2020 WI 84

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN

CASE NO.: 2017AP2530-D

COMPLETE TITLE: In the Matter Disciplinary Proceedings Against 

Carl Robert Scholz, Attorney at Law:

Office of Lawyer Regulation,

 Complainant-Respondent,

 v.

Carl Robert Scholz,

 Respondent-Appellant.

DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST SCHOLZ

OPINION FILED: November 10, 2020 

SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 

ORAL ARGUMENT: 

SOURCE OF APPEAL:

COURT: 

COUNTY: 

JUDGE: 

JUSTICES:

Per Curiam. 

NOT PARTICIPATING:

BRIAN HAGEDORN, J., did not participate. 

ATTORNEYS:

For the respondent-appellant, there was a brief filed by 

Carl R. Scholz, Mequon.

For the complainant-respondent, there was a brief filed by 

John T. Payette and Office of Lawyer Regulation. 
2020 WI 84

NOTICE

This opinion is subject to further 

editing and modification. The final 

version will appear in the bound 

volume of the official reports. 

No. 2017AP2530-D

STATE OF WISCONSIN : IN SUPREME COURT

In the Matter Disciplinary Proceedings

Against Carl Robert Scholz, 

Attorney at Law:

Office of Lawyer Regulation,

 Complainant-Respondent,

 v.

Carl Robert Scholz,

 Respondent-Appellant.

FILED

NOV 10, 2020

Sheila T. Reiff

Clerk of Supreme Court

ATTORNEY disciplinary proceeding. Attorney's license 

suspended. 

¶1 PER CURIAM. This disciplinary matter comes to the 

court on Attorney Scholz's appeal of a report and recommendation 

filed by Referee Kim M. Peterson. The referee concluded that 

Attorney Scholz committed ten counts of professional misconduct 

in connection with his representation of A.B., and recommended a 

one-year suspension of Attorney Scholz's law license. Attorney 

Scholz challenges the recommended suspension; he argues that it 

is excessive in light of the totality of the facts and 
No. 2017AP2530-D 

2

circumstances surrounding his representation of A.B. and he 

seeks a more lenient sanction.

¶2 When we review a referee's report and recommendation 

in an attorney disciplinary case we affirm the referee's 

findings of fact unless they are found to be clearly erroneous, 

and we review the referee's conclusions of law on a de novo 

basis. In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Inglimo, 2007 WI 

126, ¶5, 305 Wis. 2d 71, 740 N.W.2d 125. We determine the 

appropriate level of discipline given the particular facts of 

each case, independent of the referee's recommendation, but 

benefiting from it. In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against 

Widule, 2003 WI 34, ¶44, 261 Wis. 2d 45, 660 N.W.2d 686.

¶3 After reviewing this matter and considering Attorney 

Scholz's appeal, we accept the referee's factual findings and 

legal conclusions. However, we have determined that a two-year 

suspension, as originally sought by the Office of Lawyer 

Regulation (OLR), is appropriate. We reserve the question of 

restitution, pending receipt of supplemental briefing requested 

by separate order of this court, and we impose the costs of this 

proceeding on Attorney Scholz. 

¶4 Attorney Scholz was admitted to practice law in 

Wisconsin in 1994. He practices in Mequon. In 2011, he was 

privately reprimanded for failing to hold client funds in trust 

when he deposited a client's advance fee payment directly into 

his business account without giving the requisite alternative 

fee notices and then he used the funds to pay a personal tax 

obligation, and for transferring client funds from his trust 
No. 2017AP2530-D 

3

account to his business account without giving notice to the 

client at the time of the transfer that the funds represented a 

fee payment. Private Reprimand, No. 2011-21.1

¶5 On December 27, 2017, the OLR filed a ten-count 

disciplinary complaint relating to his representation of A.B. in 

a foreclosure/partition action between A.B. and her former 

daughter-in-law, K.D. The complaint alleged that Attorney 

Scholz converted funds that were to be held in trust, then 

engaged in various misrepresentations to hide his misconduct. 

The complaint sought a two-year license suspension and 

restitution of $60,975.94 paid either to the Ozaukee County 

Circuit Court or to opposing counsel's trust account, pending 

resolution of the foreclosure/partition action between Attorney 

Scholz's client, A.B., and K.D. 

¶6 The referee conducted a two-day hearing in January 

2019 and concluded that the OLR had proved, by clear and 

convincing evidence, all ten counts of misconduct. The referee 

recommended we impose a one-year suspension and costs, but did 

not address restitution. Attorney Scholz appeals. 

¶7 This matter has a long history that will be greatly 

abridged for purposes of this opinion. In 1985, A.B., her 

husband, and their son, D.B., purchased a partially constructed 

home on almost 80 acres of land in Ozaukee County. Several 

years later, D.B. married K.D. The two couples co-owned the 

 

1 Electronic copy available at https://compendium.wicourts.

gov/app/raw/002454.html.
No. 2017AP2530-D 

4

property until K.D. filed for divorce from D.B. in 2008. D.B. 

had been in prison since 1994. Attorney Scholz represented D.B. 

in the divorce.

¶8 The primary issue in the divorce was the division of 

the jointly owned residence and surrounding real estate. A.B. 

hired Attorney Donald Fraker, who filed a separate lawsuit to 

assert her interests in the shared property. Months of 

collateral litigation ensued. During this time, A.B.'s husband 

passed away. The court ruled that D.B. and K.D. (whose divorce 

was still pending) jointly owned a one-half interest in the 

property and A.B. owned the other one-half interest. 

Eventually, in the divorce action, K.D. was awarded the one-half 

interest in the property and was assigned responsibility for the 

outstanding mortgage. 

¶9 In May 2012, a foreclosure action was filed against 

the property. A.B. and K.D. litigated who was responsible for 

the unpaid mortgage. Then, the Department of Natural Resources

(DNR) purchased most of the jointly owned acreage. After the 

mortgagee was paid along with some other expenses, there 

remained approximately $180,000, plus the house and a five-acre 

lot. A.B. and K.D. proceeded to litigate their respective 

rights to this property.

¶10 In February 2013 A.B. and K.D. reached a stipulation 

providing that their lawyers would each hold half the disputed 

funds in their respective trust accounts pending the outcome of 

the lawsuit to partition the property. The stipulation stated, 

"Such funds shall continue to be held in such trust accounts, to 
No. 2017AP2530-D 

5

be disbursed as later may be agreed upon in writing by the 

parties or ordered by the Court." The stipulation was approved 

by court order issued on February 22, 2013.

¶11 This brings us to Attorney Scholz's involvement in the 

matters giving rise to this disciplinary proceeding. In June 

2013, Attorney Scholz assumed representation of A.B. from 

Attorney Fraker. At the time, Attorney Fraker held in trust 

$91,545.64 in disputed funds, pursuant to the terms of the 

stipulation. Attorney Fraker had "earmarked" approximately 

$30,000 of these funds for his own attorney fees but offered to 

disburse the remaining two-thirds to Attorney Scholz as part of 

the substitution of attorneys. When this occurred, in Attorney 

Scholz's own words, "[A.B.] and [Attorney Scholz] struck a deal 

that would enable her to continue the fight [against K.D.]." 

¶12 At the ensuing disciplinary hearing Attorney Scholz 

revealed that he and A.B. had agreed that she would "loan"

Attorney Scholz the balance of the disputed funds. In exchange, 

Attorney Scholz promised to represent A.B. for the duration of 

her case against K.D. for a $5,000 fee payable at some future 

date plus 10 percent of any recovery obtained for her. This 

"deal" was memorialized in a pair of written agreements. 

¶13 On July 8, 2013, Attorney Fraker disbursed $60,975.94 

of the disputed funds to Attorney Scholz. Attorney Scholz 

deposited the disputed funds into his business account – not a 

trust account. Attorney Scholz then began spending the money, 

mostly for his own benefit, and by mid-August, it was gone. We 

will not recount all the transactions. Summarized, the OLR 
No. 2017AP2530-D 

6

alleged that Attorney Scholz disbursed at least $60,343.40 of 

the $60,975.94 for his own purposes, or for the benefit of other 

clients or third parties, thereby converting at least $60,343.40 

as of August 12, 2013.

¶14 Meanwhile, A.B. and K.D. were still litigating 

ownership of these funds. Commencing in August 2013, their 

lawyers participated in a mediation and reached a written onepage "Interim Agreement" whereby K.D.'s lawyer could "release 

funds in her trust account to her client [K.D.]." There was no 

written agreement that A.B.'s lawyers could disburse any of the 

disputed funds. During this mediation Attorney Scholz did not 

disclose that he had already disbursed nearly all of the 

disputed funds he was supposed to be holding in trust. 

¶15 In December 2013, following another mediation session, 

Attorney Scholz told Attorney Fraker that he could disburse to 

himself the $29,069.73 he had earmarked for attorney fees, and 

Attorney Fraker did so. 

¶16 In February 2014, Attorney Scholz filed an amended

cross-claim in the civil property/partition dispute on behalf of 

A.B. The pleading states that $183,091.29 of disputed funds had 

not been divided and remained to be partitioned. Attorney 

Scholz did not advise the court that these funds were no longer 

in trust. 

¶17 On January 29, 2015, mediation having failed, the 

court appointed a Special Master to decide A.B.'s and K.D.'s 

rights and interests in the disputed funds and property. In 

June 2015, the Special Master advised the attorneys that he was 
No. 2017AP2530-D 

7

awaiting more information from K.D.'s attorney and that he had 

received "no information or accounting" from Attorney Scholz. 

The Special Master informed both attorneys that he expected that 

"full accountings with supporting documents would be in [his] 

office no later than July 1, 2015." Attorney Scholz did not 

provide the accounting. On July 1, 2015, the Special Master 

wrote to the attorneys, stating, as relevant here: "As to Mr. 

Scholz I have heard nothing further regarding documentation." 

Attorney Scholz asked for more time to respond but then failed 

to do so. 

¶18 On July 15, 2015, the Special Master issued a report 

determining that K.D. was entitled to 97 percent of the proceeds 

of any sale of the home and property. K.D.'s lawyer then asked 

the Special Master to explicitly resolve the allocation of the 

disputed funds. The Special Master forwarded this email to 

Attorney Scholz and requested a response by July 30, 2015. 

Attorney Scholz did not respond. On August 4, 2015, the Special 

Master sent a follow-up letter asking if Attorney Scholz had any 

response or disagreement. Again, Attorney Scholz did not 

respond. 

¶19 On August 6, 2015, the Special Master filed an amended 

report with the court, which allocated 97 percent of the 

disputed funds to K.D. The Special Master added that when the 

acreage had been sold, certain expenses had been paid from the 

sale proceeds that were A.B.'s obligations. These amounts 

included some $28,034.97 in legal fees paid to Attorney Scholz 

for D.B.'s divorce. The Special Master ordered that K.D. should 
No. 2017AP2530-D 

8

be reimbursed for these expenditures before the remaining 

disputed funds were distributed between A.B. and K.D.

¶20 Attorney Scholz filed a formal objection to the 

Special Master's amended report. A.B. filed for bankruptcy.

¶21 In January 2016, Attorney Scholz and K.D.'s lawyer 

told the circuit court that the remaining property had been 

sold, subject to bankruptcy court approval, and disclosed that 

they no longer held in trust any of the disputed funds from the 

DNR sale. The circuit court expressed consternation, stating:

"You two are going to get in a lot of trouble on this. There's 

a court order that said that was to be maintained in the trust 

accounts, and you cannot just disregard a court order."

¶22 K.D.'s lawyer clarified that she had relied on the 

written interim agreement prepared by their mediator as "written 

agreement by the parties." The court then addressed Attorney 

Scholz: "[I]t certainly looks like there was an agreement that 

[K.D.'s lawyer] could release the funds in her trust account to 

her client. It doesn't say anything about [A.B.] releasing 

those funds. She better find a way to restore them, or there's 

going to be contempt proceedings." The court continued

addressing Attorney Scholz:

Because you know what? That is - that is an ethical 

violation, what you did there. And I have an 

obligation to report that, Mr. Scholz, and I will do 

that. There was a court order, and there's nothing 

that says you can do what you did. You just went 

beyond what I said you could do, and that's a problem.

That's a huge problem. 
No. 2017AP2530-D 

9

¶23 Notably, the circuit court assumed Attorney Scholz had 

disbursed the funds to A.B. Attorney Scholz did not inform the 

court that he had "borrowed" the money from A.B. or that he had 

arranged to reimburse A.B. in part with services-in-kind. He 

also told the court that parts of the mediator's interim 

agreement were missing, implying the missing pages would confirm 

his right to disburse funds. The interim agreement was a onepage document. 

¶24 The circuit court directed Attorney Scholz to submit 

an "accounting" of his disbursement of the disputed funds. 

Attorney Scholz submitted a one-page document that the referee 

later found was a misrepresentation of what had transpired.

Attorney Scholz also provided the court with a "receipt"

purportedly signed by A.B. on December 23, 2013, which stated 

that she had received $50,975.94 "as the balance of her share of 

the proceeds . . . " and purported to authorize Attorney Scholz 

to retain $10,000 toward past and future expenses related to the 

representation. As of December 23, 2013, Attorney Scholz had 

not made any such payment to A.B. and he was no longer holding 

any of the disputed funds in trust.

¶25 Following the evidentiary hearing and submission of 

post-hearing briefs, the referee determined that the OLR clearly 

and convincingly proved that Attorney Scholz committed all ten 

counts of misconduct:

Count One: By converting to his own use or purposes, 

or for the benefit of other clients or third parties, 
No. 2017AP2530-D 

10

funds that he was to hold in trust, Attorney Scholz 

violated SCR 20:8.4(c).2

Count Two: By failing to hold in trust, separate from 

his own property, the proceeds from the sale of the 

parcel of land, Attorney Scholz violated 

SCR 20:1.15(b)(1).3

Count Three: By failing to hold all of the disputed 

funds in trust until the dispute was resolved, 

Attorney Scholz violated former SCR 20:1.15(d)(3).4 

 

2 SCR 20:8.4(c) provides: "It is professional misconduct 

for a lawyer to engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, 

deceit or misrepresentation."

3 SCR 20:1.15(b)(1) provides: 

A lawyer shall hold in trust, separate from the 

lawyer's own property, that property of clients and 

3rd parties that is in the lawyer's possession in 

connection with a representation. All funds of 

clients and 3rd parties paid to a lawyer or law firm 

in connection with a representation shall be deposited 

in one or more identifiable trust accounts. 

4 Effective July 1, 2016, substantial changes were made to 

Supreme Court Rule 20:1.15, the "trust account rule." See S. 

Ct. Order 14-07, 2016 WI 21 (issued Apr. 4, 2016, eff. July 1, 

2016). Because the conduct underlying this case arose prior to 

July 1, 2016, unless otherwise indicated, all references to the 

supreme court rules will be to those in effect prior to July 1, 

2016.

Former SCR 20:1.15(d)(3) provided:

When the lawyer and another person or the client 

and another person claim ownership interest in trust 

property identified by a lien, court order, judgment, 

or contract, the lawyer shall hold that property in 

trust until there is an accounting and severance of 

the interests. If a dispute arises regarding the 

division of the property, the lawyer shall hold the 

disputed portion in trust until the dispute is 

resolved. Disputes between the lawyer and a client 

are subject to the provisions of sub.(g)(2).
No. 2017AP2530-D 

11

Count Four: By failing to hold the disputed funds in 

trust until there was a written agreement or court 

order permitting the release of the funds, Attorney 

Scholz violated SCR 20:3.4(c).5 

Count Five: By causing Attorney Fraker to disburse 

the funds he was holding in trust, when there was no 

written agreement or court order authorizing the 

disbursement, Attorney Scholz violated SCR 20:3.4(c), 

via SCR 20:8.4(a).6

Count Six: By engaging in communications with the 

mediator and opposing counsel regarding whether 

Attorney Scholz could disburse any of the disputed 

funds, when Attorney Scholz had already disbursed 

substantially all of the disputed funds, Attorney 

Scholz violated SCR 20:8.4(c). 

Count Seven: By failing to respond to opposing 

counsel's filings with the Special Master or the 

Special Master's requests for [A.B.'s] response to 

opposing counsel's filings, or to clarify whether the 

Special Master had granted Attorney Scholz's request 

for additional time to respond and the deadline to do 

so, Attorney Scholz violated SCR 20:1.3.7

Count Eight: By presenting false evidence to the 

court regarding his handling of the disputed funds and 

his client's receipt of funds, by making false 

statements to the court regarding his handling and 

disbursement of the disputed funds, and by failing to 

 

5 SCR 20:3.4(c) provides: "A lawyer shall not knowingly 

disobey an obligation under the rules of a tribunal, except for 

an open refusal based on an assertion that no valid obligation 

exists." 

6 SCR 20:8.4(a) provides: "It is professional misconduct 

for a lawyer to violate or attempt to violate the Rules of 

Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do 

so, or do so through the acts of another."

7 SCR 20:1.3 provides: "A lawyer shall act with reasonable 

diligence and promptness in representing a client."
No. 2017AP2530-D 

12

correct false statements he made to the court, 

Attorney Scholz violated SCR 20:3.3(a)(l)8 and (3).9

Count Nine: By failing to maintain a pooled interestbearing trust account between sometime prior to 

August, 2010, and November 12, 2014, and failing 

during that period of time to participate in the 

Interest on Trust Accounts Program, Attorney Scholz 

violated, former SCR 20:1.15(c)(1), current 

SCR 20:1.15(c)(1),10 and SCR 13.04.11

 

8 SCR 20:3.3(a)(l) provides: "A lawyer shall not knowingly 

make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to 

correct a false statement of material fact or law previously 

made to the tribunal by the lawyer."

9 SCR 20:3.3(a)(3) provides:

A lawyer shall not knowingly offer evidence that 

the lawyer knows to be false. If a lawyer, the 

lawyer's client, or a witness called by the lawyer, 

has offered material evidence and the lawyer comes to 

know of its falsity, the lawyer shall take reasonable 

remedial measures, including, if necessary, disclosure 

to the tribunal. A lawyer may refuse to offer 

evidence, other than the testimony of a defendant in a 

criminal matter that the lawyer reasonably believes is 

false.

10 The relevant text of SCR 20:1.15(c)(1) provides: 

A lawyer or law firm who receives client or 3rdparty funds that the lawyer or law firm determines to 

be nominal in amount or that are expected to be held 

for a short period of time such that the funds cannot 

earn income for the benefit of the client or 3rd party 

in excess of the costs to secure that income, shall 

maintain a pooled interest-bearing or dividend-paying 

draft trust account in an IOLTA participating 

institution.

11 SCR 13.04(1) provides:

(1) An attorney shall participate in the program 

as provided in SCR 20:1.15 unless:

(a) The attorney certifies on the annual trust 

account statement filed with the state bar that: 
No. 2017AP2530-D 

13

Count Ten: By making misrepresentations to the OLR 

during the course of the investigation of this matter, 

Attorney Scholz violated SCR 22.03(6),12 enforceable 

via SCR 20:8.4(h).13

¶26 The referee found that Attorney Scholz was "careless 

and negligent" and described his misconduct as "serious"

stating:

In this case, the misconduct Scholz engaged in is 

serious. Scholz not only improperly converted funds, 

but he covered up his conduct over the course of 

several years with several instances of misleading 

omissions and false representations to the court, 

opposing counsel, the OLR, [the Special Master] and 

[the mediator]. While Scholz's conduct might not have 

harmed his client, it did harm the opposing party, who 

lost out on the funds he improperly distributed to 

himself, and later his client. 

 

1. Based on the attorney's current annual trust 

account experience and information from the 

institution in which the attorney deposits trust 

funds, service charges on the account would equal or 

exceed any interest generated; or 

2. Because of the nature of the attorney's 

practice, the attorney does not maintain a trust 

account; or (b) The board, on its own motion or upon 

application from an attorney, grants a waiver from 

participation in the program for good cause. 

12 SCR 22.03(6) provides: "In the course of the 

investigation, the respondent's willful failure to provide 

relevant information, to answer questions fully, or to furnish 

documents and the respondent's misrepresentation in a disclosure 

are misconduct, regardless of the merits of the matters asserted 

in the grievance."

13 SCR 20:8.4(h) provides: "It is professional misconduct 

for a lawyer to fail to cooperate in the investigation of a 

grievance filed with the office of lawyer regulation as required 

by SCR 21.15(4), SCR 22.001(9)(b), SCR 22.03(2), SCR 22.03(6), 

or SCR 22.04(1)."
No. 2017AP2530-D 

14

However, the referee apparently accepted many of Attorney 

Scholz's explanations, characterizing the conversion as an 

"improper loan" and finding that Attorney Scholz "repaid it 

quickly." The referee observed: "[i]n this case, Attorney 

Scholz's conduct did not injure his client, and he did not 

appear to manipulate or steal from his client, rather he took an 

improper loan, and repaid that quickly. He did not breach a 

client's trust . . .."

¶27 The referee deemed a one-year license suspension 

sufficient and recommended that Attorney Scholz should be 

required to pay the full costs of this proceeding. The OLR's 

statement of costs discloses that these costs were $16,804.30 as 

of March 17, 2020. The report does not mention restitution.

¶28 We turn to the merits of Attorney Scholz's appeal. He 

explains that:

[t]his appeal was not brought for the purpose of 

overturning that decision, but rather, as a plea for 

leniency based on the extraordinary nature of this 

case, the good work that was done, and the result that 

was ultimately obtained for a very special lady, all 

of which was overshadowed by [Scholz's] carelessness, 

neglect and in some instances, disregard for the Rules 

of Professional Conduct. 

¶29 We first consider the referee's factual findings. 

Attorney Scholz does not challenge the referee's factual 

findings, per se, taking issue only with "certain inferences."

There has been no showing that any of the referee's findings are 

clearly erroneous and we accept and affirm those findings. 
No. 2017AP2530-D 

15

¶30 We turn to the referee's conclusions of law. Attorney 

Scholz questions the conclusion that he violated SCR 20:1.3 

(Diligence), as alleged in Count 7: 

By failing to respond to opposing counsel's filings 

with the Special Master or the Special Master's 

requests for [A.B.'s] response to opposing counsel's 

filings, or to clarify whether the Special Master had 

granted Attorney Scholz's request for additional time 

to respond and the deadline to do so, Attorney Scholz 

violated SCR 20:1.3.

¶31 Attorney Scholz maintains that he gave the Special 

Master adequate information shortly after the Special Master was 

appointed. He argues that his efforts on A.B.'s behalf reflect 

his "commitment" and "dedication" and "zeal." It is clear from 

the record, however, that Attorney Scholz repeatedly failed to 

respond to the Special Master's requests for information. As 

the OLR observed, Attorney Scholz's lack of diligence in in this 

regard "deprived [A.B.] of credit for any of the other value she 

contributed to the property." Referee Peterson found that "[i]n 

the end, Scholz never filed any substantive written response to 

[the Special Master's] report." We affirm the referee's 

determination that Attorney Scholz violated SCR 20:1.3. 

¶32 Attorney Scholz does not challenge the referee's other 

conclusions of law, including her conclusion that he converted 

the disputed funds in violation of SCR 20:8.4(c), and the record 

supports the referee's conclusions. We emphasize that Attorney 

Scholz's temporary use of the disputed funds constitutes 

conversion notwithstanding the referee's unchallenged finding 

that he "repaid" A.B.; his use of the funds does not have to be 
No. 2017AP2530-D 

16

a permanent deprival. In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against 

Mulligan, 2015 WI 96, ¶36, 365 Wis. 2d 43, 870 N.W.2d 233 

(citing In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Weigel, 2012 WI 

124, ¶41, 345 Wis. 2d 7, 823 N.W.2d 798 (quoting ABA/BNA 

Lawyers' Manual on Professional Conduct § 45:503 (2007)). The 

referee's other conclusions are supported by the record and we 

affirm them.

¶33 We turn to considering the appropriate sanction for 

Attorney Scholz's misconduct. We are free to impose discipline 

more or less severe than that recommended by the referee. In re 

Disciplinary Proceedings Against Krill, 2020 WI 20, ¶54, 390 

Wis. 2d 466, 938 N.W.2d 589, (citing In re Disciplinary 

Proceedings Against Elliott, 133 Wis. 2d 110, 394 N.W.2d 313 

(1986); In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Reitz, 2005 WI 

39, 279 Wis. 2d 550, 694 N.W.2d 894). The OLR requested a twoyear suspension. The referee recommended we impose a one-year 

suspension. 

¶34 On this appeal, Attorney Scholz asks the court to 

impose a still more lenient suspension. He emphasizes that A.B. 

was not a grievant and maintains that she was "a knowing and 

consenting participant in the transaction." He argues that 

certain disciplinary cases support a more lenient sanction, 

citing In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Tobin, 2007 WI 50, 

300 Wis. 2d 250, 730 N.W.2d 896 (imposing four month suspension 

for nine counts of misconduct, including converting funds 

belonging to a number of third parties for personal use in 

violation of SCR 20:1.15(b)(1) and SCR 20:8.4(c)) and In re 
No. 2017AP2530-D 

17

Disciplinary Proceedings Against Bartz, 2015 WI 61, 362 

Wis. 2d 752, 864 N.W.2d 881 (imposing a 60-day suspension on an 

attorney who committed five counts of misconduct, including 

conversion of third-party funds in violation of 

SCR 20:1.15(b)(1) and SCR 20:8.4(c), and who failed to cooperate 

with the OLR's investigation).

¶35 Tobin is inapposite. The four-month suspension we 

imposed there reflected "numerous mitigating factors" including 

a lack of disciplinary history, Attorney Tobin's admission of 

misconduct, and Attorney Tobin's voluntary payment of 

restitution to his trust account. Id., ¶33. We are similarly 

unpersuaded by Bartz. There, the lawyer stipulated that he 

failed to timely disburse a few thousand dollars to one medical 

provider, but he ultimately paid the bill. Attorney Scholz, by 

contrast, committed ten counts of misconduct, converted tens of 

thousands of dollars via a "loan" of funds that he knew or 

should have known his client was not entitled to make, ignored 

court orders, and then systematically misrepresented what he did 

to hide his misconduct, resulting in a significant loss to K.D. 

¶36 We conclude that the facts of this case and our case 

law indicate a two-year suspension is appropriate. See In re 

Disciplinary Proceedings Against Krezminski, 2007 WI 21, 299 

Wis. 2d 152, 727 Wis. 2d 492 (imposing two-year suspension for 

misconduct that included conversion of $37,094.42 entrusted to 

the lawyer as personal representative of an estate, and the 

filing of a document containing false information with the 

probate court). The referee apparently considered the 
No. 2017AP2530-D 

18

Krezminski case distinguishable, noting that Attorney Krezminski 

stole from his own client. Attorney Scholz may not have stolen 

from his client, but the record indicates he colluded with that

client, making an improper agreement to avail himself of 

disputed funds that were not the client's to loan, at the 

expense of K.D. As the referee found, while Attorney Scholz's

conduct might not have harmed his client, it did harm K.D. 

"who lost out on the funds he improperly distributed to 

himself, and later his client." See also In re Disciplinary 

Proceedings Against Goldstein, 2010 WI 26, 323 Wis. 2d 706, 782 

N.W.2d 388 (imposing two-year license suspension for various 

trust account violations and conversion of approximately $70,000 

in client funds despite the referee's finding of "no harm"

because the attorney had reimbursed his clients). 

¶37 Attorney Scholz's misconduct reflects a callous 

disregard for the rights of the opposing party, and his 

fundamental obligation as an officer of the court to honor and 

obey circuit court orders. He lied to opposing counsel, the 

mediator, the circuit court judge, a court-appointed special 

master and to the OLR, all in an effort to conceal his 

conversion. He fabricated documents that he submitted to the 

court to try to conceal his misconduct. Considering the 

precedent cited by the OLR, coupled with a number of aggravating 

factors, including his prior discipline, we have no difficulty 

concluding that a suspension of two years is appropriate. 

Indeed, a lengthy suspension is necessary to impress upon 

Attorney Scholz and other lawyers in this state the seriousness 
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of the professional misconduct at issue here, and to protect the 

public from similar misconduct in the future. See In re 

Disciplinary Proceedings Against Roitburd, 2016 WI 12, ¶20, 368 

Wis. 2d 595, 882 N.W.2d 317 (stating that "it is ultimately this 

court's responsibility" to determine appropriate disciplinary 

sanctions).

¶38 We turn next to the issue of costs. Our general 

practice is to impose full costs on attorneys who are found to 

have committed misconduct. See SCR 22.24(1m). Attorney Scholz 

has not claimed that there are reasons to depart from that 

practice in this matter, and we have not found any reason to do 

so. We therefore impose full costs.

¶39 Finally, we reserve our final ruling regarding the 

issue of restitution pending receipt of supplemental briefing as 

ordered by this court. Upon receipt of the OLR's memorandum and 

any response from Attorney Scholz, an order resolving the 

restitution question will issue in due course. Therefore,

¶40 IT IS ORDERED that the license of Carl Robert Scholz 

to practice law in Wisconsin is suspended for a period of two 

years, effective December 22, 2020.

¶41 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Carl Robert Scholz shall 

comply with the requirements of SCR 22.26 concerning the duties 

of a person whose license to practice law in Wisconsin has been 

suspended.

¶42 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date 

of this order Carl Robert Scholz shall pay to the Office of 
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Lawyer Regulation the costs of this proceeding, which are 

$16,804.30 as of March 17, 2020.

¶43 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the court reserves the 

question of restitution pending consideration of court ordered 

briefing as set forth in this court's order dated November 10, 

2020. 

¶44 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that compliance with all 

conditions of this order is required for reinstatement. See

SCR 22.29(4)(c).

¶45 BRIAN HAGEDORN, J., did not participate.
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