colonel Joseph R. Nuñez, “Where Do We Go From Here

presented at the conference, “War and Peace in Colombia: Stra

Ambiguous Warfare,” U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, No

12-13, 1999.

5. Seyom Brown, Human Rights in World Politics, New Yo

Longman, 2000, p. 19.

But consistent with the nonintervention ideology a

sovereignty—protecting traditions of the Latin Americ

states, the Inter-American regime [OAS], unlike t

European system, makes it easy for members to veto anyth

that smacks of supranational monitoring, let alo

supranational enforcement.

6. Larry Rohter, “U.S. Anti-Drug Chief, in Colombia, Sp

Regional Crisis,” New York Times, July 27, 1999, p. A4.

7. Sean D. Naylor, “U.S. Deployment Not Likely in Colombia

Times, September 13, 1999, p. 16.

8. Jordan, pp. 99-116. See also Tim Weiner with Tim Golden

Combat Drug Traffic Caught in Lobbying Battle,” New York 

November 4, 1999, p. A8.

9. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Princeton, NJ: Pr

University Press, 1989, p. 75.

10. Michael Howard, Clausewitz, Oxford, England: 

University Press, 1983, p. 49.

11. Timothy P. Wickham-Crowley, Guerrillas & Revolution i

America, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992, pp. 

34
12. Jordan, p. 168. It should be noted that the most promisin

of democratic representation are evident at the departme

municipal levels of government. Being closer to the peop

national officials, these lower federal officials are more accounta

responsive in general.

13. Ibid., p. 19.

14. Rachel Ehrenfeld, Narcoterrorism, New York, NY: Basic 

1990, p. xiii.

15. Ibid., p. 78.

16. Human Rights Watch, War Without Quarter: Colomb

International Humanitarian Law, New York, NY: Human 

Watch, 1998. This book provides a detailed expose of human 

abuses committed by the state, paramilitaries, and guerillas.

17. Ministry of National Defense, The Public Force and 

Rights in Colombia, Bogotá, Colombia: Republic of Colombia, 2

30. In 1999 subversive attacks against the public force killed 5

wounded 809.

18. Edgar Torres, “Sentenciado por las Farc?” El Tiempo, Sep

19, 1999, p. 1. Dr. Jesus “Chucho” Antonio Bejarano, a un

professor and peace negotiator, was murdered in Bogotá on Sep

15, 1999, while walking to his classroom. Authorities believe 

was executed by the FARC in retaliation for the murder of a hu

Jaime Garzon, by the paramilitaries. Others dispute this and arg

the paramilitaries were responsible.

19. Naylor, p. 16.

20. Amnesty International, “Colombia: Amnesty Intern

Condemns Guerrilla Pipeline Attack Leaving More Than 50 C

Dead,” Amnesty International News Release, October 22, 1998, 

21. Michael Radu and Vladimir Tismaneanu, Latin Am

Revolutionaries: Groups, Goals, Methods, Pergamon-B

Washington, DC: 1990, pp. 153-154.

22. Mark Chernick, “The Paramilitarization of the W

Colombia,” NACLA: Report on the Americas, Vol. 31, March/Apr

p. 29.

23. Ibid.

35
24. George Vickers, Washington Office on Latin America (W

“Targeting the Guerrillas or the Traffickers?” paper presented 

conference, “War and Peace in Colombia: Strategy for Am

Warfare,” U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, November 12-1

See also Mark Fazlollah, “As Colombia Unravels, U.S. Search

Strategy,” Philadelphia Inquirer Sunday Review, November 28

p. D4. The term human rights abuse is deceptive because it d

account for all types of illegal violence (see endnote #32).

25. Ibid.

26. Gabriel Marcella and Donald Schulz, Colombia’s Thre

U.S. Strategy at the Crossroads, Carlisle, PA: Strategic 

Institute, 1999, p. 4.

27. BBC News, “Colombian President Lambasts Rebels,” No

19, 1999, http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/americas/n

529000/529085.stm. Other major guerrilla offensives were con

in July 1999 and July 2000.

28. BBC News, “Colombian Army Chief Says Rebels De

November 9, 1999, http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/a

/newsid_528000/528760.stm.

29. Author’s confidential conversation with a member of t

Southern Command staff on April 12, 1999.

30. Brigadier General Keith Huber, “U.S. Strategy for Col

paper presented at the conference, “War and Peace in Co

Strategy for Ambiguous Warfare,” U.S. Army War College, Carli

November 12-13, 1999. General Huber was the Operations Off

for the U.S. Southern Command.

31. Major General Henry Medina, “The Military Strategy 

Colombian Armed Forces,” paper presented at the conference, “W

Peace in Colombia: Strategy for Ambiguous Warfare,” U.S. Arm

College, Carlisle, PA, November 12-13, 1999.

32. Ministry of National Defense, Security Forces and 

Rights in Colombia, Bogotá, Colombia: Republic of Colombia, 2

12. International Humanitarian Law “compels combatants on a

to give decent treatment, assist, and respect the life of the adve

that have been put out of combat, those that have surrender

anyone in a state of defenselessness, and to avoid having t

combatant civil population fall victim to threats or to the use o

33. Ibid., p. 14.

36
34. Ehrenfeld, p. 74.

35. German Alfonso Palacio Casteñeda, “Institutional 

Parainstitutionality, and Regime Flexibility in Colombia: The 

Narcotraffic and Counterinsurgency,” in Vigilantism and the S

Modern Latin America, edited by Martha K.Huggins, New Yo

Praeger, 1991, p. 105.

36. Ibid., p. 114.

37. Tim Golden, “Now, State of Siege, Colombian Style,” Ne

Times, October 10, 1999, p. 3. See also Report of an Independe

Force, Toward Greater Peace and Security in Colombia: Fo

Constructive U.S. Policy, New York, NY: Council on Foreign Re

2000, p. 8.

38. Carlos Lemos Simmonds, “El Nosferatu Institucion

Tiempo, September 20, 1999, wysiwyg://71://eltiempo.com/

edi_n004tn0.html.

39. William Branigan, “Colombians Fleeing Homelan

Officials Worry About Tide of Immigration,” The Washington Po

28, 1999, p. A14.

40. Stanley Hoffmann, “The Politics and Ethics of M

Intervention,” Survival, Vol. 37, Winter 1995-96, p. 31.

41. Ibid.

42. Michael J. Smith, “Humanitarian Intervention: An Ove

the Ethical Issues,” in Ethics & International Affairs, edited by 

Rosenthal, Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 1

273.

43. Andres Pastrana, Plan Colombia, Bogotá, Col

Government of Colombia, 1999, pp. 7-8.

44. Heraldo Muñoz, “The Right to Democracy in the Am

Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, Vol. 40, 

1998, pp. 1-17.

45. Hoffmann, p. 34.

46. Juanita Darling, “Colombians Take Bold Steps on R

Peace,” Los Angeles Times, November 21, 1999, p. 1.

37
47. Javier Castaño, “Discurso ante la plenaria de la Asambl

ONU [UN] ayer, Cooperacion, No Intervencion: Pastrana, El T

September 21, 1999, wysiwg://17://eltiempo.com/hoy/ppl_ a000t

48. Smith, p. 287.

49. Ibid., p. 288.

50. Laurence Whitehead, “The Drama of Democratization,” J

of Democracy, October 10, 1999, p. 87.

51. Jerry Seper, “Drug Czar Rips Clinton, Congress on Fu

The Washington Times, December 2, 1999, p. 13.

52. BBC News, “Colombia Offers Reward in Human 

Slayings,” February 1, 1999, file://C:\WIND. . .\BBC, News Am

Colombia offers reward in human rights slayings.

The Colombian authorities have offered a reward of more th

thirty-thousand dollars for information leading to the captu

of suspected right-wing paramilitaries who killed two hum

rights workers over the weekend.

53. Human Rights Watch/Americas, Colombia’s Killer Ne

The Military-Paramilitary Partnership and the United State

York, NY: Human Rights Watch, 1996, pp. 2-3, 105-150. Human 

Watch/Americas obtained a secret Colombian military inte

reorganization plan called Order 200-05/91. See also Scott 

“Colombian General Convicted in Killings; Collaboratio

Paramilitaries Seen,” Washington Post, February 14, 2001, p. A

54. Human Rights Watch, Washington Office on Latin A

Amnesty International, “Colombian Human Rights Defenders in 

February 1999, http://www.igc.org/colhrnet/newscont/m

statement.htm.

55. Confidential conversation with a senior Colombian officia

conference, “War and Peace in Colombia: Strategy for Am

Warfare,” Carlisle, PA, November 12-13, 1999.

56. Centro de Analisis Sociopoliticos, Juguetes de Guerra, 

Colombia: Centro de Analisis Sociopoliticos, 1999, pp. 55-56.

57. Jordan, p. 21.

38
58. Andres Pastrana, interview with Mike Wallace, C

December 7, 1999.

59. Andrew Hurrell, “Security and Inequality,” in Ineq

Globalization, and World Politics, edited by Andrew Hurrell and 

Woods, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1999, p. 261.

Rather, the declining capacity of the state to enforce legitim

order has led in many parts of the world to the privatizatio

violence as diverse social groups are increasingly able 

mobilize armed force; and to the privatization of security 

social groups seek to protect themselves, whether through 

growth of vigilantism, the formation of para-military groups

the purchase of security within an expanding commer

marketplace. Where privatized security has been most vis

as in Russia or Colombia, it is the weak and the poor who are 

most vulnerable. In this case, as in others, the state 

certainly be a major part of the problem but remains 

unavoidable part of the solution.

60. General retired Alvaro Valencia Tovar, “The Military 

Peace Process,” paper presented at the conference, “War and P

Colombia: Strategy for Ambiguous Warfare,” U.S. Army War C

Carlisle, PA, November 12-13, 1999.

61. Colonel Joseph R. Nuñez, “Where Do We Go From Here?

presented at the conference, “War and Peace in Colombia: Stra

Ambiguous Warfare,” U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, No

12-13, 1999. See also Mark Fazlollah, “As Colombia Unrave

Searches for a Strategy,” Philadelphia Inquirer Sunday R

November 28, 1999, p. D4.

62. David Scott Palmer, ed., Shining Path of Peru, New Yo

St. Martin’s Press, 1994, pp. 262-264.

63. Judith N. Shklar, “The Liberalism of Fear,” in Political T

and Political Thinkers, Stanley Hoffmann, ed., Chicago, IL: Un

of Chicago Press, 1998, p. 8.

64. Shklar, pp. 9, 11.

65. Reverend Francisco de Roux, “Civil Society in the Mag

Medio,” paper presented at the conference, “War and Peace in Co

Strategy for Ambiguous Warfare,” U.S. Army War College, Carli

November 12-13, 1999, p. 1.

39
66. Henry Shue, Basic Rights, Princeton, NJ: Princeton Un

Press, 1996, p. 21.

67. Thomas A. Marks, Maoist Insurgency Since Vietnam, L

UK: Frank Cass, 1996, pp. 278-279. Marks argues that Peru’s su

fighting insurgency was aided by linking peasant militias to m

units, establishing government presence, and taking the coun

away from the guerrillas.

68. Frances Stewart and Albert Berry, “Liberalizati

Inequality,” in Inequality, Globalization, and World Politics, A

Hurrell and Ngaire Woods, eds., Oxford, UK: Oxford University 

1999, p. 172.

69. Cynthia McClintock, “The Decimation of Peru’s S

Luminoso,” in Comparative Peace Processes in Latin A

Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1999, p. 230.

70. Martin Hodgson, “Corruption Highway,” Christian 

Monitor, November 22, 1999, p. 6. According to official re

highway to Mogotes, Colombia was paved four times. Though p

the work was never done.

71. General retired Frederick Woerner, panel comm

presented at the conference, “War and Peace in Colombia: Stra

Ambiguous Warfare, ” U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, No

12-13, 1999. See also Marcela Sanchez, “Dardos al Plan Colombi

Estados Unidos,” El Espectador, November 14, 1999, p. 5.

72. Editorial, “America’s Role in Colombia,” New York Tim

31, 1999, p. 10.

73. Andres Pastrana interview. President Pastrana cited a 

Colombian poll that found that only 4 percent of the people supp

guerrillas.

74. Michael Shifter, “Colombia on the Brink,” Foreign Affa

78, July/August 1999, p. 17. See also Betty Brannan Jaen, “Evit

Contagio,” La Prensa, November 14, 1999, p. 12.

75. Colonel Joseph R. Nuñez, “Where Do We Go From Here?

presented at the conference, “War and Peace in Colombia: Stra

Ambiguous Warfare,” U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, No

12-13, 1999.

76. Joseph R. Nuñez, “A New U.S. Strategy for Mexico

Intensity Conflict & Law Enforcement, Vol. 8, No. 2, Summer 1

40
77. Larry Rohter, “Suddenly, Two Parts of a Nation That 

There,” New York Times, May 14, 2000, p. 4.

78. Ibid.

79. Dennis M. Rempe, “Guerrillas, Bandits, and Indep

Republics: US Counter-insurgency Efforts in Colombia 1959

Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol. 6, No. 3, Winter 1995, pp. 3

This article is an excellent history of positive counterinsurgency 

by Colombia with U.S. assistance.

80. Luz Maria Zapata, “El Presidente Pastrana es un Re

Processo de Paz con las FARC,” El Espectador, October 31, 200

81. Ruth Morris, “Rebels Freeze Colombia Peace Talks,”Los 

Times, November 15, 2000, p. A13.

82. Author’s interview with a Colombia analyst at the Headq

of the U.S. Southern Command, Miami, Florida, on May 19, 20

83. Bogota Caracol Television, “Military Offensive to R

Putumayo,” October 19, 2000, FBIS LAP20001019000093.

84. Juan Forero, “Colombia Says Rebels Have Killed 56 T

New York Times, October 21, 2000, p. 6. General (Retired) 

Wilhelm, former Commander-in-Chief of U.S. Southern Comm

an interview with the author on December 2, 2000, in Washingt

also gave a positive assessment of the current Colombian opera

the Putumayo region despite the inability of military to hold te

General Wilhelm believes that over time, given the inc

professionalization and logistical support of the Army, guerrillas 

denied resources and lose their ability to challenge for con

territory. 

85. Author received an electronic note from an intern

journalist in Colombia on November 3, 2000. This journalist 

from hot spots such as the Putumayo region.

86. Author interview with David Spencer, Colombia ana

CNA Corporation, in Washington, DC, on November 30, 2000. A

division was assigned an area of operations that was larger tha

European countries. Essentially it was given a mission that shou

been given to several corps, a force four to eight times larger 

division.

41
87. Medellin El Colombiano, “Ecuador Attends to 500 Col

Refugees,” and Cali El Pais, ”FARC Attack Village in Ecuador,” 

23, 2000, FBIS LAP20001023000054.

88. Anthony Faiola, “Colombia’s Creeping War; Neighbo

Fear Spillover of Violence,”The Washington Post, October 1, 200

89. Christpher Marquis with Juan Forero, “Key House 

Withdraws Support for Colombia Aid Plan,” New York 

November 17, 2000, p. 10.

90. According to Plan Colombia, it will take 2 years to field a 

75 helicopters for the both the Army and National Police. Mos

helicopters go to the Army. The fielding program is behind sc

maintenance concerns are many, and have become a key 

overshadowing many other aspects of the plan.

91. Anonymous, “Colombia Conundrum,” Commonweal, 

2000, p. 5.

92. For a critical account of counterinsurgency, see Winifre

“Repeating Past Mistakes: Aiding Counterinsurgency in Col

NACLA Report on the Americas, Vol. 34, September/October 20

16-19.

93. Report of the Sol M. Linowitz Forum, A Time for Decisio

Policy in the Western Hemisphere, Washington, DC: Inter-Am

Dialogue, 2000, p. 19.

94. Letter from Representative Ben Gilman (R-NY) to G

(Retired) Barry McCaffrey, head of ONDCP, November 14, 20

interesting to note that though Rep. Gilman wants to “shift al

drug fighting aid to the CNP [Colombian National Police],” 

wants Washington to “begin a serious debate . . . to consider help

Colombian military to fight the FARC and ELN guerrilla move

He goes on to say that he believes our country “would commit to h

Colombian military in its counterinsurgency struggle, consiste

fundamental respect for human rights.”

95. The arrest and dismissal rates for police far exceed thos

military. No doubt this in part is due to the fact that the 

traditionally have had the larger counterdrug mission and ha

subject to more temptation bribes.

96. Michael Radu, “The Perilous Appeasement of Guerrillas,

Vol. 44, Summer 2000, pp. 378-379.

42
97. Ibid., p. 375.

98. Paz y Derechos Humanos, “Mininterior dice que armar a 

aumentaria violencia; No a milicias: Gobierno,” El Colom

November 25, 2000, p. 1.

99. Author conversations with Colombian civilians and gove

officials between November 1999 and June 2000. See als

Chernick, “Elusive Peace: Struggling Against the Logic of Vi

NACLA Report on the Americas, Vol. 34, September/October 20

32-37.

100. Daily Brief, “Colombia: Renewed Turmoil,” Oxford An

May 10, 2000. Over the last 2 years, various polls in Colombia h

support for the FARC as low as 4 percent and as high as 6 perc

101. According to Curtis Kamman, former U.S. Ambass

Colombia, at least two-thirds of the members of Congress are “co

all ways.” Comments made at Carlisle Barracks, PA, on Dece

2000.

43
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Robert R. Ivany

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Earl H. Tilford, Jr.

Author

Colonel Joseph R. Nuñez

Director of Publications and Production

Ms. Marianne P. Cowling

Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Mrs. Christine A. Williams

Cover Artist

Mr. James E. Kistler